Conflicting Words: The Peace Treaty of Münster (1648) and the Political Culture of the Dutch Republic and the Spanish Monarchy (Avisos de Flandes) 9058678679, 9789058678676

Table of contents :
Conflicting Words
Copyright
Contents
Acknowledgements
Introduction
Chapter 1. Rebels
Confronting rebellion
Religion and revolt: The United Provinces
The Spanish attitude towards rebellion
‘No reason to revolt’: Privileges and rebellion
Sacrilege and rebellion
Negotiating with rebels in an international setting: From Cologne to Münster
Chapter 2. Tyrants
Tyranny’s two faces and the problem of tyrannicide
Fighting usurpers: Defining the tyrant in the Spanish Monarchy
The usurper’s unjust rule
Distinguishing between impious tyrants and misguided rulers
Defying tyrannical rule in the Low Countries and Catalonia
The tyrant’s intolerable behaviour
Violators of legal and moral order
Tyrants of all the world
Trusting the tyrant’s word: The Dutch road to Münster
Chapter 3. Authority
Sources, extension and limits to kingly power in the Spanish Monarchy
The power of kings
The dynasty and political power
Law, grace and the exercise of power
The morals of power
No king but a Catholic king
Ordered and disordered love
Refashioning authority in the United Provinces
Defining political authority
The peace negotiations with the Spanish Monarchy as a catalyst for internal strife
Provinces at odds
The Orange family, its aristocratic ideology and the Spanish Monarchy
Chapter 4. Negotiating sovereignty
Hispanic attempts at a protectorate over the United Provinces (1628-1632)
Relinquishing sovereignty: The Treaty of Munster (1648)
The incomplete Republic
A patrimonial concept of sovereignty
Transferring the rights over the Low Countries
Negotiating spiritual sovereignty
Monarchia in Ecclesia
The Dutch Republic and the problem of spiritual sovereignty
Chapter 5. Negotiating religious coexistence and toleration
The politics of confessionalization
The Spanish Monarchy and its confessional reason of state
From the ‘Arminian troubles’ to William ii’s stadholderate: Religious allegiances and politics in the United Provinces
Religious tolerance and confessional coexistence
Tolerance as (the lesser) evil
Dutch tolerance and its limits
The Dutch Republic and its Catholic subjects: negotiating coexistence in Den Bosch
Chapter 6. An invalid conclusion or a peace not meant to last (but which did)
Bibliography
Index
Avisos de Flandes

Citation preview

Conflicting Words

Conflicting Words The Peace Treaty of Münster (1648) and the Political Culture of the Dutch Republic and the Spanish Monarchy

Laura Manzano Baena

© 2011 by Leuven University Press / Presses Universitaires de Louvain / Universitaire Pers Leuven Minderbroedersstraat 4, B-3000 Leuven (Belgium) All rights reserved. Except in those cases expressly determined by law, no part of this publication may be multiplied, saved in an automated datafile or made public in any way whatsoever without the express prior written consent of the publishers. ISBN 978 90 5867 867 6 D / 2011 / 1869 / 12 NUR: 697 Cover & typesetting: Friedemann BVBA Illustration cover: The swearing of the Oath of Ratification of the Treaty of Münster in 1648 by Gerard ter Borch – Collection Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam

Contents Acknowledgements

9

Introduction

11

Chapter 1. Rebels Confronting rebellion Religion and revolt: The United Provinces The Spanish attitude towards rebellion ‘No reason to revolt’: Privileges and rebellion Sacrilege and rebellion Negotiating with rebels in an international setting: From Cologne to Münster

33 33 37 45 48 51

Chapter 2. Tyrants Tyranny’s two faces and the problem of tyrannicide Fighting usurpers: Defining the tyrant in the Spanish Monarchy The usurper’s unjust rule Distinguishing between impious tyrants and misguided rulers Defying tyrannical rule in the Low Countries and Catalonia The tyrant’s intolerable behaviour Trusting the tyrant’s word: The Dutch road to Münster

67 67 71 76 80 85 87 99

Chapter 3. Authority Sources, extension and limits to kingly power in the Spanish Monarchy The power of kings The morals of power

103

5

57

105 106 124

contents

Refashioning authority in the United Provinces Defining political authority The peace negotiations with the Spanish Monarchy as a catalyst for internal strife

132 133

Chapter 4. Negotiating sovereignty Hispanic attempts at a protectorate over the United Provinces (1628-1632) Relinquishing sovereignty: The Treaty of Munster (1648) The incomplete Republic A patrimonial concept of sovereignty Transferring the rights over the Low Countries Negotiating spiritual sovereignty Monarchia in Ecclesia The Dutch Republic and the problem of spiritual sovereignty

163

Chapter 5. Negotiating religious coexistence and toleration The politics of confessionalization The Spanish Monarchy and its confessional reason of state  From the ‘Arminian troubles’ to William ii’s stadholderate: Religious allegiances and politics in the United Provinces Religious tolerance and confessional coexistence Tolerance as (the lesser) evil Dutch tolerance and its limits The Dutch Republic and its Catholic subjects: negotiating coexis­tence in Den Bosch

197 199 199

140

166 170 176 182 184 189 190 192

205 212 212 216 222

Chapter 6. An invalid conclusion or a peace not meant to last (but which did)

235

Bibliography

249

Index

279

6

To Ana, true Planet Queen, and all her satellites

Acknowledgements This book in its present form would never have been possible without the support I received from a variety of people and organisations in various places. First and foremost, I would like to thank my mother for her unwavering support and help during the whole duration of the project which has this book as its final outcome. Academically, this book is a consequence of an interest and preliminary work in the fields of the History of Political Ideas and Cultural History nurtured during my studies in the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid with Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, Julen Viejo, Maria José del Río and Jim Amelang. In different ways, all four have left their imprint on my work. The PhD thesis on which this book is based was written under the supervision of Martin van Gelderen at the European University Institute. His trust and support allowed me to carry out the project. I very much appreciate his profound knowledge of the topic and the enlightening comments he made on important sections of the manuscript even during a corridor chat. Xavier Gil Pujol offered great help in the analysis of the general framework and of some of the texts on which this book is based. The combination of his enthusiasm, wisdom, and kindness has made working with him a very enjoyable and rewarding experience. Anthony Molho, Diogo Curto and Bartolomé Yun Casalilla have also given advice on different parts of this book at different stages, as Benjamin Kaplan did during the defence of the PhD thesis. The thesis was also clearly influenced by a number of discussions with Henk van Nierop during a long and early stay atn the University of Amsterdam. It has also profited from many conversations with Bernardo García García and the contacts made through him with other scholars working on the relations between the Spanish Monarchy and the Seventeen Provinces of the Low Countries during the Early Modern period, especially Werner Thomas, Alicia Esteban Estríngana and Manuel Herrero. At the European University Institute I enjoyed working in a very stimulating environment, where staff in both the administration and the library were really intent on helping researchers carrying out their work. It 9

Acknowledgements

is impossible to thank at length all the friends and colleagues who discussed concrete aspects of this work or offered support in many other ways. I would like to thank specifically Carolina Blutrach, Cesare Cuttica, María Gómez, Moritz Isenmann, José Luis Ledesma, Olivia Orozco, Luis Salas and Lucy Turner Voakes for the many hours spent discussing shared interests and for their invaluable friendship. This project relied heavily on archival and bibliographic research in a number of libraries and archives in Spain, The Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. I am greatly indebted to their staff for patiently answering my many questions and for providing valuable insights into their collections. Further thanks are due to the staff at Leuven University Press for their confidence in supporting the submission and revision stages of this book and for patiently answering all the questions I had in the process of preparing this manuscript for publication. Since these acknowledgements would become too long if I were to thank my family, friends and colleagues who have offered encouragement, fun moments and shelter in The Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Germany and Spain individually, I will do so collectively. They made the past years enjoyable, provided support as well as much needed diversion. I would like to thank Koen explicitly as he proofread both the thesis and the book and encouraged me to keep working on both. He and our children Nils and Alicia have helped me carrying out my work and made me a better and more patient person along the way. Nils and Alicia teach us every day that there are things much more important than work. The project on which this book was based would not have been possible without the financial support provided by various organisations. Most central to this was a PhD grant from the Spanish government (MAEC-AECID) for three years, and for a fourth year from the European University Institute (EUI). Missions and conference visits were supported by the History and Civilization department of the EUI. The research project “Cultura política y mecenazgo artístico entre las cortes de Madrid, Viena y Bruselas (1580-1715)” (ref. HAR200912963-C03-03) has greatly contributed to making the original PhD thesis into a book. This project was funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation and chaired by Bernardo Garcí­a García. Prior to this project, the Diploma de Estudios Avanzados at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (UAM), which included a long stay in the Universiteit van Amsterdam, was funded through a grant from the UAM. While this manuscript has benefited from the advice and support of the people and organisations mentioned above, I am responsible for any remaining errors and omissions, which are of course involuntary. 10

Introduction On 30 January 1648 the representatives of the United Provinces of the Low Countries and of Philip iv, the Spanish king, signed a peace treaty, called the Peace of Münster, in the Krameramthaus in Münster. It was later ratified in the same city on 15 May; a moment immortalized by the Dutch painter Gerard ter Borch in his The Swearing of the Oath of Ratification of the Treaty of Münster, 15 May 1648 (National Gallery, London). The United Provinces thus obtained the acknowledgement of their sovereignty and the independence from the Catholic Monarchy of seven of the seventeen provinces which formed the Burgundian Circle, finally achieving ratification by the Spanish King of what the States General had unilaterally declared by the Abjuration Act of 1581. The aim of this book is to analyse why the Peace of Münster was signed, since it went against the declared political and transcendental goals of both the Spanish Monarchy and the Dutch Republic, and how this breach was justified internally and to the outside world. Previous scholarship on this topic has mainly concentrated either on a presentation of the events which led to and accompanied the negotiations1 or, more recently, has addressed this apparent contradiction by The first study on the negotiations was Lieuwe van Aitzema, Verhael van de Nederlantsche Vreede Handeling, The Hague: Jan Veely,1650 (2 Vols.). Later Michael G. de Boer, Die Friedensunterhandlungen zwischen Spanien und den Niederlanden in den Jahren 1632 und 1633, Groningen: P. Noordhoff, 1898 studied the failed negotiations between the States General of the Dutch Republic and the provinces in the Low Countries which still recognized Philip iv as their king. The 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Münster saw the publication of Henri Ch. G. J. van der Mandere, Het 12-jarige Bestand en de Vrede van Münster, Assen: Born, 1947 and of the study which remains the standard work on the subject, Jan J. Poelhekke, De Vrede van Munster, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1948. The first and only Spanish survey is the short contribution by Jorge Castel, España y el Tratado de Münster (1644-1648), Madrid: s.n., 1956. The commemoration of the 350th jubilee of the Treaty prompted a series of publications such as Simon Groenveld’s booklet T’is Ghenoegh, Oorloghsmannen. De Vrede van Münster: de Afsluiting van de Tachtigjarige Oorlog, The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers, 1997 and Der Friede von Münster: die 1

11

Introduction

dismissing the importance of the transcendental aims, assuming them to be pure pretexts, mere window dressing, disguises for other, real (economic) interests.2 Accounts contemporary with the peace negotiations themselves offer a different view, frowning on those who were accused of using transcendental goals to disguise the pursuit of more worldly aims. In the following pages I follow these utterances closely and argue that the vocabularies, the discourses used to debate the possible peace were expressions of widespread assumptions which actually conditioned the exercise of politics. Furthermore, I aim to show that similar and congruent arguments were presented in analogous ways, using the same political language, by diplomats, members of governments, playwrights and even painters and sculptors. These vocabularies, for their part, were expressions of political belief systems, understood as the set of values defining the self-positioning of a polity and its room for manoeuvre in the political arena. Thus, at the centre of this book are the discourses and symbolic practices, with religion as a fundamental and inextricable cornerstone, by which individuals and groups in the societies here analysed articulated, negotiated and enforced their (competing) political claims and gave meaning to the events affecting them.3 These values interacted in a dialectical way with the different elements of (historical) reality: a given society, its political (and juridical) system and individual (political) actors – and their actions, as well as the language in which they were expressed. It should not, however, be considered monolithic: it offered a general framework of thought, debate, and action, but different interpretations could and always did exist. This study necessarily draws on the studies which have engaged with the intellectual debates that justified the Dutch Revolt or analysed the .

niederländische Seite des Westfälischen Friedens, Bonn: Kgl. Niederländische Botschaft, Presse- und Kulturabteilung, 1998, the proceedings of the congress held in Münster in 1996: Heinz Duchhardt, (ed), Der Westfälische Friede. Diplomatie – politische Zäsur – kulturelles Umfeld – Rezeptionsgeschichte, München: Oldenburg, 1998 and Jacques Dane (red), 1648: Vrede van Munster. Feit en Verbeelding, Zwolle: Waanders, 1998, published as an introduction to various exhibitions at several Dutch museums held in 1998-1999. 2 See for instance the works by Jonathan Israel, whose studies are among the very few which jointly refer to the Spanish Monarchy and the Dutch Republic, and, most outspokenly, Simon Groenveld. 3 This conceptualization is very close to the linguistic approach taken by Keith M. Baker for the definition of political culture. See his Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 4 ff.

12

Introduction

political ideas springing from the Catholic Monarchy, especially those coming from Philip iv’s entourage.4 Building on these previous analyses I will show how the Dutch and Spanish ideas of politics related to each other in the context of the peace negotiations held in Münster. This proves to be a crucial moment, because it shows the clash round a negotiating table – and the final achievement of an agreement – of two cultures of politics which had developed in part, the more so in the Dutch case, in opposition to each other. Thus, by justifying their rebellion on grounds of the right to resist a tyrant, the United Provinces established the principles on which their own government would be based, rejecting all elements of the tyranny they rejected. Spain’s characterization as a tyrant – and the need to repudiate the arguments presented by the rebels to justify their revolt – provoked a reaction in the Spanish Monarchy which led in turn to an open formulation of the Spanish concept of rebellion and tyranny and, at the same time, to a definition of its own rightfully exercised authority. The perceptions both of Spain’s own government and of the enemy’s greatly influenced the genesis and development of the peace negotiations themselves. Negotiating with rebels and trusting a tyrant, both defined by their falseness, treachery and untrustworthiness, presented problems which raised questions - more or less openly voiced - which give further insight into the close relationship existing between the options presented in published works and those evaluated within narrower government circles. Once the negotiations were under way, the conflicts on the two crucial issues of sovereignty and religious coexistence further show how many of the elements presented in “theoretical” works did indeed have Martin van Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt, 1555-1590, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1992 offers a complete survey of the “rebels”’ intellectual justifications from 1555 until 1590. The “loyalist” discourse has received little, if any, attention. For the first half of the seventeenth century Hugo Grotius was the object of many studies, together with the internal twists surrounding the theological conflict between Arminians and Gomarists in 1610s. Many scholars have devoted their attention to the clash between “republicans” and “orangists” after 1650, but the period between 1618 and 1650 remains practically unexplored in terms of political ideas. On the Spanish side, few studies have attempted a reconstruction of the common framework of “royalist” political discourse since José Mª Jover Zamora, 1635. Historia de una Polémica y Semblanza de una Generación, Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2003 (1949). A general overview of Spanish political ideas is to be found in various works by Jose Mª Maravall and, to a lesser extent, José A. Fernández Santamaría. The best contributions to concrete aspects of the Spanish Habsburgs’ thought are the different works by Pablo Fernández Albaladejo and Xavier Gil Pujol quoted in the bibliography. 4

13

Introduction

an impact on the ‘practical’ negotiations to the point of endangering their successful outcome. They proved crucial in shaping the discussions round the sovereignty to be granted to the United Provinces and the terms on which Catholics would coexist with adherents to the Reformed Church in the Dutch Republic. In short, the principal aim of this book is to establish a relationship between the political ideas here reconstructed and the exercise of politics to attempt a study of the political which escapes the disciplinary limitations of the realms of intellectual history and traditional political history, and thus to show how ideas, cultural and political practices were inextricably linked. This awareness contributes to a better understanding of why and how it was possible for the Spanish Monarchy and the Dutch Republic to achieve a settlement. This aim requires a combination of different types of primary sources – archival documents, pamphlets and political treatises and, to a lesser extent, plays and paintings. Generally, research into the peace negotiations has used mainly archival documents to determine their progress, resorting to the numerous pamphlets produced in the Low Countries for ‘ornamental’ purposes.5 Among Spanish scholars interest in this ‘occasional’ literature remains relatively scant, for various reasons. One is the difficulty in distinguishing between the so-called relaciones de sucesos (accounts of events) and pamphlets and (short) political treatises, the latter often subsumed among the former – except on specific occasions such as the French declaration of war in 1635 – by reason of their scarcity.6 A further reason explaining the lack of interest

This has happened in spite of Petrus J. Blok’s remarks on the interest of pamphlets for the study of the negotiations more than a century ago. Petrus J. Blok, ‘De Nederlandsche Vlugschriften over de Vredesonderhandelingen te Münster 1643-1648’ Verslagen en Mededeelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschapppen iv/1 (1897). I rely here on Joad Raymond’s definition of pamphlet as a short, quarto text –referring to the number of times the sheets were folded (2) – and where size determined status. The number of sheets used – and accordingly of pages – varies generally from one sheet (8 pages) to twelve (96). Joad Raymond, Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 5. 6 On this distinction see José Alcalá Zamora, España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte (16181639), Barcelona: Planeta, 1975, pp. 27-28. On the format and content of the “news accounts” see the essays by Henry Ettinghausen: “The News in Spain: Relaciones de Sucesos in the Reigns of Philip iii and iv”, European History Quarterly 14 (1984) pp. 1-20 and “The Illustrated Spanish News. Text and Image in the Seventeenth-Century Press”, in Art and Literature in Spain: 1600-1800. Studies in Honour of Nigel Glendinning, London, Tamesis Books, 1993, pp. 117-133. 5

14

Introduction

in these publications is their allegedly poor rhetoric and coherence.7 Dutch historiography has nonetheless relied on this type of political literature for the study of political ideas stimulated by the nineteenthcentury interest in cataloguing and classifying the large amount of this sort of publication produced during the early modern period, which includes most publications referring to the negotiations with the Spanish Monarchy.8 I have therefore made extensive use of them. The National Library in Madrid has provided most works – pamphlets, but also political treatises – relating to the Spanish view on the issues at stake at the negotiations. The collections of the Thüringer Universitätsund Landesbibliothek Jena and the Herzog Augustus Bibliothek in Wolfenbüttel have served to complement the research, both with single publications produced in either the Spanish Monarchy or the Dutch Republic and with examples of the pervasiveness of titles and conceptualizations throughout the Europe of the time. Pamphlets, especially in the case of the Dutch Republic and – relatively – in the Spanish Netherlands, provide the means to reconstruct the public debate which centred round the negotiations. Particularly in the Republic, many authors and printers openly voiced their desire to address the public, a desire made all the more explicit by the location often chosen for the development of the pamphlet’s setting.9 This was As Ronald Truman has noted, these texts did not present a well- argued account of political principles, structures, and purposes and are therefore erroneously disregarded as lacking interest. Ronald W. Truman, Spanish Treatises on Government, Society and Religion in the Time of Philip ii. The ‘de regimine principum’ and Associated Traditions, Leiden, etc: Brill, 1999, p. 8. For the most part they are untechnical in character, and in the main present themselves as participating in a discussion regarding not intellectual theories but convictions and aspirations – regarding the purposes and values to be pursued and cherished either by the ruler or by civil officials or by society at large or by individuals within that society. As Kristeller points out, they are deemed to be lacking in originality, coherence, method, and substance when stripped of quotations, examples, commonplaces and literary ornaments and digressions. Paul Oskar Kristeller, Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic, and Humanistic Strains, New York: Harper & Row, 1961, p. 18. 8 The main catalogue is Willem P.C. Knuttel, Catalogus van de Pamfletten-Verzameling Berustende in de Koninklijke Bibliotheek, 1486-1853, The Hague: Koninklijke Bibliotheek, 1899-1920, Vol. 2 (1899). I have complemented the titles listed there with the few pamphlets not included therein kept in the Royal Libraries in The Hague and Brussels and in the collections in the University libraries of Amsterdam and Leiden. 9 Martin van Gelderen, “Rebels and Royalists. Political and Intellectual Exchange between the British Monarchies and the Dutch Republic (1585-1613)”, Leidschrift. De Geschiedenis van Het Politieke Denken, Jaargang 19, n. 3, (2004), pp. 65-87, p. 87. Willem Frijhoff also noted the relevance of the literary genre of the ‘passenger-barge 7

15

Introduction

possible because the United Provinces – and up to a point also the provinces in the Low Countries under Spanish control – had a sizeable potential reading public and a certain laxity in press control. This led to the proliferation of pamphlets and to the extension of the discussion about public and political matters to wider strata of the population in spite of attempts by government and ecclesiastical bodies to monopolize these issues. The high levels of literacy in the area, combined with the fact that most pamphlets were published in the vernacular and the average pamphlet had a run of 1000 copies, made them very accessible to the general population.10 These factors were notably absent in the Spanish Monarchy.11 Levels of literacy were lower and the governmental bodies did indeed exert greater control over what was printed.12 The territorial diversity within the territories ruled by Philip iv made some flexibility possible, and every censor suffered enough smuggling and prohibited printing to show the lack of complete control over the works which became accessible. The government’s control became easier to enforce because authors needed to find support in the Royal court of Madrid or in territorial centres of political authority. The ‘market place’ was less relevant for authors’

chat” (schuiterpraatje) in political pamphlet writing. Willem Frijhoff, “The Threshold of Toleration. Interconfessional Conviviality in Holland during the Early Modern Period,” in Willem Frijhoff, Embodied Belief. Ten Essays on Religious Culture in Dutch history, Hilversum: Verloren, 2002, pp. 39-65, p. 60. 10 Craig Harline, Pamphlets, Printing and Political Culture in the Early Dutch Republic, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987, p. 21. 11 Michele Olivari does, however, consider it possible to study Castilian “public opinion” and its relationship with royal political decisions in the sixteenth century. Thematically close to many of the questions pervading the present study, he focuses on an earlier period and more on the social response to the king’s actions than I do. His results, showing a political culture pervading different strata of Castilian society, are in the main congruent with those presented here. Michele Olivari, Fra Trono e Opinione: la Vita Politica Castigliana nel Cinque e Seicento, Venice: Marsilio, 2002. 12 Estimates of the number of readers among Spanish city populations indicate that no more than 20% of the male population – and even fewer women – were literate. Catherine Connor, “The Preceptistas and beyond: Spectators Making ‘Meanings” in the Corral de Comedias,” Hispania, Vol. 82, No. 3. (Sep., 1999), pp. 417-428, p. 419. The view of Spanish cultural production during the early modern period as a (monolithic) expression of monarchical and aristocratic interests defended by José Antonio Maravall and Jose María Díez Borque is nowadays questioned. See, among others, Melveena McKendrick, Playing the King: Lope de Vega and the Limits of Conformity, London: Tamesis, 2000.

16

Introduction

subsistence and profits than in other polities.13 Only around the already mentioned French declaration of war of 1635 and during the Catalan and Portuguese revolts in 1640 were pamphlets directly dealing with political matters published in relatively large quantities, generally on commission from the authorities, also by those leading the rebellions.14 Relatively scarce as they are, these texts provide valuable information for the study of the responses given from within government circles in the Spanish Monarchy to the threat posed by the direct challenges of France and the rebellions, especially if complemented by longer and more elaborate – although equally partisan – political treatises. Many authors of the pamphlets studied here – Francisco de Quevedo, Diego Saavedra Fajardo, José Pellicer, etc – are familiar names to historians because of both their works and their links to government circles.15 Others, such as Juan de Jáuregui, if lesser known, were equally linked with political circles round the Court in Madrid, at least at some point in their careers, and on relatively close terms with the Count-Duke of Olivares, Philip iv’s favourite until 1643, a proximity which allegedly enhanced the credibility of their writings but did not necessarily hinder the progress of their careers after the favourite’s fall.16 Authors directed their (manuscript) writings to the king, his ministers, Christian Jouhaud has shown how the titles and, if present, the illustrations, were presented in as combative, polemic and appealing a manner as possible to attract the potential buyer also in France during the internal unrest of the Fronde. Christian Jouhaud, Mazarinades: la Fronde des Mots, Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1985, p. 20. 14 On the maintenance by João iv’s government in Portugal of the press control established by the Habsburgs see Diogo R. Curto, O Discurso Politico em Portugal (16001650), Lisboa: Universidade Aberta, 1988, pp. 82ff. For the interest of the Catalan authorities in the publication of texts defending their revolt and the method of financing them see Karsten Neumann, Das Wort als Waffe. Politische Propaganda im Aufstand der Katalanen 1640-1652, Herbolzheim, 2003, especially pp. 70, 137 and 290ff. 15 The fascinating figure of Quevedo has inspired countless scholarly studies. For an overview of the literature on him as a political writer see the introductions to his “historical and political writings” in Francisco de Quevedo, Obras Completas en Prosa, Madrid: Castalia, 2005, Vol. 3. Saavedra Fajardo has also attracted academic interest in his dual role of diplomat and political writer. See Quintín Aldea Vaquero’s introductions to Saavedra’s Empresas Políticas: Idea de un Príncipe Político-Cristiano, Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1977 and to his correspondence, España y Europa: Correspondencia de Saavedra Fajardo, Madrid: Centro de Estudios Históricos, 1986-1991. 16 José Pellicer stated in his Avisos when commenting on the publication of Francisco de Rioja’s Aristarco – one of the first pamphlets responding to the Catalan revolt – “its author is the inquisitor Francisco de Rioja, chronicler of his Majesty: the news come from the highest sources, him being such a confidant of the Count-Duke,” to whom Rioja was personal librarian. Avisos, 2 July 1642. 13

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Introduction

the favourite (when there was one) and to lesser authorities – addressees who became dedicatees in the event of their works reaching the press. The fact that these authors did not direct their writings to the general public but to the authorities (usually expecting a reward for their efforts towards the wellbeing of the Monarchy) clearly shows the pattern of discussion on public matters in the Spanish Monarchy. As revealing as these connections are for establishing the link between those assumed to control government affairs and the writers of polemical literature, the question whether their message actually reached wider strata of the population remains unaswered. The fascination exerted by the stage in all social groups in the early modern period is well known.17 Dramatists, like political authors, enjoyed close connections with government circles. Although they recognized – as did Lope de Vega – their need to satisfy the public who bought their merchandise, even successful playwrights depended heavily on privileges and favours bestowed by the king and the government.18 Playwrights, like authors of political pamphlets, were commissioned to write plays which served similar purposes to the ‘news accounts,’ enriched in meaning and visual impact by the scenery and the live representation.19 Both Lope and Calderón, the most famous playwrights of their time, worked round the Court and contributed to publicizing the so-called ideological stereotypes put forward by the Spanish Monarchy’s governmental elites, and although they, like other writers, did insert criticism of concrete aspects of the king’s policy, the ultimate goals of the monarchy were not questioned.20 The close A general survey of the Spanish theatre is Norman D. Shergold, A History of the Spanish Stage: from Medieval Times until the End of the Seventeenth Century, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967. 18 Lope recognized in his Arte Nuevo de Hacer Comedias en este Tiempo: “I write by that new system, recently/ Invented by the followers of the herd./ For, since their money buys my merchandise,/ I deem it but mere justice to indite/ My plays in herder’s language.” The translation is by Otis H. Green in ‘On the Attitude toward the Vulgo in the Spanish Siglo de Oro’, Studies in the Renaissance, Vol. 4 (1957), pp. 190-200, p. 198. On Lope’s dependence on favour and patronage in the court in spite of his roaring success as a playwright see Elizabeth R. Wright, Pilgrimage to Patronage. Lope de Vega and the Court of Philip iii, 1598-1621, Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2001. 19 Calderón’s El sitio de Breda was commissioned by the favourite Olivares in 1625. Shirley B. Whitaker, “The First Performance of Calderon’s El Sitio de Breda”, Renaissance Quarterly, vol. 31, No. 4 (Winter, 1978), pp. 515-531. 20 See Lope de Vega’s references in El Brasil Restituido to the negative consequences of Olivares’ lenient policy towards the descendant of Jewish converts. Rafael Valladares records examples of similar veiled criticisms made on the stage of Philip iii and iv’s poli17

18

Introduction

relationship between government and playwrights, together with the immense popularity of plays, hints at a wide reception of the message conveyed through plays, a message in tune with that transmitted through pamphlets and political treatises.21 As scholars have shown in their studies on other European territories, theatre – like poetry – was yet another means of conveying and popularizing political messages, if often simplified and transformed for easier absorption.22 The rich production of plays and poems both in the United Provinces and in the Spanish Monarchy renders an exhaustive inventory of plays and poetry impossible. Instead of focusing intensively on plays and poetry for this study I will resort to them only to complement the study. No study focusing on (proto-)public opinion during the early modern era would be complete without referring to the role played by churchmen in moulding and forming the conscience of the population, resorting both to the pulpit and to the printing press. Their influence went beyond the content of their works, as preaching techniques developed during the late Middle Ages greatly influenced the practice of

cies in Portugal while it was still under Spanish Habsburg rule. Rafael Valladares, Teatro en la Guerra: Imágenes de Príncipes y Restauración de Portugal, Badajoz: Diputación de Badajoz, Departamento de Publicaciones, 2002, pp. 20-22. 21 It is not entirely clear whether theatre ticket prices were low enough for the majority of poor Spaniards to attend. The varied seating arrangements do testify to a diversity of social groups going to the theatre. According to Catherine Connor, it is possible that many theatregoers did not pay for their tickets. Catherine Connor, “The Preceptistas and beyond,” p. 422. Emphasizing the plebeian component of theatre audience, see Ivan Cañadas, Public Theater in Golden Age Madrid and Tudor-Stuart London. Class, Gender and Festive Community, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005, pp. 12-15. 22 For the Dutch Republic see Marijke Spies, ‘Vrijheid, Vrijheid: Poëzie als Propaganda, 1565-1665,’ in Eco O.G. Haitsma Mulier and Wyger R.E. Velema (red.), Vrijheid: een Geschiedenis van de Vijftiende tot de Twintigste Eeuw, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1999, pp. 71-98. In the same volume see Hendrik Duits, “‘De Vryheid, Wiens Waardy Geen Mensch te Recht Bevat’. ‘Vrijheid’ op het Nederlandse Toneel tussen 1570 en 1700,” pp. 99-132. The renewed interest in the links between politics and culture during the struggle between Charles i of England and Parliament from 1640 onwards, led by authors such as David Norbrook, Peter Lake and Kevin Sharpe, has provided new evidence and fresh queries and disagreements in this respect. See, among others, David Norbrook, Writing the English Republic: Poetry, Rhetoric, and Politics, 1627-1660, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1999 and the collective volume edited by Kevin Sharpe and Peter Lake, Culture and Politics in Early Stuart England, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994.

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renaissance and post-renaissance rhetoric.23 Excessive theatricality could, however, make preachers the object of witticisms.24 While this thesis will not focus on the study of sermons, references to priests as authors of political works are necessary here, as by all accounts they fulfilled a significant role during rebellions, either by stirring or by calming them.25 Such was the influence of preachers on the population that political authorities, even if mostly religious, feared the impact of churchmen’s words and tried to prevent them from discussing state matters.26 The Marijke Spies, “Rhetoric and Civic Harmony in the Dutch Republic of the late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Century”, in her Rhetoric, Rhetoricians, and Poets: Studies in Renaissance Poetry and Poetics, Henk Duits and Ton van Strien (eds.), Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1999, pp. 57-68, p. 57. 24 See for instance Een Beclach Sermoen tot Münster, Ghedaen over de Vrede-handelinghe van Christen-rijck..., s.l.: s.n., 1646. 25 Rosario Villari noted long ago the decisive role played by priests and monks in the anti-Castilian revolts of the 1640s, Rosario Villari, La Rivolta Antispagnola a Napoli: Le Origini (1585-1647), Roma: Laterza, 1973. In the Catalan case, after 1645 the ecclesiastics were suffering under French disrespect for the immunities of the Church and started to forsake Louis xiii’s authority. Mª Rosa González Peiró, “Los Predicadores y la Revuelta Catalana de 1640. Estudio de dos Sermones”, Primer Congrés d’Història Moderna de Catalunya, Barcelona: Edicions de la Universitat, 1984, Vol. 2, pp. 435-443. See also Fernando Negredo del Cerro, Política e Iglesia: los Predicadores de Felipe iv, Madrid: UCM, 2001 (unpublished doctoral thesis http://www.ucm.es/BUCM/tesis/ghi/ucm-t25118. pdf ), pp. 607ff. (A reworked version is published as Los Predicadores de Felipe iv, Madrid: Actas, 2006 but substantial parts remain unpublished. I therefore make extensive use of the unpublished PhD.) The same, in the words of a contemporary, happened in Portugal in 1640 according to the accounts of two clergymen devoted to refuting Joaõ iv’s claims to the throne. Juan Adam de la Parra, Apologetico contra el Tirano y Rebelde Verganza y Conivrados, Arzobispo de Lisboa, y svs Parciales, en Respvesta a los Doce Fundamentos del Padre Mascareñas, Zaragoza: Diego Dormer, 1642, fol. 19r and Juan Caramuel Lobkowitz, Respuesta al Manifiesto del Reyno de Portugal, Antwerp: Baltasar Moreto, oficina plantiniana, 1642, p. 168. Preachers and inquisitors also helped to quieten the rebel territories and were accordingly rewarded. José Martínez Millán, “Los Miembros del Consejo de Inqusición durante el Siglo xvii”, Hispania Sacra, Vol. xxxvii, núm, 76, (1985), pp. 409-449, p. 445. 26 This was the case both in the Spanish Monarchy and in the Low Countries. See Philip iv’s words quoted in Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, Las Clases Privilegiadas en el Antiguo Régimen, Madrid: Istmo, 1985, p. 15. Preachers were equally compelled to stop commenting on negotiations with the Spanish Monarchy in the Dutch Republic in 1629, see J.L. Price, Holland and the Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century: the Politics of Particularism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, p. 186 and Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982, p. 234. In England preachers were also forbidden to speak about state affairs in the 1630s. Hugh Dunthorne, ‘The Netherlands as Britain’s School of Revolution in the Late Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries’, in Robert Oresko, G.C. Gibbs and Hamish M. Scott (eds.), Royal and Republican Sovereignty in Early Modern Europe. Es23

20

Introduction

control the clergy exerted over the population – often with the approval of the authorities – did not, however, diminish. Their impact, in spite of all prohibitions, was enormous and monks and clergymen constitute almost half of the total number of authors, both Spanish and Dutch, analysed here.27 Leading figures during the Catalan revolt, such as Pau Claris and Gaspar Sala, éminences grises of the Portuguese revolt such as Jeronimo Mascarenhas and authors defending the Spanish Monarchy’s rights over their rebelling territories such as Juan Caramuel, were all ecclesiastics, as were important Dutch authors of different leanings like the Arminian leader Johannes Uyttenbogaert and the leading orthodox Calvinist Willem Teellinck. The close relationship existing between authors of different genres – including painters – and political authorities opens the way for the use of archival material for the study of political ideas and political rhetoric. The tendency exists, as Kevin Sharpe and Peter Lake have repeatedly pointed out, sharply to distinguish ‘real’ politics from printed and literary texts, the latter considered to be fictive and possibly intentionally deceitful.28 From the 1960s onwards growing criticism was launched against the ‘traditional’ history relying on these sources, the value of which for historical research was judged to be exhausted once ‘dug out’ from archival obscurity. Nonetheless, the archival records used for writing the most traditional political and diplomatic history can still be fruitfully employed by the modern historian. Since the rise of cultural studies in the second half of the 20th century, scholars have argued about the extent to which one can rely on cultural artefacts such as literary or artistic works in order to discover the (political) culture of past times. The debate between high and low culture, their relations and tensions has been rich and fruitful. A possible derivation of it, however, has received little attention: the use of archival sources to try to bridge the (artificial) gap between the study of political ideas and political history. Interlinking the set of concepts that were present in pamphlets, literary texts and official political negotiations and discussions allows for the identification of the wider lines of the discourse(s) put forward in the says in Memory of Ragnhild Hatton, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 125-148, p. 137. 27 Of the authors giving their names to their work in the United Provinces in the period between 1607-1648 22,2% were clerics, the most numerous grouping as far as the high level of anonymous publishing enables us to discern. Craig Harline, Pamphlets, Printing and Political Culture, p. 102. 28 See for instance their introduction to Kevin Sharpe and Peter Lake (eds), Culture and Politics, pp. 1-20.

21

Introduction

polities studied, thus going beyond the distinction between theory and practice in political matters. The documents concerning primarily but not solely the negotiations with the Dutch Republic kept in the Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), the Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN) and the Archive Généraux du Royaume /Algemeen Rijksarchief in Brussels (AGR) will therefore be used to show the parallels existing between discourses in print, on stage and on canvas and the official declarations of political aims. The archival sources kept in the Nationaal Archief in The Hague form the basis of Dutch contributions to the topic since the times of Aitzema. Furthermore, debates in the States General and some of the provincial states found their way into print. I will therefore rely on these different works instead of on archival research at certain points. The combined use of these different sources facilitates a study which goes beyond the intellectual history of the settlement which concluded 80 years of warfare and signalled the independence of the small but powerful Republic of the United Provinces and the first of many territorial surrenders by the Spanish Monarchy. How different conceptualizations of power clashed and were challenged by terming them tyranny or rebellion; how power was redefined to answer those challenges and, in addition, how this redefined power positioned itself in the international and confessional arena – and how all this was conveyed – is what remains at the centre of this book. Focusing on two polities which, as previously noted, defined each other at least partially in a dialectical tension facilitates a deeper analysis of their interplay. The negotiations imply their intersection, forcing them to communicate and agree with each other. The final achievement of the settlement and the start of a relationship between them on – if only relatively – new ground provides the scholar with a not artificially constructed “pause in the flow of time.”29 If the straightforward rejection of all that could be seen as distinctively belonging to the Spanish Monarchy clearly conditioned the formation of the Dutch Republic, the Spanish Habsburgs similarly reinforced their own characterization as fighters of heresy and rebellion, making a change in this attitude the more improbable. Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann have criticized the (artificial) assumption of “synchronic cross-section” or – as a lesser evil – “a pause in the flow of time” in comparative approaches, even when dealing with processes of transformation. The signing of the peace is such a turning point in the mutual Dutch and Spanish perceptions as to put an end to the comparison “naturally”. Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, “Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity” in History and Theory 45 (Feb. 2006), pp. 30-50, p. 35. 29

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Introduction

Power appears to be constantly exercised – and consequently studied – but traditionally less attention has been devoted to the justifications of the existence of power or authority, although historians over the years, and especially since 1968, have grown increasingly interested in the topic. In order to pursue my study I will dwell on the methodological approaches that have gained ground since then. Some (Anglophone) historians of political thought, led by Quentin Skinner and John Pocock, have focused on the ‘languages’ or ‘idioms’ used by European thinkers to express their understanding of human societies in history, basing their approach on the linguistic theories of John Austin and John Searle. Representing political thought by along the use of languages allows one to accommodate both dissonance and change without reducing discussion to ‘unit ideas’ or endless strings of ‘influences.’ It allows cohesive political world-views to be outlined without perfect systems and total coherence being insisted upon. As in most historiographical currents throughout the twentieth century, at the centre of the attacks – especially voiced by Quentin Skinner in his methodological work – remains the traditional, factual historiography, in this particular case because of its neglect of intentions, beliefs and justifications deployed by political actors and the languages used to conceptualize them. Especially criticized was the assumption that political actors’ morals were mere justifications a posteriori of political behaviour – explanations which would therefore be irrelevant in the study of such conduct.30 Skinner on the contrary starts by looking at thought as an action, with the idea that the justifications of an action or an utterance by a political actor or author are caused by the awareness that the action or utterance challenges the conventions commonly accepted at the time – or the disagreement it expects to provoke from other existing conventions of the day, I would add.31 These justifications Skinner also rejects the distinction between political actions either charged or devoid of moral and ethical justifications which accordingly would or would not deserve to be studied. As representative of the first current Skinner chose Sir Lewis Namier (18881960), of the second, Herbert Butterfield (1900-1979). Quentin Skinner, “Moral Principles and Social Change,” in his Vision of Politics, 1. On Method, Cambridge, etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 145-157, pp. 145-6. See also, Quentin Skinner, “Freedom and the Historian,” in Liberty before Liberalism, Cambridge, etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 101-120, pp. 104ff. 31 See Quentin Skinner, “‘Social Meaning’ and the Explanation of Social Action” and “Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and Action”, in James Tully (ed.), Meaning and Context. Quentin Skinner and his Critics, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988, pp. 79-96 and pp. 97-118 respectively. 30

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Introduction

would impact powerfully on subsequent actions or utterances, as they imposed exigencies on those who proposed them. They were equally influenced by the conventions of the time, the study of which is consequently deemed all the more necessary to determine the potential innovation of specific authors, summed up in the title of the series published by Cambridge University Press: “Ideas in context.”32 This approach relies on the presence of clearly established discourses – open to modification and interpretation – wherein the historian can then trace the evolution or tensions of an author or a group of authors. A number of monographs and collective studies exemplify the fruitfulness of this mix of epistemology and methodology, in spite of the potential reductionism of attempting to fit different tendencies into either the ‘republican’ or the ‘law-centered’ paradigm.33 During the second half of the twentieth century yet another way of analysing political ideas with a focus on the linguistic element gained momentum. Relatively isolated until recently because of the scarcity of translations into English or other languages,34 the history of concepts – indebted to a longstanding German interest in the field since the time of Hegel – proposed a renewal of the discipline by adapting analytical tools mostly drawn from linguistics and the teachings of Heidegger and Gadamer and replacing the identification of the historically shifting meaning not with a single word but with a semantic field. At the centre of this endeavour stands the relationship of the concepts – the evolution undergone by essentially contested concepts – with socio-historical reality around the Sattelzeit, the period of rapid change at the beginning of the modern world between 1750 and 1850. The historical dimension of the evolution of political ideas was further emphasized, in open The definition of what was understood as context – where the social and economical aspects are not considered – has provoked important criticism from historians. Skinner’s idea of context is put into practice in The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, (2 Vols.), Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1978. 33 On commonalities of these paradigms see John G.A. Pocock, “Virtues, Rights, and Manners: A Model for Historians of Political Thought,” Political Theory, Vol. 9, Issue 3 (Aug. 1981), pp. 353-368. Among others, John Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, London, etc: Princeton University Press , 1975, Quentin Skinner, Foundations of Modern Political Thought and studies by disciples such as Martin van Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt have proved highly influential 34 Among the first attempts to popularize and put the History of Concepts in contact with Skinner’s and Pocock’s approach is Melvin Richter, “Reconstructing the History of Political Languages: Pocock, Skinner, and the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe,” History and Theory, Vol. 29, No. 1. (Feb., 1990), pp. 38-70. 32

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Introduction

contrast to the alleged remoteness from historical reality of Friedrich Meinecke’s studies. This emphasis also meant a distancing from the conceptual history practised in Germany before 1945; Geistesgeschichte was to give way to a more delicate interplay with social history. The late Reinhard Koselleck was, together with Otto Brunner and Werner Conze, co-editor of the monumental Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, the foremost representative of this approach.35 Koselleck’s work (generally associated with the University in Bielefeld but originating in Heidelberg) successfully links modern social history with the hermeneutic historical tradition. The emphasis on the social and the structural approach to the study of contexts caused Begriffsgeschichte to distance itself much more from the traditional analysis of individual thinkers or normative works than Skinner and Pocock.36 And it is also the socio-historicity which accounts for the widespread attention it has been receiving in recent years from other European historiographies, as it appeals to historians not specifically devoted to the study of political ideas and maintains a no-nonsense attitude towards methodology, a means to an end and not an object of enquiry in itself, common to other German historiography.37 The power of language in shaping political realities and their perception is central both for the so-called Cambridge School and for the Begriffsgeschichte. Although both lines’ insistence on language precedes   Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur Politischen-Sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, Stuttgart: Klett, 1974-1997 (8 Vols.). 36 There are some attempts at showing the commonalities and differences between the two strands of analysis of political ideas. Besides various works by Melvin Richter see also the contributions collected in Iain Hampsher-Monk, Karin Tilmans, Frank van Vree (eds), History of concepts: comparative perspectives, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1998 and Kari Palonen in “The History of Concepts as a Style of Political Theorizing: Quentin Skinner’s and Reinhart Koselleck’s Subversion of Normative Political Theory,” European Journal of Political Theory, Vol. 1, No. 1, (2002), pp. 91-106 37 Both in the Netherlands and in Spain recent publications demonstrate the growing interest in Begriffsgeschichte and show that there is more in it that the compilation of a dictionary of concepts such as the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. See Iain Hampsher-Monk, Karin Tilmans and Frank van Vree (eds.), History of Concepts and successive publications on key concepts of Dutch history. In Spain the history of concepts has had devoted to it a special issue of the review Ayer. Javier Fernández Sebastián y Juan Francisco Fuentes (eds), Historia de los Conceptos, Madrid: Asociación de Historia Contemporánea and Marcial Pons, 2004 and provides the intellectual background for Javier Fernández Sebastián (dir), Diccionario político y social del mundo iberoamericano. Conceptos políticos en la era de las revoluciones, 1750-1850, Madrid: Fundación Carolina, Sociedad Estatal de Conmemoraciones Culturales, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2009. 35

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Introduction

the poststructuralist/postmodernist explosion of the 1970s, it remains undeniable that these two lines of analysis shared with postmodern authors the frustration with too ideologized historical works as well as with the limitations of the most materialistic forms of history purportedly aiming at an objective knowledge of the past. Interest in the study of language (from philosophy of language to semiotics) as a means to undertake their research was also common. Inevitably, this book also takes into account the extra level of uncertainty born out of postmodernism, which has contributed fruitfully to demolishing the last positivist distinctions between historically truth-bearing documents – basically archival records – and other texts, be they literary or autobiographical, attempting to bridge the gap between literary and archival documents.38 Some historians educated in the German-speaking area, also drawing on the 1970s about-turn provoked by Foucault, Derrida and Bourdieu, have at the same time paid increasing attention to the links between culture and politics.39 Scholars such as Thomas Mergel and Wolfgang Reinhard have also raised the question of how to renew political history by studying it from new angles, partially derived from the new trends in cultural studies. Of relevance would be, first, approaching political history from the ‘foreign perspective’ advocated by anthropological studies to escape the teleological trap. Secondly, it is deemed necessary to widen the sources on which studies are based, including all of which contain information on the communication process. The history of politics is then studied as a mode of communication directed towards decision-making which binds the collectivity; which goes beyond the mere study of symbols to tie them in with political action. At the forefront come the process of communication, focusing not only on See Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning, Chicago, 1980 and Practicing New Historicism, Chicago, 2000. A critical account of the differences and conflicts between New Historicist practice and historians’ use of the past is Sarah Maza, “Stephen Greenblatt, New Historicism, and Cultural History, or, What We Talk About When We Talk About Interdisciplinarity,” Modern Intellectual History, 1,2 (2004), pp. 249-265. 39 The special issue of the review Geschichte und Gesellschaft devoted to the current state of the art of cultural history offers a thorough reflection – clearly derived and conceived for German historians – on the relationship between culture and historical practice. Of special interest for the topics dealt with here are the contributions by Thomas Mergel “Kulturgeschichte – die Neue “Große Erzählung”? Wissenssoziologische Bemerkungen zur Konzeptualisierung Sozialer Wirklichkeit in der Geschichtswissenschaft” in Wolfgang Hardtwig and Hans-Ulrich Wehler (eds.), Kulturgeschichte Heute, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996, pp. 41-77 and the already quoted contribution by Carola Lipp, “Politische Kultur.” 38

26

Introduction

the coercive element entailed in politics, but also on its integrational capacity – a goal each policy needs to strive for in the long run. The analysis of possible alternatives to the decisions which were actually taken needs to be considered too, challenging the idea of the inevitability of historical events.40 Wolfgang Reinhard explicitly proposes to write “a political historical anthropology,”41 proposing to study European Early Modern political culture on the basis of the shared conditionings pervading Latin Christendom as a means of tracing the origins of our present-day European political culture. Following an independent, though parallel, line, Anglo-saxon scholars such as Kevin Sharp, Peter Lake and David Norbrook have explored the artistic representations (ranging from painting to various forms of literature) as political, arguing that they are important sources of political history. This approach makes extensive use of (archival) documents. These documents, like the artist’s work, are no longer viewed as a compilation of factual information, but one which turns into one text among others, without privileged status, as it can be as fictive and biased and partial – since all information is mediated by the compiler – as other texts or human productions. All texts – manuscripts, printed works or even paintings – are argued to share fundamental characteristics, and be equally valid for exploring political culture. Research becomes a quest for perceptions and discourses, for which the use of a variety of types of documents, including paintings and engravings, becomes necessary in order to obtain the larger picture because, as shown by Sharpe, through English drama fears and queries were voiced which could not find their way into what historias have often seen as the traditional materials

Thomas Mergel, “Überlegungen zu einer Kulturgeschichte der Politik,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 28 (2002), pp. 574-606, pp. 587-592. See also the criticism of some approaches to the cultural history of politics – and the suggestion of new paths – in Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger, “Was Heißt Kulturgeschichte des Politischen?” Introduction to Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger (ed.), Was Heißt Kulturgeschichte des Politischen?, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2005 (Special issue of Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung, 35), pp. 9-24. This volume offers further reflection on the problems and methods of a cultural historical approach to the study of politics and examples of the application of this approach. It is further commendable for the attempt to integrate a recent study by Kevin Sharpe into the German discussion. 41 Wolfgang Reinhard, “Was Ist Europäische Politische Kultur? Versuch zur Begründung einer Politischen Historischen Anthropologie,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 27 (2001), pp. 593-616, p. 593. See also his monumental Lebensformen Europas. Eine Historische Kulturanthropologie, Munich: C.H. Beck, 2004. 40

27

Introduction

of political history.42 While recognizing the difficulties in trying to determine the exact relationship between rhetoric, thought and the course of events, I endorse the argument that actions are – at least in the way they are presented – embedded in known forms of representation. My own research is clearly related to that of Reinhard and Sharpe, approaching politics using the ‘methods’ and perspectives of the latest currents in cultural history, considering politics and culture as interlinked expressions. I share with Sharpe’s approach the interest in sources traditionally thought to belong to the realm of other disciplines. Although I have not used theatre or poetry extensively and have concentrated more on occasional political literature, the prevalence of images across genres hints at the presence of a shared code of values and representations which cut across the divide between populace and elite like Sharpe’s findings on the Stuart period. These values were not static. They were modified over time and could be used for differing, even opposing, purposes – as sacrilege was employed both by authors defending Philip iv’s rights over the Catalan principality and by the rebels. The politics of representation pursued by kings such as James i and Charles i through theatre and paintings are comparable with Olivares’ designs for the Buen Retiro palace.43 What was generally shared during the Early Modern era was the belief that image and perception – and the way in which they were communicated to wider audiences – were fundamental issues. There are also elements in my research which clearly differ from Sharpe’s approach. The thematic focus on diplomacy and foreign policies and, geographically, on continental Europe accounts for some of these differences and brings me closer to Reinhard’s approach. A further reason is the interest in the influence of the Law on political and social life, an Kevin Sharpe, “Remapping Early Modern England: from Revisionism to the Culture of Politics,” in Kevin Sharpe, Remapping Early Modern England, pp. 3-37, p. 14. 43 As previously noted, Calderón’s El sitio de Breda was commissioned by the favourite Olivares in 1625. Although it has not yet been shown whether other plays referring to contemporary Spanish military victories – such as Lope’s La Nueva Victoria de Don Gonzalo de Córdoba (1622) and El Brasil Restituido (1625) – were directly commissioned by the government, their later use – together with Calderón’s play – as the basis for some paintings in the Salón de Reinos (Diego Velazquez’s The Surrender of Breda; Juan Bautista Maino’s The Recovery of Bahia in Brazil and Vicente Carducho’s The Victory of Fleurus) shows how the message these plays conveyed was (if partially) taken up by the Monarchy’s government. On the Salón de Reinos and Olivares’ influence on its decoration the best reference is still Jonathan Brown and John H. Elliott, A Palace for a King. The Buen Retiro and the Court of Philip iv, New Haven, etc: Yale University Press, 1980. 42

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Introduction

influence which should not be overlooked in any attempt to study how individuals and territorial and social groups related to each other.44 In the world of Roman Law – unlike in polities functioning according to common law – the law provides a written set of norms which proved and still proves decisive in the organization of the vivere civile, becoming a fundamental mediator between rulers and ruled. Perceptions of law and justice were paramount in the definition of political ideas, as will be shown when I discuss the problem of tyranny and the subsequent (re) definition of authority. Furthermore, and while coexisting with local norms, Roman civil law as expressed in the Corpus iuris civilis helped to constitute the values and vocabulary on which political and legal debate was founded throughout Europe, finding its way into non-legal works including Aquinas’ Summa or Dante’s Divina commedia.45 Roman law also provided the maxims collected in the last title of the Digest, which were converted into general maxims or ‘commonplaces’, removing them from their context. As such they expressed truths which did not need to be justified and were regarded as self-evident, providing a ready-made source from which moral philosophers and political authors could draw propositions with centuries of authority to support them.46 A further aspect distinguishes my study from both Reinhard’s and Sharpe’s proposals: this book attempts to compare two polities’ attitudes and aims at a very specific moment. The comparison between the paths taking the Spanish Monarchy and the Dutch Republic to the peace treaty of Münster is made the more difficult by the different political climates, systems and – of enormous relevance – the type of sources available for such a study. In opposition to the freedom of pamphlet publication in the United Provinces stands the tight press control of the Spanish Monarchy. Against a Dutch government which was decentralized even on issues of foreign policy stand Philip iv’s kingdoms speaking with a single voice in the international arena. These are only the most striking differences to be kept in mind when comparing the debates on the peace negotiation in both territories. Such comparison needs therefore to focus on the different and shifting meanings of concepts which were crucial to the peace negotiations. The presence of a shared This aspect is studied by Wolfgang Reinhard in his Lebensformen Europas, pp. 287304. 45 Peter Stein, Roman Law in European History, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 67. See also Quentin Skinner’s Foundations of Modern Political Thought and the works of Janet Coleman. 46 Peter Stein, Roman Law, p. 96. 44

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cultural heritage and parallel political languages and the stress laid here on the moment of negotiation make the study’s organization round contested concepts more appropriate than one focused on a genealogy of ‘monarchical’ and ‘republican’ discourse in the Iberian Peninsula and the Dutch Republic. While my own approach to the analysis of texts is closer to Skinner’s, this focus requires me to complement it with the proposals of the Begriffsgeschichte, with the shifting meaning of concepts at the centre. This approach brings me to the concept of political culture previously mentioned which, in spite of the obvious differences because of the period studied, has close links with Keith Baker’s definition (see footnote 3). First, the analysis of the meaning of rebellion for a polity born out of the rejection of its hereditary lord and for those defending the rights of that lord will introduce the problem of what negotiating with ‘rebels’ in an international forum meant for the political culture of the time. Then the different concepts of tyranny will be studied. Based on common classical and medieval foundations, it was against tyranny that the Dutch were reacting; but notions of tyranny were also important to the Spanish Monarchy, as they served to distinguish between different types of rejection of Spanish royal rule. The question is raised how it was possible for the Dutch or any other ‘rebel subjects’ to trust agreements signed with a prince defined by his tyranny. Mirroring notions of tyranny, the images of rightful rule, of well-exercised authority, become of distinct relevance. In the Spanish Monarchy, a reformulation of the foundations of authority took place. Out of the conflict between monarchical absolutism and territorial privileges or ‘ancient constitution,’ so often highlighted in the historiography, a synthesis was constructed in which the idea of justice – with clear norms for its exercise – becomes central for the Spanish Monarchy. The integrational capacity of the notion of distributive justice was enhanced by other elements shared by all territories under Philip iv’s rule, drawing on common denominators on which a shared concept of authority could be established for all of them, thus reducing potential rebellions. The diverse views on what the foundations of the Dutch Republic should be – a problem of an internal nature – also had a direct impact on the negotiations. Religious, commercial and strategic interests were articulated in two different and opposing discourses, one favouring, the other opposing, peace with the Spanish Monarchy. This binary division, repeatedly mentioned in studies referring to the negotiations, however ignores a third set of actors in the Republic, the 30

Introduction

successive princes of Orange, and the role their aims and ambitions played during the negotiations. The separate agreement they reached with the Spanish Monarchy points to a concept of authority in the Republic which appears as a distinct third way in the redefinition of authority in the Seven Provinces in the mid-seventeenth century. The arguments developed round the concepts of rebellion, tyranny and authority had a direct impact on the negotiations themselves – especially on topics which are widely ignored in many recent scholarly works. First, the problem of granting sovereignty – and on what terms – to rebel subjects opens the way to studying the meaning of the concept both for the Spanish king and in the United Provinces and of how attitudes on the issue were altered in the course of different unsuccessful negotiations held prior to the Congress in Münster. At the core will be the impossible agreement between Dutch and Spanish on the temporal and spiritual implications of sovereignty. This problem came to the fore with reference to the lands most recently occupied by the Dutch armies, metonymically referred to in the negotiations as the Meierij of Hertogenbosch. Secondly, the different understandings of religious coexistence, its desirability and the consequences it was deemed to have for the political loyalty of the Catholics residing in the United Provinces will serve to demonstrate further the relevance of religion to the political culture of the time and its implications in the exercise of politics. The fact that both the Dutch and the Spanish saw themselves and their war in religious terms, perhaps in a more definite sense than others in Christendom, shaped the way different political options could be expressed, defended and justified. My aim is not to study the situation of Catholics in the area, nor in the whole of the Dutch Republic.47 Neither do I attempt to establish the limits of practical tolerance or coexistence among members of or sympathizers The situation of Catholics during the Republic has been an object of contention. After the liberal emphasis on the tolerant character of the Republic, represented by Willem P.C. Knuttel, De Toestand der Nederlandsche Katholieken ten Tijde der Republiek, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1892-94, there were works emphasizing the structural intolerance of the confessional state towards minorities, especially Catholicism, Ludovicus J. Rogier, Geschiedenis van het Katholicisme in Noord-Nederland in de 16e en 17e eeuw, Amsterdam: Urbi et Orbi, 1945-47. More recent (and balanced) is Paulus W.F.M. Hamans, Geschiedenis van de Katholieke Kerk in Nederland. Van Missionering tot Herstel van de Hiërarchie in 1853, Bruges: Tabor, 1992. Benjamin Kaplan’s Calvinists and libertines: confession and community in Utrecht, 1578-1620, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995 explores how the Dutch Republic emerged as the most religiously tolerant country in seventeenthcentury Europe. 47

31

Introduction

with the Reformed Church and Dutch Catholics. My aim is to establish how Dutch and Spanish government circles justified their stances on the position of Catholics in the newly conquered territories in Flanders and Brabant. On the part of the Spanish no moral or legal justifications were given for permitting Catholics to exercise their creed publicly, understandably enough as the prevalent discourse within the monarchy was one of intolerance. On the Dutch side, when observing how discussions proceeded on this specific point, the recurrent arguments shaping the intellectual debate on toleration were almost non-existent. Practical, materialistic notions prevailed among those more inclined to enlarging Catholics’ rights in the Meierij. The moral and theoretical arguments pertain to the supporters of the more inflexible position. Through the analysis of five concepts (rebellion, tyranny, authority, sovereignty and religious coexistence), I will offer a portrayal of the prevalent political cultures in both the Catholic Monarchy and the United Provinces, inserting them into the wider framework of a European Christianity which had to reassess its own values as a consequence of the Reformation and the process of Confessionalization. By drawing on Wolfgang Reinhard’s and Kevin Sharpe’s methodological questions my aim is to analyse Dutch and Spanish political cultures using Keith Baker’s definition. Therefore, I have to combine the study of a field which was the hobbyhorse of the much-criticized nineteenth-century positivist historiography with methodological questions in a clearly unfamiliar fashion. Research on the international relations of (proto-) States termed, for the sake of brevity and clarity but unhistorically, the Spanish Monarchy and the Dutch Republic (terms which are, however, common in the sources here employed) on this theoretical basis may even appear heretical to some. My aim is to show that, well founded as some of these criticisms may be, the field of international and diplomatic history can be renewed and reconceived, if not easily and flawlessly, with the help of the rethinking of the discipline undertaken by studies focusing on culture, demonstrating the artificiality of some of the barriers set up between sub-fields within historical studies. Whether I have attained this goal is for each reader to determine.

32

Chapter 1 Rebels Confronting rebellion Rebellion and resistance were important dimensions of medieval and early modern political life. Open opposition to lawful authority was generally considered to be the last resort, even during the first moments of the Reformation. Most authors of political works aligned themselves with Luther’s respect for political authority, rejecting the interpretations that nourished the most radical strands of the Reformation. The words of St. Paul in Romans 13:1 “Let every soul be subject to higher powers: for there is no power but from God: and those that are, are ordained of God” were often quoted to emphasize the duty of the subject to obey the lord even if he was not converted to the ‘true faith’.1 Discourses concerning rebellion radicalized especially during the French Wars of Religion, both on the Huguenot and on the Catholic sides, and during the first stages of the Dutch Revolt. However, the doctrine generally accepted at this time was the opposite of nonresistance, insisting on the illegitimacy of any use of force by subjects against their lawful ruler. The example of the Early Christians’ endurance under the “servitude of the Empire of Tiberius, Nero, Caligula and so many bad ones” was drawn upon when calling for obedience.2 Loyalty was thus a most central public virtue,3 and this aspect did not change See for instance Luther’s vehement siding with the authorities that crushed the Peasants’ Revolt and his arguments in “Wider die räuberischen un mörderischen Rotten der Bauern” (1525) 2 Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, Historia de Felipe ii, Rey de España, (eds. José Martínez Millán and Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales), Valladolid: Consejería de educación y Cultura, 1998 (1619), p. 226. 3 Helmut G. Koenigsberger, “Republicanism, Monarchism and Liberty,” in Robert Oresko, G.C. Gibbs and Hamish.M. Scott (eds.), Royal and Republican Sovereignty in Early Modern Europe. Essays in Memory of Ragnhild Hatton, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 43-74, p. 49. 1

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all of a sudden after the Reformation. During the 1640s, negative views of rebellion pervaded Christendom. As the fears of monarchical rulers in continental Europe increased, more compliant attitudes could gain ground. Thus, more caution prevailed when the territorial privileges or the sensibilities of the higher nobility were being dealt with. This was combined with an open discourse condemning all possible refusals to obey the ‘natural lord(s)’, pointing out that not even the systematic violation of territorial privileges would legitimize attempts to escape “such tyranny”, notwithstanding the defence of contrary views by important authors such as Hugo Grotius.4 No subject contesting the authority over him claimed to be ‘rebelling’, but to be lawfully fighting the wrongdoings of bad ministers or, in extreme situations, tyrannical lords. Even the Dutch Republic, the first successful outcome of post-reformation rebellion, displayed an ambivalent attitude when referring to rebellion in general. Although they had taken place since 1568, attacks against Philip ii were launched on a massive scale only after he had been dispossessed of his authority over the Low Countries through the Act of Abjuration in 1581. Respect for established political authority was generally favoured. Charles i’s execution in 1649, eighty years after the outbreak of the revolt, received a thoroughly bad press in the Netherlands.5 Praising obedience in a polity born out of rebellion was clearly contradictory. As a way of solving this tension, Dutch authors in the 1640s either denied that the Habsburgs had rights over the United Provinces6 or emphasized the tyrannical behaviour a a result of which Philip ii had forfeited his rights. Readers in the Low Countries were thus reminded of how, on account of Philip ii’s violations of the ‘droit de gens’, the Dutch were forced to “resort to natural law to acquire their freedom” in self-defence.7 Criticism of rebellion was fiercer elsewhere. Treatises published in the internally divided Holy Roman Empire, though aimed at explaining the reasons which moved subjects to rebel against their natural lords, nonetheless emphasized the negative outcome of rebellions. Authorities Examples of outspoken defences of royal authority are to be found among contemporary English authors such as James i and Sir Robert Filmer. 5 Copie d’une Lettre, Touchant la Justice ou l’Injustice des Armes du Parlement, contre le Roy de la Grande Bretaigne, s.l. [The Hague?]: Dirk Graswinckel, 1642, p. 4. 6 Noodige Bedenckingen der trouhertighe Nederlanders, over de aen-staende Münstersche Handelinghe van Vrede ofte Treves, s.l.: s.n., 1643. 7 Jean Louis Guez de Balzac, Discovrs Politiqve sur l’Estat des Provinces Unies des Pays-bas, Leiden: Maire, 1638. See however the contractualist emphasis of Filmer’s critique of Grotius. 4

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were warned about actions likely to push their subjects into rebellion; at the same timke rebels were lectured on the negative consequences their uprising might have.8 Publications defending the position of the Emperor during the Bohemian phase of the Thirty Years War emphasized the fate awaiting those who dared to rebel, with special reference to the defeat suffered by Frederick of the Palatinate.9 “Hellfire and damnation” would be the outcome awaiting those who “offend[ed] to the extreme the Majesty of the Prince” by “throwing off the yoke of a sovereign.”10 Conversely, discourses of loyal obedience enjoyed wide currency, especially in monarchies, where they were more numerous than ideas of citizenship.11 Cardinal virtues in the prince, fostered from birth through education, and obedience from the subjects summarize what was argued to be the basis of the relationship between ruler and ruled. Even when attempting to mobilize territories against their lord it was often considered necessary first to praise the traditional loyalty of those subjects now encouraged to overthrow their ruler.12 Certain aspects could make rebellion more acceptable. Generally rejected were the actions of the ‘mob’, considered to be rioting and not rebelling, or even resisting. Acceptance was more likely when the rebel­ lion was the outcome of resistance by intermediate authorities against an unjust lord, as the social status quo and order would be preserved. This distinction became especially significant in the Holy Roman Empire with its plurality of governmental levels, furthered by Luther’s insistence An example of this attitude is Johann Wilhelm Neimair von Ramsla, Von Auffstand der Untern wider ihre Regenten und Obern sonderbarer Tractat, Jena: Johan. Weidners Wittib, 1633. 9 See the engravings such as Deß Adlers und Löwen Kampff (1621), Gehaime Andeutung uber den vermainten König (1621), Deß gwesten Pfalzgrafen Glück und Unglück (1621) in Wolfgang Harms (ed.), Illustrierte Flugblätter aus den Jahrhunderten der Reformation und der Glaubenskämpfe, Coburg: Die Kunstsammlungen der Veste Coburg, 1983, pp.158-164. 10 Fin de la Guerre des Pays-Bas, avx Provinces qui sont encor sous l’Obeissance d’Espagne, Item la Descouverte des Proffondeurs d’Espagne cachees sous ceste Proposition de Donner au Roy de France en mariage l’Infante d’Espagne avec les Dixsept Provinces des Pays-Bas en constitution de dot, s.l.: s.n., 1645, p. 7. 11 Xavier Gil Pujol, “Republican Politics in Early Modern Spain: The Castilian and Catalano-Aragonese Traditions,” in Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner (eds), Republicanism, A Shared European Heritage, vol. i, Republicanism and Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 263288, p. 268. The polities within the Crown of Aragon (Aragon, Valencia and Catalonia) enjoyed more political and financial self-government, as will be seen later on. 12 See for instance Avis des-interessé aux Habitans des Païs-bas, qui sont sous la domination du Roy d’Espagne, s.l : s.n., 1644, p. 6. 8

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on obedience to the political authority. Counteracting subversive readings of Lutheran theology, Luther, Bucer, and Calvin, among others, responded to the challenge of defying one type of authority without attacking the social system as a whole. This gave rise to a form of justifying political resistance which proved of great importance among reformed polities.13 Investing private individuals with the right lawfully to repel by force the authority of a prince or magistrate was widely rejected. Catholic polities saw both riots and rebellion as challenges to the dictates of human and divine law. Rebels had fallen into one of the seven capital sins, that of pride, which Aquinas considered “the queen of all vices,” by which a man, through love of his own worth, aims to withdraw himself from subjection to God, defying the commands of superiors. This was a type of contempt of God and – which proved to be of special relevance when dealing with Reformed subjects – of those serving him. The first to commit the sin of pride and rebellion was none other than Lucifer. From the sparse and cryptic account of his revolt and inevitable fall in Isaiah14:12-14, Luke 10:18 and Revelation 12:7-10 a story was constructed. Lucifer’s story was easily linked with other biblical examples of (human) disobedience to God’s commands, such as the story of Adam and Eve. After the Reformation such acts of non-compliance were correlated by some Catholic authors with insub­ ordination to civil authority, thus setting rebellion against temporal and spiritual authority on an equal footing. The inquisitor Juan Adam de la Parra explicitly equated the Portuguese rejection of Philip’s iv rule – where religion was not among the motives for the rebellion – with the refusal to obey God by “the first rebel and apostate, Satan.”14 These different attitudes developed and collided during the long decades of conflict between the Spanish Monarchy – where the only title encompassing all realms forming it was none other than Catholic kings – and the Northern Low Countries. The memory of the Dutch For a general overview of the development of resistance theories see Martin van Gelderen, “‘So meerly humane’: theories of resistance in early modern Europe”, Annabel Brett and James Tully, (eds.), Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 149-170. See also Robert von Friedeburg, “‘Self-defence’ and Sovereignty: the Reception and Application of German Political Thought in England and Scotland, 1628-69”, History of Political Thought, Volume 23, Number 2, 2002, pp. 238-265. 14 Juan Adam de la Parra, Apologetico contra el Tirano y Rebelde Vergança y Conivrados, Arzobispo de Lisboa, y svs Parciales, en respvesta a los Doce Fundamentos del Padre Mascareñas, Zaragoza: Diego Dormer, 1642, fol. 40v. 13

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revolt would determine the Spanish monarchy’s answers to the Catalan and Portuguese revolts in the 1640s. Religion and revolt: The United Provinces The United Provinces of the Low Countries were the outcome of the first successful rebellion of the Confessionalization era. The reasons behind the outbreak of the revolt are multiple, linking social, economic and intellectual motives. The prominence of religious arguments in the justification of the revolt – although many Dutch authors did not have a religious argument – is only understandable within the context of the Reformation. The Reformation from its very beginning faced the problem of how to relate to civil authorities which rejected the new faith. Theories of resistance developed during the early phases of the Reformation, when the problem of how to combine political obedience to authorities of a different confession first came to the fore. Drawing on natural rights theory and the subject’s right to self-defence when unjustly assaulted – even by the authorities – soon proved insufficient.15 Theologians such as Johannes Bugenhagen built on two fundamental Lutheran ideas: the separation of secular and spiritual authority in two different spheres and the duty of all magistrates to protect the subjects, to develop a theory of resistance.16 Jurists in the service of the Protestant Saxon Elector and the landgrave of Hesse reinforced the argument by extending to the German princes the Emperor’s duty to care for the welfare of their subjects. They were thus merely fulfilling their obligation to protect their subjects against the unjust designs of the Emperor and other Catholic princes. The constitutional limitations to Imperial power, as set in the Goldener Bulle and in the Wahlkapitulationen, emphasizing the limited and conditional nature of (some of the) civil powers ended up being interlinked with a more theological strand of thought. The following decades would see the development of theories of resistance in other European polities. Confessional and political unrest was by then spreading from the Empire to other parts of Christendom.17 See Brian Tierny’s analysis of Gerson in The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law, and Church Law, 1150-1625, Grand Rapids, Mich: William B. Eerdmans, 2001, pp. 232ff. Further assessing the subjects’ rights derived from natural law see Kenneth Pennington, The Prince and the Law, 1200-1600: Sovereignty andRrights in the Western Legal Tradition, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 122ff 16 See Martin van Gelderen, “‘So meerly humane’” and the bibliography there cited. 17 Robert M. Kingdom, “Calvinism and Resistance Theory, 1550-1580” in James H. 15

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A fundamental change occurred in France during the so-called Wars of Religion, partly as a consequence of the French kingdom lacking ‘intermediate authorities.’ The institutions which could be turned to to control some royal actions were the Estates or parlements,18 which represented the body of the kingdom in order to fulfil the medieval obligation to advise the king. The argument – made by Francis Hotman in Francogallia – that the parliaments held ultimate authority within the state as custodians of the immutable fundamental laws by which all French kings were required to govern opened the way for theories of popular government. Such vindications were possible only as a result of diminishing allegiances to the royal figure, prompted, firstly, by the crown descending on to incompetent princes who were controlled either by the Guise family or the queen-mother Catherina de Medici and, secondly, by the St. Bartholemew’s Eve massacre. The accession to the French throne of the Protestant Henry iv made French Catholics receptive to these theories. The Holy League then took up elements of ‘secular’ Huguenot resistance thought. It endorsed, first, the idea of loyal resistance to malevolent and wicked advisers who had overstepped the legally and historically defined limits of their authority. Secondly, it adopted communal defiance of a tyrant in the name of the ultimate power the commonwealth held over the ruler previously defended in the Vindiciae contra Tyrannos. Political changes led Huguenots and Catholics to adapt and alter their prevailing arguments during the second half of the sixteenth century, and theories of resistance became more elaborate and widespread.19 In parallel, the Low Countries experienced a similar process, partially fed by arguments outlined above. The wide approval and widespread reception of Christian humanism and Erasmian ideas among the urban elites in the Low Countries set the foundation for a discourse that would be developed to deal with the religious controversies in the area during the sixteenth century. Together with the important presence Burns (ed.), The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450-1700, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 193-218, p. 204 and previously in Quentin Skinner, Foundations of Modern Political Thought. 18 See Sarah Hanley Madden, Le “Lit de Justice” des Rois de France. L’Ideologie Constitutionnelle dans la légende, le rituel et le discours, Paris : Aubier, 1991. 19 On Huguenot thought see Quentin Skinner, Foundations of Modern Political Thought, pp. 310 ff. John H.M. Salmon, “Catholic Resistance Theory, Ultramontanism, and the Royalist Response, 1580-1620,” in James H. Burns (ed.), The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450-1700, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 219-253, pp. 219-220.

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of Anabaptist groups, conditions were ripe for the seed of Reformed Protestantism to grow as soon as German and English exiles arrived. Calvin’s teachings gradually penetrated the seventeen provinces, and his followers set up a network of underground churches. The followers of the new creed soon faced the contradictions between their political beliefs and their expected political obedience, especially as they came out into the open and increased in numbers in the 1560s. Rising imprisonments and executions of ‘heretics’ followed. Pleas for tolerance towards religious dissenters grew, accompanied by searches for acceptable justifications of active resistance to authorities the lawfulness of which had not yet been challenged. The legitimacy and dangers of resistance theories, which permeated even the arguments favouring toleration, were still fundamental. Franciscus Junius, in A brief discourse sent to King Philip (1566), argued that as God’s commands stand over and above those of men, it was better and wiser not to force subjects into the dilemma of choosing between their allegiance to Caesar and that to God. Against the background of prevailing calls for obedience to civil authority, even if it led to martyrdom, voices started to advocate the right to resist authorities which by their cruel prosecution had turned tyrannical. Adapting the constitutional line of the duty of inferior magistrates to curb the despotic tendencies of the superior authority, the representative assemblies of the various estates were called upon to fulfil their duty. This line of argument became increasingly popular and was actively used to justify armed resistance in the event of tyrannical governments – including the violation of the territorial privileges in the equation – and was finally sanctioned by the synod of Antwerp (1566). The constitutional argument allowed for active resistance to authorities violating the key charters of the ancient constitution. Private individuals were however denied the authority to resist the government without the ‘provincial states’’ mandate. Nonetheless, until 1570 the problem of armed resistance remained highly controversial amongst Reformed Protestants. Earlier theories such as the natural right of self-defence were developed further. Most commonly, the Low Countries’ rebels justified their actions according to different conceptions of the contractualist line.20 This did not, however, prevent the assessment of rebellion and obedience on moral grounds – an interpretation more popular than juridical argument in publications aimed at wider audiences. For the development of Dutch political thought during the sixteenth century see Martin van Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt, 1555-1590, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 20

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During the seventeenth century religious discourses and Reformed eschatology had nourished the revolt with the production of an iconography and rhetorical means which had contributed to the formation of Dutch identity. Since the outbreak of the revolt, and as part of the justification of the war against the natural, although unjust, lord, the different events which were taking place were identified with the history of the people of Israel, especially with the Exodus, drawing explicit parallels with “present times.” Elements of a religious and biblical character complemented the theories of resistance and rebellion developed by authors as Albada, Vranck and Grotius.21 Religion was thus among the fundamental elements motivating the revolt and resistance to Philip ii and had fundamental consequences for the future of the United Provinces. As the Republic was formed partly by resisting religious imposition, it was not possible to resort to a unified religion to maintain either the obedience of its subjects or concord among them. Machiavelli had already pointed to this political use of religion in The Prince, a commonplace throughout Europe.22 Nonetheless, Reformed religion and its ministers continued to play an important role within the political realm.23 Tensions existed between the justification of the revolt as a fight for freedom – including freedom of conscience – and the emphasis laid on the key role played by a single confession, the Reformed, in the The importance of Calvinism for configuring Dutch “national” feeling and its role in contributing to nourishing the revolt have been taken into consideration by, among others, Herbert H. Rowen and Craig Harline, “The Birth of the Dutch Nation,” in Malcom R. Thorp and Arthur J. Slavin (eds), Politics, Religion, and Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe: Essays in Honor of De Lamar Jensen, Kirksville, Missouri: Sixteenth Century Journal Publishers, 1994, pp. 67-81, especially pp. 71-72 and by Simon Groenveld, “Nation und “Patria”. Begriff und Wirklichkeit des kollektiven Bewusstseins im Achtzigjährigen Krieg,“ in Horst Lademacher and Simon Groenveld, Krieg und Kultur. Die Rezeption von Krieg und Frieden in der Niederländischen Republik und im Deutschen Reich 1568-1648, Münster, etc: Waxmann, 1998, pp. 77-109, p. 94. Emphasizing the relevance of the respublica hebraeorum see Lea Campos Boralevi, “La Respublica Hebraeorum nella Tradizione Olandese,” in Lea Campos Boralevi and Diego Quaglioni (eds.), Politeia Biblica, special issue of Il Pensiero Politico, 3, 2002, pp. 431-463, p.451. 22 See for instance Fr. Francisco Enríquez, Conservacion de Monarqvias, Religiosa, y Politica. Primera, y segunda Parte. A la Catolica, Sacra, y Real Magestad del Rey Felipe Qvarto el Grande Nvestro Señor, Madrid: Domingo Garcia y Morrás, 1648, f. 7v. 23 A brief account of the relations between preachers and the press in the Reformed area is Bernd Moeller, “Einige Bemerkungen zum Thema: Predigten in Reformatorischen Flugschriften”, in Hans-Joachim Köhler (ed.), Flugschriften als Massenmedium der Reformationszeit: Beiträge zum Tübinger Symposion 1980, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981, pp. 261-268. 21

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struggle against the Spanish Monarchy and the configuration of the Republic. During the 1630s and 1640s the primacy of the Reformed religion was emphasized, partly out of fear of the threat posed by the growing number of other ‘sects’, especially Catholics.24 Religion was for many in the United Provinces, but by no means everyone, the reason which caused the revolt.25 Many were also “certain that the Spaniard hates us for no other reason than that of Religion.” If the religious problem had been at the core of the conflict, after the signing of the truce with the Spanish Monarchy in 1609 the problem arose of how to deal with the political attitudes of the inhabitants of the United Provinces whose religion differed from the orthodox Reformed: Mennonites, but especially ‘Papists’ and ‘Remonstrants.’ Both groups were often considered to be, if not one and the same thing, at least very close to each other. During the so-called Arminian troubles of the 1610s theological disputes had been linked with political matters. In the most concise and popular version Arminianism was reduced to a form of crypto-Catholicism. This accusation was charged with political implications, as Catholics were assumed to be potential enemies of the Revolt because they lacked religious reasons to rebel against the Habsburgs and because they were required by their faith to obey a foreign prince, the pope. Clearly linked with this was the threat factions and dissent posed to the survival of the Republic. The tragic fate of Oldenbarnevelt, Holland’s landsadvocaat and father of the Dutch Republic, executed in 1618, showed that rebellion and high treason continued to be abominable crimes.26 And – as everywhere else in Early Modern Europe – those of a different religious persuasion were deemed the more likely to commit it. Against those insisting on a religiously based resistance, some authors portrayed the Dutch Revolt as a fight in defence of territorial Consideratien ende Redenen der E. Heeren bewind-hebberen/ vande Geoctrojeerde WestIndische Compagnie inde Vergaederinghe vande Ed. Hoog-Moghende Heren Staten Generael deser Vereenighde Vrye Nederlanden overgelevert/ nopende de teghenwoordige Deliberatie over dien Treves met den Coning van Hispanjen. Midstgaders Concientieuse Bedenckingen op dese Vrage, Ofmen in goeder conscientien mach Treves maecken met den Coning van Spangjen, Haarlem: Adriaen Rooman, 1629, p. 27. 25 On the “middle groups” see different works by Jan Juliaan Woltjer such as “De vredemakers,” Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, 89 (1976), pp. 299-321. 26 In his defence, Oldenbarnevelt denied that he was a traitor, not that the punishment for the crime of high treason should be the scaffold. See Roeland de Carpentier, Historie van het Leven en Sterven van heer Johan van Olden-barnevelt, Ridder, Heere van den Tempel, Berckel, Rodenrijs. Gewesen Advocaet van Hollandt, &c. Waerachtelijck beschreven door een Liefhebber der Waerheyt, s.l. (Rotterdam): s.n. (Joannes Naeranus), 1648. 24

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privileges and against a tyrannical lord. Emanuel van Meteren, when reporting in 1618 the events of 1578 remembered how the Pacification of Ghent of 1576 had stated that the fight was not against Catholicism, but in defence of the privileges of the country. Although the Reformed religion would be “promoted by all possible means,” the States assured the Catholics that “on no account did they want to eradicate the Roman Catholic or to remove their goods.”27 In spite of growing political and religious radicalization alienating many moderate groups, attempts were nonetheless made in pamphlets to override religious considerations.28 Arguments defending this aim had to coexist with policies against Catholics’ public worship. The tension between the increasing supremacy of the Reformed ‘public’ church and the need not to provoke a Catholic backlash – plus the resistance of many Dutch to a too Calvinist ‘public’ church – affected the United Provinces not just internally. The attitude of the Dutch to foreign rebels came also to depend on their confession. The rebellions which took place during the 1640s show this ambivalence. Revolts by Catholics were often condemned, while in the conflict between the English Parliament and Charles i the former found support – if apparently tepid – in the States of the United Provinces. Confessional allegiances and arguments contributed to the condemnation of the rebellion of Catholics in Ulster in 1641. The Irish rebels were compared to the plague, and a wide range of actions against all human laws were ascribed to them.29 However, a rebellion against the Spanish even if by Catholics was to be lauded, as happened with the Portuguese ‘restauraçao.’ Shortly after the outbreak of the revolt, the newly established Portuguese authorities and the Dutch Republic signed a peace treaty (1641). The wording of the treaty emphasized the “indubitable right and justice” of the duke of Braganza claim to the Portuguese throne and the lack of any further rights of the “king of Castile” over the territory. Furthermore, Portugal suffering “injustices, insupportable tortures and other, different sorts of tyranny” by the Emanuel van Meteren, Historien der Nederlanden, en haar naburen Oorlogen tot het Iaar 1612, Ámsterdam: Jan Jacobsz Schipper, 1647 (1618), fol. 248. 28 On the development of this argument see Martin van Gelderen, The Political Thought, pp. 146ff. 29 See Het wildt-vuyr in Yrlandt ontdeckt. Vertonende hoe de Rebellen aldaer de Stadt van Dublin met Vuyrballen hebben willen in Brandt steken, Amsterdam: Joost Broersz., 1642 and Yrelandtsche Traenen: waer in Levendich is affgebeelt ..., een Lijste, vande noyt gehoorde Wreedtheden ... der bloedt-dorstighe Jesuwijten, Ámsterdam: Broer Jansz. and Jan van Hilten, 1642. 27

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“Castilian king” after his invasion of the kingdom were also mentioned.30 However, tensions arose as a consequence of the conflicting interests of the overseas empires of both polities. The rebellion of Portuguese colonists in Brazil Maranhão (1642) and Pernambuco (1645) threatened Dutch control over Brazil. The Portuguese authorities were suspected of being behind these rebellions, but the attacks directed against the rioters –as they were seen – were based on other considerations.31 The lack of an assembly supposedly representing the will of the territory which endorsed the resistance against the authority, channelling the demands through a legitimate political body, made the rebellions in both Ireland and Brazil likelier to be deemed mutinies and riots.32 Especially in the case of more popular publications juridical and political distinctions between rebellions and mutinies were almost completely absent. Catholicism was assumed to be at the core of the problem. This aspect also became relevant to the assessment of the English situation during the 1640s. Confessional disputes and violation of the privileges of the country went hand in hand during the Dutch revolt – frequently, though not always, presented as the joint outcome of Catholic wickedness – and some pamphlets drew comparisons between the Dutch and English situations during the early stages of parliamentary opposition. English pamphlets pointing to “the secret negotiations and occult understanding” between the English and papal courts were hastily translated into Dutch.33 The Dutch public was ready to see the links between Catholicism, its wicked aims, and unlawful princely rule, and to accept the right of the assemblies representing the kingdom to decide in matters touching the well-being of the community.34 The text of the treaty is recorded in Lieuwe van Aitzema, Verhael van de Nederlantsche Vreede handeling, The Hague: Jan Veely,1650, Vol. 1, pp. 402-404. 31 See the pamphlet attributed to Theodorus Graswinckel, Aen-spraeck aen den getrouwen Hollander, The Hague: s.n., 1645, p. 5 and following. Contesting these arguments see Antwoort vanden ghetrouwen Hollander op den aenspraeck van den heetgebaeckerden Hollander, s.l.:s.n., 1645. 32 The shift in alliances within the United Provinces also influenced the attitude towards rebels. As peace with Spain approached, French support for Catalan rebels was judged to be unjustified. (Attributed to Adriaen Pauw) Observatien op de Brief van A. de Bruyn, Deventer: s.n., 1647. 33 Den Enghelschen Paus/ ofte Politijck Discours waer-in De heymelijcke Onderhandelinge/ ende’t verborghen Verstandt/ tusschen het Hoff van Engelandt, ende’t Hoff van Roomen, ten deelen ontdeckt is..., s.l.: s.n., 1643. 34 The Dutch publisher of Roomsch Meester-Stuck ofte De Groote Conspiratie van den Paus… door het verwecken van een Inladsche Oorloge in Schotland, ende alle Syn Majesteyts 30

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Connections with the internal realities of the Dutch Republic also played a role in the assessment of the revolt of the Irish Catholics, when the growing number of Catholics stoked the fear of revolt in the United Provinces. Warnings were voiced that granting Dutch Catholics the right “to practise openly their idolatrous cult” would soon put the Republic in the same situation as the Irish Protestant settlers, cruelly murdered by Catholics. Furthermore, these pamphlets never failed to mention that Catholics in the Low Countries “held the King of Spain to be their temporal lord,” urged by their preachers to help the king in his fight against the Republic.35 The ties linking Dutch Catholics and the Spanish king were widely discussed in pamphlets published in the United Provinces, emphasizng that “almost all the Roman Catholic inhabitants of the United Provinces, do not only refuse to recognize the High Mighty States as their legal authority, but also call their praiseworthy government illegal”.36 The assumption that confessional and political fidelities were inextricably intertwined played an important role in the Dutch Republic, especially as peace with the Spanish Monarchy approached. Authors defending a settlement also justified – once again along the lines of confessional solidarity – the rebellions of Huguenots against the French king and attacked the French king’s actions against them.37 Arguments casting doubt on the fidelity of Catholics to Protestant authorities were also present in other Reformed polities. There was general agreement on the threat religious dissent posed to the internal concord of any polity. Although the government of the United Provinces was based to a great extent on the rejection of religious imposition, attacks against Catholics and pleas for stronger control of their activities had a clear cause. Their numbers and the fact that they would most plausibly get support from other Catholic polities heightened fears of a Catholic rebellion.

Coninchrijcken…, s.l.: s.n., 1643 stated on the title page: “translated from English for necessary instruction and warning for the locals.” 35 Noodige Bedenckingen der trouhertighe Nederlanders. 36 N.N. Een Kort Bericht. Dat de Coningen van Hispangien met hare Wapenen niet voor hebben de Bescherminge vande Roomsche-Kerck/ maer wel het Beginnen end’Op-rechten van een vijfde Monarchie, Delft: Andries Cloeting, 1641, p. 1. 37 Nederlantsche Absolutie op de Fransche Belydenis, Amsterdam: Jacob Nes, 1648 (Attributed to Adriaen Pauw).

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The Spanish attitude towards rebellion For Spanish early modern – and other – philosophers and theologians the link between religious and political allegiances was even stronger and more explicit than in the Dutch Republic. This was partly the outcome of the representation of the medieval past of the Iberian Peninsula, which was presented as a continuous war to regain territories lost to the Muslim infidels. This image was repeated during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, emphasizing the greatness of the government by the Catholic Kings Isabella and Ferdinand, conquerors of the last Muslim stronghold in the Peninsula. The ‘cleansing’ of the Peninsula achieved by the expulsion of the Jews in 1492 was completed with the expulsion of the Moriscos by Phillip iii in 1609, following their forced and ineffective conversions to Christianity in 1502 (Castile) and 1526 (Aragon). At stake was the maintenance of the purity of the Christian faith and the security of the kingdoms, as infidels and heretics were deemed to be fighting both the Church and the lawful domain of their natural lords.38 This judgement was reflected in the Castilian word ‘fe’ (faith), which meant both faith and promise – i.e. the oath of obedience to the (temporal) lord.39 The rebel was seen as someone refusing compliance, not only with political obedience, but with religion and morality too, a fact which hints at an image of the political sphere founded to a great extent on religious considerations. Insistence on the religious dimension of the Spanish Monarchy was the outcome of the linguistic and juridical diversity of the different polities and territories of which it was composed. Although many states in the early modern period were composite states, some were clearly “more composite than others.”40 Diversity and plurality of government Ludovico de Copiaria Carmerineo (Louis Cruzamont), Atroces Hechos de Impíos Tyranos por intervención de Franceses o Atrocidades Francesas execvtadas por Impíos Tyranos. Colegidas de Autores diuersos mayores de toda Excepción, y escritas primero en lengua Latina. Traducidas después en Español, y aumentadas en esta segunda Impressión de algunos Sucessos, para su mayor Claridad, Valeria: s.n., 1635, p. 27. 39 FE, in Sebastián de Covarrubias, Tesoro de la Lengua Castellana o Española según la Impression de 1611, con las Adiciones de Benito Remigio Noydens publicadas en la de 1674, Martín de Riquer (ed.), Barcelona: Editorial Alta Fulla, 2003. 40 The term “composite monarchies” was coined by Helmut G. Koenigsberger, “Dominium Regale or Dominium Politicum et Regale. Monarchies and Parliaments in Early Modern Europe,” in his Politicians and Virtuosi. Essays in Early Modern History. London: Hambledon Press, 1986, pp. 1-25. See also Xavier Gil Pujol, “One King, One Faith, Many Nations: Patria and Nation in Spain, 16th-17th Centuries,” in Robert von Friedeburg (ed.), ‘Patria’ und ‘Patrioten’ vor dem Patriotismus: Pflichten, Rechte, Glauben 38

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was a defining characteristic of the Spanish Monarchy. Significantly, the only official designation encompassing all the titles by which the king ruled each of his territories was that of ‘Catholic King’. The title was granted to Ferdinand and Isabella – whose marriage had united the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon – by Pope Alexander vi in 1492. This title officially acknowledged the monarchs as defenders of the (Christian) faith; their power was defined by it and unity in religion was considered the most valuable feature of the Monarchy, even more so after the outbreak of the Reformation. Diego de Arredondo y Agüero emphasized the political consequences of this religious unity, pointing out the fact that “the greatest security” of Philip iv’s monarchy was that “it is united in one religion”, which “appeases the spirit of the subjects”. Conversely, “all those who do not follow the religion of the king are his enemies and desire a change in the State.”41 Thus, anyone of a different religion from his prince would be not just a potential rebel, but a traitor at heart, waiting for the right moment to stab his lord or sovereign in the back, an idea repeated by Diego Saavedra Fajardo, one of the Monarchy’s envoys to the congress in Münster and a polemist in the service of the Spanish crown, two decades later.42 Until the 1640s (distinct) readings of contemporary, postReformation events – the French Wars of Religion, the revolt of the Low Countries, and even the Morisco rebellion in the Granadian Alpujarras (1568), and the Bohemian crisis of 1618 – reinforced the equation of heresy with rebellion. This explanation no longer held after 1640, when the Spanish Monarchy was facing two rebellions on the Iberian Peninsula which could not be attributed to heresy. Furthermore, the new, ‘rebel’ authorities justified their claims along lines of argument which were also part of the official discourse of the Catholic Monarchy. Regardless of the differences, Spanish theorists writing in the 1640s saw themselves as experts in the treacherous behaviour of rebels. They elucidated, for the king’s benefit, how those rebels tried to conceal their debauchery. José Laínez, court chaplain to Philip iv since 1635 and later Bishop of Solsona, explained how “the rebels start complaining und die Rekonfigurierung Europäischer Gemeinwesen im 17. Jahrhundert, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2005, pp. 105-137. 41 Diego de Arredondo y Agüero, Discvrso sobre la Necessidad qve ay en la Corona de Castilla de fundar vn Consejo, y Iunta, a quien se cometan todas las Cosas de su Gobierno Politico. s.l.: s.n, s.a. (ca. 1622) 42 Diego Saavedra Fajardo, Locuras de Europa. Diálogo entre Mercurio y Luciano, Ángel González Palencia (ed.), Obras Completas, Madrid: M. Aguilera, 1946 [Münster, 1645?], pp. 1198-1219, p. 1212.

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about the ministers, not about the prince.” In doing so they hoped to “make the name of rebellion less hateful”. And so they could “fool the people and, if only for a short time, even the princes.” The common people on their own, “for the great reverence they have for their Prince” would never rebel “if they were not fooled.” Although a revolt against the government was equivalent to one against the prince, going against ministers “did not appear as bad.”43 Writing in the context of the Catalan rebellion, which started as a rejection of the policies of Olivares – Philip iv’s favourite – and then became a fully fledged rebellion, Laínez warned the king against these arguments and recommended a twofold path of action to avoid rebellions. First, the king’s ministers had to be of “outstanding goodness and known prudence” in order to be untainted by “the first voices of this false dispute”. Secondly, at the first sign of rebellion the king had to “cut off the head of this horrid serpent”.44 Laínez assumed that there were a few who mobilized the uneducated and fickle mass. The multitude itself “is easily tamed and mollified and comes to concord, forgetting discords.”45 Rebels needed punishment because “treason to their king and natural lord is the greatest discredit among men”. The mere thought of it happening “is horrible, the quill shakes and the hand shivers when writing it”.46 The smallest insubordination was a first step towards greater dereliction; when unpunished it would “hastily degenerate into treason”. Treason and disobedience were, in the eyes of this author, one and the same thing.47 Consequently, not condemning rebellion could equally be considered treason, as appears from the fate of Ricardo Donith’s book ‘Bello civili Belgico,’ subjected to inquisitorial inquiry in the 1590s. The fact that the author tried to discuss the events of the Dutch rebellion with a certain detachment led the Spanish Inquisition to assume that he was simply disguising his sympathies for the heretics and rebels. There was no middle way between straightforward condemnation and support. José Laínez, El Daniel Cortesano en Babilonia, Susannam, y Echatanam, Madrid: Iuan Sanchez: 1644, p. 173. This was a commonplace in the political literature and practice, going back to Livy, as pointed out by Juan Márquez, El Governador Christiano: Deducido de las Vidas de Moysen, y Josue, Principes del Pueblo de Dios, Madrid: Gregorio Rodriguez, 1651 (1612), p. 137. 44 José Laínez, El Daniel Cortesano, p. 173. 45 Ibid., p. 315. 46 Ibid., p. 328. 47 Papel curioso sobre el govierno de la Monarchia, Turin, 1638, BNE, Mss/2370, fol. 342v-343r. There is also a manuscript copy of the document in Italian with the title La Monarchia di Spagna, crescente e calante, BNE, Mss/10989. 43

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The inquisitors condemned Donith because he had criticized some of the cruellest actions committed by soldiers in the service of Philip ii. Any action performed by those who fought the heretics in defence of the Catholic Church deserved to be praised.48 According to theorists and publicists writing for the Spanish Monarchy, rebellion and heresy had to be fought mercilessly. The events of the 1640s offer a unique opportunity to assess how rebellions which, among other aspects, differed in duration, geographical location and religious background were treated by the Spanish Monarchy, thus highlighting which points the Catholic king and his entourage wanted to defend at all costs, and which could be negotiated. Although other rebellions against Spanish power took place in the 1640s, I will concentrate mainly on those which, together with the Dutch revolt, had a greater impact on the peace negotiations in Münster, namely those in Portugal and Catalonia. ‘No reason to revolt’: Privileges and rebellion Purported violations of territorial privileges were at the centre of the 1640s revolts, accusations which were rejected in the royalist answer, which denied violation of the oath to uphold the ancient laws. Before the revolts broke out, resistance to the alleged centralizing tendencies of the monarchy had gone on for more than a decade. In the case of Catalonia peaceful resistance to the Monarchy’s policies was expressed as early as during the 1630s. The prevailing contractual language – with the territorial privileges seen as the outcome of a pact between ruler and ruled – was reinforced by appeals to patriotism. As Xavier Gil notes, defence of the patria was an important factor in both official and popular politics. Protection of the terra (the country), including both the indigenous laws and privileges threatened by Philip’s and Olivares’ authoritarian rule, became a cornerstone of the discourse of the rebellion.49 To say the king was crushing the country’s privileges entailed a grave accusation. Altering them was generally thought to be beyond the Virgilio Pinto Crespo, Inquisición y Control Ideológico en la España del Siglo xvi, Madrid: Taurus, 1983, pp. 223-4. 49 Xavier Gil Pujol, “Republican Politics,” p. 282. On the discourses produced and published during the revolt see Karsten Neumann, Das Wort als Waffe. Politische Propaganda im Aufstand der Katalanen, 1640-1652, Herbolzheim: Centaurus, 2003 and Jesús Villanueva López, Política y Discurso Histórico en la España del Siglo xvii. Las Polémicas sobre los Orígenes Medievales de Cataluña, Alicante: Universidad de Alicante, 2004, pp. 109-187. 48

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power of individual men and rulers. No authority could openly defend a programme of violating the ancient rights of the country, even if they put the purse strings in the hands of the States, a constant source of disagreement. Desperate financial need was a constant in the Spanish Monarchy, and the French declaration of war in 1635, opening yet another warfront, only made things worse. Lack of money determined the course of the war and prevented the king from journeying to the Catalan warfront, which was also postponed due to the political tensions in Catalonia. The Catalan Cortes of 1632 had been halted and the arrival of the king in the territory would raise expectations that the Cortes would resume and conclude its proceedings in his presence. But closing Cortes which had not been particularly cooperative would raise a number of sensitive issues that worried some of the members of the Council of State. Some feared that the king’s journey to Catalonia concealed an attempt to subdue forcibly a territory which was ‘only’ opposing its king through constitutional and legal means and that Philip would then try to impose the scheme devised by Olivares in his Gran Memorial (1624), where he advised the king to harmonize the laws by which he ruled over the different territories under his authority, making Castilian law – the one in which the States were less powerful – the standard. The king indignantly responded that the thought of conquering Catalonia – and thereby depriving it of its privileges – had never crossed his mind. He wanted the Catalan Cortes to vote him the long overdue subsidy prior to his renewing his commitment to uphold the principality’s privileges.50 Philip was well aware that no ruler could safely attempt an open and declared violation of privileges. When kings tried to bend the ‘ancient constitutions,’ they followed the lines developed by Francisco de Quevedo in his pamphlet La rebellion de Barcelona: the king was not “taking away from them the freedom of their privileges,” but was simply moderating “as lord and father” the use Catalans made of their liberties, putting an end to “the insolences that they committed because of having them.”51 John H. Elliott, The Count-Duke of Olivares: the Statesman in an Age of Decline, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986, p. 503. 51 Francisco Quevedo y Villegas, “La Rebelión de Barcelona no es por el Güevo ni es por el Fuero,” Aureliano Fernández-Guerra y Orbe (ed.), Obras de D. Francisco de Quevedo Villegas, Madrid: Atlas, 1946-1951, (1641) pp. 281-286, p. 282. Similarly, Suplica de la muy Noble y muy leal Ciudad de Tortosa, Tortosa: Pedro Martorell, 1640, f. 39v. This pamphlet is attributed to Juan Adam de la Parra by Mª Soledad Arredondo Sirodey, “Noticia de la Súplica de Tortosa (1640), atribuida al Inquisidor Juan Adam de la Parra,” Cuadernos de Historia Moderna, 22 (1999), pp. 139-156. 50

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Catalans and Portuguese justified their rebellion on the basis of the crushing of the privileges, charges vehemently denied by Spanish writers such as Juan Adam de la Parra. He dismissed the charges of having raised tributes without the consent of the states and having increased royal power as a “very common abuse” committed by those attempting to overthrow their natural lord.52 Juan Caramuel y Lobkowitz, a Castilian member of the Cistercian order and a writer and mathematician, equally denied João iv’s rights to the Portuguese throne and Philip iv’s violation of the privileges. He also admitted that kings “do not have authority to alter ancient usages,”53 something which Quevedo tacitly agreed upon. When the violation had been blatant or was not easy to dismiss a further line of argument was developed, rejecting the lawful existence of the privileges. No one did it with the virulence of Quevedo in his diatribe against the Catalans. He claimed the privileges to have been interpreted and rewritten until they became so different from the original fueros “that I did not recognize them; and being the same ones, I took them for others.” Although Catalans won their privileges in reward for “great and most loyal services,” Quevedo pointed out, “what was won through fidelity and services is lost through disservices and infidelity.”54 The same line of argument was used by the prolific writer José Pellicer de Ossau. In his Idea del Principado de Cataluña he also denied the violation of the territorial liberties, considering them not to exist. The inhabitants of the Principality were for him conquered vassals.55 The common message of all public discourses defending the actions and rights of the Catholic Monarchy was that no violation of privileges was ever intended. Dissenting voices such as that of Matias de Novoa, an opponent of Olivares’ policies, did point to breach of the privileges and to the offences committed by the ‘mighty favourite’ as causes behind the Monarchy’s ruin and the revolts of the 1640s.56 The justice of some complaints of rebelling Catalans and Portuguese was tacitly acknowledged by the non-military actions taken by Philip iv and his ministers aimed at regaining these territories, restoring some elements of Juan Adam de la Parra, Apologetico, fol 39r. Juan Caramuel Lobkowitz, Respuesta al Manifiesto del Reyno de Portugal, Baltasar Moreto, oficina plantiniana: Antwerp, 1642, “Al que leyere” and p. 12. 54 Francisco de Quevedo y Villegas, “La Rebelión de Barcelona,” p. 283. 55 Raquel Martín Polín, “Pellicer de Ossau: una Visión de la Monarquía Católica entor­no a 1640”, Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, Serie iv, Hª Moderna, 13 (2000), pp. 133-163. 56 Matías de Novoa, “Historia de Felipe iv,” Colección de Documentos Inéditos para la Historia de España, (CODOIN), Madrid: Viuda de Calero, 1842, Vol. 86, pp. 379ff. 52 53

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Portuguese ‘particularism.’57 Even if purely symbolic, displays of respect to the territorial laws were deemed necessary to mantain the obedience of the subjects. After the strong condemnation of rebellious actions and justifications, a few years later the position of the authorities seemed to be shifting, an alteration recorded in the ‘news accounts.’ The war in Catalonia was increasingly presented as a conflict with France, with the French armies as the true enemy. Rebels went out of the picture, to be substituted by vassals suffering under foreign domination.58 Sacrilege and rebellion This shift could take place only once time had elapsed since the outbreak of the revolts. When conflict broke out in Portugal and Catalonia neither party was accommodating and all mounted an aggressive publicity policy. Blaming the conflict on religion was out of the question. The enemies were Catholics and were considered ‘Spaniards’ as vassals of the mythical Roman Hispania. Most importantly, in a fight where words were arms, linguistic and cultural borders were fluid, the Catalan and Portuguese rebels argued their cases with rhetoric similar to that deployed by the defenders of the Spanish monarchy’s policies, revolving round a Catholic confessional discourse which linked political action and religion. Priests and friars took part on both sides, fulfilling a decisive role in mobilizing the population, either against the revolt or getting the “ignorant among the people to rebel,” persuading them that “with the rebellion they will win heaven”.59 In Portugal, Juan Adam de la Parra similarly accused the Portuguese clergy of inciting the people to revolt. The collaboration of the Archbishop of Lisbon had proved indispensable for “making delusions enter the innermost hearts of faithful Portuguese”, moving the people with his presence and that of “the canons, clergy and other ecclesiastics”.60

57 Rafael Valladares, Felipe iv y la Restauración de Portugal, Málaga: Algazara, 1994, p. 167 and p. 177. 58 Henry Ettinghausen, “La Guerra del Segadors y la Prensa”, Actas del x Congreso de la Asociación Internacional de Hispanistas (4 Vol.), Antonio Vilanova, (ed.), Barcelona: PPU, 1992, pp. 915-920, p. 920. 59 These are the words of Juan de Garay, governor of the Rousillon, quoted in John H. Elliott, The Revolt of the Catalans. A Study in the Decline of Spain (1598-1640), Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1984 (1963), p. 487. 60 Juan Adam de la Parra, Apologetico, fol. 19r

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The presence of clergymen supporting the revolt could have other distressing consequences, as did their interpretation of any abnormal event as a favourable sign of divine providence to a population hungry for prophecies and wonders.61 Adam de la Parra spent much time on the story of the signal made by a crucified Christ when carried in procession through the streets of Lisbon, challenging its prodigious nature with arguments founded on reason. The rash interpretation of this event as a miracle, “confusing the divine with the human,” was further evidence of its falsity, intended to “confound the multitude”.62 The rebels thus pretended there was “an express mandate of God, without illusion or fallacy, in order to excuse the human crime of laesa majestas and disobedience to the natural king.”63 He never doubted, however, that the divine mandate was superior to any human enterprise. In his treatises defending the right of Philip iv to the crown of Portugal Juan Caramuel also warned how bad ecclesiastics attempted to subvert religious values. He stated emphatically that “sin will be sin, even if these new theologians call it virtue, and those in sin will not have their conscience sure.”64 These publicists wanted to unravel the treacherous behaviour of these “new theologians,” who were especially dangerous for the king as churchmen had the authority to justify a revolt, never lawful if done “without divine authority or without the special revelation of Heaven.”65 The role of ecclesiastics in Catalonia was equally important, and again religion was at the forefront of the struggle. The first text to defend the aspirations of the Catalan resistance was the Proclamación Católica,

The link between popular interest in prophecies and politics is central to Richard L. Kagan, Lucrecia’s Dreams: Politics and Prophecy in Sixteenth-Century Spain, Berkeley, etc: University of California Press, 1990. 62 Juan Adam de la Parra, Apologetico, fol. 19r. On the publications surrounding the “Restauraçao” see Fernando J. Bouza Álvarez, ““Clarins de Iericho”. Oratoria Sagrada y Publicística en la Restauraçao Portuguesa,” in Cuadernos de Historia Moderna y Contemporánea, viii (1986), pp. 13-31 and “Papeles, Batallas y Público Barroco. La Guerra y la Restauração Portugueses en la Publicística Española de 1640 a 1668,” https://www. fronteira-alorna.pt/Textos/papelesbatallas.htm. 63 Juan Adam de la Parra, Apologetico, fol. 41r 64 Juan Caramuel Lobkowitz, Respuesta al manifiesto, p. 170. Caramuel’s work was dedicated to the Portuguese Francisco de Melo, who remained loyal to Philip iv and who commanded the Spanish army in Flanders and would later become a member of the Council of State. 65 Augustijn van Teylingen, Op-comste der Neder-lantsche beroerten, Münster: du Jardin, 1642, p. 138. 61

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by Gaspar Sala, an Augustinian friar and doctor of theology.66 And among the first and more influential works to rebut the Proclamación was the Aristarco o Censura de la Proclamacion Catolica de los Catalanes, written by the inquisitor and royal librarian Francisco de Rioja.67 Rioja, a highly influential man in Olivares’ entourage, managed the Libreria Olivarense, with close links to, among others, Adam de la Parra and José Pellicer.68 In Rioja’s text a series of arguments are used which recur in many later booklets. At the centre was the examination of the faithfulness to the Catholic religion set out in the Proclamación. Readers were first reminded of a number of acts of disobedience on the part of their Catalan subjects suffered by the Spanish Monarchs, despite their self-portrayal as loyal and lawful subjects. Then Rioja directly attacked the Catholic credentials of the inhabitants of the Principality, dismissing Salas’ attempts to base the Catalan arguments on Catalan devotion to Mary’s Immaculate Conception.69 He argued that “when one acts wrongly, there are no words, however good they may be,” which can justify those acts; “because the persuasiveness of actions is effective, and that of voices weak”. Faith would be better served, he noted, by “acting according to reason and justice, not by saying … that they are devoted to Our Lady.”70 He then pointed out that infidels and heretics such as Muhammad and Luther also admitted to her sinless conception. Drawing on the similarities between the rebels and the traditional enemies of the Catholic Faith opened up a line of argument which would frequently be adopted. The suggestion made by the General Inquisitor, Fr. Antonio de Sotomayor, to turn the On the origins and context of the Proclamación see Karsten Neumann, Das Wort als Waffe, p. 50ff and the introduction by Antoni Simon i Tarres and Karsten Neumann to the facsimile edition of Gaspar Sala i Berart, Proclamación Católica a la Majestad Piadosa de Filipe el Grande..., Barcelona: Base, 2003. 67 Prior to Rioja’s work, other texts found their way to the press, such as La Justificación Real Ofendida de los Perturbadores del Bien y Quietud de Barcelona, s.l: s.n., s.a. [1640], attributed to Guillén de la Carrera, La Estrecha Amistad que Profesamos…, s.l.: s.n., s.a. [1640] and the Suplica de la muy Noble y muy Leal Ciudad de Tortosa. 68 Jesús Villanueva, Política y Discurso Histórico, p. 127. On Rioja as royal librarian and the royal library see Elena de Santiago Páez, “La Biblioteca del Alcázar en Tiempos de los Austrias”, in Fernando Checa (dir.), El Real Alcázar de Madrid. Dos Siglos de Arquitectura y Coleccionismo en la Corte de los Reyes de España (exposición), Madrid: Nerea, 1994, pp. 318-343. 69 Francisco de Rioja, Aristarco o Censura de la Proclamación Católica de los Catalanes, s.l.: s.a., f. 9v. Also mocking alleged Catalan religiosity see Suplica de la muy Noble y muy Leal Ciudad de Tortosa, f. 28v. 70 Francisco de Rioja, Aristarco, f.13v. 66

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Santo Oficio, the Inquisition, against those who went against the king underlines the connection between religious and political order.71 In La Rebelión de Barcelona, published under a pseudonym, Francisco de Quevedo reworked the arguments articulated by the Aristarco.72 Quevedo directed his attacks not only against the Catalans, but also against their French allies. He took up some of the themes previously developed in his Carta al serenísimo, muy alto y muy poderoso Luis xiii, published at the time of the French declaration of war in 1635. France was claimed to be the main instigator of the Catalan and Portuguese rebellions, waging an unjust war “on the whole of Christendom in this Monarchy, more by sowing discord than with courage and valour”:73 ‘unjust war’ because of the reasons for which it was declared, expounded by Quevedo himself, together with Saavedra Fajardo, Guillén de la Carrera, José Pellicer and other Spanish polemists.74 Only greed and ambition motivated France’s ministers, who were trying to establish a Universal Monarchy allying with heretics and infidels and damaging Catholic interests in the process. French support for rebellions within the Iberian Peninsula showed that even “all nations plagued with heresy, allied with France, cannot cause troubles to Spain without Spaniards.”75 This idea was followed by Pellicer and his dismissal of the existence of privileges, while later authors continued to condemn France because of its ungodly alliances. Alejandro Ros and Juan de Palafox adopted a more conciliatory attitude, pointing out elements which could explain the rebellions, such as the carelessness of ministers.76 They did not, like Rioja and Quevedo, dwell on how Catalans were congenitally infidel both politically and religiously. Pellicer, for his part, emphasized that once subjects had broken the legitimate bounds tying them to their natural John H. Elliott, The Revolt of the Catalans, p. 454. Mª Soledad Arredondo ,Sirodey, “La Rebelión Catalana en Palabras de Quevedo: Refranes, Citas y Retórica para hacer Política”, in Jean-Pierre Étienvre, (ed.), Littérature et Politique en Espagne aux Siècles d’Or, Paris: Klincksieck, 1998, pp. 163-177. 73 Francisco Quevedo y Villegas, “La Rebelión de Barcelona,” p. 281. 74 The basic study of both French and Spanish arguments and publication is still José María Jover Zamora, 1635. Historia de una Polémica y Semblanza de una Generación, Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2003 (1949). 75 Francisco de Quevedo, “La Rebelión de Barcelona,” pp. 281-282. 76 On what could explain rebellions for contemporaries see Juan de Palafox y Mendoza, Juicio Interior y Secreto de la Monarquía para mí solo, (1665) apéndice documental a José María Jover Zamora, “Sobre los Conceptos de Monarquía y Nación en el Pensamiento Político Español del Siglo xvii” Cuadernos de Historia de España , xiii (1950), pp. 138150, p. 146. 71 72

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lord, it was necessary to resort to arms to subdue them. Pellicer even refused to consider Catholic those who “attempted to tear the Crown to pieces, trying to reap the fruits of the desired fall of the Most August House, as if it had been born Swedish or heretic and not Spanish and Catholic.”77 Once again, rebellion was considered a form of heresy and put the Catalan conflict in the general context of confessional strife. Fr Francisco Enríquez emphasized shortly after the signing of the treaty of Münster how the Catalan revolt was “not put in motion, no, by force of religion, because the Catalans are very Catholic, but it was clearly caused by it.” He stated that if Philip iv continued the wars against the French, it was mainly for “the preservation of religion, endangered by armies mixed with heretics of different sects, even if they serve under the banners of a Most Christian King.”78 Most polemical writers on the Catalonian revolt agreed on a number of key issues: the criticism of France for its support for rebels and heretics; the dismissal of the acts of sacrilege performed by the Spanish soldiery and the denial of the accusations that there was any royal attempt to violate the privileges of the territory. But while Rioja, Quevedo and even Pellicer wrote from a confrontational point of view, other authors took up the pen to write more for the Principality than against it, trying with dialogue and rhetoric to convince – and not force – the rebellious subjects to return to Philip’s obedience. Their discourse started from notions of love, not of sacrilege. Still, the religious aspect remains at the forefront. In Francisco Boíl’s Bozina Pastoril, y Militar, written during the first siege of Lérida (1642), the Catalans were advised to accept the king’s clemency and told how easily they would be forgiven. Emphasis was laid on the fact that the Catalans’ “willing obedience was not seen to be broken until the pulpit and the confessional (in an adulterated way) authorised with vain pretexts your deluded apostasy.”79 Not all authors were, however, as sympathetic to those who “let themselves be” taught by “some theologians and jurists” about the lawfulness of unjust acts. A few decades earlier, a Castilian author, José Pellicer de Ossau, Sucession de los Reynos de Portugal i El Algarve, Feudos Antiguos de la Corona de Castilla, Logroño: Pedro de Mon Gaston Fox , 1641, quoted by Raquel Martín Polín, “Pellicer de Ossau: una Visión de la Monarquía Católica,” p. 148. 78 Fr. Francisco Enríquez, Conservacion de Monarqvias, fol. 4r. 79 Francisco Boíl, Bozina Pastoril, y Militar, qve toca a recoger la Antigva Fe Catalana, s.l.: s.n., s.a. [1642]. On Francisco Boíl (or Boyl) see Fernando Negredo del Cerro, Los Predicadores de Felipe iv, Madrid: Actas, 2006, pp. 140ff. A mixed attitude, conciliatory but with some strong anti-Catalan diatribes prevails in Suplica de la muy Noble y muy Leal Ciudad de Tortosa. 77

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Alonso Carrillo, had expressed his contempt for those who were easily corruptible and praised the Spaniards – meaning by this term all inhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula – for their “incontestable fidelity” and their resistance to the misleading attempts of wretched clerics and lawyers.80 Even if excusing the rebels up to a point, Boíl maintained the equation of rebellion and heresy, of rebels and heretics. In the case of the Catalans, the fact that they were “deluded apostates”, however, offered the chance to lead them back to the right track through the love of the Prince for his future subjects, the unborn children of those Catalans who were rebelling.81 As treatises relying on the Justinian Code and the Bible had previously demonstrated, “the punishment of the parents is not to be passed onto the sons, as it would be when taking away succession rights of the latter for punishing the former.”82 Religion remained central. It served to justify and condemn the revolt and set limits to the punishment rebels would receive, but it was also the preferred victim of rebellion. Alejandro Ros, dean of Tortosa, reminded people that when the tyrannical government imposed by the rebellion needed funding, “the most part was taken from monasteries, convents and pious works; from these jewels and silver the idol of disobedience” was made in Catalonia.83 The rebellion was thus transformed into a golden calf, a false god adored in the name of a wrongly understood freedom, damaging the rights and taking away the goods of the true faith. In the same vein, Juan Adam de la Parra stated that the duke of Braganza, “cruel since he put himself on the throne,” resembled Jeroboam of the Old Testament, “because of the danger that he will end up adoring the golden calf.”84 Nonetheless, the king’s mercy could still be appealed to by rebels and it would ‘be sure and perpetual’ if they surrendered. Thus, repenting rebels should no longer fear punishment. The love of the king for his subjects would redeem them. The necessary mixture of force and mercy was made possible by introducing a distinction in blame. As Saavedra Fajardo pointed out in 1646, referring to the Catalan revolt, Alonso Carrillo Lasso de la Vega, Soberania del Reyno de España, Córdoba: Salvador de Cea, 1626, fol. 21r. 81 Francisco Boíl, Bozina Pastoril. 82 Juan Márquez, El Governador Christiano, pp. 262 and 265. 83 Alejandro de Ros, En Nombre de Cataluña, s.l.: s.n., s.a. [after 1652], f. 1v. BNE Ms/ 2336. The use of the expresión “idol of the rebellion” appears in other works by the dean of Tortosa, such as Discurso sobre la Forma de Reducir a la Obediencia a su Majestad a Barcelona y Cataluña, s.l.: s.n., s.a. [ca. 1650] 84 Juan Adam de la Parra Apologetico, fol. 42v 80

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“neither that uprising nor the excesses carried out in it were done by the States,” meaning that the institution representing the territory was not responsible for the rebellion. Thus, Catalonia’s territorial laws and privileges could be maintained, unlike what happened in the Empire after the crushing of the Bohemian rebellion in 1620.85 Saavedra blamed “the ill-informed mob, taken over by a sort of religion with such violence that it moved good ones to let themselves be carried away by it.” Furthermore, he stated that “almost all the offenders paid for their lack of obedience with their lives and the loss of their goods and belongings.”86 Those leading the revolt were assumed to be dead. The king could exonerate the others only by reason of the (unequal) love binding king and subjects together, as a father was tied to his sons. The offer was made to treat the Catalans in a way which clearly contradicted the attitude considered to be imperative when revolt was discussed in abstract terms. Moreover, just when clemency and forgiveness were offered to Catalonia, the Spanish Monarchy was doing something which seemed inconceivable: negotiating with the Dutch rebels in an international setting. Negotiating with rebels in an international setting: From Cologne to Münster The Habsburg position in Europe – especially within the Holy Roman Empire – worsened during the 1630s, with first the Swedish and later the French fighting openly against both branches of the dynasty. Even before France declared war on the Spanish Monarchy in 1635, many were aware of the links between all the conflicts devastating Europe and the need for a general peace to end them. This resulted in the project for an assembly of rulers, first proposed in 1632. It was initially put forward by Antoine Wolfath, the bishop of Vienna and counsellor to the Emperor Ferdinand ii. In 1634 Pope Urban viii suggested that Catholic polities send delegates to a congress to be held in a neutral town. A few months before declaring war on the Spanish Monarchy, The “Verneuerte Landesordnung” of 1627 demoted Bohemia from a constituent Habsburg kingdom to an imperial crown land, and its diet was reduced to a consultative body on matters of taxation. On the significance of this event see Hans-Wolfgang Bergerhausen, “Die “Verneuerte Landesordnung” in Böhmen 1627: ein Grunddokument des Habsburgischen Absolutismus,” Historische Zeitschrift, Heft 272/2, (2001), pp. 327-352. 86 Diego Saavedra Fajardo, “Locuras de Europa,” p. 1215. 85

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Richelieu announced Louis xiii’s intention to appoint envoys for the negotiations. They would, however, not travel until Philip iv also announced his participation in the congress. As war broke out between France and the Habsburgs, the pope renewed his offers to mediate between Christian polities. After the false starts, it was decided in 1636 that the congress would take place in Cologne, but it all ended in failure.87 In addition to the general mistrust between the different polities and the hopes each one of them had of winning the war, other reasons endangered the negotiations, such as the participation of the Dutch. It was demanded by France, following the terms of the treaty of mutual assistance signed the previous year, and it raised many questions. As Protestants the Dutch mistrusted papal mediation and insisted on negotiating within their territory, something which was incompatible with the Pope’s demands. Cardinal Mario Ginetti, the papal legate in Cologne, was thus forced to confront the claims of what he considered a heretical and rebel territory.88 Furthermore, some in the United Provinces expressed their disapproval of any possible discussion of their war with the Spanish Habsburgs in an open forum as the Dutch Republic was living “in good neighbourhood and peace” with every polity bar the Spanish Monarchy.89 Keen to avoid negotiating with the former rebels in the congresses of Cologne and Münster, the Catholic Monarchy justified its opposition along similar lines. The Spanish Monarchy noted that the United Provinces were neutral in all conflicts in which the Habsburgs were involved, apart from their own. Some ministers of the Spanish Monarchy preferred bilateral talks in The Hague as late as 1645.90 Furthermore,

On these efforts see Auguste Leman, “Urbain viii et les Origines du Congrès de Cologne de 1636,” Revue d’Histoire Ecclésiastique, xix (1923), pp. 370-383.  88 Jan J. Poelhekke, De Vrede van Münster, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1948, p. 47. 89 Erasmus Phlopatroön, Nieuw-Keulsch of Spaensch Bedrogh: Ach! Door Staet-sucht, Eersucht, Geld-sucht, Verkochte, Slavende Vryheid. s.l.: s.n., 1638, pp. 19-20. The same set of arguments was repeated a few years later in, among other pamphlets published in the United Provinces, Bedenckingen over het Thien-hoornig en Seven-hoofdigh Trefves ofte Pays Münsters-Monster; by den Paus Urbanum, den 8. ontfanghen. om het welcke inde verlossinghe by te staen, ende te omhelsen de Geunieerde Nederlanden, beneven andere potentaten van Europa, van den Koninck van Spagnien werden ghenoodicht, s.l.: s.n., 1643. 90 Letter from the Marquis of Castel-Rodrigo to the States General of the United Provinces, 2 December, 1645, reproduced with the refusal of the States General at the end of the pamphlet Copie d’vne lettre d’vn catholicq de Hollande homme de condition, escripte de la Haye à vn sien parent pardeça le 18. Decemb. 1645 svr le faict dv traicte de treves ov paix, traduicte de thiois en françois, s.l.: s.n., 1646. 87

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the Marquis of Castel-Rodrigo, Philip iv’s governor of the southern provinces between 1644 and 1647, noted that a congress bringing together so many different territories would suffer countless delays. A significant problem was posed by the passports, especially, but not merely, as far as those considered rebels were concerned. The passports or ‘full powers’ indicated the official position of a territory in relation to the polities, to a certain extent setting the basis for negotiations.91 This was confirmed by ceremonial rituals, by means of which Europe’s polities demonstrated their status, legitimacy and claims to recognition, fighting each other on ground other than the battlefield.92 There were other reasons for the Spanish Monarchy, France and the Emperor to refrain from negotiating with rebels in an international setting. A ruler could negotiate with unruly subjects only internally, as was attempted in the Empire until the 1640s. Diego Saavedra Fajardo explained this separation between external and internal conflicts in Locuras de Europa through the character of Mercurio, who expresses distress at seeing how “foreign enemies summoned the princes and States of the Empire with their letters to go to [Münster and Osnabrück] against the [Empire’s] ancient constitutions.”93 The settlement of what in the eyes of the Spanish Monarchy was still to be considered a ‘civil war’ should not take place at the same time and in the same forum as negotiations with the monarchy’s foreign enemies. Moreover, the interference of external enemies in the settlement of conflicts between rulers and rebels was to be avoided. The author of a text written at the time of the French declaration of war condemned the treaty signed by the kings of Sweden and France in 1631, aimed at restoring their domains to Imperial princes such as the Elector Palatine Frederick v “unjustly stripped of their possessions” by the Emperor. But, the writer noted, the princes were divested of their territories “because of their premeditated felonies and uprisings,” the power to impose punishment

Jan J. Poelhekke, De Vrede van Münster, p. 50. The Spanish outrage on seeing their delegates passed over by the French in the procession and subsequent mass celebrating the French arrival at Münster is recorded in the letters sent by Saavedra Fajardo to Philip iv and the subsequent Council of State of 11 June, 1644. AGS, Estado, 2062. For some aspects of these ceremonial struggles in the context of the Münster negotiations see Jonathan I. Israel, “Art and Diplomacy: Gerard Ter Borch and the Münster Peace Negotiations,” in Jonathan I. Israel, Conflicts of Empires: Spain, the Low Countries and the Struggle for World Supremacy, 1585-1713, London, etc.: Hambledon Press, 1997, pp. 93-104. 93 Diego Saavedra Fajardo, “Locuras de Europa,” p. 1199. 91 92

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for which pertained solely to the Emperor; there was no place for foreign interference.94 Such meddling was not rejected just when the domestic matters of the Empire were concerned, but also when it affected the Spanish monarchy’s internal affairs. French help first to the Dutch and then to the Catalan and Portuguese rebellions was heavily criticized, using arguments which found their way into the diplomatic negotiations.95 The preliminary agreements signed in the city of Hamburg in 1641 first cleared the way for the opening on 25 March, 1642 of peace conferences at Münster and Osnabrück, and secondly set out which territories would be officially represented in the negotiations; this left Portugal and Catalonia out in spite of French attempts to include them at a later stage. The Spanish envoys answered these claims, stating that an agreement had already been reached on the issue of ‘preliminaries,’ which should not be modified in order not to delay a possible settlement. Furthermore, the claims of the Portuguese were “far removed from reason, timing and justice” and offended “all legitimate and sovereign princes that are in the world, whose dignity is endangered if the deputies of a recent usurper, of a rebel vassal, have to pass as ambassadors or public persons.” Accepting them into the negotiations would make it “lawful for the subjects of any state to rise up against their sovereigns,” taking as trophies “the spoils of sovereignty that they have just stolen from their natural prince,” and showing them to other potentates. To accept these rebels into a general congress would be to violate “the divine and human [laws], forcing the nature of things.”96 Only acknowledged sovereign authorities were subjects of international law or, as it was referred to at the time, of the ‘law of nations,’ and could thus be represented in international forums. The Reflexiones sobre la violación de las paces de Vervins y Ratisbona por los ministros de Francia, Mss 11004, fol 89v. Similar reasons were given for excluding Portugal from a possible separate Congress in the 1640s among Catholic polities to be held in Rome if the negotiations in Münster did not bear fruit. Advice of the Duke of Villahermosa in the Council of State, 26 October, 1644, AGS, Estado, 2061. 95 On the attempts of Catalans and Portuguese to be admitted to the Congress see Fernando Sánchez Marcos, “The Future of Catalonia. A sujet brûlant at the Münster Negotiations” and Pedro Cardim, “‘Portuguese Rebels’ at Münster. The Diplomatic Self-Fashioning in mid-17th Century European Politics,” both in Heinz Duchhardt, (ed.), Der Westfälische Friede. Diplomatie – politische Zäsur – kulturelles Umfeld – Rezeptionsgeschichte, München: Oldenburg, 1998, pp. 273-291 and 293-333 respectively. 96 “Discourse to refute the French and Swedish demands to the Imperial States to grant passports to the deputies of the Portuguese tyrant to assist to this congress,” (written by Antoine Brun, 1646), AGS, Estado, 2347. 94

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Spanish representatives threatened to withdraw from the assembly if the Catalans and Portuguese accompanying the French delegation were to be received in formal audience by any of the ambassadors at the congress.97 The rejection of the Portuguese envoys followed them even after death; their lack of valid passports endangered the burial of the Portuguese envoy who died in Osnabrück.98 The Spanish monarchy’s negotiations in Münster with the Dutch rebels were in blatant contradiction with this position. However, the amount of time that had passed since the Dutch rebellion and the fact that an agreement had previously been signed played a significant role, as the count of Peñaranda, head of the Spanish delegation, made clear when the Dutch offered to mediate between Philip iv and the Catalans. With the Dutch, Peñaranda stated, “we knew how to deal, because it was not the first time that the king, our Lord, had treated with the States; but with the Catalans we had no example to follow and we were not thinking of giving it to our descendants.”99 The precedent of the truce signed in 1609 remained an important landmark – for good and for bad. Furthermore, the Dutch benefited from the rapid recognition they had achieved among other European polities. “Many foreign powers, kings, princes and republics, even the great Turk himself ” held the Dutch in high esteem because of their “big and courageous wars” and had therefore “made a close alliance and harmony” with them, without derogating any of their superiority, especially after 1609.100 This ‘superiority,’ however questionably acquired, was something the Dutch were eager to maintain at all costs, fighting hard against any wording implying recognition of a higher external authority and insisting that they were treated by the Emperor in the same way as the Republic of Venice, emphasizing the need to abandon the adjective fidelibus in any reference to them.101 Respect on the part of the Spanish envoys Advice to the Council of State on a letter from Diego Saavedra Fajardo, 1 October, 1644, AGS, Estado, 2061. 98 Letter from Diego Saavedra Fajardo, 28 January, 1645 AGS, Estado, 2346. 99 Letter from the count of Peñaranda to the marquis of Castel-Rodrigo, 20 September, 1646 in CODOIN, Madrid: Viuda de Calero, 1842, Vol. 82, p. 409. 100 Abtruck Einer auffgefangenen Jesuitischen Information Uber die Frage: Ob das H. Römishe Reich den Herrn Staten von Holland Die Neutralitet länger Vestatten soll oder nicht? Beneben einem furken und einfältingen Denen anjetzt zu Cölln auff dem angestellten Compositionis oder Friedenstag Versambleten Ständen und Abgesandten/ auch sonsten Jedermänniglich zur sonderbahrer Nachricht auss gefertiget s.l.: s.n., 1637. 101 Lieuwe van Aitzema, Verhael van de Nederlantsche, Vol. 1, p. 427. The United Provinces had rejected the address form “Nostris et Imperii Sacri Fidelibus Ordinibus” used by the Emperor as early as in 1623. Johannes Arndt, Das Heilige Roemische Reich und 97

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for Dutch susceptibilities proved important during the first steps in the negotiations in Münster, especially as the French delegates did not show a similar regard for the Dutch in ceremonial matters. The Spanish delegates Peñaranda, Brun and Joseph Bergaigne, archbishop of Cambrai, had constantly done “all that the State [representatives] could have desired, showing deference and all imaginable external signs of civility, friendship and goodwill.”102 All these gestures seemed to indicate that the Spanish Monarchy was no longer considering the Northern Low Countries as rebel provinces and could be construed as the abandonment of a policy directed towards religious goals, fighting heretics to preserve Catholicism. However, some utterances from the Spanish side qualify this approach. Around 1629 authors still expected that the “time would come, in which those Giants, rebels of Jupiter, sons of the poisonous blood of rebellion, will be struck down and buried under the mountains they build everyday defying Heaven.”103 Later still, while negotiations with the Dutch in Münster were about to begin, the rights of the Catholic Monarch over the Republic were restated in the context of a discussion about the passports to be given to merchants. The Consejo de Estado was asked whether, when dealing with the merchants of the United Provinces, “the word ‘rebels’ could be avoided without damaging the majesty of the King our Lord, his reputation and his right.” The conclusion left no doubt: the word rebels would no longer be inserted as it had no practical use and “its omission cannot bring any harm,” as the claims of Philip iv over the United Provinces were upheld by the continuation of the war.104 Thus the option to reassert the rights of the Catholic Monarchy over the United Provinces was left open. While hostilities were not recommenced after 1648, to do so was legally justifiable for the Spanish Monarchy.105 die Niederlande 1566 bis 1648 : politisch-konfessionelle Verflechtung und Publizistik im Achtzigjaehrigen Krieg, Cologne: Böhlau, 1998, p. 85 The Republic of Venice and the Holy Roman Emperor had been in dispute until 1638 about the titles which the ambassadors of the Serenissima should be given. Matías de Novoa, Historia de Felipe iv, p. 399. 102 Liuwe van Aitzema, Verhael van de Nederlantsche, Vol. 2, pp. 103-104. 103 Papel curioso sobre el gobierno,f. 348v-349v. 104 “On the proposition made as to whether in the passports for increasing the rents it would be possible to omit the word rebels without damaging the king our Lord’s majesty, his reputation and his right,” AGS, Estado, 2064 (without date, letter from Philip iv to Castel-Rodrigo confirming this point 7 February, 1645, AHN, Estado, libro 97. 105 On relations between the Dutch Republic and the Catholic Monarchy after 1648 see Manuel Herrero Sánchez, El acercamiento hispano-neerlandés (1648-1678), Madrid: Centro Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2000. An interesting hypothesis about

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The contradiction between negotiating with the Dutch in an international congress and upholding Philip iv’s rights over the Low Countries was duly noted by the Dutch and French. Furthermore, the wording of the full powers granted to Peñaranda on February 1645 to make peace with the United Provinces still maintained a veiled claim over the whole of the Low Countries. The king declared he wanted peace “as I desire so much the quiet and tranquility of my good and loyal vassals of my obedient provinces of Flanders.” This apparently innocent statement had profound implications, as was noted by the French and the Dutch delegates, as the word obedient “seems to assume that there are others disobeying.”106 A similar ambivalence pervaded the Dutch attitude towards the southern provinces of the Low Countries. It was not so clear whether the southerners were foes or fellow countrymen in need of liberation from the ‘Spanish yoke.’ This affected the course of the war and prevented the Spanish (and Dutch) armies from plundering the territories they were fighting in, both because of fear of retaliation and because they were fighting over provinces which both parties considered to be ‘theirs’.107 This unclear situation made negotiating peace in an international congress the more complex but, in the end, the decision to negotiate with the Dutch fitted in the general scheme of the Spanish Monarchy. In moments of need, the king and his advisors focused mainly on the negotiations with one of the mighty enemies of the Monarchy in order to be able to concentrate forces on fewer war fronts. There were doubts about whether it was preferable to try to achieve an agreement with the French, but a settlement with the Dutch was finally favoured. Opinions such as those of Juan de Palafox y Mendoza influenced the Spanish course. Palafox noted that “there is no doubt that the wars in Flanders have been those contributing to the ruin of our monarchy” and had provided a ready excuse for other enemies of the Spanish Monarchy the possible breach of the peace in the years immediately following the signing of the Peace of Münster is to be found in Israel, Jonathan I., “Spain and Europe from the Peace of Münster to the Peace of the Pyrenees (1648-59)” in Conflicts of Empires. Spain, the Low Countries and the Struggle for the World Supremacy, 1585-1713, London, etc.: Hambledon Press, 1997, pp. 105-144. 106 Lieuwe van Aitzema, Verhael van de Nederlantsche, Vol. 2, pp. 9-11. 107 José Alcalá-Zamora, España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte (1618-1639), Barcelona: Planeta, 1975, p. 284. For a study of the specificities of the war in frontier areas, including the juridical and moral constraints see Fernando Chavarría Múgica, “Justicia y estrategia: teoría y práctica de las leyes de la guerra en un contexto fronterizo,” Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez. Nouvelle série, 35, 2005, pp. 185-215.

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to join in the fight.108 Only by attacking their ‘Dutch’ origin were all other wars to be ended, a very pressing concern after the outbreak of rebellions within the Peninsula. Since then, the priority had become “to appease the things of Spain, reducing the rebels to the obedience and dominium of Your Majesty,” while trying to maintain positions in Flanders.109 A settlement with the Dutch was the only possible solution, and as Philip iv noted in a letter to Castel-Rodrigo “a peace or a truce should be made in the least detrimental conditions that can be obtained.”110 A few months later the king admitted again the absolute necessity of giving in to the Dutch demands. “The state of our affairs and the great lack of means to improve it,” he wrote to the count of Peñaranda, “still forces me to endure what they are demanding,” all the more so if it led to a separate peace with the Dutch and not to a general agreement.111 Although less openly voiced, be it in pamphlets or in government circles, the practical difficulties in regaining the United Provinces influenced the Spanish decision. As Henri Teller – canon of St. Gudula’s church in Brussels and honorary chaplain to the CardinalInfante Ferdinand of Austria, brother of Philip iv and governor-general of the Low Countries until his death – noted, Philip iv’s titles over the United Provinces were comparable to “the title of King of Jerusalem and Duke of Neopatras.”112 This was not the case with the Catalans and Portuguese; hopes of bringing them back under the king’s obedience had not yet been abandoned. Negotiations with the Catalans and Portuguese were possible but it was clear to Philip iv’s ministers that such negotiations should never take place in an international forum. In the case of the Catalans the Count Duke of Olivares expressed “the opinion that Your Majesty should settle with them at any cost and on whichever conditions” if only they “submit themselves to the obedience of Your Majesty.”113 Similar sentiments were expressed as late as 1660 – after the recognition of Dutch sovereignty and the signing of the Peace of the Pyrenees with France (1659) – with reference to Portugal. Juan de Palafox y Mendoza, Juicio interior y Secreto, p. 142. From the Count-Duke of Olivares to cardinal Spinola, all members of the Council of State concurred in this assessment. Advice of the Council of State, 13 August, 1641. AGS, Estado, 2056. 110 Letter to the marquis of Castel-Rodrigo, 2, February, 1646. AGS, Estado, 2254. 111 Letter to the count of Peñaranda about the plenipotency sent to continue the treaty with the Hollanders, Zaragoza, 7 June, 1646, AGS, Estado, 2254. 112 Letter by Henri Tailler (or Teller), 15 December, 1644, AHN, Estado, lib. 715. 113 Advice of the Council of State, 27 February, 1641. AGS, Estado, 2056. 108 109

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Even while deeming the return to obedience of the kingdom through an agreement more “convenient for those rebels and of less utility than what would be achieved by force,” the Junta de Estado considered it “desirable” to achieve the reduction of Portugal “without bloodshed”.114 Saavedra Fajardo summarized this attitude in a letter to Philip iv when informing him of the requests of the count of Avaux, one of the French diplomats in Münster, for negotiating with the Catalans and Portuguese in the framework of the international congress. It was possible to negotiate with rebels but it was “indecorous for Your Majesty to listen to your rebels except in your own court when they are trying to submit themselves to your obedience.”115 The decision to talk with the Dutch in the open forum of the Münster congress did not mean that rebellion and rebels had changed meaning for the Spanish governing circles. Even when political practice – such as allowing the Dutch to participate in the Congress – went against the prevailing political culture, the rejection of rebellion and its (inevitable) coupling with sacrilege, heresy and cruelty was not abandoned. Equally pervasive was the distrust of many in the United Provinces concerning the stability of any agreement signed with the Spanish king. This, together with the difficulties in agreeing the issue of sovereignty and the freedom of worship for Catholics, would pose grave obstacles to the conclusion of the treaty.

Advice of the Junta de Estado, 14 April, 1660, AGS, Estado, España, leg. 2677, quoted by Rafael Valladares, Felipe iv y la Restauración, p. 178. 115 Letter of Diego Saavedra Fajardo, 2 April, 1644, CODOIN, Vol. 82, p. 21. 114

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Chapter 2 Tyrants Rebellion is a reactive notion, because it implies the existence of something against which the rebels are acting. Early modern rebels resorted to the figure of the tyrant in order to vindicate their deeds, a consequence of Aquinas’ distinction between sedition and rebellion against a tyrannical lord who would just pursue his own advantage to the detriment of the community.1 Well-established rulers also depicted their foes as tyrants when justifying the war effort against them. Describing someone as a tyrant allowed for a clearer definition by opposition of the characteristics of a good ruler, and since classical antiquity the image of the tyrant had been of fundamental importance as an evil mirror-image of the lawful prince. Tyranny had, however, been a polysemic term since its inception, referring to the usurper, i.e. the ruler without appropriate titles, and the unjust lord. These distinctions of meaning gave rise to different courses of action when one was confronted with a tyrant and, consequently, very different notions of rightful authority. Both views nonetheless shared important commonalities and a genealogy. This did not preclude the existence of very different interpretations of the concept drawn in the Spanish Monarchy and in the Dutch Republic during the Early Modern period, interpretations which were the basis for distinct notions of the rightful exercise of power. Tyranny’s two faces and the problem of tyrannicide It is impossible to establish whether the term tyrant was already charged with negative connotations when mentioned by Archilochis with Summa, iia-iiae, qu. 42, art. 3, elaborating on Aristotle and Bartolus. See Diego Quaglioni, Politica e Diritto nel Trecento Italiano. Il “De Tyranno” di Bartolo da Sassoferrato (1314-1357). Con l’edizione critica dei trattati “De Guelphis et Gebellinis”, “De regime civitatis” e “De tyranno”, Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1983. On the use of these theories during the early modern period see Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1978, Vol. 2, pp. 318ff.

1

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reference to Gyges in the seventh century BC.2 In Greek times the meaning of tyrant shifted from Solon’s equation of violent rule with tyranny and Socrates’ emphasis on tyranny as the violation of the common will and the laws. Aristotle’s definition of ‘tyranny’ as the distorted and perverted version of ‘monarchy’ was decisive. From Aristotle onwards the concept referred to a wicked form of rule, thus becoming one of the crucial concepts of political discussion during the following centuries.3 In Roman times and during the Middle Ages the concept was further elaborated, enriching the Roman tradition with elements derived from the Bible and Church history. St. Augustine took up the idea, present in Cicero, of the tyrant as a rex iniustus, stressing the lack of respect for ethical and moral norms such as peace, justice and charity. At the same time, the tyrant is also a ruler who, perverted by his yearning for power, nonetheless governs by God’s providence.4 Isidore of Seville further emphasized moral aspects as the defining characteristics of a ruler, an element which pervaded Spanish ‘Mirrors of Princes’ literature throughout the early modern period. Aquinas brought these different aspects together when dealing with the problem of tyranny in the Scriptum super sententiis (In ii Sent., d. xliv, q. ii, a. 2). He drew on Aristotle’s approach but also equated usurpers with tyrants, taken up by many other authors, including Pope Gregory i and in legal texts such as the Castilian Siete Partidas.5 Almost a century later Bartolus of Sassoferrato refined the distinction between the tyrant by (lack of ) title (ex defectu tituli) and the tyrant by exercise (ex parte exercitii), and set out how both types of tyranny should be dealt with

William B. Gwyn, “Cruel Nero: the concept of the tyrant and the image of Nero in western political thought,” History of Political Thought, Vol 12, Number 3, (1991), pp. 421-455, p. 422. 3 For a general and synoptic study of the concept from Antiquity to the French Revolution see Hella Mandt, “Tyrannis, Despotie”, in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, Reinhart Koselleck, (eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, Stuttgart: Klett, 1974-1997, 8 Vol, Vol. 6, pp. 651-706. A longer and more recent analysis of the development of the idea of tyranny and tyrannicide is Mario Turchetti, Tyrannie et tyrannicide de l’Antiquité à nos jours, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2001. 4 Jürgen Miethke, “Tyrann, -enmord,” in Charlotte Bretscher-Gisiger, Bettina Marquis und Thomas Meier (eds.), Lexikon des Mittelalters, Stuttgart, etc: Metzler, 1999, pp. 1135-1138, p.1136. 5 Las Siete Partidas or the Seven-Part Code, is one of the most remarkable law codes of medieval times. The code, written in the Castilian vernacular, was compiled between 1256 and 1265, under the supervision of Alfonso x, the Wise (1252-1284), of Castile. 2

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in legal terms.6 Later on, Marsilius of Padua and William of Ockham deepened the understanding of tyranny, writing against the claims of any authority to aspire to the plenitudo potestatis, which would turn subjects into slaves. Parallel to this process of defining and redefining the tyrant and his rule was the search for ways to control and punish the ruler who exceeded the limits of his office, starting with the law codes of Dracon (620 BC) and Solon (594 BC). Another Athenian, Demophantos, by issuing a decree (410 BC) sanctioning and rewarding the murderer of “whoever abolishes the democracy in Athens” brought the question of tyrannicide to the fore.7 Caesar’s death at the hand of Brutus and the condemnation and justification of the act by authors such as Cicero and Seneca reverberated throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, culminating in the writing of works such as Shakespeare’s play Julius Caesar and Quevedo’s Marco Bruto. Full endorsement of tyrannicide remained rare due to Paul’s insistence on the obedience due to temporal authority (Ephesians, 6:4) and Augustine’s account of the divine appointment of tyrannical rulers to punish a people for their sins. Nonetheless, in the twelfth century authors considered the ruler who did not obey the law as a tyrant. He was thus a “likeness of wickedness” who by his behaviour was challenging God.8 Killing the tyrant would therefore be an honourable act provided that no other means of curbing his wicked rule – preferring prayers to direct action – was of any avail. This consideration was partially accepted by Aquinas in his early Scripta super libros sententiarum. Later, in De regimine principium, Aquinas endowed only those who had a ‘kingmaking’ role or carried out the will of the oppressed community with the authority to commit tyrannicide, although he never encouraged it.9 This differentiation was founded on the distinction between tyrannos in titulo and tyrannos in regimine. Showing an attitude towards usurpers (tyrannos in titulo) which would be endorsed by most theologians in the following centuries, Aquinas considered the usurper liable to be For a more extended analysis see Diego Quaglioni, Politica e Diritto nel Trecento Italiano. Relevant insights are to be found as well in the review of this edition by Julius Kirshner, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 57, No. 2. (Jun., 1985), pp. 323-324. 7 The complete text of Demophantos’ decree is to be found in Ilias Arnaoutoglou (ed.), Ancient Greek Laws. A Sourcebook, London and New York: Routledge, 1998, pp. 74-75. 8 Mario Turchetti, Tyrannie et tyrannicide, pp. 251-256. 9 R. W. Dyson, “Introduction” to Thomas Aquinas, Political Writings, Cambridge, etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. xxix. 6

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deposed and killed.10 Measures against the wicked ruler (tyrannos in regimine) were less straightforward and, following Augustine, subjects were commonly admonished to endure him. Removing the tyrant was not in the power of private individuals, but the duty of those wielding public authority.11 The emphasis on a superior authority as the only instance entitled to dispossess a ruler acting tyrannically led a number of authors embracing theocratic theories, such as Augustine of Ancona, to assert the pope’s right to depose and excommunicate emperors and kings, releasing the subjects from their oath of loyalty to their prince.12 This theory was never totally accepted and was profoundly challenged by the imprisonment of Pope Boniface viii in 1303. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the ultimate authority of the pope in political matters was reconsidered. An important question was whether private citizens were allowed to kill the ruler whom Rome had labelled unlawful. Actual tyrannicides, such as the assassination of Louis, duke of Orleans by his cousin in 1408 and of Richard ii in England, increased the unrest. The Council of Constance restated the condemnation of “the killing of any tyrant by any vassal without the authorization of any judge.” This left open the possibility that some tyrants might be killed on the authorization of some judge.13 The question of tyrannicide became all the more pressing after the Reformation and the assassination of rulers such as William of Orange (1584) and Henry iii and Henry iv of France (1589 and 1610 respectively). Most Catholic theologians agreed that a prince who had fallen into heresy could be deposed by the pope by virtue of his indirect temporal power, considering that by forfeiting the true faith the heretic prince was a usurper. This point had been generally accepted throughout the late Middle Ages, but the Reformation brought substantial change. Protestant princes ruling over Catholics confronted a serious problem threatening them and the

Aquinas, In ii Sent., d. xliv, q. ii, a. 2 Aquinas, De regno, lib. 1 cap. 7. 12 Mario Turchetti, Tyrannie et tyrannicide, pp. 276ff. 13 Guenter Lewy, “A Secret Papal Brief on Tyrannicide during the Counterreformation,” Church History, Vol. 26, No. 4. (Dec., 1957), pp. 319-324, p. 320. Juan de Mariana pointed out that the decree of the Council of Constance condemning the slaying of the tyrant had not been approved by the pope. Mariana also emphasized the troubled times during which the decree had been issued. Juan de Mariana, La dignidad real y la educación del rey, Luis Sánchez Agesta (ed.), Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1981, p. 83 (Lib. i, Chap. vi) [De rege et regis institutione, Toledo, 1598] 10 11

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stability of their territories, as any Catholic could feel empowered by the pope to assassinate ‘heretic’ princes. Like political and religious alignments, the definition of tyranny changed. But the vision of the tyrant as one of the most potent antitypes in Western civilization remained.14 This powerful concept was among the most widely used and contested in the conflict between the Spanish Monarchy and its ‘rebels’. The use made of the term by each of the contenders highlights some relevant aspects of their political culture. Fighting usurpers: Defining the tyrant in the Spanish Monarchy In 1642, Juan Adam de la Parra defined the tyranny of the Duke of Braganza in his Apologetico, summarizing a feeling commonly held in the Spanish Monarchy.15 Tyrant was he who became ruler by seizing unlawfully – be it by force or by deception – the power over the commonwealth. Francisco Suárez, leading Spanish neo-scholastic thinker of the seventeenth century and of enormous impact within and outside the Spanish Monarchy, had dutifully elaborated on Aquinas’ distinction between the two types of tyrant, arguing that “he who did not occupy the kingdom by just title” was nothing but the “shadow” of a king.16 But in texts dealing directly with contemporary tyrants, the equation between tyrant and usurper prevails, especially with reference to João iv’s rule. Lacking the proper titles to be king turned João iv into a usurper and pleas for slaying him could easily be made. Furthermore, the Spanish public had had the opportunity of seeing such a tyrannicide on stage. El príncipe despeñado (The prince fallen off a cliff), by Lope de Vega, shows the acceptance of the principles in seventeenthcentury Castile of how to deal with a tyrant ‘by lack of title’, who turns out to be a man controlled by his basest passions (i.e. sexual lust).17 Robert Zaller, “The Figure of the Tyrant in English Revolutionary Thought,” pp. 585610, Journal of the History of Ideas, 1993, p. 586.  15 Juan Adam de la Parra, Apologetico contra el Tirano y Rebelde Verganza y Conivrados, Arzobispo de Lisboa, y svs Parciales, en respvesta a los Doce Fundamentos del Padre Mascareñas, Zaragoza: Diego Dormer, 1642, fol. 31v. 16 Francisco Suárez, De iuramento fidelitatio: documentación fundamental, Luciano Pereña, Vidal Abril and Carlos Baciero (eds.), Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto Francisco de Vitoria, 1978, pp. 66-7. 17 Lope de Vega, “El príncipe despeñado,” in El Fenix de España Lope de Vega Carpio...: septima parte de sus comedias, con loas, entremeses y bayles... Madrid: viuda de Alonso Martin: a costa de Miguel de Siles..., 1617. (1602) There is a modern edition by María Soledad de Ciria Matilla, El príncipe despeñado, Pamplona: Departamento de Educación y Cultura, 1992. 14

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An apology for tyrannicide by a private citizen was allowed because of the sin committed by the usurper. Adultery ranked among the greatest offences, repugnant to what Grotius termed the ‘positive law of God,’ and he grouped it together with incest and usury.18 Even if he was not a usurper, but a lawful prince, lust, lasciviousness and fornication still explained the slaying of the tyrant. In the play Fuenteovejuna (ca 1610-1614) the tyrannical lord is the ‘Comendador’ who rules the village of Fuenteovejuna. The plot, once again based on historical accounts, reveals all the Comendador’s cruelty, but the Comendador’s insatiable appetite for women remains at the centre. Villagers reject the Comendador’s behaviour, enraging him even more. After he adds a peasant woman who has rejected him to “the baggage of the army” and kidnaps the female leading actress during her wedding, the villagers choose to slay the tyrant, an action later condoned by the monarchs. These and other plays, such as El Mejor Alcalde, el Rey (The Best Magistrate, the King), present the different destinies awaiting the tyrant: murder by a private person, by the community – an action latter sanctioned by the king – or execution by the king’s justice. In the case of the usurper depicted in El Príncipe Despeñado there was no higher authority to go to apart from God; in Fuenteovejuna and El Mejor Alcalde el Rey monarchical justice was a referent. But in all cases –as well as in Calderón’s El Alcalde de Zalamea, not used here as don Alvaro is not the ruler of the community he offends – the fornicator and adulterer find death the deserved punishment for their crimes. Tyrannicide is the just defence of the community, seeking its self preservation.19

Hugo Grotius, The rights of war and peace, in three books : wherein are explained, the law of nature and nations, and the principal points relating to government, London: W. Innys, R. Manby, J. and P. Knapton, D. Brown, T. Osborn, and E. Wicksteed, 1738 (1625), Book ii, Chap. xx, § 42. The republican emphasis on the story of Lucretia, raped by the tyrannical Etruscan king of Rome, from Cicero to the early modern period further indicates the pervasiveness of the link between tyranny and isatiable sexual apetite. 19 See Francisco de Vitoria, Lectiones in Summa Theologica i-ii. 105 § 137. English text in Francisco de Vitoria, Political Writings, Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 200-204. Tomás A. Mantecón offers examples of how local communities in Castile responded to judges who forfeited their duties – emphasizing sexual offences – and the crown’s reaction to those who finally murdered the evil judge. Tomás A. Mantecón, “El Mal Uso de la Justicia en la Castilla del Siglo xvii,” in José I. Fortea, Juan E. Gelabert, Tomás A. Mantecón, Furor et Rabies: Violencia, Conflicto y Marginación en la Edad Moderna, Santander: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Cantabria, 2002, pp. 69-98. 18

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Above all, authors and authorities feared any alteration of order, which prompted Aquinas to emphasize that nothing should to be done against a tyrant if the consequence of a change in government might be an even worse tyranny.20 This assessment soon became a commonplace.21 In many of the treatises on government and in the general attitude of the members of the Council of State of the Catholic Monarchy a modified version appears. Rebellion against the lawful lord – even if ruling wickedly – would produce a tyranny worse than any misbehaviour of the legal ruler. Thus, Caramuel stated, the Portuguese revolt forced virtuous Portuguese to live “tyrannized and oppressed.”22 The situation in Catalonia was seen in similar terms by the duchess of Cardona, widow of the viceroy appointed by Philip iv after the outbreak of the revolt in the Principality.23 Those opposing the Dutch revolt, such as Augustijn Teylingen, emphasized the unjust acts done by the unlawful government which had usurped royal power in the Low Countries.24 Even if some of Philip ii’s ministers had “acted unlawfully,” the subjects should have waited “without acting unlawfully themselves,” thereby becoming tyrants. Contrary to what those rebelling against the Catholic kings’ authority argued, for Spanish authors tyranny was often disguised as a wrongly understood freedom. This same idea was repeated by reference to to the Empire, “that consideres protection what is tyranny, and freedom what is servitude,”25 to Portugal, the United Provinces and Catalonia. The breaking of the natural ties with the natural lord would lead to the worst kind of servitude, a point made most strongly in the case of the Catalan revolt. Different authors felt compelled to “point out to Catalonia the risks of its liberty”, which were “as hazardous as the Aquinas, De regno, lib. 1 cap. 7. See for instance Johann Wilhelm Neimair von Ramsla, Von Auffstand der Untern wider ihre Regenten und Obern sonderbarer Tractat, Jena: Johan. Weidners Wittib, 1633, p. 185. 22 Juan Caramuel Lobkowitz, Respuesta al Manifiesto del Reyno de Portugal, Antwerp: Baltasar Moreto, oficina plantiniana, 1642, “Al que leyere.” 23 Quoted by Ricardo García Cárcel, Historia de Cataluña. Siglos xvi-xvii. La Trayectoria Histórica, Barcelona: Crítica, 1985, 2 Vol., Vol. 2, pp. 149-50. 24 Augustijn van Teylingen, (attr) Op-comste der Neder-lantsche Beroerten, Münster: du Jardin, 1642, p. 97. Teylingen was a jesuit priest who in this pamphlet presented a “Catholic vision” of the Dutch Revolt. 25 Diego Saavedra Fajardo, “Locuras de Europa. Diálogo entre Mercurio y Luciano,” in Ángel González Palencia (ed.), Obras Completas, Madrid: M. Aguilera, 1946 [Münster, 1645?], pp. 1198-1219, p. 1199. 20 21

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means that it employed for its preservation.”26 Fighting for territorial privileges would bring about the enslavement of the inhabitants. Publicists around Philip’s government noted the contradiction between the Catalan rebellion and the transfer of sovereignty to the French king. Catalans “moved away from obedience to their natural lord, and not for living free, but for being vassals and subjects of a foreign nation.”27 The world was turned upside down: “the ones that destroy their liberty, they laud as common fathers and restorers of the public good.”28 The idea that tyranny resulted from rejecting the lawful lord in the search of freedom had also been a commonplace for judging the Dutch Revolt. Luis Cabrera de Córdoba – the official court historian of Philip ii – noted how the promoters of the upheaval “knew that if those people” they had misled would enjoy “the sweetness of true liberty and would escape the hard yoke of war that lasted so many years,” none of the leaders of the revolt “would have ever attained their tyranny or lordship.”29 During the 1640s, Saavedra Fajardo repeated these considerations. While the Dutch had benefited from the envy of other polities of the greatness of the Catholic Monarchy, once Habsburg power had faded all would turn their forces against the newly emerging power. As a consequence, the Dutch “will open their eyes to the fact that they have been worshiping a false idol, that they have held tyranny for liberty, suffering more under it than when they had a natural lord”.30 Even harsher was the judgement on usurpers. Francisco Suárez endorsed tyrannicide if the tyrant was quo ad titulum. If the tyrant was a wicked ruler, rebellion was lawful only if the prince was deposed and excommunicated by the pope. Treatises aiming at a wider audience shared this consideration, although they were less prone to defend tyrannicide. What was stressed was the injustice of the unlawful lords’ acts, even if these unlawful lords were well-established ‘usurpers’ in Spanish eyes. Saavedra Fajardo extended to Frederick Henry, stadholder in the United Provinces, “the glory acquired for his House” when it became “the instrument of the Dutch monarchy, where he is today obeyed and respected as natural lord.” However, all his prudence and Alejandro Ros, Cataluña Desengañada, Naples: Egidio Longo, 1646 “A quien leyere.” Diego Saavedra Fajardo, “Locuras de Europa,” p. 1212. 28 Alejandro Ros, Cataluña Desengañada, p. 270. 29 Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, Historia de Felipe ii, Rey de España, (eds. José Martínez Millán and Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales), Valladolid: Consejería de educación y Cultura, 1998 (1619), p. 1036. 30 Diego Saavedra Fajardo, “Locuras de Europa,” p. 1208. 26 27

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love of country could not counteract the original sin by which Frederik’s father William attained his power, “having failed in his obligations as vassal.” Furthermore, the stadholder’s aim was “to make himself lord of them when the opportunity arises.”31 The same ambition that turned the Oranges – seen by Saavedra as a family whose aims and flaws were transmitted across generations – into rebels would make tyrants of them, a fear that was shared, in a twist of irony, by radical republicans in the United Provinces and in England.32 Spanish authors emphasized respect for the law as a defining mark of monarchy. In contrast, the tyrant would follow his will, awaking fear and hatred in his subjects: his unjust acquiring of power would be reflected in his actions as ruler.33 As Caramuel summed up, “tyrants are those who base their right on violence; rebels those who base their justice on swords.” The Spanish king, on the contrary “does not found his right on arms, but rather [his use of ] arms on right.”34 The lawfully appointed ruler could even bend the general laws, acting as a tyrant when necessary.35 Such would always be lawful actions, as sanctioned by dynastic legality and respect to God’s words. Conversely, a republic lacking “theology and conscience is not a civil body but a corpse” and could not survive.36 Usurpation, rebellion and injustice were thus one and the same thing. The usurper would violate all bounds set by natural and divine law, something which Spanish theorists and ministers saw happening in their own time.

Ibid., pp. 1208-9. See for instance the German text Trewhertzige Vermahnung/ Worinnen viel Deckwürdige und Politische Considerationes, uber den jetzigen Zustand und Beschaffenheit der Vereignigten Niederlandischen Provincien, begriffen. Welche ein Holländer/ als Leibhaber dess Vatterlandts an einen seiner guten Freund in Friessland abgehen lassen. Darbey er demselben ubersendet Ein sichern Bericht/ betreffend die Neutraliteit zwischen den zwey Burgundien. So hierbevor durch die Schweitzer angestelt und zu werck gerichtet worden, s.l.: s.n., 1644. Similar feelings were expressed by the De la Court brothers and Algenon Sidney. 33 Ulrich Dierse, “Pedro de Ribadeneira und Diego de Saavedra Fajardo: Aspekte der spanischen Machiavelli-Rezeption”, in Spaniens Beitrag zum politischen Denken in Europa um 1600, Mate, Reyes and Niewöhner, Friedrich (eds.), Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1994, pp. 99-119, p. 103. 34 Juan Caramuel Lobkowitz, Respuesta al Manifiesto, p. 192. 35 José Laínez, El Daniel Cortesano, p. 503. 36 Juan Caramuel Lobkowitz, Respuesta al Manifiesto, p. 168. 31 32

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The usurper’s unjust rule In spite of the scorn with which the authors working in the service of Philip iv rejected the legality of João’s claims, it was of course well known that Philip ii’s accession to the Portuguese throne after the extinction of the House of Aviz was the outcome of combined juridical and military action of questionable legality, which raised doubts about his legitimacy as Portuguese king. The first attacks concerned Philip’s refusal to recognize the popular election of Dom Antonio, prior of Crato, nearest in kin to the deceased king but of illegitimate birth.37 Later, doubts about Philip’s rights intermingled with the cult of Sebastianism; the belief in the return of the late Dom Sebastião, next to last king of the Aviz family who died in the battle of Alcácer Quibir (1578), supposedly held prisoner in Africa or Spain. The house of Braganza, the wealthiest Portuguese nobles, later became the political focus of Sebastianism, and João iv was expected to be the redeemerking who would liberate Portugal. Tensions erupted as a consequence of Olivares’ insistence on increasing Portugal’s military contribution to the monarchy’s war effort. After abandoned popular upheavals in Alentejo and the Algarve in 1637-38, the coup of 1 December 1640 took place. A group of nobles seized the viceroyal palace in Lisbon and proclaimed the Duke of Braganza King João iv. A set of pamphlets was published asserting that Philip ii had usurped the crown and listing the abuses Portugal had suffered under Spanish rule.38 The Spanish concept of tyranny reveals itself through the (relatively few) answers produced by loyal Habsburg subjects.39 The Spanish pamphleteers rejected accusations that the dominium of the Catholic king over some territories was illegal and therefore tyrannical, an accusation which needed to be forcefully dismissed. In the immediate aftermath of the Portuguese coup, José Pellicer de Ossau La Fin Generalle de l’Espagnol, qu’est l’Erection d’une cincquiesme pretendue Monarchie, et leva dessein vers ces Pays-bas: servant de bon advis aux reconciliés, s.l.: s.n., 1586, fol. 2v. 38 Those were the arguments presented by the priest Ignazio de Mascareñas, one of the main publicists defending João iv’s rights to the throne and reproduced by Juan Caramuel Lobkowitz, Respuesta al Manifiesto, p. 17. 39 Publications against the Braganza restauraçao are far less numerous than those defending it, although complemented by theatrical works, sermons and prophetic works. Fernando J. Bouza Álvarez, “Papeles, Batallas y Público Barroco. La Guerra y la Restauração Portugueses en la Publicística Española de 1640 a 1668,” https://www.fronteira-alorna. pt/Textos/papelesbatallas.htm. On theatre see Rafael Valladares, Teatro en la Guerra. Imágenes de Príncipes y Restauración de Portugal, Badajoz: Departamento de Publicaciones de la Diputación, 2002. 37

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published a brief pamphlet aiming to justify the Habsburgs’ rights to the Portuguese throne.40 Under attack were not only Braganza’s claims, but the very existence of an independent Portugal. Pellicer argued that all Portuguese kings, from Afonso Henriques onwards, including Dom Juan de Aviz, founder of the now extinct dynasty, were usurpers. By not conforming to ‘dynastic legality’ these kings became tyrannical. Even two authors who openly disagreed on other points, Quevedo and Juan de Jáuregui, shared the opinion that “respect for kinship is the first thing that has to concern kings,”41 as princely rule was based on nothing other than dynastic legality. Establishing the legality and validity of Philip ii’s rule over Portugal according to inheritance rules was thus crucial. Thus, the historian Luis Cabrera de Córdoba described in his Historia de Felipe ii (1619) that Philip ii had united Portugal with his other kingdoms “through legitimate heritage, force of courage and victorious arms against Dom Antonio, prior de Crato, tyrant.”42 The will of the people who proclaimed Dom Antonio king at Santarem and supported his entry into Lisbon could neither obliterate the blemish of Antonio’s illegitimate birth nor justify his rule. Philip ii’s rule was further strengthened and legitimized after he was recognized as king in the Cortes of Tomar in 1581, where he swore to maintain the ancient laws and privileges of the country.43 From then on, Portugal lived peacefully until Braganza’s usurpation, so Spanish pamphleteers argued in 1640, also drawing parallels between Dom Antonio’s and Braganza’s usurpation, fiercely attacking all claims to legitimacy they both made on the principles of popular election. Dynastic claims were easily dismissed in Dom Antonio’s case due Jose Pellicer de Ossau, Succesion de los Reynos de Portugal i El Algarve, Feudos Antiguos de la Corona de Castilla; dados en dote a Doña Teresa i Don Enrique de Borgoña, Tiranizados la Primera vez por Don Iuan Maestre de Avis; Conmovidos por Dom Antonio Prior de Ocrato, Incorporados después en la Monarchia de España, por Derecho de Sangre, i otros Ocho diversos Títulos..., Logroño: Pedro de Mon Gaston Fox, 1640. 41 Quevedo’s criticism of the French king’s disregard of family ties is to be found in Francisco de Quevedo y Villegas, Carta al Serenissimo, Muy Alto y Muy Poderoso Luis xiii, Rey Christianissimo de Francia, Madrid: viuda de Alonso Martin, 1635. 3/16627(2). Criticizing Quevedo’s lack of respect towards the French King see Juan de Jáuregui, Memorial al Rey Nvuestro señor…Ilustra la singula onra de España: aprueva la modestia en los escritos contra Francia, i nota una carta embiada a aquel Rey, s.l.: s.n., s.a. [1635], f. 5r-v. 42 Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, Historia de Felipe ii, p. 1011. 43 Analysing the importance of the elites’ interest in forming part of Philip ii’s monarchy as a driving force of the annexation see Fernando J. Bouza Álvarez, Portugal en la Monarquía Hispánica (1580-1640): Felipe ii, las Cortes de Toma y la Génesis del Portugal Católico, Madrid: UCM, 1986 (unpublished doctoral thesis) 40

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to his illegitimacy, less so in that of João iv, grandson of Catherine, Duchess of Braganza, who had in 1580 claimed the Portuguese crown and sparked the struggle for the throne of Portugal which was finally won by Philip ii. Thus, the Spanish writers directed their wrath at the idea that the kingdom could elect its king. The apparent clash with the neo-scholastic principles of transfer of authority from the community to an elected king was solved by Caramuel who, following the leading theorist Francisco de Vitoria, explained that such an election was possible only when the people were “lords of their liberty.” After the election took place, establishing a covenant, the community was bound by the conditions of this original agreement,44 which “cannot be abolished even by the consensus of men,”45 as long as there were legitimate heirs to a throne. Trying to renew the election implied falling into the crimen laesae majestatis of rebellion.46 Both De la Parra and Caramuel emphasized that election was the last resort amongst those who lacked just (dynastic) titles. They expected, as in Braganza’s case, “suffrages and acclamations from the mutinous mob to make up for the faults that he committed in this rebellion.”47 Popular election was a “heretics’ invention,”48 although Caramuel alleged that even the Dutch asserted that Braganza was made king by a “badly founded and tyrannical conspiracy.”49 The fickle mob, eager to change the established order, could not be granted the “authority to make themselves judges of the alleged depravation of the government, the uses and defects of the prince,” because anarchy would result.50 In Spanish eyes, the ‘fickle’ mob and the Braganza tyrant were the main culprits of the Portuguese secession. As with the Catalans, the “good Portuguese vassals” were offered the chance to remain under Philip iv’s dominion. As a sector of the aristocracy did in fact remain loyal to Philip iv, they made it possible to portray the unrest as the

Juan Caramuel Lobkowitz, Respuesta al Manifiesto, p. 116. Questioning even the first election see Juan Adam de la Parra, Apologético, f. 14v. 45 Francisco de Vitoria, “On Civil power” in Political Writings, section 1.7. p. 18 46 Juan Caramuel Lobkowitz, Respuesta al Manifiesto, p. 148. 47 Ibid, p. 147. 48 Juan Adam de la Parra, Apologético, f. 22r. 49 Ibid, p. 181. 50 Ibid., f. 24r-v. 44

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deeds of a minority group of wrongdoers.51 By addressing his work to one of those vassals of Philip iv who, in spite of his Portuguese ties, continued in the service of the Catholic Monarchy, Francisco de Melo, governor of the Low Countries, Caramuel defended the same line, as he expressly stated in his introduction.52 However, at the same time, João iv’s brother, Duarte, who was in the service of the Emperor when his brother seized power, was imprisoned for being “the brother of another vassal who has committed such great treason and has called himself king before my eyes.”53 Blood ties were insoluble. On the one hand, they made Duarte automatically suspect; on the other, they forced the Emperor to assist his Spanish cousin against his enemies.54 But leniency could, and did in fact, prevail in other cases. Gaspar Alfonso Pérez de Guzmán, duke of Medina Sidonia, who was both João’s brother-inlaw and nephew of Olivares, was given the benefit of the doubt.55 His justification was, according to Juan Adam de la Parra, he himself very close to Olivares’ entourage, that he had been deceived by the tyrants’ treachery.56 The dividing line between tyranny, usurpation and mistaken government policy was often blurred and judgement partly depended on power positions. When confessional allegiances and dynastical bonds intermingled, the picture increased in complexity. On the Portuguese noblemen who chose to remain loyal to Madrid see Rafael Valladares, “Sobre Reyes de Invierno. El Diciembre Portugués y los Cuarenta Fidalgos (o algunos menos, con otros más),” in Pedralbes: Revista d’Historia Moderna,15 (1995), pp. 103-136. 52 Juan Caramuel Lobkowitz, Respuesta al Manifiesto, “Al que leyere.” These people were as ruthlessly judged in Portugal as those abandoning Philip iv’s service in the Spanish Monarchy. A strong judgment by Melo is to be found in Esteves Pereira and Guilherme Rodrigues (eds.), Portugal.Dicionário Histórico, Corográfico, Heráldico, Biográfico, Bibliográfico, Numismático e Artístico abrangendo A minuciosa descrição histórica e corográfica de todas as cidades, vilas e outras povoações do continente do Reino, Ilhas e Ultramar, monumentos e edifícios mais notáveis, tanto antigos como modernos; biografias dos portugueses ilustres antigos e contemporâneos, célebres por qualquer título, notáveis pelas suas acções, pelos seus escritos, pelas suas invenções ou descobertas; bibliografia antiga e moderna; indicação de todos os factos notáveis da história portuguesa, etc., etc., Lisboa: João Romano Torres, 1904-1915. 53 Letter to Francisco de Melo, 13 April, 1641, AGS Estado, Flandes 2056. 54 Letter to the Emperor, 13 April, 1641, AGS Estado, Flandes 2056. 55 Robert A. Stradling, Philip iv and the Government of Spain, 1621-1665, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002 (1981), p. 167. 56 Juan de la Parra, Apologetico, fol. 4v. Medina Sidonia was first only packed off to exile in Old Castile, but within a year he returned to Andalusia – the stronghold of his power – in secret. Once he was discovered and apprehended a trial could no longer be avoided, Olivares’ fall from power in early 1643 not helping its deferral. Robert Stradling, Philip iv, p. 167. 51

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Distinguishing between impious tyrants and misguided rulers Heresy and apostasy automatically made rulers into tyrants as those crimes led to excommunication if the heretic persisted in his error.57 Following Gratian, subjects were forbidden to obey excommunicated or deposed rulers.58 As long as every European polity recognized papal authority as the ultimate instance for deciding on such matters, excommunication could be an important political tool in the papacy’s hands.59 Excommunication lost its effectiveness with the Reformation, but the equivalence between heresy, excommunication and usurpation remained determinant for the Spanish, even influencing the conditions under which government and suzerainty over the Low Countries were granted to the Archduke Albert and his wife and Archduchess Isabella in 1598. If any of their descendants moved away from the Catholic faith he would forfeit his title over the Provinces.60 Nonetheless, fear of revolt and respect for dynastic principles intermingled, and the censure of Reformed (thus heretic) rulers was subtler and milder than the judgement deserved by (alleged) usurpers. The consequences of this distinction were not banal, as the killing of the prince who was not a usurper would not be endorsed by Spanish theologians.61 Two seventeenth century Reformed kings, James i of England and Gustav Adolf of Sweden, were in fact not primarily criticized because of their religion. James was heavily attacked as a consequence of the Oath of Allegiance which he expected all his subjects to swear regardless of their confession, which required recognition of James i as lawful king and renunciation of the pope, denying the latter the authority to depose the former. In the ensuing polemic, Cardinal Bellarmine and the Jesuits Becanus, Gretser and Francisco Suárez condemned the Oath and other laws, reasserting the indirect temporal power of the pope to Aquinas, ii-iiae, a. 11. On excommunication during the Middle Ages see Elizabeth Vodola, Excommunication in the Middle Ages, Berkeley, etc: University of California Press, 1986. 58 C. 15 q. 6 cc. 2-5; C. 22 q. 4 cc1, 5, 6,8,12, 13 18, 19. 59 Examples of the political consequences of excommunication are that of Frederick ii Hohenstaufen during the thirteenth century and the conflict over Navarre between Ferdinand ii of Aragon and Louis xii under the papacy of Julius ii. 60 Antonio Carnero, Historia de las Guerras Ciuiles que ha auido en los Estados de Flandes des del año 1559 hasta el de 1609 y las Causas de la Rebelion de dichos Estados, Brussels: Jan van Meerbeeck, 1625, p. 430. 61 A straightforward rejection of the principles of tyrannicide is to be found in Juan Márquez, El Governador Christiano: Deducido de las vidas de Moysen, y Josue, principes del pueblo de Dios, Madrid: Gregorio Rodriguez, 1651 (1612), pp. 39ff. 57

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excommunicate kings – with all its implications. However, as James was not excommunicated he could still be a partner in peace treaties and alliances with Catholic powers and enjoyed respect among Spanish pamphleteers, who did not question Stuart dynastic rights. It was still hoped that England would be “restored to the Catholic fold,” given enough encouragement from Philip iv.62 The case of Gustav Adolf of Sweden was different. The war waged against the Habsburgs did not enhance the respect Spanish writers had for him. He was accused of “unprecedented cruelty, theft and destruction of the Holy Empire and God’s church,”63 and his heresy turned him into a tyrant with no respect for the law of nations.64 He had not hesitated to become an ally of “heretic Princes” against “a most Catholic Emperor,” thus becoming an “apocalyptical beast that destroys and wrecks everything.”65 Gustav Adolf met his just punishment by dying in the battle of Lützen, fought on the day devoted to “Saint Leopold of Austria, tutelary of this eminent and most Catholic House” of Habsburg. 66 God had thus liberated the world of Gustav Adolf, doing what it was unlawful for any human hand to do. Even his heresy and his unjust war did not allow him to die at the hands of a private citizen. Gustav’s and James’ situations clearly differed from that of Henry iv of France and Elizabeth of England, both excommunicated by the pope and subject to assassination attempts – in which Henry eventually died. Both had been Catholic and for both thrones there were other candidates – the only lawful ones, in Spanish eyes. In both cases the arguments presented by the Spanish king, his ministers and his publicists could be judged feeble. But they enabled a conceptualization of Elizabeth’s and Henry’s rule which was not possible in the case of James or Gustav Adolf. Religious arguments did play a role when constructing the images of tyrants, but appeals to tyrannicide were much more common in Spanish texts – from the stage to the Council Juan de Jáuregui, Memorial al Rey Nvuestro señor, f.4v. Ludovico de Copiaria Carmerineo (Louis Cruzamont), Atroces Hechos de Impíos Tyranos por intervención de Franceses o Atrocidades Francesas execvtadas por Impíos Tyranos. Colegidas de Autores diuersos mayores de toda excepción, y escritas primero en lengua Latina. Traducidas después en Español, y aumentadas en esta segunda impressión de algunos sucessos, para su mayor claridad, Valeria: s.n., 1635, p. 49. 64 Reflexiones sobre la Violación de las Paces de Vervins y Ratisbona por los ministros de Francia, BN Mss. 11004, fol. 90r. 65 Ludovico de Copiaria Carmerineo, Atroces Hechos de Impíos Tyranos, pp. 50-51. 66 Reflexiones sobre la Violación, fol. 90r. 62 63

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of State – when dealing with those who had not accessed the throne according to dynastic rules. Religion, though, helped to diminish any possible claims usurpers could launch about having consolidated their claims by the uncontested exercise of office. Juridical considerations – concerning the access to office – equally altered the treatment deserved by non-heretical rulers who allied with heretics and infidels. In Portugal, the alleged alliance of Dom Antonio with those of ‘the Hebrew nation’ still remained an argument for discrediting his claims to the throne in the 1640s. This served as a reminder that the Habsburgs had already defeated a usurper in Portugal, but it also discredited Dom Antonio’s rule. On the other hand, it was a way of dealing with the conduct of politics within the Spanish Monarchy, where hatred of the Jews had been instilled in the population, sometimes even to the disadvantage of the government, which found resorting to converso bankers highly controversial.67 Adam de la Parra resorted to the hatred towards the Jews by highlighting the negative consequences Dom Antonio’s seizure of power would have had for Portugal because of his alliance with those of ‘the Nation,’ who were “obstinate [enemies] to the two Majesties.” All Portuguese – including Catherine of Braganza – took pleasure, according to Adam de la Parra, in the victory of Philip ii over Dom Antonio – except the Jews, who, having suffered the “carefulness by which the matters of faith are dealt with in Castile” eagerly supported the new usurper, Braganza.68 In the case of France it was the alliances with heretics which justified the clash between the two major Catholic polities. Many of the arguments had been developed since the beginning of the fifteenth century, putting the wars against the Most Christian King since the times of the Catholic monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella into the eschatological scheme of the Spanish Monarchy and the celebration of a ‘Crusade ideal’ which justified the levying of new taxes and waging war against France, since French actions in Italy prevented the Catholic King from going to war against the enemies of Christendom, the Arabs, who could be attacked lawfully by any Christian prince “because they live in the lands that were subjected to the Roman Empire and that belonged to Christians… because they occupy unjustly (and insultingly) our lands, Referring to the Hebrews and conversos in Spain see the classic contribution by Julio Caro Baroja, Los Judios en la España Moderna y Contemporánea, 3 vol., Madrid: Istmo, 1995-2005 (1961). Criticism of the tolerance of conversos is to be found in Quevedo’s La Hora de Todos and in Lope de Vega’s El Brasil Restituido (1625), among other works. 68 Juan Adam de la Parra, Apologetico, f. 12r-15v. 67

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without wanting and trying to return them back to us.”69 Furthermore, the French king had harmed the Church, provoking the risk of another schism in the bosom of Christianity and, disregarding his duties as defender of the Church.70 This peril was revived in the literature after 1635. Louis xiii’s rights to the throne were not to be doubted, and the recognition of his rule by the pope made his reign radically different from that of his father Henry iv. But both shared a lack of commitment to the obligation of Catholic princes, which was to “shed tears for the happiness of the Heretics, at least as many tears as the Heretic sheds for the happiness of the Catholics.”71 The general criticism was directed to the French support for tyrants, without the French king being deemed one, as was made clear by the title of the pamphlet Appalling acts by impious tyrants through French intervention or French atrocities carried out by impious tyrants.72 Respect for (lawful) kingly figures pervades most texts arguing against the French policy towards heretics, something which was completely missing in all references to Dom Antonio. Of especial importance was French Catholicity which, together with family ties, forced the Spanish king to try to maintain friendship with the French king. It was because of these links that the Most Catholic king could already be considered – in spite of the war – to be a friend in spirit of the House of Habsburg, making the relationship with the French king substantially different from the rapport with other, heretic princes.73 The French king was therefore not accused, but reprimanded. He was not made responsible for the conduct of French politics but was often thought to have been fooled by his ministers, Richelieu and Mazarin,

Diego García de Palacio, Diálogos Militares, Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, Secretaría Técnica, 2003 (1583), p. 102. This is a reformulation of the definition of pagans provided by Tommaso de Vio in his comments on Aquinas, considering that the only category of people which falls under the dominium of the Church is those who lived on lands once under the Roman Empire. Anthony Pagden, Lords of all the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500-c. 1800, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995, p. 203. 70 This argument was presented by Queen Juana, mother of the future Emperor Charles v, in the Convocatoria de Cortes 1512, Patronato Real, 69, 47, AGS, quoted by Bartolomé Yun Casalilla, Marte contra Minerva. El Precio del Imperio Español, c.1450-1600, Barcelona: Crítica, 2004, p. 80. 71 Ambrosio Bautista, Discvrso Breve de las Miserias de la Vida y Calamidades de la Religión Católica, Madrid: En la Imprenta Real, 1635, p. 5. 72 Ludovico de Copiaria Carmerineo, Atroces Hechos de Impíos Tyranos. 73 Juan de Jáuregui, Memorial al Rey Nvuestro señor, f.4v. 69

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“unjust and violent ministers.”74 Being, like Richelieu, a cardinal of the Catholic Church did not spare Mazarin from being called by Philip iv himself “author of the calamities of Christendom,”75 and counted by Peñaranda “among the most despicable men in the world.”76 Equal contempt was displayed for the politiques.77 The politiques, moderates of both the Catholic and the Huguenot faith, especially since 1568, lobbied for a stronger monarchy in France which would lead the subjects into obeying the laws without caring whether they were Catholic or Protestant, were accused of having forgotten that the major task of Catholic kings and their kingdoms was to pursue salvation in the eternal life, towards which all efforts should be directed. Politiques were deemed followers of an evil reason of state which was a form of tyranny. As Juan Blázquez, chief controller and veedor in Veracruz, put it, politiques adored a “law of reason of state; on which the goal is not justice.”78 Seventeenth-century theorists in Italy and the Spanish Monarchy followed the example set by Botero in his Della ragione di stato (1589), which insisted on the necessity of having political procedures conforming to divine law; good reason of state had to be consonant with religious doctrine and beneficial to the realm.79 Following this argument Juan Blázquez distinguished between good and bad reason of state. Good reason is that which “follows the laws of justice to be rightful”, while bad is that which uses “deception to lose oneself.”80 This refers to a religious critique of reason of state, claimed to be invented by Letter from the Duke of Orleans to Philip iv, 1 May, 1634, AGS, Estado, 2061. Advice of the Junta de Estado about the treaties with the dukes of Bouillon and Vendôme and the cardinal Balanze?, 5 March, 1646, AGS Estado, 2065. 76 Letter from the count of Peñaranda to the marquis of Castel-Rodrigo, March, 1646, AGS, Estado, 2255. 77 Julián Viejo Yharrassarry, “Razón de Estado católica y Monarquía Hispánica”, en Revista de Estudios Políticos (Nueva Época), num. 104, 1999, pp. 233-244. 78 Juan Blázquez Mayoralgo, Perfecta Raçon de Estado. Dedvcida de los hechos de el señor rey Don Fernando el Catholico ... contra los políticos atheistas, México: Francisco Robledo, 1646, f. 13. 79 Stephen Rupp, “Reason of State and Repetition in The Tempest and La Vida es Sueño,” Comparative Literature, vol. 42, No. 4 (Autumn, 1990), pp. 289-318, p. 291. See also many articles by Xavier Gil Pujol, more recently “One King, One Faith, Many Nations: Patria and Nation in Spain, 16th-17th Centuries,” in Robert von Friedeburg (ed.), ‘Patria’ und ‘Patrioten’ vor dem Patriotismus: Pflichten, Rechte, Glauben und die Rekonfigurierung europäischer Gemeinwesen im 17. Jahrhundert, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2005, pp. 105-137 and Robert Bireley, The Jesuits and the Thirty Years War: Kings, Courts, and Confessors, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 80 Juan Blázquez Mayoralgo, Perfecta Raçon de Estado, fol. 8. 74 75

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“Lucifer, mutinous angel” to take revenge on God after “losing his state and honour because of his envy and haughtiness.”81 Hence, the rule based on the ‘evil’ reason of state was tyrannical. The revolt of the Catalans and the moving of their leaders towards France, offering Louis xiii the sovereignty of Catalonia, added a new dimension to this criticism. On both sides there was much talk of dynastic ties and tyranny where claims to rightful inheritance remained crucial. Authors defending the authority of the Spanish king over the Principality argued against the French claims, asserting that Catalonia had turned into a “political monster, with two heads, one false, the other natural;” only the natural was to lead the polity properly.82 Catalonia could restore its liberty and its tranquillity only by being freed from the unjust ruler, from a tyrant. Alejandro Ros admonished the Catalans for “having extinguished in [them]selves the desire for liberty” by seeking freedom from the Spanish king, coming first under “tyrants of [their] own nation” 83 and afterwards under a foreign usurper who would introduce impiety with “Huguenot and Calvinist customs.”84 Usurpation, unlawful rule and heresy were concepts deeply rooted in the Spanish consideration of the tyrant. As was inevitable, the ‘rebels’ justified their deeds by emphasizing the opposite line, focusing their definition of tyranny on the wicked Spanish exercise of power by which the Catholic king lost his legitimacy for governing. Defying tyrannical rule in the Low Countries and Catalonia Depicting the Spanish king, in his role as count or duke, titles by which he governed the different provinces of the Low Countries and Catalonia, as a usurper was not easy. Rebels thus focused on his actions, especially against the Reformed religion, to divest him of legitimacy, drawing on the theories of resistance previously elaborated. A theory

Francisco de Quevedo, Política de Dios y Gobierno de Cristo, 2nd part, chap. vi, in Obras de Don Francisco de Quevedo Villegas, Antwerp: Cornelis and Henri Verdussen, 1699, Vol. 2, p. 326. 82 Alejandro Ros, Cataluña Desengañada, Carta del Autor, a los Brazos, Eclesiastico, Militar, y Real de Cataluña. 83 Ibid., p. 272. 84 Fray Marcos Salmerón, Sacra Apología. Disposición del Señor de los Ejércitos. Ejemplar vivo de las armas católicas a favor de la fe y de los vasallos leales de la Majestad de Felipe iv Rey de las Españas y Emperador de América, Cuenca: s.n., 1642. 81

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was developed which gave rise to a moral right to resist a ruler who was no longer governing for the common good.85 During the conflict between the Low Countries and Philip ii, Dutch theories of resistance consolidated, culminating in Political Education, published anonymously in Malines in 1582. Any public authority who served his own profit and passions, suppressing justice and right with force and violence, became a tyrant, and the right to resist him belonged to the States of the country, thus legitimating the abjuration of Philip ii by the Dutch States.86 These theories were further elaborated during the first decades of the seventeenth century, when Hugo Grotius, following the Spanish neo-scholastic Vázquez de Menchaca, explained the move from natural liberty to human society and the establishment of civil power. By stating that the power of the commonwealth was not diminished after the transfer of civil power from the people to the ruler, Grotius restated the duty of parliamentary assemblies to uphold the charters and covenants between prince and people when the prince attacked the commonwealth and turned into a tyrant.87 These contractualist theories proved significant in other rebellions, both in England and against the Habsburgs,88 and for the general depiction of the Spanish Monarchy as tyrannical.89 The idea of the restoration of the ancient, lawful and ‘national’ dynasty went hand in hand in Portugal with principles of popular election. The justifications for switching allegiance from the Habsburgs The development during the Early Modern period of theories of resistance, from Lutherans in the German Empire to Calvinist theories in France, Scotland and England remains central to vol. 2 of Quentin Skinner, Foundations of Modern Political Thought. 86 For a more detailed analysis of this treatise and this arguments see Martin van Gelderen (ed.) The Dutch Revolt, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. xxivff. 87 Martin van Gelderen, “‘So meerly humane’: theories of resistance in early modern Europe”, Annabel Brett and James Tully, (eds.), Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 149-170. 88 A number of studies by Hugh Trevor-Roper, Richard Tuck, Jonathan Scott and others have confirmed John Salmon’s stress on the relevance of Grotius in the intellectual exchange between England and the European continent. See John H.M. Salmon, The French Religious Wars in English Political Thought, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1959. 89 La Fin Generalle de l’Espagnol, f. 2v. The common suffering of the Dutch and the Portuguese under the duke of Alva was also emphasized in Johan van Beverwyck, Hertogh van Alva, geessel van Nederlant ende Portugael: hoe ende waerom beyde het Spaensche jock af-gevvorpen ende met malkanderen tegens den gemeenen vyandt verbonden zyn, Dordrecht: s.n., 1641. 85

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to the Bourbons in Catalonia were more complex. Two contrasting discourses were deployed: one emphasized the ancient rights of Charlemagne’s heirs over Catalonia, while most Catalan authors underlined the elective character of the Principality. The use of sheer force to conquer and dominate territories, highlighted by Dutch and Iberian rebellious pamphleteers, delegitimized the Catholic monarchy’s rule, turning it into usurpation, picking up arguments first used in the 1570s and 1580s. The tyrant’s intolerable behaviour Initially, criticism of the Spanish Habsburgs’ rule in the United Provinces and in Catalonia did not mean a straightforward rejection of their authority as such. What was criticized was the incorrect use of authority for their own or false purposes, neglecting the common good, an argument taken to its extreme in England during the reign of the Catholic Mary Tudor by her harassed Protestant subjects, who moved to adapt the medieval ‘private law’ justification of resistance, advocating treating the wicked ruler as a private citizen who had committed a crime.90 On the whole, Dutch authors preferred to focus on deciding who had the right of resistance within the constitutional framework of the Low Countries. Martin van Gelderen has distinguished two main approaches among Dutch Reformed Protestants. One held that the States of the country were superior powers with the right to resist, while the other made the right to resist dependent on the privileges and customs of the country.91 The two theories coalesced in the Act of Abjuration of 1581, by which Philip ii was disposessed of his titles because he had exceeded the bounds of his office.92 Later on, juridical arguments were enriched with references to the ‘natural’ faults of the Spaniard, making out that the Catholic Monarchy – especially Castile – embodied the worst of human flaws. On rare occasions publicists Hugh Dunthorne, “The Netherlands as Britain’s School of Revolution in the late Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” in Robert Oresko, G.C. Gibbs and Hamish.M. Scott (eds.), Royal and Republican Sovereingty in Early Modern Europe. Essays in Memory of Ragnhild Hatton, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 129. The best-known treatise defending her tyrannicide is John Knox’s The First Blast of the Trumpet against the Monstrous Regiment of Women, Geneva: J. Poullain and A. Rebul, 1558. 91 Martin van Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt, 1555-1590, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 108. 92 Martin van Gelderen, The Political Thought. On the influence of the interpretations of the Joyous Entry see chap. 4. 90

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recognized positive consequences of the extreme tyranny of the Castilian, by having “awakened us through his tyranny,” leading the Netherlanders to “throw off the yoke” upon their necks.93 Violators of legal and moral order The first depictions of Spanish rule as tyrannical were not publicized in the Low Countries. Studies on what Julian Juderías termed the black legend show how widespread the negative view of the Spanish across Europe and the New World was.94 Spanish tyranny, a major topic since the outbreak of the Dutch revolt, remained the favourite subject of those defending the continuation of war during the peace negotiations in Münster. As in the secessionist revolts within the Spanish Monarchy in the 1640s, juridical and moral arguments intertwined, extended in the Dutch case by religious considerations. Thus a Dutch author could assert that the “right of our arms has a firm and legitimate foundation, both in the common ius gentium and in God’s word.”95 Resorting to the argument of Spanish tyranny fulfilled a twofold role. First, fighting against unjust rule and dying because of “the swords of the tyrants” justified first the revolt and then the continuation of war. Secondly, “the Het Ghelichte Münstersche Mom-Aensicht, ofte De Spaensche Eclipse in zijne Nederlanden, s.l.: s.n., 1646. 94 Julián Juderías, La Leyenda Negra: Estudios acerca del Concepto de España en el Extranjero, Valladolid: Consejería de Cultura y Turismo, 2003 (1914). There is a vast literature on the Black Legend. A modern classic – shifting the origin of the “Legend” to fourteenth century Italy – is Sverker Arnoldsson, La Leyenda Negra: Estudios sobre sus Orígenes, Göteborg: Elander, 1960. Referring to the modifications of the concept in the Low Countries see, among others, K.W. Swart, “The Black Legend during the Eighty Years War,” in Ernst H. Kossman and John S. Bromley (eds.), Britain and the Netherlands: papers delivered to the fifth Anglo-Dutch Historical Conference. Some Political Mythologies, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1975, pp. 36-57, Judit Pollmann, “Eine natürliche Feindschaft: Ursprung und Funktion der schwarzen Legende über Spanien in den Niederlanden, 1560-1581” in Franz Bosbach (ed.), Feindbilder. Die Darstellung des Gegners in der politischen Publizistik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit, Cologne, etc.: Böhlau, 1992, pp. 73-93 and Marijke Meijer Drees, “Génesis y Desarrollo de la Imagen de España en los Países Bajos en el contexto de las Guerra de Flandes” in Antonio AlvarezOssorio Alvariño and Bernardo J. Garcia Garcia (eds.), La Monarquia de las Naciones: Patria, Nación y Naturaleza en la Monarquia de España, Madrid: Fundacion Carlos de Amberes, 2004, pp. 739-763. A comprehensive study of the image of Spain in the Holy Roman Empire is Peer Schmidt, Spanische Universalmonarchie oder „teutsche Libertet“: das spanische Imperium in der Propaganda des Dreissigjährigen Krieges, Stuttgart: Steiner, 2001. 95 Suchtich, en Trouwhertich Discours over dese tegenwoordige Gestalte des Lants, In Bedenckinge van Onderhandelinge zijnde met den Coninck van Spaengien... s.l.: s.n, s.a. 93

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bond signed” between God and the inhabitants of the United Provinces “during the times of the Duke of Alva” was vindicated; God’s approval blessed the Dutch cause.96 The feeling prevailed “that these lands had to go to war against a tyrant for their necessary defence, following the right of nature and of peoples.”97 When the Dutch tried to ensure “their freedoms not to be violated and their charters to remain untouched” in a peaceful manner, the Spaniards’ answer was violence.98 Violence which, together with a general disrespect for the liberties and the territorial laws, was a major feature of Habsburg rule in general; the “machinations and actions of the Spaniard, and his alliance with the House of Austria in the Holy Roman Empire” had brought about “the complete overturning and wreckage” of the Empire.99 In both the Low Countries and Catalonia the king’s ministers were first attacked, starting with Granvelle and followed by Alva, “the cruellest tyrant of his time.”100 The king was initially spared the harshest attacks, as the sacred nature of royal dignity proved difficult to challenge.101 Similarly, during the 1640s the Catalans initially blamed the CountDuke of Olivares for all violations of the privileges of the territory, they being assumed to be the first steps towards turning the proposals he

Discovrs over Den Nederlandtschen Vrede-handel. Ghestelt door een Liefhebber des Vaderlandts, Leeuwaerden: Dirck Albertsz, 1629. 97 Discovrs aengaende Treves of Vrede met de Infante ofte Koning van Hispanien/ ende dese Vereenighde Nederlanden, Haerlem: Adriaen Rooman, 1629, pp. 8-9. 98 De Spaensche Tiranye, gheschiet in Nederlant. Waer inne te sien is de onmenschelicke en wreede Handelingen der Spangiaerden, Amsterdam: Jacob Pietersz Wachter, 1641, voorreden. This booklet was reprinted on numerous occasions but its first edition was published in 1621. 99 Abtruck Einer auffgefangenen Jesuitischen Information Uber die Frage: Ob das H. Römishe Reich den Herrn Staten von Holland Die Neutralitet länger Vestatten soll oder nicht? Beneben einem furken und einfältingen Denen anjetzt zu Cölln auff dem angestellten Compositionis oder Friedenstag Versambleten Ständen und Abgesandten/ auch sonsten Jedermänniglich zur sonderbahrer Nachricht auss gefertiget s.l.: s.n., 1637. This aspect is also analysed as well by Peer Schmidt, Spanische Universal Monarchie, pp. 120-125. 100 De Spaensche Tiranye, voor-reden. 101 Ernst H. Kossmann, “Over de Koning die geen Kwaad kan doen”, in his Polietieke Theorie en Geschiedenis. Verspreide Opstellen en voordrachten, Amsterdam: Bakker, 1987, pp. 117-126, p. 119. On the sacral dimension of royal authority cf. Marc Bloch, Les Rois Thaumaturges. Étude sur le caractère surnaturel attribué a la puissance royale particulièrement en France et en Angleterre, Strasbourg : Istra, 1924; Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s two Bodies. A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957 and more recently Paul Kléber Monod, The Power of Kings: Monarchy and Religion in Europe, 1589-1715, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999. 96

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presented in the Gran memorial into realities.102 From constitutional opposition through the Cortes it became revolt,103 justified both in Catalonia and Portugal because the Spanish government “was trying to reduce” both territories “to the Castilian style” of government.104 Philip iv also became the target of attacks, and was even accused of not “having the right to retain some of his states.”105 French polemicists defending the legitimacy of Louis xiii’s rule over Catalonia soon resorted, as was common among Portuguese authors, to expressing doubts about Philip iv’s legitimacy as Count of Barcelona, a thesis which was later embraced by the Catalan writers Gaspar Sala and Francisco Martí i Viladamor, early proponents of the principle of elective monarchy.106 The projection of the elements which had been generally identified with Spanish tyranny – especially the lack of respect for territorial privileges – to Castile was popularized by the revolts of the 1640s, even reaching the old Holy Roman Empire.107 However, when Naples Karsten Neumann, Das Word als Waffe. Politische Propaganda im Aufstand der Katalanen, 1640-1652, Herbolzheim: Centaurus, 2003, pp. 89-91. For the Gran Memorial see doc iv, Vol. 1 in John H. Elliott and J.F. de la Peña, Memoriales y Cartas del Conde Duque de Olivares, Madrid: Alfaguara, 1978-80, 2 Vols. 103 John H. Elliott, The Revolt of the Catalans: A Study in the Decline of Spain (15981640), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1963 is a classic study of the origins of the revolt, which has been followed by many publications. The political discourse of the rebellion remains at the centre of Antoni Simon i Tarrés, Els Orígens Ideològics de la Revolució Catalana de 1640, Barcelona: Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, 1999 and Karsten Neumann, Das Wort als Waffe. The royalist reaction is studied in Xavier Gil Pujol, “El Discurs Reialista a la Catalunya dels Àustries fins el 1652, en el seu Context Europeu,” Pedralbes, 18/2, (1998), pp. 475-487 and Jesús Villanueva López, Política y Discurso Histórico en la España del siglo xvii. Las Polémicas sobre los Orígenes Medievales de Cataluña, Alicante: Publicaciones de la Universidad de Alicante, 2004. For a facsimile edition of the “relaciones de sucesos” which appeared in Catalonia during the revolt see Henry Ettinghausen, La Guerra dels Segadors a través de la Premsa de l’Epoca, Barcelona: Curial, 1993, 4 vols. 104 Relación de las Cavsas qve Obligan a la Casa de Avstria a pedir Pazes al Christianíssimo Rey de Francia, y sus Confederados en la Ciudad de Münster, en el año 1642, Madrid: Alonso Pérez, 1642, f.1r. BNM, VE-35/71, f.2v. I thank Dr. Bernardo J. García García for providing me with this pamphlet. 105 Ibid, f.2v. 106 Jacques de Casan, La recherché des droicts du Roy et de la Couronne de France quoted in Jesús Villanueva López, Política y Discurso Histórico. On the growing corpus of historical treatises legitimizing French dynastic claims over Catalonia see pp. 160ff. The Catalans defending the French theses are studied at pp. 172-187. On the different lines of argument inside Catalonia see Karsten Neumann, Wort als Waffe, pp. 124ff. 107 Gross Europeisch Kriegs-Balet/ getantzet durch die Könige und Potentate/ Fürsten und Republicken/ auff dem Saal der betrübten Christenheit, published after 1645 in Wolfgang Harms (ed.), Illustrierte Flugblätter aus den Jahrhunderten der Reformation und der 102

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rose against Philip iv in 1647, Spanish tyranny was again central and Neapolitans justified their actions as “the natural defence against the oppression performed by the subjects of Spain.”108 At the same time, the idylic image of an Iberian Peninsula freed from internal dissension and war, but from where the means to stir up conflict in the rest of Christendom came, ended, surprising many who perceived Philip iv’s power as almost indestructible.109 The crushing of the ‘ancient constitution’ so dear to European seventeenth-century political writers came to symbolize everything that was violated by both branches of the Habsburgs, which in the Empire, during the reign of Ferdinand ii, meant subverting the delicate balance which protected the position of the Protestants within the Empire.110 Voices against the increasing power of the Emperor rose also in the Dutch Republic, where authors called upon “all the pious Dutch patriots” to come to the defence of their liberties.111 Habsburg rule, be it by the Austrian or Spanish branch, was deemed to be almost equally tyrannical, but the equivalence was never complete as those of “the German house … seemed to be more clement and merciful.”112 The violation of charters and privileges was only the means to an end. Habsburg tyranny was aimed – according to many depictions – at the unbridled exercise of the lowest of passions. Lust, greed and cruelty were the passions of the evil ruler. Accusations focusing on Glaubenskämpfe, Coburg: Die Kunstsammlungen der Veste Coburg, 1983, pp. 206207. This role was ascribed to “Spain” only ten years before in the Manifiesto del Rey de Francia sobre el Rompimiento de la Guerra con el Rey de España en 6 de junio de 1635, compiled by José M. Jover Zamora, 1635. Historia de una Polémica y Semblanza de una Generación, Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas , 2003 (1949), pp. 469-477. 108 Manifest, ofte Redenen, waerom de Gemeynte van Neapels Ghenootsaeckt is geworden/ om haerte Ontslaen van het Jock van Spanien. Mitsgaders, vande groote/ en wreede Moorderyen/ Vrouwenschendingen/ Branden/ Hangen/ Doot-slaen/ ende noch veel onmenschlicke Moetwillen meer/ aldaer gepleeght. Alles, door een Lief-hebber, s.l. [Leiden?]: W. Van der Boxe, 1647, f. 2r-v. 109 Eberhad Straub, Pax et Imperium. Spaniens Kampf um seine Friedensordnung in Europa zwischen 1617 und 1635, Paderborn: Schöningh, 1980, p. 12. Some noted the tensions ready to erupt in the Iberian Peninsula years earlier. Kort Verhael van de Gheleghentheyd des Koninghs van Spaingnien. Getranslateert uyt het Hoogduytsch in de Nederlantsche Tale, ‘s Graven-Haghe: Aert Meuris, 1628. 110 Fritz Dickmann, Der Westfälische Frieden, Münster: Aschendorff, 1972, pp.15-16. 111 Spieghel van des Keysers Monarchale Regier-Sucht; ofte Schriftelijck Bedencken/ over des Keysers Intentie/ om t’Roomsche Rijck te brengen onder een absolute ende onbepalde Heerschappe..., Leeuwarden: Claude Fonteyne, 1629. 112 Der Spaensche Tyrannije…, Vooreden, 3v.

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the enemies’ sexual misconduct were being made even during the first moments of the Dutch Revolt, when William of Orange was charged with adultery, with attacks growing in intensity as he married a former nun. In response, Philip ii was accused of killing his own son and wife; his fourth wedding to a niece made him incestuous.113 Furthermore, Spanish greed, expressed in the levying of new and unjust taxes throughout the monarchy’s kingdoms, with Olivares “scorching Spain, kingdoms, and [other] subjected provinces with the execrable arson of most exorbitant revenues,” was often referred to.114 The removal of privileges would merely make it easier to “extract the moneys of this country at his will.”115 These descriptions of Spanish tyrannical behaviour were complemented by references to the Spaniards as “these bandits,” comparable to the most tyrannical Roman Emperors, Nero and Caligula, who do not “spare anyone whose ship they board: for their greatest lust is rape and murder.”116 Stories of the Spanish fury in Antwerp and references to the incomparable brutality of the Spanish army became part of the collective memory and were made popular in the Empire during the Thirty Years’ War by poets such as Martin Opitz, who claimed that the victims of the Spanish soldiers were so numerous as to stop rivers from flowing,117 an image also used in Dutch pamphlets.118 These crimes were aggravated by the Spanish efforts to conceal their perfidious aims “under the veil of religion,” be it as regards the “poor innocent Indians” or as regards the Dutch, persecuted as “heretics, contaminated with Lutheran teachings, disobedient, trying to discon­ On this and other aspects of the Black legend see Wolfgang Reinhard, “‘Eine so Barbarische und Grausame Nation wie Diese.’ Die Konstruktion der Alterität Spaniens durch die Leyenda Negra und ihr Nutzen für allerhand Identitäten,” in Hans-Joachim Gehrke (ed.), Geschichtsbilder und Gründungsmythen, Würzburg: Ergon, 2001, pp. 159-177. 114 Relación de las Cavsas, f.2r. 115 La Fin Generalle de l’Espagnol, f.4r. The illegality of charging subjects with taxes not for the common good was also used as an argument against France in the later years of the Eighty Years War. Copie d’vne Lettre d’vn Catholicq de Hollande Homme de Condition, escripte de la Haye à vn sien Parent pardeça le 18. Decemb. 1645 svr le Faict dv Traicte de Treves ov Paix, traduicte de thiois en françois, s.l.: s.n., 1646. 116 Der Spaensche Tyrannije. As the French became a threat to the wellbeing of the Dutch Republic, those accusations were also directed against them. Hollandtsche Sybille, openende Verscheyden Heymelijckheden van den Staet, s.l.: s.n., 1646, p. 19. 117 „Ein Gebet, daß Gott die Spanier widerum vom Rheinstrom wolle treiben“, Martin Opitz, Gesammelte Werke: kritische Ausgabe, Stuttgart: Hiersemann, Vol. 2/1, p. 216 (1620). 118 Spaensche Tyrannye, p. 4. 113

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nect themselves from the natural bond that tied them to the king and his Majesty.”119 The Spaniards, and their king, were the worshippers of a wicked creed where the king was Christ’s mirror-image: whereas “Christ made the blind see, he [the king] blinds those who see.”120 The Dutch were admonished not to forget that their ancestors had fought to keep their privileges, their “bodies, lives, goods, freedom of conscience and above all the holy word of God,” against the most loathsome and treacherous tyrant.121 In short, Spanish tyrannical rule threatened the right order and the natural law that governed all things. Rebellion was an act for the preservation of this order, an act in self-defence of the menaced commonwealth. For many there could be no end to the fight until Spanish power was totally destroyed122 and the danger of the Habsburgs attaining universal dominium, the ultimate goal of all their cruelties and final tyranny, was ultimately averted. Tyrants of all the world123 For seventeenth century Dutch authors universal monarchy was neither an unattainable and anachronistic aim, nor a simple remnant of mental conceptions of the past.124 Even after the Reformation and the division of the Habsburg inheritance by Charles v, many still De Spaensche Tiranye, voor-reden. Dialogvs oft t’Samensprekinge, Ghemaeckt op den Vrede-Handel. Ghestelt by Vrage ende Antwoorde/ door een Lieff-hebber vande gemeene Vriiheydt, Outside Antwerp: s.n., 1644. 121 Suchtich en Trouwhertich Discours. References to the suffering and glorious struggle of the forefathers appear in many other pamphlets, such as Een Cort Verhael ende Verthooninge. 122 This argument is presented in, among many other pamphlets, Translaet uyt’t Fransch: Nopende de Gelegentheyt van dese Tegenwoordigen Staet. s.l.: s.n., 1646. 123 A monographic study of the (negative image) of the universal monarchy is Franz Bosbach, Monarchia Universalis: ein Politischer Leitbegriff der Frühen Neuzeit, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988. More recently by the same author see, among other contributions, “Angst und Universalmonarchie” in Franz Bosbach (ed.), Angst und Politik in der Europäischen Geschichte, Dettelbach: Röll, 2000, pp. 151-166. See also Anthony Pagden, Lords of all the World. Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c.1500-c.1800, New Haven, etc: Yale University Press, 1995 and, among other works, John M. Headley, “Geography and Empire in the Late Renaissance: Botero’s Assignment, Western Universalism, and the Civilizing Process,” Renaissance Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 4, 2000, pp. 1119-1155. 124 About the alleged “eccentricity” in the seventeenth century of universalistic claims voiced by authors such as the italian Tommaso Campanella see Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, “‘Imperio de por sí’: La Reformulación del Poder Universal en la temprana Edad Moderna,” in his Fragmentos de Monarquía: Trabajos de Historia Política, Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1992, pp. 168-184, pp. 168-169. 119 120

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feared the formation of a distorted version of the Empire which knew no limit in size and was a form of tyranny. The representation of this form of dominium as a distortion of the Empire, charged with negative connotations, proved to be useful in fighting those who attempted hegemony over Christendom, turning first Charles v and afterwards Louis xiv into would-be tyrants. Rulers striving for hegemony, such as Pope Julius ii, on the contrary, often depicted their Empire as a continuation of classical Rome and, in the case of Charles v, his advisor Gattinara adapted the Roman idea of ‘client kingdom’ to describe the possible existence of single kingdoms within the imperial framework.125 The notion of a hierarchically superior authority which sought to unite diverse polities under one rule, which would then come to be universally hegemonic, implied also eschatological elements, tied to Daniel’s Biblical prophecies of four successive world-empires – where the Holy Roman Empire was conceived as one and the same thing as the Roman Empire – followed by an eternal kingdom, which was interpreted as the reign of the Antichrist or considered to be already in existence in the papacy. The notion of the whole world reunited under one single temporal sword was unanimously condemned as contrary to natural law. For authors arguing the primacy of the Spanish king, such as Fernando Vázquez de Menchaca and Gregorio López Madera, this neither meant placing him over the spiritual authority of the pope nor advocating for the king’s direct dominium over the world.126 Vazquez de Menchaca, following Domingo de Soto, maintained that even if all Christians, by unanimous vote, agreed to establish a universal monarchy – understood as a prince’s direct rule over all territories – it would be invalid as contrary to natural law.127 “The subjection of the world, giving laws to everyone” could also not be attained through force, as wars waged in order to increase one’s own seigniory were pure robbery and usurpation.128 Those assertions did not dispel the suspicion that

John Robertson, “Empire and Union: Two Concepts of the Early Modern Political Order,” in John Robertson (ed.), A Union for Empire. Political Thought and the Union of 1707, Cambridge, etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 3-36, pp. 6-7. 126 Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, “Imperio de por sí,” pp. 176-179. 127 Fernando Vázquez de Menchaca, Controversiarum Illustrivum: Aliarumqve Usu Frequentium: Libri Tres / obra del jurisconsulto vallisoletano Fernando Vázquez de Menchaca; D. Fidel Rodríquez Alcalde and Calixto Valverde y Valverde (eds.), Valladolid: Cuesta, 1931-1934 (1563), Lib. ii, Cap. 20, § 37. 128 José Laínez, El Daniel Cortesano, p. 27. 125

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the Habsburgs simply wanted “to have it all,” an idea first promulgated when “Ferdinand and Isabella found and subjected the New World”.129 There was a profound tension between the attempts by kings from the Middle Ages onwards each to be recognized as an ‘emperor in his own kingdom,’ a first step towards becoming the leading figure of the res publica Christiana,130 and the unanimous disapproval of purported Spanish/Habsburg claims to universal monarchy. Sweden and France justified their wars against the Habsburgs as wars in defence of the true political nature of the Empire, which the Habsburgs wanted to turn into a tyranny, stripping it of its religious and political liberties.131 Similar arguments were used in France to justify the declaration of war in 1635, in combination with attacks which delegitimized the foundations on which the Habsburgs could ground their hegemonic claims, equating the Habsburgs with the Turks.132 Central to this were the patrimonial goals of the Habsburgs, to be achieved through the violation of territorial liberties and their wicked use of religion as a cover up for unlawful goals, which were “entreprendre coses plus hautes, & perfectionner leur pretendue Monarchie”.133 Once the territories under the Habsburgs were deprived “of all their justices, privileges and liberties,” both branches of the family, the Spanish and the Imperial, would “institute a complete domination over those who were not subjected to any laws than their own” and, in due course, “institute the fifth worldly monarchy and tyrannize all other princes and kings.”134 These calls were especially made by Protestants, who feared the Habsburgs would never stop trying “to oppress our brothers in faith,” particularly when they

Dialogvs oft t’Samensprekinge. Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, “Imperio y ‘Monarquía Católica’”, in his Fragmentos de Monarquía: Trabajos de Historia Política, Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1992, pp. 60-85, pp. 60-61. 131 On France see Franz Bosbach, Monarchia Universalis, pp. 57-59. On Sweden see, among others, John Robertson’s and Steven Pincus’s contributions to John Robertson (ed.), A Union for Empire. Political Thought and the British Union of 1707, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 132 See for instance the arguments presented by Jérémie Ferrier, Le Catholique d’Estat, p. 136. A study of the equation between Turks and Spaniards is Werner Thomas, “14921992: Heropleving van de ‘Zwarte Legende’?” Onze Alma Mater, xliv (1992), pp. 394414, p. 408. 133 La Fin Generalle de l’Espagnol, f. 2v. 134 De Spaensche Tyrannye, f. 1r. 129 130

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seemed to strive for peace.135 Furthermore, the monarchy founded “on the ruin of the kingdoms, seigniorial Houses and republics on Earth” would be the basis on which “to establish the empire of the Antichrist” and “the devastation of Christ’s church.”136 Similar arguments persisted well into the 1640s, but gradually faded away.137 The confessional element was constantly present as the universalistic claims of the papacy were seen as going hand in hand with Habsburg policies tending towards universal hegemony.138 All this was simply seen as an attempt to establish the monarchy of the Antichrist, based on the violation of the natural principles of government – such as the natural division of the world into principalities and republics and the existence of privileges and customs. Religious justifications were also increasingly denounced as a cover up, especially when accusations of striving towards universal monarchy were exchanged among Catholics, most notably between the French and the Spanish. The alliances with heretics and the attacks on or disrespect for the supreme authority of the pope by each of the contenders were dutifully listed – and then contested by the adversaries – to prove the righteousness of each king’s enterprise. This argument could be of utmost importance in the confessionally divided Dutch Republic, where it was used to stoke mistrust of Dutch Catholics. They were accused of “helping the king establish his absolute sovereignty over the Netherlands, eliminate our religion, and overthrow the current government of our country.” This would be a first step to setting up “a western monarchy by the king of Spain over the whole of Europe.”139 Other authors, influenced by French pleas for greater Consideratien ende Redenen der E. Heeren Bewind-Hebberen/ vande Geoctrojeerde WestIndische Compagnie inde Vergaederinghe vande Ed. Hoog-Moghende Heren Staten Generael deser Vereenighde Vrye Nederlanden overgelevert/ nopende de Teghenwoordige Deliberatie over dien Treves met den Coning van Hispanjen. Midstgaders Concientieuse Bedenckingen op dese Vrage, Ofmen in Goeder Conscientien mach Treves maecken met den Coning van Spangjen, Haerlem: Adriaen Rooman, 1629, p. 15. 136 Discovrs Aengaende Treves of Vrede, p. 10. 137 Nicolaes Orem, Bulle van Lvcifer aen de Prelaten van de Pausselijcke Roomsche Kercke, dewelcke sich beroemen gesuccedeert ende gekomen te zijn in de Plaetse der Apostelen, s.l.: L. Boutensteyn, 1645. 138 On this point, referring to England, see Steven C.A. Pincus, Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of English Foreign Policy, 1650-1668, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 139 Bedenckingen over het Thien-Hoornig en Seven-Hoofdigh Trefves ofte Pays MunstersMonster; by den Paus Urbanum, den 8. ontfangen. Om het welcke inde verlossinghe by te staen/ ende te omhelfen de Geunieerde Nederlanden/ beneven andere Potentaten van Europa/ 135

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toleration of Dutch Catholics, attempted to gain Dutch Catholic support for the Republic’s cause, once again resorting to the figure of the universal monarchy. Spain’s intention, a pamphlet stated in its title, was not “the preservation of the Roman Church but establishing a fifth monarchy.”140 Other texts also attempted to distinguish between religious and political, ‘national’ allegiances. In a pamphlet which caused much unrest in Spanish governmental circles, the inhabitants of the Spanish Netherlands were called upon to revolt in the name of the Catholic religion.141 Escaping Spanish dominion, they would become masters of themselves, escaping from a “bloody war that would last for a long time and endanger their religion.”142 Remaining loyal to the Spanish king would strengthen existing suspicions against Catholics in the United Provinces, as the Dutch “think that the Catholics of their country do not have all the aversion they desire” towards Spain, the reason they “bridle their liberty of conscience.” If, on the contrary, they were to abandon Spain, “the liberty of the Catholics would grow in their country,” as they would no longer be mistrusted by the opponents of the Habsburgs.143 Within the Empire some authors distinguished between Catholic and Habsburg aims. The old and omnipresent phantom of a Spanish Monarchy which would encompass the whole world was explicitly mentioned as the final goal of the alliances of the Habsburgs, who did not hesitate to play “real pranks with religion, with God’s word and the Holy Sacraments, as well as with the confession and other ceremonies of the Christian church.” The final Habsburg goal was the eradication of the liberties and privileges of all territories, establishing “absolute dominium” everywhere.144 Campanella’s apocalyptical vision of Spanish universal monarchy in his Monarchia di Spagna, hastily translated and constantly published in those polities opposing Spanish might,

van den Koninck van Spagnien werden ghenoodicht. Door E. P., s.l.: s.n., 1643. The same arguments had been deployed in the Consideratien ende Redenen, pp. 14-15. 140 N.N. Een Kort Bericht. Dat de coningen van Hispangien met hare wapenen niet voor hebben de bescherminge vande roomsche-kerck/ maer wel het beginnen end’op-rechten van een vijfde Monarchie, Delft, Andries Cloeting, 1641. 141 Advis Des-Interessé aux Habitans des Païs-Bas, qui sont sous la Domination du Roy d’Espagne. Par Une personne neutre, s.l.: s.n., 1644, pp. x-xi. 142 Remonstratie; aen de Inwoonders van Neder-landt/ zijnde onder de Heerschappie des Coninghs van Spangien, translaet uyt het Fransoys, s.l.: s.n., 1644. 143 Advis Des-Interessé, p. xi. 144 Abtruck Einer Auffgefangenen Jesuiten.

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buttressed the arguments of the Hapsburgs’ enemies.145 Campanella did in fact defend such universal rule, but, as interpreted by the enemies of Spain, his ideas were used to accuse the Spanish kings of trying to set up a world-wide monarchy in cooperation with the pope.146 But as Habsburg power in general, and that of the Spanish Habsburgs in particular, declined, Campanella, and many Dutch and Teutschen with him, began to see France as embodying the aspirations to the universal monarchy. While Campanella saw universal monarchy as the means to restore good order within Christendom, most simply feared and fought it with all possible means. As attacks against France gained strength, they had a growing impact on the 1640s debates whether to make peace treaties with the Habsburgs and under what terms. Fear of the French turning against their allies played a major role and the ghost of the universal monarchy once again came to the fore.147 In a pamphlet Adriaen Pauw, Holland’s delegate in Münster, accused the French of governing, like the Spaniards, like “Scythians and barbarians.”148 The French parliaments – guarantors of territorial liberties – were not summoned, and the government was in the hands of “favourites and court flatterers,” whose aim was “to oppress the freedoms, rights and privileges of the people” and to exercise a “despotic and arbitrary rule.”149 Other pamphlets emphasized these points, relying on the image of a tyrant who would first rule despotically within the natural borders of his domain and then extend For Campanella’s political thought see, among many others, John M. Headley, Tommaso Campanella and the Transformation of the World, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997. 146 See for instance the numerous German editions, with titles which left little room for confusion of what the publisher‘s interpretation was: Tommaso Campanella, Thomas Campanella, von der Spanischen Monarchy, Oder Außführliches Bedencken, welcher massen, von dem König in Hispanien, zu nunmehr lang gesuchter Weltbeherrschung, so wol insgemein, als auff jedes Königreich vnd Land besonders, allerhand Anstalt zu machen sein möchte : Warinnen nicht allein fast aller Herrschafften jetziger Zeit, eigentliche beschaffenheit entdeckt: sondern zumal de Ratione status ... gehandlet würdt ; Nun ... auß dem Italianischen ... in vnser Teutsche Sprach versetzt, vnd erstmals durch den offenen Truck an Tag gegeben, s.l.: s.n., 1620 or Discursus eines weitberümbten hochvernüfftigen Italianer so etwan Königlicher Mayest. in Hispanien praesentiert vnnd in dem von allerhand Mitteln gehdndelt würdt: mit welcher vorschub dass gantze Teutschlandt vnd Franckreich vnder dass hispanischer Joch gebraucht ..., s.l: s.n., 1620. 147 Montstopping aende Vrede-Haters, Leiden: s.n., 1647. 148 Nederlantsche Absolutie op de Fransche Belydenis, Amsterdam: Jacob Nes, 1648. Another pamphlet attributed to Pauw also focused on the conceptualization of the tyrant: Observatien op de Brief van A. de Bruyn, Deventer: s.n., 1647. 149 Nederlanstche Absolutie. 145

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his power without any respect for legality. The French, not feeling tied by the limits of justice, were accused of inventing a “special right” to extend their power over “all neighbouring territories … surpassing by far the borders set by God and Nature long ago, to separate the peoples.”150 National characters changed, but universal dominium remained a breach of the ius gentium.151 The scheme which had been developed to describe Spanish tyranny was now applied to France in territories where Spain had been and continued to be strongly criticized. The tensions between the conflicting realities of the Spanish and French threats deeply conditioned the attitudes and discourses before and during the peace negotiations in Münster. Trusting the tyrant’s word: The Dutch road to Münster Spain’s tyranny caused the revolt, but as rebellion spread and consolidated the fear grew of possible consequences of a greater tyranny following a possible defeat. Territories conquered (through just wars) were likely to lose their constitutions and liberties, and those rebelling were, if failing to win their struggle against their ‘natural lord,’ to be treated as conquered vassals. Some publicists writing on behalf of the Spanish Monarchy, such as Diego Manuel de la Huerta, openly defended this option.152 This argument, meant to make subjects reluctant to rebel, was used at the same time by the rebelling authorities, as they tried to keep up the collective effort against the former tyrannical lord, warning the Dutch and Catalan rebels that they would be deprived of their old customs and enslaved if defeated.153 Trewhertzige Vermahnung. For a Spanish attack on a possible French universal monarchy see Escudo de Estado y Justicia contra el Designio Manifiestamente Descubierto de la Monarchia Unibersal debajo del vano pretexto de las pretensiones de la reina de Francia, s.l.: s.a., 1667. See also Julián Viejo Yharrasarry, “El Barón de Lisola”. 152 Discurso Jurídico-Político sobre el Derecho que el Rey Nuestro Señor tiene en el Reino de Portugal y Unión de su Gobierno a la Real Corona de Castilla y León, BNE, Mss. 953. quoted by Rafael Valladares, Felipe iv y la Restauración de Portugal, Málaga: Algazara, 1994, p. 259. 153 Bartolomé de las Casas, Brevísima Relación de la Destrucción de las Indias (1522) was the preferred source for these authors. For Catalonia see Xavier Gil Pujol, “Republican Politics in Early Modern Spain: The Castilian and Catalano-Aragonese Traditions,” in Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner (eds.), Republicanism, A Shared European Heritage, vol. i, Republicanism and Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 263-288, p. 283. Among the Dutch 150 151

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Many Dutch feared for the viability of any agreement by virtue of the fact that “His Holiness has the power to exempt His Majesty (as His Majesty believes) from his oath and promises,” especially if made to heretics.154 The writings of theologians such as Aquinas and Baltasar de Ayala endorsing the Papal resolution of non esse habendam hereticus fidem confirmed these fears, and the uneasiness they caused among the Dutch was well known to the government circles of the Spanish Monarchy.155 The word of the Spanish king could thus not to be trusted a priori, and he was urged to show by deeds his willingness to comply with agreements.156 The Dutch, on the contrary, did not need a similar display of goodwill as “all true reformed Protestants know and believe that they may not and will not break an agreement even if it is to their disadvantage.”157 Other pamphlets concentrated on rejecting any negotiation on the basis of the tyrannical unreliability of the Spaniard. The appeals of the 1640s to continue the fight against the Spaniard therefore differed little from those made in earlier decades and, as on previous occasions, there was powerful criticism of those Dutch who, because of their Arminian leanings, were “so stupid and completely blind, to negotiate about peace with such an irreconcilable tyrant, who will always be resolved to ruin us.” “Damned and exterminated from the earth, shall be the house and the memory of those who try in earnest to persuade the upright Dutchman to make peace or enter into negotiations with the Spanish Geryon, that sinful son of the Devil.”158 While it was not always expressed in such aggressive language, the intrinsic unreliability of the Spaniard was a recurrent topos. The intrinsic flaws of the Spaniards, whose skin colour “tells us that they descend from the Moors,” returned to the fore: they were “more proud than modest,” cruel and false, never forgave and always considered retaliation.159 see, among others, the already quoted passage referring to the Indians of Spaensche Tyrannye. 154 Noodich bericht voor de vrede-handelaers tot Munster..., s.l.: s.n, 1646. The fate of Jan Huss became a commonplace among Protestant writers, as in Consideratien ende Redenen, p. 16, and later in Bedenckingen over het Thien-Hoornig. In defence of the lawfulness of Jan Hus’s execution see Juan Márquez, El Governador Christiano, p. 297. 155 Advice of the Council of State, 16 July 1641, AGS, Estado, 2056. 156 Erasmus Phlopatroön, Nieuw-Keulsch of Spaensch Bedrogh: Ach! Door Staet-sucht, Eersucht, Geld-sucht, Verkochte, Slavende Vryheid, s.l.: s.n., 1638, p. 16. 157 Hollands Praetje: Piscator ictus sapit, s.l: s.n., 1646, p. 4. 158 Bedenckingen over het Thien-Hoornig. 159 Den Naeckten Spangjaert. Vertoonende sijn listige Gheveynstheden/ so in de voorledene Oorlogen/ als in den tegenwoordigen Vrede-Handel. s.l.: s.n., 1647. Further referring to

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However persistent these arguments were, during the decisive years after 1640 those in favour of peace gained political control and propagated their views on how the United Provinces would fare better in peace, dismissing the negative consequences which a peaceful settlement would have. The need to avoid powerful neighbours, no matter “whether they are French, Spanish, Turks, or Tartar, as long as they do not have enough power to do us any harm,” was one of the reasons. It was beyond doubt that France, enlarged by the Southern Netherlands – either by marriage or of conquest – would be more powerful than Spain. Consequently, it was better to choose to have the weaker Spanish Monarchy as a neighbour.160 Especially negative was France’s “too fidgety” nature, which would prompt it to “disturb the neighbourhood.”161 Indeed, many authors concurred in emphasizing French unreliability.162 Advocates of peace also argued in economic terms, stressing the many expenses the Republic had incurred due to the war, costs which fell on the ‘common citizen.’ Also emphasized was the Christian’s duty to seek peace, as “God is a God of peace and Heaven the proper place for peace.”163 Neither those opposing a settlement nor those in favour of making peace with the Catholic Monarchy ever denied the tyrannical character of the Spaniard. The most moderate depictions of the Catholic kings’ rule simply tried to distinguish between the lawful Dutch revolt, as the Habsburgs governed the Low Countries merely “as count of the land”, and other illegal rebellions. In the Low Countries the Habsburgs were “Rectores Senatus sed regnantis, held in high esteem” but forced to rule with the consent of the States. In the case of Portugal, Spanish deeds could not be condemned so easily, as there the king was “hereditary lord” so that “his will, his sword are the measure of his right and law.”164 But Spanish cruelty, greed and ambition to establish an ‘imagined western monarchy’ were never challenged. Spanish tyranny – a key factor in the justification of the Dutch revolt and of the United the Moorish origin of the Spaniards as a reason for mistrusting them see Antwoordt op’t Münsters praetje, Dordrecht: Claes Claesz, 1646. See also Hollands praetje pp. 15-16. 160 Nederlanstche Absolutie. 161 Irenee, Copie d’une Lettre Envoyee de la Haye, aux Deputez des Estats d’Hollande, Pour la Paix a Münster, s.l : s.n., [1646], p. 2. 162 See for instance Antvvoordt op Seeckere Missive van een Venetiaens Edelman, aen sijn Vriendt tot Tuirin, uyttet Italiaens ende Frans over-gheset, s.l.: s.n., s.a. [1646]. 163 Münsters Praetje. Deliberant Dum fingere nesciunt, s.l: s.n., 1646. 164 Aen-spraeck aen den Getrouwen Hollander, Nopende de Proceduren der Portugesen in Brasill, The Hague: Isaac Burghoorn, 1645 (Attributed to Theodorus Graswinckel), p. 5.

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Provinces as an independent polity – was not and could never be put into doubt. While Spanish tyranny fulfilled an essential function in justifying the very existence of the Dutch Republic, it created an insurmountable dialectical tension for forging a relationship with the Spanish Monarchy which was not based on continuous warfare. Not even the most persistent advocates of the struggle against the Habsburgs could think in terms of everlasting strife and war. Unless Spanish power was eradicated from the face of earth, the moment for negotiating with the tyrant would inevitably come. The question whether promises made by a tyrant – especially a Catholic tyrant – could be trusted would be unavoidable. In the 1640s the diminishing power of the Spanish Habsburgs broke the deadlock. Spain’s inability to remain at war was seen as the best guarantee of the viability of treaties, as there were no possible juridical safeguards for negotiations with a former tyrannical lord of a different confession. The depictions of Spanish tyranny were central to the configuration of the principles of political authority within the Dutch Republic and for its foreign policy.165 The revolts of the 1640s in the Iberian Peninsula modified, at least partially, Spanish discourses by which the exercise of royal power was legitimized. On the whole, the concepts of rebellion and tyranny were expressions of long-lasting political cultures. Their centrality in the 1640s turned them into powerful preconditions for any viable theory of government in both polities.

This is of course very different for those who endorse Grotian natural law theory. See Martin van Gelderen, “‘So meerly humane’. 165

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Chapter 3 Authority Analysis of the concepts of rebellion and tyranny indicates some of the clashes between ‘Dutch’ and ‘Spanish’ political cultures. These clashes became more obvious during the negotiations at Münster, especially when they reached the more contentious issues: the extent of the sovereignty to be granted to the United Provinces and the situation of the Catholics and Catholic Church properties in the Generality Lands, the territories which Dutch armies had conquered during the 1630s and 1640s in Brabant and Limburg. These clashes were partly preconditions for and partly consequences of one of the more comprehensive differences between the two political systems and their cultures, Spanish (absolute) Monarchism against Dutch (civic) Republicanism. Both polities shared the need to establish a political authority able to unite the religious, civic, and social groups within them and to remain free from the growing threat of internal discord. In Spain, the 1640s meant a dangerous period, dominated by centrifugal tendencies which prompted a swift response from government quarters in the form of political and military actions. Among these actions was the production of ‘occasional literature’ to refute the arguments of the rebels,1 and a more outspoken and decided quest for peace on at least some of the many war fronts. The Dutch Republic was not undergoing a similar process of territorial disintegration during the early 1640s, but after the crisis of the 1610s tensions remained. Such tensions were more likely to come to the fore as the possibility of a settlement with the arch-enemy came

Some of the questions addressed here are central to Jerome de Groot, Royalist Identities, Basingstoke, etc: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, referring to the English monarchy, which was equally forced to reformulate its discourse by civil war. 1

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near, raising the spectre of growing dissent, even civil war.2 Many in the United Provinces feared that mounting disagreement would follow the end of hostilities with Spain; Philip iv and his ministers looked forward to Dutch dissent.3 In both polities there was an awareness that peace was not necessarily the ideal state for a political community. The Aragonese Jesuit Baltasar Gracián noted that “some republics, lacking conquests, suffered from internal seditions.” He felt “there are no greater enemies than not having any.”4 Furthermore, the peace negotiations to be held in Münster raised the question of who had the competence and power to give a mandate to those who would represent their polity in negotiations. Internal sovereignty à la Bodin implied that the sovereign within a territory was the only one to enjoy legitimate power which was not directly checked by other human forces. Hence those who had internal sovereignty were subjects of international law, having the monopoly of acting on the international scene.5 Therefore, the representatives of the Catholic Monarchy acted on behalf of the king, not of the different kingdoms or the parliaments, and his acquiescence was necessary for any agreements made by subsidiary powers. The collegiate character of Dutch institutions, the theoretical need for unanimity in the decisions taken by the States General and the emphasis on provincial sovereignty made the Dutch body politic very different.6 The appointment of delegates of equal rank, not by the States General but by the individual For a more detailed study see Laura Manzano Baena, “Bellum optima rerum. Elogio de la Guerra en los Países Bajos tras 1609,” in Bernardo J. García and Manuel Herrero (eds.), El Arte de la Prudencia. La Tregua de los Doce Años en la Europa de los Pacificadores (1598-1618), forthcoming. 3 The Spanish hopes of prospective discord in the United Provinces following the peace were expressed in the “Advice by the Junta de Estado,” Zaragoza, 10 September 1646, AGS, Estado, 2255. 4 Gracián, Político, pp. 147-148, quoted by Xavier Gil Pujol “Baltasar Gracián: Política de El Político,” Pedralbes, 24 (2004), pp. 117-182, p. 168. A bio-bibliographical study is Miquel Batllori and Ceferino Peralta, Baltasar Gracián en su Vida y en sus Obras, Zaragoza: Institución Fernando el Católico-CSIC, 1969. For a republican reflection on this topic through the English reading of Roman history following Lucan see David Norbrook, Writing the English Republic: Poetry, Rhetoric and Politics, 1627-1660, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 23ff. 5 Randall Lesaffer, “Peace Treaties from Lodi to Westphalia”, in Randall Lesaffer (ed.), Peace Treaties and International Law in European History. From the Late Middle Ages to World War One, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 9-44, pp. 13-14. 6 On the negative reactions of the other provinces to Holland’s proposal to send only three or four delegates to the Congress see Jan J. Poelhekke, De Vrede van Munster, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1648, pp. 121-122. 2

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provinces, making them responsible only to ‘their’ province, highlighted the sovereignty of each province but also increased the complexity of the negotiations. Moreover, the importance of the stadholders in the Dutch political system, ‘debating’ with the provincial states of the provinces that had appointed them and commanding the armies raised by the provinces, further complicated matters. The patrimonial rights of the House of Orange over territories located in the Southern, ‘obedient provinces’ and the disputes with the Spanish Monarchy – also to be settled in the framework of the Münster negotiations – gave even more complexity to the already full agenda of the Dutch and Spanish delegates. The tensions arising from a political system which has been exaggeratedly referred to as a “constitutional monstrosity born of war and rebellion”7 determined the course of the Münster negotiations. Sources, extension and limits to kingly power in the Spanish Monarchy The Catholic Monarchy was a polity the foundations of which were not based on a territory or a series of adjoining territories. Neither had all territories under Philip iv’s rule a shared political culture. The Spanish monarchy’s territories were united under the form of aeque principaliter. They kept their own laws and privileges and were supposed to be governed according to them, independently of the powers the king might enjoy elsewhere.8 Tensions between territories integrated in the Monarchy arose when rivalries and suspicions of violations of the ancient constitution emerged.9 In Spain, discourses arguing the legality of kingly rule were constructed to emphasize the fact that the crown was held by the king by sufficient and legitimate titles and power wielded according to the established laws. However, as has been shown previously, these

Andrew Pettegree, review of J. L. Price, “Holland and the Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century: The Politics of Particularism,” in The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 68, No. 1. (Mar., 1996), pp. 233-235, p. 233. 8 John H. Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies”, Past and Present, No. 137 (Nov. 1992), pp. 48-71. 9 Advice to the king on how to avoid this mistrust is given in Juan de Palafox y Mendoza, Juicio Interior y Secreto de la Monarquía para mí solo (1665), apéndice documental a José María Jover Zamora, “Sobre los Conceptos de Monarquía y Nación en el Pensamiento Político Español del Siglo xvii” Cuadernos de Historia de España, xiii (1950), pp. 138150, p. 145. 7

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principles were not univocal and the Catholic Monarchy and those rebelling against it clearly differed in their views. The power of kings The dynasty and political power Diego de Arredondo, notary and contador of the Castilian territories, summarized the basis on which the power of the Spanish kings was founded: dynastic considerations and a theological notion of just war,10 in contrast to the principles defining elective monarchies and republics. The right to the throne, as well as the sacred and timeless authority of kings, was defended, as elsewhere in Europe, by looking for an original ancestor who was as remote as possible. In the Iberian Peninsula these were the biblical Tubal and classical Hercules,11 but appeals to this historical and theological discourse could be reconciled with the neo-scholastic view of princes being constituted by a people, who transferred all powers of self-government to the one made king.12 An attempt to combine both aspects was made by authors such as Alonso Carrillo for the case of Pelayo, who refounded the monarchy after its ‘loss’ at the hands of Islam and combined being elected “according to the laws of the Goths” with being of noble, royal origins. After him, the crown would become hereditary without exclusion of the female line.13 This latter point was said to put the Spanish Monarchy above the French crown in opening up the possibility of increasing the kingdoms Diego de Arredondo y Agüero, Discvrso sobre la Necessidad que ay en la Corona de Castilla de fundar vn Consejo, y Iunta, a quien se Cometan todas las Cosas de su Gobierno Politico. S.l.: s.n, s.a. [ca. 1622], fol. 2r. 11 Richard Kagan, “Clio and the Crown,” Geoffrey Parker, Richard L Kagan, Spain, Europe and the Atlantic: Essays in Honour of John H. Elliott, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 77. See Robert B. Tate, “Mythology in Spanish Historiography of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance,” Hispanic Review, Vol. 22, No. 1. (Jan., 1954), pp. 1-18 for the different appraisals of Hercules’ role in Spanish history during medieval and early modern times. 12 Brian Tierny rightly notes that even Vitoria showed a somewhat ambivalent attitude towards the origin of a ruler’s power in his On Civil Power. In later texts Vitoria tacitly abandoned the idea of a direct divine origin of this power, without, however, ever recanting his earlier view. Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law, and Church Law, 1150-1625, Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 2001, p. 295. Further on Vitoria’s views on liberty, dominium and right see Annabel S. Brett, Liberty, Right, and Nature: Individual Rights in Later Scholastic Thought, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 125-137. 13 Alonso Carrillo Lasso de la Vega, Soberania del Reyno de España, Córdoba: Salvador de Cea , 1626, pp. 3-4. 10

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through the marriage of queens and kings of different territories. Carrillo’s argument was part of a wider line of histories of Spain which alluded to a remote election of the king by the people and the transfer of authority from the latter to the former, emphasizing the maintenance of the Visigoth election ritual and the descent from the Visigoth kings of those who reigned after the Arab invasion of the Peninsula.14 Appeals to the Visigoth past served two purposes: first, it fostered the idea of the (eternal) unity of the Iberian Peninsula as one political entity. Secondly, it was used as a means to legitimize the pre-eminence or supremacy of Castile, first inside Spain and then in the rest of the world – building on the Isidorian idea of the Visigoths being selected by God as the people chosen to succeed Rome.15 The Aragonese appealed to another source of legitimacy. The powerful myth of foral election within the Sobrarbe tradition started in the thirteenth century and retained its vitality during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. It told the story of an elected king whose continuation in office depended on his respect for the privileges of the territory.16 The Aragonese did not follow this line unanimously, and authors like Gracián in his Político stressed the importance of dynastic factors in shaping the noble character and abilities of future kings, claiming that access to royal power was possible only by inheritance.17 Many contemporaries, from Juan de Mariana to Saavedra Fajardo, praised hereditary government, which also had the advantage of avoiding dangerous interregna, establishing the continuation of the king’s political and natural bodies beyond the natural cycles of life and death.18 This was reinforced in Castile by creating a mythology stressing 14 Gregorio López Madera, Excelencias de la Monarquía y Reino de España, José Luis Bermejo Cabrero (ed.), Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 1999 (1597), pp. 71-72. 15 Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, ““Imperio” y “Monarquía Católica””, pp. 61-62. Also Robert B. Tate “Spanish Historiography” On Isidore of Seville’s historical providentialism see Jocelyn N. Hillgarth, “Spanish Historiography and Iberian Reality,” History and Theory, Vol. 24, No. 1. (Feb., 1985), pp. 23-43, pp. 26-27. 16 Xavier Gil Pujol, “Aragonese Constitutionalism and Habsburg rule: the Varying Meanings of Liberty,” in Geoffrey Parker, Richard L Kagan (eds.) Spain, Europe and the Atlantic: Essays in Honour of John H. Elliott, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 160-186. 17 For this and other aspects of Gracián’s Político see Xavier Gil Pujol, “Baltasar Gracián: Política.” On Gracian’s dynasticism, p. 147. 18 Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957, especially chapter vii, “The king never dies.”

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the continuity of the royal lineage through the centuries, disregarding fratricides, bastard sons and adulteries.19 Furthermore, popular allegiance to the dynastic principles contributed to the development of discourses emphasizing the charismatic power invested in royal lineages, particularly important in a monarchy the territories of which were scattered across the globe. This created the need to establish a system of king’s representatives where the king could not be, a role ideally fulfilled by persons of royal lineage, especially in provinces threatened by political instability, such as the Low Countries.20 By appointing his own brother as a governor of the provinces, Philip iv showed the love of the king and his commitment to the welfare of his Flemish subjects, and also prevented discord among highly placed noblemen competing with each other for power.21 At the centre remained the problem of justifying the way domain over territories was transmitted, devoting much interest to making the inheritance laws of equal value and universal to all the king’s dominions – the reason Philip iii stated in his will that the transmission of all the polities under his sceptre had to take place following the ‘mayorazgo’ laws.22 The mayorazgo was a form of entailment characteristic of Castile, which implied that the properties held by a (noble) family could not be

Even the often polemical Mariana echoed these opinions: Juan de Mariana, De rege, Lib. i Cap. iii. I quote from La dignidad real y la educación del rey [De rege et regis institutione], Luis Sánchez Agesta (ed.), Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1981, pp. 47-48.This myth found way into the works of twentieth century Spanish historians like Ramón Menéndez Pidal. See Jocelyn N. Hillgarth, “Spanish Historiography”. 20 See for instance Juan de Palafox y Mendoza, Juicio Interior y Secreto, p. 143. On the possible consequences which a visit from Philip ii could have had during the outbreak of the Dutch Revolt see Geoffrey Parker, “1567: The End of the Dutch Revolt?,” Ana Crespo Solana and Manuel Herrero Sánchez (cords.), España y las 17 Provincias de los Países Bajos: una Revisión Historiográfica (xvi-xviii), Vol. 1, Córdoba: Servicio de Publicaciones, Universidad de Córdoba, 2002, pp. 269-290. 21 This was discussed in the Junta de Estado held in Zaragona on 22 October 1644, AGS Estado Flandes 2062 and in other occasions until the final appointment of Archduke Leopold Wilhelm as governor general of the Low Countries in 1647.Visual representation reinforced the dynasty’s charismatic power. René Vermeir, “En el Centro de la Periferia: los Gobernadores Generales en Flandes, 1621-1648,” in Ana Crespo Solana and Manuel Herrero Sánchez (cords.), España y las 17 Provincias de los Países Bajos: una Revisión Historiográfica (xvi-xviii), Vol. 1, Córdoba: Servicio de Publicaciones, Universidad de Córdoba, 2002, pp. 387-402, p. 396. 22 Testamento de Felipe iii. Introd. Carlos Seco Serrano, transcript. José Luis de la Peña, Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1982, § 34, pp. 43-45. 19

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sold or alienated by the holder, a mere administrator who could dispose of the rents but not of the goods on which those rents depended.23 This consideration had a whole range of implications. First, it determined the way the territory was to be inherited. Secondly, it affected the possibilities of dividing up its parts. Thirdly, the consideration of the whole ensemble of properties as forming a unique – and indivisible – mayorazgo had implications for the relationship between the king and his kingdoms, making notions of popular sovereignty very difficult to include in the political scheme, even when they could have proved apt at advancing the interests of the Spanish Monarchy.24 The Catalan rebels resorted to emphasizing their primeval liberty as a means of justifying the appointment of a prince other than Philip iv as Count of Barcelona and sovereign over the Principality. This clashed head-on with the Spanish monarchy’s conceptions, in spite of sharing the idea of medieval Hispania as being the product of liberation from the ‘Moorish yoke.’ The moment when the inhabitants of Barcelona had escaped from Arab domination and subsequently, “with free and ready will,” had “subjected themselves” to the Holy Roman Emperor, i.e. to Charles the Bald, was recorded in ‘the privilege of Charles the Bald’ of 844. Conveniently discovered during the second half of the sixteenth century, it served to remind the king of the contractual origin of his power, which could be forfeited if he failed to respect the territorial privileges.25 Although the idea of the original election of the king by the people was not alien to Philip iv and the intellectuals defending his rights over Catalonia, the drift of the argument which assumed that the

For the formation and evolution of the mayorazgo see Bartolomé Clavero, Mayorazgo. Propiedad Feudal en Castilla 1369-1836, Madrid: Siglo xxi, 1974. For the definition of mayorazg see, pp. 21ff. 24 I refer to the attempts to make Philip ii’s daughter, later archduchess Isabella, queen of France by demonstrating the falsity of Salic law. On the arguments deployed by Spanish jurists see Albert Mousset, “Les Droits de l’Infante Isabelle-Claire-Eugénie à la Couronne de France,” in Bulletin Hispanique, xvi, 1914, pp. 46-79. Similarly, the Spanish Monarchy found it difficult to accept the voluntary transfer of sovereignty by the people of Cambrai to Philip ii: José J. Ruiz Ibáñez, Felipe ii y Cambrai, el Consenso del Pueblo: la Soberanía entre la Práctica y la Teoría Política: Cambrai (1595-1677), Rosario: Prohistoria, 2003. 25 On the discovery of the privilege see Jesús Villanueva, Política y Discurso Histórico en la España del siglo xvii. Las Polémicas sobre los Orígenes Medievales de Cataluña, Alicante: Universidad de Alicante, 2004, pp. 53ff. For the contractualist allegations during the 1630s and 1640s see Karsten Neumann, Das Wort als Waffe. Politische Propaganda im Aufstand der Katalanen, 1640-1652, Herbolzheim: Centaurus, 2003, pp. 110-111. 23

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alienation by the community had not been complete and that the title of Count of Barcelona remained elective was unacceptable.26 This was a point which the writers defending the monarchy’s right over the Principality meticulously confuted. Pellicer devoted a large number of pages in his Idea del Principado de Cataluña to prove the hereditary character of the territory. As long as there was a lawful heir to the dynasty originally invested with power, the commonwealth could not alter the existing allegiances.27 In the case of the secession of Portugal, authors defending the Spanish position also rejected the idea that the people were entitled to elect their kings, although Braganza’s claims also relied on dynastic principles.28 Fear of and contempt for the principles of popular election were thus general among writers in the Spanish Monarchy because of their rebellious connotations. Whether referring to contemporary events or to the distant biblical past, the assessment remained the same: the “popular faction,” deemed “always brutish,” longed for a wrongly understood freedom.29 Even the leading neo-scholastic Francisco Suárez rejected the view that the prince was the delegate of the people and that his power depended on the people’s will, emphasizing that the people had completely alienated their ruling power. The prince could then make use of it as its proper owner, his authority becoming greater than the kingdom’s.30 The unquestionability Francesc Marti i Viladamor pioneered the thesis of the elective character of the Count of Barcelona. See Jesús Villanueva, Política y Discurso, pp. 116-119 and Karsten Neumann, Wort als Waffe, pp. 132ff. 27 José Pellicer de Ossau, Idea del Principado de Catalvña, Antwerp: Geronimo Verdus, 1642, p. 492. Accounts of the “Philipist” response to the revolt are to be found in Mª Soledad Arredondo Sirodey, “Armas de Papel: Quevedo y sus Contemporáneos ante la Guerra de Cataluña,” La Perinola: Revista de Investigación Quevediana, Nº 2, 1998, pp. 117-154 and Jesús Villanueva, Política y Discurso, pp. 125-155. 28 Rafael Valladares, Teatro en la Guerra: Imágenes de Príncipes y Restauración de Portugal, Badajoz: Diputación de Badajoz, Departamento de Publicaciones, 2002, p. 40. On how difficult it could be for noblemen to accept as king someone they had considered an equal see Francisco de Quevedo, Respuesta al manifiesto del duque de Braganza, in Alfonso Rey (dir), Obras completas en prosa. Volumen iii, Escritos históricos y políticos, Madrid: Castalia, 2005, p. 424. 29 See José Laínez, El Daniel Cortesano en Babilonia, Susannam, y Echatanam, Madrid: Juan Sanchez: 1644, p. 12 and Juan Márquez, El Governador Christiano: Deducido de las Vidas de Moysen, y Josue, Principes del Pueblo de Dios, Madrid: Gregorio Rodriguez, 1651 (1612), p. 146. 30 On this reading of De Legibus iii.4 see Quentin Skinner, “Political Philosophy”, in Charles B. Schmitt, (general ed.), The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 389-452, p. 406 and Peter Stein, Roman Law in European History, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 95. 26

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of the king’s authority following the complete transfer of jurisdiction from the people to the prince was a principle well established in Castile by the mid sixteenth century.31 Consequently, the obedience of subjects was for Suárez inextricable from the very existence of the prince.32 Other authors pointed to the king’s role as defender of the true faith and fosterer of its church. By sacralizing the kings’ endeavours, subjects were especially obliged to follow the king’s orders and divested of any ability to form a political community unless it was under the aegis of the monarch.33 Demands for obedience at all costs in a language which emphasized subjects’ duties and obligations and the fidelity that was expected from them followed.34 Furthermore, the prince became legibus solutus, the sole source of right and justice. Following this reasoning, the next step was to situate the prince above the law, a highly contested principle which spread through medieval Europe and which in Castile was expressed as early as in the Siete Partidas of Alfonso x (1256-1265). Aware of the dangers, theologians and jurists throughout Europe tried to address the negative consequences of a prince not bound by the laws issued by him, but this did not prevent the king from monopolizing lawmaking in Castile.35 These arguments, combined with the scorn poured See Salustiano de Dios, “El Absolutismo Regio en Castilla durante el Siglo xvi,” Ius Fugit, Revista Interdisciplinar de Estudios Histórico-Jurídicos, vol. 5-6 (1996-1997), Zaragoza: Fernando el Católico, 1997, pp. 53-236, p. 88. 32 Francisco Suárez, De Iuramento Fidelitatio: Documentación Fundamental, Luciano Pereña, Vidal Abril and Carlos Baciero (eds.), Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto Francisco de Vitoria, 1978, p. 57. 33 Fray Marcos Salmerón, Sacra Apología. Disposición del Señor de los Ejércitos. Ejemplar vivo de las Armas Católicas a favor de la Fe y de los Vasallos leales de la Majestad de Felipe iv Rey de las Españas y Emperador de América, Cuenca, 1642. 34 An example of this kind of exhortations is: “Ea pues Castellanos fidelissimos, sacramentados a la fidelidad de vuestro señor natural, ocasion teneis en que mostrar vuestras obligaciones, e ya se ven quan ventajosamente cumplis puntuales con el deber”. Fr. Francisco Enríquez, Conservacion de Monarqvias, Religiosa, y Politica. Primera, y segunda Parte. A la Catolica, Sacra, y Real Magestad del Rey Felipe Qvarto el Grande Nvestro Señor, Madrid: Domingo Garcia y Morrás, 1648, f. 4v. Or “Y es muy digno de admiracion que siendo tan tierno como natural el amor de los padres con los hijos, no se rebelassen los Hebreos, ni tentassen contra la vida de Faraon quando se los mandò anegar en las aguas del Nilo” Juan Marquez, Governador Christiano, p. 35. 35 This eased the way to considering royal power in Castile to be absolute – although always emphasizing the difference between this power and tyranny and, preventively, denying subjects all possible rights of resistance. Xavier Gil Pujol, “Republican Politics in Early Modern Spain: The Castilian and Catalano-Aragonese Traditions”, in Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner (eds), Republicanism, A Shared European Heritage, 31

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on and dismissal of either the extent or the very lawfulness of territorial privileges, presented a view of the Spanish king’s authority which was very much akin to what elsewhere would be considered tyranny. Emphasis on the continuation of the dynasty and on the need to keep ‘the Majesty’ untainted even by ecclesiastical criticism was meant to keep any discussion of the king’s legitimacy at bay.36 The discourse on the king’s absolute power might be applicable to Castile, but the Spanish Habsburgs reigned over a plurality of territories where notions of constitutional limits to princely power were strong. Other means and arguments needed to be found in order to overcome the existing tensions and set the basis on which all the monarchy’s territories as a whole would be governed. Law, grace and the exercise of power Recent work referring to England during the Civil War and to Catalonia insists on the necessity of avoiding a Manichaean attitude in the analysis of ‘constitutional’ and ‘absolutist’ postulates, a line I will also pursue.37 During the first decades of Philip iv’s reign, coinciding with the period of ‘privanza’ of the Count-Duke of Olivares, government circles tried to increase the power of the monarchy, a power which radiated from the centre to the territorial and institutional periphery through the extension of Castilian laws, following Olivares’ advice in his Gran Memorial. This meant a clear violation of the principles on which the different territories forming part of the Spanish Monarchy had been united. The centre was one and was located in Castile, from where ‘mercedes’ (favours), and the most important ‘royal grace’ radiated to

vol. i, Republicanism and Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe, Cambridge, etc,: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 263-288, pp. 267-268. 36 Francisco Enríquez, Conseruacion de Monarquias, f. 38r. Only more abstruse texts such as Mariana’s De rege asserted the right of the people to “ask the king to follow the law” (“llamar a derecho al rey”) but also to “depose him from the throne if he refuses to correct his faults.” De Rege, Lib. i, Cap. 4, p. 77. 37 Xavier Gil Pujol, “El Discurs Reialista a la Catalunya dels Àustries fins el 1652, en el seu Context Europeu,” Pedralbes, 18/2, (1998), pp. 475-487, p. 476 where he also warns of the risks of explaining moments of conflict as the result of a “permanent and systematic polarization.” On England see, among many others, David L. Smith’s monograph, Constitutional Royalism and the Search for Settlement, c.1640–1649, Cambridge; New York, Cambridge University Press, 1994. On the elaborations on the “ancient constitution” see particularly Glenn Burgess, The Politics of the Ancient Constitution: An Introduction to English Political Thought, 1603-1642, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992.

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the whole body of the domains of the Catholic king.38 Accordingly, more and more often Castile was thought to encompass the whole of Spain, and discourses emphasizing the superiority of Castile and its reigning dynasty over those of the other peninsular kingdoms were developed.39 During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries authors who extended the meaning of Castile to the whole of Spain by considering it “the best part of it” became even more outspoken, 40 and this trend was not the preserve of Castilian authors alone.41 This was combined with emphasis on the ‘Spanish nation’ – which often meant Castilian – as fulfilling the monarchy’s most important tasks of government, if only because of the ‘Spaniards’’ undeniable fidelity.42 The Habsburg monarchy was thus characterized, first, by its transformation into a ‘Spanish Monarchy.’ Philip iv in particular was presented, especially in the works published surrounding the ‘explosion’ of open conflict with France in 1635, as the holder of a non-existent ‘crown of Spain,’ threatening the cohesion of the territories outside the Iberian Peninsula. Its second characteristic was Castile. Its laws and political customs came to symbolize those of Xavier Gil Pujol, “Una Cultura Cortesana Provincial. Patria, Comunicación y Lenguaje en la Monarquía Hispánica de los Austrias,” in Monarquía, Imperio y Pueblos en la España Moderna, Pablo Fernández Albaladejo (ed.), pp. 225-257. The limitations of viceregal patronage are noted at pp. 235-236. See also Salustiano de Dios, “The Operation of Royal Grace in Castile, 1250-1530, and the Origins of the Council of the Chamber,” in Antonio Padoa-Schioppa (ed.), Legislation and Justice, Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 159-173. On the importance of patronage and access to the monarch as means of avoiding internal conflict in Stuart England see Kevin Sharpe, “Stuart Monarchy and Political Culture,” in his Remapping Early Modern England. The Culture of Seventeenth-Century Politics, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 201-222, p. 204. 39 The defence of Castile’s preeminence in historical works produced during the late medieval period is emphasized by Robert B. Tate in “The Anacephalosis of Alfonso García de Santa María” in Frank Pierce (ed.), Hispanic Studies in Honour of I. Gonzales Llubera, Oxford: Dolphin Book Co., 1959, pp. 387-401 and “An Apology for Monarchy. A Study of an Unpublished 15th Century Castilian Historical Pamphlet”, Romance Philology, xv (1961), pp. 111-123. 40 Alonso Carrillo Lasso de la Vega, Soberanía del Reyno de España, p. 1, also in Gregorio López Madera, Excelencias de la Monarquía, pp. 125-6. 41 Miguel de Vasconcelos did not dispute the precedence of Castile over Portugal in the list of titles held by the Catholic monarchs, seeing it as a result of the might of kingly power in the Castilian kingdom. Quoted by Jean- Frédéric Schaub, Le Portugal au Temps, p. 70. 42 This had remained a constant since the times of Charles v. See the Peticion tercera. Cortes de León y Castilla, tomo iv, Madrid, 1882, p. 449, quoted by José Alcalá Zamora, España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte (1618-1639), Barcelona: Planeta, 1975, pp. 160-161. 38

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Spain, subsuming under this heading the variety of polities present on the Iberian Peninsula. The core of the problem was Alfonso xi’s Ordenamiento de Alcalá (1348), issued for Castile, which declared royal law to enjoy priority in the hierarchy of legal codes and which was from the moment of its declaration seen as prejudicial to the integrity of any charter of liberties and municipal interests.43 Scholars have recently emphasized the role played by territorial liberties and their defence during the same period, and have challenged the notion of an intentional ‘Castilian’ strategy to break up the ‘ancient constitution,’ questioning the paradigm of a growing ‘absolutism’ 44 and terming it ‘atrophied’ or ‘decentralized.’45 As noted before, the crown of Castile was in fact, or at least was interpreted to be, a ‘mayorazgo’ from the fifteenth century onwards, with dominium utile belonging to the king (not to the kingdom) and the eminent domain (dominium directum) to God himself.46 This conceptualization of political domination has led scholars to emphasize Benjamín González Alonso, “La Fórmula “Obedézcase pero no se Cumpla” en el Derecho Castellano de la Baja Edad Media,” Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español, Nº 50 (1980), pp. 475-477. 44 Gerhard Oestreich noted some of the problems inherent in the use of the concept in “Strukturprobleme des Europäischen Absolutismus,” in his Geist und Gestalt des Frühmodernen Staates, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1969, pp. 179-197. During the 1990s the critique became shriller with contributions such as Nicholas Henshall’s The Myth of Absolutism. Change and Continuity in Early Modern European Monarchy, London: Longman, 1992. For the Spanish Monarchy – more often than not subsumed under the term Castile for the study of these matters – see I.A.A. Thompson, “Absolutism, Legalism and the Law in Castile 1500-1700”, in Ronald G. Asch and Heinz Durchhardt, Der Absolutismus-ein Mythos? Strukturwander Monarchischer Herrschat in West- und Mitteleuropa (ca. 1550-1700), Cologne, Weimar, Vienna: Böhlau, 1996, pp. 185-227. 45 In English see the pioneering revisionism on Castilian absolutism, Charles Jago, “Habsburg Absolutism and the Cortes of Castile,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 86, No. 2. (Apr., 1981), pp. 307-326 and I.A.A. Thompson, “Crown and Cortes in Castile 1590-1655,” Parliaments, Estates and Representation 2, 1982, pp. 29-45. See also José Ignacio Fortea Pérez, “Las Ciudades, las Cortes y el Problema de la Representación Política en la Castilla Moderna,” in José I. Fortea Pérez, Imágenes de la Diversidad: el Mundo Urbano en la Corona de Castilla (s. xvi-xviii), Santander: Universidad de Cantabria, 1997, pp. 421-445. 46 Pablo Fernández Albaladejo and Julio Pardos, “Castilla, Territorio sin Cortes (Siglos xv-xvii),” Revista de las Cortes Generales, No. 15 (1988), pp. 113-210, pp. 168-169. Julián Viejo Yharrassarry, “Ausencia de Política: Ordenación Interna y Proyecto Europeo en la Monarquía Católica de mediados del Siglo xvii,” Enrique Giménez López, Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, Antonio Mestre Sanchos (coords.), Monarquía, Imperio y Pueblos en la España Moderna. Actas de la iv Reunión Científica de la Asociación Española de Historia Moderna Alicante, 27-30 de mayo de 1996, Vol. 1, 1997, pp. 615-630. 43

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that Castile was ruled according to principles of Aristotelian ‘oeconomical’ rule. The king was the father of the household of the kingdom, which had lost its political voice when the territorial assemblies (Cortes) lost their legislative power. Accordingly, monarchical rule in Castile would then fulfil one of the defining characteristics of absolutism47 – the prince of the territory under his rule saw it as his possession and dealt with it according to the norms of private law. Some texts studied here confirm these views.48 Authors such as Alonso Carrillo argued that in Castile – the grandeur and importance of which were such that it had come to encompass the plurality of Hispaniae49 – royal power was exercised without any of the “shackles” limiting princely authority.50 Other authors and events, however, challenged univocal readings of the Habsburgs’ endeavours. As the President of the Council of Castile, Don Fernando de Acevedo, reminded Philip iv, the impossibility of alienating anything belonging to his kingdoms did limit royal action.51 Even when defending royal prerogatives, Alonso Carrillo recognized this limit to the king’s sovereignty.52 Saavedra Fajardo expressed the same idea in educational tones when advising the crown prince Baltasar Carlos.53 Even for the staunchest supporters of royal authority the indivisibility and inalienability of the prince’s domain were beyond dispute, and this was the key to the relationship between the Spanish kings and their possessions, again following the limits imposed by the ‘mayorazgo’ laws. Furthermore, some territories within Castile were reinforcing their juridical and institutional particularism during the

Günter Barudio, Absolutismus – Zerstörung der ‘Libertären Verfassung’. Studien zur ‘Karolinischen Eingewalt’ in Schweden zwischen 1680 und 1693, Wiesbaden: Steiner Verlag, 1976, especially pp. 30-33. 48 This is all the more blatant in a text published in the context of the Cortes to be held in Zaragoza during 1626. Alonso Carrillo Lasso de la Vega, Soberania del Reyno, p. 1. 49 See Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, “España desde España,” in Idea de España en la Edad Moderna, Valencia: Real Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País, 1998, pp. 142-153 especially p. 147 and the bibliography there cited. 50 Alonso Carrillo Lasso de la Vega, Soberania del Reyno, p. 2. 51 Escagedo Salmón, ‘Los Acebedos’, Boletín de la Biblioteca Menéndez y Pelayo, 9, p. 150, quoted by John H. Elliot, The Count-Duke of Olivares: the statesman in an age of decline, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986, p. 177. 52 Alonso Carrillo Lasso de la Vega, Soberania del Reyno, p. 6. 53 Diego Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas Políticas [Idea de un príncipe cristiano representada en cien empresas, Munich and Milan, 1640] Francisco Javier Díez de Revenga (ed.), Barcelona: Planeta, 1988, Empresa 19. 47

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early modern period,54 indicating some disquieting cracks in the edifice of the allegedly unified household. These cracks become more obvious and bigger when historians focus on the constant process of negotiation in which the Catholic kings had to engage within Castile for the approval of any taxes (millones or other) to be granted by the cities (and one villa) represented in the Cortes or when trying to enforce recruitment and military levies.55 When scholars combine these findings with the strong emphasis in the monarch’s entourage on Philip iv’s role as “universal head of all the families of the kingdoms of his monarchy,”56 one has to reckon that generational conflict within this household was, at least potentially, considerable. Scholastic theories of power, which represented a king as incorporated in the kingdom,57 together with the representation of societies in organic metaphors, as analogies of the nature of political community, help to reconcile apparently contradictory arguments:58 a completely centralized government would be as monstrous as a body consisting only of a head.59 Thus, the monarch and the (kingdom’s) constitution were integrally and symbiotically bound together. Politics was seen as a process in which different sources of authority complemented and reinforced one other. This process was accomplished in Castile not through parliamentary assemblies, but through a system of conciliar government (polysynodie), where the king governed surrounded by councils advising him, protecting the king from turning into a tyrant. The council took over the functions generally ascribed to parliaments and dominated by letrados, possessing advanced degrees in canon or civil law; the councils ensured the privileged position of the law and

Jon Arrieta Alberdi, “La Idea de España entre los Vascos de la Edad Moderna”, en Idea de España en la Edad Moderna, pp. 117-139, p. 124. 55 For the millones see the already cited works by Jago and Thompson. On the resistance to military recruitment in Castile see Ruth Mackay, The Limits of Royal Authority: Resistance and Obedience in Seventeenth-Century Castile, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 56 Diego de Arredondo, Discvrso sobre la Necessidad, fol. 15v. 57 Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, “Monarquía, Cortes y Cuestión Constitucional en Castilla durante la Edad Moderna,” in Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, Fragmentos de Monarquía: trabajos de historia política, Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1992, pp. 284-299. 58 On John of Salisbury’s matching of the corpus ecclesiae mysticum by the corpus reipublicae mysticum see Paul Kléber Monod, The Power of Kings. Monarchy and Religion in Europe, 1589-1715, New Haven: Yale UP, 1999, p. 40. 59 António M. Hespanha, Vísperas del Leviatán: Instituciones y Poder Político (Portugal Siglo xvii), Madrid: Taurus, 1989, p. 235. 54

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the limits this imposed on a king wishing to rule following his own will.60 The discourse that linked justice, legal advice and the exercise of kingship was the outcome of a transformation of the image of the king (and his power) during late medieval times by which the prince was “transferred from the altar to the bench, from the realm of Grace to that of Jurisprudence.”61 In early modern Castile this translated into the king obtaining immense judicial powers, as he was now the fount of justice, the sole source of civil laws and the arbiter of their interpretation. In the case of a rightful lord, it was the administration of justice which set the limits to royal action, although the lack of effective counterweights means for some scholars that all theoretical and juridical arguments which dignified the prince who submitted himself to the law lacked “juridical value or political force.”62 Focusing only on coercive counterweights means, however, forgetting the inextricable union of political and legal cultures in Castile and in the rest of the Spanish Monarchy.63 As Saavedra Fajardo reminded the would-be king Baltasar Carlos, “Justice is what gave [the prince] the sceptre and what is going to preserve it for him. It is the mind of God, the harmony of the commonwealth and the fortress of Majesty.”64 Justice was a privileged channel of communication between the king and his realm, and the king’s courts would even protect subjects from

Reminding one of the boundaries to royal power as set by God and nature, see Gregorio López Madera, Excelencias de la Monarquía, pp. 39ff and Diego Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas, Empresa 20. 61 Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies, p. 140. See also Janet Coleman, “Medieval Discussions of Property, Ratio and Dominium according to John of Paris and Marsilius of Padua,” History of Political Thought, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Summer 1983),” pp. 220ff and Gaines Post Studies in Medieval Legal Thought. Public Law and the State, 1100-1322, Princeton, etc.: Princeton University Press, 1964, pp. 383-4. On Medieval Castile see José Manuel Nieto Soria, “El Rey Justiciero” in Iglesia y Génesis del Estado Moderno en Castilla, 1369-1480, Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1994. 62 Francisco Tomás y Valiente, “La Monarquía Española del Siglo xvii: el Absolutismo Combatido”, in Ramón Menéndez Pidal (ed.), Historia de España. La España de Felipe iv. El Gobierno de la Monarquía, la Crisis de 1640 y el Fracaso de la Hegemonía Europea, Vol. 25, Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1990, p. 1-214, pp. 33-34. 63 The implications of this for the aggregated kingdom of Portugal are studied by JeanFrédéric Schaub, Le Portugal au Temps and its validity for the monarchy confirmed by I.A.A. Thompson in his review of the book in the English Historical Review, June 2003. 64 Diego Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas, Empresa 22. See also Tomás de Castro y Águila, Antídoto y Remedio Vnico de Daños Publicos, conseruacion y restauración de monarchias: discurso legal y politico, Antequera: Vicente Álvarez de Mariz, 1649, f. 16r. 60

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his own decisions.65 The king subjected his own power to the laws and to a juridical procedure which was not easy to control, let alone change. This provided those dissatisfied with the king’s rule with legal avenues for raising their claims without having to resort to rebellion, as Catalan rebels were reminded.66 The prince – and his government – prided himself on acting as if bound by the laws (legibus alligatus). Thus, when infringing the law kings had to resort to principles of necessity. This necessity should have the wellbeing of the subjects as its final goal. This distinguished the king from the tyrant,67 as did the king’s submission to the vis directiva of natural law, which was difficult to define. Natural law was often seen as a body of self-evident principles implanted by God in human hearts. Its expression through justice provided the ultimate measure of right and wrong and the pattern for a good life.68 ‘Do unto others as you would have others do unto you’ and the respect due to private property, including the value of money and one’s wife, were central tenets.69 At the centre of the system was the contract, as the basic instrument regulating the transmission and perpetuation of property, but which also encompassed the relationship binding ruler and subjects, thus setting the ‘frame of government.’ Consequently, the prince who did not govern his territories “pour leur propre subsistence

On how the correct exercise of justice made the common people of Castile unlikely to revolt see James Casey, Early Modern Spain. A Social History, London and New York: Routledge, 1999, pp. 165ff. On the difficulties of convicting Adam de la Parra for libel in spite of Olivares’ personal interest see John H. Elliott, “Nueva Luz sobre la Prision de Quevedo y Adam de la Parra.” Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia, 169 (1972), pp. 171-82, especially p. 178. 66 Francisco de Rioja, Aristarco o censura de la Proclamación Católica de los Catalanes, s.n.: sl., s.a [1640], fol. 49v-50r. 67 On the existence of this concept in the works of Ribadeneira and Saavedra Fajardo see Ulrich Dierse, “Pedro de Ribadeneira und Diego de Saavedra Fajardo: Aspekte der spanischen Machiavelli-Rezeption”, in Reyes Mate and Friedrich Niewöhner(eds.), Spaniens Beitrag zum politischen Denken in Europa um 1600, Wiesbaden, 1994, pp. 99-119. 68 Anthony Pagden, “Introduction,” Francisco de Vitoria, Political Writings, Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, p. xv. 69 “A king is above all private persons in his realm, but it is not he who makes them masters of their own property”: Francisco de Vitoria, I On the Power of the Church, § 4 Q 5, Art. 3, in Francisco de Vitoria, Political Writings , Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 87. For a summary of different medieval theories concerning property and rights attached thereto see Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, pp. 131-169. For the relations between property and subjective rights see Annabel S. Brett, Liberty, Right and Nature. Also Janet Coleman, “Medieval Discussions of Property,” pp. 220ff. 65

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selon leurs privileges,” and broke the charters or (mythical) agreements between king and people turned into a tyrant.70 In practice these principles clashed with the vehement dismissal of the privileges among Castilian authors and with policies sidestepping territorial particularities. Some scholars have assumed that Castilian authorities were more than willing to accept a theory defending the absolute power of the king to attain “grand political and military objectives of the central government” or Jean Bodin’s “absolutist theory of sovereignty” without completely altering the constitutional situation.71 These views need to be reconciled with the fact that seventeenth century pamphlets and treatises never criticized privileges and ancient constitutions as such, and asserted that accusing the king of violating the charters was “a greater crime than all others” committed by the Catalan rebels.72 In certain cases the diversity of laws inside the dominions of the Catholic King was even praised.73 These considerations had an impact on the reactions of Philip iv’s government after the conquest of Lérida, one of the rebel Catalan cities. Once the city surrendered, the king faced the decision whether or not to swear anew the privileges and liberties of the city. The king and his Council of State carefully discussed the issue. First, Philip had to decide whether to take an oath on the city’s privileges, as he had done in 1632. Secondly, “because of this city having strayed from the obedience to Your Majesty, against the oath it took” the question was whether the city should also renew its oath of fidelity. Philip iv’s advisors noted that “swearing the privileges again would imply a virtual confession of Your Majesty having broken his given word,” and the same would Fin de la Guerre des Pays-Bas, avx Provinces qui sont encor sous l’Obeissance d’Espagne, Item la Descouverte des Proffondeurs d’Espagne chachees sous ceste Proposition de Donner au Roy de France en mariage l’Infante d’Espagne avec les dixsept Provinces des Pays-Bas en constitution de dot, s.l.: s.n., 1645, p. 5. For a more elaborate view see different works by Wim Blockmans, such as his “Voracious States and Obstructing Cities: An Aspect of State Formation in Preindustrial Europe” in the special issue on Cities and States in Europe, 1000-1800, Theory and Society, Vol. 18, 1989, pp. 733-755 and Martin van Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt, 1555-1590, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 71 Antoni Simon i Tarrés, Els Orígens Ideològics de la Revolució Catalana de 1640, Barcelona: Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, 1999, pp. 52 and 57. 72 Papel Político sobre la Justificación Real…, VE/1384-18. See also Francisco de Rioja, Aristarco, fol 44v. 73 Diego Saavedra Fajardo, “Locuras de Europa. Diálogo entre Mercurio y Luciano,” Ángel González Palencia (ed.), Obras Completas, Madrid, 1946 [Münster, 1645?], pp. 1198-1219, p. 1215. 70

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happen if the city were asked to renew its vows. The king’s ministers proved reluctant to endorse either of the two options. The king could not dither and he decided to swear to uphold the privileges in order “to ensure [the obedience] of the natives,” showing the Catalans Philip iv’s intention to “maintain. . . their peace and keep. . . their fueros and privileges.” And so he did, with a ‘minor’ exception in the text allowing him to maintain a garrison in the city.74 Philip iv showed awareness of and respect for territorial privileges also on other occasions, as in the instructions the king gave to those who would temporarily rule the Low Countries in the event of the Cardinal-Infante Ferdinand’s death. Once again, the proper administration of justice and respect for the privileges were thought fundamental for the “maintenance and conservation of my royal domain and sovereignty.”75 This contrasted with the position of unlawful rulers, as the French king was in Catalonia, who did not swear “the fueros (privileges) of this Principality,” the first step “towards establishing an absolute sovereign dominium” by altering Catalan nature, a subversion of God’s world order.76 This respect for territorial liberties goes against royal action against privileges and discourses emphasizing the impossibility of setting any limits other than those of a moral and religious nature on royal power. The reason lies in the different conceptions of the origin of privileges. The territorial assemblies saw the charters as an agreement between two equal parties, the prince and the commonwealth. The Spanish kings saw privileges as the product of royal grace. Grace and favour were manifestations of royal will; a favour (merced) was the corollary of political and military services rendered to the monarch; grace (gracia) was the expression of royal pity beyond the ordinary course of human justice.77 It could equally express forgiveness, clemency and compassion, culminating in the greatest of Christian theological virtues, charity. The discussion is to be found in “Consulta de oficio del Consejo de Estado”, held in Lérida on 9 August 1644, AGS, Estado, 2062. Once Barcelona was conquered by the royal armies in October 1652, the king confirmed the privileges of Catalonia in February 1653 with the same, ‘minor’ alteration of the prince retaining the right to occupy Catalan fortresses. 75 “Powers to certain persons [Francisco de Melo, the archbishop of Malines and the president of the Private Council] for the government of Flanders in the event of the Cardinal Infante’s death,” 19 July 1641, AGS, Estado, 2056. 76 Diego Saavedra Fajardo, Locuras de Europa, p. 1213. 77 Salustiano de Dios, “The Operation of Royal Grace in Castile.” The same author studies the relation between royal grace and the institution of the “mayorazgo” in his “El Absolutismo Regio,” especially p. 78ff. 74

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Examples of the king’s clemency abounded, especially around marriages and when being sworn in as ruler, extending even to rebels. When Philip iii showed mercy in Zaragoza towards those who had rebelled against his father in 1591, he was reaffirming the strength and scope of royal authority, as clemency, following Aquinas, is “leniency of a superior towards an inferior.”78 This understanding of royal power was based on a distinct vision of the legal inequality between the members of medieval and early modern societies, which made it impossible for the king to make a covenant on equal terms with anyone placed under his authority.79 Nonetheless, when privileges existed, means had to be devised to deal with them. One was, as Olivares proposed to Philip iv, to quash particular laws through prearranged uprisings. Then, under the pretext of restoring order, the king could “settle and dispose the laws in conformity with those of Castile.”80 This was, however, a proposal not always easy to implement, and political practice required constant bargaining.81 Although the idea that revolt and subsequent conquest by a lawful king implied the end of the privileges remained, from 1642, especially referring to Catalonia, there was a shift towards defending the rightful way in which Philip iv had ruled the Principality, in accordance with Catalonian privileges.82 Although some scholars considered this shift either purely rhetorical or a consequence of the territorial origins of the authors,83 there were other reasons. The change in perception and reality of Catalonian affairs after the effective decline of Olivares’ power and Philip’s unilateral decision to leave Madrid to take up command of Elizabeth R. Wright, Pilgrimage to Patronage. Lope de Vega and the Court of Philip 1598-1621, Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2001, p. 55. Thomas Aquinas, Summa, ii-iiae, Q. 157. 79 Starting from very different considerations Luis Salas arrived at a similar conclusion in the study of the origin of noble seigneurial power: Luis Salas Almela, De la Corte Ducal a la Corte Real: los Duques de Medina Sidonia, 1580-1670. Estrategias de Poder Nobiliario, Florence: European University Institute, 2006, p. 17. A reworked version is published as Medina Sidonia: el Poder de la Aristocracia, 1580-1670, Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2008. 80 “Gran Memorial”, in John H. Elliot and Jose F. de la Peña, Memoriales y Cartas, pp. 97-98, also in John H. Elliott, The Count-Duke, p. 198. 81 Jean-Frédéric Schaub, Le Portugal au Temps, p. 390. 82 See for instance Francisco Boíl, Bozina and Alejandro Ros, Cataluña Desengañada, Naples: Egidio Longo, 1646, p. 320. Quoted in Fernando Negredo del Cerro, Política e Iglesia, p. 645. 83 The territorial origin is emphasized by Mª Soledad Arredondo Sirodey, “Armas de papel: Quevedo y sus Contemporáneos ante la Guerra de Cataluña,” La Perinola: Revista de Investigación Quevediana, 2, (1998), pp. 117-154. 78

iii,

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the army on the frontier between Aragon and Catalonia was paramount. Nonetheless, the fundamental consideration that the king could not enter into an equally binding covenant with his kingdom persisted. In spite of the insistence of neo-scholastic writers on the possible limits in the concession of power from the people to the ruler,84 other authors insisted that in Castile and then, using Castile as synecdoche, in the whole of the Spanish Habsburgs’ domains, “sorrow and necessity” made the people invest the Spanish kings, irrevocably, with full might.85 The king’s powers were nonetheless first bridled by natural law and the droit de gens. Secondly, the necessity clause was claimed to be required also when it came to breaches of positive law.86 Treaties and promises were granted by royal grace. However, the prince was not in a position to break those treaties and promises once they had been made peacefully and “to provide the best to his kingdom and his subjects.” Their unmotivated violation would – according to generally accepted norms – constitute a “crimen laesae.”87 In this conceptualization, deeply engrained in the long tradition of the Italian medieval jurist Baldus de Ubaldis’ writings, the prince’s submission to the validity of contracts was paramount, as was considering that they could be broken only in case of (utmost) necessity.88 The covenant between king and kingdom (if it existed) was conceived not in abstract terms, but as one of the ordinary contracts regulating property and exchanges, falling under the heading of ‘natural law’ and therefore inviolable. Respect for “the law of oaths (and of the simple given word)” as a distinct mark of Habsburg rule over Catalonia was an argument which was used during the following century to emphasize the difference Fernando Vázquez de Menchaca, Controversiarum illustrivum: aliarumqve usu frequentium: libri tres / obra del jurisconsulto vallisoletano Fernando Vázquez de Manchaca; D. Fidel Rodríquez Alcalde and Calixto Valverde y Valverde (eds), Valladolid: Cuesta, 1931-1934 (1563), Lib ii, Cap 23, §3. See also Annabel S. Brett, “Scholastic Political Thought and the Modern concept of the State”, Annabel Brett and James Tully, (eds.), Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp.130-148, p. 139. 85 Alonso Carrillo Lasso de la Vega, Soberania del Reyno, p. 3. 86 Salustiano de Dios, “Absolutismo Regio”, p. 86. 87 Antvvoordt op Seeckere Missive van een Venetiaens Edelman, aen sijn Vriendt tot Tuirin, uyttet Italiaens ende Frans over-gheset, s.l.: s.n., s.a. [1646]. 88 Fernando de Loazes, Consilium siue Iuris allegationes reuerendissimi in Christo patris D. Fernandi Loazij ...super controuersia oppidi à Mula, orta inter illustrissimum dominum à Velez marchionem, et illius subditos, super dicti oppidi dominio, atque iurisdictione, Milan: Valerio Meda & fratelli, 1552, especially “Quintum fundamentum.” Quoted in Salustiano de Dios, “Absolutismo Regio,” p. 95. 84

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between Philip iv and the French authorities, who “do not keep during the night what they swear by day.”89 Theoretical texts and political practice emphasized the respect due to promises and oaths, as most authors’ minds were still shaped and formed by the doctrines of law, especially the ius commune.90 But the inviolable respect for promises did not tie the hands of the king and his ministers completely to the letter of what the king had sworn. Attempts were made to distinguish between “violently riding roughshod over” the privileges of Catalonia and interpreting “the severe rigour of its laws” with honesty, remembering that God exempted himself from his own ‘fueros’ when necessary.91 Respect for the law was necessary and fundamental, but not a sufficient foundation for the king’s legitimacy. Leniency was equally necessary, as was admitted both in theory and in practice.92 Thus, when the marquis of Olías and Mortara was appointed viceroy of Catalonia in 1650, he forgave (making use of royal grace) and conceded mercedes to the Catalan rebels who submitted to Philip’s dominion.93 This was a breach of the law, but it was codified and monopolized by the Chamber of Castile (Cámara de Castilla). It was an obvious sign of the king’s plenitudo potestatis,94 but by no means an exercise of his own personal whims and was never used lightly. As Saavedra put it, “the king had to let justice follow its ordinary course in the hands of the magistrate,” for human justice was the foundation of princely power. Administering the laws “more than is allowed to them by clemency” would “cause their ruin, as tyranny is nothing else than ignorance of the law.”95 For Iberian minds of the time, however, the principal difference between the good king and the tyrant lay elsewhere. The attachment

Francisco Boíl, Bozina. John G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, London, etc: Princeton University Press , 1975, p. 159 and Kenneth Pennington, The Prince and the Law, 1200-1600: Sovereignty and Rights in the Western Legal Tradition, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 271. 91 Alejandro Ros, Cataluña Desengañada, p. 320. 92 This was made explicit in Philip iv’s letter to Sor María de Agreda, 21 Aug. 1647, Carlos Seco Serrano (ed.), Cartas de Sor María, vol. 1, p. 118, quoted by Robert A. Stradling, Philip iv and the Government, p. 198. See also Juan Márquez, El Governador Christiano, pp. 223-224. 93 Lo Marques de Mortara Virrey, y Capita General. Amats, y faels de la Real Magestat. Es tant entreñable lo Amor que lo Rey nostre Señor te a sos Vassalls, s.l.: s.n., s.a. [1650] BNE VE/215/23. 94 On all these aspects see Salustiano de Dios, “The Operation of Royal Grace”. 95 Diego Saavedra y Fajardo, Empresas, Empresa 21. 89 90

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to and defence of the true faith – which was unfailingly tied to love – provided the basis on which the whole system of power rested. The king could not break his oaths or act in prejudice of his subjects due to the “sacrament of religion, by which God and your king are bound together by solemn oath.” This prevented Philip “riding roughshod over” religion in pursuit of the wicked maxims of reason of State.96 The morals of power Boíl’s link between religiously conceived morality and the proper exercise of power was an expression of the values defended by political theorists within the Spanish Monarchy. The fact that an important number of the authors of political treatises during Philip iv’s reign were clergymen – often royal preachers – already hints at the impossibility of disentangling religion and the exercise of power. This was the result of a long development. Moral theology absorbed the principles of law into a hierarchical relationship, reducing the reach of juridical acts.97 As important as, or more important than, the king’s ‘constitutional’ submission to the law were the limits imposed on his rule by his role (as part of the dynasty) as the appointed defender of the (Catholic) faith and as vicar of God on Earth. The usefulness of religion for maintaining order and obedience was acknowledged by many during the Early Modern period. It also conditioned the understanding of royal authority within the Spanish Monarchy, prompting thinkers adamantly to reject Machiavelli’s thought, adhering to Botero’s instead. Government should be based on moral standards. The need for actions, indeed for the whole reforming process, to conform to religious and moral limits was paramount – God would, Botero argued, punish temporal lords who challenged morality and religion with rebellions.98 Therefore, when it came to ensuring subjects’ obedience, the king’s ability to become a moral reference point was even more relevant than legal means. As writers insisted, the ruler should outdo his subjects in goodness and, most especially, in virtue to the same extent as he was superior to them in power and dignity. Virtue Francisco Boíl, Bozina. On this see Bartolomé Clavero, Antidora. Antropologia Católica de la Economia Moderna, Milan: Giuffrè, 1991 and also Jean-Frédéric Schaub, Le Portugal au Temps, p. 395. 98 For a transposition of this idea to the stage see Stephen Rupp, “Reason of State and Repetition in The Tempest and La Vida es Sueño.” Comparative Literature, vol. 42, No. 4 (Autumn, 1990), pp. 289-318, p. 291. 96 97

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was to be fostered through education, and the idea put forward both in ‘mirrors of princes’ and in the government’s ‘consultas’. No king but a Catholic king The Spanish Monarchy’s policies, including foreign policy, were embedded in religious considerations. This was the outcome of the strong religious foundations of the Spanish king’s authority, and by reason of the fact that religion was the core element building up its identity and uniting all its constituent parts.99 The links between political authority and religion were increasingly emphasized, placing the royal figure as mediator between the people and God.100 Ruling dynasties appropriated religious symbols and rituals to reinforce the charismatic aspects of their power, and the Spanish Monarchy was no exception, adopting ceremonies and in organizing the Royal House in such a way as to highlight the king’s quasi-divine character,101 “occupying the place of God on Earth, as his minister in the temporal realm.”102 This role, which other kings throughout Europe also thought they were fulfilling, took on a special meaning in the case of the Spanish Habsburgs, the last exponents of two different traditions which placed special emphasis on their role as defenders of religion. The mythical bond between the Habsburg dynasty and God and his church weighed heavily and intermingled with the persistent idea, born during the middle ages, of the Castilian king as a defender of the true faith and its church against Islam, which justified his superior and unrestricted authority. He could demand taxes, as territorial assemblies were often reminded, and they must be granted as they were needed first for “the protection of the Apostolic Roman Catholic faith” and in the second instance for “the service of his Majesty.”103 Both reasons went hand in hand and were See for instance José Antonio Maravall, El Concepto de España en la Edad Media, Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1954. 100 Religious dimension of royal power is central to Paul Kleber Monod, The Power of Kings. Among other studies focusing on the intellectual foundations of Early Modern authority see Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1978. See also the pioneering work by Marc Bloch, Les Rois Thaumaturges, Strasbourg: Librairie Istra, 1924. 101 John H. Elliott, “The Court of the Spanish Habsburgs: A Peculiar Institution?” in his Spain and its World, 1500-1700: Selected Essays, New Haven: Yale UP, 1989, pp. 142-161. 102 Fr. Marcos Salmerón, Sacra Apología, 10v, quoted by Fernando Negredo del Cerro, Política e Iglesia, p. 620. 103 See for instance Corte Verclaringhe: Vande Conditien, Reglement ende Directie, raeckende de gewillige Contributie, die belooft is, ende noch te beloven staet, door de yverige ende 99

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inextricably linked. As Julian Viejo puts it, the Spanish Monarchy was either Catholic or else it did not exist.104 Furthermore, religion was “the most efficient means to restrain the people” and to hold them “in secure obedience.” If the prince “trampled upon the divine laws, the vassals would be offended by having him as the measure of their actions.” They would “not only despise his commands, but also judge them lowly and comply with them only under duress.”105 The prince should be the paramount example of virtue for his subjects. The first law to which both subjects and prince had to submit was therefore God’s law as taught by his true church, that of Rome, a clarification necessary since the outbreak of the Reformation. The inextricable union between lawful political power and compliance with the Pope’s dictates became fundamental. Although the relationship between Spanish kings (and the Habsburg Emperors) and the Roman popes was not idyllic, the Spanish kings saw excommunication as equivalent to removal from power. Thus, divine law set out the principles to which royal actions had to conform; it was “the model from where … the laws to mould the multitude were extracted.” Following this reasoning, the royal preacher Juan Márquez did not hesitate to contradict Suárez and his Defensio Fidei. The prince was not bound to his own laws by reason of the clauses of the primeval contract between ruler and subjects, but because the origin of all civil law was divine law. Kings had to follow the laws made in the image and likeness of God’s law as they “owed obedience to God and natural law.” Furthermore, the prince had to “deem just for him what he wants to be just for others”. Otherwise “we could not find excuses for his hypocrisy and simulation.”106 Hypocrisy was a mortal sin, and the least acceptable form was when it concerned religion. Authors who were strongly religious, often friars, favoured a clear hierarchy of priorities. The “real road to truth” was the

getrouwe Inwoonders deser Stadt van Antwerpen, tot Bescherminghe van de Apostolijcke Catholijcke Religie, ende Dienst van sijne Majesteyt, Antwerp: Hieronimus Verdusse, 1646. Also Alonso Carrillo Lasso de la Vega, Soberanía del Reyno and Agustín de Castro, Conclusiones Politicas del Principe, y svs virtvdes al Serenissimo Principe de las Españas Nvestro Señor. Qvestion Principal. Qvien deva a qvien mas Amor, el Principe a los Vassallos, o los Vassallos al Principe?, Madrid: Imprenta Real, 1638. 104 Julián Viejo, “Ausencia de Política” p. 626. 105 Juan Márquez, Governador Christiano, p. 209 106 Juan Márquez, Governador Christiano, pp. 209-210. This assertion is repeated almost word for word by Agustín de Castro in his Conclusiones Politicas del Principe, y svs virtvdes.

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pursuit of eternal salvation, following the Gospel107 or the Decalogue. Politics, a human endeavour, was set at an inferior level, deemed to be dependent on too many contingencies to offer a true and clear path of action.108 The second line, congruent with the previous one, focused on rejecting the principles of ‘wicked’ reason of state as expounded by Machiavelli and Bodin. Unlike the reason of state which pursued “what was more convenient for the conservation or increase of his Estate,”109 proper reason of state policy should be grounded on strong moral principles. This included maintaining “the reputation of the word and the security of relations,” more important in the long run than the advantage to be gained from a single occasion.110 Worst of all, betrayals were changing religion according to political interest, “seeking one’s own preservation in the hands of men while fighting Heaven,”111 a criticism extended to those, especially the French politiques, who did not make Catholicism a policy priority, and who fooled their neighbours “under the veil of virtue, under the cloak of Religion, with the pretext of justice.”112 Alliances with those who, under one pretext or another, fought the true church were forbidden unless a much greater advantage, not for the temporal State but for the Roman Church, was to be obtained. The language of political interest could not be used to justify and reinforce royal authority. The language of Christian (theological and cardinal) virtues, going beyond mere anti-Machiavelism, provided the basis for Habsburg power. It was no accident that justice – one of the four principal, cardinal virtues – was deemed to encompass religion.113 The other cardinal virtues led the individual to God; it was through justice that the king would guide his subjects towards the only real life, the eternal one.114 There were however tensions between the exercise of Juan Márquez, Governador Christiano, p. 67. José Laínez, Daniel Cortesano, p. 176. 109 Diego Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas, Empresa 18. 110 Agustín de Castro, Conclusiones Politicas de los Ministros al Excelentissimo Señor Conde Duque […] Qual sea mas Estimable Ministro en la Republica, el de mucha Fortuna en los Sucessos ò el de mucha Atencion en los Consejos. En los Estudios Reales del Colegio Imperial de la Compañia de IESUS, a 9 de Mayo de 1636, p. 23. BN VE/9/25. 111 José Laínez, Daniel Cortesano, pp. 210 and 244-246. Religion, as Mariana emphasized, was, together with the order of succession to the throne, among the things the (Castilian) king could not alter without the acquiescence of the kingdom. 112 Tomás de Castro y Águila, Antídoto y Remedio, fol. 45r. 113 Thomas Aquinas, Summa, ii-iiae, Q. 81, Art. 5. 114 This reading of virtues is based on Aquinas. See his “Treatise on Virtue” and the iiiiae, Q. 47-170. 107 108

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justice and (excessive) clemency, which were discussed in terms of love, the notion of which was deeply determined by a Catholic vision of the world. Ordered and disordered love Unlike the tyrant, who ruled through fear and hatred, the (good) king retained his subjects’ allegiance through love. This love was an unequal one, as love in a relationship where one was the superior of the others was bound to be. Following Paul’s epistle to the Ephesians, authority should not provoke subjects “to wrath: but bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord.”115 In the case of the king, only justice, tempered by clemency and charity, could find the appropriate middle ground between hatred and disrespect, between tyranny and sedition. Machiavelli’s statement that “since love and fear can hardly exist together, if we must choose between them, it is far safer to be feared than loved”116 forced Spanish authors to analyse possible courses of action when love did not suffice to maintain peace within the commonwealth. The question was how to find the right balance between love and fear, considering that “men are always fighting against what they loathe, if not with their body, then at least with their mind.”117 The answer lay in the right exercise of justice, aptly combining punishment and mercy following God’s example, “punishing as an offended king, but lamenting punishing as a piteous father.”118 Requests to the king for other than forgiveness for rebellion were also formulated in such a way as to appeal to the king’s grace and to his “paternal love,” which had the subjects’ love as its counterpart.119 Nevertheless, rebellions implied a major challenge, forcing the prince to restore the right balance between strength and clemency. After 1640, authors and government officials in the Spanish Monarchy proposed two policies to revitalize the king’s communication with his subjects. One option was to wait until rebels “put themselves at the king’s feet,” – even if with assistance from a besieging army, as happened in Tortosa (Nov. 1640) – before proceeding to “punish the few that wanted to separate [the polity] from his obedience.”120 Only after the culprits were Ephesians, 6:4. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, ch. xvii. 117 Juan Márquez, Governador Christiano, p. 268. 118 Tomás de Castro y Águila, Antídoto y Remedio, fol. 29v. 119 Jacinto de Alcázar Arriaza, Medios Politicos para el Remedio Vnico, y Vniuersal de España, librados en la Execucion de su Practica, Sevilla: Juan Gómez de Blas, 1646, fol 16r. 120 Francisco Rioja, Aristarco, fol. 50r. 115 116

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punished could the language of love regain lost ground and set the basis for future coexistence.121 Clemency had its limits, and if it “extends to criminals it is not piety, but injustice.”122 The other possible course of action used the language of love more strongly. It was employed by those in the Spanish king’s entourage who rejected the taking of aggressive measures against the Principality of Catalonia in the early stages of the revolt.123 They argued their case by appealing to princely magnanimity, founded on notions of inequality. The rebelling subjects were too inferior to the king to offend him. Accordingly, he could exert his leniency without reducing his authority.124 The king would thus display his “loving compassion,” creating “an immortal amorous bond” with his subjects, present or future.125 In exchange, the king would be the father and shepherd of his people, guiding them with superior wisdom and not preying on them,126 because “if the subjects do not experience in the prince the solicitude and the love of a father, they will not obey as sons.”127 The king’s love was, however, not unconditional: if the rebels persisted in their errors like heretics, refusing to “be forgiven as sons,” the king should “conquer them like enemies,” making the “obdurate feel the steel and iron” of the sword.128 The love of the king for his subjects could even prompt him to sign a peace with the Dutch in order to put an end to the suffering of his good vassals in the obedient provinces of the Low Countries, speeding up the peace negotiations129 and granting the most unacceptable Dutch Juan Márquez, Governador Christiano, p. 364. Tomás de Castro y Águila, Antídoto y Remedio, fol. 25v. 123 On the different opinions defended among the members of a special Junta summoned to discuss the situation in Catalonia after the death of the count of Santa Coloma see John H. Elliott, The Revolt of the Catalans. A Study in the Decline of Spain (1598-1640), Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1984 (1963), pp. 452 ff. 124 Francisco Aguado, Discurso Politico acerca de la Jornada de S.M Felipe iv (1 August 1640), quoted by Fernando Negredo del Cerro, Política e Iglesia, p. 606. 125 Francisco Boíl, Bozina. The positive answer from the rebels to be expected for the display of kingly magnanimity was also foretold by the author of the Papel Político sobre la Justificación Real… VE/1384-18. 126 Juan Márquez, Governador Christiano, p. 207. See also Ulrich Dierse, “Pedro de Ribadeneira und Diego de Saavedra Fajardo,” p. 103. 127 Diego Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas, Empresa 20. He dedicates a whole chapter to explaining to the future king how he should behave in order to be loved by subjects and foreigners. Empresa 38. 128 José Laínez, Daniel Cortesano, p. 328. 129 Letter to Castel-Rodrigo of 13 December 1644 upon advice of the Consejo de Estado, 18 November 1644. AGS Estado Flandes 2251. 121 122

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demands.130 Only the hand of the king, in his role as vicar of God, could bring “durable and just” peace.131 If the prince lacked the love of the subjects, the stability of his kingdom would be seriously threatened, as the English events of the 1640s taught European kings.132 Princes were reminded of the need to cultivate in their subjects a “durable [love], like that of old men, within reason, not like that of boys, easy and, in the flush of youth, uncertain.”133 The distinction between these two types of love and the fear of the latter, not a virtuous feeling but a disordered passion, was paramount. Thus, the Catalans were urged to distinguish between the long-lasting love they owed to Philip iv and their temporary affections for Louis xiii, the product of whims and anger.134 Spanish theorists aimed to show to what extent these passions diverted the subjects from the true path to God and salvation, setting them under the tyranny of a wrongly understood freedom. Whether referring to the Empire, “that mistook for protection what is tyranny and for freedom what is servitude,”135 to the United Provinces or to Catalonia, the idea was the same. To break natural ties of obedience for the love of a wrongly understood freedom led to the worst of servitudes and opened up the road to tyranny and to rule by usurpers.136 Usurpers could exploit the disordered love of kings who forgot that their love should conform to rules of inequality and consequently precluded any friendship based on equality. Furthermore, favourites implied a challenge to the king’s supreme authority. Nobility and populus had transferred their power of self-government to princes for them to rule immune from the mediocre and human ambitions of their subjects.137 The favourite turned into a usurper, because he shared the king’s authority without being anointed by the divine grace of Opinion of the Marquis of Mirabel about giving the United Provinces the title of ‘free in the plenipotencies’, 2 June 1646, AGS, Estado, 2255. 131 “Mercies” sent to Flanders, 19 September 1644, AGS, Estado, 2251. 132 See the letter sent by the count of Peñaranda to Philip iv. CODOIN, 82, x-xi, quoted and translated by Robert A. Stradling, Philip iv and the Government of Spain, p. 301. 133 Alonso Carrillo Lasso de la Vega, Soberania del Reyno, p. 27. 134 Francisco de Rioja, Introduction to Aristarco and Francisco Boíl, Bozina. 135 Diego Saavedra Fajardo, Locuras de Europa, p. 1199. 136 Íbid, p. 1209. 137 Francisco de Quevedo, La Hora de Todos. When a defence of the favourite was attempted, it was through emphasizing his role as a supremely conscientious and disinterested minister, subordinated to the king’s will. See Quevedo’s arguments in his play Como ha de ser el Privado (ca. 1629), written before his clash with Olivares. 130

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majesty.138 The favourite was also seen as an excrescence of the system and was accused of being in pursuit of his own personal ambitions in vicious and wicked ways, as Richelieu and Mazarin were portrayed in the Dutch Republic.139 Each member of the dynasty had a duty to preserve and conform to the values embodied in the dynasty, such as the maintenance and defence of the Catholic faith and the allegiance of subjects to the pope. But the members of the dynasty also owed allegiance to dynastic bonds. Thus, dynastic bonds and marriages were key elements in the ‘selfpositioning’ of polities within the ensemble of Christendom and the preservation of international order and peace.140 Family reasons – with family implying also a specific idea of religion and politics – were also crucial to the external policies of both Habsburg branches. When the peace talks were about to start in Münster, the defence of the joint interests of the family was a priority – at least for Philip iv and many of his ministers. All other polities had to bear the “inseparable union of the whole Habsburg house” in mind.141 The wellbeing of the House and the defence of Christianity – the only one according to the Habsburgs, the ‘Roman Apostolic Creed’ – were indissoluble and were in Spanish eyes supposed to underlie all the Habsburgs’ endeavours.142 As Philip iv In seventeenth-century England various plays such as the anonymous Burghley’s Commonwealth, Shakespeare’s Henry viii and Samuel Rowley’s When you See me, you Know me, for example, demonstrated that by permitting one counsellor to have authority over the rest the ruler created a demi-king whose ambition led him to usurp the monarch’s power. Antonio Feros, “Images of Evil, Images of Kings: The Contrasting Faces of the Royal Favourite and the Prime Minister in Early Modern European Political Literature, c. 1580- c. 1650”, in John H. Elliot and Laurence W. B. Brockliss, The World of the Favourite, New Haven and London, 1999, pp. 205-222, p. 216. On this issue see also Robert Zaller, “The Figure of the Tyrant in English Revolutionary Thought,” Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 54, No. 4. (Oct. 1993), pp. 585-610. 139 Het groot Mvnster, s.l.: s.n., 1646 and Hollandtsche Sybille, openende Verscheyden Heymelijckheden van den Staet, s.l.: s.n., 1646, p. 5. Defenders of the alliance with France, on the contrary, praised the “incomparable wisdom” of the “great Cardinal that brought the [French] empire to such a felicitous state.” Vrymoedich Discovrs op de tegenwoordighe Handeling van Treves. Voor-ghestelt by de Ghedeputeerden van den Coningh van Spangien en de Heeren Staten Generael des Gheunieerde Provintien, s.l.: s.n., 1633, p. 11. 140 In 1646 Spanish ministers noted that the only means of reaching an appeasement with France implied marriages and dowries. Advice of the Count of Monterrey, Junta de Estado, 9 January 1646, AGS, Estado 2255. 141 Letter from Philip iv to his ambassador in Germany, 18 June 1644, AGS 2251 (The letter by Saavedra Fajardo where the event is described is kept in AGS, Estado 2062 as is the Consulta del Consejo de Estado, 11 June 1644 about these events. 142 Letter “by the royal hand” of Philip iv to Archduke Leopold, 22 November 1647. 138

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made clear in the instructions to the Spanish delegates to Münster, no peace could be negotiated unless it was aimed at attaining the best for Christendom and its defenders, the Habsburgs. “When [these words] are not set out, they are assumed” to be written.143 The preponderance of the link between dynasty and religion in Spanish political writings and actions has frequently been interpreted as hypocrisy – a way of disguising political interests behind an outdated providentialism – or as a sign of backwardness underlying Spanish political theory. The links between religion and political action were however equally paramount to the Dutch, some of whom could, in spite of the irreparable dissolution of the ties of love binding them to the Habsburgs, also remain attached to principles of dynasticism. Refashioning authority in the United Provinces The reformulation of political authority during and immediately after the Dutch Revolt was deeply conditioned by the depiction of every facet of Spanish rule as tyrannical and by the consequences of the ‘Arminian troubles’. The fear of Spanish tyranny prevented any settlement which would put the United Provinces under any, even nominal, dominium of the Spanish king. The consequences of the equation between Spanish government and tyranny were equally significant for the internal organization of the new republic. Two major leitmotifs of the revolt, the defence of charters of liberties and the abhorrence of monarchical, ‘tyrannical rule,’ conditioned Dutch political life and discourse. There was general, if qualified, agreement on both these themes. Equally widespread was the fear of the excesses of the multitude, which the Dutch shared with all European governments and most thinkers.144 Other principles guiding the United Provinces were summarized in the Republic’s constitutional essentials, ‘Union, Religion and Militia,’145 which provided the basis for organizing government and politics alike.

AGS, Estado 2257. 143 Consulta of the Council of State about different letters exchanged by the marquis of Castel-Rodrigo and Diego Saavedra Fajardo. 26 October 1644, AGS, Estado 2061. 144 The most radical discourse in the United Provinces, represented by the city of Ghent, was set aside during the Revolt. Martin van Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt, 1555-1590, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 48-49 and pp. 187-199. 145 “Justice” was initially among the values required for a “vasten Staet” but was finally set aside: Jan J. Poelhekke, De Vrede van Munster, p. 124.

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Space for dissent and divergent interpretations of these commonly shared principles existed, thereby influencing the course different groups wanted the Republic to follow. Bitter disputes arose around the peace negotiations with the Spanish Monarchy. For a polity born and raised in war making peace constituted a major challenge to the existing balance of power. How the stadholder, the States General, and the different provinces and their respective provincial assemblies were to relate to one another in times of peace was of central concern. This conflict, clearly Dutch and internal in nature, also determined foreign alliances and the conduct of different peace negotiations with the Spanish Monarchy, during which the Dutch split along allegiances and interests which proved irreconcilable with one another. Defining political authority While the definition of the borders of the Dutch Republic was partly the outcome of chance and military campaigns,146 most of the intel­ lectual foundations of the revolt – or a posteriori justifications, as some scholars see them –conditioned the Republic’s historical trajectory during the seventeenth century.147 The legitimization of the rebellion This is in opposition to earlier attempts to trace the separation between the northern and southern Low Countries back to the dawn of time. On the formation of Belgium and The Netherlands as nation-states as the logical and inevitable outcome of history see respectively Henri Pirenne, Histoire de Belguique, (7 vols.), Bruxelles: Lamertin, 19001932 and Petrus J. Blok, Geschiedenis van her Nederlandsche Volk (8 vols.), Groningen: Wolters, 1892-1908. Stressing the “accidental” birth of the Republic see, among others, the works by J.L. Price, Holland and the Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century: the Politics of Particularism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994; Herbert H. Rowen, The Princes of Orange: the Stadholders in the Dutch Republic, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1988; and Helmut G. Koenigsberger, Monarchies, States Generals and Parliaments: the Netherlands in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Jonathan Israel emphasizes the divergent paths followed by the northern and southern provinces even before the revolt: Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477-1806, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, ch. 4. 147 In defence of republican ideas, especially the concept of liberty, as a major driving force during the period of the revolt and the early Dutch Republic see Martin van Gelderen, The Political Thought. Helmut Koeningsberger and others, such as Herbert Rowen, see any theoretical elaboration of the revolt as an ex post facto justification of a course of events which was neither sought nor predicted by most of the relevant actors. The republican form of government would accordingly be a consequence of the lack of other alternatives. Helmut G. Koenigsberger, Monarchies, States Generals and Parliaments; Herbert H. Rowen, The Princes of Orange. For an approach emphasizing social and intellectual elements see J.L. Price, Holland and the Dutch Republic. 146

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against Philip ii on the grounds of the defence of territorial liberties and constitutional charters, based on emphasizing the antiquity of Dutch freedoms, was of fundamental importance.148 As the religious dimension became increasingly entangled with the justification of the revolt, growing attention was paid to principles of freedom of conscience – less frequently to freedom of worship – which became integrated into natural rights.149 By the seventeenth century, religious freedom and the preservation of provincial sovereignty had become indisputable objectives for most Dutch. There was also general agreement about the institutions that were to uphold liberty,150 the provincial States assemblies and the vroedschappen or town councils. There were, however, different views on how ‘Dutch liberty’ – the cornerstone of the Republic’s existence – would best be preserved. Once constituted, the Republic was generally cherished and deemed the best form of rule for the naturally free Dutch. In the 1640s Venice and the Swiss confederation provided the principal examples for the debates on foreign commitments and for problems of religious coexistence.151 Particular emphasis was placed on the role played by

See for instance Willem Verheyden, Nootelijcke Consideratien die alle goede Liefhebbers des Vaderlandts behooren Rijpelijck te Overeghen opten voorgeslaghen Tractate van Peys met den Spaengiarden, 1587, and the analysis of this and other similar expressions in Martin van Gelderen, “Liberty, Civic Rights, and Duties in Sixteenth-Century Europe and the Rise of the Dutch Republic, in Janet Coleman (ed.), The Individual in Political Theory and Practice (Origins of the Modern State in Europe, 13th to 18th Centuries), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, pp. 99-122, p. 100. 149 For the shift in the meaning of “freedom” during the first decades of the Dutch Revolt and the significance of religious freedom see Martin van Gelderen, “De Nederlandse Opstand (1550-1610): van ‘Vrijheden’ naar ‘Oude Vrijheid’ en de ‘Vrijheid der Conscientien’,” in Eco O. G. Haitsma Mulier and Wyger R.E. Velema, Vrijheid: een Geschiedenis van de Vijftiende tot de Twintigste Eeuw, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1999, pp. 27-52. 150 The dispute between the English advisors of Leicester and Holland’s representatives on the issue of who was the ultimate holder of sovereignty was paramount. See Martin van Gelderen, The Political Thought, pp. 201-212. 151 Examples of recourse to each of the images are to be found, among others, in St. Annens Droom. Nopende de Vrede ende Oorloge van desen loopenden Tijt, s.l.: s.n., 1646 for Venice and Trewhertzige Vermahnung/ Worinnen viel Deckwürdige und Politische cCnsiderationes, uber den jetzigen Zustand und Beschaffenheit der Vereignigten Niederlandischen Provincien, begriffen..., s.n.: s.l., 1644 for Switzerland. At the same time, monarchies’ untrustworthiness and other flaws in princes’ and crowned heads’ behaviour were increasingly voiced: (Attributed to Adriaen Pauw) Observatien op de Brief van A. de Bruyn, Deventer: s.n., 1647. 148

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Venice in Italy, balancing French and Spanish power, as an example to be followed by the Dutch.152 How the principles underlying the Dutch Republic were imple­men­ ted caused bewilderment among foreign observers and contemporary scholars.153 All provinces were jealous of their sovereignty and they tried to ensure their independence.154 Since the Union of Utrecht (1578) it had been established that foreign policy and a number of financial matters were to be handled by the States General, the members of which were delegates of and accountable to their respective provinces. While central institutions were equally committed to the defence of liberty, disagreement arose – especially with reference to the Spanish Monarchy – about how freedom would best be upheld. Those advocating greater cooperation between the provinces – a cause linked to the continuation of war against Spain – noted that the emphasis on their “own sovereignty” by the provinces hindered collaboration between them. “Too much disunited freedom” would follow, leading to internal discord and “internecine war,”155 an argument also used to maintain the high taxation imposed by the war.156 Preserving the freedom of the fatherland was also the main argument of those who advocated stronger provincial independence, the reduction of taxes and a diminution in the role played by the more central bodies while advocating for peace. No institution was more threatened by the end of hostilities than the stadholderate. A remnant of Habsburg rule, the stadholder retained his powers of military command – and the influence which came with it during war periods – and his role in the election of certain town governments’ members. These powers were further increased by the stadholder’s role as mediator between the provinces – a role assigned to him in the unions between Holland and Zeeland in 1575 and 1576.157 Den [3 deel] Ongeveynsden Nederlandtschen Patriot, Alkmaar: s.n, 1647. J.L. Price still deemed the Dutch political system unworkable in theory and functional only by reason of breaches of the same system: J.L Prince, Holland and the Dutch, p. 3. Ignoring the rule about unanimity ensured Holland’s domination of the States General, on this see Jonathan Israel in his The Dutch Republic, its Rise, ch. 13. Marjolein ’T Hart underscores the constant need of bargaining for power. “Cities and Statemaking in the Dutch Republic, 1580-1680,” Theory and Society, Vol. 18, No. 5, (Sep., 1989), pp. 663-687. 154 Discovrs aengaende Treves of Vrede met de Infante ofte Koning van Hispanien/ ende dese Vereenighde Nederlanden, Haerlem, Adriaen Rooman, 1629, p. 19. 155 Íbid. 156 E. P., Suchtigh, en Trouwhertigh Discours, over dese Tegenwoordige Gestalte des Landts, in Bedenckinge van Onderhandelinge zijnde met den Coninck van Spangien, s.l.: s.n., 1646. 157 Herbert H. Rowen, The Princes of Orange, p. 24. 152 153

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Even if Friesland – usually together with Groningen and Drenthe – had a different stadholder, the role of the princes of Orange, stadholders of the main provinces since William of Orange, greatly influenced the evolution of the Republic. The failed quest for a foreign prince in the cases of both the duke of Anjou (1578-1583) and the earl of Leicester (1585-1588) contrasted with the greater esteem reserved for William of Orange and the military success of his son Maurits. The stadholders, however, remained subject to the provincial States which appointed them. The stadholders nonetheless retained the privilege of appointing from a shortlist – and on behalf of the provincial States – the magistrates to whom they were supposed to be answerable.158 Although part of the ambiguous distribution of power within the Republic, the stadholderate often appeared to contemporaries as the only institution able to cope with the intricacies of the Republic’s political system,159 the sole representative of unity and of the interest of the Generality above the particular and competing interests of towns and provinces. This image as preserver of the political and social unity of the community was to a great extent the result of the celebration of William of Orange in the course of the seventeenth century as pater patriae and political martyr.160 Frederick Henry further endowed the stadholderate with elements characteristic of ruling dynasties. The assumption of dynastic features was prompted by the similarity of many of the stadholders’ institutional powers to those enjoyed by monarchical rulers. Some institutional traits of the stadholderate provided its holder with tools which Frederick Henry used in order to become far more than a glorified servant of the provincial states, benefiting from the fact that the Oranges were the only Dutch family which could be associated with the positive aspects of kingship. The Princes of Orange thus became symbols of (popular) proto-Dutch For a summary of the position of the different competing authorities within the Republic see Maarten Prak, The Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century: The Golden Age, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 166-185. 159 Olaf Mörke argues that the Oranges and their court brought about the cohesion of political elites and contributed to the creation of a normative frame of “statality” essential for the survival of the Dutch Republic. The Oranges appear thus to be guardians of the Republic: Olaf Mörke, ‘Stadtholder’ oder ‘Staetholder’?: die Funktion des Hauses Oranien und seines Hofes in der politischen Kultur der Republik der Vereinigten Niederlande im 17. Jahrhundert, Münster, etc: Lit, 1997, pp. 39, 267ff, 421. 160 This opinion is defended by Peter J. A. N. Rietbergen, “Beeld en zelfbeeld. ‘Nederlandse identiteit’ in politieke structuur en politieke cultuur tijdens de Republiek,” BMGN, 107, 4, pp. 657-669. 158

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nationhood, as those deprived of political power in the Republican institutions linked fatherland with the ‘fatherly’ care of a prince.161 All these elements gave Frederick Henry a strong basis for power, although he was always dependent on the support of the provinces and of foreign polities in order to play a decisive role in Dutch politics. At the basis of all allegiances fostered by the Orange family, either through attempts to increase the political power of the stadholderate or through subtler means, stood the desire to maintain a powerful position in the event of a settlement and the consequent diminution of the stadholder’s military power. Frederick Henry sought to strengthen the stadholderate by a number of methods, influencing the Holland States through the Ridderschap162 and making his offices and dignities hereditary within his family by primogeniture by means of the Act of Survivance (1631), in spite of the reluctance of certain provinces. The Oranges’ status was further consolidated by the marriage of Frederick Henry’s heir, William, into the English royal family, an important move both dynastically and politically, especially because it followed on the back of mooted marriage talks between the Spanish Habsburgs and the Stuarts.163 This also increased weariness about Frederick Henry and his On the support – and use thereof – of the commonality for the House of Orange, although referring to the first stadholderless period, see Jill Stern, “The Rhetoric of Popular Orangism, 1650-1672” in Historical Research, vol. 77, n. 196 (May 2004), pp. 202-224. On popular identification with patriarchal care see Olaf Mörke, “Sovereignty and Authority,” p. 462. Stressing the purported dynastic ambitions of the Oranges, especially of Frederick Henry, see Pieter Geyl, Orange and Stuart 1641-1672, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969 (1939). 162 Henk F. K. van Nierop, The Nobility of Holland: from Knights to Regents, 1500-1650, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 211. On Maurits’ use of the Ridderschap as a group see Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic, its Rise, p. 452. The Orangist influence over Zeeland was strongest: Maarten Prak, The Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century, p. 172. A summary of the relationship between Zeeland and the Oranges as First Nobles is to be found in Jan H. Kluiver, De Souvereine en Independente Staat Zeeland: de Politiek van de Provincie Zeeland inzake Vredesonderhandelingen met Spanje tijdens de Tachtigjarige Oorlog tegen de Achtergrond van de Positie van Zeeland in de Republiek, Middelburg: De Zwarte Arend, 1998, pp. 15-22. 163 On the interests surrounding the marriage of William ii and Mary Stuart see Simon Groenveld, “The House of Orange and the House of Stuart, 1639-1650: A Revision,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 34, No. 4. (Dec., 1991), pp. 955-972, pp. 958ff. The threat a possible marriage between Habsburgs and Stuarts would imply for the survival of the United Provinces is emphasized by Thomas Scott, Nieuwe Tydingen wt den Conseio, ofte Secreten Raedt van Spangien. Waer-inne men als in een levendigh Tafereel kan sien, hoe dat de Spangiaert steedts swanger gaet met de op-richtinge van syne gepretendeerde Monarchie, daer hy meynt toe gerecht te syn, door den tytel van Catholycken Koningh, hem gegeven door den Paus van Roomen, Amsterdam: Jacob Pietersz Wachter, 1621, p. 19. 161

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aims among the provinces’ regents, as they feared he wanted to increase his power over the Republic. Frederick Henry and his wife Amalia van Solms could also enhance their princely status by means of artistic works alluding to the eminence of the family without been kept in check by a superior authority.164 Frederick Henry’s artistic patronage demonstrated his unrivalled political power. Iconographic language emphasized the superior importance and antiquity of the nobility of the House of Orange. The most glorious and eminent ancestors were remembered, emphasizing the Oranges’ ‘Imperial kin’ by including the portrait of the short-lived Holy Roman Emperor Adolf of Nassau (1292-1298) in the Oranjezaal, and through chronicles and other historical works.165 The virtues of Frederick Henry as a good, benevolent ruler were illustrated by the assimilation of the stadholder to classical and mythological figures by means of which Frederick Henry set himself apart from the image of Spanish tyranny.166 Whereas republican writers focused on the language of liberty and liberties Frederick Henry commissioned contrasting images where the unbridled passions, lust and violence of the tyrant were countered through the praising of continence and benevolence.167 Artistic display took place within the stadholder’s court, which was also the site of another public function of the stadholder: that of diplomat. Although foreign policy was determined by the States General and the Commissie voor de buitenlandse zaken, the Oranges See the contribution of Peter van der Ploeg and Carola Vermeeren “‘From the “Sea Princes” Monies’: The Stadholder’s Art Collection,” to the volume edited by them, Princely Patrons: the Collection of Frederick Henry of Orange and Amalia of Solms in The Hague, The Hague: Mauritshuis and Zwolle: Waanders, 1997, pp. 34-60, especially pp. 58-60. 165 For the Orangezaal and the significance of its iconographical programme in Frederick Henry’s presentation of his own power see Debra Miller, “Cyrus and Astyages: An Ancient Prototype for ‘Dei Gratia’ Rule,” Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte, 56 Bd., H. 4 (1993), pp. 545-553. An example of Frederick Henry’s interest in having genealogies emphasizing the antiquity of his house is his support of Joseph de la Pise’s Tableau de l’Histoire des Princes et Principauté d’Orange, The Hague: Theodore Maire, 1639. See Marika Keblusek, “Books at the Stadholder’s Court” in Marika Keblusek and Jori Zijlmans (eds.), Princely Display: The Court of Frederik Hendrik of Orange and Amalia van Solms in The Hague, The Hague/Zwolle: Historical Museum/Waanders, 1997, pp. 143152, pp. 150-2. 166 The paintings are Jan Victors’ Magnanimity of Scipio, 1640, St. Petersburg, Hermitage and The Young Cyrus before the Throne of his Grandfather Astyages, c. 1640, Oldenburg, Landesmuseum. 167 The influence of Lipsius’ appraisal of benevolentia and auctoritas on Frederick Henry in other contexts is noted by Olaf Mörke “Sovereignty and Authority,” pp. 461 and 463. 164

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were at the centre of a more informal – though none the less decisive – diplomatic exchange. Their court constituted a less alien environment for foreign envoys – usually sent by monarchies – than the republican institutions.168 The Prince of Orange appeared in diplomatic ceremonial to be an equal sovereign partner with the States and not their servant.169 Frederick Henry’s court failed, however, to be the sole centre of patronage and clientage, as power also emanated from other poles, namely the provinces and, especially, the city of Amsterdam, which reduced the scope of the Oranges’ ambitions. Lacking a firmly entrenched power base, Frederick Henry saw his position challenged, more so than any other element of the Republic, by the possible end of the war. Furthermore, during the 1640s Frederick Henry’s attempts to consolidate his power met with increasing resistance from different sectors, extending even to Zeeland, the more Orangist province, where regents proved as reluctant as those in other provinces to increase the stadholder’s powers.170 Authors trying to mobilize the southern provinces to revolt against Spain in the 1640s, as well as writers advocating a swift end to the hostilities, voiced fears about the possibility that the stadholder might profit from “disorder and internal factions” in order to attain a degree of power “that he had never thought of previously.”171 Other authors ridiculed the stadholder’s purported aims, as “such a little prince” was deemed unlikely to subdue a Republic victorious from the fight against a mighty king.172

See Heinz Schilling, “The Orange Court. The Configuration of the Court in an Old European Republic,” in Ronald G. Asch and Adolf M. Birke (eds.), The Court at the Beginning of the Modern Age, c. 1450-1650, London, Oxford, NY: German Historical Institute London and Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 444-454. For further detail on the implications that the particular position of the Oranges and their court had for the international relations of the Republic see Olaf Mörke, ‘Stadtholder’ oder ‘Staetholder’?, pp. 199ff. 169 Olaf Mörke, ‘Stadtholder’ oder ‘Staetholder’?, p. 321. 170 Jan H. Kluiver, De Souvereine en Independente Staat Zeeland, p. 102. 171 Trewhertzige Vermahnung/ Worinnen viel Deckwürdige. Mistrust of the increased powers of the stadholder linked in expression with the criticisms formulated against Maurits during the “Arminian troubles.” See for instance Hugo Grotius, Memoire van mijne Intentien en notabele Bejegeningen, in Robert Fruin (ed.) Verhooren en andere Bescheiden betreffende het Rechtsgeding van Hugo de Groot, Utrecht: Kernink, 1871, pp. 1-80, pp. 11-12. 172 Irenee, Copie d’une Lettre Envoyee de la Haye, aux Deputez des Estats d’Hollande, Pour la Paix a Munster, s.l : s.n., [1646], p. 6. 168

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When Philip iv and his ministers became aware of the growing tensions surrounding the stadholder, they strove to use them to the benefit of the Spanish Monarchy, an attitude which greatly affected secret negotiations held with Frederick Henry during 1643. The peace negotiations with the Spanish Monarchy as a catalyst for internal strife The Dutch Republic was divided along lines which were difficult to reconcile, thereby endangering the Republic’s stability. These disputes were expressed through discourses covering very different issues, and the defence of one of the points of each group’s agenda generally entailed the assumption and acceptance of other aims. While often starting from conflicting ideas as to which was the best system for organizing the Republic, splits within the United Provinces were, from the 1620s onwards, expressed in relation to the appropriateness of making peace with the Spanish Monarchy. Debates about the political objectives of the United Provinces, the foundations of the Republic, the role of the East and West India Companies (VOC and WIC) in it, and about how God’s mercy towards the United Provinces could be preserved were entangled with the discussion about the convenience of concluding the war. There were two periods, 1628-1632 and 1646-1648, during which a settlement seemed near. In spite of the changes in the general context which occurred over the years, the arguments of opponents and advocates of peace followed similar lines, as did the general pattern of the negotiations. Shortly after the possibility of negotiations with the Spanish Monarchy was discussed at governmental level, the debate opened up – especially among those opposing the settlement – in a series of sermons and pamphlets. A process of assimilation took place between the public and the governmental debate, the latter often coming to public knowledge through the publication of parts of it.173 Some elements which were put forward by the representatives of one province in the meeting of the States General were picked up, embellished and developed in public debate. Those modified arguments were taken up again in the debates within the States General, repeating almost word

An example of how the arguments presented to the States reached wider audiences is Rapport Ghedaen by d’Heer van Beaumont/ Ghedeputeerde ter Vergaderinghe vande HogMogh. Heeren Staten van Zeeland op den 17. October 1629, s.l.: s.n., [1629]. 173

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for word the assertions of some of the pamphlets.174 The publication of the resolutions of provinces opposed to peace followed, nourished a debate on the policies of the States General, now covering a number of topics which were closely related to the settlement itself. Each of these topics, distinct in nature, became subsumed under the discourse of either the opponents or the proponents of peace, becoming entangled with the competing economic and strategic interests of the provinces.175 The settlement with the Spanish Monarchy implied more than the end or continuation of war. Provinces at odds The deep split among the United Provinces, apparently healed in 1618 with the execution of Oldenbarnevelt and the imprisonment of his closest associates, reopened a few years later. After Maurits’ death Arminians regained control of some town councils, especially in Holland, without opposition from the new stadholder. Both Arminian regents and Frederick Henry strove for peace during the late 1620s, when Habsburg power was on the rise. Opponents of peace were eager to link the rise of Arminianism and the quest for peace with the Arminian aims to subvert the commonwealth’s order, seeing the fight against the common Spanish foe as the antidote to religious discord, political dissent and corruption. In spite of opposition, negotiations started in 1626, first in Middelburg (Oost-Vlaanderen) and then in Roosendaal, a border town. They were prompted by an exchange of prisoners and took place thanks to the efforts of Gerard van Berckel, a strongly pro-peace Arminian burgomaster of Rotterdam.176 Shortly afterwards conversations began between the Dutch representatives, Daniel Slachmulder and Van Berckel, and Johan Kesselaer, lord of La Marquette and councillor of finances in the ‘obedient’ provinces.

See the different documents emanating from different governmental bodies regarding the negotiations in 1630 recorded by Lieuwe van Aitzema, Verhael van de Nederlantsche Vreede Handeling, The Hague: Jan Veely,1650 (2 Vols.), Vol. 1, pp. 128-142 and Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, p. 233. 175 Albert Waddington, La République des Provinces-Unies, Vol. 1, p. 40. 176 Lieuwe van Aitzema, Verhael van de Nederlantsche, Vol. 1, p. 118. On Gerard van Berckel and the role played by Frederick Henry during the negotiations around 1630 see Jonathan I. Israel “Frederick Henry and the Dutch Political Factions, 1625-1642,” The English Historical Review, Vol. 98, No. 386 (Jan. 1983), pp. 1-27, pp. 15ff. 174

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The Dutch debate about these negotiations centered on the parallels between the United Provinces’ situation in 1626 and the negative consequences of the Twelve Years’ Truce.177 During this period the Dutch negotiated from what became an increasingly strong position after the seizure of the Indies Silver fleet by Piet Hein in 1628, Dutch victories at Oldenzaal and Grol, the conquest of ’s-Hertogenbosch in 1629 and the seizure of Pernambuco at the beginning of 1630. In spite of this position of strength, the fear of renewed internal division prevailed, both in pamphlets attacking the negotiations and in provincial debates. The Thirty Years’ War, in spite of Dutch neutrality, influenced the debate, as those favouring a settlement in the United Provinces saw the need for an extended truce to prevent a joint Habsburg offensive against them. Although the demands for Dutch withdrawal from the Indies, the opening of the Schelde, some, if symbolic, acknowledgment of Philip iv’s authority and open practicing of their religion for Catholics were unacceptable, negotiations continued. By 1629 the truce seemed to the governments in Brussels and Madrid to be near178 but, as soon as the States were informed, prospects worsened. The provincial states, like the population, were deeply divided. Utrecht, Gelderland and Overijssel favoured a truce; Groningen, Friesland, and Zeeland even more strongly opposed it.179 Some cities in Holland, a province deeply split along lines replicating those of the Arminian troubles of the 1610s, opposed the settlement, arguing their case by alleging the necessity of making any settlement dependent on the secure establishment of ‘regime and religion’ in the Republic.180 These concerns, widely expressed in pamphlets, were, as mentioned before, linked to the fate awaiting the overseas companies, a point of great relevance for Zeeland’s regents. Spanish negotiators required the Dutch to withdraw from the Indies as a precondition to the truce and the overseas companies were closely identified with the pro-war Counter-Remonstrants.181 Some authors explicitly linked the economic interest of the shareholders of WIC and A very detailed account of the negotiations is in Jonathan I. Israel, “The Holland Towns and the Dutch-Spanish Conflict, 1621-1648,” BMGN, 94 (1979), pp. 41-69. For an analysis of the implications of these negotiations for the international commitments of the Spanish Monarchy see Eberhard Straub, Pax et Imperium, pp. 314-325. 178 Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, p. 227. 179 Ibid, pp. 228-231. 180 Jonathan I. Israel, “Frederick Henry and the Dutch Political Factions”, p. 19. The link between the interests of Counter-Remonstrants and the pro-war party is also stressed in his “The Holland Towns”, pp. 46-47. 181 On this see Jonathan I. Israel, “The Holland Towns,” pp. 62-65. 177

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the VOC with religious considerations,182 and the clash between two forms of commerce was also noted. Zeeland favoured the companies’ monopolies. This went hand in hand with scorn for unpatriotic ‘Hollanders,’ who, advocating an open system of commerce and a settlement with the Spanish Monarchy, were accused of being willing to “become the best friends of Spain,” in order to satisfy “their avarice.”183 Holland’s regents were also charged with disregarding the fact that war was vital to the Republic, predestined to grow while waging war “in the same way the fire that destroys other animals is the nourishment on which the salamander thrives.”184 The main arguments of the opponents of peace revolved round the internal strife following the Twelve Years’ Truce and the economic benefits to be obtained from the continuation of war. They also emphasized the need to maintain the alliance with France and to respect Reformed allegiances185 better to preserve the Republic and God’s church.186 Authors and editors favouring a settlement were consequently forced to address these issues. Fewer in number than those defending the continuation of war, they used different lines of argument. One subtle way was to re-publish Erasmus’ De Belli Detestatio, accompanied by an introduction rejecting war as a means to solve disputes between

Consideratien ende Redenen der E. Heeren Bewind-hebberen vande Geoctrojeerde WestIndische Compagnie inde Vergaderinge vande ... Staten Generael ... overgelevert, nopende de Teghenwoordighe Deliberatie over den Treves met den Koning van Hispanjen..., Haarlem: Adriaen Roman, 1629 (K. 3909), p. 26, the “secret” protest of the directors of the Company to the States General. Een Cort Verhael ende Verthooninge Hoe grooten Voordeel/ den Coning van Spagnen by den Treves soude Hebben. Ende daer-en-tegens De Menigh-fuldighe schafe, die onse Seven vereenighde Provincien, Duytsch-land ende andere Plaetsen daer door souden lijden, s.l.: s.n., 1630 also emphasized the importance of the continuation of war and the companies for the promotion of Dutch wellbeing. 183 Noodige Bedenckingen. This argument, opposing favourers of Spain to patriots, would be repeated frequently – and heatedly – in the coming years, as in Observatie ofte Onderhoudinghe over de Ghemeenschappen van de Interesten welck daer zijn tusschen Vranckrijck ende de Vereenighde Nederlanden, s.l.: s.n., 1647. 184 Discovrs Aengaende Treves of Vrede met de Infante, p. 8. 185 This point was especially relevant in relation to the need to continue the war to “liberate” or at least improve the situation of the inhabitants of the southern provinces. See for instance Discovrs Aengaende Treves of Vrede met de Infante, p. 19 and Jan Andries Moerbeeck, Vereenighde Nederlandschen Raedt, p. 27. 186 V. Mathijssen, Paeys of Vrede, VVwaer in Vvert Verhaelt hoe Noodich den Vrede is, namelijck Vrede inde Kercke Godts, daer tegen hoe Perijckeleus en Sorgelijck het is voor de Vrije Landen, haer te Verbinden of Verbont te Maken met de Erf-vyanden vande selve. Vlissingen: Samuel Claeys Versterre, 1630. K. 4029. 182

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Christians.187 More determined both in their pleas for peace and in their refusal to find a link between a settlement and internal discord were authors previously linked with Arminianism, such as the elderly minister Johannes Uyttenbogaert, who had been strongly involved in the conflict in the 1610s.188 He focused particularly on rejecting the Remonstrants’ accusation that the Arminians had attempted to “usurp the government” by trying to alter the order of the church and the state.189 These arguments were supported by an emphasis on the economic gains awaiting the provinces in the event of a settlement: “olive trees bear fruit; laurels do yield but useless grains and kernel.”190 The threat posed by the settlement to the well-being of the Reformed religion within the provinces was more difficult to answer. Those proposing peace avoided discussion on this point, claiming, as did Frederick Henry and Uyttenbogaert, that the internal discussions on church matters and the truce were two separate problems, pleading to keep them separate.191 Nonetheless, by 1632 truce talks had been suspended. The war party, with the province of Zeeland as its unequivocal advocate, had temporarily succeeded. From 1635 there was a strategy of open war, against the interests of towns such as Amsterdam, which had not abandoned their pro-peace attitude.192 ‘Informal’ secret negotiations with the Spanish Monarchy continued, and when the chance emerged to set up a congress to end all the wars that plagued Europe, those opposing peace made their voices heard again. First they proposed to

Desiderius Erasmus, Belli Detestatio. Ofte Oorlogs Vervloeckinge, Swol (Zwolle?): Zacharias Heyns, 1629. (K. 3921) 188 Johannes Uyttenbogaert, Discovrs op ende Teghen de Conscientievse Bedenckinghen, ofmen in goede Conscientie Trefves met Spaengien maken mach, Haarlem: Jacob de Wit, 1630; the pamphlet answered is one of the texts included in Consideratien ende Redenen ... (K. 3909). 189 Jacob Lievensz van Rog, Kort ende Klaer Vvertoogh, waer in Bewesen Wordt, dat the Staten van den Lande met VVilhelmus Prince van Orangjen, &c Den Oorlog teghen den Koning van Spangjien Aengenomen Hebben voor de Vrijheidt vande Lande ende voor de Ware Christelijcke Ghereformeerde Religie..., Adriaen Roman: Haarlem, 1630, p. 17. Attacks on the alleged introduction by the Remonstrants of novelties within the government and the church – and the consequent disagreements fostered between the two are also clearly made at a later stage in Noodige Bedenckingen. 190 Vrymoedich Discovrs, p. 3. 191 Jonathan I. Israel, “Frederick Henry and the Dutch Political Factions”, p. 19. J.L. Price, Holland and the Dutch Republic, p. 186. 192 Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, pp. 254-259. 187

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postpone any agreement until the congress began in Cologne.193 Once the congress became viable, they made clear their opposition to a general agreement. Just before the congress sponsored by Pope Urban viii actually started, delayed as it was by the problem of passports to be granted to the Dutch by the Spanish Monarchy, a pamphlet was printed containing a first version of the arguments which would flood the United Provinces during the following decade.194 Many of these arguments, such as the references to Spanish tyranny, had already been voiced. First, the old idea that “nothing has proved more harmful to this state than to talk of peace negotiations” with the diabolical Spanish king was repeated. Other arguments would also gain currency in the following years: the pro-war party identified the Dutch opposing peace as ‘pious patriots’, implying that those favouring peace were traitors to their land.195 Furthermore, political attitudes in favour of or against peace were increasingly identified with specific provinces – even despite the actual state of affairs. Those opposing and favouring an agreement shared some arguments, such as the mockery of Catholicism and, especially, of its chief representatives, the pope and the Spanish king, a constant feature of all pamphlets both favouring and opposing a settlement. As the congress of Cologne failed and the possibility of an agreement faded, publications concerning the issue petered out. Only in 1643, as delegates began to assemble in the imperial cities of Münster and Osnabrück for a general peace congress, were voices against the negotiations raised anew, coinciding with Holland’s proposal for a reduction of troops and military expenditure.196 This time Amsterdam had the upper hand within the States of Holland and, seconded by Rotterdam and other cities, was prepared to assert its interests and force a settlement.197 Those opposing peace, the first to raise their voices, On the peace negotiations in Cologne see Auguste Leman, Urbain viii et la Rivalité de la France et de la Maison d’Autriche de 1631 à 1635, Lille: Girad, 1919. For the interest of the pro-war party in (apparently) supporting the negotiations within the framework of the congress see Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, pp. 309-311. 194 Erasmus Phlopatroön, Nieuw-Keulsch of Spaensch Bedrogh: Ach! Door Staet-sucht, Eersucht, Geld-sucht, Verkochte, Slavende Vryheid, s.l.: s.n., 1638. 195 Ibid, pp. 4 and 5 respectively. 196 Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, pp. 262-3. 197 A Spanish envoy reported that “Holland was so inclined in favour of a treaty that with closed eyes she would throw herself into it if the rest of the provinces did not hinder it.” “News from Holland” 22 December, 1645. AGS, Estado, 2065. 193

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argued along the lines already outlined, with authors asking their readers the rhetorical question whether they were like “completely mad Hollanders who have sunk our understanding in such a way that we are going to do such a stupid and ridiculous thing” as to sign the peace.198 References to provincial divisions reminded the audience of the strife of the 1610s, putting the religious issue back on the public agenda. The fact that the number of Catholics in the Republic had risen after Frederick Henry’s successful campaigns since 1633 merely increased the complexity of the situation. Proponents of peace defended first the honorability and the religious purity of the magistrates who had achieved the previous truce. The lesson to be drawn from the Arminian troubles was for them the need for “high political authority” to maintain its distance from theological disputes, urging “love and mutual tolerance on both parties.”199 Furthermore, and although maintaining that the Reformed Religion “as it is taught in the public churches” stood at the centre of their concerns, pro-peace authors voiced their disagreement with policies aimed at controlling people’s consciences, defending the beneficial economic consequences of tolerant policies, imagining a polity devoted to commerce and to keeping the balance within Europe.200 Peace had to be sought on both moral and practical grounds The United Provinces should not continue the struggle to acquire what was not lawfully theirs: “we condemned with good reason the rule of plus ultra by the Spaniard,”201 an argument which found its way into prowar pamphlets.202 Authors disagreed on the question whether the end for which the war was fought had been achieved and whether peace was the only means of preserving the gains already made. For authors defending peace, the commercial expansion expected to follow the treaty with Spain would make up for the loss of the VIC and the WOC, even though they did not pay much attention to this problem. These reasons did not appease the advocates of war who still maintained that Noodige Bedenckingen. Munsters Praetje. Deliberant Dum fingere nesciunt, s.l: s.n., 1646. J.L. Price, Holland and the Dutch Republic, p. 186. 200 Examen over Seker Boecxken, genaemt: Nederlants Beroerde Inghewanden: Over de Laetste Tijdinge van de Münstersche Vrede-handelinghe, &c. Ge-examineert, Tot Onderrechtinge van alle Vrome, Vreed-lievende der Conscientien Vryheydt Beminnende Patrioten, s.l.: s.n., 1647, is most outspoken. 201 Munsters Praetje. 202 St. Annens Droom. The conscience of the regents was also appealed to rhetorically, asking how it was possible to continue war against an enemy ready to surrender, in Hollandtsche Sybille, p. 18. 198 199

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peace – and the prospect of domestic discord – would only destroy the Republic. This argument found its way into the debates in the States General, where it was dismissed by Holland’s delegates when they pleaded for a settlement with the Spanish Monarchy.203 From 1645 onwards the debate continued. It became increasingly heated as the feelings of division within the Dutch body politic and the number of pamphlets referring to the most confrontational issues intensified.204 Particular importance was given to the connivance of groups within the Republic with a foreign, Catholic polity. To the fears expressed by the opponents of peace, those favouring peace retorted “that you wanted to free the Netherlands from Spanish slavery does not mean that you should set them under a different and new French slavery.”205 The discourse of absolute Dutch independence from external influences was thus reinforced, even if it implied rewriting history and denying the extent or relevance of the military and diplomatic help the revolt had received from the Most Christian King.206 Authors defending the need for a settlement with Spain also showed an increasing mistrust towards what some had seen as the Dutch Republic’s most reliable ally. Thus, they recalled the convenience of the existence of a buffer state between the United Provinces and France, defending the end of the war and of the conquest of territory in the southern Low Countries. Suspicions of France’s true aims were further aroused by reason of the Catholicism of the French king and his ministers – the events at La Rochelle in 1628 showed that the French were not trustworthy allies of the Reformed. These reasons, plus the French government’s lack of interest in reaching an agreement with Spain, prompted the Dutch to sign a separate peace or truce with Spain, disregarding the terms of the alliance with France signed in 1635. A harsh punishment was invoked for “those who do not zealously treat for” peace,207 which, combined The text of the address is recorded by Lieuwe van Aitzema, Verhael van de Nederlantsche, Vol. 2, p. 257. 204 As Aitzema recorded, the “lords plenipotentiaries” were divided, and “jealousy and discontentment grew so much that also the State of the United Netherlands was (genoegzaam) divided in two factions”: Lieuwe van Aitzema, Verhael van de Nederlantsche, Vol. 2, p. 93. These factions neither coincided with the division between Orangists and Republicans nor implied a neat division between the two maritime provinces of Holland and Zeeland – in spite of the simplifications often presented in the embittered public debate. 205 Fransch Praetje. 206 Ibid. 207 Een Beclach Sermoen tot Munster, Ghedaen over de Vrede-Handelinghe van Christenrijck..., [s.l.: s.n.], 1646. 203

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with the prosperity prophesied for when the peace had been signed and taxes lowered – taxes which were acknowledged to be much higher by then than those imposed back in 1568 by the Duke of Alba.208 The news which spread during 1646 about the idea of a marriage between the Spanish Infanta and the French king with the Low Countries as dowry – marriage plans aborted by the death of the Spanish crown prince in October, which made the Infanta first in line of succession – increased the fear of France. “One makes a marriage: bitterest enemies become best friends” some warned.209 The ease with which kings discussed exchanging countries, uniting them by marriage or by inheritance among themselves remained alien to many in the United Provinces, who reacted with incredulity to the proposed exchange of Flanders and Catalonia in connection with the Infanta’s marriage to Louis xiv. The notions of popular sovereignty, “the unquestionable truth” that no king or prince could transfer the sovereignty of his lands without the consent of the States, made some consider such a transfer impossible.210 Distrust of the French and their true aims grew regardless and the Spanish government encouraged it with calculated disclosures of how the negotiations were progressing, leaks of information which promptly found their way into print.211 Faced with this situation, those opposing peace resorted to the same arguments that had proved so effective during the previous decade, although referring to the interests of the WIC was a less powerful argument than before because of the decline suffered by the overseas company. They reminded the public and the regents of the dangers inherent in any Spanish promise and argued that the Republic’s own

Irenee, Copie d’une Lettre Envoyee de la Haye, p. 2. Observatien op de Brief van A. de Bruyn. 210 Antwoordt op’t Munsters Praetje. 211 An example of how the Spanish delegates’ disclosures found their way into print is Brief aen hare Hoog Mogende: van A[ntoin] de Brun, een vande Conincklijcke Spaensche Extraordinaris Ambassadeurs ende Plenipotentiarisen tot Munster, Amsterdam: Dirk van der Cunst, 1647. France, through the ambassadors, also tried to play on the fears and phobias of the Dutch, resorting to the innate cruelty of the Spaniard, his untrustworthiness, etc., both in more open propagandistic pamphlets as in “official” discourses. Examples are the CopyeAautentyck van Sekeren Brief, Geshreven by den Heere Grave Servient, Ambassadeur Extraordinaris van Vranckrijck aen de respective Heeren Staten der Vereenighde Nederlandtsche Provintien, Op den 25 ende 26 April 1647, Amsterdam: Pieter Vermeulen, 1647 and Gescrifte Over-gegeven by Mijnen Heer den Ambassadeur van Vranckrijck, aen Mijne Heeren de Staten Generael der Vereenighde Nederlanden, wegens de Garantie. De 11 April 1647. s.l.: s.n., 1647. 208 209

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military strength would be reduced and discord among the provinces would return.212 As an anonymous pro-war pamphleteer summarized, “the Peace grows, blossoms, is ripe to hit you, to wound you, to whip you out of your fatherland, from your possessions, from your peace and quiet.”213 Juridical reasons were also invoked for maintaining the alliance with France and the continuation of war.214 It was also maintained that the Republic should not be scared by any polity’s force, as the Dutch had been able to hold back a powerful monarchy while small and newly formed.215 As the convenience and disadvantages of a settlement were publicly discussed, the negotiations between Spanish and Dutch delegates in Münster made rapid progress. After the preliminary agreement on taking the truce of 1609 as a basis for negotiations, it was soon proposed to turn the settlement into a peace, an option favoured by Holland in the States General.216 Zeeland, however, rejected this option, resorting to arguments circulating in print such as the decline of the militia and fear of renewed discord which would arise between “provinces, cities and members of them.”217 In spite of these and other objections, by February 1647 four Dutch delegates had travelled from Münster to The Hague in order to obtain fresh instructions to negotiate the final points to be agreed with the Spanish Monarchy, asking the Dutch regents to choose between signing the peace and complying with the French

Hollands Praetje, p. 17. Nederlants Beroerde Ingewanden, over de Laetste Tijdinge, van de Munstersche Vrede Handelige. Uytstortende Gantsch Becommerlijcke en Bewegelijcke Klachte/ in den Schoot van alle Getrouwe Patriotten/ ende Liefhebbers des Vaderlants, s.l.: s.n., 1647, one of the many pamphlets summarizing all the bad consequences the “Trojan horse, Münster’s monster” would have for the Dutch Republic. 214 Antwoordt op’t Munsters Praetje. Against waiting for France , Missive uyt Middelburgh aen syn Vrient in Hollandt. Raeckende het Tractaet tusschen de Croon Vranckrijc, ende de Geunieerde Nederlandtsche Provintien, tot Handelingh van Vrede met Spangjen, Middelburg: Gijsbert Verdussen, 1647. 215 Observatie ofte Onderhoudinghe (foto 8 dcha). 216 The proposal presented by the States of Holland and West-Friesland on 18 September 1646 was soon dispatched to Brussels, AGR, Audience, 1088-4. 217 Declaration by the States of Zeeland (20 October 1646) to the States General concerning the proposal by the States of Holland and West-Friesland. Lieuve van Aitzema, Verhael van de Nederlantsche, Vol. 2, p. 137ff. The prospect of decadence of the army following a settlement had been referred to in pamphlets since the late 1620s. See Discovrs over Den Nederlandtschen Vrede-handel. 212 213

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delaying tactics.218 Those favouring peace were helped by the Spanish interest in making France’s lack of desire for peace widely known – spreading mistrust of French expansionism.219 Consequently, the Dutch Republic signed a separate peace with the Spanish Monarchy after some months of further negotiations – and much tension.220 Signing the peace treaty did not, however, mean the end of the divisions within the Dutch body politic. Holland, the province which “had contributed and still contributes most” to defeating the Spaniard and to “secure[ing] our State, Religion, Freedom, Rights and Justice,”221 pressing for the end of the war, was the first to ratify the peace, and other provinces followed. Quarrelsome Zeeland had to face the threat of waging war alone against the Spanish Monarchy.222 The peace was finally ratified by the States General. An open clash within the United “Rapport des quatre Plenip. des Estats veniz de Munster a la Haÿe par la quell est donne la raison de leur besoign et signature du traité”, 11 Feb 1647, AGR, Audience, 1088. See the French Ambassador, Abel Servient’s, answer to these accusations, charging Pauw and Johan de Knuyt, who represented both Zeeland and Frederick Henry in the negotiations, of distorting facts in Geschrift aende Heeren Stat. Gen. der Vereen. Nederlantsche Provintien, In-ghegeven door den Heer Ambassadeur van Vranckrijck, den 4 Marty 1647, Zutpfen: Pieter Franssen, 1647. 219 Advice of the Count of Chinchon, 2 November 1646, AGS, Estado, 2065. 220 These assurances were published under the title Goede Tijdinge van Munster, Utrecht: Frans Levijn, 1648, a letter signed by all delegates except Godard van Reede, the only Dutch delegate to Münster who refused to sign the Peace Treaty with the Spanish Monarch. Another letter by the Ambassadors – once again with the exception of Utrecht’s delegate – found its way into print, announcing the conclusion of the peace with Spain and the (unsuccessful) mediation between France and the Catholic king, Missive in Dato den Eersten Februarij 1648: Gesonden uyt Munster, aen de ... Staten Generael, over de Confirmatie ende Teeckeningh van de Vrede Tusschen de Vereenichde Nederlantsche Provintien, ende de Kroon Spangien. Blijde en Waerachtighe Tijdinghe, Utrecht: Adriaen van Buren, 1648. An account of the tensions pervading the provinces and to what extent the disagreements on the “ecclesiastical” in the Meierij threatened the whole process is contained in Letter from Philipe le Roy to the Archduke Leopold, 24 September, 1647, AGR, Secretairerie d’Etat et de Guerre, 679. 221 Observatien op de Brief van A. de Bruyn. 222 Holland’s and the Spanish Monarchy’s delegates collaborated closely in moderating Zeeland’s demands – especially on religious issues – during the negotiations: Letter from Philipe le Roy, sent from The Hague, 2 December 1647, to Archduke Leopold (governor of the Low Countries), AGR, Conseil d’Etat, 953. Assurances of the pressure which Holland would exert on the other provinces were made in Letter from Philip le Roy to Antoine Brun, 14 October 1647, AGR, Secretairerie d’Etat et de Guerre, 679. On the help promised by the Spanish Monarchy to Holland in the province’s disputes with Zeeland and William ii of Orange after the signing of the peace see Albéric de Truchis de Varennes, Un Diplomate Franc-comtois au xviie siècle. Antoine Brun, 1599-1654, Besançon, 1932, pp. 415ff. 218

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Provinces seemed to have been averted. The institutional status quo of the Republic consisting of independent and sovereign provinces and towns governed according to their privileges and customs was preserved. The hatred of all that the Spanish tyranny represented, and the refusal to accept a settlement which would imply any sort of subjection to the Spanish king, however nominal, were general. The period when the provinces sought an overlord had ended – it had a long time ago. The extent to which the independence of the United Provinces was to be acknowledged would nonetheless be a matter of contention, as was the status enjoyed by other confessions – especially Catholicism. Thus the importance of religious arguments had not gone away and would be paramount in the negotiations with the Spanish Monarchy. Some controversial issues, such as whether “every province was sovereign on its own or not,” were not revisited, nor was the position of the stadholder questioned.223 The use of ‘surgical’ means as employed by prince Maurits – and defended in pamphlets such as the Antwoordt op’t Munsters Praetje – was now unnecessary. The absence of references to the stadholderate in the 1640s debate remains a puzzle, as the final aims of Frederick Henry when promoting the negotiations in 1628 are still unclear.224 In this context, criticism of his policy – towards the Spanish Monarchy but also concerning his lenient attitude towards ‘Arminianism’ – was voiced obliquely, if at all. These who were often refered to as Arminians, and who gained ground under Frederick Henry’s stadholderate and led the peace party, were obviously not going to challenge him. The pro-war party also proved reluctant (openly) to criticize Frederick Henry, even if the policy he pursued was the object of fierce attacks.225 Criticism of the stadholder himself was absent, here as in other cases. There are many reasons for the reluctance of the opponents of peace to criticize the stadholder. First, those opposing Amsterdam’s might were aware of the need for policies which would not alienate the stadholder. Secondly, popular allegiance to the House of Orange was real and closely linked to the most partisan religious attitudes defended by the Antwoordt op’t Munsters Praetje. The first argument is defended by Jan J. Poelhekke in his biography of Frederick Henry, Frederik Hendrik, Prins van Oranje: een Biografisch Drieluik, Zutphen: De Walburg Pers, 1978, pp. 309-314. Jonathan Israel, on the contrary, considers that Frederick Henry had clearly changed his policy by 1632 and that before that year he was in favour of a settlement as a means of maintaining the balance between the parties within the Republic: Jonathan I. Israel, “Frederick Henry and the Dutch Political Factions.” 225 Jonathan I. Israel, “Frederick Henry and the Dutch Political Factions,” p. 21. 223 224

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Counter-Remonstrants, orthodox Calvinism and a closer link between politics and religion, in spite of Frederick Henry’s refusal to support these lines of action. A third aspect worth noting is the efforts made by Frederick Henry since his accession to the stadholderate in emphasizing his role as mediator and positioning himself – at least rhetorically – above the political factions. Pro-war authors could thus express their views on the role they desired the stadholder to fulfil only by glorifying Maurits’ actions, remembering his opposition to the Twelve Years’ Truce and his ruthless action when confronted with traitors threatening the Republic.226 Without the decisive support of the Prince of Orange in both situations, the pro-war party could do little other than voice – with varying degrees of success – its disapproval of the peace negotiations and attempt to rekindle animosity against ‘Arminianism’ and those who favoured a settlement in all available forums. None of the parties could risk alienating the stadholder – and the popular support he enjoyed completely. But none of them supported him unconditionally either, as the stadholder’s aims differed from those of the provinces’ regents. The Orange family, its aristocratic ideology and the Spanish Monarchy In the public debate Holland and Zeeland stood for two differing and often opposing understandings of the Republic. The third element in this conflict, the Prince of Orange, was to play a distinctive role in it. Both the support he received and the obstacles he encountered concerning many of his policies within the provincial States have often obscured his particular interests. Here the fluid borders between public and private spheres of power in the early modern period are highly relevant. Marriage politics and the importance of dynastic ties in the world of the time are the best example of this unclear divide. Marriage, obviously a private contract, was used to reinforce alliances – especially but not only, among ruling dynasties – political alliances which would in turn be transformed into bonds the maintenance of which was ‘natural.’227 This ill-defined distinction between public and private underlies the conflicts between the stadholder and the province Among other examples see Jan Andries Moerbeeck, Vereenighde Nederlandschen Raedt, p. 8. Discovrs Aengaende Treves of Vrede, pp. 36ff. Also in Noodige Bedenckingen. 227 For an example of Spanish outrage when faced with the disregard of the French for these “natural” ties see Ambrosio Bautista (O. Prem), Discurso Breve de las Miserias de la Vida y Calamidades de la Religion Catolica, Madrid: Imprenta Real, 1635, pp. 20-21, also in Missive uyt Middelburgh. 226

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of Holland concerning the latter’s attempts to reduce army expenditure. They can obviously be read in terms of mere economic interest, but it is also possible to interpret the reduction of war subsidies as a means of curtailing the prince’s ambitions. This view is reinforced by the fact that, both in practical and in more symbolic terms, the authority of the stadholder largely depended on his undisputed role as head of the army. Thus, Frederick Henry was praised for “raising the young prince [William ii] to a second Alexander.’228 Conversely, the cuts in military funding reminded the Prince of Orange of his position as servant of the States. He would never seize Antwerp which, according to the Spanish government, was the last city he needed to conquer in order “to occupy all strongholds in Holland and Flanders with persons of his faction”, a first step towards dominating the province of Holland.229 Those proposing greater provincial autonomy clearly opposed any increase in the powers of the stadholder. Opponents of peace had a complex relationship with Frederick Henry’s actions. The clear-cut division among Republicans and Orangists has long been abandoned for the first stadholderless period (1650-1672).230 When one looks at the period 1621-1648 and the already mentioned split of the Dutch body politic into two camps where economic, legal and constitutional aspects intermingled, the situation is equally complex. There was no straightforward acceptance by the pro-war party of the claims increasingly put forward by Frederick Henry, indicating the unworkability of employing a division between Republicans and Orangists to analyse these debates. But the pro-war party’s need to find allies – together with its reliance on popular support – to oppose the control Holland’s regents had over the Republic and those of Amsterdam over the province – did indeed prevent straightforward opposition to the stadholder. Frederick Henry was not passive in this struggle. He had patrimonial and dynastic interests of his own which did not correspond to any of those of the provinces and he was ready to defend them.

Hollands Praetje, p. 18. See also the equivalence between the terms used to refer to the stadholder Maurits and those employed in the numerous pamphlets and treaties praising the Swedish king Gustaf Adolf. V. Mathijssen, Paeys of Vrede. 229 Letter from Castel-Rodrigo to the king, 13 May 1646, AGS, Estado, 2065. 230 The work dealing a definitive blow to this division was the already classical study on the first stadholderless period by Daniel J. Roorda, Partij en Factie: de Oproeren van 1672 in de Steden van Holland en Zeeland, een Krachtmeting tussen Partijen en Facties, Groningen: Wolters, 1961. Since then other studies on this topic have been published: see various works by Maarten Prak. 228

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In the light of these aspects, the plan envisaged by the Spanish Monarchy, offering Frederick Henry sovereignty over some of the northern provinces in exchange for help in regaining the south, does not seem so “bizarre” or “imaginative.”231 It did prove impracticable, and ideas such as the inclusion of Zeeland among the provinces to be returned to Spanish dominion, whatever sense it might have made strategically and geographically, would never be accepted. A priori the divisions within the Dutch body politic made it more difficult to consider such an agreement impracticable. As J.L. Price rightly emphasizes, foreign observers, bemused by the unique nature of Dutch political and institutional organizations, often read their own political system into the Dutch one as a means of dealing with what Peñaranda termed a “most extravagant government.”232 Those who were part of a monarchy were thus likely to assume that if the Prince of Orange was not yet a fully-fledged king, he would aspire to become one.233 Moreover, the difficulties encountered in negotiating with the complex body of the provinces in the period between 1628 and 1632 made the successful conclusion of an agreement with a single head look more likely and possibly more stable than one agreed upon with the multicephalous group of the States.234 Anti-Spanish sentiment prevailing among the population and the fear of possible French influence could “make the truce treaty impossible in provinces with such a popular government.”235 The mistrust of “that popular government” – and of any agreement not including the Oranges – prevented Philip iv from welcoming the proposal by some “principals of Holland” for suing for peace or truce without France and outside a European congress. Philip could, however, share the opinions underlying this offer, the Hollanders’ distrust of “the [increasing] power of France and its scant trustworthiness” and the consideration that French power would be better counterbalanced by a That is Israel’s assessment of it: Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, pp. 351 ff. He offers an account of the negotiations based mainly on the documents collected in the CODOIN, t. 59, pp. 207 ff. 232 J. L. Price, The Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998, p. 73. See also Albert Waddington, La République des Provinces-Unies, Vol. 1, p. 41. 233 AGS, Estado, 2062. See also Diego Saavedra Fajardo, Locuras de Europa, pp. 1208-9. 234 On Philip iv’s dismay at the difficulties encountered in the signing of a truce see Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic world, p. 236. There were also doubts whether a peace signed with the Estates would be more or less stable than one signed with the stadholder. “Advice of the Count of Oñate,” May, 1644, AGS, Estado, 2062. 235 “Report to the Cardinal-Infante concerning the Peace congress in Cologne,” (1638?), AHN, Estado, Libro 715. 231

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peace agreement without the Prince of Orange, “who they know aspires to sovereignty and is made more powerful everyday by the war.”236 At the same time, the Oranges, under the leadership, within the family, of Frederick Henry, had embarked upon a series of policies which made the stadholder look a more likely negotiating partner, especially as the prince progressively abandoned the pro-war party. The complicated state of affairs in the British Isles, the fact that “the Prince of Orange respects and appreciates kinship with the king of Great Britain [sic.]” so much, and Charles i’s need of Spanish subsidies made the British king a likely mediator between the Prince of Orange and the Spanish king.237 Furthermore, the assumed patrimonial aspirations of Frederick Henry were congruent with the Spanish Monarchy’s concept of power. Sharing the political culture of noble houses throughout Europe, Frederick Henry did not think it was disreputable or unacceptable – as would the Dutch regents – to acknowledge a symbolic form of submission to the Spanish king or the Emperor. This became clear when in 1636 the Emperor offered to elevate Meurs, a possession of the Oranges’, to the status of an Imperial principality, which would turn the prince into a vassal of the Emperor. The States General signalled their disagreement, unwilling to have their stadholder directly obedient to an external prince.238 A few years later, the Spanish offer of sovereignty to Frederick Henry, making him the vassal of the Spanish king, was based on the assumption that he would be ready to acknowledge the Spanish king’s overlordship. The Prince of Orange hastily accepted the title of Altesse conceded by the French king Louis xiii in 1637, a title which ranked him with the non-reigning members of French and Spanish royal families.239 Together with his son’s marriage to the Stuarts in 1641, this seemed to Philip iv’s government clear evidence that Frederick Henry no longer wanted to remain an obedient servant “of these low people,” governed “by merchants and beer brewers.”240 Different ways “Letter by Philip iv to the Cardinal-Infante,” 30 September, 1641, AGS, Estado 2287. “Letter by the count of Peñaranda,” 1 March 1646. AGS, Estado, 2255. 238 Herbert Rowen, The Princes of Orange, p. 69. The problems between the count of Peñaranda and the duke of Longueville, the head of the French delegation, show how the hierarchy among noblemen of different countries did actually matter – even for negotiation such as that carried out in Münster. On the repercussions for the negotiations of the different status of the two representatives see Jan J. Poelhekke, De Vrede van Munster, p. 216. 239 Herbert Rowen, The Princes of Orange, p. 70. 240 “To clarify the aim of the Hollanders or States General concerning the truce” (1644), AHN, Estado, 720. 236

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of satisfying the Oranges’ cravings were explored, demands less alien to the political culture of the Spanish Monarchy than those presented by the representatives of the provinces. The kinship between the stadholder and Charles i was also to be used in the complex dynastic chess-board of European diplomacy. Philip iv’s claims on the Palatinate could be exchanged for the county of Zutphen and Friesland – even if the Prince of Orange was not even stadholder of that province. As the British king was a relative of both Frederick v and Frederick Henry, the Spanish government expected that he would not interfere with this exchange.241 And so Frederick Henry was fully immersed in the dynastic game which involved ruling houses throughout Europe, even if, as Joseph Bergainge, then bishop in partibus infidelium of ’s-Hertogenbosch, noted in 1644, “the dissidences between the prince and the provinces increased day by day.” The regents approved neither of Frederick Henry’s interest in “confirming his Highness and the prospect of his House” nor of the stance taken by the stadholder in relation to the conflicts between king and parliament in England.242 The breakthrough took place in 1642, as Philip iv was informed by his ambassador at the British court that Charles i was ready to show his gratitude for monetary assistance received from the Spanish king by offering to broker “some sort of agreement” between the Prince of Orange and the Spanish king. This agreement would entail, or so it was hinted, the Prince of Orange becoming “absolute [lord] of some part of these provinces with dependence or investiture” from Philip iv.243 As all the main characters were well aware, the negotiations had to be carried out with the utmost discretion. In order to maintain secrecy, Francisco Galarreta, Philip iv’s secretary, was dispatched to the Low Countries in 1643. In the ‘instructions’ he carried to Brussels were formulated the main goals of the negotiation. The Prince of Orange was to receive some of the provinces which no longer recognized Philip “by way of enfeoffment, subenfeoffment or other way”, with the compromise of helping the Spanish king to regain the rest of the Dutch Republic. The enfeoffment was to be done either directly by the Spanish king or via “Instruction given by Philip iv to the secretary Galarreta,” §11, CODOIN, t. 59, p. 212. Similar proposals were contained in a letter from Philip iv to the Marquis of Castel-Rodrigo, 13 December 1644. AGS, Estado 2251. 242 “Copy of a letter from the Bishop of ’s-Hertogenbosch to Francisco Galarreta” 22 January 1644. AGS Estado 2251, CODOIN, t. 59, pp. 320-21. 243 “Letter from Philip iv to the Marquis of Castel-Rodrigo,” 11 May, 1642, AGS, Estado 2283. 241

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the Emperor. The advantages for Frederick Henry seemed obvious: he would turn from “lord into a free Prince,” a reward for his and his ancestors’ military efforts which would ensure “his and his sons’ fortune.” More importantly in Spanish eyes, the Prince of Orange would attain this position by “most just titles,” thus strengthening his position. At the same time, “what he would hand over would be greatly justified,” as Frederick Henry would be returning to his lord what belonged to him.244 According to the assessment of the king and his closest entourage, Frederick Henry, driven by vanity, lust for power and dynastic ambitions, could be brought to an agreement. In all these arguments the Bodinian notion of absolute sovereignty was absent. At its heart stood a notion of overlapping authorities very similar to those forming the Holy Roman Empire. Confronted with this approach, Frederick Henry reacted in a fashion that suggests a profound divide between his concept of authority and sovereignty and that of the Dutch town magistrates. The predictable opposition of the provintial states, wary of the increasing power of the Oranges and their possible armed opposition to such a settlement, together with the practical difficulties of the project, meant that the projected enfeoffment failed. But the Spanish king was not disheartened. In 1645 there were renewed talks within the Council of State about offering the Prince of Orange “the State of Guelders” in a desperate attempt to obtain Frederick Henry’s support for peace, while simultaneously fostering the mistrust of the provinces towards the stadholder.245 As Castel-Rodrigo emphasized, if this offer did not succeed in moving the stadholder towards the peace party, “nothing will, and if it does, everything will be well employed.”246 The possible enfeoffment of Spanish or Imperial territories to the Prince of Orange remained a recurrent theme of secret and less than secret negotiations between Frederick Henry and his representatives with the delegates of the Spanish Monarchy in Münster. Johan de Knuyt, representing both the province of Zeeland and the stadholder in the peace negotiations, was to achieve a final agreement with the Spanish crown on behalf of the Prince of Orange and his heirs. This part of the negotiations had a different pace from that with “Instruction given by Philip iv to the secretary Galarreta for the peace negotiation,” 9 March 1643, CODOIN, t. 59, pp. 207-213. 245 “Report by Domingo Cabral of 15 April 1644 with reports by Holland’s Catholics,” AHN, Estado, 720. 246 “Letter from the Marquis of Castel-Rodrigo to Philip iv,” 3 March 1645, AGS, Estado, 2063. 244

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the whole body of the Republic’s delegates, showing to what extent the aspirations and interests of Frederick Henry diverged from those of the provinces and how the Spanish envoys expected the prince to prevail forcibly if necessary over those opposing peace in the United Provinces.247 As Peñaranda gleefully announced to the king, Knuyt “seems truly to devote himself to the interests of the prince,” showing greater compliance with Spanish demands than the provinces. What was especially relevant for Peñaranda was the fact that “in the matter of religion, in the regions that Your Majesty would concede to him” the rights of Catholics would be preserved.248 Peñaranda’s optimism was not unfounded; the treaty between the Spanish king and the Prince of Orange was finally signed, to the satisfaction of both parties. Philip iv granted the family of Orange the properties Amalia van Solms and Frederick Henry demanded. In exchange, “the Prince and the Princess his consort, their heirs, successors or legitimate pretenders will enjoy and possess the aforesaid dominium without hindrance.” There were two conditions to be fulfilled. First, “that they keep the abovementioned lands in fief to His Majesty, except those which already are held in fief to some other” and, secondly, that they maintain the Catholic religion “as is at present and the clergymen in their goods, functions, liberties and immunities.”249 These were two fundamental issues which also figured in the negotiations with the United Provinces as a whole and which turned out to be among the most controversial points. The enfeoffment granted to the Prince of Orange – even if he was a heretic prince, which fact gave rise to discussion in the Council of State250 – was consistent with Letter from the Count of Peñaranda, 14 June 1646, AGS, Estado, 2255. Letter from the Count of Peñaranda, 17 May 1646, AGS, Estado, 2347. 249 “Trattato tra S.M. Católica et il Principe de Orange”, Münster, 27 December 1647, AGR, Audience, 1088-4. The agreement had been reached more than a year earlier, as Peñaranda informed the king on 14 June 1646, AGS, Estado, 2255 and the death of Frederick Henry in March 1647 did not alter the agreement. The interest of the Spanish Monarchy in not alienating the new Prince of Orange is set out in the letter sent by Archduke Leopold to Philip iv, 18 September 1647, AGR, Secretairerie d’Etat et de Guerre, 238. On how William ii nonetheless promoted the Reformation in the county of Lingen, ordering the removal of Catholic priests and stripping the churches, see Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic, its Rise, p. 600. 250 “Parecer que se ha dado en Flandes al señor marqués de Castel-Rodrigo acerca de la persona y tropas del Duque de Lorena” AGS, Estado 2065. See also the advice given by the archbishops of Malines and Cambrai and the count of Houyne about the enfeoffment of the duchy of Limburg to the prince of Orange on 24 July 1647. AGR, Secretairerie d’Etat et de Guerre, 238. 247 248

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the Spanish Habsburg idea of dominium, which implied that inherited possessions could never be fully alienated. The final enfeoffement, like the previous offers described above, was also congruent with the ideas of power deployed by the nobility. Noblemen, especially those of the highest rank, were unlikely to accept orders from a social inferior or even an equal. In the Spanish-dominated Low Countries this problem – especially relevant in provinces at open war and in a context where army service and nobility were still inextricably linked – was addressed though the presence of governors-general of royal blood. The high noblemen serving Philip iv were always judged to be less prone to disobey princes of the House of Habsburg, even if under-age and of bastard origin, than any commander of lesser social rank.251 But there was another side to the issue. Noble allegiances and social ranking within the aristocracy went beyond national allegiances, and marriages often included alliances with families in the enemy camp.252 Philip iv and his advisers were able to navigate these waters and use to their advantage the fact that many saw as the final rung of the ladder of social ascent the obtaining of one or more noble titles, something made difficult for subjects of Republics not acknowledging any princely overlordship.253 Monarchs of other, foreign polities such as the German Empire could, and did, invest Dutch families with titles. Less common was the request for such a title from the Spanish king but, more surprisingly, this request could be made through the mediation of the Dutch delegates in Münster. The Council of State in Madrid was surprised when the greffier (secretary) of Overijssel asked to be “honoured with a noble title to him and his descendants” by Philip iv. As the greffier had, according to the Council’s information, “authority and power” in his province, conceding a noble title to him would show the inhabitants of Overijssel the benefits they could expect from Philip’s magnanimity. The primary reason why Philip’s advisors strongly recommended such an unaccustomed gesture was, however, “Fr. Marçeliano de Barea, 21 January 1646 about news he claims having from Flanders and his opinion about them. “AGS, Estado 2065. 252 When the Count of Bergh was appointed as general of the army in Flanders after Ambrogio Spinola’s death, one of his problems in replacing the glorious commander was “that he was a Netherlander and was united through numerous familiar ties to the nobility of the Republic”, which was likely to arouse suspicions about his loyalty: Michael G. de Boer, Die Friedensunterhandlungen zwischen Spanien und den Niederlanden in den Jahren 1632 und 1633, Groningen: P. Noordhoff, 1898, p. 7. 253 Ronald Asch, Nobilities in Transition 1550-1700: Courtiers and Rebels in Britain and Europe, London: Hodder Arnold, 2003, p. 22. 251

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“the act of recognition of [Philip’s] sovereignty” it implied.254 Similar reasons had prompted the former governor of the Low Countries and later member of the Council of State, Francisco de Melo, to advise the king to intercede in favour of the Prince of Orange’s demands to elevate the county of Meurs into an “immediate principality of the Empire,” as this would make Frederick Henry a “vassal of the Empire” and ensure his collaboration.255 For Melo and other members of the Council of State, Frederick Henry’s personal allegiance to the Habsburgs – conceived of as a single family – opened up the possibility of regaining control over the Dutch Republic or, at least, obtaining recognition of some overlordship for Philip iv and his descendants. For the Spanish Monarchy, noble titles were not simply prestigious accolades; they implied recognition of the superior authority of the prince who granted the title. Accordingly, all possible measures were taken to prevent Philip’s own vassals from accepting titles from foreign princes, especially in territories where the personal attitudes of noblemen could profoundly alter the obedience due to the Catholic king, such as in the Low Countries.256 In the Dutch Republic the situation was assessed in different terms. The lack of automatic equivalence between holders of jurisdiction and political representatives meant that personal bounds forged between individual (noble) families and foreign rulers were not perceived as a threat to the integrity of the polity.257 The princes of Orange enjoyed different standing altogether. It was for this reasons that, instead of mediating as the delegates did in the case of the griffier of Overijssel, a majority in the States General objected to Frederick Henry’s dependence on a foreign prince. The prince’s ambition to increase his status within and – in this case – outside the Republic, deploying a patrimonial understanding of his own power deeply rooted in traditions of noble culture, met with the staunch opposition of many of the regents. While the Spanish government tried to use Frederick Henry’s and his family’s need for foreign support of all sorts to maintain their authority within “Advice by the Consejo de Estado about what the count of Peñaranda wrote about particular business,” 24 September 1648, AGS, Estado, 2068. 255 “Advice by the Consejo de Estado,” 12 May 1646, AGS, Estado, 2255. Frederick Henry had pressured the Emperor’s representative Trautsmandorff on this point in the previous years: Jan J. Poelhekke, De Vrede van Munster, p. 279. 256 “Advice by the Consejo de Estado,” 18 de julio de 1647, AGS, Estado, 2067. 257 On the extent – and limits – of the power of Holland’s (knighted) nobility see Henk F.K. van Nierop, The Nobility of Holland, especially pp. 140-176. 254

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the mixed constitution of the Dutch Republic, the regents adamantly opposed it.258 In fact, the differences between the Prince of Orange and the States went deeper. Frederick Henry – like his wife and even his son after his demise – was ready to accept in his private agreement with the Spanish Monarchy two points which clashed head-on with demands the Republic’s delegates were presenting, at the same time, to the Spanish envoys. If the representatives of the provinces were competing with one other to “se monstrer tous a qui plus zeleux et passionnez pour leur religion et pour la totale souverainete,”259 the Prince of Orange had easily accepted two opposing conditions. Orange’s priorities differed starkly from those of the States, whose staunch defence of their independence and refusal to accept any foreign imposition on confessional coexistence troubled the peace negotiations. The latent conflict between these views was averted only by the political acumen of the old stadholder, and afterwards by the death of his son. The regents had not fought for the recognition of the ‘free and absolute sovereignty’ of the United Provinces in vain.

“Letter from the marquis of Castel-Rodrigo on the report made by the abbot of Merçi after his voyage to Holland”, 29 March 1645, AGS, Estado, 2062. 259 “Letter from Philipe le Roy to Antoine Brun,” 28 November 1647, AGR, Secrétairerie d’Etat et de Guerre, 679. 258

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1

The Oranges were eager to accept an agreement under which they acknowledged both the Spanish king’s overlordship and a greater degree of freedom of worship for Catholics in the territories under their direct control. The provincial assemblies, and consequently the States General, had categorically rejected any demands made by the Spanish Monarchy and its representatives in that respect since 1609. The ensuing clash was one of the main causes preventing the making of an agreement before 1648. By the start of the Münster negotiations the Catholic king and his ministers were – albeit reluctantly – ready to recognize the freedom of the United Provinces and the degree of tolerance enjoyed by Catholics within them. However, the disputes over the extent of the sovereignty to be acknowledged and the situation of Catholics in the newly conquered territories were seriously to endanger the final signing of the peace - indicating how closely interwoven confessional and political considerations really were. The Dutch Republic declared itself independent from the Spanish Monarchy with the Abjuration Act (1581), by which the authority of Philip ii over the provinces was rejected. However, that was only one side of the equation. The recognition of their independence by other polities was something the United Provinces had striven for since the early years of the revolt, independence first sought through transfers of – if very limited – sovereignty to other, foreign princes,2 first the French duke of Anjou, and afterwards the earl of Leicester. Leicester’s failure meant the

Some of the central issues of this chapter are also central to Laura Manzano Baena, “Negotiating Sovereignty: The Peace Treaty of Münster, 1648,” History of Political Thought, vol. 28, n. 4 (2007), pp. 617-641. 2 The many limits the provincial states imposed on the sovereignty to be granted are central to Martin van Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 1

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end of the Provinces’ quest for a (foreign) prince who would command their army or assist them with financial and military aid. The provinces became a republic under the political leadership of Oldenbarnevelt and started the quest for recognition as an independent power (or perfect republic) by other polities. A first milestone was reached in 1596, when the United Provinces signed a ‘triple alliance’ on an equal footing with France and England, which implied the de facto recognition of the Dutch Republic’s existence and independence. Together with the Act of Abjuration and the Augsburg Transaction of 1548 – by which Charles v had separated the Burgundian circle from the Empire – this was interpreted by the Dutch government as having freed the United Provinces from any subjection to the Habsburgs. Thus, the United Provinces rejected imperial offers to mediate with the Catholic king in 1605, alleging that “all impartial kings, princes and polities” considered it “a free state, qualified and competent to govern itself.”3 The fact that ‘emissaries’ or ‘ambassadors’ circulated between England, France, the Swiss Confederacy, Venice and the United Provinces was the first evidence of the Republic’s independence. But the Republic requested further acknowledgement of its sovereignty by the Spanish king and the Low Countries’ suzerains, the Archduke Albert and his wife Isabella, when negotiations for what would become the Twelve Years’ Truce started.4 The Archdukes received the government of the Low Countries in 1598 as part of Isabella’s – Philip ii’s daughter – dowry, in an attempt to put an end to the Dutch Revolt bt means other than warfare. Eight years later, however, the rebel provinces had not yet returned to the Habsburgs’ dominion. Lack of financial means prompted Archduke Albert to send an envoy secretly to The Hague to test the Republic’s mood for peace, offering to start negotiating in exchange for some nominal recognition of the archdukes’ sovereignty. The Republic was facing financial difficulties of its own and could continue waging war Emanuel van Meteren, Historien der Nederlanden, en haar Naburen Oorlogen tot het Iaar 1612, Amsterdam: Jan Jacobsz Schipper, 1647, fol. 512v. 4 On the Twelve Years’ Truce see Bernardo J. García García, La Pax Hispánica. Política Exterior del Duque de Lerma, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996, especially pp. 4881 and Paul C. Allen, Philip iii and the Pax Hispanica, 1598-1621. The Failure of Grand Strategy, New Haven: Yale UP, 2000. More recently see the various contributions to Bernardo. J. García García (ed.), Tiempo de paces. La Pax Hispánica y la Tregua de los Doce Años, Madrid: Sociedad Estatal de Conmemoraciones Culturales and Fundación Carlos de Amberes, 2009. An early study on the topic is Henri Ch. G. J. van der Mandere, Het 12-jarige Bestand en de Vrede van Münster, Assen: Born, 1947. 3

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only by substantially raising provincial taxes or by putting the United Provinces under the protection of the French king – which would entail granting him complete sovereignty.5 As all of these options were rejected, the regents began to consider the possibility of a settlement, which resulted in a cease-fire in April 1607. This suspension of hostilities had been reached by negotiating with the “so called United Provinces” as “if they were free.” A final settlement was however not reached, as Philip iii confirmed that he was willing to cede sovereignty over the Provinces only in exchange for ‘free and public’ exercise of the Catholic religion. Although matters of state required that there be an immediate end to the war, Philip thought it paramount to act primarily as “an obedient son of the Church and defender of the faith,” thus making the Republic’s sovereignty, “for however long free and public worship lasts,” dependent on the free and public exercise of the Catholic creed in all provinces.6 The defence of Catholicism was a cardinal point for the Spanish Monarchy, but equally deeply engrained was the refusal within the United Provinces to allow public worship for Catholics. These irreconcilable positions brought about the suspension of the peace negotiations, to be reopened, thanks to French mediation, with the aim of a prolonged truce consisting of the extension of the existing cease-fire. No further declarations concerning the point of sovereignty would be needed. The issue of the Republic’s independence was not elaborated further and there are and were different interpretations of what it implied.7 Contemporaries such as Sir Robert Cecil, earl of Salisbury and James i’s secretary of state emphasized the ambiguity of that clause. The United Provinces were independent only with regard to suing for peace, and not in perpetuity. He noted that the Spanish would either find a pretext for breaking off the discussions once their situation improved or use the truce to win over the Dutch populace by peaceful means.8 The Paul C. Allen, Philip iii and the Pax Hispanica, p. 169. AGS, Estado 2226, quoted by Paul C. Allen, Philip iii and the Pax Hispanica, p. 217. 7 See for instance René Vermeir, “‘Oorloghsvloeck en Vredens Zegen’. Madrid, Brussel en de Zuid-Nederlandse State over Oorlog en Vrede met de Republiek, 1621-1648”, BMGN, 115 (2000) afl. 1, pp. 1-32, p. 3. An example of the standard interpretation is Simon Groenveld, De Kogel door de kerk?: de opstand in de Nederlanden en de rol van de Unie van Utrecht., 1559-1609, Zutphen: De Walburg Pers, 1979. 8 Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice and Other Libraries of N. Italy; 9, 494, Zorzi Giustinian to the doge and Senate, 2 May 1607, quoted by Paul C. Allen, Philip iii and the Pax Hispanica, p. 178. 5 6

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temporal acknowledgment – as a truce is by definition limited in time – the Provinces had obtained of their ‘as if ’ sovereignty was, as the Amsterdam city council complained, virtually meaningless.9 Hispanic attempts at a protectorate over the United Provinces (1628-1632)10 The lack of clear recognition of its independence did not prevent the Dutch Republic from sending “its servants everywhere in the quality of ambassadors to different rulers”, as soon as the Truce was signed. The States General of the United Provinces wanted thus “to make use of their sovereign authority more openly and stress it,” once their independence was “agreed upon by treaties and in the presence of all kings and rulers of the neighbouring countries and by the king of Spain.”11 Only the Emperor, who still claimed some overlordship over them, and the Spanish king – who considered that the sovereignty granted had expired with the resumption of hostilities in 1621 – denied the Republic’s independence. One of the last far-ranging political decisions of Philip iii’s reign was not to prolong the truce with the Dutch. Although the truce would not expire until 1621, during the whole of 1619, as the Thirty Years’ War started and grew in intensity, the Council of State on several occasions discussed the prospects of renewing the truce and, if so, under what terms. Re-starting the war would be justified not only on grounds of bringing the United Provinces back to the Habsburgs, which it was the king’s right and duty to do, but also in order to prevent a successful rebellion from setting a negative example which could be followed in other Habsburg possessions. Dutch expansion at the expense of the Spanish Empire had to stop, and the renewal of hostilities in the Low Countries was expected to contribute to this end. As Baltasar de Zúñiga – the uncle of the future Count-Duke of Olivares and a key figure in Resolutien van de Staten van Holland, 19 March and 3 April 1609, quoted by Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477-1806, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 405. 10 On these negotiations see Michael G. de Boer, Die Friedensunterhandlungen zwischen Spanien und den Niederlanden in den Jahren 1632 und 1633, Groningen: P. Noordhoff, 1898 and more recently, Jonathan I. Israel, especially The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982, pp. 223-249 and pp. 299-314 and John Boeren, “De Vrede van Tilburg: een Gemiste Kans”, Tilburg. Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, Monumenten en Cultuur, 16, 1 (1998). 11 Emanuel van Meteren, Historien der Nederlanden, Lib. 31, fol. 615v. 9

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the Council of State in those years – emphasized, either the rise of the Republic was halted or the Spanish Monarchy would lose “first the Indies, then Flanders, then Italy and finally Spain itself.”12 The aim was, if not a complete defeat of the United Provinces,13 the pressuring of the Republic into a “more reputable peace.” This implied the Dutch recognizing some kind of Spanish overlordship over their territory, allowing public Catholic worship, the opening of the river Schelde to trade from Antwerp, and withdrawal from the recently seized territories in the Indies. As expected, the Dutch Republic refused to accept these conditions,14 particularly the return of the “crown of freedom,” for some the greatest benefit obtained from the Twelve Years’ Truce.15 Regardless of the Republic’s outright rejection of these demands, the Spanish government – led since 1622 by Olivares – persisted. Even as late as 1628 the Spanish were unwavering in their demands concerning the Schelde and the Catholics’ freedom of worship, summarized under the heading of ‘religion and reputation.’16 A breakthrough seemed possible when the Republic’s relations with France deteriorated in 1628, when the United Provinces broke the treaty of Compiègne (1624) by refusing to attack the Huguenots of La Rochelle.17 Johan Kesselaer, delegate from the Archduchess to the negotiations, could subsequently inform Philip iv that the United Provinces no longer demanded the recognition of the Republic as ‘free and sovereign’ as a precondition for talks. Philip iv’s favourite – whose opinion was endorsed by the king – expected to make the Dutch accept: The title that is being proposed of perpetual protector, added to that of sovereign in the first place, as, let us say, sovereign protector (or perpetual and sovereign protector) and this we Quoted in Hugh R. Trevor Roper, ‘España y Europa, 1598-1621’, in La Decadencia Española y la Guerra de los Treinta Años, 1610-1648/59, Historia del Mundo Moderno, vol. 4, Barcelona, 1974, pp. 184-200, p. 199. 13 John H. Elliot, The Count-Duke of Olivares: the Statesman in an Age of Decline, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986, p. 60. 14 Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: its Rise, p. 482. 15 Johannes Uyttenbogaert, Discovrs op ende Teghen de Conscientievse Bedenckinghen, ofmen in Goede Conscientie Trefves met Spaengien Maken mach, Haarlem: Jacob de Wit, 1630, p. 19. 16 In the report on the state of the negotiations in 1629 by one of Frederick Henry’s close advisors to the States of Zeeland, these demands had apparently been reduced to the opening of the Schelde. Rapport Ghedaen by d’Heer van Beaumont/ Ghedeputeerde ter Vergaderinghe vande Hog-Mogh Heeren Staten van Zeelandt op den 17. October 1629, s.l.: s.n., s.a. [1629] 17 Michael G. de Boer, Die Friedensunterhandlungen, p. 3. 12

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have to seek as a last resort, because though they dislike that of sovereign, first they have to recognise it and secondly, here it is put in a way that they can understand it mistakenly and comfort themselves with it.18 The idea of sovereignty which the Count-Duke of Olivares was ex­ pounding in 1628 was a concept linked to feudal ties. As a consequence, Olivares and later on the Spanish delegates in Münster, considered sovereignty to be a synonym for ‘superiority’.19 For Olivares, as for many other members of the Spanish government, the independence of polities did not run counter to the idea that territories could be – and in fact were – subordinate to one another. It was this point of Bodin’s work which Spanish authors challenged most emphatically, showing their contempt for Bodin by constantly comparing him with the much-loathed Machiavelli.20 What Bodin – and many others after him – understood as sovereignty was of course known in the Spanish Monarchy. Olivares did not, however, see how inconceivable, even in the most symbolic form, submission to the Catholic Monarchy was for most in the United Provinces, as shown by the absence of any reference to this point in the Dutch printed debate. The ultimate intention of Philip iv and his ministers to regain control over the United Provinces, be it directly or via treacherous means, was recognized,21 but the possibility of the Republic voluntarily submitting to the Spanish king’s authority was never contemplated.22 Junta de Estado, 10 April, 1628, AHN, Libro 720. Colección de Documentos Inéditos para la Historia de España (CODOIN), Madrid: Viuda de Calero, 1842, t. 82, p. 449. The different concepts of sovereignty put forward by Dutch and Spanish delegates in Münster are the object of some attention in Henri Ch. G. J. van der Mandere, Het 12-jarige Bestand, pp. 141-142. 20 This equivalence is obvious in, among other writers, the title of Pedro Homem Barbosa, Discursos de la Iuridica y Verdadera Razon de Estado formados sobre la Vida y Acciones del Rey don Juan el ii de buena Memoria, Rey de Portugal llamado vulgarmente el Principe Perfecto. Contra Maquiavelo y Bodino y los demás Políticos de nuestros Tiempos, sus Secuaces, Coimbra: Nicolao Carvallo, 1629. See also Juan Márquez, El Governador Christiano: Deducido de las Vidas de Moysen, y Josue, Principes del Pueblo de Dios, Madrid: Gregorio Rodriguez, 1651 (1612). 21 Discovrs Aengaende Treves of Vrede met de Infante ofte Koning van Hispanien ende dese Vereenighde Nederlanden, Haarlem: Adriaen Rooman, 1629, p. 6. (K. 3919). This argument was frequently voiced by authors opposing any settlement. Vrymoedich Discovrs op de Tegenwoordighe Handeling van Treves. Voor-ghestelt by de Ghedeputeerden van den Coningh van Spangien en de Heeren Staten Generael des Gheunieerde Provintien, s.l.: s.n., 1633, p. 6. 22 This was clear to some in the king’s council, such as Ambrogio Spinola and Agustin Mexia. Junta de Estado, 10 April, 1628, AHN, Libro 720. 18 19

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The impossibility of agreement on this point, together with the Dutch rejection of the demands concerning the overseas companies and the opening of the Schelde, meant that there was no swift end to hostilities. The onset of the Mantua Succession Crisis, the consequent diversion of Spanish forces and the departure of the legendary commander Ambrogio Spinola from the Low Countries progressively weakened the Spanish position. Furthermore, Spain’s financial situation worsened after the seizure of the Mexican silver fleet by the admiral and director of the Dutch West India Company, Piet Hein. The surrender of the Huguenots in La Rochelle to Louis xiii, freeing the French armies to become seriously involved in northern Italy – against the Spanish armies – increased the threats facing the Catholic Monarchy. By 1629 the Republic was able to launch a powerful offensive against the southern provinces. In only five months the theoretically impregnable fortress of ’s-Hertogenbosch was conquered, in spite of the warnings of the archduchess Isabella, still governess of the Low Countries.23 The fall of ’s-Hertogenbosch, the heaviest Spanish defeat in the north since the Armada (1588), had far-reaching consequences. Along with the military stronghold, the centre of the Counter-Reformation in the area – the seat of the only bishopric in north Brabant – fell into Dutch hands, as did the river Maas. Furthermore, the seizure of the city enabled the Republic to claim the surrounding territory, the mainly Catholic Meierij. From then onwards the problem of who had jurisdiction over territories adjacent to the strongholds in Brabant and Flanders, now conquered by the Dutch, needed to be addressed repeatedly, as the Dutch argued that the district belonged to them as a consequence of their control of the city. The governments in Brussels and Madrid alleged that the superior authority remained in the hands of the feudal court of Brabant and consequently still belonged to the king as duke of Brabant.24 They rejected all Dutch claims on account of the king’s reputation and his “clear and well founded” authority.25 The exercise of ‘criminal justice’ in the area was a cornerstone. Were the United Provinces to be left the monopoly over justice, “les Estats pouroient a bonne cause maintenir que la souveraineté leur appartient Isabella to Philip iv, 13 Feb. 1629, AGR, Secrétairerie d’Etat et de Guerre, quoted by Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: its Rise, p. 506. 24 “Ecrit des Députés de sa Majesté,” (no date, 1630), AGR, Audience, 1425-6. The matter was extensively discussed in the Council of State in Brussels from February to June 1630. 25 “Advice of the Council of State in Brussels,” 27 March 1630, AGR Audience, 1425-6. 23

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entièrement en la dite Mairie, parce qu’ils en auroient le principal effect.”26 Another point, inextricably linked to the dispute over the area’s sovereignty, was to fuel further argument. If the Meierij remained in Spanish hands the Catholic Church’s rights and properties would be preserved. On the other hand, if the Dutch obtained jurisdiction over the area, the Spanish Monarchy would have to press for the preservation of the Catholic Church’s properties. Philip iv’s government tried, first, to ensure the preservation of the status quo on this point for as long as the negotiations continued, with the aim of averting the feared swift secularization of Catholic property by the United Provinces.27 These discussions, though primarily directed towards reaching a temporary agreement on the situation about territories recently conquered by the Dutch, reopened the problem of public worship for Catholics in the United Provinces. This issue was extensively discussed in the Council of State, both in Brussels and in Madrid, showing that the interest in this point was not merely symbolic.28 On the contrary, it was a nonnegotiable part of the Spanish Monarchy’s policy. Relinquishing sovereignty: The Treaty of Munster (1648) An agreement was not reached and warfare continued. During 1634 the balance of power in the Netherlands, after at least six years of Dutch military supremacy, shifted far enough in favour of the Catholic Monarchy to result in a military deadlock. Negotiations also remained at an impasse, due in part to the irreconcilable positions concerning sovereignty. Not even pro-peace Holland towns were ready to make concessions on this point. The absolute independence of the Republic was to be defended at all costs, even when negotiating an alliance with “Advice of the Council of State in Brussels,” 12 March, 1631 – approved by the Governess. AGR Audience, 1425-6. 27 “Ecrit des Deputéz de Sa Majesté” AGR Audience, 1425-6 (no date, 1630). 28 An opposite view is held by Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, p 224. An example of such disregard in a general assessment of the Spanish policy is to be found in Hugh Trevor-Roper, “Sustaining an Empire: Two Spanish Imperial Statesmen”, in his From Counter-Reformation to Glorious Revolution, London: Secker & Warburg, 1992, pp. 15-26. On the supposed willingness of the Spanish ministers to renounce sovereignty over the Provinces from the very beginning of the negotiations see also Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, p. 360. For the dismissal of the importance of the discussion over religious issues see Simon Groenveld, T’is Ghenoegh, Oorloghsmannen. De Vrede van Münster: de Afsluiting van de Tachtigjarige Oorlog, The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers, 1997. 26

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France in 1634, when the clause forcing both polities to sign the peace jointly with the Spanish Monarchy was rejected by Holland’s towns, arguing that such an undertaking would infringe the sovereign rights of the States General.29 During the first overtures towards a general peace congress in Cologne in 1638, the initial demand of the Dutch was the recognition of the freedom of the Republic, already in the passports granted to the envoys attending the congress. This demand left the government in Brussels – from where the negotiations would in part be carried on – wondering whether such demands were the product of “extreme arrogance” on the part of the Dutch or caused by fear of the prospective Spanish refusal to grant the Republic its freedom during the negotiations. In either case, it was decided adamantly to refuse “the recognition of freedom that they claim before any treaty.”30 Unable to achieve a settlement, both parties continued waging war. After 1640, the Spanish, in need of peace, offered substantial advantages for the stadholder and the States General in the event of the treaty being signed. While the Spanish ministers doubted the appropriateness of making peace with the Dutch at all costs, it was the only possible course of action once the idea of trying to reach a settlement with France was dismissed. Peace talks took place finally within the general framework of Münster, although the Spanish government mistrusted the implications of discussing what it still viewed, at least partially, as an internal conflict in an international forum. Moreover, Philip iv and his advisors were wary of the outcome of a congress which, so the Habsburgs feared, would be manipulated by French ministers. After many delays, the Dutch delegates arrived in Münster at the end of 1645. The first disagreement concerned the plenipotencies or ‘full powers’ – meaning full power or authority to sign treaties in the name of princes and republics – which the envoys of both polities carried with them. The term ‘plenipotency’ points both to its origin, the formula plena potestas, and to the fact that if delegates were invested with plenam potestatem agendi, their master was bound by the agreements signed by the delegates.31 In the negotiations between the Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, p. 304. Report to the Cardinal-Infante concerning the Peace congress in Cologne, (s.d.), AHN, Estado, 751. 31 On this aspect, mainly referring to the proctors sent to parliaments during the Middle Age, see Gaines Post, Studies in Medieval Legal Thought. Public Law and the State, 11001322, Princeton, etc: Princeton University Press, 1964, especially chapter iii. See also Kart-Heinz Ziegler, “The Influence of Medieval Roman Law on Peace Treaties”, Randall 29 30

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Catholic Monarchy and the Dutch Republic the precise phrasing of ‘full powers’ had further implications. The United Provinces demanded recognition of their sovereignty in their wording as a precondition for starting the talks because otherwise all the agreements reached could be considered invalid by the Spanish king and his ministers; the king would not be bound to respect a treaty signed with ‘rebel subjects’. The change of attitude of the Spanish king and his advisers was decisive. This change was caused by the pressure of events, by the rebellions of Portugal and Catalonia on the Iberian Peninsula itself and the situation in Italy and in the Low Countries due to the war with France. Following the advice of Francisco de Melo – the former commander of the Spanish armies in the Low Countries and later Councillor of State – the king accepted the Dutch demands and granted the Provinces free and sovereign status in the mandates given to the Spanish plenipotentiaries. Philip iv and his ministers did so in order not to halt the negotiations before they had effectively begun, remembering that “in the past truce this point was doggedly debated upon, and it could suffice that it would be put in the same way as was done back then”. They hoped to be able to modify the wording of this acknowledgement during the negotiations, expecting to obtain a “less disreputable” agreement.32 Furthermore, “if the truce with Holland was not to be agreed upon, the plenipotency is withdrawn without risking the sovereignty. And if it is settled, Your Majesty will buy cheaply the conservation of what remains of the Low Countries and Burgundy,” Melo argued, expecting that this would enable the Spanish Monarchy to restore its might throughout Europe.33 Other advisers agreed with Melo, recognizing that “the Dutch have nowadays everything they need to be generally considered as free” and that it was almost impossible to bring the Republic back under the king’s dominion.34 Once the delegates’ powers were modified, negotiations started using the 1609 truce as a starting point. A Dutch pamphleteer openly voiced his incredulity as he reported to “have heard that the Spanish Lesaffer (ed.), Peace Treaties and International Law in European History. From the Late Middle Ages to World War One, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 147-161, p. 157. 32 “Letter from the Count of Peñaranda about the plenipotency sent to continue treating with the Dutch”, Zaragoza 7 June 1646, AGS, Estado, 2254. 33 “Opinion of Francisco de Melo about the plenipotency for the treaty with the Dutch in the point of free.” 1 June 1646., AGS, Estado, 2255. 34 “Opinión of the Marquis of Leganés,” 1 June 1646, AGS, Estado, 2255.

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ambassadors in Münster say wholeheartedly that they consider us free lands.”35 His scepticism was well founded, as the discussions showed when it came to the first point of the old truce treaty. It concerned – again – the status of the United Provinces as ‘free and sovereign.’ For the Spanish ministers Philip’s rights over the United Provinces appeared “more than sufficiently preserved by the renewal of the war (once the truce had expired),” especially because the Republic’s freedom was “not grounded on right, but on tacit and simulative declarations or tolerations.” The matter of rebellion, “into which they had relapsed after the truces were finished,” was the explicit reason for opening hostilities and waging war, which had dismissed the validity of any “words, discourses, permissions or tolerations.”36 Waging war against the Republic emphasized the Spanish Habsburgs’ rights over it. Philip’s envoys attempted to maintain at least the terms of the 1609 truce but the Dutch delegates were adamant in their demands for a clear and ‘perpetual’ recognition of their sovereignty. The envoys of Philip iv tried to avoid committing themselves to any declaration about the sovereignty of the United Provinces for the time until the truce that was being negotiated expired.37 In so doing they were seeking to limit the consequences of having started negotiating with the Dutch as an independent power, which was denied to other ‘rebel’ territories and subjects such as Catalonia and Portugal – both by the Spanish Monarchy – and to the duke of Lorraine – by France.38 The delegates of the United Provinces were determined: the limitation of the recognition of the liberty and sovereignty of the provinces “could not be restricted in the time to come, and much less can it be limited to the time of a truce.” Such a limitation would only lead to further conflicts and wars.39 Hollands Praetje: Piscator Ictus Sapit, s.l: s.n., 1646, p. 5. “On the proposition made as to whether in the passports for increasing the rents it would be possible to omit the word rebels without damaging the king our Lord’s majesty, his reputation and his right,” AGS, Estado, 2064 (without date, letter from Philip iv to Castel-Rodrigo confirming this point 7 February 1645, AHN, libro 97. 37 “Answer by His Majesty’s delegates to the paper given by the Dutch” 17 May 1646, AGS, Estado, 2347. 38 On the Catalans and Portuguese in the Congress in Münster see Fernando Sánchez Marcos, “The Future of Catalonia. A Sujet Brûlant at the Münster Negotiations” and Pedro Cardim, “‘Portuguese Rebels’ at Münster. The Diplomatic Self-Fashioning in Mid17th Century European Politics” in Heinz Duchhardt, (ed.), Der Westfälische Friede. Diplomatie – politische Zäsur - kulturelles Umfeld - Rezeptionsgeschichte, München: Oldenburg, 1998, pp. 273-291 and 293-333. 39 “Answer by the Dutch,” 24 May 1646, AGS, Estado, 2347. 35 36

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Furthermore, the Dutch expected to end once and for all any quarrel over the Republic’s official position, also as far as other polities were concerned.40 The Dutch Republic refused to accept any sort of subordination, as princes throughout Europe had done during the Middle Ages, adhering to the formula rex imperator est in regno suo, refusing any submission to the temporal power of the Holy Roman Emperor.41 The United Provinces simply expected to be treated equally, defending the superior status of the Dutch Republic in comparison to the princes of the Empire, even to the electors, who were subject to an overlord42 – a point in flagrant contradiction with Frederick Henry’s desire to become an Imperial prince. Furthermore, the Republic saw its independence as a hard-won right, and not a magnanimous act on the part of the Spanish king. Thus, the Dutch delegates refused to express the Republic’s gratitude for Spanish concessions concerning sovereignty by making compromises on other points. When the Dutch delegates’ answer became known in the Council of State in Madrid, Philip iv’s ministers and the king himself could hardly believe the “insolence” of the Dutch. Only the difficult situation of the Spanish Monarchy could make it tolerable, especially with regard to the declaration of the Provinces in which they proclaimed themselves “so extensively as free and sovereign”, for time past and time to come.43 If the powers sent to start the negotiations with the Dutch acknowledged their independence, this had been done only “in order to facilitate the beginning of the negotiations, considering that it would not be necessary to specify so much the liberty claimed”. Had it not been for keeping the ‘obedient provinces’ under Spanish dominium and sparing them the dangers of war during that year’s military campaign, these concessions would never have been made on a permanent basis.44 The Spanish Monarchy had accepted, albeit reluctantly, the declaration of the Dutch Republic that it was free and sovereign, apparently the thorniest issue. The discussions continued round further points, navigation to Lieuwe van Aitzema, Verhael van de Nederlantsche, Vol. 1, p. 427. On this aspect see J.P. Cannin’s contribution “Introduction: Politics, Institutions and Ideas” to James H. Burns (ed.), The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought C.350-c.1450, Cambrige:Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 341-366, especially pp.363ff. 42 Fransch Praetje, Münster: Niclaes Staets, 1646. 43 “Advice by the Junta de Estado,” Zaragoza, 10 September 1646, AGS, Estado, 2255. 44 “Letter to the count of Peñaranda. Answer about the truce with Holland.” Zaragoza, 16 September 1646, AGS, Estado, 2254. 40 41

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the Indies and the status of the Generality Lands, the territories which Dutch armies had conquered during the 1630s and 1640s, which were inhabited by a large number of Catholics. Pressed by the demands of the province of Zeeland, the Dutch delegates demanded the “temporal and spiritual sovereignty” over Dutch-controlled Brabant, Limburg and Flanders on the same terms as they assumed they would enjoy sovereignty over the seven Northern provinces. This demand proved unacceptable to the Spanish delegates who tried to delegate it to an independent commission, “without therefore breaking the treaty and returning to arms”.45 An important ramification of this problem was the issue of the property of the churches in these territories. Spanish claims, demanding that the churches remain in the hands of the Catholics “as they were in the beginning and continue to be nowadays,”46 were flatly rejected by the Dutch, who considered the administration of ecclesiastical property part of the sovereignty to be granted. They assured the Spanish delegates that the “generally recognized freedom of conscience” would on no account be questioned.47 This demand opened up another line of discussion and disagreement between the twoh polities – and among the Dutch provinces themselves – which was about to lead to the breakdown of the negotiations. First, the toleration of Catholics and the extent of their freedom of conscience was a problematic issue for both parties. Second, two different interpretations of the limits of the spiritual and the temporal, partially – but not merely – an outcome of the Reformation, clashed here. Although agreement on these points was still pending, by the end of 1646 a preliminary treaty had been agreed upon, to the surprise and annoyance of the French.48 It is generally considered that the time which elapsed between the signing of the preliminary treaty and its ratification (more than a year) was a result of the Dutch Provinces having to wait for France to reach a similar agreement with the Spanish Monarchy. The ministers of the Spanish king justified the “disreputable” peace along lines consistent with the wider guidelines which had shaped the “What has been thought by the plenipotentiaries of Your Majesty about the third chapter of the proposals of the Dutch,” 14 May 1646. AGS, Estado, 2347. 46 “Answer by the plenipotentiaries of His Majesty to the paper given by the Dutch,” 17 May 1646, AGS, Estado, 2347. 47 Lieuwe van Aitzema, Verhael van de Nederlantsche, Vol. 2, p. 18, also in AGS, Estado, 2347. 48 The different stages of the negotiation are central to Laura Manzano Baena, “El Largo Camino hacia la Paz. Cambios y Semejanzas entre la Tregua de Amberes de 1609 y la Paz de Münster de 1648,” Pedralbes. Revista d’Història Moderna (forthcoming). 45

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Monarchy’s policy during previous decades. Although still expecting the situation to improve, at a time when all Philip iv’s domains were “running such evident risk of being lost” simply preserving what remained of the king’s dominion in Flanders was something “that would be a bargain” regardless of how expensively it might be bought. Furthermore, the king’s “pious zeal in defence of religion” and commitment to the subject’s benefit was so firmly established that Philip’s final aims were unquestionable.49 These final aims, however, further complicated the situation, as was recognized by contemporaries, especially with regard to the cession of sovereignty.50 It was generally acknowledged that the validity of the treaty would be, at best, dubious. Sarcastically, Dutch pamphleteers advised letting Philip “eat cheese and bread and allow[ing] him to say everything that can be said in words,” considering that his promises sounded too good to be true and further emphasizing the dire consequences that trusting the Spanish king’s words had always had for the United Provinces.51 These references, scarcely novel, then began to be increasingly coupled with the incredulity towards an ‘eternal’ recognition of the independence of the Dutch Republic. The incomplete Republic One of the possible challenges to the validity of the settlement was the ‘unnatural’ separation between the northern and southern provinces of the Burgundian Circle it imposed. The unification of the Netherlands north of the rivers under the Habsburgs was the culmination of a process going back three centuries. Since the 1420s the Low Countries had been under the same ruler, with first Burgundian and later Habsburg power centred in Brussels. The concentration of resources and of political and ecclesiastical patronage south of the rivers which followed probably left the States of Holland with the unpleasant feeling of serving only to pay the bills, a feeling increased by the use of the Habsburg Netherlands as a bastion against France. At the same time steps, both military and “Opinion of the Marquis of Mirabel,” 2 June 1646, AGS, Estado, 2255. The arguments put forward by the French delegates, very much in line with those of the opponents of peace within the United Provinces, are to by found in the letters from the French Ambassador to the States General. See for instance Gescrifte Over-gegeven by Mijnen Heer den Ambassadeur van Vranckrijck, aen Mijne Heeren de Staten Generael der Vereenighde Nederlanden, wegens de Garantie. De 11 April 1647. s.l.: s.n., 1647. 51 Münsters Discours ofte ‘tSamen-sprekinge/ over de Laetste Tijdinghe van Münster ghecomen/ tusschen en Fransman, Nederlander, ende Spaengiaert… s.l.: s.n., 1646, p. 5. 49 50

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legal, were being taken which would effectively lead to the unification of the Seventeen Provinces of the Low Countries. By the Treaty of Venlo (1543) – when Guelders was integrated into the Habsburg lands – and the subsequent Augsburg Transaction (1548), Charles v reunited the Low Countries in an entity which he made separate from both the Empire and France. Even if the effectiveness of these measures can be questioned,52 the sense of unity pervading the provinces has to be acknowledged. Perhaps more importantly, the juridical ties uniting the provinces could be ignored when it suited the interest of the parties but not easily undone, thus allowing for the persistence of irredentist discourses on the Spanish and Dutch sides. The Spanish government was unwilling to accept the complete separation of the ‘rebel’ provinces. The sense of the Low Countries forming a whole was also keenly felt in the early moments of the revolt. The divisions were not based on provincial or linguistic characteristics, and solutions – such as the Pacification of Ghent in 1576 – were advanced for the totality of the provinces. Neither the Union of Arras nor the Union of Utrecht, both signed in 1579, discounted the possibility of other provinces joining either or both unions. Only during the Twelve Year’s Truce did the north and south of the rivers drift further and further apart. The bonds tying the seventeen provinces remained, as shown by the repeated attempts at negotiations among the States General of the southern and northern provinces to reach not a settlement, but a reconciliation. In spite of the failure of the negotiations attempted at the turn of the sixteenth century,53 the idea of a patria communis continued to exist, and its revival was attempted – at least from the Spanish side – after the cession of sovereignty to the Archdukes Albert and Isabella which aimed to bring the provinces together. A successful conclusion was however prevented by the Dutch regents’ refusal to accept any form of submission to the Habsburgs. The reunification of the provinces would thus imply the abjuration by the southern provinces of their obedience to the Archdukes. Turning traitor to their sovereigns was impossible for the delegates of the southern provinces, much as they longed for

Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: its Rise, p. 69. Hugo de Schepper, “Los Países Bajos y la Monarquía Hispánica: Intentos de Reconciliación hasta la Tregua de los Doce Años (1574 - 1609),” Ana Crespo Solana and Manuel Herrero Sánchez (cords.), España y las 17 provincias de los Países Bajos: una Revisión Historiográfica (xvi-xviii), Vol. 1, Córdoba: Servicio de Publicaciones, Universidad de Córdoba, 2002, pp. 325-354, p. 339. 52 53

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peace.54 For the southern delegates a possible unification implied the recognition by the northern provinces of the overlordship of the prince ruling over the south, either the Spanish king or the Archduke Albert and the Archduchess Isabella.55 Once the truce was signed, the division between southern and northern provinces grew; a gap which was not to be easily bridged when sovereignty reverted once more to the Spanish king after Albert’s death without issue. As the truce talks held around 1630 did not bear fruit, separate negotiations between the States of the southern and northern provinces were attempted after 1630, with the acquiescence of the Archduchess Isabella. Spain’s position was weakened after the replacement of Spinola by the marquis of Aytona, who proved unable to strengthen the monarchy militarily. The fall of Maastricht in 1632, the attempted revolt of count Henry van den Bergh, as well as general exhaustion from the war forced Archduchess Isabella – against the will of the government in Madrid – to call the States General in Brussels.56 As soon as the representatives gathered, their first demand was to resume the negotiations with the United Provinces, promising not to challenge two points which had prevented previous agreements: the welfare of the Catholic Church and the obedience owed to the Spanish king. War would continue, they assured the king’s ministers, until an honourable agreement was obtained,57 an agreement which did not, however, materialize. The failure of these various negotiations does not conceal the fact that the bonds theoretically still uniting the Low Countries were thought to be a proper channel for obtaining peace. The discussion among fellow countrymen was often seen as a way of lessening the differences dividing northern and southern provinces. The ‘Flemish’ below and beyond the rivers remained united by family ties, commerce - albeit in smuggled goods – and often language; ties so obvious to the Spanish government even as late as October 1645, Paul C. Allen, Philip iii and the Pax Hispanica, p. 52. In 1646 the author of Münster’s Praetje noted that the south would accept coming into a bond with the United Provinces only with the consent of the Spanish king, who would retain the title of sovereign and some royalties in exchange for allowing “de Verheerde Landen” to establish their own government. Munsters Praetje. Deliberant Dum Fingere Nesciunt, s.l: s.n., 1646. 56 A recent overview on that seriers of events is Alicia Esteban Estríngana, Madrid y Bruselas: relaciones de gobierno en la etapa postarchiducal (1621-1634), Leuven, Leuven University Press, 2005, pp. 176-190. 57 Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, pp. 238 ff. René Vermeir, “‘Oorloghsvloeck en Vredens Zegen,’.p. 12. 54

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when the States of Brabant petitioned Castel-Rodrigo for permission to negotiate on a states to states basis, that this option was deemed the most convenient.58 The same reasoning prompted Peñaranda, head of the Spanish delegation in Münster, to send the Burgundian Brun frequently to talk separately with the Dutch – in their own language and as their countryman.59 These ties could, however, end up turning completely against the interests of the United Provinces. The fact that the seventeen provinces could still be considered a whole in juridical terms caused some unrest on both the Spanish and the Dutch sides during the negotiations and called for extra care in the wording of the agreements, as a means of avoiding any future claims over the northern and southern provinces respectively. More worrying for the Dutch were the consequences which the possible marriage between the French king Louis xiv and the Spanish Infanta Maria Teresa could have. The sovereignty over the Low Countries would be her dowry and the possible interpretation by the French of what was to be understood as the Low Countries made the Dutch distrustful of French intentions. Talks about a marriage for the Infanta and the cession of sovereignty over (part of ) the Low Countries had been going on since 1644. The first bridegroom considered was the French king’s brother and the dowry – as long as it would bring peace – the Duchy of Burgundy.60 During the following year negotiations on this point between French and Spanish delegates made rapid progress, the marriage partner for the Infanta becoming the king and her dowry increasing, in relation to the importance of the bridegroom, to become the whole of the provinces of the Low Countries. In January 1646 Mazarin considered the marriage nearly

Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, pp. 358-359. On the failure of these attempts see Jan J. Poelhekke, De Vrede van Munster, pp. 210ff. 59 The importance of being addressed in their own language for the Dutch delegates is recorded by Lieuwe van Aitzema, Verhael van de Nederlantsche, Vol. 1, p. 604. This was considered when appointing Brun as plenipotentiary for the Congress. “Asistencia del Canciller de Brabante al Congreso de Munster” 30 May 1644, AGS, Estado, 2061. The emphasis of the Spanish delegates on not offending the linguistic sensibilities of the Dutch is also noted by Jan J. Poelhekke, De Vrede van Munster, p. 218. 60 “Letter to Castel-Rodrigo informing him of the advice of the Council of State,” 18 November 1644. AGS, Estado, 2251. In the following months the Council of State considered the possible dowry of the Infanta. It could either include the Franche-Comté, increased with Artois, or even the Duchy of Milan. Jan J. Poelhekke, De Vrede van Munster, p. 244. 58

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accomplished,61 and a document was drafted listing the advantages the Dutch Republic would gain from it.62 A month later, Frederick Henry officially informed the States General of the agreement. Fears spread in the United Provinces about the consequences this cession might have, as the French could afterwards interpret it as giving them rights over the whole of the Low Countries. Although not explicitly arguing against the idealized unity of the provinces emanating from the Union of Utrecht, there was frequent emphasis on the need for a territory separating the Dutch Republic from France.63 At the same time, reference was made to the enormous costs of the military campaigns for the conquest “of Brabant and Flanders.” The fear of France, in spite of the repeated French rejections of the paternity of the idea,64 gave fresh ammunition to those favouring a settlement. The links existing between all provinces forming the Low Countries also served to justify the pro-war party’s aims, especially in Zeeland where the old yearning to unite the original area of the Union of Utrecht into one political entity, be it through conquest or through alliance and cantonalization, persisted. The main goal was to remove any sign of Spanish power from the territory, even if it entailed an offensive war and the consequent growing cost of warfare. Some pro-war authors considered it a price worth paying to take advantage of the Spanish Monarchy’s weakness, which would allow for “these seventeen provinces to be united as a state without any, direct or indirect, dependence on Spain, enjoying as sovereign and free states their fatherly liberties and privileges”65 As peace drew nearer in the 1640s this argument was See the letters exchanged in January 1646 between Mazarin and the French delegates in Münster on this respect recorded in Nicolas Clément and Jean Aymon, Mémoires et Négociations Secrètes de la Cour de France: touchant la Paix de Munster Contenant les Lettres, ... et Avis Secrets envoiez de la Part du Roi, de S.E. le Cardinal Mazarin, ... avec les Depêches & les Réponses desdits Plenipotentiaires, Amsterdam: Frères Chatelain, 1710, pp. 26ff. 62 “Raisons qui doivent porter Messieurs les Etats à desirer l’échange de la Catalogne, & même du Rousillon, avec la Flandre & le Comté de Bourgogne entre la France & l’Espagne,” Nicolas Clément and Jean Aymon, Mémoires et Négociations Secrètes, p. 71. 63 Irenee, Copie d’une Lettre Envoyee de la Haye, aux Deputez des Estats d’Hollande, Pour la Paix a Munster, s.l : s.n., [1646], p. 2. 64 Lettre d’un Gentil-homme Venitien, escrite de Monster le 2. d’Avril 1646. à un sien Amy à Turin, s.l.: s.n., 1646, pp. 14-15. Although allegedly translated from Italian, this pamphlet was most probably written by a French or pro-French author as stated in the Antvvoordt op Seeckere Missive van een Venetiaens Edelman, aen sijn Vriendt tot Tuirin, uyttet Italiaens ende Frans over-gheset, s.l.: s.n., [1646]. 65 Discovrs Aengaende Treves of Vrede, pp. 11-15. 61

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repeated: peace without freeing the south could not be “firm and sure” and would go against the “feelings and ancient maxims” of the “ancestors” of the Dutch. Furthermore, peace implied abandoning the “neighbouring provinces,” allegedly united with the Dutch Republic in one Union to “throw off the yoke of the Spaniards, expelling the foreign nations,” a yearning which the count of Bergh’s conspiracy against Spanish power in 1632 was meant to prove.66 Authors favouring peace and the existence of a separation from France alleged however that the “remaining dismembered provinces” did not wish to be part of the Republic.67 Other authors rejected the continuation of war to liberate “the subdued provinces of Brabant, Flanders, etc from the tyranny of Spain,” as it was unlawful to encourage “Christians who live in other [Christian] lands” to “overthrow their authorities.” 68 There were other signs of internal tension when it came to the way in which the reunion of the seventeen provinces was to take place. Some voices grounded the continuation of war in the need to “eradicat[e] the Jesuits”69 – thus implying the establishment and forcible imposition of the decreees forbidding open practice for Catholics. Others, conscious of the strong Catholic confessionalism pervading the southern provinces, advocated leaving the matter of confessional coexistence in the hands of the individual provinces. The Swiss Confederation, also a product of revolt against the Habsburgs, was the model favoured when it came to making an offer to the southern Catholic provinces to join the Dutch Republic in the 1640s, as this union allowed for a great degree of selfgovernment for the different provinces constituting it.70 In order to encourage the southern provinces to rebel, they were only offered the maintenance of the public exercise of Catholicism if they would “free themselves,” showing their intention to become part of the Republic, Noodige Bedenckingen der Trouhertighe Nederlanders, over de Aen-staende Munstersche Handelinghe van Vrede ofte Treves..., s.l.: s.n., 1643. 67 (Attributed to Adriaen Pauw) Observatien op de Brief van A. de Bruyn, Deventer: s.n., 1647. 68 Tvba Pacis ofte Basuyne des Vredes. Gestelt door een Oprecht Patriot die so wel de Vrede, als de Vryheydt der Conscientie bemint, tot Onderrechtinghe van alle Oprechte Patriotten, die om de Vryheyt der Conscientie tegens den Konink van Spanjen so veel Jaren Gevochten Hebben. Tegen het Suchtigh ende Trouhertigh Discours van E. P., s.l., s.n., 1647. 69 Noodige Bedenckingen. 70 Advis Des-interessé aux Habitans des Païs-bas, qui sont sous la Domination du Roy d’Espagne. Par une Personne neutre, s.l.: s.n., 1644 and Trewhertzige Vermahnung/ Worinnen viel Deckwürdige und politische Considerationes, uber den jetzigen Zustand und Beschaffenheit der Vereignigten Niederlandischen Provincien, begriffen..., s.n.: s.l., 1644. 66

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rather than of France.71 If the provinces were conquered, however, their right to self-determination would be reduced. The unnatural separation between northern and southern provinces and the dismemberment of closely-knit provinces as a result of the military campaigns cast doubt over the validity and sustainability of the agreement in theory and practice, as the War of Devolution (1667-68) would demonstrate. The inalienability of sovereignty, the incapacity of any prince to renounce what was not his but belonged to his dynasty would also be a matter of concern. A patrimonial concept of sovereignty The Spanish Monarchy held to a concept of sovereignty which clearly differed both from the one put forward by Bodin and from the one the Dutch Republic tried to define for its own political organization. Even if after Bodin’s Six Books the prevailing idea was that a political power which was not sovereign had to be a subject, a number of political entities existed which acted independently in their way of governing themselves while acknowledging certain obligations towards other political entities. The fact that the Duchy of Milan was feudatory to the Empire did not make all territories under its holder, the Spanish king, subject to the Empire. The Spanish king and the publicists around him could publicly deny submission to any external power while at the same time the links tying the Catholic king to the Emperor and the Empire were proudly displayed – as long as they did not imply the payment of tributes.72 This attitude openly contrasted with Antoine Aubery’s fierce assertions of the French kings not being “obliguez de rentre de foy ny d’hommage pour quelques fiefs que ce soit, & qu’ils ne peuvent jamais quitter la qualité ny les fonctions de souverains pour s’abaisser à celles Munsters Praetje. Together with the reasons for not accepting the interference of other polities in the Catholic monarchy’s –and also the Imperial – affairs [see Rebels] the right of the Spanish Monarchy to participate in the resolution of internal Imperial matters was defended on the basis that Philip iv was a “Prince of the Empire.” Letter from Saavedra Fajardo to the king, 11 February 1645, AGS, Estado, 2346. The ties existing between the two Habsburg branches allowed Arredondo y Agüero to consider “the Germans, vassals of the House of Habsburg, of which is head His Majesty, as his [Philip iv’s] vassals.” Diego de Arredondo y Agüero, Discvrso sobre la Necessidad qve ay en la Corona de Castilla de fundar vn Consejo, y Iunta, a Quien se cometan todas las Cosas de su Gobierno Politico. s.l.: s.n, s.a. [1622], fol. 2r. “Ser vn Rey tributario, no es Reynar, sino seruir.” Jose Laínez, El Daniel Cortesano, p. 17. 71 72

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de vassaux.”73 Against the feudal and contractualist distinction between dominium directum and dominium utile, the unity of the two domains as a precondition for independence and sovereignty was developed. The latter concept of domain stood behind the Dutch Republic’s adamant rejection of any form of subjection to the Spanish king or the Emperor. The princes of Orange, as previously shown, maintained the distinction. More general agreement pertained on the civilian principle of the indivisibility of dominium, the inalienability of sovereignty and attached rights. The concept of inalienability of sovereignty was a central tenet of the medieval theory of kingship. As early as the thirteenth century, Roman and canonical lawyers considered the king a guardian, curator or usufructuary of his office. As such, he could not alienate the essential functions of his office, thus impairing the state.74 Without developing a theory establishing a clear and explicit distinction between the domain of the crown and the private estate of the king, the limitations on the king in alienating territories belonging to his domain were commonplace among Spanish theorists. The king could neither harm his own authority, not even for the well being of his subjects, nor “be detrimental to his descendants nor to the sovereignty, whose minister he is, not his lord.”75 This view clearly challenged the distinction made by Hugo Grotius, who defended the validity of cessions of sovereignty, maintaining that the owner of sovereignty could renounce it, whether it be the king “if the Crown be patrimonial” or the people “but not without the king’s consent.” The king, in the latter case, was a mere usufructuary of the people’s eminent right,76 a view incompatible with those defended by the Spanish king’s entourage. Antoine Aubery, Des Justes Prétensions du Roy sur l’Empire, Paris: Bertier, 1667, “Epistre au Roy.” Quoted in Julián Viejo Yharrassarry, “El Barón de Lisola, la Defensa de la Monarquía Católica y la Paz de Westfalia”, Annali di Storia Moderna e Contemporanea, 1 (1995), pp. 93-105, p. 99. 74 Peter N. Riesenberg, The Inalienability of Sovereignty in Medieval Political Thought, New York: Columbia UP, 1956 quoted by Theodor Meron, “The Authority to Make Treaties in the Late Middle Ages”, The American Journal of International Law, vol. 89, No. 1 (Jan., 1995), pp. 1-20, p. 3. 75 Alonso Carrillo, Soberanía del Reyno de España, Cordoba, 1626, p. 14. 76 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, in three Books: Wherein are Explained, the Law of Nature and Nations, and the Principal Points Relating to Government, London: W. Innys, R. Manby, J. and P. Knapton, D. Brown, T. Osborn, and E. Wicksteed, 1738, p. 215. The same arguments on the necessity for the States’ consent in the event of a cession of sovereignty over the southern provinces to the French king are found in Antwoordt op’t Munsters Praetje, Dordrecht: Claes Claesz, 1646. 73

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The king was in charge of guarding sovereignty for the succeeding generations of his family. Thus, agreements implying a cession of sovereignty were likely to be considered invalid. Saavedra Fajardo described the patrimonial claims of the French king to the provinces of Flanders and Artois, pointing out that “no king can renounce them; moreover, they are under the obligation of recovering them by the sword”.77 Similar arguments, referring to the rights of the Catholic Kings Ferdinand and Isabella over Navarre, are to be found in the History of Philip ii written by Luis Cabrera de Cordoba. He stated, following Fernando Vázquez de Menchaca,78 that “right does not lapse when there is force of enemies and necessity that surrenders to it.”79 Even if territories were lost through war, the rights over them were not repealed.80 Explicitly referring to a possible transferring of rights over the Low Countries, whether by the French or the Spanish king, a pamphleteer stated that sovereignty was “un droict inalienable de la Couronne.” Therefore, any cession thereof “ne peut durer ni valoir.”81 This explains why a cession of sovereignty in the terms the Dutch demanded in Münster was highly unlikely. But there were ways through which the dominium utile could be transferred, as long as the Spanish monarch’s dominium directum – however deprived of prerogatives it might be – was acknowledged. Transferring the rights over the Low Countries During the first years of the Dutch Revolt, the Dutch refrained from completely abandoning their legal sovereign, proposing instead to reconcile the principles of the privileges and the provincial government Diego Saavedra y Fajardo, Locuras de Europa, p. 1205. Fernando Vázquez de Menchaca, Controversiarum Illustrivum: aliarumqve usu frequentium: libri tres / obra del jurisconsulto vallisoletano Fernando Vázquez de Menchaca; D. Fidel Rodríquez Alcalde and Calixto Valverde y Valverde (eds.), Valladolid: Cuesta, 1931-1934 (1563). Hugo Grotius refutes this point in The Rights of War and Peace, Book ii, Chap. 4. 79 Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, Historia de Felipe ii, Rey de España, (eds José Martínez Millán and Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales), Valladolid: Consejería de Educación y Cultura, 1998 (1619), p. 232. 80 This argument could be used to defend the rights of the Catholic king over the Netherlands, but it was also employed by the Portuguese when challenging the dominium of the House of Austria in the 1640s, as Juan Adam de la Parra pointed out. Juan Adam, Apologetico, fol. 8r. 81 Fin de la Guerre des Pays-Bas, avx Provinces qui sont encor sous l’Obeissance d’Espagne, Item la Descouverte des Proffondeurs d’Espagne Cachees sous ceste Proposition de Donner au Roy de France en Mariage l’Infante d’Espagne aver les Dixsept Provinces des Pays-Bas en Constitution de Dot, s.l. : s.n., 1645, p. 16. 77

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with respect for the higher authority,82 in spite of the scorn with which this option was treated in contemporary pamphlets.83 During the 1640s it became obvious that the tension caused by the revolt and Philip ii’s abjuration was not easily to be solved. When in the autumn of 1646 Holland proposed that the truce under negotiation be turned into a peace, arguing that the Republic’s sovereignty would be better ensured by a peace than by a truce, the Zeeland deputies in the States emphasized the flaws in this argument. The peace treaty would not guarantee anything at all, in peace or in war, and, moreover, it stood in flagrant contradiction to the revocation of sovereignty implied in the Abjuration Act (1581) and could be employed “in prejudice of this State, namely of the absolute sovereignty of the same.” The “solemn decree by the Lords States General of the year 1581” and the Dutch Republic’s recognition by other “Christian potentates” and the Spanish king himself “in the previous and present Truce negotiations” should suffice to ensure the Republic’s sovereignty.84 The Provinces did not need to “beg to receive liberty and sovereignty from the hand of the Spaniard.” Pamphleteers shared this argument, pointing out that the cession of sovereignty would also be legally unsustainable, as Philip iv’s successors would be entitled to impeach the cession of regalia belonging to the title and not to its holder.85 As another author noted, “quia Regalia non sunt personalia, sed regni”.86 The only way in which a cession could take place without being impeached by the Spanish Monarchy or the heirs to the patrimony had already been explored and failed. Cabrera de Córdoba noted that when the States General offered the title of governor-general of the provinces to the Archduke Matthias during the first years of the revolt they could have achieved a twofold goal. On the one hand, they would have made the Emperor support their demands by favouring his brother. On the other, by virtue of being “a prince of the House of Habsburg, he could be admitted without blemish,” and he could “force the king, his uncle, to give him his daughter and the States [of the Low Countries] Hugo de Schepper, “Los Paises Bajos y la Monarquía Hispánica,” p. 334. Martin van Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt, 1555-1590, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 141-145. 84 Lieuwe van Aitzema, Verhael van de Nederlantsche, Vol. 2, pp. 140-1. 85 Nederlants Beroerde Ingewanden, over de latste Tijdinge, van de Munstersche Vrede handelige. Uytstortende Gantsch becommerlijcke en bewegelijcke klachte/ in den schoot van alle getrouwe Patriotten/ ende Liefhebbers des Vaderlants, s.l.: s.n., 1647. 86 E. P., Suchtigh, en Trouwhertigh Discours, over dese Tegenwoordige Gestalte des Landts, in Bbedenckinge van Onderhandelinge zijnde met den Coninck van Spangien, s.l.: s.n., 1646. 82 83

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as dowry.” Consequently “they would lawfully escape the obedience of Spain.”87 Such a transfer took place when the sovereignty over the Low Countries was given as a dowry to Philip ii’s daughter Isabella when she married the Archduke Albert of Austria in 1598, offering an example of the lawful cession of sovereignty and keeping the southern provinces in many respects subordinate to Spain, and under Spanish suzerainty. The Spanish dominium utile over the Low Countries was thus ensured. This scheme has often been interpreted as an example of Spanish nefariousness regarding the Low Countries, considering it to be a trap to get the United Provinces under Spanish dominion. In fact, an alienation of sovereignty could not take place in any other way. As Alonso Carrillo stated in 1626, when he was serving under the orders of the Cardinal-Infante Ferdinand, later governor of the Spanish Low Countries, the only way the king could give away the dominium over one of his inherited territories was through the recognition of the superior power of the king over the territory alienated. There was a twofold reason for this. Firstly, Carrillo argued, sovereignty is meant to be preserved and augmented, and can therefore not be damaged by its own characteristics, making it impossible for sovereignty to be diminished. Secondly, a king could harm neither the sovereignty nor his descendants by a voluntary act of his will. Carrillo pointed out that the only thing the sovereignty of the Spanish kings could not achieve was what went against the sovereignty itself. He could therefore not alienate a part of itself, no longer recognizing it as his own. Sovereignty was “ordered for its conservation and augmentation,” an augmentation possible through just wars against heathens and heretics. The sovereign power of the king “cannot voluntarily provoke its own damage, because nothing is contrary to itself ”.88 Consistent with this theory of sovereignty were the Spanish demands to the Dutch during the negotiations held in the late 1620s, when neither Olivares nor the rest of the members of the Council of State considered it feasible to sign a peace treaty with the Dutch without some explicit recognition of the dominium of the Spanish king. The possessions of the family could not be alienated, an idea which impregnated the mayorazgo institution and the inalienability of the property thus linked with it. Cession of royal patrimony could take place only if the person to whom the territory was alienated recognized the superiority of the 87 88

Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, Historia de Felipe ii, p. 733. Alonso Carrillo, Soberania del Reyno, p. 6.

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prince and maintained close ties with the rest of the prince’s properties.89 The idea that the Crown was the king’s mayorazgo was openly declared in Philip iii’s will, in which he reminded his heir, in explicit reference to his Flanders possessions, that “those states have to belong to me, and did belong to me by own right and ancient mayorazgo.” Thus, they had to belong to the prince his son “and to the successors that might be in time in these kingdoms, without their being able to divide or remove” any of the provinces from the general ensemble.90 Even when the principle was being compromised in Münster the Spanish king through his delegates in the congress offered examples of how these alienations could take place. He considered giving the Duke of Lorraine the duchy of Guelders “in masculine feud under perpetual protection of His Majesty and forever in obligation of offensive and defensive league”91 and signed a treaty between Philip iv and the Prince of Orange pervaded by feudatory considerations. The claims and hopes of the Spanish Monarchy of keeping some kind of superior authority over the United Provinces had lessened as a consequence of the defeats suffered by the Habsburgs from 1638 onwards. Nonetheless, the dominant discourse of the Spanish Monarchy proved difficult to alter, and during the first encounter between the Spanish and Dutch plenipotentiaries in Münster, Peñaranda expressed himself in terms very much consistent with previous demands. The chief delegate of the Monarchy addressed the representatives of the Republic in Latin – not offending the linguistic sensibilities of the Dutch –expressing his expectations that in the outcome of the congress “whatever animosities there had been in the previous time, will now be left in the past and oblivion”. Looking to the future, the Spanish Monarchy expected to start a relationship of “Freedom, Confraternity and foedus perpetuum with the state of your High Mightinesses,”92 provoking a swift reaction from the Dutch delegates. Foedus could mean civil contract (as in Grotius), any treaty of alliance or, more controversial in the peace negotiations between the Spanish Monarchy and the Dutch Republic, the medieval pact signed between lord and vassals, which recognized a Ibid. Testamento de Felipe iii. Introd. Carlos Seco Serrano, transcript. José Luis de la Peña, Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1982, § 34, pp. 43-45. 91 “Advice given in Flanders to the Marquis of Castel-Rodrigo over the person and troops of the Duke of Lorraine.” Without date (1646), AGS, Estado, 2065. 92 Discourse of Peñaranda, 16 January 1646. Quoted in Lieuwe van Aitzema, Verhael van de Nederlantsche, Vol. 2, p. 7. 89 90

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hierarchy among the signing parties. The Dutch would never agree on a formulation allowing such an interpretation. Not being able to reduce the Dutch to a position of acknowledging any kind of domain by the Spanish king by force of arms or by rhetoric, the ministers of the Monarchy had to consider whether the old claims were still sustainable. The first concession was made in the wording of the full powers of the delegates to the Congress of Münster, but the matter had to be discussed once again in the Council of State after the Holland deputies suggested, in spite of Zeeland’s opposition, to turn the negotiated truce into a peace. France, still the closest ally of the Republic, also favoured turning the agreement into a peace because, owing to the terms of the 1635 treaty between France and the United Provinces, this meant that the Spanish Monarchy would also have to sign a peace with France. French and Dutch delegates were united in their desire to consider a peace treaty “much more glorious for the States” because then the recognition of sovereignty would not be on an interim basis.”93 The same arguments were deployed by the representatives of the States of Holland and West Friesland in the States General on 17 September, considering that “the mightiness and sovereignty of these United Provinces would not be ensured completely through a truce treaty”.94 In the event of a new war starting between the Spanish Monarchy and the Dutch Republic, the Provinces would not risk losing their sovereignty, as would be the case after a truce expired, as had happened after 1621. The consequences for the maintenance of sovereignty claims by the Spanish Monarchy were also considered by the Spanish government. The count of Castrillo, a member of the Council of State in Madrid, noted that the signing of a peace instead of a truce would be more damaging for Philip iv. He thought it “undeniable that a truce is more opportune, when it justifies the retention of what one has [obtained] through warfare.”95 However, the same considerations that drove the Spanish government to give in to the Dutch claims in the wording of the full powers made the rest of the councillors, and the king himself, opt for a dishonourable peace. Measures were nonetheless taken to leave a door open to reverse such a disreputable surrender.

Lieuwe van Aitzema, Verhael van de Nederlantsche, Vol. 2, p. 121. Ibid, p. 122. 95 “Advice by the Council of State about the convenience of turning into peace the truce with Holland,” in Zaragoza, 28 October 1646,AGS, Estado 2066. 93 94

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Negotiating spiritual sovereignty The divide between the Dutch Republic’s and the Spanish Monarchy’s understanding of sovereignty delayed the negotiations without leading to their suspension. Once the issue of the freedom of the United Provinces had been settled, the negotiations proceeded. By the end of 1646, Spanish and Dutch delegates could rejoice at the agreement reached on all the issues which the powers granted by their respective states allowed them to negotiate. Some matters, however, remained undecided and four of the Dutch envoys returned to the Provinces for instructions. The issue of sovereignty was among the points to be redefined. This time the problem was the determination of the type of domain the Republic enjoyed – and the Spanish Monarchy was to acknowledge – over the Meierij of ’s-Hertogenbosch. The matter had been extensively discussed within the Council of State in Brussels in 1631 but the agreement to be reached in Münster, although founded on previous considerations, was to be radically different as it would be on a – theoretically – permanent basis. The Dutch delegates, as they had done in 1630, expected the whole Meierij to be recognized as dependent on the city of ’s-Hertogenbosch and belonging to whoever possessed the city. The actual (financial) control of the territory was relevant but other reasons accounted for the fierceness of the dispute. If the Meierij was to be part of the United Provinces, the status of Catholics and the property of churches would be regulated according to the decrees emanating from the States General. Catholics’ freedom to worship and their keeping the church properties were consequently unlikely. The regents of the Dutch Republic nonetheless expected to force Philip iv to renounce any claim he would present in favour of the Catholics and their churches, as long as they ensured Catholics freedom of conscience. In the hope of resolving the matter once and for all, the Dutch delegates were instructed to ask for the cession of both temporal and spiritual sovereignty over the Meierij, a demand which was to provoke a heated debate. The Dutch thought it obvious that the sovereignty they enjoyed over the Seven Provinces encompassed both the temporal and spiritual – and that this had been acknowledged by the Spanish Monarchy when recognizing them as free and sovereign. For the Spanish Monarchy, and for Catholic polities, temporal powers could not arrogate to themselves the ultimate spiritual authority without turning heretic. A few decades before the Dutch asked the Spaniards to renounce spiritual sovereignty over the Meierij, the Jesuit Francisco Suárez – counting on papal and royal acquiescence 189

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– had proved how inadmissible such a possibility was for Spanish political culture. Monarchia in Ecclesia The Oath of Allegiance issued by James i in 1606 opened up a debate in which Catholic authors acknowledging the supreme authority of the pope had to refer to the interrelationship between temporal and spiritual powers. James wanted his subjects explicitly to reject the power and authority of the pope to depose kings, dispossess them of (part of ) their territories or authorize another prince to invade their domains. James was well aware of the subsidiary right of sovereignty that the pope could claim when a ruler not recognizing a temporal superior lapsed into heresy or was condemned as such, freeing the (Catholic) subjects from their obligation to obey a schismatic or heretical prince. Before and after James’ oath, the authors writing in and for the Catholic Monarchy agreed upon the absolute authority of the pope in spiritual matters in which temporal princes should not interfere.96 After the oath was issued, authors such as Bellarmine and Suárez prepared to refute the king’s arguments. The first basis on which the pope could limit the non-Catholic states’ sovereignty was founded on the irrefragable right to communicate the Catholic creed and preach the Gospel to everyone; a commonplace for most Spanish theologians.97 Furthermore, the pope, as head of the Church, had jurisdiction to correct – and eventually punish – subjects and (Christian) sovereign princes to the point of deposing the latter for crimes pertaining to the spiritual, as in the case of heresy.98 Of utmost importance was the distinction between heretics on the one hand and infidels and idolaters Ulrich Dierse, “Pedro de Ribadeneira und Diego de Saavedra Fajardo: Aspekte der Spanischen Machiavelli-Rezeption”, in Reyes Mate and Friedrich Niewöhner (eds.), Spaniens Beitrag zum Politischen Denken in Europa um 1600, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1994. The pope’s superior authority in the spiritual was further confirmed by the fact that in Inquisitorial trials he was the final cpourt of appeal – a prerogative he did not enjoy in civil matters. 97 Def. fidei, iii, 30, 6. The “ius communicationis ac societatis,” considered a natural right, was for Francisco Vitoria among the legitimising Spanish titles for the conquest of America. Vitoria’s and Suárez’ arguments on this matter were repeated by other authors, such as Juan Márquez, El Governador Christiano, pp. 165ff. For an account of the disputes over the legitimacy of the (colonial) empire from the 16th to the 18th centuriessee Anthony Pagden, Lords of all the World. Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c.1500-c.1800, New Haven, etc: Yale University Press, 1995. 98 Def. fidei, iv, 16. Vázquez de Menchaca had previously expressed himself in a similar vein. Francisco Vázquez de Menchaca, Controversiarum Illustrivum , Lib ii, Cap. 20, § 2. 96

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on the other. Heretics joined the community of Christians through baptism, being simultaneously cleansed of original sin and made subject to Christian rule – and Inquisitorial jurisdiction. From a Catholic perspective this meant that those who were baptised were made part of the Christian community and had the pope, regardless of their will, as their head. The pope could allow and even compel the people to rebel and depose a king to prevent heresies and schisms, applying his indirect power in temporal matters for the pursuit of spiritual ends.99 This view of the pontiff’s subsidiary temporal sovereignty remained powerful within the Spanish Monarchy well beyond 1648. It was based on the twofold division of power. This distinction was related to the nature of things, of human beings. Men consist “of body and soul, of spirit and flesh, which call for two different governments.” The temporal, “the one of the flesh,” and the spiritual were “united and intermingled with each other” with the flesh subordinated to the spirit. Accordingly, “no human action, however corporal and sensitive it may seem, has to depart from the dictate of reason, nor fail to conform to what the spirit commands with the natural and eternal law.”100 This led to a specific anthropology, clearly indebted to Aristotle, and the consequence of which for the political realm was an understanding of politics as subordinate to eternal salvation. The Catholic kings respected and acknowledged the pope’s superior authority (and sovereignty) in spiritual matters, in spite of particular conflicts with the temporal holders of Peter’s throne, fighting them as temporal princes and not as prelates of the universal church.101 The pope remained nonetheless superior in spiritual matters – which did not imply the polity’s subjection in the temporal sphere. The ends towards which both powers strive made the distinction possible. As a matter of “essence” the supreme spiritual power had to be in the hands Def. fidei, iv, 17. Quan Encadenada va con la Fe Catolica la Obediencia de la Sede Apostolica Romana: Quan errados proceden los Hereges en uno y otro: Y por que diferente Senda camina la Iglesia de Francia en favor de la Universal, s.l.: s.n., s.a. BN VE/197/41. 101 Melchor Cano, in his “Tratado de la Victoria de Sí Mismo” defended this option. Melchor Cano, Domingo de Soto, Juan de la Cruz, Tratados Espirituales: La Victoria de Sí Mismo. Tratado del Amor de Dios. Diálogo sobre la Necesidad y Provecho de la Oración Vocal, Vicente Beltrán de Heredia, O.P. (ed.), Madrid: La Editorial Católica, 1962. Quevedo’s Carta del Rey don Fernando el Catolico presents and defends the jurisdictional conflict between the king and Pope Julius ii. Francisco de Quevedo, Carta del Rey don Fernando el Católico, in Alfonso Rey (dir), Obras completas en prosa. Volumen iii, Escritos históricos y políticos, Madrid: Castalia, 2005 (1621). 99

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of “one head”. Temporal government, however, “has to be divided into different republics and governed by different laws in multiple things, according to the nature and necessities of the provinces and regions, as the people have always had.”102 The existence of “the Christian Republic, founded by God’s wisdom upon his firm foundations and laws” and which encompassed the plurality of temporal polities was never doubted by Spanish authors.103 The Spanish Monarchy only conceived of itself within that framework, which placed all Christian commonwealths under the common fatherhood of the pope. Conceiving temporal actions as mere means to reaching spiritual wellbeing, the real goal of politics as defended by the Spanish Monarchy’s government had far-reaching consequences for the exercise of politics, as the approval of the Church was needed when it came to signing a peace treaty. Assemblies of theologians had to be called to decide whether declarations of war and peace treaties signed by the Catholic Monarchy conformed to the law. Theologians were not likely to approve a heretical proposition such as the granting of spiritual sovereignty by a temporal prince to a Protestant polity. Since the Spanish delegates in Münster – as would their government – rejected the idea that the king could grant spiritual sovereignty over the Meierij, it became clear that the sovereignty the king was recognizing to the Dutch over the Seven Provinces did not include the spiritual and, consequently, the pope could maintain his superior sovereignty over them – as he did over England, as Bellarmine and Suárez had reminded James i. The Dutch Republic and the problem of spiritual sovereignty The recognition of spiritual sovereignty was vital for the Dutch Republic. The possible uprising by Catholic subjects freed from their obedience obligations by the pope created a worrying scenario – especially when combined with general doubts about their loyalty to the Republic, as Catholics were suspected of still recognizing Spanish sovereignty over the United Provinces. Adherents to other Protestant confessions such as Lutherans and Mennonites, and especially Remonstrants, who were the most criticized group, challenged any equivalence between their Gregorio López Madera, Excelencias de la Monarquía y Reino de España, José Luis Bermejo Cabrero (ed.), Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 1999 (1597), p. 32. 103 Judgment on Bodin’s works by Francisco Dávila, familiar of the Inquisition, quoted by Virgilio Pinto, Inquisición y Control Ideológico en la España del siglo xvi, Madrid: Taurus, 1983, p. 222. 102

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confessions and Catholicsm.104 Catholics were those who had least to fear from an eventual seizure of the United Provinces by the Spanish Monarchy, as they would neither be forced to emigrate nor have to fear the rigours of the Inquisition. Furthermore, the claims of the Spanish Monarchy in their favour constantly reminded Dutch regents of the links which tied the Catholic king to his former subjects. This was duly noted by pamphleteers, as were the ties uniting the Spanish king “in his conscience to the pope of Rome.” It was also noted that the pope “ascribes to himself the power to free the consciences of men from the obligations of oaths” as well as of freeing “the subjects from the oaths of loyalty made to their superiors.” The pope could whenever “the promotion of the Roman Church demands it” allow the king to break “the oath made to those who he considers as heretics and rebels,” instructing “the king to attack them unexpectedly for the benefit of the Roman Church.”105 The Catholic king would always be willing to renew the war against the Provinces in defence of the rights of the pope.” The Dutch “have not won much by the declaration of the Spanish king, that he considers us as free lands.”106 Spanish renunciation of spiritual sovereignty was thought to be a possible solution to prevent later claims based on the pope’s rights. Therefore, the Dutch delegates demanded to be accorded “all and the same rights of superiority, in the spiritual as in the temporal, in the manner they possess the United Provinces of the Low Countries.”107 Those arguing that the United Provinces and their “political government” had been recognized by Catholic polities did not find a receptive audience.108 Uyttenbogaert stressed the difference between Arminians and Catholics, while not denying the accusations of treason and subversion heaped on the “Papist.” Johannes Uyttenbogaert, Discovrs op ende Teghen de Conscientievse Bedenckinghen, ofmen in Goede Conscientie Trefves met Spaengien maken mach, Haarlem: Jacob de Wit, 1630, p. 25. 105 Consideratien ende Redenen der E. Heeren Bewind-hebberen/ vande Geoctrojeerde WestIndische Compagnie inde Vergaederinghe vande Ed. Hoog-Moghende Heren Staten Generael deser Vereenighde Vrye Nederlanden Overgelevert/ nopende de Teghenwoordige Deliberatie over dien Treves met den Coning van Hispanjen. Midstgaders Concientieuse Bedenckingen op dese Vrage, Ofmen in goeder Conscientien mach Treves maecken met den Coning van Spangjen, Haarlem: Adriaen Rooman, 1629, p. 16. Discovrs Aengaende Treves of Vrede, p. 15. 106 Spaensche Triumphe over Haer onlanghs bekomen Victorien in de Gheunieerde Nederlanden. Verthoont tot Waerschouwinge van alle Regenten, om den Vrede haestelijck te Sluyten, of at te Breken. Ghestelt door een Lief-hebber des Vaderlandts. L.G.I.M., s.l.: s.n., 1647 p. 6. 107 3rd article of the proposal done by the Dutch over the Meierij of ’s-Hertogenbosch, given to the Spanish plenipotentiaries on 13 May 1646, AGS, Estado, 2347. 108 This was one of the arguments put forward by an author trying to separate the in104

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However, as Suárez had argued, spiritual sovereignty surpassed the jurisdiction of the civil powers, and any attempt by the civil power to legislate over the spiritual was therefore invalid and heretical. Reformed theologians warned the Dutch public and government of the consequences the ‘Papist’ consideration that “the pope and all religious persons are above all kings and regents”109 would have for the United Provinces. The reticence of the Spanish delegates in Münster, counsellors of State and the king himself to grant spiritual sovereignty was based on the impossibility of acting as holder of a sovereignty which belonged to the pope, as Peñaranda tried to convince the delegates of the United Provinces.110 Zeeland and Utrecht continued to object to any settlement by which the cession of the spiritual were not made explicit.111 It was impossible to broker an agreement on this; the delegates of the United Provinces would not accept that the recognition of their independence was somehow dependent on the pope and the Spanish Monarchy could not renounce something which belonged to the pope. Even if the financial situation was desperate, the Spanish king could not go beyond certain limits. Peñaranda still thought it possible, as he informed the governor of the southern Low Countries on 30 September 1647, that the treating of peace would have to be definitively stopped if the United Provinces “persisted in asking of the king the spiritual [sovereignty], that he does not have”. He could only hope that “God will be able and willing to discover means by which the king will be in a better situation and terests of Dutch Catholics from those of the Spanish Monarchy. N.N. Een Kort Bericht. Dat de Coningen van Hispangien met hare Wapenen niet voor hebben de Bescherminge vande Roomsche-kerck/ maer wel het Beginnen end’Op-rechten van een vijfde Monarchie, Delft: Andries Cloeting, 1641, pp. 43-44. 109 See for instance Theophilus Philopatris, Anatomie ofte Ontledinghe. Similar arguments were being fiercely expressed against settlement with the Spanish Monarchy at least since 1629, as in Consideratien ende Redenen der E. heeren, p. 16. 110 The provincial States of Holland were ready in August 1646 to accept that the spiritual belonged to the pope and it would be he who would have to renounce the spiritual sovereignty. Lieuwe van Aitzema, Verhael van de Nederlantsche,Vol. 2, p. 254. 111 Zeeland’s arguments are put forward in Advys van de Gecommitteerde der Ed: Mog: Heeren Staten van Zeelandt/ ter Vergaderinge van de Ho: Mog: Heeren Staten Generael. Nopende het Temperament inde Religions Saecken, inde Meyerye van den Bosch, Marquisaet van Berget, &c. In haer Ho: Mog: Vergaderinge Over-gelevert op den 21 Januarij 1647. ende by deselve Gecommitteerde in Compentente getale Onderteyckent, s.l.: s.n., 1647. The discourse of the deputies of Zeeland was printed “for the lovers of freedom”, in order to show how the authorities of the Province “took to heart the issue of Religion during the peace negotiations.”

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the Dutch will repent”.112 The theologians consulted by the Spanish government in Brussels had also stated that “no temporal prince owns the spiritual jurisdiction, and no one ... can cede what is not his.” However, since “greater losses are to be expected” in the event of the war continuing, they advised him “without ceding or renouncing the spiritual,” to “desist from trying to preserve it, and settling it tacitly, trusting in God’s mercy and providence.” Only as the last resort, and when no more opposition could be exercised against “the power and conspiracy of all heretics and their allies,” would it be possible “if the Dutch obstinately insist on the spiritual [sovereignty] of the Meierij, to dissimulate and let that of the spiritual pass.”113 In October 1647, the theologians consulted confirmed their previous advice and their agreement with the Spanish plenipotentiaries to refuse to grant spiritual sovereignty.114 The only solution was to avoid mentioning the problem, granting sovereignty to the United Provinces over the Generality Lands “in all the rights, sovereignties, and superiorities of the same, nothing excluded, and every of them, as they do hold the Provinces of the United Provinces.”115 The combined efforts of the delegates of the province of Holland and the resistance of the Catholic Monarchy had managed to keep an explicit grant of spiritual sovereignty out of the wording of the peace treaty.116 Neither was it necessary to request the pope to take the ultimate decision on the issue of spiritual sovereignty, as he would refuse.117 Another issue which could provide justifications for “Copy of chapter of a letter from the Count of Peñaranda to the Marquis of CastelRodrigo,” Münster, 30 September 1647, AGR, Conseil d’Etat, 948. 113 Jacobus, Archbishop of Mechelen, Josephus, Archbishop Cameranensis, Ant[onius] bishop of Ghent – confirming the previously expressed judgement given by them and by Gaspar, bishop of Antwerp and later confirmed by the “professors of the theology faculty in the University of Louvain” on 5 August 1647, AGR, Conseil d’Etat, 933. 114 The Archbishop of Mechelen, the bishop of Ghent and the councillor Houyne?, 8 October 1647, AGR, Conseil d’Etat, 948. 115 Article 3, quoted from The Articles and Conditions of the Perpetuall Peace, Concluded between the most Potent King of Spaine &c. on the one Partie, and the High and Mighty Lords, the States Generall of the Vnited Netherlands, on the other Partie, Subscribed and Sealed the 13th. [sic.] of Ianuary, 1648. At MUNSTER. London: Robert White, 1648. 116 Philippe le Roy, informal Spanish ambassador to The Hague, informed Archduke Leopold of the successful efforts by the delegates of Holland in the States General to omit references to the spiritual. 2 December 1647, AGR, Conseil d’Etat, 948. 117 Philippe le Roy considered this solution convenient, also because the king’s reputation would thus be less damaged than if he renounced the spiritual himself. Letter from Philippe le Roy to Brun, without date (1647), AGR, Secretairerie d’Etat et de Guerre, 679. 112

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the renewal of war was left unresolved.118 The close relationship existing between spiritual sovereignty and the degree of tolerance to be enjoyed by Catholics in Dutch territory, another controversial point during the peace negotiations, made the issue all the more sensitive.

Tensions arose when the Council of State in the “obedient” Low Countries continued to give Philip iv the title of “count of Holland” after 1648, considering that “in the peace treaty by which the sovereignty was ceded to the States of the United Provinces, it was not said expressly that we would abandon them [the use of the titles] and we have judged that we could retain them.” “Consulta of the Conseil d’Estat,” 4 December 1651, AGR, Conseil d’Etat, 250. Heinz Duchhardt points out the role of mediators and the general interest in avoiding imprecise formulations which could “open up a possibility to interpret a questionable article in a sense favourable to oneself.” Heinz Duchhardt, “Peace Treaties from Westphalia to the Revolutionary Era”, in Randall Lesaffer (ed.), Peace Treaties and International Law in European History. From the Late Middle Ages to World War One, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 45-58, p. 49. 118

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Chapter 5 Negotiating religious coexistence and toleration The inextricable link connecting the exercise of politics and religion during the Early Modern period was constantly in evidence in the previous chapters, as were the tensions between an all-encompassing idea of Christendom – opposed to heathens and infidels – and the allegiances and conflicts resulting from the confessionalization process. Hence the emphasis laid on the divisions caused by ‘heretics’ in the desired Christian unity. In the Spanish Monarchy, as in France during the Wars of Religion, those of a different confession publicly abhorred any contact with the ‘other,’ considered sub-human, idolaters or blasphemers who deserved the severest punishment. In the Holy Roman Empire, however, Lutherans and Catholics soon came to coexist and recognize their shared belonging to a legal framework – especially after 1555.1 In the United Provinces coexistence among confessions went hand in hand with the consolidation of the Republic as a political entity in spite of varying degrees of mistrust and discrimination among confessions which were not endorsed by the ‘public church.’ The analysis of the formation of (truthful) religious beliefs and faithfulness in the human mind escapes the scholar, who has to concentrate on the way in which religious commitment was demonstrated and expressed.2 In the case of political writers when articulating specific political and religious positions in the Spanish On this see Robert von Friedeburg, Self-Defence and Religious Strife in Early Modern Europe: England and Germany, 1530–1680, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002. 2 The possibility of authors lying and the presence of deceit and dissimulation as a constant in confessionally divided Early Modern Europe can never be discounted. On this see Perez Zagorin, Ways of Lying. Dissimulation, Persecution, and Conformity in Early Modern Europe, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1990, especially the pages devoted to the discussion of Leo Strauss’ method. 1

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Monarchy and the United Provinces one can examine the extent to which political discourse was based on and conditioned by religion or religious discourses. Catholicity defined the Spanish Monarchy, and the major political options present in the Dutch Republic at least until the 1650s also implied religious positioning. The regents of the major towns in the province of Holland, though always ‘lovers’ of the Calvinist Church and never atheists or Catholics, put forward and sketched an idea of the whole Republic as tolerant and open to commerce.3 The orthodox Calvinists, on the contrary, abhorred these ‘libertine’ regents who neglected their duty to maintain the purity of the reformed faith and exercise tight control over the activities of heretics.4 In an attempt to obtain support from the political authorities, they sought an alliance with the stadholders, first Maurice and then Frederick Henry. Under William ii, who became stadholder in 1647 and clearly opposed the peace treaty with the Catholic Monarchy, dissent inside the Provinces increased as orthodox Calvinists and the pro-war party became united, with important repercussions for the political situation and the accompanying debate.5 The more tolerant option prevailed, often obscuring a discourse maintaining other political options and dissenting views on religious toleration.

Willem Frijhoff, “Identiteit en Identiteitsbesef. De Historicus en de Spanning tussen Verbeelding, Benoeming en Herkenning”, BMGN, 107 (4), 1992, pp. 614-634, p. 619. 4 Consideratien ende Redenen der E. Heeren Bewind-hebberen/ vande Geoctrojeerde WestIndische Compagnie inde Vergaederinghe vande Ed. Hoog-Moghende Heren Staten Generael deser Vereenighde Vrye Nederlanden overgelevert/ nopende de teghenwoordige Deliberatie over dien Treves met den Coning van Hispanjen. Midstgaders Concientieuse Bedenckingen op dese Vrage, Ofmen in Goeder Conscientien mach Treves maecken met den Coning van Spangjen, Haarlem: Adriaen Rooman, 1629, p. 20. It is nonetheless necessary to qualify this dichotomic division, often exacerbated by nineteenth-century historiography. See Joke Spaans, “Religious Policies in the Seventeenth-century Dutch Republic,” in Ronnie Po-Chia Hsia and Henk van Nierop (eds.), Calvinism and Religious Toleration in the Dutch Golden Age, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 72-86, pp. 72-73. 5 Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477-1806, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, pp. 595ff. On the possible consequences that this alliance could have had for relations between the Catholic Monarchy and the Dutch Republic once the peace was signed see Jonathan I. Israel, “Spain and Europe from the Peace of Münster to the Peace of the Pyrenees (1648-59)” in his Conflicts of Empires: Spain, the Low Countries and the Struggle for World Supremacy, 1585-1713, London, etc: Hambledon Press, 1997, pp. 105-144. 3

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The politics of confessionalization The Spanish Monarchy and its confessional reason of state The policy of the Catholic Monarchy was justified and shaped by confessional considerations in spite of occasional dissenting voices.6 The wars fought for the sake of religion were generally defended because, although “gruelling for Spain and the kingdoms united to her,” they had produced “great utilities for the Catholic Church,” avoiding its final ruin.7 The struggle in the Low Countries and in the Holy Roman Empire, the expulsion of the moriscos in 1609 and the attacks on the north African coast were all wars fought to recover territories unjustly seized by the enemies of the Catholic faith and were consequently – according to the Jesuit Luis de Molina – just wars.8 Which of these just wars was most important could be a matter of contention, and priorities could and did in fact change over time. There was general agreement among the ruling circles of the Spanish Monarchy: “the cause of God has always to be the primary one” even when it meant putting further strain on already depleted finances.9 Geographically the interests of the Spanish kings since Charles v were often divided between north-western Europe and the Mediterranean, between the war against heresy and the extension of Christianity. The Bohemian revolt in 1618 meant a shift in interest away from northern Africa. Only during the 1640s would the focus change, as the Turkish threat was powerful enough to make the Prince of Guéméné say to the Queen and Regent of France, Anne of Austria, referring to the then current peace negotiations, that “if our Holy Father the Pope cannot “Pues ellos se quieren perder, que se pierdan.” It was the representative of Madrid in the Castilian cortes of 1593, Francisco de Monzón, who uttered the famous sentence. Quoted by José A. Maravall, “La Idea de Tolerancia en España (siglos xvi y xvii)” in his La Oposición Política bajo los Austrias, Barcelona: Ariel, 1972, pp. 93-137, p. 117. 7 Juan Adam de la Parra, Apologetico contra el Tirano y Rebelde Verganza y Conivrados, Arzobispo de Lisboa, y svs Parciales, en Respvesta a los Doce Fundamentos del Padre Mascareñas, Zaragoza: Diego Dormer, 1642, fol. 29r. 8 On the doctrine of just war in sixteenth century Spain see Bernice Hamilton, Political Thought in Sixteenth-Century Spain. A Study of the Political Ideas of Vitoria, De Soto, Suárez, and Molina, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963, pp. 135-157. How accepted the usurpation of territories which once belonged to Catholics and Christians was as a reason to make war against heretics and infidels is shown by the use of this argument in other contemporary writings such as Diego García de Palacio, Diálogos Militares, Laura Manzano Baena (ed.), Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 2003, p. 102. 9 Resolution by the Junta de Estado, no date (ending of 1640). AGS, Estado, 2056. 6

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make peace, it will be made by our Holy Father the Turk,”10 putting bluntly the choice between a general European peace, followed by a joint effort against the Turks, and the less honourable option of peace with an arch-enemy of Christendom. The latter course of action could not be pursued by the Spanish Monarchy, even to prevent the loss of the Italian domains. Advisors urging Philip iv to reach a settlement with the Turks presented this breach of the general lines of the policy of the Monarchy in the language of the defence of religion and “the obligation of self-defence,” at a time when “everyone tries to save his own skin.”11 Regardless of support for this option among the members of the Junta de Estado, Philip’s answer left no room for further discussion: In spite of the fact that examples of these matters have been treated previously and that the times are now such that they ask for any resolution, because of finding ourselves in the present predicament; in spite of all this, I put my hope in God. And the best way to attain what is desired is not by trying to be a confederate or sign a suspension of arms with His greater enemies.12 Two interlinked points determined the Spanish kings’ actions, the defence of religion – the consequence of their title as ‘Defenders of the Faith’ – and of the inherited patrimony. When it came to establishing priorities, as one of Philip iii’s advisors emphasized, “Your Majesty has held and always will hold for the most principal the first” of those two.13 Spanish authors and those in government circles never tired of “News from France,” 10 March, 1646, AGS, Estado, 2255. The menace implied by growing Ottoman power was even stated by Dutch authors prone to continue the war as in the Antwoordt op’t Munsters Praetje, Dordrecht: Claes Claesz, 1646 and more so by those favouring an agreement with Spain as Fransch Praetje, Münster: Niclaes Staets, 1646. Also in Nieu-Politijck, Picket-Spel. Waer in de Humearen van groote Heeren, Potentaten, Grandes, ende hooge Personagien afgebeeldt, ende wat bedecktelijck vertoont worden, s.l: s.n, 1647.[1][1] “Letter from the Conde de Peñaranda” 18 November 1645, AGS, Estado, 2255. 11 “Letter from the Conde de Peñaranda” 18 November 1645, AGS, Estado, 2255. 12 “Answer to the advice of the Junta de Estado,” 9 April 1646, AGS, Estado, 2255. The precedent referred to is Philip ii’s disengagement from the Spanish historical war with the Turk in the Mediterranean by signing a truce in March, 1577 and concluding a peace in 1581. See Fernand Braudel, La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen à l’Époque de Philippe ii, Paris: A. Colin, 1976, 2 Vol, Vol. 2, pp. 439ff and 451ff. 13 Advice of the Council of State, 22 July 1603, AGS, Estado, 2511:79, quoted in Paul C. Allen, Philip iii and the Pax Hispanica, 1598-1621. The Failure of Grand Strategy, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000, pp. 241-242. For these views during Philip ii’s 10

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emphasizing that the Catholicism they defended was a very specific one and one not necessarily shared by all polities considered Catholic. This allowed them to justify the war against France along religious lines.14 As war broke out in 1635, Spanish writers denounced the policies which the French king, guided by wicked ministers, was implementing and which led to French alliances with the Turks, the “patronage given to Geneva, your league with the Dutch and the Swiss and with other enemies of the Faith, of the Christian people, of the kings and the Catholic Church.”15 The Dutch would also never have succeeded in their “obstinate and bloody war on the Church and on their Catholic king, insolently casting off the lawful yoke of both,” without French assistance.16 Fighting “all Catholics in Europe in favour of the heretics” and making “confederations with unworthy words and ends” made the French almost as bad as heretics and infidels.17 Being a Catholic prince implied obligations, emphasized by most pamphleteers around 1635. Those obligations included putting forward a policy of confessional imposition which would allow for the salvation of the souls of the inhabitants of the territories under his protection, an act of charity which would also reinforce the power of the king, ensuring divine protection.18 By declaring war on the Spanish Monarchy, the French king and his favourite were thus guilty of disregarding “natural law and the ius gentium” by breaking the family and religious ties uniting the French and Spanish kings. The French government was reign see Geoffrey Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip ii, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998. 14 The conflict between Catholic religious orders and their influence in the European conflict is studied by Ronald Cueto, “Crisis, Conciencia y Confesores en la Guerra de Treinta Años,” Cuadernos. de Investigación Histórica, 16 (1995), pp. 249-265. The presence of a similar understanding in France of the relations between politics and religion to that existing in the Spanish Monarchy should not be ignored. See Jean-Frédéric Schaub, La France Espagnole. Les Racines Hispaniques de l’Absolutisme Français, Paris: Ed. du Seuil, 2003. 15 Ludovico de Copiaria Carmerineo (Louis Cruzamont), Atroces Hechos de Impíos Tyranos por Intervención de Franceses o Atrocidades Francesas Execvtadas por Impíos Tyranos. Colegidas de Autores Diuersos mayores de toda Excepción, y Escritas Primero en Lengua Latina. Traducidas después en Español, y Aumentadas en esta Segunda Impressión de algunos Sucessos, para su mayor Claridad, Valeria: s.n., 1635, p. 3. Similarly Reflexiones sobre la Violación de las Paces de Vervins y Ratisbona por los Ministros de Francia, BNE, Mss 11004 fol. 87v-88r. 16 Ludovico de Copiaria Carmerineo, Atroces Hechos de Impíos Tyranos, pp. 26-27. 17 Reflexiones sobre la Violación, fol 86r-v. 18 Ludovico de Copiaria Carmerineo, Atroces Hechos de Impíos Tyranos, pp. 21-22.

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also attracting “the wrath of Divine Justice” whose punishment, even if deferred, would be no less severe,19 as different avisos or news accounts eagerly recorded. Confederation with heretics and infidels was advisable only when greater benefits for Christendom were to be expected.20 The welfare of the temporal state should never be promoted to the detriment of religion, as the politiques, the ‘politicians’, advised the French king to do. Politiques were proponents of another, harmful heresy, and were therefore to be fought as hard as Hebrews, Calvinists and usurpers, their natural allies,21 who neglected the major task of Catholics, pursuing salvation in the eternal life, and led the king to endanger the salvation of his subjects.22 Against the allegedly French distinction between (general) political interests and (personal) religious devotion, Spanish pamphleteers defended the inextricable union of politics and religion.23 Politiques also ignored the sacredness of any sacrament and bonds of honour and were incapable of keeping any word or promise given, hampering all the Catholic monarchy’s efforts to defend their dynastic status and the true religion.24 Those who used religion for unholy ends were repeatedly condemned in government circles, political treatises, and in plays, where allegories

Reflexiones sobre la Violación, fol. 83v-84v. Agustín de Castro, Conclusiones Politicas de los Ministros al Excelentissimo Señor Conde Duque … Qual sea mas Estimable Ministro en la Republica, el de mucha Fortuna en los Sucessos ò el de mucha Atencion en los Consejos. En los Estudios Reales del Colegio Imperial de la Compañia de IESUS, a 9 de Mayo de 1636 BN VE/9/25, p. 23. This opinión was shared by the marquis of Leyden in his opinión to the Council of State, January 1646. AGS, Estado, 2065. 21 Juan Adam de la Parra, Apologético, fol. 29v and 34r. Juan Márquez also attacked these “politicians” in his El Governador Christiano: Deducido de las Vidas de Moysen, y Josue, Principes del Pueblo de Dios, Madrid: Gregorio Rodriguez, 1651 (1612). Texts produced in the Low Countries further increased this equivalence. Copie d’vne Lettre d’vn Catholicq de Hollande Homme de Condition, escripte de la Haye à vn sien Parent pardeça le 18. Decemb. 1645 svr le Faict dv Traicte de Treves ov Paix, traduicte de Thiois en François, s.l.: s.n., 1646. See also Julián Viejo Yharrassarry, “Razón de Estado Católica y Monarquía Hispánica”, in Revista de Estudios Políticos (Nueva Época), 104, (1999), pp. 233-244. 22 Even if the king’s salvation was a private matter, since the twelfth century it had been acknowledged as the duty of the prince to aid religion and sponsor the construction of churches for the public and common welfare in the salvation of souls. Gaines Post Studies in Medieval Legal Thought. Public Law and the State, 1100-1322, Princeton, etc.: Princeton University Press, 1964, p. 380. Protestant princes shared this view. 23 Ludovico de Copiaria Carmerineo, Atroces Hechos de Impíos Tyranos, pp. 40-41. 24 Papel Curioso sobre el Govierno, fol. 339v. 19 20

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of Idolatry were to symbolize the alliance between power and untrue religion, transformed into superstition.25 Against this wicked course of action put forward by “atheist politicians” a Perfect Reason of State was presented.26 Religion had to be followed for its own sake; if a king was to die in war, it was to be in defence of religion, rather than in order to increase his temporal domain. This was the principle which guided the Spanish kings, regardless of the accusations poured out by both French and Dutch polemists, who questioned the sincerity of the transcendent goals allegedly informing Spanish political endeavours.27 God was the only reason of state the Spanish Monarchy would follow, the reason Philip iv entered the “sacred Empire” as a “most religious prince”, concerned with restoring “the Empire to the Empire, ecclesiastical property to the clergy and His beloved Church to Christ.”28 Submission to the dictates of the pope could however be a “burden of the firm catholicity of the princes of the monarchy,”29 especially during pontificates such as that of Urban viii (1623-1644), a member of the Barberino family whose support for the French made some in the Spanish Monarchy wonder about his commitment to the Roman Catholic cause in the Empire.30 The election of Innocent x (1644-1655) made many in the Spanish Monarchy hope that matters would improve This equivalence appears frequently in Calderon’s plays – such as El José de las Mujeres, Las Cadenas del Demonio and La Aurora en Copacabana – and some of his sacramental autos (liturgical plays honouring the Eucharist). See Antonio Regalado García, Calderón: los Orígenes de la Modernidad en la España del Siglo xvii, Barcelona: Destino, 1995, t. 1, p. 765. 26 Juan Blázquez Mayoralgo, Perfecta Raçon de Estado. Dedvcida de los Hechos de el Señor Rey Don Fernando el Catholico ... contra los Políticos Atheistas, México: Francisco Robledo, 1646, also in Calderon’s sacramental auto “A Dios por Razón de Estado.” 27 See for instance Jérémie Ferrier, Le Catholique d’Estat, ou Discours Politique des Alliances du Roi tres Chrestien contre les Calomnies des Ennemis de son Estat, Paris: Joseph Bouillerot, 1625 and N.N. Een kort Bericht. Dat de Coningen van Hispangien met hare Wapenen niet voor hebben de Bescherminge vande Roomsche-kerck/ maer wel het Beginnen end’Op-rechten van een vijfde Monarchie, Delft: Andries Cloeting, 1641. 28 Ludovico de Copiaria Carmerineo, Atroces Hechos de Impíos Tyranos, p. 50. 29 Fr. Francisco Enríquez, Conservacion de Monarqvias, Religiosa, y Politica. Primera, y segunda parte. A la Catolica, Sacra, y Real Magestad del Rey Felipe Qvarto el Grande nvestro Señor, Madrid: Domingo Garcia y Morrás, 1648, f. 8v. 30 On the papacy of Urban viii and his role in the tensions existing between the two branches of the Habsburgs and France before 1635 see Auguste Leman, Urbain viii et la Rivalité de la France et de la Maison d’Autriche de 1631 à 1635, Paris-Lille, Mémoires et travaux publiés par des professeurs des Facultés catholiques de Lille, 1919. More recently, see Robert Bireley, The Jesuits and the Thirty Years War: Kings, Courts, and Confessors, Cambridge, etc. Cambridge University Press, 2003. 25

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with “a pope that we hope will be less favourable to the French.”31 The alliance with the pope was fundamental for the Spanish Monarchy’s policy and silenced open criticism of Urban viii even after his demise. Whenever the late pontiff was to be named, it had to be “reverently” as “the dignity does not decay because of the human affections” of the holder, “who could incline more to one faction than to another.”32 Whoever was pope, his mediation and approval were necessary, not just for the Spanish Monarchy. All Catholic polities needed the papacy, which fulfilled a fundamental role when it came to prestige and recognition in the international arena. Thus, João iv sent the Bishop of Lamego to the Roman Curia to secure the support of Urban viii immediately after the successful overthrow of Spanish government in Portugal.33 Urban refused and the Spanish government considered it the pope’s duty to “do all that is needed to force the Tyrant to desist from his usurpation,” expressing his condemnation of “all ecclesiastical and lay persons” who supported Braganza. In Catalonia, the ministers of the Catholic Monarchy also expected the pope – according “to justice and reason” – to demonstrate his disagreement with both the rebellion and French support.34 In both cases the Spanish Monarchy achieved its aims. The pope tried to use his clout to influence the actions of Catholic princes, such as (unsuccessfully) preventing the Emperor signing peace with heretics to end the Thirty Years’ War. The Spanish ambassador to the German Imperial Court, the duke of Terranova, wrote to Peñaranda justifying the reasons the Emperor had for signing such a peace. He noted how in previous times neither France nor the pope had supported the Emperor in “recovering and restoring ecclesiastical property.” Therefore, the pontiff was not in a position to criticize the Emperor for ending the war, “not adventuring what remains his by settling with what he can” after having been abandoned by other Catholic princes who, “united with heretics,” had called on “the Turk against Christendom.”35 Similar justifications were produced by the Spanish Monarchy when signing peace treaties with heretics. Nonetheless, the Letter from Henri Tailler, 14 February 1644, AHN, Estado, Libro 715. Advice of the Junta de Estado on the previous advice of the Council about the Count of Oñate’s instructions in his embassy to Rome, 1 April 1646, AGS, Estado 2065. 33 Advice of the Council of State, 1 October 1644, AGS, Estado, 2061. 34 Advice of the Council of State on various letters exchanged by the marquis of CastelRodrigo and D. Diego Saavedra Fajardo, 26 October 1644, AGS, Estado, 2061. 35 Letter from the duke of Terranova to the count of Peñaranda, 16 February 1646, AGS, Estado, 2255. 31 32

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lack of real religious commitment, untrustworthiness, and disregard of the pope’s calls for peace and concord were constant recriminations made against the Habsburgs by their opponents. Theologians and ecclesiastics played a decisive role in the Spanish Monarchy, where they had a more established institutional presence than in France, even if the royal minister-favourites during the reign of Louis xiii and the minority of Louis xiv were both cardinals of the Catholic Church and brought other ecclesiastics with them into government. In the Spanish Monarchy the need for politics to adjust to confessional and religious standards resulted in Juntas of theologians being called upon to decide on a wide range of political matters. But the commitment to a religious understanding of history and human action went beyond conformity to ‘national’ theologians’ reports. The setbacks suffered by the monarchy were integrated into the general eschatology and interpreted as signs sent by God to the Spanish king’s subjects to “exercise their virtue” and “show their courage.” A monarchy “that always takes up arms in defence of justice and religion”, inhabited by pious and faithful people, could never be punished by God, regardless of appearances,36 feeding hopes for an improvement in the Spanish Monarchy’s situation which explains many of the decisions taken by Philip iv and his ministers in the 1640s. Feeding these expectations was the anticipation of the final annihilation of Protestantism and the restoration of the Habsburgs’ position as ‘arbiters of the world,’ two goals inextricably interconnected and to be achieved at all costs, even by signing a peace with heretics and rebels. From the ‘Arminian troubles’ to William ii’s stadholderate: Religious allegiances and politics in the United Provinces Religion and confessional allegiances also had a profound impact on Dutch political life during the seventeenth century. The Republic’s peculiar internal organization made the dialogue between politics and religion more fluid and dynamic than in other polities, but there, as elsewhere, a theological dispute could turn into a heated political debate, with far-ranging repercussions. After the ‘Arminian troubles’ the equivalence between political and ideological strife in Dutch society became less evident until William ii succeeded his father in 1647, when the lines of political confrontation came to correspond once more to the ideological divide permeating society and municipal and provincial 36

Papel Curioso sobre el Gobierno, fol. 339v.

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rivalries.37 Tensions continued to exist between these two moments of open dissent, even if they remained latent, and they significantly influenced the relationship with the Spanish Monarchy and the peace negotiations. Religious diversity and tolerance did not open the way to the deconfessionalization of politics, particularly because of the pervasive hatred of Catholicism, equated with Spanish tyranny and the Antichrist, against which all good Dutchmen had to fight,38 and the deeply rooted providentialist views on the history and destiny of the Republic. Gerrit Groenhuis, Simon Schama and Lea Campos Boralevi, amongst others, have emphasized the importance of the Republic of Israel – especially the Exodus – in the United Provinces’ political configuration,39 a comparison made by authors of all leanings.40 Further expressions of Divine providence as the driving force of history are to be found in texts recounting the progress of the Revolt or justifying

Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: its Rise, p. 595. Jan Andries Moerbeeck, Vereenighde Nederlandschen Raedt, Bewijsende met klare Exempelen ende levendige Redenen, datmen dese Vereenighde Nederlanden (met Godes hulpe), in korte Tijd, van de Vreese ende Perijckelen der Tegenwoordige Oorloge kan verlossen, mitsgaders den Staet haerder Bondgenoten redresseren en verseeckeren, The Hague: Aert Meuris, 1628, p. 4. 39 Gerrit Groenhuis, De Predikanten: de Sociale Positie van de Gereformeerde Predikanten in de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden voor 1700, Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1977, pp. 77-107. Simon Schama, The Embarrassment of Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age, London: Collins, 1987, pp. 35-50; Lea Campos Boralevi, “Classical Foundational Myths of European Republicanism: The Jewish Commonwealth,” Quentin Skinner and Martin van Gelderen (eds.), Republicanism. A Shared European Heritage Vol.1: Republicanism and Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 247-261 and Lea Campos Boralevi, “La Respublica Hebraeorum nella Tradizione Olandese,” in Lea Campos Boralevi and Diego Quaglioni (eds.), Politeia Biblica, special issue of Il Pensiero Politico, 3, 2002, pp. 431-463. 40 Dirk Volckertsz Coornhert, Comedie van Israel: vertonende Israels zonden, Straffinghe, Belydinghe, Ghebedt, Beteringhe ende Verlossinghe, uyt het thiende Capit. Judicum: Als een klare Spieghel der teghenwoordighen Tyden, Gouda: Jasper Tournay, 1590 (1575); Jacobus Viverius, Den Spieghel van de Spaensche Tyrannie: waer by ghevoegt is eene vreughdighe vieringhe over het veroveren van de stede Rijnberck: waer in verhaelt wordt den ondergangh vande Spaensche Tyrannie of bloedt-dorst, Amsterdam: Herman de Buck, 1601. These equivalences had been constant since the outbreak of the revolt. For later examples see for instance Discovrs Aengaende Treves of Vrede met de Infante ofte Koning van Hispanien/ ende dese Vereenighde Nederlanden, Haarlem, Adriaen Rooman, 1629, p. 10 or E. P., Suchtigh, en Trouwhertigh Discours, over dese Tegenwoordige Gestalte des Landts, in Bedenckinge van Onderhandelinge zijnde met den Coninck van Spangien, s.l.: s.n., 1646. 37 38

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the continuation of the war against the Catholic Monarchy.41 A whole range of events were interpreted as tokens of divine favour from which flowed political consequences. The adscription to religious commitment in politics as well as a transcendent view of politics was more widespread in some circles than others. Zeeland regents aligned themselves mainly with the more orthodox in religious matters, with authors such as Willem Usselincx, one of the founders of the WIC, heatedly advocating the continuation of war and the extension of Calvinism to the south. In Holland, however, the ‘libertine’ regents were not the spokesmen for widely held political and religious attitudes as the province’s citizens were deeply split.42 In every province there were many who saw religion as one of the foundations of the Republic, a commitment expressed not only through publications but also through political decisions.43 Not even those attacked for their alleged ‘libertinism’ questioned the necessary piety of political authorities or the exercise of politics in conformity with religion.44 The pro-war party, however, held a practical monopoly over the religious arguments, arguing against the death of the Reformed church following a settlement with the Spanish Monarchy. The attack was directed – indiscriminately – against those who had either collaborated in the signing of the Twelve Years’ Truce or rejected Counter-Remonstrant policies of religious imposition.45 Those defending the continuation of Johan van den Sande, Kort Begrijp/ der Nederlandtsche Historien Waer in ‘t Begin/ Voortgangh en Eynde der selver Beroerten en On-eenigheden klaerlick aengewesen wort. Beginnende vanden Jare 1566. tot het Jaer 1648, Amsterdam: Joost Hartgersz, 1651 (1650), p. 28 and in Discovrs over Den Nederlandtschen Vrede-handel. Ghestelt door een Liefhebber des Vaderlandts, Leeuwaerden: Dirck Albertsz, 1629 (K. 3917). 42 Jan H. Kluiver, De Souvereine en Independente Staat Zeeland. De Politiek van de Provincie Zeeland inzake Vredensonderhandelingen met Spanje tijdens de Tachtigjarige Oorlog tegen de Achtergrond van de Positie van Zeeland in de Republiek, Middelburg, 1998, p. 101. 43 Defending religion as the basis of the United Provinces see Concientieuse Bedenckingen, p. 21. Similarly, emphasizing the eternal duration awaiting the Republic because “she has God as founder and Religion as foundation” see Jean Louis Guez de Balzac, Discovrs Politiqve sur L’estat des Provinces Unies des Pays-bas, Leiden: Maire, 1638. 44 Johannes Uyttenbogaert, Discovrs op ende Teghen de Conscientievse Bedenckinghen, ofmen in Goede Conscientie Trefves met Spaengien maken mach, Haarlem: Jacob de Wit, 1630, p. 8. 45 A reading of political actions as inextricably linked with religious positioning was paramount for the fate of Oldenbarnevelt. Contemporarily, Hugo Grotius was considered to be a crypto-Papist and a traitor to the Reformed cause: see Johannis Seyfferse van Ollem, Hvygo Grotivs Papista, ofte Verhael uyt den Sent-brief dat Huygo Grotius nu Volkomelijck sich aen de Papistische Zijde gekeert heeft, Amsterdam: Ritsert Nannincx, 41

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the war appropriated the title of ‘patriots’46 and turned anyone defending alternative political options into a traitor.47 Furthermore, proponents of Reformed orthodoxy also stressed the obligations towards fellow Protestants threatened by Habsburg power and automatically linked this help with the continuation of war against the Catholic Monarchy.48 Accounts of the struggle of the Protestant hero, and “arm of German freedom,” Gustav Adolf of Sweden, against the Habsburgs served to reinforce the idea of a common war fought by all the Reformed against Catholic tyranny – an idea which also reached England.49 General mistrust of Catholicism conditioned the reception of any pleas for peace emanating from the papacy, still viewed as an incarnation of the Antichrist and as mistrusted as the Spanish king.50 If the more zealous Catholics requested peace it was not because they were “satiated with human blood,” but because they needed to gather their strength 1642. The poet Joost van den Vondel was also the object of fierce attacks: see Der Poëten Vegtschool Bestaende in diversche Paepsche Rijmen, en hare Antwoorden. Soo van Engelandt, Schotlandt, het Croonen van den Paus, het Onthalsen van den Bisschop van Cantelberch, als oock van het Afbranden der Nieuwe-Kerck, en van het ghenaemde Wonder werck der Heylighe-Stede t’Amsterdam, s.l.: s.n., 1645. 46 An attempt to reformulate the concept of patriot and turn those defending the continuation of war – and the alliance with France – into “false patriots” is Den (3 deel) Ongeveynsden Nederlandtschen patriot, Alkmaar: s.n, 1647. 47 Nehemia Publicola (pseudonym of Johannes de Swaef, 1594-ca. 1653), Mardachai ofte Christelijcken Patriot. Middelburg: Jacob van de Vivere, 1631. Similar, although less straightforward, Consideratien ende Redenen, p. 26. 48 See for instance Een cort Verhael ende Verthooninge Hoe Grooten Voordeel/ den Coning van Spagnen by den Treves soude hebben. Ende daer-en-tegens De menigh-fuldighe Schafe, die onse Seven Vereenighde Provincien, Duytsch-land ende andere Plaetsen daer door souden lijden, s.l.: s.n., 1630 and the earlier Jan Andries Moerbeeck, Vereenighde Nederlandschen Raedt, p. 6. Also in the Antwoordt op’t Munsters Praetje. 49 Examples of this type of publication are Copie. Korte ende Waarachtighe Aenwysinge. Waeromme hare Konincklijcke Majesteyt van Sweden/ etc. De Stadt Maagdeburgh/ niet en hebbe konnen ontsetten, The Hague: Ludolph Breeckevelt, 1631, or Joost van den Vondel, Lyckoffer van Maeghdeburgh, ontsteecken op het hoogh autaer, by Leypzigh, door den onverwinnelyken Koningklyken Held, Gustaef Adolf, Arm der Duytsche Vryheyd, [Amsterdam]: s.n., 1631. Also against the aspirations of the Emperor is Spieghel van des Keysers Monarchale Regier-Sucht; ofte Schriftelijck Bedencken/ over des Keysers Intentie/ om t’Roomsche Rijck te brengen onder een absolute ende onbepalde Heerschappe..., Leeuwarden: Claude Fonteyne, 1629. See also Hugh Dunthorne, ‘The Netherlands as Britain’s school of Revolution in the late Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’, in Robert Oresko, G.C. Gibbs and Hamish.M. Scott (eds.), Royal and Republican Sovereingty in Early Modern Europe. Essays in Memory of Ragnhild Hatton, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 125-148, p. 135. 50 Erasmus Phlopatroön, Nieuw-Keulsch of Spaensch Bedrogh: Ach! Door Staet-sucht, Eersucht, Geld-sucht, Verkochte, Slavende Vryheid, s.l.: s.n., 1638, p. 5.

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before once more attacking their rebels and enemies,51 a distrust fostered by the Catholic commonplace that “there is no obligation to keep the word given to heretics and rebels.”52 Fear of prospective internal discord after a settlement and the more general scepticism – across confessions and European polities – about the stability of any peace between confessions were further arguments invoked by the opponents of peace.53 Some of those opposing peace went as far as to consider any settlement as the Devil’s doing, and those advocating its appropriateness Lucifer’s servants.54 The equation of supporters of a settlement with the devil was the final step in the long sequence of slanderous remarks making Oldenbarnevelt and Grotius traitors and crypto-Papists and the Antichrist the pope, the Spanish king and the Jesuits.55 Although many of those advocating the continuation of the war in the United Provinces during the 1640s did so for local, economic and commercial interests, they often expressed and defended them using a religious vocabulary. The policies put forward by Holland’s regents were rejected by means of arguments drawn from Calvinist orthodoxy and the ministers mobilized the ordinary artisans through preaching

Spieghel van des Keysers Monarchale Regier-Sucht (Aen-Merkinghe voor den Leser). Advice of the Council of State, 16 July 1641, AGS, Estado, 2056. 53 Den Vrede met Roomen, Onmogelijck, Ongeoorloft ende Verderffelijck voor de Gereformeerde Kerke, Utrecht: A.J. van Paddenburch, 1643. On the impossible peace from the point of view of a Catholic see Ernst von Eusebiis (pseudonym of Heinrich Wagnereck), Ivdicivm Theologicvm Svper Qvæstione, An Pax, qualem desiderant Protestantes, sit secundùm se illicita? : Ex Principiis Christianis, sententia veteris Ecclesiæ, Summorumque Pontificum deductum ..., Ecclesiopoli(?): Sicecela Armona, 1646. Favouring an agreement see Johann G. Dorsch, Nothwendige Entdeckung deß Blutdurstigen Urtheils, welches der Vermummte Ernst von Eusebiis Römischer Burger, uber die Frag, ob der Frieden in Teutschland, wie jhn die Protestirenden Begehren, für sich selbst Unerlaubt und Unrecht Sey, Strasburg: Zetzner, 1648. 54 Nicolaes Orem, Bulle van Lvcifer aen de Prelaten van de Pausselijcke Roomsche Kercke, dewelcke sich Beroemen Gesuccedeert ende Gekomen te zijn in de Plaetse der Apostelen, s.l.: L. Boutensteyn, 1645. 55 The description of the pope as the Antichrist had been a constant since the beginning of Lutheranism. In the Low Countries it was adopted relatively early, including the Spanish king in it. See for instance the sea-beggars’ song “Ras Seventhien Provincen” (ca. 1572) recorded in Het Geuzenliedboek, ed. by Pieter Leendertz Jr. and Esgo T. Kuiper, Zutphen: Thieme, 1924-1925, 2 Vol, Vol. 1, pp. 121-122 or the successful pamphlet by Jan Andries Moerbeeck, Vereenighde Nederlandschen Raedt. As the threat posed by the Turk grew, some authors proposed a different consideration, making him the real threat: Fransch Praetje, Münster: by Niclaes Staets, 1646. 51 52

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and pamphleteering.56 Confessional hatred collided with another central premise of the Republic, established in the Union of Utrecht, that in the United Provinces “nobody shall be persecuted or examined for religious reasons.” This precluded both any policy of overt religious imposition and Reformed religion from becoming the only basis of either the Republic or the war waged in its defence.57 The general abhorrence of religious imposition of any kind played a significant role, as did the fact that an important percentage of the overall population in the United Provinces were not members or even ‘devotees’ of the public Church. Having a Catholic polity such as France as the major ally further prevented the authorities from taking harsher measures against Catholics, the largest dissenter confession after the successful campaigns of Frederick Henry in Flanders and Brabant.58 The growing numbers of Catholics allowed some authors of the pro-war party to combine the old accusations of Arminian crypto-Catholicism, their favouring a truce, and their policies of greater religious tolerance with the alleged untrustworthiness of Catholics and the fear of greater ‘insolence’ from Dutch Catholics in time of peace. Thus, no one in the public arena dared to align himself openly with Catholic interests or demands and both Remonstrant preachers and authors defending the settlement such as Simon Episcopius publicly abhorred the errors of Catholicism.59 Fears regarding Catholicism also became evident in relation to France. Where the Spanish authors saw lukewarm involvement with the Catholic cause, some Dutch authors read a project for aggressive imposition of Catholicism, especially after the crushing of the Huguenots’ revolt in Montauban in 1621. Louis xiii was accused of fighting “those of the Religion” for being Huguenots, hindering them Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: its Rise, p. 598. The struggle was obviously fought “for the maintenance of religion” but also to “ensure our State”: Antwoordt op’t Munsters Praetje. 58 Wiebe Bergsma maintains that the percentage of Catholics within the Republic could have reached 47% around 1648: Wiebe Bergsma, “De Godsdienstige Verhoudingen Tijdens de Vrede van Munster,” in Jacques Dane (red.), 1648: Vrede van Munster. Feit en Verbeelding, Zwolle: Waanders, 1998, pp. 83-105, p. 101. 59 See for instance the pamphlet by the Arminian theologian Simon Episcopius, Doolhof der Paus-gesinde, ofte: Bewijs dat de Papisten gheen Reden konnen gheven van de voornaemste Stucken haers Geloofs, Haarlem: s.n., 1636. On Episcopius’ tolerance discourse see Jonathan I. Israel, “Toleration in Seventeen-century Dutch and English Thought,” in Jonathan I. Israel Conflicts of Empires: Spain, the Low Countries and the Struggle for World Supremacy, 1585-1713, London, etc.: Hambledon Press, 1997, pp. 241-262, pp. 250ff. 56 57

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in the practice of their creed and threatening the firmness of the French alliance with the Dutch.60 The French lack of respect for the promise made to “the co-religionists of the majority of Hollanders”61 discredited some confessional elements of the pro-war faction and emphasized the mistrust felt towards the French. 62 In the context of the loathing of Catholicism, voices were raised against any Dutch alliance with Catholic polities such as Portugal or France, as all their actions would be directed against the interests of the Reformed.63 If the war continued and Spanish power was eliminated from the Low Countries, France would be the neighbour of the Republic and become “les maistres absolus, ils nous donneront la loy & à tous ceux de nostre Religion.”64 In that event, Dutch Catholics would be strengthened, as France would threaten to retaliate for any curtailing of the Catholics’ freedom against “Holland’s co-religionists,” the Huguenots.65 Otherwise, the French could make a new alliance with Spain in order to propagate their religion in the Republic,66 further increasing the importance of Catholics in the Provinces – which was looked upon with equal mistrust by many of the supporters of peace or ‘trevisten’ and those favouring war.

Nederlantsche Absolutie op de Fransche Belydenis, Amsterdam: Jacob Nes, 1648 (Attributed to Adriaen Pauw). 61 Antvvoordt op Seeckere Missive van een Venetiaens Edelman, aen sijn Vriendt tot Tuirin, uyttet Italiaens ende Frans over-gheset, s.l.: s.n., s.a. [1646]. In the same vein, also reminding of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew’s Day, see Hollandtsche Sybille, Openende Verscheyden Heymelijckheden van den Staet, s.l.: s.n.., 1646, pp. 8-9. 62 Nederlantsche Absolutie. 63 Aen-spraeck aen den Getrouwen Hollander, nopende de Proceduren der Portugesen in Brasill, The Hague: Isaac Burghoorn, 1645 (Attributed to Theodorus Graswinckel), p. 9 and Antwoort vanden Ghetrouwen Hollander op den Aenspraeck van den Heetgebaeckerden Hollander,.s.l.:s.n., 1645. 64 Irenee, Copie d’une Lettre envoyee de la Haye, aux Deputez des Estats d’Hollande, Pour la Paix a Munster, s.l : s.n., [1646], p. 3. Adriaen Pauw shared the mistrust about France, which led the French to distrust him as mediator. On this see Jan J. Poelhekke, De Vrede van Munster, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1948, pp. 420ff. 65 Munsters Praetje. Further criticism of the attitude shown towards the Hugenots in France as a reason for not listening to the French delegates’ pleas not to sign a peace with the Spanish Monarchy is in Eerstelinck der Vrede, of Ophoudinge van Vyandschap ter Zee, van Weghen Spangien, s.l.: s.n., 1647, pp. 5-6. 66 Noodige Bedenckingen der Trouhertighe Nederlanders, over de Aen-staende Munstersche Handelinghe van Vrede ofte Treves, s.l.: s.n., 1643. 60

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Religious tolerance and confessional coexistence After 1517 confessionalization made religious identity a central protocol of European social and cultural life. A discourse of religious imposition became the norm throughout Europe.67 Once physical elimination of the religious opponent was impossible, the idea of a peaceful agreement to disagree gained ground.68 It was founded on the need for the Protestant party to find a way of dealing with the Catholic party in the Empire, which constituted the majority in all institutions69 and was conditioned by the existence of political authorities siding with the religious minority. Most appeals for tolerance, meaning restricted civil tolerance and never relativism regarding dogma, came from the confessional minorities or in defence of them. Tolerance was “the loser’s creed,”70 and as such it could see the Spanish Monarchy becoming an (unlikely) advocate of tolerance during the peace negotiations with the English in 1604 and with the Dutch in 1607-1609. Tolerance meant patient endurance of other opinions and ways of life.71 The Dutch republic was not free from the contradiction between the need to accommodate people of different confessions within one polity and the deeply rooted conviction about the negative consequences of any dissent for the good conduct of political life, contradictions which increased during the peace negotiations with the Spanish Monarchy. Tolerance as (the lesser) evil Even around 1648, when confessional coexistence was becoming more the norm than the exception, government and writers alike defended a policy of strict religious imposition in the Catholic Monarchy. According to seventeenth century Spanish chroniclers, it was the lack of a firm policy of suppression of heresy that explained why Huguenots had gained a firm grip inside the French kingdom: tolerance had See Wolfgang Reinhard’s seminal paper, “Zwang zur Konfessionalisierung? Prolegomena zu einer Theorie des Konfessionellen Zeitalters,” Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung, 10 (1983), pp. 255-277. 68 This idea is the leitmotiv of Winfried Schulze, “Concordia, Discordia, Tolerantia. Deutsche Politik im konfessionellen Zeitalter”, in Johannes Kunisch (ed.), Neue Studien zur Frühneuzeitlichen Reichsgeschichte, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1987, pp. 43-79. 69 Ibid., pp. 60ff. 70 Andrew Pettegree, “The Politics of Toleration in the Free Netherlands, 1572-1620” in Ole P. Grell and Bob Scribner (eds.), Tolerance and Intolerance in the European Reformation, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 198. 71 José Antonio Maravall, “La Idea de Tolerancia”, pp. 135-7. 67

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resulted in the Wars of Religion.72 Therefore, heretics had to be ruthlessly suppressed and severely punished “without previous fraternal admonition,” and not by “gentle measures.”73 As bishop José Laínez, a member of the Royal Council and preacher to Philip iv, summarized, the establishment of freedom of conscience was “giving way to everyone to condemn themselves as they please and an invention coming from hell.”74 “Freedom of worship” was a “licence for vices” leading to the “disruption of public peace” and even the loss of military courage.75 Heresy was in sum a “most prejudicial cancer” which spread with “incredible celerity” because of men’s natural inclination “towards the prohibited thing.”76 The only remedy for the illness was to eradicate it as soon as the first symptoms showed themselves: cancer was not cured by “unctions or soft remedies, but with the knife” and cauterization, “that by scorching and cutting eliminate the infection.” Even going against the authority of Paul the Apostle and the Gospel, Juan Márquez and other authors recommended swift punishment of heretics of their day who were, first, incorrigible and, secondly, had strayed knowingly from the Church’s doctrine.77 The situation in the Empire and France made Spanish government circles increasingly wary of freedom of conscience. The Mercedarian friar Antonio de Herrera, Historia General del Mundo, de xvii. Años del Tiempo del señor Rey don Felipe ii el Prudente, desde el año de m.d.liiii. hasta el de m.d.lxx, Valladolid: Juan Godinez de Millis, 1606 and Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, Historia de Felipe ii, Rey de España, (eds. José Martínez Millán and Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales), Valladolid, 1998 (1619). 73 Juan Márquez, El Governador Christiano, p. 353. 74 José Laínez, El Daniel Cortesano en Babilonia, Susannam, y Echatanam, Madrid: Juan Sánchez: 1644, pp. 12-13. 75 Diego Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas Políticas [Idea de un príncipe cristiano representada en cien empresas, Munich and Milan, 1640] Francisco Javier Díez de Revenga (ed.), Barcelona: Planeta, 1988, Empresa 24. 76 Juan Márquez, El Governador Christiano, p. 354.The equivalence of heresy with cancer or gangrene is recurrent throughout different confessions. See for instance the work by the Presbyterian Thomas Edwards about the sectarianism destroying England during the Civil War, Gangraena: or A Catalogue and Discovery of Many of the Errors, Heresies, Blasphemies and Pernicious Practices of the Sectaries of this Time, Vented and Acted in England in these Four last Years..., London: Printed for Ralph Smith ..., 1646. 77 Juan Márquez, El Governador Christiano, p. 355. Spanish intellectual theories of intolerance are also to be found in England among Anglicans in the second half of the seventeenth century. Mark Goldie, “The Theory of Religious Intolerance in Restoration England,” in Ole Peter Grell, Jonathan I. Israel and Nicholas Tyacke (eds.), From Persecution to Toleration. The Glorious Revolution and Religion in England, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, pp. 331-368. 72

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Francisco Enríquez stated, repeating a Machiavellian commonplace, that religion – even if “deceitful and false” or “based on superstitions and deceit” – made monarchies stable, firm and permanent. But among religions the Catholic faith was obviously first and made the Spanish Monarchy stand out for two reasons. First, its power was based on the true religion. Secondly, “no other Monarch is more united and uniform with his vassals in terms of religion,” a result of denying vassals “freedom of conscience, the origin of the devastation of other Monarchies.”78 So widespread were these views that even those favouring Louis xiii’s dominium over Catalonia considered the Catholicity of the Principality (and of France) a non-negotiable item.79 Monarchical and ‘rebel’ authorities were equally interested in implementing in Catalonia the principles of Tridentine Catholic confessionalism and were equally antagonistic towards heretics. This attitude conditioned the possible response to confessional dissension, making Philip ii prefer, so the story goes, to lose territories rather than allow religious freedom. This argument remained valid at least until 1648, when the loss of the Seven Northern Provinces of the Low Countries was a fact, and it was generally acknowledged that with the granting of freedom of conscience the Dutch revolt “would not have come to its present extent.” Francisco Enríquez proudly recalled that the fight against heresy was “a particular prerogative” of the Spanish kings, including “heretics in other Princes’ states” in “their holy zeal,” preventing any granting of freedom of conscience even if territorial gains were to ensue. The Spanish kings were eager to give unsparingly of “the State, for not damaging the Religion.”80 Pieter Roose, president of the Secret Council at Brussels and a close follower of Olivares, summarized these views to Philip iv, repeating the cancer metaphor and that the monarchy had avoided the sorry fates of France and ‘Germany.’ Confident of sharing the king’s views, Roos asserted that, before allowing heresy in territories which the king considered his, Philip would always prefer “to tolerate divorce rather than suffer. . . the whore at home.”81 Fr. Francisco Enríquez, Conservacion de Monarqvias, f. 7v. Francisco Marti i Viladamor, Cataluña en Francia, Castilla sin Cataluña y Francia contra Castilla. Panegirico Glorioso al Christianissimo Monarca Luis xiii el Justo, Barcelona: Lorenço Deu, 1641. 80 Fr. Francisco Enríquez, Conservacion de Monarquias, f. 14v. 81 Letter from the President Roose to Philip iv, no date [1640s], AGS, Secretarías Provinciales (Flandes), 2586. 78 79

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The apparent contradiction between these views and the peace negotiations with Protestant rulers was quickly picked upon by the enemies of the Habsburgs. These settlements were, however, interpreted within Spanish government circles as just another way of defending religion if lack of funding and the proliferation of conflicts prevented the continuation of open warfare in some cases. What was paramount was the prevention of further harm to Catholicism. Basing themselves on Aquinas’ reformulation of St. Augustine’s De Ordine, theologians and ministers alike argued that evil could be suffered in order to avoid something worse, which argument permitted a dishonourable peace with heretics – postponing their forcible conversion to the true faith – if it prevented further harm to Catholicism.82 Though denying tolerance to heretics,83 Aquinas, and with him the Spanish Monarchy’s government, could recommend a settlement with heretics, but only if it ensured freedom of conscience for Catholics.84 Only with the fulfilment of this requirement – plus the compromise of not hindering Spanish troops from crossing the territory – could the Spanish Monarchy recognize the sovereignty of the Protestant Grisons over the Catholics in the Valtellina by the treaty of Monzon in March 1626. As such pacifications did not imply the abandonment of the final aim of imposing Catholicism and forcing heretics to convert, these were by nature temporary agreements.85 Only if heretics allowed some form of Catholic worship and preaching could Catholic princes (temporarily) forget that Christian heretics, unbelievers and schismatics deserved “more condemnation than the heathen” because “the Gospel has been preached to them, and they understood it, but they do not live accordingly.”86 Christians were united in the “tight kinship” of the Christian family once the Gospel had been communicated to them.87 Juan Márquez, El Governador Christiano, p. 358. ST, ii-iiae, q. 11, a. 3. 84 ST, ii-iiae, q. 103. 85 Julián Viejo Yharrassarry, “Razón de Estado Católica”, p. 240. 86 Paul Kaim, Bekäntnüs Eines Unpartheyischen Christen Wegen des einigen Seeligmanchenden Glaubens/ Unter allen Religionen und Völckern auff Erden. Oder: Beantwortung der Frage: ob die Ungetauften Juden und Heiden weil sie nicht Gestehen/ dass Christus der Sohn Gottet sey) Noch in ihrem Glauben können Seelig werden, s.l. sn, 1646, p. 37. Juan Márquez asserted that “homicides and idolaters” were more easily forgiven by God than schismatics. Juan Márquez, El Governador Christiano, p. 168. 87 Ambrosio Bautista, Discvrso Breve de las Miserias de la Vida y Calamidades de la Religión Católica, Madrid: Imprenta Real, 1635. The echoes of the Epistle to the Ephesians 2:17-19, where it was maintained that “grace has made one and the same” of all Christians” are evident.

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Those who threatened the unity of the family were to be brought back into the ‘true Christian household,’ either forcibly or by more indirect means such as signing a peace – respectful of the rights of Catholics – with such unyielding and blatant heretics as the Dutch. Dutch tolerance and its limits The Dutch Republic was forced to find stability without resorting to religious unity, confronting a greater confessional division than most European polities of the time and enjoying a degree of practical tolerance in the Dutch Republic unimaginable for many early modern Europeans. The question of how these principles of tolerance were to affect the political – and also moral – stability of the Republic nonetheless remained open for decades. Answers were advanced from different quarters, reaching differing if not opposite conclusions. The dispute between Dirck Volckertsz. Coornhert and Justus Lipsius about the appropriateness of the political power persecuting public heresy is one of the best examples of two contrasting views on how the unity of the community had to be maintained. Lipsius defended the preservation of religious unity as the best way of preserving civic concord; Coornhert maintained that toleration of religious diversity was the only way of attaining concord.88 Coornhert’s answer insisted on the individual’s right to follow the guidance of his own conscience, without having the welfare of the state as his chief priority. His answer to the trauma created by the religious conflicts in the Empire and in France could hardly be more different from the interpretations given by Spanish authors and governmental bodies. Coornhert’s views were endorsed by other Dutchmen, often starting from the idea expressed by the historian Emanuel van Meteren, who judged no war to be “more harmful to the countries than the internal ones [fought] because of difference of religion.”89 Political authorities were also deeply conditioned by the memory of the executions of heretics in the reigns of Charles v and Philip ii and Alva’s repressive actions. They led to growing mistrust among many magistrates of the Republic Martin van Gelderen, “Concordia Res Parvae Crescunt... Concord and Toleration in Dutch Political Thought (1580-1620)”, forthcoming. See also Jonathan I. Israel, “The Intellectual Debate about Toleration in the Dutch Republic”, in Christiane BerkvensStevelinck, Jonathan I. Israel and Hans Posthumus Meyjes (eds.), The Emergence of Tolerance in the Dutch Republic, Leiden: Brill, 1997, pp. 3-36, pp. 6-8. 89 Emanuel van Meteren, Historien der Nederlanden, en haar Naburen Oorlogen tot het Iaar 1612, Amsterdam: Jan Jacobsz Schipper, 1647 (1618), first part, fol. 252r. 88

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and William of Orange of any attempt by any Church, including the public (Calvinist) one, to impose its views on social life. Thus, freedom of conscience was explicitly included in the Union of Utrecht. Without ever challenging this principle, the provincial assemblies, which had the right to organize public religious life as they saw fit, did indeed publish legislation which effectively curtailed freedom of worship for dissenters.90 The most mistrusted group were the Catholics, both because of their numbers and because their religion was theoretically incompatible with their political fidelity to the Dutch Republic. Since the start of the revolt the problems inherent in the presence of Catholics in the provinces rebelling against Philip ii had been very evident. During the first stages of the revolt, it was argued, “the states from the country” had determined that “both religions should be supported.” But, “later on, many acts of treason and inappropriate practices were found among those from the Roman religion,” which placed the States in extreme danger and made religious peace impossible. Therefore, the public exercise of Catholicism needed “to be forbidden and halted” because – in an argument which would always haunt Catholics living under non-Catholic governments – “the Papists have another oath, that they esteem more and higher, than the one they make to their fatherland.”91 The fact that “good Catholic patriots” supported the revolt was duly recalled, in the memory of how they “took up arms with us against the king of Spain” because of “his tyranny and perjury.” However, almost in the same breath, readers were reminded that “their sons now maintain something different and have turned into enemies of our state.”92 The most enthusiastic views of the extension of religious freedom have been recently reassessed. See for instance M.E.H.N. Mout, “Limits and Debates: a Comparative View of Dutch Toleration in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries”, in Christiane BerkvensStevelinck, Jonathan I. Israel and Hans Posthumus Meyjes (eds.), The Emergence of Tolerance in the Dutch Republic, Leiden: Brill, 1997, pp. 37-47 and different essays in the book edited by Ronnie Po-Chia Hsia and Henk van Nierop, Calvinism and Religious Toleration in the Dutch Golden Age, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 91 Jacob Lievensz van Rog, Kort ende Klaer Vertoogh, waer in Bewesen Wordt, dat de Staten van den Lande, met Wilhelmus Prince van Orangjen, &c. den Oorlog teghen den Koning van Spangjen aengenomen hebben, voor de Vrijheydt vanden lande, ende voor de ware Christelijcke Ghereformeerde religie, Haarlem: Adriaen Roman, 1630, p. 7. 92 Theophilus Philopatris (pseudonym of Willem Teellinck), Anatomie ofte Ontledinghe van ‘t Verderffelijck Deseyn der Hedendaechsche Paepsghesinde/ teghen Kercke en Poletie/ en alle goede Inghesetene der Geunieerde Provintien..., Groningen: Jan Geertssen, 1644. That Catholics “loved as their own lord the king of Castile” was also emphasized in other pamphlets such as Antwoort op’t Munsters Praetje. 90

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Some voices were, however, raised in defence of the coexistence of the two confessions on equal terms within – at least some of – the provinces, especially when discussing the possibility of the southern provinces joining the United Provinces “in a body and Republic in the manner of the cantons in Switzerland.”93 Mistrust prevailed, partly due to the manipulation of Dutch Catholics by foreign princes. The Portuguese ambassador in the United Provinces forged a letter during the negotiations in Munster, pretending that it had been written by “the Catholics of the cities of Amsterdam and Utrecht” and sent it to the pope’s nuncio, Fabio Chigi. Catholics, it was argued, lived “persecuted and investigated not just for religious hatred but for the natural affection that we keep in our hearts to the service of His Majesty.”94 The authenticity of this letter was quickly dismissed by the Spanish plenipotentiaries and only fear of possible negative consequences prevented Peñaranda from informing the Dutch delegates of the Portuguese intrigues. But Peñaranda’s swift reaction could not alter the link between Dutch Catholics and the Spanish Monarchy which really did exist in the minds of many in the United Provinces, a link which in other circumstances was emphasized by authors defending Spanish endeavours in the Low Countries.95 The Remonstrants were equally considered enemies of the Reformed religion and of the state of the United Provinces.96 As the attacks against both Catholics and Arminians intensified, voices spoke out in defence of less partisan attitudes. Uyttenbogaert defended the need to allow all different sects within the Republic the right to practise their own religion. Experience showed, he maintained, how futile attempts at religious imposition were. Each confession, “thinking that its own religion is the true one,” would respond to discrimination by becoming intolerant towards the other, ‘untrue’ faith.97 Uyttenbogaert’s Remonstratie; aen de Inwoonders van Neder-landt/ zijnde onder de Heerschappie des Coninghs van Spangien, Translaet uyt het Fransoys, s.l.: s.n., 1644. 94 AGS, Estado, 2255, 1 October 1646. When Peñaranda read the copy of the letter Chigi gave him he immediately suspected they were dealing with a forgery. The Portuguese ambassador in the United Provinces, Sousa Coutinho, admitted having written it himself in a letter to João iv. Correspondencia Diplomática de Francisco de Sousa Coutinho durante a sua Embaixada em Holanda, ed. by Edgar Prestage and Pedro de Azevedo, Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade, 1926, p. 5. 95 Ludovico de Copiaria Carmerineo, Atroces Hechos de Impíos Tyranos, pp. 40-41. 96 Discovrs Aengaende Treves of Vrede, p. 14. 97 Johannes Uyttenbogaert, Discovrs op ende Teghen de Conscientievse Bedenckinghen, pp. 16-17. 93

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assertions coincided with the policies proposed by his former pupil, the stadholder Frederick Henry, who defended the establishing of freedom to practise for Catholics in the cities he was conquering in the provinces of Flanders and Brabant during the 1630s.98 If religious imposition was looked at askance by a large section of the population, so was a policy of open and clearly established authorization of Catholic worship. This situation led to seemingly contradictory statements, like those expressed in the ‘seven maxims’ of the Calvinist creed, summarized by the influential Zeeland preacher Maximiliaan Teellinck. On the one hand he advocated the preservation of the Union of Utrecht in its entirety – and consequently the retention of the principle of freedom of conscience. On the other hand the precedence of the Reformed religion as established by the synod of Dort and the need to act “against the heretics” so as to “eradicate the falsities of the Popery” could not be dispensed with.99 The means to combine these aims would be, “without any coercion of conscience,” the extension of the public practice of the Reformed religion while curtailing the worship of “the Papists”. The Catholic religion would consequently “decline by itself.”100 Any pleas for greater leniency towards Dutch Catholics triggered an angry response, grounded both on Catholics’ allegiances to an authority conceived as superior to the temporal and on the threat the active support they received from other polities posed for the independence of the Republic. Once Avaux, the French ambassador, had argued the Catholics’ case, the regents assembled in the States General repeated how the government of the United Provinces had “always ensured that none of its inhabitants would be subject to pressure over their conscience,” remaining “unmolested in their own houses.” On no account would “the Papists be allowed … conspicuously [to] exercise” their “superstition against God’s sacred word” and allow for their open “declaration of adherence to the king of Spain, archenemy of these lands.”101 The Catholics’ ingratitude for this “lenient permission and See the engraving Stedekroon van Frederick Henrick Prince van Oranien, & c. (Amsterdam, 1632) in Wolfgang Harms, (ed.), Die Sammlung der Herzog August Bibliothek, Vol. 2, pp. 478-479 and Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: its Rise, pp. 489ff. 99 Maximiliaan Teellinck, Vrijmoedighe Aenspraeck aen zijn Hoogheijt de Heere Prince van Orangien, Middelburgh: Anthony de Later, 1650, quoted in Jan H. Kluiver, De souvereine en independente staat Zeeland, p. 52. See also Kevre ende Ordonnantie tegens de Stouticheyt ende Excessen der Papisten ende Paus-gesinden, Ten Bevele van die vande Gherechte der Stadt Leyden, Leiden: Jan Jansz. van Dorp, 1640. 100 Antwoordt op’t Munsters Praetje. 101 Theophilus Philopatris, Anatomie ofte Ontledinghe. 98

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tolerance” made them enemies of “the foundations and order of the State,” promoting discord “within the Christian community and the good inhabitants of these lands.”102 The distinction between good and bad Dutch – placing Catholics in the latter category103 – could have negative consequences for the alliance between France and the Dutch Republic because confessional allegiances could prevail over political considerations. The Spanish king and the king of France were both “from the Roman persuasion,” and although the French were not “mortal enemies” of the religion of the Dutch, both “sought to spread their religion among the Dutch.” It was not altogether impossible that they would end up collaborating.104 Furthermore, French attempts to impose the preservation of Catholic freedom to practise in the cities conquered after 1635 aroused sharp disagreement in the United Provinces, especially in the event of the seizure of Antwerp.105 No external polity could curtail the Republic’s independence by imposing a concrete plan of coexistence – even “under the appearance of friendship.”106 Some seized the opportunity to call for greater commitment by the regents to religion and to maintaining the United Provinces’ religious purity. Preachers were asked to be involved in government issues so as to “consult with God” about the opportuneness or not of signing a peace with Spain. Reformed clergy were to “preside over the assemblies” where the regents discussed the issue, to imbue the proceedings with the “spirit of wisdom, prudence and fear of Him.”107 With peace appearing imminent, the apocalyptic tone became more strident. Building on the discourses that argued for a special divine favouring of the Republic, the consequences of a peace which brought with it the abandonment of the Kort Verhael Aengaende ‚t Versoeck der Heeren Ambassadeurs van Sijn Majesteyt van Vranckrijck, voor de Papisten hier te Lande, Dordrecht: Abraham Wynbrantsz van Macedonien, 1644. Many pamphlets reacted against Avaux – whose intermediation was also criticized by Servient, a fellow French ambassador. See for instance Stvcken Aengaende de Catholycken, s.n., s.l., 1644. 103 Lieuve van Aitzema, Verhael van de Nederlantsche Vreede Handeling, The Hague: Jan Veely,1650 (2 Vols.), Vol. 1, pp. 478ff. 104 Noodige Bedenckingen der Trouhertighe Nederlanders. 105 On the disagreements over Antwerp see Lieuve van Aitzema, Vol. 2, pp. 97ff. Using French pleas in favour of Catholic public worship as an argument against the maintenance of the alliance with France see Hollandtsche Sybille, p. 14. 106 Hollandtsche Sybille, p. 11. Authors favouring the continuation of war and the maintenance of the alliance with France also expressed their contempt for any French attempt to determine the religious policy of the Dutch Republic. Antwoordt op’t Munsters Praetje. 107 E. P., Suchtigh, en Trouwhertigh Discours. 102

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true commitment to God and his church were highlighted. “Atheists and libertines” had allegedly “crept in” and “poisoned” the Dutch government “for some years.” True religious faith had consequently turned into “a stepchild, subdued by the State, losing all its friends and proponents.” It had been “corroded and violated from within by its own offspring,” which preferred to strengthen “sectarians, Papists and lost souls” rather than favour the Just.108 These pleas mobilized those more committed to the maintenance of freedom of conscience. The memory of how “Lutherans, Reformed and Mennonites were forced to depart” by the tyrannical government of the duke of Alva was to prevent a change in the Republic’s policy with regard to confessional plurality, economic considerations being added to encourage the maintenance of freedom of conscience.109 Since the outbreak of the revolt references had abounded to how religious imposition had led many Netherlanders to abandon their country “and die in poverty abroad, and the ones remaining were charged with the tenth penny,” a reference to the much-hated tax on commerce introduced by Alva.110 Peculiar to the Dutch political setting were the assertions situating religious allegiances below those owed to the temporal state, a refutation of the view that religious considerations should determine the political agenda; religion was to be placed “under the law.” Facing a Spain dominated by the Inquisition and the pope, “Holland is a free land, where everyone may live according to his conscience.” Against Nederlants Beroerde Ingewanden, over de Laetste Tijdinge, van de Munstersche Vrede Handelige. Uytstortende Gantsch Becommerlijcke en Bewegelijcke Klachte/ in den Schoot van alle Getrouwe Patriotten/ ende Liefhebbers des Vaderlants, s.l.: s.n., 1647. 109 Examen over Seker Boecxken, genaemt: Nederlants Beroerde Inghewanden: Over de Laetste Tijdinge van de Münstersche Vrede-handelinghe, &c. Ge-examineert, Tot Onderrechtinge van alle Vrome, Vreed-lievende der Conscientien Vryheydt Beminnende Patrioten, s.l.: s.n., 1647. Archduke Albert had also resorted to this argument when trying to coax the United Provinces in the 1600s to offer freedom of worship to Catholics in their territory, as their prospective migration to the South would surely impoverish the Dutch Republic: Paul C. Allen, Philip iii and the Pax Hispanica, pp. 203-4. 110 De Spaensche Tiranye, Gheschiet in Nederlant. Waer inne te sien is de Onmenschelicke en Wreede Handelingen der Spangiaerden, Amsterdam: Jacob Pietersz Wachter, 1641, voor-reden. Pieter de la Court would in the following decades emphasize further the economic benefits of policies of active tolerance – allowing even Catholics freedom to practice: Pieter de la Court, Aanwysing der Heilsame Politike Gronden en Maximen van de Republike van Holland en West-Vriesland, Leiden and Rotterdam: Hakkens, 1669. Previously Hugo Grotius had advocated official toleration of Jews on similar grounds, Remonstrantie Nopende de Ordre dije in de Landen van Hollandt ende Westvrieslandt dijent gestelt op de Joden, Jakob Meijer (ed.), Amsterdam: [Meijer], 1949 (1614). 108

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those maintaining that this liberty planted the seed of discord the choice was clear, “freedom over everything.” 111 As regards demands for sovereignty agreement prevailed within the Dutch Republic and Spanish overlordship was widely rejected. On the issue of the tolerance to be granted to Catholics – an issue as recurrent and as problematic as that of sovereignty – disagreements were rife. Inextricably linked to the problem of spiritual sovereignty and the property of Catholic public churches not yet secularized, the discussion on this point was both to challenge the outcome of the negotiations and give expression to two attitudes to religious diversity within the Dutch Republic. The Dutch Republic and its Catholic subjects: negotiating coexis­ tence in Den Bosch The conservation and preservation of Catholicism was fundamental for the Spanish Monarchy. The Dutch regents – regardless of their attitudes to confessional diversity – unanimously viewed the preservation of the Reformed faith as indispensable to the survival of the State. Consequently, discussions on the tolerance to be granted to Catholics in the southern territories of the United Provinces forced the Spanish Monarchy and the Dutch Republic to negotiate openly on an issue which involved the very foundations of their existence as polities. Especially serious were the consequences for the internal equilibrium of the Republic. Much in evidence was the apprehension towards the potential boldness of other sects as a consequence of increased concessions being granted to the Catholics, a prospect which was disquieting to the political authorities and preachers alike.112 Furthermore, the sustained increase in the number of Catholics, with preachers allegedly gaining 7,000 new converts per year, threatened the Reformed with becoming a minority.113 Catholics were concentrated mainly in Brabant and Netherlands Flanders (Zeeuws-Vlaanderen), although significant groupings existed in the rural areas of both Utrecht and Holland, partly the descendants of those who had remained faithful to Catholicism during the revolt Het groot Mvnster, s.l.: s.n., 1646. Advys van de Gecommitteerde der Ed: Mog: Heeren Staten van Zeelandt/ ter Vergaderinge van de Ho: Mog: Heeren Staten Generael. Nopende het Temperament inde Religions Saecken, inde Meyerye van den Bosch, Marquisaet van Berget, &c. In haer Ho: Mog: Vergaderinge Over-gelevert op den 21 Januarij 1647. ende by deselve Gecommitteerde in Compentente Getale Onderteyckent. s.l.: s.n., 1647. 113 Noodige bedenckingen der trouhertighe Nederlanders. 111 112

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and partly the outcome of missionary activities conducted from Delft, Haarlem and Utrecht.114 After the Dutch seizure of ’s-Hertogenbosch in 1629 the Spanish Monarchy could no longer invoke the small number of Catholics residing in the United Provinces as an argument that the inclusion of a clause regarding Catholics’ freedom of conscience or of practice was no longer necessary when negotiating with the Dutch.115 As early as in 1628 Olivares demanded public worship for Catholics, the main benefit they would obtain from a possible treaty, “as the use of Religion” was already accorded to them in the Dutch Republic.116 Other voices, even among ecclesiastics, did however defend the idea that the benefit of peace would suffice. Iñigo de Brizuela, the former confessor of Archduke Albert and president of the Council of Flanders, advised the monarch to be satisfied if the Dutch ensured the peaceful private exercise of religion.”117 The seizure of ’s-Hertogenbosch made demands concerning the status of Catholics all the more pressing. As soon as the city was conquered, Reformed churches were speedily opened under the guidance of the doyen of the University of Utrecht and spokesman of Calvinist orthodoxy Gisbert Voetius. Frederick Henry aimed to grant a certain freedom to practise to the vast Catholic majority in the town.118 However, the Calvinist clergy insisted on applying there the decrees banning public Catholic practice.119 In later years, however, other conquered territories such as Maastricht and the Overmass were guaranteed Catholic worship, following a promise by the States General Wiebe Bergsma, “De Godsdienstige Verhoudingen Tijdens de Vrede van Munster,” p. 101. 115 As financial needs forced Philip iii to sign an extension of the cease-fire previously agreed upon without winning any concessions for Dutch Catholics, the duke of Lerma – the king’s favourite – alleged that although they had previously assumed that many Catholics lived in the northern provinces, that was actually not the case: Paul C. Allen, Philip iii and the Pax Hispanica, p. 231. 116 “Document presented to the Junta de Estado by the Count-Duke about the agreements that could be reached with the Dutch,” 10 April 1628, AHN, Estado, 720. 117 “Advice of Fray Iñigo de Brizuela” AHN, 720. Jonathan I. Israel maintains that ecclesiastics’ advocacy of a more compliant attitude is a clear indication of how Olivares used the religious argument as a pretext for deferring the truce: Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982, p. 226. 118 Jan J. Poelhekke, Frederik Hendrik, Prins van Oranje: een Biografisch Drieluik, Zutphen: De Walburg Pers, 1978, pp. 290-295. 119 Articvlen by syne Princel: Excellentie ende de Gedeputeerde vande Ho. Mo. Heeren Staten Generael der Vereenichde Provintien. Aen de Geestelijckheyt, Magistraet ende Borgerye vande Stadt van ‘s-Hertogenbosch, gheaccordeert, Amsterdam: Frans Lieshout, s. a. [1629]. 114

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of 22 May 1632 aimed at mobilizing the south to revolt against the Spanish Monarchy.120 As negotiations were held to determine juridical superiority over the territories surrounding ’s-Hertogenbosch, the Spanish Monarchy’s envoys demanded from the United Provinces, “for the period of a year, or two or three or until new orders,” that “preachers, vicars and chaplains remained in the public exercise of the Roman Apostolic Catholic religion in their churches and chapels.” Where there were two churches, if the authorities deemed it “good for the community,” the Reformed could use one.121 Although this agreement represented a reduction of the previous (near) monopoly enjoyed by the Catholic Church in the area, the council of State in Brussels advised the Archduchess Isabella to agree to “dissimulate” – a word inserted to replace the scrapped “tolerate”– the public exercise of Reformed religion.”122 Foreseeing the difficulties that such a decision would cause within the higher echelons of the Spanish Monarchy, the counsellors in Brussels justified it at length. Admittedly, Philip iv “could not grant to heretics in the form of a treaty the exercise” of their religion “in territories or places where sovereignty belongs and corresponds” to him. Resorting to an argument which would frequently be reiterated over the coming decades, such a “repugnant” dissimulation would be the only means to prevent the use of force by the enemy, which would cause “more displeasure and prejudice.”123 Many in the United Provinces denounced the negative consequences that “allowing the Papist religion and ecclesiastics to remain inside” in the cities of Venlo, Roermond and Maastricht – all three conquered in 1632 but the first two seized anew by Spanish armies in 1637 – had for “God’s glory and the true religion,”124 regardless of the negative consequences which forbidding public Catholic worship would have politically, antagonizing the French ally125 and preventing the southern Albert Waddington, La République des Provinces-Unies: la France & les Pays-Bas Espagnols de 1630 à 1650, Paris: Masson, 1895-1897, 2 Vols, Vol. 1, p. 144. 121 “Escrit des Deputez de son Altesse Serenissime à Tilburg,” 7 March 1631, AGR Audience, 1425-6. 122 “Advice of the Council of State in Brussels,” 28 March 1631, AGR Audience, 1425-6. 123 “Advice of the Council of State in Brussels,” 12 March, 1631 – approved by the Governess. AGR Audience, 1425-6. 124 Nieuw-Keulsch of Spaensch Bedrogh, pp. 41-42. 125 The negotiations between the stadholder, the States General and the French in 1646 about whether to grant Catholics freedom of worship in the newly conquered territories are recorded in Lieuve van Aitzema, Verhael van de Nederlantsche, Vol. 2, pp. 93ff. These efforts were publicized – most probably by the French – in the obedient provinces of 120

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provinces of the Low Countries from joining the Republic. Pamphlets written by pro-French authors circulated, insisting that the southern provinces would never be allowed to maintain their religious freedom.126 Doubts were raised whether the south, even if rebelling against the Habsburgs, would ever be allowed to “retenir à vous la Souveraineté de vos Provinces, & de traiter d’une confederation avec celles qui sont unies & qui forment aujourdhuy un corps de Repubique à part dans les Paysbas.” In that unlikely event, the widespread loathing of Catholicism in the Republic was supposed to hinder such a solution, prophesying the oppression of Catholics by the Reformed.127 Too compliant a Dutch attitude towards Catholics, paradoxically enough, raised fears among Spanish ministers. The count of Chinchón wondered about the consequences that the agreements signed between the French and the Dutch in the event of the conquest of Bruges for “the use of the Catholic religion to remain free there” would have for the Spanish domination. The count emphasized the political consequences as enjoying the right of freely practising their (Catholic) religion would remove “the principal interest and reason that moves the obedient vassals to remain such.”128 These fears were, however, allayed by the reluctance of the Republic to give in to French demands on other occasions. The Catholic Monarchy thus remained the defender of Catholics’ rights in the so-called Generality Lands, commonly subsumed during the negotiations under the term Meierij.129 the Low Countries, Advis secret donne par le Conseil d’Estat au Roy et a la Royne mere de France. Sur les maximes & regles à garder en la conqueste des Pays-Bas, s.l.: s.n., 1646. 126 Copie d’vne lettre d’vn catholicq de Hollande. Recalling the “oppression of the Catholic religion taking place in ’s-Hertogenbosch” in nearly apocalyptic tones see Ludovico de Copiaria Carmerineo, Atroces Hechos de Impíos Tyranos, p. 34. 127 Fin de la Guerre des Pays-Bas, avx Provinces qui sont encor sous l’Obeissance d’Espagne, Item la Descouverte des Proffondeurs d’Espagne Cachees sous ceste Proposition de Donner au Roy de France en Mariage l’Infante d’Espagne aver les Dixsept Provinces des Pays-Bas en Constitution de Dot, s.l. : s.n., 1645, pp. 18-19. 128 “Advice of the Count of Chinchon in the Council of State,” 2 November 1646, AGS, Estado, 2065. News on this point also concerning the eventual seizure of Antwerp was dispatched to the Spanish government during the summer: “News from Holland,” 31 July 1646, AGS, Estado, 2066. 129 Some of the Dutch delegates went back to The Hague to present what they had agreed upon with the Spaniards on the 23 July 1646. They informed the States General about the need to reach an agreement on what touched the “spiritual” of ’s’Hertogenbosch, noting that everything agreed on this point would also apply to the countryside of Bergen op Zoon, Breda and Cuyck: Lieuve van Aitzema, Verhael van de Nederlantsche, Vol. 2, p. 101.

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Both sides fought for their aims on the battlefield, in the negotiations for the possession of ecclesiastical property and through publications. Meant to bring about conversions, publications played a leading role, especially in the territories situated along the border between the Spanish Low Countries and the United Provinces. Accounts of miracles and prodigious conversions were published and circulated, informing the population both of the iconoclasm of Reformed preachers and of the punishment inflicted on them by God.130 Furthermore, contested Catholic dogmas and sacraments – such as the confession – were defended in the language of fierce confrontation.131 These booklets found their way into the Dutch Republic in spite of prohibitions.132 References were made in equally combative publications to the Jesuit teachings spreading over the border from “famous booksellers of Antwerp,” teachings which Reformed preachers were eager to confute.133 Those who thought “it superfluous to talk about peace as things had come to such an extreme that one religion had to extirpate the other”134 seemed to be right. The situation between the Spanish Monarchy and the Dutch Republic did not seem to be any better. Irreconcilable positions were taken up on On the continuation of pilgrimages to sanctuaries housing miraculous holy images in the Low Countries and its function for maintaining the cohesion of Dutch Catholics see Willem Frijhoff, “The Function of the Miracle in a Catholic Minority. The United Provinces in the Seventeenth century,” in Willem Frijhoff, Embodied Belief. Ten essays on Religious Culture in Dutch history, Hilversum: Verloren, 2002, pp. 111-136. For an account of miracles in the recently seized ’s-Hertogenbosh see Relacion de los Prodigiosos Sucessos que han Sucedido en la Ciudad de Bolduque, y Castigo que Dios Nuestro Señor ha Embiado a los Predicantes de aquella maldita Seta, este año de 1630. Granada: Miguel de Lorençana, 1630. 131 Examples are Getyden van Het H. ende Hoogh-waerdig Sacrament des Altares Soo in ‘t Gemeÿn als loor de Stadt van Amsterdam, Antwerpen: Hendrik Aertssens, 1640 and Biecht-lessen: dat is, Korte maere om Profijtich sijn Bichte te Sprecken. Waer by Gevoecht is der Catholijcke kleyne Borst-weeringh/ Vervattende in sich alle Voornaemste Hooft-punten teghen de Lutheranen, Calvinisten, ende alle ander Ghesinden, Antwerpen: Hendrick Aertsz, 1641. 132 References to fluid traffic between north and south of the Low Countries which implied knowledge of and familiarity with books produced on both sides are to be found in Modestus Stephanus Senck, Catholiicke Antvvoordt op een eerst Onbekende, doch daer naer Bekende Schrijvers Boeckje dat Simon Episcopivs ... teghens de Roomsche Catholijcke Kerck heeft Gheschreven, Antwerp: Hendrick Aertssens, 1641. 133 Jacobus Laurentius, Der Papen Dood-Stuypen, ofte Proces Perdu van Mr. Guilielmus de Lands-Heere, Iesu-Wijd tot Antwerpen, Amsterdam: Hendrick Larensz, 1643. 134 One of the Spanish plenipotentiaries reported how a delegate from Magdeburg had publicly said the words here quoted: “Letter from Münster,” 6 May 1647, AGS, Estado, 2349. 130

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the confessional coexistence to be established, jeopardizing the final conclusion of a peace. Negotiations on the status of Catholics and their places of worship would resume from the unsuccessful negotiations held circa 1630 in the city of Tilburg. During the month of May 1646 the Spanish plenipotentiaries demanded that the churches in the Generality Lands should remain in the hands of Catholics “as they were in the beginning and continue to be so nowadays.”135 The Spanish delegates aimed to obtain in the newly lost territories what it was impossible to ask for for Catholics within the Seven Provinces.136 The Dutch, however, proved equally reluctant to give in on this same issue over the Meierij of Breda, ’s-Hertogenbosch, etc., where they saw the possession and administration of ecclesiastical property as part of the sovereignty to be granted. The Dutch rejected any concession on that point, though assuring the Spaniards of the preservation of “the same freedom of conscience generally recognized to all the inhabitants of the United Low Countries.”137 A few days later, the Spanish delegates offered to recognize the United Provinces’ sovereignty over the bailiwick of ’s-Hertogenbosch and other disputed territories provided that on the spiritual sovereignty and the property of the Churches in these territories “a compromise can be reached to the satisfaction of both parties.”138 The two issues, handled jointly from then onwards, were of a different – although interconnected – nature. Spiritual sovereignty, as noted before, pertained to the pope. The property of the churches, however, was of a more distinctly internal nature. For most Dutch authorities and pamphleteers, the ‘absolute sovereignty’ granted by the Spanish Monarchy implied the right to determine the status enjoyed by different confessions. Consequently, the Spanish demands were an intrusion into the internal affairs of the United Provinces which no polity would

“Answer given by His Majesty’s plenipotentiaries to the proposal by the Hollanders,” 17 May 1646 (after consulting with the Marquis of Castel-Rodrigo), AGS, Estado, 2347. 136 “Letter from Chigi to the Segreteria di Stato,” 8 June 1646, Archivio Vaticano, Nunziatura Paci, 20, quoted by Jan J. Poelhekke, De Vrede van Munster, p. 275. 137 Answer by the Dutch plenipotentiaries to the Spanish objections,” 24 May 1646, recorded by Lieuve van Aitzema, Verhael van de Nederlantsche, Vol. 2, p. 84. Also in AGS, Estado, 2347. 138 “Answer given by His Majesty’s plenipotentiaries to the proposal by the Hollanders the 24,” 27 May 1646, AGS, Estado, 2348, also in Lieuve van Aitzema, Verhael van de Nederlantsche, Vol. 2, p. 87. 135

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readily admit.139 Confessional dissension and religious coexistence were intrinsic to life in the Dutch Republic, and some noted how the Dutch lived with Catholics “in the depths of their country, without it stopping them from marrying, trading, promenading, eating and drinking with them.”140 Against the background of this exaggeratedly idyllic image, the insistence on the maintenance “of the decrees against the Papists” appears contradictory.141 Allegedly, such claims to apply the Union of Utrecht in full to all territories within the United Provinces were made only in order to check the swift progress of the negotiations.142 However, excessive coexistence with those of another faith, “meeting them constantly on the streets and admitting them to commerce,” had for many – in the United Provinces as in the Spanish Monarchy – undesirable consequences.143 Especially feared was the example given Spaensche Triumphe over Haer onlanghs bekomen Victorien in de Gheunieerde Nederlanden. Verthoont tot Waerschouwinge van alle Regenten, om den Vrede haestelijck te Sluyten, of at te Breken. Ghestelt door een Lief-hebber des Vaderlandts. L.G.I.M., 1647, p. 5. Very similar opinions were voiced by Zeeland’s representatives in the States General. Advys van de Gecommitteerde der Ed: Mog: Heeren Staten van Zeelandt… 21 Januarij 1647. 140 (Attributed to Adriaen Pauw), Observatien op de Brief van A. de Bruyn, Deventer: s.n., 1647. An analysis of the realities and fears around interfaith marriages in the United Provinces is made in Benjamin J. Kaplan, “‘For They Will Turn Away thy Sons’: the Practice and Perils of Mixed Marriage in the Dutch Golden Age,” in Marc R. Forster and Benjamin J. Kaplan (eds), Piety and Family in Early Modern Europe: Essays in Honour of Steven Ozment, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005, pp. 115-133. On the extent (and limits) of religious coexistence in everyday life at the time see Willem Frijhoff, “The Threshold of Toleration. Interconfessional Conviviality in Holland during the Early Modern Period,” in Willem Frijhoff, Embodied Belief. Ten Essays on Religious Culture in Dutch History, Hilversum: Verloren, 2002, pp. 39-65, especially pp. 56ff. 141 The basic terms on which it had been agreed that the delegates’ mandate had to be based were restated on 16 November 1646 at the meeting of the States General emphasizing the importance of maintaining the union among the provinces and the maintenance of the decrees against Catholics: Extract Uyt het Register der resolutien van de Hooghm: Heeren Staten Generael der Vereenighde Nederlanden. Veneris, den 16. November, 1646, s.l.: s.n., s.a. [1646] 142 According to Poelhekke, the reasons the Zeeland delegates to the States General rejected the peace proposals were the result of “fanatical hatred and unbridled avarice,” depicting some of these delegates as the most “undisguised cynical expressions of power politics” ever seen in European politics: Jan J. Poelhekke, De Vrede van Munster, p. 314. Simon Groenveld maintains that the demands for increased tolerance for Catholics were abandoned by the two contenders: Simon Groenveld, Der Friede von Münster: die Niederländische Seite des Westfälischen Friedens, Bonn: Kgl. Niederländische Botschaft, Presse- und Kulturabteilung, 1998, p. 62. 143 An opinion that coexistence with heretics should never be allowed if it endangered the purity of the true faith from the side of the Spanish Monarchy is Gil González Dávila, Historia de la Vida y Hechos de el Ynclito y Poderoso Monarcha Amado y Santo Rey 139

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by heretics who proved more attached to the commandments of their (wrong) creed than most of those of the true faith, especially if they shared creed with the arch-enemy, the king of Spain. 144 The possibility of a growing number of conversions once public worship for Catholics was allowed also played a role.145 The doubt in the Dutch Republic about the loyalty of Catholics – even after the peace with Spain was signed – encouraged mistrust. Warnings abounded against the control the Spanish king and his ministers allegedly exerted, by means of the Catholic preachers, on the hearts and minds of “a large proportion of the inhabitants.”146 The image of Catholics easily led – or misled – by other, foreign polities was recurrent. Thus, the influence which the French king might exert over Dutch Catholics could, as mistrust towards French intentions grew, turn to their disadvantage, as happened during the eighteenth century.147 As a pamphleteer advocating peace put it, the French, in order to attain greater control over the Republic, would not hesitate to “incite the Catholics, whose numbers are great among us, to revolt” in pursuit of their freedom of worship.148 Mistrust of the French was also behind the reasons given by one of the few pamphleteers who attempted to disentangle political and religious allegiances. The author of Holland’s Sibyl noted how Catalans and Portuguese rebelled against Spain in spite of their Catholicism and how preferable it was to govern Catholics – however pro-Spanish they might be – than be subjects of the French.149

Dn. Phelipe iii de este Nombre (posthumously published with a dedication to Carlos ii) by José González Dávila, s.l., s.n., ca. 1690, f. 162v. 144 Nederlants Beroerde Ingewanden. 145 Zeeland’s advice to the States General, 20 October 1646, recorded by Lieuve van Aitzema, Verhael van de Nederlantsche, Vol. 2, pp. 260-262. 146 Hollands Praetje: Piscator Ictus Sapit, s.l: s.n., 1646, p. 12. The Portuguese envoy to the Dutch Republic, Sousa Coutinho, also noted that preachers and clergymen were most favourable towards the Spanish Monarchy among the Dutch Catholics. Correspondencia Diplomática de Francisco de Sousa Coutinho durante a sua Embaixada em Holanda, ed. by Edgar Prestage and Pedro de Azevedo, Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade, 1626, p. 4. 147 1734 and 1757 marked two moments of anti-Catholic action caused by the suspicions of Catholic treason linked to the French invasion of the territory: Joke Spaans, “Religious Policies,” p. 82. 148 Irenee, Copie d’une Lettre, p. 3. 149 An attempt to tone down these arguments is to be found in Hollandtsche Sybille, p. 23.

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Whether they were sponsored by the Spanish or the French, Catholics’ main allegiances were deemed to be to the pope, who would fight the Reformed untiringly. All influence Catholics would gain over the United Provinces would consequently be used against the Dutch and their government,150 as the Catholics’ oath to the pope “is more binding than all other oaths that they make to the government of these lands.” The consequences for the Republic were potentially serious, more so if Catholics obtained positions of power.151 It was on these grounds that the representatives of Zeeland to the States General rejected any Catholic demands for greater freedom of worship.152 On the basis of a different confession, the official discourse used by the representatives of the States from Zeeland had many points in common with the attitudes held by political institutions in the Spanish Monarchy. A year before the official signing of the peace, Zeeland’s delegates stated their commitment to the “Reformed religion as it is taught in the public churches of these Lands” and how this was “God’s sanctifying truth” in contrast to “Roman superstition.” Highest among the priorities of the temporal State was the maintenance of religion, the basis of the ‘flourishing Republic’ and the preservation of its purity. If the Catholics were allowed to control public churches in the Generality Lands, they would corrupt the divine message and bring about “the ruin of both religion and polity.” The States of Zeeland could not agree that something that went so directly against the Dutch Republic’s maxims and previously issued decrees as allowing public worship for Catholics would be part of the settlement. Any concession to Catholicism was interpreted as a threat to the Reformed religion, reasoning which pervaded other, earlier opposition in this and other provinces.153 The reasons began with the obstruction Consideratien ende Redenen, pp. 5-6. Theophilus Philopatris, Anatomie ofte Ontledinghe. 152 Advys van de Gecommitteerde der Ed: Mog: Heeren Staten van Zeelandt… 21 Januarij 1647. 153 The arguments put forward in the Advice here summarized coincide largely with the opinions voiced by representatives of Zeeland and Gueldres about the proposal of the States of Holland and West-Friesland to turn the truce into peace months earlier. See the “Declaration by the States of Zeeland of 20 October 1646 recorded by Lieuve van Aitzema, Verhael van de Nederlantsche, Vol. 2, pp. 140-141. Some of the points would also be stressed by Utrecht’s delegates. On the position of some Utrecht authorities on the issue of freedom to practise for Catholics see Dirk E. A. Faber and Renger E. de Bruin, “Tegen de Vrede. De Utrechse Ambassadeur Godard van Reede van Nederhorst en de Onderhandelingen in Munster”, in Jacques Dane (red.), 1648: Vrede van Munster. Feit en Verbeelding, Zwolle: Waanders, 1998, pp. 107-131, p. 109. 150 151

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which would follow from the maintenance of Catholic public churches for the swift progression of the Reformed creed in the south of the Republic; it was the duty of the temporal government to prevent the situation whereby “other sects, as if they were weeds and tares, could come to oppress, infect and corrupt the Reformed religion.”154 Nonetheless, the unassailability of the principle of freedom of conscience “that one does not want to withdraw because our religion cannot be enjoyed by everyone” was never questioned. Yielding to Spanish demands for free Catholic worship in the Generality Lands would also imply that Catholics elsewhere in the United Provinces would maintain “vehemently that one cannot or should not withhold from them what is allowed to other subjects of this State regarding the Papist religion,” becoming bolder by the day and demanding more freedom. The subordination of spiritual to temporal interests was viewed very negatively by Zeeland’s regents especially as it “would show that the Reformed religion is not as dear and important for us as their superstitions and idolatries for the Spaniards.”155 The Zeelanders emphasized the important gains to be obtained by the negotiations in Münster. If “instead of ending and crowning a really troublesome and bloody eighty years war with a glorious and reputable treaty” the Dutch Republic surrendered “its known interests and fundamental maxims” in the matter of religion, such a settlement would both vex “our religious fellows” and “turn to our shame and ignominy.” Recalling the position of force the United Provinces enjoyed as regards the Spanish Monarchy and the latter’s craving for peace, Zeeland’s representatives’ advice was to “remain scrupulous and prefer not to sign any treaty than to give up the fundamental maxims of this state.”156 Negotiations proceeded nonetheless, and the Spanish Monarchy was finally forced to accept the adamant rejection of open freedom to practise for Catholics and be content with the absence of any overt Gueldres’ representatives in the States General had reminded their fellow delegates that the “seclusion of any other persuasions” was among the points agreed upon when drafting the mandates for the negotiations and that it was the prerogative of each province to decide on similar matters: “Advice of the Delegates of Gueldres,” October 1646, in Lieuve van Aitzema, Verhael van de Nederlantsche, Vol. 2, p. 147. 155 In a similar vein both Gisbert Voetius and Utrecht’s delegate in Münster, Godart van Reede, showed their disagreement with the peace negotiations. See Dirk E. A. Faber and Renger E. de Bruin, “Tegen de Vrede. De Utrechse Ambassadeur Godard van Reede van Nederhorst,” p. 110. 156 Advys van de Gecommitteerde der Ed: Mog: Heeren Staten van Zeelandt… 21 Januarij 1647. 154

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references in the wording of the treaty to ‘spiritual sovereignty.’ The theologians advising Philip iv from the obedient Low Countries had, albeit reluctantly, recognized how much more important it was to preserve the absolute freedom of worship enjoyed by Catholics in the territories still under Spanish control in the area than risk their wellbeing by the continuation of war. The maintenance of what could be saved and the fear of the possible negative consequences for both worshippers and priests was the argument often advanced by theologians and high ecclesiastical authorities in Flanders to bring the Spanish king and ministers to a less staunch defence of the Catholic Church’s prerogatives.157 It was in order to prevent the hindrance of the exercise of the Catholic religion in the area that the Archbishop of Mechelen, and the bishops of Gand, Namur, Antwerp and Ypres, with their ruling confirmed by “the Doctors and Professors of the Faculty of Theology in Douay University,” had advised the king to allow the Reformed to preach in the Meierij of ’s-Hertogenbosch during the 1630s. In the years which elapsed between 1636 and 1647, the ecclesiastics and the members of the theology faculty of Leuven University confirmed this decision. But in 1647 the problem – as the churchmen consulted for advice recognized – had gained in complexity. No longer was it a matter of allowing heretics, but of allowing these heretics not only to control “the ecclesiastical goods” but also to hinder Catholics’ access to the sacraments. The ecclesiastics compared the plight of the monarchy – forced to surrender “cities full of Catholics without express reservation of the spiritual” in the Seven Provinces – with that of the cities “besieged by heretics or infidels.” Both, unable to resist, were forced to “capitulate without fighting to the death” or trying to negotiate advantageous conditions for the preservation “of their religion and ecclesiastical property.” If only the “liberty of conscience and Catholic religion” were maintained “as the States of the United Provinces profess and assert that they allow to every sectarian, and even the Jewish perfidy,” that would suffice.158 On the influence of advisors who had previously served in the Low Countries in convincing Philip iv to sign the peace see Laura Manzano Baena, “Entre La Haya y Madrid. Los Gobernadores y Oficiales en Flandes como Mediadores Políticos y Culturales para la Paz de Münster (1648),” in René Vermeir, Maurits Ebben and Raymond Fagel (eds.), España y los Países Bajos, siglos xvi-xvii. Agentes e Identidades en Movimiento. Madrid: Sílex. 2011, p. 267-282. 158 Advice from the Archbishops of Mechelen and Cambray and the bishop of Gand, 5 August 1647, AGR, Conseil d’Etat, 933. 157

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The unyielding attitude of Zeeland – voicing the repugnance of many in the Dutch Republic – forced the Spanish Monarchy to give in. The reasons were the same as those which made it legitimate to sign truces and to allow contact with heretics. Communication with heretics was defensible only, first, if “morally there was a spiritual benefit to be expected in the conversion of these heretics,” as grounded on the fourth commandment, “love thy neighbour.” In the case of the staunch heretics of the Low Countries, a second reason applied: “when the forces of the heretics exceed those of the Catholics,” and the latter feared being defeated by the former, the Catholics would legitimately accept closer contact with heretics. In both cases it was as an act of charity that such coexistence could ever be permitted.159 The delegates of the Spanish king and those of the Dutch Republic finally signed – and eventually ratified – an agreement in which freedom of religious practice for Catholics was not acknowledged outside certain strongholds such as Maastricht. Spanish consciences were assuaged by the support theologians gave to their deeds. Peñaranda could consequently reply to the official protest against the recently signed peace made by the papal nuncio Chigi. The future Pope Alexander vii emphasized how he had seen the plenipotentiaries of the Spanish Monarchy “have at heart the same interests” as those defended by the pope and his ministers. However, as harm to the Catholic religion could ensue from the peace treaty, following the papal brief issued on 20 November 1647 the nuncio was forced to “repugn and contradict” such an agreement, in an action which anticipated the final papal protestation at the peaces of Westphalia by means of the bull Zelo Domus Dei.160 Peñaranda restated to the nuncio how strongly he, the other Spanish delegates and the king himself had demonstrated “constant firmness and zeal for religion” and repeated how the treaty was agreed upon “in truthful observance” with the “terms of the ruling of universities and theologians.”161 In what was – for the Spanish Monarchy – a somewhat sad end to the long years of war and to the resources spent on winning back the heretics and rebels to their true Lords, both on earth and in Heaven, publicists had to content themselves with celebrating the fact that Catholics had been enabled to practise their faith “freely within their houses, without being Gil González Dávila, Historia de la Vida y Hechos de el Ynclito y Poderoso, f. 161v. Letter from Fabio Chigi to the Count of Peñaranda, 16 May 1648, Bibl. Vat., Fondo Chigi A-I-6, quoted in Jan J. Poelhekke, De Vrede van Munster, p. 560. 161 Letter from the Count of Peñaranda to Fabio Chigi, 16 May 1648, Bibl. Vat., Fondo Chigi Q-II-52, quoted in Jan J. Poelhekke, De Vrede van Munster, p. 561. 159 160

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disturbed” in the whole of the United Provinces.162 Less frequently voiced were the reminders by the Spanish Monarchy to Catholics in the Generality Lands of how they would ensure their freedom only “if they live and behave as loyal and obedient subjects of the Lords States,” now holders of “the sovereignty that the king of Spain has entirely transferred” to them.163 These words denote the acceptance by the Spanish king and his government of their defeat, a defeat made all the more opprobrious by the swift secularization of ecclesiastical property in the Meierij and other annexed areas.164 Although the Spanish Monarchy protested against ensuing bans on the entry of Catholic priests into the Generality Lands, the secularization and increasing Reformation of the territory progressed.165 Spanish expectations of turning the situation round were never fulfilled. Dutch Catholics would not officially obtain freedom to practise until the nineteenth century.

Langh-ghevvendschden Peys tusschen Sijne Catholijcke Majesteyt van Spaignien ende de Vereenighde Heeren Staten van Hollandt, &c. Ghesloten ende Gheteeckent tot Munster op den 8. Ianuarius, 1647. Antwerp: Martinus Binnart, 1647. 163 AGR, Conseil d’Etat, 948 [1648, addenda to the peace treaty]. 164 Voices rose then in defence of Catholicism in the area, reprinting previously written works by Cornelius Jansenius, Deffense de la foy de l’Église catholique, contre le deffy des ministres calvinistes de Bois-le-duc, Paris : A. Vitré, 1651. 165 On how the Reformation progressed in the Generality Lands and on the situation of Catholics after the signing of the peace see Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: its rise, pp. 599ff. 162

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Chapter 6 An invalid conclusion or a peace not meant to last (but which did) Finally, the peace was signed. The baleful prophesy of a French writer ten years earlier which opens this book had come true. The road to this final settlement was long and difficult, but by 1648 the journey seemed to have been accomplished. After surmounting the problems posed by the Spanish Monarchy’s political culture, Dutch rebels were admitted to the negotiating table and placed under the European spotlight. And this in spite of their rejection of the authority of their two natural lords, the heavenly and the temporal, as the Spanish government saw it. With their inclusion in the preliminaries for the peace congress signed in Hamburg the Dutch won the first skirmish of the last battle for their independence. The Spanish government’s revulsion at this surrender was made explicit and had already contributed to the failure of the negotiations in Cologne in 1638. However, once Spanish rule was contested within the Iberian Peninsula, other priorities came to the fore. The longstanding nature of the Dutch rebellion and the precedent set by the Truce signed in 1609 allowed Philip iv to enter into talks with the Dutch. Conversely, the Catalans and Portuguese were to remain absent from the official proceedings of the Congress. The attitudes displayed towards different rebel polities in the context of the Münster negotiations hint at the elements which did or did not enable them to gain international recognition. Negotiating with rebels was possible – although straightforward repression was desirable – but on conditions which could not be fulfilled in an international forum. Rebellions should never be encouraged, not even those directed against other princes. Allowing rebels to display their proudly-won freedom in front of the assembled European polities was a most dangerous incitement to other subjects to revolt. If the Dutch were finally allowed to participate in the Congress it was only on the grounds of a greater 235

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benefit to be obtained by the Spanish Monarchy’s subjects and the whole of Christendom, a crucial and repeated refrain justifying breaches of the prevailing political culture. An international forum provided rebels negotiating with a tyrannical lord – especially if of a different religious faith – with a better guarantee that the agreements signed would be honoured. An agreement which left the loathed oppressor powerful enough potentially to renew his attacks was, however, deemed unwise by many, especially on account of the congenital malignity that defined the tyrant. Nonetheless, and however ruthless the tyrant’s rule might be, long-lasting norms continued to determine the course of action to be followed when one was confronted with tyranny. Tyranny had been a polysemic term since the Middle Ages, referring to the usurper, the ruler without appropriate titles, and the unjust lord. These distinctions of meaning gave rise to different courses of action when one was confronted with a tyrant. Slaying the tyrant by title was allowed – as long as his assassination did not lead the community into that most dreaded of situations, anarchy. Less radical was the attitude towards the ruler who, though lawfully appointed, disregarded the terms of his mandate. Theories of resistance, developed during the Early Modern period, nonetheless argued the right of intermediate authorities and of parliamentary assemblies to oppose a ruler who did not respect the limits of his covenant with his subjects and thus became a private citizen whose power could lawfully be resisted. In spite of the profound radical implications of theories of resistance, the safeguarding of order remained the main goal of political government. It was the fear of a greater, nearer and more threatening French tyranny that moved many in the United Provinces to opt to trust the Spanish king’s promises and enter into negotiations in spite of the longevity of the stereotype of Spanish tyranny, which survived the signing of the peace. The accusations that they were rebellious subjects did not prevent the Dutch from entering into negotiations with the Spanish Monarchy, nor did being fought against as a tyrant stop the Spanish king from treating for a truce or suing for peace with his former subjects. The accusations made and the threat to internal stability posed by them did, however, bring about a reformulation of the fundamentals by which each polity was ruled. In spite of claims advocating the straightforward repression of rebellion, which have attracted widespread attention by means of recent historiography, many in and around the Spanish Monarchy’s government were aware of the need for royal authority 236

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to be able to clasp to its bosom the many territories and cultures of politics over which it reigned. The dynasty – although its power was founded on the communities’ voluntary alienation of their power to rule themselves – was a first element providing unity over the many and scattered territories, which were integrated into a single line of hereditary transmission. The transfer of self-governing power by the commonwealth was a fully endorsed neo-scholastic principle which could even be argued for historically in Castilian history, referring to the example of Pelayo, first king after the Muslim conquest of the Iberian Peninsula. However, by the 1640s this principle was radically reinterpreted by the pamphleteers and writers in the Spanish king’s entourage. Unlike for some neo-scholastic writers such as Domingo de Soto, for the Spanish government and the pamphleteers studied here the cession of its power to govern itself by the commonwealth was irreversible. Further common elements would tie the different territories’ subjects together and unite them to the king. Justice, reward and punishment for each according to his merits, distributed by a king who, out of love for his subjects, voluntarily submitted to his own laws was the most visible one. But the rigour of justice exercised by the king would be mitigated through the greatest of theological virtues, charity. Conformation to the precepts of the true Catholic faith provided both king and subject with the ultimate justification of royal power – which ultimately derived from divine will, a divine will argued to be compatible with the acceptance of the transfer of the power to govern from the commonwealth to the prince – and with guidelines for princely behaviour which could not be disregarded without tragic consequences. It was in order to keep their subjects in the true faith that kings were annointed, adding a religious dimension to contractualist theories of civil power, and it was the king’s duty – according to theorists, ministers and the Spanish king alike – to extend and maintain the purity of the faith around the globe. But it was part of his religious obligations to care so much for his subjects as to be able to forgive them for their most heinous crimes, even rebellion, if they showed willingness to change their behaviour. In the case of heretical rebels such change implied their return to obedience, not just to the king, but to the pope too. The previous pages have shown how religion was among the reasons which had prevented any reconciliation of the Reformed Dutch with the person who still viewed himself as their natural lord. The concept of authority developed in the United Provinces after a possible reconciliation with the Spanish Habsburgs was abandoned was also 237

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based on religion. A general set of political principles – partly a cause of the revolt and partly a product of it – stood out. What was generally rejected was the investiture of any person or institution with absolute power over the polity. The stage was thus set for the establishment of a mixed constitution where human agency and consent – as opposed to divine investiture and dynastic principles – would remain paramount. Citizens could not completely alienate their power to rule themselves, at least not the naturally free Dutch. The course of events and the abortive search for a prince who would rule the United Provinces according to their territorial privileges and customs led to the establishment of a republican form of government. Different interpretations of the Republic’s foundations and its future did, however, come into being and clash. The signing of the truce in 1609 and the Arminian troubles in particular created tension. Even if the conflict subsided after 1618, every time the possibility of a settlement with the Spanish Monarchy seemed within grasp the Dutch republic saw its internal divisions grow. At stake was not just the end of hostilities. The experience of 1609, when the Dutch Republic had been on the brink of civil war, gave arguments to those who opposed peace; a settlement with the Spanish Monarchy was argued to be incompatible with civic concord. The lines on which such a rupture might occur were outlined by contemporaries, who in their writings for and against peace emphasized the points on which little or no agreement would be possible within the Republic. Difficulties arose concerning different conceptions of the economic course the Republic should take, of the position to be enjoyed by the Reformed church and of what principles were to determine the Republic’s alliances. Of fundamental importance for the final outcome of each of these conflicts – and naturally for the agreement achieved in 1648 as well – was the stance taken by the Prince of Orange and stadholder of the major provinces. The study of the peace negotiations, the separate agreement reached by the Oranges to solve their particular territorial quarrels with the Spanish Monarchy and some aspects relating to the court gathered around Frederick Henry in The Hague offer a further and new insight into possible intentions and aspirations nurtured by the Oranges. Their monarchical aspirations thus appear not unrealistic – however difficult this was for many in the Republic to accept. The widespread acceptance of the republican form of government made a return to princely rule almost impossible. Furthermore, Frederick Henry’s reluctance to tie together politics and religion – even advocating freedom to practise for Catholics in the southern territories conquered during the 1630s – 238

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alienated those among orthodox Calvinists who advocated a political government guided (solely) by religious considerations. What is undeniable is Frederick Henry’s – and also his son William’s – readiness to accept an agreement with the Spanish Monarchy which would establish them first as feudatories of the Spanish Habsburgs – and possibly of the Emperor – and secondly as lords over territories where there was to be freedom of religious practice for Catholics. This readiness contrasted sharply with the reticence shown by the regents in the provincial assemblies and the States General to submit to similar Spanish claims over the whole of the Republic. It remains, however, an open question whether these different aims indicated the Oranges’ willingness to submit to albeit nominal submission to the Habsburgs in exchange for the latter’s support for enlarging the Oranges’ control over the United Provinces. Neither is it possible to determine the consequences this could have had for the future course of the Republic. It remains clear that the refusal of any acknowledgement, however nominal, of Spanish sovereignty and of freedom of religious practice for Catholics could threaten the settlement with the Spanish Monarchy or prevent it altogether, as had happened during the negotiations for the truce in 1609 and around 1630. The Spanish Monarchy, for reasons deriving from its own conception of power, could never consider as legally binding an agreement which would entail alienating completely and irreversibly its sovereignty over part of the territories inherited by the king. Only by giving them as a fee, which implied the preservation of the direct dominium by the king, could sovereignty be granted, even partially – as had happened with the transfer of sovereignty over the Low Countries to the Archdukes Albert and Isabella and in the agreement signed in 1648 with the Prince of Orange. The Dutch regents nonetheless remained unyielding on this point, as without a complete grant of sovereignty the threat of war and final (re)conquest by Spanish armies would not be absolutely removed. After 1630 not even those more favourable to a settlement could conceive of any agreement which would place them once more under Spanish dominion. Some in the Republic, although never considering it possible to restore the United Provinces to Spanish domain, pointed to the fact that any agreement on that issue could be repealed by the Spanish king or his heirs on grounds of the inalienability of his sovereignty, which belonged not to him but to the Crown as a mystical body. Contemporaries knew that they were not talking about a juridical fiction, as the events following the renunciation by François i 239

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of France of his rights over Artois and Flanders under the treaty of Madrid (1525) showed. As a pamphleteer recalled more than a century later, such cession was subsequently rescinded by the king, with the confirmation of the pope. A king could not renounce his rights “au prejudice de ses successeurs Roys de France.” Such a renounciation was “à faute d’hoirs masles par l’institution originaire & par la nature de tells fiefs & dignités.”  The rights over Artois and Flanders “doibt tousiours revenir à la couronne pour y demeurer d’icelle, & du Comté d’Arthois.”1 In spite of these reasons, the views of pragmatists gained ground within the Republic. The Dutch delegates were well aware that they were treading on very thin ice when dealing with this aspect, and, paradoxically enough, that was one of the reasons which led them finally to sign a peace with the Spanish Monarchy. By the 1640s the provincial sovereignty of the Dutch Republic and the right of the provincial assemblies to determine their form of government had been generally accepted. However, the tensions this implied with other concepts of power existing in Europe at the time forced Dutch regents and pamphleteers to address the issue in earnest. The possibility that ‘Catholic reason of state’ would lead Philip iv to sign a peace with France and reinforce the treaty through the marriage of his daughter with Louis xiv, giving her the rights over the Low Countries as a dowry – a legally valid cession as the territories remained within the dynasty – frightened the Dutch regents. They feared a neighbour as powerful as France, especially if it could unite might and dynastic right. Therefore, the attitude of the most pragmatic Dutch prevailed. The authors favouring an agreement, while acknowledging the possibility that neither Philip iv nor his heirs would ever consider valid the renunciation of the territories in the Low Countries, tended to point out the difficulties the Spanish king would encounter in the event that he did “not forget the rights he says he has over us”, remembering that the king of England had also not forgotten the right that he claimed to have over France; while the duke of Lorraine also had claims over France, France over Milan, Naples, Sicily, also over Holland, as did Poland over Sweden. As the author of the pamphlet stated sardonically,

Fin de la Guerre des Pays-Bas, avx Provinces qui sont Encor sous l’Obeissance d’Espagne, Item la Descouverte des Proffondeurs d’Espagne Cachees sous ceste Proposition de Donner au Roy de France en Mariage l’Infante d’Espagne aver les Dixsept Provinces des Pays-Bas en Constitution de Dot, s.l.: s.n., 1645, p. 6. 1

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“everyone is free to lay claims and beg for bread.”2 Those opposing peace, divided between considering any cession by the Spanish Monarchy on that point either unnecesary – as the Dutch Republic was already independent and sovereign – or insuficient if it did not also acknowledge spiritual sovereingty, thus precluding any future ‘crusade’ against them, saw their demands unsatisfied.Only the problems caused by the continuing revolts in the Iberian Peninsula and the continuation of war against France could, however, justify the ignominious surrender of any Spanish claims over the United Provinces. The fact that the Emperor was not willing to continue fighting for the common wellbeing of the House of Habsburg, preferring to sign a separate peace in the Empire, and the general lack of resources to continue sustaining wars all over the globe further accounted for the Spanish king’s willingness to accept a settlement. Different councillors of Philip iv and the king himself repeated that the agreement would never have been signed in a less desperate situation. Only preoccupation with the wellbeing and preservation of the obedient provinces in the Low Countries and the rest of the Spanish Monarchy made it acceptable. But even necessity had its limits, and the Spanish king, his advisors and the delegates in Münster concurred in the adamant rejection of clauses which would threaten the claims for universal dominium in the spiritual realm which the pope held and which the Spanish Monarchy acknowledged and made inherent in its own self-positioning within Christendom. Consequently, the transfer advocated by Zeeland’s regents of ‘spiritual sovereignty’ over the territories referred to as the Meierij of ’s- Hertogenbosch was rejected, in spite of its possible negative consequences for the final outcome of the agreement. Any mention of spiritual sovereignty was finally avoided, but the question remains how insistence on this point by the States General would have affected the result of the negotiations. The delegates of the Spanish Monarchy, however, finally accepted that Catholics in the Meierij and other newly conquered territories – except in Maastricht, as a result of the agreement reached when the city surrendered to Dutch armies – would enjoy freedom only of creed and not of practice. The problem of religious tolerance and the questions raised about the political loyalties of those subjects of a different faith Adriaen Pauw (atrib.), Nederlantsche Absolutie op the Fransche Belydenis, Amsterdam: J. Nes, 1648. Authors defending the continuation of war and – consequently – the maintenance of close ties with France reminded the public how François i had renounced his rights over the Low Countries in the peace of Cambrai: Antwoordt op’t Munsters Praetje, Dordrecht: Claes Claesz, 1646. 2

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from their rulers remained central, not only to the Spanish Monarchy but also to the Dutch Republic. Both polities defined themselves to a great extent on religious grounds, and often as if to outdo each other. Catholics were urged to shed tears for the happiness of heretics, in the same way that many Reformed – inside and outside the United Provinces – considered it their and the government’s duty to protect the Protestant religion with as much zeal as the king of Spain protected Catholicism. For the Spanish Monarchy such a definition of its own existence had the effect of turning all opponents of a religious view of politics into heretics or worse – as in the case of the French politiques. In the Dutch republic, however, the important links existing between religious and political loyalties, ties which went further than the attitude towards Catholics and also included the Arminians, coexisted with a different tendency. Among the root causes of the revolt was the rejection of the policies of religious imposition pursued first by Charles v and afterwards by his son, Philip ii, and his appointed governors of the Low Countries. The tension between these two tendencies was already implicit in the Union of Utrecht – where freedom of conscience was ensured at the same time as the privileged position of the Reformed church was maintained. The fact that no one in the United Provinces would be subject to persecution for his or her creed allowed the Spanish Monarchy to sign the peace with the Dutch with the acquiescence of the theologians consulted. As in other cases, such as the peace with England in 1604 or the Twelve Years’ Truce in 1609, freedom of conscience would have to suffice to salve Spanish government officials’ consciences. Furthermore, Catholics in the United Provinces were reminded by the Spanish Monarchy’s governors in the Low Countries that they were to remain faithful to their creed but also of their political allegiances to the newly recognized state. The peace was duly signed and, especially for the Spanish Monarchy, it might have been interpreted as a moral and ideological abandonment of the principles which, theoretically, informed the government’s actions. Although the peace implied that the United Provinces renounced any idea of extending the limits of their republic – an issue of strategic as well as moral importance, since it meant the end of all thought of liberating the southern Low Countries from the Spanish and Catholic yoke – criticisms of the Dutch signature of the peace were voiced only internally. More widespread across Europe was the negative assessment of the Habsburgs – including the Emperor – for reaching 242

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a settlement with heretical polities which was not limited in time but meant apparently to last indefinitely. Interpreted as an abandonment of the Catholic cause, the signing of the peaces of Westphalia and Münster prompted an official protest by the pope. To these criticisms Spanish ministers and diplomats responded along similar lines to those previously set out in theoretical works by preachers and lawyers and confirmed by the theologians consulted on the eve of the final signature of the peace. The final reason for this surrender was the ultimate advantage of Catholicism, the true supporters of which needed peace in order to prevent the eradication of Catholicism so as eventually to regather their strength before launching another assault on heretics and rebels. The duke of Terranova, Philip iv’s ambassador at the Imperial court, gave voice to this attitude when complaining bitterly about the criticism the Emperor was receiving from Imperial Catholic princes when about to sign peace with their Protestant counterparts. “Even if it causes rumour in the world that a Catholic Emperor settles with heretics, abandoning the Catholics,” the duke defended the reasons the Emperor had for signing an agreement by which “the heretics do not get anything new against the religion and the common good.” If the Catholics of the Empire claimed, he said, “that for their interest and passions what remains pious and Catholic in these States and the Empire” were to be lost, they would be advocating the “destruction and annihilation of the Most August House, the only pillar on which the Catholic faith rests.” Thus those princes who risked the benefit of the whole Christendom for their own petty and material interests were bad Catholics.3 The greater advantage Catholicism expected to result from the signing of the peaces was complemented by the advice given to Philip iv by his ministers. They recommended that the king introduce “some sort of disclaimer, as it would be the protest or reclamation of your Majesty” when it came to signing treaties “which are going to be so disadvantageous to your Majesty.” Careful to give it legal validity – further demonstrating the often neglected, though deeply-rooted, juridical culture of the Monarchy – the disclaimer would have “to be done and given in juridical form, with the greatest possible secrecy, justifying it with the reasons that arise from the present situation.” It Letter from the duke of Terranova to Peñaranda, 16 February 1646, AGS, Estado, 2255. This statement is consistent with the marquis of Castel-Rodrigo’s protestations against those who tried to prevent Philip iv from signing the peace with the Dutch in October 1646, CODOIN, Vol. 82, pp. 438-439. 3

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should be explicitly stated that the peace was signed by Philip only because he was forced to do so by “the power, violence, iniquities and falsehood of the alliance of the Dutch, French and other allied heretics; the divisions among the Catholic Princes; the revolts in the kingdoms of your Majesty, and the Pope’s lack of action against his disobedient subjects, the ecclesiastics.”4 It was a commonplace that promises and treaties signed under duress were not valid, as observed by Juan Caramuel in his treatise against the Portuguese rebellion and by the Spanish king’s delegates in Münster.5 As Antoine Brun emphasized with reference to the signing of the treaty, “swearing was never the vehicle of iniquity, as the canonists say.”6 Shortly before the effective start of the negotiations in Münster an anonymous French pamphleteer had pointed out two of the reasons which would invalidate any cession of sovereignty of one polity to another. The first was the inability of a king to renounce part of his possessions. The second reason was that such an agreement would be signed by the king “comme prisonnier & par contrainte,” as was the case with the aforementioned treaty of Madrid.7 On these grounds Clement vii absolved François i from his oath, giving rise to new conflicts between the houses of Valois and Habsburg. By 1648 the pope was no longer recognized as spiritual head by all European polities. The eventual papal dispensation of the oaths taken by Philip iv on the peace treaty – especially if conjoined with the aforementioned reservation – made their validity questionable, as opponents of peace in the United Provinces were eager to note. Papal dispensation and the juridical form of such a ‘mental reservation’ in the signing of a treaty were indispensable for its validity, as Caramuel noted when dismissing the reasons given on those grounds by João iv’s supporters to justify the latter’s breaking of his oath of obedience to the Spanish king.8 There

Advice from the count of Chinchon, Junta de Estado, 27 June 1646, CODOIN, Vol. 82, p. 376. 5 “All concerts and contracts done by violence, and having no option, lack political liberty and cannot be forceful”: Juan Caramuel de Lobkowitz, Respuesta al Manifiesto del Reyno de Portugal, Antwerp: Baltasar Moreto, oficina plantiniana, 1642, p. 78. 6 Letter from Antoine Brun to the king, 16 October 1646, AGS Estado 2348. 7 Fin de la Guerre des Pays-Bas, p. 6. 8 The emphasis on juridical form served to distinguish this mental reservation from the one alleged by Braganza for diminishing the validity of João iv’s swearing of loyalty to the Spanish Kings “pronunciou as palavras com a boca, mas com o animo protestoy, que não juraua” (num. 52). Scowling at Braganza’s justifications see Juan Caramuel de Lobkowitz, Respuesta al Manifiesto, p. 155. 4

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was an established order even in the breaking of oaths for the juridical system – national and international – to uphold. The peace could be signed by the Spanish Monarchy only as a way of postponing the war and avoiding further losses. Voices within the monarchy noted the impossibility of recovering the northern provinces of the United Provinces, but some nurtured hopes of recovering them once the expected internal conflicts within the Dutch Republic had materialized.9 In spite of claims that pointed to tacit reservations held by the Habsburgs over the United Provinces – or the Low Countries as a whole in the case of the Emperor10 – the Dutch pragmatist who laughed at the different princes’ claims over territories happened to be right. The Spanish side had three grounds on which to consider the peace treaty not to be binding, but the peace lasted nonetheless. The arguments of lawyers and canonists could do little against the force of events. But this should not lead us to dismiss the importance of the discourses in shaping the development of political events. Kevin Sharpe – and with him much of the self-styled revisionist historiography on the English Civil War – has to deal with the apparently contradictory results of his research, which offer a less confrontational view of English politics in the 1630s than is traditionally assumed, but cannot escape the truth of a conflict that erupted in 1642.11 Neither can this study escape the contradiction between the declared intention to breach the peace signed and the enduring of the agreement. It is nonetheless worth questioning what role the justifications here outlined would have played in the event that the military, financial and even dynastical situation of the Spanish Monarchy had evolved differently – if an able prince instead of the handicapped Charles ii had succeeded Philip iv. The sources analysed here do not offer an all-encompassing explana­ tion, and it was never anticipated that they would. The texts and documents cited throughout the previous pages do indeed show how political vocabularies and culture were shared by authors of different Similar hopes were nurtured shortly after the final recognition of Portuguese independence in 1668: Rafael Valladares, Felipe iv y la Restauración de Portugal, Málaga: Algazara, 1994, p. 180. 10 Johannes Arndt, Das Heilige Römische Reich und die Niederlande 1566 bis 1648 : Politisch-Konfessionelle Verflechtung und Publizistik im Achtzigjährigen Krieg, Cologne: Böhlau, 1998, p. 92. 11 See, pointing to this (apparent) contradiction, Kevin Sharpe, “Remapping Early Modern England: from Revisionism to the Culture of Politics,” in his Remapping Early Modern England. The Culture of Seventeenth-century Politics, Cambridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 3-37, pp. 10ff. 9

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works and by the political actors. Pervading their words – as expressed on the stage, through the press or in archival documents recording government meetings – appear similar and congruent conceptions of politics. The role to be fulfilled by rulers and the moral obligations which should inform political action were thus widely acknowledged and respected. The placing of the different sources on an equal footing illuminates different sides of a single entity, namely the political cultures in the United Provinces and in the Spanish Monarchy. Claims that these sources and methodological approach allow for the writing of a complete history cannot, however, be advanced. The control effected by government circles in the Monarchy over different forms of political expression – with censors and Inquisitors hard to fool – makes the leading voice heard much more loudly than the dissenters’. Recent studies of the ideas expounded during the Catalan revolt – although starting from different perspectives – show significant resemblances with the purportedly ‘Castilian’ political culture the Catalans were revolting against. It seems tempting to say that the success and failure of the Dutch, Portuguese and Catalan revolts depended, apart from on the varying success of military campaigns, on the successful appropriation or rejection of the traditional discourses on authority embodied by the Spanish Monarchy they all fought against. The shared political language and the difficulties in finding extensive common ground with the French mode of governance eased the return of the Catalan rebels to the Habsburgs’ dominion. Substituting one king with another who could appropriate the symbols and languages of Habsburg power probably contributed to the swift substitution of Philip’s by João’s government in Portugal. In the Dutch case, the lack of a study of royalist arguments during the first phase of the revolt comparable to Martin van Gelderen’s analysis of the rebels’ ideas makes it difficult to establish the principles which led to the success of the rebellion. The religious argument, the potential capacity of Reformed religion to provide arguments for legitimizing the reversal of the political system of the Seventeen Provinces of the Low Countries, does not fully account for the success of the revolt in some not particularly reformed provinces and its failure in others. The longenunciated social and economic explanations will remain the received interpretation, at least until more research is done on this point which for obvious chronological and thematic reasons fell well beyond the scope of the present study.

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It appears undeniable from the evidence put forward here that in the Dutch case the lack of tight censorship of the press in fact offered an opportunity to opposing opinions and views on politics to clash on equal terms in the more official political arena (the debates in the provincial assemblies and the States General) or in pamphlets. In all arenas the majority group of ‘middel men’ were those whose mobilization was sought through rhetoric – and even rhetorical excesses. The power of this ‘middle group’ should not be ignored, as they formed the backbone of the Dutch Republic and if persuaded to support one line of action, they could exert enormous influence on the regents, who were held resposible in a land “of such popular government.” In spite of this rhetorical division, common lines of argument and widely shared principles appear, and they seem to confirm the view of a Republic proud of its political system and firm in its foundations. By the 1640s, the dispute over the extent of provincial sovereignty and the relationship between religion and politics – which played an enormous role in the Arminian troubles in the 1610s – was basically over, as the pamphlets here studied show. Ironically, the prevailing opinion ended up being that defended by the losers in 1618, Oldenbarnevelt and Grotius, whose arguments were hotly defended by the pro-war party, regardless of the tendency for rhetorical purposes to equate defenders of peace and ‘Arminians’. When one considers only the pamphlets, Frederick Henry did not seem to challenge this state of affairs, in spite of the charges made against the Princes of Orange by some of their contemporaries, who accused the Oranges of attempting to subvert the Republican constitution. Nevertheless a different picture of Frederick Henry and his intentions emerges if we look both at his marriage politics and at the design of the decoration of his palace, however far-fetched the combination may have seemed to historians decades ago. But the combination of sources and their reading as expressions of political meaning also point to a shared acceptance of values which did indeed shape political actions, both in the international and in the domestic arena. Moral and ideological boundaries appear which, in spite of the possible negative consequences, those in government neither in the Dutch Republic nor in the Spanish Monarchy were ready to overstep. Freedom of conscience was one of those principles in the Dutch Republic, in spite of all the distrust of Catholics’ political loyalties. Equally indisputable was the defence of the Catholic faith for the Spanish Monarchy. The long disputes over two issues, Dutch sovereignty and tolerance of Catholics, which seemed either to have 247

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been settled before the negotiations actually started or pure pretence in view of the final results, demonstrate the extent to which certain matters beyond purely material interests guided the exercise of politics in both polities.

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278

Index

A

Afonso Henriquez, duke and later king of Portugal 77 Albada, Aggaeus 40 Albert of Austria, archduke 80, 164, 177, 178, 221 (n109), 223, 239 Alexander vi, Pope 46 Alfonso x, king of Castile 68, 111 Alfonso xi, king of Castile 114 Alva, Fernando Álvarez de Toledo duke of 86 (n89), 89, 216, 221 Amalia van Solms, wife of Frederick Henry of Orange 138, 158, 161 Anjou, Francis, duke of 136, 163 Anne of Austria, queen and regent of France 199 Antonio, prior of Crato 76, 77, 82, 83 Aquinas, Thomas 29, 36, 67, 68, 69, 71, 73, 100, 121, 215 Archilochis 67 Aristotle 67 (n1), 68, 191 Arredondo y Agüero, Diego de 46, 106 Aubery, Antoine 182 Augustine, st 68, 69, 70, 215 Augustine of Ancona 70 Avaux, Claude des Mesmes count of 65, 219 Ayala, Baltasar de 100 Aytona, Francisco de Moncada, marquis of 178

B

Baldus de Ubaldis 122 Baltasar Carlos, heir to the Spanish trone 115, 117 Bartolus of Sassoferrato 68 Becanus, Martin 80 Bellarmine, cardinal Robert 80, 190, 192 Berckel, Gerard van 141 Bergaigne, bishop of ’s-Hertogenbosch and archbishop of Cambrai, Joseph 62, 156 Bergh, count Henry van den 159 (n252), 178 Bláquez, Juan 84 Bodin, Jean 104, 119, 127, 157, 168, 182, 192 (n103) Boíl, Francisco 55, 56, 124 Boniface viii 70 Botero, Giovanni 84, 124 Brizuela, Iñigo de 223 Brun, Antoine 60, 62, 179, 244 Brutus, Marcus Junius 69 Bucer, Martin 36 Bugenhagen, Johannes 37

C

Cabrera, Guillén de 54, Cabrera de Córdoba, Luis 74, 77, 184, 185 Caesar, Julius 69

279

INDEX

Calderón de la Barca, Pedro 18, 72, 203 (n25 and n26) Calvin, John 36, 39 Campanella, Tommaso 93, 97, 98 Caramuel y Lobkowitz, Juan 21, 50, 52, 73, 75, 78, 79, 244 Cardona, duchess of 73 Carrillo Lasso de la Vega, Alonso 56, 106, 107, 115, 186 Castel-Rodrigo, Manuel de Moura marquis of 58 (n90), 59, 64, 157, 179 Castrillo, García de Haro y Avellaneda count of 188 Catherina de Medici 38 Catherine, duchess of Braganza 78, 82 Cecil, Robert earl of Salisbury 165 Charlemagne 87 Charles i, king of England 19 (n22), 28, 34, 42, 155, 156 Charles ii, king of Spain 245 Charles v, Holy Roman Emperor 93, 94, 164, 177, 199, 216, 242 Chigi, Fabio 218, 233 Chinchón, Luis Jerónimo Fernández de Cabrera y Bobadilla, count of 225 Cicero 68, 69, 72 (n18) Claris, Pau 21 Clement vii, Pope 244 Coornhert, Dirck Volckertsz. 216 Court, Pieter de 211 (n110)

D

Dante Alighieri, 29 Demophantos 69 Donith, Ricardo 47, 48 Dracon 69 Duarte de Braganza, brother of João iv 79

E

Elizabeth i, queen of England 81 Enríquez, Francisco 55, 214 Episcopius, Simon 210

F

Ferdinand of Austria, Cardinal-Infante,

64, 108, 120, 186 Ferdinand ii of Aragon, Catholic king 45, 46, 80 (n59), 82, 95, 184 Ferdinand ii, Holy Roman Emperor 57, 59, 91, 155 Ferdinand iii, Holy Roman Emperor 204, 241, 243 François i, king of France 239, 244 Frederick v, elector Palatine 35, 59, 156 Frederick Henry, prince of Orange and stadholder of the United Provinces 74, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 144, 150(n218), 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 160, 161, 171, 174, 180, 187, 198, 210, 219, 223, 224 (n125), 238, 239, 247 Frederick ii Hohenstaufen 80 (n59)

G

Galarreta, Francisco 156 Gattinara, Mercurino 94 Ginetti, Mario 58 Gracián, Baltasar 104, 107 Granvelle, Antoine Perrenot cardinal 89 Gratian 80 Gregory i, pope 68 Gretser, Jacob 80 Grotius, Hugo n 4, 34, 40, 72, 86, 183, 207 (n45), 209, 211 (n110), 247 Guéméné, Charles prince of 199 Gustav ii Adolf, king of Sweden 59, 80, 81, 153 (n228), 208 Gyges 68

H

Hein, Piet 169 Henry iii, king of France 70 Henry iv, king of France 38, 70, 81, 83 Hotman, Francis 38 Huerta, Diego Manuel de 99 Huss, Jan 100 (n154)

I

Innocent viii, Pope 203 Isabella i of Castille, Catholic queen 45, 46, 82, 95, 184 280

INDEX

Isabella, archduchess and governess of the Spanish Low Countries 80, 109 (n24), 164, 167, 169, 177, 178, 224, 239 Isidore of Seville 68, 107

J

James i, king of England 28, 34 (n4), 80, 81, 165, 190, 192 Jáuregui, Juan de 17, 77 João iv, duke of Braganza and king of Portugal 17 (n14), 42, 50, 56, 71, 76, 77, 78, 79, 82, 110, 204, 218 (n94), 244, 246 John Frederick i, elector of Saxony 37 Juan de Aviz, king of Portugal 77 Julius ii, Pope 80 (n59), 94, 191 (n101) Junius, Franciscus 39

K

Maria Teresa of Austria, daughter of Philip iv 179, 240 Márquez, Juan 126, 213, 215 (n86) Marsilius of Padua 69 Marti i Viladamor, Francisco 90 Mary Stuart, wife of William ii of Orange 137 (n163) Mary Tudor, queen of England 87 Mascarenhas, Jerónimo 21 Matthias of Austria, Archduke 185 Maurits, prince of Orange and stadholder of the United Provinces 136, 137 (n162), 139 (n171), 141, 151, 152, 153 (n228), 198 Mazarin, cardinal Jules 83, 84, 131, 179 Melo, Francisco de 79, 160, 172 Meteren, Emanuel van 42, 216 Molina, Luis de 199 Monzón, Francisco de 199 (n6)

Kesselaer, Johan 141, 167 Knuyt, Johan 150 (n218), 157, 158

N

L

O

Laínez, José 46, 47, 213 Leicester, Robert Dudley, earl of 136, 163 Lerma, Francisco Gómez de Sandoval y Rojas, duke of 223 (n115) Lipsius, Justus 216 Longueville, duke of 155 (n238) Lope de Vega, Félix 18, 71 López Madera, Gregorio 94 Lorraine, duke of 173, 187 Louis xii, king of France 80 (n59) Louis xiii, king of France n 25, 44, 58, 59, 83, 85, 90, 130, 155, 169, 201, 205, 210, 214 Louis xiv, king of France 94, 179, 205, 240 Louis, duke of Orleans 70

M

Machiavelli, Niccolò 40, 124, 127, 128, 168, 214 Mariana, Juan de 70, 107

Novoa, Matías de 50, Ockham, William of 69 Oldenbarnevelt, Johan van 41, 141, 164, 207 (n45), 209, 247 Olías y Mortara, Francisco Orozco marquis of 123 Olivares, Gaspar de Guzmán countduke of 17, 28, 47, 48, 49, 50, 53, 64, 76, 79, 89, 92, 112, 118 (n65), 121, 167, 168, 214, 223 Opiz, Martin 92

P

Palafox y Mendoza, Juan de 54, 63 Parra, Juan Adam de la 36, 50, 51, 52, 53, 56, 78, 79, 82, 118 (n65) Paul, apostle 33, 69, 128, 213 Pauw, Adriaen 98, 211 (n64) Pelayo, 106, 237 Pellicer de Ossau, José 17, 50, 53, 54, 55, 76, 77, 110 Peñaranda, Gaspar de Bracamonte y Guzmán count of 61, 62, 63, 64, 281

INDEX

84, 154, 155 (n238), 158, 179, 187, 194, 218, 233 Pérez de Guzmán, Gaspar Alfonso duke of Medina Sidonia 79 Philip i, landgrave of Hesse 37 Philip ii, king of Spain 34, 40, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 86, 87, 92, 109 (n24), 134, 163, 164, 185, 200 (n13), 214, 216, 217, 242 Philip iii, king of Spain n 20, 45, 108, 121, 165, 166, 187, 200, 223 (n115) Philip iv, king of Spain 11, 13, 17, 28, 29, 30, 36, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 55, 61, 62, 63, 64, 73, 74, 76, 78, 79, 81, 84, 90, 91, 104, 105, 108, 109, 112, 113, 115, 116, 119, 120, 121, 123, 124, 130, 131, 140, 142, 154, 156, 159, 160, 167, 168, 170, 171, 173, 176, 182 (n72), 185, 187, 188, 189, 196 (n118), 200, 203, 205, 214, 224, 232, 235, 240, 241, 243, 244, 245 Quevedo y Villegas, Francisco de 17, 49, 50, 54, 55, 69, 77, 191 (n101) Reede, Godard van 150 (n220), 231 (n155) Richard ii, king of England 70 Richelieu, cardinal Armand Jean du Plessis de 58, 83, 84, 131, 201 Rioja, Francisco de 16, 53, 55 Roose, Pieter 214 Ros, Alejandro 54, 56, 85 Roy, Philippe le 195 (n116 and 117)

S

Saavedra Fajardo, Diego 17, 46, 54, 56, 57, 59, 65, 74, 75, 107, 115, 117, 123, 184 Sala i Berart, Gaspar 21, 53, 90 Sebastian i, king of Portugal 76 Seneca 69 Servient, Abel 150 (n218), 220 (n102) Shakespeare, William 69 Slachmulder, Daniel 141 Socrates 68

Solon 68, 69 Soto, Domingo de 94, 237 Sotomayor, Antonio de 53 Sousa Coutinho, Francisco de 218 (n94), 229 (n146) Spinola, Ambrogio 159 (n252), 168 (n22), 169 Suárez, Francisco 71, 74, 80, 110, 111, 126, 189, 190, 192, 194

T

Teellinck, Maximiliaan 219 Teellinck, Willem 21 Teller, Henri 64 Terranova, Diego de Aragón duke of 204, 243 Teylingen, Augustijn van 73

U

Urban viii, Pope 57, 58, 145, 203, 204 Usselincx, Willem 207 Uyttenbogaert, Johannes 21, 144, 193 (n104), 218

V

Vázquez de Menchaca, Fernando 86, 94, 184, 190 (n98) Vio, Tommaso de 83 (n69) Vitoria, Francisco de 78, 190 (n97) Voetius, Gisbert 223, 231 (n155) Vondel, Joost van den 207 (n45) Vranck, Francois 40

W

William i, prince of Orange and stadholder of the United Provinces 70, 75, 92, 135, 136, 217 William ii, prince of Orange and stadholder of the United Provinces 137, 150 (n222), 153, 158 (n249), 161, 198, 205, 239 Wolfath, Antoine 57

Z

Zúñiga, Baltasar de 166

282

Avisos de Flandes Director Werner Thomas

Monografías 1 Werner Thomas & Bart De Groof (eds.), Rebelión y Resistencia en el Mundo Hispánico del Siglo xvii. Actas del Coloquio Internacional Lovaina, 20-23 de noviembre de 1991, 1992 ISBN 978 90 6186 501 8 2 De Belgen en Mexico. Negen bijdragen over de geschiedenis van de betrekkingen tussen België en Mexico, 1993 ISBN 978 90 6186 576 6 3 Les Belges et le Mexique. Dix contributions à l’histoire des relations BelgiqueMexique, 1993 ISBN 978 90 6186 580 3 4 Miguel Ángel Echevarría Bacigalupe, Alberto Struzzi, un precursor barroco del capitalismo liberal, 1995 ISBN 978 90 6186 670 1 5 Bernardo José García García, La Pax Hispanica. Política exterior del Duque de Lerma, 1996 ISBN 978 90 6186 766 1 6 Werner Thomas & Robert A. Verdonk (eds.), Encuentros en Flandes. Relaciones e intercambios hispanoflamencos a inicios de la Edad Moderna, 2000 ISBN 978 90 5867 087 8 7 Rafael Valladares, Castilla y Portugal en Asia (1580-1680). Declive imperial y adaptación, 2001 ISBN 978 90 5867 130 1 8 Bruno Feitler, Inquisition, juifs et nouveaux-chrétiens au Brésil. Le Nordeste. xviie et xviiie siècles, 2003 ISBN 978 90 5867 263 6 9 Paul Arblaster, Antwerp and the World. Richard Verstegan and the International Culture of Catholic Reformation, 2004 ISBN 978 90 5867 347 3

10 Alicia Esteban Estríngana, Madrid y Bruselas. Relaciones de gobierno en la etapa postarchiducal (1621-1635), 2005 ISBN 978 90 5867 436 4 11 Alain Servantie & Ramón Puig de la Bellacasa (eds.), L’empire ottoman dans l’Europe de la Renaissance - El imperio Otomano en la Europa renacentisca. Ideas e imaginarios de intelectuales, diplomáticos y opinión pública del siglo xv, xvi y principios del siglo xvii en los antiguos Países Bajos y el Mundo Hispánico, 2005 ISBN 978 90 5867 463 0 12 Eddy Stols, Werner Thomas, Johan Verberckmoes (eds.), Naturalia, Mirabilia & Monstrosa en los Imperios Ibéricos, 2007 ISBN 978 90 5867 556 9

Fuentes 1 Lieve Behiels & Kathleen Kish (eds.), Celestina. An annotated edition of the first Dutch translation (Antwerp, 1550), 2005 ISBN 978 90 5867 423 4

Supplementa 1 Bart De Groof, Patricio Geli, Eddy Stols & Guy Van Beeck (eds), En los deltas de la memoria. Bélgica y Argentina en los siglos xix y xx, 1998 ISBN 978 90 6186 860 6 2 Werner Thomas, La represión del protestantismo en España, 1517-1648, 2001 ISBN 978 90 5867 106 6 3 Werner Thomas, Los protestantes y la Inquisición en España en tiempos de Reforma y Contrarreforma, 2001 ISBN 978 90 5867 107 3

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