Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: NATO and EU Options in the Mediterranean and the Middle East [1 ed.] 0714656062, 9780714656069, 9780203336205

Table of contents :
Book Cover......Page 1
Title......Page 6
Copyright......Page 7
Contents......Page 8
Illustrations......Page 9
Introduction......Page 10
1 The emerging security environment in the Mediterranean and the Middle East......Page 15
2 Recent developments in arms control and non-proliferation......Page 28
3 Assessing the proliferation threat......Page 36
4 WMD terrorism......Page 68
5 WMD capabilities of selected countries in the Mediterranean and the Middle East......Page 82
6 WMD proliferation: Threats and challenges to Western security and NATO’s response......Page 99
7 Basic principles of US counterproliferation strategy......Page 120
8 The EU’s response to WMD proliferation......Page 130
Conclusions......Page 137
Glossary......Page 144
Notes......Page 146
Bibliography......Page 218
Index......Page 236

Citation preview

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Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

As counter-proliferation is expected to become the central element in the new national security policy of the US, such actions will constitute a central element of several major international conflicts in the first decades of the twenty-first century. One of the most important geostrategic phenomena of the past decade has been the extraordinary diffusion of war-making capabilities from the developed North to the developing South. In the eyes of some proliferant states, possessing nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons would not only add to their regional stature, but would also offer an asymmetrical counter to the West’s massive superiority in conventional forces. In the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, a number of countries are assumed to possess varying levels of NBC-weapons capabilities. Reasons for concern include the fact that such weapons have been used in the past; the region’s geographic proximity to Europe and the vital interests of the West (which is prepared, under certain circumstances, to use force to protect them); the multiplicity of conflicts and other security problems; and the general instability in the region (including the spread of religious extremism). This important and timely book assesses, in detail, the accuracy of predictions, and perceptions, about a possible military threat from the Southern Mediterranean (Muslim) world, and their impact on NATO and the EU’s political and military posture. Thanos P. Dokos presents an assessment of the Alliance’s options for dealing with the problem. This book represents an invaluable, topical resource for researchers and policy makers. Thanos P. Dokos is the Director-General at the Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) in Greece. He is the author of Arms Control and Security in the Middle East and the CIS Republics.

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Contemporary Security Studies

NATO’s Secret Armies Operation Gladio and terrorism in Western Europe Daniele Ganser

The Distracted Eagle The rift between America and Old Europe Peter H. Merkl

The US, NATO and Military Burden-Sharing Peter Kent Forster and Stephen J. Cimbala

The Iraq War European perspectives on politics, strategy, and operations Edited by Jan Hallenberg and Håkan Karlsson

Russian Governance in the Twenty-First Century Geo-strategy, geopolitics and new governance Irina Isakova The Foreign Office and Finland 1938–1940 Diplomatic sideshow Craig Gerrard Rethinking the Nature of War Edited by Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom

Strategic Contest Weapons proliferation and War in the Greater Middle East Richard L. Russell Propaganda, the Press and Conflict The Gulf War and Kosovo David R. Willcox Missile Defence International, regional and national implications Edited by Bertel Heurlin and Sten Rynning

Perception and Reality in the Modern Yugoslav Conflict Myth, falsehood and deceit 1991–1995 Brendan O’Shea

Globalising Justice for Mass Atrocities A revolution in accountability Chandra Lekha Sriram

The Political Economy of Peacebuilding in Post-Dayton Bosnia Tim Donais

Ethnic Conflict and Terrorism The origins and dynamics of Civil Wars Joseph L. Soeters

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Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism Patterns and predictions Brynjar Lia Nuclear Weapons and Strategy The evolution of American nuclear policy Stephen J. Cimbala Nasser and the Missile Age in the Middle East Owen L. Sirrs War as Risk Management Strategy and conflict in an age of globalised risks Yee-Kuang Heng Military Nanotechnology Potential applications and preventive arms control Jurgen Altmann NATO and Weapons of Mass Destruction Regional alliance, global threats Eric R. Terzuolo Europeanisation of National Security Identity The EU and the changing security identities of the Nordic states Pernille Rieker

Changing Transatlantic Security Relations Do the US, the EU and Russia form a new strategic triangle? Edited by Jan Hallenberg and Håkan Karlsson Theoretical Roots of US Foreign Policy Machiavelli and American unilateralism Thomas M. Kane Corporate Soldiers and International Security The rise of private military companies Christopher Kinsey Transforming European Militaries Coalition operations and the technology gap Gordon Adams and Guy Ben-Ari Globalization and Conflict National security in a ‘new’ strategic era Edited by Robert G. Patman Military Forces in 21st Century Peace Operations No job for a soldier? James V. Arbuckle

International Conflict Prevention and Peace-building Sustaining the peace in post conflict societies Edited by T. David Mason and James D. Meernik

The Political Road to War with Iraq Bush, 9/11 and the drive to overthrow Saddam Nick Ritchie and Paul Rogers

Controlling the Weapons of War Politics, persuasion, and the prohibition of inhumanity Brian Rappert

Bosnian Security after Dayton New perspectives Edited by Michael A. Innes

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Kennedy, Johnson and NATO Britain, America and the dynamics of alliance, 1962–68 Andrew Priest

Governance in Post-Conflict Societies Rebuilding fragile states Edited by Derick W. Brinkerhoff

Small Arms and Security New emerging international norms Denise Garcia

European Security in the Twenty-First Century The challenge of multipolarity Adrian Hyde-Price

The United States and Europe Beyond the neo-conservative divide? Edited by John Baylis and Jon Roper Russia, NATO and Cooperative Security Bridging the gap Lionel Ponsard International Law and International Relations Bridging theory and practice Edited by Tom Bierstecker, Peter Spiro, Chandra Lekha Sriram and Veronica Raffo

Ethics, Technology and the American Way of War Cruise missiles and US security policy Reuben E. Brigety II International Law and the Use of Armed Force The UN charter and the major powers Joel H. Westra Disease and Security Natural plagues and biological weapons in East Asia Christian Enermark

Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States US national security policy after 9/11 James H. Lebovic

Explaining War and Peace Case studies and necessary condition counterfactuals Jack Levy and Gary Goertz

Vietnam in Iraq Tactics, lessons, legacies and ghosts Edited by John Dumbrell and David Ryan

War, Image and Legitimacy Viewing contemporary conflict James Gow and Milena Michalski

Understanding Victory and Defeat in Contemporary War Edited by Jan Angstrom and Isabelle Duyvesteyn Propaganda and Information Warfare in the Twenty-First Century Altered images and deception operations Scot Macdonald

Information Strategy and Warfare A guide to theory and practice John Arquilla and Douglas A. Borer Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction NATO and EU options in the Mediterranean and the Middle East Thanos P. Dokos

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Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction NATO and EU options in the Mediterranean and the Middle East

Thanos P. Dokos

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First published 2008 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2008 Thanos P. Dokos All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Dokos, Thanos P., 1965– Countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: NATO and EU options in the Mediterranean and the Middle East / Thanos P. Dokos. p.cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Arms control – Middle East. 2. Weapons of mass destruction – Middle East. 3. Arms control – Mediterranean Region. 4. Weapons of mass destruction – Mediterranean Region. I. Title. U793.D65 2007 327.1'7450956–dc22 ISBN 0-203-33620-8 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 10: 0–7146–5606–2 (hbk) ISBN 10: 0–203–08735–5 (ebk) ISBN 13: 978–0–7146–5606–9 (hbk) ISBN 13: 978–0–203–08735–0 (ebk)

2007017239

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Contents

List of illustrations

viii

Introduction

1

The emerging security environment in the Mediterranean and the Middle East

6

Recent developments in arms control and non-proliferation

19

3

Assessing the proliferation threat

27

4

WMD terrorism

59

5

WMD capabilities of selected countries in the Mediterranean and the Middle East

73

WMD proliferation: threats and challenges to Western security and NATO’s response

90

1 2

6 7

Basic principles of US counterproliferation strategy

111

8

The EU’s response to WMD proliferation

121

Conclusions

128

Glossary Notes Bibliography Index

135 137 209 227

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Illustrations

Box 6.1 Operational requirements

101

Figures 1.1 Mediterranean security: a theoretical model 4.1 WMD terrorism

10 71

Tables 1.1 Demographic characteristics of major Mediterranean countries 5.1 Selected cruise-missile systems and programmes 5.2 Membership to arms control and disarmament treaties 5.3 Casualty estimates for various WMD delivered on Washington DC 5.4 Comparative effects of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons 5.5 Effects of chemical and biological weapons

14 76 79 81 82 82

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Introduction

What is the Mediterranean? It is a thousand things. It is not merely one landscape, but countless landscapes. It is not one sea, but a number of seas. It is not one civilization, but a multitude, the one following upon the other. It is an encounter with things that are immeasurably old, yet still alive, side by side with the ultra-modern.1

The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the emergence of China and (potentially) India as major economic and, increasingly, political players, globalization, the rise of political Islam and the events of 11 September 2001, the re-emergence of the new Christian right and neo-cons in the US and Europe’s inability to assert itself as a single, powerful actor in international politics, among other factors, have contributed to an international security environment that is fluid, relatively unstable, offering state and non-state actors opportunities but also bearing serious risks. In the post-Cold War period, security is more widely defined and the list of possible problems, as well as the interaction between them, has grown almost at an exponential rate.2 ‘New’ security problems were added to more traditional ones, such as ethnic conflicts, nationalist struggles and internal conflict among groups and tribes, over the distribution of state power and resources.3 New dividing lines have replaced the old East–West rivalry. In addition to North–South dynamics and the division between ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, the world is divided broadly between countries that are well integrated into, and committed to, the evolving norms of the global economy, and countries that are either being left behind by, or may seek to challenge the norms of, the emerging global order.4 As Anatol Lieven contends, the danger to world order comes not from ruling elites integrated into world society, but from those numerous social and economic groups who, for whatever reasons (culture, history, geography), are unable to take part in the global success and produce new political pathologies that are profoundly anti-global. ‘This is the dark side of the global village – the ability of that village’s alienated minorities to hit out at their perceived oppressors over huge distances.’5 The Middle East and Persian Gulf are examples of regions facing both troubled economic conditions and unstable security affairs. The region suffers from slow

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growth rates and inability to compete in the world economy. At the same time, they are victimized by the dangerous dynamics of modern security affairs: deepseated political tensions, regional bullies, vulnerable neighbours, weak collective security mechanisms, power imbalances, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and local violence.6 Moving from the regional to the international/global level of analysis, and attempting to understand the basic dynamics of this new strategic epoch, one of the most important geostrategic phenomena of the past several years has been the extraordinary diffusion of war-making capabilities from the developed North to the developing South.7 There have been several causes for this: regional military rivalries and conflicts, military aid and technological assistance from the superpowers and a shared belief by many governments (following the example of the superpowers) that military power lends status and political clout in the international system. The spread of advanced weapons is viewed today by many analysts as symptomatic of the evolving multipolarity – at least at the regional level – of the international system. Even if the emerging strategic environment is not multipolar in the classic nineteenth-century sense, it is likely that we will witness the rise to eminence of a whole series of second- and third-rank local and regional powers, militarily powerful, and occasionally economically strong enough to forward their political ambitions. In the post-Cold War international system, the perception of the developing world as a group of compliant client states may have to be replaced by a system of competing regional powers with distinct ambitions with or without the sanction of the developed states. Today, in the eyes of some proliferant states, possessing WMD would not only add to their regional stature, but would also offer an asymmetrical counter to the West’s massive superiority in conventional forces.8 As a result of two ‘cataclysmic’ changes – the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union – the Mediterranean, the Middle East and much of their surrounding regions (the so-called broader Middle East) are in the midst of a rapid geopolitical evolution; without, however, a clear direction. There is a huge ‘arc of political and social crisis’, extending from Russia in the north to the Korean peninsula in the far east, the Indian sub-continent in the south and the Maghreb in the south-west. This region contains a potentially explosive mix of nuclear weapon states (NWS), inheritors of the Soviet nuclear infrastructure, covert NWS, nuclear aspirants and states which would feel threatened by the nuclearization of their neighbours and have the technological capability to eventually develop their own nuclear weapons.9 There is also a rather slow and limited, in quantitative and qualitative terms, but steady process of proliferation of other types of weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological) and of delivery means (ballistic and, in the not-so-distant future, advanced land-attack cruise missiles). In the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, at least six countries (Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, Israel and Egypt) were assumed to possess varying levels of NBC-weapons capabilities. In the same region, chemical weapons and ballistic missiles have repeatedly been used in conflict (during the Egyptian intervention

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in the civil war in Yemen, the Iran–Iraq War and the first Gulf war). The collapse of the Soviet Union has added a major destabilizing factor: the heirs of the former Soviet arsenal and of its weapon potential. Disclosures about the activities of the Khan nuclear smuggling network led to concerns that existing non-proliferation and export control regimes may be inadequate to deal with the emerging threat of non-state proliferation. Although Iraq and Libya (each for different reasons) are no longer part of the WMD proliferation problem, and Egypt and Israel are not considered as current or potential threats in the context of WMD proliferation, reasons for continuing concern include the region’s geographic proximity to Europe and the vital interests of the West (which has proven that it is prepared, under certain circumstances, to use force to protect them), the existence of unstable regimes in the region, the multiplicity of conflicts and other security problems and the general instability in the region (including the increasing influence of radical political Islam). The issue is of great concern to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as demonstrated by the Alliance’s June 1994 ‘Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’ and reiterated in every single Alliance document since then, the EU, as explicitly stated at the ‘European Security Strategy’ and the ‘EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, both adopted in 2003, and, of course, the US, as strongly emphasized in the ‘National Security Strategy’ (especially the editions of 2002 and 2006). As counterproliferation officially became a central element in the new national security policy of the US, it is probable that counterproliferation actions will constitute a key element of major international conflicts in the first decades of the twenty-first century. The expected efficiency, limitations and consequences of counterproliferation actions should, therefore, be studied at great detail. The objective of this study is to assess the nature and seriousness of the WMD threat to Western security and to evaluate possible options for dealing with the problem. The basic methodological tool will be a review of the existing literature and an effort will be made to provide a synthesis of views. The added value of this book is the fact that the issues will be approached from the perspective of an analyst living in a medium-size, southern European/northern Mediterranean country, which is not directly involved in a conflict with a WMD-country, but which is a full member of the EU and NATO and a close US ally, while at the same time maintaining very good relations with the Arab world, but also Israel and Iran. The analysis will attempt to navigate between two extremes: unwarranted concern on the one hand, and complacency leading to inaction on the other. The study assumes that there are no competitor nations that will soon be able to challenge militarily the US, and that NATO is the only multinational organization that has the military capabilities to deal with the threat of NBC proliferation. The EU is still a long way from being capable of dealing with such problems, and the UN is by nature unable to deal with regional proliferation threats. Single countries, such as the US or Israel, could attempt to deal with the problem, but this is beyond the immediate scope of this analysis. Although this book is dealing with the proliferation of all types of weapons of mass destruction, it considers

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nuclear weapons as being the ultimate weapon of mass destruction and therefore more attention will be paid on the consequences of the spread of such weapons. In Chapter 1, it is argued that most security challenges and problems in the Mediterranean are of a non-military nature and therefore cannot be dealt with by military means. However, military issues still have a considerable impact on regional stability. The strategic environment on Europe’s periphery is characterized by numerous actual and potential flashpoints for conflict and crises that may demand a Western response. A more extensive reference will be made to two of the above problems: religious dynamics and migration. Chapter 2 discusses recent developments in arms control and non-proliferation. Chapter 3 attempts to answer the following questions: If nuclear weapons are introduced in a region, can a stable system of deterrence develop? Does the probability of the deliberate (or accidental) use of nuclear weapons, leading to nuclear war, increase or decrease? Two other issues are also extensively analyzed: the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles and WMD terrorism. The latter is a low (but apparently increasing) probability and a high consequence threat. Dealing with that threat should be a clear policy priority, as it constitutes a much more realistic and frightening threat than the probability of a rogue state launching a ballistic missile attack against the US or Europe. In Chapter 4, the WMD capabilities of selected countries in the Mediterranean and the Middle East are examined, with an extensive reference on Iran. Chapter 5 deals with WMD proliferation-related threats and challenges to Western security and NATO’s response and policy options. Chapter 6 presents the central elements and provides a critical analysis of US counterproliferation policy; whereas Chapter 7 describes the European approach to WMD proliferation and the initial, rather reluctant attempts of the EU to tackle the problem. It will be argued that WMD proliferation is a serious security problem with regional and global repercussions, but not necessarily a direct threat to the West. The proliferation threat against Western states should be conceived of as a midto long-term threat that – under certain circumstances – might be avoided altogether by political changes in the countries concerned, by the intensification of institutional contacts, economic co-operation (mainly in the form of investment and development assistance from the West) and by the development of good neighbourly relations. The question, however, is whether one can rely solely on political-diplomatic means or whether these should be complemented by military preparations. Since it is very difficult to predict with any certainty the future proliferation developments, it may be prudent to be prepared for any contingency involving WMD. In this context, operational planning and certain military capabilities (including limited missile defences) should be available as an insurance policy. However, it should be emphasized that a counterproliferation strategy should remain an option of last resort as it presents significant political and military problems.

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Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to the following people that have played an important role in my occupation with the WMD proliferation phenomenon: David Fischer, Harald Mueller, John Simpson and Kosta Tsipis. Also, I am thankful to Ian Lesser and Jackie Davis for their very useful comments on an earlier draft of this monograph. I would also like to thank NATO for granting me an Institutional Fellowship, which allowed the preparation of an initial draft of this study. And, of course, the greatest thanks should go to my family for showing unlimited and unqualified understanding, patience and support for the considerable time ‘stolen’ from them and devoted to the writing of this book.

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The emerging security environment in the Mediterranean and the Middle East

Following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and much of their surrounding regions have been placed in the midst of a rapid and directionless geopolitical evolution. The end of the Cold War has upset many of the old faultlines in the Mediterranean and the Middle East and the strategic environment is more diverse and uncertain. An ‘arc or triangle of crisis’ emerged in the 1990s,1 extending from the Balkans to Central Asia/Transcaucasus and the Middle East. As a result, several regimes in the wider region that have not yet faced a legitimacy crisis could face one in the near future. The Mediterranean and its adjoining regions contain a sizable number of flashpoints and the security environment remains ‘Hobbesian’. Although the Palestinian–Israeli conflict,2 Lebanon, the future of Iraq and the Iranian nuclear programme remain the most important unsettled issues, the wider Mediterranean security environment is predominantly characterized by multiple sources of insecurity, fluidity, instability and continued change and evolution.3 Accordingly, increasing stability of the region has been a high priority for Europe and the US. In addition to the direct and indirect consequences of the events of 11 September 2001, there is a plethora of other developments which have – or will have in the near future – a significant impact in international and/or regional stability and are re-shaping the strategic landscape. These developments include EU and NATO enlargement; the evolution of EU’s Euro-Mediterranean Policy (EMP), New Neighborhood Policy and Common Foreign and Security Policy (ESDP) and the creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force; US unilateralism and its impact on the Transatlantic relationship; burden-sharing in the context of NATO and the gap in military capabilities between the two pillars of the Alliance; the Israeli–Palestinian conflict; American policy towards Iraq and Iraq’s future; Iran’s nuclear programme; US relations with Saudi Arabia; Russia’s new relationship with NATO and the US as well as its emergence as an ‘energy superpower’; new asymmetric threats in NATO’s southern flank and general concern about the South as zone of instability in a region of vital interest for the West; to name but a few. Furthermore, after the US occupation of Iraq, there appears to be a relative power vacuum in the Gulf region and even beyond.4 Key Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, have expressed their anxiety about the creation of a new Shi’ite block or crescent that could include Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon and that could redefine the balance of power in the region across sectarian lines.5

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However, it is argued that the Persian ethnic and Shi’a religious factors limit Iran’s appeal.6 Even if this is true, there will continue to be strategic uncertainty in the region for the foreseeable future. The common element of all those developments is increased instability and fluidity in regional affairs. There are divergent views on the strategic unity of the Mediterranean. Is it correct to assert, as Fernand Braudel predicted, that ‘the fate of the whole Mediterranean will be a common one’? Does the Mediterranean constitute a single ‘regional security complex’7 or is it actually a matter of overlapping, interwoven regions and security sub-systems (for instance, the Middle East, the Balkans and Transcaucasus)? Given the differences in religion and culture and the diversity of political systems, does it make sense to study the Mediterranean (for research purposes) as a single entity? Is there a common denominator for the countries in the region, apart from geographical proximity and problems – such as environmental ones – which is widely perceived as common to all? Increasingly, the view is being expressed that the Mediterranean may be a unified geographic entity, but this does not make it either a political or strategic whole. Various conflicts may impinge on or affect the Mediterranean, but it is not central to any of them. No one regards the Mediterranean as the focal point of military conflict; neither is the Mediterranean the source of security-related problems. As far as military relations are concerned, it is more of a security vacuum. The great majority of analysts agree that this is a highly heterogeneous region.8 At a minimum, two – rather loosely defined – regional sub-systems9 can be identified: Eastern Mediterranean (Mashreq), with predominantly ‘hard’ security problems, and Western Mediterranean (Maghreb), with ‘soft’ security problems. Still others describe the Mediterranean as a multi-fragmented region.10 In any case, it is difficult to examine the Mediterranean from a security perspective in isolation from developments in the surrounding regions of Transcaucasus/Central Asia, the Balkans, the Black Sea and the Middle East, including the Persian Gulf.11 According to Ian Lesser, an alternative approach to security in the [eastern] Mediterranean focuses on the functional dimension, cutting across regional lines.12 The traditional definition of security in military terms (so-called hard security issues) is obviously inadequate in the post-Cold War era. Economic, social, demographic and environmental problems (so-called soft security issues) have a considerable impact on national security and political stability.13 Therefore, a broader concept of security is required. Most security challenges and problems in the Mediterranean are of a non-military nature and therefore cannot be dealt with by military means. Military issues, however, still have a considerable impact on regional stability. The strategic environment on Europe’s periphery is characterized by numerous actual and potential flashpoints for conflict and crises that may demand a Western response.14 The character of military capabilities, including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles on Europe’s periphery, will be a key strategic issue in the overall evolution of relations between Muslim and Arab states and the West.15 Most security problems in the Mediterranean will be largely transnational16 in that they will affect the security of many states and their resolution will

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require the co-operation of many states (governments, as well as other societal components). According to one school of thought,17 today and for the foreseeable future, the main sources of friction between the North and the South will be problems of migration, religious extremism, enivronmental degradation, trade energy and raw material issues, lack of democracy and respect for human rights, etc. Another school of thought (best exemplified by Samuel Huntington’s theory on the ‘Clash of Civilizations’) argues that Islam constitutes at least as grave a threat to the West as the one posed in the past by communism (see, for instance, the statement of then General Secretary of NATO, Willi Claes, in February 1995).18 It is likely that this friction would manifest itself mainly across the Mediterranean – a major ‘faultline’ between those two ‘worlds’ – or, as Christopher Coker puts it, the ‘Mediterranean is no longer a flank, as it was in the Cold War; it has become an “interface” between two different cultures or ways of life’.19 There will be problems of migration, religious extremism, environmental degradation, trade energy and raw material issues, lack of democracy and respect for human rights, etc. Another school of thought (best exemplified by Samuel Huntington’s theory on the ‘Clash of Civilizations’) argues that Islam constitutes at least as grave a threat to the West as the one posed in the past by communism (see, for instance, the statement of then General Secretary of NATO, Willi Claes, in February 1995).20 An important issue that needs to be tackled for methodological, as well as substantive reasons, is the lack of a single, agreed definition of the political and geographic boundaries of the Mediterranean (and the Middle East). For the purposes of the EU’s Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the Mediterranean has been geographically defined as including all littoral states (although Libya has so far been excluded from the EMP, for political reasons), but excluding the Balkan states21 (Albania and the states of former Yugoslavia).22 In the past few years, this narrow definition appears to be making less and less sense as intrastate relations and security problems are increasingly cutting across regions, influences from beyond the Mediterranean basin are obvious and various initiatives reach over traditional Mediterranean frameworks to embrace a larger strategic space. Many analysts argue that the most accurate way to describe this highly inclusive region would be to add to the inner core of the Middle East (North Africa, the Levant, Sudan, the Gulf region and the Horn of Africa), the Transcaucasus, west Central Asia and South Asia.23 Others assert that the demise of the Soviet Union has also resulted in an expansion of the ‘broader Middle East’ itself, adding the Muslim lands of Central Asia to the region. By ‘broader Middle East’ one can also define the huge area from North Africa through Egypt, Israel and the Tigris–Euphrates valley, through the Persian/Arabian Gulf region into Turkey and on to the Caspian basin, and reaching as far as Afghanistan and Pakistan.24 For the purposes of this book, the wider definition will be used, not in the sense used by the US (based on the need to ‘promote’ democracy), but as a more efficient analytical tool. The Mediterranean and the Middle East, in both the narrow and the wider sense, are regions where the West in general, and European countries in particular, have

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a number of vital or core interests,25 including energy security26 (from North Africa, the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Basin),27 regional stability, containment of religious extremism, prevention of mass migration and the protection of Israel28 and other friendly regimes.29 The energy dimension is increasingly important. Oil and natural gas is – and will continue to be – a major factor in regional and international politics. The consensus view suggests that Caspian resources will provide an important new long-term source of energy for world markets,30 although still much less significant than other Middle Eastern sources and far from the transforming development that early analyses implied.31 The US and Europe will continue to depend largely on the Persian Gulf and North Africa for much of their energy supplies32 and, therefore, have a strong incentive for securing the continuous supply of energy products.33 In the entire region a wide range of energy transportation projects are underway, linking energy and economic security interests on a South-South as well as a North-South basis.34 According to the IISS, ‘an increasingly dense web of infrastructure for the supply of oil and, above all, gas, is making the Mediterranean and southern Europe a critical entrepôt for Europe’s energy needs, and a critical engine of development for states across the greater Middle East. The reintegration of Libya will accelerate this trend.’35 One of the most critical geopolitical questions haunting the West is whether the Middle East will be a stable supplier of oil and gas exports at market-driven prices.36 This is not easy to predict in a region with many interregional and internal conflicts, serious economic and major demographic problems. The concern has been expressed that, even without an immediately discernible threat, an extended period of instability or conflict in oil- or gas-producing regions in North Africa and the Middle East might pose a threat to the energy supplies of Europe. On the other hand, the Middle East is so heavily dependent on the income from energy exports that few – if any – nations will voluntarily limit their export revenues.37 It has also been argued that, with growing levels of European dependence on gas from the southern periphery, it would not be surprising if NATO (or even the EU) in the twenty-first century were compelled to plan for operations to restore the flow of gas from far-flung and unstable regions.38 Finally, it should be said that the Mediterranean and Southern Europe have in the past fulfilled the roles of both bridge and barrier. Many historians have addressed themselves to the question whether the Mediterranean unites or divides culturally, economically or strategically. The events of recent years have made this question a particularly urgent one. The answer will depend on how relations develop between Europe (and the West as a whole) and the Islamic world, and also on the success of attempts to modernize the Mediterranean South.

Existing and emerging threats and challenges to regional security in the Mediterranean and the Middle East There is a rather long list of problems and existing or potential threats and challenges to regional security and stability in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

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These include ● ●

●

●

● ● ● ●

● ●

The slow or negative economic growth in the southern shore; The demographic explosion in many countries and the ‘threat’ of mass migration to European countries; The spread of religious [Islamic] radicalism (different versions of radicalism/fundamentalism are supported and funded by Saudi Arabia or promoted by Iran); The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of sophisticated conventional weapons; The lack of democratization and of respect for human rights; The scarcity of water resources; Transnational organized crime; The pollution of the Mediterranean as a potential threat to the economies of Mediterranean states and to the quality of life of their people; The continued existence of regional conflicts. Some of the above problems have a synergistic effect (see Figure 1.1).

A more extensive reference will be made to two of the above problems: religious dynamics and demographic trends. After the collapse of communism, the Soviet Empire and the Soviet Union itself, as well as the beginning of the democratization process in these areas, Islam became the most powerful transnational force in

WMD

Interstate level

Regional– international instability

Terrorism

Regional conflicts

Natural resources Transnational crime

Domestic instability

State level

Population increase

Underdevelopment

Pollution

Figure 1.1 Mediterranean security: a theoretical model.

Religious radicalism

Lack of democracy

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the world, with more than 1 billion believers. Muslims form the majority in 45 countries from Africa to Southeast Asia, while there are numerically important communities in the US, the former Soviet Union and Western Europe (where the total number comes to over 15 million). The possibility of a ‘mass movement of the faithful’ is disquieting for the West. Although this is not the central theme of this book, relations between Islam and the West need to be examined in some detail due to its extremely high importance for stability and security in the Mediterranean and the wider Middle East region. There is growing concern among officials and analysts about ‘Europe’s Islamic periphery’.39 For some in the Western world, which for many years had grown accustomed to a bipolar international system monopolized by US–Soviet rivalry for global influence and domination (a rivalry which in many circles was regarded in a rather Manichean manner as a struggle between ‘good’ and ‘evil’), there was great temptation to invent a new global ideological threat to fill the ‘threat vacuum’ that emerged after the fall of communism.40 Thus, some consider Islam the new monolithic global enemy of the West, and attempts are made to substitute the former ‘red threat’ with the ‘green threat’ (green being, of course, the colour of Islam). Anti-Islamism appears to have replaced anti-communism and anti-Sovietism in the eyes of the more conservative sectors of Western societies.41 In a number of Mediterranean countries, there has been an increase in popular support for radical Islamic movements. The possibility that such movements might seize power in various countries in the Mediterranean and the Middle East is a source of concern for a number of Western analysts and officials who see Islam and the West as fundamentally incompatible. Islam remains a very important element of those countries’ political, economic, social and cultural systems. Radical Islamic fundamentalism has been a political factor in the Middle East since the early twentieth century. One of the more prominent groups, the Muslim Brotherhood, was founded in Egypt in 1928 and spread to most other Arab countries in North Africa and the Levant. The rise of the Khomeini regime in Iran brought a different strain of the movement in that country. Strong fundamentalist groups are also to be found in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.42 Throughout history, relations between Islam and Christianity have been overshadowed by conflict, as armies and missionaries from both religions competed for influence over souls and territories.43 This confrontation included the Crusades; the expulsion of the Moors from Spain; the seize of Constantinople and the fall of the Byzantine Empire; the Ottoman threat to Europe; European colonialism and domination in the eighteenth, nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries; superpower political and cultural intervention after World War II; the formation of the state of Israel; and the active role of the Islamic factor in politics in recent years.44 For the Muslims, the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century – the colonial period – was marked by foreign occupation, as well as cultural humiliation. Even in the second half of the twentieth century, there have been frequent political or military interventions by the West in the Middle East.

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Islamic fundamentalism is often characterized as a grave threat to the stability of the Middle East (and the Mediterranean) and for Western interests in the whole of the Islamic world. The following questions have often been asked in public, especially after 9/11: Are Islam and the West on an unavoidable collision course? Are Islamists fanatics of a medieval kind? Are Islam and Western-style democracy incompatible partners (in this context, how relevant are the cases of Turkey, Malaysia and Indonesia)? Is Islamic extremism a serious threat to the stability of the Muslim world, Western interests in the region and Western security in general? The confrontational line of thinking is best exemplified by the theories of Harvard professor Samuel Huntington, who argues that culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilizational identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration and conflict in the post-Cold War world and the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political or economic, but cultural.45 Huntington divides the post-Cold War world into seven or eight major civilizations and argues that ‘the local conflicts most likely to escalate into broader wars are those between groups and states from different civilizations. The key issues on the international agenda involve differences among civilizations. Power is shifting from the long predominant West to non-Western civilizations. Global politics has become multi-polar and multi-civilizational.’46 Huntington also examines the spread of NBC weapons and argues that ‘the time, effort and expense required to develop a first-class conventional military capability provide tremendous incentives for non-Western states to pursue other ways of countering Western conventional military power’ and that ‘the core states of civilizations and countries which are or aspire to be regionally dominant powers have special incentives to acquire these weapons. Such weapons, first, enable those states to establish their dominance over other states in their civilization and region, and, second, provide them with the means to deter intervention in their civilization and region by the US or other external powers.’47 Weapons proliferation is where the Confucian-Islamic connection has been more extensive and most concrete, with China playing the central role in the transfer of both conventional and non-conventional weapons to many Muslim states.48 The majority of analysts and experts disagree with Huntington’s analysis. Fouad Ajami, for example, finds Huntington wrong in underestimating the tenacity of modernity and secularism in the Middle East and elsewhere in the Third World, and downplays the threat to the West represented by traditionalist movements in Egypt, Algeria, Iran, Turkey and India, among others. Ajami sees Western values and culture as having been totally and irretrievably internalized in these areas, and further sees Huntington as having underestimated the continuing power of the nation-state.49 Shireen Hunter argues that Huntington greatly underestimates the significance of ethnic, linguistic and other distinctions within a particular civilizational cluster.50 John Esposito, among others, offers a countering view, insisting that most Islamic movements are not necessarily violent,51 anti-Western, anti-American or anti-democratic, and that it is a serious mistake by Westerners to interpret Islam as a monolith, rather than a complex and diverse realm (emphasis added).52

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One needs to study, and attempt to understand and address, the reasons for the increase in the influence of Islamist movements, which are manifold: the worsening of economic and social problems in the majority of Muslim countries,53 the lack of democratization and broad political participation, and the failure of the secular ideologies of many Arab regimes.54 Consequently, the Islamist movements are a reaction to the failure of Arab nationalism to secure for the Arabs a primary political and economic status consonant with the important cultural and historical inheritance of the Arabs.55 Political Islam aims to attain this goal and regards the West as its chief opponent. In contrast to pan-Arab nationalism, however, far from wishing to obtain political and economic equality with the West, Islamism seeks to emphasize its differences from it.56 Since the 1970s, many Middle Eastern and North African regimes have failed to relieve the social tensions and dislocation that resulted from the highly uneven economic development, rapid urbanization and accelerated liberalization of their states.57 Low living standards and the high rate of particularly youth unemployment in the Mediterranean region and the Middle East, the sense of inferiority to the West (in combination with the historical knowledge that at some time the positions were reversed) and the perception that the Middle East and North Africa are being left behind in the globalization process, provide fertile ground for the growth of anti-Western sentiments and the increase in the influence of Islamists. Apart from the manipulation of popular disillusionment, the Islamist movements offer alternative solutions to the failures of the state system of social welfare (in the realms of education, health and employment) and have created a parallel society based on a network of mosques. Given the number of problems in Arabic societies, Islam can appear to many as the last refuge, the ultimate solution.58 As pointed out in a Wilton Park report Islam as a political force in the Muslim world will play an important role in shaping relations between Europe and the southern Mediterranean countries. The Islamist movements are the main opposition to the regimes in the region, and their influence is expected to increase in the 21st century. The Arab and Mediterranean experience leads to the conclusion that disgruntlement felt by an increasing part of the ‘marginalized’ in developing countries will fuel social conflict which will shape the world in the 21st century.59 Population movements and wider demographic developments are issues of concern for the region. The EU member-states are home to more than 5 million immigrants from the Mediterranean non-members, especially from North Africa. Illegal movement of people is greatly facilitated by the proximity of North Africa to European states: there are only 12 km between the Maghreb and Europe across the Strait of Gibraltar and 150 km between Italy and Tunisia. There are also significant numbers of Iraqi Kurds, Afghans and other immigrants travelling via Turkey and landing into EU territory through Greece’s archipelago of islands and its long coastline.60

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Table 1.1 Demographic characteristics of major Mediterranean countries Country

Greece France Italy Spain Portugal Mediterranean North Morocco Algeria Tunisia Libya Egypt Turkey Syria Mediterranean South

Population (million)

Annual growth rate

Fertility rate

1960

2000

1960–1991

2025

1991–2000

2000

8.3 45.7 50.2 30.5 8.8 143.5

10.5 58.8 58.1 39.6 9.9 176.7

0.6 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.4

10.2 60.8 56.2 40.6 10.1 177.9

0.2 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.1

1.4 1.8 1.3 1.2 1.3

11.6 10.8 4.2 1.3 25.9 27.5 6.4 87.7

31.7 32.7 9.8 6.4 64.8 68.2 17 230.3

2.6 2.8 2.2 4.0 2.3 2.4 3.3

47.5 51.8 13.4 12.9 93.5 92.9 34 346.0

2.3 2.7 1.9 3.4 2.1 2.0 3.3

3.1 3.3 3.1 3.0 2.8 5.5

Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 1993, World Development Report 1994. Note: Israel is not included.

The population in North Africa and the Middle East is projected to double from 240 million in the early 1990s to almost 500 million by the year 2020.61 There is agreement that demographic pressures of this magnitude are producing relentless urbanization, social and economic strains, and a steady stream of migrants seeking jobs and social services (a process which starts well to the south of the Maghreb and affects societies on both sides of the Mediterranean).62 These pressures, together with more visible economic inequalities between ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ are also threatening the political stability of states around the Southern Mediterranean.63 European analysts have been concerned about the potential for large-scale refugee flows, although, to date, there has been little effect on the flow of legal and illegal migrants across the Mediterranean.64 Migration will remain a central and highly politicized issue for most European countries, mostly for domestic political reasons. Ironically, according to German demographers, Europe will be significantly labour-short by 56 million workers within the next 25 years, due to the general ageing of European populations. This is equivalent to one-third of the labour force, according to French sources. It has been argued that youth from the Maghreb in search of work could compensate for Europe’s increasingly ageing population.65 Nonetheless, in the short-run, European states are not prepared to encourage inward migration.66 Beyond a certain level, increased migration may bring social dislocation and community tension. Further, the majority of immigrants will be Muslim – a factor

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which may alarm public opinion in Europe even further. As the former Spanish Foreign Minister and NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana, once confessed, the region has ‘all the ingredients for the conflict between Islam and Europe that has made up so much of the unhappy history of the Mediterranean’.67 Slow or negative economic growth in the southern shore of the Mediterranean is either at the source of or accentuates many security problems in that region. The economic problems that governments in North Africa and the Middle East have to confront are serious and manifold. In many cases, the transition from what was largely a state-controlled-and-planned economy to one based more on the free market is proving to be a painful experience (as was the case in Eastern Europe and the Balkans).68 To become internationally competitive, the economies of Mediterranean Arab countries will have to distance themselves from government controls and central planning and adopt strategic increases in exports and privatization. Liberalizing the economy in this way will affect the internal political situation in the country (as in the former Soviet Union and China). If the non-oil-producing countries of the Mediterranean and the Middle East do not modernize their economies, they will be further marginalized economically, and this will have serious negative consequences both for domestic and regional stability. Existing social divisions will be exacerbated and will be targeted by extremist Islamist groups who will attempt to overthrow the existing order of things, threatening pro-Western regimes.69 There is an almost linear relationship between economic prospects for the future and demographic growth,70 which leads to increased unemployment and migration (both internal and external). The liberalization of the economy is expected to have a short-, and perhaps medium-term, negative impact on the majority of the population in the countries of the region, increasing social instability. Low living standards are in fact one of the main causes of the rise in the influence of Islamic movements.

The role of extra-regional powers Following the end of the Cold War the Mediterranean has been in search of a new balance of power. The level and nature of American involvement in the Mediterranean will continue to play an important role in shaping the strategic environment in the region in the next decades. In political terms (though not geographic), the US is a Mediterranean power,71 and its political and military presence was not merely a phenomenon born of the circumstances of the Cold War.72 The prevailing view among the ranks of American strategic analysts (one adopting Admiral Mahan’s way of thinking) has been that the Mediterranean is important because of its proximity to crisis regions. The role of the US in the Middle East and the Mediterranean will be one of balance maintenance – and easy access to the Mediterranean is essential for that purpose (from this perspective, the Mediterranean Sea thus has been restored to its role of ‘lifeline’ with the Indian Ocean, which it had at the time of the British Empire).73 There are other views, however, of the region’s strategic role.74 The ‘power-projection’ model

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views the southern periphery as a logistical anteroom to critical regions beyond the Mediterranean basin – above all, the Gulf and the Caspian.75 Ian Lesser argues that 9/11 and the Iraq War have also marked a ‘substantial shift from a US foreign and security policy oriented toward regions, to a policy driven by specific functional issues. Counter-terrorism heads the list of current functional challenges, together with countering the proliferation of WMD, energy security, and political and economic reform. For the US, these are now global imperatives, with regional applications.’76 According to Richard Haas, the US will ‘continue to enjoy more influence in the region than any other outside power, but its influence will be reduced from what it once was. This reflects the growing impact of an array of internal and external forces, the inherent limits of US power, and the results of US policy choices.’77 Russia, although not geographically a Mediterranean power, is attempting to restore and extend political and economic relations with countries of the Mediterranean South and to play a more substantial role there. Although there was some concern that a change of leadership in Moscow – a more nationalistic leader – could lead to increased sales of armaments to the Mediterranean and the Middle East and a more active naval presence and diplomatic involvement in the region, such fears have not been realized with Vladimir Putin. The only serious complaint of the West concerning Russia’s Mediterranean and Middle Eastern policy is about its ‘nuclear co-operation’ with Iran. The role of the European countries is, of course, of particular importance. The countries of the Mediterranean North – all member-states of the EU and NATO – comprise a fairly homogenous group of states with common security structures, a common political culture and cultural identity (although this does not mean that differences or disagreements on various issues do not exist).78 For historical and geographic reasons, relations between European countries and the Mediterranean reflect an informal division of labour whereby Spain directs her attention to North-west Africa (Western Sahara, Morocco), Italy focuses on Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean, France on Algeria and the Lebanon and Greece on Cyprus and Turkey.79 Historically, France has played the part of intermediary between Western Europe and the Maghreb,80 and greatly influences Northern European perceptions of Mediterranean issues.81 It is not clear what the ‘European’ policy in the Middle East consists of. A number of European countries have strong economic, political and security interests in the region. When their leaders travel in the Middle East, they represent national interests more than European interests.82 The main instrument of European policy towards the Mediterranean region is the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). The concept of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was approved by the EU and twelve Mediterranean countries at the Barcelona Conference on 27–28 November 1995. It aims at the creation of a European–Mediterranean free trade area, substantially increased financial support of Mediterranean countries, the institution of political dialogue involving all the partners concerned, more internal democracy and a more peaceful coexistence of all the countries of the region. These broad objectives were outlined in the ‘Barcelona Declaration’.

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In the last years of its existence, the Western European Union has been noticeably active in trying to create a European defence role with the Mediterranean as its principal field of action.83 The military forces being created for the WEU (EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR) can be used for humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping operations (including missions to impose peace) and crisis management.84 Another interesting trend is the (relative) strengthening of national capabilities of power projection within the establishment of rapid intervention forces by France, Italy and Spain and, generally speaking, the air-naval orientation and reinforcement of Southern European military doctrines and instruments (e.g. the French, Italian and Spanish aircraft carriers). European policies towards military force projection in the Middle East will be largely determined by US strategic choices. The current de facto division of labour – the Americans take the lead in military operations, the Europeans provide qualified support and a minor military contribution – reflects current capabilities; it does not necessarily serve as a guide for future intentions.85 Both Europe and the US face a period of reassessment in their co-operation on high priority issues. The next decade will almost certainly see new pressures on both NATO and the EU to expand their engagement and security responsibilities both southwards and eastwards.86 According to the IISS, the result could be ‘deepening friction, or an agreed division of labour, between European allies focused on Mediterranean risks and US policymakers looking to stretch security institutions towards more distant problems in the Gulf, Central and even southeast Asia.’87 Ian Lesser observes that the ‘extent to which American and European approaches to the region will converge or diverge over the coming years is a critical, open question shaping the future of the Mediterranean’.88 Perceptions regarding the establishment of European military formations also need to be addressed, in addition to the psychological consequences of the events of 11 September 2001. A priority task for the EU is to provide detailed, constantly updated information on the reasons for establishing forces such as the European Rapid Reaction Force. Such an exchange of information, to be accompanied by a frank dialogue on proliferation and terrorism issues, might also greatly facilitate intelligence and police co-operation to combat terrorism in general (and prevent WMD terrorism). Indeed, the role and significance of perceptions should not be underestimated. According to Alvaro Vasconcelos, ‘security perceptions are a decisive component of Mediterranean security in the north-south and south-north direction alike. In the minds of a number of European publics, political Islamism – identified with terrorism, and at its worse confusingly identified with Islam itself – tends to replace the defunct Soviet threat as the number one enemy, potential at its best.’89 Certain institutional developments since the end of the Cold War – the strengthening of the WEU (now merged with the EU), the activities of the OSCE, the enlargement of the EU, the enlargement of NATO and the creation of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) and movements towards a common foreign security policy (CFSP),90 have strengthened the impression of the Mediterranean South slowly and systematically being isolated and excluded.91 On a conceptual level, the aims of these organizations have been perceived by some

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analysts as coinciding with a divisive cultural line (according to Huntington’s logic). On a practical level, European investments in Central and Eastern Europe have served to increase fears about the marginalization of North Africa. NATO suffers from a serious image problem in the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. The general public in those countries views NATO as a Cold War institution in search of a new enemy. An example of misperceptions between the northern and the southern Mediterranean countries are Arab reactions regarding the establishment of EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR.92 Western (NATO and EU) countries must make it clear to the countries of the Mediterranean that the advancement of a CFSP or various military developments inside NATO should not be perceived by these countries as a potential threat.93 The concerns of southern Mediterranean states have been to a certain extent justified.94 It should also be emphasized that a uniform and commonly accepted definition of security on the two sides of the Mediterranean is still lacking. The absence of a common political vocabulary and approach to security hinders the progress of a security dialogue with the Mediterranean countries and often contributes to misperceptions and misunderstandings on both sides.95 Additional work is necessary in this context.96 Again, in addition to the psychological consequences of the events of 11 September 2001, one also needs to understand and address partner countries’ perceptions regarding the establishment of EU and NATO military formations or other EU and NATO actions and statements, in addition to the psychological consequences of the events of 11 September 2001. For instance, NATO SecretaryGeneral Claes’ statement about a ‘threat from the south’ has influenced the way Arab governments and their peoples view the north. The Arab public, in general, is very suspicious and critical of Europe and the US97 and suspects that the West is seeking to interfere in the internal affairs of Arab states and impose alien values on their societies.98 Most Arab governments, quite aware of the need to maintain close economic and political ties with the EU and the US, at the same time have to take into account the feelings and concerns of their peoples.

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Recent developments in arms control and non-proliferation

If a great number of countries come to have an arsenal of nuclear weapons, then I am glad I am not a young man and I am sorry for my grandchildren. (David Lilienthal, The Lilienthal-Acheson Plan)

From the dawn of history, states or empires in possession of advanced weaponry have sought to prevent their spread to rising powers on their peripheries, fearing that this would diminish their capacity to stave off attacks from challengers. By the same token, up-and-coming states in the periphery have sought to gain access to advanced technologies in order to reduce their military inferiority vis-à-vis the dominant powers. Throughout history, then, there has been a struggle between those seeking to curb the diffusion of technology and those seeking to accelerate it – between non-proliferation and proliferation. This epic contest acquired particular intensity in the post-World War II era because of the potency of the weapons involved.1 The prospect of a world free of nuclear weapons probably vanished in 1946. However, nuclear weapons have spread much more slowly than it was once feared they would. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was believed that as soon as a nation was able to manufacture the bomb, it would do so. That had been the path taken by all the countries which had mastered the technology, except Canada and Sweden. President Kennedy’s sombre forecast has often been quoted. He foresaw, within the next decade (the 1970s), a world in which fifteen to twenty-five nations would have the bomb. Expressing no more than the common view, he wrote, ‘I regard this . . . as the greatest possible danger and hazard’. By the early 1960s, the elevation of non-proliferation from a specific goal to an international norm had acquired momentum as a pragmatic response to the threatening spread of nuclear weaponry. As William Walker points out, the new regime had two main elements: (a) ‘a managed system of deterrence; and (b) a managed system of abstinence, whereby other states abandoned their sovereign rights to develop such weapons whilst retaining rights to develop nuclear energy for civil purposes in return for economic, security and other benefits’.2 Today, there are between thirty and forty countries that have the technical capability and resources to manufacture nuclear weapons. Yet, only

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seven have done so openly, three more than when Kennedy wrote those words (although it is certain that a fourth, Israel, possesses an arsenal of advanced nuclear weapons). There are only two known ‘threshold states’, namely Iran and North Korea, although the latter apparently conducted a (failed?) nuclear weapon test in 2006.3 Against this, 184 Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), including all the major industrial NNWS, have formally undertaken not to make or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. Only three ‘major’ countries, India, Pakistan and Israel, have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with North Korea having withdrawn. The NPT was extended indefinitely at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. Although this was hailed as a major success, a number of states-parties to the Treaty, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and analysts continue to be sceptical about the general ‘health’ and effectiveness of the treaty and even its medium-term survival, due to, among other reasons, the perceived failure of the nuclear weapons states (NWS) (especially the US and Russia) to honour the commitments undertaken under Article VI of the Treaty.4

Nuclear arsenals today If one were to study trends of change, instead of current figures, it would be worth recalling that in 1987 there were, according to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, an estimated 68,000 nuclear weapons held by the five NWS: 24,000 by the US; 43,000 by the USSR; 300 by the UK; 420 by France; and 420 by China. By 1997, estimates indicated that this figure had been reduced to approximately 36,000 nuclear weapons. In 2000, the numbers were not significantly lower, but a decrease was expected in the next few years after the ratification (and eventual implementation) of START II by Russia. In early 2007, the numbers are: US: 5,521, Russia: 5,682, UK: 185, France: 348, China: approx. 130, India: approx. 50, Pakistan: approx. 60, Israel: 100–200.5 Both Russia and China are modernizing their strategic nuclear forces (a modest increase of Chinese Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles/ICBMs) should be expected as the US moves ahead with full deployment of its National Missile Defence (NMD), and the US is repackaging existing warheads and formulating new missions for its nuclear forces.6 There are also changes in the national security concepts of the US and Russia. For the US, it is designed to hedge against old nuclear threats reappearing and new ones emerging.7 In the case of the Russian Federation, the move appears to be towards greater reliance on nuclear weapons as a means of ensuring security (because of the serious problems faced by Russian conventional forces).8 In the coming years, Russia will have to take a fundamental decision regarding the structure and mission of its armed forces, and in particular the relationship between its nuclear and conventional components.9 This will ultimately depend on the even more fundamental decision regarding Russia’s own post-Soviet strategic identity. As Dmitri Trenin put it, ‘Will Russia, in other words, move towards an ever closer association with the EU and progressively demilitarize relations with the West? Will it withdraw into some form of self-imposed isolation? Will it seek to build anti-Western alliances with China and, possibly, Iran?’10

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China is perhaps the major unknown variable in the strategic nuclear equation. China is likely to become the dominant military presence in East and South-east Asia over the next couple of decades, an evolution which will take longer if it suffers serious domestic disturbances.11 Beijing has a modest arsenal of some 350–450 weapons; only some two dozen ICBMs.12 It is modernizing its nuclear arsenal qualitatively – for example. smaller, more accurate warheads, solid-fuel, longer-range missiles, multiple-warhead missiles – and quantitatively.13 In a book called Unrestricted War, published in the late 1990s, the Beijing regime declared that since it cannot possibly win a conventional conflict with the US, it intends in case of a conflict to target US civilian infrastructures that control financial systems and transportation, communications and power grids. One of the authors, Colonel Wang Xiangsui of the Chinese Air Force, amplified those sentiments in August 1999: ‘War has rules, but those rules are set by the West. . . . If you use those rules, then weak countries have no chance. . . . We are a weak country, so do we need to fight according to your rules? No.’ Future adversaries can be expected to seek asymmetries, allowing them to confront superior opponents such as the US by embracing an ‘indirect approach’.14 Finally, there is no realistic prospect that either France or the UK will give up their nuclear deterrent in the foreseeable future. Neither London nor Paris is likely to join the US–Russian arms reduction process in the near future. Both countries consider their deterrents as ‘sufficient’ or ‘minimum’, not determined by the size of other nuclear powers’ arsenals. A US decision to deploy a National Missile Defence (NMD) system has all but improved the chances of British and French participation in multilateral arms reduction, since both London and Paris fear that such a system would, over the long term, indirectly affect their own penetration capabilities against other countries.15

The arms control and proliferation scene in the early twenty-first century There were also some negative developments, including a serious setback to the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), after its rejection by the US Senate in 1999. An additional NWS, China, has yet to ratify the Treaty. Of the 44 states whose ratifications are required for the Treaty to enter into force, only 34 have ratified. In connection to testing, the persistent conduct by the US of sub-critical tests of nuclear explosive devices, an activity focused on maintaining, not eliminating, nuclear stockpiles, is a source of concern. Efforts to establish a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) are deadlocked. Furthermore, not all NWS have signed and ratified the protocols attached to the South-east Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) and the African NWFZ and there were no developments regarding the Middle Eastern NWFZ. The recent deployment by the US of a limited NMD system was perceived by many states, including some US allies, as a destabilizing development.16 There is also resistance on the part of the NWS to proposals to de-alert their arsenals and to agree to binding nuclear security guarantees for NNWS parties to the NPT.

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There have been rapid changes in the international system, and there are now major new sources of global upheaval and uncertainty: the dominant preeminence of American power and concerns about the future strategic direction of the US; weak and potentially failed states; and new threats from terrorists with global reach. At the same time, as Ariel Levite has rightly pointed out, ‘the [nuclear] proliferation phenomenon has taken many twists and turns over the years, with the pace, direction, and loci of action varying considerably. More recently, developments in India and Pakistan17 as well as in Iran and North Korea (especially its withdrawal from the NPT and its nuclear test of October 2006) have caused considerable concern.’18 We are also witnessing what Therese Delpech characterized as contradictory developments regarding the value of nuclear weapons: in the first years after the Cold War, trends seemed to be towards devaluing and marginalizing nuclear weapons (a number of arms control agreements). Other more recent developments may rather evoke a threat against the preservation of nuclear peace in the twenty-first century.19 There are serious concerns about the non-proliferation regime, which in the eyes of many has already been eroded and is in danger of becoming irrelevant.20 In December 2004, the UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change concluded: ‘We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.’21 The NPT suffers from several weaknesses, which contributed to the failure of the 2005 Review Conference.22 In addition to long-time problems related to the implementation of Article VI, verification of compliance, withdrawal from the treaty and weak enforcement mechanisms, the NPT regime was designed for a world in which threats came from states.23 It is rightly argued that existing nonproliferation and export-control regimes may be inadequate to deal with the emerging threat of non-state proliferation exemplified by the A. Q. Khan nuclear smuggling network.24 Khan’s essentially transnational network included suppliers and middlemen in a number of countries, including Britain, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, Italy, Turkey, South Africa, the UAE, China, Malaysia and Singapore.25 Khan and his associates provided Iran, Libya and North Korea, among others, with designs for Pakistan’s older centrifuges, as well as designs for more advanced and efficient models.26 The network also provided these countries with components, and, in some cases, with complete centrifuges.27 It remains to be seen whether the A. Q. Khan experience is indicative of the future of nuclear proliferation.28 The demise of the state’s absolute authority in Russia and, to a lesser extent, China29 is another related disquieting factor. Bruno Tertrais points out that proliferation can now involve private bodies or autonomous state entities whose behaviour is unknown to, or not sanctioned by, central government (even if things seem to be improving in both countries).30 Serge Sur has identified four ‘non-mutually exclusive reasons’ for this weakening of the non-proliferation regime: ‘the NPT no longer protects against proliferation; it allows the parties to prepare for proliferation; coercive measures

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against proliferation either do not exist or do not work; the imbalance between NWS and NNWS remains at best untouched and may be aggravated.’31 There is general agreement that proliferation has been slowed but not halted and export-control regimes are losing efficiency as secondary proliferation32 is increasing.33 According to an official US view, ‘national and international efforts to block the spread of WMD and related technology have in recent years been outpaced by technology diffusion and the increasing number and potency of non-state actors operating outside the traditional non-proliferation regime’.34 The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), launched by the US at the end of May 2003, aims to prevent trafficking in WMD and related technology, through improved international co-operation and co-ordination.35 The PSI establishes a multilateral framework for the interdiction of WMD at sea, on land or in the air. In June 2003, eleven initial PSI participants (Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the UK and the US) agreed to the Madrid Initiative, which formalized their mutual commitments. In early 2004 both Liberia and Panama signed bilateral agreements with the US, permitting either party to interdict suspected flagships in support of PSI activities.36 The apparent goal is pre-emptive interdiction, including detaining and searching ships and aircraft as soon as they enter PSI members’ territorial waters or national airspace; denying suspicious aircraft over-flight rights; grounding planes when they stop to refuel in member countries or in states willing to co-operate on a case-by-case basis; and boarding and searching ships registered in a PSI member nation or operating under a ‘flag of convenience’ of another state prepared to authorize an interdiction in a particular instance.37 The fact that the PSI will be basically limited to the territorial waters and airspace of member-states has led some to charge that it will have little impact in halting the spread of WMD.38 On 28 April 2004, the UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1540, ‘Affirming that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security’, requiring states to ‘adopt and enforce appropriate laws’ to deny WMD, their components, or means of delivery, to non-state actors. Passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Resolution 1540 details a series of steps that shall be taken by all states to preclude support to non-state actors seeking WMD and calls upon all states to take co-operative action to prevent illicit nuclear trafficking. Consensus on bilateral or regional enforcement was unattainable, however, and United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 made enforcement measures the province of the UN Security Council.39 Further efforts in the UN would include the GA’s unanimous adoption on 13 April 2005 of the Nuclear Terrorism Convention, requiring the extradition or prosecution of those implicated in acts of nuclear terrorism and encouraging the exchange of information and inter-state co-operation. The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HcoC) is the first multilateral instrument aimed at combating the proliferation of ballistic missiles. The final text of the Code, made possible by the work done within the MTCR, and supported by a declaration at the European Council of Gothenburg

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in 2001, was adopted in The Hague on 26 November 2002 by 93 states.40 As of late 2006, the Code numbered 124 states signatories. It remains open for signature since, as yet, not all states in possession of ballistic missile capabilities have joined it.41

The NPT as a non-proliferation tool in the twenty-first century It is often argued that ‘the global consensus over how to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is in danger of unravelling’ and there is discontent over the ‘fundamental agreement between nuclear and non-nuclear states to manage the spread of nuclear weapons and technologies. And, as already mentioned, the regime was never designed to deal with the challenge posed by non-state actors’.42 The question of whether the NPT can be kept together, without the abolition of nuclear weapons, automatically leads to another question: What is the alternative: a world without a non-proliferation regime, with ensuing nuclear anarchy and chaos? Is the international community prepared to risk the ‘health’ of the NPT, and the non-proliferation regime in general, in order to promote the idea of complete nuclear disarmament? On the other hand, should concerns about the survival and future of the NPT prevent any pressure on the NWS to drastically reduce their arsenals? Can it be expected that pressure for complete nuclear disarmament would lead at least to nuclear reductions? This author is a strong supporter of nuclear disarmament at the earliest possible date. Yet, one has to be pragmatic. The international security environment is not ripe for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Relations between major powers remain competitive. The use of military force is still an acceptable foreign policy tool for governments. International law is not always respected and, in most cases of violations, there is no international body capable of punishing the aggressor and enforcing the law. Furthermore, the technology is out there. There are thousands of nuclear scientists from the former Soviet Union and hundreds of tons of fissile material under security conditions that more often than not leave much to be desired. The stark reality is that, as far as the NWS are concerned, there is very little willingness to engage in serious disarmament negotiations.43 By implying that the use of chemical or biological weapons against US forces or targets may lead to nuclear retaliation, by giving what is perceived by many states as unreasonably high priority to the threat of proliferation of NBC weapons and ballistic missiles and the threat of NBC (catastrophic) terrorism and with its initial deployment of a missile defence system, the US is all but ruling-out any thoughts or plans about the abolition of nuclear weapons. Further reductions in the framework of START III or START IV or in the model of the US–Russian treaty signed on 24 May 2002 could probably be considered (the Moscow Treaty decreases the number of strategic nuclear warheads to 1700–2200 by 2010); yet, this is probably as far as the US is prepared to go towards nuclear disarmament. As mentioned previously, under the circumstances France and the UK would be extremely unlikely to accept significant cuts in their nuclear arsenals. Finally,

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despite its nuclear inferiority vis-à-vis the US and Russia, for China nuclear weapons are still the ‘great equalizer’ in its relationship with those two countries, particularly the US. The role of public opinion is also an important factor. There is reduced pressure, because of lower threat perceptions among the general public. Therefore, realistically, we should aim for further reductions and other restrictions (e.g. no first-use policies, confidence-building measures/CBMs, NWFZs). At the same time, in order to prepare the ground for deep reductions and eventual disarmament, we should promote the idea that nuclear weapons should have a reduced role in comparison to the Cold War period, thereby moving towards a ‘low salience nuclear world’. In the current strategic environment, whether the US and Russia have 2,000 or 1,000 weapons is of less importance than in the Cold War era. Of primary significance are the existence of a steady reduction process and a relative devaluation of the importance of nuclear weapons. If abolition lies at the end of the road, so much the better, but it looks like an unrealistic goal for the foreseeable future. Our highest priority in the field on non-proliferation should be the strengthening of the NPT and the non-proliferation regime. However, not observing any progress on the issue of nuclear disarmament might have a negative impact on efforts to preserve and strengthen the non-proliferation regime (especially the export-control regimes). Therefore, reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the NWS should be the next objective of the international arms control community. Although realistically such reductions can only be gradual, the various steps of the process should be clearly defined, along with specific timetables. The international community’s policy should be a pragmatic compromise between the immediate need to preserve and strengthen the non-proliferation regime and the mid- to long-term requirement for deep reductions and even nuclear disarmament. One needs to find the right balance between strong support for the NPT and pragmatism, on the one hand, and pressure to NWS for disarmament, on the other; without, however, weakening the non-proliferation regime (therefore, the ‘degree’ of pressure upon NWS is a critical element in this context). Implicit acceptance by the NNWS of the fact that nuclear disarmament is only a long-term objective is an essential element of such a ‘middle-of-the-road’ strategy. Such a strategy is certainly ‘unfair’, and would not help to assuage feelings of discrimination among some NNWS, but continuous friction in the framework of NPT Review Conferences and the inability to agree on a final text would hurt the non-proliferation regime. The constructive role of Western NNWS in NPT Review Conferences and preparatory meetings, as ‘mediators’ between NWS and non-Western NNWS, would also be an important element. It is essential to avoid the transformation of the NPT into a lame-duck regime, by holding the Treaty hostage to other objectives, such as fulfilling the ambitions of regional powers or the unofficial leaders of discontented NNWS, or other unrelated grievances against NWS. The non-proliferation consensus must hold, and hopefully be strengthened, even without spectacular progress in the direction of nuclear disarmament. Whether the various parties to the NPT realize this and are willing to contribute to this objective is less clear.

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One could envisage a nuclear reduction agenda that would include the following items (with a strong non-proliferation regime as the bedrock): ratifying the CTBT44 and successfully negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty; accelerating the implementation of START II and the 2002 Moscow Treaty; ratifying all protocols related to NWFZs; engaging other NWS in arms control negotiations; freezing their arsenals as an interim measure; de-alerting nuclear weapons; enhancing transparency and promoting irreversibility;45 addressing rationales for possession of nuclear weapons and theories of deterrence; and, eventually, addressing delivery vehicles. This list is not exhaustive.46 Some of the proposed measures can be implemented in the short term; others are medium or long term and in some cases conditional upon the successful implementation of the short-term ones. All those measures, however, would be important contributing factors in the avoidance of what Albert Wohlstetter described more than twenty-five years ago as, ‘life in a nuclear-armed crowd’.

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Risks arising from nuclear proliferation This book deals with the proliferation of every type of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It considers, however, nuclear weapons as being the ultimate WMD and therefore places more emphasis on the consequences of their spread. The crux of the horizontal nuclear proliferation problem has been whether it might increase the probability of the use of nuclear weapons (although other consequences, such as destabilizing specific regions through costly and risk-prone arms races should not be underestimated).1 There has been considerable disagreement between analysts on this question for at least three decades.2 The answers to this question range from extremely optimistic – that nuclear proliferation will result to greater regional and global stability – to extremely pessimistic – that nuclear proliferation will bring the world closer to the brink of nuclear annihilation. The author’s view is that each potential NWS presents a distinct case that has to be examined and analyzed. It is therefore risky and misleading to generalize about potential nuclear proliferators without considering their particularities. The specific characteristics of each country and region, together with a large number of continuously changing variables3 make any attempt to derive a norm extremely difficult and largely inaccurate.4 If nuclear weapons are introduced in a region, can a stable system of deterrence develop? Does the probability of the deliberate use of nuclear weapons, leading to nuclear war, increase or decrease? There are two opposing schools of thought. Some analysts, such as Pierre Gallois and Kenneth Waltz, argued that the West and the Soviets did not go to war for over forty years largely because their adversary’s nuclear weapons deterred them from doing so. The superpowers became increasingly fearful of the threat of mutual-assured destruction (MAD) if nuclear weapons were employed. Hence, these analysts argued, if nuclear weapons were introduced into each regional conflict, a measure of nuclear deterrence would develop to ensure peace in those parts of the world.5 According to Waltz: Nuclear weapons have been the second force working for peace in the postwar world. They make the cost of war seem frighteningly high and thus discourage states from starting any wars that might lead to the use of such

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Assessing the proliferation threat weapons. . . . Nuclear weapons, responsibly used, make wars hard to start. Nations that have nuclear weapons have strong incentives to use them responsibly. Because they do, the measured spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than feared.6

Hedley Bull comments that, taken to its logical extreme, this argument implies the best way to keep death off the roads is to put a small amount of nitroglycerine on every car bumper. Everybody would drive indefinitely more carefully, but accidents would occur – people being human and cars breaking down – and the results would be far nastier.7 Analysts of the Waltz school of thought seem to ignore the fact that the conflicts that have occurred in the Middle East, South Asia and elsewhere in the developing world are qualitatively different from the Cold War relationship between the superpowers. At the heart of the views of the Waltz school is a simple extrapolation from the non-use of nuclear weapons in the US–Soviet context to the future non-use of those weapons in other regions. This analogy overlooks the unique combination of circumstances that has helped to ensure nuclear peace over the past decades. The non-use of nuclear weapons has rested upon particular geopolitical and technical factors: cautious leadership (despite the harsh rhetoric of both powers); the fact that neither national survival nor territorial integrity was immediately at stake and that neither power has ever been at war with the other; the lack of common frontiers, thereby lessening flashpoints for conflict and impending escalation; and adequate technical means to prevent accidental detonation and the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. Without these features, mere fear of nuclear destruction, though itself important, might not have sufficed. Even if we accept the proposition that the balance of terror has kept the peace between the superpowers, can we apply the same reasoning to other parts of the world? This is particularly so in regions where classical causes of war clearly exist between states – territorial ambitions, racial and religious hatred and fanaticism – and have broken out in violent conflict time and again since 1945. Nuclear multipolarity seems even more destabilizing because it multiplies not only decision-making centres, but also the strategic profiles and motivations of countries that have WMD programmes. India, Pakistan and Iran do not all necessarily have the same objectives, concepts of use, force structures or even civilian control over the military as the two major Cold War players. The impact of those differences on stability in this century will be all the more difficult to predict because little is known about them.8 This points to other major weaknesses of such theories about the stabilizing impact of proliferation; they ignore the inherent instability of the period of transition.9 They assume that the new nuclear weapons states will almost automatically acquire securestrike forces. They also ignore the fact that the development of the nuclear forces of two adversaries will rarely be parallel, for example, Israel in the Middle East and India in South Asia. Both countries – especially Israel – have a significant advantage over potential nuclear opponents (Israel in terms of experience and of an existing nuclear force, and India in terms of scientific and technological capability).

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One should bear in mind that both superpowers had deployed their nuclear weapons in a heavily protected second-strike posture, with extensive systems of reconnaissance with command and control facilities which no developing country is likely to be able to afford. Arguably, in a conflict where both sides have nuclear weapons which are vulnerable to the other side’s aggressive strike, each side will be tempted to strike first to destroy the other side’s potential.10 This concern is higher in the case of battlefield nuclear weapons, whose acquisition could increase the risks of nuclear war between new nuclear weapon states (NWS).11 By their nature, these weapons are more accident- and miscalculation-prone than other types of nuclear weapons. Because one must ‘use them or lose them’, they have to be used early in a conflict. In the early stages of a crisis or a conventional war, a military commander might decide to use the nuclear weapons under his command; in the confusion of combat, this could not be ruled out.12 The use of battlefield weapons could easily lead to escalation and to an all-out nuclear war between adversaries. Thus, the acquisition of battlefield nuclear weapons could be a highly destabilizing development. It must be conceded that the very limited historical record does not give much support to the pre-emptive/preventive attack argument. The US did not attack the Soviet Union before the latter had acquired a second-strike force, nor did the USSR attack China at a comparable stage of its nuclear weapons development programme (although it is almost certain that it considered doing so). Nevertheless, it is believed that the special characteristics of most candidate NWS would increase the probability of the use of nuclear weapons. The most significant of those characteristics is the lack of secure second-strike forces, the short distances and the high levels of tension between the adversary states. The author’s overall view is that the deliberate use of nuclear weapons in the two ‘classical’ regions where nuclear proliferation has already taken place (Middle East and South Asia) is unlikely indeed (except, possibly, by an Israel in extremis), but not for the reasons put forth by Gallois and Waltz. It should be stressed again that this conclusion cannot necessarily be extended to other ‘candidate nuclear rivalries’ because of the particularities of each case. Whereas a stable system of deterrence might be developed in one region, it may be impossible to do so in another region. Furthermore, as it will be explained below, the probability of the unintentional/accidental use of nuclear weapons would be higher. Accidental use of nuclear weapons One of the major concerns presented by horizontal nuclear proliferation would be the accidental use of nuclear weapons. Accidental war can be defined as a war resulting from a malfunction of some weapons system or from human error, not including errors in judgement. American and Russian nuclear forces are safeguarded from accidental firings by a considerable array of features built into both the chain of command and the weapons themselves. For the US these features include the ‘two-man’ concept

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whereby no single individual has the capability to fire nuclear weapons; a control system whereby each individual with nuclear weapon responsibility is certified under the Human Reliability Programme; the use of secure, split-handed codes; the employment of coded locking devices which prevent firing in the absence of specific signals from higher command (Permissive Action Link/PAL); sealed authenticator system (SAS); emergency destruction devices and procedures; the use of environmental sensing devices which prevent firing in the absence of specific signals form higher command; and the use of environmental firing devices which prevent unwanted detonations through the operation of switches that do not respond to acceleration, declaration, altitude, spin, gravity, and thermal forces.13 It is unlikely that a potential NWS (especially a developing state) would be prepared or able to deploy these costly and complex safety mechanisms. Moreover, such a state might find it necessary to dispense with certain safeguards in the interest of preventing pre-emption (that issue is discussed in detail in the section dealing with nuclear crisis management). The prospect of a nuclear accident would be, therefore, much higher in a proliferated world. It is, of course, very important that in the event that all redundant safety systems fail, a nuclear accident should not be interpreted by an adversary as the beginning of a nuclear attack and lead to a retaliatory strike and to all-out nuclear war. It can be argued that such a chain of events could be avoided only on condition that, first, strategic stability is assured and, second, no Launch-On-Warning (LOW) or predelegation policies have been adopted. In most cases it seems unlikely that these conditions would be met by new nuclear-weapon states. According to Salomon, strategic stability can be defined as the existence of invulnerable strategic forces such that neither side could destroy the other’s ability to retaliate with a devastating blow, if attacked with nuclear weapons. Thus, strategic stability is closely connected with the survivability of forces designated for retaliation. Every potential NWS (with the possible exception of Israel) would lack secure second-strike forces for many years. The first condition for avoiding an accidental war is unlikely to be met. Regarding the second condition (no LOW or pre-delegation): In response to the need for a quick-reaction nuclear force which could be fielded as soon as possible, a new nuclear power (again, with the possible exception of Israel) would have a powerful incentive to turn to automatic or nearly-automatic systems of nuclear retaliation which are not ‘encumbered’ by complex and costly command and control checks. A new NWS is likelier to have a greater number of national decision-makers that would be properly authorized to use nuclear weapons. First, because the country’s early-warning networks are unlikely to be totally reliable, and, second, because the lines of communication and command make it difficult to ensure that retaliation orders reach field commanders following a first strike attack. Hence, a new nuclear-weapon state may be apt to pre-delegate launch authority to selected field commanders. Such LOW strategies would increase the probability of all forms of unauthorized nuclear strikes. However, there is another contrasting possibility. The chief of state of a politically unstable new NWS may not have great confidence in his subordinates. He would distrust other fingers on the button: rival button pushers might be, in his view,

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‘irresponsible’ or even find ways of turning the weapons against him. If no one else has the means to push the button, however, then the state would be subject to nuclear decapitation. One bomb (or one ‘silver bullet’) directed not at the state’s nuclear forces, but at the leader, would suffice. Given the leader’s dilemma, the control over retaliation, so necessary to stable and credible deterrence, is not assured.14 It is difficult to generalize which of these two command postures is more probable.15 Some of the potential new NWS might be affected by such a dilemma (North Korea, Pakistan), whereas others might have less difficulty in delegating launch authority (Israel, India and probably Iran). One quickly realizes, therefore, that the conditions under which an accidental use of nuclear weapons could be interpreted as a nuclear attack do exist. In this case, pressures to escalate in a last-ditch attempt to destroy the remaining nuclear weapons of the opponent before they, too, are fired would become intense. Similarly, a technical malfunction of a radar warning system or a human error in interpreting an ambiguous warning might trigger a nuclear clash.16 Unauthorized first-strike use of nuclear weapons by the military is also a possibility, however small. For example, faced with imminent conventional military defeat and believing there was little left to lose, a few members of Pakistan’s military establishment might attempt to launch a nuclear strike against India to damage the country as much as possible. These officers’ emotional commitment to a self-ordained higher mission would overwhelm any fear of the adverse personal or national consequences. Aside from the initial destruction, such unauthorized use could provoke a full-scale nuclear conflict between the hostile countries.17 One should also examine the ‘failed state’ problem. The principal concern is Pakistan, because of its growing nuclear arsenal and a government under pressure. It has been argued that, while the international community’s worst fears with respect to Pakistan have not materialized so far, the possibility cannot be ignored of ‘nightmare scenarios in which extremist elements, perhaps with the support or assistance of sympathizers in the armed forces and intelligence services, come to power in Islamabad or gain control of some or all of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Uncertainty regarding the physical security of Pakistan’s weapons also raises the possibility of the theft of one or more weapons.’18 It has been suggested that there may be merit in the established nuclear powers sharing their technology to control nuclear weapons with the new nuclear-weapon states. Such policies, which have the effect of lowering the probability of accidental war, can significantly offset the potentially destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation.19 Such a policy, however, might be perceived by potential NWS as a signal of acceptance or encouragement of nuclear proliferation. It should only be considered if and only if a state actually acquires nuclear weapons and then implemented in a covert fashion. The probability of miscalculation during a crisis In the event of further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, the quality of crisis management may significantly affect the probability of their use. Even if we

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assume that the deliberate use of nuclear weapons is very unlikely, mainly because of mutual-assured destruction (MAD), there is a higher probability that during a crisis, when all restrictions and safeguards are progressively lifted, nuclear weapons might be used by a field commander without higher authorization or that some other mishap or miscalculation might take place. The validity of this argument shall be examined on the basis of the history of crisis management of the superpowers during the Cold War. A (nuclear) crisis may be defined (one out of several definitions, of course) as that threshold situation in which governments at peace suddenly begin thinking about a transition into war, either because they see opportunities to launch an attack, or because they much fear being attacked. The single most important characteristic of a crisis is a limited time for response to the external threat.20 One definition of crisis management is the ability of one of the parties to deter its adversary from escalation and to produce a crisis de-escalation outcome in accord with its interests through the use of credible escalation threats. This does not mean, however, that a crisis ends only when one adversarial party capitulates or backs away. A crisis may also be resolved through a process in which both contestants exercise restraint and seek a face-saving path of mutual retreat or a compromise which transforms the situation without being incompatible with the irreducible interests of either. In this context, the most important elements of crisis management are the processes of escalation and de-escalation.21 Crisis escalation is a two-edged sword: it raises the risk of war in the hope of preventing it. By demonstrating willingness to wage war, leaders attempt to impress an adversary with their resolve and thereby encourage its leaders to moderate their behaviour. But escalation often makes a crisis more difficult to resolve, because it increases for both sides the political costs of backing down. Miscalculated escalation refers to steps up the political-military escalation ladder in a crisis; steps taken to moderate adversarial behaviour which instead provoke further escalation by the adversary. It can thus lead to war by loss of control. Lebow and Bracken maintain that there is a remarkable degree of ignorance in Washington about war plans and crisis management. One effect of this ignorance is that many top officials give evidence they conceive of crisis management in terms of their stereotyped understanding of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Others have shown that they see crisis management as controllable and reversible steps up a ladder of escalation, steps taken to moderate an adversary’s behaviour by demonstrating resolve. Worse yet, some believe that the demonstration of resolve requires readiness to threaten the use of nuclear weapons, and even to deliver on the threat ‘if necessary’. It should be noted, ironically perhaps, that this approach is not very different from the definition of crisis management given by Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, and referred to above. If one assumes that officials of nuclear powers will not think or act much differently, then this factor combined with some of the special characteristics of nuclear weapon states would be a factor of instability.22 Before we continue the enquiry, one more concept needs to be defined. For the purpose of this study, an unintentional war is a war resulting from failure to

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foresee the consequences of military actions or accumulation of irreversible threats in the heat of crisis, or a war initiated by the belief that war has already started or has become inevitable or a war initiated independently of any explicit decision by the legitimate authorities.23 For either of the above to happen, two conditions are necessary: the first is a general predisposition of the system of nuclear deterrence; depending on its characteristics, the system might be more or less likely to produce an unintentional nuclear war and thus would have a certain propensity for unintentional nuclear war. The second is a cause triggering such a war at a specific moment, that is, an acute international crisis. The crucial factor affecting the propensity of a system to produce unintentional war is the urgency with which the decision must be made. This, in turn, depends on the vulnerability of both the nuclear forces and the communication and command channels. As already noted, the nuclear forces and the command and control systems of most potential new NWS are likely to be vulnerable to a first strike attack. The risk of unintentional nuclear war greatly increases as a function of the intensity and frequency of causes that may trigger the potential instability inherent in a strategic situation. There is reason to fear that, in times of mounting political crisis, vulnerable weapons systems might provoke their own first use, to avoid the danger of being destroyed. In addition, the degree of tension involved in all crisis situations tends to generate a variety of interaction processes which involve considerable risks of misinterpretation, misunderstanding and miscalculation and also risks of organizational failure sufficient to overthrow the potentially unstable strategic system.24 In at least one case (India–Pakistan), new nuclear powers will be immediate neighbours, a factor which complicates considerably their deterrent postures and their requirements for command and control systems. Due to geographical proximity, the leaders of a country not possessing a secure second-strike force (which is likely to be the case for Pakistan and India) may feel constrained to respond very quickly to a warning of nuclear attack in order to be able to retaliate. The danger exists that a state will lose control of its nuclear forces during a crisis, with disastrous consequences. Loss of control can take a variety of forms and can have diverse causes. It can, in theory, result from fragmented political authority, domestic pressures which leaders are powerless to resist, or an institutional breakdown or malfunction. It can also be the inadvertent and unanticipated outcome of military preparations taken to protect oneself in a crisis or to convey resolve to an adversary. It is this last cause that seems most plausible. The risk, moreover, is likely to be made much more acute by the kinds of measures which would be taken in a war-threatening crisis to ensure retaliation and by the special characteristics of new NWS (close proximity, inexperience, hair-trigger doctrines to ensure retaliation, etc.), like India and Pakistan. This will certainly not be the case for Israel. A serious problem is the contradiction between the measures necessary to prevent an accidental or unauthorized firing of a nuclear weapon, on the one hand, and those required to guarantee the country’s ability to retaliate promptly after being attacked, on the

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other. The dilemma becomes particularly acute at high levels of alert. There it constitutes the single more serious cause of potential instability.25 The time constraints associated with quick launch procedures require that the decision to retaliate be made nearly instantaneously upon warning of attack. A Launch-On-Warning (LOW) posture would, in the worst-case, delegate the decision to go to war to a radar signal or other kind of warning, which might be correct, ambivalent or completely false. If one examines the history of superpower command and control systems and of nuclear crisis management (and especially that of the US because of the lack of detailed information concerning the USSR), one could make the following remarks: ●

●

So far, the combination of institutional checks and physical restraints has prevented an accidental and unauthorized launch. The possibility of such a disaster seems extremely remote under day-to-day operating conditions. It is much more likely to occur in a crisis, however, because of the stress to which the system would be exposed and the ways in which stress could aggravate structural problems; In the case of neighbouring countries lacking a secure second-strike force, time constraints will necessitate some circumvention of institutional checks and balances. The first consideration arises from the near certainty that, in the course of an acute crisis, the leader of the country would choose to predelegate some degree of launch authority. In 1977, Daniel Elsberg asserted that such pre-delegated authority had been given to the military by the presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. He stated that the authority had been given to the ‘six or seven three-and four-star generals’; these generals must have corresponded to the US unified and specified commands.26

To dramatize the implications of pre-delegation, Paul Bracken invokes the metaphor of a revolver. A revolver has two control mechanisms: a safety catch and a trigger. As long as the safety catch is locked, the trigger cannot fire the gun. Once the catch is released, the trigger gains full control of the weapon. A nuclear arsenal can be linked to a revolver with one safety catch and many triggers. When negative control is in effect, the safety catch is engaged; none of the triggers can fire a nuclear weapon. The vulnerability of command centres to attack, however, requires that arrangements be made to pre-delegate launch authority, either in advance of an attack or in response to indications that one has started. Presumably, the more acute the crisis and the perceptions of vulnerability, the further down the chain of command would launch authority be pre-delegated. If and when the system is shifted to positive control, any one of these triggers could fire the nuclear gun.27 Grants of release authority could lead to a number of weapons in the hands of field commanders. Nuclear artillery batteries or other battlefield nuclear weapons that would be under attack and in danger of being overrun could launch their weapons, perhaps in the erroneous belief that a nuclear war had already begun.

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One weapon fired in this manner might be enough to start a full-scale nuclear war, because of the obvious difficulty of controlling a nuclear war under combat circumstances. A field commander might not be able to communicate with his headquarters, and, therefore, would have to decide himself whether to use nuclear weapons. If one did, most – if not all – might follow. Other dangers related to nuclear crisis management will now be discussed, drawing on the US experience. American presidents (and there is no reason not to assume that this is a more general phenomenon) did not familiarize themselves with nuclear crisis management procedures. Successful crisis management requires knowledge that cannot readily be assimilated in the course of a confrontation. Leaders who have not previously involved themselves with the details and the procedures of crisis management are not likely to be sufficiently aware of the danger of loss of control associated with high alert levels. They are also more likely to become captives of prepackaged military options that bear little relationship to their political needs at the time. Finally, they are most likely to be affected adversely by the stress of the crisis.28 Another factor for bad decision-making is what Irving Janis called ‘group-think’. He calls attention to a concurrence-seeking tendency among moderately or highly cohesive groups, and to the deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing and moral judgement that results from in-group pressures. Such possibilities are all the more dangerous because it is during crisis that policy-makers need to be at their most efficient.29 When this tendency is dominant, the members use their collective cognitive resources to develop rationalizations in line with shared illusions about the invulnerability of their organization or nation and display other symptoms of concurrence-seeking (‘group-think’ syndrome). In all group think-dominated groups, there were strong internal pressures towards uniformity which inclined the members to avoid raising controversial issues, even in their own minds, or calling a halt to soft-headed thinking, even when they were keenly aware that the group was moving towards an ill-conceived course of action.30 It should be noted that there is another uncertainty. The human factor constitutes an important strategic vulnerability, and it is a possible cause of loss of control in crisis. Indeed, the human factor is the most significant strategic frontier remaining to be explored. We need to know much more about the limits and potentialities of people subjected to complex problems and acute stress.31 The most frequently cited example of a crisis and of crisis management is the Cuban Missile Crisis. Had there been a different man at the helm in either Washington or Moscow, had the choice of the air-strike option instead of the blockade been employed, yet another act of insubordination by either military establishment, a change in any of a hundred conditions could have led to a different outcome. Robert Kennedy and Theodore Sorensen (according to Graham Allison) believed that the US came perilously close to the brink of a nuclear war as a U-2 reconnaissance plane strayed into Soviet airspace, as American fighters attempted to rendezvous with the errant plane, as the Soviet ships continued to steam towards Cuba, and the USAF prepared to destroy

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the surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in Cuba. If any one of six (against the fourteen persons involved in the Executive Committee) had been President, Robert Kennedy believed that the bombers would have been on their way to destroy the Soviet missiles in Cuba.32 Another way in which events may get out of hand is through impetuous actions or reactions. An escalatory move by one side, for example, might lead to an automatic reaction by the opponent. The possibility of this occurring is heightened by the problems that beset the decision-making process during crises. Not the least is that policy-makers have to act under considerable stress. The short time available for formulating a response, the element of surprise and the high level of tension all contribute to this. So does the fatigue that is inevitable if the crisis continues for any length of time. It has been argued quite persuasively that, although a moderate level of stress can be beneficial, at higher levels it disrupts decision processes. Although both the Soviet and the American governments strongly wished to avoid (nuclear) hostilities, it is clear that their control of the crisis was far from satisfactory. On the other hand, the fourteen Americans involved in the ExCom did not succumb to ‘group-think’. Betts believes, moreover, that J. F. Kennedy’s assessment that the danger of (nuclear) war had been between one-to-three and fifty-fifty must have been hyperbole. The crucial fact is that, despite the immense stress placed on the two leaders and their advisers, President Kennedy refrained from the act that could have triggered irreversible escalation (bombing the SAMs of the IRBMs), and helped Khrushchev to retreat from the brink by undertaking to withdraw US missiles from Turkey. And the idea of pre-emptive war was never mentioned. What conclusions can be drawn? It cannot be denied that loss of control during a crisis between two NWS may lead to the use of arms and eventually escalate into a nuclear war, that this risk is heightened by the removal of all peacetime safety procedures and mechanisms, and that the possibility of unauthorized acts by field commanders exists; but in the one clear-cut case we have to go on, this did not happen. The probability of nuclear war by miscalculation, however, is higher if the NWS have primitive C3, are contiguous, have a record of recent hostilities and no secure second-strike capability. These characteristics are likely to apply to some (but not all) of the states regarded as potential NWS. On the other hand, one should not underestimate the constraints – moral, psychological, as well as technical factors that would exist in these cases, as well as the mitigating effects of confidence-building (or war-avoidance) measures, such as a hot-line between, for example, New Delhi and Islamabad. Rationality of leadership A key question is the extent to which nations in the Middle East, South Asia or North-east Asia will operate according to rational norms – as we understand them – with respect to the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons. Would rules of nuclear deterrence apply in the emotional circumstances of Middle East conflict or the Indo-Pakistani rivalry?

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According to Brito and Intriligator, the reasoning for concern is simple: the larger the number of countries with nuclear weapons, the greater is the likelihood that at least one of them will be governed by someone who is not adequately ‘stable’ or ‘rational’. If countries possess nuclear weapons, nuclear peace thus comes to depend on the emotional stability or rationality of all of them, and it is threatened by the weakest link in the chain. As the chain gets longer, the threat in the category of psychological stability becomes greater. Opinion on this question differs: At one extreme, some believe that the question can be reduced to whether heads of state have the ability to accurately assess the costs and benefits of the use of military force with care and accuracy. Others assert the possibility that individual leaders or elites could act on a basis that might appear irrational to those in the West while being quite comprehensible in terms of an individual political culture or that they could be carried away by emotions of the moment to make what we would term irrational choices about nuclear war.33 A number of scholars studying non-Western cultures warn us that we should not assume that other people and other cultures have the same values and think in the same way. They do not necessarily share the Western assumptions about life or politics.34 Although this may be somewhat exaggerated, it probably contains an element of truth. For the purposes of this monograph, however, the leaders of the potential NWS in both the Middle East and South Asia, as well as other parts of the world (with the possible exception of the North Korean leadership), are assumed to be rational and sensitive in terms of the costs of the use of nuclear weapons.35 As Martin van Creveld argues, there seems to be no ‘factual basis for the claims that regional leaders do not understand the nature and implications of nuclear weapons; or that their attitudes to those weapons are governed by some peculiar cultural biases which make them incapable of rational thought; or that they are more adventurous and less responsible in handling them than anybody else.’36 According to van Creveld, the international (i.e. Western) literature on proliferation appears to be distorted, ethnocentric and self-serving. It operates on the principle of beati sunt possedentes (‘blessed are those who are in possession’); like the various international treaties and regimes to which it has given rise, its real objective is to perpetuate the oligopoly of the ‘old’ nuclear powers. To this end, regional powers and their leaders have been described as unstable, culturally biased and irresponsible. Weapons and technologies that used to be presented as stabilizing when they were in the hands of the great powers were suddenly described as destabilizing when they spread to other countries.37 Although van Creveld is probably right in making this argument, James Wirtz raises an interesting point. Wirtz claims that ‘no group of scholars has made a systematic comparison of the use doctrines embraced by the states and groups that have recently acquired unconventional weapons. What strategic purposes do the actors in question hope to achieve with their new arsenals? Is there a guiding principle – deterrence, coercion, aggression, revenge, prestige, or some unique idea embedded in a given strategic culture – that shapes their plans to use these highly lethal weapons systems? How and for what purposes should they plan to

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use such weapons? How do they ensure that these weapons actually are used according to these plans and not under different circumstances or for other purposes?’38 The probability of the intentional use of nuclear weapons: the case of the Middle East Despite the small number of threshold states that exist today (currently two: North Korea and Iran), the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons (as well as chemical and biological weapons and ballistic and cruise missiles) remains a serious threat to regional and international security. In parallel with efforts to prevent further proliferation, it should be a high-priority objective to deal with the following dangers that might arise from nuclear proliferation (listed in roughly descending order of plausibility): (1) Calculated use of nuclear weapons during a crisis or conflict (possibly as a weapon of last resort); (2) In new nuclear-weapon states the safeguards against accidental launchings and detonations may be adequate or non-existent; (3) During a crisis, unintentional use of nuclear weapons or apparent threats to use them might lead to nuclear war; (4) In regions dominated by a high degree of tension, a new NWS might be tempted to launch a pre-emptive (conventional or even nuclear) strike before its adversary has acquired a secure second-strike capability. For this reason, the initial stages of a regional nuclear arms race are prone to strategic instability; (5) Rogue states or irrational leaders might gain access and use or threaten to use them without regard or full understanding of the consequences; (6) Terrorist groups – perhaps with covert state support – might gain access to one or more nuclear devices; (7) The emergence of 10 to 15 new NWS (the domino effect) might result in the collapse of the international security system and to nuclear anarchy (or, at a minimum, greatly complicate international politics).39 Specifically, nuclear weapons could be used as a result of: (a) Loss of control during a crisis; (b) The accidental launch or detonation of a nuclear weapon; (c) A decision by an irrational or religious fanatic leader; (d) Unauthorized use; (e) An act of nuclear terrorism; (f) A ‘rational’ decision by a country’s leadership (the probability of the calculated use of nuclear weapons would be very low, except in extremis to avoid a total defeat e.g. Israel). The possibility, however, cannot be excluded, especially if other weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical or biological, have been used against population centres. The Middle East is an extraordinarily complex political system, composed of an unstable mixture of religion, natural resources and raw military power.40 Some of the most ‘interesting’ characteristics of the Middle East are: (1) It is a region riddled with protracted conflicts. In addition to the Arab–Israeli one, there are conflict situations in the Persian Gulf, Lebanon, Sudan, North Africa and the Horn of Africa; (2) These conflicts have led to a number of armed conflicts in the (recent) past, as well as to a number of arms races in the region; (3) Ballistic missiles have been used in two major armed conflicts: the Iran–Iraq War (where CW were also used) and the war for the liberation of Kuwait; (4) Because many regional conflicts overlap, and proliferation issues across geographic regions are

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often inter-connected, an escalation in the arms race tends to convey itself from one area of tension to another;41 and (5) Other factors of instability include the existence of many conflicts with multiple sources, and multiple threat perceptions, which further complicate the security environment.42 According to many analysts, the ‘special’ characteristics of some of the new members of the ‘WMD-club’ constitute cause for concern. For instance, as Janne Nolan argues, unlike the major powers, these countries have not had time to perfect systems of command and control over their new strategic forces.43 They have had little time to learn how to manage the complexities of (non-conventional) military brinkmanship. On the other hand, most of those countries have fought wars again and again, and one would expect them to be very careful in such matters. As already mentioned, proliferation is not a new phenomenon in the Middle East. Egypt and Israel first began to pursue nuclear weapons during the early 1960s. Egypt used chemical weapons when it intervened in the civil war in Yemen in the 1960s, and both Israel and its opponents were heavily equipped for chemical warfare during the October War in 1973. The Shah of Iran initiated Iran’s nuclear weapons programme during the 1970s, and Iraq was actively seeking nuclear weapons at the time Israeli jets struck its Osiraq reactor in 1981. The most extensive use of WMD in the Middle East took place during the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–1988. Iraq first used mustard gas and then more sophisticated nerve agents, not only against Iran but also against towns and civilians in Iraqi Kurdistan. The worst of these attacks took place on Kurdish civilians in the town of Halabjah. Iran was much slower than Iraq in its acquisition and use of CW in response to the Iraqi attack.44 The most likely scenario in the Middle East is that of an established nuclear power state versus a state that is in the first stages of a nuclear weapons development programme: Israel versus Iran (or an Arab adversary in the future). Since Israel can be considered as already possessing nuclear weapons, this is a reasonable scenario to examine. The probability of a (conventional) preventive attack by Israel would be rather high in that case. Although this is the most plausible scenario, it is also proposed to examine another three – admittedly low probability – scenarios. In the second, Israel, a NWS, would be matched with an Arab state or Iran with a more primitive nuclear capability. It could be put in a broader context: a relatively advanced nuclear nation against one that is a more modest entrant. The advanced nation (Israel) could be paired with more than one nuclear opponent but, in this instance, the simpler case is illustrative of the broader.45 According to the third scenario, Israel (advanced nuclear) would face defeat from an Arab conventional force. Finally, in the fourth scenario, two Middle East states other than Israel acquire nuclear weapons. The last two scenarios will be examined very briefly. Preventive attack On 7 June 1981, Israel carried out a preventive strike against a nuclear facility. On that day, Israeli aircraft flew some 1,000 km over Arab territory and destroyed Iraq’s newly constructed Osiris-type nuclear reactor. In the 9 June 1981

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announcement of Osiraq’s destruction, the Israeli government stated its belief that, had Iraq’s leader acquired nuclear weapons, ‘he would have not hesitated to drop them on Israel’s cities and population centres’. The assessment was viewed as also applicable to other leaders among Israel’s opponents. Hence, the general pre-emptive thesis: ‘Under no circumstances would we allow the enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction against our nation; we will defend Israel’s citizens with all the means at our disposal.’ The thesis was soon ensconced as a doctrine. As Ariel Sharon, Israel’s Defence Minister, stated The third element in our defence policy for the 1980s is our determination to prevent confrontation states from gaining access to nuclear weapons. For us, it is not a question of balance of terror but a question of survival. We shall therefore have to prevent such a threat at its inception.46 Although Israeli officials have not publicly referred to this doctrine after 1982, the ‘Begin doctrine’ probably remains the official policy of Israel. The implication is that Israel will forcibly oppose any nuclear weapons programme in the Middle East in order to maintain its monopolistic position. It is not clear whether this policy is to be extended to the less radical or anti-Israeli Arab states which may decide to develop a peaceful nuclear programme (Egypt or Saudi Arabia, for example). Clearly, it applies to states hostile to Israel, like Syria and Iran (and Iraq and Libya in the past).47 Israel considers that these countries are committed to her defeat and destruction and would consider the acquisition of nuclear weapons by them as a serious threat. The assumption is, therefore, that it would not hesitate to repeat an Osiraq-type preventive strike. It must be stressed that there is no obvious reason why Israel should use nuclear weapons for that purpose. Conventional weapons did a satisfactory job the first time, so they will probably suffice for future use. In the first stages of a nuclear weapons development programme, there is a single facility which is indispensable; that is the enrichment plant (Kahuta) or the reactor and reprocessing plant (Dimona) and, eventually, Osiraq.48 Had this continued to be the case, the crucial centre could have been rather easily destroyed by a conventional attack (this is especially so in the Middle East, where the Israeli air force has been controlling the skies for the last twenty years).49 Nevertheless, as the de-centralization and redundancy of the Iranian nuclear programme demonstrates, a pre-emptive attack would be far more difficult than the Osiraq attack.50 As explained in the International Crisis Group (ICG) report, the strike would be operationally complex, having to hit a large number of targets more or less simultaneously in order to maximize the damage inflicted while minimizing risk to the attacking forces. Nor does the performance of Western intelligence with respect to Iraqi and North Korean WMD programmes inspire great confidence51 regarding their ability to determine the location and extent of Iran’s nuclear facilities.52 Not everyone agrees with that assessment. A paper written by Whitney Raas and Austin Long provides a rough net assessment of an Israeli strike on known

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Iranian nuclear facilities. The IAF, after years of modernization, now possesses the capability to destroy even well-hardened targets in Iran with some degree of confidence. While limitations still exist, especially in the case of hardened targets, precision-guided weapons have become extremely capable, particularly when strike aircrafts are confronted by relatively low-quality air defence. The use of precision strike for CP should therefore not be discounted lightly.53 Even if the strike is militarily feasible, there is less doubt about the negative political ramifications. The operation would be liable to present Iran as the victim of aggression, and in this way allow it to reject the international pressure and the demand for IAEA supervision.54 Politically, a raid also could have a backlash effect, provoking a closing of the ranks behind the regime and alienating many who currently oppose it. A raid would cause a number of Iranian casualties and this might bolster nationalist sentiment in favour of the nuclear programme, thereby tilting the internal debate.55 Tehran could retaliate by taking steps to destabilize the situation in Afghanistan, Iraq or elsewhere in the Middle East (most notably in the Lebanon) and sponsor terrorist activities by terrorist groups under its ‘influence’. Two NWS: Israel vs. an Arab adversary or Iran According to the second scenario, an Arab country or Iran manages to acquire nuclear weapons (because, for example, Israel failed to destroy a facility or hesitated to attack a facility in a conservative pro-Western Arab state). The probability of a calculated attack by either side would still be very low. Israel’s likely nuclear superiority would give it a credible capacity to deter initiation of a nuclear attack on its cities or on forces within Israel by a regional adversary. Israel would have both the technical ability to strike back and little, if anything, to lose had it absorbed a nuclear first strike.56 This capacity for mutual deterrence is reinforced by other factors: the impact on Israeli and Arab populations in the occupied territories; the possible effects of fallout on cities in neighbouring enemy countries; and the desire of an attacking nation to be able to occupy Israeli territory, especially Jerusalem.57 Israel’s most important disadvantage is her small population and territory, but the Arab states are vulnerable too. Some analysts argue that a major disadvantage of Israel’s deterrent posture is that its population is highly concentrated and vulnerable to massive damage from even a few nuclear weapons and its territory is very small.58 All major cities are within easy striking range of bombers flying from Egyptian or Syrian airfields. If these were unable to evade Israel’s interceptors and surface-to-air defences, the Scud surface-to-surface missile with a range of 160 to 180 miles could reach any target from Syria, or the Shahab missile from positions in Western Iran.59 The argument about Israel’s population demonstrates that it would be even more unacceptable for Israel to fight a nuclear war than for a larger country. The main purpose of nuclear weapons, however, is deterrence, not war-fighting. The relevant question for Israel is whether she can threaten her adversaries with damage that they will find unacceptable, and the answer to this is affirmative. The

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Israeli air force has enjoyed the freedom to strike in depth at Arab targets for twenty years virtually limitless. Should this freedom be lost in the future because of advances in air-defences, Israel is reported to have an offensive missile of its own manufacture, the Jericho I, with a striking range of 280 miles. Cairo, Alexandria, Damascus, Amman and the Euphrates dam could be hit from Jericho launching sites behind the pre-1967 borders of Israel. The newer Jericho II missile with a range of 500 miles could hit any target in the Arab world. Reportedly, the Israelis have developed an enhanced version of Jericho II with a range of 800 miles. Israeli aircraft could also hit any target in the Middle East. By any combination of delivery modes, an Israeli strike force armed with a few nuclear weapons of modest yield could threaten damage adequate to deter any rational Arab adversary.60 No city of the Arab world would be immune to destruction if Israel were attacked with nuclear weapons or if overwhelming conventional forces penetrated across the ‘green’ line to threaten the heartland of the Jewish state.61 Moreover, as stated above, a feature of most Middle Eastern states is their high concentration of value. In most of the region’s states there are only a few significant targets. The destruction of these targets would essentially destroy the societies as we know them. The complete destruction of three to four targets in each state might eliminate 20–30 per cent of the population. While the numbers are terrifying in themselves, their implications for the future of the stricken societies go much further. For most of the states involved these targets encompass all their hopes for a better future. Almost everything that enables them to participate in the twenty-first-century’s marketplace is concentrated in those few targets: their entire business, technical, industrial, intellectual, military and political elites reside there.62 As Richard Burt has pointed out Rapidly developing states may be more vulnerable to discriminate strategic attack than mature industrial societies. These states, like oil-producing countries, may possess only a single resource, which holds the key to their development plans, and, if attacked, would drastically affect their future.63 The importance of the numerical asymmetries has been stressed by the Arabs. President Sadat attempted to convince Israel of superior Arab capabilities to recover from nuclear war. In 1977 he warned, ‘If a half a million Egyptians were to die, I could recover them. But if I respond . . . and half a million Israelis are killed, Israel would never be able to make up the loss.’ This perception was well formulated by an editorial in the Saudi Arabian newspaper Al-Yamama: ‘At the level of nuclear confrontation the Arabs enjoy strategic depth, which Israel lacks. Should Israel use nuclear weapons, the Arabs will absorb the first strike, but any nuclear strike against Israel would be the first and the last.’64 Even if it were true, however, that the Arab world as a whole is less vulnerable than Israel, when making decisions on (nuclear) war Arab leaders are likely to regard this as irrelevant. For each leader the important question to be considered

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is the vulnerability of his own state. The leader of any one Arab state will not be much comforted by knowing that other Arab countries will go unscathed. Nor would the expectation of long-term recovery capacity have a decisive impact on the decision-makers’ calculations. The possibility that their countries may have a better chance of recovery from a nuclear attack in twenty years’ time would not be very convincing. Political leaders have much shorter time horizons.65 The fact that Israel would possess a second-strike capacity and would be able to retaliate under almost any circumstance would be a very strong constraining factor for the Arab leaders. In comparing relative vulnerabilities it should be noted that, in some respects, the asymmetry is in Israel’s favour. As Lawrence Freedman has pointed out, ‘in the event of an Arab nuclear attack on Israel, the large Arab population in Israel would suffer, as would Arabs in refugee camps and the neighbouring territories. In addition, Israel contains many sites of great religious and traditional importance to the Arabs, as well as the homeland of the Palestinians, supposedly the point of the whole conflict. The nuclear destruction of Israel would also be the nuclear destruction of Palestine.’66 What about the Arabs? Generally speaking, seven different elements play a role in providing invulnerability to a nuclear force: variation in the means of delivery; number of weapons and delivery vehicles; mobility; hardening; alertness; dispersion; concealment; and secrecy. Each of these elements contributes its share to complicate the adversary’s efforts to achieve a disarming first strike. Middle East nuclear forces (except Israel’s, of course) would lack most of these elements. On the other hand, even if Israel could destroy its adversaries’ nuclear forces without great fear of retaliation, why should Israel use nuclear weapons when it could achieve its objectives by a conventional strike? There is no objective, other than national survival, that would justify any use of nuclear weapons. The consequences would be disastrous (international involvement, world public opinion, fallout). And, as already mentioned, there is also the possibility that some Arab nuclear weapons might escape destruction and be launched against Israel. Even two or three weapons could exterminate 20–30 per cent of Israel’s population. The basic argument of many analysts is that new nuclear states will necessarily go through a precarious transition phase during which each of their small nuclear forces will be vulnerable. At some point during this transition process, two states are likely to be caught in what might be called the dilemma of infinite regress. Each will be sorely tempted to attack the other before it is itself attacked, because it will be afraid that the other side would attack first. When the US and the Soviet Union went through the initial phase of nuclearization, missiles were not as accurate as they are now, so the fear that a first strike would actually hit small targets was not so acute and an air-strike would have little chance of success, mainly because of the distances involved. Now, with more accurate missiles available, the temptation to launch a first strike might become almost irresistible. The flaw in this argument is to assume that the development of the two sides’ nuclear forces would be almost parallel. This is clearly not the case in the Middle East. Israel has a time-advantage of at least forty years over its adversaries. If and when

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these states were to acquire nuclear weapons, Israel would long be a mature nuclear-weapon state with a secure second-strike capability. Therefore, the so-called dilemma of infinite regress is not applicable in the Middle East.67 Whether or not the Arab states or Iran would in fact heed Israeli ‘general deterrent’ threats in an assumed multinuclear Middle East depends on two factors: first, the extent to which these states would be sensitive to the costs of nuclear war; and second, the extent to which they would come to realize that mutual capability to inflict punishment coupled with Israel’s willingness to run higher risks once her survival was threatened would expose them to a high probability of nuclear disaster should they decide to challenge Israel’s survival. Once nuclear postures were overtly introduced into the region, the socialization process following their introduction would be likely to bring about full comprehension of both factors among Arab and Iranian elites. The net effect would be the realization that in order to avoid nuclear punishment, the Arab states or Iran would have to refrain from threatening Israel’s survival through a massive conventional or nuclear attack.68 Israel in extremis The only conceivable deliberate use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East is by Israel as a last means of defence. In the, rather unlikely, scenario where Israel were losing a conventional war and Arab armies invaded its pre-1967 territory, then Israel might use nuclear weapons in an effort to avoid total destruction. It has been argued that even this is unlikely, because the Arabs would refrain from pushing a nuclear Israel to the brink of elimination. It is maintained that no country would press a NWS to the point of decisive defeat. In the desperation of defeat, desperate measures may be taken; but the last thing anyone would want is to make a nuclear power feel mortally threatened. The unconditional surrender of a nuclear power cannot be demanded.69 This argument would be perfectly valid if complete rationality is assumed. But in the confusion of war, how easy is it to draw the line of desperation? When each state’s threshold is not known to the other side, that threshold may be unintentionally crossed. Or, if no clear commitments have been made, one of the adversaries may cross the other’s threshold in the false expectation that his action will be tolerated. Even in the case of Israel, which serves as the exemplar for proponents of the rational argument in question, what is the threshold? Is it the invasion of the pre1967 borders, the destruction of a significant part of the Israeli army or the (conventional) bombing of Israeli cities? Moreover, in the case of Iran, North Korea and Pakistan, is the threshold the total defeat of the country or the survival of the regime? It seems that the use of nuclear weapons as an act of desperation cannot be excluded, but remains a low probability event. Other hostile nuclear pairs in the Middle East: the irrationality factor The probability that several Middle East states other than Israel will acquire nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future is quite low. This is attributable to

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a lack of necessary infrastructure (most of them are parties to the NPT and their facilities are under IAEA safeguards), and to the fact that Israel would try to prevent them from acquiring nuclear weapons. Let us, however, assume that Iran and an Arab country acquire nuclear weapons. For the reasons offered in scenario B, a calculated use of nuclear weapons against each other is very unlikely (except, again, as weapons of last resort). The main reason for concern in a multinuclear Middle East would be the issue of the rationality of the leaders and the possibility of loss of control during a crisis. One should conclude that the probability of the deliberate use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East (were states other than Israel to acquire such weapons) would be very low. The calculated use of nuclear weapons would be unlikely because of the vulnerability of both sides. Would the nuclearization of the Middle East be a stabilizing development for the region? Would the prospects for peace be improved by the introduction of nuclear weapons in Middle Eastern states other than Israel? The creation of arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, chemical) and the proliferation of delivery vehicles (ballistic missiles) would probably increase the already high tensions that exist in the region. Each state would become increasingly suspicious and paranoid. As a result, the present state of ‘armed peace’ would not change towards the normalization of relations and peaceful co-existence, but more probably in the direction of actual warfare. Even under the present circumstances, the probability of a conventional war is not very low. And, if a conventional war breaks out, the likelihood of escalation cannot be ruled out completely. Although, most probably, neither side would take the decision to escalate; the probability of accidental war or of loss of control during a crisis should neither be ignored nor underestimated (especially if launching authority for nuclear weapons is delegated to subordinates in order to ensure retaliation). The possibility exists that nuclear weapons may be used without explicit orders from a country’s political leadership (e.g. because of a technical malfunction). Assessing the risk The purpose of this chapter has been to examine the relationship between horizontal nuclear proliferation and the probability of nuclear war. Nine dangers arising from assumed nuclear proliferation have generally been identified: (a) calculated use of nuclear weapons, (b) accidental detonation or launching of a nuclear weapon, (c) miscalculation during a crisis, (d) maverick or irrational leaders, (e) escalation of a local nuclear conflict to global war, (f) nuclear terrorism, (g) weakening of the nuclear taboo, (h) unidentified nuclear strikes and (i) collapse of the international security system. It is clear that not all of these risks are equally plausible and were not, therefore, examined at the same length. The possibility of an unidentified strike would remain very small, mainly because, with a small number of NWS and improving technical capabilities for missile tracking and identification, the source of the attack would be quite

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obvious and would result in retaliation.70 The probability of an unidentified strike by a non-state actor with state support or by a state using terrorist methods of delivery will be examined in the section dealing with WMD terrorism. The risk of escalation of a local nuclear conflict into a global war by dragging in the great powers should be considered as extremely low. Superpower co-operation in the prevention of nuclear proliferation in the last forty years suggests that, in the case of a nuclear war between two new NWS, the great powers would move very carefully and would either try to impose a cease-fire or to hold the ring. However unimportant moral considerations may be for governments, the post-war nuclear taboo has served as a powerful incentive for the non-use of nuclear weapons, especially against non-nuclear adversaries.71 It seems, however, that the precise consequences of breaking the ‘nuclear taboo’ against the lethal use of nuclear weapons since Nagasaki, although deplorable, would depend on the circumstances of use, such as the states that were involved and the kind of strike.72 The collapse of the international security system as a result of nuclear proliferation would be rather unlikely at the present pace of proliferation. However, if 10 or 20 countries acquired nuclear weapons in quick succession, the system might collapse. This could happen only if the non-proliferation regime was to break down. Although this was rather improbable only a few years ago, the possibility of a ‘domino effect’ as a result of the open and non-reversible nuclearization of North Korea and Iran cannot now be excluded.73 Nuclear terrorism, in its various forms, should not be discounted or dismissed. As it will be explained in section 3c, it should be seen as a real threat to stability and peace. The possibility of an accidental detonation or launching of a nuclear weapon would be greater in new NWS because, in most cases, they would lack most of the safeguards that existing NWS have deployed. Since most potential NWS would probably adopt LOW postures, the risk that an accidental detonation or launching of a nuclear weapon would be perceived by another state as an attack and lead to retaliation cannot be dismissed. Although sharing accident control technology might reduce the risk of accidental war, it might be misinterpreted as acceptance or encouragement of proliferation. The probability that an irrational leader can gain control of nuclear weapons would, in theory, increase with their further spread. While most existing threshold states have a rather good historical record in this respect, there is no assurance that this will continue to be the case in the future.74 Of course, there is no evidence to the contrary. The deliberate use of nuclear weapons by rival new NWS is unlikely today.75 As was shown in the analysis of Middle Eastern scenarios, a preventive strike (should one be made) would almost certainly be conventional. The only conceivable deliberate use of nuclear weapons would be as a weapon of last resort, in the face of a conventional defeat. The probability of deliberate use might be higher in the Middle East, because a conventional defeat of Israel would probably be catastrophic for that state. But since 1973, the balance of conventional forces has tipped in Israel’s favour. The seriousness of the threat or use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East depends in part on the future evolution of this balance. In all

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cases, the acquisition of battlefield nuclear weapons would be a destabilizing development, but it appears to be still technologically remote. Last but not least, the probability of the use of nuclear weapons as a result of miscalculation or loss of control during a crisis (as opposed to accidental launching) should not be dismissed.76 The lack of secure second-strike forces in most new nuclear-weapon states and the adoption of LOW postures as a consequence, could result in strategic instability and could increase the probability of the use of nuclear weapons due to miscalculation. Summarizing our speculative analysis, if there were to be a nuclear war between new nuclear-weapon states, it would most likely result from a miscalculation, an accidental detonation or launching of a nuclear device, or be an act of desperation in the crisis or conventional war. The further spread of nuclear weapons would also make it even more difficult to come to grips with the existing (vertical) nuclear arms race. The larger the number and diversity of nuclear-weapon states, the more difficult it could be to agree on arms control and disarmament measures. Even a small number of new NWS would complicate negotiations considerably. And, however small the risk of each individual scenario may be, one should also consider the cumulative risk of all the possible dangers arising from assumed nuclear proliferation.

The proliferation of ballistic missiles: A threat assessment for the early twenty-first century Motivations of states: Why states acquire ballistic missiles? The spread of advanced weapons, such as ballistic missiles, is seen by many as symptomatic of the diffusion of industrial and military capacity in an international system no longer dominated to the same degree as in the past by the two superpowers and a few great powers. It can be argued that, in many cases, Third World states’ attempts to increase their political and military clout and influence through the acquisition of sophisticated weapons actually reflects the evolving multipolarity of the international system.77 As Martin Navias puts it, ‘this phenomenon must be viewed against the background of the increasing military and political autonomy of smaller states and their significant progress in developing scientific expertize and military industrial capabilities’.78 Or, as Thomas Mahnken observed, ‘witness the rise of a series of second- and third-tier regional powers with substantial military and economic power to support their increasingly ambitious political agendas. For those regional powers, the possession of advanced technologies more than raw military power symbolizes an advanced industrial capability and the ability to match the great powers in this high-prestige area.’79 Despite apparent diseconomies80 and rather dubious security advantages, they consider the ability to manufacture weapons a sina qua non of national sovereignty.81 It also constitutes a highly visible indicator of superiority over local rivals. Underlying all this is a shared belief – often ascribed to the example of the

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superpowers – that military power lends status and political clout in the international system. It is indeed ironic that rising regional powers are seizing upon these very symbols of national power just when the US and Russia are in the process of drastically reducing their own arsenals of ballistic missiles (and nuclear weapons). In addition to winning prestige, the developing countries acquired weapons of mass destruction for the same reasons that had motivated their great-power predecessors: to deter attack, intimidate enemies and build a technological base.82 According to Janne Nolan, ‘the systemic incentives driving developing countries’ arms programmes are consistent with those of the industrial world, ranging from national independence, enhanced security, economic and technological advancement, and diplomatic leverage. These factors differ in degree among countries, but the principal rationale for producing weapons is the perception of sovereignty.’83 Regional rivalries that lead to arms races constituted a major reason for the concentration of arms. According to Rodney Jones and Steven Hildreth, rivals tend to ‘judge the value of weapons systems or technologies not on the basis of pure economic utility against local threats, but rather in terms of whether they are as modern technologically as the systems their neighbours are acquiring’. Thus, the US-Soviet arms race was replicated in several volatile regions of the Third World.84 The acquisition of such weapons by some states may have motivated other states to acquire similar or equivalent weapons. The global superpower rivalry was another major cause. The USSR and the US provided ‘fuel’ for local conflicts; the US is still the largest supplier of all types of arms to the Middle East. Superpower competition created a situation in which anyone could ask for and receive practically anything that was ‘standard issue’ in Soviet and US arsenals.85 It should be conceded, however, that the superpowers were not always enthusiastic ‘pushers’ of these weapons, and occasionally they resisted demands for particular systems (such as the Pershing to Israel and the SS-23 to Syria). On the whole, however, the transfer of these technologies to the Middle East followed the same logic that explains the diffusion of other technologies: the perception that weapons are the currency by which political, strategic or commercial advantage can be gained or preserved in the Middle East. This was particularly evident with respect to the USSR.86 In a typical case of myopic policy, the great powers ignored for many years the proliferation of ballistic missiles and sought political advantage by arming their clients. In doing so, they presumed that the bipolar alignment of power would restrain regional conflicts. The preoccupation with East–West issues overshadowed problems in the Third World.87 There were four ways in which SSMs have spread throughout the Middle East (and the Third World in general). First, they have been exported to it from outside of the region. Second, there were transfers of missiles within the region.88 Third, countries have entered into agreements with other parties to develop missiles.89 Fourth, they developed their indigenous capabilities of missile production.90 The easiest method of developing a domestic system is to upgrade or reverse engineer a foreign-produced system already in one’s possession.91 This allows the developing country to avoid manufacturing many of the complex components noted

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above and enables it to copy, and in some instances to improve, range and payload characteristics.92 Once missiles are transferred to other states, they can be further modified.93 Most of the ballistic missiles in the Third World are of foreign origin. The great majority of all those currently operational were originally furnished by the USSR and, to a much lesser extent, the US and France, and even domestically manufactured Third World missiles rely on key foreign technologies.94 At the beginning of the missile proliferation era in the 1960s, the supply of missiles was restricted to a flow between the superpowers and selected clients. Greater restraint by the superpowers in the late 1970s and 1980s had little effect, since other suppliers entered the Middle Eastern missile market during that period. These included private companies based in Europe (that sold the necessary technology for indigenous programmes)95 and the so-called second-tier suppliers in the developing world,96 since missile exports are also a source of income for those states that export them.97 Ballistic missile production programmes provide a tangible example of the dedicated efforts by developing countries to acquire the means to prosecute national ambitions immune from the dictates of the great powers. With several developing states already serving as sources of technical assistance to other Third World producers, missile proliferation may become increasingly a matter of intraThird World diplomacy, potentially circumscribing the ability of industrial powers to impose meaningful trade controls or exert decisive influence over clients’ military policies.98 In some cases, initiating a missile or nuclear programme has accorded states greater access to weapons imports and co-production agreements from advanced countries in return for slowing or abandoning a programme. The preferred (and in some cases the only) instrument of dissuasion against missile producers has been to provide advanced conventional technologies which are considered less destabilizing.99 Finally, it should be noted that intra-Third World defence co-operation is becoming a far more important variable in international politics. Military and political utility of ballistic missiles Ballistic missiles had a considerable impact on the Iran–Iraq War,100 with the two countries engaging in the broadest use of surface-to-surface missiles against population centres and economic targets since the use of V-1 and V-2 rockets by Nazi Germany against Britain (and Belgium) during World War II (when the Germans launched some 4,300 missiles (V-1 and V-2), mostly against London and Antwerp, in the closing months of World War II in Europe, but they had no effect on the outcome of the war, other than causing significant damage and casualties).101 In the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq launched ballistic missiles (SCUD-B and its variants Al-Abbas and Al-Husayn) against population centres in Israel and (mainly) against military targets in Saudi Arabia. Some of these missiles were successfully intercepted by the US-made anti-missile system PATRIOT.102

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The experience from the Iran–Iraq War reinforced a lesson from previous conflicts. The effect of strategic bombardment with conventional munitions on the course of a war is likely to be determined far more by its effect in catalyzing public opinion103 and in shaping the overall political conditions affecting the war than by the size of the casualties or actual damage that is inflicted by the weapons involved. The importance of ballistic missiles increases considerably if they carry a chemical, biological or nuclear warhead. Experts claim that even those with a chemical warhead are more of a ‘terror weapon’ rather than weapons of mass destruction because large numbers of chemical weapons are needed to cause large casualties, and ballistic missiles have a limited payload.104 This widespread use of ballistic missiles in the Iran–Iraq War led to a change in military thinking at the end of the 1980s. One manifestation of this was that Israel considered itself to be facing a grave new threat: a possible attack by ballistic missiles with chemical warheads against airports, administrative centres and reserve troops depots by Arab countries in the event of a future Arab–Israeli clash. Saudi Arabia has also been supplied with medium-range ballistic missiles by China, to strengthen its defence and ward off Iraqi and Iranian expansionist designs. In terms of military effectiveness, the most significant advantage of ballistic missiles is their almost assured penetration capability. In addition, it is cheaper than a modern fighter aircraft ($1 million for a SCUD-B, $50
million for an F-16) and there is no need for trained pilots. Supersonic speeds impart considerable energy to ballistic missiles when they land, especially when the missile does not separate from the warhead or separates just before impact. The SCUD-B travels at three times the speed of sound when it lands, not only exploding unexpended fuel but causing considerable damage with the impact of its two-ton missile fuselage.105 However, ballistic missiles can be used only once, unlike aircraft. In range, payload and accuracy aircraft are superior to most Third World ballistic missiles (SCUD-derivatives) which can carry about 500 kg of payload to a range of about 300 km. Iraq’s local version of the SCUD, the Husayn, could carry 250 kg to 650 km. But the F-16 can carry about 2,000 kg to 1,000 km. The Soviet Su-24 can carry 3,000 kg to 1,300 km and the Tornado can carry a similar load to 1,400 km. The military value of ballistic missiles increases proportionally, however, if aircraft are unable to penetrate enemy air space, or casualties are expected to be very high.106 There seems to be a general consensus that the limited military utility of missiles produced in the Third World (probably) precludes any dramatic transformation of combat environments in the near term. For the time being, and for the region of the Middle East, aircrafts remain the most significant and lethal platforms for attacks against military targets.107 In trying to assess the effect of missile proliferation on stability, it is important to define stability. If crisis stability is defined as a situation ‘in which neither side can expect a lasting profit by actually initiating war’, as Martin Navias suggested, the concern is whether a weapons system that guarantees rapid penetration of enemy defences and is capable of delivering both conventional and non-conventional ordnance undermines or supports Third World deterrent postures. There isn’t any

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simple or single answer to this question. One must identify the circumstances in which missiles could be – or are perceived to be – decisive weapons. At the same time, it is essential to assess whether, in the course of a conflict, the possession of missile capabilities – either mutually or unilaterally – will induce protagonists to widen and intensify the struggle, or impose restraints for fear of escalation.108 One is inclined, however, to adopt the argument that Ali Dessouki, Seth Carus, Mark Heller and other analysts put forward, that, while the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is morally troubling (not just for developing but for developed countries as well), it has no definite unilinear influence. Rather, it could have both a stabilizing and a destabilizing impact at the same time. One may argue that it is the way arms are used, the balance of military forces, state perceptions of the nature of the threat, the political-military strategy they are employed to serve and the character of strategic relations between the opponents which determine the nature of their impact. These weapons have an inevitable outcome, however: they change the character of the future battlefield, and if war erupts, they enable adversaries to inflict massive destruction on one another. A weapon can be destabilizing if it ensures a decisive military victory or if it drastically changes the military balance. According to the same logic, the same weapon can be stabilizing if it redresses an existing imbalance and creates greater parity and equivalence. The majority of analysts seem to agree that the general effect of missile proliferation may be to undermine crisis stability, increase the costs of regional military rivalries and raise the risk of inadvertent confrontation,109 even if it is not according either side decisive military advantages.110 Mark Heller argued that, even if the use of missiles is avoided, their mere presence may encourage the outbreak or expansion of war by neutralizing the deterrent power that status quo regimes (e.g. Israel) formerly exercised through their ability to strike deep inside an aggressor’s territory.111 It is rather doubtful, however, that Syria or another Arab state would have decided to initiate war against Israel only because the former possessed missiles with conventional warheads. Possession of chemical warheads would complicate the situation, but, again, it would take much more than that to change the balance of forces in the Middle East. Recent missile proliferation developments Several missile-related events took place in the 1990s and early twenty-first century, including the SCUD attacks on Saudi Arabia and Israel in the 1991 Gulf War, the publication of the Rumsfeld Commission Report, North Korea’s missile activities and the missile diplomacy of India and Pakistan in the late 1990s. As Smith succinctly put it, ‘all helped to give prominence to missile proliferation, even as 9/11 gave a brutal reminder of other technologies and other enemies, and warned us not to overstate the missile issue’.112 It should be noted that in the past few years there has been no increase in the number of new missile states. While several programmes are a cause for serious concern and could develop into potential international threats, in general the

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ballistic missile threat is confined, limited and changing relatively slowly.113 However, both China and North Korea114 continue to play an important role in the proliferation of longer-range ballistic missiles and support the development of indigenous capacities for manufacture and modification.115 The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the practical disappearance of the Soviet threat had a less catalytic impact on American threat assessment and threat perceptions than one would have expected. The idea that some rogue state would develop an intercontinental ballistic missile and launch a NBC-armed warhead against the continental United States became the issue of heated debate in the mid-1990s, only to be eclipsed by the events of 9/11. However, despite heightened concerns about catastrophic terrorism, the deployment of a missile defence system is moving ahead more or less as planned. Of course, American missile defence initiatives and the transatlantic debates about them are hardly new. In the 1960s, the US pursued missile defence programmes (Sentinel and Safeguard) in the face of European scepticism about their utility and opportunity costs. Sentinel, however, was never deployed, and Safeguard was limited to the role of protecting selected ICBM sites, a role permitted by the ABM Treaty.116 The Reagan Administration’s Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) of the early 1980s was meant as a bold strike to replace entirely the logic of mutual destruction with that of mutual defence. SDI ignited a furious debate in and beyond the US about the merits of defence vs. deterrence. Yet it failed to overcome the technological obstacles to ballistic missile defence. By the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War had removed the motivation for SDI but left in place an ABM Treaty that had been agreed under conditions of US–Soviet confrontation and parity that no longer existed. In sum, the judgement in 1972, and for at least the decade that followed, was that missile defence was not needed because of technological difficulty, and not desirable because of the superpower arms race and crisis instabilities it could aggravate. Of course, because this judgement predated both the end of East–West confrontation and the onset of a dramatic technological revolution, it must be reconsidered in the new era.117 After Reagan left office, the political salience of strategic defences declined. But the idea of a national missile defence system remained on the US agenda.118 In 1995, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) issued a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on ‘Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years’, which concluded that ‘no country, other than the major declared nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states or Canada.’ Although the Gates Commission, headed by former DCI Robert Gates, found that the NIE made ‘a strong case that for sound technical reasons, the U.S. is unlikely to face an indigenously developed and tested ICBM threat from the Third World before 2010’, others were sceptical because of the inherent difficulty of the prediction, because the US Intelligence Community has missed innovations in the past, and because of the assistance countries like Russia and China were providing to rogue nations, particularly Iran, thus making the qualifier ‘indigenously’ of indeterminate value.119

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An assessment by an independent commission headed by former Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld in 1998 stated that the threats to the US were ‘broader, more mature, and emerging more rapidly’ than previous intelligence estimates had suggested; that such threats might appear ‘within about five years of a decision to acquire such a capability’ by states such as North Korea and Iran, or ten years in the case of Iraq; and that the ‘U.S. intelligence community’s ability to provide timely and accurate estimates of ballistic missile threats to the U.S. is eroding’.120 The bipartisan Rumsfeld Commission reached four major conclusions ●

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‘Concerted efforts by a number of overtly or potentially hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the U.S., its deployed forces, and its friends and allies’; North Korea, Iran and Iraq could inflict major damage on the US within five to ten years of a decision to acquire the capability; US intelligence community is incapable of determining when proliferant states might have made the decision to acquire WMD and long-range delivery systems.121

Dean Wilkening argued that the ‘Rumsfeld report portrayed a more serious ballistic-missile threat for three reasons. It did not assume that emerging ballistic missile states would require the same high standards for accuracy, reliability and safety that characterise U.S. and former-Soviet programmes, nor would they necessarily seek large arsenals. It assumed that extensive technical assistance from outside sources was readily available, notwithstanding the MTCR, and that countries were increasingly able to conceal important parts of their ballistic missile programmes.’122 Both the Rumsfeld Commission and a number of US analysts assumed that there was a serious possibility that North Korea,123 and perhaps Iran, would eventually acquire a very small inventory of relatively crude (but effective) nuclear-armed ICBMs.124 Not everyone in the US or in Europe agreed with that assessment.125 It has been argued that the Rumsfeld Commission’s assessment was more pessimistic than previous intelligence estimates, partly because it put more emphasis on what a state could do, particularly given the availability of foreign assistance, rather than on what it was known to have done or was judged likely to do.126 The threat assessment of the Rumsfeld Commission suggested that appropriate objectives for US missile defence are to protect against small intentional ballistic-missile attacks from countries to which ICBMs might proliferate in the future, and to protect against accidental or unauthorized ballistic-missile attacks from countries to which ICBMs might proliferate in the future, and to protect against accidental or unauthorized ballistic-missile launches by any state possessing ICBMs.127 Proponents of missile defences, both inside and outside the Bush administration, argue that absent missile defence, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the greater US vulnerability that this entails will significantly limit the US’s ability to

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secure its foreign policy goals. ‘A policy of intentional vulnerability by the Western nations’, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld argues, ‘could give rogue states the power to hold our people hostage to nuclear blackmail – in an effort to prevent us from projecting force to stop aggression’.128 Similarly, as Walter Slocombe, Under-secretary of Defence in the Clinton administration, asserted, ‘without defenses, potential aggressors might think that the threat of strikes against U.S. cities could coerce the U.S. into failing to meet its commitments’.129 According to Philip Gordon, the first and most fundamental factor seems to be the assessment, or more precisely the interpretation, of the potential threat. It is not so much that Europeans make different assessments about the growing ballistic and WMD capabilities of potentially hostile states, but rather that they question whether those states would ever have the intention of using such capabilities against the West.130 It is unlikely that any emerging ballistic-missile state will threaten, much less attack, the US, except under the most dire circumstances (e.g. if the leadership believes it has nothing left to lose by threatening an attack, perhaps to avert unconditional surrender in a war).131 Furthermore, even if a state would decide to use ballistic missiles against the US, the identity of the culprit would most likely not remain hidden.132 The dominant ‘alarmist’ threat assessment suggested that appropriate objectives for US missile defence are to protect against small intentional ballistic-missile attacks from countries to which ICBMs might proliferate in the future, and to protect against accidental or unauthorized ballistic-missile launches by any state possessing ICBMs.133 A third class of threat, a deliberate full-scale attack by Russia, is considered unlikely today (and it is highly unlikely that the US could build in the near future a defensive system that would be effective against a massive attack in any case).134 The following arguments have been used in favour of missile defence (the list is, of course, not exhaustive): ●

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The operational requirement for missile defence is simple enough. It stems primarily from the need of the US to be able to project ground forces into regions where they may be opposed by regional ballistic missile threats.135 ‘If there is even a small chance that a country will launch a missile topped with a NBC warhead, then is not some defense, however imperfect, better than none? Particularly if the goal of deploying such a defense is to provide some form of insurance, then clearly something is better than nothing.136 Nor do defenses need to be perfect on the first day they become operational – it is possible to improve and upgrade these systems over time, as additional research and testing is done.’137 It is difficult in a democracy for a political leader to eschew developing technologies that could mean preventing potential missile attacks on its civilian population.138 The logic of missile defence is that, for prospective proliferators such as North Korea or Iran, neither the NPT nor major arms reductions by the major nuclear powers are likely to deter their ambitions. Given US concern that, in future regional conflicts, adversaries such as Iran might obtain WMD

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capabilities that could constrain the US’s ability to mobilize coalitions and intervene, prudence counsels developing a capacity to neutralize the threat.139 Missile defence is needed to assure non-nuclear states that the US would be willing to protect them from aggression, even when backed by nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.140 On the other hand, of course, seeing the US move towards protecting itself from ballistic missile attacks can disturb not just the rogue states, but others who fear a US with both overwhelming offensive military power and effective defences. The US desire an added layer of security against emerging ballistic missile threats in the unlikely event that deterrence fails to prevent attack. Specifically, US leaders have cited the ‘act of desperation’ scenario as a probable scenario during a possible war with so-called rogue states. Some contend that an unseated implication is that the US does not want to be deterred itself by ballistic missile-capable states. ‘Missile defences would preclude the U.S. from being held hostage to coercive diplomacy or blackmail by rogue states. If diplomacy and deterrence break down – and there are circumstances under which this is conceivable – the U.S. currently feels that it must have the means to defend itself.’141 It could also reduce the danger that the US will be forced to threaten or resort to the use of nuclear weapons and augment deterrence by raising doubts about the success of a missile attack142 and create a sense of futility in the mind of the attacker.143 According to Anthony Cordesman, the ‘U.S. defense strategy for the 21st century seeks to shape the international security environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests, respond to the full spectrum of threats, and prepare for an uncertain future. Missile defense is a key component of this strategy. Missile defenses may contribute to the reduction and prevention of missile proliferation144 and strengthen regional stability by undermining the utility of ballistic missiles to potential aggressors, both critical for shaping the international security environment.’145

There was, and still is, strong opposition to missile defence. It has been argued that whether unilaterally developed and deployed, or co-operatively organized by a small group of states, defensive systems raise the following problems: ●

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Convincing the international community that the motivation behind these expensive development and deployment activities is the low probability, high consequence threat of the ‘countries of concern’, and not a more general aspiration to achieve global military hegemony; Clearly differentiating between a limited system that would not threaten the Russian and Chinese nuclear forces and thus ‘strategic stability’, and one capable of infinite expansion which would threaten the credibility of all other national nuclear deterrents.146

Opponents of MD argued that an assessment of the desirability of MD must begin with the nature of the threat posed by missiles to the US, its allies and its military

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forces deployed overseas. The main threat allegedly emanates from North Korea, Iran, and an extremely small number of other possible rogue states (which the alarmist school of thought usually refrains from identifying, with the exception, perhaps, of Syria). ●

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Every ‘sober’ and objective assessment of current and future capabilities would probably reach the same conclusion: Those emerging missile powers that might have the intent to strike at the US (e.g. North Korea, Iran) will not be able to field long-range missiles or ICBMs over the next 10 years147 (i.e. until approximately 2015), and those that could develop the capability (e.g. Israel, India, Pakistan) are not likely to have the intent. It is therefore unlikely that any country (other than China and Russia) would pose a direct ballistic missile threat to the US within the next 10 years.148 Missile defence sceptics argued on technical grounds that any system designed to intercept ICBMs during the mid-course state of flight was condemned to operational failure because it would be unable to deal with countermeasures (decoys) to be developed along with long-range missiles.149 Furthermore, there are many other ways that an attacker can strike at the American (or European) homeland.150 The currently contemplated national missile defence is only effective against systems with intercontinental ranges. It provides little or no defence against shorter-range, sea-launched ballistic missiles, cruise missiles or bombers.151 It provides no defence against CBRN weapons smuggled into the US or assembled on its soil. Missile defences should be deployed only after they are proven to work.152 Missiles represent one way by which states attempt to acquire some deterrent capability against these interventionist forces near their borders, and therefore missile defence may address a symptom whilst failing to deal with the underlying cause.153 Steven Miller argues that ‘missile defences will discourage proliferation. This is a plausible logic. But the opposite logic, which emphasizes that the deployment of missile defences is likely to produce offence-defence arms racing, commands wider support and is more fully supported by the historical evidence.’154

Leading analysts have expressed strong criticisms over US policy on missile defence. Francois Heisbourg has argued that ‘what Washington is telling the world through missile defence is that the U.S., which already commands 35 per cent of the world’s military expenditures, considers itself secure only if it now gets a missile shield in addition to the world’s most powerful conventional and nuclear forces’.155 According to Steven Miller, ‘massive American nuclear conventional capabilities are thought to be insufficient to deter potential adversaries. By contrast, even small states in possession of tiny WMD inventories are thought to be capable of deterring the U.S.’ William Pfaff voices a characteristic response when he says of the plans for missile defence, ‘they want a rush program to stop a missile threat widely held to be improbable, if it exists at all’.156

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Possible politico-military consequences It is tempting to dismiss the push for missile defence as being driven purely by domestic politics in the US,157 but the political popularity of missile defence is long-standing. What has changed in recent years is both the strategic context within which missile defence would be deployed and the nature of the threat confronting the US.158 Unlike the Cold War debates on missile defence, a broad bipartisan consensus has developed within the US political establishment in support of the basic idea that deploying missile defences, if handled properly, is likely to enhance rather than diminish US security.159 If missile defence were only about countering ballistic missiles deployed by rogue states, then whether to deploy missile defence would be a ‘normal’ national security issue. The military technical question would concern only feasibility. What makes missile defence special is its unavoidable connection to US strategic nuclear policy and to the US’s political relationships with Russia and China. Both states view US missile defence as a threat to their strategic nuclear capabilities and their relationship with the US.160 Furthermore, as Victor Utgoff points out, ‘U.S. development and deployment of effective defences against ballistic missile attack seems likely to have substantial effects on how nuclear forces around the world evolve, on how the threat posed by nuclear proliferation is perceived, and more generally how the world at large arranges for its security’.161 The impact of any missile defence upon Russia (especially if there is any significant European component into the missile defence system) appears to be heavily dependent upon the assimilation of Russia into a constructive US–Russia–NATO relationship, perhaps, inter alia, involving it having the role of a provider of technology and other assistance in building a European-based Missile Defence (EBMD). In its absence, Russia may regard the US–NATO partnership and the combination of missile defence and EBMD as devices to give the partners ‘unfettered freedom to intervene in the affairs of other regions using their advanced conventional weapons’.162 China’s situation differs from Russia’s for one reason: even a limited US missile defence system potentially threatens its current nuclear deterrent of approximately 20 ICBMs.163 The Chinese believe that missile defence will consolidate US hegemony. Beijing tends to view missile defence as part of a grand strategy for American domination, exacerbating the US inclination towards unilateralism and further strengthening America’s willingness to pursue a preemptive strategy.164 Quantitatively, there is widespread consensus that missile defence will have an important influence on the ultimate size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal.165 Given the importance that Beijing places on retaining a credible nuclear deterrent and preserving its ability to attack Taiwan – a core issue for Beijing – its willingness to punish the US if its interests are harmed should not be doubted.166 For that reason, the US stands to gain little by engaging in an offensive-defensive competition with Beijing.167 It has been suggested that the parties have time to begin a strategic dialogue and work out an informal accord. According to one possible scenario, Washington would acquiesce to a limited

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degree of military modernization on China’s part – possibly including the acquisition of additional ICBMs – in exchange for China’s acceptance of missile defence within certain broad limits.168 Several European countries have reluctantly, and in some cases with privately expressed misgivings, come to recognize the depth of US feeling on this issue. Barring a major technological setback in the near future, the question increasingly appears to be not whether the US will deploy missile defence, but what kinds of systems it will choose.169 One of the concerns for the international community is that national policies might jeopardize the international legal order related to the use of WMD. For example, as Yannis Stivacthis has argued, the ‘decision of the U.S. to produce and deploy anti-ballistic missiles as well as to demand the revision and modification of the ABM Treaty may provide other states with an excuse to produce and deploy weapon systems that are currently prohibited and then ask for the revision and modification of the relevant treaties’.170 Another important issue concerns the implications of MD for outer space. Currently, this realm is, at least in principle, a weapon-free environment, supported by a limited treaty regime (the Outer Space Treaty) and a number of tacit agreements against militarization. However, in the absence of specific treaties banning anti-satellite weapons, a US missile defence deployment that relies on space-based components may open a Pandora’s box of possible responses by other states. Even a limited anti-missile shield that relied on spacebased sensors could provoke the speedier development of anti-satellite weapons and thus an arms race in space.171 Possible ramifications of testing weapons in space include the stimulation of foreign space-based military development; an increase in orbiting space debris; problems of maintenance of space assets; and the political effects of deployment on US international standing.172

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In the 1990s there were a number of attempted acts of mass killing. Al-Qaeda came close to achieving it at the World Trade Center in 1993, as did Aum Shinrikyo in 1995.1 But, as Gurr and Cole argue, it was not until 9/11 that the world finally crossed the threshold into the era of mass killing in which terrorists proved to be both willing and able to execute their plans.2 As Anat Kurz points out, the ‘9/11 attack itself, even though non-conventional weapons were not used, indicated that a threshold was crossed in terms of casualties and destruction, as well as in audacity and brazenness. This implied that a “logical” next step would be a non-conventional attack.’3 The 9/11 attacks were a shock, but they should not have come as a surprise. Islamic extremists had given plenty of warning that they meant to kill Americans indiscriminately and in large numbers.4 Although Osama bin Laden himself would not emerge as a major terrorist figure until the mid- to late-1990s, the threat of Islamist terrorism grew over the decade.5 The possibility of acts of terrorism6 involving the use or threat of use of nuclear, radiological, biological or chemical weapons should not be underestimated nor overestimated. A sober and accurate analysis and assessment are essential since many analysts perceive this as the most serious actual or potential threat to the US and the West. Developments of the past few years, from reports of nuclear smuggling out of the former Soviet Union7 and the greater availability and accessibility of fissile material in various parts of the globe,8 to the terrorist use of nerve gas in a Tokyo subway, to the increasing number of potential targets in civil nuclear programmes, to the rapid diffusion of technologies applicable to the manufacture of BW, have heightened fear of the WMD terrorist threat to national and international security.9 The bombings at the World Trade Center in New York in 1993 and at the Federal Office Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, the tragic events of 11 September 2001 and the anthrax letters of September 200110 have raised the issue of domestic vulnerability to NBC terrorism in congressional and other circles in the US and, perhaps to a lesser extent, European countries.11 In fact, warnings about terrorists’ use of WMD are not new. The same concerns have been voiced since the end of the 1970s. There was only one – classified as unsuccessful – WMD attack, the 1995 use of Sarin gas by Aum Shinrikyo. Have any parameters of the security equation actually changed, thus making the

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acquisition and use of such weapons easier and more probable? The central issue is that of technical and political constraints, as well as political incentives. Therefore, the following questions need to be examined: (1) Are non-state actors12 capable of manufacturing or otherwise acquiring WMD? (2) Which terrorist groups would be more attracted to such weapons? and (3) If they manage to acquire NBC weapons, will terrorist groups decide to use them? Concerning the question of whether non-state actors are capable of manufacturing WMD, there are thousands of professional papers, monographs and books on the manufacturing of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Could the terrorists manufacture their own nuclear weapon? Such a process would involve three stages: (1) obtaining fissionable material; (2) designing the bomb; and (3) producing and assembling the weapon. To carry out those stages would require specialists in several different disciplines. Financial resources and freedom of action within the confines of a certain territory would be necessary. Any layman could easily become confused by rather contradictory assessments. According to the distinguished physicist Carson Mark, building a nuclear device would be difficult, time consuming and expensive.13 Sceptics argue that the terrorist group must manifest a determination to complete a task lasting a long time (perhaps even years). Moreover, the fabrication of a nuclear explosive is a complex matter, especially if the weapon is expected to be highly reliable. It is questionable whether a large enough group of people with the necessary skills could be assembled to achieve such an objective. In addition, for some of the same reasons that will dissuade supporting states from providing nuclear weapons to terrorists, host states would be unlikely to provide terrorists with the necessary freedom of action. On the other hand, Manhattan Project scientist Luis Alvarez and nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor argued that, once the terrorists had the fissile material, it would be easy to build the device. A classified study by Zimmerman makes the case that building a successful high-yield improvized nuclear device is a project probably requiring a year or more and costing in the $100,000–$1,000,000 range, even if HEU or plutonium is readily available.14 Other analysts argue that a terrorist group could, at best, produce a simple nuclear explosive device that would only be capable of generating a nuclear explosion. Like the nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, it would have a simple design, would require a large amount of nuclear material15 and would have a large mass that could only be transported by ship, boat or lorry, but not by a ballistic missile. Besides which, the creators of such a bomb could never be entirely sure that it would really explode.16 Therefore, despite this divergence of views, there are many experts who consider the manufacture of a simple nuclear weapon a difficult but feasible task. There is increasing concern about a different type of nuclear threat. Even though most of the material on sale in the ‘nuclear black-market’ or exposed in various nuclear installations around the world cannot be classified as fissile material, highly toxic radioactive agents can be used for the manufacture of a crude, nonfissionable radiological weapon (so-called ‘dirty bomb’). Such a device would not

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only physically destroy a target of rather limited size, but, more importantly, also contaminate the surrounding area (see section on nuclear scenarios below).17 It has been argued that the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons would present rather limited technical challenges.18 There are no meaningful controls on the availability of chemicals, and what limited control exists over pathogenic cultures can be overcome in a variety of ways. Perhaps most important is the fact that the chemical and biological materials can be produced under the cover of an apparently legitimate commercial venture such as a small research company, fine chemical manufacturer or bio-medical laboratory.19 The production of blister agents is within the reach of well-motivated non-state actors with certain financial assets. It is estimated that a sulphur mustard production plant with air-handling capabilities costs between $5 million and $10 million to build. To put this figure in context, the CIA estimated that al-Qaeda spent around $30 million each year on expenses, including terrorist operations, salaries and maintenance on terrorist training camps prior to Operation Enduring Freedom.20 There seems to be general agreement, therefore, that technical barriers for CW production and dissemination are low and within the reach of subnational groups and terrorist organizations. Weaponization is more problematic, but may not be a requirement for these groups.21 According to another source, the technical challenge is equivalent to the clandestine production of chemical narcotics or the refinement of heroin. A more specific assessment, perhaps overtly pessimistic, suggests that the development of BW would cost less than $100,000, require five biologists, and take just a few weeks using equipment that is readily available.22 Biological agents may appeal to non-state actors for a variety of reasons. First, the delay between infection and the appearance of symptoms can help maximize the reach of an attack. Second, the potential for contagion may lead to ripple effects without additional action by the attacker.23 Third, the presence of non-specific symptoms such as those commonly associated with common colds can further magnify the effect of an attack. Fourth, difficulties in detecting an attack and its source may attract individuals or groups who want to remain anonymous.24 Disincentives for the use of biological weapons by terrorist groups might include the following: (a) The effects occurring after the release of biological weapons cannot be controlled.25 Instead of having an overwhelming efficiency, the effects of such bioweapons could just ‘fizzle out’ (see the example of Aum Shinrikyo);26 (b) Terrorists usually have an aversion to producing large numbers of casualties, although 9/11 demonstrated that Al-Qaeda is not constrained by that factor. It remains to be seen whether Al-Qaeda is an exception or a new trend, even if that involves only a tiny minority of terrorist organizations;27 (c) The use of BW might undermine support for the group by members or sympathizers and might provoke a reaction from the government attacked. Together, these might endanger the survival of the terrorist group;28 and (d) The lack of interest in BW can also be explained by the complexity of BW programmes, as compared to traditional terrorist means.29 How easy may it be for terrorists (as opposed to state actors) to successfully use CBW in an attack causing mass casualties? Have non-state actors actually

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attempted to use CBW? And if it is easy to produce and disperse CB agents, why have there been no successful terrorist attacks before or since the Tokyo subway incident? Dissemination of BW agents poses significant technical hurdles. According to Jonathan Tucker, whereas persistent chemical agents such as sulphur mustard and VX nerve gas are readily absorbed through the intact skin, no bacteria and viruses can enter the body unless the skin has already been broken.30 Although aerosol delivery is potentially the most lethal way of delivering a biological attack, it involves major technical hurdles that most terrorists would be unlikely to overcome.31 On the question of use, it is important to remember that even Aum Shinrikyo, which had considerable financial resources, front companies, and members with scientific talents, failed in all 10 of its BW attacks.32 Spyer maintains that serious technical difficulties remain, however, for terrorist organizations wishing to make use of such weaponry, stressing that the storage and effective dissemination of most CBW requires specialized knowledge and equipment not easily obtained by non-state actors, unless acting with state support or sponsorship.33 According to Lindstrom, however, with information on the production stage increasingly available, certain analysts argue that production is easier today than a few years ago.34 On the issue of the historical record, as mentioned in an authoritative study by Ron Purver, until 1986 ‘there have been more than 50 CBW incidents involving terrorists or other non-state actors in recent years, a figure which reportedly represents only the so-called tip of the iceberg since federal authorities in the US believe that there have been more incidents, but that most have gone unrecognized for what they really were’.35 David Rapoport reports that ‘excluding military efforts, 70 biological attacks, including 18 terrorist ones, have occurred since the beginning of the twentieth century, occasioning nine deaths and 985 casualties. Forty-five of those attacks have occurred in the last decade which indicates great interest now in biological weapons however unimpressive the demonstrated capacities to use those weapons are.’36 A slightly different estimate is given by Gustav Lindstrom, who argues that ‘CBW-related deaths since the early 1990s as a result of terrorist attacks are estimated to be in the mid-twenties. The figure is small compared with figures resulting from international terrorism (625 deaths in 2003, 725 in 2002). If we take into account both domestic and international terrorism, there were 1,165 incidents world-wide in 2003, resulting in 1,133 fatalities. In turn, these figures pale in comparison with the number of people affected by other global threats. For example, according to the WHO, over 14 million people die each year from preventable infectious diseases. Thus, when CBW-related deaths are put in perspective, there seems to be minimal cause for concern.’37 This may sound reassuring, but the picture would change dramatically with even a single successful CBW attack. The congressionally mandated TOPOFF exercise, co-sponsored by the US Justice Department and FEMA in early 2000, and the DARK WINTER38 simulation conducted in June 2001 by several prominent former US officials have highlighted the dire implications of a biological attack. In each exercise, the hypothetical attack was successful because medical

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and emergency personnel did not know how to diagnose unusual symptoms, and the local medical infrastructure collapsed. Daunting complications also arose with respect to quarantine laws and information management. Analysts assessed that hundreds of thousands could have died had the simulated circumstances been real.39 For obvious reasons, possible nuclear scenarios have been analysed much more extensively. According to the related bibliography, terrorists could ‘go nuclear’ in a variety of ways:40 ● ●

●

●

The theft and detonation of an intact nuclear weapon; The theft or purchase of fissile material leading to the fabrication and detonation of a crude nuclear weapon – an improvised nuclear device (IND);41 Attacks against and sabotage of nuclear facilities, in particular nuclear power plants,42 causing the release of large amounts of radioactivity;43 The unauthorized acquisition of radioactive materials contributing to the fabrication and detonation of a radiological dispersion device (RDD) – a dirty bomb.44

Radioactive material suitable for use in a RDD may be found, stolen or purchased legally. Given the relatively weak laws and regulations surrounding the storage, sale and shipment of radiological material, coupled with the vast number of orphaned and unprotected sources located throughout Russia and former Soviet states, as well as the US and other developed countries, a determined and well-financed group could obtain even quite large sources.45 ‘Importing’ the fissile material or the device in the US is considered to be feasible.46 The immediate impact of an RDD is likely to be limited. It is thought that a likely RDD scenario involves approximately 20 deaths and 500 injured – all caused by the effects of the explosives. A large group of people, most likely in the thousands (if the event takes place in a heavily populated area), will think they are contaminated. This can result in mass panic, evacuations and saturation of the health services. The psychological dimension of an RDD attack has a significant human and financial cost.47 It is likely that any RDD involving more than a few curies or radioactive material will contaminate some areas so heavily that decontamination will not be attempted. The areas will either be abandoned (as was the town of Pripyat, near the Chernobyl reactor) or fenced, or the buildings will be razed and the soil scraped to the depth of a metre or so, and both buildings waste and soil will be taken to a low-level radioactive waste depository (as happened in Goiania).48 As Zimmerman and Loeb point out, the economic impact on a major metropolitan area from a successful RDD attack is likely to equal and perhaps even exceed that of 9/11 attacks in New York City and Washington DC. The estimated cost of returning the lower Manhattan area to the condition prior to the September terrorist attacks was in excess of $30 billion. The immediate response exceeded $11 billion. Much of the private cost of recovery from the 9/11 attacks was paid by insurance. That would not be the case following an RDD attack,

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because radiation is a specifically excluded risk in virtually all policies written in the US. The government will have to step in to subsidize economic recovery after an attack, or some form of insurance reform will have to occur before an attack, in order to facilitate economic recovery.49 On the other hand, ‘dirty bombs’ are weapons of mass disruption, not mass destruction. Experts at Los Alamos National Laboratory who studied this threat concluded that ‘a RDD attack somewhere in the world is overdue’. According to Graham Allison, however, ‘as one national security official related, if a RDD was the best shot Al-Qaeda could now take, we should declare victory’.50 Theft of an assembled nuclear weapon from a nuclear-weapon state is another possibility. The existence of PALs on the nuclear weapons of ‘older’ nuclear powers makes these weapons useless if they fall into the hands of terrorists or unauthorized personnel.51 However, new nuclear-weapon states’ forces may not be equipped with PALs.52 They could, thus, become a target for terrorists. The very small number of such facilities and the fact that they would be very well guarded minimizes but does not eliminate the risk. As Graham Allison points out, ‘neither India’s nor Pakistan’s weapons are fitted with locks, nor are most old enough to require reconditioning. Moreover, each of these arsenals has been deployed with an eye, first, to preventing the other from disarming it in a pre-emptive attack, and only secondarily to preventing insider theft. If terrorists obtain a bomb from the Asian subcontinent, they will be able to use it immediately.’53 Another scenario, and one that is directly linked with nuclear proliferation, is the provision of a nuclear weapon by a state to a terrorist group.54 One view among experts is that terrorist groups operating with state support are likely to have a greater capability and fewer inhibitions.55 However, the transfer of a device to a terrorist group from a sympathetic government, most likely on a covert basis to avoid retaliation, would not be a simple matter. Such a state would have to consider that there would be some probability of Western intelligence penetration somewhere along the chain between her and the terrorist group: that the risk that the source of the nuclear device be discovered and that as a result she might attract lethal retaliation.56 In fact, the state supporting terrorism should consider that they might attract an Israeli or US strike, even if the weapon’s source were not discovered. In addition, it would have to consider the possibility that the terrorists might turn around and use the nuclear device to blackmail her.57 The plausibility of state-supported nuclear terrorism is further limited by the fact that the five existing nuclear-weapon states would not give nuclear weapons to terrorists, neither would Israel, India, Pakistan or Iran, if and when the latter acquired nuclear weapons. Although the author is not in a position to authoritatively evaluate the moral constraints of the North Korean leadership, it is more likely than not that concern about the possible consequences would constitute a sufficiently strong disincentive for this country, as well as any other. A degree of certainty that such an act would go undetected or unpunished might, however, change the calculus. Therefore, while terrorist organizations are routinely sponsored by some states, there is no evidence that even ‘rogue’ states have been prepared to supply WMD

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to such groups and it is plausible to argue that this would only be contemplated in extreme situations; for example, involving a regime’s survival.58 Gavin Cameron agrees with that assessment, but argues that ‘more likely than state sponsorship is the possibility that military or scientific elites in some states might be willing, for ideological or financial reasons, to provide nuclear weapons, materiel or expertize to terrorist organizations’.59 Regarding the possible consequences of WMD terrorism, as correctly pointed out by Jessica Stern, the impact of international terrorism has derived thus far much more from the fearful reaction it generates than from its actual physical effects. Terrorists aim to make a target group feel vulnerable, and they often succeed.60 When it comes to non-conventional terrorism, an assessment of the consequences is rather uncertain as it varies according to a number of factors, such as the type and amount of agent used, its dispersion method, meteorological conditions, the target struck and societal reactions to the event. Richard Falkenrath identifies seven consequences of a WMD attack: casualties, contamination, panic (as demonstrated by the anthrax letters of 2001), degraded response capabilities, economic damage, loss of strategic position, social-psychological damage and political damage. Public expressions of paranoia, xenophobia, isolationism and vengeful fury could become powerful influences on foreign policy. There could be a loss of confidence in the government because of its inability to prevent the attack, and society would demand action from its government.61

Who might acquire and use WMD? Although new adversaries with new motivation and new rationales, seeking to maximize both damage and political impact by trying to cause more casualties,62 have indeed appeared in recent years, their emergence has yet to produce any of the anticipated changes in either terrorist weaponry or tactics that were predicted to follow in the wake of the Aum Shinrikyo’s nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway.63 Instead, the gun and the explosives continue to be the terrorists’ main weapons of choice, as has been the case for more than a century.64 WMD have not yet been regarded as weapons of choice for non-state actors, as they require a higher level of technological expertize65 and cause a level of damage that might seriously endanger support for whichever group attempted to use them.66 According to Ferguson and Potter, the factors influencing terrorists who decide not to resort to WMD terrorism are numerous and can be divided into four groups: philosophical or moral issues, implementation challenges, response fears and insufficient capability.67 However, other analysts argue that the nature of terrorism seemed to have changed fundamentally. Terrorists no longer seemed bound by previous limits, when they sought attention to their cause, not deaths. Already by the mid-1990s, terrorists sought mass and indiscriminate killing and justified it by invoking higher, religious authorities.68 Furthermore, it appears that at least some terrorists have come to believe that attention is no longer as readily obtained as it once was. To their minds, ‘both the public and media have become increasingly desensitized

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to the continuing spiral of terrorist violence. Accordingly, these terrorists feel themselves pushed to undertake even more dramatic or destructively lethal deeds today in order to achieve the same effect that a less ambitious or bloody action may have had in the past.’69 There are many terrorist groups world-wide, not just Muslim groups or fundamentalist groups or those in the Middle East or South Asia. Their motivation is not only poverty and ignorance, as is often alleged, but also revenge for past humiliations and despair. Of course, different terrorist groups have different motivations and ideologies, so there is no such thing as a ‘stereotypical terrorist’.70 Today, the more traditional and familiar types of ethnic/nationalist and separatist as well as ideological groups have been joined by a variety of organizations with less comprehensible nationalist or ideological motivations. According to Ian Lesser, these new terrorist organizations ‘embrace far more amorphous religious and millenarian aims and wrap themselves in less-cohesive organizational entities, with a more diffuse structure and membership’.71 Historically, terrorist organizations with concrete political agendas, such as social-revolutionary or nationalist–separatist groups, have not sought to acquire or use weapons of mass destruction or otherwise cause mass casualties. In addition to moral constraints, the most important consideration appears to be that since such groups are trying to win popular support, they would refrain from acts that would alienate public opinion.72 In contrast, groups that are predominantly religious in character appear to believe that mobilizing their constituency is best achieved not by limiting violence, but in pursuing heightened levels of violence directed against clearly defined enemies,73 which their constituency also identifies as their enemy.74 Of great concern are the ‘new terrorists’ who have come to dominate the post-9/11 dialogue on terrorism.75 These groups are hybrids in that they have both political and religious motivations and objectives, which are tightly intertwined with their rhetoric, ideology and action.76 Sebastyen Gorka argues that ‘one important common denominator amongst the vast majority of those sub-state actors that used political violence in previous decades was that the end-state they wished to achieve was at least theoretically possible’.77 On the contrary, as pointed out by Anat Kurz, ‘the strategic objective at which al-Qaeda is aiming – renewal of the Islamic caliphate – places rapprochement and compromise out of the question. For this reason an organization like al-Qaeda does not restrain its activities out of a drive to create a positive image, which will prepare the ground for its participation in a political process.’78 This analysis suggests that the greatest danger of NBC terrorism lies with two groups: religious extremists (both religious-fundamentalist terrorists79 and millenarian cults) and right-wing extremists. Transnational radical Islamists, as exemplified by Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network, are of particular concern.80 Another question regards individuals and splinter groups within other groups, who might be willing to accept extremely high levels of indiscriminate casualties in planning attacks against specific targets.81 As al-Qaeda is, in the minds of most analysts and officials, the prime suspect for a terrorist act involving NBC weapons, it might be interesting to look closer

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at this organization’s aims and objectives. In 1988, al-Qaeda al-sulbah (‘the solid base’) was founded, as an organizational structure intended to maintain the links between the ‘Afghan Arabs’ for further jihad operations after the conclusion of the Afghan war. In the course of the 1990s, both al-Qaeda’s organizational base and the idea that drove it underwent considerable change and development. From an organization whose primary concern had been the presence of infidel forces in Saudi Arabia, al-Qaeda from the mid-1990s onwards began to stress broader themes and grievances.82 Also, from an organization that had been built around the core of Arab veterans of the Afghan war, al-Qaeda began to expand to form a linking network, bringing together radical Islamist organizations in many different parts of the world.83 Having lost its physical base, after the defeat of the Taliban in 2001, and some high-quality personnel, thanks to determined efforts by Western law enforcement, intelligence and armed forces, al-Qaeda has searched for and found new bases of operation. Al-Qaeda activists are playing a key role in the insurgency in Iraq (despite the fact that it did not have a presence in the country before the 2003 war).84 Of crucial significance, too, is the return of al-Qaeda to active militancy in Saudi Arabia. Other areas of importance, all of which host their own local Islamist insurgency, are Mindanao in the Philippines, the Bangladesh–Myanmar border, Yemen, Somalia, Chechnya, the Pankisi Valley in Georgia, and, of course, the Afghan–Pakistan border.85 It is argued that the organization has become fragmented.86 Experts consider that, in the period ahead, al-Qaeda will increasingly work through the three dozen constituent Islamist organizations that it has been helping to train and finance over the last decade.87 Among the Islamist groups with whom al-Qaeda operatives are today working are Jemma Islamiya (South-east Asian group that carried out the Bali bombing, with al-Qaeda experts assisting), al-Ittihad al-Islami (Horn of Africa), al-Ansar Mujahidin (Caucasus), Tunisian Combatants Group, Jayash-e Mohammad (South Asia), Salafi group for Call and Combat (GSPC, active in North Africa, Europe and North America), as well as a number of smaller groups in Europe and the Middle East. Indeed, a troubling development is that – to an extent as a result of globalization – non-state criminal organizations and terrorist groups have begun organizing themselves into networks or virtual networks rather than large organizations, often with the explicit purpose of evading law enforcement detection. International terrorist organizations, similarly, are forming loose affiliations that operate across national boundaries, making them harder to identify, penetrate and stop.88 As a result, the leadership of the movement is more dispersed, and the network thereby made more robust.89 Is al-Qaeda interested in acquiring WMD? Has this organization attempted to acquire WMD? Bin Laden reportedly has stated that If the Israelis are killing the small children in Palestine and the Americans are killing the innocent people in Iraq, and if the majority of the American people support their dissolute president, this means the American people are fighting

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and that Acquiring weapons for the defence of Muslims is a religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so. And if I seek to acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims.91 Furthermore, he stated in a May 1998 interview that We do not differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and civilians; they are all targets in this fatwa. . . . American history does not distinguish between civilians and military, and not even women and children. They are the ones who used the bombs against Nagasaki. Can these bombs distinguish between infants and military? . . . The only way for us to fend off these assaults is to use similar means.92 After the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaeda spokesman Abu Gheith wrote: We have not reached parity with them. We have the right to kill four million Americans – two million of them children – and to exile twice as many and wound and cripple hundreds of thousands. Furthermore, it is our right to fight them with chemical and biological weapons, so as to afflict them with the fatal maladies that have afflicted the Muslims because of the [American] CBW.93 It is argued that al-Qaeda has attempted to develop a biological and chemical capability94 and that the organization probably may even have the ability to carry out small-scale operations involving the use of CBW. However, according to the IISS, documents ‘obtained in al-Qaeda hideouts in Afghanistan provided vivid details that al-Qaeda was seeking NBC weapons. Upon analysis, it seemed that al-Qaeda’s efforts to obtain WMD were largely unsuccessful, but that assessment was construed as merely emphasizing the point that terrorists were most likely to obtain WMD through state assistance.’95 Furthermore, as Jonathan Spyer observed, while in theory al-Qaeda may have the ability to use a CBW, it is highly unlikely that its use would actually result in massive casualties – especially when compared to al-Qaeda’s proven ability to cause large-scale loss of life using conventional weapons. Moreover, should al-Qaeda launch a chemical

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or biological attack that resulted in few casualties, it might actually undermine al-Qaeda’s ability to instil fear and uncertainty in the societies it seeks to disrupt – a psychological asset with which a terrorist group will be loath to part. These technical hurdles may form a major element explaining why until now there has been no major attack by al-Qaeda using CBW, despite the considerable evidence that the network possesses some capabilities in this regard.96 As for nuclear weapons, Tom Fingar, US Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, stated that: ‘We have seen no persuasive evidence that al-Qaeda has obtained fissile material or ever has had a serious and sustained program to do so’.97

A risk assessment98 If one assumes that technical hurdles for the manufacture of NBC weapons are considerable and only a handful99 (or perhaps only one: Al-Qaeda100) of terrorist groups would be capable of overcoming the technical challenges, the central question remains, therefore, whether terrorists are willing to use weapons of mass destruction. Debate about this question tends to be conducted in extremes (between complacency and paranoia).101 Optimists suggest that terrorists ‘want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead’, that they prefer ‘patient harassment’ to large-scale murder and are unlikely to turn to unconventional weapons.102 Such optimism ignores the fact that terrorism is not a static phenomenon. Although change tends to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, new modes of terrorism have emerged over the years. If one looks at the methods or technologies used in the 9/11 attacks, the optimist argument is accurate. If one focuses on the intended or final number of casualties, then we are faced with an important shift in terrorist methods and aims. In the words of George Quester, ‘one would have to be extremely optimistic to conclude in the face of these terrorist attacks, on buildings normally housing some 65,000 people, that terrorist use of nuclear weapons is not more likely – if such weapons were ever to slip into terrorist hands’.103 Furthermore, there is little doubt about the willingness of many terrorists to offer their lives, if necessary. According to a rather alarmist view, ‘even if the threatened retaliation would, from the Western perspective, impose unacceptable costs on an enemy, what constitutes unacceptable costs in one culture may not necessarily be unacceptable to decision makers who weigh and calculate costs and benefits differently and who operate in a strategic culture vastly different from the Western tradition’.104 The issue at hand is, of course, quite complex. One would have to examine the possible motives of terrorists and ask what the political and physical risks are.105 On the list of incentives, as Ferguson and Potter are pointing out, ‘consider the impact should a nuclear weapon be detonated inside the US – terrorists would achieve the goals not only of killing many Americans, but also of psychologically

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scarring the American public, perhaps even undermining the public’s willingness to be global leaders or causing the U.S. government to strike out in excessive retaliation, thus triggering a clash of civilizations’.106 Furthermore, the possession of WMD would allow a terrorist group to blackmail governments and perhaps achieve one or more of its objectives, although this success may be short-lived. What negative reactions might terrorists expect following their use of NBC material or weapons to cause mass casualties? Murder on a massive scale could be expected to provoke widespread world revulsion, erode support among sympathizers,107 cause severe governmental reactions,108 provoke retaliation109 against the domestic or international supporters of the terrorists and their bases of operation, and, finally, divide the group and open it to betrayal. According to Jeffrey Simon, the absence of large-scale terrorist incidents involving WMD can be attributed to the above factors plus the fact that terrorists are unfamiliar with and some of them may be fearful of the personal risks involved in using WMD110 and may, therefore, perceive conventional attacks as meeting their objectives.111 Ferguson and Potter argued that (a) ‘the lack of a precedent stands out as a major deterrent to nuclear terrorism by suggesting that other groups have found this option too difficult or too dangerous in view of the scale of likely retaliation. Once that precedent has been set, however, the playing field will change dramatically’;112 and (b) ‘the difficult task of effectively dispersing a chemical or biological agent – as the Aum Sinrikyo case proved – has arguably acted as a significant deterrent to other terrorist groups’.113 Anat Kurz puts forward an additional factor, arguing that the ‘warning and defence systems developed and implemented over the years and the efforts devoted to prevention of unauthorized transfer of non-conventional materials and technologies have arrested [slowed] the spread of non-conventional terrorism, at least for the moment’.114 According to Judith Miller, the debate in Washington about the likelihood of such an attack usually reflects one of three schools of thought. First, there is the ‘not if but when’ group, which believes it is only a question of time before a terrorist group launches a major attack against an American target at home or abroad.115 Hence, advocates of this view argue, the federal government should spend massively on homeland defence, and launch multifaceted programmes aimed at protecting Americans against an inevitable threat.116 By contrast, proponents of the second school argue that, because an NBC attack is much harder to carry out than is commonly understood, it is unlikely that an aggressor will try to conduct one.117 Therefore, they reason, the US should not spend much countering what is at best an improbable threat.118 The third school’s motto is ‘low probability, but high consequences’. This middle ground between doomsayers and optimists holds that the US must take practical, cost-effective steps to protect American military forces and civilians against even the improbable event of a bio-attack, because the damage inflicted could be devastating.119 One could hardly disagree with the argument that the likelihood that a terrorist group could successfully combine the material resources, technical skills and motivations necessary to perpetrate an act resulting in mass destruction remains

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Motives

No population to retaliate against

Technical–financial capabilities

Willingness to kill a large number of people

Figure 4.1 WMD terrorism.

low, but the results could have the highest level of consequences for society.120 However, as terrorism expert Brian Jenkins argues, ‘the fact that, despite nearly three decades of intense world-wide terrorist activity and more than 25 years of warnings, nuclear terrorism has not occurred suggests that nuclear terrorism is neither attractive nor as easy as it is often imagined. In addition to the technical difficulties . . . it appears that terrorists still make other calculations of a moral or political nature that dissuade them from going nuclear. In other words, terrorist violence still appears to be limited by self-imposed constraints although these seem to be gradually eroding.’121 According to an experienced observer of the terrorist phenomenon, John Parachini, ‘the few historical cases of terrorist interest in and acquisition of CBRN weapons make for a comparatively small data set to formulate general observations about the potential for terrorists to use unconventional weapons successfully. Furthermore, the details of many of these cases are sketchy and often ambiguous, which only further complicates the task of accurately portraying the scope and magnitude of the threat. With these uncertainties, many people will understandably hedge against the unknown and err on the side of finding the threat potential high.’ The author takes the middle ground in this debate, arguing that the risk of unconventional terrorism is small but growing. Moreover, its high consequences are forcing the targeted countries to increase efforts to prevent an act of NBC terrorism. Some terrorists do want a lot of people dead or injured, and they are increasingly considering unconventional weapons with this goal in mind.

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Candidates for employing these weapons are found at the intersection of three subsets: terrorists who want to use the weapons despite formidable political costs, terrorists who are able to acquire or produce them and terrorists who have the ability to deliver or disseminate them covertly. It can be argued that the area created by the intersection of these sets is small but growing, especially for ‘low technology’ attacks such as disseminating chemical or biological agents in an enclosed space. Such attacks would not kill millions, but their effects still could be devastating.122 Indeed, if mass casualties are not the aim and the use of CBW alone meets the terrorists’ purpose (i.e. to cause panic), the risk of an incident occurring is higher.

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Ballistic missiles proliferation In terms of military efficiency, the destructive power of conventionally loaded missiles – often with poor target precision – is small in comparison to modern aircraft. In terms of military utility, not only quality but also quantities are important. Given the limited arsenals of missiles of Third World states, it is hard to imagine a strategically relevant threat unless NBC weapons are involved. In most cases the missile arsenals of developing states do not exceed the total of 600 SCUD-B or C, with the average being much lower. To put this figure into perspective, during World War II Germany fired approximately 4,300 V-1 and V-2 rockets and missiles at targets in Britain, without affecting the course of the war. As demonstrated by ballistic missile use in the first and second Gulf Wars, their main strategic value lies in their psychological impact. When ballistic missiles carry conventional warheads, their military use is in fact quite limited. Their importance increases considerably if they carry a chemical, biological or nuclear warhead. Experts claim that even those with a chemical warhead are more of a ‘terror weapon’ rather than weapons of mass destruction because large numbers of chemical weapons are needed to cause large casualties and ballistic missiles have a limited payload.1 Concerning the missile arsenals of states in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, most missiles in the arsenals of proliferating countries will still be FROGs, SCUDs or SCUD-derivatives within the next ten to fifteen years.2 The Iraqi derivatives (Al-Abbas and Al-Husayn) compromised the payload and in-flight stability of the missile in the interest of an increased range.3 As for the capabilities of specific countries, Iran’s missile development programmes are receiving significant levels of outside assistance, with Russia, China and North Korea being the foremost suppliers. It has an increasing force of SSMs, mainly consisting of about 270–300 SCUD-Bs and about 40–50 longer-range SCUD-Cs supplied by North Korea or assembled from North Korean materials, as well as over 200 Chinese-origin CSS-8 missiles. There are about 10–12 mobile SCUD launchers provided by North Korea and Libya and 20–25 CSS-8 launchers. Iran now has a production capability for SCUD missiles and, with continued Russian assistance, limited numbers of a 1,000 km
missile could be available by 2008 or soon after.

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Over the next 10 years, improvements in Iran’s WMD and SSM capabilities could significantly increase the potential threat to its neighbours. A 2002 intelligence assessment on Iraqi missile capabilities would have read as follows: ‘Iraq may be concealing 16–25 prohibited Al Husayn-type missiles and related equipment. Under current conditions, Iraq is unlikely to be able to produce a missile with a substantially longer range than 150 km. If UN controls are lifted, in the worst case, SCUD-type missiles could probably be indigenously manufactured almost immediately and a 1,000 km missile (a SCUD-derivative) could be produced in 5–7 years.’ But Iraq is now completely out of the proliferation business for at least the next several years. Syria has begun to deploy North Korean-manufactured SCUD-Cs. According to the IISS Military Balance, Syria has 18 FROG, 18 SS–21 and 30 SCUD-B/C/D launchers and approximately 850 missiles. There is no evidence of Syria targeting ballistic missiles against NATO or EU countries. Before its ‘voluntary’ disarmament, Libya had approximately 300 SCUD-B and 80 MAZ Transporter-erector-launchers (TELs). Only a portion of these, however, is operational. In the worst case, Libya could have developed an improved SCUD (500 km
) with foreign help by the year 2005. In parallel, Libya would probably have continued to try to purchase 1,000 km-range ballistic missiles. Algeria does not have ballistic missile capability and is unlikely to acquire any of these over the next decade. Egypt has produced a small number of SCUDs with North Korean assistance and has also undertaken R&D on a missile of longer range than SCUD-C. Israel has the most advanced missile capabilities in the region, with the Jericho systems that have a range of over 2,000 km and could probably develop a missile with a range of 5,000 km. Given the continuing export behaviour of North Korea and possibly China and Pakistan, the potential for collaboration between emerging missile powers, and the possibility of missile experts becoming available from the former Soviet Union or from financially troubled companies in other non-MTCR countries with expertize in both short- and long-range missile systems may continue to spread.4 It is highly uncertain, however, that there will be significant improvements in their accuracy and payload.

Cruise missiles proliferation Cruise missiles basically are small unmanned aircraft. They are powered by rockets or jet engines with an internal computer or remote control for guidance and navigation. Cruise missiles stay aloft by aerodynamic lift; they are powered and guided all the way to the target. By contrast, most ballistic missiles are powered by rockets that operate only during the initial boost phase of the target path. Once the rocket cuts off, the missile coasts to the target along a ballistic trajectory and – except for very sophisticated systems – can no longer be guided.5 Cruise missiles do not fly at the same high speeds as ballistic missiles, but they are relatively small and therefore present a much smaller radar signature. Moreover, they fly at low altitudes, meaning they can drop below radar cover.6

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WMD capabilities of selected countries 75 Over 70 countries (40 of them in the developing world) possess more than 75,000 anti-ship cruise missiles, most with ranges under 100 kms. According to analysts, the emerging cruise-missile threat may well represent the prototype of twenty-first-century defence planning challenges: multiple acquisition paths, uncertain development cycles and opaque monitoring environments.7 It is argued that military breakthroughs are increasingly resulting from commercial, rather than military, research. In the case of cruise missiles, the main example of these new commercial technologies are cheap guidance and navigation systems based on the US Global Positioning System (GPS)8, whose use during Operation Desert Storm gave a brief glimpse of the revolutionary changes now under way in warfare. Combined with commercially available geostrategic-information systems and one-metre-resolution satellite imagery to target fixed objects, new guidance and navigation technology for cruise missiles offers substantially more accurate delivery (by at least a factor of ten) and costs notably less (half or less) than far more complex – and export-controlled – ballistic missile guidance systems.9 According to the IISS, Land-attack cruise missile (LACM) capability could bolster an adversary’s willingness to oppose U.S.-led military coalitions in strategically significant ways. Compared with ballistic missiles, LACMs are expected to be more accurate (by a factor of at least ten), less costly (by at least half) and, because of their aerodynamic stability, substantially more effective in delivering chemical or biological payloads (conservatively, enlarging the lethal area for biological attacks by at least ten times). Precise LACM attacks against key fixed points – ports, airfields and other logistical sites – could be used to harass adversaries and achieve strategic leverage in the early phase of a theatre campaign.10 The concern has been expressed that by 2010, several countries, including some potentially hostile to the US, will probably acquire land-attack cruise missiles to support regional goals.11 According to the US Office of Technology Assessment, the ‘flow of critical enabling technologies is a necessary but insufficient condition for the widespread proliferation of land-attack cruise missiles. The rate at which developing countries absorb and assimilate openly available technologies and, most crucially, integrate them into militarily significant weapon systems, are equally – if not more – relevant.12 Developing nations could also convert existing anti-ship cruise missiles or UAVs, or directly purchase complete land-attack cruise missiles currently on sale from key industrial producers.’13 Given the number of options available for their acquisition, cruise missiles will be extremely difficult to monitor in the developing world.14 Fortunately, longerrange land-attack systems are not yet available to proliferant countries and are still amenable to some measure of control through the MTCR.15 The MTCR is

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Table 5.1 Selected cruise-missile systems and programmes Country

System

Type

Range (km)/ Payload (kg)

Status

Egypt

OtomatMk2 HY-2 Seersucker HY-I Silkworm C-802 HY-I mod Gabriel-3 Popeye-3 SSC-I Sepal

ASCM ASCM ASCM ASCM LACM? ASCM LACM ASCM

180/210 95/500 85/400 120/165 400?/500? 35–60/150 350/360? 450/1,000

In service In service In service In service Development In service Development In service

Iran Israel Syria

Sources: Stephen Blank, ‘Russia’s Clearance Sale’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 11, November 1997, pp. 517–522; Duncan Lennox (ed.), Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, 1997; Robert Shuey, ‘Ballistic and Cruise Missile Forces of Foreign Countries’, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 95–688, U.S. Library of Congress, Washington D.C., 25 October 1996; David Bosdet, Humphry Crum Ewing, Robin Ranger, David Wiencek, Cruise Missiles: Precision & Countermeasures, Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, Lancaster University, Lancaster, 1995. Notes ASCM  anti-ship cruise missile. LACM  land-attack cruise missile. CM  cruise missile. IOC  initial operational capability. SLAM  stand-off land-attack missile.

most restrictive in its treatment of missiles carrying 500 kg payloads to ranges of 300 km or more. MTCR members are urged to make ‘a strong presumption to deny’ exports of missiles meeting this range/payload threshold. However, most of the MTCR’s implementation experience has focused on determining range and payload capabilities for ballistic missiles. Such a determination is not so simple for cruise missiles and other UAVs.16

Chemical weapons proliferation Regarding traditional chemical agents, history suggests that in military settings they injure far more than they kill.17 From an operational standpoint, chemical weapons (CW) agents have both advantages and disadvantages when compared to conventional weapons. Chemical nerve agents can kill in minutes, and their invisible, insidious nature gives them a powerful psychological impact. Furthermore, the ability of persistent CW agents to contaminate buildings and people creates the potential for sowing disruption and chaos in an affected urban area.18 On the down side, CW are hazardous to handle, unpredictable to disperse in open areas and can be countered with timely medical intervention such as administration of antidotes.19 During World War I, the first use of lethal CW occurred at Langemarck, where, within 30 minutes, the use of 171 tonnes of chlorine gas caused approximately 15,000 casualties, of which 5,000 were fatalities. The total number of CW casualties during World War I was 1.3 million, including about 100,000 deaths. CW developed since then are hundreds of times more toxic. A lethal dose of VX, for instance, would fit on a pinhead.20

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WMD capabilities of selected countries 77 Technologies and materials that are used extensively throughout the world for civilian purposes can easily be diverted to produce CW agents. Furthermore, the technology and infrastructure required to produce CW are considerably less expensive than those required for nuclear weapons. Consequently, any nation with a reasonably advanced chemical industry could easily manufacture CW agents. Indeed, CW can be manufactured in civilian chemical plants using facilities and materials that have perfectly legitimate civilian uses. Facilities used to manufacture fertilizers, insecticides, pharmaceuticals and petrochemicals can quickly be turned to the production of CW agents.21 For a nation that wishes to acquire a useful CW capability, production of the agent is a necessary but not sufficient condition. A true CW consists of not just an agent, but also a means of delivery. The technical difficulties involved in developing effective delivery devices such as missiles and bombs depend upon the desired purpose of the weapon. If genuine military effectiveness is the goal, great attention must be paid to optimizing payload size and the means of dispersing the agent.22 If the goal is to induce terror in a civilian population, the technical demands are far less rigorous.23 As for the capabilities of specific countries: Iran’s retaliatory use against Iraq is well documented. The DOD reports that Iran’s CW programme started in 1983 as a response to Iraq’s use of CW. Iran produced its first chemical agent in 1984, but cumulative production is ‘a minimum several hundred tons of blister, blood and choking agents’. Some sources have claimed that the Iranians might have as much as 2,000 tonnes of chemical agents, possibly including a nerve agent. Although it has signed and ratified the CWC, Iran is apparently nearing selfsufficiency in production of CW agents and more advanced agents may be under development. It probably has CW bombs and tactical weapons and may have developed CW warheads for its SCUD-B missiles. Iraq was engaged in largescale production and use of chemical weapons against Iran and against Iraqi Kurds. Its substantial CW stockpile was largely destroyed by UN inspection teams. After 2003, Iraq no longer has any CW production capability. Syria probably possesses chemical warheads for ballistic missiles and could enhance its capability with the nerve agent VX. Libya had CW bombs and possibly artillery shells. Before the disarmament process, its capability to use CW at regional-strategic range was limited to aircraft or terrorist/special forces. Algeria does not have a CW capability and is unlikely to acquire any of these over the next decade. Furthermore, it has signed the CWC. Egypt has used chemical weapons in its intervention in Yemen (1960s) (probably from British stockpiles left from World War II). Today, it has the capability to produce CW weapons on a rather significant scale if desired. It has not signed the CWC. Israel is considered capable of manufacturing CW; nevertheless, it has signed (but not yet ratified) the CWC.

Biological weapons proliferation Primitive biological weapons have been used many times in the history of warfare. More than two millennia ago, Scythian archers dipped arrowheads in manure and rotting corpses to increase the deadliness of their weapons; Tartar armies in the fourteenth century catapulted cadavers infected with the plague into

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enemy cities; British troops distributed smallpox-infected blankets to unfriendly native American tribes in the Ohio Valley in the eighteenth century; the Germans in World War I spread glanders, a disease of horses, among the mounts of rival cavalries; and the Japanese released millions of plague-infected fleas from aircraft over Chinese cities during World War II, killing hundreds and perhaps thousands of people. What is new about the problem today is the development of novel and more lethal pathogens24 and the ability of increasing numbers of states and non-state groups to develop such weapons.25 Biological weapons have been designed to spread live organisms, usually bacteria or viruses, which could neutralize or kill the victim by causing some infectious disease.26 They can be used against living organisms (people and animals) as well as against plants and crops. Biological agents are lethal in very small quantities. Although there is debate on the precise figures and about which agents are the most lethal, there is no disagreement that biological agents are astonishingly toxic.27 Biological weapons were of limited military value for two reasons: firstly, because for them to have any effect the bacteria or viruses have to complete their incubation period, and secondly, because of the difficulty of ensuring that they would cause damage only to a specific military target and would not then spread beyond the battlefield (the use of biological weapons against centres of population will be discussed below). There is likelihood that biological weapons will harm the user (both the armed forces and the civilian population if the warring countries are neighbours).28 These difficulties, the inability to calculate the possible outcome and the dubious military value of biological weapons, together with the fact that most people regard biological warfare as totally unacceptable from a moral point of view, explain the relative success of attempts at control.29 If biological weapons indeed have serious drawbacks and relatively low military value, why do several countries show interest in research into biological weapons? The answer is likely to be found in the impressive progress made by genetic manipulation (i.e. the attempt to alter genetic material to get a desired result) and in biotechnology.30 These advances have aroused concern over the development of new technologies which may not be wholly covered by the articles of the Biological Weapons Convention. In response, the alleged violators claim that the study of the aggressive uses of biotechnology is essential if they are to develop an effective defence should there be violations of the agreement. This may prove to have dangerous ramifications, given the tendency of research programmes to move away from prevention, therapy, monitoring and decontamination into grey areas which are not easy to distinguish from research into aggressive weapons. At the same time, fund availability for research into biological warfare is increasing at an alarming rate.31 Although it is not yet clear whether current advances and developments in biotechnology have already changed the aspects of biological warfare which render them unsuitable for military use (delayed effect, uncertain result, inaccuracy and the possibility of harm to the user), this could easily happen in the near future. The ‘genie should be put back in the bottle’ while there is still time.

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WMD capabilities of selected countries 79 As for the capabilities of specific countries: Iran has conducted extensive BW research and, although there is no evidence of production, it has the infrastructure for a significant BW capability. According to the DOD, Iran ‘is conducting research on toxins and organisms with biological warfare applications’. Iraq’s substantial BW stockpile was destroyed by UN inspection teams and Iraq should be taken out of the picture anyway. There are no indications that Syria’s BW programme has progressed significantly from the R & D stage. Libya had been conducting some BW research and some analysts claimed that it was in possession of small quantities of BW agents, although there was no proof of that. Algeria does not have a BW capability and is unlikely to acquire any over the next decade. There are no indications that Egypt’s BW programme has progressed significantly from the R & D stage. The same is probably true for Israel, although there is little real evidence.

Nuclear weapons proliferation The characteristics and destructive power of nuclear weapons are well known, so there is no need to mention them in any detail. Concerning the capabilities of specific countries in the region under examination: Iran has unfinished nuclear power reactors and, although it has signed the NPT and has concluded a safeguard agreement with the IAEA, is suspected of nuclear ‘transactions’ with former Soviet republics (mainly Russia) and the Pakistani ‘Wal-Mart’ of Dr Khan, and is accused of developing a military nuclear option. In 1993, the CIA calculated that Iran could develop a nuclear weapon in eight to ten years. Other analysts argue

Table 5.2 Membership to arms control and disarmament treaties Country

Geneva protocol

NPT1

BWC2

CWC3

Algeria Egypt Jordan Iran Iraq Israel Libya Morocco S. Arabia Syria Tunisia Yemen

Yes 1928 1977 1931 1929 1969 1971 1970 1971 1968 1929 1971

No 1981 1970 1969 1970 No 1975 1969 1988 1969 1980 1979

No S4 1975 1991 1973 No 1982 S 1972 S 1974 1979

1995 No 1997 1993 No S-1993 Yes 1995 1996 No 1997 S-1993

Notes 1 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 2 Biological Weapons Convention. 3 Chemical Weapons Convention. 4 S: Signed but not ratified.

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that Iran is unlikely to develop a nuclear weapon before 2015 without substantial foreign assistance. Iraq had a significant nuclear programme (it probably needed less than one year to manufacture a nuclear weapon at the time of its invasion of Kuwait), which was bombed by the US in ‘Desert Storm’ and what was not destroyed was subsequently dismantled by UN teams. Algeria, a signatory of the NPT, is not considered to be pursuing a nuclear-weapon capability. Even if it chose to do so, it would not be in a position to achieve this for a long time. Libya had nuclear ambitions and had repeatedly tried to purchase nuclear weapons (or to acquire them by bankrolling the nuclear programmes of other Muslim countries). However, it voluntarily dismantled its nuclear programme. Egypt and Syria have insignificant nuclear programmes and are both signatories of NPT. The former has concluded Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA. Finally, there is general agreement that Israel is an advanced nuclear weapon power and possesses 100–200 high- and low-yield nuclear weapons (probably including boosted and thermonuclear ones).32

Lethality of NBC weapons According to some analysts, there are significant differences between the lethality of CW on the one hand, and BW and nuclear weapons on the other. For example, the lethality of CW is substantially less; a considerably greater quantity of chemical agent is needed to inflict a given level of casualties than biological agents and, of course, nuclear weapons. Likewise, significant differences exist in the feasibility of defences. It is generally possible to provide high-quality CW defences, even for civilian populations, at relatively low cost. Because of these differences, some experts tend to minimize the potential consequences of CW use, arguing that CW does not merit consideration as a WMD.33 Biological agents may be lethal in very small quantities. One source maintains that, in theory, one ounce (about 35 gms) of botulinum toxin would be sufficient to kill 60 million people, while another suggests that half that quantity would be sufficient to kill the entire population of the US. According to another study, 1 gram of anthrax spores would be sufficient to kill one-third of the US population. Estimates such as these are often based on the minimum lethal dose under laboratory conditions. Lethality figures drop when factors such as population density and practical dispersion under normal day-to-day conditions are taken into account. Even so, the figures make alarming reading. Several hundred thousand deaths could be caused in a crowded urban area by four tonnes of VX or only 50 kgs of anthrax spores and a single ounce of anthrax introduced into the air-conditioning system of a doomed stadium could infect 70,000–80,000 spectators within one hour.34 A study by the UN compared the delivery of 10 tons of highly lethal biological agent, 15 tons of chemical nerve agents and a one-megaton nuclear bomb. It found that the biological agents could cover an optimal area of up to 100,000 square km, the chemical agent could cover up to 60 square km and the nuclear weapon could cover up to 300 square km. The time before the onset of

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WMD capabilities of selected countries 81 Table 5.3 Casualty estimates for various WMD delivered on Washington DC Delivery method

Warhead

Approximate number of deaths

Scud-type missile

300 kg sarin nerve gas 30 kg anthrax spores Atomic bomb 12 KT equivalent Hydrogen bomb 1 MT equivalent 1,000 kg sarin nerve gas

60–100 30,000–100,000 23,000–80,000

100 kg anthrax spores

420,000–1,400,000

Dispersal by single aircraft

570,000–1,900,000 400–800

Source: Lord Lyell, Chemical and Biological Weapons: the Poor Man’s Bomb, Science and Technology Committee, North Atlantic Assembly, November 1996, p. 3.

weapons effects was days for BW, minutes for CW and seconds for the nuclear weapon. The maximum effect on humans for BW was 50 per cent morbidity and 25 per cent deaths without medical intervention, 50 per cent deaths for CW and 90 per cent deaths for the nuclear weapon. The biological and chemical weapons did not destroy property, but the nuclear weapon damaged structures over an area of 100 square km.35 Based on these types of estimates, the OTA concluded – among other things – that, in principle, pound for pound, BW could exceed the killing power of nuclear weapons. If warning is provided, however, civil defence measures are easier to take against CBW than against nuclear weapons. Another important finding was that CW would be less destructive against well-protected troops or civilians than even conventional explosives.36 Nuclear weapons remain unmatched in their ability to wreak vast and immediate damage. In contrast, chemical weapons are potentially far less destructive. Protection and defensive measures can greatly reduce their impact on the battlefield against well-trained troops. Biological weapons fall somewhere in between. Like nuclear weapons, biological weapons threaten great destruction to unprotected military forces and civilian populations and can be thousands of times more lethal than the most deadly chemical agents.37

The comparative effects of biological and chemical and nuclear weapons delivered against a typical urban target Using missile warheads Assumes one SCUD-sized warhead with a maximum payload of 1,000 kgms. The study assumes that the biological agent would not make maximum use of this payload capability because this is inefficient. It is unclear whether this is realistic.

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Table 5.4 Comparative effects of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons Area covered in sq kms Chemical: 300 kgs of sarin nerve gas with a density of 70 mgms per cubic meter Biological: 30 kgs of anthrax spores with a density of 0.1 milligram per cubic meter Nuclear: One 12.5-kiloton nuclear device achieving 5 pounds per cubic inch of over-pressure One 1-megaton hydrogen bomb

0.22

10

7.8

190

Deaths assuming 3,000–10,000 people per sq km 60–200

30,000–100,000

23,000–80,000

570,000–1,900,000

Table 5.5 Effects of chemcial and biological weapons Area covered in sq kms Clear sunny day, light breeze Sarin nerve gas Anthrax spores Overcast day or night, moderate wind Sarin nerve gas Anthrax spores Clear calm night Sarin nerve gas Anthrax spores

Deaths assuming 3,000–10,000 people per sq km

0.7446 0.7446

300–700 130,000–460,000

0.8140 0.8140

400–800 420,000–1,400,000

7.8300 7.8300

3,000–8,000 1,000,000–3,000,000

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, U.S. Congress OTA-ISC-559, Washington, August, 1993, pp. 53–54.

Using one aircraft delivering 1,000 kgms of Sarin nerve gas or 100 kgms of Anthrax spores Assumes the aircraft flies in a straight line over the target at optimal altitude and dispensing the agent as an aeroso1. The study assumes that the biological agent would not make maximum use of this payload capability because this is inefficient. It is unclear whether this is realistic.

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Countries of special concern Iran Iran occupies a critical strategic location, with access to the Strait of Hormuz through which the majority of the world’s oil supplies transit; its position acts as a bridge between East and West; and it possesses significant resources, both human and natural.38 Tehran’s current security policies – including its strong interest in WMD weapons – antedate the Islamic revolution and are rooted in Iranian nationalism and historical sense of regional leadership.39 The present views of the Islamic Republic towards regional affairs, security threats, and Persian nationalism mirror those of the former Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, in defining security policies.40 In the Shah’s time, Iraq was not always seen as an immediate security threat, but ancient animosities as well as current hostile revolutionary regimes and volatile ethnic groups on Iran’s borders breed suspicions of potential threats posed by Russia or the US to Central Asia as well as American domination in the Persian Gulf.41 Prior to the US intervention in Afghanistan in the aftermath of 11 September, the prime motivation for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons was to deter Iraq.42 It has been argued that other potential threats to Iran’s threat perception were Israel,43 Turkey and Pakistan. Nuclear weapons also would have allowed Iran to compensate for strategic isolation in face of increasing US military presence in the Persian Gulf region and to increase its influence and prestige in the Middle East and throughout the Islamic world.44 Beyond addressing threats and affording influence, nuclear weapons have domestic ‘benefits’ for the regime, too. Following the examples of India and Pakistan, the regime is interested in the ability of high-technology programmes to bolster its international standing and to showcase nuclear technology45 as a substitute for the lack of progress in most economic sectors.46 According to Ray Takeyh’s penetrating analysis, the ‘surprising aspect of the nuclear debate in Iran is the extent to which it mirrors the discussion that took place in China, India and Pakistan before these states joined the nuclear club. Although Iran initiated its programme to address certain strategic challenges, as the programme matures, nationalistic sentiment and patronage politics are emerging as rationales for sustaining it.’47 Furthermore, historical experience shows that, as a state unleashes its nuclear programme, it creates political and bureaucratic constituencies and nationalistic pressures that generate their own proliferation momentum. As such alliances and constituencies develop, a state can cross the point of political no-return years before it can actually assemble a single nuclear bomb. This phenomenon is becoming all too evident in the case of Iran.48 Post-11 September developments in the Middle East have had a paradoxical impact on Iran, as two of Iran’s enemies, the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, have been defeated and overthrown by the US. At the same time, the latter is entangled in an Iraqi quagmire, draining its resources and tempering its ambitions. Nevertheless, the Iranian clerical elite have been expecting a turbulent future, which apparently accentuates their sense of insecurity. Iran remains in America’s

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crosshairs, at a time when the US military presence in the region has never been greater.49 Influential groups within the country are concerned about encirclement by hostile or potentially hostile countries and fearful that the US intends to change its regime by force. They are eager to assert Persian power in a region where Israel, Pakistan and the US possess nuclear weapons, and deeply marked by the experience of its war with Iraq,50 when Iran was virtually abandoned by the international community,51 do not appear willing to forsake the possibility of a military nuclear programme.52 As Perkovich argues, ‘any Iranian government will want to satisfy these interests – whether it is hard line or moderate, clerical or technocratic’.53 Writing in November 2005, Dr Babak Ganji argued that the main nuclear debate in the Iranian leadership was over what kind of latent indigenous nuclear capability Iran should possess. Former President Mohammad Khatami, former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Hasan Rowhani and the head of the Expedient Council, Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, have been the most prominent advocates of a capability which could enable Iran to construct only a limited nuclear arsenal over the next decade. They saw this as a means of strengthening Iran’s deterrent capability vis-à-vis the West.54 Rowhani’s report to Khatami on the nuclear negotiations with the EU made clear that Iranian leaders entered the talks with the EU because of their fear of U.S. attack and not because they were prepared to give up Iran’s nuclear programme in return for economic concessions. Prominent opponents, led by the current secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani and the head of the Atomic Energy Organization, Gholamreza Aqazadeh, who were most probably supported by Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, have been intent upon constructing a larger, industrial scale, nuclear capability which would enable Iran to produce much greater quantities of weapons grade material. This policy is closely intertwined with Ali Khamene’i’s preferred grand strategy which is aimed at establishing Iran as the dominant power in the Persian Gulf and reducing U.S. influence in Eurasia. This strategy gained increasing support from late 2004 onwards and the EU’s and U.S.’s opposition to indigenous Iranian enrichment and Mahmud Ahmadinezhad’s victory in the Iranian presidential elections enabled proponents of this strategy to begin to implement it.55 According to Anoushiravan Ehteshami, ‘these debates do not seem to have reached a conclusive point in Iran, and the outcome will depend as much on the balance of power between the various factions and the nuclear schools of thought, as on how the West reacts to Iran’s nuclear ambitions’.56 George Perkovich argues that Tehran appears to be making tactical decisions to balance its desire not to become an international pariah with its concern that security and status interests may argue for preserving a nuclear weapon option.57 The example of

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WMD capabilities of selected countries 85 North Korea’s ‘nuclear blackmail’ may appear appealing to the Iranian leadership. Pyongyang’s presumed nuclear capability has not only prevented a pre-emptive invasion, but actually generated potential security and economic benefits. Also, notwithstanding widespread condemnation, India, Pakistan and presumptively Israel have all developed nuclear capabilities without adhering to the rules set forth by the NPT and without facing commensurate diplomatic or economic punishment.58 Leaving Iranian policy aside for a moment and moving to capabilities, the current stage of Iran’s effort to acquire a nuclear weapons capability began in the early 1980s, but made less rapid progress, due to limits on its indigenous capabilities and the success of the US and its allies in imposing an embargo on nuclear assistance to Iran, with the exception of some overt assistance from China and the Bushehr power reactor from Russia. During the 1990s, however, Iran received centrifuge-enrichment technology from a foreign source (most likely Pakistan’s ‘nuclear supermarket’) and obtained bits and pieces of nuclear fuelcycle technology from institutes and individuals in Russia.59 The extent of Iran’s nuclear programme was revealed in August 2002, when an Iranian opposition group revealed the existence of a heavy water plant under construction near Arak and a centrifuge-enrichment plant under construction near Natanz.60 Under international pressure, Iran allowed the IAEA access to these facilities in January 2003.61 IAEA inspections in February 2003 determined that the plants – a facility for uranium enrichment in Natanz, and one for heavy water production at Arak – were larger, more sophisticated and much closer to completion than previously assumed.62 According to the ICG Report, based on the available, albeit highly unreliable, information, observers and intelligence officials estimate that Iran could be in a position to develop a nuclear weapon within two to four years at the low end, roughly ten years at the high end. According to reported estimates by the British, French and Israeli governments, Iran could have a nuclear weapon capability by 2007,63 obviously a very pessimistic estimate. In the ISIS report, in a worst-case assessment, it was noted that Iran might have its first nuclear weapon in 2009.64 At the same time, according to Uzi Rubin, ‘Iran’s missile and space programs are progressing with singular urgency: no other country in the world, including established industrialized powers, comes close to Iran in the number and variety of ballistic missiles in development or already deployed’.65 According to Ian Lesser, ‘one quite plausible scenario is that Iran will move steadily toward a nuclear capability over the next decade, perhaps with repeated political and economic confrontations along the way.66 This (along with events in North Korea) could spur further nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation across the broader Middle East.’67 Anthony Cordesman generally shares that view, arguing that Iran is ‘likely to be both defensive and hostile, seeking ways to strengthen its position relative to the US and its allies. Proliferation will almost certainly go on at some level, regardless of outside pressure and what Iran appears to agree to. Iran will continue to build its capabilities for asymmetric warfare, but be careful to limit their use unless it feels threatened or it sees a major opportunity.’68

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As was also the case with North Korea, experts differ over the seriousness of the Iranian threat. According to a rather alarmist view, ‘Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and long-range missile delivery system is likely to affect its behaviour in the region. Tehran’s new military muscle would bolster its aspirations for regional leadership and influence over a number of issues – from resolving territorial disputes to determining energy policy and production limits to serving as a beacon of political enlightenment for Arabs and Muslims worldwide.’69 Most Israeli defence and military officials are quite pessimistic, seeing a nuclear Iran with Israel as the prime target. They worry, too, about what Egypt and Syria will do when – not if – Iran acquires nuclear weapons. They caution that a new arms race will begin, with Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the UAE70 seeking non-conventional weapon systems.71 In 2003, Israel’s defence minister, Shaul Mofaz, drew a line in the sand, declaring an Iranian nuclear bomb ‘intolerable’ and warning that ‘only a few months are left for Israel and the world to take action and prevent Iran from getting the nuclear bomb’.72 Indeed, many Israeli leaders regard the Iranian threat as the gravest strategic threat facing Israel, and some regard it as liable to endanger Israel’s very existence in the future.73 According to Efraim Inbar, Director of the BESA Center for Strategic Studies, military action against Iranian nuclear installations involves many risks and complications, but the difficulty is exaggerated, and inaction is bound to bring about far worse consequences.74 Other Israeli analysts appear to be less alarmed, arguing that Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons is of major significance to Israel because for the first time since Israel’s establishment an enemy state has the capability of fatally wounding it. However, it is ‘doubtful whether the Iranian regime would actually exercise a nuclear capability against Israel, despite its basic approach that rejects Israel’s existence’.75 Ephraim Cam offers three reasons that may alleviate the gravity of this threat: Iran’s defensive-deterrent motive for its nuclear programme, the Iranian regime’s lack of propensity for risky, adventurous moves and the possibility that a more moderate regime will arise in Iran at some point in the future.76 A central issue remains, of course, whether deterrence will be sufficient to ensure restraint in the case of Iran. Two schools of thought have emerged on this question, centering largely on the enigmas posed by the potential of Iranian weapons proliferation. On the one hand, students of the Iranian strategic culture like Shahram Chubin, Geoffrey Kemp and Michael Eisenstadt, cautiously suggest that Iran’s strategic goals are modestly limited to self-defence. Although all three acknowledge the overwhelming importance of internal debates and power struggles over strategic goals, their work gives credence to the hope that Iranian power can ultimately be tamed, much like that of China in the 1970s. On the other hand, there are those who regard Iran as an inherently revolutionary state, unable to accept either its cultural inferiority or confessional slights and insults to Islamic pre-eminence, and unwilling to abandon a mission to undermine the authority of its adversaries. Deterrence, from this perspective, is little more than wishful thinking. Against this Iran there is no alternative to engaging in a long-term effort to topple the revolutionary government.77

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WMD capabilities of selected countries 87 In the author’s view, there should be little doubt about Iran’s rationality and its understanding of the concept of deterrence and concerns about the range of Iranian missiles. The probability of nuclear strikes against Europe or any of Iran’s neighbours do not sound especially convincing. According to a recently published Chatham House report, ‘Iranian regional foreign policy, which is often portrayed as mischievous and destabilizing, is in fact remarkably pragmatic on the whole and generally aims to avoid major upheaval or confrontation’.78 Barry Rubin partly agrees with that view, arguing that Iran is not a ‘crazy state’, but is also not a normal one guided by pragmatic ideology, limited aims and realpolitik.79 Mark Fitzpatrick sees no intentional use by Iran, but a higher probability of miscalculation.80 Nevertheless, the open nuclearization of Iran could also, in combination with other negative developments, deal a deadly blow to the NPT regime.81 The probability of a nuclear ‘domino effect’ has often been emphasized, whereby the presence of nuclear weapons in Iran may well motivate other countries in the region, such as Egypt, Turkey82 and Saudi Arabia, to try and develop their own nuclear weapons. Fitzpatrick argues that, although not inevitable or automatic, Iran’s nuclear arming would significantly increase prospects for a nuclear arms race in the region.83 Indeed, according to a senior official of the IAEA, six Arab states (namely Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia) have shown interest in developing nuclear power. This has deepened concerns that Iran’s apparent pursuit of nuclear-weapon capabilities may be provoking some of its neighbours to think about their own nuclear futures. Although desalination and energy diversity are the primary motivations for a renewed interest in nuclear power in the region, building up a nuclear infrastructure, including a cadre of trained personnel, can concurrently serve as part of a future hedging strategy. The interest in nuclear energy in the Middle East, however, is not as recent as media reports suggested.84 It is far from clear whether these states have really made a decision to go nuclear. As Emily Landau points out, at this early stage they may well want to create the impression that they will not remain on the sidelines in the face of Iran’s challenge, but there are no clear indications that they have made up their minds to actually embark on the same path as Iran.85 Syria Syria’s national security objectives have not changed to any considerable extent following the death of Hafez al-Assad. These objectives include preserving the new regime of Assad’s son, Bashir al-Assad, regaining the entire Golan Heights, protecting Syrian territory, maintaining internal stability and protecting Syrian interests or, after the recent developments, maintaining a degree of influence in Lebanon. Damascus also seeks to avoid regional isolation by maintaining strong ties with Iran and, prior to the 2003 war, warming relations with Iraq, and hopes to play a leading role in the Arab world. It has long perceived itself to be surrounded by hostile neighbours, and most of Syria’s armed forces are arrayed against Israel, which it perceives to be its primary external threat.86

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Syria’s CW-armed ballistic missiles are primarily a strategic deterrent against Israel, given the latter’s current conventional military superiority, but these are probably weapons of last resort.87 There is no evidence of Syria targeting ballistic missiles at NATO or EU countries, but improvements in its WMD and ballistic missile capabilities over the next 10 years may theoretically increase the potential threat to NATO’s southern flank. According to Eyal Zisser, for Syria, ‘acquiring WMD, especially CW and advanced missile capability, was a central pillar of its national security concept. Already by the 1980s, Syria was working toward obtaining non-conventional weapons. These efforts were a main component in its nascent national security concept to achieve strategic parity with Israel.’88 In keeping with this concept, the Syrians strove to establish not only military parity but full strategic parity – in the economic, social, technological and other spheres as well. When the USSR collapsed in 1991, Syria was left alone in a threatening environment.89 Its strategic options shrunk since the US intervention in Iraq deprived it of cheap oil and a ready market for its goods, but its regional influence has been increasing after the conflagration in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 and the continuing imbroglio in Iraq.90 Iraq By 1991 Iraq had produced 19,000 ltrs of botulinum toxin, 8,500 ltrs of anthrax, 2,200 ltrs of aflatoxin and were working on a number of other agents; 2,850 tonnes of mustard gas, 210 tonnes of tabun, 795 tonnes of sarin and cyclosarin and 3.9 tonnes of VX91 and had used significant quantities of mustard, tabun and sarin during the war with Iraq, resulting in over 20,000 Iranian casualties. Iraq declared to UN inspectors that it had produced over 200,000 chemical weapons munitions, exhausting half of them against the Iranian military and Iraqi Kurds during the eight-year Iran–Iraq War (Anfal campaign).92 It fired over 500 SCUD-type missiles at Iran during the Iran–Iraq War at both civilian and military targets, and 93 SCUD-type missiles during the 1990–1991 Gulf War.93 Had the Gulf War not intervened, Iraq could have accumulated a nuclear stockpile of a dozen or so weapons by the end of the decade.94 According to the British government, Iraq has continued to produce CB agents after the 1990–1991 Gulf War; had command and control arrangements in place as well as military plans for the use of CBW,95 including against its own Shia population; some of these weapons were deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them; illegally retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles, with a range of 650 km, capable of carrying chemical or biological warheads; and constructed a new engine test stand for the development of missiles capable of reaching the UK Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus and NATO members (Greece and Turkey), as well as all Iraq’s Gulf neighbours and Israel.96 Unfortunately for the British government’s credibility, the accuracy of this assessment was hotly disputed – and for good reason, as findings, or rather the lack thereof, after the defeat and occupation of Iraq proved.

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WMD capabilities of selected countries 89 Libya Following its announced renunciation of its WMD programmes in December 2003, Libya has submitted complete initial declarations to the OPCW and IAEA, and the corresponding inspection regimes have now been applied. These confirmed what had generally been assumed, namely that Libya had managed to manufacture CW in industrial quantities but was not yet capable of producing nuclear weapons. They also answered questions about its BW capabilities, about which much less had been previously known.97 According to one source, Qadhafi confessed that A. Q. Khan had provided Libya with an actual nuclear weapon design98 and an IAEA official who reviewed plans confiscated in Libya remarked to the journalist Seymour Hersh that the ‘design in question was “a sweet little bomb” that would be “too big and too heavy for a SCUD, but it’ll go into a family car” – a terrorist’s dream’.99 Opinions differ somewhat as to what brought about the Libyan change of course of action. The Bush Administration argued that the Iraq War had established a ‘punitive model’ and proved the US’s willingness to use military force to deal with rogue states acquiring WMD.100 It was also argued that economic sanctions had successfully suppressed the Libyan economy. With a growing population, and potential revenue from undeveloped oil resources, Qadhafi might have decided to prioritize Libya’s economic survival over WMD procurement.101 However, Dafna Hochman argues that, nearly four years prior to the war, the Libyans expressed willingness to discuss disarmament with the US. Therefore, the main reason for the policy change was not the Iraq War but rather Libya that conducted a cost-benefit analysis of its security situation and concluded that disarming enabled multiple security gains. On balance, these outweighed the costs of destroying its WMD arsenal.102 Wyn Bowen agrees that Libya’s ‘economic and security picture had changed dramatically over the preceding decade and the pursuit of nuclear weapons and other WMD had come to be viewed by the regime as a strategic liability, as opposed to a potential deterrent’.103 Hochman makes another interesting point on the issue of WMD and intelligence, arguing that the ‘debate among U.S. policymakers and arms control experts regarding the uncertain size of Libya’s WMD programme raises concern about the intelligence community’s knowledge of the WMD capabilities of rogue regimes’.104 Finally, Michele Dunne observes that ‘some commentators are taking a second lesson from the Libya case: the U.S. will forgo its declared interest in democratization and reform if a country takes positive security-related steps and has enough petroleum to offer’.105

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WMD proliferation Threats and challenges to Western security and NATO’s response

NATO’s new role in the post-Cold War era After the collapse of the Soviet Union there was no longer a major direct threat to NATO territory. As a result, NATO was increasingly focused on crisis management and so-called non-Article V threats. These new threats – or ‘risks’ – were officially recognized in the new Strategic Concept adopted at the Washington Summit in April 1999.1 The post-Cold War strategic thinking of NATO countries has evolved from the pre-eminence of territorial defence to the predominance of security interests. Concomitantly, the dominant concern is the management of crises and conflicts that are deemed to put at stake relevant security interests within the Euro-Atlantic area.2 The new Strategic Concept reflects this changing balance between collective defence and crisis response. It notes that that Alliance forces must be able to carry out a full range of missions. At the same time, these forces must also be able to contribute to conflict prevention and non-Article V crisis response operations (paragraph 14 of the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept). In the 1990s, many analysts and officials felt that NATO was faced with the dilemma ‘out of area or out of business’. Even today, no clear consensus exists within the Alliance on exactly how far NATO’s geographic scope extends. NATO’s expanded scope for action, its willingness to act in some cases without a UN mandate – one of the most divisive issues within the Alliance – and its emphasis on the need to enhance its power-projection capabilities could intensify concerns in the Middle East and North Africa about NATO’s purposes and objectives, stimulating fears that NATO is now more likely to intervene in these regions.3 It has been argued that the war in Kosovo may prove to be both the first and the last NATO war. Instead, coalitions of the willing endorsed by the NATO political structure, using NATO-committed military assets (which means principally US assets for any significant effort), and employing some, but not all, elements of NATO military structure, are likely to be the option of choice in the future.4 Particular emphasis is placed on deployability, mobility and survivability of forces and their ability to operate beyond NATO’s borders (paragraphs 53b and 53d of the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept). The Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) aims at increasing inter-operability and enhancing the Alliance’s capability for power-projection. While such a reorientation is necessary to allow NATO to

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handle the new risks it may face in the coming decades, this adjustment could create the impression in some Middle East and North African countries that NATO is trying to become a global policeman.5

NATO and the Mediterranean: a threat assessment Although the Balkans are not yet fully stable (with Kosovo being the major remaining hotspot), NATO’s attention has already been shifting towards the Mediterranean and the Middle East (including the Persian Gulf), especially after the events of 11 September 2001. According to the 1999 Strategic Concept, The Mediterranean is an area of special interest to the Alliance. Security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue process is an integral part of NATO’s cooperative approach to security. It provides a framework for confidence building, promotes transparency and cooperation in the region, and reinforces and is reinforced by other international efforts. The Alliance is committed to developing progressively the political, civil and military aspects of the Dialogue with the aim of achieving closer cooperation with, and more active involvement by, countries that are partners in this Dialogue. (Article 38 of the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept) Almost all of the risks6 referred to in the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept are present in a more or less acute form in those regions (although those risks are much more indirect and ambiguous).7 NATO’s increased attention is demonstrated, among others, by its new Command Structure (with the emphasis on the Southern Flank),8 the Mediterranean Dialogue9 and the debate on current programmes and future deployment of Theatre Missile Defences (TMD). More specifically, there are two distinct dimensions of NATO’s Mediterranean strategy: 1

2

Core objectives and related defence planning: it involves NATO’s military presence in the region, military exercises and, perhaps in the not-too-distant future, a theatre missile defence (TMD);10 Multilateral co-operation: in February 1995 an institutionalized dialogue was launched in Brussels between NATO and the ambassadors of Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Israel, Mauritania, Tunisia, with the subsequent addition of Algeria.11

There is wide support among security thinkers and planners in NATO and the EU for the argument that the threat to European security in the region is not derived from the malevolent use of state power directed against Western Europe but rather from the partial, or full, collapse of the existing political authorities in the southern and eastern Mediterranean.12 There is strong concern in NATO about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.13 Because of the so-called global war against international

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terrorism (GWOT) launched by the US, with the support of some European allies, and with the participation of NATO in certain related activities, the Alliance is expected to devote a significant share of its efforts and (rather limited) funds in dealing with the proliferation threat.14 In this context, both offensive and defensive options need to be examined in detail. There is an institutionalized discussion in the context of NATO,15 as well as a debate at the national level in various European countries. The proliferation threat against European countries should be conceived of as a mid- to long-term threat that – under certain circumstances – might be avoided altogether by political changes in the countries concerned, by the intensification of institutional contacts, economic co-operation (mainly in the form of investment and development assistance from the West) and by the development of good neighbourly relations. The question, however, is whether one can rely solely on political-diplomatic means or whether these should be complemented by military preparations, mainly in the form of theatre missile defences (TMD).16 In this context, there are two important variables: (a) to what extent may the WMD capabilities of proliferants have advanced significantly, particularly if abetted by the purchase or illicit transfer of weapons, delivery systems and related technologies? and (b) the uncertainty about the political stability of a number of regimes in the region, many of which are faced with strong internal challenges, mainly from extremist Islamic groups.

WMD threats against Alliance territory and populations Proliferation is generally perceived within the Alliance as both a political and a military threat17 that could both destabilize regions of interest and undermine NATO’s ability to conduct essential defence missions,18 including peace support operations, both in regional conflicts beyond its borders and in protecting Alliance territory and populations.19 Although allies may have slightly different views on the immediacy of the problem and the most effective means of response, there is an emerging consensus that NATO should act to protect itself against the growing threat.20 Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya have in the recent past been unofficially identified as potential threats to the Alliance during the near or long term.21 Today, Iraq and Libya would have to be removed from this list, and Syria is in a rather tight spot and it is unlikely that it would even contemplate the (first) use of WMD against the West (or Israel, for that matter). A threat involves ‘a combination of capability and intention’. For a threat to be real, both of these elements must be present. In the Mediterranean and the Middle East, risks/threats are less likely to result from ‘calculated aggression’, but ‘rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities’ which may arise from serious economic, social and political difficulties.22 A WMD threat could take any of the following four forms: a b

Threats against Alliance territory where NATO populations would be at risk; Threats to the ability of Alliance members to intervene in regions of vital interest where an NBC-armed adversary could threaten NATO’s ability to deploy forces and conduct combat operations;

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Threats to missions, such as peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, in which NATO (or EU) forces would be involved;23 and Finally, the possibility of acts of terrorism involving the use or threat of use of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons constitutes a more serious shortterm threat to Western states (and especially the US) than the launch of ballistic missiles against them.

The seriousness of those threats will be examined in this study.24 Threats against Alliance territory where NATO populations would be at risk Various scenarios of conflicts of NATO and EU countries with potential proliferators in the Mediterranean exist, although the probability of an open conflict seems very low at present. These conflicts are not likely – in the short term – to include a nuclear threat towards NATO countries. There is general agreement that indigenous nuclear programmes are not expected to reach the weapons manufacturing stage for at least three to five years (as the majority of analysts would agree) in the case of Iran and 10–12 years in other cases (unless there is substantial foreign assistance), and Israel is not expected to use nuclear weapons against Western countries under any foreseen circumstances.25 Furthermore, missile arsenals in the region are limited in both quality and quantity. The ‘missile threat’ today is limited geographically to southern Europe. Northern and central Europe are still substantially immune as potential opponents in the Mediterranean and the Middle East do not yet possess the capability to strike NATO countries’ territory beyond southern Italy, southern Greece and a significant part of Turkey (except, of course, by terrorist attacks). Even for those countries, it seems that the threat of massive conventional (or nuclear by NATO capabilities) retaliation and the limited NBC and missile capabilities of proliferant countries make it highly unlikely that such weapons would be used against the populations of NATO member-states. It is possible, however, that, under certain circumstances, they could be used against NATO theatre forces on power-projection or peacekeeping operations (see scenario 2 below). At this juncture, one is roused to observe that the anxieties of Western leaders regarding such an outcome are largely ‘psychological’ and owe largely to the deep-seated fears that countries in the Third World will gain, for the first time in history, at some projected period in the future, the means to strike at the metropolitan territories of Western countries. Up to now, both the West and the East (the former Soviet Union) have been able to intervene in various parts of the world with relative impunity. The countries in question could only strike at the land or naval forces in the actual theatre of operations. Today, with the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery, they can reach the territory of developed countries. The threat of NBC use against European territories should not be conceived of as an immediate or short-term threat, but as a mid- to long-term one.26 In analyzing threat scenarios, one must remain realistic and keep in mind that in most cases

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these are worst-case scenarios and that there probably are active political and economic measures to prevent such scenarios from being realized.27 Threats to the ability of Alliance members to intervene in regions of vital interest Is it possible that an NBC-armed adversary could threaten NATO’s ability to deploy forces and conduct combat operations, thereby severely limiting the ability of Alliance members to intervene in regions of vital interest? In the minds of many officials and analysts, this is the most plausible threat in the immediate future. In fact, potential regional adversaries seek NBC weapons not only to intimidate and/or defeat their neighbours and to achieve regional hegemony, but also to deter and, if necessary, disrupt and block outside intervention. Most, if not all, such states view the US and the West as their principal extra-regional threat, and NBC weapons as the means for ‘devaluing’ Western military capabilities by exploiting American and European aversion to casualties and its dependence upon access to ports, airfields and military facilities in the theatre of conflict. The perceived value of nuclear weapons is reflected in the often-cited statement attributed to former Indian Army Chief Sundarji: ‘one principal lesson of the Gulf War is that, if a state intends to fight the U.S., it should avoid doing so unless and until it possesses nuclear weapons’.28 The primary lesson that many would-be regional hegemons took from the second Gulf War is that it is probably futile to try to compete with the US and the West in the field of advanced conventional weaponry.29 Adversaries may have several different objectives for utilizing NBC weapons against the West,30 such as deterring Western (mainly US) intervention, intimidating the West’s regional allies and disrupting and blocking Western deployments and/or combat operations.31 Assessments vary widely on the extent of the threat posed by a new NBC-armed power against Western forces or military bases overseas. The view that a future nuclear-armed Iraq or Iran would ‘never dare’ to use nuclear or biological weapons against US or European forces contrasts with the contention that some new NBC-armed powers could be ‘undeterrable’.32 Reality is likely to lie somewhere in between. Most leaders of hostile new nuclear nations probably recognize that nuclear use against US or European forces would almost certainly be met with a devastating, even if not nuclear, counterblow. Nonetheless, under certain circumstances, a sufficiently desperate and ruthless leader might use nuclear or biological weapons against Western power-projection forces.33 There is only one (recent) historical example, the 1990–1991 Gulf War. Although it is impossible to know with confidence why Iraq did not use its BW and CW, revelations in late 1995 by the Iraqi leadership indicate that Iraq’s decision was based on the fear that the US (or Israel) would retaliate with nuclear weapons in the event of a CW or BW attack.34 The threat of Western nuclear retaliation raises, of course, the issue of credibility, which is closely linked to the asymmetry of interests. It can be argued that, even if a regional state were to choose not to employ his NBC capabilities as a ‘weapon of first resort’, the Alliance’s ability to deter their use further along in

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a conflict may be compromised by the disparity between the strength of the Alliance’s interests and those of its opponent. If a nuclear response is totally disproportionate, it could lack credibility. Depending on the nature of the operation – peace-enforcement or defence of Western access to key economic resources – NATO is unlikely to have its physical security threatened, as it was during the Cold War. In contrast, an adversary regime may feel that its very existence is at risk in a conflict with NATO. According to a study of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), this asymmetry of interests could lead a regional state to believe that NATO is more likely to back down if threatened with NBC capabilities, given that the Alliance’s interests may be perceived as peripheral to the core security interests of member nations. Regional actors may also question the strength of the Alliance’s commitment to respond decisively to the use of CBW against deployed Allied forces or the civilian populations of non-NATO Coalition members in instances where the Alliance’s interests are not readily defined or understood by the general publics of member nations. Alternatively, even if NATO’s resolve is clearly perceived, the personal risk to the leadership of a regional aggressor in the event of defeat may be such that it would be willing to employ NBC capabilities in a last ditch attempt at victory, calculating that there would be little more to lose in the event of a possible retaliatory nuclear strike than in the case of a certain conventional military defeat.35 Therefore, it is possible, although not necessarily very probable, that an NBC-armed adversary could threaten NATO’s ability to deploy forces and conduct combat operations, thereby severely limiting the ability of Alliance members to intervene in regions of vital interest. In this context, it is argued that NATO forces should be capable of defending themselves and completing their mission. Therefore, defensive military preparations (including training, decontamination capabilities, availability of protective equipment, etc.) would be necessary. Threats to missions, such as peacekeeping and humanitarian operations It is possible that, under certain circumstances, NBC weapons could be used against NATO forces participating in peacekeeping operations under UN auspices. This is a somewhat lower probability than the threat against NATO forces on a power-projection mission, but by no means a negligible one. However, if one looks at the proliferant countries in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, it is rather difficult to describe such a scenario. Under present circumstances, one could hardly imagine a peacekeeping operation in Iran or Syria. It would be even less likely that a proliferant would use NBC weapons against a peacekeeping force to prevent a peacekeeping operation in a neighbouring country. In case such an attack (or threat of) takes place, under unforeseen circumstances, the same capabilities requirements for NATO forces as in scenario B would be required.

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The threat of WMD terrorism As extensively discussed in Chapter 3, this is probably the most serious WMD-related threat, but there is probably little NATO as an alliance can do to address the problem, although it could certainly contribute to the management of specific crises or in the field of consequence-management.

Responding to the proliferation of WMD: options for NATO Preventing the further spread of WMD remains a shared objective and a high priority for the majority of states in the world. The question is, however, how it can be achieved: through non-proliferation initiatives, counterproliferation policies, or the combination of both.36 An assessment of the Alliance’s options for dealing with the threat of NBC proliferation, including non-proliferation and counterproliferation will be presented. It will be examined whether any ‘offensive’ military counterproliferation action presents significant political and military problems and whether it should be seen as an option of last resort. We will also discuss the argument that defensive measures, such as ballistic missile defences (BMD) are more feasible, both politically and militarily, although they may be less efficient and have a high economic cost. Responses to the proliferation threat may include one or more of the following: 1 2 3 4

International legal regimes, intended to block the spread of WMD; Supply side actions, intended to prevent access to technology; Security guarantees/assurances, intended to provide alternatives to WMD;37 Military actions (counterproliferation), intended to prevent the development, or to destroy existing WMD arsenals or to defend against attacks.38

It is argued that Western countries should make two types of responses to WMD proliferation. The first is to strengthen the instruments of non-proliferation policy. However, one cannot assume the total success of non-proliferation efforts.39 Nonproliferation efforts did not always succeed in the past, as the cases of India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, Iraq, North Korea and Iran testify. But the international non-proliferation regime obstructed nuclear weapons acquisition in numerous countries by raising the costs and lengthening the time period. Efforts to reinvigorate the regime by strengthening safeguards, tightening export controls and promoting confidence-building measures (CBMs) have been taking place for more than a decade, with rather mixed results.40 The second necessary response to the new risks of NBC weapons proliferation consequently consists of undertaking prudent defence planning against the possibility that Western forces may have to confront a regional, WMD-armed adversary on the battlefield. While diplomatic, political, economic, trade and export control measures will remain pivotal to preventing and reversing proliferation, counterproliferation as prudent defence planning constitutes a fundamental element in mitigating the possibility that an adversary’s possession of WMD will

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deter the West from intervening militarily in order to protect strategic interests.41 As already mentioned, given the growing availability of dual-use technology and alternative suppliers, a determined proliferator is likely to succeed (especially with CBW programmes). Thus, there is a requirement to prepare for the growing threat.42 There seems to be general agreement that NATO is the only international body with the competence (but not the authorization or mandate) to counter the consequences of proliferation should political means fail. Although the Alliance’s main emphasis will remain on non-proliferation methods, despite initial political emphasis, in certain cases where non-proliferation will be perceived as inadequate, it will inevitably focus on defensive measures as well.43 If we assume that some kind of military preparedness is necessary for NATO to deal with NBC contingencies, what type of capabilities will be required? In theory, options include offensive and defensive ones. Offensive (counter-force) options One of the main options for a military counterproliferation action is preventive or pre-emptive attack (‘counter-force’ operations44). Preventive war can be defined as the use of military force to destroy an adversary’s capability to develop or deploy NBC weapons, and pre-emption as the use of military force (shortly before or during a conflict) to disable or destroy an adversary’s WMD before they can be used.45 So far, there have been six cases of preventive/pre-emptive attacks against nuclear installations: (1) Allied bombing of Nazi heavy-water plant in Norway; (2) US bombing of Japanese nuclear labs; (3) unsuccessful Iranian air attack against Osiraq in 1980; (4) successful Israeli air attack against Osiraq in 1981; (5) successful Iraqi air attack against Bushehr in Iran in 1987; and (6) Allied attacks and partial destruction of Iraq’s WMD facilities and assets during the 1990–1991 Gulf War.46 It should be noted, however, that even Israel’s successful raid on the nuclear facility at Osiraq did not convince Iraq to abandon its nuclear weapons programme. On the contrary, the Iraqis subsequently enlarged their programme and dispersed and hid their nuclear facilities.47 Internationally, there appears to be a broad consensus in favour of reversing proliferation where possible; there is far less agreement on the wisdom of using military force to do so. Any preventive war is, therefore, likely to be highly controversial. For any head of state to order a preventive/pre-emptive counterproliferation strike would require a very special set of conditions (such a decision would be even harder for the leaders of a coalition or an alliance, like NATO) a

b

The WMD aspirant would have to be rapidly approaching (or have crossed) the WMD threshold and be led by a hostile government that appears ready to take extreme risks. Such a government would be unlikely to be deterred from pursuing future offensive military actions; Actions of the proliferant would have to directly and immediately threaten a vital interest of the country or coalition considering the pre-emptive strike;

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c

The adversary should not be able to threaten the pre-emptor with assured WMD retaliation; All other non-military options (diplomatic pressure, export controls, economic sanctions) should have been exhausted before such a strike is undertaken; The head of state (or governing body of an Alliance/Coalition) should have adequate domestic and international political support for such an action.48

d

e

There are significant political and military problems for counter-force operations. The more threatening a nuclear programme becomes, the less vulnerable it will be to military attack. Military planning for the use of force to limit or eliminate the danger of WMD proliferation will be defined by three parameters: (a) the timing and political context for military action; (b) the nature of the adversary; and (c) the kind of targets to be attacked. Political judgement about these parameters will have a decisive impact upon the prospects for military success.49 The ambiguous and clandestine nature of the WMD programmes of future proliferators is the biggest problem a counterproliferation strategy determined to protect against those programmes would face today. It will probably not be very effective to issue a direct threat like an ultimatum to stop a certain activity if it is not known for sure whether this activity is taking place, and if so, where. In addition, one would have to present indisputable proof to convince the international community for the necessity of counterproliferation action. Furthermore, it would be politically very controversial, if not damaging, for NATO states to attack nuclear installations or facilities for the production of dual-use chemical and biological weapons precursors in a country which is not at war and which is living up to its treaty obligations. On the other hand, the best hope for stopping WMD production programmes with military means is to act during the early stages of the programmes. It is far less damaging (in terms of collateral damage) to destroy a reactor or reprocessing plant if fissionable material has not yet been introduced.50 Another important factor is international support for a military counterproliferation action. Certainly, unless such action is undertaken against a pariah state or a state that has engaged in an act of naked aggression or whose weapons programme presents a clear and urgent threat, it will receive far from unanimous support.51 Without a sense of urgency deriving from the proliferator activity itself or from other related objectionable international behaviour, there will be no international consensus for multilateral responses such as warnings, or embargoes, let alone military action. Such problems are highlighted by past US efforts to control the transfer of sensitive technologies to Iran. Even those countries that would welcome the elimination of potential WMD threats may baulk at having the US act as self-appointed ‘judge, jury and executioner’.52 At an October 1993 NATO meeting, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel stated his view that military enforcement of non-proliferation is only permissible in self-defence or under a UN Security Council mandate.53 According to Georgi Mamedov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia,

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‘it is obvious that aspirations for unilateral use of armed forces without a UN Security Council decision, and only on the basis of intelligence data concerning the appearance of WMD or their delivery vehicles in a certain region of the world, does not fit in with existing norms of the international law. . . . We believe that resorting to the use of military force may be considered only in exceptional circumstances, and only when sanctioned by the UN Security Council.’54 Even US officials are not fully convinced. As Michele Flournoy, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence, has noted: ‘A preventive war in the absence of a larger crisis would be less likely to receive domestic popular support and would raise some profoundly unsettling moral questions: Would the U.S. be justified in initiating hostilities for the sole purpose of denying an adversary a nuclear weapons capability? Would the amount of force required to accomplish this, and the damage it could cause, be proportionate to the objectives involved?’55 US Senator Pete Domenici argued that ‘the counterproliferation options that will be considered must support and not undermine traditional nonproliferation measures. And they must support rather than complicate our broad foreign and defence policies around the world, especially in conflict-prone regions.’56 As a unilateral (‘national’) policy, counterproliferation constitutes a threat to the credibility and legitimacy of the international regime and therefore to the NPT as the discrimination problem, the perpetual dynamite of the regime, will be further aggravated if one powerful country is talking about military measures to combat proliferation.57 Although the majority of officials and analysts would agree that regimes need sanctions, and, under certain circumstances the use of force against violators may be necessary, many would argue that sanctions are a matter for the regime community, not for unilateral action of a single country. It is also argued that any military action, even if sanctioned by the UN, has an impact for the international non-proliferation regimes, as such action highly publicizes the failure of the regime. Finally, the US and the West must be prepared for other countries to follow its example by engaging in their own pre-emptive military strikes against regional rivals and adversaries. The US needs to examine carefully how its security would be affected if many states adopted strategies to unilaterally destroy the NBC capabilities of other states, including those of possible US allies. For example, what would be the US response to Russian or Chinese counterproliferation actions? This may be more of a theoretical than practical concern at this time, however, and these countries would likely base their decisions on national security grounds and not on prior US behaviour (which would then be used as an excuse).58 Military measures to prevent or reverse NBC proliferation present significant difficulties not only in the political, but also in the military field. The intelligence requirements for actions against proliferators’ programmes are particularly demanding, whether those actions are designed to disable or to destroy R & D and production facilities or weapons and materials while minimizing collateral damage. In the case of a pre-emptive attack during or immediately before an

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armed conflict, the most immediate problem for a military planner considering a pre-emptive strike is the possible dispersal of these NBC weapons to a number of locations, some of which may not be known in advance (or even for several hours or days after the beginning of operations). Indeed, after a prolonged period of political crisis, the target country, fearing military action, would likely already have adopted diplomatic measures to deflect international suspicion, while intensifying military preparations to defend against an attack, such as concealment and dispersal of critical strategic assets59 and placing defence forces in a higher state of readiness.60 To support a pre-emptive strike on a new WMD arsenal, the NATO intelligence community would need to provide data on the existence, size and disposition of the arsenal. Mobile missiles, submarines and unconventional means of delivery present the most challenging basing modes from the perspective of the military planner interested in pre-emption.61 One of the first ‘lessons’ of the 1990–1991 Gulf War was that the Allies’ prewar WMD-related intelligence had been inadequate.62 Only two of twenty nuclear sites were even identified and targeted during the war.63 In total, the Coalition mounted approximately 970 air strikes against WMD targets. Despite this, post-war surveys showed no evidence that Iraqi BW were either destroyed or even found to exist. In addition, the UN Special Commission teams uncovered some 150,000 chemical munitions that were untouched by the bombings. Also, nearly 1,500 sorties were flown against mobile SCUD launchers.64 According to the US Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS), ‘there is no indisputable proof that Scud mobile launchers – as opposed to high-fidelity decoys, trucks or other objects with Scud-like signatures – were destroyed by fixed-wing aircraft. What the Gulf War experience demonstrates, however, is that carrying out a CP attack can be difficult in the extreme. Intelligence may not be able to locate WMD weapons due to enemy countermeasures (i.e. constant relocation, mobility and decoys), thwarting even determined attacks on such assets.’65 In addition to intelligence requirements, precision-guided munitions will have to be improved and perhaps specially tailored for such tasks. Even the use of current generation ‘smart’ or ‘brilliant’ weapons against targets such as nuclear materials production facilities can have unintended consequences, resulting in the death of a large number of non-combatants, damage to co-located and other civil facilities and adverse environmental consequences.66 To prepare for CP action, it has been recommended that NATO should acquire a ‘core’ set of capabilities: ● ● ● ● ●

●

strategic and operational intelligence,67 including early warning data; automated and deployable command, control and communications (C3); continuous wide-area ground surveillance to locate and track mobile targets; remote and point CW and BW detection, identification and warning; extended air defences, including against tactical ballistic and cruise missiles for deployed forces; and NBC individual protective equipment for deployed forces.

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Box 6.1 Operational requirements ● ●

● ● ● ● ●

●

Location of targets Assessment of targets (type of site, material, weapons, accessibility, defences) Estimation of collateral damage under different options Assessment of options (destruction/seizure/covert action) Estimation of prospects of overcoming resistance Training and doctrinal preparation of troops involved Procurement of equipment for operating in an environment where the use of WMD weapons cannot be excluded Post-strike activities (handling of material; emergency containment of collateral damage; emergency aid to civilian population, inspection support)1

Note 1 Dembinski, Kelle and Muller, NATO and Nonproliferation, p. 41; In addition to those requirements, the May 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review underscored two key challenges that DoD must meet to ensure future preparedness: (1) Institutionalising counter-proliferation as an organising principle in every facet of military activity; (2) Internationalising these efforts to encourage allies and coalition partners to train, equip and prepare their forces to operate under NBC conditions. (DoD 1997, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 61)

According to analysts and officials, ‘the identified capabilities, essential if NATO is to project a credible deterrent posture, include the ability to conduct strikes against hardened and underground NBC targets which in turn requires enhanced penetration capabilities and the ability to contain collateral effects. Also critical is the ability to conduct operations against mobile targets.’68 It is argued that if these capabilities were acquired, they would clearly advance non-proliferation goals by devaluing NBC weapons by denying their use or by mitigating their effects.69 The following box presents another set of operational requirements, slightly different to those outlined above. Defensive options Defences are traditionally referred to as ‘passive’ (those that do not involve the destruction of the attacking weapon or platform) and ‘active’ (those that do). Active defences are intended to prevent weapons from reaching and detonating at their intended targets; passive defences are designed to minimize damage from such detonations should they occur. They include NBC agent detection, identification and warning, protection and decontamination capabilities, etc. There is concern in the United States, Israel and some European countries, and also Japan and South Korea (because of the possible threat from North Korea)

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about the threat from ballistic or cruise missiles (carrying NBC warheads) from developing countries. in this context, there are four main options a b c d

early interception during or shortly before a conflict; the hardening of installations; passive defences for the protection of populations and deployed forces; and ballistic missile defences (BMDs).

The first option has already been examined. Regarding options (b) and (c) ●

●

The hardening of installations is rather expensive, covers only fixed military targets and does little to protect deployed forces or Alliance populations; Passive defences would have a complementary role to play (mainly in the direction of damage control), but their usefulness on their own may be rather limited.70

Option (d) – BMDs – need to be examined in greater detail. Missile defence can be configured to provide ‘global’, ‘theatre’ or ‘point’ defence. Of greater interest and feasibility for NATO are ‘theatre’ missile defences (TMDs). Research & Development costs for BMDs place considerable burden on small economies where military-industrial capacity is comparatively modest. In addition, the current generation of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) is not effective against most classes of surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) because of their high-velocity trajectory. This means that an effective defence requires a dedicated development effort usually beyond the defence capabilities and budget of smaller NATO member-states. A TMD system involves a number of different functional capabilities: detection of a launch, surveillance and warning weapons guidance, hand-over of the endgame engagement to the interceptor, kill assessment and additional engagement decisions. Multiple elements, subsystems and systems are involved.71 In addition, an effective anti-missile defence system should be able to disable the warhead and not only the missile body.72 Finally, interceptions of ballistic missiles must take place further away from the target area, given the fact that falling missile debris proved as dangerous as an unimpeded impact on built-up areas.73 The deployment of TMDs designed to provide coverage against threats that originate in the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern regions should be seriously considered by NATO planners. This initiative would have two objectives: to dissuade states from developing and deploying offensive missiles and, should proliferation of more sophisticated ballistic missiles occur, to defend against their use in a crisis.74 However, TMD deployment should not be regarded as a panacea, only as a contribution to regional deterrence. In fact, TMD efficiency would be rather limited as proliferators are expected to develop TMD counter-measures such as decoys and early release chemical and biological submunitions.75 Some analysts believe that emphasis on a technical solution will undermine multilateral non-proliferation efforts. Others note that the

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costs of the system do not merit its deployment because the offensive systems available to a potential proliferator will always be cheaper than any ATBM system. Furthermore, there is a fear that the possible deployment of such systems towards the South could contribute to weakening European relations with the Maghreb countries.76 Finally, the problem with an allied missile defence system is that the political and military decision of interception cannot be shared, owing to time constraints and technical reasons. The decision therefore would need to be centralized. This in turn raises difficult questions regarding the modalities of such a centralization.77 Several Western countries are interested in TMD development programmes. France has the most advanced TMD programme in Europe, focusing its current efforts on developing an effective system called ‘Aster’. Italy is concerned because the deployment of ATBM systems on the Mediterranean frontiers could contribute to destabilizing the relations with Maghreb countries. On the other hand, Germany is not specifically interested in TMDs because there are no current or prospective threats that require an ATBM system and a wide-area defence of Germany would be problematic because missile interceptions would probably occur outside German territory, with debris falling (unacceptably) on other European countries.78 A southern Mediterranean country, Israel, has developed a TMD capability, the Arrow system. The total development cost of Arrow exceeded $1 billion and was shared by the US government (72 per cent) and Israel MoD (28 per cent); deployment costs were paid for by Israel (64 per cent) and the US (36 per cent). Within NATO, there was agreement on the necessity to work on NBC proliferation and two groups were created: the Senior Political Military Group on Proliferation and the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation. The first one is chaired by the NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and is focused on the political and preventive aspects of NATO’s approach regarding proliferation. The Senior Defence Group, co-chaired by a European and American official, is responsible for considering how NATO’s defence posture can support NATO’s non-proliferation efforts but also provide protection should those efforts fail (diplomatic responses to the proliferation problem will remain the preferred political instrument of NATO members). In this context, it has been focusing on the military capabilities necessary to effectively manage proliferation in order to identify existing capabilities, to assess how they will be used operationally and to advise what could be done to address them. The work of the two groups is brought together and reported to the North Atlantic Council by the Joint Committee on Proliferation (JCP), chaired by the Deputy Secretary General. Eric Terzuolo reports that the DGP examined ‘potential NBC and missile proliferation threats to NATO out to 2010. The risk assessment concluded that the strategic personalities of regional proliferators were very different from, and more dangerous than, those of the former Warsaw Pact states: more inclined toward risk, less inclined to respect “rules” of deterrence. Such countries might treat WMD use as a “first choice” rather than a “last resort”. The DGP concluded that NBC proliferation could be a direct military threat to NATO and had to be addressed in alliance defence planning.’79

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The SDGP adopted a three-stage programme for itself. In the first phase, the working group conducted a risk assessment, with help from intelligence information provided by member-states. The second phase was an evaluation of how far the new situation affected NATO’s existing defence posture.80 The results were made public in November 1995 and the SDGP identified three principal contingencies which are of concern to the Alliance: (a) threats to NATO territory and populations; (b) regional conflicts; and (c) peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. ‘NATO’s Response to Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’ collected the results of the DGP’s work to ‘address the military capabilities needed to discourage NBC proliferation, deter threats or use of NBC weapons, and to protect NATO populations, territory and forces’.81 Also, NATO’s Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) has been in charge of developing an Alliance Extended Air Defence/Theatre Missile Defence. The CNAD set up a high-level group, called Extended Air Defence/Theatre Missile Defence Ad Hoc Working Group, which co-ordinates activities in this area. The high-level working group of 8 nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the UK and the USA), chaired by the US, has been established to deal exclusively with finding ways to define future opportunities and methods of collaboration in TMD programmes. It has already identified 15 areas for potential research and international co-operation. Within SHAPE there is a NATO TMD Working Group with the task of establishing tactical missile defence military requirements.82 Since the late 1990s there has been some mobility in NATO’s TMD programme. In October 1999, the alliance approved a TMD feasibility study that could pave the way for NATO deployment of more advanced BMD capabilities. The selection of defence industrial companies to prepare the study was announced in June 2001, and the winning teams were given 18 months to design a system for the protection of deployed forces from missile attack, putting the alliance on track to make a decision in 2004 on programme development.83 The participation of major European defence firms in this venture gives European governments a stronger financial stake in advancing NATO’s TMD programme.84 As Richard Sokolsky rightly points out, however, ‘NATO’s track-record on TMD development does not warrant unrestrained optimism about the willingness or ability of NATO allies to invest substantial political capital or financial resources in territorial missile defences. Despite North Atlantic Council’s endorsement of TMD co-operation in 1996, scant progress has been made in developing and deploying an alliance-wide TMD capability in Europe or for the protection of forward-deployed bases.’85 The WMD Centre is an interdisciplinary team in the Political Affairs Division of NATO. It was established in order to support the work of committees and working groups dealing with proliferation issues. The WMD Centre draws its mandate directly from the Alliance’s 1999 Washington Summit and the WMD Initiative. There are basically six broad objectives: to ensure a more vigorous debate at NATO leading to strengthened common understanding among Allies on WMD issues and how to respond to them; to improve the quality and quantity of intelligence and information-sharing among Allies on proliferation issues; to

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support the development of a public information strategy by Allies to increase awareness of proliferation issues and Allies’ efforts to support non-proliferation efforts; to enhance military readiness to operate in a WMD environment and to counter WMD threats; to exchange information concerning national programmes for bilateral WMD destruction and assistance – specifically how to help Russia destroy its stockpiles of CW; and to enhance the possibilities for Allies to assist one another in the protection of their civil populations against WMD risks. The Alliance has an active programme of work regarding WMD risks and threats, and the Centre is the focal point for support to these efforts.86 Overarching principles to guide NATO’s defence response to proliferation87 ●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Ensure Alliance cohesion through continued widespread participation in Allied defence preparations for operations in the NBC proliferation risk environment. Maintain freedom of action and demonstrate to any potential adversary that the Alliance will not be coerced by the threat or use of NBC weapons. Reassure both Allies and coalition partners of the Alliance’s ability effectively to respond to, or protect against, NBC threats or attacks. Ensure responsive and effective consultation procedures to resolve crises which have a potential NBC dimension at the earliest possible stage. Complement non-proliferation efforts with a mix of military capabilities that devalue NBC weapons, by reducing the incentives for, and raising the costs of, acquisition. Complement nuclear deterrence with a mix of defensive and responsive conventional capabilities, coupled with effective intelligence and surveillance means, that together would reinforce the Alliance’s overall deterrence posture against the threats posed by proliferation by increasing the options available to Alliance decision-makers during crises and conflicts. Balance a mix of capabilities including nuclear forces and conventional response capabilities to devalue a proliferant’s NBC weapons by denying the military advantages they would confer and through the prospect of an overwhelming response to their use. Prioritize needed capabilities in terms of their contribution to Alliance objectives. Conflict control, including the tempo and direction of military operations, and the ability to prevail in all phases of any conflict. Evolve capabilities as the threat evolves while focusing on existing conditions and expected near-term trends, with their regional emphases, and maintaining options for deploying more capable systems if necessary in the future. Emphasize system mobility, given that NBC proliferation risks are expected to be primarily regional in character and that NATO forces may be called upon to operate beyond NATO’s borders. Integrate NBC-related concepts into the Alliance’s defence planning and standardization processes.88

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Deterrence and the role of NATO’s nuclear weapons There are two significant questions related to deterrence and the role of NATO’s nuclear weapons: (1) What would be the role of NATO’s nuclear deterrent? and (2) Would (conventional and nuclear) deterrence work against regional opponents? Concerning NATO’s nuclear deterrent, there seems to be general agreement that nuclear weapons should never be used, except in the direst circumstances. Actual use might only be considered if a NATO state faces a very serious threat, if there exists a high probability that nuclear use would end the fighting and not result in an even more catastrophic destruction, and if no other means are available to counter this existential threat, even if these other means would require greater efforts and higher costs.89 One should keep in mind that 1 2

The norm of non-use of nuclear weapons remains a vital Western security interest; There exists a code of conduct laid out in the humanitarian law of war, according to which military operations should only be directed at military targets, as well as ethical considerations concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons.90

In addition, there are questions of credibility and legitimacy of the use of nuclear weapons.91 More specifically, questions may be raised concerning the legitimacy of use of nuclear weapons to retaliate against CBW attacks. And if a nuclear response is disproportionate, it could lack credibility.92 Furthermore, there is considerable uncertainty (and speculation) on whether (conventional and nuclear) deterrence would work against regional opponents. According to the US–Soviet Cold War model, leaders were assumed to be rational, well-informed and capable of cost-benefit calculations; driven by the military balance, not their domestic political agendas; in control of military forces; able to communicate with the adversary; sufficiently familiar with the opponent’s goals, determination and values to understand the type of threat necessary for deterrence to work; and to know to whom and how to communicate that threat. In the post-Cold War environment, the difficulties involved in establishing relationships with regional powers that can meet these necessary conditions will far surpass those of the past. There is concern, however, that many of the assumptions on which US–Soviet deterrence was founded may or may not hold.93 For example ●

●

●

●

The US/West ascribed a basic and shared rationality to Soviet leaders that may not always be present in regional conflicts;94 The proliferator might weigh the same expected costs and benefits of a given action, but weigh them differently than US leaders would, based on different values;95 There is the possibility of lack of effective communication between the two sides; There may be inadequate understanding of the strategic personality of the adversary (lack of ‘strategic profiles’).96

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NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue: a synopsis of activities NATO began to focus on the Mediterranean in the 1960s with the establishment of the Expert Working Group on the Middle East and the Maghreb, and later – at a more political level – of the Ad Hoc Group on the Mediterranean.97 However, until the end of the Cold War there was little common NATO policy towards the Mediterranean to speak of, beyond a basic commitment to common defence of allied territory, maritime space and sea-lanes. The primary concern for the Atlantic Alliance in the Mediterranean during the Cold War was the growing presence of a Soviet maritime capability developed for deployment in the region (the Sovmedron or Fifth Eskadra) and the deployment of Soviet military personnel and equipment in friendly states around the littoral.98 The shift by the Alliance beyond a primary concern with military security to a concern with multiple security threats was manifest in the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept of 1991, which declared that ‘the stability and peace of the countries on the southern periphery of Europe are important for the security of the Alliance, as the 1991 Gulf War has shown. This is all the more so because of the build-up of military power and the proliferation of weapons technologies in the area, including WMD and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the territory of some member-states of the Alliance.’ In December 1994, NATO Foreign Ministers stated their willingness ‘to establish contacts, on a case-by-case basis between the Alliance and Mediterranean non-member countries with a view to contributing to the strengthening of regional stability’. The Alliance’s Mediterranean Dialogue was launched with six Mediterranean partners, namely Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. Algeria joined the Dialogue in February 2000. According to NATO, the Dialogue is aimed at creating good relations and better mutual understanding throughout the Mediterranean, as well as promoting regional security and stability. It provides for political discussions with the participating countries. Its work is organized through an annual Work Programme focusing on practical co-operation in security and defence-related areas, information, civil-emergency planning and science.99 In this regard, NATO’s contribution should be to continue to strengthen the Mediterranean Dialogue by concentrating on fields where it has a clear comparative advantage: defence and security. This will complement the initiatives of other organizations and contribute to constructive relations with NATO’s Mediterranean neighbours.100 It is argued that the Mediterranean Dialogue does not signal a redirection of the Alliance’s priorities, but instead a modest addition to its numerous and fast-growing functions101 and that it is ‘divorced from NATO’s broader security and defence agenda in the Mediterranean’, which involves ‘such important security issues as CP, counterterrorism, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance’. Reducing misunderstandings and improving the overall climate of relations between the two shores of the Mediterranean was the primary motivation behind the Dialogue. This attempt came against the background of growing concern among NATO members about the risk of WMD proliferation, as well as more diffuse types of instability emanating from the South and South-east. However,

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108 WMD proliferation assessments of the implications of such risks have varied considerably in the course of the 1990s among the allies, making it difficult to develop unambiguous policies in support of common goals. As Roberto Menotti put it, ‘there is still limited agreement regarding the goals of the Dialogue, its scope and the substantive issues it ought to deal with. Thus, the initiative suffers from weak support among some key allies and a continuing lack of focus, in spite of recent efforts to enhance the level of activities included in the Dialogue. Additional factors that have constrained the evolution of the initiative include the politically fragmented character of the Mediterranean region, the priority of NATO’s Eastward enlargement, the constant spillover of the Middle East peace process, and the institutional overlap between NATO’s Dialogue and the EU’s Barcelona process.’102 As mentioned above, not all NATO member-states regard the initiative with the same degree of enthusiasm.103 The lack of a solid consensus over the essence of the Dialogue has not deterred its sponsors, which is in itself an indication of the unique characteristic of this consultative forum: the unspoken premise seems to be that a weak dialogue is better than no dialogue at all.104 The success or failure of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative will be determined to a considerable extent by the degree to which it addresses the concerns and fears of the Dialogue partners themselves. How do they regard the initiative? Are they enthusiastic about it or simply indifferent? To what extent does it address their security concerns? How can the initiative be made more relevant and effective? As a general principle, none of the dialogue states is opposed to the initiative per se, and each of them regards it with a varying degree of interest. At the same time, there is a variety of uncertainties, questions and concerns that need to be addressed if the Dialogue is to achieve its objectives and promote greater transparency for and understanding of NATO’s goals.105 Some Arab partners to the Dialogue view with concern what they perceive as the ‘lack of basic requirements for conducting a healthy and constructive dialogue, such as the absence of a concrete agenda as well as the lack of common definition or even understanding of the main aspects of security in the Mediterranean such as risks, threats and modalities of tackling security issues, particularly when NATO is undergoing significant conceptual transformations, including resorting to “soft security” which is unconventional to its modalities and operations’.106 One of the critical issues for the Dialogue countries is the composition of the group itself – why each was chosen to participate in the Dialogue and why others were excluded.107 Each of the seven countries realizes that it was chosen because it was perceived to be a moderate, Western-looking, constructive (as defined by the West) participant in regional affairs. Furthermore, all six have diplomatic and political ties with one another, which is no small matter, given the fractious quality of political life in the Middle East and North Africa.108 The initiative is, therefore, of necessity a multi-bilateral discussion between a highly organized and capable Western institution and a group of states – some regionally powerful, others not – on the other side of the Mediterranean. Even a marginal contribution

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to the reduction of the level of mistrust towards the ‘West’ among the elites of those states and – a much more difficult task – their societies, would be a significant achievement.109 In this context, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue is a useful tool of preventive diplomacy and a potentially important CBM.110 NATO also launched the ‘Istanbul Co-operation Initiative’, offered by NATO to interested countries in the broader Middle East region, starting with the countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council, to foster mutually beneficial bilateral relationships and thus enhance security and stability. The initiative focuses on practical co-operation where NATO can add value, notably in the defence and security fields. This initiative is distinct from, yet takes into account and complements, other initiatives involving other international actors.111 In conclusion, and returning to the central question of threat assessment and counterproliferation options for the Alliance, there is general agreement that the conventional capabilities of NATO member-states and regional powers in the Middle East and the Mediterranean cannot stand any qualitative or quantitative comparison. Proliferant states do not have the ability to defeat, not even threaten, NATO members in classic military terms.112 As a result of their conventional inferiority, developing states in the southern Mediterranean and the Middle East might choose to either not challenge the West at all, or seek an equalizer: WMD. The proliferation threat against NATO countries should be conceived of as a mid- to long-term threat that – under certain circumstances – might be avoided altogether by political changes in the countries concerned, by the intensification of institutional contacts, economic co-operation (mainly in the form of investment and development assistance from the West) and by the development of good neighbourly relations. NATO should be prepared to deal with the threat of NBC proliferation, without, however, exaggerating this threat. NATO should avoid giving the impression that it is searching for a new ‘raison d’ être’ and trying to replace the ‘Soviet threat’ with a new threat combining religious (Islamic) extremism and NBC weapons proliferation. This could unnecessarily antagonize and isolate the Islamic/Arab world and become a self-fulfilling prophecy. In the opinion of the author, NATO’s emphasis should continue to be on political-diplomatic means and on non-proliferation, but these should be complemented by military preparations (mainly of a defensive nature). In fact, the ‘Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, including the ‘Assessment of Proliferation Risks to NATO’, provides a basis for Allied defence efforts against proliferation and argues that, as a defensive Alliance, NATO must maintain a range of capabilities needed to discourage NBC weapons proliferation and use, and to protect NATO territory, populations and forces against such use. At this point, NATO will find itself in front of a difficult dilemma: the Alliance is confronted with a situation in which it must continue to prepare itself against potentially adverse military developments, while ensuring that such action is not perceived within the region as threatening (and therefore increase the likelihood of the contingency occurring), lest it preclude the Alliance from taking advantage of additional political and diplomatic openings to enhance security in the

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Mediterranean region. This dilemma will likely only increase as NATO’s thinking on non-Article V operations continues to mature.113 Finally, when it comes to offensive CP action, it is inconceivable to many analysts that NATO as an Alliance would find the political will to launch a preventive military strike against an NBC proliferator, without being in a state of war with that country. Action by an individual country may, under certain circumstances, be a different matter. It is also possible that the NATO members who have the interest and are motivated to do so can put together a ‘regional coalition’ and undertake military activities which include non-NATO members. 114

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Since he came to office, President George W. Bush has made dealing with the combined threats of proliferation,1 terrorism2 and authoritarian regimes a top priority, one that justifies a systematic rethink of alliances, doctrines, strategies and the traditional rules of American policy.3 It has been argued that the Bush administration’s emphasis on defence and deterrence to deal with proliferation threats has its roots in the Clinton administration. Drawing on the lessons of the Gulf War and the possibility that the US might find itself in conflict with an adversary armed with CBW and short-range missiles, the Clinton Pentagon stepped up efforts to develop theatre missiles defences and announced a doctrine of ‘counterproliferation’, which was primarily intended to protect troops against CBW attack.4 Especially after 9/11, the American government has seriously re-examined the utility of both nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation5 as the attacks have prompted a drastic shift in the US’s conception of national security.6 For the first time since 1814, the American heartland was attacked.7 The vulnerability of its people, transportation networks and economic lifelines were exposed.8 No longer were oceans a buffer against attack,9 and no longer was military superiority sufficient to deter it.10 The shock of 9/11, the realization that the security landscape has undergone a profound transformation and the ‘fluidity of current and potential threats at a time of epochal transition, in terms of both security and technology’11 created much stronger public willingness in the US to use military force to eliminate America’s enemies.12 Like the Clinton administration, the Bush administration argued that ‘multilateral arms control treaties helped to limit proliferation and provide an international basis for rallying political coalitions, but, by themselves, could not stop a determined proliferator, such as Iraq or North Korea’.13 The Bush administration went much further than its predecessor, effectively downgrading multilateral arms control as a tool for combating proliferation. As Newman points out, ‘arms control is increasingly seen by official Washington as ponderous at best and counterproductive at worst. George W. Bush and his national security team have embraced a “new way of doing business in the strategic nuclear realm”, and have placed greater emphasis on the prevention and preemption of emerging NBC programmes in “rogue regimes” by military means.’14

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The perceived failure of non-proliferation regimes has been a central issue in US defence debates. America’s European allies are openly opposed to this assertive, military-oriented approach.15 A dominant view among American analysts and officials is that, due to the growing availability of dual-use technology and alternative suppliers, a determined proliferator of even modest resources is likely to succeed, especially with BW and CW programmes.16 Export controls may help to slow proliferation but cannot stop it.17 Despite a very obvious degree of hyperbole and an effort to exploit the events for promoting other objectives, the psychological impact of the 9/11 attacks should not be underestimated. The 9/11 attacks spawned proclamation of a new use-of-force doctrine calling for preventive military action against so-called rogue states seeking to acquire nuclear weapons.18 The doctrine reflected a loss of confidence in traditional nuclear deterrence; rogue states, it was believed, were irrational and might launch attacks on the US19 or transfer WMD to terrorist organizations. Already, and the immense retaliatory capabilities of the US notwithstanding, a non-state adversary was willing to attack and face the consequences.20 Thus, Jeffrey Record points out that the ‘global war in terrorism, highlighted by the preventive war against Iraq, became as much a war of counterproliferation as it was a war on terrorism’.21 A typical description of rogue states is given by Toby Gati, Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research in the Clinton Administration: ‘rogue states threaten us by maintaining programs for WMD, sponsoring terrorism, often targeted specifically at Americans, and by their hostility toward and active opposition to our political and social systems and those of our friends and allies’.22 Another, somewhat less convincing definition of rogue states is provided by Raymond Tanter, formerly a member of the US National Security Council in the Reagan administration: ‘Rogue states or leaders are defined as the ones that have large conventional military forces and that condone international terrorism and/or seek weapons of mass destruction’, and defines rogue behaviour vaguely as ‘unacceptable international conduct’.23 The ‘rogue state’ label implies that they are too irrational to be deterred by policies designed to deal with ‘normal’ countries.24 Such a classification is based on highly subjective criteria and rogue states constitute a rather ‘elastic grouping with a disputed membership’.25 Furthermore, critics argue that such regimes may be more risk-prone but they fear removal from power 26 and are quite capable of making rational calculations of ends and means.27 Michael Clare focused on the search for new enemies and justifications for defence spending – in the US defence community – in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, arguing that to ‘secure public backing for their long-range strategic plans, military officials focused increasingly on the most threatening characteristics of the least friendly powers, attempting to portray these nations’ military plans as posing a clear and present danger to American security interests. . . . The officials hoped in this fashion to define a strategic environment that would compel legislators to relinquish dreams of a substantial peace dividend in return for enhanced national security.’28 Out of this process came what might best be termed the

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‘Rogue Doctrine’ – the characterization of hostile (or seemingly hostile) Third World states with large military forces and nascent WMD capabilities as rogue states or ‘nuclear outlaws’.29 According to a rather sympathetic view of the Administration’s policies, the US national security strategy was the ‘product of the existing post-proliferated and terror-prone security environment. The best defense against proliferation and terrorism is a good offense;30 use of these weapons against U.S. forwarddeployed forces, U.S. friends and allies, or even U.S. or allied homelands is increasingly likely.’31 The strategy aims at ‘replacing traditional state-centred U.S. non-proliferation approach with one that – for the first time – privileges counterproliferation and explicitly acknowledges prospective requirements for preemption’.32 The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS)33 (2002 and 2006) provides a very clear and candid description of the current US approach The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking WMD, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. . . . We will build defenses against ballistic missiles and other means of delivery. We will cooperate with other nations to deny, contain, and curtail our enemies’ efforts to acquire dangerous technologies. And, as a matter of common sense and selfdefense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. But new deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists . . . the nature and motivations of these new adversaries, their determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto available only to the world’s strongest states, and the greater likelihood that they will use WMD against us, make today’s security environment more complex and dangerous. Our response must take full advantage of strengthened alliances, the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries, innovation in the use of military forces, modern technologies, including the development of an effective missiles defense system, and increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis. The NSS refers to a multilayered and comprehensive strategy, but also puts considerable emphasis on CP efforts: Our comprehensive strategy to combat WMD includes: ●

Proactive CP efforts. We must deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed. We must ensure that key capabilities – detection, active and passive defenses, and counterforce capabilities – are integrated into our defense transformation and our homeland security systems. CP must also be integrated into the doctrine, training, and equipping of our forces and those of our allies to ensure that we can prevail in any conflict with WMD-armed adversaries.

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Basic principles of US counterproliferation Strengthened nonproliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring the materials, technologies, and expertise necessary for WMD. Effective consequence management to respond to the effects of WMD use, whether by terrorists or hostile states.

The transition from non-proliferation policy to counterproliferation (CP) takes place after the acquisition by a state of one or a few nuclear weapons, or the equivalent in biological and chemical weapons. However, under certain circumstances, even before the acquisition of an actual NBC capability, the preventive use of military force may be contemplated. In NATO context, counterproliferation refers to defence efforts, practices and capabilities intended to deter NBC weapons use – if countries acquire such weapons – or to protect and defend against their use should deterrence fail. According to the US DoD, one of the core objectives in proliferation protection policy is to convince potential and actual proliferants that NBC weapons will be of no value because the US and its coalition partners will have the capability to deny or limit the political and military utility of NBC weapons, and because the damage inflicted by US and coalition forces will far outweigh any potential benefits of use.34 Military counterproliferation options may be of an offensive or a defensive character.35 Counterproliferation aims to provide instruments to be used in cases where non-proliferation measures have failed, and aims at developing new military capabilities to deal with the growing proliferation threat. Ashton Carter points out that the ‘CP toolbox contains what the DoD began calling the “8 D’s” during the Clinton administration: dissuasion, disarmament, diplomacy, denial, defusing, deterrence, defences and destruction’. He then argues that ‘because the dynamics driving proliferation in different countries vary, no single tool is appropriate or sufficient for every case. A sensible policy must use them all.’36 No single non-proliferation and counterproliferation policy can deal successfully with diverse opponents and one should take under consideration the key local conditions.37 It is essential to understand the military, political and cultural dynamics which are critical in identifying which assets should be held at risk for deterrent purposes.38 US analysts argue that ‘in-depth “strategic profiles” that provide insights into our potential foes have been lacking, particularly with regard to likely strategies for employing NBC weapons and how these states might be deterred’.39 This effort should focus on the mindset, doctrine and specific military characteristics of the arsenals that have already crossed the line from proliferation to threat.40 One of the main challenges, as Laver rightly argues, will be ‘translating this strategic guidance into credible operational capabilities and plans’.41 After the colossal mistake (?) in the assessment of Iraqi WMD capabilities, most of the emphasis is placed on intelligence.42 It is argued that, with respect to the spread of WMD-related technologies, the intelligence community’s intrinsic assessment challenges are rooted in at least six principal causes: (a) Improved, complex deception and denial efforts by would-be proliferants; (b) Increasing access to dual-use technologies that effectively mask proliferants’ intentions; (c) The availability of expertize from which

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proliferants can advance WMD and missile programmes; (d) The interconnectedness of the proliferation challenge; (e) An accelerating pace of technological progress as information and advanced technologies become increasingly available worldwide;43 and (f) Use concepts of an adversary: how, when and for what specific purpose will WMD-armed states or non-state actors opt to use WMD? 44 Intelligence collection tasks include the following: (a) To detect, characterize and track the progress of WMD programmes; (b) To precisely locate nuclear materials, CBW agents and NBC munitions from stand-off positions; and (c) To accurately assess results in real time of any option selected.45 Hersman and Koca argue that a ‘new mission, WMD elimination, was created, and planners began trying to define, adapt and incorporate this mission into existing and developing war plans. The U.S. must be capable of conducting WMD elimination operations, concurrent with major combat operations when necessary, to find, exploit, and secure WMD materials and programs.’46 In the Cold War, especially following the Cuban missile crisis, we faced a generally status quo, risk-averse adversary. Deterrence was an effective defense. But deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations. ●

●

These weapons may also allow these states to attempt to blackmail the United States and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behaviour of rogue states. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States. Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness. The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action. (US National Security Strategy)

The NSS makes a direct reference to the utility of nuclear deterrence. It has often been questioned whether deterrence by the threat of retaliation would be enough to cope in a ‘world characterized by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction’ and leaders that may be less than rational. Will ‘undeterrable’ actors emerge? Should one rather move towards a ‘force posture in which deterrence through offense peacefully co-exists with active defense?’47 On the latter, there seems to be wider agreement among analysts that the West needs to include new factors in thinking about deterrence; factors that are likely to vary substantially region by region. These include a better understanding of the region, the culture, the leadership itself, risk tolerances and communications. Employment concepts of potential regional adversaries will almost certainly be much different than those assumed of the former Soviet Union by US planners in the Cold War.48

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Supporters of this line of thinking maintain that ‘faith in deterrence is not unqualified’ and that a rather recent report by the British MoD argued that ‘deterrence at the sub-strategic level was in need of development, in light of ballistic missile proliferation and the possibility that some states may not respond to deterrence as we might expect’.49 Furthermore, as Bruno Tertrais argues, ‘even if one assumes that deterrence can and should work, there could still be a “deterrence malfunction”. This is because of the uncertain political dynamics which may surround a major crisis involving the survival of an authoritarian regime.’50 Proponents of the traditional deterrence logic argue that ‘deterrence applies particularly well vis-à-vis autocratic states: dictators (Saddam Hussein was a good illustration of this) are at least as capable as the democracies of responding rationally to the crude logic of deterrence. Dictators are sensitive to whatever may dispossess them of the state power to which they are so intimately wedded.’51 A 1999 North Atlantic Assembly report argued that ‘it is not clear why deterrence, which proved so effective at deterring the Soviet Union, is not applicable to lesser powers whose own capability to strike the U.S. is in doubt and who would not survive a retaliatory attack by the U.S.’52 The issue of rational decision-making has already been examined in Chapter 3. It would be interesting to add an observation by strategic theorist Colin Gray, who argued that ‘American theory and practice of deterrence is prone to commit the cardinal error of confusing rationality with reasonableness. . . . The problem is not the irrational adversary; instead it is the perfectly rational foe who seeks purposefully, and rationally, to achieve goals that appear wholly unreasonable to us. American strategic thinkers have long favored the fallacy that Rational Strategic Persons must think alike.’53 It should also be mentioned, of course, that even critics of the Administration’s policy would acknowledge the ‘inherent difficulty of maintaining credible deterrence’, especially against adversaries with a ‘different’ strategic culture54 and that deterrence is a psychological process, and as such is inherently unstable and contains an element of strategic uncertainty.55 The exclusive role of nuclear weapons as a deterrent has been under question for several years now in the US. The Project for the New American Century (September 2000) identified the need for new nuclear weapons to target deep underground, hardened bunkers; the need to maintain nuclear superiority; and the need to develop a system of global missile defences. A report by the National Institute for Public Policy released in January 2001 described five possible roles for nuclear weapons: (a) deterring WMD use by regional powers; (b) deterring WMD or conventional aggression by an emerging global competitor; (c) enhancing US influence in crises; (d) preventing catastrophic losses in conventional war; and (e) providing unique targeting capabilities, such as deep underground and biological weapons targets.56 The Nuclear Posture Review listed seven countries that are incorporated into US contingency planning, which determines nuclear strike capabilities: North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, China and Russia.57 According to Robert Joseph, ‘Conventional superiority alone cannot provide for a credible deterrent. In fact, despite sustained and determined efforts by some

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to de-legitimize our nuclear weapons and assertions that their utility ended with the Cold War . . . we have concluded that our nuclear weapons are the single most important instrument we have for deterring NBC use against us by rogue states.’ Under-Secretary of State John Bolton argued that the 1991 Gulf War demonstrated the utility of the nuclear weapons as a deterrent to CBW use by ‘rogue states’.58 Furthermore, the Bush administration has said it may need to build a new class of low-yield, earth-penetrating nuclear weapons – sometimes called ‘bunker busters’ – because of its concern about whether the US military can destroy the growing number of hard and deeply buried facilities being built in a number of countries.59 Citing government studies, the Nuclear Posture Review states that more than 70 countries now have such underground facilities for military purposes. These include more than 1,000 known or suspected strategic targets,60 which are used for storing WMD, protecting senior leaders, and executing top-echelon command and control functions.61 However, US consideration of nuclear weapons employment should take account of the potential accelerating effect of such action.62 In this context, there are non-proliferation benefits to providing national leaders with robust non-nuclear alternatives to achieve decisive operational and strategic effects across the spectrum of conflict.63 Critics have argued that Washington should carefully weigh the marginal benefits of new nuclear capabilities for deterrence and destruction against their diplomatic cost to the overall CP effort64 and that the US could give up the option of using nuclear weapons except in response to the use of WMD against its territory, troops and friends.65 According to Joseph Cirincione, ‘their actual use would cross a threshold that has not been breached since the Truman administration. That in turn would encourage other nations to develop and use nuclear weapons in similar manner.’66 And, as Jeffrey Record points out, ‘there is the unavoidable and overriding political question: Would any American president actually launch a nuclear attack on a non-nuclear, nonWestern state with which it was not in war?’67 Therefore, it is argued that the emphasis should be on advanced conventional weapons with smart fuses capable of defeating counterforce targets with minimum collateral damage, including high-velocity kinetic weapons for deep bunkers. The issue of pre-emption is undoubtedly the most controversial element of the NSS, which states that For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction – weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning. We cannot let our enemies strike first. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act

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Basic principles of US counterproliferation pre-emptively.68 . . . The United States will not use force in all cases to pre-empt emerging threats, nor should nations use pre-emption as a pretext for aggression.

Walter Slocombe comments that ‘preemption is not a new option and the current U.S. administration is by no means the first to espouse the notion that the U.S. has the right, even the duty, to act alone if the nation’s vital interests are at stake, and that, in the end, it is the U.S. and no one else that reserves the ultimate right of unilateral action’. What is new is open discussion of pre-emption.69 National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice has explained that the ‘National Security Strategy does not overturn five decades of doctrine and jettison either containment or deterrence. These strategic concepts can and will continue to be employed where appropriate.’70 According to the IISS, the NSS ‘acknowledged that the number of potential targets was small and preemption would not be an appropriate response to all emerging threats. Moreover, practical and political obstacles would limit the actual use of such a policy – though perhaps not the benefits that arise from its deterrent effect’.71 Critics argue that the NSS is written in terms of ‘pre-emption’, but in fact makes a case for ‘preventive’ action. It is a distinction with an important difference: imminence.72 Litwak observes that the US debate ‘mistakenly conflated two terms – preemption and prevention – whose analytical distinction has important policy implications’.73 ‘Preventive’ war, it is argued, is not only in violation of international law, but an unbounded invitation to use of force on mere suspicion of the ambitions or intent of another nation, and indeed a negation of the very concept of international law.74 As William Walker points out, it is ‘not clear where the boundaries lay between justifiable self-defence and a programme of imperial expansion’.75 For those accepting the logic of pre-emption, the critical question is that of criteria for making such a decision. The most important criterion is, of course, the sufficiency and imminence of the threat.76 The NSS sets no standards for acting pre-emptively. According to Bunn, the NSS ‘sensibly refrains from setting down rigid criteria for when preemptive military action should be seriously considered or used, its reticence to elaborate the general conditions and circumstances, or the factors to be weighed in deciding on the preemptive use of force’.77 Blinken comments that ‘military preemption requires a standard of proof that may be impossible to meet – or it lowers the bar so that the concept of proof becomes meaningless’.78 Michele Flournoy and Philip Zelikow came up with a very useful set of questions that American decision-makers would have to answer when contemplating a pre-emptive action 1 Do we have less than high confidence that we can deter a given country from using NBC weapons against U.S., our allies and our interests? 2 Do we believe that the country might transfer the capabilities to others who might use them? 3 Will the mere acquisition by this country of WMD significantly increase the danger of war or coercion or attack that would threaten our interests? If the answer to any of these is yes, then the next question is: 4 Are we confident that these dangers can be significantly dealt with short of preemption? If not, then we go down the list.

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5 Do the actions and behavior of the country ethically and legally justify offensive military action by the U.S.? 6 What kind of public reaction – domestic and foreign – can we anticipate? 7 Can military action contain or eliminate the danger without risking either retaliation or unintended consequences that would pose an even greater risk to our interests? Is preemption worth the risk of the response? 8 Do we know enough about the adversary’s capabilities, their defenses, and their operations, to actually launch a strike that will be effective with high confidence of success and with acceptable levels of collateral damage? 9 Can we do it? Do we have the military and intelligence capabilities to pull it off (full or partial destruction)? 10 Looking strategically at the long-term implications, what precedents does this action set?79 Barry Schneider offers a number of additional criteria or guidelines 1

Is the enemy undeterrable, violent and a risk taker? 1a The regime about to acquire or in possession of nuclear weapons would have to be a sworn and dedicated enemy of the U.S., its rulers ruthless practitioners of violence to achieve their ends, and willing to take extreme risks rather than following conservative foreign and military policies. 1b The enemy would have to be considered erratic, unpredictable, and quite possibly non-deterrable by the threat of retaliation against his country’s assets.

2

3

4 5 6

Before acting, U.S. intelligence would have to be extremely convincing evidence that such an enemy regime was about to acquire WMD, as well as the means of delivering them.80 The situation would have to be seen very clearly as a kill-or-be-killed scenario. The enemy regime would have to pose a ‘clear and present danger’ of striking the U.S., its allies, or other vital interests after it had acquired a certain number of WMD. The costs of not striking first would have to be seen as totally unacceptable. This would have to be a case of either decisively intervening or there being a very high probability of being struck a devastating blow. Is the U.S. homeland safe from enemy WMD? Would the U.S. be safe from WMD retaliation by third parties? Has the U.S. exhausted all other non-military options first? Has the U.S. set clear objectives and is it using appropriate means? Is the U.S. committed to win?81

Another important issue is the strategic implications and the precedent pre-emption would set. Robert Litwak argued that the Iraq War set ‘an important historical precedent by being the first case in which forcible regime change was the means employed to achieve non-proliferation ends’.82 Administration officials argued

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that acting pre-emptively against Iraq would have a salutary ‘demonstration effect’ well beyond the Middle East.83 Critics of the Iraq War argued that the demonstration effect would only serve to convince Tehran and Pyongyang of the need to develop nuclear weapons to deter American efforts to destroy their regimes.84 Moreover, critics argued that Washington’s focus on Iraq, which did not pose an imminent threat of acquiring nuclear weapons, distracted attention away from dealing with Iran and North Korea, whose nuclear programmes were clearly more advanced.85 Pre-emption would send a very mixed message to a number of states with unresolved problems with their neighbours.86 There is the risk that this will be seen as a licence by other powers to take some such action; and second, there is the risk that states that feel threatened by action of this kind will start acting in destabilizing ways.87 The rhetoric of pre-emption runs the risk of becoming counterproductive across a broader range of issues. The US would also have to judge the policy effect of the message. Bunn observes that the administration was obviously ‘cognizant of the “precedent for other nations” criticism’. National Security Advisor Rice has stated, ‘But this approach must be treated with great caution. . . . It does not give a green light – to the U.S. or any other nation – to act first without exhausting other means, including diplomacy. . . . The threat must be very grave. And the risks of waiting must by far outweigh the risks of action.’88 One can hardly disagree with Knight’s astute observation that ‘preemptive attack, as a last resort, in an extremely dangerous and unique situation, makes sense. In general, however, preemptive CP actions should be considered only in the most extreme cases, where all other options appear to be ineffective, and where the conditions favour success.’89 In the words of Anthony Blinken, ‘preemption must remain what it has been: an option, not a doctrine’.90 Finally, some very critical views have been expressed regarding the Bush administration’s counterproliferation policies, as, for example, by Jeffrey Record, who argued that ‘one can speculate that the 9/11 attacks, which admittedly raised the specter of nuclear armed terrorism, afforded an already predisposed administration the political opportunity to shift to a new CP policy based on threatened and actual preventive military action’.91 William Walker pointed out that ‘a perception grew outside the U.S. that the problems of WMD were, in some measure, being “surfed” in order to institute a new type of hegemonic order’.92 And Graham Allison observed that ‘by exaggerating fears of nuclear weapons in the case of Iraq, and then being exposed, the Bush administration has considerably damaged U.S. credibility and has encouraged many people, abroad and at home, to discount the real and growing threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism’.93

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In 2003, the European Security Strategy was adopted by the EU. WMD proliferation enjoys a prominent position among perceived threats to European security. It is mentioned that this is ‘potentially the greatest threat to our security. . . . We are now, however, entering a new and dangerous period that raises the possibility of a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East.’1 The Union also adopted the EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Brussels, 10 December 2003, 15656/03), according to which, 1 The proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery such as ballistic missiles are a growing threat to international peace and security. While the international treaty regimes and export control arrangements have slowed the spread of WMD and delivery systems, a number of states have sought or are seeking to develop such weapons. The risk that terrorists will acquire chemical, biological, radiological or fissile materials and their means of delivery adds a new critical dimension to this threat. 2 As the European Security Strategy makes clear, the EU cannot ignore these dangers. WMD and missile proliferation puts at risk the security of our states, our peoples and our interests around the world. Meeting this challenge must be a central element in the EU’s external action. The EU must act with resolve, using all instruments and policies at its disposal. Our objective is to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation programmes of concern worldwide. 5 Increasingly widespread proliferation of WMD increases the risk of their use by States (as shown by the Iran/Iraq conflict) and of their acquisition by terrorist groups who could conduct actions aimed at causing large-scale death and destruction. ... 11 In areas of tension where there are WMD programmes, European interests are potentially under threat, either through conventional conflicts between States or through terrorist attacks. In those regions, expatriate communities, stationed and deployed troops (bases or external operations), and economic interests (natural resources, investments, export markets) can be affected, whether or not specially targeted.

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These are interesting general observations, with limited operational usefulness, however. Before drafting a European counterproliferation strategy, one needs to answer a number of specific questions regarding the nature of the threat. For example, how serious are the challenges/threats that the EU faces at present? How are those challenges/threats expected to evolve in the near future? The regions considered directly relevant to European security, whether in the context of WMD proliferation or in more general terms, are Russia and the former republics of the Soviet Union, the Mediterranean and – increasingly – the broader region of the Middle East. The only countries in Europe that have wider security concerns are Britain and France.2 Unofficial discussions with government officials and analysts in southern European countries, as well as academic studies, lead to the following conclusion: although there are frequent references and a rather extensive debate (especially after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001) on new risks and challenges (mostly of a transnational nature such as religious extremism, illegal mass migration, terrorism, organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc.)3 to Western security, and it is accepted that most of those risks originate in the southern shores of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, there is very little if any official direct reference, either in a national or European level, to threats coming from the South.4 At the level of national positions, there are only general and rather vague statements on instability and transnational problems in the Mediterranean, without naming any specific country in the South. Unofficially, some concern is expressed because southern EU countries perceive themselves as having vital interests in the Mediterranean (including energy security and the prevention of mass illegal migration). Positions at the EU level are equally vague. It is not clear whether this is intentional in order to allow freedom of maneuvre or because of the inability of EU members to agree on a clear specific policy and course of action vis-à-vis the Mediterranean. European countries are mainly interested in WMD proliferation that is related directly to European territory (although there is a risk potential for European peacekeeping forces operating in different parts of the world5) because of geographical proximity – usually measured in terms of the range of the means of delivery available to proliferators.6 As Mueller rightly points out, this is a ‘shortsighted view since, for example, a nuclear exchange in South Asia would strongly affect the EU, since it would change the parameters of world politics’.7 As a result of this limited approach, there was very limited European involvement in the Indian–Pakistani and North Korean nuclear problems. In contrast to American threat assessments, most European governments and analysts have interpreted the proliferation of WMD in the Middle East ‘as no immediate threat to their national security’.8 As Nicole Gnesotto correctly pointed out, the Europeans are ‘defined firstly in relation to American policy – with every imaginable variation from complete agreement on some sides to radical opposition on others – and not with respect to a truly European threat assessment’.9

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There are two major conceptual disagreements between the US and Europe. First, as Therese Delpech argues, according to the Europeans, the US had ‘built its threat assessment on technological grounds, leaving aside political and strategic motivations’.10 Harald Mueller adds that such an assessment is ‘essential, certainly, but it must be combined with intention and strategy’.11 Second, European countries do not, in general, share US concerns about irrational state actors or rogue states.12 France, for example, does not believe that nuclear weapons will ever be used for irrational reasons.13 Even when European states agree with the US on many of the technical evaluations of the WMD threat, they differ on their judgements of its timing, significance and the methods of dealing with it.14 According to Justin Vaisse, ‘French experts and officials accept that risks are increasing, and point out instances in which Western intelligence estimates have proved to be overly optimistic. And the possibility exists that countries like North Korea would sell missiles to countries close to Europe.’15 Still, French analysts feel the real threats will be less serious and emerge on a longer time-scale than those foreseen by US analysts. What are the tools the EU is proposing to use to deal with the WMD proliferation threat? According to the EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction16 14 At the same time, the EU will continue to address the root causes of instability including through pursuing and enhancing its efforts in the areas of political conflicts, development assistance, reduction of poverty and promotion of human rights. 15 Political and diplomatic preventative measures (multilateral treaties and export control regimes) and resort to the competent international organizations form the first line of defence against proliferation. (B) Promotion of a stable international and regional environment is a condition of the fight against proliferation of WMD ... 6 Non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control can make an essential contribution in the global fight against terrorism by reducing the risk of non-state actors gaining access to WMD, radioactive materials and means of delivery. ... 21 To this end, the EU will foster regional security arrangements and regional arms control and disarmament processes. The EU’s dialogue with the countries concerned should take account of the fact that in many cases they have real and legitimate security concerns, with the clear understanding that there can never be any justification for the proliferation of WMD. 24 Proliferation of WMD is a global threat, which requires a global approach. However, as security in Europe is closely linked to security

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The EU’s response to WMD proliferation and stability in the Mediterranean, we should pay particular attention to the issue of proliferation in the Mediterranean area. 29 The elements of the EU’s Strategy against proliferation of WMD need to be integrated across the board. We have a wide range of instruments available: multilateral treaties and verification mechanisms; national and internationally-coordinated export controls; cooperative threat reduction programmes; political and economic levers (including trade and development policies); interdiction of illegal procurement activities and, as a last resort, coercive measures in accordance with the UN Charter. While all are necessary, none is sufficient by itself.

As the excellent study by Clara Portella points out, the EU is not a unitary actor in the nuclear non-proliferation domain, being mainly constrained by the diversity of positions of its members as regards nuclear weapons on the one hand and the transatlantic link on the other.17 Portella also argues that ‘due to the multiplicity of positions on nuclear questions, and since CFSP still operates by consensus on substantive issues, the EU has only been able to take those initiatives on which everyone agreed. This has resulted in a selective approach to nuclear weapons issues.’ She also makes the important observation that the ‘main difficulty hampering the effectiveness of the EU’s action does not lie with the objectives, but with their implementation. EU instruments often do not contain any measures to be adopted for the attainment of the stated aims.’18 A more positive appraisal of EU’s performance is presented by Bruno Tertrais, who argues that Given the various difficulties (diversity of ‘nuclear cultures’, complexities of EU policies in a field that has to involve both the Commission and the Council, the Union’s cumbersome budgetary practice, which precludes it from being appropriately responsive to new international developments, the ‘competition’ the EU faces from national efforts), the EU has not fared too badly and its nuclear non-proliferation efforts can be considered moderately successful. Awareness of nuclear proliferation issues has increased dramatically in EU circles. Coordination and visibility of EU actions have improved. Non-proliferation activities represent a large part (some 25 per cent) of the total CFSP budget. The nomination in October 2003 of a Personal Representative on non-proliferation of WMD has helped a lot.19 European states prefer a non-proliferation policy based upon political and diplomatic initiatives. They appear more ‘confident that international treaties, institutions and diplomacy can prevent proliferation and organize effective action to reverse illegal proliferation that might occur’.20 Although there is a brief reference in both the European Security Strategy and the EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction to the use of military force as a means of last resort, the EU lacks any CP planning (or capabilities for that matter). The two European nuclear powers, Britain and France, appear more prepared on this front.

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The UK’s CP strategy is, in general, more pragmatic and realistic than its American counterpart. It maintains, among others, that there is no ‘panacea to counter the threat posed by the proliferation of WMD’, nor is there a ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy that can be applied, and that ‘all proliferators pose a challenge to the international community, but our response must be tailored to the circumstances of each one’. It is also argued that there are ‘a number of tools at our disposal. All are necessary; none is sufficient in itself’ and that as the ‘experience of the UN inspectors in Iraq demonstrated, inspection regimes in themselves will not stop a determined proliferator from trying to develop WMD’. As a last resort, the ‘UK Government does not rule out direct action, including military action in accordance with international law. But this is not a strategy that the UK can pursue alone.21 Diplomatic and economic pressure can be effective against some countries of proliferation concern: most often when it can be brought to bear multilaterally rather than bilaterally. Proliferation poses a global challenge and requires a collective international response.’22 As pointed out by Paul Cornish, ‘the UK government has adopted a so-called toolbox approach to CBRN non-proliferation and counter-proliferation. The toolbox consists of a range of policy options, the selection of which will be determined by the political, geographical and strategic circumstances of each case of CBRN proliferation. The toolbox offers the following range of options, in five categories: Defuse; Dissuade; Deny; Defend; Disrupt and Disable.’ It is emphasized that although ‘each tool has its use, no one tool should be considered so important as to be sufficient in all cases of CBRN proliferation’.23 French defence planning has undergone a ‘southward reorientation’ to take account of WMD in developing states since the Defence White Paper of 1994. The French Senate Report of June 2000 accepted that long-range missile capabilities would emerge in the Middle East at some point in the future, but, like Britain, France places greater faith in the deterrent power of its nuclear weapons against small ‘rogue states’ than does the US.24 In a June 2001 speech, presenting conclusions from the 1999–2001 nuclear review, French President Chirac announced that, when facing a regional power threatening its vital interests, France would target ‘in priority its political, economic, and military centers of power’.25 The French government document issued in January 2003 for its 2003–2008 military programme addressed pre-emption as well: ‘We must . . . be prepared to identify and forestall threats as soon as possible. In this context, the possibility of preemptive action might be considered, from the time that an explicit and confirmed threatening situation is identified.’26 According to Justin Vaisse, for France, there is ‘no contradiction between non-proliferation and counter-proliferation. . . . The real debate is on the optimal combination to reach between them. In this respect, it would be illusory, and destabilizing for the international strategic balance, to claim that it is possible to reach this goal only by defense, as the U.S. seems to think. But it would also be insufficient for Europe to rely only on diplomacy’.27 There is also a debate in Europe regarding missile defences. The central question is what kind of missile defence, if any, will Europe need in view of

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potential threats to European territory and to European forces participating in international peace operations and regional crisis management?28 There are strong disagreements on the imminence of the threat.29 Also, as Philip Gordon put it, the ‘American determination to proceed with missile defences thus posed a central dilemma for the Europeans: should they acquiesce and support a policy they believe to be counter-productive for the sake of helping to make it work and maintaining transatlantic harmony? Or should they oppose it, thus adding to its potentially negative consequences and undermining allied cooperation in the process?’30 It has been argued that any emerging missile threat to European states may be qualitatively less immediate than for the US, which has a far stronger militarypolitical presence around the world.31 According to another, rather typical, European view, from a ‘technological point of view a ballistic missile threat to European territory from a proliferator cannot in the future be ruled out, but the risk does not at the moment justify major investment. Financially, a project of this size seems completely unrealistic.’32 As the US Atlantic Council reported, ‘until there is a real prospect of a ballistic missile threat to European countries from a state that Europeans see as potentially harbouring ill designs on them in a crisis, their inclination will be to argue that intentions are more important than capabilities and that to base policy responses too heavily on the latter risks undesirable or unnecessary strategic consequences’.33 Seaboyer and Thranert agree that with only ‘a moderate threat perception, tight budgets and other military necessities, missile defences cannot be a political priority’.34 Although it is certainly not our objective to provide a chronology of European (and American) efforts to deal with the challenges posed by the Iranian nuclear programme, a reference should be made to the role played so far by the EU-3. It is quite accurate that the US tends to ‘consider the Union a junior partner in the management of nuclear affairs, be it with Russia, or in negotiations with Iran and North Korea’35 and that EU remains a marginal actor in non-proliferation.36 Rather unexpectedly, therefore, the EU, or at least the big three (France, Germany, United Kingdom), have been central actors almost from the beginning of the Iranian nuclear crisis. One would have expected the intra-European division over the war in Iraq to further undermine efforts for a common foreign and security policy, and in many ways it did. However, the EU and the US shared a common concern in the case of the Iranian nuclear programme and despite substantial differences in their respective approaches both towards Iran and the methods to deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, they managed to maintain an almost united front, with the EU-3 being at the forefront of diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis and the US providing support for a diplomatic solution, although frequently hinting (and sometimes clearly stating) that all options (including the use of nuclear weapons to destroy underground hardened installations) are on the table. One would not dare to make predictions about the final outcome of the Iranian nuclear crisis or on whether the EU and the US will manage to maintain a united front on the matter.

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In conclusion ●

●

●

●

●

●

● ●

In view of the lack of noticeable progress and consensus on how to proceed with the further development of an ESDP, a European debate on new nuclear and strategic questions is necessary as there is an urgent requirement for enlarged European strategic vision. Europe has ambitions of greater diplomatic and security engagement in the Middle East and, therefore, proliferation-related developments will be issues of increasing priority.37 For the time being, however, the Europeans are relegated to a marginal role in the Middle East.38 There is very slow convergence between Europe and the US on WMD threat assessment. Europe is generally concerned about the proliferation threat, but not worried enough to undertake a major effort to deal with the problem. It is rather unlikely that the Europeans will make any serious decisions unless faced with a direct threat. The EU has three major assets in the fight against nuclear proliferation: its financial resources, its attractiveness as a trade and investment partner (e.g. Europe accounts for one-third of Iranian trade), and its preference for ‘engagement’ rather than ‘containment’. However, it lacks the ability to threaten credibly the neutralization or destruction of a nuclear programme by conventional means.39 Noteworthy elements of the EU non-proliferation approach include the proposed use of the whole range of tools and the conditionality clauses. It is very unlikely that the EU will even contemplate preventive/pre-emptive attacks. It is extremely unlikely that the Union will make such a decision (unless faced with a direct and unambiguous threat), and will continue to be incapable of implementing without the US, as its counterproliferation capabilities will remain very limited for the foreseeable future. There is some mobility in consequence management.40 Co-operation against terrorism and WMD proliferation have become an increasingly important theme in NATO–EU relations and there is agreement that synergies with NATO should be explored.41

Clara Portella offers a number of recommendations: (a) The EU Strategy should ensure that non-proliferation objectives are adequately mainstreamed into the Union’s external relations; and (b) to the extent possible, it should find a satisfactory ‘division of labour’ with the US in the resolution of proliferation crises, complementing US initiatives with other means, rather than merely endorsing them financially.42 Gustav Lindstrom recommends that the EU should, among other things, establish a co-ordinator for homeland security at the EU level and formulate a homeland security strategy.43

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The proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles in the Middle East and the Mediterranean is generally considered by Western officials and analysts as a destabilizing development. Indeed, in the recent past ‘no issue has dominated the strategic agenda more than the proliferation of WMD’.1 Reasons for concern include the large number of conflicts and the region’s endemic instability, the fact that such weapons have been used in the past, the region’s geographic proximity to Europe and the vital interests of the West (which is prepared, under certain circumstances, to use force to protect them), the unstable regimes in the region, the multiplicity of conflicts and other security problems and the general instability in the region (including the spread of religious extremism). What worries Western officials most is the confluence of WMD proliferation and the possibility of a radical Islamist take-over. The crux of the horizontal nuclear proliferation problem has always been whether it might increase the probability of the use of nuclear weapons (although other consequences, such as destabilizing specific regions through costly and risk-prone arms races or because of shifts in regional power balances that were wrought or accelerated by WMD proliferation, should not be underestimated). There has been considerable disagreement between analysts on this question for, at least, the past thirty years. Indeed, the answers to this question range from extremely optimistic – that nuclear proliferation will result in greater regional and global stability – to extremely pessimistic – that nuclear proliferation will bring the world closer to the brink of nuclear annihilation. The author’s view is that each potential NWS presents a different case that has to be examined and analyzed, always taking its particularities into consideration. It is risky and, sometimes, misleading to generalize about potential nuclear proliferators. Each country and region has its own characteristics and there are so many variables (most of which change almost continuously) that any attempt to derive a norm is difficult and, in most cases, misleading. The deliberate use of nuclear weapons by rival new NWS is unlikely (but not impossible) today. As was shown in the analysis of Middle Eastern scenarios, a preventive strike (should one be made) would almost certainly be conventional. The only conceivable use of nuclear weapons would be as a weapon of last resort, in the face of a conventional defeat.

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If there were to be use of nuclear weapons by a new nuclear-weapon state, it would most likely result from a miscalculation, an accidental detonation or launching of a nuclear device, or be an act of desperation in the crisis of conventional war. The further spread of nuclear weapons would also make it even more difficult to come to grips with the existing nuclear arms race. The larger the number and diversity of nuclear-weapons states, the more difficult it could be to agree on arms control and disarmament measures. Proliferation would make the strategic chessboard more complex whilst at the same time multiplying risks and complicating strategic decision-making. The spread of nuclear weapons to three, five or ten countries, in addition to the existing eight NWS, would simply multiply by many times the likelihood that one or another such ‘unstable’ leader would come to command a force of nuclear weapons, with peace therefore coming into danger. A world that depends on the psychological stability of regimes in Moscow and Washington (but also London, Paris and Beijing, Tel-Aviv, New Delhi and Islamabad) must a priori be considered to be comparatively safer than one which requires such rationality in all these places and in a ninth and a tenth and an nth. As Stephen Rosen argues, ‘if several more small nuclear powers will coexist along with the large ones, then the problems of nuclear deterrence, arms races, offensive and defensive weaponry, and appropriate retaliation will need to be worked out again in new and more complex conditions’.2 It should be noted, however, that a single case of counterproliferation action or the use of missile defences could change the picture in a dramatic way. In the same way, a single case of use of NBC weapons (by a state or terrorist group) would radically transform the situation. It is correctly pointed out that ‘answers from today’s perspective may differ from the day after perspectives that is, if in fact WMD had already been used against the U.S. or American forces or allies with many thousands of casualties, would leaders and the public have a different perspective on the advisability and the desirability of action?’3 Another extremely important issue will be the international community’s response to the next significant use of NBC weapons. When Iran and Iraq used chemical weapons against each other in the 1980s, the international community was virtually silent. As Ellis observes, ‘to prevent further use, key states and international organizations will have to take appropriate punitive measures or risk an eradicated norm of nonuse on the years ahead’.4 Shaping the post-use strategic environment will be a critical task for the great powers. Moving from the abstract to the specific, dealing with Iran’s nuclear programme is probably the most critical strategic question in the proliferation field today. Iran’s nuclear programme, dating from the time of the Shah, is motivated, among others, by some legitimate security concerns. Although military action would probably not solve any problems,5 but rather create new ones, failure to take any action may lead to a ‘domino effect’ in the region and deal a fatal blow to the international non-proliferation regime. A nuclear Iran could serve as a ‘tipping point’ for some states in their thinking about acquiring a nuclear capability, though it is possible that key states in the region could learn to live with this outcome. Many analysts predict that a cascade of WMD

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proliferation, especially regarding nuclear weapons, could lead to a strong incentive for prominent non-nuclear countries, such as Germany and Japan, to ‘go nuclear’, and indeed could have sparked vertical nuclear-weapon build-ups by established powers. This would have represented a relative decline in American primacy and, thereby, facilitated the rise of a future near-peer competitor.6 It has been argued that even armed with nuclear weapons, Iran will not necessarily be hostile to US interests, and the US should not necessarily treat a nuclear-armed Iran as an enemy. Whether a nuclear-armed Iran is a danger to the US and its interests7 depends on Iranian threat perceptions and the progress of internal reform. A cautious, moderate Iran armed with nuclear weapons may even be an improvement over the status quo. However, the Bush administration sees Iran’s nuclear programme from a different perspective and, if sanctions do not work, it cannot be ruled out that the US (and/or Israel) will undertake unilateral military action, with uncertain results regarding the Iranian nuclear programme, but with assured negative political and economic consequences for the region and the world in general. At the same time, failure to take any action against the Iranian nuclear programme may lead to a ‘domino effect’ in the region and constitute a severe or fatal blow to the international non-proliferation regime. Perhaps the adoption of a ‘nuclear weapons in the basement’ policy by Iran would be an acceptable solution for all parties involved. Under such a scenario, Iran would proceed very slowly to the eventual acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability, without openly crossing the nuclear threshold. Thus, the Iranian regime would be able to declare to its domestic audience that it did not wield to US pressure, and to appear internationally as a responsible power. At the same time, any existential threat to Israel’s security would not materialize for a long time, allowing for the use of political, diplomatic and economic tools to address the problem. Such an option might also contribute to the prevention of a ‘domino’ scenario, as other regional countries might perceive the threat as less immediate. Unfortunately, the lack of trust and the limited channels of communication between Iran and the Western powers reduce the likelihood of an agreement according to the above line of logic. The use of military force to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be among Europe’s options, albeit a last-resort one. However, it will probably not work in the case of Iran.8 The only rational, and potentially effective, course of action for Europe would be a

b

to convince the US to recognize that Iranian proliferation, Persian Gulf security, the US role in the Middle East, Israel’s nuclear status, and Palestinian-Israeli relations are all linked and cannot be resolved without a more balanced US stance;9 to assist in the development of a new security system in the Gulf region which will take under consideration Iranian, but also GCC and Iraqi, security concerns. To achieve this, ‘the transatlantic allies must now come up with a new game plan, involving both Russia and China’.10

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But ultimately, the key to a peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear crisis is the normalization of US-Iranian relations (which would also greatly facilitate the stabilization of Iraq). But to achieve this, it ‘takes two to tango’. And, unfortunately, the EU is not one of them.

Managing proliferation: options for NATO and the EU It is often argued that since 9/11 the rules have changed. The short- and long-term consequences of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the US on relations between the EU (and the Western world in general) and the Arab/Islamic world, as well as on perceptions between the two sides, are expected to be farreaching. However, because of the many uncertainties at this stage of transition, the new patterns of behaviour and unpredictable regional dynamics, a prognosis and accurate assessment of consequences would be extremely difficult. Regarding the proliferation of WMD, there is in some circles widespread concern that the calculus of incentives and disincentives has shifted during the past decade, with incentives increasing and disincentives declining.11 Although the number of nuclear proliferants remains limited, it might be prudent to start thinking about shaping, or at least managing, the post-proliferation future. Even if the use of military force is not the best option to deal with the Iranian nuclear crisis, there may be other nuclear crises in the future in which the use of military force may be the best or perhaps the only option. To resolve problems of legitimacy that a unilateral counterproliferation action will entail, criteria, rules and procedures for an internationally sanctioned preventive action should have been agreed well before any nuclear crisis erupts. According to the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, In the world of the 21st century, the international community does have to be concerned about nightmare scenarios combining terrorists, WMD and irresponsible States, and much more besides, which may conceivably justify the use of force, not just reactively but preventively and before a latent threat becomes imminent. The question is not whether such action can be taken: it can, by the Security Council as the international community’s collective security voice, at any time it deems that there is a threat to international peace and security. The Council may well need to be prepared to be much more pro-active on these issues, taking more decisive action earlier, than it has been in the past.12 As George Perkovich points out, ‘leaders as diverse as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan have called for an international initiative to establish guidelines for possible military action against grave but non-imminent threats. Without such guidelines, Kissinger warns, the world could become increasingly chaotic, with numerous countries embarking on preventive military campaigns justified by a variety of individual standards.’13 The only appropriate forum for negotiating such guidelines would be the

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UN Security Council, despite its considerable dysfunctionalities. It is safe to assume, however, that it will be very difficult – although not necessarily impossible – for members of the Security Council and other great powers to agree on the need and criteria to act when the threat is not imminent. It will be easier to agree on preconditions for CP action when there is unambiguous and present threat to national, regional or global security. It will be very difficult to convince the international community by using rather shaky arguments of the type ‘perhaps, if this happens, possibly . . . under certain circumstances country X may consider the eventual use of WMD’ and therefore we need to use force against that country to prevent a future threat. One could envisage various scenarios of conflicts with potential proliferators in the Mediterranean. However, missile arsenals in the region are limited in both quality and quantity. The ‘missile threat’ today is limited geographically to southern Europe. Potential opponents in the Middle East and North Africa do not yet possess the capability to strike NATO/EU countries’ territory beyond southern Italy, southern Greece, and a significant part of Turkey (except, of course, by terrorist attacks). For at least the next ten years, their missile arsenals will continue to consist mainly of FROGs, SCUDs or SCUD-derivatives. Even for those countries, it seems that the threat of massive conventional (or nuclear by NATO capabilities) retaliation and the limited NBC and missile capabilities of proliferant countries make it highly unlikely that such weapons would be used against the populations of NATO member-states. (It is possible, however, that, under certain circumstances, they could be used against NATO theatre or powerprojection forces.) The threat of NBC use against European territories, thus, should not be conceived of as an immediate or short-term threat, but as a mid- to long-term one. In analyzing threat scenarios, one must remain realistic and keep in mind that in most cases these are worst-case scenarios and that there probably are active political and economic measures to prevent such scenarios from being realized. The number of active proliferators and their technological capabilities remain limited. It should, however, be noted that within the overall proliferation trend the NBC capabilities of proliferants may have advanced significantly, particularly if abetted by the purchase or illicit transfer of weapons, delivery systems and related technologies. The foreign assistance aspect is an incalculable variable. Furthermore, there is considerable uncertainty about the political stability of several regimes in the region, which are faced with strong internal challenges, mainly from radical Islamic groups. In this context, one should recall that the principal non-proliferation goal of NATO is defined as ‘to prevent proliferation from occurring or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means’. Should these means fail to achieve this objective, the use of military means might be considered as part of the Alliance’s overall response to a specific crisis involving the use of weapons of mass destruction. To this end, NATO must maintain a range of capabilities needed to discourage NBC weapons proliferation and use and to protect NATO territory, populations and forces against such use. In some cases counterproliferation capabilities may

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be more useful as a ‘stick’, preferably in combination with some ‘carrots’, rather as an actual policy instrument. Transatlantic co-operation will be a critical factor in managing NBC weapons proliferation. There are some problems in security co-operation between Europe and the US. For example, it is argued that not only do US and European policymakers lack a shared view of what the threats to Mediterranean security are, they also lack an effective and co-ordinated strategy to deal with the spectrum of possible security challenges that could emerge across the region. It is also argued that there is no transatlantic consensus on the role of military force in coping with the problems of the Greater Middle East. 11 September 2001 has widened a transatlantic gap that opened years ago in the way Americans and Europeans view the international system.14 Furthermore, extensive research by the Atlantic Council of the United States concluded that ‘the most pervasive differences in threat perception across the Atlantic derive from a different weighting of technological capabilities as opposed to political intentions’. This greater reliance on political intent also generates a preference for deploying diplomatic, rather than military, responses when threats are seen to exist.15 There are a number of measures and initiatives that NATO, the EU and the West in general could undertake in order to improve the prospects for security and stability in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, their relations with the regional countries, as well as their capability to face the NBC proliferation threat. The following list is, of course, not comprehensive: a

b

c

NATO and the EU are faced with a range of threats and potential threats that are multi-directional, multi-dimensional and highly unpredictable. In this context, better co-ordination between the two main initiatives, those of the EU and NATO, directed at the Mediterranean is essential to ensure that their approaches are complementary and mutually reinforcing.16 The US and Europe need to develop effective crisis management capabilities to cope with crises in the region. Close consultations between allies during a crisis will also be critical. The best means for preventing many future crises in the Mediterranean is to address their root causes – which are primarily economic and social – ahead of time.17 The EU is the actor which is best placed to deal with these problems and ensure that they do not escalate into major crises requiring military action.18 Furthermore, the European states’ relations with countries on the southern rim of the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the former Soviet Republics should continue to address essential political, economic, social and development issues rather than being expressed in alarmist militarysecurity terms. The fight against WMD proliferation is a global challenge, requiring, among others, a more comprehensive and less unilateral US approach and a more coherent European policy. Especially for the latter; although the Europeans should avoid overestimating the proliferation threat, they cannot afford to remain completely exposed and unprotected.

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Conclusions Because proliferation has expanded to a number of regional actors, a single strategy is unlikely to be sufficient in deterring states with varied motivations, and social, economic, religious, cultural and political backgrounds. Each case should be carefully evaluated on its own merits and policy planners should, therefore, prepare country-specific strategies.19 Whereas military preparations as an option of last resort may be necessary, the emphasis should be on traditional non-proliferation methods. Nuclear weapons remain important for deterrence but should not play a primary role in counterproliferation efforts because of the operational problems and the political inhibitions analyzed in previous chapters. The emphasis of NATO and US efforts should be on the development of necessary conventional technologies and theatre missile defences, not on preventive/pre-emptive attack. A TMD for Europe must be developed together with other forms of CP, joined to non-proliferation measures and as a complement to conventional and nuclear deterrence. However, TMD deployment should not be regarded as a panacea, only as an effective first step towards strengthening regional deterrence.20 The possibility of nuclear terrorism has been mentioned by many analysts as one of the gravest dangers of the future. Preventing non-state actors from gaining access to WMD should constitute a high priority for Western countries and, indeed, the whole international community. What can be done to keep the threat of NBC terrorism as low as possible? Probably the biggest hole in the massive effort to prepare for and counter NBC terrorism in the twenty-first century is ignorance about the psychology of terrorists and what would motivate them to use or refrain from using these dreadful weapons.21 Preparation is also necessary for dealing with the consequences of NBC terrorism.

There can be little doubt that WMD proliferation is one of the most critical strategic challenges for the twenty-first century and dealing with its consequences should be a matter of high priority. It will probably be more difficult to agree on issues such as authorization and legitimacy of action, the division of labour and the modalities of great power co-operation. Victor Utgoff makes the interesting point that ‘the world needs at least one state, preferably several, willing and able to play the role of sheriff, or to be members of a sheriff’s posse, even in the face of nuclear threats’.22 One should make sure, however, that the sheriff’s deputies do not include any Dr Strangeloves and apprentice sorcerers.

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ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile System; 1972 U.S.-Soviet Treaty ACRS Arms Control and Regional Security ATBM Antitactical Ballistic Missile AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System BMD Ballistic Missile Defence BMDO Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation BW Biological Weapons C3 Command, Control and Communications C3I Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear CBW Chemical and Biological Weapons CEP Circular Error Probable CNAD Conference of National Armaments Directors CP Counterproliferation CSBMs Confidence and Security Building Measures CSCE Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe CTR Co-operative Threat Reduction CW Chemical Weapons DCI Director of Central Intelligence DGP Defence Group on Proliferation DoD (U.S.) Department of Defense EAD Extended Air Defence ERINT Extended Range Interceptor EU European Union Exo-Atmospheric Intercept of one missile by another at an altitude where the Intercept atmosphere has little or no effect on the terminal phase of the intercept GIA Armed Islamic Group (Algeria) GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System GPALS System for Global Protection Against Limited Strikes GPS Global Positioning System HE High Explosive HEU Highly Enriched Uranium IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

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ICBMs IISS IND JCS LACM LOW MENA MTCR MW MWe NBC NEST NPT NSG NSS NWFZ NWS OSCE PAC-3 PAL Pf P R&D RDD SAM SAR SDI SHAPE SLCM

SRBM SSM TBMD TEL THAAD TMD UAV UN WEU WMD

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles International Institute for Strategic Studies Improvised Nuclear Device Joint Chiefs of Staff Land-Attack Cruise Missile Launch-On-Warning Middle East and North Africa Missile Technology Control Regime Megawatt Megawatt Electric Nuclear, Biological & Chemical (Weapons) Nuclear Emergency Search Team Non-Proliferation Treaty Nuclear Suppliers Group [U.S.] National Security Strategy Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Nuclear Weapons States Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Patriot Advanced Capability (Level 3) Permissive Action Links Partnership for Peace Research and Development Radiological Dispersion Device Surface-to-Air Missile Synthetic Aperture Radar Strategic Defence Initiative Supreme Headquarters Allied Europe Sea Launched (Land-Attack) Cruise Missiles – those cruise missiles launched from submarines and surface ships that are designed for use against land targets Short-range Ballistic Missile Surface-to-Surface Missile Tactical/Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Transporter-erector-launchers Theatre High Altitude Area Defence system Theatre Missile Defence Unmanned Aerial Vehicle United Nations Western European Union Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Introduction 1 Fernand Braudel, La Mediterranee, l’ Espace et l’Histoire, Flammarion, Paris, 1995, pp. 9–10. 2 As Harald Mueller put it, ‘additional, diffuse security problems entered the debates: ethnical conflict and failed states, with their repercussions on migration and organized crime – the latter two items also being seen as security risks on their own right – were among the more politico-military issues’ (Harald Mueller, Terrorism, Proliferation: a European Threat Assessment, Chaillot Papers No. 58, EU-ISS, Paris, March 2003, pp. 7 and 13). 3 Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws. America’s Search for a New Foreign Policy, Hill and Wang, New York, 1995, p. 211. 4 Stephen J. Flanagan, Challenges of the Global Century, Report of the Project on Globalization and National Security, Supt. of Docs., US GPO, 2001, p. 14. 5 Christopher Coker, Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the Management of Risk, Adelphi Paper no. 345, IISS, London, 2002, p. 40. 6 Because this combination of economic weakness and political strife inhibits these regions from achieving wealth or peace, it makes them natural breeding grounds for conflict and war (Challenges of the Global Century, p. 15). 7 As Robert Chandler points out, ‘the advent of Second-Wave [according to Alvin Toffler’s classification] powers obtaining WMD, cruise and ballistic missiles, precision navigation, and space-based platforms for situational awareness, targeting C3 and other support for terrestrial forces is transforming relationships between the powerful and the not-so-weak states world-wide’ (Robert Chandler, Tomorrow’s War, Today’s Decisions, AMCODA Press, Virginia, 1996, p. 4). 8 Robert Joseph, ‘Proliferation, Counter-proliferation and NATO’, Survival, Spring 1996, p. 113. 9 Theodore Couloumbis and Thanos Dokos (eds), Arms Control and Security in the Middle East and the CIS Republics, ELIAMEP, Athens, 1995, pp. 2–3. 1 The emerging security environment in the Mediterranean and the Middle East 1 Some analysts have used the term ‘arc of social tension’. 2 The single most important conflict is the Israeli–Palestinian one. Indeed, the latest and quite long-lasting – since September 2000 – deterioration of relations between Israelis and Palestinians and the resulting deadlock in the peace process is greatly complicating efforts for regional co-operation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, at both the bilateral and multilateral levels. Many analysts and officials believe that as long as there is no settlement of the Palestinian problem, prospects for multilateral co-operation in the wider region will remain rather poor.

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3 According to a RAND study, ‘[t]raditional distinctions and barriers across the Mediterranean are breaking down and being reshaped by a wide and diverse set of demographic, political and economic forces. European, North African and Middle Eastern security are intersecting in new ways . . . . The emerging geopolitics of energy supply illustrate how the Middle Eastern and European environments are increasingly interwoven’ (R. Asmus, S. Larrabee, I. Lesser, ‘Mediterranean Security: New Challenges, New Tasks’, NATO Review, No. 3, May 1996, pp. 25–26). 4 Ian Lesser describes a very dynamic and fluid regional security environment where ‘internal forces, the experience of the Iraq war, and the emergence of more active strategies on the part of key security actors mean that the status quo cannot be taken for granted and patterns of change may be rapid and non-linear’. He goes as far as to predict that ‘ten years from now, major states of the region may look very different in terms of their governance and external policies. The arc of crisis is now better described as an arc of change’ (Lesser, Security and Strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean, p. 17). 5 Anthony Cordesman and Khalid Al-Rodhan, Iran’s WMD: The Real and Potential Threat, The CSIS Press, Washington DC, 2006, p. 2. 6 Barry Rubin, ‘Iran: The Rise of a Regional Power’, MERIA, Vol. 10, No. 3, September 2006, p. 5. 7 For an analysis of particular regions, Barry Buzan’s methodological approach seems particularly useful. He uses the concept ‘regional security complex’ – an empirical phenomenon with historical and geopolitical roots – which he defines as a group of states whose chief security concerns are so closely linked and interwoven that the problems of national security they face cannot be examined separately, country by country (Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, New York, 1991, p. 194). 8 Other analysts argue that today’s Mediterranean may be seen as a vital crossroads open to influences and exchanges, but they also tend to stress that the Mediterranean has become a ‘frontier’ separating different worlds. According to Stephen Calleya, the Mediterranean ‘is a frontier separating different political, economic, military and cultural forces’ (Gareth Winrow, ‘A Threat from the South? NATO and the Mediterranean’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1, Summer 1996, pp. 3 and 7). 9 According to Buzan, the basic characteristics of a regional security complex or subsystem are as follows: (a) geographical proximity of the participants to each other; (b) sustained and regular contacts and constant inter-reactions to such an extent that a change in one part of the system also affects the rest; and (c) acknowledgement of the system, both from within it and outside it, as distinct, and the existence of two or more actors in the particular sub-system. Stephen Calleya argues that the ‘Mediterranean space’ consists of three ‘semiautonomous sub-regional units’: southern Europe, the Maghreb and the Levant. Because these units belong to ‘their own international regions, namely Western Europe and the Middle East’, the Mediterranean Sea is ‘more of a frontier’ and the area is ‘rapidly becoming a fault line between two separate and increasingly polarised regions’. The Mediterranean is a frontier separating different political, economic, military and cultural forces. At the same time, it is an area in which sub-regional dynamics are a priority (Stephen Calleya, ‘Post-Cold War Regional Dynamics in the Mediterranean Area’, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3, Summer 1996, pp. 43 and 49). 10 According to Roberto Menotti, ‘The Mediterranean region is not unitary, let alone cohesive. This is true from the political, economic and cultural points of view. The Mediterranean basin comprises a large number of national actors belonging to various sub-regional complexes, linked by a series of interacting rivalries, animosities and highly competitive relationships . . . the basin is practically a patchwork of subregional complexes showing little coherence’ (Roberto Menotti, NATO’s

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Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative: Italian Positions, Interests, Perceptions, and the Implications for Italy-US Relations, Final report, NATO Individual Research Fellowship 1997–1999, p. 25). Lesser argues that security in the Black Sea, the Red Sea and the Gulf will be more closely integrated with the Mediterranean, and new security arrangements, within NATO and the EU, will need to look beyond the Mediterranean basin itself and that, in some respects, the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea can be regarded as a single strategic space, but with very different patterns of security presence, cooperation and architecture. In terms of maritime and energy security, the strategic environment in both seas is increasingly integrated. Both areas are characterized by trans-regional challenges, cutting across traditional distinctions between European, Eurasian and Middle Eastern security (Ian Lesser, Security and Strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean, ELIAMEP Policy Paper no. 5, Athens, 2005, pp. 13 and 17). Lesser, Security and Strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean, p. 14. A development recognized explicitly even in NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept. According to Article 21, ‘The Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognizes the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension.’ According to former CINCSOUTH, Admiral Lopez, ‘the next war could grow out of a number of explosive factors: economic difficulties, water shortages, religious fanaticism, immigration, you name it. There are many different forces of instability, and they all seem to be prevalent in the southern region’ (William Drozdiak, ‘Is NATO’s Southern Flank Exposed?’, International Herald Tribune, 20 May 1997). Ian Lesser and Ashley Tellis, Strategic Exposure: Proliferation Around the Mediterranean, RAND, Santa Monica, 1996, p. 3. The transnational dimension of Mediterranean security is becoming more prominent as Europe and the Middle East become more interdependent in political, economic and military terms (Ian Lesser, Jerrold Green, Stephen Larrabee, Michele Zanini, The Future of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative. Evolution and Next Steps, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2000, p. 19). Indeed, the north and the south are becoming more interconnected through various economic, social and political ties. However, as Gareth Winrow rightly argues, ‘it is far too early, though, to speak of a “EuroMediterranean region”. A clearly identifiable Mediterranean region has yet to emerge with its own particular agenda and measure of autonomy’ (Winrow, ‘A Threat from the South?’, p. 224). For instance, Joseph Nye, Paul Kennedy, Ian Lesser, Shireen Hunter, Barry Buzan, Bishara Khader, and others. However, with respect to the danger posed by Moslem fundamentalist movements within the region, NATO apparently has not endorsed the view that Western and Islamic cultures are diametrically opposed and thus destined for conflict. Rather, it was emphasized that ‘to the extent Islam is seen as a threat, it is only so when it falls to the context of religious extremism and is utilized by radical groups to justify their own respective agendas’ (Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Exploring U.S. Missile Defence Requirements in 2010, April 1997, p. V). Christopher Coker, Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the Management of Risk, p. 89. However, with respect to the danger posed by Moslem fundamentalist movements within the region, NATO apparently has not endorsed the view that Western and Islamic cultures are diametrically opposed and thus destined for conflict. Rather, it was emphasized that ‘to the extent Islam is seen as a threat, it is only so when it falls to the context of religious extremism and is utilized by radical groups to justify their own respective agendas’ (Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Exploring US Missile Defense Requirements in 2010, April 1997, p. V).

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21 There appears to be general agreement that the Balkans constitutes a different security sub-system. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine a direct connection between crises in the Balkans and tensions in the Southern Mediterranean, as they would stem from different political and security issues (although events in BosniaHerzegovina had an impact on Arab/Muslim perceptions). (Roberto Aliboni, quoted in Gareth Winrow, The Role of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative, Garland Publishing, Inc., New York and London, 2000, p. 4). 22 Although such a strict geographical definition of the Mediterranean would exclude Jordan, Mauritania and Portugal, these countries are participating, for political reasons, to various Mediterranean co-operation initiatives. 23 Geoffrey Kemp and Robert Harkavy, Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 1997, p. 15. 24 Robert Blackwill and Michael Stuermer (eds), Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997, p. 1. 25 According to a WEU report, ‘The Mediterranean Basin is a high priority for European security. This area merits particular attention from WEU, which has initiated a dialogue on security issues with certain non-WEU Mediterranean countries’ (paragraph 100, WEU Council of Ministers, ‘European security: a common concept of the 27 WEU Countries’, Madrid, 14 November 1995). More recently, Javier Solana, High Representative for CFSP, pointed out that ‘ . . . Within the same fold, the countries of the Balkans and the Southern Mediterranean shore deserve our utmost attention, because their political and economic evolution can have serious implications for our prosperity and even for our security’ (speech by Javier Solana, Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft fur Auswartige Politik, Berlin, 14 November 2000). For the core interests of Europe, see also, Blackwill and Stuermer, Allies Divided, p. 19; For the core interests of the US, see Kemp and Harkavy, Strategic Geography, p. 10 and Blackwill and Stuermer, Allies Divided, p. 10. 26 ‘Most European countries are largely dependent for their supplies of energy and raw materials on countries whose political and economic stability over the medium term cannot be taken for granted . . . . In the event of a major crisis, the disruption of those supplies is a distinct possibility and maritime transport routes could be vulnerable. The flow of gas and oil to European markets through reliable pipeline and maritime routes hold great political and strategic significance’ (paragraph 26, WEU Council of Ministers, ‘European security: a common concept of the 27 WEU Countries’, Madrid, 14 November 1995. According to a House of Lords report, ‘The Mediterranean Basin is the source of many intranational and international conflicts, and while it would appear that the EU has little interest in intervening on the ground, few southern Mediterranean states can be regarded as stable’ (House of Lords, European Union, Ninth Report, 14 March 2001, p. 5). 27 As Kemp and Harkavy point out, in the short term there is no realistic alternative to Persian Gulf oil to meet increased world supply. Approximately two-thirds of the world’s proven oil and one-third of its natural gas reserves are situated in the Persian Gulf. If the estimated reserves of the Caspian Basin are added to these figures, the respective percentage for reserves goes higher, perhaps 70 per cent for oil and over 40 per cent for natural gas. For this reason, the ‘Gulf-Caspian Energy Ellipse’ is one of the most significant geostrategic realities of our time. The greater Middle East and its energy resources may now be the strategic fulcrum and prize in the emerging arena of world politics. What is of special relevance are the growing energy needs of Asia, including China, India and Southeast Asia, and the fact that all will have to compete with Europe and North America for greater Middle East energy supplies (Kemp and Harkavy, Strategic Geography, pp. xiii and 111). 28 This is perceived by the US as a vital interest; probably less so for the European states who have adopted a more balanced approach to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. According to an American analyst, the ‘US has enduring interests in the Middle East,

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especially pursuing a comprehensive breakthrough to Middle East peace, assuring the security of Israel and our Arab friends, and maintaining the free flow of oil at reasonable prices’ (Edward Atkeson, The Powder Keg. An Intelligence Officer’s Guide to Military Forces in the Middle East 1996–2000, Nova Publications, Virginia, 1996, p. 1). As William Walker put it in very vivid terms, the US was ‘ensnared in the region by oil, by its unshakable devotion towards Israel and Saudi Arabia, and its equally unshakable enmity towards Iran, Iraq and Syria, an enmity reciprocated in full measure’ (William Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, Adelphi Paper 370, IISS, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p. 44). To the above list of interests, one may add the safety of Western civilians living and working in the southern Mediterranean (often in the oil and gas industries). Developments in the south of the Mediterranean can directly affect the stability and well-being of European members of the Alliance through disruption of energy imports and trade. Much of Europe’s and the West’s energy supplies are imported from the region: 65 per cent of its oil and natural gas imports pass through the Mediterranean on approximately 3,000 ships daily; 30 per cent of Italy’s oil is imported from Libya and 32 per cent of its natural gas from Algeria; France, Germany, Greece, Spain, Turkey and the UK all import oil from Libya, while Algerian natural gas is exported to Belgium, France, Portugal and Spain; 74 per cent of Spain’s natural gas needs, 50 per cent of Italy’s and 29 per cent of France’s were imported from the Maghreb states in 1996. Trade in the other direction amounted to $6 billion in European exports to Algeria in 1996, or 67 per cent of its imports; with 69 per cent of Tunisia’s imports, 66 per cent of Libya’s and 57 per cent of Morocco’s also coming from Europe in 1996 (Nicola de Santis, ‘The Future of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative’, NATO Review, Spring 1998, p. 33). Ian Lesser, NATO Looks South. New Challenges and New Strategies in the Mediterranean, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2000, p. 20. They will, however, be joined by the likes of China and India that will need to satisfy their growing energy demands and therefore access to these areas will remain a high foreign policy priority (Stephen Calleya, ‘Regional Security Challenges in the Mediterranean’, in Stephen Blank (ed.), Mediterranean Security Into the Coming Millennium, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, 1999, p. 106). The Mediterranean countries provide 24 per cent of the total EU member-state energy imports, 32 per cent of the imports of natural gas, and 27 per cent of oil imports. Europe is linked to supply from the region via the Transmed pipeline carrying Algerian gas to Italy, via Tunisia, and the Maghreb–Europe pipeline to carry Algerian gas, via Morocco, to Spain and Portugal. An electricity interconnection has also been on-stream between Morocco and Spain since 1995 (Richard Whitman, Securing Europe’s Southern Flank? A Comparison of NATO, EU and WEU Policies and Objectives, Final report, NATO Individual Research Fellowship 1997–1999, p. 26). As Ian Lesser points out, the ‘proliferation of new energy routes, and especially gas pipelines, around the Mediterranean and its hinterlands is uniting previously distinct economies and encouraging interest to protect this complex and costly infrastructure. It is a promising area for cooperation on a Mediterranean and sub-regional basis. It will also raise new issues for the transatlantic debate about energy security. In past decades, this debate has focused largely on oil, and above all, the Persian Gulf. In the future, Europe, in particular, will have a more pronounced state in the security of gas supply’ (Lesser, Security and Strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean, p. 14). The sheer scale of tanker shipping in the Mediterranean, including that of highly explosive liquid natural gas, highlights the potential risks to population centres, the environment and economies posed by maritime terrorism in the region (IISS Strategic Survey 2003–2004, p. 154). According to Anthony Cordesman, the ‘real threats in the Middle East may well consist of how well local powers can achieve enough stability and resources to consistently meet the world’s growing need for oil and gas exports’ (Anthony Cordesman,

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Notes Evolving Threats in the Middle East: Their Implications for US Defense Planning, Testimony to the Middle East and Africa Threat Panel of the House Armed Services Committee, 28 September 2005, p. 2). Anthony Cordesman, Transnational Threats from the Middle East: Crying Wolf or Crying Havoc?, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, 1999, p. 221. Lesser, Security and Strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean, p. 21; It should be mentioned, however, that, to date, energy-related facilities have been spared serious attack, and gas exports, including those shipped via the trans-Maghreb pipeline stretching from Algeria through Morocco and Spain, have continued without significant interruption (IISS Strategic Survey 2003/2004, p. 154). See, for example, R. Asmus, S. Larrabee, I. Lesser, ‘Mediterranean Security: New Challenges, New Tasks’, May 1996, p. 28, where the authors argue that ‘today, the Islamic factor is playing a key role in the Mediterranean security equation. Not, as some might argue, as a result of an inevitable “Clash of Civilizations”, but rather as a leading force for change, perhaps violent change, within key states, and as one among many new cleavages on Europe’s periphery.’ John Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, p. 426. The lack of a believable enemy figure makes it more difficult to reach consensus on foreign policy issues within individual countries as well as among allies. Bichara Khader, L’Europe Face aux Nouveaux Risques: Le Defi du Maghreb, Bruxelles, 1993, p. 18. As Shireen Hunter argued, ‘with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union and with the absence of another country that could credibly challenge Western supremacy, the West is lacking a believable enemy figure, making it more difficult to reach consensus on foreign policy issues within individual countries as well as among allies. Thus, at least for commentators with the requisite psychological and analytical bent, there is utility in finding an ideological enemy against which to unite’ (Shireen Hunter, The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?, Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, 1998, p. 27). In Egypt, the most prominent Islamic organization is the Muslim Brotherhood, while the most extremist organization today is Al Jama’at Al Islamiya. The clampdown by the government has kept the problem under control, but there are fears of escalation if there is no clear improvement in the economy and in people’s living conditions. The attempts by President Mubarak to deal with the problem through banning the Muslim Brotherhood were attended by serious dangers, considering the historical tendency of this organization to split into moderate and extremist factions (IISS Strategic Survey 1994/1995, p. 144; Thomas Friedman, ‘Egypt Quashes Militants For Now’, International Herald Tribune, 25 October 1995; Stanley Reed, ‘The Battle for Egypt’, Foreign Affairs, September–October 1993). Ian Lesser argued that Egypt ‘poses challenges of a very different sort. The country’s size and prominence in Arab affairs, including the Middle East peace process, makes it a key regional actor and a key interlocutor for Europe and the US After decades of stasis, Egypt’s internal scene may be poised for greater turmoil. Instability, and possibly the advent of a different regime in Egypt, could affect the security environment in the eastern Mediterranean in a number of important ways’ (Lesser, Security and Strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean, pp. 8–9). It is an undeniable fact that, for almost a millennium, the Islamic threat was the fundamental strategic dilemma facing European countries, from the Iberian Peninsula and Austria to the Balkans (and Russia, if one counts the Tartars). According to some researchers, the relationship between the West (Spain and later the Central European monarchies) and Islam (the Moors and later the Ottoman Turks) can be characterized as the first ‘Cold War’ (Graham Fuller and Ian Lesser, A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1995, p. 18). John Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?, pp. 3–4.

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45 According to Huntington, ‘The balance of power among civilizations is shifting: the West is declining in relative influence; Asian civilizations are expanding their economic, military, and political strength; Islam is exploding demographically with destabilizing consequences for Muslim countries and their neighbours; and nonWestern civilizations generally are reaffirming the value of their own cultures . . . . The West’s universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with Islam and China; at the local level faultline wars, largely between Muslims and non-Muslims, generate “kin-country rallying” and the threat of broader escalation’ (Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1996, pp. 20–21). 46 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, p. 29; Shireen Hunter argues, however, that, at the political level, talk of relations between the Islamic world and the West as though each were a coherent and unified entity is also unjustified. The only realistic and productive way of dealing with these relations is instead at the level of individual Muslim states and Western countries (Hunter, The Future of Islam and the West, p. 168). 47 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, p. 186. 48 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, p. 188. 49 According to a RAND study, ‘Islam is indeed likely to be a continuing and significant force in the political evolution of many states in the region, and a factor in foreign and security policy orientations. But it would be unwise to dismiss the power of nationalism as a key motivating factor in the behavior of states, with or without an Islamist component’ (S. Larrabee, J. Green, I. Lesser and M. Zanini, NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative: Policy Issues and Dilemmas, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, September 1997, p. 6). 50 According to some of his detractors, Huntington ‘conflates ethnicity with civilisation, assuming that all Muslims, for example, are part of a vast ethnic group whose primordial values lead them inevitably to persecute heretics, veil women and establish theocratic regimes’ (Hunter, The Future of Islam and the West, p. 6). 51 It must be remembered that the use of terrorism as a means of achieving political aims is not the exclusive property of Islamic movements (Bassma Kodmani-Darwish, ‘International Security and the Forces of Nationalism and Fundamentalism’, in New Dimensions in International Security, Adelphi Paper No. 226, IISS, London, 1991, p. 47; Fuller and Lesser, A Sense of Siege, p. 73). 52 Kemp and Harkavy, Strategic Geography, p. 7. According to a Wilton Park report, ‘one of the main dangers of the current situation is judging all Muslims by the behaviour of a minority, those who arrogate to themselves the “right” to act and speak on behalf of the Islamic world. This ignores complexity and perplexity within many parts of that “cultural universe”. It is also mistaken for the West to look for a unified, authoritative Islamic voice rejecting the behaviour of the extreme minority. There is no centralised, final and authoritative Islamic voice which can resolve once and for all, to the satisfaction of all believers, the issue “who speaks for Islam?”.’ It is further argued that ‘four principles can be adduced for future Western policies towards the Islamic world; there is a need for: constant engagement; a deeper understanding; a need for greater consistency; and a longer-term policy perspective’ (Western Policies Towards the Islamic World, Wilton Park Conference, 11–15 February 2002, pp. 2 and 4). 53 A large portion of the ever-increasing urban population is desperate. For many there is not the slightest chance of them finding work and an increasing number of educated young people are discovering that their professional ambitions cannot be fulfilled. 54 After Nasser’s death (1970), pan-Arabism lost its strength as an ideology. Recent years have seen disillusionment with world ideology (especially Marxism, but also with liberalism). 55 The powerful religious trend, which for many is identified with fundamentalism in the Islamic world is, above all, a number of internal movements which question the political, economic and social administration of their respective counties and

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Notes challenges the status quo (Andre Dumoulin, Risques et Menaces Dans un Monde en Mutation, GRIP, Brussels, p. 95). Roberto Aliboni, ‘Southern Europe and the United States: the Community Approach’, in John Holmes (ed.), Maelstrom: The United States, Southern Europe and the Challenges of the Mediterranean, Cambridge, MA, 1995, p. 174. Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole, The New Face of Terrorism. Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction, I.B. Tauris Publishers, London, 2002, p. 127; Ghassan Salame, ‘Islam and the West’, Foreign Policy, Spring 1993, p. 23. Furthermore, the painful legacy of colonization and the lowered morale stemming from continuing political and economic decline should be balanced against the image the Muslims have of themselves as a strong and developed culture in the past. For this decline, the Islamists hold responsible not only the rulers of Arab countries, but also the West. Margaret Blunden, ‘Insecurity in Europe’s Southern Flank’, Survival, Summer 1994, p. 142. In the Maghreb, the fundamentalists are usually people from urban areas, with technical and scientific education, who, propelled by the dynamics of the generation gap, are seeking a societal model which is not that of their fathers (with national independence as the supreme value), nor the Western model, nor the failed socialist experiment. The only thing that remains to them is Islam. (Andres Ortega, ‘Relations with the Maghreb’, in Holmes, Maelstrom, p. 39; Fuller and Lesser, A Sense of Siege, p. 92). Western Policies Towards the Islamic World, Wilton Park Conference, p. 6. See, for example, paragraph 59 of WEU Council of Ministers, ‘European security: a common concept of the 27 WEU Countries’, Madrid, 14 November 1995: ‘Problems associated with uncontrolled or illegal migration have grown considerably in recent years. As such, it has become an issue relevant to European stability and security . . . massive displacements of persons in particular as a consequence of internal upheavals or armed conflicts in areas adjacent to our countries; illegal migration can pose a threat to internal security and affect law and order in our societies.’ Other analysts, however, are adopting a different view on this matter. According to Alvaro de Vasconcelos, ‘Migration is not a security problem, even in the softer realms, and should indeed be decisively decoupled from security concerns’ (Alvaro de Vasconcelos, Europe’s Mediterranean Strategy. An asymmetric equation, IEEI, 1999, p. 6). Winrow, The Role of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative, p. 100. One witnesses the appearance of demographic and technological faultlines on various parts of the planet such as the Mediterranean, the Rio Grande, Central Asia, China – between the coastal areas and the hinterland between rapidly burgeoning populations, young, poor in resources, capital, and education on the one hand and technologically inventive, demographically stable, and increasingly nervous, rich societies on the other. Another aspect of the demographic issue needs very careful attention. Certain societies are becoming extremely ‘youthful’ (60 per cent of the population of Kenya is under the age of 15) and others increasingly geriatric (20 per cent of the population of Sweden is over the age of 65). Demographic growth is dramatically one-sided. At the same time, the wealth of the planet, its capital, scientists and research centres are to be found in countries with slow to zero rate of population increase. In the future, this can only cause severe friction between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ (Matthew Connelly and Paul Kennedy, ‘Must It Be the Rest Against the West?’ The Atlantic Monthly, December 1994, pp. 78–79; Ivan Head, ‘South-North Dangers’, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1989, pp. 76–78). Larrabee, Green, Lesser and Zanini, NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative, p. 2. More specifically, there was concern that the establishment of some form of Islamist government in a particular state in North Africa will trigger a mass migration from that state to Europe or to another neighbouring Arab state. It would seem, however, that only the Westernized and wealthy ruling and financial elites would seek to flee the country. Some businessmen would remain in the hope of playing an influential

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commercial role for the new government. The majority, being the poorer sections of society, would presumably also stay, in the belief that Islam could address their grievances (Lesser, Security and Strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean, p. 12; Winrow, The Role of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative, p. 103). Winrow, The Role of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative, p. 101. Europe needs immigrants, but it also needs to control their influx. The two most pronounced trends in the shaping of its future are the decline in numbers and the ageing of the population. Currently, 21 per cent of the population of the EU is over 65. This is expected to rise to 34 per cent by mid-century, meaning that around two-thirds of the population will not be ‘economically active’. As for absolute numbers, the population of Europe in 2000 was 727 million. The UN’s ‘medium projection’ for 2050 is 603 million – a loss of 124 million people or 17 per cent, an unprecedented drop. The ‘low’ projection is 556 million – a loss of 25 per cent. George Joffe, ‘Mediterranean security: The Social, Political and Economic Dimensions’, in Simon Serfaty et al., Transatlantic Approaches to the Mediterranean. Impact of the New NATO on North and South Perspectives, CSIS Occasional Reports in European Studies, May 1999, p. 30. It has been argued that any population with sub-replacement fertility (the current UK and German situation) that attempts to maintain a given population size through immigration would acquire a population of predominantly, eventually entirely, immigrant origin. Populations can only adopt this solution to stabilize numbers at the risk of their original identity (Coker, Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century, pp. 46–47). Winrow, The Role of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative, p. 97. The problem of political legitimacy and internal stability will be closely tied to demographic and economic trends across the region. From Morocco to Turkey, attempts at economic reform and the emergence of a more dynamic private sector are widening the gap between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots, with potentially destabilizing consequences. Reforms aimed at promoting longer-term prosperity and encouraging foreign investment may well reinforce stability over the longer-term, but the shorter-term political risks are substantial, especially where dissatisfaction with the existing political order is already widespread. Rising expectations will be difficult to meet and could prove to be a powerful source of political change in countries where the established political class proves incapable of promoting a better distribution of wealth and opportunity (Lesser, Green, Larrabee and Zanini, NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative, 2000, p. 7). Given the rate of demographic growth in southern Mediterranean countries, it has been estimated that a constant growth of at least 6–7 per cent will be required in the coming 30 years or so only to maintain current standards of living. Lesser points out that the ‘US is an economic actor of some importance in key Southern Mediterranean countries, but is a relatively insignificant actor in panMediterranean terms. With a few exceptions, American aid, trade and investment around the Mediterranean have not, and probably will not play a role approaching that of the EU. Despite many points of engagement, a “Mediterranean” outlook is not part of the American foreign and security policy tradition’ (Ian Lesser, The US and EuroMediterranean Relations: Evolving Attitudes and Strategies, EuroMeSCo Policy Brief No. 10, July 2004, p. 3). Holmes, Maelstrom, p. 7. Holmes, Maelstrom, p. 219; Fuller and Lesser, A Sense of Siege, p. 1. According to a very pertinent RAND study, ‘When senior US policy-makers think of the Mediterranean, they see the Mediterranean as the stepping-stone to both the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. In contrast, European policy-makers, especially in countries like France and Spain, think first and foremost of the Western Mediterranean, especially the Maghreb. This bifurcated view – and the division of labour that has flowed from it – no longer makes sense for either the US and Europe.

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Notes The European, Middle Eastern, Southwest Asian and even the Central Asian strategic spaces are increasingly beginning to overlap and intersect in new ways, rendering obsolete the traditional compartmentalized view of various sub-regions of the Mediterranean as well as the explicit or implicit division of labour among key countries that had evolved regarding these regions’ (R. Asmus, S. Larrabee, I. Lesser, ‘Mediterranean Security’, p. 29). Lesser, NATO Looks South, p. 45. Lesser, The US and Euro-Mediterranean Relations, p. 7. Richard Haass, ‘The New Middle East’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2006, p. 5. There is no unified western European or southern European approach to, and concept of, the Mediterranean (Andres Ortega, ‘Relations with the Maghreb’, in Holmes, Maelstrom, p. 43). This state of affairs is likely to continue, with a limited convergence of views on matters of foreign policy (George Joffe, Political Institutions and Political Culture in the Mediterranean Region, IAI, 1992, p. 1). Thanos Veremis, in R. Aliboni, Southern European Security in the 1990s, London 1992, p. 33. However, the colonial past of France, Italy and Spain remains a stumbling block to their relations with the Maghreb countries. Margaret Blunden, ‘Insecurity in Europe’s Southern Flank’, Survival, Summer 1994, p. 139. Furthermore, one must agree with Roberto Aliboni that ‘neither France nor other Mediterranean European Union member countries can on their own create the necessary climate for smooth, effective co-operation between the North and the South of the Mediterranean. Something of this nature could only come about at the EU level. Drafting a European security policy for the Mediterranean (the “communiterization” of Mediterranean security problems) would in fact strengthen national security for the southern members of the EU’ (Aliboni, Southern European Security, p. 13). As Lesser rightly points out, it was ‘never entirely accurate to speak of a “European” strategy toward the eastern Mediterranean, although elements of such a strategy have been articulated via the EU’s Mediterranean Strategy, the EMP, enlargement policy vis-à-vis Turkey and the Balkans, and participation in the Middle East peace process’ (Lesser, Security and Strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean, p. 15). Fuller and Lesser, A Sense of Siege, p. 63. WEU Assembly, Security in the Mediterranean, 1993, p. 32. Francois Heisbourg, ‘The United States, Europe and Military Force Projection’, in Blackwill and Stuermer, Allies Divided, p. 291. According to Ian Lesser, it is not ‘unlikely that NATO will take on a formal role in security management across large parts of the “broader” Middle East, putting the eastern Mediterranean at the center of a strategic space extending to the Gulf, and perhaps beyond. Under these conditions, current Mediterranean security initiatives may be overtaken or made redundant by arrangements of wider scope, reaching beyond the Mediterranean basin’ (Lesser, Security and Strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean, pp. 1–2 and 16). IISS Strategic Review 2003/2004, p. 155. Lesser, Security and Strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean, pp. 1–2. Vasconcelos, Europe’s Mediterranean Strategy, p. 3. Indeed, the process of change and adjustment of the Western/European security organizations is regularly monitored by Arab governments and analysts. (Roberto Aliboni, Security Cooperation in the Mediterranean: Perceptions and Notions in Mediterranean and Arab Countries, Conference organized by IEEI on ‘Building the Euro-American partnership in the Mediterranean’, Oporto, 22–23 June 1998, p. 3). As Edgard Pisani, President of the Institute of the Arabic World, has stated, ‘While Europe is being unified, the Mediterranean is being fragmented, and while we are drawn by Eastern Europe, we sense the South as a threat’ (Azzouz Kerdoun, La Securite en Mediterranee, Paris, 1995, pp. 154–155).

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92 When the creation of a rapid reaction force for possible action in North Africa and the Middle East is planned, one should try to imagine how the creation of an equivalent Arab or Islamic force to deal with ‘emergencies’ in Europe would appear to Europeans. 93 An urgent task for the EU is to provide detailed, constantly updated information on the reasons for establishing forces such as the European Rapid Reaction Force, as well as those answerable to WEU (FAWEU) – such as EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR, formed by France, Italy, Spain and Portugal in the framework of the WEU – which continue to be a source of concern to the countries in the south. As argued in a 1996 WEU Assembly Report, ‘If these forces are to carry out Petersbergtype missions (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions, prevention of armed conflict, etc.) without excluding military operations under Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, the southern countries may well speculate as to whether such missions are in anticipation of possible conflict between North and South or, on the contrary, whether the southern countries could benefit from the assistance of these forces should the need arise and even take part in their activities’ (Martin Lipkowski, Security in the Mediterranean Region, Working Paper, Political Committee, Assembly of the WEU, October 1996, p. 28). 94 WEU, Security in the Mediterranean, p. 19; Edward Mortimer, European Security after the Cold War, Adelphi Paper No. 271, IISS, London, 1992, p. 37. The international system tends by its very nature to cause insecurity and suspicion, and the moment a pattern of hostility is established, each side will view the other as an enemy and will assume the worst about his behaviour (Buzan, People, States and Fear, p. 228). 95 Lesser, Green, Larrabee and Zanini, NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative, p. 84. 96 Promoting greater understanding of each other’s positions and concerns has been one of the main objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo), which has provided, since its creation, a forum for the exchange of ideas and arguments on such issues. 97 The view exists that the South is a ‘piece of property’, which the North of right dominates. To lend legitimacy to this attitude, an ideological base has been formed which describes the South as a threat because of the population explosion, high unemployment, the failure of attempts to democratize and modernize, unbridgeable religious and cultural differences and general instability. These opinions have provoked reactions and a wave of anti-Western feeling in the South. 98 According to Shireen Hunter, many Muslims believe that ‘they are facing a new “campaign” by the West, spearheaded by the issues of human rights, democratisation and economic liberalisation, and this leads to the emergence of anti-Western sentiment. Typically, they will point out that, whenever any Arab leader, even a tyrant like Saddam Hussein, “rebels” against the West, the first instinctive reaction of the people in Muslim countries is to applaud him and to support him, regardless of his real aims and intentions or the crimes he has carried out against his people. Muslims are also concerned about the dilution and possibly the disappearance of their civilisation under the influence of what Bernard Lewis has characterised as “the seductive allure” of Western civilisation’ (Hunter, The Future of Islam and the West, p. 12. See also, Fuller and Lesser, A Sense of Siege, p. 38). 2 Recent developments in arms control and non-proliferation 1 Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws. America’s Search for a New Foreign Policy, p. 177. 2 William Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, Adelphi Paper 370, IISS, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, pp. 24–25; As Stephen Cimbala argued, ‘Russia and the US had many opposed interests during the Cold War. But one common interest was in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and of long-range delivery systems. The reasons for this were obviously

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Notes self-serving. On the other hand, US and Soviet preferences for nuclear bipolarity and against proliferation had a residual, altruistic benefit for the system as a whole. The management of nuclear risk was expedited by confining the taking of nuclear decisions in a small number of states with politically accountable militaries and with a considerable stake in the international status quo’ (Stephen Cimbala, ‘Nuclear Proliferation and Great Power Security’, Defence Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3, Autumn 2002, p. 77). Each one of them would require more detailed discussion, because they do not necessarily fit the typical ‘profile’ of threshold-states. Article VI calls for the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) to, ‘( . . . ) pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control’ (Article VI of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty). SIPRI YEARBOOK Yearbook 2006, SIPRI, Oxford University Press, New York, 2006, p. 640. Tariq Rauf and John Simpson, ‘The 1999 NPT PrepCom’, The Nonproliferation Review, No. 2, 1999, p. 129; The Bush Administration wants to proceed with research on a new, low-yield nuclear weapon and earth-penetrating ‘bunker-busting’ nuclear bomb, while Russia has increased the prominence of nuclear arms in its defence strategy and reportedly is working on new weapons and delivery systems (IISS Strategic Survey 2004–2005, p. 39). The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) outlines a ‘new triad’ concept to replace the traditional nuclear triad rationale for the American strategic force posture. The traditional strategic arsenal of ICBMs, SLBMs and penetrating bombers would be combined with conventional strike capabilities to form the ‘offensive strike systems’ leg of the new triad. The other two legs of the new triad are homeland defences (national missile defence (NMD) and air defences) and civilian defences and infrastructure resources to protect against CBRN threats (David McDonough, Nuclear Superiority, The ‘New Triad’ and the Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Adelphi Paper 383, IISS, 2006, p. 8). According to the 2000 Russian National Security Concept, ‘The Russian Federation considers the possibility of employing military force to ensure its national security based on the following principles: ( . . . ) use of all available forces and assets, including nuclear, in the event of need to repulse armed aggression, if all other measures of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted and have proven ineffective.’ In recent years, Russian weakness has led to a revaluing of nuclear weapons in Russian defence calculus. Robert Manning argues that Russia faces ‘a predicament not dissimilar to that of the US in the 1950s: the sharp decline in conventional capabilities has lowered the nuclear threshold in Russian military doctrine and led to a discarding of the always-propagandistic Soviet “no-first-use” policy. The Russian view that nuclear weapons might be used to deter or respond to conventional conflicts is quite explicit and codified in an April 2000, Russian foreign ministry document articulating Moscow’s security doctrine’ (Robert Manning, ‘The Ultimate Weapon Redux? US Nuclear Policy in a New Era’, in Burkard Schmitt (ed.), Nuclear Weapons: A Great Debate, Chaillot Papers No. 48, EU-ISS, Paris, July 2001, p. 68.; The Future Nuclear Landscape: New Realities, New Responses, Center of the Study of WMD, National Defense University, 2006 Annual Symposium, Washington DC, 2006, p. 6). Trenin, ‘Russia and the Future of Nuclear Policy’, p. 125. Michael May, Rivalries Between Nuclear Power Projectors: Why the Lines Will Be Drawn Again, Center for International Security and Arms Control. Stanford University, May 1996, p. 8.

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12 The DF-31, and a longer-range missile, the DF-41, not projected for deployment before 2010, will for the first time provide China with a survivable second-strike capability (Manning, ‘The Ultimate Weapon Redux?’, in Schmitt (ed.), Nuclear Weapons, p. 72). 13 According to the proceedings of the Center of the Study of WMD’s Annual Symposium, ‘China is serious about modernizing its nuclear forces to ensure deterrence, but does not appear to be competing with the US for nuclear supremacy. In part, China is motivated to maintain a modern nuclear force in order to avoid nuclear blackmail from other major powers; this is an enduring legacy from the 1950s, reinforced by contemporary Chinese threat perceptions. But Beijing also seeks to cast a nuclear shadow over Eurasia to advance its strategic interests, and believes its nuclear capabilities could decisively influence US behavior in a crisis or conflict over Taiwan. Beijing is particularly concerned with ensuring that US missile defenses do not deny it an assured retaliatory capability. There is debate in some quarters in the US about whether to tailor the New Triad to negate the Chinese deterrent’ (The Future Nuclear Landscape, p. 6). 14 Winn Schwartau, ‘Asymmetrical Adversaries’, ORBIS, Vol. 44, No. 2, Spring 2000, pp. 198–199. China is also concerned that missile defences deployed in Taiwan, or even mobile naval defences brought forward to the Taiwan Straits, might embolden political forces in what Beijing regards as an irredentist province to enhance their efforts to attain independence (Muller, p. 39). 15 Bruno Tertrais, Nuclear Policies in Europe, Adelphi Paper, No. 327, IISS, London, 1999, pp. 51–52. 16 Jayantha Dhanapala, ‘The NPT at a Crossroads’, The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2000, pp. 141–142. 17 In South Asia, for Pakistan, nuclear capability is the great equalizer against an Indian conventional edge. Moreover, the growth of Islamic political groups outside government control and the possibility that a troubled Pakistan could move into the failed-state category raises the possibility, albeit still remote at present, of a nightmare scenario in which anti-Western Islamic groups could gain control of Pakistani nuclear weapons (Manning, ‘The Ultimate Weapon Redux?’, in Schmitt (ed.), Nuclear Weapons, p. 74; see also, George Quester, Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken Taboo, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 2006, p. 37). 18 Ariel Levite, ‘Never Say Never Again’, International Security, 27: 3, Winter 2002/2003, p. 60; As Manning points out, ‘the question of what nuclear future lies ahead – a reversal of the build-down, a wave of proliferation or a marginalization of nuclear war – must be seen as part of a broader reshaping of global institutions and patterns of international relations slowly unfolding a decade and a half since the demise of the Soviet Union and, above all, a reflection of the regional and global security environment’ (Manning, ‘The Ultimate Weapon Redux?’, in Schmitt (ed.), Nuclear Weapons, p. 59). 19 Therese Delpech, ‘Nuclear weapons – less central, more dangerous?’, in Nuclear Weapons: A New Great Debate, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper No. 48, Paris, July 2001, p. 13. 20 International Crisis Group, Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear Program, Middle East Report No. 18, 27 October 2003, Amman/Brussels, p. 33. 21 Indeed, there is a spreading belief that the nuclear non-proliferation regime has reached a tipping point, where in the absence of measures to repair and strengthen the regime it might unravel altogether (IISS Strategic Survey 2004–2005, pp. 37 and 43). 22 It is true that the 1980 and 1990 NPT Review Conferences also failed to achieve substantive agreements, and the nuclear non-proliferation regime with the NPT at its core nevertheless survived. However, this time failure came at a particularly bad moment (Burkard Schmitt, ‘NPT Breakdown’, EU-ISS Newsletter, No. 15, July 2005, p. 3).

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23 As Perkovich points out, ‘it was not built to deal with terrorist groups bent on mass destruction or nuclear black marketers with murky connections to governments. Many of the activities of the clandestine Pakistani network violated no existing laws’ (George Perkovich et al., Universal Compliance. A Strategy for Nuclear Security, Carnegie Endowment, Washington DC, June 2004, p. 10). 24 Charles Lutes, ‘New Players on the Scene’, eJournal USA, 8 April 2005. 25 IISS Strategic Survey 2004–2005, p. 41. 26 Jeffrey Record, Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War and Counterproliferation, Policy Analysis No. 519, CATO Institute, 8 July 2004, p. 19. 27 Over 30 years, Khan put together what Mohamed El Baradei, head of the IAEA, called a ‘veritable Wal-Mart’ for nuclear weapons buyers, a not-so-secret netherworld where proliferation meshed with globalization. Khan even held nuclear-related symposiums (Michael Hirsh and Sarah Schafer, ‘Black Market Nukes’, Newsweek, 23 February 2004). 28 Wyn Bowen, Libya and Nuclear Proliferation. Stepping Back from the Brink, Adelphi Paper 380, IISS, London, 2006, p. 83. 29 It is claimed that in spite of public commitments to the contrary, several quasigovernmental corporations and enterprises in China have provided valuable assistance to the nuclear and missile programmes of Pakistan, as well as nuclear, missile, and chemical programmes in other countries such as Iran, Libya and North Korea (At the Crossroads. Counterproliferation and National Security Strategy, National Defense University, Washington DC, April 2004, p. 13). 30 Bruno Tertrais, ‘Europe and Nuclear Proliferation’, in Gustav Lindstrom and Burkard Schmitt (eds), Fighting Proliferation – European Perspectives, Chaillot Papers, No. 66, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, December 2003, p. 42. 31 Serge Sur, ‘Non-proliferation Initiatives and the NPT Review’, The International Spectator, Vol. XL, No. 3, July–September 2005, p. 9. 32 As William Walker points out, ‘ “secondary” supply has emerged as a growing concern in recent years as it was recognized that the march of economic globalization could, along with the general diffusion of scientific and technological understandings, substantially reduce barriers to the acquisition of WMD’ (William Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, Adelphi Paper 370, IISS, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p. 43). 33 Colonel Ralph Thiele, WMD: New Patterns, Bundeswehr Center for Analyses and Studies, 19 September 2003. 34 Thomas Lehrman, ‘Rethinking Interdiction: The Future of the Proliferation Security Initiative’, The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 11, No. 2, Summer 2004, pp. 1–45. 35 Global Issues: International Security, p. 2. 36 Thomas Lehrman, ‘Rethinking Interdiction: The Future of the Proliferation Security Initiative’, The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 11, No. 2, Summer 2004, pp. 1–2. 37 See, for example, Fighting Proliferation, Promoting Arms Control and Disarmament: France’s Contribution, Republique Francaise, 2005, p. 16. 38 ‘The Proliferation Security Initiative. An Interdiction Strategy’, IISS Strategic Comments, Vol. 9, No. 6, 2003, p. 2; Thomas Lehrman argues that ‘despite this growing threat, international maritime law and its traditional interpretations have failed to provide a clear justification for interdicting foreign flag ships reasonably suspected of transporting WMD on the high seas. Traditional legal principles such as freedom of the seas and the right of innocent passage have created an environment in which rogue states and non-state actors face relatively few obstacles to the transport of WMD-related technology’ (Lehrman, ‘Rethinking Interdiction’, pp. 1–2). 39 IISS Strategic Survey 2004/2005, p. 43; Eric Terzuolo, NATO and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Routledge, London, 2006, p. 155; Michael Intriligator and Abdullah Toukan, ‘Terrorism and WMD’, in Peter Catona, Michael Intriligator and John Sullivan (eds), Countering Terrorism and WMD, Routledge, London, 2006, p. 79. 40 According to Mark Smith, its ‘basic purpose was twofold: to begin a process of global norm-construction on ballistic missiles, and to try to offset their most destabilizing effects.

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It tried to achieve this through a system of annual declarations on missile and space launch vehicles (SLV) policy, pre-launch notification (PLNs) of missile flight tests, and a plea to restrain and where possible roll back missile development’ (Mark Smith, ‘Assessing Missile Proliferation’, in Lindstrom and Schmitt, Fighting Proliferation, p. 27). The HCOC lays down a general commitment to exercise restraint in the development, testing and deployment of ballistic missiles, including the reduction of national stockpiles, and an undertaking not to contribute to proliferation. The Code also sets out a strong political commitment to put in place and comply with transparency measures in the form of an annual declaration on ballistic and space programmes, and prior notification of the launch of missiles and space launch vehicles. Finally, and no less importantly, it recognizes that states should not be prevented from making use of space for peaceful purposes while affirming that space programmes must not be used to conceal ballistic missile programmes. In this way, the HCOC seeks to tackle the ‘demand’ for means of delivery, whereas the MTCR aims to control the ‘supply’ of the technology (Fighting Proliferation, Promoting Arms Control and Disarmament: France’s Contribution, Republique Francaise, 2005, pp. 42–44). A Nuclear Nonproliferation Strategy for the 21st Century, Building Global Alliances for the 21st Century, Working Paper No. 1, p. 5. Despite widespread demand by a large number of states, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations, no formal multilateral negotiations aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament have been held. The United States has led the opposition of the NWS to multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. Governments in favour of taking relatively quick action on global nuclear disarmament look chiefly to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the world’s only multilateral body negotiating disarmament, to pursue binding agreements. However, the CD has been unable to resolve differences between the NWS and those countries that want quicker action, as no negotiating ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament has been convened. For the first time, in autumn 1995, the UN General Assembly adopted by a vote of 99–39–15 a resolution proposed by China calling on the CD to work out a programme for phased nuclear disarmament within a fixed time span. The United States, France, Britain, other EU countries, Canada, and the majority of Eastern European states voted against the resolution. Russia, Australia, and Japan abstained. During 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons. While addressing the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, it also concluded that an obligation existed under Article VI of the NPT, ‘to achieve a precise result – nuclear disarmament in all its aspects – by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter’ (PPNN Newsbrief, No. 50, 2nd Quarter 2000 and No. 51, 2nd/3rd Quarter 2000, Southampton, 2000). Today, the CTBT is more of a symbolic than a substantive arms control measure. However, symbols and perceptions are at least as important as objective reality. Mark Moher, ‘The Nuclear Disarmament Agenda and the Future of the NPT’, The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1999, p. 67. For instance, there are even some suggestions of offering covert technical assistance to India and Pakistan, in order to improve their Command and Control systems and to minimize the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons or the loss of control during a crisis (the infamous concept of proliferation management). Although this would constitute a violation of the NPT, it is argued that it may be a necessary step to prevent the use of nuclear weapons in the sub-continent.

3 Assessing the proliferation threat 1 Joachim Krause, ‘’Proliferation des Armes de Destruction Massive: Risques pour l’ Europe’, in L’ Europe et le Defi de la Proliferation, Cahiers de Chaillot, No. 24, Institut d’ Etudes de Securite, Union de l’ Europe Occidentale, May 1996, Paris, p. 16.

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2 According to Wallace Thies, ‘despite years of research and a rousing scholarly controversy, a consensus on the question of whether proliferation increases the risk of war between new nuclear powers remains elusive. Disagreements between proliferation optimists and pessimists have proven so intractable that representatives of both schools have recently suggested that it is time to advance beyond the ultimately irreconcilable “optimism vs. pessimism” debate and into a series of inquiries explaining . . . the actual behaviour of states that develop nuclear weapons . . . ’ (Wallace Thies, ‘Proliferation and Critical Risk’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 23, No. 4, December 2000, p. 51). 3 One can identify at least six major variables: Scope and extent of proliferation; Quality or sufficiency of forces; Nature and intensity of the regional rivalries; Sobriety and awareness of decision-makers; Local criteria of unacceptable damage; Evolution of the global-international system. (John King (ed.), International Political Effects of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1979, pp. 47–48) 4 Indeed, it has been argued that the ‘proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, though morally disturbing (for developing and developed countries alike), has no definite or foreordained linear effects, but rather contains within it both stabilising and destabilising elements’. We largely agree with the argument that it is the way which these weapons are used and the political and military strategy which they serve that defines the nature of the consequences of proliferation. 5 If nuclear weapons compelled the US and USSR and for that matter the UK, France and China to behave with restraint, why should their gradual diffusion not be allowed to usher in a more general restraint and avoidance of war? (William Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, Adelphi Paper 370, IISS, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p. 24). 6 Kenneth Waltz, in Fred Holroyd (ed.), Thinking About Nuclear Weapons, Croom Helm, London, 1985, pp. 374 and 386. 7 See, for instance: Pierre Gallois, The Balance of Terror, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, MA, 1961; Kenneth Waltz, More May be Better, Adelphi Paper No. 171, IISS, London, 1981. 8 The new nuclear powers lack the experience of two World Wars and the Cold War, which bred a culture of caution and common perception in international affairs amongst the actors involved. Will they proceed cautiously as 20th century statesmen? (Therese Delpech, International Terrorism and Europe, Chaillot Papers No. 56, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, December 2002, pp. 19 and 31). 9 It has rightly been argued that concern that nuclear weapons might be used in a conflict among new nuclear powers is well founded. Even assuming that stable deterrent relationships among newly nuclear rivals may eventually emerge – facilitated perhaps by outside assistance – the transition period may be dangerously unstable (Robert Blackwill and Albert Carnesale (eds), New Nuclear Nations. Consequences for U.S. Policy, Council of Foreign Relations Press, New York, 1993, p. 39). The chances of such weapons falling into the hands of renegade military units or terrorists is far greater, as in the number of nations carrying out hazardous manufacturing and storage activities (Victor Utgoff, ‘Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions’, Survival, Vol. 44, No. 2, Summer 2002, p. 88). 10 As Eric Herring put it, ‘even if the leaders suffering a conventional counterforce attack choose not to use but lose their small nuclear forces, their command and control system might “fail deadly”. Situational stress, organizational malfunction or even the ex ante design of their command and control system might make it impossible for some states to withhold their nuclear weapons once they are attacked by

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conventional forces’ (Eric Herring (ed.), ‘Preventing the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Special Issue, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1, March 2000, p. 12). However, the first nuclear weapons of a new NWS are likely to be heavy and of relatively high-yield, usable for counter-value attacks and therefore in the MAD category. Miniaturization of warheads for battlefield use is usually only achieved with increasing sophistication and after several nuclear tests. Whenever nuclear forces are present in the arsenals of states involved in an international crisis, there is the risk that such weapons will be used if a conventional battle were to erupt, because of the sheer confusion and chaos that emerges in the process of fighting and because of the natural reactions of any military unit that faces being overrun but has nuclear weapons close at hand (George Quester, Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken Taboo, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 2006, p. 8). Daniel Frei, Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War, UNIDIR, Geneva, 1982, pp. 161–162. Bruce Russett, in Brito and Intriligator, Strategies for Managing Nuclear Proliferation, Lanham, Lexington Books, Massachussetts, 1983, p. 152. Information remains highly limited concerning the procedures and processes for the command and control of NBC weapons. The information that does exist, however, suggests a strong preference for assertive, centralized command and control in most new NBC powers (Lewis A. Dunn, Peter R. Lavoy, and Scott D. Sagan, ‘Conclusions: Planning the Unthinkable’, in Peter Lavoy, Scott Sagan and James Wirtz, Planning the Unithinkable: How New Powers Will Use NBC Weapons, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY and London, 2000, p. 242). Paul Bracken, Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons, Yale University Press, Connecticut, New Haven, 1983, p. 122. Lewis Dunn, in Robert Waltz and Kenneth Art (eds), The Use of Force, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, New York, p. 603. At the Crossroads. Counterproliferation and National Security Strategy, National Defense University, Washington DC, April 2004, p. 48. Intriligator and Brito, Nuclear Proliferation and the Probability of War, pp. 11–12. George Quester, ‘Some Pakistani Problems and a Nuclear Non-Solution’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, December 1985, p. 103. James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1981, pp. 497–498. Richard Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1987, pp. 163–164; see also: Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1983. Frei, Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War, p. 4. Frei, Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War, p. 8. Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management, p. 80. Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces, p. 198. Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces, p. 86. Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management, p. 142. Baylis, Booth, Garnett and Williams, Contemporary Strategy, London, Croom Helm, 1975, pp. 164–166; see also Janis, Irving, Victims of Groupthink, Boston, MA, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982. Ralph White (ed.), Psychology and the Prevention of Nuclear War, New York University Press, New York, p. 187. Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management, p. 187. Graham Allison, Essence of Decision, Longman, Boston, MA, 1971, pp. 141 and 185. Rodney Jones (ed.), Small Nuclear Forces and U.S. Security and Policy, Lexington Books, Lexington, MA, 1984, p. 67.

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34 It is argued that cultures that put the collective good far above the happiness and life of individuals differ from the highly individualistic societies of Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand, where casualties in war are accepted less willingly (Beatrice Heuser, ‘Beliefs, Culture, Proliferation and Use of Nuclear Weapons’, in Herring, ‘Preventing the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, p. 78). 35 Joseph Rotblat and Ubiratan D’Ambrosio, World Peace and the Developing Countries, Macmillan Press, London, 1986, pp. 37–38. 36 Van Creveld argues that an ‘even more critical reason why regional leaders tend to be at least as careful in handling nuclear weapons as those of the superpowers is the fact that many of the countries in question are quite small, adjacent to each other, and not separated by any clear natural borders; often they share the same local weather systems and draw their water from the same river basin. Hence the question of how escalation, radiation and contamination may be avoided appears even more baffling in their case than in that of the U.S. and the former USSR, which used to be located on different hemispheres and which for decades prepared to fight each other on terrain belonging to third parties’ (Martin Van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict, Free Press, New York, 1993, pp. 122–123). 37 Van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation, pp. 123–124. 38 Lavoy, Sagan and Wirtz (eds), Planning the Unthinkable. How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2000, pp. 5, 7, 10 and 16. 39 See Thanos Dokos, ‘The Probability of the Deliberate Use of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. III, No. 1, Spring 1989. 40 Lawrence Freedman, ‘The Gulf War and the New World Order’, Survival, May 1991, p. 204. 41 Janne Nolan and Albert Wheelon, ‘Third World Ballistic Missiles’, Scientific American, August 1990, p. 34. 42 According to Sami Hajjar, ‘various dynamics link the subregions and problems of the area to one another. A myriad of historical, cultural, social, political and economic factors accounts for the centripetal forces connecting North Africa, the Nile Valley, the Levant, and the Gulf region’ (Sami Hajjar, ‘Regional Perspectives on the Causes of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 19, No. 1, January–March 2000, pp. 35 and 38). Furthermore, Cordesman argues that the ‘sub-regional tensions in North Africa, the Gulf and South Asia, along with the tensions associated with the Arab–Israeli conflict, interact in ways that may well force all of the major powers in the Middle East to continue their efforts to acquire CBRN weapons and delivery systems, regardless of the nature of the ruling regime’ (Anthony Cordesman, The U.S. Military and Evolving Challenges in the Middle East, CSIS, Washington DC, 2002, p. 4). 43 Nolan and Albert, ‘Third World Ballistic Missiles’, p. 34. 44 Cordesman, The U.S. Military and Evolving Challenges in the Middle East, 2002, p. 2. 45 Rodney Jones (ed.), Small Nuclear Forces and U.S. Security and Policy, Lexington Books, Lexington, MA, 1984, p. 67. 46 Jones, Small Nuclear Forces, p. 68. 47 Shai Feldman, ‘The Bombing of Osiraq: Revisited’, International Security, Fall 1982, pp. 122–123. 48 J. Snyder, ‘The Road to Osiraq: Baghdad’s Quest for the Bomb’, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 137, No. 4, pp. 581–582. 49 However, as Jeremy Tamsett points out, ‘although the Israeli CP operation was capable of hampering and delaying nuclear weapon development and associated procurement activities in Iraq, it did not significantly alter Iraq’s latent intellectual capacity to build a nuclear device. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that Iraq’s intention to acquire or build weapons may in fact have been strengthened by the bombing. As such, while the Israeli CP operation was an expeditious way to obviate

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and eliminate the short-term threat posed by the potential for Iraq to acquire nuclear weapons, in the long-term it may have driven the Iraqi nuclear program underground where its detection and destruction became more difficult’ (Jeremy Tamsett, ‘The Israeli Bombing of Osiraq Reconsidered’, The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 11, No. 3, Fall/Winter 2004, p. 82). Kam agrees that, although the Osiraq attack disrupted the short-term development of Iraq’s nuclear capability, in the long term it is possible that it stepped up Iraq’s nuclear efforts (Kam, ‘Curbing the Iranian Nuclear Threat’, p. 5). Robert Litwak, ‘Non-proliferation and the Dilemmas of Regime Change’, Survival, Vol. 45, No. 4, Winter 2003–2004, p. 21. It is argued that Israel probably could degrade or delay parts of Iran’s nuclear programmes, but could not eliminate them (McNair Paper 64, The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington DC, 2001, p. 53; Anthony Cordesman and Khalid Al-Rodhan, Iran’s WMD: The Real and Potential Threat, p. 7). Additional difficulties include the fact that the Iranian facilities are much further away from Israel than the Iraqi reactor; they are better protected; and some of them are located underground. The possibility cannot be ignored that Iran has already secretly constructed additional nuclear facilities that have not yet been identified (Ephraim Kam, ‘Curbing the Iranian Nuclear Threat: The Military Option’, Strategic Assessment, JCSS, Vol. 7, No. 3, December 2004, pp. 5–6). A study released in 2005 by the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute noted: ‘As for eliminating Iran’s nuclear capabilities militarily, the U.S. and Israel lack sufficient strategic intelligence to do this’ (David Isenberg, ‘Overstating Iran’s Threat’, Defense News, February 20, 2006). Based on existing intelligence, the most important facilities for the purposes of nuclear device production would appear to be the 1000 MW power plant at Bushehr, the newly discovered uranium enrichment plant at Natanz, the Kalaye power plant in Tehran, and the heavy water facility at Arak (International Crisis Group, Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear Program, Middle East Report No. 18, 27 October 2003, Amman/Brussels, p. 31). Whitney Raas and Austin Long, Osiraq Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities, SSP Working Paper, April 2006, p. 27. Kam, ‘Curbing the Iranian Nuclear Threat’, p. 6. International Crisis Group, Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear Program, p. 31. Iran’s nuclear programme is perceived as a national project and there is broad internal agreement regarding the need to continue it (Kam, ‘Curbing the Iranian Nuclear Threat’, p. 6). Cameron Brown argues, however, that the main problem with Israel’s deterrent strategy is that Israel has failed to build reinforced silos for its missile force, and has instead sufficed with storing both its Jericho-2 missiles and nuclear weapons (both warheads and gravity bombs) in limestone caves that cannot be reinforced. Since the missile site covers an area smaller than 24 km-square, it is possible that just a few nuclear-tipped missiles could neutralize Israel’s missile threat and damage the nearby bunkers holding the air force’s nuclear gravity bombs. While Israel has most likely found this step unnecessary until today, with Iran on the verge of gaining nuclear weapons capability, Israel may have to reconsider that decision (Cameron Brown, ‘Israel and the WMD Threat: Lessons for Europe’, MERIA Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3, September 2004, p. 7). Dokos, ‘The Probability of the Deliberate Use of Nuclear Weapons’, pp. 43–44. The point is emphasized by the IISS that the concentration of three-quarters of Israel’s population on a narrow strip of coastline from Ashkelon to Haifa makes it extremely vulnerable to nuclear strikes. Israel’s presumed second-strike capability might severely damage its attacker, but there would be no Israeli state left to take satisfaction. Israelis are not the first to notice this asymmetry. Former Iranian president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani remarked five years ago that ‘the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything. However, it will only harm the Islamic world. It

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Notes is not irrational to contemplate such an eventuality’ (‘Israeli Military Calculations Towards Iran’, IISS Strategic Comments, Vol. 12, No. 9, November 2006; see also, Brown, ‘Israel and the WMD Threat’, p. 2). Brown, ‘Israel and the WMD Threat’, p. 32. As Anthony Cordesman has pointed out, ‘Population increases will also increase the “mass destruction” impact of much more conventional strikes on facilities like desalination plants and electricity generation facilities, and the potential impact of precision attacks on energy facilities can become the equivalent of “weapons of mass economic impact” ’(Anthony Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East. Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options and Weapons Effects, CSIS, Washington DC, July 2001, pp. 9–10). Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence, Columbia University Press, New York, 1982, p. 84. George Quester, ‘Nuclear Weapons for Israel’, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 37, No. 4, p. 554. Albert Wohlstetter et al., Moving Towards Life in a Nuclear Armed Crowd, Pan Heuristics, Los Angeles, 1975, p. 150. Paul Power, ‘Preventing Nuclear Conflict in the Middle East: The Nuclear Free Zone Strategy’, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 37, No. 4, p. 625. Quester, ‘Nuclear Weapons for Israel’, p. 554. Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence, pp. 84–85. Lawrence Freedman, ‘Israel’s Nuclear Policy’, Survival, May–June 1975, p. 116. Ray James Lee, The Future of U.S.-Israeli Relations, University Press of Kentucky, Kentucky, Lexinton, 1985, p. 105. Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence, p. 89. Gideon Raphael, ‘Syria and Israel: Too Near the Brink of War’, International Herald Tribune, 15 June 1987; see also Leonard Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, Carnegie Endowment, Washington DC, 1988. Stephen Rosen is, however, much more sceptical, arguing that ‘if a nuclear-armed ballistic missile were launched while conventional fighting involving non-nuclear armed ballistic missiles was going on in the region, how confident would any government be that it could identify the party responsible? The difficulty would be greater still if an airplane or a cruise missile were used to deliver the nuclear weapon’ (Stephen Peter Rosen, ‘After Proliferation’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2006, p. 10). There is, however, the rather cynical (and dangerous) argument that a demonstration of the horrible effects of the use of nuclear weapons would provide a powerful incentive for the nuclear powers to cut drastically their nuclear arsenals and to pledge never to use nuclear weapons again (provided that the whole world did not lie in radioactive ruins by the time they reached that decision). Read, for example, George Quester, Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken Taboo, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 2006. According to a more pessimistic view, ‘prudent policy should assume a next use of nuclear weapons is becoming more likely and will be a shock to the international system, especially if it is deemed successful in achieving the user’s objectives. The full range of near- and long-term consequences is impossible to predict, and will depend on the specific circumstances’ (The Future Nuclear Landscape: New Realities, New Responses, Center of the Study of WMD, National Defense University, 2006 Annual Symposium, Washington DC, 2006, p. 3). According to a very interesting collective volume – Kurt Campbell, Robert Einhorn and Mitchell Reiss (eds), Nuclear Tipping Point. Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2004 – ‘five key international and domestic factors that could lead to a reversal in a country’s nuclear posture are: (i) a change in the direction of U.S. foreign and security policy (ii) a

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breakdown of the global nonproliferation regime (iii) the erosion of regional or global security (iv) domestic imperatives, and (v) increasing availability of technology. Of course, no one single feature of the new strategic landscape may give one great pause; instead, the various ways multiple factors might accumulate and reinforce one another will account for many of the new dangers.’ As George Quester put it, ‘the rationality of decision processes in the Middle East has not been reassuring to the outside world’ (Quester, Nuclear First Strike, p. 7). Islamic extremism may be the chief disturbing factor in this context. Michael May argues that ‘while neither nuclear nor any other kind of deterrence is foolproof, or applies with equal effectiveness in all regions at all times, deterrence, especially nuclear deterrence, will continue to induce caution in nuclear-armed power projectors as they pursue rival goals’ (Michael May, Rivalries Between Nuclear Power Projectors: Why the Lines Will Be Drawn Again, Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, May 1996, p. 39). Quester observes that if a ‘war breaks out between two opposing nuclear powers, such as today’s India and Pakistan, or between some other nuclear dyad of the future, this might be the result of a brinkmanship in which neither side backed down, bluffs got called, and the worst that was threatened became an awful reality’ (Quester, Nuclear First Strike, p. 5). He also presents a number of nuclear escalation scenarios (pp. 24–25). Janne Nolan and Albert Wheelon, ‘Ballistic Missiles in the Third World’, in New Threats, an Aspen Strategy Group Report, University Press of America, Lanham, MD, 1990, p. 118; Martin Navias, ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Middle East’, Survival, May/June 1989, p. 4. Navias, ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Middle East’, p. 7. Thomas Mahnken, pp. 195–196. Nolan argues that in ‘most instances, Third World weapon development – especially of complicated and expensive systems like ballistic missiles – is not impelled by traditional criteria of military and economic efficiency . . . . Some states have found themselves condemned to expending scarce resources not only to reinvent the wheel, but to do so with less effectiveness and at a higher cost’ (Janne Nolan, ‘Ballistic Missiles in the Third World – The Limits of Nonproliferation’, Arms Control Today, November 1989, p. 10). Janne Nolan, Trappings of Power, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 1984, p. 5. ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Middle East’, p. 10. Janne Nolan, ‘Ballistic Missiles in the Third World The Limits of Nonproliferation’, Arms Control Today, November 1989, p. 11. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, May 1990, p. 11. Andrei Shumikhin, ‘Preventing the Proliferation of Chemical Weapons and Ballistic Missiles in the Middle East’, conference organized by Institute for East–West Studies, Wiston House, 7–9 February 1990, p. 7. Mark Heller, ‘Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons in the Middle East’, conference organized by Institute for East–West Studies, Wiston House, 7–9 February 1990, p. 3. Nolan andWheelon, ‘Third World Ballistic Missiles’, p. 34. Transfers of missiles within the region are far less important. The only major transfer took place during the Iran–Iraq War, when Syria and Libya supplied Iran with SCUD-Bs from their own stocks (A. J. Miller, ‘Towards Armageddon: The Proliferation of Unconventional Weapons and Ballistic Missiles in the Middle East’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 1990, p. 398). Miller, ‘Towards Armageddon’, p. 397. According to Martin Navias, since the technological, economic and political complexities involved in developing missile systems are enormous, Third World programmes are almost never entirely indigenous (Navias, ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Middle East’, p. 7).

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91 The client state modifies missiles to achieve capabilities that the original suppliers would not have countenanced. Next it produces copies of the improved version. Then it designs new missiles from scratch, seeking export markets to defray some of the expense. The emergence of such Third World missile exporters has helped create a buyer’s market, in which a remarkable range of missile technology is available to anyone with cash (Nolan and Wheelon, ‘Third World Ballistic Missiles’, p. 37). 92 Navias, ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Middle East’, p. 16. 93 In order to strike at Tehran, Iraq doubled the range of its SCUD-Bs to about 600 km by lightening the warhead (with technical assistance from Western Europe and possibly East Germany). Space-launch vehicles can also be adapted to military purposes because they are much alike in their propulsion and guidance requirements. The US, USSR and France have provided such technology to India, Brazil, Argentina and Japan (Nolan and Wheelon, ‘Third World Ballistic Missiles’, p. 37). 94 By far the most generous of the external suppliers was the Soviet Union and its allies which, beginning in 1957, exported short-range rockets (the FROG-4, 5 and 7) and a short-range missile, the SCUD-B, in large numbers. Receivers of those missiles included Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, South Yemen and Syria (Kuwait also received the FROG-7). In 1983, Syria and Yemen also received the more advanced SS-21. The US offered the short-range LANCE to Israel in 1972. France assisted Israel with the development of the JERICHO in the 1960s. 95 Indeed, Western European firms were the leading suppliers of missile components and sub-systems for engines, fuel systems, guidance, fusing and heat-shielding, as well as overall missile design and manufacturing know-how. Without access to foreign technology, few developing countries could have sustained the rapid missile R and D programmes that took off in the mid-1980s (IISS, Strategic Survey 1988/1989, p. 20). 96 Indeed, the major exporters of missiles in the Middle East for the past few years have been China and North Korea. The former exported up to 70 CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia in March 1988. North Korea exported to Iran and Syria large numbers of domestically manufactured SCUD-Bs and of a modified version called SCUD-C. 97 Mark Smith, ‘Assessing Missile Proliferation’, in Gustav Lindstrom and Burkard Schmitt (eds), Fighting Proliferation – European Perspectives, Chaillot Papers, No. 66, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, December 2003, p. 19. 98 Nolan, ‘Ballistic Missiles in the Third World’, p. 10. 99 Nolan, ‘Ballistic Missiles in the Third World’, p. 11. 100 In the first months of 1988, Iraq fired an average of 3 SCUDs a day against Iran and the impact of Iraq’s missile and air strikes on Iran was far greater in 1988 than in previous years. Where the Iranians had previously been able to adapt to the relatively limited and short-lived Iraqi bombing efforts, the constant pounding of missiles interacted with a growing fear that Iraq might use chemical weapons, and, combined with war-weariness (after eight years of fighting), it had a major impact on Iranian morale. So did the rumours and reports that senior Iranian officials – including Khomeini – had left Tehran. According to some reports, nearly a million Iranians had fled Tehran by mid-March 1988 and several more had fled by late April (Anthony Cordesman and Abraham Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Volume Two: The Iran–Iraq Conflict, Westview, Boulder, CO, 1990, p. 500). 101 In the Yom Kippur war, in 1973, one SCUD-B missile and several FROG-7 rockets were launched by Egypt and Syria against military targets in Israel. SCUD-B missiles were widely used by the Afghan government against the Mujaheedin, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. 102 A US Government Accounting Office report estimated that only 9 per cent of the Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) interceptors actually hit their targets during the 1991 Gulf war (Dennis Gormley, ‘Missile Defence Myopia: Lessons from the

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Gulf War’, Survival, Vol. 45, No. 4, Winter 2003–2004, p. 63). The US Army would eventually revise its assessment, stating that it was highly confident that 25 per cent of Patriot–SCUD engagements resulted in warhead kills. However, as mentioned above, for only 9 per cent of the total did the Army actually have direct evidence of a kill, with the rest relying on radar tracking data that showed the Patriots simply came close enough to the SCUDs to potentially destroy them. While no assessment is very reliable, the available evidence does seem to support Theodore Postol’s contention that the ‘first wartime experience with tactical ballistic missile defence resulted in what may have been an almost total failure to intercept quite primitive attacking missiles’. Israel suggested after the war that the real success rate for the Patriots was somewhere between zero and 20 per cent (Cameron Brown, ‘Israel and the WMD Threat: Lessons for Europe’, MERIA Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3, September 2004, p. 9). Missile attacks against population centres seem to have a unique potential to undermine public morale or regime support among political elites. Iraqi attacks against Tehran during the War of the Cities demonstrates the former, while initial Iranian attacks against Baghdad (for which the Iraqis at first had no response) serves as an example of the latter (Timothy MacCarthy, ‘Criteria for Assessing Ballistic Missile Threats’, in Current Issues Concerning the Control of Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Ballistic Missile Defences in International Perspectives on Missile Proliferation and Defences, p. 14). Under optimal weather and delivery conditions, it takes about 21 tons of phosgene to achieve 50 per cent lethality over a one square km area, four tons of mustard gas, two tons of Tabun, 0.5 tons of Sarin and 0.25 tons of VK. Under most real-world conditions, far larger amounts are required, and the actual number of deaths would be far smaller (Cordesman and Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Volume Two: The Iran–Iraq Conflict, p. 505). Seth Carus, Ballistic Missiles in Modern Conflict, Praeger, New York, 1991, p. 35. If aircrafts are unable to penetrate enemy air space (example: Syria against Israel), then their cost curve rises sharply (owing to equipment and pilot losses) and their value as a counter-deterrent approaches zero. Barring some change in the relative effectiveness of Israeli air-defences and Syrian manned aircraft, missiles probably are the most cost-effective way for Syria to attain a penetration capability. However, missiles carrying conventional warheads would be of limited military utility for Syria. Although aircraft may be more efficient counter-force and counter-value weapons than missiles, Third World countries might still prefer to use missiles in attacks on enemy cities. Aircraft may be required for counter-military missions, while countercity targets are by nature less demanding from an accuracy standpoint (Navias, ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Middle East’, p. 39). Navias, ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Middle East’, p. 32. The properties that make ballistic missiles well suited to strike first increase the likelihood of pre-emptive strikes by the potential victims of a surprise attack. ‘The introduction of missiles’, argues Gerald Steinberg, ‘reduces critical decision making time to a few minutes. In a crisis, states that face the possibility of a missile attack involving chemical or biological, not to mention nuclear warheads will be strongly induced to launch a pre-emptive strike’ (Thies, ‘Proliferation and Critical Risk’, p. 52). Nolan, Trappings of Power, p. 85; Heller, ‘Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons in the Middle East’, p. 18. Heller, ‘Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons in the Middle East’, p. 15. Smith, ‘Assessing Missile Proliferation’, in Lindstrom and Schmitt, p. 11. Center for Policy Analysis and Planning, Conference on Nuclear Proliferation, Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 2003, p. 33; Smith, ‘Assessing Missile Proliferation’, in Lindstrom and Schmitt, p. 15; George Perkovich, Toward

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Notes Transatlantic Cooperation in Meeting the Iranian Nuclear Challenge, Proliferation Papers, IFRI, Paris, Winter 2005, p. 36. According to the IISS, ‘North Korea has long been the world’s leading exporter of missiles and related components and technology to a range of customers, including Egypt, Syria, Libya, the UAE, Yemen and Pakistan. Since the late 1990s, however, opportunities for additional sales may be declining. Some customers, such as Iran, have nearly achieved an independent production capability, reducing the need for North Korean assistance. Other customers, such as Egypt, Pakistan, Yemen, the UAE, Pakistan, and Libya have made political commitments to limit or end their missilerelated relationship with North Korea. Periodically, Pyongyang has also exercised some caution in making missile sales and the multinational Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) may impose greater constraints and obstacles to additional missile sales’ (North Korea’s Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment, An IISS Strategic Dossier, Press statement by Dr. John Chipman, 21 January 2004, p. 3). Ian Lesser, ‘WMD in the Middle East: Proliferation Dynamics and Strategic Consequences’, in Nora Bensahel and Daniel Byman (eds), The Future Security Environment in the Middle East, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2004, p. 288. Philip Gordon, ‘Bush, Missile Defence and the Atlantic Alliance’, Survival, Vol. 43, No. 1, Spring 2001, p. 19. David Gompert and Klaus Arnhold, Ballistic Missile Defence. A German-American Analysis, RAND-SWP, January 2001, p. 4. Clinton proposed a defensive system of 100 to 200 interceptors, based on American soil, to protect the US against limited ballistic threats. In September 2000, he deferred a deployment decision to his successor, partly because of the programme’s technical and operational difficulties (Bruno Tertrais, U.S. Missile Defence. Strategically Sound, Politically Questionable, Center for European Reform, London, April 2001, p. 4). Randall Forsberg, William Driscoll, Gregory Webb, Jonathan Dean, The NonProliferation Primer: Preventing the Spread of NBC Weapons, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1995, pp. 60–61. Dean Wilkening, Ballistic-Missile Defence and Strategic Stability, Adelphi Paper 334, IISS, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, pp. 10–11. Kori Schake, ‘NATO’s “Fundamental Divergence” over Proliferation’, in Ted Galen Carpenter (ed.), ‘NATO Enters the 21st Century’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3, September 2000, p. 113. Wilkening, Ballistic-Missile Defence and Strategic Stability, p. 11. According to the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies (IDDS), the first US nuclear warheads weighed 4,100–4,500 kg. The likely weight of a first warhead produced by a proliferating country has been variously estimated at 450–1,000 kg. The lower estimate was for the first effort of an advanced, industrialized country and the higher estimate for a developing country. The US and the USSR each needed six to eight years to reduce their warhead weights to 1000 kg. Existing North Korean ballistic missiles could carry a 500 kg nuclear warhead. ICBM-range derivatives of these missiles could carry only 200–300 kg. Thus, even assuming that North Korea’s first generation nuclear warhead is at the low end of the estimated range (450 kg), an ICBM derivative of the existing missiles could not lift the warhead (Ronald Siegel, The Missile Programs of North Korea, Iraq, and Iran, Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies (IDDS), Cambridge, MA, September 2001, p. 5). Gary Samore agrees that while it is ‘plausible that North Korea could build its first generation implosion design nuclear device, whether it is able to deploy weapons small and light enough to fit on its existing missiles is not known’ (Gary Samore, ‘Nuclear Proliferation After Iraq’, IISS Global Strategic Review, Leesburg, Virginia, 12–14 September 2003, p. 3). Ivo Daalder, James Goldgeier and James Lindsay, ‘Deploying MD: Not Whether, But How’, Survival, Vol. 42, No. 1, Spring 2000, p. 6.

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125 For example, Anthony Cordesman argued that the ‘U.S. has other ways to deter missile attacks on the American homeland, and it has the time to make wise decisions and do the job right’ (Anthony Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East. Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options and Weapons Effects, CSIS, Washington DC, July 2001, p. 179). 126 Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter, ‘National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy’, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1, Summer 2001, p. 45. 127 Wilkening, Ballistic-Missile Defence and Strategic Stability, p. 12. It is also theoretically possible that a small number of Russian or Chinese missiles might be launched at the US accidentally or without authorization. 128 Aaron Carp argued that in the short-run – the next 10–15 years – while the threat is limited to conventional explosive – and CBW – armed ballistic missiles, the effect of missile defences may be most pronounced. Once fairly reliable defensive systems are in the hands of Israel, US forces in the region and their allies, they will dramatically reduce the credibility of threats to attack (Aaron Carp, The Middle East in Strategic Transition: From Offense to Defense Dominance? Missile Proliferation and Defences: Problems and Prospects, Center for Nonproliferation Studies and Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, Occasional Paper No. 7, Monterey, CA, 2001, p. 84). 129 Robert Powell, ‘Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense’, International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4, Spring 2003, p. 86. 130 French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine, for example, argued that it is ‘not very serious’ to claim that states like North Korea, Iran, Iraq or Libya could threaten a nuclear superpower like the US, and called their threats ‘microscopic – or theoretical’. The British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee has also argued that the Americans’ focus on capability rather than intention ‘makes the threat which missile defence is intended to counter less credible’ (Gordon, ‘Bush, Missile Defence and the Atlantic Alliance’, p. 23). 131 Wilkening, Ballistic-Missile Defence and Strategic Stability, p. 13. Hyping the threat, and basing all analysis on worst-case assumptions about what could happen rather than what is most likely to happen, has its costs – not least to encourage the very same countries to believe an improvement in political relations with Washington is not possible (Ivo Daalder, Missile Defense: The Case for a Limited Insurance Defense, Paper prepared for the CEPS/IISS European Security Forum Meeting, Brussels, 2 April 2001, p. 3). 132 The infra-red signature of a missile plume can be detected by US early-warning satellites, pinpointing the launch site. Radar data can also be used to trace the missiles’ paths back to their launch points. Thus, even if the US has no way to defend against incoming ballistic missiles, it will still know with complete certainty from whose territory they were fired, and thus precisely whom to retaliate against (Richard Falkenrath, Robert Newman and Bradley Thayer, America’s Achilles Heel. NBC Terrorism and Covert Attack, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998, p. 244). 133 The question is whether the insurance is worth the cost. The cost effectiveness of missile defences against such hypothetical (accidental or unauthorized) attacks is virtually impossible to determine. Moreover, there are other, cheaper approaches, such as de-targeting missiles, reducing their alert rate and fitting them with command-destruct packages (although such measures may introduce other vulnerabilities) (Wilkening, Ballistic-Missile Defence and Strategic Stability, pp. 11–14). 134 Joseph Cirincione and Frank von Hippel (eds), The Last 15 Minutes. Ballistic Missile Defense in Perspective, Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, Washington DC, 1998, p. 7. 135 As Bruno Tertais put it, ‘Missile defence is about how the U.S. can counter the emerging missile threat and maintain its freedom of action’ (Tertrais, U.S. Missile Defence, p. 9). Robert Pfaltzgraff was also quite clear on this point: ‘Unless missile threats can

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Notes be countered, the stakes of regional crises are unlikely in most cases to be judged by U.S. and other Western leaders to be worth the risks involved in power projection. This would reduce the West’s capacity for regional deterrence, because it will have the effect of undermining both the capability and the will of the U.S. and its allies to project power in response to regional aggression’ (Robert Pfaltzgraff Jr. (ed.), Security Strategy and Missile Defense, IFPA, Brassey’s, Virginia, McLean, 1995, p. 23). Indeed, although the Bush administration’s objective is to provide a layered defence of the entire US homeland, its overseas forces, friends and allies, the ‘initial defensive capability’ slated for early deployment cobbles together a still maturing GroundBased Midcourse Defence (GMD) segment, sea-based Aegis defences, and the necessary tracking and command, control and communications components to offer what Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld called a ‘better than nothing’ shield against a limited number of enemy ballistic missiles (‘U.S. ballistic missile defences. Initial rollout’, Strategic Comments, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2004, p. 1). Daalder, Missile Defenses, p. 4. Robert Manning, ‘The Ultimate Weapon Redux? U.S. Nuclear Policy in a New Era’, in Burkard Schmitt (ed.), Nuclear Weapons: A Great Debate, Chaillot Papers No. 48, EU-ISS, Paris, July 2001, p. 80. As Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State, put it to the international audience at the 2001 Munich Conference for Security Policy, ‘No American president can neglect an alternative to using nuclear weapons against a small nation poised to launch a ballistic missile at the U.S.’ (Martin Aguera, ESDP and Missile Defense, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, December 2001, p. 10). McDonough agrees that one should not underestimate America’s long-standing desire to reduce its societal vulnerability to a nuclear attack and, thereby, to escape the seductive logic of MAD. He adds, however, that nor should one ignore the growing American consensus on a primacist grand strategy, which this administration – far more than any of its predecessors – appears to have embraced (David McDonough, Nuclear Superiority. The ‘New Triad’ and the Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Adelphi Paper 383, IISS, 2006, p. 87). Manning, ‘The Ultimate Weapon Redux?’, in Burkard Schmitt (ed.), Nuclear Weapons, p. 75. Victor Utgoff, ‘Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions’, Survival, Vol. 44, No. 2, Summer 2002, pp. 98–99. Daalder also argues that the ‘main reason why these countries seek to acquire long-range missiles capable of threatening the U.S. is to deter American intervention in their region. As one advocate put it, missile defense is about preserving America’s ability to wield power abroad. It’s not about defense. It’s about offense’ (Daalder, Missile Defenses, p. 5). Missile Defense, Deterrence and Arms Control: Contradictory Aims or Compatible Goals?, UNIDIR-Wilton Park, United Nations, Geneva, 2004, pp. 3–4. Although he agrees with the argument that without missile defence the US might be deterred from confronting a hostile state with WMD and ballistic missiles, thus allowing that state to hold it hostage as it threatened its neighbours or other vital Western interests, Philip Gordon questions the use of missile defence to the US if it left Paris, London, Rome and Berlin – to say nothing of thousands of Americans on Ramstein, Aviano or Incirlik air bases – vulnerable to a WMD threat. He argues that ‘if it is deployed at all, missile defence should offer, as far as possible, protection to the alliance as a whole’ (Gordon, ‘Bush, Missile Defence and the Atlantic Alliance’, p. 30). David Gompert and Klaus Arnhold, Ballistic Missile Defence. A German-American Analysis, RAND-SWP, Santa Monica, CA, January 2001, p. 9. Belen Lara, ATBM Systems and European Security, UNISCI Papers No 6. Madrid, 1997, p. 76. Pfaltzgraff, Security Strategy and Missile Defense, p. 110. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, p. 21.

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146 John Simpson, ‘Current Issues Concerning the Control of Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Ballistic Missile Defences’, in International Perspectives on Missile Proliferation and Defences, Center for NonProliferation Studies and Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, Monterey, CA, March 2001, p. 4. 147 Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, Office of Technology Assessment, December 1993, p. 235. In the rather unlikely case that countries other than Russia and China develop ICBM capabilities by 2010, they are unlikely to deploy more than a few liquid-fuel missiles based at relatively vulnerable fixed sites (Wilkening, Ballistic-Missile Defence and Strategic Stability, pp. 11–14). 148 Bruno Tertrais asked characteristically: ‘Can one really imagine the circumstances in which a regional power would be willing to take the risk of threatening a missile strike on the territory of the strongest military power in the world?’ (Tertrais, U.S. Missile Defence, p. 9). 149 It is beyond the scope of this paper to offer a technical assessment of missile defence. 150 As Glaser and Fetter observe, ‘smuggled nuclear weapons would not have to meet the stringent size and mass requirements imposed by missile delivery; . . . and unlike ICBMs, which carry an unmistakable return address, the U.S. might be unable to determine the identity of an attacker. However, although alternative means of delivery are cheap and potentially quite effective, their military-operational characteristics are very different from those of ICBMs. Intercontinental missiles reside on national territory, under the firm control of political and military leaders, until the moment of use. Roguestate leaders might be extremely reluctant to relax their control over such valuable and destructive weapons. In addition, ICBMs are visible symbols of a country’s military power. Their main purpose, in the eyes of a rogue-state leader, may be to acquire prestige, or to deter or coerce great powers’ (Glaser and Fetter, ‘National Missile Defense’, pp. 55–56). The US Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, has pointed out that missiles ‘work without being fired’, since they ‘alter behaviour’ (Tertrais, U.S. Missile Defence, p. 10). Similarly, Bruno Tertrais argues that the ‘sheer existence of ballistic missiles obliges the other party to factor them into the management of the crisis. Terrorism does not have any political impact when there is no threat of a terrorist action. By contrast, ballistic missiles allow for “existential coercion” ’ (Tertrais, U.S. Missile Defence, p. 11). 151 Despite some modest efforts after 11 September 2001, America still has virtually no means of detecting threats that manage to fly under 3000 feet (‘US ballistic missile defences. Initial rollout’, Strategic Comments, IISS, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2004, p. 5). 152 A Consensus on Missile Defence?, pp. 64–65. 153 Smith, ‘Assessing Missile Proliferation’, in Lindstrom and Schmitt, p. 29. 154 Steven Miller, ‘The Flawed Case for Missile Defence’, Survival, Vol. 43, No. 3, Autumn 2001, p. 100; James Clay Moltz, ‘Forecasting the Strategic-Military Implications of MD Deployment’, in Current Issues Concerning the Control of Ballistic Missile Proliferation, p. 33. 155 Tertrais, U.S. Missile Defence, p. 22. 156 Miller, ‘The Flawed Case for Missile Defence’, pp. 97–98. 157 It has been argued that the end of the Cold War provided an enormous shock for American military leaders as every programme in the defence budget came under intense scrutiny. Unless a new rationale for these programmes could be found, the Pentagon would soon encounter great difficulty in securing the funds needed to preserve them (Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws, pp. 6–7). 158 Daalder, Goldgeier and Lindsay, ‘Deploying NMD: Not Whether, But How’, p. 7. 159 Wilkening, Ballistic-Missile Defence and Strategic Stability, p. 6. 160 Glaser and Fetter, ‘National Missile Defense’, p. 40. 161 Utgoff, ‘Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions’, p. 99. 162 Ian Kenyon, Mike Rance, John Simpson and Mark Smith, Prospects for a European Ballistic Missile Defence System, Southampton Papers in International Policy, No. 4, Southampton, 2001, p. 1.

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163 Glaser and Fetter, ‘National Missile Defense’, p. 40; Kori Urayama, ‘China Debates Missile Defence’, Survival, Vol. 46, No. 2, Summer 2004, p. 127. 164 As Urayama points out, there are several pertinent questions regarding missile defence and China. For example, ‘is missile defence fundamentally destabilizing for East Asia, or is it nothing more than a modern Maginot line – an expensive grandiose project that can never achieve its objectives? At this point, they seem to have acquiesced in the U.S. suggestion that missile defence deployment need not be destabilizing’ (Urayama, ‘China Debates Missile Defence’, p. 137). 165 It appears that the pace of increase of China’s arsenal of ICBMs capable of striking the US will depend to a significant extent on how the Chinese leadership judges the effectiveness of missile defence (Urayama, ‘China Debates Missile Defence’, p. 132). 166 It should be noted that China does not distinguish between missile defence and theatre missile defence (TMD). This view stems from the fact that a TMD deployed in either Taiwan or Japan would present China with strategic implications (Missile Defense, Deterrence and Arms Control, UNIDIR and Wilton Park, United Nations, Geneva, 2002, p. 21). 167 James Lindsay and Michael O’ Hanlon, Defending America. The Case for Limited Missile Defense, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2001, p. 129. 168 Strategic Survey 2000–2001, IISS, London, May 2001, p. 19; Ivo Daalder, James Goldgeier and James Lindsay, ‘Deploying NMD: Not Whether, But How’, p. 23. 169 Wilkening, Ballistic Missile Defence and Strategic Stability, p. 6. Lindsay and O’Hanlon put forward three criteria that ‘should govern the choice of a specific missile defense architecture. First, force planning should be based on what we can reasonably expect technology to accomplish during the next decade, not what we hope it might achieve decades from now. Second, the U.S. needs a missile defense robust enough to defend against attacks from new ballistic missile states, but not as robust as to provoke Russia and China into taking actions that undercut the broader causes of nuclear security and nonproliferation. Third, any missile defense must also be an alliance missile defense’ (Lindsay and O’ Hanlon, Defending America, p. 145). According to Richard Sokolsky, ‘If such a system is ever to be constructed, the U.S. will have to be prepared to develop a design that is flexible and adaptable, allowing allies to plug into it in varying ways, depending on the evolution of threat perceptions, advances in both theatre and national missile defence technologies, and changes in domestic political and economic circumstances’ (Richard Sokolsky, ‘Imagining European Missile Defence’, Survival, Vol. 43, No. 3, Autumn 2001, p. 112). 170 Stivachtis, ‘The International System and the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, in Herring, ‘Preventing the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, p. 128. 171 See, for example, James Clay Moltz (ed.), Future Security in Space: Commercial, Military and Arms Control Trade-Offs, Center for NonProliferation StudiesMountbatten Centre for International Studies, Monterey/Southampton, July 2002. Claus Becher rightly points out that ‘while boost-phase and mid-course missile defence from space may look like a technologically attractive option in the long-term for the U.S., its pursuit would open the gates to a broad militarisation of space that could only result in much increased vulnerability for all nations. The post-ABM regime should include a ban on developing, testing and deploying space-based intercept devices, as a step toward banning all other weapons in full or partial orbit’ (Klaus Becher, Missile Defence: European Approaches and Interests, Paper prepared for the CEPS/IISS European Security Forum Meeting, Brussels, 2 April 2001, p. 6). 172 Missile Defense, Deterrence and Arms Control, UNIDIR-Wilton Park, p. 3. 4 WMD terrorism 1 The Tokyo attacks killed 12 people, injured 5,510 and greatly stressed the Japanese health-care system. (Peter Katona, ‘Historical Impact of Terrorism, Epidemics and

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WMD’, in Peter Catona, Michael Intriligator and John Sullivan (eds), Countering Terrorism and WMD, Routledge, London, 2006, p. 28). Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole, The New Face of Terrorism. Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction, I. B. Tauris Publishers, London, 2002, p. 263. Anat Kurz, ‘Non-Conventional Terrorism: Availability and Motivation’, Strategic Assessment, Vol. 7, No. 4, March 2005, p. 30; The chance of an attack with a WMD somewhere in the world in the next 10 years runs as high as 70 per cent, arms experts have predicted in a US survey (CNN International, 21 June 2005). According to Reuven Paz, ‘the new phase of Islamist terrorism is actually a move from internal terrorism in their own countries to terrorism in the global arena against secular “heretic” regimes. Two separate events triggered this phase. One was the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York. The second was the participation of Islamist volunteers/warriors in the wars in Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Kashmir and Daghestan throughout the 1990s. These two lines joined forces in the second half of the 1990s with the establishment in Afghanistan of what seems to be an international or inter-Muslim front. But this front was also the result of the oppression of these groups by various Arab regimes’ (Reuven Paz, ‘America and the New Terrorism: An Exchange’, Survival, Vol. 42, No. 2, Summer 2000, p. 168; Brian Jenkins, ‘Will Terrorists Go Nuclear: A Reappraisal’, in Harvey Kushner (ed.), The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium, Sage Publications, London, 1998, p. 243). Even before 9/11, it was argued that ‘terrorism will appeal to many weak states as an attractive option to blunt the influence of major power . . . [but] there will be a greater incidence of ad hoc cells and individuals, often moved by religious zeal, seemingly irrational cultist beliefs, or seething resentment . . . . The growing resentment against Western culture and values . . . is breeding a backlash . . . . Therefore, the US should assume that it will be a target of terrorist attacks against its homeland using WMD’ (US Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, 1999, p. 48). ‘Super-terrorism’ or ‘catastrophic terrorism’ can be defined as the use of WMD to bring about a major disaster with a death toll reaching tens to hundreds of thousands or more. (Ehud Sprinzak and Idith Zertal, ‘Avenging Israel’s Blood’, in Jonathan Tucker (ed.), Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000, p. 39). The following definition of ‘hyper-terrorism’ is provided by Sebestyen Gorka: ‘political violence that is more interested in extent of damage caused than in simply the inculcation of fear’ (Sebestyen Gorka, The Death of National Security, mimeo, May 2004, p. 3). The collapse of the Soviet Union, the impoverishment of its once mighty scientific establishment, economic instability, widespread corruption, and the growth of organized crime in Russia have fuelled fears that its vast nuclear – some 600 to 650 tons of fissile material scattered among 300 buildings at more than 50 nuclear facilities – (or CBW) arsenal may become accessible through theft or diversion to state or non-state actors (Jenkins, in Kushner (ed.), The Future of Terrorism, p. 235; also, Rensselaer Lee, ‘Nuclear Smuggling: Patterns and Responses’, Parameters, Spring 2003, p. 95). There still is a problem of lax security in Russian nuclear installations (Ian Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, Michelle Zanini, Countering the New Terrorism, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1999, p. 38; Anna Pluta and Peter Zimmerman, ‘Nuclear Terrorism: A Disheartening Dissent’, Survival, Vol. 48, No. 2, Summer 2006, p. 58). The problem of insecure nuclear material is not only confined to the former Soviet Union. Globally, there are about 250 tons of military plutonium and about 1,700 tons of military HEU. Civil stocks have to be added to this (Alexander Kelle and Annette Schaper, Terrorism Using Biological and Nuclear Weapons. A Critical Analysis of Risks After 11 September 2001, PRIF Report No. 64, Frankfurt, 2002, pp. 22–23). John Deutch, Director of CIA, said that ‘We are concerned that terrorists will push this trend to its most awful extreme by employing weapons of mass destruction’

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Notes (Joseph Pilat, ‘Prospects for NBC Terrorism After Tokyo’, in Brad Roberts (ed.), Terrorism With Chemical and Biological Weapons, The Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, Alexandria, VA, 1997, pp. 1 and 6). The hatred that drove the 9/11 attackers, and the spread of technologies needed to build WMD, indicated a real and imminent threat of catastrophic attack (IISS Strategic Survey 2002/2003, p. 7). One week after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to the offices of NBC News, the New York Post, and the publisher of the National Enquirer. Contaminated letters were subsequently sent to, among others, then Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) and Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT). By the end of the year, anthrax-contaminated letters had infected 18 people, 5 of whom died. Although the anthrax attacks resulted in relatively few casualties, there was widespread public concern. Some 10,000 people, actually or potentially exposed to virulent anthrax spores, were prescribed prophylactic antibiotics with unknown longterm effects on their health or the health of the public at large (Jessica Stern, ‘Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons’, International Security, 27: 3, Winter 2002/2003, p. 89). As Alexander Kelle points out, the ‘loner theory’, working on the assumption that a ‘lone, Western individual who has scientific expertize and access to anthrax samples and a well-equipped laboratory’ is behind the anthrax attacks seems to have been the most influential approach in the FBI-led anthrax investigation since the end of 2001 (Kelle and Schaper, Terrorism Using Biological and Nuclear Weapons, p. 9). The head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Y. Primakov, declared in 1993 that ‘A great possibility . . . exists of CBW use for terrorist purposes’ (Ron Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism. The Threat According to the Open Literature, June 1995, p. 126). The term ‘non-state actors’ includes the traditional terrorist organizations; paramilitary guerrilla groups fighting for the control of territory; cults and other religious organizations; militias or other geographically fixed paramilitary groups; organized crime syndicates; mercenary groups; breakaway units of a state’s military, intelligence, or security services; corrupt multinational corporations; and lone individuals (Richard Falkenrath, Robert Newman and Bradley Thayer, America’s Achilles Heel. NBC Terrorism and Covert Attack, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998, p. 29). It may also include familiar adversaries who are modifying their structures and strategies to take advantage of networked designs, such as transnational terrorist groups, blackmarket proliferators of WMD, transnational crime syndicates, fundamentalist and ethno-nationalist movements, intellectual property and high-seas pirates, and smugglers of black-market goods or migrants (Lesser et al., Countering the New Terrorism, p. 48). Robin Frost, Nuclear Terrorism After 9/11, Adelphi Paper 378, IISS, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, pp. 25–26. Pluta and Zimmerman argue that large private groups such as Aum Shinrikyo or al-Qaeda in its present incarnation probably do have the resources needed to finance the necessary acquisition of nuclear material and the construction of a weapon (Pluta and Zimmerman, ‘Nuclear Terrorism’, pp. 62 and 66). Graham Allison argues that the ‘sustained financial and political commitment of North Korea and Pakistan illustrates the difficulty involved in enriching uranium and reprocessing plutonium. While they are within the reach of states, especially those left unhindered by the international community, the technology, industrial base, and costs required for producing fissile material present an almost insurmountable obstacle for terrorist organizations without state sanctuary and support. In the post-9/11 world, buying fissile material in the black market is a more attractive option’ (Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism. The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, Times Books, New York, 2004, p. 102). Kelle and Schaper, Terrorism Using Biological and Nuclear Weapons, p. 18.

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17 Lesser et al., Countering the New Terrorism, p. 30. 18 It has been argued that ‘a trained clandestine adversary has virtually at his fingertips, at almost any university library, all the information he would need to synthesize toxic chemical agents from raw materials or intermediates’ (Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism, p. 66). 19 Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism, p. 97; According to the US Defense Department and other sources (Carnegie Endowment, SIPRI, etc.), there are probably over two dozen states or non-state groups that either have some capability of, or have an interest in acquiring, CW. Existing stores of nerve gas also exist. According to a 2003 GAO report, ‘it may be 40 years before Russia’s nerve agent stockpile can be destroyed. Despite improvements, two-thirds of Russia’s stockpile remains vulnerable to theft’ (Gustav Lindstrom, Protecting the European Homeland: the CBR Dimension, Chaillot Papers, No. 69, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, July 2004, pp. 11 and 21). 20 Building a sophisticated G-agent production facility might cost between $30 and $50 million. A facility without the waste-handling capacity would lower the price tag to around $20 million (Lindstrom, in Lindstrom and Schmitt, Fighting Proliferation, pp. 19 and 21). While nerve agents are frequently portrayed as the greatest threat, the likelihood of their effective usage is limited. The resources and costs associated with a production facility make it very difficult for a non-state actor to pursue the production of agents such as sarin and soman (Lindstrom, Protecting the European Homeland, p. 23). 21 Pilat, in Roberts, Terrorism With Chemical and Biological Weapons, p. 10; It has been argued that terrorists do not even have to provide the materials for simple chemical attacks. The 1984 chemical plant disaster in Bhopal, India, killed more people than 9/11 and left more with serious long-term injuries. While Bhopal was an accident, it presents a precedent for a devastating chemical attack. The existence of chemical plants and the movement of toxic industrial chemicals needed to support the American lifestyle ensure the raw material for a chemical attack is always present (Thomas Hammes, ‘Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation’, Strategic Forum No. 214, January 2005, p. 6). 22 Lord Lyell, Chemical and Biological Weapons: the Poor Man’s Bomb, Science and Technology Committee, North Atlantic Assembly, Brussels, November 1996, p. 5. 23 A germ attack would be, according to President Clinton, ‘the gift that keeps on giving’, if not quickly identified and properly treated (Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg and William Broad, Germs. Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2001, p. 247). 24 Lindstrom, Protecting the European Homeland, p. 31. 25 This is true for non-contagious pathogens like Bacillus anthracis, the organism that causes anthrax, and even more so for pathogens causing contagious diseases, like, for example, Variola major, the virus that causes smallpox (Kelle and Schaper, Terrorism Using Biological and Nuclear Weapons, p. 3). 26 Aum’s failures were instructive: they showed that making a biological weapon was harder than some experts had claimed. Experts frequently suggested that anyone who had studied science in college could make a biological bomb. Aum had invested lavishly in laboratory gear, had even dreamed of doing recombinant experiments. The group’s scientists had taken graduate courses in modern universities. Yet they couldn’t master the engineering challenges of producing a terror weapon from pathogens (Miller, Engelberg and Broad, Germs, p. 192). 27 As Kelle and Schaper point out, the ‘1995 Aum Shinrikyo attack with the nerve agent sarin was not imitated immediately, as was feared. Traditional terrorist organizations remained true to their traditional means and procedures and movements believing that the end of the world is near, like the Aum Shinrikyo sect, apparently did not consider the Aum an example worth imitating. In fact, it took over six years until a terror group

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Notes or individual distributed pathogens as BW in a “successful” way, in October 2001’ (Kelle and Schaper, Terrorism Using Biological and Nuclear Weapons, p. 6). This assessment, however, begs the question whether al-Qaeda is a ‘ “traditional” ’ terrorist group. The use of anthrax in the US in September 2001 leads to the question of whether a paradigm change has occurred in the strategies and methods of terrorists, with BW becoming a standard tool in the terrorist’s repertoire (Kelle and Schaper, Terrorism Using Biological and Nuclear Weapons, p. I). This method of attack was not, however, imitated by another group aftersince 2001. Kelle and Schaper, Terrorism Using Biological and Nuclear Weapons, p. 4. Tucker (ed.), Toxic Terror, p. 7. Tucker, Toxic Terror, p. 8; According to Jessica Stern, ‘ideal conditions are unlikely to prevail in the field, making the actual results of a BW attack uncertain. The movement of aerosols, the virulence of microorganisms, and the susceptibility of victims all depend on exogenous variables, some of which the perpetrator will be unable to influence and most of which government analysts will be unable to predict. Warfare agents are killed by strong sunlight. Contagious viruses can mutate to become harmless, but they can also mutate to become more contagious and more lethal. Bacteria can be made – or may become – antibiotic resistant over time’ (Jessica Stern, ‘Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons’, International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3, Winter 2002/2003, p. 101). John Parachini, ‘Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4, Autumn 2003, p. 45; Lindstrom, in Lindstrom and Schmitt, Fighting Proliferation, p. 13. Jonathan Spyer, ‘The al-Qaeda Network and Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 8, No. 3, September 2004, p. 14. Lindstrom, Protecting the European Homeland, p. 12. Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism, p. 111; Katona also reports that, since 1968, threats of actual use of CBW account for only 52 cases out of more than 8,000 in the RAND Chronology of International Terrorism (Katona, ‘Historical Impact of Terrorism’, p. 30). David Rapoport, ‘Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse’, in Henry Sokolski and James Ludes (eds), Twenty-First Century Proliferation, Frank Cass, London 2001, p. 25. Lindstrom, Protecting the European Homeland, p. 11; The Monterey Institute’s Database of NBC terrorist incidents identifies 282 cases, but only 26 per cent of them involved the actual use of a weapon. (Gurr and Cole, The New Face of Terrorism, p. 32). A senior-level war game in June 2001, called ‘Dark Winter’, looked at the national security, intergovernmental, and information challenges of a biological attack on the US homeland. One conclusion of the war game, hosted by the CSIS, the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies, the ANSER Institute for Homeland Security, and the Oklahoma National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, was: Within three months of a biological attack on Oklahoma City using smallpox, over 3 million could be infected, and over a million would be killed. Moreover, the study concluded ‘an attack on the US with biological weapons could threaten vital national security interests. Massive civilian casualties, breakdown in essential institutions, violation of democratic processes, civil disorder, loss of confidence in government and reduced US strategic flexibility abroad are among the ways ao biological attack might compromise US security’ (Jack Spencer and Michael Scardaville, Understanding the Bioterrorist Threat: Facts and Figures, The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1488, 11 October 2001, p. 13; See also, Lindstrom, Protecting the European Homeland, p. 28). IISS Strategic Survey 2001/2002, p. 51. As Gustav Lindstrom points out, ‘with globalization and modern transportation, the impact of a CBR attack is likely to be

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felt across borders. Within the EU, open borders among member states connected by high-speed railways, low-cost airlines and modern roads greatly enhance the crossborder spread of such agents – especially biological agents that may take time before manifesting their symptoms. Among neighboring countries, the effects of a chemical or radiological attack may rapidly cross borders depending on meteorological conditions.’ Furthermore, ‘it is widely accepted that a few hundred, or at most, a thousand CBR victims would overwhelm any nation’s existing civilian capacity’ (Lindstrom, Protecting the European Homeland, pp. 14 and 57). Charles Ferguson and William Potter (with Amy Sands, Leonard Spector and Fred Wehling), The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, Monterey Institute, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2004, p. 3); Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, Lexington, 1987, pp. 12–13. Developing an IND represents the most challenging type of nuclear terrorism. An attack involving IND requires extensive financial and technological resources, in addition to a secure facility in which to develop and construct the weapon (Ferguson and Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, p. 35). A widely discussed scenario involves a passenger plane, with full fuel tanks, being crashed into a nuclear power station. However, the terrorists would have to be capable of hitting the shield vertically, in a nosedive, and not just scrape it against it from the side. This is far more difficult than directing a plane into a high building (Kelle and Schaper, Terrorism Using Biological and Nuclear Weapons, p. II). Attacks on nuclear reactors constitute a much more serious threat. Several observers have pointed out that security at most North American commercial plants is poor and that the NRC’s design-basis threats do not cover several plausible terrorist attack scenarios, such as the use of shoulder-launched missiles. Security at spent-fuel storage pools, which contain highly radioactive materials, is even worse (Robin Frost, ‘Nuclear Terrorism Post-9/11: Assessing the Risks’, Global Society, Vol. 18, No. 4, October 2004, p. 421). Frost came up with a longer, more analytical list of possible actions, including: • • • • • • •

theft or sabotage of nuclear materials for demonstration purposes; attack on a nuclear reactor or other facility to spread alarm; capture of a nuclear reactor for blackmail; environmental contamination – of a city water supply, for example – with radioactive material; sabotage of a reactor, storage dump, or other nuclear facility short of meltdown; a credible, widely publicized nuclear threat that proves to be a hoax; detonation of a low-yield home-made fission device or ‘fizzle bomb’. (Frost, ‘Nuclear Terrorism Post-9/11’, p. 399; Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, p. 102)

45 Additionally, many smaller sources are vulnerable to loss or theft (Peter Zimmerman and Cheryl Loeb, ‘Dirty Bombs: The Threat Revisited’, Defense Horizons, No. 38, January 2004, p. 5). The Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) describes the very large number of ‘orphaned’ – ‘lost to institutional control’ – medical, industrial and research radiation sources around the world, including the US and Western Europe (Frost, ‘Nuclear Terrorism Post-9/11’, p. 408). According to the IAEA’s Illicit Trafficking Database, there were 540 confirmed incidents involving illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials between 1 January 1993 and 31 December 2003 (Lindstrom, Protecting the European Homeland, p. 37). According to the Institute for Science and International Security, there are 1.27 million pounds of HEU and 200,000 pounds of plutonium stored in America’s nuclear complexes (Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, p. 84). Finding radiological materials is not impossible. According to the IAEA, ‘the radioactive materials needed to build a “dirty bomb” can be found on almost any country in the world, and more than 100 countries may have inadequate

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Notes control and monitoring programmes necessary to prevent or even detect the theft of these materials.’ The IAEA estimates that there are over 10,000 medical radiotherapy units in use worldwide; approximately 12,000 industrial sources for radiography supplied annually (Lindstrom, Protecting the European Homeland, pp. 33–34). Today, there are more than 200 addresses around the world from which terrorists could acquire a nuclear weapon or the fissile material from which one could be made (Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, p. 67). According to Allison, ‘every day, 30,000 trucks, 6,500 rail cars, and 140 ships deliver more than 50,000 cargo containers with more than 500,000 items from around the globe. Approximately 21,000 pounds of cocaine and marijuana are smuggled into the country each day in bales, crates, car trunks – even FedEx boxes. Any one of these containers could hold something far more deadly’ (Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, p. 107). Lindstrom, Protecting the European Homeland, p. 35. While the physical effects of an attack using conventional weapons are immediate, the effects of a radiological attack could be felt for years. For example, the radioactive material caesium-137 has a half-life of 30 years (Lindstrom, Protecting the European Homeland, p. 35). Even after clean-up has been accomplished, there will likely be residual public fear of the site. Tourist traffic will likely never resume, and commerce will be handicapped. If any agricultural area is involved, the farmers may find it difficult to market their produce. Zimmerman and Loeb, ‘Dirty Bombs: The Threat Revisited’, p. 1. The most severe tangible impacts of a RDD would likely be the economic costs and social disruption associated with the evacuation and subsequent clean-up of contaminated property (Frost, ‘Nuclear Terrorism Post-9/11’, p. 413). There is not yet any technical solution other than razing structures and carting them away. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, p. 8. In 1997, Boris Yeltsin’s assistant for national security affairs, General Alexander Lebed, acknowledged that 84 of some 132 special KGB ‘suitcase’ nuclear weapons were not accounted for in Russia (Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, pp. 10 and 90). However, according to Russian expert Nikolai Sokov, ‘without scheduled maintenance, these devices apparently can produce only minimal yield and eventually possibly no yield at all, and can only serve as a source of small amounts of weaponsgrade fissile materials’ (Robin Frost, Nuclear Terrorism After 9/11, Adelphi Paper 378, IISS, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p. 21). Although little is known about Pakistani national security measures, it appears that nuclear weapons are not protected against accidental detonation nor equipped with PALs. The Taliban and radical terrorists are met with sympathy by parts of the population and even the security forces. It is unknown whether religious fanatics could get access to nuclear material and could pass it on to terrorists (Kelle and Schaper, Terrorism Using Biological and Nuclear Weapons, pp. 26–27). Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, p. 92. State-sponsored nuclear terrorism has been a serious concern. According to this scenario, a state provides terrorists with a nuclear weapon that they can use, or threaten to use, against an opposing state, allowing the patron to thereby avoid direct responsibility and the risk of retaliation. However, if discovered (and it is quite probable that it will be), the risks to the sponsoring state would be enormous (Jenkins, in Harvey Kushner, The Future of Terrorism, p. 241). State sponsorship has in fact a ‘force multiplying’ effect on ordinary terrorist groups. It places greater resources in the hands of terrorists, thereby enhancing planning, intelligence, logistical capabilities, training, finances and sophistication (Lesser et al., Countering the New Terrorism, p. 15). To date, there are no known cases of state-sponsored CBW terrorism (at least in the public domain), probably because of the likelihood of severe retaliation against the sponsoring government if its involvement were to become known. Still, a state sponsor

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that believed it could shield its identity through proxies or intermediaries might take the risk, particularly in a crisis situation or wartime. In addition, an ad hoc or ‘transnational’ terrorist organization may be only loosely affiliated with a state sponsor and hence less constrained to act on its behalf. Terrorists with sufficient financial resources might also seek to acquire technical expertise from freelance weapon scientists formerly employed by countries with advanced CBW programmes, such as the former Soviet Union, South Africa or Iraq (Tucker, Toxic Terror, pp. 267–268). Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence, New York, 1982, p. 169; Roger Pajak, Nuclear Status and Policies in the Middle East: Implications for the Superpowers, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, 1982, pp. 94–95. States usually lack confidence in the terrorists they sponsor (Richard Falkenrath, Robert Newman and Bradley Thayer, America’s Achilles Heel. NBC Terrorism and Covert Attack, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998, p. 94). There are a number of conceivable scenarios in which desperate leaders in these states might release NBC weapons to terrorist groups to further their goals, particularly if their regime was threatened, and they wanted to exact final revenge against their enemies. But in general it could be concluded that an act of state-sponsored terrorism would be such an extreme act that it would be an option of last resort for any of these states (Gurr and Cole, The New Face of Terrorism, p. 208). Gavin Cameron, ‘Nuclear Terrorism: Weapons for Sale or Theft’, eJournal USA, 8/4/2005. Stern, ‘Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons’, p. 102. Richard Falkenrath, ‘Confronting Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism’, Survival, Autumn 1998, pp. 48–50; Gurr and Cole, The New Face of Terrorism, pp. 81 and 85; Stephen Flynn, ‘The Neglected Home Front’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 5, September/October 2004, p. 25. Michael Intriligator and Abdullah Toukan, ‘Terrorism and WMD’, in Peter Catona, Michael Intriligator and John Sullivan (eds), Countering Terrorism and WMD, Routledge, London, 2006, p. 71. The CIA had predicted copycat phenomena in the Aum Shinrikyo case, but they did not in fact materialize, probably due to the difficulties of building and maintaining such a weapon (Intriligator and Toukan, ‘Terrorism and WMD’, p. 75). Bruce Hoffman, ‘America and the New Terrorism: An Exchange’, Survival, Vol. 42, No. 2, Summer 2000, p. 163. With the technological problems involved, terrorists are going to have to undertake systematic, long-term programmes to develop even the simplest forms of NBC weapons. The fact that Aum Shinrikyo took approximately two years to develop its first batches of sarin provides a useful indicator (Gurr and Cole, The New Face of Terrorism, pp. 68 and 121). Terrorists operate in contexts of enormous uncertainty and anxiety; accidents fatal to the terrorists are plentiful, and to avoid them terrorists seek simple weapons that are easy to transport and assemble. (Rapoport, ‘Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse’, in Sokolski and Ludes (eds), Twenty-First Century Proliferation, p. 16). William Walker argues that the typical terrorist group does not operate totally without restraint. It may be restrained by the paucity of its capabilities, the need to conduct its operations from the shadows and the desire not to antagonize constituencies that may be attracted to its cause (William Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, Adelphi Paper 370, IISS, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p. 53). Ferguson and Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, p. 32. Parachini, ‘Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective’, p. 40; Writing in 1990, Professor Paul Wilkinson identified a trend, that originated from 1982, of increasingly indiscriminate and lethal attacks in which ordinary civilians were targeted. He pondered: ‘How does one explain this increase in indiscriminateness? In part it results from the terrorists’ ever more desperate desire for publicity’ (Gurr and Cole, The New Face of Terrorism, p. 23).

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69 Lesser et al., Countering the New Terrorism, p. 13; Stern, ‘Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons’, p. 70; Pilat, in Roberts, Terrorism With Chemical and Biological Weapons, pp. 11 and 13. 70 Michael Intriligator, ‘Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction’, presentation at the 1st Athens Forum, 7 March 2004, p. 2. 71 Terrorists are organizing themselves in new, less hierarchical structures and using ‘amateurs’ to a far greater extent than in the past. The lethality of terrorist attacks gradually increased over time as terrorists motivated by ethnic hatreds or religious fanaticism revealed themselves to be demonstrably less constrained, more inclined to carry out large-scale indiscriminate attacks (Lesser et al., Countering the New Terrorism, pp. vii and 9). 72 Tucker, Toxic Terror, p. 10; Gurr and Cole, The New Face of Terrorism, p. 114. 73 As Ian Lesser points out, ‘religious terrorism tends to be more lethal than secular terrorism because of the radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimization and justification, concepts of morality, and Manichean worldviews that directly affect the “holy terrorists” motivation. For the religious terrorist, violence is a sacramental act or divine duty, executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative and justified by scripture. Religion therefore functions as a legitimizing force, specifically sanctioning wide-scale violence against an almost open-ended category of opponents’ (Lesser et al., Countering the New Terrorism, p. 20). 74 Gurr and Cole, The New Face of Terrorism, p. 117. 75 According to Bruce Hoffman, in 1968 none of the 11 identifiable international terrorist groups could be classified as ‘religious’. In 1980, the first modern religious terrorist groups emerged following the Iranian revolution, but comprised only 2 of the 64 active terrorist groups. By 1992 that number had risen to 11, comprising a quarter of all the terrorist groups that carried out attacks in that year. By 1994, the trend had accelerated, and 16 (or one-third) of the 49 identifiable groups could be classified as religious in character or motivation. In 1995 that number had risen to 25 out of 58 known active terrorist groups, or 42 per cent. (Gurr and Cole, The New Face of Terrorism, p. 29). 76 Ferguson and Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, pp. 18–19; According to Ron Purver, ‘Tomorrow’s most dangerous terrorists will be motivated not by political ideology but by fierce ethnic and religious hatreds . . . . NBC weapons are ideal for their purpose’ (Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism, p. 126). 77 Gorka, The Death of National Security, p. 7. 78 Kurz, ‘Non-Conventional Terrorism’, p. 33. 79 According to Harald Mueller, it ‘would be a mistake to equate fundamentalism with terrorism, just as it is a mistake to see Islam as a fundamentally violent religion. It would be equally wrong, however, to underrate the incredible momentum that a disposition to use violence gains when it feeds on religious motivation. And it is also a statistical fact that the number of fundamentalist terrorists of the Islamic faith is larger, and their acts of violence are therefore more numerous, than those of other religions. In addition, it is only religiously motivated terrorism that has managed to create a transnational, globally organized network’ (Harald Mueller, Terrorism, Proliferation: A European Threat Assessment, p. 26). 80 Jerrold M. Post, ‘Psychological and Motivational Factors in Terrorist DecisionMaking: Implications for CBW Terrorism’, in Tucker, Toxic Terror, pp. 287–288; Stern, ‘Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons’, p. 7; According to the RAND Corporation: ‘Terrorist groups with more millennial aims, as opposed to those operating on behalf of concrete political programmes, may be less constrained in their actions and hence more willing to cause or risk mass casualties. These more fanatical and extreme terrorist groups tend to hold apocalyptic views, devoid of specific political content and seek the creation of new and continuing disasters as the precondition for the emergence of a new heavenly order on earth’ (Gurr and Cole,

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The New Face of Terrorism, p. 142). Bruce Hoffman also argues that the different characteristics, justifications and mindsets of religious and quasi-religious groups suggest that they might be the most likely types of group to use NBC weapons, because they have radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimization and justification, concepts of morality and world view (Gurr and Cole, The New Face of Terrorism, p. 30). Gurr and Cole, The New Face of Terrorism, p. 154. Jonathan Spyer offers a very interesting description of al-Qaeda, arguing that this is a ‘political organization with clear political aims and belongs in the category of extreme, violent revolutionary organizations rather than apocalyptic, millennialist sects. This is a matter of much more than semantic distinction. Millennialist sects, such as the Aum Sinrikyo, are convinced of the imminent intervention of supernatural forces in the human world. Often, their violent acts are intended to bring this event about, or at minimum to hasten the perceived process. The practical result of such convictions is the immunity of such groups to a rational calculus of cost and effect. By contrast, al-Qaeda, while based on a religious world view, does not include in its theology the notion that a single apocalyptic act of violence may precipitate supernatural events. Rather, the project is to bring about God’s rule on earth through the political and military victory of His servants’ (Spyer, ‘The al-Qa’ida Network and Weapons of Mass Destruction’, p. 9). Harald Mueller agrees with that assessment, adding that, where al-Qaeda co-operates with national terrorist networks, other targets also gain prominence (Mueller, Terrorism, Proliferation: A European Threat Assessment, p. 37). Among the swelling ranks of Iraq war critics, there is an emerging view that, as Graham Allison points out, ‘in the campaign to prevent nuclear terrorism, Iraq was at best a strategic diversion and at worst a strategic blunder. By devoting most of its energy and leverage to Iraq during 2002 and 2003, the US neglected higher-priority threats to its national security. North Korea and Iran were essentially given breathing room to advance their own nuclear ambitions. Al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups had an opportunity to recover, adjust, and adapt following the war in Afghanistan, which was truly disruptive to their activities’ (Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, pp. 133–134). Spyer, ‘The al-Qa’ida Network and Weapons of Mass Destruction’, pp. 7–8. According to the US Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, the problem is that al-Qaeda represents an ideological movement, not a finite group of people. It initiates and inspires, even if it no longer directs. In this way it has transformed itself into a decentralized force. Killing or capturing Bin Laden, while extremely important, would not end terror. His message of inspiration to a new generation of terrorists would continue (US Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, 1999, p. 11). Ferguson and Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, p. 21; Gurr and Cole, The New Face of Terrorism, p. 127; According to the IISS, which has been following terrorist activities quite closely, the ‘European experience with North African networks encourages a view of Islamic terrorism that departs significantly from prevailing images in the US, where al-Qaeda is often portrayed as a coherent, even hierarchical group. European analysts, and an increasing number of American observers, tend to see Moroccan, Tunisian and Algerian networks as harbingers of a much looser, ad hoc constellation of extremists, with a variety of motives and modes of action, in which the al-Qaeda link may or may not be significant’ (IISS Strategic Survey 2003/2004, p. 152). Lesser argues that, ironically, the success of the US operation in Afghanistan against the Taliban may have induced remaining al-Qaeda operatives to strengthen their ties with other groups, including Jaish-e-Mohammed in Pakistan and Jemaah Islamiyah in South-east Asia, in effect creating franchise outfits around the world’ (Lesser et al., Countering the New Terrorism, p. 62).

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89 Stern, ‘Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons’, p. 97; According to Coker, Al-Qaeda is largely a franchising agency that functions through religious internationalism and stateless networks (Christopher Coker, Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century, p. 39). As Eliza Manningham-Buller, the director-general of Britain’s MI5 intelligence service, has observed, ‘There are many al-Qaedas rather than a monolithic organization with the leadership organizing every facet of the organization’s activities’ (Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, p. 29). 90 Post, ‘Psychological and Motivational Factors in Terrorist Decision-Making’, in Tucker, Toxic Terror, p. 283. 91 Ferguson and Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, p. 31. 92 Scott Sagan, ‘Terrorism, Pakistan, and Nuclear Weapons’, in Michael Barletta (ed.), After 9/11: Preventing Mass-Destruction Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation, Occasional Paper No. 8, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, CA, 2002, pp. 46–47. 93 Intriligator and Toukan, ‘Terrorism and WMD’, p. 70. 94 Even before 9/11, the official US estimate was that the ‘reported interest of Osama Bin Laden’s network in NBC materials is a key concern in terms of possible future threats to US interests’ (Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, p. 3). According to Spyer, al-Qaeda possesses weapons capabilities in the biological, chemical and radiological areas. The evidence in support of the claim that the organization has made serious progress in its ambitions regarding nuclear weaponry is sketchy and unreliable (Spyer, ‘The al-Qa’ida Network and Weapons of Mass Destruction’, p. 17; Lindstrom, Protecting the European Homeland, p. 11). Opinions on this issue are diverging. According to Delpech (Therese Delpech, International Terrorism and Europe, Chaillot Papers No. 56, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, December 2002, p. 24), training camps, like the one in Derunta in Afghanistan, have been set up specifically to train terrorists in the manufacture of CBW, whereas Parachini argues that there is no hard physical evidence of Al-Qaeda weapons production in Afghanistan (Parachini, ‘Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective’, p. 39). 95 IISS Strategic Survey 2001/2002, p. 30. 96 Spyer, ‘The al-Qa’ida Network and Weapons of Mass Destruction’, p. 15; According to Allison, ‘the consensus view within the US intelligence community is that al Qaeda has experimented with chemical weapons (including nerve gas), biological weapons (anthrax), and RDDs. Many fear that bin Laden’s demand for an attack that will shock Americans as profoundly as 9/11 can be satisfied only by the real thing’ (Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, pp. 26, 28–29). 97 Frost, Nuclear Terrorism After 9/11, Adelphi Paper, p. 55. 98 Risk can be defined as the probability of an event multiplied by its consequences. Thus, the greater the probability or the greater the consequences, the higher the overall risk (Ferguson and Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, p. 5). 99 The strongest lesson of the historical record is that non-state actors that become involved with WMD are extremely rare. Even fewer groups possess both the intent and the technical ability to inflict massive human casualties with an NBC weapon. (Falkenrath, Newman and Thayer, America’s Achilles Heel, p. 30). On the other hand, history is to be consulted, but it is by no means a foolproof predictor (Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, ‘America and the New Terrorism: An Exchange’, Survival, Vol. 42, No. 2, Summer 2000, p. 171). 100 According to Ferguson and Potter, ‘at the present time al Qaeda is likely the only network with all the requisite characteristics to pursue nuclear terrorism of the most extreme form, either by acquiring or developing a nuclear weapon’ (Ferguson and Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, p. 37). 101 Falkenrath, Newman and Thayer, America’s Achilles Heel, p. 219. 102 Bruce Hoffman, ‘America and the New Terrorism: An Exchange’, Survival, Vol. 42, No. 2, Summer 2000, p. 163.

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103 George Quester, Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken Taboo, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 2006, p. 3. 104 Paula DeSutter, Denial and Jeopardy: Deterring Iranian Use of NBC Weapons, NDU, Washington DC, 1998, p. 3. 105 As Frost points out, ‘Any terrorist group contemplating mass casualty or mass destruction terrorism, especially nuclear terrorism, does so within the context of a number of constraining or facilitating actors. Politically and strategically these include the group’s internal dynamics and leadership, its claimed or actual constituency, its relationship with its host state or states, the latter’s and their own susceptibility to deterrence, their positions in the international system, the terrorists’ target or targets and the likely lethality or destructiveness of the contemplated attack’ (Frost, Nuclear Terrorism After 9/11, Adelphi Paper, p. 46). It is important to study in detail how truly effective WMDs would be in furthering a terrorist group’s ultimate agenda in both the short term and the long term (Intriligator and Toukan, ‘Terrorism and WMD’, p. 77). 106 Ferguson and Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, p. 27. 107 Kurz, ‘Non-Conventional Terrorism’, p. 31; Gurr and Cole, The New Face of Terrorism, p. 7; Jenkins, in Harvey Kushner, The Future of Terrorism, pp. 230 and 232; Roberts, Terrorism With Chemical and Biological Weapons, p. xi. 108 The attacks of 9/11, highly imaginative yet ultimately conventional in nature, have resulted in the US-led overthrow of two regimes and opened the floodgates for American military activity around the world. Clearly, the impact of a nuclear terrorist attack could be devastating for both the target of the attack and the terrorist support base. (Ferguson and Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, p. 29; Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, p. 63). As Kurz argues, even the organizations that turned suicide bombings into the symbol of their struggle are not themselves inclined to organizational suicide (Kurz, ‘Non-Conventional Terrorism’, p. 31). 109 However, as Allison points out, a nuclear bomb smuggled into the country inside a ship or a truck and detonated by surprise would leave no return address. In the aftermath of a nuclear attack, America’s leaders could find themselves with no idea of where it came from, or how and against whom to respond (Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, p. 130). 110 A 1941 bio-attack on Changteh, China, that had gone wrong killed at least 1,700 Japanese troops, demonstrating that biological weapons are tricky to use and can backfire – a lesson to future terrorists (Katona, ‘Historical Impact of Terrorism’, p. 20). 111 Jeffrey Simon, Terrorists and the Potential Use of Biological Weapons. A Discussion of Possibilities, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, December 1989, p. 11; For disincentives for NBC terrorism, see also Falkenrath, Newman and Thayer, America’s Achilles Heel, pp. 45–46 and 60; and Frost, Nuclear Terrorism After 9/11, Adelphi Paper, p. 62. 112 Should an NBC terrorist act be met with only a moderate response, the perceived taboo against such terrorist methods might erode considerably (Ferguson and Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, p. 30). 113 Ferguson and Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, pp. 29–30. 114 Kurz, ‘Non-Conventional Terrorism’, p. 30. 115 Since the early 1990s, the maximum violence in acts of international terrorism has steadily increased. It is on the basis of this trajectory – and because of al-Qaeda’s stated aims to acquire and use a WMD – that many analysts have concluded that a nuclear terror attack is most likely only a matter of time (Pluta and Zimmerman, ‘Nuclear Terrorism’, p. 55). 116 As Gurr and Cole point out, ‘the allocation of hundreds of millions of dollars to NBC terrorism-related programmes has made it the latest “pork-barrel” issue in US politics. There are actors both inside and outside of government who have a vested

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Notes interest in emphasizing the worst-case analysis’ (Gurr and Cole, The New Face of Terrorism, p. 11). According to the ‘optimistic’ school of thought, ‘although ever more individuals, groups, and states have access to the materials and technology of WMD and this has led to dire predictions about the imminence of massively destructive terrorist attacks, these predictions are at odds with the historical record: of all the terrorist actions of recent years and decades, only the Aum Shinrikyo sect has actually employed such weapons’ (Roberts, Terrorism With Chemical and Biological Weapons, p. xi); and despite its 30,000 Russian members, Aum Shinrikyo was unable to acquire a Soviet nuclear weapon (Frost, Nuclear Terrorism After 9/11, Adelphi Paper, p. 40). John Mueller is an outspoken proponent of this logic, arguing that ‘the evidence so far suggests that fears of the omnipotent terrorist reminiscent of those inspired by images of the 20-foot tall Japanese after Pearl Harbor or the 20-feet tall Communists at various points in the Cold War (particularly after Sputnik) – may have been overblown, the threat presented within the US by al-Qaeda greatly exaggerated. The massive and expensive homeland security apparatus erected since 9/11 may be persecuting some, spying on many, inconveniencing most, and taxing all to defend the US against an enemy that scarcely exists’ (John Mueller, ‘Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2006, p. 8). Judith Miller, ‘Bioweapons and the National Interest’, in Michael Barletta (ed.), WMD Threats 2001: Critical choices for the Bush Administration, Monterey Center for NonProliferation Studies, Monterey, CA, May 2001, p. 29. Pilat, in Roberts, Terrorism With Chemical and Biological Weapons, p. 19; At the late 1990s, Richard Falkenrath was arguing that WMD terrorism was ‘a low probability, high-consequence threat’ (Falkenrath, ‘Confronting Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism’, p. 61; Gurr and Cole, The New Face of Terrorism, p. 9). According to Intriligator, ‘using the concept of expected loss, the very low probability of a remote possibility, such as a terrorist group gaining access to and even using nuclear weapons, is offset in terms of expected loss by the extraordinarily high loss it entail’ (Intriligator, ‘Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction’, p. 4). Jenkins, in Harvey Kushner, The Future of Terrorism, p. 248. Jessica Stern, ‘Terrorist Motivations’, in Lavoy, Sagan and Wirtz (eds), Planning the Unthinkable, pp. 202–203.

5 WMD capabilities of selected countries in the Mediterranean and the Middle East 1 On the other hand, although tactical ballistic missiles have a limited military value, their production and procurement, even of the most sophisticated types, is relatively cheap. Their employment is quite simple: they require a minimum of maintenance; they can be mounted on mobile launchers that can easily be hidden or camouflaged (Belen Lara, ATBM Systems and European Security, UNISCI Papers No. 6, Madrid, 1997, p. 43). 2 The SCUD missile is based on primitive technology dating to the 1940s. 3 M. Dembinski, A. Kelle and H. Muller, NATO and Nonproliferation: A Critical Appraisal, PRIF Reports No. 33, Frankfurt, 1994, p. 46. 4 Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, Office of Technology Assessment, Washington DC, December 1993, p. 235. 5 Dennis Gormley, ‘Hedging Against the Cruise-Missile Threat’, Survival, Vol. 40, No. 1, Spring 1998, p. 93. See also, Anthony Seaboyer and Oliver Thranert, ‘What Missile Proliferation Means for Europe’, Survival, Vol. 48, No. 2, Summer 2006, p. 87. 6 Mark Smith, ‘Assessing Missile Proliferation’, in Gustav Lindstrom and Burkard Schmitt (eds), Fighting Proliferation – European Perspectives, Chaillot Papers, No. 66, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, December 2003, p. 29.

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7 Gormley, ‘Hedging Against the Cruise-Missile Threat’, pp. 93 and 95; Smith, in Lindstrom and Schmitt (eds), Fighting Proliferation, pp. 16–18. 8 According to a report of the US Office of Technology Assessment, ‘In the past, indigenous development of guidance and propulsion systems for long range cruise missiles presented almost insurmountable barriers for developing countries. In recent years, however, near-revolutionary advances in satellite navigation, long-distance communications, composite materials, and lightweight turbojet and turbofan engines have greatly facilitated cruise missile development in a growing number of countries. Developing sophisticated, light-weight jet-engine technology remains a significant obstacle for most developing countries’ (Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, Office of Technology Assessment, Washington DC, December 1993, p. 245). 9 According to Dennis Gormley, ‘Cruise missiles can be placed in canisters, making them fairly easy to maintain and operate in harsh environments. Their relatively compact size suggests more flexible launch options, more mobility for groundlaunched versions and a smaller logistics burden – making them even less susceptible to counterforce targeting than Iraqi Scuds were during Operation Desert Storm. Moreover, cruise missiles need not be stabilised at their launch points. They can be launched from commercial ships and aircraft, as well as from ground launchers’ (Gormley, ‘Hedging Against the Cruise-Missile Threat’, pp. 95–96). 10 According to the IISS, regional campaigns are not the only context within which the cruise-missile threat is relevant. As the US considers options to deploy defences against ballistic-missile threats, it must confront the alternative ways in which enemies might wish to attack the US homeland. Conceivably, an adversary lacking the resources or technical skill to build and deploy ICBMs could instead deploy a LACM on a commercial level. Even a bulky cruise missile like the Chinese Silkworm – converted for land attack – could readily fit inside a standard 12-metre shipping container equipped with a small internal erector for launching. Fired from outside territorial waters, such a LACM could strike most population and industry centres of North America and Europe (‘Cruise Missile Proliferation’, Strategic Comments, Vol. 7, No. 5, p. 2). 11 Joseph Cirincione and Frank von Hippel (eds), The Last 15 Minutes. Ballistic Missile Defense in Perspective, Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, Washington DC, 1998, Appendix B. Although most cruise missiles have in the past been anti-ship systems, that technology can now be adapted to land attack missions by adding an aircraft inertial navigation system (INS) that incorporates GPS/GLONASS update receivers that can be used to steer the missile (Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, A Prognosis for International Missile Developments: 2010, Cambridge, MA, August 1997, p. 3). 12 An alternative to developing or modifying cruise missiles would be to purchase commercially available unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) could also provide a proliferant country with engines suitable to power its own airframes up to perhaps a few hundred kms. ASCMs are widely available and, due to their short range, are generally exempt even from the new MTCR restrictions. Nevertheless, very small, lightweight, and fuel-efficient engines, which are particularly important for longer range or stealthy cruise missiles, are still very difficult for proliferant countries to acquire (Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, p. 249). 13 Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, p. 245. 14 Between them, China, France, Italy, Russia, the UK and the US have exported antiship cruise missiles and UAVs to more than 40 developing nations. While such transfers are useful stepping-stones to land-attack cruise missiles and are generally not subject to any MTCR controls, the quickest way for developing nations to obtain land-attack cruise missiles is to purchase them directly from a quality supplier. 15 Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, Office of Technology Assessment, Washington DC, December 1993, p. 255. 16 Gormley, ‘Hedging Against the Cruise-Missile Threat’, p. 98.

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17 This makes sense if only because it takes massive amounts of chemical agent to produce military casualties with any reliability, and maximizing their military dissemination is no easy task. If the agent is released too high in the atmosphere, it will be too diluted to do much harm when it comes to the ground. If it is released too close to the ground, the lethal area of the attack will be small. Wind can blow agents off their intended path, and sun and heat can evaporate volatile ones such as sarin (Henry Sokolski, Rethinking Bio-Chemical Dangers, ORBIS, Vol. 44, No. 2, Spring 2000, pp. 211–213; Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole, The New Face of Terrorism. Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction, I. B. Tauris Publishers, London, 2002, p. 49). 18 In addition to causing human casualties, acts of chemical terrorism may aim to sabotage or disrupt the economy. Chemical and agricultural terrorism comes easily within reach of single-issue groups, criminals or loosely structured organizations (Jean-Pascal Zanders, ‘The Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat’, in Lindstrom and Schmitt (eds), Fighting Proliferation, p. 65). 19 Jonathan Tucker (ed.), Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000, p. 264. 20 Lord Lyell, Chemical and Biological Weapons: The Poor Man’s Bomb, Science and Technology Committee, North Atlantic Assembly, Brussels, November 1996, p. 2. 21 Lyell, Chemical and Biological Weapons, p. 4. 22 According to experts, possessing a chemical agent is not the same as possessing a militarily useful war-fighting capability. Indeed, the history of chemical warfare is replete with examples of technical surprises, where the chemical agent does not operate as anticipated, or operational ineptitude, where the employment of the agent significantly reduced its operational effectiveness (Seth Carus, ‘Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implications and Responses’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1, March 1998, p. 4). 23 Lyell, Chemical and Biological Weapons, p. 4. 24 Advances in biotechnology could increase the potency or survivability of the agent or toxin, or lead to the creation of entirely new organisms (Joseph Pilat, ‘Prospects for NBC Terrorism After Tokyo’, in Brad Roberts (ed.), Terrorism With Chemical and Biological Weapons, The Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, Alexandria, VA, 1997, p. 9). Biotechnological capacity is increasing and spreading rapidly. This trend seems unstoppable, since the economic, medical and food-security benefits of genetic manipulation appear so great. As a consequence, thresholds for the artificial enhancement or creation of dangerous pathogens – disease causing organisms – will steadily drop. The revolution in biotechnology will therefore almost inevitably place greater destructive power in the hands of smaller groups of the technically competent: those with skills sufficient to make use of the advances of the international scientific community. This future is being driven not primarily by military programmes, but rather by open, legitimate private and academic research (Christopher Chyba and Alex Greninger, ‘Biotechnology and Bioterrorism: An Unprecedented World’, Survival, Vol. 46, No. 2, Summer 2004, pp. 143–144). 25 Peter Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James J. Wirtz (eds), Planning the Unthinkable. How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2000, p. 5; Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg and William Broad, Germs. Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2001, pp. 37–38. 26 The NATO Handbook dealing with BW lists 31 agents. A Russian panel assessing microbiological agents identified 11 that were ‘very likely to be used’. The top four were smallpox, plague, anthrax and botulism. These four were chosen because they can all be delivered as aerosols, and have theoretical lethality rates of 30–80 per cent, and smallpox and anthrax are particularly attractive because they are easy for states to produce in large quantities, and the organism is resistant to destruction. The other items on the list included tularemia, glanders, typhus, Q fever, Venezuelan equine

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encephalitis, Marburg, and the influenza viruses (Anthony Cordesman, Defending America. Asymmetric and Terrorist Attacks with Biological Weapons, CSIS, September 2001, p. 20). The British Medical Association warned in January 1999 that, in the foreseeable future, the mapping of the human genome, together with advances in genetic engineering, might allow the development of diseases directed against a specific ethnic group (‘Biological Weapons. The potential for terrorist use’, IISS Strategic Comments, Vol. 5, No. 5, June 1999, p. 1). BW use micro-organisms or toxins derived from organisms to cause disease in humans, plants, or animals. They come in many different forms, ranging from viruses to bacteria to rickettsiae to toxins (At the Crossroads, Counterproliferation and National Security Strategy, A Report of the Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, Washington DC, April 2004, p. 9). Toxins are non-living poisonous substances which are derived from biological processes. Examples include botulin, ricin and animal venom. Cloning techniques enable some of these agents to be produced in large quantities and some can be synthesized chemically (Lyell, Chemical and Biological Weapons, p. 2). It is estimated that, in the assault on Chekiang (China, 1942), Japanese toxins caused 10,000 Japanese casualties, including 1,700 deaths (Rapoport, in Henry Sokolski and James Ludes (eds), Twenty-First Century Proliferation, Frank Cass, London, 2001, p. 17). Although many states have the capacity to cause a high-consequences event, this outcome is unlikely because biological weapons have not proved to be reliable strategic weapons (Salerno, Gaudioso, Frerichs and Estes, ‘A BW Risk Assessment’, The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 11, No. 3, Fall/Winter 2004, p. 48). In theory, genetically engineered agents could kill or cripple selectively by race or gender (Miller, Engelberg and Broad, Germs, p. 206). US and other states’ programmes to develop biological agents under banners of defence or non-lethal warfare risk taking everyone down a dangerous path. As Julian Perry Robinson and Matthew Meselson have observed, ‘the rise of biotechnology . . . poses a special problem, as it will inevitably develop means for manipulating cognition, development, reproduction and heredity. Therein lie unprecedented and, in time, widely accessible possibilities for violence, coercion, repression or subjugation’ (William Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, Adelphi Paper 370, IISS, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p. 80). Israel is capable of air and missile delivery by both short-and long-range strike systems (Jericho I [500 km], Jericho 2 [1,000–2,000 km], roughly 140 F-15C/D/I and 53 F-15C/D/I), and sea-based systems have almost certainly been deployed. Israel is the only country in the region with advanced target and battle management capability to use such weapons, and the only country with its own missile defences (Anthony Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East. Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options and Weapons Effects, CSIS, Washington DC, July 2001, pp. 8–9; also IISS Military Balance 2006/2007 and Middle East Military Balance 2005). Robert Joseph and John Reichart, ‘Deterrence and Defense in a Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Environment’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1996, p. 61. Lyell, Chemical and Biological Weapons, pp. 2–3. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, p. 74. Lyell, Chemical and Biological Weapons, p. 4. Lewis A. Dunn, Peter R. Lavoy, and Scott D. Sagan, ‘Conclusions: Planning the Unthinkable’, in Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan Tucker (eds), Saddam’s Toxic Arsenal in Lavoy, Sagan and Wirtz, p. 231. See also, Eric Herring (ed.), ‘Preventing the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Special Issue, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1, March 2000, pp. 167–168; Richard Falkenrath, Robert Newman and Bradley Thayer, America’s Achilles Heel. NBC Terrorism and Covert

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Attack, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998, pp. 149–150, 157, 169; Richard Betts, ‘The New Threat of Mass Destruction’, Foreign Affairs, January/February 1998, p. 32; Jessica Stern, ‘Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons’, International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3, Winter 2002/2003, pp. 21 and 24. 38 Paula DeSutter, Denial and Jeopardy: Deterring Iranian Use of NBC Weapons, INSS, National Defense University, Washington DC, 1998, p. 6. Iran’s size, resource base, history, and mobilized population will always make it a major power in the Persian Gulf region and the broader Middle East (George Perkovich, Toward Transatlantic Cooperation in Meeting the Iranian Nuclear Challenge, Proliferation Papers, IFRI, Paris, Winter 2005, p. 11). 39 Iran’s nuclear programme, motivated by ‘a fusion of Iranian national ambition and concern for the direction of the neighborhood’, began in the 1960s during the reign of Shah Reza Pahlavi when the US was the country’s principal supplier of nuclear technology and research assistance (International Crisis Group, Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear Program, Middle East Report No. 18, 27 October 2003, Amman/Brussels, p. 3). 40 Since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, Iranian foreign policy has been a coherent expression of Iranian nationalism, not far from the policies of the Shah (except concerning Israel – and relations with the US/West) (Olivier Roy, ‘America and the New Terrorism: An Exchange’, Survival, Vol. 42, No. 2, Summer 2000, p. 158). According to a Chatham House report, Iran’s core foreign policy concerns are: • • • • •

Regional hegemony, particularly economic and cultural, within its sphere of influence; An extension of the sphere of influence; Regional stability; To see Iraq unified but unable to pose a military threat; An obsession with the US but uncertainty how to deal with it. (Robert Lowe and Claire Spencer (eds), Iran, its Neighbours and the Regional Crises, Chatham House, London, 2006, p. 6)

41 The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran, McNair Paper 64, National Defense University, Washington DC, 2001, p. 3. 42 It is argued that in ‘Iran’s threat perception, the war with Iraq, which Tehran viewed as being imposed on it, exposed the state’s vulnerability. A country that perceived itself not only as the region’s most powerful state, but also as a mini-superpower, was apparently unable to deal with a smaller neighbor. Beyond the sense of vulnerability, the experience of war with Iraq illustrated to the revolutionary Iranian leaders a sense of helplessness’ (Amin Tarzi, ‘The Role of WMD in Iranian Security Calculations: Dangers to Europe’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3, September 2004, p. 14). 43 According to Ray Takeyh, however, ‘both Iran and Israel have been careful to regulate their low-intensity conflict and have assiduously avoided direct military confrontation. The alarmist Iranian rhetoric regarding the immediacy of the Israeli threat is more an attempt to mobilize domestic and regional constituencies behind an antiIsrael policy than a genuine reflection of concern. For the Islamic Republic, Israel may be an ideological affront and a civilisational challenge, but it is not an existential threat mandating provision of nuclear weapons’ (Ray Takeyh, ‘Iran Builds the Bomb’, Survival, Vol. 46, No. 4, Winter 2004–2005, p. 53). 44 Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, p. 34. Iran’s priority is to be recognized as a regional power and to establish a leading role in the Gulf. After the 1990–1991 Gulf War and the subsequent US military build-up in the area, Tehran decided to call off its confrontation with the conservative Arab states (Roy, ‘America and the New Terrorism’, p. 159). 45 According to Perkovich, ‘most discussants in Iran argue that nuclear weapons would do Iran little good, but that Iran should acquire nuclear technology in order to modernize. Efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear technology are seen as

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colonial discrimination, an effort to keep Iran from becoming an advanced country’ (Perkovich, Toward Transatlantic Cooperation, p. 15). Tarzi, ‘The Role of WMD in Iranian Security Calculations’, pp. 18–19; Ian Lesser, The U.S. and Euro-Mediterranean Relations: Evolving Attitudes and Strategies, EuroMeSCo Policy Brief No. 10, July 2004, p. 14. Jeffrey Record described the motives behind Iran’s nuclear programme in a blunt manner, arguing that ‘Iranian interest in nuclear weapons began under the Shah and was stimulated by having a hostile nuclear superpower (the Soviet Union) to the north, an aspiring hostile nuclear power (Iraq) to the west, and yet another nuclear aspirant (Pakistan) to the east. Throw in a nuclear armed Israel and a history of violence, instability and war in the region, and later, a US declaration of Iran as “evil”, and you get a perfectly understandable explanation for Iran’s nuclear ambitions’ (Jeffrey Record, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism, p. 33). See also Le debat strategique, No. 70, Oct./Nov. 2003, CIPRES, p. 1). Takeyh, ‘Iran Builds the Bomb’, pp. 60–61. Whatever strategic benefits such weapons offer a state, they are certainly a source of national prestige and parochial benefits to various bureaucracies and politicians. As such constituencies emerge, a state can potentially cross the nuclear threshold even if the initial strategic factors that provoked the programme are no longer salient (Takeyh, ‘Iran Builds the Bomb’, pp. 51–52 and 58). Takeyh, ‘Iran Builds the Bomb’, p. 55. Iraq used chemical weapons on a large scale against Iran without the international community protesting more than lamely. On the contrary, military support to Iraq continued, and Western companies assisted Saddam Hussein with his WMD programmes (Harald Mueller, Terrorism, Proliferation: A European Threat Assessment, p. 82). As the newspaper Ya-Letharat noted, ‘One can still see the wounds on our war veterans that were inflicted by poison gas used by Saddam Hussein that were made in Germany and France’ (Takeyh, ‘Iran Builds the Bomb’, p. 53). In October 1988, Ali Rafsanjani stated that ‘CBW are poor man’s atomic bombs and can easily be produced. We should at least consider them for our defense. Although the use of such weapons is inhuman, the war taught us that international laws are only scraps of paper’ (Patrick Clawson (ed.), Iran’s Strategic Intentions and Capabilities, McNair Paper No. 29, Washington, DC, pp. 2–3). Another Iranian author argues that ‘certain strategic perspectives influenced by the bitter experiences of the eight years of war with Iraq also supported the development of a large-scale military programme’ (Hamid Baeidi-Nejad, ‘Khatami’s Nuclear Policy’, The Iranian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, 2005, p. 54). Frustration and anger over the battlefield reverses were exacerbated by the international community’s behaviour. Iran was the victim of Iraqi aggression, including repeated chemical attacks, both clear breaches of international law. Yet virtually no country came to its aid, either directly or by effectively sanctioning Iraq. Western nations continued to sell weapons and offer other forms of assistance to Iraq throughout the conflict (International Crisis Group, Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear Program, p. 12). According to the very illuminating ICG Report, ‘Iran faces a strategic environment that is more fluid and potentially more menacing than at any time in the past decade. Ideologically hostile to Israel but culturally uncomfortable with the Arab world; persuaded it has no true ally but many potential adversaries; surrounded by countries whose governments are sympathetic to the US, host large US military forces or both; and possessing a military capacity that is insufficient to deter its most powerful adversaries yet sufficiently intimidating to sow suspicion among its Gulf neighbours, Iran sees itself encircled and under threat’ (International Crisis Group, Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear Program, pp. i and 11). According to then Director of CIA, George Tenet: ‘No Iranian government, regardless of its ideological leanings, is likely to willingly abandon WMD programmes that are seen as guaranteeing Iran’s security’ (Robert Litwak, ‘Non-proliferation and the Dilemmas of Regime Change’, Survival, Vol. 45, No. 4, Winter 2003–2004, p. 22).

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53 George Perkovich et al., Universal Compliance. A Strategy for Nuclear Security, Carnegie Endowment, Washington DC, June 2004, p. 1. 54 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, ‘The Future of Iran’s Defence and Nuclear Policy’, in Walter Posch (ed.), Iranian Challenges, Chaillot Paper No. 89, EU-ISS, Paris, 2006, p. 80. 55 Babak Ganzi, Iranian Nuclear Politics: Change of Tactics or Strategy?, Conflict Studies Research Centre 05/63, November 2005, p. 1. Iran’s domestic power structure is complex and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is only one of a number of players. His dramatic millenarian rhetoric attracts headlines, but the broader governing polity does share his robust conviction that Iran is a central player in the wider region and can maintain firm independent positions (Lowe and Spencer (eds), Iran, its Neighbours and the Regional Crises, p. 5). 56 Ehteshami, ‘The Future of Iran’s Defence and Nuclear Policy’, p. 81. 57 Perkovich, Toward Transatlantic Cooperation in Meeting the Iranian Nuclear Challenge, p. 7. 58 IISS Strategic Survey 2004–2005, p. 11. As an Iranian official told ICG: ‘India and Pakistan have both acquired nuclear weapons, were softly reprimanded, and currently enjoy strong relations with the US As for Israel, it has been given an international pass’ (International Crisis Group, Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear Program, p. 15). 59 Information about the Iranian nuclear programme came also from Libya. For a detailed history of Iran’s nuclear programme, see Ehteshami, ‘The Future of Iran’s Defence and Nuclear Policy’, pp. 77–78. 60 In August 2002, the Iranian opposition movement in exile, the Paris-based National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) – a cover organization for the People’s Mojahedin – revealed details of two secret nuclear sites that were under construction in Iran (Johannes Reissner, ‘EU-Iran Relations; Options for Future Dialogue’, in Walter Posch (ed.), Iranian Challenges, Chaillot Paper No. 89, EU-ISS, Paris, 2006, p. 118). 61 Based on these and more recent IAEA inspections, Iran has clearly mastered the basic elements of centrifuge enrichment technology, but it is still probably a few years away from completing a production-scale facility at Nantanz that could theoretically produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a few nuclear weapons annually. Iran’s programme to develop a plutonium production capability (of which the heavy water plant is one element) appears to be far less advanced, although Iran says it has plans to build a heavy water-moderated reactor. Virtually nothing is known about Iranian weaponization efforts, although Iran possesses missiles (courtesy of North Korea) that are capable of delivering first generation nuclear weapons (Gary Samore, ‘Nuclear Proliferation After Iraq’, IISS Global Strategic Review, Leesburg, VA, 12–14 September 2003, pp. 6–7). In a follow-up report in November 2003, IAEA’s Director-General el-Baradei highlighted the fact that Iran has been developing a uranium centrifuge-enrichment programme for the past 18 years and a laser-enrichment programme for the last 12 years. According to the IAEA, while the breaches by Iran ‘to date have involved limited quantities of nuclear material, they have dealt with the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing’. However, somehow, the IAEA report concludes, ‘to date, there is no evidence that Iran’s illicit nuclear activities were related to a nuclear weapons programme’ (Tarzi, ‘The Role of WMD in Iranian Security Calculations’, p. 29). 62 According to the ICG, Iran did not disclose the existence of several nuclear facilities. When it finally did declare these facilities, it under-declared, downplaying what turned out to be extensive and sophisticated plants. It failed to report the importation from China of natural uranium over 10 years ago. Most disturbing, there are indications that it introduced enriched uranium into a nuclear site without first notifying the IAEA (International Crisis Group, Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear Program, pp. I and 1). IISS’s Gary Samore argued that Iran’s efforts to justify its fuel cycle efforts as part of its civilian nuclear programme are not credible, given the status of its nuclear programme.

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Based on IAEA investigations, Iran clearly failed to report the receipt of nuclear material from China and most likely conducted undeclared enrichment experiments in violation of its safeguards agreement (Samore, ‘Nuclear Proliferation After Iraq’, p. 7). International Crisis Group, Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear Program, p. 8; Tarzi, ‘The Role of WMD in Iranian Security Calculations’, p. 30; Tertrais, in Lindstrom and Schmitt, Fighting Proliferation, pp. 41–42. David Isenberg, ‘Overstating Iran’s Threat’, Defense News, 20 February 2006. Uzi Rubin, The Global Reach of Iran’s Ballistic Missiles, Memorandum 86, Institute for National Security Studies, November 2006, p. 7. As Washington learned with India and Pakistan in the 1980s and 1990s, sanctions only increase the costs of going nuclear; they do not reduce the ability of a determined government to get the bomb (Scott Sagan, ‘How to Keep the Bomb from Iran’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2006, p. 46). But even if international pressure succeeds in forcing Iran to comply with its existing safeguards obligations and accept enhanced safeguards, however, Iran could still seek to preserve the development of a nuclear breakout option under IAEA safeguards (Samore, ‘Nuclear Proliferation After Iraq’, p. 8). The emergence of one or more new nuclear-armed states in the Middle East over the next decade would be a transforming development for the region and for those, like the US and Russia, with regional interests. Western strategists would be compelled to address the reality of a larger and more diverse nuclear club, in a way that has not really been the case regarding India and Pakistan. As with Pakistan, the question of nuclear control would be a standing concern, with an open-ended potential for international action to secure ‘loose’ weapons and technologies (Ian Lesser, Security and Strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean, ELIAMEP Policy Paper No. 5, Athens, 2005, p. 6). Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, p. 10. According to this view, Iran’s Arab neighbours’ chief concern will not be the possibility of Iranian warheads detonating on their soil, but rather the re-emergence of an aggressive Iranian foreign policy devised by a regime that is emboldened by its possession of nuclear weapons (‘Iran and its neighbours’, IISS Strategic Comments, Vol. 11, No. 6, August 2005, p. 1). According to the IISS, there is ‘an unconfirmed report that a UAE team visited Kahuta in Pakistan during the mid-1990s. This has suggested to some analysts that the UAE might be contemplating the acquisition of deliverable nuclear weapons from a foreign source, rather than the far more problematic route of developing such weapons themselves’ (‘Iran and its neighbours’, p. 2). The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran, pp. 31 and 39. Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism. The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, Times Books, New York, 2004, p. 164. Ephraim Kam, ‘Curbing the Iranian Nuclear Threat: The Military Option’, Strategic Assessment, JCSS, Vol. 7, No. 3, December 2004, p. 4. The head of Israel’s Mossad has held that Iran ‘constitutes an essentially irrational threat, combining Islamic fundamentalism with all forms of nonconventional weapons and surface-to-surface missiles. The existential threat posed by Iran warrants its supreme ranking among Israel’s national concerns’ (Dany Shoham, ‘Libya: The First Real Case of Deproliferation in the Middle East?’, Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 77, May–June 2004, p. 101). Iranian support to Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hizbullah suggests in Israeli minds a willingness to take risks for a purpose that does not contribute directly to the security of the Iranian state (‘Israeli Military Calculations Towards Iran’, IISS Strategic Comments, Vol. 12, No. 9, November 2006). Efraim Inbar, The Need to Block a Nuclear Iran, BESA Center for Strategic Studies, Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 67, 2006, p. 1. It may also aggravate some of Israel’s security problems, by increasing their complexity, the capability of dealing with them, and the degree of uncertainty that

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Notes Israel would be required to face. However, it is not inevitable that the Iranian threat will increase to the point that it poses a viable endangerment to Israel’s very existence (Kam, ‘Curbing the Iranian Nuclear Threat’, pp. 4–5). Kam, ‘Curbing the Iranian Nuclear Threat’, p. 4. This analysis was, of course, published before the rather surprising outcome of Iran’s presidential elections in 2005. Aaron Carp, ‘Regional Perspectives in the Middle East in Current Issues Concerning the Control of Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Ballistic Missile Defences’, in International Perspectives on Missile Proliferation and Defences, p. 59. Lowe and Spencer (eds), Iran, its Neighbours and the Regional Crises, p. 6. Uzi Rubin, The Global Reach of Iran’s Ballistic Missiles, Memorandum 86, Institute for National Security Studies, November 2006, p. 11. Mark Fitzpatrick, ‘Assessing Iran’s Nuclear Programme’, Survival, Vol. 48, No. 3, Autumn 2006, p. 21. It is argued that the trend set in Iraq and Libya would be reversed and the nonproliferation regime would not likely survive such a breakout (Perkovich, Toward Transatlantic Cooperation, p. 7). Lesser argues that, if Turkey remains within Western security institutions, and if the NATO nuclear guarantee remains credible, it is difficult to imagine Turkey ‘going nuclear’. But Ankara might feel compelled to respond in other ways, in terms of procurement and doctrine, with cascading effects on military balances and perceptions around the Black Sea and the Aegean (Lesser, Security and Strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean, p. 31). The IISS shares that assessment, arguing that ‘while an independent nuclear capability would take years to develop and saddle Turkey with diplomatic troubles that would hobble its economic development, a closer relationship with the US and refurbishment of Turkey’s declining military ties to Israel might look like more practical alternatives’ (IISS Strategic Comments, ‘Iran and its neighbours’, Vol. 11, No. 6, August 2005, p. 2). See also, Lowe and Spencer (eds), Iran, its Neighbours and the Regional Crises, p. 39; and Leon Fuerth, ‘Turkey: Nuclear Choices Amongst Dangerous Neighbors’, in Kurt Campbell, Robert Einhorn and Mitchell Reiss (eds), The Nuclear Tipping Point. Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2004, pp. 145–174. Fitzpatrick, ‘Assessing Iran’s Nuclear Programme’, p. 21. Israel’s nuclear capacity is bound to be raised in this context (International Crisis Group, Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear Program, p. 28). ‘Nuclear Energy Expansion in the Middle East’, IISS Strategic Comments, Vol. 12, No. 9, September 2006; Emily Landau, ‘New Nuclear Programs in the Middle East: What Do they Mean?’, INSS Insight, No. 3, 11 December 2006, p. 1. Landau, ‘New Nuclear Programs in the Middle East’, p. 1. Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, p. 42. As Eyal Zisser points out, ‘a broad debate has been going on in Israel for years on the issue of Syria’s determination to acquire non-conventional weapons. There are those in Israel who think that these missiles and this weaponry are designed to allow Damascus to launch a preemptive strike against Israel already at the beginning of a possible Syrian surprise attack against it with the objective of neutralizing a considerable part of Israel’s military capabilities. However, most of the experts believe that this is a Doomsday Weapon to be used if and when Syria is attacked. In any event, the very existence of this weaponry in the hands of a regime like the Syrian Baa’th regime and certainly under the control of a young and inexperienced leader like Bashar al-Assad is enough to cause concern in Israel’ (Eyal Zisser, ‘Syria and the Question of WMD’, MERIA Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3, September 2004, p. 4). Zisser argues that the two main checks on Syria’s military development have been the country’s poor economy and that most of the world’s suppliers are closed to it either for political or financial reasons. This has led Syria, since the early 1990s, to base its national security increasingly on WMD as a kind of miracle cure that will, in the blink

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of an eye, narrow the ever-widening technological gap between Syria and Israel, most importantly between the air forces (Zisser, ‘Syria and the Question of WMD’, p. 3). A different explanation for Syria’s motives is provided by William Walker, who claims that Israel’s nuclear capability and supremacy in conventional weapons have encouraged and legitimized WMD proliferation within the region. Where, unable to gain access to nuclear technologies, states have turned to CBW instead, thereby reinforcing the link between the three weapons of mass destruction (Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, p. 66). This was made clear by Syrian Information Minister Ahmad al-Hasan who, when asked about his reaction to the Libyan decision to give up plans to develop WMD, stated, ‘Syria is not Libya. The Libyans are far away from the front and from the enemy [Israel], and this is why Syria will never follow the Libyan course’ (Zisser, ‘Syria and the Question of WMD’, pp. 2–3). IISS Strategic Survey 2004–2005, p. 7. The Gulf War devastated Iraq’s primary CW production facilities and a large portion of its stockpile of CW munitions. Through to 1998, UNSCOM was able to dispose of large quantities of CW munitions, bulk agent, precursors and production equipment that were not destroyed in combat (John Chipman, IISS Strategic Dossier – Iraq’s WMD: A Net Assessment, 9 September 2002, p. 5). Ibrahim al-Marashi, ‘Saddam’s Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Iraq as a Case Study of a Middle Eastern Proliferant’, MERIA, Vol. 8, No. 3, September 2004, p. 4). Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government, pp. 12–16. Chipman, IISS Strategic Dossier, p. 3. During the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq forward-deployed chemical munitions, and evidence strongly suggests that Saddam Hussein delegated authority to commanders to use unconventional weapons under certain circumstances. He reportedly believed that his WMD stockpile had deterred the US from expanding its war aims beyond the liberation of Kuwait and marching on Baghdad to change the Iraqi regime. This accepted understanding from 1991 of the Iraqi dictator’s attitudes toward WMD use, as well as his subsequent unwillingness to account fully for the destruction of the unconventional weapons stocks identified by UNSCOM in their final 1998 report, supported a pre-war assumption that Saddam Hussein both possessed and would employ WMD in the event of hostilities to oust him (Litwak, ‘Non-proliferation and the Dilemmas of Regime Change’, pp. 14–15). Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government, London, pp. 5–6. According to one report, the CW stockpile consisted of approximately: 23 metric tons of mustard gas (reportedly produced a decade ago); some 3,500 artillery shells and aerial bombs to be filled with this chemical warfare agent on short notice; 1,300 metric tons of precursor chemicals needed to produce nerve gases; two CW storage facilities; one inactivated CW production facility (located at Rabta) (Shoham, ‘Libya’, p. 1). Dafna Hochman, ‘Rehabilitating a Rogue: Libya’s WMD Reversal and Lessons for U.S. Policy’, Parameters, Spring 2006, p. 65. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, p. 93. Hochman, ‘Rehabilitating a Rogue’, p. 64. Hochman, ‘Rehabilitating a Rogue’, pp. 66–67; Eric Terzuolo, NATO and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Routledge, London, 2006, p. 154. Hochman, ‘Rehabilitating a Rogue’, p. 67. Wyn Bowen, Libya and Nuclear Proliferation. Stepping Back from the Brink, Adelphi Paper 380, IISS, London, 2006, p. 81. Hochman, ‘Rehabilitating a Rogue’, p. 75. Michele Dunne, Libya: Security Is Not Enough, Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief No. 32, October 2004, Washington, DC, p. 1.

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6 WMD proliferation: threats and challenges to Western security and NATO’s response 1 Shahram Chubin and Jerrold Green, NATO’s New Strategic Concept and Peripheral Contingencies: The Middle East, RAND Corporation and Geneva Center for Security Policy, Santa Monica, CA, 1999, p. 2. 2 Alvaro de Vasconcelos, Europe’s Mediterranean Strategy. An Asymmetric Equation, IEEI, Libson, 1999, p. 4. 3 Ian Lesser, Jerrold Green, Stephen Larrabee and Michele Zanini, The Future of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative. Evolution and Next Steps, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2000, pp. 20 and 22. 4 Simon Serfaty et al., Transatlantic Approaches to the Mediterranean. Impact of the New NATO on North and South Perspectives, CSIS Occasional Reports in European Studies, Washington, DC, May 1999, p. 7. 5 Lesser, Green, Larrabee and Zanini, The Future of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative, p. 22. 6 As Anthony Cordesman observes, ‘virtually every trend and potential risk becomes a “threat” when it is carried to logical extremes. Most potential threats do not materialize, particularly in the draconian form often used by strategic analysts . . . . The problem is to put regional threats in the kind of perspective where it is possible to examine possibilities without confusing them with probabilities’ (Anthony Cordesman, Evolving Threats in the Middle East: Their Implications for U.S. Defense Planning, Testimony to the Middle East and Africa Threat Panel of the House Armed Services Committee, 28 September 2005, p. 11). 7 ‘Notwithstanding positive developments in the strategic environment and the fact that large-scale conventional aggression against the Alliance is highly unlikely, the possibility of such a threat emerging over the longer term exists. The security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks, which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises in and around the Euro-Atlantic area, which could evolve rapidly. Some countries in and around the Euro-Atlantic area face serious economic, social and political difficulties. Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability. The resulting tensions can lead to crises affecting EuroAtlantic stability, to human suffering, and to armed conflicts. Such conflicts could affect the security of the Alliance by spilling over into neighbouring countries, including NATO countries, or in other ways, and could also affect the security of other states’ (Article 20 of the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept). 8 Regional Command (RC) South covers approximately 1.5 million square miles from the Strait of Gibraltar to the north-eastern coast of Turkey on the Black Sea and from the North African littoral to the Alps and Crimea. 9 ‘The Alliance operates in an environment of continuing change. Developments in recent years have been generally positive, but uncertainties and risks remain which can develop into acute crises . . . . [I]ts increased political and military partnership, cooperation and dialogue with other states, including with Russia, Ukraine and Mediterranean Dialogue countries’ (Article 12 of the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept). 10 Ian Lesser argues that the Alliance ‘would need to shape the security environment and contain new security risks, especially those of a transregional character, such as WMD and missile proliferation, spillovers of terrorism and political violence and threats to energy security, and to plan for various scenarios of regional uncertainty dealing with disastrous refugee flows and civil emergencies will be part of this hedging dimension, as will anticipating and preparing for humanitarian interventions’ (Ian Lesser, NATO Looks South. New Challenges and New Strategies in the Mediterranean, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2000, pp. 57–58).

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11 Azzouz Kerdun, La Securite en Mediterranee, Paris, 1995, p. 130; Frederick Bonnart, ‘What does NATO propose to be doing South of the Mediterranean?’, International Herald Tribune, 17 February 1995; J. Green, F. S. Larrabee and I. Lesser, ‘NATO is looking South and Mideast Peace Stands to Gain’, International Herald Tribune, 19 January 1996. 12 Richard Whitman, Securing Europe’s Southern Flank? A Comparison of NATO, EU and WEU Policies and Objectives, Final report, NATO Individual Research Fellowship 1997–1999, p. 2. The prime motivation for the EU’s involvement in the region was to avoid the spillover effects of instability and insecurity from the South and the 9/11, Madrid and London attacks gave new weight to such concerns. 13 In 1994 the WEU published a paper which argued that missile proliferation among ‘regional adversaries’ in North Africa and the Middle East posed a genuine threat to Europe, and advocated a European missile defence as a way to combat this (Ian Kenyon, Mike Rance, John Simpson, Mark Smith, Prospects for a European Ballistic Missile Defence System, Southampton Papers in International Policy, No. 4, Southampton, 2001, p. 19). In 1995, the WEU Council of Ministers agreed that ‘The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their delivery means, in certain countries of this region, is also a cause for concern for regional stability and European security’ (WEU Council of Ministers, European Security: A Common Concept of the 27 WEU Countries, Madrid, 14 November 1995, paragraph 105). 14 Terrorism, proliferation and failed states do not affect all NATO allies the same way (Michael Ruhle, ‘Different Speeds, Same Direction. NATO and the New Transatlantic Security Agenda’, International Politics, Summer 2006, p. 78). 15 According to Article 56 of NATO’s Strategic Concept, ‘The Alliance’s defence posture against the risks and potential threats of the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery must continue to be improved, including through work on missile defences. As NATO forces may be called upon to operate beyond NATO’s borders, capabilities for dealing with proliferation risks must be flexible, mobile, rapidly deployable and sustainable. Doctrines, planning and training and exercise policies must also prepare the Alliance to deter and defend against the use of NBC weapons. The aim in doing so will be to further reduce operational vulnerabilities of NATO military forces while maintaining their flexibility and effectiveness despite the presence, threat or use of NBC weapons.’ 16 Thanos Dokos, ‘The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Mediterranean: The Threat to Western Security’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3, Autumn 2000, p. 112. According to Therese Delpech, ‘to the U.S., which had for decades learned to live with its vulnerability vis-à-vis Moscow, the idea of having to reckon with possible attacks from Tehran, Pyongyang or Baghdad is intolerable, not just because of the random, unpredictable nature of the threat, but because of its highly asymmetrical character. Since many states involved in ballistic missile proliferation are in Europe’s neighborhood, one might imagine that European countries would share that view, but that is not the case. Even Italy, which came under attack from Libya in 1986, rarely expresses concern. Whether this equanimity persists in 10 to 15 years from now will depend on the evolution of proliferation in the Mediterranean area, which it would be advisable not only to monitor but see increased efforts to contain’ (Therese Delpech, ‘Nuclear weapons – less central, more dangerous?’, in Nuclear Weapons: A New Great Debate, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper No. 48, Paris, July 2001, p. 13). 17 Joachim Krause assessed in 1995 that proliferation was serious enough to warrant NATO action because of threats to NATO territory, military forces operating outside the NATO area, shifts in regional power balances, regional instabilities, erosion of international norms, danger of accidents, and new dimensions of terrorism. French President Jacques Chirac, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder stated in October 1999 that ‘our greatest concern is proliferation of WMD, and chiefly nuclear proliferation. We have to face the stark truth that nuclear proliferation

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Notes remains the major threat to world safety’ (Kori Schake, ‘NATO’s “Fundamental Divergence” over Proliferation’, in Ted Galen Carpenter (ed.), ‘NATO Enters the 21st Century’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3, September 2000, p. 118). Obviously, the emergence of new nuclear-weapon states (NWS) could affect how NATO countries project power in any comparable future contingencies and more generally in the Alliance’s military strategy and operations. As a start, the readiness of NATO forces to operate in a NBC environment may need to be enhanced. According to NATO’s (then) Secretary-General, Lord Robertson, ‘the spread of WMD will be a defining security challenge of this new century. It will lead to more fingers on more triggers. And not all of those triggers may be operated by rational minds. In such a situation, deterrence may not always deter.’ NATO Military Committee Chairman, General Harald Kujat, stressed that the proliferation of WMD ‘will continue to accelerate over time because there is no reason a developing country would want to compete in the traditional military way with developed countries when WMD provide inexpensive force equalizers. Simply put, possession of these weapons allows nations to project greater national power than would otherwise be the case.’ Kujat stressed that non-state actors as well recognize the potential of WMD as force multipliers (Eric Terzuolo, NATO and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Routledge, London, 2006, pp. 87 and 176). National positions are not very different. A Spring 1994 French White Paper identified NBC and missile proliferation as a serious danger to the nation’s vital interests. The threat was described as twofold: first, NBC weapons threaten French national territory, currently from the former Soviet Union and in the future from the Mediterranean basin, especially Algeria; and second, NBC proliferation raises the stakes for future intervention by French forces in ‘strategic zones’ outside Europe. A 1994 German White Paper described NBC proliferation as a risk to regional and global stability and called for ‘an all-embracing approach, encompassing the numerous and diverse elements, from classic non-proliferation and disarmament through development aid to politico-military measures’ (Robert Joseph, ‘Proliferation, Counter-proliferation and NATO’, Survival, Spring 1996, pp. 111 and 117). As Eric Terzuolo pointed out, the 1999 Strategic Concept ‘did not “name names” when it discussed the heightened WMD proliferation threat facing the alliance. But the fact that many suspected or potential proliferators were located on or near the Mediterranean littoral led to expectations of a greater southern focus for NATO. Dialogue on security issues with countries in the southern Mediterranean, many themselves threatened by WMD proliferation, concomitantly seemed to grow in importance’ (Terzuolo, NATO and Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 70). Gareth Winrow, ‘A Threat from the South? NATO and the Mediterranean’, p. 47. As identified in 1995 by the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (Joseph, ‘Proliferation, Counter-proliferation and NATO’, pp. 122–123). See also, Joachim Krause, ‘Proliferation Risks and their Strategic Relevance: What Role for NATO?’, Survival, Summer 1995; Gregory Schulte, ‘Responding to Proliferation – NATO’s Role’, NATO Review, July 1995. Threats related to the NBC arsenal of Russia (or threats from NBC proliferation in South Asia or the Korean peninsula) will not be examined. For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that Islamic fundamentalism will not become the dominant ‘political’ ideology in the region and that NATO will continue to exist and function efficiently as an Alliance/defence organization. According to NATO definitions: Near-term: 1–2 years, Mid-term: 3–5 years, Long-term: 6–10 years or more. Provided that the Alliance will act to implement these political measures in time. For a detailed analysis, see M. Dembinski, A. Kelle and H. Muller, NATO and Nonproliferation: A Critical Appraisal, PRIF Reports No. 33, Frankfurt, 1994, pp. 13–21. Robert Joseph and John Reichart, ‘Deterrence and Defense in a Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Environment’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1996, p. 60. As one analyst put it, ‘nuclear weapons may still be the great equaliser; the problem is

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the U.S. and the West may now be the equalisee’ (Mark Dean Millot, Roger Molander and Peter Wilson, ‘The Day After . . . ’: Nuclear Proliferation in the Post-Cold War World, RAND Issue Paper, Santa Monica CA, February 1993, p. 187). Robert Pfaltzgraff Jr. (ed.), Security Strategy and Missile Defense, IFPA, Brassey’s, VA, 1995, p. 9. Of course, the above argument begs the question: Would a developing country decide to use NBC weapons against the West? If yes, under what circumstances? In addition to the calculated use of NBC weapons, one must also take under consideration the possibility of an irrational or religious, fanatic leader, or an unauthorized use due to an accident or loss of control during a crisis (see, for instance, Thanos Dokos, ‘The Probability of the Deliberate Use of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Spring 1989, pp. 38–48). Robert Chandler, Tomorrow’s War, Today’s Decisions, pp. xix–xx. After the Cold War, a fear emerged that at least some of the leaders of proliferating nations might be immune to any retaliatory threats, due to their slight regard for the health and well-being of their subjects (Robert Grant, Counterproliferation and International Security, US-CREST. Arlington, VA, 1995, p. xvii). Robert Blackwill and Albert Carnesale (eds), New Nuclear Nations. Consequences for U.S. Policy, Council of Foreign Relations Press, New York, 1993, pp. 42–43. Joseph and Reinhart, ‘Deterrence and Defense’, p. 69. Allied-Central European Workshop on Post-Cold War Concepts of Deterrence, Conference report by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Cambridge, MA, 1996, pp. 5–6. There is also the question of legitimacy of use of nuclear weapons to retaliate against CBW attacks. The answer would depend on the nature of the attack, the number of casualties and other factors. Vicente Garrido Rebolledo, NATO and the Counterproliferation: A New Role for the Alliance, NATO, Individual Research Fellowship 1995–1997, Madrid, June 1997, p. 50. The first three options belong to the field of non-proliferation. Instruments to combat proliferation include security guarantees, treaties and safeguards, regional agreements and diplomacy, technology denial, incentives, sanctions, collective international action, multilateral arms control, military preparedness and preventive or pre-emptive attack (J. Pilat and W. Kirchner, ‘The Technological Promise of Counterproliferation’, Washington Quarterly, Winter 1995, pp. 157–160). According to Seth Carus, ‘because of the extent to which countries have acquired capabilities, a growing focus of such efforts are initiatives to prevent countries from enhancing the size and sophistication of existing arsenals . . . . In other cases, inhibiting proliferation means slowing programmes, even though there is little reason to believe that they can be stopped. Often we are trying to buy time, hoping that changing circumstances will alter the cost-benefit assessment that encouraged the proliferation activity in the first place’ (Seth Carus, ‘Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implications and Responses’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1, March 1998, p. 8). Zachary Davis and Mitchell Reiss, U.S. Counterproliferation Doctrine: Issues for Congress, CRS Report, September 1994, p. 7. Robert Grant, Counterproliferation and International Security, US-CREST, Arlington, VA, 1995, pp. xv–xvi. Joseph and Reinhart, ‘Deterrence and Defense’, p. 60. Michael Ruhle, ‘View from NATO. NATO and the Coming Proliferation Threat’, Comparative Strategy, 1994, pp. 315 and 319. According to the 1997 Proliferation: Threat and Response: ‘DOD understands that the U.S. will not be successful in preventing proliferation all the time and in all places. When proliferation occurs and U.S. interests and commitments are threatened, the U.S. must be in a position to prevail on the battlefield, even against opponents who possess NBC weapons. DOD has unique responsibilities for the military responses needed if proliferation fails: active defence, passive defence, counterforce and response to paramilitary/covert threats’ (Proliferation: Threat and Response, DOD, Washington DC, 1997, p. 77).

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44 Counter-force options include (but are not limited to) attacking agent-production facilities, storage complexes and deployed mobile weapon platforms (Proliferation: Threat and Response, DOD, Washington DC, 1997, p. 71). According to a 1993 Congressional Research Service report, there are ‘six military countermeasures that form a broad spectrum. Three of them can be classified as offensive options: Option A constitutes interdiction operations designed to prevent proliferators from acquiring NBC-related materials, finished products, and/or economic sustenance. Option E relies on explosives to terminate NBC programmes. Option F attacks NBC delivery vehicles. The other three belong to the wide category of non-lethal defences. Option B seeks to neutralise (if the term is used for the physical “neutralisation” of people, it would fit better to the offensive options) skilled scientists, technicians, and programme managers without whom proliferation would slow or stop. Option C employs non-lethal instruments such as supersticky foams and computer viruses to disable or disrupt NBC processes for long periods. Option D instils qualms among first-generation proliferators by making them fearful that Special Operations Forces might seize the few finished weapons they have produced. It is emphasised that no military option is risk-free; all may be unattractive, but inaction eventually could become unacceptable’ (NBC Weapon Proliferation: Potential Military Countermeasures, CRS Report, Washington DC, p. 1). 45 For example, the US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) was assigned to assist regional commands in drawing up plans for nuclear war with Third World proliferators, and one of the first projects was the Silver Book concept. The ‘Silver Books’ were plans for military strikes against WMD facilities in a number of ‘rogue’ nations, such as Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea (Hans Kristensen and Joshua Handler, ‘The USA and Counterproliferation. A New and Dubious Role for U.S. Nuclear Weapons’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 27, No. 4, December 1996, p. 391). 46 Barry Schneider, Radical Responses to Radical Regimes: Evaluating Pre-emptive Counterproliferation, McNair Paper 41, National Defense University, Washington, DC, 1995. 47 Millot, Molander and Wilson, ‘The Day After . . . ’, p. 184. As mentioned elsewhere in this study, the Iraqi nuclear programme was not stopped, but instead re-directed in ways that brought it very close to producing nuclear weapons without being detected either by different intelligence agencies or by international monitoring arrangements. Before the Gulf War, two possible nuclear weapons-related facilities had been detected in Iraq. After the war, UNSCOM found no less than 21 different nuclear weapons-related facilities, with the air campaign during the Gulf War having had only a very limited effect on them (Carl Bildt, ‘Preemptive Military Action and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force, Remarks from a European Perspective’, prepared for the CEPS/IISS European Security Forum, Brussels, 13 January 2003, p. 6). 48 Dembinski, Kelle and Mueller, NATO and Nonproliferation, p. 34. 49 Blackwill and Carnesale, New Nuclear Nations, p. 169. 50 As noted above, however, the Israeli raid against Osiraq was probably no more than a temporary setback. 51 According to an American analyst, pre-emptive strikes against states not at war are illegal in international law. Pre-emptive counter-proliferation actions should be reserved only for the unique criminal regime whose previous violent and dangerous actions do not warrant giving it the benefit of the doubt (Schneider, Radical Responses, p. 37). 52 Zachary Davis and Mitchell Reiss, U.S. Counterproliferation Doctrine: Issues for Congress, CRS Report, Washington, DC, September 1994, p. 17. 53 Davis and Reiss, U.S. Counterproliferation Doctrine, p. 17. 54 Georgi Mamedov, in William Lewis and Stuart Johnson (eds), Weapons of Mass Destruction: New Perspectives on Counterproliferation, INNS, National Defense University, Washington DC, 1995, pp. 169–170. 55 Robert Chandler, Tomorrow’s War, Today’s Decisions, p. 198.

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56 Pete Domenici, ‘Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1, Winter 1995, p. 149. 57 Moreover, because such action is likely to be carried out, for the foreseeable future, by the US, by its Western allies, or by a US-or Western-led multilateral force, it will have an air of serving the interests of these states and thereby enhance discrimination (a major problem for the non-proliferation regime) (Mueller, in Harald Mueller and Mitchell Reiss (eds), International Perspectives on Counterproliferation, Woodrow Wilson Center Paper No. 99, 1995, pp. 27 and 33; Sanders, in Mueller and Reiss, p. 9). 58 Davis and Reiss, U.S. Counterproliferation Doctrine, p. 18. 59 Having learned the lessons both of the Osiraq raid and of the Gulf War, other Middle East countries can be expected to place even more emphasis on duplication, diversification and concealment (Blackwill and Carnesale, New Nuclear Nations, p. 23). Furthermore, ‘non-military’ counter-measures that take advantage of US sensitivities to civilian casualties might be even more effective. These counter-measures could include placing nursery or elementary schools near sensitive nuclear facilities, co-locating hospitals with CBW laboratories, or building prisons with the country’s leading political dissidents next to ballistic missile factories. These steps would confront Washington with a difficult choice: forego the destruction of the country’s NBC weapons or risk killing innocent civilians (Davis and Reiss, U.S. Counterproliferation Doctrine, p. 16). 60 Fear of pre-emption and decapitation could lead planners to deploy forces that, while secure in times of peace, would feature rapid devolution of release authority in crisis or under attack, complicating attempts to pre-empt through decapitation, and at the same time increasing the possibility of use of such weapons. 61 Various means exist to gather intelligence on nuclear weapons programmes – including nuclear intelligence, imagery intelligence, signals intelligence, communications intelligence, and human intelligence. Beyond the threshold of production of one weapon there are three critical problems: unlocking the strategic personality of a new proliferator (the organization for making nuclear decisions, and the doctrine that guides it, nuclear alert procedures, the safety of weapons, and security and controls); military ‘threat assessment’ of new nuclear arsenals; and intelligence support for a US-led attack on a fledgling arsenal. For an analysis of military requirements and options, see John Collins, Zachary Davis and Steven Bowman, NBC Weapon Proliferation: Potential Military Countermeasures, CRS Report for Congress, 5 July 1994; Robert Grant, Counterproliferation and International Security; and Z. Davis and M. Reiss, U.S. Counterproliferation Doctrine: Issues for Congress. 62 Chandler, Tomorrow’s War, p. 152. 63 Schneider, Radical Responses, p. 17. 64 Chandler, Tomorrow’s War, p. 188. 65 Schneider, Radical Responses, p. 18. As an analyst put it, ‘by the USAF’s own dmission, the 43-day assault – conducted with impunity and under optimal conditions – merely “inconvenienced” the Iraqi nuclear effort’ (Chandler, Tomorrow’s War, p. 155). 66 Attacks on NBC stockpiles and facilities present significant challenges to minimizing and containing collateral damage. Contamination from a military strike on a nuclear facility could be enormous. Depending on whether a reprocessing facility or nuclear reactor was operating, a military strike could release dangerous quantities of radioactive fission products and highly toxic plutonium into the atmosphere, causing many casualties and contaminating the environment in friendly and neutral, as well as enemy, countries (Davis and Reiss, U.S. Counterproliferation Doctrine, p. 14). 67 Especially after the Iraqi debacle, better intelligence assets would allow Washington’s NATO allies to replicate and validate the factual basis of US assessments. 68 Robert Joseph, ‘Proliferation, Counter-Proliferation and NATO’, pp. 124–126. According to Ashton Carter: ‘ . . . the better prepared we are to operate effectively in the face of special weapons, the less incentive we provide for potential proliferators to seek

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Notes to develop such weapons in the first place’. If credible, a CP strategy could deter some potential proliferants from realizing their goals, increase the risks and costs of others’ programmes, and possibly prevent yet others from ever using the weapons they may possess. It could thereby increase disincentives to NBC proliferation and possibly reshape perceptions of the military utility of possessing these weapons (Pilat and Kirchner, ‘The Technological Promise of Counterproliferation’, pp. 156 and 163). Grant, Counterproliferation and International Security, p. xix. Furthermore, by either eliminating or most likely eroding the adversary’s WMD capabilities, counter-force systems could reduce the potential pressures on active and passive defensive systems. However, some analysts argue that passive defences (such as dispersal of troops, protective clothing and civil defence) can be over 90 per cent effective at preventing casualties from CBW, a level of protection that would be difficult to achieve with active defences (Joseph Cirincione and Frank von Hippel (eds), The Last 15 Minutes. Ballistic Missile Defense in Perspective, Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, Washington DC, 1998, p. 11). Successful TMD operations will require ground, air, sea and space elements to work together in a variety of configurations and environments. These systems must be: strategically deployable in order to be easily airlifted to an area of conflict; highly mobile; and, once more, inter-operable with other elements of the BMD architecture and quickly made operational once deployed. The system must be flexible to operate in a wide range of geographic locations and sustain the rigours of battlefield mobility (Belen Lara, ATBM Systems and European Security, UNISCI Papers No 6, Madrid, 1997, p. 6). If, for example, a chemical weapon warhead was intercepted in the lower atmosphere, atmospheric conditions could result in the unintentional dispersion of most of the agent near the original target (Dembinski, Kelle and Muller, NATO and Nonproliferation, p. 47). As described in an IFPA study, ballistic missiles ‘can be shot down at three points during their flight: during the early “boost phase”; in mid-course, when most of them are outside the atmosphere; and in the terminal phase, shortly before they strike. Ideally, a defender should hit a missile during the boost phase, before it can divide into multiple warheads (if it has them) and so that the debris falls on the enemy. But that kind of interception is hard to achieve, for the boost phase even of a long-range missile will last less than three minutes; by the time satellites have spotted the launch and informed the defender, that phase may be over. The next best time to hit the missile is the mid-course: if an interceptor misses there is time for another shot. The terminal phase is the worst time, for any debris will fall on the defender’s territory. But terminal interceptions are the easiest to achieve with current technology. Short-range systems could also hit cruise missiles’ (Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Exploring U.S. Missile Defense Requirements in 2010, Cambridge, MA, April 1997, p. 25). As already discussed in Chapter 3, it is argued that the deployment of a TMD could achieve several objectives, such as •

• •

Facilitate coalition building options by reassuring allied military forces and populations, thus permitting power-projection operations such as peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, and permitting intervention in regions where WMD threats are likely; Deny enemy objectives involving the use, or threatened use, of missiledelivered NBC weapons; Contribute significantly to escalation control/dominance, enhancing deterrence. (Lara, ATBM Systems, p. 76)

75 Cirincione and Von Hippel, The Last 15 Minutes, p. 11. This action/reaction cycle is not new. Throughout history offensive weapons have spawned defensive counters, and defensive counters have driven offensive improvements. During the initial decades of the twenty-first century, it seems clear that much of this action/reaction cycle is going to be

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centred on the missile programme (Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, A Prognosis for International Missile Developments: 2010, Cambridge MA, August 1997, p. 22). In terms of technical feasibility and reliability, a prohibition on the testing, reduction and deployment of ballistic missiles is incomparably simpler than an active defence against them (Lara, ATBM Systems, pp. 3 and 7). Another problem with an allied missile defence system is that it threatens to split up Europe into zones of differentiated security. A NATO MD system, for instance, would be problematic both for France and the non-NATO members of the EU (Missile Defense, Deterrence and Arms Control: Contradictory Aims or Compatible Goals?, UNIDIR-Wilton Park, United Nations, Geneva, 2004, p. 23). Lara, ATBM Systems, pp. 16–17. Col. Herbert Woelfel, Branch Chief for Air Defence Planning, added that ‘such potential could be used in times of crisis to influence NATO political and military decisions’. Germany believes that a defence against long-range missiles can only be developed as an alliance-wide effort, not only to share the cost but also because several political implications must be considered (Jane’s Defence Weekly, 5 March 1997). Terzuolo, NATO and Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 14. As mentioned in the Lyell report, in the first phase, the group produced an ‘Assessment of the Proliferation Risks to NATO’, a classified report combining regional and technical analysis of potential proliferation challenges to Alliance peace and security. This report looked at the risks that could emerge by the year 2010 and, specifically, at potential risks in various countries. This exercise was performed with the full co-operation of all the NATO nations and was based on intelligence estimates. The second phase, completed in November 1995, assessed the military and strategic implications for NATO operations and defences. It examined the capabilities required to protect NATO forces, territory, and populations. These included deterrent forces, passive and active defences, and counter-force capabilities. The third and final phase was concluded in mid-1996 and recommended specific, tangible changes in NATO’s force posture that would provide these capabilities. This recognized that urgent action was required, and Ministers agreed to implement an accelerated process to correct shortfalls in military capabilities (Lord Lyell, Chemical and Biological Weapons: The Poor Man’s Bomb, Science and Technology Committee, North Atlantic Assembly, Brussels, November 1996, pp. 20–21). Eric Herring (ed.), ‘Preventing the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Special Issue, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1, March 2000, p. 38. The SDGP concluded that ‘greatest emphasis should be placed on core, integrative capabilities that would make the most substantial contributions . . . strategic and operational intelligence; automated and deployable command, control and communications; wide area ground surveillance; stand-off/point biological and chemical agent detection, identification and warning; extended air defences, including tactical ballistic missile defence for deployed forces; individual protective equipment for deployed forces’ (Kori Schake, ‘NATO’s Fundamental Divergence’, p. 119). Lara, ATBM Systems, p. 40. ‘The work that is done against NATO’s requirement will inevitably address many of the issues that are relevant to EBMD, including command, control and communications, effectiveness, networking of sensors, early warning and data sharing, mobility, seabased vs. land-based systems, coverage areas, fixed point defences, layered systems, national assets vs. imported systems, simulations, testing and so on’ (Kenyon et al., Prospects for a European Ballistic Missile Defence System, p. 19). The main issues associated with NATO co-operation are: Transatlantic industrial links; the Russian proposal for joint TMD; the need to deal with the existing risk (short, medium-range systems) and address possible future risks from multistage missiles; the need for different intercept methods; boost phase, midcourse, and terminal phase. Options for the Alliance include: (a) NATO allies co-operate in a US-run

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Notes programme; (b) they procure NATO-owned assets; (c) NATO and Russia co-operate; and (d) NATO, Russia, and other partners co-operate. Richard Sokolsky, ‘Imagining European Missile Defence’, Survival, Vol. 43, No. 3, Autumn 2001, pp. 113–114. ‘There are three international staff and seven national experts at the WMD Centre. The seven national experts bring with them a very wide experience. We have expertise in CW, biological agents, ballistic missiles, knowledge and experience in force protection, intelligence, and political aspects of arms control and non-proliferation regimes. We support a number of NATO committees. The two principal ones are the Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation and the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation, already mentioned in the previous section. In addition, the WMD Centre actively supports the Senior Political Committee in its work dealing with TMD, cooperation with Russia and issues related to the Alliance’s response to terrorism following the 11 September 2001 attacks against the U.S.’ (NATO On-line library, Web edition, Vol. 49, No. 4, Winter 2001, Ted Whiteside, Head of NATO’s WMD Centre, p. 22. Also, interviews with WMD Centre’s staff). ‘NATO promises (a) to retaliate against WMD use, (b) to make its troops less vulnerable under WMD impact, and (c) to use its technology to detect WMD development and to render the acquisition of such weapons more costly. The idea is to change the cost-benefit-ration of WMD programs: the costs of such programs would be considerably higher, since detection and destruction would become more probable; the benefits, with NATO troops operable and effective even under the impact of WMD use, would be lower’ (Henning Riecke, ‘NATO’s Non-Proliferation and Deterrence Policies: Mixed Signals and the Norm of WMD Non-Use’, in Herring, ‘Preventing the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, p. 40). Ashton Carter and David Omand, ‘Countering the Proliferation Risks: Adapting the Alliance to the New Security Environment’, NATO Review, September 1996. Some analysts argue that utilization of nuclear capability must be wholly retaliatory in nature. The use of nuclear weapons must only be considered as a policy option in the event of the actual use of nuclear weapons by a rogue nuclear state (Gregory Pickell, ‘Strength in an Unsettled World: The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Nuclear Nonproliferation and Deterrence’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1996, p. 88). According to others, although the post-Cold War role of nuclear weapons in US defence policy is not precisely defined, nuclear weapons remain the ultimate sanction and a vital element of deterring NBC use. However, the US has given up the ability to respond in kind to CW and BW use. Therefore, the US is limited to conventional and nuclear response options and must think about the inter-relationship of these two capabilities so that they work together to strengthen deterrence (Robert Joseph and John Reichart, ‘Deterrence and Defense in a Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Environment’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1996, pp. 68 and 72). A nuclear threat would have extremely negative political repercussions. The three NATO NWS have given guarantees to NNWS not allied with a hostile NWS not to attack or threaten them with nuclear weapons. A nuclear threat in the abovementioned cases would violate this promise and could trigger what NATO wants to avoid: solidarity with the culprit and maybe even more demand for nuclear weapons in Third World countries (Dembinski et al., NATO and Nonproliferation, pp. 35 and 37). NATO’s continued emphasis on nuclear deterrence has been criticized by a number of experts. As Steven Miller put it, ‘here is the most powerful and successful alliance in history, led by the mightiest power the world has even seen, in an environment in which serious enemies or major threats are lacking, insisting that nuclear weapons remain not simply useful but “essential” to its security “for the foreseeable future”. The most formidable aggregation of conventional military power ever mustered by any group of states “cannot ensure credible deterrence” ’ (Center for Policy Analysis and Planning, Conference on Nuclear Proliferation, Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 2003, p. 51).

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92 It is argued that, unless intrinsic US interests are present in the region, American nuclear threats may not be credible (Robert Chandler, Tomorrow’s War, p. xxi). 93 Robert Pfaltzgraff Jr. (ed.), Security Strategy and Missile Defense, IFPA, Brassey’s, VA, 1995, p. 21. 94 To give a rather extreme example, some analysts argue that ‘Predictions that Iran shares the Western perspectives on NBC use or that it would employ NBC weapons strictly as weapons of last resort may be dangerously misleading. There are few apparent moral or religious impediments should Iranian leaders choose to employ NBC weapons’ (Paula DeSutter, Denial and Jeopardy: Deterring Iranian Use of NBC Weapons, INSS, National Defense University, Washington DC, 1997, pp. 1–2). Similarly, another study argued that, ‘After the Cold War, a fear emerged that at least some of the leaders of proliferating nations might be immune to any retaliatory threats, due to their slight regard for the health and well-being of their subjects’ (Robert Grant, Counterproliferation and International Security, p. xvii). Finally, according to another analyst, ‘Leaders of these radical regimes may see the world so differently, and desire such immediate large-scale changes in their regions of the world, that they might not be very easily deterred, if at all, from first use of WMD against their perceived enemies. It is not always clear what price such radical leaders might accept for their populations in order to destroy an enemy state. The Western concept of deterrence, applied throughout the Cold War, may not play well against these actors from a far different set of values, culture, historical experience, and world view’ (Barry Schneider, Radical Responses to Radical Regimes: Evaluating Preemptive Counter-Proliferation, McNair Paper 41, May 1995, p. 7). 95 Blackwill and Carnesale, New Nuclear Nations, p. 143. Another analyst suggests that ‘even if the threatened retaliation would, from the Western perspective, impose unacceptable costs on an enemy, what constitutes unacceptable costs in one culture may not necessarily be unacceptable to decision-makers who weigh and calculate costs and benefits differently and who operate in a strategic culture vastly different from the Western tradition’ (DeSutter, Denial and Jeopardy, p. 2). 96 The West might lack the keys to ‘unlock the strategic personality’ of the proliferator. What is its foreign policy agenda? What domestic pressures are influencing this agenda? How do nuclear weapons fit into this picture? Under what circumstances would the country’s leadership be willing to use nuclear weapons? How would it use them? And what carrots and sticks, if any, could prevent such use? (Blackwill and Carnesale, New Nuclear Nations, p. 144). 97 Lesser, Green, Larrabee and Zanini, The Future of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative, p. 45. 98 The Mediterranean south played a rather marginal role in the East–West strategic competition and NATO strategy (Whitman, Securing Europe’s Southern Flank?, p. 5; Lesser et al., The Future of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative, p. 5). 99 www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/med-dia.htm. For a history of the Mediterranean Dialogue, see, Whitman, Securing Europe’s Southern Flank?, pp. 11–12. 100 Alberto Bin, ‘Strengthening Cooperation in the Mediterranean: The Contribution of the Atlantic Alliance’, Presentation at the 1999 International Halki Seminars, organized by the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Halesi, Greece, p. 15. 101 Roberto Menotti, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative, p. 1. 102 Menotti, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative, abstract. 103 Internal consensus on MD is a delicate one. Some regard it as a simple public relations effort, others think of it as a useful channel to discuss security questions, while the more ambitious would like the dialogue to consider how NATO could address the security concerns of the Mediterranean partners (Lesser et al., The Future of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative, p. 50). 104 Menotti, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative, p. 12. 105 Lesser et al., The Future of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative, p. 57.

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106 Raouf Saad, ‘Egypt and the North Atlantic Treaty organization. Perceptions and Prospects’, in Maurizio Coccia (ed.), The 50 Years of NATO Seen From the Mediterranean Region, Rubbettino, Rome, 1999, pp. 77–78. According to RAND Corporation study, ‘Many dialogue countries feel that NATO is essentially seeking a way to keep the North African states and their problems at arm’s length, rather than genuinely trying to engage in closer partnerships with them’. Even worse, it has been argued that, for some in the Middle East, NATO and the West are the security threat (Lesser et al., The Future of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative, pp. 59 and 61). Terzuolo argues further that ‘many Dialogue countries, especially those in the Maghreb, were concerned that NATO’s increasing emphasis on WMD was part of an effort to depict the Mediterranean as the new center of threats to alliance countries, and hence justify military intervention in the region’ (Terzuolo, NATO and Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 71). 107 According to Roberto Menotti, potential Dialogue partners include ‘grey’ countries Syria, Lebanon, Algeria; ‘black’ countries or ‘rogue states’ Iraq, Iran, Libya; and countries belonging to a de facto ‘American reservoir’ in the Persian Gulf and the Arab peninsula (Menotti, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative, p. 8). 108 Lesser et al., The Future of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative, pp. 29 and 57. 109 Menotti, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative, pp. 8, 15 and 17. 110 For a discussion of the potential role of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, see Thanos Dokos, NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative: Prospects and Policy Recommendations, ELIAMEP Policy Papers No. 3, Athens, June 2003. 111 NATO’s Istanbul Summit, Reader’s Guide, 28 June 2004, p. 23. 112 Robert Joseph, ‘Proliferation, Counter-Proliferation and NATO’, p. 123. Countries in the broader Middle East do not have a power projection capability (very limited capabilities for force transportation by air and sea), and they lack ‘Blue water’ navies and sufficient long-range strike aircraft. They do not possess advanced military technologies such as stealth, precision-guided munitions, advanced electronics, sophisticated C4I systems, advanced air defence capabilities, space capabilities, etc. Therefore, their ability to strike at NATO territory is very limited. In addition, they would not be able to successfully fight full-scale regional wars against US or NATO forces. 113 According to IFPA, ‘if in fact such missions do become a priority for the Alliance, the procurement of systems by member states to facilitate regional intervention will be required, possibly giving the Alliance an offensive posture in the eyes of some Mediterranean countries (Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Southern Region Workshop on TMD, Counter-Proliferation Planning and Security Collaboration in the New Era, Cambridge MA, November 1995, p. ix). 114 Indeed, if military action were to be required in the Gulf or other parts of the Middle East, this would most likely be carried out by a ‘coalition of the willing’ of NATO members rather than NATO ‘as an institution’. Nevertheless, NATO could serve as a forum for discussing these issues and trying to build an Alliance consensus, even if NATO as an institution was unlikely to undertake military action in the Gulf or Middle East (Shahram Chubin and Jerold Green, NATO’s New Strategic Concept and Peripheral Contingencies: The Middle East, RAND Corporation and the Geneva Center Security Policy, Conference proceedings, Geneva, 1999, p. 7). 7 Basic principles of US counterproliferation strategy 1 The proliferation threat has been described in very strong terms since the late 1990s. President Clinton spoke about ‘the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security . . . of the United States posed by the proliferation of NBC weapons and the means of delivering such weapons’ (November 1998) and President Bush about ‘The gravest danger facing America and the world is outlaw regimes that seek and possess NBC weapons’ (January 2003). According to (former) DCI George Tenet, ‘the “domino theory” of the twenty-first century may well be nuclear’ (11 February 2004).

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2 It is rightly argued that the ‘merging of the terrorism and proliferation threats proved in 2002–2003 to be one of the most controversial of the many strategic policy innovations that emerged during the year from the US’ (IISS Strategic Survey 2002/2003, p. 5). 3 Gnesotto, in Gustav Lindstrom and Burkard Schmitt (eds), ‘Fighting Proliferation – European Perspectives’, Chaillot Papers, No. 66, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, December 2003, p. 5. The Bush administration came to office with a strong political impetus to pursue a strategy that emphasized defence instead of multilateral efforts, rather than defence in addition to multilateral efforts (IISS Strategic Survey 2001/2002, p. 19). 4 The Clinton administration did oversee the gradual if reluctant move towards a NMD system that would be capable of protecting the US from a small number of ballistic missiles; the central scenarios were a limited attack from a rogue state and an accidental or unauthorized strike by an established nuclear power (David McDonough, Nuclear Superiority. The ‘New Triad’ and the Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Adelphi Paper 383, IISS, Oxford, 2006, p. 37). 5 Jeffrey Record, Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War and Counterproliferation, Policy Analysis No. 519, CATO Institute, Washington DC, 8 July 2004, p. 1. 6 11 September did initiate a paradigm shift in strategic planning as significant as that of 1945 (Harry S. Laver, ‘Preemption and the Evolution of America’s Strategic Defense’, Parameters, Vol. 35, No. 2, Summer 2005, pp. 107–120 ). 7 As Jessica Mathews observed, ‘September 11 changed the U.S. far more than it did the rest of the world. It tore away the sense of distance and difference that has enfolded us throughout our history. Some time ago technology and globalization turned that safe and separate “city in the hill” into an illusion, but it was one we still believed in’ (Jessica Mathews, ‘September 11, One Year Later A World of Change’, Policy Brief No. 18, Carnegie Endowment, Washington DC, 2002, p. 1). 8 According to the IISS, ‘another homeland-security concern is a scenario analysts call a “Digital Pearl-Harbor”: a surprise attack on the web of computer networks that undergirds the American economy and government. A cyber-attack might immobilize the Pentagon’s ability to communicate with U.S. military forces, siphon billions from the economy, or shut down all the services of a large city’ (IISS Strategic Survey 2001/2002, p. 50). 9 Gurr and Cole point out that since the end of World War II, the US has ‘experienced three waves of vulnerability. The first followed the test of an atomic bomb by the Soviet Union in 1949; the second was a consequence of the escalating superpower nuclear arms race that ensued; and, from 1995, the third has been NBC terrorism’ (Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole, The New Face of Terrorism. Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction, I. B. Tauris Publishers, London, 2002, p. 1). 10 IISS Strategic Survey 2001/2002, p. 36. 11 Robert Manning, ‘The Ultimate Weapon Redux? U.S. Nuclear Policy in a New Era’, in Burkard Schmitt (ed.), Nuclear Weapons: A Great Debate, Chaillot Papers, No. 48, EU-ISS, Paris, July 2001, p. 62. 12 As Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has stressed, ‘it is not possible to defend against every conceivable kind of attack in every conceivable location at every minute of the day or night . . . . The best, and in some cases, the only defense, is a good offense’ (Elaine Bunn, ‘Pre-emptive Action: When, How, and to What Effect?’, Strategic Forum, No. 200, July 2003, p. 5). 13 IISS Strategic Survey 2001/2002, p. 20. 14 Andrew Newman, ‘Arms Control, Proliferation and Terrorism: The Bush Administration’s Post-September 11 Security Strategy’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, March 2004, p. 59; IISS Strategic Survey 2004/2005, p. 43. 15 Kori Schake, ‘NATO’s “Fundamental Divergence” over Proliferation’, in Ted Galen Carpenter (ed.), ‘NATO Enters the 21st Century’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3, September 2000, p. 111.

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16 Robert Joseph and John Reichart, ‘Deterrence and Defense in a Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Environment’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1996, p. 60. 17 It must also be recognized that it will not always be possible to reconcile fully nonproliferation imperatives and the war on terror. In fact, the GWOT has already presented the US with non-proliferation policy trade-offs, such as the case of Pakistan, and the impact on the non-proliferation regime does not appear to be a major concern in current US thinking (At the Crossroads. Counterproliferation and National Security Strategy, National Defense University, Washington DC, April 2004, p. 235). 18 As Bunn points out, ‘it is hard to overestimate the impact of September 11, 2001, on administration thinking. As the weight of responsibility for protecting the U.S. from an even worse occurrence – a potential 9/11 with WMD – settled on the shoulders of administration officials, the need to act swiftly and firmly before threats become attacks is perhaps the clearest lesson they have drawn from the experience’ (M. Elaine Bunn, ‘Pre-emptive Action: When, How, and to What Effect?’, Strategic Forum, No. 200, July 2003, p. 4). 19 The Bush administration argued that rogue states and terrorist organizations share one critical attribute: some measure of immunity from deterrence. However, unlike terrorist organizations, rogue states have critical assets that can be held hostage to the threat of devastating retaliation (Jeffrey Record, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, December 2003, pp. 1, 13–14). 20 Derek Smith, Deterring America. Rogue States and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 3. 21 Record, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism, p. 1. As Robert Kagan has noted, the nexus between terrorism and WMD has become ‘the reigning foreign policy paradigm of the post-9/11 era’ (Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism. The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, Times Books, New York, 2004, p. 129). 22 Jeffrey Record argues quite convincingly that ‘stapling together rogue states and terrorist organizations with different agendas and threat levels to the U.S. as an undifferentiated threat obscures critical differences among rogue states, among terrorist organizations and between rogue states and terrorist groups. Terrorist organizations are secretive, elusive, non-state entities that characteristically possess little in the way of assets that can be held hostage. In contrast, rogue states are sovereign entities defined by specific territories, populations, governmental infrastructures, and other assets; as such, they are much more exposed to decisive military attack than terrorist organizations’ (Record, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism, p. 16). 23 Eric Herring, ‘Rogue Rage: Can We Prevent Mass Destruction?’, in Eric Herring (ed.), ‘Preventing the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Special Issue, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1, March 2000, pp. 192–193. It was also argued that ‘beyond providing sanctuary, some antagonistic leaders may develop symbiotic relationships with terrorist organizations, employing them as proxies to carry out an attack which they can then disavow as the handiwork of unknown extremists’ (Smith, Deterring America, p. 7). 24 John Mueller and Karl Mueller, ‘The Methodology of Mass Destruction: Assessing Threats in the New World Order’, in Herring, p. 165. Rogue states regimes may be more risk-prone than governments of ‘normal’ states, but does that mean they do not value their own survival and are incapable of making rational calculations of ends and means? (Record, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism, p. 18). 25 According to Pascal Boniface, ‘the reality is that whether a country is perceived as a threat or a rogue state or a member of the “axis of evil” is more closely linked to whether countries are perceived to be friendly toward the U.S. than it is to a state’s actual behaviour or the actual threat it poses to international order’ (Smith, Deterring America, p. 14). 26 Eric Terzuolo, NATO and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Routledge, London, 2006, p. 88.

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27 Record, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism, p. 18. 28 As the US defence budget declined in the wake of the Cold War, the Pentagon has emphasized the threat posed by proliferation in an effort to justify new military missions and to give some threatened procurement programmes a new lease on life (Robert Blackwill and Albert Carnesale (eds), New Nuclear Nations. Consequences for U.S. Policy, Council of Foreign Relations Press, New York, 1993, p. 139). 29 Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws, 1995, pp. 25–26; Hans Gunter Brauch, ‘Missile Defence Programmes and Debates in the U.S. – Threat Perception on the MENA Area: An Assessment and Proposal’, in the very interesting volume by Hans Gunter Brauch, P. H. Liotta, Antonio Marquina, Paul Rogers and Mohammad El-Sayed Selim (eds), Security Environment in the Mediterranean, Springer, Berlin, 2002, p. 402. Although Klare sees ‘rogue state’ as an appropriate label for North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria, the central thesis of his book is that the threat posed by them has been exaggerated by the Pentagon in order to prevent its post-Cold War budget from being cut. Herring argues that this ‘motivated bias could be caused unconsciously by a desire to prop up their military budget; self-deception rather than the deliberate deception Klare hints at’ (Herring, ‘Preventing the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, p. 196). 30 Jason Ellis, ‘The Best Defense: Counterproliferation and U.S. National Security’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 2, Spring 2003, p. 115. 31 It was also argued that ‘even a limited WMD capability may afford regional adversaries a significant strategic advantage: the ability to hold friendly cities and other important strategic assets at unacceptable risk’ and that the ‘mere possession of nuclear weapons could embolden a rogue state and encourage risk-taking behaviour. Nations with nuclear capacity may be more likely to employ CBW while reserving a trump card to deter regime change or to use as leverage during war-termination negotiations’ (Ellis, ‘The Best Defense’, p. 118). Richard Falkenrath makes a specific reference to the situation in the Persian Gulf where ‘WMD allow Iran the opportunity to attack each of the pillars on which the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf rests: very capable and expensive armed forces, the political will to keep these forces deployed abroad, and friendly host nations. WMD increases the odd that an adversary such as Iran could deter the U.S., disrupt U.S.-led coalitions, and foment regional instability and arms races’ (Richard Falkenrath, Robert Newman and Bradley Thayer, America’s Achilles Heel. NBC Terrorism and Covert Attack, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998, p. 2). 32 Jason Ellis argues that ‘in response, the U.S. seeks to advance its security along two parallel and mutually reinforcing lines: pursuing a proactive, full-court press against security challenges emerging from the proliferation-terrorism nexus; and strengthening homeland and transforming military capabilities to deter, protect against, and mitigate the effects of an attack’ (Ellis, ‘The Best Defense’, pp. 115 and 117). 33 Although the National Security Strategy may have been a rhetorical device intended primarily for a domestic audience in the aftermath of 9/11, it still carried a considerable weight in terms of providing guidance for US foreign policy (William Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, Adelphi Paper 370, IISS, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p. 58). 34 Proliferation: Threat and Response, DoD, April 1997. 35 According to a DoD report, the US ‘is pursuing several initiatives to neutralize the military advantages gained by potential opponents from deploying, threatening to use or actually using WMD: (1) Ensuring that the U.S. has the ability to destroy WMD with a high degree of assurance at acceptable costs; (2) Maintaining the U.S. capability to deter credibly any state that would threaten the use of WMD; (3) effective military power projection with minimum vulnerability; (4) ability to identify origins of attacking WMD; (5) viable decision-making and C3I after WMD attack; (6) ensuring the capability to prevail militarily; (7) enhanced capability for damage limitation and escalation control; and (8) providing the capability for rapid deployment of active and passive

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defences’ (Eric Herring, ‘Introduction’, in Eric Herring (ed.), ‘Preventing the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Special Issue, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1, March 2000, p. 6). Ashton Carter, ‘How to Counter WMD’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 5, September/October 2004, pp. 73–74. The new nuclear players’ characteristics included covert nuclear programmes, roots in nationalism, regional concerns, willingness to co-operate with other proliferators, and vulnerability to political change (Josiane Gabel, ‘The Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons After September 11’, The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2004/2005, pp. 184, 189–190). Without a strong understanding of the varying motivations behind rogue state development of WMD, a standardized response to proliferation runs the risk of not disarming the most dangerous states, or attempting to disarm those better left alone (Smith, Deterring America, p. 5). 1997 Strategic Assessment, National Defense University, Washington DC, p. 11. A key requirement is to understand an adversary’s likely NBC employment concepts (Paula DeSutter, Deterring Iranian NBC Use, Strategic Forum No. 110, INSS/National Defense University, Washington DC, 1997, p. 1). Ashton Carter and Celeste Johnson, ‘Beyond the Counterproliferation Initiative’, in Henry Sokolski, and James Ludes (eds), Twenty-First Century Proliferation, Frank Cass, London 2001, p. 67. Laver, ‘Preemption’, p. 115. As Walter Slocombe points out, a ‘major operational issue with preemption is whether the proposed operation will actually eliminate the WMD capability targeted. The problem is not (usually) whether there is a means of executing a preemptive attack once targets are identified, but knowing what and where to strike. Precision weapons require precision intelligence, and preemption requires that intelligence be comprehensive as well as precise’ (Walter Slocombe, Preemptive Military Action and the Legitimate Use of Force: An American Perspective, prepared for the CEPS/IISS European Security Forum, Brussels, 13 January 2003, p. 10). According to the National Defense University, the WMD proliferation has ‘put special pressures on intelligence and analysis. The margins for acceptable variance and error in estimates are smaller than for conventional capabilities while the difficulty of developing and delivering acceptable estimates is far more difficult’ (1997 Strategic Assessment, pp. 11–12). Also, ‘proliferation surprise may result from mistaken estimates of the nature or maturity of specific national indigenous programs, but the potential for strategic surprise also exists if, for example, actors acquire unforeseen capabilities covertly from external sources’ (Ellis, ‘The Best Defense’, p. 123). Finally, the US’s Iraqi ‘adventure’ of 2003 clearly demonstrates that the process of intelligence collection and analysis can be fatally compromised by political pressures to reach desired conclusions (Record, Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War and Counterproliferation, p. 16). This observation is followed by the pessimistic prediction that ‘even if U.S. intelligence does improve its new performance, strategic and tactical warning of both WMD proliferation and terrorism are clearly prone to failure. For this reason, and because the consequences of particular WMD attacks may be severe, White House officials have argued that the U.S. must plan as if such weapons will be used. Indeed, not only does the continuing proliferation of WMD capabilities appear inevitable, the potential for adversarial use of WMD against U.S. forces and allies, or the U.S. homeland is increasingly likely’ (Ellis, ‘The Best Defense’, pp. 122–123). Furthermore, ‘given the extent of NBC proliferation around the globe, the U.S. can ill afford to assume that any significant future adversary would not possess a WMD capability’ (Rebecca Hersman and Todd Koca, ‘Eliminating Adversary WMD: Lessons for Future Conflicts’, Strategic Forum, No. 211, October 2004, p. 4). This is a difficult intelligence task, as the states of greatest concern are among the most challenging targets (At the Crossroads. Counterproliferation and National Security Strategy, p. 15).

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45 J. Collins, Z. Davis and S. Bowman, NBC Weapon Proliferation: Potential Military Countermeasures, CRS Report, July 1994, p. 28. 46 WMD elimination is more than finding NBC weapons; it is about understanding the range of activities the adversary has undertaken to acquire these weapons, including development, production, and employment (Hersman and Koca, ‘Eliminating Adversary WMD’, pp. 1, 5 and 6). 47 Hans Ruehle and Michael Ruhle, ‘A View from Europe: Missile Defense for the 21st Century: Echoes of the 1930s’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 20, No. 2, April–June 2001, p. 221. 48 Joseph and Reichart, ‘Deterrence and Defense in a Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Environment’, p. 63. 49 Ian Kenyon, Mike Rance, John Simpson and Mark Smith, Prospects for a European Ballistic Missile Defence System, Southampton Papers in International Policy, No. 4, Southampton, 2001, p. 6. 50 Bruno Tertrais, U.S. Missile Defence. Strategically Sound, Politically Questionable, Center for European Reform, London, April 2001, p. 10. 51 Francois Heisbourg, ‘A View from Europe’, Survival, Vol. 43, No. 3, Autumn 2001, p. 67. 52 Kenyon, et al., Prospects for a European Ballistic Missile Defence System, p. 8. 53 Record, Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War and Counterproliferation, p. 24. 54 McDonough refers to the possibility that the strategic culture of rogue states might not be so amenable to the otherwise persuasive logic of deterrence (McDonough, Nuclear Superiority, p. 74). And Terzuolo points out that rogue state leaders can ‘vary greatly in their readiness to undertake risky behaviour, implying the need for deterrent policies that are closely tailored to specific cases’ (Terzuolo, NATO and Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 88). 55 Record, Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War and Counterproliferation, p. 3. 56 Andrew Newman, ‘Arms Control, Proliferation and Terrorism: The Bush Administration’s Post-September 11 Security Strategy’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, March 2004, p. 67; Theresa Hitchens, ‘Nuclear Posture is New’, Defense News, 25 June 2001. 57 Newman, ‘Arms Control, Proliferation and Terrorism’, pp. 68–69. Rogue states have been incorporated as critical targets in the increasingly prompt and flexible US nuclear-war plans (McDonough, Nuclear Superiority, p. 2). 58 Newman, ‘Arms Control, Proliferation and Terrorism’, p. 66. 59 The expansion of American nuclear targets led to a renewed emphasis on more usable and low-yield nuclear warheads for CP missions (10-tonne ‘micro-nukes’, 100-tonne ‘mini-nukes’, 1,000-tonne ‘tiny-nukes’) (McDonough, Nuclear Superiority, pp. 40–41). 60 According to another source, US intelligence has ‘identified 10,000 HDBTs in countries of proliferation concern, 2,000 of which are believed to be strategically important’ (‘U.S. Military Options Against Emerging Nuclear Threats’, IISS Strategic Comments, Vol. 12, No. 3, April 2006, p. 2). 61 Among the underground targets of most concern are very hardened structures built at depths of 1000 feet or so with reinforced concrete capable of withstanding up to 1000 atmospheres over-pressure. However, even a one-kiloton earth penetrator would be quite devastating in a city, and against really deep targets, high yields would be required because there are limits to how far a penetrator can travel through the earth’s surface before disintegrating. ‘Such a weapon would obliterate much of the surrounding area and spread radioactive debris far and wide’ (Sidney Drell, James Goodby, Raymond Jeanloz and Robert Peurifoy, ‘A Strategic Choice: New Bunker Busters Versus Nonproliferation’, Arms Control Today, March 2003, pp. 8–9; Anthony Blinken, ‘From Preemption to Engagement’, Survival, Vol. 45, No. 4, Winter 2003–2004, p. 43). 62 Gabel rightly points out that a US nuclear retaliatory strike may be precisely what a terrorist organization such as al-Qaeda seeks (Gabel, ‘The Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons’, p. 192).

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63 Herring cites the ‘strength of the nuclear taboo, felt by American elites and citizens alike, as another factor that has forced U.S. policymakers to concentrate on developing non-nuclear options as the basis of potential counterforce strategies’ (Herring, ‘Preventing the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Special Issue, p. 9). 64 Carter, ‘How to Counter WMD’, p. 82. A Cato Institute analysis by Charles V. Pena concludes: ‘Ultimately, mini-nukes could undermine deterrence and make the U.S. less secure, especially when combined with a policy of preemptive regime change. If rogue states believe that the U.S. has a nuclear capability that it is willing to use preemptively, leaders of those countries may feel they have nothing to lose by striking first at the U.S. (knowing that waiting means certain defeat)’ (Record, Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War and Counterproliferation, pp. 21–22). 65 David Gompert and Klaus Arnhold, Ballistic Missile Defence. A German–American Analysis, RAND–SWP, January 2001, p. 24. 66 Jeffrey Record makes the same point: ‘It would probably not matter a whit if the weapons employed were “mini-nukes” of low yield and employed in a fashion that minimized collateral damage. A terrible line would be crossed; not since 1945 has a nuclear weapon been detonated in war, and since then near universal opprobrium has helped prevent their use’ (Record, Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War and Counterproliferation, p. 21). There is also concern that more ‘usable’ nuclear weapons would blur the line between conventional and nuclear capabilities, lowering the nuclear threshold by giving nuclear capabilities battlefield uses (Gabel, ‘The Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons’, p. 191). 67 Record, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism, p. 31. 68 As President Bush has stated, ‘Knowing these realities, America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof – the smoking gun – that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud’ (Blinken, ‘From Preemption to Engagement’, p. 36). A similar statement is attributed to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, who said, ‘We don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud’ (Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism. The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, Times Books, New York, 2004, p. 137). David Frun and Richard Perle (both at the American Enterprise Institute) are asking the question: ‘Why let an enemy grow stronger? By waiting . . . we forfeit the initiative. We cast away the opportunity to act at a time and place of our choosing and gamble our security on future circumstances that may or may not be favorable to us’ (Record, Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War and Counterproliferation, p. 12). 69 Slocombe, Preemptive Military Action, p. 3; Bunn, ‘Pre-emptive Action: When, How, and to What Effect?’, p. 1. 70 Bunn, ‘Pre-emptive Action’, p. 13. 71 IISS Strategic Survey 2002/2003, p. 7. Looking beyond Iraq, it is difficult to predict whether pre-emptive military action will be the doctrine of the future or a seldom-used option. 72 As Blinken points out, ‘one acts “preemptively” against an adversary whose fist is cocked. One acts “preventively” against an adversary whose fist is not even raised, but who has been muscling up and might decide to strike you sometime in the future. Israel’s attack against the Egyptian army massing on its borders is a prime example of the former; its destruction in 1981 of an Iraqi nuclear reactor under construction is a textbook case of the latter’ (Blinken, ‘From Preemption to Engagement’, p. 35). 73 Robert Litwak, ‘Non-proliferation and the Dilemmas of Regime Change’, Survival, Vol. 45, No. 4, Winter 2003/2004, p. 17. 74 Slocombe, Preemptive Military Action, p. 8. 75 Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 56. As Freedman points out, ‘in the absence of a compelling cause claims of preventive war can easily become a cover for aggression. Hegemonic powers fearful of rising rivals, neighbouring states with undefined borders, or historic enemies on constant alert could use preventive war as a universal justification

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depending on one’s interpretation of what constitutes an inevitable threat’ (Smith, Deterring America, p. 118). Laver argues that ‘post-9/11 world requires a reassessment of “imminent”, that the proliferation of WMD and their potential nexus with terrorists has made obsolete the customary understanding of international law’s necessity requirement’ (Laver, ‘Preemption’, p. 114). Bunn, ‘Pre-emptive Action’, p. 3. Blinken, ‘From Preemption to Engagement’, pp. 36–37. Bunn, ‘Pre-emptive Action’, p. 14. It is also suggested that one should: (a) Consider the risk-tolerance and values of the target state and whether it is likely to remain fundamentally conservative, or be highly motivated to challenge the status quo and threaten the US; (b) Estimate US interests in the region to determine the overall balance of resolve in a potential conflict. After Iraq, it will be much harder to rally the world against more dangerous weapons programmes like Iran and North Korea (Blinken, ‘From Preemption to Engagement’, p. 38). Charles Knight, First Strike Guidelines: The Case of Iraq, Project on Defense Alternatives, Briefing Memo No. 25, 16 September 2002, pp. 1–5; Barry Schneider, Radical Responses to Radical Regimes: Evaluating Preemptive Counter-Proliferation, McNair Paper 41, May 1995, pp. 25–26. Litwak, ‘Non-proliferation and the Dilemmas of Regime Change’, p. 7. Bunn, ‘Pre-emptive Action’, p. 2. Many believe the threat of pre-emptive or preventive military strikes and a policy of regime change only encourages the development of WMD in states that fear, and thus want to deter, a US attack (IISS Strategic Survey 2004/2005, p. 43). Gary Samore, ‘Nuclear Proliferation After Iraq’, IISS Global Strategic Review, Leesburg, VA, 12–14 September 2003, p. 1. Record observes that Operation Iraqi Freedom appears, at least so far, to have had the opposite effect on North Korea and Iran (Record, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism, p. 30). Blinken, ‘From Preemption to Engagement’, pp. 36–37. According to the IISS, ‘what seems to be emerging as a U.S. preference for unilateral responses focused on a potential enemy’s capabilities over cooperative bilateral and multilateral arms control dialogues and agreements where intentions can be clarified is something that is likely to strengthen the norm of self-help in international security, at the expense of the concept of cooperative security’ (IISS Strategic Survey 2002/2003, p. 5). For example, as Carl Bildt points out, ‘if there is a perception in Islamabad that New Delhi believes that there is an international climate that tends towards tolerating pre-emptive strikes against nuclear facilities, the threshold against Pakistan using its nuclear weapons against India during a crisis or confrontation might be lowered substantially’ (Carl Bildt, Preemptive military action and the legitimacy of the use of force. Remarks from a European Perspective, prepared for the CEPS/IISS European Security Forum, Brussels, 13 January 2003, pp. 8–9). Bunn argues that ‘used judiciously, with good reason, and effectively – only in the toughest cases – preemption is likely to be accepted, if somewhat grudgingly, by the international community’ (Bunn, ‘Pre-emptive Action’, pp. 11 and 15. See also, What is the Future of Striking First in U.S. National Security Strategy?, RAND Research Brief, 2006, p. 1). Knight, First Strike Guidelines, p. 1. As Derek Smith observes, ‘ultimately, the U.S. must develop the capabilities to deter and defeat its adversaries when it really counts, but it should also work to create an international environment where it has to “roll the dice” of deterrence as few times as possible. It is a deadly game, so one must know the other players and choose opponents wisely’ (Smith, Deterring America, p. 159). India and Pakistan, China and Taiwan, Russia vis-à-vis Georgia or Chechnya, and Israel and its Arab neighbours, to cite some obvious examples, may well conclude that

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they can attack one another first and ask questions later, if that is good enough for the US. As Henry Kissinger put it in a testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: ‘It cannot be either the American national interest or the world’s interest to develop principles that grant every nation an unfettered right of preemption against its own definition of threats to its security’ (Blinken, ‘From Preemption to Engagement’, p. 38). 91 Record, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism, p. 21. 92 After Iraq, it will be difficult for the US, the UK or any other state to garner domestic and international support for another preventive war on WMD grounds unless the threat is accepted to be truly substantial, imminent and avoidable only by military means (Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, pp. 15 and 62; Gnesotto, in Lindstrom and Zanders, p. 5). 93 Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, p. 138; The Future Nuclear Landscape: New Realities, New Responses, Center of the Study of WMD, National Defense University, 2006 Annual Symposium, Washington DC, 2006, p. 4. 8 The EU’s response to WMD proliferation 1 A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council of Brussels on 13 December 2003, p. 10. 2 Therese Delpech, ‘Nuclear weapons – less central, more dangerous?’, in Burkard Schmitt (ed.), Nuclear Weapons: A New Great Debate, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper, No. 48, Paris, July 2001, p. 14. 3 See, for instance, references to instability in the Mediterranean and asymmetric threats in the 1999, 2001 and 2004 White Papers of the Hellenic Ministry of National Defence, unsurprisingly without reference to specific countries. 4 As Therese Delpech observes, ‘documents on European defense and security include no threat assessment. The subject is far too divisive. Furthermore, threat assessments rely on military, technical and political knowledge, which requires good intelligence. And strategic intelligence is hardly a European strength, particularly at the collective level, although 9/11 has encouraged significant intelligence sharing’ (Delpech, ‘Nuclear weapons – less central, more dangerous?’, p. 12). 5 Zanders, in Lindstrom and Schmitt, p. 80. 6 Were Iran to develop nuclear weapons, the integration of Turkey into the EU would establish a new ‘nuclear frontier’ for Europe. 7 Harald Mueller, Terrorism, Proliferation, pp. 55–56. 8 Harald Mueller, ‘The Future of Arms Control’, in Schmitt (ed.), Nuclear Weapons: A New Great Debate, p. 422. 9 Gnesotto, preface in Mueller, Terrorism, Proliferation: a European Threat Assessment, p. 5. 10 Delpech adds that ‘although the Europeans may have been right, they have never produced a serious evaluation of the intentions or motivations of potentially hostile forces’ (Delpech, ‘Nuclear weapons – less central, more dangerous?’, p. 24). 11 Mueller, Terrorism, Proliferation, p. 54. 12 As Francois Heisbourg pointed out, ‘Iran or North Korea may be called many things; but the Europeans do not usually consider such countries to be more disruptive, more criminal or, above all, more irrational than Stalin’s slave-labour collectivist nightmare of a nuclear armed police-state. Nor, on the face of it, do they seem crazier than the nuclear China of Mao’s “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution”, with its maddened crowds of Red Guards, who on occasion engaged in the practice of ritual cannibalism – a China which had, furthermore, just managed to engineer the largest famine on recorded history’ (Francois Heisbourg, ‘A View from Europe’, Survival, Vol. 43, No. 3, Autumn 2001, p. 67). 13 Justin Vaisse, French Views on Missile Defense, US–France Analysis, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 2001, p. 3.

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14 Ian Kenyon, Mike Rance, John Simpson, Mark Smith, ‘Prospects for a European Ballistic Missile Defence System’, Southampton Papers in International Policy, No. 4, Southampton, 2001, p. 1. 15 Vaisse, French Views on Missile Defense, p. 2. 16 Brussels, 10 December 2003, 15656/03, Council of the European Union, 15896/03, Brussels, 8 December 2003 (POLGEN 85), Subject: Multi-annual strategic programme. 17 One of the factors determining the attitude of every single European state towards nuclear weapons is its relationship with NATO (Clara Portella, The Role of the EU in the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: The Way to Thessaloniki and Beyond, PRIF Reports, No. 65, Frankfurt 2003, pp. i. and 4). 18 Portella, The Role of the EU, pp. 4 and 10. 19 Bruno Tertrais, ‘The EU and Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Does Soft Power Work?’, The International Spectator, Vol. XL, No. 3, July–September 2005, p. 54. 20 As Perkovich points out, there ‘seems to be a general sense that the black-and-white distinction between good guys and bad guys is not as stark as the U.S. tends to make it, and, in any case, dealing with the bad guys requires international consensus and cooperation that only will come through patient diplomacy and adherence to rules. The new EU proliferation strategy expresses willingness to use force in the worst cases, but, unlike comparable American documents, does not appear bullish about the effectiveness of military action’ (George Perkovich, Toward Transatlantic Cooperation in Meeting the Iranian Nuclear Challenge, Proliferation Papers, IFRI, Paris, Winter 2005, p. 5). 21 The UK argues – and this is an important distinction with US policy – that all options in the CP spectrum – particularly interdiction and direct action – ought properly to be multilateral in the conception and execution (Paul Cornish, ‘UK Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Weapons, Materials and Associated Technology’, in Conference on Nuclear Proliferation, 30–31 May 2003, Center for Policy Analysis and Planning, Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 2003, MFA, p. 143). 22 Global Issues: International Security, Foreign and Commonwealth Office-UK Counter-Proliferation Strategy, 2004, pp. 1–2. 23 Cornish, ‘UK Policy’, p. 139. 24 Kenyon et al., ‘Prospects for a European Ballistic Missile Defence System’, p. 6; France acknowledges, however, that there is a growing threat coming from short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and cruise missiles and, in the longer-term, MRBMs. The French Ministry of Defence has included a theatre missile defence system in its next five-year plan (Vaisse, French Views on Missile Defense, p. 3). 25 Eric Terzuolo, NATO and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Routledge, London, 2006, p. 89. 26 M. Elaine Bunn, ‘Pre-emptive Action: When, How, and to What Effect?’, Strategic Forum, No. 200, July 2003, p. 12. 27 Vaisse, French Views on Missile Defense, p. 4. 28 David Gompert, David and Arnhold, Klaus, Ballistic Missile Defence. A GermanAmerican Analysis, RAND-SWP, Santa Monica CA, January 2001, p. 28. Sokolsky points out that the ‘real choice is not between an elegant, single point solution to the European missile defence problem or no protection at all. Rather, it is between a Europe that remains totally vulnerable to ballistic missile attack and one that enjoys varying levels (e.g. unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally) of protection against missile threats of different ranges that will be pursued by some but not all NATO allies at different levels and on different timetables’ (Richard Sokolsky, ‘Imagining European Missile Defence’, Survival, Vol. 43, No. 3, Autumn 2001, pp. 123–124). 29 To design a missile defence system means first agreeing on the threat and where it may originate. And that is something most European countries do not want to advertise for fear of provoking the threat. ‘We have problems of instability facing us across the Mediterranean, all around Turkey’s borders, in the Balkans and around the

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Black Sea and Caucasus regions – areas that will be right next door to the EU when Romania and Bulgaria join the union in 2007,’ a European diplomat added. ‘What are we going to do? Point radars and missile heads in specific directions? What kind of impression would that give? It would be a return to a new cold war’ (Brooks Tigner, ‘NATO Still Wrangling With Missile Defense Issues’, Defense News, 3 October 2005). Philip Gordon, ‘Bush, Missile Defence and the Atlantic Alliance’, Survival, Vol. 43, No. 1, Spring 2001, p. 22. Smith, ‘Assessing Missile Proliferation’, in Lindstrom and Schmitt, p. 21. Burkard Schmitt and Camille Grand, ‘Conclusion’, in Schmitt (ed.), Nuclear Weapons: A New Great Debate, p. 167. Kenyon et al., ‘Prospects for a European Ballistic Missile Defence System’, p. 8; According to Sokolsky, ‘European militaries, facing a downward trajectory in defence spending and struggling to modernise and restructure their forces for new tasks, generally view missile defence as an unwanted distraction. Most European parliaments and publics show a similar lack of enthusiasm’ (Sokolsky, ‘Imagining European Missile Defence’, p. 113). Anthony Seaboyer and Oliver Thranert, ‘What Missile Proliferation Means for Europe’, Survival, Vol. 48, No. 2, Summer 2006, p. 93. Tertrais, ‘The EU and Nuclear Non-Proliferation’, p. 55. Portella, The Role of the EU, p. 22. As Cameron Brown points out, ‘while the current threat to EU territory may not justify acquiring active defense capabilities, an active foreign policy would likely demand a heavy immediate investment in this field’ (Cameron Brown, ‘Israel and the WMD Threat: Lessons for Europe’, MERIA Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3, September 2004, p. 18). Therese Delpech observes that ‘if Europe continues to make important financial contributions to the Middle East without ever becoming a serious player, then it will be continuously delegating responsibility for Middle Eastern security to the U.S., and will remain unable to control its own security interests there’ (Delpech, ‘Nuclear weapons – less central, more dangerous?’, p. 20). Tertrais argues that it is more a lack of know-how, adequate planning and training than a lack of military assets (Tertrais, ‘The EU and Nuclear Non-Proliferation’, pp. 54–55). However, even hardware sufficiency is debatable. On 19 October 2001 at Ghent, at the very moment that bio-attacks were being carried out in Florida, Washington and New York, the heads of state and governments of the EU decided to establish a programme to fight bio-terrorism that would be handled by the European Commission and health experts from member states. It includes the setting up of a consultation mechanism in times of crisis and a register of the capacities of European laboratories expert in matters of prevention. Since 1 January 2002 all EU members have access to this information centre on bio-terrorism that is manned 24 hours a day and provides a register of national intervention teams, a training course, a system for mobilizing and co-ordinating earmarked experts, and a network dedicated to emergency communications between the EU Commission and national authorities. The first priority was to set up a fast communication system between the member states and the European Commission in the event of an emergency. The network is now up and running (Delpech, ‘Nuclear weapons – less central, more dangerous?’, p. 27). Terzuolo, NATO and Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 132. Portella, The Role of the EU, p. ii. Gustav Lindstrom, Protecting the European Homeland: The CBR Dimension, Chaillot Papers, No. 69, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, July 2004, pp. 66–72; see also, Securing the European Homeland: The EU, Terrorism and Homeland Security, Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.), Bertelsmann, Guetersloh, August 2005.

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Conclusions 1 Nicole Gnesotto, in Gustav Lindstrom and Burkard Schmitt (eds), Fighting Proliferation – European Perspectives, Chaillot Papers, No. 66, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, December 2003, p. 5. 2 Stephen Peter Rosen, ‘After Proliferation’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2006, p. 14. 3 M. Elaine, Bunn, ‘ “Pre-emptive Action: When, How, and to What Effect?” ’, Strategic Forum, No. 200, July 2003, p. 15. 4 Jason Ellis, ‘ “The Best Defense: Counterproliferation and U.S. National Security” ’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 2, Spring 2003, p. 130. 5 Ian Lesser rightly points out that with the situation in Iraq still unresolved, there will be few enthusiasts for a more ambitious campaign aimed at driving the religious establishment from power. The military option, if chosen, would be driven by narrower security interests; at base, the belief that a nuclear-armed Iran cannot be accommodated (Ian Lesser, Security and Strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean, ELIAMEP Policy Paper No. 5, Athens, 2005, pp. 5–6). 6 David McDonough, Nuclear Superiority. The ‘New Triad’ and the Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Adelphi Paper 383, IISS, London, 2006, p. 33; see also, Campbell, Einhorn and Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point. Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2004. 7 The US has four national interests that could be jeopardized by a nuclear-armed Iran with long-range means of delivery: preserving the safety of US territory, retaining the ability to use US conventional forces freely in the Middle East, sustaining nonproliferation regimes, and maintaining the willingness of allies and friends to work in coalition with the US. The degree of effect depends on how Iran behaves once it is a nuclear state. This analysis is premised on the assumption that the US cannot prevent Iran from developing NW without incurring prohibitively high political and diplomatic costs, especially while Iran’s domestic politics are in flux. A second assumption is that Iran’s domestic circumstances are likely to remain unclear for a long time (The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran, McNair Paper 64, National Defense University, Washington DC, 2001, pp. 52 and 58). 8 Gareth Evans is in favour of abandoning the ‘zero enrichment’ goal in favour of a ‘delayed limited enrichment’, arguing that the wider international community would explicitly accept that Iran can enrich uranium domestically for peaceful nuclear energy purposes. In return, Iran would agree to phasing in that enrichment programme over an extended period of years, with major limitations on its initial size and scope, and a highly intrusive inspections regime (Gareth Evans, ‘It’s Not Too Late to Stop Iran’s Bomb’, International Herald Tribune, 16 February 2007). 9 George Perkovich, ‘Iran Is Not an Island: A Strategy to Mobilize the Neighbors’, Policy Brief, No. 34, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, February 2005, p. 1; As Iranians often point out, that any nuclear deal could be irrelevant or even dangerous without U.S. involvement. They see the need for a ‘grand bargain’ to resolve all outstanding questions (Walter Posch, in Iranian Challenges, Chaillot Paper No. 89, EU-ISS, Paris, 2006, p. 108). 10 Mark Fitzpatrick, ‘Weapons Watch’, The World Today, February 2006, p. 10; It has been argued, however, that the US can expect only limited help from Russia and China in advancing its combating WMD and counter-terrorism agendas (The Future Nuclear Landscape: New Realities, New Responses, Center of the Study of WMD, National Defense University, 2006 Annual Symposium, Washington DC, 2006, p. 4). 11 ‘New threats have arisen while the nuclear taboo was weakened. And it is not just a single factor in this new strategic landscape that gives pause. Rather, it is the accumulation of multiple factors and their interplay and mutual reinforcement that account for many of these new dangers. For instance, there have always been terrorist groups, but never before has there been the simultaneous concentration of terrorist groups,

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diffusion of bomb design information, and poorly secured or unaccounted for nuclear material from the former Soviet Union’ (Campbell, Einhorn and Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point, p. 13). Terzuolo, NATO and Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 150. George Perkovich et al., Universal Compliance. A Strategy for Nuclear Security, Carnegie Endowment, Washington DC, June 2004, p. 38. According to Jessica Mathews, ‘this is one of the most significant, as well as least expected, results of the attacks. Long before September 11, Europeans had become concerned about the American “hyperpower” and what appeared to them a growing tendency toward unilateral action and a disregard for international laws and institutions. Americans were beginning to doubt Europe’s strategic relevance and to wonder whether it could help the U.S. at all in preserving international security’ (Jessica Mathews, ‘September 11, One Year Later A World of Change’, Policy Brief, No. 18, Carnegie Endowment, Washington DC, 2002, p. 8). Mark Smith, ‘European Perspectives on Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Missile Defences’, in Missile Proliferation and Defences: Problems and Prospects, Center for NonProliferation Studies and Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, Occasional Paper No. 7, Monterey, CA, 2001, p. 72. As Eric Terzuolo put it, ‘the largest divergence between the European and American strategic outlooks is over the role of military force’ (Terzuolo, NATO and Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 173). Also, the combination of U.S. unilateralism and a tendency to use military clout abroad for domestic political purposes will make Europeans wary about signing up to a CP policy over which they would have little control (Elizabeth Young, ‘CP and the Militarisation of U.S. Policy’, Letters to the Editor, Survival, Summer 1996). Nicola de Santis, ‘The Future of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative’, NATO Review, Spring 1998, p. 33. Thomas Barnett divides the world into the ‘Functioning Core’ and the ‘Disconnected Gap’ and speaks of the urgent need to ‘shrink the Gap’ (see his very interesting book The Pentagon’s New Map. War and Peace in the 21st Century, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, 2004). Ian Lesser and Ashley Tellis, Strategic Exposure: Proliferation Around the Mediterranean, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1996, p. 30. Jerome Kahan, Regional Deterrence Strategies for New Proliferation Threat, Strategic Forum No. 70, INSS/National Defense University, Washington DC, April 1996, p. 1. Missile defence is unlikely to revolutionize the strategic environment or render offensive weapons obsolete, nor is it expected to have a fundamental impact on the strategic calculus of the US and its allies (Ivo Daalder, Missile Defenses: The Case for a Limited Insurance Defense, Paper Prepared for the CEPS/IISS European Strategy Forum Meeting, Brussels, 2 April 2001, p. 5). Jerrold Post and Ehud Sprinzak, ‘Searching For: Why Haven’t Terrorists Used Weapons of Mass Destruction?’, Armed Forces Journal International, April 1998, p. 16. Derek Smith, Deterring America: Rogue States and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 12.

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ABM Treaty 52, 58 accidental war 29 Ajami, Fouad 12 Algeria 74, 80 Allison, Graham 35, 64, 120 al-Qaeda 59, 61, 66–70 anthrax letters 59 A.Q. Khan nuclear smuggling network 22, 79, 89 Arrow anti-missile system 103 Assad, Bashir 87 Atlantic Council (US) 126, 133 Aum Shinrikyo 61–62, 65–66 ballistic missiles 47–51 battlefield nuclear weapons 28–29, 34 bin-Laden, Osama 59, 66–67 biological weapons 77–79 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 78–79 Blinken, Anthony 118, 120 Bolton, John 117 Bracken, Paul 32, 34 Braudel, Fernand 7 Brito, Dagobert 37 Bull, Hedley 28 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 20 Bunn, Matthew 118, 120 Burt, Richard 42 Bush administration 53, 111, 117, 120 Bushehr (reactor) 85 Cameron, Gavin 65 Carter, Ashton 114 Caspian Basin 8–9 chemical weapons 76–77 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 77, 79 China 12, 20–22, 25, 57

CIA 61, 79 Cirincione, Joseph 117 Clare, Michael 112 clash of civilizations 8, 12 Clinton administration 111 Coker, Christopher 8 Cold War 1, 52, 106–107, 115 Cole, Benjamin 59 command, control and 29, 33, 34, 88, 117 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP/EU) 17, 124 communications (C3) 36, 100 consequence management 127 Cordesman, Anthony 55, 85 Cornish, Paul 125 counterproliferation (CP) 98–101, 105, 113–114 crisis management 31–36 cruise missiles 74–76 CTBT 21, 26 Cuban Missile Crisis 35 Dark Winter 62 Delpech, Therese 22, 123 deterrence 21, 86, 106, 115–116 dirty bomb 60, 63 domino effect 38, 86–87 Egypt 3, 74, 79–80, 87 Ehteshami, Anoushiravan 84 Ellis, Jason 129 energy security 8–9 Esposito, John 12 EUROFOR 16, 18 EUROMARFOR 16, 18 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) 8, 16 European-based Missile defence (EBMD) 57

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European Security Strategy 121 European Union (EU) 3, 17–18, 121–122, 124, 126–127, 131–133 EU-3 126 EU Strategy Against WMD Proliferation 3, 121, 123, 133 Falkenrath, Richard 65 Ferguson, Charles 65, 69–70 first strike 31, 43 Fitzpatrick, Mark 87 Flournoy, Michele 99, 118 France 16, 20–21, 24, 102, 115, 122, 125 Freedman, Lawrence 43 Gallois, Pierre 27 Ganji, Babak 84 Gates Commission 52 Gati, Tobi 112 Geneva Protocol 79 Germany 103, 126, 130 Gnesotto, Nicole 122 Gordon, Philip 54, 126 Gorka, Sebastyen 66 Greece 88, 132 group-think 35 Gulf War (1990–1) 88, 94, 100, 119 Gurr, Nadine 59 GWOT 92 Hague Code of Conduct 23 Heisbourg, François 56 Heller, Mark 51 Hersman, Rebecca 115 High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (UN) 22, 131 Hochman, Dafna 89 Hunter, Shireen 12 Huntington, Samuel 8, 12 ICBMs 53–54 Inbar, Ephraim 86 India 20, 22, 28, 31, 33 Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) 95 Intelligence 100–101, 115, 118–119 International Atomic Energy Agency/IAEA 45, 85, 87, 89 International Crisis Group (ICG) report 40, 85 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 9, 17, 74–75, 118 Intriligator, Michael 37

Iran 10, 20, 22, 31, 40–41, 53, 56, 73, 77, 79–80, 83–87, 93, 120, 126, 129–130 Iran–Iraq War 38–39, 50, 77 Iraq 73–74, 77, 79–80, 88, 120 Islam 10–11, 13 Israel 3, 20, 28, 31, 39, 41, 43–44, 51, 77, 79–80, 86, 103, 130 Istanbul Co-operation Initiative 109 Italy 16, 103, 132 Janis, Irving 35 Japan 101, 130 Jenkins, Brian 71 Jericho missile 42 Joint Committee on Proliferation (NATO) 103 Joseph, Robert 116 Kam, Ephraim 86 Kennedy, John 19, 135–136 Kissinger, Henry 131 Knight, Charles 120 Koca, Todd 115 Kurz, Anat 59, 66, 70 Landau, Emily 87 Launch-on-Warning (LOW) 30, 34, 46–47 Laver, Harry 114 Lebow, Ned 32 Lesser, Ian 7, 15, 17, 66, 85 lethality of NBC weapons 80–82 Levite, Ariel 22 Libya 73–74, 79–80, 89 Lieven, Anatol 1 Lindstrom, Gustav 62, 127 Litwak, Robert 118–119 Loeb, Cheryl 63 Maghreb 2, 7, 14, 103 Mahnken, Thomas 47 Mashreq 7 Mediterranean Dialogue (NATO) 17, 91, 107–108 Mediterranean region 6–10, 90, 122 Menotti, Roberto 108 Middle East 2, 8, 15, 29, 38–39, 45, 122, 127 Miller, Judith 70 Miller, Steven 56 Miscalculation (during a crisis) 31–36 missile defence (MD) 21, 54–56, 101–102, 126 Moscow Treaty 24, 26

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Index 229 MTCR 75–76 Mueller, Harald 101, 122–123 mutual assured destruction (MAD) 27, 32 Natanz 85 National Institute for Public Policy 116 National Security Strategy (US) 3, 113, 115, 117–118 Navias, Martin 47, 50 Nolan, Janne 39, 48 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 17–18, 20, 22, 24–26, 79, 85 North Atlantic Assembly 116 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 17, 90–93, 95, 97–98, 100, 104–106, 131–133 North Korea 20, 22, 31, 54, 56, 73–74, 86, 120 Nuclear Posture Review 116–117 nuclear taboo 45–46 nuclear war 27, 33, 44–46, 79–80, 106 nuclear weapons 27; accidental use 33; intentional use 38; unauthorized use 32, 36 nuclear weapons-free zones (NWFZ) 21, 25 Office of Technology Assessment 75, 81–82 Osiraq 40 outer space 58 Pakistan 20, 31, 33 Parachini, John 71 passive defences 101 Patriot anti-missile system 49 Perkinson, George 131 Perkovich, George 84 Permissive Action Links (PALs) 30, 64 Persian Gulf 48, 130 Pfaff, William 56 Pflatzgraff, Robert 32 population movements 13–14 Portella, Clara 124, 127 Potter, William 65, 69–70 preemptive action 97–98, 118, 120 preventive attack 39–40 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 23 Purver, Ron 62 Putin, Vladimir 16 Qadhafi, Muammar 89 Quester, George 69

radiological dispersion device (RDD) 63 Rapoport, David 62 rationality of leadership 36–37, 129 Reagan administration 52 Record, Jeffrey 112, 117, 120 religious terrorism 65–66 resolution 1540 23 Rice, Condoleezza 118, 120 rogue states 112–113 Rosen, Stephen 129 Rubin, Barry 87 Rubin, Uzi 85 Rumsfeld Commission Report 53–54, 85 Russia 16, 20–22, 25, 57 Sadat, Anwar 42 Saudi Arabia 10, 50, 87 Schneider, Barry 119 SCUD missiles 49–50, 73, 88 Seaboyer, Anthony 126 Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (NATO) 103 Senior Political Military Group on Proliferation (NATO) 103–104 September 11, 2001 59, 63, 83, 111–112, 131 Shahab missile 41 Shi’ite block 6–7 Simon, Jeffrey 70 Slocombe, Walter 54, 18 Sokolsky, Richard 104 Solana, Javier 14 South Asia 28–29 Soviet Union/USSR 34, 43, 48 Spain 16 Spyer, Jonathan 62 START I/II 20, 26 Stern, Jessica 65 Strategic Concept (NATO) 90 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 52 Sur, Serge 22 Syria 40–41, 51, 53, 56, 74, 77, 79–80, 87–88 Takeyh, Ray 83 Tanter, Raymond 112 terrorism 59, 61, 65–66, 134 Tertrais, Bruno 116, 124 Terzuolo, Eric 103 theatre missile defence (TMD) 91, 101–104 Thranert, Oliver 126 Transatlantic cooperation 133 Trenin, Dmitri 20

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United Arab Emirates (UAE) 86 United Kingdom (UK) 24, 116, 122, 125 United States 15, 16, 48, 126; counterproliferation policy 99, 113–120; missile defence 54–57; nuclear weapons 20–21, 25 UN Security Council 99, 132 Utgoff, Victor 57, 134

Walker, William 19, 118, 120 Waltz, Kenneth 27–28 Western European Union (WEU) 17 Wilkening, Dean 53 Wilton Park 13 Wirtz, James 37 WMD Centre (NATO) 104 WMD terrorism 59; biological 61; chemical 61; nuclear 60; radiological 63 Wohlstetter, Albert 26

Vaisse, Justin 123, 125 van Creveld, Martin 37 Vasconcelos, Alvaro 17

Zelikow, Philip 118 Zimmerman, Peter 60, 63 Zisser, Eyal 88

Tucker, Jonathan 62 Turkey 83, 86, 132