Building Peace in the Middle East: Challenges for States and Civil Society 9781685852924

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BUILDING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Published in association with the International Peace Research Association

BUILDING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST Challenges for States and Civil Society edited by

ELISE BOULDING

LYNNE RIENNER PUBLISHERS • BOULDER & LONDON

Published in the United States of America by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 1994 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved ISBN 978-1-55587-436-0 (hardcover : alk. paper) Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.

This book is lovingly dedicated to Kenneth Boulding, 1910-1993, my companion, guide, and teacher for fifty-two years and a founder of the International Peace Research Association

Contents

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Acknowledgments Peace Building: Regional Processes in a Global Context Elise Boulding Part 1 The Commission Document on Peace Building in the Middle East

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Part2 Democracy and Social Development

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1 Democratization in the Middle East from an Islamic Perspective Charles Amjad-ali 2 The Democratization Process in the Arab-Islamic States of the Middle East Sanaa Osseiran 3 Gender Issues in Democracy: The Palestinian Woman and the Revolution HananAwwad 4 Gender Issues in Democracy: Rethinking Middle East Peace and Security from a Feminist Perspective Simona Sharoni 5 The Arab World After the Gulf War: Challenges and Prospects Emile A. Nakhleh Part3 Diplomatic Paths to Conflict Management

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Peace-Building Initiatives from the Middle East Mohamed Sid-Ahmed

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69 79

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7 Turkey in Its Regional Environment in the Postbipolar Era: Opportunities and Constraints PeriPamir 8 The Kurdish Question: Conflict Resolution Strategies at the Regional Level Omar Sheikhmous 9 The Maghreb and the Gulf War Adelwahab Biad 10 The Roots of U.S. Middle East Policy and the Need for Alternatives Stephen Zunes Part4 Alternative Security Strategies

133 147 163 173

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11 World Order Conceptions and the Peace Process

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in the Middle East Richard Falk Strategic Balance and Disarmament in the Middle East Ali E. Hilla/ Dessouki Environmental Impacts of Military Defense Policies: Strategies for the Future Frank Barnaby Collective Security Under Subregional Arrangements: A Cooperative Approach Michael Harbottle The Role of the United Nations in the Middle East Juergen Dedring PartS Strategies for Economic Development

16 Development and Islamic Values Sallama Shaker 17 Middle East Oil Resource Policies Dorothea H. El Mallakh 18 Regional Cooperation in Water Resource Management Maher F. Abu-Taleb 19 Conflict and Cooperation in Resource Development Miriam R. Lowi Part6 Creating a Culture of Peace

189 197 205 213 223

235 237 241 251 265

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20 Educating for Peace in the Mediterranean: A Strategy for Peace Building James Calleja

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21 One Very Simple Idea: A Possible Israeli Contribution 22 23 24 25

to a Lasting Middle East Peace Israel W. Charny Core Values for Peacemaking in Islam: The Prophet's Practice as Paradigm Chaiwat Satha-Anand Interfaith Relations: Old Wars and New Dialogue Landrum R. Bolling Working for Peace in the Middle East: The Educational Task HaimGordon Hope for the Twenty-First Century: NGOs and People's Networks in the Middle East Elise Boulding

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The Contributors Index About the Book

331 335 347

295 303 311

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Acknowledgments

Many people have helped make this book possible: First and foremost, the members of the IPRA Commission on Peace Building in the Middle East, whose names are listed at the end of Part 1, and the consultants who prepared the background papers that were so important to the project, many of which make up Part 2 of this book. (Their names are also listed at the end of Part 1.) I am particularly grateful to those who struggled with me on the drafting of the Commission Document (Part 1): Peri Pamir, who prepared our very first position paper; Hassan Nejad, who prepared the first draft of Part 1; and Paul Smoker, Saul Mendlovitz, Louis Kriesberg, and Richard Falk, who labored over conceptualizations and revisions. The work of Ellen Wild in circulating papers and materials for the Kyoto Meeting of the Commission in July 1992 and the highly concentrated, intense work of the Commission and its consultants in Kyoto were all of critical importance in giving shape to this book. Maria Krenz contributed outstanding editorial work, DeLinda Wunder brought speed and accuracy to the typing of the final manuscript, and Marty Gonzales organized the logistics of the whole operation with incredible and cheerful efficiency. We are grateful to Lynne Rienner for her personal interest in and support for the book, and we also wish to acknowledge her staff. Neither the project nor the book would have been possible without the generous support of the ARCA, the MacArthur and Needmor Foundations, and the United States Institute of Peace. Finally, I want to acknowledge the loving support of Kenneth Boulding, my husband and teacher for fifty-two years, throughout the months of his last illness. He never begrudged the time I spent away from his bedside in order to bring the book to completion. Although his name does not formally appear in the book, in a profound sense this volume is one of the many fruits of his lifelong dedication to peace research.

-Elise Boulding xi

Peace Building: Regional Processes in a Global Context ELISE BOULDING

The fast-paced events of the past three years have made it difficult to generate fresh strategies for managing immediate crises in the Middle East, let alone to shape new approaches to peace building and new visions of future possibilities. Nevertheless, the latter is the challenge the Commission on Peace Building in the Middle East of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA) took up when it was created in January 1991 in response to the Gulf War. The Commission has sought to assemble the serious thinking about peace building of peace researchers from various world regions while at the same time giving a central role to scholars from the Middle East itself. Because scholars have differing analyses of the dynamics of the conflicts involved and of the dynamics of their resolution, different voices will be heard in this book, but those varied voices all contribute to what can be considered a broad consensus on long-term possibilities for peace. The contribution the book has to make, in both the Commission Document presented in Part 1 and the background papers in Part 2, does not lie in specific strategies-which in any case would have been rendered obsolete by publication time-but in calling attention to new pathways, new channels of social and political action. What is happening in the Middle East has a global context, as every peace researcher is keenly aware. Memories of the rise of ancient empires, of the fresh new life that came to an ancient world with the birth of Islam (the third Religion of the Book for this axis mundi), and the ebbing of that freshness just as Western colonial adventures-starting with the Crusades -inaugurated a long struggle for hegemony, all contribute to the intensity of the present situation. The Middle East is seeking its own path based on its own traditions at a time when the unparalleled power of the West to dominate other lifeways through its industrial and social inventiveness, economic strength, and sheer physical capability to mine the earth and its people for its own purposes is waning. Israel, belonging to both worlds, has suffered all the contradictions of that reality. The great bitterness that

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indiscriminately exercised Western power and influence have aroused in many of the peoples of the Middle East distorts their own strengths and has given rise to the extremisms we are now witnessing. As the old bipolar power alignments are breaking up and formerly suppressed peoples seek new autonomies, bitterness is rampant on every continent. Extremism is no one's monopoly now, nor is terrorism. The countries of the Middle East, already occupied with their own internal and regional power struggles as well as with conflicts with the West, are competing for allies in the Balkans and wooing newly independent states no longer tied to the old Soviet Union. That the European Community, once seen as a potential partner for peace-building projects in the Middle East, is now paralyzed by indecision in the face of an avalanche of new-old ethnic conflicts, darkens the picture we had hoped to paint for the future. Yet precisely that helplessness of Europe and puzzlement of the United States over the role it should now play contain the seeds of hope. Old statist solutions are clearly not working. It is time for a new look at the role of people's associations, particularly the transnational ones, a little-recognized new set of civic resources that will come into their own in the twenty-first century. These INGOs (international nongovernmental organizations}-frequently referred to throughout this book and briefly looked at in the last chapter as a source of hope and new energies for the future-work in flexible ways through their own channels, while also providing key peace-making and peace-building capacities for states and for the United Nations itself. The twenty-first century will see new configurations of nongovernmental, intergovernmental and UN structures, which in this critical last decade of the twentieth century are beginning to come into their own. Readers seeking bold new ideas and fresh metaphors for dealing with stale problems may be disappointed that the IPRA Commission has not strayed as far from the recognized terrain of international studies as it might have. It has been hard to prick the social imagination of the peace research community, East or West, North or South, sufficiently to come up with a brave new world. Perhaps that is because, scholar-activists that we are, too much of our creative energy has been spent trying to mend the old world. Yet the seeds for the new are here if the reader will patiently look for them, both in Part 1, the Commission Document, and in Part 2, the background papers. Part 2 presents an examination of democracy and social development in the Middle East from the perspectives of a Pakistani Islamic scholar, a Lebanese social scientist/journalist, a Palestinian activist and an Israeli activist (both of them feminists), and an Arab-American political scientist. Both the need to seek the roots of creative further development in Islam itself and the need for radical change in many existing social and political

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practices, such as the exclusion of women from public life, come out clearly in these chapters. In Part 3, Diplomatic Paths to Conflict Management, scholars from Egypt, Turkey, Algeria, and the United States, as well as one expatriate Kurd, give a series of penetrating analyses of how diplomacy might be utilized to leverage far-reaching change in the longer run. Part 4, Alternative Security Strategies, cuts a very wide swath indeed. A leading U.S. world order scholar, an Egyptian political scientist, two defense experts from the United Kingdom, one a brigadier general, and a senior member of the UN professional staff consider from their various perspectives paths to security: paths that go beyond primary reliance on arms to create the conditions for human security-political, social, and environmental. The achievement of economic security is a special problem in the Middle East, given the scarcity of water, the abundance of oil, and the extremes of poverty and wealth in the region. In Part 5, on strategies for economic development, scholars with ties to Jordan and Morocco, as well as several Arab-Americans address the knotty issue of how there can be cooperation in sharing the scarce resources of water as well as the abundant resources of oil across the chasms of mistrust, greed, and foreign intervention that are hardly unique to the Middle East but create particularly urgent challenges there. Finally we turn to Part 6, Creating a Culture of Peace-that long-term process that will extend well into the twenty-first century. A Maltese peace educator with extensive networking experience in the Mediterranean, an Israeli social psychologist specialist on the holocaust, an American-Israeli who has worked in some of the violent areas of the occupied territories, a Thai professor of peace studies and Islamic scholar, and a U.S. Quaker cofounder of the Interfaith Academy in Tantur, Israel, all look at the hard question of how values of peaceableness and skills of peace making and peace building can be developed in the midst of situations made intractable by long-continuing violence. The Commission's project director offers a closing glimpse of the potentialities of the civil society in the countries of the Middle East by providing an overview of existing international nongovernmental and intergovernmental structures and networks, both regional and international. It is suggested that by giving more attention to these largely ignored structures, particularly the nongovernmental ones, the possibilities for breaking the bonds of traditional statist behavior and liberating civic creativity to work at the shaping of peaceful futures in the Middle East and the world to which it is so inextricably linked begin to emergeoffering a more hopeful future than doomsayers currently predict.

The Commission Document on Peace Building in the Middle East

The hope of the peace research community is to contribute to a new level of dialogue about the future of the Middle East with our colleagues from the region as well as with the many interested parties concerned with the region. The Gulf War has presented a special challenge to the body of knowledge developed by the interdisciplinary field of peace studies. This war, ignited so abruptly in an area long identified as an international tinderbox, represented an application of outmoded national-security paradigms and principles that rest on the immediate exercise of superior military force. The results have been generally catastrophic, although the restoration of Kuwait's sovereign rights was an important achievement of the UN response. We are speaking as concerned human beings who also happen to be scholars. While taking account of the negatives in the current situation, we have nevertheless, as peace researchers, tried to cut through the barrier of pessimism blocking the opportunities that lie in the hands of the men and women of the civil society of the Arab/Middle East world, as well as in the hands of its more far-seeing policy officials. We wish to help release the regional energies for change so long hampered in their expression, and to support the curbing of global interventionary strategies. This document is offered most particularly to the civil society of the Middle East-the peoples' organizations-as well as to the UN itself, to national governments, and to regional intergovernmental organizations prepared to take a fresh look at strategies for the future. Each has a part to play in ensuring a more peaceful Middle East. The Gulf War represents the nadir of the old international political order. The use of state force and direct violence have reached their limits as guarantors of security, and the nature of power and territoriality are undergoing redefinition. Although the world's current turmoil makes this seem unlikely from the perspective of this decade, the next century may well see the decline of the territorially based warrior state system and the rise of what some foresee as a high-entropy world with a diversity of

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actors, overlapping types of social affiliations and identities, and reconstituted political arrangements for dealing with sovereignty issues. 1 The outlines of such a world are far from clear. Living with uncertainty will be difficult for everyone, particularly for those who identify with the statist orientation of the old world order. How will the civil society and the new groupings it generates interact with older institutions in this era of transition in human development? Using the vocabulary of common security, we explore some possibilities that may lie ahead. Rejecting simplistic traditional formulations of peace as the absence of war, we envision a future Middle East characterized by stability, justice, and a flowering of forward-looking human and social development rooted in the ancient civilizations of the region-a Middle East that will offer creative leadership to the evolving world of the twenty-first century. "We" is the International Peace Research Association, a body representing peace researchers in more than seventy-five countries, which in late January 1991 appointed a twenty-five-person Commission on War Termination and Peace Building in the Middle East (the War Termination part of the title being dropped at the war's end). The Commission's goal has been to visualize and formulate scenarios for peace building in the region. This has involved exploring new social and structural arrangements, strongly related to ideas originating among men and women scholars and thinkers in the Middle East, as well as being informed by perspectives, practices, and experiences of other regions. The context of the exploration is the concept of world order characterized by the rule of law and principles of equity, justice, and human rights, and their practice in terms of the physical, social, and spiritual well-being of individual human beingswomen, men, and children of every race, ethnicity, culture, and religion. While the focus is on optimal possible achievement levels for peace building, minimal possibilities are also considered. A group with goals such as those of the IPRA Commission faces almost overwhelming challenges in addressing Middle East issues because of the region's long historic experience of extra-regional penetration and dominance that has manipulated regional forces in many diverse and destructive ways, including divide-and-rule strategies with respect to ethnic tensions and efforts to undermine impulses toward regional self-assertion. This legacy-and its continuing reality as expressed during the Gulf War and beyond-produces something of a hypersensitive political consciousness in the region, leading to various abdications of responsibility by regional forces and at the same time wariness of any ideas externally generated. The question of Israel and its relationship with its neighbors looms large. A regional peace process must include both a decisive move toward regional autonomy and an assumption by all regional actors of greater social and political responsibility.

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Another way in which the extraregional penetration has contributed to a dynamic of global dependence and regional impotence is in relation to oil. The global system has been unable to allow democratic forces to operate in the region if they imperil access to Gulf oil reserves. This concern will remain fixed and salient in the years ahead. As energy dependence shifts and as the reserves in the Gulf are depleted, the extent of global preoccupation with the region is likely to diminish. The more basic problem of water scarcity, not yet adequately dealt with, remains to be faced. Finally, the historic dependence on passage through the region for lucrative and exotic trade was crucial to European economic expansion. The challenges to that expansion posed by Islam were beaten back as part of the cultural-religious resolve of the West to dominate the global order. The memories and resonances of all these interventions remain, and it behooves any group of scholars, no matter how well meaning and no matter how internationally or regionally representative, to approach the future of the Middle East with great humility. Has the peace research community developed concepts, models, and practices that may be of use in present and future conflicts? The present report attempts to apply what we know, drawing, for example, on cataclysmic theories of conflicts, initially developed from arms race studies; on "graduated reciprocation in tension reduction" (GRIT) and the concept of confidence building; on various models of zones of peace and nonoffensive defense strategies; on studies of alternative security, or comprehensive security, including people's security and common security in their ecological, socioeconomic, and spiritual dimensions; and on our understandings of structural violence, including its gender, race, and class dimensions. The Commission also takes account of work in reconciliation processes, reduction of enemy images, second-track diplomacy, and conflict resolution practices. More recent work on the reconstitution of sovereignty is also included, as are studies of alternative, earth-nurturing development now seen as closely linked with peace and disarmament processes. All this is closely related to democratization, a long-term process of working in solidarity with and providing support for those people and social movements in the Middle East that have been struggling to participate more fully in shaping their own societies. Peace-building strategies require that particular attention be paid to the ways in which national, regional, global, and people's organizations interact, including those not currently represented by state structures, such as the Palestinians and the Kurds. The possibilities presented here draw on a series of background papers prepared by men and women of professional competence (from the Middle East and elsewhere) in the fields of politics, economics, resource development, religion, culture, international relations, military affairs, and international law. Also included are the new fields of women studies, ethnic studies, and urban and environmental studies.

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An initial version of the present document was scrutinized and intensely debated at a workshop that preceded the Fourteenth Biennial Conference of the International Peace Research Association in Kyoto, Japan, in July 1992. It has since been reworked in response to those discussions. Our approach, eclectic and interdisciplinary, looks at the historical context of present developments as a background for focusing on the lived life of highly diversified groups and societies struggling to deal productively with a tangle of conflicts. The aim is peace building as well as peace making and peace keeping in a Middle East seen as a complex of cultures and civilizations rather than simply a constellation of sovereign states. Thus, the document may be considered to supplement the numerous other ongoing projects on the Middle East, as a source of additional concepts and strategies for policymakers and civil society activists.

THE MIDDLE EAST: A CULTURE AREA CHARACTERIZED BY GREAT DIVERSITY How It Came to Be Called the Middle East The label "Middle East" is a Western invention and reflects the West's changing perceptions of and commercial and strategic interests in this part of the world. The various labels used in different historical eras also reflect the scope and stages of Western domination over this region. During the thirteenth century, Italian merchants used the term "Levant" (the "rising" of the sun) to refer to the lands and communities located immediately east of the Mediterranean Sea-lands where these merchants had established profitable commercial ties. As other Europeans began trading with these communities, they too began using the term as a convenient way to define a newly discovered non-European area. After the Ottoman conquest of a large expanse of territory in the sixteenth century and the concomitant increase in commercial ties between the Ottoman Empire and Europe, Europeans found the term "Levant" too limited in its application. Thus a new term, "East," was coined to designate all of the Ottoman territory east and southeast of the Balkan Peninsula, including the peninsula itself and the Levant. As European involvement extended to India and China in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a new designation seemed imperative. With strong commercial and colonial relations between the French and British on the one hand, and Persia, India, and China on the other, the Ottoman possessions east of the Balkans were called the "Near East," whereas India and its surrounding territories were designated as simply the "East." The Near East also included Persia. By the same token, the lands farthest away from Europe and east of the Indian subcontinent were referred to as the "Far East."

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"Middle East" as a term referring to an undefined area around the Persian/Arabian Gulf first came into use about 1902. In the late 1930s the British government placed its military forces in the area, extending from the Indian subcontinent to the central Mediterranean, under a "Middle East Command," and during World War II used the designation "Middle East" to refer to all the Asian and North African lands west of India. U.S. military and security forces soon adopted and applied the new designation. After the World War, Western scholars, journalists, political leaders, and international organizations showed a growing preference for the term "Middle East," but except for its Fertile Crescent core, no precise definition of either the geographic limits or the populations of this area has been provided. Some Westerners include the area extending from Iran to Egypt and from Turkey to the Sudan, Yemen, and Oman. Others have added Afghanistan to this but have labeled it "Southwest Asia." Some have included half of Libya, whereas others have included all of Libya, and a few have included all of North Africa except Algeria. Seldom have Pakistan, Somalia, Djibouti, or Cyprus been included.2 From the very beginning, Western perceptions of the Middle East were based on concrete economic and military interests. Thus, commercial and military objectives gave rise to the view of the region as the "crossroads of the world," and a bridge between three continents. The industrializing West wanted raw materials, foodstuffs, and markets as well as control over sea-lanes and land routes. Such strategic locations as the Persian Gulf, Suez Canal, Gulf of Aqaba, the Bosphorous, and the Dardanelles "had" to be colonized or controlled to ensure military superiority and dictate the terms of international trade. The West was attracted to the Middle East for another reason: here were the birthplaces of Judaism and Christianity-the foundation of its cultural, ethical, moral, and legal systems-as well as that of Islam. The West had little interest in understanding Islam or the Muslim populations of the region. Pilgrims, tourists, archaeologists, missionaries, anthropologists, merchants, special envoys, regular diplomats, and military forces, each came for their own purposes, ranging from curiosity to the desire for conquest. Very few came to learn and to understand the cultures, peoples, and history of the area. Discovery of oil in the first decade of this century and the dependency of the industrial nations on petroleum resources significantly increased the economic and strategic importance of the region. The West would seek all means to prevent the control of more than 60 percent of the world's known petroleum reserves from falling into the hands of the peoples for whom the oil fields were home. The defeat and demise of the Ottoman Empire at the conclusion of World War I gave the West the power and opportunity to remake theregion on the Westphalian pattern of the "nation-state." Through secret and contradictory agreements during, and open covenants and treaties after, the

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war, the West divided and combined tribes, subcultures, and religioethnic communities into separate political entities on a model alien to the region. The role of the West in structuring and dominating the emergent statecentric Middle East has produced anomalies, dilemmas, and paradoxes. Inhabitants of the region, who for centuries had fluid patterns of interdependence among nomads, farmers, urban dwellers, and imperial authorities, are now citizens of states that rigidly adhere to sovereignty, national interest, and independence. This has caused many interstate wars and influenced the weakening or the demise of several regional organizations established since the introduction of the nation-state system in the area. Earlier patterns of sharing the region's scarce resources among various traditional entities have given way to each state putting its own power and prosperity ahead of concerns for the well-being of the whole. Competition among outside powers for selling arms, for expanding markets, for controlling the sources and supply routes of oil, and for buying the loyalty of kings, presidents, emirs, generals, and bureaucrats has been a major cause of violence, distrust, and instability in the region. European initiatives in facilitating the creation of a Jewish homeland that became the state of Israel have remained a challenge to positive Middle East-West relations. There is no question that the role of the West has been divisive and conflictual for the Middle East, but it must also be recognized that the Arab-Muslim empires of the Middle East have their own history of conquest and expansion both by the sword and through penetration by way of trade. Arabs were early entrepreneurs in the African slave trade. Although Islamic doctrine and jurisprudence inculcate respect for all races and beliefs, practice is another story, as has also been true for Christianity and Judaism. Clan and tribal warfare further complicate the picture, but must also be seen in the context of a longing for an all-embracing Arab-Islamic community, or umma, a longing greatly strengthened by the desire for independence from Western influence.

Defining the Middle East in Its Own Terms Despite its vague meaning, ambiguous usage, and Eurocentric origin, we do not propose abandoning the term Middle East. It is now universally accepted, even by the peoples who had little to do with establishing the nomenclature. Such terms as "al shargh al-usat," "khavare miyaneh," "orta dogu," and "ha mizrahk a tikhon" represent, respectively, Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Hebrew equivalents of the Western-invented labeL We view the Middle East as a fabric of civilizations and cultures that have created the distinctive patterns of interaction over the centuries that make it possible to think of the Middle East as a unique region among world regions. This approach helps us to identify the Middle East not only in its geographical boundaries and populations but also in its diverse

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values, institutions, experiences, and heritages. It helps us to understand not only the sources and causes of conflict and disunity but also those factors that can produce unity. The Judaic/Coptic Christian/Arab-Islamic/North African civilizational traditions are interwoven with the traditions of many nomadic and other tribal peoples spread across plains, mountains, river valleys, and deserts in a complex linkage system we call the Middle East. The cultural pluralism that underlies the more visible Arab-Islamic civilization is what gives the region its distinctiveness. The area includes millions of non-Muslims (Jews, Christians, Baha'is, Hindus, Zoroastrians, animists, etc.). The Arab-Islamic civilization, as one part of the complex, is spread far beyond the Middle East. It has made a significant and growing impact on the cultures of sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and parts of southern and central Europe. This has led to the emergence of what is sometimes called the "Islamic world." Countries with strong Arab-Islamic cultural influence include Bangladesh, Benin, Brunei, Burkino Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Gabon, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Uganda. It is therefore not surprising that in the core geographically contiguous area defined here as the Middle East, the culture of Islam plays a special role in the lives of all the inhabitants, regardless of their own religion and cultural tradition.

Who Belongs to the Middle East: The Pulls of History The above discussion should not be read as assuming that there is a clearly bounded territory that is the Middle East. Many of the peoples and countries in the area also belong to geographic, linguistic, cultural, ethnic, political, occupational, and religious communities that extend beyond the region. These overlapping areas, entities, identifications, and affiliations include Mediterranean, Jewish, Islamic, European, African, petroleum-exporting countries, Roman Catholic, social-democratic, medical, and academic. The listed countries, then, are ones in which the Arab-Islamic culture is very strong; however, it varies in preeminence, and other identities and entities have greater significance in some countries or parts of countries. Furthermore, there are peoples and organizations within the Middle East who believe that they are oppressed and excluded by the Arab-Islamic culture, which dominates the region. It should also be noted that in another sense the reach of the Middle East is worldwide; there are cultural and political communities as far away as the Philippines, for example, that identify with the cultures of the Middle East. With this caveat, we are here designating the Middle East to encompass a larger area than is usually implied by the term. The Middle East will be considered to include all of North Africa, the northeast and eastern Mediterranean, the Arabian peninsula, the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman,

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the Red Sea and Arabian Sea regions, and Central Asia and Azerbaijan. As such, it warily includes the following countries: Afghanistan Algeria Armenia Azerbaijan Bahrain Cyprus Djibouti Egypt Iran Iraq Israel

Jordan Kazakhistan Kirkizistan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Mauritania Morocco Oman Pakistan Qatar

Saudi Arabia Somalia Sudan Syria Tajikistan Turkey Turkmenistan Tunisia United Arab Emirates Uzbekistan Yemen

To this list of independent states one must add Palestine and Western Sahara. Palestine is a member of the Arab League and the Islamic Conference Organization, has been recognized by more than ninety countries, and has a population of more than four million, half living in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Western Sahara, the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), has a population of about two hundred thousand. Although it has been functioning as an independent state since the early 1980s, is a member of the Organization of African Unity, and is recognized by more than seventy-five countries, the recent collapse of plans for a UN-supervised referendum makes unclear what its relation will be to Morocco, which claims Western Sahara as part of its territory. The Iraqi Kurds have also declared in October 1992 the existence of an independent Kurdistan, suggesting the emergence of an additional state in the region. The Middle East region thus may be considered as consisting of thirty-three independent states and one or more states in the making. (Describing the area in terms of the number of independent states it encompasses is simply to demonstrate its geographic expanse, not to advocate a state-centric analysis.) The region consists of more than five hundred million inhabitants--close to 10 percent of the world's population. The actual states of the Middle East with which we will be concerned in the recommendations represent a smaller segment of this larger area, but we feel that it is important to indicate the larger context in which the peace-building activities we identify will need to be carried out. The Arab conquest of Kharazm in the eighth century began the integration of Central Asia into the region treated here as the Middle East. Even though direct Arab rule came to an end early in the ninth century, Arab-Islamic culture left a strong imprint on this area, and in the ninth century Kharazm became home to one of the early Islamic states, that of the Samanids.

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The legacy of Arab-Islamic civilization in Central Asia has survived two centuries of Russian and Soviet domination. After the disintegration of the Soviet empire, the five republics immediately joined the Islamic Conference Organization (OIC), sent observers to the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), and established close economic, financial, and political links elsewhere in the Middle East. A series of incursions by Arabs and Central Asian Turks brought Arab-Islamic culture and civilization to Afghanistan and the Indian subcontinent, including today's Pakistan, to be followed by successive waves of Turks, from the Ghaznavids in the early tenth century to Timur the Lame in the late fourteenth century. Through religion, economies, language, politics, migration, and traditions, the antecedents of both Afghanistan and Pakistan have been an interactive part of the Middle East for fourteen centuries, a fact ignored by most students of the Middle East. Pakistan was one of the constituent members of the Baghdad Pact and is currently a member of the ECO along with Iran and Turkey. Pakistani nationals comprise a large percentage of immigrants or foreign workers in the Gulf region. Pakistani religious scholars and intellectuals often lead Islamic ideological and theological discourses inside as well as outside the region. Since Afghanistan's secession from the Persian empire in the mideighteenth century, Afghanistan's dominant language has been Farsi, and even the communist regime (1978-1992) recognized Islam in its constitution as the "state religion." The Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, Tunisia, Western Sahara, and Libya) is not a periphery but an integral part of the Middle East culture complex. Adding to the Judaic and Christian lifeways already present in the area, early Islam brought into the Maghreb a new language and a new legal, administrative, and commercial system. Later French occupation of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, as well as Italian occupation of Libya, did not in a major way influence the unique cultural identity the region had developed in previous centuries. All four states have made significant contributions to the culture of the region through such figures as the great historian Ibn Khaldun and through efforts to bring into Islamic thought some of the new developments from post-Enlightenment Europe. As members of the Arab League and members of the Islamic Conference Organization as well as founders of the Arab Maghreb Union, the Maghreb countries are directly affected by events in the rest of the region, and sometimes they themselves are the precipitators of change that affects the entire area. Egypt plays an important role in the region as one of the oldest and most powerful civilizations, commanding trade routes to all the known world, housing early universities, and nurturing the intellectual and spiritual traditions of Coptic Christians and of Jews from the days when it was

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a province of the Roman Empire. Once Egypt became a part of the Arab caliphate it continued to give positions of leadership to Coptic Christians and Jews, as did all Arab-Islamic societies right through the centuries of the Ottoman Empire. Jewish Middle East identity is rooted in the historical memory of the short-lived Hebrew Kingdom of 1000 B.C.E., which was ended by a series of conquests and dispersions. According to Arab sources, it was the Kurdish Muslim ruler Salah el-Deen who brought the Jews back to Palestine after driving the Crusaders out of Jerusalem. The nineteenth century saw a number of Jewish settler movements from Europe, undertaken by permission of the Ottoman sultanate. The older Jewish-Oriental culture survived as one of several indigenous cultures of the region, making mutual cultural enrichment with surrounding groups possible; Jewish pilgrimages from the Diaspora to the Holy Land were continuous over the centuries. Efforts to establish separate states for Jews and Palestinian Arabs in the 1930s and 1940s ended in failure, as did the UN attempt at partition to enable contiguous homelands in the former British Mandate of Palestine. The subsequent founding of a separate Israel with strong European support led to a series of Arab-Israeli wars and bitter conflict continuing to this day. It is clear that in spite of the historical predominance of Islamic culture in the region, the Middle East, in fact, includes a vast number of ethnic, religious, and linguistic peoples. It is home to Arabs, Turks, Persians, Kurds, Armenians, Berbers, Pathans, Nubians, Bakhtiaris, Baluchis, Tartars, Jews, Greeks, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Safaird, Seljug, and dozens of smaller ethnic groups. It has given birth to Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Baha'ism, and a host of other ancient and contemporary religions. These religions in turn consist of sects and denominations (as, for example, Sunni, Shi'ite, Alawite, Coptic, Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Melkite, Syriac, Nestorian, Maronite, Chaldean, Yazidi, and Hasidic Jews). Different empires (Babylonian, Hittite, Egyptian, Assyrian, Chaldean, Persian, Seleucid, Byzantine, Parthian, Sassanian, Umayyad, Abbasid, and Ottoman) located in different parts of the Middle East have linked, interwoven, and influenced the cultural orientations of these peoples. The intermixture has produced a cultural pluralism in which each subculture has adopted significant elements from other subcultures. The Islamic heritage interacted with these other cultures to give direction to the economic systems, social organizations, moral and ethical values, and judicial and political traditions that characterize the Middle East. Arabic, as the language of the Quran, has religious, literary, and artistic significance not only for Arabs of the region but also for non-Arabs and non-Muslims. It is a script with great symbolic as well as substantive meaning for Iranians, Turks, Kurds, Pathans, Berbers, Baluchis, and other peoples. Many non-Muslim populations of the area, including Christian and Jewish Arabs, speak Arabic. The language of poetry, prose, design,

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calligraphy, arts, and sciences for Arabs and many non-Arabic speaking peoples since the birth of Islam, Arabic was, prior to European colonization, the lingua franca by which non-Arab peoples of the region communicated with each other and with Arabs. The cultures of the Middle East share certain values, attitudes, and practices with other non-Western societies and civilizations, as well as exhibiting features that are unique to the region. The Middle Eastern patriarchal, patrilineal extended family, as a key social and economic unit in a communitarian society that downplays individualism and overvalues generic maleness, has its counterparts on other continents, as does the feminist subculture struggling for autonomy on the basis of libertarian elements in religious teachings that all patriarchal societies systematically downplay. This feminist struggle is particularly noteworthy in Islam, a religion mistakenly thought not to have room for a strong women's culture. Attachment to and reverence for the land, patterns of communal ownership, a strong sense of history and ethnic-religious identity, feudal loyalties often abused by local elites, an ethic of hospitality and sharing, and traditional practices of conflict resolution and consensus decisionmaking are all found in the Middle East as elsewhere around the world, albeit in distinctive cultural patterns characteristic of the region. The close association of religion and politics, once also characteristic of European Christianity, has been maintained intensely in much of the Middle East and thus may be considered to be a distinctive characteristic of the region. This distinctiveness is directly related to the predominance of Islam in most countries of the region. Religious activism is high in some societies, whereas in others more secular attitudes have evolved, but all Muslim societies emphasize the relevance of religious teachings to the conduct of social, economic, and political affairs to an extent not found in non-Muslim societies. Among the teachings of Islam that have given a special flavor to the history of the Middle East as a region have been the coexistence of values of tolerance toward other religions with practices of obedience to the teachings of the Prophet; a strong emphasis on social and economic equality (which should include, but rarely does, the equality of women and men); the relative absence of a strong priestly hierarchy; and an unusual emphasis on the seeking of knowledge (giving rise to an early emphasis on science in Muslim societies). The oft-noted practices of the seclusion of women are considered by scholars specializing in ArabMuslim women's studies to be a Mediterranean practice predating Islam. The hijab, the distinctive headcovering for women, and all it represents, are certainly Middle Eastern, but did not originate with Islam. Having emphasized the uniqueness of the Muslim contribution to the cultures of the Middle East, we must also say that a high vision of a just and sharing society spiritually faithful to the Divine Creator also characterizes Judaism and Christianity. The tragedy of Israel's situation in the Middle

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East is that the Zionist movement can be understood as dedicated to realizing this high vision, and a tremendous amount of intellectual and spiritual energy by Zionists has gone into trying to realize that vision in a reclaimed land. The violence and injustice associated with the establishment of the state of Israel can be seen as a betrayal of that vision, just as the violence and injustice associated with some revolutionary Islamic movements in the region can be seen as a betrayal of the Islamic vision. A more secular vision of the good society in the region has been crystallized in Pan-Arabism, which has its roots in kin and ethnic bonds, paralleled by a practice of hospitality and kindness to the stranger. Pan-Arabism in its political manifestations has not been successful in overcoming intergroup factionalism and statist rivalries, but is not inherently more violent than the religiously inspired visions in the region. In the long run these visions, religious and secular, will have a positive role to play in helping the societies of the Middle East move toward the ideals of human goodness and peacefulness that all tendencies in the region aspire to in some way.

CURRENT CONFLICTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST The dismantling and decline of the once great Ottoman Empire and the concomitant intrusion of resource-hungry European colonialism is only the most recent chapter in a history that has seen the rise and fall of many empires. It is of particular importance because these events have played such a determining role in creating the present high-conflict situation in the Middle East. Bereft of the Ottoman administrative devices that gave some protection to ethnic and religious diversity in Muslim empires, and also bereft of the respect and recognition due a cluster of civilizations with a long history, the peoples of the region and/or incipient proto-states have been struggling ever since to reconstitute themselves into viable political entities. Their current boundaries bear little relation to the distribution of the peoples and nations of the region, and have much to do with the self-interest of Britain and France (and, more recently, the United States). The result has been a century of conflict-intrastate, interstate, and extrasystemic. This section will briefly examine some critical dimensions of these conflicts.

Dimensions of Conflict Because the causes of any particular conflict tend to be multiple and overlapping, we will here consider conflicts as multidimensional and look at several important dimensions of those conflicts: (1) the economicresource-access dimension, (2) the political-ideological dimension, (3) the

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territory-identity dimension, (4) the social-psychological dimension, and (5) the externality dimension.

The Economic-Resource-access Dimension Wealth and resource inequalities are pervasive: between rich and poor states; between governing and business elites and poverty-ridden peasants and workers; between privileged natives and exploited expatriate workers; between nomads and settled peoples; and, most pervasively, between women and men. These inequalities are the more intolerable because of religiously based expectations of sharing, rooted in all the religious cultures of the region. Differences in "water-wealth" due to the pattern of rivers flowing through the region are an even more serious source of conflict than differences in oil wealth. Water-poor countries suffer severe limitations on even subsistence agriculture, seriously hindering further development of agricultural sectors as well as the possibilities for urban-industrial development. Water-rich states have been very resistant to developing water-sharing arrangements. Patterns of industrialization and consumption by wealthy states also harm the environment and prevent the development of more diversified national economies and a strong middle class. Practices of the seclusion of women prevent half the labor force from working to its fullest potential in every sector from agriculture and industry to the professions and government, and thus keep both the economic and the social productivity of each society artificially low.

The Political-Ideological Dimension Many Middle Eastern states are, in a sense, European creations from the dissolved Ottoman Empire. Some countries are little more than the family estates of the ruling class. Authoritarian regimes pervade the region. Traditions of discussing political affairs and forming community opinion (shura, consultation, and ijma, consensus) in local mosques, and patterns of autonomy and self-rule from earlier eras, have for the most part not found translation into the new state structures. Another kind of tradition, the glorification of the military, has taken on new force in the modern authoritarian state. The systematic use of religious teaching recast and distorted for political purposes, particularly in regard to the exclusion of women and various religious and tribal minorities from public life, has also added to the rigidity and repression that pervades the political process. By further diminishing the space for open discussion and dissent, governments of such states feed the anger of victimized groups and fuel endemic civil war. In the decades since the two world wars, capitalism, socialism, statism, radical lslamism, secular Ba'thism, and Nasserism have all failed to

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open up a peaceful path to economic, social, and human development for these states. As competing imperatives, these ideologies are resistant to dialogue and processes of negotiation and accommodation. Choices tend to become bipolar: Westernization versus Islam, Pan-Arabism versus statist nationalism, statist nationalism versus ethnic autonomy, sharia-based family law versus civic freedom for women. This denial of any middle ground makes every conflict a win-lose situation and leaves violence as the major option in each ideology's continuing struggle to prevail.

The Territory-Identity Dimension Europe's hand in creating Middle Eastern states has left a legacy of elitist minority rule that disregards the multiethnic population of their states. As a consequence, these states are seething with secessionist tendencies. Each ethnic group is strongly attached to its own traditional lands, many of which lie across the boundaries of two or more new states. Shi'ite, Sunni, Druze, Berber, Jewish, Christian, and other religiocultural identities overlap ethnic and tribal identities to create a set of geographic claims that play havoc with recently drawn state boundaries. The Palestinians are the best known of the trapped peoples, but the Kurds, a much larger population spread across more than four states, also have a long history of seeking to secure autonomy as a people. Many other peoples also seek either autonomy or sovereignty, including the Bedouin, whose nomadic tracks cross all boundaries, and the Sahrawi, who claim their own state in the Western Sahara. Although the claims of some of these peoples are rooted in clearly identifiable historical experience and in international law, authoritarian states are not by their nature constituted to be responsive to such pressures. Thus, escalating violence and civil war become the norm rather than the exception.

The Social-Psychological Dimension Traditionally the image of the Other was as the stranger, someone to approach carefully, classify, and establish a relationship of provisional trust with in order to maintain mutual security while preparing to solve any problems that might arise from the interaction. Relationship-establishing devices enabled many different ethnic groups to live side by side in relative harmony. Once state structures established boundaries and cut off access to groups of one's own people, and delimited the territories that could be utilized for subsistence, the stranger became the enemy, a new threat to an already threatened livelihood. Even familiar neighbors from other ethnic groups became the enemy, as economic hardships under the new government regimes multiplied. New phenomena of racism, religious intolerance, and fear of cultural dominance arose; the old phenomenon of sexism took on new force; and mutual misperceptions fueled mutual

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distrust. Violence against women and children, closely related to other forms of social violence, became part of an endless cycle, which can be reversed only by a powerful counterdynamic.3 Religion, one possible source of such a reversal of violence, is all too often unavailable under these circumstances. In the Middle East the failure to maintain earlier traditions of religious tolerance is perhaps one of the most serious aspects of current conflicts because political and economic factors become embedded in religious doctrines that deny the intrinsic spirituality and worth of every human being. The fact that revolutionary religious groups, whether Muslim, Jewish, or Christian, are usually responding to real grievances and serious malfunctioning of the society of which they are a part is sometimes taken as a legitimation of violence. Thus the conflicts spiral on and on.

The Externality Dimension The wars that Europe formerly fought on its own territory have increasingly been fought on the lands of the Middle East. The nineteenth century witnessed exploitation by France, England, Germany, Italy, Russia, and Spain. By the twentieth century the European powers divided the territory into spheres of influence, with continued domination aided by the League of Nations mandate system. During World War II the United States joined the competition for Middle East resources, and the UN-sponsored independence of Middle Eastern states was followed by a neocolonialist style of continued European domination. Since the end of World War II and especially after the Suez War in 1956, the United States has become the major power in the region, and many, although by no means all, current conflicts have been directly shaped by European and U.S. intervention on behalf of Western national interests-to the detriment of indigenous economic and social development. Even when the roots of conflict are local, previous external intervention has often contributed to their existence. For a long time several local conflicts were linked with the East-West conflict sometimes because that suited the superpowers and their aims and sometimes because local rulers saw it as being in their interests to get external support. Where there was external intervention, armed conflicts tended to be more protracted and more devastating.

Types of Conflict The Middle East embodies all major types of conflict: interstate, intrastate, and extrasystemic. "Intrastate conflict" refers to wars involving groups, movements, and/or the regime within one sovereign state. "Interstate conflict" refers to wars between two or more sovereign states. "Extrasystemic

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conflict" refers to wars involving a sovereign state and movements or groups outside that state's jurisdiction. These types of conflict are not necessarily exclusive of one another, and indeed several conflicts referred to as intrastate by one set of criteria become interstate by another. However, all three types occur frequently in the Middle East. The following is a short list of conflicts, representing each type, that currently plague the region. Some are at a high level of intensity, others simmer as "high potential conflicts." The list is intended to be illustrative rather than inclusive.

Intrastate Conflicts Lebanon. With seventeen confessional groups plus the Palestinians struggling for power, and with military occupation and intervention by Israel, Syria, Iran, Iraq, France, the United States, and other states in its domestic affairs, Lebanon's conflicts can be as well considered extrasystemic as intrastate. Israel. Israel, facing a persistent uprising-intifada-by the Palestinians living in the occupied territories, would be classified as intrastate from the Israeli perspective, but as interstate from the Palestinian-Arab perspective, whereas the involvement of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the United States gives it also an extrasystemic character.

Iraq. In Iraq the secular modernizing authoritarian Ba'thist regime struggles with Shi'ite and Kurdish populations, each of which seeks varying degrees of autonomy. Syria. The 1.5 million Kurds in Syria are responsive to autonomy movements of Kurds in neighboring countries, but they are not currently engaged in sustained internal paramilitary activities. Iran. The numerous sectarian Muslim groupings that emerged in Iran during the struggle to overthrow the Shah continue to compete for leadership in the new revolutionary Islamic state, as well as in Kurdish and other ethnic opposition movements.

Turkey. The secularist and pro-West governing party in Turkey struggles with a variety of Kurdish movements with a range of aims from political and cultural autonomy to independence. Egypt. The struggle between several revolutionary Islamic groups and a secular, pro-Western regime continues in Egypt, as do the activities of the increasingly embattled autonomy-seeking 10 percent Coptic minority.

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Gulf Countries. The Gulf countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) face serious crises as traditional patrimonial states whose privileged native populations are often outnumbered by disenfranchised expatriate workers from other, poorer Middle East states. The Maghreb. The Maghreb states of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia all have radical religious or nationalist movements battling conservative military or military-backed regimes. In Morocco, the Western Sahara conflict may also be considered an interstate conflict because seventy-five countries recognize the SADR. In Libya, apparent opposition within the authoritarian regime is considered to be primarily "palace intrigue." The Sudan. For decades the Sudan has been driven by North-South conflicts. A resource-poor Muslim North dominates a resource-rich set of autonomy- and independence-seeking Christian and traditional tribal groups in the South. Cyprus. In the aftermath of Turkish military intervention, the Turkish minority in Cyprus declared an independent state (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus), recognized only by Turkey, in 1983. The Greek majority continues to struggle for a unified Cyprus, with UN forces present to keep Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot (and Greek and Turkish) forces apart. Afghanistan. The Mujahiddin, consisting of twelve to fourteen political and religious organizations, are struggling with each other for control after victory over the previous Marxist regime. Somalia. The long-standing civil war between tribes of northern and southern Somalia as yet holds no prospect of termination, nor does interclan violence, in spite of the sufferings of a people already pushed to the extreme of deprivation by prolonged drought and famine. Central Asian Republics. Each of the renamed Central Asian republics is a multination state, home to Turks, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Tatars, Tajiks, Ukrainians, Kirgizs, and Russians. The challenge facing these nascent republics is how to protect the rights of the various communities in their jurisdictions while developing as integrated societies actively participating in Middle East affairs. Azerbaijan. The dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia over NagornoKarabagh, a conflict which is both intra- and interstate, has erupted into full-scale warfare.

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Interstate Conflicts As seen above, the intrastate classification is not a clean one because several intrastate conflicts could equally well be designated as interstate. Although a number of the interstate conflicts listed are relatively clear-cut, the ambiguity will continue in this section.

Iraq-Iran. A mutually destructive eight-year war between Iraq and Iran was initiated in 1980, reviving much older claims to the disputed Shatt a)Arab waterway, a valuable access to the Gulf that has at times been under Persian and at times under Arab jurisdiction. The revival of conflict was activated by ideological tensions between the secularist regime in Baghdad and the religious regime in Teheran. Iraq-Kuwait. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which triggered the 1991 Gulf War, is the most recent chapter in a set of long-running territorial disputes originating in the days when both states were part of the Ottoman Empire. Iraq-Saudi Arabia. Iraq's modernizing secularism contrasts with the conservative patrimonial rule of the Ibn Saud family, which bases its authority on a conservative interpretation of Islam but requires an alliance with the U.S. military to maintain the status quo. Iraq-Syria. Syria and Iraq both have strongly authoritarian and secular modernizing Ba'thist regimes; each aspires to regional hegemony, invoking the respective ancient glories of Baghdad and Greater Syria. It was to maintain its hegemonic option that Syria entered the Gulf War nominally on the side of the Western allies, especially in light of the collapse of its Soviet patron.

Syria-Lebanon. As a modernizing state with a strong sense of history and with internal minorities well controlled, Syria has at its disposal both its own forces and outside movements to assist it in attempts to recreate "Greater Syria," which from Syria's perspective would include Lebanon, in which it presently has occupying forces. Israel-Surrounding Arab States. The 1947 UN partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states and Israel's 1948 declaration of independence generated more than four decades of wars, invasions, and counterinvasions as Israel tried to maintain and expand its boundaries and Arab states, including Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria, tried to crush Israel and ensure Arab dominance in "Palestine." The history of these wars has been worked over and reworked by both Arab and Jewish scholars and cannot be described in a way that satisfies all parties. Egypt made a separate peace with

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Israel by way of the Camp David Accords of 1978. The conflict with Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon has continued. Current negotiations involving particularly the West Bank, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, and Israel's "security zone" in Lebanon, if successful, may lead to some constructive conflict resolution and possibly even to future cooperation.

Jordan. Lands established as part of the Palestine mandate after World War I were "given" to Jordan by Britain after World War II; ever since that time, Jordan has tried to steer a safe course through conflicts with Palestinians, with Israel, and with its powerful Arab neighbors, including Syria and Iraq. Its decision for neutrality in the Gulf War made Jordan unpopular with all sides, yet its diplomatic capabilities may become important in the decades ahead.4

Egypt-Sudan. Egypt and the Sudan have long-standing disputes over distribution of access rights to scarce sources of water, and they mistrust each other's political agendas. It should be noted that the United Nations has played an active role in trying to deal with a number of the above conflicts through the deployment of UN peacekeeping teams. Of the six UN peacekeeping teams currently in the Middle East, one has operated since the 1940s and one since the 1960s. The six missions are: 1. UNTSO (572 UN peacekeepers) has operated in Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon since 1948. 2. UNCYP (6,411 in unit) has operated in Cyprus since 1964. 3. UNDOF (1,450 in unit) has operated in the Syrian Golan Heights since 1974. 4. UNIFIL (7,000 in unit) has operated in southern Lebanon since 1978. 5. UNIKOM (1,440 in unit) has operated in the Iraq-Kuwait demilitarized zone since 1991. 6. MINURSO (375 in unit) has operated in Western Sahara since 1991. The sheer duration of some of these missions is one more indication of how intractable these conflicts have been.

Extrasystemic Wars There are also wars that are neither intra- nor interstate conflicts. These wars, called "extrasystemic conflicts," occur between a sovereign state and movements or groups outside the state's jurisdiction. One such conflict involves the Kurds and the states they inhabit in the Middle East, especially

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Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Turkey. The best-known extrasystemic conflict involves the PLO, which is spread through several states in the region and whose mission is to fight Israel for the right to a separate state within the borders of the presently expanded Israel. A third extrasystemic conflict includes the Polisario, which is fighting Morocco on behalf of a separate state for Sahrawis in the Western Sahara, currently claimed as Moroccan territory. Arguably, it is reasonable to classify as extrasystemic the conflicts between Western multinational corporations and the Middle Eastern states for control over markets, resources, and raw materials. Likewise, detached paramilitary and intelligence units of Western states fighting clandestinely to protect Western economic and/or political interests may be classified as extrasystemic conflict. Extrasystemic wars are the hardest to move toward a conflict resolution mode because in many cases one party to the conflict does not regard the other as legitimate. Protocols for dealing with extrasystemic conflicts are an essential precondition for peace building in the Middle East.

PEACE BUILDING

The Range of the Possible Given the conflicts and problems confronting the region, quite different futures can be envisaged. Common to all these futures are the end of the Cold War, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the reality of newly autonomous Central Asian states exploring a Middle East identity. Although the world system is no longer politically dominated by the old superpowers, it continues to be economically dominated by an oligarchy of governments representing the industrial, economic, and military power of the West. In addition, multinational corporations, transnational organizations and movements, and international governmental organizations all play increasingly significant and autonomous roles in international affairs. Five possible future courses of development can be projected, each different in its immediate or long-term effects. Brief descriptions of these scenarios will suggest which next steps might best set the Middle East on the path toward the preferred future and away from unwanted futures.

Possibility #1. Current negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors and the related regional conferences may flounder without reaching any explicit agreements and with no specific commitments to take steps toward the establishment of an independent Palestine. Similarly there may be no resolution of the Iraqi government's disputes with its neighbors or major groups of its citizens. Western intervention efforts may become increasingly ineffective with a withdrawal of support for those efforts from other

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Arab countries. Struggles over the allocation of water resources and oil revenues could increase, and there might be new outbursts of intense violence. Economic and social conditions would deteriorate.

Possibility #2. The United States may be successful in brokering a series of dispute settlements among major governmental actors in the region. For example, Syria and Israel may reach an agreement to be implemented over time, linked to Israeli-Jordanian and Israeli-Lebanese settlements as well as future Israeli-Palestinian settlements. U.S. resources would be committed to the political and military security of particular states, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, and committed to economic assistance to several countries, including Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel. The United States may also succeed in its effort to broker the establishment of a new regime in Iraq. In this scenario the United States remains a major actor in the region, although playing a somewhat less dominating role than in the immediate past. Possibility #3. Various governments in the region negotiate several unrelated agreements independently of diplomatic efforts of the United States and other Western powers. For example, there may be a series of treaties between Israel and Syria, Israel and Jordan, Israel and Palestine (with or without the PLO), and Israel and Lebanon, or an alliance might be formed among countries bordering on Iraq that would include agreements with Iraq. The agreements may pertain to political and military affairs, but they may also refer to social and economic matters. There wou.ld be no overall coordination or linkage. Possibility #4. The European Community and the United Nations might play important coordinating roles, engaging Russia, the European powers, the United States, and other countries to resolve the conflicts between Israel and its Arab neighbors, with Israel and Palestine treated as separate actors. Potential spillover from ethnic conflicts in the Balkans might also be dealt with in these negotiations. The emphasis would be on humanitarian concerns and socioeconomic development. (The recent European Community Commission Report on the Middle East and Europe is helpful in pointing to ways in which Europe may assist in the process of peace making in the Middle East. 5) Although the primary actors would be governments, civic organizations and transnational nongovernmental organizations also would take part in the negotiations. Possibility #5. An adaptation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe suitable for the particular cultural complexities of the Middle East might be developed, beginning with the convening of an intergovernmental regional meeting to explore the creation of a Conference

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on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME). 6 The alternative possibilities of two subregional conferences or one inclusive regional CSCME are left open for the future. Negotiations might be conducted by governments of the region over an extended period of time on a series of security issues as well as economic development and resource-sharing issues. As in Europe, a Citizen's Assembly within the region could play a key role in developing the social vision of how such a body could function in helping to create the social institutions that could make it work and in creating public support for its existence. Women's organizations, regional civic, humanitarian, and religious activist organizations, and professional groups would assist in proposing options, facilitating the formal intergovernmental negotiations, pressuring governments to take accommodative steps, and would themselves engage in peace-building activities. The European-based Helsinki Citizen's Assembly would share its expertise with these activist organizations, and transnational professional groups would be available to provide training in the skills of dispute settlement and conflict resolution for citizens' groups in each of the countries of the region. No single future possibility will, of course, be wholly realized, but some are more likely than others. Nor are these the only possible scenarios. It is useful to keep the varieties of possibilities in mind because they may be combined in different ways over time. The first scenario would create near-term disasters; such calamities might bring people in the region to turn away from the horrors of violence and war and toward peace building, but other routes are preferable. The second and third scenarios would yield, at least in the immediate future, a more effectively functioning statecentric system. The fourth and fifth scenarios would most likely move in the direction of what could be called the "preferred world."

A Preferred World Before moving to a discussion of near- and longer-term peace-building policies, it would be well to fix our eyes on what can be hoped for rather than on what might be feared. The process of building a community of nations in the Middle East is a multidimensional process involving political, social, economic, territorial, and military adjustments, to say nothing of the efforts required in the religious and spiritual domains. It requires institutional mergers, structural changes, functional coordination, and common planning, all firmly linked to grass-roots capabilities for adaptation and change. The process calls for significant alterations in patterns of economic production, political participation, resource allocation, and security arrangements in the context of an evolving partnership between women and men in the shaping of the social order. The community of nations also implies a contraction in national bureaucracies, political elites, military forces, and redundant offices, agencies, and projects, as intergovernmental

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bodies and transnational people's associations become more involved in the activities of the region. What might be found in a "preferred world" of the Middle East in the decades ahead? To provide a sense of possible directions, in what follows we draw on the expressed hopes of scholars and NGO activists in the Middle East and elsewhere.

A Palestinian State The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, rooted in the injustices experienced by the Palestinians through the deprivation of their homeland and in the fears for security and survival experienced by homeland-seeking Israelis, would be resolved through a series of steps already under way as this document is being written. The eventual outcome should be the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, buttressed by provisions guaranteeing security, recognition, and adequate access to resources for Palestinians and security and recognition for Israel as a partner in the Middle East community of nations.

Kurdish Autonomy Neither suppression nor forced assimilation have ended or reduced Kurdish aspiration and struggle for a degree of self-determination and for equality. The "preferred world" would have an autonomous Kurdistan made up of Kurdish regions within existing states, whose boundaries continue to be acknowledged, but with a provision for free movement of Kurds across state boundaries to other parts of Kurdistan. Schools would teach Arab, Islamic, Kurdish, Hebrew, and Berber cultures so that cultural diversity becomes an integral part of the individual consciousness.

Recognition of Israel by Other States in the Community Israel's agreement to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories would pave the way for cooperative activities between Israel and neighboring states to their mutual economic and social benefit, thus laying to rest the image of Israel as an expansionist threat to the security and existence of its neighbors. Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and Palestine itself-the nation that knows the culture and lifeways of Israel the most intimately-might take the lead in developing joint activities to benefit the region.

An End to All Expansionist Tendencies A general recognition would prevail that expansionist behavior is no longer acceptable in the twenty-first century. This would apply to Turkish, Syrian,

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Iraqi, or Iranian desires to increase their territories at the expense of neighbors who have their own counterclaims and similar tendencies on the part of other states in the region, as well as to the territorial claims of Israel.

A Regionwide Organization The community of nations needs an umbrella organization, a uniquely Middle East version of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), with roots both in the state structures of the region and in the citizens' organizations-the civil society-to represent the community as a whole, assess its needs, adjudicate its disputes, pool and utilize its resources for collective good, and make and implement community-wide policies. This umbrella organization would have (1) a legislative body, (2) an economic and social security council, (3) a community court, (4) an ecological and environmental council, and (5) separate bodies for peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Such an organization should interface actively with a parallel "citizens' assembly," which could in addition to cooperating with the regional organization also initiate its own activities along similar lines.

Demilitarization With effective supervision and inspection by men and women experts from the umbrella organization, the community would become a nonnuclear, nonchemical, and nonbiological weapons area, with the reliable elimination of weaponry of mass destruction being the initial priority. Concurrent with demilitarization, a conversion committee would facilitate the development of programs for the redirection of military forces and technology to socioeconomic development, environmental programs, reconstruction of societal infrastructure, better educational opportunities, and nonoffensive defense.

Nonalignment Middle East nations would provide leadership to the Nonaligned Movement to promote regional and global peace and security through respect for international law, improvement of living standards, economic development, and sharing of the world's resources.

Strong Support for Human Rights There would be respect by all state members for human rights and human dignity for all women, men, and children, and protection of minority rights as well as freedom of the press, assembly, speech, other forms of communication, and religious beliefs. Autonomy for minority peoples and new freedoms to travel, reside, work, and own property anywhere in the community

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of nations would be achieved as well as protection of the rights of refugees, and of persecuted religious minorities such as the Baha'i and other nonviolent, antimilitarist groups.

Health Common policies would improve the health of the members of the community through projects dealing with disease prevention and primary health care and training of docto~s, nurses, and traditional healers and caregivers. There would be rural health centers, adequate sanitation and water supply oversight, health education in schools and local communities, and disease surveillance and control, with a thoughtful blending of traditional health practices with new scientific advances.

Science and Education There would be a major emphasis on the development of universities, research institutes, and centers for advanced studies of all kinds in the best tradition of Islamic science as well as a renewed emphasis on the pursuit of knowledge at all educational levels. This includes more educational facilities for girls and women as well as men, and more adult education in local communities.

Interfaith Dialogue and Cooperation Interfaith bodies would increase their level of activity, making available the best of each faith's traditions of sharing, and of nonviolence and peace making, as conflicts within the community are dealt with. This would include cooperation in the maintenance of and access to religious, historical, and cultural sites. Certain religious sites would be administered jointly by representatives of the different religious communities with special historical and spiritual interests in those sites. In principle, all religious, cultural, and historical sites would be open to all members of the community.

Economic and Financial Integration The concept "community of nations" implies gradual economic integration and the establishment of a common market, which has the potential of improving the quality of life for the region. In practice this means the removal of all formal restrictions on interstate flows of goods, labor, and capital. Careful attention to the education and training of every socioeconomic, ethnic, and religious group will ensure that no group is left out in the process of improving the quality of life. Careful attention would also be paid to the development of a diversity of environmentally sound economic enterprises that ensure quality work conditions. Community-wide

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banks, financial and insurance institutions, and a community currency would increase trade within the community, reduce imports, improve foreign exchange earnings, reduce dependency on external financial institutions, and facilitate travel and exchange of goods and services within the community.

Common Agricultural and Industrial Policies Community-wide agricultural policies relating to soil and water conservation based on the best of traditional practices in a given area, a political commitment to water-sharing between neighboring countries with common river basins, and further development and diversification of subsistence and commercial agriculture would make the area more selfsufficient. Programs such as the "industrial complementation program" adopted by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) would enable the production of complementary products in specific sectors as well as joint industrial ventures between states.

A Flourishing Civil Society with Empowered Human Beings All the above developments would require the active participation of local, national, and transnational civic and professional organizations and groups in community-wide networks to support community-wide intergovernmental programs and projects. Grass-roots participation, particularly of grass-roots women's groups with knowledge of and experience with local conditions, would be of the greatest importance. If people are to exercise their human rights, they need an education that will develop the special potentials of each person. This means not only book literacy and numeracy, but civic literacy (knowing how things get done) and oral literacy (the knowledge of one's history and traditions and of the arts and crafts associated with them as passed on by the older generation). It means knowledge about how the larger world works. It includes the skills of interaction and introspection that will lead to emotional and intellectual maturity. The women (who make up half of every society), the urban poor, the small farmers, and the nomads all need this multifaceted type of education. The love of learning taught by every religion is the best point of departure for this kind of education in every society, and should be remembered as states shape their educational policies. Because women in the region begin from a more disadvantaged position than men, special attention must be paid to the quality of education for women. In addition to adequate training for a variety of occupations and professions, technical information that will enable women to plan family size is critical both for the well-being of families and for the well-being of states suffering from overpopulation. Adequate information on child

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development in all its dimensions-physical, socioemotional, cognitive, and moral-will similarly empower women (and men) to provide formative experiences for children that will bear fruit in creative, stable, peaceful future societies. Women from the international community should work in collaboration with women's centers and early childhood education centers in the region to help implement programs to meet those needs. 7

Gender Equality Equality of participation of women in all political, economic, social, technological, financial, and other programs would be necessary in order to draw on their knowledge and skill. Starting with a goal of having one-third women in every administrative, planning, and decisionmaking body, eventually half of every working body in the region would be female. The patriarchal structures that for centuries reproduced cultures of domination, violence, and economic and environmental exploitation, in the Middle East as elsewhere, would be seen as having no place in the twenty-first century world. With gender equality there also needs to be equality of opportunity for children; that is, freedom from exploitative child labor and opportunities for quality education.

A New Way of Seeing the World The radical transformation of the world system reveals the inadequacy of traditional interpretations of international affairs. The world is no longer comprehensible simply as a set of sovereign nation-states, constraining each other by violence or threat of violence. Rather we are in the midst of a great transition. It has become almost a truism to say that the world and the way we see it are undergoing a paradigm shift. New concepts of sovereignty and security are still evolving as countries in various world regions gradually discover that force is no longer effective in controlling minority ethnic communities within their borders and that the stability and survival of states depend on creating new institutional forms that allow for significant degrees of autonomy for constituent peoples while still maintaining an umbrella state structure. The old forms of state sovereignty no longer work. Economic forces, social ideologies, and the movement of people, ideas, and images cannot be wholly circumscribed by borders. It is not only the countries of the Middle East that face these problems, but the unusual history of the area and its past traditions of political innovation in the face of cultural diversity should be considered as assets that may lead to creative solutions. The new reality is that sovereignty is shared by many agencies over various territories. Control of national resources is exercised in part by intergovernmental bodies, in part by multinational corporations, and in part

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by occupational and industrial associations. The civil and human rights of citizens in each country are affected by all these bodies, as well as by the work of citizens' transnational associations. Security is being understood in a new way, not as state security but as peoples' security-all people, not only elites. Peoples' well-being may actually be threatened by their own state as well as by boundary-crossing phenomena affecting the environment and economic development. The new meanings of security call for new means of providing it. Even when the old, narrow sense of security against military attack is under consideration, there is new awareness that the best security is the kind that threatens none of the adversaries-that is, common security. Recognition of the power of nonviolent resistance broadens the repertoire of policies available to maintain security and peace. The role of shared interests and identities in limiting conflict escalation also comes into play, as do increased interdependence of peoples, and integration of resources and trade. Intractable conflicts are not doomed to remain intractable.s We have looked at some features of a "preferred world." Now let us consider near- and longer-term policies to help bring it about.

Policies for the Near Future

Conditions in Iraq Following the war in the Gulf and its particular pattern of destruction of Iraqi infrastructure, the circumstances of the people in Iraq have become difficult and, for many, life threatening. The military and economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations largely remain in effect to bring the Iraqi government into compliance with the terms it accepted to end the fighting. Those terms include the destruction of Iraqi chemical and biological weapons and of ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers, the placement of all materials usable for nuclear weapons under the exclusive control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Iraqi facilitation of the repatriation of Kuwait nationals (Security Council Resolution 687, April 3, 1991). The provision of humanitarian aid, to be compensated by Iraqi petroleum sales and monitored and supervised by the UN, also awaits implementation (Security Council Resolution 705, August 15, 1991). The Iraqi regime has been resistant to complying with Security Council resolutions, but has taken care never to be seriously noncompliant. A complete settlement remains elusive while the power struggle goes on between the regime and the Security Council. The United Nations is seen by many in the Arab world as not having behaved in the Gulf War like an

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impartial body responding to conflicts in a balanced way, and other Arab states-with the exception of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia-have distanced themselves to varying degrees from the punitive policies promoted by the Western-led alliance in the Security Council. However, two factors may shift the situation toward a more productive outcome. First, the Iraqi regime is increasingly being seen by other Arab regimes, including Jordan, as out of touch with reality; and second, all Iraqi opposition groups were represented at a September 1992 meeting in Arbeil, Kurdistan, that began preparatory work for a general conference, "For a Democratic Federal Iraq," to form a transition government for the country that could gain international acceptance. All countries of the area agree that it is important for Iraq to resume a positive role in the region, and negotiations that give an acceptable role to Kurds and Shi'ites in Iraq may be helpful for addressing similar problems in neighboring states. There is an opportunity for both the United Nations and the weakened existing Arab/Mediterranean/Gulf area regional structures to regain credibility by undertaking constructive mediating roles in the coming months, as the pattern for the new Iraq takes shape. The complex and long-standing issues regarding Iraq's access to the Gulf, use of offshore islands, and the pumping of petroleum in disputed border areas with Kuwait have been very inadequately addressed by the United Nations. Failure to resolve these issues is likely to trigger new conflicts. Further exploration of solutions involving seasoned experts from the region needs to be conducted. In general, Middle East leaders see the necessity of transnationalizing such issues by using the diplomatic instruments available to them through the Arab League (which has an earlier track record of success, however limited, in the settlement of boundary disputes), 9 the Islamic Conference Organization, and other regional intergovernmental structures rather than continuing to involve punitive threats of force. Diplomacy is seen as the path to long-run stability in the region. In the process of settling border disputes, new understandings about sovereignty and security need to be considered. Intergovernmental authorities can share jurisdiction over particular uses of resources without changing country borders. The creative treatment of such territorial issues becomes all the more important now that Iran is engaged in a territorial dispute with one of the Gulf emirates over a Gulf island that had previously been jointly administered. War is too expensive a solution for such problems. Limits on Iraqi development of weapons of mass destruction can be effective and enduring only if all governments in the region are similarly constrained. Recent new rounds of arms sales to other Middle East states from the United States and other countries make a mockery of arms limitation agreements. Regional initiatives are urgently needed if any form of arms control is to succeed.

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Any demilitarization of Iraq must take place in the context of the demilitarization of all states of the region, including Israel. Because many of Iraq's economic problems stem from excessive militarization, the redirection of its highly skilled labor force to civilian production is facilitating a recovery of infrastructure more rapidly than had been thought possible. Achieving economic strength by way of demilitarization-a lesson well learned by Japan and Germany after World War 11-may now also be learned by Iraq. The United Nations, which has produced many studies on the economics of disarmament,IO can assist in showing concretely how conversion is the best road to economic and social development for Iraq. The monitoring of disarmament, which will inevitably happen by very slow stages, can be done by regional and UN bodies already in existence.

Israeli-Arab/Palestinian Bilateral Negotiations and Citizens' Organizations The current negotiations between Israeli and Syrian, Israeli and Lebanese, and Israeli and Jordanian and Palestinian delegations can be effective only to the extent that leaders give priority to these negotiations, and this in turn depends to some degree on popular opinion in the states concerned. Therefore, it is important that citizens' groups increase their peace-building efforts in each country that participates in the negotiations. Citizens in other countries in which both Jewish and Arab communities are of significant size bear a special responsibility here. The support from transnational organizations concerned with peace can also be a key factor in influencing local public opinion. The efforts should include supplementary diplomacy by private citizens who can contribute by suggesting new options, transmitting information from one adversary to another in ways that each can hear, and exploring possible areas of agreement. "Second-track" or "multitrack" diplomacy can help steer negotiations away from traps and ultimatums by working on areas where agreement will be easiest, thus creating a climate more friendly to further dialogue.! I There is an informal network of institutes and organizations in Europe, Asia, and the Americas concerned with conflict resolution, peace building, and economic development that maintains active collegial ties with individuals and institutes with similar concerns in the Middle East. Collaborative activities to deal with specific conflict areas or issues have been recently strengthened. All this activity can help mobilize support for emerging intergovernmental agreements.l2 Other types of groups foster dialogue as well as carry out specific problem-focused projects, for example, the Vezelay Group with members from Europe, the Maghreb, and Africa; the Third World Forum with offices in Egypt and Senegal; and the Continuing Committee of the International NGO Conference in Geneva. There needs to be increased public awareness

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of the existence of such groups and more media coverage of their activities to counterbalance the emphasis on mistrust and negativity that often characterizes reporting on the official negotiations.

Stabilizing Lebanon Restoration of an effectively functioning society in Lebanon is critical to regional peace, justice, and security. The same concentrated regional diplomatic efforts that will be required to re-establish partnership roles with Iraq will be required to defuse the intense internal struggles among the diverse communities of Lebanon. Particular attention must be given to securing the prompt and complete withdrawal of Israeli, Syrian, and Iranian forces and dissolution of support forces of local units controlled by them. The UN peacekeeping forces cannot be effective except in the context of strong regional diplomatic initiatives. Even after the prolonged civil war, Lebanon retains a highly skilled and creative population, both in the country and in its diaspora, and many transnational ties still link Lebanon to the global community _13 Demilitarization of Lebanon could release great energy from within that country for the work of building the new community of the twenty-first century in the region.

Refugees and Displaced Persons The 1990-1991 war in the Gulf resulted in one of the greatest mass displacements in recent history-between four and five million humans became refugees and displaced persons. In the immediate aftermath of the war, the tragic conditions of these people were dealt with by returning many of them to their homelands-Pakistan, Egypt, the Philippines, Jordan, Yemen, Iran, the Sudan, and elsewhere. But persons who fled or who were driven from annexed Kuwait lost their savings and property as well as jobs, and few have been able to return. Palestinians forced to leave Kuwait after its liberation, or to leave other Gulf states, have faced particularly severe problems. These people suffered the loss of employment as well as savings and property, and many are now stranded in Jordan. Because the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees is overwhelmed by needs in other parts of the world as well as in the Middle East, more resources must be made available to the United Nations and to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to provide assistance for the refugees and help in processing their claims. Funds must come largely from the states of the Middle East itself, particularly the wealthier states, as well as from war-devastated states-including Iraq and Kuwait. One condition that will require much work to change is the resistance in many states in the region to allowing residents from other states to become citizens, even second- and third-generation residents. When governments

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increase their readiness to allow residents to acquire citizenship, this will assist democratization processes in the societies concerned, and inequities of the region will be reduced.

De-escalation Initiatives Each of the adversarial parties in the Middle East region needs to take more initiatives to develop peace-building contacts and proposals. Useful approaches include offering negotiation proposals embodying components sought by the adversary, acting unilaterally to give the adversary something it has wanted, and developing agreements about mutual confidencebuilding measures. An initiative may be a single declaration or act, or it may be part of an extended effort to breach the barriers of mistrust and fear that many years of hostility have constructed. One widely recognized type of effort is the GRIT strategy. In this strategy, the initiating party declares it is undertaking a tension reduction campaign and announces a deescalating initiative, anticipating reciprocation, but persists with further actions even if there is no immediate reciprocation.1 4 There are many possibilities for the introduction of such de-escalation initiatives in the conflicts of the Middle East, including those relating to the Israelis and Palestinians, the Kurds and Iraqis. In the current IsraeliPalestinian negotiations, for example, Israel has taken such an initiative with regard to halting certain activities related to construction of new Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, and negotiations on a possible return of the Golan Heights in a comprehensive peace settlement with Syria are also under way. Many Palestinians are not impressed, however. It is precisely because disagreements are serious and levels of mutual mistrust are high that the GRIT strategy is so important-not simply taking one tension-reducing step and stopping there, but taking several in succession to show seriousness of intent. The creation of justifiable trust is imperative. Ideas for peace-making initiatives might arise in conjunction with UN peacekeeping missions in the region. A team of peace researchers and other relevant specialists serving as observers with each of these peacekeeping missions is likely to gain insights that could lead to activities beyond the mission itself that would greatly enhance the mission's effectiveness. One of the problems with UN peacekeeping missions is that they often get stuck in a conflict trap and may continue for decades, keeping warring adversaries apart without ever being able to create the conditions for the resolution of the underlying conflict. The situation cries out for imaginative field research and inventive approaches to conflict resolution by experienced peace researchers to explore ways out of these conflict traps.

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Developing Conditions for Long-term Solutions The gap between the types of discourse and the technologies involved in serious arms control and reorientation of defense strategies and those involved in creating a humane, ecologically aware, and physically and socially productive international order that treats conflicts as problems to be solved rather than battles to be won is enormous. Yet both types of thinking are required to move the Middle East, and the world of which it is a part, from a war system to a peace system. The dialogue must begin now. The two principal impediments to integration and unity in the Middle East have been ideology and the state. Ideologically based efforts have focused on the integration of certain ethnic and/or linguistic (Arabs, Turks) or religious (Muslim) groups in the area, leaving out others. The "state" as an institution has been primarily concerned with maximizing its own power and territorial interests at the expense of others. The current subregional cooperative arrangements (the United Arab Republic has long since been dissolved) represent a start and have accumulated some valuable experience despite the weaknesses mentioned above. However, they are no substitute for more inclusive area-wide institutions. The suggestions presented here for community building differ from previous approaches in that they try to encompass the whole rather than part of the community, advocate a reduced role for the state, and place a strong emphasis on civic organizations and the strengthening of civil society. The focus is on human beings, women and men, the development of their peace-building capacities within and among the societies of the region, and on their environment-nurturing capacities within the fragile ecosystem that is their common home. Each of the immediate steps suggested in the previous section imply related long-term peace-building activities that lead toward the preferred world. The remainder of this section will focus on long-term processes, first considering bridging activities.

Preparing the Ground Recognition by the peoples of the Middle East that they-and the worldare in a new time and that old ways will not work any more, is a first step in building a bridge to new ways. A part of the recognition must be the awareness that the old language will not work any more either, partly because it deals with abstractions rather than concrete realities. A new way of speaking requires new vocabulary. Women's ways of seeing and experiencing human relations, of listening, and of undertaking problem-solving as a nurturing work, rooted in everyday life, can make important contributions to the shaping of a new language. IS

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By searching in the hidden spaces of each society for how human beings care for one another, how they gain the inner strength to go on in the face of hardship and oppression-in the hidden spaces of families, of nomadic groups, or struggling ethnic minorities-an expressive vocabulary will be found that can transform public discourse from the language of domination to the language of human nurturance. It is this new language that needs to be introduced into the efforts to develop peaceful relations between former adversaries. The exchange of ideas, people, and goods that can create mutual understanding and bonds of mutual dependence cannot be carried out in the old language. Some transnational bodies already speak the new language to a varying extent, others do not. It is important for existing transnationals and the new citizens' associations that are forming to help create a new type of community in the Middle East to tap the deep spiritual roots of the many cultural groups in the region. Here are sources for learning to think, speak, and act in the ways called for by the new community.16

Israel and Palestine as Members of the Middle East Community of Nations A requirement for Israel's full participation in the new Middle East community is a good-faith continuance of negotiations already in process regarding autonomy and the eventual independence of Palestine. In the transitional period many trust-building cooperative projects between Israel and Palestine-in-process, as well as between Israel and other neighboring states, need to be undertaken. For example, there need to be experiments with different ways of sharing control over basic components of the area's infrastructure-including transportation, water, and electricity-and also over symbolically important locations such as religious shrines. The new Palestinian state can play a special role in furthering bridging activities between Israel and other neighboring states because it brings to such activities a unique experience of both Israeli and Arab cultures in all their diversity. In recent years a number of Palestinians and Israelis have worked together on peace building between the two societies. The examples are many: experimental bicultural villages such as Neva Shalom, special joint bilingual education projects and schools, Muslim-JewishChristian dialogue by interfaith groups, joint research projects by Palestinian and Israeli scholars, women's peace projects ranging from joint protest marches, demonstrations, and vigils to solidarity visits and neighborhood problem-solving conferences.J7 All these activities and many more are designed for trust building. In each joint activity there is an emphasis on the link between person-toperson trust and reconciliation and larger socioeconomic and political issues. This trust-building work needs much more public attention for it to

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be effective in changing the climate of opinion in Israeli and Arab circles generally toward support for more far-reaching steps of bringing both Israel and Palestine into the community of nations.

Reintegrating Iraq into the Middle East Community Whereas the Iraqi attempt to annex Kuwait received almost universal condemnation in the Middle East, the subsequent isolation of Iraq and relentlessly continued punitive sanctions have generated very different feelings in the "Arab street." Public opinion even in the countries most heavily involved in supporting the U.S.-led military action has some sympathy with what is widely perceived as Iraq's courageous stand against Western imperialism. As sanctions continue and new policing actions such as establishing a no-fly zone over southern Iraq are undertaken, even the leaders of the Middle East states that joined the military action are becoming deeply concerned about the dangers of dismembering Iraq or at the least rendering it helpless for a long time to come, and thus unable to play its role as the traditional buffer vis-a-vis Iran. These same states are also uneasy about the fall 1992 conferences in northern Iraq that brought together several hundred delegates from almost every Kurdish and Arab opposition group in the country to work for a merger that could focus opposition activity and create credible options for a future democratic post-Saddam Iraq. The negotiations will be complex and protracted, as the negotiators must take account not only of their own diversity and the need to win over supporters of the Saddam regime peacefully rather than by warfare, but also of the pressing interests of Western states and the other states of the region, which are wary of what it may mean to institute a genuine democratic process in Iraq. Reports from observers indicate that a long, slow transition process is envisaged. It is essential that the collaborative process be reinstituted. Iraq, whose male/ female work force is one of the most highly educated in the Middle East, will be an indispensable partner in future economic development. Iraqi women will be a particularly valuable resource for region-wide integration of women into the public sectors of the economy and polity. As a relationship-building process, more transnational citizens' groups need to be promoted. In people-to-people terms, Iraq is not as isolated as allied policy would make it appear; there are 578 international nongovernmental organizations with sections and/or members in Iraq. As new international and transnational agencies are created to deal with particular problems, citizens will have transnational interests in relationship to those agencies and develop appropriate parallel bodies. An instructive example is the case of the European Coal and Steel Community, which led to the development of European steel and coal producer and consumer organizations. IS

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The Kurds Issues relating to Kurdish cultural autonomy, political rights, and human rights could be effectively addressed if the UN Secretary General were to explore with regional bodies the possibility of holding a multilateral conference regarding the situation of Kurds in the region, possibly in Geneva. The conference would not consider any changes in borders but would address the rights of movement of people and information across existing borders. Furthermore, provisions for cultural autonomy in regard to language, education, modes of economic development, and other matters such as self-determination within existing states could be discussed. The conference should involve government representatives from Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran, and relevant Central Asian Republics, as well as Kurdish political parties and Kurdish citizens' groups in the region and abroad, for example, the Kurdish community in Europe. Kurdish autonomy is a difficult matter to discuss multilaterally, and it is even more difficult to manage within any one country. The conference might proceed without all governments being represented, but it is important that at least two governments participate to get negotiations started. National and transnational citizens' organizations, both Kurdish and non-Kurdish, also should explore options, including conferences and informal dialogues, for dealing with the need for more secure lifespaces for Kurds in the region as a whole as well as in the four-country area referred to as Kurdistan.

Protecting Human and Civil Rights Human rights and democratization go hand in hand. One cannot develop without the other; the process of defining human rights, however, is still ongoing. It must be understood that the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not the ultimate universal document it has been considered to be in the West and that its use as a blunt instrument to remold social practices in non-Western countries has roused resistance and a sense of violated cultural identities, particularly in the Middle East. Progress can be made, however, by seeing the series of UN conventions on human rights as a process of developing human rights concepts that can become viable and operative in every cultural tradition, not only the Western tradition. The idea has been proposed to consider the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as representing first-generation rights, and the Conventions on Economic, Social, Civil and Political Rights as second-generation rights. This would make the new formulations on group rights (including the proposed UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples) thirdgeneration rights, and opens up the possibility of using all three sets of concepts without arousing hostility whether in the Middle East and other countries of the South or in the West.

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The goal is to establish standards for freedom of expression, participation, and movement for everyone, and to guarantee due process under law, taking account of the issues of work, education, and cultural participation. This requires norms of mutual respect based on empowering the groups whose rights have been violated in the past. It also means those groups must be organized and have support from others within and outside each society. Programs need to be developed that foster mutual understanding of different subcultures in the area. One important recent step toward the strengthening of the civil society in the Middle East is the publication of a newsletter entitled Civil Society, Democratic Transformation in the Arab World, by the Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development Studies in Cairo. Its stated purpose is to strengthen "nascent democratic forces in the Arab world and at the same time to serve as a networking function among organizations of the Arab civil society."19 Arab human rights organizations have also done courageous work along these lines, independently and in collaboration with international human rights organizations.2° Particular attention should be paid to the fine work done by national and Pan-Arab women's associations, in collaboration with transnational women's associations, to secure participation rights for women and protect them from abuse.2 1 Increases in social adaptability and stability tied to improved economic and social benefits to all citizens are the fruits of solid human rights practices. Educational programs on human rights can draw on the variety of cultural traditions of people in each country. These programs need to be carried out not only in schools but in the media and places of religious worship as well. Human rights refer basically to the rights of all people to participate in the shaping of their society as well as the shaping of individual, family, and community life, with the corollary responsibility to assure those rights for others. The task of building on diverse cultural traditions to open up space for individuals and groups to exercise these rights and responsibilities is a never-ending task in every society. In the Middle East, religions, histories, and certain cultural traditions have been misinterpreted and utilized to prevent minority groups and women from enjoying equal rights. In fact, the concepts of equality, justice, and peace are congruent with basic Islamic as well as Judaic, Christian, and other religious teachings.22 The urgency of providing human rights education in every settingschool, mosque/temple, and other community fora-is not only so that mutual understanding and respect can be fostered, but so that skills can be developed for nonviolent conflict management in the face of conflicting wants, needs, and lifeways among culturally diverse peoples. Human rights education is therefore closely related to education for peace, for development, and for conflict resolution across ethnic and gender lines. The fall 1992 Mediterranean peace education consultation sponsored by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was an important step in this direction, and its recommendations

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need the support of schools, universities, religious institutions, and research organizations in the region. Specific training in peaceful settlement of disputes will increasingly become available as the UNESCO initiative and other international nonviolence training groups become active in the Middle East.23

Developing Knowledge and Practice in Managing Conflicts Recent developments in the theory and practice of conflict resolution have been dramatic. A broad range of methods of negotiation and mediation have been identified and applied to a great variety of social conflicts. The effects of different kinds of negotiation and mediation methods in different conflict situations are being assessed. Knowledge and experience are also being extended to the prenegotiation and the postagreement states of conflict. It should be noted that the practices of conflict resolution are not intended as a way of bringing adversaries together to accept an inequitable status quo. Seasoned practitioners emphasize the need for struggle in order to reach a situation where balanced negotiations are possible and fair and enduring settlements are likely to emerge. The means of struggle may include nonviolent direct action and other methods that avoid escalation into violence and hasten settlement and reconciliation. Greater understanding of the strategies and tactics of conflict resolution opens up new opportunities for facilitating peace making. Moreover, increased familiarity with such possibilities helps create understanding and encouragement for their application, and provides support for alternative methods of waging and ending conflicts. There is a groundswell of interest on the part of citizens groups as well as governments in many strife-torn parts of the world in learning about conflict resolution. It is becoming increasingly evident that the more destructive weaponry becomes, the less usable it is in actual conflict situations. Because each conflict situation is in some sense unique, the conflict resolution training teams that are multiplying on each continent are learning how to engage in intercultural dialogue in the countries where they work in order that conflict resolution processes can fit local sites. Each conflict calls for dialogue and new learning for all the parties involved. University centers, conflict resolution institutions, and nongovernmental organizations are already playing an increasingly active role in sponsoring conferences, workshops, and consultations, as well as in preparing curricular material for schools and communities on conflict resolution and dispute settlement. In the Middle East as elsewhere this is best done as a collaborative process representing skills from several regions. The subject matter includes, but goes beyond, the exercise of traditional diplomatic skills. Examples of this collaborative process include the Cairo-based

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initiative of the Joint Program on Conflict Resolution, codirected by Dr. Gama Abou el Azayem of Egypt and Dr. Leila F. Dane of the United States,24 and the conflict resolution program at the American University of Beirut (A.U.B.). The Beirut program will offer undergraduate and graduate training in conflict resolution, drawing on theories and practices developed in the West to develop a framework appropriate in the Arab world. The program will work closely with civic groups, beginning with groups concerned about the environment and human rights. In addition to strengthening the capabilities of the civil society, the Beirut program will seek to increase the study and use of conflict resolution in the Middle East generally, starting with the 1993 Conference in Cyprus on Conflict Resolution in Theory and Practise in the Arab World.25

Equitable Social and Economic Development, Utilizing Water and Oil Resources Because of the great unevenness in distribution of different types of natural resources throughout the region, counterbalanced to some degree by a welleducated labor force in certain resource-poor countries, there is a strong basis for complementary exchanges and strong regional development. The Golden Age of Islam was characterized in its first three centuries by a high degree of scientific creativity-a tradition that withered under the impact of succeeding centuries of warfare and outside interference. In the meantime the Arab countries have become technology borrowers, depending on the scientific inventiveness of the West. With the new awareness of the fragility of Middle East environments and the depletion of the nonrenewable resources on which the entire economic development program of the area has been built, the historical moment has arrived for recovery of the earlier tradition of scientific creativity in order to develop a more sustainable way of life for the peoples of the region. Israel has a great deal to contribute to this necessary process of invention, as a relatively resource-poor state with a highly educated citizenry. So does Jordan. So do the new Arab and African institutes of science and technology, and Arab and African scientists trained there as well as in the West. It will take the best joint effort of all the countries of the region to create the stable, productive post-oil economy that can eliminate poverty in the region. It will also require drawing on the rich cultural traditions in the humanities and the arts of each of the diverse peoples of the Middle East, in order to craft a human and social development that is people-centered and spiritually alive, to replace the technology-centered development based on narrowly defined economic principles that has been taking place in recent decades. In many countries of the Middle East, water is scarce and getting scarcer, not only because of growing demand and poor planning practices

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that ignore vital human needs but perhaps more so due to the perceptions by states that control of water is part of their security. In the region as a whole, however, there is considerable potential for making water more available.26 With regional or global cooperation, particularly threatened areas can be greatly aided. Some regional intergovernmental organizations have already placed water shortage problems on their agenda. Nongovernmental organizations also are contributing to increased awareness of this problem, suggesting options for solutions, and mobilizing support for likely solutions. A network of research institutes in Middle East countries and the West is becoming increasingly active in the area of water policy. Each country in the Middle East shares one or more river basin systems with its neighbors. There are many stories of failed efforts at sharing regional water resources in recent times. Even within countries, industry, agriculture, and urban areas have competing interests. It is essential that professional, civic, and user groups from each country-cluster work together with major corporations and governments to keep at the difficult task of developing workable, mutually acceptable water-resource-sharing programs. Community-wide water-resource-development projects will need to include a process of negotiating agreements to replace what states give up in terms of water supplies with other resources they need. Meetings on hydropolitics in the Middle East, such as the one undertaken by the UN University with the International Water Resources Association and other UN bodies in 1992, provide opportunities to combine conflict resolution expertise with technical knowledge to move water negotiations to a new level of practicality. Agricultural development in the Middle East suffers from three major problems: (1) soil is lost to cultivation through industrial development, thus removing badly needed traditionally cultivated acreage; (2) many large-scale "modern" cultivation practices are not appropriate to soil type and water availability where practiced; and (3) wasteful irrigation practices deteriorate soil quality. A model readily available for a major development in Middle East agriculture is the movement of village peasant groups rapidly spreading across Africa over the past decade. This movement is a dramatic witness to the power of local initiative to reclaim deserts, restore soil, and recreate a viable agriculture based on existing know-how and the capacity for learning and innovation among African peasants.27 The most notable thing about oil in the Middle East is how unevenly it is distributed geologically in the region. Some regional and global sharing of this resource results from the movement of people to work in the areas of petroleum production, but the gap between rich and poor states, and between haves and have-nots within states, is very wide. The establishment of banks that provide funds for development and the investment

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of profits from the production of oil need to be carried out in ways that improve the quality of life for the region as a whole. Specific negotiations about more equitable resource access for all countries in the Gulf area must be resumed with much more adequate support and recognition from Middle East states themselves and their regional organizations (such as the Maghreb Union, the Islamic Conference Organization, the Arab League, and the Gulf Cooperation Council), as well as from bordering states in Eurasia and Africa. The fact that Israel is not included in these regional organizations will be a continuing problem until a way is found to provide modalities for Israeli participation in regional negotiation and problem-solving. Turkey will also need to play a fuller regional role in resource-access negotiations. Major powers of the West can be most helpful by working to overcome their addiction to oil and by making more use of science and technology to develop alternative, renewable energy sources. There could be a greater role for the Economic and Social Commission for West Asia (ESCWA), operating under the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), in this process. It is important that Israel become a full participating member in ESCWA to ensure that the types of rethinking that are now going on in Israel are available in this regional dialogue. We are slowly realizing that a basic rethinking of the philosophy of development is imperative worldwide, not just in the Middle East. Reflection on the wise long-term use of nonrenewable resources such as oil and water28 as well as on the creative use of the renewable resources must begin very soon, before too much environmental deterioration and wastage has taken place. Among the human resources available for such rethinking that are not usually thought of are (1) religious scholars knowledgeable about the sound ecological wisdom to be found in the teachings of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam; and (2) women with experience in the intimate linkage among family, community life, and economic systems and how that linkage is acted out, particularly in the work of women to feed their families. This rethinking needs to happen at every level of social organization-locally, nationally, and internationally (in the West as well as in the Middle East). These issues must also be considered at a global level. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has made continuing efforts since the 1970s to begin producer-consumer dialogues that would include states of both the North and South on a full range of energy issues including environmental concerns. (This initiative has been supported by Europe and Japan, but consistently opposed by the U.S. government.) Others have called for the convening of an international conference to be attended by major oil-producing and oil-consuming countries to agree on guidelines for oil policy, to consider establishment of an oil revenue fund

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managed jointly by producers and consumers to support investments in improving energy efficiency, to develop alternative energy sources, and to help poor nations meet their energy needs while minimizing oil consumption.29 The one resource available to all the states-sunlight-remains underused as a renewable energy source. The basic rethinking referred to above will take a long time, but some initiatives can and must be undertaken very soon.

Military Spending Governments in general, and Middle East governments in particular, shortsightedly view a growing domestic arms industry as contributing to their economic development as well as to national security, and are therefore often not truly interested in arms control. Many governments in this region spend extraordinarily high percentages of their gross national product (GNP) on purchasing arms. This cripples economic and social development. Iraq's recent declining economic development after the successful decades of the 1960s and the 1970s provides an outstanding example of this. Military spending also reduces real security as neighboring countries fear attacks and increase their own armaments. There is very substantial research on how military production weakens a country's economy, on the benefits of conversion to civilian production, and on the wisdom of investment in conversion. There are data-based analyses of burdens and costs of arms imports to economic development. There are also empirical analyses of the benefits to security of nonoffensive defense and the benefit of investment in conflict resolution.3° More effective use needs to be made by citizens' groups and transnational associations of this by-now abundant material. The United Nations Resolution on Transparency in Armaments (A/Res/46.36) and its requirement for the establishment of the Registry of Conventional Arms as of January 1, 1992, are important preliminary steps toward monitoring the arms trade. While two United Nations Disarmament Decades have had little effect on overall arms levels, a renewed effort at the regional level may be possible now, given a heightened regional awareness of the dangers of continuing instability in the region (and in the neighboring regions of the Balkans and Central Asia) and the desire to avoid more of the terrible destructiveness unleashed in the Gulf War. A multinational regional conference could be held soon, with national and transnational professional and activist peace groups fully participating, to develop specific protocols for disarmament. Agreed-upon restrictions on arms purchases and strategies for conversion of weaponry and military installations to peacetime uses would be important agenda items. The European Community (EC) can play an important role in helping to develop common guidelines on arms export control based on its own recent work in the field.31

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An important boost for such a conference was the April 1990 initiative of President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt for a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. The initiative was supported by a declaration of the 1990 Baghdad Arab Summit meeting, which held only a reservation for continuing civilian nuclear technology, and further initiatives by President Mubarak keep the agenda item alive. Existing Zone of Peace treaties also provide for continuing civilian nuclear technology, including the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The 1985 Treaty of Raratonga is another important regional denuclearization initiative; the historical evidence suggests that this can be a viable first step toward arms control.

Structures for the New Community of Nations It will take time for the conditions to exist for constructing enduring institutional arrangements for the promotion of peace and justice in the region. In one sense it is premature to discuss such arrangements when so much groundwork needs to be laid, but it is nonetheless helpful to imagine possibilities-to create images of what could be-as guides for our actions in the present. We have done this in the "Preferred World" section above. Here we briefly explore further what some new regional institutions might look like. '

Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East The experience of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the proposals (by Italy and Spain) for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean/Middle East (CSCM/ME) can serve as points of departure for thinking about a new security arrangement in the Middle East.32 An appropriately designed structure offers the possibility of replacing U.S.-backed military security with community-sponsored and guaranteed security, one based on shared interests of the peoples of the Middle East rather than on outside interests. It also eliminates the need for allocating scarce resources to national armed forces and to arms races that serve only to escalate conflicts, mistrust, and insecurity. Such a CSCM/ME could help strengthen currently weak regional infrastructures and offer mechanisms to deal with (1) demilitarization and inspection of defense installations throughout the culture area; (2) development of nonoffensive defense strategies usable only for internal defense of each country; (3) establishment of a zone of peace agreement as the larger context for (1) and (2); (4) economic and resource unevenness; (5) safeguarding minorities of the region; (6) nurturing of indigenous democracy movements; and (7) development of cross-cultural exchanges, building on the existing institutions such as the Euro-Arab Itinerant University currently based in Rome.

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The recent report for the EC Commission, The Middle East and Europe: An Integrated Communities Approach, indicates a readiness on the part of the EC to share expertise and to support a process toward a CSCM/ME. The report emphasizes the need to help strengthen regional intergovernmental as well as national governmental and nongovernmental infrastructures.33 There are three areas in which the EC might play a special role in helping the CSCM/ME process: (1) the expansion of the EC's development projects in the West Bank and Gaza into an opportunity for ArabIsraeli cooperation; (2) the extension of the EC's development projects to Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Central Asian republics to assist with the integration of these states into the region and to build the basis for a nonmilitary security system in the area; and (3) the adoption of severe restrictions on arms sales and exports of arms from EC countries to the states in the Middle East.

New Security Institutions As confidence building develops through collaborative projects in the region, a parallel process of developing new state, regional, and global institutions could begin to reduce reliance on military means to provide for national security. At the country level, there may in many cases be the possibility of transarmament into defense structures that retain or increase their defensive capability while reducing or eliminating their offensive capability. To what extent this is possible and how to do it calls for closer analysis of local conditions. One advantage of this is that because it can then be done unilaterally without loss of security, it is not as dependent on difficult and often abortive negotiations between parties as are many forms of disarmament. Another advantage is that such transarmament leads to more stable relations in which the risk of escalation of conflicts is less because there is less of a premium on striking first and therefore also smaller risks for preemptive strikes. Still another advantage is that transarmament in this direction reduces the degree to which the defensive efforts of one adversary stimulate those of the other. Adversaries are thus not stimulated to arm in order to retaliate. Several European countries have given serious consideration to what has come to be known as nonoffensive defense (NOD), and a body of relevant strategic research is now available to be drawn upon by Middle East specialists.34 Farther down the road, security could be supported by the development of a well-organized civilian-based defense system. This type of approach, with roots in local community institutions, involves training the women and men of each community not only for nonviolent active resistance in the event of an invasion but for practical nonviolent conflict

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resolution and problem-solving at the local level. This approach democratizes defense and it democratizes community problem-solving. At the regional level the parallel development would be the development of a nuclear-weapon-free zone or, in broader terms, a zone of peace.J5 The establishment of such a zone could spur multifaceted dialogue among states inside and outside the region, also involving intergovernmental bodies and citizens' groups. In the context of the development of other positive problem-solving approaches mentioned above, discussions about a zone of peace can be initiated by both nongovernmental and intergovernmental bodies of the region, culminating in a regionwide conference involving both kinds of groups for more formal action. Details of actual steps to be taken would have to be worked out state by state. At the global level, more attention needs to be paid to the strengthening of the UN capability for impartial peacekeeping, along the lines of the Agenda for Peace Report laid before the UN General Assembly by the Secretary General in June 1992.36 Fuller use of the Court of International Justice would also be beneficial. The strengthening of the largely inactive Military Staff Committee of the United Nations would be an important step in strengthening the competence of UN forces for rapid response in crises. As national defense forces become smaller, more financial resources can be made available to UN forces by member states, especially the larger ones. Economic Integration

Community-wide economic institutions need to be founded. Initially, these institutions will have to rely on national institutions to share the work of developing resources. The immense inequalities in the region pose great dangers and also obstacles to community-wide institutions. However, as has already been pointed out, a number of Arab and Islamic institutions, both subregional and regionwide, now exist.37 They are not inclusive and their infrastructure is weak. Inclusiveness (particularly including Israel) will grow as other trust-building activities evolve. Strengthening the infrastructure of economic institutions requires drawing more systematically on the strengths of existing cadres of young professionals trained in the Middle East and abroad. It also requires the development of more institutions for relevant education and training in the Middle East itself, and the control of internal corruption and outside manipulation, which distorts healthy socioeconomic priorities. More democratic participation by an increasingly well-educated citizenry, resolved to decrease the gap between rich and poor, will enhance the effectiveness of existing or proposed regulatory authorities for activities from banking to oil and water development to agriculture. Incremental, step-by-step efforts are more likely to be

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successful in the long term than rapid movements toward political and economic union.

Democratization Most of the discussion about democracy in the Middle East since World War II and earlier has been in terms of how the Western mode of democracy can be reconciled with Islam, and how authoritarian governments have contributed to the failure of democratic institutions in the region. The many cultures of the Middle East, including the Christian cultures, have evolved along different paths than the Western one. Therefore, to use particular practices developed in Europe and North America as criteria for democracy in the Middle East is to invite the hostility of all but the most Westernized Middle Easterners. People of the region want to enter the modern, more participatory world in their own way. Of course, Western-defined requisites of democracy such as communication, media exposure, education, industrialization, urbanization, literacy, economic prosperity, and the like have a role to play. But whereas Western democracy tends to be mostly concerned with processes and institutions that are expected to ensure equal opportunities for participation in choosing alternatives, with individual freedoms as the ultimate goal, the Arab-Islamic and other strong traditional cultures of the region tend to seek first a just, honest, and responsive government, responsible for common economic welfare, the protection of human dignity, and public security. Because Islam is one of the most significant cultural forces in the region, Western perceptions that Islam is inherently antidemocratic are of concern. The evidence is indeed clear that Islamic religion and culture value such universally desirable ends as justice, fairness, welfare, equality, responsibility, accountability, legitimacy, and consensus, and that Islamic jurisprudence requires their realization. Islam and other cultures of the region are rich both in normative assumptions about how women and men should live together on earth, and rich in means, processes, and mechanisms for achieving the corollary goals. In Islam, shura (consultation), ijma (consensus), and the millet system (cultural and political autonomy for religious minorities) exemplify such traditions. As in all polities, however, these norms and practices are often more honored in the breach than in the observance. Whereas Western-style democracies have focused on the freedom of the individual somewhat at the cost of emphasis on the obligations and duties toward the polity, Muslim cultures and some, but not all, other traditional cultures of the region emphasize these obligations and duties somewhat at the cost of an adequate emphasis on individual human beings. In fact, both Western and Middle East cultures have failed to provide for the

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full human development of women, and what participatory practices exist in societies of both the West and Middle East are badly flawed because of the privatization of women and their virtual exclusion from decisionmaking in public arenas-although the exclusion is more extreme in the Middle East than in the West. In both culture worlds this exclusion is justified by reference to the sanctity of the family. There is little disagreement that current participatory democratic institutions need strengthening in Middle Eastern countries. However, it is important to recognize that the region has its own history of settling disputes, choosing alternatives, selecting public officials and holding them accountable, and ensuring honesty and integrity in public life through consultation and participatory policymaking. A number of current governments may be too contaminated by authoritarianism and corruption to serve as useful models. But village and tribal communities still uphold and practice many of the traditional methods of consultation and consensus; thus they offer security to minorities as a right, share scarce resources, and remove dishonest or incompetent community leaders. Rethinking is going on in each Middle East society as to how the best of religious and traditional teaching and practice can be applied in redesigning institutions of governance. One important task is to create the missing links between vigorous local participation and responsible, accountable decisionmaking at the national level. Another is to see that no ethnic, religious, or culture group, and no particular class of people by reason of gender or other characteristics, is excluded from the participation process.3 8 The Future Is Open Those of us from the Middle East and the West alike can try the kind of thinking suggested here-and work at visualizing a vigorous, culturally alive Middle East with a thriving civil society maintaining innovative, diversity-preserving structures of governance, stretching from the Straits of Gibraltar to the Arabian Gulf. We can visualize flourishing institutions for education, science, and culture tied into regionwide networks that support world-renowned centers for innovation and lay the groundwork for a new twenty-first century, environmentally conserving agro-industrialization that supports fulfilling lifeways for everyone. However, only the Middle East itself can generate the actual images of the future that will capture the imagination and social energies of its peoples. The possibilities are many, and there is still time. For the rest of us, the task is to help break longstanding habits and patterns of Western interventionism and to stand back and make room for something fresh-for developments that will further enrich the human spirit and the human communities of the future.

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DISSENTING COMMENTS BY COMMISSION MEMBERS AND CONSULTANTS At the Kyoto IPRA meeting at which the first version of this document was intensively discussed, Elise Boulding promised that dissenting views would be noted at the close of the final version of the document. A revised version was circulated after the Kyoto meeting, and twenty Commission members and consultants gave detailed comments, which have been taken account of in the third revision, as far as possible. The editor would like to express her appreciation to the participants for the time and thought that went into the feedback process. As a result, the document is far better than it would have been without that diverse and expert input. The editor accepts full responsibility for mistakes that failed to get corrected. Because there are disagreements about emphasis and even about facts, it has been impossible to incorporate all views in the document itself. A summary of dissents and critical comments-not identified by author because there was considerable overlap in comments-follows. 1. There should have been more emphasis on European colonialism and on the role of current global powers in terms of intervention, control, and hegemony. Some felt there was too much and too favorable emphasis on the role of the European Community and the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly. 2. There have been continuing disagreements on the breadth of the definition of the Middle East, on whether to give more emphasis to the diversity of cultures and civilizations or to give more primacy to Arab and Muslim civilization. The problem of keeping religion, culture, and ethnicity distinct was not successfully solved. 3. Some felt that not enough emphasis was given to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, others felt it was emphasized too much. 4. Some felt there should be stronger statements about injustices and oppression in the Arab world, including the oppression of women, and that the population problem received insufficient attention. One participant wrote: "There is no half freedom or Islamic freedom or Jewish freedom. Freedom is indivisible." The dangers of fundamentalism, regardless of religion of origin, were seen as not addressed strongly enough. By the same token some felt that the idealistic values of Zionism as a creative social vision were downplayed in concern for the injustices of the Israeli government. 5. Some were concerned that the document underestimated the difficulties of the underlying conflicts, that there were imbalances in emphasis, and that there was too little specificity on strategies of problem-solving and conflict resolution. By trying to do too much, perhaps too little was accomplished.

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6. Who were we, anyway-a group of peace researchers from very diverse cultural backgrounds, North, South, East, West-to think we could say something as a group about a region whose realities only a few of us could really understand? One consultant in the end rejected association with the project and with the document, which he felt was a completely colonial reductionist and irrelevant view of the Middle East, with these words: My visions of the future ... have been frustrated by a folkloric and quasi paternalistic approach to the future of the Middle East. It is a post-colonization of the future of other peoples which excludes the expression of their endogenous dreams and visions.

Nevertheless, with all its weaknesses, we offer this document as an attempt to communicate the possibilities of shared efforts at peace building, by actors in the various civic cultures of the North and the South, as well as by those who function within the governmental and UN structures that in their present forms are so inadequate to the planet's future. Elise Boulding Editor

COMMISSION ON PEACE BUILDING IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Drafting and Editorial Committee Elise Boulding Former Secretary-General, International Peace Research Association Project Director, International Peace Research Association Commission on Peace Building in the Middle East, Boulder, Colorado, USA Richard F alk Professor Director, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, New Jersey, USA Louis Kriesberg Professor of Sociology Director, Program in Analysis and Resolution of Conflict, Syracuse University, New York, USA Saul Mendlovitz Acting Secretary, Dag Hammarskjold Professor of Peace and World Order Studies, Rutgers University Law School, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA Director, World Order Models Project, New York, New York, USA

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Hassan Nejad Professor, Department of Political Science, Antioch College, Ohio, USA Former Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Teheran University Law School, Teheran, Iran Paul Smoker Secretary-General, International Peace Research Association Lloyd Professor of Peace Studies and World Law, Antioch College, Ohio, USA Maria Krenz Editorial Assistant, Boulder, Colorado, USA

Commission Members MubarakAwad Director, Nonviolence International Public Affairs Office, Washington, D.C., USA Founder-Director, Palestinian Center for Study of Nonviolence, Jerusalem, Israel Judit Balazs Senior Research Fellow, Institute for World Economics; Deputy Director, Center for Peace Research; Hungarian Academy of Science, Budapest, Hungary Founder and Deputy Director, African and Oriental Studies and Trade Development Foundation-AFRORIENT Abdelwahab Biad Professor of Law, Institute de Droit, Universite D' Annaba, Annaba, Algeria Israel Charny Director, Institute of the International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide; Professor of Psychology, School of Social Work, University of Tel Aviv, Tel Aviv, Israel Kevin Clements Professor of Sociology, Peace Research Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Australia Najwa Makhoul Research Associate, Population Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA Founding Director, Jerusalem Institute for the Study of Society, Jerusalem, Palestine K. Mathews Professor, Department of African Studies, University of Delhi, Delhi, India

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Syed Sikander Mehdi Professor and Chair, Department of International Relations, University of Karachi, Karachi, Pakistan Solomon Nkiwane Professor and Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe Peter Okoh Executive Director, African Peace Research Institute, Lagos, Nigeria Sanaa Osseiran Representative to UNESCO for IPRA, Paris, France Director, Cultural Symbiosis, Al-Andalous Project, Paris, France llrsula Oswald Research Associate, Centro Regional de Investigaciones Multidisciplinarias, UNAM, Cuernavaca, Mexico Peri Pamir Research Associate, Conference of European Rectors, Geneva, Switzerland Kumar Rupesinghe Secretary General, International Alert, London, United Kingdom Yoshikazu Sakamoto Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan Chaiwat Satha-Anand Professor, Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand Mohammed Sid-Ahmed Journalist, Al-Ahram newspaper, Cairo, Egypt Lev Voronkov Director, International Institute for Peace, Vienna, Austria Hakan Wiberg Director, Center for Peace and Conflict Research, University of Copenhagen, Denmark

Commission Consultants Who Contributed Papers Mohammed Abo-Nimer Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, USA Maher Abu-Taleb Jordan Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., USA

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Samir Amin UNITAR, Dakar, Senegal Charles Amjad-Ali Christian Study Centre, Rawalpindi Cantt, Pakistan Mohammed Arkoun Paris, France HananAwwad Jerusalem, Palestine Anthony Ayok Chol Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania Centre for Refugee Studies, York University, Ontario, Canada Tariq Banuri International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Islamabad, Pakistan Frank Barnaby Defense Analyst and Writer on Military Technology, Institute for Strategic Studies, London, UK Former Director of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Stockholm, Sweden Eliezer Ben Rafael University of Tel Aviv, Israel Alejandro Bendana Center for International Studies, Universidad Centroamericana, Managua, Nicaragua Landrum Bolling Washington, D.C., USA Winifred Byanyima Assistant to Uganda's Representative to UNESCO and Permanent Delegate of Uganda to UNESCO, Paris, France James Calleja Foundation for International Studies, University of Malta Carl Conetta Project on Defense Alternatives, Commonwealth Institute, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA Juergen Dedring Department of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations, New York, New York, USA Ali E. Hillal Dessouki Center for Political Research, Faculty of Economic and Political Science, University of Cairo, Egypt

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Aabha Dixit Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, India Muhammed Faour American University, Beirut, Lebanon Herbert Feith Monash University, Melbourne, Australia Haim Gordon Ben Gurian University, Beer Sheva, Israel Juan Gutierrez Gernika Gogoratuz, Guernica, Spain Michael Harbottle Brigadier General (Ret.) Director, Centre for International Peacebuilding, Chipping Norton, UK MiriamLowi Morocco Center of International Studies, Princeton University, New Jersey, USA Dorothea El Mallakh International Research Center for Energy and Economic Development, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, USA Toshiki Mogami International Christian University, Mitakan, Tokyo, Japan Radmila Nakarada Institute for European Studies, Belgrade, Yugoslavia Emile Nakhleh John Morrison Professor of International Studies, Mount Saint Mary's College, Emmitsburgh, Maryland, USA Indar Rikhye U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., USA Sallama Shaker Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., USA Simona Sharoni Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, USA Omar Sheikhmous Center for Research on International Migration and Ethnic Relations, University of Stockholm, Stockholm, Sweden Alan Smith World Council of Indigenous Peoples, Cawongla, Australia Majid Tehranian Institute for Peace, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA

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Stephen Zunes Institute New Middle East Policy, Bainbridge, Washington, USA

Commission Consultants

Evelyn Blamont ISSC, UNESCO, Paris, France Stephen Collett Quaker United Nations Office, New York, New York, USA Leila Dane Joint Program on Conflict Resolution, Institute for Victims of Trauma, McLean, Virginia, USA Richard Eisendorf Search for Common Ground, Initiative for Peace and Cooperation in the Middle East, Washington, D.C., USA Scilla Elworthy Oxford Research Group, Oxford, UK Saad Eddin Ibrahim Ibn Khaldoun Center for Developmental Studies, Cairo, Egypt Robert Johanson Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana Anthony Judge Union of International Associations, Brussels, Belgium MaryKaldor Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, Sussex, UK EdyKaufman Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, Jerusalem, Israel Herbert Kelman Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA Peter King Department of Government and Public Administration, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia Katsuya Kodama Department of Humanities, Mie University, Mie-Ken, Japan George Kutukdjian Division on Human Rights and Peace, UNESCO, Paris, France Robin Ludwig UN Peace Studies Unit, United Nations, New York, New York, USA

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Abdel Salam Majali World Council Affairs, Amman, Jordan Tuomo Melasuo Tampere Peace Research Institute, Tampere, Finland Lester Ruiz International Christian University, Mitaka, Tokyo, Japan Dieter Senghaas University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany Takeo Uchida UN University, Tokyo, Japan Janusz Symonides Division of Human Rights and Peace, UNESCO, Paris, France

NOTES 1. See Johan Galtung, "Entropy and the General Theory of Peace," in Proceedings of the International Peace Research Association, Second Conference (Assen: Van Gorcum and Co., 1968); Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). 2. Roy R. Anderson et a!., Sources of Conflict and Accommodation (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1987); Peter Beaumont, The Middle East: A Geographical Study (London: John Wiley, 1976); George B. Cressey, Crossroads: Land and Life in Southwest Asia (Chicago: Lippincott, 1960); William B. Fisher, The Middle East: A Physical, Social and Regional Geography (London: Methuen, 1978); Don Peretz, The Middle East Today (New York: Praeger, 1988). 3. The research of Marc Howard Ross clarifies this relationship; note especially Marc Howard Ross, "Social Structure, Psychological Dispositions and Violent Conflict: Extensions from a Cross-Cultural Study," in James Silverberg and J. Patrick Gray (eds.), Aggression and Nonaggression in Humans and Other Primates (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Marc Howard Ross, "Childrearing, Social Organization and Warfare in Preindustrial Societies," in Francesca Canian and William Gibson (eds.), Making War-Making Peace: Social Foundations of Modern Conflict (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1990). 4. Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Jordan and the Gulf Crisis, August 1990-March 1991: White Paper (Amman, Jordan, 1991). 5. Gerd Nonneman (ed.), The Middle East and Europe: An Integrated Communities Approach (London: Federal Trust for Education and Research, ©EC Commission, 1992). 6. Inter-Parliamentary Union, Preparatory Documents for the Interparliamentary Union Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, prepared by Morocco and France (CSCM/I/5 (a,b, and c)-M.2): (a) "Regional stability: political and military aspects of security"; (b) "Co-development: cooperation and partnership in the economic, social, scientific and environmental fields"; (c) "Dialogue among civilizations and human rights: Mutual respect, cultural cooperation and the human dimensions" (Geneva, Switzerland: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1992). 7. Women's networks that cover all continents form key coordinating centers and provide information and support in every arena of women's needs and

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concerns. Such networks include The International Women's Tribune Centre, New York (founded during the first International Women's Year Conference in 1975); ISIS International, Santiago, Rome, and the Philippines; Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), Brazil; Grass Roots Organizations Operating Together for Sisterhood (GROOTS), Madras, India; and Women, Environment and Sustainable Development, Amsterdam. More information on women's networks will be found in Elise Boulding, The Underside of History: A View of Women Through Time, rev. ed. (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1992). 8. John Burton, Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict: A Handbook (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987); Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas, World Security: Trends and Challenges at Century's End (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); Saul Mendlovitz and R. B. J. Walker (eds.), One World, Many Worlds: Struggles for a Just World Peace (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988); Louis Kriesberg, Terrell Northrup, and Stuart Thorson (eds.), Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1989). 9. The Arab League successfully mediated the border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait in 1963. Similar mediation efforts were under way in the months before the Gulf War, but were squeezed out by big-power initiatives. In the 1980s the Arab League set up conciliation missions and mediation committees for disputes between Morocco and Mauritania, Jordan and Syria, Iraq and Syria, and Iraq and Libya. It played a role in the formation of the Maghreb Union. In the case of the Iran-Iraq war, the League made numerous efforts to negotiate an end to the war, but did not succeed. 10. Note the following UN publications: UN Department of Disarmament Affairs, The International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, May 31-June 25, 1988 (New York: United Nations, 1988); UN Department of Disarmament Affairs, Study on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, Report of the Secretary General to the UN General Assembly, 36th session, 69.A/36/356 (1981); UN Department of Disarmament Affairs, Disarmament and Development: Report of the Group of Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament (New York: United Nations, 1973); UN Department of Disarmament Affairs, Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament (New York: United Nations, 1962). 11. See John W. Burton, Conflict and Communication: The Use of Controlled Communication in International Relations (New York: Free Press, 1969); John W. Burton, Global Conflict, The Domestic Sources of International Crises (London: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., 1984); Don Carlson and Craig Comstock, Citizen Summitry, Ark Communications Institute Book (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986); Haim Gordon and Rivka Gordon (eds.), Israel/Palestine: The Quest for Dialogue (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1991); John W. McDonald, Jr., and Diane Bendahmane, Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State, 1987). 12. There are a number of overlapping networks. The most inclusive network reporting is done by the Initiative for Peace and Cooperation in the Middle East, a project of Search for Common Ground. It publishes a quarterly bulletin that includes profiles of NGOs and other bodies seeking to advance regional cooperation, both scholarly and activist, in the Middle East. The Bulletin of Regional Cooperation in the Middle East is published at 1601 Connecticut Ave. NW, Suite 200, Washington, D.C. 20009. 13. An IPRA-sponsored conference at UNESCO, Paris, on peace building in Lebanon brought representatives from thirty-three Lebanese NGOs and represen-

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tatives from an additional eighteen NGOs, all actively concerned with the situation in Lebanon. See Sanaa Osseiren (rapporteur), Peace Building and Development in Lebanon (Paris: IPRA and UNESCO, 1991). The report of a Canadian-based international research project on peace for Lebanon gives a similar picture of the extent of international linkage that continues to be available to Lebanon. See Deirdre Collings and Jill Tandy, "Peace for Lebanon," Working Paper 43 (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1992). 14. Charles Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962). See also Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). 15. See, for example, V. Spike Peterson (ed.), Gendered States, Feminist (Re) Visions of International Relations Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992); J. Ann Tickner, Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992). See also Birgit Brock Utne, Feminist Perspectives on Peace and Peace Education (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press, 1988); Betty Reardon, Sexism and the War System (New York: Teachers College Press, 1985). 16. See Haim Gordon and Leonard Grob (eds.), Education for Peace: Testimonies from World Religions (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1987). See also the analysis of male and female culture differences in Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982). The indigenous peoples of the Middle East have a special contribution to make, in terms of language and ways of thinking, to the development of new relationships among peoples and with the earth. These indigenous peoples include the Berber peoples of North Africa, the Turkmen of Central Asia, and the Bedouin of the Negev, as well as other nomadic peoples such as the Qashqa (Turkic) and the Bakhtiars (Persian). See David McDowell, Minorities in the Middle East (London: Minority Rights Group International, 1992); and other publications of the Minority Rights Group. The International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs (IGWIA) has drafted a Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples for the UN Year of Indigenous Peoples in 1993. The draft is available from IGWIA, Copenhagen, Denmark. 17. Examples from a much longer list of organizations that include both Israelis and Arabs (Palestinians and others) working together for peace, coexistence, and human rights include Palestinians and Israelis for Nonviolence (Branch of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation); Reshet (Women's Network for the Advancement of Peace); Runners for Peace (sponsored by Runner's World); Women and Peace coalition; Association for the Support and Defense of Bedouin Rights in Israel (Bedouin and Jewish members); Association of Israeli and Palestinian Physicians for Human Rights; Clergy for Peace Dialogue Group of Muslim, Christian and Jewish clergy; Committee of Israeli and Palestinian Artists Against the Occupation; Interns for Peace Program (Israeli and American Jews and Arabs); and Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information. A much longer list with addresses is available from Alternative Information Center, P .0. Box 24278, Jerusalem. 18. Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958). 19. The October 1992 issue of the Ibn Khaldoun Center Newsletter, Civil Society, covers activities in eleven countries: Egypt, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, and Tunisia. 20. See Kevin Dwyers, Arab Voices: The Human Rights Debate in the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). The Human Rights Tribune, a publication of the Human Rights Internet, Ottawa, Canada, reports fully on

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Arab/Middle East human rights activities, as does The 4th R, an Amnesty International Bulletin on Human Rights published in the United States. 21. Papers from a mid-1980s Arab Women's Solidarity Conference have been published in Nahid Toubia (ed.), Women of the Arab World, The Coming Challenge (London: Zed Books, 1988). An important collection of bios-withbibliographies describing the research of 143 women scholars of the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) on the economic and social participation of women in society has recently been published by the UN University's World Institute for Economic Development Research (UNU-WIDER). See Touria Hadraoui and Myriam Monkachi, Etudes Feministes, Repertoire et Bibliographie (Casablanca: Editions Le Fennec, 1991). Other important publications from UNU-WIDER include Valentine M. Moghadam, "Development and Patriarchy: The Middle East and North Africa in Economic and Demographic Transition," Working Paper (Helsinki, Finland: WIDER, 1992); and C. Jean Weidemann and Zohra Merabet, "Egyptian Women and Microenterprise: The Invisible Entrepreneurs," Technical Report no. 34 (Bethesda, MD: Development Alternatives, Inc. 1992). INSTRAW, the UN International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women in the Dominican Republic, maintains active links with governmental bodies and women's groups in Egypt, the Sudan, Morocco, Iraq, and Libya; conducts collaborative projects with local groups; and presents a series of training seminars for women of member countries of the League of Arab States. INSTRAW is also exploring the possibility of women and development projects in member countries of the Islamic Conference Organization, through OIC institutes and research centers. Further insight on the situation of women can be gained from Nawal El Saadawi, The Hidden Face of Eve, Sherif Hetata (trans.) (London: Zed Books, 1988); Nadia Hijab, Womanpower: The Arab Debate on Women at Work (Cambridge: Cambridge Middle East Library, Cambridge University Press, 1988). 22. Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992); Fatima Mermissi, The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women's Rights in Islam, Mary Jo Lakeland, trans. (New York: Addison Wesley, 1987). 23. James Calleja, "Educating for Peace in the Mediterranean: A Model for Peace Building," paper presented at the 1992 IPRA Conference, Kyoto, Japan, to the Commission on Peace Building in the Middle East. 24. Leila Dane (ed.), The Cairo Proceedings: Proceedings of the First Conference of the Joint Program on Conflict Resolution (McLean, VA: Institute for Victims of Trauma, 1992). Training for international and crosscultural negotiation and nonviolent problem-solving is increasingly offered by institutes in Europe, Africa, and Asia, as well as in Euro-North America. In addition to the new Cairo Center, there is the Conflict Resolution Network based in Chatswood, New South Wales, Australia; the Center for Intergroup Studies at the University of Capetown, South Africa; Nonviolence International, originally founded in Palestine; the Bradford School of Peace Studies, Bradford, United Kingdom; Gernika Gogoratuz in Gernika, Spain; the Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Sweden; the International Negotiation Network at the Carter Center, Emory University, Georgia, United States; and many more on every continent. All have international groups of trainees preparing to deal with conflicts nonviolently in every conceivable kind of setting. 25. The American University of Beirut has been holding annual conflict resolution learning workshops for the past three years, most recently in Cyprus. Information on the program is available directly from Dean Paul Salem or Professor Muhammad Faour at A.U.B.

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26. See Maher Abu-Taleb, "Regional Cooperation in Water Resources Management," paper prepared for IPRA Commission on Peace Building in the Middle East, Kyoto, Japan, 1992; Peter Haas, Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Miriam Lowi, Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Miriam Lowi, "Conflict and Cooperation in Resource Development," paper presented at 1992 IPRA Conference, IPRA Commission on Peace Building in the Middle East; Oran Young, International Cooperation: Building Resource Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989). 27. See Pierre Pradervand, Listening to Africa: Developing Africa from the Grassroots (New York: Praeger, 1989). 28. Although water is considered a renewable resource in a global sense, it is most often a nonrenewable resource in a location-specific context. 29. Michael Adams (ed.), The Middle East (London: Muller, Blond and White Ltd., 1987); Khhaldoun Hasan Al-Naqeeb, Society and State in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula: A Different Perspective (London and New York: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1990); Charles F. Doran and Stephen W. Buck (eds.), The Gulf, Energy, and Global Security: Political and Economic Issues (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991); Dorothea El Mallakh, "Middle East Oil Resource Policies," paper prepared for the IPRA Commission on Peace Building in the Middle East, Kyoto, Japan, 1992; Melvin A. Friedlander, Conviction and Credence: US Policymaking in the Middle East (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991 ); Yousef Mohammad and Walter Mead, World Oil Prices: Demand, Supply and Substitutes (Boulder, Colo.: International Research Center for Energy and Economic Development, 1990); Mohamed Rabie, The New World Order (New York: Vantage Press, 1992); Daniel Yergin, The Prize (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991). 30. See note 8 for references on the economics of disarmament and the relationship of disarmament to development. On economic conversion, see Lloyd Dumas and Marek Thee (eds.), Making Peace Possible: The Promise of Economic Conversion (London: Pergamon Press, 1989); Seymour Melman, The Demilitarized Society: Disarmament and Conversion (Montreal: Harvest House, 1988); Peter Southwood, Disarming Military Industries: Turning an Outbreak of Peace into an Enduring Legacy (London: Macmillan, 1991). On arms control, see Scilla Elworthy and Paul Ingram (eds.), International Control of the Arms Trade, Current Decisions Report #7 (Oxford: Oxford Research Group); Joseph Rotblat and John P. Holdren (eds.), Building Global Security Through Cooperation: Annals of Pugwash, 1989 (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1990); Valinakis and Yannis Nicolaou, CFE Treaty Impact on Mediterranean Security (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy, University of Athens); Kostas Lordanidis, Fotis Kikiras, Ted Couloumbis, Kostas Hadjikonstantinoy,CFE and Beyond: Security and Naval Arms Control in the Mediterranean (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy, University of Athens); Centro de lnvestigacion Para La Paz, Madrid, Naval Strategies in the Mediterranean; (B. Rauenel, R. Ragioneri et al.); United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), The United Nations, Disarmament and Security: Evolution and Prospects (New York and Geneva: UNIDIR, 1991); "Disarmament, Environment, Security" (special issue), UNIDIR Newsletter #18 (July 1992); Raimo Vayrynen, Military Industrialization and Economic Development, Theory and Historical Case Studies, a UNIDIR publication (Aldershot, Hants, UK: Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1992). 31. Ian Anthony and Paul Evis, Regulating Arms Exports: A Programme for the European Community (Bristol, UK: Saferworld Foundation, 1992); Burns

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Weston (ed.), Alternative Security: Living Without Nuclear Deterrence (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press). 32. Martin Kohler, "Italian Search for Mediterranean Security in Perspective of Transatlantic Security Relations," Mediterranean Quarterly 2 (1991 ): 4. 33. Gerd Nonnemann, The Middle East and Europe: An Integrated Communities Approach, a report of the EC Commission (London: Federal Trust for Education and Research; Brussels: Trans-European Policy Studies Association, 1992). 34. The International Research Newsletter, NOD and Conversion, gives full reports of research and policy activity in the field. It is published at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, University of Copenhagen. See also David Gates, Non-Offensive Defense: An Alternative Strategy for NATO? (London: Macmillan, 1991); Bjorn Moller, Common Security and Non-Offensive Defense. A Neorealist Perspective (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992); Gene Sharp, Making Europe Unconquerable: The Potential of Civilian-Based Deterrence and Defense (London: Taylor and Francis Ltd., 1985). 35. For an overview of this subject, see Elise Boulding, "The Zone of Peace Concept in Current Practise: Review and Evaluation," in Robert H. Bruce (ed.), Prospects for Peace: Changes in the Indian Ocean Region (Perth, Western Australia: Indian Ocean Centre for Peace Studies, Monograph no. 1, 1992). See also United Nations, Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones in A lilts Aspects, Special Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Publication E.76.1.7 (New York: United Nations, 1976). 36. United Nations, "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping," Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council and the UN General Assembly, UN A/47/277; S/2411, June 17, 1992. See also Thomas G. Weiss and Jarat Chopra, United Nations Peacekeeping. An ACUNS Teaching Text, ACUNS Reports and Papers 1992-1 (Hanover, N.H.: Dartmouth College, 1992). 37. World Muslim Gazeteer (Karachi, Pakistan: The World Muslim Congress Research and Publication Bureau, 1985). 38. Gilles Kepel and Yann Richard (eds.), lntel/ectuels et Militants de L'lslam Contemporain (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1990). See also Haim Gordon and Leonard Grob, Education for Peace: Testimonies from World Religions (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1987); Edy Kaufman, Shukri B. Abed, and Robert L. Rothstein (eds.), Democracy, Peace, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993); Sanaa Osseiran, "The Democratization Process in the Arab-Islamic States of the Middle East," paper presented at 1992 IPRA Conference, Kyoto, Japan, to the Commission on Peace Building in the Middle East.

1 Democratization in the Middle East from an Islamic Perspective CHARLES AMJAD-ALI

SETTING THE PARAMETERS The title of this chapter poses a serious problem from the outset. It assumes a geographical limit for Islam that is neither factually nor ideologically sustainable. In terms of the sheer number of people involved, this geographical limit is unjust, to say the least, as the absolute majority of Muslims live outside of what is conventionally thought of as the Middle East. Thus, when dealing with Islam and the democratization process, one of the main political and religio-ethical issues that surfaces is the validity of the tendency to reduce Islamic societies to the Middle East. Equating the Islamic perspective with the Middle East has an important historical background that needs to be uncovered to understand both the current crisis in the Middle East and the tension between Islam and the West. However, limiting the study of democratization in an Islamic perspective to a purely Middle Eastern context overlooks the other major strains that have contributed to the current generation and character of the crisis. Looking at the major milestones of Islamic history, one can argue that the emergence of Islam in the Arabian peninsula and its rapid expansion over most of the Mediterranean basin, which the West assumes to be its base of civilization and cultural foundation, caused difficulty between Europe and Islam from the very outset.! That difficulty has surfaced over and over. For most of the period of Islamic existence (some 800 of its 1,400 years) Muslims remained entrenched, but in the last 500 years there have been continuous victories scored by the West over the Muslims. This has left the Muslim world divided and uncertain, which fundamentally affects the democratization process. Looking at the history of Islam more closely, one sees that from the initial Islamic expansion and throughout the heyday of the Islamic dominance until the fifteenth century, Europe was fenced off from the land

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trade routes to India and China, and therefore its potential for economic growth was seriously limited. The Crusades failed to force a trade route through this Islamic fence. European success came only in the fifteenth century when the Moors were pushed out of Spain. Incidentally, the year of this victory also saw the expansion of Europe into the Americas and the acquisition of massive wealth, which allowed Europe to expand its power and glory. More recently a series of situations have all contributed to create ever new, as well as to sustain the old, biases in the West against Islam and Muslim states: (1) the disintegration of the Ottoman Turkish Empire and the importance of creating new Middle Eastern states for the weakening of the Ottoman Empire (this process coincidentally matched the growing importance of crude oil); (2) the establishment of the state of Israel and the dislocation of the Palestinian people as well as the support for Israel against all norms of just behavior; (3) continuing tensions between the state of Israel and Arab states, which erupted in the 1967 and 1973 wars, and theresultant oil crises, which had direct impact on the daily lives of the people in Europe and America; (4) the Iranian Revolution and its aftermath of massive vilification campaign against Muslims during, as well as after, the Gulf War. This process poses serious obstacles for peace-generating possibilities and for a democratized polity in the Middle East and other Muslim countries. The ability of certain Muslim leaders and Muslim states to challenge the West and threaten its way of life through petro-power has been seen by some as the initial phase of a resurgent Islam, which has the potential to revive the old "fence" in a new way. This has not only brought to the Western consciousness the issues of the Muslim states in the Middle East and revived the old anti-Islamic feeling, but it has also led to a more positive and broader Islamic scholarship. The two most significant events that have forced the Middle Eastern issue to the center of the international political and peace agenda took place very recently. The first was the overthrowing of the Pahlavi Rule in Iran through the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the second was the Gulf War of 1991. Although in almost all the situations enumerated above (and the list can be extended much further) general Western propaganda and perception was highly negative toward Islam, there were saner minority voices asking for a proper evaluation, deeper analysis, and even a wider study of Islamic history, politics, law, and theology. What was not taken into consideration, by and large, were the Islamic societies in the non-Arab-and therefore also in the non-Middle Eastern-context. (Iran was given honorary Middle Eastern and Arab status as were the Ottoman Turks.) Present-day Turkey was ignored and the Islamic communities in Eastern Europe were not even acknowledged. All this has obviously begun to change since 1989, but still without full recognition of the emergence of the Islamic identity question in the

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Muslim populations of Albania, former Yugoslavia, and the overwhelmingly Muslim Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. Further, Pakistan-the only Muslim nation clearly formed on the foundation of religious identity-has not been given its due place in the discussion. Yet Pakistan was a linchpin state from 1979 to at least 1989 for the U.S. policies in Afghanistan. During this period Pakistan was used by U.S. and Western interests to challenge and counter the Soviet and communist presence in Afghanistan. In the same period the largest recipients of U.S. aid were, in order of the amounts given, Israel, Egypt, and then Pakistan (two Middle Eastern states and then Pakistan). In the case of Pakistan and Afghanistan, Islam was, as a matter of fact, assessed as a bulwark against the expansion of communism (read the Soviet Union), and thus some of the more conservative political groups with a radical Islamic identity were promoted and supported at the very time when a similar strain in Iran was the target of Western media propaganda as an Islamic fundamentalist state. In this sense the Muslim conservative-radical groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan were given a treatment similar to that extended to Saudi Arabia against Iran. All this has changed since the collapse of the Soviet empire. Islam is now perceived as a coherent ideological movement, which, if not a serious threat and challenge to the liberal political construction, is certainly an impediment to its overall universal acceptance. So Francis Fukuyama, utilizing his own version of the Hegelian/Marxist epistemology, claims that the success of liberalism vis-a-vis communism has ushered in "the end of history," but the presence of Islam remains a major stumbling block to this perception and to its universal application and control. In a sense, therefore, the collapse of communism has placed Islam as the only challenge to the liberal bourgeois capitalist model and has therefore also brought it into a negative prominence. This negative prominence does not auger well either for Islam or for the construction of an alternative political and international model serving peace and justice in the world. In short, the bipolar epistemology, and its necessity of an enemy, which has dominated thinking in political and international relations, has quickly replaced the "red threat" with the "green threat" while leaving much of the rest of debate intact, replacing just the enemy and adjusting the rhetoric to fit the character of the new enemy. That this enemy does not pose the same level of threat to international peace and survival in terms of nuclear and conventional arsenals is apparent, but the rhetoric of the possibility or the potential of possessing such weapons (the so called "Islamic bomb") is much more vitriolic than ever before. Under these circumstances of challenge to the peace, not only the Middle Eastern states but other Muslim states need to be studied and evaluated. Leaving aside the fact of the sheer bulk of population, these Muslim states deserve to be studied because of the ideological and theological

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underpinning of the current Islamic debate on issues such as politics, statecraft, identity, and religiocultural heritage, and the character of integration that is to take place. These are the issues with which some of the non-Arab and non-Middle Eastern states are internally struggling and even exporting to the Middle East itself. Maulana Abu Ala Maudoodi and Jamaat-eIslami of Pakistan are classical cases in point. Also, Islamic communities in countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, and even on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao are all struggling on a much more significant level regarding these issues than most of the Middle East countries. Yet the discussion on Islamic politics has tended to focus on the Middle East without giving due appreciation to these other countries. The Islamic issues relating to these countries are highlighted only when some "fundamentalist" activity is perceived by the West in these countries, and since it has an Islamic basis, the struggle is seen to have its origin in the Middle East. Therefore, in order to come to a proper grasp of the issue of Islam and democracy, the religious resurgence, which has political implications in these states, has to be thoroughly examined and studied before making any conclusive statement about Islam and democracy at a broader level. Because of the significance of the Middle East for the West and its economic interest in the area, undue importance is given to the area not only for politicoeconomic purposes, as reflected during the Gulf crisis, but also in terms of the democratization process,2 even though democracy is not on any priority list in the Middle East. On the other hand, those Muslim societies (such as Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia) in which democracy has become an issue of life and death have been ignored. In what follows, I will make certain general statements but the locus of this reflection will remain tied to Pakistan in particular and South Asia in general. Such an exercise is meant not only to be informative to outsiders but also to be democratically therapeutic internally. When evaluating the twofold focus of Islam and democracy, one needs to recognize three points. First, whatever the position of the elites in Muslim societies vis-a-vis the West, the population at large generally perceives the West as a threat to its existence. In this sense the Crusades remain a living symbol of the tension between the West and the Muslim world. The more recent colonial experience and the even more recent neocolonial domination all influence and inform the current perceptions of the West in the Islamic world. These attitudes are intensified when public statements are made either against a particular state with Islamic identity or against Islam itself. Serious consideration needs to be paid to the perceptions, apprehensions, and anxieties of both the Islamic and Western worlds if peace is to have a durable role both within these societies and in their international presence in the comity of nations. Related to the above is the second point, which deals with a seemingly "schizophrenic existence" of a radical Islamic identity alongside a radical

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nationalist identity that presumes a nation-state along certain modern lines. This existence is further distorted by ethnic and linguistic identity questions, so that on the one hand there is a supra-nation-state ideology, which is Islam, and on the other hand there are the so-called "primordial identity" questions beneath the national identity. At the same time, most of the people support some concept of the modern nation-state, which is and remains at variance with all these other identity questions. The three-pronged quest for identity and their integration remains one of the crucial issues of political debate in contemporary Islamic states and challenges the concept of democracy in the light of Islamic ideology. The third issue is that along with the preservation of the nation-state, weakened and threatened as it may be, comes a search for instrumental rationality for the application and efficient working of systems and institutions, which, although given an Islamic veneer, are largely a product of particular historical evolution in the Western social theory, politics, and statecraft. These institutions not only have historical reasons behind their particular manifestation, they also have a certain philosophical, ethical, and ideological geist. Although there is an adoption-and in some case even a certain amount of adaptation--of these systems and institutions, in most cases there is either a conscious ignorance or a conscious rejection of the underlying geist, which is quickly replaced by Islam or Islamic ideology. In order to justify the existence of these instruments they are baptized Islamic (e.g., shifting from Parliament to Majlis-e-Shoora, etc.). These three tension points produce a high level of anti- Western polemic and rhetoric, which is fed to the general populace for their consumption and support. It is at this point that a certain kind of democratic and peoples' participatory expression begins to surface, which is at an apparent level against the status quo that is seen to be Western and secular and even anti-Islamic in character. So what is largely seen as a fundamentalist thrust against the modern state and its instruments and institutions is paradoxically dependent on the modern concept of democracy and peoples' participation for its success against the status quo. In this sense the more traditional groups see themselves as victims of the modern controlling elites who are the agents of the West in the Islamic states. They use the traditional religious symbols for evoking political activity and the antiWest sentiments to attack the ruling groups that control the state institutional structure. This contradiction between·the upholding of traditional values and symbols and the use of people power against the status quo dominates the current political process and practice in most Islamic states. This contradiction, however, is not always apparent either to the elites in these societies or to the Western political theorists and analysts, which leads to all kinds of confusion, distortions, and bad judgments when dealing with Islamic societies. This lack of accurate perception is one of the obstacles to coming to terms with both the Islamic societies and their role

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in the international arena, and it poses a serious threat to the peace processes vis-a-vis these nations.

DEMOCRACY AND PLURALISM It is apparent that the character of democracy and even of the state will have a different manifestation in those societies that are dominated by Islam. First of all, the emergence of nation-states and democracy in the West has a particular history that cannot be repeated in other places. This puts into jeopardy from the very inception the application of concepts such as nation-state and even democracy in Islamic states. Further, whereas the nation-states in the West assumed a homogenous cultural, social, and ideological foundation on which they could build a multiparty system that was seen as imperative for the democratic process, this is not the case in the Muslim societies.3 The division of Europe after the emergence of Catholic-Protestant plurality, the century-long religious wars along this plurality, and finally the end of Christendom led to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which is correctly interpreted to be the beginning of the formation of nation-states and secular politics in Europe. None of this can be repeated in other places unless the West assumes such exclusive hegemony that what was a product of particular history has a flat universal and atemporal application everywhere else. The modern nation-states with majority Muslim population are either a product of the end of colonialism or a creation of direct intervention of the West through the breaking of the Ottoman Turkish Empire. Most of the non-Arab Muslim states have large heterogenous ethnic and linguistic bodies (except for Iran), and Islam has been seen as the transcendent ideology that will hold these multisocial and cultural factors together and in this sense provide the same ideological transcendent role in these newer Muslim states as secularism was to provide in the West after the collapse of Christendom. That the rhetoric of Islam as glue has failed is now quite apparent, in spite of the "head in the sand" attitude of some of our leadership. Islam failed to provide the cohesive opposition against the state of Israel in the two wars, it failed to provide the necessary integration in the conflict between what is now Pakistan and Bangladesh, and it was not enough to bring together Muslim states against the United States during the Gulf War nor to stop one Muslim state attacking another during the Iran-Iraq and the Gulf wars.

BASES OF DEMOCRACY The fundamental question we face when we discuss democracy is the character of the basic unit that is to act as the locus politicus. In the West for the last three hundred years or so this has been the individual (preferably,

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but not necessarily, rational), but the role of other identity factors is seen as an impediment to the freedom of this individual and his/her political choices. The current debate on identity can be broadly defined, for the lack of a better term, as a conflict between ethnos and demos. We can generally use ethnos in broader terms to define the character of identity groups that are based on commonalities of culture, language, religion, or similar factors-that is, certain shared symbolic horizons. These are normally treated as "prepolitical primordial affiliations" that need to be transcended in a rational political order. The assumption is that when such rationality becomes effective over all in a given society then these affiliations and symbolic horizons will also wither away. Against this notion is the concept of demos, which is much more of a politico-economic identity group (e.g., the concept of "people" generated by the French Revolution and the concept of "masses" during the communist revolutions). Most Western scholarship has tended to either negate or overlook the ethnos factor in their theorizing and analysis of politics. In most cases ethnos is seen as a problem of superstitious and primordial political order; that is, it has been seen as restricted to the Third World. This tendency, however, has undergone a major shift after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which led to the emergence of nineteen new states, cut largely along ethnic lines, and after the battle which continues in former Yugoslavia. The end of communism in Europe4 has produced to date at least twenty-three new nation-states, with a potential of a couple more looming large. Thus the imperative of ethnos in political discourse has been dramatically highlighted. Also, in those European states where the ethnos was not homogenous there are still tensions, and at times these tensions have been quite violent in character-for example, the Protestant-Roman Catholic battle in Ireland and the Basque-Spanish battle in Spain. Another reason why ethnos has not been dealt with in political discourse is the confusion caused in the context of Germany during the Hitler period, with its emphasis on the superiority of the Aryan race over all other races. Here a biological racial identity was promoted over other races. We have to differentiate between cultural identity (ethnos) and racial identity based on biological factors to properly assess the current political dilemma and its implication for democracy and just political order. Islamic societies struggling with the democratic political order are averse to reducing the basic political unit to an individual but pose the ethnos and demos factors into the political discourse, which is a fundamental challenge to the foundations of liberal democracy with its emphasis on the isolated vying individual. Further, the debate in Islam on the contemporary role of the umma (which is the conjoining of the ethnos and demos factors into one) and its status in the state is clearly the most critical issue of politics, statecraft, and democracy. In this way Islam is contributing to the larger democratic discourse a very novel element. Raising the ethnos and demos factors as a prerequisite for democracy also highlights the inability of liberal democracy

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to deal in a fundamental way with these components in democratic polity. This becomes much more apparent where we have fundamentally pluralistic ethnos and demos and not just a pluralism along denominational and clannish lines. In fact, the experiment with democracy and the demand for democracy that is emerging in Islamic states will always be tinged with the ethnos/demos factor, which is very difficult for a liberal structure to accept. The only way it knows to catalogue this ethnos/demos-based democracy is through the negative nomenclature of "fundamentalism" or "primordial politics." The other factor that impedes the emergence of a proper understanding in terms of dealing with the question of democracy in an Islamic context is the confusion Western history has made between the proper institutional separation of church and state and its improper ontological extension to the separation of religion and politics. Officially, Islam has never had an institution like the church and a priestly class, so the separation of church and state makes no sense. Neither does the transference of the theocratic state, which was based on the power of the church and the priestly class. The separation of religion and politics makes no sense in an Islamic context, which has a hard theological and philosophical commitment to keeping the two together in order to provide the ethical and moral parameter to the political order and to show the relevance of religion in its ability to be translated in the political order.

CONCLUSION Thus, an Islamic perspective of democratization demands a different understanding of democracy and political order, one that clashes in some very fundamental way with the liberal understanding of democracy and politics that now dominates the political discourse. If there is to be peace, one has to push for the plurality of political orders and democratic expressions within a particular perspective. Peace is most threatened when the historical basis and experience of a particular people is hegemonically thrust upon others who have a completely different history and experience. This pseudo-universalizing challenges Islamic states most particularly as they see that they also possess a moral and philosophical basis that has clear application in their own political order and where they would like to experiment with people's participation on a different scale that cannot be judged along liberal political lines.

NOTES 1. For a fuller expression of this point, see what has come to be called the "Pirenne Thesis," which Henri Pirenne began to articulate as early as 1910 and

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which was given final form in his now famous Mahomet et Charlemagne (published in 1937; the English translation of which, Mohammed and Charlemagne, appeared in 1939). See also the discussion in Alfred H. Havighurst (ed.), The Pirenne Thesis: Analysis, Criticism, and Revision (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1966). 2. None of the Middle Eastern Muslim states have practiced democracy, except the more recent Algerian experiment with a multiparty democratic system. But there the process was stopped short immediately when it became apparent that the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) would be gaining more than 80 percent of the seats. The other place is Iran, whose democratic struggle has not been recognized as such because it does not fit the Western pattern of democracy. But even here we are getting into the very extremities of the Middle East, if we accept for the sake of argument their Middle Eastern status. 3. The liberal political theory in the 1950s generated a paradigm based on the not so apparent but crucial distinction between plural politics and plural society. In this understanding, the former had to be promoted and the latter had to be, at the least, minimized. The concept of a plural society was developed by Furnivell, a Dutch sociologist and apologist for colonialism who studied the Dutch colonies of Southeast Asia. The distinction between pluralist societies and pluralist politics is implicit in the discussion of the former in Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977), especially Chapter 1. 4. It should be emphasized that communism has not collapsed universally as is so quickly assumed and stated from the Eurocentric perspective. The largest communist state in the world (the People's Republic of China), North Korea, and some of the Indo-Chinese states still classify themselves as communist. This caveat is essential in order to give a factual and proper picture rather than a triumphant universal projection based on the European experience.

2

The Democratization Process in the Arab-Islamic States of the Middle East SANAA 0SSEIRAN

It is challenging and hazardous to write about the democratization processes in contemporary Arab-Islamic states of the Middle East. We have to bear in mind that we are analyzing twenty-one different systems of nation-states and one national liberation movement aspiring to become a state. Until 1919, these states formed one Islamic umma under the Ottoman Empire, thus sharing a common destiny and history. Yet each region (Machrek, Maghreb, and Arabia) had its own specificities due to local developments and traditions. These factors can be analyzed in the light of how modern republics, monarchies, and emirates came into being in the aftermath of World War I. Consequently, the specificities of each country and its historical evolution in relation to the central power must be considered. However, within the limitations of this chapter, I attempt to discuss only the democratization process in general, underlining the common problems and needs of the region. Western democracies have been achieved after centuries of struggle, which culminated in the separation of church and state, as a result of free and fiercely intellectual debates, scientific innovations, and discoveries, as well as the "Declaration of the Citizen" of the French Revolution of 1789 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights enacted after World War II. Similar events have not taken place in the Arab-Islamic world. The people of these states lived in a system that had no frontiers, under a political system embodied in the caliphate power and administered by Islamic Jaw. Hence, one does not encounter a rich literature on the subject of democracy and its components and specialties in the regional context. It can be argued, however, that despite the absence of "democracy" in ArabIslamic states today, the demand for democratic regimes has been incessant.

A DEFINITION OF DEMOCRACY What is democracy? What are its components and how is it perceived and expressed in the Arab-Islamic states of the Middle East today?

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If democracy means "a legitimate civic virtue or civism," this is not yet a value in the Arab-Islamic world. The civic virtues of these states are based on religious values in which the collective interest of the community or umma represents one of the fundamental virtues. If democracy means consensus rule, one may argue that it is a value in certain Arab-Islamic states where it is exercised. If by democracy we mean the traditional slogan "a government that derives its power from and is bestowed by the people, where human beings can no longer be terrorized, brutalized, slain, tortured, and where people have the freedom of expression and thought,"! then democracy is nonexistent in these Arab-Islamic states. Professor Ghassan Salameh of the Sorbonne University draws a harsh picture of democracy in these states. He maintains categorically that in the ArabIslamic states there is an absence of democracy and democratic practices.2 Democracy can be thought of as existing in a society that promotes duties and responsibilities between the governed and the governors, in a political system varied in its expression but dependent on reciprocal legitimation by a set of economic, social, and moral rules and cultural values. This very general concept of democracy makes possible the analysis of democratization in the context of Arab-Islamic cultural values. Six fundamental issues must be examined in such an analysis: (1) the question of power, its legitimacy, and the separation of religion from the state; (2) economic fears and challenges; (3) education; (4) revival of Arab and Islamic cultural heritage and humanistic values; (5) the role of nongovernmental organizations in promoting democracy; and (6) narrowing the gap between urban and rural areas and decentralization.

Power, Legitimacy, and the Separation of Religion and State The three concepts in the collective memory of the people of the ArabIslamic region, and used by the Islamic movements to legitimize their actions, are the umma, the caliphate, and Islamic jurisprudence. Prior to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, the Arab-Islamic people of the Middle East were conceived as an Islamic umma, governed and administered by the caliphate system. Non-Muslims lived in Islamic cities as People of the Book, with their own legal courts and independent exercise of religious beliefs. This concept of the umma "had no equivalence in the historical experience of the West. It was a grouping of believers linked politically andreligiously by the sacred word of God. This umma did not correspond either to the notion of people in medieval Christianity or to a nation."3 Consequently, this umma had no frontiers, no nationalities. People were supposed to be equal, color and race being of no importance; what counted was piety and obedience to God. The Islamic community was never, in

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theory or in practice, a theocracy. The caliph is neither a religious chief nor a representative of a specific caste as in Hinduism. Neither the Quran nor the Prophet Mohammed laid down any particular form of government for Muslims. The umma can choose any structure as long as it applies divine law as embodied in the Quran. Consultation and consensus form the core of "democracy" in Islam. If the caliph does not rule justly, the believer has a right to disobey. It is said that the first Caliph Abu Baker said, "Obey me as long as I obey God and his Prophet. If I disobey them, you are not bound to obey me." This explains how opposition to unjust rule emerged in Islam. Thus, the first three caliphs governed the Islamic umma by consultation and consensus. Dissension began later, and the caliphate became a hereditary phenomena reflecting the political power of the ruler. The Arab-Islamic people lived for thirteen centuries under the caliphate system. But the system came to represent increasingly the interests of the ruler, his family, and the administrative elite. When the Arab-Islamic states were formed using Western models for their system of government (except for Saudi Arabia), people did not contest the legitimacy of their rulers or the new imported Western model. Indeed, the ideas of the French Revolution influenced their acceptance of that model. The earlier primacy of Turks over Arabs, the emergence of nationalism (and with it the colonial and military power of the West) all gave rise to the hope, euphoria, and aspirations that shaped the modern destiny of the Arab-Islamic states. However, discontent with the regimes emerged as a result of bad politics, inefficient economic strategies, authoritarian rule, and ambiguity between state and religious laws governing the social life of the citizen. This accounts for the success of the lslamists' claims today. Arab-Islamic governments are intimidated by them precisely because of the failures of the ruling elite. The question of Muslim jurisprudence and state laws further complicates the issue of democracy. Arab-Islamic states are modern republics with constitutions, yet the family code is still based on Islamic laws. Consequently, societies in these states have been living a continuous schism with all its contradictions, leading to great confusion. Therefore, any democratization of the Arab-Islamic states presupposes either a harsh separation of the state from religion, as enacted by the founder of modern Turkey, Kemal Ataturk (a solution most appropriate to Arab-Islamic states composed of different ethnic and religious groups), or a full re-examination of divine law and the filch (jurisprudence). Some Arab and Muslim intellectuals have been calling for such a re-examination, others for a complete separation between state and religion. 4 According to Mohammad Said Al-Ashmawy, an Egyptian jurist, Islam and democracy are compatible. He argued that "many of the religious

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Fatawass are in reality legalized 'opinions', made by jurists at the service of a Caliph. They are man-made, and have nothing to do with divine quranic law." He added that this lack of separation and clarification between what is political and what is essentially religious has caused great confusion in the Muslim community. Moreover, he believed that this confusion has led to the alienation of the population in reaction to decisions affecting their lives. Instead they concentrate on promoting their private affairs.6 The Islamic movements are the only ones in the Arab-Islamic states that have kept a vigilant eye on the development of Arab-Islamic societies. The failure of leftist and rightist intellectuals, as well as unsatisfactory governments, have brought these religious movements into the foreground of the political scene. Recent events in Algeria as well as the history of modern Egypt underline this trend. Many Arab and Muslim intellectuals share Al-Ashmawy's concern. Professor Mohammad Arkoun has stressed the need for a new reading of the Quran.7 However, any discussion of democracy or democratization is automatically conceived of as being "Western" and automatically disloyal to one's cultural heritage and religion. What is ironic is that the Islamic movement has used "democratic prerogatives" to gain power. An open and neutral forum is urgently needed in which Arab-Islamic jurists, state jurists, intellectuals, representatives of Islamic fundamentalists, and the Muslim movements representing the different sects in Islam can meet in different regions to discuss these issues with the formal acquiescence of Arab-Islamic states and perhaps under the auspices of UNESCO. The United Nations could use moral sanctions if recommendations emerging from such a forum are not applied. A minimum consensus needs to be reached between the different social actors. Islamic movements should be democratically incorporated in the Arab-Islamic state system as political parties so that their ideas could develop peacefully, without the use of coercive methods, as is the case today. What is happening in Algeria causes sympathy with the Martyrs of Islam. Such developments will not facilitate democracy or democratization. There are differences among Arab and Muslim intellectuals concerning the question of interpreting the notions of Hukm, or "government," and political authority. Some argue that one of the greatest acts of Islam was precisely "to liberate man from all human authority, be it a prince, a priest, or other kind of rulers." 8 Nothing in Islam grants authority to religious leaders as it is exercised today. A new cult has developed, a new caste of religious sheiks who have become intermediaries between a Muslim and God, playing a priestly role, but with more authority. No doubt such developments have been triggered by the success of Imam Khomeiny in seizing power. This trend has traveled to the Sunni regions of ArabIslamic states.

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What is clear today is that the leadership in Arab-Islamic states has lost its legitimacy because of corruption, favoritism, and a lack of concern for the governed. The corruption of the FLN (National Liberation Front) in Algeria partially explains the success of the Islamic movement. At each crisis in the Arab-Islamic states, whether caused by a military defeat in its wars against Israel or the desire to cover up scandals, lip service has been paid to Islam. This was the case with President Anwar Sadat, with Faafar Nimeiry, and most recently with secular President Saddam Hussein, who suddenly discovered Islam in order to rally the Arab-Islamic people during the Gulf War. Islam is still a dynamic force. This dynamism should be geared toward improving the future development of ArabIslamic societies and not be conceived of as a regressive force. The spirit of Islam should be used for the present as well as for the future. Professor Fatima Mernissi explains clearly the factor of "obedience," which has paralyzed the reaction of the Arab-Islamic people toward their ruler and their relation to democracy.9 She maintains that obedience to God, the ruler, Islamic laws, and jurisprudence was from the outset at the expense of individualism, aql, or reason; 10 hence, the urgent need to change the mentality of the omnipresent "sultan" in the state apparatus, and that of the small "sultans" who operate at all levels of the hierarchical pyramid of the government, political parties, and the family. Many interArab quarrels stem from this illness, the so-called "sultan mentality." The struggles in Lebanon are an example. That repression and oppression in the Arab-Islamic states have been obvious under military regimes does not mean that democracy existed under republican regimes. In fact, the mentality of possessing the people, of having a right to dispose of lives, is a general phenomenon characterizing all Arab-Islamic states of the Middle East and reflects the fear, anxiety, and paranoia of their leaders. We here do not discuss the very real external fears concerning encroachment of the West and Israel, but focus instead on internal fears and challenges.

Economic Fears and Challenges Never have the dreams and aspirations of the people of the Arab-Islamic states been so shattered as in the twentieth century. Nor have the people of the region ever been so impoverished as they are under the banner of PanArabism or Pan-lslamism. The economic situation of the Arab-Islamic states, a vital factor in any democratization process, indicates the presence of an artificial economy oriented toward consumption and military defense. How can sustainable development be ensured when 38 percent of petroleum revenues were spent on security and defense issues in the 1980s and only 23.88 percent

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on development?ll The Gulf War has demonstrated that the purchase of arms did not protect the rich petroleum countries from outside aggression. Arms purchases in the Arab-Islamic states have served Western multinational companies and Western economies; such wealth could have served to develop the region and to show the solidarity and compassion the Muslim religion demands from its community. This lack of South-South solidarity reflects the fears of leaders concerning the awakening of the masses. Nevertheless, when mass communication and television networks have made the global village accessible to every individual in these states, attempts to prevent this awakening are futile. Employment rates for the peoples of Arab-Islamic states-excepting Israel, Turkey, and Iran-are low. In Egypt, the rate of employment for males is 48 percent and for females only 6.1 percent. There is, of course, the hidden economy, but this is a situation that affects democratization, for it leads to further exploitation. The Lebanese worker needs more than one job to survive. International Labor Organization standards concerning working hours are not met. How can the democratization process develop in the face of very high rates of unemployment? Population riots in Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, the Sudan, and recently in Lebanon express a deep malaise, undermining the legitimacy of these governments and denoting a crisis only Islamic movements were able to exploit. It is very difficult to talk to people about democracy when they are hungry. Is it surprising that anguish and present fears lead to what Mernissi and so many others call "the loss of orientation/Al-Diy'a"?12 The enemy is within, reflecting the lack of solidarity among Arab-Islamic leaders but not among the people. In order to realize a state's economic potential a high level of civil spirit is necessary. But this implies civic education of the people. The democratization process in the Middle East needs active vocational training for men and women in fields that enhance the economy of every state in the region. Common economic interest of states must be based not on ideological premises such as Arab nationalism, or PanArabism, but on a practical recognition of common interests and benefits, of complementary economies and an empowered work force.

Education Democracy needs to become an integral part of the psychology of the Arab-Islamic individual. This requires the adoption of long-term strategies and orientations for the educational system of Arab-Islamic states. Democracy can be exercised at school, at home, and in society. It permits the exercise of individuality and critical thinking within the collectivity. Individuals must be taught what the term "peoples' economic and human rights" means and how they may be ensured.

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The problem is not the inability to find the values of tolerance, pluralism, interdependence, cooperation, human rights, and fundamental liberties within the Arab-Islamic heritage. However, the high rate of illiteracy causes confusion and perpetuates myths. The family has a great responsibility in promoting democracy; yet, it is handicapped by differences in educational opportunities between males and females. Because children are brought up mainly by their mothers, it makes a significant difference whether the mother is educated. The 1991 UNESCO Report on World Education shows that male enrollment is 92.3 percent in first-level education, 60.2 percent in the second level, and 15.6 percent in the third level, whereas female enrollment is 74.6 percent in the first level, 44.9 percent in the second level, and 9.5 percent in the third leveJ.13 The priority given to male education in Arab-Islamic states has a major impact in the long term on the civil society and its capacity for democracy. In a country such as Lebanon, education for women, which before the war was high and promised a real participation of women in the life of the country, has deteriorated due to the worsening economic situation. During the UNESCO/IPRA Conference on Peace-Building and Development of Lebanon, held at UNESCO Headquarters, May 6-7, 1991, the representatives of forty-l(ight women's associations stressed that Lebanese families are forced to give priority to the education of their male children to the detriment of their female children.14 When one speaks about the relationship between education and democracy, the question of women's rights, women's status, and the way women are considered cannot be ignored. Arab-Islamic women had hopes in the 1920s and 1930s, as did women in the West, for the emancipation of women. A study of women's movements in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and Iraq sufficiently shows that women's roles could be enhanced and they could play a leading role in the promotion of democracy. Yet women are increasingly confined to a limited number of professions and have limited access to education. At a symposium held at the Institute of the Arab World in Paris, women from the Maghreb region (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) indicated that 85 percent of Moroccan women between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-four cannot read or write, with similar situations elsewhere in the Maghreb. These women called for the adoption of Islam in their private lives only, and for the secularization of government, rejecting Islam as the religion of the state. They pointed out that what blocks the evolution of women is the patriarchal system in which Islamic order is used to disguise other interests.15 The violation of women's rights in education and in work, as well as the application of the Islamic family code, prevents Arab-Islamic women from becoming full and equal citizens, thus violating international conventions on equality between the sexes and the basic principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, signed by most Arab states. A further

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inequality exists between Muslim and Christian Arab women, the latter having more advantages in areas such as inheritance.

Revival of the Arab and Islamic Cultural Heritage and Humanistic Values Arab-Islamic states and people have a rich cultural background drawn from the humanistic ethics of Islam that is not in conflict with universal values. However, it depends on how one uses it. Terms such asAl-Rahma (meaning compassion), al-Ta'tatuf (solidarity), al-Maghfira (pardon), and ar-riqa (tenderness) are universal values that Arab-Islamic people need to retain.1 6 In addition, the Sufi movements in Baghdad under Abbassid rule, as well as in AI-Andalus and the Machrek, provide sufficient literature from which democracy can be guided_l7 Various scientific activities prior to the Ottoman Empire indicate that the zenith of the Arab-Islamic empires was marked by innovation, creativity, and a contribution to global civilization. Unfortunately, at present there is a huge emigration of creative talents from Arab-Islamic states precisely because the environment in which people work is repressive. An Arab-Islamic Charter of Human Rights needs to be developed by jurists-by modern state and religious leaders and specialists from different Arab-Islamic states. While some Islamic laws do guarantee certain individual rights, these rights are not well known to the public and are not applied to Arab citizens of Jewish and Christian faith. There is also an urgent need to explicate the modern applicability of traditional Islamic terms. In Islam, the community is placed over and above individual rights providing that the individual is not dehumanized and that collective interests do not lead to the loss of dignity and liberty. There are contradictions between the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and rights of individuals in Arab-Islamic states that need to be resolved. According to Mernissi, "the UN Charter, which was signed by the majority of Arab-Islamic states, is administered by contradictory laws, such as a law which gives the citizen freedom of thought and a Shari'a which, because it is based on obedience, condemns in its official interpretation the citizen."18 Discussions and clarifications must become accessible to the masses, instead of being confined to a handful of intellectuals.

The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in Promoting Democracy In the past decade there has been a proliferation of associations dealing with questions of human rights in the Arab-Islamic states, particularly in Egypt, the Maghreb, Palestine, Jordan, and Lebanon. Similarly, Lebanese nongovernmental organizations have been strengthened during the long

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years of war. They were in fact the only structure that operated on behalf of the general population. The need to end the war led to NGO efforts in education for peace and human rights, through holding debates and reflecting on the most appropriate methods of linking universal human rights with local rights. For example, the Lebanese Association for Human Rights (ALDHOM), a national branch of the Arab Association for Human Rights based in Egypt, started a quarterly newsletter in 1991 that deals with human rights violations in Lebanon and gives information on peoples' rights, women's rights, and international treaties. Such organizations perform an important function and should be strengthened through support from UN agencies. The work of international nongovernmental organizations such as Amnesty International has been instrumental in raising the level of consciousness of the population of the Arab-Islamic states. Their continuous condemnation of human rights violations has led to the release of many prisoners of conscience. The Arab Organization for Human Rights in Egypt publishes a yearly bulletin on the state of human rights in the ArabIslamic world. The recent meeting on "Citizens of the Mediterranean" (Paris, February 1992) heralds the link between the people of the region and the Helsinki Citizens' Association. A proliferation of such contacts will lead eventually to the development of a wider understanding of democracy and a demand for democratic practices. Nevertheless, one should not exaggerate the impact of these initiatives on the general population. Nongovernmental organizations remain weak and fragile in the overall system between the power of the state and the fundamentalists. Western countries and organizations, as well as the UN system and UN agencies, should give more support to nongovernmental organizations in the region by inviting their participation in conferences on development organized in the region, and in the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights (Montreal, March 1993). Western democracies should link their aid to the liberalization and democratization of the Arab-Islamic states, as was the case with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Narrowing the Gap Between Urban and Rural Areas and Decentralization Narrowing the huge gap between the urban and rural areas in Arab-Islamic states will undoubtedly accelerate the democratization process. This narrowing of the inequality in development within Arab-Islamic states could be structured on the basis of decentralizing power from the state to smaller units, thus involving the rural regions and their populations in shaping their future. In addition, such decentralization would train the general population, the professional elite, and intellectuals to work together in

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decisionmaking. It would help eliminate the "Sultan" attitude of government officials. A concrete example was given by the Co-ordinating Committee of Lebanese Non-Governmental Organizations (with the assistance of the United Nations Development Programme [UNDP]) for a regional development model for various Lebanese regions. In planning this decentralized model, village representatives were aware of the weight of their input, which gave them dignity and self-assurance. It is only through the direct and active participation of the individual at all levels of society that democratization will become an inherent part of the psychology of ArabIslamic states.

CONCLUSION Can democracy prevail in countries where poverty, ignorance, illness, and unemployment are rampant? Democracy flourishes in an atmosphere of economic and social justice, in the absence of imagined or real external threats, thus releasing the energies of peoples for human and social development. Democracy in the Arab-Islamic states will certainly accelerate when the United Nations enforces its resolutions on international law ensuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinians to establish their own state; when the United Nations applies resolutions concerning the withdrawal of foreign armies from Lebanon; when war in the Sudan ends; when the people of Iraq and Libya are not punished collectively because they have not overthrown their leaders-leaders with whom Western democracies have collaborated for the past twenty years. The Gulf War and the destruction of Iraq weakened all the efforts made in the region toward increasing democratization in the Arab-Islamic states. Democracy cannot exist in the face of double standards, in an international environment devoid of credible moral ethics. Some Western intellectuals and Western media courageously pointed out the great hypocrisy and lies behind Western democracies. In February 1992, Le Monde, a French monthly review, published a document condemning the propaganda of the Western media and the way in which information was handled during the Gulf War. These lies unfortunately have set back greatly the hope of democratization. It took the assassination of a devoted and sincere Egyptian intellectual, Faraj Fouda, to make intellectual circles in the Arab-Islamic world react with anger at the current intolerant environment. However, this may be a brief light that may soon be extinguished. Those who believe in a universal message should assist all efforts made in the direction of democracy, but this should not be undertaken through a paternalistic and arrogant approach, as has been the case with Western intellectuals. The Middle East has a great number of capable and intelligent people who could envision the future of their states in the

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democratization process, but they must have protection and the opportunity of developing such a vision through the form of dialogue. In addition, those Western forces interested in the democratization process of Arab-Islamic states and their people should review their own democracies when dealing with these states. In so doing, a constructive link between the Western world and the Arab-Islamic world could be developed through an interdependent and harmonious relationship, and the continuous state of conflict and antagonism could end.

NOTES 1. Guy Hermet, "The Disenchantment of the Old Democracies," International Social Science Journa/129 (August 1991). See also Guy Hermet, "The Age of Democracy," International Social Science Journa/128 (May 1991). 2. Ghassan Salameh, "Problematique de Ia democratie dans le monde arabe," presented at the Institute of the Arab World Symposium, Paris, May 1989. 3. A. Marcel Boisard, Humanisme de ['/slam (Paris: Albin Michel, 1973). 4. The Egyptian writer Paraj Fouda, who openly called for the separation of the state and religion and stressed contradictions in statements of the Muslim fundamentalist movement, was recently assassinated. 5. Fatawas are opinions by religious leaders that become law in an Islamic society. Furthermore, local customs may become law if there is a consensus on the issue. This is why Muslim societies vary in their habits and attitudes. 6. S. Mohammad Al-Ashmawy, L'islamisme contre ['Islam (Paris: Albin Michel, 1973). 7. Mohammad Arkoun, L'lslam: Ethique et politique (Paris: UNESCO Publications, 1986). 8. AI-Ashmawy, L 'islamisme contre l'Islam. 9. Note that the Algerian government has accepted that Algerian women vote themselves instead of their men doing it for them. This was considered a great success for Algerian women, who constitute 53 percent of the total Algerian population, in their battle to obtain more rights and freedom of decision. Had the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria won the election, the situation of women would have deteriorated. 10. Fatima Mernissi, La Peur-modernite: Conflit Islam democratie (Paris: Albin Michel, 1992). 11. George Corm, "La longue litanie du developpement et de Ia democratie," Le Monde Diplomatique (October 1990). 12. Mernissi, La Peur-modernite. 13. From "L'education face a Ia crise des valeurs," a meeting organized by UNESCO, Budapest, October 1991. 14. Report on the International Conference on Peace-Building and Development in Lebanon, UNESCO, Paris, May 1991. 15. "Droits des femmes au Maghreb," Symposium Act, presented at the Institute of the Arab World Symposium, Paris, March 6-7, 1990. 16. Mernissi, La Peur-modernite. 17. The Mut'aziltes called for rationalist thinking. They were accused of Hellenizing Islam. However, this school of philosophy, which flourished under Abbassid rule, insisted on man's ability to determine events and be responsible for his

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destiny. The rationalists expressed the common human need for logical consistency in one view of the world, especially in its application to religious matters. What is needed is further research on this philosophy and those of other leading rationalist philosophers in the Islamic world. 18. Memissi, La Peur-modernite.

3

Gender Issues in Democracy: The Palestinian Woman and the Revolution HANAN AWWAD

Democracy is based on two main principles: equality before the law and freedom. Equality includes civil and political equality according to law, and its main buttress is submission and obedience to those laws, which are equally applied to all. According to Nawal Saadawi, in a democracy every individual belonging to a group feels that he or she participates in the organization, planning, and decisionmaking process, and not that others organize and he or she merely executes the work.l The immediate question to be raised concerns what the principles and these concepts of democracy imply for women in general and the Palestinian woman in particular, given that she lives in the absence of all freedoms. Her rights are violated by the Israeli occupation, as indeed are the rights of all Palestinians. Is the Palestinian woman in any position to speak about social freedom, given the absence of political freedoms in the wider society? After all, she lives under conditions of occupation, whereby her rights and status are arbitrarily violated and denied. To answer this question, I have assumed a basic hypothesis: namely, the more the Palestinian woman participates in the wider national struggle, the more she gains her own personal freedom. In other words, the more the Palestinian woman is engaged in revolutionary responsibilities, and at all levels-political, social, and economic-the more gender stereotypes are eroded and traditional reservations lifted.

THE WOMAN AND THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM Since the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, a great deal has been written on the subject of women's freedom and liberation. Qasem Amin was one of the first to acknowledge the interdependency between the quality of home life and external social structures. In

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"Women's Liberation" he wrote, "in the East we find that woman is in man's bondage, and the man is in the government's bondage" and added, "when the women enjoy their personal freedom, the men enjoy their political freedom. The two cases are well interwoven."2 At the same time, Amin stressed that man has monopolized all rights, "leaving nothing for the woman but what the master throws to his animaJ."3 The woman has been traditionally separated from the means of production and as such has no economic independence. Such a situation is in part responsible for her loss of rights. Amin goes on to draw a wider parallel between women's condition of lagging behind and the dominance of despotic and masterly regimes. Having shackled and chained her, the woman's liberation became entangled with a degree of arbitrariness, and her liberation became dependent upon the liberation of society as a whole. 4 Several writers and academics, having considered this premise alongside their own interpretation of the meaning of "freedom," concluded that women's liberation could be achieved only outside of the normal codes and ethics of society and that anything that society offered was by deduction wrong. This seems to be a flawed argument in that whereas it is true that tradition places many restrictions upon women, this is only a part of the issue and not the whole. Further, it is based on a narrow interpretation of freedom, while ignoring the sociopolitical dimensions of it. Freedom is a human concept and as such is fluid, and as society changes and matures so does the understanding of freedom. 5 Munif Razzaz states that freedom is not measured by how much restriction is placed upon it, nor does it mean "the absence of restrictions, and the presence of restrictions does not necessarily mean the absence of freedom. However, the importance of restrictions lies in the quality of freedom, and not in the quantity ."6 In the East, there is no accommodation for liberty under imperialism, and when the people lose their liberty, both as a group and as society, the individual will not smell the fragrance of freedom despite imperialism's attempt to glaze the laws and codes of slavery with the hues of liberty. Under such conditions, colonized and oppressed nations struggle fiercely for the attainment of independence, which will bring political, social, and economic freedoms and emancipation from exploitation. National freedom is the combination of all types of freedom. Thus, the personality is a free one only when society itself is freed from imperialism, institutionalized monopolies, and the forces of hunger and poverty. However, personal freedom is merely a disorderly bourgeois term. Genuine freedom must be accompanied by a permanent struggle for the liberation of the people from all forms of oppression and tyranny, from the shifting of personal to collective action. The individual engages in a historic operation and as a part of the throng. His capability is normally measured by his degree of integration with the norms of class and society.

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In order to achieve the readjustment from the personal to the collective, the process undertaken must embrace two dimensions: (1) achievement of a qualitative change for the better; and (2) the creation of both the moral and humanitarian framework within which to achieve this goal, which carries radical concepts and broad dimensions.

HISTORY OF THE PALESTINIAN WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT The history of the Arab women's movement is a borrowed one, greatly influenced by the concept of liberation from the West. Early thoughts interpreted equality with men solely in the realm of sexual politics. Gender relationships of that time were based on tyranny and despotism, and therefore sexual liberation became a means in itself. In a patriarchal society based on religious laws, any ideas of furthering women's position were at odds with the codes of that society, which had ensured that women held no political or social status outside of the traditional domain of the home. Some Arab women writers, such as novelist May Ziadeh, concentrate on the importance of women's education and culture in order to become decisionmakers. In a letter to AI Sayyed about the forty-day memorial service commemorating the death of Fathi Zaghloul Pasha, Ziadeh blames Sayyed for not inviting women to that occasion. "It is surprisingly strange that you did not invite the women to such an important gathering, which might have had a great effect on their modus vivendi, and could have shown them the importance of culture, and taught them the grandeur of their homeland, and the sublimity of their leading personalities. Alternatively, you allow them to frequent the Opera House." 7 One of May's contemporaries was Hafny Nasif, a researcher on Bedouin life, whom May urged to treat the issue of women's liberation with sincerity and concern. 8 Among the women writers of that time who were groping with the predefined understanding of the relationship between man and woman were Laila Baalabky, Colette Khouri, Laila Asiran, Alya Dalati, Ghadal Samman (in her early works), and Sahar Khalifeh, to name but a few. Women's literature, as such, was confined to "women's issues," and its themes were romantic, viewing the search for love as a necessary credential for ritual passage into the world of life. Writing by women had a one-dimensional perspective, and even the educated middle-class woman could not "find herself' other than through the vehicle of man. She failed to gear her knowledge and understanding to the wheel of history and to the future. Critics classified her works as "the female literature," or "women's literature," or the "womanly literature." Many writers have dealt with the multiple psychological and social aspects of the women's movement of this period, the most renown being Nawal Saadawi.9

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The early women's movement did not achieve its objectives because women restricted their focus, thinking that the cause was only women's, and failed to realize that such a limited perception was exactly the result of a despotic, arbitrary, colonizing, and occupying society.

THE PALESTINIAN WOMAN AND THE REVOLUTION The position of the Palestinian woman is somewhat special, because from the beginning she was an integral part of the wider national struggle and the revolutionary path of the Palestinian people against the military occupation by the state of Israel. Following the Palestinian Conference in 1964 in Jerusalem, and the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Palestinian women formed the General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW). On January 1, 1965, the Palestinian revolution exploded, offering a conceptual and military vision as a way forward through the trench of revolution toward liberation. Women's liberation did not surface as a separate issue but came from the general axis of the national Palestinian liberation movement. The first Palestinian women's union was formed in 1921 in Jerusalem, and its main purposes were to demonstrate against Zionist expansion and to provide a framework for women's activities.lO Women's roles began to expand as they took on the task of providing transport, food, and weapons to the freedom fighters. This new trend found a fertile ground under the Palestinian revolution. From the outset, the Palestinian women had a solid presence in the hallmarks of the revolution, in the unions and committees. The prevailing conditions of civil and military occupation and the confiscation of Palestinian lands compelled Palestinian women to move into the labor market and to enhance their skills through education. Such activities reinforced their role and importance in the national dynamics of Palestinian society and in its political life and future. The prevailing circumstances and the success of the Palestinian revolution also urged the need for a unified women's movement.Jl

THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN THE INTIFADA The outburst of the intifada represented an extension of the Palestinian revolution, an expression of outrage, and a rejection of the Israeli occupation. It carried with it a firm belief in the strategy of liberation. The Palestinian woman has assumed her rightful role and authority in the course of these events. The intifada has come to crown an avalanche of struggle, of unsung heroism, and of victories buried by Western interpretations of

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Palestinian history. The intifada also arose from an accumulation of unsolved internal problems that have festered under years of occupation. The gravity of the social and economic problems was further exacerbated by a weakened economy and the increased pressure from Zionist policies of repression, collective punishment, arbitrary mass imprisonments, demolition of houses, and the wide-scale violation of Palestinian human rights. At the same time the popular, often volatile, intifada has put the women's movement to the test. Equally beyond doubt, it has established the need to recruit women into relevant organizations and to offer them the necessary guidance in economic and social skills. It is recognized that the increased and effective participation by Palestinian women in the national infrastructure and the local economy is in itself a contribution toward further minimizing Palestinian dependence upon the Israeli economy. Such a broadening of women's participation could further her entry into the productive labor market as a permanent feature of the national Palestinian economy. Palestinian women have adopted a multiplicity of roles during the intifada and have made themselves highly visible. They physically and verbally challenge the occupation, throw stones and incendiary devices, fight hand to hand with the soldiers, participate in street demonstrations, and place themselves as shields to protect those at risk of arrest or injury. Their courage and bravery have earned them the undying respect of the people. Often under curfew, the Palestinian woman has managed to feed her family, has boycotted Israeli goods, and has found her way through hostile territory and closed areas to provide people with food and sustenance. She has indeed become a mature and experienced activist in the revolutionary struggle. She is forever in the center, the hub, in her relationship to the intifada. The mother of a martyr, the sister of a detainee, the wife of a deporteeshe is all of these people. The prominent role played by Palestinian women in the intifada can in one sense be measured by their losses and suffering. From 1987 to 1990 there were 788 recorded cases of involuntary abortion caused directly from physical abuse at the hands of Israeli soldiers or from exposure to tear gas. To date almost two hundred babies are lost in this way each year. From the beginning of the intifada (December 9, 1987) to 1991, 117 women (including girls and children) between the ages of four days and ninety years have died, and 7,000 have been injured-deaths and injuries caused by bullet wounds, tear gas, or beatings. Some women have sustained neurological damage as a result of brutal assaults. 12 Between 1967 and 1990, about 350 women have been deported, and some 24,000 imprisoned, including 4,000 in 1987, some as young as twelve and as old as sixty. In 1991 alone there were thirty Palestinian women political detainees in Israeli prisons.

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CONCLUSION • Palestinian women first challenged the British Mandate (19221947) and Zionist expansionism by providing front-line support to the freedom fighters. • Following the Israeli occupation in 1967, Palestinian women expanded their roles, enhanced their skills through education, and fulfilled productive roles in the open labor market. • From the beginning, Palestinian women were an integral part of the emergent Palestine national movement (the PLO) and sought radical solutions both to national problems and to those of their own liberation. Through the national resistance movement they were given roles of significance on a variety of levels. • The importance of the role of Palestinian women in the intifada cannot be overemphasized. They have worked alongside their activist brothers, and their importance has been formally stressed by the PLO in its charter. The more Palestinian women participate in the wider national struggle, the more they gain their own freedom. From the moment they took their first steps of alternative awareness, without falling victim to partisan propaganda slogans, the direction of their struggle was radically altered. In this context of liberation, and armed with a positive and sophisticated interpretation of the nature of freedom, each Palestinian will gain his and her liberation. From this standpoint, freedom for women is no longer regarded as negative and unproductive, and women will avoid exchanging one form of oppression (clothed in the form of freedom) for another new form of oppression.

NOTES 1. Several writers. Research and discussion by the debating society arranged by the United Arab Studies Center. The Woman and Her Role in Arab Unity (Beirut: The United Arab Studies Center, 1982), pp. 481-482. 2. Muhammad Amara, Qasem Amin and the Liberation of Woman (Beirut: Almu'assasa al-arabiyya lid-diraset wal-nashr, 1976), p. 105. In this book, Amara states that Rifa'a El Tahtawi was the first to ask for the liberation of the woman in his book, A Summary Framework on Paris, first published in 1902. 3. Ibid., p. 113. 4. Ibid., p. 111. 5. Munif Razzaz, Political Work Concepts: Delineations of the New Arab Life: Evolutions of the Interpretation of Nationalism and Liberty, fourth edition (Damascus: Dar AI Mutawwaset, 1985), p. 396. 6. Ibid., pp. 385, 389. 7. Jamil Jaber, May's Letters (Beirut: Dar Beirut, 1954), p. 3.

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8. Yusuf Asaad Dagher, Sources of Literary Studies: Modern Arab Concept in the Biography of Its Writers, second volume (Beirut: Lebanese University Publications, 1972), p. 739. See also Hanan Awwad, Arab Problems in the Literature of Ghada Samman (in English) (Sherbrook, UK: Numen Publications, 1983), pp. 17, 18, 33. 9. For further information, refer to the following by Nawal El Saadawi: Women at Point Zero (London: Zed, 1983); Two Women in One (Beirut: The Arab Establishment for Studies and Publications, 1977); The Woman and Sex (Beirut: The Arab Establishment for Studies and Publications, 1974); The Woman and the Psychological Conflict (Beirut: The Arab Establishment for Studies and Publications, 1977); The Female is the Fundament (Beirut: The Arab Establishment, 1974); The Death of the One Man on Earth (Cairo: Dar AI Kutob, no date). 10. The Woman and Her Role in Arab Unity, p. 166. 11. For further information, refer to the leaflet "Our Struggle is Continuing" issued by the Women's League of Palestine in the State of Palestine, March, 1989. Also refer to the various leaflets issued by the women's committees and unions in the State of Palestine: Yassin Abdul Qader, "The Role of the Palestinian Woman Under the Intifada, the Economic Samed" (October, November, December, 1988); Faisal Draj, "The Palestinian Woman, the Hub of National Struggle and its Supreme Portrait: An Opinion of the True Self of the Palestinian Woman" (AI Hadaf, December 3, 1989). 12. Izzat Daraghmeh, The Woman's Movement in Palestine, 1930-1990 (Jerusalem: Diaa Office for Studies, 1991), pp. 213-219, 220-235.

4

Gender Issues in Democracy: Rethinking Middle East Peace and Security from a Feminist Perspective SIMONA SHARON! Unnoticed by the gender-blind international media, Palestinian and Israeli women engaged in a series of international conferences to develop feminist frameworks for Middle East peace long before there was any official acquiescence to the 1991 Madrid peace conference. They alerted the international community to the serious need for an international initiative to address the broader Middle Eastern conflicts, of which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was at the forefront.! More recently, although the international media made Palestinian spokeswoman Hanan Mikhail-Ashrawi a media celebrity, many failed to recognize that the participation of prominent Palestinian women like Hanan Mikhail-Ashrawi and Zahira Kamal at the Middle East peace talks in 1991-1992 was not simply decorative affirmative action. It marked the entry of women articulating, within the arena of Middle East and international politics, explicit feminist agendas for peace building in the region.2 These examples of feminist interventions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict introduce voices and perspectives that have been marginalized or excluded from most discussions of Middle East politics. The separate and joint struggles of women in Israel and Palestine confirm that women in different parts of the Middle East are gradually becoming aware of the explicit and implicit ways in which gender is embedded in the politics of the region as well as in international relations. Feminist projects that have critiqued states and their practices, international relations, and dominant political discourses opened up opportunities for rethinking concepts such as peace, security, and power from the lives and struggles of women in the Middle East. 3 Articulating feminist perspectives on peace building in the Middle East does not mean simply adding gender as another category in social science research. It involves uncovering the web of gender politics in the Middle East as it relates to the broader context of global politics. Looking at Middle East politics through feminist eyes implies taking into account the life experiences, voices, and ongoing struggles of women in

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the region to rethink and redefine concepts such as "security" and "peace" from that perspective. As Carol Cohn so eloquently put it: [F]eminists, and others who seek a more just and peaceful world, have a dual task before us-a deconstructive project and a reconstructive project that are intimately linked. Our deconstructive task requires close attention to, and the dismantling of, technostrategic discourse. The dominant voice of militarized masculinity and decontextualized rationality speaks so loudly in our culture, it will remain difficult for any other voices to be heard until that voice loses some of its power to define what we hear and how we name the world-until that voice is delegitimated. Our reconstructive task is a task of creating compelling alternative visions of possible futures, a task of recognizing and developing alternative conceptions of rationality, and a task of creating rich and alternative voices-diverse voices whose conversations with each other will invent those futures.4

To challenge the dominant voice of "militarized masculinity," this chapter seeks to elicit new definitions of central concepts such as "peace" and "security" from the lives and struggles of women in the Middle East. As for "decontextualized rationality," working within the space opened by feminist scholars such as Sandra Harding and Donna Haraway, this chapter calls attention to the need for conflict resolution and peace studies scholarship that emerges from specific contexts of struggle, and it stresses the significance of "situated knowledges."5 Thus, I wish to begin by situating myself and my partial and very subjective attempts to elicit feminist perspectives from the lives and struggles of my sisters in the Middle East. My identity and political positions have been shaped primarily in Israel, in a political climate that prevented me from learning about the struggles of my sisters across the border and from coming to terms with my Middle Eastern identity. But, despite systematic attempts to control my identity through the imposition of sovereign national boundaries and construction of essentialized "enemies," coming to terms with my feminist identity, my commitment to the struggle to end the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the pursuit of a doctoral degree in conflict analysis and resolution have enabled me to write and speak up against injustices committed in my name. Recognizing the interconnectedness of militarism and sexism in Israel, understanding that my identity as an Israeli feminist is inseparable from the rest of my political views and especially from my positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and enjoying the privilege of collaborating with other Middle Eastern feminists, particularly Palestinian feminists, on several projects, I have realized that I wish to be part of an "imagined community" of Middle Eastern feminists. It is with this sense of commitment and responsibility to our separate and joint struggles that I write this chapter, recognizing that being able to use my voice to share my perspective is in itself a

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privilege for which many of my sisters in Israel as in other parts of the Middle East are still struggling.

CHALLENGING STEREOTYPICAL DEPICTIONS OF MIDDLE EASTERN WOMEN The stories of women's life struggles have been marginalized and written out of conventional scholarship on Middle East politics. When Middle Eastern women are portrayed in academic studies and in the media, it is usually as passive victims with little or no attention paid to their struggles to achieve control over their lives and social and political change in their societies. In order to open up discussions of women's life experiences and struggles for social and political change and to articulate feminist perspectives to peace building in the Middle East, the passive stereotypical portrayals of Middle Eastern women need to be challenged. To do so, it is not enough to record women's voices and perspectives. One has also to call attention to the social construction of stereotypical images and their political implications, to the multiplicity of voices among Middle Eastern women, and to the complexities, contradictions, and the changes in the struggles of women in the region.6 Algerian feminist Marnia Lazreg challenged the political agendas behind the stereotypical portrayals of Middle Eastern women-as inferior and primitive on the one hand and as veiled, passive victims on the other-by linking the representation of Middle Eastern women to the broader context of international relations in the region. She argued that "the intense current interest in 'Middle Eastern women' is occurring at a time when the 'Middle East' has been neutralized as a self-sustaining political and economic force."' Lazreg's intervention demonstrates how the stereotypical depiction of Middle Eastern women by Eurocentric men and women reinforces the existing power disparities between North and South (or East and West) on the international political arena. Along the same lines, feminist examinations of U.S. media coverage, such as that of the Gulf War by Cynthia Enloe, have underscored the political consequences of the juxtaposition of an archetypal veiled Arab woman with a "liberated" U.S. woman soldier.8 Enloe demonstrated how "by contrasting the allegedly liberated American woman tank mechanic with the Saudi woman deprived of a driver's license, American reporters are implying that the United States is the advanced civilized country whose duty it is to take the lead in resolving the Persian Gulf crisis." 9 The same powerful subtext was at play during the Iranian Revolution of 1979. During that time, millions of Iranian women stepped into the political arena. Nayereh Tohidi pointed out that women's "involvement in the revolution took many forms: some collected and disseminated news or distributed

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leaflets; others gave shelter to the wounded or to political activists under attack. Many actively marched and demonstrated in the streets, some went so far as to help erect barricades against the police, and a few even took up arms and went underground as members of a guerilla movement." 10 The Western media, however, did not cover the range of political activities carried out by Iranian women during the revolution. Instead, reporters used images of veiled Iranian women demonstrating against the Shah, contrasted with "modern" and "liberated" U.S. and European women, to reinforce the differences that underscore the dichotomies of "us" (the "West," especially the United States) versus "them" (Iran). This juxtaposition was essential in order to mobilize public opinion in the United States and in Europe against the Islamic revolution and in support of continued U.S. intervention in Iranian politics. Nevertheless, the media as well as Western policymakers failed to notice that Iranian women did not show obeisance to the stereotypes. Tohidi called attention to the fact that many Iranian activists at the time, both women and men, considered the veil part of the superstructure as a secondary phenomenon that bothered only Western feminists or a few Iranian women intellectuals. The immediate concern was to rid the country of the Shah's regime and his imperialist supporters .... [M]any women, even nonreligious, nontraditional, and highly educated women, took up the veil as symbol of solidarity and opposition to the Shah.ll The complex and detailed accounts that are required to challenge crude dichotomies such as veiled Middle Eastern women versus liberated Western women cannot be captured in media-narrated sound bites. Instead, the media becomes a powerful tool in shaping public opinion and foreign policies. This happened again in the military coup in Algeria following the national elections in December 1991. Immediately after it became clear that the Islamic Salvation Front won the elections, the Western media was mobilized again. Discourses of democracy, human rights, and women's rights were suddenly invoked to ensure the "stability" of the country, which is essential for unchallenged U.S. hegemony in the region. While these crucial political events were taking place, those who were concerned with their impact on women's lives and struggles in Algeria had to search for information between the lines of alternative progressive magazines. In only one of these magazines could one find an analysis by Algerian socialist feminist Shafla Jemame, which highlighted the direct relationship between global intervention in Algeria, state policies, and women's daily battles. Grounding her analysis in examples from the lives of women in her country, Jemame outlined the direct implications of Algeria's economic dependency on the West by mentioning the rise in unemployment, the decline in purchasing power resulting from the government's decision to abolish subsidies on basic necessities, the shortage in

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housing, and the cuts in health-care programs that previously were free. She emphasized that "the subjection of the government to the IMF's [International Monetary Fund's] dictates will only serve to make reactionary ideology of the fundamentalists more popular."l2 The above examples demonstrate why understanding the hidden agendas behind stereotypical portrayals of Middle Eastern women and the political economy of foreign interventions in the Middle East is crucial to feminist attempts to alter the gendered politics of the region and articulate alternative scenarios for peace and justice in the region. Detailed accounts of women's resistance and struggles to influence the course of politics in the Middle East hold the potential to map alternative feminist interpretations of peace and security.

RETHINKING PEACE AND SECURITY Despite the fact that most Middle Eastern women have not come across feminist scholarship on issues related to war and peace, which until recently has originated primarily in the United States and in Europe, many have been more skeptical of both national and international "security." In most countries throughout the region, governments have used the Arab-Israeli conflict as a major excuse to institutionalize "national security" as a top priority, thus relegating all other social and political problems, including women's struggles for emancipation and equality, to secondary status. In most countries in the Middle East, the defense budget consumes the largest portion of the state's budget and the military is a central and prestigious social institution. These factors have a large influence on the conceptualization of masculinity and femininity and of fixed gender roles and gender relations across the region. Accordingly, all male citizens become potential soldiers whose role is to fight and protect the land and the nation. Women (and children), on the other hand, are portrayed as potential victims and targets for enemy aggression, and thus in need of male protection-yet women are also expected to nurture the fighters and satisfy all their needs. While calling attention to the implications of this dominant discourse for the institutionalization of gender inequality, feminist interpretations have opened up space for alternative scenarios for Middle East peace. Such perspectives were not born in academic settings alone, but emerged from the ongoing struggles of women in the region as part of ways of coping with political developments. The assumption underlying women's struggles is that questions of war and peace are inseparable from questions of development, environmental and ecological degradation, gender, race and class inequalities, abuses of human rights, and attacks on cultural identities. In a newly created space, feminists have begun to articulate the

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connections between violence against a projected "enemy" and violence against women and other nonprivileged citizen groups within and across state borders.13

CHALLENGING BOUNDARIES: WOMEN'S ALLIANCES FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE Throughout the years, Middle Eastern women have learned from bitter experiences that even when changes have occurred in the social and political platforms of states or national liberation movements that have enabled women to take new economic and social roles, such reforms did not challenge the basic systems of gender inequalities.t4 To overcome these setbacks, women in the Middle East have recently engaged in direct challenges of the distinctions between "public" and "private" and between "politics" and narrowly defined "women's issues," and have asserted that all issues are women's issues and that "women's issues" are profoundly politicaJ.15 Thus, feminists in the Middle East have recently stressed the importance of developing social and political strategies to mobilize and intervene in local and global politics in ways that will advance specific women's interests as well as ongoing struggles for emancipation and equal rights.1 6 For example, Middle Eastern women have mobilized around issues such as their legal status and political rights, education, health care, and employment opportunities.J7 By challenging the artificial distinctions between "women's issues" and "politics" and forging new spaces for social and political mobilization, women in the Middle East have engaged, sometimes without intention, in questioning the primacy and sovereignty of national and geographic borders. Two particular examples come to mind in the context of the Middle East: Lebanese women who have crossed the demarcation line in Beirut and the joint "Women Go for Peace" march of Palestinian and Israeli women from West to East Jerusalem. Evelyne Accad described the demarcation line in Beirut as "the most desolate, depressing, and often dangerous spot in the city."t8 Accad called attention to the significance of this symbolic act: Most of the time they go on foot, since only a few cars that have a special permission are allowed through. They go because they are convinced that by this gesture, real as well as symbolic, Lebanon's reunification will take place .... Women friends who cross the demarcation line, defying weapons, militia, and political games ... walk assuredly through the apocalyptic space ... conscious that their march is not an ordinary one, that their crossing is a daring act, important to Lebanon's survival.l9 In Jerusalem, another divided city in the Middle East, 6,000 Palestinian, Israeli, European, and U.S. women participated in a peace march in December 1989 that called for Israeli negotiations with the PLO, a two-

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state solution with security guarantees for all, respect for Palestinian human and political rights, and an immediate end to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.20 To demonstrate the significance of feminist perspectives and practices to peace building in the Middle East, the following account focuses primarily on the separate and joint struggles of Palestinian and Israeli women to articulate alternative frameworks for peace and security. The Palestinian uprising that began in December 1987, known as the intifada, represented a crucial turning point in the political consciousness of Israeli and Palestinian women. Palestinian women have been at the forefront of the intifada, expanding already existing organizations and utilizing them to build an economic, social, and political infrastructure for the future Palestinian state. In addition, Palestinian women have pointed out that their participation in the struggle for self-determination and statehood is not limited to the national agenda, thus, insisting on placing their demands for women's liberation and equal rights on and alongside the national agenda.2t On the other side of the conflict, whereas the majority of Israeli society-including large segments of the nominal male-dominated peace movement-failed to grasp the message and challenges of the intifada, Israeli women participated in large-scale activities with two major goals: to mobilize public opinion against the occupation in Israel and abroad and to build bridges of solidarity with Palestinian women in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.22 These new women's groups that emerged during the intifada provided a context for the demarginalization of feminist discourses by appropriating national principles of self-determination, justice, and equality for women's political activism. The intifada also created better conditions for cooperation between Israeli Jewish women and Palestinian women in Israel and in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These new and fragile alliances have taken the shape of joint protests, solidarity visits, and conferences. Most alliances and encounters between Palestinian and Israeli-Jewish women challenge the primacy of national identities and the rigidity of sovereign boundaries. For example, Hana Safran, an Israeli-Jewish feminist and peace activist and a founding member of Women in Black in Haifa, alluded to the political significance of collaborative solidarity work: In the sociopolitical context there are many forces that work to keep us separate and the joint protest enables the building of a common ground, opens a dialogue. There is a process of trust building. They [Palestinian women] know that we are their allies, that we do not represent the Israeli government. Our persistence in the vigils makes us more credible to Palestinian women.23

But the emerging alliances between Palestinian and Israeli-Jewish women face constant challenges. As Palestinian feminist scholar and activist Rita Giacaman reminds us: "Bridges cannot be built in a vacuum. Not every

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woman will agree with another woman. Sisterhood is not necessarily global. For sisterhood to be global certain predispositions need to be met. ... Bridges are very difficult to build."24 To even begin to imagine how we might construct bridges between Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian women, women on each part of the divide need to develop critical consciousness of where we stand in relation to the divisions between us. For example, Hana Safran pointed out that: Before the intifada there was a fear amongst feminists that were interested in building bridges of solidarity with Palestinian women; those of us who were aware that feminism as we practice it emerged in a Western context, we were afraid of imposing our "way of life" on Palestinian women who carry a struggle which emerged in a completely different context than ours. There wasn't enough knowledge about their struggles and their local unique definitions of feminism. Our fear was of patronizing in cooperation.25 This example alludes not only to the differences between different feminist frameworks that Palestinian and Israeli women utilize, but also to the ways in which essentializing discourses of "us" versus "them" and state's ideologies and policies aimed at "divide and conquer" have made solidarity work across the national divide very difficult and very limited prior to the outbreak of the intifada. In addition to creating better conditions for solidarity, the intifada also triggered the emergence of feminist voices in Israel and Palestine, linking narrowly defined "women's issues," such as violence against women, discrimination in the workplace, women's health and reproductive rights, to the sociopolitical contexts within which they unfold. On the Palestinian side, the Women's Studies Committee at the Bisan Research and Development Center in Jerusalem organized a special conference, "The Intifada and Some Women's Social Issues." The conference took place in Jerusalem on December 14, 1990, with the participation of more than 400 women, including grass-roots activists, academicians, and researchers. On July 18, 1991, another Palestinian Women's Studies Center on the West Bank held a conference on domestic violence against women, which was attended by 100 women.2 6 On the Israeli side, too, feminists began to see the linkages between "women's issues" and the broader political context. For example, following her participation with Palestinian women at an international women's conference in Brussels entitled "Give Peace a Chance-Women Speak Out," Rachel Ostrowitz, a long-time feminist, peace activist, and editor of Noga, the only feminist magazine in Israel, linked the oppression of Israeli women with the oppression of Palestinians: Our oppression is not acceptable nor is the oppression of others .... We, the women of the Israeli peace movement, will not allow our senses to be

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numbed by the daily killings. We will not accept oppression, discrimination, or exploitation as part of our political system .... We won't give up, or shut up, or put up with the current version of reality.27

With the unprecedented increase in violence against women and children since the outbreak of the intifada, and especially in the aftermath of the Gulf War, more feminists and peace activists in Israel realize that the struggle for women's liberation in Israel is directly connected to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and that militarism and sexism are interconnected. Furthermore, some Israeli feminists argue that the conception of Israeli masculinity is linked to the militarized political climate in Israel and in the region. They demonstrate how the institutionalization of "national security" as a top priority in Israel contributes to gender inequalities on the one hand, and legitimizes violence against Palestinians and against women on the other. The major argument is that the social construction of masculinity in Israel has to be addressed in its historical context, especially in light of the Holocaust and the creation of the Jewish state. Accordingly, the state of Israel can be seen as a reassertion of manhood, justified by the need to end a history of weakness and suffering by creating an image of an Israeli man who is exceedingly masculine, pragmatic, protective, assertive, and emotionally tough. Utilizing images such as "a nation under siege" surrounded by enemies that threaten to throw the entire population into the sea, the Zionist ideology of the state made "national security" a top priority and gave rise to the centrality of the army and its practices in all spheres of Israeli life, thus offering the "new" Israeli men a privileged status in Israeli society.28 In Israel, for example, the national project of creating unity in the face of the "enemy" has been grounded in colonial, Orientalist, and sexist relations of power. In other words, because one of the primary objectives of the Israeli doctrine of "national security" has always been to build a cohesive unified front, "national security" has been used not only to justify Israeli militaristic and expansionist political projects, but also to legitimize and reinforce existing inequalities among Israeli citizens along lines of gender, nationality, birthplace, ethnicity, class, and political affiliation. Resistance attempts on the part of grass-roots social movements representing Israel's second, third, and fourth-class citizens-women, Jews from Arab and North African countries, and Palestinians who hold Israeli citizenship--to protest against discriminatory state policies have been often dismissed under the premise of "national security": Israel's disenfranchised populations were asked to understand that until the Arab-Israeli/Israeli-Palestinian conflict is resolved, they have to stand united against the "enemy ."29 New projects that intend to articulate and implement feminist perspectives on peace building in the Middle East have to explore the inter-

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play between the social construction of masculinity and state ideologies. Such projects require critiques of the dominant discourse of "national security," Zionist ideologies and practices, hegemonic interpretations of the Bible, the Holocaust, and other chapters of Jewish and Israeli history that have been taken for granted, despite their implications not only for Palestinians but also for the lives of the majority of Israeli citizens.30 The fact that conventional scholarship on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict tends to ignore feminist interventions such as the ones described above is no doubt related to the fact that the majority of such scholarship is produced by. white, privileged men. Therefore, women and other social groups in the Middle East who are interested in social and political changes in the direction of a just peace in the region should view as significant the fact that there are Palestinian and Israeli women who, despite fundamental differences separating them, have begun, especially since the outbreak of the intifada, to seriously challenge the primacy of national identities and the confines of sovereign boundaries and link their struggles for women's liberation with their broader political struggles. The emergence of transnational discourse on liberation opens up space for new politics of resistance and solidarity and new avenues for conflict resolution and peace building in the region and across the globe.

CONCLUSIONS In order to mobilize women's movements across the region around feminist projects directed at advancing the prospects for peace in the Middle East and to overcome the obstacles facing them, women and progressive movements in the region have to engage in numerous processes of personal and political transformations. Some of the challenges facing women are (1) to further explode the artificial distinctions between narrowly defined "women's issues" and the politics of war and peace; (2) to engage in laying the groundwork for coalition politics that transcend national sovereignties and encourage women's movements and other progressive social movements in the region to expand their collaboration on particular issues such as the long-term task of peace building in the Middle East; (3) to move from dialogue as the major avenue of conflict resolution to solidarity (this implies the need to recognize and address differences in power and privilege among peoples and parties that have been entangled in particular conflict); and (4) to develop the necessary strategies, resources, and coalitions that will enable women to move from the margins of local and global political arenas to all centers of political power. To open up opportunities for such projects, topics such as the social constructions of gender identities and roles; the interconnectedness of militarism and sexism; and the relationship between colonialism, nationalism,

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and feminism need to be made an integral part of peace studies and conflict resolution scholarship as well as of the agendas set by the international peace and justice community for peace building in the Middle East. NOTES 1. Naomi Chazan, "Israeli Women and Peace Activism," in Barbara Swirsky and Marilyn Safir (eds.), Calling the Equality Bluff" Women in Israel (New York: Pergamon Press, 1991 ); Yvonne Deutsch, "Israeli Women: From Protest to a Culture of Peace," in Deena Hurwitz, (ed.), Walking the Red Line: Israelis in Search of Justice for Palestine (Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1992); Simona Sharoni, "Women's Alliances and Middle East Politics: Conflict Resolution Through Feminist Lenses," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Israel Studies, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, May 1992. 2. Rabab Hadi, "Ms. Exclusive: The Feminist Behind the Spokeswoman: A Candid Talk with Hanan Ashrawi," Ms. Magazine (April/March 1992): 14-18. 3. Sarah Brown, "Feminism, International Theory, and International Relations of Gender Inequality," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 17(3) (1988): 461-475; V. Spike Peterson, "Transgressing Boundaries: Gender, States, Militarism," in Peace, World Order and Conflict Resolution Studies: Problems, Challenges, Prospects (New York: World Order Models, 1991); Anne Sisson Runyan and V. Spike Peterson, "The Radical Future of Realism: Feminist Subversions of IR Theory," Alternatives 16 (1991): 67-106; Christine Sylvester, "Reginas Face Regimes: Gender Cooperations, and Theory Confoundings," paper presented at the International Studies Association annual conference, Atlanta, Georgia, April 1992. 4. Carol Cohn, "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals," in Linda Rennie Forcey (ed.), Peace: Meanings, Politics, Strategies (New York: Praeger, 1989), pp. 39-72. This article originally appeared in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 12 (1987): 687-718. 5. Donna Haraway, "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective," Feminist Studies 14(3) (1988): 575-599; Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (New York: Cornell University Press, 1987); Sandra Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women's Lives (New York: Cornell University Press, 1991). 6. Simona Sharoni, "Middle East Politics Through Feminist Lenses: Toward Theorizing International Relations from Women's Struggles," in Christine Sylvester (ed.), Special Issue: "Feminist Write International Relations," Alternatives 18 (1993): 5-28. 7. Marnia Lazreg, "Feminism and Difference: The Perils of Writing as a Woman on Women in Algeria," in Marianne Hirsch and Evelyn Fox-Keller (eds.), Conflicts in Feminism (New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 343. 8. Cynthia Enloe, "Women and Children: Making Feminist Sense of the Persian Gulf Crisis," The Village Voice (September 25, 1990). 9. Ibid., p. 1. 10. Nayereh Tohidi, "Gender and Islamic Fundamentalism: Feminist Politics in Iran," in Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Ann Russo, and Lourdes Torres (eds.), Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 251. 11. Ibid., pp. 251-252. 12. Shafla Jemame, "Women Fight Exclusion and Poverty," International Viewpoint 220 (January 20, 1992): 5.

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13. Evelyne Accad, Sexuality and War: Literary Masks of the Middle East (New York: New York University Press, 1990); Simona Sharoni, "Every Woman is an Occupied Territory: The Politics of Militarism and Sexism and the IsraeliPalestinian Conflict," paper presented at the First International Conference of the Ethnic Studies Network, Northern Ireland, June 1992. 14. Accad, Sexuality and War; Tohidi, "Gender and Islamic Fundamentalism"; Deniz Kandiyoti (ed.), Women, Islam and the State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991); Fatima Mernissi, The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women's Rights in Islam (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1991). 15. Liela Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992); Judith Tucker, (ed.), Arab Women: Old Boundaries, New Frontiers (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993). 16. Julie Peteet and Barbara Harlow, "Gender and Political Change," Middle East Report 173 (November/December 1991): 4-8. 17. Ramla Khalidi and Judith Tucker, Women's Rights in the Arab World, a special MERIP publication (Washington, D.C.: MERIP 1992). 18. Accad, Sexuality and War, p. 2. 19. Ibid. 20. Deutsch, "Israeli Women." 21. Suha Sabbagh, "Palestinian Women Writers and the Intifada," Social Text 22 (Spring 1989): 1-19; Nabla Abdo, "Women of the Intifada: Gender, Class and National Liberation," Race & Class 32(4) (1991): 19-34. 22. Naomi Chazan, "Israeli Women and Peace Activism," in Special Issue: "Women in Action," New Outlook (June/July 1989); Simona Sharoni, "Women in Black," Palestine Perspectives (May/June, 1990): 3-4; Shlomo Swirsky, Israel: The Oriental Majority (London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd, 1989). 23. Excerpts from interview with Hana Safran, May 1990, Haifa, Israel. 24. Excerpts from conversation with Rita Giacaman, Maha Nasar, and Eileen Kuttab, June 1991, Ramalla, Occupied West Bank. 25. Excerpts from interview with Hana Safran, May 1990, Haifa, Israel. 26. Eileen Kuttab, "The Intifada and Some Women's Social Issues," Al-Mar'a 6 (1990): 8-11. (Jerusalem: Women Studies Centre, P.O. Box 19591, East Jerusalem); Eileen Kuttab, "Women's Studies Centre Holds Conference on Domestic Violence Against Women," Al-Mar'a 6 (1990): 12. 27. Rachel Ostrowitz, "The Israeli Women's Peace Movement," New Outlook 32(6/7) (June-July 1989): 14-15. 28. Sharoni, "Every Woman is an Occupied Territory." 29. Ella Shohat, "Sepharadim in Israel: Zionism from the Standpoint of its Jewish Victims," Social Text 19/20 (1988): 1-35; Swirsky, Israel: The Oriental Majority. 30. Nira Yuval-Davis, "The Jewish Collectivity," in The Khamsin Collective (ed.), Women in the Middle East (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1987); Nahia Abdo, "Racism, Zionism and the Palestinian Working Class, 1920-1947," Studies in Political Economy 37 (Spring 1992): 59-93.

5

The Arab World After the Gulf War: Challenges and Prospects EMILE

A. N AKHLEH

The Gulf crisis, which was precipitated by the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, has generated serious challenges for the Arab state system that must be confronted if the Arab states intend to contribute to regional peace and security as the world heads into the next century. The aggression by one Arab state against another has caused concern and confusion in the Arab street and among Arab intellectuals regarding the concepts of Arab unity, Arab nationalism, and Pan-Arabism as unifying principles. Furthermore, the inability of Arab states, individually and collectively through the Arab League, to thwart the Iraqi aggression and reestablish Kuwaiti sovereignty and their reliance on foreign forces to restore the peace have raised serious questions in the Arab world regarding the defense of these states and their ability to protect the security of the region. Despite the billions of dollars they have spent on weapons systems in the last decade, the Arab states were unable to withstand the Iraqi aggression. Nor was their invoking of Arab "brotherhood" or Islamic umma slogans sufficient to persuade Saddam Hussein, a self-proclaimed Arab nationalist, not to invade a "sister" state or to resolve his disagreements with Kuwait peacefully. The much-touted "Arab solution" to the Gulf crisis was proposed after Iraq invaded Kuwait, and even then could not convince the Iraqi leadership to withdraw from Kuwait short of an all-out war. The challenges facing the Arab state system as a consequence of the Gulf War are both internal and external. It is somewhat ironic that many of these challenges were brought forth by Saddam's "public diplomacy" message that justified his aggression against Kuwait. Regardless of the veracity of Saddam's message, several of his claims found resonance in the Arab street. These included democratization and political participation, redistribution of wealth, artificiality of state boundaries, control of natural resources, human rights, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Islam, and foreign presence. The internal challenges focus principally on the relationship between the individual and the regime and the Arab peoples' desire to participate in

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the political and economic national policies of their countries. From Algeria to Kuwait, people are demanding to participate in the governing process. Although mostly centralized, Arab regimes-monarchies and single-party autocracies-are responding to these demands by promising some kind of a shura system of participation. Not surprisingly, no ruler has come forth with a promise for a true democracy. However, even a trend toward "shuracracy" 1 is sure to generate some upheaval in the region. The recent disturbances in Algeria are perhaps a precursor of further confrontations. The external challenges involve the relations of these states with each other, with non-Arab Islamic states in the region, and with foreign, especially Western, powers. The Gulf crisis has also forced the Arab states to face the apparent dichotomy between their support-at least rhetorical-of Arab unity and Pan-Arab objectives and their pursuit of particularistic (state-driven) national interests. The anti-Saddam Arab coalition states justified their pro-Western position to their own peoples on the grounds that the United States, which spearheaded the coalition, would help them get rid of Saddam and would effect a resolution of the Palestinian conflict. However, a year after the start of Operation Desert Shield, eight months after the beginning of the air war, and almost half a year after the termination of Operation Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein was still in power, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has remained unresolved. The coalition Arab states, including Egypt, are becoming less sanguine about the demise of Saddam or the revival of the peace process. The lofty goals expressed by regional leaders during the crisis are yet to be realized. In order to delineate and analyze the postwar challenges facing the Arab world, it would be useful to establish a few pertinent axioms or "givens." • The Arab state system cannot for long be oblivious to the issues raised by Saddam Hussein during the Gulf crisis, even though the Iraqi strongman is perhaps the least qualified to address such issues as democracy and political participation in government. • The challenges facing the Arab states in the postwar era are complex and multidimensional. They are political, economic, educational, ethnic, religious, social, technological, environmental, military, strategic, and even racial. • These challenges have been sharpened and polarized by the war, but they are neither new nor attributable to any one source; the Gulf War is a catalyst but not a cause. • These challenges and the Arab regimes' response to them are not a series of discrete actions; they require coordination, commitment, and resources. They do not represent a single crisis to be managed as a "one-shot affair."

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• Although these challenges are decades old, they must be addressed precipitously while the "iron is hot" and the victory over Saddam is still fresh in people's minds. • From a positive perspective, challenges are but one side of the coin, the other being the opportunities the Arab state system can utilize if a functional partnership is established between governments and peoples. In planning for the future, perhaps the three most fundamental challenges facing the Arab state system are the issues of democratization, Islam and the modern state, and the Palestinian conflict. Other challenges such as poverty and wealth, education, regional peace, and economic cooperation are also very important; however, they could be dealt with once the fundamental ones are addressed. I will focus here on what I believe is the most fundamental challenge: the issue of democratization.

DEMOCRATIZATION In a June 19, 1991, article in the Christian Science Monitor, Lamis Andoni reported on a conference held in Amman, sponsored by the Center for Arab Unity Studies. Academics from several Arab countries attended. Several important themes emerged during the discussion, and consensus developed among conference participants on the following points. • search for a new political identity; • need to reform authoritarian systems and restore unity in the region; • political soul-searching as a result of the Gulf War; • general absence of political freedom as a major factor allowing Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and the subsequent armed intervention in the Gulf to occur. One Iraqi academic at the meeting stated that the "absence of the minimum level of democracy in Iraq was one of the major mistakes of the regime." The imbalance in the Arab political order, argued some of the conference participants, is caused by the weakness or absence of political popular participation. In this regard, conference participants agreed that the most promising models for democratic transformation are Jordan and Algeria. Finally and most importantly, conference participants concluded that "democracy should not be sacrificed for any value or cause-including Arab unity." The conference represented a turning point in Arab political thinking. In the past, priority was given to sovereignty and political unity over

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democracy. Since the Gulf War, the reverse has begun to emerge in Arab political thought. Although on the surface many Arab regimes and leaders seem to have reverted to prewar behavior, the war has caused subtle and more far-reaching changes among all segments in the Arab world-academics, thinkers, other elites, and the man in the street. A review of the post-Gulf crisis developments in the region raises several important questions: How are Arab governments assessing postwar changes and responding to them? Or are they? • What kinds of information are these governments conveying to their peoples and to each other about these changes? • Has public diplomacy, as evidenced in government pronouncements, reflected these changes since the end of Operation Desert Storm? • Does Arab government policy in the postwar period reflect any awareness of the postwar changes? Available information indicates that other than Egypt, Algeria, and Jordan, and to some degree Tunisia, Arab regimes are either moving slowly toward political reform or not moving at all. One should hasten to add that the political reform envisioned by some of the regimes is highly structured and controlled by the ruler or the regime. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, which have in practice blocked political reform toward democratization, have argued that internal and regional "stability" dictates that the status quo be maintained.2 Saudi Arabia seems to have persuaded Washington that a move toward democratization would undermine Gulf security and stability. A similar argument might also be the reason behind the Kuwaiti ruling family's half-hearted nod toward democracy, in spite of the fact that the crown prince had pledged to the Kuwaiti people in October 1990 in Jedda that after liberation Kuwait would move toward political participation. The Jordanian monarchy, on the other hand, has concluded that free elections and parliamentary politics are the wave of the future. Even the Islamist parties and movements seem to have functioned responsibly in the parliament. The Jordanian National Charter, which was endorsed by King Hussein and Jordan's political elites in July 1991, reflects a national commitment to democratization in the country. Some opponents of political liberalization have argued that democratization would not succeed in political systems that are embedded in Islamic culture. However, there is no inherent contradiction between Islam and democracy. Islam is not inimical to democracy; Islamic autocrats are. Several Islamic states-for example, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Bangladesh, Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan, and Egypt-in recent years have had popular

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elections, although some are more democratic than others. During and since the Gulf crisis, Arab and Islamic political and economic elites throughout the Arab-Islamic world openly called for democratization in the region. Privately and publicly, many of these elites have urged the Western democracies, especially the United States, to use their military victory over Saddam Hussein to promote democratization. These elites have rejected the argument presented by some Arab regimes, especially in the Gulf, that the "current situation" dictates that the status quo be maintained. In an unprecedented move, a group of fortythree prominent Saudi personalities presented a signed petition to King Fahd calling for the establishment of a majlis shura (consultative assembly) and a review of the system of governance in the kingdom. Indeed, the petitioners used Islamic teachings and principles to buttress their petition. The petition, which was first published in the Egyptian newspaper al-Ahali in spring 1990, included several important demands: • A majlis shura should be established to decide on domestic and foreign matters. It should consist of honest, loyal, independent people who are also recognized specialists in their respective fields. • All current laws, and political, economic, and administrative procedures should be reviewed in light of the Islamic shari'a and those that contradict the shari' a should be discarded. • Government officials and diplomatic representatives should display good behavior and should be appointed to their positions because of honesty, integrity, and expertise. • Justice, equality, and civil rights should be guaranteed for all citizens without any privileges for the powerful or discrimination against the weak. • An effective system of accountability should be established for all government officials. Those convicted of corruption or malfeasance in office should be punished. • Public wealth should be distributed on a just basis among all citizens in society, and all forms of monopoly should be prohibited. • A strong, well-integrated army should be established whose responsibility would be to protect the country and its holy places. • The kingdom's foreign policy should serve the interests of the community and the world of Islam and should refrain from joining alliances that are inimical to the teachings of Islam. • Religious and doctrinal institutions in the country should be strengthened and supported financially. • The judiciary should be unified and granted complete and actual independence. • Individual and community rights should be guaranteed and human dignity should be protected according to accepted laws and practices.

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The Saudi monarchy was shocked by the petition, and several signers of the petition were questioned by the authorities. Yet, in spite of the petition and in spite of earlier promises by the monarchy regarding the establishment of a consultative assembly, no action has been taken on the road to democratization. Although the petition was submitted in the spring, the Saudi monarch did issue a statement in fall 1990 promising some sort of liberalization. Indeed, King Fahd's November 9, 1990, announcement that the kingdom would liberalize its political system including the establishment of a majlis shura caused a reaction of surprise and promise among many Saudis. A question was raised at the time as to the timing and motives of the king's announcement. In response to that question, analysts offered at least four possible explanations.3 • Several voices were raised in the United States and other Western democracies questioning the policy of defending the familial Gulf regimes that violate human rights and ignore democracy. Public opinion in the West strongly demanded that Gulf regimes should encourage democratization. Otherwise, why go to war to liberate a wealthy family-run autocracy? • At the beginning of the Gulf crisis, a state of panic dominated the Gulf monarchies, and the media of those regimes began to call on their governments to consult their citizens in the defense of those countries. The majlis shura approach has always been presented as the most suitable vehicle for political participation in the Gulf monarchies. • At the outset of the crisis, Gulf citizens did not show much sympathy for their governments. In response to the lack of citizen loyalty and concern, Gulf governments announced their intention to carry out some reforms in the future, after the crisis had ended. • The Gulf crisis helped the indigenous political groups-fragile as they are-raise their voices to call for introducing genuine democratic changes inside the Gulf countries. The logic of these groups was that the absence of democracy in Iraq had put it in that situation, and consequently the presence of democracy in Saudi Arabia and in the Gulf in general would save these countries from other "Saddams." • The economic boom that was experienced by the Gulf states in the 1970s and 1980s has ended, and Gulf citizens are beginning to face economic difficulties that did not exist during the boom period. The demands for democratization in Kuwait were, of course, heavily influenced by the occupation of the country. Although the different Kuwaiti opposition groups disagree on the tactics and modalities of reform, they all agree on the demand to reinstate the 1962 constitution and to

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resurrect the popularly elected National Assembly, which was dissolved in 1986. The ruling family's promise in October 1990 to restore the National Assembly and have free national elections upon liberation did not materialize. Instead, the emir formed a cabinet in which family members hold all the important portfolios, and in which the opposition refused to serve. He also promised to hold national elections in October 1992, which did not take place. The internal situation in Kuwait is highly volatile, violations of human rights are prevalent, and opposition forces are being silenced. The tension between those who stayed during the occupation (al-Samidoon) and those who fled (al-Hariboon) threatens to erupt into open conflict, especially if the ruling family fails to take measures toward political liberalization. In assessing the political future of the Gulf monarchies, it is possible to make several observations. • The Gulf states will face serious challenges that must be addressed if they are to survive as family-ruled monarchies. The ruling families unfortunately do not seem to meet these challenges seriously. If this trend continues, the long-term survival of Gulf emirates will be problematic. • Demands for participation (al-musharaka fi sun' al-qarar) have been made by indigenous Gulfis, not Palestinians, not Iraqis, and not Egyptians. Therefore, they cannot be dismissed as "foreign" or "alien" ideas. To illustrate, in a panel discussion broadcast on Bahraini television on November 12, 1990, three Bahraini intellectuals argued that after the crisis Gulf monarchies should invite their peoples to participate in decisionmaking. • Gulf states do not have the luxury of security in obscurity; they will continue to be in the limelight of international energy policy. Although the Cold War between the two superpowers has come to an end, Gulf states will find themselves for the foreseeable future entangled in some facet of a three-pronged "Cold War": Arab-U.S., Arab-Arab, and Arab-Israeli. • Internal stability and regime legitimacy will directly affect the long-term survival of the Gulf states. Domestic instability and regime precariousness would in the long run be detrimental to the stability of the region. • Genuine legitimacy of political tribalism in the latter part of the twentieth century can be guaranteed only through meeting the challenges facing these states. Political participation in decisionmaking is the most important of these challenges. Other Arab states outside the Gulf will also have to face the democratization challenge. Some of them, such as Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan,

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and Lebanon, already have a parliamentary process based on national elections. Although the role of the opposition in these polities is yet to be clearly defined, most political movements in these countries-from radical leftists to Islamic fundamentalists-have participated in the electoral process. Iraq and Syria-the other two most important countries-have not adopted a democratic system of government, and thus they are the focus of the comments below. Since his defeat in Kuwait, Saddam Hussein has promised to institute a new constitution based on political pluralism and national elections. However, although the role of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) has been somewhat curtailed, Saddam is still the strongman of Iraq, and the Ba'th party, for all practical purposes, still runs the country. Saddam's trusted relatives, advisers, and clansmen also remain in control of the government. It is possible to identify several reasons why prodemocracy Sunni elements in Iraq have not made vocal demands for political reform or why they have not openly opposed Saddam's rule. • The Iraqi security forces have throughout the years terrorized and liquidated the opposition. Internal security agents have penetrated all segments of society. • Saddam Hussein has developed a masterful propaganda machine and has used the government-controlled media to strengthen his control of the entire country and to silence the opposition. • Saddam succeeded in portraying his war with Iran (1980-1988) as a nationalist war of survival against a non-Arab enemy. His "victory" against Iran was hailed as a great achievement of a secular Arab nationalist, who was also perceived as the only Arab leader who could potentially challenge Israel's military power in the region. • During the Gulf crisis, Saddam Hussein presented the crisis to his people as a "U.S.-Atlantic-Zionist" conspiracy aimed at the destruction of Iraq, not just the elimination of Saddam Hussein's rule. The regime pointed to the bombing of Iraq's public services infrastructure as evidence of the campaign to beat Iraq into submission. The continued UN-imposed sanctions are also being presented by the regime as another indicator of Washington's policy to humiliate Iraq. • The Shi'a uprising in southern Iraq after the war and the Kurdish rebellion in the north left the Sunnis in a precarious position as an embattled minority in the center of the country. The Shi 'a and Kurdish uprisings forced the Sunnis to support Saddam because to them he represented the unity of Iraq, and they, of course, opposed the disintegration of the country. • The Sunni elites-military and civilian-received all kinds of economic and status privileges under Saddam's Ba'th regime. Many of

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them correctly believe that their fortunes, and in some cases their very survival, are dependent on Saddam's staying in power. One would have to wait and see whether after the removal of sanctions, Iraqi Sunni political elites would mount a serious challenge to Saddam Hussein's rule. Political liberalization will remain a fundamental challenge in Iraq for the foreseeable future. In Syria, President Hafiz ai-Asad has also not moved toward political participation. He has used the government-controlled media to underscore the importance of the country's involvement in foreign policy and to minimize the significance of domestic issues. AI-Asad cited three foreign policy "successes" in the last year as evidence of his stature as a regional leader: Syria's participation in the anti-Saddam coalition; the extension of Syria's hegemony in Lebanon; and Syria's agreement to engage in the Middle East peace process under Washington's sponsorship. Al-Asad has also moved to mend his relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization. There were indications during the Gulf crisis that the Syrian public did not support the anti-Iraqi policy of ai-Asad. However, because of the pervasive presence of the security forces, no antiregime demonstrations occurred. It is as if the "Hama rules" continue to dominate the political process in Syria.4 It is difficult to predict how long it would take Syria's political elites to begin to demand participation in the political process. It would be equally difficult to predict how long al-Asad would be able to use foreign policy issues and accomplishments as an excuse to delay a move toward democratization.

CONCLUSION Demands for democratization in the Arab world are different from those voiced in Eastern Europe, for example. The difference lies in the nature of the Arab state system and its Islamic cultural heritage. • In advocating political reform, Arab elite groups are in effect calling for a redefinition and a reexamination of national political identity with the Arab citizen, rather than the regime, as its focus. • By demanding a new role for the individual, prodemocracy advocates are concentrating on the nature of the state and are bringing into sharp focus the organic relationship between the state as an administrative unit and the umma as an Islamic collective community concept. • Political reformists are also signaling Arab society in general and Arab regimes in particular that some of the major national problems or "mistakes," as one Iraqi intellectual described them

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recently, are caused by one-person autocratic rule. Political participation, exercised through a national debate of the issues, would lessen the possibility of reckless adventurism, similar to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. A free, open discussion of major issues in a national forum, such as a parliament or a national assembly, would minimize the temptations of ambitious leaders to spread their control of the region through aggression. • Advocates of political reform are also signaling Arab leaders that individual freedoms must be protected and human rights must not be violated regardless of one's religion, tribal and ethnic origin, or political ideology. The state has a responsibility to protect its citizens not to terrorize or brutalize them. • Finally, advocates of democratization are not only calling for participation in political decisionmaking; they want to influence national economic policy as well. This is particularly relevant to the family-ruled oil states in which only a few members of the ruling family reach major economic decisions pertaining to the national treasury. Reformists have also argued for a role in national educational policy. The fact that many Arab leaders have in the last year promised their citizens some sort of political participation indicates that the demands for democratization are national in scope and are being somewhat heard. The evils of the Iraqi dictatorship, assailed so relentlessly by the anti-Saddam Arab leaders during the Gulf crisis, cannot in the long run be limited to Iraq. Autocrats in other Arab countries would be unable to keep demands for democratization and political freedom on the other side of the fence. The wonderful annus mirabilis year of 1989 in Europe might still dawn in the Arab world.

NOTES 1. Ehud Ya'ari, Jerusalem Report, June 27, 1991. 2. Flora Lewis, New York Times, July 19, 1991. 3. AI-Fatah, Cairo, April 1, 1991. 4. Thomas Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem (New York: Farar, Straus & Giroux, 1989).

6

Peace-Building Initiatives from the Middle East MOHAMED SID-AHMED

More is being heard of peace initiatives for the Middle East coming from outside than from inside the region itself, if only because most of the protagonists in the conflict are skeptical as to whether conditions exist at this specific moment to reach a peace agreement that would satisfy the basic demands of the parties. If the Arab parties have now come to the conclusion that the issue of peace should be taken seriously, it is out of exhaustion rather than a conviction that conditions are ripe for an equitable peace-and also, perhaps, because of the emergence of some particularly thorny inter-Arab conflictual situations that appear to have acquired more importance than the conflict with Israel. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that any Israeli negotiators at this time, and not only the Likud government, would consider the status quo to be more to their advantage than signing a peace agreement that would entail relinquishing a yet unspecified chunk of occupied Arab territory. They would question the wisdom of signing a contractual peace accord that commits Israel to final borders at a time when more Jewish immigration is expected, not only from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe but eventually also from South Africa.

THE END OF THE BIPOLAR WORLD GAME Even when it comes to external pressure brought to propel the peace process forward, the efforts furnished so far have not really optimized available opportunities. The United Nations, for instance, has been completely marginalized in the peace process and is reduced to the status of observer, despite the fact that the whole process is formally based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 for the Arab-Israeli conflict as a whole, and on Resolution 425 as far as Lebanon is concerned. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN Secretary General, refused to have anything to do

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with the Moscow Conference that inaugurated the multilateral talks on the Middle East in January 1992, because the United Nations was not properly represented. The European Community is also kept out of the peace process, with only the status of observer. Furthermore, after the breakdown of the former Soviet Union, it is obvious that the Russian cosponsorship of the peace process does not mean much and that the only relevant sponsor of the whole undertaking is the United States. This means that Washington will have the upper hand when it comes to deciding how the negotiations are conducted, which does not necessarily go hand-inhand with responding to the legitimate interests of all the regional and international parties concerned. Still, whatever the reluctance of the regional parties to accept the concessions that a peace agreement would entail, they find themselves compelled to consider some form of give-and-take in the name of peace, if only because the rationale of resistance that prevailed in the previous bipolar world game no longer exists. Previously, parties were more concerned with using any support they could get from the superpower that backed them to improve their negotiating position rather than actually going to the negotiating table. It is no accident that the Madrid Conference was convened after the bipolar system had come to an end. U.S.-Soviet cosponsorship of the Madrid Conference had more to do with ensuring commitment from the former Soviet Union to the U.S. line than offering Moscow an opportunity to counterbalance Washington's hegemony over the process.

DOES THE EXCLUSIVE U.S. SPONSORSHIP OF THE PEACE PROCESS MEAN UNRESERVED BIAS IN FAVOR OF ISRAEL? It has been said that because in the new unipolar world game the United

States is the only real sponsor of the peace process, and that because in the previous bipolar world game the United States supported Israel whereas the former Soviet Union supported the Arabs, the outcome of any negotiation process is bound to be favorable to Israel. This is the viewpoint of the rejectionist front in the Arab and Islamic worlds. However, the situation cannot be reduced to that simple deduction. Throughout the entire Cold War period, Israel was all-important to the United States from a strategic standpoint. Contrary to what the Arabs believed, Israel's strategic importance derived less from the fact that it was a deterrent against Arab anti-Western independence movements than from the fact that it was a bulwark on which the United States could rely when it came to a military confrontation with the former Soviet Union. All Sadat's efforts to convince Washington that as the West's most reliable Arab friend in the Middle East he was better placed than Israel to mobilize

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the whole region against the Soviet Union in case of war had little credibility in the eyes of U.S. strategists. But now that Moscow is no longer Washington's number one enemy, the situation has changed fundamentally. When a war did erupt in the region, it turned out to be not a war with the former Soviet Union but an inter-Arab war in the Gulf area, and, in this new context, Israel appeared to be more a liability than an asset to U.S. strategic interests. On the other hand, the Arabs, not Israel, hold the most important oil reserves in the world, and oil is a key commodity in a multipolar world order that is based on economic competition between developed postindustrial groups of nations rather than on military confrontation. In this competition, whoever is in command of how the main sources of energy are managed and distributed has the upper hand. Regions such as the Gulf, which retains the most important reserves of oil discovered so far, are bound to be major elements in the new global game. Moreover, as the Gulf War has made clear, the stability of this oil-rich area should not be taken for granted, and therefore the Arab-Israeli conflict should not become a factor that could further destabilize the area. If the United States can no longer support Israel as unconditionally as it did before, it is because the stability of the oil-rich area is acquiring greater importance for U.S. strategic interests at the same time that Israel no longer has strategic value as an anti-Soviet bulwark in the Middle East. This does not mean that Washington will switch from being a staunch supporter of Israel into becoming a defender of the Arab cause. It does not follow that, because of the U.S. stake in the stability of the Arab oil area, Washington will uphold what the Arabs see as their legitimate rights, particularly the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, nationhood, and sovereignty. But it does mean that the United States can no longer afford to be unconditionally biased in favor of Israel. That is not to say that the capacity of the pro-Israel lobby in the United States to put pressure on U.S. decisionmaking institutions, notably the Congress, has diminished. Nor does it imply that the Arabs have built up a pressure group of their own in the United States capable of standing up to the pro-Israel lobby. If Israel can influence U.S. policy "from above" through its powerful lobby in the Congress and other key institutions, any pressure the Arabs can bring to bear would come, rather, "from below." It is not likely to come from the Arab regimes, which are more keen than ever before to be in the good graces of the U.S. administration. It would come, rather, from a number of factors, notably the threat represented by movements of dissent throughout the Arab world and grass-roots dissatisfaction with the way the United States perceives a "solution" to the Palestinian problem. The United States does not doubt the willingness of the Arab regimes to ruthlessly put down movements of dissent within their own countries, but it is less sure of their ability to do so. Given the elements

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of instability in the equation, the United States is wary of appearing unduly biased in favor of Israel in the peace process. Obviously, what we have outlined is not the only possible scenario for U.S. policy toward the Middle East. We have focused on what has actually been the Bush administration's policy toward the region. His successor's policy is not yet clear, especially in the light of growing social and interracial tension within U.S. society, exacerbated by economic instability and a looming recession. But no matter how overwhelming the pull of internal problems may be, no U.S. administration can afford to disengage altogether from the Middle East peace process, nor to make a complete U-turn from U.S. policy toward the region over the last two decades. A Democratic president might not make the granting of loan guarantees to Israel dependent on a clear-cut commitment that immigrants will not be settled in occupied territories, but even a Democratic president cannot afford to adopt a policy that would deprive the United States of its hegemony over Middle East oil-hence it needs to take Arab sensibilities into consideration.

OTHER FACTORS FAVORABLE TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT An additional factor that could be considered as favorable to the peace process is that many Arab regimes, and not only the Western powers, are interested in ensuring the stability of the Gulf oil area. At one time it seemed that Sadat was the only Arab leader willing to subordinate the Arab-Israeli conflict to inter-Arab tensions and conflicts. Sadat believed that with Egypt carrying the main burden in the Arab military confrontation with Israel, he was under no obligation to keep the peace process with Israel hostage to Arab overbidding and militant rhetoric when it was thanks to his October 1973 war that the other Arabs had become rich while Egypt was exposed to hunger riots. His decision to go to Jerusalem in 1977 may have been determined more by his frustration with the behavior of the oil-rich Arab regimes than by a desire to conclude a separate peace with Israel. The process Sadat inaugurated at that time has now become the rule for most Arab regimes. Many Gulf regimes now perceive the conflict with Israel as a distraction from the more immediate problems posed to the very survival of their regimes and the stability of their oil revenues. Before the Gulf crisis, a basic postulate of Arab politics was that inter-Arab conflicts, no matter how intense, should always be subordinated to the conflict with Israel. It seemed at the time that Sadat's violation of this postulate was a temporary aberration. The Gulf crisis proved that it was not. Today, interArab conflicts can take precedence over conflicts with other parties in the

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region-not only Israel, but also Iran. The conflict with Israel is no longer perceived as "absolute" but, rather, as one conflict among others within the region, with "relative" importance on a scale of priorities. Yet another factor favorable for a negotiated settlement is the impossibility to sustain relentless enmity between neighboring states in a world that has become a "global village," with ever-increasing interdependence, interpenetration, and complementarity between states and communities worldwide. The Middle East, including Arab-Israeli relations, cannot indefinitely remain an exception to this rule. The multilateral talks inaugurated in Moscow are significant in this regard. Delegations from some thirty countries, including Israel and many Arab countries, are taking part in the talks, which address a comprehensive range of Middle East issues including arms control, economic cooperation, the environment, water resources, and the refugee problem. Even before achieving any substantive progress in the field of peace, all Arab parties have come to accept Israel, in principle, as a legitimate regional interlocutor with whom to deliberate over regional problems, even if the actual implementation of solutions to these problems will have to wait until the peace process bears fruit. Moreover, it is difficult to make an economic boycott of Israel effective. It could even backfire against its advocates. It is unrealistic to expect third parties that are in no way involved in the conflict to seriously apply boycott provisions against Israel at a time when all Arab parties concerned are negotiating with Israel for peace and are trying to convince the international community that they embarked on peace negotiations in good faith. A parallel has been drawn here with Egypt's attempts to convince African countries not to resume diplomatic relations with Israel after Egypt itself had signed a peace treaty with the Jewish state. The Arab boycott of Israel has evolved from being a weapon of resistance to the very idea of peace into a temporary measure to bolster the Arab negotiating position. Its relevance is confined to putting pressure on Israel to accelerate the peace process. This is not the type of argument that can induce third parties into implementing the boycott consistently. Then there is also the environmental problem, and in particular the water problem. As mentioned by Maher Abu-Taleb in Chapter 18: The inherent water scarcity in the region, coupled with a growing population and a lack of water-sharing agreements, is causing serious water deficits, environmental problems, and heightened health concerns. In fact, it has been said that water, ultimately, will determine the issue of conflict or peace in the Middle East. ... The alleviation of tensions could contribute enormously to the attainment of equitable, least cost solutions in Middle East water resource development. This in turn could enhance prospects for regional and international cooperation on a grand scale for the mutual benefit of all concerned.

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A NEW RATIONALE Things are bound to change. When peace, not confrontation, becomes the frame of reference of all parties concerned, it follows that those who are more farsighted in identifying and addressing problems that are likely to arise when peace is achieved will be better placed to reap the benefits of their foresight. Many Arab parties have come to realize the advantages Egypt has drawn from its ground-breaking initiatives toward Israel. The members of the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks went to Cairo to learn from Egyptian diplomats how to negotiate successfully with Israel. Various organizations are now being established to promote creative thinking in the peace process. There is an effort to investigate in depth how the opposite party thinks in order to find some common ground, however arduous the task might appear. A U.S.-sponsored group, Initiative for Peace and Cooperation in the Middle East, is one such organization that is trying to "introduce unofficially into the region innovative negotiating processes which promote cooperative relationships among Middle Eastern nations and peoples." Such "private" initiatives are still vilified and criticized, but not as vehemently and consistently as before. Innovative thinking entails making the frame of reference the future rather than the past. All the parties should start with the premise that a settlement can be accomplished rather than the assumption that conditions are not ripe and that, consequently, any settlement will not fulfill their minimal requirements-thus justifying a return to the previous pattern of confrontational politics. The time has come for imaginative ways out of the stalemate, based on future-oriented solutions. This thrust in the direction of a future-oriented Middle East does not in itself remove all the difficulties that make the parties cling to their previous outlooks and patterns of behavior. Frustration still plays a very large role in keeping tensions alive and in justifying the propagation of whatever is available in terms of ideology or belief, including religious fundamentalism, to express the Self as necessarily opposed to, and in acute contrast to, the Other. A realistic outlook that replaces rhetorical overbidding can be achieved only in an atmosphere where hope exists, where the belligerents have come to believe that abandoning the patterns of the past will bear better fruit than remaining dominated by them. Such developments, however, have not diminished the objective difficulties still standing in the way of peace in the region. Statements by Israeli officials, such as the one delivered by David Ebri, a high-ranking official in the Ministry of Defense, to the effect that peace will not be forthcoming as long as the Arabs do not perceive the presence of Israel in the region as beneficial, even complementary, to their own interests, make the task of laying the groundwork for peace more formidable than ever. Ebri went as far as to say that even Egypt's peace with Israel is more

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likely to be an "armistice" and a "pause" than a final peace arrangement, and that the possibility of war breaking out between Egypt and Israel in the future should not be totally excluded. New Arab thinking is trying to find ways to neutralize the threat that Israel represents without assuming that this entails the elimination of Israel. In other words, it is trying to define the conditions in which the security threat represented by the ideology of Zionism can be removed without the removal of the state of Israel-that is, to find a formula by which Israel's presence in the region is not detrimental to Arab interests. Now that all the protagonists, including the Palestinians and the Israelis, know that none of them can militarily liquidate any of the others, they understand that some interaction between them is unavoidable, that peace has to be genuine and real, and that it is no longer a situation where only two options exist: either to live side by side with no forum for interaction other than the battlefield, or to remain in a "no-peace, no-war" limbo in which eventual negotiations between the parties serve more as safety valves against further deterioration than as instruments of genuine peace.

A NEED FOR MORE DARING THINKING The Palestinians, as the only party in the Middle East conflict to have lived closely with both the Arabs and the Israelis and thus to know them intimately, are well placed to help remove the psychological barriers separating the belligerents. If Israel responded to the Palestinians' legitimate aspirations and treated them as their eventual "ambassadors" to the Arab world, instead of directing all its efforts at denying their rights, a fundamental breakthrough in the peace process could be achieved. There is now clear-cut evidence that Israel is no longer looked upon by most Arab regimes as a party for whom they carry implacable enmity. Because of the growing acuteness of various other conflicts throughout the region, including inter-Arab conflicts (the Gulf conflict, for example), the Israeli threat is perceived as one amongst a number of other threats, to be assessed in "relative" rather than in "absolute" terms. During the Gulf crisis, Iraq represented for a number of regimes in the Arabian peninsula a more immediate threat than Israel. It is interesting to note that many Arab parties accepted the U.S. assessment that if Saddam's attack against Kuwait should be characterized as outright "aggression," his missile attacks against Israel were obviously a "provocation." This meant that the key issue at stake was Saddam's aggression against a fellow Arab country, not against the "Zionist enemy," and that, therefore, the Arab-Israeli conflict had come to be perceived, not only by the United States but also by many Arab Gulf states, as collateral to an inter-Arab conflict.

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This does not mean that Israel can acquire, in the eyes of other regional protagonists, a "functional" role throughout the region, even if many Israeli scholars and politicians do not hide their intention to implement a vision of the future based on some form of relationship, of "complementarity" between Arab oil money and Israeli technological knowhow. No one can claim that any Arab party, including Egypt, shares this vision. However, as previously mentioned, pressing environmental and water problems might become instrumental in articulating the search for given forms of "complementarity." Scarcity of water could precipitate conflict, but could also accelerate the search for alternative nonconfrontational ways out. The key factor in any solution is an Israeli pullout from the occupied territories, that is, the implementation of the "peace-for-land" trade-off. Israel's recent Likud government pledged that it would not give up any land in exchange for peace. The present government's stance is not yet clear. Solutions should be found to these problems. Hypothetical solutions do exist, although there is nothing "deterministic" about their having to be implemented. Indeed, as far as the Palestinian problem is concerned, both parties have accepted the principle of an intermediary stage along the lines proposed in the Camp David Accords, based on the idea that the final outcome is not decided beforehand but is left open to mature according to the extent to which it becomes possible to build up confidence between Palestinians and Israelis throughout the intermediary stages. The basic postulate is that "self-rule" is an "open" system, with no a priori final decisions. The experience of the actual implementation of self-rule will be the decisive factor in determining what the final outcome will be and will decide, in the long run, what specific form of Palestinian authority will be acceptable to all concerned. Nothing so far has demonstrated that this approach to the solution is possible, but it seems to be the only approach currently envisaged. As far as the Golan Heights is concerned, no preliminary work paving the way to a mutually acceptable solution exists. Each party is still adopting its "maximalist" stand. However, Yitzhak Rabin, the leader of the Israeli Labor party, has come up with the idea of "leasing" the Golan from Syria for an unspecified period of time, thus implicitly acknowledging Syria's sovereignty over the Golan Heights. This might be an acceptable starting point for a solution. Actually, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, under which Israel withdrew from the Sinai, committed the two parties to something comparable. Egypt restored its sovereignty over the entire Sinai but with restrictions concerning troop deployments in the Sinai for an indefinite period of time and with no troops deployed beyond the passes. These restrictions will continue to hold as long as Israel's peace arrangement with Egypt remains an exception in the region. This scenario might eventually be a model for a similar arrangement with Syria. The Syrian peace arrangement would have the advantage of being formulated at a time

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when the Middle East peace process has acquired a comprehensive character and thus it would no longer be perceived as a separate deal. Jerusalem will probably be the last issue addressed. It is difficult to imagine a solution to this problem before the other sensitive aspects of the conflict have been settled. All parties seem to accept the idea that Jerusalem must not become a divided city once again. Since the fall of the Berlin wall, the idea of divided cities is more unacceptable than ever. Obviously, this does not mean that the whole of Jerusalem, the holy city for the three monotheistic religions, should be surrendered to the Jewish state. Some understanding of "shared sovereignty" will have to be devised. The notion is no longer inconceivable at a time when "sovereignty," in the context of the "new world order" and with growing interdependence and interpenetration between societies and states, is perceived as not necessarily "absolute." Theoretically speaking, there is no reason to assume beforehand that no solution exists for even the most intractable issue on the agenda. Still, much must be done to transform hypothetical solutions into concrete ones in the form of contractual agreements. The parties will have to accept the ideal that a resolution of the critical problems will only come in phases, and that there will be many intermediary phases. There will even be intermediary phases beyond the peace agreements, meaning that restrictive clauses will be devised, and their removal will depend on the progress achieved according to criteria fixed in advance. What has to be fixed in advance is not what the outcome of every specific issue will be, but rather the ground rules according to which the issue is to be settled. Peace will not mean the final settlement of all issues but will rather be the major turning point toward a settling of the most critical issues in the conflict. These elements could eventually offer an optimistic view. When pessimism has the upper hand, frustrations increase on both sides; so does overbidding, extremism, and a tendency to cling firmly to the previous logic of confrontation, with the further consolidation of its patterns of conduct, thus further deepening frustration and making the solution still more difficult. The key question here is how to create the conditions in which the optimistic and not the pessimistic view will prevail.

7

Turkey in Its Regional Environment in the Postbipolar Era: Opportunities and Constraints PERI PAMIR

Located at the crossroads of East and West, North and South, Turkey is perhaps one of those countries most affected by the recent changes occurring within range of its borders and influence, a region extending from the Balkans, to the Caucasus, to Central Asia, and southward to the Middle East. Theoretically, it has considerable potential to play a stabilizing role in this currently unstable region, a role that will be determined as much by Turkey's own capabilities as by the balance of opportunities and constraints with which it will be faced. This chapter will make an attempt at assessing the latter by seeking to understand the relationship between the way Turkey conceives its newly emerging role, and the way its potential and performance is being perceived by others. This chapter is based on current analysis, debate, and speculation in Turkish academic, political, and media circles regarding the interests, opportunities, and constraints facing Turkey in its regional environment following the demise of the bipolar world. It should be noted that the following analysis provides more of a reflection than a critique of this ongoing debate.

POSTBIPOLAR DEVELOPMENTS Numerous developments in 1991, most linked to the end of the Cold War in Europe, forced Turkey to reconsider its interests and potential role in the face of the shifting balance of forces around its frontiers. The most prominent of these, the majority of which occurred within close geographical proximity, were: • the collapse of the Soviet empire, which also led to an increase in the number of states neighboring Turkey (with the emergence of Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; the latter through Nakhichevan, an enclave of Azerbaijan in Armenia); 133

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• the end of the bipolar system and the dissipation of the Soviet threat; • the dismemberment of the Warsaw Pact, and the subsequent presumed diminution of Turkey's role within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); • the emergence of independent Central Asian republics, most of which (with the exception of Tajikistan) are of Turkic origin (racially and linguistically); • the Gulf War, in which Turkey sided with the UN/U.S. coalition; • the civil war in former Yugoslavia, which has also led to a proliferation of nations and interests, with the Bosnian and eventual Kosovo crises affecting Turkey closely; • the progress of the lslamists in Algeria, and the implications this carried for the future of democratic governance in Islamic societies; • integration efforts within the EC, and Turkey's continuing efforts to become a full member (these not being linked to the end of bipolarity); • the Middle East peace process; and • the emergence of the United States as the sole global superpower, which, as some strategists point out, does not necessarily imply the advent of a unipolar world. According to this school of thought, what is more likely to emerge-after a short-lived transition period of U.S. hegemony-is a multipolar world order based on economic competition (as opposed to military confrontation) and made up of several competing poles, including the United States, Germany, Japan, and eventually Russia and China.l

Turkey's Role Given these developments, Turkey has been trying to find its place in a world that, since the collapse of the East-West divide, has basically reemerged across a fundamentally unstable North-South axis. Turkey is located at the crossroads of this new macro-conjuncture. At the micro (regional) level, it is searching for a new role and identity by seeking to exploit the hegemonic void that has emerged in the region as a result of the disintegration of East-West rivalry and the disappearance of the military and political threat from the North. Whereas initial fears had focused on a possible loss of Turkish strategic importance for the West as an eastern bulwark against Soviet/communist expansionism, subsequent developments, including the Gulf War, served to reaffirm Turkey's geopolitical value as a key country of crucial importance to Western interests in an increasingly unstable region. These developments have had the effect of propelling Turkey into the forefront of political initiative-taking by creating new opportunities within the political arena extending from the Balkans,

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the Caucasus, to Central Asia. Developments in the Middle East, as demonstrated by the Gulf War, will also closely affect Turkey's fortunes. Geographically (not to mention culturally), Turkey is both in Europe and in the Middle East. In fact, from a geopolitical viewpoint, it straddles East and West, North and South, being simultaneously a Balkan, Middle Eastern, Mediterranean, Black Sea, Caucasian, and Asian country. Its society is Muslim, although its state is secular. It has a progressively developing, Western-style, pluralistic parliamentary system. Not yet sufficiently industrialized, Turkey is exerting maximum effort to bring its economy to a level that will allow integration with Western Europe. It possesses an agricultural potential that places it within the category of self-sufficiency enjoyed by only seven nations in the world. Although it does not have a favorable human rights record, it is technically accountable for abuses committed in this field by virtue of its adherence to the major international human rights instruments. Because it has been a member of the Western alliance system since World War II, some argue that Turkey, although at the crossroads between North and South, is nevertheless a de facto member of the North, itself not a homogeneous or stable unit.2

Turkey's Foreign Policy Objectives Policymakers in Ankara have recently stated a new set of foreign policy goals for Turkey in the postbipolar era. As outlined by Prime Minister Demirel at a press conference in Ankara in December 1991, these objectives encompassed:3 • An active, multifaceted, and balanced approach that seeks to exploit the new opportunities created by recent developments involving expanded relations with the Balkan, Black Sea, Middle Eastern, Mediterranean, Caucasian, and Central Asian countries. The particular emphasis given to relations with the nations of the CIS (the Commonwealth of Independent States-the former Soviet Union) and those of the Balkans and the Caucasus was reflected in the recent creation of two new departments in the Foreign Ministry of Turkey that cover these areas. • Expanded relations with Turkey's historical foe, Russia. In fact, the disappearance of a physical and ideological threat from the North theoretically enables Turkey to pursue policies that are relatively more independent of U.S. and Western interests. • Multifaceted relations with the United States, encompassing increased economic, in addition to the traditional military and political, dimensions. • Pursuit of efforts to enter the EC because the above horizons do not constitute an alternative, but a complement to Turkey's desire to

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consolidate its ties to Europe. For Europe, Turkey's main attraction probably lies in its role as an entry point to the West for the republics in Central Asia.4

CENTRAL ASIA

Turkey's Role Of all the areas recently opened up to potential Turkish influence, Central Asia currently constitutes the richest reservoir of opportunity from Turkey's viewpoint. Indeed, the emergence of the Central Asian republics in the aftermath of the Cold War and the subsequent rediscovery of this "Turkophone" area in the former Soviet Union with a population of approximately 60 million people have created vivid interest within Turkey and abroad as to Turkey's potential role in a region with which it shares close historical, cultural, ethnic, and linguistic ties. The assessments coming from the West and from Turkey's regional neighbors (including Russia) vary in their evaluation, some expressing anxiety about the re-emergence of potential "Pan-Turkism/Pan-Ottomanism" encompassing a territorial span extending from the Adriatic to the China Sea. Turkish officials categorically refute such allegations on the grounds that Turkey's interest is not to establish political hegemony, but to lay the foundations for stability and peaceful progress in the region. Most, however, have tended to welcome Turkey's potential leading role in providing a Western-type secular model for those newly created republics of Islamic faith seeking a political and cultural identity as well as strong external partners in the aftermath of their release from Moscow's domination.5 A cursory survey of Western reactions will illustrate the point. Turkey's geopolitical value for the Western world has risen dramatically owing to its critical position at the epicenter of the effervescing "Islamic crescent" that extends from the steppes of Kazakhstan to Damascus; hence, argues this analysis, it is in the vital interests of the Western world to support Turkey in its efforts to become a model society for Islamic countries, particularly for those in the former Soviet Union. The consequences of a rejection of Turkey's efforts to reach out to Western society is a Turkey that might attempt to carve out a sphere of influence for itself based on Pan-Turkic ambitions in which cultural links became an impediment and not a bridge to Islamic-Western reconciliation.6 Other Western analysts have warned that Europe's continued rejection of Turkey could lead to a crystallization of East-West tensions and eventually breed more Saddam Husseins.7 There are two other important Western concerns. One is the presence of large numbers of (mostly tactical) nuclear weapons in the Central Asian

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republics. Dotted with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), Kazakhstan, the largest of the Central Asian republics, is described as the first "Islamic" nuclear power, ranking third in the world (after the United States and Russia). The second is the potential spread of Islamic fundamentalism in the region, spearheaded by Iranian influence and Saudi wealth. A common assumption is that Turkey, with its Western-style secular form of government and free-market economy, poses the main barrier to Islamic forces. Although the historic potential is there, it is generally acknowledged that beyond the "power and influence" Turkey hopes to exercise in these newly liberated areas, the government in Ankara is still a long way from formulating a coordinated policy. Whether Turkey can continue to be the "guiding star" will depend on the ability of the Ankara government to fulfill the expectations of those republics, and to allay its neighbors' fears about Turkey's dreams of a restored grandeur. 8

Reactions and Repercussions Indeed, Turkey's bid for leadership in the region has created some uneasiness among a number of countries, notably Iran, Russia, Armenia, Greece, and Serbia, and has led to mixed reactions in the Middle East and Europe. Whether Turkey can use its new potential in a beneficial manner also depends on the extent to which it succeeds in alleviating the concerns raised in these various countries.9

Regional Rivalry: Iran and Turkey Iran is one major power in the region with which Turkey has clashed in the effort to gain regional influence. It is generally acknowledged that since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Iran and Turkey have entered into cultural, diplomatic, and economic competition in Central Asia, with Turkey claiming to represent the secular tradition and Iran the fundamentalist. Clerics in Iran have accused Turkey of pursuing pro-U.S. policies in the region and of engineering them in a manner aimed at jeopardizing Teheran's relations with the Central Asian republics. To counteract Turkey's growing influence, Iran has suggested that the Caspian Sea has now become a "Pan-Islamic sea" uniting Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Iran, most lucratively around projects related to oil exploration.JO This has led to speculation that Iran's fundamentalist values may find some sympathy at the popular level in these republics, a theory discounted by those who argue that the secular tradition to which these populations have been subjected for the past seventy years (as well as their predominantly Sunni faith) will make them intrinsically less receptive to fundamentalist religious influence. Furthermore, religion is not necessarily the

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predominant factor in determining current affinities and future trends. Although Azerbaijan and Iran share the same Shi'ite tradition, the former has been more receptive to Turkish influence because of closer bonds at the cultural and linguistic levels. Indeed, fully aware of the potential opportunities involved, Turkey promptly recognized the independence of all the Central Asian republics together with the other republics of the former Soviet Union (a few days prior to the creation of the CIS on December 16, 1991). In acknowledgment of this gesture, the Kirghiz head of state, Askar Akayev, during his maiden visit to Turkey in December 1991, remarked that Turkey was like the "north star" guiding the path for the Turkic populations. If Kirghizistan was able to attain the economic standards it aimed for within a secular democratic tradition, Akayev argued that Islamic fundamentalism and PanTurkism (which was currently filling the vacuum left by the collapse of central communist rule) would lose their appeal.1 1 Although divisions exist within the Turkic peoples,12 one characteristic they appear to share is the desire to orient themselves toward Ankara. What they require most from Turkey is cultural and economic cooperation. In view of this need, some have even suggested that Turkey could be instrumental in the creation of a Turkic Commonwealth or Common Market in Central Asia. The inclusion of all members of the CIS in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, some speculate, creates a kind of "Turkish bloc" within this organization that could serve to increase Turkey's leverage in its dealings with the West in the future.13 A major area of competition important for its symbolic significance is the rivalry concerning the adoption of the Latin as opposed to the Arabic/Persian alphabet.1 4 Turkey argues that Latin will make these republics more accessible to Western ideology and technology. It has also claimed that switching to Latin will eventually remove most of the dialectic differences between the Turkic languages and forge even closer links at the cultural, economic, and commercial levels. Azerbaijan already decided to pursue this path in December 1991, whereas Farsi-speaking Tajikistan has opted in favor of the Persian alphabet. IS In the effort to enhance its leverage, Turkey has also had television broadcasting to Central Asia since April 1992 by means of a communications satellite ("Avrasya"), which is said to be the second largest after Cable News Network (CNN) in terms of geographical scope.l6 Despite the obvious regional competition, both sides seem to be exerting some effort to simultaneously sustain other areas and structures of cooperation. In this vein, Iran has recently been forthcoming in assisting the Turkish state's struggle against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Similarly, steps have also been taken to revive the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO-the former Regional Cooperation for Development, RCD) with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan-an organization that was phased out after the Islamic revolution in Iran.J7

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Russian Concerns Turkey's efforts to forge closer links with the Central Asian republics have also elicited mixed reactions in Russia. With the historical RussianOttoman rivalry in mind, the more alarmist interpretations have alluded to Turkey's "expansionist," "Pan-Ottoman/Pan-Turkic" ambitions. 18 Other Russian analyses, however, have welcomed the prospect of Turkey's rising influence in the region on the assumption that this will inhibit the further growth of Islamic consciousness, and thereby avert any serious Slav-Muslim polarization.I9

THE CAUCASUS Given that the Transcaucasus constitutes the principal land bridge connecting Turkey to Central Asia, Ankara's relations with the neighboring Transcaucasian republics form a vital component of Turkish efforts to play a more active role in the region. Hence Turkey has been pulled into the Caucasian conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan principally because of its geographic proximity. Other factors accounting for its involvement include its historically uneasy relationship with Armenia, its cultural ties to Azerbaijan, and its common frontier with Nakhichevan, an Azeri enclave within the Armenian republic whose creation as an independent Azeri region was mutually guaranteed by Turkey, Moscow, Georgia, and Armenia under several agreements concluded in 1920-1921.20 Even more sensitive from Turkey's perspective, however, have been the conflict in Nagorno-Karabagh and the difficulties experienced as a result of the West's initial implicit support for the Armenian cause, which, to Turkish observers, was reminiscent of the double standards applied by the West to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The situation is rendered even more sensitive by the fact that the Anatolian Turks enjoy the closest bonds with the Azeris, with whom economic relations are the most developed. Indeed, Azerbaijan forms an economic (and geographic) bridge (albeit across the Caspian or Iran) between Turkey and the other Central Asian republics. Hence, the Transcaucasian conflict constitutes the most unstable and explosive area around Turkey's borders today, and Turkey has been involved in seeking a mediated solution to the dispute.

THE BALKANS Turkey has direct interests in the Balkans, a region in which it has historically played a predominant role. Its principal means of seeking to influence events has been through its self-declared role as the protector of

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Turkish minorities (in Bulgaria and Greece) and Muslim interests (in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania) in the region, the latter prompted by Serbia's strategy of overt expansionism based on a policy of ethnic cleansing. Indeed, united by their fear of the pursuit of a "Greater Serbia," the Albanians (in Albania and Kosovo), the Muslims of Bosnia, and the government in Macedonia have made repeated appeals for Turkey's support, which the Turkish government has nominally extended. In this vein, the Turkish president recently sought to activate UN interest in the Bosnian crisis by pledging Turkish troops (for the first time since the Korean War) to any possible UN peace-enforcement or peacekeeping mission in BosniaHerzegovina. This pledge was viewed also as a means of forestalling a similar crisis in Kosovo, which most observers agree is imminent. Turkey was also successful in extracting the same pledge from the Islamic countries during an extraordinary session of the Islamic Conference in Istanbul last June.2t

THE MIDDLE EAST 22 Turkey's Role As previously mentioned, the crisis over Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the 1991 Gulf War provided an excellent opportunity for Turkey to prove her geopolitical credentials, which were in question following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Beyond financial and military assistance, the Ozal leadership hoped to gain the goodwill of both the United States and Western Europe by giving unequivocal support to the U.S.-led coalition, with the expectation that this support would not only restrain the hegemonic ambitions of a regional power, but would also boost Turkey's position in the Western security system and as a potential member of the EC.23 Because of the divisions within the Arab world itself, Turkey's actions during the Gulf War reaped mixed reactions within the Middle East. Whereas Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab states extended financial aid to compensate for losses that accrued from Turkey's closure of its two pipelines to Iraqi oil exports and from the trade embargo, public opinion in some Arab countries, such as Jordan, generally remained critical and apprehensive of Turkish actions. Turkish public opinion also proved averse to Turkey's playing an active political role in the Middle East during the crisis.24 The most constructive role for Turkey is its encouragement of economic cooperation as the prime basis for regional confidence-building to replace regional rivalry and mistrust. Cooperation in the form of sharing

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Turkey's water resources (the so-called "peace pipeline" project estimated at $16--21 billion) in return for enhanced trade, including agreements on oil pipelines and supplies, is considered to be a firm basis for regional economic development by building upon the reality of interdependence and complementarity. Unfortunately, a common reaction in the Arab world has been to dismiss the Turkish offer on grounds that Turkey was seeking to use its water resources as a political weapon to increase Arab dependency on Turkey and to establish regional hegemony-although a counterargument could also be made in relation to Arab control of oil resources. But if one considers the growing importance of water in the region, which, some argue, "will determine the issue of conflict or peace in the Middle East" (see Chapter 18), it is difficult to deny the potentially positive longer-term implications of the Turkish offer, which proposes to use a likely factor of conflict as a catalyst for regional peace, cooperation, and development, looking toward future interest and not to past prejudice. Whereas the provision to include Israel in the peace pipeline project has been another factor contributing to Arab skepticism, Ankara now tends to view cooperation with Israel as no longer posing an obstacle to Turkey's playing a more active role in the Middle East. The beginning of a new cooperative era in the Middle East is believed to have removed the principal political and psychological barriers to broader regional cooperation. There is also general confidence that following its fairly successful experiment with liberal market economics during the 1980s, Turkey can now realize its bridging role by acting as a conduit for Western investments in the region during the 1990s.25 The extent to which it can exploit the new environment, however, is also dependent on the manner in which Ankara approaches the Kurdish problem.26 Turkey and the Kurds With the flow of Kurdish refugees into Turkey in the aftermath of the Gulf War, the UN's subsequent humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq, the emerging political vacuum in the area, and the fresh emphasis accorded to democratic processes within the new Turkish government (a coalition of the main social democratic and center-right wing parties), the Kurdish question was once again propelled to the forefront of Turkish politics. This question is the main link between Turkish foreign and internal policy, by virtue of the sizable Kurdish minority living in the country. There has been a significant shift in Turkey's official policy toward its ethnic Kurds, despite the complications posed by the state's ongoing confrontation with the militant Kurdish faction known as the PKK, whose stated ambition is to form a Marxist-Leninist state in southeastern Turkey. From a position of denying their existence as a separate ethnic identity

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group (which had begun to soften with the restoration of the right to use the Kurdish language in 1991), the government, spearheaded by President Ozal, moved considerably closer toward a "democratic" solution of the "Kurdish reality." Policies to this end have included pledges to grant Kurds full cultural freedom, debate on legalizing Kurdish political parties, and discussion over the possible diffusion of Kurdish broadcasting to the entire region. High-level talks were held between Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq (Talabani and Barzani) and Turkish government officials to devise measures to prevent the eruption of yet another crisis in the region. The principal problem, including the danger of yet another military takeover should PKK attacks be perceived as posing a serious threat to national security and stability, has not been diffused.27 There is a tendency to try to delink the problem of the PKK completely from the question of Kurdish rights. Consequently, an "all out war" against the PKK was declared in September 1992. There are large-scale military operations against presumed camps, with the occasional cooperation of the Peshmergas in northern Iraq, where the PKK is predominantly concentrated.28 This may be an enticement to Kurdish nationalism, spreading militant separatist sentiment beyond the currently limited (and gradually increasing) circle of PKK sympathizers in the region. The Kurdish problem has also historically complicated Turkey's relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors, notably in the form of continuing tension with Syria, Iraq, and Iran for allowing PKK camps to operate from their territory. However, recent reports confirming the departure of PKK militants from the Beka'a Valley (probably under U.S. pressure) to join their brethren in MosuJ29 presumably remove a major point of friction with Syria while putting the onus on the Baghdad regime. Further reports indicate the existence of some degree of cooperation between the Turkish and Iranian governments to control PKK operations in contiguous areas.3° Tensions have also occasionally erupted between Turkey and some Western European countries, notably Germany, over Turkey's Kurdish policy. Bonn imposed an arms embargo on Ankara in March 1992 (which was removed in June) following allegations that Turkey was using German arms to retaliate against PKK camps in northern Iraq. The U.S. administration, by contrast, has been quick to support Turkish policy against the PKK, drawing a clear distinction between what it considered as a terrorist organization posing a direct threat to Turkey's territorial integrity and the status of a minority population, which, it argued, Turkey was implicitly acknowledging by allowing the continued operation of the UN Combined Task Force (CTF) from its territory.31 Growing French economic interests in Turkey have led to a similar analysis by France.32 Indeed, the extent to which Ankara succeeds in following an active foreign policy in the Middle East based on the principles of stability and

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progress is very much dependent on whether it is able to resolve its Kurdish problem in a democratic manner acceptable to both domestic and international norms and standards. A preferred strategy for the immediate term would be to try to break the vicious cycle of violence and to seek to neutralize the PKK through measures granting Turkish Kurds greater internal recognition and regional autonomy.

CONCLUSION Turkey's success in exploiting the new international environment in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East to its advantage and in playing the stabilizing role it aspires to is closely linked to its relations with Western Europe and the United States. The pursuit of the former does not constitute an alternative to Turkey's historical aspiration to become a fully acknowledged member of the European political and economic community. Another important factor linking Europe to Turkey, the significance of which is bound to grow over time, is the 2.5 million Turks and Turkish Kurds living in the West. The extent to which Turkey will be successful in carving out a constructive new role and position for itself in the currently emerging regional configuration will be conditioned by several factors, including: • Its proximity to Middle East oil and its willingness to promote economic development, and hence, stability, in the region by bridging gaps between North and South. • Its role as a Muslim society with a Western-style secular and democratic system providing a barrier to the further spread of radical Islamic currents, particularly in Central Asia. • Its role as a conduit for Western technology and capital toward the republics of Central Asia. Depending on how its relations with the West develop over the next few years, such a trend could either be exploited as a means of furthering Western{furkish interests in the region or as a vehicle for creating an alternative zone of influence and cooperation for the medium term. • The extent to which Turkey makes further progress in consolidating its democracy, notably by improving its human rights record, particularly in southeastern Turkey.

NOTES 1. Murat Yetkin, Ates Hattinda Aktif Politikia, Blakanlar, Kafkaslar ve OrtaDugu Ufgeninde Tiirkiye (Istanbul: Alan Yayincilik, February 1992), p. 60.

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2. Ibid. We are aware that this argument may appear somewhat dubious, given the problem of comparing the West, which is a strategic concept, with the North, which is an economic concept. 3. Milliyet, December 13, 1991. 4. It should be noted that a comprehensive understanding of Turkey's emerging options in its regional environment would also require a more detailed examination of Ankara's current relations with Western Europe and, particularly, the United States, which have not been fully dealt with here. Space restrictions have also forced us to omit related sections on the Black Sea, Armenia, Greece, and Cyprus, which are covered in a longer version of this chapter. 5. Victor Kuvaldin, "Post-Soviet Moslems at the Crossroads," Security Dialogue (March 1993). 6. The Economist, December 14, 1991. 7. Jonathan Power, Los Angeles Times, December 12, 1991, cited in Yetkin, Ates Hattinda Aktif Politikia, pp. 325-326. 8. Amalia van Gent, "Turkey's Claim to Leadership in Central Asia," Swiss Review of World Affairs (May 1992): 22. 9. Other countries, besides those in the West, that also seek regional influence in the area through cultural or economic penetration include Saudi Arabia (which has spent millions of dollars in the region since 1989 building religious schools and mosques), Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Japan, and South Korea. 10. As reported by the German news agency (DPA), cited in Milliyet, January 18, 1992. 11. Milliyet, December 24, 1991 and December 31, 1991; Yetkin, Ates Hattinda Aktif Politikia, p. 289; The Economist, May 16, 1992. Mindful of this warning, Turkey has concluded trade, commercial, economic cooperation, diplomatic, and cultural agreements with all the Central Asian republics. It has pledged $1.2 billion in credits, export guarantees, and soft loans to Central Asia. It is also proposing the construction of oil pipelines from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and a gas line from Turkmenistan that will reach Turkey under the Caspian Sea and through Armenia and Azerbaijan. 12. It is interesting to note that among the Central Asian republics only Kirghizistan and Turkmenistan, which have no common border, have no outstanding disputes. The Economist, April 25, 1992. 13. Ibid., p. 303. 14. The Cyrillic alphabet had been imposed by Stalin on the Central Asian republics during the 1940s precisely in order to discourage linguistic/cultural links. Some now argue that just as the adoption of Cyrillic enabled the Muslim republics to incorporate into the socialist system more rapidly, the conversion to the Latin alphabet will facilitate their transition to the capitalist market system. See Milliyet, January 26, 1992; Yetkin, Ates Hattinda Aktif Politikia, p. 310. Others have argued that Turkic groups in the former Soviet Union are considering adopting the Latin alphabet also as a way of forestalling the expansion of Russian influence in the region. This point was stressed at the meeting of all Turkic-speaking groups in Alma-Ata in December 1991 and reported in p. 301, Yetkin, Ates Hattinda Aktif Politikia, and in Milliyet, December 24, 1991. 15. Milliyet, January 26, 1992; Milliyet, April 13, 1992. 16. Milliyet, March 23, 1992. 17. Milliyet, February 6, 1992. 18. Such was the speculation of the Russian News Service (RNS) during the visit of the Central Asian heads of state to Ankara in December 1991 (cited in Milliyet, December 24, 1991). There have also been rumors to the effect that the Rus-

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sians were considering using the "Arab card" against Turkey by exploiting Arab discomfort over Turkey's growing influence in Central Asia as a counterbalance or counterthreat to the growth of a Pan-Turkish sentiment in the Caucasus. Another scenario foresaw the creation of a "Christian belt" composed of Christian republics with Muslim minorities, namely, Armenia (Azeris), Georgia (Southern Ossetians and Abkhazis), and Russia (Northern Ossetians, Tatars, and the Chechen Ingus), to offset the danger of an opposition Muslim{furkic coalition emerging in the resource-rich regions of Central Asia (cited in Milliyet, January 1, 1992). 19. Milliyet, January 17, 1992; quoting from Komsomolskaya Pravda. 20. The strategic significance of Nakhichevan for Turkey arises from the fact that it forms the main cultural border link (not counting Armenia or Georgia) with the Central Asian republics. This explains why the Turks are currently constructing a major bridge connecting the narrow mountainous frontier between the two territories, and why Iran has also recently opened up its own border with the Azeri enclave. 21. Milliyet, June 19, 1992. 22. For a competent review of Turkey's contemporary relations with countries in the region, see Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East (New York: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), p. 130. 23. It is noteworthy that Ozal's policy did not go unopposed in Turkey. Two foreign ministers and the chief of the Turkish general staff (General Necip Torumtay) resigned in protest against what was perceived as precipitous actions inherently inimical to Turkish interests. 24. Deniz Akagul and Semih Vaner, "Turquie: pont ou ile au Moyen Orient," Le Trimestre du Monde (2e trimestre 1991): 137-138. 25. For an assessment of how Turkey's economic potential could be put to mutual benefit in the Middle East and act as a factor of political stability, see Akagul and Vaner, "Turquie," pp. 138-147; and Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, pp. 100-114. 26. Yetkin, Ates Hattinda Aktif Politikia, pp. 106-107, 122. 27. Not to mention serious setbacks in the democratic process that many people argue is already taking place given the brutal and clumsy manner in which Turkish security forces have been handling the situation in southeastern Turkey. 28. Milliyet, October 23, 1992. 29. Milliyet, May 9, 1992; Hurriyet, June 7, 1992. 30. From a transcript of the press conference by Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin, September 28, 1992; unpublished document distributed to the UN Secretariat, Geneva. 31. Precisely because of this interpretation, opponents argue that the continued extension of the CTF is inimical to Turkish interests as it implies a de facto Turkish recognition of a Kurdish entity, which, although based in northern Iraq (and currently legitimized under the auspices of the Kurdish parliament), is also implicitly extended to the Kurds in Turkey, given that the fate of the Iraqi and Turkish Kurds is inextricably interlinked. Hence, the Turkish government was reluctant to recognize the Kurdish parliament as an independent political entity (as opposed to a mechanism realized within the framework of the autonomy agreement signed between the Iraqi government and the Kurds in 1974) on the grounds that this would constitute an affront to Iraqi (and, by extension, to Turkish) national sovereignty. Milliyet, July 8, 1992; Hurriyet, July 8, 1992. 32. Milliyet, April 2, 1992; Milliyet, April 10, 1992; Milliyet, April14, 1992.

8

The Kurdish Question: Conflict Resolution Strategies at the Regional Level 0MAR SHEIKHMOUS

The Kurds are among the oldest peoples of the Middle East. They make up the fourth largest population group of the area after the Arabs, Turks, and Persians. They are estimated to number 20-25 million (approximately 12 million in Turkey; 6 million in Iran; 4 million in Iraq; 1.5 million in Syria; 0.5 million in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; and 0.7 million in the Diaspora in Jordan, Lebanon, Western Europe, North America, and Australia). They are mainly concentrated in a joint geographical area that stretches over the borders of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The Kurdish language belongs to the West Iranian group of Indo-European languages and constitutes a common language despite dialectal differences including two main dialects (Kurmandji and Sorani) and three minor dialects (Zaza, Hewrami, and Kirmanshahi). The majority of the Kurds are Sunni Muslims of the Shafei school. A minority are Shi'tes (Alawites and Jafaris). Some are Yezidis. There are also sects such as the Ahle Haqq (holders of the truth) and Shabaks, and minority Christian and Jewish communities in Kurdistan. The territories populated by Kurds were divided between the Safavid Persian and Ottoman empires in the Treaty of Zuhab in 1639 and then into four parts among Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria in 1920. Since World War II, and more especially since the late 1950s, the Kurds have developed a greater degree of national consciousness, and have therefore come to consider themselves to be a distinct ethnic group with a distinct language, common origins, a shared historical experience, a common culture, and, to a certain extent, a common destiny and set of aspirations. 1 C. J. Edmonds has summed up this sense of national identity as follows: The historical basis of Kurdish nationalist thinking may then perhaps be fairly summed up as follows. The Kurds constitute a single nation which has occupied its present habitat for at least three thousand years. They 147

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have outlived the rise and fall of many imperial races: Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Mongols, Turks. They have their own history, language and culture. Their country has been unjustly partitioned. But they are the original owners, not strangers to be tolerated as minorities with limited concessions granted at the whim of the usurpers.2

GENERAL BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONFLICT The ethnic conflicts in the different states where Kurds live (Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria), or in the joint geographical area in the Middle East that is denoted as Kurdistan, have been accentuated by the wishes of these states for forced assimilation of the Kurds in their so-called "nation-building" process. The levels of the ethnic conflict have undergone varied degrees of intensity, from mild accommodation to severe punishment and genocide.3 The political systems of the states that engulf parts of Kurdistan have rarely developed democratic or pluralist forms of government. Except for two limited periods in Iraq (1958-1961 and 1970-1974), the Kurds in these states have been forced to resist rather than work within the framework of the political system because there have been no possibilities of democratic political action to achieve their quest for equality and freedom. Despite the multiethnic composition of these states, none have showed a willingness to establish confederal, federal, or decentralized states in order to accommodate the aspirations of other ethnic groups. In recent decades, the ethnic conflict involving the Kurds has accelerated and intensified in violence with very serious destructive consequences for the Kurds and the states concerned. Consequently, Kurdish demands have progressed from moderate requests of local administration and language rights to cultural autonomy and self-determination in the form of federal solutions or secession.

DIMENSIONS OF THE ETHNIC CONFLICT Modern forms of Kurdish nationalism had developed during the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century along parallel lines with similar movements of the other nations of both multiethnic empires-the Arabs, Armenians, Azeris, and so forth, who had come to be influenced by the ideas of the European Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and nationalism. Kurdish disappointments in the interethnic common struggle for constitutional reforms in both Iran and the Ottoman state, which were followed by the assimilationist policies of Turkification and Persianization in

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both states, led to ethnic separation and the establishment of separate Kurdish organizations that aimed at self-government or separation. Iran In Iran, after the accession of Reza Khan to power (1925), the Kurds and other non-Persian ethnic groups were subjected to extreme forms of repression and assimilation through forced deportations and other administrative measures in the fields of education, bureaucratization, conscription, and changes in language and dress.4 The Kurds were subjugated until Reza Shah was forced to abdicate in 1941. New Kurdish nationalist organizations were formed that, despite very intensive contacts and cooperation with Kurdish nationalists in Iraq, aimed at autonomy within the boundaries of the state of Iran. These included the Society for the Rebirth of Kurdistan (Komeley Jianewey Kurdistan), founded in 1943 and later dissolved and integrated into the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iran (KDPI). The KDPI, founded in 1945, proclaimed and led the autonomous Democratic Republic of Kurdistan in Mehabad (January-December 1946).5 A new wave of repressive measures were directed at the Kurdish population by the new government of Mohamed Reza Pahlavi (1941-1979), including the hanging of the leaders of the Mehabad Republic and mass imprisonment of Kurdish nationalists. During the late Shah's reign and the Islamic regime, some limited Kurdish publications and broadcasting were allowed after 1960. But both governments have enforced assimilationist policies. The Shah's regime never showed any willingness to accommodate Kurdish demands. The Islamic Republic twice entered into unsuccessful negotiations with the Kurdish movement: in October 1979, when it felt weak and threatened, and in July 1989, which was a trap for the assassination of the Iranian Kurdish leader of KDPI, A. R. Ghassemlou. Turkey The ascendance of Mustafa Kemal to power in Turkey (1924) and the establishment of a populist secular Turkish republic led to the total denial of Kurdish identity and an attempt to turn Kurds into Turks by decree. 6 The Kurds officially became "Mountain Turks." All public vestiges of separate Kurdish identity were crushed. Kurdish schools, associations, publications, religious fraternities, and teaching foundations were banned.? Historians were ordered to produce "scientific proof" that denied the separate identity, language, and culture of the Kurds. Under the guise of the struggle against "feudalism," a law was passed giving the government authority to expropriate large landholdings in the eastern provinces. The expropriated

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lands were not given to local landless Kurds, but to Turkish or Turkicized settlers mainly from the Balkans. Thus, the initial stages of the policy of forced assimilation of the Kurds in Turkey were put into motion. 8 The Kurds reacted by forming their own clandestine political organizations such as Azadi (Freedom) in 1923, which was behind the revolt of Sheikh Said for independence (1925); and Khoybun (Independence) in 1928, which led and organized the revolt in Mount Ararat (1927-1930) for the establishment of an independent state. The suppression of both revolts was accompanied and followed by drastic punitive measures, which were said to have included deportations, mass arrests, and summary executions.9 Such measures and the threat of further atrocities against an unarmed civilian population silenced Kurdish nationalist activities for almost thirty years. It was not until January 1991 that the existence of twelve million Kurds was officially recognized in Turkey and the ban on the use of the Kurdish language was Iifted.IO This new moderate attitude came about after a long debate, which started after 1985, by both Kurds and Turks who questioned the old official ideology. Turkish ambitions to join the European Economic Community (EEC) and Western European pressures, as well as the second Gulf War (1991) and its aftermath, were factors in the process. This change of attitude by the Turkish majority has been reciprocated by the Kurdish organizations. They are acting in moderation and showing willingness to work within the political process in Turkey. There are possibilities of legalizing Kurdish political parties, and more than twenty-four Kurdish members of parliament have been elected on a special electoral ticket. The extremist policies of the Kurdistan Workers Party, which has since 1984 been waging a guerrilla war for Kurdish separation and independence, have been an exception to this moderation. The possibility of a peaceful process is also undermined by the extreme repressive measures of the military and security forces in Kurdistan against the civilian population. Syria In Syria during the French mandate (until 1945), the Kurds enjoyed some cultural and political rights in the form of political parties, cultural magazines, youth and social clubs, radio broadcasts (during World War II), limited education in Kurdish, and recruitment into the army and administration. Following Syrian independence in 1945 some of these rights were abolished, but the Kurds were not subjected to any degree of repression. The union of Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic in 1958 and the rise of intensified Arabism triggered the first round of oppressive behavior toward the Kurds. The main excuse became the establishment of a Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria (KDPS) in 1957, which called for recognition of the Kurds as an ethnic group and for democracy in Syria, as well as drawing attention to the lack of economic development in the Kurdish areas and discrimination against the Kurds in education and

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recruitment to the police and military academies. Kurdish leaders were arrested and Kurdish cultural publications were forbidden. In 1963, a Ba'thist security officer, Mohamad Talab Hila!, drew a plan for the repression and forced assimilation of the Kurds, including the transfer and dispersion of the Kurdish population. The plan resembled very much the general outlines of the policies already implemented by Iran and Turkey during the 1930s and 1940s.ll It was not until 1976 that President Hafiz al-Asad officially renounced the long-standing plan to transfer Kurdish and Arab populations in this sensitive area according to the "Arab Belt" plan. Many of the Kurds who had lost their right to citizenship in 1962 are still without identification cards and denied all civil rights in Syria. During the 1980s, the Kurds have not been subjected to any harassment or persecution because of their ethnic origin, but neither have they been granted any ethnic or cultural rights. In the elections of 1991, however, three leaders of Kurdish political parties were elected into the Syrian parliament.

The Fonner Soviet Union In the old territories of the former Soviet Union, the Kurds are dispersed among a number of Caucasian and Central Asian republics. Their main historical presence has been in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and Turkmenistan. An autonomous Kurdish republic was established in 1920 but was abolished in 1929. The Kurds have generally enjoyed a degree of cultural freedom in these republics, except in Azerbaijan, where their official numbers were reduced from 40,000 in the census of 1920 to nil in the census of 1979. They were allowed their own schools, school books, and press. Radio Yerevan in Armenia had special Kurdish broadcasts that covered all of Kurdistan. The Kurds seem to have maintained a strong sense of identity despite their dispersion and isolation from other parts of Kurdistan and the assimilation of many of them. A new awareness after glasnost of their Kurdish identity has resulted in more extensive cultural and political contacts among the Kurds from different republics and demands for the reestablishment of the Autonomous Republic of Kurdistan.l2 In the current atmosphere of ethnic revival among the peoples of the former Soviet Union and the waves of expulsion of Kurds from Armenia and Azerbaijan, more people are rediscovering their ethnic origins and identifying themselves as Kurds.13

Iraq In Iraq, the Kurds were more nationally conscious than in other parts of Kurdistan. The Treaty of Sevres (1920) had stipulated that the Kurds of southern Kurdistan of the Vilayat of Mosul could adhere to the proposed

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"state of Kurdistan" in eastern Turkey, after one year of the establishment of such a state, "if they so wish." 14 But the rise of Mustafa Kemal in Turkey prevented the treaty from being ratified. Consequently, the British Mandatory Power and the newly established government of Iraq officially communicated the following statement to the League of Nations on December 24, 1922: The Government of His Britannic Majesty and the government of Iraq recognise the rights of the Kurds living within the frontiers of Iraq, to establish a Kurdish Government within these frontiers. They hope that the different Kurdish groups will arrive as soon as possible at an arrangement among them on the form they desire for this government and the limits within which they would like it to extend. They will send responsible delegates to discuss their economic and political relations with the Government of His Britannic Majesty and the Iraqi Government.15

The Kurds, however, were against being included in Iraq. They had earlier (1920) boycotted or rejected a referendum that was held in Iraq to approve the accession of Prince Faisal to the throne of the new monarchy and subsequently boycotted the ceremony. In Baghdad, the Arab nationalists, as well, were opposed to giving Kurds senior positions in the national government. 16 From 1920 to 1970 there was a long series of efforts by the League of Nations, European powers, Arab unity forces, and a succession of governments in Iraq to create some form of autonomy for Kurds in Iraq. The efforts produced repeated failures, continued conflict, and continued savagery inflicted upon the Kurdish people. A 1970 Declaration of Peace Agreement by the Ba'th government after one of the many wars recognized the binational character of the Iraqi state, in which the Kurds were to be free and equal partners, and included the following: • participation of Kurds in government, including the appointment of Kurds to key posts in the state; • recognition of Kurdish in those areas where Kurds constitute the majority (Kurdish and Arabic would be taught together in all schools); • furtherance of Kurdish education and culture; • requirement that officials in the Kurdish areas speak Kurdish; • right to establish Kurdish student, youth, women's, and teachers' organizations; • economic development of the Kurdish area; • return of Kurds to their villages or financial compensation; • agrarian reform; • amendment of the constitution to read "the Iraqi people consist of two main nationalities: the Arab and Kurdish nationalities";

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return of the clandestine radio and heavy weapons to the government; appointment of a Kurdish vice-president; amendment of provincial laws in accordance with this declaration; formation of a Kurdish area with self-government.

The agreement committed the government to implementation of these points within four years.J7 During 1970, a number of clauses in the agreement were implemented, including the amendment to the constitution and the appointment of senior Kurdish officials, among them senior members of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), as governors of Dohuk and Arbil. Kurdish police chiefs were appointed in the three Kurdish provinces of Dohuk, Arbil, and Sulaymania. Factories were established, and agrarian reform hastened. Kurdish irregular troops were disbanded. The agreement fell apart in March 1974 because the Kurds doubted the sincerity of the Iraqi government in implementing it. Such issues as the status of Kirkuk, the extent of autonomy, and the allocation of oil revenues were the cause of the conflict. The Ba'th government was unwilling to make concessions and invited KDP support for the Autonomy Law to be announced on March 11, 1974. The KDP was given fourteen days in which to assent in order to participate in the government. The KDP rejected the government offer and the war resumed. The government then unilaterally promulgated the Autonomy Law. The Autonomy Law was an emasculated version of the 1970 agreement. Its provisions were: 1. The area of Kurdistan shall enjoy autonomy, limited by the

2.

3. 4. 5-9.

10-15.

16-21.

legal, political, and economic integrity of the Republic of Iraq. The area shall be defined in accordance with the March 11, 1970 manifesto and the 1957 census records. Kurdish will be the official language beside Arabic in the region, and the language of education, although the teaching of Arabic will be compulsory. The rights of non-Kurdish minorities within the region will be guaranteed, with proportional representation in local autonomy. The Judiciary will conform with the legal system of Iraq. These items covered fiscal aspects of autonomy, within the financial integrity of the state. These items provided for the establishment of a Legislative and an Executive Council as governing organs of the autonomous area. These items established the relationship between the Central authority and the autonomous administration, defined by the government as one of supervision and coordination.

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This law, while acknowledging the existence and the rights of the Kurds as a distinct group, also imposed such limits on this autonomy as to ensure that effective authority remained in the hands of the central government.1 8 This one-sided law of autonomy is still the applicable law in Iraq. It is one-sided because it was rejected by the Kurds and their representative organizations. The rejection was justified by the exclusion of numerous Kurdish areas from the Autonomous Region (notably Kirkuk, Khaneqin, parts of Sinjar, Ain-Zaleh, Kifri, Mandali, and Badra) and the denial of a share of oil revenues for the economic development of Kurdistan. These two issues have continued to constitute a major stumbling block for a peaceful solution of the Kurdish question in Iraq during subsequent negotiations between the concerned parties. The war that resulted after the Autonomy Law was promulgated lasted until March 1975, and the Kurds received covert aid from Iran, United States, and IsraeJ.19 On March 6, 1975, an agreement was reached between Iran and Iraq during the summit meeting of OPEC countries in Algiers. According to this agreement, Iraq ceded its claim to the whole of the Shatt At-Arab waterway and accepted the Thalweg line partition. Iran reciprocated by sealing its border to the Kurds.2o This agreement ended the armed resistance war in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurdish leader Barzani gave up and crossed into Iran with a few thousands of his pesh mergas.21 Some rejected Barzani's leadership and decided to continue the struggle; others accepted Iraq's amnesty and returned home. After 1975, the Iraqi policy of revenge covered cultural, educational, economic, and social domains as well. Kurdish schools and universities were closed down or demolished. Publications in the Kurdish language were reduced and heavily censored. There were mass expulsions from government and private employment. Property ownership by Kurds was restricted in some regions of Kurdistan. Residents of strategic hamlets were forbidden to farm or raise cattle and were forced into a deliberate state of unemployment. Flagrant forms of discrimination were practiced against the Kurds in services and economic projects.22 There have been unconfirmed reports of selling arrested Kurdish women and children in Baghdad, southern Iraq, and the Gulf states. In the light of such genocidal practices, the flight of nearly two million Kurds to the borders of Iran and Turkey in the aftermath of the second Gulf War in April 1991 can be clearly understood. This massive refugee exodus led to a unique UN action, Resolution 688, for the establishment of a "security zone" in Iraqi Kurdistan, based on the "international duty to intervene" in the internal affairs of member states when human rights are seriously violated by them.23 The Kurdo-Iraqi negotiations for finding an accommodation and a peaceful solution to the conflict, held between April and October 1991, ended in failure. The main obstacle was Iraqi refusal to compromise on

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central issues, including the question of the borders of the autonomous Kurdish region (especially the oil city of Kirkuk, even when the Kurds proposed joint administration); control of the judiciary and the return of Iraqi security forces to the Kurdish region; and introduction of a freely elected democratic government for all Iraq. The Iraqi government, following the breakdown in negotiations, introduced an economic blockade against the Kurdish areas and withdrew its administration and services. The Kurds responded by holding free elections under international observation (May 1992) for a parliament and a local government-that is, de facto ruling the region under their control, protected by the allied force of "Poised Hammer" that is stationed in Turkey, and 500 lightly armored UN guards as well as 600 UN relief workers.

Other Dimensions The contribution of regional organizations to the Kurdish situation has been very limited. Organizations such as the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Countries, the Non-aligned Movement, the Council of Arab Unity, the Arab Cooperation Council, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, the Economic Cooperation Council, and the Gulf Cooperation Council have, unfortunately, rarely intervened or made an effort to mediate in the conflicts concerning the Kurds, not even when such conflicts had reached genocidal proportions or it may have suited their own interests to intervene. Where they have intervened, it has been to the detriment of the Kurds and in support of the repressive power elites of these states. The examples of the holy war by Iran against the Kurds (1979), the use of chemical weapons on Halabja (1988), and the exodus of Kurdish refugees in the aftermath of the latest Gulf War (1991) are ample reminders. The involvement of the states who host some parts of Kurdistan in any of the ethnic Kurdish conflicts in any of their neighboring states has never been for mediatory purposes but for instrumental ones. It has either been for destabilizing the neighbor concerned, hindering the recognition of Kurdish rights in any of these states, or joint cooperation for the suppression of Kurdish movements. Prominent examples are the Treaty of Sa'abad (1937) among Turkey, Iran, and Iraq; and the Baghdad Pact (1955) among Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Britain (after 1958, the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO, without Iraq). Other examples include pacts between Turkey and Iraq (1926); Turkey and Iran (1932); Iraq and Syria (1963); Iran and Iraq (1975); and Turkey and Iraq (1978-1988).24 Third-party involvement has been very rare. Egypt under President Nasser mediated on three occasions (1963, 1964, and 1966) and exercised its good offices with the Iraqi government to resolve the conflict by peace-

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ful means. The Soviet Union made similar discreet mediation efforts in 1964 and 1974 in Iraq.25 The Palestine Liberation Organization made an unsuccessful attempt at mediation between Iran and the Kurds in 1979. Otherwise, the most common form of mediation has been that of the leaders of one Kurdish movement with the government of a neighboring state that is in conflict with the government of their home state. The division of Kurdistan among four or five states with different political, cultural, and social systems, coupled with the geopolitical location of Kurdistan as a land-locked area with vast natural resources, has further complicated the Kurdish quest for emancipation and justice. The lack of a neighboring Kurdish state has also meant the absence of irredentist claims. Any demand, therefore, for ethnic justice by the Kurds in these states is conceived as a threat and suspected as a move toward separation. Furthermore, serious attempts are made to hinder Kurds in neighboring states from receiving ethnic recognition for fear of its spillover effects on their own populations. The realization by Kurds of the relationship between their fight for ethnic justice, self-government, and the wider issues of human rights and democracy in these states, together with their relative integration (but not assimilation) into their host states, has induced them to follow modest strategies of self-government. This moderate strategy is designed to bolster the possibilities of accommodation with the central governments, through negotiation, or of cooperation with opposition political forces for finding democratic solutions to their common problems. In Syria and Turkey (but not Iraq and Iran), serious efforts seem to have developed in rethinking the issues involved, in order to avoid the destructive effects of protracted and violent ethnic conflict, both within the Kurdish movement (except for the PKK) and the governments concerned (except for the military in Turkey). Even in Iraq and Iran, such a rethinking process has taken place within the Kurdish movement and the opposition political forces but has not extended to the power elites. The Kurds had gradually reconciled themselves to the futility of separation, during the period between the two world wars, and accepted their presence within the boundaries of the existing regional states as a result of severe repression or the influence of universalist ideologies of interethnic solidarities. At the same time, ideas that dominated and became victorious in World War II, which resulted in the establishment of the United Nations and the decolonization process that followed after, seem to have given the Kurds a greater insight and awareness that they share the same plight as other ethnic groups and peoples in former colonies and non-selfgoverning territories. They know that some of these peoples have achieved independence and established their own nation-states, which have become members of the United Nations. They realize that some of those nations have populations of less than a million people, whereas they-a people of

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more than twenty million-are denied their right to existence and selfdetermination. The demise of the rigid bipolar international political system, the end of the Cold War, and the collapse of the Soviet empire have resulted in an unprecedented ethnic revival in Eastern Europe and the old Soviet territories. This revival has brought about radical changes in established borders and the formation of more than twenty-three new sovereign states (for example, in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic states, the former Soviet Union, and the unification of Germany). Such changes were inconceivable before 1989. Furthermore, regional states in the Middle East started to question the holiness of their own international borders and aimed at changes in the status quo that had existed since World War I (e.g., Iraq's invasions of Iran and Kuwait, Iran's attempts at invasion of Iraq, Turkish recurrent attacks into Iraq, Syrian intervention in Lebanon, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon). These developments might provide a better international atmosphere and understanding for Kurdish demands for self-determination, especially if carried out peacefully and by democratic means. The existence of a large homogeneous population in the heartland, and a more ethnically mixed population in the periphery of Kurdistan, as well as large colonies of Kurdish groups residing in the capitals or industrial centers of their respective states, might lead to bridge building and a reduction of the ethnic conflict through increased political and social interactions in common national associations and organizations. On the other hand, if such population movements are a result of the deportation of Kurds and settlement of majority groups in Kurdistan, they are bound to lead to bitter and intensified ethnic conflict (Turkey and Iraq).

CONFLICT-RESOLUTION STRATEGIES The ethnic conflicts involving Kurds are currently violent in Turkey (since 1984), violent in Iran (since 1979, except for October 1979-April 1980), violent in Iraq (since 1961, with peaceful periods in 1963, 1964-1965, 1966-1968, 1970-1974, 1975-1976, and 1984), nonviolent in Syria, and nonviolent in the Commonwealth of Independent States. In dealing with resolution strategies for the Kurdish ethnic conflicts in the states of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the CIS, this section will rely heavily on the "ethnic conflict resolution model" proposed by Stephen Ryan, with its emphasis on peacekeeping, peace-making and peace-building strategies.26

Peacekeeping Strategies Harbottle has defined peacekeeping as an activity that involves the interposition of military and/or police forces between armed groups either to

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stop violence or to prevent it.27 Most peacekeeping most of the time is the responsibility of the governments of sovereign states. However, there are certain types of internal conflicts in which the very legitimacy of the state is being questioned (e.g., by movements calling for ethnic autonomy as in the Kurdish case) and in which the state agents will be seen more as part of the conflict than part of the solution. When ethnic groups are engaged in a violent conflict, peacekeeping by multinational or regional forces is often the most urgent and necessary of all peace strategies, for it is the only one that deals directly with the warriors on all sides who are engaged in mutual destruction. Until this violent behavior is stopped, or at least managed, it is unlikely that any attempts to resolve competing interests (peace making), to change negative attitudes, or to alter socioeconomic conditions (peace building) will be successful. Violent behavior has a certain logic of its own, which deepens conflicts and creates a vicious spiral of destruction, hatred, fear, and suspicion. As noted above, the Kurdish ethnic conflicts in Syria and the CIS are not violent ones, so peacekeeping efforts are not required. In Iraq, Turkey, and Iran, on the other hand, they are violent to varying degrees. In Turkey, resolutions and decisions at the Helsinki Summit of CSCE states (July 1992), in which Turkey is a member, might help in de-escalating the conflict by formalizing the whole process and establishing specific structures and procedures (monitors and peacekeeping missions). In Iran, the Organization of Islamic Conference might be called upon to make an effort as other regional or international structures might not be approved of or tolerated by the Iranian government. In Iraq, the presence of the Allied force (Poised Hammer) and the stay of the UN guards should be extended until a peaceful resolution of the conflict is reached or a change of government takes place. A UN peacekeeping force might not be as effective as the Allied force in deterring the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein from resuming massive cruel and repressive campaigns against the Kurds.

Peace-making Strategies This approach is concerned with the search for a negotiated resolution of the perceived conflicts of interest between the parties. Negotiations can be divided into two broad categories. The first is traditional mediation. Some of the critics of this approach have developed what is usually referred to as "alternative dispute resolution" (ADR).28 Traditional dispute settlement tends to work within frameworks of institutional legitimacy, whereas ADR emphasizes much more the importance of "identity groups," even when these are deemed to be illegitimate by existing power structures. Both traditional dispute settlement and ADR often involve third parties, but ADR emphasizes much more the importance of imaginative and innovative techniques by these parties. One

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of the most valuable contributions ADR has made to the literature on conflict resolution is the emphasis it places on the process of interaction rather than the content of the negotiating positions of the parties. The second type of negotiation, developed by John Burton, is based on the idea of basic human needs, and a technique for negotiation, which has become known as a "problem-solving workshop."29 This technique is meant to provide a supportive, non-competitive environment in which the parties can explore issues rather than haggle over positions. Such workshops are private and informal, and they allow third-party representatives to facilitate direct and accurate communications between the parties. The mediation process involves more than just getting leaders to sit around a table to discuss competing interests. It is being increasingly realized that the so-called prenegotiation phase is an important part of any peace-making initiative. This involves dealing with a whole host of problems that might impede direct talks between the parties. Such ideas as ADR, problem-solving workshops, and prenegotiations can be used to complement traditional negotiation by preparing the ground in the prenegotiation phase of talks. As van der Merwe has pointed out, unofficial facilitators who are private individuals "have the freedom to be flexible, to disregard protocol, to suggest unconventional remedies or procedures, to widen or restrict the agenda or change the order of items, to propose partial solutions or package deals, to press the case for constructive initiatives or magnanimous gestures."30 In the case of the Kurdish conflicts, both traditional and, to a lesser degree, ADR modes of mediation have been used with some success in Iraq (1964 and 1970) but not in the other states. Third-party intervention has usually been rejected by the governments concerned in order to deny recognition and legitimacy to the Kurdish side. This mode of external involvement, however, together with ADR and prenegotiation techniques, might be most promising in Turkey. But the major problem in Iran and Iraq is that the governments are opposed to negotiations (except on their own terms) and a peace process. They prefer to pursue a policy of repression and armed confrontation with the Kurds, which hinders effective international or regional peace making.

Peace-building Strategies Peace building is the strategy that most directly tries to reverse the destructive processes accompanying violent ethnic conflict. This involves a shift of focus away from the warriors, with whom peacekeepers are mainly concerned, to the attitudes and socioeconomic circumstances of ordinary people. Therefore, it tends to concentrate on the context of the conflict rather than on the issues that divide the parties. All peace-building strategies involve greater interparty contact. So whereas peacekeeping is about

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building barriers between the warriors, peace building tries to build bridges between the ordinary people. Peace building has to be more than simple contact to be effective. Five forms of modified contact are proposed by Ryan: 1. Contact plus forgiveness, which emphasizes the need for reconciliation. 2. Contact plus the pursuit of superordinate goals. The latter are urgent goals that could be achieved only by cooperation between the conflicting groups. It is not the same as a common goal, which could be achieved through unilateral action. 3. Contact plus economic development. A region experiencing protracted ethnic conflict will also often suffer from economic underdevelopment. Therefore, it seems reasonable to link the peace process with economic development on an equitable basis. 4. Contact plus confidence building. In violent ethnic conflict, multilateral distrust inhibits the search for a peaceful solution. The strategy of graduated reciprocation in tension reduction (GRIT) might be very fruitful through reciprocal and mutual initiatives by both sides that can be verified by third parties. 5. Contact plus education for mutual understanding (EMU). Here, the emphasis is on the attitudes of children and young adults, and the hope is that peace can be obtained through generational change. A combination of these strategies would be a forceful instrument for establishing peace. In the Kurdish case, however, these strategies will have to be combined with strategies for power sharing, elimination of discrimination, ending of repression, respect for human rights, recognition of Kurdish culture and identity, and equitable economic development. Instances of track-two diplomacy between the Kurds and groups of the majority ethnic groups are also common. Finally, the most important and vital strategy is the establishment of constitutional and democratic forms of political systems and regional integration structures. Furthermore, a just and peaceful solution to the Kurdish question might be possible within a process similar to that of the Helsinki Accords (CSCE) for the Middle East.

NOTES 1. The following standard works are useful as an introduction for the study of the Kurdish question. Van M. Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1992); G. Chaliand, People Without a Country (London: Zed Press, 1980); D. McDowall, The KurdsA Nation Denied (London: Minority Rights Publications, 1992). 2. C. J. Edmonds, "Kurdish Nationalism," Journal of Contemporary History

6(1) (1971): 87-107.

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3. Turkey, Iran, and Iraq have occasionally resorted to genocidal practices against their Kurdish populations, but Syria has never reached such extremes. 4. L. Beck, "Tribes and the State in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Iran," inS. P. Khoury and J. Kostiner (eds.), Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 206. 5. A. Hassanpour, The Language Factor in National Development: The Standardization of the Kurdish Language, 1918-1985, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1989, pp. 58-59. 6. Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, p. 274. 7. McDowall, The Kurds--A Nation Denied, p. 36. 8. Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, p. 274. 9. B. Chirguh, La Question Kurde, Ses Origines et ses Causes (Le Caire: Paul Barbey, 1930), pp. 39-40. 10. Statement by President Ozal, in Yiizyil, February 10, 1991. 11. Mohamad Talab Hilal, Dirasa A 'n Muhafazat Al-Jazira-Minal Nawahi Alqawmiya, Alijtimai'ya, Alsiyasiya (A Study on the Governorate of Jazira-From National, Social and Political Perspectives) (Al-Hasaka: Chairman of Political Intelligence Bureau, 1963). Hilal later became a governor of the city of Hama and a minister in the Ba'th government. 12. J. Heydari, "The Kurds of the USSR," paper presented to the Stockholm Conference on Kurdish Human Rights, Stockholm, March 1991. 13. N. Nadirov, "Position of the Kurds in USSR," paper presented to the Kurdish Symposium, Pantheon University, Athens, June 1991. 14. I. C. Vanly, "Kurdistan in Iraq," in Chaliand, People Without a Country, p. 160. 15. J. Jwadie, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Its Origins and Development, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, 1960, pp. 569-570. 16. D. Kinnane, The Kurds and Kurdistan (London: OUP, 1964), p. 36. 17. H. Hanum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), pp. 190-192. 18. McDowall, The Kurds--A Nation Denied, pp. 95-97. 19. Jordan and Syria were also supportive of the Kurdish resistance movement. 20. Vanly, "Kurdistan in Iraq," p. 186. 21. Pesh merga is the Kurdish name for guerrilla soldier. 22. Middle East Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Unquiet Graves: The Search for the Disappeared in Iraqi Kurdistan (New York: UN Economic and Social Council, 1992). "Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq," prepared by Max Vander Stoel, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, E/CNA/1992/31, United Nations. 23. UN resolution of April 5, 1991. 24. Hassanpour, The Language Factor in National Development, pp. 57-58. 25. Kinnane, The Kurds and Kurdistan, p. 83; and personal information communicated by the late leader of KDPI, A. R. Ghassemlou, on Soviet Defense Minister Grechko's last efforts with the Iraqi government and the Kurdish delegation headed by Idris Barzani to avoid war in 1974. 26. Stephen Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations (Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth, 1990), pp. 50-93. 27. M. Harbottle, "The Strategy of Third Party Intervention in Conflict Resolution," /nternationalJourna/25(1) (1979-1980). 28. Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations, p. 78. 29. John W. Burton, "The Resolution of Conflict," International Studies Quarterly 16(1) (1972). 30. Quoted in Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations, pp. 81-82.

9

The Maghreb and the Gulf War ADELWAHAB BIAD

When on August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein launched his troops to attack Kuwait, he let loose forces that were not only going to wound the emirates and Iraq, but were going to shake the foundations of the entire Arab world. Though geographically distant, but in their feeling close to the zone of combat, the people of the Maghreb (the states of North Africa) took part in the conflict without participating in the war. Thus, they have suffered from an event in which they had no influence, but which put them into a paradoxical situation. Looking at the Maghreb within the perspective of the Gulf War, three fundamental questions will be considered: • What were the reactions of the Maghreb people to the invasion of Kuwait and to the action taken by the Coalition forces? • What has been the role of the Union Maghrebien Africain (UMA) in trying to settle the crisis? • What has been the impact of the conflict on the states of the Maghreb and on the region?

CRITIQUE OF IRAQ AND OF THE COALITION The invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi forces in August 1990 raised a wave of consternation in the world. The first Arab countries to criticize this aggression were Algeria and Morocco. However, within the Maghreb this critique of Iraq gradually gave way to a vigorous condemnation of the Coalition forces.

The Critique of Iraq The UMA got word of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti1 dispute at its council session in Algiers. In the final summit declaration the council expressed its "great 163

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concern" about "negative repercussions upon the relations between brother states."2 The council sent an appeal to the two parties for dialogue. To bring about propitious conditions for such a dialogue, the Algerian summit charged Chadli Bendjedid, president of the UMA, to dispatch an emissary to the two parties. When the public learned about the invasion of Kuwait, consternation was shared by most of the people in the Maghreb countries. Diplomatic efforts were undertaken to mediate the dispute because all Maghreb states disapproved to varying degrees of the initiative taken by Hussein that had provoked a major international crisis. The main criticism concerned the violations of the principle of not resorting to force in order to settle a dispute. Thus, Algeria, which described the invasion of Kuwait as a "precedent of exceptional gravity," declared itself to be "more than ever opposed to the use of force as a means to settle quarrels between countries." 3 The president of Tunisia pointed out that "one must stay within the international legality and the principles expressed in the Charter of the UN and that of the League of the Arab States, especially those concerning the settlement of conflict, namely, not to resort to force and not to interfere with internal affairs of other states." 4 Similarly, the king of Morocco condemned "monopolizing force and coercion and the application of an old non-Arab maxim, which says: 'might is right."' 5 These censures indicated that the situation resulting from the Iraqi aggression-that is, the occupation and the annexation of Kuwait-was not accepted in the Maghreb. On August 2, 1990, Algeria, in agreement with the other Maghreb countries, demanded the immediate retreat of the Iraqi forces and that the sovereignty and independence of Kuwait be respected. President Chadli Bendjedid emphasized the "unswerving position" of his country, which was "opposed to the occupation of any country, Arab or not Arab." The war was an embarrassment for the Maghreb governments, who in spite of internal differences, try to promote peaceful solutions to Arab conflicts. The Iraqi aggression was primarily criticized because it was seen as a factor dividing the Arab world. The Algerian Foreign Ministry declared that the Iraqi action "further weakened the Arab nation in its defense of sacred causes, especially the Palestinian cause which thus became marginalized." This is in contrast to Saddam Hussein's position that his initiative of August 2 was a contribution to the liberation of Palestine. Although the public opinion in the Maghreb countries had been sensitive to this type of argument, their governments did not agree to accept such a linkage of two disparate issues. The Algerian president during his December 1990 visit to Cairo called this approach illogical, and deemed the Gulf problem first of all an Arab-Arab question, whereas the Palestinian problem was one of Arabs against Israel and its allies.

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The Maghreb countries have been unanimous in their view that the Iraqi aggression opened the road to an internationalization of the conflict. Already on August 2, the Algerian Foreign Ministry expressed its concern in this matter by warning that the invasion of Kuwait would dangerously increase the risk of intervention in that region.

The Condemnation of the Coalition By the first week of August 1990 signs appeared of an internationalization of the conflict: the UN Security Council passed Resolution 660, calling for the withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and Resolution 661, decreeing a total embargo of Iraq and the deployment, starting August 8, of U.S. troops to the Gulf within the framework of a multinational force. The harshness of the sanctions imposed on Iraq was criticized throughout the Maghreb. The emergency meeting of the foreign ministers of the UMA at Algiers on September 2, 1990, resulted in the release of a statement denouncing all maneuvers to starve and weaken the Iraqi people and strategies affecting Iraqi productive capacity. 6 With the exception of Morocco, all members of the UMA condemned the foreign intervention on the grounds that it served neither the Arab interests, nor peace and security in the region. On the contrary, the intervention, by internationalizing the matter, would further complicate the situation and harden the positions of parties to the conflict. The fact that the Security Council adopted several particularly harsh resolutions against Iraq in record time as well as the deployment of a powerful multinational force in the Gulf fed the criticism in the Maghreb countries of the politics involving such punitive measures. The ambiguity of international law as called on by the Coalition powers against Iraq and its uneven application were denounced. The bombardment of Iraq that started on January 16, 1991, raised questions in the Maghreb countries about the real objectives that the Coalition, and in particular the United States, were pursuing in this war. The report of the UMA's second council meeting in Algiers (January 7-9, 1991) characterized the presence of the U.S. and Western forces in the Gulf as a U.S. strategy to lay hands on the oil wells in the region and to shatter Iraq's military and technological potentiaJ.7 The Algerian foreign ministry denounced the Coalition's fixation on its mission to defend Saudi Arabia (Desert Shield) and then to liberate Kuwait (Desert Storm) in order to finally destroy Iraq. Algeria could only "condemn this war most vigorously ."8 In this same manner Tunisia energetically condemned "the destructive war" against Iraq.9 In the Maghreb countries it is widely believed that the destruction of the Iraqi infrastructure confirms that the real intention of the West is to block the Arab nation's access to progress in sciences and technology,

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condemning it to permanent dependency .to The large number of civilians killed in the bombing of Iraq has fostered in the Maghreb countries a hostility toward the Coalition, especially toward the United States, Great Britain, and France; nor has the United Nations been spared criticism.

MAGHREB PERSPECTIVES AND ACTIONS From the beginning of the Gulf crisis, the Arab world gave the impression of being unable to adopt a common position. The intransigence of Saddam Hussein and the flux of foreign troops into Saudi Arabia increased interArab differences, including the Maghreb countries. But the UMA's approach is to establish the lowest common denominator reflecting the positions of its members.

The Divided Maghreb The Arab League's Ministerial Council revealed in its session of August 3, 1990, the first dissonances within the UMA. These dissonances grew stronger at the Arab summit on August 10, 1990, in Cairo. This summit adopted a resolution "condemning the aggression against Kuwait" and "the Iraqi threats against the Gulf States." It also decided to send "Arab forces" into the region. Although Morocco approved of the resolution, Libya rejected it, Algeria abstained from voting, Mauritania had doubts about it, and Tunisia boycotted the summit. Here an explanation is necessary to shed light upon the respective positions. King Hassan II of Morocco has always had a close rapport with the Gulf monarchies, and on August 2 he expressed his solidarity with Emir Jaber Es Sabah. Morocco and Egypt were the first Arab countries to send 1,200 soldiers each to Saudi Arabia, thus joining the anti-Iraqi coalition. But the Moroccan sovereign did not forego the opportunity to seek an Arab solution to the conflict. His initiative of November 11 aimed to bring together an Arab summit for "one last chance for a peaceful solution to the Gulf crisis."ll Although the proposal had little chance of success in the context of a divided Arab world, its author was able to give the impression of a new initiative although Morocco's maneuvering capacity was already reduced. Libya's negative vote at the Cairo summit expressed its opposition to the use of foreign troops as initiated by the United States. The Libyan leader, who has no sympathy for Saddam Hussein nor for the monarchs of the Gulf, supported Iran in the war of 1980-1988. In the Gulf conflict he tried to promote an Arab solution. A Libyan-Palestinian effort recommended that Iraq accept the drawing of a border, delineating its territory from that of Kuwait. In exchange, Iraq would get a financial indemnification and the

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Kuwaiti islands of Boubyane and Warba.l2 This plan was made obsolete by the resolution adopted at Cairo, which condemned Iraq. But Libya continued its dialogue with Egypt, hoping to reunify the Arab countries. The Mauritanians were concerned not to alienate Iraq as a valued supporter in their conflict with Senegal. Nouakchott was also sensitive about the division of the Arab world. Tunisia boycotted the Cairo summit out of a certain sympathy for Iraq, claiming it had been prepared "precipitously and in haste" at a moment when foreign troops kept pouring into Arab lands. The removal of the seat of the Arab League from Tunis to Cairo in October 1990 can be interpreted as a sanction imposed on Tunisia. Algeria also found the Arab summit to have been organized "hastily." It sought to submit amendments to the Cairo resolution to leave open the possibility of dialogue and negotiation and abstained from voting, still hoping that the Arab ranks could be brought to unity. Algeria pledged to mobilize the UMA, over which it would preside from July to December 1990, to promote an Arab solution.

The Minimum Maghreb Consensus It took a month of intense dialogue to organize an emergency meeting of the foreign ministers of the UMA to discuss the Gulf conflict on September 2, 1990 at Algiers. A document that outlined a Maghreb contribution to a solution to the crisis was produced and sent to the heads of states. It was not intended to be a structural plan; rather, it outlined principles and elements for ending the conflict.B The text contained three points constituting the minimum consensus reached by the UMA states:

• That force be rejected as a means to settle disputes. • That international law in all circumstances be respected, particularly with regard to the Palestinian problem. • That measures to "starve the Iraqi people and to destroy the Iraqi potential" be opposed. Whereas the first point was directed particularly to Iraq, the second and the third points were directed toward the Coalition. Differences among UMA members had to do with the procedures taken to handle the problem created by the Iraqi invasion. Morocco felt that only the UN Security Council or perhaps the Arab League could end the conflict. Those members of the UMA who did not support the Cairo resolution would have preferred to open a dialogue and to push for Iraqi-Kuwaiti negotiations. Libya favored Kuwait making certain territorial and financial concessions to Iraq, and Algeria did not want to prejudge future negotiations between the parties.14

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On the basis of the working principles agreed upon at the UMA meeting in Algeria, Algeria continued to work for a peaceful solution. Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid traveled to fourteen capitals in the Middle East, in Europe, and in the Maghreb countries. He traveled, however, not to mediate, but to gather ideas from concerned countries for a feasible peaceful solution.15 Subsequently, President Bendjedid presented a plan to the Security Council, a plan that was not approved because it contained a clause calling for an international conference to deal with the Palestinian question, to which the United States objected. After the bombing began, the Maghreb states made every diplomatic effort to stop the fighting, and sent delegations to both the UN and the Security Council to ask for a cease-fire.16 At a second emergency meeting of the UMA ministers of foreign affairs in February in Benghazi a declaration was adopted that expressed regret over the Security Council's refusal to hold a plenary session for the calling of a cease-fire. The declaration also stated that because Iraq had accepted UN Resolution 660, the continuation of the war was no longer justified. To the members of the Coalition they sent statements that condemned the barbarous bombardments of civilians in Iraq and in Kuwait and the premeditated destruction of Iraqi productive capacity as a flagrant overstepping of the Security Council's resolutions.17 The failure of these initiatives was very discouraging to the Maghreb countries.

THE IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT ON THE MAGHREB The Gulf conflict, by its intensity and scale, sent shock waves all over the world. In particular it humiliated the Arab people. In spite of their being far from the battlefields, the Maghreb countries suffered internal difficulties. The crisis, however, has not affected their mutual cooperation within the UMA.

Economic and Political Impact for Individual States

Economic Impact A March 1991 report by the Italo-Arab Chamber of Commerce, published in Rome, has revealed that the Gulf crisis seriously affected the economies of Tunisia and Mauritania and caused a noticeable decline in the Algerian economy .18 The losses of income from reduced tourism and from the cessation of exports to both Iraq and Kuwait were initially estimated to be $412 million for Tunisia, dashing its hopes for an increase of gross national product (GNP) in 1991. The generous financial assistance these countries re-

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ceived from the Gulf monarchies was suspended, and U.S. aid was reduced by two-thirds, from $58.7 million in 1990 to $19.4 million in 1991. The Mauritanian economy was also severely affected by the conflict, having to pay a higher price for crude oil and losing its financial assistance from the Gulf area, in particular from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Mauritania's economic difficulties were compounded by its long-lasting agricultural crisis. Morocco suffered as well from the high price of crude oil and from the losses in its tourist industry,19 but due to its participation in the Coalition it received substantial financial aid from the Gulf's oil monarchies.2o Algeria and Libya benefited because of the higher oil prices. The increase from $16 to $24 per barrel of oil in August 1990 increased Algeria's oil revenues by 36 percent,2 1 giving a real boost to an economy previously troubled by a heavy debt crisis.

Political Impact All Maghreb countries suffered from destabilizing internal political setbacks. Public opinion, sympathizing with Iraq, gave vent to frustration and rage against the Coalition. In a Tunisian opinion poll at the height of the Gulf War, 93 percent of the interviewees said they supported Iraq and 79 percent condemned the Saudi government for having "defiled the Holy Places" by calling in foreign troops. 22 Sentiment in Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Mauritania were similar. When anti-Coalition sentiment threatened to create havoc in Algeria and Tunisia, governments made an effort to maintain order. Algerian authorities put in place a committee to manage the expression of the public's feelings regarding the Middle East conflict. The committee was "charged to see to it that the normal function of economic and social activities be maintained, that the citizens be safe, and that public order be ensured." 23 The Tunisian government opened a dialogue with opponents to the war to reach for consensus and to build national solidarity. A real threat to the peace in both countries stemmed from the exploitation of the conflict by Islamic parties to gain popularity and to put themselves in readiness to take power.24 The Tunisian regime forbade all demonstrations; in Algeria the president denounced demagoguery and the undermining of the democratic functioning of the country. In Morocco the Islamic movement is less influential. But there, too, the government was under pressure by public opinion to oppose the war. Riots that shook several Moroccan cities in December 1990 were aimed at reclaiming the economic and social order. The power structure saw these riots as being "orchestrated by agitators from outside Morocco," and subsequent marches and support meetings for Iraq were viewed as a real

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challenge to the regime.25 The government kept a low profile during strikes and demonstrations.

The Impact on the UMA At the July 1990 summit in Algiers the UMA adopted agreements of regional cooperation and recommended the setting up of a common economic strategy.26 This strengthening of the Maghreb occurred just before the crisis broke out. Up to October 1990, the UMA's business sessions followed a normal course. But from then until December 1990 there were at least fifteen ministerial or special commission conferences of the UMA in the different capitals of the region. The most significant conference included the foreign ministers and the ministers of economy and agriculture of the UMA; it convened in October and December in Algiers and adopted a three-stage plan for an Economic Union. During this time, progress was made in the sensitive areas of financial, commercial, judiciary, and postal cooperation. And finally, in spite of unfavorable international conditions, Maghreb-Europe relations were dealt with in the course of a conference of the 5+4 in Rome in October, and at a UMA meeting with the European Community in Brussels in November. Algerian-Moroccan cooperation was confirmed by a meeting of a joint commission of these countries in November, and more comprehensive cooperation was agreed upon by the heads of government at Tunis in December and at Rabat in January 1991. The diverse positions regarding the crisis do not seem to have influenced the adoption of across-the-border cooperation agreements between Algeria and Morocco and between Algeria and Tunisia that insure free movement of persons and of merchandise. Thus, between July and December 1990, while Algeria was presiding over the UMA, inter-Maghreb cooperation made progress in spite of the degraded international climate caused by the Gulf conflict. The beginning of the Libyan presidency of the UMA coincided with the Coalition forces' attack on Iraq in January 1991. Continued intensification of the crisis translated into a sharpening of differences among the Maghreb countries; it became imperative to come to an agreement before a common step could be taken. This was on the agenda at the emergency conference of the top UMA diplomats at Benghazi in February. After the cease-fire, the conditions for a Maghreb summit were again favorable. The Maghreb council, with the exception of the Moroccan sovereign who was represented by his foreign minister, met again on March 11 at Ras-Ahnouf, Libya, and came to some agreement regarding the return of peace to the region. The main achievement of this summit was the adoption of nine points of regional cooperation and the development of a strategy for setting up the economic union.

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The different agencies of the UMA did a tremendous amount of work in this period in spite of the severe crisis gripping the Arab world. Participants have learned the importance of discussing economic cooperation separately from political and diplomatic questions. They have also become conscious that building a greater Maghreb is a vital issue that should not be jeopardized by international crisis. Although the Gulf conflict disturbed the agenda of the inter-Maghreb meetings and brought to the fore differences as to how to deal with the crisis, it has in essence not affected the process of cooperation within the Maghreb. On the contrary, the crisis, in a way, was helpful in that it convinced all Maghreb members that the building of an effective union required a strategy adapted to an international scene dominated by the law of the strongest.

WHAT CAN THE MAGHREB LEARN FROM THE GULF CRISIS? After the Gulf War the North again activated its "security concerns" with regard to pretended threats coming from the South. The polemic regarding the Algerian Nuclear Program is based on the strategy of laying guilt on the Third World, particularly on the Arab countries. The solidarity and vigilance of the Maghreb countries are all the more essential as the North tries to bar the "forbidden technology" needed by the Maghreb to insure the momentum of its economy. The postwar situation has brought about conditions favorable for the UMA to launch a project of "global security"; this could undo current attempts to "Balkanize the region strategically." But before the UMA can do that, it must coordinate foreign policies of its constituent states. The practically uninterrupted efforts made by Maghreb officials to coordinate their management of the Gulf crisis has undeniably been a plus for the functioning of the UMA. Their diplomacy, however, needed a stronger and better elaborated common stance with regard to the conflict. In this regard they did not really succeed. The Maghreb countries must now come to some joint decisions as to what their "vital interests" are in the international arena. This must be done to insure the viability of their development projects in coming decades.

NOTES 1. This dispute came to the world's attention through Saddam Hussein's speech of July 17, 1990, in which he accused Kuwait of driving oil prices down by surpassing the pumping quota given to them by OPEC in November 1989. He further accused Kuwait of pumping on Iraqi territory.

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2. El Moudjahdid, July 24, 1990. 3. See the declaration of the Algerian Foreign Ministry's spokesperson of August 2, 1990, in El Moudjahdid, August 3 and 4, 1990. 4. See the message of Zine el Abidine Ben Ali to the Tunisian people of August 11, 1990, in Revue Eludes lnternationales (Tunis) 36 (October 1990): 6--8. 5. Speech quoted in Depeche Reuter and in El Moudjahdid, November 21, 1990. 6. El Moudjahdid, September 4, 1990. 7. El Moudjahdid, January 10, 1991. 8. El Moudjahdid, January 27, 1991. 9. See the speech of the Tunisian premier minister on January 23, 1991, in Le Monde, January 25, 1991. 10. This is specifically the position of the Tunisian president, quoted in Nadia Khourky-Dagher and Aziza Argouth-Medimegh, "Why the People of the Streets of Tunisia Support Baghdad," Le Monde Diplomatique (March 1991): 12. 11. Le Monde, November 17, 1990. But Morocco based its "Arab solution" on accepting the Security Council's resolutions and the League of Arab States, which at first was unacceptable to Iraq. 12. Quoted in "La Guerre du Golfe," Liberation collection #3 (September 1990): 26. 13. This document has not been published, but the Algerian foreign minister has revealed the content particularly in an interview in the Saudi daily newspaper, AI Shang AI Awat, quoted in El Moudjahdid, October 6, 1990. 14. Ibid. 15. According to Sid Ahmed Ghozalie in El Moudjahdid, December 20, 1990. 16.1bid. 17. See the final report of the conference in El Moudjahdid, February 22 and 23, 1991. 18. This report has been widely quoted in the Moroccan daily newspaper, Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb, as well as in El Moudjahdid, April 2, 1991. 19. The loss of money from tourist travel has been estimated to be between 40 percent and 50 percent compared to a normal season. Le Monde, February 2, 1991. 20. See the Algerian daily, El Watan, April 23, 1991. 21. This figure was quoted in the report of the ltalo-Arab Chamber of Commerce. 22. This poll was done by Le Cabinet de Prospective Sociale of Tunis between February 4 and 8, 1991. See Khourky-Dagher and Dargouth-Medimegh, "Why the People." 23. See the report of the government advisors, quoted in the daily paper, Le Soir d'Algerie, January 21, 1991. 24. The correspondent of Le Monde en Algerie wrote with regard to this that if the war goes on, the political climate within the country would be likely to deteriorate more by disturbing the fragile equilibrium by which the country lives. See Le Monde en Algerie, February 2, 1991. 25. See Latifa Madani, "Les Marocains preferent Saddam," Algerie-Actualitie 1391 (February 7-13, 1991): 16-17. 26. El Moudjahdid, July 24, 1990.

10

The Roots of U.S. Middle East Policy and the Need for Alternatives STEPHEN ZUNES

Western stereotypes to the contrary, the Arab and Islamic world has not historically been characterized by warfare and violence. Indeed, throughout the past five hundred years North America and Europe have seen far more bloodshed. Much of the conflict and strife for which the Middle East is now known stems from the European colonial era; at its roots are the same sort of problems that are affecting the rest of the Third World. Artificial colonial boundaries, which helped spark the recent Gulf crisis, are but one. The "Third World" problems afflicting the Middle East are: (1) a lack of democratic institutions; (2) a high level of militarism; (3) an enormous gap between the rich and poor, with economies geared more toward exports to wealthy countries than for regional economic development; and (4) the ongoing presence of foreign military forces. Indeed, the Middle East has more dictatorships, more weapons, more inequality, a higher ratio of exports to regional consumption, and a longer history of Western military interventionism than any region in the world. Added to this, (5) the festering Israeli-Palestinian conflict creates a formula for conflict that goes far beyond any culturally based explanation. This chapter seeks to analyze these problem areas in the context of U.S. foreign policy toward the region, particularly regarding the close U.S. relationship with Israel, and suggests alternative policies that would help address the underlying issues. Like any effective demagogue, Iraq's Saddam Hussein was able to take these legitimate concerns-albeit manipulatively and hypocriticallyand use them for his illegitimate ends, giving him the important popular support in the Arab world he needed to force a showdown with the United States during the Gulf War. Therefore, if the United States is interested in long-term stability in the Middle East, U.S. policy must be geared toward addressing the underlying problem areas outlined above; otherwise it will only invite continued instability and embolden future tyrants. Unfortunately, U.S. Middle East policy has not only failed to resolve these areas of conflict, it has exacerbated them.

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THE NEED FOR DEMOCRATIZATION Rather than encouraging democratization, the United States has reducedor maintained at low levels-its economic, military, and diplomatic support to Arab countries that have experienced substantial liberalization in recent years, and increased support for dictatorial regimes such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Morocco. Jordan, for example, received large-scale U.S. support in the 1970s and 1980s despite widespread repression and authoritarian rule. Now that it has become, arguably, the most democratic country in the Arab world-with a relatively free press, opposition political parties, and lively debate in a parliament that wields real political power-the U.S. Congress voted in spring 1991 to cut off all foreign aid. Even Israel, which has the strongest democratic tradition in the Middle East (regarding its own Jewish citizens, at least), has received increased U.S. assistance as its repression in the occupied territories has increased. U.S. occupation forces failed to stop widespread repression, even lynching, of Palestinian residents of Kuwait. Aid to Morocco increased as that country's savage repression in occupied Western Sahara and even within Morocco itself continued unabated. The message to Middle Eastern countries appears to be that democracy is not important to the United States. It is the lack of democratic institutions that encourages acts of aggression, such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In addition, given the growth of democratic movements throughout the Middle East and the likelihood that many of these dictatorships will eventually be overthrown, the built-up resentment against the United States from years of backing repressive regimes will undoubtedly backfire to hurt U.S. interests, either through the imposition of a hostile regime, as in Iran, or the total breakdown of order, as with Somalia. What is needed is a U.S. policy directed toward supporting democratic institutions and movements for political liberalization and reform. These need not be on a Western model: traditional Arab and Islamic means of governance, such as the majlis system-which allows for direct petitioning to authorities and the use of consensus decisionmaking among tribal elders-could evolve into a participatory democratic structure, as has been the case within the Polisario Front of Western Sahara. It was the British who helped ossify the sheikly system and-with U.S. assistance in subsequent years-led the evolution of several Middle Eastern monarchies away from these relatively open traditional governing structures to models more closely resembling bureaucratic authoritarianism. Whereas U.S. support of undemocratic governments in Latin America and Southeast Asia has become more difficult politically, there has been little domestic opposition to U.S. support of similar rulers in the Middle East, aside from their (often exaggerated) potential threat to Israel. As with other Third World regions, it may be up to U.S. human rights activists

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-utilizing information gathered by Middle East Watch, Amnesty International, and other groups-to mobilize solidarity with human rights activists in the Arab world and to pressure administration policy to make support for democratic evolution a criterion for U.S. aid to Middle Eastern governments. The increase in recent years of Middle Eastern organizations concerned with human rights has been impressive.! Although their successes have not been as dramatic as those of their counterparts in Eastern Europe or Latin America, the potential is there, and a high level of international solidarity with such movements could play a major role in their chances of forcing political change.

OVERCOMING MILITARIZATION Rather than encourage demilitarization, the United States has been responsible for the transfers into the region of hundreds of billions of dollars worth of highly sophisticated armaments during the past twenty years, totaling 80 percent of all U.S. arms exports to the Third World. These even included some limited arms shipments to Iraq prior to its invasion of Kuwait and a willingness to allow funds for U.S. agricultural assistance to be transferred for arms purchases elsewhere. Despite these embarrassing revelations, the Bush administration announced plans to substantially increase arms transfers to the region immediately following the Gulf War. During the first year after that conflict, for example, the United States received orders from Middle Eastern countries for as much as $16 billion in military goods.2 Such high levels of militarization raised the threat that these arms may be used, not for legitimate self-defense, but against neighboring states, their own populations, or possibly even Americans. U.S.supplied weapons to Middle Eastern states have been used repeatedly, killing thousands of civilians during Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, and have already killed scores of Americans as well. What is needed is a comprehensive arms control regime for the region. As the largest arms supplier to the Middle East, the United States must take the lead. Given cutbacks in U.S. domestic spending for armaments and the willingness of Middle Eastern states-particularly those with petrodollars-to purchase large amounts of weapons, the temptation to continue the role of arms supplier is high. With the recent failure of the United Nations to act decisively over U.S. objections on this matter, it may be up to popular mobilization within the United States by citizens concerned with the moral and political implications of their country's role as arms merchants to reverse the recent trend. Several congressional resolutions were passed in the wake of the Gulf War that called for limitations in arms exports; however, they included sufficient escape clauses as to render them essentially meaningless. Public opinion polls in the United States

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indicate widespread and growing opposition to the high levels of arms transfers to the Middle East, so there is potential for forcing change from below.

THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC FACTORS Rather than encourage a redistribution of wealth within or between Middle Eastern countries and support mechanisms that would enable the countries' enormous wealth to remain in the region, the United States has opposed the establishment of a regional development bank and has instead encouraged greater investments by oil-rich Middle Eastern states into U.S. banking, real estate, and military industries. As long as relatively few Arabs live in opulent luxury while millions remain malnourished and poverty-stricken, and as long as domestic sustainable development remains limited, any hope of political stability in the Middle East is a fantasy. The identification of a wealthy Arab elite with U.S. interests further breeds anti-U.S. resentment, especially as the awareness of the widespread corruption and decadence of these elites, and their contravention of Islamic values, grows. The 1991 Damascus Declaration among the six monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), along with Syria and Egypt, stressed the national control of resources-in effect, signaling the end of any illusion that the underpopulated oil-rich states would share their wealth with the 90 percent majority in the Arab world that do not have access to such a source of wealth. The rise of the Arab nation-state at the expense of Pan-Arabism, as with the rise of the GCC and the eclipse of the Arab League, culminates years of effort by the West to divide the Arab world. The rush toward a U.S.-led military resolution of the Kuwait crisis and the active resistance by the United States to any Arab-sponsored peace formula helped make this possible. Officials of the Arab Monetary Fund, based in Abu Dhabi, have expressed great disappointment that the United States has effectively blocked the establishment of a Middle East Development Bank. The wealthy Gulf states would contribute a lot more to regional development than they are currently through existing institutions if the United States and other developed countries would share the burden. Without U.S. participation, however, it is unlikely the European Community (EC) or Japan would do so on their own. The officials of the Arab Monetary Fund believe that such a development bank could become exclusively a self-supporting Middle Eastern enterprise within five years if they could count on initial Western support. With settlement of the Palestinian problem, they would even welcome Israeli participation in such regional economic cooperation} As the perceived threat from Iraq and Iran diminishes and the resulting desire for strong military ties with the United States decreases, there

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may be an enhanced ability for more independent thinking within the Arab world regarding economic priorities. As relative U.S. economic influence declines and oil revenues increase, as projected, there may be an opening for a more egalitarian distribution of resources as a rising educated middle class insists on reforms-and the threat of an Islamic reaction remains. Meanwhile, as domestic U.S. demands for a conversion to a peacetime economy may limit the ability or willingness of the United States to project its policies through military means, this may lead to a greater realization that the best way to maintain stability is to encourage a more equitable economic order.

THE U.S. MILITARY ROLE IN THE GULF When the British declared their intention in 1969 to withdraw their military involvement from "east of the Suez," the United States was determined to fill the void. As domestic opposition to the Vietnam War grew, however, the prospects of the United States sending combat troops to this volatile region was not politically feasible. Antiwar sentiment had been curbed in part by the Nixon administration's "Vietnamization" program, in which the reliance on South Vietnamese conscripts and a dramatically increased air war had minimized U.S. casualties. As a result, the Nixon Doctrine (also known as the Guam Doctrine or "surrogate strategy") came into being, in which Vietnamization evolved into a global policy of arming Third World allies to do the intervention for the United States. The Gulf was the primary testing ground, with Iran's Shah-who owed his throne to CIA intervention and had long dreamed of rebuilding the Persian Empire-being a willing participant. Throughout the 1970s, the United States sold tens of billions of highly sophisticated arms to the Shah and sent thousands of U.S. advisors to turn the Iranian armed forces into a sophisticated fighting unit capable of counterinsurgency operations. Such a strategy proved successful when Iranian forces helped crush a leftist insurgency in the southeastern Arabian sultanate of Oman in the mid-1970s. However, this strategy came crashing down in 1979 with Iran's Islamic revolution, inspired in part by the strong U.S. presence in the country and the Shah's penchant for spending on military procurement rather than on internal economic development. The Carter Doctrine came into being in response to the 1979 revolution, with the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Force (later known as the Central Command), which would enable the United States to strike with massive force. This extremely costly effort would enable the United States to fight a war that would rely so heavily on air power, could be over so quickly, and would have such a favorable casualty ratio that popular domestic opposition would not have time to mobilize. This is exactly the scenario for Operation

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Desert Storm. Although the exact circumstances that would lead to such a war were not known, it had in effect been planned for more than a dozen years. It was designed less for strategic reasons than for domestic political impact. For better or worse, it worked well. This has led to the establishment of what, in effect, is the beginning of a permanent U.S. military presence in the Gulf. The financial costs will be extraordinary, and will result in a further strain on the U.S. taxpayer and/or an economic dependence on the oil states themselves, and thus create the awkward position of the U.S. military becoming essentially a mercenary force. The greatest costs may be political, however, as it will likely fuel anti-U.S. extremism, which could create a cycle of violence and intervention. In this sense, current U.S. policy may be self-defeating, and alternative policies will need to be developed. For example, the military threat to the Gulf states posed by Iraq and Iran came into existence only as a result of virtually unrestrained massive arms and technology transfers by the industrialized nations. Now, the U.S. insistence on a foreign military presence, combined with increased arms transfers to Israel and the Arab Gulf states, will only lead in turn to a greater determination by the two large Gulf nations to further militarize. Similarly, on the question of nuclear proliferation, rather than single out any one country's nuclear potential as a rationale for military attack, the United States needs to rescind its opposition to the establishment of a nuclear-free zone-a principle accepted by every Middle Eastern country except Israel, which already possesses a nuclear arsenal developed with no apparent U.S. objections. The United States for a number of years has also maintained a nuclear force of its own in the Middle East, leading many Arabs to see U.S. calls for nonproliferation as hypocritical. The U.S. attitude that nuclear weapons in the Middle East should be the exclusive domain of Israel and the United States will not encourage nonproliferation, but will instead result in a rush to counter a perceived U.S.-Israeli threat, as has been demonstrated by Iraq's ambitious nuclear program.

THE U.S.-ISRAELI ALLIANCE The cornerstone of U.S. policy in the Middle East has been its relationship with Israel. Few people familiar with the region believe that a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is possible until the national rights of both Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs are recognized. Despite taking on the role of the chief mediator in the conflict, the United States is virtually alone in the world community in its refusal to support such a two-state solution. The United States refuses to even negotiate with the Palestinian government-in-exile, led by the Palestine Liberation Organization, which is recognized by the vast majority of Palestinians as their representative and has

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been formally recognized by 117 nations. The United States also refuses to make its large-scale economic and military assistance to Israel conditional on honoring international law, human rights, or UN Security Council resolutions. The United States has repeatedly cast its veto to prevent the United Nations from taking effective action against ongoing Israeli violations of international law and UN resolutions. Popular support for the Palestinian cause is widespread in the Middle East, and the U.S. support of Israeli intransigence and repression makes possible opportunistic attacks by Arab dictators against U.S. interests and even against Israel's very right to exist. The unprecedented diplomatic, economic, and military support of Israel by the United States has been well documented. However, many observers attribute this simply to domestic politics. As I have argued elsewhere, this assumes a degree of pluralism in U.S. foreign policy decisionmaking that does not, in fact, exist. 4 The primary reason for the direction of U.S. policy is the role Israel plays for the United States. Israel has successfully prevented victories by radical nationalist movements in Lebanon, Jordan, and Yemen, as well as in Palestine. It has kept Syria, for many years an ally of the former Soviet Union, in check. Israel's air force is predominant throughout the region. Israel's frequent wars have provided battlefield testing for U.S. arms, often against Soviet weapons. They have been a conduit for U.S. arms to regimes and movements too unpopular in the United States to openly grant direct military assistance, such as South Africa, Iran, Guatemala, and the Nicaraguan Contras. Israeli military advisors have assisted the Contras, the Salvadoran junta, and foreign occupation forces in Namibia and Western Sahara. Their secret service has assisted the United States in intelligence gathering and covert operations. Israel has missiles capable of reaching the former Soviet Union and has cooperated with the U.S. military-industrial complex with research and development for new jet fighters, antimissile defense systems, and even the Strategic Defense Initiative. As a result, the United States has been encouraging some of the more chauvinistic and militaristic elements in the Israeli government, undermining the last vestiges of Labor Zionism's commitment to socialism, nonalignment, and cooperation with the Third World. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger put it, "Israel's obstinacy ... serves the purposes of both our countries best."5 The rise of the right in Israel is in large part due to this large-scale U.S. support. Israeli politicians such as Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Shamir, and Ariel Sharon would certainly exist without U.S. support, but they would likely be part of a small right-wing minority in the Knesset. No one with those kinds of policies could last very long in office, given the self-defeating effect of such militarization on economic well-being or in terms of international isolation, were they not supported to such a degree that they did not have to worry about the consequences of their policies on their own population.

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In reality, the problems with U.S. Middle East policy are not that unfamiliar. The biases so evident in U.S. policy toward Israel are a result of the same kind of thinking that has plagued U.S. policy elsewhere. As Ron Young observed in his study, Missed Opportunities for Peace, the same worldview-an obsession with military solutions to political problems, the underestimation of the power of popular movements, the tendency to see everything in an East-West perspective, and the insistence on unilateral initiatives-has dominated U.S. policy toward Israel and the Middle East as well.6 The myth of Middle East exceptionalism in U.S. foreign policy has made the widespread dissemination and discussion of critiques of that policy even more difficult than that of other issues. What is needed instead is a fresh approach that recognizes the shortsightedness of U.S. policy and the importance of finding new alternatives.

RAMIFICATIONS OF POLICIES AND CONCLUSION One of the more unsettling aspects of U.S. policy toward Israel is how closely it corresponds with historic anti-Jewish oppression. Throughout Europe in past centuries, the ruling class of a given country would, in return for granting limited religious and cultural autonomy, set up certain individuals in the Jewish community to become the visible agents of the oppressive social order, such as tax collectors and money lenders. When the population would threaten to rise up against the ruling class, the rulers could then blame the Jews, sending the wrath of an exploited people against convenient scapegoats, resulting in the pogroms and other notorious waves of repression that have taken place throughout the Jewish Diaspora. The idea behind Zionism was to break this cycle through the creation of a Jewish nation-state, where Jews would no longer be dependent on the ruling class of a given country. The tragic irony is that as a result of Israel's unwillingness or inability to make peace with its Arab neighbors the creation of Israel has perpetuated this cycle on a global scale, with Israel being used by Western imperialist powers-initially Great Britain and France and more recently the United States-to maintain their interests in the Middle East. Therefore, one finds autocratic Arab governments and other Third World regimes blaming "Zionism" for their problems rather than the broader exploitative global economic system and their own elites who benefit from and help perpetuate such a system. The ramifications of U.S. policy are quite apparent when it comes to the suffering of Palestinians, Lebanese, and other Arabs. But they also have a negative impact on Israel. The respected Israeli intellectual Ishawa Leibowitz has noted The existence of the Jewish people of 60 to 80 generations ... was a heroic situation. We never got from the goyish world a cent. We

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supported ourselves. We maintained our own institutions. Now we have taken three million Jews, gathered them here and turned them over to be parasites-parasites of America. And in some sense we are even the mercenaries of America to fight the wars of American interests, or what the ruling persons in American consider to be American interests.7

. Many leftist Zionists point out that Israel's dependency on the United States violates the principle of nonalignment, once a cornerstone of Labor Zionism. They fear that Israel's close ties with the United States alienate Israel's potential allies in the Third World and leave Israel vulnerable to the whims of U.S. foreign policy. Like the Jews of medieval Europe, they fear Israel could be suddenly abandoned by the West after being set up to become the visible agent of an oppressive world order. The large amount of U.S. aid to the Israeli government has not been particularly beneficial to Israel. Indeed, it is striking that such a huge infusion of capital to such a small country has not led to any real economic growth. This is in large part because the economic aid has gone primarily to finance nonproductive sectors, such as the settlements in the occupied territories and the military, as well as to finance loan repayments to U.S. banks. In addition, the $1.8 billion in annual military aid is in fact simply a credit line to U.S. arms manufacturers, and actually ends up costing Israel two to three times that amount to train operators, to staff and maintain, to procure spare parts, and other related costs. The overall impact is to increase Israeli economic and military dependency on the United States and to drain Israel's fragile economy .s Matti Peled, a retired Israeli major general, reported that as far as he can tell, the $1.8 billion figure was arrived at "out of thin air."9 Such a figure is far more than Israel needs to replenish stocks, is not apparently related directly to any specific security requirements, and has remained relatively constant in recent years, thereby reinforcing the impression that it is little more than a U.S. government subsidy for U.S. arms manufacturers. This benefit to U.S. defense contractors is multiplied by the fact that every major arms transfer to Israel creates a new demand by Arab states-most of which can pay hard currency through petrodollars-for additional U.S. weapons to challenge Israel. The resulting arms race is a bonanza for U.S. arms manufacturers. As a result, Peled questions the role of pro-Israel groups as a major factor in U.S. foreign aid, going as far as to say, "If it weren't for the Jewish lobby, the U.S. government would have to invent them."IO Indeed, given that such subsidies for major U.S. corporations are not popular with the U.S. public, the pro-Israel lobby is a convenient excuse. It is a timehonored tradition for elites in Western societies to avoid taking responsibility for unpopular decisions, particularly regarding the misallocation of public resources, by blaming the Jews. As A.F.K. Organski observed,

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The belief that the Jewish lobby ... is very powerful has permitted top U.S. policy makers to use "Jewish influence" or "domestic politics" to explain the policies ... that U.S. leaders see as working to U.S. advantage, policies they would pursue regardless of Jewish opinion on the matter. When Arab leaders or officials of allies protest, U.S. officials need give only a helpless shrug, a regretful sigh, and explain how it is not the administration's fault, but that policy makers must operate within the constraints imposed by powerful domestic pressures molding congressional decisions. Presidents, and those who speak in their names, have followed this strategy time and time again. Congressmen employ this same device.ll

What has resulted, then, is a new kind of dependency between two advanced technological societies in which the smaller dependent country is widely perceived to be the exploiter in the bilateral relationship. In essence, Israelis are also victims of U.S. policy. Like El Salvador and South Vietnam, Israel is becoming a client state where a tiny rightwing elite has made common cause with U.S. global designs that could ultimately lead to the country's self-destruction. While the Israeli government certainly deserves criticism for its policies, it must be seen within the context of its alliance with the United States. Not only is this a more accurate picture of the situation, but it makes it easier for Palestinians and other critics of Israeli policy to ally with progressive Zionists to work for peace and justice independent of outside interference. Only when Israel sees its future with the Third World-made necessary by its geography, its linguistic and cultural roots, its majority Sephardic population, and the Jews' history of exploitation by the Europeans-will Israel end its isolation and find the real security that it has been missing. Many of the so-called "supporters of Israel" in U.S. politics are actually making Israel vulnerable by tying its future to a declining Western imperial order and blocking its more natural alliance with the world's Afro-Asian majority.12 Israeli leaders and their counterparts in many U.S. Zionist organizations are repeating the historic error of choosing short-term benefits for their people at the risk of long-term security. This cycle can be broken only when current U.S. policy is effectively challenged and Israelis and Arabs are finally allowed to settle their differences among themselves and join together in liberating the Middle East from both Western imperialism and their own autocratic rulers. Israeli technological advances, particularly regarding agricultural development in an arid region, are among the most significant in the world. The highly educated and skilled Palestinian work force has had a major influence throughout the Middle East and beyond. The surplus of capital from the oil-rich Gulf states needs more productive investment opportunities. With peace, the combination of Israeli technology, Palestinian industriousness, and Arabian oil wealth could result in an economic, political,

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and social transformation of the Middle East that would be highly beneficial to the inhabitants of the region and beyond.l3 The Middle East, given its rich human and material resources, could be a model for sustainable autonomous development for the Third World.l4 Only through such economic interdependence, where the Israelis would necessarily play a key role, can Israel find the security it has been lacking. Economic stability and demilitarization, in turn, would greatly encourage trends for democratization, and because this kind of development would be based more on domestic priorities, it would also curb the more reactionary forms of Islamic revivalism that have built upon the massive dislocation and inequalities from development strategies built upon the exigencies of Western capital. Such a scenario would not likely appeal to certain elites in the United States and other Western nations, who profit enormously from the continued divisions between these Semitic peoples. It would be overly simplistic to imply that this is part of some grand conspiracy by Western capitalists to divide and rule the Middle East; however, the policies of the United States and some European powers have directly resulted in a regional system that greatly benefits Western oil companies, arms manufacturers, and national security elites at the expense of the region's population. Although it is doubtful that U.S. foreign policy toward the region is calculated with such a sinister goal in mind, given the forces that benefit from such policies in the Middle East and elsewhere, it might also be more than just coincidence. There is a strong temptation in the West to blame the peoples of the Middle East for their problems rather than to see how past and current policies by the United States and other major powers have created or exacerbated them. This tendency has led to an often paternalistic view that the United States needs to intervene to set things right, when, in fact, such intervention has tended to make matters worse or, at best, to partially rectify problems that had their origins in previous actions by Western powers. Not only is U.S. policy wrong in an ethical sense, but it is simply unworkable. It is not only harmful for the inhabitants of the region, but, in the long-term, damaging to U.S. interests as well. Current U.S. policy increases the prospects of terrorism and puts future diplomatic initiatives, as well as economic and cultural exchanges, at risk. Public opinion polls that indicate popular support for U.S. Middle East policy do not mean that most people in the United States support that policy. It merely means that they support what they think that policy is. Most actually believe their government's rhetoric that the United States supports democracy, international law, demilitarization, economic development, and Israeli-Palestinian peace. The challenge for North Americans is to expose the real nature of U.S. policy and to work for change, as was done regarding Vietnam, Central America, and southern Africa. The mobilization of a popular movement for peace and justice in the Middle East that avoids the ideological

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divisiveness that has often limited the effectiveness of such efforts up to this point may be the best hope for changing U.S. policy. The challenge for Arabs and Israelis is to recognize that their long-term interests are in allying with each other, encouraging democratization and self-determination, sharing their wealth and technical expertise, and rejecting efforts by the United States and other Western countries to impose a Pax Americana or any other form of domination. The United Nations could be a vehicle for this-and is a far more workable alternative than U.S. unilateralismbut only if members of the UN Security Council are willing to challenge the efforts by the United States or any other power to use the United Nations for their own narrow policy agenda. The emphasis on bilateral negotiations, as with those at Camp David, is a divide-and-rule tactic designed to further weaken Arab unity and to create increased dependency on the United States. Instead, talks should be under the auspices of the United Nations or some other neutral international body, should invite all concerned parties to choose their own representatives, should start on the premise of guaranteeing the right of national self-determination for both Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs within secure borders, and should work for a comprehensive settlement worked out jointly by the participants. The imposition of economic sanctions against those unwilling to cooperate should be an available option. For centuries, Western powers have tried to impose an order on the Middle East that is beneficial to their own narrow strategic, economic, and ideological imperatives. At times, by pitting Middle Eastern peoples against each other, they have been successful. However, such internal conflicts have often gotten out of hand and threatened the very stability these Western powers sought to put into place. These efforts of Western domination have always ended in failure and carried enormous human costs. Just such a scenario may be in process today. It is imperative that those interested in peace building in the Middle East seek to speed the end of such domination in a way that will minimize bloodshed and create a foundation for a just and lasting peace.

NOTES 1. One of the more prominent regional groups is the Arab Organization for Human Rights (AOHR), based in Cairo and Geneva, which has separate country groups in Egypt, Kuwait, Algeria, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan. There are also national human rights groups: Tunisia's League for Human Rights, recently banned by the government, was established in 1977 and other groups were active in Algeria prior to the recent crackdown there. In 1989, the AOHR joined with the Tunisian government, the Tunisian League for Human Rights, the Arab Lawyers Union (a regional organization founded in 1956 and based in Egypt), and the UN Center for Human Rights to establish the region's first Arab Institute for Human Rights to train human rights workers and disseminate information.

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Human rights groups also work with local media, bar associations, trade unions, university groups, and women's and children's groups, which often set up separate human rights committees. The General Federation of Labor's Section on Education has organized conferences on teaching human rights. These groups have set up important logistical and intellectual support from academic and quasi-academic institutions, including the Arab Thought Forum in Amman, the Center for Arab Unity Studies in Beirut and Cairo, the Thought and Dialogue Forum in Morocco, and the Third World Forum in Cairo. These groups and their concerns, in turn, are often supported by outside nongovernmental organizations such as Amnesty International, Middle East Watch, Amideast, the International Commission of Jurists, Article 19, and the Minority Rights Group. In addition, the Ford Foundation and other groups support human rights centers and programs for concerned Arabs in both Europe and the Middle East. 2. Joint hearings of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittees on arms control and on Europe and the Middle East, March 24, 1992. Figures taken from testimony by Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs Regina! Bartholomew and questioning by Rep. Lee Hamilton. This includes $11 billion for the Foreign Military Assistance program plus $3 to $5 billion in commercial sales. Subsequently, arms transfers have continued to rise dramatically. 3. Based on a series of interviews in Abu Dhabi, January 1992. 4. See Stephen Zunes, "Factors Shaping the U.S.-Israeli Alliance," New Political Science 21-22 (Spring-Summer 1992): 91-116, for a detailed discussion of this argument. 5. Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), p. 621. 6. Ronald Young, Missed Opportunities for Peace: U.S. Middle East Policy 1981-1986 (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 1988). 7. lshawa Leibowitz, interview, Public Broadcasting System, 1987. 8. It is noteworthy that in the development of a new antimissile defense system for Israel, the United States insisted that it be mobile, despite the Israeli preference for a cheaper and simpler fixed system, which would have been quite adequate for their small territory. 9. Matti Peled, interview, Seattle, Washington, May 12, 1992. 10. Ibid. 11. A.F.K. Organski, Thirty-Five Billion Dollar Bargain Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 28. 12. Even the Gulf War may have been, in the long term, a strategic setback for Israel, as it has more firmly allied Israel-in the minds of millions of Arabs-with the Western powers and unpopular Arab monarchies. 13. Indeed, Israel's development programs in sub-Saharan Africa prior to the souring of relations following the 1967 war were outstanding models of appropriate technology transfers and other forms of foreign assistance. 14. For example, even problems such as water resources could be handled by the construction and operation of desalination plants. Such facilities are currently considered too costly, yet they could become far more affordable if capital were redirected from military procurement.

11

World Order Conceptions and the Peace Process in the Middle East RICHARD FALK

The undertaking of this chapter is simple: a comparison of two orientations to a peace process for the core antagonism (Israeli/Palestinian) in the Middle East. The first orientation is so dominant as to crowd out other perspectives, accepting the capacity and goodwill of official elites to agree upon a conflict-resolving process; let us consider this approach "peacefrom-above." In contrast is a second orientation that stresses the relevance of well-being of the peoples affected and of an emergent ethos associated with the activities and horizons of transnational social forces; let us consider this "peace-from-below." The argument of this chapter is that there are severe shortcomings associated with the prevalent first orientation and that the second orientation deserves greater attention, especially given the hard facts of the long, anguished Israeli/Palestinian struggle.! Rarely in conflict situations are guiding assumptions about world order made explicit. This is an aspect of the realist hold on the political imagination, which applies often as much to academic discourse as to the ebb and flow of diplomacy.2 The presumed background of conflict-resolving diplomacy continues to be premised on relative bargaining strength rather than comparative equity or assessments of human effects. What is "realistic" is interpreted primarily by reference to power variables. These variables include the perceived capabilities of the parties themselves, as well as their ability to reinforce their claims through alliance with others. Realism in this ideological sense is derived from the fundamental suppositions of the modern project, which bases its confidence in human capacity to control chaos by the application of reason.3 It is reason that underpins technological innovation, which enables greater control, or at least illusions of control. Military technology, then, is the hard currency of this view of human destiny, with weaponry of mass destruction being both the fulfillment of this Promethean dream and a demonic threat to the survival of humanity. Realism, not surprisingly, plays out in geopolitics by way of a two-tier world in relation to nuclear weaponry: the guardian states (of

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nuclear weapons) and the ordinary states. The latter are forbidden such weaponry, whereas the former retain the weaponry without even accepting serious limitations on their discretion to threaten and use it. What, it may be asked, have such comments to do with a peace process in the Middle East? The unsatisfying answer is everything (the grammar of power) and nothing (the syntax of negotiations).4 Perceptions of strength and interest are at the core of the realist calculus. Hence,· if the relative capabilities of the two sides are not perceived in a congruent manner, then even agreement based on relative capabilities is not reachable, as no consensus as to what is "reasonable" is likely to emerge. Closely related here is what the now embattled tycoon Donald Trump calls "the art of the deal," altering perceptions in one's favor by way of bluff, intimidation, side payments, and overall negotiating style. In world-order terminology, conflict resolution involving issues that are substantively and symbolically vital occurs within the Westphalian template of sovereign states, as conditioned in crucial respects by the manipulations of geopolitics.s It is on this basis that Israel, as an established state with a strong military capability and record as well as powerful U.S. backing, can be said to hold most of the cards with respect to negotiating "a peace" with the Palestinians. Israel is a state, the PLO is not, and this single dimension of status has given Israel extraordinary leverage in relation to the character of negotiations-what might be described as Israel's "Westphalian advantage." This Westphalian advantage enables Israel to shape political discourse largely in its favor, treating its ongoing recourse to violence as part of the legitimate security function of the state while stigmatizing far lower levels of Palestinian violence (and even nonviolent modes of collective resistance) as "terrorism." This discourse control, in turn, lends a kind of polemical plausibility to Israel's refusal to deal with the most legitimate Palestinian representatives and political organization, contending that it will not negotiate with "terrorists."6 It is an expression of the Palestinian sense of their own weakness that they have been compelled to accept this invalidation of their own expression of self-governance, the PLO, as a negotiating partner in the Middle East peace process.? Another illustration of discourse control is the treatment of Israel's initiative in 1991 immediately following Labor's electoral victory. In response to a temporary freeze on expansion of "political settlements" in the occupied territories, then Secretary of State James Baker immediately praised Israeli authorities, called on the Arab side to take a corresponding step, and, as a reward, the U.S. government proceeded to go ahead with the $10 billion loan guarantees sought by Israel to defray costs of further Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union. In literal terms what Israel agreed to do at the time was to suspend the expansion of settlements and the initiation of new ones, but it needs to be recalled that the very existence of settlements

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is widely agreed to be flagrantly illegal by reference to the law of belligerent occupation.s Since when does partially and provisionally agreeing to stop international law violations that have been persistently condemned by the UN Security Council entitle a country to diplomatic rewards? And when did the PLO receive corresponding credit and rewards for its renunciation of terrorism and its curtailment of violence against civilians, along with its shift of policy that included the geographical confinement of struggle to the areas in contention? The media reinforces these contradictory perceptions that regard Israeli conduct by one set of criteria and Palestinian conduct by another.9 The Westphalian/geopolitical character of this invalidation is plain: The PLO is certainly as representative of the Palestinian people as is the Israeli government of the Israeli people; the violent tactics of the Israelis are more extensive and no more respectful of civilian innocence, international law, and the authority of the United Nations than have been Palestinian tactics. Thus, the exclusion of the PLO from the negotiating process cannot be convincingly explained by principled legal or moral considerations. This conclusion is not affected by the further observation that the "acceptable" (to Israel) Palestinian representatives at the peace process have turned out to be surprisingly effective, arguably more so than would have been their probable PLO counterparts; it would be no more relevant than to point out that Israel might itself have been more effectively represented in the early phases of the peace process by moderate diplomats not drawn from Likud ranks or subject to extremist guidelines. The manipulations of geopolitics have been of decisive importance to the Israeli-Palestinian interplay over the years, and even more so to the wider Arab-Israeli relationship. The rejection of the UN partition of the Palestinian Mandate in 1948 by Arab countries reflected widely shared perceptions that a Jewish homeland was being imposed on the region by colonial, Christian, European forces. But this attempted rejection of Israel was completely stymied by the military and diplomatic success of the Jewish settlers, by the ineptitude of Arab military efforts, and by successful Israeli terrorist tactics designed to frighten Palestinians. As the balance shifted in Israel's favor from war to war, Arab perceptions adjusted unevenly, and perhaps unreliably, to the realities of power, an adjustment encouraged by geopolitical forces led by the United States. But as Israel's position improved so its claims and ambitions expanded, and what was acceptable to Israeli leadership at an early stage of perceived weakness became totally unacceptable later on.'O The play of opposed forces since 1948 has been immensely complex and confusing.'! Israel could, as the years went by, increasingly count on the virtually unconditional support of the U.S. government for its basic view of the conflict. The PLO countered with an effort to mobilize global diplomatic support, with some notable success in the South and in some European countries. The internal

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developments on both sides were important, as well: Israel's turn to Likud leadership and the Palestinian struggle on the ground that culminated in the intifada. Two more recent geopolitical developments seem relevant to the realist calculus of negotiating prospects: the end of the Cold War and the associated Soviet geopolitical withdrawal from the region, which thereby removed a partial offset to predominant U.S. influence; but complexity abounds. With the collapse of a global strategic rivalry in the region, Israel also loses some of its geopolitical value, which had been generally rising since 1967 (and especially after the collapse of the Shah's power in 1979), as ally and asset of the United States.l2 Yet the line of conjecture goes on in light of new challenges to U.S. hegemony. If Islamic fundamentalism sweeps forward anew, threatening Western hegemony in the Gulf, Israel's usefulness would undoubtedly rise rapidly.J3 The second area of uncertainty is in the policy outlook on the part of the political leadership of the key actors, especially Israel and the United States. Rabin's replacement of Shamir as a result of the June 1992 elections is being widely treated as greatly improving peace prospects (a Ia Westphalia, that is, state-to-state). Again there are darkening clouds in such a sky. With Bush no longer president, the Palestinians are confronting a political leadership in Washington far less prepared to put pressure on the Israelis. And might not the Palestinians, confronted by this prospect, swallow an offer that gives them no more than a nominal, sharply circumscribed form of self-government, partly to avoid the desperation of the status quo? The shift in leadership within the United States as a result of the 1992 elections discloses the precariousness of the Westphalian approach to diplomatic negotiations. The Clinton administration has already confirmed its unwillingness to exert even the modest gradient of pressure on Israel that had been applied by George Bush and James Baker, which itself was grossly insufficient if the objective was to establish parity between the two sides. It is not the purpose of this chapter to delve into these complexities of substantive interpretation, but only to address the issues of the PalestinianIsrael antagonism~onceptually and schematically, and as metaphor for the relationship of the region to the larger hegemonic structures of world order. My conclusion is this: What is known as the Middle East peace process is being carried forward under the sway of Westphalian/geopolitical ideas and practices, thereby privileging state actors (as opposed toothers) and associating "realism" primarily with perceived power relations, including the will and interests of ascendent geopolitical elites. The extent of this realist dominance is exhibited by the reluctance of most radical critics of geopolitics to approach an ongoing conflict of this sort in other than realist terms, partly, to be sure, because the diplomatic participants on all sides tend to be realists. Thus, for instance, to interpose a Gandhian stress

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on nonviolence and reconciliation as the basis for conflict resolution would be to place oneself outside the domain of serious commentary, and would probably not even engage the Palestinian side, except possibly as a pragmatic tactic. Yet it is important to appreciate that the "costs" of relevance include becoming a meek accessory to Westphalian geopolitics, as well as its affirmation of statism, war-making, and governance in accordance with strength and will-in effect, succumbing to despair about the future.14 What is excluded from this Westphalian framework is also, or perhaps especially, revealing. The most notable exclusion is any explicit consideration of the impact of alternative negotiating outcomes on the well-being of the peoples whose fate is being determined. The Westphalian/geopolitical optic is doggedly abstract. A different orientation would immediately arise if the focus of a peace process acted as if people mattered, to recall Roy Preiswerk's poignant plea (to international relations theorists, itself a reworking of Fritz Schumacher's famous indictment of economists).l5 The peace process would then be by its very nature symmetrical, emphasizing security and dignity for both sets of peoples. Of course, there would still be ample controversy arising from opposed perceptions among participants based on differing identities and experience, but the Westphalian exclusionary rules would no longer work against the representation of the Palestinian people, and the strategic games associated with military power and oil would no longer be permissible. At another level, abandoning, or even moderating, Westphalian geopolitics would also help focus the negotiating process on the conditions of enduring peace, rather than on merely persuading the parties at the table to reach agreement. At this stage of public consciousness, virtually any agreement that emerged from negotiations would be celebrated as "peace." Such an attitude forgets the Versailles experience. A hard peace may be no peace at all. To coerce the Palestinians to swallow a humiliating arrangement for partial autonomy is to practice hardball geopolitics, not peace making, the healing of wounds, the reconciling of grievances by sharing what is at stake. Unless equals are treated equally, injustice is generated or perpetuated.l6 A moral premise of my perceptions is that the Israelis and the Palestinians should be regarded as essentially equals when it comes to sharing what had been in British colonial days the Palestinian mandate. The UN partition image was based on such a rough sense of equality. Such a refocusing of the peace process would bear directly on Palestinian representation in negotiations, the status of any Palestinian homeland, the rights of return of the Palestinian exile communities, and the future of Jerusalem. We are comparing, then, two contrasting conceptions of world order: • a realist orientation that seeks to translate asymmetries of power and influence among states (or their diplomatic equivalent) into a negotiated agreement;

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• a global civil society orientation committed to identifying and realizing human rights and democracy on behalf of the peoples concerned, and to evolving a practical conception of the human interest capable of addressing wider regional and global concerns.17 The realist "soiution" would most probably center upon Israel relenting to the extent of terminating the expansion of settlements in the occupied territories and conferring autonomy in the form of Palestinian domestic governance over the West Bank and Gaza, Israeli retention of water rights and security zones in the Palestinian territories, and strictly enforced permanent Palestinian demilitarization and neutralization. Such a Palestinian homeland would be presented as a significant improvement over the present circumstances of oppressive occupation, but it would fall far short of Palestinian/Israeli parity with respect to diplomatic status and completeness of self-determination, and would undoubtedly sow seeds of discord among the Palestinians at the moment of their supposed "victory." Denial of statehood, disqualification of PLO legitimacy, and refusal to share formal and substantive control over Jerusalem would be among the most anguishing expressions of Palestinian subordination. In relation to the Arab countries, a regional solution would involve Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights in return for their demilitarization and some kind of guaranteed Arab access to Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem. Such a solution would strike a compromise between Palestinian rights of self-determination and Arab territorial grievances on the one side and Israeli anxieties and position of strength on the other. Economic rewards along the lines of the payoffs made to Israel and Egypt for reaching agreement at Camp David are also likely to encourage a negotiated agreement, particularly in view of Israeli and Palestinian needs. The global civil society "solution" is oriented toward the mutual wellbeing of the peoples involved, which would suggest two homelands with the same status and shared responsibility in relation to Jerusalem. In the wider setting of regional conflict, the approach would be one of drastic demilitarization and dramatic economic cooperation on the regional basis, as well as an emphasis on democratization and human rights. Historical and geographical factors would have to be taken into account early in this kind of organic peace process-Israel's distrust of Arab intentions would have to be dissipated through time and by concrete steps; also, the isolation of Israel within an Arab-Islamic region would have to be overcome by way of building an interlinked community based on trade, investment, cultural ex~ change, tourism, and a gradual opening of borders. Expressing these two contrasting images of a peace process for the Middle East has a further implication: The Westphalian/geopolitical path that is currently generally presented as the peace process can lead only in the direction of a realist solution; the global civil society path would insist,

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first of all, on a peace process shaped at every stage by representatives of societal forces that were committed to a nonviolent one-world community as a vision of an attainable postgeopolitical type of world order; such areorientation could become possible only after a series of democratizing moves within the Middle East and in the United States-developments that would give a far greater salience than is now imaginable to human rights, nonviolence, and demilitarization as policy priorities. Of course, the discussion of peace for the region by reference to these two contrasting paths is meant to be heuristic. There is considerable room for maneuver on each path, including their partial fusion, and there are a number of additional paths that might be explored. To advocate the global civil society approach is meant to be "utopian," but to affirm the realist approach is to conspire with "dysutopian" forces. This choice between the unattainable and the unacceptable embodies the contemporary world order dilemma, most poignantly manifest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Also, the focus on the Israeli-Palestinian agenda is not meant to suggest that other peace-related concerns in the Middle East are not critical, including problems associated with Northern penetration and domination; with a misappropriation of revenues from oil; with the construction of a regime for developing, conserving, and sharing water; with the promotion of democratizing tendencies and the protection of human rights; with religious tolerance; and with the abatement of regional conflict among other states. A peace process for the region must necessarily encompass this entire range of issues generative of collective violence, political and religious repression, and human misery.

NOTES 1. One of these hard facts is the inequality of the parties, and the insistence by Israel, as the stronger party, to define the terms of peace in a manner that encroaches upon conditions of self-esteem of the weaker party. Another is the partisan orientation of the United States, at once Israel's strongest, indispensable ally and supporter, and simultaneously the peace-making third party that acts as a guide to both sides. An outstanding study of the U.S. relationship to the conflict is George W. Ball and Douglas B. Ball, The Passionate Attachment: America's Involvement with Israel, 1947 to the Present (New York: Norton, 1992). For an excellent earlier account, see Cheryl A. Ruben berg, Israel and the American National Interest (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1986). 2. For a critique of realism, see Richard Falk, "Theory, Realism, and World Security," in Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas (eds.), World Security: Trends and Challenges at Century's End (New York: St. Martin's, 1991), pp. 6-24. 3. For a depiction of the modern project as it applies to the global setting, see Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (New York: The Free Press, 1990); Richard Falk, Explorations at the Edge of Time (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), esp. pp. 1-51.

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4. Put differently, the structure of current world order establishes the conditions, but each set of circumstances is a concrete enactment, with even personality playing a role. For instance, a given leader may be able to facilitate or obstruct "progress," but not without regard to the limits imposed by structural factors. 5. See Richard Falk, "The Western State System," World Order Studies Program Occasional Paper no. 23 (Princeton, N.J.: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1992), pp. 1-32. 6. This plausibility is more apparent than genuine, more a feature of the U.S.-Israeli political landscape than a dimension of the global setting. Actually the PLO has been recognized by more than a hundred countries, and Palestinian entitlement to a state of their own is affirmed by an overwhelming consensus, including within the United Nations. 7. A PLO state is definitely the embodiment of the Palestinian aspiration for self-determination, as well as their normative image of an "imagined community" fulfilling national identity. 8. In Article 49 of the Geneva Convention IV on the Protection of Civilians in Times of War (1949) the following clear language describes the legal situation: "The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies." For the text, see Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff (eds.), Documents on the Law of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 272-337, at 289. 9. Perhaps an even stronger instance involves the deportation of 415 Palestinians from the West Bank without any due process and in violation of the law of belligerent occupation. For language forbidding "deportations of protected persons" from occupied territory, see Roberts and Guelff, Documents on the Law of War, p. 288. Despite a unanimous condemnation of the Israeli move, there was a willingness to accept Israel's agreement to allow one hundred of those expelled to return. Such a gesture was accepted as compliance at the very time that the UN Security Council was demanding 100 percent compliance by Iraq with the resolutions associated with the Gulf War. 10. An insightful critique of foundational Israeli thinking is contained in Simha Flapan, The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities (New York: Pantheon, 1987); Edward W. Said, The Question of Palestine (New York: Random House, 1979). 11. See Ball and Ball, The Passionate Attachment; Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest. 12. During the Gulf crisis, Israel arguably was perceived as a burden on the fashioning of an effective response to Iraqi aggression. The U.S. strategy depended on mobilizing the support of several anti-Israeli Arab governments in the region, including Syria and Iran. Such a process depended on excluding Israel as a belligerent partner despite Iraq's deliberate provocation in the form of Scud missile attacks. Israel was, in effect, paid to remain on the sidelines. 13. For an analysis of the U.S. relationship to Israel in light of its regional interests, see Richard Falk, "Can US Policy Toward the Middle East Change Course?" Middle East Journal41 (1993): 11-70. 14. Fundamentalist Islam can be understood as a reaction to such despair on the part of the Arab masses. 15. See Roy Preiswerk, "Could We Study International Relations as if People Mattered?" in Richard Falk, Samuel S. Kim, and Saul H. Mendlovitz (eds.), Toward a Just World Order (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 175-197. 16. For elaboration of this line of reasoning, see Falk, "Can U.S. Policy." 17. Depicted more fully in Falk, "Theory, Realism, and World Security."

12

Strategic Balance and Disarmament in the Middle East ALI

E. HILLAL DESSOUKI

The Middle East is often described as the most armed region in the Third World. Its states have been the leading element in arms trade for the last two decades. Its conflicts led to a number of wars, the last of which in 1991 was, minus the use of nuclear weapons, an image of what the Third World War could have looked like. The region is a case study of arms races, arms industrialization, and arms limitations or disarmament. The Middle Eastern experience could be helpful in understanding why different states go to war or get involved in arms races, in what circumstances they accept disarmament, and what the interplay or trade-offs are between military and political factors in the process.

THE STRATEGIC BALANCE: LEGACY OF THE PAST The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and the subsequent events leading to war shattered the previous strategic balance and opened the way for a new one. Today the region witnesses a dual process of a new arms race and a new search for a comprehensive peaceful settlement to its conflicts, including arms control arrangements. These developments are better understood in the context of the strategic situation in the region by the late 1990s, which was characterized by four main features: 1. The region is home to a number of interstate and intrastate conflicts that find their origins in ethnic, communal, religious, and sectarian fragmentation. It also harbors the most long-standing conflicts of the twentieth century: the Palestine question and the Arab-Israeli conflict. In addition, there is the Iraq-Iran conflict and there are conflict zones in Lebanon, the Sudan, North Africa, and the horn of Africa. These conflicts had their authentic causes but additionally they were fueled by the availability of oil money, the Cold War

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environment, and the absence of viable regional institutions for conflict management and regulation. 2. These conflicts led to a number of arms races in the region. In the 1980s, thanks to the Iran-Iraq war, the Middle East arms market expanded and new arms suppliers joined it. Moreover, a number of regional states already have formidable indigenous arms industries. According to the 1990 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook, among the leading fifteen exporters of major weapons to the Third World during the period 1989-1990, Israel ranked tenth and Egypt fourteenth.! Thus, whether one considers military expenditures as a percentage of government spending or the percentage of population in uniform, or considers the extent of arms procurement and military technology transfers, the Middle East is the most heavily armed region in the Third World. For example, according to the 1987 SIPRI Yearbook, the value of arms imported to the Middle East and North Africa totaled $11.925 billion or 48.2 percent of all arms imported by Third World countries. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reported that Iraq and Iran spent some $55 billion on military expenditures in 1989.2 The five countries having the largest shares of Third World arms imports during the period 1984-1988 include four Arab states: Iraq (13.9 percent), India (12.4 percent), Saudi Arabia (8.1 percent), Egypt (6.9 percent), and Syria (6.2 percent). In 1989, the SIPRI Yearbook reported that for the first time in twenty years, the Middle East was replaced by South Asia as the leading importing region. In addition to interstate wars, arms races were enhanced by other factors such as perceived national interest in terms of a balance with rival powers, the influence of the army as an interest group in domestic politics and its impact on resource allocation, the quest for prestige and the image of the army as a source of national pride, the role of the army in achieving internal stability, and finally, regional ambitions and leadership rivalries. 3. In terms of integrated war capabilities, Israel enjoys more power than any one or combination of Arab states. Thus, even when the Arabs fought under the best of circumstances in October 1973, Israel was able to turn the tide of the war in its favor. Due to the modernization of Arab armies, however, the human and material price of Israeli victory tended to increase. Each succeeding ArabIsraeli conflict proved to be more difficult and costly, and the Israeli ability to terminate each war rapidly with minimal costs steadily declined. Until the firing of Iraqi Scuds on Tel Aviv in 1991, the Arab states and Israel adopted an essentially conventional defensive

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posture, which entailed denying one's territory to the other, limiting damage to oneself, and destroying the other side's armed forces on the battlefield. Neither side resorted to the use of weapons of mass destruction, or, with few exceptions, engaged in urban warfare or the attack of civilian targets. Israel developed a major military arsenal with capabilities that extend beyond the Middle East. It has a broad range of missiles, including ballistic missiles and antitactical ones, as well as a stockpile of nuclear warheads. Failing to catch up with Israel, Arab states started to develop chemical weapons and to acquire delivery systems capable of reaching Israel. 4. The introduction of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons changed the nature of the regional military balance. As Cohen and Miller summarized, this development was underlined by the following factors: "1---Jsraeli attainment of an advanced nuclear capability; 2-Iraqi determination to pursue its own nuclear program; 3-the acquisition of ballistic missile technology by many states, especially Iraq and Israel; and 4-the legacy of the Iraq-Iran war in which both ballistic missiles and chemical weapons were used." 3 The end result is a potentially explosive situation in which a war would involve high levels of destruction, as witnessed in the Gulf War of 1991.

ARMS CONTROL AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT It is in the above context that issues of disarmament and arms limitations

are better understood. The acquisition of arms is the symptom, not the cause, of conflicts. Thus, an approach that does not address the reasons that Jed to arms races is neither conceptually correct nor practically effective. It follows that disarmament arrangements depend on the progress in resolving regional conflicts. Moreover, given the number of suppliers, a commitment to restraint by the big powers alone is not sufficient. Previous experience demonstrates that as long as some countries feel their national security is at risk, they are likely to circumvent any arms control regime. Indeed, they will perceive any such regime as an imposed policy to maintain an unbearable status quo. Thus, as Kemp has argued, supplier arrangements "can only work in the long run if they are supported by key regional countries and are ultimately part of a broader agenda on conflict resolution."4 Therefore, the need is for a formula or a package of policies in which military, technical, and political measures go hand in hand. Throughout the Arab-Israeli conflict, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Israel accepted arms control measures. The cease-fire and armistice agreements of 1948 and 1949 contained provisions for neutral and demilitarized zones

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on the Israeli borders with Egypt and Syria and in Jerusalem. In 1950, Britain, France, and the United States signed the Tripartite Declaration, which imposed an arms rationing scheme for conventional weapons. The UN agreements that ended the 1956 Suez War included provisions for a UN peacekeeping force on the two sides of the Egyptian-Israeli border. Although Israel declined to accept this force on its side, Egypt accepted, and thus endorsed, a unilateral control on the movements of its forces in the Sinai, in a clear signal of no intention of aggression against Israel. While these measures were to de-escalate existing conflicts, it was after the 1973 war that arms control measures were used to enhance the unfolding peace process. In the first disengagement agreement in 1974, Egypt not only accepted limitations on its armed forces in certain areas in the east of the Suez Canal, but also accepted the existence of UN forces and curtailment of its air defenses west of the Suez Canal. In the second disengagement agreement in 1975, Egypt accepted, in addition to demilitarized zones, certain further confidence-building measures, such as early warning systems, electronic sensors, and notification to the UN force of military movements in the Sinai. The most ambitious of these arrangements came in 1979 in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Sinai was divided into three zones. Zone A would not have more than one mechanized infantry division with up to a total of 230 tanks and 22,000 personnel. Zone B would not have more than four battalions of border units equipped only with light weapons and up to a total of 4,000 personnel. Zone C would have only Egyptian civil police. On the Israeli side of the border, Zone D would not have more than four infantry battalions with up to a total of 4,000 personnel, up to 180 armored personnel vehicles, and their military installations and field fortifications. These zones would be supervised by early warning systems and multinational forces. The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty extended the provisions of arms control to the territorial waters of Egypt and Israel. Article IV of the military Annex I to the treaty established a naval regime, setting the following provisions: (1) Egypt and Israel may base and operate naval vessels along the coasts of Zone A and D, respectively; (2) Egyptian coast guard boats, lightly armed, may be stationed and operated in the territorial waters of Zone B to assist the border units in performing their functions in this zone; (3) Egyptian civil police, equipped with light boats, lightly armed, shall perform normal police functions within the territorial waters of Zone C; (4) nothing in this annex shall be considered as derogating from the right of innocent passage of the naval vessels of either party; and (5) only civilian maritime ports and installations may be built in the zones. The provisions of the peace treaty reduced dramatically the possibility of surprise attack for both Egypt and Israel. The countries have activated a process of military cooperation to monitor the implementation of the

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agreement in good faith. They, furthermore, established the precedent of asymmetrical balance of forces as one of the means to address Israeli insecurities in the exchange of territories. Finally, they reduced to the minimum the possibility of accidental clashes whether on land, air, or sea. For Egypt and the other Arab states, the Israeli nuclear capability is perceived not as a weapon of deterrence but of aggression. It is considered a destabilizing factor in the Middle East and a call for continuing the arms race in weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, Egypt and Iran introduced a resolution in the 29th Session of the United Nations in 1974 for the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in the region of the Middle East. Resolution 3263 was adopted by the UN General Assembly by a majority of 138 members, with only Israel and Burma abstaining. This resolution was reconfirmed in the subsequent General Assembly meetings and starting in 1980 there was no opposition or abstention to the resolution. Several Arab countries (Tunisia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, Mauritania, and the Sudan) participated in introducing these resolutions starting from 1975. During the debates on the resolution, Egypt stressed four basic principles: (1) The states of the region should refrain from producing, acquiring, and possessing nuclear weapons; (2) the nuclear powers should refrain from introducing nuclear weapons into the area or using nuclear weapons against states in the region; (3) an effective international safeguard system affecting both the nuclear powers and the states of the region should be established; and (4) the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East should not prevent parties from enjoying the benefits of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, especially for economic development. Furthermore, Egypt took unilateral steps toward arms control. First, Egypt considered the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty as a way to curtail, if not eliminate, the Israeli nuclear arsenal. Although this did not materialize, Egypt ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1982, and in 1986 froze all nuclear programs. Second, Egypt pursued through different international forums the idea of establishing NWFZs in the Middle East. Third, during the Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons in January 1989, Egypt supported the multilateral efforts to impose a total ban on chemical weapons of mass destruction. Countries that possess nuclear weapons refused this link. The Egyptian position was based on a plan proposed by President Mubarak that called for making the Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction.

ARMS CONTROL AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION We referred earlier to the need for introducing disarmament measures as part of the strategies for conflict resolution. Fortunately, the second Gulf

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crisis created a general consensus among the major powers that peace and security in the Middle East cannot prevail without limitations on the acquisition of arms, particularly weapons of mass destruction. The UN Security Council Resolution 687 for a permanent cease-fire in the Gulf demands the elimination of all Iraqi chemical and biological weapons, the dismantling of nuclear facilities, and limitations on the range of ballistic missiles. What is important about this resolution is that it not only sets precedents in the Middle East context, but also it states explicitly that these measures are taken as steps toward the goal of establishing a zone in the Middle East that is free of nuclear, mass destruction weapons and their delivery systems (Article 14). Furthermore, the present efforts to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict, enhanced by the Gulf crisis, include arms limitations talks as part of the multilateral phase of the negotiations. The success of this attempt depends on the ability of the concerned parties to develop ideas that will enhance the prospects of peace and security in the Middle East. In October 1990, a group of experts presented to the UN Secretary General a Study on Effective and Verifiable Measures, which would facilitate the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East. The study suggested practical measures to cap the Israeli nuclear capabilities by putting the Dimona reactor under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguard within the Non-Proliferation Treaty system. This will keep the Israeli nuclear deterrent intact until further political steps are taken that will lead Israel to the road of NWFZ. The study introduces a host of other ideas applicable to the Middle East, drawn from the European experience in arms control and confidence building. What is interesting about this study is that it does not confine itself to the nuclear field only, but also ventures to limit other mass destruction and conventional weapons, including missiles. The study also merges several proposals for establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East, proposals regarding the Mediterranean region and beyond. What is lacking in this UN study, however, is the mention of a link between the establishment of the NWFZ in the Middle East and the overall settlement of conflicts, particularly the Arab-Israeli one. In this regard, the Moscow negotiations would have been the proper forum to discuss and link military, economic, and, of course, political issues in the Middle East. Also lacking in this study is the time frame to introduce Israel into the NWFZ in the Middle East. Although certain asymmetries might be acceptable to facilitate agreements, symmetrical and reciprocal arrangements should be the norm at the end of the road. Therefore, if Israel would keep its nuclear weapons while safeguarding its Dimona reactor, these weapons should be phased out over a period of time. The number of these weapons should be reduced as a part of the confidence-building measures. Some of them could be eliminated as a result of international guarantees, or in peace treaty negotiations with Arab countries. The remainder should be

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eliminated once full normalization of relations and different types of economic and functional cooperation have been installed. The same process should be applied to chemical weapons for both sides of the conflict. In this respect arms control measures should be part of the peace process, in addition to other issues such as regional economic development, water resources, and environmental issues. Confidencebuilding measures such as notification of naval movements, cooperative sea operations against drug smuggling, or terrorist actions by regional powers could enhance both the possibilities of arms control and mutual trust necessary for peace in the Middle East. Other confidence-building measures, such as transparency measures, arrangements regarding incidents at sea, notification of exercises, and agreements regarding the prevention of dangerous military activities, can contribute to the achievement of this goal. It has to be understood, however, that confidence-building measures should not be an aim in themselves. They should be-as is the case in Europe-an integral part of the political process that reduces tensions and de-escalates conflicts in the Middle East. In fact, as presented above, the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict shows that demilitarized zones, curtailments of military movements, and confidence-building measures did indeed help to de-escalate conflicts and to achieve the first peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

NOTES 1. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 220-221. 2. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "U.S. World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1989" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), pp. 21-22. 3. Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller, "Nuclear Showdown in the Middle East," DACS Working Paper, December 1990, p. 1. 4. G. Kemp, The Control of the Middle East Arms Race (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1991), p. x.

13

Environmental Impacts of Military Defense Policies: Strategies for the Future FRANK BARNABY

The Gulf War demonstrated yet again the horrific damage that can be done to the environment during modern warfare. The war brought home dramatically the need to evolve a new legal instrument to protect the environment in armed conflict. The purpose would be to outlaw the deliberate abuse of the environment by powerful modern weapons, including conventional ones.

FUTURE PATTERNS OF VIOLENCE Advances in military technology will certainly complicate military policies. New conventional weapons are making the battlefield so lethal that humans will refuse to fight on them. Already, conventional war between industrialized countries would be so destructive as to be perceived as unacceptable. Major wars between industrialized countries can therefore be virtually discounted. But the frequency of wars in the Third World is, for the foreseeable future, unlikely to decrease. And the Gulf War is unlikely to be the last war between industrialized and Third World countries.

NEW, POWERFUL, CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS Given the likely future patterns of violence, the potential environmental impact of very powerful conventional warheads and of improved yield-toweight ratios is considerable. An example of a new powerful conventional warhead is the fuel air explosive, used by Coalition forces during the Gulf War. The weapon produces an aerosol cloud of a substance such as propylene oxide vapor. When mixed with air, the substance is very explosive and the aerosol cloud, ignited when at its optimum size, produces a very

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powerful explosion, between five and ten times as effective, weight for weight, as a high explosive. Several clouds of fuel air explosive can be formed close together so that when ignited they produce a huge explosion. This can be so large as to be equivalent to that of a low-yield nuclear explosion. People under the exploding cloud die from asphyxiation caused by physical damage to the membranes of their lungs. The fireball produced by the exploding aerosol cloud can kill and injure people at the edges of the explosion. Cluster bombs and fragmentation munitions are some of the other new conventional weapons. Exploding bomb fragments can scatter small, jagged chunks of metal over a large area. The fragments have razor-sharp edges, are very hot, and travel at high speeds. A rocket warhead can carry very large numbers of fragmentation munitions. Most of the people in the range of the fragments are killed, many of them literally shredded. Those who escape immediate death often have multiple wounds that are difficult to treat. Some fragmentation munitions are made of plastic, which does not show up on X-rays, greatly complicating medical treatment. The Vought Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) fires rockets that carry cluster munitions with antipersonnel bomblets. Each rocket, about 4 meters long and 23 centimeters in diameter, contains 644 bomblets. A salvo of twelve rockets can be fired in about 45 seconds and there is a reload time of 10 minutes. The range of MLRS is more than 30 kilometers. Each salvo of MLRS rockets, which contains nearly 8,000 bomblets, can cover an area of about 60 acres with antipersonnel fragments, making it as lethal as a low-yield nuclear weapon.

EXISTING INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS RELATING TO THE ENVIRONMENT Existing relevant international conventions are not adequate to outlaw the destruction of the environment by powerful modern weapons. These existing conventions include the 1925 Geneva Protocol, prohibiting the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and the use of bacteriological methods of warfare; the 1977 Protocol I on the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, additional to the 1949 Geneva Convention Relating to Protection of Victims of Armed Conflicts, prohibiting the use of methods and means of warfare that are intended or may be expected to cause widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment; the 1977 Environmental Modification Convention, prohibiting the hostile use of environmental modification techniques that cause widespread, long-term, or severe damage to the environment; and the 1980 Inhumane Weapon Convention, restricting the use of a few specific weapons, such as remotely delivered mines and incendiary weapons.

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This list looks impressive, but the conventions are ambiguous and unclear and neither comprehensive nor authoritative enough in themselves to significantly constrain military activities in armed conflict. The relevant articles in the 1977 Protocol, for example, are so general that they can be interpreted to mean what one wants them to mean, with the result that they are interpreted to suit the interests of the interpreter. It is virtually impossible to judge which activities resulting in environmental damage in warfare are violations of existing international instruments.

TIME FOR A NEW CONVENTION The aftermath of the Gulf War, with its horrendous environmental destruction, may be the right legislative moment to mobilize political and public opinion in favor of the adoption of a comprehensive and unambiguous environmental law of war, including realistic means of enforcement, with perhaps an international tribunal to judge violations. A recent conference in London, organized by Greenpeace, discussed the tenets on which a new convention to protect the environment in war should be based, and proposed the following: • military interests should not be permitted to overrule environmental protection; • the environment needs to be protected in all armed conflict, not just in war; • no armed conflict should be permitted to damage the environment of a third party; • military action should be ruled out if the environmental consequences are unknown or expected to lead to severe damage; • each party should be held responsible for the environmental damage it has caused during armed conflict; • the use of weapons of mass destruction must be banned; • the environment should not be used as a weapon, and weapons aimed at the environment must be banned; • the indirect effects of warfare on the environment should be covered by the treaty; • the destruction of or damage to installations that can release dangerous radioactive or poisonous substances should be forbidden; • nature parks and areas of special ecological importance should be classified as demilitarized zones. The most effective first step, however, may be to prohibit the use of specific weapons that do unacceptable damage to the environment. This could be done most simply by strengthening existing conventions.

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It should not be forgotten that military activities in peacetime-such as large-scale maneuvers, weapon testing, and the consumption of considerable quantities of scarce raw materials-can also damage the environment. The time is ripe to mobilize public opinion and press politicians to work for the legal protection of the environment in war and peace. The right legislative moment may not come again for a long time.

A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY, AN ESSENTIAL INTERIM MEASURE An arms control measure that would significantly reduce the impact of military activities on the environment would be a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty that banned all nuclear tests, including those conducted underground. A comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty would achieve three important objectives. First, because testing is essential for the development of new types of nuclear weapons, a total ban on testing would stop, or at least considerably slow down, the nuclear arms race by preventing the development of new types of nuclear weapons. The vast majority of nuclear tests are performed to develop new warheads. Second, nuclear weapons are taken at random from the nuclear arsenal and exploded to check that they still work effectively. If testing is banned the military leaders are likely, sooner or later, to lose enough confidence in the reliability of their nuclear weapons that they would be unwilling to use them in a sudden, preemptive nuclear attack. This would move nuclear strategies back from today's nuclear war-fighting strategies to nuclear deterrence by mutual assured destruction-a strategy that does not require very accurate or reliable nuclear weapons. Going back to nuclear deterrence by mutual assured destruction would significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war, including accidental nuclear war. Third, a comprehensive test ban treaty would hinder the spread of nuclear weapons to new countries and would strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Five countries-the United States, the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, China, and France-have regularly tested nuclear weapons. India tested one nuclear device in 1974, and it is suspected that South Africa, perhaps in collaboration with Israel, tested a nuclear weapon over the Indian Ocean in 1979. To date, nearly 2,000 nuclear tests have been conducted. About 518 of these nuclear tests have been in the atmosphere, under water, or in space. In 1963, the Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed, banning tests in the atmosphere, under water, or in space. The United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom joined the treaty and moved their nuclear tests underground. But France continued testing in the atmosphere until 1974

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and China did so until 1980. Since 1980, all five nuclear-weapons powers have conducted their nuclear tests underground. About 1,400 nuclear weapons have been tested underground in many locations around the globe. The International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, in their book, Radioactive Heaven and Earth, point out that although, in the short term, these have much less dangerous effects on health and the environment than atmospheric tests, they nevertheless release huge quantities of radioactive isotopes underground, some with halflives of tens of thousands of years. Over the decades, some of these radioactive materials will almost certainly escape into the groundwater and hence to the human environment. An example of the impact of underground nuclear testing is the health effects at the Soviet test site at Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan, about which there has been a great deal of publicity since 1985. It has been found that many of the underground nuclear tests burst through the earth's surface, releasing radioactivity into the atmosphere. Consequently, 10,000 or more people living in the Semipalatinsk region have been exposed to significant doses of radiation. According to some estimates, the incidence of cancer among this group may have been increased by as much as 40 percent and a considerable increase in thyroid disease, particularly among children, has been reported. There has also been much criticism of France for conducting nuclear explosions in French Polynesia, at Moruroa and Fangataufa atolls. Considerable damage has been done to the coral reefs there by about 123 underground nuclear-weapon tests, and significant amounts of radioactivity have been released into the marine environment. Radioactivity from the French tests will continue to leak into the Polynesian environment for many decades. Recent research shows that the health and environmental damage done by nuclear-weapon testing is considerably more than was anticipated. People living near the test sites, those who participated in the tests, as well as the general public have been exposed to higher doses of radiation than was previously assumed. Most worrying of all are the risks to future generations from nuclearweapon testing. It is well known that exposure to radiation can induce genetic effects that may damage the offspring of exposed people for generations. The exposure of people worldwide to radiation from atmospheric testing will produce significant numbers of mutations. The risks to future generations from underground testing have not yet begun to be studied seriously. A comprehensive test ban treaty that bans all nuclear tests is urgently required. Not only would it considerably increase world security, but the damage being done by the nuclear-weapons powers to other people's health and the health of unborn generations can no longer be morally

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justified. One could argue that nuclear testing is not legal under current international law.

THE NEED FOR NONOFFENSIVE DEFENSE POLICIES Potential environmental damage by military activities would be reduced if military policies emphasized defense rather than offense, so that reliance on very destructive conventional warheads was reduced. Fortunately, military technological advances favor defensive weapon systems, particularly technologies that provide long-range and real-time surveillance and target acquisition; computerized command, control, communications, and intelligence systems; and sensor and guidance technologies for smart and ultrasmart "fire-and-forget" missiles, which are able to detect, identify, and effectively attack armored vehicles, combat aircraft, and warships, as well as hardened, fixed targets such as command and control centers, in all weather and battlefield conditions, and, once fired, without further instructions from the launching platform. Antitank, antiaircraft, and antiship missiles are particularly benefiting from the new technologies. Today's most cost-effective weapons are shortrange missiles designed to attack main battle tanks, combat aircraft, and warships. Nonoffensive defense is, or very soon will be, the most economical military posture. Nonoffensive defense relies on the principle that the size, structure, weapons, logistics, training, maneuvers, war games, military academy textbooks, and all the other activities of the military forces can be so designed as to demonstrate that they, in their totality, provide an effective conventional defense but have virtually no offensive capability. Nevertheless, the United States is likely to maintain its current superpower capabilities to project offensive military force worldwide so that it can influence, and intervene in, affairs in other countries. The major European powers are also likely to keep some military forces for rapid deployment for use in future conflicts in other regions, but they may, in time, restructure their main military forces to a defensive posture. Third World powers should also come to realize that they will get the best value for their military budgets if they adopt defensive policies.

CONCLUSIONS Strategies to reduce the impact on the environment of military activities include changing military postures to nonoffensive defense, strengthening existing conventions relating to methods and means of warfare that cause damage to the environment by banning specific weapons that cause

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environmental damage, negotiating a comprehensive and unambiguous environmental law of war, controlling peacetime military activities that damage the environment, and negotiating a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. The government of Jordan is asking the UN General Assembly to establish a committee to submit proposals to the General Assembly for an efficient mechanism to prevent the exploitation of the environment in times of armed conflict. This may lead to the drafting of a new treaty. The Jordanians also point out that insufficient data were available to predict with any precision the potential damage of the Gulf War. They are therefore proposing the establishment of an international environmental data base that would assist global decisionmaking in times of crisis. These Jordanian proposals deserve wide support. The decade of the 1990s is the United Nations' decade of international law, intended to promote the supremacy of international law in the conduct of international relations. The evolution of an environmental law of war would be a most appropriate exercise for this time.

14

Collective Security Under Subregional Arrangements: A Cooperative Approach MICHAEL HARBOTILE

Among the issues addressed in the 1982 Palme Commission Report, Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament, I was that of Third World collective security. Since its publication, little has been heard of the report and still less has been done to implement its proposals. Now that politicomilitary perspectives are changing with the virtual end of the East-West confrontation in Europe, the demise of apartheid in South Africa in sight, and a reassessment of security in the Middle East following the Gulf War needing to be undertaken, the Palme Report has a renewed importance. The point has been reached where old concepts of security and military doctrines do not have the same relevance or strategic soundness anymore. Cooperation rather than confrontation can create the kind of relationships between states by which defense and security needs can best be served. It is no longer sufficient or realistic to focus on the purely politicomilitary dimension of security. Today, security must be seen in a holistic context--economic, cultural, humanitarian, and environmental, as well as military. Moreover, political and military considerations are no longer the most important. The days of nuclear deterrence as the means of preventing war are past; instead, it is preventive action of a peaceful nature that can make military intervention unnecessary. Most situations of violent conflict stem from structural causes, such as displacement (refugees), deprivation, suppression, man-made and natural disasters-all of which create a climate in which violence can evolve and breed. When that violence erupts, it invariably activates a military response. That is where collective security can help. What follows is a suggested way of developing and implementing the "Third World" collective security structures mentioned in the Palme Report, thus lessening the dependency of most small nations on military capability and viability. More and more we see the bankruptcy of smaller states through their mounting indebtedness to the big industrial and exporting countries, and the tightening of the disarmament knot, which ties them inextricably to the

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arms traders. This knot must be cut and the premise that security lives in the barrel of a gun must be rejected.

THE CASE FOR A NEW CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF SECURITY BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES In a world where peace and security are measured in terms of military strength, it may be difficult to visualize how security could be based on any other quantifying factor. On the other hand, it is both negative and dangerous to accept weapons power as the ultimate guarantor of world peace. Peace is not just the absence of war; it is the establishment of international and interstate understanding and cooperation. It is freedom from fear, threat, and mistrust. However, for the developing countries particularly, security is relative to the overall world situation and has to be set and structured within it. Security cannot evolve in isolation but must develop as a relationship with one's neighbors. If it is to be viable, it has to be holistic, right across the spectrum of social, economic, and environmental needs. If we could persuade ourselves to define security in these wider terms, and recognize that this could help to bring stability in its wake, what are the criteria on which national defense policies should be based? What are the essential ingredients for an adequate defense? It is important to recognize that there is no standard threat situation but rather a diffuse number of national and regional situations that call for specific responses. For most developing countries the threat is seen to be both external and internal. In certain countries the threat is seen as not so much coming from their immediate neighbors but from the developed states whose perceived self-interests are involved. Given great power domination, the fragility of the United Nations, and the bankruptcy of many developing countries as their military expenditures far outstrip their budgets for essential growth and development, how can developing countries break free and structure for themselves a security that could lead to increased stability and expanded development? The basic solutions have to be "homemade," independent of external influence, and based on the geopolitical perspectives of the countries in question. Both the Brandt Commission Report2 and the Palme Commission Report addressed these problems, the former from a development perspective and the latter from a common security perspective. Both afforded valuable insights into the problems and to their possible solution-both, as already has been pointed out, have been largely ignored. These reports are relevant to the development of collective security structures, but it is the chapter of the Palme Report dealing with collective security arrangements within

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the Third World that is selected here as being the framework for the collective security cooperation outlined below. I have also drawn on the Report of the Special Consultative Group set up by the Secretary General of the Commonwealth in 1983 to study the security of small states, presented to the meeting of the heads of Commonwealth governments in the Bahamas in 1985.3 Whereas the Palme Commission considered the role of the United Nations in safeguarding the security of sovereign states against external aggression, the Commonwealth Commission looked more closely at the structures it considered could be built, with international assistance, to strengthen interstate security and stability. (Clearly, the onus of responsibility is on the state to ask for the assistance, not to have it imposed.) Dependent upon the policy priorities of the developing countries, the quality of their armed forces can range from those poorly equipped to those with the most modern sophisticated equipment short of nuclear weapons. Because of the limited economic resources of the developing countries, expenditures on arms bear heavily on their economic viability. If the financial drain through arms expenditure is to be halted, the security of small states requires a reassessment with the emphasis placed on the collective rather than the independent approach. The structuring of a collective security system to which national armies would contribute, which would involve interstate collaboration and cooperation in the whole field of economic, social, and environmental, as well as military, activity, would create a new perspective of defense and security built on relationships and common interest arrangements. Countries forming the collective could share their resources for the benefit of all its members, plan a joint security policy, assist each other where one of the member states is in need of help, and present to the outside world a united and viable whole. Any external threat to any member of the collective would represent a threat against them all, whereas individual state security would be enhanced by the collective security strategy. Costa Rica, whose army was disbanded in 1948, has proven this point. It has relied for its territorial security on the provisions of the 1948 Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance ratified by seventeen member nations of the Organization of American States. Since then two attempts by neighboring Nicaragua to interfere in Costa Rica's affairs have been forestalled by pressure from the signatory countries. In the Northern Hemisphere, rivalry and confrontation are between alliances, whereas in the Third World the threat is seen to be interstate aggression and internal rebellion. As long as nation-state security takes precedence over all other considerations, the military budgets of the developing world will continue to rise. But if the unit state concept of defense and security were to be replaced by subregional arrangements, there could be a decrease in military spending with a compensating increase in spending on social and economic development.

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If the collective security concept is to be viable, however, it must be of the subregion's own making, with external agencies such as the UN, the appropriate regional organization, and the developed world playing only a supporting role. Too often in the past it has been the developed countries that have attempted in their own self-interests to impose security from outside. Let it not be thought that collective security structures are only appropriate for Third World subregions. In recent years the concept of "Finlandization" has been promoted as a means for increasing security in the northern region of Europe. The idea of creating a cooperative security association among the Balkan states, based on interdependency and mutual assistance, was a subject for discussion and debate among some radical thinkers before the present tragic hostilities erupted, and it will some day be returned to.

COOPERATIVE SECURITY SYSTEMS UNDER SUBREGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS The premise upon which any collective security system has to be based is the willingness of all participating states to surrender some state sovereignty in return for a shared cooperative within a group of states. The system would have to be seen as providing for greater security and stability than exists under present arrangements. Regional systems already exist-in the Americas it is the Organization of American States and in Africa it is the Organization of African Unity. But these are continental in size and have proved unwieldy and largely impotent in dealing with conflict situations and economic crises within their own sphere of influence. The subregional concept breaks the problem down to more manageable proportions for countries whose borders are largely contiguous. In effect, the regional structures and their viability could benefit from a lower-tier system of subregional bodies. To be manageable, collective and cooperative security, therefore, should be considered in the subregional context rather than in a regional or continental configuration. However, whatever subregional security arrangements may be devised are unlikely to be sufficiently strong in themselves to repel aggression by an outside superior military power, as, for instance, posed until recently by South Africa with respect to southern Africa. They would therefore need regional and international safeguards as insurance for their security-what might be described as a multilevel security support arrangement-which could operate and be implemented in whole or in part on request by the subregion, as needed.

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The Subregional System How might the collective security system operate? The participating states would be the base on which the structure would be built, and the interstate relationship would be the cornerstone of their security and stability. Consultative bodies already existing within the subregion4 could be expected to acquire an enlarged significance in the development of such interstate relationships. At present not all of these bodies operate a permanent secretariat but set up temporary offices to manage the periodic meetings that are held. To ensure the effectiveness of the subregional security system, a permanent secretariat would be needed to monitor and process the developing situation within the subregion. It would also service a consultative councilS that would coordinate subregional policy in all its aspects. This council would operate on a permanent footing with sitting members drawn from the highest ministerial ranks of the respective governments. The terms of reference of the council might include the following: • formulation of common security procedures for avoiding internal subregional conflict; • coordination of a subregional collective security and defense strategy; • liaison with regional and UN organizations on collective security and development measures; • coordination of joint initiatives in the face of an external threat; • cooperation in the study of military requirements called for by the above; • cooperation and coordination in meeting the economic, social, and development needs of the subregion; • collaboration in pooling respective national resources for the benefit of the subregion as a whole; • formulation of joint plans to combat environmental problems within the subregion; • development of joint marketing and purchasing enterprises.

Relations with Regional Organizations Nothing in the above terms of reference would run contrary to the recognized responsibilities of the regional organization. The subregional development would strengthen rather than weaken the existing mechanisms for achieving the peaceful settlement of disputes under regional arrangements. Regional organizations under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter are empowered to deal with any matter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security within their region. To date, their success in this context has been limited and their potential for settling disputes has so far not been

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properly exploited. Subregional security structures could help in a greater realization of that potential. The extent of practical regional support in times of crisis will be affected by many factors, not the least being geographical distance, which could limit the assistance to no more than moral support. But the formation of subregions could provide a basis for developing new regional initiatives. Linked as the regions are through the UN Charter, their role could buttress the UN's contribution to the viability of the subregion's security system.

The Role of the United Nations The 1982 Palme Commission Report outlines the potential role that the United Nations could be invited to play in helping to safeguard the security of sovereign states against external aggression, both in the preattack and attack phases. The focus is on anticipatory and preventive action. The Palme Commission proposed a three-phase UN involvement: (i) On being alerted by at least one of the disputing parties to the danger of possible conflict, the Secretary General would constitute a factfinding mission to advise him on the situation. (ii) If circumstances warrant, and with the consent of at least one of the disputing parties, the Secretary General would seek the authorization of the Security Council to send a military observer team to the requesting state to assess the situation in military terms and to demonstrate the Council's serious concern. (iii) In the light of circumstances and the report of the military observers, the Security Council would authorize the induction of an appropriate UN military force at the request of one or both of the disputing states, with a view to preventing conflict. This force would be deployed within the likely zone of hostilities ... , thereby providing a visible deterrent to a potential aggressor.6

The difference between the three-phase UN involvement proposed by the Palme Commission and current UN operations is that the former is intended to preempt the outbreak of hostilities. Past and present UN peacemaking and peacekeeping missions and operations have followed, not preceded, the act of aggression or communal violence for which they have been required. It is obvious that prevention is better than postoperative treatment. However, this degree of preventive action is not likely to be sufficient to satisfy the subregion. Member states would be looking for stronger safeguards from the United Nations, and these might be provided in the following way: • The appointment by the Secretary General of a permanent special representative, chosen for his or her experience as an international diplomat and knowledge of the subregion and its languages and customs. The task of the special representative would be to act in a diplomatic capacity to help

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promote the internal security and stability within the subregion through personal relationship to the individual heads of states. He or she would also act as the eyes and ears of the UN Secretary General with regard to any direct or potential threat to the subregion as a whole and to the states individually. The representative would need the services of a small secretariat. A precedent for such a role exists in Britain's Malcolm Macdonald's roving diplomatic mission in southern Africa in the 1950s. A comparable role was performed by Sture Linner of Sweden who, as head of the UN Development Programme for the Middle East, was adviser and confidante to the respective governments. • The UN Security Council could be encouraged to set up an ad hoc "good offices commission," using approved and impartial diplomatic missions accredited to the countries of the subregion-an action the Security Council is entitled to take under the provision of Article 29 of the Charter, empowering it to set up subsidiary organs deemed necessary for the performance of its functions. Their function would be to monitor continuously the security situation and report back to the Security Council any development that might create a potential threat to the viability of the subregion, enabling the Security Council to act early in preempting possible conflicts. This role also has a precedent: In 1946 the Security Council, under the authority of Article 29, set up a Good Offices Commission (GOC) to monitor on its behalf the handover by the Netherlands of their East Indies' colonial territories to the Indonesians. The GOC relied on selected consular missions in Jakarta for day-to-day information and advice about the progress and management of the handover.

The Role of Extra-Regional Countries The industrial and developed countries can contribute experience and material assistance, which could benefit the system and enhance the subregion's viability. Such assistance, however, must be optional for recipient states. This is a reversal of the usual practice in which security in the Third World is seen by the First World countries in the perspective of their own best interests and needs. The 1985 Report of a Commonwealth Consultative Group, which assessed the security needs of small countries and the Third World in general, listed those ways in which they can help themselves and be helped in return by the richer industrial nations. The report analyzed the military, economic, social, and environmental considerations and pointed to the way in which the First World can contribute information, training, and talents to the development process.

CONCLUSION It may appear that the possibilities for subregional security systems have been oversimplified, particularly in the light of the reality of violent

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conflict in the world as a whole. Can one hope for something of the kind evolving in the Middle East as an outcome and in the aftermath of the Gulf War? This will depend upon a clear intent and willingness on the part of the states of the region, including Israel, to work out the structures for peace and security and evolve a cooperative association using the CSCE pattern on which to build. But the structure has to be of the region's own making and must be appropriate to the economic, cultural, humanitarian, and environmental needs of all the people. It should not be imposed from outside by the developed countries as a part of great power politics. If the Middle East is to achieve security and stability in the future, it will be as a result of the states of the region developing a collective modus operandi relevant to their needs and their perspectives. The industrial nations can play a vital support role in the provision of assistance, expertise, and technological know-how, but only as requested. It is often the case that mechanisms for change exist but are ignored because of a lack of imagination and incentive. This is true of cooperative security. In 1975 the East and West European countries, plus Canada, the United States, and the Soviet Union drew up and endorsed the Final Act of the Helsinki Accord. It contains a comprehensive blueprint for building confidence and strengthening security through interaction. Those sections of the act dealing with military and human rights issues have been the subject of much publicity. However, the section dealing with economic, social, educational, and environmental cooperation has been given attention only in recent years, and then largely on the initiative of the nongovernmental organizations rather than the governments themselves. Yet that section sets out a catalogue of interaction, exchange, and joint project work in which ordinary people can be involved. It is peace building in practice and demonstrates that peace is everybody's business. Real security and stability can be achieved only when there is a total involvement of the people in its achievement. Although the Helsinki process was designed for implementation in Europe, its relevance is not confined to that continent. The provisions of the Final Act can easily be modified and adapted for application in other countries, regions, or subregions. They offer a useful model. Security, to be absolute, has to take account of everyone's sense of insecurity. Each nation must recognize that there is not just one but many perspectives of security, depending upon where one lives on the planet and how one views the world from that place. If global security and stability are to be achievable, everyone needs to become aware of the different standpoints-through communication, interaction, and cooperation. As the wisdom of the Native American puts it, "You have to walk a mile in another's moccasins before you can know what that person is thinking."

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NOTES 1. Palme Commission Report, Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament (London and Sydney: Pan Books Ltd., 1982) 2. Brandt Commission Report, North-South: A Programme for Survival (London and Sydney: Pan Books Ltd., 1980). 3. Report of the Commonwealth (British) Consultative Group to the Commonwealth Heads of State at their meeting in the Bahamas in 1985. Report commissioned by the Commonwealth Secretary General in 1983 under the title of Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society. 4. Such as the already established Southern African Development Coordination Conference. 5. A possible title could be the Consultative Council for Common Concern. 6. Palme Commission Report, Common Security, pp. 162-164.

15 The Role of the United Nations in the Middle East }UERGEN DEDRING

The premise of these reflections is the emergence of a moment in the Middle East debate, in about three to five years, when the principal immediate actors will be ready to accept direct, broad involvement of the United Nations through its Secretary General or other suitable venues. Time will tell whether UN involvement will be possible in conjunction with the continued role of the United States or whether it can be initiated only once the U.S. approaches come to a complete end. Hence, the argument does not rest on the prerequisite of the failure and termination of the U.S. peace initiative. The following exposition is divided into three main parts dealing with monitoring, assistance, and facilitation through good offices and other suitable venues by the United Nations. The presentation of the various suggestions and the subsequent discussion will reveal the extent to which the role of the United Nations is seen as effective in overcoming the deepseated antagonism between the Israeli and Arab sides. The key question is really whether the multilateral machinery of the world organization can affect the stubborn, bitter division between the two communities, who are condemned to live together as neighbors on a very small spot. Although the ultimate objective would indeed be the peaceful settlement of all territorial issues, it must suffice for our argument if confidence-building can initiate some kind of rapprochement and diffusion of tension among the peoples of the area. That alone would have to be recognized as a breakthrough of some magnitude; one that would allow further steps of accommodation upon that foundation.

MONITORING The first vital instrument that the international community could legitimately bring to bear on a variety of aspects of the situation in the Middle

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East as a whole is the monitoring process. A principal undertaking to which the Israeli government and people must give prior consent would involve the stationing of UN observers in the occupied territories. The idea is not to strengthen the UN peacekeeping teams, but to engage mostly civilian personnel for the purpose of patrolling urban and rural regions on foot or by car to observe the quality of Palestinian life under Israeli occupation, on the one hand, and to detect, and possibly prevent, abuses on the side of the authorities or violent outbursts of Palestinian anger or protest, on the other hand. The current lack of any outside neutral monitor in the occupied territories or in Israel proper has given the Israeli police and military an essentially free rein in their dealings with the Palestinians. The tension-strewn path of the quarter century of Israeli control provides testimony that the presence of UN monitors could unquestionably make a difference. It would, of course, be required that the Israeli side concur with the UN monitoring function and that the Palestinian side commit themselves to an absolute guarantee of safe conduct for the UN personnel and to less civil disobedience involving violence against the Israelis. If these conditions were more or less met, one could safely assume that the international presence would be a stabilizing element and promote a more open social climate, easing both sides into a more neighborly relationship. Recourse of the UN monitors to the Secretary General and the Security Council, if necessitated due to major clashes and possible bloodshed, would add to the stabilizing impact on at present highly volatile communities. The advantage for both sides should be apparent. A wider monitoring approach could be developed for the Middle East as a whole in a wide range of contemporary concerns including the environment; resource problems including land, water, oil, and so forth; arms control and disarmament; and human rights and their violations. In a time of growing environmental concern, it seems sensible to start monitoring the Middle Eastern region as a whole for signs of deterioration or possibly of reversal. The June 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development is another international milestone that launched an ambitious, far-reaching program of monitoring and action. The full benefit of this new commitment will not accrue to the Middle East unless the whole region, including Israel, takes part in the new forward movement. The pollution of air and water has reached alarming levels around the Mediterranean; the Gulf War, and in particular the devastation of the Kuwaiti oil wells and production facilities, has wrought damage to the regional environment; and other matters such as waste removal and dumping of chemical substances urgently demand attention. The common interest is overwhelming, and not even the most reluctant government could nowadays assume responsibility for its stalling in view of a growing environmental crisis. Although the UN system could launch a regional action program, one would hope that eventually the

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regional parties themselves would agree to take over the task of monitoring, as well as of ending deterioration and repairing the damages as much as possible. A related area that also lends itself to international monitoring by the United Nations is the problem of resources. A matter of especially serious consequence is the water problem. Tensions have been high for many years over charges that one or the other side tried not only to divert the natural flow of the water supplies but to deny others their legitimate access to water reserves that seem to belong to the international commons. Endeavors to bring water issues under professional management and remove them from the heat of political enmity have so far shown little success. In the meantime, the natural reservoirs are steadily decreasing, and experts have been warning for years against further depletion of the water supplies of the region. It would appear most promising to allow an appropriate international agency in the UN family to immerse itself in the Middle Eastern water problem. The UN agency could initiate a tight monitoring scheme that would register the flow and usage of water, and a program of measures that would result in an actual reduction of consumption by the various communities. A professional team should be able to win the confidence of the various authorities and peoples, and once trust was earned the misuse and cheating would decline together with mutual recriminations. With hostile charges receding, an opportunity would arise to raise general awareness to the menace of the depletion of this most important resource, and to plant ideas about its equitable sharing. Otherwise, there is reason to fear the outbreak of violent conflict as hostile neighbors in the region confront the danger of water shortage and drought. The concrete success of a UN agency in this area could provide great stimulus to further peaceable arrangements. Monitoring could also be made available in connection with land distribution in the region. There has been a persistent process of expropriation or occupation of Palestinian land by Jewish settlers, often supported by the Israeli government. A careful program of inspection and registration of these and similar land-related actions could result in objective data and reports; such data could then guide the discussion in the various communities about how much land they own, have lost, or needed to gain. This would further enable the groups to arrive at clearer determinations as to which land could serve for agricultural purposes, for industrial projects, or for new settlements. Deforestation is a special problem in the region. The absence of trees and even bushes in wide stretches of the Middle East is familiar to everybody. Here, a look by unbiased international observers into the whole issue of de- and reforestation throughout the Middle East could help set the foundation for a change in thinking on all sides. Considerations of their

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own advantage, supported by such outside monitoring and evaluation, would lead the communities further toward working for the path of the common good in this matter without regard to borders. The next area for possible monitoring on the regional level is that of human rights practices. For years, reports have been issued in the United Nations regarding the practice and violation of human rights in just about each of the states and territories of the Middle East. In many cases, however, visits to the countries under survey are not tolerated by the respective governmental authorities so that the information gathered often does not meet the general standards of what would be admitted as evidence before a judicial body. The international community, through the United Nations, could be assigned to set up a system of human rights monitors to be stationed in all areas for which allegations about human rights violations had been made. International personnel would be posted throughout the whole area and report regularly to the relevant office at the United Nations. The governments and other authorized representatives, for instance of the Palestinian community, would be given the right of reply, and an effort would be made to come to a final determination about the alleged violations. The UN Human Rights Commission could serve as the forum that would receive the reports and periodically issue an assessment of the human rights situation in the various communities. In this fashion, the practice of each group would be identified, publicized, and, it would be hoped, corrected. This approach of separating human rights issues from the usual polemics and charges traded between actors in the Middle Eastern region would benefit the overall atmosphere of openness and cooperation among the antagonists. They would learn on the one hand that everybody can be found guilty of human rights violations, and on the other that the identification and unbiased evaluation by the international community of alleged breaches improve relations within and between states. For these reasons, such monitoring, although most delicate in the tense Middle East situation, could become a foremost venue for a process of opening up and eventual conciliation. An even more difficult area of intense concern is the whole issue of armaments and disarmament in the region. Past history offers undeniable proof that something must be done urgently to avert the next war in the region. Proposals for the establishm~nt of a nuclear-weapons-free zone have failed in view of the unbroken hostility between the Israelis and the Arabs. The vast destruction of Iraq has, however, illustrated the potential scope of any new military conflagration. The recognition that armed conflict involves huge casualties and material damages should deter decisionmakers in all camps from hasty provocative or aggressive acts. It can be assumed that this thinking will gain over the next few years and that eventually there will be sufficient readiness to explore avenues of arms control and reduction.

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As such an undertaking affects most immediately the sensitive domain of national security, great caution must be applied in setting forth a program of international monitoring by the United Nations. After careful negotiation, specific documents should be prepared for each component of such monitoring. The UN Security Council would offer a sufficiently high authority to bind the parties to a faithful implementation of their agreements. Once in place and operational, the focus of monitoring should be on the overall state of military preparedness and especially on weapons of mass destruction including chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Recent experiences in the aftermath of the Gulf War and in the CSCE framework of confidence-building measures exemplify the enormous task for the international community; but the fact that UN inspectors would carry out the function should be sufficient assurance for the parties in the region that all arrangements would be voluntary. There is an all-important threshold to be overcome in agreeing to UN-organized monitoring. Preliminary measures can be taken without requiring any of the parties to abandon their principled stands. They would not run much of a risk regarding the final outcome of selective monitoring operations under the aegis of the world organization, and their image as reasonable partners would be enhanced. The UN organs in charge of the respective monitoring activities would review the pattern of events periodically and decide to renew or cancel the engagement, with the concurrence of the parties.

ASSISTANCE A totally different dimension suitable for UN involvement is what is here referred to as assistance. Whereas monitoring involves only observation and reporting, aid goes hand in hand with practical engagement to help those who stand to benefit from this activity. The UN itself, through the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Children's Fund (formerly UNICEF), and numerous smaller agencies, has a great deal of experience that could be brought to bear on the troubled Middle East and its antagonistic members. The following are some special functions that the UN community could start offering. The first proposal relates to the envisaged grant of limited autonomy for the disenfranchised Palestinians that could be expected to be more or less in place by the time the United Nations would start playing its role in the Middle Eastern peace process. The Palestinian community might not be quite ready to tackle the varied responsibilities that relate to medical facilities, policing, education, sanitation, welfare planning, and so on. UN personnel could provide technical assistance and thereby contribute to the success of Palestinian self-government. UN representatives might also be available to bridge the gap between the Palestinians and Israelis if differences of opinion

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over the mandate and scope of autonomy arise. A UN representative might defuse the tension and offer ideas to overcome deadlocks. An accord between the Palestinians, the Israelis, and the United Nations should be sought to regulate the specifics of principal UN assistance. Without such an accord, it would make little sense for the United Nations to send its personnel to the occupied territories. It can be assumed that everybody would welcome calm and stability if both sides could live their respective lives undisturbed. Over time, feelings in both communities would probably change to a friendlier disposition toward each other. A second area of assistance is in economic development. It is evident that to be effective, economic development assistance must be programmed for the region as an interdependent whole. Israeli membership in the Economic and Social Commission for West Asia could enhance the role of that regional commission. UN experts should offer to assess the regional needs and to help states develop comprehensive strategies for the short and long term. Seed money for accepted projects should also be supplied by the UN system and stepby-step monitoring should accompany the actual implementation of viable projects. Experts could make follow-up suggestions to improve on the performance. Through such an integrated approach to assistance and implementation a maximum of improvement and accelerated development could be achieved, and the UN could play an exemplary role in replacing the sword with the plow. The role of science and technology for economic development as well as the financing of research and development are crucial. The motto of development in the Middle East should be sustainability. Much new thinking could emerge from the common efforts of the regional states and the United Nations. A conference of international experts to explore goals and methods of a comprehensive program of economic development and to draft a plan of action for all parties to consider would be an important beginning. The range of possible projects in the Middle East is enormous. Israel has an outstanding record in overall development and in technical knowhow, as its earlier role in technical assistance to African countries demonstrates. In the areas of conquering the desert, promoting a balanced economy with agriculture and industry, or struggling with the problem of converting salt water into sweet water, Israel could make a contribution to the development goals of the region as a whole. However, mutual distrust between Israel and the Arab states makes cooperative projects very difficult, and the United Nations as a third party thus has an important role to play. The international banking industry will not offer the necessary financing for development projects unless the area as a whole is stable, and thus promises a decent return on the investment provided. Here, the UN system

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could fulfill a vital service by coaxing the world bankers into a Middle East project and extracting from the immediate antagonists a firm commitment for peaceable conduct in order not to drive the investors away. War and development are antonyms. Suitable development projects should be finalized by the concerned parties in conjunction with international experts under the auspices of the UN system. Two projects would deserve major attention. One would be an attempt at reforestation in the Middle East as a whole; a second could launch a program of water resource management comparable to the Tennessee Valley Authority, which had an enormous impact several decades ago for the development of the Tennessee Valley in the United States. Both new forests and adequate equitable water supplies could affect the life in the Middle East tremendously, but the scope and cost of such an overarching program of action would necessitate that the region and the international community muster all available resources in pursuit of the objective. The Israelis and Arabs would once again realize that their fates are inextricably intertwined and that they need to seek to make the best of this given condition. Participants in the proposed water and reforestation projects would enjoy the fruits of their common endeavor to the extent that they focused on peaceful competition instead of violent rivalry. The world community could thus help to open the passage to a new world of economic cooperation and possible subsequent political accommodation. The potential impact of these and similar common projects should be viewed as a major stepping stone toward a new Middle East.

FACILITATION Whereas monitoring and assistance are auxiliary roles for the United Nations, the facilitating function is clearly the central task for the world organization and involves the UN Charter mandate of peaceful settlement of disputes. The United Nations appears here as a third party and, based on past history, can be expected to work in several well-tested modes of operation. In view of the severity of the discord and its inherent complexity, the key actor for the United Nations should be the Secretary General, whose good offices are ideally suited for an exercise in quiet diplomacy. The specific steps in facilitation that would be brought to bear on the outstanding issues relating to the future stability of the Middle East would be determined only after a basic understanding had been reached that the Secretary General and designated personal representatives would handle the task of peacemaker. The UN effort in Afghanistan provides relevant precedents that could be applied to the Middle East. The instrument of so-called "indirect" and "proximity" talks at an early point in the long pursuit of a peaceful solution

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allowed the Secretary General to overcome initial impediments and avoid the derailment of the first phase of the peace feelers among the parties interested in the future of Afghanistan. The recent experience with the Madrid Conference on the Middle East, initiated by the U.S. government, shows the unsuitability of conference diplomacy uniting the hostile parties around the same table. It became a dialogue of the deaf. Further encounters filled with empty rhetoric and unreasonable demands are likely to worsen the prospects for an eventual comprehensive peace settlement. The deliberate decision in the Afghan crisis to keep the parties apart was the only way to get the long process-lasting eight years until the Geneva Accords of April 1988 were signed-on the road. The Secretary General and his representative avoided direct communications between the different interested parties concerning Afghanistan during most of the time that they made their good offices available. It is remarkable that the four signatories of the Geneva Accords met for the first time on that topic in 1988 when the agreements were signed in Geneva. All previous contacts were made through the third party as good officer, a method that has widely been seen as the crucial ingredient for the ultimate breakthrough. When the UN representative announced in 1984 that the initial indirect talks would be replaced by "proximity" talks, the world learned that a decisive step forward had been taken, although the principal contenders were far from being prepared to meet the adversary face to face. The Afghanistan experience as well as recent successes in Central America provide a good set of guidelines for a UN role in the Middle East. Every conflict situation is, of course, idiosyncratic, but certain common characteristics allow wider comparison and application of these instruments in diverse conflict situations. In view of the manifold complications in the Middle East situation it appears likely that months and even years of multitrack consultations involving the Secretary General and the representatives of the various parties would have to take place before one could think of calling for a general conference with all the parties under the auspices of the United Nations. One should envisage parallel conversations of the Secretary General with the governments of Israel, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, and representatives of the Palestinian people. The pattern and number of contacts under this scenario can be compared with a delicately woven, highly complex web. Such a task would strain the skills of even the most experienced negotiator or mediator. Thus, speedy solutions are not to be expected. Following prolonged indirect and proxy talks, the idea of a general conference convened by the United Nations and chaired by the Secretary General as the main interlocutor in the earlier phase of the talks could be translated into reality. Because the Israeli side so far has refused to meet the Arabs under UN auspices, it is evident that getting the parties to the table also would be enormously difficult the second time. It will be equally

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difficult to find the right approach to the issue of Palestinian representation, especially if it is assumed that the 1991 U.S. initiative will have ended by that time. The timing of such a large-scale meeting would also depend on the informal elaboration of certain points of agreement that could flow into the final declaration or statement of principles that everybody expects to emerge from the conference at some point in time. After the first general session, the UN conference would adjourn to allow for the start of bilateral negotiations that would focus on the implementation of Resolution 242 (1967), the blueprint of the Security Council for peace in the Middle East. The range of issues that demand a solution is wide, and the problems have great urgency. In each of the bilateral talks, a UN representative should be present as facilitator and good officer. In this way, the international community could be present without intruding too bluntly into the first tentative steps toward dialogue. Recent experiences of the UN in Central America, Somalia, and Yugoslavia show both the difficulties and the feasibility of UN involvement in those initial phases of contacts among adversaries. Although nobody could predict the end result of such chaperoned talks on the Middle East problem, the direction and thrust could be affected by the central role of the United Nations in the conference. Because the immediate parties continue to be at loggerheads over the underlying issue of the place of Israel in the Middle East and the specific questions concerning the withdrawal of Israel from the territories occupied in the June 1967 war, considerable tension must be anticipated throughout the various meetings. Any hint of the international community, through the United Nations or a regional grouping, trying to impose a solution from above or outside will bring about a further delay in the forward movement of the dialogue. A maximum of discretion must go hand in hand with a clear sense of the basic purpose of the conference so that the world community, which is vitally interested in an eventual comprehensive settlement in the embattled region, can provide the dynamic energy to propel the bargaining toward the envisaged agreement. The main reason for advocating the UN venue for a peace conference rests with the fact that the noncoercive quality of the voice of multilateralism establishes its superiority over bilateral or regional approaches. The current experiment under the sponsorship of the United States, the foremost power of the moment, depicts the fragility and brittleness of the foundation upon which the edifice of negotiation is erected. International persuasion and tenacity could create a flow of support and good will that would re-ignite the fire of compromise and consensus essential for small and large breakthroughs. If the gentle pressure of international morality cannot open the issue of peace in the Middle East to a rational search for peace and stability, political sanctions or even the threat

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or use of force do not seem to guarantee more success in dealing with this type of intractable conflict. The parties can at best be gently coaxed into embracing what initially each of them strongly rejects. The pitfalls in the Middle East are so numerous that luck may play some part in the eventual success of the peace effort.

CONFIDENCE BUILDING As was said earlier, the time for such broad and intense involvement of the world organization in one of the world's hot spots has not come yet. Instead, the United Nations could seek to develop some confidence-building measures that would prepare the envisaged peace process in the more distant future and ease the overall relationships among the Middle East parties as soon as possible. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe provides a growing repertory of measures that help to mitigate the ever-present hostile feelings between the adversaries, including opening up to each other so-called military and security-related secrets and giving each other access to military installations and maneuvers. Such steps could be developed in conjunction with the UN monitoring of arms control and armaments in the region. Even small steps such as allowing the distribution of publications coming from the other side or examining together school textbooks in terms of distortion, misinformation, and enemy images, with a view to removing errors of this type, could be effective. Freer travel, exchange of students and teachers, uncensored statements and writings in each other's media, and regular meetings of political and military leaders are some of the many confidence-building initiatives that could be proposed and implemented. Confidence-building measures require time. The time span for the confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM) adopted by the CSCE in and after 1975 extended to about fifteen years before the Europeans could see any impact on the pacification of the political and military relations across Europe. Patience and persistence promise to bring progress also in the Middle East if the immediate parties are sincere and persistent. Confidence-building measures would fit the rhythm of the tit-for-tat strategy of negotiation and could be stopped or even canceled at any moment if the other side failed to keep its part of the bargain. Thereby, the chance for slow but steady progress would be given, and as mutual trust grew the parties would turn more and more to nonviolent ways of arguing their case for territorial adjustment and political compromise. In this way the ground could be prepared for launching the actual peace conference under UN auspices.

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CONCLUSION This survey of available and well-practiced roles of the United Nations as they might relate to the Israeli-Arab conflict makes it clear that the international community, if and when asked, can indeed help to point the way to understanding and compromise. The fact that the parties still tend to walk out on each other in the large multilateral fora (e.g., the UN General Assembly) demonstrates their mental block regarding the "enemy." A prolonged peace process initiated and assisted by the United Nations, accompanied by programs of economic assistance and by confidence-building measures on both sides, will help overcome the long-standing estrangement and launch a mutual learning experience through which all parties will come to recognize their socioeconomic interdependence and their irreversible geographic bond. The Arabs know that they cannot expel the Israelis from Palestine. In the course of that long peace process, the basic insight into the geographic facts of life will mature into a readiness to make the best of a difficult situation. Making peace with the blessing of the international community will bring political and economic benefits, whereas renewed warfare will deepen the economic malaise of the region and prolong the agony of impotence. As the need for a solution grows ever more pressing, the prospects for a multilateral solution that employs the formal and informal instruments of conflict resolution and peace making indicated in the UN Charter and in the growing records of international customary law are improving and will continue to do so in the years ahead. The United Nations, as seal of moral authority and legitimator of international as well as internal efforts at settlement, is an invaluable asset that the parties in the Middle East will come to appreciate after many years of failed unilateral third-party approaches. Peace with and through the United Nations is not guaranteed. But for a region rent with conflict, recourse to the instruments of multilateralism may indeed become the only hope. The current phase of the search for peace will in fact prepare the parties for a future working out of a comprehensive peace agreement under the auspices of the United Nations.

16 Development and Islamic Values SALLAMA SHAKER

At a time of rapid change in the world, and in the Middle East in particular, it is of vital importance to understand the cultural and societal values of the people in that region, in order to avoid any violent militant reaction. Hence, if we are addressing the issues behind the economic, political, and social crises in the Middle East region, it is necessary to perceive the problems in the context of the realities of each country. The philosophical tenor of our time seems dominated by Western concepts and paradigms endorsing "free market" and "democratic institutions" regardless of the nature of the problems facing particular societies. A just new world order cannot be built solely on Western notions and concepts, ignoring the diversities of the present condition of the societies being addressed as well as their cultural heritage and values. The economic, political, and social crises the Arab countries are facing require a "tailor made" approach to development. The right dose must be found, the mix must be carefully balanced, and the timing of measures taken must be exact in order to produce positive healing results. Robert Heilbroner and Abdul Aziz Said have emphasized that the challenge remains to understand how to develop the Middle East through its own traditions and not through Western ideologies.' The point that needs underlining is that any system in which the local culture has no faith and with which the people cannot identify can be expected to fail. What is needed is more than multilateral and bilateral flows of aidit is fundamental changes at the local level, so that individuals and families participate in the development process and act together to improve their standards of living by producing more and feeling equal responsibility in the development process. This calls for a change in the focus and definition of development, with more concentration on people's well-being rather than on mere economic growth. Eventually, if development will target people, then in order to acquire productive, affirmative, and creative participation from the people there is a need to build structures of participation that conform to the heritage and values of the Middle East. 237

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Because Islam is a major cultural heritage in an area of divine cultural heritages, eventually it might help to establish "economic justice" through the zakaat system, or alms tax, which is a religious duty for all capable Muslims. According to Islam, the zakaat is a compulsory levy and not a voluntary charity. It is a contribution of 2.5 percent of gross wealth (not income) to charity every year. Like the Christian tithe, this has become a matter of individual conscience, in spite of the fact that the Quran legislated the zakaat as the only permanent levy or tax to be spent on the needy who cannot gain enough to sustain themselves and their families because of illness, old age, or lack of employment. In other words, economic justice as prescribed by Islam, while recognizing differences in human abilities and competence, requires equitable distribution of wealth (Quran: verse no. 59, 7). However, Islam urges everyone to have a job and contribute to the welfare of the community. In some working papers of the World Bank, experts have recommended the zakaat as excellent means for funding public investment projects and for redistributing wealth to the poorer segments of society. They point out that the community is capable of participating effectively in channeling these funds to the needy without going through the bureaucrats. It is clear that the zakaat can be a productive form of social security and welfare whereby the needy and the poor can be helped. This principle is of great importance to the Arab countries because it can justify taxes for social welfare purposes. In fact, the World Bank seems to be considering and suggesting the application of such Islamic values as part of the programs to alleviate poverty that are being introduced to some countries, such as Egypt and Tunis. There are countries that have adopted the structural adjustment policies, which can have a negative impact on the poorer segments of the society. Policies designed for the Muslim world ought to take into account Islamic values and attempt to incorporate them in one way or another into the development project; this will ensure that the policies suggested are acceptable to the local culture and the people. In fact, what seems urgently needed in the Arab world is pragmatic solutions to the existing problems. Th~re is a need for the Arabs to find solutions for their economic problems through ijma, that is, consensus among them. ljma is a fundamental concept in Islam embodying the idea that whatever is accepted by the entire community as true and effective must be adopted by the governing body. To turn one's back to the community (jamaa) is to abandon the orthodoxy and main principle of the Islamic values. Clearly, this principle provides Islam with an effective corrective device against any authoritarian rule, but unfortunately it has been shelved for many years. What is needed in the Arab world is a political awareness and a determined will to embark on a genuine road to reform and development. There is a vital need to cooperate and address regional issues such as the water problems, environmental matters, and human

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potentialities. The Gulf War created a crisis environment that should be giving impetus to reform. However, the problems seem vast and need to be carefully analyzed because of their multidimensional nature. There is a need to understand the roots of the problems in order to diffuse the tensions and lessen the chances of possible future confrontations. Development of the natural and human resources of the Middle East, sharing of wealth, and people's involvement in the development process can bring to the area the economic stability that is needed through their own authentic development paradigm that fits with the Islamic values and Arab heritage. In this respect, it is worth emphasizing, for example, that on the one hand Islam seems to embrace basic pursuits of profit through business activities, respect for private property, and commercial trade activities; whereas on the other, Islamic principles mandate that the state take all necessary actions to correct imbalances in the economic status of the poor segments of the society, by creating safety nets, providing social security, and offering free education. Islamic legislation known as sharia enhances the "community sharing spirit" with a meritocratic perspective that gives rise to customary law and legislative morality. As for the Islamic concepts of "redistribution of wealth," there are certain doctrines and patterns of conduct advocated by the Quran, the Sunna, and the Islamic scholars. There are two basic principles: 1. No one shall get more or less than what is appropriate to his labor input (second verse in the Quran 188: 4, 29). 2. Wealth must be distributed (Verse no. 59, 7). Following the Quranic injunction that wealth must be distributed, many institutions have been established on the basis of a charitable trust known as the waqf, usually made up of community funding. The waqf is a financial trust developed very early by Islamic law in order to allow for the self-sufficiency of public institutions and to prevent self-serving intervention by the state. The waqf was used historically to stop the dissipation of wealth and channel it to beneficial ends and to protect property from abuses. The public waqf is dedicated to the people in general, and anyone has access to it (e.g., mosque, bridge, public facility). Awqaf (plural of waqf) funded a number of public institutions including education, public health, libraries, and the building of mosques. There is the semipublic waqf, which provides a category of people access to facilities such as a hospital for the handicapped, a school for non-Muslims, and graveyards for the poor. Finally, there is the private waqf, which covers the interests of the heirs of an individual. The waqf system was essential to the development of the Muslim economy; unfortunately, the institution of the waqf was at times abused at the hands of the state and the colonial powers in the Arab world. Recently,

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the idea of the waqf is being rediscovered as a successful institution that can help the process of development and enforce the redistributive process. Lawrence Rosen of Colombia University argues the need torevive the waqf system as a monitoring body in charge of distributing the oil funds earned by Arab countries to poorer countries in the region, in order to lessen the tension between the haves and the have nots.2 The Gulf War remains as a reminder of the urgency to redress the issue of economic disparity in the Middle East. If the Arab countries can reach consensus (ijma) on the establishment of such an Islamic institution or fund to supervise the distribution of wealth earned by participating countries, more successful developmental targets may be achieved. In order to do this, it is important to understand the spirit of Islam and develop the structures in accordance to the local culture. In conclusion, sustained development has to come from within to achieve its targets. In this particular scenario, the actors need to be from the area and any bilateral or multilateral aid being disbursed should be useful in creating the democratic institutions and in educating the people to help them participate in the development process. Development must be a genuine response to the real needs of the people; it cannot be imposed or structured according to Western ideologies. The extent of international understanding of the language, culture, and traditions of the Middle East-of the peoples as well as their real needs--can determine how successful our generation will be in achieving a new world order in which nations from every region will work together to deter aggression, and build a prosperous environment conducive to stability and peace.

NOTES 1. Robert Heilbroner, The Great Ascent: The Struggle for Economic Development in Our Time (New York: Harper & Row, 1963); Abdul Aziz Said, "The Paradox of Development in the Middle East," Futures 21 (December): 619-627. 2. Lawrence Rosen, Bargaining Reality: The Construction of Social Relations in a Muslim Community (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

17 Middle East Oil Resource Policies DOROTHEA

H. EL MALLAKH

As in the past four decades or more, oil resource policies and economic security in the Middle East will most likely continue to be subordinate to political considerations, despite a number of positive factors that should, in a more "perfect world," underpin a relatively high degree of economic complementarity and shared interests. The cultural, religious, ethnic, and political dissimilarities in the region addressed in other portions of this volume include Arab and non-Arab populations, Sunni and Shi'a divisions within Islam, varying resource bases, different political structures, and post-World War II decolonialization experiences. In the economic realm, there are significant shared characteristics among all the states and even more so within subgroupings. For the purpose of this chapter, which focuses on oil resource policies, the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) as well as Iraq, Iran, and Yemen will be examined in greater depth.! Yemen has been included because it holds a strategic geographical position on the Arabian peninsula in the south and west and, with its population and size, should not be disregarded. Keeping in mind the distinction between production and the proportion of internationally traded oil (that is, exports or oil available to world trade), the Arabian/Persian Gulf producers' market share was 34 percent in 1990. Some predictions are that the region's market share will rise to 42 percent by the year 2000 and as high as 45 percent by 2010. The importance of the Gulf/Peninsula is both clear and compelling (Table 17.1 ). Nonetheless, this area should also be placed within the larger complex of the Arab world in general. Five additional Middle Eastern nations-all Arab-have been included in the statistical compilations and for purposes of comparison: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, and Syria. Algeria and Libya, as members of OPEC, are both significant oil and/or natural gas producers. Egypt, which has a relatively diversified economy encompassing agriculture and manufacturing, relies heavily on oil revenues to meet 241

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its foreign-exchange needs; it was also one of the "front line" or "confrontation" states with Israel until the Camp David Accords in 1979. Syria similarly has a diversified resource base and a traditionally strong, mercantile middle class; it, too, has been a confrontation state in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Jordan was selected because it remains home to the largest number of Palestinians in the region, has lost territory in conflicts with Israel, and offers a special set of political problems.

ECONOMICS AND CONFLICT The most recent military conflict in the Middle East, signaled by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and the subsequent international embargo and military action to force the Iraqis from Kuwait, had a number of economic components. Resolving the aftermath of that conflict as well as reducing the potential for a replay of the 1990-1991 events may benefit from defining and then addressing certain economic conditions and policies. The presence of massive oil reserves spurs the overwhelming interest on the part of the United States, Western Europe, and, indeed, the world in the Arabian/Persian Gulf and peninsula and in that region's stability. Retaining access to this petroleum acted as a balance to a pro-Israeli stance on the part of the United States from 1948 until the beginning of the 1990s. Aside from keeping the Gulf's oil available to the world trade, U.S. and Western policy was aimed at excluding Soviet (that is, communist) control over any part of the region's resources; the end of the Cold War effectively erased this second raison d'etre. As one wag put it, if Kuwait had four times the orange juice reserves of the United States rather than four times its oil reserves, the reaction to the Iraqi invasion would most likely have been neither rapid nor sweeping. For the Gulf states as major oil exporters as well as for other Middle Eastern petroleum producers, the oil-generated governmental revenues and foreign exchange have been crucial to the financing of development. In Iraq's move into Kuwait, there were major factors that led to the nearbankrupt condition of the Iraqi economy. First, the eight-year war (1980-1988) with Iran had required heavy military expenditures that siphoned off revenues from investment in other sectors and required heavy foreign borrowing-much from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Second, the priorities of a military-dominated budget tended to focus job creation in defense and defense-related activities. Thus, demobilization of a million-man armed force would present no small obstacle. Third, oil prices, in both real terms and current dollars, had been declining for much of the 1986-1990 period, with only brief times of respite under conditions of output restraint. The main sources of regional "overproduction"-that is, above the quotas adopted by OPEC-had been the United Arab Emirates, to a lesser extent Kuwait, and on occasion

Middle East Oil Resource Policies Table 17.1

243

Selected Arab Countries and Gulf/Peninsula Oil and Gas Reserves as of January 1, 1992, and Oil Production in 1989-1991 Estimated Proved Reserves Gas Oil (billion (billion barrels) cubic feet)

Oil Output (million barrels/day)

Number of Producing Wells (as of 12/31/90) 1989

1990

1991

Bahrain Iran Iraq Kuwait Neutral Zonea Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates Yemen TotaJC

0.097 92.860 100.000 94.000 5.000 4.250 3.729 257.842

6,250 600,350 95,000 48,000 1,000 9,900 162,000 184,048

317 361 820 363 499 1,237 238 1,235

0.042 2.934 2.830 1.543 0.397 0.623 0.395 4.936

0.038 3.252 2.080 1.079 0.312 0.677 0.394 6.258

0.038 3.342 0.280 0.126 0.130 0.705 0.390 8.158

98.100 4.000 659.878

200,400 7,000 1,313,948

1,178 87 6,335

1.845 0.187b 15.730

2.117 0.189 16.180

2.405 0.201 15.775

Algeria Egypt Jordan Libya Syria Total world OPEc