Identity Politics in US National Elections: Underrepresented 303128383X, 9783031283833

Table of contents :
Acknowledgments
Contents
Notes on Contributors
Abbreviations and Acronyms
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 Identity Politics in US National Elections
References
2 Gendered Attitudes and Support for Elizabeth Warren in the 2020 Democratic Primary
Gender and Presidential Candidates
Data and Variables
Gendered Attitudes and Early Support for Warren
Conclusion
References
3 African American Women in 2020 US Politics, the Stony Road Walked
Theoretical Considerations
Misogynoir: The Intersection Between Race and Gender for African American Women
The Stony Road Walked—A Brief Historical Overview
Upswing in Electoral Politics: 1968–2020
African American Women Behind the Scenes
Changing the Political Climate: African American Women Led Social Movements Impacting 2020
Stars of the 2020 Election, Abrams and Harris
Conclusions
References
4 Voicing Support for Black Lives Matter in Congress and Its Impact on the 2020 House Elections
2020 Election Landscape
Public Attitudes on Racial Justice
Congressional Support for Black Lives Matter
Did Support for BLM Matter for the 2020 Elections?
Conclusions
References
5 Black Lives Matter’s Role in the 2020 Presidential Election: An Assessment of Individual and District-Level Data
Theoretical Framing: Blumer’s Group Position Perspective
Data and Methods
Results
Conclusions
References
6 The Rainbow Wave in 2020: The LGBTQ+ Community and the Path to Equitable Representation
The Current State of LGBTQ+ Representation
A Closer Look: LGBTQ+ Representation in State Legislatures
Discussion and Conclusion
References
7 Influences and Preferences Among Older Voters in the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election
U.S. Presidential Election
Age and Generation Effects
COVID-19 and the 2020 Election
Policies and Platforms: Where Was Aging Policy in the 2020 Election?
Media, Social Media, and Misinformation
Conclusions
Looking Ahead
References
8 Identity Politics in the Wake of 2020
Introduction
The Democrats: Governing While Tending a Coalition of Identities
Republicans: Two Potential Futures in Tension
Conclusion
References
Index

Citation preview

PALGRAVE STUDIES IN US ELECTIONS SERIES EDITOR: LUKE PERRY

Identity Politics in US National Elections Edited by Tauna S. Sisco Jennifer C. Lucas Christopher J. Galdieri

Palgrave Studies in US Elections

Series Editor Luke Perry, Utica College, Utica, NY, USA

This Pivot series, established in collaboration with the Utica University Center of Public Affairs and Election Research, brings together cuttingedge work in US Politics focused on trends and issues surrounding local, state, and federal elections. Books in this series may cover but are not limited to topics such as voting behavior, campaign management, policy considerations, electoral social movements, and analysis of significant races. While welcoming all projects on US elections within and across all three levels of government, this series proceeds from the truism that all politics is fundamentally local. As such, we are especially interested in research on state and local elections such as mayoral races, gubernatorial races, and congressional elections, with particular focus on how state/local electoral trends influence national electoral politics, and vice versa. This series is open to any relevant scholar and all methodological approaches.

Tauna S. Sisco · Jennifer C. Lucas · Christopher J. Galdieri Editors

Identity Politics in US National Elections

Editors Tauna S. Sisco Sociology Saint Anselm College Manchester, NH, USA

Jennifer C. Lucas Politics Saint Anselm College Manchester, NH, USA

Christopher J. Galdieri Politics Saint Anselm College Manchester, NH, USA

ISSN 2731-6785 ISSN 2731-6793 (electronic) Palgrave Studies in US Elections ISBN 978-3-031-28383-3 ISBN 978-3-031-28384-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28384-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgments

In March 2020, scholars across the country gathered at the fifth American Elections Conference at the New Hampshire Institute of Politics on Saint Anselm College campus in Manchester New Hampshire. This book was inspired by the multiple sessions that illuminated how politics are often tumultuous and identity politics, now more than ever, play a strong role in the electoral process moving forward. This conference would not have been possible without the generous contributions of the faculty at Saint Anselm College, and prior conference organizers Dr. Peter Josephson and Dr. Ward Holder. This work would not have been possible without the generous support of the Vice President for Academic Affairs Office at Saint Anselm College and the New Hampshire Institute of Politics. We are especially indebted to Dr. Joseph Favazza, President of Saint Anselm College, Bro. Isaac Murphy, O.S.B, Vice President of Academic Affairs, and Mr. Neil Levesque, Director of the New Hampshire Institute of Politics. We would like to thank our editor at Palgrave Pivot, Madison Allums, Project Coordinator Naveen Dass, and the entire editorial and production staff. Finally, thank you to our partners, Jim, Dave, and Kate, with special thanks to our children: James, Sebastian, Gabriel, Adelaide, Desmond, Veronica, and Alex.

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Contents

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Identity Politics in US National Elections Tauna S. Sisco, Jennifer C. Lucas, and Christopher J. Galdieri

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Gendered Attitudes and Support for Elizabeth Warren in the 2020 Democratic Primary Jennifer C. Lucas

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4

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African American Women in 2020 US Politics, the Stony Road Walked Walton Brown-Foster

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Voicing Support for Black Lives Matter in Congress and Its Impact on the 2020 House Elections Jeff Gulati and Lindsey Cormack

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Black Lives Matter’s Role in the 2020 Presidential Election: An Assessment of Individual and District-Level Data Kevin Doran and Tauna S. Sisco The Rainbow Wave in 2020: The LGBTQ+ Community and the Path to Equitable Representation Hanna K. Brant and L. Marvin Overby

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Influences and Preferences Among Older Voters in the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election Elizabeth Hahn Rickenbach, Janelle Fassi, and Kevin Doran Identity Politics in the Wake of 2020 Christopher J. Galdieri, Tauna S. Sisco, and Jennifer C. Lucas

Index

101 131

141

Notes on Contributors

Hanna K. Brant is Assistant Professor at SUNY Geneseo. Her primary area of research and teaching is American politics, with a particular focus on legislative institutions and women in politics. Her work has been published in the Journal of Women, Politics & Policy, Congress & the Presidency, and Presidential Studies Quarterly. Walton Brown-Foster is Professor of Political Science at Central Connecticut State University. She received her doctorate in political science from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Her areas of research and teaching are Race and Ethnicity in US and Global Politics, Latin American Politics, African Politics, International Relations, Comparative Politics, Religion and Politics, and African Americans and US politics. She has taught at the University of Georgia, Athens and Yale University, New Haven. She is a published book author and coauthor and has published chapters in edited book volumes and academic journals such as Presidential Studies Quarterly, Proteus: Journal of Ideas, Women in International Security Policy Briefs, and Journal of Intercultural Disciplines. She is the current Chief Editor for the online journal 1619: Journal of African American Studies. Lindsey Cormack is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Stevens Institute of Technology. She received her doctorate from New York University. Her research interests include political communications, legislative politics, and electoral systems. She runs the DCinbox database

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and her work has appeared in Political Behavior, Congress & the Presidency, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Politics & Policy, Politics & Gender, The Journal of Gender Studies, Energy Economics, The Legislative Scholar as well as in popular outlets including the New York Times, The Washington Post, FiveThirtyEight, ProPublica, Roll Call, The New York Post, NBC News, the LSE US Centre, and The Hill. Kevin Doran is Associate Professor of Sociology at Saint Anselm College. He received his Ph.D. in Sociology from Indiana University, Bloomington. His research interests are broadly in the intersections between stratification, identity, and conflict. His recent work has examined racialized demographic changes and voting outcomes and the impact of accented speech on teaching evaluations and learning outcomes. Janelle Fassi is a Gerontology Ph.D. student at the University of Massachusetts Boston. She earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in Communication and Psychology from Saint Anselm College. Her research interests include the study of older voters in addition to intergenerational relationships and the stress and health of grandparent caregivers. Her research has been published in The Journal of Intergenerational Relationships. Christopher J. Galdieri is Professor of Politics at Saint Anselm College. He received his doctorate from the University of Minnesota. He is a frequent commentator on New Hampshire and presidential primary politics. He is the author of Stranger in a Strange State: The Politics of Carpetbagging from Robert Kennedy to Scott Brown and Donald Trump and New Hampshire Politics. Jeff Gulati is Professor of Political Science at Bentley University. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Virginia. His primary research interests are in the US Congress, congressional elections, race and American politics, and politics in popular culture. His recent work has appeared in Congress & The Presidency, Social Science Computer Review, Government Information Quarterly, Journal of Telecommunications Policy, and New Media & Society. He also is on the senior editorial board of the Journal of Information Technology & Politics and the Journal of Political Marketing. Jennifer C. Lucas is Professor of Politics at Saint Anselm College where she teaches courses on congressional politics and gender politics. She

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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holds a Ph.D. from the University of Maryland—College Park and is the former co-Editor of the Journal of Women, Politics & Policy. Her research has appeared in Politics & Gender, American Politics Research, and Politics, Groups and Identities, and she has co-edited several volumes on campaigns and elections, including Polarization and Political Party Factions in the 2020 Election with Tauna S. Sisco and Christopher Galdieri. L. Marvin Overby is Professor of Political Science and Director of the School of Public Affairs at Penn State Harrisburg. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Oklahoma and has held previous faculty positions at Loyola University Chicago, the University of Mississippi, and the University of Missouri. His research into various aspects of American politics has been published in such journals at the American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, Political Research Quarterly, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Polity, Social Science Quarterly, American Politics Research, and Party Politics. Elizabeth Hahn Rickenbach is an Associate Professor of Psychology at Saint Anselm College. She earned a doctorate in Aging Studies from the University of South Florida and completed a Post-Doctoral Research Fellowship in Developmental Psychology at Brandeis University. Her research interests include the study of older voters in addition to stress, health, and well-being in the daily lives of middle-aged and older adults. Her research has been published in a number of gerontology and psychology journals, including The Gerontologist and Psychology & Aging, and also the edited volume Conventional Wisdom, Parties, and Broken Barriers in the 2016 Election. Tauna S. Sisco is Professor of Sociology at Saint Anselm College. She received her doctorate from Purdue University. Her research interests include studies of social problems, women and politics, and healthcare practice. The coauthor of several edited volumes on US elections, her work has also appeared in Journal of Women, Politics, and Policy, Feminist Media Studies, and the Journal of Advanced Nursing.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AARP ACA ACLED AIDS ANES BLM GIS GOP HUD KKK LES LGBTQ+ NAFTA NASCAR NFL PAC PVI

American Association of Retired Persons Affordable Care Act Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome American National Election Study Black Lives Matter Geographic Information Systems Computer Software Republican Party Department of Housing and Urban Development Klu Klux Klan Legislative Effectiveness Scores Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer and/or Questioning North American Free Trade Agreement National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing National Football Leagues Political Action Committee Partisan Voting Index

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List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Fig. 4.1 Fig. 5.1

Fig. 6.1 Fig. 7.1 Fig. 7.2

Fig. 7.3

Fig. 7.4

Fig. 7.5

Gendered attitudes and early support for Elizabeth Warren Official Congressional e-newsletters mentioning “Black Lives Matter” by Party, 2015–2020 Map of BLM activity by event type in contiguous United States (Source This map was created using ArcGIS Pro 2.7 software by Esri, Esri’s [2013] topographic basemap, Esri’s [2021] USA 117th Congressional Districts layer, and ACLED protest data [Raleigh et al., 2010]) Percent of state legislators by sexual orientation and race/ethnicity NPR/PBS NewsHour/Marist Poll: December 2020. Provided By Roper Center for Public Opinion Research Kaiser Family Foundation Poll: December 2020 Kaiser Health Tracking Poll/COVID-19 Vaccine Monitor. Provided By Roper Center for Public Opinion Research Kaiser Family Foundation Poll: December 2020 Kaiser Health Tracking Poll/COVID-19 Vaccine Monitor, Provided By Roper Center for Public Opinion Research Kaiser Family Foundation Poll: October 2020 Kaiser Health Tracking Poll Provided By Roper Center for Public Opinion Research Kaiser Family Foundation Poll: December 2020 Kaiser Health Tracking Poll/COVID-19 Vaccine Monitor, Provided By Roper Center for Public Opinion Research

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72 92 114

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List of Tables

Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 4.4 Table 5.1 Table 5.2 Table 5.3 Table 5.4 Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 6.3 Table 7.1 Table 7.2

Negative binomial model of pro-BLM messages in official e-newsletters, House members, 116th Congress OLS regression model of 2020 two-party vote share for house incumbents running for reelection OLS regression model of 2020 two-party vote share for house incumbents running for reelection, democrats OLS regression model of 2020 two-party vote share for house incumbents running for reelection, republicans Descriptive statistics Patterns among those abandoning and switching to Trump in 2020 Logistic Regression of 2020 Vote Using ANES Pre-Election Data (Odds Ratios) District Change in Trump Vote Share (State Fixed Effects) LGBTQ+ legislators by state Number of state legislators by race/ethnicity and sexual orientation Number of state legislators by race/ethnicity and gender identity/expression Eligible and estimated voters and eligible voter attributes, by age Average feelings thermometer score for Clinton and Trump (0–100 scale)

51 54 56 56 70 73 75 77 89 92 93 103 106

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CHAPTER 1

Identity Politics in US National Elections Tauna S. Sisco, Jennifer C. Lucas, and Christopher J. Galdieri

Abstract Identity Politics assembles eight chapters by respected and emerging scholars in political science, psychology, and sociology to produce a sustained look at the 2020 US national election. These chapters emerged from papers presented at the American Elections Symposium held at the New Hampshire Institute of Politics at Saint Anselm College. They apply an impressive diversity of theoretical explanations and methodological approaches to explore how electoral identity shaped an American election, and what impact it could have in the future. Keywords US national elections · 2020 · Identity politics · Underrepresented

T. S. Sisco (B) · J. C. Lucas · C. J. Galdieri Saint Anselm College, Manchester, NH, USA e-mail: [email protected] J. C. Lucas e-mail: [email protected] C. J. Galdieri e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. S. Sisco et al. (eds.), Identity Politics in US National Elections, Palgrave Studies in US Elections, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28384-0_1

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Emerging in the late 1970s in connection with Black women’s oppression and activism, identity politics has transformed over the last 40 years to include historically marginalized groups such as minorities, women, and LGBTQ+ and their political representation, alliances, and activism. Identity politics encompasses political theory and activism embedded in demographic groups (e.g., race, gender, sexuality, religion) and developed as a reaction to structural oppression subjugating group representation. Identity politics has been “widely critiqued and rejected as irredeemably essentialist, insufficiently intersectional, deeply individualizing and depoliticizing, and/or excessively liberal and statist” and rebutted by traditional political party elites who prefer class-based based or national-based identities (Singh, 2022, 591; McCall & Orloff, 2017). While identity politics may be criticized, it looks here to stay in contemporary American politics. As Masket (2020) suggests identity politics is the politicization of a voter’s identity and how “politicians will tap into those identities for political advantages” (22). The phrase identity politics surged in the 2016 national election and remains prevalent in political discourse. Studying four decades of mainstream media usage of identity politics, Amira and Abraham (2022) found the term dormant until 2007/2008 (Barack Obama/Hillary Clinton candidacy) and then “skyrocketed” in 2016 (678). By 2020 identity politics was at the forefront of the divisive national election that resulted in the first African American woman voted in as Vice-President of the United States, a spotlight on social movements from Black Lives Matter to #Metoo, and a Rainbow Wave in congressional candidates. But how successful are identity politics and for whom? What impact does identity politics have on traditional parties as we edged closer to the 2024 elections? This book seeks to address those questions raised by a continued spotlight on identity in politics. It collects research by eleven established and emerging scholars of American politics who gathered at Saint Anselm College’s New Hampshire Institute of Politics in the spring of 2021 to dissect the 2020 national election. In the second chapter of this book, Jennifer C. Lucas examines gender as identity politics in her research on the 2020 Democratic presidential primaries. While one of the most diverse nomination fields in history, the nomination ultimately went to a white, male, septuagenarian, heterosexual candidate. To explain this outcome, Lucas analyzes gendered attitudes early in the Democratic primary process in the state of New Hampshire and their impact on the likelihood of preferring a female

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candidate, Elizabeth Warren, as the party’s nominee. Lucas finds that while gendered attitudes predicted early support for Warren, stereotypes of women politicians, perceptions of sexism from the 2016 election cycle, and attitudes about having a woman as president were all significant predictors of support for her candidacy. Ultimately, Lucas notes that gender, as identity politics, still plays an important role in elections. In Chapter 3, Walton Brown-Foster explores the roots of identity politics in the early fights by African American women for political representation and the gains of that struggle. She states that political advancements made by African American women should be viewed by intersectional aspects of their identity—race, gender, and class—and that theories of representation, political motivation, and ‘misogynoir’ provide lenses in which to do so. Brown-Foster provides an overview of the history and struggle for African American women in politics, examining their role, agency, and ascendancy, but also the unique challenges they face as women of color in a system historically built to exclude them. In light of the “bellwether” 2020 year for African American women in politics, she offers tentative conclusions about the sustainable viability and agency of African American women in politics. The next two chapters analyze raced-based identity politics, activism, and political consequences of support for Black Lives Matter (BLM). By the summer of 2020, BLM protests calling for police reform, equity, and greater opportunities for people of color were occurring in frequency and magnitude across the nation. In Chapter 4, Jeff Gulati and Lindsey Cormack examine the electoral consequences of voicing support for BLM by members of Congress. Of the small percentage of congressional leaders that supported BLM publically, all were Democrats, more likely white than non-white, and key to their support was district competitiveness, as Democrats in safe seats were more likely to voice support than Democrats in tight races. Incumbent House members gained the most for their vocal support of BLM. While there was an electoral benefit to supporting BLM, Gulati and Cormack suggest that if racial justice continues to equate to police opposition, it is unlikely Congress would address racial injustice legislatively. Chapter 5 explores the intersectionality of identity politics, racial/group threats, conservative voting, attitudes, and proximity to BLM protests on voting. The political sphere constructed two competing definitions of the BLM movement—one as violent, the other a nonviolent movement for justice. How do attitudes about BLM impact

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people’s voting preferences in 2020? And did proximity to BLM activity have consequences on the Trump vote share at the district level? Kevin Doran and Tauna S. Sisco suggest yes to both. Using geo-coded protest data and district lines from 2016 to 2020, they analyze demographic differences in districts and if BLM events and their proximity impacted change in Republican vote share. They find the greatest predictors of voters’ plan to abandon Trump were positive attitudes about BLM. While living near BLM events decreased voters’ likelihood to choose Trump, their proximity to police intervention in BLM events increase their likelihood to vote for Trump in the 2020 election. In Chapter 6, Hanna K. Brant and L. Marvin Overby evaluate the record number of LGBTQ+ candidates running and winning office in the 2020 election cycle at the national, state, and local level. Labeled the “rainbow wave,” Brant and Overby provide a demographic portrait of LGBTQ+ legislators where identity politics connected to sexuality is being “normalized” in their legislative environments. They suggest the Trumpdominated political environment propelled the surge in LGBTQ+ success, as he saw the highest levels of LGBTQ+ support for the re-election of any Republican candidate in 30 years. They speculate that only time will tell if there is a growing distance between LGBTQ+ elites who stress identity above other issues, and LGBTQ+ voters, who in good portion, were drawn to vote for Trump in 2020. While the majority of this book focuses on identity politics of underrepresented groups, Masket tells us that “all politics is identity politics” (2020, 22). Elizabeth Hahn Rickenbach, Janelle Fassi, and Kevin Doran in Chapter 7 explore the behavior of older voters in relation to key factors of the 2020 election: COVID-19, age-related policy platforms, and the role of media and misinformation. While historical trends showed the 65+ voter bloc as a Republican stronghold, they suggest that increasing diversity, and socioeconomic, and education differences may be better predictors of voting preferences in the future than age. The final chapter of the book examines how identity politics since 2020 has shaped American politics with specific emphasis on major party responses to their successes and failures. Christopher Galdieri, Tauna S. Sisco, and Jennifer C. Lucas state that while Democrats fielded the most diverse candidates of any party in American history, they must now govern while tending a coalition of diverse identities. Since inauguration, President Biden has diversified appointments to executive and judicial branches. However, any legislation aimed at ameliorating racial injustice,

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such as police reform, has faltered. Meanwhile, the Republican Party has two potential futures in tension: one that breaks with Trump to appeal to new nonwhite voters and women or one that embraces a third Trump run with the hope his selection will not endanger the party’s recent inroads with Hispanic voters and women. In sum, this volume empirically explores the multiple forms that identity politics takes in the trials and triumphs of the 2020 election cycle and the consequences moving forward in electoral politics. These chapters apply an impressive diversity of theoretical explanations and methodological approaches to explore how identity politics shaped an American election, what impact it could have in the future of diversity and democracy, and what lessons should be learned for 2024.

References Amira, K., & Abraham A. (2022). How the media uses the phrase “identity politics”. PS: Political Science & Politics, 55(4), 677–681. Masket, S. E. (2020). Learning from Loss: The Democrats, 2016–2020. Cambridge University Press. McCall, L., & Orloff, A. S. (2017). The multidimensional politics of inequality: Taking stock of identity politics in the U.S. Presidential election of 2016. The British Journal of Sociology, 68(1), S34–S56. Singh, J. (2022). Prior to its wounding: On the emancipatory possibilities of identity politics. Polity, (3), 591–599.

CHAPTER 2

Gendered Attitudes and Support for Elizabeth Warren in the 2020 Democratic Primary Jennifer C. Lucas

Abstract While the 2020 Democratic field was one of the most diverse in presidential nomination history, a white, male, heterosexual candidate ultimately won the nomination. Democrats typically have stronger baseline preferences for female candidates and expressed greater enthusiasm for voting for a minority or female candidate early in the 2020 primary process (Henderson et al. 2022, Sanbonmatsu 2002), so the result is somewhat surprising. To help explain this outcome, I examine support for Elizabeth Warren in the 2020 New Hampshire primary. Using a national survey from early in the Democratic primary process, I examine several gendered attitudes to assess whether they had an impact on the likelihood of preferring her as the party’s nominee. Gendered attitudes do

J. C. Lucas (B) Saint Anselm College, Manchester, NH, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. S. Sisco et al. (eds.), Identity Politics in US National Elections, Palgrave Studies in US Elections, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28384-0_2

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predict early support for Warren. Attitudes about having a woman as president, stereotypes of women politicians, perceptions of sexism in 2016, and beliefs about whether it was important for the party to nominate a woman were all significant predictors of supporting her candidacy. Gender still plays an important role in elections, and Elizabeth Warren’s candidacy in 2020 was no exception. Keywords Gender · Elizabeth Warren · New Hampshire primary · Democrats

To what extent does gender influence elections? In general elections, gender is typically overwhelmed by partisan effects (Anastasopoulos, 2016; Dolan, 2014). However, in primary elections, where partisanship does not vary, issues, ideology, endorsements, and identity factors all play a role in candidate choice (Henderson et al., 2022). While several women joined the 2020 presidential race initially, only one female candidate, Elizabeth Warren, polled within a few points of the eventual nominee. At first glance this is surprising, as Democratic voters are more likely to prefer gender parity in government, are less likely to have a baseline preference for a male candidate than Republicans, nominated a female candidate in 2016 that won the popular vote, and early polls found 83% of Democrats said they were ‘enthusiastic’ about voting for a woman (compared to 53% who were enthusiastic about voting for a white man) (Dolan & Sanbonmatsu, 2009; Henderson et al., 2022; Kurtzleben, 2020; Sanbonmatsu, 2002; Schaffner & Green, 2019). Warren also didn’t seem to suffer from the same problems with likability that had plagued Hillary Clinton in 2016 (North, 2019). What explains why the campaign was unsuccessful? In this chapter, I examine the role of gendered attitudes in explaining support for Warren in an early primary state. Previous work demonstrates that female candidates are evaluated differently from their male counterparts because the relevant reference group ‘politicians’ is stereotypically masculine (Bauer, 2020). It is important then to analyze to what extent gendered attitudes about women in politics predicted support for Elizabeth Warren. There are a number of factors that might have worked against her, including stereotypes about women politicians, concerns about sexism lingering from 2016, and even perceptions of how other voters might react. In

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fact, pollsters asked throughout the primary about whether women would be electable against Trump in 2020 (DeMora et al., 2022). Once the campaigns begin in earnest, voters may be affected by the dynamics of the campaign far more than early in the primary process. Therefore, in this chapter, I examine support for Elizabeth Warren six months before the Iowa Caucuses. The goal of this chapter is to examine the ways in which gender might affect presidential elections, and evaluate the evidence for whether gendered attitudes had a measurable impact on early impressions of Elizabeth Warren.

Gender and Presidential Candidates One of the key debates in the gender and politics literature is whether (and if so, to what extent) gender influences elections. Masculinity has always shaped the presidency, though as female candidates progress closer to winning the presidency they must contend with being a woman trying to live up to masculine political expectations (Bauer, 2020; Katz, 2012; Lawrence & Rose, 2009). In general elections, gender effects are typically overwhelmed by partisanship (Anastasopoulos, 2016; Dolan, 2014). However, primary elections, where partisanship is constant, may be shaped by gendered attitudes (Henderson et al., 2022). Why might gendered attitudes be important? Previous studies point to attitudes that may work against female candidates, although there have been limited cases in which to study this at the presidential level in the U.S. Individual sexist beliefs can influence both the likelihood of information gathering on female candidates and, as a result, support for them (DiTonto, 2019; Schaffner & Green, 2019). In addition, equal outcomes may mask gender differences that shape candidate perceptions and ambition (Pearson & McGhee, 2013). For example, women candidates are often rated highly on qualifications, but as less viable because they are evaluated using a masculine reference standard (Bauer, 2020). Hillary Clinton, though she lost in 2016, was rated 33% more knowledgeable than her opponent. This qualification gap between male and female candidates means women have to meet or exceed a higher bar than male candidates (Barnello et al., 2019; Bauer, 2020; Pearson & McGhee, 2013). The influence of stereotypes may be particularly acute at the presidential level, where stereotypes relevant to the role include traits more often associated with masculinity (Conroy, 2015; Rosenwasser & Seale, 1988). For example, a survey question about whether a woman was ready

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to serve as Commander-in-Chief found only 64% agreed, much lower than the 90% agreeing when asked about support for a woman president (Barnello et al., 2019). The institutionalized masculinity of the presidency has historically hindered female candidates (Conroy, 2018; Godbole et al., 2019; Ono & Burden, 2019; Smith et al., 2007). Hillary Clinton’s career, including two unsuccessful presidential campaigns, was shaped significantly by gendered expectations and sexism (Beail et al., 2019; Carroll, 2009; Conroy, 2018; Conroy et al., 2020; Godbole et al., 2019; Holman et al., 2011; Knuckey, 2019; Lawrence & Rose, 2009; McThomas & Tesler, 2016). For example, in the 2016 presidential election, hostile sexists were more favorable to Bernie Sanders than Hillary Clinton (Long et al., 2022). Masket (2020) shows that activists were also wary of committing to female candidates early in the 2020 primary process because they were concerned about sexism in the electorate based on Clinton’s experience in 2016. Some Democrats were concerned the party would not win if it didn’t choose the ‘safer’ (i.e. white male) candidate. However, those activists who were concerned about sexism were more likely to commit early to supporting Elizabeth Warren than other candidates in 2020. Since the late 1930s, when Gallup began asking if Americans would vote for a female president (if she were qualified), the proportion who said they would vote for a woman increased from just over 30% to more than 90%. Problematically though, questions asking explicitly about prejudice against women in office are likely to underestimate voter bias (Setzler, 2019). Even though numbers are high, there is a small but durable segment of the population that some might view as a built-in female disadvantage who are less likely to prefer female candidates (Kennedy, 2001; Lucas & Ossoff, 2021). More specifically, beliefs about women’s lower emotional suitability for politics make voters more likely to believe that men can better handle a range of stereotypically ‘masculine’ issues, including crime, foreign policy, and Social Security (Sanbonmatsu, 2003). Finally, it might also be that voters choose primary candidates strategically rather than just based on their own preferences (Culbert, 2015). This is one reason why momentum from early states is important—it provides information to help voters make judgments about a candidate’s viability (Utych & Kam, 2014). Bateson (2020) found evidence of what she calls strategic discrimination among primary voters in 2020 because they were concerned about the sexism of other voters. In other words, even those who supported them were thinking about whether or not a

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woman or minority candidate was electable in 2020. This is likely because of the heighted attention to sexism leading up to 2020, including President Trump’s own rhetoric, the #MeToo movement, and the Supreme Court hearings for Justice Kavanaugh (DeMora et al., 2022; Schaffner, 2020a, 2020b). Survey data also reveals voters do perceive greater obstacles for women candidates. Hayes and Lawless (2016) find that 60% of Americans, especially women and Democrats, believe women candidates face sexist media coverage, and almost half think women face voter bias. Female candidates in 2020 were perceived as less electable (Franks, 2021; Utych, 2021), and this can have significant consequences for women candidates. How likely is it that Elizabeth Warren’s campaign was influenced by some of these gendered factors? Schaffner and Green’s (2019) survey experiment early in the 2020 contest found that when asked about an ideal candidate, more Democratic voters had a baseline preference for a female candidate. However, when asked which one might be able to beat Trump, that trend was reversed. Similarly, in a follow-up survey closer to the Iowa Caucuses, they showed that hostile sexism was a strong predictor of whether or not voters supported Warren, reducing her support (Schaffner & Green, 2020). Similarly, White (2020) found that Democratic voters were more likely to choose Elizabeth Warren as president if they didn’t have to worry about the campaign or electability (i.e., the ‘magic wand’ question). Because she was the leading woman throughout most of the campaign, this study looks at the extent to which gendered expectations and attitudes among voters shaped early support for her as the nominee.

Data and Variables The data used here is an Ipsos/Daily Beast poll conducted June 10–11, 2019 of a sample of 1005 adults—well before any of the early primaries. Looking at early preferences gives a snapshot of initial reactions to the slate of candidates before the vagaries of the campaign began in earnest. The sample analyzed here includes only self-identified Democrats and Independents (n = 567). The sample was randomly drawn from Ipsos’ online panel and includes sample weights (see Ipsos, 2019). The main dependent variable for this analysis is whether the potential Democratic primary voter is supporting Elizabeth Warren in the primary. Analyzing actual candidates provides a complement to existing experimental studies, which are open to questions of external validity (Falk & Kenski, 2006).

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In order to assess the relevance of gendered attitudes in her support (or lack thereof), I look at several key variables that measure gendered attitudes. The first variable of interest measures the extent to which the respondent perceived that sexism played a role in Clinton’s loss in 2016. It is indicated by the (reverse-coded) question, ‘Do you think gender and sexism played a role in Hillary Clinton’s loss to Donald Trump in 2016?’ (Sexism in 2016). Forty-one percent of Democrats and 14% of Independents said it played a major role, while 36% of Democrats and 40% of Independents said it played a small role, (the final option was ‘no’). Following Masket (2020), I expect that those who perceive greater sexism in 2016 will support Warren. Bankert (2020) concludes that experiences with sexism can mobilize liberal women in particular, which also suggests that perceived sexism might mobilize them to support Warren. Next, I include a measure of others’ perceptions of a female candidate by asking whether respondents agreed/disagreed with the statement ‘Your neighbors are comfortable with a female president’ (Others Comfort with Woman Pres ). This can measure the general perception of the electorate relative to electing a female candidate for president, and the potential for strategic discrimination and lower support for Warren (Bateson, 2020). Third, I include a measure of traditional gender stereotypes in agreement with the statement ‘Women are less effective in politics than men’ (Stereotypes Women Politicians ). Fourth, I include a measure of concern for women’s perceived electability in 2020, as agreement with the statement ‘A woman would have a harder time than a man running against Donald Trump in 2020’ (Wom Electability). Several studies have argued that female candidates were perceived as less electable than more ‘traditional’ (i.e., white, male) candidates in 2020 (Bateson, 2020; Franks, 2021; Utych, 2021). While this may be related to concerns about sexism in the electorate in 2020, which is captured in a previously discussed question, previous studies have found evidence that more sexist voters had lower support and favorability toward female candidates (Franks, 2021; Utych, 2021). Finally, I expect that those who agree that it is important for the party to elect a woman in 2020 will also be more supportive of Warren (Impt Nom Woman). I also include several control variables for the multivariate analyses of support and evaluation of female candidates, including respondent sex, education, age, race, and whether they live in the suburbs, a key swing group in 2020 (Frey, 2020).

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Gendered Attitudes and Early Support for Warren The results of the Ipsos survey suggest that several gendered attitudes predict support for Warren early in the 2020 campaign. Figure 2.1 indicates there were a number of ways gender decreased early support for Elizabeth Warren. First, the small, durable group who are still willing to say that they would not support a woman for President were, not surprisingly, significantly less likely to support Warren. They were approximately five percent less likely than other Democratic primary voters to support her candidacy. Neither the perceptions of others’ nor beliefs about whether a woman would have a more difficult time getting elected against Trump had significant effects. However, stereotypes about women politicians as being less emotionally suited for politics were also associated with 3.5% less support for Warren. That the two more traditional measures of gender stereotypes are the ones that are significant is interesting, as both are not used as often due to concerns about social desirability today. However, this may capture the small group that is indifferent to those pressures and holds traditional attitudes toward gender roles. At the same time, this represents a relatively small group of voters, particularly among Democratic primary voters. Approximately 25% of Democrats and Independents in this survey did not strongly or somewhat agree that women are less effective in politics than men, and only 17% did not strongly or somewhat agree that they were comfortable with a female president. Still, when dividing up the Democratic coalition of voters by a large number of candidates, as occurred in 2020, female candidates will face a hurdle in winning without the (at least initial) support of these voters. On the other hand, it does appear that gender also mobilized support for Warren early in race. Those who believed it was important for the party to nominate a woman were, not surprisingly, 3% more likely to prefer Warren six months before the first caucuses. In the Ipsos survey, 36% of Democrats and Independents responded that it was somewhat or very important to elect a woman. The largest substantive effect is among those who believed that sexism played a major role in Hillary Clinton’s loss in 2016. It appears that voters angry about that perceived sexism were 8% more likely to support Warren early in the race in 2020. This is in line with previous research. For example, in one experiment, liberals who were

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Support for Wom Pres Sexism in 2016 Oth Comfort Wom Pres Wom Electability Stereotypes Wom Politicians Impt Nom Woman R Suburban R Gender R Education R Age R White -.1

-.05

0

.05

.1

.15

Effects on Probability of Supporting Warren

Fig. 2.1 Gendered attitudes and early support for Elizabeth Warren

exposed to gendered attacks were likely to react with anger (Cassese & Holman, 2019). This might serve as a catalyst for the potential for change (Bankert, 2020; Brown et al., 2011). Overall then, it appears that early preferences for Elizabeth Warren were significantly shaped by gender but in an ambivalent way. For some voters, a female candidate violated traditional gender stereotypes and made them less likely to support her. For others, especially those angry at sexism in the 2016 campaign, and potentially the normalization of sexism during the Trump Administration years (Schaffner, 2020a), and those who believed it was important for the party to continue to nominate nonwhite male candidates drew people to her candidacy even in the very early stages of the campaign. It should be noted that none of these effect sizes are especially large, and they may balance each other out. As the support for any one particular candidate this early in the campaign tends to be relatively small, it would be surprising to see very large effects. However, the significance of these findings provides some additional evidence to the growing body of work that shows that sexism and other gendered

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attitudes played an important role in the success of female candidates in 2020.

Conclusion There is less evidence assessing the role of gendered attitudes at the presidential level, in part because we have had fewer female candidates running (though see Katz (2012) and Conroy (2015) for how masculinity shapes the presidency in the absence of female candidates). The 2020 election provided an opportunity to look at the ways gender shapes presidential elections by looking at the fortunes of female candidates trying to navigate the double bind. Because the data focused on 2020, additional research will be necessary to know whether it was the particularities of this election that brought electability concerns to the fore (DeMora et al., 2022). The perception that sexism played a role in Clinton’s 2016 loss became one of the competing post-election narratives subscribed to by some voters and activists (Ipsos, 2019; Masket, 2020). The normalization of sexist beliefs during the Trump era (Schaffner, 2020a) might provide an especially ripe moment for Democratic voters to be skeptical that female candidates would emerge unscathed from a long general election campaign. Another limitation of this study is that these surveys did not include direct measures of individual sexism, so we cannot test its relative impact (e.g. Schaffner & Green, 2019). Overall though, the findings from this chapter provide important evidence that future presidential bids by female candidates may be shaped by gendered attitudes among voters, though whether they will, on balance, favor or hinder those women remains to be seen.

References Anastasopoulos, L. (2016). Estimating the gender penalty in the house of representative elections using a regression discontinuity design. Electoral Studies, 43(September), 150–157. Bankert, A. (2020). Let’s talk about sexism: The differential effects of gender discrimination on liberal and conservative women’s political engagement. American Politics Research, 48(6), 779–791. Barnello, M. A., Bitecofer, R., & Kidd, Q. (2019). Ready for Hillary? explicit and implicit sexism in the 2016 presidential election. The Forum, 17 (2), 295–313.

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Bateson, R. (2020). Strategic discrimination. PS: Perspectives on Politics, 18(4), 1068–1087. Bauer, N. M. (2020). The qualifications gap: Why women must be better than men to win political office. Cambridge University Press. Beail, L., Goren, L. J., & McHugh, M. A. (2019). Madame president? female candidates, masculine norms of executive power, and the 2020 nomination contest. In J. Bernstein & C. B. K. Dominguez (Eds.), The making of the presidential candidates 2020 (pp. 1–24). Rowman & Littlefield. Brown, E. R., Diekman, A. B., & Schneider, M. C. (2011). A change will do us good: Threats diminish typical preferences for male leaders. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37 (7), 930–941. Carroll, S. J. (2009). Reflections on gender and Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign: The good, the bad, and the mysognic. Politics & Gender, 5, 1–20. Cassese, E. C., & Holman, M. R. (2019). Playing the woman card: Ambivalent sexism in the 2016 U.S. presidential race. Political Psychology, 40(1), 55–74. Conroy, M., Martin, D. J., & Nalder, K. (2020). Gender, sex, and the role of stereotypes in evaluations of Hillary Clinton and the 2016 presidential candidates. Journal of Women, Politics and Policy, 41(2), 194–218. Conroy, M. (2015). Masculinity, Media, and the American presidency. Springer. Conroy, M. (2018). Strength, stamina, and sexism in the 2016 presidential race. Politics & Gender, 14(1), 116–121. Culbert, G. (2015). Realizing ‘strategic’ voting in presidential primaries. Rationality and Society, 27 (2), 224–256. DeMora, S., Lindke, C. A., Merolla, J. L., & Stephenson, L. B. (2022). Ready for a woman president? Polls, public comfort, and perceptions of electability in the 2020 Democratic nomination. Public Opinion Quarterly, 86(2), 270–292. Ditonto, T. (2019). Direct and indirect effects of prejudice: Sexism, information, and voting behavior in political campaigns. Politics, Groups, and Identities, 7 (3), 590–609. Dolan, K. (2014). When does gender matter? Women candidates and gender stereotypes in American elections. Oxford University Press. Dolan, K., & Sanbonmatsu, K. (2009). Gender stereotypes and attitudes toward gender balance in government. American Politics Research, 37 (3), 409–428. Falk, E., & Kenski, K. (2006). Sexism versus partisanship: A new look at the question of whether America is ready for a woman president. Sex Roles, 54, 413–428. Franks, A. S. (2021). The conditional effects of candidate sex and sexism on perceived electability and voting intentions. Analysis of Social Issues and Public Policy, 21(1), 11–28. Frey, W. H. (2020, November 13). Biden’s victory came from the suburbs. Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/research/bidens-victorycame-from-the-suburbs/. Retrieved October 2022.

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Godbole, M. A., Malvar, N. A., & Valian, V. V. (2019). Gender, modern sexism, and the 2016 election. Politics, Groups, and Identities, 7 (3), 700–712. Hayes, D., & Lawless, J. L. (2016). Women on the run: Gender, media, and political campaigns in a polarized era. Cambridge University Press. Henderson, J. A., Sheagley, G., Goggin, S. N., Dancey, L., & Theodoridis, A. G. (2022). Primary divisions: How voters evaluate policy and group differences in intraparty contests. The Journal of Politics, 84(3), 1760–1776. Holman, M. R., Merolla, J. L., & Zechmeister, E. J. (2011). Sex, stereotypes, and security: A study of the effects of terrorist threat on assessments of female leadership. Journal of Women, Politics, and Policy, 32(3), 173–192. Ipsos. (2019, June 17). Nominating woman or minority come second to nominating candidate who can beat Trump. Ipsos Press Release. https://www. ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/nominating-woman-or-minority-come-secondto-nominating-candidate-who-can-beat-trump. Retrieved 1 March 2021. Katz, J. (2012). Leading Men: Presidential Campaigns and the politics of manhood. Interlink Books. Kennedy, C. (2001). Is America ready for a woman president? Is the Pope protestant? Does a bear live in the city? White House Studies, 1(3), 311–312. Knuckey, J. (2019). ’I just don’t think she has a presidential look’: Sexism and vote choice in the 2016 election. Social Science Quarterly, 100(1), 342–358. Kurtzleben, D. (2020, April 17). Did gender keep Democratic women from winning the presidential primary? NPR.org. https://www.npr.org/2020/ 04/17/818952460/did-gender-keep-democratic-women-from-winning-theprimary. Retrieved 1 March 2021. Lawrence, R. G., & Rose, M. (2009). Hillary Clinton’s Race for the White House: Gender politics and the media on the campaign trail. Lynne Rienner. Long, M. T., Dawe, R., & Suhay, E. (2022). Gender attitudes and candidate preferences in the 2016 U.S. presidential primary and general elections. Politics and Gender, 18(3), 830–857. Lucas, J., & Ossoff, E. (2021). It’s not me, it’s you: Perceptions of others and attitudes toward a female nominee in the 2020 New Hampshire democratic primary. Politics, Groups and Identities. Published online Sept 2021. Masket, S. (2020). Learning from loss: The democrats 2016–2020. Cambridge University Press. McThomas, M., & Tesler, M. (2016). The growing influence of gender attitudes on public support for Hillary Clinton, 2008–2012. Politics & Gender, 12, 28–49. North, A. (2019, July 29). Poll: Warren and Harris lead the field in likability. Vox.com. Online at: https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/7/29/ 8931604/elizabeth-warren-kamala-harris-2020-election-democrats. Retrieved 1 March 2021.

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Ono, Y., & Burden, B. C. (2019). The contingent effects of candidate sex on voter choice. Political Behavior, 41, 583–607. Pearson, K., & McGhee, E. (2013). What it takes to win: Questioning ‘gender neutral’ outcomes in U.S. house elections. Politics & Gender, 9, 439–462. Rosenwasser, S. M., & Seale, J. (1988). Attitudes toward a hypothetical male or female presidential candidate—A research note. Political Psychology, 9(4), 591–598. Sanbonmatsu, K. (2002). Gender stereotypes and vote choice. American Journal of Political Science, 46(1), 20–34. Sanbonmatsu, K. (2003). Political knowledge and gender stereotypes. American Politics Research, 31(6), 575–594. Schaffner, B. F. (2020a). The acceptance and expression of prejudice during the Trump Era. Cambridge. Schaffner, B. F. (2020b). The heightened importance of racism and sexism in the 2018 U.S. midterm elections. British Journal of Political Science, 1–9. Schaffner, B., & Green, J. (2019, July 11). What attributes do Democratic primary voters value? Data for Progress.org. https://www.dataforprogress. org/blog/2019/7/11/what-attributes-do-democratic-primary-voters-value. Retrieved 1 March 2021. Schaffner, B., & Green, J. (2020, March 5). Sexism is probably one reason why Elizabeth Warren didn’t do better. Data for Progress.org, https://www.dat aforprogress.org/blog/3/5/sexism-one-reason-why-warren-didnt-do-better. Retrieved 1 March 2021. Setzler, M. (2019). Measuring bias against female political leadership. Politics & Gender, 15(4), 695–721. Smith, J. L., Paul, D., & Paul, R. (2007). No place for a woman: evidence for gender bias in evaluations of presidential candidates. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 29(3), 225–233. Utych, S., & Kam, C. D. (2014). Viability, information seeking, and vote choice. The Journal of Politics, 76(1), 152–166. Utych, S. (2021). Sexism predicts favorability of women in the 2020 Democratic primary… and men? Electoral Studies, 71, 1–3. White, M. (2020, February 3). Ambivalent support, part 2: Supporting a non-preferred candidate. Data for Progress.org. https://www.dataforprogr ess.org/blog/2020/2/3/ambivalent-support-part-2-supporting-a-non-prefer red-candidate. Retrieved 1 March 2021.

CHAPTER 3

African American Women in 2020 US Politics, the Stony Road Walked Walton Brown-Foster

Abstract Vice-President Kamala Harris’ election was viewed as a “bellwether” for the political ascendency of African American women. This chapter is a qualitative assessment of the wave of African American women elected and appointed to state, local and national positions of power culminating in the 2020 election cycle. The chapter reviews several theoretical frames of reference that assist in the analysis and understanding of historical and contemporary trends in African American women’s political participation; gives an overview of the history of African American women in politics; examines the role, agency, and ascendancy of African American women in electoral politics to identify the unique challenges, experiences, methods, and strategies leading to recent successes; and, offers tentative conclusions about the sustainable viability and agency of African American women as a force in American politics.

W. Brown-Foster (B) Central Connecticut State University, New Britain, CT, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. S. Sisco et al. (eds.), Identity Politics in US National Elections, Palgrave Studies in US Elections, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28384-0_3

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Keywords Kamala Harris · Stacy Abrams · African American Women · Political participation · Oppression

In 2020, African American women scored major election victories and political appointments to local, state, and federal positions. The certification and swearing-in of Vice-President Kamala Harris was a victory for most women of color and of African descent after a long bitter history of exclusion from electoral participation for decades after the ratification of the 19th amendment. African American women have carved a unique space for themselves in American politics. It is a space in which gender and race intersect. Traditionally, African American political progress and inclusion are viewed and measured in terms of African American male success. Meanwhile, women’s political inclusion and success are often considered and measured by the achievements of white women. Scholar Carol Dubois observed that since the era of Reconstruction and the passage of the 14th amendment, the dominant perspective about race and gender politics has been that the “Negro” is male, and the “woman” is white (DuBois, 1978). There was no room for African American/Black women, and their role in politics and governance was inconceivable. Despite these historical oversights was by Congresswoman Barbara Jordan recognized the efficacy of African American women’s leadership when she opined: I believe that black women have a very special gift of leadership, because we have been called upon to lead in very trying times. And history has recorded the fact that black women rose to the forefront in times of struggle during periods of conflict about civil rights. But we don’t have to go that far forward to recall that there was also leadership even in the days of slavery in this country (Gill, 1997, 35).

This chapter explores the stony road African American women have walked, from early fights for political representation and agency at the intersection of race and gender, to the ascendancy of Kamala Harris, the first African American woman Vice President.

Theoretical Considerations The theories of representation, political motivation, and “misogynoir” are lenses through which perceived advancements in African American

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women in politics may be appropriately evaluated. The historical pattern of African American women in politics is one in which the need and desire for political representation are driven by unique intersectional aspects of their identity—race, gender, and class. As individuals and a group, their political efficacy is an ambition driven by the desire to be accepted as advocates, proponents, and “players” in the decision-making systems for their communities and the nation. Finally, these motivations are rooted in the brutal lessons of their history and the legal consequence of being property and non-entities in the eyes of the law, which meant powerlessness, sexual abuse, family impoverishment, poor health, and death in too many cases. Generations of African American women gained the acute awareness that their victimization and fates were determined by laws made by those with the privileges, power, and representation they lacked. The hypocrisy of the American creed of equality and liberty was not missed, even by enslaved Black women. Several early historical cases illustrate how clearly African American women understood the precarious nature and costs of their powerlessness, requiring them to use all means available to gain agency—leading in front when possible and primarily from behind for several centuries of US history. Political representation, simply put, equates to political voice and agency. Representation also contributes to the formation of public opinion about issues as well as about representatives and those they represent. Representation in the arenas of political and social power and influence is necessary to advance and protect group interests (Urbinati & Warren, 2008). In addition to the imperative to seek representation, African American women, like all political actors, are motivated by ambition—collective and personal. For proponents, the theory of “political ambition” is predicated on the assumption that all office seekers and political actors have political ambitions. Pearl K. Ford Dowe’s (2020) groundbreaking theory asserts that African American women’s political ambitions are driven by three factors—marginalization, ambition, and radical imagination. Women’s political ambitions are met with criticism and suspicion, and African American women candidates are no exception. For example, criticisms of Kamala Harris’ political ambitions surfaced immediately after Biden announced her choice and circulated through the media. Schwartz (2020) states:

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When Kamala Harris was announced as the choice for Biden’s vice president, one of the first detractions made public by opponents was that she was too ambitious. Another claim was that she was opportunistic. Too ambitious to be vice president, to hold one of the highest positions of power in the country, to be second in command to a 77-year-old man. According to a report from CNBC, a group of Biden’s close allies have launched a campaign against Harris, questioning her “loyalty” and claiming she would be too focused on eventually becoming president to be an effective vice president. As if anyone took the position of vice president for its own sake rather than as a stepping stone to the presidency.

Criticism of Harris’ ambitions was consistent with gender stereotyping. However, she was also stereotyped because of her racial identity as a Black woman.

Misogynoir: The Intersection Between Race and Gender for African American Women Marginalization because of stereotypes and culture creates specific and unique forms of political motivation and ambition for African American women. Marginalization either politically demobilizes or mobilizes African American women, depending upon the era (ibid.). Their unique position in the “social order” required the use of agency to challenge or cope with specific and unique roadblocks to inclusion. The roadblock of systemic racism is compounded by traditional roadblocks of scarce election resources—financial, institutional, and professional staff—thus “the exclusion of Black women from political participation facilitated the development of a nontraditional form of engagement that was informed by their political, economic, and social conditions ” (Giddings, 1984; Schwartz, 2020). African American women have had to deal with criticisms of physical appearance, often blatant, that other women have not. To analytically address the impact of traditional stereotypes about African American women, Mora Bailey coined the term “misogynoir.” The term identifies the unique socio-cultural responses that African American/Black women evoke. An example of “Misogynoir” is the particular scrutiny and criticism of African American women’s physical appearance and characteristics in high-profile positions of power, authority, political process, or

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seeking office. As candidates, African American women are uniquely scrutinized “due to hair texture, complexion, and financial and career history” (Lemi & Brown, 2020). In Skin Color Paradox and the American Racial Order, Hochschild and Weaver (2007) identified the phenomenon of “colorism,” in which lighter-complexioned Black people had a higher probability of winning elected office. While this has changed significantly since the 2007 publication of the article, especially as it relates to African American males, African American women continue to be confronted by disparate acceptance and treatment based on complexion and hair type. The latter led to a series of national legislative actions to pass the “Crown Act,” which specifically targets discrimination based on ethnic hair type and race-related styles (Hochschild & Weaver, 2007). While the issue of appearance may seem trivial, skin color and hair are used to discriminate against African American women seeking or in office. Bill O’Reilly of Fox News, for example, directly attacked Congresswoman Maxine Waters with very personal comments about her looks (Wang, 2019). Brown (2018) states: Dominant white beauty standards and gender norms that favor men set the backdrop for American politics. Because of this, African American Women candidates and elected officials are forced to navigate a political landscape that is very different from the landscape experienced by people from other racial and ethnic groups – and substantially different from the political landscape experienced by Black men.

Hochschild and Weaver’s (2007, 643) troubling conclusion is that among African Americans, “…the overall goal of racial equality and equity supersedes the ‘color-archy’ ” but “… policies designed to solve the problem of racial hierarchy are not helpful to and may even make worse the problem of skin color hierarchy.” Therefore, African American women policymakers and their allies bring the necessary and unique perspectives about those socio-cultural aspects of public policy that worsen rather than improve issues of inequity and inequality. They additionally bring sensitivities about socio-cultural factors that subtly inhibit social equality. Judgments based on hair texture and complexion color are idiosyncrasies of the historical experience of slavery and unique to the African American experience. Additionally, the historical stereotypes of the “strong BLACK woman,” hyper-sexual Jezebel, “the angry

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Black woman,” or stoic “Mammy” are damaging and particularly limiting. However, they must be understood as integral components of African American women’s marginalization and political mobilization to neutralize the agency of those perceptions. Dowe (2020, 700) suggests that for Black women, “The decision to engage politically—particularly as a candidate—encompasses personal, political, and social choices that often are misunderstood and misrepresented. However, they are significant and provide substantive and descriptive representations of Black women and the Black community.” African American women’s ascendancy in electoral politics has been driven by the need for representation, by ambition, and in reaction to misogynoir.

The Stony Road Walked---A Brief Historical Overview Enslaved women effectively used the small space of marginalization to develop forms of agency on plantations; their resistance via flight, fight, or accommodation should be interpreted as political participation. Those who escaped, like Harriet Tubman, demonstrated decisive leadership and assertion of agency that challenged the political and economic status quo of chattel enslavement. The first record of an African American woman speaking about political issues was Maria Stewart. Stewart delivered public lectures about women’s rights, anti-slavery, and abolition to mixed audiences of men and women, whites and blacks. She was influenced by “African-American women preachers of the era, such as Jarena Lee, Julia Foote, and Amanda Berry Smith… and Sojourner Truth” (Cooper, 2011, 16). She appeared publicly at a time when African American women, even those who were born free, were harshly stereotyped within the parameters of two roles: pious Mammy or wanton Jezebel (Harris-Perry, 2011). Stewart and the many other African American women who were contemporaries attempted to carve a niche for African American women to assert in the public square their humanity and consciousness of their particular place in the shadows of American society. Stewart carved the path countless known and unknown African American women have followed. Those free and in the north formed abolitionist societies, such as the Boston Female Anti-Slavery Society, the Philadelphia Female Anti-Slavery Society, and New York Female AntiSlavery Society (Gordon, 1997). The ability of women to form societies,

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clubs, and organizations, and speak in churches which were the primary venue for proponents of abolition and suffrage, was the extent of political participation in the era. The consolidation of the Women’s Suffrage organizations into the National American Women Suffrage Association in 1890 excluded African American women because it focused exclusively on suffrage for white women. As a result, the Northeastern Federation of Colored Women’s Clubs was sidelined from the mainstream of the suffrage movement. Nevertheless, from the late nineteenth to the twentieth century, African American women’s clubs were the primary vehicles for socializing and creating a tier of activist African American women. The Club movement spearheaded the recruitment and mobilization of African American women in the suffrage movement, as well as convincing African American males who were able to vote in some areas, to support the movement. African American women’s clubs also informed their communities about political issues. The exclusion of African American women from the franchise varied from state to state. The majority of African American women living in the South were denied because of the pernicious system of Jim segregation and the varying forms of racial repression prevented their access to representation. From 1920 to the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, African American women continued to work outside of the electoral system along with African American men to mobilize for change and inclusion. The agency of African American women remained primarily through their leadership roles and membership in communitybased organizations, churches, clubs, sororities, and, for a few, organized labor. Through these avenues, they could as outsiders alter the political environment and culture to influence public policy issues. From the civil rights movement to the Black Power era, African American women remained outside the mainstream of electoral politics. African American women in areas of the country where they were allowed access to party membership could participate in party contests but not seek office. In regions of the country that practiced ‘softer’ Jim Crow, and in some parts of the South, African American Women first affiliated with the Republican Party, Black Americans’ first partisan home. After the racial partisan realignment occurred during the elections of FDR, African Americans became Democrats. President Roosevelt’s African American “kitchen cabinet” included the storied Mary McLeod Bethune. In terms

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of party opportunities for leadership, influence, and power, the Democratic Party became the stronghold of African American political power in general and for African American women. Former Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice stands as the only Republican African American woman to rise to the highest levels of national political power in government. The inclusion of African Americans in mainstream American politics did not begin in earnest until the end of the 1960s. However, a few African American women had achieved access to positions in government through presidential appointments, such as Patricia Roberts Harris, Mary McLeod Bethune, civil and Human Rights leader and participant in the creation of the United Nations; Edith Sampson, the first African American delegate to the United Nations; and Patricia Roberts Harris, first African American women cabinet member and Ambassador. The long and hard-fought-for gains in African American Women’s political agency and effectiveness, though late in coming, have not been limited to accessing the ballot box and exercising their votes. Individual African American women have distinguished themselves as leaders at all levels of government as well as in, interest groups, cabinet secretaries, campaign professionals, and the political media. They have been effective advocates, legislators, and bureaucrats, changing all areas of public policy. From the start, African American women have been a consistent force for fulfilling American democratic ideals, guardians, and promoters of the fundamental ideals of democracy and democratic governance at home and abroad.

Upswing in Electoral Politics: 1968–2020 Although credited as the first African American woman to seek elected office, Ida B. Wells Barnett was the first to transition from protest and outrage to the politics of the elected office. Forty years later, after the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 and the political mobilization of masses of African American voters during the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements gave entre to the first African American candidate for President, Shirley Chisolm. She was elected as the first to the United States Congress in 1968, soon followed by the election of the first cohort of African American women in Congress—Barbara Jordan and Yvonne Brathwaite Burke in 1972. All were elected in majority-African American or majority-minority districts.

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Congresswoman Jordan served on the impeachment hearings for Richard M. Nixon and became the first African American woman to deliver a keynote address at a major party convention in 1976. Her roles in both instances were among the first in the Civil rights era to represent an African American woman politician on the national stage. Congresswomen Val Demmings and Stacy Plaskett would follow in her shoes, each serving as House Managers for one of the two Trump impeachment hearings. All had previous legislative experience in their states, and all were keenly aware of whose footpaths they were following. Since then, fourteen African American women served in the House of Representatives and one in the Senate, Carole Mosely Braun. Over twenty-five years, forty-three Black women have served in the US House of Representatives and two in the US Senate. In addition to the leadership in Congress, eight Black women serve as mayors in the nation’s 100 largest cities, and three hundred sixty-nine serve in state legislatures (CAWP, 2022; Harlan & McDonnell Neito del Rio, 2021). With the election of Vice-President Kamala Harris and her departure from the Senate, there are no African American Women in the Senate. It was not until the 2022 confirmation of Justice Katanji Brown Jackson that an African American woman sat on the US Supreme Court Justice. Additionally, despite the greatest number of African American representatives in the House serving in US history, there are still ongoing issues regarding leadership roles. In a caucus that frequently touts diversity as one of its core strengths, Black women have been repeatedly excluded from elected senior positions. And despite the country as a whole undergoing a reckoning over race in recent months, the current leadership team will remain in place for the next two years. … When the vote is taken by our body, Black women don’t win, Lawrence (D-Mich.) said in an interview. I cannot comprehend how, for 40 years, a Black woman has never earned the collective majority vote of our caucus. (Ferris & Caygle, 2021)

Note that neither Senator Braun nor Senator Harris became members of their party caucus leadership. The 2018 midterm election was a “banner” year for the election of African American women. Five became the first African American women elected to the US House in the histories of their States—Ayanna Pressley (D-MA), Ilhan Omar (D-MN), and Jahana Hayes (D-CT).

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Four of these new members were elected in majority-white districts. They were harbingers of 2020 because their victories in majority white districts demonstrated a broad appeal and efficacy of African American women candidates outside of traditional majority African American districts. Representatives Lucy McBath (D-GA) and Lauren Underwood (D-IL) were elected in traditionally Republican districts, and their 2020 re-elections proved the viability of African American women as candidates. According to the Center for American Women in Politics (CAWP, 2021), women candidates who identify as Black alone or in combination with other race(s) are at least 20.1% of all women running for the US House in 2020. In 2020, thirteen African American women ran as Democrats and four as Republicans. Mia Love made history as the first and, so far, only African American Woman Republican candidate elected by Utah voters. State Representative Nikema Williams won her bid to replace Representative John Lewis in Georgia’s 5th district. African American women also made gains in State level elected and appointed positions. In 2019, in Texas’ Houston and Harris Counties, two of the most ethnically and racially diverse metropolitan counties, seventeen African American women were elected to the bench, bringing the total to nineteen. The group named themselves the “Houston 19” and the “Harris County Black Girl Magic” (NPR). Although not the first African American, Atlanta Georgia’s first woman District Attorney, Fani Willis, made history in her efforts to investigate and possibly indict former President Donald Trump and associates, for attempts to interfere in the 2020 election in the state. If successful, she join New York Attorney General, Letisha James, also an African American woman history maker, in the effort to indict a former President for criminal activities. In 2018, Latisha James became the first Black woman to win statewide office in New York. She became the third African American woman to be elected to the position of Attorney General on a statewide ballot after the 2000 election of Karen Freeman Wilson, Indiana, and the 2011 election of Kamala Harris in California. Freeman Wilson served seven years as Mayor of Gary, Indiana. Four African American women have served as elected State Treasurer, three as Lieutenant Governors, three as Territorial Governors, and twelve as state Secretaries of State. Nearly fifty have served as Mayors, including, notably, Jessie M. Rattley (Newport News, VA) and

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Carrie Saxon Perry (Hartford, CT). They were elected in multiracial cities in 1986 and 1987, respectively. Perry became the first to be elected as Mayor of a capital city. In 2019, Lori E. Lightfoot became the first Black woman elected Mayor of Chicago, the country’s third most populous city. (In the 2023, democratic Mayoral primary, Lightfoot was defeated in the Democratic primaries). African American women’s pace of success in their efforts to gain political agency through elections has been slow and steady. In addition to elected offices, the number of African American women appointed to roles at the national level in the Office of the Presidency cannot be overlooked. As mentioned earlier, the “kitchen” cabinet of the Roosevelt administration and future administrations included a few African American women. The first official high-profile appointment and confirmation of an African American woman was that of Patricia Roberts Harris as the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Secretary Harris previously served as President Johnson’s administration’s Ambassador to Luxembourg as the first African American woman diplomat. President Carter appointed Azzi Taylor to the office of US Treasurer in 1977. Since the Johnson administration, African American women have served as Administration appointees. President Clinton, at this writing, appointed the highest number of African Americans, male or female, in recent history. Most recently, President Joseph Biden and VicePresident Kamala Harris successfully appointed sixteen African American women to serve in the administration of the 46th president. They are Linda Thomas Greenfield, UN Ambassador; Susan Rice; Domestic Policy Advisor; Marsha Fudge, Secretary of Housing; Rema Dodin, Deputy Director and Shuwanza Goff, Director of the Office of Legislative Affairs; Kristen Clark, Assistant Attorney General; Ashly Etienne, Vice President’s Chief Communications Director; Symone Sanders-Townsend, Senior Aid and Advisor to the Vice President; Tina Flourney, Vice President’s Chief of Staff; Joelle Gambel, National Economic Council, and Special Assistant to the President of Economic Policy; Karine Jean-Pierre, White House Deputy Press Secretary; Brenda Mallory, Chair of the Council of Environmental Quality; Dr. Marcela Nunez-Smith, Cochair Coronavirus Task Force; and, Celia Rouse, Chair, Council of Economic Advisors. This roll call of African American women in the Biden administration is impressive, but also part of a process that has been building since the 1960s.

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African American Women Behind the Scenes The 2020 election brought aspects of African American women’s political competency and agency to the forefront, personified in the effort Stacey Abrams and other women leaders in Georgia mounted from 2018 to 2020. The powerful force of African American women’s organizing efforts in Georgia began decades earlier. “…it was Donna Brazile who became the first African-American woman to head a major-party presidential campaign. For many Americans, seeing a confident Black woman standing alongside former Vice-President Al Gore as he sought the presidency in 2000 was a revelation” (Owens, 2020). This behind-the-scenes organization expanded networks and opportunities for African American women’s participation. By 2020, African American women were fully prepared. After Brazile’s work on the Gore campaign, the door opened wider for more African American women to sharpen their skills in organizing and strategizing national campaigns. “…Brazile, Yolanda Caraway, Leah Daughtry, and Minyon Moore— who’ve dubbed themselves The Colored Girls—have lent their talents to the presidential campaigns of Barack Obama, Bill Clinton, the Reverend Jesse Jackson, former Vice-President Walter Mondale, and Governor Michael Dukakis ” (ibid.). Brazile’s groundbreaking campaign work was followed by Maggie Williams, who managed Hillary Clinton’s campaign. Williams and Clinton met while working at the Children’s Legal Defense fund founded by Clinton’s long-time mentor, the civil rights activist Marion Wright Edelman. For a century, African American women developed organizational networks and coalitions across the nation. The emergent agency and visibility of African American women in politics were not accidental; the 2020 election cycle gave another opportunity for African American women to prove their efficacy as individual candidates and a collective force in politics and government.

Changing the Political Climate: African American Women Led Social Movements Impacting 2020 The political agency of African American women has historically been from the outside through socio-political movements. The COVID-19 pandemic illuminated the long-standing underpinning a political environment in which African American women were simultaneously victims and

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leaders. The pandemic highlighted the nation’s structural and systemic race and gender inequities. African American women were among the hardest hit during the early phases of the pandemic for structural reasons. Evelyn Siemien (2020), observed: Early data has shown that COVID-19 is adversely impacting areas marked by high-density living spaces where residents cannot buy healthy food and “sheltering in place” is not an option. Poor Black women are among the hardest hit and least able to rebound from the impacts of this pandemic. At the same time, Black women figure prominently in accounts of ongoing health disparities that dub them agents of contagion, a demographic group with a particularly high infection rate of the coronavirus… Structurally relegated to many of the most menial jobs, low-income Black women claim with reverence an identity that revolves around strength—the strong Black woman. Enduring ongoing shifts of paid work, childcare responsibilities, and social distancing, many women have come to accept the expectation that they neglect themselves to support others as a compliment.

The health pandemic also elevated two African American women mayors, Keisha Lance Bottoms (Atlanta, Ga.) and Muriel Bowser (Washington, DC), to the national spotlight because of the massive demonstrations in their cities ignited by the murder of George Floyd. Both Mayors faced an unprecedented political environment in which police violence and COVID-19 combined to challenge their leadership abilities. Mayor Bottoms dealt with civil unrest due to the two shootings of unarmed African American males in the Atlanta metropolitan region. Georgia was also one of the first states with one of the early cases of COVID-19 deaths due to community spread in Atlanta. Mayor Bowser had to navigate the crisis of massive Black Lives Matter protests and the political maneuvers of the Trump administration that criminalized peaceful demonstrations. The tragic and unfortunate police shootings of unarmed African American males galvanized Georgia Congressional Representative Lucy McBath (Ga-6th) to run for office. Her political ambition was personal, as the mother of a son murdered in 2012 in a racially motivated shooting. Her political career symbolizes the role of individual experiences in motivating African American women to participate in electoral politics. The 2020 election season was one in which African American women not only reacted to the political climate but also participated in ways to alter it through movements. Three social movements spearheaded by African women altered the political landscape in 2020. In many ways, the

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#MeToo Movement, Black Lives Matter (BLM), and its spinoff, #SayHerName were the twenty-first-century reiteration of the civil rights, Black Power, and Feminist/Womanist movements (Forum, 2015; Santiago & Criss, 2017). These movements reached a crescendo during 2020, though all but #SayHerName began decades before. The formation of activities requires a unique form of leadership, shown by African American activists such as Tarana Burke, Alicia Garza, Patrice Cullors, and Opal Tometi. It requires leadership and organizational skills that create momentum, adapt to change, and have “staying power” for the long term. Black Lives Matter and #SayHerName elevated police violence, over-policing, and persistent and systemic violence in police relations and behavior toward African American individual males, females, groups, and communities. #MeToo was founded because of the systematic oversight and insouciance of authorities in cases involving sexual violence toward African American women, whether it be sexual assault, rape, or persistent harassment, which is reminiscent of the history of sexual victimization of enslaved African American women, as discussed earlier. Social movements mobilize resources like volunteers, media attention, financial support, and, most importantly, efficacy and legitimacy. The synergy between these movements and the 2020 campaign was significant. The movements organized and mobilized a “waiting and ready” constituency for the Biden-Harris campaign and other campaigns of African American women. The movements also consolidated the Democrats’ intersectional coalition of voters. These movements became another path to political involvement, participation, representation, and inclusion for African American women, and delivered measurable results in the 2020 election. African American women were founders and leaders of all three movements that shaped the political environment of 2020 and altered American political culture.

Stars of the 2020 Election, Abrams and Harris The 2020 election cycle provided an opportunity for African American women to come closer to bridging the gap between representation and their consistent level of voting turnout. Compared to any other demographic, African American women have proven to be loyal and consistently reliable blocs of Democratic voters in national election cycles (Budiman & Igielnik, 2020).

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While Vice-President Kamala Harris and Stacey Abrams became household names in 2020, they were beneficiaries of several phenomena: the legacy of African American women and women, in general, carving their place in politics and government; the racially polarizing vitriol of the Trump era; the support from African American male leaders, especially Harris’ endorsement by James Clyburn (D-SC); and traditional organizations’ corralled support, especially in the African American community, which resulted in new voters and high voter turnout. Harris, like Obama, inspired new African American and young voters, especially in battleground states. Both created new battleground states, such as Virginia in 2008 and 2020 Georgia. In her campaign for president, Kamala Harris did not raise adequate and sustainable funds. The choice of Harris as a vice presidential running mate, however, bolstered the coffers of a struggling Biden campaign. South Carolina was the turning point in the Biden campaign during the primaries, which can be attributed to South Carolina Representative James Clyburn’s influence. During the 2020 campaign, Kamala Harris’ campaign for president ended shortly after her rise in the polls and a successful showing in the first round of debates. Her four-year service as the junior Senator from California provided the necessary experience and credibility as a candidate for national office. She was also the beneficiary of ground broken by Shirley Chisolm, Carol Mosely Braun, and a handful of other Black women who ran presidential campaigns on thirdand marginal-party tickets, such as Ida B. Wells, Lenora Fulani, Angela Davis, and former congressperson Cynthia McKinney, to name a few. Stacey Abrams’ meteoric rise in Georgia politics and then national politics in 2020 was a significant part of the historic vote and change of power in the US Senate. Abrams’ call to action is reminiscent of Fannie Lou Hamer’s. Abrams, like Hamer, confronted and challenged the gross inequities and systematic corruption in Georgia elections. She, like Hamer, became a first. Hamer was the first African American woman to speak at a national Democratic Convention in 1964 while representing the delegation of the Freedom Democratic Party. Likewise, Abrams became the first African American woman to give the Democratic Party’s response to a State of the Union Address in 2019. Abrams ran a successful campaign to serve in the Georgia House of Representatives, representing the 89th District. Her victory was unique in that she outraised campaign funds in a primary against two wellestablished white male candidates and won the primary by a clear majority.

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Her district is demographically 52% female and majority African American. The district was previously represented by another African American woman, Joanne McClinton. Her career in the House included service on the Ways and Means Committee, and in 2010, she became a minority party leader. She established a reputation of bipartisanship for her cooperation with the administration of Republican Governor Nathan Deal on taxes, criminal justice reform, transportation funding, and a student scholarship program. It was the loss of her 2018 bid for Governor, however, that catapulted Abrams into the national spotlight. Her loss to Brian Kemp, the former Georgia Secretary of State, ironically mirrors the 2020 presidential election. Kemp’s actions to cancel over a million voter registrations between 2012 and 2018 is, in the eyes of many, a blatant and systemic abuse of power to suppress the votes of predominantly minority Georgians. In 2018, 75% of the voters whose applications were held back were nonwhites. Georgia’s strict laws were a pretext for the purge of a large number of voters on October 30, 2018 (Nadler, 2018). Abrams turned down two opportunities to run again for one of Georgia’s Senate seats despite the endorsement, encouragement, and support from high-profile national Democratic Party leaders. Instead, she focused her energies on the organization and mobilization of her network to register voters throughout the country. In the case of Abrams, the theory of ambition takes on a unique manifestation as it did in the case of Hamer. On August 17, 2019, Abrams announced the founding of Fair Fight 2020, an organization to aid Democrats financially and technically to build voter protection teams in 20 states. This work helped establish a national base of support that would assist her in her 2022 Georgia gubernatorial campaign. Both Abrams and Harris set new benchmarks for African American political achievement.

Conclusions Since 1865, only two African American women have served in the US Senate, and their recent gains in political representation in elected office at all levels have occurred only within the past fifty years. African American women are latecomers to elected office and campaign roles beyond voter mobilization and volunteering. Historically, the primary path to the political agency was from the outside as political, cultural change agents and influencers. The nation’s progress on racial and gender equality intersects

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in ways that affect African American women’s political inclusion, access, and success. After 1965, African American women gained advances as political “insiders” through appointments and elections. However, although allowed access to the vote, de facto exclusion continues as limited funding, professional expertise, and essential support—impediments common to the political access of all women, regardless of race—limit their ability to run for office. Additionally, because the success of African American women candidates occurred within districts that represent African American or majority-minority constituencies, their continued success will be contingent upon appealing to larger diverse constituencies and the continued preservation of majority-minority districts whose existence is under constant legal challenge. A small number have been able to gain acceptance as representatives of majority districts or in statewide campaigns for offices such as judgeships, attorney general, and lieutenant governor. Overall, the perception of a “rising tide or wind” or “Black Woman Magic” in 2020 politics may be overestimated. In the period 2019–2020, the largest number of African Americans were elected to Congress since the era of Reconstruction. However, despite the 2020 election successes, currently African American women have no representation in the Senate, no African American woman has ever been elected from the House to the Senate, and the majority of African American women in elected office, nationally and at the state level, represent districts that are majorityminority. In the 2022 midterm election season, there were two African American women candidates for Governor, Deidre DeJear in Iowa and Stacey Abrams in Georgia. Despite Harris’ victory, the statewide and national perception of “electability” needs to be addressed. The few African American women successfully elected by statewide and mixed constituencies, like Vice-President Harris, tend to be liberal, left of center to center, and in favor of criminal justice reforms, accessible health care, and optimistic in their rhetoric about racial issues. Abrams and Harris have been able to be blunt and forthright on racial justice and equity issues. African American women candidates who lean too far left are not successfully elected unless they come from majority African American constituencies. Ayana Presley and Ilhan Omar were quickly labeled as members of the “radical” group “the squad” by Donald Trump. Both have majority-minority constituents.

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Presley’s election from Massachusetts was a clear signal of demographic changes in metropolitan Boston, in which the white majority has declined to the point that in 2021, for the first time in Boston politics, an African American woman was appointed interim Mayor (LeBlanc, 2021). Lauren Underwood’s election in a majority white, conservative 14th district in Illinois effectively flipped it Blue. It is unclear whether her success resulted from a changing demographic or the anti-Trump political climate. Nonetheless, these successes suggest that given the right positioning, African American women could take advantage of new opportunities when voters, even majority-white voters, are seeking alternatives. Underwood’s reelection in 2020 was close, but she raised more money than her primary opponent and benefitted from an emerging demographic shift. In 2022, she held onto the seat in a race that will be a model for others running in overwhelmingly white districts. A study conducted by Higher Heights and the Brookings Institution in 2018 produced a summary of African American women’s progress as candidates for office, suggesting that black women’s electoral success is correlated with a concentration of black residents at the local and state level, however, black women have proven as viable candidates in districts, such as mayoral races, where blacks are not the majority (Perry, 2018). The study also concluded that African American women are less likely to receive early donors; therefore, fundraising must be emphasized to mount successful campaigns. Secondly, African American women need training in culturally relevant approaches to presenting their candidacies and communicating the universal or specific appeal of their lived experiences in effective campaign strategy. African American women have an advantage and strength in grassroots, political activism, and community organizing. This asset must be transferred to statewide and national campaigns to expand representation at those levels (ibid.). African American women have gained confidence in running for office and pursuing several alternative paths to political inclusion, representation, and agency—from running for office, organizing campaigns, and mobilizing voters and mass socio-political campaigns. The 2020 election was a culmination of all their efforts through all the pathways that resulted in a critical mass of successful African American women candidates winning office. The actual test will be the efficacy of their leadership once in office. For those organizing, training, and running campaigns, the proof will be in their ability to produce positive election outcomes and significant public policy changes or reforms.

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The more African American women there are in the political arena, the more role models are available to those with political aspirations and the more “normal” their presence at the policymaking table becomes. However, for that to happen, the major political work to be done to create a pipeline of prepared women and African American women with the requisite policymaking, campaigning, and fund-raising skills. The 2020 campaign is proof of the effectiveness of several organized efforts launched years earlier by organizations such as Emily’s List, Higher Heights, grassroots activism, and voter registration campaigns to prepare and create new pathways for African American Women to run successful campaigns for state, local, and federal campaigns as well as being in the pipeline for appointed positions. As a result, the paths for political involvement and participation have expanded. The successful planning of organizations like Higher Heights for America PAC has spurred the formation of other organizations and PACs for African American women candidates. The 2020 campaign results of organized and planned campaigns for African American women candidates directly resulted from recruiting volunteers and supporters. It cannot be overemphasized that the election of the first African American woman Vice President, the mobilization of voters in Georgia to flip the Senate in favor of the Democrats, support for the first African American woman gubernatorial candidate in Georgia, and the election of an expanded number to the office of mayor in some of the country’s most populated urban areas were all impacted by African American women’s political efforts along with their allies (ibid.). The 2020 campaign set the stage for the 2022 midterms and the 2024 presidential election. The political ambitions of African American candidates will continue to produce more interested participants in the political process. Still, the legislative success of those in office and the continued resistance to voter suppression will determine the trajectory for increased African American women’s inclusion and participation. Did the 2020 election result in a temporary surge or a longer-term increase of African American women in politics? Without a detailed, caseby-case analysis of the election accounts and contexts in which African American women candidates win office or appointment to positions at the state, local and national levels, it is impossible to generalize the extent to which political climate, partisanship polarization, and other factors impact their political successes. However, it is possible to conclude that

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the potency of African American women’s organizational and leadership abilities and their ability to change the political environment and climate through social and cultural vehicles will continue to close the political opportunity and representation gap. (Note: At this writing, Jennifer McClellan became the first African African woman was elected to Congress in Virginia, and Summer Lee became the first African American woman elected to Congress from Pennsylvania. Yet, there are no African American women in the US Senate and no African American women governors).

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Perry, A. M. (2018). Analysis of Black women’s electoral strength in an era of fractured politics. Metropolitan Policy Program, Brookings Institute and Higher Heights. Plotke, D. (1997). Representation in democracy. Constellations, 4(1), 19–34. Santiago, C., & Criss, D. (2017, October 17). An activist, a little girl and the heartbreaking origin of ‘Me too’. CNN Online. https://www.cnn.com/ 2017/10/17/us/me-too-tarana-burke-origin-trnd/index.html Schwartz, B. (2020, July 29). Some Biden allies wage shadow campaign to stop Kamala Harris from becoming Vice President. CNBC.com https://www.cnbc. com/2020/07/29/biden-allies-move-to-stop-kamala-harris-from-becoming. Siemien, E. M. (2020). COVID-19 and the ‘Strong Black woman’. Gender Policy Report. https://genderpolicyreport.umn.edu/covid-19-andthe-strong-black-woman/. University of Minnesota. Retrieved October 2022. Taylor, U. (1998). The historical evolution of Black feminist theory and praxis. Journal of Black Studies, 29(2), 234. Urbinati, N., & Warren, M. E. (June 2008). The concept of representation in contemporary democratic theory. Annual Review of Political Science, 11, 387–412. Sage Publishers. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.053 006.190533 Wang, A. (2019, March 29). Maxine waters swings back at Bill O’Reilly: ‘I’m a strong black woman and I cannot be intimidated’. The Washington Post online. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/03/28/ bill-oreilly-compared-a-black-congresswomans-hair-to-a-james-brown-wig/

CHAPTER 4

Voicing Support for Black Lives Matter in Congress and Its Impact on the 2020 House Elections Jeff Gulati and Lindsey Cormack

Abstract The killing of George Floyd at the hands of police in the spring of 2020 not only refocused attention on racial inequality in America but also seemed to spark an increase in awareness among white Americans and support for Black Lives Matter (BLM). It is not clear, however, whether members of Congress would alter their own messaging and actions to meet the moment and how their messaging would impact them electorally. This chapter explains the impact messaging, or lack of messaging, on BLM had on the electoral outcomes of members of Congress who ran

J. Gulati (B) Bentley University, Waltham, MA, USA e-mail: [email protected] L. Cormack Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. S. Sisco et al. (eds.), Identity Politics in US National Elections, Palgrave Studies in US Elections, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28384-0_4

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for reelection. An analysis of e-newsletters distributed by House members in 2020 reveals that few (13%) members voiced support publicly for BLM. White Democrats from safe districts were the most likely to voice support for BLM. Members who publicly voiced support for BLM won a higher share of the vote than members who stayed quiet or voiced opposition even after taking other variables into account. Keywords Black Lives Matter · Congressional elections · Public support · Roll call voting

The killing by police of two unarmed Black men—Eric Garner and Michael Brown—in the summer of 2014 elevated the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement onto the media agenda and reignited long-standing debates about police brutality and racial inequality in the United States. An increase in support for BLM among a significant number of white Americans failed to materialize, however (Cohn & Quealy, 2020). A divided Congress failed to take any official action on the matter, and most white members of Congress avoided public support for the movement altogether (Dansey & Masand, 2019). The backlash against NFL quarterback Colin Kaepernick’s symbolic protest (Mather, 2019) and the election of Donald Trump for President in 2016 halted hope of addressing systemic racism in American institutions any time soon. The killing of George Floyd, another unarmed Black person, at the hands of police in the spring of 2020 not only refocused attention on racial inequality in America but also seemed to spark an increase in awareness among white Americans and support for Black Lives Matter (Cohn & Quealy, 2020). On the other hand, a significant unsympathetic opposition, which was led by the U.S. President, characterized BLM as “anti-police” and emphasized the need to maintain “law-and-order” (Bump, 2020). Given the increased support for BLM but also the potency of the lawand-order message frame to undercut social change in an election year, it is not clear how members of Congress would alter their own messaging and actions to meet this moment and what impact them electorally going forward. In this paper, we explain the impact messaging on BLM had on the electoral outcomes of members of Congress who ran for reelection. To do so we first identify the extent to which members of the 116th

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Congress encouraged and criticized BLM after Mr. Floyd’s death in their official e-newsletters. We then estimate the effect of higher levels of public support for BLM on the vote share for the House members who ran for reelection in 2020. Answers to this question provide an important step for furthering our understanding of the obstacles to addressing racial inequality and police brutality toward Black Americans and how Congress responds to constituency opinion on matters of racial justice.

2020 Election Landscape The Democrats entered the 2020 election cycle optimistic they could build on their wins from 2018 when they gained House seats and took control of the House the following year (Kondik, 2021). They also saved two vulnerable Senate incumbents in two strongly Republican states (Pisani, 2021). The outlook for Democrats remained bright in early 2020 as incumbent President Donald Trump’s approval ratings were stuck in the low 40s and would be a drag on other Republicans. Although the President’s ratings increased slightly after his impeachment acquittal and then again during the early weeks of the COVID-19 pandemic, his numbers sank to new lows as the pandemic wore on and the economy went into a freefall. Their position was strengthened further by Joe Biden’s convincing wins on Super Tuesday and that the top of the ticket would be held by a nominee who was perceived to be an asset in moderate swing districts (Byler, 2021; Sabato, 2021). The murder of George Floyd on May 25, 2020, which was captured on video and soon available for the world to see, added to the crowded issue agenda of the 2020 campaign (Pew Research Center, 2020). The widespread condemnations of Mr. Floyd’s death at the hands of a police officer expanded to an indictment on the law enforcement and criminal justice system (Ailworth et al., 2020; Queally & Hennessy-Fisk, 2020; Stapleton, 2020). More generally, a robust discussion about systemic racism seemed to emerge and predictions were made that Americans finally had approached a racial reckoning (McLaughlin, 2020). Protests, meant to highlight long-standing racial injustice, peaceful protests formed in cities across the United States and were attended by several thousand people (Taylor, 2021). With Democrats seen by the public as the party best able to handle race relations (Pew Research Center, 2020), some political analysts saw the Democrats as benefitting electorally from increased attention to racial inequality and injustice (Alter, 2020). While

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most of the protests were peaceful (ACLED, 2020), much of the media attention seemed to be focused on the incidents involving clashes with law enforcement and a handful of riots (Mehta, 2020). Moreover, by the end of the summer, violent crime rose near the top of voters’ concerns (Pew Research Center, 2020). With Republicans traditionally seen as best able to address violent crime, it was not clear how protests in support of Black Lives Matter and racial justice would matter electorally.

Public Attitudes on Racial Justice Research on racial attitudes and support for racial equality consistently finds resistance among white voters for expanding civil rights for Black Americans and acknowledging systemic racism (Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Krysan, 2000; McConahay et al., 1981; Reny et al., 2019; Schaffner et al., 2018). Conservative political candidates have tried, moreover, to capitalize on feelings of racial resentment among whites against Blacks and other non-whites by campaigning on themes of law and order, a war on drugs, states’ rights, and limited government (Hackworth, 2019). A Pew Research Center poll released a year before Michael Brown’s killing in Ferguson, MO found that a majority of white voters believed that Blacks in their community were treated as fairly as whites in dealing with the police and in the courts. A CBS News poll fielded in the same week found that whites believed that the criminal justice system was generally fair toward Blacks. In both polls, nearly two-thirds of Blacks but only one-third of whites felt that Blacks as a group were treated unfairly (Dutton et al., 2013; Pew Research Center, 2013). In the months leading up to Brown’s death and the protests in Ferguson, most whites seemed quite proud of the nation’s progress toward racial equality and were optimistic for further progress going forward. A June 2014 CBS News Poll found that 82% of whites believed that a lot of real progress had been made since the 1960s to eliminate racial discrimination and racial inequality in the United States, and only 14% believed that there was a lot of discrimination against Blacks today. In a March poll, a slim majority of whites believed that there was real hope for ending racial prejudice in the future. While a strong majority of Blacks (59%) agreed that there had been real progress since the 1960s, 41% said there was a lot of discrimination against them today and only 35% saw real hope for ending prejudice in the future. What also was surprising

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and telling about these polls from 2014 was the absence of any questions about police performance or misconduct (Dutton et al., 2014a, 2014b). The killing of an unarmed Black teenager by a police officer on August 4, 2014, did not seem to alter whites’ conclusions about racism within the criminal justice system. Rather, a near majority of whites believed that there was too much media attention given to the incident and only onethird were critical of the police response to the protests. Two-thirds of whites saw the protests as going too far. Almost two-thirds of whites agreed, moreover, with a grand jury decision not to indict the police officer responsible for killing Brown. Surprisingly, a majority of white voters disapproved of the decision by another grand jury not to indict the New York City police officer who choked Eric Garner to death in July (Dutton et al., 2014c; Pew Research Center, 2014). It is unclear on the reason for this split. It could have been the result of the difference in the nature of the killings or a realization that the death of Garner was not an isolated incident. Another possibility could have been that whites would much rather believe that these tragedies were the result of individual “bad apples” rather than a larger systemic problem with policing in America. There seemed to be a clear shift among whites after George Floyd’s death in their opinions about racial inequality. A CNN poll in the early summer found that 60% of whites believed that racism is a big problem in our society today and 88% supported the peaceful protests opposing police killings of African Americans. Moreover, only 29% of whites believed that the police in their community treated all racial and ethnic groups equally (Dezenski, 2020). Support among whites seemed to decline as the protests wore on, however. In September, only 51% of whites believed that racism is a big problem and 74% supported peaceful protests (Agiesta, 2020). Even with the decline in support over the summer, there seemed to be a marked shift in public opinion. A similar pattern occurred with respect to Black Lives Matter. Support for the BLM movement increased from only 40% in the spring of 2016 to 60% in June 2020. By September, however, support among whites dropped back to 45% (Thomas & Horowitz, 2022). In sum, while the protests against police violence toward Blacks after Mr. Floyd’s death captured much of the public’s attention, the net impact on white voters’ opinions about addressing the violence or even acknowledging a problem seems to have been somewhat limited. It would be no surprise, therefore,

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to see members of Congress take a cautious approach to communicating their views on the matter.

Congressional Support for Black Lives Matter With racial justice at the forefront of the public consciousness, it would be expected that members of Congress would comment publicly on the issue or at least acknowledge the events taking place as others in leadership positions were doing since Mr. Floyd’s murder. In developing expectations about which members of Congress will be more or less likely to discuss BLM in official constituent communications, we draw from literature emphasizing the role of individual legislator characteristics and legislators’ responsiveness to constituency opinion. We start with the assumption that all legislators have a basic goal of seeking reelection (Mayhew, 1974) and, therefore, behave in a manner they believe offers the best way to solidify support within a constituency. Studies of roll call voting have shown members of Congress to be responsive to constituency opinion (Adler et al., 2018; Bartels, 1991; Miller & Stokes, 1963) even though it is not clear that voters have preferences on most issues or are aware of their representatives’ voting behavior (Arnold, 1990). But it assumed that representatives believe that their actions could be visible at any time (Fenno, 1978) and, as a result, are responsive to what they estimate to be constituency opinion (Arnold, 1990; Kingdon, 1989). Much of this same literature shows that the member’s partisan affiliation also matters, which of course overlaps considerably with the partisan composition of the constituency. Another activity that can enhance a member’s standing within the constituency is position taking, where members of Congress express publicly their views on current events that align closely with the views of their constituents and other relevant political actors (Mayhew, 1974). Although there have been only a few attempts to explain position taking, this research concludes that both constituency preferences and partisanship drive position taking both in terms of communicating a position and which position to take (Cormack, 2016; Highton & Rocca, 2005). These studies of roll call voting and position taking lead us to expect that members representing more liberal constituencies will be more supportive of Black Lives Matter. In addition, since Democrats have been more supportive of civil rights legislation since the realignments following passage of the Voting Rights Act (Abramowitz, 2010;

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Carmines & Stimson, 1990), we expect Democrats to be more likely than Republicans to communicate publicly support for Black Lives Matter. We also expect the racial makeup of a district and the personal characteristics of each legislator to influence such considerations (Grose, 2011; Lowande et al., 2019; Mansbridge, 1999). The impacts of individual legislator characteristics and the preferences of a district are of course intertwined, as most sitting legislators were once elected by their constituency in the first place as an expression of collective preferences. This connection is even stronger and harder to disentangle when studying racial justice issues since nearly all the African Americans elected to Congress are Democrats and many have been elected from majority-minority districts (Grose, 2011). Before the passage of the Voting Rights Act, there was a strong negative relationship between the percentage of Blacks in the district and the extent of liberal roll call voting among White members of Congress in the South (Key, 1949). The first studies conducted soon after the passage of the Voting Rights Act and when no African American members were elected from the South found a strong negative relationship between the percentage of Blacks and policy liberalism (Feagan, 1972; Shannon, 1981). Other studies found the persistence of racial threat and a curvilinear relationship: the relationship was positive until the Black population approached a sizeable percentage such as 30% and then would turn negative before turning positive again when Blacks were a majority of the district (Black, 1978; Bullock, 1981; Keech, 1968). By the 1980s, the relationship again turned positive (Fleisher, 1993). During this same period, African American Democrats were more likely to be elected from districts with a larger percentage of Black voters and in almost all cases where a majority of the population was Black. Moreover, African American Democrats were shown to be even more responsive to Black voters than white Democrats and more inclined intrinsically to represent Black interests than other legislators (Broockman, 2013). In addition, Black legislators are more likely to introduce legislation to promote Black material interests and more legislation recognizing Black history and culture (Baker & Cook, 2005). They also do more work on pro-Black bills within committees (Gamble, 2007; Minta, 2009). Emerging research on public support for BLM specifically by members of Congress is limited but mostly is consistent with the more general Congress literature. An analysis of tweets made by members of Congress in the months following the death of Michael Brown and Eric Garner

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found that members elected from more liberal constituencies were more likely to voice support for BLM. African American legislators, however, were the most likely to express support for BLM independent of constituency opinion. Surprisingly, being a Democrat or the size of the Black population did not influence the decision to voice support for BLM (Dancey & Masand, 2019). Another analysis during the same period found that African American female members were even more likely to support BLM than their African American male counterparts (Tillery, 2019). This leads us to believe that African American members of Congress and particularly African American women will be more likely to voice support for BLM. It is unclear, however, what impact the racial composition of the district had on support after George Floyd’s murder. Whereas the more general literature on race and Congressional roll call voting would predict a positive relationship, the emerging albeit limited literature on BLM would predict no relationship. There also is a lack of consensus within the larger Congress literature on how electoral considerations affect responsiveness. While most of the literature on party competition predicts greater responsiveness as competition increases, very few studies have been able to demonstrate empirically that this is the case (Griffin, 2006). Rather, much of the literature has found that members of Congress are particularly responsive to their primary constituency (Bishin, 2011; Gulati, 2004). Given that both the electorate and their representatives have become more polarized since those studies were conducted, we do not expect that electoral competition will make members more responsive to constituency opinion. To explain why some House members discussed Black Lives Matter with constituents in their official capacity and others did not, we analyzed data from the DCinbox database of all official e-newsletters sent by Representatives and Senators between January 1, 2020, and November 3, 2020.1 We consider legislator support or opposition for BLM as a count of how often different members expressed support or opposition. In the days after George Floyd’s murder and subsequent protests, a number of legislators sent messages discussing his death and what their observations were of police action and the public reaction. During our study period, 16,521 e-newsletters were sent, and 1,124 mentioned 1 Full communications data are available at https://www.lindseycormack.com/data-dow nloads.

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Fig. 4.1 Official Congressional e-newsletters mentioning “Black Lives Matter” by Party, 2015–2020

Black or African Americans, 689 mentioned George Floyd, but only 121 mentioned “Black Lives Matter.”2 This may seem like a low degree of position taking, but for BLM, 2020 was the year that Congress showed the most attention to the movement. Figure 4.1 shows the number of official e-newsletters mentioning Black Lives Matter by the party since the first message in 2015. It is unsurprising based on the politics of race and partisanship during the Trump administration that Democrats account for an overwhelming amount of all Congressional references to BLM. However, not all of the mentions of BLM were in support of the movement. Some sent by Republicans were critical and aired grievances. All messages from Democrats were positive. Among House members, 51 Democrats (20% of all Democrats) sent supportive mentions of BLM, while only 4 Republican members (4% of all Republicans) sent supportive mentions. Seven Republicans sent anti-BLM messages.3 To explain why some members communicated positive messages about Black Lives Matter more often than others, we estimated a negative binomial model of the number of pro-BLM messages communicated in official e-newsletters for each member of the House in the 116th Congress.

2 For reference 2,604 mentioned women, 3,704 veterans, 1,355 teachers, 1,759 police, and 1,278 nurses. 3 Jim Banks (R-IN) sent both positive and negative e-newsletters about BLM.

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Drawing on the review of the literature above, we included as independent variables the member’s party, district constituency opinion, the racial composition of the district, the race and gender of the member, and electoral competitiveness. Since so few members communicated any negative references to BLM and the ones that did were all Republicans, we did not estimate a model of anti-BLM messages. Our measure of the share of the Black population in each district was obtained from the U.S. Census 2019 American Community. We operationalize district opinion as the level of racial resentment in the district. Racial resentment is measured with a scale consisting of six questions asked in the 2018 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (Schaffner et al., 2021).4 Districts with higher numbers on this scale are those less apt to believe Blacks have faced racism and, thus, have higher levels of racial resentment. We obtained legislator characteristics from ProPublica’s congressional database.5 We control for district competitiveness with Charlie Cook’s Partisan Voting Index (PVI) from 2020. The PVI for each incumbent is the party’s presidential candidate’s vote in the district in the most recent presidential election minus the party’s presidential candidate’s vote nationwide in the same year.6 The estimates from the negative binomial count model are displayed in Table 4.1 Confirming what we observed in the bivariate data displayed in Fig. 4.1, Democrats were more likely to publicly support Black Lives Matter. Many of the other results were not expected, however. The level 4 The six questions that comprise the racial resentment scale are: (1) Irish, Italians, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors; (2) Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class; (3) Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve; (4) It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough, if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites; (5) White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin; and (6) Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations. Since this survey includes 60,000 respondents, there was a large enough sample size in each congressional district to aggregate reliably a mean score with each district. 5 The ProPublica legislator database of current and former legislators is maintained by Derik Willis and available at https://github.com/unitedstates/congress-legislators. 6 See https://cookpolitical.com/index.php/pvi-0 for a discussion of the methodology and access to the raw data for the most recent election.

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Table 4.1 Negative binomial model of pro-BLM messages in official enewsletters, House members, 116th Congress

(Constant) Party (1 = Republican) Racial Resentment Black population in the district (%) African American member African American X Female Female White member Partisan Advantage (PVI) N = 415 Pseudo R 2 = 0.15

B

Std. error

p

0.082 −3.055 −0.330 0.006 −0.730 0.367 −0.098 0.988 0.047

1.212 0.614 0.440 013 0.793 0.820 0.345 0.462 0.017

0.946