Congressional Realignment, 1925-1978 9781477304891

Citation preview

Congressional Realignment, 1925 -1978

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Congressional Realignment 1925-1978 by Barbara Sinclair

University of Texas Press, Austin

Copyright © 1982 by the University of Texas Press All rights reserved First Edition, 1982 Requests for permission to reproduce material from this work should be sent to Permissions, University of Texas Press, Box 7819, Austin, Texas 78712. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Sinclair, Barbara, 1940Congressional realignment, 1925 - 19 78. Bibliography: p. Includes index. I. United States. Congress. House-Voting-History. 2. United States-Politics and government-20th century. I. Title. JK I 319·s53 328.73'0775'09 82-4812 ISBN 0-292-70360-0 AACR2

To Howard

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Contents

Acknowledgments ix I. Agenda, Policy, and Alignment Change: A Framework for Analysis 3 2. Agenda and Policy Change during a Realigning Era, 1925-1938 18 3. Expansion of the Political Agenda: Civil Liberties and International Involvement, 1937-1952 37 4. Aftershocks of Realignment and the Return to Normal Politics: Social Welfare, Government Management of the Economy, and Agricultural Policy, 1939-1952 51 5. The Eisenhower Interlude, 1953-1960 73 6. Policy Change without Realignment: New Frontier and Great Society, 1961-1968 90 7. Divided Government in a Time of Turmoil, 19691976 115 8. Democratic Control and Liberal Malaise, 1977-1978 152 9. Agenda, Policy, and Alignment Change: Determinants and Interrelationships 170 Notes 187 References 193 Index 197

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Acknowledgments

In carrying out a study such as this, an author always accumulates multiple debts. Joseph Cooper and David Brady read the entire manuscript; their suggestions immensely improved the book. Many of my colleagues have commented upon various parts of the study, and all contributed something of value. Grace Saltzstein served as research assistant during a part of the study and carried out a huge amount of boring data manipulation with good humor and good sense. Shirlee Pigeon expertly typed more versions of the manuscript than either she or I want to remember. The Academic Senate of the University of California, Riverside, provided a number of intramural research grants without which the study could not have been done. The Inter-University Consortium for Political Research supplied the roll call data but, of course, bears no responsibility for what I have done with them. Finally, I would like to thank Scott Lubeck, my editor, for his support and his patience, and Holly Carver for an excellent job of copy editing. Chapter 2 is a revised version of my article 'Tarty Realignment and the Transformation of the Political Agenda: The House of Representatives, 1925-1938," which appeared in the September 1977 issue of the American Political Science Review. I would like to thank the Review for permission to reprint that material here. The original version of chapters 3 and 4 appeared under the title "From Party Voting to Regional Fragmentation: The House of Representatives, 1933- I 956" in the American Politics Quarterly 6, no. 2, pp. 125146, and is reprinted by permission of the publisher, Sage Publications, Inc. Part of chapter 4 was published as "The Policy Consequences of Party Realignment: Social Welfare Legislation in the House of Representatives, 1933-195 4" in the American Journal of Political Science 22, no. 1, and is reprinted by permission of the University of Texas Press.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Congressional Realignment, 1925-1978

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

1. Agenda, Policy, and Alignment Change: A Framework for Analysis

Energy, inflation, the Middle East. To the regular newspaper reader, it often seems that the central problems facing the country never change and that governmental attempts to deal with the problems consist mostly of sound and fury rather than effective action. On a day-to-day basis, the political agenda does seem to be remarkably stable and the policy process extremely slow. Stuart Eizenstadt recently said, "Moses would have difficulty getting the Ten Commandments through [Congress] today" [Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, October 6, 1979: 2199). Probably every president, at some point during his service, has felt the same about Congress. A government in which powers are formally divided and actually shared among relatively autonomous branches with quite different constituency bases is not designed for swift action. Yet, if we take a longer-range viewpoint, much more change is evident. The issues at the center of controversy certainly have changed, and so has policy. The recent fiftieth anniversary of the stock market crash of 1929 reminded us of just how much has changed. It is still possible to go broke playing the stock market, but, because of governmental regulation, another crash is not possible. Less than fifty years ago, the primary objective of civil rights forces was the passage of antilynching legislation; whether the federal government had any responsibility for helping the millions thrown out of work and made destitute by the Great Depression was being hotly debated; in foreign policy, debate revolved around the question of isolationism. This study focuses upon three aspects of change: change in the political agenda, change in policy outputs, and congressional alignment change. Its purpose is to describe and attempt to explain such change over the 1925 to 1978 period. By the political agenda, we mean the set of problems and policy proposals being seriously debated by the attentive public and by policy makers and the terms of

4

Agenda, Policy, and Alignment Change

that debate. Agenda change can be said to have occurred when new problems are perceived, when new solutions to existing problems are proposed, or when the terms of the debate, that is, the basis of the division between the sides, change significantly. Policy outputs can, at least theoretically, be arrayed along an incremental-nonincremental continuum. Similarity to the existing body of legislation in terms of the problem at which the policy is aimed and the means used is the criterion. Alignment change refers to systematic changes in voting response of groups of House members relative to one another. Agenda, alignment, and policy change are, of course, interrelated but, almost certainly, in a highly complex fashion. Specifying those relationships requires a theoretical framework which will provide concepts and guiding questions. Because of its focus on policy change, Burnham's realignment theory is a useful starting point. Policy Change The policy process in the United States is normally incremental. Yet there are instances of major abrupt policy change. The clusters of policy changes passed during the Civil War era, the New Deal, and the mid 1960s, for example, marked a clear break with the past in terms of the problems attacked or the means specified by the legislation. Such policy change cannot be seen simply as a culmination of a series of incremental changes. The American policy process, then, appears to be characterized by discontinuities; long periods of minimal change are interrupted occasionally by shorter periods of abrupt major change. Walter Dean Burnham has constructed a theory to account for the character of the American policy process. Burnham argues that the pervasive American political ideology based upon Lockean individualism has resulted in nonprogrammatic political parties which cannot anticipate but can only react. Decentralized, undisciplined parties are incapable of planning; they cannot develop and pass programs aimed at problems which are still in an embryonic stage. Because of the nonprogrammatic character of the parties, the American political system is ordinarily capable only of incremental policy change. Incremental change is, however, inadequate to deal with the dislocations produced by a dynamically developing socioeconomic system and, thus, when the strain becomes severe enough, normal politics gives way to a realigning period. Such an era is characterized by high-intensity politics, by "sharp reorganizations of the mass coalitional bases of the major parties'' and results in

A Framework for Analysis "significant transformations in the general shape of policy" "Ideological polarizations and issue-distances between the major parties" are, during a realigning era, "exceptionally large by normal standards" (Burnham 1970: 10). For a short time, under the spur of the crisis, the new majority party may act as a programmatic party More explicitly, the process hypothesized to link realignment in the electorate with policy transformation is as follows. A party realignment is the result of the mass electorate's response to a new and highly salient issue which cuts across old party lines. Such massive changes in voting behavior will occur only if a considerable proportion of the electorate feels that the government should respond to or in some sense handle the new issue. That is, the catalytic event must be perceived as being amenable to government action. The new alignment will be lasting only if the party which benefits from the new issue does respond in a way that the new majority considers satisfactory. A realignment thus has policy implications. Because the issue which precipitated the realignment is highly salient, the majority party must quickly attempt to satisfy its new coalition by responding to the issue. Because the issue is new, a satisfactory response is likely to require fairly radical departures from past policies. If it had been amenable to incremental, politics-asusual solutions, the issue is unlikely to have brought about a realignment. Through its responses to the issue now at the center of controversy, the majority party may create a new political agenda. Not only are certain pieces of innovative legislation passed, but the centers around which controversy revolves are permanently changed. Thus, in the United States, realignments are an important mechanism through which major policy change comes about. Burnham does not explicitly spell out the impact of a realignment upon Congress. Yet, because major policy change requires congressional action, it is important to understand the process by which a legislature ordinarily capable of making only incremental policy change is transformed into a body willing and able to break sharply with the past. Working within the Burnham framework, David Brady (1972, 1973, 1978) has investigated the institutional linkage between electoral outcomes and clusters of policy change. Realignments are, of course, associated with landslide elections. This high interparty membership turnover, Brady argues, has important consequences. He finds during realigning eras a shift in the constituency bases of the parties—a shift which increases policy agreement within the parties and decreases it across party lines. The new members from switched seats are most responsive to the pro-policy

5

6

Agenda, Policy, and Alignment Change

change signal embodied in the electoral outcome; they, more than their party colleagues, feel mandated. In addition, high turnover creates committee instability and, thus, reduces committee insulation. Although clusters of major policy change are associated with realignments, such change has also occasionally occurred during nonrealigning eras. Brady, Joseph Cooper, and Pat Hurley (1977) have extended the work on the relationship between structural variables and policy change beyond realigning eras. They attempt to construct a measure of the potential for major policy change in the House of Representatives. The components of the measure are size of the majority party and cohesiveness of both the majority and the minority party; the measure assumes that the potential for policy change is an interactive function of these components. The measure performs well in identifying those congresses which are generally associated with major policy change. Basing their conclusions on a correlation analysis, the authors show that the potential for policy change is strongly related to electoral outcomes—specifically, to presidential landslides and high interparty membership turnover. They argue that presidential landslides are often perceived as policy mandates. Interparty membership turnover is important because it is associated with changes in the size of the majority party and because new members are seen as more amenable to change than continuing members. Presumably, new members from switched-seat districts increase not only the size but also the cohesion of the majority party. This work implies that the process leading to major policy change is similar in realigning and nonrealigning periods. The authors find that the potential for change is not always realized; that is, their measure identifies certain congresses as having a high potential for enacting major policy change which no one would claim actually did so. Split control of Congress and the presidency is used to account for some of these cases. In another paper, Brady (1976) argues that the lack of a program proposing major policy change is another crucial factor. In some cases, the 1920 elections for example, an electoral landslide carries a mandate against policy change. Combining the work reviewed, one can sketch out the process through which major policy change is hypothesized to occur. Some sort of environmental change of sufficient intensity to affect, usually adversely, the lives of large numbers of people leads to a widespread popular demand for governmental action. The governmental response is perceived to be inadequate and a landslide election follows. The landslide election may, at least during a realigning era, shift the constituency bases of the parties so as to increase policy

A Framework for Analysis

7

agreement within the majority party. It will bring in a large number of new members of the advantaged party who read the election as a prochange mandate. Continuing members of the advantaged party may also feel mandated. The high membership turnover will reduce committee insulation. These changes increase both the size and the cohesion of the majority party. Assuming that the landslide occurred in a presidential election year and, thus, that the advantaged party controls both Congress and the presidency, policy change will follow. The Burnham-Brady-Cooper model, as this hypothesized process will be labeled, will be used to provide questions to guide the analysis. Because the model operates at a high level of abstraction, a closer analysis and an elaboration of the primary causal links and of the underlying assumptions are required. The more than half a century under study includes a realigning era but also other periods of significant policy change and periods of policy incrementalism. What the model implies about the conditions promoting policy stability and policy change in nonrealigning eras, consequently, is of special interest. Agenda Change The political agenda is one of the primary organizing concepts of this study. What does the model say about the sources of agenda change and the relationship between agenda and policy change? For realigning periods, Burnham posits a clear and direct relationship between agenda and policy change. An intense environmental stimulus thrusts a new and highly salient issue to the center of controversy. Thus, the environmental stimulus directly alters the political agenda. The new majority party responds by passing a cluster of nonincremental policy changes which transforms the centers around which controversy revolves. This transformation sets the agenda for the period of normal politics which follows the realigning era. Burnham, thus, posits agenda stability between realigning eras. If by agenda change one means only the most basic transformations, that formulation is useful. Fairly significant changes in the issues at the center of controversy do, however, occur between realigning eras. Although the model provides no guidance as to the sources of agenda change in nonrealigning eras, there are at least two possible processes consonant with the model that could account for such agenda change. Agenda change, by a form of political logic, might evolve out of past policy change. Attempts to solve a given problem by policy change may sensitize decision makers to related problems. Clientele groups benefiting from the policy change as well as those adversely affected may be activated and stimulated to make new de-

8

Agenda, Policy, and Alignment Change

mands. Alternatively, significant agenda change—like major policy change—may require an external environmental stimulus of some magnitude. The political agenda, at a given point in time, consists of the set of issues or problems considered important by those segments of the public with sufficient political clout to persuade a significant subset of political decision makers to promote their concerns. Both within the Congress and in the polity at large, there always exist policy entrepreneurs attempting to thrust new issues onto the agenda. However, the same factors that militate against major policy change act as barriers to significant agenda change. Because a substantial minority is sufficient to produce agenda change while a series of successive majorities is required for policy change, the barriers are not as high for the former as for the latter. Nevertheless, given the competition for space on the live agenda even among established claimants, the barriers are far from negligible. Because agenda change has received so little attention in the literature, examining its sources is important and is one major focus of this study. Returning to the question of the relationship between agenda change and policy change, we have seen that the model posits a clear and direct relationship during realigning eras. The intense environmental stimulus which thrusts the new issue to the center of controversy precipitates a landslide election which leads directly to policy change. The work of Brady, Cooper, and Hurley implies that the relationship can also be direct during nonrealigning periods. Policy change during nonrealigning periods is, however, predominantly incremental; the lack of an intense environmental stimulus plus the structural barriers which are, in part, a function of that lack militate against major policy change. Since the barriers to policy change are higher than the barriers to agenda change, significant agenda change may occur during nonrealigning periods and yet not be followed by policy change. When significant agenda change is not followed by policy change, can the barriers which prevented such change be identified with any sort of specificity? Are structural factors—divided control, size of the majority party—sufficient explanations? If low party cohesion is an important barrier, can this be explained? Does the process by which the new issue got onto the agenda affect the probability of policy change? If agenda change is not always followed by policy change, then policy change may occur without immediately prior agenda change. The problem or issue may have been long on the agenda. In such cases, what accounts for the policy change? Is a change in structural parameters sufficient? That is, might a partisan change in the presi-

A Framework for Analysis

9

dency or a prochange minority becoming a majority in Congress by virtue of gradual turnover produce such change? Or is some catalytic event that increases the saliency of the issue required? Generally, is the process different for old issues than for new issues? Alignment Change The critical intervening variable between agenda change and policy change is the congressional process. The Congress' response to the issue at controversy determines whether policy change occurs. The model's predictions about the nature of that response rest upon two crucial underlying assumptions: the primary determinant of party cohesion or lack of cohesion is external to the legislature, and policy change majorities must be party-based. The Burnham-Brady-Cooper model, then, emphasizes an environmental stimulus as the activator of the process, a landslide election as the mechanism by which the public conveys its demands to government, and the party in government as translator of the public demand into policy outputs. Both of the first two are seen as necessary to major policy change. Much of what we know from individual-level studies of voters and of members of Congress is consonant with the hypothesized process. The average voters' inattentiveness to politics has been profusely documented. Consequently, a strong stimulus is required to deflect them from their normal voting habits. Voters can and do use their votes to send a message but only under the impetus of an intense environmental stimulus which, by its effect on them, increases the saliency of politics (see Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976). Students of congressional roll call voting have emphasized the stability of incumbents' voting behavior. Aage Clausen's policy dimension theory of congressional decision making postulates that "legislators reduce the time and energy requirements of policy decision-making by (I) sorting specific policy proposals into a limited number of general policy content categories and by (2) establishing a policy position for each general category of policy content, one that can be used to make decisions on each of the specific proposals assigned to that category" (1973: 14). Clausen argues that this process militates against change in voting behavior and, in fact, he finds stability over the 1953 to 1962 period. In a similar vein, Herbert Asher and Herbert Weisberg (1978) argue that the voting history of representatives is not only a good predictor but also the major determinant of their future voting behavior. If the voting behavior of incumbent members is highly stable, new members are quite obviously the most likely source of change,· and congresses in which the number

10

Agenda, Policy, and Alignment Change

of new members is large are most likely to produce major policy change. Our knowledge of the Congress also, however, includes elements which square less well with some of the links in the hypothesized process. Considerable evidence indicates that members of Congress are responsive to their constituencies, at least on highly salient issues. Warren Miller and Donald Stokes (1963) found high congruence between constituency policy preferences and congressional voting behavior on civil rights issues. On social welfare issues, high congruence between the member's voting behavior and the preferences of the district majority was found. On foreign policy issues, in contrast, congruence was low. These results suggest that issue saliency is a crucial variable and that, when there is a difference of opinion within the constituency, representatives attend to their reelection constituency—those voters who support them— rather than to the entire geographical constituency. Both John Kingdon and Richard Fenno report that members believe that they m u s t keep their voting record as a whole from getting "too far away from the district" (Fenno 1978: 144). On specific issues, Kingdon (1973) found saliency to the constituency to be a crucial determinant of the extent to which members felt bound to reflect constituency sentiment in their votes. The responsiveness of members to their local constituencies is often used to explain low party cohesion in Congress. Yet the Burnham-Brady-Cooper model posits a rather rigid unresponsiveness under certain circumstances. The landslide elections, which play such a crucial role in the process, are due to a lack of responsiveness. Yet they are assumed to occur during a period of high-saliency politics when members should be receiving strong and clear signals from their constituencies. This seeming paradox raises a number of questions. How stable are congressional voting alignments? The studies from which the generalization concerning high stability is drawn are all based upon one time period—the 1950s and early 1960s. If members are responsive to their constituencies, might not voting behavior change in response to constituency signals? Must the electorate's prochange signal be conveyed by a landslide election? Or, under some circumstances, will enough incumbent members get the message, change their voting behavior, and produce policy change without a landslide? Once it is granted that policy change might occur as a result of behavioral change on the part of incumbent members, explaining

A Framework for Analysis

11

the lack of responsiveness which leads to landslide elections becomes necessary. The unprogrammatic character of American political parties which militates against policy innovation in anticipation of a crisis does not, in any obvious way account for a lack of responsiveness once the crisis has developed and representatives are receiving strong, clear prochange constituency signals. The work of Fenno and of Kingdon offers suggestions which might provide an answer. They show that the member's image of his or her district is a highly differentiated one and that supportive elites in the district play a central role in the member's electoral success and as sources of information for the member about the constituency. Particularly on low-saliency issues, the constituency the member is representing may be the supportive elite. It is possible, then, that these supportive elites play an important role in enhancing or limiting the representative's responsiveness to mass constituency opinion. Depending upon the character of these elites, their influence might result in increased or decreased party cohesion and might work for or against policy change. Certainly, understanding the determinants of alignment stability and alignment change is critical to understanding the policy change process. In order to deal with questions of alignment stability and alignment change, we do require some further theoretical propositions about the determinants of congressional voting behavior. The propositions must be consonant with what we know from cross-sectional studies of congressional behavior and with the basic assumptions of the Burnham-Brady-Cooper model. Given that criterion, the general thrust of representatives' voting behavior is hypothesized to be a function of their constituency. The constituency is not, however, conceptualized as an undifferentiated mass. The constituents of any member of Congress differ among themselves both in their policy preferences and in their attentiveness to politics. If members are assumed to 'Vote their constituency" in order to further their chances of reelection, those constituents most important to that goal should have the greatest influence upon congressional voting behavior. Given a difference of opinion within the constituency, one would expect the members to pay more attention to those people who voted for them than to those who supported their opponent. Operating in an environment of considerable uncertainty, members seem to be risk minimizers. Since this supportive or reelection constituency made each representative's election possible in the past, keeping that segment satisfied is the least risky reelection strategy (see Fenno 1978; Mayhew 1974: 46-49). Members of

12

Agenda, Policy, and Alignment Change

Congress may, of course, work to expand their supportive constituency, but they will not knowingly use strategies which lead to disaffection among previous supporters (hence the attractiveness of constituency service). Given differences in attentiveness among constituents, one would expect those supporters who follow the representative's record closely and who make frequent contact to have greater influence than those who do not. The member knows that such constituents both know and care how he or she votes and is clear about their policy preferences. Furthermore, it is from this supportive elite that campaign workers and financial contributors are likely to come (see Kingdon 1973). If congressional voting behavior is hypothesized to be a function of the views of the reelection constituency and of the supportive elite, what happens when these two groups do not agree? If their opinions conflict, the member's voting behavior should depend upon the saliency of the issue. If the issue is highly salient to the reelection constituency, she or he should vote in accordance with this segment's opinions. Although the representative needs contributions and campaign workers, votes win elections. If, however, the issue is salient only to the supportive elite, one would expect their opinions to be expressed in the member's vote. These hypotheses provide a rationale for the two critical assumptions underlying the Burnham-Brady-Cooper model. Within this schema, the external source of party cohesion is the local constituencies upon which members are dependent for reelection. The level of party cohesion, then, is determined by whether members of a party are receiving congruent or conflicting constituency signals. The second assumption—that policy change majorities must be party-based—is also consonant with the constituency-influence hypothesis. During a realigning era, elections produce a congressional majority party membership for which constituency signals are congruent and dictate policy change. Even years after a realignment, some remnants of common constituency interest are likely to remain. In most districts, elements of the supportive elite will be committed to the party's ideology which grew out of the last realignment. In those districts in which the politically active do include a significant element so committed, recruitment processes are likely to produce candidates who, to some extent, reflect the differences between the parties' ideological thrusts. Because the parties' core constituencies differ, the programs advocated by presidents of the two parties differ and presidential influence, whatever its extent, is

A Framework for Analysis

13

more likely to be effective with members of the president's own party than with opposition party members. Although these factors are not sufficient by themselves to produce prochange party majorities, they do produce considerable party-line voting and their absence makes the likelihood of stable prochange cross-party majorities extremely remote. Because this study focuses upon aggregate change over a long period of time, the constituency-influence hypothesis will not be directly tested. Of central importance is its fruitfulness in suggesting explanations for alignment change and in aiding us to understand the relationship between agenda change and policy change. The Questions This study attempts to answer three interrelated sets of questions, (I) What are the sources of agenda change? Is a significant change in the issues at the center of controversy usually a function of a major and clearly identifiable environmental stimulus, or is the process an evolutionary one? (2) What are the determinants of congressional voting alignments and of alignment change? Just how stable are alignments? What can be said about the impact of the reelection constituency and of the supportive elite? What is the relative contribution of membership turnover and of behavioral change to alignment change? What are the relationships among changes in issue saliency, alignment change, and policy change? (3) What are the determinants of and barriers to major policy change? Does the way in which an issue gets on the agenda affect the probability of policy change? What is the role of structural variables (e.g., majority party size, divided versus unified control of Congress and the presidency)? What is the role of behavioral change among continuing members? Are these factors substitutes for each other, or do they interact? Method and Procedure In order to discuss congressional alignments over a half-century period, a schema for classifying votes into a limited number of issue categories is needed. As many thousands of roll calls were taken, it would be impossible to study them individually. Aage Clausen developed a useful issue categorization in his work on the congresses of the 1950s and early 1960s (1973). Since the period he studied is approximately in the middle of that covered here, his classification seemed likely to be appropriate and was employed. Clausen's five policy domains are government management of

14

Agenda, Policy, and Alignment Change

the economy, social welfare, civil liberties, agricultural assistance, and international involvement. The government management category centers on legislation dealing with the economy and the nation's resources. Examples are business regulation, public works, conservation and environmental legislation, monetary and fiscal policy, and the overall level of governmental spending. In contrast, the social welfare domain includes legislation designed to aid the individual more directly. Aid to education, public housing, and labor legislation are examples. The civil liberties category includes black civil rights and such issues as subversive activities regulation and federal criminal justice procedures. The agricultural assistance domain encompasses all questions of farm policy. The international involvement domain includes all nondomestic policy questions. The first step was to classify the roll calls taken during each Congress under study into these broad policy domains. The possibility that other domains might exist was kept in mind. Although roll calls which did not fit into any of the five categories were located, no set of such votes which could be called a domain was found. That is, no such set of roll calls with common content appeared in a number of congresses. In each of the congresses he studied, Clausen found, within each domain, a preponderant issue cluster which met the criteria for unidimensionality. He showed that, from the 83 rd through the 88th Congress, voting alignments on each issue dimension were highly stable. He labels a set of unidimensional scales a dimension only if the scales evoke stable voting alignments over a number of congresses. The procedure used here to establish the existence of unidimensional clusters of roll calls is similar to that employed by Clausen (see Clausen and Cheney 1970). Roll calls on which the majority was greater than 90 percent were excluded from the analysis. Yule's Q matrices including all roll calls which met the 90 percent criterion were generated for each Congress. The Johnson hierarchical clustering technique was then used (1967: 241-254). A dimension was defined as consisting of a group of roll calls with common content for which the m i n i m u m Yule's Q intercorrelation was .60. This criterion produces clusters with mean intercorrelations of approximately .80. Since this procedure establishes unidimensionality, a simple scoring procedure can be used. In each cluster, one roll call was arbitrarily chosen to establish direction; the direction of the other roll calls was then determined by the sign of their correlation with the

A Framework for Analysis

15

chosen roll call. For members who voted on one-half or more of the roll calls in a given cluster, the percentage of the roll calls on which each voted in the chosen direction was computed and this became the score. The basic procedure having been outlined, it is now necessary to discuss how change is identified. There are several ways in which agenda change can become manifest. The development of a new issue domain obviously indicates agenda change. Because the issue domains are broad, agenda change within an existing domain may also occur. A significant proportion of roll calls on a problem not previously dealt with or on a distinctly different approach to an existing problem also indicates agenda change. Agenda change within an existing domain may but need not lead to the development of a new issue dimension. If we were to follow Clausen strictly, then whenever alignments changed significantly on an existing dimension we should label it a new dimension. Doing so, however, leads to expositional confusion without any commensurate theoretical gain. Thus, only if a dimension appears in a domain in which there was previously no dimension or if an additional dimension appears in a domain previously characterized by one preponderant dimension will the label "new dimension" be applied. Before a unidimensional scale is labeled a dimension, we do, however, require that the voting alignments it elicits not be ephemeral; scales with similar content evoking similar alignments must appear in several congresses before the label "dimension" will be applied. Congressional voting alignments are characterized in terms of the distance between the parties and of regional splits within each party. The emphasis on party requires little justification, given the critical role that party-based majorities play in the Burnham-BradyCooper model. The use of region rather than of some other variable or variables requires more justification. Given that party cohesion has been hypothesized to be a function of the members' constituencies, the variable or variables used should tell us something about those constituencies. But why use region rather than such demographic constituency characteristics as urbanism? Previous studies indicate that region does correlate with vote. (See the review by Cherryholmes and Shapiro 1969: 31-33.) We have evidence for the importance of regional affiliation as far back as the congresses of the early 1800s. James Young contends that the single most important factor explaining voting behavior in these early congresses was membership in boardinghouse cliques; congressmen chose their boardinghouse on the basis of region:

16

Agenda, Policy, and Alignment Change Within the congressional subcommunity, members segregated principally on the basis of sectional affiliation. Legislators had a decided aversion to sharing their mess table, their living quarters, and their leisure hours with colleagues from regions other than their own and much preferred to live in groups restricted to men having approximately the same geocultural affiliation. (1966:98)

A multitude of studies on later periods confirm that region continues to be important and, moreover, that region is a better predictor of vote than demographic constituency characteristics (see especially Clausen 1973: 172). Knowing both a member's party and region tells us a good deal about the likely demographic makeup of the constituency (see Deckard 1976 b: 334). Furthermore, the region variable seems to capture something more than the demographic variables do. Although social scientists have not yet made much progress in operationalizing the term, regional culture does seem to exist. As is perhaps most obvious in the case of the South, the history of an area leaves residuals upon attitudes which are not captured by demographic characteristics. Several practical reasons also suggest the use of region. For much of the period under study, little demographic data on the congressional district level are available. A reasonable demographic characterization of districts would require the use of a number of such variables, and this would complicate the analysis and the presentation of findings. Public opinion data, which will frequently be used to substantiate explanations, are often broken down by region. For the earlier part of the period under study especially, consistent breakdowns on demographic variables which could be matched to those available on the district level do not exist. (See chapter 2, note 1, for the regional categories used in this book.) The procedure for determining alignment stability or change among continuing members is straightforward. If the scale scores on a given dimension of all members who served in both of a pair of congresses are correlated across the two congresses, the magnitude of the resulting correlation allows us to make a judgment about alignment stability. A high correlation indicates that the ordering of continuing members was very similar on the dimension in the two congresses. That is, members who were highly supportive in the first of the two congresses remained so in the second, and the same is true of moderately supportive and unsupportive members. If, however, the correlation is low, we can conclude that the ordering of

A Framework for Analysis

17

members changed; an appreciable number switched position relative to one another. The analysis of alignments, then, begins with an examination of cross-Congress correlation matrices of scores on a given dimension. For each dimension, three matrices are generated—one for all members and one for each of the parties separately. An examination of the latter sometimes provides evidence of alignment change within one party which is obscured in the matrix based upon all members. Each of the correlations in these matrices is based upon the scores of members who served in the pair of congresses across which the correlation is being computed. The influence of party is assessed by the correlation between party and score, that of region by multiple regression analysis within each party. For each dimension and each party, an equation is estimated using scale scores as the dependent variable and the eight regions defined by the Survey Research Center as independent d u m m y variables. Tables of mean scores for the most distinctive regional party groups are presented. This procedure results in a description of alignments over time. For congresses characterized by high membership turnover, the party correlation and regional regression analyses may reveal evidence of alignment change not apparent from inspection of the cross-Congress correlation matrices since new members' scores are, of course, excluded from the computation of the crosstime correlations. The procedure, in addition, provides a test of the adequacy of using party and region to characterize alignments. If the correlation matrices indicate that alignments have changed, the analysis should reveal a change in the party or regional structure of voting. The Burnham-Brady-Cooper model and other previous research lead us to expect stability, not change, to be the norm. In order to locate enough instances of change to allow for analysis, a long time span seemed necessary. A period of more than half a century should provide the environmental variation postulated to be important by the model. There are, however, costs in covering such a long period. Richness and detail m u s t sometimes be sacrificed. Some of the specific explanations offered must be considered tentative. I hope that this study—by its failings as well as any virtues it possesses—will stimulate research in this still neglected area.

2. Agenda and Policy Change during a Realigning Era, 1925-1938

In 1925, the year with which this study begins, the Republicans had, for several generations, been the majority party in the country. This dominance was reflected in a Republican president and a heavily Republican Congress. By 1938, Franklin Roosevelt had twice been elected to the presidency by landslide margins and Democrats had controlled the House since 1931 and the Senate since 1933. In the House of Representatives elected in 1936, Democrats outnumbered Republicans by more than three to one. As subsequent elections were to show, the Democrats, during this period, became the nation's majority party. That a party realignment took place distinguishes the 1925 to 1938 period from the other periods covered in this study. According to Walter Dean Burnham, party realignments are the major mechanism through which rapid and nonincremental policy change occurs (1970: 10). As we are interested in alignment, agenda, and policy change, it seems fruitful to begin this study with a period of party realignment. During realigning periods, the relationship between change in the politically relevant environment and alignment, agenda, and policy change should be especially clear. The Burnham-Brady-Cooper model leads us to expect a relatively abrupt and nonincremental transformation in agenda and policy in direct response to the Great Depression, the event which precipitated the realignment, and to expect the coalition supporting the new agenda to be a partisan one. Realignment and the Changing Regional Bases of the Major Parties Landslide victories and a change in the coalitional bases of the parties are associated with realignments. Data on the regional composition of the major parties in the House show the extent to which the Democratic party changed not only in size but in composition

19

1925-1938

Table 2.1. The Changing Regional Composition of the Democratic Party in the House, 1925-1938: Percentage of Seats by Region Region New England Middle Atlantic East North Central West North Central Solid South Border South Mountain Pacific Democrats as % of House members

69

70

71

Congress 72

73

74

75

12.5 26.1

10.3 32.6

12.5 28.3

25.0 33.7

41.4 47.9

55.2 59.6

44.8 68.1

16.3

18.6

14.0

37.2

71.1

65.6

72.2

24.6 98.9 65.9 28.6 15.8

29.8 98.9 70.7 35.7 10.5

15.8 94.7 51.2 21.4 10.5

31.6 97.9 78.0 28.6 15.8

63.8 100.0 94.9 92.9 65.5

59.6 100.0 92.3 100.0 69.0

53.2 100.0 92.3 100.0 79.3

42.1

44.8

38.2

50.6

72.0

74.0

76.6

during this period.1 Table 2.1 shows the percentage of the seats in each of eight regions held by Democrats over the seven congresses and the percentage of all House seats held by Democrats. During the 1920s, the Democrats were a regional party. In the 69th, 70th, and 71st congresses (1925-1930), almost two-thirds of Democratic House members were from the South, which then held about 30 percent of all House seats. In no other region did the Democrats consistently win as much as one-third of the seats. The magnitude of the change can be seen by comparing these three congresses with the first three New Deal congresses. In the 73rd (1933-1934), Democrats held over half the seats in all regions but New England and the Middle Atlantic. In the other nonsouthern regions, the Democratic percentage varied from 63.8 percent to 92.9 percent. More than half the seats in every region were held by Democrats in the 74th (1935-1936) and, in the 75th (1937-1938), Democrats held a majority in all but New England and over two-thirds in all but one of the other regions. The New Deal realignment changed the Democratic party in the House from a southern and thus heavily rural party to a national party. The Southerners' proportion of the Democratic House membership dropped from almost two-thirds to about 40 percent.

20

Change during a Realigning Era

Government Management of the Economy Clausen's government management issue domain centers on legislation dealing with the economy and the nation's resources (1973: 49-50). Since tax policy and questions about the overall level of government spending are included, roll calls which fall into this issue category have existed since the nation began. By the 1920s, government regulation of business and involvement in public works also had a long history. The existence of roll calls which fall into the domain does not, however, guarantee the existence of a government management dimension. The requisite unidimensionality will result only if members of Congress see the roll calls as similar and thus use similar voting cues. In each of the congresses under study, a predominant government management dimension does emerge. The dimension is stable over the 1925 to 1938 period; the mean intercorrelation of scores is .93. Throughout the period, voting on the government management dimension is highly partisan; the mean correlation with party is .93; the range is .90 to .96.2 This seeming stability hides considerable change in the content of the roll calls over time. In the pre-New Deal congresses, federal spending was not seen as a tool for government management of the economy. The Democrats favored additional government spending when it would directly help their constituents. Money for additional rural letter carriers and for flood control projects on the lower Mississippi, for example, was strongly supported by the heavily rural Democratic membership. When the proposed spending did not benefit their constituents, Democrats tended to interpret it as milking the taxpayer for the benefit of selfish private interests and/or for the benefit of the Republican party and voted in opposition. Thus the Democrats opposed spending several hundred thousand dollars to improve a road in northern Alaska, claiming it would benefit only a few gold prospectors. They attempted to reduce the appropriation for ocean mail service, saying it was simply an unwarranted subsidy for certain steamship companies. On regulatory legislation, varying tinges of populist-progressive ideology are evident. Democrats consistently opposed any legislation which would directly or indirectly weaken the antitrust laws. Thus a proposal to allow pools or combinations for the purchase of raw rubber abroad and another to lift the prohibition on interlocking directorates in banks not in substantial competition with each other brought forth classic populist statements on the House floor. The Democrats opposed some regulatory legislation, arguing that the

1925-1938

21

legislation did not contain sufficient safeguards against monopoly. States' rights and Jeffersonian minimal government arguments, however, also appear. Democrats, for example, opposed additional employees for the Federal Power Commission, claiming it was just the first step toward the creation of a giant bureaucracy. On tax policy, elements of populist-progressive ideology are also evident. While no longer united in opposition to Secretary of the Treasury Mellon's proposals to lower taxes on high incomes, as they had been in the early 1920s, Democrats did oppose Mellon's proposals much more consistently than Republicans (Burner 1968: 162-164). Democrats also favored a graduated corporate tax and attempts to close loopholes in corporate tax laws. Tariff legislation, which was important in the 71st Congress (1929-1930), saw Democrats tending to take the free-trade position on manufactured goods but favoring some protection for farm products and raw materials. Several of the minor government management scales show a stronger populist-progressive thrust. In the 69th (1925-1926), a number of roll calls on allowing branch banking and on radio regulation form a unidimensional cluster. In the 72nd (1931-1932), there appears a cluster of roll calls on limiting the size of loans under the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, for imposing a surtax on high incomes, for congressional review of any tax refund over twenty thousand dollars, and for government operation of Muscle Shoals. These dimensions bring forth moderately similar voting patterns (r = .75). Neither is as highly related to party as are the major government management dimensions (69th, r = .61; 72nd, r = .71). During this period, the Republicans are a probusiness party, as their support for the Mellon tax bills, their attempt to turn over Muscle Shoals to private business, and the sort of regulatory legislation they sponsored show. Thus, in the pre-New Deal congresses, the extent of sentiment for or against big business does somewhat distinguish the parties, but neither party advocated an activist federal role in regulating or managing the economy. With the 73rd Congress, the major government management dimension becomes a New Deal dimension. In the 73rd, a high score indicates that the representative voted for the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority, for the invalidation of the gold standards clause, for Roosevelt's tax bill, for the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, and for the Securities Exchange Act. In the 74th and the 75 th congresses, the major government management dimension included roll calls on Roosevelt's "soak the rich" tax bill, on a controversial corporate tax bill, on the regulation of public utility holding companies (recommittal and final passage), on extending the time in

22

Change during a Realigning Era

which the president could further devalue the dollar, and on the Banking Act of 1935. By and large, the bills included in the dimension were proposed or at least strongly supported by the administration and represent an activist federal government philosophy. Congressional voting behavior on these measures, as shown before, was highly partisan. Thus, while the gross voting response remained stable, the content of the measures included in the government management dimension changed with the coming of the New Deal. The result was a much greater ideological distance between the parties, with the Democrats now clearly supporting an activist position. The average Democrat's support for the party position on the major government management dimension is actually higher after 1930 than in the less ideologically charged preceding years (see the second column of table 2.2). Not all major New Deal measures cluster in the main dimension. In the 73rd, a number of roll calls on the National Industrial Recovery Act form a scale of their own. The same is true of roll calls on the death sentence provision of the public utility holding company bill in the 74th. This bill would, in effect, have outlawed holding companies in the public utilities area (see Schlesinger 1960: 302-325). Both were administration proposals and voting on each is influenced by party, but on neither is the level of party voting as high as on the major government management dimensions. (The correlation with party is .68 for the National Industrial Recovery Act, .72 for the death sentence scale.) These lower correlations are due primarily to the Democrats' lower support for these measures as compared with their support for those included in the main government management dimension. The mean Democratic support on the major dimension for the 73rd through the 75th congresses is 90.1 percent; on the minor scales, it is 74.2 percent. While Democrats did give substantial support on these measures, the figures clearly indicate that Roosevelt by no means had a blank check even from these overwhelmingly Democratic congresses. The party position had shifted toward favoring activist government, but many congressional Democrats were leery of carrying the activist thrust too far. Throughout the period, party is highly related to voting on the major government management dimension and substantially related on the minor ones. But, since the relationship is not perfect, the extent to which there are within-party differences in voting behavior deserves consideration. To ascertain whether there are stable voting patterns on the major government management dimension within each party, we examine the correlation of scores across congresses for Democrats and Republicans separately. If the correlations are

1925-1938

23

Table 2.2. Government Management Support Scores by Party and Region, 1925-1938 Democrats Solid West and North North- Border Ceneast South tral

Republicans West North North- CenAll east tral

Congress

All

69 70 71 72 73 74 75 69, populistprogressive 72, populistprogressive 73, National Industrial Recovery Act 74, public utility holding company

86.4 83.4 84.7 94.8 91.6 89.3 89.4

93.4 62.4 67.9 95.9 88.8 86.5 89.8

85.8 90.6 88.9 94.6 96.4 90.0 94.7

86.7 81.5 93.2 93.3 91.4 91.5 80.7

5.7 14.2 9.9 11.6 10.9 11.8 6.2

3.8 6.8 1.5 4.8 6.0 4.5 3.2

2.6 18.6 23.2 21.0 24.7 35.4 12.1

49.9

3.8

55.0

73.4

6.8

1.6

11.8

71.4

37.4

79.6

90.9

20.3

4.3

38.9

78.9

94.5

77.5

62.2

16.2

10.2

18.2

69.4

60.0

72.4

83.0

8.4

2.5

26.2

high, we can conclude that the party members' voting response was structured and stable during this period. If the correlations are low, either there is little variation in voting behavior among the members of a given party or the within-party structure changes from Congress to Congress. For Republicans, we find considerable structure and stability from the 69th through the 74th Congress. The mean of the correlations is .72. The scores for members in the 75th Congress, however, have a mean correlation with scores in the 69th through 74th of only .31. This indicates that the stable within-party alignments have begun to change or disappear by 1937· The Democrats show much less within-party stability. The mean intercorrelation for the 69th through 75th congresses is only

24

Change during a Realigning Era

.14. The scores for the 70th and 71st congresses correlate at .60, indicating that alignments in those two congresses were similar. The meaning of these results becomes clearer when voting alignments in each Congress are examined. For reasons outlined earlier, alignments will be described in terms of regional patterns. Since we know that region is an important predictor of voting behavior in the contemporary congresses and since the realignment significantly changed the regional composition of the Democratic party, it is important to determine the extent to which regional subgroups display distinctive voting patterns in the 1920s and the effect which the realignment had. Despite the strong relationship between party and vote on the major government management dimension, some regional differences within each party do appear. Within the Republican party, regional differences account for substantially more than 10 percent of the variance in scores in all but one Congress, the 69th. In the p r e New Deal congresses, the greatest differentiation in voting behavior along regional lines occurs in the 70th. Of the major government management scales, the 70th Congress has the strongest populist-progressive content; included are a number of roll calls on tax measures and several on bills which would indirectly relax antimonopoly laws in certain cases. The progressive heritage of many west north central members shows up in their being the most consistently deviant regional grouping (see table 2.2). Prior to the 73rd Congress, east north central members also show a greater tendency than other Republicans to vote with the Democrats, but, in the New Deal congresses, this deviance ceases. Throughout the whole period, northeastern Republicans are most loyal to their party. By the 75 th Congress, this pattern is beginning to change. While west north central Republicans are still more supportive than the average Republican, the difference is not as great as in the previous congresses and Pacific Republicans have become the single most deviant regional grouping. Furthermore, while in the first two New Deal congresses regional differences accounted for more than one-third of the variance in Republican scores, in the 75 th Congress they explain only a little more than one-fifth of the variance. This then explains the lack of continuity in Republican voting alignments, which the correlation matrix revealed. From the 69th through the 71st Congress (1925-1930), Democrats show somewhat greater splits along regional lines than do Republicans. After the Democrats become the majority party in the 72nd, the positions of the two parties are reversed. The strong populist-progressive thrust of the government management dimension in

1925-1938

25

the 70th resulted in distinct regional voting patterns, with the South and the west north central region strongly supportive and the Northeast most opposed. Through the 73rd Congress, when regional splits occur, the same pattern emerges. Only in the 75 th Congress do middle Atlantic representatives become somewhat more loyal than the average Democrat and, even then, they are less supportive of the party position than are southern Democrats. From 1931, when Democrats take control of the House, through 1938, regional differences tend to be muted. The low correlations of scores over time are due to high cohesion among Democrats, not to changing regional voting alignments. For the 72nd through 75th congresses, regional differences account, on the average, for 10.7 percent of the variance in Democratic scores; the comparable figure for the 69th through 71st is 34.2 percent. From 1931 through 1938, Democrats from all parts of the country were highly supportive on the major government management dimensions. On the two minor government management scales with a strong populist-progressive thrust which appear in the pre-New Deal congresses, the west north central and to a lesser extent the southern Democrats were especially supportive of the populist-progressive pole, the northeastern members especially opposed. Within the Republican party, west north central members are most supportive, Northeasterners most opposed. Not surprisingly, given its antimonopoly thrust, the public utilities holding company scale produced similar voting patterns. Scores on this scale correlate at .72 with those on the minor scale in the 69th and at .80 with that in the 72nd. On the National Industrial Recovery Act scale, in contrast, regional voting patterns are quite different. The governmental philosophy underlying this legislation significantly conflicts with a major tenet in populist-progressive thought, and many members were concerned that it, in effect, sanctioned monopoly. On this scale, congressional Democrats from the west north central region and those from the solid South, who on most government management legislation were most supportive of the Democratic party position, were most likely to vote in opposition. This discussion of region should not obscure the predominance of party as a predictor of voting behavior on the government management dimensions. The findings are of interest because they show that the realignment did not immediately transform the congressional parties of the 1920s into parties which, in terms of regional voting patterns, are similar to the parties of today. In the 1920s, Southerners were the most loyal segment of the Democratic party; the relatively few northeastern Democrats were the most deviant

26

Change during a Realigning Era

(see Turner 1951: 136). Within the Republican party, Northeasterners were the most loyal; Midwesterners, especially those from the west north central states, were the most likely to defect from the party position. The immediate effect of the realignment was to alter the party balance massively and, through the infusion of large numbers of new Democrats, to change policy outputs dramatically. New Democrats voted very differently from the Republicans they had replaced. The realignment did not, however, result in any drastic shift in relative party loyalty within either party. On the government management dimension, which includes much of the significant New Deal legislation, the regional patterns of the 1920s persisted through the 1930s. Agricultural Policy Farmers did not participate in the prosperity of the 1920s. With the end of World War I, farm prices dropped drastically while the prices of farm supplies and other manufactured goods remained high. Whether and how farmers should be helped was one of the major controversies of the 1920s (Hicks 1960: 193-200). In Congress, the controversy centered on the McNary-Haugen Plan, which was the brainchild of George Peek of the Moline Illinois Plow Company. ("You can't sell a plow to a busted customer/' he explained.) The McNary-Haugen bill proposed the setting up of a two-price system for agricultural products. Domestic prices were to be kept high by restricting the domestic supply. This would be done, not by production cutbacks, but by dumping abroad whatever could not be sold at the high domestic price. The plan appealed to farmers who sold most of their output in the domestic market; it had little to offer those, such as cotton growers, who sold a large proportion of their crop abroad. All the roll calls included in the agricultural dimension in the 69th and 70th congresses (1925-1928) were on various versions of the McNary-Haugen Plan. A version was defeated in the House in the first session of the 69th, as had been the case in the previous Congress. Both Houses passed the bill in the second session of the 69th and in the 70th; but, in each case, it was vetoed. Its supporters' inability to muster the votes to override the vetoes killed the McNary-Haugen Plan as a viable answer to the farmers' plight. The depression brought a further dramatic drop in cotton and wheat prices; from 1929 to 1933, agricultural prices fell 63 percent (Braeman, Bremner, and Brody 1975: 85). This combined with the great drought of 1930 made it clear even to Hoover that something had to be done and aided in uniting the Democrats. The 71st Con-

1925-1938

27

gress agricultural dimension consists of roll calls on Democratic attempts to strengthen and liberalize Hoover's proposals. To the rather weak Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929 the Democrats attempted to add the debenture plan. An exceedingly complex piece of legislation, this would essentially have used tariff receipts to aid farmers wherever they sold their crops. The Democrats also attempted to increase the amount of money to be spent on drought relief over the amount desired by Hoover. Since at this time drought was especially severe in the lower Mississippi Valley, this legislation was of great interest to Southerners. In the 72nd Congress, no agricultural dimension appears. With the House narrowly controlled by the Democrats and the presidency still Republican, stalemate on agricultural policy had been reached. From the 73rd Congress on, the agricultural dimension centers on the New Deal farm program. Roll calls on the Agricultural Assistance Act, on the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act, on the Cotton Control Act, the Soil Conservation Act, and other similar bills are included. The severity of the farm situation and the wide coverage of the legislation which provided benefits to producers of all farm products assured generally high Democratic party support for this legislation. For farm Congress members, agricultural policy legislation is always a matter of direct constituency interest; and, in a time of agricultural depression, this interest should be intense. As the various pieces of legislation proposed during this period promised relief to different sets of farmers, one would expect a change in voting behavior. In fact, as table 2.3 shows, voting alignments on agricultural policy changed dramatically during the period under study; the dimension in existence at the beginning of the period is completely transformed. In the 69th and 70th congresses, voting on agricultural policy is unrelated to party; from the 71st on, it is highly influenced by party. Within each of these periods, alignments are quite stable. An examination of the matrix of correlations within each party shows considerable within-party stability in voting on the two McNary-Haugen scales (69th and 70th congresses). For Democrats the correlation is .74; for Republicans it is .93. Thereafter, Democrats show little stability.3 In contrast, Republicans display relatively stable voting patterns during the first three New Deal congresses and these within-party alignments are similar to those which appeared in the 69th and 70th Congress.4 Thus, the change in alignment is primarily due to changes in voting behavior within the Democratic party. As one would expect, during the McNary-Haugen period voting

28

Change during a Realigning Era

Table 2.3. The Agricultural Policy Dimension: Intercorrelations, 1925-1938 Congress 69 70 71 73 74 Correlation with party

69

.09

70

71

73

74

75

.85

.14 .21

.48 .54 .94

.41 .47 .92 .88

.33 .43 .89 .82 .80

.13

.93

.90

.89

.76

was largely sectional (see table 2.4). Members from the Northeast opposed the legislation; west north central representatives were its most fervent supporters. The split was most intense within the Republican party; in both the 69th and the 70th Congress, the regional dummy variables account for almost half of the variance in Republican scores. During the New Deal congresses, the Republican party continued to split on farm legislation, with the west north central members consistently most supportive of the Democratic position. Among Democrats, regional splits were much less deep. The solid South had the highest levels of support, but all sections of the party supported the administration program. In the agricultural policy area, regional voting alignments gave way to party voting under the pressure of political and economic events. The change took place before the 1932 election, and the precipitant was the worsening of the farmers7 position in 1929 and 1930. The great Democratic victories of 1932, 1934, and 1936 were, however, required to solidify the new alignment behind a comprehensive and, in terms of the time, radical program. Social Welfare The origins of the welfare state are popularly associated with the New Deal. Prior to the depression, federal legislation designed to help the individual relatively directly was not completely without precedent in American history. Some labor legislation was on the books (Chamberlain 1946: 138-164), veterans' pensions and other social services for certain classes of veterans had a relatively long history; and, in the early 1920s, legislation concerning maternal and infant health needs was passed (Chafe 1972: 27). Nevertheless, di-

1925-1938

29

Table 2.4. Agricultural Policy Support Scores by Party and Region, 1925-1938 Democrats

Congress

All

Northeast

Solid South

West North Central

69 70 71 73 74 75

55.6 64.2 93.9 88.3 90.0 76.8

41.1 38.7 81.7 82.9 79.1 76.6

47.6 59.6 97.2 94.8 99.0 88.6

92.9 93.8 95.6 76.1 90.0 65.8

Republicans

All

Northeast

West North Central

50.1 52.3 8.5 11.6 7.5 9.1

11.3 9.8 1.6 3.2 .7 .9

90.0 91.0 12.6 37.2 27.0 28.9

rect help to individuals was generally not considered within the province of legitimate federal action. During the period under study, the social welfare dimension first appears in the 71st Congress. Roll calls on a veterans' pension bill and on providing additional hospital facilities for veterans are included. More clearly related to the depression are roll calls on taking a census of unemployment and on the use of federal funds for relief. President Hoover favored relying upon private charity to alleviate the misery caused by widespread unemployment and was firmly opposed to a federal "dole" (Leuchtenburg 1958: 258). The Democrats read their gains in the 1930 midterm election as a mandate and, in the 72nd Congress, Speaker John Nance Garner proposed a several billion dollar relief bill. Democratic control of the House and Hoover's statement that the bill was "the most gigantic pork barrel ever proposed . . . an unexampled raid on the public treasury" helped insure that the measure would be perceived in partisan terms (Herring 1932: 862-872). The struggle over relief spending dominates the major social welfare dimension during the New Deal congresses also. While in the 71st and 72nd congresses debate centered around whether the federal government should provide direct relief, in the later congresses the controversy concerned the dollar level. The various relief programs were conceived as temporary measures which would alleviate some of the suffering caused by the depression. During the 74th Congress, two major permanent programs were passed. In terms of the expansion of federal responsibility for

30

Change during a Realigning Era

the welfare of the individual, the Social Security Act and the Wagner Labor Relations Act represented truly nonincremental change, yet both passed with relative ease. The crucial vote on the social security bill in the House, which came on the Treadway motion to recommit with instructions to strike out the old-age insurance system, is included in the major social welfare dimension. The Wagner Act passed the House by a voice vote. The 75 th Congress saw the passage of two more clearly nonincremental programs. The Housing Act of 1937, which committed the federal government for the first time to a long-range program of public housing for low-income families, passed the House easily (276 to 86), though it evoked much more controversy in the Senate (Braeman, Bremner, and Brody 1975: 252). The Fair Labor Standards Act, the first federal wages and hours bill, passed but only after it had been discharged from committee twice; as will be shown below, it evoked a very different alignment from that characteristic of the major social welfare dimension. The social welfare dimension which emerged in the 71st Congress is stable over the 1929 to 1938 period; the mean intercorrelation of scores is .87. Voting on the dimension was partisan at its inception and remained so throughout this period; the mean correlation between scores and party is .89. Democrats were highly supportive; there is little regional variation and no tendency for the South to be less supportive than other segments of the party. While the average support level of Republicans is low, their voting behavior shows considerably more within-party structure and stability than that of Democrats. The mean of the correlations of scores across congresses is .63 for Republicans, compared with .16 for Democrats. Republican support levels do vary along regional lines, with members from the west north central states being the most consistently deviant regional grouping (see table 2.5). The roll calls on the Fair Labor Standards Act do not cluster with those in the major social welfare dimension in the 75th Congress but constitute a distinct scale. Voting on this scale is much less partisan; the correlation with party is only .38. The bill split the Democrats along North-South lines; southern Democrats were much less supportive of the party position than their northern colleagues. On the scale, the two southern regional dummy variables account for almost half of the variance in Democratic scores. Republicans were much less severely split along regional lines, though Pacific and New England members were somewhat more likely than the rest of the party to favor the measure. The 1937 Housing Act also split the Democrats along North-

1925-1938

31

Table 2.5. Social Welfare Support Scores by Party and Region, 1929-1938 Democrats

Republicans

Congress

All

Northeast

Solid South

All

Northeast

West North Central

71 72 73 74 75 75, Fair Labor Standards Act

97.3 96.3 86.8 91.1 83.6

96.9 97.4 93.8 93.3 85.0

97.9 99.7 87.4 95.0 84.3

20.9 11.5 2.6 2.0 7.7

11.9 5.0 .7 .6 3.4

26.6 13.5 7.6 4.8 15.8

77.8

99.0

39.2

43.5

46.1

39.8

South lines, though the division was much less deep. Just under 6o percent of Democrats from the solid South supported the bill on final passage, compared with 94.9 percent of Democrats from other regions. The regional split on the Fair Labor Standards Act had an economic foundation. Southerners feared that a nationwide minimum wage would nullify their region's advantage in attracting industry. For the same reason, some usually very conservative northeastern Republicans supported the bill. The much less intense southern opposition to the housing bill stemmed from the Southerners' belief that the program would aid primarily large northern cities and offered little to rural areas (Braeman, Bremner, and Brody 1975: 252). During the New Deal, Democrats were united and highly supportive of most social welfare legislation. By the 75 th Congress, however, the first beginnings of the regional split, which was to become so pronounced in later years, are evident. On two clearly nonincremental pieces of legislation, both of which were perceived as benefiting urban industrial areas, the rural South defected from the party position. Mechanisms of Change The years 1933 to 1938 were a period of rapid nonincremental policy change. Clearly the large number of new Democrats elected in 1932 and reelected, with reinforcements, in 1934 and 1936 were

32

Change during a Realigning Era

critical to the passage of this legislation. Voting alignments during these years were heavily partisan; the New Deal program was passed by a partisan majority. Brady hypothesizes that the new members brought in by such landslide elections are important not only because they increase the size of the advantaged party. New members are assumed to be more sensitive than their veteran party colleagues to the prochange signal conveyed by the election. Consequently, they should provide greater support for the new policy thrust than do veteran members. To test this hypothesis, support scores on the major government management, social welfare, and agricultural policy dimensions and on several of the important minor dimensions have been computed for veterans and newcomers within each party. Veterans are defined as members first elected in 1928 or before; newcomers are members first elected in 1932 or later. Because the 1930 election is transitional, taking place after the depression had begun and, under that stimulus, resulting in significant Democratic gains, members first elected to the 72nd Congress are excluded. The hypothesis provides little guidance as to what one should expect of Republican voting behavior. On the one hand, as new Republicans were first elected during the New Deal, one might argue that they would be less set in their ways, less committed to the older party positions, and thus more sympathetic to the new agenda. Conversely one might argue that, since they won despite a strong adverse electoral tide, they would see themselves as mandated to oppose the new agenda and thus should have even lower support scores than their senior party colleagues. As table 2.6 shows, there are few consistent differences between Republican veterans and newcomers. Only on agricultural policy do newcomers consistently support the New Deal position more than do veterans, but even here the differences are not impressive in magnitude. More important for the status of the hypothesis is the result of the test on the Democrats. The analysis provides little support for the mandate hypothesis. On the major dimensions, the differences which do occur run counter to the prediction: veterans are more supportive of the new agenda than are newcomers. Only on the Fair Labor Standards Act dimension do newcomers give significantly more support than veterans. The difference is largely due to members from the solid South being a much larger proportion of veterans than of newcomers. This is not, however, sufficient reason for dismissing the difference. Newcomers from the solid South were more supportive on this dimension than veterans from the same region. Thus, while no support has been found for the mandate hypothesis

33

1925-1938

Table 2.6. Veterans' and Newcomers' Support Scores for the New Deal, 1933-1938

Congress Government management 73 74 75 Agricultural policy 73 74 75 Social welfare 73 74 75 73, National Industrial Recovery Act 74, public utility holding company 75, Fair Labor Standards Act

Democrats NewVeterans comers

Republicans NewVeterans comers

95.1 90.8 95.9

90.3 90.1 87.1

10.5 7.5 8.1

10.7 18.0 4.7

90.6 92.5 87.2

84.8 89.3 72.4

8.6 5.5 7.3

14.9 11.2 10.3

88.1 94.7 85.2

85.5 89.8 83.8

2.4 1.3 7.5

2.9 2.6 8.9

86.7

72.3

15.0

15.3

69.1

70.9

5.4

12.0

60.2

82.0

45.8

42.8

in general, it may be that on some particularly innovative programs it does hold. Overall, the marginal differences between the two groups in voting response indicate that the Great Depression and the landslide elections served as strong signals to Democratic veterans and newcomers alike. Agenda, Alignment, and Policy Change in a Realigning Era The 1930s stand as the archetype of the nonincrementai policy change process hypothesized by Burnham, Brady, and other realignment theorists. Certainly the Great Depression was a major environmental stimulus. It had a very direct and drastic impact upon people's lives; by 1933, the unemployment rate was 25 percent. The economic misery led to a popular demand for governmental action. A sharp increase in voter turnout is just one indicator of the increased saliency of politics (Bartley and Graham 1975: 9)·

34

Change during a Realigning Era

When the majority Republicans did not respond, the electorate expressed its displeasure in elections which were landslides for the opposite party The 100-plus majority which Republicans won in the House in 1928 was, in the two subsequent elections, transformed into a 193-seat deficit. In the years between the beginning of the depression and the election of a Democratic president, congressional Democrats did attempt to represent the interests of the depression's victims and, in doing so, were much more willing than the Republicans under Hoover to try new approaches and expand the federal government's responsibilities. One may speculate that the Democrats' status as the minority party and the remnants of populist-progressive ideology, more prevalent among Democrats than Republicans, made the Democratic party more likely to respond to the emergency in an innovative way. These activities by congressional Democrats probably did not have a major effect on the elections of 1930 and 1932. The Democratic gains were probably primarily the result of an anti-Hoover vote. Seemingly, in our system, only a president with his "bully pulpit" can produce in the voters' minds an identification between certain policies and his party. Nevertheless, the elections did carry a policy signal and were interpreted thus by the Democrats. The electoral message was not a demand for or an endorsement of specific policies. Particularly when environmental change is both drastic and abrupt, such specificity is unlikely. For a strong majority to coalesce around a concrete set of proposals takes time. The electoral signal indicated a direction— a large majority wanted an activist governmental response to the Great Depression. It was up to the new majority party to determine the specifics of the response. In the 71st Congress, the small size of the Democratic House majority and an inflexible Republican president served as barriers to significant policy change. In any case, the congressional Democrats' response to the emergency took the form primarily of short-run measures which would alleviate some of the suffering without making structural changes. The Roosevelt administration developed a number of permanent programs which were intended to produce structural changes. Thus, it was Roosevelt who made the Democratic party the party of the new agenda in the eyes of the electorate. In that process, the congressional party was a willing partner. Certainly the Democratic House membership acted as if it perceived itself to be mandated; party cohesion was high. Both new-

1925-1938

35

comers and veterans strongly supported most New Deal programs. The New Deal programs and Roosevelt were immensely popular in both the North and the South (Cantril 1951: 754-755; Hero 1965: 184; Ladd with Hadley 1975: 131-132). By voting for New Deal programs, Democratic members from all regions were responding to strong constituency signals. Between 1933 and 1938, the heavily Democratic Congress passed a large amount of significant and innovative legislation. In the process, the centers around which political controversy would revolve were permanently changed. That the federal government should play a positive role in managing the economy and in protecting individuals from economic forces beyond their control became, during this period, a major tenet of the party's ideology. The Democratic party's response to the Great Depression made it the new majority party. Because of its failure to respond to the crisis adequately, the Republican party lost its majority party status. What led to this serious miscalculation of popular sentiment? In part, it may have been due to the expansion of the electorate. Reliance upon one's previous reelection constituency can prove electorally fatal when masses of former nonvoters suddenly become voters. Surely this is an insufficient explanation. Signs of political upheaval were everywhere. That Republicans did not perceive the need for a fundamental change in policy was probably a result of their reliance upon their supportive elites' views as a surrogate for more general constituency opinion. During a period of low-saliency politics such as the 1920s, one would expect supportive elites to have disproportionate influence. Elites always know and care about what their congressional representatives are doing; when the saliency of politics is at a low ebb, they are the only ones who do. Accustomed to responding to their supportive elites' views, which they undoubtedly shared, Republicans may well have misperceived the extent of change in popular opinion and intensity. Even those who perceived the change may have been restrained by elite resistance. Supportive elites may, then, play an important role in limiting the responsiveness of individual members. In any case, whatever its cause, the lack of responsiveness cost the Republicans dearly. In a time of major crisis, if the party in power does not respond to constituency signals, it will be replaced. If the crisis is sufficiently intense and the new majority party sufficiently responsive, the result is a party realignment. While all the effects of the New Deal realignment on the electorate and on the House took many years to

36

Change during a Realigning Era

become fully manifest, the basic outlines of the domestic political agenda which dominated politics till the mid 1960s took their shape in the 1933 to 1938 period. A sufficiently intense environmental stimulus can produce rapid and radical change even in a political system seemingly designed to further only incremental change.

3. Expansion of the Political Agenda: Civil Liberties and International Involvement, 1937-1952

In his work on the 1950s and early 1960s, Aage Clausen delineated five issue domains. We have shown that two of these—agricultural assistance and government management of the economy—predated the New Deal, though during the realigning period voting alignments on the former and the content of both changed. The social welfare dimension appeared in the 71st Congress (1929-1930), but by the mid 1930s the remaining two, civil liberties and international involvement, had not yet developed. Civil liberties and international involvement are not, of course, completely new issue areas; Congress had a long history of legislating in both areas. However, as will be shown below, the decade beginning in 1925 saw little activity in these areas, and in neither does one find a stable issue dimension. The appearance of the dimensions in the late 1930s and their development through 1952 are the focus of this chapter. Civil Liberties Even if the civil liberties domain is broadly defined, no stable civil liberties dimension existed in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The major related concerns during those years were prohibition and immigration restrictions, and several clusters of such roll calls do appear in various congresses from 1925 through 1936. However, the alignments which appeared on these scales were not stable across time (Sinclair 1977: 949-950). The House took no recorded votes on civil rights for blacks during those years. As the Democratic coalition which emerged from the New Deal realignment included northern blacks, civil rights inevitably entered the political agenda. Roosevelt, keenly aware of the party-splitting potential of the issue, kept his distance from legislative proposals in this area; but congressional Democrats from the Northeast felt no such compunction (Braeman, Bremner, and Brody 1975: 170-217;

38

Expansion of the Political Agenda

Freidel 1965: 71-102). Blacks were now part of their voting constituency and a modicum of attention had to be paid to their demands. Civil rights becomes an element of the House agenda in the 75th Congress (1937-1938). An antilynching bill passed the House but died in the Senate. The 76th House (1939-1940) again passed an antilynching bill and, from 1942 through 1949, the House five times passed bills barring the poll tax as a voting requirement. None of this legislation survived the Senate. A related issue which provoked controversy during the war years was the soldiers voting bills. Southerners were concerned that the measures passed continue the states' rights to regulate the standards of registration and voter eligibility (Young 1956: 82-88). During the 80th Congress (1947-1948), a bill granting home rule to the District of Columbia came to a vote but was defeated in the House. Franklin Roosevelt recommended no civil rights legislation to the Congress, though he did take two important executive actions— the creation of the Civil Liberties Unit in the Justice Department in 1939 and the 1941 establishment by executive order of the Fair Employment Practices Commission. In 1948, Truman did present Congress with a comprehensive civil rights program which included antilynching, a n t i - p o l l tax, and Fair Employment Practices Commission legislation [Congress and the Nation 1965: 1616). The 81st House (1949-1950) passed a watered-down fair employment practices bill as well as an a n t i - p o l l tax bill, but both were killed in the Senate. By executive order, Truman ended segregation in the armed forces and barred discrimination in federal employment and in work done under government contract, but serious attempts to enact civil rights legislation ceased. No such legislation came to a House vote during the 82nd Congress (1951-1952). The Senate filibuster had proved an insurmountable barrier to civil rights forces. Another prominent element of the civil liberties agenda during these years concerned subversive activities. In 1938 the House established its Committee on Un-American Activities (popularly known as HUAAC) as a select committee and, in 1945, made it a standing committee. The continuation of and funding for HUAAC were the subject of numerous roll calls during these years. The Congress also passed major legislation in the subversive activities area. The Alien Registration Act of 1940 required all aliens to register with the government and allowed the deportation of those who had belonged to "subversive" organizations. The Smith Act, as title I of the Alien Registration Act came to be known, made it a crime to advocate violent overthrow of the government. The Mundt-Nixon bill, which required the registration of all communist and commu-

1937-1952 Table 3.1. Civil Liberties Scales: Intercorrelations,

Congress

75

76

Civil Rights 77 78 79

80

81

Civil rights 76 .83 77 .73 .68 78 .81 .70 .83 79 .75 .62 .82 .85 80 .75 .53 .70 .72 .79 81 .79 .70 .85 .88 .90 .80 Subversive activities 75 -.22 -.06 .28 .19 .37 .46 .41 76 .36 .06 .35 .35 .40 .55 .46 78 .25 -.19 .30 .24 .34 .48 .29 79 -.03 -.41 .11 .08 .32 .40 .23 81 .35 .06 .39 .37 .50 .57 .47 Correlation with party -.32 -.81 -.34 -.45 -.22 -.17 -.29

39

1937-1950

75

Subversive Activities 76 78 79

.61 .68 .61 .57

.72 .55 .69

.82 .66

.64

.44

.32

.57

.70

nist-front organizations, passed the House in 1948 but was not considered in the Senate. The 81st Congress passed, over Truman's veto, the Internal Security Act of 1950. Popularly known as the McCarran Act, it was similar to but even more repugnant to civil libertarians than the Mundt-Nixon bill. Two sets of civil liberties scales appear during this period. One consists primarily though not exclusively of roll calls on black civil rights. Such a scale was found in each Congress from the 75th through the 81st (1937-1950). In five congresses, scales consisting predominantly of roll calls on subversive activities and including no civil rights votes appeared. The civil rights scales elicited sufficiently similar voting alignments to be labeled a dimension; the mean correlation across congresses is .77 (see table 3.1). Whether the five subversive activities scales should be considered a dimension is somewhat more doubtful; the mean intercorrelation is .66. For ease of exposition and because, as will be shown below, gross voting alignments on these scales were quite stable, the term "dimension" will be used.

81

.29

40

Expansion of the Political Agenda

That the two sets of scales constitute distinct dimensions is shown by the mean correlation between them, which is only .26. An examination of the influence of party on voting on the dimensions confirms their distinctiveness. The mean correlation with party for the civil rights dimension is -.37, which indicates that on the average Democrats were less supportive of civil rights than were Republicans; for the subversive activities dimension, the mean correlation is .46, indicating the reverse relationship. The matrix of correlations of Democratic scores over time makes it clear that, for Democrats, the distinction between the two dimensions is not sharp, especially from the 77th Congress (1941-1942) on. Voting alignments on the scales included in the civil rights dimension are highly stable, with a mean intercorrelation of .86. The mean intercorrelation of all the scales is a respectable .74, and the mean for all scales from the 77th through the 81st congresses is .80. Thus, for Democrats, voting alignments on the civil rights dimension and on the subversive activities dimension are quite stable and increase in similarity over this period. On the civil rights dimension we would, of course, expect to find a North-South division within the Democratic party, and this is the case. Regional differences, on the average, account for 74.3 percent of the variance in Democratic scores, with the differences between the two southern regions and the rest of the party being responsible for most of the regional variation. Democrats from the west north central states, however, are consistently and significantly less supportive than Democrats from the Northeast and the east north central states, and mountain state Democrats usually are less supportive. On the subversive activities scales, the alignments are very similar but the North-South split is somewhat less intense. The average variance accounted for by region is 45.6 percent. The Republicans show little within-party stability on either the civil rights or the subversive activities dimensions. The mean intercorrelation of scores on the former is .34; on the latter, it is .48. On neither are regional variations of much importance,· region, on the average, explains 5.7 percent of the variance in scores on the civil rights scales and 5.4 percent on the subversive activities scales. The minor regional differences which do occur vary from Congress to Congress. On both of these dimensions, there is usually little variation in Republican scores; high cohesion is the norm. The two dimensions did, however, elicit very different voting responses from the Republican members. Republicans are highly supportive of civil rights legislation. Not until the 79th Congress (1945-1946) do northern Democrats consistently provide signifi-

1937-1952

41

Table 3.2. Civil Liberties Support Scores by Party and Region, 1937-1950 Democrats Congress Civil rights 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 Subversive activities 75 76 78 79 81

Republicans All

All

North

Solid South

59.3 29.6 53.9 49.5 52.6 41.3 57.5

90.0 50.6 80.4 94.5 94.8 88.4 95.2

1.1 3.1 14.7 7.6 3.6 10.4 4.4

94.7 97.9 78.3 87.4 70.3 52.2 81.4

53.2 33.4 48.7 66.4 28.8

63.3 55.7 78.6 90.1 52.8

27.8 7.4 19.9 41.3 .9

10.9 9.5 7.0 10.1 10.5

cantly higher support than Republicans (see table 3.2). On the subversive activities dimension, Republican mean scores are extremely low, frequently below those of southern Democrats. Thus, unlike Democrats, Republicans did not perceive the two major strands of civil liberties legislation during this period as being philosophically similar. On both, the Republican party was cohesive but the direction of the vote depended upon whether civil rights or subversive activities legislation was at issue. In the 82nd Congress, neither the civil rights nor the subversive activities dimension appears. Civil rights forces, convinced by bitter experience that they could not defeat a Senate filibuster, temporarily shifted their efforts elsewhere. The subversive activities dimension disappears for quite different reasons. By 1951, the anticommunist hysteria which had been growing steadily in the postwar years had reached such a level that congressional opposition was cowed into silence. From 1943 to 1946, a roll call on continuing HUAAC as a special committee and three on HUAAC funding drew an average of 74 opposition votes, and the 1945 vote on making HUAAC a permanent committee was really quite close, winning by 208 to 186. From 1947 to 1950, mean

42

Expansion of the Political Agenda

opposition on HUAAC-funding roll calls is only 26 votes and declines monotonically. In 1950, only 36 House members voted to sustain Truman's veto of the McCarran Act. The remainder of the 1950s saw almost no overt congressional opposition to HUAAC or to other subversive activities legislation at the floor stage. The two civil liberties dimensions differ both in origin and in history during this period. The inclusion of northern blacks in the Democratic coalition resulted in civil rights entering the political agenda. The fight over the civil rights plank at the 1948 Democratic convention shows that, by the late 1940s, support for civil rights had become a tenet of liberal Democratic ideology in the North. Republicans did continue to support civil rights legislation. As the party of Lincoln, party tradition pointed toward support. Furthermore, the civil rights area was always a fertile ground for embarrassing the majority Democrats. Despite heavy support from northern Democrats and Republicans, not a single civil rights bill became law during this period. The Senate filibuster gave southern Democrats a powerful weapon. The hopelessness of breaking the southern filibuster led to civil rights temporarily receding from the congressional agenda. Hysteria about subversives has been a periodically recurring phenomenon in American political history. The rapid social change brought about by the New Deal and World War II and the development of the cold war provided conditions conducive to such an outbreak. As always, political entrepreneurs ready to take advantage of the situation appeared. Even in the prewar period, popular support was considerable. In November 1938, 74 percent of those with an opinion approved of the Dies Committee. Support was higher among Republicans than among Democrats (83 and 68 percent respectively approved) and was also high in the South (80 percent approved) (Cantril 1951: 164). Support for the anticommunist witchhunt remained high in the postwar years, with the South and, to a lesser extent, other rural areas showing the least tolerance (Stouffer 1955: 39-46, 109-119). As the hysteria grew in the postwar years, a vote against HUAAC or subversive activities legislation became increasingly difficult to explain, and most House members were unwilling to take the risk. Thus the demise of the subversive activities dimension was due to the withering away of opposition. International Involvement During most of the 1930s, the United States was preoccupied with domestic concerns. Not until the 76th Congress does a sub-

1937-1952

43

stantial cluster of roll calls warranting the designation of international involvement appear. The worsening situation in Europe thrust foreign and defense policy onto the political agenda. The 76th Congress scale includes a number of roll calls on the Neutrality Act of 1939. Between 1935 and 1937, a number of Neutrality Acts prohibiting the export of arms to belligerents in times of war had passed rather easily. Increasing German aggression and the realization that the arms embargo disproportionately hurt Britain and France led to attempts to modify these acts. The first attempt during the 76th proved unsuccessful, but, late in the Congress, the arms embargo was repealed (Divine 1962). Also included in the scale are several roll calls on the bill enacting the selective service system and on defense appropriations. The 77th Congress passed the lend-lease program and further amended the Neutrality Act. Less than three months before Pearl Harbor, the House, by a one-vote margin, amended the Selective Service Act to extend terms of service. During the 78th and 79th congresses (1943-1946), the beginnings of what was to become the postwar foreign aid program took shape. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration was established and Congress voted funds. Congress approved U.S. participation in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund. A large loan to Britain was approved. The 80th Congress passed the Marshall Plan and aid to Greece and Turkey. The selective service system was extended. Most of the postwar aid had been for economic reconstruction. With the passage of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, a shift from economic to military aid begins. The 81st Congress also passed an economic aid bill and, with the beginnings of the war in Korea, funds for that country were voted. In 1951, all foreign aid authorizations were consolidated in the Mutual Security Act. Events, thus, had forced the United States to move from its position of observer in 1939 to that of a central participant on the world stage. When international involvement scales first appear in the 76th and 77th congresses (1939-1942), voting alignments are partisan, with a mean correlation with party of .81. All roll calls included in the 77th Congress scale were taken before the attack on Pearl Harbor and the U.S. entry into the war. The scales in the 78th through 80th congresses (1943-1948), at the height of World War II and the beginning of the cold war, produced much less partisan voting behavior; the mean correlation with party is .42. When the Democrats regained control of Congress in the 81st, partisanship increases but

44

Expansion of the Political Agenda

Table 3.3. The International Involvement Dimension: Intercorrelations, 1939-1952 Congress

76

77

78

79

80

81

77 78 79 80 81 82 Correlation with party

.89 .44 .65 .52 .79 .76

.55 .72 .62 .79 .77

.65 .59 .58 .59

.69 .68 .68

.60 .52

.89

.84

.77

.41

.50

.34

.68

82

.70

does not reach its prewar level; the mean correlation with party for the 81st and 82nd congresses is .69 (see table 3.3). The matrix of correlations of scores over time shows that the two prewar scales evoked highly similar voting alignments, as did the 81st and 82nd Congress scales; in both cases the correlation between scale scores is .89. The mean correlation between these two pairs of scales is .78, which indicates considerable similarity in alignments on all four scales. The 78th through 80th Congress period displays considerably less stability in voting alignments; the mean intercorrelation is .64. Furthermore, the alignments during these congresses are not highly similar to those in either the preceding or the succeeding congresses. Clearly no single stable international involvement dimension existed during the 1939 to 1952 period. An examination of the over-time correlation matrix of Democratic scores shows that within-party alignments were similar in the 76th and 77th congresses (r = .74). During the 78th through 80th congresses, there is little within-party structure to voting on international involvement roll calls; the mean intercorrelation is only .24. The 81 st and 82nd congresses again show considerable structure (r = .76), but the alignments which appear in these congresses show no significant relationship to those characteristic of the prewar congresses (the mean correlation between the pairs of scales is .26). During this period, then, Democratic alignments underwent a transformation. A change in the regional structure of voting accounts for much of this change. In the 76th and 77th congresses, the two southern

45

1937-1952 Table 3.4. International Region, 1939-1952

Involvement

Support Scores by Party and

Democrats Congress

All

76 77 78 79 80 81 82

85.8 89.9 92.6 89.6 88.6 85.8 83.9

North

Solid South

All

77.4 81.9 96.6 89.4 79.2 91.5 96.5

95.1 98.3 88.5 89.1 93.2 75.6 68.5

19.4 30.3 64.0 54.8 65.0 37.0 29.4

Repu blicans NorthPaeast cific

Interior

39.3 42.9 72.5 76.2 90.3 49.4 33.4

8.0 15.3 48.7 34.4 47.2 2.6 16.5

29.8 51.2 87.0 80.6 85.5 51.7 47.9

regions were significantly more supportive of international involvement than were Democrats from other regions (see table 3.4). Regional differences account for an average of 17 percent of the variance in Democratic scores in those two congresses. From the 78th through the 80th Congress, regional differences within the Democratic party are slight, accounting for an average of only 4.1 percent of the variance. With the 81st Congress, regional differences reappear, but now members from the solid South are the least supportive regional group. In the 81st Congress, this regional split accounts for 10.6 percent of the variance in Democratic scores; in the 82nd, it accounts for 23.3 percent. There are no other significant differences among regions. Thus, on international involvement legislation, Democrats from the solid South moved from being the most supportive regional group in the 1939 to 1942 period to being the least supportive group from 1949 on. The declining support of Democrats from the solid South was a generalized phenomenon. Of those members who served in both the 80th and the 81st congresses, 47.4 percent show a drop of 10 percentage points or more in scores from the 80th to the 81st; the scores of only 3.9 percent increased by 10 points or more. In contrast, the scores of 33.9 percent of northern Democrats increased by at least 10 points, while only 1.8 percent show a drop of 10 points or more. All but one southern state delegation show an appreciable decline in support. In the 80th Congress, only two delegations averaged below 90 percent support; by far the lowest delegation support score was the 77.1 percent average of North Carolina. In the 81st

46

Expansion of the Political Agenda

Congress, only one delegation—Alabama—averaged above 90 percent, and the mean support score of half the delegations was below that of the lowest in the 80th. Quite clearly, the drop in support was both a generalized and a behavioral phenomenon. In the 81st Congress, new members actually provided slightly higher support than continuing members (76.9 versus 75.4 percent). Compared with the Democrats, the Republicans show considerable stability in voting on international involvement. Although the same three periods are evident, the mean across-time correlation of .62 for the whole period suggests that no major alignment changes occurred. Within the Republican party, regional voting differences are important and quite stable throughout the 1939 to 1952 period. Regional differences account for an average of 31.4 percent of the variance in Republican scores, and the split is always along coastal versus interior lines. The level of support of both groups of Republicans does vary. During the 78th and 79th, which were war congresses, and the Republican-controlled 80th Congress, both groups' support is much higher than in the preceding or succeeding congresses. The impact of world events can be clearly seen on the origin and development of the international involvement dimension in the 1939 to 1952 period. The dimension developed in response to the situation in Europe. During most of the 1930s, Congress concentrated its time and attention on the domestic scene; large majorities supported a hands-off policy toward Europe, as did the populace (Divine 1962: 180-181). Not until 1939 did a majority become convinced that the conflict in Europe required a change in U.S. policy. Even then the majorities were party-based and were frequently very narrow. Not until Pearl Harbor did a consensus develop. During the war years, party differences on those foreign policy issues which provoked any conflict at all were much less deep. Although Democrats provided greater support than Republicans for the administration's aid program, most measures drew support from Republican majorities. A hot war did not seem the time to oppose the president's foreign policy. Bipartisanship in foreign policy voting continued during the 80th Congress. The cold war was taking shape; the first Republican majority since the 1920s was not inclined to defeat Truman's foreign policy proposals and thereby risk winning a reputation for irresponsibility. When the Democrats regained control in the 81st Congress, partisanship on foreign policy voting again increased. Congressional conflict had, however, been largely narrowed to the details of the foreign aid program. By then, a bipartisan consensus on the contain-

1937-1952

47

ment policy and on presidential supremacy in the foreign policy area was firmly established. In addition to the influence of world events and of partisan control of the Congress, constituency attitudes seem to have influenced voting on the international involvement dimension. During the pre-Pearl Harbor period, Southerners were consistently most favorable toward the United States adopting an activist role in helping the Allies; the public in the midwestern states was least favorable (Hero 1965: 91-103). This pattern of opinion is reflected at least roughly in congressional voting in the prewar period. Southern Democrats are most supportive of international involvement; interior Republicans are least so. The coastal-interior split within the Republican party is evident throughout the 1939 to 1952 period. Regional culture—the greater parochialism and isolation from world events of the small-town and rural people of the interior regions—has frequently been offered as an explanation for this split (Rieselbach 1966: 16-17). Certainly the persistence of this regional split suggests that it is rooted in constituency differences—though it may be the supportive elite rather than the general constituency which is crucial. How is the decline in southern Democratic support on international involvement to be explained? We know that, between the late 1940s and the early 1960s, the southern public became much less supportive of foreign aid (Hero 1965). The first significant drop in members' support came in the 81st Congress and thus seems to predate the change in public opinion. Furthermore, although mass constituency attitudes may be assumed to influence congressional voting on foreign policy during periods when such issues are highly salient, as was probably the case from the late 1930s through the mid 1940s, this is much less likely in noncrisis periods. Most people most of the time are not much interested in or informed about foreign policy. It can be argued that, from the point of view of southern representatives and quite likely of their constituency elites, the issues changed (Hero 1965: 204-205, 380). Charles Lerche contends that Southerners have consistently taken a unilateralist rather than a multilateralist stance. "Unilateralism . . . insists that the United States retain under all circumstances the maximum area of freedom of choice and action in foreign policy, while the multilateralist contends the United States is no exception to the general principle of the interdependence of all states. The unilateralist sees the mission of the United States as requiring the projection of American will and

48

Expansion of the Political Agenda

power to arrange affairs in the world to the liking of the nation; the multilateralist defines the central purpose of American policy as one of adjusting as comfortably and safely as possible to an environment over which the United States can exercise no more than partial control·'' (1964: 262). Thus, Southerners have consistently supported a strong national defense, have believed the U.S. should pursue clear-cut victory in wars cold or hot, and have opposed "giveaways" to countries not sufficiently grateful and subservient. Support for the Allies in the pre-Pearl Harbor period was seen as necessary to protect the United States and was also influenced by the South's traditional proBritish sentiments. Foreign aid in the early postwar years was interpreted in much the same light; protecting Greece and Turkey and helping the European countries in economic reconstruction were aimed at containing communism and thus protecting the U.S. By the early 1950s, the foreign aid program began to look less and less like a temporary emergency measure; to many Southerners, it began to appear increasingly like a "giveaway" to frequently unreliable and undeserving countries for which the U.S. received no adequate return. Between 1949 and 1952, southern Democrats, although considerably less supportive on the international involvement dimension than they had been previously, still provided majorities for the administration's requests. Nevertheless, the seeds for further defections were sown. Conclusion The late 1930s, then, saw a further expansion of the political agenda. The international involvement dimension developed in response to a clear-cut external environmental stimulus—the crisis in Europe. Elections played no role in getting foreign policy questions onto the agenda or in effecting policy change. Foreign policy is preeminently an area of elite influence. Although the public's intense desire to stay out of the mess in Europe probably retarded policy change in the 1930s, the shaping of the response to the European situation in the late 1930s and the development of postwar foreign policy were otherwise little affected by mass public opinion. The public strongly supported the Marshall Plan, but certainly this support was the result of elite influence on public opinion, not the cause of elite actions. In this case, the mechanism through which major policy change came about was not high membership turnover, bringing in new

1937-1952

49

members with new viewpoints, but behavioral change on the part of continuing members. During most of the 1930s, however, Congress ignored the troubled situation in Europe. By attending to domestic concerns rather than to foreign policy, members were responding to constituency signals. Only when the situation in Europe had reached a crisis state did congressional attention shift and policy change come about. There is, during this period, considerable alignment change on the international involvement dimension. Such change is the result, not of membership turnover, but of behavioral change among continuing members. As the environment changed, as peace gave way to war and then again to an uneasy peace and a world transformed, as partisan control of the Congress changed, members altered their voting behavior in response. These findings suggest that, when alignment stability is found, it should not be attributed solely to the character of congressional decision-making processes. Environmental stability is likely to be of at least equal importance. The civil rights area during these years illustrates a quite different set of relationships among agenda, policy, and congressional alignments. The return of civil rights to the active agenda was the result, not of some specific galvanizing event, but of the New Deal's transformation of the Democratic coalition. Northern blacks were now an important component of that coalition, and the Democrats who represented them felt they had to be responsive to their demands. By the late 1940s, the Democratic president also felt thus obligated. The interparty congressional membership turnover which altered the regional composition of the Democratic party in the House thus played an important role in the process by which civil rights returned to the center of conflict. This agenda change was, however, a by-product of the coalitional changes wrought by the realignment. As such, the issue did not of necessity cut along the same lines as the issues which precipitated the realignment. In fact, the issue cut across party lines and badly split the Democratic party. On civil rights, northern and southern Democrats received sharply conflicting constituency signals. Despite intense southern opposition, cross-party majorities in the House repeatedly passed civil rights bills during this period. The filibuster in the Senate proved to be an insurmountable barrier and none of these bills became law. Although public opinion at the national level certainly would not have barred some modest progress, no large segments of either mass or elite felt any urgency about

50

Expansion of the Political Agenda

change. Given the intensity of Southerners' opinion and the apathy of white Northerners, the structural barrier of the Senate rules was sufficient to prevent policy change. Repeated failure, in fact, led to civil rights temporarily receding from the congressional agenda as advocates concentrated their efforts elsewhere.

4. Aftershocks of Realignment and the Return to Normal Politics: Social Welfare, Government Management of the Economy, and Agricultural Policy, 1939-1952

The New Deal transformed the political agenda; the legislation passed permanently altered the centers around which domestic policy controversy revolved. That the federal government did have a role in managing the economy and in protecting individuals against economic forces beyond their control became widely accepted political tenets. By the late 1930s, the sense of urgency which had fueled the New Deal had largely dissipated. Numerous reforms had been passed. The economy, while still not fully recovered, was no longer in danger of total collapse. As the European situation became more and more grave, attention shifted away from domestic concerns. After Pearl Harbor, the war overshadowed all other problems. War production brought prosperity and thus eroded any remaining impetus toward further domestic reform. Although, during the 1939 through 1952 period, it became increasingly clear that the Democrats were now the majority party in the country, the huge congressional majorities of the New Deal were a thing of the past. Republicans made big gains in House seats in the 1938 and 1942 elections and, in 1946, won control. The conditions for further nonincremental policy change were absent, and a return to normal politics was to be expected. How these changes in the political environment affected policy and alignments in the social welfare, government management, and agricultural assistance areas is the subject of this chapter. Social Welfare The landmark legislation passed by the 74th and 75 th congresses (1935-1938), to a very large extent, set the agenda for the

52

The Return to Normal Politics

1939 to 1952 period. The 76th Congress (1939-1940) amended the Social Security Act to include monthly benefits for dependents and survivors. On final passage, the sole roll call vote on the bill, only two members voted in opposition. The overwhelming passage of a major extension in social security by a Congress much more heavily Republican than the New Deal congresses indicates the quick popular acceptance of the program. The Republican-controlled 80th Congress (1947-1948) did, however, pass over Truman's veto a bill which restricted social security coverage by excluding certain workers. Another major revision of social security was passed by the 81st Congress (1949-1950). Coverage was enlarged, eligibility eased, and benefits improved. This bill was passed over opposition and was weaker than the bill President Truman had requested. The 82nd Congress (1951-1952) saw a minor increase in social security benefits, but efforts to extend unemployment compensation to federal workers failed, as they had in previous congresses. Housing legislation was also an important element of the agenda during this period. Here the controversy was more intense and centered on public housing. During the war, Congress passed various emergency housing bills. The Housing Act of 1948 did not include either public housing or urban redevelopment; but the new Democratic majority in the 81st Congress passed the landmark National Housing Act in 1949, which significantly broadened the federal role in this area. The bill established a billion dollar program of urban renewal and broadened the public housing program. The more conservative 82nd House, in contrast, set very restrictive ceilings on new contracts for public housing, though the more moderate Senate provisions eventually prevailed. Numerous attempts to revise the Fair Labor Standards Act were made during these years. The 81st Congress passed the only major revision; the m i n i m u m wage was increased and the child labor prohibition was strengthened, but Congress refused to include the very extensive coverage increase which Truman had requested. Probably the fiercest controversy during this period revolved around labor legislation. Although the Wagner Labor Relations Act had passed without a record vote, it quickly came under strong attack. From the 76th through the 80th Congress, attempts to weaken the provisions of the bill were an important part of the agenda (Millis and Brown 1950: 332-392). In 1943, the Smith-Connally War Labor Disputes Act, giving the government the authority to seize strike-bound plants and to regulate strikes by supervising prestrike plebiscites as well as prohibiting labor organizations from contributing directly to political campaigns, became law over Roosevelt's veto

1939-1952

53

(Young 1956: 63-65). The 79th Congress (1945-1946) passed the Case bill, a forerunner of Taft-Hartley, but the House failed to override Truman's veto. Antilabor forces scored a major victory when the Republican-controlled 80th Congress passed the Taft-Hartley bill over Truman's veto. Labor forces considered the bill a disaster and attempted to repeal it in the again Democratic-controlled 81st but failed. Thus, in the social welfare area, controversy during the 1939 to 1952 period primarily centered around issues brought to the fore by the New Deal. The only really new element that entered the agenda during these years was rent control. The need for controls was fairly generally accepted as a war measure, but, in the postwar years, the extension of rent controls provoked repeated and bitter struggles. The agenda, then, did not change. Judged in terms of policy output, the progressive thrust of the New Deal had lost all momentum by 1940. The 81st Congress, in which the Democrats had a new majority, did pass some major legislation—the 1949 Housing Act and revisions in social security and wages and hours legislation. Even in this Congress, Truman and congressional liberals did not get all they wanted. Weakening compromises were necessary to build a majority coalition and, in the labor legislation area, their efforts failed. With the exception of the 81st Congress, progressive policy change was minimal and, in the labor legislation area, change was, from the liberals' point of view, retrograde. Even in this case, however, the major principle of the Wagner Act—the right of collective bargaining— was not nullified. Both in terms of the issues on the agenda and in terms of policy output, 1939 through 1952 was a period of normal politics. The agenda remained stable and policy change was incremental. A social welfare dimension similar to that delineated by Clausen both in content (including both labor and nonlabor social welfare legislation) and in level of partisanship evoked does not develop until the late 1940s. This mixed content dimension was the result of the merging of two earlier distinct dimensions. As we saw in chapter 2, one major social welfare dimension appears in the 71st through 74th congresses (1929-1936), and voting on the dimension is heavily partisan. In the 75 th a similar partisan dimension appears, but a second dimension on which voting is much less strongly related to party was also found. This second, smaller dimension consists of roll calls on the Fair Labor Standards Act. From the 76th through the 79th congresses (1939-1946), two dimensions appear in each Congress. In terms of the number of roll calls included, neither can be considered a minor dimension. In con-

54

The Return to Normal Politics

tent, the two dimensions are clearly distinguishable. One consists mostly of legislation regulating labor unions, by and large attempts to weaken the Wagner Act, also including attempts to amend wages and hours legislation and to extend unemployment compensation to federal employees; the other includes no such labor legislation and consists of roll calls on relief measures, housing bills, and the like. Voting on the labor dimension tends to be much less partisan than voting on the nonlabor dimension. With the 8oth Congress, the two dimensions merge into one which includes both labor and nonlabor social welfare legislation. During the remainder of the period under study, a single dominant social welfare dimension emerges in each Congress. The relationship between party and voting behavior on the nonlabor and the mixed social welfare scales decreased over time. Roughly two periods are apparent. From the 71st through the 78th congresses (1929-1944), voting on the nonlabor dimension is, with one exception, heavily partisan. The mean correlation, excluding the deviant 77th, is .89. From the 79th Congress on, the relationship is appreciably less, with a mean correlation of .76. This decrease in partisanship cannot be attributed to the merging of the two dimensions. The trend is clearly evident in the 79th Congress, before the two dimensions merge (r = .76). Nor, as the earlier discussion of social welfare legislation during these years showed, can the decline in partisanship be explained by some other obvious change in content. During the early part of the period, various New Deal relief programs are an important component of the highly partisan nonlabor dimension, but some roll calls on social security and numerous votes on housing are also included. By the 77th Congress (1941-1942), voting on relief programs had become much less partisan. This Congress' nonlabor dimension is totally composed of roll calls on relief, yet it is less highly correlated with party than is any other nonlabor scale (r = .55). From the 79th Congress on, relief programs are no longer part of the agenda and, in the postwar congresses, a few new issues—rent control particularly—do come up. With these exceptions, however, the nonlabor content of the dimension is very similar to that in the earlier, more partisan period. A single dominant social welfare dimension, thus, emerged by the 80th Congress. To establish that this is a dimension in Clausen's sense, one must show that it elicited stable voting behavior over time. An examination of the matrix of correlations among scores over time should also clarify the process by which the dimension developed.

1939-1952

55

The matrix indicates that the nonlabor and mixed scales could be considered one dimension over the whole period. The mean intercorrelation of scores is .77. A closer examination of the matrix shows that considerable change did occur. While no abrupt break is evident, the congresses under study can be divided into two fairly distinct periods. The mean intercorrelation for the 73rd through the 78th (excluding the deviant 77th) is .84; the mean for the 79th through the 82nd is .86. The correlation of scores between periods is .72. Thus the 79th Congress seems to be something of a cutting point. By the 79th, voting on the nonlabor dimension was less partisan than in the New Deal congresses, and the two dimensions were about to merge into a single highly stable dimension. A look at the labor-related scales further clarifies the process of change. Voting on all five labor-related scales is relatively stable, with a mean intercorrelation of .74. Voting is not much related to party; the mean correlation with party is .33. In terms of voting alignments, these labor scales are distinct from the nonlabor and mixed scales, but the sort of voting alignment which characterized the labor dimension throughout the period is much more similar to that which appears on the other social welfare scales in the 79th and succeeding congresses than to that in the earlier period. The mean intercorrelation of the labor scales with the nonlabor scales for the 73rd through 78th is .43; for the 79th through 82nd, the mean correlation is .63. Throughout the entire period under study, House Democratic voting on the labor scales shows considerable stability and withinparty structure; the mean intercorrelation is .80. On the nonlabor and mixed scales, Democratic voting behavior changed during the period. The mean intercorrelation for the 73rd through 75 th Congress scales (1933-1938)15 only .23, which indicates little structure. Within the Democratic party, variations in voting over these congresses were more or less idiosyncratic. For the 76th through 78th (1939-1944), the mean intercorrelation is .50, indicating that some within-party structure is beginning to appear. The mean intercorrelation of .79 for the 79th through the 82nd (1945 -1952) shows that by 1945 a stable alignment had developed. The alignment which characterizes voting on the nonlabor and mixed scales from the 79th Congress on is quite similar to that found on the labor scales for the 76th through 79th. The mean intercorrelation between the two sets of scales is .72.l Thus, for Democrats the voting alignment prevalent on labor issues throughout the period came, by the mid 1940s, to characterize voting on all social welfare issues.

56

The Return to Normal Politics

Table 4.1. Social Welfare Support Scores by Party and Region, 1933-1952 Democrats Congress

All

Republicans

Northeast

Solid South

90.7 93.2

89.1 84.3 46.6 77.4 51.1 38.5 56.1 36.8

All

Northeast

West North Central

Nonlabor and mixed

73- 75 (mean)

76 77 78 79 80 81 82

87.2 87.8 59.8 85.6 74.9 59.4 65.3 68.4

98.6 98.5 96.4 71.5 96.9

77.8 65.5 51.3 45.5 56.8

98.8 95.8 95.5 97.9 99.0

77.7

4.1

1.6

9.4

12.1 25.3

11.6 22.6

16.1 24.9 11.1 15.5

9.2

7.7

19.2

23.2

4.1

3.6

4.3

23.3 21.4

24.9 33.1

21.6 14.1

43.5 26.5 43.4 24.5 23.4

46.1 28.4 44.2 25.1 28.9

39.8 21.3 22.5 14.9 21.0

Labor

75 76 77 78 79

39.2 36.7 11.3

8.9 15.6

Given the well-documented North-South split within the Democratic party in the postwar period, one would suspect that shifts in regional voting patterns account for at least some of this change. Table 4.1 shows that from the 73rd through the 76th congresses there was little distinctly regional voting within the Democratic party on the nonlabor dimension. To the extent that there were regional differences during New Deal congresses, northeastern and southern Democrats tended to be more supportive of social welfare legislation than were their party colleagues from other regions. In the 76th Congress, the southern Democrats' mean score is, for the first time, slightly below that of all Democrats. During the 77th and 78th congresses, both solid South and border South Democrats are appreciably less supportive than their northeastern colleagues. With the 79th Congress, a new pattern has become established. From then on, the solid South is by far the least supportive region, with mean

1939-1952

57

scores usually closer to the Republicans' than to those of northeastern Democrats. The southern Democrats' drop in support for social welfare legislation is a generalized phenomenon; it is not restricted to certain state delegations or to a specific group of solid South representatives. In the 79th Congress, for example, the mean support score of the most supportive state delegation, Alabama, was 63 percent—well below the mean for northern Democrats. The mean scores of seven of the ten state delegations dropped by more than 25 percentage points from the 78th to the 79th Congress. A look at Democrats from the solid South who were supportive of social welfare legislation after 1944 again shows that the defection was extremely widespread. Since, in the 79th, 80th, and 82nd congresses, the northern Democrats' mean score was well over 80 percent, Democrats from the solid South with scores of 80 percent or higher were examined. The 79th Congress, the first in which the North-South split is fully developed, saw only twelve Democrats from the solid South scoring at 80 percent or above. Among the high scores were four Texans and two Alabamians. Lyndon Johnson and John Sparkman were two of the seven with perfect support scores. No member from Mississippi, Louisiana, Virginia, or South Carolina was among the high scorers. In the 80th Congress, only Sam Rayburn, former Speaker and then minority leader, scored above 80 percent. In the 82nd Congress, five solid South Democrats—four from Alabama and one from Georgia—attained scores of 80 percent or above. By the late 1940s, the North-South split in the Democratic party on the nonlabor and mixed social welfare dimension was fully developed. Nonsouthern Democrats were highly supportive and showed little regional variation in voting behavior; support from Democrats from the solid South was low. Border South Democrats took an intermediate position. Regional differences on the average accounted for 57.2 percent of the variance in Democratic scores in the 79th through 82nd congresses, compared with 14.1 percent in the 76th through 78th. While, during the early New Deal, Democrats from the solid South were highly supportive of nonlabor social welfare legislation, on the labor dimension they were, throughout the period, by far the least supportive regional grouping. Southern Democrats were usually less supportive than the average Republican, and their support decreases still further after the 76th Congress. Thus, the regional patterns found on the labor dimension are quite similar to those

58

The Return to Normal Politics

characterizing the nonlabor and mixed dimension from the 79th Congress on. Nonsouthern Democrats, however, were not as regionally homogeneous in voting behavior on the labor dimension as they were to become on the combined social welfare dimension. Northeastern and east north central Democrats, who primarily represented urban districts, were consistently more supportive than Democrats from the west north central region and from the West. Compared with the changes in the Democratic party, the changes which occurred within the Republican party are less massive and less clear-cut. Republican voting on the nonlabor and mixed social welfare scales is considerably more stable over the whole period than is the case for the Democrats. If the deviant 77th and 80th are excluded, the mean intercorrelation among scores is .62. Roughly, there seem to be two periods: the mean intercorrelation of scales for the 73rd through 76th is .68; the correlation between the 81st and 82nd is .84·2 Thus, on the nonlabor and mixed scales, moderately stable Republican voting patterns in the early period became highly stable by the late 1940s and early 1950s. On the labor dimension, Republican voting is only moderately stable over the whole period, with a mean intercorrelation of .55. The scales in the 75th and 76th congresses (1937-1940) elicit fairly similar voting responses, with a correlation of .67. The scales which appear in the 77th through 79th (1941-1946) have a mean intercorrelation of .64. The correlation between scales from the two periods is .49. Thus, in contrast to Democratic voting, which on the labor scales remained stable over the whole period, Republican voting patterns changed. In one sense, however, there is similarity between the parties. The voting alignment characteristic of Republicans on the labor scales for the 75 th and 76th congresses is similar to that on the mixed scales for the 81st and 82nd, the mean intercorrelation being .71. For both Democrats and Republicans, when the two dimensions merged and voting patterns stabilized, the new stable voting alignment was similar to that characteristic of voting on the earlier labor scales. While considerably less dramatic than in the Democratic case, a change in regional voting patterns occurred in the Republican party also. In the years before the Great Depression, the Northeast was the center of Republican orthodoxy, while the Midwest, especially the west north central region, was the center of insurgency. This pattern is evident on the nonlabor social welfare scales through the 78th Congress (1943-1944). West north central Republicans are consistently more supportive than northeastern Republicans. With the 77th and 78th congresses, the magnitude of the dif-

1939-1952

59

ference becomes quite small. In the remaining congresses, the relative positions of the two groups are, with one exception, reversed. Except in the 8oth Congress, northeastern Republicans are more supportive of social welfare legislation. By the 82nd Congress, they are by far the most supportive. On the labor dimension, no such switch in relative support is evident. Northeastern Republicans are, throughout the period, more supportive than west north central Republicans. During the late 1930s, however, the difference tends to be relatively small; in the 1940s, the difference in support levels widens. The relative instability of within-party correlations across time for the 73rd through 80th Congress, thus, is due to a change in regional voting patterns within the Republican party. The Midwest, especially the west north central region, which had been the center of progressivism and as such the most deviant regional group, by the late 1940s became the conservative mainstay of the Republican party. Northeastern Republicans became the regional group most willing to support the opposition party's social welfare program. The period under study, then, sees a change in voting alignments within both parties. To ascertain whether the changes documented above were the result of replacement or of changes in veterans' voting behavior, two tests were applied. The first consists of comparing congressional newcomers' support scores with those of veteran members. For Democrats from the solid South, newly elected members tend to be more supportive than veteran members. On the nonlabor and mixed dimension, the mean difference is + 6.2 percentage points; on the labor dimension, the mean difference is + 12.3. Within the Democratic party, no other regional group shows a consistent difference between incoming and continuing members' support scores. The decreasing support for social welfare legislation among Democrats from the solid South is not due to more supportive members being replaced by less supportive members. A form of cohort analysis provides a second test. Members were divided into five cohorts, as shown in table 4.2. The table shows again that newly elected southern Democrats tended to be more supportive than veterans. After one or two terms, however, they tended to vote very much like their more senior colleagues. The decline in support over time occurs within each cohort. Thus conversion, not membership replacement, is the mechanism at work. A comparison of Republican newcomers' and veterans' scores within regional groups shows no trend on the nonlabor and mixed dimension. On the labor dimension, both northeastern and west north central newcomers tend to be more supportive than veterans.

60

The Return to Normal Politics

Table 4.2. Cohort Analysis of Southern Democrats' Support Scores: Nonlabor and Mixed Scales, 1939-1952 Congress 76 77 78 79 80 81 82

1936 or Before 83.5 43.7 77.7 53.6 37.5 58.1 36.6

Scores < of Those First Elected in 1938 or 1942 or 1940 1944 1946 87.4 91.0 75.6 46.9 34.3 54.3 33.4

82.1 50.5 41.6 55.1 38.8

42.7 55.6 35.1

1948 or 1950

57.6 40.8

The mean difference for the Northeast is +9.1 percentage points; for the west north central region, it is +15.9. Of the other major regional groups, the east north central Republicans show a similar pattern, with a mean difference of +16.7. The cohort analysis of northeastern Republicans' scores both on the labor and on the nonlabor and mixed dimensions shows that those first elected in 1938 or later tended to be more supportive than those first elected in 1936 or earlier. The differences are greatest on the labor scales—the mean score on the 76th through 79th congresses labor scales for those first elected in 1936 or before is 21.8 percent; for those first elected in 1938 or later, the mean is 40.5. On the nonlabor and mixed scales, the two groups diverge significantly from 1945 on. Of the twenty-five northeastern Republicans who won seats from Democrats in 1938, nine scored in the top fifth of Republicans on the 79th Congress major social welfare scale, and they account for over half of such high-scoring northeastern Republicans. Membership replacement does seem to have had an effect. Replacement by no means accounts for all the change on the nonlabor and mixed dimension. In the 82nd Congress, northeastern members were the most supportive regional group within the Republican party. While northeastern Republicans first elected in 1936 or before were less supportive than their junior regional colleagues, they were more supportive than representatives from any other region. The change in west north central Republicans' voting cannot be attributed to membership replacement. New members are not less

1939-1952

61

supportive than veteran members. One other possibility remains: a higher rate of attrition among the more supportive members could explain the decrease in mean support. Of the west north central Republicans who served in the 75 th Congress, 41.2 percent were no longer members of the House in the 79th. The mean support score in the 75th of these nonsurvivors is 17.6 percent, compared with a mean of 14.4 percent for the survivors. The difference is too small to attribute the change to selective attrition. Perhaps one concrete example is more convincing than such statistical tests: the mean social welfare support score of Carl Mundt of South Dakota in the 76th and 77th congresses was 47.5 percent; his mean for the 78th through 80th was 12.1 percent. Although some of the change in the case of northeastern Republicans can be attributed to replacement, the same is not true for west north central Republicans or for southern Democrats. The change which occurred is predominantly a behavioral change. Despite stability in the social welfare agenda during the 1939 to 1952 period, a considerable change in voting alignments took place. The causes of this change will be considered later; the result was regional fragmentation of the majority party on a core element of the new political agenda. Government Management of the Economy During the New Deal, the federal government's role in managing the economy expanded immensely. Although conservatives continued in the post-New Deal period to fight a rearguard action against this greater role, a return to the predepression status quo ante was never a politically viable possibility. Even the Republicancontrolled 80th Congress made no serious attempt to dismantle the New Deal in the government management area. Appropriations were slashed; on the third attempt the Congress passed over Truman's veto a tax cut bill considered highly regressive by many Democrats, but these were temporary and marginal changes (Hartmann 1971: 35-40,73-79, 95-96). Although the clock could not be turned back, further expansion in the government's role could be and was halted. With the exception of issues thrust onto the agenda by war and reconversion— most notably price controls—agenda and policy change from 1939 to 1952 was incremental. Congressional conflict revolved around such familiar issues as public works and public power, taxes and spending levels, and business regulation. The 1946 full employment bill in its original form did propose nonincremental change. Insuring full employment was to be made a

62

The Return to Normal Politics

responsibility of the federal government. The bill was emasculated, and the version which became law did not signal a new departure (Bailey 1950: 173-177).3 Fear that, with the end of war production, the economy might again sink into a depression provided the impetus for the bill. When no severe economic downturn materialized, the strong environmental stimulus needed for the passage of such nonincremental legislation was lacking and its proponents were easily defeated. Voting on the government management dimension is heavily partisan during this period, just as it was in previous years. The mean correlation of scores with party on scales for the 76th through 82nd congresses is .92. The across-Congress correlation matrix for all members shows a continuation of the high stability characteristic of the congresses from 1925 through 1938. The mean intercorrelation of scores for the 76th through 82nd congresses is .92; the mean correlation of these scores with those in the 73rd through 75 th is .90. On government management of the economy, these congresses seem to be ones of continuity and stability in alignments. An examination of intercorrelations over time within each party leads to somewhat different conclusions. From the 73rd through the 77th Congress, Democratic voting shows very little within-party stability. The mean Democratic intercorrelation of .24, combined with the very high intercorrelation for all members, indicates that, while Democrats and Republicans consistently voted very differently, variations in voting behavior within the Democratic party from Congress to Congress tended to be idiosyncratic. With the 78th Congress, some within-party stability begins to appear. The mean correlation of scores in the 78th with those in the four succeeding congresses is .49. The 79th through 82nd congresses show considerable stability; if the deviant 81st is excluded, the mean intercorrelation is .72. A look at mean Democratic scores for various regional groups shows that a regional split developed within the party during the 1940s (see table 4.3). In the 76th and 77th congresses, regional variations in voting behavior are minimal, as they were in the 73rd through 75 th. Regional differences, on the average, account for only 10.1 percent of the variance in Democratic scores for the 73rd through 77th congresses. To the extent that regional variations are evident, Democrats from the solid South tend to be more supportive than the average Democrat. In the 78th Congress, the solid South becomes distinctly the least supportive region, and regional differences account for 16.7 percent of the variance. From the 79th Congress on, Democrats from the solid South are consistently much

1939-1952

63

Table 4.3. Government Management Support Scores by Party and Region, 1933-1952 Democrats

Republicans West North

Congress

All

North

Solid South

All

Central

cific

Pa-

All Other

73-75 (mean) 76 77 78 79 80 81 82

90.1 90.5 87.5 75.5 76.3 80.9 81.2 80.0

87.7 91.3 85.8 83.3 86.9 92.8 83.0 94.2

94.0 88.9 90.1 68.3 65.3 72.0 77.8 62.0

9.6 8.8 11.6 5.8 11.7 6.7 18.0 9.9

24.1 10.4 8.8 13.6 11.4 10.7 26.3 8.6

22.1 23.9 20.2 13.3 20.9 14.4 24.2 17.1

5.6 7.2 11.5 3.1 11.0 4.6 15.2 8.7

less supportive than those from other regions. Only in the 81st Congress, in which the Democrats had a new majority were regional differences small. Excluding that Congress, the mean R2 for the 79th through 82nd is .386. The decline in southern support for government management is a generalized phenomenon, just as high support had been in previous years. In the 77th Congress, no southern state delegation has a mean score below 80 percent, and eight of the ten had means of 90 percent or greater. By the 79th Congress, Alabama with a mean of 73.6 percent is the most supportive solid South delegation. Between the 77th and the 79th congresses, the smallest drop in support was the 19.3 percentage point decrease of the Alabama delegation; the support of two state delegations—Louisiana and Mississippi—decreases more than 30 percentage points. As was shown earlier, alignment patterns within the Republican party were quite stable from 1925 through 1936. With the 75th Congress, the within-party structure begins to disintegrate. From the 75 th through 82nd Congress, alignments are much less stable; even with the deviant 77th Congress scale excluded, the mean intercorrelation of scores is only .53. The decline in within-party structure is due to a lessening of the regional split within the Republican party. West north central mem-

64

The Return to Normal Politics

bers, consistently more supportive on the government management dimension in the earlier period, are from 1939 on much less likely to defect from the party's opposition stance. Republicans from the Pacific coast states continue to be consistently and significantly more supportive, but the magnitude of their difference from other Republicans decreases and, in any case, they constitute a very small proportion of the Republican membership. Regression analysis shows the decline in regional differences. In the 73rd and 74th congresses, regional differences accounted, on the average, for 35.2 percent of the variance in Republican scores; for the 75th through 77th Congress period, the figure drops to 23.1 percent and, for the 78th through 81st, it drops to 15.6 percent. In the 82nd Congress, regional differences accounted for 4.5 percent of the variance in Republican scores. Thus, while partisanship remained high on the major government dimension throughout the 1939 to 1952 period, changes in voting patterns within each party did take place. A North-South split developed within the Democratic party; within the Republican party, a regional split from the prerealignment political era gradually faded away. Among the various minor government management scales which appeared, three are of special interest because of their content and because of the alignments they evoked. In the 78th and 79th congresses, scales consisting mostly of roll calls on price controls were found. In the 82nd Congress, a scale composed of roll calls on the Defense Production Act, a comprehensive bill which included price control provisions, appears. Of the legislation in the government management area which reached the roll call stage from 1939 through 1952, that included in these scales was among the most clearly nonincremental. These three scales evoked much less partisan voting behavior than did the major government management dimension. The correlation with party for the 78th Congress scale is .62; for the 79th, it is .68; for the 82nd, .44. Voting alignments on the three scales are very similar, with a mean intercorrelation of .82. The mean intercorrelation of Democratic scores is .76, and the regional pattern which appears is similar to that characterizing the major government management dimension after the 78th Congress but more pronounced. Northern Democrats' average score over the three scales was 90.4 percent; that of solid South Democrats was 40.9. The mean variance accounted for by regional differences is 49.3 percent. For Republicans, the mean intercorrelation of scales is .72, but

1939-1952

65

the regional voting alignments are very different from those found on the major government management dimension. Regional differences account for an average of 18 percent of the variance,· northeastern and Pacific members, with a mean support score of 34.5 percent, were much more supportive of these programs than were their party colleagues from the interior regions, whose average support score was 13.6. In the 82nd, coastal Republicans were more supportive than Democrats from the solid South: 36 versus 22.1. The voting alignment on these scales is of interest because, as will be shown later, it is similar to that prevalent on government management roll calls during the 1960s. Thus, in the controversial area of price controls, we find a preview of later developments. What accounts for the development of the North-South split in the Democratic party and the fading of the regional division in the Republican party? Was the change due to membership replacement, or is it a behavioral change? For Democrats from the solid South, the evidence for a behavioral change is overwhelming. There is no consistent difference in support between incoming and veteran members; the mean difference between newcomers and veterans on scales in the 78th through 82nd Congress is -.5 percentage points. Cohort analysis reveals the same results; the most senior members, those first elected in 1928 or before, show a drop of 22 percentage points in support between the 77th and the 79th Congress. The mean score of those members first elected during the New Deal (1932-1936) drops 25.7 points from the 77th to the 79th Congress. The change in west north central Republicans' voting behavior also seems to be primarily behavioral, although replacement played some role. Members newly elected in 1936, 1938, and 1940 were consistently less supportive than continuing members. (The mean difference is 6.2 percentage points, 5.7 if weighed by the number of newcomers.) Development of the North-South Split in the Democratic Party: A Closer Look During the height of the New Deal—1933 to 1938—very few southern Democrats were nonsupportive on either social welfare or government management. Over the three congresses, an average of 6.7 members scored below 80 percent on the major government management dimension, an average of 14.3 on the major social welfare dimension. If we define as conservative those members who had scores below 80 percent on half or more of their valid scores on the two dimensions in the three congresses, only thirteen members can be

66

The Return to Normal Politics

classified as conservatives. Of these, seven served in all three congresses, three in two, and three in only one. No member from Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, or Mississippi is included. Three of the conservatives are from Virginia; two each are from Texas and North Carolina. Five are from Georgia but, since three of the Georgians served less than the full three terms, the classification is somewhat suspect. The 76th Congress sees solid South Democrats for the first time since the election of Roosevelt score lower as a group on government management and social welfare than northern Democrats. Although the differences are small, an examination of nonsupportive Southerners beginning with that Congress may illuminate the development of the North-South split. For the 76th and 77th congresses, members are classified as conservatives if they scored below 80 percent on half or more of their valid scores on all but the 77th Congress' social welfare scale. As the northern Democratic mean was 71.3 percent, a cutoff of 65 percent was used on that scale. According to this standard, thirty-three members representing twenty-nine districts were classified as conservatives. Four of these were also classified as conservatives during the 1933 to 1938 period. Of the other nine New Deal conservatives, seven did not serve in either the 76th or the 77th Congress; two—both Georgians—were more supportive during the latter than during the earlier congresses. Of the thirty-three conservatives, twenty had served during at least part and seventeen during the entire 1933 to 1938 period and had been supportive during the height of the New Deal. These members, thus, changed their voting response in a way which many of their regional colleagues would do a little later. Examining this group of early conservatives may shed some light upon why the North-South split developed. Of the thirty-three, none are from Alabama or Louisiana; there is one each from Mississippi and Arkansas, and two sequentially represented the same district from Florida. Nine of the conservatives are Virginians, and eleven are Texans. Thus, slightly over 60 percent of the early conservatives came from only two states. By the late 1930s and early 1940s, the Virginia delegation was almost completely conservative; only one member did not fall into this category. The large Texas delegation, in contrast, was split. That the preponderance of these early conservatives came from only two states is suggestive. Virginia, during this period, was run by a conservative, business-oriented oligarchy. V. O. Key (1949) entitles his chapter on Texas 'The Politics of Economics." In 1944, Sam

1939-1952

67

Rayburn narrowly survived a tough primary fight against an opponent lavishly financed by banking and utility interests (Mooney 1971: 196). Aided by extremely low voter turnout in Virginia and by a strong push toward industrialization in Texas, business elites seem to have reasserted their influence earlier in these two states that in the rest of the South. Agricultural Policy Even more than in other areas, the New Deal set the basic agricultural policy agenda for years to come. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, passed after the 1933 act had been declared unconstitutional, established the price support and production control system which, in general outlines, is still the basis of agricultural policy today [Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1973: 288). During World War II, farm policy was not at the center of controversy. As demand increased, farm surpluses vanished and prices rose. The postwar years saw debate focusing upon the choice between high, rigid support prices and lower flexible supports. Democrats generally favored rigid supports, Republicans lower flexible support prices. Truman did ask the 80th Congress to pass a farm bill incorporating flexible supports (Hartmann 1971: 154-156). The president's proposal failed due to both Democratic and Republican opposition and, by the 81st Congress, Truman had changed his position. The Brannan Plan, which the president proposed to the 81st Congress, took a radically different approach to the farm program. Under the plan, farmers would receive direct government income payments when prices fell below a certain level; farm products would sell to consumers at supply-and-demand prices. A limit on payments to large farmers was also included. The one roll call on the plan produced a very different alignment from that prevalent on other agricultural legislation. With the plan's defeat in the House, Truman's attempt to reorient agricultural policy was dead. In each of the seven congresses from 1939 through 1952, one dominant agricultural policy scale appears. The scales very clearly are a continuation of the dimension which first appeared in the 71st Congress. The mean correlation of scores across congresses is .85 for the 73rd through 82nd. Voting continues to be partisan; the mean correlation of scores with party for the seven congresses is .83. Democratic voting on agricultural policy continues to show no within-party structure. The mean intercor relation of scores for the 73rd through 82nd Congress is .10. Republican voting, in contrast, is much more structured. If the deviant 79th Congress scale is ex-

68

The Return to Normal Politics

Table 4.4. Agricultural Assistance Support Scores by Party and Region, 1939-1952 Democrats Congress

All

North

Solid South

All

76 77 78 79 80 81 82

75.4 85.6 80.2 88.4 91.3 83.8 86.4

77.9 78.7 88.6 91.2 94.7 70.7 87.1

72.6 93.3 71.6 88.1 89.6 98.5 84.7

17.2 34.7 5.4 2.8 9.8 34.6 23.9

Republ icons West North NorthCeneast tral 13.7 9.0 2.9 2.7 2.8 6.2 13.1

32.6 71.0 14.7 5.7 27.8 79.3 43.8

All Other 15.4 39.6 4.1 1.8 9.2 43.2 25.3

cluded, the mean intercorrelation of scores across congresses for the 73rd through the 82nd is .54/ In neither party is there any indication that voting alignments are changing during this period. Regression analysis shows that, on the average, regional differences account for 15.6 percent of the variation in Democratic scores for the 76th through 82nd congresses—not a great deal higher than the 10.9 percent for the three New Deal congresses. As is indicated by table 4.4, both northern and southern Democrats were generally highly supportive of legislation to aid the farmer. Within the Republican party, voting continues to be along regional lines. Members from the west north central states are consistently more supportive than Republicans from other areas. Excluding the deviant 79 th, the mean variance accounted for by regional differences is 34 percent for the 76th through 82nd congresses— slightly higher than the 32.8 percent mean for the three New Deal congresses. West north central Republicans' voting behavior on agricultural legislation is directly linkable to constituency interest. The west north central states are, other than the South, by far the most heavily agricultural area of the country. Using 1950 census data, David Mayhew defined farm districts as those in which 10 percent or more of the total population are involved in farm work. According to that criterion, about 70 percent of west north central districts in the 1950s were farm districts (Mayhew 1966: 18).

1939-1952

69

In the late 1940s and during the 1950s, the conflict on agricultural legislation centered around the choice between rigid and flexible supports. J. Roland Pennock has classified states as to whether their predominant constituency interest was in flexible or rigid support prices. All the west north central states fall into the rigid or mixed category, as do all the states of the solid South (Pennock 1956: 194-195). On one crucial roll call during this period, the normal pattern of a divided Republican party facing a united Democratic party does not appear. A watered-down experimental version of the Brannan Plan was brought to the floor as part of a farm bill in the 81st Congress. The only roll call vote was on a substitute which did not include the plan. On that roll call, all but four Republicans voted in favor of the Gore substitute and thus against the Brannan Plan. They were joined by approximately two-thirds of the Democrats from the solid South. Only eight northern Democrats voted against the Brannan Plan. The Brannan Plan seems to have been opposed both by those who thought it would be too costly and by those who feared it would not provide sufficient assistance to agriculture, as annual congressional appropriations would be required (Pennock 1956: 173). It has also been suggested that Republican opposition stemmed, in part, from a fear that the combination of high farm income and low consumer prices promised by the plan would make the Democrats politically unbeatable. Thus a Michigan Republican called the plan a "bold, pernicious, bald-faced attempt to buy millions of votes with public money" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1949: 133). Whatever the reason for the Republicans' opposition, it should be noted that, in one of the few cases in which a Democratic president supported a farm program unpopular with the southern farm block, the congressional party split. Democrats from the solid South opposed Truman, while northern Democrats overwhelmingly supported him. This roll call suggests that northern Democratic support for farm bills is, to a considerable extent, motivated by loyalty to a president of their own party. The defeat of the Brannan Plan also illustrates that, lacking an intense environmental stimulus, even strong presidential support is not sufficient to bring about nonincremental policy change. Conclusion During the 1940s and early 1950s, the domestic political agenda was remarkably stable. The war added rent and price controls to the agenda; but, to a very large extent, the New Deal policy innovations

70

The Return to Normal Politics

set the agenda for this period. Conflict centered around attempts to extend or reverse the New Deal policy thrust. Policy change was incremental. The two attempts at clearly nonincremental change— the Full Employment Act and the Brannan Plan—failed. The political environment was not conducive to further rapid or radical change. War production brought prosperity which was maintained in the postwar years. Although the war also brought social change, most people were so much better off than they had been in the 1930s that conflict on economic issues lessened in intensity. The strong environmental stimuli which are often associated with agenda and nonincremental policy change were absent. Structural parameters, which are in part a function of the immediate political mood, were also not conducive to policy change. The Democratic congressional majorities were much narrower than they had been during the height of the New Deal and, in the 1946 election, Republicans won control of both chambers. These substantial new Republican majorities, however, faced a Democrat in the White House. On the basis of structural parameters, the 81st Congress was the most likely to innovate. The 1948 elections returned Truman to the White House and brought in a very sizable new Democratic majority. In fact, the 81st Congress did pass some important extensions of New Deal programs, but none of the legislation enacted can reasonably be considered to represent nonincremental change. It was the 81 st which defeated the Brannan Plan. Structural factors were not the only barrier to further policy change. During this period a regional split developed within the Democratic party. Southern Democrats became, during these years, much less supportive of the New Deal policy thrust. The resultant decline in Democratic party cohesion not only militated against further nonincremental policy change but often made expanding old New Deal programs much more difficult than passing new ones had been in the 1930s. Thus, although the political agenda was stable, voting alignments did change. Most dramatic is the development of the NorthSouth split within the Democratic party on social welfare and, to a lesser extent, on government management of the economy. Within the Republican party, west north central members became, relative to the rest of the party, less supportive of the Democratic position on social welfare and government management. Northeastern Republicans, the most conservative regional group in the late 1920s and most of the 1930s, became, by the early 1950s, the most supportive of social welfare legislation. Alignment change, during this period,

1939-1952

71

was primarily the result not of membership turnover but of behavioral change among incumbent members. The North-South split in the Democratic party is so familiar to us that we political scientists have largely been blind to the need to explain it. The reasons for the development of the split are, however, far from self-evident. Southern members' high support for New Deal programs in the 1930s was consonant with public opinion in the South. Opinion surveys from the 1930s and early 1940s show Southerners to be the regional group most supportive of New Deal programs. In 1936, for example, support for a compulsory old-age insurance program was higher among southern whites than among the inhabitants of any other region. In 1939, Southerners were much more likely than Northeasterners to believe that the administration's policies toward private business were about right or too friendly. A 1940 poll showed Southerners more favorable toward business regulation than were the residents of other sections. Only on questions pertaining to labor unions was the South consistently more conservative than the North (Ladd with Hadley 1975: 131-132). If, during the late 1940s and early 1950s, southern public opinion had swung sharply right, the increased conservatism of southern representatives could be explained as a response to constituency opinion change. Surveys indicate, however, that, except on race, there were no significant regional attitude differences on domestic issues during those years (Key 1961: 101-105). The explanation seems to lie in the change in political atmosphere generally and in a change in the southern economy coupled with the special character of southern politics. Public opinion polls show some overall decline in support for further policy departures in the late 1930s (Cantril 1951: 978-979). Many people, mass as well as elite, perceived the emergency to be over and believed further change to be unnecessary. Many members of Congress and presumably many ordinary folk saw the New Deal programs as simply a pragmatic response to a crisis. The permanently enlarged role of the federal government was a not always welcomed by-product. Certainly the support of Democratic members for New Deal programs during the 1933 to 1938 period did not necessarily imply an ideological commitment to continued expansion of the federal government's role. When the war brought prosperity, those whose support for the New Deal rested upon the emergency argument could see little rationale for further policy innovation. And, just as important, prosperity probably brought a decline in the saliency of domestic poli-

11

The Return to Normal Politics

tics. In the postwar years, the South began to industrialize. We know that industrializing elites tend to be strongly opposed to government intervention of the sort supported by liberals in the post-New Deal years (Ladd with Hadley 1975: 138-139). When the forces of industrialization were added onto the older agrarian conservatism, the remnants of agrarian radicalism in the South were largely extinguished. Southern elites in the postwar years had a heavily conservative cast (Key 1949: 655-656). When these developments are considered in the light of the special character of southern politics, an explanation for the NorthSouth split begins to emerge. The low level of political participation in the South gave elites in the area greater influence than they had in the rest of the country. When the saliency of politics to the mass public drops, elite influence should be further magnified. The lack of a rich organizational life in the South—particularly the lack of unions—limited the avenues of expression for those opposed to the economic elite. In many northern districts, a supportive coalition could be based upon blue-collar workers and union leaders. In the South this was not possible. The difference in interest between agrarian and industrializing areas on the one hand and industrialized areas on the other may explain the changing alignments within the Republican party also. According to Everett Ladd, 'The key point seems to be the essential harmony between the thrusts of the New Deal and the conditions of advanced industrialism" (1975: 141). By the late 1940s, northeastern Republicans seem to have realized that the New Deal's social welfare programs were a force for stability in their heavily industrialized area. The resulting softening of their opposition led to Northeasterners becoming the most deviant section of the Republican party on social welfare. During the late 1930s and early 1940s, the conditions which had made nonincremental policy change possible rapidly faded. Elections reduced the large Democratic majorities; the New Deal's legislative successes and the war stilled the strong prochange constituency signals which had welded congressional Democrats into a cohesive prochange majority. As prosperity returned and the saliency of politics to the mass public decreased, the heterogeneous Democratic coalition forged by the New Deal realignment began to split along particularized constituency interest lines.

5. The Eisenhower Interlude, 1953-1960

The 1952 elections ended twenty years of Democratic control of the presidency. Republicans won both the presidency and control of the Congress for the first time since 1928. The shift in partisan control did not, however, signal a basic change in policy direction. In the fight for the presidential nomination, the moderate wing of the Republican party had emerged victorious. Republican majorities in the House and Senate were narrow. If dreams of repealing the New Deal still lurked in some Republican hearts, political reality militated against their expression. The 1954 elections saw Democrats narrowly regain control of the Congress. This was now a Democratic party fairly evenly divided between an increasingly conservative southern wing and the northern liberals. Not until recession sharply increased the Democratic majority in the 1958 elections did the northern wing gain a clear numerical preponderance. Even then, their committee positions gave Southerners power out of proportion to their still very considerable numbers. The 1950s saw few burning issues which involved large numbers of people. Two wars followed by general prosperity had led to a period of low-saliency politics. By the mid 195o's, the cold war had become routine. Public pressure for domestic policy departures was minimal. Opinion polls showed that majorities favored such new social welfare programs as aid to education (Sundquist 1968: 443). But such opinions did not seem to be intensely held. In only one area— civil rights—did a popular movement demanding change emerge in the 1950s.

Social Welfare The social welfare agenda during the Eisenhower years shows strong continuity with that of the Truman administration. Housing, labor, and minimum wage legislation remained important elements.

74

The Eisenhower Interlude

In the housing area, the controversy over public housing continued. Eisenhower, during the early years of his presidency, supported moderate housing legislation, including some public housing. The housing bills passed by the 83rd and 84th congresses (1953-1956) were somewhat weaker than Eisenhower's requests. The 85th House (1957-1958) killed an omnibus housing bill on the floor. By the 86th Congress (1959-1960), the president had changed his position and recommended terminating or reducing most housing programs. This heavily Democratic Congress passed a strong bill, which Eisenhower vetoed. A second Democratic bill was also vetoed before a compromise was worked out. During the 84th Congress, a bill increasing the m i n i m u m wage to one dollar an hour passed with relative ease, even though the increase was higher than that which Eisenhower had requested. Congressional Democrats in the 86th Congress wrote a strong bill increasing the m i n i m u m wage and the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act. On the House floor, a weakening substitute supported by the administration was adopted on a close vote. The Senate version was much stronger and the bill died in conference. Publicity about labor racketeering led to further legislative attempts to regulate labor unions. In the 85th Congress, the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act was killed on the House floor by those who thought it not strong enough. Over bitter labor opposition, the 86th Congress passed the Landrum-Griffin bill. In the social welfare area, the only new element added to the agenda during the 1950s was aid to education. While the topic had been hotly debated in the postwar years, the House first voted on a general aid-to-education bill in the 84th Congress. The bill at issue had been written by the Democrats and was considerably stronger than Eisenhower's proposal. Furthermore, an antidiscrimination amendment had been added to the bill, and this contributed to its defeat in the House. The 85 th House also killed a general aid-toeducation bill, but the National Defense Education Act passed both houses and became law. Designed to improve the teaching of science, math, and foreign languages at all school levels, the act was, in part, a response to sputnik. In 1960, the House finally passed a general aid-to-education bill. The School Construction Assistance Act of 1960 provided $1.3 billion in grants for school construction. Despite an antidiscrimination amendment having been added to the bill, it passed the House on a close vote. The bill did not, however, become law. The Rules Committee refused to let the bill be sent to conference and thus killed it. In terms of both political agenda and policy output, the 1950s are

1953-1960

75

characterized by continuity rather than change. Aid to education does enter the live agenda but fails to be enacted. During each of the four Eisenhower congresses, one major social welfare scale was found. In the 86th Congress, a smaller scale which is dominated by aid-to-education roll calls also appears. The mean correlation with party of scores on the major scales is .54, .62 if the 84th Congress scale is excluded.1 Since the comparable mean for the 79th through 82nd congresses was .76, we see that party has become somewhat less important in structuring the vote. The means are, however, somewhat misleading; there is certainly no abrupt break between the two periods. The 82nd Congress scale correlates with party at .62. Voting on the aid-to-education scale in the 86th is less partisan; the correlation is .35. The correlation of scores across congresses for all members and within each party shows stability within the period and continuity with the previous period. For all members, the mean correlation of scores for the 83rd through the 86th is .81; the mean correlation of these scores with those for the 79th through 82nd congresses is .79. The magnitude and similarity of these correlations indicate no change in alignments. Democratic alignments became somewhat more stable and structured during the 1950s. The mean intercorrelation of scores is .87, while the mean across periods is .82. Republicans voting on social welfare legislation, it was shown in the last chapter, became quite stable with the 81st Congress. The mean correlation of .75 between the last two Truman congresses and the Eisenhower congresses indicates considerable continuity in alignments; the mean for the 83rd through 86th, which is .71, indicates both continuity and considerable stability. A deep split between Northerners and Southerners characterized Democratic voting on social welfare during the 1950s, as table 5.1 shows. The split dates back to the mid 1940s, but it does seem to have intensified somewhat during the 1950s. The percentage of variation in scores accounted for by regional differences averaged 57.2 for the 79th through 82nd congresses; the average rises to 63.1 percent for the 83rd through 86th congresses. The aid-to-education scale in the 86th shows the same North-South split but in an even more exaggerated form. Regional differences account for 73 percent of the variance in scores. Another perspective on the North-South split results from looking at those solid South Democrats who were supportive of social welfare legislation. As before, members with scores of 80 percent or above are considered supportive; since the mean score for northern

76

The Eisenhower Interlude

Table 5.1. Social Welfare Support Scores by Party and Region, 1953-1960 Democrats

Republicans All NorthAll east Other

Congress

All

North

Solid South

83 84 85 86 86, aid to education

63.3 76.4 70.0 76.2

91.4 99.1 91.7 91.6

31.8 45.8 42.5 48.8

15.1 60.3 35.1 20.2

23.4 73.1 48.2 28.9

10.5 54.7 28.0 15.2

70.5

93.9

26.6

43.8

62.9

32.8

Democrats is consistently above 90 percent, this is a quite generous criterion. Most striking is how few Democrats meet the criterion. The m a x i m u m number is 19 in the 84th Congress; the average over the four congresses is 10.5. Since the number of Democrats from the solid South was greater than 90 in each of these congresses, the proportion who were supportive of social welfare legislation was, on the average, only slightly more than one in ten. Some variation by state is evident. Alabamians are always well represented among high supporters; in none of the congresses do we find even one member from Mississippi or South Carolina among the high scorers, and only once does a Virginian appear. By the early 1950s, northeastern Republicans were consistently and considerably more supportive of social welfare legislation than Republicans from other areas, and this continues during the Eisenhower years. Compared with that in the Democratic party, however, the Republicans' regional split is rather mild. For the 83rd through the 86th congresses, regional differences account, on the average, for 14.1 percent of the variation in Republican scores. Still this is very considerably above the 4.9 percent average for the 77th through 81 st congresses, and the average difference between the mean scores of the two groups is 16 percentage points. The 86th Congress aid-to-education scale split the Republicans along the same lines, but, as was true for the Democrats, the split was deeper. Regional differences account for 26.9 percent of the variation in scores. The extent to which even moderate support for social welfare legislation had become a northeastern phenomenon within the Re-

1953-1960

77

publican party can be seen from an examination of the fifth of Republicans with the highest scores. During the 83rd through 86th congresses, approximately 60 percent of these high scorers were northeastern Republicans, who then made up about one-third of the Republican membership. Furthermore, during the four congresses, 36 percent of northeastern Republicans were included in the most supportive fifth of the party; for Republicans from other areas, the average was 12.3 percent. These figures are quite similar to those for the 82nd Congress, which again shows continuity.2 New to the period under study is the fact that the northeastern Republicans7 mean score twice exceeds that of Democrats from the solid South. The Eisenhower years were a period of relative quiescence domestically. Under such circumstances, the political agenda and policy outputs tend to change only incrementally and alignments tend to remain stable. The minor changes which did occur seem to be the result of processes set in motion in an earlier period. Government Management of the Economy In content, the scales constituting the government management dimension during the Eisenhower years show strong continuity with the previous period. In the 83rd Congress, sharp conflict erupted over a tax bill which many Democrats claimed benefited primarily the rich by providing a credit for divided income. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was debated in terms of the familiar public versus private power division. Both the 83rd and 84th congresses saw debate on the sale to private industry of government rubber plants. Under the impetus of the 1958 recession, congressional Democrats made a series of attempts to enact massive public works programs. The 85 th Congress passed a bill authorizing $1.6 billion in new river, harbor, and flood control funds. Intended by the Democrats as an antirecession measure, it was vetoed by Eisenhower. During the same Congress, the Senate passed the community facilities lending bill, another Democratic pump-priming measure. Coming to the House floor after the 1958 elections, the bill was killed when the rule was defeated. The 86th Congress passed two big public works appropriations bills. Eisenhower vetoed both but the Congress, much more heavily Democratic following the 1958 elections, overrode the second veto. The House, however, failed to override the president's veto of another antirecession measure which increased funds for sewage treatment plant grants. Depressed-areas legislation did represent a departure from purely

78

The Eisenhower Interlude

incremental policy making. During the postwar years, it became increasingly clear that, even when the overall employment level was high, concentrated pockets of severe unemployment remained. In 1955 the Democratic majority of the Joint Economic Committee proposed a program to aid such chronically depressed areas. The major elements were long-term credit and technical assistance for new industry, a public works program, and subsidized retraining of jobless workers (Sundquist 1968: 63). The Senate in 1956 passed depressed-areas legislation. In the House, the Rules Committee refused to clear the bill for floor action, and an attempt to bring it up under suspension of the rules was abandoned when the administration indicated its opposition (Sundquist 1968: 65). During the 85th Congress and again in the 86th, Democrats passed area redevelopment legislation, but in both cases the bill died after a presidential veto. The roll call votes on area redevelopment legislation do not form a part of the major government management dimension. In the 85 th Congress, a scale including votes on area redevelopment, the community facilities lending bill, and the debt limit was found; in the 86th Congress, a scale consisting exclusively of area redevelopment roll calls appears. An 87th Congress scale is sufficiently similar in content and in alignment patterns that it will be considered here. That scale includes roll calls on area redevelopment, which finally was enacted, on the debt limit, and on two antirecession measures—the Public Works Acceleration Act and grants for sewage treatment plants. The latter was a section of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, which also strengthened federal enforcement procedures against polluters. The Eisenhower years, then, saw no major policy change in the government management area. On area redevelopment, the most innovative proposal added to the agenda during the 1950s, congressional liberals were unable to overcome an increasingly conservative administration armed with the veto power. Voting on the government management dimension remained heavily partisan; the mean correlation of scale scores and party is .93. The matrix of across-Congress correlations for all members again suggests both stability and continuity. The mean intercorrelation of scores for the four Eisenhower congresses is .93, and the correlation of scores for the 83rd through 86th congresses with those in the four preceding congresses is .91. In the government management area, as we discovered before, the dominance of the party cue can obscure changes in within-party

1953-1960

79

Table 5.2. Government Management Support Scores by Party and Region, 1953-1960 Democrats

Republicans

Congress

All

North

Solid South

All

Northeast

East North Central

83 84 85 86

78.1 85.1 91.4 86.7

91.0 91.6 94.2 90.0

62.8 77.3 88.0 80.3

5.5 12.4 14.2 20.6

5.7 12.0 14.3 23.0

4.3 8.7 10.2 16.2

alignments. An examination of the across-time correlation matrices within each party shows that this is again the case. During the Truman administration, it will be recalled, the Democratic party displayed considerable within-party structure to voting alignments. The Eisenhower years see some decline in structure; the mean intercorrelation of scores is only .56. On the major government management dimension, the Democrats' North-South split moderates somewhat during the Eisenhower years—particularly during the 85th and 86th congresses (see table 5.2). Regional differences account,on the average, for 25.2 percent of the variance in Democratic scores, compared with an average of 38.6 percent for the 79th, 80th, and 82nd congresses. The measures which came to a vote during the administration of a status quo-oriented president were not as divisive as those at controversy during the administration of his activist predecessor. For Republicans, the first two Eisenhower congresses are a continuation of the preceding period of relatively weak within-party alignment structure. The correlation between scores in the 83rd and 84th congresses is .50—quite close to the mean intercorrelation of .53 for the 75th through 82nd congresses. The mean correlation between these two sets of scores is .54—which indicates again a relatively weak structure but no discontinuity between the two periods. With the 85 th Congress, considerably more structure becomes evident; the correlation between the 85 th and 86th Congress scales is .71. The .42 mean correlation of these scores with those for the 83rd and 84th does indicate a discontinuity in alignment patterns.

80

The Eisenhower Interlude

Regression analysis shows that, during this period, a new regional split is beginning to develop within the Republican party Although region continues to have little explanatory power, in both the 85th and the 86th congresses Republicans from the east north central states score significantly lower than other Republicans on the government management dimension. The area redevelopment scales provide an interesting contrast with those composing the major government management dimension. Voting is less heavily partisan; the mean correlation of party with scores is .60. The three scales do evoke quite similar voting alignments; the mean intercorrelation is .78 for all members, .74 for Democrats, and .61 for Republicans. On the area redevelopment scales, Democrats are deeply split along North-South lines (see table 5.3). Regional differences account, on the average, for 42 percent of the variance in Democratic scores. Thus, although the Eisenhower years saw a decline in the North-South split on the major government management dimension, the one truly innovative proposal divided the party more severely than it had ever been on government management legislation. Area redevelopment legislation also split the Republican party along regional lines. Regional differences account, on the average, for 25.4 percent of the variance in scores. An alignment pattern quite different from any that has appeared on the government management dimension characterizes voting on area redevelopment. Northeastern members and those from the border South states are much more supportive than other Republicans; in the 86th Congress, they are more supportive than Democrats from the solid South. To members representing districts which the program would benefit, constituency interest outweighed the Republican administration's opposition as a voting cue. On government management, as on social welfare, the 1950s were a period of stability. Policy change, to the extent that it occurred at all, was incremental; and alignments show both continuity with the previous period and considerable stability during the Eisenhower years. On government management, the beginnings of a new split within the Republican party are evident, but the form this will take is still unclear. In the government management area, one innovative program did pass the Congress. Like aid to eduation, area redevelopment legislation was a product of the Congress, not of the administration, specifically a product of the northern liberal wing of the Democratic party. As was also the case with general aid to education, area redevelopment did not become law during this period; it was killed by

1953-1960

81

Table 5.3. Area Redevelopment Support Scores by Party and Region, 1957-1962 Congress 85 86 87

Democrats Solid South North 93.9 94.5 90.6

62.3 32.8 66.4

Northeast

Republicans Border South

All Other

65.0 37.4 53.0

63.5 55.0 46.1

34.5 12.6 28.7

a presidential veto. These two attempts at nonincremental policy change share another similarity: both split the parties more deeply than did the older, more familiar programs included in the major scales. Agricultural Policy During the Eisenhower administration, the conflict over high, rigid supports versus flexible supports continued. By 1953 farm surpluses were again becoming a major problem, and the new administration was determined to reorient farm policy. According to Ezra Taft Benson, Eisenhower's secretary of agriculture, "price supports should be used to provide insurance against disaster,'' not "to encourage unnecessary production" [Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1973: 289). The Agricultural Act of 1954, which provided for lower flexible supports, was close to Eisenhower's request. The 84th, 85th, and 86th congresses were controlled by the Democrats and were much less amenable to presidential leadership. Bills restoring higher support prices were regularly passed and routinely vetoed. Voting alignments on agricultural policy during the Eisenhower years are quite stable; the mean intercorrelation of all members' scores across the four congresses is .88. The influence of party on voting is similar to that in previous years; the mean correlation of scores with party is .81. The correlation between the scores in the last two Truman congresses and those for the 83rd through 86th, which is .76, does suggest that some change in alignment may have occurred. The matrix of correlations of Democratic scores across the Eisenhower congresses shows that, for the first time since the coming of the New Deal, Democratic voting on agricultural policy is

82

The Eisenhower Interlude

structured and stable. The mean intercorrelation is .61, compared with a mean of .10 for the 73rd through 82nd congresses. Republican voting behavior also shows an increase in structure and stability during the Eisenhower years. The mean intercorrelation of scores is .74, compared with a mean of .54 for the 73rd through 82nd congresses. A consistent and stable regional split characterizes Democratic voting behavior during these four congresses. Northeastern Democrats are consistently and significantly less supportive on agricultural policy than other Democrats. East north central Democrats are less supportive in three of the four congresses. On the average, regional differences account for 27.6 percent of the variation in Democratic scores, compared with an average of 14.6 percent for the 73rd through 82nd congresses. As table 5.4 shows, northeastern Democrats' support drops sharply with the 83rd Congress. Without a direct constituency interest in agricultural legislation and now without a Democratic president requesting their support, northeastern Democrats seem no longer willing to vote overwhelmingly for farm legislation. Within the Republican party, no change in alignments takes place; the regional split which has been shown to be characteristic of Republican voting on farm legislation simply gets deeper. Regional differences in voting behavior, on the average, account for 42.4 percent of the variation in Republican scores, compared with 30 percent for the 73rd through 82nd congresses. West north central Republicans are consistently and significantly more supportive of agricultural assistance legislation than are other Republicans. For members representing farm districts, constituency interest is of obvious importance as a determinant of their vote. Members from nonfarm districts have much greater freedom in deciding how to vote on agricultural legislation. Most of the time, few of their constituents will know or care. The most clearly disinterested group within the Republican party—Northeasterners—follows party and undoubtedly ideological inclination and opposes generous farm legislation. As long as the president is a Democrat, the disinterested northeastern Democrats show loyalty to their president by providing high support. Under a Republican president, their support decreases. The party's traditional position, however, continues to influence voting even in the absence of a Democratic president asking for support. During the Eisenhower years, northeastern Democrats, most of whom had no constituency interest in farm legislation, were about as supportive on the agricultural assistance dimension as were

83

1953-1960 Table 5.4. Agricultural Assistance Support Scores by Party and Region, 1939-1960 Democrats Congress

All

76-82 (mean) 83 84 85 86

84.4 82.6 90.0 82.8 81.8

North- Solid east South 84.4 55.4 77.8 58.2 63.7

85.5 93.4 94.2 94.5 89.9

Republicans West North

All Other

All

Northeast

Central

All Other

84.0 84.4 92.5 82.9 84.5

18.3 17.6 19.6 21.2 12.5

7.2 5.1 5.1 11.4 6.3

39.9 63.3 54.2 61.6 42.3

19.8 13.9 19.8 18.2 10.5

west north central Republicans, many of whom had a very direct constituency interest at stake. International Involvement As was the case in the domestic areas considered so far, the foreign policy agenda during the Eisenhower years shows strong continuity with that of the preceding period. The change in administrations brought no basic change in foreign policy. Despite the rhetoric of Secretary of State Dulles, the containment policy developed under Truman continued in effect. In Congress, conflict on foreign policy was confined to the annual fight over the mutual security bill. Eisenhower strongly favored foreign aid, and majorities in the Congress supported him. That the support was frequently not enthusiastic is shown by the reductions made in Eisenhower's foreign aid requests; cuts averaged 21.4 percent for the 1953 to 1960 period, compared to 12.1 percent for 1948 through 1952 (Congress and the Nation 1965: 185). During the Truman administration, it was still possible to think of foreign aid as a temporary response to an emergency situation; by the mid 1950s, it had quite clearly become a permanent program. The shifting locus of aid toward the developing countries seems also to have influenced some representatives. Lacking a constituency, foreign aid did not become more popular over time. While the issues did not change, the voting response did. During

84

The Eisenhower Interlude

the Eisenhower years, party was no longer related to voting on international involvement. The mean correlation of party with scores on scales for the 83rd through 86th congresses is .11. When compared with the .69 mean for the 81st and 82nd congresses or even with the .42 figure for the 78th through 80th, the decline in the importance of partisanship is striking. Voting alignments during the four congresses are quite stable, with a mean intercorrelation of scores of .83. That a change in alignments accompanied the change in administrations is shown by the correlation of scores across periods. The mean correlation of the scores in the last two Truman congresses with those in the four Eisenhower congresses is .51. An examination of the cross-time correlation matrices for the two parties separately shows that within-party voting alignments are more stable during the Eisenhower years than previously. For Democrats, the mean intercorrelation of scores is .82, compared with .76 for the 81st and 82nd congresses; for Republicans, the comparable figures are .86 and .81. The correlation of scores between these two sets of congresses (.69 for Republicans, .64 for Democrats) indicates that within-party alignments did change. With the change in administrations, Republican support for international involvement legislation increases and Democratic support drops (see table 5.5). Even during the Eisenhower presidency, the Democratic party provides greater support for the president's foreign aid requests than do members of his own party, but the distance between the parties decreases. Mean Democratic support in the 81st and 82nd was 84.9 percent and decreases to 69 percent in the 83rd through 86th period. Mean Republican support increases from 33.2 percent in the 81st and 82nd to 53.5 percent during the Eisenhower years. The Democratic drop in support is not solely due to Democrats from the solid South. In the 85th and 86th congresses, northern Democrats are also considerably less supportive than they had been during the Truman administration. Solid South Democrats' support, however, decreases so much more sharply that the regional split within the party is deeper during the Eisenhower years than previously. Regional differences account, on the average, for 37.5 percent of the variance in Democratic scores, compared with 17 percent for the last two Truman congresses. All segments of the Republican party increase their support on the international involvement dimension. During the Eisenhower presidency, northeastern Republicans are about as supportive as northern Democrats; the former group's mean for the four con-

1953-1960

85

Table 5.5. International Involvement Support Scores by Party and Region, 1949-1960 Democrats

Congress

All

81-82 (mean) 83 84 85 86

84.9 73.0 77.1 57.6 67.6

Republicans

North

Solid South

94.0 92.2 95.8 81.2 83.9

72.1 50.2 49.9 29.0 35.7

All

Northeast

cific

Pa-

Interiora

33.2 58.5 58.2 59.7 66.9

49.8 85.2 79.5 87.7 96.6

41.4 75.7 77.9 67.7 76.0

19.6 37.1 39.5 39.7 47.7

Republicans from the solid South are not included.

gresses is 87.3 percent, compared with the northern Democratic mean of 88.3 percent. Pacific Republicans, while still more similar to northeastern than to interior Republicans, are now distinctly less supportive than the former. (The mean difference in scores over the four congresses is 13 percentage points.) Interior Republicans are by far the least supportive group but are much more supportive than they were during the Truman administration. The Republican party, then, continues to split along regional lines on the international involvement dimension; on the average, regional differences account for 26.2 percent of the variance in scores. With the election of a Republican president, the division remains but all groups' support levels increase. Presidential influence on voting behavior is clear in the international involvement area. Members do seem inclined to support a president of their own party at a higher level than they support an opposition party president. The party of the president is, however, only one of several determinants of the vote on international involvement. The change in administrations did not transform withinparty voting alignments. The North-South split in the Democratic party, which had developed during the later Truman years, continued and intensified under Eisenhower. Although, with the election of a Republican president, Republican support increases, the coastal-interior split remains. Civil Liberties In foreign policy and in most areas of domestic policy, the Eisenhower years were a period of stability if not stagnation. Not

86

The Eisenhower Interlude

only was there little policy innovation, but with a few exceptions the agenda itself remained constant. Few new problems gained widespread attention; few truly innovative programs won a place on the live agenda. Civil rights provides the major exception to these generalizations. The 1954 Supreme Court decision declaring school segregation unconstitutional and, later in the decade, the growing civil rights movement thrust the issue to the center of controversy. In 1953, few would have predicted these developments. The 83rd, like the 82nd Congress, saw no major civil rights legislation come to the floor of the House. Various attempts to add antidiscrimination amendments to other legislation were made during these congresses, but none came to a record vote. In 1956, the Eisenhower administration for the first time asked Congress for civil rights legislation. The proposal called for the creation of a bipartisan Commission on Civil Rights to investigate grievances, for the authority to use civil procedure to protect civil rights, and for broader statutes to protect voting rights [Congress and the Nation 1965: 1620; Sundquist 1968: 226). After much parliamentary maneuvering, the House passed a bill incorporating these points, but the Senate did not act. The 85 th Congress passed the first civil rights bill since the p o s t - C i v i l War Reconstruction period. A relatively weak voting rights bill, this was nevertheless a break though of major proportions. While the bill had no appreciable effect on black voting in the South, a report issued by the Civil Rights Commission created by the act did have an important impact. The report's exposure of voting discrimination in the South provided impetus for the passage of the 1960 Civil Rights Act (Sundquist 1968: 244-245). That bill, although it strengthened voting provisions somewhat, was considered a defeat by many civil rights advocates. It did not include authorization for the attorney general to initiate suits to seek injunctions against deprivation of civil rights, a provision which had also been deleted from the 1957 act. Nor was the Civil Rights Commission's proposal for federal voting registrars incorporated into the act. Yet, despite the liberals' unhappiness, these measures did represent progress. The impasse on civil rights had been broken. These civil rights acts were at the center of the civil liberties agenda in the 84th through the 86th Congress, but other issues also came to a vote during those years. The 1954 school desegregation decision, as well as other rulings concerning federal-state relations and antisedition laws, led to various attempts to curb the power of

1953-1960

87

the Supreme Court (Congress and the Nation 1965: 1442). Such preemption doctrine legislation came to a vote in the 85th and 86th congresses, but in neither case was a bill enacted. These congresses also attempted to reverse the Court's Mallory Rule, which limited police interrogation prior to arraignment. A civil liberties scale appears in each Congress from 1955 through 1960. An examination of the across-time correlation matrix suggests that some change in alignments took place during this period; voting on the scale for the 84th Congress is more like that on the 81 st than like the alignments on the scales for the 85 th and 86th. The 81 st and 84th Congress scales correlate at .90; the mean correlation between the 84th Congress scale and those in the 85 th and 86th is .82, while the correlation between the latter scales is .96. Democratic alignments are extremely stable over the three congresses; the mean correlation is .96. There is no discontinuity with the earlier period; the mean correlation of scores in the 81st with scores in the 84th through 86th congresses is .95. The Republican across-time correlation matrix does provide evidence of discontinuity. Republican voting on civil liberties, it will be recalled, showed relatively little within-party structure from 1939 through 1950. In these terms the 84th Congress scale seems similar to those in the earlier period.3 In contrast, the 85 th and 86th Congress scales elicited quite structured and stable voting alignments; the correlation between them is .80. Another perspective on the change which occurred is provided by an examination of the correlation between scale scores and party. From the 75 th through the 81st Congress, the correlation is consistently negative, indicating that the Republican party as a group was more supportive of civil liberties than was the Democratic party. This correlation for the 84th Congress scale is -.40, showing continuity with the previous period. In the 85 th and 86th congresses, civil liberties voting and party are unrelated (the correlations are -.04 for the 85th and .09 for the 86th). Table 5.6 shows that, in the 84th Congress, Republicans are still highly supportive on the civil liberties dimension; with the 85 th Congress, their mean score drops precipitously and remains low in the 86th. This decrease is not due to a change in position on civil rights. Only a handful of Republicans took an anti-civil rights position on any of the roll calls on the major civil rights bills; by far the strongest such vote was that of the 24.5 percent who supported a weakening amendment to the 1957 bill. Rather, the new issues which come to the floor in the 85 th and 86th congresses account for

88

The Eisenhower Interlude

Table 5.6. Civil Liberties Support Scores by Party and Region, 1955-1960 Democrats Congress

All

North

Solid South

All

84 85 86

53.1 51.5 58.9

98.1 90.5 93.1

.7 5.8 3.9

89.0 54.0 51.3

Republicans Solid and North- Border east South 94.4 66.5 67.4

43.6 31.7 26.6

All Other 91.0 49.3 44.2

the change. The attempts to curb the power of the Supreme Court find many Republicans allied with southern Democrats in support while northern Democrats are opposed. Accompanying this overall drop in support and explaining the high correlation between the 85th and 86th Congress scale scores is the development of a regional split within the Republican party. In the 84th Congress, there are for the first time enough Republicans from the solid South to produce a North-South split on civil liberties within that party. More interesting is the pattern which appears in the 85th and 86th congresses. The handful of Republicans from the solid South remain significantly less supportive than their party colleagues from other parts of the country. Republicans from the Northeast are significantly more supportive than members from other regions. Regional differences account, on the average, for 32.4 percent of the variance in Republicans' scores, compared with an average of less than 6 percent for the 75 th through 81st period. As one would expect, the civil liberties legislation which came to a vote during this period deeply split the Democratic party. Northern Democrats were highly supportive; solid South Democrats were inalterably opposed. Democrats from the border South were themselves split. That regional differences account, on the average, for 85.5 percent of the variance in Democratic scores shows how firm the regional divisions were. Civil rights, then, is the one area in which the 1950s did see significant policy change. Even though the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts were relatively weak, their passage signaled a major breakthrough.

1953-1960

89

The proximate reasons for the passage of these bills lie in internal Senate maneuvering and thus do not concern us here (Sundquist 1968: 221-250). Environmental changes which set the stage are of interest. Between the mid 1940s and the late 1950s, Northerners' attitudes on race changed significantly (Cantril 1951: 988-990,· Sundquist 1968: 448-449). By 1958, 63 percent of a national sample agreed that "if Negroes are not getting fair treatment in jobs and housing, the government should see to it that they do." Violent southern opposition to school desegregation and the growing civil rights movement may have played a role in this opinion change and certainly increased the saliency of the civil rights issue. In 1957, segregation headed the list of most important issues on the Gallup Poll (Gallup Opinion Index, October 1971). Thus, in the civil rights area, conditions conducive to policy change were present and the Congress did respond. Conclusion The Eisenhower years were a period of continuity and stability. There was no major change in the political agenda. Aid to education and area redevelopment, both extensions of the New Deal policy thrust, moved to the center of conflict, but neither was enacted into law. Except in the civil rights area, policy change was minimal. The 1950s were a period of low-saliency politics. Elections did not carry any clear policy signal. The 1952 elections gave Republicans control of both the presidency and the Congress for the first time since 1928. The victory owed much to Eisenhower's personal popularity; it was not and Eisenhower did not interpret it as a mandate to repeal the New Deal. In any case, the Republican congressional majorities were razor-thin. In 1954 and 1956, Democrats won majorities in both houses but by narrow margins. In 1958, under the impetus of recession, Democrats won a landslide congressional victory; this much larger and more northern majority did attempt to respond to the electoral signal. Republican control of the presidency and regional divisions within the party were, however, major barriers to moving beyond incremental policy change. Despite these structural barriers, nonincremental change did occur in the civil rights area. The aftermath of the 1954 school desegregation decision—violent southern opposition and the growing civil rights movement—thrust civil rights to the center of public attention. These dramatic events, all thoroughly covered by national television, provided the stimulus to action lacking in the other policy areas.

6. Policy Change without Realignment: New Frontier and Great Society, 1961-1968

The election of John Kennedy to the presidency brought eight years of divided control to an end. Kennedy, during the campaign, promised to "get the country moving again." National Democrats had read their landslide victory in the 1958 congressional elections as a mandate for turning away from Republican economic and social welfare policies (Sundquist 1968: 462-463). Republican control of the presidency had, however, blocked most of their initiatives. Although Kennedy's winning margin was small and the Democrats lost seats in the Congress, their majority was nevertheless substantial. The president himself and the northern wing of the party were committed to policy change. Signs that the political quiescence of the 1950s was a thing of the past became increasingly evident. In 1960, the voter turnout rate reached a twentieth century high point (Dawson 1973: 4). The civil rights movement gained momentum and attracted widespread public notice. In late 1958, a Gallup Poll asked its respondents what they hoped the new Congress would do. "Straighten out the school integration crisis" was the most frequent answer. Passing aid-to-education legislation and cutting down on unemployment were among the four most frequent responses (Gallup 1972: 1586). A late 1960 poll found 46 percent of the respondents saying that the new president and the new Congress should "do more to end segregation" (Gallup 1972: 1700). Medical care for the aged, federal aid to education, and an increase in the minimum wage were also mentioned by a large proportion of the sample. The assassination of Kennedy brought into office the first southern president since the Civil War. Johnson soon made it clear that his dedication to civil rights was at least equal to that of his predecessor. When the right wing of the Republican party captured the presidential nomination, a Democratic landslide followed. Johnson won by a margin of sixteen million votes, and the Democratic

1961-1968

91

congressional majority was massively increased. Goldwater did, however, make inroads in the South, and several solid South states elected Republicans to the House for the first time. Civil Liberties Although committed by the party platform and his own campaign statements to a strong civil rights posture, Kennedy delayed asking the Congress for legislation. Like other Democratic presidents before him, he feared that southern committee chairmen would retaliate by blocking other elements of his program. The 87th Congress (1961-1962) did pass a constitutional amendment barring the poll tax, which Kennedy had endorsed. The Civil Rights Commission was extended and funded. In the early 1960s, the civil rights movement was becoming increasingly active and visible. The spring and summer of 1963 saw a series of massive demonstrations, culminating in the August march on Washington. Southern reprisals against black protests, made vivid to millions by the extensive television coverage, shocked the nation. The changed climate led Kennedy to strengthen his civil rights requests, and, after the assassination, Johnson reiterated that such legislation had top priority. The House passed the administration bill in February 1964 and, after the Senate for the first time successfully invoked cloture on a civil rights measure, the bill became law. Unlike the acts of 1957 and 1960, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was much more than a symbolic victory. Discrimination in public accommodations, in programs receiving federal assistance, and in employment was prohibited; the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission was established to enforce the last provision. Enforcement of voting laws and of school and public facilities desegregation was strengthened. Although civil rights was the most visible and intensely debated issue in the civil liberties domain, the 88th Congress (1963-1964) saw controversy on several other items. The Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions led to an attempt to bar federal court jurisdiction over state legislative reapportionment. Roll calls on revising and strengthening the Sedition Act of 1917 and the Internal Security Act of 1950 also appear in the civil liberties scale. It will be recalled that, between 1937 and 1950, a subversive activities dimension distinct from the civil rights-dominated dimension was found in a number of congresses. During the 1950s, a great deal of subversive activities legislation was passed but by such overwhelming margins that the roll calls are not included in this study (Congress and the Nation 1965: 1656-1661).1 By 1963, the atmo-

92

Policy Change without Realignment

sphere had changed sufficiently so that some members were now willing to vote against subversive activities legislation. When this issue reenters the contested agenda, it does so as part of the dominant civil liberties dimension. During the remainder of the period under study, subversive activities roll calls regularly cluster with civil rights votes. The victories scored by the civil rights forces in the 88th Congress were but a prelude to those of the 89th (1965-1966). The influx of new northern Democrats gave civil rights activists their most sympathetic Congress ever. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 suspended state voter qualifications, authorizing federal examiners to register voters in areas of marked discrimination, and strengthened penalties for interference with voting rights. Unlike the 1957 and 1960 acts, this measure was to have a major impact on black voting in the South. The 89th House also passed an open housing bill, a bill giving the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission cease and desist powers, and a District of Columbia home rule bill. None of these measures, however, became law. The Senate did not act on the first two and, although both chambers passed a home rule bill, the versions were so different that no conference was held. The House also took some roll calls in the subversive activities area. Its Committee on Un-American Activities was at issue on most of these votes; three on the issuance of contempt citations drew an average of seventy-one opposition votes. In 1966, a new focus in the subversive activities area becomes evident. The House passed a bill making it a federal crime to aid foreign powers or other groups engaged in armed conflict with the U.S. or to obstruct military movements—a bill clearly aimed at war protesters (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1966: 623). The 90th Congress (1967-1968) seemed to offer civil rights advocates little hope of progress. In the 1966 elections, Democrats lost forty-seven House seats, almost all in the North. Furthermore, the political atmosphere had changed. The riots which broke out in many city ghettos in the summers of 1966 and 1967 eroded both public and congressional support for further civil rights legislation (Orfield 1975: 69). Nevertheless, shocked by the assassination of Martin Luther King, Congress did pass an open housing bill which barred discrimination in the sale or rental of approximately 80 percent of all housing. The 1968 Civil Rights Act also provided criminal penalties for interfering with persons exercising their civil rights and protected

1961-1968

93

civil rights workers. A bill aimed at eliminating discrimination in the selection of federal juries was enacted. The 90th Congress also, however, refused to seat Adam Clayton Powell and began what was to become an annual ritual—the passage of measures intended to limit federal school desegregation enforcement. In response to the ghetto riots and especially to the growing antiwar movement, a host of restrictive legislation was brought to the floor. The 1968 Civil Rights Act included antiriot provisions. A bill making flag desecration a crime and one establishing penalties for delivery of goods to the enemy passed the House. An amendment barring funds to student disrupters was attached to the Student Aid Program. Civil rights advocates, then, scored their first congressional victory in 1957 and, in 1964 and 1965, won the passage of two really strong bills. The 88th and the 89th Congress saw truly significant progress made on civil rights. By the 90th Congress, the m o m e n t u m had slowed and signs of reaction were evident. Yet there was still enough m o m e n t u m to pass an open housing bill. The civil liberties dimension is represented by one scale in each of the four congresses from 196l to 1968.As was shown earlier, civil liberties voting was unrelated to party in the 85 th and 86th congresses; this is also the case in the 87th (r = o). By the 88th Congress, we find a weak positive relationship between scale scores and party (r = .17); in the 89th and 90th, the correlations remain positive and become a bit stronger (the mean correlation is .27). By the mid 1960s, then, the Democratic party in the House was, as a group, more supportive of civil liberties than was the Republican party. The cross-Congress correlation matrix for all members provides only a faint hint of a change in alignments. There seems to be considerable stability from the 85 th through the 90th Congress, though two groups of scales can be distinguished. Scales for the 85 th through 87th congresses evoked highly similar voting patterns; the mean intercorrelation is .89. The 89th and 90th Congress scales are also highly similar, with a correlation between scores of .90. The correlation between these two sets of scales is .83. Thus, although no abrupt or drastic change in alignments is evident, both the intercorrelation matrix and the correlations between scale scores and party suggest some change from the 85th through 87th congresses to the 89th and 90th congresses, with the 88th marking a point of transition. The cross-time correlation matrix reveals no discontinuity in voting alignments within the Democratic party 2 As expected, Dem-

94

Policy Change without Realignment

ocrats continue to split along North-South lines. Members from the mountain and from the west north central states continue to be less supportive than other northern Democrats. These regional differences account, on the average, for 69.4 percent of the variance in Democratic scores. Voting alignments within the Republican party do show discontinuities during this period. As was demonstrated earlier, from 1937 through 1956 Republicans tended to be highly cohesive in support of civil rights. There was little within-party structure to voting alignments; the mean over-time correlation was .35. With the 85th Congress, mean Republican support drops and some within-party structure develops. The mean across-time correlation for the 85 th through 87th congresses is .62. The 89th and 90th Congress show highly similar voting alignments, with a correlation between scores of .84. The 88th seems to be transitional, with alignments somewhat more similar to those in the 89th and 90th than those in the three preceding congresses. During the period under study, the Republicans' high cohesion on the civil liberties dimension declines and a withinparty structure to voting alignments develops. The structure is a regional one. As we saw before, in the 85 th and 86th congresses northeastern Republicans were significantly more supportive than their party colleagues from other areas. This pattern persists throughout the 1960s and intensifies with the 89th Congress. In the 87th and 88th congresses, regional differences account, on the average, for 20.3 percent of the variance in Republican scores; in the 89th, this figure jumps to 44.7 percent and remains quite high in the 90th (32.6 percent). As table 6.1 shows, the 1960s saw another big decline in Republican support on the civil liberties dimension. The drop seems to occur between the 87th and 88th congresses but, in the 88th, scores were generally low. In terms of the distance between Republican mean support and that of northern Democrats, the 89th Congress marks a high point. The mean difference for the 85th through 87th is 34.8 percentage points; in the 88th, the difference is 36.9 points, and this increases to 42.1 points in the 89th. In the 89th and 90th congresses, the Republican mean score was considerably closer to that of Democrats from the solid South than to the mean of northern Democrats. The decline in Republican support on the civil liberties dimension was not the result of the changing composition of the party in the House. The growing number of Republicans elected from the solid South did, of course, influence the mean Republican score. The

1961-1968

95

Table 6.1. Civil Liberties Support Scores by Party and Region, 1961-1968 Democrats Congress

All

North

Solid South

All

87 88 89 90

60.4 48.3 60.4 43.3

87.0 74.5 81.0 65.2

19.0 8.1 13.2 7.8

60.5 37.6 38.9 28.9

Repu blicans Border and NorthSolid east South 69.4 46.7 60.5 40.7

50.3 24.6 14.8 14.2

All Other 56.6 35.4 35.8 28.4

decline in support is, however, clearly evident among nonsouthern Republicans. Furthermore, the decline cannot be attributed to membership replacement. Nonsouthern Republican newcomers tended, in their first term at least, to be slightly more supportive than veteran members. For northeastern Republicans, incoming members averaged 3.5 percentage points higher support over the 84th through 89th congresses; in the 90th Congress, they were significantly lower. Over the 84th through 90th congresses, new members from the rest of the country averaged 1.8 percentage points higher support. These differences between veterans and newcomers do not seem to persist; that is, cohort analysis reveals no consistent differences. Furthermore, the differences in support levels are quite small. The analysis does make it clear that the decline in Republican support cannot be attributed to more supportive members being replaced by less supportive members. Selective attrition also fails as an explanation for the change. The Republican losses in the 1964 elections were heaviest among the less supportive members. The mean 88th Congress support score for members who also served in the 89th was 39 percent; the score of those who did not return was 34.9 percent. Among Northeasterners only, the difference between survivors and nonsurvivors is even greater (50 percent versus 40.3 percent). The change which occurred, thus, was a behavioral one. The decline in Republican support on the civil liberties dimension which occurred in the late 1950s was attributed to new issues

96

Policy Change without Realignment

not directly related to civil rights entering the agenda. On the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts, the Republican party was highly supportive, and this support continued on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. During the 89th Congress, however, the civil rights bills at issue began to change in kind and the Republican voting response changed. In 1966, 63.2 percent of Republicans voted to delete the open housing section of the civil rights bill; when this failed, 44.9 percent opposed the bill on final passage. During the 90th Congress, a majority of Republicans again voted against open housing and for antibusing amendments. Thus the declining Republican support on the civil liberties dimension in the mid 1960s was due to many Republicans' growing unwillingness to proceed further in the civil rights area. Unlike the earlier civil rights legislation, a strong open housing bill would influence Republicans' constituents directly; and the mail from home, which previously had supported civil rights measures, was now strongly opposed. The National Association of Real Estate Boards generated a flood of opposition mail (Sundquist 1968: 278-279). Given the opposition of their white constituents and their lack of black constituents, given the increasing loyalty of blacks to the Democratic party and their own dislike of federal legislation which intruded into the private life of the individual, Republican members saw little reason to support further civil rights measures. The lower scores of northern Democrats in the 88th through 90th congresses provide another indication that the issues included in the dimension during those years were more controversial and more difficult to support than those which had come to the floor previously. Northern Democrats, by and large, provided united support for civil rights legislation, but many found it difficult to vote against measures aimed at war protesters and other subversive activities-related legislation. The slippage in northern Democratic support is not a result of membership replacement. Junior members were consistently more supportive than more senior members; the mean score on scales for the 88th, 89th, and 90th congresses for those first elected in 1958 or before was 69 percent; for those first elected in 1960 or later, the mean was 79.5. Junior members seem to have been more strongly influenced by changes in the political environment than were their senior colleagues. Northern Democrats first elected in 1960 or later are much less likely then their senior colleagues to have directly experienced the McCarthy era. Many came of age politically after the height of the hysteria, and none had established a congressional vot-

1961-1968

97

Table 6.2. The Relationship of Civil Liberties Support Scores to Seniority and Location: Solid South Democrats, 1961-1968 Texas: and Florida

Other Solid South

Congress

All

Senior

Junior

All

Senior

Junior

87 88 89 90

38.0 17.8 20.6 16.5

34.4 13.4 13.0 8.5

54.6 28.0 30.5 24.6

9.6 2.7 8.0 2.2

10.0 1.9 7.6 2.7

8.0 5.2 8.5 1.8

ing record on subversive activities issues. For these reasons, junior members seem to have found it easier to vote against subversive activities legislation. For Democrats from the solid South, civil liberties voting behavior is related to both location and seniority Democrats from Florida and Texas, although hardly supportive, nevertheless do as a group score significantly higher than those from other solid South states. Furthermore, junior members from Texas and Florida—those first elected in 1958 or later—are considerably more supportive than the senior members of those delegations—those first elected in 1956 or earlier. Among solid South Democrats from other states, support is not related to seniority (see table 6.2). During the four congresses, only three Democrats from the solid South scored at or above the northern Democratic mean, and all were Texans or Floridians. Henry Gonzalez of San Antonio, Texas, served in all four congresses and was consistently highly supportive. Claude Pepper, elected from a newly created Miami district in 1962, scored above the northern Democratic mean in the 88th but not in the two succeeding congresses, although his score did remain considerably above the southern mean. The third is Bob Eckhardt, elected from a heavily black Houston district in 1966. During the 1960s, civil rights was, of course, a highly salient issue in the South; and, since most whites were strongly opposed to civil rights legislation and a majority of blacks were disenfranchised, the opposition of southern representatives was to be expected. Yet, even during this period, some members from the rapidly growing and consequently less tradition-bound states of Texas and Florida were not unalterably opposed to any change, and a sprinkling of members

98

Policy Change without Realignment

newly elected from districts which demographically resembled northern Democratic districts began to vote like northern Democrats on civil liberties issues. The civil rights movement and the generally sympathetic northern public response provided the impetus for nonincremental policy change. Northern members united across party lines to pass strong bills in 1964 and 1965. After 1965, the character of civil rights bills began to change—they began to be aimed at discrimination in the North as well as in the South. Ghetto riots eroded public sympathy for further civil rights measures. Legislation aimed at the growing antiwar movement made its way onto the agenda. Increasingly, southern Democrats were joined by Republicans, especially by those from areas other than the Northeast, on civil rights roll calls. Antiwar protester and other subversive activities legislation tended to split the usually united northern Democratic contingent. The period of rapid, nonincremental policy change, thus, was brief. The conditions which made it possible were short-lived. As the environment changed, as the issues on the agenda shifted, alignments were altered. Because the issues which came to a vote were tougher, the overall level of support on the civil liberties dimension decreased. Yet the new members elected during this period, especially the new northern Democrats, were more supportive of civil liberties than were their more senior colleagues. The transformed political environment seems to have left its mark on these younger members. Social Welfare With the recapture of the presidency, national Democrats had high hopes that the 87th Congress would pass legislation for which they had unsuccessfully fought during the 1950s. The Congress did pass a major revision of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The bill, which raised the m i n i m u m wage and included the first significant extension of coverage since 1938, was similar to the one which had died in conference in 1960. Again the two chambers' versions were very different, as a House majority had voted for a severely weakening amendment on the floor. This time, however, the House conferees accepted the m u c h stronger Senate version and the House approved the conference report. Other significant victories were the passage of the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, the Housing Act of 1961, the most comprehensive since 1949, and the Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, which increased the federal share of welfare costs and let parents as well as children receive benefits under the Aid to Dependent Children program.

1961-1968

99

In a number of important areas, the administration and liberal Democrats fared much less well. General aid to education did not get out of the Rules Committee, and a higher education aid bill was killed when the House voted to recommit the conference report. An attempt to strengthen the child labor provisions pertaining to agricultural employment failed. Kennedy's National Labor Relations Board reorganization plan was defeated on the House floor, as was his proposal to create a cabinet-level Department of Urban Affairs. The 88th Congress saw the extension of the National Defense Education Act and of the impacted area program; the expansion of the Library Services Act; and the passage of the Health Professions Education Assistance Act and of the Higher Education Facilities Act. However, no general education aid bill passed. In 1962, Kennedy had requested long-range aid for urban mass transit, and the 88th Congress finally responded with the Urban Mass Transportation Act. By far the most innovative and the only clearly nonincremental piece of legislation passed by the 88th Congress was the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. Johnson's antipoverty program was a true departure because its intent was specifically to aid the poor minority. The thrust of previous social welfare legislation had been to help the nonrich majority. The 1964 Democratic landslide brought in the most heavily Democratic Congress since the New Deal. With an activist president, the time for action was ripe. The most productive Congress since the New Deal finished old business and took new departures. In the area of education, the first general aid-to-education bill—the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965—was passed, as was the Higher Education Act of 1965, which included a wide variety of major new programs to aid students and colleges. The National Foundation on Arts and Humanities was established. Medicare, long an aim of liberals which had never before even reached the voting stage, was enacted. The House repealed section 14b of the Taft-Hartley Act, but the bill was killed in the Senate by a filibuster, handing labor one of its few defeats in this Congress. The minimum wage was raised and coverage substantially increased. Over nine million additional workers were included and, for the first time, some agricultural workers were given protection. In the Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1965, funds for the antipoverty program were doubled and governors' veto powers, included as a concession to Southerners in the original act, were weakened. The 89th Congress also passed the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, the most far-reaching housing bill since 1949. In-

100

Policy Change without Realignment

cluded in the bill was a completely new program. Rent supplements for the poor proved to be the bill's most controversial provision and would remain a center of controversy in succeeding years. The House defeated a supplemental appropriation for rent subsidies in 1965 but provided funding, though not at the level requested by Johnson, in 1966. The model cities bill—also a program aimed at aiding the poor—and an urban mass transportation act became law. In the 1966 elections, Republicans made major gains and the more conservative Congress which resulted was not inclined to carry on at the pace the 89th had established. Funds for model cities and rent supplements were cut deeply. Money for the antipoverty program was also cut, but a two-year authorization passed and the House, on a teller vote, rejected Republican attempts to dismantle the Office of Economic Opportunity. The House defeated the rat control bill but, after much press criticism, included money for the program in another bill. Both the teachers corps and the food stamps program were extended. The 90th Congress also passed a massive aid-to-education bill and a housing bill which contained a new program to encourage home ownership among low- and moderate-income families by providing federal subsidies for mortgage payments. The mid 1960s, then, saw the first major change in the social welfare agenda since the New Deal. The programs to help the very poor were a truly new element. A number of proposals that had been on the agenda for years also were finally enacted into law. The period of rapid nonincremental change was short-lived. It began in 1964, with the passage of the antipoverty bill, and culminated in the 89th Congress. By the 90th Congress, the m o m e n t u m was spent and reaction had set in. Like the New Deal, though not to the same extent, the policy departures of the 89th Congress changed the centers around which controversy revolved. Succeeding congresses might carp and cut funding, but little of the landmark legislation was repealed. How were these policy changes reflected in voting behavior? The relationship between party and voting on social welfare does not change from the previous period; the mean correlation for the four congresses is .57, not very different from the mean of .54 for the Eisenhower years. Inspection of the correlation matrices of scores across congresses indicates not a change in alignments but a further stabilization if not rigidification. For all members, the mean intercorrelation of scores for the 87th through 90th congresses is .91, which indicates considerably more stability than in the 83rd through 86th period, for which the mean was .81. That there was no basic change in alignments between the periods is shown by the mean correlation of .85

101

1961-1968 Table 6.3. Social Welfare Support Scores by Party and Region, 1953-1968 Democrats

Congress

All

83-86 (mean) 87 88 89 90

71.5 71.6 84.4 77.2 73.1

North

Solid South

All

93.5 96.6 97.6 94.3 93.0

42.2 31.2 60.6 35.6 34.1

32.7 37.2 28.2 29.4 38.3

Republicans NorthAll east Other 43.4 56.7 49.9 56.0 57.3

27.1 27.1 18.6 19.3 25.4

between the scores for the 83rd through 86th Congress and those of the 87th through 90th. Not only do alignments become more rigid with the 87th Congress, but a further rigidification occurs with the 89th. The correlation between scores in the 89th and 90th congresses is .97 and, as will be shown later, this extreme stability continues throughout the Nixon years. An examination of the intercorrelations of Democratic scores reinforces these conclusions. The mean intercorrelation for the 87th through 90th is .91; the mean correlation of these scores with those for the 83rd through 86th is .85. The incredibly high correlation of .99 between the scores in the 89th and 90th congresses suggests that the high ideological content of the social welfare dimension during those congresses led to an extremely rigid voting alignment. The increasing stability of within-party alignments with the 87th Congress is even more dramatic for the Republicans than for the Democrats. The mean intercorrelation of scores for the 87th through 90th congresses is .86, compared with a mean of .71 for the 83rd through 86th period. Again this is a stabilization, not a change in alignments, as the mean across-period correlation of .72 shows. During this period the North-South split within the Democratic party intensifies still further (see table 6.3). Solid South Democrats' support scores drop while northern Democrats' mean support actually tends to increase. The 88th Congress is an exception. Solid South Democrats' mean support score is unusually high—perhaps due to a feeling of obligation to support the first southern president since the Civil War. Excluding the 88th Congress, the mean variance accounted for by regional differences in scores is 66.1 percent.

102

Policy Change without Realignment

Examining those solid South Democrats whose support score was 80 percent or greater, we find some increase in the average number, but only if the atypical 88th Congress is included. With that Congress, the mean number is 16.3; without it, the mean is 11, very similar to the 10.5 mean for the 1950s. That in the 88th Congress almost half (ten of twenty-one) of the Texas Democrats were high scorers lends some credence to the rally-round-the-president explanation for the Southerners' unusually high support, as does the appearance of Wilbur Mills, Carl Vinson, and Harold Cooley, all southern committee chairmen, among the high scorers. Some change in the locus of southern support for social welfare legislation has occurred. Mississippi and South Carolina are still completely unrepresented among the high scorers. In the 89th Congress, in fact, the Mississippi Democratic delegation's mean score was 3.3 percent; that of South Carolina, 6.1 percent. The states most associated with the new South—Florida and Texas—contribute an increasing proportion of the high scorers. In the 89th, ten of the fifteen solid South Democrats with scores of 80 percent or above are from these two states; in the 90th, nine of ten are.3 Within the Republican party, the split between Northeasterners and members from other regions intensifies during the KennedyJohnson years. Regional differences account for an average of 35.8 percent of the variance in Republican scores, compared with 14.1 percent for the 83rd through 86th period. The high ideological intensity of the 89th Congress provoked the deepest split; almost half the variance in scores is attributable to regional differences. Except in the 88th Congress, northeastern Republicans are very substantially more supportive of social welfare legislation than are Democrats from the solid South. From the 87th through the 89th Congress, on the average, almost 80 percent of the highest-scoring fifth of the Republican membership were from the Northeast and, on the average, over half of the northeastern Republicans were high scorers. In contrast, an average of only 6.9 percent of Republicans from other areas were high scorers during these three congresses. The contrast is not so dramatic in the 90th, although over 40 percent of Northeasterners are high scorers in that Congress, while only 14.5 percent of those from the rest of the country are. The intensification of the split within the Republican party is, in part, a result of membership replacement and, in part, a behavioral change. Northeastern Republicans first elected in 1958, 1960, or 1962 are, in the first three Kennedy-Johnson congresses, significantly more supportive than their more senior regional colleagues.4 Newcomers to the 89th Congress are considerably less supportive

1961-1968

103

than either of the more senior cohorts. There are, however, few such newcomers, and the 1964 elections, through selective attrition, actually made the northeastern Republican group more liberal on social welfare. In the 88th Congress, those members who also served in the 89th were much more supportive than those who did not return (56.3 percent versus 47.5 percent). There is, then, evidence indicating that, during the first three Kennedy-Johnson congresses, membership replacement played a role in widening the split within the Republican party. That replacement is not the only mechanism at work can be seen by inspecting the scores of senior northeastern Republicans, which are much higher than those of Republicans from other areas. While membership replacement among Northeasterners does, in part, account for the widened split in the Republican party, the same is not true for the Democratic party. Among Democrats from the solid South, an alignment pattern very similar to that found on the civil liberties dimension holds. The Texas and Florida delegations are consistently and significantly more supportive than those from other states. Within these delegations, junior members score considerably higher than senior members.5 The 1960s were a period of activism in the social welfare area. A number of proposals which had been hotly debated in the 1950s were finally enacted. The activism, however, went beyond simply finishing up old business. The social welfare agenda changed as emphasis shifted to aiding the poor. In terms of altering the centers around which controversy would revolve, the war on poverty represented the most clearly nonincremental change since the New Deal. Government Management of the Economy Compared with the policy innovation which occurred in the civil rights and social welfare areas, activity in the government management area during the Kennedy-Johnson administration is much less dramatic. While a number of new programs were enacted, the centers around which debate revolved remained relatively constant. The 87th Congress again passed the Area Redevelopment Act and Kennedy, of course, signed it into law. An important tax bill which included the investment tax credit requested by Kennedy was enacted, and the antitrust law was tightened. The public versus private power debate continued, centering on the Hanford, Washington, atomic reactor, and debt limit extensions continued to produce roll call votes. Appropriations to carry out the 1962 Accelerated Public Works Act won approval from the 88th Congress after the House overrode

104

Policy Change without Realignment

its Appropriations Committee, which had cut the funds. The Area Redevelopment Act Amendments of 1963, authorizing additional funds for the program, failed on the House floor, however. In 1963 the Clean Air Act, expanding and strengthening the federal program to control and prevent air pollution, was enacted. Most controversial at the time was Kennedy's tax cut proposal, which was intended to stimulate the economy. Its enactment in 1964 was interpreted as signaling the overt acceptance of Keynesian economics as a tool for government management of the economy. According to Democratic Senator Joseph Clark, the bill was "the first step toward the intelligent use of tax and expenditure policy to achieve full employment in the United States'' (Sundquist 1968: 52). The activist 89th Congress easily passed the Appalachian Regional Development Act, which in 1964 House leaders had not brought to the floor because of lack of votes (Sundquist 1968: 104). The Public Works and Economic Development Act, which consolidated and extended a number of depressed-areas programs, was enacted. The Clean Air Act authorized the secretary of health, education, and welfare to set standards for car emissions and deadlines for compliance. The Traffic Safety Act of 1966, which required the secretary of commerce to set federal safety performance standards for autos and tires, passed the House without dissent. In the government management area, the 89th Congress does not mark an abrupt change in policy agenda. It does signal the culmination of a former thrust and the emergence of a new trust. The last of the major depressed-areas programs advocated by liberal Democrats during the 1950s was finally enacted. Environmental issues and consumer safety, which were to become so central in later years, began to appear on the active agenda. The much more heavily Republican 90th Congress saw a series of relatively successful attempts by conservatives to cut spending. Numerous roll calls on across-the-board cuts in appropriations and on the debt limit appear in the government management scale. The Dickey-Lincoln dam proposal occasioned another round of the public versus private power controversy. The 89th Congress had approved planning funds but, in 1967 and again in 1968, the House voted down such funds. The 90th Congress did extend the Appalachian Regional Development Act. It also established the National Commission on Product Safety and easily passed a strong truth-inlending bill—there were only four opposition votes in the House. Partisanship continues to be extremely important in structuring the vote on the government management dimension; the mean correlation of scores with party is .90. The across-time correlation ma-

1961-1968

105

Table 6.4. Government Management Support Scores by Party and Region, 1953-1968 Democrats

Congress

All

83-86 (mean) 87 88 89 90

85.3 84.3 86.6 84.6 83.7

Republicans

North

Solid South

All

Northeast

All Other

91.7 90.8 93.3 91.9 92.0

77.1 71.7 74.3 64.2 66.3

13.2 13.7 24.9 18.3 12.3

13.8 17.0 34.0 31.0 19.5

13.0 12.0 20.0 13.7 9.6

trix for all members again suggests both stability and continuity. The mean intercorrelation of scores is .95; the mean correlation of scores from the 87th through 90th congresses with those from the 83rd through 86th is .87. Again, however, the distance between the parties obscures changes which took place within each of the parties. During the Kennedy-Johnson years, Democratic alignments on the government management dimension were much more stable and structured than during the 1950s. The mean intercorrelation of scores for the 87th through 90th period is .82—compared with a mean of .56 for the 83rd through 86th congresses. The North-South split, which had moderated during the 1950s, intensifies again and is especially deep in the 89th and 90th congresses (see table 6.4). Regional differences account, on the average, for 34.2 percent of the variance in Democratic scores, up from 18.7 percent during the last Eisenhower Congress. The requests of activist Democratic presidents put considerable strain on party unity in the government management area. Among Republicans, we find a different sequence of change. Alignments in the 87th Congress are quite similar to those in the 85th and 86th; the mean intercorrelation of the three scores is .68. A change occurs with the 88th Congress. Voting alignments on the 88th through 90th Congress scales display considerable stability, with a mean intercorrelation of .69. The discontinuity between alignments in these three congresses and the three preceding congresses is shown by the mean correlation of .48 between the two sets of scales.

106

Policy Change without Realignment

From the 88th Congress on, Northeasterners are significantly more supportive than other Republicans. In the 88th and 89th congresses, the regional split within the Republican party on the government management dimension is deeper than it has been since the New Deal years; 31.2 percent of the variance in Republican scores in the 88th and 38.7 percent in the 89th are attributable to regional differences. In the 90th Congress, the division moderates, but Northeasterners remain significantly more supportive than their fellow Republicans. The deepening of the split within each party is the result of a behavioral change; it is not due to membership replacement. Within the solid South Democratic contingent, a now familiar pattern is again found. Members from the new South states of Texas and Florida are more supportive than those from other states. During the latter three Kennedy-Johnson congresses, junior members from those two states score significantly higher than their delegation colleagues. There is some relationship between juniority and support for members from other southern states as well, but it is much less strong.6 From the 85 th through the 90th Congress, incoming northeastern Republicans were, in their first Congress, consistently less supportive than veteran members. In the earlier congresses the differences were small, but in the 89th and 90th newly elected members average 10.2 percentage points lower than veterans. Northeasterners' increasing support on the government management dimension obviously is not attributable to more supportive members replacing less supportive ones. The 1964 elections, through selective attrition, did make the northeastern Republican contingent more liberal. The mean support score for those members of the 88th Congress who also served in the 89th was 37.6 percent; the mean for those who did not return was 29.1 percent. Although the elections did affect the ideological complexion of the northeastern Republican group, this does not account for the deepened split in the party. The split is clearly evident in the 88th Congress, and northeastern nonsurvivors, while less supportive than survivors, score very considerably higher than Republicans from other parts of the country. The 1960s, then, saw both parties split on the government management dimension. Within the Democratic party, the familiar NorthSouth split intensified. The Republican party, which since the late 1940s had been united on government management, saw a division between its northeastern wing and the rest of the party develop. In this period, alignments on the government management dimension

1961-1968

107

came to resemble those which had characterized the social welfare dimension since the late 1940s. Alignments changed even though the government management agenda was not fundamentally altered, especially when compared with the civil rights and social welfare agenda. Part of the explanation lies in the change in party control of the presidency. The measures which reached the voting stage under activist Democratic presidents were more clearly aimed at managing the economy than was the bulk of the legislation under Eisenhower. It will be argued later, however, that the changed political climate also played an important role. Agricultural Policy In three of the four domestic policy domains, the Kennedy-Johnson years were a period of policy innovation. Policy proposals in the agricultural assistance domain, in contrast, show strong continuity from the 1950s to the 1960s. Not until late in the Johnson administration do the terms of the debate begin to change. The lower support prices during the Eisenhower years did not decrease production. Because their unit prices were lower, farmers did everything possible to increase yield per acre, and the result was an ever increasing surplus. The Kennedy program attempted to solve this problem by imposing strict production controls. In return, support prices were to be raised. While Congress never accepted all elements of the program, the thrust of the legislation passed during the Kennedy years was toward tighter supply control as well as higher supports [Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1973: 289). The traditional agricultural policy dimension is represented by one scale in the 87th, 88th, and 89th congresses but does not appear in the 90th.7 Voting on the dimension is quite stable, though not as stable as during the Eisenhower years. The mean intercorrelation of scores for the 87th through 89th Congress scales is .79 compared with a mean of .88 for the 83rd through 86th. The mean correlation between periods is .74, which provides a faint hint that some alignment change may have accompanied the change in administrations. Voting continues to be highly partisan; the mean correlation of scores with party is .81. The Democrats' voting behavior shows less within-party structure than it did in the 1950s. The mean intercorrelation of scores for the 87th through 89th congresses is .46, considerably below the .61 mean for the Eisenhower years though still above the .10 figure for the 1933 to 1952 period.

108

Policy Change without Realignment

Table 6.5. Agricultural Assistance Support Scores by Party and Region, 1953-1966 Democrats Congress

All

83-86 (mean) 87 88 89

84.3 92.3 94.7 81.2

North- Solid east South 63.8 90.6 90.6 81.2

93.0 77.3 87.9 77.6

All Other

All

86.1 91.1 97.3 83.1

17.7 11.9 34.5 22.9

Republicans West North- North All east Central Other 7.0 7.8 28.5 18.9

55.4 24.5 53.5 53.1

15.6 10.8 33.4 18.5

This decline in structure is due to the complete disappearance of the regional split among Democrats on agricultural policy which characterized the Eisenhower years (see table 6.5). The mean variance accounted for by regional differences drops from 27.6 percent during the 83rd through 86th period to 4.9 percent for the 87th through 89th congresses. Northeastern Democrats' mean support score, which averaged 63.8 percent during the Eisenhower years, rises to 87.5 percent during the Kennedy-Johnson administration— slighly higher than the 86.6 percent mean for all Democrats. Clearly, even those Democrats without a constituency interest in agricultural assistance legislation were willing to support the program of a president of their party. For the Republicans, within-party structure also declines; the mean intercorrelation of scores is only .40. The split between west north central Republicans and those from other areas continues but is less intense than it was in the Eisenhower years. On the average, regional differences account for 23.6 percent of the variation in Republican scores during the 87th through 89th congresses—a considerable drop from the 42.4 percent average for the 83rd through 86th congresses. West north central Republicans continued to be by far the most supportive group in the party, but the extent of their deviance was less than during the Eisenhower years. The 1961 to 1966 period, then, saw a continuation of the agricultural policy debate in terms familiar since the New Deal. Alignments remained basically stable, although, when a Democratic president replaced a Republican, the support scores of disinterested Democrats rose.

1961-1968

109

International Involvement The change in administrations brought no basic foreign policy change. Until the heating up of the Vietnam War, controversy in Congress continued to center on the foreign aid program. In 1961 Kennedy persuaded Congress to drop the mutual security framework by which economic and military aid were tied together. This was primarily an administrative change. Some new programs were developed, most notably the Peace Corps and the Alliance for Progress. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agenda was established. Specific events added some items to the agenda. The 87th Congress, for example, voted on money for the United Nations' Congo force, and a considerable controversy developed over whether the U.S. should buy U.N. bonds as the president had requested. Until late in Johnson's administration, however, the issues which came to a vote in the House did not differ substantially from those dominant during the Eisenhower administration. Change in partisan control of the presidency, even if unaccompanied by a change in policy, brings a change in voting alignments on the international involvement dimension. This was the case, as was shown earlier, when Eisenhower replaced Truman. It is again the case when Kennedy succeeds Eisenhower. During the Kennedy-Johnson administration, party is again related to voting on the international involvement dimension; the mean correlation with party is .49, compared with a mean of .11 for the Eisenhower years. Alignments are very stable; the mean overtime correlation is .90 for all members, .87 for Republicans, and .90 for Democrats. That there is some discontinuity between the Eisenhower and the Kennedy-Johnson congresses is shown by the considerably lower correlation between scores in the two periods: .71 for all members and for Republicans, .79 for Democrats. As expected, the replacement of a Republican president by a Democrat results in an increase in Democratic support on the international involvement dimension and a decrease in Republican support (see table 6.6). Both northern and southern Democrats' support increases, but solid South Democrats' support does not return to the levels of the last two Truman congresses. The regional split within the Democratic party actually hardens; regional differences account for an average of 43.1 percent of the variance in Democratic scores during the Kennedy-Johnson administration, compared with a mean of 37-5 percent during the Eisenhower years. Thus, although southern Democrats did respond to the change in administrations by increasing their support, their absolute sup-

110

Policy Change without

Realignment

Table 6.6. International Involvement Support Scores by Party and Region, 1953-1968 Democrats

Congress

All

83-86 (mean) 87 88 89 90

69.0 81.3 77.6 77.9 71.6

a

North

Solid South

88.3 95.3 94.7 91.0 87.9

41.2 53.6 47.9 46.8 40.3

Republicans

All

Northeast

cific

Pa-

Interior'1

60.8 50.0 31.2 42.0 35.1

87.3 73.2 55.0 69.8 55.8

74.3 45.3 26.2 44.7 41.4

41.0 36.5 20.1 31.8 29.1

Republicans from the solid South are excluded.

port level remains low. The habit of opposition developed during the Eisenhower years was reinforced by a decline in constituency support for foreign aid (Hero 1965: 547-551). The replacement of a Republican president by a Democrat was not sufficient to fundamentally alter Southerners' voting response. As expected, Republican support on the international involvement dimension declines. The support of Northeasterners, although considerably lower than during the Eisenhower years, remains much above that of other segments of the party. During the Eisenhower administration, interior Republicans and solid South Democrats provided almost equal support for foreign aid. The Kennedy-Johnson years saw interior Republicans, relieved of the need to give at least minimal support to a president of their own party, become much less supportive. Pacific Republicans' support drops more sharply than that of the other groups. During the 87th through 90th congresses, Republicans from the west coast vote more like interior Republicans than like Northeasterners. As California Republicans as a group became more conservative, the coastal-interior split within the Republican party was replaced with a Northeast-other split. With this exception, the change in partisan control of the presidency influenced Republican support levels but did not change the form of the regional split within the party. The stability of the international involvement agenda in the House contrasts sharply with the transformation in the terms of public debate which took place during this period. As U.S. forces became more and more deeply involved in the Vietnam War, a vocal

1961-1968

111

antiwar movement sprang up. By 1968, the Democratic party was so sharply divided on the war that Johnson withdrew from the presidential race. Yet scarcely a trace of this heated public debate is reflected in the House voting agenda. The majority leadership was almost completely successful in keeping antiwar measures from coming to a record vote. This would change in the next Congress; but, during the Johnson administration, while protesters marched by the thousands and respected members of the president's own party questioned his policies, the House as a body remained largely impervious to the turmoil which swirled around it. Conclusion The mid 1960s saw the first cluster of nonincremental domestic policy changes since the New Deal. In both the civil rights and the social welfare domains, Congress passed bills which represented a distinct break with the existing body of legislation in terms of the problems at which the policy was aimed or the means used. The 1960 elections, by ending divided control, removed the structural barrier to passage of certain legislation long on the agenda. Area redevelopment and a major extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act, for example, were enacted into law. Kennedy's victory, however, was narrow. Southern Democrats especially did not read the elections as a mandate for change; their opposition prevented more far-reaching policy change. Policy change in the 89th Congress was nonincremental and nicely fits the model discussed in the first chapter. A landslide election produced a very large Democratic congressional majority, and nonincremental policy change followed. The policy change model explicated in the first chapter, it will be recalled, places considerable emphasis upon an intense environmental stimulus as the activator of the process. Quite clearly, none of the events of the early 1960s was of the same magnitude as the Great Depression—the stimulus for the New Deal cluster of policy changes. Yet the period did see a significant increase in the saliency of politics to the mass public (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976: 108, 271-273). As a major contributor to this increase, the civil rights movement seems to have played an extremely important role. Because civil rights forces needed northern public support, their tactics were intentionally dramatic. Heavy television coverage brought sitins and marches as well as southern reprisals into living rooms across the country. The movement, thus, thrust civil rights to the center of the political agenda; in a poll taken in late 1960, 46 percent

112

Policy Change without Realignment

said that the new president and the new Congress should "do more to end segregation" (Gallup 1972: 1700). By mid 1963, over half the respondents to a Gallup Poll named civil rights as the most important problem facing the American people today, and race remained among the most frequently mentioned problems throughout 1964 and 1965 (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976: 102-103). Kennedy's personality may also have contributed to the increased saliency. His assassination probably further concentrated public attention on Washington. Then, in 1964, the voters were offered their clearest choice in many years. Not only was the Republican candidate seen as trigger-happy and as opposing federal action on civil rights, he also questioned the post-New Deal consensus on domestic policy. The political environment, thus, was conducive to policy change. The public was more attentive and clearly favored civil rights legislation and such social welfare programs as aid to education and Medicare (Sundquist 1968: 441-452, 484-489; Gallup 1972: 1700, 1827, 1859, 1908; Free and Cantril 1967: n - 1 5 ) . To the extent that data are available, they indicate that such preferences do not represent a major change in attitudes since the 1950s. On aid to education, for example, a majority was in favor in the mid 1950s (Orfield 1975: 126). What did change was the extent to which politics was salient to the average voter. The 1964 elections did carry a signal for policy change, but the public's mood was evident well before the elections and Congress did respond. The 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Economic Opportunity Act, both clearly nonincremental measures, were passed by the 88th Congress. Structural parameters, which had been barriers, were not altered but overcome. Clearly, enough members got the message to initiate the period of nonincremental policy change before the 1964 landslide. Almost certainly, however, the landslide and the huge, much more heavily northern Democratic majority it produced were necessary for carrying that policy thrust further. The large Democratic majority was necessary because party cohesion decreased during this period. The events of the early 1960s did not affect all sections of the country in the same way, and the 1964 elections carried a very different signal in the North and the South. The impact of the civil rights movement on the South was, of course, very different from its impact on the North. Southerners in the 1960s remained far to the right of people from other sections on questions pertaining to race (Ladd with Hadley 1975: 172), and the civil rights ferment clearly increased the saliency of the race issue. A

1961-1968

113

major increase in voter turnout in the South between 1956 and 1964 suggests a general increase in the saliency of politics. In terms of numbers, the greatest increase occurred among less-educated whites (Bartley and Graham 1975: 9, 111-112). During this period, Southerners were becoming more conservative relative to the rest of the country on social and economic issues (Ladd with Hadley 1975: 168). In the 1950s, Southerners held distinctive attitudes only on race-related questions; now increasingly the region diverged from the North across the whole spectrum of domestic issues. The proportion of southern whites favoring federal job guarantees, for example, fell precipitously between 1956 and 1964, with the biggest decrease occurring between 1960 and 1964. By 1964, not much more than a third of low-income whites responded affirmatively, while, in 1960, almost two-thirds had endorsed the idea (Bartley and Graham 1975: 141). Federal government pressure on civil rights may have been translated into generalized distrust of federal government actions. The increasing industrialization in the region may have influenced attitudes. Whatever the cause, to the extent that southern members received signals from their districts—and the increased saliency of the race issue and the jump in voter turnout would suggest that signals from the general constituency increased—these signals pointed in an increasingly conservative direction. The 1964 elections carried very different signals in the South and the North. The only states which Goldwater carried other than his native Arizona were five solid South states, and the Republican party picked up seven new House seats in the South—five in Alabama and one each in Mississippi and Georgia. While Southerners were becoming more conservative, Northeasterners were becoming more liberal. Polls from the 1940s and 1950s had shown inhabitants of the Northeast to be more tolerant on civil liberties issues than the public as a whole; in the 1960s, this continued to be the most liberal section on civil rights (Stouffer 1955: 109-118; Ladd with Hadley 1975: 172). In the 1960s, Northeasterners became more liberal than the inhabitants of other sections on social and economic policy as well (Ladd with Hadley 1975: 168). Free and Cantril, on the basis of five questions concerning social welfare policy, classified their respondents along an operational liberal-conservative continuum. Those who favored aid to education, Medicare, federal housing programs, and the urban renewal program and who felt that the government had a responsibility to do away with poverty were classified as complete liberals. In the 1964 survey, 54 percent of Northeasterners compared with 39 percent of

114

Policy Change without Realignment

Midwesterners and 37 percent of Westerners were classified as complete liberals (Free and Cantril 1967: 217). They also found Northeasterners were less likely to believe that the federal government had too much power and more likely to subscribe to the view that "the federal government should use its power even more vigorously to promote the well-being of all segments of the people" (1967: 219). A May 1965 Gallup Poll found approval of Johnson's job performance highest in the Northeast; 75 percent of Easterners, 66 percent of Westerners, 64 percent of Midwesterners, and 49 percent of Southerners approved (Gallup Opinion Index, June 1965). These regional differences are not a function of the distribution of party identification in the regions; the same Gallup Poll found the proportion of Republicans slightly higher and the proportion of Democrats slightly lower in the East than in the other nonsouthern regions. The constituency signals which eastern Republicans received were, thus, more likely than previously to point toward support for at least some of the measures proposed by Kennedy and Johnson. The 1964 elections may also have served as a signal to eastern Republicans. Throughout the North, conservative Republicans fared less well than more moderate members (Schoenberger 1969: 515-520); when it is measured by the difference in support scores on social welfare, government management, and civil liberties, the tendency for survivors to be more liberal than nonsurvivors is much clearer in the Northeast than in the rest of the country. Of the five northeastern Republican representatives who endorsed Goldwater, three were defeated and the district of another who retired was won by a Democrat. Furthermore, the average Johnson vote in the districts of winning northeastern Republicans was 64 percent—over 10 percentage points higher than the comparable figure for other Republicans and only slightly below that for northern Democrats. The 1960s showed that clusters of nonincremental policy changes can occur without a realignment. During a realignment, however, the new issues serve to unify the parties with the result that policy coalitions are party-based. Public opinion on the burning issues of the 1960s did not follow party lines, yet the issues were not sufficient to precipitate a party realignment. As a result, the new issues deeply split the congressional parties along regional lines that roughly corresponded to the divisions in the populace.

7. Divided Government in a Time of Turmoil, 1969-1976

When Richard Nixon was inaugurated in January of 1969, he became president of a deeply divided and demoralized country. The period preceding the election year had been one of turmoil. Ghetto riots during the heat of summer had become a regular occurrence, as had antiwar protests all year round. Many believed the life style of the young, which now received wide media coverage, to be increasingly immoral and irresponsible. Crime was on the increase. To many, the America they knew and loved seemed to have changed into a dangerous and incomprehensible place. The election year was one of tragedy and increased turmoil. The Tet offensive brought the wisdom of U.S. policy in Vietnam into further question. A sitting president was challenged from within his own party and forced to withdraw from the presidential contest. Martin Luther King was assassinated and riots erupted all over the country. Two months later, Robert Kennedy was killed just as he had won the California primary. A Democratic party bitterly split on the war met in Chicago to pick its nominee. The police's brutal treatment of the war protesters who had come to Chicago in massive numbers only deepened the split within the party. Television carried the scenes of battle both outside and inside the convention hall across the country which further eroded public confidence in the Democratic party. George Wallace, running in opposition to essentially all the social changes of the preceding decade, showed surprising strength in the polls. Although his support faded as election day approached, he still won 13.5 percent of the popular vote and deprived Nixon of a popular majority. Opinion surveys showed that the public's central concerns were Vietnam, crime and lawlessness, and race (Gallup 1972: 2107, 2151). By August 1968, a majority believed the United States had made a

116

Divided Government in a Time of Turmoil

mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam [Gallup Opinion Index, September 1969). Yet, on what to do about the war, no consensus existed. A 1968 poll shows 41 percent of the respondents identifying themselves as doves, 41 percent as hawks (Gallup 1972: 2125). As the major party candidates did not take clearly distinguishable positions on Vietnam, the election outcome could not be read as a mandate for any specific policy. International Involvement Nixon inherited from Johnson a country bitterly divided on the Vietnam War and, increasingly, on the whole spectrum of foreign and defense policy issues. As protesters marched in the streets and middle America looked on with disgust and disapproval, the battle between hawks and doves raged in the halls of Congress. The war transformed the international involvement agenda. Assumptions that had been widely accepted were questioned, and previously noncontroversial decisions provoked heated conflict. Opposition to the Vietnam War led many to reappraise the direction of U.S. foreign and defense policy more generally. The size of the military budget, the need for a wide variety of expensive and deadly new weapons systems, and U.S. aid to repressive regimes were brought into question. Opponents of the Vietnam War found Senate supporters for their position as early as 1964. In March of that year, Wayne Morse and Ernest Gruening demanded total U.S. withdrawal from Indochina, and the next year Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright held televised hearings on the war. The antiwar movement grew and more senators spoke out publicly against the war; but, in the House, little sympathy for the antiwar position was evident. In 1966, only three members—Phillip Burton of California, John Conyers of Michigan, and William F. Ryan of New York—voted against Vietnam War funds. The next year an amendment stating the opposition of Congress to U.S. military operations in and over North Vietnam attracted only eighteen votes—all from northern Democrats. Although the House leadership continued to keep such measures from coming to the floor whenever possible, the House, during the 91st and 92nd congresses (1969-1972), did take numerous Vietnam-related votes. While opposition to the war increased, it remained well below a majority. The Senate did pass various end-the-war amendments, but they were deleted or emasculated in conference at the insistence of House conferees. In the spring of 1973, after the Vietnam cease-fire agreement had been signed, the House for the

1969-1976

117

first time voted to cut off funds. Nixon had continued bombing in Cambodia and Laos; and both chambers voted to bar the use of funds for U.S. combat activities in, over, or off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia. In 1973 also, the Congress enacted the war powers bill, which placed limits on the president's power to commit U.S. troops abroad without congressional approval. Passage of the bill over a presidential veto showed Congress' determination to reassert itself in the foreign policy sphere. From 1969 to 1976, two distinct clusters of international involvement roll calls appear in each Congress. One set is, in content, very similar to the international involvement dimension found in earlier congresses. It consists mostly of roll calls on foreign aid bills. The other includes numerous votes directly related to the Vietnam War but also roll calls on cutting Department of Defense appropriations, on cutting funds for a wide variety of weapons systems (the antiballistic missile, nerve gas, the B-i bomber are examples), on barring aid to Chile and other dictatorships, on overseas troop cuts, on prohibiting the importation of Rhodesian chrome, and on barring the Ford administration from becoming involved in Angola. This dimension will be labeled foreign and defense policy reorientation (see Clausen and Van Horn 1977: 631-632). Certainly those members who supported these departures were challenging basic precepts of American foreign and defense policy. The four foreign and defense policy reorientation scales do constitute a dimension. The mean intercorrelation for all members and for Democrats is .90; that for Republicans is .80. The correlations between the reorientation scales and the traditional international involvement scales indicate that these are two distinct dimensions. The mean correlation is .51. A 93rd Congress (1973-1974) scale, which consists of three votes on the war powers bill (passage, acceptance of the conference report, and the veto override vote), produced an alignment little related to that which appears on either the reorientation or the international involvement dimension; the mean correlation between the war powers scale and the four reorientation scales is .43. Voting on the reorientation dimension was influenced by partisanship. The mean correlation with party is .46, which indicates that Democrats were more inclined toward the new approach to foreign and defense policy than were Republicans. (The correlation of war powers scale scores with party is .40.) Democrats split deeply along North-South lines on the reorientation dimension. On the average, regional differences accounted for

118

Divided Government in a Time of Turmoil

42.4 percent of the variance in Democratic scores and, on all four scales, Democrats from both the solid South and the border South were much less supportive than northern Democrats. Democrats from the solid South were very much opposed to the approach to foreign policy embodied in the reorientation dimension. As table 7.1 shows, however, northern Democrats were far from unanimously supportive. The split within the ranks of the usually united northern Democrats raises the question of which members were most likely to support the new approach to foreign policy. The precepts of bipartisanship and presidential supremacy in foreign policy, which became firmly established in the postwar years, were first seriously questioned in the mid 1960s. One might thus expect members who entered the House during the years of foreign policy consensus to be least likely to support a new approach opposed by the president. Junior members, lacking these deep-seated habits of thought and behavior, might be more likely to respond to new situations in new ways. This is, in fact, the case. Northern Democrats first elected in 1950 or before are least inclined to high support on the reorientation dimension; their mean score over the four scales is 40 percent. Those first elected during the Eisenhower years are more supportive than their more senior colleagues (their mean is 55.1) but less supportive than those first elected in 1960 or 1962 (their mean is 70.2). Those first elected in 1964 or later are distinctly the most supportive of the four cohorts (their mean is 76.2). Among northern Democrats, then, support for a reorientation of foreign and defense policy is strongly related to seniority. Senior members, though much less supportive than their junior colleagues, are nevertheless still considerably more supportive than Democrats from the solid South. Support for reorientation is linked to both seniority and location among Democrats from the solid South. Texas and Florida Democrats, although basically opposed, nevertheless score consistently higher than members from other states, and junior Floridians and Texans score higher than their senior delegation colleagues. The 93rd and 94th Congress (1973-1976) classes are much more supportive than the more senior cohorts.1 Republicans were much less deeply split than Democrats on the reorientation dimension. As a party, they were opposed. Regional differences account, on the average, for 17.1 percent of the variance in Republican scores. Northeasterners are consistently more supportive than members from other areas and are, in each of the four congresses, more supportive than Democrats from the solid South. While relatively more supportive, the northeastern Republicans' basic pos-

1969-1976

119

Table 7.1. Foreign and Defense Policy Reorientation Support Scores by Party and Region, 1969-1976 Democrats

Republ icans

All Members

All

North

Solid South

All

Northeast

cific

Pa-

Interiora

91 92 93 94

31.0 30.8 42.9 41.9

42.8 43.1 59.6 51.6

63.1 60.0 76.9 65.2

10.6 9.8 30.0 22.1

15.8 13.3 22.4 21.9

29.8 20.3 31.7 34.3

13.3 9.3 21.4 19.1

13.4 13.6 22.2 20.5

93, war powers bill

64.0

79.7

87.8

65.7

44.4

57.6

44.2

42.1

Congress

a

Republicans from the solid South are not included.

ture was one of opposition. Among Republicans, voting on the reorientation dimension is unrelated to seniority. Given the overwhelming Republican opposition and the divisions within the Democratic party, many of the proposals aimed at a basic reorientation of foreign and defense policy failed. However, the defeat of many of the more far-reaching proposals does not mean that policy remained unchanged. The change in agenda was followed by a certain amount of policy change. Funds for the Indochina war were eventually cut off, some cuts in defense spending were made, and Congress refused to let the Ford administration get involved in Angola. Congress did become much more assertive on foreign and defense policy during these years. Passage of the war powers bill over a presidential veto indicates the change in congressional attitude. A number of amendments to the bill clustered with the 93rd Congress reorientation scale. The votes on passage, on the conference report, and on the veto override formed a separate scale. The war powers scale splits the parties along regional lines much less than the reorientation scales. Within the Democratic party, members from the solid South are less supportive than their northern party colleagues. Northeastern Republicans were, as one would expect, the most supportive segment of their party; nevertheless, despite intense presidential pressure, Republicans from all areas provided very considerable support on this important bill.

120

Divided Government in a Time of Turmoil

The conflict over the Vietnam War which led some members of Congress to question the basic thrust of American foreign policy inevitably influenced the ongoing debate on the foreign aid program. As was mentioned earlier, numerous attempts to cut off aid to dictatorships were made. (Such roll calls clustered with the reorientation dimension.) During this period, foreign aid lost support in the Congress. The Senate defeated aid bills in 1971 and 1972 and, in 1973 and 1974, the program survived in the House on very close votes. In 1976, Congress included in the foreign military aid bill provisions granting itself new authority over governmental and commercial sales of major military weapons and equipment. After a Ford veto, a compromise bill was passed which still increased congressional power over arms sales. Despite the change in the policy-making environment, the international involvement dimension does not change its form during the 91st through 94th congresses. Voting on the dimension is stable; the mean intercorrelation of scores is .84 for all members, .86 for Republicans, and .81 for Democrats. We expect a change in partisan control of the presidency to bring about some change in alignments, and that does occur. The mean correlation between scores for the 87th through 90th congresses and the 91st through 94th is .67. We further expect that, with a Republican in the White House, party would not be related to voting behavior on the international involvement dimension. During the Nixon-Ford years, the mean correlation with party is .16—almost identical to the .11 mean for the Eisenhower years and much below the .49 figure for the Kennedy-Johnson congresses. Also, as expected, Democratic support decreases and Republican support increases (see table 7.2). The drop in northern Democratic support is much sharper than the decrease which occurred when Eisenhower replaced Truman. This may reflect growing disillusionment with the foreign aid program on the part of a segment of the liberal community. All segments of the Republican party increase their support; that of interior Republicans, traditionally the least supportive group, rises most sharply. During the four Nixon-Ford congresses, interior Republicans' mean support is consistently above that of solid South Democrats. Although northeastern Republicans' support increases less than that of the other two groups, they remain by far the most supportive segment of their party. An examination of voting patterns on the two dimensions together sheds some further light on alignment change in the foreign policy area. For Republicans, scores on each scale were dichoto-

1969-1976 Table 7.2. International Region, 1961-1976

Involvement

Support Scores by Party and

Democrats

Congress

All

87-90 (mean) 91 92 93 94

77.1 60.4 61.9 65.9 67.2

a

121

Republicans

North

Solid South

92.2 77.9 76.5 79.8 81.5

47.2 32.3 31.5 40.8 40.0

All

Northeast

cific

Pa-

Interiora

39.6 53.9 53.3 50.9 49.1

63.5 73.2 75.9 70.3 74.1

39.4 66.2 51.6 53.2 39.2

29.4 51.9 50.0 48.7 47.5

Republicans from the solid South are not included.

mized at the 50 percent mark, and the results for the reorientation and the aid scales were cross-tabulated for each Congress. As no consistent variation across congresses was found, table 7.3 presents the results for the four congresses combined. The table shows that, on both dimensions, northeastern Republicans were more likely to be supportive than other Republicans and that both segments of the Republican party are more supportive of aid than of reorientation. More interesting is the finding that, for Republicans, high support on aid seems to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for high support on reorientation. Very few members scored below 50 percent on aid and above that mark on the reorientation scales. The Republican "left" supported both aid and reorientation. Among northern Democrats, we find a more complex pattern. The reorientation scale is trichotomized, as shown in table 7.3, and the aid scale is dichotomized at the 70 percent mark. 2 The table shows that as a group northern Democrats were supportive on the international involvement dimension and split on reorientation. A very small group scored relatively low on both. More interesting is the small but not insignificant group who supported a reorientation of foreign and defense policy and were relatively nonsupportive of foreign aid. 3 A comparison of these members with those supportive on foreign aid but opposed to reorientation is illuminating. Seniority sharply distinguishes these two groups. Almost twothirds (62.5 percent) of the members supportive of reorientation but low on the aid dimension were first elected in 1968 or later; only 15.3 percent were first elected in 1958 or before. Among the mem-

122

Divided Government in a Time of Turmoil

Table 7.3. Voting Patterns on the International Involvement and Foreign and Defense Policy Reorientation Dimensions, 1969-1976 Group

Dimensions

Northeastern Republicans Aid

Reorientation 0-49.9 0-49.9 I 22.6a 50-100 1 51.6 74.2

50-100 .6 I 25.2 [ 25.8

23.2 76.8

50-100 1.6 1 1 5.6 | 7.2

57.5 42.6

50-100 2.9 I 8.0 | 10.9

68.4 31.6

I 1

All other Republicans Aid

0-49.9 50-100

0-49.9 I 55.9 1 37.0 92.9

0-49.9 50-100

0-49.9 1 65.5 23.6 89.1

I

Solid South Democrats Aid Northern Democrats Aid

0-69.9 70-100

I

0-49.9 50-69.9 70-100 I 6.0 I 5.0 I 11.9 22.9 21.5 16.7 | 38.9 77.1 27.5 21.7 50.8

a

These numbers are a percentage of the total group.

bers who fall into this category are Ronald Dellums of California, Patricia Schroeder of Colorado, John Conyers of Michigan, David Obey of Wisconsin, Allard Lowenstein of New York, and James Abourezk of South Dakota. Clearly, these members are critics of the foreign aid program from the left. For these members, their rethinking of American foreign policy led to a decline in support for foreign aid. Those members who provided high support on the international involvement dimension but opposed reorientation are a m u c h more senior group. Almost two-thirds (62.6 percent) were first elected in 1958 or earlier, and 25.2 percent were first elected in 1950 or before. Committee chairs and other members of the House establishment are prominent in this group. "Doc" Morgan, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Clement Zablocki, a high-ranking member of that committee, Melvin Price, chair of the Armed Services Commit-

1969-1976

123

tee in the 94th Congress, Samuel Stratton, a senior member of Armed Services, and John McFall, the Democratic whip, are included in this group. Wayne Aspinall, Wayne Hays, and Chet Holifleld, chairmen of the Interior, House Administration, and Government Operations committees respectively, and James Delaney and Ray Madden, high-ranking members of the Rules Committee, also fall into this category. Given the power of this group, it is not surprising that their opponents frequently experienced difficulties in getting their proposals to the floor. Reaction to the Vietnam War led to a transformation in the foreign policy agenda that went far beyond the dispute over American involvement in that country. Public concern about the war was intense. By late 1967, over half the respondents to a Gallup Poll named Vietnam as the most important problem facing the American people, and the war remained a major concern until 1972 [Gallup Opinion Index, October 1971, 1971-1974). Public opinion regarding what to do about the war was ambivalent. Americans wanted to get out of Vietnam yet to do so with honor; as a result, public opinion during the late 1960s swung erratically from dovelike to hawklike and back again (Watts and Free 1972: 194-198). By early 1971, however, public opinion had stabilized; strong majorities supported relatively rapid withdrawal (Weissberg 1976: 141-153). Among the attentive public, a deep and bitter split developed. Opposition to the war led some to question fundamental precepts of American foreign policy. Supporters of the war frequently refused to credit the good faith of opponents and questioned their patriotism. To many on both sides, one's position on the war became a test of one's morality. Members of Congress are, of course, members of the attentive public, and they too were bitterly split on the war. Congressional voting behavior did roughly correspond to constituency opinion. In the population, Democrats after 1968 were somewhat more likely to be doves than were Republicans; Northeasterners were distinctly more dovelike than inhabitants of other sections (Gallup 1972: 2125, 2223; Harris 1970: n o , 115). On questions concerning defense spending and U.S. relations with communist countries, Southerners were especially inclined to take a hard line (Ladd with Hadley 1975: 170). Certainly the general public's growing disillusionment with the war had an important effect on policy. The combination of public opposition to what most saw as further senseless sacrifice and of an intense and extremely vocal antiwar movement was too much for all but the most hawklike of policy makers.

124

Divided Government in a Time of Turmoil

In terms of support for a more general reorientation of foreign and defense policy, however, it seems likely the members' own attitudes and those of their active supporters were more important than mass constituency sentiment as voting cues. The antiwar movement, which did call for such a reorientation, was predominantly liberal, middle-class, and urban in composition. Those who represented districts in which this element was important and who themselves shared these characteristics were most likely to favor a reorientation of American foreign and defense policy. For some members, antiwar activists became an important component of their core constituency. Richard Fenno quotes a member as saying, ' T h e people in the peace movement are probably my very strongest supporters. Don't forget, I was one of the first congressmen to come out against the war. To the peace people, I'm a semihero. We went through hard times together when being against the war wasn't popular, and they worked very hard for m e " (1978: 201). Although members who favored a basic reorientation of foreign and defense policy were a minority in the Congress, they did force a majority to rethink some previously unquestioned precepts of U.S. policy. The memory of Vietnam will be long in fading. Civil Liberties During the Nixon-Ford years, civil rights advocates and civil libertarians generally were forced to concentrate on preserving past gains rather than winning new ones. The House responded to continuing antiwar protests with more repressive legislation. With the election of Nixon, civil rights advocates no longer had a friend in the White House. Nixon opposed further civil rights legislation and increasingly supported the weakening of existing statutes. The public at large, strongly disapproving of war protesters even as opposition to the war itself grew, showed much less sympathy for further civil rights advances than it had in the mid 1960s. The 91st Congress saw a major battle over extension of the Voting Rights Act, which was due to expire in 1970. Nixon opposed extension and favored a drastically weaker measure. The House accepted the administration's version, but the Senate actually strengthened the original bill and the House accepted the Senate version (Orfield 1975: 94-102). Various measures aimed at antiwar protesters came to a vote. The House attempted to set limits on demonstrations in the District of Columbia and to bar picketing at the Pentagon. Student antiwar protesters were the target of amendments to several appropriations bills. The House voted to require that universities certify com-

1969-1976

125

pliance with the antidisorder measures passed earlier in order to be eligible for federal funds. As desegregation lawsuits began to affect some northern cities, busing became a highly salient issue. An August 1971 Gallup Poll found that 94 percent of the respondents had heard or read about busing, a m u c h higher proportion than for any other domestic issue; 73 percent were opposed [Gallup Opinion Index, September 1971). Busing dominated the civil liberties domain in the 92nd and 93rd congresses. The House by wide margins passed a series of antibusing provisions, many supported by the administration. In both congresses, the Senate either killed the measures or emasculated them (Orfield 1975: 179-186). Although a discouraging time for civil rights and civil liberties proponents, the early 1970s were not unrelievedly bleak. The 92nd Congress passed a bill prohibiting the establishment of emergency detention camps; it extended the Civil Rights Commission for five years and expanded its jurisdiction to include sex discrimination. An attempt to give the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission cease and desist powers was defeated in the House when the administration's weaker proposal was accepted. The final bill did, however, augment the Commission's enforcement power by giving it the right to bring suit directly. The 93rd House passed a District of Columbia home rule bill which provided for partial self-government. Despite the shrill rhetoric, a good deal of which emanated from the administration, the early 1970s were not another McCarthy period; opponents were never cowed into silence. The continued growth of opposition to the House Committee on Un-American Activities is one indicator of how different the two periods were. From the early 1960s on, opposition to HUAAC had been gradually growing in the House. In the 87th Congress, only 6 members went on record as opposed to funding the committee; in the 88th, 20 members voted against funds. Five HUAAC-related roll calls during the 89th drew an average of 59 opposition votes; on five roll calls in the 90th, mean opposition was 64·, by the 91st the figure had risen to 76. As always during this period, opposition was greatest on the least visible roll calls; 123 members voted against calling the previous question on the resolution to change the committee's name. The 92nd House took a number of roll calls on funds for HUAAC and for the Subversive Activities Control Board; the opposition continued to grow—the mean on the HUAAC roll calls was 103—but remained far from a majority. The 91st through 93rd congresses, then, saw little progress in the civil liberties area. Both on civil rights and on civil liberties, the

126

Divided Government in a Time of Turmoil

House took some drastic retrograde actions; the more progressive Senate contained the damage by killing or watering down most of the House's more extreme measures. In the 94th Congress, controversy centered around extension of the Voting Rights Act, which was due to expire in mid 1975. Over heated Republican opposition, Congress not only extended the act for seven years but strengthened it as well. Coverage was extended to language minorities, and a temporary nationwide ban on literacy tests was made permanent. The Democratic caucus, liberalized by the large number of northern members newly elected in the wake of Watergate, voted to kill HUAAC, and the House twice refused to earmark funds for the Judiciary Committee subcommittee which took over HUAAC's jurisdiction. The major civil liberties dimension is represented by one scale in each Congress from the 91st through the 94th. The trend toward an increasing relationship between voting and party evident in the 89th and 90th congresses continues. The mean correlation with party for the 91st through 94th is .43, compared with a mean of .27 for the 89th and 90th and .06 for the 85th through 88th. Alignments on the four scales are quite stable. The mean intercorrelation for all members and for Democrats is .87; for Republicans the mean is .83. The correlations between 91st and 92nd Congress scores and those in the 89th and 90th indicate strong stability; the mean is .90 for all members, .93 for Democrats, and .80 for Republicans. Alignments in the 93rd and 94th congresses are less similar to those in the last two Johnson congresses; the mean correlation is .81 for all members, .82 for Democrats, and .76 for Republicans. Although no massive alteration in alignments occurred, these figures do hint at some change. Republican support on the civil liberties dimension continues to be low and, relative to that of northern Democrats, drops further (see table 7.4). The average difference in mean scores for the 91st through 94th congresses is 47.6 percentage points, compared with a mean of 39 points for the 89th and 90th. Northeasterners continue to be more supportive than Republicans from other areas, but a proportion of the middle Atlantic segment of the northeastern contingent increasingly votes like other nonsouthern Republicans. Only during the 91st Congress are middle Atlantic Republicans as a group significantly more supportive than other Republicans. In contrast, New England members continue to score significantly higher. Middle Atlantic Republicans' declining support results in a lessening of the regional split on civil liberties in the Republican party; the mean variance accounted for by regional differences drops to 19.4

1969-1976

127

Table 7.4. Civil Liberties Support Scores by Party and Region, 1961-1976 Democrats Congress

All

North

Solid South

All

87-90 (mean) 91 92 93 94

53.1 50.1 59.1 54.7 72.5

71.9 71.9 79.1 70.7 85.5

12.0 12.6 17.9 24.1 42.5

41.5 22.9 31.5 29.1 33.5

Republicans Solid and North- Border east South 54.3 34.6 43.7 40.6 49.9

26.0 10.7 15.5 10.9 13.2

All Other 39.1 22.2 31.5 31.6 34.1

percent for the 91st to 94th congresses from 38.7 percent in the 89th and 90th. Republicans have come almost full circle on the civil liberties dimension. From being highly cohesive and highly supportive in the 1930s, their voting behavior evolved to the point where, in the mid 1970s, they were increasingly cohesive and strongly opposed. In the 94th Congress, the Republican mean score was below that of Democrats from the solid South. The decline in support is, in part, due to membership replacement. From the 90th Congress on, incoming northeastern Republicans were, except in the 92nd Congress, less supportive than their more senior regional colleagues. The difference in mean support scores was frequently substantial, and the difference did persist after these members' first Congress. Northeastern Republicans first elected in 1966 or later are consistently less supportive on the civil liberties dimension from the 90th through the 93rd Congress. The senior group's mean over those congresses is 43.6 percent; that of the junior group is 35.8. By the 94th, this is no longer the case, but by then the more senior cohort has dwindled to only a quarter of the northeastern Republican membership. 4 A similar pattern was found to hold among Republicans from other nonsouthern regions. In every Congress from the 91st through the 94th, newcomers were less supportive than veterans and these differences do persist. The mean for the four congresses of those first elected in 1966 or earlier is 32.4 percent; for more junior members, it is 24.1. As new Republican members in the 1950s and early 1960s

128

Divided Government in a Time of Turmoil

tended to be somewhat more supportive than veterans in their first Congress, the tendency of incoming members from the mid 1960s on to be less supportive is noteworthy Nevertheless, replacement does not entirely account for the declining Republican support. The distance between the mean support score of northern Democrats and that of senior Republicans also increases. The underlying cause of the declining support since the mid 1960s seems to be a change in the type of civil rights issues coming to the fore. Open housing, busing, and giving the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission real enforcement power all directly affected the Republican middle-class and business constituency In the 92nd Congress, in addition to the major dimension, which includes some busing roll calls, a scale consisting almost entirely of votes on busing appeared. Mean Republican support on this scale was 22.9 percent and there was little regional variation; only New England Republicans were significantly more supportive and solid South Republicans significantly less so than the average Republican (R2 = .099). In addition to their opposition on such highly charged issues as busing, Republicans also strongly supported weakening the Voting Rights Act in 1970 and 1975. In this they supported a president of their own party, and perhaps they were also motivated by the desire to increase Republican strength in the South. Given the overwhelmingly Democratic allegiance of black voters, few Republicans would see any point in appealing to this group; some might even have felt that for the Republican party to encourage greater black turnout was politically foolish. In opposing the 1975 extension bill, the Republican Policy Committee attacked it as perpetuating "punitive 'reconstruction' type federal intervention in southern states. It broadens the act's original legislative intent to reach into more than onefourth of the congressional districts, a spotty approach that will augment the voting strength of some, but not all, groups in the electorate" [Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1975: 527). The Nixon-Ford years, particularly the 93rd and 94th congresses, see a softening of the North-South split within the Democratic party. Although Democrats from the solid South are still much less supportive on civil liberties than their northern party colleagues, the distance between the two groups decreases significantly. In the 93rd and 94th congresses, the average difference between the mean scores of northern and solid South Democrats is, for the first time, less than 50 percentage points and, for the first time, the variance accounted for by regional differences is below 50 percent. (The

1969-1976

129

mean R2 for the 93rd and 94th congresses is .417, compared with a mean of .737 for the 75th through 92nd Congress period.) The trend toward a lessening of the regional split actually dates back to the early 1960s. From 1961 through 1972, most of the change was due to a drop in support among northern Democrats. Many found it difficult to oppose antibusing amendments and legislation aimed at war protesters. Kingdon quotes a northern Democrat as saying, "Suppose I vote against the college disruption amendment. Then I have to explain to everyone why I voted in favor of riots" (1973: 47). The decline in the North-South split in the 93rd and 94th congresses, in contrast, is due to increasing support on the civil liberties domain by Democrats from the solid South. In the 94th Congress, mean southern Democratic support is higher than mean Republican support. This change in southern Democratic voting deserves further examination. All members from the solid South who, in any Congress from the 88th through the 94th, scored above the mean of all members were examined. From the 88th through the 92nd Congress, very few Southerners met this criterion; the average over the five congresses was 5.8. All the high scorers are Democrats and most represent big-city districts—Houston, Miami, and Atlanta, for example. Texas and Florida account for almost three-quarters of the high scorers. Georgia and Louisiana are also represented—the latter by Hale Boggs—but no other solid South state is. In the 93rd Congress, the number of Democrats with scores greater than the mean for all members increases to thirteen; in the 94th, the number increases to twenty-four. These high scorers continue to be all Democrats, but now at least one member from each solid South state except Alabama and Mississippi makes the list. The high scorers also seem to be more diverse in terms of the districts they represent, although metropolitan districts are still overrepresented. Most striking is the proportion of new members among the high scorers. Six of the thirteen in the 93rd Congress were newly elected, and fourteen of the twenty-four in the 94 th were first elected in either 1972 or 1974. Table 7.5 clarifies the process of change. Within the solid South Democratic contingent, the 91st and 92nd congresses see a continuation of the pattern characteristic of the 1960s. Florida and Texas Democrats as a group are substantially more supportive than members from other southern states, and junior Texans and Floridians score appreciably higher than their senior delegation col-

130

Divided Government in a Time of Turmoil

Table 7.5. The Relationship of Civil Liberties Support Scores to Seniority and Location: Solid South Democrats, 1969-1976

Group All Cohort 85th or earlier 86th-92nd 93rd-94th

91 92 93 94 Tex.Tex.Tex.Tex.Fla. Other Fla. Other Fla. Other Fla. Other 21.3

7.0

27.7

11.4

30.4

19.3

50.7

37.0

15.0 28.1

6.5 7.1

21.7 33.8

10.7 11.8

17.1 36.8 50.0

14.3 12.1 41.4

42.0 52.6 65.7

31.6 22.6 55.0

leagues. These generalizations continue to hold in the 93rd and 94th congresses. The new element is the m u c h higher support of members first elected in 1972 or 1974. Texas and Florida members who first entered the House in the 1973 to 1976 period are m u c h more supportive than either of the more senior groups, but so also are those from the other southern states. Since there was considerable turnover among solid South Democrats in the 1972 and 1974 elections, the new members 7 greater willingness to be supportive on the civil liberties domain had a strong impact on the mean southern support score. Both the election in the South of Democrats moderate on the race issue and some moderation of more senior members' opposition can be attributed to changes in the South since the mid 1960s. As blacks became an important element of the electorate, race baiting became a counterproductive tactic in more and more districts. Gradually whites found they could live with the effects of the civil rights revolution, and the race issue receded in saliency in m u c h of the South. For example, the proportion of southern white parents who said they would object to sending their children to a school where half the children are black declined from 78 percent in 1963 to 36 percent in 1973 [Los Angeles Times, August 28, 1978). George Wallace's poor showing in the 1976 southern primaries further indicates the extent to which the race issue declined in prominence. Ironically, as civil rights became a less salient issue in the South, race-related problems became more divisive in the North. The impact on Republican voting has already been discussed. Northern Democrats were also affected, as their generally lower sup-

1969-1976

131

port scores from 1966 on indicate. Had it not been that members elected in the 1960s and 1970s were more supportive than their seniors on civil liberties, the mean northern Democratic score would have fallen even further.5 Busing was an especially ticklish issue for many northern Democrats. On the 92nd Congress busing scale discussed earlier, the mean northern Democratic support score was 65.3 percent. Voting on this scale offers a clear example of the influence of intense constituency feeling on congressional voting behavior. In September 1971, a federal court found Detroit and the state of Michigan guilty of intentional school segregation, which opened up the possibility of court-ordered desegregation of the whole metropolitan area. Most of the roll calls in the busing scale were taken on November 4, 1971, when the House, seemingly in response to the Detroit decision, engaged in an antibusing amendment orgy. On this scale, the mean score of Michigan Democrats was 33.4 percent—far below the not very high mean of all northern Democrats and also much below that of Democratic members from adjacent states. Yet, on the major 92nd Congress civil liberties scale, Michigan Democrats were more supportive than the average northern Democrat. Clearly, Michigan Democrats believed that registering strong opposition to busing was a political necessity. From the mid 1960s to the 1970s, the civil liberties agenda did not undergo any basic change, although the busing issue did become more prominent. Policy change was incremental. Progressive impulses were frequently blocked by a conservative president; the House's more extreme antiwar protester and antibusing measures were blocked by the Senate. The public spoke with no clear voice. Strongly opposed to busing and upset by campus disruptions and civil disobedience, the public nevertheless was becoming less racially prejudiced (Harris 1973: 236-239). For Republicans, constituency interests, political benefit and loss calculations, and an ideological dislike of intrusive federal action led to a continued decline in support on the civil liberties dimension. The increase in black voting in the South, brought about by the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and the decline in the saliency of the race issue in the South resulted in a lessening of the North-South split within the Democratic party. Social Welfare Confrontations between an increasingly conservative presidency and an inconsistent but frequently activist Congress characterized the Nixon-Ford years. Veto threats and vetoes flew hot and

132

Divided Government in a Time of Turmoil

heavy. Struggles around the labor-health, education, and welfare appropriations bill became an almost yearly occurrence; educational funds were frequently at issue. Minimum wage legislation, the antipoverty program, and the food stamps program excited continuing controversy. On minimum wage legislation, at issue were not only the usual question of whether and how much to increase the figure but also whether to allow a subminimum for youths. The 92nd House approved this provision, which labor strongly opposed, but the bill died when the House twice refused to send it to conference. Conservatives feared House conferees would accept the much more liberal Senate version. In 1973 the House passed a much stronger minimum wage bill, one without the youth subminimum, a provision the administration favored. Nixon vetoed the bill and the House failed to override. When, in 1974, Congress again passed essentially the same bill, Nixon decided not to veto. The food stamps program became more controversial than it had been before. The eligibility of strikers for food stamps was a particularly hot issue. The 93rd House voted to bar strikers from receiving stamps, but the provision was dropped in conference. Over congressional opposition, Nixon attempted to dismantle the Office of Economic Opportunity through executive action. The attempt was stopped by a court order, and, in 1974, Congress extended OEO programs through fiscal 1977 and replaced OEO with the new independent Community Services Administration. The Congress did make some new departures, but congressional initiative was frequently stifled by presidential vetoes. The 91st Congress passed the manpower training bill, the first major public service employment bill ever passed by Congress. Nixon vetoed the measure and the Senate failed to override. The administration also opposed the Emergency Employment Act of 1971, which provided public service employment during times of high unemployment. Given the poor economic situation, however, Nixon decided to compromise after the bill had passed both chambers. The conference version was closer to the weaker Senate bill, and Nixon signed it into law. As liberals had been working for such a program since the mid 1960s, its passage even in a weakened form was a major breakthrough. In 1973, the Comprehensive Training and Development Act (CETA) passed. The compromise between the administration and the Congress did include some funding for public service jobs. During the 94th Congress, a bill providing emergency jobs funds was vetoed, and the House failed to override. The public service jobs section of CETA, however, was extended in 1976, though it had been

1969-1976

133

watered down to avoid a veto. Despite presidential opposition, then, Congress had successfully taken a step toward establishing government responsibility as the employer of last resort. The Congress also passed a bill liberalizing eligibility standards for benefits to coal miners with black lung disease, the Older Americans Act, an extension of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act, and a bill reviving, in a limited way, the public housing program. A more significant departure was the Urban Mass Transportation Act passed by the 93rd Congress, which authorized for the first time federal subsidies for operating expenses of urban mass transit systems. The administration opposed the congressional version of each of these bills, and all were weakened either after a veto or to avoid a veto. Some congressional departures were completely thwarted by the Republican administration. The 92nd Congress included a comprehensive child development program in a bill extending the Office of Economic Opportunity. Claiming the program had "family weakening implications'' Nixon vetoed the bill and the Senate failed to override. In 1972 an OEO extension bill became law, but it did not contain the child care section. The heavily Democratic 94th Congress passed the common-situs picketing bill, long a priority goal of organized labor. Despite a promise to the contrary, Ford vetoed the bill and no override attempt was made. The 94th also passed a broad housing aid bill, which included cash grants to middle-income home buyers for down payments and temporary subsidies reducing mortgage interest rates. Again Ford used the veto and the House failed to override. The 92nd and the 93rd House each passed a bill establishing an independent consumer protection agency, but both times a Senate filibuster killed the bill. During the 94th Congress, both chambers finally passed the measure, but, because of a veto threat, it never came out of conference. In one case, Nixon attempted to innovate and was thwarted by the Congress. His Family Assistance Act, which proposed substituting a negative income tax for existing welfare programs, passed the House in the 91st and 92nd congresses but did not make it through the Senate.6 The 1969 to 1976 period, thus, saw the Congress generally protecting old programs and even passing a few new ones. With very few exceptions, what progressive initiative existed came from the Congress. The Nixon-Ford years do not constitute a distinct period in terms of dimensional structure or voting alignments. The correlations of scores across congresses for all members indicate high stability. The mean intercorrelation of scores for the 91st through 94th

134

Divided Government in a Time of Turmoil

Table 7.6. Social Welfare Support Scores by Party and Region, 1969-1976 Democrats Congress

All

91 92 93 94

78.1 80.6 80.1 79.1

North

Solid South

All

95.3 94.2 93.2 88.8

44.4 49.0 53.8 56.2

42.1 24.5 37.0 27.7

Republicans NorthAll Other east 62.6 37.3 58.0 46.3

36.0 20.6 30.2 21.8

is .95. The mean correlation between 91st through 94th Congress scores and those in the 89th and 90th, which is .94, shows strong continuity in alignments.7 The correlations between scores and party indicate that, despite this seeming stability, voting on social welfare legislation became more partisan during this period. The 91st Congress is very similar to the preceding congresses. The correlation of social welfare scores with party is .54, compared with a mean of .55 for the 89th and 90th. The 92nd through 94th congresses see a significant increase in partisanship—the mean correlation is .72. The increased partisanship is due to a narrowing of the NorthSouth split within the Democratic party during these congresses (see table 7.6). In the 89th and 90th congresses, the difference in means of the two segments is just under 59 percentage points; in the 91st, it is 50.9 points. The difference decreases monotonically to 32.6 percentage points in the 94th. This narrowing is the result both of a minor decrease in the northern Democratic mean and, more important, of a substantial increase in the mean of Democrats from the solid South. Regression analysis tells the same story. While the mean percentage of variance accounted for by regional differences is a hefty 53.1, it decreases monotonically over these four congresses from 62 percent in the 91st to 45.7 percent in the 94th. Even at the end of the period, then, the North-South split is of major proportions, yet it is less deep than in most of the congresses since its inception. Only two of the congresses between 1945 and 1972 saw a regional split as mild as that found in the 93rd and 94th (R2 is used as the criterion). As table 7.7 shows, membership turnover was an important contributor to the decline in the North-South split. In the 91st and

135

1969-1976 Table 7.7. The Relationship of Social Welfare Support Scores to Seniority and Location: Solid South Democrats, 1969-1976

Group All Cohort 85th or earlier 86th-92nd 93rd-94th

91 92 93 94 Tex.Tex.Tex.Tex.Fla. Other Fla. Other Fla. Other Fla. Other 58.4

34.9

58.5

42.2

62.9

46.4

61.3

52.9

49.1 68.4

28.5 38.8

51.9 65.2

37.1 44.8

52.7 68.5 74.2

42.2 38.1 69.2

53.0 68.4 65.0

52.3 41.4 65.8

92nd congresses, southern Democratic support for social welfare legislation continues to be related to both location and seniority in a fashion identical to that characteristic of the 1960s. The 93rd and 94th congresses see a change. Members first elected in 1972 or 1974 are, as a group, considerably more supportive than their senior colleagues, and the differences are especially large for members from states other than Florida and Texas. Of the fifteen solid South Democrats with support scores of 80 percent or higher in the 93rd Congress, six were newly elected. The fifteen high scorers in the 94th Congress include eight who were first elected in 1972 or 1974. Since, in the 94th Congress, the members of these two classes account for approximately a third of the solid South Democratic membership, turnover made a significant contribution to narrowing the regional division in the Democratic party. Within the Republican party, the split between Northeasterners and members from other regions continues. While not as intense as during the Kennedy-Johnson years, it does not return to the lower levels of the Eisenhower period. Regional differences account for an average of 23.6 percent of the variance in Republican scores during the 91st through 94th congresses, compared with 35.8 percent during the 87th through 90th and 14.1 percent during the 83rd through 86th. Northeasterners continue to be the most deviant section of the party. The Nixon-Ford years saw little change in the social welfare agenda. By and large, conflict revolved around the issues which had come to the fore during the 1960s. Policy change was predominantly incremental. The one exception was in the area of public service em-

136

Divided Government in a Time of Turmoil

ployment. The notion that the government should be the employer of last resort dated back to the 1960s and, more remotely, to the Great Depression (Orfield 1975: 192-201). Bills embodying this approach failed during the prosperous 1960s but, when unemployment rose sharply in the 1970s, Congress forced a reluctant president to accept a modest public employment program. In other areas, divided control and the lack of clear signals from the public made major policy departures impossible. Continuity in the political agenda would usually lead one to expect continuity in alignments. To a considerable extent, alignments are stable and very similar to those characteristic of the 1960s. The one change of note is the decline in the depth of the North-South split in the Democratic party. Agricultural Policy In the last Johnson Congress and continuing throughout the Nixon-Ford years, a new issue becomes important in the agricultural policy area. The proposal to restrict the subsidy payment a single farmer may receive produced voting alignments very different from those on traditional agricultural legislation. In each Congress from 1967 through 1976, a scale including roll calls on the subsidy limit or related issues appears. The House approved a $20,000 limit in 1968 and again in 1969 but, in both cases, the final bill excluded the provision. In 1970, both chambers approved a $55,000 limit. In the 92nd and 93rd congresses, the House again took a number of roll call votes on the $20,000 subsidy limit. The 93rd and the 94th House voted to eliminate all federal financing for Cotton, Inc., a producerrun cotton research and promotion program. In addition, the 94th Congress scale includes a roll call on lowering target prices for cotton and one setting a limit on the peanut subsidy program. Voting on the five subsidy limit scales is much less partisan than is that on the traditional agricultural assistance dimension. The mean correlation with party is .23. As the scoring procedure used resulted in a high score representing high opposition to imposing a subsidy limit, the correlation indicates that Republicans were more favorable to subsidy limits than were Democrats. However, given the size of the correlation, it is clear that voting was only slightly related to partisanship. The mean correlation of scores across congresses for the five scales is .68. Thus voting alignments, while not as stable as on the major dimensions, do show considerable continuity. Democrats show considerably more within-party alignment stability than Republicans—the mean correlation of Democratic scores across con-

1969-1976 Table 7.8. Subsidy Limit Opposition 1967-1976

137

Scores by Party and Region,

Democrats

Republicans West

Congress

All

Northeast

Solid South

All Other

All

Northeast

North Central

All Other

90 91 92 93 94

71.7 61.1 56.9 55.3 51.1

50.5 29.1 29.4 20.2 24.8

93.1 91.5 86.9 90.0 82.9

68.3 58.7 53.1 52.1 47.7

53.0 51.8 43.2 37.0 24.6

27.6 20.0 18.8 15.8 12.1

86.9 77.8 58.8 60.2 51.2

55.0 59.1 49.8 41.8 26.4

gresses is .71; the mean for Republicans is .59. That these scales represent a distinct dimension from the agricultural assistance dimension is shown by the correlation between the two sets of scales. The mean correlation between the five subsidy limit scales and the 92nd through 94th Congress agricultural policy scales is .45. The subsidy limit controversy divided the Democrats m u c h more deeply than traditional agricultural legislation ever did (see table 7.8). On the average, regional differences accounted for over 40 percent of the variation in Democratic scores. Democrats from the Northeast and those from the east north central states, predominantly representing urban and suburban districts, were consistently and significantly more in favor of a subsidy limit than were other Democrats. Since big cotton growers were the greatest beneficiaries of large subsidy payments, solid South Democrats consistently opposed any limitation. As we saw earlier, Democrats without any direct constituency interest in doing so generally supported their rural colleagues on traditional agricultural assistance legislation. Such programs could be defended as necessary to preserve the family farm of American political mythology. When the question shifted to whether rich farmers should continue to be allowed to collect hundreds of thousands of dollars in subsidy payments, the political calculus for urban Democrats changed. Both liberal ideology and the difficulty of explaining a contrary vote during a period of rising food prices dictated voting for the subsidy limit. Thus, during debate, Lowenstein of New York said, "It seems to me sound economics and sound morality to stop paying large subsidies to people who do not need them while other

138

Divided Government in a Time of Turmoil

people go hungry and millions more are crushed by taxes and inflation" [Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1970: 638). For northern Democrats and northern Democrats only, voting on the subsidy limit dimension is related to seniority. Members first elected in 1960 or later are consistently and significantly more supportive of imposing subsidy limits than are their more senior colleagues. The mean score over the 90th through 93rd Congress scales for those first elected in 1958 or earlier is 51.8 percent; for those first elected during the 1960 to 1972 period, the mean is 41.4. The 94th Congress mean for the most senior group is 53.1; for the intermediate group, it is 35.i; for the large incoming class, 30.3. Junior members, less habituated to supporting their southern party colleagues on agricultural legislation, were most willing to take a strong antisubsidy stance. The subsidy limit dimension split the Republican party along regional lines also. Northeastern Republicans consistently and overwhelmingly supported the subsidy limit; members from the east north central and from the Pacific coast states also tended to support the limit. West north central Republicans were joined by their southern and mountain party colleagues in opposition. These regional differences account, on the average, for 33.5 percent of the variation in Republican scores. The traditional agricultural policy dimension does not appear in the 90th and 91st congresses but reemerges in the 92nd. Like Eisenhower, Nixon and Ford attempted to move toward a free-market economy in agriculture, and this brought them into conflict with the Democratic Congress. The 1973 farm bill, passed during a period of soaring agricultural prices, replaced the traditional program with a more flexible income support system. By 1975, farm income was declining and farmers' production costs increasing. The congressional response was the emergency farm bill, which would have increased target prices and loan levels for the major crops [Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1975: 501). Ford vetoed the bill as budget busting and the House failed to override. In contrast to the subsidy limit dimension, voting on traditional agricultural policy is quite strongly influenced by party; the mean correlation is .79. Alignments are stable across the three congresses, with a mean intercorrelation of .80. We showed previously that, for the 1933 to 1966 period, Democratic voting displayed considerably more within-party structure during Republican than during Democratic administrations. One would thus expect the Nixon-Ford years to show an increase in structure over the previous Democratic administration, and this is, in fact, the case. The mean intercorrelation of scores across con-

139

1969-1976 Table 7.9. Agricultural Assistance Support Scores by Party and Region, 1961-1976 Democrats Congress

All

87-89 (mean) 92 93 94

89.4 89.5 87.3 81.5

North- Solid east South 87.5 82.5 80.4 68.0

80.9 91.3 91.4 87.2

All Other

All

90.5 92.8 87.7 85.0

23.1 8.7 25.6 29.3

Repw blicans West North- North All east Central Other 18.4 .8 17.1 13.6

43.7 23.8 57.8 84.4

20.9 9.3 24.5 27.4

gresses for the 92nd through 94th is .66, compared with a mean of .46 for the 87th through 89th congresses. Northeastern Democrats' support for farm legislation drops from the high level of the Kennedy-Johnson years; but the drop, while considerable, is not as great as that which occurred between the Truman and Eisenhower administrations (see table 7.9). Several factors seem to account for this difference. Included in the scales are roll calls on several programs which were generally popular with Democrats and which Nixon attempted to discontinue. Votes on rural electrification and the rural environmental assistance program put little strain on Democratic unity. Furthermore, northern Democrats were increasingly requiring a quid pro quo from their southern party colleagues—in a number of cases, southern support for the food stamps program, especially for the continued eligibility of strikers for food stamps, was the price [Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1969: 747, 1973: 303). Also important are roll call votes which did not appear in the agricultural assistance dimension. By the 94th Congress, the subsidy limit dimension had, in content, become broader than the name implies. It included, for example, a very important roll call on an amendment to the emergency farm bill. This amendment lowered the target price for cotton and, when it passed, northern Democrats were willing to give at least grudging support to the bill. During this period, then, we begin to see some roll calls on traditional agricultural policy produce such different alignments that they no longer form part of the traditional agricultural assistance dimension. Within the Republican party, the 93rd and 94th Congress agri-

140

Divided Government in a Time of Turmoil

cultural assistance scales produced stable voting alignments. The correlation between the scores was .74, considerably higher than the mean correlation of .40 for the 87th through 89th congresses and equal to the mean for the Eisenhower years. Thus, we again find that, for Republicans as well as Democrats, within-party structure is greater during Republican than during Democratic administrations. 8 Scales in the 93rd and 94th congresses show the now familiar pattern of west north central Republicans defecting from the party position to support agricultural assistance legislation. The percentage of variance in scores accounted for by regional differences increases; the average was 23.6 percent for the 87th through 89th congresses, 28.8 percent for the 92nd through 94th congresses. While the figure is much below that of the Eisenhower years, we do see again that agricultural policy tends to split Republicans along regional lines more deeply during Republican than during Democratic administrations. That the Republican party is more deeply split during Republican administrations seems to be a function of the sort of farm proposals characteristic of presidents of the two parties. Republican presidents have favored low, flexible support prices, which most southern and west north central farmers consider disastrous. When the Republicans control the White House, the Democratic farm program is a product of the congressional agricultural committees, which are dominated by members from farm districts. Thus, when a Republican is president, a high score on the agricultural assistance dimension represents opposition to the president's program and support for the very generous committee proposals. The proposals of Democratic presidents, while leaning toward high, rigid support prices, have not been as generous to farmers as those favored by farm Democrats in the Congress. Kennedy, for example, favored high supports but also effective production controls. Under a Democratic president, a high score on the agricultural assistance dimension represents support for the president's program. Since elements of the program are not to the liking of many farmers, the support of farm representatives drops somewhat. Within the Democratic party, the result is that solid South members score somewhat lower than their northeastern party colleagues on the agricultural assistance dimension during Democratic administrations while, during Republican administrations, they score much higher. The split within the Republican party narrows during Democratic administrations because farm members vote against certain administration proposals which they consider not suffi-

1969-1976

141

ciently profarmer, while nonfarm Republicans continue to oppose the agricultural assistance program altogether. The late 1960s, then, saw the development of a new dimension in the agricultural policy area. At the beginning the issue at controversy was whether a limit should be placed upon the subsidy payment received by a single farmer. By the 94th Congress, however, questions that previously had formed part of the traditional agricultural assistance dimension entered this new dimension. This shift was the result of northern Democrats now seriously questioning the farm program supported by their southern party colleagues. The growing consumer movement seems to have played a role in the development of the subsidy limit dimension. Throughout the 1950s and much of the 1960s, Democrats seem to have viewed agricultural policy making as pure distributive politics (Lowi 1964). That is, the policy was seen as benefiting farmers but not at anyone's expense. The consumer movement attempted to rephrase the terms of the debate, and subsidy limits were an easy place to begin. High inflation and soaring food prices made the issue one of potential saliency to constituents. For urban and suburban representatives, a vote in favor of large subsidies to rich farmers would be very hard to explain to the folks back home. A change in the political environment led to a new issue entering the agenda, and this led to a change in voting alignments. Furthermore, the controversy over the new issue seemed to be changing the terms of the debate on agricultural policy more generally, with the result that some members began to reevaluate their support for traditional agricultural programs. Government Management of the Economy During the Nixon-Ford years, environmental and consumer protection issues became increasingly central elements of the government management agenda. A 1970 Harris Poll found that 41 percent mentioned air and water pollution as one of the problems Congress should do something about. In 1971, 72 percent chose pollution in response to a similar question. Over 80 percent of the respondents in both years favored increased government spending on pollution control (Harris 1970: 46, 48, 1971: 55, 58). This issue remained among the most frequently mentioned in 1972 and 1973· As the prosperity of the 1960s gave way first to inflation and then to recession combined with inflation, the economy reemerged as an issue of high saliency. Prices began to climb sharply in the late 1960s and, from 1972 through 1975, rose precipitously. The reces-

142

Divided Government in a Time of Turmoil

sions of 1969 to 1970 and 1974 to 1975 saw unemployment increase, in the latter case to 9 percent, but prices did not fall (Sherman 1976: 5 - 9 , 134-135). In 1971 and in 1973 through 1976, the economy headed the Gallup Poll's list of major problems facing the United States (Gallup Opinion Index, October 1971, 1973-1976). Worsening inflation in 1970 led the Congress to give the president authority to freeze wages and prices. Although Nixon said he neither wanted nor would use the authority, in August of 1971, faced with the prospect of rampant inflation in an election year, he imposed wage-price controls. In late 1971, Congress extended the president's authority to impose such economic controls. In addition to taking the unprecedented step of giving the president unrequested economic control powers, the 91st Congress passed, over Nixon's opposition, an extremely strong Clean Air Act which set specific deadlines for the reduction of emissions. The Appalachian Regional Development Act was extended and a major tax reform and tax cut bill, initiated by Congress, was enacted. The 92nd Congress became involved in a series of confrontations with the president. In response to rising unemployment, Congress passed the Public Works Acceleration Act, backed by the Democratic leadership. Despite the bill's political attractiveness—in addition to its antirecession purpose, it had ecological appeal, as m u c h of the money would be used for water and sewer projects— Nixon vetoed it. After the Senate sustained, a much smaller compromise bill was enacted (Orfield 1975: 233-235). A bill to amend and extend the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965 was pocket vetoed by Nixon. The 92nd Congress took a series of actions in the environmental area. The Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act, which changed the basic pesticide law from a labeling into a regulatory law, a strong Water Pollution Control Act, and a bill creating the Consumer Product Safety Agency were enacted. The House, for the first time, voted to cut off funding for the supersonic transport; and it passed a tough strip-mining regulation bill, but, on this, the Senate did not act. In addition, the Nixon administration won approval for its revenue-sharing program and for the Lockheed loan guarantee bill. (Roll calls on these measures do not enter the government management dimension but form independent scales, which will be discussed later). The 1973 Arab oil embargo thrust energy to the center of the government management agenda in the 93rd Congress. The Emergency Energy Act would have given the president broad authority to

1969-1976

143

control the production and consumption of energy. A number of amendments to the bill suspending or postponing clean air requirements during the emergency were offered on the House floor. Although the membership rejected the more extreme proposals, the House did delay the effective date for some standards. A House amendment restricting windfall profits led to the bill's demise. When the conference committee deleted the provision, the House refused to accept the conference report. Efforts to weaken clean air standards continued to be made and, in 1974, emission requirements were relaxed for another year. Environmentalists suffered a second defeat when Ford pocket vetoed a strip-mining bill. A bill authorizing funds for land use planning died when the rule was defeated on the House floor. The Congress did pass a bill strengthening Federal Trade Commission regulation of consumer warranties and expanded the FTC's authority to protect consumers. The Russian wheat deal served as a catalyst for the enactment of a bill strengthening federal regulation of commodity futures trading. With inflation continuing to worsen, Democrats attempted to use the extension of the Economic Stabilization Act as a vehicle for tightening controls and rolling back prices. These proposals failed on the House floor, and the bill was extended without major revisions. Energy policy continued at the center of controversy during the 94th Congress. Debate on the omnibus energy policy bill was dominated by the conflict over oil price controls; as enacted, it continued price controls on gas and set mileage standards for cars. The Democratic party's response to the energy emergency was an Energy Tax Plan. This included some highly unpopular features— most notably a gas tax of twenty cents a gallon—and was stripped down on the House floor. Natural gas deregulation also occasioned conflict in the House. The natural gas bill was intended as an emergency measure, but the rule allowed substitution of a long-range deregulation provision. Opponents of deregulation fashioned a compromise that deregulated only small producers and won on the floor. The bill eventually died. In the 94th Congress, liberals achieved a long-sought goal: repeal of the oil depletion allowance. Strengthened by the 1974 elections and by the antipathy to the oil companies engendered by sharply rising prices, the anti-depletion allowance forces used the Democratic caucus to insure a floor vote on depletion repeal. Repeal won in the House, and the conference committee compromise restored the allowance for small producers only.

144

Divided Government in a Time of Turmoil

The Democrats' response to the deepening recession brought them into conflict with President Ford. In early 1975, an emergency tax cut bill was passed; but, when the bill came up for extension, Ford insisted on the cuts being accompanied by curbs on federal spending. When this was not done, he vetoed the bill and the House failed to override. The prospect of starting an election year with an increase in taxes led to a quick compromise. As an antirecession measure, the House Democratic leadership proposed a $5 billion public works program. Ford again vetoed the measure and the House failed to override. The House took a number of roll calls on the British-French supersonic transport and did impose a limited ban on landings at U.S. airports. An attempt to revise the Clean Air Act of 1970 was killed by a conservative filibuster in the Senate. Consumer advocates scored a major victory with the passage of the Anti-Trust Parens Patriae Act, which authorized state attorneys general to bring antitrust suits on behalf of citizens, required large companies to notify the government of planned mergers, and strengthened federal antitrust investigatory powers. Some consumer groups also counted the passage of a major tax revision bill, which did close some loopholes, as a victory. In addition, the 94th saw the new congressional budget procedure go into effect, and the House took a number of roll calls on the budget resolutions. Stagflation—the combination of inflation and unemployment—the Arab oil embargo, and the environmental movement, then, did bring about a major change in the government management agenda. But only in the environmental area were public signals both strong and clear, and only in that area was agenda change accompanied by nonincremental policy change. The 1970 Clean Air Act, the single most important accomplishment, not only attempted to attain its goals through regulation rather than subsidies, which had been the primary mechanism in earlier environmental legislation; it also contained "technology-forcing" provisions—that is, standards were set above what was thought to be feasible with present technology (Ingram and Mann 1978: 133-136). The Arab oil embargo, however, ended the period of easy victories. As attention shifted to the need for increased energy production, environmentalists were forced onto the defensive. The change in the focus of government management legislation does bring about a change in alignments. The importance of partisanship decreases; the mean correlation of scores with party is .71—a considerable decline from the .92 mean for the 69th through 90th Congress. For the first time during the period under study, the

145

1969-1976 Table 7.10. Government Management Support Scores by Party and Region, 1961-1976 Democrats

Congress

All

87-90 (mean) 91 92 93 94

84.8 62.6 78.5 64.3 76.9

Republicans

North

Border South

Solid South

All

Northeast

All Other

92.0 77.3 89.6 76.6 88.7

90.0 58.9 76.8 54.4 67.7

69.4 35.5 54.7 41.0 49.8

17.3 16.2 29.6 29.8 22.6

25.4 27.0 41.7 47.2 40.9

14.1 13.0 24.4 23.8 16.7

across-time correlation matrix for all members shows some discontinuity. Voting alignments from the 91st through the 94th are quite stable, with a mean intercorrelation of .90. The discontinuity with the earlier congresses is shown by the correlation of scales for the 91st through 94th with those for the 87th through 90th, which is .81. Democratic alignments during the Nixon-Ford years are more highly structured than in any of the earlier periods examined; the mean across-time correlation is .86. Again the correlation matrix shows discontinuity with the previous congresses; the mean correlation of scores for the 91st through 94th with the 87th through 90th is .65. On the issues which dominated the government management dimension in the 1970s, the Democrats were more deeply divided than they had been at any time during the half century studied (see table 7.10). Regional differences accounted, on the average, for 52.6 percent of the variance in scores—up from 34.2 percent in the Kennedy-Johnson years, during which the split was relatively deep. Democrats from the solid South are least supportive; border South Democrats are now consistently significantly less supportive, and Democrats from the mountain states usually are. A kind of Snowbelt versus Sunbelt alignment pattern has developed, though the Sunbelt bloc does not include Democrats from the Pacific states. On these scales, Democrats from the solid South vote more like Republicans than like northern Democrats. The decline in southern support is a generalized phenomenon. Every solid South Democratic delegation shows an appreciable de-

146

Divided Government in a Time of Turmoil

cline in mean support score between the 90th and the 91st Congress—the support score of eight of the ten delegations drops by more than 20 percentage points, that of four by more than 30 points. This decline in support is a behavioral change; it is not due to membership replacement. Texas and Florida Democrats, as a group, continue to score higher than members from other southern states, although the difference narrows during this period. More junior Floridians and Texans—those who entered the House between 1958 and 1970—continue to be more supportive than their senior delegation colleagues. On government management as on civil liberties and social welfare, solid South Democrats first elected in 1972 or 1974 do display distinctive voting patterns.9 They are much more supportive than their senior regional colleagues,· the differences are especially large for members from states other than Texas and Florida. Had it not been for the influx of these more supportive members, the solid South Democrats' mean support would have declined even further. The increased distance between northern Democrats and those from the solid South is all the more startling since this period also sees some decline in the high support of northern Democrats on the government management dimension. These issues not only divided northern and southern Democrats but also depressed the usually high cohesion of the northern Democratic contingent. On the government management dimension during these years, northern Democrats split along seniority lines. Members first elected in 1962 or later are considerably more supportive than members first elected earlier; the mean over the four scales is 79 percent for the senior group, 86.4 for the more junior group. As was the case for southern Democrats, membership replacement not only fails to account for the decline in support but actually mitigates that decline. Republican alignments show greater stability over the 91st through 94th Congress than in any previous period; the mean across-time correlation is .79. The alignment pattern characteristic of the 1970s is not identical to that prevalent during the 1960s. The mean correlation of scores for the 91st through 94th congresses with those for the 88th through 90th is .60. During this period, Northeasterners continue to move away from the opposition stance of other Republicans. Over the four congresses, Northeasterners' scores average 18.3 percentage points higher than those of other (but non-solid South) Republicans; from the 87th through the 90th, the mean difference was 11.3 percentage points. The split is especially deep in the 93rd and 94th congresses. The Northeasterners' mean support score in the 93rd is almost double that of other Republicans and, in fact, is higher than the solid

1969-1976

147

South Democrats' mean. In the 94th, Northeasterners are more than twice as supportive as other Republicans. Republicans, unlike Democrats, do not split along seniority lines. Northeastern newcomers continue to be a little less supportive than their senior colleagues but, by and large, this does not persist beyond their first term. The 1974 elections, through selective attrition, did have the effect of making the northeastern Republican contingent more supportive on government management legislation. The mean 93rd Congress score for Northeasterners who also served in the 94th was 51.5 percent; for those who did not return, the mean was 39.3. The same pattern holds for Republicans from all regions except the West; for Republicans from areas other than the Northeast, the mean score of survivors was 26, that of nonsurvivors 19.3. Although the 1974 electorate seemed especially harsh to Republicans who were conservative on government management, and this was somewhat more pronounced in the Northeast than in other areas, selective attrition does not account for the intensification of the split within the Republican party. The "conservative" northeastern nonsurvivors were considerably more supportive than the "liberal" survivors from other areas. In addition to the scales constituting the government management dimension, several other interesting scales appeared. One of these consisted solely of the three roll calls on the Lockheed loan guarantee during the 92nd Congress. This scale is interesting because it provides a clear example of constituency interest voting. Among Democrats, those from the Pacific coast states, where the aerospace industry is prominent, were much more supportive than members from other areas. Pacific Democrats' mean support score was 85.2 percent—much higher than the 67.6 percent mean of solid South Democrats or the 43.9 percent mean of other Democrats. Pacific Republicans also were quite supportive (75 percent), but so were other Republicans (71.8 percent). In addition to obviously constituency-based voting, northern Democrats also split along seniority lines; members first elected in 1968 or 1970 were much less supportive than more senior members (29.2 percent versus 58.2 percent). In the government management area, revenue sharing was the only Nixon proposal enacted which represented a significant departure from past policy. The four House roll calls on establishing the program do not cluster with those in the government management dimension but do form a separate scale. Voting on revenue sharing was only slightly influenced by partisanship; the -.14 correlation

148

Divided Government in a Time of Turmoil

between scores and party indicates that Republicans in the aggregate were somewhat more supportive than Democrats. Among Republicans, Nixon got his most consistent support from northeastern members; among Democrats, those from the Northeast and from the east north central states were most supportive. Only members from the solid South were opposed—with Democrats scoring considerably lower than Republicans. Among Democrats, support was related to seniority, with junior members showing considerably more enthusiasm for the program than did their senior colleagues. Northern Democrats first elected in 1964 or later had a mean score of 78.4 percent, while the mean for more senior members was 67.8. Among Democrats from the solid South, the mean of those first elected in 1964 or earlier was 22; the mean of those first elected in 1966 or 1968 was 41.2.10 The Nixon-Ford years saw a transformation in the government management agenda. The environmental and consumer movements succeeded in thrusting those issues to the center of the agenda. Stagflation complicated and reoriented the familiar partisan debate on the government's role in managing the economy. The oil embargo catapulted energy policy to the center of the agenda and also forced a change in the terms of the debate; scarcity rather than abundance became the basic premise. Policy change during these years lacked a clear thrust. Given divided control, new issues which cut across established coalitions, and no clear signals from the public, this was to be expected. Much of the consumer protection legislation required such extensive compromises that the final product had little real effect, yet a few strong bills did get through. The Democratic Congress took the unprecedented step of giving the president wage and price control powers, but the motive was largely to embarrass Nixon. Despite the immense amount of time spent on the problem, Congress found it impossible to pass any coherent, long-range energy program. No convincing solution to stagflation was even proposed. Environmental legislation was the one major exception. In the early 1970s, the public strongly supported government action to protect the environment, and the Congress did respond. Although the energy crisis cut short the period of nonincremental policy change, the strong bills passed did change the centers around which controversy revolved. The new agenda did lead to a change in voting alignments. Environmental and consumer protection legislation had its greatest appeal to the affluent in the industrialized areas (Harris 1973: 99-118).

1969-1976

149

In industrializing areas, elites and often the general population as well found such regulations a barrier. When the debate was phrased in "environmental protection versus jobs" terms, labor also found itself in opposition. Energy policy pitted producer against consumer interests. Thus, northeastern Republicans representing affluent constituents in a heavily industrialized and non-oil-producing area moved toward the Democratic pole on the government management dimension. Solid South Democrats representing an oil-producing and a still industrializing area moved toward the Republican pole. Northern Democrats found their usual unity on the government management dimension strained as certain environmental legislation divided their constituents. During this period, voting on the government management dimension was much less party-dominated than at any time in the previous half century. Conclusion In the social welfare and civil liberties domains, controversy during the 1969 to 1976 period revolved mostly around issues that came to the fore in the 1960s. Clear agenda change did occur in the other three domains. Some of the new issues can be traced to quite specific environmental stimuli which directly affected large numbers of people—the Vietnam War, the oil embargo, rampant inflation. Also important in influencing the agenda were political movements and public interest pressure groups, which were increasingly prominent. The antiwar movement had an influence in placing and keeping U.S. involvement in Vietnam at the center of controversy and strongly influenced the debate on U.S. foreign and defense policy more generally. The consumer movement and environmentalists played a similar role with respect to those issues. The growth of such movements is a legacy of the 1960s. Widespread affluence made it possible for an appreciable number of people to spend significant amounts of time and money on such concerns. The civil rights movement served as an example and an inspiration. Television provided the forum for spreading these concerns far beyond the core group of activists, and affluence and its attendant complications made a wide stratum of the population receptive to the message of environmentalists and consumer activists. Agenda change does not automatically lead to significant policy change. Elections, during this period, did not convey clear policy signals. Nixon's narrow victory in 1968 and his 1972 landslide were, at best, negative mandates. In 1968, the electorate was upset by the war

150

Divided Government in a Time of Turmoil

and by social disruption; in 1972, McGovern was perceived as too far left and as incompetent. Yet, throughout the period, the electorate returned substantial Democratic majorities to Congress. Consequently structural parameters were not favorable to policy change. Divided control and an incohesive congressional majority party militated against major policy change. In the social welfare and civil liberties areas, on which the agenda was fairly stable, divided control acted as a barrier to much policy change. Although Democratic cohesion increased as the North-South split softened, cohesion was seldom sufficient to force conservative Republican presidents to accept significant policy innovations. The Democratic majorities were sufficient to stymie Republican attempts at change, most of which had the aim of weakening or even dismantling existing programs. The lack of strong, clear constituency signals enhanced the effect of structural barriers. In the foreign policy area, despite a deeply divided majority party and a minority party opposed to a reorientation in general, the structural barriers to policy change were, in selected instances, overcome. Funds for the Indochina war were cut off, the war powers bill was enacted over a presidential veto, and Congress refused to allow Ford to involve the U.S. in Angola. The public wanted what it increasingly perceived as a senseless war terminated and desired some assurance that the U.S. would not again make the same mistake. The congressional desire to reassert its own role was for many members strongly reinforced by signals from the constituency. In the area of government management of the economy, Congress responded to strong public support of environmental causes by enacting major legislation in the early 1970s. As in the foreign policy area, constituency signals were sufficiently strong to make possible the surmounting of structural barriers to change. In contrast, attempts to respond to the oil embargo by enacting a comprehensive energy program ended in failure. Divided control was only one barrier to policy change. Although, during periods of gas shortages, the issue was highly salient, the general public was not convinced that the problem was serious or that major policy change requiring sacrifice was necessary. Suggested responses to the energy problem badly split the majority party along constituency interest lines. The new government management agenda which emerged during the 1970s transformed alignments in such a way that policy change was hindered rather than facilitated. Structural barriers to policy innovation, such as divided control, can be overcome when constituency signals are sufficiently strong.

1969-1976

151

Such signals need not be conveyed by the electoral mechanism; incumbent members do change their voting behavior in response to such signals. The impact of the issue at the center of controversy across constituencies is the primary determinant of whether member responsiveness will result in policy change. Such responsiveness may decrease as well as increase party cohesion and, consequently work against as well as for policy change.

8. Democratic Control and Liberal Malaise, 1977-1978

Inflation and unemployment were the primary concerns of Americans as they went to the polls in 1976. An October 1976 Gallup Poll found 47 percent of the respondents mentioning inflation and 31 percent mentioning unemployment as the most important problems facing America [Gallup Opinion Index, January 1977). Jimmy Carter narrowly won the presidency, primarily because the electorate believed Democrats more capable than Republicans of handling the economic problems facing the country. The Congress remained heavily Democratic—in the House, Democrats held 66.9 percent of the seats; in the Senate they held 62 percent. With a Democrat again in the White House, various liberal constituencies hoped to accomplish goals stymied by the Nixon-Ford administration. Labor, black groups, environmentalists, and consumer advocates all had long lists of priority legislation they wished to see passed. Government Management of the Economy The 95th Congress (1977-1978) sees no fundamental change in the government management agenda. Unemployment and inflation, plus energy and environment, are the major concerns. The Democratic recapture of the White House did remove roadblocks to policy change in some areas. Early in the Carter administration, an economic stimulus package was enacted. A strong strip-mining bill was passed and signed into law. On other priority legislation, the administration and various Democratic constituencies fared much less well. Although Carter's energy program passed the House almost intact, it was gutted in the Senate. Carter asked for fundamental tax reform but was presented with a bill considered highly regressive by liberals. The Humphrey-Hawkins full employment bill, the top legislative priority of black groups, was emasculated in committee; its

1977-1978

153

passage was at most a symbolic victory. The Clean Air Act Amendments further weakened the 1970 bill. During the 95 th Congress, two government management scales appear; in terms of comprehensiveness, neither can be labeled as the major government management dimension of the Congress. In content, one is dominated by roll calls on environmental and energy legislation; votes on the strip-mining bill, on the Clean Air Amendments, on the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, and on the most crucial amendments to and on passage of the energy bill are included. The second government management scale includes roll calls on economic stimulus programs, on debt limit increases, on the Humphrey-Hawkins bill, and on the Kemp amendment to the tax bill—an amendment which would have drastically cut taxes. Also included are numerous roll calls on budget resolutions, particularly on Republican substitutes and on passage. The two scales elicit quite similar voting alignments; the correlation between them is .90. An examination of the correlations between scores and party suggests that the first scale—that dominated by energy and environmental legislation—is a continuation of the 1970s' government management dimension. For that scale, the correlation with party is .70, almost identical to the .71 mean correlation with party of the 91st through 94th Congress government management dimension. In contrast, the other scale elicits much more partisan voting behavior; the correlation with party is .85. The cross-Congress correlations confirm that the energy-environment scale is a continuation of the government management dimension. For all members, the mean correlation of scores with those in the 91st through 94th congresses is .92; for Democrats, the mean is .88 and, for Republicans, it is .77. The comparable figures for the second scale are .88 for all members and .75 and .69 for Democrats and Republicans respectively. As table 8.1 shows, the government management dimension continues to split both parties deeply along regional lines. Regression analysis indicates that border South and mountain Democrats, as well as solid South Democrats, are significantly less supportive than their party colleagues from other areas. These regional differences account for 44.6 percent of the variance in Democratic scores. Northeastern Republicans continue to be significantly more supportive than other Republicans; regional differences account for 28.5 percent of the variance in Republican scores. The second scale splits each of the parties to a much lesser extent than do the other government management scales of the 1970s.

154

Democratic Control and Liberal Malaise

Table 8.1. Government Management Support Scores by Party and Region, 1969-1978 Democrats Congress 91-94 (mean) 95 (dimension) 95 (scale 2)

Republicans NorthAll All east Other

All

North

Solid South

70.5

83.1

45.3

24.6

39.2

19.5

72.3

83.9

47.2

24.1

41.0

19.4

81.7

88.5

65.2

16.7

27.4

13.6

The same alignment pattern is evident, but the distance between the regional factors is less and that between the parties is greater than on the other scales. For Democrats, regional differences account for 25.9 percent of the variance in scores; for Republicans, they account for 20.8 percent. The greater partisanship on this scale is probably due to the Democratic recapture of the presidency. Democrats from all regions seem to be more willing to follow party lines on those issues considered by the congressional leadership and the president to be crucial to the party program as long as constituency interests are not fundamentally compromised. Unfortunately for the president and the leadership, this condition excluded many of the most crucial issues, such as energy. During the Nixon-Ford years, it will be recalled, northern Democrats split along seniority lines on the government management dimension; senior members were less supportive than junior members. In the 95th Congress, those first elected in 1960 or before continue to be slightly less supportive than those who began their service between 1963 and 1975 (82.9 versus 85.5 percent). Newly elected members, however, are less supportive than either of the more senior groups; their mean is 78.9. When these incoming members are divided into those who replaced Democrats and those who won previously Republican seats, one finds that the former are about as supportive as the most senior group, while the latter are the least supportive group (82.2 versus 78.6 percent).1 Within the big 1974 class, switched-seat members are also less supportive than their colleagues who replaced Democrats, as they were in the 94th; the dif-

1977-1978

155

ferences are, however, very small—less than 3 percentage points in each Congress. Voting on the second government management scale is more strongly related both to seniority and to previous partisanship of the district. In content, this scale is quite similar to the government management dimension of the 1960s and earlier, with its emphasis on antirecessionary spending and similar traditional Democratic programs. Northern Democrats first elected in 1972 or earlier are most supportive (their mean is 93.3 percent); 1974 and 1976 newcomers elected from previously Democratic districts also score high (89.4 and 89.2 percent respectively). Switched-seat members, in contrast, are much less supportive. The mean for those first elected in 1974 is 80.6; that of the 1976 newcomers is 71.5. The budgetcutting, antigovernment mood engendered by high inflation seems to have had an impact upon junior northern Democrats from previously Republican districts. During the Nixon-Ford years, government management support among solid South Democrats was related to both seniority and location. By the 95 th Congress, on the scale representing the government management dimension, the difference between Texans and Floridians on the one hand and members from the other solid South states on the other has almost completely disappeared, and, for the former, support is no longer related to seniority. The large number of energy policy roll calls, on which Texans were particularly sensitive to producer interests, accounts for the change. Among Southerners from other states, support varies inversely with seniority. Incoming members, although less supportive than the 93rd and 94th Congress classes, nevertheless score considerably higher than the two more senior cohorts. Turnover, thus, continued to mitigate the deep North-South split on government management of the economy. On the second government management scale, support levels are higher but the pattern is much the same.2 In the government management area, then, the agenda remained stable. Although the end of divided control made it possible to pass some legislation stymied by Ford, divisions within the majority party prevented any real policy innovation. Some junior Democrats seem to have been influenced by the anti-big-government atmosphere, but alignments did not basically change. Both parties continued to be deeply split along regional lines. Social Welfare The 95 th Congress saw no basic change in the social welfare area. Carter proposed few new departures; his major innovation—a

156

Democratic Control and Liberal Malaise

fundamental revamping of the welfare system—did not get out of committee. With the return of Democratic control of the White House, labor expected to accomplish goals stymied by the Nixon-Ford administration. Common-situs picketing legislation, labor law reform, and an increase in the m i n i m u m wage were the top priorities. Despite the full support of the party leadership, common-situs picketing lost on the House floor and the House adopted a weakening amendment to the m i n i m u m wage bill. The establishment of a subminimum wage for youths was, however, narrowly defeated. Labor law reform passed the House but was killed by a Senate filibuster. Consumer groups hoped, with Carter's support, that the bill establishing the Consumer Protection Agency would finally be enacted. Heavy business lobbying, however, led to the bill's defeat on the House floor. The 95th Congress, thus, passed no major new social welfare programs. Much of the liberals' unfinished business that had accumulated during the Nixon-Ford years was again left unfinished when Congress adjourned. Agenda stability resulted in alignment stability. Scores on the social welfare dimension correlate at .72 with party—a figure identical to the mean for the 92nd through 94th congresses. Thus, the increased partisanship on social welfare voting, which began in the early 1970s, is maintained. The cross-Congress correlations of scores also indicate stability. For all members, the mean correlation between 95th Congress scores and those for the 91st through 94th is .95; for Democrats, the mean is .93, for Republicans .86. Democrats continue to split along North-South lines (see table 8.2). Regional differences account for 47.1 percent of the variance in Democratic scores, and border South and mountain members as well as those from the solid South score significantly lower than their party colleagues from other areas. The depth of the regional split is similar to that in the 93rd and 94th Congress (mean R2 .470) and is much less deep than that during the 89th through 92nd Congress period (mean R2 = .617). Republicans also continue to split along regional lines, with Northeasterners being much more supportive than members from other areas. Regional differences account for 27.8 percent of the variance in Republican scores—a little higher than the 23.6 percent mean for the 91st through 94th Congress period. In previous congresses, no relationship between social welfare voting and seniority among northern Democrats was found. During the 95th, the class of 1974 is marginally less supportive than are more senior members (89.1 percent versus 91.2 percent), and the in-

1977-1978

157

Table 8.2. Social Welfare Support Scores by Party and Region, 95th Congress, 1977-1978 All 78.3

Democrats North Solid South 89.4

52.1

All 27.2

Republicans Northeast All Other 46.9

21.7

coming class is appreciably so (its mean is 84.4). The lower support of both of these junior classes is primarily due to the switched-seat members. Those who replaced Democrats vote very much like their more senior colleagues; the mean for the 1974 class is 92.9, that of the 1976 class 89.9. Those elected from previously Republican districts are considerably less supportive; the 1974 class mean is 87, the 1976 class mean 79.2. (The same holds true for the 1974 class in the 94th Congress. The score for switched-seat members was 6 percentage points below that of other newcomers.) Among southern Democrats, social welfare support continues to be related to both location and seniority. Texans and Floridians are more supportive than members from other southern states, but the difference is considerably less than in previous congresses—only 4 percentage points. Excluding the 1976 newcomers, support is inversely related to seniority in both groups. The small Texas and Florida incoming class is less supportive than any of the more senior cohorts from those states. Newly elected members from other southern states are, as a group, less supportive than members first elected in 1972 or 1974 but score considerably higher than more senior members.3 Turnover, thus, continues to contribute marginally to the narrowing of the North-South split. The 95 th Congress, then, was a period of stability in the social welfare area. The agenda and alignments remained stable; policy change was minimal. Civil Liberties As was the case in the social welfare area, the change in administration in 1977 brought no significant change in either agenda or policy in the civil liberties area. No major civil rights legislation was up for renewal during the 95 th Congress, and no measure which would fit into the civil liberties domain was high on Carter's priority list. The 95 th Congress civil liberties scale does include a number of roll calls aimed at Carter's Vietnam soldiers amnesty program,

158

D em ocra tic Con trol an d Li beial Malaise

which many House members opposed. Also included are a couple of busing roll calls, votes on the District of Columbia Voting Rights Amendment and on extending the ratification deadline for the Equal Rights Amendment, several roll calls on amendments restricting the activities of the Legal Services Corporation, and votes on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and on the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act. The trend toward increasingly partisan voting on civil liberties legislation, evident throughout the 1970s, continues. The correlation between scores and party on the 95th Congress scale is .59; the mean for the 91st through 94th congresses was .43, that for the 89th and 90th .27. Cross-Congress correlations indicate that the 95th Congress alignment pattern, nevertheless, is very similar to that characteristic of the 91st through 94th. For all members, the mean intercorrelation is .88; for Democrats, it is .87, for Republicans .84. Democrats continue to split along North-South lines (see table 8.3). Regression analysis shows that border South and mountain Democrats as well as those from the solid South are significantly less supportive than their party colleagues from other areas. Regional differences account for 36.1 percent of the variance—an appreciable amount but the lowest during the half century under study. Thus, the trend toward a softening of the North-South split which became evident in the early 1970s, continues. In the 95th Congress, southern Democrats are, for the first time, slightly more supportive than northeastern Republicans and are appreciably more supportive than Republicans as a whole. The lessening of the North-South split in the 1973 to 1976 period was, in part, attributed to membership turnover. Southern Democrats first elected in 1972 or 1974 were shown to be considerably more supportive than their senior regional colleagues. As table 8.4 shows, these two classes continue to score much higher than other southern Democrats. The 1976 incoming class, although not nearly so supportive, nevertheless scores higher than members first elected in 1970 or earlier. Even in 1976, then, turnover contributed marginally to a lessening of the split. From the 88th Congress on, northern Democrats split along seniority lines on civil liberties. Members first elected in 1960 or later tended to be appreciably more supportive than more senior members. By the 95 th, partly due to the dwindling in size of the senior cohort, this difference is no longer evident. During the 95 th Congress, newly elected members are considerably less supportive than more senior members (68.7 percent versus 79.3 percent). The m u c h

159

1977-1978 Table 8.3. Civil Liberties Support Scores by Party and Region, 1973-1978

a

Democrats

Congress

All

93-94 (mean) 95

63.6 64.7

North

Solid South

All

78.1 77.4

33.3 36.5

31.3 21.4

Republicans Northeast Othera 45.3 35.9

32.9 20.8

Solid South Republicans are excluded.

lower scores are not, however, due to switched-seat members, who actually score a little higher than their fellow newcomers. On the emotional, style-of-life issues included in the civil liberties dimension, new northern Democratic members took a very cautious voting stance. During the 95 th Congress, Republican voting alignments are very similar to those characteristics of the Nixon-Ford years. Northeastern Republicans are considerably more supportive and solid South Republicans less supportive than members from other areas. Regional differences account for 19.4 percent of the variance in Republican scores—a figure identical with the mean for the 91st to 94th Congress. An overall decline in Republican support accounts for the increased correlation of scores and party. Agricultural Policy When he became president, Carter faced a party split on the subsidy limit dimension and only fragilely united on traditional questions of agricultural policy. Southern Democrats continued to favor high, rigid price supports. High food prices and the growing consumer movement had led many urban and suburban Democrats to question this approach, and such members were increasingly requiring a quid pro quo from their southern party colleagues. A farmer himself, elected with strong southern support but committed to reducing the budget deficit, Carter walked a fine line on agricultural policy. Although more supportive of traditional agricultural legislation than were his Republican predecessors, he was forced to concentrate his effort on restraining the very generous agriculture committees. The agricultural policy scale in the 95th Congress does not represent a confrontation between the administra-

160

Democratic Control and Liberal Malaise

Table 8.4. The Relationship of Civil Liberties Support Scores to Seniority and Location: Solid South Democrats, 95th Congress, 1977-1978 Group All Cohort 85th or earlier 86th-92nd 93rd-94th 95th

Texas and Florida

All Other

40.3

33.8

35.3 38.5 52.9 38.5

15.0 21.5 49.4 29.5

tion's policies and those of the agriculture committees—as had been the case during the Nixon-Ford years. A high score represents support for the compromises worked out by Carter and the committees. Voting on the agricultural policy dimension is considerably less partisan than it was in the immediately prior period. The correlation with party for the 95th Congress scale is .56; the mean for the 92nd through 94th congresses was .79. The cross-Congress correlations for all members indicate only moderate alignment continuity with the previous period; the mean is .75. For Democrats, the mean correlation of 95 th Congress scores with those in the 92nd through 94th is .62; for Republicans, the comparable figure is .70. 4 For Republicans, voting alignments on the agricultural policy dimension in the 95 th Congress are quite similar to those characteristic of the dimension during the Nixon-Ford years (see table 8.5). The increase in the Republican mean score is due to the inclusion in the scale of several roll calls on final passage of agricultural appropriations bills which passed with overwhelming margins; these are the only roll calls included in the scale on which a majority of Republicans voted with the Democratic majority. In any case, the alignment pattern within the Republican party is identical to that characteristic of the party since the 1930s; west north central Republicans are most supportive, Northeasterners most opposed. The regional differences account for 26.7 percent of the variance in Republican scores—a figure very close to the 28.8 percent mean for the 92nd through 94th congresses. Although, on every roll call included in the scale, a substantial majority of Democrats took the supportive position, the mean scores do indicate some change in Democratic voting patterns. When Ken-

1977-1978

161

Table 8.5. Agricultural Assistance Support and Subsidy Limit Opposition Scores by Party and Region, 95th Congress, 1977-1978 Democrats

Republicans West North- North All east Central Other

Dimension

All

Northeast

Solid South

All Other

All

Agricultural assistance Subsidy limit

79.3

72.5

85.1

79.5

41.7

29.4

74.7

40.5

67.5

45.8

84.2

69.3

47.0

24.0

66.6

51.2

nedy replaced Eisenhower, the agricultural policy support score of northeastern Democrats and that of Democrats from other nonsouthern areas increased. The Carter administration brings no such increase; in fact, the means decline. In the case of the "all other" Democratic group, the decline is, in part, due to the unhappiness of California Democrats with a provision of the compromise Emergency Agriculture Act which they feared would hamper California cotton exports. In part it is due to the relatively low support of the primarily urban Democrats from the east north central states. These Democrats, like those from the Northeast, seem rather less willing to support expensive agricultural programs in the inflation-ridden mid 1970s than they were in the prosperous 1960s. The percentage of variance accounted for by region is, however, only 6, which indicates considerable support variation within each region. For northern Democrats, support on the traditional agricultural policy dimension in the 95 th Congress is, for the first time, related to seniority. The class of 1974 is considerable and that of 1976 is slightly less supportive than are more senior members (from most to least senior, the means are 78.8, 70.4, and 76.1 percent). The lower mean scores are completely attributable to switched-seat members. The non-switched-seat newcomers, over 30 percent of whom represent either west north central districts or Hawaii, are more supportive than any other group (their mean is 82.1 percent). Junior switched-seat members, who presumably are least electorally secure, are least supportive—the 1974 class mean is 67.5; that of the 1976 class is 65.4. The 95 th Congress subsidy limit dimension seems to be moderately similar to that in the previous period. Partisanship remains

162

Democratic Control and Liberal Malaise

low; the correlation between scores and party is .26—very similar to the .23 mean for the 90th through 94th. For all members, the mean correlation between 95 th Congress scores and those in the 90th through 94th is .63; for Democrats, the mean is .65, for Republicans .59. Although subsidy limit alignments have never been as stable as those characterizing the other dimensions, these means may indicate some change in alignments with the 95th Congress. The Republican alignment on the subsidy limit dimension is, in general form, quite similar to that in the previous period—Northeasterners favor such limits; west north central members are most opposed (see table 8.5). These regional differences account for 26 percent of the variance in Republican scores—considerably less than the 33.5 percent mean for the 90th through 94th period. In the 95th Congress, Republican scores are generally higher than they were during the Nixon-Ford years, and the differences among the regional groups are smaller. Democratic scores rise also. Although Northeasterners continue to be most in favor of subsidy limits and Southerners most opposed, the distance between the groups decreases. Regional differences account for 26.1 percent of the variance in scores—much below the 44.1 percent figure for the Nixon-Ford years. Northern Democrats continue to split along seniority lines on the subsidy limit dimension (see table 8.6). Junior members are more supportive of such limits than are senior members. The 95th Congress newcomers are the exception, but, when this group is divided into switched-seat and non-switched-seat members, one finds that the former do follow the general pattern. Thus, except for the incoming non-switched-seat members who disproportionately represent interested districts, junior northern Democrats are much less likely than their senior colleagues to oppose subsidy limits—a position hard to explain in a nonfarm district. The general decrease in enthusiasm for further subsidy limits may be the result of previous successes. Subsidy limits had been imposed; many members may have felt that what had already been done was sufficient. The change in administration may also have played a role. Certainly the opposition scores of Democrats, particularly of Northeasterners, rose much more sharply than those of Republicans, and this may indicate responsiveness to the Democratic administration. For beneficiaries of federal agricultural programs, voting trends on traditional agricultural assistance legislation were m u c h less heartening. Democrats from nonfarm districts were less willing than during previous Democratic administrations to support such aid.

1977-1978

163

Table 8.6. The Relationship between Subsidy Limit Opposition and Seniority: Northern Democrats, 1977-1978 Those First Elected in 1958 or before 1960-1972 1974 Non-switched-seat Switched-seat 1976 Non-switched-seat Switched-seat

95th Congress Score 69.4 60.4 50.1 52.4 48.8 67.7 71.1 55.7

International Involvement From 1969 through 1976, two dimensions appeared in the international involvement domain. One, consisting predominantly of roll calls on foreign aid bills, is clearly a continuation of the traditional international involvement dimension. The other, foreign and defense policy reorientation, centers on a set of issues brought to the fore by the debate over the Vietnam War. Although the issues at the center of controversy remain basically the same, with the 95 th Congress the dimensional structure of the international involvement domain changes, and this change is the result of partisan turnover in the presidency. As the reorientation dimension represented a challenge from the left to the hard-line foreign and defense policy of Republican presidents, some change in the debate could be anticipated with the advent of the Carter presidency. Carter attempted to incorporate some elements of the new perspective into his foreign policy. His human rights policy, in selected instances, led him to cut off or diminish aid to right-wing dictatorships. A somewhat tougher stance on requiring the military to justify expensive new weapons systems led to the decision against production of the B-1 bomber. Carter's foreign policy infuriated hard-liners in the Congress while not going far enough to satisfy those committed to a true reorientation of U.S. foreign and defense policy. In the 95 th Congress, in addition to the traditional foreign aid scale, two other major scales appear. One represents a challenge from the right to Carter's foreign policy. Prominent are votes on

164

Democratic Control and Liberal Malaise

a number of amendments placing restrictions on the countries to which U.S. aid may go; the named countries are communist or leftleaning ones and the aim is to restrict the president's discretion. Attempts to restrict the president's discretion with respect to the Panama Canal Treaty and the pullout of U.S. troops from Korea are included, as are roll calls on the bill reimposing an embargo on Rhodesian chrome, several votes on the neutron bomb and on restoring money for the nuclear aircraft carrier, and several attempts to increase defense spending above the level requested by Carter. The other scale includes a large number of roll calls on defense spending, some on amendments which would cut such spending below the level requested by the president. Votes on weapons systems, the B-1 for example, on restricting aid to right-wing regimes, on reducing overseas troop strength, and on the Turkish arms embargo are also included. The scores on this scale are not easily characterized in terms of support of or opposition to the president's policies. Members who scored high on the scale supported the president on the B-1 bomber and on the prohibition of military aid to Somoza's Nicaragua; on the other hand, they opposed the president on lifting the Turkish arms embargo and on some defense spending votes. The foreign aid scale, which consists mostly of roll calls on across-the-board cuts and on passage of aid bills, is clearly a continuation of the traditional international involvement dimension. The mean cross-Congress correlation of scores in the 95 th with those in the 91st through 94th is .84 for all members, .81 for Democrats, and .88 for Republicans. These correlations are, in fact, somewhat higher than what we have come to expect when the presidency changes party. In the past, voting on the traditional international involvement dimension showed a partisan component during Democratic administrations and none during Republican, and this is again the case. The correlation between 95 th Congress scores and party is .42—a considerable increase from the .16 mean for the Nixon-Ford years. As expected, with a Democrat in the White House, all segments of the Democratic party increase their support and that of all Republican groups falls (see table 8.7). Northeastern Republicans continue to provide much higher support than their party colleagues from other areas. Regional differences account for 26.3 percent of the variance in Republican scores—an increase from the 20 percent mean for the Nixon-Ford years. Democrats are, as usual, split along North-South lines. Regional differences account for 33.5 percent of the variance in scores—very similar to the 34.6 percent mean for the Nixon-Ford years. Although

165

1977-1978 Table 8.7. Foreign Policy Support Scores by Party and Region, 95th Congress, 1977-1978 Democrats

Republicans NorthAll east Other

Scale

All

North

Solid South

Aid Reorientation Hard-line

70.1

82.8

44.3

39.8

62.2

33.4

54.1 62.4

67.9 74.9

24.9 35.7

18.7 23.4

32.0 38.1

15.0 19.1

All

northern Democratic support increases, it remains well below the high level of the Kennedy-Johnson years. The intense debate on other aspects of foreign and defense policy, as well as the budgetbalancing mood, seems to have led some northern Democrats to question the value of the foreign aid program. The lower northern Democratic support is, in part, due to membership turnover (see table 8.8). Support varies positively with seniority. The large 1974 class also shows a split between switchedseat and non-switched-seat members, with the former scoring very significantly lower than the latter. (The same pattern held in the 94th Congress.) Of the other two scales, the one including a number of roll calls on weapons systems and on restricting aid to right-wing regimes is, in terms of content and ideological thrust, quite similar to the foreign and defense policy reorientation dimension of the Nixon-Ford years. Cross-Congress correlations confirm that this is a continuation of that dimension. For all cases, the mean correlation is .88; for Democrats, it is .89, for Republicans .79. (The comparable figures for the third scale are .83, .82, and .71.) Voting on the 95 th Congress reorientation dimension is more partisan than on the aid scale and somewhat more so than on the 91st through 94th Congress reorientation scales. The correlation with party is .53; the mean for the 91st through 94th Congress was .46. As table 8.7 shows, alignments are very similar to those during the Nixon-Ford years. All segments of the Republican party are basically opposed to such a reorientation of foreign and defense policy. Northeasterners, nevertheless, score significantly higher than their party colleagues from other areas. Regional differences account

166

Democratic Control and Liberal Malaise

Table 8.8. The Relationship between International Involvement Support and Seniority: Northern Democrats, 1977-1978 Those First Elected in 1958 or before 1960-1972 1974 Non-switched-seat Switched-seat 1976 Non-switched-seat Switched-seat

95th Congress Score 91.0 85.2 79.6 85.5 76.2 75.7 78.0 77.2

for 18.6 percent of the variance in Republican scores—a figure very similar to the 17.ι percent mean for the Nixon-Ford period. Democrats continue to split along North-South lines, with southern Democrats basically opposed and northern Democrats divided. Regional differences account for 41.2 percent of the variance in Democratic scores—also very similar to the 42.4 percent mean for the 91st through 94th Congress period. During the Nixon-Ford years, junior northern Democrats showed more enthusiasm for a reorientation of foreign and defense policy than did their senior colleagues, and this continues to be the case in the 95th Congress (see table 8.9). The 1976 newcomers are the exception, although they do score higher than the two most senior groups. Curiously, the incoming switched-seat members actually score higher than their non-switched-seat classmates (70.1 percent versus 66.2 percent). Southern Democrats also split along seniority lines, with junior members scoring higher than their senior colleagues. On the reorientation dimension, members newly elected in 1976, who on most dimensions are somewhat less supportive than other fairly junior members, vote much like the classes of 1972 and 1974. The generally conservative Texas and Florida newcomers are the most supportive group.5 Those members committed to a reorientation of foreign and defense policy, almost all of whom are northern Democrats, then, did not cease their attempts to make such changes when a Democratic president was elected. Carter's policy was not in total conflict with these members' views, as had been the Nixon-Ford policy; and,

1977-1978

167

Table 8.9. The Relationship between Support for Foreign and Defense Policy Reorientation and Seniority: Northern Democrats, 1977-1978 Those First Elected in 1958 or before 1960 or 1962 1964-1970 1972 or 1974 1976

95th Congress Score 56.7 62.0 67.2 75.9 65.2

when they agreed with Carter, these members supported him. But, when their views and administration policy were in conflict, they felt free to oppose the president. Quite clearly, the vigorous debate on a whole series of questions that, before the Vietnam War, were considered beyond debate represents a fundamental change in the centers of controversy—one with which relatively soft-line Democratic presidents as well as hard-line Republican presidents will have to contend. Unlike his Republican predecessors, Carter also faced a concerted attack on his foreign and defense policy from the congressional right. In the 95 th Congress, tactics developed by doves during the Nixon-Ford years were used, often very effectively, by hard-line representatives. Table 8.7 shows voting alignments on the scale which incorporates this hard-line threat to the Carter policy as well as alignments on the foreign aid scale. Voting is more partisan on the hard-line scale (the correlation with party is .57). The regional splits within the parties are, however, similar on the two scales. Within the Democratic party, Northerners are more supportive of Carter than are Southerners; within the Republican party, Northeasterners are more supportive than their colleagues from other areas. The hard-line scale does split the Democrats slightly more deeply along regional lines than the aid scale; the R2 is .388. Republicans are somewhat less regionally split; the R2 is .232. Although the shape of the alignment is similar, levels of support on the two scales are very different. Northeastern Republicans as a group are part of the hard-line attack on the Carter policy. Northern Democrats are split; their support of Carter's policies against attack from the right is considerably lower than their support on the for-

168

Democratic Control and Liberal Malaise

eign aid scale, which itself is significantly below the support northern Democrats gave Kennedy and Johnson on foreign aid. The 95 th Congress, then, brought no basic change in the international involvement agenda. Carter's relatively soft-line foreign policy, while scarcely a sharp break with previous policy, did bring about a change in dimension structure within the international involvement domain. By adopting some of the tenets of those calling for a reorientation of foreign and defense policy, Carter activated strong hard-line opposition without, however, satisfying those committed to a thorough reorientation. Conclusion The 95 th Congress illustrates the limited impact on policy of structural change alone. In 1976, the election of a Democratic president ended eight years of divided control. The 95 th Congress was about as heavily Democratic as any since the height of the New Deal. But policy change in the 95th was incremental. If Ford had been reelected, the economic stimulus program would have been more modest, strong strip-mining legislation is unlikely to have become law, and foreign policy would have had a more hard-line thrust. Yet, with the possible exception of foreign policy, in which the president still exercises very considerable discretion, these are differences of degree, not of kind. To the extent that the 1976 elections carried a policy signal, it concerned the economy. Democrats quickly responded to recession by passing an economic stimulus program. As unemployment fell and inflation rose, concern about the high cost of living overshadowed all other problems. In an October 1978 Gallup Poll, 75 percent of the respondents mentioned inflation as the most important problem facing the country (Gallup 1978: 18). Concern about inflation increasingly influenced debate on the whole range of government programs. On inflation, there was a clear public demand for action, yet for that problem liberals and moderates have developed no solution. Consequently, the public increasingly supported conservative nostrums, as the adoption of Proposition 13 and of similar measures in other states showed. The increasing conservative domination of debate seems to have influenced the voting behavior of junior Democrats. In the North, members first elected in 1974 or 1976 from previously Republican districts seem to have been especially affected. The class of 1974 is particularly interesting for analysis because it is so large and because one can compare its voting behavior in the 94th and the 95th congresses. In the 94th Congress, 1974 switched-

1977-1978

169

seat members were less supportive than both their fellow newcomers and more senior members on social welfare and on traditional international involvement. In the 95 th, they remained less supportive on these issues; in addition, they became less supportive on both agricultural dimensions and on the second government management scale, which consists predominantly of roll calls on traditional Democratic programs and on debt limit increases and budget resolutions. These are all issue areas in which high support can be interpreted as favoring "big government" and "wasteful federal spending." As debate began more and more to revolve around such slogans, these electorally vulnerable switched-seat members began to diverge in their voting behavior from their more secure regional party colleagues. During the half century under study, no other instance of switched-seat members systematically differing from their classmates and from veteran members across a number of issues was found. Landslide elections which bring in large numbers of switched-seat members have, in the past, been accompanied by a strong, clear public signal. Members who won seats from the opposition party, thus, tended to interpret their victory as a mandate for change and, consequently, voted much like other members from their party and region. The 1974 Democratic landslide carried a rather murky signal. It was the product both of Watergate and of the sad state of the economy. Democrats did attempt to deal with the recession during the 94th Congress and, after Carter's election, did so quickly and successfully. The decline in unemployment and the increase in the inflation rate brought a change in public signals. Liberals' lack of an answer to inflation and the subsequent conservative domination of the debate resulted in the most electorally vulnerable Democrats defecting from traditional Democratic positions.

9. Agenda, Policy, and Alignment Change: Determinants and Interrelationships

That the 1925 to 1978 period was one of immense change is indisputable. When such a long period is covered briefly, instances of change often appear unique if not random. Showing that generalizations about the determinants of and relationships among agenda, alignment, and policy change can be drawn is the purpose of this chapter. Agenda Change The more than half century under study has seen a rich variety of issues at the center of controversy. The set of problems and policy proposals being seriously debated by the attentive public and by decision makers has changed as new issues entered the agenda and old issues faded. In chapter 1, two processes through which significant agenda change might come about were suggested. Agenda change might be the result of a strong and reasonably discrete environmental stimulus. Alternatively, the process might be evolutionary; decision makers and clientele groups might extend the thrust of the most recent cluster of major policy changes. Some instances of the latter process were found. Aid to education and Medicare, both policy proposals representing significant agenda change, were extensions of the New Deal policy thrust. Each addressed a very real problem which affected large numbers of people, but in neither case was there some galvanizing event which thrust the issue onto the agenda. The return of civil rights to the live agenda in the late 1930s was also a by-product of the New Deal realignment. Northern blacks became a component of the Democratic coalition and, by responding to constituency signals, members of Congress who represented them thrust civil rights to the center of controversy.

Determinants and Interrelationships

171

Most instances of significant agenda change during the 1925 to 1978 period are, however, traceable to a strong and clearly identifiable environmental stimulus. The Great Depression, the European situation in the late 1930s and World War II, the civil rights movement in the late 1950s and 1960s, the Vietnam War and the antiwar movement, the environmental and consumer movements, OPEC and the oil embargo, and rampant inflation significantly changed the agenda. The breadth and intensity of impact varied, but each altered the decision-making environment of a significant set of representatives. That a major change in the political environment is usually required for agenda change is the result of basic characteristics of the American political process. Even among established groups, the competition for agenda space is intense. Unprogrammatic and usually incohesive political parties find that producing policy outputs which minimally satisfy their core constituencies is difficult enough; as entities, they lack both the incentives and the mechanisms for placing on the live agenda problems still in an embryonic stage. The dependence of members of Congress on their local constituencies, which weakens the parties as action collectivities, does enhance the responsiveness of individual members to constituent concerns. If a change in the environment affects constituents in such a way that their demands change, their representatives will respond. Because the activities which indicate agenda change—congressional hearings, for example—require that a number of members see the new issue as deserving of attention, the impact must be felt in a number of districts. Consequently, an environmental stimulus of considerable magnitude is usually required. Because of the responsiveness of members to their constituencies and a congressional process which gives them considerable scope for initiative, an electoral signal and high membership turnover are not required to get an issue of intense concern to a significant segment of the public onto the congressional agenda. House Democrats proposed relief measures for alleviating some of the suffering caused by the Great Depression before the 1930 elections. The activity of incumbent members returned civil rights to the center of the congressional agenda in the late 1950s. The congressional debate over Vietnam War policy was not the result of a landslide election which brought large numbers of new members concerned with the problem into a Congress previously unconcerned. Electoral signals played only a slight role in the rise to prominence of environmental issues.

172

Agenda, Policy, and Alignment Change

Significant agenda change, then, usually does require an environmental stimulus of considerable magnitude which, by its impact upon constituents, alters the signals an appreciable number of members receive. Given such a change in constituency signals, affected members do respond. Massive membership turnover is not a prerequisite to agenda change. Although these generalizations hold for the entire period under study, one aspect of the agenda-setting process does appear to have changed. Throughout the period one finds crises which directly affect the lives of large numbers of people serving as the stimulus for agenda change. The Great Depression and the oil embargo, although very different in magnitude, both had a direct and clearly perceivable impact on the everyday lives of most Americans. From the late 1950s on, groups or movements seem to play an increasingly important role. The civil rights, antiwar, consumer, and environmental movements all had a major impact upon the political agenda. The success of such movements in thrusting their concerns onto the agenda is almost certainly due to television. Because of television's insatiable appetite for the new and dramatic, such movements are given extensive coverage and, thus, are provided with a forum for spreading their concerns. A movement will have an impact only if its concerns strike a responsive chord among a significant segment of the public; the problem at issue must be perceived to be real and serious. Such movements can play an important role in focusing attention on and crystallizing such perceptions; and, with television coverage, they can not only reach more people much faster but also provide a m u c h more intense experience. The civil rights movement in the late 1950s and early 1960s is the most interesting example because the problem at issue had no direct impact upon the lives of northern whites. Yet, given the impact of television coverage, civil rights became the single most salient political issue. Television, thus, seems to have accelerated agenda change. New issues can become salient more quickly without having as intense and direct an impact upon people's lives. Recent changes in congressional procedure make it easier for individual members to respond to changes in constituency signals by holding hearings and bringing amendments to a vote. The process has not, however, basically changed. Agenda stability and agenda change remain a function of the signals members receive from their constituencies; significant agenda change continues to require new signals.

Determinants and Interrelationships

173

Alignments and Alignment Change Whether agenda change leads to policy change depends upon the collective response of political decision makers. Before we analyze the effect of agenda change on Congress, some preliminary issues require examination. The roll call literature, to the extent that it has concerned itself with questions of stability and change, has emphasized the stability of congressional voting behavior. High stability over long periods of time would raise questions about the responsiveness of members to change in their environment and would imply that membership turnover is the primary mechanism through which change occurs. In fact, the fifty-four-year period under study has seen major alterations in voting alignments, and such alterations have frequently been the result of behavioral change on the part of continuing members. The distance between the parties and the shape and intensity of divisions within each party have varied over time as well as across issues. In the 1920s, Southerners were the most loyal regional group within the Democratic party, Northeasterners the least so. During the 1930s, the Democratic party was highly cohesive in support of most New Deal programs; but, in the mid 1940s, the party split as Southerners' support dropped on social welfare and, to a lesser extent, on government management of the economy. The 1960s saw the split deepen; during the 1970s, it changed in form. Democratic cohesion increased on social welfare and on civil liberties, traditionally the most divisive issue area. Regional divisions on government management of the economy were deeper than at any time during the period under study. During the 1920s and throughout most of the 1930s, Northeasterners were the conservative mainstay of the Republican party; members from the west north central states were most likely to defect. By the mid 1940s, the latter group no longer deviated from the Republican opposition stance on government management or social welfare issues but continued to defect on agricultural assistance legislation. Northeasterners, by the early 1950s, had become the most deviant section of the Republican party on social welfare and, in the 1960s and 1970s, this deviance from opposition was extended to government management issues. As Republican support on civil liberties began to decline in the late 1950s, a regional split developed, with Northeasterners providing significantly more support than their party colleagues from other areas. This split intensifies in the 1960s and continues, in a somewhat milder form, in the 1970s. The

174

Agenda, Policy, and Alignment Change

decline in mean Republican support also continues; by the mid 1970s, southern Democrats are more supportive on the civil liberties dimension than are Republicans. Alignment Change through Behavioral Change. Congressional voting behavior was hypothesized to be a function of the reelection constituency and of the supportive elites (see chapter 1). If the two elements hold conflicting policy preferences, the higher the issue saliency the greater the weight a member was assumed to place upon the reelection constituency. The constituency is not the sole determinant of congressional voting behavior. Some evidence of presidential influence has been found. Voting on the traditional international involvement dimension is clearly influenced by the partisanship of the president; members are more responsive to a fellow partisan in the White House than to an opposition party president. Northeastern Democrats' higher support of agricultural assistance legislation during Democratic rather than during Republican administrations indicates presidential influence. The change in the dimensional structure of government management in Carter's first Congress and consequently, in retrospect, the abrupt and massive change in Democratic alignments in this issue area when Nixon replaced Johnson suggest that partisan turnover in the White House had an effect. Presidential influence on alignments, as opposed to influence on individual roll calls, seems to be restricted to fairly low-saliency issues. Furthermore, its impact is at the margins, changing support levels but not the shape of alignments. Although constituency is not the sole determinant, the constituency-influence hypothesis provides a useful framework for analyzing alignment change. Given that hypothesis, a major change in the composition of a member's voting constituency should result in a change in voting behavior. Urbanization and similar processes which result in compositional change usually occur slowly enough that their effect on significant sets of incumbent members is diffuse. One instance of quite abrupt compositional change did occur. The 1965 Voting Rights Act massively increased black voting in the South. Because of increasing Republican strength, many southern Democrats suddenly needed black votes for reelection. The effect was strongest on new members, but incumbent members did change their voting behavior in response to the change in their reelection constituencies. Their support on both the civil liberties and the social welfare dimensions rose. The Texas and Florida Democratic delegations' increased support, relative to that of other southern Demo-

Determinants and Interrelationships

175

crats, on the domestic policy dimensions from the early 1960s on can be attributed to such compositional change. Rapid industrialization and urbanization and heavy in-migration changed the composition of many Florida and Texas districts. Again the impact is most evident among newer members, but veterans were also affected. The signals members receive from their constituencies can change even though the composition of their districts remains constant. What members hear from their constituencies is a function of the issues at the center of controversy. A change in those issues can alter alignments on existing dimensions or change the dimensional structure of voting. The development of the social welfare dimension in the 71st Congress, of the civil liberties dimension in the late 1930s, and of the foreign and defense policy reorientation dimension in the late 1960s, for example, was the result of changes in the issues at the center of controversy. In the first case, Democrats received congruent constituency signals and the result was high party cohesion. In the second, constituency signals were conflicting and the result was a deep North-South split. On reorientation, Republicans and southern Democrats were opposed, and northern Democrats were split; in this case, supportive elites' views were almost certainly more important as determinants of the vote than were signals from the reelection constituency In the late 1950s and again in the mid 1960s, the nature of the issues included in the civil liberties domain changed and so did constituency signals. Republican support decreased sharply and the party split along regional lines, a reflection of differences in constituency views. The change in the government management agenda in the 1970s split both parties along constituency interest lines. Given the normally low centrality of politics to most people, changes in the saliency of politics can alter alignments by altering the relative weight of the reelection constituency and of the supportive elites as determinants of the vote. The high-saliency politics of the 1930s produced high Democratic cohesion as members received strong, congruent constituency signals. When prosperity returned and the saliency of politics declined, the relative influence of supportive elites increased, especially in the South. Given the conservative cast of industrializing elites, the result was a North-South split within the Democratic party. The high-saliency politics of the 1960s saw an intensification of the regional split within the Democratic party on social welfare and on government management of the economy; within the Republican party, a preexisting regional division on social welfare intensified and was extended to government management issues. In the social welfare area, new issues—the war on pov-

176

Agenda, Policy, and Alignment Change

erty most notably—account in part for alignment change. The government management agenda was, however, relatively constant. The increased conservatism of the southern public and the increased liberalism of the people of the Northeast, when combined with high-saliency politics, changed the constituency signals received by southern Democrats and northeastern Republicans. A change in the saliency of politics is one form of change in the context of congressional decision making. Other types of alterations in the environment can modify perceptions of old issues and, thus, change alignments. The decline in southern Democrats' support on the international involvement dimension in the late 1940s and early 1950s was explained by such a perceptual change (see chapter 3). Northern Democrats' declining support for foreign aid in the 1970s seems a result of the new light cast on those programs by the Vietnam War experience. In both these cases, given the low saliency of foreign aid as an issue, supportive elites' views are much more likely to have been influential than those of the broader reelection constituency. For previously disinterested Democrats, inflation changed the context of voting on agricultural policy in the late 1960s and the 1970s. By the late 1970s, continuing inflation seemed to be affecting voting in other issue areas as well, with the impact being most pronounced on switched-seat northern Democrats. The Limits of Responsiveness. Members of Congress, thus, are responsive to changes in constituency signals. Yet landslide elections in which large numbers of incumbents are defeated do occur. Furthermore, most such elections can be interpreted as the electorate's response to a lack of responsiveness on the part of the disadvantaged party. Recently the electorate has been quite selective even among members of the party out of favor. In both 1964 and 1974, conservative Republicans were more likely to be defeated than their more moderate party colleagues. It seems likely that, at least under certain conditions, supportive elites limit their members' responsiveness. Politically active by definition, the supportive elites are likely to have a well-formed and stable ideology. If when new problems arise satisfactory solutions can be squared with this ideology, the member is free to embrace the new approach. If, however, the new approach conflicts with the supportive elites' ideology, the representatives have a problem. That they are likely to share the supportive elites' ideological outlook only exacerbates the dilemma. When, for example, consumer protection became a hot issue,

Determin an ts an d Intenelation ships

177

most northern Democrats could embrace it with enthusiasm. Their supportive elites generally favored regulation of business. Emotional issues such as law and order and busing, in contrast, did place many in a conflict situation. Their reelection constituencies almost certainly favored strong legislation, which supportive elites almost certainly opposed as repressive. When such issues became prominent, northern Democratic support on the civil liberties dimension dropped, but probably not as much as it would have if these members had been perfectly responsive to their reelection constituencies. For many Republican members, bread-and-butter issues have been especially likely to produce conflicting signals. Republican supportive elites have tended to oppose extensions of federal responsibility in the social welfare and economic policy areas. The broader reelection constituency, in contrast, has frequently been much less leery of such change. During times of low-saliency politics, the problem is not severe. When saliency increases, particularly if the increase is due to economic problems, Republican members have been caught in a dilemma. Supportive elites, then, may limit congressional responsiveness to signals from the reelection constituency. The consequent limitation on the congressional parties' flexibility to respond innovatively to problems of concern to the public has tended to produce rotation of the party in power. But because, on bread-and-butter issues, Republican elite and mass have tended to differ more widely than Democratic elite and mass and because these issues are most likely to become highly salient fairly frequently, the tension between the supportive elites and the reelection constituency has, over the long run, worked to the detriment of Republicans. Democratic landslides from the New Deal to the present have primarily been based upon bread-and-butter issues, and each seems to have augmented Democratic core strength. Republican landslides, based upon more ephemeral issues, have left no such residuals. The inflation issue does offer Republicans an opportunity to reverse this dynamic, but only if they develop a strategy which does not require sacrificing the social welfare programs which benefit the broad middle class. Republican supportive elite inflexibility may save the Democratic party. The Effects of Turnover on Alignments. Congressional voting alignments have been characterized in terms of the distance between the parties and of regional splits within each party. Membership turnover will affect alignments if new members vote differently from

178

Agenda, Policy, and Alignment Change

continuing members of the same region and party or if, by changing the composition of the parties, turnover increases or decreases the distance between them. The high interparty membership turnover produced by the landslide elections of the 1930s did not immediately alter alignments but did fundamentally change the composition of the Democratic party in the House. From being heavily southern and thus rural, the party became much more heterogeneous, with a large urban component. The extreme heterogeneity of the New Deal coalition led to policy conflicts once the crisis which produced the coalition was perceived to be over. The North-South split that developed within the Democratic party in the mid 1940s, thus, can be traced to the interparty turnover of the 1930s. In succeeding years, Democratic landslides augmented the relative strength of Northerners and, consequently, increased the distance between the parties; Republican landslides increased the relative strength of Southerners within the Democratic party and, thus, decreased the distance between the parties. A secular trend is also evident. The 1958 elections mark a long-range shift upward in the size of the Democratic majority. From 1943 through 1958, Democrats averaged 52.5 percent of the House seats. For the 1959 through 1980 period, the average was 61.6 percent of the seats, and the lowest the Democratic margin fell was to 56 percent. Even after the 1980 elections, Democrats controlled almost 56 percent of House seats. These Democratic gains came in the North. The figures cited, in fact, understate Democratic inroads into previously Republican territory in the North because, during the 1960s and 1970s, Republicans began to win significant numbers of southern seats. As a result, the Democratic party in the House has become much more northern. Southerners typically accounted for over a third of the Democratic membership until the mid 1960s. By the mid 1970s, this had fallen to about a quarter. The increasingly northern composition of the Democratic House membership has had important consequences for voting alignments. Because, during this period, southern Democrats were becoming less supportive in a number of issue areas, the changing composition of the Democratic membership has served to maintain the distance between the parties in voting thrust. Compositional changes within the Republican party have had the same effect. The most deviant segment of the party, the Northeasterners, are also a decreasing proportion of the membership. Until the mid 1960s, a third or more of the Republican membership

Determinants and Interrelationships

179

came from the Northeast. By the 95 th Congress, this had dropped to well below a quarter. During the last two decades, then, there has been a net shift in seats to Republicans in the South and to Democrats in the Northeast. The shift is consonant with changes in public opinion in those areas, and the consequence has been to maintain the distance between the parties in voting thrust. Turnover has had important effects, even though we have found that new members tend to vote much like veterans from the same region and party. This generally is true for incoming members who won opposition party seats as well as for those who replaced members of their own party. A sophisticated conceptualization of constituency and a realization that landslide elections act as signals lead one to expect this finding. Although massive differences between switched-seat and other members do not occur, more modest relationships were occasionally found. Switched-seat northern Democrats elected during the New Deal tended to be somewhat less supportive than other members. The differences, however, tended to be slight and were not maintained in later congresses. The New Deal landslides did convey a strong signal, and both new and veteran Democrats were highly supportive of New Deal programs. Some members elected from previously Republican districts nevertheless displayed a modicum of caution in their voting behavior. A clearer case is that of switched-seat northeastern Republicans elected in 1938. These members were distinctly more supportive than their regional party colleagues on social welfare issues. These electorally vulnerable members seem to have believed that at least some support for New Deal social welfare programs was necessary for reelection. Certainly their behavior represented the beginning of a trend. Northeastern Republicans generally began to defect from the party position on social welfare, with members first elected in 1938 or later defecting more than those who began their service earlier. For the northern Democratic classes of 1974 and 1976, voting behavior also was linked to whether or not the member had won a previously Republican seat. The number of switched-seat members in the class of 1976 was quite small, so one must be careful not to overinterpret the findings. The 1974 class as a whole, as well as the proportion which replaced Republicans, is large and provides a sounder basis for analysis. The 1974 switched-seat members, it will be recalled, showed a much stronger tendency to defect in the 95 th

180

Agenda, Policy, and Alignment Change

than in the 94th Congress. This change in behavior, combined with the tendency of 1976 switched-seat newcomers and to a lesser extent other newcomers to defect, suggests that these electorally vulnerable members were especially influenced by the anti-big-government, budget-cutting mood of the mid 1970s. Although some instances of a relationship between previous partisanship of district and voting behavior have been found, their effect on alignments is extremely modest. In the case of northern switched-seat Democrats during the New Deal, what was important was not that they were a little less supportive than other Democrats but that they basically voted like Democrats and very differently from the Republicans they replaced. The 1938 switched-seat northeastern Republicans are important as harbingers of a trend, evident also among nonswitched members, which eventually led to a regional split in the Republican party. Whether the behavior of 1974 and 1976 switched-seat northern Democrats also represents a trend is not yet evident. Its immediate impact on alignments was to reduce northern Democratic cohesion somewhat without, however, basically changing the shape of alignments. On a number of issue dimensions, these switched-seat members were less supportive than their regional party colleagues, but their voting behavior nevertheless was m u c h more similar to that of other northern Democrats than to that of any other group. More interesting than the relationship between switched-seat ness and voting behavior are the seniority-linked differences in voting behavior found in the 1960s and 1970s. For Republicans, the most clear-cut example of such a relationship occurs on civil liberties issues in the 1970s. Republicans first elected in the late 1960s and thereafter are consistently less supportive than more senior members. This is a period during which civil liberties issues were changing; civil rights legislation was becoming more intrusive, and various highly emotional issues such as law and order and busing were prominent. The support of Republicans generally was falling, but new members were consistently less supportive than their seniors. Among northern Democrats, support for civil liberties was related to juniority from the 88th Congress on. During the 1970s, similar relationships were found on government management of the economy, the agricultural subsidy dimension, and the foreign and defense policy reorientation dimension. In each of these cases, the development of a link between seniority and voting coincided with a change in the issues at controversy. And, in each case, junior mem-

Determin an ts an d In ten elation ships

181

bers were more receptive to new policy thrusts than were more senior members. Junior members were socialized to politics in a different period and had less commitment to old ideas; thus, they responded differently to the new issues. The issues prominent during one's first successful campaign may strongly influence the composition of one's supportive elites. If that is so, members may be wedded to a particular approach because it is what links them with their supporting elites. New policy thrusts which conflict with older approaches may find expression in Congress as the membership changes. Certainly, on these new issues, junior northern Democrats were more supportive than their senior colleagues. The effect of turnover was to produce a greater distance between the parties than there would have been otherwise. During the 1960s and 1970s, southern Democratic voting behavior was also seniority-linked. During the 1960s, significant deviations from southern low support on the three primary domestic issue dimensions were largely confined to junior members from the new South states of Texas and Florida. The 1972 and 1974 elections brought in more supportive members from other solid South states as well. Urbanization and industrialization made the South more heterogeneous and weakened the grip of tradition. These changes made possible the building of a different sort of winning coalition, one somewhat less at variance with the ideological thrust of the national Democratic party. The change first manifested itself in Texas and Florida, the most rapidly changing of the southern states. With the decline of race as an overriding issue in the 1970s, aided also by reapportionment, new members elected in other southern states also began to take on a somewhat different cast. Consequently, membership turnover among southern Democrats served to lessen the regional split within the Democratic party. Membership turnover most significantly influences alignments when it changes the composition of the parties. New members, whatever the previous partisanship of their district, whether elected in a landslide year or not, tend to vote much like their senior regional party colleagues. For most, their reelection constituency and supportive elites will be similar to those of more senior members, and a landslide election especially is likely to convey the same message to most members of a regional party group. A change in the political environment less drastic than that associated with landslide elections does, nevertheless, often seem to affect junior members

182

Agenda, Policy, and Alignment Change

more than senior members. Junior members' greater receptivity may be a result of the environmental change affecting the character of their initial supportive elites. The Relationship between Agenda and Alignment Change. The relationship between change in the political agenda and congressional alignment change is complex. We have found instances of agenda change leading directly to alignment change. Government management of the economy in the 1970s is an example. Alignments can change even when the agenda remains stable, as the development of the North-South split within the Democratic party in the mid 1940s shows. Conversely, even very significant agenda change may not produce alignment change. Thus, with the coming of the New Deal, the government management agenda was transformed yet alignments remained stable. The impact of agenda change on the signals members receive from their constituencies determines whether alignment change follows agenda change. And, since there are sources of change in constituency signals other than agenda change, alignments can alter even when the agenda remains stable. Policy Change Of the instances of major policy change over the past half century, the New Deal is most consonant with the Burnham-BradyCooper model. The Great Depression was an intense environmental stimulus which increased the saliency of politics and led to a public demand for governmental action. When the Republican party did not respond, a landslide election followed. The election brought in a new Democratic president and increased both the size and the cohesion of the Democratic party in Congress. The advantaged party responded to the strong prochange signal embodied in the election by passing a cluster of major policy changes. The model also fits the mid 1960s' cluster of policy changes fairly well. The period was characterized by high-saliency politics and strong public support for policy change. The 1964 landslide increased the size of the Democratic majority, and the 89th Congress responded to the prochange electoral signal by passing a cluster of policy changes. The period of policy change, however, began before the 1964 landslide: the 88th Congress passed a major civil rights bill and the antipoverty bill. This case as well as the other instances of significant policy change during the period under study indicate that, at least under certain circumstances, given a sufficiently strong environmental

Determin an ts an d In tenela tion ships

183

stimulus, the structural parameters which ordinarily act as barriers to policy change can be surmounted. Elections which removed structural barriers played no role in the foreign policy change associated with World War II and its aftermath. In that case, the environmental stimulus seems to have acted on members of Congress directly; supportive elites may well have played some role but the mass constituency played little. In the case of civil rights legislation in the late 1950s and in 1964, environmental legislation in the early 1970s, and the Vietnam War-related foreign and defense policy changes, prochange constituency signals received by incumbent members resulted in policy change. Elections which removed structural barriers played no role. In fact, in three of the four cases, policy change occurred under conditions of divided control. Incumbent members' responses to prochange constituency signals, thus, can be the mechanism through which policy change comes about. The instances cited, however, are all cases of isolated policy change restricted to one issue area, not broad clusters of change. Policy change clusters may be associated with landslides because the environmental stimuli which precipitate landslides are stronger and broader in impact or because landslides reduce the structural barriers to change. The interrelationship makes untangling these explanations difficult, but a more detailed analysis of the effects of structural parameters may provide some answers. The Effects of Structural Parameters. The two major parties do represent somewhat different core constituencies and display somewhat different ideological thrusts. When control of the Congress and the presidency is divided, both parties are less able to satisfy their core constituencies and a backlog of demands builds up. An election which reunites control in the hands of one party is, consequently, likely to directly result in some change in policy thrust. Since the congressional parties are ordinarily not highly cohesive, the increase in the size of the advantaged party's membership which such an election usually brings will also facilitate policy change. Without some additional environmental stimulus, the policy change which follows such an alteration in structural parameters will fall toward the incremental end of the spectrum. The 81st, 83rd, 87th, and 95th congresses were characterized by significant alterations in structural parameters, yet, in each, policy change was incremental. A comparison of the 89th and 95 th congresses is instructive. In both cases, Democrats controlled the presidency and Congress by wide margins. The size of the Democratic congressional majority

184

Agenda, Policy, and Alignment Change

was very similar during the two congresses, yet the 89th Congress passed a cluster of major policy changes while, in the 95th, policy change was incremental. For straightforward extensions of past policy thrusts of direct interest to a party's core constituencies, a favorable change in structural parameters is often enough. Generous increases in the minimum wage, for example, have usually followed a change in such parameters which favored the Democrats. For more major policy change, an alteration in structural parameters is not sufficient. Policy Change Clusters. For the enactment of clusters of major policy changes, both an environmental stimulus which produces strong prochange constituency signals and a landslide election seem to be necessary. The interaction between the two may be the key. If the landslide was the result of the old majority party's lack of responsiveness to prochange constituency signals, the high interparty membership turnover directly increases the Congress's disposition toward policy change. Such unresponsiveness results when no adequate solution to the problem at issue consonant with supportive elites' interests and ideology can be found, and this is most likely to be the case when the problem requires fairly drastic and far-ranging change. The Great Depression presented Republicans with such a dilemma; for Democrats, the high inflation of the 1970s constituted a similar problem. In both cases, lack of responsiveness led to a significant electoral victory for the other party. Landslide elections are the public's most powerful method of sending signals to representatives. New members swept into Congress by the landslide will interpret their victory as a mandate. Continuing members of the advantaged party, who also read election returns, will receive the message as well; consequently, high turnover is likely to increase continuing members' receptivity to major policy change. The signals conveyed by landslide elections are powerful but also blunt. Their lack of specificity may increase the range of policy change. As they attempt to respond to intense public concern, decision makers may be more receptive to the ever present policy entrepreneurs. Faced with a public demand to "do something" about a highly salient and usually complex problem but little public direction regarding specifics, the advantaged party, as it attempts to satisfy the electorate, may enact a wide-ranging cluster of policy changes. For some members, the conditions offer an opportunity to make changes long desired; for many, however, their receptivity to change is a result of the new political environment.

Determin an ts an d Interrelationships

185

The Relationship between Agenda and Policy Change. A number of instances in which agenda change was directly followed by policy change have been found. In the case of the New Deal cluster of policy changes and environmental legislation in the early 1970s, for example, the stimulus which thrust the issue to the center of controversy also led to policy change. The mechanisms involved in the two cases were, however, different. In the first, landslide elections played a critical role; in the second, policy change resulted from behavioral change among continuing members. Agenda change does not always lead to policy change. The return of civil rights to the congressional agenda in the late 1930s was not followed by policy change. Not until the civil rights movement in the late 1950s increased the saliency of the issue did policy change come about. Aid to education entered the agenda in the 1950s yet, despite majority support in the public, a change in the political environment was required for enactment. The Arab oil embargo of 1973 thrust energy to the center of the agenda; in the period since, Congress has passed numerous bills but, to date, has been unable to enact a comprehensive and consistent energy program. Whether agenda change leads to policy change depends upon the impact of the new issue upon the members' constituencies. If it produces strong and congruent prochange constituency signals for a majority, policy change will follow (given bicameralism and the congressional rules, if an intensely opposed minority exists, more than a bare majority will be required). The mechanism may be either behavioral change among continuing members or a landslide election which brings in large numbers of new members. That is, incumbents may perceive and act upon strong prochange constituency signals; or if, restrained by supportive elites, incumbents are unresponsive and the issue is highly salient, the public will convey the prochange signals through a landslide election. If agenda change produces conflicting signals and the issue is not sufficiently salient to precipitate a landslide election, no policy change will follow. For such an old issue to be resolved via major policy change requires a new environmental stimulus which alters the constituency signals received by members. Congress as a policy maker is, thus, reactive in a twofold sense. The dependence of members upon their local constituencies produces congressional parties that are weak as action collectivities. The mechanisms and incentives to act on problems still in an embryonic stage are lacking. Yet, given the constituency tie, when a majority of members do receive strong prochange constituency signals, the Congress will react with policy change. Issue saliency, con-

186

Agenda, Policy, and Alignment Change

sequently, plays an immensely important role in the process. Given the normally low centrality of politics to most people, a problem frequently has to reach a crisis state before it becomes sufficiently salient to activate the policy change process. Given the increasingly complex problems facing the United States, the 1980s will test the viability of this policy change process.

Notes

2. Agenda and Policy Change during a Realigning Era, 1925-1938 1. The regional categorization used throughout this study is: New England—Conn., Maine, Mass., N.H., R.I., Vt. Middle Atlantic—Del., N.J., N.Y., Pa. East North Central—111., Ind., Mich., Ohio, Wis. West North Central—Iowa, Kans., Minn., Mo., Nebr., N.Dak., S.Dak. Solid South—Ala., Ark., Fla., Ga., La., Miss., N.C., S.C., Tex., Va. Border South—Ky., Md., Okla., Tenn., W.Va. Mountain—Ariz., Colo., Idaho, Mont., Nev., N.Mex., Utah, Wyo. Pacific—Alaska, Calif., Hawaii, Oreg., Wash. Northeast includes the New England and the middle Atlantic states; Midwest, the east north central and the west north central states; West, the mountain and Pacific states. Unless otherwise specified, South refers to to the solid South states only. North includes all regions except the solid and border South; interior, all but the Northeast and the Pacific. 2. Throughout this study, Democrats are coded I and Republicans o for the computation of correlations between scores and party. 3. The mean intercorrelation of 71st through 75th Congress scores is .33. The mean correlation of these scores with those in the 69th and 70th is .26. 4. The mean intercorrelation of 73rd through 75th Congress scores is .60. The mean correlation of these scores with those in the 69th and 70th is .65. Scores in the 71st do not correlate highly with either set. 4. Aftershocks of Realignment and the Return to Normal Politics 1. The comparable correlation for the 73rd through 75th Congress scales is .07; for the 76th through 78th, it is .49. 2. The 78th and 79th congresses appear to be transitional, with voting behavior in the 79th being clearly more similar to that in the later period. The 80th is an interesting anomaly. In the first Republican-controlled Congress since 1929 to 1930, Republican voting behavior tends to be more similar to that in the early New Deal congresses than to that found in the later period. The mean correlation of the 80th Congress

188

Notes

scores with those for the 73rd through 76th is .67; the mean with the 78th through 83rd is .49. With the regaining of control in the House, Republicans seem to have temporarily reverted to an older alignment pattern. 3. The three House roll calls on the full employment bill form a scale independent of the major government management dimension. Because the House did not vote on the original bill but only upon the severely weakened committee version, the scale is of little interest and will not be discussed further. 4. The lack of a regional split within the Republican party on the 79th Congress scale seems to be due to the kind of issues which came to a vote. No major agricultural legislation was at stake; votes on appropriations predominate. On such matters of lesser intensity, west north central Republicans seem more inclined to follow the party line, especially perhaps when they know that Democrats will provide the votes to pass the appropriations bills. 5. The Eisenhower Interlude, 1953-1960 1. The 84th Congress scale correlation with party is only .28, and the mean scores of all groups except southern Democrats are unusually high. This is due to the inclusion of several relatively noncontroversial roll calls— for example, the vote on the rule for the school construction aid bill. Because the number of votes of which the scale is composed is unusually low, such roll calls have a greater effect than those on the typical larger scales. 2. During the 82nd Congress, 37.8 percent of northeastern Republicans were among the fifth of Republicans with the highest scores, and twothirds of such high-scoring Republicans were Northeasterners. 3. The correlation between the 81st and 84th Congress scales is .56. The mean correlation between the scale for the 81st and those for the 85 th and 86th is .55. 6. Policy Change without Realignment 1. All roll calls on which the minority was less than 10 percent of those voting were excluded. 2. The mean intercorrelation of scores for the 87th through 90th congresses is .89. The mean correlation between these scores and those for the 85th and 86th is .90. 3. The only other highly supportive Southerner in the 90th Congress is Hale Boggs of Louisiana. Democratic whip from the 87th through 91st and majority leader in the 92nd, Boggs is quite consistently among the high supporters from the 84th Congress on. Jim Wright of Texas, who was later to be elected majority leader, first appears among the high supporters in the 88th Congress and, with the exception of the 90th Congress, maintains a support score of 80 percent or better during the remainder of the period under study. These two cases suggest that Dem-

Notes

4. 5.

6.

7.

189

ocrats from the solid South must demonstrate support for social welfare legislation, a core element of the party program since the New Deal, if they wish to enter the higher party leadership circles. The mean score over the 87th through 89th Congress scales for those first elected in 1956 or earlier is 49.2 percent; for those first elected in 1958, 1960, or 1962, the mean is 59.4. The mean 87th through 90th Congress scores for Texas and Florida Democrats is 52.3 percent; for those first elected in 1956 or earlier, the mean is 47.4; for more junior members it is 61.6. The mean score for Democrats from other solid South states is 33.4. The mean scores in the 87th through 90th congresses for Texas and Florida Democrats is 78.3 percent; for those from other solid South states, it is 63.7. For the former, senior members' (1956 or earlier) mean is 72.5; junior members' is 82.4. For the latter, senior members' mean is 61.9; junior members' is 66.8. Voting on agriculture-related legislation in the 90th Congress is discussed in chapter 7.

7. Divided Government in a Time of Turmoil, 1969-1976 1. Over the four scales, the Texas and Florida members average 7 percentage points higher than members of other solid South states. Among the former, those first elected between 1958 and 1970 averaged 11.6 percentage points higher than their more senior colleagues. In the 93rd, Texas and Florida newcomers' mean score was 57.3 percent, that of other solid South newcomers 48.5. In the 94th, the mean score of Texas and Florida first and second termers was 38.9; that of first and second termers from the other solid South states was 31.8. 2. This is done because northern Democrats throughout the period under study score well above this level; their mean for the 83rd through 94th congresses is 86.5 percent. Thus for a northern Democrat a score below 70 percent is low. Using the same cutting point for Republicans only marginally changes the figures presented earlier and does not change the conclusions. A larger percentage score low on both dimensions but only four additional members score low on aid and high on reorientation simultaneously. If the 70 percent cutoff on aid is used, 2.3 percent of Republicans fall into that category. 3. Use of the same cutting points as were employed for Republicans would decrease this group to 8.9 percent of the northern Democratic membership. 4. The seniors' mean is 46.8 percent, the juniors' 51. 5. The mean score over the 91st through 94th Congress scales for those first elected in 1958 or earlier is 69.6 percent; that of more junior members is 81.4. 6. The three roll calls on this bill do not cluster with those discussed earlier but do form part of a minor scale in each of these congresses. Democrats split along North-South lines, but the northern group is much less

190

Notes

cohesive than usual. Republicans also split along North-South lines; northeastern Republicans are only marginally more supportive than Republicans from the other, non-solid South regions. 7. Within-party intercorrelations also indicate stability. The mean intercorrelation for 91st through 94th Congress scales is .95 for Democrats and .88 for Republicans. The mean correlation of scores for the 89th and 90th Congress with those for the 91st through 94th is .95 for Democrats and .83 for Republicans. 8. The 92nd Congress scale produced a distinctive alignment pattern in the Republican party. The mean correlation of scores in the 92nd with those in the 93rd and 94th is only .39. Constituency interest voting seems to account for this anomaly. Included in the scale are a number of roll calls on a bill which would have directly benefited sugar beet growers in several of the mountain states. On this scale, mountain Republicans are much more supportive than the average Republican and even considerably more so than the typically deviant west north central Republicans. 9. Over the four congresses, Texas and Florida Democrats average 12.6 percentage points higher support than those from other solid South states; the difference in the 94th is 5.8. Among the former group, those first elected between 1958 and 1970 average 10.2 points higher than more senior members. The mean for Texas and Florida newcomers in the 93rd is 57.7 percent; that of other solid South newcomers is 51.4. Texas and Florida first and second termers averaged 58.1 in the 94th; other solid South first and second termers averaged 60.6. 10. Only one 92nd Congress newcomer had a valid score; it was o. 8. Democratic Control and Liberal Malaise, 1977-1978 1. One extremely conservative member, Bob Stump of Arizona, falls into the switched-seat group. Because the number of switched members is relatively small (ten), his very low scores strongly affect the mean. Thus, when comparisons between switched-seat and non-switched-seat 95 th Congress newcomers are made in this chapter, Stump is excluded. His scores are included in the means for all incoming 95 th Congress members. 2. For other solid South members, mean scores on the dimension range from 28.5 percent for those first elected in 1956 or earlier to 56.8 for the 93rd and 94th classes; on the second scale, that range is 44.5 to 70.3. The newcomers' mean score is 47.8 on the former and 67.8 on the latter. 3. For Texans and Floridians, mean scores range from 51.1 percent for those first elected in 1956 or earlier to 62.8 for the 93rd and 94th classes; the score of the four newcomers was 41.4. For Democrats from other solid South states, the range is from 26.8 for the most senior group to 61.3 for the 93rd and 94th classes. The incoming members' mean score is 52.9.

4. The Republican figure is based upon the correlation of the 93rd and 94th

Notes

191

Congress scores with those in the 95 th. Because, among Republicans, the scale for the 92nd elicited a deviant alignment pattern, it is not included. See chapter 7. 5. The mean for all Texas and Florida Democrats is 26.3 percent, that of the newcomers 38. The mean for all Democrats from other solid South states is 24; that of the 93rd and 94th classes is 32; that of the newcomers is 26.4.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

References

Asher, Herbert, and Herbert Weisberg. 1978. "Voting Change in Congress" American Journal of Political Science 22 (May): 391-425. Bailey, Stephen Kemp. 1950. Congress Makes a Law. New York: Vintage Books. Bartley, Numan, and Hugh D. Graham. 1975. Southern Politics and the Second Reconstruction. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Brady, David. 1972. "Congressional Leadership and Party Voting in the McKinley Era: A Comparison to the Modern House." Midwest Journal of Political Science 16 (August): 439-459. . 1973. Congressional Voting in a Partisan Era. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. . 1976. "Congressional Policy Responses to Issues and Elections: A Time Series Analysis." Paper presented at the Social Science History Association meeting. Philadelphia. . 1978. "Critical Elections, Congressional Parties and Clusters of Policy Changes." British Journal of Political Science 18 (January): 79-100. , and Phillip Althoff. 1974. "Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1890-1910: Elements of a Responsible Party System." Journal of Politics 36 (August): 753-777. , and Naomi Lynn. 1973. "Switched-Seat Congressional Districts: Their Effect on Party Voting and Public Policy." American Journal of Political Science 17 (August): 528-543. , Joseph Cooper, and Pat Hurley. 1977. "Legislative Potential for Policy Changes: The House of Representatives." Legislative Studies Quarterly 4 (August): 385-398. Braeman, John, Robert H. Bremner, and David Brody, eds. 1975. The New Deal: The National Level. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. Burner, David. 1968. The Politics of Provincialism: The Democratic Party in Transition 1918-1932. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Burnham, Walter Dean. 1970. Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics. New York: W. W. Norton. Cantril, Hadley, ed. 1951. Public Opinion 1935-1946. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

194

References

Chafe, William. 1972. The American Woman: Her Changing Social, Economic, and Political Roles, 1920-19so. New York: Oxford University Press. Chamberlain, Lawrence H. 1946. The President, Congress and Legislation. New York: Columbia University Press. Cherryholmes, Cleo H., and Michael J. Shapiro. 1969. Representatives and Roll Calls. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. Clausen, Aage. 1973. How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus. New York: St. Martin's Press. , and Richard Cheney. 1970. "A Comparative Analysis of SenateHouse Voting on Economic and Welfare Policy, 1953-1964." American Political Science Review 64 (March): 138-152. , and Carl E. Van Horn. 1977. 'The Congressional Response to a Decade of Change." Journal of Politics 39 (August): 624-666. Congress and the Nation 1945-1964. 1965. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service. Congressional Quarterly Almanac. 1949-1978. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. October 6, 1979. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service. Dawson, Richard E. 1973. Public Opinion and Contemporary Disarray. New York: Harper and Row. Deckard, Barbara Sinclair. 1976a. "Electoral Marginality and Party Loyalty in House Roll Call Voting." American Journal of Political Science 20 (August): 469-481. . 1976b. "Political Upheaval and Congressional Voting: The Effects of the 1960s on Voting Patterns in the House of Representatives" Journal of Politics 38 (May): 326-345. Divine, Robert A. 1962. The Illusion of Neutrality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Fenno, Richard. 1973. Congressmen in Committees. Boston: Little, Brown. . 1978. Home Style. Boston: Little, Brown. Free, Lloyd, and Hadley Cantril. 1967. The Political Beliefs of Americans. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. Freidel, Frank. 1965. F.D.R. and the South. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. Gallup, George. June 1965-. Gallup Opinion Index. Princeton, N.J.: Gallup International. . 1972. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971. 3 vols. New York: Random House. . 1978. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1972-1977. 2 vols. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, Inc. Harris, Louis. 1970, 1971, 1975, 1976. The Harris Survey Yearbook of Public Opinion. 4 vols. New York: Louis Harris Associates. . 1973. The Anguish of Change. New York: W W. Norton. Hartmann, Susan M. 1971. Truman and the 80th Congress. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.

References

195

Hero, Alfred O. 1965. The Southerner and World Affairs. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. Herring, E. Pendleton. 1932. "First Session of the Seventy-second Congress. " American Political Science Review 26 (October): 862-872. Hicks, John D. 1960. Republican Ascendancy 1921-1933. New York: Harper Torchbooks. Ingram, Helen M., and Dean E. Mann. 1978. "Environmental Policy: From Innovation to Implementation." In Theodore Lowi and Alan Stone, eds., Nationalizing Government: Public Policies in America. Beverly Hills: Sage. Johnson, Steve. 1967. "Hierarchical Clustering Schemes." Psychometrika 32 (September): 241-254. Key, V. O. 1949. Southern Politics in State and Nation. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. . 1961. Public Opinion and American Democracy. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Kingdon, John. 1973. Congressmen's Voting Decisions. New York: Harper and Row. . 1977. "Models of Legislative Voting." Journal of Politics 39 (August): 563-595· Ladd, Everett Carll, Jr., with Charles D. Hadley. 1975. Transformations of the American Party System. New York: W. W. Norton. Lerche, Charles O. 1964. The Uncertain South. Chicago: Quadrangle. Leuchtenburg, William E. 1958. The Perils of Prosperity 1914-1932. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Los Angeles Times. August 28, 1978. Lowi, Theodore. 1964. "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory." World Politics 16 (July): 677-715. Mayhew, David R. 1966. Party Loyalty among Congressmen. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. . 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press. McClosky, Herbert, Paul Hoffman, and Rosemary O'Hara. 1960. "Issue Conflict and Consensus among Party Leaders and Followers." American Political Science Review 54 (June): 406-427. Miller, Warren E., and Donald E. Stokes. 1963. "Constituency Influence in Congress." American Political Science Review 57 (March): 45-56. Millis, Harry Α., and Emily Clark Brown. 1950. From the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mooney, Booth. 1971. Roosevelt and Rayburn. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott. Nie, Norman H., with Kristi Anderson. 1974. "Mass Belief Systems Revisited: Political Change and Attitude Structure." Journal of Politics 36 (September): 541-591. , Sidney Verba, and John Petrocik. 1976. The Changing American Voter. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Oppenheimer, Bruce. 1974. Oil and the Congressional Process. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath.

196

References

Orfield, Gary. 1975. Congressional Power: Congress and Social Change. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. Patterson, James T. 1967. Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press. Pennock, J. Roland. 1956. "Party and Constituency in Postwar Agricultural Price-Support Legislation'' Journal of Politics 18 (February): 167-210. Reichard, Gary W. 1975. The Reaffirmation of Republicanism: Eisenhower and the Eighty-third Congress. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. Rieselbach, Leroy N. 1966. The Roots of Isolationism. Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill. Schlesinger, Arthur M. 1960. The Politics of Upheaval. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Schoenberger, Robert. 1969. "Campaign Strategy and Party Loyalty: The Electoral Relevant of Candidate Decision-Making in the 1964 Congressional Elections/' American Political Science Review 63 (June): 515-520.

Sherman, Howard J. 1976. Stagflation: A Radical Theory of Unemployment and Inflation. New York: Harper and Row. Sinclair, Barbara. 1977. "Party Realignment and the Transformation of the Political Agenda: The House of Representatives, 1925-1938/' American Political Science Review 71 (September): 940-953. . 1978. "From Party Voting to Regional Fragmentation: The House of Representatives, 1933-1956." American Politics Quarterly 6 (April): 125-146.

Stouffer, Samuel A. 1955. Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties. New York: Doubleday. Sundquist, James L. 1968. Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson Years. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. Turner, Julius. 1951. Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Watts, William, and Lloyd A. Free. 1972. State of the Nation. New York: Universe Books. Weinbaum, Marvin G., and Dennis R. Judd. 1970. "In Search of a Mandated Congress." Midwest Journal of Political Science 14 (May): 276-302. Weissberg, Robert. 1976. Public Opinion and Popular Government. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. White, Theodore H. 1965. The Making of the President 1964. New York: Atheneum Publishers. Young, James Sterling. 1966. The Washington Community, 1800-1828. New York: Columbia University Press. Young, Roland. 1956. Congressional Politics in the Second World War. New York: Columbia University Press.

Index

Accelerated Public Works Act, 103 Agenda change: defined, 4; determined by evolutionary process, 7, 170; environmental stimulus, 7-9, 46, 70, 144, 148, 149, 170172; evidence of, 15, 42; incremental, 61, 74-75, 77, 89, 136; relationship to alignment change, 9-13, 148, 156-157; relationship to policy change, 7, 8, 70, 119, 149-150, 185; role of constituency, 171 -172; role of membership turnover, 171; role of party in, 171; role of policy entrepreneurs, 8; role of social movements, 172; role of television in, 172; saliency of politics to constituency, 113-114; sources of, 7-8, 48-49; structural barriers to, 8, 152 Agricultural Act of 1954, 81 Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 67 Agricultural Assistance Act, 27 Agricultural legislation, 67 Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929, 27 Agricultural subsidy limit scale, 137 Aid to education, 99, 112 Alien Registration Act of 1940, 38 Alignment change: defined, 4 ; determinants of, 11; determined by behavioral change, 49, 60-61, 65,

71, 95-96, 106-107, 146, 173176; determined by membership replacement, 5-6, 59-61, 65, 96, 102-103, 127-128, 134, 158, 165, 173, 177-182; determined by party, see Congressional voting alignments; determined by region, see Congressional voting alignments; influence by constituency, 11, 12, 27, 35, 47, 49, 72, 82, 114, 123-124, 144, 174-176; influence of president, 120, 174; role of environmental stimulus, 9, 36, 141; role of party, 9-10; seniority as determinant, 121, 180-182 Anti-Trust Parens Patriae Act, 144 Appalachian Regional Development Act, 104, 142 Area Redevelopment Act, 103, 104 Area redevelopment scale, 80 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 77 Black civil liberties scale, 39 Brannan Plan, 67, 69 Burnham, Walter Dean, 4, 5, 7, 18,33 Burnham-Brady-Cooper model, 7, 9-12, 15, 17, 18, 182 Busing, 131 Carter administration, 152-169 Civil Liberties Unit in the Justice Department, 38

198

Index

Civil rights acts, 86, 88, 91, 92, 93 Civil Rights Commission, 91, 125 Civil rights legislation, 86, 91-92 Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 158 Clark, Joseph, 104 Clausen, Aage: issue categorization, 9, 13, 53, 54 Clean Air Act, 104, 142 Clean Air Act Amendments, 153 Cohort analysis, 59-60 Commission on Civil Rights, 86 Comprehensive Training and Development Act (CETA), 132 Congressional voting alignments: on agricultural issues, 27-28, 67-69, 81-83, 107-108, 136138, 139, 140, 160-162; attentive constituency, 11-13; on civil liberties, 40-42, 87-88, 93-95, 126-128, 158; determinants of, 11-13; on government management of the economy, 22-23, 25-26, 62-64, 78-80, 105-107, 144-147, 153-154; on international involvement issues, 44-48, 84-85, 109-110, 117-118, 120, 121, 164-168; party membership role, 15-17; regional splits in, 15-17; on social welfare policy, 30, 31, 54-59, 75-77, 100-103, 134-136, 156-157 Constituency: role of mass public, 9, 72, 114, 123, 171; role of attentive elites, 11-12, 27, 35, 47-49, 72, 82, 124, 144, 174-177 Consumer legislation, 104, 133, 148 Consumer Product Safety Agency, 142 Consumer protection legislation, 133 Cooley, Harold, 102 Cotton Control Act, 27 Defense Production Act, 64 Defense spending scale, 164

Dies Committee, 42 Dulles, John Foster, 83 Eckhardt, Bob, 97 Economic legislation, 142, 152 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 99 Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1965, 99 Economic Stabilization Act, 143 Education legislation, 74, 99, 112, 124-125 Eisenhower administration, 73-89 Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 99 Emergency Agriculture Act, 161 Emergency Employment Act of 1971, 132 Emergency Energy Act, 142 Emergency Farm Mortgage Act, 27 Employment legislation, 61-62, 77, 152 Energy legislation, 142-143 Energy tax plan, 143 Environmental legislation, 104, 142, 148, 153 Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, 91, 125 Equal Rights Amendment: extension of ratification date, 158 Fair Employment Practices Commission, 38 Fair Labor Standards Act, 30-32, 52, 74, 98 Fair Labor Standards Act scale, 30 Family Assistance Act, 133 Farm legislation, 81 Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act, 142 Foreign aid legislation, 83 Foreign aid scale, 164 Foreign and defense policy reorientation scale, 117-120 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 158 Foreign policy legislation, 109

Index Garner, John Nance, 27 Gonzalez, Henry, 97 Higher Education Facilities Act, 99 Hoover, Herbert, 29 House Un-American Activities Committee, 38, 92, 125 Housing Act of 1937,30 Housing Act of 1948, 52 Housing Act of 1961, 98 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, 99 Housing legislation, 52, 74, 99-100, 133 HUAAC. See House Un-American Activities Committee Humphrey-Hawkins full employment bill, 152 Ideological dimension of voting behavior, 20, 21, 42, 101, 102, 106, 131, 137 Income legislation, 52, 133 Internal Security Act of 1950, 39,91 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 43 International Monetary Fund, 43 Issue salience, 5, 7, 10, 12, 47, 72, 73,89,97, 112-113, 130, 141, 175-176, 177, 185-186 Johnson administration, 57, 90, 99-114 Kennedy administration, 90-99 Kennedy-Johnson administration, 105 Key, V. O., 66 Labor legislation, 52, 74, 98, 132 Labor legislation scale, 54 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 74 Landrum-Griffin Act, 74 Landslide elections: causes of, 10; as mechanism of change, 32-33;

199

paradox of, 10; role in realignment theory, 5-7; signals from, 169, 181, 182, 184 Library Services Act, 99 Lockheed loan guarantee bill, 142, 147 Lockheed loan scale, 147 Mandate hypothesis, 32-33 Marshall Plan, 43, 48 Mass transportation legislation, 133 McCarran Act, 39, 42 McNary-Haugen scales, 26, 27 Mellon, Andrew, 21 Mills, Wilbur, 102 Minimum wage legislation, 132 Model cities legislation, 100 Mundt, Carl, 61 Mundt-Nixon bill, 38-39 Mutual Security Act, 43 National Commission on Product Safety, 104 National Defense Education Act, 74, 99 National Housing Act of 1949, 52, 53 National Industrial Recovery Act, 22, 25 National Industrial Recovery Act scale, 25 Neutrality Act of 1939, 43 Nixon-Ford administration, 115-151 North-South split: Democrats, 30-31, 40, 47, 56-58, 64-67, 71, 75,88,97-98, 101-102, 105, 117, 128-131, 157-158, 164166, 175, 178-182; Republicans, 88 Office of Economic Opportunity, 100, 132, 133 Older Americans Act, 133 Panama Canal Treaty, 164 Pepper, Claude, 97

200

Index

Policy change: behavior change as cause, 48-49; causes of clusters, 184; environmental stimulus to, 33,49,98, 111-113, 141, 183, 185; incremental, 4, 61, 70, 77, 80,89, 100, 111, 131, 135, 168, 183; nonincremental, 31-32, 51, 61-62, 78, 86-89,98, 111, 148; periods of high-saliency politics, 182, 185-186; periods of major change, 4; without realignment, 90-114; relationship to agenda change, 7, 8, 70, 119, 149-150, 185; role of constituency, 151; role of issue saliency, 5 ; role of landslide elections, 182, 184; role of new members, 9-10; role of political parties, 4 - 5 ; role of public opinion, 123-124; structural barriers to, 50, 70, 89, 111, 150151, 183-184 Policy dimensions: agricultural policy defined, 26-30; 1925-1938, 26-28; 1939-1952,67-69; 1953-1960, 81-83; 1961-1968, 107-111; 1969-1976, 136-141; 1977-1978, 159-163; civil liberties policy defined, 37-38; 1937-1952,37-42; 1953-1960, 85-89; 1961-1968,91-98; 1969-1976, 124-131; 19771978, 157-159; government management of the economy defined, 20; 1925-1938, 20-26; 1939-1952, 61-65; 1953-1960, 77-81; 1961-1968, 103-107; 1969-1976, 141-149; 19771978, 152-155; international involvement defined, 42; 19371952, 42-48; 1953-1960, 83-85; 1969-1976, 116-124; 19771978, 163-168; social welfare policy defined, 28-29; 19251938, 28-31; 1939-1952, 51-61; 1953-1960, 73-77; 1961-1968, 98-103; 1969-1976, 131-136; 1977-1978, 155-157; theory of, 9-13

Policy domains: agricultural policy, 26-28, 67-69, 81-83, 107-111, 136-141, 159-163; civil liberties, 37-42, 85-89,91-98, 124-131, 157-159; defined, 13-15; government management of the economy, 20-26, 61-65, 77-81, 103-107, 141-149, 152-155; international involvement, 42-48, 83-85, 116-124, 163-168; social welfare, 28-31, 51-61, 73-77,98-103, 131136, 155-157 Policy outputs: defined, 4 Political agenda: continuity of, 89; defined, 3; expansion of, 48-49; relationship to policy change, 7-9 Political parties: cohesion within, 12, 34-35, 173, 180-182; constituency base of, 6; regional bases of, 18-19; role in policy process, 4 - 5 Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, 98 Public Works Acceleration Act, 74, 142 Public Works and Economic Development Act, 104, 142 Public works legislation, 77-78, 104 Rayburn, Sam, 57, 66 Realignment: assumptions of theory, 12; of parties, 18; role of landslide elections in, 4-7; theory of, 4 - 7 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, 21 Regional voting patterns: cohort analysis, 59-61; relationship to location and seniority, 97-98, 118, 121-123, 127-128, 138, 146, 155, 157, 161-162, 166 Regulatory legislation: role of ideology in, 20 Responsiveness: to constituency, 10-11; limits of, 176-177; role

Index of ideology in, 176-177 Revenue sharing legislation, 147 Revenue sharing scale, 147-148 Roosevelt administration, 34, 37-38 Rules Committee, 74, 99 School Construction Assistance Act of 1960, 74 Securities Exchange Act, 21 Sedition Act of 1917, 91 Smith Act, 38 Smith-Connally War Labor Disputes Act, 52 Social Security Act, 30, 52 Soil Conservation Act, 27 Sparkman, John, 57 Subversive activities scale, 39, 91-92 Switched-seat members. See Congressional voting alignments Taft-Hartley bill, 53, 99 Tax legislation, 103; role of ideology, 21

201

Tennessee Valley Authority, 21 Traffic Safety Act of 1966, 104 Transportation legislation, 99 Truman administration, 38, 42, 52, 67, 70, 83, 84 Unidimensional scales: defined, 14-15 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 43 Urban Mass Transportation Act, 99 Vietnam War, 109, 110, 116-124 Vinson, Carl, 102 Voting rights legislation, 92, 96, 124, 126, 128, 174 Wagner Labor Relations Act, 30, 52 War powers bill, 117 Water Pollution Control Act, 142 Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, 78 Within-party structure. See Congressional voting alignments