Bombs and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction 1889315117, 9781889315119

Citation preview

Greg Funderburk Dennis McGowan Charles Stumph

BOMBS AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Greg Funderburk Dennis McGowan

Charles Stumph

LavnTech hing fustom Publis

_|

~~

Copyright © 2004 Greg Funderburk, Dennis McGowan, and Charlie Stumph

or by any means, whether [All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form publisher.] the from electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior written permission LawTech

Custom

(949)498-4815, ext. 19

Publishing,

Inc.

FAX:(949) 498-4858

e-mail: [email protected] www.LawTechCustomPublishing.com Comments & suggestions are welcome.

v.06.30.05

pp 278

PSBN

ele-oe ioe 5—L1=7

About the Authors Greg Funderburk has over twenty years of experience in the fire service and is currently a Fire Officer for the Huntington Beach (CA) Fire Department, Hazardous Materials Response Team. He possesses a bachelor’s degree in Vocational Education, an associate's degree in Fire Technology as well as numerous technical certifications including, Hazardous Materials Specialist, and Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Instructor. Greg is an outreach instructor for the California Office of Emergency Services as well as the California Fire Service Training and Education System. He has previously served as the Hazardous Materials Section Coordinator and an instructor for his local community colleges’ Fire Academy and Environmental Technology Program. Greg has served on numerous organizations involved with hazardous materials and WMD incident management. Recently, he was selected to be a member of an instructional cadre responsible for providing terrorism response and WMD training to regional law enforcement and fire service personnel. In addition to his fire service and instructional responsibilities, Greg is currently a member of a private incident management team under contract with several energy (petroleum) companies to provide incident command system (ICS) training and incident command overhead personnel. In 1992, he established Emergency Management Network to provide technical consulting and training services to both public and private organizations. Greg has developed and published numerous training programs regarding incident command, and emergency preparedness, response and recovery.

Dennis McGowan recently retired as Chief of Operations for the Fulton County Medical Examiner's Office in Atlanta, GA. He was Chief Investigator for the Medical Examiner's Office prior to this position. Dennis is an experienced medical-legal investigator and emergency response program manager. He was a firefighter in New England during the 1970's and worked in the New Jersey State Medical Examiner's Office through the 1980's. Dennis has over 25 years of fatality/mass fatality management experience and disaster mitigation planning, training and response including coordination of the mass fatality planning for the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta. He has worked at numerous mass fatality incidents including Egypt Air in 1999, World Trade Center and American Airlines 587 in 2001. Dennis also participated in TopOff and TopOff 2 preparedness exercises. He has specialized training and experience in terrorism response and Weapons of Mass Destruction incident planning and mitigation. Dennis has authored a number of articles on mass fatality management and weapons of mass destruction. With his experience and knowledge, Dennis has traveled throughout the United States and internationallyas a presenter and instructor.

Charles Stumph retired after 36 years with the Orange County California Sheriff's Department during which 31 years were spent assigned to the Bomb Squad. He is a past Director of the International Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators and former Chairman of the National Bomb Squad Commander's Advisory Board. Charlie has served with the National Domestic Preparedness Office and the DOJ/DOD Interagency Board on WMD. He

has been a guest instructor on Bomb Disposal and Bombing Investigations with law enforcement agencies throughout the world, and currently teaches with the Center for Criminal Justice at California State University, Long Beach. Since retirement he consults with several research companies on counter-terrorism methodology

Contents at a Glance Chapter 1

The Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction,

Chapter 2

Explosive Devices, 9

Chapter 3

Suicide Bombers,

27

Chapter 4

Chemical WMD,

41

Chapter 5

Biological Weapons: Part I, 61

Chapter 6

Biological Weapons: Part I, 85

Chapter 7

Nuclear And Radiological Devices,

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE),

Chapter 9

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation,

Chapter 10 — Personal Decontamination,

Chapter 11

1

106

201

Facility and Equipment Decontamination,

243

123

171

Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2022 with funding from Kahle/Austin Foundation

https://archive.org/details/oombsotherweapon0O00O0fund

Contents

Chapter 1 The Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, INTRODUCTION, 2 TERMINOLOGY, HISTORY? S

3

ASSESSMENT OF WMD THREATS, SUMMARY, 8 DISCUSSION QUESTIONS, 8

Chapter 2

Explosive Devices,

6

9

INTRODUCTION, 10 EXPLOSIONS, 10 Mechanical Explosions,

11

Chemical Explosions, 11 Nuclear Explosions, 11 CHEMICAL EXPLOSIVES, 11 LOW EXPLOSIVES, 12 HIGH EXPLOSIVES, 12 Primary High Explosives, 12 Secondary High Explosives, 14 Blasting Agent High Explosives, Improvised Explosives, 15 EXPLOSIVE EFFECTS; 16 Blast Pressure Effect,

14

16

Fragment Effect, 17 INCENDIARY THERMAL EFFECT, 19 Explosive Effects Protection, 19 IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, 19 Electric,

19

Non-electric,

21

INITIATION DELAYS, 22 Time Delay, 22 Action Delay, 22 Command Delay, 23 IED PACKAGING, 23 FOUND IED GUIDELINES, 23 EXPLOSION GUIDELINES, 24 SUMMARY, 25 DISCUSSION QUESTIONS, 25 BIBLIOGRAPHY, 26

Chapter 3

Suicide Bombers,

27

INTRODUCTION, 28 HUMANOID EXPLOSIVE DEVICE, 29 EXPLOSIVE EFFECTS PROTECTION, 30 MODUS OPERANDI, 30 Prevention Tips from the Israelis, 31

1

Contents

INCENDIARY DEVICES, 32 Basic Incendiary Devices, 34 Methods ofInitiation,

38

Countering Incendiary Devices, 38 SUMMARY, 39 DISCUSSION QUESTIONS, 39 BIBLIOGRAPHY, 39

Chapter 4

Chemical WMD,

41

HISTORY, 42 TERMINOLOGY, 43 Nerve Agents, 44 Vesicants, 44 Lewisite, 44 Blood Agents,

45

Choking Agents, 45 Irritants, 45 Industrial, 45 Clinical Terms,

46

ROUTES OF ENTRY, Inhalation,

46

46

Ingestion, 46 Eyes, 46 Skin Absorption (Percutaneous Exposure),

INDEX OF SUSPICION, 47 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS, 47 CLASSIFICATIONS AND EFFECTS, Nerve Agents,

46

47

47

Vesicating (Blister) Agents, 50 Cyanides (Blood) Agents, 53 Choking Agents, 54 Irritants,

55

Industrial Agents, 57 CURRENT PRACTICES, Victim Care,

57

57

Responder Protection,

Decontamination,

58

58

MODES OF DELIVERY, 59 SUMMARY, 60 DISCUSSION QUESTIONS, 60

Chapter5

Biological Weapons: Part I, 61

HISTORY, 62 TERMINOLOGY, 64 AGENCIES AND THEIR ROLES, Epidemiology, 65 Clusters, 66 Local Physicians, 67

65

Emergency Departments (ED), 67 CDC Reporting, 67 Coroners & Medical Examiner’s Office,

vi

70

Contents

METHODS OF DETECTION, 71 Syndromic (Syndromal) Surveillance, 71 Culture and Sensitivity (C&S), 71 Laboratory Response Network, 72 Time Progression (After Symptoms), 75 Hand Held Assays (HHA), 76 Real Time,

77

Limited Capability, 77 QUARANTINE & MASS DISPOSITION, Quarantine,

77

77

Mass Disposition, 79

SUMMARY, 83 DISCUSSION QUESTIONS,

Chapter 6

83

Biological Weapons: Part Il, 85

AGENTS, SYMPTOMS AND EFFECTS, Bacterial Agents, 86

86

Anthrax, 86 Cholera, 87 Glanders, 87 Plague, 88 Tularemia, 89 Brucellosis, 90

VIRAL AGENTS, Smallpox, 90

90

Viral Encephalitides,

92

Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers, 93 TOXINS, 93 Botulinum Toxin, Saxitoxin, 94

93

Staph Enterotoxin B (SEB), Ricin, 96

95

Trichothecene Mycotoxins (T2), 96 RICKETTSIA, 97 Q-Fever, 97 Typhus, 98 OTHER, 98 Salmonella,

98

SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), 99 Genetically Engineering/Enhanced Diseases, 99

MODES OF DELIVERY, Weaponization, 99 CURRENT PRACTICES, Triage, 101 EMS, 101 Public Health,

101

101

Federal Agencies, Containment,

99

102

102

Vaccines and Treatments, Clean-up,

102

103

SUMMARY, 103 DISCUSSION QUESTIONS,

103

Contents

Chapter 7

Nuclear And Radiological Devices,

INTRODUCTION, 107 NUCLEAR EXPLOSION RESPONSE, RADIATION HEALTH RISKS, 112 PERSONAL PROTECTION, 113 Time;

106

111

113

Distance,

113

Shielding, 114 DECONTAMINATION, 114 RADIATION DETECTION SYSTEMS, 114 ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE FOR PUBLIC SAFETY, DIRTY BOMB, 116 Dirty Bomb Construction, 118 SUMMARY, 119 DISCUSSION QUESTIONS, 120 BIBLIOGRAPHY, 120

Chapter 8

WMD

115

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE),

123

INTRODUCTION - PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT, 124 PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT PROGRAM, 125 REDUCING POTENTIAL EXPOSURES, 126 ROUTES OF EXPOSURE TO WMD AGENTS, TOXIC INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS (TIC), AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS, 127 Chemical Warfare Agents and TICs, 127 Biological Warfare Agents, 127 Radioactive Materials,

127

CHEMICAL PROTECTIVE CLOTHING, 128 Non-encapsulating CPC, 129 Encapsulating CPC, 130 RESPIRATORY PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT, 131 Supplied-Air Respirators (SAR) and Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA), Supplied-Air Respirators (SAR) / Airline System, 132 Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA), 132 Air-Purifying Respirators (APR), 134 Plas Powered Air-Purifying Respirators (PAPRs), 136 N95 Particulate Respirators, 136 Surgical masks, 137 EPA LEVELS OF PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT, 137 Level A PPE, 137 Level B PPE,

131

139

Level @.PPE. (41 Level D PPE, 143 SPECIALIZED PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT, Barrier Gown and Latex Gloves, Battledress Over-Garments,

Chemical Protective Gloves,

144

144

145

146

Chemical-Protective Footwear Covers, Patient Protective Wraps, 147

146

Wartime Personal Protective Equipment for Civilians, 147 Military Personal Protective Equipment, 147 Explosive Ordinance and Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (EOD/IEDD) Ensembles, vill

147

Contents

PPE SELECTION CRITERIA, 148 PPE TRAINING, 151 PERSONAL FACTORS AFFECTING USE OF PPE, 152 RESPIRATORY PROTECTION PROGRAM, 152 FIT TESTING AND MEDICAL EVALUATION, 153 RESPIRATORY PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT SPECIFIC TRAINING, 154 PPE LIMITATIONS, 154 WORK MISSION DURATION, 155 DONNING PROCEDURES, 157 SUPPORT PERSONNEL, 158 MONITORING PROCEDURES DURING PPE USE, 159 STANDARD DOFFING (REMOVAL) PROCEDURES, 159 SECONDARY DECONTAMINATION (INSPECTION & MAINTENANCE), 160 Sample PPE Inspection Checklist., 160 PPE STORAGE, 162 PPE EXPOSURE AND MAINTENANCE LOG, 162 HEAT STRESS MONITORING & PREVENTION, 163 SPECIFIC WMD PPE RECOMMENDATIONS, 165 Interim Recommendations for the Selection and Use of Protective Clothing and Respirators Against Biological Agents,

166

Medical Treatment of Radiological Casualties Respiratory Protection, 168 Skin Protection,

9

WMD

168

169

SUMMARY, 169 DISCUSSION QUESTIONS, BIBLIOGRAPHY, 170

Chapter

- CDC Publications,

170

Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation,

171

INTRODUCTION, 172 EQUIPMENT USAGE CATEGORIES, 173 OVERVIEW OF CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND RADIOLOGICAL DETECTION AND MONITORING TECHNOLOGIES, 174 Chemical Detection and Monitoring Technologies, 174 Point Detection Technologies, 175 Ionization/Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS), 175 Flame Photometry, 177 Infrared Spectroscopy, 178 Photoacoustic Infrared Spectroscopy (PIRS), 178 Filter Based Infrared Spectrometry, 179 Electrochemistry, 179 Colorimetric or Color Change Chemistry, 179 Surface Acoustic Wave (SAW), 181 Photo Ionization Detection (PID), 182 Sensor Array Technology, 183 Thermal and Electrical Conductivity, 183 Flame Ionization,

183

Standoff Detectors (Infrared Spectroscopy),

183

Passive Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR), Fourier Transform Infrared (FTIR)),

Active (Differential Absorption LIDAR), 184 Analytical Instruments, 185 Mass Spectrometry (MS), 185 Gas Chromatography (GC), 186 High Performance Liquid Chromatography (HPLC), Ion Chromatography (IC), 186

186

184

Contents

Capillary Zone Electrophoresis,

186

Wet Chemistry — Chemical Identification and Hazard Categorization (HazCat™),

Biological Warfare Agent Detection Technologies, Immunoassay,

187

187

188

Optical Methods, 189 Optical Microscopy, 190 Radiological Detection Technologies,

191

Geiger-Mueller (G-M), 192 Scintillation Method, 192

Ionizing Chamber, 193 OTHER SPECIALTY DETECTION AND MONITORING INSTRUMENTS, Combustible Gas Indicators (CGI), 193 Oxygen Monitors, 194 SELECTION FACTORS, 195 Selectivity,

195

Sensitivity,

195

Resistance to Interferants,

193

196

Response Time, 196 Start-up Time, 196 Detection States,

196

Alarm Capability, Portability,

196

196

Power Capabilities, 197 Battery Needs, 197 Operational Environment,

Durability,

197

197

Procurement Costs,

197

Operator Skill Level, 198 Training Requirements, 198 SUMMARY, 199 DISCUSSION QUESTIONS, 200 REFERENCES, 200

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination,

201

INTRODUCTION, 202 PRIMARY/TECHNICAL DECONTAMINATION, 204 Primary/Technical Decontamination Methods, 204 INCIDENT SPECIFIC DECONTAMINATION PLAN, 206 DECONTAMINATION (CONTAMINATION REDUCTION) CORRIDOR SET-UP, Determining the Necessary Number of Decontamination Team Members, 209 Recommended Primary/Technical Decontamination Team Staffing, 210 Level of Personal Protective Equipment for the Decontamination Team, 210 Determining a Sequence for Decontamination of the Entry Team, 211 Testing Effectiveness of Primary/Technical Decontamination, 211 Natural Light, 212 Ultraviolet Light, 212 Extent of Primary/Technical Decontamination Necessary,

213

Example of Primary/Technical Decontamination Corridor Set-up, 213 Entry Personnel Exposures During PPE Removal (Doffing Procedure), 219 Decontamination of the Decontamination Team,

220

Termination and Clean-up of the Decontamination Corridor, 220 Managing the Bagged PPE, 221 Personal Hygiene and General Good Work Practices,

221

206

Contents

SECONDARY DECONTAMINATION, 221 Secondary Decontamination Methods, 222 Removal Techniques:, 222 Testing Effectiveness of Secondary Decontamination,

EMERGENCY DECONTAMINATION, Safe Refuge Area Operations, 224 Decontamination of Victims,

222

222

225

Emergency Decontamination Procedure - Ambulatory Victims, 226 Emergency Decontamination Procedure — Non-ambulatory Victims, 226 Mass Emergency Decontamination Procedure, 227

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR EMERGENCY DECONTAMINATION, 230 All Hazard Approach, 230 Secondary Devices and Assaults, 231 Medical Facility Impacts, 231 Management of Water (Rinse) Run-off During Emergency Decontamination Operations, 231 Waste Water Runoff / Disposal, 231 Cold Weather Decontamination, 232 Wetting a Person in Cold Weather,

233

DECONTAMINATION SOLUTIONS, 233 Recommended Decontamination Solutions for WMD agents, 235 SUMMARY, 241 DISCUSSION QUESTIONS, 241 REFERENCES, 241

Chapter 11

= Facility and Equipment Decontamination,

INTRODUCTION, 244 CHEMICAL DECONTAMINATION METHODS AND TECHNOLOGIES, PAST DECONTAMINATION SOLUTION FORMULATIONS, 247 Supertropical Bleach, 247 Decontamination Solution 2 (DS2), 247 EPA Decontamination Solutions for Toxic Industrial Chemicals,

243 246

248

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENT DECONTAMINATION, 248 NEW FACILITY AND EQUIPMENT DECONTAMINATION METHODS AND TECHNOLOGIES, SNL Decontamination Foam, 251 Antimicrobial Pesticides and Devices, 251 DECONTAMINATION APPLICATION METHODS, 252 Contaminated Space Fumigants, 252 Hard Surface Decontaminants,

250

253

Portable (Movable) Property Fumigation, 254 Physical Removal Decontamination Methods, 255 ADDITIONAL FUTURE DECONTAMINATION METHODS AND TECHNOLOGIES, 256 Solution Phase Chemistry, 256 Solid Phase Chemistry, 257 Gas Phase Chemistry, 257 Supporting Technologies, 257 EPA’S ROLE IN RESPONDING TO ANTHRAX AND OTHER WMD RELATED CONTAMINATION,

257 EPA’S REGISTRATION OF PESTICIDES, 259 FIFRA Section 18 Emergency Exemption and Anthrax, 260 WORKER PROTECTION FOR PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN FACILITY AND EQUIPMENT DECONTAMINATION OPERATIONS, 261

xi

Contents

OTHER FACTORS INFLUENCING DECONTAMINATION Detection and Intervention Timelines, 262 Stability and Persistence of the Released Substance, Nature of the Location,

262

Effectiveness of Decontamination Methods, Prevent Further Migration of Contaminant, Survey of Effected Area, 263

Determine Target Clearance Levels, 264 Waste Transportation and Disposal, 264 SUMMARY, 265 DISCUSSION QUESTIONS, 265 REFERENCES, 266

xil

263 263

262

STRATEGIES,

262

Table of Articles and Figures Chapter 2 Pigure: 2

\..Non-Electric: Blasting Cap asiies ahancl uhh ok andes

Figure 2.2 Electric Bastin o"Caney

tee, cee

Settee

Rare

eee

oes es ese

na

SRE

13

reine,

fetaneee

13

Figure:2.3)

Binary Two:Component Explosive’. 4:400.0¢.. 20.7227 8 2 Oe

15

Eigurcy?

AuEitects Gl altex plosion se aean tie atc

16

Higuic!2

ivictal: Pips Bombs

este

eet

Maseticn Girciitus

eet DARA

Piguce:2.9. Parallel Cacuitawen: Pioure:)

ae

eee

SuSeries-earalleCincuit ss

02) Shits eae

eae

hak

ee

ee

Laat eee

ficure 2.6 Fragments of Exploded Pipe Bombs. igUrCr

Ree

9

eee

AR

ee

OR

ue (et

eee

Lee tk eee ee

tei

ee

17

ee ee

18

eee

20

lies ope

et

ee

Pe

ee

aie

ee ene

ee

es

ee eles oe

eee

eee eee

eee

21

ee Zh

Chapter 3 higures.\sAmmE vewithess Accounts: Chapter 4 Figure 4. Myabuts

£1522 ehe

2.4 6.2.4 co cae Be 8 SOE

Ay eed OR) RSS

PiGUIS 4 25 Salas

Gos oe aA a a ae Week

Bigure 4.3). Somates

s&s sas 2 does De naead onus Sic i

REN

hgNN ag a

he

AURIS SA

Ie

Figure 4.6: Distilled Mustardaiw

sy. Sa

AeA

igure: 4 J MNittosen analogs OlMVinStarde icuted Sy Phosgene @xime (CX) als mae

ee

REA pte

el

eh as eae

Oe

OR

SearoretSalon ASM chne geht SoAaR

Figure 4.5. Sulfar Mustard, at. eden tinh

GA

NS oo

See

we cs ere

as

ttt

oe

Pigire 4a Oy Wewisticatne

as eret

EG

Pigure

islivdrogen Cyanide:

5a CO

120s. 9 f cogaa

oe

CS a.8 Si11 oi ee aa

JSiryea cokeMa atGe510) no Me

a

Rm,

i

Pioure 4.15 WPHOs genes Aten s Sante eaten. Bigure 4 OmMOSS ecg: oa PAU Ae

© SUMMA EP

Leas hdlkro OS Buea | Fie VOM

Peis Ae OsOe

ontcrm chsh

acc aatad

OIN peters ee ete

oe oe es Sein

rane

48

Ao

ee

ee

eo

49

oe

50

eee ee

ctl al

ee

50

eee

51

ees mere Ol

eo oe

EVO eRe

eee eer

dee

SpE Sere nT 3: So

Mr cite peete ae

Ae

eT

54

ea

54

eRe

55

ene See

55

Sire, NE

antes Gia 5 use

oe

cae

eae sae

ST

48) ee arial) ae

33 53

8 balm Wek A

52

oR eee ae Te a2

aad aye ae io

Tercera ie Uae

orn ae isl eta elas WAY Ms Con UIE

eee

yreeieerice

eR ee orem nieSIRES, SWC rey es ses

48

ee

OR

enya

Figure 41) -Cyanogetr Chionde: site a ws to to ays 3 ash che FiFeabrace?

MEST

ee

48

cnet ee te te ie

eres Ne

a

ee

ee

ane tae oe ee

seme ae

a2

AA

Ore wt ne

i eeey sere ate tee ae

rc

ee

enearene

Figure 4,9" Orsanie Arsenicals i Wee

ee

ee eee

COR Deas Se Ren CEERI

arrag

en oE 56

Sere ey

in hoe

eae

56

red ae

agin Re baese ee iooue gw aes hp eiSlonorNida eat WSS acee meee

56

cee ete cee eee

69

th

etna

8 ew

aie Uo ene

ne

Chapter 5 Figure 5.1. Diseases Reportable to the CDC...

.. 2 2. 2.

sec

ee

66... eee eee eee Figure 5.2 Center for Disease Control Abstract ..........

73 Xiil

Table ofArticles and Figures

nae Sree

ese rae iam

eee

Figure 5:3.CDC Health AdvisorysOctober, 200 Lies

76

Figure 5.4 Federal Regulations to Control Communicable Diseases ...........---+-+++- ii, er

ce to

sia. ics", coo sonavere ole ce demo ne ages Pane atte tao

Fiorewds5 Case Studies

81

Chapter 6 Figure.6e2* Cholera cctaccaxs etl tee ie a 0. Gath, te fe

Figure 6-3 landers. Biguire G4. Plague

ian

FiCute Of MULATOM:

i, a

osnwa yeve hle Bee Wee otos eae ng

Uae ace GAN cee « a

eee soe

5.555. ct, sain: 3 OW eo Viraltemorrhagic: Fevers: . x 22. sae

ts

ies Gees Ooi

0... bum daapl 1

PioureO:)- Smallpox stone) cS

ee mee

Teac

Rea

eee

ote ee

oth ee eae

86

ee

ree

SseS

opacnne eee ch ome ee vials Aiea is Si

Figure Gil Anthrax...

Cua

aa rs Ee

ee

SI ec

ee

ee

eee

ee

97

Oe

eee

98

Chapter 7 Figure 7. | Procedures in the Event Of Nuclear Explosioncgp4: weinerteeae 111 Figure 7-2. Procedures in the Event.of a: Dirty Bomb...

... a

veaeee ee) cee

eae

La 7

Chapter 8 ables)"

Recommended Work, Mission LDurationins:

able. 3:2: Disorders of Heat Related Injury: *. 5

oc.

3.006 aha: a...

os ae

Vee

eee

ee

156 165

Chapter 10 ihable 1031 Recommended Decontamination Team! Staffing 42.) 5...

peer

2)

ys

210

able 102 3iazard suspected. — Preterred pOlutOnS ac... ee

235

Table 10.3 Recommended Decontamination Solutions For CW/BW andRadiologtcall WMatettals xc.2/5 wae sie «eum ee os ee Aas A

236

a

ee

Article 10.1 US EPA Emergency Decontamination Alert Procedure .................. 236

Chapter 11 Table 11.1 Molecular Components Of Chemical Warfare Agents .................... 247 Table 11.2 Hard Surface Decontaminant Applications

XIV

=. -—. Gs... ee

254

Chapter

1

The Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction This chapter introduces the foundation for understanding the nature of WMD incidents and the measures necessary to minimize their impact on a community. No one resource can be the sole voice of wisdom about a topic as complex as WMD, but the fundamentals

offered

here,

in combination

with

ambitious, creative thinking about response solutions will be a strong starting point.

1. Discuss produce 2. Explain WMD. 3. Discuss attacks. 4. Explain

the how WMD attacks are techniques used to fear and destruction in the target population. what basic terminology is used in the study of the historical context of WMD and terrorist and discuss the assessment of WMD threats.

The Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION The acronym WMD stands for Weapons of Mass Destruction and is the most recent designation in an evolving series assigned to a group of weapons and techniques that are employed to produce destruction and fear in a target population. WMD represents a significant component of

the suite of tools used by foreign and domestic terrorists and has received an enormous degree of attention in the U. S., particularly since the events of September 11, 2001. These weapons are separate, distinct from those found in purely military actions, and they can accurately be categorized within two different but related definitions, WMD and weapons of Terrorism. They are used for their ability to produce severe or widespread destruction

including injury and loss of life as well as for their ability to create an atmosphere of fear and public panic, which is the signature of terrorism. Terrorism is not a 20th century invention. It has been ongoing, sometimes for reasons related to conflicts involving religious beliefs, for centuries. In the past twenty years the motives and actions of groups that use

terrorist

weapons

have

changed

considerably.

Previously,

disaffected groups that employed bombs and other tools of terrorism were mainly interested in attracting attention to their political cause and

creating a platform for their message. They were far more interested in seizing favorable public attention than they were in killing or injuring people and causing widespread destruction. Even where WMD

were

used for political assassinations, the attacks tended to be narrowly focused

and

allowed

the terrorists

to subsequently

dominate

an

undamaged populace. Critical to the success of any traditional political attack was the need to insure the sympathies followers. Where

terrorists

historically

rooted

their

of the movement’s actions

in political

philosophies, today we see attacks motivated by religious and ethnic hate. In a period that has been reminiscent of the religious conflicts that punctuated European politics for several centuries and contributed to the founding

of America, the past 20 years have seen the global re-emergence of violence along religious lines. The purpose of contemporary terrorist attacks has been to inflict punishment on a target population, including the United States, and inflict heavy damage, loss of life and fear.

Chapter 1

The Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

TERMINOLOGY Over the last decade the names of the components included in WMD have changed, and they require some explanation for contemporary clarity. Acronyms such as COBRa, CBRNE and NBC, with some international variation, have been used to describe the same collection of

tools. The list of these components includes the following: Chemical - which is broken down into four major classes: Nerve Agents, Vesicants, Blood Agents and Choking agents along with some less destructive chemicals. Biological - consisting of Bacteria, Viruses and Toxins. Radiological - including “Dirty Bombs” also known as Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) which depend on the inclusion of radiological source material with a conventional explosive.

Nuclear - differentiated from Radiological agents because they rely on fission to create

an explosion

causing lethal damage

near the

epicenter of the blast and spreading “fallout” Ordinance - which is a collection of conventional weapons that has become less frequently included in the current WMD definition

Explosive - primarily a collection of conventional explosives but includes some incendiary, or fire starting materials. Any homemade explosive device, as opposed to a purpose-built manufactured device, is

known as an Improvised Explosive Device (IED).

HISTORY In the first few months of the year 1605, a group of religious dissidents

completed

an ambitious

project in central London and awaited an opportunity to commit an act of terrorism that today would qualify as a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) incident. They had acquired space in the basement of Parliament House and had managed to

hide 2% tons of gunpowder, packed in 36 barrels, under the House of Lords. In October of that year ,their plan, known today as the Gunpowder Plot, was discovered and subsequently resulted in the arrest of Guy Fawkes and his co-conspirators and their execution shortly thereafter. While this incident may not have been the first or the largest historical attempt to deploy WMD, it is certainly noteworthy, and its

The Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Chapter 1

failure is memorialized on November Sth each year with bonfires and fireworks as Guy Fawkes Night. Fast forward 300 years and 3500 miles to the west. The prosperity of the early 1900’s in the United States had been accompanied by social change and political foment. Women were voting, a new political view known as communism was attracting attention worldwide, and after the first World War drew to a close, the economic advantages enjoyed by

the wealthy had stirred resentment in the ranks of the working class. In 1920 Prohibition arrived and so did a general softening of the economy.

In the midst of social unrest and growing economic problems, particularly for many immigrant laborers, the Stock Market in New York City was being recognized as the world’s center for prosperity and financial activity. On September 16th a horse drawn wagon parked outside J. P. Morgan and Company, a prominent Wall Street bank, exploded. The blast resulted in 30 deaths, hundreds of injuries, about 2

million dollars in damage and virtually no interruption in the business of Wall Street. Despite the fact that this incident was the most serious terrorist attack in the U. S. to date, it was business as usual by the next afternoon. This was

not to be the last terrorist attack in America,

but the

booming prosperity of the period known as the “Roaring Twenties” produced a temporary national amnesia about domestic threats that lasted decades.

Contemporary cases of limited domestic WMD

incidents go back

over 30 years. In 1972, an attempted attack on U. S. water supplies in

Chicago and St. Louis by the extremist group “The Order of the Rising Sun” was intercepted. During that same year, a tavern in New York City was bombed by the Puerto Rican nationalist group FALN, killing four

people. This was only one of nearly 50 bombings conducted by the same group in a three-year period. In 1975,a TWA terminal at LaGuardia airport in New York City was bombed by Croatian nationalists, killing 11 people and injuring 75. A bomb planted by another Puerto Rican resistance group in a rest room at New York’s Kennedy Airport killed one man in 1981. On December 21st, 1988 Pan Am flight 103 exploded over the small Scottish town of Lockerbie, killing all 259 people aboard and 11 people on the ground. The incident was ascribed to Libyan terrorists.

Chapter 1

The Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The February1993, bombing of the World Trade Center by Islamic

fundamentalists killed 6 and injured more than 1000 people. The following year Salmonella was used to poison restaurant salad bars in Oregon in an attempt to influence the outcome of an election, resulting

in hundreds of illnesses but no fatalities. A plan to attack Disneyland with Sarin was discovered in 1995 and the conspirators arrested. The Murrah Building in Oklahoma City was the target of domestic terrorism in April 1995, and the explosion resulted in 168 deaths and over 500 injuries. In 1996, a bomb detonated at Olympic Park in Atlanta during the Centennial Olympics killed one victim outright and led to the death of another from heart failure. Over 100 people were injured. Acts of terrorism against American assets overseas were carried out

in 1996, 1998 and again in 2000 against the U. S. barracks in Saudi Arabia, the U. S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the USS Cole in Yemen. All are attributed to Islamic fundamentalists.

In December

1999, customs agents found explosives and timing

devices in the trunk of a car arriving at Port Angeles by ferry from Canada. The driver turned out to be part of what is now known as the “Millennium Plot” to bomb the Los Angeles Airport, Disneyland and the Seattle Space Needle at the direction of Osama bin Laden. Despite the frequency

with which

acts of terrorism

had been

perpetrated against U. S. cities or international assets, the American people had been slow to acknowledge the magnitude of the risk or develop an awareness of the intentions and methods of the terrorists.

Inhabitants of other geo-political target areas around the world, such as Israel

and Belfast

in Northern

Ireland,

had

learned

that terrorism

intruded into their lives with frightening regularity, and they understood the need to counter to the threat. America was awakened on the morning of September 11, 2001, to the reality of concerted terrorist activity on U. S. soil. Airliners used successfully as instruments of WMD at the Pentagon and the World

Trade Center Towers, along with a failed attack that terminated in a cratered field in Pennsylvania, made terrorism a part of American

history that could not be ignored.

Much of the development of the materials used in WMD response training and educational programs has been the result of the events of 9/11 and a determination to be prepared for the next incident. In some

The Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Chapter 1

communities like Atlanta, where preparations for the 1996 Olympics made terrorism and WMD part of the planning process, the architects of local and federal response plans had nearly a ten-year head start on the rest of the country. Through this text, we will examine issues related to WMD incidents.

We will discuss technologies associated with WMD

and the counter

technologies that are applied to detection. We will look at responder safety and the resources that are needed fora WMD response. Become

fluent in the concepts, threats, equipment and structure of WMD incidents and their management and you will have a solid foundation upon which to base analytic conclusions and flexible plans.

ASSESSMENT OF WMD THREATS Each community has a different level of exposure to risk from WMD and will respond in a way consistent with their plans. Metropolitan areas will have a different risk than rural areas, but a small town may have a

unique risk factor of its own. We need to examine the components of a WMD attack and understand the rationale for the act in order to asses a threat. We also need to understand that terrorists do not see their actions as terrorism and that their conscience is not a constraint.

Since

the goals

of terrorists

who

employ

WMD

include

a

combination of physical and psychological damage as the impetus for political change, they will frequently select symbolic sites instead of, or in addition to, heavily populated or key infrastructure targets. The Pentagon’s symbolism, as the seat of U. S. military management, is clear. The World Trade Center Towers represented capitalism and American wealth and success. Had the fourth flight, which is speculated to have been aimed at the White House, been successful it would have

struck the seat of American power and politics. To the degree that a practical projection of a WMD threat can be made, it will first have to account for the presence of inherent hazards that can be the target of an opportunistic attack. A suburban community, otherwise of little value to terrorists, may become a much more

attractive target if it includes a plant that produces large quantities of dangerous chemicals. Likewise, a community that contains a large

hydroelectric generation center or a nuclear power generating station

Chapter 1

The Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

that serves a huge geographic area could find itself a lot further up the list of desirable targets than it might be otherwise. As a practical matter, most Emergency Management plans identify such sites for conventional incident response.

In locations like these, a safety plan and worker training will reduce most incidents to the status of anticipated events. If such a site becomes the target of a WMD

attack, the elements of an effective response are

already in place. Terrorism depends on panic, fear, and a lack of ready response. Take that advantage away through reasoned, measured response, and terrorists lose their edge. Population is also a factor, not only in terms of numbers, but also in

terms of evacuation problems. In 1893, the coast of Georgia saw landfall

for a hurricane that killed over 2000 people. Modern forecasting and communications

technology should greatly reduce the risk from a

similar storm today. However, the roads that exist today as evacuation routes are inadequate, and some planners estimate that a similar storm would claim even more lives than it did over a century ago. A broad

chemical

attack in a heavily populated

area that is served by a

bottlenecked roadway system may be far more successful merely by virtue of the victims’ inability to flee quickly enough. We know that chemical, biological, and even nuclear WMD are in the hands of parties dedicated to disrupting American society and, by

extension, affecting political decision-making. Attacks will follow a

path that poses the least risk of detection theoretically

increasing

the

chance

and interception,

of success.

As

attacks

thus are

discovered, interdicted, or carried out successfully, we learn from them

and our ability to prevent them in the future is enhanced by those lessons. Many of the solutions and response measures for a WMD attack are already available within the public safety and health communities

and can be mobilized quickly once an incident occurs. However, recognition of a WMD incident is dependent, to a significant degree, on the vigilance of the public and the response community. The sooner an attack is recognized or detected the more we can do to limit its effectiveness.

The Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Chapter 1

SUMMARY Any discussion of WMD necessarily includes an understanding of motives,

methods,

mitigation

measures,

science

and

technological

issues, response contingencies and long-term remediation efforts. While

we tend to study each of these components of WMD individually, they are inextricably linked and need to be understood in the context of their

relationship to one another. The material presented in this book will provide a good foundation for understanding the nature of WMD

incidents and the measures

necessary to minimize their impact on a community.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. Discuss the types of events that could be characterized as WMD incidents. 2. Compare the potential for destruction by WMD now vs. 100 years ago.

3. Examine the contemporary users of WMD and their motives. 4. Create a list of measures to minimize WMD destruction.

Chapter

2

Explosive Devices OVERVIEW In order to successfully counter an attack, or threatened attack, with an explosive device the public safety officer needs to have a basic understanding of explosive devices and how they function. This chapter will cover the effects of an explosion along with the various methods to construct and initiate an explosive device. The information will aid first responders in developing a specific response plan for their respective jurisdictions in combating this type of criminal activity.

ne iccTivcsc OBJECTIVES

1. Discuss a brief history on the use of explosive devices by terrorists in the United States. 2. Recognize the different types of explosions and how they may interact with one another. 3. Define low explosives, high explosives, and improvised explosives, and have a basic knowledge of how each type functions. 4. Recognize the damaging effects from an explosion and know how to counter these effects. 5. Recognize the two basic components of an improvised explosive device. 6. Discuss the three different methods to delay the initiation of an improvised explosive device. 7. Recognize the basic guidelines for a safe response to an incident involving either an explosion or a found improvised explosive device.

Chapter 2

Explosive Devices

INTRODUCTION Explosives and explosive devices continue to be the weapon most used by terrorist and extremist organizations to carry out their mission. Whether they are called a bomb, infernal machine, destructive device or improvised explosive device (IED), these weapons can inflict mass casualties, create major property damage, and instill panic among the populace with a single strike. They also allow the perpetrator significant time to flee the target area prior to the explosion, if desired. Bombings and the criminal use of explosives do not represent a new public safety problem. In 1886 during a labor protest at Haymarket Square in Chicago a bomb detonated, killing seven Chicago Police Officers.

The

detonation

of a bomb

inside

the police station

in

Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in 1917, killed 9 police officers. On Wall Street

in 1930, the massive detonation of a car bomb killed 33 and injured 200. Studies of more contemporary incidents such as the bombing of the World Trade Center in February 1993 which killed six and injured over 1,000; and the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in April 1995 which took the lives of 168 and injured over 600 are grim reminders of the continued criminal use of these devastating weapons.

In order to successfully counter these types of attacks, a basic

understanding of explosives and explosive devices is necessary. This chapter will cover the effects of an explosion along with the various

methods to construct and initiate an explosive device. The information will aid first responders in developing a specific response plan for their respective jurisdictions in combating this type of criminal activity. Under no circumstance should the student consider this to be a course in bomb disposal operations. The dedicated men and women

responsible for bomb disposal operations in both the military and public safety communities invest hundreds, if not thousands, of hours in training to neutralize these type weapons. The cost of required safety equipment for bomb disposal alone can have a financial impact of tens of thousands of dollars on a government agency.

An explosion may be basically defined as the rapid release of energy from a confined space. This energy consists of a rapid generation of gases, which may be accompanied by high temperatures, a loud noise,

Chapter 2

and

violent

Explosive Devices

shock.

There

are

three

basic

types

of explosions:

Mechanical, Chemical and Nuclear.

Mechanical Explosions

Mechanical explosions occur when the pressure inside a closed container rises to a point that it bursts the container. One example of this type of explosion would be a toy balloon where air is forced into the

balloon until it bursts. Another example would be a steam boiler where the water inside is heated to form steam, which is a gas. If the safety valve on the boiler fails to vent the excess steam, then the build-up of gas will eventually cause the boiler to rupture and explode. The explosion of

a pipe bomb filled with gunpowder is an example of a mechanical explosion caused by the rapid burning of the gunpowder creating a large volume of gas.

Chemical Explosions Chemical explosions occur when a solid or liquid explosive material rapidly changes

into gases.

This rapid change

is initiated by the

application of heat, shock or friction to the explosive material; and the

gases generated have a much greater volume than the original explosive materials. The entire conversion takes only a fraction of a second, produces extremely high temperatures (several thousand degrees F) and

is accompanied by shock and loud noise. All manufactured explosives are chemical explosives with the single exception of nuclear explosives.

Nuclear Explosions Nuclear explosions occur through either fission (the splitting of the

nuclei of atoms) or fusion (the joining together under great force of the nuclei of atoms). When fission or fusion occurs, a tremendous release of energy, heat, gas and shock takes place.

CHEMICAL EXPLOSIVES These items, often referred to as “energetic materials”, may be either chemical mixtures (i.e. black sporting powder) or chemical compounds (i.e. dynamite, TNT, nitroglycerine, C-4, etc.); and they are found in

either liquid or solid forms. With the application of heat shock or friction, these energetic materials will go through a very rapid change (i.e. explosion) and become a gas. Chemical explosives are divided into

Chapter 2

Explosive Devices

three classifications: low explosives, high explosives, and improvised explosives. The classification of these materials depends upon the velocity at which they deflagrate or detonate. A chemical explosive that

detonates at a velocity between 3,280 feet per second and 29,900 feet per second is classified as a high explosive. A material that deflagrates at a velocity less than 3,280 feet per second is classified as a low explosive.

LOW EXPLOSIVES Low Explosives are chemical mixtures (i.e. black sporting powder or flash powder) or chemical compounds (i.e. smokeless gunpowder,

nitrocellulose). They consist of a fuel and an oxidizer, which enhances the burning rate of the fuel. Low explosives deflagrate (rapidly burn) rather than detonate (explode), and they are usually initiated by heat. A bomb can be constructed using low explosives by confining the material

inside a pipe with end caps. The deflagrating low explosive will rapidly create an expanding gas, which will rupture or explode, the pipe container.

This

is a combination

of a chemical

and

mechanical

explosion. Low explosives are usually initiated by heat; however, a specific type of gunpowder may also be initiated by heat or shock (i.e.

blasting cap). Gunpowder has a chemical name of nitrocellulose, which deflagrates

deflagration

when

introduced

for nitrocellulose

to a heat

can

source.

The

velocity

be greatly increased

with

of

the

introduction of nitroglycerine or nitroguanidine to the nitrocellulose. This material is marketed as double base smokeless gunpowder and triple base smokeless gunpowder, and if initiated with a blasting cap, it becomes a high explosive material and will detonate unconfined.

HIGH EXPLOSIVES High explosives are chemical compounds that are usually initiated by a combination of heat and shock produced by a blasting cap. These materials do not need to be confined to create a detonation. High explosives are further broken down into three classifications: Primary, Secondary and Blasting Agents.

Primary High Explosives Primary high explosives are extremely sensitive and powerful explosives used in blasting caps and military fuze detonators, which in turn detonate secondary explosives. Examples of primary explosives are

Chapter Pp 2

Explosive Devices

re Azide, Fulminate of Mercury and Lead Styphnate. These materials will react violently with the least amount of heat, shock or friction. Figure 2.1 Non-Electric Blasting Cap ALUMINUM

HGONET

OPEN END FOR. INSERTION OF SAFETY FUSE

aT

ALUMINUM

SHELL

NO.

8 NONELEC

AST

IGNITION

MIX

y.e

a

SHUNT

Oe

\

LEG WIRES

SHELL RUBBER

PRIMER

‘\ BASE

\, CHARGE BRIDGEWIRE

PLUG

CHARGE

DUPONT NO. 6 COMMERCIAL ELECTRIC BLASTING CAP

LEG WIRES

/RUBBER

BRIDGE WIRE

2 Zs

JZ

\

=

SULFUR

~

a

/i

é IGNITION CHARGE’

{LEAD STYPHNATE

AND seesBARIUM fee

>HROMATE

BLASTING

P 5 ALLOY

CUP

/f

\

\

Nore tee pL CRMES mae CHARGE (LEAD AZIDE)

MILITARY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, SPECIAL

NO. 8 ELECTRIC

ALUMINUM

/

CAP

“BASE

(ROX!

CHARGE

14

Chapter 2

Explosive Devices

Secondary High Explosives

Secondary high explosives are relatively insensitive to heat, shock or

friction compared

to primary explosives.

Because

of this relative

insensitivity, they need to be initiated by a very strong explosive shock, which can be produced by a blasting cap. Examples of secondary high explosives (i.e. main charges) are dynamite, deta-sheet, detonating cord, Trinitrotoluene (TNT), composition C-4, etc. These energetic materials

do not need to be confined to cause them to detonate. Blasting Agent High Explosives

Blasting agent high explosives are insensitive chemical compounds or mixtures consisting mainly of ammonium nitrate, which is a strong oxidizer. The most common use of ammonium nitrate is in agriculture as a fertilizer; however, when fuel is combined with ammonium nitrate it

becomes an explosive. Blasting agents are relatively insensitive to heat, shock

or friction; and usually require a booster

(secondary

high

explosive) along with a blasting cap to create a detonation. One of the

more common

types of ammonium

nitrate based explosives is the

BINARY or two-component explosive. As indicated by the name, this

product has two parts, an oxidizer (finely granulated ammonium nitrate) and

a

fuel

(usually

liquid

nitromethane).

These

materials

are

non-explosive until they are mixed together; however, once mixed they

become secondary high explosives and can be detonated with a blasting cap.

Chapter 2

Explosive Devices

15

Figure 2.3 Binary Two Component Explosive

improvised Explosives Improvised explosives are without a doubt the greatest threat to public safety personnel. Depending upon the available materials to make

the explosive, they may be a low explosive, secondary high explosive, blasting agent, or primary high explosive. A very common improvised low explosive consists of a chlorate material mixed with granulated

sugar as the fuel. A secondary problem with this mixture is the deflagration produces chlorine gas. There are no definitive physical characteristics of improvised explosives. They may be granular or solid, and they may be any color such as white, beige, red, etc. Numerous different formulas for making improvised explosives are readily available on the Internet and through publications available by mail order or through retail outlet stores. The main problem with the

publication of this material is that you cannot adequately describe the

potential

hazards

of these

mixtures.

There

have

been

numerous

documented cases of people, including very young adolescents, being

critically

explosives

injured or killed while

attempting

to make

improvised

Chapter 2

Explosive Devices

16

EXPLOSIVE EFFECTS is initiated, the energetic material is instantaneously converted from a solid or liquid into a rapidly expanding mass of gases traveling outward in all directions. Three primary effects are produced by the explosion which can cause damage and great personal injury or death to anyone in the area. These effects are Blast an

When

Pressure,

explosive

Fragmentation, and Incendiary or Thermal.

Figure 2.4 Effects of an Explosion

4

:

‘

J FRAGMENTATION |

~~

;

\

‘

‘

~

\

\

\

“SHOCK \, ~*~Ne F R '@)NT

a

a

%

~

i

7 EFFECT

i

j

.

f

2

|

Se

i Gi

i

PO

/

i /

z

erg,

a

4

-

,

a

ad

ae

oe

. 5

igi,

_ BLAST PRESSURE\, ® EFFEGT eS

=

:

Se

INCENDIARY THERMAL EFFECT laod z > Pe eo 7 Blast Pressure Effect

The rapidly expanding gases coming out in all directions from the energetic material create Blast Pressure Effect. The gases can exert

pressures of approximately 700 tons per square inch on the atmosphere surrounding

the energetic

material,

and the gases

are

formed

in

approximately 1/10,000th of a second. The shock wave preceding this build-up of gases has a velocity of up to 13,000 miles per hour at the

point of detonation; however, its velocity dissipates rapidly as it travels outward. A person will sustain eardrum damage at a pressure of between 30 and 40 pounds per square inch, and death may occur at a pressure of between 300 and 400 pounds per square inch.

Chapter 2

Explosive Devices

rragment tiiect -

$

wee

oe

9°

gee

te

Fragment Effect is produced by the shock wave that rapidly travels

outward from the point of detonation. The velocity of the shock wave is relative to the detonation velocity of the specific energetic material. In other words, the faster an explosive material detonates, the faster the

shock wave travels away from the point of detonation. As the shock wave strikes objects in its path, it will fragment or distort the objects and propel them outward. Any solid material that is a component of the bomb will also be fragmented and propelled outward much like a bullet leaving the barrel of a firearm. The average fragment produced by a

detonation will reach a velocity of 2,700 feet per second a few feet from the point of detonation, and it will lose velocity as it travels outward.

Fragments

determined

to have been components

of the bomb

are

referred to as primary fragmentation. All other fragmentation caused by the shock wave is referred to as secondary fragmentation.

Figure 2.5 Metal Pipe Bomb

STEEL PIPE

a “2273.

FUSE

18

Explosive Devices

Figure 2.6 Fragments of Exploded Pipe Bomb

Chapter 2

Chapter 2

Explosive Devices

INCENDIARY THERMAL EFFECT Incendiary Thermal Effect is produced by the detonation of a high explosive or deflagration of a low explosive and varies widely from one explosive material to another. This effect is seen at the moment of

explosion as a brilliant flash of light and lasts only for a fraction of a second. High explosive materials produce a much greater degree of heat during detonation than low explosive materials; however, the heat produced by a low explosive material lasts longer than that produced by

a high explosive due to the slower rate of deflagration. Because of this, a secondary fire from the explosion is more likely to occur with a low explosive than with a high explosive. However, unless highly combustible materials are involved, the incendiary thermal effect plays an insignificant part in the explosion. Explosive Effects Protection The two primary effects from an explosion that have the greatest potential to cause property damage, injuries or death are the Blast Pressure Effect and the Fragmentation Effect. These two effects are best

countered by distance and shielding. The public safety officer should remain a minimum of 300 feet away from the explosive device and be under cover to be protected from fragments propelled through the air. The officer should also maintain a position that is not in the line-of-sight with the explosive device. Remember, if you can see the bomb, then the

bomb can see you! If people in the target area are too close to the suspected explosive device, move the people away; do not-attempt to move the suspected device away from the people.

In basic terms, an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) consists of two components, an explosive material and a method to initiate the explosive material (fuzing system). We have already discussed explosives and how they function; therefore, now we are going to

discuss the fuzing system that makes the bomb go off. There are two methods to initiate an IED, electric or non-electric. Electric

Most

retail electronics

stores

sell books

on electric circuits

for

hobbyists. The idea behind any electric circuit is to cause something to

20

Explosive Devices

Chapter 2

function. The electric current may light a light bulb, ring a bell, turn on a radio, etc. Electric fuzing systems are usually constructed around a power source consisting of dry cell batteries (i.e. standard flashlight type batteries). Most electric initiators (blasting caps or electric matches) will

function with as little as 1.5 volts of current. In the case of any IED, the electric current is going to activate an electric match or blasting cap, which will then explode the bomb. There are three general types of electric circuits that may be used in

the construction of an IED. A simple series circuit consists of a power source, wire, explosive charge, and a firing switch that causes the circuit to function. A parallel circuit consists of a power source, wire, explosive

charge, and multiple firing switches that can cause the circuit to function in a variety of different ways. A series-parallel circuit consists of a power source, wire, explosive charge, multiple firing switches, and an

arming switch that causes all of the firing switches to arm when it closes. The arming switch allows the bomber to safely transport a booby trapped IED to a target area.

Figure 2.7 Series Circuit

Chapter 2

Explosive Devices

Figure 2.8 Series-Parallel Circuit

Figure 2.9 Parallel Circuit emnrt,

Non-electric fuzing systems will cause the IED to function without any power source. The most common type of non-electric fuzing system

21

Explosive Devices

22

Chapter 2

is a pyrotechnic fuse. In this case the bomber lights a fuse, anditburns down into the explosive. The flame from the burning fuse is all that is needed to initiate a low explosive inside a pipe with end caps; however, to initiate high explosive materials, the fuse needs to be inserted into a blasting cap. Other non-electric initiating methods include pull-friction igniters (usually found in fireworks) and ammunition primers that emit a flame when impinged. An IED constructed with a non-electric fuzing system will last for years without any concern of battery decay.

Additionally, all components for a non-electric fuzing system may be hand made.

INITIATION DELAYS Every IED has some type of delay built into the fuzing system. This allows the bomber to transport the IED to the target area and/or wait for the intended target to enter the area where the IED is placed. There are three basic methods to delay the detonation of an IED. These are Time Delay, Action Delay, and Command Delay. All three methods of delay

can be built into both electric and non-electric fuzing systems. Time Delay

Time Delay means that a certain amount of time must pass before the

bomb detonates. The simplest method of time delay is the pyrotechnic or blasting fuse. The delay is the amount of time it takes from the ignition of the fuse to when the flame reaches the explosive charge. Other

methods of time delay include travel alarm clocks, kitchen timers, integrated circuit timers, etc. In fact, a very small timing system can be

constructed with an integrated circuit timer that will fit on top of a 9-volt transistor battery. 4 ho eae Feonez Action Delay

Action Delay is another name for a booby-trap IED. This type delay means that the intended victim or an unsuspecting person must do some type of action to cause the bomb to detonate. Examples of these actions

include opening a parcel, opening a briefcase, starting a car, turning ona light inside a room, moving a closed package, etc. As you can see almost any type action can be incorporated into the fuzing system of an IED. By including an arming switch in the fuzing system, this allows for a multitude of firing switches to also be included in the system. In other

Chapter 2

Explosive Devices

words a parcel bomb could be constructed that could not be opened, could not be moved, could not be x-rayed, could not be frozen; and it would still detonate after a certain lapse of time. Command Delay

Command Delay is a method where the bomber controls the exact moment the IED detonates. This can be accomplished through a radio control unit such as the type used by hobbyists, cellular telephones,

pagers, etc.

A command delay detonation can also be done with a firing

line, which is a long duplex electric wire that carries the current from the power source to the initiator. A non-electric example of command delay

could be a pull-friction igniter placed inside an enclosed pipe with a low explosive filler. A long cord tied to the igniter would allow the bomber to activate the IED from a distance. Command delay allows the bomber

to make certain a specific person is in the target area before detonating the TEI),

IED PACKAGING An IED may be encountered in one of two different forms, either open or closed. An open IED, such as a pipe bomb or several cartridges of dynamite with a battery and clock attached, is obvious to the person

confronting it . The open IED may be easily identified as a bomb. However, a closed IED can be concealed in a usually innocuous type container such as a cardboard box, briefcase, lunch box, etc. The actual

movement or opening of the closed container holding the IED may cause a detonation of the device. The closed IED allows the bomber to transport the device to the target area without arousing the suspicion of anyone he/she might encounter.

or a suspected, closed IED is encountered, the following guidelines will assist the public safety officer with the safe handling of the incident. Whether

an obvious,

open IED

23

Explosive Devices

Chapter 2

of 300 ¢ Establish an immediate security perimeter a minimum feet away from the suspected item. The only persons allowed access within this security perimeter are the bomb disposal personnel. The perimeter distance may increase significantly depending upon the size of the suspected device. The bomb

disposal personnel may enlarge or compress the security perimeter after their initial evaluation of the incident.

¢ Evacuate all non-essential persons from the area. Remember to evacuate away from the suspected item. Do not allow persons leaving the area to walk past the suspected device. ¢ Request fire department rescue and medical personnel to stage

nearby for immediate response in the event of an explosion.

¢ Do not transmit on radios near the area of the suspected IED. ¢ Establish a command post on the security perimeter that is

easily accessed by the bomb disposal personnel for their tactical operation. ¢ Record incident information. — Was there a bomb threat? — Who found the package, and can they provide details of the package? Are any unusual noises emitting from the package? Are there stains on the package? If so, what color? Is there an address label or other label on the package? Are there unusual odors emitting from the package? How was the package delivered to the location? BO 0 (On (O8 ORO;What is the approximate size and weight of the package?

¢ Record target information and hazards in the area. — Power lines — Gas lines — Fuel storage tanks — Chemical storage tanks —

Critical infrastructures

EXPLOSION GUIDELINES * Request fire department rescue and medical personnel if necessary. If a rescue is necessary, immediately check the surrounding area for any secondary or unexploded IED’s; alert rescue personnel if anything is found. This will expedite

removal of personnel from the target area.

Chapter 2

25

Explosive Devices

* Determine potential target hazards such as broken power or gas lines, damaged hazardous materials storage areas,

weakened structures, etc.

* Establish a security perimeter that contains all obvious fragmentation from the explosion. * Request bomb disposal personnel to check for any secondary

or unexploded IED’s.

* Check fire department and medical transport apparatus for any IED fragments that may be adhering to equipment.

¢ Follow normal criminal investigation guidelines.

SUMMARY In this chapter the importance of how to successfully prepare for an attack, or threatened attack, with an explosive device was discussed. It also covered

the importance

for first responders

to have

a basic

understanding of explosive devices and how they function. The chapter covered the effects of an explosion along with the various methods to construct and initiate an explosive device. The information will aid first responders in developing a specific response plan for their respective

jurisdictions in combating this type of criminal activity.

DISCUSSION

QUESTION:

1. Discuss different methods a bomber can use to disguise an IED and transport it to a target area. 2. What are some of the sources available to obtain information on

improvised explosives and how to construct IED’s? 3. Ifa briefcase-size suspected IED is found in an open area, what can be used as shielding to protect the public safety officers at the Scene’ 4. Is it possible to construct a bomb that once armed even the bomb maker can’t take it apart?

BIBLIOGRAPHY Brodie, Thomas G. (1972). Bombs and Bombings, Charles C. Thomas.

E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co., Inc. (1977). Blasters Handbook Davis, Tenney Lombard (1975). The Chemistry of Powder and Explosives, Angriff Press Lenz, Robert R. (1970). Explosives and Bomb Disposal Guide, Charles C. Thomas

Stoffel, Joseph (1972). Explosives and Homemade Bombs, Charles C. Thomas

Chapter

3

Suicide Bombers OVERVIEW Due to the increased use of suicide bombers by terrorist groups throughout the world, it is imperative that the public safety officers have a_ basic understanding of this type of criminal activity and how to counter it. The fact that the bomber intends to die makes deterrence of this type attack almost impossible; however, by understanding reconnaissance and surveillance of potential targets, security against a suicide bomber may be greatly enhanced. Incendiary devices will also be covered in this chapter. The construction and use of these type weapons will be shown to closely parallel improvised explosive devices. Recognition of the different types of incendiary devices will greatly aid the first responder in countering an attack using these weapons. Arson must be understood for what it is, a violent crime that terrorizes, kills and injures.

1. Discuss the history of suicide bombers and recognize that the act of suicide bombing is not linked to any particular nationality or religion. 2. Discuss the terms “Suicide Bomber,” “Homicide

Bomber,” and “Humanoid Explosive Device,” and determine if there is a difference in the descriptions. 3. Recognize that a suicide bomber is an improvised explosive device using a human as the firing switch. 4. Discuss the explosive effects from a suicide bombing and how to safely counter these effects. 5. Recognize the indicators of a suicide bomber. 6. Discuss the three elements necessary to conduct a suicide bombing: secrecy, reconnaissance, and rehearsals. Discuss a brief history of incendiary devices. Recognize the basic types of incendiary devices. Recognize a hypergolic incendiary device. 0. Discuss different methods of initiating incendiary eee devices. 11. Discuss methods for countering incendiary devices. 2]

Chapter 3

Suicide Bombers

28

INTRODUCTION The suicide attacks against the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001, caused much outrage throughout the world due to the magnitude of their destruction and loss of life; however, were they a new type of terrorism or warfare? The answer to this is, not really; most terrorism throughout history has carried a high risk of death for the terrorists themselves. Because the terrorists were willing to die, the September 11 attacks turned passenger jets into deadly missiles and inflicted mass casualties.

According to historian Walter Laqueur, improvised or homemade bombs

used

by

anarchists

and

Russian

revolutionaries

in the

nineteenth-century “‘were so unstable that they had to be thrown from a

short distance (that is, if they did not explode first in the hands of the attacker). Those who went on an attack of this kind were fully aware of the risk and many of them wrote farewell letters to their friends and families.”

The ritual act of self-sacrifice during combat appeared in a large scale toward the conclusion of World War II with the Japanese kamikaze pilots and midget two-man submarines sent on suicide missions. The Japanese culture perceived seppuku, or honorable suicide, as a part of samurai duty.

Suicide Bombings are not linked to any particular nationality or

religion. They have been carried out by members of the Tamil Tigers, a separatist group fighting the government of Sri Lanka; the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, a separatist group fighting the government of Turkey; Hezbollah, an Iranian backed group of Shiite Islamists; and al-Qaeda,

Osama bin Laden’s network of radical Sunni Islamists to name a few. Suicide bombings have taken place in over 20 different countries including Afghanistan,

Argentina,

China, Colombia,

Croatia,

India,

Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, Panama, the Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Tanzania,

Tunisia, Turkey, the United States, Uzbekistan and Yemen. The term “suicide bombing” became commonplace after the attack on the United States Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983. That attack

involved a truck laden with explosives being driven into the barracks which had been established at the Beirut International Airport.

Chapter 3

Suicide Bombers

29

Different phrases are often used in order to give the term “suicide bomber” a positive or negative connotation. The administration of U. S. President George W. Bush refers to “suicide bombing” as “homicide bombing” in order to de-emphasize the self-sacrificial connotation. The Arab press refers to suicide bombers as martyrs by using the term “Shaid” which describes a person who died in a Jihad in order to testify his faith in Allah.

HUMANOID EXPLOSIVE DEVICE This phrase best describes, in technical terms, the suicide bomber. In

the preceding chapter, explosive devices were described as having two main components: explosive material and a fuzing system. The fuzing system can be constructed to function on a time, action, or command

delay. In the case of a suicide bombing attack, the bomber becomes part of the fuzing system. In other words, the bomber is the “firing switch”

for the explosive device. In the case of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the

World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the explosive devices used were fully fueled

commercial

aircraft which

acted as enormous

cruise

missiles. The firing switches were the terrorists sitting at the controls of the aircraft. The explosive device used in the attack against the USS Cole in Yemen consisted of a boat packed with explosives as the main charge

and a command delay fuzing system using the bomber as the firing

switch. The

1998 bombings

of the U.S. embassies

in Kenya and

Tanzania consisted of trucks packed with explosives, and the firing

switch was the driver of each truck. Finally, you have the lone suicide bomber who walks into a target area wearing a disguised explosive belt or vest and detonates it at his/her selected time.

All of these attacks have utilized different modes of transportation of the device along with different main charges. The only common component of the devices has been the firing switch in the fuzing system. By utilizing parallel circuitry in the fuzing system, the bomb maker can also include a remote control firing switch and/or an anti-tilt firing switch. With this type design, the bomb can be remotely detonated if the humanoid firing switch has a change of heart at the last moment.

The anti-tilt switch will detonate the bomb in the event the humanoid firing switch is either shot or placed flat on the ground prior to detonating the device by command delay.

Chapter 3

Suicide Bombers

Explosive Laden Suicide Vest

EXPLOSIVE EFFECTS PROTECTION The two explosive effects that are most harmful and damaging witha suicide bombing are the same as with any other Improvised Explosive Device. Those are blast pressure and fragmentation. In addition, there is a potential problem with blood borne pathogens in the bone and tissue fragments from the body of the bomber. The best protection from these effects is distance and shielding. If the suicide bomber is identified

before the detonation, remain a safe distance from him or her. Keep bystanders away from the suspected bomber and attempt to isolate the

bomber.

For a group intent on carrying out an attack involving a suicide bomber, three main elements must be achieved for the attack to be

Chapter 3

Suicide Bombers

successful. The best method of countering this type attack is to interrupt any of the three elements. Secrecy: This is essential for the planning stage and operational stage of the attack. Reconnaissance: A thorough reconnaissance and surveillance is necessary to select the target and identify its weakness. This is the best time to deter this type attack. The terrorist group wants to succeed in the operation, and the suicide bomber does not want to die for nothing. If the target has been hardened to an extent that it is extremely difficult for the bomber to reach, then another target will be chosen. Strong, obvious and impenetrable security measures are the best way to deter a

suicide attack. Rehearsals: Extensive rehearsals are necessary to make sure the attack can be carried out quickly and stealthily. This will usually followed up with the Reconnaissance and Surveillance

phase of the planning.

The country of Israel has suffered through more suicide bombing attacks against its citizens than any other nation. In September 2002, the government of Israel publicly distributed a pamphlet on “Terror: Only Together Can We Stop It”. This pamphlet lists basic external, behavioral

indicators for suicide bombers. These indicators are: Unseasonable dress or conspicuous, bulky clothing. Obvious or awkward attempts to “blend in” to a crowd. Repeated and nervous handling of parts of clothing.

31

Chapter 3

Suicide Bombers

32

- Profuse sweating, slow-paced walking while focusing on sides. « Attempts to stay away from security personnel. ¢ Hesitant, nervous muttering.

¢ Perfumed, recently shaved. Figure 3.1 An Eyewitness Account

The May 19, 2001 issue ofthe International Herald Tribune ran a

story of a suicide bombing at a shopping mall in Netanya. The article listed several external, behavioral

indicators as mentioned

in the

pamphlet “Terror: Only Together Can We Stop It”. Here are some

interesting extracts from that article:

“I saw a young man, with an Arab face, a moustache, very well dressed, with a huge blue jacket and I whispered to my father quietly,

‘Look Dad, it’s a terrorist.” The young woman was with her father just across the road from the shopping mall in Netanya. Moments later, the man detonated an explosive device he was wearing, killing 999

seven.

The young

woman’s

father said that he thought there was

something strange about the bomber. He said that the man was completely calm but had wide eyes and showed tension in his face.

INCENDIARY DEVICES According to the National Fire Data Center, arson is a serious

problem in the United States. It is the number one cause of all fires, and it annually kills hundreds

of Americans,

injures thousands

more,

and

causes over $3 billion in damage to property. In each of the past ten years, there have been over 500,000 arson fires.

For many

years, the general populace has perceived arson as

primarily an insurance concern. In other words, a crime with limited impact on anyone other than the insurers; however, for the firefighters who have been injured or killed responding to set fires and the hundreds of civilians killed each year in incendiary or suspicious building fires, arson looms as a significant issue. Arson must be understood for what it is: a violent crime that terrorizes, kills and injures.

Chapter 3

Suicide Bombers

Vegetation Arson Fire in Rockland ' MA

Structure Arson Fire

33

Chapter 3

Suicide Bombers

34

The use of fire as a weapon dates back to medieval history; however,

some of the improvised incendiary devices with which we are familiar today had their origins during World War II. The term “Molotov Cocktail” was coined by members of the Finnish Army during their conflict with the Soviet Union during the Continuation War. Vyacheslav Molotov was the Foreign Minister and Secretary of War in the Soviet Union during this conflict. Finnish soldiers used glass bottles filled with petrol and a cloth wick protruding from the mouth of the bottle to successfully

repel Red Army tanks. The Finnish military even mass-produced “Molotov Cocktails” bundled with matches to light them.

The heat from the burning petroleum proved to be very effective against light tanks and quickly destroyed the morale of the enemy. The effective use of these improvised weapons was also noted during the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in 1943 and the Arab-Israeli War in 1948.

During the 1950’s and 1960’s, the Molotov Cocktail was used extensively by criminal elements in the United States. These domestic, or homegrown, terrorist organizations also started printing information on how to construct various

types of improvised

incendiary

and

explosive devices. They also started improving the technology of the devices. The basic Molotov Cocktail consisted of a breakable glass container filled with gasoline or some other highly flammable liquid. A cloth wick was then inserted into the neck of the bottle, and when ready to throw,

the bottle was turned upside down to saturate the cloth wick with the

liquid filler. The cloth wick was then lit, and the bottle was thrown. Often times the device would fail to function because the bottle didn’t break or the wick fell from the bottle while in flight. Other times the

burning wick would fall from the bottle just as it was thrown, dousing the thrower with flaming gasoline. In order to enhance the ability of the burning gasoline to cling to a

target once struck, a thickener would be added to the flammable filler. Two items that have been used to thicken the flammable filler are Styrofoam and bars of hand soap that have been peeled into flakes. These materials cause the flammable liquid to have a consistency similar

Chapter 3

Suicide Bombers

to military Napalm. Thus, the flammable liquid will cling to the target

once the bottle breaks and the liquid ignites.

Molotov Cocktail

35

36

Suicide Bombers

Chapter 3

Molotov Cocktail with Highway Flare

Another technology that was added to the Molotov Cocktail was the self-igniting or hypergolic incendiary device. This device is constructed by adding a small amount of sulfuric acid to the flammable liquid filler inside the glass container and sealing or capping the mouth of the bottle.

A mixture of potassium chlorate and sugar 1s then attached to the outside of the bottle. When the bottle breaks after being thrown, the acid ignites

Chapter 3

Suicide Bombers

the potassium chlorate and sugar mixture, which in turn ignites the flammable liquid filler. The reactive mixture on the outside of the bottle

can either be contained in a cloth rag tied around the outside of the bottle or it can be concealed behind a Styrofoam or paper label on the outside of the bottle. If a hypergolic Molotov Cocktail is used in an incendiary device attack, there will be obvious evidence at the scene once the fire has been

extinguished. Broken glass fragments from the frangible container will be around the point of ignition. There will also be an acrid odor and a glossy black spot near the point of impact on the target. The glossy black material is the sulfuric acid from inside the container. The acid will not

burn, and the fire from the incendiary device attack will not destroy it.

Hypergolic Molotov Cocktail

37

Suicide Bombers

38

Chapter 3

Viethods of Initiation

Similar to explosive devices, incendiary devices may be initiated by either an electric or non-electric method. The non-electric method entails the insertion of a wick or pyrotechnic fuse into a flammable material and lighting the fuse. This method has already been discussed in the section on Molotov Cocktails.

Methods of electric initiation are the same as those discussed in another chapter, however, the blasting cap initiator for explosives will be replaced with an electric match or improvised electric match. Electric matches, also called solar igniters, are readily available at any hobby shop that sells model rocket supplies; however, a simple electric match may be improvised by securing a small piece of steel wool onto the bare

ends of the circuit wire where the blasting cap or electric match would normally be connected. When current passes through the fine steel wool, it will ignite thus igniting the flammable material in the incendiary device.

Three delays may be built into the incendiary device’s fuzing system. These are Time Delay, Action Delay and Command Delay. ¢ Time Delay means that after a predetermined time has elapsed,

the incendiary device will function. This method allows the arsonist to flee the target area if desired.

¢ Action Delay is used as a booby trap in the incendiary device.

This method requires that the intended victim or an unsuspecting person must do some specific action to allow the incendiary device to function. This action may be opening a briefcase, starting a car, turning on a light switch or other

electric appliance, etc. ¢ Command Delay is used when the arsonist wants to target a specific individual or a specific target at a specific time.

Through a remote control radio signal or a long circuit wire, the arsonist controls the exact moment that the incendiary device functions. nsmtnyviven te glacax mT Tere Countering Incendiary Devices

In order for the incendiary device to function, it must have the three basic elements required for any fire. These are Fuel, Heat and Oxygen. Unlike explosive materials that contain their own oxygen, incendiary materials require atmospheric oxygen to maintain combustion. An

Chapter 3

Suicide Bombers

attack with an incendiary device should be countered using normal firefighting techniques.

SUMMARY Throughout the world, the use of suicide bombers by terrorist organizations has been on the rise. This type of violent attack is common only when

one

side in a conflict

lacks the means

for effective

“conventional” attacks. The fact that the bomber intends to die makes deterrence almost impossible; however, the best opportunity to thwart this type attack is during the reconnaissance and surveillance-planning phase.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. Is suicide bombing a new type of terrorist tactic? ~ Is suicide terrorism linked to any particular religion or nationality? 3. What steps can be taken to harden a target against a potential suicide bombing? 4. What are the external, behavioral indicators of a suicide bomber? 5. What are some of the sources available to obtain information on

the construction of incendiary devices? 6. What materials, other than gasoline, could be used as the

flammable material in an incendiary device? 7. If you are in an area where a Molotov Cocktail has ignited what technique should be used to suppress the fire?

BIBLIOGRAPHY Brodie, Thomas G. (1972). Bombs and Bombings, Charles C. Thomas.

Lenz, Robert R. (1970). Explosives and Bomb Disposal Guide, Charles C. Thomas. Powell, William. The Anarchist Cookbook,

Lyle Stuart, Inc.

Fall, Bernard B. Hell in a Very Small Place: The Seige of Dien Bien Phu, 1966 Da Capo Press

Swamy M.R. Narayan (1996). Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas, Vijitha Yapa Bookshop USAF Suicide Bombers Intelligence Brief

Terrorism: Questions & Answers, Council on Foreign Relations

39

vorpal 7 eohiaw’ quit, Tt | ren betaine neat na

° ni cio

UMA 2S Sota Sval, ter

wet ‘. to tsill coven fach lly2 Cvling jemi oee wtin

.

|

ag

esr) awikonage tae eeevir aa —)

~~

: ores NYS H0)

ee \/ ead

pL

:

=

«LE ot

wat a

Rar

Use ina Hw wy val ef

ny ph ew: a Saige rf

‘

»’* A aw

PS

rier eanbs eh

Py a

a eeaha

Saket

ee ee

oe) et

aes

:

Chapter

WMD

8

Personal

Protective Equipment (PPE) This chapter will niniaarthe various

types, the

selection and use criteria, and the maintenance

personal chemical materials involved

of

protective equipment (PPE) used for and biological warfare agents, radiological and toxic industrial chemicals that might be ina WMD incident.

OBJECTIVES The objectives of this chapter are to identify the following: 1. General configurations of chemical protective clothing and their relative use. 2. The four EPA Levels of Protection and their relative capabilities. 3. The four routes of exposure to chemical and biological agents, radiological materials and toxic industrial chemicals. 4. The various types of respiratory protective equipment and their relative capabilities and limitations. 5. Respiratory equipment fit testing and medical evaluation requirements. 6. Personal protective equipment limitations. 7. Personal factors and medical issues related to PPE use. 8. Recommended donning, doffing and care procedures for PRE:

122

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Chapter 8

. PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT For several centuries, mankind has recognized the need to utilize personal protective equipment to provides a barrier from exposure to unhealthful materials and injury. Early PPE, such as body armor, helmets, boots and gloves, was primarily intended to protect the wearer from physical injury. In the seventeenth century, medical practitioners tasked with the care and treatment of persons infected with the plague

utilized specialized protective uniforms. The design of these uniforms was extremely primitive by modern

standards, but based upon the

understanding at that time of how the disease was spread. The uniform consisted of a full-length gown, helmet, mask, gloves, and boots. The

gown was made of thick material that was covered in wax to make it

water (body fluid) resistant. Additionally, the uniform included glass eye coverings and a long beak attached to the mask. The beak was

stuffed with herbs, perfumes or spices to purify the air that the doctor breathed while near his patients.

Seventeenth century medical practitioners wore specially designed uniforms to protect themselves when treating patients suffering from the plague.

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Modern personal protective equipment has become much more sophisticated, although the basic concepts of wearer protection remain the same. PPE is defined as equipment used to shield or isolate a person from chemical, physical, biological and thermal hazards that may be encountered at a hazardous materials or weapons of mass destruction event. Adequate PPE should protect the respiratory system, skin, eyes, face,

hands,

feet,

head,

body,

and

hearing.

Personal

protective

equipment generally includes both clothing and respiratory protection

appropriate

and should be used in conjunction with instrumentation for the hazards present.

monitoring

PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT PROGRAM Personnel utilizing PPE during a WMD

event may be required to

operate under a written Personal Protective Equipment Program. The

two basic objectives of a PPE program are to protect the wearer from the hazards that exist at the event and to prevent injury from incorrect use

and/or malfunction of the PPE. The written PPE program includes policy statements, procedures, and guidelines. Copies should be made available to all personnel, and a reference copy should be made available

at the worksite maintenance

whenever

manuals,

possible. Technical

relevant

regulations,

data on equipment, and

other

essential

information should also be collected and maintained. The purpose of personal protective clothing and equipment is to

shield or isolate individuals from the physical, chemical, biological, radiological and thermal hazards that may be encountered at a WMD event. However,

no single combination

of protective equipment is capable of protecting against all hazards. Thus PPE should be used in conjunction with other protective methods, and its effectiveness should

be evaluated periodically. The use of PPE can itself create significant worker hazards, such as heat related injuries, physical and psychological stress, impaired vision, mobility, and communication problems. For any given situation, PPE

should be selected that provides an adequate

level of protection.

However, over-protection, as well as under-protection, can be hazardous

and should be avoided where possible.

123

124

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

The PPE program should be reviewed each year and revised as necessary. Elements that should be considered in the review include the following:

- A review of each incident requiring protective equipment for operations in the exclusion (hot) zone. ¢ The time, duration and number of back-to-back entries into the

exclusion zone. ¢ Accident and illness experiences. ¢ Adequacy of equipment selection.

¢ Adequacy of operational guidelines. ¢ Adequacy of decontamination, cleaning, inspection, ¢ ¢ ¢

¢ ¢

maintenance, and storage programs. A review of the exposure and maintenance logs. Adequacy and effectiveness of training and fitness programs. Coordination with overall health and safety program. The degree of fulfillment of program objectives. Recommendations for program improvements and modifications.

e Program costs.

REDUCING POTENTIAL EXPOSURES Personal protective equipment must be used in conjunction with other means of reducing potential exposures to personnel working in the exclusion zone. Federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations require the consideration of engineering controls and hazardous substance operating procedures as a means of reducing hazards to personnel. (29 CFR 1910.120) Engineering controls are mechanical systems or remote systems that

reduce

the hazardous

concentrations

or provide

an alternative

to

personnel working in Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) environments. Examples of engineering controls include providing positive pressure ventilation to an enclosed space to reduce hazardous concentrations and using remotely operated devices, such as bomb squad robots.

Operating procedures should be implemented which reduce exposures to contaminants in the exclusion zone but that do not increase the risk to persons in the surrounding area. Examples include approaching the released material from upwind and limiting the number

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

125

of people who actually are exposed to the material. The benefit of an operation should be balanced by the potential for gross contamination of personnel in PPE.

ROUTES OF EXPOSURE TO WMD AGEN INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS (TIC), A MATERIALS g

Chemical Warfare Agents and TICs Exposure to chemical warfare agents and TICs occurs by inhalation

of chemical gas or vapor. Exposure also occurs by direct contact of the eyes or skin to chemical vapors, liquids, or solids. Mucous membranes are

particularly

vulnerable

since

these

membranes

are

especially

susceptible to injury and moisture promotes the absorption of many chemicals. Ingestion and injection are rare routes of exposure, but their potential must be anticipated and planned for.

Exposure to biological warfare agents is most likely to occur by inhalation of biological aerosols or very small particles (1-5 mm

in

diameter). Mucous membranes or damaged skin are also vulnerable and require protection. Since intact skin provides an effective barrier to most biological

contact

warfare

does

agents

not pose

(except trichothecene

mycotoxins),

a significant risk. Accidental

skin

injection of

biological warfare agents is possible since an injection involves violated skin. Simultaneous injection and ingestion is a rare route of exposure, and the risk can be significantly reduced with proper work practices and hygiene.

Personnel or victims exposed to ionizing radiation (e.g. gamma,

radiation-emitting (radioactive) material do not emit radiation and therefore pose no radiation danger to others. However, in incidents involving an explosion, fire, or spill of radioactive material, personnel or victims can become contaminated with radiation-emitting material. External x-ray)

and

who

are

not

contaminated

with

contamination occurs when radioactive material gets on clothing, skin,

or hair. Personnel or victims can also become contaminated internally if

126

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

radioactive material is ingested, inhaled or enters the body through an open wound.

CHEMICAL PROTECTIVE CLOTHING Chemical

protective clothing (CPC) is designed to protect the

wearer’s skin and eyes from contact with a contaminant.

CPC

is

generally made from specialized and often proprietary materials that are resistant to specific chemicals

or groups of chemicals.

Most CPC

provides minimal to no thermal protection. National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards recommend that CPC ensembles provide

the wearer flash protection against instantaneous (flash) fire. However, one of the most significant risks to the wearer is that the CPC may melt

or burn if subjected to fire or extreme temperatures for a prolonged period of time. Chemical

Protective

clothing

may

be designed

to be reused

(multiple use) or to be disposed of after use (single or limited use). Numerous generic and proprietary materials are used to construct CPC. These materials includes, but are not limited to the following: ¢ Butyl rubber ¢ Chlorinated polyethylene ¢ Chloropel ® ¢ Hypalon ®

¢ Natural rubber ¢ Neoprene

¢ Nitrile Rubber

¢ Polyethylene ¢ Polyurethane

¢ Polyvinyl alcohol ¢ Polyvinyl chloride ¢ Tyvek®

¢ Tyvek® polyethylene coated ¢ Tyvek® / Sarenex® laminated « Viton

Chemical protective clothing is generally found in two distinct configurations:

* Non-encapsulating suits ¢ Encapsulating suits

Chapter 8

The

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

configuration

selected

for a given operation

is entirely

dependant on the degree of exposure risk and the route of entry of the suspected or known contaminant. Non-encapsulating CPC is generally selected when the risk of exposure is limited to inhalation and ingestion

and limited splash protection is desired. Encapsulating CPC is generally selected when the risk of exposure involves skin absorption/contact, inhalation and ingestion, or possible immersion in the contaminant. Encapsulating CPC offers the highest degree of wearer protection. Non-encapsulating CPC

Non-encapsulating CPC consists of several pieces of clothing and equipment which when combined together work to provide limited skin and eye protection from a substance. CPC of this type does not provide

full body protection, particularly from gases, vapors or other airborne contaminants. Non-encapsulating CPC includes the following items: ¢ Head protection — helmet or hardhat * Face and eye protection — safety glasses, chemical goggles, vapor-tight goggles, full-face shield or hood. ¢ Splash hood — chemical resistant garment covering the head,

face and neck from splashes ¢ Body protection — chemical resistant jacket and pants or one-piece coverall (with or without a hood) designed to

prevent body contact from liquids or solids. ¢ Hand protection — chemical resistant gloves ¢ Foot protection — chemical resistant boots, booties, or shoe covers

127

128

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Chapter 8

Example of non-encapsulating PPE

Encapsulating CPC

Encapsulating CPC isa one-piece completely enclosed garment that provides chemical protection for the entire body. The suit includes a vapor-tight closure, usually in the form of a heavy-duty zipper, exhaust or pressure-relief valve(s) and integral boots and gloves. Separate over gloves and boots may also be provided and worn to provide additional chemical and physical protection.

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Example of Encapsulating PPE

RESPIRATORY PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT Respiratory protective equipment protects the wearer from the inhalation and ingestion of contaminants. Federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations describe the specific

requirements for a respiratory protection program that should be in place for proper personnel protection (29 CFR 1910.134). It is also imperative

that potential

wearers

be thoroughly

trained

in the proper

use,

capabilities and limitation of respiratory protection equipment they may use. Respiratory protection equipment is generally divided. into four

types: ¢ Supplied-Air Respirators

¢ Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus ¢ Air Purifying Respirators ¢ Powered Air-Purifying Respirators {CAB ancl rs- (SAR) and 222 ?

Supplied-air

respirators

Gee2%s

and self-contained

breathing

apparatus (SCBA) should be designed to meet OSHA and National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) requirements. Each system

also has its own respective capabilities and limitations that are further discussed below.

129

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

130

Supplied-Air Respirators (SAR) / Airline System al

al

The supplied-air respirator provides air to the wearer from a remote air source, usually a compressor or bank of compressed air cylinders, located outside the contaminated environment. The air source is connected to a mask via specialized hose (airline). Systems can be demand, pressure demand, or continuous flow. Pressure demand and continuous flow provide the highest level of protection due to the positive pressure created inside the mask, thus reducing the risk that a

contaminant can be drawn into the mask when the wearer inhales. Due to the possibility that the remote air supply could malfunction or the air line could become damaged or entangled, an escape capability is either recommended or required depending on the atmospheric situation. The escape problem is usually addressed through the use of either a small escape air cylinder incorporated into the users harness or the use of a self-contained

breathing

apparatus

to function

as

a combination

airline/self-contained breathing apparatus system. While airline systems provide an air supply for extended operations, the necessary air hose is cumbersome and limits both the range and mobility of the wearer.

Example of a Supplied-Air Respirator

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) ©

1f

4

Self-contained breathing apparatus utilize a source of breathable air or oxygen carried on the wearer. As the name implies, the air source and the necessary equipment to utilize it are self-contained on the wearer. Self-contained breathing apparatus can be either positive pressure

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

(pressure demand) or negative pressure (demand). Positive pressure

(pressure demand) self-contained breathing apparatus are recommended because they maintain a positive pressure in the face-piece, thus reducing the possibility that contaminants can be drawn into the mask when the wearer inhales. Positive pressure self-contained breathing apparatus with tight fitting, full-face piece masks provide the highest level of respiratory protection. Since a demand type self-contained breathing apparatus relies on a negative pressure inside the mask to

activate airflow, these types of respirators do not conform to OSHA standards for use in Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) environments.

Example of a Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus

Self-contained breathing apparatus can be either open or closed circuit systems. Open circuit systems are designed to exhaust exhaled air containing lowered levels of oxygen and relatively high levels of carbon dioxide directly to the outside atmosphere. These systems usually consist of a compressed air cylinder that contains 30 to 120 minutes of breathable air. Closed circuit systems rely on a mechanism designed to remove the carbon dioxide from the exhaled air, usually with some form of a chemical scrubber, and add oxygen from either a liquid or gaseous

131

132

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

oxygen source, or some oxygen-generating chemical. Closed circuit systems typically allow up to four hours of use. Air-Purifying Respirators (APR) Air-purifying respirators remove contaminants by passing ambient air through

a mechanical

and/or

chemical

filtering

mechanism.

Air-purifying respirators can effectively filter particulates, fibers, gases, vapors,

mists,

aerosols

and

other

airborne

contaminants.

Since

air-purifying respirators rely entirely on the effort of the wearer’s breathing and the creation of a negative pressure inside the mask, stringent use requirements exists including the following: ¢ Can only be used when the contaminant and concentration(s) are known.

¢ Require sufficient oxygen be present (at least 19.5% in air).

¢ Cartridge or canister must be suitable for the actual or potential

contaminants present. ¢ Should not be used in atmospheres that are Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH).

¢ Require constant atmospheric monitoring to ensure

concentrations do not exceed IDLH and adequate oxygen is present. ¢ Require the contaminant to have sufficient warning properties

to alert the wearer. APRs fitted with high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) cartridges or canisters can protect against particles such as biological spores (e.g.

anthrax), fibers, dusts and fumes. Air-purifying respirators fitted with chemical-specific cartridges or canisters provide protection against chemical vapors, gases, mists and aerosols. Combination cartridges and canisters combine the capabilities of the HEPA and chemical-specific

filtration. Most cartridges and canisters rated for WMD agents are the combination type.

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Example of an Air Purifying Respirator (APR)

133

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

134

Powered Air-Purifying Respirators (PAPRs) PAPRs also filter the ambient air. However, unlike the APR, PAPRs

use

a battery-powered

blower

to force

air through

the filtering

mechanism and into the wearer’s face-piece. The battery life of these units typically ranges from 8 to 10 hours using rechargeable battery technology. Among the advantages of PAPRs is the decreased effort required of the wearer due to the positive pressure created by the blower. PAPRs are subject to the same use requirements as APRs. However,

much like the pressure demand SCBA, the positive pressure inside the mask decreases the likelihood that a contaminant can be drawn into the mask around the face-piece seal.

Example of a Powered Air-Purifying Respirator (PAPR)

N95 Particulate Respirators

The N95 particulate respirator is commonly used in healthcare environments as part of standard “universal precautions” against transmission of airborne infections (e.g. tuberculosis). This type of respirator is effective in providing protection from infectious aerosols and particulates but is not effective in atmospheres contaminated with gases and chemical vapors.

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Example of N95 Particulate Respirator

Surgical masks While surgical masks filter out large-size particulates, they offer no

respiratory protection against chemical vapors and little against most biological aerosols.

EPA LEVELS OF PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT Personal

protective

equipment

is

divided

by

the

Federal

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) into four categories based on the degree of protection provided. Combinations of personal protective equipment

other than those

described

for Levels

A, B, C, and D

protection may be more appropriate and should be used to provide the

proper level of protection for the characteristics of each incident or situation.

Level A PPE

Level A provides the greatest level of skin, respiratory and eye protection. Protection is accomplished with an encapsulating chemical

protective suit combined

with a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) or supplied-air respirator. The encapsulating suit protects the wearer against chemical vapors, gases, mists, aerosols, liquids and

135

136

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Chapter 8

solids as well as biological material. Level A PPE should be used when any ofthe following apply: Substances with a high degree of hazard to the skin are known or suspected to be present, and skin contact is possible.

The substance has been identified and requires the highest level of protection for skin, eyes, and the respiratory system based on either the measured or potential for high

concentration of atmospheric contaminants | The site operations and work functions involve a high potential for splash, immersion, or exposure to unexpected vapors, gases, mists, aerosols or airborne contaminants that are

harmful to skin or capable of being absorbed through the skin. Operations are being conducted in confined, poorly ventilated areas, and the conditions requiring Level A have not been ruled-out.

The following components comprise Level A protection:

Positive pressure, full-face-piece self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), or positive pressure supplied air respirator with escape SCBA approved by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). Encapsulating chemical protective suit Gloves, inner and outer, chemical-resistant Boots, chemical-resistant, steel toe and shank

Fire resistive coveralls or jumpsuit (optional) Long underwear (optional) Hard hat (under suit) (optional)

Disposable protective over-suit over-gloves and boot-covers Depending on suit construction, these overprotection garments may be worn over totally encapsulating chemical protective suit (optional) Two-way radio (intrinsically safe - worn inside encapsulating Suit) (optional)

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Example of Level A PPE

Level B PPE Level

B

provides

the

highest-level

respiratory

protection

in

conjunction with a lesser level of skin protection. Protection is provided by appropriate splash protection with a SCBA or supplied-air respirator. Non-encapsulating suits provide protection against liquid splashes or

stationary solids, but not against vapors, gases, mists, aerosols or

airborne contaminants. Level B PPE should be used when any of the following apply: ¢ The presence of liquids or solids is indicated, but they are known not to be harmful to the skin or capable of being

absorbed through the skin.

137

138

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Chapter 8

The substance type and atmospheric concentration have been identified and requires a high level of respiratory protection, but less skin protection. The atmosphere contains less than 19.5 percent oxygen. The presence of incompletely identified airborne contaminants is indicated by a direct-reading air monitoring instrument, but the contaminants are known not to be harmful to the skin or capable of being absorbed through the skin. ; Level B should be the minimum level utilized to conduct initial site

entries until the hazards have been further identified and defined by monitoring, sampling, and other reliable methods of analysis.

A SCBA

or supplied-air respirator must be worn until conditions warranting a

lesser level of respirator protection can be verified through appropriate monitoring techniques. The following components comprise Level B protection: Positive pressure, full face-piece self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), or positive pressure supplied-air respirator with escape SCBA (NIOSH approved) Hooded chemical resistant clothing (overalls and long-sleeved

jacket; coveralls; one or two-piece chemical splash suit; disposable chemical-resistant overalls) Gloves, inner and outer, chemical-resistant Boots, chemical-resistant steel toe and shank

Boot-covers, chemical-resistant (disposable) (optional)

Coveralls (fire resistive jumpsuit) (optional) Hardhat and face shield (optional) Two-way radio (protected from exposure) (optional)

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

aes KIS

Example of Level B PPE

Level C PPE

Level

C

Protection

provides

is provided

minimal

skin

by chemical

and

respiratory

protective

clothing,

protection. including

coveralls or aprons, and an air-purifying respirator. Non-encapsulating

protective suits provide protection against liquid splashes or solids, but not

against

vapors,

gases,

mists,

aerosols

or

other

airborne

139

140

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Chapter 8

contaminants. Level C PPE may be used when the following conditions are met:

The atmospheric contaminants, liquid splashes, or other direct contact will not adversely affect or be absorbed through any exposed skin. The types of air contaminants have been identified,

concentrations measured, and an appropriate air-purifying respirator is available that can remove the contaminants.

All criteria for the use of air-purifying respirators have been met. Level C protection would not be appropriate where atmospheric concentrations of chemicals exceed IDLH levels, nor where the atmosphere contains less than 19.5 percent

oxygen. The following constitute Level C protection: Full-face or half-mask, air-purifying respirators (NIOSH approved) Hooded chemical-resistant clothing (overalls; two piece

chemical-splash suit; disposable chemical-resistant overalls) Gloves, inner and outer, chemical-resistant Boots, chemical-resistant steel toe and shank.

Boot-covers, chemical-resistant (disposable) (optional) Coveralls (fire resistive jumpsuit) (optional)

Hardhat, face shield, and/or escape mask (optional)

Two-way radio (protected from exposure) (optional)

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Example of Level C PPE

Level D PPE

Level D is a work uniform and does not include respiratory or skin protection for chemical exposures. Level D clothing does not provide protection against chemical

exposures

above

permissible

exposure

limits. Level D clothing may be used under the following conditions: The atmosphere contains no known chemical hazard above

permissible exposure limits. Work functions preclude splashes, immersion, or the potential for unexpected inhalation of or contact with hazardous levels

of any substance.

The following components comprise Level D protection: Coveralls. Safety glasses or chemical splash goggles. Boots/shoes, chemical-resistant steel toe and shank.

Gloves (optional) Boot-covers, chemical-resistant (disposable) (optional) Hardhat and face shield (optional)

Escape mask (optional)

141

142

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Chapter 8

Example of Level D PPE (Note: APR as pictured not required.)

SPECIALIZED PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT Barrier Gown and Latex Gloves

Barrier gowns that are waterproof may protect against exposure to biological materials, including body fluids, but do not provide adequate skin or respiratory protection against chemicals. Latex gloves also protect wearers from biological materials but are inadequate against

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

most chemicals. Barrier gowns, surgical masks, eye protection, latex gloves, and leg and/or shoe covers together comprise “universal precautions” for blood borne pathogens and most, but not all, biological warfare agents. Battledress Over-Garments

Battledress protective

over-garments

over-garments

(BDQOs)

that contain

are

2-layered

chemical

an inner layer of activated

charcoal to adsorb penetrating chemical liquids and vapors. BDO also protects against biological warfare agents and radioactive alpha and beta particles. BDOs are increasingly being used by specialized law enforcement tactical units for WMD response (e.g. SWAT units).

143

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

144

Chemical Protective Gloves g

Chemical-protective glove sets consist of a protective outer glove made out of chemical resistive material (e.g. butyl rubber) and an inner glove

for absorption

of perspiration.

After

use,

gloves

may

be

decontaminated and reused. Chemical-Protective Footwear Covers

Chemical-protective footwear covers are single-sized butyl rubber or vinyl footwear covers that protect boots against WMD agents.

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

145

Patient Protective Wraps Patient

protective

chemical-protective

wraps

and

(PPWs)

or

casualty

wraps

are

_biological-protective

wraps for non-ambulatory victims in contaminated environments. The top of the PPW has a charcoal lining similar to the BDO, while the bottom is constructed of impermeable rubber. Breathing occurs through the permeable PPW top, which functions as a protective respiratory mask. Use of PPWs is generally limited to military warfare operations. Wartime Personal Protective Equipment for Civilians The chemical infant protective system (CHIPS) is a semi-closed hood-like system designed to protect infants in contaminated environments.

This

protective

device

delivers

filtered

air via a

battery-operated blower. CHIPS are available for civilian use in Israel.

WVilitary Personal Protective Equipment Like civilian PPE, military PPE also has been graded into levels, which are known

as mission-oriented

protective postures (MOPP).

Seven levels of MOPP have been defined, ranging from MOPP ready (MOPP

gear available to the soldier within 2 hours) to MOPP

4

(maximum protection with protective respiratory mask and BDO being

worn). The higher the level of MOPP, the greater the level of protection (and greater is the adverse impact on individual performance) Boas

Posen yall ae ; fospent| (Ean ay Sos, RYE Explosive Ordinance and Improvised Explosive Deviceam Sy. Disposal

For many years specialized military and non-military (civilian) units

have been responsible for the reconnaissance and disposal of explosive ordinance and improvised explosive devices. Personnel assigned to

these units are highly trained and use specially designed equipment (e.g. robots, x-ray units, suits, etc.). Among the equipment used by these units are specialized personal protective ensembles

designed to provide protection against the effects of overpressure, fragmentation, impact and heat associated with explosive material and device detonation. These ensembles usually include a jacket, trousers, groin protection and an integrated helmet and visor. The jacket, trousers and groin protection are usually made of fire retardant and water resistant materials and include soft and hard ballistic materials to provide additional fragmentation

146

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

protection. With the increased threat that a chemical, biological or radiological dispersal device (RDD) could be used in a WMD event, some ensembles can be used with self-contained breathing apparatus or

other

respiratory

protection.

Additionally,

some

manufactures

of

EOD/IEDD protective equipment now offer ensembles especially designed for the combined threat of EOD/IEDD and chemical/biological agent operations.

Example of an EOD/IEDD Ensemble

PPE SELECTION CRITERIA Selection of appropriate PPE is a complex process that should take into consideration a variety of factors. Key factors involved in this process are identification of the hazards, or suspected hazards; the routes of entry (inhalation, skin absorption, ingestion, and eye or skin contact); and the performance of the PPE materials (and suit construction) in

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

providing a barrier to these hazards. The amount of protection provided by PPE is material-hazard specific. That is, protective equipment materials will protect well against some hazardous substances and poorly, or not at all, against others. In many instances, protective equipment materials cannot be found which will provide continuous protection from the particular hazardous substance. In these cases the breakthrough time of the protective material should exceed the work

durations. products

PPE manufactures for the substances

are required to test and certify their they are intended

to protect against.

Manufacturers as well as other companies offer chemical protective

clothing selection guides that provide breakthrough time and other test data for specific materials. Other factors in the selection process to be considered are matching the PPE to the wearer’s work requirements and task-specific conditions. The durability of PPE materials, such as tear strength and seam strength, should be considered in relation to the wearer’s tasks. The effects of PPE in relation to heat stress and task duration are a factor in selecting and using PPE. In some cases layers of PPE (over-suits) may be necessary to

provide

sufficient

protection

or to protect

expensive

PPE

inner

garments, suits or equipment. The more that is known about the hazards at the site, the easier the

job of PPE selection becomes. As more information about the hazards

and conditions at the site becomes available, the level of PPE protection

can be adjusted to match the tasks at hand. The levels of PPE discussed earlier are guidelines that can be used to begin the selection of the appropriate PPE. As noted above, the site information may suggest the use of combinations of PPE selected from Levels A, B, C, or D as being more suitable to the hazards of the work. It

should be noted that the EPA Levels of PPE do not fully address the performance of the specific PPE material in relation to the specific hazards at the job site and that PPE selection, evaluation, and re-selection is an ongoing process until sufficient information about the hazards and PPE performance is obtained.

The following list of factors should be considered when determining the appropriate personal protective equipment for use in the exclusion Zone:

147

148

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Personal protective equipment (PPE) should be selected and used which will protect personnel from the hazards and potential hazards they are likely to encounter as identified during the site characterization and analysis. Personal protective equipment selection should be based on an evaluation of the performance characteristics of the PPE relative to the requirements and limitations of the site, the task-specified conditions and duration, and the hazards and potential hazards identified at the site.

Positive pressure self-contained breathing apparatus, or positive pressure air-supplied respirators equipped with an escape air supply should be used when exposure levels present

will create a possibility of illness, injury, or impair the ability

to escape. The level of protection provided by PPE selection should be increased when additional information on site conditions indicates that increased protection is necessary to reduce personnel exposures below permissible exposure limits and published exposure levels for hazardous substances and health hazards.

Note:

The

level of personnel

protection provided

may

be

decreased when additional information or site conditions show that decreased protection will not result in hazardous exposures to personnel. Combinations of personal protective equipment other than those described for Levels A, B, C, and D or alternative PPE

(e.g. explosion protection) may be more appropriate and may be used to provide the proper level of protection.

Totally-encapsulating chemical protective suits (Level

A PPE)

should be used in conditions where skin absorption of a hazardous substance may result in a possibility of illness, injury, or impair the ability to escape. Operations in a confined space (any area which will allow the collection of hazardous concentrations) involving unidentified materials with an unknown skin hazard may require the use of Level A PPE when the materials involved are gases, liquids

with high vapor pressures (evaporate quickly), aerosols or effectively suspended airborne contaminants.

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Level B protection is appropriate for environments with IDLH concentration of specific substances that present severe

inhalation hazards but do not represent severe skin hazards. Chemical protective clothing should meet National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standards 1991 and 1992. The Federal Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) does not require compliance with these standards, but they are provided as a recommendation. Personal protective equipment that is not in compliance with the NFPA standards may be used when the garment is appropriate for the hazards in the exclusion zone.

PPE TRAINING PPE training is required before allowing personnel to operate in a hazardous

environment.

Effective

PPE

training

provides

several

benefits, including: Allows the user to become familiar with the equipment in a non-hazardous situation

Instills confidence in the use of the equipment Makes the user aware of the limitations and capabilities of the equipment

Increases the efficiency of operations May increase the protective efficiency of PPE use Reduces the expense of PPE maintenance

Training should be completed before actual use in a hazardous environment and should be repeated as necessary to retain employee competency. The training should include: The user’s responsibility The proper use and maintenance of all PPE that may be used

The capabilities and limitations of all PPE that may be used The nature of hazards and the consequences of not using PPE The human factors influencing PPE performance

Instruction in inspecting, donning, checking, fitting, and using PPE Individualized respirator fit testing to ensure proper fit (if respirators are used)

Use of PPE in a normal atmosphere for a long familiarity period

Wearing PPE in a test atmosphere to evaluate its effectiveness

149

150

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

¢ The decontamination, cleaning, inspection, maintenance, and

repair of PPE * Emergency procedures and self-rescue in the event of PPE failure

¢ Operating with the buddy system * Operating within the guidelines of a “Site Safety Plan”

PERSONAL FACTORS AFFECTING USE OF PPE Certain personal features of personnel using personal protective

equipment may jeopardize the safety of the operation. Facial hair and long hair will interfere with respirator fit and the wearer’s vision. Any

facial hair that passes between the face and the sealing surface of the respirator is prohibited. Long hair must be effectively contained within protective hair coverings.

Personnel

who require corrective vision

should request a spectacle kit to be installed in their facemask. Contact lens use with a respirator is not recommended as the contact lenses may

trap contaminants and/or particles between the lens and the eye, causing Irritation, damage, absorption, and an urge to remove the respirator.

Wearing contact lenses with a respirator in a contaminated atmosphere is prohibited by federal regulation (29CFR 1910.134). Gum and tobacco chewing

is also prohibited

during respirator use

as it may

cause

ingestion of contaminants.

RESPIRATORY PROTECTION PROGRAM Federal OSHA regulations require employers whose personnel use respiratory protective equipment to develop and implement a written

respiratory protection program. The specific regulatory requirements

can be found in 29CFR include:

1910.134.

Main elements of the program

¢ Respiratory equipment selection * Medical evaluations for employees using respirators ¢ Fit Testing * Respirator use in normal and emergency situations * Cleaning, disinfecting, storing, inspecting, repairing,

maintaining and discarding respirators * Ensuring adequate quality and quantity of breathing air ¢ Annual training in respirator fitting, usage, limits and capabilities

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

* Program reevaluations and record keeping Copies of this program should be maintained at the employer’s place of business and are required to be available to personnel. In addition to federal requirements, personnel responsible for the compliance of worker related regulations should consult their respective state and local regulations for additional requirements.

FIT TESTING AND MEDICAL EVALUATION All personnel expected to use respiratory protection equipment must

be fit-tested and medically evaluated prior to use in a hazardous atmosphere. Fit testing must be conducted for each type of respiratory equipment to be used to determine appropriate sizing for the wearer.

OSHA provides specific respiratory fit testing procedures that can be

found in 29CFR 1910.134 Appendix A. General provisions of fit testing include the following: ¢ Employees must pass an approved qualitative or quantitative fit test.

¢ Employees must be fit-tested in the same make, model, style

and size of respirator to be worn. ¢ Testing must be conducted in both positive and negative pressure modes, if possible. ¢ Testing must be conducted prior to initial use, whenever a different face piece (make, model, size or style) is used, and at

least annually thereafter. In addition to annual fit testing,

personnel

expected

to use

respiratory protective equipment are required to be medical evaluated by a physician or other licensed health care professional (LHCP). OSHA regulations state: “ [personnel] shall not be assigned to tasks requiring the use of respirators unless it has been determined that they are physically able to perform the work and use the equipment.”

29CFR 1910.134: “The medical evaluation must be conducted prior to respirator use or fit testing and can be done in two ways as determined by

the physician or LHCP: ¢ Medical exam (physical) ¢ Medical questionnaire

151

152

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

While

initial

evaluations

are

mandated,

the

scope

and

frequency of subsequent evaluations are determined by the physician or LHCP.”

RESPIRATORY PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT SPECIFIC TRAINING OSHA

frequency

regulations

of

also

respirator

mandate

training.

the

Such

minimum

training

content

and

should

be

performance-based, ensuring that personnel are proficient in the use, cleaning and maintenance of the respirator(s) they use, as well as the capability and limitations of the equipment, especially in emergency situations. Initial training prior to use of the equipment and annual

retraining based upon the workplace and employee needs is required.

PPE LIMITATIONS PPE is associated with a number of potential limitations. In general, the higher the level of protection, the more difficult the PPE is to use. ¢ Time~— Levels A & B PPE takes the longest time to put on (don).

¢ Impaired dexterity — Finger sensation and mobility are impaired by protective gloves. ¢ Impaired mobility — Wearer mobility and balance are

decreased by the weight and bulkiness of PPE. Mobility also is limited by using supplied-air respirators, since the wearer must retrace his or her steps along the airline (hose) to exit. ¢ Impaired communication — Wearing a face piece or mask commonly results in poor speech intelligibility. ¢ Impaired vision: Face pieces, mask or CPC suit lens may limit the wearer’s visual field. * Heat stress — Encapsulation and moisture-impermeable CPC material lead to heat related injuries. ¢ Increased weight — Level A with SCBA is the heaviest PPE. ¢ Psychological stress — Encapsulation increases the psychological stress to wearers and victims. * Limited duration of use — Wearing LevelA and B PPE for longer than 30 minutes is difficult.

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

* Limited oxygen availability -SCBAs can be used only for the period of time allowed by the air in the cylinder (tank). APRs can be used only in environments in which the ambient air provides sufficient oxygen and do not exceed IDLH concentration.

PPE also is associated with potential “hazards” or risks to wearers, as follows: * Improper use — Protective respiratory devices and CPC must be properly fitted, tested, and periodically checked before use. An improper fit is an avoidable cause of penetration. ¢ Penetration — Penetration refers to the process by which a substance may penetrate openings in protective respiratory equipment or clothing. The risk of penetration increases with the use of negative-pressure respirators ¢ Permeation — Permeation refers to the process by which a

substance passes through protective barriers. Permeation depends on both the properties of the CPC or other PPE construction material, the chemical properties, and the concentration and duration of chemical contact on the surface. Permeation is measured in terms of the breakthrough time. ¢ Degradation — Degradation refers to the process by which structural characteristics of CPC or other PPE construction materials are degraded by contact with chemical substances. Degradation allows permeation or penetration. ¢ Recontamination — Wearers may become contaminated during

PPE removal unless decontamination and PPE removal protocols are followed correctly.

The Site Safety Plan should address the anticipated work duration necessary to accomplish the entry goal. This work duration is commonly referred to as the “work mission duration”. Several factors limit the length of operation, including air supply consumption, PPE permeation by contaminants, ambient temperature, and the prevention of heat related injuries.

The duration of the air supply must be considered before planning any SCBA-assisted work activity. The typical half-hour or one-hour

153

154

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

rated operating time for an SCBA is reduced by the user’s work rate, fitness level, body size, and breathing patterns. The length of the work mission should be shortened when multiple entries into the exclusion zone are required. Additionally, the work mission duration should be adjusted due to air temperature and radiant heat exposure, such as radiant heat from direct sunlight. Table 8.1 below provides recommendations for the length of work missions when multiple entries and air cylinder changes are planned using chemical protective clothing. Each cycle includes appropriate rest periods and medical monitoring. Table 8.1 Recommended Work Mission Duration Recommended Work Mission Duration Between Rest Periods When wearing impermeable or semi-impermeable Chemical Protective Clothing Air

Sunshine (Radiant Heat Exposure)

Temperature (maximum)

Full Sun Sun casts Shadows 100% of time

Partly Sunny Full Shade | Shadows approx 50% | No Shadows from the of time sun

70°F

60 minutes of work

90 minutes of work

120 minutes work

JAF

30 minutes of work

L 60 minutes of work

90 minutes of work

80° F

20 minutes of work

30 minutes of work

60 minutes of work

85° F

15 minutes of work

| 20 minutes of work

30 minutes of work

90° F

15 min. light work

95° F or above

Extreme Danger

|

15 minutes of work

20 minutes of work

Danger

15 minutes of work

Reference Occupational Safety and Health Guidance Manual for Hazardous Waste Site Activity

Full sun or full shade identifies the suns intensity and is determined by the presence or lack of shadows created by the sun. Shadows from the sun approximately one-half of the time is defined as partly cloudy.

The amount and type of PPE worn into the exclusion zone directly influences the risk of heat stress and impedes work tolerance. PPE adds weight and bulk, severely reduces the body’s access to normal heat exchange mechanisms, and increases energy expenditure. When PPE is selected, each item should be carefully evaluated in relation to its potential for increasing the risk of heat related injuries. In consideration

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

of the PPE selected for an entry into the exclusion zone, the safe duration of work and rest periods should be determined based on the following: ¢ Anticipated work rate ¢ Ambient temperature and other environmental factors ¢ Type of protective ensemble to be worn ¢ Individual worker characteristics and fitness

¢ The need for re-hydration during rest periods outside of the hot zone The ambient temperature has a major influence on work mission duration as it affects both the worker and the protective integrity of the clothing ensemble.

Heat related injuries, which can occur even in

relatively moderate temperatures, is the greatest immediate danger to personnel using PPE. Hot and cold ambient temperatures also affect:

¢ Valve operation on suits and/or respirators

¢ The durability and flexibility of suit material ¢ The integrity of suit fasteners ¢ The break through time and permeation rates of chemicals on protective clothing ¢ The concentration of airborne contaminants The

possibility

of chemical

penetration

or permeation

of the

protective clothing is a matter of concern and may limit the work duration. No single clothing material

is an effective barrier to all

substances or all combinations of substances, and no material should be

considered an effective barrier to prolonged exposure, especially at elevated concentrations. Possible causes of penetration include:

¢ Suit valve leakage, particularly under excessively hot or cold

temperatures ¢ Suit fastener leakage if the suit is not properly maintained or if fasteners become brittle at cold temperatures ¢ Exhalation valve leakage at excessively hot or cold

temperatures

DONNING PROCEDURES A routine donning procedure should be established for each piece of PPE and practiced periodically as part of the required training. The fundamental component of the donning procedure is to ensure that all equipment needed for personnel conducting operations is removed from transportation vehicles and placed in a logical sequence. Equipment

155

156

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

should be laid out in order of the donning process with tools and equipment at the point nearest the access control point into the exclusions zone. This step prevents unnecessary delays when the donning process begins.

Outer Gloves

Optional Oversuit

ss i

Chemical Protective Gloves

mee

Flagging Tape (Personnel Marking)

2

°

Boot Cover

(Booties) Chemical Protective Sutt

SST

:

= _|

=

_Inner Disposable |

Gloves

Aig

ower)

a,

=

Z

:

A

Communication &

iN

Respiratory Protection Equipment a

i f

a

Inner Protective Suit co

! ; S

Chair & Drinking VWater

Support personnel are required to assist when donning PPE to prevent damage of suits and to ensure timely donning of all persons involved in an operation. Personnel are subject to unnecessary heat stress when waiting for the remainder of the entry team, back-up team or decontamination team to be prepared for an entry into the exclusion

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

zone. Whenever possible, one support person should be provided to assist each person donning PPE.

MONITORING PROCEDURES DURING PPE USE The wearer of PPE must understand all aspects of the protective equipment’s operation and its limitations, particularly when using encapsulating suits where misuse could result in suffocation. During use, personnel should report any perceived problems or difficulties with their equipment or the equipment of others and, if necessary, initiate abortion of the operation in the exclusion zone. Situations that may

indicate the need to abort an operation include the following: ¢ Degradation of the protective suit, shield, or gloves

¢ Perception of odors ¢ Skin irritation ¢ Unusual residues on PPE ¢ Discomfort

¢ Resistance to breathing

¢ Fatigue due to respirator use ¢ Interference with vision or communication ¢ Restriction of movement

¢ Personal responses such as rapid pulse, nausea, and chest pain During the work assignment, the PPE wearer should continue to inspected his/her suit and his/her buddy’s suit for any of the following

indications of failure: ¢ Evidence of chemical attack such as discoloration, swelling, stiffening, and softening (keep in mind, however, that chemical permeation can occur without any visible effects)

¢ Closure failures ¢ Tears

e Punctures

¢ Seam discontinuities

STANDARD DOFFING (REMOVAL) PROCEDURES protective equipment are necessary to prevent exposures to the wearer’s body and contamination migration from the decontamination corridor. Doffing procedure should only be performed following primary decontamination with the Procedures

for

removing

personal

assistance of a decontamination team member wearing an appropriate

157

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

158

level of PPE. Additionally, the person acting as an assistant in the doffing procedure (a decontamination team member) should avoid operations in the decontamination corridor which cause gross contamination exposures and may pose a secondary exposure hazard to contamination exposures will be avoided if the assistant does not perform operations in the first decontamination pool (see Chapter 10 for additional the

wearer

while

doffing

PPE.

gross

Generally,

information).

SECONDARY DECONTAMINATION (INSPECTION & MAINTENANCE) Secondary decontamination is the process of evaluating equipment and protective clothing for the presence of residual contamination, ensuring thorough equipment decontamination and providing necessary maintenance prior to returning the equipment to an in-service status. Secondary decontamination is also vital to prevent secondary exposures

during future use. Following the removal of contamination from PPE, the process must include sanitizing the inside surfaces of garments. All used PPE should then be subjected to thorough inspection, maintenance, and drying.

It is not necessary equipment.

to attempt

All disposable

decontamination

equipment

should

of disposable

be placed

in large

polyethylene bags and left on the scene for proper disposal by the responsible party unless other arrangements

are made. These bags

should be identified as contaminated materials or provided with a hazardous waste sticker, if appropriate.

Refer to the manufacturers’

recommendations

in addition to the

following recommendations:

* Glove Inspections - Pressurize gloves to check for pinholes. Inflate glove and hold under water to determine if air escapes. ¢ Clothing Inspections — Determine that the clothing material is correct for the specified task at hand.

.

— Visually inspect for imperfect seams, non-uniform coatings,

tears, and malfunctioning closures. — Hold up to light and check for pinholes.

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Flex material and observe for cracks and other signs of shelf deterioration. If the suit has been used previously, inspect inside and out for signs of chemical attack, such as discoloration, swelling, and stiffness. Check the operation of pressure relief valve, if provided. Inspect the fitting of wrists, ankles, and neck, if provided.

Check face shield, if equipped, for cracks, crazing, and fogginess. Perform suit testing per the manufacturer’s recommendations

SCBA Respirator Inspections Inspect SCBA’s before and after each use, at least monthly when in storage, and every time they are cleaned.

Check all connections for tightness. Check material conditions for signs of pliability, deterioration, or distortion. Check for proper setting and operation of regulators and valves

according to manufacturers’ recommendations. Check operation of alarms. Check face shields and lenses for cracks, crazing, and fogginess.

Supplied-Air Respirator (SAR) Inspections Inspect SAR’s before and after each use, at least monthly when in storage, and every time they are cleaned. Inspect air lines before each use for cracks, kinks, cuts, frays, and

weak areas.

Check all connections for tightness. Check material conditions for signs of pliability, deterioration, or

distortion. Check for proper setting and operation of regulators and valves

according to manufacturers’ recommendations. Check operation of alarms.

Check face shields and lenses for cracks, crazing, and fogginess.

Air-Purifying Respirator Inspections Inspect air-purifying respirators before and after each use, at least

monthly when in storage, and every time they are cleaned. Check material conditions for signs of pliability, deterioration, or distortion.

159

160

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

— Examine cartridges or canisters to ensure that they are the proper

type for the intended use, the expiration date has not passed, and they have not been opened or used previously. — Check face shields and lenses for cracks, crazing, and fogginess.

PPE STORAGE Chemical protective clothing and respiratory protective equipment must

be properly

stored to prevent damage

or .malfunction

from

exposure to dust, moisture, sunlight, damaging chemicals, extreme temperatures, and impact. Many equipment failures can be directly attributed to improper storage on transportation vehicles as well as improper storage before placing the equipment in service (refer to the manufacturers’ recommendation for proper storage).

The storage methods for protective clothing prior to placing it in service is generally either by placing the garment upon a large surface area

hanger

or

folding

and

stacking

per

the

manufacturers’

recommendation. Storage on transportation vehicles should also follow the manufacturers’

recommendations

preventing abrasion damage

with special considerations for

from swinging back and forth during

movement of the vehicle. Storage of totally encapsulating garments in

transportation vehicles should allow the suit to lay flat and avoid folds. Limited-use suits that come folded by the manufacturer may also be stored in a folded manner. PPE that is folded or subject to abrasion

should be evaluated and inspected prior to each use.

PPE EXPOSURE AND MAINTENANCE LOG Records should be kept of all inspections and testing for all PPE. Individual identification numbers should be assigned to all reusable

equipment and records maintained by that number. At a minimum, each inspection

should

record

the ID number,

date, inspector,

and any

unusual conditions or findings. PPE Exposure and Maintenance Logs should provide a system to record the history of each piece of equipment and garments including when the item was purchased, manufacturer, model numbers, distributor, a unique identification number, exposure

history and maintenance by date of activity.

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

HEAT STRESS MONITORING & PREVENTION PPE users are especially susceptible to heat related injuries, even during moderate temperature conditions. Individuals vary in their susceptibility to heat stress due to a variety of factors. The following factors may predispose someone to heat related injury: ¢ Lack of physical fitness * Level of acclimation to working under hot conditions ¢ Dehydration * Obesity ¢ Alcohol and drug use ¢ Infection or illness

¢ Sunburn

¢ Diarrhea and vomiting Personnel

wearing

semi-permeable

or impermeable

protective

clothing should be monitored when the temperature in the work area is above 70 degrees Fahrenheit (refer to Work Mission Duration earlier in this chapter for additional numerous

information).

Personnel

participating in

entries into the exclusion zone should have their medical

condition (e.g. heart rate, oral temperature, and body weight) thoroughly assessed prior to re-entry by qualified medically trained personnel on site and operations for the worker altered if warranted.

Proper training and preventative measures will help avert serious illness and loss of work productivity. The following describes methods

of reducing the risk of heat related injury. ¢ Adjust work schedules. — Modify work/rest periods in relation to the work area

temperature. — Specify work slowdowns when needed. — Rotate personnel and alternate physically demanding tasks. — Add additional personnel to work teams. — Perform work during cooler hours of the day, if possible, or at

night with adequate lighting.

¢ Provide shelter (air-conditioning, if possible) or shaded areas during rest periods.

161

162

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Chapter 8

¢ Maintain workers’ body fluids at normal levels. This is. necessary to ensure that the cardiovascular system functions adequately. Daily fluid intake must approximately equal the amount of water lost in sweat. The normal thirst mechanism is not sensitive enough to ensure that enough water will be consumed to replace fluids from sweating. When heavy sweating occurs, personnel should drink more water. — Maintain drinking water temperature between 50° and 60°F. — Provide small disposable cups that hold approximately 4 ounces (personnel should drink slowly).

— Personnel should drink 16 ounces of fluid before beginning work (preferably water or dilute drinks)

— Personnel should drink a cup or two every 15 to 20 minutes, or at each monitoring break. — A total of | to 1.5 gallons of fluid are recommended per day, but

more may be necessary to maintain body weight. — If possible, weigh personnel before and after work to determine if

fluid replacement is adequate. (loss should not exceed 1.5% body weight)

¢ Personnel should maintain an optimal level of physical fitness. ¢ Provide cooling devices to aid natural body heat exchange during prolonged work activity or severe heat exposure. Cooling devices include: — Field showers or hose-down areas to reduce body temperature

and cool off protective clothing. — Cooling jackets, vests, or suit internal air distribution systems.

Note: Cooling devices should not be used as justification for increasing the work period duration unless the wearer’s body temperature and other vital signs are verified within appropriate

limits.

* Train personnel to recognize and treat heat stress, including signs and symptoms. Table 8.2 below describes the symptoms, causes and recommended treatments for various heat related illness that may occur when using

PPE.

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Table 8.2 Disorders of Heat Related Injury Physical Disorder

Symptoms

Causes

Treatments

Transient Heat Fatigue

Decreased productivity, alertness, coordination, and vigilance

Not acclimated to hot | Gradual adjustment to environment hot environment

Heat Rash (Prickly Heat)

Rash in areas of heavy perspiration; discomfort; or temporary disability

Perspiration not easily | Periodic resting in removed from skin cool area; regular surface; sweat glands | bathing; drying skin plugged; sweat glands inflamed

Fainting

Blackout, possible collapse

Shortage of blood to the brain reducing oxygen

Heat Cramps

Painful spasms of heavily used skeletal muscles

Loss of electrolytes; large quantities of water consumed; excess water seeps into active muscles and causes pain

Electrolyte and fluid replacement; (unless advised differently by a physician)

Heat Exhaustion

Extreme weakness or fatigue; giddiness; nausea; headache; pale or flushed complexion; body temperature normal or slightly higher; moist skin; vomiting and/or loss of consciousness (extreme cases)

Loss of water and/or salt; loss of blood plasma; strain on the circulatory system

Rest in cool area; electrolyte and liquid replacement (unless advised differently by a physician)

Heat Stroke

Skin hot, dry and often red or spotted; body temperature as

Thermo-regulatory system breaks down under stress and sweating stops. The body's ability to remove excess heat is almost eliminated

Remove to cool area;

high as 105°F or more and rising; mental confusion; deliriousness; convulsions; possible unconsciousness; death or permanent brain damage may result unless treated

Lying down; moving around

implement immediate rapid cooling measures, cool with water; fan body; send to hospital. THIS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A MEDICAL EMERGENCY

The United States Center for Disease Control and Prevention has issued a series of recommendation for the selection and use of protective clothing and respirators against WMD agents. The following are

excerpts of these recommendations. Consult the current and complete recommendations for additional information.

163

164

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

interim Recommendations for the Selection and Use of Protective

Clothing and Respirators Against Biological Agents

The approach to any potentially hazardous atmosphere, including biological hazards, must be made with a plan that includes an assessment of hazard and exposure potential, respiratory protection needs, entry conditions, exit routes, and decontamination strategies. Any plan involving a biological hazard should be based on relevant infectious disease or biological safety recommendations by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and other expert bodies

including emergency

first responders, law enforcement,

and public

health officials. The need for decontamination and for treatment of all

first responders with antibiotics or other medications should be decided in consultation with local public health authorities.

This INTERIM STATEMENT is based on current understanding of the potential threats and existing recommendations issued for biological aerosols. CDC makes this judgment because:

¢ Biological weapons may expose people to bacteria, viruses, or toxins as fine airborne particles. Biological agents are

infectious through one or more of the following mechanisms of exposure, depending upon the particular type of agent: inhalation, with infection through respiratory mucosa or lung

tissues; ingestion; contact with the mucous membranes of the eyes, or nasal tissues; or penetration of the skin through open

cuts (even very small cuts and abrasions of which employees

might be unaware). Organic airborne particles share the same physical characteristics in air or on surfaces as inorganic

particles from hazardous dusts. This has been demonstrated in military research on biological weapons and in civilian research to control the spread of infection in hospitals. * Because biological weapons are particles, they will not penetrate the materials of properly assembled and fitted respirators or protective clothing.

¢ Existing recommendations for protecting workers from biological hazards require the use of half-mask or full facepiece air-purifying respirators with particulate filter efficiencies ranging from N95 (for hazards such as pulmonary tuberculosis) to P100 (for hazards such as hantavirus) as a minimum level of protection.

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

* Some devices used for intentional biological terrorism may have the capacity to disseminate large quantities of biological

materials in aerosols. * Emergency first responders typically use self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) respirators with a full facepiece operated in the most protective, positive pressure (pressure demand) mode during emergency responses. This type of SCBA provides the highest level of protection against airborne hazards when properly fitted to the user’s face and properly

used. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) respirator policies state that, under those conditions, SCBA reduces the user’s exposure to the hazard by a factor of at least 10,000. This reduction is true whether the hazard is

from airborne particles, a chemical vapor, or a gas. SCBA respirators are used when hazards and airborne concentrations are either unknown or expected to be high. Respirators

providing lower levels of protection are generally allowed once conditions are understood and exposures are determined to be at lower levels. When using respiratory protection, the type of respirator is selected on the basis of the hazard and its airborne concentration. For a biological

agent, the air concentration of infectious particles will depend upon the method

used to release

self-contained

breathing

the agent. apparatus

Current (SCBA)

data suggest that the which

currently use for entry into potentially hazardous

provide

responders

with

respiratory

protection

first responders atmospheres will

against

biological

exposures associated with a suspected act of biological terrorism. Protective clothing, including gloves and booties, also may be required for the response to a suspected act of biological terrorism. Protective clothing may be needed to prevent skin exposures and/or contamination of other clothing. The type of protective clothing needed will depend upon the type of agent, concentration, and route of exposure.

The interim recommendations for personal protective equipment, including respiratory protection and protective clothing, are based upon the anticipated level of exposure risk associated with different response situations, as follows:

165

166

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Chapter 8

¢ Responders should use a NIOSH-approved, pressure-demand SCBA in conjunction with a Level A protective suit in responding to a suspected biological incident where any of the

following information is unknown or the event is uncontrolled: — The type(s) of airborne agent(s)

— The dissemination method — If dissemination via an aerosol-generating device is still occurring or it has stopped but there is no information on the duration of dissemination, or what the exposure concentration

might be

¢ Responders may use a Level B protective suit with an exposed or enclosed NIOSH- approved pressure-demand SCBA if the situation can be defined in which: — The suspected biological aerosol is no longer being generated — Other conditions may present a splash hazard

¢ Responders may use a full facepiece respirator with a P100

filter or powered air-purifying respirator (PAPR) with high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters when it can be determined that: — An aerosol-generating device was not used to create high airborne concentration,

— Dissemination was by a letter or package that can be easily bagged.

These types of respirators reduce the user’s exposure by a factor of 50 if the user has been properly fit-tested. Medical Treatment of Radiological Casualties - CDC Publications Respiratory Protection

For situations where airborne particulates are the chief concern, such as Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) events, Level C protection is general sufficient.

There are several approaches to respiratory protection. Fit-tested full or half-mask cartridge-filtered respirators should be used when available. Powered-air purifying respirators (PAPAs) are also useful. Any respiratory protection that is designed to protect responders against chemical or biological agents will likely offer benefits in an RDD event. In fact, concerns for the presence of chemical contaminants at a terrorist

Chapter 8

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

event will drive the selection of respiratory protection as they may require a higher level of PPE. One of the best approaches is also one of the simplest. Ordinary surgical facemasks provide good protection against inhaling particulates and allow excellent air transfer for working at high breathing rates. If available, high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter masks such as common NIOSH “N-95” mask provide even better protection. Skin Protection

Normal barrier clothing and gloves give excellent personal protection against airborne particles. Disposable medical scrub suits, high-density polyethylene coveralls (e.g. Tyvek®), or other close-weave coveralls and hood should be used if they are available.

The choice of clothing will often be driven by other more immediate hazards, such as fire, heat, or chemicals. Protection for these hazards

covers any additional threat that radioactive material could pose.

SUMMARY This chapter is intended as an introduction to the types, levels and

use considerations of personal protective equipment. The optimal choice of PPE ata WMD event will be challenging, due to the likely complexity of the event and the demand on available resources. The ability of

personnel site-specific

responsible hazards

for the

selection

is of paramount

of PPE importance

to evaluate

the

to the overall

successful use of PPE and personnel safety. Two important principles

remain to guide the optimal choice of PPE. Whenever possible, choose the level of PPE based on the known properties of the hazards present.

And when the types or properties of the hazards are unknown, assume a “worst case” exposure and use the highest level of adequate PPE. Of equal importance to the proper selection, personnel tasked with PPE usage must be adequately trained and competent. This training should be equipment-specific and include “hands-on” application and practice. Injury or death in PPE more often results from poorly trained individuals and improper use of PPE rather than from failure of the

equipment.

167

168

WMD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Chapter 8

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. Describe the two general configurations of chemical protective clothing and their relative use. 2. Describe the four EPA Levels of Protection and their relative

capabilities and application. 3. Describe the four routes of exposure to a WMD related agents and materials. 4. Identify the various types of respiratory protective equipment. 5. Describe the capabilities, limitations and use restriction of air-purifying respirators. 6. Describe four personal protective equipment (PPE) limitations. 7. Summarize personal factors and medical issues related to PPE use. 8. Summarize recommended donning, doffing and care procedures for, PPE.

BIBLIOGRAPHY NIOSH, OSHA, et al. Occupational Safety and Health Guidance Manual for Hazardous Waste Site Activities. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services. USEPA Standard Operating Safety Guides. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Response Branch. 29 CFR 1910.120 Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response. OSHA, Department of Labor. Casualty Management After a Deliberate Release of Radioactive Material. US Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Medical Treatment of Radiological Casualties. US Center for Disease Control and Prevention.

Interim Recommendations for the Selection and Use of Protective Clothing and Respirators Against Biological Agents. US Center for Disease Control and Prevention. CBRNE Personal Protective Equipment, E-Medicine, June 2004 EOD-8 Suit Product Specifications, Med-Eng Systems, Inc.

Chapter

WMD

9

Monitoring and

Detection Instrumentation This chapter will discuss the various technologies currently in use for the detection and monitoring of chemical and biological warfare agents, radiological materials, and toxic industrial chemicals that may be used during a terrorist attack.

1. Identify the various equipment use categories for detection and monitoring instruments. 2. Identify the three major method categories of chemical agent detection and monitoring equipment. 3. Identify the various technologies used for the detection and monitoring of chemicals. 4. Identify the three major categories of biological warfare agent detection. 5. Identify radiological detection and monitoring technologies. 6. Identify the fifteen selection factors that should be considered when selecting detection and monitoring instrumentation.

169

170

Chapter 9

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

INTRODUCTION Among one of the most important issues to be addressed during a situation involving the release of a chemical, biological, or radioactive

material is that of identification. As is the case in most common industrial hazardous-materials incidents, one of the first operational priorities in the management of the event involves ascertaining the identity, concentration and properties of the substance that has been released. It is only with accurate substance identification that specific

planning can be made to respond, mitigate and recover the incident scene. Without accurate identification, responders and workers involved in WMD operations are left to utilize generalized, and in most cases, overly conservative approaches to ensure personnel and public safety. At the time of the September

non-military

emergency

agencies,

11, 2001, terrorist attacks, most

including

specialized

hazardous

materials teams, did not possess or had little in the way of effective detection and monitoring equipment to help identify sophisticated chemical or biological warfare agents. Equipment commonly in use at that time, and still in use, was primarily designed to detect and measure more

common

September

toxic

industrial

chemicals

(TICs).

However,

11, and largely through federal funding, many

services have made significant enhancements detection and monitoring capability.

since

civilian

to their WMD

agent

With the increase in available funding and emphasis on WMD response, new technologies, or improvements constantly

emerging.

monitoring

and

available

As

detection

to military

and

these

to existing ones, are

technologies

equipment

will

non-military

evolve,

become

personnel.

additional

commercially

As

with

any

technology, the advancement in the capability, design enhancements and the affordability of equipment is constantly changing. Therefore, the data presented here is a representation of the most prevalent technologies currently available. Persons responsible for the purchase, selection, and use of such equipment should consult the most current data before making any significant decisions.

Chapter 9

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

EQUIPMENT USAGE CATEGORIES Detection and monitoring equipment can be generally categorized based on the prospective manner of usage. These usage categories include:

Handheld-Portable — Equipment that is considered human portable for mobile operations in the field. These devices are light enough to be carried by an operator while moving through an incident site. Handheld-Stationary — Equipment that is considered human

portable for stationary operations. These devices are light enough to be carried by an operator but can only be operated while stationary. Vehicle Mounted — Equipment capable of being used in or from a mobile vehicle and generally uses the vehicle battery for power requirements. The equipment is designed for monitoring inside or within the general vicinity of the transporting vehicle. Fixed-Site Analytical — Equipment capable of being used as

stand-alone detection systems specifically designed to operate inside a building. The duration of operation for these devices is indefinite, and the power requirements are met through the building infrastructure. Consumables required for continuous operation of the detection equipment would need to be

provided for sustained operations. Fixed-Site Analytical Systems — Equipment capable of being used as stand-alone detection systems requiring a means of

delivering a sample to the equipment for analysis. This equipment generally requires a trained technical operator as well as extensive labor to assemble and disassemble inside a building for short duration monitoring of an area. This equipment typically performs low level monitoring of an area but has not been specifically designed for use outside a laboratory.

171

172

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

Chapter 9

¢ Standoff Detector Systems — Equipment specifically designed to monitor the presence of chemical and biological agents and TICs that may be present in the atmosphere up to three miles away. These systems typically require one or two individuals for monitoring operations. Depending on the technique employed and the environmental conditions, these detectors can have high or low selectivity. Standoff detectors usually require vehicle transportation and special setup.

OVERVIEW OF CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND RADIOLOGICAL DETECTION AND MONITORING TECHNOLOGIES Chemical Detection and Monitoring Technologies The applicability of chemical agent and TIC monitoring equipment

will be dependent upon the characteristics of the equipment, the type of chemical agent(s) or TIC(s) to be detected and the needs of the personnel

intended to use it. Numerous technologies are available for the detection of chemical agents and TICs. Technologies are available for detection and identification of liquids (usually in droplet or aerosol form), solids, gases and vapors. And many laboratory-based technologies exist for the

detection of TICs in water. The quality of analytical results from the various detectors is dependent upon the availability of a sample above the device’s minimum level of detection and the ability of the user to

effectively sample the environment and get the sample to the mechanism or technology responsible for analysis. Detectors (monitors) designed for analysis of vapors will not be readily effective for the detection of low volatility liquid contamination

on surfaces or contamination in water. Also, many detectors may have difficulty in identifying small amounts of chemical agents or TICs in an environmental containing high background of non-hazardous chemicals. For example, a chemical vapor detector may readily detect trace levels of chemical agents or TICs in an outdoor setting such as a forest or an open field, but the same detector may not be capable of detecting the same level of chemical agent or TIC in a crowded subway station or on a busy city street due to interference materials. These common civilian environments contain many contaminants and chemicals produced by everyday activities (automobile exhausts,

Chapter 9

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

deodorants and perfumes, insecticides, etc.). Prolonged exposure to these common materials that may appear similar to chemical agents or TICs to the detector may eventually affect the reliability of the instrument as well as its sensitivity. Personnel responsible for the operation of monitoring instruments should become familiar with the peculiarities of the equipment when exposed to various contaminants and chemicals expected in operational areas. As technological advances are made, it is most likely that more effective and accurate methods of detection that are less affected by

common

environmental

contaminants

and chemicals

will become

commercially available at lower costs.

Chemical methods

warfare agents and TICs can be detected by several

that incorporate various technologies.

These methods

are

grouped into three major categories: *Point detection *Stand-off detection * Analytical instruments The type of technology needed for chemical agent and TIC detection

will be dependent on the type of agent or TIC to be detected and the objective of the intended user.

Point detection technology is applicable in determining the type of

chemical warfare agent or TIC released. It can also be useful in mapping out contaminated

areas providing adequate resources

are available. Point detectors are commonly used as warning devices to alert personnel to the presence or spread of toxic vapors and gases. Point detectors can also be used to determine which people and equipment have been triage or mass such as during contamination contaminated,

decontamination operations. lonization/lon Mobility Spectrometry (IMS)

A detector using IMS technology is typically a stand-alone detector that samples the environment using an air pump. Contaminants in the sampled air are ionized (temporarily breaking apart the electrons from

the molecule) and passed through a weak electric field toward an ion detector. The time it takes the ionized sample to traverse the distance is

173

174

Chapter 9

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

proportional to the mass of the chemical and is used as a means of

identification. Analysis time ranges from several seconds to a few minutes. IMS requires a vapor or gas sample for analysis; therefore, liquid samples must first be volatilized (converted to vapor). The

gaseous sample is drawn into a reaction chamber by a pump where a radioactive source ionizes the molecules present in the sample. The ionized air sample, including any ionized chemical

agent, is then

injected into a closed tube through a shutter that isolates the contents of the tube from the atmospheric air. The tube (called a drift tube) has a

minor electrical charge gradient that draws the sample towards

a

receiving electrode at the end of the drift tube. When ions from the

sample impact the receiving electrode, an electrical charge is generated and recorded with respect to the travel time. The travel time is measured from the introduction gate (shutter) to the receiving electrode. The ions present in the drift tube impact the electrode at different intervals

providing a series of peaks and valleys in electrical charge that is usually graphed. This travel time and the strength of the electrical charge provide a relative concentration of chemical in the sample.

An example of an instrument that uses IMS technology is the APD 2000 manufactured by Smiths Detector, Incorporated.

¢ Capabilities: — Detects nerve and blister agents

— Can be used as an area or point monitor

Chapter 9

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

— Can be operated in 100% humidity or rain — Non-destructive technology

¢ Limitations: — Must maintain records for radioactive source — Limited detection capability — Extremely sensitive to interferants

— Costly to operate and maintain — Heavy for handheld instruments Flame Photometry

Flame photometry is based upon burning ambient air with hydrogen gas. The produced flame decomposes any chemical agents or TICs present in the air. Compounds

that contain phosphorus

and sulfur

produce hydrogen phosphorus oxygen (HPO) and elemental sulfur (S), respectively. At the elevated flame temperature, the phosphorus and

sulfur emit light of specific wavelengths. A set of optical filters is used to selectively

transmit

only the light emitted

from

the presence

of

phosphorus and sulfur to a photo-multiplier tube, which produces an analog signal relative to the concentration of the phosphorus and sulfur

containing compounds in the air. Since classical nerve agents all contain phosphorus and sulfur and mustard agents contain sulfur, these agents are readily detected by flame photometry. Flame photometry is sensitive and allows ambient air to be sampled directly. However, it is also prone to false alarms from interferants that contain phosphorus and sulfur. Flame photometric detectors (FPD) are commonly combined with gas

chromatograph technology to reduce the likelihood of false alarms. ¢ Capabilities: — Detects nerve and hydrogen mustard

— Very quick response time when not used in conjunction with gas chromatography

¢ Limitations: — Not all will detect sulfur based blister agents — Is generally used in conjunction with gas chromatography technology — Uses compressed gas cylinders that must be carried with the instrument

— Cannot be operated in an explosive atmosphere

— Extremely sensitive to interferants

175

176

Chapter 9

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

— Difficult to operate while wearing protective clothing — Destructive technology Infrared Spectroscopy

Infrared (IR) spectroscopy is the measurement of the wavelength and intensity of the absorption of mid-infrared light by a sample material. Mid-infrared light is energetic enough to excite molecular vibrations to higher energy levels. The wavelengths of IR absorption bands are characteristic of specific types of chemical bonds, and every molecule has a unique IR spectrum or fingerprint. IR spectroscopy finds its greatest utility for identification of organic and organo-metallic molecules. There are two IR spectroscopy technologies employed in

point detectors: photoacoustic infrared spectroscopy (PIRS) and filter based

infrared

spectroscopy.

These

two

technologies

are

further

discussed below. Photoacoustic Infrared Spectroscopy (PIRS)

Photoacoustic detectors use photoacoustic effect to identify and detect chemical warfare agent vapors. When a gas or vapor absorbs

infrared radiation, its temperature rises, thus causing the gas to expand. If the intensity of the infrared radiation is modulated, the sample will expand

and contract.

If the modulation

frequency

is an audible

frequency, a microphone can be used to detect the resulting sound. Photoacoustic gas detectors use various filters to selectively transmit specific wavelengths of light that are absorbed by the chemical agent being monitored. The greater number of wavelengths used to identify the sample, the fewer interferants will be observed. When no chemical agent is present in the sample, the specific wavelength of infrared light is

typically not absorbed and, therefore, no audible signal is detected. When a chemical agent is present in the sample, an audible signal (at the frequency

of modulation)

is produced

by the absorption

of the

modulated infrared light. Selectivity can be increased by sequentially exposing the sample to several wavelengths of light. Chemical agents are distinguished from interferants by the relative signal produced when several different wavelengths are sequentially transmitted to the sample. Photoacoustic detectors are sensitive to external vibration and humidity. However, as long as the detector is calibrated in each operating environment immediately prior to sampling, selectivity will be very high.

Chapter 9

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

Filter Based Infrared Spectrometry

Filter based infrared spectrometry technology is based upon a series of lenses and mirrors that directs a narrow infrared beam through the sample. The amount of energy absorbed by the sample is measured and

stored in memory. The same sample is examined at several additional wavelengths. The multi-wavelength data is analyzed by the built-in microprocessor and the resulting identification information displayed. Electrochemistry

An electrochemical sensor generally has three main components: electrodes (one or more of which is coated with a catalyst), electrolyte

and a membrane. Gas or vapor is drawn into the devise by an air pump. The gas or vapor diffuses through the membrane and reacts with the catalyst-coated electrolyte, which creates an electrical current. The instrument measures the current and translates it into a concentration.

¢ Capabilities: — Detects certain TICs

— Used in industrial settings for monitoring IDLH levels — Very small and compact — Non-destructive technology

¢ Limitations: — Detects only specific chemicals

— Will not operate efficiently in temperature extremes —

Sensitive to interferants

Colorimetric or Color Change Chemistry

Detector kits, or tickets, are wet chemistry techniques formulated to indicate the presence or absence of a chemical agent by a color change resulting from a chemical reaction involving the suspect agent. These kits are usually used to verify the presence of a chemical agent after an alarm is received from another chemical detector. The kits are also used

to test drinking water for contamination. A similar detection method using this technology is detection paper, which contains a dye that is colorless when crystalline (solid) and colored when dissolved in a chemical agent. Detector papers are generally used for testing suspect droplets or liquids on a surface. For gaseous or vaporous chemical agents, colorimetric tubes are also available. These consist of a glass tube that has the reacting compound sealed inside. Upon use, the tips of

177

178

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

the tubes are broken off and a pump is used to draw the sample across the reacting compound (through the tube). If a chemical agent is present, a reaction resulting in a color change takes place in the tube. Examples of colorimetric detection devices include Draeger colorimetric tubes, Smart Tickets, and M8 and M9 paper.

¢ Capabilities: Wet chemistry technology will detect nerve and blister agents and numerous TICs Can detect liquids, aerosols and vapors Will react in 100% humidity

Non-destructive technology Little maintenance required

Can be discarded after use Most affordable technology e

Limitations:

Temperature sensitive

Results are subject to interpretation Can be a very time intensive process Requires close contact with suspect agent.

Some have short shelf lives Difficult to operate while in protective gear Some tubes contain extremely toxic chemicals

Chapter 9

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

Surface Acoustic Wave (SAW)

Surface acoustic wave detectors consist of piezoelectric crystals coated with a film designed to absorb chemical agents from the air.

SAW detectors use up to six piezoelectric crystals that are coated with different polymeric films. Each polymeric film preferentially absorbs a particular class of volatile compound (chemical). For example, one

polymeric film will be designed to preferentially absorb water, while other polymer films are designed to preferentially absorb different classes of volatile organic compounds (e.g. trichloroethylene, toluene, ethyl-benzene, etc.). The piezoelectric crystals detect the mass of the chemical compounds they have absorbed. The change in mass of the polymeric coatings causes the crystal to vibrate at a lower frequency. By

monitoring the frequency changes of the different piezoelectric crystals, a response pattern specific to a particular vapor, or suspect agent, is

generated. These response patterns are compared to stored data in a built-in microprocessor. If the response pattern of the sample matches

the stored pattern data, the agent is identified and the system alarm activated.

¢ Capabilities: — Detects nerve and blister agents — Very compact technology

— Can be used for point or area monitoring

179

180

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

Chapter 9

— Non-destructive technology

¢ Limitations: — Does not detect all chemical agents

— Does not detect TICs — Extremely long response time — Subject to electro-magnetic radiation interference — Extremely sensitive to interferants Photo lonization Detection (PID)

Photo ionization detectors (PID) recognize a concentration of gases by using ultraviolet light to ionize (temporarily break apart the electrons

from the molecule) the gas sample. This process produces ions that are collected by electrodes generating an electrical current. The amount of current generated is a measure of the sample concentration. Although all elements and chemical compounds can be ionized, they differ in the

amount of energy required. Some materials lose electrons, or can be ionized, relatively easily while others can not. The amount of energy required to displace the electron is called the ionizing potential (IP) and is measured in electron volts (eV). Each element has its own IP.

¢ Capabilities: — Will quickly identify the presence of a suspect agent — Excellent for point monitoring

— Will ionize numerous TICs — Excellent for establishing perimeters and hot zones — Will detect in parts per million or billion — Non-destructive technology

¢ Limitations: — Will not specifically identify an ionized agent, but will alert user

of its presence — Will not operate efficiently in high humidity conditions or rain — UV lamps are very maintenance intensive and costly

— Must be backed up by another technology

— Requires several hours (days) of training for operators to become skilled in the use of PIDs

— UV lamps have a short life depending on the operating conditions — Will not detect all nerve agents — Difficult to calibrate after agent exposure

— UV lamps can become saturated with moisture and oxygen

Chapter 9

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

Sensor Array Technology

Sensor array technology (SAT) devices are based on the use of an array of several different chemical sensors such as conductive polymer, metal oxide, bulk acoustic wave (BAW) and SAW devices used simultaneously for real time monitoring. The various sensors that are used must respond rapidly and reversibly to the chemical vapors they are exposed to. This technology is used in instruments commonly known as electronic noses. Thermal and Electrical Conductivity

Thermal

and electrical

conductivity

detectors

use metal oxide

thermal conductivity semiconductors that measure the change in heat

conductivity that occurs as a result of gas adsorption on the metal oxide surface. Also, the change in resistance and electrical conductivity across a metal foil in the system is measured when a gas adsorbs onto the surface

of the metal

film. Contaminants

measured

will result in measurable

“clean”

or

background

in the atmosphere

electrical differences

atmosphere.

Additionally,

being

from the

different

contaminants will have different thermal conductivities and, therefore,

different electrical responses from thermal and electrical conductivity detectors. Flame Ionization

A flame ionization detector (FID) is a general-purpose detector used to determine

the presence

of volatile carbon-based

(carbonaceous)

compounds that are incinerated in a hydrogen-oxygen flame. When the carbonaceous compounds burn, an increase in the flame’s baseline ion current takes place and detection of a compound occurs. FIDs are not specific and require separation technology for specificity, such as a gas chromatograph.

Standoff detectors are used to give advance warning of a chemical agent cloud. Standoff detectors typically use optimal spectroscopy and can detect chemical agents at distances as great as 5 kilometers (3.1 miles). Agent-free spectra must be used as a baseline to compare with freshly measured spectra that may contain chemical agent. Standoff detectors are generally difficult to operate and usually require the operator to have some knowledge of spectroscopy in order to interpret

181

182

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

Chapter 9

results. Available standoff detectors use infrared spectroscopy with either passive or active sensing. Passive Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR), Fourier Transform Infrared (FTIR))

Passive standoff detectors collect infrared radiation emitted and/or measure infrared radiation absorbed from the background to detect chemical agent and TIC vapor clouds. Passive standoff detectors employ

one of two infrared spectroscopy technologies: (1) Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) imager or (2) Fourier Transform Infrared (FTIR) spectrometer in order to collect the infrared radiation. The difference between the two is how they process the infrared radiation. FLIR spectroscopy uses a series of optical filters, and FTIR spectroscopy uses an interferometer (an instrument that uses interference patterns to make

accurate measurements). Active (Differential Absorption LIDAR)

Light detection and ranging (LIDAR) is the laser cousin to radar. In LIDAR, a pulsed laser beam is sent out to a target object (e.g. vapor

cloud). Some of the light that interacts with the target object is reflected back to the sender unit, and the rest is scattered, reflected, transmitted or

absorbed. The time it takes for the light to travel from the sender unit to

the target object and back to the sender unit is used to calculate the distance to the target. For studying clouds in the atmosphere, differential

absorption LIDAR can be used to measure both the range of the cloud and the concentration profile of the cloud. In differential absorption LIDAR, two laser beams of slightly different frequency are used to analyze the cloud. One of the frequencies is tuned to a molecular absorption of one of the molecules in the cloud (this requires prior knowledge of cloud composition). The intensity of the reflected beam is

a function of the amount of laser light absorbed by the cloud. This is related to the concentration of the absorbing molecule in the cloud. The

cloud does not absorb the second frequency. Since its frequency is

similar to that of the first laser, it will have a similar reflection and scatter profile. Thus the difference in the intensity of the two reflected beams will be due to absorption of the first laser beam by the cloud. The intensity of the return signal from the second laser beam is used as a baseline for calculating concentrations in the cloud. The time it takes for the two lasers to reflect back to the sender is used to calculate the range of the cloud. LIDAR is useful for tracking a chemical agent cloud once it

Chapter 9

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

has been identified but typically cannot be used to identify a chemical agent cloud. Analytical Instruments The analytical instruments described in this section can be used to analyze samples as small as a few micro liters or milligrams. They are designed to differentiate between and accurately measure the unique chemical properties of different molecules. These instruments are quite sophisticated in order to detect and differentiate subtle differences

between trace amounts of different molecules. Accuracy and reliability require that only very pure reagents are used and that very rigid protocol and operating procedures are followed. This typically precludes their

use outside of a laboratory environment that is staffed by technically trained

people.

However,

some

analytical

instruments

have

been

developed for field applications. Additionally, the instruments do not display the measured data in a straightforward manner. Interpretation of the measured data typically requires a technical background and extensive formal training. Mass Spectrometry (MS)

Mass spectrometry is a technique that can positively identify a

chemical

agent at very

low

concentrations.

In this technique,

a

volatilized sample is ionized, typically by an electron beam, which also causes the molecule to fragment into smaller ionized pieces. The ionized molecules and fragments are then passed into a mass analyzer that uses

electric fields to separate the ions according to the ratio of their mass divided by their electric charge. The analyzer allows only ions of the same mass over charge ratio to impinge upon the detector. By scanning the electric potentials in the mass analyzer, all the different mass/charge ions can be detected. The result is a mass spectrum that shows the relative amount and the mass of each fragment, and the un-fragmented parent molecule. Since each molecule forms a unique set of fragments,

spectroscopy provides positive identification. To simplify interpretation of the mass spectrum, it is best to introduce only one compound at a time. This is often achieved by using a gas chromatograph to separate the components in the sample. The end of the gas chromatography column is connected directly to the inlet of the mass mass

spectrometer.

183

184

Chapter 9

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

Gas Chromatography (GC)

The gas chromatograph uses an inert gas to transport a sample of air through a long chromatographic column. Each molecule sticks to the column with a different amount of force and does not travel down the column at the same speed as the carrier gas. This causes the chemical agents and interferants to come out the end of the column at different times (called the retention time). Since the retention time is known for

the chemical agents, the signal from an associated detector is only observed for a short period starting before and ending just after the retention time of the chemical agent. This eliminates false alarms from similar compounds that have different retention times. High Performance Liquid Chromatography (HPLC)

High performance

liquid chromatography

is most useful in the

detection and identification of larger molecular weight chemical agents and in the detection and identification of biological agents. As with GCs, HPLC instruments can be equipped with a variety of detectors such as

mass spectrometers, fluorescence spectrometers, and electrochemical detectors. Two limitations to the fielding of HPLCs and their detectors are the need for power requirements (120V house current) and high purity solvents. lon Chromatography (IC)

Closely related to HPLC is a chromatographic technique known as ion chromatography (IC) where ionic species can be separated, detected

and identified. IC has been successfully used in the U.S. Army Materiel Command’s Treaty Verification Laboratory in the analysis of several chemical nerve agents and their degradation products. As with HPLC, IC instruments require power requirements (120V house current), high purity water, and high purity chemical reagents for the preparation of buffering solutions. Like HPLC, IC instruments can use mass

spectrometers and electrochemical detectors. Capillary Zone Electrophoresis

Capillary zone electrophoresis (CZE or CE) is a chromatographic technique that can be thought of as a hybridization of gas chromatography, liquid chromatography, and ion chromatography. Rather than using a temperature gradient or a solvent gradient (as in GC or HPLC, respectively),

a mobile phase containing an ionic buffer is

Chapter 9

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

used (as in ion chromatography). A high voltage electric field (either fixed potential or a gradient) is applied across a fused silica column similar to capillary columns used in GC. CZE instruments are typically configured with other technologies and share the same electrical requirements as HPLC and IC instruments. These devices need high purity water and chemical reagents, but in much smaller quantities. Wet Chemistry — Chemical Identification and Hazard Categorization (HazCat™)

These systems utilize a series or algorithm of chemical (reagent) and

physical tests to identify suspect materials. Use of these tests requires close contact with the suspect material in order to perform the various steps. Use of these systems is common among non-military hazardous materials response

teams

due to their affordability, simplicity and

dependability for field use.

|

An example of an instrument that uses wet chemistry technology is the HazCat™ WMD Identification System manufactured by HazTech™ Systems, Incorporated. » A Biological Warfare Agent Detection Technologies

One of the major problems in providing sophisticated biological agent detection capability is that such technology is generally very costly and its applicability in the field very limited. Due to the limits of

commercially available detectors, several different technologies may be needed as components of a layered detection process or algorithm. Low maintenance, easy to use and durable systems are becoming increasingly available to the commercial market place. And as with chemical agent

detection, a significant effort is currently underway to advance the availability of effective and affordable biological agent detection and warning systems.

185

186

Chapter 9

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

It is difficult to discriminate and measure biological warfare agents from naturally occurring background materials. Real-time detection and measurement of biological agents in the environment is daunting because of the number of potential agents to be identified, the complex nature of the agents themselves, the countless number of similar microorganisms that are constantly present in the environment, and the minute quantities of pathogen that can initiate infection. Potential biological agents can disguise themselves in apparently benign entities or lie in dormancy awaiting a suitable host organism to infect. Because of the makeup of biological warfare agents, approaches for detecting these agents differ from technologies used to detect chemical warfare agents and TICs. The lethality of biological warfare agents heightens the requirements for detection system sensitivity, which can lead to increases in cost, size, weight, and power requirements. Gram for

gram, biological warfare agents can be more

lethal than chemical

warfare agents. Hence, the farther the detector is from the agent release point, the more sensitive the system must be to detect the biological

agent. Biological warfare agents can be detected by several methods that incorporate various technologies. These methods are grouped into three major categories: immunoassay, optical, and microscopy. The type of technology needed for biological agent detection will be dependent on the type of agent to be detected and the objective of the intended user. Immunoassay

Immunoassay devices utilize the pathogen-antibody mechanism like

that found in the human body to fight infection. By mimicking the antibody process, infectious organisms (pathogens) can be tagged, thus allowing them to be identified biologically. Immunoassay is among the fastest of methods for detecting pathogens (such as biological warfare agents). The tag can be a group of molecules that are colored (colorimetric), emit light (chemiluminescent or bioluminescent), fluoresce (glow) when illuminated by a source, or are radioactive. Immunoassay devices require the specimen be prepared into a liquid form,

usually

through

the mixing

with

a buffer

solution.

This

preparation is applied to the kit, or ticket, which is similar to a home pregnancy test kit, and after a predetermined period of time the results are interpreted either visually or with an optical “reader”. As with any

Chapter 9

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

detection device, proper preparation and processing of the specimen is essential to obtaining accurate results.

An example of an instrument that uses immunoassay technology is the BioThreat Alert™ Test Strips and Guardian Reader manufactured by Alexeter Technologies, Incorporated.

¢ Capabilities: — Detects numerous biological agents — Minimal training needed to operate technology — Relatively quick response times

— Very affordable

¢ Limitations: — Must be stored in a temperature controlled environment

— Short shelf life of tickets — Tickets are pathogen specific Optical Methods

The majority of modern biological warfare agent detectors utilize

optical

transduction

technologies

(fluorescence

or

luminescence

spectroscopy). Fluorescence involves the excitement of molecules in the specimen with light, usually in the ultra-violet wavelength. As the molecules revert to their non-excited state they emit light at a differing wavelength. The wavelength and intensity of the emitted light is analyzed by the detector to identify and quantify the sampled material.

187

188

Chapter 9

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

Other optical methods used for biological detection include Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR), Fluorescence Resonance Energy Transfer

(FRET), and Cytometry. Each of these methods uses highly scientific analytical processes and are relatively very costly. ¢ Capabilities: — Detects most biological and chemical agents — Mobile — Passed all field tests performed by the US Military

¢ Limitations: — Requires several extensively trained operators — Very costly Optical Microscopy

Optical microscopy utilizes microscope technology to magnify a sample of the suspect material. By evaluating the size, shape and relative quantity of biological

material

it is possible

to identify specific

microorganisms. Preparation of the sample requires close contact with

the specimen and use of such equipment in protective clothing can be difficult. Optical microscope analysis

commonly

capture.

Digital

equipment designed for WMD

incorporate

imaging

enables

digitization, the user

or

electronic

to transmit

agent image

a digital

(electronic) copy of the image to biological specialists for further interpretation. Field microscopy units are generally optical in nature.

Numerous other microscopy technologies applicable to laboratory settings.

are

available,

mostly

Chapter 9

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

. ED

oN

. uh4

An example of an instrument that uses optical microscopy technology is the MicroCat Field Microscopy Kit manufactured by HazTech Systems, Incorporated

Radiological detection technologies measure radiation indirectly by detecting

and

measuring

phenomena

produced

by the radiation.

Radiation detection equipment is commercially available at relatively inexpensive cost. This equipment includes numerous radiation-specific

handheld and pager-like devices. Additionally, several chemical agent detectors discussed above incorporate radiation detection as part of their detection array.

The type of radiation detector used will be dependant upon the intended use as well as the type of radiation (Alpha, Beta, Gamma, etc.)

189

190

Chapter 9

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

to be detected. Some radiation detection technologies are capable of measuring multiple types of radiation simultaneously while others are more limited. There are three common commercially available radiation technologies: Geiger-Mueller (G-M), Scintillation Method, and Ionization Chamber.

Examples of radiological detection instruments include the SAIC radiological pager and the Ludlum Field Survey Meter.

Geiger-Mueller (G-M)

G-M instruments use a special form of ionizing chamber, called a Geiger-Mueller

tube.

G-M

instruments

use

a process

called

gas

amplification in which incoming radiation ionizes gas in the G-M tube

causing this gas to collide with and ionize other non-ionized gas in the tube. This avalanche

effect produces

an electrical

current that is

extrapolated by the instrument and a value (reading) provided on the display. G-M

instruments are capable of detecting alpha, beta and

gamma radiation with quick response time and sensitivity. Scintillation Method

Scintillation method instruments use crystalline materials that emit

flashes or light (scintillations) when bombarded by ionizing radiation. These flashes cause electrons to be broken away from metal-coated surfaces inside the device. This release of electrons produces an electrical charge proportional to the amount of radiation present. The

Chapter 9

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

resulting electrical charge is extrapolated and a value (reading) provided on the display. Scintillation Method instruments are capable of detecting alpha, beta and gamma radiation with quick response time. lonizing Chamber

Ionizing chambers may have a number of configurations and can be either sealed, with a gas or mixture of gases inside, or they can be open to the atmosphere. When radiation strikes the detector at a steady rate, an electron flow (current) is produced through the ionization of the gas or air inside the instrument. The electron flow is extrapolated and a value (reading) provided on the display. Ionizing chamber instruments are capable of measuring gamma, x-ray and some alpha and beta radiation.

OTHER SPECIALTY DETECTION AND MONITORING INSTRUMENTS In addition to the instruments discussed above specifically intended for WMD

agent and TIC

identification

and quantification,

other

monitoring devices may be required to ensure adequate personnel and

public safety. These devices

are designed to detect flammable

or

explosive atmospheres, oxygen levels in the ambient air, as well as select toxic industrial chemicals. Several “multi-gas” monitors combine these capabilities into one handheld devise such as the Eagle multi-gas monitor.

Combustible Gas Indicators (CGI)

CGI

devices

flammable

are designed

to measure

the concentration

of a

gas or vapor

in the atmosphere. Characterization and identification of flammable/explosive atmospheres is of extreme importance to worker safety. Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) regulations prohibit operations in atmospheres that exceed ten percent of the lower explosive limit (LEL). LEL is measured as a percentage and is a unique chemical property of every gas or vapor that will burn. The LEL is the lowest concentration of gas or vapor by volume in air that will burn. Below the LEL the concentration may be considered too lean to burn. However, due to the variable present

and explosive atmospheres conducting operations in atmospheres above ten percent is considered extremely hazardous, in addition to being illegal. In addition to percentage by volume readings, in flammable

191

192

Chapter 9

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

some CGI devices may provide readings in parts per million (PPM).

These instruments are designed to detect low concentrations of a wide range of combustible gases and vapors. CGI devices are not chemical specific and cannot identify specific materials. They can only determine if a flammable gas or vapor is present and the relative concentration based upon the gas used to calibrate the instruments. Because of sensor limitations, CGI devices are not generally accurate beyond 100 percent of the LEL concentration.

Oxygen Monitors

Oxygen

monitors

generally

use

the

same

electrochemical

technology as discussed above to measure the concentration of oxygen

in the ambient air. Normally, air contains about twenty-one percent oxygen, with the remaining seventy-nine percent being nitrogen and other inert gases. An oxygen monitor draws air into the devise with a pump, detects the percentage of oxygen present, and displays this value on the display. Readings below twenty-one percent should cause the user to consider what gas or vapor is displacing the oxygen (flammable, toxic, or other gases/vapors). The Occupational

Safety and Health

Administration (OSHA) regulations establish specific requirements for

Operations

in oxygen

deficient

and enriched

atmospheres.

These

regulations prohibit the use of air-purifying respirators (APR) and powered air-purifying respirators (PAPR) in atmospheres containing

less than 19.5 percent oxygen (deficient) and prohibit all operations in atmospheres exceeding twenty-five percent oxygen (enriched).

Chapter 9

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

An example of an instrument that uses CGI, oxygen and TIC detection technology is the Eagle Multi-Gas Monitor manufactured by RKI Instruments.

SELECTION FACTORS The following section provides a discussion of selection factors that

are recommended WMD

for consideration when selecting and purchasing

agent and TIC detection equipment. There are many options

available when choosing a type of detection technology. Detection

strategies and specific equipment operational requirements need to be taken into account. The following general criteria should be rigorously considered

when

planning for detection and monitoring

of WMD

materials:

Selectivity Selectivity refers to the capability of equipment to detect the intended chemical, biological, and/or radiological material(s). What will

the device or technology detect (e.g. chemical weapon agents, TICs, biological, radiological)? Is the device capable of measuring only one specific substance or multiple materials/agents?

Sensitivity Sensitivity is the lowest concentration of WMD agent or TIC that can be detected by a detector or instrument. This is also referred to as the

193

194

Chapter 9

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

detection limit. Detection limits may be dependent upon the WMD agent or TIC, the environmental conditions, or operational conditions. Can the instrument detect agent(s) at or below unhealthful or infectious dose concentrations?

Resistance to Interferants

An interferant is a compound that causes a detector to either false alarm (false positive) or fail to alarm (false negative). This factor describes the ability of a detector or instrument to resist the effects of

interferants. What can cause false positives and negatives? Is the device “fooled” by common (ordinary) materials? Response Time

Response time is defined as the time it takes for an instrument to

collect a sample, analyze the sample, determine if an agent is present, and provide feedback. How long does the device take to collect, analyze, quantify, and provide accurate feedback? Are there time constraints involved in the response? Start-up Time

The start-up time is the time required for setting up and initiating sampling with an instrument. How

long does the start-up/warm-up

process take before the device is “ready” for use? Detection States

This factor indicates the sample states that an instrument can detect. What type of detection states does the device need for analysis (e.g. vapor, aerosol, liquid, particulates, etc.)? Alarm Capability

This factor indicates if an instrument has an audible, visible, or

audible/visible alarm. What does the device use to indicate alarms (e.g. audible, visual, or a combination)? Are the alarms easily heard/seen?

Can alarms be selectively turned off when desirable? Portability

‘9

githie

Wen

lek

Portability is the ability of the equipment to be transported including any support equipment required to operate the device. Two important

Chapter 9

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

things to consider under portability are the equipment dimensions and its weight. They determine if a single person can transport the equipment or if the equipment requires vehicular transport. Is the device (including

any support equipment) easily transported? Power Capabilities

Power capabilities indicate whether specific equipment components can operate on a battery and/or AC electrical power. What does the device need for power (e.g. AC, DC, or combination of both)? Battery Needs Battery power is the ability of the equipment to be powered by batteries

with

an

operating

life capable

of sustaining

activities

throughout an incident. The number of batteries required for operation is

also an important consideration. Can the device operate for long periods on the same set of batteries? How long to recharge batteries after each use? Operational Environment This factor describes the type of environment equipment designed

to operate optimally. to operate

conditions

snow,

fog,

For example,

etc.

some

in the field under common

and climates, e.g., extreme

However,

other

required by the outdoor

temperatures,

equipment

equipment

may

is

weather

humidity,

rain,

require

more

climate-controlled conditions such as a laboratory environment. Can the device be used in the variety of expected weather environments (e.g. heat, cold, rain, snow, high humidity, etc.)? Is the device intrinsically

safe?

The durability of a piece of equipment describes how rugged the equipment is, (e.g. how well can the equipment withstand rough handling and still operate). How rugged is the device? Can it handle the rigors of the expected use? Procurement Costs

Unit cost is the cost of the piece of equipment including the cost of all support equipment and consumables. How much does the device

195

196

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

Chapter 9

cost? How much are the required accessories, resources/consumables and maintenance?

Operator Skill Level Operator skill level refers to the skill level and training required for the operation of an instrument. What is the skill level needed for basic or

advances level of operation? Training Requirements Training requirements is the amount of time required to instruct the operator to become proficient in the operation of the instrument. For

example, higher end equipment such as ion mobility spectrometers or SAW device requires more in-depth training such as specialized classes for operation, maintenance, and calibration of the equipment. What is the training time to get an average operator to a proficient level of understanding to get accurate

information

from the device?

What

on-going training commitments are required to maintain proficiency?

Chapter 9

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

SUMMARY Incidents

involving

the

release

of chemical, biological, or radioactive material will present many significant challenges to persons responsible for the management of the event. Among one of the most important issues will be the accurate and reliable identification of the released

agent(s)

or

materials.

Without

accurate

and_ reliable identification, incident managers will be significantly challenged and forced to use extremely conservative approaches. It is only with accurate

contaminant identification and characterization that specific planning can be made to respond, mitigate and recover the incident scene. There

are

currently

numerous

detection and monitoring of WMD

technologies

available

for the

agents, and radiological and toxic

industrial chemicals. And with the increase in available funding and emphasis on WMD

response, new technologies, or improvements to

existing one, will continue to emerge to address the needs of responders and site workers. As with any technology, the tools of the trade are only as good as the people who use them. In the case of WMD detection and

monitoring technologies, this statement could not be truer. Personnel responsible for the operation of such devices and the interpretation of the

findings must be adequately trained and skilled to operate the equipment

safely and proficiently. This training will require equipment specific, hands-on operation and practice as well as a thorough understanding of

the capabilities and limitations of the equipment to be used. Any purchaser of detection and monitoring equipment should seriously consider the training and equipment maintenance requirements before making a purchase decision. Without a competent operator, the capability of the instrument is meaningless, thus placing the operator, his/her co-workers and the surrounding public at risk.

197

198

WMD Monitoring and Detection Instrumentation

Chapter 9

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS Le Describe the six different equipment use categories for detection

and monitoring instruments. Describe the three major method categories of chemical agent detection and monitoring equipment. Describe three different technologies that could be used for nerve agent detection. Describe one of the three major categories of biological warfare agent detection. Describe the three technologies used for radiological material detection. y

Summarize the fifteen selection factors that should be considered

when selecting detection equipment.

REFERENCES Office of Domestic Preparedness, Domestic Preparedness Equipment Technical Assistance Program (DPETAP). Chemical, Biological and Radiological Detection Technologies manual.

An Introduction to Biological Agent Detection Equipment for Emergency First Responders, National Institute of Justice. Testing of Commercially Available Detectors Against Chemical Warfare Agents Summary Report, U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command’s (SBCCOM’s) Homeland Defense.

Chapter

1O

Personal Decontamination OVERVIEW This chapter will discuss the numerous considerations and protocols involved in personnel and victim decontamination. Effective decontamination practices are critical for providing adequate personnel and public safety. Traditionally, decontamination practices focused on the actions necessary to reduce contamination resulting from accidental releases of toxic industrial chemicals or the remediation of contaminated sites. These activities generally involved few, or very limited numbers of contaminated and/or injured victims. However, with the emergence of possible intentional acts involving the release of chemical and biological warfare agents, and radioactive materials, decontamination procedures are discussed to address situations when significant casualties and contaminated victims exists.

1. Identify the difference between contamination and exposure. 2. Identify the applications for Primary/Technical Decontamination. 3. Identify the application for Emergency Decontamination. 4. Identify the elements of a incident specific Decontamination Plan. 5. Identify the relationship of the Contamination Reduction Corridor to control zones. 6. Identify Contamination Reduction Corridor options. 7. Identify the required level of protection for decontamination personnel. o Identify emergency decontamination considerations. 9. Identify recommended personnel, victims and protective equipment decontamination solutions. 10. Identify recommended decontamination team staffing.

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

200

INTRODUCTION Effective

decontamination

prevents

the

spread

of hazardous

substances beyond the area(s) of contamination and established control zones; prevents exposures to personnel removing protective equipment; prevents secondary exposures to personnel from tools and equipment previously used in a contaminated environment; and prevents secondary exposures to emergency medical personnel, transport vehicles, and health care facilities from the treatment of contaminated victims. Implementation of decontamination procedures should take into

account

the mechanisms

of contamination

verses

exposure

since

significant differences exist affecting the need for decontamination. ¢ From contamination: — Substance is transferred or deposited on person, clothing and/or equipment

— Dose and effect increase as long as contaminant remains — Cross-contamination/secondary contamination may be possible — Off-gassing or airborne re-suspension may occur

¢ From exposure only: — No substance is transferred — Dose is discontinued after exposure ends, but effects may

continue — No cross contamination/secondary contamination risk

— No off-gassing or airborne re-suspension exists except with certain biological pathogens

Decontamination is defined by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) as the removal of hazardous substances from

employees and their equipment to the extent necessary to preclude the occurrence of foreseeable adverse health affects (29CFR

Furthermore,

these

regulations

require

that

1910.120).

provisions

for

decontamination be established prior to conducting entry operations during a hazardous materials incident (emergency) or at a contaminated site (post emergency). Since WMD agents are considered hazardous materials, these provisions are considered to apply. This chapter divides decontamination into three operations related to timing and the extent necessary to preclude health effects: primary/technical, secondary, and emergency

decontamination. It is important to note that no one decontamination procedure is the “right” procedure for all situations.

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

Incident specific issues, state and local regulations, resource capabilities

and limitations, and personal preferences of the decision makers will all have a bearing on the specific procedures used in any one location.

Mass Emergency Decontamination being performed by hazardous materials response personnel.

¢ Primary/Technical Decontamination is an accelerated removal of contamination from the personal protective

equipment (PPE) worn by personnel exiting from the exclusion (hot) zone. The operation continues to an extent that prevents exposures while personnel remove their PPE.

¢ Secondary Decontamination is the process of evaluating equipment and protective clothing for contamination, conducting a thorough decontamination, and providing necessary maintenance prior to returning the equipment to an in-service status. The operation continues to an extent that

prevents secondary exposures during future use.

¢ Emergency Decontamination is a procedure for the immediate removal of contamination from exposed victims, usually due to an endangered life or health situation. The operation continues to an extent that prevents secondary exposures to emergency medical personnel, transport vehicles, and health care facilities.

201

202

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

PRIMARY/TECHNICAL DECONTAMINATION Primary decontamination is an organized and planned process of removing contamination from personnel exiting the exclusion zone. The purpose is to prevent the spread of contamination from the exclusion zone and to carry out an accelerated contamination reduction. The operation continues to an extent that prevents exposures while personnel remove their personal protective equipment. Additionally, primary decontamination may be used for stabilized “contaminated” victims. Primary decontamination may not be appropriate for victims with acute medical conditions due to the considerable time required for set-up and organization of the primary decontamination operation.

Typical Primary/Technical Decontamination personnel

being performed by hazardous materials response

Primary/Technical Decontamination Methods The common methods of primary decontamination include a wet procedure or a dry procedure followed by a doffing procedure. The choice of conducting a wet or dry procedure is predicated by the physical

characteristics of the contaminant and the type of operations in the exclusion zone that may increase the potential for exposures. The wet or dry procedures are intended to remove enough contamination in order to prevent exposures while the wearer removes his/her personal protective

equipment using an appropriate doffing procedure.

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

Primary/Technical

Decontamination

- Wet

203

Procedure

is a

process of washing with a solution that will neutralize the hazard, react

with the hazard, and/or dilute and wash the hazard away. Prior to commencing with doffing, the extent of contamination is evaluated to prevent exposures to personnel removing personal protective clothing.

The wet procedure may be appropriate for primary decontamination following activities in the exclusion zone that may result in exposures to the personal protective equipment worn by the entry personnel. Primary/Technical

Decontamination

- Dry

Procedure

is a

process conducted

without the use of water or a decontamination solution. If needed, contamination reduction may be accomplished by means such as vacuuming, dusting or absorption. The dry procedure is conducted in the following sequence: ¢ Determine the need for decontamination. ¢ Ifneeded, remove contamination in areas around openings in the chemical protective clothing. ¢ Evaluate the extent of contamination in order to prevent

over-exposures during doffing. The dry procedure may be appropriate for primary decontamination

following activities in the exclusion zone that result in minimal or no exposures to the personal protective equipment worn by entry personnel and may be appropriate for removing water-reactive materials. The potential for exposure to personnel removing their personal protective

equipment

is evaluated

when

developing

the

Incident

Specific

Decontamination Plan. This “potential for exposure” is based on the

released materials persistence, potential for secondary contamination, as well as specific operational limitations placed on activities in the exclusion zone which may result in direct exposures to the personal protective equipment. Operational limitations should be identified in the site specific Health and Safety Plan (HASP) or Exclusion Zone Entry Work-Plan (if used).

Primary/Technical Decontamination - Doffing Procedure is a process that ensures that personnel are not exposed to secondary contamination while removing their personal protective equipment following an entry into the exclusion zone and completion of a primary decontamination wet or dry procedure. Personnel continue to wear the

respiratory protective equipment face piece until all protective clothing is removed to mitigate respiratory exposures. Exposure to substances on

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

204

the exterior of the PPE is mitigated by ensuring that the wearer limits physical contact to the interior portions of garments and that the decontamination personnel assisting in removal of the PPE limits physical contact to the exterior portions of garments. The exposed portions of clothing or respiratory protection should not be handled without proper PPE or until the equipment is subjected to a Secondary Decontamination process.

INCIDENT SPECIFIC DECONTAMINATION PLAN A plan for accomplishing

primary decontamination

should be

developed for each incident as part of the site specific Health and Safety Plan (HASP) or “Exclusion Zone Entry Work Plan.” As a standard to

prevent

uncontrolled

equipment

leaving

contamination

and

spread the

of contamination,

exclusion

subjected

zone

to the

must

all persons be

appropriate

evaluated

and for

decontamination

process. The decontamination corridor should be operational prior to commencing

with

operations

in

the

exclusion

zone.

The

decontamination plan should:

¢ Assign the responsibility of a Decontamination Team Leader. ¢ Evaluate the necessary number of decontamination team

members. The need is based on the number of personnel

entering the exclusion zone. ¢ Determine appropriate decontamination methods for anticipated hazards (e.g. wet or dry procedure).

¢ Determine the required number of stations for each decontamination corridor.

¢ Review methods and procedures to minimize entry team contact with contaminants during removal of personal

protective clothing and respiratory protective equipment.

DECONTAMINATION (CONTAMINATION REDUCTION) CORRIDOR SET-UP The decontamination

corridor is located

in the Contamination

Reduction (warm) Zone. The corridor serves as a control for egress from the Exclusion Zone and confines decontamination activities to a limited

area. Personnel leaving the Exclusion Zone must exit through the decontamination corridor. No food, drink or smoking should be allowed in the decontamination corridor, contamination or Exclusion Zones.

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

Cold Zone WarmZone

Outer Perimeter

Diagram of Control Zones and their relationship to the Contamination Reduction Corridor

While there are numerous variations in the manner decontamination corridors may be established, the following is one example of a common

corridor set-up. ¢ Determine a proper location for the decontamination corridor. Considerations for the corridor are weather conditions, wind

direction, topography and water supply. Shifting winds and the size of migrating vapor clouds should also be considered to

avoid moving the decontamination corridor once it is

functional. ¢ Choose a location that will reduce the spread of contaminants by personnel leaving the spill and traveling through the Exclusion Zone on their way to the decontamination corridor.

Example:

If the incident is in a building, the decontamination

corridor should be outside the door with the most advantageous access to

the spill. This will prevent personnel from “tracking” contaminants through uninvolved portions of the building. ¢ Establish physical barriers displaying the location of the Exclusion Zone perimeter, decontamination corridor, and Support (cold) Zone (flagging tape, road cones, etc.).

205

Personal Decontamination

206

Chapter 10

« Place polyethylene plastic sheeting on the ground at the entrance to the decontamination corridor; this will be the only exit from the Exclusion Zone. The plastic sheeting provides protection from ground permeation of contaminants and extends between the Exclusion Zone and the last decontamination pool. Weighted road cones, sand bags or other available heavy objects should be used to secure the plastic sheeting from moving in the wind. To minimize potential run-off from the decontamination area, cover adjacent drains or manholes, and dike sloped edges of the plastic sheeting with dirt/sand, absorbent or sand bags. ¢ Inflate three decontamination pools. Place the decontamination pools on the plastic sheeting close enough together to allow personnel to step from one pool into another. Water can be put

into the pools to hold them from moving in the wind. ¢ Set up decontamination equipment: — Prepare decontamination solutions.

— Long handled brushes, sponges, rags, buckets, soap. — Large plastic bags for decontaminated equipment. — Decontamination shower, garden hose. —

Secure water source.

— Place boots at the re-dress station for personnel that have completed decontamination. — Equipment for monitoring vital signs, oxygen equipment. — Three decontamination pools —

Stools or bench, if available, for personnel to sit on when

removing clothing.

— Spare self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) bottles, if operation includes a cylinder change and return to the exclusion

zone. — pH paper or other detection instrumentation for monitoring effectiveness of decontamination.

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

Typical Primary/Technical Decontamination Coriidor

Determining the Necessary Number of Decontamination Team Members Effective decontamination is measured by the ability to remove

personnel from their contaminated protective clothing in a timely fashion, in addition to necessary contamination reduction. As more personnel enter the exclusion zone, additional decontamination team members are required. During large operations within the Exclusion

Zone a second decontamination corridor should be established to ensure safety. ¢ The decontamination team should have a minimum of three persons conducting operations and will require the Decontamination Team Leader to actively participate in

hands-on procedures while supervising the operation. ¢ The decontamination team should provide a work force of at least the same number as the entry team.

¢ A second decontamination corridor should be established where six more persons are operating within the exclusion zone at one time.

¢ When two or more decontamination corridors are operating, the Decontamination Team Leader should supervise the overall operations and should not be involved with hands-on operations.

207

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

208

Recommended Primary/Technical Decontamination Team Staffing The number of personnel operating within the Exclusion Zone determines the size of the decontamination team. Decontamination is generally a slow process that results in a line of personnel waiting in the Exclusion Zone and continuing to breathe from respiratory protective equipment. The potential for injury or heat related emergencies (e.g.

heat

stress)

if personnel

increases

in reaching

delayed

are

the

decontamination process. With at least one person available on the decontamination team for each person attempting to go through decontamination, a minimum safety level is reached by providing a buddy monitoring system.

Table 10.1 below provides recommended

decontamination team

staffing. Note that when one decontamination corridor is operating, the Decontamination Team Leader may function in a hands-on fashion as one of the required personnel. When two decontamination corridors are in operation,

the Decontamination

Team

Leader

must

act as the

supervisor and should not engage in hands-on operations. Table 10.1 Recommended Decontamination Team Staffing Entry Team Size

Recommended Size of Decontamination Team

One Decontamination Corridor in Operation (Team Leader may conduct hands-on operations)

2

3 Minimum assigned to hands-on operations

3

t

3 Minimum assigned to hands-on operations

4

4 Minimum assigned to hands-on operations

5

5 Minimum assigned to hands-on operations

Two Decontamination Corridors in Operation (Decon Team Leader must act as supervisor)

6

7 Minimum (3+3 hands-on operations + 1 supervisor)

i}

8 Minimum (4+3 hands-on operations + 1 supervisor)

8

9 Minimum (4+4 hands-on operations + 1 supervisor)

Levei of Personal Protective Equipment for the Decontamination Team ax

The

é

4%

decontamination

e

team

should

be provided

with

personal

protective equipment appropriate for the contamination hazard carried out of the exclusion zone by the entry team. A minimum level of protection should include respiratory protection and splash protection. The level of protection worn by the decontamination team is determined by:

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

209

* Type of contaminant and associated respiratory and skin hazards * Total gas/vapor concentrations in the decontamination corridor

* Expected or visible contamination of personnel exiting the exclusion zone The Occupational Safety and Health Guidance manual for Hazardous Waste Site Activities identifies that in some cases the decontamination team may be sufficiently protected by wearing protective clothing one level lower than the entry team. This method should not be considered a standard for determining the appropriate level of protection. The Level of PPE for the decontamination team should be adequate to protect workers from the associated hazards particular to each entry into the Exclusion Zone. Decontamination workers who come in contact with personnel and equipment exiting the Exclusion Zone will require more protection from contaminants than decontamination workers who are assigned to the last station in the decontamination corridor.

Determining a Sequence for Decontamination of the Entry The

Entry

Team

Leader

decontamination

sequence

decontamination.

The

for

criteria

is responsible personnel for

the

for

establishing

waiting first

for

person

a

primary into

the

decontamination corridor is based on the following order:

¢ Medical emergencies or no air supply ¢ Damaged PPE or contamination inside of the suit ¢ Low air supply ¢ Least contaminated person before the most contaminated individual

Testing Effectiveness of Primary/Technical Decontamination

Decontamination methods vary in their effectiveness for removing different substances. There is no reliable test to immediately determine the effectiveness of decontamination. In some cases, effectiveness can

be estimated by visual observation under natural light and ultraviolet light. Detection and monitoring instrumentation may be used to evaluate decontamination effectiveness only after: ¢ Ensuring that there is no cross-sensitivity to decontamination

solutions used, if any

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

210

¢ Ensuring that instrumentation can detect contamination before initiating the cleaning processes (to establish a baseline)

wy

“EE

|

_f

Various monitoring instruments may be appropriate for evaluating decontamination effectiveness

Effectiveness

can

be estimated

by visual

observations

in the

following light: Natural Light

Discolorations, stains, corrosive effects, visible dirt, or alterations in

clothing fabric may indicate that contaminants have not been removed. However, not all contaminants leave visible traces (many contaminants

can permeate clothing and are not easily observed). Ultraviolet Light

Certain contaminants, such as polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons,

fluoresce and can be visually detected when exposed to ultraviolet light. Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons are common in many refined oils and solvent wastes. Ultraviolet light can be used to observe contamination of skin, clothing, and equipment; however, certain areas of the skin may

fluoresce naturally. In addition, use of ultraviolet light can increase the risk of skin cancer and eye damage.

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

211

Extent of Primary/Technical Decontamination Necessary Primary

decontamination

efforts

should

continue — until

contamination is reduced to a level where personnel will not receive exposures when removing protective clothing. Persistent chemical warfare agents and highly toxic industrial chemicals will require more decontamination effort as compared to a substance that is water-soluble. Incidents located at industrial settings (e.g. chemical plants) may allow for the use of fixed decontamination systems such as emergency showers, thus eliminating the need to set-up primary/technical decontamination corridors (as described below). Example of Primary/Technical Decontamination Corridor Set-up

The

following

Decontamination

procedure

is

Corridor

an

example set-up.

As

of

a

Primary/Technical

previously

or set-up is necessarily appropriate

stated,

no

one

for every situation.

Incident specific issues should be considered and incorporated into every decontamination plan. In this procedure, the person entering the decontamination corridor for decontamination procedures is referred to

as the PPE wearer and the persons assisting with the decontamination and clothing removal assistance are referred to as the decontamination

team. Station A: Equipment Drop-off Pad This station, located in the Exclusion Zone, is used for depositing all

equipment used in the Exclusion Zone (i.e., tools, monitors, sampling equipment, etc). This equipment may be used for future operations in the Exclusion

Zone.

Equipment placed on the drop-off pad should be decontaminated only after completion of decontamination procedures

for personnel and victims. Station B: Remove Over-suit Protection

This station is for the removal of over-suit protection, including outer gloves, boot covers, apron, if worn. Removing these outer garments prior to continuing in the decontamination process should

eliminate the majority of contamination. Stations C through E:

Stations C through E are divided into wet and dry procedures. The decontamination plan, which is established prior to starting an entry into the exclusion zone, will identify the method of decontamination and the number of stations that may be necessary to control the contamination

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

212

expected from the released material and the extent of exposure from the operation.

Station C-Wet: Pool 1 Wash-Rinse Pool | is for the removal of gross contamination by use of water and/or a decontamination solution. Decontamination solution is applied with a sponge or cloth to the wearers PPE from head to toe in a systematic fashion. If using a decontamination solution designed to

neutralize the contaminant, application by means. of a sprayer may be

more effective. Provide additional attention to highly contaminated areas such as hands and feet. The person wearing the PPE can point out areas of heaviest contamination. Use a scrub brush only on boots because a brush could damage the chemical-protective suits. When using the decontamination shower, rinse while maintaining a low

flow

to

prevent

decontamination

team

splashing member

or

overflowing

should remain

the

pool.

The

in one position for

washing and rinsing operations while the person wearing the PPE rotates

in the pool to expose areas to be cleaned. To decontaminate their boots while entering the next decontamination pool, the PPE wearers should lift their feet one at a time to be washed and rinsed; then step with that foot directly into the next pool.

The

cleaning

process

should

continue

until

visible

signs

of

contamination are no longer visible. If decontamination pool | overfills or becomes grossly contaminated, relocate Station C operations into the next decontamination pool. Additional decontamination pools can be added if needed. Sponges and brushes should not be mixed between stations. Station C-Dry: e

Determine Need for Decontamination

¢

Evaluate the extent of contamination on suit.

Station D-Wet: Pool 2 Wash-Rinse

This pool is for the removal of the decontamination solution used in the first pool. Each of the decontamination solutions commonly used has the potential of deteriorating protective clothing fabric. A mild soap solution should be used to thoroughly remove the decontamination solution, then rinse from head to toe. The person wearing PPE should step into the next pool while the decontamination team member cleans and rinses the boots.

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

213

Station D-Dry: Remove Contamination Gross

contamination

should be removed

Openings by an appropriate means, vacuuming.

from areas

around

suit

such as absorption, dusting, or

Station E-Wet: Pool 3 Evaluate Decontamination

This

station

decontamination

is used

for assessing

the

process and for continuation

effectiveness

of the

of decontamination,

if

needed. Monitoring instrumentation may be used to detect possible contamination remaining on the suits. If contaminants are found, the decontamination process should be continued by the most effective means. Station E-Dry: Pool 3 Evaluate Decontamination

The extent of contamination must be evaluated on the personal protective equipment. If contaminants are found, the decontamination team member must determine if the amount of contamination will not create an over-exposure

when the PPE is removed.

If needed, the

decontamination process should be continued by the most effective

means. Station F: Air Cylinder Change (if needed)

If personnel have left the Exclusion Zone for an air bottle change only, they would receive the new bottle at this point and then return to the Exclusion Zone. If wearing Level A protection (encapsulated suit), the wearer’s

suit must be opened and the cylinder replaced. The

decontamination

team member

changing the cylinder must not be

involved in other decontamination operations in which contamination is possible. Station G: Remove Outer Personal Protective Clothing

Station G is divided into G-1 and G-2, depending on the type and location of the respiratory protective equipment with the outer protective clothing, either on the outside or inside. At the end of this

station, the wearers will either continue to wear the respiratory protective equipment over the inner suit (if an inner suit is worn), or the wearers will have the respiratory protective equipment in a small bag with the face mask still covering their faces.

Station G-1: Remove Outer Protective Clothing (respiratory protective equipment within the Outer Suit)

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

214

The person wearing the PPE steps from the third pool into a plastic bag where the suit and boots are removed and placed into the bag. Any tape remaining on the wearer’s PPE should be removed. A decontamination team member assists the wearer in removing the suit by handling the outside surface of the suit while the wearer will touch only the inside surface of the suit. This procedure prevents the transfer of possible contaminants between the exterior and interior of the suit. The person wearing PPE continues to wear his/her respiratory protective equipment to prevent accidental inhalation of any present contaminant. The respiratory protective equipment will be removed during later stations.

The decontamination team members who perform scrubbing and rinsing

operations

are

more

highly

contaminated

than

members

operating at the end of decontamination process and assisting in the removal

of the personal protective clothing. Personnel

assigned to

stations where the suit is opened and who then assist in suit removal

should not be exposed to contamination in the previous decontamination stations.

Removed PPE and equipment that is re-usable should be placed into separate bags form disposable equipment. Re-usable equipment will be processed

through

secondary

equipment

will be appropriately

decontamination discarded.

while

disposable

Decontamination

team

personnel should avoid allowing this equipment segregation to delay personnel completing the decontamination process. Station G-2: Remove Outer Protective Clothing (where respiratory protective equipment covers the Outer Suit)

When personnel are wearing personal protective clothing in which the respiratory protective equipment is worn on the outside of the suit, it will be necessary to remove the respiratory protective equipment from the wearer’s back or waist and then remove the suit while he/she is still breathing from the respiratory protective equipment. It is important that the wearer continue to protect him/herself from respiratory hazards in the decontamination corridor. Safety is accomplished by leaving the operational facemask in place while removing the other equipment worn by the wearer. If the respiratory protective equipment is a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) it should then be placed into a small plastic

bag so that any contaminants are contained. If the respiratory protective equipment is a powered air-purifying respirator (PAPR), the equipment

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

215

will not function properly if bagged. A decontamination team member should take extra care to prevent it from contacting the ground or known contaminant. A decontamination team member can then hold the PAPR, or the bagged SCBA may be placed on the ground while the wearer’s other personnel protective clothing is removed. Station #H: Remove Inner Protective Clothing Station H is divided into H-1 and H-2, depending on the location of the respiratory protective equipment with the outer protective clothing either on the outside or inside. At this station, the wearer should either have the respiratory protective equipment worn on/over the inner suit, or the respiratory protective equipment will have already been removed with the facemask still covering the wearer’s face. Station H-1: Remove Inner Protective Clothing (where respiratory protective equipment covers the Inner Suit)

When personnel are wearing personal protective clothing where the respiratory protective equipment is worn on/over the inner suit, it will be necessary to remove

the respiratory protective equipment from the

wearer and then remove the suit while he/she is still breathing from the

unit. It is important that the wearer continue to protect him/herself from respiratory

hazards

accomplished

in the

decontamination

by leaving the operational

corridor.

facemask

Safety

is

in place while

removing the other respiratory protective equipment. If the respiratory protective equipment is a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) it should then be placed into a small plastic bag so that any contaminants are contained.

air-purifying

If the respiratory protective equipment is a powered

respirator

(PAPR),

the equipment

will not function properly if bagged. A decontamination team member should take extra care to prevent it from contacting the ground or known contaminant. A decontamination team member can then hold the PAPR, or the bagged SCBA may be placed on the ground while the wearer’s other personnel protective clothing is removed.

Station H-2: Remove Inner Protective Clothing (where respiratory protective equipment, excluding the face mask, has been removed) The person wearing the PPE steps from Station G with the operational facemask still covering his/her face. A decontamination team member can then hold the respiratory protective equipment or can

place the bagged SCBA on the ground while the wearer’s inner personnel protective clothing is removed. The wearer steps into a large

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

216

plastic bag where the suit is to be removed and placed into the bag. Any tape remaining on the wearer’s PPE should be removed. A

decontamination team member assists the wearer in removing the suit by handling the outside surface of the suit while the wearer will touch only the inside surface of the suit. This procedure prevents the transfer of possible contaminants between the exterior and interior of the suit. Station I: Remove Respiratory Protection Equipment Face Mask The wearer should walk to the end of the decontamination corridor

(beginning of the Support [cold] Zone) from Station H before removing

the respiratory protective equipment facemask. Decontamination team members

may need to assist the PPE wearer

in moving removed

respiratory protective equipment to this location. This procedure avoids the potential

of inhaling vapors

surrounding

the decontamination

corridor. The respiratory protective equipment should then be removed and placed into a plastic bag, if not removed in a previous station, and then the facemask

should be removed.

The respiratory protective

equipment should be placed on the ground at this location prior to exiting the decontamination corridor. Station J: Re-Dress

The PPE wearer should be provided with footwear, such as new over-boots, for immediate donning once in the support zone. He/she should also change into clean, dry clothing. Station K: Monitor Vital Signs Station K is located

decontamination

corridor.

in the cold zone

Personnel

at a distance

from the

should have their vital signs

monitored at this safe location. Further evaluation and medical treatment

may also be rendered, if needed. Station L: Debriefing

The debriefing station is located where the PPE wearer (entry team personnel) would report to their supervisor (e.g. Haz-Mat Group Supervisor).

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

217

Diagram of Decontamination Corridor Set-up

Entry Personnel Exposures During PPE Removal (Doffing Procedure)

The doffing procedure mitigates personnel exposures to secondary

contamination while removing protective procedure must accomplish the following:

clothing.

The

doffing

¢ The entry personnel will wear their respiratory protection throughout the entire decontamination process and will not remove the facemask until exiting the decontamination corridor. When decontaminating personal protective

equipment (PPE) where the respiratory protective equipment is worn on the outside of the protective clothing, the entry team member must follow a procedure to remove the respiratory

protective equipment while continuing to breath through the face mask. ¢ Decontamination team members assigned to decontamination stations where the entry team removes their protective clothing should not participate in decontamination operations that may expose them to contamination from personnel and equipment

exiting directly from the Exclusion Zone. ¢ Decontamination team members must touch only the outside

of protective clothing while the person wearing the garment assists in removal by touching only the inside areas.

218

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

Decontamination of the Decontamination Team

The decontamination team is exposed to the potential of receiving contamination from entry personnel during the decontamination process. Decontamination team members working with personnel and equipment directly from the Exclusion Zone may have more contamination

than personnel assisting with removal

of protective

clothing. Contamination could be expected over the front of the body

from splashing and located on hands from touching the entry team. Decontamination team members should assist each other in this operation. Operations for decontamination of the decontamination team include: ¢ Using the decontamination pool with the least amount of

contamination or a new pool. ¢ Levels of contamination should normally be very low and may not require application of decontamination solutions. ¢ When applying decontamination solutions, avoid using the same container of decontamination solution used on contaminated entry team personnel.

¢ Refer to doffing procedures to prevent exposures during removal of protective clothing. Termination and Clean-up of the Decontamination Corridor

The decontamination corridor should not be dismantled without approval from the Incident Commander and/or other appropriate public health official. All disposable equipment should be separated from equipment that will undergo secondary decontamination efforts. ¢ All spent wash and rinse solutions, brushes, sponges, and other similar equipment used in the decontamination process should be considered contaminated and properly decontaminated or disposed.

¢ Disposable equipment, pools, and solutions should be left on-scene for proper disposal by the responsible party or appropriate public health official. * When equipment is not subjected to secondary decontamination while on-scene, all equipment should be bagged and marked “‘Needs Secondary Decontamination.”

Gross contamination should be removed from the equipment prior to bagging.

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

* Protective clothing should be divided so that disposable clothing is bagged separately from non-disposable clothing. If boot covers were not used, the boots should be placed in bags separate from suits due to the potential for extending contamination to the inside of protective clothing while inside the plastic bag. Managing the Bagged PPE

Chemical protective clothing (CPC) should be separated so that disposable clothing is bagged separately from non-disposable clothing. If entry personnel did not wear over-booties, it should be assumed that

the boots

would

be more

highly contaminated

than other CPC.

Therefore, boots should be bagged separately to avoid further exposure to the other CPC. To avoid a delay in the decontamination of personnel, the bagging of personal protective equipment should be done after

personnel have completed the decontamination process. Bags should be marked identifying them as contaminated items (i.e., “Needs Secondary Decontamination’’). Personal Hygiene and General Good Work Practices

Following completion of decontamination and doffing of equipment entry and decontamination team personnel should immediately wash their hands. Personnel should be provided personal cleanliness facilities at the work site or other location. Personnel should wash their hands

before meals or smoking and should shower thoroughly with special attention given to hair, face, neck, and hands, using plenty of soap before leaving at the end of the workday.

SECONDARY DECONTAMINATION Secondary decontamination is the process of evaluating equipment for contamination, conducting a thorough decontamination, and providing necessary maintenance prior to returning the equipment to an in-service status. All equipment that leaves the Exclusion Zone should

be decontaminated and bagged. Disposable equipment should be set-aside in bags for proper disposal or be disposed of as hazardous waste. The cost of replacing contaminated PPE or tools may be less than the charge to decontaminate them.

219

220

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

Secondary Decontamination Methods

Secondary decontamination methods involve physical removal of contaminants or chemical deactivation. Gross contamination can be removed by physical means of rinsing, wiping off, and evaporation. Cleaning and decontamination solutions may assist in dissolving, neutralizing, or detoxifying contaminants. Removal Techniques: * Contaminant Removal (e.g. water rinse, using pressurized or gravity flow, chemical leaching and extraction, evaporation/vaporization, pressurized air jets, and scrubbing/scrapping). ¢ Removal of Contaminated Surfaces (e.g. disposal of deeply

permeated material [e.g., clothing, floor mats, and seats] and disposal of protective covering/coatings/suits). ¢ Chemical Detoxification (e.g. halogen stripping, neutralization [acid/alkali], oxidation/reduction, thermal degradation)

¢ Disinfection/Sterilization (e.g. chemical disinfection, dry heat sterilization, gas/vapor sterilization [fumigation}, irradiation, steam sterilization).

Testing Effectiveness of Secondary Decontamination

The effectiveness of secondary decontamination can be measured in the following methods: ¢ Air monitoring within a closed bag containing the decontaminated equipment.

¢ Wipe sampling is a method whereby a dry or wet cloth, glass fiber filter paper, or swab 1s wiped over the surface of the

potentially contaminated equipment and then analyzed. ¢ Cleaning solutions can be tested for indication of the contamination. Elevated levels of contamination found in the final rinse are an indication that further decontamination is necessary.

EMERGENCY DECONTAMINATION Emergency

decontamination

is a procedure

for the immediate removal of contamination from an exposed victim or victims, usually due to an endangered life or health situation. The operation continues to

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

221

an extent that prevents secondary exposures to emergency medical personnel,

transportation

personnel

and vehicles,

and health care facilities. Emergency decontamination takes place without the benefit of

a pre-established containment area or primary decontamination plan. These situations include (1) actual or potentially contaminated victims, and (2) personnel operating within the exclusion zone who have lost their capability to reach the preplanned decontamination set-up (primary/technical decontamination). The scope and size of emergency decontamination operations will be dependant on a number of variables,

most significantly the number of actual and potential contaminated victims. Incidents involving small numbers of victims (e.g. less than 5)

will require minimal

set-up. While

involving

incidents

numerous

victims (mass emergency decontamination) will be among one of the

significant resource

most

medical

services.

decontamination

on response

demands

Pre-event procedures

planning will

organizations

and training

dramatically

on

affect

and

emergency the

overall

effectiveness. As

with

other

types

of decontamination,

no

one

method

of

emergency decontamination is the “right” method for every situation or jurisdiction.

Varying

methods

have

been

developed

by different

organizations and agencies. However, these variations generally involve similar

generalized

components,

only

the

specific

methods

of

application vary. These general emergency decontamination operations

procedure components include: ¢ Response personnel should use the best available personal protective equipment for the hazard present, such as chemical protective clothing (e.g. WMD PPE) or firefighter full turnouts and SCBA.

¢ Ambulatory victims (having mobility) should be directed to relocate to an area away from the hazard and where water run-off exposure is minimized. This area is referred to as a “Safe Refuge Area”.

¢ Emergency decontamination should not be significantly delayed due to concern for water run-off exposures (see Special Considerations For Emergency Decontamination, Article 10.1, at the end of this chapter).

222

Chapter 16

Personal Decontamination

¢ Victim’s clothing should be removed where contaminated to allow flushing of affected skin and hair. Modesty for the victim should be considered in relation to the extent of contamination and the immediate health threat. ¢ Contaminated areas of the victim should be subjected to a water rinse (flush) from the best water supply available, such as showers, garden hoses, or hose lines on fire apparatus or special set-ups for mass emergency decontamination operations. Flushing should continue for a minimum of sixty seconds or longer where contamination persists. Mild soap or shampoo may be used when needed and appropriate for the number of victims. ¢ Decontaminated victims should be provided dry body cover to

maintain body temperature and be medically assessed and/or treated.

¢ Treatment for life threatening conditions, such as CPR for cardiac arrest, may begin prior to decontamination and

continue through decontamination, when there is little risk for secondary contamination and adequate resources are available. ¢ Medical supplies and equipment should be protected from contamination where possible.

¢ Disposable equipment should be used whenever possible. ¢ All contaminated equipment must be decontaminated or returned to the Exclusion Zone and treated as hazardous waste.

Safe Refuge Area Operations The safe refuge area is established between the Exclusion Zone and Contamination Reduction Zone. This location provides an area where

victims are protected from further exposure

and are evaluated

for

contamination prior to decontamination and treatment. Triage may be necessary to determine a sequence for victim decontamination. The triage process must take into consideration the potential for secondary contamination to response personnel when immediate treatment for life threatening conditions is required prior to decontamination.

Ambulatory (mobile) victims within the Exclusion Zone should be directed to a safe refuge area for contamination evaluation that will prevent further contamination exposure. In the safe refuge area, victims are evaluated for contamination and acute medical conditions. Persons

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

223

with gross contamination and/or presenting an acute medical condition should receive the first priority for emergency decontamination. Persons with minimal contamination and not presenting any medical condition should receive the lowest priority. Ambulatory contaminated victims remain in the safe refuge area until they are directed to the decontamination corridor. Whenever possible, persons with no exposure should be segregated from contaminated victims to minimize the risk of secondary contamination. At the conclusion of emergency decontamination

operations, or when adequate resources are present,

these victims should be reassessed for contamination prior to releasing

them to medical treatment or investigative resources. Contaminated victims must be decontaminated prior to treatment in order to prevent secondary contamination of unprotected or minimally protected emergency medical service (EMS) personnel (including paramedics, ambulance attendants, and medical facility personnel). Decontamination of Victims .

=

%#*

Contaminated victims may be subjected to either ambulatory or non-ambulatory emergency decontamination procedures; the following

may be applied to both procedures. The number of victims, type or extent of contamination, and the type or extent of injuries will dictate the decontamination contamination,

effort victims

required. should

If there

is any

doubt

about

be subjected to a decontamination

process. ¢ Victim decontamination includes removal of wet or exposed clothing, flushing affected skin and hair with water along with soap or shampoo when needed. ¢ Washing with large amounts of water is usually the only decontamination process available or needed. ¢ Victims contaminated with a substance that will cause secondary contamination should not be treated or transported

prior to decontamination attempts. This prevents exposure of emergency personnel, transport vehicles, and medical care facilities.

¢ Some decontamination procedures will continue beyond the decontamination area. For example, irritants in the eyes may require irrigation with water following the decontamination

process.

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

224

¢ Contaminated clothing removed from the victim should be handled in accordance with local procedures and treated as contaminated waste.

Emergency Decontamination Procedure - Ambulatory Victims

This sample procedure provides a simple outline that describes one of many alternatives for conducting emergency decontamination of a

minimal

number

of victims.

Mass

emergency

decontamination

procedures require significantly more resources. ¢ Communicate with the victim(s) by the best means available (i.e., bullhorn or public address system).

¢ Instruct the victim to walk away from the released material/area to a safe refuge area. The safe refuge area must be located in an area that will prevent continued exposure to the released material and away from water run-off.

¢ If multiple victims are present, instruct one victim to approach the area where decontamination will take place near a water

source. ¢ Instruct the victim to remove all contaminated clothing and

equipment. ¢ Approach the decontamination area with two personnel wearing appropriate personal protective equipment.

¢ Rinse the victim(s) with copious amounts of water. The victim and response personnel should avoid standing in the water run-off. All water run-off should be considered contaminated until tested. ¢ Provide the victim with dry cover (e.g. disposable polyethylene blanket or garments) to cover him or herself. ¢ Evaluate the effectiveness of decontamination and the potential for secondary contamination of emergency medical personnel. Continue any appropriate decontamination, if needed. ¢

Direct the victims to the treatment area.

Emergency Decontamination Procedure — Non-ambulatory Victims

This sample procedure provides a simple outline that describes one of many alternatives for conducting emergency decontamination of a minimal number of non-ambulatory victims. Non-ambulatory

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

emergency decontamination will usually require the extrication or rescue of victims from the area of greatest risk or its vicinity. Therefore, before any rescue operations are conducted rescuers must perform a comprehensive risk assessment and ensure proper procedures and equipment are utilized.

* Determine victim status by attempting to communicate by the best means available (e.g. bullhorn or public address system). ¢ After performing risk assessment and determining the site is safe to enter, approach the victim with at least two personnel

wearing appropriate personal protective equipment and carrying a water source (e.g. charged hose line) along with an

appropriate carrying device (e.g. backboard, litter, etc.). ¢ Establish victim status, if possible. ¢ Remove all contaminated clothing and equipment while attempting to stay clear of the released material. ¢ Rinse the victim(s) with copious amounts of water.

¢ Place the victim on the carrying device and relocate to a safe refuge area. ¢ Provide the victim with cover (e.g. a disposable polyethylene blanket) ¢ Evaluate the effectiveness of decontamination and the potential for secondary contamination of emergency medical

personnel. Continue an appropriate decontamination, if

needed. ¢ Relocate the patient to the treatment area.

to the significant variations in resource availability and capabilities, numerous mass emergency decontamination procedures have be developed. While these various systems have their differences, they all share the common goal of “doing the greatest amount of good for the greatest number of victims, in the shortest amount of time.” In other words, the quicker the decontamination process begins the better. Mass emergency decontamination procedures generally involve one of two Due

configurations based upon the intended operation (1) mobile/portable and (2) stationary.

Mobile/portable mass emergency decontamination equipment 1S capable of being rapidly transported to and deployed at the incident

225

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

226

scene.

For example,

numerous

emergency

response

organizations

charged with the responsibility to provide this capability (e.g. fire departments, law enforcement, public health agencies) have developed procedures using ordinary or specialized response equipment and vehicles, thus making them portable or mobile. Fire agency mass

emergency decontamination plans commonly identify the use of ordinary fire apparatus, such as fire engines, spaced apart at prescribed distances (usually between ten to twenty feet) to create emergency shower corridors. The specific design and operating procedures of these corridors varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction based upon available mass emergency types of mobile/portable Other resources. include designed equipment specially decontamination decontamination trailers, trucks and rapid deployment decontamination systems (e.g. inflatable tents).

Stationary mass emergency decontamination facilities are a relative new comer due to the emerging WMD

threat. Numerous

medical

facilities (hospitals) are equipped with, and their personnel trained in the

use of, emergency mass decontamination equipment. This equipment commonly

includes

rapid deployment

emergency

decontamination

shelters such as inflatable self-supported tents incorporating a shower

system. In some instances, permanent, stationary mass decontamination facilities may be constructed.

emergency

Procedures must also be in place to deal with both ambulatory and non-ambulatory victims. Ambulatory victims resulting from a WMD event will generally be among the least contaminated

and injured

victims at the incident scene. However, ambulatory victims will present

perhaps the most significant issues at a WMD

event, their shear

numbers. It is very likely that a well-planned terrorist attack involving a WMD

will result in casualties, including severe injuries and possible

death. But the greatest number of victims requiring management by emergency response personnel will be non-injured victims or persons with only minor to moderate injuries. These victims often suffer from injuries that require medical attention but that do not prevent them from being ambulatory (or “the walking wounded’). Depending on the victims’ proximity to the dispersed material, and the material’s characteristics, some of these victims will likely be contaminated. Perhaps the greatest number of victims from a WMD event will be from the “walking worried.” Extreme stress and fear, and even panic, among

Ch apter 10

Personal Decontamination

227

persons in the vicinity of a WMD event are understandable and should be anticipated. Providing contamination assessment, decontamination if necessary,

reassure

and a medical

assessment

may

be all that is needed

to

and

comfort these victims. The greatest advantage of ambulatory victims is their ability to follow instructions from emergency response personnel and self-decontaminate through the established process.

Example of Ambulatory Mass Emergency Decontamination Corridor

Non-ambulatory themselves

victims

are by definition

from the incident scene.

unable

Non-ambulatory

to extricate victims

will

usually require rescue by trained and properly equipped emergency

response personnel. In most cases, non-ambulatory victims will have sustained serious to life-threatening injuries. Additionally, relative to the victims’ proximity to the dispersed material, and the material’s characteristics, these victims may have moderate to high levels of contamination

and

extended

exposure

times.

Mass

emergency decontamination of non-ambulatory victims is potentially one of the greatest demands on trained emergency personnel. Following being rescued (extricated), non-ambulatory victims will require qualified personnel to process them through the emergency decontamination process. This process commonly involves numerous trained and

equipped personnel using victim carrying devices (backboards, litter baskets) and roller systems. A picture of such a system is provided below. Mass emergency decontamination procedures should take into

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

228

account each of these types of victims. Following mass emergency decontamination, all victims should be medically assessed and provided appropriate medical treatment and/or transportation to a medical facility.

“

Example of Non-ambulatory Mass Emergency Decontamination Corridor

Providing rapid mass emergency

decontamination

is among the

most important medical treatment issues for victims involved ina WMD incident. Removal from the contaminant and reduction of exposure time is universally important for all WMD agents and materials. Despite the configuration or procedure used for mass emergency decontamination,

the most critical factor for its successful implementation is the ability of responsible personnel to efficiently and effective operate it. Providing and maintaining well-trained and equipped personnel should be an

integral part of any mass emergency decontamination plan.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR EMERGENCY DECONTAMINATION All Hazard Approach

An

all

hazard approach to planning and implementing decontamination efforts has the greatest chance of providing a successful outcome.

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

Secondary Devices and Assaults

Intentional WMD scenes may include secondary devices or armed secondary assaults intended to kill or incapacitate emergency response personnel. While life saving operations should not be delayed, emergency response personnel should remain vigilant for these risks. Additionally, WMD response operations should include coordination with local and other available law enforcement to provided “force

protection” for all response personnel. Medical Facility Impacts Statistics indicate that up to 80 percent of persons arriving at a hospital following a large-scale disaster travel via private vehicles. Therefore, assumptions should be made that large numbers of potentially contaminated persons may self direct to health care facilities (e.g. hospitals, doctors offices, etc.), in private vehicles. Plans should

exist for each facility addressing their specific needs for maintaining traffic control and vehicle parking, security, crowd control, hazard analysis,

decontamination,

community

and

regional

coordination,

alternate care sites and resources, and facility evacuations.

Management of Water (Rinse) Run-off During Emergency Decontamination Operations The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has stated that, in

accordance with the limits of liability in Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),

the run-off

from emergency decontamination operations is not a primary concern. However, run-off is a definite consideration for the placement of

post-emergency decontamination collection and treatment. In July 2000 EPA issued an alert titled, “First Responders’ Environmental Liability Due To Mass Decontamination Runoff’ which addresses run-off liability. A copy of this alert is included at the end of this chapter. Waste Water Runoff / Disposal

Due

to the toxic nature

agents and toxic industrial decontamination solutions and other

of WMD

chemicals, as well as common disinfecting agents which may be used, every possible precaution must be taken to effectively contain all wash waters generated in order to

prevent any releases to surface waters or groundwater used for drinking.

229

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

230

The following general considerations will generally assist with this objective: ¢ Minimize use of decontamination solutions and other disinfecting agents ¢ During decontamination activities, contain all wash water within watertight container and/or away from any storm drain, catch basin, stream, swale or other direct access to surface

_ water. * Carefully dispose of the wastewater only to a municipal sanitary sewer after proper authorization or via a waste hauler licensed to transport the waste. Cold Weather Decontamination

The mean

temperature

decontamination

processes

most

comfortable

is approximately

for standard 65°

F.

outdoor

Below

this

temperature, persons may be reluctant to follow the standard process. If the outdoor temperature is between 35° F to 65° F, then moving persons

directly to a warmer environment as soon as possible after outdoor decontamination is critical. These areas can be decontamination trailers,

strategically

deployed

heated

tents, office buildings,

hospitals,

or

shelters.

If the temperature

is below

35°F, decontamination

should be

conducted a indoor locations, including decontamination trailers, indoor shower

facilities, car washes,

weather the more

probable

or swimming

scenario

pools. During

of large numbers

colder

of persons

exposed to a possible contaminant would take place “inside” of a

building whether it be an office building, mall, or other public venue. Larger buildings with multi-zone HVAC systems offer the ability to move

persons to a portion of the building that as of yet may be

unaffected by the contaminant where it may be possible to initiate decontamination or screening efforts indoors. This option requires pre-planning and coordination by the local emergency response agencies with the responsible facility staff. The facility staff would be responsible for reconfiguring the HVAC system to avoid the spread of the contaminant to the area of operation and to increase fresh air supply to the operational area. This option also mandates extensive air monitoring to assure operational viability. If a clean air environment

Chapter 10

cannot

Personal Decontamination

be maintained,

then movement

to the outdoors

would

231

be

indicated. * PPV Fans - For gaseous substances such as anhydrous ammonia and chlorine, persons can be thoroughly decontaminated using Positive Pressure Ventilation Fans set up approximately 10 - 15 feet away from the individuals being decontaminated. * Automatic Sprinkler Systems - Use one or more sprinkler heads to decontaminate persons moving into a building or out of a contaminated building. Wetting a Person in Cold Weather

Cold-weather decontamination

should be done incrementally vs.

having the person immediately drenched. Special attention must be paid to cardiac patients and the elderly if there is absolutely no alternative to outdoor wet decontamination. If no indoor facilities can be accessed, the

following Dry Decontamination procedures can be employed: 1. Remove outer clothing and blot with paper towels 2. Persons can assist each other

3. Transport to warm area for wet decontamination ¢ Soap - Baby shampoo is the most effective soap agent for decontamination purposes at this time. Mixing of

approximately 8 oz. of soap with water in a standard 2.5-gallon garden sprayer should yield an effective soaping agent. ¢ Sea / Salt Water - The National Institute of Standards and

Technology reports that, due to its pH level, sea water has been proven to be a more effective wetting / decontamination agent than “normal” water.

DECONTAMINATION SOLUTIONS solutions should be designed to react with and neutralize the specific potential contaminants involved in an incident. Decontamination

However, the contaminants ata WMD event or toxic industrial chemical

release may be unknown and the primary concern is for life safety. Therefore, it is necessary to use a decontamination solution that is effective for a variety of contaminants while at the same time compatible for human application if victim decontamination is to be performed.

232

Personal Decontamination

Decontamination

Chapter 10

solutions

A-D

below

should

generally

be

restricted to decontamination of chemical protective clothing exposed to toxic

industrial

chemicals.

When

used,

solutions

A-D

should

be

followed by decontamination with solution E to remove any potential residue of the initial decontamination solution.

Several general-purpose decontamination solutions based on EPA guidelines are listed in Table 10.2 below:

Chapter 10

233

Personal Decontamination

Table 10.2 Hazard Suspected — Preferred Solutions Solution A

Inorganic acid, Metal processing wastes, Heavy metals, mercury, lead cadmium, etc.

Solution B

Pesticides, fungicides, chlorinated phenols, dioxins, PCB’s, cyanides, ammonia and other non-acidic inorganic wastes

Solution C (or | Solvents and organic compounds; ex: trichloroethylene, chloroform and toluene PBB’s and PCB's solution A)

’

+

Solution C

Oily, greasy unspecified wastes

Solution D

Inorganic bases, alkali and caustic waste

Solution E

General cleaning, removal of previous decontamination solutions

Solution A: A solution containing 5% sodium carbonate (Na, CO,) and 5% trisodium phosphate (Na, PO,): ¢ To two gallons of water, add one pound of sodium carbonate (sodium lime) and one pound of trisodium phosphate. Stir until evenly mixed. Solution

B: A

solution

containing

10%

calcium

hypochlorite

(CaG@iO»): ¢ To two gallons of water, add two pounds of calcium hypochlorite. Stir with a wooden or plastic stirrer until evenly mixed. Solution C: A solution containing 5% trisodium phosphate (Na,

PO): ¢ To two gallons water, add one pound of trisodium phosphate. Stir until evenly mixed. Solution D: A dilute solution of hydrochloric acid (HCI): -

¢ To two gallons water, add one-third cup of concentrated Hydrochloric acid. Stir with a wooden or plastic stirrer. Solution E: A solution containing dish-washing liquid.

recommended determining decontamination solutions should consult current technical information sources or the specific material safety data sheet. Caustic and oxidizing Personnel

responsible

for

solutions should be limited to the decontamination of equipment and not used for direct skin contact. Table 10.3 below is intended to provide examples of specific chemical warfare (CW) and biological warfare (BW) agent and radiological material decontamination solutions.

234

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

Table 10.3 Recommended Decontamination Solutions For CW/BW And

Radiological Materials Agent or Material

Decontamination Solution

Biological Warfare Agents (e.g. Bacillus anthracis)

EPA-registered sporidal/germicidal agent or .050% hypochlorite solution (one part household bleach added to nine parts water)

Chemical Warfare Agents (e.g. Sarin (GB), Taban (GA), Soman (GD)

Sodium Hydroxide solution (min 10 wt %), Decontamination Solution No. 2 (DS2), Sodium Carbonate and Supertropical Bleach Slurry (STB)

Chemical Warfare Agent (VX only)

Calcium Hypochlorite (HTH) mixture, Decontamination Solution No. 2 (DS2), Supertropical Bleach Slurry (STB), and Sodium Hypochlorite

Sulfur Mustard (HD or THD)

5.25 percent Sodium Hypochlorite solution, Calcium Hypochlorite Decontamination Solution No. 2 (DS2), and Super Tropical Bleach Slurry (STB). WARNING: Pure, undiluted Calcium Hypochlorite (HTH) will burn on contact with liquid blister agent.

Radiological

Soap and water

Article 10.1 US EPA Emergency Decontamination Alert Procedure The following article was provided by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and submitted by Steve Johnson.

EPA CHEMICAL

SAFETY ALERT

FIRST RESPONDERS’ ENVIRONMENTAL

LIABILITY

DUE TO MASS DECONTAMINATION

RUNOFF

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is issuing this alert as part of its ongoing

effort to provide information on environmental issues related to biological, chemical, and nuclear terrorist incidents. EPA publishes Alerts to increase awareness of possible hazards and environmental concerns. It is important that State Emergency Response Commissions

(SERC's), Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPC’s), emergency responders and others review this information and take appropriate steps to minimize risk.

PROBLEM

On April 19, 1999, the leader of the Chemical Weapons Improved Response Program (CWIRP), U.S. Army Soldier Biological and

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

235

Article 10.1 US EPA Emergency Decontamination Alert Procedure (cont'd)

Chemical

Command

sent a letter to the EPA raising issues concerning first responders’ liability during a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorist incident. Specifically, the CWIRP asked about the first responders’ liability for spreading contamination while attempting to save lives.

Environmental liability resulting from critical lifesaving actions may seem unlikely, but could be a serious concern for many first responders. The question is: Can emergency responders undertake necessary actions in order to save lives in dire situations without fear

of environmental

liability when

such

emergency

actions

have

unavoidable adverse environmental impacts? This concern is not limited to WMD terrorist incidents; it has broad implications for our National Response System (NRS) and frequently is discussed in the

:

hazardous response community.

THE NERVE AGENT DRILL The federal government recently sponsored a multi-agency drill based on a simulated nerve-agent attack. The release of the nerve

agent resulted in hundreds of simulated casualties who survived the initial

terrorist

attack.

The

hazmat

team

had

to rescue

and

decontaminate these “survivors” before they could receive medical attention. The hazmat team identified the need to collect the water used to decontaminate the victims (deconwater) to avoid a release to

the environment. During the drill, these very capable, well-equiped, well-intentioned,

professional hazmat teams delayed their initial

entry for more than one hour, awaiting the arrival and set-up of pools to collect the deconwater. While the actor-survivors were dying a slow, painful, convulsive

death, state and federal officials were

debating and insisting that deconwater had to be collected for proper disposal. By the time the rescuers set up the holding pools and entered the site, nearly 90 minutes later, the “survivors” had expired. The deconwater was collected but the “victims” died.

GOOD

SAMARITAN

PROVISIONS

The Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), Section 107 (d) Rendering Care or

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

236

Article 10.1 US EPA Emergency Decontamination Alert Procedure

(cont'd)

Advice, addresses this issue. Section 107 (d)(1), often known as the “Good Samaritan” provision states: “No person shall be liable under this sub chapter for costs or damages as a result of actions taken or omitted in the course of rendering care, assistance, or

advise in accordance with the National Contingency Plan (NCP) or at the direction of an on-scene coordinator appointed under such plan, with respect to an incident creating a danger to public health or welfare or the environment as a result of any releases of

a hazardous substance or the threat thereof”. This provision does not preclude liability for costs or damages as a result of negligence. Releases of chemical and biological warfare agents due to a terrorist incident are considered hazardous materials incidents and therefore

CERCLA

107 (d)(1) could apply, to the extent that there is a release

or threatened release of a hazardous substance. In addition, 107 (d)(1) provides that state and local governments

are not liable under CERCLA “as a result of actions taken in response to and emergency created by the release or threatened release of a hazardous

substance

generated by or from a facility owned by

another person”. Section 107 (d)(2) would insulate state and local

governments

from potential CERCLA

liability arising from first

responder actions. However, the provision does not apply to costs for damages caused by “gross negligence or intention misconduct by the state or local government”.

During a hazardous materials incident (including a chem./bio

agent

terrorist

event),

first responders

should

undertake

any

necessary emergency actions to save lives and protect the public and themselves. Once any imminent threats to human health and lives

are

addressed,

first responders

should

immediately

take all

reasonable efforts to contain the contamination and avoid or mitigate environmental consequences. EPA will not pursue enforcement actions against state and local responders for the environmental consequences of necessary and appropriate emergency response actions. First responders would not be protected

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

237

Article 10.1 US EPA Emergency Decontamination Alert Procedure (cont'd) under CERCLA

from intentional contamination

such as washing

hazardous materials down the storm-sewer during a response action as an alternative to costly and problematic disposal or in order to avoid extra-effort. OTHER LIABILITY ISSUES AND STATE TORT LAWS EPA cannot prevent a private person from filing suit under CERCLA. However, first responders can use CERCLA’s Good Samaritan provision as defenses to such action. First responders could also be subject to actions under other laws, including state tort laws. A state’s tort law allows individuals and business to seek compensation for losses or harm caused by another. The tort law of each state establishes the extent of tort liability of a state or local governmental

as well

jurisdiction,

as individual

employees

or

representatives of that jurisdiction. The liability of governmental jurisdictions and their employees may be shaped by factors such as

negligence,

statutory

and

discretionary

immunity,

etc.

First

responders should consult legal counsel in their state to discuss authority,

status

as

an

agent

of

the

state,

immunities

and

indemnification.

FEDERAL SUPPORT DURING A WMD INCIDENT Contaminated runoff should be avoided whenever possible but

should not impede necessary and appropriate actions to protect human life and health. Once the victims are removed and safe from further harm and the site is secured and stable, the first responders

should be doing everything reasonable to prevent further migration of contamination into the environment.

First Responders should involve state and federal officials as soon as possible to reduce potential liability concerns. Under CERCLA, the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) can determine which environmental regulations are applicable (or relevant and appropriate) to any removal response and may further determine that any

such

environmental

regulation

is impracticable

to achieve

depending on the necessities of the situation. If the FOSC determines that it is impracticable to comply with any particular environmental

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

238

Article 10.1 US EPA Emergency Decontamination Alert Procedure (cont'd)

regulation, then the responders (local, state, federal, or responsible party) do not have to comply with that particular environmental regulation. By involving FOSC, first responders can substantially reduce their potential liability. In addition, FOSC’s have an expanse of resources under the NRS

to support state and local responders in determining a solution which best address protectiveness of human health and the environment. Under the NRC, the FOSC

can provide invaluable assistance in

determining clean up and decontamination needs, health criteria and appropriate clean-up protocols as needed. FOSC

support is even

more critical in the aftermath of a WMD terrorist attack when critical

post-emergency actions such as agent identification, crime scene sampling, crime scene preservation, and long-term risk evaluation are also being conducted.

PRE-PLANNING IS KEY! It may not be technically feasible to contain all the runoff resulting from a WMD or large-scale hazmat incident, but emergency responders may be able to reduce its impact to the environment by pre-planning. Responders can maximize local resources by using existing response mechanisms as much as possible. LEPC’s (Local Emergency Planning Committees) are a good starting point. LEPC’s are established under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act to develop local governments’ emergency response and preparedness capabilities through better coordination and planning, especially within the local community. LEPC’s include elected

officials,

police,

fire, ems,

civil defense,

public

health

professionals, environmental, hospital and transportation officials, who

can work together creatively using available

resources

to

minimize the environmental impact of a WMD or large-scale hazmat

incident.

For more Community

information Right-to-Know

contact

the Emergency

Planning

Hotline at: (800) 424-9346

and

or (703)

412-9810; TDD (800) 553-7672, Monday through Friday 9 AM to 6 PM ET OR Visit the CEPPO Homepage on the Internet at http://www.epa.gov.cppo/

Chapter 10

Personal Decontamination

SUMMARY Personnel responsible for performing decontamination operations

should be well trained and knowledgeable about the protocols used by their organization. Improper decontamination, personal hygiene and general work practices can lead to completely preventable exposures to contaminants possibly resulting in serious injury or death. Training should include hands-on application and frequent practice to ensure proficiency. While most decontamination operations will most likely be conducted during accidental releases of hazardous materials and clean-up of characterized contaminated sites, the potential for intentional acts involving the release of toxic industrial chemicals as well as chemical and biological warfare agents, or radiological materials is “real”. This reality means personnel charged with the responsibility for performing decontamination be vigilant about their preparation, particularly regarding mass

emergency

decontamination

operations.

The demands of this low frequency, high consequence operation should not be underestimated.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. Describe the difference between contamination and exposure.

2. Describe the relative uses of Primary/Technical Decontamination, Secondary Decontamination and Emergency Decontamination. 3. Describe the relationship of the Contamination Reduction Corridor to established control zones. 4. Describe the personal hygiene and general good work practices that should be performed by personnel involved in hazardous materials response or clean-up operations. 5. Describe the considerations and issues related to ambulatory and non-ambulatory mass emergency decontamination.

REFERENCES Occupational Safety and Health Guidance Manual, OSHA. 29CFR 1910.120. Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response, Sections L & Q NFPA 471 — Recommended Practices for Responding to Hazardous Materials Incidents NFPA 472 — Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents Riegle Report (MSDS) — Chemical Warfare Agents

239

240

Personal Decontamination

Chapter 10

The Capitol Region Metropolitan Response System — Rapid Access Mass Decontamination Protocol, January 2003 City of Huntington Beach — Mass Emergency Decontamination Plan, February 2003 US EPA First Responder Environmental Liability Due to Mass Decontamination Runoff Alert, July 2000 Decontamination For Hazardous Materials Emergencies, Timothy V. Henry, 1999

Chapter

il

Facility and Equipment Decontamination OVERVIEW

The following chapter is intended to discuss the various technologies and methods used in facility and facility related contents (e.g. equipment) decontamination following contamination from a WMD agent or toxic industrial chemical.

1. Identify chemical warfare agent facility and equipment decontamination methods and technologies. 2. Identify biological warfare agent facility and equipment decontamination methods and technologies. 3. Identify radiological material facility and equipment decontamination methods. 4. Identify new facility and equipment decontamination methods and technologies. 5. Identify various antimicrobial pesticides used for biological agent decontamination. 6. Identify the various application methods used for facility decontamination. 7. Identify US EPA’s role in responding to Anthrax and other WMD related contamination. 8. Identify worker protection issues for personnel involved in facility and equipment decontamination.

9. Identify other factors influencing decontamination strategies.

241

242

Chapter 11

Facility and Equipment Decontamination

of response and cleanup related equipment is discussed in Chapter 10, Personal Decontamination. As with other disciplines related to WMD incident response and management, the processes used for decontamination are under a constant state of development and/or improvement. The following technologies and processes represent some of the most common methods currently in use, Decontamination

while others discussed are only in their developmental stages. The incident

specific

complex

scientific considerations associated with facility and equipment decontamination, combined with the continual evolution of decontamination technologies, mandates that personnel responsible for the selection of facility decontamination various

and

methods have extensive expertise in this specialized discipline.

INTRODUCTION Historically,

decontamination

methods

used

for facilities

and

equipment have been based on chemical and physical methods, or a combination

of both. These methods have focused on the kill and

neutralization

(detoxification)

of chemical

and

biological

agents.

Several past and current methods place little emphasis on the restoration

and re-use of facilities and equipment. Rather, contaminated equipment, and in some instances entire facilities, were considered to be expendable and were expected to be replaced in the event of a chemical or biological weapon

attack. Because of this disposal philosophy, most common

decontamination methods in use are both highly toxic and destructive (corrosive

and/or

oxidizing).

However,

extensive

research

and

development is underway to identify non-toxic and non-destructive

decontamination methods for use in fixed facility and other settings where disposal and replacement is economically impractical. Following the 200 1anthrax incidents in Washington, D.C., New York, and Florida,

several

new

and

innovative

decontamination technologies where deployed. Anthrax contamination in Senator Daschle’s office suite was successfully fumigated with chlorine dioxide. Several other suites and common

areas in the Hart Building and in other Capitol Complex buildings were cleaned using chlorine dioxide liquid, foams and high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter vacuuming.

Chapter 11

Facility and Equipment Decontamination

Hart Senate Office Building

Most chemical warfare agents share chemical characteristics and formulations that provide for specific methods of detoxification. For example, Sarin (GB), Soman (GD), and Tabun (GA) are all phosphorus-containing compounds. Some Mustard agents and V agent (VX) are sulfur-containing compounds. Each of these compounds and

many others can be chemically altered, thus losing their toxicity. In addition, certain biological warfare agents (e.g. spore-forming bacteria, vegetative bacteria, toxins, and various viruses) can also be deactivated

chemically. Radioactive

materials

are

generally

considered

non-destructive

(they cannot be destroyed), other than through their natural degradation. Decontamination

methods

depend on numerous

used

for radioactive

contaminants

factors, such as the type and strength of the

radioactive material, the extent and scope of contamination,

chemical

and physical

speaking,

will

characteristics

decontamination

of the material.

of radioactive

materials

and the

Practically

is generally

accomplished by the physical removal of the source material as well as

any contaminated items or surface materials (if possible). Because

of the variety of dispersal methods

that can be used, chemical and biological warfare agents and radioactive materials may be encountered in several different physical states including bulk,

aerosols, vapors and dusts. Therefore, decontamination methods must in

243

244

Chapter 11

Facility and Equipment Decontamination

themselves offer flexibility or different methods must be used based upon site-specific contamination issues.

CHEMICAL DECONTAMINATION METHODS AND TECHNOLOGIES used for chemical methods decontamination Non-military compounds have focused primarily on toxic industrial chemicals and particular chemical warfare agents. For example, the US Environmental Protection Agency has recommended five decontamination solutions (Solutions A-E) for toxic industrial chemical decontamination. Decontamination of chemical warfare agents has primarily focused on

the nerve agents (e.g. Sarin, Soman, and VX) and on the blistering agents (e.g. Mustard). Recommended methods used in the detoxification

of chemical warfare agents are generally divided into two categories: ¢ Substitution reactions ¢ Oxidation reactions

Certain chemical agents share a similar chemical characteristic in

the fact that they contain phosphorus bonds that can be altered when subjected to nucleophilic substitution.

These agents include the G

(Sarin, Soman, and Tabun) and V (VX) nerve agents. Each of these

agents can be chemically detoxified and/or neutralized if the phosphorus bond is chemically altered by hydrolysis or by oxidation. Blister agents such as Mustard (HD) are chemically distinct from

nerve agents in that they do not have a phosphorus-containing group in their molecular structure. However, carbon-chloride bonds in Mustard

agents are also subject to hydrolysis and the sulfur component can be

oxidized to form sulfone and sulfoxide, thus detoxifying the agent. Mustard does share a similar characteristic with the nerve agents in that they all are only sparingly soluble in water. Hydrolysis (substitution) of chemical agents can be carried out with water, hydroxyl ions or other nucleophiles. Substitution reactions are particularly useful for the detoxification of Sarin (GB) and Soman (GD). Oxidation reaction methods are especially useful for Mustard agents and VX. Potassium permanganate, perborate, peracetic acid, benzoyl peroxide, Oxone and numerous other oxidizing chemicals have been used as oxidants.

Ch apter 11

Facility ili and Equipme i nt Decontamination

Table 11.1 Illustrates the molecular components of chemical warfare agents.

Table 11.1 Molecular Components Of Chemical Warfare Agents

V Agent (VX) H3C

| H3C — CH_ N—H9C—C—S” |

:

‘O-—CH9CH3

H»

Sarin (GB), Soman (GD), and Tabun (GA) are all phosphorus containing compounds. Some Mustard agents and V agent (VX) are sulfur-containing compounds.

In 1917, bleaching powder was widely used by the Germans to neutralize

Mustard

agent.

In the

1950’s

a supertropical

bleach

formulation was standardized which is more stable for long-term storage and easier to use. This formulation hypochlorite

is a mixture of 93%

of supertropical bleach is that it is a very strong oxidizing material and therefore, possibly destructive to certain surfaces and materials. ‘

‘

and 7% sodium hydroxide. Among

calcium

entian

Caintinn

2

the drawbacks

(MSF)

Decontamination Solution 2 (DSZ) Decontamination Solution Number 2 (DS2) was introduced in 1960

as a highly effective decontaminant for chemical weapon agents. DS2 is

245

246

Chapter 11

Facility and Equipment Decontamination

a non-aqueous liquid formulated from 70% diethylenetriamine, 28% ethylene glycol monomethyl ether, and 2% sodium hydroxide. Among the drawbacks of DS2 is that the ethylene glycol monomethy! ether has shown terratogenic effects in mice and propylene glycol monomethy] ether was proposed as a replacement (DS2P). Another drawback of DS2 is that it can be destructive to paints, plastics, and leather materials. This problem may be minimized by limiting contact time to thirty minutes followed by thorough rinsing with large amounts of water. EPA Decontamination Solutions for Toxic Industrial Chemicals

The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recommends five decontamination solutions for cleaning equipment used for the clean up of toxic industrial chemicals (Solutions A-E). These solutions are most applicably

protective

used

for the

clothing worn

decontamination

of tools

and

by entry and decontamination

chemical

personnel

involved in hazardous substance emergency response and cleans up. See Chapter 10, Personal Decontamination, for further discussion on EPA

recommended decontamination solutions.

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENT DECONTAMINATION Prior

to the anthrax

events

of 2001,

the use

of sterilization

techniques and chemicals for decontamination purposes was primarily a

focus for the healthcare industry. Only the military had direct experience using sterilants, such as fumed paraformaldehyde to remove Bacillus anthracis (B. anthracis), the bacterium cause of anthrax disease.

In the most general of terms, all sterilants are disinfectants since disinfectants are substances or techniques that kill biologically active

microbial life. Some microbial life, primarily bacteria, have the ability to enter into a biologically inactive, dormant state, creating spores. Spores can remain capable of becoming biologically active, that is viable, for extended periods of time, possibly for years. The ability of an antimicrobial agent to kill spores elevates the agent to that ofa sterilant. Most

disinfectants

can be used to sterilize if factors, such as

concentration of the agent, duration of exposure to the agent by the microbe (termed contact time), and other environmental factors such as temperature and relative humidity, are controlled.

Chapter 11

Facility and Equipment Decontamination

Biological warfare agents are among some of the most toxic substances known to mankind. While there are literally hundreds of biological warfare agents that could be used by terrorists, these biological agents can be grouped into four general categories: * Spore forming bacterium (e.g. B. anthracis) * Vegetative bacterium (e.g. plague, cholera) * Virus (e.g. smallpox, yellow fever) * Bacterial toxins (e.g. botulism, ricin)

B. anthracis spores magnified under microscope. Copyright - WHO/P. Virot

Decontamination of biological agents is primarily focused on bacterial spores (e.g. B. anthracis) since endospores (commonly referred to as spores) are considered to be among the most difficult of all microorganisms to kill (possible only exceeded by Prions). Spores are considerably more complex than vegetative organisms. The outer

surface of a spore consists of a coating that is typically made up of a

247

248

Chapter 11

Facility and Equipment Decontamination

dense layer of insoluble proteins that are significantly resistant to environmental factors (temperature, moisture, etc.) and many bactericides. Although spores are highly resistant to many common physical and chemical methods, some antibacterial decontamination

agents are also sporicidal (e.g. formaldehyde, peracetic acid, ethylene oxide, hypochlorite). One major drawback of these decontamination agents is that they are all considered toxic to humans and may be damaging to common building and equipment materials. In addition to chemical decontamination agents, non-chemical methods to kill spores and other biological agents exist, including high thermal sources and irradiation (radiation).

In addressing the effectiveness of decontamination methods for treating contaminated (or suspected contaminated) buildings in the fall and winter of 2001/2002, the EPA used a kill factor of greater than Log 6

as an “action level” to cease decontamination activities.

A Log 6 kill

factor means that less than one out of one million surrogate spores survived exposure to the decontamination process. In this process, strips

containing surrogate (substitute) benign spores were placed in treatment areas prior to the decontamination method application, and the strips were examined for growth.

NEW FACILITY AND EQUIPMENT DECONTAMINATION METHODS AND TECHNOLOGIES Extensive research and development, largely funded and supported

by the United States government,

is underway to improve existing

technologies and to develop new methods. In particular, biological agent facility decontamination is a rapidly evolving field, with new methods and technologies

Technology

continually

Innovation

being developed

Office

and

tested.

EPA’s

is leading an effort to collect and

disseminate information about technologies that detect and kill anthrax and other biological agents. Additionally, in 2002 EPA established the Environmental Technology Verification (ETV) Program Building Decontamination

Technology

(BDT)

Center to _ identify decontamination technologies suitable for verification testing.

However,

based

upon

the

EPA’s

past -handling

of facility

decontamination, it is unclear whether the EPA will ever pre-approve products as Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)-registered disinfectants and sterilants for facility biological

Chapter 11

Facility and Equipment Decontamination

decontamination.

Rather,

the EPA

will most

249

likely issue Crisis

Exemptions (CE) in accordance with FIFRA on an incident-specific, as needed (ad hoc) basis. However, some manufacturers have stated they

intend to pursue FIFRA registration, despite the costly process. SNL Decontamination Foam Sandia

National

non-corrosive

Laboratories

aqueous

has

developed

a

non-toxic,

foam

with enhanced physical _ stability characteristics for the rapid neutralization and decontamination of chemical and biological warfare agents. The formulation is advertised to be effective on a broad spectrum of chemical and biological agents. The formulation

allows

decontamination

of areas populated with both

people and sensitive equipment and can be applied via several methods including foams, sprays, mists, and fogs. The technology has been licensed to Modec, Inc. for commercialization and distribution. Antimicrobial Pesticides and Devices

Qualified experts under carefully controlled conditions are currently using

several

Antimicrobial microorganisms

different pesticides

are

substances

pesticides used

and _ devices.

to control

harmful

including bacteria, viruses and fungi on inanimate

objects and surfaces antimicrobial

antimicrobial

primarily

products

have

in indoor

environments.

traditionally

Types

of

included _ sanitizers,

disinfectants, and sterilants.

¢ A “sanitizer” is a substance that significantly reduces the bacterial population in the inanimate environment, but does not destroy or eliminate all bacteria or other microorganisms. - A “disinfectant” is a substance that destroys or eliminates a specific species of infectious or other public health organism,

but not necessarily bacterial spores, in the inanimate environment.

¢ A “sterilant” is a substance that destroys or eliminates all forms of microbial life in the inanimate environment, including all forms of vegetative bacteria, bacterial spores,

fungi, fungi spores, and viruses. Many of these antimicrobial pesticides have been used in anthrax cleanups completed across the county. These pesticides include: ¢ Ethylene Oxide (fumigant)

250

Chapter 11

Facility and Equipment Decontamination

¢ Paraformaldehyde (fumigant) ¢ Vaporized Hydrogen Peroxide (fumigant)

¢ Methyl Bromide (fumigant)

¢ Chlorine Dioxide (fumigant — gas or surface decontaminant liquid) ¢ Bleach with vinegar (surface decontaminant — liquid)

« Hydrogen Peroxide and Peroxyacetic Acid (surface decontaminant — liquid)

DECONTAMINATION APPLICATION METHODS Because of the varied physical properties of biological warfare agents and the possible mechanisms of contamination, no one single

method

of application is suitable for all possible decontamination

situations.

Application

methods

used

for facility

and

equipment

decontamination generally fall into four categories:

¢ Contaminated Space Fumigants ¢ Portable (movable) Property Fumigants ¢ Hard Surface Decontaminants ¢ Physical Removal Decontamination Methods

Contaminated Space Fumigants Contaminated

space

fumigation

involves

the

discharge

of a

disinfectant (sterilant) gas or vapor into the airspace of a sealed building or structure. The first step in the process includes the construction of isolation barriers, usually from polyethylene or similar impermeable material, to contain the contaminant and fumigant inside the structure.

Negative pressure air machines are also used to contain the fumigant and control the movement

of the contaminant within the structure. Air

exhausted out of the structure is first passed through high efficiency particle air (HEPA) filter and chemical scrubbers. Machines producing live steam or cold vapor humidifiers are also used to control temperature

and humidity levels inside the containment area. After achieving the desired atmospheric conditions (temperature and humidity) inside the structure, the fumigant is then discharged and directed, both naturally and mechanically, to permeate as much of the structure airspace as possible, including accessible void spaces and ventilation systems. The structure remains isolated while the fumigant is continually emitted to maintain the proper fumigant concentration.

Chapter 11

Facility and Equipment Decontamination

To evaluate the effectiveness of the fumigant, test strips containing benign surrogate spores believed to be heartier than B. anthracis may be placed throughout the structure. This process allows for the evaluation of variations in spore kills related to the various causes (e.g. air currents, distribution of highly absorbent materials such as cardboard and cloth,

and the condensation of water vapor that prevents the migration of the fumigant).

In addition to spore kill evaluation, multiple monitoring

devices capable of measuring the fumigant concentration, and the ambient humidity and temperature are recommended. Because of the variations mentioned above, and the problems they may create, dividing large facilities

and

spaces

into smaller

areas

and treating them

individually is the most effective method. Upon completion of the treatment, the airspace in the structure may need to be treated with a neutralizing agent (e.g. sodium bisulfite) and ventilated before reoccupation is permitted. Contaminated space fumigation, using chlorine dioxide, was used to

treat the B. anthracis contamination at the Hart Senate Office Building and the United State Postal Service Brentwood facility, in Washington,

De Hard Surface Decontaminants

Hard surface decontaminants include hypochlorite and acetic acid solution, peroxyacetic acid and hydrogen peroxide solution, and

chlorine dioxide. Since these solutions contain water, they tend to dry prior to the completion of the necessary contact time. One approach used to address this problem is the repeated application of the solution to maintaining the solution’s liquid state. Ordinary pressure sprayers have been found to be the best applicator combined with Potassium iodide to indicate moisture levels.

Diluted bleach (0.5% sodium hypochlorite solution or 1:10 dilution of household bleach) is commonly recommended as a readily available hard surface decontaminant. However, this solution as well as others may cause damage to certain surface materials. Table 11.1 below

provides a summary of the applicable surfaces for common hard surface decontaminants.

251

252

Chapter 11

Facility and Equipment Decontamination

Table 11.2 Hard Surface Decontaminant Applications

Decontamination Agent

on

ee

Bal Ge

6

=

&

2 See

S ve >

oO

°

=

os

Ss

=

S

|

D

=|

oO

ee

rat

2

5 Pil =

”

Qa.

= ee

21s &

a

oe

a

ms}

io

|

N

X

X

X

X

X

N

X

X

X

X

N

W?

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

W? | X

X

X

X

X

X

X

W? | X

0

W

|N

S

X

X

P

P

X

N

N

L

0

W

|X

X

X

X

X

X

X

N

N

ae os auto-clave

G

lorn|IN |

IN

|S

|X

IN

IX.

1X

1X.

IGENWe

Irradiation

Rad | R

X

P

P

X

X

P

S

S

S

X

Ultraviolet

Rad | O/R | P

P

P

X

S

S

S

S$

S

|x

G

0

W? | X

|G

0

W? ie

G

R

X

X

Methyl Bromide

G

0

Chlorine Dioxide

L

Chlorine Dioxide

Paraformaldehyde

Ethylene Oxide

X

X

Vaporized Hydrogen Peroxide

Peroxyacetic Acid/ Hydrogen Peroxide

Bleach/Vinegar Hydrogen Peroxide Plasma

Legend Loc = location; O = usable on-site;

R = items must be sent

off-site; Rad = radiation; X = applicable; W =may cause water

damage; S = may affect some types of material; P = poor penetration

capacities; N — not applicable Portable (Movable) Property Fumigation Portable (movable) equipment and other contents may be most

effectively treated by relocation to a suitable decontamination facility. Due to its broad compatibility with numerous items (see Table 11.1 above), Ethylene Oxide (EO) has been used in the sterilization of letters, documents, furnishings, and other non-replaceable items. EO has been used extensively as a sterilant for medical equipment, clothing and bedding. EO sterilization facilities are sealed chambers into which items

Chapter 11

Facility and Equipment Decontamination

253

are placed and EO gas is applied. After completion of treatment, the portable equipment and building contents can be returned to the facility for re-use. Unfortunately, EO is a flammable gas, thus making it unsuitable for large space, facility decontamination. To address the impracticality of transporting movable property to off-site EO treatment facilities, some private remediation companies are considering the feasibility of mobile EO chambers. Mobile chambers could be brought to the contaminated facility where building contents could be loaded and treated. Following treatment, the contents could be placed in portable storage containers (e.g. tractor trailers) for holding and evaluation of decontamination efficacy. Physical Removal Decontamination NVses42] onsa oak-] = =

oo6 fod4

Physical removal methods are generally considered point-source decontamination activities. These activities are usually confined to areas where physical, visual evidence of contamination exists or is strongly suspected. One of the most significant issues related to physical removal of

contaminants,

especially

high-grade

weaponized

anthrax,

is

controlling the secondary aerosolization that can be expected to occur

during physical removal operations. Minor air disturbances are capable of re-suspending or moving contaminants such as airborne spores and very fine particulates. The most common method of physical removal is the use of specially equipped HEPA-filtered vacuums. These types of

vacuums were used as part of the decontamination protocol for several

of the Federal buildings following the 2001 anthrax incidents. Other physical removal methods include wet wiping hard surfaces with appropriate decontamination solutions, use of absorbent pads and wipes, and the collection of loose suspect powders and dusts in wet cloths. Following contaminant collection, the soiled cloths and other cleanup materials should be placed in airtight plastic bags with special care to minimize secondary aerosolization of the agent (suspect material). In addition to use for biological substances,

physical removal

methods may be used to cleanup chemical contamination, and physical removal is the only effective active method of radiological substance decontamination. Physical removal methods that may be used include: ¢ Ionizing radiation (electron beams, X-rays, and Gamma Rays) © Ultraviolet (UV) light/germicidal air cleaning systems ¢

Microwave irradiation

254

Chapter 11

Facility and Equipment Decontamination

e Plasmas

¢ Encapsulation ¢ Ultra high-pressure sterilization (UHP) ¢ Warm or hot air oxidation ¢ Sorbents ¢ High-pressure washing

¢ Sandblasting ¢ Vacuuming ¢

Bulk contaminated debris removal

NTAMINATION METHODS AND As previously

stated,

extensive

research

and

development

is

currently underway by both private and governmental entities to identify and develop improved and all together new decontamination methods and technologies. In addition to programs being conducted by the EPA,

the following is a list of research and development programs currently underway by the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of

Energy (DOE), and the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) in the area of chemical and biological decontamination. men

a8iaoG

Cl AnmictrG whiGMiSiry 2

al

e

¢ Environmentally Friendly Solvents: DoD ¢ Enzyme Decon (Chemical): DoD

Chapter 11

* * * * ¢ * ¢ ¢ * ¢

Facility and Equipment Decontamination

Enzyme Decon (Biological): DoD Solution Chemistry: DoD DF-100/200 (Sandia Foam): DOE Peroxymonosulfate Oxidizers (L—gel): DOE L-gel (Solid Water): DOE Electrostatic Decontamination System (EDS): TSWG Oxidative Formulations DTO: DoD Decon Green: DoD Surfactant Based Decontaminating Solution: DoD Dioxiranes: DoD

Solid Phase Chemistry ¢ Destructive Adsorption: DoD

Gas Phase Chemistry ¢ Reactive Gas Phase Reagents: DOE ¢ Plasma: DoD ¢ Supercritical Carbon Dioxide: DoD

¢ Powered Decontamination Systems (APPJ): DOE

Supporting Technologies e

Mass Decontamination Protocols: TSWG

¢ Decontamination/Restoration Methodology: DOE

EPA'S ROLE IN RESPONDING TO ANTHRAX AND OTHER WMD RELATED CONTAMINATION , EPA provides technical expertise and oversight in detecting anthrax and other WMD agent contamination, as well as ensuring that cleanup

fully protects public health and the environment. Local police, health department officials or hazardous materials teams are usually the first ones on scene in response to incidents that

could involve WMD agents and materials. They do the initial sampling, and if anthrax or other WMD agents are found, more comprehensive sampling is needed to fully assess the severity and extent of contamination.

Private contractors

building to

owners

conduct

are

this

responsible sampling

and

for hiring

qualified

perform

whatever

decontamination is necessary. Due to the extreme hazards potentially associated with exposure to WMD

agents, it is absolutely essential to

255

Chapter 11

Facility and Equipment Decontamination

256

work closely with EPA and other federal, state and local agencies with expertise in sampling, decontamination and protection of workers. EPA is notified through the National Response Center and provides an On Scene Coordinator to ensure that work proceeds appropriately. Under the National Contingency Plan, EPA has the authority to take over this work if the situation exceeds the capability of the owner or state and local responders.

= HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RESPONSE @® ae

Local fire departments, law enforcement, and hazardous materials emergency response teams are usually among the first resources on scene of incidents that could involve WMD agents and materials.

Once technical

the extent expertise

of contamination in developing

a

is assessed,

EPA

provides

site-specific

cleanup

plan.

Decontamination of WMD agents is a rapidly evolving field, with new technologies continually being advanced and tested. It is the EPA’s

responsibility to ensure that antimicrobial pesticides used in biological agent decontamination plans meet all Federal requirements for standards of safety and effectiveness. In developing a strategy for decontamination, EPA consults with a variety of scientific experts, such

as:

* EPA’s Environmental Response Team Scientific Support Coordinators ¢

EPA research laboratories

Chapter 11

Facility and Equipment Decontamination

257

* The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) ¢ The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) * The US Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases * The Defense Advanced Research Project Agency State and local environmental and health officials are also consulted,

and the EPA may request recommendations from national experts in universities and private industry. The cleanup plan reflects the size and type of the potentially contaminated areas (e.g. a large open mailroom or a small office cubicle), how the contamination

was delivered, how contamination

could be dispersed (e.g. through an air handling systems or by ordinary movement within an office), and other characteristics related to daily activities in the area. Since each site is different, each cleanup plan will

be tailored to the unique situation at the site. Once cleanup is completed, a new round of sampling is completed to make sure that the contaminant have been removed or killed and that it is safe to reoccupy the area. In some cases, it may be necessary to use more than one type of treatment or to treat more than one time.

EPA'S REGISTRATION OF PESTICIDES Before a pesticide can be marketed and used in the United States, EPA must evaluate the pesticide to ensure that it meets federal safety standards. EPA grants a registration (or a license) for a public health pesticide product only after the Agency has reviewed efficacy and safety data to ensure that, when used according to the specific instructions on

the label, the product is effective and does not cause any adverse effects on human health or the environment. Such particularly important for antimicrobial pesticides that reduce or eliminate microbial contamination. Under

unreasonable evaluation is are used to

the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), all products that

claim

to be a sanitizer,

registration

number

or

disinfectant,

approval

sterilant,

for

or sporicide

emergency

use

need

from

Antimicrobials Division of the EPA’s Office of Pesticide Program.

a

the

258

Chapter 11

Facility and Equipment Decontamination

FIFRA Section 18 Emergency Exemption and Anthrax

Under Section 18 of FIFRA, EPA “may exempt any federal or state agency from any provision of this Act if the Administrator determines that emergency conditions exist which require such exemption.” Normally, a federal or state agency submits an application for a FIFRA exemption to EPA for review and approval. If EPA approves the request, it issues either a specific or a public health exemption, as appropriate.

However, if the emergency is of such urgency that the federal or state agency

does not have

enough

time to submit

an application

for

exemption and wait for EPA’s approval, then the federal or state agency may issue crisis exemption, which is effective for fifteen days. In order for the crisis exemption to be extended beyond fifteen days, the federal

or state agency must submit an application for exemption to EPA. To handle all anthrax contamination cases as quickly as possible, the EPA has decided to issue all crisis exemptions itself. To obtain a crisis exemption from EPA for the unregistered use of a pesticide against anthrax,

a state or federal

agency

must

submit

a written

request

describing the antimicrobial product(s) to be used; how, when and where they will be used; the data demonstrating efficacy of the product for the intended purpose; and how human health and safety will be protected.

Prior to issuing the exemption, EPA will perform a multi-disciplinary risk assessment of the requested use, relying on data that they have supplied for the pesticide. If during this review, EPA

notes any adverse human health or

environmental

concerns, EPA may deny the exemption request. If,

however, EPA

believes that the proposed use of an antimicrobial

product will be effective and will protect human health and the environment, EPA will issue a crisis exemption. Moreover, if EPA determines that use of the product is needed beyond the fifteen-day use period, EPA will complete an application for a public health exemption on behalf of the requesting entity, which allows the crisis exemption to continue in effect until it is either withdrawn or EPA issues a public health exemption.

Chapter 11

Facility and Equipment Decontamination

WORKER PROTECTION FOR PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN FACILITY AND EQUIPMENT DECONTAMINATION OPERATIONS Facility and equipment decontamination operations are subject to numerous federal, state and local regulations. Among the most important of these regulations is those related to personnel health and safety. 29CFR 1910.120, Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response (commonly referred to as HAZWOPER) provides specific provisions for cleanup operations of and emergency response to hazardous materials and substances. By their inherent nature, facility and equipment decontamination operations can pose significant risks to personnel. The Federal Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) requires that a Health and Safety Plan (HASP) be developed for

any clean up of hazardous materials (including WMD related agents and materials).

Furthermore,

the use of appropriate personal protective

equipment (PPE) and proper procedures are of critical importance to

worker involving

safety.

Personnel

chemical

performing

and biological

decontamination

warfare

operations

agent, toxic industrial

chemicals, or radioactive materials should be properly equipped and

trained in accordance with list competencies. Provided PPE (including protective clothing, respiratory protection, and monitoring equipment) should be appropriate for the site-specific hazards present.

Recommended

Medical Protocols For Antimicrobial Prophylaxis

For Workers Involved in Cleanup and Decontamination of Bacillus

Anthracis According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), personnel involved in cleanup and decontamination of facilities known to be contaminated with B. anthracis spores should receive antimicrobial

prophylaxis in accordance with the CDC’s unofficial guidelines and administered by a qualified physician. The prophylaxis should start in conjunction or prior to the time the worker enters the contaminated location.

At a minimum, the prophylaxis protocol should include a baseline medical assessment, including an assessment of the worker’s medication allergy history. Workers should also receive education regarding recognition of protection breaches, anthrax symptoms, and associated reporting procedures. Provisions should also be made to

259

260

Chapter 11

Facility and Equipment Decontamination

provide periodic re-assessments and follow-up of workers receiving prophylaxis. Re-assessments should include monitoring for adverse medication reactions (side effects) as well as evidence of worker exposure.

OTHER FACTORS INFLUENCING DECONTAMINATION STRATEGIES Detection and Intervention Timelines

The immediate effects of a chemical agent release will most likely be noticeable more quickly than a biological or radioactive substance. Due to the delayed onset of symptoms

associated with exposure

to a

biological material, the affected area may be much larger due to the

migration

of affected

individuals.

Contamination

with radioactive

materials may also result in delayed onset of symptoms, resulting in

contamination spread before it is detected. Contaminated areas resulting from the release of chemical substances will most likely be limited to a distance

of less

than

a few

hundred

yards.

However,

airborne

contamination and contaminated ambulatory victims may further spread contamination resulting in a larger area. Stability and Persistence of the Released Substance The decontamination strategy selected will depend heavily upon the

persistence of the released substance. Although chemical and biological substances properties vary considerably, persistent for long periods

substances are not always

of time. Many

substances

will safely

breakdown rapidly or within a few hours to days when exposed to sunlight or rain. However,

most radiological

substances,

and some

chemical and biological substances, are highly persistent. Additionally, chemical, biological and radiological substances may penetrate into cracks or be absorbed into porous materials that may protect the substance from decontamination efforts. Nature of the Location

Decontamination methods used for urban areas may be different from methods used in rural areas. Isolations of the substance, loss of land

use, exposure to the elements (weathering) should be factors considered when evaluating decontamination options. Additionally, natural

Chapter 11

Facility and Equipment Decontamination

261

weathering wet decontamination methods will be most effective in outdoor settings. Effectiveness of Decontamination |

Decontamination method decisions should take into account the expected benefits of different options and also their likely contribution to the affected population’s return to normal living as soon as possible and practical. Prevent Further Migration of

C3antaminant Mamnant

Decontamination operations should be conducted within established control

zones

contamination.

or

perimeter

to

prevent

the

further

spread

All access and egress from the contaminated

of

sight

should be restricted and strictly enforced. The contaminated area should be sealed off as soon

as possible and runoff material contained.

Contaminated animals and livestock may also need to be considered to

prevent the spread of hazardous substances.

Contaminated animals and livestock may also need to be considered to prevent the spread of hazardous substances. Photo taken by Greg Mathieson

Environmental monitoring should be conducted to “map out” the area(s) with contamination. Initial sampling should initially focus on the establishment of a safe perimeter. Once the site is secured, subsequent monitoring can be conducted to determine specific locations and amounts of contamination.

262

Facility and Equipment Decontamination

Chapter 11

Determine Target Clearance Levels The decontamination

strategy employed

will be influenced by

knowledge of the risk to public health from the released substance, what levels of residual contamination may safely be permitted to remain (“safe clearance

levels”) and the availability of suitable detection

equipment capable of monitoring above and below the determined safe level. Due to the relatively limited technical data available, federal, state

and local health officials should be consulted

in determining

safe

clearance levels.

Waste Transportation and Disposal Waste

management

planning should be an integral part of the

decontamination strategy and plan. WMD decontamination may involve

demolishing highly contaminated structures, pressure washing lightly contaminated

surfaces,

sandblasting,

replacing

road

surfaces

and

sweeping and vacuuming streets. These actions, and others related to facility decontamination, will result in large volumes of contaminated

aqueous solutions and solid wastes. Emergency and Primary/Technical decontamination

operations

performed

by

emergency

response

personnel will also produce large volumes of contaminated wastes, including

contaminated

water

and

bagged

clothing,

and residual

decontamination solutions.

Early coordination with federal, state, and local regulatory agencies as well as private waste management companies will be of vital importance. All waste should be transported and disposed in accordance with applicable federal, state and local regulations.

Chapter 11

Facility and Equipment Decontamination

263

SUMMARY There are numerous methods and associate considerations related to facility and equipment decontamination. The vast amount of technical information, combined with continued evolution of the field and the

significant

health

decontamination

and

safety consequences operations, requires serious

associated

with

consideration by technically qualified personnel with specific expertise. This chapter is intended to provide a comprehensive introduction to facility and equipment decontamination practices. However, with the increased emphasis

on

chemical

and

biological

agent

decontamination,

particularly in the non-military setting, new methods and technologies will surely emerge. Of critical importance to persons involved in WMD response and management is that the overall event management must be,

by its nature, a team effort. The criticality of necessary decisions requires

that individuals

from

a wide

variety of disciplines

and

backgrounds be actively engaged to achieve the most desirable outcome.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. Describe two chemical warfare agent decontamination methods and two currently available chemical agent decontamination solutions, including their specific uses. 2. Describe the different types of microorganisms which could be used as biological agents and which type is among the most difficult to kill. 3. Describe the three types of antimicrobial pesticides used for biological agent decontamination. 4. Describe the various application methods used for facility and equipment decontamination. 5. Describe US EPA’s role in responding to Anthrax and other WMD related contamination. 6. Describe worker protection issues for personnel involved in facility and equipment decontamination. 7. Discuss three other factors influencing decontamination strategies.

264

Facility and Equipment Decontamination

Chapter 11

REFERENCES Technical Report, Formulations for the Decontamination and Mitigation of CB Warfare Agents, Toxic Hazardous Materials, Viruses, Bacteria and

Bacterial Spores, Modec, Inc. February 2001

Hazardous Materials For First Responders, Second Edition, IFSTA

Technical Report, Integrated Chemical and Biological Defense Research, Development and Acquisition Plan, Chemical & Biological Point Decontamination Information Systems. April 2003 Biological Agent Decontamination, A New Issue for Business, But One

that Must Be Addressed. William Perry

j

CDC Guidelines for State Health Departments — How to Handle Anthrax and Other Biological Agent Threats. October 2001

LawTech Custom Publishing specializes in criminal justice textbooks for colleges and public safety training. To order, or for adoption review copy, contact us at: (949/498-4815, ext. 19 Fax: (949)498-4858 email: [email protected] www.LawTechCustomPublishing.com