Close Ties in European Local Governance: Linking Local State and Society [1st ed.] 9783030447939, 9783030447946

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xxix
Interactions of Societal Actors and Local Government in Institutionalized Governance Arrangements: The Book’s Scope and Content (Filipe Teles, Adam Gendźwiłł, Cristina Stănuş, Hubert Heinelt)....Pages 1-12
Diversity in Local State-Society Relations: A Typology to Grasp Differences in Institutional Networks (Filipe Teles)....Pages 13-30
How to Measure the Autonomy, Coherence and Relevance of Local State-Society Relations (Björn Egner, Hubert Heinelt, Detlef Sack)....Pages 31-38
Local State-Society Relations in Austria (Werner Pleschberger)....Pages 39-53
Local State–Society Relations in Flanders (Belgium) (Koenraad De Ceuninck, Tom Verhelst)....Pages 55-72
Local State–Society Relations in Croatia (Ivan Koprić, Dubravka Jurlina Alibegović, Romea Manojlović Toman, Dario Čepo, Sunčana Slijepčević)....Pages 73-89
Local State-Society Relations in the Czech Republic (Jakub Lysek, Dan Ryšavý)....Pages 91-104
Local State-Society Relations in England (Alistair Jones, Colin Copus)....Pages 105-115
Local State-Society Relations in Finland (Linnéa Henriksson)....Pages 117-131
Local State-Society Relations in France (Deborah Galimberti)....Pages 133-148
Local State-Society Relations in Germany (Björn Egner, Hubert Heinelt, Detlef Sack)....Pages 149-164
Local State-Society Relations in Greece (Panagiotis Getimis)....Pages 165-180
Local State–Society Relations in Iceland (Grétar Þór Eyþórsson, Eva Marín Hlynsdóttir)....Pages 181-193
Local State-Society Relations in Ireland (Paula Russell)....Pages 195-213
Local State-Society Relations in Italy (Annick Magnier, Marcello Cabria)....Pages 215-230
Local State-Society Relations in Latvia (Iveta Reinholde, Inese Āboliņa, Malvine Stučka)....Pages 231-242
Local State-Society Relations in Lithuania (Jurga Bučaitė-Vilkė, Aistė Lazauskienė)....Pages 243-257
Local State-Society Relations in the Netherlands (Hans Vollaard)....Pages 259-274
Local State-Society Relations in Norway (Karin Fossheim)....Pages 275-288
Local State–Society Relations in Poland (Adam Gendźwiłł, Joanna Krukowska, Paweł Swianiewicz)....Pages 289-302
Local State-Society Relations in Portugal (Luís Mota, Patrícia Silva, Filipe Teles)....Pages 303-318
Local State-Society Relations in Romania (Cristina Stănuș, Daniel Pop)....Pages 319-335
Local State-Society Relations in Spain (Carmen Navarro, Lluis Medir)....Pages 337-351
Local State-Society Relations in Sweden (Anders Lidström, David Feltenius)....Pages 353-366
Local State-Society Relations in Switzerland (Oliver Dlabac)....Pages 367-377
Local State-Society Relations in European Countries: Main Findings (Hubert Heinelt, Filipe Teles, Adam Gendźwiłł, Cristina Stănuş)....Pages 379-422
Back Matter ....Pages 423-427

Citation preview

PALGRAVE STUDIES IN SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE

Close Ties in European Local Governance Linking Local State and Society Edited by Filipe Teles Adam Gendźwiłł Cristina Stănuș Hubert Heinelt

Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance Series Editors Linze Schaap Tilburg University Tilburg, The Netherlands Jochen Franzke University of Potsdam Potsdam, Germany Hanna Vakkala University of Lapland Rovaniemi, Finland Filipe Teles University of Aveiro Aveiro, Portugal

This series explores the formal organisation of sub-national government and democracy on the one hand, and the necessities and practices of regions and cities on the other hand. In monographs, edited volumes and Palgrave Pivots, the series will consider the future of territorial governance and of territory-based democracy; the impact of hybrid forms of territorial government and functional governance on the traditional institutions of government and representative democracy and on public values; what improvements are possible and effective in local and regional democracy; and, what framework conditions can be developed to encourage minority groups to participate in urban decision-making. Books in the series will also examine ways of governance, from ‘network governance’ to ‘triple helix governance’, from ‘quadruple’ governance to the potential of ‘multiple helix’ governance. The series will also focus on societal issues, for instance global warming and sustainability, energy transition, economic growth, labour market, urban and regional development, immigration and integration, and transport, as well as on adaptation and learning in sub-national government. The series favours comparative studies, and especially volumes that compare international trends, themes, and developments, preferably with an interdisciplinary angle. Country-by-country comparisons may also be included in this series, provided that they contain solid comparative analyses. More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/15960

Filipe Teles  •  Adam Gendźwiłł Cristina Stănuș • Hubert Heinelt Editors

Close Ties in European Local Governance Linking Local State and Society

Editors Filipe Teles Research Unit on Governance Competitiveness and Public Policies Department of Social, Political and Territorial Sciences University of Aveiro Aveiro, Portugal Cristina Stănuș Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu Sibiu, Romania

Adam Gendźwiłł Department of Local Development and Policy Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies University of Warsaw Warsaw, Poland Hubert Heinelt Institute of Political Science Technische Universität Darmstadt Darmstadt, Germany

ISSN 2523-8248     ISSN 2523-8256 (electronic) Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance ISBN 978-3-030-44793-9    ISBN 978-3-030-44794-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44794-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Dmitry Merkushin / Alamy Stock Vector This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

Why Did We Publish This Book? We intend to deliver a readable and informative book, particularly useful for those interested in local governance and in the role of institutionalized networks between societal actors and local government. This book’s originalities lie in the comparability it allows and in the comprehensive information it provides about these networks, which—despite their relevance—have been less discussed. It should be made clear, just at the beginning of this book, that it presents just results of a first step of a broader research project1 and that these results will form the basis for a much more ambitious undertaking— namely a survey of actors involved in networks representing local state-­ society relations in the countries from which project partners are involved. As not all kinds of local state-society relations in these countries can be covered by the planned survey, criteria for selecting some for each country (between three and five per country) have to be defined. In the planned survey the respondents will be recruited only from the networks described in the country chapters of this book. The first criterion for the selection of networks was (as already mentioned) that they are institutionalized. The institutionalization can be done either by law (of upper levels of government) or by contract of the involved partners.2 Furthermore, the focus should be put on the networks which are of representative types: either characterizing local state-society relations in a country by a particular form or representing features which also other (similar) networks have.

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Finally, networks of local state-society relations have to be characterized. This is not only crucial for this book to reflect on the patterns to be found among the networks along or across countries and policy domains. More importantly, characteristics of the networks have to be made clear from which participants will be included in the survey. Such characteristics are set out by a typology presented in Chap. 2 and are operationalized in Chap. 3.3 The identification of different types of networks in the countries included in the study will allow a robust comparison and analysis. Such comparative reflections of the findings presented in the country chapters will be offered in the concluding chapter. The comparative reflections deal with a number of questions. Obvious questions are (a) whether or not patterns of the identified types of networks can be detected, (b) whether or not these patterns are country-specific or policy-specific, and if countryspecific patterns can be detached and (c) explained by the typology of “national infrastructures” for local governance arrangements developed by Sellers et  al. (2020; see also Sellers and Kwak 2011 and Sellers and Lidström 2014). Furthermore, there is the question why there are differences among countries also in networks which are substantially structured by EU legislation—like the Local Action Groups (LAGs)4 of the LEADER5 funding scheme.

The Origin of the Book This book originates from the work of a group of scholars organized into the standing groups on Local Government and Politics (LOGOPOL) of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) or the European Urban Research Association (EURA). This group has carried out surveys since more than 20 years on actors performing different roles within local government.6 The main aim of these surveys has been to shed light on issues that cannot be specified either by comparative analysis of the institutional set-up of local government or by comparative case studies on individual cities in different countries—that is, issues like problem perceptions or attitudes toward the administrative reforms of mayors, councilors, or high-ranking appointed employees as well as their values, policy priorities, behavior, role definition, perception of self-influence, and role behavior, including leadership style. Furthermore, little comparative information was available at the

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time on the social profile of these actors. The same applies to their notion of democracy and whether and how it differs among countries, how differences in their notions of democracy can be explained, and whether different notions of democracy matter for instance with respect to role definition and role behavior or attitudes toward administrative reforms. Moreover, no information was available to determine whether problem perceptions and notions of democracy (a) differ among mayors, councilors, or high-ranking appointed employees as well as (b) among councilors from different levels of local government (i.e. municipalities and the so-­ called second tier of local government, like counties, provinces, and départements), and (c) whether they have changed over time. The interest in these topics has been naturally extended to cover the non-state actors involved in institutionalized networks of local state—society relations, which are the subject of this project. The composition of the academic network and the themes that it addresses correspond to the current mixed configuration of “urban political science,” namely the convergence among different approaches in political science and sociology, as more or less explicitly illustrated in many of the international assessments of the state of the art (e.g. Mossberger et al. 2012; Loughlin et al. 2010). Several workshops were organized for the current study on local state-­ society relations. The first one took place in Bensheim (Germany) from 24th to 26 November 2017 to reflect conceptually on the interaction between municipalities and societal actors and to consider if and how a survey related to the actors involved in these interactions could be carried out. A second workshop took place on the Greek island of Hydra between 10 and 13 May 2018. This workshop was focused on the planning of the theoretical chapters as well as country chapters of this book. Furthermore, the participants initiated the development of a questionnaire which will be sent to actors involved in selected local state-society network. Both drafts of book chapters and a draft of the questionnaire were discussed at a third workshop, which took place in Aveiro (Portugal) on 6 and 7 March 2019. A fourth workshop took place in Kaunas (Lithuania), on 14 and 15 November 2019, where the questionnaire for the survey was agreed among the involved partners. The organization of these workshops and, consequently, the development of this book were partially supported by a small grant of the European Urban Research Association.

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This volume is clearly a collective effort of a longstanding group of scholars whose most recent contribution to this field of knowledge is reflected in the following pages. The editors would also like to acknowledge the significant number of other academics who voluntarily agreed to follow this endeavor, namely through their helpful and valuable comments, suggestions, and blind review of every chapter of this book. Aveiro, Portugal Warsaw, Poland  Sibiu, Romania  Darmstadt, Germany 

Filipe Teles Adam Gendźwiłł Cristina Stănuş Hubert Heinelt

Notes 1. This research project receives no direct funding. Instead, the involved partners mobilize and bring in own resources for the studies presented in this book and for the planned survey. In those cases where there is/was individual/national funding for developing research, it is acknowledged in the respective chapter. 2. Without going further, we like to emphasize that we proceed from new-­ institutionalist approaches that are not just looking at “organisation fields” (created by law or contracts) but also at “meaning systems” and the complementarities between the two (see Scott 1994: 57 ff. and 70–71). It is left to the project partners to follow one of the different new-institutionalisms (see Hall and Taylor 1996 as well as Schmidt 2010). 3. It must be emphasized that these characteristics are generalizations referring to the country as a whole. This means that there can be local differences. These differences (and their extent) can only be determined by the planned survey. 4. More details about LAGs will be presented in various country chapters of this book (see particularly the chapter on Spain). 5. The acronym corresponds to Liaisons Entre Activités de Developpement de l’Economie Rural, that is, linking activities of rural economy development. 6. An overview about these surveys, their core questions and main findings, as well as the publications which resulted out of them is given in Heinelt and Magnier 2018 and Heinelt et al. 2018: 2–4.

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References Hall, P.  A., & Taylor, R.  C. R. (1996). Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. Political Studies, 44(5), 936–957. Heinelt, H., & Magnier, A. (2018). Analysing Governance Through Local Leaders’ Perceptions: Comparative Surveys, Academic Networks, and Main Results. Revista Española de Ciencia Política, 46(1), 157–172. Heinelt, H., Magnier, A, Cabria, M, & Reynaert, H. (2018). Introduction. In H.  Heinelt, A.  Magnier, M.  Cabria, & H.  Reynaert (Eds.), Political Leaders and Changing Local Democracy: The European Mayor (pp. 1–17). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Loughlin, J., Hendriks, F., & Lidström, A (Eds.). (2012). The Oxford Handbook of Local and Regional Democracy in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mossberger, K., Clarke, S. E., & John, P. (2012). Studying Politics in an Urban World: Research Traditions and New Directions. In K. Mossberger, S. E. Clarke, & P. John (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Urban Politics (pp. 2–8). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schmidt, V.A. (2010). Taking Ideas and Discourse Seriously: Explaining Change through Discursive Institutionalism as the Fourth ‘New Institutionalism’. European Political Science Review, 2(1), 1–25. Scott, R.  W. (1994). Institutions and Organizations: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis. In R. W. Scott & J. W. Meyer (Eds.), Institutional Environment and Organizations. Structural Complexity and Individualism (pp.  55–80). Thousand Oaks, London, and New Delhi: Sage. Sellers, J.  M., & Kwak, S.-Y. (2011). State and Society in Local Governance: Lessons from a Multilevel Comparison. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 35(3), 620–643. Sellers, J. M., & Lidström, A. (2014). Multilevel Democracy, Societal Organization and the Development of the Modern State. Paper Prepared for Presentation at the 23 Nordic Local Government Conference, Odense 27–29 November 2014. Sellers, J., Lidström, A., & Bae, Y. (2020). Multilevel Democracy: How Local Institutions and Civil Society Shape the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Praise for Close Ties in European Local Governance “This edited volume on local state-society relations is the result of an ambitious comparative research project. In focus for the book are intermediate structures between local authorities and actors and stakeholders in the local community in European countries. The country chapters are structured according to a theoretical framework developed by the authors that leads to a typology for describing the structures sampled for each country according to the autonomy, cohesion and effectiveness of the networks and institutions. This book is recommended for students and scholars in governance and local government studies.” —Henry Bäck, Emeritus Professor of Public Administration, Gothenburg University, Sweden “A book on local state-society relations fills a most important gap in the literature on, and understanding of local politics and policy-making. The systematic and comparative approach, and the scope of the book (22 European countries) means that theory-building in the field may proceed on much firmer ground than before since previous contributions have often been case studies or single-country studies. The typology of municipal-­society relations that guide the country studies included in this book will remain a benchmark in the field in the years to come.” —Harald Baldersheim, Professor Emeritus in Political Science, University of Oslo, Norway “This book is about analyzing, measuring, explaining local state-society networks in more than 20 European countries from Austria to Britain, Greece or Poland. This books goes convincingly beyond national typologies to emphasise the role of agency and innovation in particular policy sectors. A major contribution to grasp the local governance of Europe.” —Patrick Le Galès, CNRS Research Professor of Sociology and Politics, Science Po, Paris, France

Contents

1 Interactions of Societal Actors and Local Government in Institutionalized Governance Arrangements: The Book’s Scope and Content  1 Filipe Teles, Adam Gendźwiłł, Cristina Stănuş, and Hubert Heinelt 2 Diversity in Local State-Society Relations: A Typology to Grasp Differences in Institutional Networks 13 Filipe Teles 3 How to Measure the Autonomy, Coherence and Relevance of Local State-Society Relations 31 Björn Egner, Hubert Heinelt, and Detlef Sack 4 Local State-Society Relations in Austria 39 Werner Pleschberger 5 Local State–Society Relations in Flanders (Belgium) 55 Koenraad De Ceuninck and Tom Verhelst 6 Local State–Society Relations in Croatia 73 Ivan Koprić, Dubravka Jurlina Alibegović, Romea Manojlović Toman, Dario Čepo, and Sunčana Slijepčević xiii

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7 Local State-Society Relations in the Czech Republic 91 Jakub Lysek and Dan Ryšavý 8 Local State-Society Relations in England105 Alistair Jones and Colin Copus 9 Local State-Society Relations in Finland117 Linnéa Henriksson 10 Local State-Society Relations in France133 Deborah Galimberti 11 Local State-Society Relations in Germany149 Björn Egner, Hubert Heinelt, and Detlef Sack 12 Local State-Society Relations in Greece165 Panagiotis Getimis 13 Local State–Society Relations in Iceland181 Grétar Þór Eyþórsson and Eva Marín Hlynsdóttir 14 Local State-Society Relations in Ireland195 Paula Russell 15 Local State-Society Relations in Italy215 Annick Magnier and Marcello Cabria 16 Local State-Society Relations in Latvia231 Iveta Reinholde, Inese Ā boliņa, and Malvine Stučka 17 Local State-Society Relations in Lithuania243 Jurga Bučaitė-Vilkė and Aistė Lazauskienė 18 Local State-Society Relations in the Netherlands259 Hans Vollaard

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19 Local State-Society Relations in Norway275 Karin Fossheim 20 Local State–Society Relations in Poland289 Adam Gendźwiłł, Joanna Krukowska, and Paweł Swianiewicz 21 Local State-Society Relations in Portugal303 Luís Mota, Patrícia Silva, and Filipe Teles 22 Local State-Society Relations in Romania319 Cristina Stănuș and Daniel Pop 23 Local State-Society Relations in Spain337 Carmen Navarro and Lluis Medir 24 Local State-Society Relations in Sweden353 Anders Lidström and David Feltenius 25 Local State-Society Relations in Switzerland367 Oliver Dlabac 26 Local State-Society Relations in European Countries: Main Findings379 Hubert Heinelt, Filipe Teles, Adam Gendźwiłł, and Cristina Stănuş Index423

Notes on Contributors

Inese Ā boliņ a  is Deputy Executive Director and a lecturer of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Latvia, Latvia. She received her Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Latvia. Her Ph.D. thesis focused on public administration aspect of presidential vetoes and leadership in decision-making within the political governance in Latvia. Her research interests include political leadership, decision-­making, governance, network governance, and the formation of democracy. Dubravka Jurlina Alibegović  is a senior research fellow and the Head of the Department for Regional Economics at the Institute of Economics, Zagreb, Croatia. Her main research topics are local public finance, fiscal decentralization, intergovernmental fiscal relations, and local development. Jurga  Bučaitė-Vilkė is an associate professor in the Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences, Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania. Her research focuses on participatory democracy, local governance, and local social welfare policies. She has been involved in several research projects on local governance, community participation, and territorial welfare policies. She also works as an external expert for the Research Council of Lithuania. Marcello  Cabria  is a Ph.D. candidate in a joint program between the University of Florence, Department of Social and Political Sciences, and the University of Turin, Department of Cultures, Politics and Society, Italy. His research interests are currently focused on local development.

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Dario Č epo  is an assistant professor at the Chair of Sociology, Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb, Croatia. His main research interests are legislative institutions, the European Union, and conservative social movements. Koenraad  De Ceuninck  is Assistant Professor of Local Politics at the Centre for Local Politics, Ghent University, Belgium. His main research areas are scale and local government, reforms of local government, municipal amalgamations, and inter-municipal cooperation. Colin  Copus  is Emeritus Professor of Local Politics at De Montfort University, UK, and a visiting professor at Ghent University, Belgium. His main research interests are local party politics, the constitutional status of local government, and the developing role of the councilor. He has extensive experience as an academic advisor to government and policy bodies: Communities and local Government Committee of the House of Commons on the role of the councilor, All Party Parliamentary Group for District Councils, All Party Parliamentary Group on Local Democracy, Chair of the Local Government Association, National Association of Local Councils, Committee on Standards in Public Life Inquiry into Standards in Local Government, Council of Europe, Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, Localis (not-for-profit, neo-localist think-tank), Association of Democratic Service Officers, and Political and Constitutional Reform Committee of the House of Commons. Oliver Dlabac  is a senior researcher at the Centre for Democracy Studies Aarau, University of Zurich, Switzerland. He leads the research group on local democracy and teaches on decentralization. He is interested in  local and regional democracy in Switzerland and in comparative perspective, including issues of laymen organization, administrative reforms, urban planning, housing policy, school governance, metropolitan governance, and state rescaling. Björn Egner  is an adjunct professor at the Institute of Political Science, Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany. He chairs the research group “Methodology and Philosophy of Science” at the institute. His research interests include local politics, quantitative methodology, and policy analysis, especially housing policy and fiscal policy.

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Grétar Þór Eyþórsson  is Professor of Government and Methodology at the University of Akureyri, Iceland (2008). He was Director of the University of Akureyri Research Institute and the Icelandic Institute for Regional Policy Research (2001–2005), Director of Bifröst University Research Centre (2005–2008), and a professor at Bifröst University (2005–2008). His research has, for long, been local government and politics—especially territorial reforms. Further, he has done research related to regional and rural development and politics. He was a board member of Nordregio (Nordic and European research center for regional development and planning) in 2002–2007 and is since 2009 the contact point (ECP) for Iceland in ESPON (European Territorial Observatory Network). David Feltenius  is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science, Umeå University, Sweden. In addition to studies of civil society, his research focuses on marketization and the welfare state, central-local government relations, and territorial politics. Recent publications include an article on civil society and marketization in the Journal of Civil Society (with Jessika Wide, Vol. 15, 2019, No. 3), as well as a chapter on subnational government in a multilevel perspective in the Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics (ed. Jon Pierre). He is working on a research project focusing on public providers of elderly care in a marketized welfare state, financed by the Swedish Research Council for Health, Working Life and Welfare (FORTE). Karin  Fossheim is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Norway. She is also a research political scientist at the Norwegian Institute of Transport Economics (TØI). Her research includes local government, governance networks, urban development, democratic governance, and political representation. Deborah Galimberti  holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and in European Urban and Local Studies. She has been teaching and researching in France for ten years before joining the Department of Political and Social Science at the University of Florence, Italy, as Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow in 2018. Her research interests include comparative territorial politics and policies in Europe, local development and governance, as well as more broadly political economy and sociology.

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Adam  Gendźwiłł is Assistant Professor of Political Sociology in the Department of Local Development and Policy at the University of Warsaw, Poland. His research interests comprise local politics, electoral studies, and party politics. He is also interested in research design and methodology of social research. Panagiotis Getimis  was Professor of Urban and Regional Policies in the Department of Economics and Regional Development at the Panteion University of Political and Social Sciences, Greece. His research focuses on local government studies, local and regional development, metropolitan governance, and spatial planning. Hubert Heinelt  is Professor of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Urban Research at the Institute of Political Science, Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany. Between 2010 and 2013 he was the president of the European Urban Research Association (EURA). His research covers various policies (particularly labor market, environment, climate policy) in multilevel systems. Furthermore, he is interested in how the shift from government to governance can be turned into a participatory form meeting standards of democratic self-determination. Linnéa  Henriksson is a university teacher in the Department of Public Administration at Åbo Akademi University, Finland. She is interested in local politics and local politicians, roles and representation, municipal service production and privatization thereof, and implementing bilingual administration. She is the chair of NORKOM (Nordiska Kommunforskningsföreningen, the Nordic Municipal Research Association). Eva  Marín  Hlynsdóttir is Associate Professor of Public Policy and Governance at the University of Iceland, Iceland. In her research she has focused on local government and public administration from a broad perspective including issues such as local leadership and horizontal power relations at the local level as well as central-local relations. Alistair Jones  is Associate Professor of Politics and a university teacher fellow at De Montfort University, UK. His main research interests are on parish councils in England, and on Britain’s relationship with the EU. Jones has written several textbooks, including Britain and the European Union (2007) and Contemporary British Politics and Government (2002). He is frequently in the local, national, and international media commenting on a range of issues in relation to British politics.

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Ivan Koprić  is Professor of Administrative Science and Local Governance at the Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb; president of the Institute of Public Administration in Zagreb, Croatia; and the editor-in-chief of Croatian and Comparative Public Administration. His current work is focused on administrative reforms at the central and local levels and their evaluation, European Administrative Space in multilevel context, and improving local democracy. Joanna Krukowska  is an assistant professor in the Department of Local Development and Policy, Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies, University of Warsaw, Poland. Her research interests are in  local and regional policies. She particularly focuses on development policies, urban management, and political leadership. Aistė Lazauskienė  is an associate professor in the Department of Public Administration, Faculty of Political Science and Diplomacy, Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania. She is an ordinary member of the Group of Independent Experts at the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities at the Council of Europe. Her focus in research is currently on local politics and Lithuanian local government reforms. Anders Lidström  is Professor of Political Science in the Department of Political Science at Umeå University, Sweden. He specializes in  local, regional, and urban democracy and governance, and he was the convener of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) standing group on local government and politics 2010–2016. Recent publications include Multilevel Democracy: How Local Institutions and Civil Society Shape the Modern State (with Jefferey Sellers and Yooil Bae), 2020, and a special issue of the Journal of Urban Affairs on ‘The Citizens in City-­ Regions’ (No 1, 2018, edited with Linze Schaap). Jakub  Lysek is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the Palacký University Olomouc, Czech Republic. His research focuses on voting behavior, elections, local governance, and quantitative methods in social sciences. His work has been published in journals such as Electoral Studies, Government and Opposition, and Lex localis— Journal of Local Self-Government. Annick Magnier  holds the Jean Monnet Chair “The City in European Integration” in the Department of Political and Social Science, University of Florence, Italy. As an urban sociologist, her research activity has been

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mainly dedicated to comparative analyses of local leadership and their recruitment and values. Her focus in research is currently on local spatial policies and planning systems. Lluis  Medir is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Barcelona, Spain. He belongs to the research group on local government at the same university (www.ub.edu/grel), and his research interests include local government, intergovernmental relations, and public policies at the local level. Luís  Mota is invited assistant professor at the University of Aveiro, Portugal, and a researcher at its Research Unit on Governance, Competitiveness and Public Policies (GOVCOPP-UA). He holds a Ph.D. in Public Administration and his research interests are public governance reforms, network governance, policy process, and local governance. He is developing a post-doctoral project on Local Governance Modernization, financed by the Foundation for Science and Technology (SFRH/BPD/115117/2016). Carmen Navarro  is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Universidad Autonoma de Madrid, Spain, where she teaches public policy and local government undergraduate and graduate courses. Her research interests are local democracy, local public policies, local government institutions, and local political leadership. Werner Pleschberger  has been an associate professor at BOKU University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences, Vienna, from 1999 to 2015. His main research interests concern local politics, and he has been a three-­ times titleholder of a European module grant funded from the Jean Monnet Action of EU. He is working as an independent consultant (non-­ research work) for companies and political organizations. Daniel Pop  is based at the Ethnocultural Diversity Resource Center in Cluj, from where he leads the Education Support Programmes of the Open Society Foundations. There, he leads policy research initiatives and efforts to build networks of commitment and strengthen new forms of civic activism. Iveta Reinholde  is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Latvia, Latvia. Her main interests are administrative reform at local and national levels. Her focus in research is currently on urban governance and multilevel governance. She is a member of the Group of Independent Experts at the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities at the Council of Europe.

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Paula Russell  is an assistant professor and Director of Graduate Studies in the School of Architecture, Planning and Environmental Policy, University College Dublin, Ireland. Her main area of research relates to the role of civil society in the planning process, looking at issues of engagement and influence. She is a member of the governing board of the European Urban Research Association (EURA) and is an associate editor of the journal Urban Research and Practice. Dan  Ryšavý  is an assistant professor in the Department of Sociology, Andragogy and Cultural Anthropology, Faculty of Arts, Palacký University Olomouc, the Czech Republic. As a sociologist, his main research interests concern to local and subnational governments, their political representatives and currently to local government responses to urban housing affordability crisis. Detlef  Sack is Professor of Comparative Politics at the Faculty of Sociology, University of Bielefeld, Germany. He is interested in public policy and governance. His research covers various policies (particularly economic, regional, transport, energy policy as well as home and justice affairs) and interest associations (in particular Chambers of Commerce, Organized Business). He is interested in institutional change and comparative policy analysis. Patrícia Silva  holds a Ph.D. in Political Sciences. She is a researcher at the Governance, Competitiveness and Public Policies Research Centre, the University of Aveiro, Portugal, and was granted a Scientific Employment Stimulus Contract by the Foundation for Science and Technology (grant number CEECIND/04550/2017). Her main research interests are political parties, the politicization of the recruitment of appointed elites, territorial governance, and local public-­sector reform. Her research has been published in international journals—with the most recent articles published in Public Administration and the International Review of Administrative Sciences—and chapters of books by national and international publishers. Sunčana Slijepčević  is a senior research associate in the Department for Regional Economics at the Institute of Economics, Zagreb, Croatia. Her main research topics are economics of public sector and local ­development, with specific focus on financial issues, efficiency, productivity, and competition.

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Cristina Stănuș  is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Romania, where she teaches courses on governance, policy analysis, and research methodology. Her research interests focus on the study of Romanian local government and politics in a comparative context and the governance of public service delivery. She is a member of the Governing Board of the European Urban Research Association. Malvine Stucˇka  is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Latvia, Latvia. Her research is centered on political leadership in  local governments. She has received both Bachelor’s and Master’s degree in Political Science with a public administration focus. In addition, she has experience in analyzing policies introduced in  local governments. Paweł Swianiewicz  is Professor of Economics at University of Warsaw, Poland, and leads the Department of Local Development and Policy at the Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies. Between 2005 and 2010 he was the president of the European Urban Research Association (EURA). His teaching and research focus on local politics, local government finance, and territorial organization. Most of his empirical research focuses on Poland, but also on comparative studies of decentralization in Central and Eastern Europe. Filipe Teles  holds a Ph.D. in Political Sciences and teaches courses in the field of comparative local governance. He is acting as Pro-rector for Regional Development and Urban Policies at the University of Aveiro, Portugal. He is a member of the Research Unit on Governance, Competitiveness and Public Policy (GOVCOPP), where he has developed research work on governance and local administration, territorial reforms, and political leadership. He is a member of the Governing Board of the European Urban Research Association (EURA) and of the Steering Committee of the standing group on Local Government and Politics of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR). Romea  Manojlović  Toman is an assistant professor at the Chair of Administrative Science, Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb, Croatia. Her research interests are public management, human resources management, and citizens’ participation.

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Tom  Verhelst  is Assistant Professor of Local Politics at the Centre for Local Politics, Ghent University, Belgium, and a postdoctoral research fellow at the Department of Political Science, Maastricht University, the Netherlands. His research focuses on the Europeanization of local government (with a particular interest for the regulatory mobilization of local government in EU decision-making processes) and on the role and position of the local council in Belgium and the Netherlands (with a particular interest for council scrutiny). Hans Vollaard  is Lecturer in Dutch and European Politics at the Utrecht University, School of Governance, the Netherlands. In the area of European politics, he has written on European disintegration, Euroscepticism in the Netherlands, and the implementation of EU healthcare law. His work on Dutch politics concentrates on local councils, provincial councils, and non-elected representatives.

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Fig. 2.2 Fig. 3.1

Grid-group cultural types Typology of local state-society networks Measurements of the three dimensions and their relation to the types of networks distinguished by Teles

22 27 36

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List of Tables

Table 26.1 Table 26.2 Table 26.3 Table 26.4 Table 26.5 Table 26.6 Table 26.7 Table 26.8 Table 26.9 Table 26.10

Means for autonomy, coherence and relevance by network type distinguished by Teles 382 Means for autonomy, coherence and relevance by network and country 383 Types of network by country 385 Means for autonomy, coherence and relevance by type of national infrastructure of local state-society relations 387 Means for autonomy, coherence and relevance by network and policy field 390 Type of network by policy field 392 Type of network characterizing Local Action Groups by country393 Functions and power of network by policy field 398 Networks of local state-society relations by country and the dimensions of the typology and indicators for characterizing the networks 411 Networks of local state-society relations by country and (selected) policy field 414

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CHAPTER 1

Interactions of Societal Actors and Local Government in Institutionalized Governance Arrangements: The Book’s Scope and Content Filipe Teles, Adam Gendźwiłł, Cristina Stănuş, and Hubert Heinelt

Interactions of societal actors in institutionalized governance networks with local government are one of the most common features of contemporary local governance. The multiple and diverse forms it can take provide relevant clues concerning different roles of local government in Europe,

F. Teles (*) Research Unit on Governance, Competitiveness and Public Policies, Department of Social, Political and Territorial Sciences, University of Aveiro, Aveiro, Portugal e-mail: [email protected] A. Gendźwiłł Department of Local Development and Policy, Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 F. Teles et al. (eds.), Close Ties in European Local Governance, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44794-6_1

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administrative, civic and political cultures, governance arrangements, decentralization processes, state–society relations, local practices in interest intermediation and political action. Comparative studies on this topic providing an in-depth analysis of institutionalized governance networks are needed. The book will provide an understanding of the types of networks in a large number of European countries, their formal differences and partly also the motives for their creation. Given the comprehensiveness of subjects, dimensions, historical and political events to cover, this book will proceed by selecting the most relevant topics to address and identifying reasonable arguments in order to classify these differences between European countries but also policy domains. The comparative lessons and implications are particularly interesting not only for the scholarly debate but also for political practice. These are useful for those pursuing this debate and implementing similar agendas: local government associations, local authorities and professionals. This book is focused on relations between (a) individual and collective or corporate societal actors and (b) municipalities, that is, the first tier of local government with a directly elected representative body as the crucial organ for taking binding decisions. This clarification might be necessary for readers who—due to particular circumstances in their countries— would probably look at this phenomenon from a legal perspective and regard local government not as a level of statehood but as means of self-­ administration and, in this sense, as part of the executive branch of a state. In this book, organized interests—ranging from chambers of commerce and industry and so on to differently organized associations with various kinds of membership (from enterprises to elderly people)—as well as individuals engaged in the policy process are regarded as societal actors.

C. Stănuş Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Sibiu, Romania e-mail: [email protected] H. Heinelt Institute of Political Science, Technische Universität Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany e-mail: [email protected]

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The focus on the municipal level of local government means that we will consider local representatives of state (national or sub-national) authorities or agencies only in cases where they are interacting with societal actors when representatives of municipalities are also involved. The focus on the local level also means that there are numerous cases of networks of each type and that the networks’ institutional design is adapted locally. The book concentrates on institutionalized interactions between representatives of municipalities (mayors, councilors and members of the municipal administration) and societal actors. Consequently, those municipal committees which consist only of councilors who occasionally ask societal actors and experts for their opinion will not be considered. Some local state-society relations have developed in the field of inter-­ municipal cooperation or reach beyond the border of just one municipality. These forms of organized interest intermediation at the inter-municipal level will be considered as well. However, as will be shown by the country chapters, most of the forms of local state-society relations considered here are located within the boundaries of one municipality. The question of the size of the municipalities under study is defined precisely: Municipalities of all sizes should be included—providing institutionalized interactions between representatives of municipalities and societal actors exist. However, actually the number of smaller municipalities considered has been limited because, particularly in countries with two tiers of local government (municipalities on the one hand and counties, provinces, etc. on the other), some forms of local state-society relations are located at the second tier of local government. In these countries, only ‘cities with county status’, ‘kreisfreie Städte’, ‘unitary local authorities’ and so on which combine the competencies of both tiers of local government have been considered. These are usually urban centers and municipalities with a larger number of inhabitants.

Organized Interests and Their Interaction with Local Government—And the Question of How Democracy Is Understood Although individual actors will also be considered as part of institutionalized interactions between representatives of municipalities and societal actors, empirically the latter are usually collective and corporate actors (in

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the sense outlined in Sect. “Measuring the Coherence of Societal Actors” of Chap. 3 in this book). This implies that we are ultimately dealing with organized interests and how they interact with local government in interest intermediation, decision making and partly also the implementation of decisions. Interest intermediation within interest organization and between them and government has been a ‘traditional’ topic of debates in political science for decades (for an overview, see Schneider and Grote 2006 or the contributions in Petracca 1992). The topic has been examined by proponents of pluralism, neo-corporatism and the policy-network approach. However, these debates have been focused mainly on societal processes at large and the national level of political systems. As will be discussed in greater detail in the next section of this chapter, these debates have dealt only marginally with policy making at the local level (as already argued by Cawson 1985). Nevertheless, some ideas developed in these debates were considered as starting points for the work carried out so far by the authors of the contributions to this book—as will be outlined in the following section. However, one issue in the debates among proponents of pluralism, neo-corporatism and the policy-network approach, as well as those of governance, has served as a starting point for the common work presented in the book—namely the relationship between organized interest and democracy or, more precisely, the understanding of democracy. Particularly proponents of neo-corporatism, but also those interested in policy-networks and governance arrangements as empirical phenomena, are in danger of not being critical enough to recognize the ‘democratic deficits’ and limitations of citizen participation as a core element of democracy in their objects of investigation (for this criticism see, for instance, Dahl 1994; Bekkers et  al. 2007). This danger has been emphasized in scholarly as well as political debates against the background that nowadays political systems in the ‘Western World’ have been characterized as a ‘post-­ democracy’ resulting from the complexity of modern society (Zolo 1992) and are sometimes considered as a ‘crisis of egalitarian politics and the trivialization of democracy’ (Crouch 2004: 6). Nevertheless, the authors of the contributions to this book agree that a democratic political system has to ensure ‘a degree of participation so great and so fairly spread about that no one feels neglected and everyone feels, with justice, that his viewpoint has been pretty fairly attended to’ (Dahl 1971: 112). However, they also agree with the dictum of Schmitter (1993: 4) that a democratic political system is not to be conceived of as one ‘regime’ ‘but as a composite of “partial regimes”’ because it consists

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of a complex web of various forms of participation. This also means that in a democratic political system ‘citizenship, its most distinctive property, is not confined to voting periodically in elections. It can also be exercised by [—] joining associations or movements, petitioning authorities, engaging in “unconventional” protest, and so forth’ (Schmitter 1993: 4). To put it precisely, in this book we are not focused on the use of ‘citizenship […] confined to voting periodically in elections’ but on its exercise ‘by […] joining associations or movements’ and engaging in what is called ‘functional interest representation’.1 In this sense, we are looking beyond a ‘thin’ liberal (or representative) democracy (as Barber 1984 called it) to a (broader) participatory democracy.2

Studies on the Relations Between Local Government and Societal Actors: What Has Been Achieved? What Is Missing? What Could Be Helpful for Closing the Research Gap? Much has been written about local governance in the sense of governing a city beyond city hall (or: Who [really] governs the city?). However, most of it has been focused on single case studies or, at best, comparative case studies. The focus on case studies can be explained because it is taken for granted that ‘city matters’ (see Boddy and Parkinson 2004). This assumption is based on the fact that the relevance of space and ‘locality’ has been emphasized at least since the 1980s (see Gregory and Urry 1985; Savage et al. 1987). In this scholarly debate, place-specific and sometimes historically rooted circumstances are often invoked to explain local differences in the relations between city hall and societal actors (see, for instance, Goodwin and Duncan 1986). Nevertheless, these differences between cities or the distinctiveness of a single city have been explained in line with more general approaches and research interests. This particular attention to the local context should be taken into account and considered as a useful building block for further research—particularly with regard to the planned survey and the studies which will be based on it. This applies, for instance, to different versions of interest theory (i.e. either from neo-Marxist positions or by referring to rational-choice models). They played and still play a role in the debate about ‘urban regimes’ (see Elkin 1987; Stone 1989, 2004a, 2004b and with a critical perspective Davies 2002, 2003, 2004; Imbroscio 2003, 2004; Pierre 2005). Furthermore, ideas have also gained attention in the context of case

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studies as hegemonic frames for forming and stabilizing coalitions and guiding ‘city choices’. One such choice is, for instance, the one to turn the city, in a collaboration between local government and societal actors (mainly from the business sector), into a ‘growth machine’ (Molotch 1976; Logan and Molotch 1987). In a similar way, ideas about different paths (and how they are guided) taken by cities in the post-Fordist era (Halford et al. 1993; Jessop 1997) have received attention in the debate (inspired by the French regulation school of thought and neo-Gramscian approaches). Finally, it must be remembered that the ‘community power’ debate was based on case studies which started with the seminal studies of Floyd Hunter (1953) on Atlanta and of Robert Dahl (1961) on New Haven. However, although the ‘community power’ debate was based on case studies of individual cities, its focus was more general—namely on the question of power in society. This becomes clear in the results of this debate, in which power has been understood not just as the ability of actors to dominate decisions (Dahl 1957), but as the structuring logic of communication that enables certain issues to attract public attention while others are kept off the agenda (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 1963) or even kept from being perceived as a problem at all (Lukes 2005 [1974]). Furthermore, urban research from a political science perspective has not only been limited to local case studies. It has also been limited by focusing on local government in general—and not on local governance or relations between societal actors and local government. This even applies to international comparative studies on national differences among local government systems (for an overview, see Heinelt et al. 2018). Although there are several typologies of local government systems (see ibid.), comparative studies on national patterns of local governance or relations between societal actors and local government are missing until now.3 A broadening of this focus usually takes place only when certain local policies are considered—for instance local labor market or housing policy (see, e.g., Heinelt 1992; Egner and Grabietz 2018 )—because in these policies it is obvious that they depend not only on decisions taken in city hall but— in one way or the other—on societal actors. Looking for approaches on state–society relations in general in political science, of course, the debates about pluralism and neo-corporatism and the controversies among their proponents could be considered. However, it was already emphasized in the debate in the early 1990s on policy networks that the ‘traditional’ dichotomy between pluralism and neo-­ corporatism is too general for capturing state–society relations that are

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specific to a country or a particular policy field (see, for this debate, Jordan and Schubert 1992). Although the policy-networks approach has been often used in the empirical analysis of specific state–society relations,4 the resulting classification of detected patterns of institutionalized relations between government and societal actors has not proved helpful. It led to a multitude of ‘dimensions and types of policy networks’ (van Waarden 1992) and attempts to distinguish them by creating a long (if not endless) list of policy-network labels. However, all efforts at ‘ordering of policy network labelling’ (Jordan and Schubert 1992) have turned out to be fruitless—at least according to the assessment of the partners involved in the project. Nevertheless, the partners involved in the project started their conceptual reflections on relations between local government and societal actors at the municipal level with a debate about the policy-networks approach. Furthermore, the partners involved in the research from which this book resulted made use of the typology of ‘national infrastructures for local governance’ developed by Sellers et  al. (2020; see also Sellers and Kwak 2011 and Sellers and Lidström 2014), which aims at establishing a theoretical link between the institutions of local government and the organization of civil society. The authors present three alternative configurations which characterize infrastructures of multilevel local governance in contemporary democracies: nationalized, civic localist and local elitist. Their distinction is based on differences along two general dimensions: vertical inter-governmental relationships (among the local state and higher levels of government) and incorporation of various actors representing different spheres of society. In the local elitist infrastructure, a restricted set of elites dominates local governance and assures the integration of local governance with the policies of national government. In the civic localist infrastructure, incorporation of societal actors is wide, but the integration of local and national policies is limited. Local government relies more on the resources of local society than on support from higher-level authorities. In the nationalized infrastructure, local governments carry out policies formulated at the national level, and a high level of policy integration and wide incorporation of nation-wide organized societal actors are possible through strong multilevel party organizations. As Sellers et al. (2020) argue, each infrastructure developed following its own long-term trajectory and displays distinctive patterns of tensions and conflicts, but also institutional complementarities. Finally, the partners decided not to use this typology because it became obvious that in a country, policy-­specific, local state-society relations can exist which can show different network

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characteristics from those attributed to the ‘national infrastructures’ for local governance distinguished by Sellers et  al. This is also admitted by Sellers and Kwak (2011) by referring to ‘sectoral influences’ or influences from policy domains: ‘Although sectors are part of the infrastructure for local governance, influences from them reflect infrastructural effects distinct from those of national types’ (Sellers and Kwak 2011: 627). Against this background, the partners involved in the project decided to use the typology of different networks of local state-society relations presented in Chap. 2. This approach makes it possible to capture within-­ country variation in institutional arrangements which establish and regulate local state-society networks.

Limitations of the Approach Applied in the Book This book presents a systematization of knowledge resulting from the analysis of local state-society relations in 22 European countries and identifies and classifies patterns in these institutionalized governance networks. However, as in any attempt to capture empirical observations by a typology and ‘measure’ empirical observations, a number of ‘critical’ issues arise and have to be clarified. This applies first of all to the selection of networks presented in the country chapters of this book. It had to be done by the authors (as experts on local state-society relations in their respective countries) based on the agreement of all partners involved in the project to consider networks which are either typical for local state-society relations in the country or resample main feature also shown by other networks in a country. Nevertheless, a high degree of discretion remained for the authors in selecting such networks. However, the double-blind peer-review procedure applied for the country chapters of this book contributed to the avoidance of implausible or even arbitrary decisions by the authors, because in a number of cases reviewers asked authors to rethink their selection of local state-society networks.

Notes 1. For functional interest representation (and its differences from territorial interest representation through political parties and directly elected representative bodies), (see for example, Heinelt 2010: 52–53 and Knodt et al. 2011).

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2. Concerning the different understandings of democracy among mayors and councilors detected empirically in the studies mentioned in the section on ‘The origin of the book’ of the preface of this book, (see Vetter et al. 2018). These different notions of democracy clearly follow the distinction between liberal (or representative) democracy and participatory democracy. 3. Finally, although the eastern and some southern parts of the European continent have experienced democratic transitions over the last three decades, accompanied by reforms of local government as well as of local governance, little has been written on the functioning of institutionalized networks among societal actors and local government in these parts of Europe (e.g. Furmankiewicz et al. 2010; Petrova 2011; Dąbrowski 2014). 4. Beside these empirical network studies, policy networks have been studied to understand general (governance) modes for coordinating societal interactions. For the differences between these two policy-network approaches, (see Börzel 1998, Marsh 1998).

References Bachrach, P., & Baratz, M. S. (1962). Two Faces of Power. The American Political Science Review, 56(4), 947–952. Bachrach, P., & Baratz, M. S. (1963). Decisions and Non-decisions: An Analytical Framework. The American Political Science Review, 57(3), 632–642. Barber, B. (1984). Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age. Berkeley: University of California Press. Bekkers, V., Dijkstra, G., & Fenger, M. (2007). Governance and the Democratic Deficit. Assessing the Democratic Legitimacy of Governance Practices. London: Routledge. Boddy, M., & Parkinson, M. (Eds.). (2004). City Matters. Competitiveness, Cohesion and Urban Governance. Bristol: Policy Press. Börzel, T. (1998). Organising Babylon – on the Different Conceptions of Policy Networks.Public Administration, 76, 253–273. Cawson, A. (1985). Corporatism and Local Politics. In Grant W. (Eds.), The Political Economy of Corporatism. Sociology, Politics and Cities. London: Palgrave. Crouch, C. (2004). Post-Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. Dahl, R.  A. (1961). Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Dahl, R. A. (1957). The Concept of Power. Behavioral Science, 2(3), 201–215. Dahl, R.  A. (1971). The City in the Future of Democracy. In M.  Cook (Ed.), Participatory Democracy (pp.  85–114). San Francisco: Canfield Press (first published in 1967 in American Political Science Review, 61(4), 953–969). Dahl, R. A. (1994). A Democratic Dilemma. System Effectiveness Versus Citizen Participation. Political Science Quarterly, 10(1), 23–34.

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M.  Lauria (Ed.), Reconstructing Urban Regime Theory: Regulating Urban Politics in a Global Economy (pp. 51–73). Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications. Jordan, G., & Schubert, K. (1992). A Preliminary Ordering of Policy Network Labelling. European Journal of Political Research, 21, 7–28. Knodt, M., Greenwood, J., & Quittkat, C. (2011). Territorial and Functional Interest Representation in EU Governance. Journal of European Integration, 33(4), 349–367. Logan, J. R., & Molotch, H. L. (1987). Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place. Berkley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press. Lukes, S. (2005 [1974]). Power: A Radical View. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, London: Macmillan Education Ltd. Marsh, D. (1998). The Development of the Policy Network Approach. In D. Marsh (Ed.): Comparing Policy Networks (pp. 3–17). Buckingham and Philadelphia: Open University Press. Molotch, H.  L. (1976). The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place. The American Journal of Sociology, 82(2), 309–332. Petracca, M. P. (Ed.). (1992). The Politics of Interests: Interest Groups Transformed. Boulder: Westview Press. Petrova, T. (2011). Citizen Participation in Local Governance in Eastern Europe: Rediscovering a Strength of Civil Society in the Post-Socialist World? Europe-­ Asia Studies, 63(5), 757–787. Pierre, J. (2005). Comparative Urban Governance. Uncovering Complex Causalities. Urban Affairs Review, 40(4), 446–462. Savage, M., Barlow, J., Duncan, S., & Saunders, P. (1987). Locality Research: The Sussex Programme of Economic Restructuring, Social Change and the Locality. The Quarterly Journal of Social Affairs, 3(1), 27–51. Schmitter, P. C. (1993). Some Propositions About Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy. Wien: Institut für Höhere Studien. Reihe Politikwissenschaft. Schneider, V., & Grote, J.  R. (2006). Introduction: Business Associations, Associative Order and Internationalization. In W.  Streeck, J.  R. Grote, V.  Schneider, & J.  Visser (Eds.), Governing Interests: Business Associations Facing Internationalization (pp. 1–18). Abington and New York: Routledge. Sellers, J.  M., & Kwak, S.-Y. (2011). State and Society in Local Governance: Lessons from a Multilevel Comparison. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 35(3), 620–643. Sellers, J. M., & Lidström, A. (2014). Multilevel Democracy, Societal Organization and the Development of the Modern State. Paper prepared for Presentation at the 23 Nordic Local Government Conference, Odense 27.–29. November 2014. Sellers, J., Lidström, A., & Bae, Y. (2020). Multilevel Democracy: How Local Institutions and Civil Society Shape the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Stone, C. N. (1989). Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta: 1946–1988. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Stone, C.  N. (2004a). It’s More Than the Economy After All. Continuing the Debate About Urban Regimes. Journal of Urban Affairs, 26(1), 1–19. Stone, C. N. (2004b). Rejoinder: Multiple Imperatives, or Some Thoughts About Governance in a Loosely Coupled but Stratified Society. Journal of Urban Affairs, 26(1), 35–42. Vetter, A., Heinelt, H., & Rose, L.  E. (2018). Mayors’ Notions of Local Democracy. In H.  Heinelt, A.  Magnier, M.  Cabria, & H.  Reynaert (Eds.), Political Leaders and Changing Local Democracy: The European Mayor (pp. 173–208). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. van Waarden, F. (1992). Dimensions and Types of Policy Networks. European Journal of Political Research, 21, 29–52. Zolo, D. (1992). Democracy and Complexity. A Realistic Approach. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

CHAPTER 2

Diversity in Local State-Society Relations: A Typology to Grasp Differences in Institutional Networks Filipe Teles

Introduction Interactions of societal actors in institutionalized governance networks with local authorities are one of the most common features of contemporary local governance. The multiple and diverse forms it can take provide relevant clues regarding different roles of local government in Europe and its administrative, civic and political cultures. It adds also to the knowledge on different governance arrangements, decentralization processes, state-society relations, and citizens’ engagement practices. Comparative studies on this topic with in-depth analysis of formally and informally as well as compulsorily and voluntarily institutionalized governance networks are needed but require a conceptual framework that allows for a clearer

F. Teles (*) Research Unit on Governance, Competitiveness and Public Policies, Department of Social, Political and Territorial Sciences, University of Aveiro, Aveiro, Portugal e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s) 2021 F. Teles et al. (eds.), Close Ties in European Local Governance, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44794-6_2

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identification of such arrangements and provides the tools for an analytical instrument for comparison. This chapter aims at developing a typology that allows researchers to systematize evidence and knowledge resulting from the analysis of these networks. The identification of different types of local state-society arrangements will allow a more robust comparison and analysis. The involvement of societal actors within the public governance of different policy domains is increasingly seen as the ‘big idea’ to cope with a series of social, economic, and political dilemmas (Rathgeb Smith and Grønbjerg 2006; Pestoff and Brandsen 2010), particularly under the recent economic crisis and the subsequent welfare sustainability problems (Ervasti et al. 2012; Silva and Teles 2018). Although the involvement of societal actors in local governance has clear benefits, it also results in a series of challenges of coordination and management. This applies particularly for the integration of different network arrangements, given their interaction and the wickedness of the problems they are targeted to solve (Andrews and Entwistle 2010). In parallel, the interaction between non-state organizations and local governments needs to be reassessed. Societal actors are often perceived as a source of social innovations, fostering novel forms of organization and interactions that address societal needs that have hitherto been unmet in several policy areas, among others. Extant research, however, is scant in assessing the consequences for both societal actors and public policies of the network relationships that have to be redefined to encompass these new processes. This is all the more pressing in contexts with poor traditions of co-governance. Indeed, these emerging collaborative mechanisms may entail major risks, both for local governments and societal actors, dealing with a plethora of (public and) private bodies—that are not directly subject to democratic controls. The emergent complexity of policy networks may erode the position of local governments and ultimately generate problems of democratic legitimacy or accountability (Rhodes 1997). The possible drawback is local government’s attempt to curtail third sector organizations’ autonomy, that is, organizations acting neither along the logic of the market nor the hierarchy of statehood and the solidarity of private households. In such scenario, these actors may be confined, with limited opportunities to influence substantive policy direction or content, thus restraining the benefits attributed to them, namely their autonomy: not being just another arm of government (Verschuere and De Corte 2012).

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This argument may also be extended to public policies: limited autonomy may restrain the potential—and expected counter-cyclical—role of societal actors in  local policies. These are relevant questions for academics and practitioners and particularly for policy makers.

Local Networks: State-Society Relations The dividing line between state and civil society has never been sharp. Over recent years, policy makers across Europe have increasingly turned to organizations between the market and the state in seeking to identify, manage, or solve a range of economic, social, and political problems. At the same time, the number of relevant research on partnerships and co-­ governance at the local level has grown significantly, reflecting a common understanding that at this level of government we can analyse the implications of newly emerging forms of policy making and delivery (Mouritzen 2013; Lowndes and McCaughie 2013; Teles 2016). One of the most recurrent dictums about these state-society networked mechanisms is that they enhance the efficiency of public service access and delivery, nurture social solidarities for public good, and strengthen the legitimacy of political authorities (Kendall 2009; Brandsen and Pestoff 2006). This narrative, however, warrants further inspection. The term governance implies that the interest of the analysis goes beyond the functioning and the strategies of formal public institutions and elected authorities. It stands on a wider notion of politics, including the provision of public services at the civil society’s level. In order to identify new ways of ‘achieving collective action in the realm of public affairs, in conditions where it is not possible to rest on recourse to the authority of the state’ (Stoker 2000), local governments are increasingly seen as facilitators of these processes, enabling collaborative local networks. New agendas on urban politics and local administration reforms have implied an important expansion of the notion of policy delivery through the inclusion of non-state actors (Schwab et al. 2017). However, the necessarily synergistic relationship between local government and civil society in facilitating governance mechanisms requires further elaboration. Individuals and institutions engage in collective action using several strategies and using assorted means and capacities. The issue of who initiates these new governance arrangements and how autonomous it really is from political power and public institutions is seminal to the definition of governance itself. Most of the known local governance

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models derive from a normative approach and seek better policy formulation and policy delivery arrangements—in general seen as incapable of accomplishing all local government’s tasks, insufficient to answer all demands or relying on optimist assessments of grassroots autonomous and spontaneous organization. In this chapter, both terms (governance arrangements and local state-­ society networks) are used as a way to capture the wide range of mechanisms through which consultation, coordination, power over policy making and delivery at the local level are exercised. The multi-agent context of local governance, with its complex diversity of networks, has produced a rich literature and has shaped significant research on the plural mechanisms of delivery of public services and collaborative arrangements. The aim is allegedly to improve public policy decision and delivery processes in a ‘joined up’ way, together with the local community. Local public services’ restructuring, modernization agendas, New Public Management-type reforms, and, more recently, the consequences of economic downturns have attracted attention from research, signalling an arrangement where public and non-public agencies are involved in the formulation of policy and delivery of services (Brandsen and Pestoff 2006: 497; Schwab et al. 2017). State-society partnerships and co-governance are often used to describe the context within which public services are delivered at the local level. Co-governance refers to the mutual formation of collective bodies around governmental roles and addresses the capacity for government and communities to work together (Sommerville and Haines 2008). This conceptual approach has accompanied a volume of literature on how localities are currently governed, on the influence of informal networks (Rhodes 1997), and on the analysis of the proliferation of non-state actors, their resource exchanges, and interdependency (Stoker 2006). Likewise, research on interactions between various network actors (e.g. Rhodes 1996) and on the new steering and monitoring roles expected from governments (Stoker 2000; John 2001) has suggested the decline of state power (Jessop 2003) or of the existence of new complex power configurations through which state actors steer networks (see Lukes 2004). The delivery of public services and policy networking has resulted in unresolved problems related to the differentiation and integration of non-­ state actors. The generic terms of collaborative governance, actually just an add-on to the concept of governance, or of co-governance, depict, in essence, very complex systems: it is much more than shared rules of

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commitment between actors; it is not only the consequence of individual interests based on expected future profits; and it does not result just from the voluntary urge to engage in public policy decisions and delivery. Collaboration between state and non-state actors is also a consequence of intentional strategies to involve the latter in governance arrangements. These institutional mechanisms coming from beyond the borders of public authorities result in an assemblage of processes to ensure coordination, power, resources, and information. Such system needs not be a replica of the way local governments work, and, in fact, is most of the times an all new way of connecting the public and the private/voluntary spheres. Governance arrangements, even in the cases where local authorities can claim to be their main initiators, present new challenges that confront the extant scholarship with profound changes in the actors involved in the network. Kooiman (2005) distinguished three ways of governance: the hierarchical one, where top-down directives from public authorities shape public policy; the self-governance mode, a collective based approach to bottom­up policy building; and, co-governance, in which societal actors and public authorities cooperate in a mutual shaping process of partnerships. This simple taxonomy presents an interesting potential to explain how state and non-state actors participate in policy building and service delivering. It tends to produce diverse arenas for engagement, since it includes both the hierarchical modes of governance (which tend to be dominated by state actors) and the more self-governed arrangement (usually seen as non-state actors’ homeland). However, it is still far from grasping all the different types of networks, since the kind of relations and interdependencies that are developed between these actors is much more diverse. Over the last decades, the diverse approaches (both conceptual and methodological) to policy network and governance have provided a more or less fair map of these local governance arrangements, but typically fail to fully develop the practical implications for the understanding of the diversity of networks in place. It has also failed to provide sufficient guidance about how to create the adequate conditions for collaborative practices. Consequently, scant attention has been paid to developing the necessary tools to assess the real extent of network diversity of these local governance systems. Despite the growing attention local governance has received, there is little systematic attempt to analyse the practical implications of these emerging solutions. Indeed, despite the efforts to conceptualize and

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operationalize measures of autonomy, institutionalization, and policy discretion (see, inter alia, Verhoest et  al. 2004; Verschuere and De Corte 2012), the discussion remains far from being settled. More importantly, existing efforts fail to provide an integrated approach to the analysis of the kind of interdependencies that are developed between local governments and societal actors and how the resulting type of institutional network affects the process of taking collectively binding decision and policy delivery. Inconclusive results are partly a consequence of the lack of an integrated approach that allows understanding the diversity of governance networks at the local level, using a common framework. The suggested typology in this chapter aims at allowing in-depth analysis of each kind of local state-society network, and potentially provides a framework for large-­ scale comparative research.

Cultural Theory: A Grid-Group Typology The ‘grid-group method’ developed by the anthropologist Mary Douglas (1978), which has subsequently become known as Cultural Theory, offers an opportunity to identify four logical strategies that derive from expectations about the possibility and ability to manage situations. These strategies, initially seen as a consequence of alternative cultural biases, can be used as instruments to understand possible approaches deriving from plural rationalities. Actually, these two main standpoints were particularly vivid in the debate that confronted agent-centred perspectives (e.g. Wildavsky 1987) with institutional approaches (e.g. Perri 6 2003); concurrently, the analysis based on the ‘grid group method’ evolved from individual solidarities and agent’s rationalities to social systems and institutional arrangements. The main argument for the use of grid-group theory is that it allows understanding institutional networks as neither isolated from, nor wholly determined by, social environment, and as being stemmed from a belief system inherently tied to expectations and experiences. Despite the expected complexity of a framework of state-society networks, its success will be due in large part to its capacity to allow understanding on how these different networks perform. This use of the grid-group theory as a typology of social settings is not novel and has been thoroughly adapted and applied, becoming a subject of its own. The basic premise of grid-group approach is that competing worldviews and systems of beliefs can be understood as a result of only two

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dimensions. It argues that it is possible to systematize group or organizational cultures as an answer to two basic social dimensions: its degrees of hierarchization and of social cohesion. First developed in social anthropology—despite the fact that this system is essentially deductive—the grid-group theory has since been applied throughout the social sciences. Mary Douglas states that the intention was to produce ‘a crude typology […] to account for the distribution of values within a population’ (Douglas 2007: 2), in order to ‘show the connection between different kinds of social organization and the values that uphold them’ (ibidem). Wildavsky (1994) argued that it helps explaining how people derive their answers to basic questions like: how does my context work? How do I hold people accountable to me? Answers to these questions produce basic orientations towards the two dimensions: external control and rules (grid) and the strength of prescriptions and affiliation with others (group). It explains how societal arrangements’ preferences are formed as consequence of different grid and group positions. Aaron Wildavsky was responsible for major contributions to the history and development of grid-group theory—thereafter, and mainly due to this author’s work, often called ‘Cultural Theory’. From an apparently intuitive theory by Mary Douglas, it evolved to a better integrated idea of organizational cultural bias. Together with Michael Thompson and Richard Ellis (1990), Wildavsky rendered a theory that comprised important features about the exercise of power and its applicability to the realm of politics, assuming that the four types of cultural bias are normally present in any group. Rather than a static and deterministic framework, grid-­ group or cultural theory provided important explanatory value for the generation of different ‘worldviews’, conflict, leadership, institutional arrangements, and societal roles. It has, since, morphed into a dynamic theoretical system and analytical tool. Grid-group theory has been presented as useful to better understand institutions (Wildavsky 1987), new institutionalism (Grendstad and Selle 1995), citizenship (Denters and Geurtz 1999), political ideology (Coughlin and Lockhart 1998), political change (Lockhart 1999), and policy analysis (Hoppe 1999). Stoker (2000) did the same when studying British local governance, and Hood (1998) applied it to public administration. This analytical framework provides a useful tool to understand how individuals position themselves in relation to their environment. Denters and Geurtz (1999: 2) explain that grid-group theory ‘pretends to bridge

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the gap between individual preferences and the social structure’. It can illuminate many of the fundamental analytic questions of networked governance, as it captures much of the variety in individual and organizational attitudes and perspectives about how the public sphere is circumscribed by autonomy—Grid—and the extent to which choice is constrained by formal group belonging—Group (Hood 1998).

Grid and Group Dimensions Grid-group theory is grounded on the idea that ways of ‘organizing’ the world and ways of positioning and acting towards it are inextricable and linked. Accordingly, the individual or the organization is an adherent of one of a restrict number of ways of life, each characterized by mutually exclusive sets of shared beliefs and motivations. The theory is constructed around two dimensions, where grid brings about the prescribed autonomy of social units, and group refers to the constraints created by ordered group coherence. Hence, in the first case, the greater degree to which the individual or organization has to follow imposed rules, the higher one is on the grid axis. On the other hand, the more one feels bound by collective decision, the higher one is on the group dimension. Group measures the extent to which behaviour is pre-determined and influenced by the membership of a certain group, and how much of choice has to be made in order to privilege the interests of the collective rather than one’s own. High group situations relate to those when organizations or individuals are conscious of what they have to do as a consequence of their membership of a coherent particular social unit. Low group situations are those in which the individual adheres to collective units by choice and the role of the group is permanently negotiated. As stated by Mary Douglas: ‘The group itself is defined in terms of the claims it makes over its constituent members, the boundary it draws around them, the rights it confers on them to use its name and other protections, and the levies and constraints it applies’ (Douglas 1978: 8). Every group varies in boundary strength and control acceptance. This is supplied by the second dimension: Grid. This measures the extent to which roles and autonomy in social relations are constrained by some kind of differentiation, and options limited by rules and norms. A high grid situation corresponds to those where behaviour is constrained by imposed rules and where the autonomy to overcome the complexity of the real world is particularly limited. A low grid situation is one where the role is

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not pre-set, and action is less constrained by imposed definitions or expectations. As a possible definition of grid, Thompson et al. (1990: 5) argued that it comprises ‘the degree to which […] life is circumscribed by externally imposed prescriptions’. Hence, ‘the more binding and extensive the scope of the prescriptions, the less of life is open to negotiation’ (ibidem). The concepts here presented are opposites in the sense that they cannot coexist—and this is an extremely important feature of grid-group theory, since it is grounded on the assumption of the existence of few types of possibilities, each one needing the others to define itself against. For instance, it would be a social impossibility to consider a group with a high degree of internal solidarity coexisting with strong personal liability of any member within it. The higher the group coherence, the weaker the individual accountability. The conflict here suggested between group cohesion and individual responsibility is a reflection of the real-world tension between an individual who favours collective action based on solidarity and the individual who works based on personal liability. Similar examples can be given to unveil the conflict between high grid and low grid constraints: the stronger the responsiveness to external directives and to follow rules, the weaker the willingness to act free from imposed norms. This approach suggests, for instance, the conflict between bureaucracy and social entrepreneurship, as each reflects different world visions and diverse motivations.

Four Cultures: Four Network Types It is the blend of both grid and group dimensions that provides the framework upon which a comparative analysis can be created, based on the generated four logically distinct cultures (Fig. 2.1: 1. high grid/high group: the hierarchic culture, who favours clear patterns of action and a commitment to the group that creates them; 2. high grid/low group: the fatalist culture, highly responsive to external directives in isolation from any group identity or role performance; 3. low grid/low group: the individualist culture, demonstrating negative attitudes towards restrictions on freedom of choice, and low levels of communal shared identity; 4. low grid/high group: the egalitarian culture, combining low levels of social hierarchy with a high degree of group belonging.

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Fig. 2.1  Grid-group cultural types

Group

Egalitarian

Grid

Individualist

Fatalist

Hierarchic

The individualist culture favours competition and autonomy, and rejects coercion, since boundaries and practices are negotiable. Success results from the individual capacity to tackle with the endless array of raw material provided by the context, and, when it does not succeed, the only one to blame is the individual and not some external system. Weak both in group boundaries and regulation, independents find competition as the main form of control. The egalitarian way conciliates collective choice and group’s autonomy by ordering and institutionalizing equality. It avoids large bureaucracies, centralization, and decision making driven by experts or power holders (Wildavsky 2006: xvii). The lack of differentiation leads to the absence of a control role performed by a particular pre-determined actor, asking for those who can plausibly claim to speak in the name of all the members. This strongly bounded group tends to be egalitarian not only as a way of repudiating inequalities amongst its members, but mostly as a strategy to avoid ‘external aggression’. As this ‘enclave community’—as it was often labelled by Mary Douglas—frequently avoids ranking and ordered rules, it becomes harder to organize. Such a group would be apparently menaced by leadership and authority (Douglas 1978). The fatalist’s freedom of movements is limited by rules and is excluded from community life, since resources, events, and relationships are uncontrollable and uncertain. The individual is not to blame if things go wrong, nor the ‘system’, but rather fate and pure chance. Actually, it is possible to assume that fatalists settings can result from non-relevant assemblage of interests or individuals; non-conformed to group identities in hierarchic

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networks and non-rendered with the same amount of autonomy as individualists. The hierarchic group is as restricted by external as the fatalist, but not excluded from the decision-making process. Limited autonomy to networks bounded within clear social units is a way of encouraging harmonious action and predictability. Process is therefore an important characteristic of these social relations, which constitutes a rather different approach from the ceremonial network, to which processes are seen as over-constraining. In a society in which roles are ascribed and behaviours are ruled by positional norms, hierarchy is the valid cultural ‘way of life’ that sees programming as the best way to solve coordination problems (Douglas 1978). The commitment to authority exercised through rules and organization is a key feature, as it is believed to favour network strength and remove the possibility of dissent. These networks accept the existence of elites to conduct things and to manage resources. Likewise, participation is relevant as long as it confines itself to pre-determined rules and does not conflict with the existing system. Jon Elster uses a similar approach when presenting four cognitive attitudes to the world: certainty, ignorance, risk, and uncertainty (Elster 2007: 125–126). In the first case, one can identify the context in which hierarchic networks work. In the mode of ignorance, outcomes are unknown as in the fatalist networks. Risk and uncertainty would correspond to the low grid attitudes and highly autonomous individualist networks (allowing a certain degree of exposure to the numerous strategic possibilities) and to the egalitarian networks (the ones preferring to hold on to their own group identity).

A Typology of Local Sate-Society Networks The interaction of societal actors at the local level, in particular in a context where these take form as networks of diverse individuals and organizations engaging in power relations with local authorities, requires from research to be equipped with comparative tools that allow both in-depth analysis of each kind of network, and establishing delimited classifications in order to clarify its diversity. A typology, as the one presented above, performs this methodological role, and provides the framework to understand the diversity of network types. Though grid and group seem rather simple typological dimensions, the fact that formal networks of local state and societal actors are our research

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object requires a special attention to their operationalization in a plausible and observable context. As abovementioned, grid refers to the constraints created by ordered structures, which in a governance context brings up questions of autonomy. On the other hand, group—while focused on the cohesion and pre-established determinants of an organization’s role— denotes the level of shared identity and group coherence of a given network. Therefore, what is being suggested is to consider adapting cultural theory’s grid-group dimensions into the theory-grounded and the empirically recognizable dimensions of autonomy and group coherence. Autonomy measures the extent to which a network role in local state-­ society relations is limited by external rules and norms and constrained by some kind of differentiation between members. A low autonomy (high grid) situation corresponds to those networks where roles are constrained by imposed rules and where its policy discretion, influence, and capacity to overcome the complexity of the policy world are particularly limited. High autonomy (low grid) situations are those where the outcomes of the network and roles are not pre-established or perfectly limited, and action is less constrained by imposed definitions or expectations. Accordingly, to determine how autonomous a network is, it is relevant to consider both organizational and rule prescription aspects. In the first case, assessing how voluntary network membership is, who initiated it, and who has the power to coordinate it are important questions. The same regarding the second aspect: It should be taken into consideration, how precise and detailed the rule prescription regarding the network’s roles and members is and who defines those rules. Group coherence refers to the degree to which the network is internally bounded, and how much the group meaning and identity is shared amongst members. Therefore, coherence measures the extent to which the network is pre-determined and influenced by the way it is organized as a group, and how much choice is made to privilege collective interests rather than those of some actors. High group coherence (high group, in Douglas’s typology) relates to those where the members are conscious of what they have to do as a consequence of their membership of an organized social unit, with a role definition, and driven by collective interest. On the other hand, low group coherence is observable in those networks in which the members adhere often by their own choice, and the role of the group is permanently negotiated. Consequently, to determine how coherent a particular network of local state and society actors is, it is important to consider the width and the

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relevance of shared beliefs amongst members as a premise for group interaction. One should also expect that coherence would determine more stable and regular network action, as well as the independence of individual group members in relation to the group itself and the type of actors involved. Replicating grid-group theory, it is acceptable to expect the following types based on the two dimensions: • high group coherence/low autonomy: the hierarchic network; • low group coherence/low autonomy: the fatalist network; • low group coherence/high autonomy: the individualist network; • high group coherence/high autonomy: the egalitarian network. However, these four types do not provide all the information available on the diversity of networks. In particular, it does not provide any information regarding how tangible and measurable their impact is, or if it is relevant for local policy outcomes. Therefore, more detail is desirable and possible in the analysis, allowing the distinction—within each type—of the relevance of each network. Adding colour and complexity to the two-­ dimension typology, through a distinction that allows checking how much impact it can have and how relevant this impact is, can be made within each typological quadrant. This distinction between relevant and irrelevant networks will allow further exploration and comparability. The relevance of a network focuses the acts of a specific group of actors within the relationship between local state and society members. Structures that endow the network with considerable power over the political agenda and decision-making will allow its members and society in general to attach greater importance to the role of the network. What introduces an important dichotomy in these types of networks is this sense of relevance: a belief that changes in the context can be produced as a consequence of network action. Consequently, the third claim (a new dimension in the analysis) is that network types depend on the admissible success of its intervention. The perception of relevance is therefore important in determining which type is more appropriate in a particular setting. This dimension, resulting from the eventual constraints generated by the extent of its ascribed power and role, can provide the network with the instruments that will allow it to produce the desired effects, or to consider that it ‘won’t matter how much effort will be put into action, no real result will occur’. Thus, the type of

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network should take into consideration if it is adequate to accomplish a purpose and to produce the intended or expected results. The role and functions of the networks, especially how much impact does it have on policy, should, therefore, be taken into consideration when assessing its relevance, Furthermore, one must also consider the power of the network, and the scope and the degree of public awareness of its impact. In this chapter, the original Douglas’s and Wildavsky’s labels (hierarchic, fatalist, individualist, and egalitarian) were used as a way to classify the types resulting from a two-dimensional analysis based on network autonomy and group coherence. However, when referring to the patterns of social relations and governance networks resulting from the inclusion of relevance as a third dimension, there is an evident need to provide adjusted terms that are better equipped to designate observable patterns of arrangements, strategies, and roles of governance networks in the broader local public sphere. This option is particularly relevant since labels transmit different connotations, and different interpretations of the theory, implicitly emphasising one analytical level rather than the other. The resulting typology, presented in Fig. 2.2, considers eight admissible types of local state-society networks. From the ceremonial network, low in every dimension considered in the analysis, to the consociational form of local arrangements with allocated collective rights and shared authority between local actors, there is a wide variety of possible network types. Hence, when relevance is taken into account, hierarchic networks can range from a group-centred self-reflective network to one where delegated powers are attributed. Likewise, fatalist type can cover the powerless ceremonial network or the one performing an influencer role. Individualist forms of local state-society relations comprise communicative networks, where the exchange and sharing of information is expected, to the independent way of acting. Finally, the egalitarian type includes collaborative networks with low impact and the powerful consociational forms of local state-society arrangements. These plural rationalities represent eight ways of organizing but are condemned to the requisite of variety condition—that each ‘world vision’ needs the other in order to have something to organize itself against. Grid-group theory holds that its four cultures coexist and continually contest for hegemony. Societal networks, of course, can be analysed along these lines, not as a consequence of one eventual dominant culture of the social context, but as a result of different arrangements, which, as claimed, must result from an intentional design to act based on a preferred ‘way of

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Independent

AUTONOMY

Communicative

E NC

27

Consociational

Collaborative

Influencer

Delegated

A LEV

RE

Ceremonial

GROUP COHERENCE

Self-reflective

Fig. 2.2  Typology of local state-society networks

organizing’. In this sense, autonomy, group coherence, and network relevance, given the nature of local state-society relations and the formal institutionalization process of the network arrangements under consideration, correspond to measurable and analytically relevant dimensions. To venture into a clarification of local state-society networks, and—as a consequence—of its different types, we need to set some boundaries, strong enough to be accepted as delimiting different types. Within the existing contested boundaries, typologies tend to capture only a share of the whole picture. The major risk of a typology is to be convinced that all other existing classifications might fit under the same rationale. Re-interpretation and forced integrations would lead to the weakening of each typology. It is only useful when it allows specifying the content of the types in particular settings, upgrading its analytical capacity, and reinforcing its eventual explanatory potential. We aimed at providing a logical claim that combines different kinds of causal segments, with a particular emphasis on the autonomy, group coherence, and relevance of such networks. The limitations of ‘traditional’

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typologies asked for a new explanation and for a more complete and inclusive framework. The three suggested dimensions should be sufficient to provide a landscape of diversity and offer an acceptable clue on why these types are observable in local governance. The operationalization of the three dimensions and particularly their measurement, which was used by the authors of the following chapters in order to identify different types of networks in European countries, is presented in detail in the following chapter of the book. Acknowledgments  Funding for the development of this chapter was provided to Filipe Teles by the Research Project ‘DECIDE—Decentralized Territorial Governance: coordination, capacity and accountability of governance arrangements in complex regional settings’ (POCI-01-0145FEDER-032502), funded by POCI-Programa Operacional Competitividade eInternacionalização (FEDER) and by the Portuguese Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (Portugal)(PTDC/CPO-CPO/32502/2017).

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Schwab, C., Bouckaert, G. & Kuhlmann, S. (Eds.) (2017). The Future of Local Government in Europe: Lessons from Research and Practice in 31 Countries. Berlin:Nomos/Edition Sigma. Silva, P., & Teles, F. (2018). The biggest loser? Local Public Services under austerity measures in Portugal. In Lippi, A. & Tsekos, T. (Eds.), Local Public Services in Times of Austerity across Mediterranean Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Sommerville, P., & Haines, N. (2008). Prospects for Local Co-Governance. Local Government Studies, 34(1), 61–79. Stoker, G. (2000). Urban Political Science and the Challenge of Urban Governance. In J.  Pierre (Ed.), Debating Governance. Authority, Steering and Democracy (pp. 91–109). Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Stoker, G. (2006). Public Value Management. A New Narrative for Networked Governance? American Review of Public Administration, 36(1), 41–47. Teles, F. (2016). Local Governance and Inter-municipal Cooperation. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Thompson, M., Ellis, R., & Wildavsky, A. (1990). Cultural Theory. Boulder: Westview Press. Verhoest, K., Peters, G., Bouckaert, G., & Verschuere, B. (2004). The Study of Organisational Autonomy: A Conceptual Review. Public Administration and Development, 24(2), 101–118. Verschuere, B., & De Corte, J. (2012). The Impact of Public Resource Dependence on the Autonomy of NPOs in Their Strategic Decision Making. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 43(2), 1–21. Wildavsky, A. (1987). Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation. American Political Science Review, 81(1), 3–21. Wildavsky, A. (1994). Democracy as a Coalition of Cultures. Society, 31(1), 80–83. Wildavsky, A. (2006). Cultural Analysis: Politics, Public Law, and Administration. Swedlow, B. (ed). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

CHAPTER 3

How to Measure the Autonomy, Coherence and Relevance of Local State-Society Relations Björn Egner, Hubert Heinelt, and Detlef Sack

As Filipe Teles showed in his chapter at the beginning of the book, various networks between local government and societal actors can be characterized by three dimensions—namely their autonomy, coherence and relevance.1 In the following, these three dimensions are operationalized. This operationalization provided the basis for the analysis of particular local state-society relationships to be found in individual European countries presented in the country chapters of this book.

B. Egner (*) • H. Heinelt Institute of Political Science, Technische Universität Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] D. Sack Faculty of Sociology, University of Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 F. Teles et al. (eds.), Close Ties in European Local Governance, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44794-6_3

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Measuring the Autonomy of the Network The autonomy of a network in the sense of being an externally bounded, formal organization or not (i.e. Mary Douglas’s [1978, 2007] ‘grid’ dimension) is considered against the background of the question of how much the operation of the network is determined by externally imposed rules. The degree of autonomy (from high ‘grid’ = low autonomy to low ‘grid’ = high autonomy) is measured by values from 0 to 10 by asking the questions set out below. The first question is whether or not the organization is compulsory and has to follow imposed rules. This question is addressed in more detail by the following questions (resulting in values from 0 to 5 in total): a. How voluntary is the organization/formation of the network? (not voluntary = 0; incentive-driven = 0.5; voluntary = 1) b. Is the network initiated by upper level government, local government, or (national or local) civil society? (initiated by upper level government = 0; initiated by local government = 0.75; initiated by national civil society = 1.25; initiated by local civil society = 2) c. Is the network internally coordinated by upper level government, local government, or civil society? (coordinated by upper level government = 0; local state/government = 1; shared between local state/ government and civil society = 1.5; civil society = 2) The second set of questions concerns the rule prescription applying to the formation and operation of the network (resulting in values from 0 to 5 in total). a. Is the composition of the network statutorily defined by upper levels of government—or not? (precisely set = 0; set with incentives = 1; broadly set = 2) b. Are the rules according to which the network has to function precisely or broadly specified? (precisely set = 0; to some degree set = 1; broadly set = 2) c. How are the rules determined according to which the network has to function? (by one actor = 0; by majority = 0.5; by all actors = 1)

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Measuring the Coherence of Societal Actors The coherence of the societal actors (i.e. Mary Douglas’s ‘group’ dimension) is considered against the background of the questions of the extent to which membership of the societal actors is internally bounded and whether these actors share basic beliefs and a common identity. Moreover, the coherence of the societal actors is reflected against the background of how much the societal actors have a prescribed role as a group. Finally, the kinds of actor are taken into account, assuming that associations are highest on the ‘group’ dimension and individual actors the lowest. All the properties of the network mentioned above address different aspects of coherence. Unfortunately, there are no general guidelines for combining additive indices in social science. In addition, the correct way of combining composite indicators is disputed even for well-documented indicator sets (see Mazziotta and Pareto 2013 referring to comparative development indicators as an example). Even if researchers could assume that all the individual indicators used measure the same concept, the question of weighting is crucial (cf. Saisana et al. 2005: 309f.). Consequently, we adopted a pragmatic approach by proposing an equally weighted index, while assuming that the single indicators affect the target dimension independently from each other. A certain correlation among the indicators is expected when the networks have all been assessed, but is not absolutely necessary in order to use the index. Independently of the degree of correlation, we followed the idea that either (a) the indicators do in fact correlate, and thus do in fact measure the same phenomenon and are thus interchangeable— which allows us to use them for an additive index of coherence—or (b) the indicators do not correlate, so that they measure different subdimensions of the phenomenon (perhaps ‘coherence by stability’ and ‘coherence by belief’). We thus leave open the question of whether the single indicators are compensatory in nature or not (Vansnick 1990). The degree of coherence (from high to low) is measured by values from 0 to 10 by asking the following questions: a. How imperative is the mandate? This aspect defines coherence as a lack of outside pressure regarding decisions within the network. (Free mandate = 0; some discretion = 1; bound to the actor’s original organization = 2) b. How stable is the network? How regularly do the members of the network meet? This aspect measures coherence by interpreting regular

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meetings as (a) an investment of their time by the actors involved and (b) opportunities to develop a shared understanding of problems and of how to address them in a way regarded as appropriate (irregular or ad hoc meetings = 0; regular [3 meetings or more per year] = 2) c. Is the network characterized more by individual actors or by group representatives?2 This aspect uses the difference between individual logic and group logic as a measure of coherence. When groups interact with each other, individuals are more prone to erratic behaviour than groups which are usually connected to predictability, especially concerning group-to-group interactions (mostly individuals = 0; mixed = 1; mostly group representatives = 2). d. Are there shared beliefs as a basis for interaction? (no = 0; some = 1; yes = 2). ‘Shared beliefs’ mean that the network has already developed common ground regarding the aims and forms of interaction of its members.3 e. How broad (unspecific) are the shared beliefs? (broadly defined = 0; somewhat defined = 1; specifically defined = 2). If the beliefs of the actors only overlap in a small area, for example, a very narrow scope or problem, which is the focus of the network, the coherence of the network is high. If the shared beliefs are broadly defined, this can be seen as an indicator of low coherence of the network.

Measuring the Relevance of the Network The relevance of the networks is measured first of all with regard to the role of the network in policy making—or more precisely: the degree of power exercised by the network. For distinguishing different degrees of power, we refer to Arnstein’s (1969) ‘ladder of participation’. Arnstein distinguishes eight forms of ‘citizen participation’ (see also Heinelt 2010: 36–38). To her, only partnership and delegated power (see below) are relevant forms of participation insofar as they facilitate ‘“nobodies” in several arenas are [becoming] “somebodies” with enough power to make the target institutions responsive to their views, aspirations, and needs’ (Arnstein 1969: 217).4 For the other forms of participation she considered, she demonstrated that they are not worth characterizing in this way, because they either do not actually lead to participation or merely make a show of leading to participation.

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The latter applies particularly in the case of provision of one-sided information to citizens by decision-makers ‘with no channel provided for feedback and no power for negotiation’ (Arnstein 1969: 219). In such a constellation, the access to information may have broadened for a larger group of actors but not enough to allow informed actors ‘to make the target institutions responsive to their views, aspirations, and needs’ (ibid). Placation is used to describe the practice of involving single citizens in discussions, but reserving the decision for the power holder, for example, in participatory planning, where the deciding body may take the ideas and propositions of the citizens into account or not. Consultation is a fraud according to Arnstein (1969: 219) ‘since it offers no assurance that citizen concerns and ideas will be taken into account’. In the case of partnership, ‘power is in fact redistributed’ and in particular rules are made ‘to share planning and decision-making responsibilities through such structures as joint policy boards, planning committees and mechanisms for resolving impasses. After the ground rules have been established […], they are not subject to unilateral change’ (Arnstein 1969: 221). In contrast to information, placation and consultation, rules are different in this case insofar as articulated concerns, ideas and suggestions cannot just be ignored because rules grant all those involved bargaining power. Furthermore, rules determine decision-making procedures which reflect shared decision-making competencies. ‘Delegated power’ refers to cases where responsibilities for specific tasks are transferred. Rules allow the actors involved in such cases to take decisions quite autonomously. However, the range and scope of decisions are limited to those who have taken them or a particular group of affected people. Accordingly, the five forms of participation mentioned above were measured regarding the degree of power exercised by the network as follows: a. ‘delegated power’, that is, potentially high impact on policy (high relevance = 5), b. ‘partnership’ (= 3.75), c. ‘placation’ (= 2.5), d. ‘consultation’ (= 1.25), e. ‘information’, that is, participation, but no guaranteed impact on policy ([possibly] no relevance = 0).

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Furthermore, the relevance of a network is measured with regard to the substance of the matter or the importance of the policy for the local community in terms of a. the number of people affected (0 = low; 0.33 = medium, 0.67 = high) b. the scope of impact (0 = narrow; 0.33 = medium, 0.67 = wide) and c. the level of public awareness (0 = low; 0.33 = medium, 0.67 = high). All three subunits of measurement are summed in order to derive the overall value (minimum = 0; maximum = 2) The scores for (a) the degree of power exercised by the network and (b) the substance of the matter or the importance of the policy for the local community were multiplied (minimum is 0  x  0  =  0; maximum is 5 x 2 = 10). This approach ensures that a network can only score high on the relevance dimension if both subdimensions (degree of power and substance) are assessed as high. Thus, the two indicators are not treated as compensatory (see above) (Fig. 3.1).

autonomy

coherence of societal

relevance

type of network

actors high (5 to 10)

high (5 to 10)

yes (5 to 10)

consociational

high (5 to 10)

high (5 to 10)

low (0 to 4.75)

collaborative

high (5 to 10)

low (0 to 4.75)

yes (5 to 10)

independent

high (5 to 10)

low (0 to 4.75)

low (0 to 4.75)

communicative

low (0 to 4.75)

high (5 to 10)

yes (5 to 10)

delegated

low (0 to 4.75)

high (5 to 10)

low (0 to 4.75)

self-reflective

low (0 to 4.75)

low (0 to 4.75)

yes (5 to 10)

Influencer

low (0 to 4.75)

low (0 to 4.75)

low (0 to 4.75)

ceremonial

Fig. 3.1  Measurements of the three dimensions and their relation to the types of networks distinguished by Teles

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Notes 1. As already emphasized in the introductory chapter (see endnote 3), these characteristics are generalizations referring to a country as a whole. This means that there can be local differences—probably particularly regarding the coherence and the relevance of networks. These differences (and their extent) can only be determined by the planned survey. 2. Scharpf (1997; see also Flam 1990) made a distinction between collective and corporate actors on the one hand and individual actors on the other. Collective and corporate actors are ‘complex’ or ‘composite actors’ when compared with individual actors (Scharpf 1997: 54). Corporate actors are characterized by ‘a high degree of autonomy’ in the definition and pursuit of their objectives in relation to their members or ‘the ultimate beneficiaries of their activities’. By way of contrast, collective actors are composite actors ‘that are dependent on and guided by the preferences of their members’ (Scharpf 1997: 54). In the operationalization of ‘group representatives’, this distinction between collective and corporate actors was not used because it was not possible for the authors of all country chapters to make this clear distinction. Nevertheless, authors of some country chapters could distinguish between collective and corporate actors in the sense outlined and used the category ‘group representatives’. 3. For an overview of the scholarly debate about the relevance of shared beliefs for political decision making, see Heinelt 2019. Instead of shared beliefs, Heinelt (2019: 1–2) preferred to speak of common ‘causal assumptions and normative orientations’. 4. For Arnstein, a third relevant form of participation is ‘citizen control’. However, she emphasized at the outset that ‘no one in the nation has absolute control’ (Arnstein 1969: 223)—‘including the President of the United States’ (Arnstein 1969: 216). By ‘citizen control’, she refers to forms of participation involving self-administration or self-government at least in respect to single policies or programmes. In contrast to forms of ‘delegation’ (previously mentioned), in the case of ‘citizen control’, the rules are to be designed in such a way that available (granted) financial resources (which can eventually imply costs for uninvolved ‘third parties’) can be used according to autonomous decisions and that the intended effects are also defined autonomously. We did not consider ‘citizen control’ because we could hardly find a case where this form of participation can be found at the local level, that is, a case where not only the ‘local state’ but also upper levels of government grant citizens or societal actors this degree of self-government. Furthermore, we did not consider what Arnstein called ‘therapy’ and ‘manipulation’. We agree with her that these are forms of ‘non-participation’.

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References Arnstein, S. R. (1969). A Ladder of Citizen Participation. Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 35(4), 216–224. Douglas, M. (1978). Cultural Bias. London: Royal Anthropological Institute. Douglas, M. (2007). A History of Grid and Group Cultural Theory. Toronto: University of Toronto. Retrieved from http://projects.chass.utoronto.ca/ semiotics/cyber/douglas1.pdf. Heinelt, H. (2010). Governing Modern Societies. Towards Participatory Governance. London and New York: Routledge. Heinelt, H. (2019). Challenges to Political Decision-Making. Dealing with Information Overload, Ignorance and Contested Knowledge. London and New York: Routledge. Mazziotta, M., & Pareto, A. (2013). Methods for Constructing Composite Indices: One for All or All for one? Rivista Italiana di Economia Demografia e Statistica, 67(2), 67–80. Saisana, M., Tarantola, S., & Saltelli, A. (2005). Uncertainty and Sensitivity Techniques as Tools for the Analysis and Validation of Composite Indicators. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 168(2), 307–323. Scharpf, F. W. (1997). Games Real Actors Play. Actor-centered Institutionalism in Policy Research. Westview: Boulder. Vansnick, J. C. (1990). Measurement Theory and Decision Aid. In C. A. Bana e Costa (Ed.), Readings in Multiple Criteria Decision Aid (pp.  81–100). Berlin: Springer.

CHAPTER 4

Local State-Society Relations in Austria Werner Pleschberger

Introduction Austria, until today, is usually described as a model case of a strong democratic neo-corporatist state (see, among many other authors, Lehmbruch 1991; Siaroff 1999; Baccaro 2002; Jahn 2016) in which at the national level, only a few—formally and informally—state-privileged and monopolistic peak organizations collaborate with the government in the formulation and implementation of national economic policies in seeking to find a compromise in the general interest. The peak organizations are commonly called social partners1 because they agree to work together, and with the government to solve issues and conflicts, this can be referred to as tripartism—state, employer or business associations and unions. What has been going on beneath strong national and sectoral corporatism in Austria is, astonishingly continuing today, a desideratum in national and international research. We may observe more or less institutionalized forms of sectoral corporatism. Due to the rampant interventionism, it appears the state rules over many problems and issues in increasing technical details of old and new policies in numerous and fragmented policy

W. Pleschberger (*) University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences, Vienna, Austria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 F. Teles et al. (eds.), Close Ties in European Local Governance, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44794-6_4

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areas at the regional and local levels, showing many forms and patterns of collaboration between the state apparatus and a broader diversity of nonstate interests coming from different levels and functional sectors of society. This perspective takes regard of the famous metaphor of policy network as an emerging phenomenon in state-dominated policy making. The direct intercession of diverse interests is rare. More frequently, associations of organized interests are involved in the process of policy making. It would broaden the known types of associational interest representation. In empirical terms, the social partners at the national level (1971–1987) are represented in multiple state advisory boards, above average in the core areas of economy, finance, labor and social affairs (Bulda et al. 1990). The federal state has introduced few tripartite committees to collaborate in local labor market policy (see below). At the level of provincial policy making, the social partners are becoming a marginal phenomenon, in an increasingly pluralistic landscape with many bodies wherein state agencies dominate and numerous organizational interests are represented which are not attached to economic corporatism. Based on official information,2 for instance 20 diverse bodies can be identified in the province Vorarlberg. The state’s preponderance, the associational representation from municipal and other interests with high organizational, conflict resolution skills and expertise are characteristic of such regional bodies. They activate, promote and exert a focused influence on local policies, predominantly under participation of organized interests, including locally elected representatives. Local governments, for their part, set up time-limited committees for advising planned construction projects or strategies of local development, mostly to consult experts. In contrast, broad concerns are permanently institutionalized in advisory committees—like citizen participation, interests of disabled people or of foreigners (see below). More, innovative network approaches address for instance local health promotion (see below). On this short and selectively described landscape of organized local state-society relations in Austria, four relevant networks are presented: . Local foreigners’ advisory councils 1 2. Local health working groups 3. Biosphere park committees 4. Councils of the Labor Market Service Agencies

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Local Foreigners’ Advisory Councils Embedded in intensive scientific and political debates on the forms and reach of the political participation of foreigners in the 1990s, the introduction of the then common term of local foreigners’ advisory councils (Ausländerbeiräte) found low support in Austria.3 Only the cities of Graz and Linz formed advisory councils. Other cities such as Vienna (see Waldrauch and Sohler 2004: 118ff and Koller 1998) and Salzburg opted for ‘softer’ forms of representation and for a welfare approach to satisfy the new urban interests and needs. By decision of the municipal council, Graz, the second largest city of Austria, established a foreigners’ advisory council in 1995. In 2005 at the instigation of that foreigners’ advisory council and subsequently by decision of the municipal council, the name Migrantinnen- und Migrantenbeirat (female migrant and male migrant advisory council) was bestowed. The council should represent the interests of migrants by informing and advising the municipality. Submitted written advisory opinions and proposals to the municipality must be replied to within a period of three months. The council also aims at reaching out to the whole population of the city and informing on their concerns (e.g. with open information events). The foreigners’ advisory council has no right to petition the local council and thereby demand a legal position is taken on a matter. Conversely, the local authority has in its general formulation the duty before taking a decision on matters affecting the interests of migrants ‘in particular’ of informing and inviting an advisory opinion (without more detailed limitations) from the advisory board. The integration office of the municipal administration and the mayor’s office are important counterparts of the council, with which a ‘close relationship’ with elements of a formal and an informal nature exists. The council has its own personnel resources, as the city of Graz financed two posts in 2018. The foreigners’ advisory council operates with nine voluntary elected members. The election is made on the basis of submitted nominations in accordance with the same electoral laws used for general elections to the local council. A nomination must be supported by at least ten eligible foreign voters. The legislature of the province Styria, wherein Graz is located, in 1999 amended its municipal code by writing a new norm, the ‘Protection of the interests of foreign residents’, by the establishment of a local foreigners’ advisory council. This was subject to more than 1000 people from a third

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country living in a municipality, which was at this time only true for four municipalities in the country. Municipalities under this threshold are free to introduce an advisory council with three members, with the more detailed institutional regulations omitted. The city of Linz established also by a decision of the municipal council in 1996 the AusländerInnen-Integrationsbeirat (AIB, male and female foreigner-integration advisory council). It was renamed in 2008 as the Migrations- und Integrationsbeirat Linz (MIB, migration and integration advisory council). Since that time, the currently 19 members (a maximum of 21 is possible) have been appointed by the mayor. Criteria for appointment of member are the presence in the migrant population, gender aspect and so on. Furthermore, each party in the municipal council sends an advisory member to the council (currently five). The foreigner-integration advisory council has the task to articulate the general interests of migrants and to provide the municipal organs with advice. For this purpose, it may appoint ‘specialists’ to participate in the meetings of the organs. Further, it also can insist on information about local activities, that ‘substantially affects’ the interests of migrants. An insight into documents may be sought through political groups in the municipal council (while maintaining confidentiality). Opinions of the council submitted to the municipality must be dealt with and any decisions must be notified to it. Concrete deadlines for responses are not named. It remains also open what is meant by the central term migrant interests or when they are substantially affected. An ‘overrepresentation’ of particular groups in the foreigners’ advisory councils can be expected, particularly given the strong presence of ethnic, regional or religious lists that run in the elections and which can mobilize their voters differently (like in Graz). On the other hand, the electoral turnout has been very low (with, e.g., in Graz 3 percent in 1995 and 9 percent in 2017). The change from election of representatives to appointing (like in Linz) was justified by the experience of low voter turnouts in the past. To summarize, special municipal advisory boards to promote the interests and political representation of foreigners or migrants are a rare exception in Austria. Furthermore, the few consultative advisory councils differ, among other things, with regard to their members between a purely membership of foreigners and a mixed membership comprised of representatives of foreigners and municipal councilors or regarding the strength of their formal institutionalization. Some features show striking similarities with foreign venues (Friedmann and Lehrer 1997). The councils had to

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be listened respectfully. Each formal communication submitted to municipal authorities deserves a kind of reply, written or informal. They have the right to participate in meetings of municipal organs, to inform or to listen the deliberations. The councils are expected to speak as a political bloc in the general interests of all foreigners or migrants, in reality for a very diversity, composed with nationalities, religious groups (among them many Muslims) and other ethnic minority groups. It remains openly whether this type of ethnic corporatism (Uitermark et al. 2005) resulted in real or symbolic achievements. More common in larger Austrian local authorities are other institutional forms, such as integration committees of the municipal council, integration offices in municipal administration, integration conferences or platforms, which institutional design does hardly ensure a direct interest representation of foreigners or migrants through their organizations or spokespersons. The autonomy of the local foreigners’ advisory councils is rather low, even in the best case. These councils are established by a municipal decision; in part, the regional legislature also determines their legal status. Organizational resources are provided by the municipality at the direction of the municipal council. The coherence of the network is rather low because the membership in the council reflects and favors very diverse group interests. It is difficult to define the interests of foreigners, so that they can be said to be held in common, let alone to find a way to share so them outwardly. Altogether, the policy relevance of the local foreigners’ advisory councils can be estimated as considerable low. The promising general duty of the foreigners’ council and the municipal administration of informing each other—about the interests of foreigners, and accordingly the effects of municipal actions on the former—is not a regular practice. Direct impacts of this mechanism are not documented. This participation can be qualified as a mixture of information and consultation according to Arnstein’s ladder of participation (Arnstein 1969).

Local Health Working Groups Nationally, most areas of the Austrian health system fall under the competence of the federal level and the provinces, which include health promotion, education and information (see Hofmarcher 2013: 141). Voluntary municipal health promotion, as in the general interest of local citizens, offers various preventive or curative programs along with measures for

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information and counseling (e.g. nutritional counseling for overweight pupils, antenatal classes). The federal government and the governments of the provinces guide municipal health promotion with financial incentives and subsidy programs, thereby actively intervening in  local conditions. Decisive is the high diversity of the municipalities in Austria, in terms of size, structure or financial means and so on, which often does not seem to allow many municipalities to develop and manage own measures to promote the health of their constituencies. Instead, they are dependent on state aid. The initiative Gesunde Gemeinde (Healthy Community) is a program of the provinces since the late 1980s. Their programs place smaller cities and municipalities in the focus of health promotion, programmatically inspired by the ‘New Public Health’ concept of the World Health Organization (WHO) which looks at health through the social lens and advocates a change of all structural conditions having a negative impact on health (Baum and Brown 1989; WHO 1999; Tulchinsky and Varavikova 2014). As of 2017, there are around 1200 local units in seven of the nine provinces recognized as ‘Healthy Community’ or ‘Healthy District/Quarter’ in the bigger cities.4 In one province (Upper Austria), almost all municipalities are ‘Healthy Communities’ and members of the regional network.5 The many and different approaches, health themes, target groups and regulatory requirements prove the living federalism in the praxis of health promotion. The first step toward a ‘Healthy Community’ is—as demonstrated in the Province of Salzburg (since 1992 there has been a network)6—a unanimous municipal council decision to become a healthy community. The citizens have to set up a health working group and to develop a health program ‘according to the needs of people’. This is a certain incentive to collectively reflect the local health situation, wants and needs to promote local health. The participants are volunteers. Ideally, they came from kindergartens and schools, pensioner associations, sports clubs, health and patient care staff, educational works and people without a professional background, but who want to commit to the cause of health in their municipality. In accordance with the program’s requirements, health professionals should in any case be represented in the working group. The activities are supported organizationally and financially by the provincial program, which suggests speaking rather of regional–local health promotion. The supporting provincial organization—the private association Arbeitskreis Vorsorgemedizin (AVOS, Working-group Preventative

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Medicine) was founded by medics for the management of its non-profit Gesellschaft für Vorsorgemedizin GmbH (Society for Preventative Medicine GmbH)—is actively involved in all local project phases. This association influences the incentives and guidelines set for the operation and thematic content of the local working groups and thereby events in  local health promotion. The municipalities should provide an annual budget for health promotion (calculated with an amount per inhabitant), and they pay a charge to the network and can in return call on it for ‘help’. For activities in the context of a province-wide health theme, the municipalities with the help of AVOS also can ‘profit’ from a special subsidy from the province. Around three new communities are taken into the ‘Healthy Community’ program of the province of Salzburg each year. After a quality check, the municipalities can receive a label that distinguishes them as a Healthy Community. The health working group as the core network structure is—like the initiative itself—weakly institutionalized. The social background of the participants does vary. If the municipal organs are not present in the local working group, then ongoing contacts with them are maintained more informally. Accordingly, a health advisory board is called for, to be directly established in the local administrative structure (see Penz 2008: 83; Weninger 2015: 231). Based on their expertise, management resources and money, the local health working groups are the core of community health activities. The municipalities join the programs voluntary, and they should mobilize their own resources, in accordance with the program’s requirements. In most cases, there is a high dependence on the financial resources of the program defined by the respective province. Autonomy looks to be very low given the many imposed operational requirements from the provincial level. The coherence is minimal because the presence and cooperation in the working groups is voluntary, activity levels may vary, as does the professionalism of (some) trained and skilled members. Even the policy relevance is at a minimum. The municipal organs should be represented in the working group ideally. Direct structural effects on local activities in traffic or city planning are hard to identify. Therefore, the activities of healthy communities working group at best enrich local policies just with new ‘nuances’, and being a steered ‘partner’ of the municipal and provincial level.

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Biosphere Park Committees Nature conservation is in legislation and enforcement a competency of the Austrian provinces and a rare example of prerogatives of provinces in national federalism. The policy field demonstrates in practice the diversity of the interests of provinces and the problems of coordination between the provinces involved. The broadest integrated approach to the management of large protected areas is represented as Biosphere Parks acknowledged by the UNESCO.7 In these internationally recognized areas, models for integrated sustainable development should be tested and legally implemented, which also protect the environment, but primarily implement action for a needed regional policy in order to promote economic development to permanently improve conditions of ‘Man in the Biosphere’ in a particular area. This would suggest that at the level of action, other actors, especially from the private sector, are appearing (Pütz and Job 2016: 580). In the initiation phase, thematic forums or working groups are the key forms of participation for developing projects and measures to embed them in a broad consensus. The so-called land protection groups who defend their traditional land use interests exert a great influence. Overall numerous measures have been developed and implemented by private associations, mainly in a unanimous way. Among the 1395 protected areas in Austria (2017), there are four biosphere parks with different geographical areas and legal bases, mainly aimed at sustainable development. These four biosphere parks are Großes Walsertal, Nagelfluhkette, Salzburger Lungau/Kärntner Nockberge and Wienerwald. Nagelfluhkette is proclaimed, but still not yet acknowledged as a Biosphere Park by the UNESCO.  Two of the parks cross regional borders, and one of them is crossing national borders. Point 6 of the general UNESCO criteria determines that ‘Organizational arrangements should be provided for the involvement and participation of a suitable range of inter alia public authorities, local communities and private interests in the design and carrying out the functions of a biosphere reserve’.8 Therefore, state representatives, the resident population, important stakeholders, landowners and representatives of NGOs have to be involved. The formation of ‘networks’ and ‘cooperative partnerships’ should be explicitly sought. Experts, NGO representatives and citizens of the area are to be involved in ‘consultative expert bodies’ or in ‘advisory councils’.

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The provinces where the biosphere parks are located are responsible for the concrete institutional design of the widely held participatory approach. In the biosphere park Großes Walsertal, a board of trustees is responsible for strategic matters. This board consists of seven officials. Six are mayors of the communities located in the park, and the seventh member is the chairman of the regional planning community established to promote the inter-local cooperation and development in the area. Furthermore, there is an advisory board gathering four representatives of the province. In the biosphere park Nagelfluhkette, there is also a board of trustees. In this case, the board of trustees consists of eight mayors and a representative of the province. The advisory board consists of 11 people. Six come from the regional state sector (mainly forestry); one member is an employee of a municipal natural history museum, two members are tourism entrepreneurs, one member is a representative of the so-called energy region (geographically identical to the park) and the rest are mayors. The setting is more pluralistic in the biosphere park Salzburger Lungau/ Kärntner Nockberge which covers large areas in two provinces—namely Salzburg and Kärnten. In the part of the biosphere park belonging to Salzburg, there is a steering group consisting of two representatives of the government of the province responsible for nature protection or agriculture and forestry, three representatives of the provincial administration responsible for nature conservation, tourism or ‘livelihoods’, two representatives of regional planning association and one member representing the regional chamber of agriculture and forestry, the economic chamber, the tourism association or the alpine associations. This steering group has operational and strategic functions and can seek special thematic advice from experts. The part of the biosphere park belonging to Kärnten has a governance structure formed by a board of trustees and a committee. The board of trustees consists of a representative of the government of the province, the mayors of the four municipalities within the park, three representatives of the landowners appointed by the government of the province, a nature conservation expert and two representatives of the regional business community. The board has strategic and advisory functions. It can consult professionals with an advisory vote, a separate advisory board is not provided. The committee includes two representatives of the government of the province, the mayors of the four municipalities, two representatives of landowners and one representative of the chamber of agriculture and

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forestry. This organ guides inter alia the management of the park and decides on grant applications. Also the biosphere park Wienerwald falls within the joint competence of two provinces—namely Vienna and Lower Austria which founded a public interest company (public GmbH). The two provinces send one representative each to the Biosphärenpark Wienerwald Management Gesellschaft m.b.H. The general assembly of the company consists of two members of the governments of the two provinces. Recently, a scientific advisory board with nine members was established.9 One of the tasks of the management is inter alia the information and public relations work and the development and supervision of participatory instruments and processes. The described structure of actor constellations in governing biosphere parks confirms the observation already made elsewhere: municipal and provincial actors dominate and a broad plurality of other actors are thus participating in a new initiative (Pütz and Job 2016: 580), to be characterized by ‘governance by government’ or ‘shared governance’ (Pütz and Job 2016: 581–582). Overall, the autonomy of the Biosphere Park committees is high in comparison with the other networks of local state-society relations in Austria presented in this chapter. However, in comparison to the whole set of local state-society relations in Europe, their autonomy is relatively low (although only 0.5 points below the threshold to be considered high). The members share common experiences due to prior regional activities they have participated in. They have typically been working together in a network for regional development goals already before. Their interactions are based on partnership, displaying a high level of coherence. The committees in general have the functions of counseling, strategic orientation and operational decision-making, but in doing this, the actors involved have the power to determine and to exert their own control over programmatic and operational aspects of regional development processes in a viable manner, which gives them a high degree of policy relevance.

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Advisory Councils of the Labor Market Service Agencies Labor market policy in Austria is ultimately a federal competence, which is implemented at national and sub-national levels by federal administrative agencies. A special feature of this policy domain is strict participation of the ‘social partners’—the Austrian Economic Chamber, the Chamber of Labor, the Austrian Federation of Labor and the Federation of Austrian Industries—in the formulation and implementation of labor market policy. The current legal basis is the Arbeitsmarktservicegesetz (Labor Market Service Act) from 1994, which strengthened the role of the social partners involved. By this law, the Arbeitsmarktservice (labor market service) was outsourced organizationally from the Ministry organization and established as a public services company with its own legal personality. It is apportioned into a federal organization of 9 provincial organizations, 98 regional offices and 5 branch offices. The different organizational units provide bodies for the representation and participation of the social partners in collaboration with state representatives. These bodies are (a) at the federal level the board of directors, at the provincial level the Landesdirektorium (province directorate) and finally at the regional level the Regionalbeirat (regional advisory council). Altogether, currently there are 434 representatives of the social partners and 139 representatives of the various levels of government in these bodies. The business associations make up four of the five members in the regional advisory council. Their final appointment is made by the province directorate where the social partners are equally represented. The regional advisory councils lay down the principles of local labor market policy, propose its details, appoint the head of the offices, adopt reports, approve regional work programs and so on. The relevant ministry repeatedly stresses the significant participation of the ‘social partners’ (BM 2018), and the Court of Auditors again these partners’ significant participation in decision-making (Rechnungshof 2017: 15) or their considerable influence (Rechnungshof 2017: 30). The social partners’ themselves highlight their ‘strong involvement’ in labor market policy too. However, the neo-corporatist governance structure excludes ‘other’ interests—particularly those of local authorities and those organizations that are carrying out the many funded and experimental measures (projects) of local labor market policy.

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Nevertheless, in addition to functional decentralization, the involvement of the ‘responsible’ social partners at every organizational level of the labor market service has to be highlighted, and as crucial for innovation in labor market policy and its success in Austria in particular (Eichhorst 2007). As the regional advisory council is regulated very detailed by mandates by the responsible federal ministry, it enjoys a very low autonomy in the formal sense. Though the chairperson of the council is a state actor, the committee is formed by a clear majority of representatives from powerful union and business associations which are clearly corporatist actors. There is a high level of coherence among these actors, which does not rule out partial conflict over particular measures in times of labor market crisis. Finally, the strategic and operational policy relevance is very high because the advisory council is requested and able to take a series of decisions which can be crucial for the structuring and development of the local labor market. Instead, the broad counseling function regarding labor market policy is not in the foreground.

Summary Institutionalized policy networks in Austria show a high variability and familiarity with them is necessary for a better understanding of state intervention, even though the demands of the sector are an important factor in the cause of variability (Lehmbruch 1991: 6). The, mainly small-part territorial, structure of the local system is a structural impediment to the formation of a uniform and simple pattern of interest representation at the local level. The networks show a broad picture, namely in the context of old (labor market) or new (foreigners, health promotion, biosphere park development) policy sectors. Partly they appear widespread, partly they are singular manifestations of broader and diverse tendencies and interests in a particular policy sector. Some networks are ceremonial, that is, ranking low in all three dimensions (such as the local health working groups), or self-reflective, that is, ranking high only in respect to their coherence (like the foreigners’ advisory councils). Others can be labeled as delegated networks which are embedded in a framework set by upper-level government, yet still allow meaningful participation and decision-making over regional development and its implementation (such as the advisory councils of the labor market service and the biosphere park committees).

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Notes 1. Numbered among them are the Austrian Economic Chamber, the Austrian Chamber of Labor, the Austrian Chamber of Agriculture, the Austrian Federation of Labor and the Federation of Austrian Industries. 2. E-mail from the Office of Provincial Government of Vorarlberg, 15 October 2018; and E-mail from the regional Association of Local Governments of Vorarlberg from 15 October 2018, both addressed to the author. 3. In comparison with 24 other EU countries, Austria was among the group of 12 countries that refused the right to vote and accordingly the group of 13 countries that set up advisory boards at the local level; see Cyrus et  al. (2005), tables 2 and 3 and Golubeva (2013). 4. See https://www.gesundheit.gv.at/gesundheitsleistungen/gesundheitsfoerderung/gesunde-gemeinden. 5. With a view on assumed success of the Healthy Cities Network, Baum (2003: 105) argues: ‘There is some evidence to indicate that the development of community initiatives has been more rhetorical than real and that often Healthy Cities projects are driven by the agendas of policy makers and other professionals (also Baum 1993)’. 6. The following quotations are based on https://gesundheitsalzburg.at/ angebot/regionales/gesunde-gemeinde; and https://avos.at/sites/files/ avos/anhang/2016_4.1_gesunde_gemeinde_ok.pdf. 7. Worldwide there are 669 Biosphere Parks in 120 countries, to which have been awarded the international UNESCO title ‘biosphere reserve’ (UNESCO 2016) and which are also allowed using the label ‘model region for sustainable development’. 8. https://en.unesco.org/op-wnbr; also, Pool-Stanvliet et al. 2018, Box 1. 9. https://www.bpww.at/de/artikel/wissenschaftlicher-beirat.

References Arnstein, S. R. (1969). A Ladder of Citizen Participation. Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 35(4), 216–224. Baccaro, L. (2002). The Construction of ‘Democratic’ Corporatism in Italy. Politics & Society, 30(2), 327–357. Baum, F. E. (1993). Healthy Cities and Change: Social Movement or Bureaucratic Tool? Health Promotion International, 8(1), 31–40. Baum, F. E. (2003). The Effectiveness of Community-based Health Promotion in Healthy Cities Programmes. In T.  Takano (Ed.), Healthy Cities and Urban Policy Research (pp. 104–130). London and New York: Routledge.

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Baum, F.  E., & Brown, V. (1989). Healthy Cities (Australia) Project: Issues of Evaluation for the New Public Health. Community Health Studies, 13(2), 140–149. BM/Bundesministerium für Arbeit, Soziales, Gesundheit und Konsumentenschutz, Soziales. (2018). Basisinformationsbericht Arbeitsmarktpolitik – Institutionen, gesetzlicher Rahmen und Verfahren, Maßnahmen – Berichtsjahr 2016/2017. Wien. Bulda, I., Hengl, M., & Müller, W. C. (1990): Das österreichische Beiratswesen in den siebziger und achtziger Jahren. In Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik 1989 (pp. 763–786). Wien: Böhlau Verlag. Cyrus, N., Gropas, R., Kosic, A., & Vogel, D. (2005). Opportunity Structures for Immigrants’ Active Civic Participation in the European Union: Sharing Comparative Observations. Oldenburg: University of Oldenburg, POLITIS-­ Working Paper No. 2. Eichhorst, W. (2007). Wachstumsaspekte der Arbeitsmarktpolitik  – Von den Nachbarn lernen. Bonn: IZA Research Report No. 13. Friedmann, J., & Lehrer, U.  A. (1997). Urban Policy Responses to Foreign In-Migration: The Case of Frankfurt am Main. Journal of the American Planning Association, 63(1), 61–78. Golubeva, M. (2013). Consultative Bodies and Dialogue Platforms for Immigrant Communities: Lessons from three EU Countries. Riga: Centre for Public Policy PROVIDUS. Hofmarcher, M. M. (2013). Das österreichische Gesundheitssystem. Akteure, Daten, Analysen. Wien: MWV Medizinisch Wissenschaftliche Verlagsgesellschaft. Jahn, D. (2016). Changing of the Guard: Trends in Corporatist Arrangements in 42 Highly Industrialized Societies from 1960 to 2010. Socio-Economic Review, 14(1), 47–71. Koller, J. (1998). Kommunale Integrationspolitik: eine Analyse des Wiener Integrationsfonds im Kontext sozialdemokratischer Interessenpolitik. Wien: Thesis unpublished. Lehmbruch, G. (1991). The Organization of Society, Administrative Strategies, and Policy Networks. In R.  Czada & A.  Windhoff-Héritier (Eds.), Political Choice. Institutions, Rules and the Limits of Rationality (pp.  121–158). Frankfurt a.M. and Boulder: Campus. Penz, H. (2008). Gemeindebezogene Gesundheitsförderung. Eine Fallstudie zu etablierten Konzepten in der landesweiten Umsetzung. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Pool-Stanvliet, R., Stoll-Kleemann, S., & Giliomee, J.  H. (2018). Criteria for Selection and Evaluation of Biosphere Reserves in Support of the UNESCO MAB Programme in South Africa. Land Use Policy, 76, 654–663. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2018.02.047.

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Pütz, M., & Job, H. (2016). Governance und Regionalentwicklung in Großschutzgebieten der Schweiz und Österreichs. Raumforschung & Raumordnung, 74(6), 569–583. Rechnungshof. (2017). Bericht des Rechnungshofes Arbeitsmarktservice (AMS), III–65 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates XXVI. GP, Reihe BUND 2017/60. Wien. Siaroff, A. (1999). Corporatism in 24 Industrial Democracies: Meaning and Measurement. European Journal of Political Research, 36(2), 175–205. Tulchinsky, T., & Varavikova, E. (2014). The New Public Health (3rd ed.). San Diego: Academic Press. Uitermark, J., Rossi, U., & van Houtum, H. (2005). Reinventing Multiculturalism: Urban Citizenship and the Negotiation of Ethnic Diversity in Amsterdam. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 29(3), 622–640. Waldrauch, H., & Sohler, K. (2004). Migrantenorganisationen in der Großstadt: Entstehung, Strukturen und Aktivitäten am Beispiel Wien. Frankfurt and New York: Campus. Weninger, T. (Ed.). (2015). 100 Jahre kommunale Interessenvertretung. Österreichischer Städtebund 1915–2015. Wien: Böhlau Verlag. WHO. (1999). Health21: The Health for All Policy Framework for the WHO European Region. Copenhagen: WHO.

CHAPTER 5

Local State–Society Relations in Flanders (Belgium) Koenraad De Ceuninck and Tom Verhelst

Introduction The Flemish region in Belgium is characterized by a high degree of consultation between government and society (Fobé et al. 2013). Also in local government, a wide range of instruments have been put into place to facilitate this consultation regime, ranging from highly institutionalized settings to more ad hoc consultation forums across numerous policy domains. The landscape of local state–society networks (LSSNs) is thus broad and varied. Yet simultaneously, its impact could be questioned, since Flemish LSSNs have to operate in a local political setting which is dominated by a powerful executive body, a professionalized administration and a growing degree of public service delivery provided by (quasi-) independent municipal companies and inter-municipal cooperation (De Rynck and Wayenberg 2010).

K. De Ceuninck (*) • T. Verhelst Centre for Local Politics, Department of Political Sciences, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 F. Teles et al. (eds.), Close Ties in European Local Governance, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44794-6_5

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This chapter discusses the region-specific pattern of local state–society relations in Flanders. Since the state reform of 2001, the Belgian regions have been granted the formal authoritative competence over local authorities on their territory. Both the Flemish region (2005 and 2017) and the Walloon region (2006) used this new competence to publish their own Local Government Act. Since then, the framework for local government and LSSNs falls under the jurisdiction of the regions.1 Flanders, the Dutch-speaking region in Belgium, counts approximately 6.5 million inhabitants and 300 municipalities from January 1, 2019, onwards. This recent number is the result of a round of municipal amalgamations carried out in 2018, in which 15 municipalities were merged into seven new ones (De Ceuninck 2018). In addition to those 300 municipalities and the large number of inter-municipal cooperations they have established,2 Flanders also counts five provinces, functioning as a second tier of local government with a limited number of place-bound competences (Valcke et al. 2011). As the Local Autonomy Index (LAI) indicates, local government in Belgium, including Flanders, is characterized by a comparatively strong degree of local autonomy (European Commission 2015; Ladner et  al. 2016, 2019). Indeed, local authorities are entitled to take on a lot of tasks and powers, and thereby dispose over a large autonomy to shape those tasks. The task package of Flemish local government typically includes, among others, public security, education, sports, culture, social policy, health care, environment, economy, urbanism, general administration and so on (De Rynck and Wayenberg 2010). In certain cases, however, the authorities have to operate within the boundaries defined by central government (i.e., the Flemish region or the Belgian federal state). As a result, the effective political discretion for local government varies between the different tasks and policy domains within its remit. In some areas, it is fair to speak of local self-government (with local authorities holding real authoritative decision-making power) while others are perceived as cogovernance (with some authoritative decision-­ making power for local authorities), or territorially deconcentrated central government (with no authoritative decision-making power for local authorities; Steyvers 2015). For instance, local government acts as implementer of policy developed by federal government when issuing official documents such as driver’s licenses or passports. On the other hand, it enjoys full local autonomy in the design of its cultural policy or sports policy.

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Furthermore, several surveys show that the confidence people place in local authorities is relatively high in Flanders and in Belgium as compared to the European average (Węziak-Białowolska and Dijkstra 2015). This relatively high confidence is also expressed in a long and rich tradition of local authorities consulting local society in drafting and implementing local policy through different kinds of LSSNs. This chapter describes five particular types of LSSNs in Flanders: • the local youth council; • the Municipal Committee for Spatial Planning (Gecoro); • the Local Action Group (LAG); • the local mobility commission (GBC); • the local housing consultation. Together, these networks offer an adequate picture of the current institutionalized consultation landscape in Flemish local government in terms of issue salience, legal status, function and membership.3 Besides, the networks in our overview represent the broad policy range covered by the institutionalized cooperation between the local state and local society in Flanders. The youth council is the first LSSN in our overview. This network is selected as an example of the numerous generic advisory councils in Flemish local government involving a specific subset of local society. These networks are established to provide local government with policy advice in a broad variety of policy domains such as culture, sports, elderly policy, welfare, social affairs, education, tourism, local economy, environment, public safety, development cooperation and youth policy. The common legal basis for the different advisory councils is the Flemish Local Government Act (FLGA 2017). The FLGA (Article 304.3) grants the local council the authority and discretion to establish advisory councils. Only two formal obligations are centrally imposed including gender representation and the prohibition to include local politicians (councillors, aldermen (deputy mayors) or the mayor) as full members entitled to vote. Advisory councils are authorized to issue policy advice on a regular and systematic base, yet not to decide upon the specific policy issue. It is up to the local council to further regulate the advisory councils (e.g., composition, representativeness and procedures). Below this general surface, the autonomy and legal status of these advisory councils differs. Most of them have a discretionary basis, and their existence varies according to the

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specific local context (e.g., economy, development cooperation, public safety). Other advisory councils are conditional as they are a practical solution to the legal requirement to organize some form of public participation in a given policy domain (e.g., sports, culture), or they are mandatory insofar as local government decides to develop a policy plan in this specific policy domain (e.g., environment). A fourth category, such as the youth council, is compulsory. The other networks discussed in this chapter represent LSSNs that have a more distinct status. A particular example of such a network is the Municipal Committee for Spatial Planning, abbreviated as Gecoro. This advisory council for spatial planning is a compulsory standing committee as well, but it is more functional than representative in nature. The Gecoro is a good example of a very formal contact between the local state and different sections from local society on a highly relevant policy issue. Thirdly, the chapter outlines the importance and substance of the Local Action Groups—LAGs (called Plaatselijke Groep in Dutch), which are established in the context of the EU programme LEADER. This voluntary network includes a broad range of societal and governmental actors. As a policy network, Flemish LAGs are designed to contribute to strengthening social inclusion and local development in rural areas. The two remaining networks are the local mobility commission (GBC) and the local housing consultation. Both are well-established and compulsory networks in Flemish local government that address salient policy issues. The GBC acts as a standing committee in the field of local mobility policy, involving a wide range of stakeholders. The local housing consultation takes the shape of a special (ad hoc) committee and includes a more strictly defined set of actors.

The Local Youth Council The local youth council is a compulsory LSSN in Flanders. On the basis of the Local Youth Policy Act (2012, Art.5.2.), the local council of each municipality is required to establish a youth council, or to certify an existing one. The main function of the youth council is to organize the consultation and participation of youth during the preparation and implementation of local youth policy, including the municipality’s strategic multiannual policy plan (i.e., a compulsory plan that defines the main policy choices for each legislative term).4 The Act stipulates that representatives of active local youth associations or organizations, but also individual children or

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young people of the municipality, can serve in the council. Furthermore, the municipality’s youth officer and the alderman responsible for youth policy can attend the meetings as observers (hence, without having voting rights). The Act instructs the local council to determine the procedures of the youth council including the guarantees to the latter’s right of information vis-à-vis the executive board (the governing body consisting of the mayor and the aldermen); the support of the council; the way in which the executive board should motivate its opinion on the council’s policy advice; and rules concerning the publicity of the advice and the operation of the council. Finally, the Act states that the executive board is bound to ask the youth council’s formal policy advice on all matters of youth policy including the design of the municipality’s strategic multiannual policy plan. Additionally, the youth council is allowed to proactively issue policy advice on all matters concerning youth and children. The executive board should motivate its decision when it decides not to act upon this policy advice. Therefore, we attribute youth councils a fairly high score on the dimension autonomy. In terms of coherence, the youth council scores high as well. Its main aim is to promote the views of youth in the locality, in local government and in  local policy. Youth councils adopt a traditional organizational scheme to achieve this end (Schrijvers 2015). They include a general assembly, which decides upon the council’s policy advices, and a specific executive committee, which defines the organization and procedures of the council. Overall, the general assembly tends to meet seven times per year. According to Schrijvers (2015), this number did not fluctuate much in the past decade. In around 60 percent of the Flemish municipalities, the youth council has an executive committee as well, which meets nine times per year on average. Two-thirds of the youth councils have a formal policy agreement with local government, and an average youth council counts 22 full members. This number has decreased over the past years (in 2004, the average number was 28) reflecting a decrease of the involvement of local youth organizations. The latter, however, still represent the large majority of the council members (almost 80 percent). Additional full members are representatives of the youth branch of political parties (around 5 percent) and individual children or youth (around 15 percent). Apart from these full members, youth councils may also include a number of ‘observers’ such as the alderman for youth policy, municipal councillors, external experts or the local youth officer (in 2014, this group

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counted three members on average). As such, the youth council comprises the three main actors of local youth policy: youth (organizations), the municipal youth officer and the alderman responsible for youth policy (Schrijvers 2015). The nature of the youth council’s policy advice is twofold. On the one hand, the council issues advice on policies concerning youth organizations (e.g., formal approval or modification of the youth organization plan, subsidy rules, material services, infrastructure, etc.). This type of advice forms the large majority of youth council work (70 percent). On the other hand, the council is less frequently engaged in advising local government on broader policy issues that may have particular consequences for youth (e.g., local culture and sports policy, nightlife, day-care, mobility, playgrounds, etc.). The division between advice on demand (from local government) and proactive advice is 50/50. Apart from their core mission, many youth councils (90 percent) also organize specific youth activities (e.g., recreation, information, nightlife, leisure) and establish different working groups to prepare and implement those activities (Tubex et al. 2006). Lastly, youth councils serve as liaison office for local youth and youth organizations (Van Nieuwenhove in Wijnant 2006). With regard to the relevance of the youth council, Tubex et al. (2006) found that this type of LSSN secured a structural place in  local society. The cooperation between the council and the local administration is harmonious and constructive. The political sphere (in the person of the alderman) respects the autonomy of the council. Simultaneously, however, this weakens the link between the council and local government. As a result, the work of the youth council is often restricted to ‘youth association work’ instead of broader ‘youth policy’, and the council thereby fails to assume its role as agent of the general youth interests in  local policy-­ making. Moreover, youth councils tend to be consulted in a very modest fashion, or only at the final stage of decision-making. The authors also argued that youth councils find it hard to reach out to the less privileged groups of young people in the municipality. Van Roelen (in Wijnant 2006) listed five factors impeding youth councils from being more powerful actors: a lack of status, position and recognition by other actors; its composition which is quite narrow in practice (including very few young people from outside the circle of associational life); its daily operation (e.g., a lack of outward communication, frequent change of membership); its substantive operation (e.g., a lack of focus on broader policies due to the

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focus on organizing specific activities) and its lack of proactive networking (connecting different participation initiatives). A recent study of Op de Beeck and De Peuter (2017) examined the effect of the introduction of a new local strategic multiannual policy plan in 2010 upon the involvement of different actors such as the youth council. This new plan replaced the old individual policy plans (such as the specific youth policy plan) by a more comprehensive and strategic general plan. Op de Beeck and De Peuter noticed a status quo or even a reduction in local government’s attention to youth participation. Furthermore, half of the youth councils indicated to be less involved in policy-making and to have less influence on municipal youth policy under the new system. As acclaimed by the general youth council in Flanders, the divide between the youth council and local government is further deepened by the alderman’s increased autonomy, influence and flexibility in policy-making. Local officers, on the other hand, have to devote more time to their role as manager, networker and policy assistant, which negatively affects the time they can invest in supporting and involving local youth. Combining high scores for autonomy and coherence with a low score on relevance, we consider the Flemish youth council as a collaborative local state–society network.

The Municipal Committee for Spatial Planning (Gecoro) The advisory council for spatial planning (in Dutch Gemeentelijke Commissie Ruimtelijke Ordening, abbreviated as ‘Gecoro’) has been established in every Flemish municipality since 1999 on the basis of Article 1.3.3 of the Flemish codex on spatial planning.5 This advisory council acts as a compulsory standing committee of local government. It is entitled to give advice, make comments or draft proposals on all matters related to municipal spatial planning, either on its own initiative or at the request of the local executive board or the local council. The Gecoro always counts between 7 and 21 members, depending on the scale of the municipality concerned. It is up to the local council to appoint the members of the advisory board, each for a term of six years. The advisory council follows the same period as the directly elected local councils, and is renewed after every local election. Although the local council thus has the discretion to appoint the individual members of the

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Gecoro, it is the Flemish government that decides which social groups have to be included on a general level. A minimum of one quarter of the members, including the chairman, are spatial planning experts. This concerns, for instance, architects or spatial planners, although the legislation is not clear about what is exactly to be understood by ‘experts’. The other members are representatives of the most important sections of society within the municipality. Examples of those social groups are environmental associations or organizations that defend the interests of farmers or independent entrepreneurs. Their contribution increases the degree of participation and creates broader support for spatial policy. Members of the local council are not allowed to be full members of this network: they can attend the meetings of the Gecoro, but they do not have voting rights. Political parties represented in the local council usually send one municipal councillor to the Gecoro to attend the meetings. Two or more municipalities can set up an inter-municipal spatial planning committee through an inter-municipal partnership in order to overcome problems of scale and size. In practice, however, the vast majority of Flemish municipalities have their own Gecoro. An evaluation from 2013 showed that there is a very large variation between municipalities in the functioning of their advisory councils on spatial planning (Coppens et al. 2013). This is largely due to the hybrid role that the legislator has assigned to the advisory board, namely that of an expert forum, a supervisory body and a mediator, in addition to the more traditional role as an advisory body. This is also the result of the fact that the Gecoro enjoys a large autonomy in the performance of its duties. It has the right to set its own rules and regulations. However, the latter are always submitted to the local council for approval. This results in a very hybrid image of the Gecoro as a network with great autonomy in its own functioning, but rather limited autonomy in its composition. It is a compulsory network in which central government defines the outlines, while local government gives substance to the specific composition of the network. There is, however, a larger autonomy with regard to the internal functioning of the Gecoro. In this latter aspect, the network enjoys considerable freedom to shape the way in which it works and how it is organized internally. In terms of network coherence, the Gecoro scores rather high. The network meets regularly, and the representatives of the various sections of society serve the same interest, namely a vision on the spatial development of the municipality. However, this does not prevent these representatives

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from defending other interests from one another, which in turn does not always benefit the internal coherence of this network. Finally in terms of relevance, the network scores high. Although it is just an advisory council, there has been some case law stating that the advice of a Gecoro is an indispensable step in the process of local spatial planning. In other words, it is an advice that is difficult to ignore. At the very least, there must be a solid motivation why the advice of the Gecoro has not been followed in the end. Moreover, the network deals with a very salient policy issue that affects local society considerably. In conclusion, (moderately) high autonomy, high coherence and high relevance lead to the description of the Gecoro as a consociational network.

The Local Action Group Local Action Groups (LAGs, called Plaatselijke Groep in Dutch) are the second consociational network in our overview. They are established on a voluntary basis in the context of LEADER, the EU program for rural development. LEADER aims to improve the quality of life on the countryside by supporting local initiatives which strengthen the economic and social fabric of the locality. The LEADER approach is part of the EU’s agriculture policy promoted and cofunded by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD)6 and implemented by national/ regional Rural Development Programmes/RDP (European Network for Rural Development 2019). In Belgium, both Flanders and Wallonia adopted an RDP. For the program period 2014–2020, the Flemish program amounts to €925 million of public funding (€384 million EU funding, €288 million national cofunding and €253 million national top-ups). The program prioritizes five objectives: increasing the competitiveness of agriculture and innovative farm technologies; improving the food chain organization and risk management; restoring, preserving and enhancing ecosystems; investing in resource efficiency and climate; and strengthening social inclusion and local development. The final objective is supported through the LEADER approach (allocating €34 million)7 and the Local Action Groups (LAGs), which design and implement Local Development Strategies to accomplish this objective (European Commission 2019). Flanders counts 12 LAGs (on a total number of 32 in Belgium). They are organized on a provincial basis and selected by Provincial Management Committees (PMC) after an assessment of the proposed Local Development Strategy (i.e., a long-term and integrated vision on the territory). Formal

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conditions are the rural and coherent character of the territory of the LAG, an appropriate scale, comprising at least 50 percent members from the private sector and developing an integrated strategy for the sustainable development of the territory. After being selected by the PMC, Flemish government and the executive board of the province formally confirm the establishment of the LAG (implying the approval of the LAG’s Local Development Strategy, territory and budget). By using its budget to support projects of local actors, the LAG can implement its strategic vision (De Seranno 2008). Flemish LAGs should formally involve public and private actors from different socio-economic sectors and associations. Once they have been established and funded, they enjoy full discretion to implement their strategic vision and manage the budget. The LAG thus determines the procedure for submitting and selecting projects that fit into its development strategy. In doing so, it holds the autonomy to implement policy on the countryside (De Seranno 2008). The Flemish LAGs are distributed over the five provinces. A LAG involves different municipalities (ranging from 6 to 18, and covering half of the Flemish municipalities in total) and is organized as a type of inter-­ municipal cooperation. The LAG is free to choose its operational and organizational form. Next to the different participating municipalities (i.e., usually municipalities with a rural character represented by the mayor or an alderman), a typical LAG is comprised of representatives (councillors or executives) from the province (which have a long tradition of fostering territorial governance and cooperation) and different socio-economic organizations in the locality (e.g., employer organizations, farmer organizations, environmental organizations, welfare organizations). Often, the LAG also includes advisory members (often officers involved in territorial governance). The LAG of Mid-West-Flanders, for instance, includes 14 municipalities covering 61,284 km2 and representing 163,360 inhabitants (Leader Midden-West-Vlaanderen 2014). It further includes the province and representatives from the different relevant social and economic sectors. The focus of the network is on transferring knowledge and innovation within the rural sector (agriculture, horticulture and forestry); profiling and promoting the regional identity (including tourism and recreation); and tackling poverty and vulnerability in the agricultural and rural community. The province (West-Flanders) is appointed as the responsible authority for the administrative and financial management of the network. The

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province also employs and coaches the coordinator of the network. The LAG is further divided into an executive committee (preparing meetings and monitoring projects), a secretariat including the coordinator (coordinating, informing and advising the promoters of the projects and monitoring the LAG’s budget) and the board of the Local Action Group as decision-making body. The latter meets at least once per year to decide upon the projects (preferably by consensus) and/or to organize information sessions, evaluations, project presentations and so on. Finally, the LAG has installed an advisory body involving officers of the participating governments and associations who are selected on the basis of their knowledge, experience and expertise. In a recent study of the European Network for Rural Development (2017), the Belgian LAGs were asked to assess the implementation of LEADER. The report, including answers from eight networks, shows that the top priority themes for Belgian LAGs are ‘agriculture and farming, supply chains, local food’ and ‘natural environment and resources, landscape’. In general, the LAGs seem fairly satisfied with the discretion granted by the national/regional framework to pursue the policies they prefer. Still, nearly half of the respondents would welcome additional independence and responsibility. All respondents argued that this would (at least somehow) improve the network’s achievements. On the basis of their high autonomy, strong coherence and substantial relevance (which stems from its delegated power rather than its policy substance), we typify Local Action Groups in Flanders as consociational networks.

The Local Mobility Commission The local mobility commission (officially called ‘municipal guidance commission’, in Dutch Gemeentelijke begeleidingscommissie or GBC) is a multidisciplinary and compulsory local standing committee which tackles mobility issues in a transversal way. The GBC is legally anchored in the Flemish Mobility Act (2012, Art. 15) and has a dual objective. On the one hand, the commission is involved in the preparation, layout, follow-up and evaluation of the municipal or inter-municipal mobility plan. This plan outlines the future evolutions on local mobility issues. On the other hand, the commission is also responsible for the preparation, follow-up and evaluation of all projects that are in line with a sustainable local mobility policy, in particular with regard to all measures related to the support of other

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strategic plans, the improvement of existing infrastructure, the construction of new infrastructure, the development of high-quality public transport and other measures that contribute to local sustainable mobility. In that sense, it is an indispensable consultation platform for everything that has to do with mobility at the local level. A sustainable local mobility policy is central to this. A final goal of this network is to gain support among the local population and all partners involved for new initiatives in the context of local mobility. The GBC is established by decision of the local council. If a project concerns several municipalities, those municipalities can install an inter-­ municipal GBC.  As long as the GBC is not officially established by the council, it is not possible to validly decide on plans and projects on mobility in the municipality. The day-to-day operation of the GBC is arranged by internal rules. The GBC has the discretion to draw up these rules based on a model laid down by Flemish government. The composition of the GBC is diverse and consists of three types of members: permanent members, alternating members that are required to be invited and local representatives. As defined by the Flemish Mobility Act, every GBC has to include the initiator, representatives of the municipality, representatives of the Mobility and Public Works department of Flemish government, the Flemish public transport company and other road authorities. It is up to the local council to decide on the specific composition of the GBC, such as the appointment of the chairman, the municipal representatives and the advisory members. The alternating members that can be invited are, among others, the province, the Belgian railways (or other public transport providers) and other authorities that have to issue permits or grant subsidies as part of a current project which is discussed in the GBC. Finally, since the commission plays an important role in gaining support for mobility projects, the municipality has a large autonomy to appoint advisory members. Those members can be both local and non-local actors who are invited because of their expertise or involvement. Citizens or certain focus groups can also be invited. In this way, the GBC plays its role as consultation forum and generates local support for the intended mobility projects. The GBC formulates its recommendations by consensus. Each of the permanent and alternating members has one vote by which they decide on the plan or project. The autonomy of the GBC is rated as moderately low. It is dependent on central government for its composition, although the network has more autonomy when it comes to setting its internal rules. In terms of

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coherence, the network scores very high. The mandate of the actors in the GBC is clearly defined, and we can label the network as being stable. Moreover, the actors within the network function as partners. The image of the network’s relevance is blurred. On the one hand, the issues raised in the GBC affect many people and have a considerable impact. On the other hand, the power of the network is merely consultative (even though the informal impact of the GBC differs from one municipality to another). Therefore, we identify this network as a self-reflective type of network.

Local Housing Consultation The final LSSN discussed in this chapter is a compulsory special committee which deals with local housing policy. Article 28 of the Flemish housing code, the legal framework for housing policy in Flanders, stipulates that local authorities have a coordinating role in the field of local housing policy. This means that municipalities are responsible for developing a housing policy at the local level, paying attention to stimulating social housing projects, supporting families and single people in need of housing and monitoring the quality of the local houses and the living environment. Municipalities have a large degree of local autonomy, however, to define how they exactly fulfil their coordinating role. Following a resolution of Flemish government (2018, Art.3), the municipalities should do this, among other things, by convening all actors involved in local housing policy at least twice a year in what is called a ‘local housing consultation’. This results in the incentive-driven character of this (ad hoc) committee, which is established both to prepare local housing policy and to implement it. In this way, the local housing consultation serves as an important instrument of local housing policy, which is a salient policy field that affects all people in the locality. The intention of this network is to achieve policy coordination, greater efficiency and effectiveness, and to create support for the local housing policy. Furthermore, the local housing consultation also serves to develop a policy vision on housing and living in the municipality or city, and to work on the improvement of the quality of life. All decisions in that context are finally taken by the local council, yet not without considering the prior advice from the local housing consultation. A number of policy decisions are even conditional to such advice (e.g., rules on social housing allocation, social renting or housing standards). In practice, this means that the municipality brings together all actors involved in housing policy on a regular basis to give direction to the local

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housing policy. Therefore, the municipality’s role is limited to the role of coordinator. Three types of actors are defined by central government: local housing stakeholders, local welfare organizations and the Flemish agency. Next to social housing companies, social rental offices and local welfare organizations, associations of homeowners and associations of renters can thus be invited as well. In this way, both the public sector and the private sector are represented in the network, which reduces the network’s coherence in terms of shared beliefs. However, those actors are not obliged to accept that invitation. In fact, the housing consultation is based on voluntary participation. Only the Flanders Living Agency (the Flemish administration competent for housing) is obliged to accept the invitation. The municipality in turn is obliged to draw up a report of those meetings and to send it to all members involved, including the Flemish Living Agency. Although this network was only established in 2009, the instrument has rapidly become a useful and widespread instrument for shaping local housing policy. In almost all Flemish municipalities, there is now a local housing consultation that meets with certain regularity (Luyts 2015). In terms of autonomy, this network scores moderately low. It is compulsory as both its composition and the policy areas it deals with are generally defined by central government. Yet simultaneously, municipalities enjoy the discretion to determine the specific modus operandi of the network. The same goes for the coherence of the network. The local housing consultation is comprised of actors who do not necessarily represent the same kind of interests. The network is however stable and characterized by group membership. Finally, in terms of relevance, this network scores rather low. Similar to the GBC, the substance of the network is not matched by its impact, as the latter does not go much further than providing advice on housing policy. In the end, it is still up to the local council and the licensing authorities (mostly the local executive, but also the province or Flemish government) to decide on the policy options that are chosen. All this makes the local housing consultation a self-reflective type of network.

Summary The five cases discussed in this chapter clearly show that Flanders, one of the three regions in Belgium, has a rich tradition when it comes to local authorities shaping policy in coproduction with the local state via different kinds of institutionalized networks. These networks are often

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consociational, collaborative or self-reflective in nature. They are involved in designing, implementing and evaluating a wide range of local policies. Per policy domain, the LLSNs include different types of relevant actors and stakeholders. Underneath this general conceptual picture, however, lies a more variegated landscape in practice. Indeed, LSSNs in Flanders have a different legal basis and come in various forms, ranging from voluntary or easily accessible and informal consultation forms to very formal, institutionalized types of consultation. Often, the autonomy of the network results from a centrally defined framework complemented by local operational discretion. Next to this, the difference between the rules-in-form and the rules-in-use in terms of operation and composition, alongside local practice, blurs the strict divide between the network types even more in terms of coherence and autonomy. Finally, we should emphasize the trade-off between substance and power in the assessment of the networks’ relevance. In most cases, the final decisions are still taken by the local council or, above all, the members of the executive board. Their decisions may be in line with what has come out of the advisory procedure, but they can also go against it. In the latter case, it is up to the local authorities to justify why they did not follow the advice of the network, and why they developed an alternative policy after all. As such, the Flemish case exemplifies the potential paradox of local state–society relations. Although a wide and variegated landscape of policy networks can exist, hinting at a structural move towards local governance, the policy outcome is still dependent upon the local political culture, which is often reminiscent of traditional local government, including its political primacy and executive dominance. Networks that can acquire a quasi-formal status such as the Gecoro or which enjoy real decision-making power in a specific policy domain (e.g., the LAGs) still seem an exception in that regard.

Notes 1. The Brussels Capital Region did not install a new LGA yet. 2. An official report counted no less than 2.229 different types of inter-­ municipal cooperation in Flanders in 2012, ranging from very formal inter-­ municipal companies up to more informal administrative city forums (ABB 2012). 3. Next to these institutionalized local state–society networks, there are numerous informal consultation forums where local government meets local society to exchange ideas on new policy plans, or to adjust current policies.

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4. In addition to the youth council (as the most institutionalised instrument), municipalities utilize more informal instruments to involve local youth in policy-making as well. These include, among others, the work of the municipal youth service, ad hoc surveys, a youth check on local policy, children councils and teen councils (Schrijvers 2015). 5. This Flemish codex on Spatial Planning is the basic law on everything related to spatial planning in Flanders. For more information: https://www.ruimtelijkeordening.be/VCRO. 6. LEADER represented the local development method that was funded by the European Fund EAFRD and that was used until the current EU Multiannual Financial Framework 2014–2020. During the period 2014–2020, the method has been extended to the broader term Community-­ Led Local Development including funding from three additional EU Funds (EMFF, ERDF, ESF; European Network for Rural Development 2019). 7. The LEADER approach entails a focus on specific subregional territories; guidance from the community (involving representatives from the public and private sector); implementation via integrated and multisectoral territorial strategies for local development; and a design in the context of local needs and possibilities while being innovative in the local context (Europa Nu 2019).

References ABB. (2012). Regioscreening. Bestuurlijke regionale samenwerking in Vlaanderen. Inventarisatie en analyse. Brussel, Agentschap voor Binnenlands Bestuur (Policy report published by the Flemish administration for internal affairs). Coppens, T., Voets, J., & Van Wymeersch, E. (2013). De werking van de gemeentelijke en provinciale commissies van advies in Vlaanderen. Gent: Artesis Hogeschool – Ugent. De Ceuninck, K. (2018). 2019. Scharnierjaar voor het schaaldebat in Vlaanderen. In H.  Reynaert (Ed.), Verrekijkers voor lokale besturen. Een lange(re)termijnvisie?! (pp. 15–34). Brugge: Vanden Broele. De Rynck, F., & Wayenberg, E. (2010). Local government in Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia : towards more convergence or divergence in Belgium’s local government system? In E. C. Page & M. Goldsmith (Eds.), Central and local government relations : a comparative analysis of West European unitary states (pp. 14–29). London, UK: Sage. De Seranno, L. (2008). 10 Vlaamse plattelandsgebieden erkend als Leadergebied. Retrieved from https://www.vlaanderen.be/vlaamse-overheid/persberichten/ 10-vlaamse-plattelandsgebieden-erkend-als-leadergebied. European Commission. (2015). Self-Rule Index for Local Authorities. Final Report. Brussels: European Commission. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.

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eu/regional_policy/en/information/publications/studies/2015/ self-rule-index-for-local-authorities-release-1-0. European Commission. (2019). Factsheet on 2014–2020 Rural Development Programme of Flanders (Belgium). Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/rural-development-2014-2020/country-files/ be/factsheet-flanders_en.pdf. European Network for Rural Development. (2017). LEADER LAG Survey 2017. Working Paper Findings at Member State Level. Member State: Belgium. Retrieved from https://enrd.ec.europa.eu/sites/enrd/files/ leader-resources_lag_survey_report_be.pdf. European Network for Rural Development. (2019). LEADER/CLLD. Retrieved from https://enrd.ec.europa.eu/leader-clld_en. Europa Nu. (2019). Door de Gemeenschap geleide lokale ontwikkeling (CLLD). Retrieved from https://www.europa-nu.nl/id/vh92knl8mlv1/door_de_ gemeenschap_geleide_lokale. Fobé, E., Brans, M., Vancoppenolle, D., & Van Damme, J. (2013). Institutionalized Advisory Systems: An Analysis of Member Satisfaction of Advice Production and Use Across 9 Strategic Advisory Councils in Flanders (Belgium). Policy and Society, 32(3), 225–240. Flemish Local Government Act (2017). Ladner, A., Keuffer, N., & Baldersheim, H. (2016). Measuring Local Autonomy in 39 Countries (1990–2014). Regional & Federal Studies, 26(3), 321–357. Ladner, A., Keuffer, N., Baldersheim, H., Hlepas, N., Swianiewicz, P., Steyvers, K., & Navarro, C. (2019). Patterns of Local Autonomy in Europe. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Leader Midden-West-Vlaanderen. (2014). Lokale Ontwikkelingsstrategie 2014–2020. Luyts, H. (2015). Lokaal woonoverleg. Basiscursus lokaal woonbeleid. Brussel: Wonen Vlaanderen. Op de Beeck, S. & De Peuter, B. (2017). Eenmeting jeugdbeleid in lokale besturen. Lokaal jeugdbeleid in een nieuwe context van strategische meerjarenplanning. Brussel: onderzoeksrapport Departement cultuur, jeugd en media. Schrijvers, E. (2015). Cijferboek lokaal jeugdbeleid 2014–2015. Brussel: onderzoeksrapport Departement cultuur, jeugd, sport en media. Steyvers, K. (2015). Local Autonomy Index for the European Countries (1990–2014): Country Report Belgium. Brussels: European Commission. Tubex, S, De Rynck, F. & Coussée, F. (2006). De inspraak en participatie van kinderen, jongeren en het jeugdwerk in en aan het lokale beleid. Gent: onderzoeksrapport Hogeschool Gent. Valcke, T., Reynaert, H., & Steyvers, K. (2011). Belgium. In H.  Heinelt & X. Bertrana (Eds.), The Second Tier of Local Government in Europe. Provinces, Counties, Départements and Landkreise in Comparison (pp. 27–55). London: Routledge.

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Węziak-Białowolska, D., & Dijkstra, L. (2015). Trust, Local Governance and Quality of Public Service in EU Regions and Cities. JRC Science and Policy Report. Brussels: European Commission. Wijnant, E. (2006). Het adviesorgaan van het gemeentelijke jeugdbeleid; Descriptief onderzoek naar de lokale jeugdraden in Vlaanderen. Brussel: niet-­ gepubliceerde scriptie, VUB.

CHAPTER 6

Local State–Society Relations in Croatia Ivan Kopric ́, Dubravka Jurlina Alibegovic ́, Romea Manojlovic ́ Toman, Dario Č epo, and Sunc ̌ana Slijepc ě vic ́

Introduction Croatia is a highly centralized country. Local governance is based on the network of 428 municipalities and 128 towns, 17 of which have a special status of the large town. Almost 51 percent of local governments have fewer than 3000 inhabitants, and an additional 20 percent have between 3000 and 5000 inhabitants. Despite the constitutionally guaranteed local scope, their role in performing public tasks is considerably limited. Many of them are financially dependent on central state grants. Counties (20 of them) are supplementary, second-tier local governments with weak financial capacity. State budget provides for about 60 percent of their finances through centrally managed grants. I. Koprić • R. Manojlović Toman (*) • D. Č epo Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] D. Jurlina Alibegović • S. Slijepčević The Institute of Economics, Zagreb, Croatia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 F. Teles et al. (eds.), Close Ties in European Local Governance, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44794-6_6

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Since many local governments have extremely weak capacities, only counties and 34 towns were able to take over certain functions from the central state in the 2001 decentralization (Koprić and Đulabić 2018). In the period 2008–2014, the share of local revenues in national GDP amounted to around 6.7 percent (Koprić et  al. 2019: 170). Although local autonomy index has recently shown a medium degree of local autonomy (Ladner et al. 2015: 68–69), there is an overdeveloped machinery of the central government.1 Moreover, significant regional and local disparities, asymmetric allocation of powers, and incomplete decentralization still indicate that local governance system is not fully in line with the European standards (COE Report 2016). Strengthening the position of counties became a new political goal from 2017 onwards, although their financial autonomy is flawed—the share of central budget financial support in the total county revenues in 2017 was 57.1 percent with the prospect of increasing.2 The counties exert strong regulatory, financial, and control-­ based influence over municipalities and towns (CoE Report 2016; Škarica 2019). Different forms of direct democracy and citizen participation were established at the local level in the frame of the so-called self-management system during the socialist Yugoslavia (Ivanišević et al. 1979; Pusić 1981). After gaining independence in 1991, Croatia has strived to democratize local politics by using the following institutions: (a) electoral (independent lists and candidates, national minorities’ representation, direct election, and recall of mayors), (b) traditional (referenda, citizens’ initiative, citizens’ meetings, sub-municipal governance, and public debates), and (c) new (youth councils, public consultation procedures, participatory budgeting, coproduction, etc.). However, they are rarely used or unsuccessful (Koprić 2011a; Koprić and Vukojičić Tomić 2013; Koprić and Klarić 2015; Džinić et al. 2016; Milošević 2017; Manojlović Toman and Vukojičić Tomi 2018; Č epo and Ravlić 2018). Civil society in Croatia consists of about 52,000 citizen associations, 267 foundations and funds, 660 trade unions, several dozens of commerce, craft, and employer chambers and associations, religious communities, informal civic initiatives, and other forms of citizen engagement. The relatively low level of citizen participation opens the problem of local governments’ legitimacy. According to the autumn 2018 Eurobarometer (European Commission 2018), only 23 percent of Croatian citizens tend to trust local and regional authorities. The trust level is one of the lowest among the EU member states. However, the most recent research has

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shown that civil society has advanced, has attained stronger support, and has been recognized as an important societal actor (Bežovan and Matančević 2017: 143). This chapter analyses the main societal networks involved in local state– society relations in Croatia, taking into consideration the autonomy, the coherence, and the relevance of these networks. Four important networks relevant to local state–society relations have been analysed: (a) youth councils, (b) school boards and parents’ councils, (c) local development agencies (LDAs), and (d) local actions groups. These networks have been chosen because of their representativeness as they function in different sectors of local policy. Three of them are linked to the first tier of government, while school boards and parents’ councils involve both the first and the second tiers, depending on whether towns or counties are school founders. Along with these, there are other local networks promoting partnership of local stakeholders, such as tourist boards and firefighting associations, councils for crime prevention, and so on. Tourist boards are institutions with legal entity that ought to be established by every municipality or town on whose territory there is at least one locality designated as a tourist settlement by the minister of tourism. Their tasks are the promotion and planning of tourism. All legal and physical persons performing tourism-­ related activities are obligatory members. Local mayors and county governors serve as presidents of these boards. The Croatian Tourist Board and the Ministry of Tourism are umbrella bodies with extensive powers over this network. Firefighting associations encompass voluntary firefighting organizations and professional firefighting squads. There are 248 local firefighting associations, 20 county associations, and the Croatian Firefighting Association which has the status of a central state administrative organization. This network relates to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Koprić et al. 2016). Councils for crime prevention are local advisory bodies promoting community-oriented policing and proposing measures for improving local security. About 165 local governments established them between 2004 and 2011. Their members are representatives of local authorities and institutions, but they do not have citizen representation. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Police are umbrella bodies of this network (Borovec 2012: 47–48, 237–238). These three networks are not analysed because there are ministries and other mentioned state bodies that regulate, decide about, coordinate, and supervise them, which means that they are not really in the hands of either

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citizens or local governments. Tourism is not equally important in all parts of Croatia and in all municipalities. In addition, tourist boards are essentially economic institutions, quite like economic chambers. Local firefighting associations coordinate local fire service, as a form of co-production primarily based on voluntary service. Finally, there is a serious lack of citizen participation in crime prevention councils, whose establishment, structure, and functioning promote partnership of various governmental institutions at the local level, but not citizen participation.

Youth Councils Youth councils are a result of harmonization with the European youth policy standards in Croatia (Koprić et al. 2014: 330–333). According to the Law on Youth Councils (LYC) of 2014,3 youth councils are established by a local representative body in every municipality, town, and county. The youth council is a consultative body entrusted with information-­sharing, consultative, and reporting competences. It cooperates with local councils and mayors, handling the issues important to young people, enhancing participation of the young in  local affairs and decisions, and empowering local youth population. The autonomy of youth councils is low. Although the law imposes their establishment, there are no sanctions for non-complying with the LYC provisions. Since the adoption of the first LYC in 2007, the number of municipalities and towns with established youth councils has constantly been declining. In 2011, youth councils were established and functional in less than a third of local governments: in 75 towns (74 percent) and 83 municipalities (28 percent) (Koprić 2011b: 10). Later, the total number of active youth councils (including those at the county level) fluctuated between 86 and 117 (15–21 percent) (Ministry of Demography, Family, Youth and Social Policy 2018: 1; Koprić 2018: 158). The finances and premises for youth councils are to be ensured by local governments, and they coordinate the work of youth councils. Youth councils’ statutory composition and statutory rules are set by the LYC. The councils must adopt detailed rules of procedure by a majority vote. They are highly dependent on the political will of both the local executives and local councils. Their role encompasses information-sharing, advising, establishing other collaborative arrangements within and outside the municipality, reporting, and requesting reports, but there is no effective tool for their realization.

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The coherence of the network is medium. Members of youth councils are appointed by the local representative body at the proposal of the (a) associations dealing with youths; (b) students’ and pupils’ councils; (c) youth branches of political parties, trade unions, or professional organizations; and (d) informal groups of young people.4 Candidates have to be between 15 and 30  years of age. The number of youth council members varies between five and seven in the smallest municipalities and between 15 and 21 in the capital, the City of Zagreb. The mandate of youth representatives lasts for three years. Once appointed by the local council, the members of youth councils enjoy a non-imperative mandate. One of the problems is that they are appointed by local politicians in local councils, which opens a problem of party politicization and partisan political activity of the youth council members (Koprić 2011b: 17). Members of youth councils should share beliefs as a premise of interaction, especially about empowering the young and enhancing their role and position in local society. However, the width of shared beliefs is only modestly defined. The LYC has prescribed the council meetings to be held at least once every three months. According to the Report on the Work of Youth Councils of 2017, in 2017 there were only 341 youth council meetings in total (Ministry of Demography, Family, Youth and Social Policy 2018: 1). Since there were 86 active youth councils, a council held four sessions in average.5 The network is stable, in terms of regular meetings, only in a rather small number of local governments. The relevance of the network is low. Youth councils are defined as advisory local bodies whose mission is to promote and advocate the interests of young people. Youth councils can discuss all issues related to youth policy and young people’s position in local society; they can initiate youth-­ related decisions of the local representative body (which has no obligation to adopt them), they inform young people on issues related to their status, and members of youth councils can influence youth-related decisions by giving their opinion or advice (Art. 13 LYC). Thus, their power is mainly consultative.6 According to the Report on the Work of Youth Councils of 2017, youth councils mainly organized and took part in round tables and trainings dedicated to the youth councils’ activities, local entrepreneurship, education, nutrition, and elections. Members of youth councils took part in projects dealing with young people and in different humanitarian, educational, volunteer, sport, and other activities (Ministry of Demography, Family, Youth and Social Policy 2018: 1).

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Although youth councils could affect a medium range of people (all young people but also those interested in the young, such as various local subjects dealing with youth, from pre-school institutions to parents), their real influence is rather low. Their power is merely consultative, they are established in a small number of local governments, and their members are appointed by local representative bodies, not elected by young people. In practice, there are different problems with youth councils. There is a particular problem of insufficient interest on the behalf of young people, which can also be a consequence of the lack of information about the legal regulation, the importance, the role, the scope of activities, the real work, and the results of youth councils (Koprić 2011b: 17). The Ministry of Demography, Family, Youth and Social Policy (2018: 1) also recognizes that there is a lack of initiative coming from local representative bodies and mayors, who are responsible for establishing the youth councils. In addition, there is a problem of the lack of real support of local bodies and lack of financial resources for the youth policy (Koprić 2011b: 16–18). Furthermore, there is a rather high level of politicization of these councils stemming from the fact that youth councillors are very often members of political parties (Koprić 2011b: 17). The problem of politicization was also recognized by the National Convention of Youth Councils (NCYC) in 2018, which has suggested some measures for its lessening. Among others, the suggestions include allowing the candidates for youth councils to present themselves to the members of the local representative body responsible for their appointment (so they can see the candidates and their programmes and not only their possible party affiliation) and stimulating members of youth councils to collaborate with members of the representative body belonging to different political parties in order to avoid the political connotations of proposals made by the youth council (NCYC 2018). In conclusion, it can be observed that because of these problems and poor practice, there is lacking public awareness concerning youth policy and youth councils.

School Boards and Parents’ Councils The relations between the local state and society regarding school boards are somewhat more complex compared to the other examples in this chapter. The complexity stems from understanding who the school founders are. The founders of most elementary schools (and of all secondary schools) are counties, that is, second tier of local government. However,

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34 larger towns are founders of primary schools on their territory and hence are involved in the functioning of school boards. Therefore, school boards have been included in the analysis, despite overall focus of the research on local government. Parents’ councils are smaller and predominantly unknown advisory bodies, albeit ones growing in symbolic power. They are becoming politicized venues through which societal actors7 with different ideological positions regarding the role of education in children’s lives vie for influence. They will be mentioned in the analysis but will not be considered later, as they do not reflect the cooperation between a societal actor or a subgroup and local state bodies or representatives. Therefore, only school boards will be assessed on the autonomy, coherence, and relevance criteria. The Education Act,8 first adopted in 2008, and amended several times (most recently in 2018), regulates the establishment, functions, and rights of school boards. Each school sets further details in its basic by-law, the school statute, with school boards adopting their own Rules of Procedure as well. School boards manage the functioning of primary and secondary schools in Croatia. They consist of seven members and are appointed by the county at the proposal of various stakeholders. One member is elected by workers’ council, that is, teaching and non-teaching staff (through direct, secret ballot), two members are elected by teachers’ council (comprising teaching staff only), one member by parents’ council, and three members by the local government as the founder. School boards in schools where some or all teaching is performed in the language and script of a national minority must respect proportional representation of those minorities. Members of school boards have a renewable four-year mandate. The competences of school boards include appointing and removing school principals; giving prior consent to hiring teaching and non-­teaching staff; adopting the statute and other legal acts (at principal’s proposal); adopting the school’s annual curriculum (as proposed by the principal and the teachers’ council); adopting the annual programme (proposed by the principal) and controlling its execution; adopting the annual budget (as proposed by the principal); deciding on workers’ demands regarding the protection of their labour rights; recommending decisions to the founder regarding founder’s rights; and giving recommendations and opinions to the local government and the principal concerning all questions pertaining to functioning and security of the school. Decisions are adopted with the majority vote of all members of the school board. The school board can be constituted when the majority of its members have been appointed.

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There are 904 elementary and 444 secondary in Croatia with almost 9500 school board members. Almost 4000 of them elected by teachers’ councils stand as a backbone of their professional autonomy. However, a significant local political influence comes from more than 4000 local politicians participating in the school boards’ decision-making. The position of parents is the weakest because not only do parents have just one representative per school board but also because of the great diversity of parent population and the fact that parents’ councils are rather inactive, although this is changing to a degree with their politicization. All three groups are interested in participation in decision-making and in results of their schools. Although the autonomy of schools is narrow, there is a space for the development of “distributed leadership” of schools. Current research shows that teaching staff in Croatian schools perceive their participation as rather poor (Kovač et al. 2014). Although the relationship between schools and parents in Croatia is still traditionally oriented and school-focused, and communication with parents is relatively infrequent and focused on individual issues (Pahić et al. 2010), the situation is changing with the involvement of parents in parents’ councils. These are advisory bodies that must be established in every school. Parents of all pupils/students enrolled in a class (depending on the age of the child) elect one member among themselves to represent them in the parents’ council. It is the right of parents’ councils to give opinions regarding the school curriculum, school’s annual programme (proposed by the principal), as well as to debate about the realization of the annual programme and the curriculum. The council considers all complaints submitted by parents regarding the educational work of the school and its employees and recommends improvements. School boards and principals are obligated to consider the recommendations of parents’ councils and to report back in written form on the procedures taken. The autonomy of the school boards is medium. School boards and parents’ councils are established by the central state-level law. They exist in institutions that function under devolved authority and are mandatory for all schools in the country. The town/county as the founder has functioning power since three out of seven members represent that stakeholder. Their competences are prescribed by law and cannot be expanded by other regulations, but they can be detailed by school statues and rules of procedures. However, they influence personnel decisions (selection of the principal, recruitment of teachers and other staff), financial plan and financial

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decisions, and various other decisions about premises, equipment, and other issues important for the school. The coherence of the school boards is high. Their membership is stipulated by law. The dominant actor is the founder (a county or a town), with three representatives, who are usually involved in education policy. The rest represent the collective actors (teachers and non-teaching staff) and parents. In acting, they are bound to the original organization, group, or stakeholder that delegated them. One might expect the coherence to be low, as representatives of different groups may have differing interests linked to stakeholders that delegated them. However, due to the specific focus of their activities (dealing with school curricula, appointments, and the work of the principal), the assessment is that their coherence is high. The group enjoys a shared meaning, with the focus on enhancing education opportunities in the local community, despite sometimes conflicting ideological view that the diverse actors share depending on the stakeholder they represent. The identity of school boards (and parents’ councils) can be complex, but when the actors involved focus on their prerogatives, they can assert, albeit in a limited manner, the interests of the board. Together with the dominance of the local community as the school’s founder, this helps to improve the stability aspect of the school board, which further fosters the rapport between different actors involved in its functioning. This in turn helps to strengthen the collective identity of the actor, which furthers policies based on shared meaning of everybody involved in the functioning of both school boards and parents’ councils. The relevance of the school boards is medium. Although they have almost no say in policy change, policy reform, or policy implementation, they have an opportunity to oversee the functioning of the education system in a specific school, as well as the right to issue opinions on specific topics. However, there is no obligation of either state-level or local-level (founder) stakeholders or of the principal to act upon those opinions apart from answering the questions submitted. However, their latent impact on the local community is potentially large due to the nature and importance of education policy.

Local Development Agencies Local development agencies were mostly established after 2004. Since 2015, based on the Regional Development Act and the regulations concerning the register of regional coordinators and local development

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agencies, they have been recognized as public institutions with their own specific role in promoting, fostering, and coordinating local development strategies. They were thus incorporated into the overall institutional framework of regional and local economic development. A local development agency coordinates and stimulates development at the local level. It can be established by a single local government unit or by several local governments, as a form of intermunicipal cooperation. The legal basis for establishment of local development agencies are the Act on Companies and the Act on Institutions. In both cases, the owner is a local government or several cooperating local governments. There were 16 local development agencies in Croatia in 2015 (Analiza 2017), with one of them in liquidation in the following year. In 2019, there are 11 local development agencies registered in the official register of the Ministry of Regional Development and EU Funds, but the official register of the Ministry of the Economy registers 41 of them at the same time.9 They can have a significant impact on local development throughout the country by fostering innovations, developing best local practices, attracting money from the EU and national funds, and in other ways.10 The aim of local development agencies is to (a) counsel local government about start-ups, growth and development, optimization of business, and new trends in business; (b) coordinate the preparation of local development strategies, action plans for their implementation, and monitor the implementation of these strategies; (c) develop projects and apply for funding (applying for EU or national public funding or bank loans); (d) develop education and information activities (start-ups, entrepreneurial skills, communication and presentation skills, and entrepreneurship of young people); and (e) facilitate partnership and cooperation with local government, local action groups, schools, associations, other entrepreneurial support centres, development agencies in the country and abroad, chambers of commerce and crafts as well as industry, the Croatian Employment Service, and with all other actors involved in or promoting entrepreneurship. Moreover, several agencies deal with introducing the smart city concept and stimulating entrepreneurship and rural development at the local level. The autonomy of local development agencies is relatively high. The establishment and functioning of local development agencies are regulated by law, but they are not mandatory institutions. Their actual establishment is initiated and coordinated by local governments. Their internal management structure is regulated by the respective laws (on institutions and

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companies). Since many of them have been established as institutions, members of their managerial boards (upravno vijeće) are appointed by mayors, in line with the provisions of the Local and Regional Self-­ Government Act. Their statutes and other internal acts as well as their tasks and functioning are defined by the owners, that is, the representatives of owners in their managing bodies, in accordance with the law. Their real results depend on their work and business success. The coherence of the network is relatively high. The composition of the membership is not stipulated by law. Because members of LDAs’ managerial boards are as a rule appointed by mayors, they are the agents of mayoral political concepts approved by citizenry through direct election of mayors.11 Members of managerial boards have certain discretion in making strategic and business decisions. The stability and regularity of network’s meeting is high because board members depend on mayors’ will and mayors are highly stable in their offices—not a single mayor has been recalled so far. Members of the network share common beliefs as a premise for interaction, especially in relation to the implementation of strategic and programmatic goals of a municipality or a town, because they follow mayor’s developmental concepts supported by the citizenry. The relevance of local development agencies is rather low. The degree of local development agencies’ influence on strategic local decisions is limited. They may express their views, design development projects, and have some autonomy in the realization of local strategic decisions and projects, but they lack power to ensure that their views are accepted by the decision-­ makers. Thus, according to the Arnstein (1969), the degree of citizens’ power is evaluated as placation. The substance of policy relevance for the local community is low to medium. Namely, local development agencies regularly have certain impact on local development. However, their scope of impact is medium because they are not the only local development actors and the public awareness of their existence is rather low.

Local Action Groups The establishment of local action groups (LAGs) in Croatia started after 2009, based on the LEADER (i.e. the European Union’s initiative that supports rural development projects at the local level with the goal to revitalize rural areas) approach guidelines and principles. Local action groups represent a local partnership between stakeholders from the public, the private, and the third sector of a specific rural area, according to the

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Regional Development Act. They have been established with the intent of creating and implementing a local development strategy of the specific rural area, as well as deciding about the allocation and management of financial resources. In Croatia, the LEADER approach in rural development policy was introduced through the EU pre-accession assistance for rural development (IPARD), and the establishment of LAGs was its important element. The LAG is an association registered in accordance with the Law on Associations. It must cover a clearly defined geographically continuous rural area that has between 10,000 and 150,000 inhabitants. There were 54 LAGs in Croatia in 2017 (CRDN 2019).12 LAGs are intermunicipal networks. About 93 percent of local government units in Croatia are members of LAGs. They spread to approximately 92 percent of the total area of the country, with 57 percent of the total number of inhabitants living in the LAG-covered areas (Croatian Rural Development Network 2019). LAG members can be representatives of local government and public institutions, professional organizations, other associations, development agencies, companies, crafts, and other organizations from the private sector, as well as individuals (Croatian Rural Development Network 2019). In principle, every legal and physical person can become a member of a LAG. Out of 3995 LAG members, 43 percent were representatives of the private sector, 36 percent of the third sector, and 21 percent of the public sector (Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Croatia 2019). The autonomy of local action groups is rather high. Their establishment is left to the decision of municipalities involved. Although once registered, the LAGs are governed by the rules of the Law on Associations, the prescribed rules are quite broad, and LAG members can decide about statutory provisions by themselves to a large extent. Some provisions of the statute are characteristic for LAGs. Although the establishment of LAGs can be initiated by different actors, it is most often initiated by local governments with the aim of defining the development strategy for the rural area and of conducting joint activities to develop projects aimed at improving living conditions and fostering the development and competitiveness of the rural area. The coherence of local action groups is high. Although it is not prescribed, it is expected that LAG members represent the views of their organizations, even though this may depend on the issue they decide on. However, it may be said that the decision-making mandate is bound by the actors of the original organization. It is difficult to assess the stability of the network

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on average, since there are certain differences between LAGs. On average, the stability of the network is medium to high. The meetings of the general assembly and the managing board are prescribed by the LAG’s statute, but in many cases, the assembly meets at least once a year and the managing board between one and four times a year. Members of the LAG usually share certain common beliefs and views about the development of their area, but they are partly defined. Since individuals (particularly those renowned in their local community) can also be included in the work of LAGs, it can be said that the network is characterized by both individual and group representatives (Croatian Rural Development Network 2019). The relevance of the network is low. LAGs adopt local development strategies for their rural area as their fundamental working documents. The basic idea of the establishment of LAGs is to achieve synergy among different sectors in order to improve the development and competitiveness of local areas. The local development strategy defines the basic characteristics of LAG area as well as development goals and priorities according to the specific needs of the respective area. Thus, a LAG impacts policy implementation at the local level, and it is very important for local development, but LAGs achieve different levels of influence and success. The process of creating local development strategies is participatory, and all interested stakeholders can usually participate, which increases the level of citizen participation in the decision-making process. It is very hard to assess the number of affected individuals and the scope of impact of the network, and it will require an additional survey to evaluate the real relevance of the network for local communities. Having in mind the goal of LAGs, the structure of their membership and their importance for the local level, the substance of policy relevance for local communities is evaluated as medium.

Summary In the chapter on Croatia, the following networks of local state–society relations are considered: youth councils, school boards and parents’ councils, local development agencies, and local actions groups. After the analysis, it was obvious that these networks can be grouped in two major types of groups. While the youth councils and school boards (together with parents’ councils) can be characterized as self-reflective groups, local development agencies and local action groups have been characterized as collaborative networks.

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Notes 1. The number of deconcentrated branch offices of central state administrative bodies increased from 1279 in June 2015 to 1464 in May 2018. The robust sector of centrally established public agencies must be added, with several additional networks of field offices (e.g. the Croatian Forests has 175, the Financial Agency 188, the Croatian Pension Insurance Fund 111 of them, etc.). 2. See at: http://www.spi.hr/financijska-analiza-poslovanja-proracuna-zupanija-iz-financijskih-izvjestaja-za-2016-i-2017-godinu (accessed 2 May 2019). 3. The first Law on Youth Councils was enacted in 2007. 4. In case informal groups of young people propose members for the youth council, they have to be supported by a certain number of youth signatures ranging from 10 to 50, depending on the size of the local unit (art. 9 the Law on Youth Councils). 5. The total number of youth councils was 106, which decreases the average number of meetings per youth council to 3.2. 6. The same level of participation is established also when Hart’s ladder of young people’s participation is taken into consideration. Namely, this ladder has eight degrees, ranging from level 1 (young people are manipulated) to level 8 (young people share decision-making with adults), and Croatian youth councils are put at level five—young people are consulted and informed (Bužinkić 2011: 18–20). 7. See more at: https://uimeobitelji.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ RODITELJI-ODLU%C4%8CUJU-V-2.2.pdf. 8. Zakon o odgoju i obrazovanju u osnovnoj i srednjoj školi (Official Gazette 87/2008, 86/2009, 92/2010, 105/2010, 90/2011, 5/2012, 16/2012, 86/2012, 126/2012, 94/2013, 152/2014, 07/2017, 68/2018). 9. The Ministry of Regional Development and the EU Funds’ register is available at: https://razvoj.gov.hr/pristup-informacijama/upisnik-regionalnih-koordinatora-i-lokalnih-razvojnih-agencija/4007. The Ministry of the Economy, Entrepreneurship, and Crafts’ register is available at: http:// reg.mingo.hr/pi/public/# (accessed 12 September 2019). 10. LDAs are free to register in one of two or in both of these two registers, depending on their mission agreed with the respective local governments. They can even decide not to register, but in that case, they cannot apply for the support from state and other public budgets. For more details, see Suknaić (2018). 11. Mayors are free to appoint the members of the managerial boards regardless of their political affiliation, professional, or other criteria. There is no data or published research about the structure of LDAs’ managerial boards. 12. LAGs include more than 500 local governments. In addition, there are 14 FLAGs (Fisheries LAGs) that include 94 local governments in the Croatian coastal zone.

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References Analiza. (2017). Analiza razvojnih agencija i poduzetnički inkubatora u Republici Hrvatskoj. Rijeka: Riječka razvojna agencija Porin. Arnstein, S. R. (1969). A Ladder of Citizen Participation. Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 35(4), 216–224. Bežovan, G., & Matančević, J. (2017). Civilno društvo i pozitivne promjene. Zagreb: Školska knjiga. Borovec, K. (2012). Strategija policija u zajednici i njezin utjecaj na strah od kriminala, percepciju kriminaliteta i javnog nereda u Hrvatskoj. Doctoral dissertation. Retrieved July 9, 2019, from https://dr.nsk.hr/islandora/object/ erf:212/preview. Bužinkić, E. (2011). Zakon o savjetima mladih u praksi. Zagreb: Mreža mladih Hrvatske. Č epo, D., & Ravlić, S. (2018). Politički okvir Europske povelje o lokalnoj samoupravi: uspjesi i neuspjesi lokalne demokracije u Hrvatskoj. In I. Koprić (Ed.), Europeizacija hrvatske lokalne samouprave: dva desetljeća primjene standarda Europske povelje o lokalnoj samoupravi (pp.  251–272). Zagreb: Institut za javnu upravu. CoE Report. (2016). Local and Regional Democracy in Croatia. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. Retrieved August 20, 2019. Croatian Rural Development Network, CRDN. (2019). http://www.hmrr.hr/ hr/leader/hrvatski-lagovi/. Džinić, J., Murray Svidroň ová, M., & Markowska-Bzducha, E. (2016). Participatory Budgeting: A Comparative Study of Croatia, Poland and Slovakia. The NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, 9(1), 31–56. European Commission. (2018). Standard Eurobarometer 90  – Autumn 2018 ‘Public opinion in the European Union, First results’. Bruxelles: European Commission. https://doi.org/10.2775/104. Ivanišević, S., Pavić, Ž., & Ramljak, M. (1979). Samoupravljanje. Zagreb: Školska knjiga. Koprić, I. (2011a). Nezavisni lokalni politički akteri u Hrvatskoj. In J.  Barbić (Ed.), Izbori zastupnika u Hrvatski sabor i referendum (pp.  87–112). Zagreb: HAZU. Koprić, I. (2011b). Analiza podataka prikupljenih temeljem Obrasca o provedbi Zakona o savjetima mladih. Retrieved May 2, 2019, from https://mmh.hr/ files/ckfinder/files/Analiza-Ministarstvo%20obitelji_v2.doc. ̵ Koprić, I. (2018). Uspavano srce demokracije: lokalna samouprava za gradane i zajednicu. Banovo: Avis Rara Studio. Koprić, I., & Đulabić, V. (2018). Evaluation of the Decentralisation Programme in Croatia: Expectations, Problems and Results. In I. Koprić, H. Wollmann, &

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G.  Marcou (Eds.), Evaluating Reforms of Local Public and Social Services in Europe: More Evidence for Better Results (pp.  243–260). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Koprić, I., & Klarić, M. (2015). New Developments in Local Democracy in Croatia and Its Neighbouring Countries. Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava – Croatian and Comparative Public Administration, 15(2), 389–414. ̵ Koprić, I., & Vukojičić, T. (2013). Lokalni politički sustav nakon uvodenja neposrednog izbora načelnika – stanje i prijepori. In I. Koprić (Ed.), Reforma lokalne i regionalne samouprave u Republici Hrvatskoj (pp. 155–188). Zagreb: Institut za javnu upravu. Koprić, I., Marčetić, G., Musa, A., Đulabić, V., & Lalić Novak, G. (2014). Upravna znanost:Javna uprava u suvremenom upravnom kontekstu. Zagreb: Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu. Koprić, I., Musa, A., & Đulabić, V. (2016). Local Government and Local Public Services in Croatia. In H. Wollmann, G. Marcou, & I. Koprić (Eds.), Public and Social Services in Europe: From Public and Municipal to Private Sector Provision (pp. 201–215). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Koprić, I., Škarica, M., & Manojlović Toman, R. (2019). Local Public Services and Austerity Measures in Croatia: Adaptations of the Resilient Social Model through the Central-Local Power and Blame Games. In A. Lippi & T. Tsekos (Eds.), Local Public Services in Times of Austerity across Mediterranean Europe (pp. 167–191). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Kovač, V., Staničić, S., & Buchberger, I. (2014). Obilježja i izazovi distributivnog ̵ školskog vodenja. Školski vjesnik, 63(3), 395–412. Ladner, A., Keuffer, N., & Baldersheim, B. (2015). Self-rule Index for Local Authorities (Release 1.0). Brussels: European Commission. Retrieved July 9, 2019, from https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/studies/pdf/self_rule_index_en.pdf. Law on Associations, Official Gazette 74/2014 and 70/2017. Law on Institutions, Official Gazette 76/1993, 29/1997, 47/1999 and 35/2008. Law on Regional Development of the Republic of Croatia, Official Gazette 147/2014, 123/2017 and 118/2018. Law on Youth Councils, Official Gazette 41/2014. Manojlović Toman, R., & Vukojičić Tomić, T. (2018). Načelo demokracije ̵ Europske povelje o lokalnoj samoupravi i sudjelovanje gradana u odlučivanju u hrvatskoj lokalnoj samoupravi. In I.  Koprić (Ed.), Europeizacija hrvatske lokalne samouprave: dva desetljeća primjene standarda Europske povelje o lokalnoj samoupravi (pp. 343–371). Zagreb: Institut za javnu upravu. ̵ Milošević, B. (2017). Decentralizacija i povjerenje gradana: aktualna pitanja i ̵ problemi. In I. Koprić, A. Musa, & T. Giljević (Eds.), Gradani, javna uprava i lokalna samouprava: povjerenje, suradnja i potpora (pp.  153–193). Zagreb: Institut za javnu upravu.

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Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Croatia. (2019). https://ruralnirazvoj. hr/english/. Ministry of Demography, Family, Youth and Social Policy. (2018). Godišnji izvještaj osnovanih savjeta mladih pri lokalnim i područnim (regionalnim) samoupravama u 2017. godini. Zagreb: Ministry of Demography, Family, Youth and Social Policy. Retrived from https://mdomsp.gov.hr/UserDocsImages/ Vijesti2018/Godi%C5%A1nji%20izvje%C5%A1taj%20o%20provedbi%20 Zakona%20o%20savjetima%20mladih.pdf. NCYC. (2018). Nacionalna konferencija savjeta mladih Republike Hrvatske  – Zaključci i preporuke. Retrieved July 9, 2019, from http://www.udruga-gradova.hr/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/NKSM2018-zaklju%C4%8Dcii-preporuke.pdf. ̵ ki, R., & Vizek Vidović, V. (2010). Uključenost roditelja Pahić, T., Miljević-Ridič u život škole: percepcija roditelja opće populacije i predstavnika roditelja u školskim tijelima. Odgojne znanosti, 12(2), 329–346. Pusić, E. (1981). Komuna i općina. Zagreb: Informator. Regulation on the implementation of on the measure 202  – ‘Preparation and implementation of local rural development strategies’ within IPARD program, Official Gazette 53/2012, 75/2012 and, 24/2013. Regulations on the Register of Regional Coordinators and Local Development Agencies, Official Gazette 121/2015 and 24/2018. Škarica, M. (2019). Relations Between Local and County Government in Croatia: Cooperation and Competition in Europeanization Context. Paper prepared for the 27th Annual NISPAcee conference in Prague, Czech Republic, 24–26 May 2019. Suknaić, F. (2018). Agencije za poticanje razvoja malih i srednjih poduzeća u Republici Hrvatskoj. Zagreb: Sveučilište u Zagrebu.

CHAPTER 7

Local State-Society Relations in the Czech Republic Jakub Lysek and Dan Ryšavý

Introduction The chapter analyses the local state-society relations in a country that is commemorating 30 years after the collapse of the former communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. Although the former national committees, as bodies of the communist system of local government, were selected from representatives of civic associations, unions, and other hierarchically organized societal networks according to quotas and census data, they only served to artificially legitimize the totalitarian regime. The re-establishment of local self-government was viewed as an antidote to the centralized state, and an institution through which people could gain control over their own lives, and regenerate and revitalize their communities (Campbell and Coulson 2008: 4). A new generation of citizens has arrived since that time which was not socialized under the former regime. They support democracy more than the older ones but without a higher level of interest in politics and active citizenship (Linek et al. 2018). The Czech

J. Lysek (*) • D. Ryšavý Palacký University Olomouc, Olomouc, Czech Republic e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 F. Teles et al. (eds.), Close Ties in European Local Governance, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44794-6_7

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Republic is now a member of the community of democratic countries, and the European Union serves as a source of inspiration and funding for different forms of local state-society relationships. The aim of this study is to shed light on how societal actors interact with the local state. We focus on institutionalized networks that mediate the local state-society relationship in the Czech Republic. We do not take into account, however, specific local practices reflected in the literature as democratic innovations concerning particularly participatory or deliberative democracy because such instruments are not permanent but ad hoc created, and have no formalized deliberative assemblies (see e.g. Illner 2011a: 20; Macková and Macek 2014; Pánek 2018). Therefore, the analysis refers to the following forms of local state-society relationship: • Municipal Board Commissions and Municipal Council Committees, • Local Action Groups, • Local Partnership(s) for Social Inclusion, • Community Action Plan(s) for Social Services, • Local Action Plan(s) in Education (MAPs). The first type of these forms is defined by the Czech Municipal Law. They are the most common and basic forms. These are municipal board commissions and municipal council committees that have been established as consultative bodies of municipal boards and municipal councils, respectively. Local Action Groups (LAGs) that perform various kinds of inter-­ municipal cooperation and coordination with civil society, NGOs, the non-profit sector, or small rural businesses are the second distinct platform. The third form consists of networks recently formalized by the central or the regional level of government or derived from the formalization stemming from the EU cohesion policy. This implies that the EU has an indirect but significant effect on local state-society relations. The last Local Action Plan(s) in Education (MAPs) are also tied with EU funding, but are distinct in their functioning. It must be emphasized that the municipal structure of the Czech Republic is substantially fragmented (Illner 2011b): approximately 80 percent of the 6253 municipalities in existence have populations under 1000.1 Therefore, the character, the scope, and the intensity of the relationship between the local state and society differ between rural and metropolitan areas. In the rural areas, the relationship is more formalized due to the Local Action Groups (LAGs), while in large cities the local society

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interacts with government in a more loose fashion through the committees of the municipal council and the commissions of the municipal board. Furthermore, mid-sized municipalities (municipalities with delegated powers)2 are involved in projects and platforms that are organized by the central or the regional level of government. The form of local state-society relationship largely depends on local political leaders. According to a survey among European mayors (see Heinelt et al. 2018), the Czech ones are less consensus-oriented and rely on their power and the decisive influence of the executive board (Denters et al. 2018: 292). An enthusiastic mayor with strong support from both the local government and the citizens is the key, however, for successful local state-society relations (see e.g. Kveton et al. 2014). Furthermore, there is not a strong tradition of formalized and hierarchically arranged cooperation between trade unions, chambers, and the municipal governments. The need for cooperation with the local business community, knowledge institutions, professional organizations, or voluntary associations is much less felt (according to Czech data collected by the above-mentioned survey among mayors). Generally, the Czech system of local state-society relations resembles the ‘local elitist infrastructure’ type according to the typology developed by Sellers and Kwak (2011: 626; see also Sellers and Lidström 2014). The Czech Republic used to serve as a case of a collective form of local government (Heinelt and Hlepas 2006). The council elects, however, the municipal board as an executive body in only approximately one-fifth of the municipalities (Ryšavý and Bernard 2013: 839). As their advisory organs, the council establishes committees and the board also has the right to form commissions. There are many similarities but also differences between these two forms of local state-society relationships.

Municipal Board Commissions and Municipal Council Committees The two networks are the broadly defined instruments for the local state-­ society relationship in the Czech Republic. They may be likened to the advisory boards or councils in other countries in which they are usually defined by the national law and their establishment may be compulsory in some policy areas (social, youth, education, labour, etc.). Czech law defines, however, both instruments loosely which results in a high

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variation in the scope, policy areas, and their everyday functioning. We first describe the municipal board commissions and subsequently the municipal council committees. Municipal Board Commissions (§ 122 of the Municipal Law) are the main institutionalized form of mediating the local state-society relationship. It is exclusively in the discretion of the municipal board to establish a commission of intended purpose and field in which it is supposed to consult the municipal executive. The establishment of commissions is not compulsory and thus a municipality can decide accordingly. Generally, these commissions are established in the areas of housing, schooling, social services, environment, traffic, urban development, crime prevention, tourism, sports and culture, and economic development. Furthermore, commissions can be established for parts of a municipality or neighbourhoods. Municipal boards have mainly consultative tasks. Municipal government can delegate, however, some powers (within the delegated state power) to a commission (§ 122 sub-section 2) after consultation (formal approval) with the director of the regional office.3 The majority of the commission members are usually nominees of the governing coalition of parties which forms the municipal board.4 Furthermore, most members are also members of a political party. Political parties serve as an important tool for citizen participation in the Czech Republic. This applies to large cities and municipalities. The prevalence of national parliamentary parties decreases, however, the smaller the municipalities are (Linek and Pecháček 2007). Even the large political parties do not have enough members to fill candidate lists in smaller municipalities (Ryšavý and Šaradín 2010). The composition of the commissions can indicate, on the one hand, how far the electoral competition reaches and, on the other hand, illustrate the breadth of opportunities for participation in local politics. It is difficult to say for whom the participation in the commission is an expression of active citizenship and for whom rather a partisan duty. The composition of commissions, for example, for parts of a statutory city (see Lysek 2018), is different as in these commissions the share of non-­partisans is higher. Moreover, the number of nominees from the opposition also depends on the local political culture and the willingness of the ruling parties. Or in other words: the non-partisan representatives of society and its various associations are selected if the political culture is consensual and cooperative. The city of Jihlava serves as a good example where almost half of the members were non-partisan.

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The second form are the municipal council committees that virtually differ from board commissions in only one respect—they are established and the members are nominated by the municipal council. Their functioning is in practice, however, the same as the municipal board commission. Czech municipal law (§ 117 to 121) prescribes obligatory financial and control committees established by the municipal council. Therefore, every municipality has at least these two compulsory committees. If there is a share of a minority population larger than 10 percent, a committee for national minorities also has to be established. The members of the committees are mainly councillors.5 In addition, municipalities may establish a voluntary committee for a specific task for whatever reason. A committee has to be formed by at least three members; an upper boundary is not set. There is a condition, however, that the number must be odd. The municipal council elects or dismisses the chair of the committee and the members. It is fully in the council discretion. The committee chair must be a member of the council with one exception of the neighbourhood committee (see below). Regarding the policy areas, most of the cities have only established the compulsory committees but some have also established committees for strategic development and urban planning, the urban conservation zone of historical city centres, or even more specific committees. In addition to councillors, the members are usually professionals delegated by their professional chambers (architects, teachers, etc.). For this reason, we have included the committees among the analysed networks. Additionally, there are two types of committees that have a distinct character deserving of a brief description. The committee for national minorities must be composed of members of that community (at least half of its members). Members are delegated by the council and can be nominated by the minority associations with a legal status. In the Czech Republic, there are 47 municipalities with a Slovak minority, 31 municipalities with a Polish, 18 municipalities with a German, 1 municipality with a Hungarian minority, and 1 municipality with a Roma population that have established committee for national minorities.6 The most active minority is the Polish minority living in the Moravian-Silesian Region at the Czech-Polish border. The municipalities closely cooperate with local clubs and associations of these minorities. The names of the municipalities on traffic signs or on other official symbols are also bilingual (Czech and Polish) which is not typical for other municipalities with national minorities. Although important, the committees for national minorities do not establish a broader and general relationship between the municipal tier of

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local government and society. They are instead particular instruments to deal with national and ethnic issues. A municipality, either rural or urban, may establish a neighbourhood committee. All members must have permanent residency in the parts of the municipality that are intended to be represented by the neighbourhood committee. In large urban municipalities, this is the case in parts or districts of a city. In rural areas, neighbourhood committees are usually established in detached parts of the main municipality. These parts are virtually villages that were formerly merged with a larger municipality. The members are individual citizens from parts or districts of the city and from parts of rural municipalities. The neighbourhood committees are crucial in large statutory cities that are not sub-divided in sub-municipal parts with the regular sub-municipal bodies such as a directly elected sub-municipal council and sub-municipal board. In such a case, they are the only formalized form of the relationship between the citizens of parts or districts of the city with the ‘central’ municipal government. The role and scope of activities of the neighbourhood committees differ across municipalities and across time. Generally, the neighbourhood committees serve as a platform for the local state-society relationship because they are predominantly composed of local citizens. In some municipalities, there are voluntary ‘elections’ organized by the municipality in which citizens select their representatives. Unlike regular councillors in sub-municipal councils, these representatives are confirmed by the municipal council. Since there is no substantial difference between the municipal board commissions and the municipal council committees, we analyse them together. The fact that in practice there is a huge variety within these networks regarding the scope, policy areas, and their importance complicates the general conclusion for the three dimensions of the analytical framework. Once established by the municipal board or by the municipal council, the autonomy of the commissions or committees is rather high. The composition varies and is broadly set. There are no strict statutory rules. Decisions are taken by majority. More consensual rules, however, are applied to a specific committee for national minorities. Both commissions and committees are initiated by the local government. The coherence of these boards is, however, quite low. This is given by the heterogeneity of the composition (councillors, local activists, representatives of the NGO, and non-profit sector). Delegates are not bound in their decisions. It is up to the free will of a member. There is some variety, however, because some delegates might have strong ties with their mother

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organization. The municipal board commissions and municipal council committees hold meetings on a regular basis—usually once a month. The relevance is not particularly high. This is because the commissions and committees are dependent on the electoral cycle and the will of the municipal board or council respectively. Some commissions have discreet power to decide on various policy measures. The commission on sports and youth, for example, proposes a draft on how to reallocate a significant amount of money directed to sports clubs and associations or professional sports. The municipal board usually makes a final decision accordingly and usually does not dispute the proposals of the commissions. Regarding the neighbourhood committees established in large urban areas, it is up to the municipal council to transfer some responsibility in policy-making. Neighbourhood committees might, for example, decide which project the municipality will spend money on. The public awareness is generally rather low but is high in larger cities regarding the settlement committee or the commissions of city parts that deal with everyday common issues in city neighbourhoods.

Local Action Groups LAGs are a quite novel municipal tool for rural development in the Czech Republic. The discussion began in 2001, but the first LAGs were established in 2003 just a year before Czech EU accession. Since then, however, LAGs have obtained significant support from municipal representatives and Czech associations of municipalities (namely the Union of Towns and Municipalities/UTM of the Czech Republic and the Association of Local Self-governments/SMS Č R). They have become the most widespread and well-functioning forms of inter-municipal cooperation of small rural municipalities. As argued by Šaradín and Šulák (2015), their success is partly due to the three different segments on which the cooperation is based. These are representatives of the public administration, local employers (the self-employed, entrepreneurs), and the non-profit sector, represented mainly by local associations. The formal legal status of the LAGs is that of a non-governmental and non-profit organization. In total, there are 179 LAGs (October 2018), and they cover most of the municipalities in the Czech Republic. The LAGs emphasize the active role of citizens and local civil society represented by various associations, clubs, and NGOs. The NGOs are viewed as partners in developing the municipality and entire region. There

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are large within-country variations as in some parts of the country politicians might view NGOs as a direct political competitor and accuse these NGOs and associations of being ‘unelected and illegitimate’ political groups. Although most of the LAGs were initiated by an active mayor or group of mayors, a survey (Czech Dataset in Teles and Swianiewicz 2017) on LAGs (2017) indicated that 24 percent of the LAGs were initiated by a non-profit organization active in the respective region. Based on this survey, non-profit organizations are also viewed as the most active actors on average, far more than citizens, and more than local entrepreneurs and businesses and municipal councillors. Such a result provides quite an optimistic perspective on the role of the local civil sector and their relation with local governments, as many problems encountered at the local level go beyond the scope of the public administration and often require broader participation of citizens and civic organizations. Particularly in rural and semi-urban areas, LAGs play a significant role in networking between the local political elite, local associations, and NGOs. LAGs seem to be an ideal type of organized local state-society relations in the Czech Republic because they score high in each of the three dimensions. They have high autonomy because they were established from bottom-­ up—sometimes initiated by the local civil society that persuades mayors to establish it. Although the municipalities are key players, LAGs are partly coordinated by local civil society. Representation in LAGs is intertwined with local associations and clubs. The composition of LAGs is very broad, and the rules are broadly set. Decision-making is highly consensual and is done by all the actors. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that they can possess their own property, have their own budgets, and do not need to only rely on the EU funds which they redistribute and allocate. The general law on non-profit organizations applies to the LAGs, so they have very broad competencies like any other NGO/non-­ profit sector. The coherence of LAGs is also quite high. LAGs are now part of local society in rural areas. The meetings are held on a regular basis. LAGs are composed mostly of collective actors (apart from mayors and local entrepreneurs). The goal is regional development, not only economically but primarily concerning community building and networking of various local actors. The relevance can be considered high. LAGs are responsible for significant development projects and allocation of EU funding. Moreover,

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through this platform NGOs and local associations can directly influence policy-making in the region, that is, not only in a single municipality. LAGs and its members are active in tourism and in promoting local traditional manufacturing or cultural events. In rural areas, LAGs are basically an umbrella organization through which interaction between NGOs, citizens, and local government takes place in many policy areas.

Local Partnership(s) for Social Inclusion and Community Action Plan(s) for Social Services Both networks share some similarities and we therefore decided to analyse them jointly. First, they tend to be top-down initiated on the central and regional state levels. Second, they are established as a form of networks among NGOs, the non-profit sector, the state service, regional government, and local government in a broader territory. The descriptive part starts with the local partnership for social inclusion which is followed by the community action plan for social services. The local partnership for social inclusion was initiated by the Agency for Social Inclusion which is part of the central state administration. Its aim is to connect relevant stakeholders involved in social policy aimed at fighting social inequalities and social exclusion. With the relevant stakeholders, the agency prepares a local strategic plan for social inclusion. The plan is intended to combat social exclusion, revitalize excluded localities, and improve the economic development of the lagging parts of the municipalities. The agency’s main purpose is to stimulate cooperation across local governments, regional governments, and detached offices of the central state administration and link public administration with NGOs. Not only municipalities but also micro-regions, as a main form of inter-­ municipal cooperation, are involved. Additionally, the agency helps municipalities or NGOs prepare projects in social policy and then with the application for EU funding. Geographically, the socially excluded areas are concentrated in the Northern Bohemia Region and Moravian-Silesian Region which are the structurally disadvantaged regions due to the collapse of the former ineffective state-owned industrial sector. These regions also have a high share of minorities. Currently, local partnerships for social inclusion are operating in 48 localities. The cooperation follows the principles of the EU cohesion policy, such as the programming and partnership principle.

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Provision of social services in the Czech Republic is fairly decentralized. The main responsibility is with the regional tier of government, but municipalities are also involved. The provision requires coordination between the central state, the regional, and local government level and the involved stakeholders. These stakeholders are non-profit organizations and the clients of social services. The central government was aware of that effect especially in the context of the anticipated EU accession. A pilot programme began in 2000 and selected regions gained support from the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the EU. The community action plans consequently spread to all regions in the country. The regional administration has an obligation as of 2006 according to the Law on Social Services (108/2006) to prepare and implement the plan for social services on the regional level. Municipalities can voluntarily prepare their own plans, which have to be prepared in cooperation with the micro-regions, and the region. In some regions, all the municipalities with an extended scope are involved. The local social service providers (NGOs, non-profit sector) are involved in the local planning. Although established as a result of various central state or regional level projects, their goal was to involve all relevant actors and stakeholders in social and education policy. The autonomy is rather small because they tended to be initiated top-down. The composition and rules are decided on by the convener—be it the state agency or regional government. These networks score high, however, on the coherence dimension. This is due to their specific and concentrated tasks in social policy. Furthermore, they are mainly composed by collective actors such as service providers and various NGOs. The relevance is quite low. These forms of local state-society relations significantly help improve social inclusion and social services. In both policies, the non-profit organizations are very active and key players. Without them, the state would not have been able to secure and provide services for elderly, ill people, or socially excluded citizens. It is reasonable that effective social policy at the local level needs a formalized network where the non-profit and civic sector would have a larger say in policy-making. They therefore score high in the scope of the functional impact. The public awareness and the number of affected people are limited, however, to those in need of the social services.

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Local Action Plan(s) in Education The Local Action Plan in Education (LAPE) is a new tool for cooperation between municipalities, school directors, parents’ associations, and NGOs aimed at improving the performance of schools and the efficiency of schooling in the respective region. The action plan is prepared for the territories of the municipalities with extended scope. Most of the plans are executed, however, by LAGs. This might cause a problem because a school can be located in a municipality that is part of the administrative territory of the higher tier municipality with extended scope but not a member of an LAG. LAPE consists of the implementing or executive team and the steering committee. The former is composed of LAGs’ managers and specialists, while the latter is composed of representatives of an LAG, regional governments, local governments, directors of schools and kindergartens, excellent teachers, representatives of NGOs providing educational help beyond public education or out-school activities, and representatives of parents. The project is not permanent, and the final date of realization may differ across regions (some up to 2022). LAPE is funded by the EU Structural Funds, and it is uncertain if the cooperation continues in a formalized way after the projects end. The autonomy of LAPE is comparatively larger than those of the previous networks. The plans are initiated by LAGs. The steering committee is composed of school directors, representatives of other educational facilities (art schools, after-school education, etc.), regional and municipal representatives, and representatives of micro-regions. The operation of the steering committee is regulated by its statutes. Consensual decision-­ making is tacitly presumed. The coherence is high. There are the common shared beliefs which are specifically defined. Moreover, despite the fact that the network is a result of a temporal EU-funded project, it has gained legitimacy among its stakeholders. It seems that the network will survive the time horizon of the current projects. Eventually, LAPE might transform themselves into a more permanent network unrelated to the EU funding. LAPE has a rather low relevance. It is the first tool for strategic planning in the field of education in the regions. Additionally, the NGOs and parents associations involved have a platform to influence the educational system in their locality. Similarly, the school directors and teachers are now regionally networked and can thus benefit from mutual experience. In

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rural areas, there are single schools for more than one municipality so that cooperation and coordination is needed. The public awareness is low, however, and the scope of impact is also low because the main responsibility for the education policy is borne by the single municipalities that select the school directors, not the associations of municipalities, the LAGs, and the LAPE networks.

Summary The Czech Republic has formal tools for mediating local-state society relations. They depend, however, on the local political culture and practice if these tools have been institutionalized. The presented Czech forms of local state-society relations can be labelled as follows: • the municipal board commissions are communicative networks, • the municipal council committees communicative networks, • the Local Action Groups (LAGs) consociational networks, • the local partnership(s) for social inclusion self-reflective networks, • the community action plan(s) for social services self-reflective networks, and • the Local Action Plan(s) in Education (MAPs) collaborative networks. Acknowledgement  This chapter was supported by Czech Science Agency [grant number 16-01331S; European Mayor II].

Notes 1. The Czech Statistical Office, https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/population 2. There are 205 municipalities (ORPs) that are endowed with state delegated powers. They are responsible for conducting state delegated power within their district. These municipalities serve virtually as an intermediary tier between the region and the smallest municipalities. 3. By regions we mean the second tier of local government in the Czech Republic (Heinelt and Bertrana 2011). As at the municipal level, there is a mixture of delegated state administrative and self-government. 4. These observations and the following information presented in this paragraph are based on data on municipal board commissions and its members collected by the authors since the 2010 elections (other electoral periods are delimited by the years 2014 and 2018) for the largest and most populous municipalities (so-called statutory cities).

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5. The secretary of a municipal office and mayor and deputy mayor are not eligible to be members of the control and financial committees. 6. The Czech Government, https://www.vlada.cz/cz/pracovni-a-poradniorgany-vlady/rnm/yybory-samospravy/yybory-v-obcich/

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CHAPTER 8

Local State-Society Relations in England Alistair Jones and Colin Copus

Introduction The focus of this chapter is on England, not on all of the United Kingdom. The issue of devolution, with devolved powers to the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly and Northern Ireland Assembly means there is now a potentially wide range of different relationships between the local state and civil society set within the different governing contexts of the constituent nations of the United Kingdom. In Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, local government is under the remit of the devolved bodies. Thus the focus in this chapter is on England, having one less tier of government above local government with which to deal. Just to make any analysis even more problematic, there is no standardized structure of local government across England (unlike in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland all of which have single tier unitary A. Jones (*) De Montfort University, Leicester, UK e-mail: [email protected] C. Copus De Montfort University, Leicester, UK Visiting Professor, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 F. Teles et al. (eds.), Close Ties in European Local Governance, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44794-6_8

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authorities providing all local services resting with local government). Wilson and Game (2011) have described the structures as ‘a dog’s breakfast’ with unitary authorities and tiered authorities across all of England, and some councils having directly-elected mayors. In the county of Leicestershire, for example, the city of Leicester is a unitary authority, with a directly-elected mayor. The rest of the county is tiered, with Leicestershire County Council responsible for the delivery of some services and half a dozen district or borough councils forming a distinct tier beneath, and responsible for the delivery of other distinct services. The county council is responsible for services such as education, social services, strategic planning, fire and rescue, libraries, consumer protection and waste disposal. The district or borough councils are responsible for services such as housing, local planning, refuse collection, leisure activities, environmental health and council tax collection. The county and district or borough councils share responsibility for highways and museums and galleries. Unitary authorities are responsible for all of the above-mentioned services (see Wilson and Game 2002). To complicate matters even further, there may also be a tier of parish or town councils. At time of writing, there are over 9000 such parishes or town councils in England, covering around 30 percent of England. While it is important to note these parish and town councils, they are deemed beyond the remit of this study because not all of England is parished and because parishes are extremely diverse in terms of size, function and budget. Finally, and arguably most importantly, is the constitutional position of local government, or, more accurately, the lack of such a position. This has been discussed in great detail elsewhere (see, e.g., Cocker and Jones 2015 or Wilson and Game 2011). The most important point in this relationship is that local government in England has little financial autonomy (see Copus et al. 2017). The United Kingdom, as a whole, is one of the most highly centralized systems of government. Any moves to devolve powers to local government must come from the center. What has happened since the 1980s has been the steady reduction in the provision of services by local authorities as central government has transferred responsibilities to a range of un-­ elected public and semi-public bodies. No longer is it the case of councils delivering all of the services for their local community, even in two-tier areas where there are county and district councils. Instead, through various pieces of legislation from central government, local authorities have to ensure the delivery of services for which they are legally obliged but may

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not necessarily deliver those services themselves. Wilson (2005: 155) has described the situation as ‘a complex mosaic of agencies’. There is no compunction for the local authority to be the service provider. Leicester City Council, for example, has tendered out the refuse collection service to a private company, Biffa. The contract, signed in November 2002, runs for 25 years. Some councils have taken this opportunity much further. Peterborough City Council no longer provides any public services directly. They have all been put out to tender, privatized or delivered by bespoke providers (possibly established by the council) to ensure the council no longer delivers the services. This leaves the council with a regulatory role and brings into question a range of issues around the democratic deficit. This reduction in the number of services provided by local authorities has diminished even further with the centrally driven austerity drive (see Lowndes and Gardner 2016), which emphasizes the control the center has over financing and other activities of local government in England. Rhodes (1997) saw local government as one of many players in a system of local networks; but it did not have any special role—it was not even first among equals. Indeed, as Copus et  al. (2017) show, English local government exists in a highly fragmented environment where it not only shares space with other public sector providers but also shares policy-­ making and political space with a range of unelected bodies. The significance of local government in any local networks had been severely diminished through the 1990s (see Sullivan 2004) and has experienced a progressive diminution of its role—whichever party was in power nationally. Even when power appeared to be given to local authorities, such as in the Local Government Act (2000) and the Localism Act (2011), it was very much a top-down process with the center deciding what it would devolve, how and when. The 2000 Act gave local councils a clear community leadership role and ‘a duty to prepare community strategies with partners at the local level and with the involvement of the public’ (Wilson 2004: 18). A conceivable consequence of this complexity, and this is something which has been raised in the past, is a possible disconnect between local councils and their communities (see Pratchett 2004). Some of this can be attributed to the size of local councils, and the ensuing remoteness from the public (England has some of the largest units of local government across Europe; see Newton 1982; McDonnell 2019). Yet the possibility of this disconnect is also a consequence of the ‘limited discretion and autonomy’ (Pratchett 2004: 214) of councils. While there may be a duty to

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consult, there is no consistency across councils as to who is consulted. Non-statutory consultations have no legal status. And even after such consultations, councils may not be in a position to deliver on any of the demands. Consequently, there may be a possibility of a worsening disconnect between the public and local government. This is why many councils are trying to be more proactive in encouraging various forms of community engagement, as well as trying to develop new forms of collaboration and partnership. What we see in this brief structural and constitutional description is no one single pattern of relationships—or indeed responsibilities—between local government and civil society and that different types of authorities relate to different sets of publics (or indeed the same public) in different ways and for different purposes. Thus, there is a complex and scattered pattern existing which complicates any analysis, often lacking a clear hierarchy or delineation of roles (see, e.g., Leach and Percy-Smith 2001). Thus, tracking the local, regional and national networks used by local authorities in England is extremely difficult. There may be no requirement for local authorities to consult with vested interests. In fact, if central government was to compel such consultation, central government would have to provide the finance to enable such consultation to take place. In this, there is a great reluctance from central government to do so. Consequently, each local authority will develop its own set of networks. While there may be patterns across the country, for example developing relations with the local Chambers of Commerce, there is no necessity to do so. A consequence of all of this has been a significant change in the role of councilors in England. Rather than sitting in full council and in council committees, most councilors now sit on a range of other regulatory bodies—external to the council of which they are an elected member but which legislation may require council participation. Councilors are, in these circumstances, merely members of a larger body which will have a majority of members that are not councilors, but appointed, more often than not by central government. These bodies are quite diverse, often covering areas beyond the remit of a council, but requiring that local council input. This has been explored elsewhere (see Copus and Wall 2017). Again, as with so many things about local government in England, there is no uniformity of practice. For local authorities in England, there is a duty to consult. In fact, upon accessing the web pages of any local authority, there is a link to the consultations which are open (with a closing date) and those which are closed.

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There is, however, no requirement for any local authority to consult with any organizations. Individual councils may inform specific groups of any ongoing consultations, especially if such input is deemed valuable or necessary. There is no compunction. Yet effective politics is built upon the active articulation of competing interests, with a consequent negotiation and compromise, resulting in a settlement that may be tolerable to all (Pratchett 2004). From a societal perspective, there is spasmodic engagement with local government. The most obvious example of engagement—voting—sees turnouts averaging below 40 percent. Yet this is to hide other forms of engagement. It may not be the public per se engaging with local government but pressure and lobby groups which are willing to engage. The problem is that such engagement is very much on an ad hoc basis. The groups engage with specific issues that concern them, rather than a more full-on engagement. It is a form of NIMBYism, based on the desire to protect existing standards of service and quality of life. For many members of the public, there may be a distinct lack of awareness of these groups and the forms of lobbying undertaken by them. This, however, does not stop people complaining about the faults of the council, even if the council no longer delivers those services. With this contextual introduction in mind, the chapter explores aspects of local networking between local state and society in two key areas. Thus, the next section explores network stemming from the European Union, namely Local Action Groups (LAGs). However, such groups are not run or coordinated by councils. Yet, they provide a necessary network of interaction for councils. The final networking is via the Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), which have been set up across England. These involve different councils from different geographic regions of England, in networks specifically focused on economic growth and development. The chapter concludes by drawing together the issues relating to local authority networks.

Local Action Groups Local Action Groups (LAGs) were established under the auspices of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union. They are also a part of the European Network for Rural Development. LAGs have been established within eight of the regions of England, all except London. In total, there are 79 LAGs across England (Department for Environment,

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Food and Rural Affairs 2017). They are not, however, directly linked to any local authorities. In fact, some of these LAGs straddle English regions, for example, North Warwickshire and Hinckley and Bosworth is listed as a West Midlands LAG but Hinckley and Bosworth District Council is in the East Midlands, while Rural Peterborough and Rutland is listed as an East of England LAG but Rutland Council is also in the East Midlands. The LAGs focus upon rural development, which immediately removes many of the urban conurbations in England. Shucksmith (2000) raised the issue of capacity building in the LEADER project and within LAGs. He noted how the LAGs were not prioritizing the development of community capacity. Rather, the emphasis was upon job creation. The reality is the characteristics of any LAG will be influenced by the local geography and by the priorities of the organizations that tend to dominate: that is, the local councils. No one council may necessarily dominate an LAG, but the councils—collectively—will take the lead in bidding for monies from, for example, the European Agricultural Funds for Rural Development (EAFRD). The projects will be coordinated at a council level as well. The East Leicestershire LAG ties in with the Leicestershire Rural Partnership (LRP), despite both Rutland and Hinckley and Bosworth councils looking elsewhere. The LRP, like any rural partnership, tries to bring together the different stakeholders who have a vested interest in the development and protection of rural services. They will have representation from the county council, as well as one representative to cover all of the district and borough councils, and one for all of the parish councils. Thereafter, other stakeholders such as the Local Enterprise Partnership (see below) and representatives for the conglomerations of private businesses will be involved. All of this is purely voluntary. There is no compunction to draw in any specific partners and no compulsion on partners to be involved. Membership of a LAG is open to any business or organization operating within the LAG area. Bosworth et  al. (2016: 489) have noted how the LAGs have empowered local actors to attempt to participate in a more bottom-up approach. Conversely, Raco et al. (2006) noted how the different Action Groups tended to be dominated by the agendas of the local authorities. Added to this, the LAGs tended to have something of a silo mentality, in that they worked individually rather than working together for mutual benefit. This is despite the EU guidance on LAGs, which notes they should not be bound by administrative boundaries (European Commission 2018). The priorities of the LAGs are in line with the Local Development Strategies (discussed below), which are designed

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by the local councils and the Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs). The end result, like with so much in local government in England, is a patchwork quilt of practice. The collective budget of the LAGs’ LEADER scheme is not high. For the period 2015–2020, it was £138 million across all of the LAGs in England. This is made available to different projects across the LAGs by open tender. The Cumbria Fells and Dales LAG, for example, sought over £4.3 million for various projects in their region. In sum, membership of a LAG is voluntary, although the rules by which they operate are set elsewhere. The membership is not coherent, although there is a reasonably strong co-ordination among those who deign to participate. Participation rates among local businesses and voluntary organizations can be high. The actual influence of the LAGs tends to be low. This can be seen in a context where the concerns of the rural communities are not considered to be as high a concern as those of urban areas. At best, the LAGs tend to perform more of a communicative role.

Local Enterprise Partnerships Across England there are 38 Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs). These see the development of partnerships between a number of local authorities, other public bodies, private organizations, and voluntary organizations, with the aim of developing economic growth in their respective regions. They are very much private sector or business-led, with economic development priorities to the fore. The origins of the LEPs date back to the Government’s 2010 White Paper ‘Local Growth: Realising Every Place’s Potential’. This was very much a centrally driven agenda, with the concurrent abolition of the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), which had been established by the previous Labour Government. There were nine RDAs, one for each of the NUTS English regions; the 38 LEPs are consequently much smaller and, although not a direct replacement, they took over many of the roles of the RDAs. The formal powers of the LEPs are significantly fewer, as are their resources (see Morphet and Pemberton 2013 or Laffin 2016). The LEPs can bid for funds from a centrally organized regional growth fund and other centrally organized funds such as the Growing Places Fund. Some of the LEPs are attempting to work together across boundaries. In 2016, the government announced a review of the LEPs, led by Mary Ney, including their roles and responsibilities. Such a review merely underpins the centralized nature of English

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governance as any changes to the LEP system will come from the center and not the constituent local authorities and other partners. One of the perceived problems with the LEPs is councils may decide to sit on more than one LEP. Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council, for example, sits on both the Leeds City Region LEP and the Sheffield City Region LEP, while North East Derbyshire District Council sits on the Sheffield City Region LEP and the Derby, Derbyshire, Nottingham Nottinghamshire LEP (as do Chesterfield, Bassetlaw, Bolsover and Derbyshire Dales councils). Each LEP has different priorities, some of which will link in with the strategic plans of the member councils. The LEPs are quite insular, in a way not too dissimilar to the LAGs (as discussed earlier) and therefore councils with split interests may not be looked upon too fondly. On each of the Boards of the LEPs, there will be representation of local authorities—with both county and district or borough representation, as well as that of any unitary authorities. The make-up of the Board of Directors for each LEP is a 50:50 split between public and private. Boards vary in size from 28 on the South East LEP to 9 on the Greater Cambridge and Greater Peterborough LEP (Ward 2019: 23). There are many opportunities for networking through the LEPs, but the emphasis is very much upon business. The Leicester and Leicestershire LEP, for example, hold quarterly Business Leaders’ Network meetings. These tend to be day-long fora where high-level issues around economic development and strategic planning can be debated. Such fora are open to the public. It requires merely a pro-active citizen or business leader to apply to attend an event. The aim of each LEP is to participate in the economic development of their region. In fact, the LEPs should almost be seen as business champions. In tandem with the development of Local Strategic Partnerships, the LEPs should be identifying and promoting various opportunities for further economic development. In this, they perform a clear advocacy role (Pugalis and Townsend 2012). The slight problem here is that Local Strategic Partnerships tend to be at the local authority level—although not all local authorities have established such bodies; while the LEPs operate across local authority boundaries. Such partnerships pull in a range of different actors from the public, private and voluntary sectors. Within each council, there are different priorities for the strategic partnerships, with different local players having prominence as a result of local political history.

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As LEPs are non-statutory bodies, they require an Accountable Body to manage funding from government and other sources. Funding has increased considerably from a one-off start-up fund of £5 million and access to a £1 billion regional growth fund. That growth fund was extended to £2.7 billion over a five-year period, ending in 2016 (Ward 2019: 9). The Accountable Body, through its Section 151 Officer (the Director of Finance), is responsible for ensuring that statutory requirements are met in resource allocation decisions and that the public interest is protected. This Accountable Body is usually one of the local councils. Thus, the Cornwall and Isles of Scilly (CIoS) LEP reports to Cornwall Council, while the Cumbria LEP has a combined Scrutiny Committee with representatives from Cumbria County Council and all six district or borough councils in the LEP. The issue of accountability is an interesting one. The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (2019: 19) notes LEPs are accountable to the communities that they serve. Noting the unelected nature of the LEPs, this appears to be a little challenging. It is the participating local authorities which bear the brunt of the accountability. This, however, is based on the assumption members of the public are even aware of the existence of the LEPs, lest their roles and functions. Ultimately, central government will bear the responsibility for any gross failings within a given LEP or across the LEP system as a whole. In sum, the LEPs are little more than highly influential advisory bodies but ones which receive not inconsiderable government funding for their activities. Although non-statutory bodies, the role and function of the LEPs have been outlined broadly by central government. Their scope of impact is high, as is the impact of the decisions undertaken. However, credit for such decisions is likely to be taken by the local authorities due to the lack of public awareness of the existence of the LEPs.

Conclusions As with much of local government in England, there is a diversity of structure, practice, and of legal requirements which produces numerous patterns of interaction and activity. The relationship between local government and the networks with which it interacts also reflects this diversity. Local authorities across England have been extremely innovative in finding new forms of collaboration. Such collaboration tends to be on an ad hoc basis and varies from council to council. Our exploration of Local Action

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Groups and Local Enterprise Partnerships provides a flavor of just how diverse the interactions between local government and various networks can be and what stimulates those interactions. The interactions local government has with various networks, particularly those we have focused on here, are shaped by whether or not the interactions are legally required, statutorily structured or voluntarily entered into by councils with specific networks within their own areas. What this means is local government does not necessarily enter these interlocking and overlapping networks on their own terms. Rather they engage within a set of rules that tend to be detailed by central government. Where they do interact on their own rules, such approaches have no statutory basis and thus are accepted or rejected by civil society. Local government must be flexible, responsive and politically attuned if it is to have impact within the myriad of networks within which it engages and cannot rely on its democratic mandate alone to wield influence.

References Bosworth, G., Annibal, I., Carroll, T., Price, L., Sellick, J., & Shepherd, J. (2016). Empowering Local Action through Neo-Endogenous Development: The Case of LEADER in England. Sociologia Ruralis, 56(3), 427–449. Cocker, P., & Jones, A. (2015). Contemporary British Politics and Government (4th ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge Media Group. Copus, C., Roberts, M., & Wall, R. (2017). Local Government in England: Centralisation, Autonomy and Control. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Copus, C., & Wall, R. (2017). The Voice of the Councillor: Final Report of the De Montfort University and Municipal Journal Councillor Commission. Leicester: DMU. European Commission. (2018). European Structural and Investment Funds: Guidance for Local Actors on Community-Led Local Development. EGESIF_18-0034-00 Laffin, M. (2016). Planning in England: New Public Management, Network Governance or Post-Democracy? International Review of Administrative Sciences, 82(2), 354–372. Leach, R., & Percy-Smith, J. (2001). Local Governance in Britain. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Local Growth: Realising Every Place’s Potential, CM 7961. London: The Stationery Office. Lowndes, V., & Gardner, A. (2016). Local Governance Under the Conservatives: Super-austerity, Devolution and the ‘Smarter State’. Local Government Studies, 42(3), 357–375.

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McDonnell, J. (2019). Municipality Size, Political Efficacy and Political Participation: A Systematic Review. Local Government Studies 46(3), 331–350. Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government. (2019). National Planning Policy Framework. London: Crown Copyright. Morphet, J., & Pemberton, S. (2013). ‘Regions Out—Sub-regions In’—Can Sub-­ regional Planning Break the Mould? The View from England. Planning, Practice & Research, 28(4), 384–399. Newton, K. (1982). Is Small Really so Beautiful? Is Big Really so Ugly? Size, Effectiveness, and Democracy in Local Government. Political Studies, 30(2), 190–206. Pratchett, L. (2004). Institutions, Politics and People: Making Local Politics Work. In G. Stoker & D. Wilson (Eds.), British Local Government into the 21st Century (pp. 213–239). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Pugalis, L., & Townsend, A.  R. (2012). Re-balancing England: Sub-National Development (Once Again) at the Crossroads. Urban Research & Practice, 5(1), 159–176. Raco, M., Parker, G., & Roak, J. (2006). Reshaping Spaces of Local Governance? Community Strategies and the Modernisation of Local Government in England. Environment and Planning C: Politics and Policy, 24(4), 475–496. Rhodes, R. A. W. (1997). Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance Reflexivity and Accountability. Buckingham: Open University Press. Shucksmith, M. (2000). Endogenous Development, Social Capital and Social Inclusion: Perspectives from LEADER in the UK. Sociologia Ruralis, 40(2), 208–218. Sullivan, H. (2004). Community Governance and Local Government: A Shoe that Fits or the Emperor’s New Clothes? In G. Stoker & D. Wilson (Eds.), British Local Government into the 21st Century (pp. 182–198). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Ward, M. (2019). Local Enterprise Partnerships. House of Commons Library Briefing Paper Number 5651. Wilson, D. (2004). New Patterns of Central-Local Government Relations. In G. Stoker & D. Wilson (Eds.), British Local Government into the 21st Century (pp. 9–24). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Wilson, D. (2005). The United Kingdom: An Increasingly Differentiated Polity. In B.  Denters & L.  Rose (Eds.), Comparing Local Governance: Trends and Developments (pp. 155–173). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Wilson, D., & Game, C. (2002). Local Government in the United Kingdom (3rd ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave. Wilson, D., & Game, C. (2011). Local Government in the United Kingdom (5th ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

CHAPTER 9

Local State-Society Relations in Finland Linnéa Henriksson

Introduction Finland belongs to the countries with a nationalized infrastructure for local state-society relations, according to the typology developed by Sellers and Kwak (2011: 626; see also Sellers and Lidström 2014). Finland is a decentralized unitary state with a highly influential local government (Anttiroiko and Valkama 2017: 153) and a high score (over 75) on the Local Autonomy Index, along with the other Nordic countries (Ladner et al. 2015: 68–69). Finland has a two-tier structure of government (Haveri 2015: 138–1401), a central national government and local government at the municipal level. The municipalities, 311 in year 2019,2 have a strong self-­ government and a broad or even extensive mandate; they are responsible for providing basic public service such as social and health care, primary and secondary education as well as waste management, water and other public goods (Anttiroiko and Valkama 2017: 158, Haveri 2015: 138). These services are produced by the municipality itself, by a joint municipal

L. Henriksson (*) Åbo Akademi University, Turku, Finland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 F. Teles et al. (eds.), Close Ties in European Local Governance, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44794-6_9

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body (on regional or sub-regional level) or contracted out. Half of the municipal expenditures are covered by local, flat rate taxes (set by the council) (Anttiroiko and Valkama 2017: 159), while a quarter is covered with state grants and the rest with municipal service charges. The regional government structure has historically been weak and has (as of yet) no democratic or welfare-related responsibilities (Anttiroiko and Valkama 2017: 153).3 Municipalities employ about 20 percent of the total workforce in Finland (Moisio and Uusitalo 2013: 151). The civil society in Finland shows a corporate structure, where ‘voluntary and collective activities are supported by the state, because they are seen as the tools of social consensus’ (Cepel 2012: 331). As in the other Nordic states, citizens in Finland actively participate in voluntary organizations, since the first of them were founded in the 1830s (Cepel 2012: 333). Finland has over 130,000 registered associations, of which maybe 70,000 are actively working and furthermore 20,000–30,000 unregistered voluntary organizations (Seppo 2013: 10). Within this infrastructure, the function of bodies in which local government and the civil society interact is (as will be shown below) mainly advisory. In this respect, Finland differs from many European countries where institutionalized cooperation between the local state and the civil society is regarded as an important way of bringing the civil society closer to local government. The difference occurs in practice, the discourse is the same. The main reason is the lesser need for a service producing civil society in the Nordic countries, due to their extensive welfare state. Another possible explanation to this difference is the national political culture or the role of the parties in the Nordic society (see also Sellers and Kwak 2011: 640). In, for example, Poland, only circa one-third of the local councilors belong to a political party (see Egner et  al. 2018: 335). In Finland, the corresponding number is over 97 percent (Piipponen 2013: 74). The local decision-making system is thus practically an affair only for the political parties. However, the election system also offers an extended possible explanation. Finland has an open-list election system. To succeed in a person-­oriented election system, parties look for possible candidates, obviously, among persons who show an interest in (local) politics, and also among persons who are already active and preferably already known to the public. In practice, parties look for candidates among representatives of various associations, especially among people acting as representatives for their peers in organizations for labor, business owners, farmers, forest owners, sports associations, school associations and so on. There is

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significant overlapping between local representatives of parties and of various associations (Pikkala 2005: 31–32). The overlapping also follows some party-specific traits. Representatives of labor organizations are often Social Democrats, farmers and forest owners often belong to the Centre Party and, accordingly, representatives of business owner’s organizations are often members of the Moderate Party (Helander 2003: 43). The bottom line is that the need for communication between the local government and the civil society to a big extent is channeled through the party system in Finland. This is facilitated by the fact that, unlike other Nordic countries (e.g. Sweden), Finland has a clearer legislation concerning both the civil society (Cepel 2012: 333–334, Seppo 2013: 19)4 and the political parties,5 which regulates the behavior for those involved in both parties and associations. Three specific types of networks are here considered as relevant6 for local state-society relations in Finland—namely • youth councils, • councils on disability, and • local action groups (LAGs). The criteria for selecting these networks are that they stand for (a) repeated interaction, (b) mutual exchange and (c) recognized representative claims among the involved actors. Furthermore, these networks exist at the local level all over the country. The Finnish Municipal Act7 requires municipalities to establish advisory committees for the youth, the elderly and the disabled. These advisory committees are very similar to each other. They are all an effect of the increasing emphasis on societal participation (e.g. Christensen et al. 2016: 9), which resulted in several new mandatory bodies in the local administration according to the new Municipal Act, fixed in 2015. Already in 2015, these networks were in use in more than 80 percent of the municipalities (Christensen et al. 2016: 22). According to the law, they should be set up in all municipalities, except for those municipalities that have decided to have a joint body on this matter, and they can be considered as typical local state-society relations in Finland. The variations in their actual work (i.e. inter-local differences) are presumably larger than variations between the types of networks (see Kimpimäki 2012; Latvalahti 2015). As councils on disability constitute the most clear-cut example of local state-­ society relations in a Finnish context, and youth councils differ from the

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other two concerning representation, they are discussed in this chapter more in detail and categorized according to the three dimensions outlined by Teles (in Chap. 2) and their operationalization (in Chap. 3 of this volume).8 Finally, Local Action Groups are considered relevant. Finland’s accession to the EU in 1995 was the main springboard to the need to strengthen the regions and their development, to be able to handle structural funding. It caused both new and changed institutional structures in the Finnish administration, mostly on regional and sub-regional (inter-municipal) level (Anttiroiko and Valkama 2017: 161, Kettunen and Kungla 2005). This caused new institutional structures also in the civil society, namely Local Action Groups. Local Action Groups are voluntary, but necessary to get financial support from the EU (particularly from the LEADER program) for local development. Usually they are joint bodies including more than one municipality. Their composition and other features are different from the municipal advisory committees mentioned earlier, which will be discussed below.

Youth Councils According to the Finnish Municipal Act, municipalities must establish a youth council (nuorisovaltuusto in Finnish, ungdomsfullmäktige in Swedish),9 or a corresponding group for the youth, to guarantee the young population possibilities to participate, and provide the council prerequisites for action. Youth councils should, according to the Municipal Act, be given opportunities to influence planning, implementation and monitoring of the activities of various municipal agencies in matters of importance regarding young resident’s welfare, health, studies, environment, living or mobility and any other matters considered important for children and youth. Therefore, youth councils are primarily bodies for advocacy, but they also arrange events for the youth. Youth councils have occurred in Finnish municipalities since the end of the 1990s (Christensen et al. 2016: 9, Nikkilä 2002: 66) but have been obligatory since 2017. In May 2017, in total 81 percent, that is, 241 out of 295, of the municipalities (i.e. mainland Finland, excluding the Åland Islands) had constituted a youth council.10 As the legal regulation is new, the number of councils should be rising, although it should be noted that several municipalities can have a joint youth council.

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The autonomy of youth councils is rather high, although youth councils are statutory and thus their existence, initiation and administration are matters of law. Youth councils are often assigned an adult mentor in the municipal administration, usually a civil servant or employee from the department where youth issues are handled, as support or as secretary general, who can arrange the elections, send out invitations, take notes, prepare minutes and so on (see Gretschel 2002: 55). The rules are to be decided by every municipality itself. The variation is in practice not that great. The Municipal Act set up some rules but allows municipalities itself to set up their organization according to the Administrative Regulations.11 Thus, the composition of the youth council12 is often decided upon in the Administrative Regulations by the municipal council. According to the Union of Local Youth Councils in Finland (Nuva 2019), the youth councils mostly seem to consist of residents aged 13–18, although the age gap is not fixed (as people by law are considered young until 29 years old). The youth councils have between 5 and 60 members, mostly depending on the size of the municipality (Nuva 2019). Members are chosen either by free elections, on municipal level or in schools or youth centers, or designated at annual youth parliaments (Nuva 2019, see also Gretschel 2002: 48). Some rules of conduct are statutory, some decided upon by the municipal council and some given by the youth council itself. The rules most likely decide how something is to be done rather than what. Youth councils tend to have a short mandate, they are often elected annually. The coherence of the networks is low. Elections to youth councils are usually arranged as free elections in schools or youth centers. Thus, the members of the youth councils, although representing the youth and thereby having a common goal in speaking for the youth, can act on their own behalf, while not representing any organization. In the 1990s, there were some examples of very politicized youth councils (see Nikkilä 2002: 67) but nowadays youth councils are mostly kept free from party politics, to ensure equal possibilities to participate. Still, members of youth councils are often active persons in many respects (Nikkilä 2002: 69). Youth councils usually meet regularly. In some municipalities, youth councils can appoint representatives or observers in other municipal bodies (see Kallio and Bäcklund 2012: 252), but the operations of the youth council are not necessarily tied to any municipal schedule. The relevance of the networks is also considered as low. Youth councils share information and might contribute by consultation but cannot otherwise exercise power (which is discussed almost every time youth

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participation is mentioned, e.g. Christensen et al. 2016). In comparison to different potential channels of participation (voting, giving feedback, take part of meetings, influencing via buying behavior, violence, etc.), active work in youth councils or youth organizations is considered the second most influential instrument. They are pinpointed as influential by about 60 percent of the respondents in the Youth Barometer Survey but used as a channel of influence by less than 25 percent (Myllyniemi and Kiilakoski 2013: 109, 111). The policy relevance for the local community is low or medium. The mandate of the youth councils is not broad and does not consist of large policy areas, but youth councils own the right to be heard in matters concerning the youth and may thus get issues on the agenda in the local society.13

Municipal Councils on Disability As already mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the Finnish Municipal Act prescribes municipalities to establish a council on disability (vammaisneuvosto in Finnish, råd för personer med funktionsnedsättning in Swedish) and provide the committee prerequisites for action and to guarantee possibilities to participate.14 About 5 percent of the Finnish population experience some kind of slight disability, while 1 percent of the cases have a more severe variant (Hästbacka and Nygård 2013: 129). These councils on disability are clear-cut examples of institutionalized relations between the local state and the civil society; ‘A Municipal Council on Disability is a collaboration forum for disabled associations, the authorities and decision makers’.15 The first municipal councils on disability were found in the 1970s, some years after the first corresponding municipal councils on disability were founded in Sweden in 1971 (Valtakunnallinen vammaisneuvosto 2006). The councils on disability have appeared in the legislation since the Act on Services for the Disabled was approved in 1987, but back then as a form of voluntary cooperation. In 2009, before the new Municipal Act (in 2015) made them mandatory, two-thirds of the municipalities in Finland had a council on disability (Piipponen 2013: 74). The autonomy of the councils on disability is rather high, although they are statutory according to the Municipal Act and are initiated and coordinated by the municipal administration. The council can be arranged as a joint committee for more than one municipality or as a joint committee

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for both disabled and elderly, although both alternatives are quite unusual (Kimpimäki 2012). The rules of advisory committees are decided upon by every municipality itself. In practice, the rules follow, as is the case with youth councils (see above), the Municipal Act and the Administrative Regulations. Some rules of conduct are statutory, some decided upon by the municipal council or board and some given by the council itself. The rules most likely decide how something is to be done rather than what, as the question of substance is decided by law. The council members are usually named by the municipal board, for a period of two or four years. The composition of the council on disability contains persons representing different organizations in the field, relatives (families) of the disabled and the municipality. In 2011, two-thirds of the council members were representing organizations (Kimpimäki 2012). The amount of organizations working in the municipal area varies between different municipalities and consequently so does the composition of representatives. In some municipalities, every existing organization is represented, in other municipalities organizations are represented each in its turn and, in cases where there are no relevant working organizations, the disabled are represented by well-known, active disabled persons or relatives to them (Kimpimäki 2012: 5). The most common organizations are representing people with heart diseases, cancer and diabetes, as well as neurological and rheumatic diseases (Kimpimäki 2012: 5). The last third of the council members are officials or politicians representing different municipal branches. Almost all councils have representatives from social services, but also persons representing municipal infrastructure (>50 percent), education (