Camps, Campaigns, Colonies: Roman Military Presence in Anatolia, Mesopotamia, and the Near East: Selected Studies 3447113812, 9783447113816

Table of contents :
Table of Contents
Preface
Abbreviations
I. Camps
The Roman Army in Syria under Augustus and Tiberius
La garnison romaine à Doura-Europos
II. Campaigns
“. . . ostentasse Romana arma satis . . .”
The Roman Army in Action in Judaea (4 BCE–66 CE)
The “Camp of the Assyrians” and the Third Wall of Jerusalem
The Bellum Commagenicum and the ornamenta triumphalia of M. Ulpius Traianus
Naval Operations during Persian Expedition of Emperor Julian (363 AD)
III. Colonies
Colonial Coinage and Religious Life of Roman Colon
Les colonies honoraires ou les colonies de vétérans?
Le vexillum sur les monnaies coloniales (IIe – IIIe s. ap. J.-C.)
Roman Military Colonization in Anatolia and the Near East (2nd–3rd c. AD)
Les colonies et la colonisation romaine en Anatolie et au Proche-Orient(IIe – IIIe s. de n. è.) : nouvelles observations
La legio III Gallica, la colonisation militaire et les Sévères
Military Colonization in the Near East and Mesopotamia under the Severi
Veterans and the Urban Policy of Roman Emperors
Bibliography
Index of Names
Index of Places
Index of Sources

Citation preview

Edward Dąbrowa

Camps, campaigns, colonies Roman Military Presence in Anatolia, Mesopotamia, and the Near East Selected Studies

PHILIPPIKA

Altertumswissenschaftliche Abhandlungen Contributions to the Study of Ancient World Cultures 138

Harrassowitz Verlag

© 2020, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11381-6 ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19981-0

P H I L I P P I K A

Altertumswissenschaftliche Abhandlungen Contributions to the Study of Ancient World Cultures

Herausgegeben von /Edited by Joachim Hengstl, Elizabeth Irwin, Andrea Jördens, Torsten Mattern, Robert Rollinger, Kai Ruffing, Orell Witthuhn 138

2020

Harrassowitz Verlag . Wiesbaden

© 2020, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11381-6 ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19981-0

Edward Dąbrowa

Camps, campaigns, colonies Roman Military Presence in Anatolia, Mesopotamia, and the Near East Selected Studies

2020

Harrassowitz Verlag . Wiesbaden

© 2020, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11381-6 ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19981-0

Bis Band 60: Philippika. Marburger altertumskundliche Abhandlungen.

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.dnb.de abrufbar. Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the internet at http://dnb.dnb.de.

For further information about our publishing program consult our website http://www.harrassowitz-verlag.de © Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden 2020 This work, including all of its parts, is protected by copyright. Any use beyond the limits of copyright law without the permission of the publisher is forbidden and subject to penalty. This applies particularly to reproductions, translations, microfilms and storage and processing in electronic systems. Printed on permanent/durable paper. Printing and binding: Hubert & Co., Göttingen Printed in Germany ISSN 1613-5628 ISBN 978-3-447-11381-6 e-ISBN 978-3-447-19981-0

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For my children: Aleksandra and Juliusz

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Table of Contents

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

I. Camps The Roman Army in Syria under Augustus and Tiberius . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 La garnison romaine à Doura-Europos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

II. Campaigns “. . . ostentasse Romana arma satis . . .” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 The Roman Army in Action in Judaea (4 BCE–66 CE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 The “Camp of the Assyrians” and the Third Wall of Jerusalem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 The Bellum Commagenicum and the ornamenta triumphalia of M. Ulpius Traianus . . . 69 Naval Operations during Persian Expedition of Emperor Julian (363 AD) . . . . . . . . . 77

III. Colonies Colonial Coinage and Religious Life of Roman Colonies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 Les colonies honoraires ou les colonies de vétérans? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Le vexillum sur les monnaies coloniales (IIe – IIIe s. ap. J.-C.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Roman Military Colonization in Anatolia and the Near East (2nd–3rd c. AD) . . . . . . . . 115 Les colonies et la colonisation romaine en Anatolie et au Proche-Orient (IIe – IIIe s. de n. è.) : nouvelles observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 La legio III Gallica, la colonisation militaire et les Sévères . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 Military Colonization in the Near East and Mesopotamia under the Severi . . . . . . . . 149 Veterans and the Urban Policy of Roman Emperors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 Index of Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 Index of Places . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 Index of Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

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Preface

Preface

After many years of studying a specific problem, any scholar will usually attempt to summarise the results of his work and present them as something of a whole. This is the essence of this book. The texts it contains arose over many years and were published in various countries, sometimes in volumes and journals that were not easily accessible. The book’s aim is to revive them as well as to make them available to a wider circle of researchers interested in Roman military history. The texts included in this volume do not contain the full range of issues related to the history of the Roman army during the Empire, which was the subject of my research, but only a selection limited to certain problems associated with various forms of presence of the Roman army in Anatolia, Mesopotamia and the Near East. These are arranged into three thematic groups. The first concerns camps and places where various units of the Roman army were stationed in Mesopotamia and Syria. The second relates to the various campaigns which the Roman army undertook over time either against its eastern neighbours – the Parthian Empire of the Arsacids and the Persian state governed by the Sasanian dynasty, or rebel subjects. The largest number of texts are in the third group. These consist of articles concerning issues of organised forms of colonisation of veterans after Hadrian. The general consensus is that this emperor’s rule marked the end of the period of founding of veterans’ colonies. The causes of this are thought to have been both economic and social – an insufficient number of veterans for establishing large settler communities and the decided aversion of the veterans themselves to participating in this form of settlement. However, literary, epigraphic, numismatic and archaeological sources prove indisputably that – contrary to the view generally accepted by scholars – organised forms of colonisation of veterans were used not only by the first emperors, but also those ruling in the 3rd century CE. For the sake of clarity, it is important to add that we understand the concept of organised forms of colonisation of veterans to refer to both the settlement of small groups of veterans, which did not necessarily entail a change to the legal status of the cities in which they were settled, and establishment of veterans’ colonies in the full sense of the word. Despite the many accomplishments of various rulers of Rome, especially those from the Severan dynasty, in the field of military settlement in the first half of the 3rd century CE, this aspect of their domestic policy has not received sufficient attention. I have devoted a number of papers to describing and interpreting this subject in previous years. The political and social significance

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Preface

of this later phase of colonisation of veterans is the reason why various aspects of this issue are presented in many texts. My thanks above all go to the first publishers of the texts included in this collection for granting permission for them to be reprinted. The bibliographical data of the publications in which these articles were first published is given in the appropriate places. The content of the texts does not differ significantly from that of the first editions, although minor language corrections have been made and errors removed in some cases. I would like to thank Hadrien Bru for help with linguistic edits to the French-language texts, and David M. Jacobson in the case of the English ones. I also owe gratitude to other colleagues and friends whose names are mentioned in the appropriate places, and who offered me their advice and support. None of these people is responsible for the opinions and conclusions I present. The texts in this volume differ from the original editions in terms of their new composition and a standardised system of bibliographical references, which will certainly make it easier to find full bibliographical descriptions of the cited publications in the bibliography provided at the end of the book. The relevant indices should also help the reader to find names of individuals and geographical features as well as the sources cited. I am particularly grateful to Prof. Dr Robert Rollinger, who not only consented to include this book in the “Philippika” series of which he is editor, but also made a significant contribution to its development. I also offer my heartfelt thanks to Prof. Dr Jan Święch, Dean of the Faculty of History of the Jagiellonian University, for the financial support which enabled me to prepare this book for print. Lastly, I thank my wife Teresa, whose help in the work on producing this book has been invaluable. Kraków, December 2019

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Abbreviations

Abbreviations

AE – Année Épigraphique, Paris 1888– ANRW – H. Temporini, H. Haase (eds.), Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, Teil II: Principat, Berlin – New York 1974–1998. BMC – British Museum Catalogues. BMC Phoenicia – G. F. Hill, Catalogue of the Greek Coins of Phoenicia, London 1910. BMC Syria – W. Wroth, Catalogue of the Greek Coins of Galatia, Cappadocia, and Syria, London 1899. CIL – Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum. FGrH – F. Jacoby, Die Fragmente der griechischer Historiker, Leiden 1950– IGLS – Inscriptions grecques et latines de la Syrie, Beyrouth – Paris – Beyrouth 1929– IGR – R. Cagnat, Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes, I, III–IV, Paris 1906– 1927. ILS – H. Dessau, Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae, Berlin 1892–1916. MAMA – Monumenta Asiae Minoris Antiqua. PIR – Prospographia Imperii Romani saec. I.II.III, Berlin 1897–1898. PIR2 – Prospographia Imperii Romani saec. I.II.III, editio altera, Berlin 1933–2015. RE – A. Pauly, G. Wissowa et al. (eds.), Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft, Stuttgart 1894–1980. RMD – M. Roxan, P. Holder, Roman Military Diplomas, vol. I–V, London 1978–2006. RIC – Roman Imperial Coinage. RPC I – A. Burnett, M. Amandry, P. Ripollès, Roman Provincial Coinage, vol. 1: From the Death of Caesar to the Death of Vitellius, Paris – London 1992. RPC II – A. Burnett, M. Amandry, I. Carradice, Roman Provincial Coinage, vol. 2: From Vespasian to Domitian (AD 69–96), London – Paris 1999. RPC IX – A. Hostein, J. Mairat, Roman Provincial Coinage, vol. IX, 1: From Trajan Decius to Uranius Antoninus (AD 249–254), London – Paris 2016. SEG – Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum. SNG – Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum. SNG ANS – SNG. The Collection of the American Numismatic Society. Part 6: Palestine–South Arabia, New York 1981. SNG von Aulock – SNG Deutschland. Sammlung von Aulock. SNG Copenhagen – SNG. The Royal Collection of Coins and Medals. Danish National Museum: Syria – Cities, Copenhagen 1959; Phoenicia, Copenhagen 1961.

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Abbreviations

SNG Fitzwilliam – SNG Great Britain IV: Fitzwilliam Museum Leake and General Collections, fasc. 6: Asia Minor – Phrygia. London 1965. SNG München – SNG Deutschland. Staatliche Münzsammlung München, München 1989– SNG Switzerland I – SNG Switzerland I: Levante – Cilicia, Bern 1986. SNG Schweiz II – SNG Schweitz II. Münzen der Antike. Katalog der Sammlung JeanPierre Righetti im Bernischen Historischen Museum, Bern – Stuttgart – Wien 1993.

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Abbreviations

I. Camps

© 2020, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-11381-6 ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19981-0

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The Roman Army in Syria under Augustus and Tiberius

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The Roman Army in Syria under Augustus and Tiberius

Octavian’s military reforms marked a breakthrough and a new beginning in the military history of Rome. Not only were the army’s organization and its mode of operation thoroughly transformed, but the entire concept of the empire’s border defense was revised with standing armies posted in fringe provinces. Some reforms were introduced by Octavian immediately after the battle of Actium (Sept. 2, 31 BC). They were necessitated by the need to solve quickly the problems caused by a vast and politically differentiated armed force which included Octavian’s own legions and those of M. Antony – a force that was no longer needed. The measures taken were intended to prevent possible outbreaks of troop unrest that could easily undermine the hardwon order that followed the civil war. For the army itself, more important changes did not follow until, probably, 27 BC, when the Senate granted Octavian imperium proconsulare, which gave him full powers over the provinces where the legions were stationed. This position enabled him to adjust the military organization in respective provinces to the real needs of their defense. One of the largest local garrisons was stationed in the strategically important province of Syria. We know that at the end of Augustus’ reign, its garrison consisted of at least several legions,1 supported by auxiliary units whose numbers are difficult to establish.2 Unfortunately, our knowledge of the troops stationed in Syria under Augustus and their deployment is very modest, as the first relatively reliable information on the subject, which we owe to Tacitus, Flavius Josephus, and epigraphic sources, refers to the reign of Tiberius. Curiously, no material evidence has so far turned up of the troops’ presence in the province during Augustus’ reign: there is no trace of soldiers’ encampments, fortifications, military cemeteries, etc. It is hardly likely that * 

The Roman Army in Syria under Augustus and Tiberius, [in:] A. Morillo, N. Hanel, E. Martín (eds.), Limes XX. XX Congres Internacional de Estudios sobre la Frontera Romana – XXth International Congress of Roman Frontier Studies, León (España), Septiembre, 2006 (Anejos de Gladius 13), Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Istituto Histórico Hoffmayer, Instituto de Arqueología de Mérida, vol. II, Madrid 2009, 997–1005.

*  * I would like to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of my colleagues Prof. Anthony Birley and Prof. Henry I. MacAdam with correction of the English of this paper. Any error of fact or of interpretation remains strictly my own responsibility. 1 Cf. Josephus, AJ 17.286; BJ 2.40. 2 Cf. Josephus, AJ 17.286; Tac. Ann. 4.5.4; Gebhardt 2002, 26–27 and 26, note 4.

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this should be due to some extraordinary set of coincidences, for we are speaking of nearly a half-century of Roman military presence in the area. The causes of this state of affairs are therefore worth investigating. Preparations for war between M. Antony and Octavian included a call to arms to tens of legions of which the majority was subsequently sent to the Balkans and played a part in the final showdown at Actium. Yet this is not to say that all the forces under M. Antony’s command in the East were sent to the front3 as he moved out against Octavian. He had to reckon with a threat from the Parthians, who had constantly kept him on his toes since he arrived in the East. It could thus be surmised that at least several larger units must have stayed behind in Syria and Anatolia for their defense. Their presence there was an assurance of safe borders at a critical juncture in the struggle for power over the empire. Nor is there any question that after Octavian’s victory at Actium, control over Syria was high on his priority list. It is possible that directly after the battle of Actium, Syria was guarded by units formed by M. Antony or supplied by his vassal rulers. This state of affairs could survive until the conquest of Egypt in 30 BC. Only then could their assignment be taken over by Octavian’s troops which had served in the Egyptian campaign or had been transferred from western provinces. Regardless of the need to hold the province, a large contingent had to be maintained in Syria due to the political situation in the East which offered favorable circumstances for Rome to expand its sphere of influence.4 The Parthian state at that time saw a civil war between king Phraates IV and a usurper called Tiridates. Although Rome did not intervene, it did not quite remain neutral. Tiridates sought Octavian’s assistance, and when he was defeated by Phraates IV, he and the Parthian king’s son he had abducted found refuge on Roman territory. The delivery of Tiridates and return of the son continued for a few years to be a diplomatic issue pursued by Phraates IV. Rome’s asylum granted to Tiridates and its delay in releasing the king’s son could not have left mutual relations unaffected. Nor were they helped in any way by the situation in Media Atropatene and Armenia. Right after the battle of Actium, both those lands found themselves controlled by rulers sympathetic to the Parthians. This was detrimental to Roman interests and called for quick counteraction. Yet placement on both thrones of pro-Roman-oriented kings proved to be an inadequate solution as the vacillating political sympathies of local political elites and populations soon made another Roman military intervention necessary. Thus to safeguard its interests in the region, 3 4

One example is king Herod of Judea, whose help M. Antony consciously declined for various reasons, even though he possessed forces and resources not insignificant in view of Antony‘s approaching confrontation with Octavian. For a detailed discussion of Roman-Parthian relations during the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius, see Debevoise 1938, 135ff.; Ziegler 1964, 45ff.; Dąbrowa 1983a, 40ff.; 1987; 1989; 2002.

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The Roman Army in Syria under Augustus and Tiberius

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Rome was obliged to maintain an appropriately large military force nearby to intervene without delay when need arose. We have a number of accounts of Rome’s military activity in the East under Augustus and Tiberius, but they are too generalized and do not provide detailed descriptions of individual operations, information on numbers of troops used, their compositions, or origin. The information we do possess is sufficient to mention at least some large operations in which Syrian-based Roman troops were used in action. Arguments suggesting that Syrian units were indeed deployed in those campaigns have been presented elsewhere and need not be repeated at length here.5 The first action of Roman forces stationed in Syria, as related in sources, took place in 20 BC, when Tiberius, ordered by Augustus, prepared an intervention in Armenia to put on its throne a Roman-favored candidate. The concentration of forces brought about at that time affected Roman-Parthian relations in a quite unexpected way as Phraates IV, fearing that the force might be used against him, returned to the Romans the legion eagles that had been lost by M. Licinius Crassus and M. Antony during their expeditions against the Parthians in Mesopotamia and Armenia. Tiberius’ raid in Armenia proved a success, but we know nothing of its course or the number of troops involved.6 In AD 1–4, another great Roman campaign was launched in the East. In it, fame was won by Gaius Caesar, dispatched there by Augustus to strengthen Roman influence in Arabia and Armenia. Another longer campaign, under the command of Germanicus, occurred early in the reign of Tiberius, in AD 18–20, with the aim of strengthening Roman control over various regions and settling the Roman-Parthian rivalry for control over Armenia. Toward the end of that emperor’s reign, the legions stationed in Syria, commanded by its then governor L. Vitellius, engaged in a campaign against the Parthian king Artabanus II. Apart from military operations outside Syria in which a large number of troops stationed there were engaged, we know of a series of smaller episodes where those forces were or could have been used. In the year AD 6, Augustus made another of his attempts to place his favored candidate on the throne of Armenia. While we cannot be sure that military action was involved,7 it cannot be ruled out either. In AD 9/10, Augustus lent his support to the son of Phraates IV, Vonones, who had been residing in Rome since 10 BC, in his struggle to win the Parthian throne. Near the end of his reign, Tiberius pursued several similar actions.8 Even if on such occasions Roman forces did not usually cross the Euphrates, the sheer size of such operations kept them occupied for 5 See Dąbrowa 2002. 6 Perhaps it was during this action that a Roman candidate was also placed on the throne of Media Atropatene: Res Gestae Divi Augusti 33. 7 Cf. Tac. Ann. 2.4.1. 8 Cf. Dąbrowa 1989.

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many weeks or even months at a time. It should be remembered that Roman armies stationed in Syria were active also in other events in that and adjacent provinces. Many scholars believe that Syrian-based units might have been engaged in fighting in the Homanadensian war against a tribe inhabiting the mountainous regions in the south of what Augustus conceived as the province of Galatia. Exceptionally fierce, the struggles continued for at least several years. The threat that at times called for large military action came from inhabitants of some lands subject to the governor of Syria who were engaged in robbery and plunder: Arab highland dwellers known as Itureans or gangs of robbers headed by the vassal ruler Zenodoros roaming the inaccessible areas of Trachonitis, Araunitis, and Batanea.9 Not infrequently, Syrian-based troops were called upon to deal with developments in Judea, part of the Syrian province. It suffices to mention the disturbances in Judea that followed Herod’s death. To quell them, Syrian governor P. Quinctilius Varus resorted to the use of one of the province’s legions.10 The examples suggest that Roman units stationed in Syria were in constant movement between one theater of operations and another. This mobility was necessitated by the unstable situation in and outside the province and must have made it difficult for the Romans to build permanent military infrastructure like encampments or fortifications. Nor did the very nature of Rome’s eastern frontier favor the creation of a solid and stable base for military presence. In the West, Augustus consistently sought to demarcate his empire along the natural borders of the Rhine and Danube. A similar role could be played by the Euphrates in the East, but Augustus embraced as the defensive policy in the region the solution that continued Rome’s practice in the Republican period. It consisted in the presence of a Roman garrison in Syria on the one hand, and on the other on shifting some defensive responsibilities onto vassal rulers. Augustus not only maintained the pre-existing system of vassal states, but also left in power the rulers elevated by M. Antony.11 Effective though it was, this solution had a disadvantage that clearly manifested itself under Augustus: Rome did not exercise control over some strategic areas and sections of borders. Leaving areas of Anatolia and Syria adjacent to the Euphrates in the hands of vassal rulers made it difficult for Rome to build a stable and effective defensive system. As long as the Parthian Empire was separated from Rome by a belt of vassal states, the defense of Rome’s eastern boundary and effectiveness of policies pursued there largely depended on their loyalty, and not only on the force of the legions. During his reign, Augustus tried to achieve a number of aims in the Roman East that varied from region to region. We could thus risk a hypothesis that the creation 9 Cf. Josephus, BJ 1.398–400. 10 Josephus, AJ 17.251, 286; BJ 2.40. 11 Bowersock 1965, 42ff.; Sartre 2001a, 497ff.; Aliquot 1999/2003, 213ff.

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The Roman Army in Syria under Augustus and Tiberius

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of a defensive system based on permanent military foundations was never part of his plan. For this reason, the legions stationed in Syria could have been deployed in temporary, frequently changed bases located in the province’s cities or in military installations previously belonging to the rulers of respective lands that had come under Rome’s dominion. For one instance, Roman troops occupied fortifications erected in Jerusalem by the Judean king Herod after he died. It is this practice that may help explain why we know of no substantial remnants of Roman military presence from the time of Augustus while we do know those from the reign of Tiberius.12 Recent archeological excavations in Zeugma have yielded much interesting evidence such as roof tile stamps and inscriptions, and also remnants of temporary Roman military camps that were probably connected with Tiberius’ attempts to support Parthian pretenders. This can be explained by a different position taken by Augustus’ successor in Eastern policies as well as by changes in Roman-Parthian relations. While Phraates IV’s actions required Augustus to be watchful, the Parthia’s relatively weak political position enabled the Roman emperor to win some spectacular political successes. Besides, after Phraates IV’s death, the mutual Roman-Parthian relations did not immediately show a radical change. New elements did not come into play until shortly after Artabanus II rose to power in Parthia about 11 AD.: to strengthen his state, he was ready to risk confrontation with Rome. In response Tiberius dispatched Germanicus to the East. His mission suggests a complete departure from the eastern policy set out by Augustus. Its effects included annexation of Commagene, a vassal kingdom bordering on Parthia where main Euphrates crossings were located, and placement of permanent military camps on that river.13 From then on, the Euphrates played a key role in Roman policies in the East, both defensive and offensive. Late in Tiberius’ reign, offensive actions toward the Parthian state included Roman attempts to intervene in its policies by supporting or opposing various pretenders to its throne.14 Naming of Syrian-based legions late in Augustus’ and early in Tiberius’ reigns does not pose a big problem as records by Josephus and Tacitus enable us to trace their names. The records also offer a starting point in the search for camp locations.15 Still, the size and composition of the Syrian army in the early years of Augustus’ reign remain unclear. An answer to this question is of primary importance to elucidate the real situation in the province and surrounding areas and to understand the

12 Tac. Ann. 12.12.2; Hartmann, Speidel 2002 and 2003. 13 An example of Germanicus’ efforts to strengthen the Roman presence on the Euphrates was the stationing of leg. X Fretensis in a camp located near Zeugma: Philo, Leg. 32 (207); Josephus, BJ 7.17; Dąbrowa 1993, 12; Gebhardt 2002, 32–33. 14 See Dąbrowa 1989. 15 Keppie 1986, 411ff.

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nature of Rome’s policies toward its neighbors. It seems that the discussion presented above offers some hints of possible conclusions. Some help is offered by coins of the veteran colony at Berytus (now Beirut). The exact date of its creation is not known. According to Strabo,16 it was founded around 15/14 BC by M. Agrippa. That the Berytus colonists were of military origins is confirmed by presence of their respective legion numbers on the colony’s coins: leg. V and leg. VIII.17 Their identification as leg. V Macedonica and leg. VIII Augusta is now beyond question.18 Military settlement under Augustus was effected as grants of land to individuals and groups. Organized groups of veterans were directed to colonies that were usually located in a different province than that in which a given legion was stationed; several examples of colonist settlement in the close neighborhood of their service locations are also known. It is not easy to decide which of the two options the case of the Berytus colony was as we have no clear evidence that either of these legions was deployed in Syria at the time of Augustus. Hence, the supposition is often raised that the units in question might have been stationed in another region. In our view, consideration should be given to a hypothesis that both units were stationed in Syria. A starting point for this discussion may be offered by the coinage of Antioch in Pisidia, a veteran colony. The colony was presumably founded about 24 BC, soon after the creation of the province of Galatia where it lay.19 The veterans settled there came from leg. V [Gallica] and leg. VII [Claudia].20 This is confirmed 16 Strabo 16.2.19 (756). Not all scholars accept his account. Quoting Pliny (NH 5.78), they believe that the first group was settled in Berytus as early as ca. 27 BC (cf. Reddé 2000, 120; Sawaya 2002, 124ff., 131ff.; for more references see MacAdam 2001/2002, 198, note 16), later to be supplemented by another one settled by M. Agrippa. Despite their various arguments to support an earlier founding of the colony, this hypothesis is considered unlikely (cf. Sartre 2001a , 646 and note 45; Sartre 2002, 188; MacAdam 2001/2002, 198). Another question that falls outside our scope is the date of creation of the veteran colony in Heliopolis and its links with Berytus. We know that that colony was also founded perhaps at the time of Augustus with the first settlers being veterans from leg. V Macedonica and leg. VIII Augusta: Bowersock 1965, 66; Keppie 1986, 412; Okamura 1988; Millar 1990, 18ff.; Sartre 2001a , 646 and note 46; Sawaya 2002, 124. 17 The earliest issue bearing these legion names comes from Claudius’ reign (RPC I, no. 4547). Yet already from Augustus’ time, the Berytus mint turned out coins with representations of two aquilae on the reverse (cf. RPC I, no. 4535, 4541, 4544) that clearly refer to the settlers’ background in two legions (for more on the symbolism of this representation, see Dąbrowa 2004a, 215ff.; 2004b, 394ff.). 18 The generally accepted view identifies leg. V Macedonica with leg. V Gallica (Levick 1967, 200–201; Keppie 1987, 207), and even leg. V Alaudae (cf. Levick 1967, 200; Keppie 1987, 206), whose veterans were settled in Antioch in Pisidia (see below), yet there is no evidence to accept it as plausible and thus to equate these legions: Strobel 2000, 522–523 (L. Keppie (1986, 412; 1987, 130) identifies leg. VIII with leg. VIII Gallica). Nor are there any arguments to assume these legions as deriving from M. Antony’s army (Reddé 2000, 120) as is held by L. Keppie (1987, 202, 208). 19 For a debate on the founding circumstances and dating of the Antioch colony, see Vittinghoff 1952, 132–133 and 133, note 2; Levick 1967, 29ff.; Krzyżanowska 1970, 13–14; Strobel 2000 , 520ff.; Rebuffat 2002, 375ff. 20 RPC II, no. 1603.

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not only by the output of the local mint bearing those legions’ numbers, but also by many inscriptions from the Antioch area.21 They helped determine that both legions, before being transferred to other provinces, were most were probably stationed for a time in Galatia.22 By analogy, we can surmise that the presence of leg. V Macedonica and leg. VIII Augusta veterans in Berytus may be linked with the units being stationed in Syria. The hypothesis is also plausible because all veteran colonies created in Syria at later times were normally settled by former soldiers from units stationed in the province. An important hint lending validity to the hypothesis is the date when the Berytus colony was created. Had it been founded soon after 31 BC, settlement of demobilized soldiers from legions being dissolved could be assumed to have been a natural step in the military reform Augustus then initiated. Yet more than a decade later, in a situation when Syria had for many years seen legions stationed there, assigning to Berytus groups of veterans from units posted in other regions of the Roman Empire must seem incomprehensible and anachronistic. For practical reasons, it was preferable to settle large veterans’ groups near their former service stations, rather than incur the expense of transporting them to remote regions. Another argument in favor of this solution could be important political considerations. In the period preceding the creation of the Berytus colony, the area was deserted and unpopulated while unruly natives from the Lebanon mountains were causing Rome much trouble.23 Given these circumstances, use for military settlement of a vast area owned by Augustus between Berytus and Heliopolis could bring measurable and quick benefits: it satisfied the expectations of a large veteran group, helped stabilize the situation in a troubled area, and offered a guarantee of its economic development.24 Considering the fact that the Berytus colony had been founded by M. Agrippa, at that time dispatched to the East on Augustus’ orders to settle various issues in that part of the Roman Empire, its foundation could possibly be interpreted as an effort to form a garrison in Syria. Probably soon afterward, during the Homanadensian war in Galatia,25 both legions were dispatched there, never to return to Syria.26 In a later period, leg. V Macedonica served in the Balkans,27 when leg. VIII Augusta in Germany.28 Not impossibly, that was the decision that might have determined the future shape of the Syrian army. Several years later, on the death of king Herod of 21 Levick 1967, 58ff.; Christol, Drew-Bear 1998, 307ff., nos. 1–10. 22 Cf. Mitchell 1976; Strobel 2000, 526–527. 23 According to commonly shared opinion, the threat came from Itureans in the Lebanon Mountains (cf. ILS 2863) and from nomadic tribes. Some scholars claim that the threat was not that great; cf. Isaac 1998, 122ff.; Sartre 2001a, 779ff.; Aliquot 1999/2003, 181–182, 200ff. 24 Cf. Strabo 16.2.19 (756); Bowersock 1965, 71; MacAdam 2001/2002, 199–200. 25 See Levick 1967, 203ff. 26 Keppie 1986, 413. 27 Strobel 2000, 523ff. 28 Reddé 2000, 120ff.

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Judea, the Syrian garrison was made up of three legions, and another decade or so later – four, at which it remained until the time of Vespasian.29 The observations presented here suggest that Augustus’ Eastern policy for the defense of the Roman Empire and Roman interests, in keeping with Roman tradition, relied on a system of vassal states. The course of events during his reign in and outside the province of Syria showed the ineffectiveness of that system. While it contributed some short-term political benefits, it prevented the establishment of a border on the Euphrates and its effective defense. The existence of vassal states did not ensure stability and proper safeguards for Roman interests and influences. Internal struggles and unexpected changes on their thrones, threatening emergent independence from Rome, forced Syrian-based troops to make exertions whose effects all too often proved ephemeral. Apart from foreign assignments, they were given the duty of fighting much internal unrest. In view of all these factors, Augustus’ reign can hardly be considered the first effort to establish a Roman frontier in the East. The credit should rather go to Tiberius. Work begun by Germanicus was halted under Caligula and it was not until a real threat loomed to Syrian territory under Nero that such efforts were resumed on a larger scale. However, it was only Vespasian’s reign that brought a marked turning point in this respect. It was brought about as almost the entire Eastern frontier of the Roman Empire followed the Euphrates line.30

29 See Josephus, AJ 17.286; BJ 2.40: 3 legions (4 BC); Tac. Ann. 4.5.3: 4 legions (AD 23). 30 See Wagner 1985; Dąbrowa 1986; Keppie 1986; Ergeç, Önal,Wagner 2000; Hartmann, Speidel 2002; Hartmann, Speidel 2003.

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La garnison romaine à Doura-Europos

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La garnison romaine à Doura-Europos Influence du camp sur la vie de la ville et ses conséquences

Doura-Europos était l’une des nombreuses villes de garnison de l’Empire romain. Or, on sait que l’interdépendance de la vie du camp militaire et de celle de la ville, près de laquelle ou dans laquelle se trouvait le camp, est un des problèmes les plus intéressants de l’histoire des villes de l’Empire. Il est donc naturel qu’il ait été plus d’une fois l’objet d’études, mais surtout en ce qui concerne les villes constituées autour des camps militaire. Du fait du manque d’un nombre suffisant de sources, on a consacré beaucoup moins d’attention à l’influence exercée par le camp sur la vie de la ville dont il était devenu voisin. Cependant, c’est là un problème très important et très intéressant, car en l’étudiant on peut déceler l’apparition et le cours de bien des nouveaux phénomènes de la vie sociale. Ils étaient dus à la présence de la garnison qui introduisait ainsi un tout nouveau facteur dans la situation sociale depuis longtemps fixée. La richesse et la diversité des sources obtenues à la suite de fouilles archéologiques opérées à Doura-Europos et concernant la garnison romaine en cette ville sont une invite à s’occuper de plus près de ce problème.1 Mais il faut d’abord présenter tout au moins une esquisse de l’histoire de Doura-Europos. La ville a été établie sur l’emplacement d’un village déjà existant vers 300 av. n.è.2 Selon la tradition, elle aurait été fondée par Nikanôr ; on suppose que c’était l’un des chefs d’armée de Séleucos Ier Nikatôr et qu’il avait agi ici sur l’ordre de ce dernier.3 * 

La garnison romaine à Doura-Europos. Influence du camp sur la vie de la ville et ses conséquences, Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego – 613: Prace historyczne 70, PWN, Warszawa – Kraków 1981, 61–75.

*  * Abréviations: Rep. I, II, etc. – The Excavations at Dura-Europos. Preliminary Report of First, Second etc. Season of Work, New Haven 1929–1952. 1 Cf. Rostovtzeff 1938a, 50 sq.; MacMullen 1967, 77 sqq. 2 Isid. Charac. Mans. Parth. 1: (…) Δοῦρα Νικάνορος πόλις, κτίσμα Μακεδόνων, ὑπὸ δὲ Ἑλλήνων Εὔρωπος καλεῖται (…); Johnson, Rep. II (1931), 155–156; Rostovtzeff 1934a, 86 sq.; 1938a, 10, 136 sqq. et note 3; 1938b, 99; Welles 1951, 261, note 72. On admet généralement que la nouvelle colonie a été nommée Europos en l’honneur de Séleukos Ier Nikatôr qui était originaire d’une ville du même nom en Macédoine. 3 Rostovtzeff 1934a, 86; 1938a, 10; 1938b, 99–106; Bellinger 1949, 196; Welles 1956, 467; Cohen 1978, 18, note 73. On a aussi suggéré qu’il aurait été general d’Antigone: Tcherikover 1927, 88. Que cette colonie a été fondée sous Séleukos Ier Nikatôr est soutenu par le culte de ce souverain qui a duré jusqu’a la fin du IIe siècle de n.è.: Welles, Fink, Gilliam 1959, 126 sqq., no 25; 166 sqq., no 32. Cf. aussi Rep. III (1932), 54 sq., no 151 = SEG VII 347; Rostovtzeff 1935a, 36 sqq.

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Les qualités particulières comme la position de défense de l’endroit où cette ville fut construite,4 ainsi que les puissantes fortifications5 élevées peu après l’arrivée des premiers habitants grecs, permettent de supposer que, lors des luttes entre les successeurs d’Alexandre le Grand, Doura-Europos était un important chaînon de défense protégeant la Mésopotamie alors aux mains de Séleukos.6 Lorsque, sous le règne de ses successeurs, la situation politique se fut stabilisée en Syrie et en Mésopotamie, il semble que Doura-Europos ait perdu de son importance stratégique et ne soit plus restée qu’en marge des grands événements.7 Vers la fin du IIe siècle av. n.è., la ville tombe sous la domination des Parthes.8 Elle regagne alors de l’importance, car elle devient le centre de l’administration civile et militaire en cette partie du royaume parthe,9 et, du Ier siècle av. n.è. jusqu’à la moitié du IIe siècle de n.è., est aussi un grand centre de transit commericial.10 Doura-Europos est demeurée aux mains des Parthes jusque vers 165 de n.è., date de la campagne victorieuse de Lucius Verus contre le roi parthe Vologèse III ; alors la ville, ainsi que d’autres territoires de Mésopotamie, sont soumis à Rome.11 Doura-Europos a cessé d’exister vers 256 de n.è., lorsque les Perses l’ont conquise et l’ont devastée.12 Ainsi qu’il résulte de ce bref résumé des moments les plus importants de l’histoire de cette ville, les périodes les plus longues de son existence se rattachent à l’époque des Séleucides et des Parthes. Ceux-ci ont laissé des traces profondes dans tous les domaines de la vie sociale de Doura-Europos.13 La période romaine de son histoire n’a duré que 90 ans, mais c’est justement ce qui est le plus essentiel du point de vue de la question que nous étudions. Nous sommes en effet en état de définir les conditions qui existaient à Doura-Europos au moment de l’installation du camp militaire romain, de fixer le temps et les suites de l’influence de ce dernier sur la société urbaine, sa voisine. Les sources épigraphiques et papyrologiques, trouvées au cours des fouilles, nous permettent d’affirmer que la garnison romaine a été installée à Doura-Europos peu 4 5

Rostovtzeff 1938a, 33 sq.; 1938b, 104 sq.; Perkins 1973, 3–4, 10; Cohen 1978, 19 sq. Hopkins, Rep. V (1934), 1 sqq.; von Gerkan, Rep. VII/VIII (1939), 4 sqq.; Rostovtzeff 1934a, 57 sq.; 1937, 197 sqq.; 1938a, 11 sqq.; Perkins 1973, 11 sqq. 6 M. Rostovtzeff (1938a, 11; 1938b, 104) suppose qu’outre Doura-Europos, Edesse et Nisibis ont pu constituer d’autres chaînons de ce système. Cf. Jones 1971, 215 sq.; Šišova 1956, 108 sq. 7 Rostovtzeff 1938b, 106; Welles 1951, 253. Cf. aussi Bellinger 1949, 196 sqq. 8 Bellinger 1948, 64 sqq.; 1949, 199 sqq.; Welles 1956, 468–469; 1959b , 5–6; Perkins 1973, 5.  9 Welles, Rep. VII/VIII (1939), 437–438; 1959b, 6; cf. Welles 1951, 252; Wolski 1953/1954, 285 sqq.; Šišova 1956, 111. 10 Rostovtzeff 1934a, 86 sqq., 96 sqq.; 1938a, 18 sq. 11 Cf. SEG II 817. 12 Res Gestae Divi Saporis, v. 17; Rostovtzeff 1934a, 107 sq.; 1943/44, 17 sqq.; du Mesnil du Buisson, Rep. VI (1936), 188–205; Bellinger 1943/1944, 61–71; 1949, 209 sq; Perkins 1973, 6 sq. Cf. aussi Welles 1956, 473 sq. et note 29; Baldus 1971, 263 sqq., 268. 13 Rostovtzeff 1934a, 179 sqq.; 1938b, 105 sq.; Perkins 1973, 10 sqq., 16 sqq.

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La garnison romaine à Doura-Europos

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après que la ville a été occupée par les Romains, c’est-à-dire vers 165 de n.è., et y est restée sans interruption jusqu’en 256. On peut distinguer deux périodes dans l’histoire de la garnison.14 La première va d’environ 165 de n.é. jusqu’à environ 208/209 de n.è. ; c’est celle où les détachements auxiliaires15 constituent la garnison romaine. La seconde, qui va d’environ 208/209 de n.è. jusque vers 256 de n.è., se caractérise par le fait que le camp militaire est séparé du reste de la ville, que la garnison est nettement plus nombreuse et subit aussi de grands changements : à côté des détachements auxiliaires, les vexillationes des légions syriennes en deviennent l’élément stable.16 La garnison de Doura-Europos a compté les plus nombreux effectifs entre 208 et 217, ce qui est très certainement lié aux préparatifs et ensuite aux hostilités menées par Caracalla contre l’État parthe.17 Bien qu’après 217 la garnison ait été réduite, la dèfense de ce tronçon de la frontière de l’Empire n’a pas été affaiblie.18 On le voit dans le fait que de nouveaux détachements auxiliaires arrivent et sont placés en divers postes le long de l’Euphrate, aussi bien en aval qu’en amont de Doura-Europos.19 En se basant sur les données qu’apportent les sources, on peut évaluer approximativement le nombre de soldats de la garnison de Doura-Europos. Il se montait, dans la première période de la présence des effectifs, à quelques centaines d’hommes ; 14 J. F. Gilliam 1959 , 24 sqq. distingue trois périodes dans l’histoire de la garnison de Doura-Europos : 1) ca 165–208, 2) 208–217, 3) 217–256 de n.è. 15 Étaient alors cantonnés à Doura-Europos un détachement d’archers palmyréniens (Rep. VII/VIII (1939), 83 sq., nos 845 – 846; cf. ibidem, p. 279 sq., no 909 et p. 265) et la cohorte II Ulpia equitata c. R. sagittariorum (Rep. I (1929), 42, no 1; p. 43 sq. et note 1; Rep. II (1931), 83, no H1; Rep. V (1934), 226–227, no 561; cf. Rostovtzeff 1934b, 352; Gilliam 1959, 24, note 5. Cependant, les chercheurs ne sont pas d’accord au sujet de la composition de la garnison de Doura-Europos à cette époque. Voir Rostovtzeff, Rep. I (1929), 54; 1934b, 357 sq.; 1938a, 24; Gilliam 1959, 24 sq. 16 Ainsi qu’il le semble, étaient cantonnés à partir de cette date à Doura-Europos les vexillationes leg. IV Scythica [Rep. VII/VIII (1939), 85, no 847 (ca 209 – 211 de n.è.); Rep. IX, 3 (1952), 107, no 970 (211); Rep. VI (1936), 77 sq., no 630 (216); Rep. V (1934), 224 sqq., no 560 (222/223?); Welles, Fink, Gilliam 1959, 166 sqq., no 32 (254)] et leg. XVI Flavia Firma [Rep. VII/VIII (1939), 85, no 847 (ca 209 – 211 de n.è.); Rep. IX, 3 (1952), 107, no 970 (211); 115, no 974 (ca 211 – 217); Rep. VI (1936), 77 sq., no 630 (216); Welles, Fink, Gilliam 1959, 232 sq., no 64B (221); 176 sqq., no 43 (238 – 244)]. En outre, on a enregistré à Doura-Europos la présence des vexillationes leg. III Cyrenaica [Rep. IV (1933), 150 sq., no 294; Rep. V (1934), 221, no 557], leg. III Gallica [Rep. V (1934), 229 sq., no 562 (ca 211 – 217); cf. 218 sqq., no 556], leg. X Fretensis [Rep. V (1934), 230, no 563]. Leur séjour dans cette ville se rattache indubitablement à l’une des campagnes contre les Parthes ou les Perses. L’un des détachements auxiliaires cantonnés à Doura-Europos entre 208–256 de n.è. était la cohorte XX Palmyrenorum: Rostovtzeff 1938a, 24 sqq.; Welles 1951, 255 sqq.; Gilliam 1959, 25 sqq. 17 Rostovtzeff 1934a, 106; du Mesnil du Buisson 1935, 277; Brown, Rep. VI (1936), 80; Rostovtzeff 1938a, 26– 27; Gilliam 1959, 25 et note 15 . Cf. aussi Bellinger 1949, 205 sqq. 18 Vers l’an 251 de n.è., est confirmée la présence à Doura-Europos de vexillatio coh. II Paphlagonum (Rep. IX, 3 (1952), 110, no 971 = SEG XVII 770) et coh. II Equitata (Rep. IX, 3 (1952), 112 sq., no 972 = SEG XVII 771). Cf. Gilliam , Rep. IX, 3 (1952), 111 sqq. et 112, note 23. 19 Welles, Fink, Gilliam 1959, 137 sq., no 26; 156 sqq., no 30; 224, no 60B (cf. particulièrement, p. 233, note 2); Rostovtzeff 1933, 315 sqq. (particulièrement, p. 320 sq.); 1934b, 373 sqq.; Welles 1951, 271; Gilliam 1959, 26.

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dans la seconde – malgré bien des changements dans la composition du camp – il se maintenait à plusieurs milliers.20 Ceci indique que l’influence de la garnison sur la ville voisine n’était pas la même au cours des deux périodes. Ce qui est important, c’est de bien connaître l’étendue, la forme et la localisation du camp.21 Or, d’après les données archéologiques, il s’avère que le camp de Doura-Europos n’était pas conforme aux strictes catégories de l’architecture militaire romaine.22 En effet, sa base architecturale était constituée par des constructions urbaines adaptées aux besoins de l’armée. En soulignant ce trait caractéristique du camp militaire de Doura-Europos, il faut attirer l’attention sur les facteurs qui ont décidé de sa forme particulière, forme qui d’ailleurs subit des transformations au cours de la domination de Rome en cette ville. Dans les premiers temps de la présance de la garnison à Doura-Europos, ses quartiers étaient situés en divers points de la ville : aux alentours de la porte de la ville, près de la citadelle hellénistique ainsi que dans certaines maisons qui, plus tard, ont été englobées dans le camp.23 Ce qui ne signifie certes pas que dès les premières années de son séjour à Doura-Europos, le plan du camp ait été établi. Il résulte plutôt des données dont nous disposons que le fait de situer les postes et les quartiers des soldats à proximité de la porte principale était dicté par la fonction que les Romains attribuaient à celle-ci, tant dans le système défensif de la ville que dans sa vie.24 Il est permis de supposer que lors de l’occupation de Doura-Europos par les Romains, la localisation et la construction du camp n’avaient qu’une importance secondaire. Il en a été autrement vers 208/209 de n.è., lorsque la garnison cantonnée en cette ville a été très renforcée par de nouvelles unités ; il a fallu alors songer en premier lieu non seulement à les loger, mais à assurer le fonctionnement normal de cette grande garnison. L’augmentaion de ces effectifs a touché directement une grande partie des habitants de Doura-Europos. À l’intérieur des murs de la ville, les constructions étaient très serrées, ce qui rendait difficile le choix d’un bon emplacement du camp. C’est pourquoi les autorités militaires ont décidé d’établir les quartiers des soldats dans la partie nord-est de la ville ; ceci a entraîné l’expulsion des habitants.25 20 Voir Hopkins, Rowell, Rep. V (1934), 226; Gilliam 1941, 170, note 59; Welles 1951, 256. 21 D’autres informations sur le camp, mais qui ne concordent pas toujours avec que l’on a constaté plus tard, se trouvent chez Rostovtzeff (1934a, 185 sqq.; 1934b, 309 sqq.; 1938a, 50 sqq.; 140, note 14). Dans un ouvrage qui n’a pas encore été publié, E. H. Gilliam (cf. Rep. IX, 3 (1952), 130, note 2) s’est occupée du plan et du développement territorial du camp. 22 Hopkins, Rotwell, Rep. V (1934), 201 sqq. (particulièrement, p. 203 sq.); Rostovtzeff 1934b, 351 et 357; Rep. VI (1936), 301. 23 Johnson, Rep. II (1931), 155; Hopkins, Rowell, Rep. V (1934), 228 sq.; Crosby, Rep. VI (1936), 28 sqq.; Rostovtzeff 1934b, 352; 1938a, 24; cf. idem, 1934a, 188, 191 sq.; Welles 1951, 259. 24 Rep. I (1929), passim; Rostovtzeff 1934a, 188 sqq. 25 Johnson, Rep. II (1931), 151 sqq.; Pillet, Rep. III (1932), 13 sq.; Little, Rowell, rep. IV (1933), 78 sq.; Hopkins, Rowell, Rep. V (1934), 207; Rostovtzeff 1934a, 167; 1934b, 352; 1938a, 24 sqq.; Welles 1951, 259; Perkins

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Afin de souligner le nouveau caractère de l’emplacement occupé, on l’a séparé du reste de la ville par un mur.26 Les constructions qui s’y trouvaient ont été adaptées aux nouveaux besoins ; une partie des maisons et des édifices publics a été reconstruite et transformée en casernes, le reste démoli.27 Les premières démolitions ont fourni une place d’exercices (campus exercitatorius) et ont permis l’édification – probablement en même temps – d’un petit temple dédié au culte de l’empereur.28 L’arrivée à Doura-Europos, sous le règne de Caracalla, de nouveaux détachements ainsi que l’installation, dans la première moitié du IIIe siècle de n.è., du siège du dux ripae,29 ont entraîné d’autres démolitions et l’extension du camp. Vers 210/211, on a construit un praetorium,30 on a établi presque en même temps un Dolicheneum ;31 en 216, on a élevé un amphithéâtre pour le camp,32 et vers 218 l’ensemble du palais du dux ripae.33 Bien que le camp ait été isolé, tous les bâtiments précédemment occupés par l’armée sont restés sa propriété.34 La présence de l’armée ne se limitait pas uniquement au quartier du camp, ni à quelques postes situés en dehors ; nous l’enregistrons en effet dans la ville entière.35 Dans bien des maisons particulières en différents endroits de la ville, on trouve les traces de logements de soldats et d’officiers. Il se peut que ce fût là une partie du personnel de la garnison qui, en raison des diverses démolitions à l’intérieur du camp, a dû occuper des logements privés. Ou bien, comme le pensent certains chercheurs, c’étaient les officiers et les soldats des détachements auxiliaires cantonnés à Doura-Europos, car selon eux le camp était réservé aux légionnaires.36 Que l’une ou l’autre de ces suppositions soit juste, il est certain que lorsque le camp a été isolé et que les effectifs de la garnison ont été augmentés, l’armée est devenue le facteur socio-politique dominant de le vie de Doura-Europos. À partir d’environ 208/209, son influence est de plus en plus grande et sa présence se fait remarquer à chaque pas. L’organisation des autorités municipales a été tôt influencée par la présence de la garnison. Il est probable qu’elle n’avait guère changé son fonctionnement depuis 1973, 25 sq. 26 Gilliam, Rep. IX, 3 (1952), 130, note 1; Rostovtzeff 1938a, 25; Welles 1951, 259; Perkins 1973, 28. 27 On a découvert des quartiers militaires entre autres dans le bloc A (Rep. IX, 3 (1952), 97 sqq.), C 7 (Rep. V (1934), 38 sqq.), E 4 (Rep. VI (1936), 4–48, cf. particulièrement, p. 28 sqq.), E 8 (cf. Welles 1951, 258, note 48), J 6, L 5 (Rep. VII/VIII (1939), 177 sq.), L 7A (Rep. VI (1936), 265 sqq., 299 sqq.), M 8 (Rep. VI (1936), 172 sqq.), etc. 28 Rep. II (1931), 83 sqq., no H; Rostovtzeff 1934b, 251–252. 29 J. F. Gilliam (1941, 157–175; 1959, 23 ) apporte d’autres détails concernant ce poste de commandement. 30 Rep. V (1934), 218 sq., no 556. 31 Rep. IX, 3 (1952), 97 sqq., 107 sqq., no 970; 115 qq., no 974. 32 Rep. VI (1936), 68 sqq.; 77, no 629. 33 Rostovtzeff 1938a, 27 sq.; Perkins, Rep. IX, 3 (1952), 95 sq.; Gilliam 1959, 23. 34 Rostovtzeff 1934b, 352 sqq. 35 Rostovtzeff, Rep. VI (1936), 301 sqq.; 1938a, 30 sq.; Welles 1951, 258 sqq.; 1959b, 23 ; Perkins 1973, 29–30. 36 Rostovtzeff 1934b, 310 sqq.

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la fondation d’Europos jusqu’au début du IIIe siècle de n.è.37 Les sources prouvent que c’est alors que son statut juridico-administratif a subi un changement ; on émet l’opinion que Caracalla a accordé à Doura-Europos les droits d’un municipium.38 Cependant certains indices montrent qu’elle a pu obtenir, sous le règne de cet empereur, les droits d’une colonie.39 Les changements de statut de la ville ont également trouvé leur reflet dans le changement de son nom officiel – à partir du IIIe siècle de n.è., le nom grec Europos est remplacé par le nom primitif de Doura.40 C’est très certainement à ces changements que se rattachent directement les transformations sociales, dont nous pouvons voir les symptômes dans les documents qui remontent à cette période. Un phénomène caractéristique est celui qu’un notable pourcentage de citoyens de Doura-Europos – d’entre ceux qui y sont cités – porte des noms d’origine sémitique et latine. On ne peut se rendre compte de ce fait que si l’on établit une comparaison avec diverses autres époques.41 Peuvent nous servir de départ les informations contenues dans le parchemin daté de 180 de n.è.42 Y sont mentionnés les plus hauts fonctionnaires municipaux,43 de même que les prêtres des principaux cultes urbains,44 à savoir : Héliodoros στρτηγὸς καὶ ἐπιστατης τῆς πολὲως ; Théomnestes , Théodotos et Athénodoros χρεοφὑλακες ; Lysanias, fils de Zénodotos, petit-fils d’Héliodoros – prêtre de Zeus ; Théodoros, fils d’Athénodotos, petit-fils d’Artémidoros – prêtre d’Apollon ; Héliodoros, fils de Dioclès, petit-fils d’Héliodoros – prêtre du culte dynastique des Séleucides (ἱερευς τῶν δὲ προγόνων) ; Danymos, fils de Séleucos, petit-fils de Danymos – prêtre du culte de Séleucos Ier Nikatôr. Comme il est aisé de le voir, tous portent des noms gréco-macédoniens, de même que les autres habitants de Doura-Europos mentionnés dans ce document.45 37 Welles, Fink, Gilliam 1959, 126 sqq., no 25; Johnson, Rep. II (1931), 156 sqq., 160 sqq.; Welles 1951, 254–255. Cf. Lifshitz 1977, 27 sq. 38 Voir Welles, Fink, Gilliam 1959, 141 sq., no 27; cf. ibid., p. 7; Welles 1951, 261 sq. 39 Welles, Fink, Gilliam 1959, 166 sqq., no 32. Les sources actuellement accessibles ne permettent pas de préciser nettement le moment où Doura-Europos a obtenu le statut de colonie. H. T. Rowell et A. R. Bellinger (Rep. III (1932), 52), suivant en cela F. Cumont, sont d’avis que cela a eu lieu sous Caracalla. A. H. M. Jones (1971, 221) et C. B. Welles (1956, 471) partagent également cette opinion. Dans l’un de ses ouvrages plus anciens, ce dernier avait émis la supposition que Doura-Europos avait obtenu le statut de colonie sous Alexandre Sévère (Welles 1951, 262). Cf. Rep. III (1932), 51, no 149 = SEG VII 332; Rep. V (1934), 223 sq., no 559; SEG II 824. 40 Welles 1951, 261 sq.; 1959a, 4; Lifshitz 1977, 26. 41 Au sujet des rapports ethniques et démographiques à Doura-Europos avant l’an 165 de n.è., voir Welles 1951, 262 sqq.; Šišova 1956, 113 sq. 42 Welles, Fink, Gilliam 1959, 126 sqq., no 25. 43 Cf. aussi SEG II 815, 817, 818; Rep. II (1931), 91 sq., no 4 = SEG VIII 361; Welles 1959b, 7. 44 Ces cultes avaient leur origine dans la tradition des Séleucides dont ces divinités étaient les protectrices: Rostovtzeff 1935a, 56–66; 1935b, 298 sq. 45 Tant que l’aristocratie gréco-macédonienne de Doura-Europos tenait le haut rang en cette ville, elle soulignait et accentuait le caractère distinctif de sa culture et de son ethnicité: Rostovtzeff 1938a, 15.

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Le changement du statut de Doura-Europos a entraîné non seulement des modifications dans la structure des autorités municipales, mais a également trouvé son reflet dans leur composition sociale.46 On en a de nouveau la preuve dans les noms des fonctionnaires conservés dans les documents du IIIe siècle de n.è.47 Étaient alors, entre autres, décurions : tel et tel, fils de Réchomnaeus ; tel et tel, fils d’Antoninus ; Asclépiodotos, fils d’Athénodoros. Cette mosaïque de noms48 peut être traitée comnme le reflet de ces changements sociaux qui ont eu lieu à jonction du IIe et IIIe siècle de n.è., ce qui est également confirmé par les données onomastiques. Les vétérans49 ont été le groupe social qui a sans doute exercé une grande influence sur ces changements. Il faut en effet tenir compte de ce que, dans les unités qui se sont trouvées à Doura-Europos, il pouvait y avoir de nombreux soldats dont la fin du service tombait au moment de leur séjour dans cette ville. Libérés, ils s’établissaient certainement souvent soit dans la ville même, soit dans les proches environs en acquérant des terres.50 Comme ils jouissaient de privilèges quant au droit et au fisc, ainsi que de ressources financières, ils avaient facilement accès à de hautes dignités municipales et étaient prédestinés à occuper un rang social élevé dans la communauté des citoyens de Doura-Europos.51 Bien que les sources ne le disent pas expressis verbis, il semble cependant qu’en témoignent les noms, cités plus haut, des décurions – ainsi que les analogies en d’autres parties de l’Empire romain. Si l’on tire profit des données onomastiques contenues dans les sources épigraphiques et papyrologiques, on peut encore mieux se rendre compte du caractère et des propriétés des changements qui ont eu lieu à la fin du IIe et au début du IIIe siècle de n.è. à Doura-Europos. C’est de ce point de vue que C. B. Welles52 a procédé à l’analyse des inscriptions gravées sur les murs de la porte principale et contenant des noms. Cette analyse a fourni d’intéressantes conclusions : dans les inscriptions qui remontent à la période d’après 165 de n.è., la majorité des noms est sémitique, les noms latins sont également nombreux ; en revanche, les noms gréco-macédoniens ne constituent qu’un pourcentage infime. Mais ce qui est bien plus intéressant et plus éloquent, c’est de constater que parmi les noms sémitiques, on en voit apparaître de tout nouveaux, inconnus auparavant à Doura-Europos. Ceci indique donc que ceux qui les portaient venaient d’en dehors de la ville. La justesse de cette conclusion a été aussi confirmée par les listes de noms figurant dans les sources papyrologiques de 46 Rostovtzeff 1938a, 50; Welles 1951, 272 sq. 47 Rep. IV (1933), 170, no 343; Welles, Fink, Gilliam 1959, 141, no 27 (ca 225–240); 149 sqq., no 29 (251); 166 sqq., no 32. 48 Cf. Welles 1959b, 7–8; Welles, Fink,Gilliam 1959, 142, note 1. 49 Welles 1951, 271. 50 Voir Welles, Fink, Gilliam 1959, 137 sqq., no 26; Welles, Rep. VII/VIII (1939), 438. 51 Welles 1951, 273. 52 Welles 1951, 265 sqq.

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Doura-Europos, établies par ce même savant,53 ainsi que les données prosopographiques provenant du Mithraeum.54 Qui étaient et d’où venaient ces gens ? c’est là une question à laquelle il n’est pas très difficile de répondre. Et cela car cette interdépendance entre le moment de l’installation de la garnison romaine à Doura-Europos et l’apparition en cette ville d’un grand nombre de personnes portant des noms latins et sémitiques – et souvent les deux à la fois, latins et sémitiques ou inversement – est trop évidente pour être due au hasard. Il n’y a pas de doute que la majorité de ceux qui les portaient étaient des soldats, une partie – probablement des hommes d’affaires attirés à Doura-Europos par l’appât du gain.55 Parmi ces derniers, les Juifs formaient un groupe à part.56 Les recherches de G. Forni, consacrées au problème du recrutement et de la composition ethnique de l’armée romaine à l’époque de l’Empire, nous autorisent à soutenir la supposition émise ci-dessus grâce à d’autres arguments. On sait qu’au début du IIIe siècle de n.è., étaient cantonnées à Doura-Europos, constamment ou provisoirement, les vexillationes des légions III Cyrenaica, III Gallica, IV Scythica, X Fretensis et XVI Flavia Firma. Les données recueillies par G. Forni,57 quant à la composition ethnique de ces légions, montrent qu’au moins dans plusieurs des légions mentionnées – à l’époque qui nous intéresse – les soldats d’origine syrienne constituaient l’élément prépondérant.58 Si nous considérons de ce point de vue les détachements auxiliaires qui entraient dans la garnison de Doura-Europos, nous obtiendrons un tableau encore plus complet. On sait fort bien, en effet, que l’état numérique de ces unités était complété, à partir du IIe siècle de n.è., à l’aide de recrues provenant le plus souvent de la province où leur detachement stationnait.59 Ces faits expliquent, du moins en partie, l’une des causes possibles d’un si grand afflux de l’élément sémitique à Doura-Europos dans la seconde moitié du IIe et au début du IIIe siècle de n.è. Nous en savons beaucoup moins sur les arrivants qui n’étaient pas soldats. L’opinion selon laquelle c’étaient des hommes d’affaires, fournisseurs en tous genres de l’armée, est confirmée non seulement par des analogies avec d’autres villes de garnison, mais par certaines données apportées par les fouilles opérées dans quelques quartiers du centre de Doura-Europos, où se concentrait la vie économique – les magasins et 53 54 55 56

Welles 1959c, 58 sqq. Francis 1975, 431 sqq. (particulièrement, p. 434); id., dans: Cumont 1975, 154, note 17. Welles 1951, 271 sq. L’importance de ce groupe ethnique à Doura-Europos est confirmée non seulement du fait qu’il existait une synagogue, mais aussi par le nombre de ses membres. Voir du Mesnil du Buisson 1933, 201 sqq.; Hopkins, du Mesnil du Buisson 1933, 243–255; Rostovtzeff 1934a, 175 sqq.; Pearson, Kraeling, Rep. VI (1936), 309– 396; Rostovtzeff 1938a, 100 sqq.; Kraeling 1956; Perkins 1973, 24. 57 Forni 1953, 222, 223, 228 et 233. 58 Cf. Francis 1975, 434; id., dans: Cumont 1975, 154 et note 17. 59 Cf. Welles 1951, 271 sq.; 1959c, 58 sq.

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les ateliers. Dans l’un des blocs, on a trouvé les vestiges de quelques ateliers où l’on produisait des objets en métal ; on a établi, dans deux cas, que leurs propriétaires fabriquaient et réparaient des armes. On peut supposer qu’il y avait beaucoup d’autres ateliers semblables60 qui s’occupaient de la fabrication et de l’entretien d’autres parties de l’équipement des soldats ; et aussi qu’on avait ouvert des boutiques pour servir la clientèle militaire. On peut le déduire des nombreuses transformations des maisons d’habitation en magasins, notamment dans la partie du bazar qui se trouvait à proximité du camp.61 Ajoutons encore ici le développement ininterrompu de cette partie de la ville à l’époque que nous étudions.62 On constate aussi la nette influence de la présence de l’armée sur le développement d’institutions destinées à satisfaire les besoins intimes des soldats.63 Des changements dus à la présence de la garnison se font remarquer dans un autre domaine de la vie urbaine : celui de la religion. Avant 165 de n.è., dix et quelques temples existaient et fonctionnaient à Doura-Europos.64 De nombreuses inscriptions conservées dans leurs ruines prouvent qu’ils étaient des centres actifs de la vie religieuse qui florissait grâce à la grande générosité des adeptes. Le tremblement de terre de 160 de n.è. que subit Doura-Europos avait sérieusement endommagé les divers temples.65 Bien que reconstruits, ils ne remplirent leurs fonctions, après 165 de n.è., que pendant dix et quelques années, rarement plusieurs décennies. Après l’arrivée des Romains, certains d’entre eux servirent à tout autre chose qu’à la religion ; ainsi, par exemple, des soldats furent logés à l’intérieur du temple d’Artèmis Azzanakhtona.66 Pendant tout le temps que dura la domination des Romains, seuls trois d’entre les vieux temples de la ville continuèrent à remplir leurs fonctions : celui d’Artèmis Nanaia,67 des Dieux palmyriens68 et d’Adonis.69 Le premier d’entre eux a joué un rôle important, car lors de la réorganisation des autorités municipales, au début du IIIe siècle de n.è., il était devenu non seulement le centre principal du culte dans la ville, mais celui de la vie sociale et politique. On peut juger de son importance dans la vie publique de Doura-Europos à cette époque du fait qu’il a été le seul, parmi les vieux 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

Hopkins, Rep. V (1934), 86; Brown, Rep. IX, 1 (1944), 67 sq.; Welles 1951, 260 et 271. Brown, Rep. IX, 1 (1944), 116. Brown, Rep. IX, 1 (1944), 55 sq. Brown, Rep. IX, 1 (1944), 116; Immerwahr, Rep. IX, 1 (1944), 203–264; Wells 1951, 260. Welles 1970, 50–65; Perkins 1973, 8 sq. Rostovtzeff 1938a, 52; Welles 1951, 254; Perkins 1973, 23. Hopkins, Rep. V (1934), 151 sqq.; Rostovtzeff 1934a, 167 sq.; 1934b, 355 et 359 sqq.; Brown, Rostovtzeff, Welles, Rep. VI (1936), 482 sqq.; Rostovtzeff 1938a, 24–25. 67 Pillet, Rowell, Rep. III (1932), 4 sqq., 28 sqq.; Brown, Rep. VI (1936), 397 sqq. 68 Rep. II (1931), 91 sqq., no H4; Pillet, Rep. II (1931), 11 sq.; Rep. IV (1933), 16 sqq.; Rostovtzeff 1934a, 170 sqq.; 1938a, 44, 68 sqq., 139, note 10; 146, note 42. 69 Rep. VII/VIII (1939), 135 sqq., nos 873–876.

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temples de la ville, à être notablement agrandi sous la domination des Romains.70 Le temple des Dieux palmyréniens occupait une place assez particulière parmi les monuments de Doura-Europos. Il avait été élevé au Ier siècle de n.è. comme lieu de pratiques religieuses des Palmyréniens, qui habitaient en grand nombre la ville ou y venaient séjourner et désiraient rendre hommage à leurs divinités nationales. Il est probable que le temple remplissait encore cette fonction après 165 de n.è., mais il ne sert alors qu’aux soldats palmyréniens faisant partie de la garnison de Doura-Europos. À ce moment, en effet, le temple se trouvait à l’intérieur du camp militaire. C’est avec l’arrivée des détachements de l’armée romaine à Doura-Europos que coïncide l’apparition, entre autres, du culte de l’empereur,71 du mithriacisme,72 du culte de Jupiter Dolichenus,73 du christianisme ;74 les cultes palmyréniens regagnent en activité.75 Cette diversité et cette multiplicité des cultes de la Doura-Europos romaine semblent démontrer la richesse de la vie religieuse de ses habitants, mais ce n’est là qu’une impression superficielle, car en fait cette vie s’est nettement appauvrie. Il faut séparer la religion des soldats de celle des habitants de la ville, car chacun de ces ensembles adorait d’autres dieux.76 Il est bon de se rappeler aussi que la majorité des temples en activité se trouvait à l’intérieur du camp militaire et que presque tous les nouveaux cultes que l’on constate dans la seconde moitié du IIe siècle de n.è. et la première moitié du IIIe siècle de n.è. à Doura-Europos étaient des cultes typiquement militaires. À l’exception peut-être du christianisme, mais nous ne savons que peu de chose sur ses adeptes. Les sources indiquent que c’étaient principalement des soldats,77 mais on ne sait s’il y avait des fidèles en dehors d’eux. Les opinions diffèrent grandement au sujet de la position économique de Doura-Europos sous la domination de Rome.78 Une chose est indiscutable, à savoir que le jour où la ville a été soumise aux Romains, ce fut la fin de sa grande prospérité. Du fait de son intégration à l’Empire, elle a perdu sa principale source de richesse, c’est-à-dire 70 Rotwell, Rep. III (1932), 29 sqq.; Brown, Rep. VI (1936), 402; Rostovtzeff 1934a, 166 sq.; 1938a, 53 sq., 143, note 32; Perkins 1973, 29. 71 Outre les monuments de ce culte, nous disposons aussi d’un document exceptionnel en son genre, trouvé à Doura-Europos, ce qu’on appelle Feriale Duranum – calendrier religieux officiel en vigueur dans l’armée romaine: Welles, Fink, Gilliam 1959, 191 sqq., no 54; Fink, Hoey, Snyder 1940, 1–222; Herz 1978, 1193 sqq.; Helgeland 1978, 1481 sqq. 72 Cumont 1934, 90–111; Rostovtzeff 1934c, 180–207; Pearson, Rostovtzeff, Cumont, Rep. VII/VIII (1939), 62– 134; Cumont 1975, 151–214. 73 Perkins, Gilliam, Rep. IX, 3 (1952), 97–134. Cf. aussi Speidel 1978. 74 Rostovtzeff, Hopkins 1932, 323–328; du Mesnil du Buisson 1933, 200–201; Hopkins, Rep. V (1934), 238–253; Rostovtzeff 1938a, 130 sqq. 75 Rep. VII/VIII (1939), 276 sqq., nos 905–906; Rostovtzeff 1934a, 168 sqq.; 1935c, 290 sqq. (cf. particulièrement, p. 300); Brown, Rep. VII/VIII (1939), 218 sqq. 76 Rostovtzeff 1938a, 61 sq. 77 Rep. V (1934), 159 sqq., no 481; Rep. VI (1936), 486, no 809. 78 Cf. Rostovtzeff 1938a, 30 sq., 53 et 55; Perkins 1973, 30 sq.

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les profits qu’elle tirait du commerce intermédiaire entre l’Empire romain et l’État parthe.79 Toutefois, tous les habitants de Doura-Europos n’ont pas été touchés par la perte des profits du commerce. Les grands marchands, qui en avaient tiré leur fortune, ont très certainement dû la ressentir le plus profondément. Les sources du IIIe siècle de n.è. justifient la supposition que peu d’entre eux ont réussi à subsister dans les nouvelles conditions.80 L’arrivée des Romains n’a pas dû avoir des conséquences aussi désastreuses pour tous les habitants, bien que leur situation ait pu subir une aggravation passagère. Bien que la plupart n’aient pas profité directement des revenus du commerce, les services que rendait aux caravanes un grand groupe d’habitants de Doura-Europos étaient leurs principales ressources.81 La garnison a remplacé les caravanes, c’est pour elle que travaillait alors la population ; plus la garnison était nombreuse, plus il y avait de services à rendre. En plus de ceux-ci, assez étendus, l’armée constituait un marché commercial.82 Mais ce dont avaient besoin les troupes était trop diversifié et la demande trop limitée pour intéresser les grands marchands. Quant aux petits producteurs et aux boutiquiers, ils avaient là une bonne possibilité de gagner de l’argent; pas assez grande pourtant pour subvenir à leurs besoins. Nous avons vu, en effet, qu’on a trouvé dans le quartier commercial la trace de nombreuses transformations et de reconstructions en vue d’adapter les maisons d’habitation pour en faire de nouveaux ateliers et de nouvelles boutiques. Et comme il y eut beaucoup de ces transformations, cela signifie que ces entreprises étaient assurées des profits. Ceci prouve qu’à cette époque la situation économique des habitants de Doura-Europos n’était pas la plus mauvaise. S’il en est ainsi, peuton accepter l’opinion suivant laquelle la période romaine a été pour Doura-Europos celle d’une régression économique, opinion qui se justifie du fait qu’en dehors des bâtiments construits à l’intérieur du camp, aucun autre ne l’a été dans la ville même ? La réponse à cette question n’est point aisée et ne peut se faire d’une manière concluante. L’affirmation ci-dessus contient bien des points réels, mais est trop partielle. En la formulant, M. Rostovtzeff n’a pas tenu compte des facteurs dont on ne peut négliger l’influence. En engageant la discussion du sujet de son opinion, il faut remarquer que la Doura-Europos de la période parthe n’a que peu de traits communs avec celle de la période romaine. Il en est de même de la population qui habitait dans la ville à ces deux moments de son histoire. Rappelons que ce qui les différencie essentiellement, c’est que d’une part l’aristocratie gréco-macédonienne avait perdu ses 79 Rostovtzeff 1934a, 97 sq., 193 sq.; 1938a, 21 sq. 80 Nébuchelos était probablement d’un d’eux (cf. Rep. VII/VIII (1939), 172 sq., no 876). Dans la maison qui lui appartenait, on a découvert ses archives. Elles apportent une quantité de données sur les marchandises dont il faisait commerce et sur l’importance des transactions: Rostovtzeff, Welles 1931, 162–188; Welles, Rep. IV 1933, 79–145 (cf. SEG VII 381–439); Rostovtzeff 1934a, 193 sq.; Welles 1951, 269 sq. 81 Rostovtzeff 1934a, 97. 82 Cf. Brown, Rep. IX, 1 (1944), 67 sq.

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positions, de l’autre – il y avait eu le très large afflux d’un nouvel élement ethnique qui l’a emporté sur les anciens habitants de Doura-Europos. Le fait que les sources ne comportent plus de noms gréco-macédoniens, ainsi que la perte de sa position par l’aristocratie ancienne, ne signifie pas nécessairement que celle-ci ait été repoussée en marge de la vie sociale. Nous avons déjà fait remarquer qu’à la fin du IIe et dans la première moitié du IIIe siècle de n.è., c’étaient les petits commerçants et les propriétaires de petits ateliers qui jouaient un rôle dominant. Il semble qu’on puisse expliquer la disparition de l’aristocratie gréco-macédonienne dans les sources : elle avait émigré.83 La perte des profits qu’elle tirait du commerce signifiait pour elle non seulement le déclin de sa prosperité, mais entraînait aussi la perte de ses positions sociales et politiques. Car l’aristocratie, en tant que groupe social et gouvernant, conservait et garantissait les traditions urbaines, ce dont on voit le témoignage, entre autres, dans ses grandes et nombreuses donations à sa ville natale et à ses concitoiyens.84 Qu’elle ait émigré ou que son rang se fût dégradé, il en a résulté un changement complet de l’atmosphère de la ville ; l’afflux d’un élément social et ethnique étranger a fait de Doura-Europos une ville cosmopolite. Les nouveaux habitants ne se sentaient aucunement liés par les traditions de la ville et, par suite, ignoraient l’évergétisme. Tout ce qu’ils entreprenaient était régi par des buts et des besoins personnels. Si l’on tient compte de cette circonstance, la rigueur du jugement de M. Rostovtzeff s’en trouve en grande partie atténuée. Considérer en ces catégories les symptômes extérieurs de la prosperité économique de Doura-Europos, ainsi qu’il l’a fait, conduit à trop de subjectivisme. Les considérations présentées ci-dessus nous amènent à conclure que la présence de l’armée à Doura-Europos a exercé son influence à un degré plus ou moins grand dans tous les domaines de la vie de la population urbaine, et que son action a été nettement destructrice. En dépit d’une domination romaine de près d’un siècle, on ne trouve à Doura-Europos pas la moindre trace de romanisation, ni de nouvelles et durables valeurs pour remplacer les anciennes qui avaient été détruites. Une autre opinion de M. Rostovtzeff est très largement connue, celle de la mort de Doura-Europos en tant que ville, due à la domination romaine bien avant qu’elle ne fût détruite par les Perses.85 C’est là, sans aucun doute, une opinion suggestive et 83 L’une des causes probables de la disparition de ce groupe a pu être en une certaine mesure l’épidémie apportée par les détachements romains revenant de Mésopotamie sous le commandement de Lucius Verus. On ne peut pas étudier la question à la lumière des sources que nous possédons. Toutefois, celles-ci nous permettent d’affirmer que, même si l’épidémie a touché Doura-Europos , ses conséquences n’ont pas pu être catastrophiques pour ce groupe d’habitants au point de les faire entièrement disparaître (cf. Welles, Fink, Gilliam 1959, 126 sqq., no 25; Welles 1951, 270). M. Rostovtzeff (1934a, 194) estime que vers la fin du IIe siècle de n.è., l’aristocratie urbaine n’avait subi aucun changement ethnique, mais était uniquement appauvrie. 84 Rostovtzeff 1938a, 21; Welles 1951, 273; Lifshitz 1977, 26–27. 85 Rostovtzeff 1938a , 31: « Dura was dying before the Sasanians killed it. »

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très imagée, mais – pour employer les mêmes termes – cela n’a pas été un meurtre prémédité. Bien que la cause directe de la destruction du régime social, économique et politique ait été la présence de la garnison, il faut en voir la cause indirecte dans la politique de Rome à l’égard de l’État parthe. Elle a amené un changement dans la structure politique et militaire sur le Moyen Euphrate vers le milieu du IIe siècle de n.è. Ceci a eu pour effet l’établissement d’une nouvelle frontière entre l’Empire et le royaume des Arsacides, ce qui a eu pour conséquence de faire de Doura-Europos – ville autrefois située à l’intérieur de l’État parthe – une forteresse romaine frontalière d’une grande importance stratégique.86

86 Rostovtzeff 1938a, 27 sq., 30 et 50; Gilliam 1941, 170–171.

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La garnison romaine à Doura-Europos

II. Campaigns

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“. . . ostentasse Romana arma satis . . .” The Military Factor in Roman-Parthian Relations under Augustus and Tiberius

The importance of the military factor in Roman-Parthian relations during the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius has never really been questioned. Yet, no attempt has been made so far to analyse its nature and specify its role in relations between the two countries. A comprehensive account of Roman military involvement in relations with Parthia comes from Tacitus. He recorded the operation of AD 36 under the then governor of Syria L. Vitellius, carried out in order to help Rome-supported Tiridates II, pretender to the throne of the Arsacids, to ascend to power. The operation ended in a surprising way. The governor’s mission ended once the troops under his command reached the Euphrates, which separated Rome from Parthian lands. From then on, Tiridates II was to be accompanied solely by his Parthian supporters (Tac. Ann. 6.37.3) and a memory of the mighty Roman host on the Syrian bank of the Euphrates.1 Any action taken by the governor of Syria must have been specified in detail by Tiberius, for whom L. Vitellius’ mission was an important part of Rome’s policy toward its eastern neighbour (cf. Tac. Ann. 6.32.1). The course of events during the mission suggests that, from the outset, it had been carefully planned and well prepared. Consequently, it may be surmised that its final Roman demonstration of power had also been premeditated. Tacitus’ account indicates that the demonstration was intended to convince Tiridates II’s Parthian supporters that Rome was backing him and was ready to use its legions in his aid.2 * 

“. . . ostentasse Romana arma satis . . .” The Military Factor in Roman-Parthian Relations under Augustus and Tiberius, [in:] Ph. Freeman, J. Bennett, Z. T. Fiema, B. Hoffmann (eds.), Limes XVIII. Proceedings of the XVIIIth International Congress of Roman Frontier Studies held in Amman, Jordan (September 2000), (BAR International Series – 1084), Archeopress Publishing, vol. 1, Oxford 2002, 275–279.

1 Tac. Ann. 6.37.4: Vitellius ostentasse Romana arma satis ratus … . 2 Tac. Ann. 6.37.1: … robur legionum sociorumque ripam ad Euphratis ducit. Tiridates’ supporters could be only some of those allies. Tacitus’ account suggests that those Parthian aristocrats who supported him did not rally to his side until he had crossed the Euphrates, cf. Tac. Ann. 6.37.3. The presence among L. Vitellius’s force of troops provided by the allies was probably due to the concentration of forces he had arranged to keep in check Artabanus II – who was fighting in Armenia against Mithridates, ruler of Caucasian Iberia – by a threat to launch an attack into Mesopotamia, cf. Tac. Ann. 6.36.1–2. Cf. Ziegler 1964, 61f.; Dąbrowa 1983a , 111.

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L. Vitellius’ attitude leaves no doubt that Tiberius’ commitment to support the Parthian pretender was far from being tantamount with Rome’s actual readiness to engage in military action across the Euphrates. The subsequent struggle for the Parthian throne confirms that it was not. When, despite initial successes, Tiridates II proved unable to retain the Arsacid throne, Rome abandoned him, confining itself to the rôle a passive observer. The comprehensive description of L. Vitellius’ military action in AD 36 is particularly valuable evidence of Rome’s use of the military factor in relations with its eastern neighbour. Its importance is further emphasized by information on military action taken by the governor himself. In the light of this source, this military involvement was confined solely to the province under his administration and its mainstay was made up of legions stationed in the province and allied troops. This action, however, is not the only example of the army being used as a diplomatic tool under the first emperors of the Julio-Claudian dynasty. Sources from the times of Augustus and Tiberius contain a number of other references to both emperors using the legions as a decisive argument in relations with Armenia and Parthia. Nonetheless, some aspects have so far passed unnoticed. This lack of interest may be explained by the nature of our sources. Although relatively many, they rarely contain information on the strength of forces involved, their composition, place of origin, march routes, etc. What is more, sometimes, it is quite difficult to find clear confirmation that the army actually played a rôle in events. Yet a precise knowledge of these facts is necessary for a fair examination of the rôle of the military factor in the eastern policy of the first emperors of the Julio-Claudian dynasty. It is also important in a study of the organization and functioning of the Roman military system in the east. The first credible mentions to the importance of the military factor in Roman-Parthian relations refer to the events of 20 BC, in which Phraates IV returned the military ensigns lost by M. Licinius Crassus and M. Antonius, released Roman prisoners-of-war, and made large political concessions regarding Armenia.3 It should be stressed, however, that the military involvement in those events resulted from a coincidence, for at that time Augustus was in the east, while Tiberius was preparing an armed intervention in Armenia to install a Roman candidate. Hence Phraates, fearing a possible assault from Rome,4 displayed a greater than usual willingness to make concessions and alleviate arguments. The Arsacid’s concessions enabled both 3 4

RGDA 29.1; Liv. Per. 141; Velleius 2.91.1; Suet. Aug. 21.3; Tib. 9.1; Just. 42.5.11; Dio 54.8.1; Eutrop. 7.9; Oros. 6.21.29. More on this subject, see: Ziegler 1964, 47ff.; Pani 1972, 29; Krämer 1973, 362–363; van der Vin 1981. Whether Augustus really intended to attack Parthia in case his claims were rejected is not certain, even for ancient authors, cf. Just. 42.5.10; Dio 54.8.1. It may be worthwhile to quote the tell-tale opinion of Justinus (42.5.12), who thus summed up Augustus’ successes in relations with the Parthians: plusque Caesar magnitudine nominis sui fecit, quam armis facere alius imperator potuisset. It is more an echo of official propaganda that an objective assessment of events, cf. van der Vin 1981, 130–131; Rich 1998.

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countries to co-exist peacefully for a long time. Their foundation was recognition by both sides of the Euphrates as a border (cf. Strabo 16.1.28 (748)). The representative of Augustus who received the ensigns from Parthian hands was probably Tiberius.5 We know no details of the ceremony of handing over the standards, nor do we know where it happened. A demonstration of Roman military might probably constituted an important – if not dominating – element of the scene. Tiberius was acting in the twin rôles of the Roman emperor’s envoy and commander in chief of the army that was to restore to the Armenian throne the representative of the local dynasty, Tigranes, who had been held in Rome as a hostage.6 Records of Tiberius’ campaign in Armenia contain no details on its duration, course of events, routes, numbers of soldiers under his command, or their origin.7 All we know is that its main purpose, placement on the Armenian throne of a Roman candidate, was accomplished without too much effort.8 Still, some speculations might be made as to the origin of the detachments and the route they followed. At that time, Roman legions were stationed not only in Syria, but also in Anatolia.9 It is thus quite obvious that it was from those that troops were selected for the Armenian venture. If Tiberius moved out of Anatolia, as some scholars believe,10 then, for reasons of organization,11 the core of his force must have 5

We owe to Suetonius the information that it was Tiberius who won this privilege (Tib. 9.1). Yet some scholars question its credibility, cf. Krämer 1973, 363, Levick 1976, 234, note 38 (ibid. a presentation of earlier opinions) (yet elsewhere in her book [p. 26], the author makes a contradictory statement: “ … he [Tiberius] arrived on the frontier in time to receive the standards on 12 May, 20 BC.”). The main argument against Tiberius’ participation in the celebration is, in their opinion, that Velleius Paterculus is silent about it. Without disputing this observation, it may be sufficient to note that no source suggests that the legions’ ensigns were received by Augustus himself. It is true that in his Res Gestae, Augustus boasts of the fact that he recovered the standards, but this need not be taken as meaning that he received them in person. (RGDA 29: Parthos … spolia et signa reddere mihi …). The actual contribution of Tiberius might have amounted to carrying out orders. In this context, the Velleius’ silence becomes easier to understand. 6 Velleius 2.94.4; Tac. Ann. 2.3.2; Suet. Tib. 9.1; Dio 54.9.4–7; Pani 1972, 17ff. Velleius erroneously suggests that Tiberius installed Artavasdes on the Armenian throne. Cf. J. Hellegouar’h comm. ad loc. in Velleius Histoire romaine, T. II, livre 2, Paris 1982, 238, note 11; Sherwin-White 1984, 325, note 6. Despite the claim of Sherwin-White (1984, 324), accounts of Tiberius’ expedition lack sufficient evidence to treat the regaining of the signa and the Armenian expedition as two separate events. Cf. also Pani 1972, 18–19. 7 Cf. Strabo 17.1.54 (821); Velleius 2.94.2; Suet. Tib. 9, 1. Concerning the composition of Tiberius’ army, we have only one vague remark in Velleius (2.94.4: cum legionibus ingressus Armeniam). 8 The Armenian expedition of Tiberius probably involved installation of a Roman candidate on the throne of Media Atropatene (RGDA 33). Cf. Pani 1972, 70ff., 87–88; Sherwin-White 1984, 325. 9 See Syme 1933, 18–19, 24, 30; Mitchell 1976, 298–308; Sherwin-White 1984, 339 and note 35; Keppie 1986, 412. 10 Levick 1976, 26. In their opinion, this is implied by the presence at Tiberius’ side of the king of Cappadocia, Archelaus. In itself, however, it is not a sufficiently plausible argument to support the opinion. See Pani 1972, 20–23. 11 Sources seem to suggest that the Armenian expedition was prepared in a hurry. If the military standards reached Augustus, then in Syria, about mid-May AD 20 (cf. Ovid, Fasti 5. 545–598), then with much likelihood the event can be dated at the early spring of that year. Wintertime in Anatolia with its abundant snowfall would

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come from that area. In that case, Tiberius commanded a modest force that could have proved insufficient to carry out the objective Augustus put before it. One more circumstance deserves to be considered. Roman possessions in Anatolia were delimited by the boundaries of Galatia annexed in 25 BC. Between it and Armenia lay lands that recognized Roman domination and this fact facilitated Tiberius’ passage, but on the other hand this part of Asia Minor was relatively little known to Romans. In this light, it would be more plausible to assume that Tiberius chose Syria as his base of operations. Not only was a much greater force stationed there, but also the lands between Syria and Armenia were far more familiar to the Romans since the expeditions of M. Crassus and M. Antonius. These factors should have determined the choice of routes starting from Syria also on other occasions. Another Roman military operation in Armenia occurred in the years AD 2–3.12 Together with an earlier expedition by C. Caesar to Arabia,13 it was part of a largescale mission entrusted to the young prince by Augustus. As in Tiberius’ mission, the purpose of the Armenian expedition was to place a Roman candidate on the throne.14 An important historical event happened on the way to Armenia: C. Caesar met on the Euphrates the ruler of Parthia, Phraataces (Phraates V).15 The meeting was of crucial importance for the young prince’s mission as well as for peaceful relations between the countries that had been disturbed by the Arsacid’s action against Roman interests. Thanks to the meeting, Rome managed to avert armed confrontation with Parthia.16 The subsequent course of events showed that although Phraataces recognized the provisions of the new treaty, he did not, contrary to Roman expectations, entirely give up Parthian claims to Armenia. His attitude could not have failed to influence the situation in that country and it most probably fuelled anti-Roman resistance. Although Augustus’ envoy managed to prevail at the cost of some heavy fighting, the success proved short-lived and its price disproportionate to the effects achieved. The literary evidence suggests clearly enough that C. Caesar’s base of operations in the east was Syria (Velleius 2.101.1; Dio 55.10.19; Oros. 7.3.4). Without a doubt, Syria was chosen because of its close location to the theatre of operations and the

have prevented swift passage of a large military forces. Not having too much time to get ready, Tiberius was compelled to use solely troops stationed in one of these two areas. 12 For more on problems of the chronology, see Zetzel 1970; Bowersock 1971, 227 = Bowersock 1994, 111; Pani 1972, 50ff. 13 Pliny NH 2.168; 6.141, 160; Zetzel 1970, 259ff.; Bowersock 1971, 227–228 = 1994, 111–112; Romer 1979, 204ff.; Luther 1999, 171–175, esp. 175. 14 Cf. Pliny NH 6.141; Dio 55.10a.4; Velleius 2.102.2; Florus 2.32. 15 Velleius 2.101.1–3, 102.2; Dio 55.10a.4; Ziegler 1964, 53ff.; Romer 1979, 208ff.; Barzano 1985, 214, 219–220; Winter 1994, 593–594. 16 It is difficult to be certain whether the orders that C. Caesar received from Augustus instructed him to take military action against the Parthian ruler, cf. Dio 55.10.21.

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size of the force stationed there.17 The action against the Arabs probably involved only some of the force, as the remaining part was obliged to man positions in Syria in view of the tense relations with Phraataces.18 In addition to Syrian legions, the task force probably included Egyptian legions (cf. Dio 55.10a.1). Although we have no detailed information on the force engaged in the Armenian expedition, some observations are still possible. The known chronology of events indicates that C. Caesar set out for Armenia after a meeting with Phraataces. A description of the Roman-Parthian summit meeting suggests that it took place on the Syrian border: both men were on their own respective territory.19 Without risking a big mistake we may therefore conclude that the core of C. Caesar’s force was made up of Syrian legions. Serious tensions between Rome and Parthia arose in the first years of the reign of Tiberius, after the Parthian king Artabanus II installed his own son on the Armenian throne (Tac. Ann. 2.4.3; Josephus, AJ 18.52). In order to prevent a strengthening of Parthian influence in Armenia, Tiberius entrusted to Germanicus the task of securing Roman interests in the area. Even though Tacitus devoted a comprehensive account to Germanicus’ activities in the east in AD 18–19, his Armenian venture and military involvement there remains relatively obscure. Tacitus’ account allows a conclusion that in order to complete his mission in Armenia, Germanicus needed legions stationed in Syria, although it is difficult to prove that on his way to Armenia Germanicus indeed took any troops with him. The matter is further complicated by the historian’s ambiguous remark referring to the failure of the governor of Syria to comply with Germanicus’ order to send to Armenia some of the legions stationed in his province.20 Doubts resulting from this unclear passage boil down to the question, once he was in Armenia, why did Germanicus ask the Syrian governor to supply troops? Was it only then that he deemed it necessary to command an armed force? It seems hardly likely that this was indeed the case. It is difficult to imagine, considering for example C. Caesar’s mission, that Germanicus could have achieved anything on the strength of the emperor’s mandate alone. In our opinion, Germanicus’ order referred to a reinforcement of the troops already at his command. It may have 17 No evidence is extant to suggests that legions from elsewhere in the empire took part in G. Caesar’s Armenian expedition. If we knew in detail the military career of L. Velleius Paterculus, then his presence at the meeting between G. Caesar and Phraataces on the Euphrates (2.101.2) could cast some more light on this question. Based on his eye-witness account, it cannot be ruled out that his presence might have resulted from his service with a unit stationed in Syria (2.101.3: … omnibus ad Orientem visis provinciis…). 18 Characteristically, Velleius makes not a single reference to the Arabian part of G. Caesar’s mission. 19 Cf. Velleius 2.101.3: Prior Parthus apud Gaium in nostra ripa, posterior hic apud regem in hostili epulatus est. 20 Tac. Ann. 2.57.1: … qui (C. Piso) iussus partem legionum ipse aut per filium in Armeniam ducere utrumque neglexerat.

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been needed to complete some unexpected military venture planned by the emperor’s envoy. It is quite certain that the presence of the troops did not imply danger to his life or his mission. The latter had already been successfully accomplished.21 It should be stressed that Germanicus’ actions in Armenia and Syria do not indicate that he was aiming at an armed conflict with Parthia’s ruler. His attitude toward Artabanus II was in line with general eastern policy of Tiberius. Although that policy aimed to avoid direct confrontation, it showed determination to achieve its purposes and it relied on much diplomatic activity directed against the Parthian ruler. It cannot be ruled our completely that in acting as he did, Germanicus deserves the credit for the laying of foundations for a permanent Roman defence system on the Euphrates.22 Apart from L. Vitellius’ action for Tiridates (mentioned above), the governor has one more political-military operation to his name – the meeting with Artabanus II in the spring of AD 37.23 Its effect was yet another agreement on mutual relations between the two countries.24 We do not know either the composition or the strength of the force accompanying L. Vitellius, but it can be taken for granted that it included legions stationed in his province.25 The attendance of Syrian legions at another diplomatic “summit” suggests that their presence had become an indispensable tool in implementing Rome’s eastern policy. For any analysis of the role of Syrian legions, this insight makes it possible to add more events to the list, even though sources are silent about any military presence, for example, when in 10 BC Phraates IV handed over four royal sons and their families to M. Titius, governor of Syria.26 Under an agreement with Augustus, they were to stay in Rome under the emperor’s protection.27 Given the political importance of this event, the governor of Syria must have received the royal sons entrusted to his care in an escort of troops under his command.

21 Cf. Tac. Ann. 2. 57.1: Cunctaque socialia prospere composita… . 22 Cf. Dąbrowa 1986, 96–97. 23 Scholars disagree whether the meeting took place while Tiberius was still alive or after Caligula had ascended to power (for arguments by both sides, see eg. Garzetti 1956: 211ff.; Ziegler 1964: 61–62). Such details would be important for chronology, have no great significance for political assessment of the event. Although other sources point to Caligula as the initiator of this meeting (Suet. Cal. 14.3), in our opinion Josephus’ (AJ 18.101) suggestion that Tiberius arranged the meeting seems more credible as a logical crowning of that emperor’s policy toward the Arsacid state. 24 For more on this, see Ziegler 1964, 63–64; Dąbrowa 1983, 111–112. 25 Their presence on the Euphrates is attested to by Suetonius (Cal. 14.3; Vit. 2.4). 26 RGDA 32; Strabo 6.4.2 (288); 16.1.28 (748); Velleius 2.94.2; Tac. Ann. 2.1.2; Josephus, AJ 18.42; Suet. Aug. 43.4; Just. 42.5.12; Oros. 6.21.29. The king and the governor met on the initiative of the former. Although sources make no mention of the venue, it must have been on the Euphrates. 27 For more on the various aspects of the Parthian princes’ presence in Rome and the role they played in the Roman emperors’ eastern policies, see Pani 1972, 26–35; Dąbrowa 1983a ; Niedergaard 1988; Dąbrowa 1989.

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Roman military participation can be surmised in the not quite successful operation of AD 6 to install on the Armenian throne Artavasdes, whom Augustus supported. The operation involved some unspecified Roman failures. Tacitus alludes to them in such a way that it may mean either the emperor’s unsuccessful political schemes or a defeat of Roman troops.28 It is difficult to fathom what the historian meant since this remark is the only record we have of that operation. It is highly probable that the legions based in Syria were involved in two other similar events. The supposition is justified by an account of Tiridates II’s ascent to power in Parthia, mentioned earlier in this paper. These events involved Rome extending its support to other pretenders to the Arsacid throne and we may surmise that their scenario did not differ significantly from the one we already know. The first was in approximately AD 9/10. Its hero was Vonones, one of the sons of Phraates IV residing in Rome. Asked by Parthian aristocrats, Augustus agreed to Vonones’ ascent to the Arsacid throne.29 On another occasion, in AD 35, in response to a similar request, Tiberius approved as king Phraates, son of Phraates IV.30 These episodes in Roman–Parthian relations demonstrate an unexpectedly important rôle of the army as an instrument of Roman policy in Armenia and vis-à-vis Parthia.31 Clearly perceptible is the difference with which Rome used the military factor in respect to each of its neighbours. To protect and promote Roman interests in Armenia, both Augustus and Tiberius were ready to resort to the use of troops, which Parthia formally sanctioned when it recognized Rome’s right to interfere in the politics of that land. In its policies toward the Arsacid state, the military factor served mainly to exert more or less intense pressure as to complement the diplomatic protocol. The successes that both emperors managed to achieve using this tool, however, did not lull their vigilance. Although official propaganda wasted no opportunity to present Parthia as a weak, subjugated opponent, sources show that in direct relations the both emperors adopted a respectful and apprehensive attitude. The equal status of both powers in diplomatic contacts, repetitious confirmation of the agreement on mutual 28 Tac. Ann. 2.4: Dein iussu Augusti impositus Artavasdes et non sine clade nostra deiectus; cf. Pani 1972, 25, 38ff. According to M. Pani (1972, 38), the task to install Artavasdes on the throne fell to the governor of Syria. However, we have no evidence for the reign of Augustus or his successor that any of governors operated with the Syrian legions stationed there outside his province. 29 RGDA 33; Josephus, AJ 18.50; Tac. Ann. 2.1.1 – 2.4; cf. Suet. Aug. 21.3. 30 Tac. Ann. 6.1–2; Dio 58.26.2. Phraates died in Syria before he reached his country’s border. The exact place and circumstances of his death remain a mystery. It may be surmised, however, that he was escorted by Roman troops as Tiberius recognized the importance of this and the next expedition of Tiridates II a few month later. 31 In this contribution I have not included a discussion on the Aelius Gallus’ expedition to Arabia. Arguments raised by Marek (1993) to put it into scheme of Roman–Parthian relations under Augustus are very impressive indeed, but in my opinion are neither completely convincing nor appropriate. See also Luther 1999, 157–170.

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relations as achieved in 20 BC, skilful avoidance of open confrontation with Parthian rulers, and deployment of a large army in Syria further confirm this.32 One more important observation can be drawn from the foregoing discussion. Although it did not add to our knowledge of Syria’s military organization during the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius, it cast some light on the rôle of that province and its legions in the events described. Use of Syria as a permanent base of operations in Armenia proves not only its strategic positioning in Roman policies but its strong military presence from early in Augustus’ reign. There can be no doubt that he assigned Syria a key role in relations with Rome’s eastern neighbour from the moment he ascended to power. Although we have only imprecise information on the size of the force he sent there,33 the identity of units,34 and placement of its camps, there is no doubt that without this military force at their disposal, both Augustus and Tiberius could hardly have achieved their successes in their eastern policy.

32 The first mention containing the names of legions stationed in Syria refers to the years 18–19 CE. They included legio X Fretensis (Tac. Ann. 2.57.2; AE 1993, 204) and legio VI Ferrata (Tac. Ann. 2.79.2). 33 Cf. Sherwin-White 1984, 328–341. 34 Cf. Dąbrowa 1986, 96–97; Keppie 1986, 413–414.

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The Roman Army in Action in Judaea (4 BCE–66 CE)1

The death of King Herod was an event of great significance for the fate of Judaea. Many of his subjects viewed his rule as oppressive and, in spite of his gestures aimed at winning him the sympathy of various social groups, they detested him. It was the support and help of Rome that enabled him to rule so despotically, although his conduct in certain matters, and especially the way he resolved conflicts within his own family, was on more than one occasion the cause of embarrassment of even his Roman protectors and friends. Despite this, the ruler of Judaea enjoyed their full trust, as his loyalty to Augustus and the devotion he showed to him was a guarantee of order and peace in a crucial area of the Middle East. The forces and means at Herod’s disposal allowed him to take immediate and effective action against anyone who tried to undermine his rule. Where necessary he was also able to provide significant support to the Romans outside of his state. As soon as Herod died, the Romans saw what an important and useful partner they had lost, as the situation in Judaea underwent a sudden and unfavourable transformation. There were at least several reasons that led Herod’s stable state to change overnight into a country engulfed by social tremors and widespread chaos. The most important of these was an explosion of social dissatisfaction among wide sections of the Judean population. They expected Herod’s son and successor Archelaus to deliver an immediate improvement in their situation by freeing them from the burden of various obligations they had to the ruler as well as granting amnesty to political prisoners. Archelaus declared himself willing to satisfy these demands, only to renege on them, arguing that he did not have the necessary authority (his status as Herod’s successor had to be confirmed by Augustus). This led to a fierce conflict with his subjects and the deaths of many protestors in clashes with his soldiers. Archelaus’ departure to Rome did nothing to improve the atmosphere, as his absence meant that the social dissatisfaction took the form of widespread rebellion and encompassed an increasingly large area of Judaea. The destabilisation of the structures of power and army was instrumental in the appearance of local leaders (including members of the royal family dissatisfied with Archelaus’ designation as Herod’s successor), who not only opposed the previous order, but also proclaimed anti-Roman slogans. The anti-Roman * 

The Roman Army in Action in Judaea (4 BCE–66 CE), [in:] A. Tomas (ed.), Ad fines Imperii Romani. Studia Thaddaeo Sarnowski septuagenario ab amicis, collegis discipulisque dedicata, Institute of Archaeolgy, University of Warsaw, Warszawa 2015, 59–68.

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sentiments were also fuelled by Sabinus, Augustus’ procurator in Syria, who made a major contribution to fanning these flames with his ruthless actions during attempts to take Herod’s land for the emperor.1 The then governor of Syria, P. Quinctilius Varus,2 correctly foresaw the likely course of events in Judaea in Archelaus’ absence, and therefore took the necessary steps to counteract the appearances of potential troublemakers. Immediately following Archelaus’ departure from Judaea, he left for Jerusalem together with one of the three legions that remained under his orders. The situation in the city led him to leave that legion there.3 This decision, an entirely legitimate one from the Roman perspective. Although over a decade earlier Syrian units under Tiberius’ leadership had participated in efforts to enthrone the Roman candidate on the throne of Armenia,4 these were not actions on the territory of a vassal state. From Josephus we can gather that cases of military activity of Syrian units in Judaea occurred later on too; he also cites many examples of combat operations of Roman units stationed in Judaea itself. Although his account is not always clear and detailed, it casts much light on various aspects of the Roman military presence in the region. Some of these have already been analysed in detail by scholars and there is no reason to return to them here. One such often-discussed issue is the problem of the presence of the Roman army in Judaea,5 as well as the relationship between the Roman soldiers and the inhabitants of Jerusalem.6 All that we are interested in, though, is the question of Roman military activity in Judaea in the period from Herod’s death until the outbreak of the revolt in 66 CE. When he stationed his legion in Jerusalem, Varus could not have known how disastrous the outcomes of Sabinus’ doings would be. Although Varus demanded that he cease his attempts to take over the property of Herod and he gave his word to the governor to this effect, the procurator soon resumed these efforts7. The Sabinus’ ruthlessness heightened emotions to the degree that the menace of annihilation at the hands of the Jews hung over the whole unit. These events reached a climax when the Romans captured the Temple Mount. Their plunder of the Temple treasury brought a furious reaction from the Jewish population, who had congregated in Jerusalem to celebrate Passover. The indignant Jews launched a fierce attack on Herod’s palace, in which Sabinus was sheltering with his soldiers. The Romans’ position became more 1 Cf. Josephus, BJ 2.16–18 and 41; AJ 17.252–253. 2 Cf. Dąbrowa 1998, 22–24. 3 Josephus, BJ 2.39–40; AJ 17.250–251. 4 Cf. Velleius 2.94.4; Tac. Ann. 2.3.2; Suet. Tib. 9.1; Dio 54.9.4–7; Dąbrowa 2002, 276. 5 See Dąbrowa 2000b, 317–325; Haensch 2004, 161–165; Eck 2007, 105–155; Isaac 2010, 153–159. 6 Cf. Kraeling 1942, 263–289; Maier 1969, 109–121; Eck 2009, 226–228; 2011, 55–56, 65–66; 2014, 174–175, 182–183. 7 Josephus BJ 2.16–18, 41; AJ 17.252–253.

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and more difficult day by day, as the civil population was joined by many soldiers who had until recently served Herod.8 In response to Sabinus’ call for help, Varus, having assembled substantial forces – two legions, several auxiliary units and a large unit of veterans settled in the colony of Berytus – set off for Jerusalem. Varus’ whole army was concentrated in Ptolemais, where units sent on request of the governor of Syria by vassal rulers allied with Rome also arrived.9 At the beginning of the campaign, Varus had an army of over a dozen thousand soldiers under his orders. The premises of the tactics adopted by the governor of Syria were clear: the core of his forces, heading from Ptolemais towards Jerusalem, mostly attacked the major insurgent strongholds and divisions of local leaders, while the task of eradicating smaller, marginal insurrectionary centres was entrusted to separate units.10 The decisive actions of Varus’ armies rather effectively sapped the rebels’ will to fight, and their resistance quickly weakened. Even the residents of Jerusalem opened the gates to the city upon sight of his troops,11 and after the city was taken by the Romans the remaining rebel concentrations were soon snuffed out.12 Despite the elimination of all centres of social and political unrest in Judaea and punishment of those to blame, social moods remained far from being soothed. Varus decided to leave one of the legions in Jerusalem in an attempt to counter the outbreak of any further disturbances.13 We do not know how long the legion was stationed there. The lack of any mentions of its presence in the city during the rule of Archelaus (whose right to the throne of Judaea, in accordance with Herod’s will, was confirmed by Augustus14) suggests that this unit returned to Syria shortly after his return from Rome. Without doubt Archelaus, granted control over Judaea by Augustus, had to assure the emperor – as his father had before him – that with the help of his own forces he was able to guarantee peace in the territory over which he ruled. Archelaus swiftly proved to be an inept ruler. Following numerous complaints from his own subjects to the Roman authorities, Augustus finally stripped him of power and exiled him to Gaul. In 6 CE his power was transferred to the administration of the province of Syria.15 Judaea was to be locally administered by a prefect from the equestrian estate named by the emperor, whose direct superior was the governor of 8 Josephus, BJ 2.42–54; AJ 17.254–268. 9 Josephus, BJ 2.66–68; AJ 17.286–288. 10 Josephus, BJ 2.68–71; AJ 17.288–291. 11 Josephus, BJ 2.72–73; AJ 17.292–293. 12 Josephus, BJ 2.75–78; AJ 17.295–297. 13 Josephus, BJ 2.79; AJ 17.299. 14 The form of the state that Augustus entrusted to Archelaus differed from that which it possessed at the time of Herod’s death: Josephus BJ 2.93–98; AJ 17.318–323. 15 Josephus, BJ 2.117; AJ 17.355; 18.1; Dio 55.27.6. The formal dimension of this decision is often equated with Judaea being given the status of province, but this view is inaccurate. Augustus’ decision meant only the provincialisation of Judaea, i.e. its incorporation in the administrative borders of the province of Syria: Ghiretti

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Syria.16 The implementation of Roman administration in Judaea was accompanied by a census of its inhabitants. Augustus entrusted this, as well as getting the property affairs of Archelaus in order, to P. Sulpicius Quirinius, governor of Syria.17 Although we do not know whether he used the help of soldiers subordinated to him to unertake this task, there is no doubt that he must have had their active protection. We can deduce this from Josephus’ account of the residents of Galilee’s strong opposition to the census. This resistance was inspired by local religious leaders: Judas of Gamala and Zadok.18 Since their activities caused serious social disquiet combined with acts of violence, it is hard to imagine that quelling these disruptions might have been possible without use of force on the part of the Romans.19 Further evidence of the participation of units permanently stationed in Syria in the census is the inscription of Q. Aemilius Secundus (CIL III 6687 = ILS 2683). This mentions that, as commander of one of the auxiliary units (praefectus cohortis) and on the orders of Quirinius, he carried out a census of the population of Apamea (iussu Quirini censum egi Apamenae civitatis). Sending units from Syria for actions in Judaea also took place during the reign of Gaius, when, probably in 40 CE, the governor of this province – P. Petronius20 – received the order to erect a statue of the emperor in the Jerusalem temple, regardless of the consequences.21 Clearly mindful of the difficulties that he would encounter in pursuing this assignment, P. Petronius mobilised most of the units under his orders – legions along with the auxiliary units accompanying them.22 After arriving in Judaea, he held a series of meetings with representatives of various groups of the Jewish population in Ptolemais and Tiberias, seeking to persuade them to consent to the presence of a statue of the emperor in the holy place. Given the determination of the Jews, ready to defend their religious principles at all costs, Petronius tried to persuade Gaius of the merits of the idea.23 The attempt on the emperor’s life ultimately solved this problem. After several months of inaction and waiting for events to unfold, the units concentrated in Judaea returned peacefully to their Syrian camps.24 1985, 751–766; Bernett 2007, 310–313; Eck 2007, 23–51; 2008, 219–220; 2009, 216–217. Judaea did not receive the status of a province until the rule of Vespasian: Josephus, BJ 7.163. 16 Cf. Josephus, BJ 2.18; AJ 17.355; 18.1–2; cf. 18, 89. During the period from Augustus to Claudius, these officials held the title of praefectus, and after 44 CE that of procurator. For more on the rank and nature of these functions see Eck 2007, 25–37, 39–43, 48. Although the prefect/procurator was an official named by the emperor, in special cases the governor of Syria could have him removed from the position; cf. Tac. Ann. 12.54. 17 Josephus, AJ 17.355; 18.1–2; cf. Dąbrowa 1998, 27–30. 18 Josephus, BJ 2.118; AJ 18.4. 19 Cf. Josephus, BJ 2.118; AJ 18.4–6. 20 Cf. Dąbrowa 1998, 42–43. 21 Josephus, BJ 2.184–185; AJ 18.261–262. 22 In BJ 2.186 Josephus refers to three legions, whereas in AJ 18.262 he speaks of two, and it is the latter figure that is viewed as the more likely, cf. Phil. Leg. 207. 23 Cf. Josephus, BJ 2.187–203; AJ 18.263–309. 24 Josephus, BJ 2.201.

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In 44 CE, after the death of the king of Judaea, Agrippa I, relations between the Jews and C. Cuspius Fadus, the newly named procurator, became tense.25 The cause was the dispute over who should be entrusted with care of the ritual vestments used by the high priest during the major Jewish festivities. From the time of Tiberius, thanks to L. Vitellius,26 governor of Syria in 35–39 CE, they remained in the care of the priests of the Jerusalem temple. Fadus decided to change this practice, demanding that they be returned to Roman custody.27 This led to protests among the priests, which reverberated widely in society. The threat of unease in Judaea became so real that the governor of Syria of the time, C. Cassius Longinus,28 arrived in Jerusalem with a large number of soldiers to support Fadus.29 This time the army was not required. Instead, both sides decided to solve the dispute by invoking the decision of Claudius, who upheld the legitimacy of Vitellius’ resolution.30 In late spring 66 CE, the question of potentially sending units stationed in Syria to fight against the inhabitants of Judaea was one discussed by the colleagues of the Syrian governor, C. Cestius Gallus.31 This was triggered by a letter from the procurator of Judaea, Gessius Florus,32 in which he demanded military support against the Jews whom he accused of stirring up rebellion and provoking bloody battles in Jerusalem.33 Since at the same time Gallus had received a letter from the Jews accusing Florus of provoking these events, before making his final decision he decided to check the legitimacy of the accusations of both sides. To do this, he sent one of his officers to Judaea. The report that was submitted failed to confirm the veracity of the procurator’s charges, which made armed intervention of the Syrian troops in Judaea unnecessary. The situation changed just a few months later when the uprising in Jerusalem began, but the military action taken then by the governor of Syria is outside the scope of this article. Apart from the mentions of the use of troops in Syria by the Roman authorities, we can also find many passages in Josephus that refer to the military activity of the soldiers of units permanently deployed there. The prefects and procurators based in Roman Judaea were in charge of at least a few units.34 Some of these were 25 Josephus, AJ 19.363; 20.2; PIR2 C 1636; Stein 1900, 1885, no. 2. 26 Cf. Dąbrowa 1998, 38–41. 27 Josephus, AJ 20.6. 28 Cf. Dąbrowa 1998, 46–49. 29 Josephus (AJ 20.7) does not give any details as to their number, instead giving a rather vague description. 30 Josephus, AJ 20.7–14. 31 Cf. Dąbrowa 1998, 56–57. 32 PIR2 G 170; Stein 1910, 1325–28, no. 5. 33 Josephus, BJ 2.334. 34 Cf. Suet. Claud. 28. As Judaea belonged to the province of Syria, all the units stationed there were part of the Syrian army. Owing to the small number of sources and lack of precision shown by Josephus regarding the

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stationed in Caesarea Maritima – the city that was the official base of the prefect/ procurator.35 At least one cohort constituted the garrison of Jerusalem.36 It is also possible that other units or their vexillationes were also stationed in strategically important places in Judaea.37 In Jerusalem the Roman soldiers were billeted in the Antonia fortress, and when the prefect/procurator came to the city the soldiers who accompanied him were quartered at Herod’s palace.38 Analysing Josephus, we can state that the soldiers of the units stationed in Judaea by no means lived an indolent garrison life. The first more extensive mention of the soldiers under the orders of the prefect concerns the period when Pontius Pilatus was staying in Judaea (26–36 CE).39 He deliberately provoked a whole host of situations that brought fierce reactions from the inhabitants of Jerusalem. The best-known of these was the incident involving the public presentation in Jerusalem of military symbols featuring the emperor’s image. The Jewish population was up in arms, considering this an affront to their religious feelings.40 The prefect was ready to use force to solve this situation, although he ultimately relented.41 The next episode came a little later and concerned the construction of an aqueduct delivering water to Jerusalem, the costs of which were covered by the funds collected by Pilatus from the temple treasury. So fierce were the protests among the population that the prefect decided to bring in the army. The operation of soldiers armed with clubs caused panic in the crowd of protestors. As they Roman military and civil administration (Saddington 1995, 53–55; Eck 2008, 220–226), it is very difficult to determine not only the rank of the officers and officials he mentions, but also the names and numbers of the units that prefects/procurators of Judaea had at their disposal, as well as being able to trace any changes in their deployment between 6 and 66 CE. Probably, after Archelaus was removed from Judaea the most valuable divisions of his army were handed to Rome and granted the status of auxiliary units (auxilia). According to Josephus, the core of these units was made up of soldiers from the cities of Sebaste and Caesarea Maritima founded by Herod (cf. Josephus, AJ 19.365; 20.122; 20.176). We know that the prefects/procurators of Judaea were in charge of five cohorts (Josephus, AJ 19.365; 20.122). Some scholars believe that they were all formed of soldiers from the aforementioned two cities (cf. Saddington 1970, 120; 1988, 36; 1996, 2414; Schürer 1985, 448–450). In reality, the inhabitants of the two cities comprised just one unit of the cavalry, probably named ala I Sebastenorum (Josephus, BJ 2.236; AJ 19.365; 20.122), and one of the infantry, entitled coh. I Sebastenorum. Apart from said coh. I Sebastenorum, we know the names of two more units stationed in Judaea at the time: coh. Italica, coh. Augusta (Acta 10:1; 27:1; Saddington 1970, 121–122; 1996, 2415–16, 2417–18; Speidel 1982/1983, 233–240). 35 Cf. Josephus, BJ 2.236, 318–319; AJ 18.55; Tac. Hist. 2.78; Haensch 1997, 227–234; Eck 2009, 221–233. 36 Cf. Josephus, BJ 2.224, 332; AJ 18.55; Schürer 1985, 451–452. 37 Little is known about the presence of military units outside of Caesarea and Jerusalem in the years 6–66 CE. It is only confirmed for the period preceding the outbreak of the uprising or the initial phase of the battles associated with it, cf. Josephus, BJ 2.408, 484–486; 3.12, 309; Vita 115. 38 Josephus, BJ 2.329. 39 PIR 2 P 815; Fascher 1950, 1322–1323; Saddington 1996, 2426. 40 Josephus, BJ 2.169–174; AJ 18.55–59. 41 Cf. Josephus, BJ 2.172–174; AJ 18.55–59.

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fled, many people were either trampled to death or perished under the blows of the cudgels.42 At the end of Pilatus’ stay in Judaea, a group of the region’s inhabitants, motivated by religious feelings, attempted to take Mount Gerizim by force in the hope of finding the holy vessels supposedly buried there by Moses. Without waiting to see how events panned out, Pilatus gave his troops the order to launch an attack on those congregated adjacent to the village of Tiratan. This offensive led to dispersal of the gathering, many of whose members lost their lives.43 Pilatus’ successor, Cuspius Fadus, also used military means to annihilate another religious group, that led by Theudas.44 Most of the various occurrences featuring Roman soldiers we know come from the time of the reign of Claudius, when the procurator of Judaea was Ventidius Cumanus (48–52 CE).45 The first of these took place in Jerusalem during the Feast of Unleavened Bread. One of the Roman soldiers standing on the Temple cloister behaved in an inappropriate way towards the participants in the festivities, meeting with an indignant and fierce reaction. Cumanus called up extra forces to deal with the congregation. At the sight of approaching soldiers, the crowd panicked and fled, leaving many people trampled to death.46 Another incident occurred near Beth-horon, when a band of highwaymen attacked Stephanus, the emperor’s slave, robbing him of his baggage. When news of this event reached the procurator, he immediately ordered a revenge operation, which was in fact aimed not at the thieves, but rather against the inhabitants of local villages accused of failing to give chase to the perpetrators of the crime.47 Cumanus’ next military operation was conducted in Samaria, and was caused by an attack of Samaritans on a group of pilgrims from Galilee travelling to Jerusalem that resulted in the death of one of them. In response, the Jews mounted a retaliatory operation against the inhabitants of Samaria. After some time, the organised bands of highwaymen involved in these incidents also began to harass Jews. When one of them, led by Eleazar, son of Dinaeus, and Alexander, became particularly bothersome for the local population, Cumanus launched armed operations against the group.48 This was only partially successful. The Romans did manage to break up the band, but its leader, Eleazar, managed to escape. He was captured only sometime later by M. Antonius Felix (52–58/59? CE),49 a colleague

42 Josephus, BJ 2.175–177; AJ 18.60–62. 43 Josephus, AJ 18.85–87. 44 Josephus, AJ 20.97–99. 45 PIR V 250; Hanslik 1955, 816–818, no. 7. 46 Josephus, BJ 2.224–227; AJ 20.105–112. 47 Cf. Josephus, BJ 2.228–231; AJ 20.113–117. 48 Josephus, BJ 2.232–237; AJ 20.118–124. 49 PIR 2 A 828; von Rohden 1894, 2616–2618, no. 54; Saddington 1996, 2426–2427.

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and successor to Cumanus,50 who energetically and for some time successfully restricted the phenomenon of banditry in Judaea.51 During Felix’s administration of Judaea, various political and religious groups were activated whose ideology meant that the Roman authorities treated them as a threat to the existing political system and social order. As a result of their fierce and radical actions aimed at the members of the priestly and secular elites responsible for collaboration with the Roman authorities, it was not just the Roman administration that fought against them, but also the representatives of the upper social strata of Judaea working with it. A similar threat was posed also by religious movements with a messianic and apocalyptic character. The slogans spouted by their leaders attracted adherents ready to take any action, however irrational. Felix did not ignore any of these movements. With the help of the units at his disposal, he used full force in fighting all these groups in which he saw even a shadow of rebellion and their leaders.52 He also did not hesitate to use the army to pacify Jews living in Caesarea Maritima and fighting tenacious battles for power over the city with the Greeks who lived there.53 Procurator Porcius Festus (58/59?–62 CE) also fought an energetic battle with robbery using forces stationed in Judaea,54 but he too was unable to completely eradicate this phenomenon.55 We can assume that Lucceius Albinus also had to contend with this problem after taking up the office of procurator of Judaea (62–64 CE).56 One of the reasons for the lack of success of the Roman activities was the fact that in the 60s CE certain forms of political banditry enjoyed the tacit support of a section of the Jewish social elites.57 On occasion, they used members of the radical anti-Roman Sicarii group58 to eliminate their political enemies, and sometimes ordinary

50 According to Tacitus (Ann. 12.54), both received nominations for positions in Judaea at the same time. Cumanus was supposed to be responsible for Galilee, and Felix for Samaria (… Ventidio Cumano, cui pars provinciae habebatur, ita divisis, ut huic Galilaeorum natio, Felici Samaritae parerent…). The abuses committed by both led to the intervention of the governor of Syria, C. Ummidius Durmius Quadratus (cf. Dąbrowa 1998, 49–53), who deposed Cumanus from his position. Yet family connections ensured that Felix kept his. 51 Josephus, BJ 2.253–254; AJ 20.160–162. 52 Cf. Josephus BJ 2.258–260; AJ 20.168–172. There was cause for Felix to be suspicious. The leader of one such group, who managed to attract a crowd of several thousand people to his side, made as his goal the conquest of Jerusalem and its liberation from the Romans and then proclaiming himself king (Josephus, BJ 2.261–263; AJ 20.169–172). 53 Josephus, BJ 2.266–270; AJ 20.173–178. 54 PIR2 P 858; Lambertz 1953, 220–227, no. 36. 55 Josephus, BJ 2.271; AJ 20.188. 56 Josephus AJ 20.204. PIR 2 L 354; Stein 1927, 1559–1560, no. 11. Josephus makes no mention of it in the account contained in BJ (2.272). 57 Cf. Josephus, AJ 20.131. 58 Josephus calls them bandits (οἱ λῃσταὶ), like other groups opposing the existing order, cf. BJ 2.254–257, 262; AJ 20.162–166, 172, 185–188. For more on the Sicarii’s ideology and methods of action see Zeitlin 1962, 395– 398; Smith 1971, 1–19; Horsley 1979, 436–453; Rappaport 2011, 323–342.

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people also fell victim to these feuds. In spite of the large scale of this phenomenon, corrupt representatives of the authorities permitted these practices.59 The last mention of the activity of troops stationed in Judaea comes from the period when Gessius Florus held the office of procurator of Judaea. It concerns incidents which took place several months before the outbreak of the uprising against Rome. This dramatic chain of events began when 17 talents were removed from the Temple treasury on the orders of Florus. The Jews’ opposition to this deed and Florus’ fierce reaction and obdurate attitude towards efforts to end the conflict resulted in the Roman soldiers sacking a large part of the city and murdering many of its residents, including women and children.60 These events were the backdrop for the aforementioned attempt to persuade Cestius Gallus to send Syrian units in Judaea to intervene. Reading these passages from Josephus’ works which describe the cases when units of the Roman army were used in Judaea, we can see that the author selected the situations according to a certain pattern. This is especially visible when we place all the examples in chronological order, and at the same time look at the nature of the events he describes. A certain regularity can be recognised: the protagonists are those Roman officials whose corruption and other negative characteristics prevented them from serving the stabilisation of Roman-Jewish relations. By presenting the events associated with these figures episodically, ignoring the wider background, we can see that the author was acting deliberately.61 Despite their selective nature, all the described cases of military activity of Roman units in Judaea form a certain unity. This can lead us to drawing more detailed conclusions. There is no doubt that it was rare for the Roman units stationed in Syria to appear in Judaea. These exceptional circumstances occurred when the emperor ordered the governor of Syria to carry out tasks that were significant for the interests of the ruler (as with the census entrusted to Quirinius) or on this governor’s own initiative when there was a threat of unrest that would endanger the stability of the whole region.62 This could also occur on request of the prefect/procurator administering Judaea.63 He would request armed intervention from the governor of Syria if he deemed the forces at his disposal insufficient to maintain order in the province owing to the scale of the social unrest there or expected in the near future. It was probably such events that Cuspius Fadus feared would result from his decision to take over care of the high priests’ liturgical vestments. It was also the prospect of such unrest that led Gessius Florus to request military support from Cestius Gallus. There is no doubt 59 Cf. Josephus, BJ 2.272–276; AJ 20.160–166, 205–210, 213–214. 60 Josephus, BJ 2.293–308. 61 Cf. Eck 2011, 53–65; 2014, 173–182. 62 Cf. Josephus AJ 20.7. 63 See Eck 2011, 50–53; 2014, 168–173.

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that, barring a few cases of direct instructions from the ruling emperor, it was exclusively the governor of Syria who decided to make use of the Syrian units in Judaea, on the basis of verified and credible information which he received from the prefect/ procurator of Judaea or other credible sources. However, the decision to deploy the units stationed in Judaea was entirely in the hands of the imperial officials who administered the province. This entitlement was an integral part of their mandate of authority and was a guarantee of the effectiveness of their actions. Yet it was often abused for their personal benefit. The main task of the units based in Judaea was to ensure peace throughout the province and the safety of the representative of Roman power. The procurators/prefects were based in Caesarea Maritima, which was why this city was the main operational base of the units under their command, which usually participated in the military actions they undertook. Other units stationed in Judaea only took part in larger-scale operations.64 It is important to note the lack of information about any participation in military actions in Judaea by soldiers based in Jerusalem. The Roman units were mainly engaged in order-keeping and policing operations. Apart from keeping the peace in Caesarea and Jerusalem, they were also used by the prefects/procurators for varying degrees of fighting with the robbery and banditry that plagued Judaea as well as the religious groups that the Roman administration saw as a real threat to the existing political and social order. There is no doubt that the specific character of Judaean society and its religious aspects, along with the way in which the Roman administration functioned there, contributed to the increased number of conflicts solved by military means. But these should not be viewed as a phenomenon unique to this area. For this reason, the account provided by Josephus in relation to the deployment of Roman military units in Judaea is useful in reconstructing a picture of the way in which the Roman army operated in peacetime, its role in maintaining order in the provinces of the Roman Empire and the mechanisms of the origins of pathology of power resulting from corrupt officials using the army for their personal aggrandisement.

64 Cf. Josephus, AJ 20.121.

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The “Camp of the Assyrians” and the Third Wall of Jerusalem1

The historical works of Josephus, though not the only source of our knowledge of the topography of Jerusalem until its destruction in 70 CE, are certainly the most valuable. The importance of the information provided by the historian is all the greater as he had an excellent knowledge of Jerusalem from personal experience, having spent much of his life in the city. Despite the frequency with which we refer to his works in reconstructing a picture of the city, it is not always possible to place many of the toponyms, characteristic places and buildings which he mentions with any accuracy. These difficulties are the cause of incessant disagreements between scholars which often highlight various weaknesses in Josephus’ account. These include excessive vagueness, occasional lack of credibility of the statistical data and dimensions of the sites he describes, or lack of the requisite care in providing significant topographical details associated with the places in which the events he describes were played out. The liberties Josephus takes in describing the city were natural for somebody who knew Jerusalem’s topography very well and was addressing his work to contemporaries with a similarly good knowledge of how it had looked before the destruction. For later generations of readers, on the other hand, much effort is required to reconstruct this picture. Since the beginning of the first systematic archaeological excavations in Jerusalem in the 19th century, along with studies on the city’s historical topography, it has been possible to clear up a number of ambiguities and inaccuracies in Josephus’ works. Still, though, the identification and location of many places and buildings that he refers to continue to be unknown or controversial. The toponyms still to be located on the map include the “Camp of the Assyrians,” which Josephus mentions in the context of the Siege of Jerusalem in 70 CE on two occasions in the Jewish War (BJ 5.303; 504). The context in which this name appears suggests that owing to its convenient location, the area identified as the “Camp of the Assyrians” gave the Roman command full control over the course of the battles waged on the line of the Second Wall, stoutly defended by the Jewish rebels, and at the walls of the Antonia fortress. Despite the strategic importance of the “Camp of the Assyrians” during the siege of Jerusalem in 70 CE, scholars debating various details of the course of the fighting have never made a serious effort to locate this site. In general, they place it as they see

* 

The ‘Camp of the Assyrians” and the Third Wall of Jerusalem, Scripta Judaica Cracoviensia 13, 2015, 19–30.

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fit.1 I would argue that its location is important both for correcting certain aspects of the picture of the battles at the walls of Jerusalem, and for solving important problems concerning the history and topography of the area to the north of today’s line of the walls of Jerusalem’s Old City, especially the question of the course of the Third Wall, the erection of which is attributed to King Agrippa I.2 The toponym “Camp of the Assyrians” used by Josephus does not appear in any other source. This seems to suggest that it was known only to the residents of Jerusalem, referring to an event that had taken place in the distant past. The name itself sounds as if it referred to an extensive area. The only event that can be linked to this name was the siege of Jerusalem during the rule of Sennacherib, mentioned in the Books of Kings (2 Kings 18: 17–19: 36), Chronicles (2 Chr 32: 1–21), and Isaiah (36: 2–37: 38). These sources, unfortunately, contain no indication of the place where the camp was located.3 With the shape of the terrain around Jerusalem in mind, as well as examples of other sieges in later eras, we can only assume that it was probably situated to the northern side of the city, where the comparatively flat land offered good conditions for setting up camp not too far from the walls of Jerusalem. If we acknowledge that “Camp of the Assyrians” was a toponym known to the inhabitants of Jerusalem contemporary with Josephus, the aim of its use in the description of events was probably to maintain the narrative’s clarity, as well as avoiding the need to introduce any further topographical explanations. In order to determine whether this is hypothesis is correct, we need to look more closely at those passages of Bellum Judaicum in which Josephus refers to the “Camp of the Assyrians.” I shall quote these here in order to make the subsequent discussion clearer. The first mention appears in connection with Titus’ decision to move his quarters to the area of the “Camp of the Assyrians” after the Romans had taken the Third Wall. The Romans having thus on the fifteenth day (of the siege), being the seventh of the month Artemisius, become masters of the first wall, razed a large part of it along with the northern

1

According to M. Avi-Yonah (1968, 113), M. Kenyon located “the Camp of the Assyrians” “within the presentday Old City.” Avi-Yonah himself (1968, 113, note 89) suggested that it “would be about where the Russian Compound is at present.” Other proposals are: Ussishkin 1979, 139 (the Northwest Hill); Price 1992, 132–133 (the northwest corner of the city); Ussishkin 1995, 292; 2014 (the Northeast Hill); Kokkinos 2015, 99* (“This [i.e. Camp of the Assyrians] occupied the area from the Third Wall to the Kedron [tower] (…) or, in other words, beginning from above the Royal Caverns (…) and extending a part of northern Bethesda some way towards the eastern line of the Third Wall by the Kedron Valley (…)”). 2 Cf. Josephus, BJ 2.218–219; 5.152–155; AJ 19.326–327. Scholars frequently differ in their opinions as to what part of this wall was built during his rule and what part after his death, as well as whether it was Agrippa I who built it, or somebody else should be credited. Josephus himself is to blame for these discrepancies, as in each case when he mentions the construction of the wall by this king in his works, he gives a different version of the circumstances and a different date. 3 See Ussishkin 1979, 139–142; 1995, 290–292; 2014, 95–96.

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quarter of the city, previously destroyed by Cestius. Titus now shifted his camp within the first wall to the so-called Camp of the Assyrians, occupying all the ground between it and the Kedron, but keeping far enough back to be out of bowshot from the second wall, which he forthwith proceeded to attack (BJ 5.302–303; tr. H. St. J. Thackeray).4

The second appears in the description of the course of the circumvallation, or earthen rampart built by the Romans to encircling Jerusalem. According to Josephus, this fortification started and finished in the “Camp of the Assyrians:” Beginning at the camp of the Assyrians – the site of his own encampment – he directed the wall towards the lower region of the New Town and thence across the Kedron to the Mount of Olives (….) (BJ 5.504; tr. H. St. J. Thackeray).5

Titus’ attack, which led to breaking of the first insurgent line of defense of Jerusalem, probably took place close to the Psephinus Tower, from the western side.6 It also allowed the city gate to be opened from the northern side, and as a result enabled the remainder of the onrushing units to quickly pass through and immediately begin cleansing the area (BJ 5.301–302). The first wall that Josephus mentions, seen from the side of the attacking Romans, is identified as the Third Wall seen from the city side. This means that the new Roman camp found itself in the area between the Third and the Second Wall, i.e. in the part of the city which we otherwise know to have been called the New City or Bezetha (cf. BJ 5.149–152), and which in 66 CE was the target of the intervening attack on the governor of Syria, G. Cestius Gallus (BJ 2.527–530), in Jerusalem at the time. This account makes it clear that the term “Camp of the Assyrians” did not refer to the whole area. The name might therefore have been used only to refer to the western part of the area between the walls, which undoubtedly also confirms the contents of the second reference. Yet stating that the area known as the “Camp of the Assyrians” should be placed to the north-west of the Second Wall by no means brings us any closer to its actual location. It would be possible to determine this only if we were to definitively solve the problem of the course of the Third Wall. This problem presented itself in 1838, when Edward Robinson discovered a section of the reinforcements lying north of the western line of the present-day walls of Jerusalem’s Old City (and probably constituting an extension of 4

῾Ρωμαῖοι μὲν οὕτω τοῦ πρώτου τείχουϛ πεντεκαιδεκάτῃ κρατήσαντεϛ ἡμέρᾳ, ἑβδόμη δὲ ἦν Ἀρτεμισίου μηνός, αὐτοῦ τε πολὺ κατασκάπτουσι καὶ τὰ προσάρκτια τῆς πόλεωϛ ἃ καὶ πρότερον Κέστιος. Μεταστραοπεδεύεται δὲ Τίτος εἴσω κατὰ τὴν Ἀσσυρίων παρεμβολὴν καλουμένην, ἐπισχὼν πᾱν τὸ μεταξὺ μέχρι τοῡ Κεδρῶνος, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῡ δευτέρου τείχους ὅσον ἐξωτέρω βέλους εἶναι. προσβολὰς δ᾽εὐϑέως ἐποιεῑτο. 5 ἀρξάμενος δ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀσσυρίων παρεμβολῆς, καθ᾽ ἣν αὐτὸς ἐστρατοπεδεύσατο, ἐπὶ τὴν κατωτέρω Καινόπολιν ἦγε τὸ τεχοῑς, ἔνϑεν διὰ τοῡ Κεδρῶνος ἐπὶ τὸ Ἐλαιῶν ὄρος. 6 For archaeological evidence, see Avner, Arbiv 2016, 83–94.

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them) and called them a remnant of the Third Wall.7 The debate on the path of this wall grew in intensity many years later, following the archaeological excavations of E. L. Sukienik and L. A. Mayer in 1925–19278 and 1940.9 These led to the discovery of further sections of the same defensive wall of a combined length of around 500 meters, extending over a space of 750 meters and located practically parallel, approximately 400–450 meters away, to the present Turkish northern walls of the Old City. Its discoverers dated the wall to the end of the 60s CE, stressing that its foundations were from much earlier.10 Later archaeological work along the line of this wall not only corroborated their findings as to the time when it was built, but also made it possible to discover new sections and unknown elements of its construction.11 Essentially, the debate comes down to either accepting the argument that the remains are part of the Third Wall, or insisting that the course of the latter wall basically coincided with the line of the present northern wall of Jerusalem, which dates back to Ottoman times. Since the early 1990s, the vast majority of scholars expressing an opinion on this question are in no doubt that the remains of fortifications discovered by Robinson as well as Sukienik and Mayer are part of the Third Wall.12 Yet there is still no shortage of scholars questioning this opinion.13 For the proponents of both these views, the main point of reference is Josephus’ description of the Third Wall. To obtain a better understanding of the arguments made by both sides it is necessary to refer to the passages from this description containing significant topographical information: The third [wall] began at the tower Hippicus, whence it stretched northwards to the tower Psephinus, and then descending opposite the monuments of Helena (queen of Adiabene and daughter of king Izates), and proceeding past the royal caverns it bent round a corner tower over against the so-called Fuller’s tomb joining the ancient rampart terminated at the valley called Kedron. This wall was built by Agrippa to enclose the latter additions to the city, which were quite unprotected; (. . .) (BJ 5.147–148; tr. H. St. J. Thackeray).14

7 8 9 10 11

Hamrick 1981, 262; cf. Paton 1905, 196–211; Ariel, Baruch, Zilberbod 2014, 156. Sukienik, Mayer 1930. Sukienik, Mayer 1944, 145–151. Sukienik, Mayer 1930, 56. Kenyon 1966, 87–88; Hamrick 1966, 19–26; Ben-Arieh, Netzer 1974, 97–107; Ben-Arieh 1976, 60–62; Hamrick 1985, 217–222; Tzaferis, Feig, Onn, Shukron 2000, 287–288. For a detailed description of all discovered sections of this fortification see: Sukienik, Mayer 1930, 13–35; Ben-Arieh, Netzer 1974, 98–102; Hamrick 1966, 21–24; 1985, 217–219; cf. also Kloner 2001, 105*–107*; Küchler 2007, 978–985. 12 Ben-Arieh, Netzer 1974, 106–107. 13 Cf. Kokkinos 2015, 95*–96*. 14 τῳ τρίτῳ δ᾽ἀρχὴ ἦν ὁ Ἱππικὸς πύργος, ὅϑεν μέχρι τοῡ βορείου κλίματος κατατεῑνον ἐπὶ τὸν Ψήφινον πύργον, ἔπειτα καϑῆκον ἀντικρὺ τῶν Ἑλένης μνημείων, Ἀδιαβηνὴ βασιλὶς ἦν αὕτη Ἰζάτου βασιλέως ϑυγάτηρ, καὶ διὰ σπηλαίων βασιλικῶν μηκυνόμενον ἐκάμπτετο μὲν γωνιαίῳ πύργῳ κατὰ τὸ Γναφέως προσαγορευόμενον μνῆμα,

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Although this passage does not contain any mention of a gate in the wall, Josephus confirms the existence of one elsewhere. It was situated next to the “Women’s Towers,” with the main road from Jerusalem northward leading through it (cf. BJ 5.54– 55).15 The gate was well fortified by the insurgents16 and played an important role in the defense of the city (BJ 5.55–66, 109–119). Titus almost died in its vicinity when the unit he was leading, carrying out a reconnaissance of the Third Wall’s fortifications, was lured into a trap by the rebels (BJ 5.55–66). Key factors in this debate are the distance of the discovered fortifications from the Old City and the location of the Psephinus Tower and the “royal caverns.” One argument frequently cited against recognizing these fortifications as the Third Wall is the large distance between them and the present-day walls of the Old City. If, as Josephus suggests and archaeological data confirms,17 the area of the New City was not densely populated, according to critics of this identification it would not have made much strategic sense for Agrippa I to build defensive walls at such a distance from the city. They therefore argue that the line of the Third Wall more or less coincided with the course of the present northern walls of Jerusalem, and that the “royal caverns” mentioned by Josephus were quarries found beneath the Old City.18 Taking these elements of the current topography of the city as a reference point, these scholars sought to identify the fortifications variously with the remnants of the circumvallation built by Roman soldiers during the siege of Jerusalem, the so-called fourth wall, intended as a barrier built by the insurgents to protect Jerusalem from the north,

15 16 17 18

τῷ δ᾽ἀρχαίῳ περιβόλῳ συνάντον εἰς τὴν Κεδρῶνα καλουμένην φάραγγα κατέληγεν. Τοῡτο τῇ προσκτισϑείσῃ πόλει περιέϑηκεν Ἀγρίππας, ᾕπερ ἦν πᾱσα γυμνή. N. Kokkinos (2015, 97*) identifies this gate as the present Damascus Gate. This is confirmed by archaeological excavations carried out by this gate, which provide archaeologists with evidence of the work the rebels did to fortify the city: Sukienik, Mayer 1944, 148–151. Cf. Tzaferis, Feig, Onn, Shukron 2000, 287; Geva 1993c, 745–746; 2011, 301–309. The problem of the identification of these “royal caverns” is connected to the unspecified character of the name used by Josephus, as well as the suggestion of their identification with King Solomon’s Quarries, also known as the Cave of Zedekiah (cf. Kokkinos 2015, 96*–97*). This opinion is not shared by all scholars; cf. Ross 1942, 77–78. According to A. Kloner (1986, 126–129), who is in favor of identifying the fortifications as the remains of the Third Wall, the “royal caverns” should be identified as graves hewn in a rock found by Nablus Road in land belonging to the École Biblique, although again this may be doubted owing to the distance between these graves and the fortification lines. The results of archaeological works conducted in the last two decades in the immediate and further vicinity of the wall and the remains of quarries that they unearthed in many places, from which the material for building it was taken, together with numerous graves and caves hewn nearby, justify another hypothesis still: the name “the royal caverns” used by Josephus refers neither to any of the topographical points previously known to us, with which attempts were made to link them, nor to specific royal graves, but perhaps instead to expansive quarries discovered by archaeologists with numerous burial graves hewn in rocks from Herodian times (cf. Ben-Arieh, Netzer 1974, 97–98; Kloner 2001, 82*–87*, no. 241–261). Their name may be connected not to royal burial grounds, but rather to King Agrippa I, as it was during his rule that these quarries began to be utilized intensively in connection with work on the fortifications. Data obtained during the excavations tells us that they also functioned for a long time afterwards. [See Avni 2005, 386–390].

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part of the fortifications of the camp of legion X Fretensis, and earthworks built at the time of the Bar-Kokhba revolt.19 It has also been argued that there is no historical context permitting an understanding of the function of the find.20 The description of the battles at the wall furthest removed to the north of Jerusalem, which Josephus calls the first one, mentions something that has not been used in the discussion on its identification with the Third Wall or with today’s northern wall of the Old City. Josephus notes the considerable distance of the wall from the city and the fact that the long battle had sapped the energy of its defenders and discouraged them from continuing their resistance, which they saw as useless as there were another two walls behind them (BJ 5.299–300). If we accept the hypothesis that the line of the Third Wall constituted the line of the northern walls of the Old City, that would not justify the defeatist approach of some of its defenders, if behind them, in full view, was the Second Wall. The existence of the Third Wall on the course of today’s northern walls of Jerusalem is also not confirmed by the archaeological excavations near Herod’s Gate and Damascus Gate.21 Archaeologists have been unable to identify any traces of the foundations of this wall there. Neither has any evidence of the existence of the Psephinus Tower been found nearby Tancred’s Tower, which was located in the place where the Collège des Frères can currently be found. The remains discovered there date from much later historical eras.22 Describing Titus’ preparations for the attack on Jerusalem, Josephus mentions that after carrying out a reconnaissance of the area and preparing the terrain, he transferred the joint camp of legions XII Fulminata and XV Apollinaris and the auxiliary units active with them to the vicinity of the Psephinus Tower, locating it at a distance of two stadia from the tower. From the western side, at the level of the Hippicus Tower and at a similar distance from the walls of Jerusalem, was the camp of legion 19 On the history of research on this wall, the proposed interpretations of its function and scholars’ opinions on the time of its erection, see Paton 1905, 196–211; Sukenik, Mayer 1930, 7–12; Ross 1942, 75–81; Kenyon 1966, 87–88; Avi-Yonah 1968, 98–122; Hamrick 1968, 23–25; 1977, 21–22; Ben-Arieh, Netzer 1979, 140–141; McNulty 1979, 141–144; Schmitt 1981, 153–170; Hamrick 1981, 262–266; 1985, 215–216, 223–232; Margalit 1990, 31–32; Price 1992, 290–292; Geva 1993b, 744–745; Wightman 1993, 159–181; Bieberstein, Bloedhorn 1994, I: 115–116, 125–127; Magness 2000, 328–329; Küchler 2007, 978–985; Galor, Bloedhorn 2013, 71–74. 20 This isolated position is represented by Kokkinos 2015, 96*: “The notorious ‘Mayer and Sukienik wall,’ as often called, is a wall with a historical context totally unknown to us.” 21 This conclusion is supported by archaeological and numismatic material allowing us to date the building of the wall running along the line of the present northern wall of the Old Town to at the earliest the late 3rd/early 4th centuries CE: Hamilton 1940, 19–20, 35, 52–53; Magness 2000, 330, 335–336. Another important piece of evidence showing that at the time there were no defense walls in the place of the present northern walls of the Old City is the lack of archaeological evidence of their presence in the segments either to the east or to the west of the Damascus Gate: Hamilton 1940, 35, 52–53; Kloner 1986, 124–126; Baruch, Avni, Parnos 2008, 1819–1820; Bahat 2008, 1821–1822. 22 Cf. Ross 1942, 71; Avi-Yonah 1968, 103–105. N. Kokkinos 2015, 96* disagrees, regarding them as relicts from this tower.

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V Macedonica (BJ 5.133–134). One can assume that this distance was justified by the range of some of the Roman siege engines of the time, held by the rebels.23 Irrespective of whether the insurgents had the means to make use of their technical possibilities, this distance ensured the safety of the soldiers billeted in these camps. It also created a wide strip of land between the warring sides, allowing any unexpected sorties on Roman positions from the rebel units to be quelled. After securing the external wall, Titus again moved the camp of his units, this time to the area of the “Camp of the Assyrians” (BJ 5.303). This decision must have been dictated by particular strategic concerns, as any change in the position of the camp was a major logistical operation whose successful completion required time and a huge amount of work connected with transferring a large number of people and a mass of military equipment as well as building the entire camp infrastructure from scratch, from fortifications to quarters for several thousand soldiers. Such a move could be justified only by a significant change in the situation on the battlefield, i.e. a shift in the frontline making it hard for Titus to command effectively and to efficiently lead the siege of the city from the previous position. This happened only when the Third Wall was conquered, and so it must indeed have been far removed from the line of the Second Wall. If we take into account the distance of 400–450 meters that divides the line of the fortifications discovered by archaeologists from the current northern walls of Jerusalem, and add to this the two stadia, that is 370–390 meters, that divided the Psephinus tower from the then Roman camp, we get a total distance of over 800 meters. This would make Titus’ decision to move the camp nearer to the city fully understandable. If we accept that the Psephinus tower was indeed located in the north-western corner of the Old Town, then its conquest together with the line of the Third Wall must rightly have led to doubts as to the wisdom of the Roman leader’s decision. In this case, his units would be separated from the line of the Second Wall by a strip of land measuring between 250 and 400 meters in width.24 It is doubtful that a new camp could have been made in this space in a way that would offer Titus and his men the necessary security. At the same time, it is unlikely that Titus would have abandoned the caution employed previously in setting up a new camp. The intensive nature and changing situation on the front line of the battle for the Second Wall, with unexpected rebel sorties, showed that safeguarding his army’s positions was a priority for the Roman commander, making Josephus’ rhetorical assertion (BJ 5.303) that he chose to make a camp in the immediate vicinity of the Second Wall rather 23 Cf. BJ 5. 269–270. 24 This width is purely hypothetical, as we do not know what the course of the Second Wall was. It may in fact have been smaller, depending on which hypothesis regarding the course of the Second Wall we view as being the most probable.

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improbable.25 Assuming that the Third Wall could indeed be found in the place of the present northern walls of the Old City, we can state unequivocally that owing to the topographical realities there is no way that Titus’ new camp could have been located in the area between the Second and the Third Wall. In considering where the “Camp of the Assyrians” was located, it is also important to think about the size of the camp that Titus had to set up there. Josephus makes several mentions of Roman camps around Jerusalem. These references are in particular to the camps of legions scattered around the city. When speaking of Titus’ camp, however, he means the camp housing his billets, at least two legions and auxiliary units working with them. Finding quarters for such large forces required a suitably extensive area. Since archaeologists have examined dozens of Roman camps of various sorts – of legions as well as auxiliary units – providing us with reliable data on their size, construction and the layout of the internal construction, we are able to determine the dimensions of Titus’ camp. The question of the size of the camp where Titus’ quarters were housed should be considered against the background of similar Roman military installations known to us elsewhere in the Roman Empire. It does not matter much whether these were permanent camps – fortresses – or temporary camps built on a short-term basis for the duration of a campaign. Regardless of whether a soldier was staying in a camp or fighting outside of it at a given moment, he had a guaranteed place there. Even if the infrastructure of temporary camps might sometimes not meet the same standards as those of fortresses, it was certainly always put in place, as it was difficult to foresee how long the camp would be in operation. Excellent examples of the remnants of temporary camps are provided by the Roman military installations at Masada26 and Machaerus.27 These are of inestimable importance, as we can base on them our ideas of how the fortifications that the Romans built around Jerusalem might have looked. An analysis of the dimensions of the legionary camps that we know of suggests that their average size was 18.5–20 ha.28 With Titus’ camp in Jerusalem, however, we are looking at a site where two legions were quartered, along with an unknown 25 26 27 28

Cf. Kokkinos 2015, 99*. Davies 2011, 65–82. Strobel 1974, 128–184. By way of an example, let us cite the dimensions and area of several legionary camps from various parts of the Roman Empire from the 1st and early 2nd centuries CE: the camp of legion XIII Gemina at Apulum, ?470 × 470 m; approx. 22 ha; the first camp of legion II Adiutrix at Aquincum, 460 × 430 m, approx. 19.80 ha; the camp of legions XV Apollinaris and X Gemina at Carnuntum, 490 × 334/391 m, approx. 16.5/approx. 18.2; the camp of legion XI Claudia at Durostorum, 410 × 520 m, 21.3 ha; the camp of legion IV Flavia at Sarmizegetusa, 546 × 600 m, 32.8 ha; the camp of legion IV Flavia at Singidunum, 560 × 330 m, approx. 18.5 ha; the camp of legion VII Claudia at Viminacium, 443 × 386 m, approx. 17.1 ha (Wilkes 2000, 114–116); the camp of legion III Cyrenaica at Bostra, 440 × 350 m, approx. 16.5 ha (Lenoir 2002, 176; cf. Parker 2000, 124: 463 × 363 m, 16.8 ha); the camp of legion XVI Flavia Firma at Satala, approx. 470 × 350 m, 16.5 ha (Parker 2000, 123).

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number of soldiers sent by vassal rulers and Roman auxiliary units. We can rule out a situation in which the allied units and auxilia were all placed in one common camp, as such a concentration would make little tactical sense. When the decision to build the circumvallation was made, most auxiliary units were quartered around the city, in positions between the legions’ camps (cf. BJ 5.510). Only units supplied by rulers allied with Rome could, for various reasons, stay in the main camp of the Roman commander. Bearing in mind the medium size of the Roman legionary camp, we are justified in assuming that to quarter both legions and the accompanying allied units Titus would have needed an area of at least around 50 ha. If we then take into account the aforementioned issue of security, requiring that a certain distance be maintained between the camp and the line of the Second Wall, and the size of the area between the Second and Third Walls (assuming that the latter corresponds to the course of the Turkish walls) available to Titus, we can see that it would have been simply impossible to billet his army there, even if it had been spread across all the way from the north-western corner of the Old City to the Kidron Valley. There is one more reason why it is hard to accept the hypothesis of the dislocation of the Roman units in this area. Josephus’ description of the course of the Second Wall is so general that any efforts to reconstruct it are only suppositions, of varying degrees of probability, which it is extremely difficult to verify.29 Not only do they lack any significant topographical elements, but they also fail to mention whether it had any gate apart from the towers.30 This information is of huge importance as the lack of a gate in the Second Wall would have made communication between the old quarters of Jerusalem and the New City as well as access to the road heading north from Jerusalem towards Damascus impossible. Since there is no doubt that such a gate must have existed, it remains to be considered where it may have been located – which is indirectly also significant for the location of Titus’ camp in the area of the “Camp of the Assyrians.” Despite the lack of any written mentions of the location of the gate in the Second Wall, archaeological data is available that is worth some attention. The excavations carried out at the Damascus Gate by R. W. Hamilton in 1937–1938 and under the direction of C. M. Bennett in 1964–1966 provided evidence that allows us to date its origin at least to the rule of Hadrian.31 The next phase of these excavations, conducted in 1979–1984 by Menahem Magen, demonstrated that the Roman gate was raised 29 Cf. Ross 1942, 72–75; Avi-Yonah 1968, 123–125; 1971, 169; Margalit 1990, 30–31; Price 1992, 292; Wightman 1993, 181–184; Geva 1993a, 736; Kokkinos 2015, 88*–90* and 81*, fig. 2. 30 The context in which Josephus (5.336: ἄλλοι δ’ἔξω τοῡ τείχους κατὰ τὰς ἄνω προπηδήσαντες πύλας) mentions the upper gates in the Second Wall suggests that he is not referring to a large gate, as G. J. Wightman (1993, 182) and N. Kokkinos (2015, 89*) believe, but rather an element of the construction of this embankment. 31 Hamilton 1940, 19, 21–23; Hamrick 1968, 22; Hennessy 1970, 24; Wightman 1993, 167–173; Magen 2000, 286; cf. Kloner 1986, 125–126.

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on the foundations of an earlier one, from Herodian times, that is from the period from the rule of Herod to the death of Agrippa I.32 This discovery is extremely important as most scholars cite the results of the earlier excavations and argue that the Roman gate was the first such construction built from materials used in Herodian buildings.33 Only some believe that the unearthed Herodian remains belong to the gate of the Second Wall and take its position into account in their proposed reconstructions of its course.34 I would suggest that the location of this gate in the place of the present Damascus Gate is supported by the fact that it is close to the Women’s Towers in the Third Wall, since both these gates would be joined by the same road heading northwards from Jerusalem, whose course continues to coincide partially with today’s Nablus Road. In selecting a place for the gate, the builders of the Third Wall must have borne in mind the course of this road, which had long been in use, and made the section of it between the two walls a communications axis linking the fortifications of the Old and New Cities. By recognizing the Damascus Gate as a constituent part of the Second Wall, we can state that the southern edge of Titus’ camp was north of the line of the current walls. A common feature of the sieges of Masada, Machaerus and Jerusalem was the circumvallation built by the Roman soldiers around each of these points of resistance. This was designed to prevent the defenders from escaping, and at the same time prevent support arriving from outside. This feature of the Roman fortifications is worthy of attention, as in the case of Jerusalem we know of it only from the rather imprecise description given by Josephus (BJ 5.503–508). Owing to the lack of agreement among scholars as to where some of the topographical points mentioned in this account may have been, there are many disparities in the proposed reconstructions of the course of the circumvallation outside Jerusalem. One factor that must be considered when establishing its likely course is the location of the Roman camps. With the sieges of Masada and Machaerus, the camps of participating units were located either on the line of the circumvallation itself, with one of their sides being an integral part of it, 32 Most elements of the earlier gate construction were preserved in the lower part of the towers that flanked it; cf. Magen 2000, 283–284, 286. According to J. Magness (2000, 333–335), the Romans erected not a gate, but a free-standing triumphal arch in honor of Hadrian, founder of Aelia Capitolina, which was transformed into a gate only in the late 3rd/early 4th centuries CE, when the fortification system was built on the line of the current northern wall of the Old City. Nevertheless, this conclusion is not supported by the content of the fragmentarily preserved Roman inscription on the Damascus Gate. This shows that the building was erected on the basis of a decree of the authorities of the Aelia Capitolina. Moreover, it is highly likely that the block on which the inscription is carved was placed inside the pre-existing construction of the gate (arch) later: Corpus Inscriptionum Iudaeae/Palestinae, vol. 1: Jerusalem, Berlin – Boston 2012, 30–31, no. 728 (comm. ad loc. by W. Eck). 33 Cf. Hamilton 1940, 19; Avi-Yonah 1968, 122–123; Hamrick 1966, 22–23; 1977, 20; Kloner 1986, 125–126; Wightman 1993, 169–173; Geva 1993d, 761. 34 Cf. Ross 1942, 74; Avi-Yonah 1968, 124–125.

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or at a certain distance behind this line. The ramparts themselves were built at a considerable distance from the places under siege.35 In the case of Jerusalem, it is certain that the part of the fortifications of the camp located in the “Camp of the Assyrians” was made part of the structure of the circumvallation,36 which is one more piece of evidence showing that Titus’ camp must have been located at some distance from the line of the present northern walls of Jerusalem.37 Since the size of Titus’ camp excludes the possibility of it having been located within the present Old City walls, it must have been situated in appropriately more extensive terrain. Here we should mention Josephus’ mention of demolitions carried out by Roman soldiers in the area of the New City immediately after controlling it (BJ 5.302). One of the objectives of these actions was without doubt to destroy all the existing buildings that might have offered cover or shelter for launching unexpected attacks on the Roman units. But more important in these systematic demolitions and the levelling of the terrain that came with them was the preparation of the land for a new camp.38 The same process was followed each time the Roman camps were moved at the walls of Jerusalem. The area of the New City to the north of the Second Wall is the only area in which there was sufficient space to set up a camp. In order to safeguard the soldiers stationed there, at least some sections of the Third Wall might have been used, especially those that surrounded the New City from the east and north.39 Bearing in mind the shape of the terrain of the New City east of the Nablus Road line, where rocky elevations are now situated,40 it is more probably that 35 The width of the strip of land between the circumvallation and the besieged fortresses was in the case of Masada and Machaerus determined by terrain conditions, which prevented Roman units from getting too close to the positions occupied by the insurgents. 36 We can assume that although Josephus does not refer to this explicitly, a section of these ramparts must also have run in the proximity of the camp of legio V Macedonica. 37 According to Josephus, it took just three days to build the embankment (BJ 5.509). But his assertion that the sole cause of this speed was the soldiers’ fervor seems rather dubious (BJ 5.502–503). Without underestimating the significance of this factor, we must assume that the decision to build an embankment must have been preceded by collection of the necessary amount of the appropriate building materials, especially as adequate quantities of some of them, e.g. wood, could not be found near Jerusalem. For the circumvallation around Masada and Machaerus, stone was used, large amounts of which were readily available. However, in both cases much work, and no doubt also time, was needed to collect sufficient quantities of it. The preparations for building the circumvallation around Jerusalem may have begun as soon as the idea of building it was first considered among Titus’ men; cf. BJ 5.491–501. 38 These operations were so painstaking that they resulted in the removal of almost all traces of previous human activity. It is very likely that this is why archeologists have been unable to find very many relics dating from the period before the siege of Jerusalem in the New City (Hamrick 1981, 265 offers a different interpretation of this fact). 39 Cf. Ariel, Baruch, Zilberbod 2014, 152–156, 159. 40 However, the terrain was not an obstacle in setting up a camp of one of the auxiliary units here when the circumvallation was built; cf. BJ 5.510. Its presence was justified by the strategic position of this area opposite Antonia. The Romans may also have used part of the eastern section of the Third Wall as an element of the camp’s reinforcements.

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Titus had his quarters and the legionary camps located rather on the western side of this road, in the area of the valley contained approximately within today’s streets Shivtei Yisra’el and Derekh Shkhem (the Nablus Road).41 This valley is sufficiently vast, and the gentle slopes of the surrounding hills would have been perfectly suited to setting up a large camp there. In addition, it was very close to the front of the battles at the walls of Jerusalem – so close that the besieged rebels could observe the Roman soldiers’ camp life from the heights of the First Wall and Temple Mount (BJ 5.348–352). Owing to the proximity of Titus’ camp to the city, we can assume that it was this valley that Jerusalem’s inhabitants called the “Camp of the Assyrians.” The conclusions that this discussion allows us to make confirm that scholars who on the basis of interpretation of the archaeological data identify the Third Wall, which we know from the work of Josephus, with the line of the discovered fortifications, are correct to do so. An analysis of the description of Titus’ activities at Jerusalem not only provides further arguments to corroborate this interpretation, but also means that we can look at them from another point of view than that which has previously been widely accepted. We can therefore have more confidence in pinpointing the location of the quarters of the Roman commander outside of Jerusalem in the decisive phase of its siege and identifying one of the important points of the city’s topography.

41 The area needed for the camp on the east-west axis probably went beyond the western line of the Third Wall. Presumably, a large section of it on this side might have been destroyed during the fighting, and the process of its further demolition might have been accelerated when Titus decided to move the camp to the area of the New City.

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The Bellum Commagenicum and the ornamenta triumphalia of M. Ulpius Traianus The person of M. Ulpius Traianus, the Elder, who was the emperor Trajan’s father, is not without reason a continuing object of scholars’ interest, as he played an important role in the seizure of power by Vespasian and later belonged to the circle of the emperor’s close collaborators. However, it is not the course of his career that is of interest to us here just one episode from it. In the Panegyricus by Pliny the Younger there are some references or rather allusions to the ornamenta triumphalia he gained while he was the governor of Syria.1 The hints are of such a general nature that they allow us to state only that the occasion arose after his victory over the Parthians. It is difficult to reconstruct the circumstances and establish the date. Apart from Pliny the fact of M. Ulpius Traianus’ receiving the ornamenta triumphalia is confirmed by an inscription found in the excavation of Miletus towards the end of the 19th century.2 However, on this basis it is equally difficult to define accurately the date when this distinction was gained. The reason Pliny did not discuss this issue at length is quite clear if the time and circumstances in which his Panegirycus was delivered are taken into consideration. Pliny delivered it in the senate in AD 100 while taking office as consul; and he addressed it to emperor Trajan, who according to official titular customs prevailing at that time was a son of the divine Nerva. So, it is obvious that the person of the emperor’s father appears in Panegirycus only when the deeds of the ruler were directly connected with him. Echoes of events in which M. Ulpius Traianus figured appear in the works of later Roman writers. Unfortunately, these sketchy accounts contribute little to identification of the circumstances in which the distinctions were gained, or the time when the events took place.3 Scholars studying the history of Vespasian’s rule or the senatorial career of M. Ulpius Traianus are not unanimous in their conclusions. They suggest that it was either AD 75 or AD * 

The Bellum Commagenicum and the ornamenta triumphalia of M. Ulpius Traianus, [in:] E. Dąbrowa (ed.), The Roman and Byzantine Army in the East. Proceedings of a colloquium held at the Jagiellonian University, Kraków in September 1992, Kraków 1994, 19–27.

1 Pliny, Paneg. 9.2; 14.1; 16.1; 58.3; 89.3. 2 ILS 8970. 3 Aur. Victor, de Caes. 9.10; Epit. de Caes. 9.12; Suda, s.v. ἐπικλημα. See also Welles 1938, 398, no. 50 = Bower­ sock 1973, 138.

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76 that M. Ulpius Traianus received the greatest honors and when the conflict with Parthia took place.4 The latter date is more frequently used in earlier accounts, the former in recent works.5 Both of these dates assume that the occasion for his receiving such high distinction arose in AD 75, during the invasion by the Alans of territory of Armenia, which affected Parthia as well. Thanks to historical evidence it is known that, in the face of danger, the Parthian ruler Vologeses I turned for help to Vespasian,6 who refused.7 According to scholars it is that refusal which disappointed the Parthian king, who decided to take action against Rome after the Alans’ withdrawal.8 This opinion requires reexamination. We may look at the time M. Ulpius Traianus gained distinction against Parthia from a different angle, in the light of information about military incidents in the East and about the Syrian legates from the first years of Vespasian’s reign. According to Josephus, the first governor of Syria designated by Vespasian was L. Iunius Caesennius Paetus, in AD 70.9 One of the best known events connected with his presence in this province was the military action against king of Commagene, Antiochus IV, as a result of which his state was annexed by Rome and incorporated into Syria as its administrative unit.10 Chronological data included in the historian’s work place these events in the second half of AD 72.11 The reliability of this date raises no doubts and is confirmed indirectly by other documentary evidence. The official reason why the king of a country in alliance with Rome was unexpectedly attacked was an accusation of secret contacts with Parthia. In the opinion of Josephus this was merely a pretext.12 The tone of his report on the whole course of action against Antiochus IV minimizes its military importance, in particular because Roman units attacking by surprise did not meet any hard resistance. The same interpretation is supported by modern scholars. If the pretext was flimsy the operation itself had been well-prepared.13 It would be very interesting to find out from an eye-witness account about the reaction of the Parthian ruler to the events in Commagene, especially since Vologeses I was indirectly involved 4 5

Cf. Dąbrowa 1981, 203, note 7. Only G. W. Bowersock (1973, 135) has proposed daring it for the year AD 73. The selection of one of these dates (much earlier authors suggested AD 77) depended to a large extent on the state of the evidence connected with his presence in Syria, which the scholars possessed at that time. 6 Suet., Dom. 2.5. 7 Dio 65.15.3. 8 See Dąbrowa 1981, 202–203. In G. W. Bowersock’s (1973, 135) opinion the source of the tension was the Commagene annexion, not the Alans’ invasion. 9 Josephus, BJ 7.58–59. 10 Josephus, BJ 7.219–237. Cf. Fränkel 1895, 301, no. 437; Habicht 1969, 43, no. 21; AE 1929, 98 etc. 11 Josephus, BJ 7.219. 12 Josephus, BJ 7.220–221. 13 Dąbrowa 1981, 199–200.

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in them: two sons of the Commagenian ruler, along with a number of his subjects took shelter on the Parthian territory.14 But it is difficult to find even a single word about it in the historian’s work. In spite of his silence, an answer to this question seems possible.15 In the autumn and winter of AD 72, L. Iunius Caesennius Paetus enjoyed the taste of his victory. The spring of AD 73 did not turn out so happily for him. We can assume that, quite unexpectedly, death prevented him from performing his official duties.16 At the same time, the situation in the East changed rapidly, leaving Rome exposed to a danger no one expected. The source of it was Parthia, which aimed not only to demonstrate its power but to use it as well. The circumstances in which L. Iunius Caesennius Paetus’ successor took office as the legate of Syria allow us to reach that conclusion. In 1902 an inscription was published; it had been found at Sarilar (for. Ayni) near Samosata. It proves that Syrian legate Marius Celsus was there around the middle of the year AD 73.17 His praenomen has not been preserved, and that is why he was mistakenly identified as P. Marius, cos. a. 62.18 The error of this identification stems from the fact that this senator is always mentioned in the sources without any cognomen19. An inscription published only in 1979, which was found in Vynen near Xanten, has enabled us to identify the Syrian legate beyond doubt as A. Marius Celsus, cos. suff. a. 69.20 The same document unexpectedly threw new light upon the incidents in Syria which we have already mentioned. The Vynen inscription, according to its editor, was a part of a monument commemorating the Roman victory over the Batavians.21 The monument was erected while the above-mentioned A. Marius Celsus was the governor of Germania Inferior.22 On the basis of the titles assigned to Vespasian and Titus in the inscription, we can fix the time precisely between April and June that year.23 To compare the dates from the Vynen and Sarilar inscriptions is not only bewildering but extraordinarily dramatic in effect. It is not natural for the governor 14 Josephus, BJ 7.236–237; cf. ILS 9200 = IGLS VI 2796. 15 On the basis of his mention about the fate of Antiochus IV’s sons (Josephus, BJ 7.242–243) we can assume that Josephus was well-informed about the nature of the events that took place in Commagene after it was annexed. We suppose he deliberately made no mention on them. 16 Syme 1981, 133 = Syme 1984, 1383. 17 BCH 26, 1902, 206, no. 61 = AE 1903, 256 = ILS 8903 = IGLS I 66 = French 1994, 41–43, no. 1 18 The first who proposed this identification was V. Chapot (1902, 207–208), the editor of the Sarilar inscription. 19 Eck 1975, 334–335; Houston 1975, 33ff.; Evans 1981, 215, note 2; Syme 1981, 133–134 = Syme 1984, 1383– 1384. 20 Rüger 1979, 196 = AE 1979, 143. 21 Rüger 1979, 189ff. 22 Eck 1985, 137–138. 23 Rüger 1979, 196–197, 200.

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of Germania Inferior to be found suddenly in Syria hundreds of kilometers away only two or three months later. We have a sufficient number of examples to show that in peacetime during the routine shift of governors such haste was not the norm. If for some reason the newly-appointed governor of Syria did not manage to arrive on time in his province, during his absence his duties would have been taken over by the legate of legion stationed in his province, most often by the commander of leg. IV Scythica.24 That is what was done in such situations. We know that during the absence of L. Iunius Caesennius Paetus who, after his appointment as legate of Syria, could not take the post immediately, Cn. Pompeius Collega, legate of leg. IV Scythica took on his duties.25 Under Tiberius, L. Aelius Lamia, governor of Syria, did not leave Rome for many years after his appointment but administered the province through his legates.26 Thus if Vespasian decided to assign the new post in remote Syria to the legate of Germania Inferior quite unexpectedly, and if the legate covered the distance between provinces so quickly, we cannot draw any conclusion but that there were some really significant reasons to justify the emperor’s decision and A. Marius Celsus’ response to it. One should add that the choice of the new legate of Syria was not accidental. A. Marius Celsus had gained considerable battlefield experience in Armenia where he had been in command of leg. XV Apollinaris fighting against the Parthians.27 There is yet another fact whose meaning cannot go unnoticed, connected with A. Marius Celsus, then already the legate of Syria. He quickly took office in this province and just as quickly disappeared.28 Somewhat less than a few months later, sources testify of the presence in of its new governor, M. Ulpius Traianus. The question of more precisely defining the moment he took office will be discussed later. The data provided by the documentary evidence leads us to exclude coincidence in connection with the great probability that two successive Syrian legates died in the span of a few months in AD 73. The haste in which the posts were taken over by both A. Marius Celsus and M. Ulpius Traianus also argues against coincidence. The fact that Vespasian chose them is very significant, for they were both experienced military commanders. The qualifications of M. Ulpius Traianus were well-known to Vespasian, since he had commanded leg. X Fretensis fighting at his side in Judaea.29 Apart from what has been said, there is other evidence that in the spring and summer of AD 73, there were some military encounters between the Romans and the 24 Cf. Cn. Pompeius Collega: Josephus, BJ 7.58–59; A. Larcius Priscus: AE 1908, 237; ILS 1055; C. Julius Severus: IGR III 173–174. 25 Josephus, BJ 7.58–59. 26 Tac. Ann. 6.27.2; Suet. Tib. 41; Dio 58.19.5. 27 Tac. Ann. 15.23.3. 28 Syme 1981, 134 = Syme 1984, 1384. 29 Josephus, BJ 3.289; JRS 66, 1976, 15 = AE 1977, 829; cf. Dąbrowa 1993, 23ff.

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Parthians. There are two inscriptions: one of them comes from Heliopolis,30 the other from Volubilis.31 Both of them are fragmentarily preserved, so the names of the honored officers are unknown. Their content permits us to state with certainty that the first was carved under the rule of Vespasian, the second probably under Domitian. They contain information on the military careers of two centurions who took part in many campaigns, gaining military distinctions and promotion. Particularly significant from our point of view is the fact that they both participated in the bellum Commagenicum.32 In his comment on the inscription from Heliopolis, H. Dessau stated that the term bellum Commagenicum covers the expedition of L. Iunius Caesennius Paetus against Antiochus IV.33 This interpretation has been widely accepted. A closer look at the contents of these two inscriptions and a comparison with Josephus’ account on the course of that campaign raise doubts about the reliability of H. Dessau’s opinion. The historian clearly maintains that Roman action in Commagene did not meet any serious resistance.34 The only attempt to resist was a skirmish between the Romans and certain number of Antiochus’ soldiers under the leadership of the king’s sons.35 We cannot really regard this skirmish as a military event important enough to justify the conferring a set of distinctions to both centurions that would be appropriate to their rank.36 We cannot agree that the operation of annexing Commagene (regarded by the eye-witness as an event of little military importance) was, in the eyes of the Romans, worthy of being called bellum Commagenicum. We notice that the inscription from Heliopolis comes from a military colony where many similar honorific inscriptions have been found. They enumerate the names of long-fought and difficult Roman military campaigns in the Flavian period, and for taking part in them the officers honored by these inscriptions received these decorations.37 In comparison with these wars (bellum Iudaicum, bellum adversus Marcomannorum Quadorum Sarmatarum), the campaign against Antiochus IV did not deserve the name of bellum. Although participation in it was made known, in the eyes of inhabitants of Heliopolis who had great military experience it was not a great source of pride. As the distance between Heliopolis and Commagene was no great, the inhabitants must 30 CIL III 14387i = ILS 9198 = IGLS VI 2798. 31 AE 1942/43, 33 = IAM, no. 497. 32 Linguistically, the form of the name of that war: [bell]o Commageno[rum] proposed by the editor of the second inscription is difficult to accept. 33 ILS 9198, note 1. 34 Josephus, BJ 7.227–228. 35 Josephus, BJ 7.232–233. 36 CIL III 14387i = ILS 9198 = IGLS VI 2798: [Bell]o Co[m]magenico donis Donato a[b i]mperatoribus corona aurea, tor[quibus, a]rmillis, phaleris. The condition in which the Volubilis inscription (AE 1942/43, 33) is preserved makes it impossible to reconstruct fully the fragment that interests us. No doubts, however, that the Anonymous received decorations equal to centurion rank. Cf. Maxfield 1981, 185–193. 37 Cf. ILS 9200 = IGLS VI 2796.

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have had an idea of what had happened. If the Anonymous of Heliopolis had really gained his decorations in that campaign, it would have been better for him not to mention the name of it. There are numerous examples of instances when the name of the campaign or war for which dona militaria were received was not mentioned although their importance was certainly much greater than the participation in that attack against an ally of Rome. Shall we then assume that Josephus deliberately, for reasons only he knew, gave a false picture of that operation led by L. Iunius Caesennius Paetus, diminishing its significance, or do the above – mentioned inscriptions perhaps refer to an event quite different from the one related by the historian. In the light of the presented facts the latter possibility seems much more probable. So then, where and when did bellum Commagenicum take place? Before presenting our view on this issue we must return to the moment when M. Ulpius Traianus became legate of Syria. Undoubtedly, he was the immediate successor to A. Marius Celsus. From some data we may suppose that he received his post in the second half of AD 73. One of these items is from two inscriptions found in the vicinity of Antioch-on-the-Orontes, known for over half a century38 though published only a few years ago.39 Both documents date from the 122nd year of the socalled Caesarian era, which corresponds to the period from October, AD 73 to September, AD 74. M. Ulpius Traianus is mentioned as the legate holding office. A more precise date cannot be given since Vespasian, Titus, and Domitian, mentioned in them, are not given their official titles. The ornamenta triumphalia received by M. Ulpius Traianus also support the thesis that he was appointed as governor of Syria not later than in the second half of AD 73. It is known that Roman emperors owed the imperatorial acclamations bespeaking their military achievements to both their own deeds and to their commanders victories.40 For military success the commanders would sometimes be given high decorations which usually imply also the addition of imperatorial acclamation to the emperor’s title. Vespasian gained 20 imperatorial acclamations during his rule. A certain number are connected with Roman victories during the war in Judaea; others, however, were for successes not mentioned in sources which also do not contain the slightest allusion to the conferring ornamenta triumphalia upon M. Ulpius Traianus. This is not surprising. The context of the reference of Pliny the Younger to Trajan the Elder receiving the laurus Parthicus concerns the person of the emperor Trajan, not Vespasian We may assume that in all probability Vespasian did not refuse to add to his imperatorial acclamations a further one whose emotional and propaganda value must 38 See Robert 1951; Feissel 1985. 39 Feissel 1985, 79, no. A (= SEG XXXV 1483A = AE 1986, 694); 82f., no. B (= SEG XXXV 1483B). 40 See Maxfield 1981, 103–109.

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have been especially important to him. The very rank of ornamenta triumphalia, the highest distinction given to victorious commanders by the Senate at the emperor’s suggestion, was so highly regarded that its conferment was accompanied by the assumption of the imperatorial title by the ruler. What proves that Vespasian enthusiastically took every opportunity to enhance his military achievements is the number of imperatorial acclamations he gained during not more than ten years of his reign. He gained the acclamations both in the first years of his rule, when occasions for them were numerous, and towards the end, when the general situation in the Roman Empire and on the borders became largely stabilized. Not to dwell on the particulars of the relationship between Vespasian and the Parthian king in the first weeks and months after he was proclaimed emperor (the issue is discussed at length elsewhere)41 one can acknowledge that Vologeses’ attitude was highly offensive to Vespasian. Irrespective of that, Vespasian had to show great diplomatic skill to prevent Vologeses from interfering in Roman internal affairs. So the addition of the next imperial title (for victory over the Parthians) to his collection must have given him great satisfaction, so great that he could not relinquish it. With that assumption, the correctness of the date usually suggested – the year AD 75 – can be examined. Analyzing the official titles of Vespasian, and Titus ruling jointly with him, we must say that the data concerning them do not support it. From the middle of AD 73 until the beginning of AD 76 the number of the imperatorial acclamations received did not change at all.42 That means that even if there were some tensions between Rome and Parthia in AD 75 they surely did not take the form of a conflict. What is more, it was the only year under the rule of Vespasian that was free of noteworthy military events. In this situation there are more arguments for the year AD 73. The facts presented above prove that Parthian threat to Rome that year was real and very serious. Despite their general character, the sources emphasize one more significant moment connected with M. Ulpius Traianus which brought him the ornamenta triumphalia. His activities led to the restoration of the peace relationship between the two states.43 If a peace was negotiated there must have been reasons which had disturbed it. The Parthian king’s verbal threats and accusations against Rome, even a possible demonstration of power (which did not have to be followed by military action) certainly would not require peace negotiations. Similar situations often arose in the history of the states’ relationship. However, peace talks and treaties are mentioned in sources only when both sides came into open, more or less long-lasting military conflict.44 Having excluded the possibility of any real conflict in AD 75 and 41 42 43 44

Cf. Dąbrowa 1981 , 187ff. Buttrey 1980, 7 and 19. Aur. Victor, de Caes. 9.10; Epit. de Caes. 9.12; Suda, s.v. ἐπικλημα. Dąbrowa 1983a, passim.

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the chance of M. Ulpius Traianus’ having gained his distinction later during his presence in Syria, we must conclude that only the events of AD 73 could have provided him with the opportunity. The correctness of this conclusion is supported by the titles of Vespasian and Titus. In the second half of AD 73, the number of Vespasian’s imperatorial acclamations reached 11; those of Titus 5 and remained unchanged until the spring of AD 74.45 Now we can sum up the above considerations and formulate the conclusions to be drawn from them. The annexation of Commagene in the second half of AD 72 by L. Iunius Caesennius Paetus was an easy success. However, in the spring of AD 73, to the Romans’ surprise the Parthian king commenced military actions which probably took place on part of Commagene territory.46 They were so serious that they (directly or indirectly) caused the death of one or two Syrian legates. Tension diminished in the second half of that year, due on the one hand to fierce resistance by the Romans, and on the other hand, to the arrival of M. Ulpius Traianus in Syria. The diplomatic discussions between the Parthian king and the governor of Syria led to a peace treaty between Rome and the Arsacid kingdom,47 and to Vologeses’ consent to hand Antiochus IV’s sons over to the Romans;48 the defence of rights of Antiochus’ sons could constitute a pretext for the Parthian ruler to begin military operations.49 Thus, although M. Ulpius Traianus did not have a chance to demonstrate his military abilities he attained a success which was rewarded by Vespasian with the greatest distinction a victorious commander could attain. This is the final moment of the conflict which began some months earlier and was highlighted by Pliny in his Panegirycus. It passed into historiographic tradition which emphasized it a few centuries after it had taken place, but the very conflict that gave emperor Trajan’s father occasion to receive the laurus Parthicus was forgotten.50

45 Buttrey 1980, 7 and 18–19. 46 Cf. Bowersock 1973, 135. 47 The “happy end” of these discussions is ascribed to Trajan, the future emperor, then serving as a military tribune in one of the Syrian legions: Pliny, Paneg. 9.4–5; 14.1; 89.2. 48 ILS 9200 = IGLS VI 2796; Josephus, BJ 7.241–243. Cf. Kennedy 1983, 187–188. 49 Cf. Josephus, BJ 7.242. 50 Aur. Vict., de Caes. 9.10: ac bello rex Parthorum Vologaeus in pacem coactus; Epit. de Caes. 9.12: rex Parthorum Vologaesus metu solo in pacem coactus est.

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Naval Operations during Persian Expedition of Emperor Julian (363 AD) The Emperor Julian’s expedition against the Persians in 363 AD had long interested scholars. The many studies devoted to it have arisen out of research on his reign and analyses of the operation itself, as well as from interpretation of sources,1 foremost among which are unquestionably the works of Ammianus Marcellinus and Zosimos.2 There is now a vast body of literature which analyzes the military aspects of Julian’s Persian venture. What this article proposes to scrutinize is its accompanying naval involvement, for the fleet played an active part in the campaign, as is unambiguously testified by the sources. They describe the fleet’s operations in greater or lesser detail, but their real value is that they enable us to determine the tasks set for the fleet to perform at the planning and preparation stage, and the fleet’s subsequent practical implementation of its objectives. As a side benefit, the naval scenario of AD 363 may be helpful in reconstructing other similar operations conducted during some earlier Roman wars against its eastern neighbor, whether against the Parthians under the Early Empire, or later, when Rome was pitted against the Sasanian Empire. Many references to such prior engagements were naturally made in the context of Julian’s military action.3 At least from the early 1st century AD, the Euphrates or Tigris had been the theater of war in almost all such conflicts. During fighting with the Parthians over Armenia  * Naval Operations during Persian Expedition of Emperor Julian (363 AD), [in:] A. S. Lewin, P. Pellegrini (eds.), The Late Roman Army in the Near East from Diocletian to the Arab Conquest. Proceedings of a colloquium held at Potenza, Accerenza and Matera, Italy (May 2005), (BAR International Series – 1717), Archeopress Publishing, Oxford 2007, 237–242.  ** I would like to acknowledge the friendly assistance of Professor Anthony R. Birley with correction of the English of this paper. 1

Studies on sources on Julian and his Persian expedition dwell on controversies concerning the dependences between respective ancient authors and their mutual borrowings, see Thompson 1947, 28–34, 134–137; Norman 1957, 129–133; Chalmers 1960, 152–160; Dillemann 1961, 110–135, 144–151; Cameron 1963, 232–236; Fontaine 1968, 25–28; Blockley 1973, 54–55; Ridley 1973, 317 and note 2; Arce 1974, 340ff.; Mathews 1989, 161–179; Paschoud 1979, xii–xix; Bleckmann 1992, 375–383; Den Boeft et al. 1998, xii ff. Still, such contentions have little impact on the subject of this discussion. 2 Of particular interest in recent years has been the work by Ammianus Marcellinus: Fontaine 1977, 1996; Den Boeft et al. 1995, 1998, 2002. Zosimos’ account has gained an excellent commentary: Paschoud 1979. 3 Cf. Lib. Or. 18.233; 18.245; Amm. 24.6.1; Zos. 3.24.2.

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in Nero’s reign, the Syrian bank of the Euphrates was fortified by Cn. Domitius Corbulo against possible enemy attack.4 In the course of Trajan’s Parthian expedition (113–117), the Roman fleet operated on the Tigris, enabling the emperor and his army swiftly to advance to the walls of Seleucia-on-the-Tigris and Ctesiphon.5 We can almost take it for granted that in all later wars against the eastern neighbor, the Roman emperors likewise employed their fleet on a larger or smaller scale. The use of ships made it possible for Septimius Severus to capture Seleucia-on-the-Tigris and Ctesiphon.6 We also know that the fleet provided the transportation of supplies during the Persian venture of Gordian III.7 The strategic importance of the Euphrates lay in the fact that much of its course constituted the boundary between Rome and the Iranian world. The river’s flow naturally determined the direction of an advancing Roman army. In the deserts and semi deserts of northern Mesopotamia, the Euphrates was the chief and only natural source of water to supply great masses of men and beasts, while it also provided a convenient route of transportation. The latter function, given the river’s strong current, was only available to the Romans. War against the Persians had become a priority in Emperor Julian’s policy right from his accession to power.8 The intention was radically to alter relations with Persia so as to improve the prestige of Rome and its rulers in the eyes of subjects and neighbors alike.9 The emperor’s determination was such that he could not be made to abandon his plans either by negotiations proposed by Shāpūr II of Persia10 or by resentment toward the expedition voiced by parts of society and the political elites.11 In planning his operation, Julian studied accounts of previous engagements in Rome’s wars against the Parthians and Persians.12 Such studies probably influenced his own strategy and tactics employed on enemy territory. The knowledge he thus gained proved useful in making decisions as events were unfolding. It made him 4 5

Cf. Dąbrowa 1986, 97ff. Dio 68.26.1–3; 28. 1–2; Suda, s.v. ναῦς; cf. Amm. 24.6.1. We have indications suggesting that the Euphrates was also considered in planning the war, probably as a supply route for troops operating in Babylonia. Unfortunately, our fragmentary sources leave us to speculations in this respect, cf. ILS 9471; Lepper 1948, 9–10, 133ff. 6 Herod. 3.9.9–10; cf. Amm. 24.6.1. Herodian’s account suggests that the capture of those cities by Septimius Severus resulted from an unexpected coincidence. 7 SHA Gord. 29.2. 8 According to Zosimos (3.11.3) Julian began preparations for the campaign soon after arriving to Constantinople. They lasted continuously for the whole period of his stay in Antioch, which lasted for several months (Zos. 3.11.5; cf. Amm. 22.12.1). See also Andreotti 1930, 245ff.; Blockley 1992, 24ff.; Den Boeft et al. 1995, 214ff.; Fontaine 1996, 319–320, note 939. 9 Cf. Lib. Or. 17.19; Amm. 22.12.1–2; Andreotti 1930, 241ff.; Seager 1997, 253ff., 263ff. 10 Lib. Or. 12.76–77; 17.19; 18.164. 11 Amm. 22.12.3–5; 23.5.4; Matthews 1989, 134ff.; Blockley 1992, 26; Den Boeft et al. 1995, 217ff. 12 Lib. Or. 18.233 and 245. Cf. Greg. Naz. Or. 5.8.

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direct his fleet to the so-called Trajan canal, which had been masked by the Persians, enabling the ships to reach Ctesiphon relatively uneventfully.13 Choice of the Euphrates as the main line of attack was all-important,14 for it determined where the fleet was to be built and the necessary provisions stored. A witness of and participant in Julian’s Persian expedition, Magnus of Carrhae, suggests that the site for shipbuilding was chosen at and around Samosata, it being an area rich in timber.15 Extant descriptions of Julian’s fleet permit a fairly accurate knowledge of its size and composition. According to Ammianus Marcellinus, its core consisted of 1000 transport craft (naves onerariae). In addition, there were 50 warships (naves bellatrices) and the same number of auxiliary vessels that could be used to build a floating bridge.16 Magnus of Carrhae says that the fleet numbered 1250 units in total,17 some of them built of wood (τὰ μὲν διὰ ξύλων), and others of leather (τὰ δὲ διὰ βυρσών).18 More chaotic in his account, Zosimos states that the fleet possessed 600 wooden ships (ἐκ μὲν ξύλων πεποιημένων), 400 vessels made of leather (ἀπὸ δερμάτων), 50 warships (στρατιωτικαὶ νῆς), an unspecified number of floating platforms to serve as a pontoon bridge, plus many other units of various types.19 Zonaras gives the total number of 1100 units, of which as many as 700 were warships, while the remaining ones were transports.20 There is no reason to question the veracity of Magnus of Carrhae’s figure. It will be sensible to assume that it embraces all manner of vessels including smaller boats, probably the same ones that Zosimos had in mind in referring to a large number of other units of various types (δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πάμολλα πλοῖα).21 Some interesting details can be deduced concerning the construction of the ships. Ammianus Marcellinus mentions that they were built of beams joined together, which suggests that they looked more like rafts than enclosed-hull vessels. This type of unit 13 Lib. Or. 18.244–247; cf. Amm. 24.6.1–2; Zos. 3.24.2. The canal attributed to Trajan by Roman authors (Dio 68.28.1–2) was probably started during the reign of Seleucus I: Paschoud 1978, 353ff., 357ff.; Den Boeft at al. 2002, 172. 14 Julian’s alleged hesitation as to his choice of route is better explained by a need to keep his strategic plans secret (cf. Lib. Or. 18.213) than by indecision. Trajan had chosen for his attack a path along the Tigris and built his fleet at Nisibis using timber from the surrounding forests, from where he transported the ships overland to the launch site: Dio 58.26.1–2. Choice of a shipbuilding site was conditional on the abundance of timber. Such policy suggests that the Romans had a good knowledge of the area and of navigation. The latter determined the design of the vessels. By contrast, Alexander the Great in preparing his attack on Mesopotamia had had his fleet built in Cyprus and Phoenician cities before it was transported in parts to Thapsacus: Strabo 16.1.11 (741). 15 Magnus, FGrH, no. 225, F 1 = Paschoud 1979, 242 (1) = Malalas 13.21 (Thurn 2000); Zos. 3.12.1. 16 Amm. 23.3.9. 17 Magnus, FGrH, no. 225, F 4 = Paschoud 1979, 242 (2) = Malalas 13.21 (Thurn 2000). 18 Magnus, FGrH, no. 225, F 1 = Paschoud 1979, 242 (1) = Malalas 13.21 (Thurn 2000). 19 Zos. 3.13.2–3. Zosimos’ account gives the impression of being composed of two stylistically mismatched fragments: one on the number of ships, the other on their design: Ridley 1972, 319. 20 Zon. 13.8: ἦσαν δὲ τριήρεις μὲν ἑπτακόσιαι φορτηγοὶ δὲ τετρακόσιαι. 21 Zos. 3.13.3. For a discussion on the size of the fleet, see Ridley 1972, 319; Fontaine 1977, 32–33, note 71; Paschoud 1979, 113–114, note 35; Den Boeft et al. 1998, 54–55.

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was called šahtūr. Contrary to views widely accepted not long ago, the leather vessels were by no means a separate type of craft – known as kelek – but rather a variation of šahtūr probably intended for transporting foodstuffs. The use of leather in their construction was meant to protect their precious cargo from moisture.22 They were designed to be simple – they would only be used in downstream river navigation – and sufficiently solid to assure safety to crews and cargoes. Once their destination was reached, their structural timbres would normally be sold.23 Depending on size, a šahtūr vessel could carry loads between ten and 20 tons.24 A serious problem to solve was how to man the fleet with a sufficient number of trained sailors. We do not know how this question was handled by Julian’s predecessors. Since the Romans did not regularly practice navigation on the Euphrates, finding a suitable number of men acquainted with sailing and with that particular river was next to impossible. What we know is that Julian’s shipboard crews numbered as many as 20,000 men.25 Had that body been composed of civilian sailors and members of other Roman flotillas, not only would their experience have been of little use on the Euphrates, but on reaching the fleet’s destination they would have become a useless encumbrance for a fighting army. It seems therefore that the crews of Julian’s vessels were most probably formed of suitably trained soldiers.26 This supposition is confirmed by the active part played by ship crews in operations in the march on Ctesiphon and their subsequent inclusion in the army when the fleet had been disbanded.27 The large number of transport craft in the fleet indicates that its chief task was to carry sufficient food supplies to last the army a long time.28 Thanks to this, Julian’s 22 For earlier discussions on identification of vessel types in Julian’s fleet, see Tardieu 1990, 95–102. Such craft, called kelek, which utilized in their design not just timber but also sheep skins inflated with air for added buoyancy, were only used in navigating the Tigris and its tributaries. Owing to the more difficult navigation on the Euphrates, they were never used there: Tardieu 1990, 81– 82. 23 Dillemann 1961, 152; Matthews 1989, 147; Tardieu 1990, 75ff., 83ff. The ships Alexander the Great had built for his Mesopotamian campaign were probably shell-type craft which the Greeks were commonly using at the time. It is not known whether their design stood the test on the Euphrates. It is a fact, however, that when Alexander ordered more ships built in Babylon, their design was similar to that of boats used by the locals: Strabo 16.1.11 (741); cf. Amm. 24.3.11. 24 Tardieu 1990, 101. 25 Amm. 24.7.4: armatorum fere viginti milia in trahendis occuparentur eisdem navibus et regendis. 26 The basic skill involved in navigating Mesopotamian rivers with their swift current was the effective use of steering oars: Tardieu 1990, 101. 27 The conclusion that ship crews were recruited from among soldiers has a significance for a discussion of the size and composition of Julian’s army in his Persian venture. It is fairly generally assumed that it numbered 65,000 men (Zos. 3.13.1; cf. Paschoud 1979, 110–111, 186). Yet this figure completely ignores the presence of ship crews, which must have accounted for almost a third of the entire army. Considering what has been said above, it seems justified to presume that the overall figure included the crews. This is confirmed by the fact that not a single historical source details such crews in a separate statistic (cf. Zos. 3.13.1–2); their silence in this matter is perfectly understandable. 28 Cf. Jul. Ep. 98 (402a, ed. Bidez); Lib. Or. 18.214 – 215; Zos. 3.13.3; Festus 28; Greg. Naz., Or. 5.9; 5.11.

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army did not have to rely on uncertain local sources of provisions along its route and could advance swiftly. It was likewise efficacious to have the fleet transport heavy war equipment and material for its construction and repair. Another advantage consisted in the inclusion in the fleet of pontoons to be used in building temporary bridges. It would be wrong to assume that in the ensuing warfare the fleet played a passive, secondary role. Transports carrying war machines on board were used in fighting as floating artillery batteries and offered efficient support to Roman ground troops against targets on land. As provisions were being consumed, emptied ships were used to transport assault troops.29 The largest among them could accommodate dozens of soldiers.30 We are told that the fleet included 50 craft described in sources as warships.31 Those must have been intended for other purposes than the transport craft and were differently built. Our sources for Trajan’s expedition permit the conclusion that those ships were intended for special purposes.32 One such purpose could have been to offer the emperor and his entourage a convenient quarter and means of transportation, which, however, it seems that Julian never used for any extended period.33 What we know is that they covered his crossing of the Euphrates.34 It would be rational to expect such units to perform reconnaissance along the Euphrates ahead of the approaching flotilla, suppress smaller points of resistance on the banks and isles, and maintain liaison between commanders of squadrons, detachments, and corps.35 The latter task became vital as the flotilla was stretched over many miles along the river.36 The movement of such a multitude on the river must have constituted a problem in its own right as any false maneuver could lead to a disaster of grave proportions. Apart from one mention, accounts of the naval operation offer no clues as to any mishaps during the journey.37 The sole mention concerns an unusual predicament: the 29 Amm. 24.1.6; 6.4. 30 Cf. Amm. 24.6.4. 31 The same number of warships, which were a flat-bottomed equivalent of the trireme in size, were commanded by Trajan: Suda, s.v. ναῦς . The presence of warships in Julian’s fleet did not, as some maintain (cf. Andreotti 1930, 249), result from inclusion in it of craft from a regular Roman flotilla operating on the Euphrates as the Romans never had such a flotilla on that river: Dąbrowa 1997, 109; Saddington 2001, 583–584. Presumably, the ships had been built specifically for that mission. 32 Cf. Suda, s.v. ναῦς. 33 Apart from Magnus of Carrhae (FGrH, no. 225, F 5 = Paschoud 1979, 242–243 (5) = Malalas 13.21 (Thurn 2000), no source mentions Julian making longer trips on board a ship. 34 Cf. Amm. 24.1.8. 35 No record contains the least mention of those ships in action. We are left to pure speculation on their role. 36 Taking as a reference the length of a marching military column that flanked it, the fleet extended over about 10 Roman miles along the Euphrates: Amm. 24.1.2–4; Den Boeft et al. 2002, 10. 37 It must have been skillful navigation indeed if the Roman army reached Dura Europos in two days from leaving Circesium (Amm. 24.1.5) and after another four days attained the isle of Anatha (Ana) on the Euphrates (Amm. 24.1.6): Den Boeft et al. 2002, 12–13, 13–14.

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sinking of several transport craft due to a sudden rise in water level in the Euphrates caused probably by deliberate destruction of riverside engineering installations by the Persians.38 Sailing down the river, the fleet was protected by forces marching along on both banks of the Euphrates.39 Although no indication is available as to any division of the fleet into smaller sections, we may surmise that it included squadrons that were separate entities. Such a division contributed to a much more efficient cooperation between crews. This was of special importance when naval support had to be given to ground troops.40 To apprise the role of the naval forces in Julian’s Persian expedition we must consider all the episodes and events in which it made its presence felt, if only to a modest degree. First among such episodes was an operation against the Persian stronghold on the Euphrates island of Anatha (now Ana).41 The emperor himself took the decision to assault it. The task was to be performed by a thousand lightly armed troops transported to the fortress by ships under cover of darkness. Then the ships surrounded the island in a tight embrace to prevent the defenders’ contact with mainland. Aware of the precariousness of an attack on a well fortified stronghold, the emperor ordered that floating artillery batteries be introduced into action and personally supervised their preparedness. The assault never actually came to pass, for the defenders negotiated surrender.42 Moving further down the river, the Romans chose not to capture two other powerful Persian fortresses: Thilutha43 and Achaiachala.44 In the first case, the garrison, on seeing the enemy flotilla filing past down the Euphrates, decided against taking any action against the Romans.45 A pontoon bridge was first deployed by the Romans on enemy territory as they were crossing the river near the city of Baraxmalcha.46 On another occasion, floating bridges proved useful in crossing canals in the vicinity of Macepracta.47 The bridges made a signal contribution to a skirmish that ensued on the far bank of a canal when a cavalry detachment swimming across it was unexpectedly attacked by the 38 Amm. 24.1.1; Den Boeft et al. 2002, 22–23. 39 Amm. 24.1.4: Classis autem licet per flumen ferebatur assiduis flexibus tortuosum, nec residere nec praecurrere sinebatur. Researchers agree that the army marched along the left bank of the Euphrates, for it was there that a road led which was used by the Romans to attack Mesopotamia, cf. Gawlikowski 1988, 89–90. The fragments quoted of Ammianus Marcellinus and Zosimos (3.14.1) suggest that both banks were covered by land forces. Such cover was probably needed only in some sections of the route. 40 Cf. Amm. 24.6.4. 41 Lib. Or. 18.218; Amm. 24.1.6; Fontaine 1977, 137–138, note 300; Gawlikowski 1997, 151; Den Boeft et al. 2002, 14–15. 42 Lib. Or. 18.218; Amm. 24.1.6–9; Zos. 3.14.3–4. 43 Gawlikowski 1997, 152; Den Boeft et al. 2002, 30. 44 Den Boeft et al. 2002, 32. 45 Lib. Or. 18.219; Amm. 24.2.1–2; Zos. 3.15.1–2. 46 Amm. 24.2.3; Fontaine 1977, 141, note 313; Den Boeft et al. 2002, 33–34. 47 Amm. 24.2.6–7; Zos. 3.17.3. Cf. Fonatine 1977, 142, note 315; Den Boeft et al. 2002, 41.

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Persians. It was only through a timely intervention of some lightly armored Roman soldiers who had reached the enemy bank across a pontoon bridge that the cavalry got away with only minor losses.48 Another instance when floating bridges proved helpful was at Maiozmalcha.49 Their deployment enabled the Roman soldiers to take more favorable positions in laying siege to that city.50 As battle was waged on land outside the city walls, while Roman soldiers engaged in a parallel struggle in their ships on the water.51 In subsequent actions as well, the use of floating bridges proved indispensable to a Roman advance in unfavorable terrain crisscrossed with many canals.52 At Coche,53 they rendered important services in crossing an artificial limb of the Naarmalcha canal called the Trajan canal.54 The benefits of having ships at hand were again demonstrated by an episode in Pirisabora. During the fight for the city, the Romans captured a large amount of food stockpiled there which, instead of being wasted, was loaded on the ships and helped replenish the Romans’ shrinking provisions.55 Preparing to strike at the Persian capital, Julian decided to include his fleet in the operation. All larger transport craft were to ferry an assault force across the Tigris. A large number of ships were prepared for this role. For efficient conduct of the operation, they were divided into squadrons, presumably each with its own deployment area. However, the idea of an assault was opposed by the emperor’s staff. Despite such objections, at the emperor’s express command, some craft attempted a landing, encountering fierce resistance from the Persians. Immediately Julian gave further orders and the rest of the vessels joined in the struggle, obtaining success and securing a bridgehead across the river.56 Soldiers who fought on ships in that battle were awarded naval decorations (corona navalis) by the emperor.57 48 Amm. 24.2.8; Zos. 3.16.1 – 17.1. Zosimos has more detail to relate about this event: Fontaine 1977, 145–146, note 326; Den Boeft et al. 2002, 46ff. 49 Zos. 3.17.5; cf. Amm. 24.2.22. 50 Amm. 24.4.6; Den Boeft et al. 2002, 108. 51 Amm. 24.4.9; Fontaine 1977, 164, note 377; Den Boeft et al. 2002, 111–112. 52 Cf. Amm. 24.3.21. 53 Lib. Or. 18.244– 247; Amm. 24.6.1–2; Magnus, FGrH, no. 225, F 7 = Paschoud 1979, 243 (7) = Malalas 13.21 (Thurn 2000); Zos. 3.24.2; Greg. Naz. Or. 5.10; Sozomenos, HE 6.1.5. The fragment quoted from Ammianus Marcellinus contains mentions of Roman actions which are difficult to understand, see Ridley 1973, 321; Den Boeft et al. 2002, 170ff. For topography of Coche, see Matthews 1998, 141ff. 54 The course of the canal and its identification has become the subject of many studies: Dillemann 1961, 153ff.; Fontaine 1977, 180–181; Paschoud 1978, 246ff.; Gawlikowski 1988, 86–87; Matthews 1989, 149ff.; Den Boeft et al. 2002, 171–172. 55 Matthews 1989, 155ff. 56 Lib. Or. 17.21; 18.250 – 252; Amm. 24.6.4–6; Zos. 3.25.1–4; Festus 28; Sozomenos, HE 6.1.7. For differences between Ammianus Marcellinus’ and Zosimos’ accounts of those struggles, see Andreotti 1930, 267–268, note 145; Ridley 1972, 321; Austin 1979, 158ff.; Den Boeft et al. 2002, 177–183. 57 Amm. 24.6.16.

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The struggles near Ctesiphon were a turning point for the fleet as well as for the entire expedition. Despite his victory, Julian abstained from storming the city and decided to change his route. From that point on, it would lead inland, offering hopes for easier procurement of much needed provisions.58 Useless now, the fleet was burned so as not to fall to the enemy.59 Of the entire armada, only some smaller craft were taken along to be used as a floating bridge if necessary.60 Although Julian’s decision seems justified and his arguments convincing, it caused not only mixed responses from his entourage but also criticism from ancient authors. Those of the latter who sympathized with Julian justified his step with the same arguments that he voiced. According to Libanius, destroying the ships had been planned in advance.61 But Chrisian authors heaped accusations on Julian decision. They began by emphasizing the negative consequences of his step for the army’s commissariat, calling it near-suicidal behavior that resulted in great losses and troop demoralization in the face of the adversities that awaited them. In addition, they wasted no time in suggesting that the move was closely bound up with the emperor’s faith in pagan deities and fortune-telling.62 The undisguised enmity of Christian authors toward Julian makes them much less convincing.63 Libanius’s contention that Julian’s action was planned and calculated is much more credible. Even at the planning stage, the emperor must have learned that the current in the Euphrates and Tigris in their upper and middle course was so strong as to make any upstream navigation practically impossible.64 A further circumstance that could only reaffirm his determination, and the hopelessness of any efforts to the contrary, was the unusually high water mark on the Tigris, caused by a late spring thaw in the Armenian mountains.65 A wait until the water levels drooped before upstream navigation could be contemplated, in the face of an ever more active enemy, would have been waiting to be surrounded and courting disaster as there was no hope of outside help. The decision to burn his boats was therefore fully justified under the circumstances as the fleet had served its purpose and its further maintenance at all 58 Amm. 24.7.1–3; Zos. 3.26.2. 59 Lib. Or. 18.262–264; Amm. 24.7.4–5; Zos. 3.26.2–3; Sozomenos, HE 6.1.9; Zonaras 13.5–9. Ammianus Marcellinus’ story contains a marked contradiction resulting from simultaneous presentation of two different attitudes: Austin 1972, 301ff.; 1979, 97ff. 60 According to Ammianus, 12 vessels were kept (Zonaras (13.7) quotes the same number), Libanius has 15 (Or. 18.263), but Zosimos speaks of 18 Roman-type and four Persian-type craft. Cf. Fontaine 1977, 192–193, note 460; Paschoud 1979, 185–186; Den Boeft et al. 2002, 214, 217–218. 61 Lib. Or. 18.262. 62 Greg. Naz., Or. 5.12; Theodoret, HE 3.25.1–4; Aug., de Civ. Dei 4.29; 5.31. 63 Gregory of Nazianzus devoted two speeches to a criticism of Julian (4 and 5), cf. Moreschini 1975, 416–430. 64 Paschoud 1978, 350–351 and the next note. 65 Lib. Or. 18.262 – 263. Typically the Tigris rises with spring flooding in late April and early May, cf. Den Boeft et al. 2002, 183, 213.

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costs would have been useless effort and would have severely restricted Roman mobility on enemy territory. The facts quoted above lead to the conclusion that the severe judgments on the emperor Julian’s Persian expedition passed by some researchers,66 do not equally apply to all its elements and are unjustified in relation to his naval strategy. It should be recognized with full conviction that this strategy significantly contributed to the course of and effects won in the first stage of the campaign. Efficient in its task of providing transportation, the fleet made it possible for the land force to advance rapidly. It should be remembered that a mere three months had elapsed from the launch of the campaign to the burning of the flotilla and the emperor’s death.67 During that time, the army had not only made the long, strenuous march,68 but had also fought a number of battles and clashes, surmounting many water obstacles big and small. Without an effective support from the fleet, which not only afforded continued supply of provisions but often also actively engaged in combat, the army could not have progressed at the rate it did. The sources of the naval operations leave no doubts that the fleet was well prepared to fulfill its mission and completed it satisfactorily.

66 Critics try to demonstrate Julian’s lack of suitable preparedness for the expedition, his poor knowledge of the enemy territory, and indecision. They look for causes of the emperor’s defeat in his religious policies and emotional state. Among the most severe of them is G. Wirth (1978). Not all researchers share this point of view. Cf. Ridley 1973, 326. 67 This much time passed from the moment he left Antioch on March 5, 363 (Jul. Ep. 98). Assuming as the start of the campaign the time he crossed the empire’s border in early April (cf. Amm. 23.5.1; Zos. 3.14.2), the period would be shorter still. The emperor was killed on June 26: Lib., Or. 18.268–274; Amm. 25.3.6–23; Zos. 3.28.4–29; Magnus, FGrH, no. 225, F 12–13 = Paschoud 1979, 244 (12–13) = Malalas 13.21 (Thun 2000). A detailed chronology of Julian’s expedition is given by: Dodgeon, Lieu 1991, 231–237; Den Boeft et al. 1998, xv–xx; Den Boeft et al. 2000, xiii–xxiii. 68 For the army’s route and distances between respective points, see Gawlikowski 1988, 81ff., 92.

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III. Colonies

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Colonial Coinage and Religious Life of Roman Colonies

The religious life of the Roman army with its varied forms and transformations over time can be studied from ample surviving epigraphic, papyrological, and also archeological evidence. Factors facilitating such study are organized and obligatory religious practices, as well as cults popular among soldiers which followed defined rules. A much more difficult subject to study, despite plentiful sources, are the religious beliefs and practices of military veterans. Surviving sources tend to consider individual religious attitudes, only rarely offering insight into the religious practices of whole veteran groups. This is due to the great variety of individual vicissitudes of the men as they completed their army service. It is this fact that creates difficulty in any study of the religious life of Roman military veterans. We know that veterans who settled in a civilian environment, outside colonies, usually quickly mixed with the local community, accepting its traditions and cults, but not forgetting their military past, a point of pride for them.1 What is worth taking a closer look at are the religious attitudes of those veterans who assimilated to civilian life in their own communities, i.e., in veteran colonies. Although the problem of religious life in colonies has already often been analyzed in the context of the history of many of them, this time our purpose is to determine whether colonial religious life was dominated by cults widespread in the Roman army or rather followed a path of its own. It must be said at this point that this discussion will concentrate only on official cults of colonies, i.e., those that were declared such during colony foundation or were introduced later by a duly authorized body of officials and priests.2 We do not have any complete list or any preserved list of all official * 

Colonial Coinage and Religious Life of Roman Colonies, [in:] C. Wolff, Y. Le Bohec (eds.), L’armée romaine et la religion sous le Haut-Empire romain. Actes du quatrième Congrès de Lyon (26 –28 octobre 2006), Lyon 2009, 65 – 72.

*  * I would like to acknowledge assistance of Prof. Henry I. MacAdam with correction of the English of this paper. Any error of fact or of interpretation remains only my own responsibility. 1

There is a great number of studies on various aspects of the veterans life in different provinces of the Roman Empire. From available evidence is not very easy to construct a general pattern of their civil careers, because there are many local differences and practices. See Demougin 1999, 370ff; Rossignol 2003, 368ff. 2 Cf. Crawford 1996, 393ff., no. 25 (lex coloniae Genetivae), ch. 62, 64, 66–68, 70–71, 128; Bendlin 1997, 48ff.; see also Scheid 1999, 390ff.; Haack 2003, 451, 453ff., 456ff. For a general description of religious life in Roman colonies, see Beard, North, Price 1998, I, 328ff.; II, 242ff.; Belayche 2003b, 158ff.

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cults in every particular colony. But we can attempt (with available data) to reconstruct one from evidence in preserved temples, religious-related inscriptions inspired or ordered by colony authorities, and coinage.3 The numismatic evidence has for this aim a very special value. The representations on the colonial coins were subject to control by local authorities, hence representations of deities on them should be treated not only as proof of their cult as such but also for their importance in the religious life of the entire community. Since the coinage of some colonies runs to hundreds of reverse types, we have in our hands evidence of invaluable historical import, permitting a closer look at their past. Unfortunately, an important obstacle in an attempt to use this vast material is a lack of coin catalogs for most colonies. For this reason, the discussion presented below is meant to draw attention to the problem through the lens of selected cases. As its point of departure, this discussion uses the fairly well researched and cataloged coinage of two Roman veteran colonies: Pisidian Antioch and Colonia Aelia Capitolina.4 Consideration is also given to the fact that both issued their own money right from their foundation and continued almost uninterrupted coinage until the second half of the 3rd century AD.5 This affords us a broad view of their monetary depictions over a fairly long span of time. One more factor determining the choice of these particular colonies is the possibility of examining how distinct local communities determined the colonies’ religious life. It should be stipulated that our scope excludes both military symbols referring to the original settlers’ background, i.e., representations of colony founding (the so-called founder type), military signa, etc. as being typical references unrelated directly to a colony’s religious life,6 as well as portraits of various emperors being obvious signs of inhabitants’ loyalty to the ruler and his family.7 The Antioch veteran colony was founded by the emperor Augustus about 24 BC, soon after the Celtic king Amyntas’ state was turned into the Roman province of

3

Cf. p.ex. Belyache 2003b, 160ff. (Berytus). Far less telling is evidence relating to individuals. Much of it originated from individual piety which need not always have reflected official colony cults. As the owners migrated, many religious aspects may have found their way to a completely different social and cultural context from that in which they were created. 4 For the coinage of Pisidian Antioch, the basic catalog is that compiled by A. Krzyżanowska (1970), but it must be complemented by Antioch coins published in respective collection catalogs in the Sylloge Nummorum Graecarum series. For Aelia Capitolina coinage, the most up-to-date work is the catalog by Y. Meshorer (1989). The catalog of Aelia’s coinage published by L. Kadman (1956) is now obsolete although its parts can still be useful. 5 Although there were longer interruptions in the Antioch mint functioning (Caligula – Nero, Domitian – Hadrian), the use of the same imagery over long spans of time suggests that the choice of its canon was not significantly affected by such breaks. 6 For more on these reverse types and their symbolism, see Dąbrowa 2003a, 127ff.; 2004c, 213ff. 7 Especially many obverses and reverses of such nature are known from the period of the Severan emperors.

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Galatia.8 From the colonial coins, and also from many inscriptions in and around Antioch, we know that the first settlers came from two units: leg. V Gallica and leg. VII Claudia.9 Adjacent to the colony was a Hellenistic city with its center of worship a popular Asia Minor deity Men Ascaenos.10 His Antioch sanctuary enjoyed fame far beyond local confines and attracted his worshippers from neighboring regions.11 Just how Men’s cult was popular is suggested by the large number of inscriptions dedicated to the deity.12 Nor were the Roman colonists impervious to its influence, although it took a long time for it to be officially acknowledged as in integral part of the colony’s religious life. Coin analysis suggests that this came about sometime during the 2nd century AD. The reverses of Antioch coins issued from Augustus to Antoninus Pius show only standard depictions of the colony founding scene or military signs.13 It was not until the reign of Antoninus Pius that military symbolism was replaced by religiously-inspired depictions with Antioch reverses first featuring representations of Men, Fortuna, and (colony) Genius.14 From then on until the closure of the Antioch mint, an image of Men (in many poses15) would be constantly present. Apart from him, frequently featured on coin would be Fortuna and Genius, and also Tyche.16 At the time of Marcus Aurelius and Septimius Severus, small Antioch pieces, dispensing with an effigy of the emperor, instead bore Heracles and Hermes on obverse and reverse.17 Under Heliogabalus, reverses first featured, next to the by then familiar Men, another representation that referred to local religious tradition: Anthios, the god of the river near the colony.18 The same effigy was repeatedly struck on Antioch coins.19 Other deities identified on Antioch coinage include

8 The foundation date of the Antioch colony long remained the subject of dispute, see Vittinghoff 1952, 132–133 and 133, note 2; Levick 1967, 29ff., 34–35; 1968, 49–50; Krzyżanowska 1970, 13–14; Christol, Drew-Bear 1998, 305, note 8; Rebuffat 2002, 375ff. 9 RPC II, no. 1603; Levick 1967, 58ff.; 1968, 50–51; Krzyżanowska 1970, 22 ff.; Christol, Drew-Bear 1998, 304 ff. and 304–305, note 7. 10 Strabo 12.3.31 (557); 12.8.14 (577); Lane 1975, 82–87, nos. 1–17 and Pl. XXX-XXXI. See also Lesky 1931, 692–693; Levick 1967, 72ff.; Lane 1976, 55–66. 11 See Hardie 1912; Mitchell, Waelkens 1998, 37ff. 12 Anderson 1913; Levick 1970; Lane 1971, 57, no. 87; 66, no. 101; 69–70, nos. 105–106; 75–76, nos. 118–120; 84–85, nos. 130–131; 100–155, nos. 160–294; Lane 1978, 13–50, nos. 1–161. See Lane 1978 (1–12, nos. 1–45) for corrections and additions to the inscriptions published in Lane 1971. 13 See RPC I, nos. 3429–3432; RPC II, nos. 1603–1611. 14 Krzyżanowska 1970, 137, rev. nos. 1–5, 7–9; 138, rev. nos. 11, 14–20 (Men); 137, rev. no. 6; 138, nos. 10, 12 (Fortuna); 138, rev. no. 13 (Genius). Cf. Krzyżanowska 1969, 287–288. 15 All of them are collected and reproduced in Lane 1975, 88–104 (Antioch 18–60) and Pl. XXXI-XXVI. 16 Cf. Krzyżanowska 1969, 289; 1970, 104ff. 17 Krzyżanowska 1970, 42ff. 18 Krzyżanowska 1970, 108–109; 172, rev. no. 4. 19 Krzyżanowska 1970, 173, rev. nos. 1–5 (Alexander Severus); 189, rev. nos. 8–9 (Philippus the Arab); 192, rev. no. 5; 193, rev. nos. 11–12; 194, rev. no. 1 (Trebonianus Gallus); 209, rev. no. 53 (Gallienus).

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Cybele,20 Sol,21 and Minerva.22 Religious practices of Antioch are also echoed in the rare reverse type showing items used in religious worship.23 Considering the large number of Antioch’s coinage issues and its use of varied reverse types, the list of deities does not seem long. Among all religious-related reverse types, effigies of Men make up a vast majority, which seems to suggest that the religious life of the colony was dominated by his cult and, by the same token, that descendants of Roman veterans completely succumbed to the influences of local tradition. Still, this conclusion is not so obvious: Men’s iconography as known from various reverse types24 leaves no doubt that its original character evolved, absorbing new, Roman-inspired elements that better suited the deity’s Roman worshippers while providing the cult a new ideological dimension. According to A. Krzyżanowska and others scholars, all such elements suggest a conscious association of Men worship with a cult of the Roman emperor.25 This means that as Roman inhabitants of Antioch accepted the local god as their own, they thoroughly Romanized it. Without a doubt, however, the worship of Men and other deities pictured on Antioch coins has little in common with the religion of the Roman army.26 It should nonetheless be noted that while the impact of religio castrensis on the religious life of the colony’s inhabitants largely evades observation, the awareness of the military background of original settlers was not lost across many generations. Such awareness is expressed in many reverse types that included military symbols and recurred throughout the Antioch mint’s period of operation, especially so during the 3rd century. The symbols on the reverses emphasized not only the colony’s military origin, but also its Romanity, such as the appearance on coin reverses of representations of the goddess Roma and the Capitoline Wolf. Antioch’s inhabitants equally strongly demonstrated their sense of belonging to the Roman world by showing attachment to the Latin language and culture as expressed in their use, over centuries, in public epigraphy and in coin legends. Aelia Capitolina was a veteran colony established in approximately 130 AD by the emperor Hadrian in Jerusalem,27 adjacent to the leg. X Fretensis camp present 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Krzyżanowska 1970, 176, rev. no. 1 (Gordian III). Krzyżanowska 1970, 183, rev. no. 90 (Gordian III). Krzyżanowska 1970, 195, rev. no. 14 (Volusianus). Krzyżanowska 1970, 186, rev. no. 5 (Philippus the Arab); 192, rev. no. 32 (Trajan Decius). Cf. Krzyżanowska 1970, 97 ff. Cf. Krzyżanowska 1969, 288–289; 1970, 100 ff., 125 ff. A comprehensive commentary and interpretations of such representations are supplied by A. Krzyżanowska (1970, 103–110). In recent decades, advances in research on religious life in Anatolia in the imperial period have rendered many of her observations obsolete. See also Lane 1976, 56–57, 65–66. 27 Dio 69.12.1–2. The date of the colony’s foundation was until recently disputed by scholars as many questioned the credibility of Dio Cassius’ account (cf. Eshel 2000, 637–638). Yet new archeological data fully bear him out: Eshel 2000, 642–643.

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there from 70 AD.28 Such a combination of legionary fortress and veteran colony, an exception in the Roman world,29 was meant to help Romanize the city. Despite centuries of Hellenization, the face of the city and the life of its inhabitants were dominated by Judaic tradition, until the 66 AD Jewish revolt against Rome, whose great strength and staying power stemmed from Jerusalem possessing Judaism’s supreme sanctuary. The city did not radically change its cultural and religious face until after the destruction of the Temple by Titus and the establishment in it of a Roman military garrison. A factor contributing to the change was that Roman policies were unfavorable to believers in Judaism. Soldiers stationed in Jerusalem and veterans settled in Aelia Capitolina lived in isolation from local religious traditions, viewing them with hostility. Considering that not only first settlers but subsequent groups that swelled the colony community came most probably from legions stationed in Judea,30 it is plausible to presume that Aelia Capitolina’s religious life was dominated by forms of cult popular among soldiers. Whether that presumption is true can be tested, as it could for Pisidian Antioch, by analyzing the reverses of the local coinage. First coins were struck at the Aelia Capitolina mint soon after the founding of the colony, under emperor Hadrian. One of them bears on the reverse a telling image: “façade of distyle temple; within, in centre, Jupiter seated l., resting l. on scepter, extending r.; on l. Minerva, helmeted, standing r., resting r. on spear; on r. Juno standing l., resting l. on scepter”.31 The group of deities that made up the Capitoline Triad (the three supreme state gods of Rome) and the temple that housed them are an unmistakable reference to the chief place of worship in any Roman colony, the Capitolium.32 Choice of this particular reverse design doubtless served to accentuate the nature of the new colony and to indicate its main center of religious life; it is worth emphasizing that this reverse type was never repeated, although a later issue would once again feature Jupiter.33 More reverses with religious images appeared in Aelia Capitolina coinage under Antoninus Pius. They illustrated 28 Josephus, BJ 7.5; 7.17; Vita 422. The exact site of the camp is not known. For more on suggested sites and arguments used, see Geva 1993d , 759–760; Dąbrowa 1993, 14, note 27; Bar 1998, 8ff. According to the Mazar’s recent hypothesis under Hadrian the camp was moved on the Temple Mount and the area at the foot of its southwestern corner: Mazar 2006. 29 Cf. Millar 1990, 29; Isaac 1998, 324. 30 Cf. Millar 1990, 29–30; Dąbrowa 1993, 17 note 42; 21; Isaac 1998, 101ff. 31 Meshorer 1989, 70, no. 1; cf. ibid. p. 22. 32 According to Dio Cassius (69.12.1), in Aelia Capitolina it was on the Temple Mount, on the site of the demolished Jerusalem Temple. The credibility of this account as a result of later corruption – this passage by Dio is known from Byzantine excerpts – is commonly questioned by scholars. Still, no other suggested locations of Capitolium in Jerusalem had won general approval. For a discussion of this subject, see Murphy-O’Connor 1994, 407ff.; Eliav 1997, 125ff.; Belayche 1997, 388ff.; 2001, 136ff., 142ff. The dispute also concerns the plan and architecture of Hadrian-founded colony; cf. Geva 1993d , 759ff.; Belayche 1999, 317ff.; Geva 2000, 18ff.; Magen 2000, 283ff.; Magness 2000, 330ff.; Belayche 2001, 131ff.; Mazar 2006, 82. 33 Meshorer 1989, 70, nos. 18–19. Cf. ibid., p. 27–28, 55.

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Tyche-Astarte,34 Sarapis,35 Dionysus,36 Jupiter,37 the Dioscuri,38 Ares,39 and three unidentified feminine figures.40 Most often repeated in a later period would be effigies of Tyche, Dionysus, Sarapis, and the Dioscuri. In addition to those deities, Aelia Capitolina coins would bear images of Roma,41 Nemesis,42 Hygeia,43 Zeus,44 and a scene showing the stone of Elagabal carried on a quadriga.45 Issues with this last group are a rarity and only accompany the names of some emperors and empresses. They were probably meant as a reflection of their religious preferences; Aelia Capitolina authorities displayed such representations of deities on the colony’s coinage as an expression of their loyalty and devotion to the ruler. This interpretation seems to be confirmed by an issue from the time of Heliogabalus bearing on the reverse a quadriga with the Emesa betyl. The scene refers to the well-known removal from Emesa to Rome of the Elagabal worship by the same emperor, who was himself a priest of the deity.46 The number of coin issues showing the above deities suggests that the religious life of Aelia Capitolina placed much emphasis on the worship of (in particular) Dionysus and Sarapis. The popularity of Dionysus is expressed not only by the large number of reverses with his image, but also by the use of religious symbols associated with him as mint marks.47 While both gods enjoyed great popularity in various civilian social groups, their links with the Roman army’s religion is also confirmed. The same applies to the cult of the Dioscuri. It can thus be surmised that the popularity of these deities among Aelia Capitolina inhabitants could have stemmed from a simple transfer of their attachment to them from the garrison to the colony’s temples.48 No such association with military worship is positively attested for the cult of Tyche. It was among the most popular religious cults in the 34 Meshorer 1989, 72, nos. 10–11, 20–21. For more observations on her cult in Aelia Capitolina, see Belayche 2003a, 121ff. 35 Meshorer 1989, 72, nos. 13–13a; 74, no. 28. 36 Meshorer 1989, 72, no. 14; 74, no. 24. 37 Meshorer 1989, 72, nos. 18–19. 38 Meshorer 1989, 74, nos. 22–23. 39 Meshorer 1989, 74, nos. 25–26. 40 Meshorer 1989, 74, no. 29. Cf. ibid., p. 29. 41 Meshorer 1989, 78, no. 44; 80, no. 58 (Marcus Aurelius). Cf. ibid., p. 32–33. 42 Meshorer 1989, 88, no. 83 (Julia Domna). 43 Meshorer 1989, 114, nos. 175; 116, no. 185. Cf. ibid., p. 56–57. 44 Meshorer 1989, 114, nos. 171, 174. 45 Meshorer 1989, 104, nos. 133–133d. 46 Her. 5.6.6–7; Meshorer 1989, 48ff. 47 Meshorer 1989, 25ff., 35–36, 44, 50–51; Belayche 2001, 157ff. 48 It is confirmed by imagery on gems most probably belonging to soldiers found during the various excavations in Jerusalem. The gems are a valuable source in a study of the religious life of Roman soldiers stationed in the city; cf. Peleg 2003, 54ff.

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cities and in colonies alike,49 a fact confirmed by the coinage of both centers being discussed.50 Although military symbols on coins are not subject to our observations here, it may be worth mentioning that they dominate among various reverse types from Pisidian Antioch and Aelia Capitolina, making it quite clear that the coinage was issued by a veteran colony mint. Noteworthy also is a peculiarity in Aelia Capitolina coinage that probably resulted from the neighborhood of a legionary fortress. In addition to standard reverse types, proper for and common to all veteran colonial coinage, it included many reverse types that made direct reference to leg. X Fretensis military symbols. The unit’s signa were featured on the first colonial issues,51 to be often repeated in subsequent decades, as long as the Aelia Capitolina mint was in operation.52 Summing up our observations it may be said that although themes referring to colonial religious life are frequently represented on the veteran colonies’ coinage, this source alone does not gives us its full picture as coins exhibited only those deities that occupied paramount positions in the religious life of the inhabitants. We can also conclude that the colonists’ military background did not determine the choice of particular deities they worshipped and did not preclude the cult of a local deity, albeit gradually modified as needed. Colonial coinage also does not supply any evidence to suggest that veteran colonies possessed any common model of religious life. It seems rather that each colony made its own choices in this respect, any eventual references to past religious practice in the days of military duty being quite insignificant.

49 See Belayche 2003a. 50 Recently, much space and attention to the religious life of Aelia Capitolina was given by N. Belayche (1997; 1999; 2001, 108–170; 2003b, 168ff.). 51 Meshorer 1989, 70, nos. 4–6; cf. p. 22. 52 Meshorer 1989, 74, nos. 30–34 (Antoninus Pius); 104, nos. 131–132 (Elagabal); 114, nos. 169–170 (?) (Herennius Etruscus).

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Les colonies honoraires ou les colonies de vétérans?

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Les colonies honoraires ou les colonies de vétérans? Observations sur l’iconographie de quelques types de revers des monnaies coloniales

Les monnaies des colonies romaines, de même que le monnayage des viloles grecques, constituent, en dehors du témoignage des textes et de celui des monuments épigraphiques, l’une des sources historiques les plus importantes pour la connaissance du passé et des destinées des lieux où élles ont été émises. Dans de nombreux cas, les monnaies représentent même la seule et unique source d’information.1 Le monnayage des différentes colonies possède un caractère individuel qui se traduit par une diversité des types de revers où se reflètent non seulement des événements politiques et sportifs locaux d’une importance plus ou moins grande mais aussi des traditions religieuses et mythologiques. Sur ces pièces de monnaie, sont également figurés des temples et des bâtiments publics ainsi que les noms des fonctionnaires locaux.2 Cependant, malgré son caractère individualisé, le monnayage colonial possède des traits communs. L’un d’entre eux, qui nous intéresse plus particulièrement, est l’iconographie de plusieurs types de revers qui sont considérés comme appartenant au canon de ce monnayage. On y recense notamment les revers avec la représentation de Roma, des Dioscures, de Marsyas, de la louve capitoline, des enseignes militaires (signa) et celle de la scène de fondation de colonie (« the founder type »).3 Le trait commun des revers précités consistait à faire appel à la tradition mythologique et aux symboles politiques de Rome. Les habitants des colonies témoignaient ainsi leur adhésion aux systèmes des idées * 

Les colonies honoraires ou les colonies de vétérans? Observations sur l’iconographie de quelques types de revers des monnaies colonials, [in:] P. Defosse (ed.), Hommages à Carl Deroux, III: Histoire et épigraphie, Droit (Collection Latomus – 270), Éditions Latomus, Bruxelles 2003, 127–134.

1 Il existe une littérature abondante consacrée au monnayage des colonies. Pour cet article une importance toute particulière doit être accordée aux ouvrages suivants: Castelin 1946 ; von Aulock 1968, 221–237 (cf. von Aulock 1971, 22) ; 1970, 151–159; 1972, 509–518 ; Krzyżanowska 1970 ; Burnett, Amandry, Ripolles 1992 (= RPC I) ; Burnett, Amandry, Carradice 1999 (= RPC II). 2 Il faut signaler que les faibles différences dans l’iconographie des revers qui apparaissent dans le monnayage de certaines colonies, servent essentiellement à enrichir la représentation principale d’éléments ayant une couleur locale. Ces éléments individualisés de l’iconographie permettaient de mieux associer la monnaie avec la colonie qui l’émettait. C’était en quelque sorte son signe distinctif. 3 Une étude plus détaillé sur ces représentations, voir Dąbrowa 2004a, 213–216.

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et des valeurs romaines. Ces représentations servaient en outre à accentuer le statut juridique de la colonie elle-même. Le lien avec Rome était d’autre part souligné par l’utilisation du latin pour les légendes inscrites sur les monnaies.4 La pratique consistant à fonder des colonies avait une longue tradition dans l’histoire de Rome. Les débuts remontent aux temps de la conquête de l’Italie. Les colonies, non seulement, témoignaient de la présence des Romains sur un territoire donné, mais aussi constituaient la preuve de la puissance de Rome. Elles devaient garantir la sécurité et la stabilité du pouvoir de Rome et permettre le contrôle des vastes territoires et l’exploitation de leurs ressources. Au cours des siècles, ces fonctions des colonies n’ont rien perdu de leur importance. On note une intensification de la colonisation à partir du milieu du Ier siècle av. J.-C. et au cours du Ier siècle ap. J.-C. Pendant cette période, on créa plusieurs dizaines de colonies nouvelles, en majorité en dehors de l’Italie.5 Leur trait caractéristique était que le noyau des habitants était constitué, le plus souvent, par des vétérans de l’armée. À partir de la seconde moitié du IIe siècle, on constate l’apparition d’une nouvelle catégorie de colonies, les colonie honoraires dont le statut était établi par un acte juridique qui n’avait aucun rapport avec la colonisation militaire.6 Pour certains chercheurs qui considèrent que la colonisation de type militaire est pratiquement terminée sous le règne d’Hadrien,7 il faut envisager que l’attribution du statut de colonie aux villes de province était uniquement un acte de clémence et de générosité de l’empereur. La cause de cette pratique, en usage essentiellement en Orient, devrait être recherchée, selon eux, dans les troubles politiques provoqués par les luttes entre les prétendants au trône romain vers la fin du IIe siècle ap. J.-C. Ce fut en effet de cette manière que Septime Sévère récompensa les villes syriennes qui s’étaient prononcées en sa faveur lors du conflit qui l’avait opposé à Pescennius Niger.8 L’obtention d’un statut juridique privilégié autorisait l’émission d’une monnaie à carcatère colonial. Du point de vue formel, le monnayage des colonies honoraires ne diffère en rien de celui des colonies de vétérans ; sur leurs monnaies, en effet, 4

Cette fonction toute particulière du latin est perceptible dans le cas des colonies honoraires. L’obtention du statut de colonie était accompagné du changement immédiat de la langue des légendes monétaires du grec au latin. Et si ce changement n’avait qu’une signification formelle, dans de nombreux cas, notamment pour les monnaies des petites villes d’Orient, cette opération était difficile à effectuer. La preuve nous en est fournie notamment par les fautes d’ortographe dans l’inscription latine du nom de la nouvelle colonie ou l’utilisation de l’alphabet grec dans les légendes latines. De manière plus détaillée, cette question a été traitée par M. Sartre (2001b, 142 sqq.). 5 Voir Grant 1946 ; Vittinghoff 1952 ; Levick 1967 ; Keppie 1983 ; 1984, 77–114 ; Millar 1990, 5–58 ; Sartre 2001b, 112–119. 6 Cf. Levick 1967, 165 ; Millar 1990, 23, 39 sqq., 57. Voir aussi Vittinghoff 1952, 27 sqq. 7 Zahrnt 1991, 484. Cf. Millar 1990, 8 sqq., 31 sqq. 8 Millar 1990, 31 sqq. Les empereurs successifs firent de ce privilège un instrument de promotioon des centres urbains de province. Parmi plusieurs dizaines de colonies honoraires connues, la plupart ont obtenu leur statut dans la première moitié du IIIe siècle ap. J.-C., cf. Sartre 2001b, 117 sqq.

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apparaissent des légendes en latin et, sur les revers, des représentations bien connues dans le monnayage des colonies de vétérans. Cette uniformisation revêtait un double objectif : un objectif de propagande d’une part mais aussi celui d’estomper les différences qui existaient entre les deux types de colonie. On pourrait penser que cette pratique aurait eu pour conséquence une unification iconographique des types de revers adoptés par les colonies honoraires. Il n’en est rien. Il est erroné, en effet, de penser que l’utilisation, par les ateliers des colonies honoraires, de modèles connus n’avait qu’une signification symbolique et se limitait à une simple imitation. En effet, l’analyse des différences iconographiques d’un même type de revers dans plusieurs colonies honoraires, exclut de manière catégorique l’hypothèse selon laquelle il ne s’agirait que d’une variante peu importante d’un modèle initial. Il est donc utile d’expliquer autant les raisons de ces différences que de tenter de déterminer leur signification éventuelle. J’ai rappelé ci-dessus que le canon des types de revers caractéristiques dans le monnayage colonial servait d’une part essentiellement à accentuer les liens qui unissaient la colonie et ses habitants au système des valeurs et des symboles de l’État romain, attestait d’autre part un statut juridique privilégié. Parmi les types de revers que j’ai signalés, il en est deux, le « founder type » et le revers avec les emblèmes militaires, doivent tout particulièrement attirer notre attention. Nous appellerons ce dernier type « type colonial de signa » pour le distinguer d’un groupe important de monnaies, les « Signa-Münzen », qui proviennent des villes d’Asie Mineure avec sur le revers la représentation de l’aigle des légions entre deux étendards.9 L’utilisation de l’expression « Signa-Münzen » dans le cadre de notre recherche sur les monnaies coloniales, pourrait être une source de malentendus, car Clemens Bosch, qui a introduit cette dénomination, considérait, en raison du rôle économique spécifique qu’il leur attribuait, l’ensemble des monnaies représentant des enseignes militaires sur le revers comme un groupe à part. Selon lui, elles devaient servir essentiellement à satisfaire les besoins du marché monétaire local en monnaie de moindre importance au moment de la présence, en raison des combats menés sur le front de l’Est aux IIe et IIIe siècles ap. J.-C., d’une grande quantité de militaires sur les territoires de l’Asie Mineure. C’est la raison pour laquelle il n’attachait guère d’intérêt au statut des ateliers qui avaient émis ces pièces.10 Cependant, il suffit de comparer les revers des monnaies coloniales et ceux des monnaies frappées dans les villes anatoliennes pour constater que leur iconographie est différente. En effet, une certaine uniformisation avec la représentation 9 Bosch 1931, 426 sq. 10 Une nouvelle interprétation des émissions classées dans la catégorie « Signa-Münzen » a été proposée par F. Rebuffat (1998). Ce chercheur distingue les émissions coloniales et municipales avec représentation des enseignes militaires sur le revers, mais en raison du type commun du revers, il les situe dans la même catégorie.

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des emblèmes militaires figurés sur le monnayage colonial et municipal, n’apparaît que sur les émissions mises en circulation vers le milieu du IIIe siècle ap. J.-C. En outre, la chronologie de l’apparition des signa sur les revers est, elle aussi, différente pour les deux types de monnayage : dans le monnayage colonial, la présence de signa apparait sur les revers est attestée à partir de la seconde moitié du Ier siècle ap. J.-C., alors que dans le monnayage municipal, les emblèmes militaires, sauf quelques rares exceptions, deviennent un type populaire à partir du IIe siècle apr. J.-C. seulement.11 Bien que l’on ne puisse pas totalement exclure un prototype commun de la représentation elle-même, les différences, en ce qui concerne l’iconographie des signa, doivent être recherchées dans le caractère distinct des deux types de monnayage. L’aquila entre les deux sigma apparaît pour la première fois vers l’an 82 av. J.-C. sur le revers des monnaies romaines frappées à Massalia par C. Valerius Flaccus.12 Le même type de représentation, avec de petites modifications iconographiques, apparaît à nouveau, après une longue interruption, sur des pièces frappées à Rome en 49,13 42,14 et vers l’année 37.15 Il semblerait cependant que la forme iconographique définitive de ce type de revers ait été grandement influencée par une importante série de monnaies portant les noms des légions frappées vers 31–32 av. J.-C. par des ateliers qui appartenaient à Marc Antoine.16 Il ne fait aucun doute que l’apparition de cette représentation sur le denier frappé à Rome sous le règne de Néron17 et son utilisation fréquente, par la suite, dans le monnayage des empereurs, ont abouti à ce que toutes les associations politiques que ce type de revers pouvait éveiller auparavant, notamment en Orient, ont été voilées par de nouvelles significations. Elles furent probablement à l’origine de leur importante utilisation dans le monnayage municipal. Dans le cas du monnayage colonial, les revers avec la representation de signa n’avaient pas une connotation politiques aussi évidente ; les signa soulignaient, en effet, l’origine militaire de la colonie. Ceci explique que l’iconographie des revers 11 Les émissions municipales les plus anciennes avec la représentation de signa datent du Ier siècle ap. J.-C. : Rebuffat 1998, 30 sqq. 12 Grueber 1910, II : 388–390, nos 1–26; Sydenham 1952, 120, no 747; Crawford 1975, I : 381, no 365 et p. 80 et note 10. 13 Grueber 1910, I : 504, nos 3950–3952; Sydenham 1952, 157, no 937 ; Crawford 1975, I : 460, no 441, 1. 14 Grueber 1910, II : 410, nos 96–99; Crawford 1975, I : 513, no 497, 3. 15 Grueber 1910, I : 593 sq., nos 4314–4320 ; Sydenham 1952, 185, nos 1127–1128A ; Crawford 1975, I : 529, no 525, 2. 16 Grueber 1910, II : 526 sqq., nos 183–184, 187–226; Sydenham 1952, 195 sqq., nos 1212–1253 ; Crawford 1975, I : 539 sqq., nos 1–39. Le même revers est celui de la monnaie de l’an 31 av. J.-C., frappée dans Cyrénaïque par Scarpus, légat de Marc Antoine: Grueber 1910, II : 583, no 1 ; Sydenham 1952, 200, no 1279 ; Crawford 1975, I : 542, no 1. 17 RIC I, 149, no 60 ; RIC I2, 154, no 68 ; Giard 1988, 144, no 238.

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coloniaux a gardé longtemps des traits individuels. Le nombre diversifié des enseignes militaires sur les revers n’est donc nullement un hasard: il correspond au nombre des légions d’où provenaient les vétérans qui avaient fondé les colonies. Cette interprétation ne laisse aucun doute si on se réfère aux légendes qui accompagnent les représentations des signa et aux noms des légions. D’ailleurs, dans certains cas, ce n’est qu’en se référant aux signa qu’il est possible d’établir l’origine des premiers colons.18 Les colonies ont, en effet, gardé la mémoire de leurs origines militaires pendant toute leur existence et l’ont exprimée dans leur monnayage depuis la première jusqu’à la dernière émission. Le problème réside dans le fait qu’avec le temps, le motif figuré sur le revers des premières émissions a subi des transformations qui ont, d’une certaine manière, effacé le contenu initial pour se rapprocher du modèle standard, c’està-dire une représentation de l’aigle des légions placé entre deux étendards. Ceci explique les nombreux problèmes que pose l’interprétation des émissions coloniales plus tardives présentant ce revers standard.19 La représentation d’emblèmes militaires apparaît aussi sur des revers de monnaies coloniales considérées généralement comme monnaies commémoratives. Il ne s’agit cependant ni de l’aquila, ni même de signa, mais du vexillum, signe distinctif particulier, dont le choix nous amène à réflechir sur sa fonction symbolique dans la mesure où ce symbole n’était pas utilisé par toutes les colonies et dans la mesure où il apparaît conjointement avec d’autres représentations caractéristiques: la louve capitoline et la scène de fondation de colonie. Si les colonies honoraires devaient leur titre et le statut de colonie uniquement à un acte juridique, comment expliquer que certaines d’entre elles faisaient appel à des symboles militaires pourtant si différents de ce que l’on retrouve dans le monnayage municipal de l’époque? Il semble que l’iconographie du deuxième type de revers des monnaies coloniales, le « founder type », puisse apporter une explication à cette question. Le revers appelé « the founder type» est bien connu des numismates qui étudient le monnayage des colonies romaines. On le retrouve sur des monnaies de pratiquement toutes les colonies, tant militaires qu’honoraires, qui émettaient leur propre monnaie. La signification symbolique est évidente. Ce thème rappele la tradition, bien connue par tous les Romains, du tracé des murs de la Ville par Romulus ; il rappelle également l’acte réel de fondation de colonie lorsqu’elle a été créée par deductio ou par le biais d’une convention dans le cas où il s’agit de l’obtention du statut de colonie. La description du rite de fondation a été conservée grâce aux témoignages littéraires qui nous disent que le moment essentiel était le tracé de l’enceinte des murs.20 18 C. Dąbrowa 2001, 75 sq. 19 Cf. Rebuffat 1998, passim. 20 Le recensement de l’ensemble des témoignages relatifs à ce rite ainsi que leur interprétation ont été effectués par C. O. Thulin (1909, 3–17 ; cf. Thulin 1968). Cf. Schroder 1971, 40–41, frg.18 ; 171–176.

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Cet acte devait être accompli par un augure, etrusco ritu. Drapé dans sa toge, la tête couverte, le fondateur, à l’aide d’un attelage constitué d’un taureau et d’une vache, traçait un sillon qui correspondait à la ligne des murs.21 Cette scène, qui rappelait le moment le plus solennel du rite de la foundation de Rome, accompagnait les débuts de toute nouvelle ville et de toute nouvelle colonie.22 Contrairement à ce qu’on pourrait croire, les principes de base de ce thème ne sont pas toujours clairs. Certes les scènes de fondation apparaissent le plus souvent sur les premières émissions, mais il existe aussi de nombreux cas où cette scène est figurée alors que la fondation a eu lieu depuis plusieurs années. En outre, dans le monnayage de certaines colonies, le « founder type » n’est utilisé qu’une seule fois alors que, dans d’autres cas, la scène est reprise de nombreuses fois pendant une longue période. D’un point de vue iconographique, on peut distinguer deux types de revers : le revers civil et le revers militaire. Ce dernier, qui fait appel à la symbolique militaire, figure les étendards militaires (signa), le vexillum dont l’utilisation répond à un certain principe. Au IIIe siècle ap. J.-C., apparaît, essentiellement sur les monnaies des colonies honoraires, la version civile du « founder type ». En ce qui concerne les émissions coloniales datant du Ier siècle av. J.-C. au IIe siècle ap. J.-C., les signa, dans le contexte du « founder type », n’apparaissent que sur les monnaies des colonies des vétérans militaires et il n’y a aucun doute que cette pratique a eu comme objectif de mettre en évidence de l’origine militaire de ces colonies.23 Des règles quelque peu différentes peuvent être constatées en ce qui concerne l’utilisation du thème du vexillum.24 Un cas particulièrement rare est celui de l’émission de monnaies dont le revers ne présentent que le vexillum,25 alors qu’en principe, ce dernier représente plusieurs types de signes militaires.26 Sur certaines 21 Cf. Keppie 1984, 91 ; Caraffa 2000a, 272–273 ; 2000b, 227. 22 Sur les monnaies romaines, cette scène est représentée pour la première fois dans le cas de l’émission des monnaies L. Cassius Caecinus au tournant du IIe et Ier siècles av. J.-C. (Grueber 1910, I : 236 sq., nos 1725– 1741 ; Sydenham 1952, 83, no 594; Crawford 1975, I : 325, no 321). À partir de ce moment, sur les pièces frappées par l’atelier de Rome, cette scène apparaît à de nombreuses reprises. Bien que, dans le monnayage colonial, le revers « the founder type » soit l’un des plus populaires, la représentation de cette scène dans l’art romain est considéré comme extrêmement rare. La seule représentation en est connue par un fragment fragment de relief trouvé à Aquilée: Brusin 1931, 473, fig. 1 = Beard, North, Price 1998, II: 244 = Caraffa 2000a, 273, fig. C. 23 Cela n’exclut nullement l’utilisation dans le monnayage des colonies militaires de la version civile de ce revers, voir Antioche de Pisidie : Krzyżanowska 1970, 135 (= RPC I, no 3529), 175 (= pl.XXX, no 26); Berytus : RPC I, nos 4540, 4543, 4545–4546 ; Caesaraugusta : RPC I, nos 304–310, 314, 317–318, 322, 325–326, etc. ; Lystra : RPC I, nos 3538–3539; Patras : RPC I, nos 1252–1254. 24 Il faut remarquer que les chercheurs s’occupant de l’iconographie du vexillum ne se sont pas du tout intéressés à sa représentation dans le monnayage colonial, voir von Domaszewski 1885, 1–80 = von Domaszewski 1972, 1–80 ; Neumann 1958 , 2446–2454. 25 Cf. Caesaraugusta : RPC I, nos 311, 315, 321, 323, 357, 358 ; Rhésaina: Castelin 1946, 16 sq., nos 1–13 ; Leypold 1993, 63–66. 26 Cf. Caesaraugusta : RPC I, nos 319, 325, 326, 346; Ilici : RPC I, nos 189–191.

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monnaies avec la scène de fondation, le vexillum est tenu par fondateur qui trace le sillon.27 Le vexillum apparaît également sur d’autres types de revers.28 La présentation la plus fréquente est celle de la scène avec le vexillum, à l’arrière-plan, portant l’inscription du nom de la légion. Cette figuration est attestée dans les émissions coloniales à partir du Ier siècle ap. J.-C., mais la plupart datent cependant des IIe – IIIe siècles ap. J.-C. Alors que la présence du vexillum sur les monnaies émises par des colonies de vétérans est normale, sa figuration sur les monnaies des colonies considérées comme honororaires – Rhésaina,29 Tyr,30 Sidon,31 Césarée-Arca du Liban,32 Damas33 – reste incompréhensible. Les chercheurs qui se sont occupés de ce question, ont plutôt tendance à attribuer au vexillum une siginification symbolique ou de le considérer comme le témoignage de stationnement, sur le territoire de la colonie, de soldats d’une légion déterminée et non d’y voir le souvenir de l’acte réel d’une colonisation militaire.34 Cette manière de voir est proche de l’opinion largement répandue selon laquelle, sous le règne d’Hadrien, a cessé la pratique de créer des colonies par des groupes importants de vétérans. Mais à la lumière des sources numismatiques, cette opinion soulève des doutes sérieux. En effet, en ce qui concerne la période qui s’étend du Ier siècle av. J.-C. au IIe siècle ap. J.-C., l’iconographie des monnaies est considérée, indépendamment des autres sources d’information, comme un témoignage crédible à propos de la colonisation militaire. Les arguments qui mettent en doute ce témoignage pour la période des IIe et IIIe siècles, ne sont pas totalement clairs. S’il est vrai que la signification de différents symboles utilisés dans le monde romain a suivi une évolution et a acquis de nouvelles significations, il serait difficile d’admettre que ceci était accompagné de l’oubli du contrat initial. En effet, la signification de symboles utilisés sans interruption pendant plusieurs générations était universellement compréhensible et connue de tous. Un de ces symboles était le vexillum. Sa relation avec la colonisation militaire remontait aux dernières décennies de la république. C’était en effet sous ce signe que les vétérans se rendaient dans les colonies.35 La présence du vexillum dans le monnayage colonial, jusqu’au IIe siècle ap. J.-C., uniquement sur les monnaies de colonies de vétérans, exclut la possibilité d’une utilisation fortuite 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34

Cf. Antioche de Pisidie : Krzyżanowska 1970, 136–137, nos 1–10 (= pl. I–II, table 4, nos 1–10). Cf. Castelin 1946, 19 sq., nos 14–18. Castelin 1946, 16 sq., nos 1–13 ; Leypold 1993, 63–66. Dąbrowa 2001, 77. Dąbrowa 2001, 77 sq. Dąbrowa 2001, 80. Dąbrowa 2001, 78. Voir Honigmann 1923, 2227–2228; Eissfeldt 1948, 1900–1901 ; Mann 1983, 43. R. Ziegler (1978, 512 ; 512–513, note 113) est le premier chercheur qui reconnut la présence du vexillum sur les monnaies de Tyr et de Sidon comme témoignage de la colonisation militaire dans ces villes. Cf. Rebuffat 1998, 410. 35 Voir Cic., Leg. Agr. II, 86; Phil. II, 102 ; Appien, BC II, 120 ; Keppie 1984, 96 ; Moatti 1993, 23–24.

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ou arbitraire de ce symbole par un atelier quel qu’il soit. En conséquence, sa présence sur les pièces de monnaies émises par certaines colonies qui ont obtenu leur titre et leur statut à la fin du IIe siècle ou au milieu du IIIe siècle ap. J.-C., ne peut pas être considérée considerée, contrairement à ce que pensent certains chercheurs, comme un symbole dépourvu de sa signification initiale. En guise de conclusion, nous pouvons constater que l’apparition de colonies honoraires ne signifiait nullement la fin de la pratique de fondation des colonies de vétérans par voie de deductio. Il est probable que telles colonies aient encore été fondées au moins jusqu’au milieu du IIIe siècle ap. J.-C.

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Les enseignes militaires utilisées par l’armée romaine constituaient un exemple explicite de la puissance de Rome. Grâce à de nombreuses représentations apposées essentiellement sur les revers des monnaies mais aussi sur les reliefs et sur les tombeaux, ainsi que grâce aux descriptions fournies par les auteurs de l’Antiquité, nous sommes en mesure de distinguer, sans difficultés, leurs différents types. Pour la première fois, des étendards militaires ont été représentés sur les monnaies romaines à l’époque républicaine. Depuis le règne d’Auguste jusqu’à la fin du IIIe siècle après J.-C., ce motif revint fréquemment sur les pièces frappées par les Monnaies impériales, municipales et coloniales. Le type de revers le plus répandu était celui où était représenté l’aigle légionnaire placée entre deux signa. Pour la première fois, cette image apparaît sur les monnaies frappées vers 82 av. J.-C. par C.Valerius Flaccus.1 Cependant, la popularité de ce type de revers s’est seulement accrue grâce à une série de monnaies frappées par Marc Antoine dans les années 32–31 av. J.-C.2 Sur les pièces frappées dans l’atelier de Rome, le même type de représentation n’apparut qu’un siècle plus tard, sous le règne de Néron.3 Sans aucun doute, l’introduction de cet élément dans l’iconographie des monnaies impériales fut décisif pour sa diffusion. Dès l’époque de Néron, la représentation de l’aigle des légions placée entre deux signa, devint un modèle standard du revers des monnaies impériales. Il est d’autre part évident que l’utilisation de ce type de revers par l’atelier de Rome explique les raisons de sa popularité dans le monnayage local en Orient. Le grand succès du revers avec la représentation des signa reste lié par ailleurs à la modification de sa signification politique. À l’époque de la république il fut, à l’origine, exclusivement le symbole des forces armées dirigées par un légat. Sous le règne des premiers empereurs, le revers doté d’enseignes militaires, exprimait des contenus différents, ceci en foncion du type de monnaies sur lesquelles il apparaissait (impériales, * 

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1

Grueber 1910, 388–390, nos 1–26 ; Sydenham 1952, 120, no 747; Crawford 1975, I : 381, no 365; p. 80 et note 10. 2 Grueber 1910, 526 sq., nos 183–184, 187–226 ; Sydenham 1952, 195 sq., nos 1212–1253 ; Crawford, 1975, I: 539 sq., nos 1–39 ; cf. Grueber 1910, 583, no 1 ; Sydenham 1952, 200, no 1279; Crawford 1975, I : 542, no 1. Voir aussi Brunt 1971, 505 sqq. ; Chitescu 1974, 147–153, part. p. 147–151; Keppie 2000b , 78 sqq. 3 Mattingly, Sydenham 1923, 149, no 60 ; Sutherland 1984, 154, no 80 ; Giard 1988, 144, no 238.

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municipales ou coloniales).4 Ce fut seulement à partir du IIe siècle ap. J.-C. qu’il devint le symbole reconnu de la loyauté de la population des villes et des colonies à l’égard de Rome et de l›empereur.5 Le rôle particulièrement important de l’armée dans le maintien et dans le fonctionnement du système politique mis en place par Auguste trouva son reflet dans le monnayage impérial. Auguste tout comme ses successeurs soulignaient le lien les unissant à l’armée par le biais des monnaies, à de nombreuses occasions, grâce à un large éventail de divers types de revers. Outre le monnaygae impérial, la symbolique militaire n’apparaissait aussi fréquemment que dans le cas des monnaies relatives aux colonies des vétérans militaires. Le plus souvent, on faisait appel à la représentation de différents types d’enseignes utilisés par les légions dont, à quelques exceptions près, étaient originaires les colons.6 Pour ce qui concerne la légion, l’enseigne guerrière la plus importante était l’aigle (aquila), et, à part cette dernière, le signum, un autre type spécifique de l’étendard de la légion. Le signum était utilisé comme un emblème standard par chaque centurie faisant partie d’une légion. Les signa des centuries appartenant à la même unité pouvaient toutefois différer car leur aspect dépendait du nombre et du type d’enseignes guerrières obtenues par les soldats faisant leur service dans la centurie déterminée. Ces distinctions étaient symbolisées par les plaquettes situées sur la hampe du signum. En dehors des enseignes mentionnées ci-dessus, un motif utilisé fréquemment par l’armée romaine était celui du vexillum7 que l’on retrouvait, d’une part, dans les unités régulières, à savoir dans les légions, dans les troupes auxiliaires (auxilia) et dans la garde prétorienne et, d’autre part, dans les entités distinctes (vexillationes) et même, occasionnellement, dans des groupes formés temporairement par des soldats et des vétérans. Dans le monnayage colonial, l’une des représentations les plus répandues était celle de l’aigle de la légion située entre deux signa. D’un point de vue iconographique, ce 4

Un phénomène caractéristique est celui de l’utilisation de ce type de revers dans le monnayage des prétendants au trône dans les années 68–69 ap. J.-C. (Mattingly, Sydenham 1923, 179 sq. ; Sutherland 1984, 199 ; Giard 1998, 24, no 12; 25, nos 16–20) et L. Clodius Macer (Hewitt 1983, 68, nos 1–2; 68–69, no 5 ; Giard 1998, 65, nos 1–5). L’aspect propagandiste de ce monnayage laisse penser que ce ne furent pas les monnaies de Néron mais plutôt celles de Marc Antoine qui étaient à l’origine du revers avec la représentation d’enseignes militaires (cf. Sutherland 1984, 191). 5 Cette représentation est interprétée quelque peu différemment par F. Rebuffat (1998, 367): « En fait, nous devons complètement rennoncer à l’idée selon laquelle les types avec enseignes se feraient l’écho d’événements locaux et, pourrait-on dire, strictement militaires; les enseignes représentent seulement le symbole le plus géneral et le plus immédiat pour évoquer l’armée romaine avec ses diverses composantes. » Cf. aussi, p. 404–405, 410. 6 Pour une étude plus approfondie quant à l’ensemble des différentes enseignes militaires romaines et à leur iconographie, voir: von Domaszewski 1885, 1–80 (= von Domaszewski 1972, 1–80). 7 Domaszewski 1885/1972, 76–80; Mayer 1910 ; Rostovtzeff 1942, 92–106 ; Neuman 1958 , 2446–2454 ; Breeze, Dobson 1993 , 81 sqq.

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type de revers était similaire au revers des pièces frappées dans la Monnaie romaine mais dans le canon des revers coloniaux il n’apparut que sous le règne d’Auguste. Jusqu’au milieu du Ier siècle ap. J.-C., la représentation de l’aigle de la légion et du signa était souvent accompagnée du numéro de la légion dont étaient originaires les vétérans appartenant au groupe des premiers colons. L’association de ces deux éléments ne laisse pas de doute quant à l’origine coloniale de ce revers qui fut strictement lié à l’action de colonisation. À l’époque du Haut-Empire, ce lien se trouve confirmé par différentes variantes iconographiques du modèle standard : sur les monnaies des colonies de vétérans militaires, on retrouve aussi la représentation de l’aigle et du vexillum entre deux signa,8 deux aigles entre deux signa,9 le vexillum entre deux aigles,10 le vexillum entre deux signa.11 Du modèle initial s’éloigne le plus le revers des monnaies frappées dans la colonie Acco-Ptolemaïs, sur lequel on retrouve la représentation de quatre vexilla. À cela s’ajoutent les noms des quatre légions dont étaient originaires les colons.12 Malgré les différences évidentes entre le modèle standard et ses variantes, il n’y a pas de doute que ces dernières se rapportent directement à l’action réelle de colonisation car, outre quelques rares exceptions, ces variantes apparaissent sur de différentes émissions provenant de la même Monnaie. Les numéros des légions, dont étaient originaires les vétérans qui s’installèrent dans les différentes colonies, apparaissant sur des revers différents du modèle utilisé le plus fréquemment, confirment aussi cette hypothèse. Ces numéros permettent d’autre part d’établir que, sur les revers, un nombre parfois plus élevé d’aquilae ou de vexilla correspond au nombre de légions dont les soldats firent partie et aussi au groupe des premiers colons. Or, le détail le plus intéressant de l’iconographie de certaines variantes est la représentation du vexillum. Très souvent il s’agit de l’un des éléments constitutifs et exceptionnellement, il en est l’élément principal et unique. L’apparition distincte de la représentation du vexillum dans le monnayage colonial nous incite à une réflexion quant à son contenu et quant à sa fonction. Les dimensions parfois considérables du monnayage des colonies militaires et civiles fondées en Italie et dans les provinces au Ier siècle av. J.-C. et au Ier siècle ap. J.-C., peuvent nous faire penser que la monnaie en bronze que l’on y frappait, nécessaire dans des transactions de moindre importance, devait servir au développement économique des territoires limitrophes. La part que joua réellement la monnaie coloniale dans la circulation monétaire locale est cependant difficile à déterminer car cela 8 9 10 11

Italica : RPC I, nos 70–71 ; Ilici : RPC I, nos 189–191. Acci : RPC I, nos 133, 143; Antioche de Pisidie : RPC I, nos 3530–3531; Berytus : RPC I, no 4547. Ilici : RPC I, no 199. Caesaraugusta : RPC I, no 319, cf. no 325 (la même représentation sur l’envers ; sur le revers, la scène de fondation de la colonie). 12 Acco Ptolemaïs : RPC I, nos 4749–4750 ; Dąbrowa 2001, 76 et note 12.

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dépendait du monnayage de chacune des colonies. À part les Monnaies coloniales qui émettaient leurs propres pièces systématiquement pendant une longue période et dans de nombreuses émissions, nous en connaissons aussi d’autres dont l’activité fut limitée à plusieurs ou à une dizaine d’émissions. De nombreux cas sont connus dans lesquels les premières émissions n’eurent lieu que plusieurs dizaines d’années après la création de la colonie. C’est pourquoi l’on peut considérer que l’approvisionnement du marché local en pièces de valeur inférieure ne constituait pas du tout l’objectif principal de fonctionnement des Monnaies coloniales. Il serait beaucoup plus justifié de penser que dans leur activité, une importance primordiale eut tout d’abord l’aspect de propagande. C’est d’ailleurs ce que prouvent les légendes en latin sur les pièces coloniales ainsi que l’iconographie des revers accentuant les liens de la colonie avec Rome. Dans ce contexte, il faudrait aussi placer les revers des monnaies des colonies de vétérans militaires faisant appel à la symbolique des étendards militaires en tant que témoignage de leur origine. Pour expliquer la fonction de la représentation du vexillum dans le monnayage colonial, il est nécesaire de savoir à quelle époque ce motif était utilisé sur les revers des monnaies coloniales. Les exemples précités permettent de constater que pour la première fois, cette représentation apparaît sur les monnaies frappées au Ier siècle ap. J.-C. En tant qu’élément de l’iconographie du revers, ce motif était utilisé aussi bien séparément qu’en association avec les représentations d’autres types d’enseignes militaires. De nouveau, dans le monnayage colonial, le vexillum était abondamment utilisé dans la seconde moitié du IIe siècle ap. J.-C. et tout au long de la première moitié du IIIe siècle ap. J.-C., mais les raisons de ce phénomène n’ont pas été expliquées de manière satisfaisante jusqu’ici. Selon une opinion généralement adoptée, depuis les temps d’Hadrien, en raison de l’insuffisance de territoires qui pourraient être colonisés et compte tenu du manque d’intérêt manifesté par les vétérans en ce qui concerne cette forme de récompense pour le service effectué, la pratique consistant à fonder des colonies par les vétérans liée à l’attribution des terres pour les colons (deductio)13 avait disparu et, à la place des anciennes colonies, apparut une nouvelle catégorie, les colonies honoraires (ou titulaires) qui devaient leur statut uniquement à un acte juridique. La conséquence naturelle découlant de l’acceptation de ce point de vue est la supposition que le monnayage des colonies ayant le même statut juridique devrait faire appel au même type de revers, comme cela avait eu lieu pour ce qui concerne le monnayage colonial au Ier siècle ap. J.-C. L’iconographie des revers des villes ayant obtenu le statut de colonie pendant la période qui nous intéresse, semble, jusqu’à un certain point, confirmer 13 Cf. Sherwin-White 1973, 413 ; Mann 1983, 65 ; Millar 1990, 8 sq., 31 sq. ; Zahrnt 1991, 484 ; Keppie 2000e, 302, 311 sq. Voir aussi les très intéressantes remarques formulées par P. Brennan (1990, 491–502).

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la justesse de cette supposition car certains types de revers sont effectivement communs à la plupart des monnaies indiquées précédemment. Or, dans le monnayage de certaines colonies apparaissent aussi des revers qui, tout en conservant le canon iconographique commun, font état d’une diversité considérable en ce qui concerne certains éléments.14 Le plus caractéristique de ce point de vue est le type de revers que les numismates appellent « the founder type ». Il représente la scène symbolique de fondation d’une colonie : le fondateur, en toge et la tête couverte, conduit un attelage composé d’un boeuf et d’une vache et, avec la charrue, il creuse un sillon qui indique le pomerium de la nouvelle colonie. Ce rituel était en quelque sorte la répétition de l’acte de fondation de Rome par Romulus.15 Dans le monnayage colonial, un tel revers soulignait le lien unissant la colonie et ses habitants avec la capitale sur les rives du Tibre. La scène de fondation de la colonie apparaissait d’habitude sur les premières émissions de ses monnaies. Or, dans le monnayage de certaines colonies, cette scène se trouve enrichie par la représentation du vexillum, sur lequel est parfois apposé le nom de la légion. Dans certains cas, il est tenu par le fondateur mais bien plus souvent, il représente l’un des éléments de la toile de fond dans cette scène. L’iconographie de ces deux représentations est différente à tel point qu’il est justifié de définir la première d’entre elles comme étant la version civile du founder type, et la seconde comme étant sa version militaire.16 Il n’y a guère de doute que les monnaies coloniales avec le revers représentant la scène «civile» de fondation de la colonie peuvent être considérées comme étant un exemple crédible confirmant l’obtention ou la possession du statut de colonie par une ville déterminée. Par contre, l’utilisation de la variante militaire de ce revers est évidente pour ce qui concerne le monnayage des colonies de vétérans du Ier siècle av. J.-C. et du Ier siècle ap. J.-C., car en déterminant les origines des premiers colons, cela est plus difficile à expliquer que dans le cas des pièces qui proviennent, entre autres, de Singara, Rhésaina, Tyr, Sidon, Césarée-Arca du Liban et Dams, c’est-à-dire de colonies considérées généralement comme honoraires. Seuls quelques chercheurs ont tendance à considérer ce revers comme étant le témoignage d’une colonisation militaire.17 La majorité d’entre eux explique l’utilisation de la représentation de cet étendard par la présence, sur le territoire 14 Voir Dąbrowa 2003a, 127–134. 15 Pour la première fois, cette scène fut représentée sur les monnaies romaines frappées au tournant du IIe – Ier siècle av. J.-C. par L. Cassius Caecinus: Grueber 1910, 236 sq., nos 1725–1741; Sydenham 1952, 83, no 594 ; Crawford 1975, I : 325, no 321. Voir aussi Eckstein 1979 [1981], 86 sqq. ; 96 note 19; 97 note 32 ; Keppie 1983, 91; Caraffa 2000a, 227 ; 2000b, 272–273. Malgré l’opinion de A. M. Eckstein (1979 [1981], 97 note 32 : « The tradition of the aratrum ritual persevered: images of the ceremony persist on the coinage of coloniae down to the end of the second century A.D ; . . . » ), la scène de fondation des colonies apparut sur les revers des monnaies coloniales jusqu’au milieu du IIIe siècle ap. J.-C. ; cf. ci-dessous, note 23. 16 Cf. Dąbrowa 2003a, 129–133. 17 Ziegler 1978, 512 et 512–513 note 113 ; Dąbrowa 2001, 75–80 ; 2003a, 134 ; cf. Rebuffat 1998, 410.

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de ces villes-colonies, d’un camp d’une légion dont le nom apparait sur le vexillum.18 Or, il serait difficile d’accepter sans aucune objection une telle interprétation car, pour ce qui concerne certaines légions, cela pourrait signifier un important éparpillement des soldats dans les villes situées à une distance considérable par rapport au camp-mère.19 Pourtant, aucune des sources ne contient la moindre indication qui pourrait justifier cet éparpillement par une menace pour l’ordre ou pour la structure ou qui aurait été provoquée par des raisons tactiques ou stratégiques. Sans une telle justification, il serait difficile de comprendre à quoi cela devrait servir, d’autant plus que les conséquences qui en découlaient consistaient en de sérieuses difficultés quant au maintient de la communication entre les différentes garnisons appartenant à la même unité. Il faut aussi attirer l’attention sur un autre aspect que l’on passait jusqu’à maintenant sous silence et qui met en doute le bien fondé d’une telle interprétation. Si le vexillum, avec le nom de la légion qui y était inscrit, devait être considéré comme une preuve de la présence du camp de cette légion ou de sa vexillatio, pourquoi alors sur les monnaies des villes qui n’avaient pas le statut de colonie, et dans lesquelles un tel camp se trouvait, n’apparaît jamais ni ce type de revers, ni même le nom de la légion qui y stationnait? Ainsi, en voulant déterminer si la version militaire du revers représentant la scène de fondation de la colonie contient un message particulier, il serait indispensable d’établir les principes selon lesquels on utilisait la représentation du vexillum dans le monnayage et tenir compte d’autre part des autres types de revers, que nous n’avons pas énumérés jusqu’à présent et sur lesquels cette représentation a été utlisée. L’analyse des sources numismatiques nous amène aux conclusions suivantes: 1) La représentation du vexillum n’apparaît jamais sur les revers des monnaies frappées indépendamment par les villes dans lesquelles se trouvaient les camps des légions. Comme allusion à cette présence est considéré seulement le signe du zodiaque apposé sur les revers des monnaies en tant qu’élément iconographique, et ceci en raison de sa conformité avec l’enseigne de la légion qui stationnait dans cette ville.20 Compte tenu du statut de colonie, ce groupe ne peut pas inclure les émissions de Rhésaina, Singara et celle de Aelia Capitolina. Rhésaina obtint le statut de colonie sous le règne de Séptime Sévère.21 Les débuts de son monnaygae colonial remontent à l’époque du règne de Caracalla. Sur les revers 18 Honigmann 1923, 2227–2228 ; Eissfeldt 1948, 1900–1901 ; Mann 1983, 43 ; Harl 1987, 50 ; Isaac 1992, 139 et note 191 ; 360 et note 169 ; Pollard 2000, 63. 19 L’une des unités de ce type aurait été la leg. III Gallica, cf. Dąbrowa 2000a, 314 ; 2001, 76 sqq. 20 Cf. Wagner 1977, 229 sqq. ; 1985, 53 ; Harl 1987, 49 ; Stoll 2001b, 66 sqq. 21 Millar 1990, 39 ; Isaac 1992, 360; Pollard 2000, 273 sq. ; Sartre 2001a, 706; 2001b, 117.

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des premières émissions nous avons deux types de représentations. Le premier représente le vexillum avec le nom leg. III Parthica qui l’accompagne ; on retrouve le même revers sur les monnaies frappées sous le règne de Héliogabale, d’Alexandre Sévère et de Trajan Dèce.22 La seconde représentation diffère en ce sens qu’au premier plan, à la place du vexillum, on retrouve le sagittarius. Les monnaies avec ce type de revers étaient frappées non seulement sous le règne de Caracalla, mais aussi sous Héliogabale et Alexandre Sévère.23 Pour de nombreux chercheurs, les émissions avec la représentation du vexillum, auquel était associé le nom de la leg. III Parthica, constituent la preuve de la présence de cette unité à Rhésaina.24 Cependant, le bien-fondé de cette conception généralement adoptée, a été dernièrement mis en doute par D. Kennedy. Selon lui, il y a des arguments qui semblent indiquer que ce ne fut pas à Rhésaina mais probablement à Nisibis que stationnait cette legion.25 En tenant compte de ces arguments, on peut en arriver à la conclusion que, puisque la présence du vexillum et du sagittarius sur les monnaies de Rhésaina n’est en aucune relation avec la présence dans ses murs de la légion III Parthica, l’utilisation de ces représentations sur les monnaies ne pourrait être justifiée que par le fait d’avoir obtenu le statut de colonie par cette ville.26 Dans tout autre cas, l’utilisation, dans le monnayage de Rhésaina, du vexillum et du sagittarius, reste incompréhensible. L’association si exceptionnelle de ces deux éléments iconographiques nous amène à la conclusion selon laquelle la ville ne devait pas son nouveau statut à la décision impériale mais qu’il s’agissait bien de la conséquence de l’action de colonisation à laquelle participèrent les vétérans de la leg. III Parthica. Singara, située dans Mésopotamie, fut l’endroit où stationnait la leg. I Parthica.27 L’appellation de la ville permet d’établir qu›elle avait aussi le statut de colonie. Selon l’opinion des chercheurs, elle l’obtint soit sous le règne de Marc Aurèle, tout de suite après la prise de la ville par les Romains,28 soit sous le règne de Septime Sévère29 ou 22 Castelin 1946, 16 sq., nos 1–13 ; Leypold 1993, 63 sqq., nos 3–4a, 9–10. 23 Castelin 1946, 19 sq., nos 14–17A ; Leypold 1993, 63 sqq., nos 1–2, 5–8. La version civile du revers avec la représentation de la fondation d’une colonie apparaît sur les monnaies de Rhésaina seulement aux temps du règne de Trajan Dèce : Castelin 1946, 90 sqq., nos 94–104. L’interprétation de certains éléments de l’iconographie pose quelques difficultés: Castelin 1946, 68 sqq. 24 Cf. Castelin 1946, 24–26, 30, 40–41, 42 ; Isaac 1992, 42 note 150 ; 360. 25 Kennedy 1987, 61. Cette opinion est partagée aussi par M. Sartre 2001a, 619 et note 41. 26 Cf. Sartre 2001a, 619 note 41 ; Dąbrowa 2004c, 217–218. 27 Speidel, Reynolds 1985, 31–35; cf. ILS 9477 = MAMA VIII 522. Sur Singara, voir Gregory, Kennedy 1985, 6–21, 385–391 ; Kennedy, Riley 1990, 125–131 ; Pollard 2000, 274 sq. L’opinion de G. F. Hill (1916, 165) ne trouva pas de nombreux partisans. Selon cette hypothèse, le signe du sagittarius fut le signe du zodiaque de la colonie. Le caractère civil du signe du zodiaque sur les monnaies de Zeugma n’est cependant pas exclu par K. Butcher (1998, 235). 28 Cf. Jones 1971, 220 : « Singara is styled Aurelia Septimia: the former title perhaps indicates that the city was first colonized by Verus, the second that Severus re-colonized it. » 29 Millar 1990, 39 ; Pollard 2000, 274 ; Sartre 2001a, 706–707 ; 2001b, 117.

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même à l’époque d’Alexandre Sévère.30 Étant donné que les premières émissions coloniales connues de Singara remontent aux temps du règne de Gordien III, il est impossible de déterminer avec plus de précision la date à laquelle elle obtint le statut de colonie d’après son monnayage.31 Or, c’est justement de l’époque du règne de cet dernier empereur que date la monnaie unique avec un revers identique à celui que nous connaissons de Rhésaina: le sagittarius avec, au fond, le vexillum.32 Il n’y a guère de doute que l’iconographie fait appel à l’emblème de la leg. I Parthica. Comme ce fut le cas de la leg. III Parthica, cette unité se servait de la représentation du sagittarius comme étant son signe du zodiaque.33 Vu le caractère identique des revers ainsi que les conclusions qui découlent des observations susmentionnées relatives aux monnaies de Rhésaina, on peut avancer l’hypothèse selon laquelle dans le cas de Singara, là-aussi, l’obtention du statut de colonie pouvait être lié à l’action de colonisation à laquelle prirent part les vétérans de la leg. I Parthica. La Colonia Aelia Capitolina fut fondée par l’empereur Hadrien à proximité du camp de la légion X Fretensis, stationnant à Jérusalem à partir de l’an 70 ap. J.-C. (Flavius Josèphe, Bell. Jud., VII, 1,2). L’iconographie des revers des premières monnaies de la nouvelle colonie met l’accent essentiellement sur les origines militaries; ses premiers colons furent les vétérans militaires qui étaient probablement originaires de cette légion.34 Les éléments iconographiques, faisant appel aux enseignes de la légion qui stationnait à proximité, une fois introduits, restèrent sur les monnaies de Aelia Capitolina jusqu’à la dernière émission. L’association, sur les revers, du vexillum, symbole de la colonie, avec les enseignes de la légion est, dans ce cas, plutôt un rappel constant des origines des premiers colons et non pas forcément la conséquence d’une coexistence durable des deux structures. 1. la représentation du vexillum n’apparaît que sur les monnaies des colonies 2. outre le revers avec la scène de fondation de colonie, le vexillum apparaît encore dans l’iconographie d’un autre type de revers colonial, caractéristique pour la période qui s’étend du IIe au IIIe siècle ap. J.-C. Sur ce revers est représentée la louve capitoline qui nourrit Romus et Romulus avec, comme toile de fond, le vexillum et, parfois, le nom de la légion.

30 Cf. Weissbach 1927, 232. 31 Cf. SNG Copenhagen: Palestine–Characene, nos 254–258; SNG Schweiz II, nos 2642–2647 ; SNG Italia : Milano, t. XII, 4, nos 140 sqq. 32 Cf. Castelin 1946, 30 et Pl. III : F et G.  33 Le sagittarius était le signe commun de toutes les trois légions portant le surnom de Parthica : Castelin 1946, 27 sq. ; Wolff 2000, 251. 34 Dąbrowa 2001, 79 et note 38.

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La représentation de la louve qui nourrit les frères jumeaux, sans le vexillum, devint à cette époque très populaire dans le monnayage des villes. La raison de la popularité de ce type de revers était due au fait qu’il s’agissait de l’expression des liens très proches unissant les colonies et les villes avec Rome, avec ses traditions historiques et politiques.35 Les données présentées ci-dessus permettent de formuler l’hypothèse selon laquelle l’utilisation de la représentation du vexillum dans le monnayage était basée sur des principes strictement définis qui réservaient le droit à l’utilisation uniquement aux colonies militaires. À l’origine de cette loi, il eut la pratique qui s’instaura et se consolida au Ier siècle av. J.-C. : les vétérans qui obtinrent l’attribution des terres dans les colonies quittaient Rome pour se rendre, en groupes, dans des lieux déterminés prévus à la colonisation. Chacun de ces groupes s’y rendait sous son propre étendard qui était le vexillum. Après l’arrivée sur place, avait lieu la cérémonie de fondation de la colonie.36 Il n’y a pas de doute que d’autre part, la présence du vexillum sur les revers des monnaies coloniales frappées tout au long du Ier siècle ap. J.-C. reste strictement liée à la tradition républicaine. Sans commetre une grave erreure, on peut considérer qu’elle ne fut pas tombée dans l’oubli ni, d’ailleurs, sujette à des modifications significatives postérieures. Cette constatation est fondée sur le fait qu’est utilisée la représentation du vexillum par les monnaies dans les nouvelles colonies créées après le règne d’Hadrien. Leur monnayage ne laisse pas de doute que l’association à laquelle renvoyait dans la conscience collective le vexillum pour ce qui concerne la colonisation, restait la même encore aux IIe et IIIe siècles ap. J.-C. En voulant trouver une réponse à la question relative au message de la version militaire du revers du founder type, nous arrivons à la conclusion qu’il s’agit d’un témoignage de l’action de colonisation réellement menée avec la participation de vétérans militaires. Ainsi, la conviction des chercheurs selon laquelle, à une période plus tardive que la première moitié du IIe siècle, il ne fut fondé aucune colonie militaire, doit être réexaminée. Il est évident que, par comparaison avec la période précédente, l’échelle de la colonisation militaire aux IIe – IIIe siècles fut nettement moins importante mais, proportionnellement, le nombre de vétérans était, lui aussi, beaucoup moins élevé. Il semblerait d’autre part que les obstacles qui devaient contribuer à la disparition de la colonisation ne furent pas suffisemment importants pour la rendre 35 Cf. Dąbrowa 2004b ; 2004c, 214–215. 36 Cf. Cicéron, Phil. II, 102 : « (…) Tu autem insolentia elatus omni auspiciorum iure turbato Casilinum coloniam deduxisti, quo erat paucis annis ante deducta, ut vexillum tolleres, ut aratrum circumduceres (…) » (cf. ad loc. Eckstein 1979 [1981], 89–90, 93 sq.) ; Appien, BC II.119–120; Dio 44.51.4; Keppie 1983, 96 ; Moatti 1993, 23–24 ; Eckstein 1979 [1981], 91 sq.

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totalement impossible. Si nous considérons que l’attribution du statut de colonie aux villes de province constituait un instrument politique utilisé par les empereurs aux fins de l’intégration de l’État et de l’acquisition du soutien et de la loyauté de la population locale, la colonisation militaire représentait un instrument permettant en pratique de résoudre les problèmes auxquels ils devaient parfois faire face. Dans un autre étude nous avons remarqué que cela permettait la reconstruction et le développement des villes et des régions détruites et d’autre part, servait à accentuer le prestige des villes liées aux membres de la famille du souverain.37 L’exemple de Rhésaina et de Singara prouve que les colonies de vétérans fondées à la fin du IIe siècle ap. J.-C. et tout au long de la première moitié du IIIe siècle, de même que celles qui furent créées à la fin de la république et au Ier siècle ap. J.-C., remplissaient constamment l’un des objectifs principaux de la colonisation militaire romaine : ces colonies servaient à renforcer la présence militaire sur les territoires récemment rattachés à l’empire. Le signe du vexillum placé sur les revers des pièces frappées par certains ateliers coloniaux dès l’époque de Septime Sévère jusqu’à Valérien démontre que les colonies de vétérans militaires dans l’empire romain étaient fondées au moins jusqu’à la moitié du IIIe siècle ap. J.-C. Les témoignages numismatiques permettent de supposer que de telles colonies furent aussi fondées à Singara, Rhésaina, Césarée-Arca du Liban, Tyr, Sidon et Damas. Une colonie de vétérans militaires fut aussi probablement créée à Tyana.38

37 Dąbrowa 2004c, 224–226. 38 Cf. Dąbrowa 2004c, 220–221.

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Roman Military Colonization in Anatolia and the Near East (2nd–3rd c. AD): The Numismatic Evidence

According to the now widely accepted opinion, it is assumed that the last colonies of Roman veterans were founded during the reign of Hadrian.1 Advocates of this view claim that the reasons why this form of rewarding veterans ceased included the high costs of settlement, shortage of suitable land, and even lack of interest among eligible settlers. After the mid-2nd century, colonies created as an organized settlement of veterans or civilian colonists receiving a grant of land (deductio) were replaced by so-called titular colonies that had nothing to do with actual colonization. Those appeared as emperors granted the title of colony – and the resulting legal status – to provincial cities.2 The title enabled local communities not only to take advantage of the privileges of Roman citizenship (civitas Romana) but it boosted their prestige vis-à-vis localities that did not possess this status.3 A large number of those grants had to do with the civil wars fought between pretenders to the imperial throne in the late 2nd and throughout the 3rd centuries in that they were a reward for loyalty and support extended to the eventual winner.4 Some grants were simply sought and obtained by local populations. In the 3rd century, cities are known to have received the privilege because they were the birthplace of an emperor or an influential member * 

Roman Military Colonization in Anatolia and the Near East (2nd–3rd c. AD): the Numismatic Evidence, [in:] G. Salmieri, A. Raggi, A. Baroni, Colonie romane nel mondo greco, “L’Erma” di Bretschneider, Rome 2004, 211–231.

*  * Preparation of this paper was made possible thanks to a fellowship of the de Brzezie Lanckoroński Foundation in Rome. I would like to acknowledge the friendly assistance of the Professors Martha Baldwin Bowsky and Anthony R. Birley with correction of the English of this paper. Any errors of fact or of interpretation remain strictly my own. 1 Cf. Watkins 1982/1983, 319ff.; Mann 1983, 18, 61, 65; Zahrnt 1991, 484. 2 De Martino 1965, 673f. 3 See Aul. Gell., Noct. Att., 16, 13, 8–9: Sed ‘coloniarum’ alia necessitudo est; non enim veniunt extrinsecus in civitatem nec suis radicibus nituntur, sed ex civitate quasi propagatae sunt et iura institutaque omnia populi Romani, non sui arbitrii, habent. Quae tamen condicio, cum sit magis obnoxia et minus libera, prior tamen et praestabilior existimatur propter amplitudinem maiestatemque populi Romani, cuius istae coloniae quasi effigies parvae simulacraquae esse quaedam videntur, et simul quia obscura oblitterataque sunt municipiorum iura, quibus uti iam per innotitiam non queunt. 4 Cf. Ziegler 1978, 493ff.; Kushnir-Stein 2000, 149ff.

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of his family.5 Imperial generosity had the effect that within about 100 years – from the mid-2nd to mid-3rd centuries AD – in Rome’s Greek-speaking provinces nearly 20, or perhaps more, towns obtained colonial status.6 The arguments to support the position in question are seemingly unquestionable. Yet closer scrutiny of the sources suggests that, at least in relation to Rome’s eastern provinces, the position – and specifically, questioning the creation of colonies by deductio later than Hadrian’s rule – requires some amendment. So far absent from the discussion of Roman military colonies in the East has been some significant information contained in the autonomous coinage that is so characteristic of the region. Sometimes referred to as “the Greek imperial coinage”, it is the local coinage produced in municipal and colonial mints. This coinage is an indispensable and – with a great number of coin types – unique source of knowledge about the cities that issued it. The wealth of information contained in those coins is found not only in their legends but also in the representations on them. The information is not always easy to use, especially if attempts to decipher the meaning of a coin’s reverse arouse arguments and speculations among scholars. Despite its great variety, the iconography of local coinage reveals some regularities and similarities. Its common denominator is seen in some standardized reverse types. They were copied in almost unchanged form, frequently and for long periods of time, on coins of many cities and colonies; only occasionally were they supplemented by additional graphic elements that referred to local religious, mythological, or historical traditions or local geographical characteristics. Many of those typical representations are a sign of respect for Rome’s authority and of loyalty to the emperor. An excellent example is found on issues which feature the Roman military standards, called the Signa-Münzen.7 A very interesting group are reverses referring to the issuing city’s legal status. It is this last group’s iconography that is relevant to our discussion. In the coinage of most colonies, we find some characteristic and relatively easily identified, recurring reverse types. Some of them are just variants of the type’s basic design, differing in minute graphic details or a treatment of the depiction. Characteristic reverse types on colonial coins include images of Roma, the Dioscuri, Marsyas, the she-wolf, or a ritual marking out of the colony’s boundaries (sulcus primigenius). 5

See below, note 74. A particularly interesting case is the granting of colonial status (honorary) to Philippopolis, the home town of emperor Philip the Arab. The act not only boosted the city’s prestige and growth (Millar 1990, 50f.). It was also part of a broader propaganda programme aimed at strengthening the emperor’s political position and in the future facilitating his son’s succession, cf. Nony 1997, 49f. 6 See Millar 1990, 7ff. 7 The first to note this type of reverse was C. Bosch (1931, 426f.), who associated its iconography with the presence of the Roman armies in Asia Minor marching toward the eastern frontier during the wars with Parthia in the second and third centuries AD. This interpretation has recently been questioned: Rebuffat 1998 .

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The last representation is called “the founder type” by the numismatists. To develop some orientation in the iconography of the types, a brief characteristic of their most common variants would be in order. Roma. The allegorical figure of Rome on the reverses of colonial coins appeared as late as the 3rd century AD, although the iconography of the figure was established in the 2nd century.8 Its presence on coins was probably to emphasize the colony’s links with the Roman system of political values. Even though this reverse type never became too popular, at least a few variants are known.9 The Dioscuri. The pair of twins so characteristic for Roman tradition and iconography from the 2nd century AD onwards is also repeatedly presented in many different ways on colonial coins even from the same mint.10 As representations of the Dioscuri or their symbols appear equally often on coinage of many Anatolian and Syrian cities in which the divine brothers were popular and worshipped, such coins should not be considered as a type used solely in the coinage of veteran and titular colonies. Marsyas of the Forum. On the reverses of colonial coins, representations of Marsyas shown in a variety of designs are as common as the Dioscuri.11 Its prototype was the statue of this satyr that stood in the Forum Romanum.12 In generally accepted opinion, this representation acts as a symbol of civic liberty13 and its placement on colonial coinage is believed by some scholars to testify to the possession by a colony of ius Italicum.14 Yet the association between Marsyas’ presence on coins and the possession by a colony of ius Italicum15 is neither obvious nor certain, for a representation of the satyr is also found on the coinage of municipia.16 Regardless of this

8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Representations of Roma occupy a dominating position in the colonial coinage of Philippopolis, cf. SNG ANS, nos. 1402–1412. On iconography and ideological function of Roma in the imperial coinage, see Méthy 2000. a) ‘R. helmeted, seated l. on shield holding in r. Nike and resting with l. on scepter. She wears a long chiton’ [Caesarea (Samaria): Baramki 1974, 12, no. 52]; b) ‘R. helmeted, seated l. on shield in r. Nike and resting with l. on scepter; facing her is the emperor standing r., wearing toga, sacrificing’ [Caesarea (Samaria): Baramki 1974, 12, no. 54]; c) ‘R. standing l., holding phiale and spear; in lower r. shield’ [Philippopolis: SNG ANS, nos. 1402, 1412]; d) ‘R. seated l., holding eagle supporting two small figures (Dioscuri) and spear; in l. shield’ [Philippopolis: SNG ANS, nos. 1403, 1407–1411]. Cf. Aelia Capitolina: SNG ANS, nos. 595–597, 601: ‘Nude Dioscuri standing facing, looking at each other, in center eagle’; no. 602; ‘Mounted Dioscuri l., below cantharos’. Cf. Kindler 1983, 66. Cf. Kindler 1983, 66 See Small 1982, 127–132. Cf. Veyne 1961 , 87f., 95, 97f.; Small 1982, 92. Paoli 1938, 96–130; Krzyżanowska 1970, 119; Klimowsky 1982/1983, 100; Hoskins Walbank 1989, 80ff., 86f. Cf. Trell 1970, 41–42. The nature of this prerogative has long been the subject of incessant debates and controversies among scholars. Recent literature on the subject includes: Luzzatto 1950, 79–100; De Martino 1965, 676–688; Watkins 1979, 59–99; 1982/1983, 319–336; Malavolta 1964/1985, 2333–39; Bleicken 1974, 379– 391; Sartre 2001b, 136f. Veyne 1961, 92ff.; De Martino 1965, 683ff.; Dulière 1979, I, 216–220; Small 1982, 132–139.

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circumstance, the presence of Marsyas on colonial coinage permits no conclusion as to the nature of the colony that issued it. The motif can be found both for colonies founded by deductio and for titular ones.17 The Roman she-wolf. Of those already mentioned, representations of the she-wolf feeding Romulus and Remus are among the most common reverse designs on colonial coins and refer to the links between a Roman colony and Roman tradition.18 There are two principal variants of this reverse type.19 The main representation is usually accompanied by a series of additional graphic elements that refer to local symbols readily understood by the population.20 A unique variant of this reverse type is a rendition of the she-wolf and the Dioscuri seen on a coin of Aelia Capitolina.21 One more characteristic variant of this reverse appears in the 3rd century AD: the she-wolf feeding the twins against the backdrop of a vexillum. The founder type. Our observations so far suggest that each of the reverse types mentioned served primarily to emphasize the colony’s links with Roman traditions and to call attention to its legal status. Yet none establishes the type of colony in which it was issued. To determine whether the nature of the colony finds any reflection in its coinage, it is worth looking into reverses called “the founder type”. This reverse type appears on colonial coins with a frequency that fully justifies the statement that it is the most commonly employed type. It can be found on coins of nearly all colonies that struck their own coinage. The images on reverses counted among the founder type refer to the ritual of Romulus marking out the walls of Rome which was re-enacted every time the Romans founded a new city or colony.22 What is important is that in the imperial period, this reverse type appears on the coinage of both veteran and titular colonies. The 17 Cf. Veyne 1961, 94. 18 Krzyżanowska 1970, 111f.; Samonati 1964/1985, 2198ff.; Weigel 1992, 292f. See also Parisi Presicce 2000, 21– 31. Coin issues with a representation of the she-wolf, repeated over and over again by mints at various colonies, continually emphasized the status they possessed and cherished. Although this reverse type predominated on colonial coinage in the imperial period, it was not the exclusive privilege of colonies. The she-wolf also appears on the coins of a number of Asia Minor cities that did not possess colonial status. Those included: Ilium (SNG Schweiz II, no. 802), Ephesus (SNG München – Ionien, no. 155), Hierapolis (SNG München – Phrygien, nos. 230, 234), Thyateira (SNG München – Lydien, nos. 675–677), Anazarbus (SNG Switzerland I, no. 1425), etc. There is no doubt that the lupa Romana was one of the colonial status symbols, but certainly was not unique to colonies. We know instances in Spain and Africa of municipia erecting a statue of the she-wolf, most likely in the forum. See Samonati 1964/1985, 2199 – 2200; Dulière 1979, I, 219–229. 19 a) She-wolf r. suckling Romulus and Remus; b) She-wolf l. suckling Romulus and Remus. 20 On the coins of Neapolis (Samaria) such a symbol is a representation of Mt. Gerizim (Baramki 1974, 29, no. 58; SNG ANS, nos. 1018, 1040). For Pisidian Antioch, it is a tree (SNG Fitzwilliam, nos. 5127, 5133, 5140; SNG Schweiz II, nos. 1344, 1358). 21 She-wolf r. suckling Romulus and Remus, flanked by Dioscuri: SNG ANS, no. 601; Meshorer 1989, 72, no. 17. 22 The most detailed description of the ritual is given by Cato, Orig., frg. 18 Peter (cf. Servius, ad Verg. Aen. 5, 755; Isid., Etym., 15, 2, 3); Var., l.l., 5, 143, 1–2; agric., 2,1, 9–10; Dion. Hal., Bibl. hist., 1, 88, 2.

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representation depicts the sulcus primigenius, or the scene when the colony founder, a toga covering his head, drives a plough hitched to a draft team of a bull and a cow as he furrows a line marking the colony’s walls. Two main iconographic variants of this theme can be discerned: civilian and military. The first, the more common one, shows the founder, his head veiled in a toga, ploughing to the left or to the right with a bull and a cow yoked.23 The scene is usually accompanied by a legend stating the colony name. The military variety is distinct by the presence in the back of the founding scene of a vexillum, the characteristic standard of the Roman army. For our discussion, this variant is particularly interesting. The presence of signa in a founding scene on colonial coins is nothing exceptional. This theme was commonly used, especially during Augustus’ reign and throughout the 1st century AD. The signa appear primarily on the first issues of veterans’ colonies founded by that emperor. Their representations are usually accompanied by the number and/or name of a legion.24 Literary and epigraphic evidence suggests that the legions’ names and the number of the signa featured on a reverse correspond to the name and number of the unit that the first colonists came from. Much later issues also echoed the early settlers’ background. Insofar as the presence of signa on colonial coin reverses in the Early Empire is understandable, their appearance on the 2nd and 3rd-century colonial issues has not been plausibly explained.25 The lack of interest in this problem must be a natural consequence of the position that following Hadrian’s death the only colonies that appeared in the East were cities granted the title by the emperor. In this context, the use of the founder type reverse in colonial coinage could only serve propaganda reasons. Yet this conclusion would be unfounded if the mints had used just the civilian variety of the type. In fact, numerous instances are known of the military version of this reverse. Especially indicative is the fact that, in most cases, the vexillum bore a legion name. Without a doubt, there is no justification whatever for any suggestion that the appearance of the military reverse variant on colonial coinage involved the possible presence of a legionary

23 Except the coins, we have only one known depiction of a scene of ploughing the sulcus primigenius in the Roman art. It is known from a fragment of a frieze found at Aquileia in 1931: Brusin 1931, 473, fig. 1 (= Beard, North, Price 1998, 244). 24 Cf. Burnett, Amandry, Ripollès 1992, passim. 25 For E. Honigmann (1923, 2227–2228) they are evidence that there was a fortress of legio III Gallica at Sidon. O. Eissfeldt (1948, 1900–1901) is indecisive about it as at one point he assumes that they prove that veterans of that legion were settled in Tyre, and that the legion was stationed nearby at another city. A similar position to E. Honigmann’s is taken by J. C. Mann (1983, 43), who, without analyzing the iconography of coins bearing legion’s names on their reverses, claims: “… at this date [i.e. III c. AD] the appearance of legionary standards on coins may imply only that those legions were stationed in the vicinity of the issuing authority”. R. Ziegler (1978, 512, 512–513 note 113) treats those issues as evidence for veteran colonization, as does Rebuffat (1998, 410).

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camp or a small garrison in a colony.26 No such presence is attested by any of the known sources. The only logical explanation for the phenomenon is the practice used in colonial coinage in the Early Empire as mentioned above. In other words, the use of the military version of the founding-type reverse in the colonial coinage of the 2nd and 3rd centuries AD as well as vexillum representations occasionally found on other reverse types on colonial coins are connected with military settlement by deductio. This conclusion is suggested by the presence of signa and legion names on coins of some colonies. In our opinion it does allow us to suppose that the title and colonial status was conferred in connection with military settlement involving deductio on Rhasaena, Caesarea ad Libanum, Tyre, Sidon, Damascus, and probably also Tyana. It seems necessary to present evidence for such a statement. Rhasaena. The title Colonia Septimia Rhesaina allows to think that the city received colonial status probably from Septimius Severus.27 The colonial issues began under Caracalla. All the legends are without exception Greek, in Latin is only the name of legio III Parthica. For a long time scholars have accepted the view that at Rhasaena was located the fortress of that legion.28 Presence of a vexillum on Rhasaena’s colonial coinage, so characteristic for issues of the veteran colonies, leads to the conclusion that at Rhasaena was, rather, settled a group of veterans of legio III Parthica.29 Caesarea ad Libanum. The coinage of Caesarea allows the conclusion that it acquired its colonial status probably during the reign of Elagabalus, as its first colonial issues date from this emperor’s time.30 On issues from the reigns of Elagabalus,31 and Severus Alexander,32 we find the military version of the founder type. The symbolism of this reverse allows the observation that the change in the city’s legal status involved the settlement of veterans in it. As no legion name is featured on the vexillum, the colonist group might have been veterans from several units. Tyre. The city received colonial status and ius Italicum from Septimius Severus in 198 AD.33 Contrary to appearances, these privileges were not a mere formality,34 as is 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34

Cf. Rebuffat 1998, 337. Cf. Castelin 1946, 45ff. Even the present author in a recently published study accepted it wrongly: Dąbrowa 2001, 81. D. Kennedy (1987, 61) was the first who had presented arguments for this solution. Cf. Sartre 2001a, 619, note 41. Rouvier 1901, 61f., nos. 734ff.; BMC Phoenicia, 109, nos. 6–8; SNG Copenhagen – Phoenicia, no. 150. Dates found on the coins suggest that Caesarea enjoyed colonial status as early as about 218/219 AD: BMC Phoenicia, 109, no. 6. Rouvier 1901, 61, no. 734. Rouvier 1901, 63, no. 740; SNG Schweiz II, no. 2268. Herod. 3, 3, 3–4; Dig. 50, 15, 1, 1; 8, 4; Ziegler 1978, 498f.; Millar 1990, 34ff.; Kushnir-Stein 2000, 152 note 22. The emperor’s titulature on the coin (IMP XI) helps determine the terminus post quem of this bestowal, cf. Kienast 1990, 157. See also Paoli 1938, 107–109; Millar 1990, 34f. Millar 1990, 23.

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suggested by iconography on the reverses of the first colonial issues of Tyre. Some of them bear the military version of the founder type. Shown on the vexillum, the inscription LEG III GAL suggests that Tyre received its colony status as veterans from that legion settled in the city.35 The supposition is further confirmed by the fact that the name of legio III Gallica on the reverses of Tyre coins appears again and again in the later period, during the reigns of Caracalla,36 Geta,37 Macrinus,38 Elagabalus,39 Trebonianus Gallus,40 and Valerian.41 An important testimony to veteran settlement in Tyre is a very rare coin from the reign of Philip the Arab. Its reverse shows the she-wolf suckling the twins, while in the background there is a vexillum with the inscription LEG: VI: F.42 The same type of representation appears on colonial coinage quite frequently, so its clear connotation leads us to the conclusion that the coin must refer to settlement by Philip the Arab of another organized group of veterans in Tyre, this time of legio VI Ferrata. Sidon. That the city possessed colonial status is confirmed not only by numismatic evidence. From the coins, it is possible to determine that the city was granted its status during the reign of Elagabalus, no later, however, than 221 AD.43 Like the Tyrian issues, its colonial coinage bears the military variant of the founder type reverse with a vexillum marked LEG III GAL.44 Both these elements allow the supposition that Sidon, too, won its colonial status when veterans settled there.45 Damascus. It received its colonial status probably during the reign of Philip the Arab.46 The reverses of two colonial issues of Damascus, one with a portrait of Philip the Arab on the obverse, the other with a likeness of his wife Otacilia, suggest that to this city too the new status came with the arrival of a group of veteran settlers.47 35 Rouvier 1904, 66, nos. 2300, 2302–2304; BMC Phoenicia, 269, nos. 367–368; 270, no. 371; 271, nos. 377 –378; 272, nos. 380, 383; 274, nos. 394–395; SNG Copenhagen – Phoenicia, no. 359; Baramki 1968, 31, no. 108; Meshorer 1989, 45. Cf. Dąbrowa 2000a, 314; Dąbrowa 2001, 77. 36 Rouvier 1904, 69, nos. 2319–2320; BMC Phoenicia, 271, nos. 377–378; [Anonymous] 1963, 21–22; Baramki 1968, 31, no. 109. 37 Rouvier 1904, 71, no. 2331; BMC Phoenicia, 272, no. 380. 38 BMC Phoenicia, 272, no. 383. 39 Rouvier 1904, 81, no. 2392; BMC Phoenicia, 274, nos. 394–395; SNG Schweiz II, no. 2341. 40 Rouvier 1904, 94, no. 2473. 41 Rouvier 1904, 101, nos. 2512–2513. 42 Heymann 1963, 48. 43 The date may be inferred from the Sidon coin with a portrait of the wife of Elagabalus, Annia Faustina: Rouvier 1902, 277, no. 1576. He married her away in 221 and sent away by the end of the same year: Kienast 1990, 174. Cf. Paoli 1938, 106f.; Ziegler 1978, 512f.; Millar 1990, 50f. 44 Rouvier 1902, 264, nos. 1508–1510; 271, no. 1544; 277, no. 1576. 45 This interpretation is also supported by R. Ziegler (1978, 512–513 note 113). Cf. Dąbrowa 2001, 77–78. 46 BMC Syria, 286f., nos. 22–27; SNG Copenhagen: Syria – Cities, no. 425; SNG Schweiz II, nos. 2154–2157. We do not know when exactly the city had won the colonial status. According to F. Millar (1990, 316) it had happened under that emperor (“… apparently under Philip …”). Cf. Dąbrowa 2001, 78. 47 De Saulcy 1874, 48, no. 13; Baramki 1968, 70–71, no. 237; BMC Syria, 286, no. 25 (= De Saulcy 1874, 44); SNG Schweiz II, no. 2156; Cf. Ritterling 1925, 1593–94; Rey-Coquais 1978, 57; Dulière 1979, I, 217; Rey­Coquais 1989, 56.

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The reverses feature the she-wolf-and-twins with a vexillum with the inscription LEG VI F.48 The iconography seen here is the same as on the Tyre coins mentioned above. As we name cities whose coinage suggests that veteran settlement might have helped them achieve colonial status, we should also mention the case of Tyana. Legends on its coins from the time of Septimius Severus leave no doubt that during his reign the city did not possess the status.49 Tyana did not achieve it until Caracalla’s reign.50 This is confirmed both by the appearance then on the reverses of its coins of a legend with its name altered (in Greek !), and by representation of the foundations scene.51 Doubts arise out of the fact that, for reasons unknown to us, in same year were issued at least two parallel colonial coin series, the obverses of which bear a portrait of Julia Domna52 or Caracalla53, while the reverses feature either the civilian or the military variant of the founder type. The appearance of both reverse types is nothing surprising in itself. Such instances are known from the coinage of other colonies including those whose military origin is unquestionable, such as Acco-Ptolemais54 or Aelia Capitolina.55 What is unusual is the simultaneous issues of coins with both types of reverse. It may be worth noting that the iconography of the civilian variant differs somewhat in details from the pattern known from other colonies. The draft team hitched to the plow is composed of as a pair of zebu rather than a bull and a cow which is the most common pattern.56 A zebu also appears, without the founder’s figure or a plough but with two other characteristic items, on the secondary variety. The shape of these items suggests that they can be identified as vexilla57 but no inscription is visible on either of them. We are thus left without a clue as to whether these two vexilla symbolize the number of legions that supplied settlers or perhaps arrival of two different groups.58 It is equally inexplicable why Tyana did not use Latin legends to accompany the granting of the colonial status, which was common practice. 48 De Saulcy 1874, 48, no. 13; cf. ibid. 43–44, no. *5; BMC Syria, 286, no. 25; SNG Schweiz II, no. 2156. 49 See SNG von Aulock, no. 6542; SNG Schweiz II, no. 1810. 50 See BMC Syria, 98f., nos. 11–15; SNG Fitzwilliam, nos. 5486–5489; SNG von Aulock, nos. 6544–6553. Cf. also Berges, Nollé 2000, 360–361, 365–367, and Pl. 123–125. 51 SNG von Aulock, nos. 6544, 6548–6549, 6553 (cf. Berges, Nollé 2000, Pl. 124, 35; 125, 36–38). 52 SNG von Aulock, nos. 6544, 6546. 53 SNG von Aulock, nos. 6548–6550, 6553; SNG Schweiz II, no. 1811. 54 Kadman 1961, 110, no. 100 (Trajan); 130, no. 199 (Philip the Arab). 55 Meshorer 1989, 116, no. 178 (Hostilian). 56 According to D. Berges (Berges, Nollé 2000, 359) depicted on the coins of Tyana is not a zebu, rather the local hunch-backed cattle (die Buckelstier), characteristic of this region of Anatolia. 57 BMC Syria, 98, no. 12; SNG von Aulock, nos. 6546, 6550, 6553; SNG Schweiz II, no. 1811; SNG Tübingen, no. 4710 (cf. Berges – Nollé 2000, 361 and Pl. 124, 32–34); Rebuffat 1997, 281f. and Pl. 24, 3–4); Berges, Nollé 2000, 363f. 58 Earlier interpretations associated the issue of these coins with Caracalla’s visit to Tyana (Dio 77.18.4); cf. Ruge 1948, 1638f.; Levick 1969, 434, no. 44; Rebuffat 1998, 278ff. They can be challenged on the ground of chronology.

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Apart from Tyana and Caesarea, cities in which we can guess at organized military settlement without certainty about the exact provenance of colonists include Aelia Capitolina, founded by Hadrian in Jerusalem.59 The dearth of narrative sources forces us to supplement what little we know about the origin of this colony with an analysis of its coinage. And, in fact, the reverses of the first colonial coins of Aelia Capitolina struck under Hadrian make it quite clear that the core of the new colony’s population consisted of veterans. This is clearly suggested by the use of the founder type reverse right from the first issues. Although it is supposed that those veterans might have come from leg. X Fretensis stationed in Jerusalem,60 no actual evidence is available to support it. To be sure, on some coins a residual inscription can be traced against a vexillum, but on all extant examples it is too indistinct to be legible.61 However, since there is only one vexillum on the coins of Aelia Capitolina datable to the reign of its founder, the first group of colonists must have come from just one legion. The coinage of Aelia Capitolina supplies one of three known examples of the original settlers being joined by another group at a later date. This is suggested by the appearance on one colonial issue from the time of Marcus Aurelius of a founding scene with two vexilla in the background, neither bearing an inscription.62 This interpretation is correct notwithstanding the fact that some later issues featuring the military variant of the founder type have just one vexillum.63 Memory of those two settler groups was preserved in Aelia Capitolina for many generations, as is suggested by a coin struck during the emperor Hostilian’s reign. On its reverse we see

59 60 61

62 63

The date found on the reverse suggests that the coins were issued about 212/213 AD (Berges, Nollé 2000, 363), while the emperor’s visit came about no sooner than the second half of 215 AD: Halfmann 1986, 224, 228. Dio 69.12.1–2; Isaac 1980/1981, 31–54 (= Isaac 1998, 87–108); Millar 1990, 28–29; Birley 1997, 232– 233; Goodman 2000, 673. Cf. Isaac 1980/1981, 46f., 51 (= Isaac 1998, 101–102, 105–106; Dąbrowa 1993, 17 note 42; 21; 2000b, 324 and note 60; 2001, 78ff. We can assume with a large amount of certainty that the name of the legion which had supplied the settlers was placed on the first issue with the founder type reverse (Meshorer 1989, 70, nos. 2–2a), for some specimens bear its traces, unfortunately illegible and beyond reconstruction. On the reverse of one coin, L. Kadman (1956, 80, no. 1), and J. Meyshan (1958, 19f.) made out on the vexillum the characters LE.V. After a close scrutiny, Y. Meshorer (1989, 21) emphatically questioned that reading. In his opinion “(…) If anything can be read on this coin, it is the letter X, the numeral of the Tenth Legion (…) we believe that that if ever a clear coin of this type will be found with a plainly legible inscription on the standard, the initials of the LXF (Legio Decima Fretensis) will be on it !” Meshorer 1989, 78, no. 42 and p. 31. Three issues with only one vexillum come from the reign of Elagabalus (Meshorer 1989, 96, nos. 111– 113). From Hostilian’s time (Meshorer 1989, 116, no. 178), we know an issue with the civilian founder type reverse. According to L. Kadman (1956, 53): “The coins were dedicated to these emperors with the purpose of showing that Aelia Capitolina considered itself founded or re-founded by them”. Lack of evidence renders it impossible either to prove or disprove this claim. Periodic repetition of the reverse showing the scene of founding of the colony may have served to remind new generations of residents of the event. Alternatively, their reverse might have marked the arrival of a new group of settlers; but we have no data to confirm it.

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a representation of the she-wolf suckling twins with two vexilla in the background; between them sits legionary eagle.64 It appears that the complex iconography refers to the origin of the inhabitants of Aelia Capitolina from two separate groups as well as to the presence of leg. X Fretensis stationed in the neighbourhood. The hypothesis that there may have been cases of new settler groups joining the original colonists is, in our opinion, substantiated not only by the coinage of Tyre and Aelia Capitolina but also Acco-Ptolemais. Founded by the emperor Claudius, that colony consisted of veterans of four legions stationed in Syria at that time: III Gallica, VI Ferrata, X Fretensis, and XII Fulminata.65 The colonists’ military background is evoked in coin issues with the military variant of the founder type reverse, struck during the reigns of Nero,66 Hadrian,67 and Geta.68 Under Elagabalus, a coin was struck with the same reverse type but with different iconography compared to the earlier issues.69 Shown in the background of a foundation scene is a single vexillum with an inscription TER, which doubtless refers to leg. III Gallica.70 Given the reverse iconography, the possibility must definitely be ruled out that the issue had anything to do with the legion’s presence in the province.71 The reference is probably to the fact that the emperor settled another group of veterans from the same legion in Ptolemais. This interpretation of the coin’s reverse is also supported by the fact that Elagabalus had good reasons to reward that legion’s soldiers as they had been faithful and devoted to him when he ascended to power. The evidence presented constitutes sufficient support for the conclusion that the practice of military settlement involving deductio did not disappear under Hadrian, but continued to be used much later, in the second half of the 2nd century and the first half of the 3rd century AD. More important than establishing the number of colonies is determining the reason and purpose of this late military colonization. Criticizing the opinion quoted at the beginning concerning the cessation of organized military colonization after reign of Hadrian requires us to present reasons that might have led later emperors to revive the practice of veteran colonization that had been suspended for decades.

64 Meshorer 1989, 116, no. 182. 65 For identification of those legions, see Dąbrowa 2001, 76 note 12. Cf. also Sartre 2001b, 119–120 and 120 note 97. 66 BMC Phoenicia, 131, no. 16; Kadman 1961, 110, nos. 92, 94; Burnett, Amandry, Ripollès 1992, nos. 4749–50. 67 Rouvier 1901, 217, no. 1000; BMC Phoenicia, 132, no. 23; Kadman 1961, 112, nos. 101–102. 68 Rouvier 1901, 221, no. 1025; Kadman 1961, 120, no. 150; 121, nos. 151–152. Only on an issue from the time of Nero were legions’ numbers inscribed. On the remaining issues there were only four vexilla. 69 Rouvier 1901, 222, no. 1032; Kadman 1961, 122, nos. 157–159. 70 Kadman 1961, 54, 78. 71 Cf. Kadman 1961, 78.

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In all of the above mentioned cases, it is impossible to point to the circumstances in which decisions were made to send military settlers to a selected city. The difficulty is that numismatic sources, although they testify to such colonization, contain no clues as to the reasons behind it. By a lucky coincidence, a record by Herodian helps identify them at least for Tyre (Herod. 3, 3, 3–4). During the civil war between Septimius Severus and Pescennius Niger, Tyre took the side of the former. As a result, the city suffered damage from Pescennius Niger’s forces. In this context, subsequent privileges granted to the city – colonial status, ius Italicum (Dig. 50, 15, 1, 1; 8, 4)72, and arrival of a colonist group – appear as not just a generous reward for loyalty but also as factors permitting revival of the city. To be able to receive colonists, the city must have possessed suitable land to allot to them. Their presence increased the population, which could help speed up reconstruction. Septimius Severus’ action can be seen as an attempt to restore political and economic stability in a city loyal to him. Seemingly different, though effectively similar, were probable reasons why colonial status73 was granted and veterans were sent to Caesarea ad Libanum. Thanks to the privileges it obtained, this small town from which came a member of the imperial family74 was elevated in status and acquired perhaps a large group of new inhabitants. This opened up for Caesarea much greater opportunities for development. Without much risk of a gross mistake, we may therefore conclude that the practice of settling veterans as we see it in the 2nd and 3rd centuries AD stemmed from different motives than was the case previously. Instead of being systematic, long-term policy, it served current purposes such as quick and measurable political and economic gains. That this was the purpose of that settlement is suggested by instances where new groups of veterans were directed to already existing colonies. Introduction of new members to established colonial communities could serve many purposes simultaneously: increase the number of inhabitants, reinforce the Latin element, and heighten sympathies for the ruling emperor. Yet in order for these objectives to be met, the newcomers had to enjoy a standard of living comparable to that of the established members of the population. This end must have been served by grants of land. There might have been several ways of acquiring necessary land. It could be areas belonging to the colony but left uncultivated because of abandonment by original settlers or their families dying out, or areas acquired by the emperor’s treasury as donations or seizures. In either case allotting a piece of land did not involve much difficulty or expense on the part of the emperor. And the benefits were tangible enough. Most importantly, a colony had more inhabitants and could recover and develop. 72 Cf. Bleicken 1974, 390. 73 Cf. Chéhab 1962, 35ff.; Gaggero 1997, 186ff. 74 Gessius Marcianus, the second husband of Julia Mammaea, father of Severus Alexander (PIR2 G 171; Bo­wer­ sock 1982, 665, no. 9).

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As we stress the political and economic import of late military settlement, we should note one more aspect involved in the process. What is conspicuous about it is that in many instances known to us, settlers came from leg. III Gallica. Chronologically, all those instances happened during the reign of the Severan dynasty. The peculiar predilection of the emperors from this dynasty for this unit cannot be merely incidental. Without offering a detailed explanation for this phenomenon in this paper (a closer analysis will be the subject of a separate study by the present author), suffice it to say that it has to do with the exceptional loyalty and devotion that soldiers serving in this unit showed to rulers from the house of Severus. Seen in this light, the process suggests that the Severans used organized settlement for veterans of this particular legion as a special reward for services rendered to the dynasty. This policy almost certainly helped acquire and maintain political influence. Unfortunately, none of the extant sources helps answer a long list of crucial questions concerning numbers of settlers, their ethnic makeup, their place in the community they joined, their affiliations with it, the new colonists’ later course of life, etc. Some of these queries are answered to a greater or lesser degree for colonies created in the Early Empire.75 In conclusion, it can be said that the occurrence of organized military colonization is not confined to the period of the Republic and the Early Empire. Numismatic sources supply evidence that, to a limited degree, the practice survived at least until the mid-3rd century AD. The important difference between the two phases was – apart from its extent – its nature. Military colonies in the later period no longer served the purpose of Romanization, spread of Roman culture and way of life, or civilizing influence on the outside world. Instead, they became an instrument of current domestic policy, used by various emperors as needed, even in times of grave financial difficulty. Locating colonies in provincial cities probably required the consent of local authority and citizenry to help finance the establishment of a colony, in return for which they received certain privileges. This allowed the emperors to limit radically their own outlay in creating the infrastructure necessary to assure proper functioning of the new colonial communities. Meanwhile, their establishment brought the emperors political, economic, and social benefits that were difficult to overestimate.

75 See Sartre 2001b.

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Les colonies et la colonisation romaine en Anatolie et au Proche-Orient (IIe – IIIe s. de n. è.) : nouvelles observations.1

Margaret Roxan in memoriam La colonisation était l’un des moyens les plus caractéristiques de renforcement de la présence et de la souveraineté romaines sur les territoires conquis ou annexés. Cette méthode était largement pratiquée à l’époque de la République comme aux temps de l’Empire. Deux groupes de colonisateurs étaient concernés : le premier, composé de population civile et le second, beaucoup plus important, formé de vétérans militaires. La réforme militaire de Gaius Marius fit que, dès le début du Ier siècle avant de n. è., les vétérans devinrent les principaux bénéficiaires du système de colonisation. De nombreux et divers témoignages permettent de constater que cette situation n’évolua pratiquement pas, ceci au moins jusqu’au début du IIe siècle de n. è. Pour les périodes qui suivirent, les sources écrites relatives à la colonisation militaire sont très rares, et celles dont nous disposons ne permettent pas de trancher de manière définitive quant au type de colonisation, civil ou militaire – en réalité, lié à une deductio ou seulement à l’obtention du statut juridique de colonie – auquel nous avons affaire dans les cas concrets. Le caractère fortuit, et fragmentaire, ainsi que le nombre très restreint de ces témoignages permit de formuler l’hypothèse, largement acceptée par les chercheurs, qu’après la période du règne d’Hadrien, la colonisation militaire dans l’Empire romain prit fin. Le fait que les empereurs y renoncèrent était dû essentiellement à des coûts très élevés, au manque de terres qui pourraient servir à cette fin ainsi qu’au manque d’intérêt de la part des vétérans.2 Sans mettre en question le bien-fondé de ces arguments, il serait toutefois difficile de ne pas remarquer que si, dans la pratique romaine, la dimension sociale de la colonisation militaire demeure indiscutable, elle servait toujours les intérêts stratégiques de * 

Les colonies et la colonisation romaine en Anatolie et au Proche-Orient (IIe – IIIe s. de n. è.) : nouvelles observations, Electrum 7, 2003, 71–82.

1 Cf. Dąbrowa 2004c. 2 Cf. Forni 1953, 41 ; Watkins 1982/1983, 319 sqq. ; Mann 1983, 18, 61, 65 ; Brennan 1990, 492 sqq. ; Millar 1990, 7 sqq., 39 sqq. ; Zahrnt 1991, 484 ; Pollard 2000, 63 sq.

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l’État. C’est dans ce contexte-là qu’elle était mise en œuvre indépendamment des coûts. Et comme elle constituait un instrument important de la politique intérieure d’Auguste, ainsi que de celle de ses successeurs, ils y firent souvent appel. Pour cette raison notamment, les arguments en faveur du renoncement bénévole des empereurs à se servir de cet instrument doivent soulever des doutes tout à fait justifiés, et ceci d’autant plus que la relation entre la possession de la terre et l’obligation du service militaire, dans l’univers romain, ne fut jamais rompue. Son importance fut accentuée et confirmée par les solutions introduites à la suite des réformes militaires de Dioclétien et de Constantin le Grand. Avant toutefois d’aborder une nouvelle fois la question de savoir si les empereurs qui succédèrent à Hadrien fondaient des colonies de vétérans militaires, il faut indiquer les sources qui en constituent le point de départ. La question de l’utilité relativement limitée et de la valeur des témoignages écrits que nous avons signalée ci-dessus nous amène à attirer l’attention sur les sources numismatiques qui, sans aucun doute, en raison de leur caractère, constituent une source historique crédible. Parmi les différentes catégories de ces sources, dans le cadre de nos investigations, s’avèrent comme particulièrement utiles les monnaies provenant des ateliers coloniaux. Les légendes et l’iconographie que l’on retrouve sur les légendes représentent bien souvent les seuls témoignages historiques dont disposent les chercheurs. Les motifs qui se trouvent sur les revers des monnaies coloniales ne sont nullement un ensemble fortuit de symboles. En les analysant, on peut déduire que l’utilisation ne serait-ce que de certains types de ces représentations était subordonné à des principes bien définis dont la connaissance permet de mieux comprendre et de déchiffrer la signification des différents éléments de cette iconographie. Grâce à cela, entre autres, il est possible d’établir, avec une forte dose de probabilité, si dans un cas concret nous avons affaire à la monnaie d’une ville ayant le statut de colonie titulaire ou d’une réelle colonie de vétérans militaires.3 En vue de trancher ces doutes, une importance particulière est à attribuer à la présence de la représentation du vexillum sur le revers des monnaies. Mais comme nous avons consacré à ce problème des remarques à part, nous ne nous limiterons pour l’instant qu’à constater que la présence du vexillum sur le revers des pièces de monnaies coloniales provenant des territoires d’Anatolie, de Mésopotamie, de Syrie et de Judée, frappées entre le Ier et le IIIe siècles, constitue un témoignage, difficile à remettre en question, de la colonisation militaire qui fut directement à l’origine de l’obtention du statut de colonie par de nombreuses villes.4 L’interprétation des revers des monnaies coloniales, renforcée dans la mesure du possible par les textes historiques et par les témoignages épigraphiques, permet de 3 4

Cf. Dąbrowa 2003a. Cf. Dąbrowa 2004a ; 2004c.

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constater que contrairement à l’opinion généralement répandue, pendant la période qui s’étend de la fin du règne d’Hadrien jusqu’à la moitié du IIIe siècle de n. è., sur les territoires de l’Anatolie et du Proche Orient, au moins plusieurs colonies de vétérans militaires avaient été fondées et qu’au moins dans quelques-unes des villes fondées antérieurement s’installèrent de nouveaux groupes de colons-vétérans. Parmi les villes sur le territoire desquelles furent localisées de nouvelles colonies, il faut citer notamment : Tyana, Rhéseina, Singara, Tyr, Sidon, Césarée-Arca du Liban et Damas.5 Les nouveaux groupes de vétérans furent, quant à eux, installés à Acco-Ptolemaïs, Tyr et probablement à Aelia Capitolina.6 Selon nous, la liste de villes que nous venons de présenter ne peut pas être considérée comme tout à fait exhaustive. Les catalogues de collections numismatiques publiés lors des quelques dernières années, ainsi que les témoignages archéologiques, non seulement complètent les données déjà disponibles mais, et ceci est beaucoup plus important, permettent d’éliminer les doutes qui accompagnaient les interprétations précédentes. Ainsi, il a été possible de déterminer le statut colonial de Mallos, ville située sur le territoire de Cilicie Plane. Et si les monnaies coloniales étaient connues depuis longtemps par les chercheurs, ces derniers n’étaient guère unanimes quant à la date à laquelle la ville obtint le statut de colonie7, ni quel fut le caractère réel de ce statut.8 En s’appuyant sur la publication récente de l’une des monnaies frappée dans cette ville,9 nous pouvons déterminer que ce statut de colonie lui fut attribué lors du règne de Sévère Alexandre.10 Cet événement était intervenu à un moment particulier, lors des préparatifs de cet empereur à l’expédition militaire contre les Perses, mais pas avant l’automne de l’année 230 de n. è.11 L’obtention du statut de colonie par Mallos constitue, dans un tel contexte, un événement significatif.12 Cette attribution pourrait être expliquée par le rôle important que la ville devait jouer lors de l’expédition projetée. Une telle explication est probable mais elle n’est pas la seule explication possible et ceci tout d’abord parce que de nombreux centres importants situés sur l’itinéraire 5 Dąbrowa 2001, 77 sq., 80 ; Dąbrowa 2004c. 6 Dąbrowa 2001, 76 sq., 79. 7 L’attribution de ce statut est considéré par les savants soit à Elagabal (Ruge 1928 , 916; Jones 1971, 207 ; Sartre 2001b , 118 ; cf. Ziegler 1985 , 95, note 184) soit à Alexandre Sévère (Levick 1966 , 59; Kienast 1985 , 271 ; Ziegler 1985, 95, 97) ; cf. Rebuffat 1998, 280. 8 Selon F. Rebuffat (1998, 280) et B. Levick (1966, 59) Mallos était une colonie titulaire. 9 Ziegler 1992, 181 ; Pl.15, 2 ; SNG Switzerland I, Supplément, no 309. 10 En se référant aux légendes sur les monnaies, nous pouvons estimer que le nom officiel de la colonie était : Mallo Colonia Felix : cf. SNG Switzerland I, nos 1288, 1291–1294. Dans le cas d’une des inscription, ce nom prend la forme de colonia Mallotarum: ILS 9221. Le surnom de Felix provient probablement de l’un des éléments de la titulature officielle de Sévère Alexandre. 11 Ziegler 1985, 97 ; 1992, 182. 12 Avant d’obtenir le statut de colonie, Mallos, au sein des villes Cilicie Plane, ne jouait qu’un rôle très limité: Dion Chrysostome 34, 44 ; Ziegler 1985, 95. Certains chercheurs estiment que ce fut cet événement-là qui eut une importance considérable pour son histoire : Ziegler 1985, 97 ; Brandt 1992 , 161.

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des armées n’obtinrent jamais un tel statut alors même qu’elles avaient parfois plus d’une fois accueilli dans leurs murs des troupes de l’armée de l’empereur.13 Ainsi, les raisons pour lesquelles Mallos fut en quelque sorte distinguée par l’attribution du statut de colonie ne doivent pas être interprétées uniquement comme étant la conséquence des événements historiques qui eurent lieu sur ces terres. Comme dans le cas de nombreuses autres colonies, la réponse devrait être recherchée dans l’iconographie des monnaies des colonies. L’obtention du nouveau statut était d’habitude accompagnée de l’émission de monnaies avec une représentation de la scène de fondation de colonie sur le revers.14 Dans le cas de Mallos, cette scène se trouva probablement sur l’une des premières émissions coloniales, frappée encore à l’époque du règne de Sévère Alexandre.15 Ensuite, le revers représentant la scène de la fondation apparut encore à plusieurs reprises, sous le règne de ces successeurs.16 Sur les monnaies de Mallos, la symbolique de la scène de fondation de la colonie dépasse considérablement le cadre du schéma traditionnel,17 ce qui ne permet pas de déterminer de quel type de fondation il s’agissait dans le cas de cette ville. Dans ce contexte, il est utile de faire appel à la représentation que l’on retrouve sur le revers d’une monnaie frappée probablement sous le règne d’Hostilien.18 On y retrouve Tyché avec deux vexilla situés des deux côtés. Cette scène est complétée par les silhouettes de deux divinités fluviales. La présence du vexillum dans cette scène poussa D. Kienast à proposer l’hypothèse selon laquelle Sévère Alexandre avait fondé à Mallos une colonie de vétérans.19 D’après nous, le bien-fondé de cette hypothèse se trouve entièrement confirmé par les conclusions qui découlent des investigations au sujet de la signification de la représentation du vexillum sur les revers des monnaies coloniales qui, dans le monnayage colonial, constitue le symbole de la colonisation militaire. Cette interprétation n’est nullement mise en doute par le fait d’y retrouver des associations atypiques appartenant à la symbolique militaire (vexilla) et à la symbolique civile (Tyché, divinités fluviales). Il est important de signaler d’autre part que des associations similaires de ces symboles dans la représentation de Tyché apparaissent sur les revers des monnaies frappées par une autre colonie de vétérans, à savoir Alexandrie 13 L’importance de la Cilicie du point de vue des opérations militaires contre les Perses au IIIe siècle de n. è. : Ziegler 1993. 14 Cela n’avait pas toujours lieu immédiatement après l’acte de fondation. Nous connaissons des cas où sur les monnaies, cette scène n’apparaît pas du tout ou seulement des dizaines d’années après l’événement lui-même. 15 SNG Switzerland I, no 1288. 16 Cf. Ziegler 1988, 121, nos 914–915 ; SNG Switzerland I, nos 1291–1294 ; SNG Deutschland : Pfälzer Privatsammlungen VI, no 915 (Trajan Dèce) ; SNG von Aulock, nos 5727–5728 (Hostilien) ; SNG Switzerland I, Supplément, no 312 (Valerien). 17 Cf. Ziegler 1985, 95. 18 Certaines de ces monnaies portant la légende sur l’avers SACRA SINATVS sont difficiles à dater avec plus de précision, cf. Ziegler 1988, 121, nos 918–922 ; SNG Switzerland I, nos 1286–1287 (Trajan Dèce ?). 19 Kienast 1985, 271.

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de Troade. On y retrouve le buste d’une déesse ornée de corona muralis. Malgré un schéma standard, cette représentation est toutefois dotée d’un détail particulier: derrière le bras droit de Tyché, on aperçoit le vexillum.20 Sa présence sur les monnaies coloniales frappées pendant la période qui s’étend entre le règne de Commode et celui de Valérien fait incontestablement appel à l’origine militaire des premiers colons. Ainsi, la présence de deux vexilla sur les pièces de Mallos n’est nullement liée à des préoccupations d’ordre esthétique ou à une volonté de garder une symétrie de l’image représentée. Par conséquent, nous ne pouvons pas exclure la supposition selon laquelle il s’agit de témoignage que les colons qui s’y installèrent provenaient de deux unités militaires bien distinctes.21 * Le manque de sources, les difficultés quant à leur datation et parfois aussi quant à l’évaluation de leur utilité, constituent des obstacles difficiles pour ce qui concerne l’interprétation des témoignages provenant du territoire de la province de Syrie se rapportant à l’attribution du statut de colonie aux villes existantes ou à la fondation de colonies sur leurs territoires. Dans le cas de l’Asie Mineure comme dans celui de la Syrie, la principale preuve de changement du statut ou d’une éventuelle action de colonisation est, le plus souvent, celle qui nous est fournie par les pièces de monnaie. Très rarement seulement, ce témoignage est conforté par un autre type de témoignage. Cependant, une situation tout à fait exceptionnelle apparaît dans le cas d’au moins deux villes de Syrie, Émèse (actuellement Homs) et Damas, d’où proviennent des vestiges qui sont particulièrement importants du point de vue de la connaissance des processus de colonisation : il s’agit des traces identifiées de la centuriation romaine, c’est-à-dire du lotissement des terres.22 Dans les deux cas, ce processus s’étendait sur des territoires si vastes que cela exclut tous les doutes quant à leur rôle et à leur signification. En revanche, compte tenu du manque d’autres données, il nous est difficile de procéder à la datation de ces vestiges.23 Avant de nous occuper des conclusions qui découlent des interprétations de ces précédents témoignages, il serait utile de présenter ce que nous savons actuellement des dates auxquelles ces villes obtinrent le statut de colonie.

20 Voir SNG von Aulock, nos 1462–1467 ; SNG Copenhagen: Troas, nos 98–117 ; SNG Deutschland : Tübingen IV, nos 2631–2638 ; SNG Deutschland, München 19, nos 49–67. 21 Cf. Dąbrowa 2004b. 22 Van Liere 1958/1959, 55–58; Dodinet, Leblanc, Vallat, Villeneuve 1990 , 339–354. 23 Les recherches menées actuellement sur la colonisation dans les environs de Homs n’ont rien apporté de nouveau en cette matière car ces études ne concernent pas les zones qui étaient concernées par le lotissement, cf. Philip 2002.

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Émèse obtint le statut de colonie et le ius Italicum sous le règne de Caracalla.24 Sous le règne d’Élagabal, la ville devint métropole.25 Tous ces privilèges découlaient du fait que Julia Domna, femme de Septime Sévère et en même temps mère de Caracalla, fut la fille du prêtre du temple d’Élagabal se trouvant dans cette ville. Les filles de sa sœur, Julia Maesa, étaient les mères de deux empereurs: Julia Soaemias celle d’Élagabal, alors que Julia Mamaea était la mère de Sévère Alexandre.26 Dans un tel contexte, les démarches des empereurs de la dynastie des Sévères visant à renforcer l’importance d’Émèse sont tout à fait compréhensibles. En tenant compte du souci que Septime Sévère attachait à sa ville natale, Leptis Magna, et en se souvenant des démarches qu’entreprirent d’autres empereurs originaires des provinces en voulant contribuer au développement matériel de leurs villes natales, on peut supposer de manière tout à fait justifiée que de telles actions ne se limitaient pas exclusivement à des privilèges d’ordre juridique. Quels en furent les résultats dans le cas d’Émèse ? La réponse à cette question est importante dans la mesure où les données dont nous disposons semblent indiquer qu’il ne s’agissait que d’une colonie titulaire. Sur aucune des émissions connues des pièces frappées à Émèse on ne retrouve ni la scène de fondation de la colonie, ni même la symbolique propre aux monnaies coloniales. Les motifs représentés sur les revers se rapportent essentiellement au culte du dieu Élagabal.27 Ce qui est par ailleurs caractéristique, c’est l’utilisation exclusive de la langue grecque sur les légendes de ces monnaies.28 D’après les monnaies, il est possible de constater que Damas obtint le statut de colonie probablement sous le règne de Philippe l’Arabe.29 Cependant, contrairement aux émissions d’Émèse, sur les revers des quelques rares pièces coloniales connues provenant de Damas, frappées depuis le règne de Philippe l’Arabe jusqu’à l’époque de Valérien, on retrouve aussi des motifs typiques des monnaies coloniales, et les légendes, quant à elles, sont en langue latine.30 Parmi tous les types de revers, une attention particulière doit être attribuée à celui où est représentée la louve qui nourrit Romulus et Rémus, et ceci en raison du fait qu’à l’arrière-plan de cette scène, on aperçoit le vexillum avec l’inscription LEG VI FER.31 D’après certains chercheurs, ce revers constitue la

24 Dig. 50.15.1.4 (Ulpien) ; 50.15.8.6 (Paul). 25 BMC Syria, 240, nos 18–21 ; cf. Millar 1990, 41. 26 La question des relations familiales entre tous les représentants de la dynastie des Sévères liés à Émèse a été abondamment traitée par A. R. Birley (1999 , 221–226). 27 Cf. BMC Syria, 238–240, nos 9–21. 28 Cf. Millar 1990, 41. Aux IIe et IIIe siècles de n. è., la pratique générale consistait, et ceci même dans le cas des colonies titulaires, à placer sur les monnaies coloniales les légendes en langue latine. 29 Millar 1990, 53 ; Dąbrowa 2001, 78 ; Sartre 2001b, 118. 30 Cf. De Saulcy 1874, 44–56 ; BMC Syria, 286–288, nos 22–33 ; SNG Copenhagen, Syria : Cities, nos 425–426; SNG Schweiz II, nos 2154–2157 ; Baramki 1968, 70–71, no 237 ; Rosenberger 1990/1991, 78–79, no 5. 31 Baramki 1968, 70–71, no 237 (Philippe l’Arabe) ; de Saulcy 1874, 44 = BMC Syria, 286, no 25 (Otacilia Severa).

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preuve du stationnement à Damas un vexillatio de cette légion.32 Le caractère de cette représentation trouverait sa justification plutôt dans la thèse selon laquelle il s’agirait d’une preuve de l’installation des vétérans de cette légion dans ce lieu.33 La confrontation de ces données avec les conclusions tirées par les chercheurs analysant les données archéologiques relatives au processus de lotissement autour des villes précitées fait ressurgir des questions importantes quant à leur valeur historique. Les conclusions qui découlent de ces analyses vont toutes dans le sens de la négation d’une relation éventuelle entre l’obtention par Émèse et Damas du statut de colonie et les vestiges de lotissement découverts autour de ces villes.34 L’argument principal qui soutiendrait la thèse du manque d’un tel lien est la superficie moyenne des lots identifiés correspondant au modèle appliqué sous le règne d’Auguste.35 Les données relatives à ce modèle proviennent des recherches sur le lotissement dans les provinces occidentales de l’Empire romain. Des informations sont aussi fournies par les écrits des gromatici romains; les plus anciens d’entre eux contiennent des données se rapportant à l’époque de Trajan. Il est donc évident que de telles constatations sont basées sur la conviction généralement répandue, et dont on a parlé ci-dessus, que les derniers lotissements d’envergure importante eurent lieu sous le règne d’Hadrien. Les mêmes conceptions sont à l’origine de l’hypothèse avancée par M. Dodinet et ses collègues, selon laquelle sur le territoire de la Syrie pouvaient avoir lieu jusqu’à ce moment-là les lotissements et la colonisation effectués sans aucun lien avec la création de colonies.36 Le bien-fondé de cette thèse reposerait notamment sur le fait qu’il serait difficile d’imaginer que des terrains agricoles très vastes et fertiles situés près de Damas soient restés non exploités pendant plusieurs siècles.37 Cependant, à la datation proposée de ces lotissements s’opposeraient les événements historiques connus, aussi bien ceux de l’époque du règne du premier empereur que ceux de ses successeurs. Dans aucune des sources conservées se rapportant à la politique qu’Auguste menait sur le territoire de la Syrie on ne retrouve la moindre indication qui prouverait qu’il aurait entreprit des actions visant à installer des colons romains à proximité des deux villes précitées. Et si l’argumentum ex silentio n’est 32 Cf. Mann 1983, 43 ; Isaac 1992, 139 ; Pollard 2000, 42, 63 sq. 33 Cf. Rey-Coquais 1978, 57 ; 1989, 56 ; Dąbrowa 2004b. Voir aussi Ziegler 1978, 512 ; 512–513, note 113; Rebuffat 1998 , 410. 34 Dodinet, Leblanc, Vallat, Villeneuve 1990, 353. Dans le cas d’Émèse, pour une telle relation se prononce Van Liere 1958/1959, 55. 35 Dodinet, Leblanc, Vallat, Villeneuve 1990, 346. Cette constatation n’exclut pas en même temps une datation ultérieure du lotissement mais, comme nous pouvons déduire d’après les propos des auteurs, elle ne serait pas postérieure à l’époque d’Hadrien. 36 Dodinet, Leblanc, Vallat, Villeneuve 1990, 350. 37 Dodinet, Leblanc, Vallat, Villeneuve 1990, 353 :« Il est en outre difficile d’imaginer qu’au début du IIIème siècle ap. J.-C. les terres disponibles à la périphérie immédiate de Damas n’aient pas encore été exploitées et cadastrées! ».

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bien évidemment pas décisif dans ce cas, il serait difficile de s’imaginer que Strabon, Pline l’Ancien et Flavius Josèphe, grâce auxquels nous connaissons bien les actions d’Auguste en Syrie et en Judée, aient passé entièrement sous silence l’installation éventuelle d’un groupe considérable de colons sur les territoires d’Émèse et de Damas. Et si une telle colonisation n’était pas liée à la fondation de colonies, il est étonnant de constater le manque total de traces durables de cette présence, ne serait-ce que dans la toponymie locale.38 La présence d’une telle colonisation à l’époque d’Auguste et de ses successeurs directs ne se trouve pas confirmée, et elle est même exclue, par les faits que nous connaissons à propos de l’histoire de ces deux villes. Tout au long des premières années du règne d’Auguste, époque à laquelle fut probablement fondée la colonie de vétérans à Beyrouth,39 la sécurité de Damas était menacée par les pillages de la part de Zénodôros qui occupa les territoires appartenant au tétrarque Lysanias. Ce danger était tellement grave que les Romains furent obligés d’entreprendre des actions résolues. Or, la réponse ne consista pas à envoyer des colons à Damas mais à léguer par Auguste les territoires limitrophes de Damas, à savoir Trachônitide, Batanée et Auranitide à Hérode, régnant en tant que roi-client sur la Judée, en lui imposant ainsi de faire disparaître les causes de ce danger.40 Une telle solution permit, pour une longue durée, d’exclure la nécessité d’un engagement direct sur ces territoires de la part des Romains.41 Dans le cas d’Émèse, au premier siècle de notre ère, nous avons affaire à une subordination « vassale ». Depuis au moins l’époque de Domitien probablement, la ville restait sous l’autorité de la dynastie locale, ce qui excluait la possibilité d’installation de colons romains sur son territoire. Jusqu’aux temps de la dynastie des Sévères, lorsqu’elle obtint le statut de colonie ainsi que d’autres privilèges, ses destinées ne sont guères connues.42 À la lumière des événements historiques cités, le fait de considérer le modèle de lotissement comme principal critère chronologique permettant de déterminer le moment approximatif où ce processus eut lieu semble insuffisant, car nous ne disposons pas d’exemples suffisamment crédibles quant au lotissement, ni pour ce qui concerne 38 Cf. Rey-Coquais 1981], 170 sq. 39 La date de sa fondation n’est pas connue avec exactitude. Certains chercheurs estiment que l’acte de fondation eut lieu vers l’an 27 av. de n. è. (Rey-Coquais 1978, 51–51 ; Rey-Coquais 1991, 149), alors que d’autres se prononcent pour une date un peu plus tardive, vers 15/14 av. de n. è. (Millar 1990, 11 sqq.; Sartre 2001b, 115). 40 Strabon 16.2.20; Flavius Josèphe, AJ 15.10.1–2; BJ 1.20.4 ; cf. Dąbrowa 1998, 18 ; Gebhardt 2002, 247. 41 Cette approche va évoluer de manière significative au moment de l’annexion de l’Arabie, cf. Gebhardt 2002, 247 sqq. 42 Les chercheurs sont d’une part unanimes quant à la thèse que c’est probablement au dernier représentant de la dynastie de Samsigéramos que se rapporte l’une des inscriptions retrouvées à Homs : IGLS V, 2212; Sullivan 1978, 218–219. Nous connaissons d’autre part une série d’inscriptions datant du IIe siècle de n. è. attribuées à ses successeurs : IGLS V, 2213–2217; Sullivan 1978, 219. De manière concise, les événements de l’histoire de la ville sont retracés par A. R.Birley (1999, 69–72) ; cf. aussi Seyrig 1959 .

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le territoire de la Syrie elle-même, ni pour ce qui concerne les provinces voisines.43 Et c’est pour cette raison que nous ne pouvons pas certifier sans équivoque que le lotissement des terres effectué sur les territoires d’Émèse et de Damas fut effectué à la même époque. Car le modèle auquel on fit appel à cette occasion pouvait être appliqué pendant une longue période. Comme peu convaincant pourrait d’autre part être considéré l’argument disant qu’en Syrie, les territoires pouvant être utilisés pour le lotissement faisaient défaut. Cet argument découlerait plus de nos connaissances insuffisantes relatives à la propriété des terres que de preuves indubitables. La Syrie était l’une de ces provinces où la structure de la propriété de terre était particulièrement compliquée. Il en était ainsi en raison de la situation politique qui eut lieu sur les terres de la Syrie aussi bien avant l’apparition des Romains que pendant leur gouvernement. À l’intérieur de ses frontières, il existait toujours de nombreux États plus ou moins grands, ainsi que de nombreux centres de culte dont les territoires étaient parfois composés de nombreuses parties. Les destinées de chaque partie de ces terres sont extrêmement difficiles à suivre, d’autant plus que ces territoires changeaient parfois plusieurs fois de propriétaire à la suite d’une décision des autorités administratives de la province. L’annexion de chacune de ces structures politiques entraînait l’inclusion, au sein des domaines privés des empereurs, des terrains ayant appartenu aux souverains précédents. Par conséquent, sur le territoire de la Syrie, on observa la création d’une véritable mosaïque composée de différents types de propriété terrestre qu’il est impossible de reconstituer de nos jours.44 Sans aucun doute, on peut toutefois admettre que les terres faisant partie de la propriété privée des empereurs romains représentaient un pourcentage considérable des terres arables sur le territoire de la province. Cela signifie qu’ils disposaient de terres suffisamment vastes qu’ils pouvaient à tout moment affecter aux besoins de la colonisation sans avoir à recourir à l’annexion des terres appartenant aux villes de province en évitant ainsi des tensions sociales inutiles et en conservant une marge de manœuvre considérable. Comme l’une des raisons importantes pour lesquelles les empereurs renonçaient à la colonisation, on indique souvent les coûts élevés de telles opérations. En réalité, ces coûts représentaient un obstacle beaucoup moins significatif qu’on ne pourrait le penser. Le facteur décisif résidait dans le fait que la réalisation d’un objectif ou d’un projet déterminé avait une importance considérable pour la politique d’un empereur concret ou était dans l’intérêt de la dynastie. Il suffit de citer l’exemple de 43 Si, outre Émèse et Damas, nous connaissons aujourd’hui, pour ce qui concerne le Proche-Orient, d’autres vestiges du processus de lotissement romain (cf. Dodinet, Leblanc, Vallat, Villeneuve 1990, 350; Tate 1990, 60 sq.), nous ne disposons toutefois que de trop peu de matière à comparaison pour pouvoir formuler des conclusions à caractère plus général. 44 Ceci est bien illustré par l’exemple de la situation qui caractérisait le territoire appartenant à Héliopolis : Ghadban 1981 ; Rey-Coquais 1981.

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Philippopolis (actuellement Shahba) qui, étant à l’origine un petit et insignifiant village, fut en peu de temps transformé par Philippe l’Arabe grâce à des moyens et à des actions exceptionnels en un centre doté du statut de colonie et de dimensions imposantes.45 Indépendamment des coûts relatifs à la mise en place de l’infrastructure urbaine, Philippe l’Arabe devait consacrer des moyens importants pour augmenter le nombre d’habitants et pour leur garantir les bases de leur existence. En nous appuyant sur les sources disponibles, nous ne sommes pas en mesure de dire si cela avait pu être atteint à l’aide de méthodes administratives en procédant au transfert forcé de la population locale vers la ville, ou par le biais de l’installation des colons et, dans le deuxième cas, si cela nécessitait l’attribution des terres aux colons.46 Nous savons cependant que la nouvelle ville devait représenter un cadre digne de ses aspirations politiques et dynastiques.47 Les similitudes en ce qui concerne les destinées d’Émèse et de Philippopolis sont évidentes. Ainsi, on ne peut pas exclure qu’en attribuant à la ville d’Émèse le statut de colonie, Caracalla prit en même temps la décision d’installer sur les territoires limitrophes et faisant partie du domaine de l’empereur des colons, dont la présence devait contribuer à l’augmentation du nombre d’habitants et par conséquent au développement matériel de la ville. Les privilèges même les plus considérables ne constituaient pas un stimulus suffisamment fort pour permettre le développement de la ville, qui auparavant ne jouait qu’un rôle très limité dans la vie de la province. Le manque de références quelconques dans l’iconographie des revers des monnaies coloniales à la symbolique militaire permet d’avancer la supposition que les colons pouvaient être issus de la population civile. En considérant le motif représenté sur le revers de la monnaie susmentionnée de Damas comme étant le témoignage de la colonisation réelle, nous pourrions tenter d’en tirer la conclusion que sa preuve matérielle réside dans les vestiges du lotissement. Nous avons les raisons de penser que l’attribution du statut de colonie à Damas et l’installation sur son territoire des vétérans de la leg. VI Ferrata doivent être perçus comme étant une partie d’un projet politique plus vaste réalisé par Philippe l’Arabe sur les territoires des provinces de Syrie et d’Arabie, dont l’élément constitutif était, à part la construction de Philippopolis, l’attribution du rang de métropole à Bostra, l’engagement à l’extension des temples de Dmeir et de Baalbek, ainsi que d’autres actions visant à s’assurer un soutien puissant de cette partie de l’empire.48 Le choix de Damas en tant que colonie de vétérans pouvait découler non seulement 45 Aur. Victor 28.1 ; cf. Epit. de Caes. 28.4 ; Amer, Gawlikowski 1985; Millar 1990, 53–55 ; Burns 1999, 220– 223 ; Körner 2002, 211–225. 46 Les monnaies coloniales de Philippopolis ainsi que celles d’Émèse ne contiennent aucune référence iconographique quant à l’acte de fondation des colonies. Sur les revers de ces monnaies, on retrouve uniquement la représentation de Rome : Spijkerman 1978, 260 sq., nos 1–7 ; cf. Körner 2002, 219–220. 47 Amer, Gawlikowski 1985, 11 sqq. ; Körner 2002, 214–218. 48 Cf. Körner 2002, 211–231.

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de la disponibilité des terres pour la colonisation mais aussi de la menace éventuelle que représentaient les nomades.49 * Malgré les doutes exprimés par les chercheurs quant à la poursuite de la pratique connue entre le Ier siècle avant notre ère et le Ier siècle de n. è., consistant en une colonisation organisée pendant la période qui suivit le règne de l’empereur Hadrien, l’analyse des sources historiques ne donne nullement le droit d’accepter sans aucune réticence une telle prise de position. Il semblerait que de telles pratiques eurent effectivement lieu, mais à un degré limité. Cet état des choses était dû tout d’abord à un contexte social et politique différent. Aux IIe et IIIe siècles, les empereurs ne devaient plus faire face à une pression aussi importante de la part des masses considérables de vétérans attendant avec impatience la satisfaction de leurs attentes, liées à l’attribution de terres comme ce fut le cas à l’époque des imperatores de la république ou à celle d’Auguste au moment où il prit le pouvoir. Il est difficile d’accepter la thèse selon laquelle les vétérans, à l’époque du Bas-Empire, n’auraient pas été intéressés par cette forme de récompense. Non seulement pendant la durée du service militaire, mais au moment où ce service prenait fin, les soldats n’étaient pas entièrement maîtres de leur propre sort. Si les intérêts de l’État ou du souverain le demandaient, les vétérans étaient forcés de suivre les ordres de l’empereur. Et s’il est vrai que pendant l’Empire les priorités politiques liées à la colonisation changèrent, celle-ci restait tout de même un élément important de la politique des différents souverains de Rome. Cette politique permettait de renforcer la présence romaine sur les terrains récemment conquis, de stimuler le développement des villes de province et constituait un instrument permettant d’atteindre des objectifs importants, d’un point de vue politique et dynastique. Sans aucun doute, chaque décision d’attribution du statut de colonie ne fut pas forcément accompagnée de colonisation. Nous avons cependant des raisons de penser que tout au long des IIe et IIIe siècles de n. è., dans certains cas, ces deux éléments intervenaient en une relation réciproque et très proche.

49 Cf. Rey-Coquais 1978, 70 ; Isaac 1992, 138–139.

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À l’époque de l’Empire, la représentation du vexillum apparaissait souvent sur les revers des monnaies frappées dans pratiquement la totalité des colonies de vétérans militaires. Elle constituait, avec le nom de la légion qui parfois l’accompagnait, le témoignage des origines militaires des colons et permettait aussi de pérenniser ce fait dans la conscience collective de la population coloniale. Or, malgré la signification pourtant si évidente de cette représentation, de nombreux chercheurs, se spécialisant dans la problématique de la présence de l’armée romaine sur les territoires du Proche Orient entre la seconde moitié du IIe et la première moitié du IIIe siècle apr. J.-C., estiment qu’elle avait perdue alors sa signification initiale. Une telle hypothèse avait été formulée d’après l’interprétation d’un nombre relativement restreint d’émissions de monnaies provenant des villes romaines de Mésopotamie, de Syrie et de Judée, pièces sur lesquelles la représentation du vexillum était apparue pour la première fois justement à cette époque-là.1 Le motif essentiel d’une telle interprétation de ce symbole repose dans la conviction partagée par la plupart des chercheurs selon laquelle le phénomène de colonisation organisée des vétérans militaires, procédé si répandu vers la fin de la République et dans les débuts de l’Empire, depuis le règne d’Hadrien avait disparu presque totalement.2 On admet que toutes les villes qui, après Hadrien, avaient obtenu le statut de colonie, n’étaient que des colonies titulaires ou honoraires car un tel statut avait seulement le caractère d’un privilège juridique. Sur de telles bases il est évident que la représentation du vexillum apparaissant sur les pièces de monnaie frappées dans les villes qui obtinrent le statut de colonie postérieurement au règne d’Hadrien devait avoir une signification différente de celle qui était prévue à l’origine. L’interprétation qui est devenue aujourd’hui l’une des plus répandues consiste à associer la représentation du vexillum sur les pièces frappées dans certaines villes de Syrie et de Judée avec le stationnement d’une garnison romaine sur leur territoire.3 Et bien que cette .

* 

La legio III Gallica, la colonisation militaire et les Sévères, [in:] F. Beutler, W. Hameter (eds.), ”Eine ganz normale Inschrift ”… und ähnliches zum Geburtstag von Ekkehard Weber. Festschrift zum 30. April 2005, (Althistorisch-Epigraphische Studien – 5), Wien 2005, 35–43.

1 Cf. plus bas note 3. 2 Voir Forni 1953, 41 sqq. ; Sherwin-White 1973, 413 ; Watkins 1982/1983, 319 sqq. ; Mann 1983, 18, 61, 65 sqq. ; Millar 1990, 7 sqq., 39 sqq. ; Brennan 1990, 491 sqq. ; Zahrnt 1991, 484; Pollard 2000, 63 sq. ; Keppie 2000e, 302, 311 sq. 3 Voir Honigmann 1923, 2227–2228 ; Eissfeldt 1948, 1900–1901 ; Mann 1983, 43 sq. ; Harl 1987, 50; Isaac 1992, 139 et note 191 ; 360 et note 169 ; Pollard 2000, 63 ; Stoll 2001a, 380 sqq., 399.

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hypothèse semble certes séduisante, si nous la soumettons à une analyse détaillée, elle ne résiste pas à la critique. Et cette approche critique, il faudrait la commencer en rappelant les données essentielles relatives au processus de mise en place du système d’attribution des récompenses aux soldats romains terminant leur service militaire. Ce fut Gaius Marius qui, le premier, avait entrepris une tentative visant à régler cette question. L’attribution des lots de terre aux vétérans quittant l’armée, pratique qui s’était rapidement répandue, a contribué en même temps à rendre le service militaire beaucoup plus attractif. Et si le lieu de l’emplacement des vétérans était à chaque fois désigné par le Sénat, en cas de conflit ou de tensions entre les chefs et le Sénat ou pendant les guerres civiles, les décisions adoptées en cette matière entraînaient des conséquences sociales dramatiques, car il arrivait que les terres qui allaient être attribuées aux vétérans fussent souvent des terres confisquées aux adversaires politiques. La réforme suivante du système visant à récompenser les vétérans a été introduite par Octavien qui, au moment de la prise du pouvoir, s’est trouvé devant la nécessité de répondre aux besoins et aux attentes des nombreux soldats qui avaient quitté l’armée peu après la bataille d’Actium et dans les années qui suivirent. Cette situation nécessitait une action rapide et résolue afin d’éliminer le risque de déclenchement d’un mécontentement éventuel qui aurait pu constituer pour le pouvoir d’Octavien une menace directe et aurait pu avoir pour conséquence une longue déstabilisation politique de l’empire. Les modifications qu’Octavien avait été forcé d’introduire ont apporté des résultats si avantageux qu’elles sont devenues, pour longtemps, le fondement du système officiel de rémunération des vétérans dans l’armée romaine. Le système mis en place par Octavien Auguste prévoyait deux principales formes de rémunération: la missio agraria, l’attribution d’un lot de terre, et la missio nummaria, rémunération sous forme de versement unique en espèces (cf. RGDA 3; 16); dans les premières années de son règne, prédominait la première de ces formes alors que la seconde est devenue la plus répandue seulement après la création de l’aerarium militare en l’année 6 apr. J.-C. La missio agraria pouvait prendre la forme soit de l’installation collective des vétérans dans les colonies nouvellement créées, soit celle de l’attribution collective ou individuelle des terres dans l’une des colonies ou des municipia déjà existants. L’une des caractéristiques importantes de ce système était sa souplesse. La forme de la prestation attribuée n’était pas déterminée à l’avance et chaque fois dépendait de la décision de l’empereur. Et si la forme, de loin la plus populaire et en même temps la plus appréciée par les soldats, était le versement en espèces, la colonisation militaire, dans les deux cas précités, se poursuivait tout de même, bien qu’à une échelle plus restreinte. Pour de nombreux empereurs qui ont succédé à Auguste, cela constituait un élément et un instrument important de leur politique interne aussi bien sur le territoire de l’Italie que dans

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les provinces.4 Contrairement à l’avis de bon nombre de chercheurs, cette politique ne s’était pas terminée avec Hadrien car, d’après les témoignages numismatiques, il n’y a aucun doute que la pratique consistant à fonder des colonies de vétérans militaires se poursuivit jusqu’à la moitié du IIIe siècle apr. J.-C. Une telle conclusion semble fondée si nous nous référons à toute une série d’émissions de monnaies coloniales sur les revers desquelles est présentée la scène de fondation de colonie (ce type de revers est appelé le « founder type »). Cette scène représente le rite de creusement du sillon qui délimite les frontières de la colonie (sulcus primigenius) et qui, de par sa symbolique, fait appel à la tradition liée à la fondation de Rome car, conformément aux convictions répandues dans l’univers romain, chaque colonie de citoyens romains devait être une sorte de réplique de la ville fondée sur les rives du Tibre.5 À l’époque du Haut-Empire, la pratique générale adoptée par pratiquement toutes les colonies consistait à représenter cette scène sur les revers des premières monnaies coloniales. Dans la majorité des cas son iconographie, outre quelques éléments d’importance secondaire, ne contenait pas de différences majeures. Cette scène apparaît sur les pièces frappées dans les villes qui obtinrent le statut de colonie dans la deuxième moitié du IIe siècle ou dans la première moitié du IIIe siècle apr. J.-C., car le privilège de l’insérer sur les revers des monnaies revenait à chaque colonie, et ceci indépendamment du fait s’il s’agissait d’une réelle colonie de vétérans ou seulement d’une colonie titulaire.6 Les chercheurs, en acceptant l’hypothèse selon laquelle, après le règne d’Hadrien, les empereurs n’auraient plus fondé de colonies de vétérans, estiment que toutes les villes de l’Asie Mineure, de Mésopotamie, de Syrie et de Judée, auxquelles le statut de colonie fut attribué dans la seconde moitié du IIe siècle ou dans la première moitié du IIIe siècle apr. J.-C., étaient exclusivement des colonies titulaires. La comparaison de l’iconographie de la scène de fondation des colonies présentée sur les revers des monnaies frappées dans ces villes permet toutefois de distinguer une nette différence entre eux. Elle se traduit par la présence du vexillum – accompagné parfois du nom de la légion – dans la scène de fondation de la colonie. En tenant compte de la dimension symbolique de ce motif dans le monnayage des colonies militaires, nous pouvons considérer que son apparition sur le revers des monnaies de quelques-unes seulement des colonies, n’était pas due au hasard. En raison de ce type de revers, on doit catégoriquement rejeter la supposition que la représentation du vexillum qui avait été utilisée à cette occasion devrait être associée d’une manière ou d’une autre à la présence d’une garnison quelconque 4 Voir Keppie 1984, 77–114 (= Keppie 2000a, 263–300) ; 2000b, 301–316. 5 Aul.Gell., Noct. Att. 16, 13, 8–9. Outre les représentations figurant sur les revers des monnaies, la scène de fondation des colonies est connue uniquement grâce à deux reliefs. L’un d’eux provient d’Aquilée (Brusin 1931, 473, fig. 10), l’autre de Cologne (Franken 2001, 485 sqq. ). 6 Au sujet des colonies titulaires en tant que catégorie légale voir : Vittinghoff 1952, 27 sqq., 31 sq.

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dans la colonie. Elle ne peut pas non plus se reporter à l’obtention du statut de colonie par une ville concrète car, dans un tel cas, il n’aurait pas été nécessaire d’introduire d’importantes modifications dans l’iconographie d’une scène connue généralement par tous. La présence du signum devient compréhensible seulement dans l’hypothèse où l’obtention du statut de colonie était accompagnée de la colonisation de vétérans. Outre la version militaire susmentionnée du revers (« founder type »), dans le monnayage colonial, nous connaissons aussi un autre type de revers dans l’iconographie duquel apparaît le vexillum. Il s’agit de la représentation de la louve capitoline. On avait commencé à faire fréquemment appel à cette image sur les pièces de monnaie vers la fin du IIe siècle et dans la première moitié du IIIe siècle apr. J.-C. Comme dans le cas de la représentation de la scène de fondation des colonies, là aussi, le message idéologique était compréhensible et évident pour tous: la louve était le symbole de la ville de Rome et la colonie, sa réplique à une échelle réduite. Il est intéressant de constater que le vexillum accompagne la représentation de la louve sur les pièces de quelques-unes seulement des colonies, essentiellement celles qui avaient obtenu leur statut justement pendant cette période-là. L’originalité de cette liaison, là aussi, ne laisse aucun doute quant au fait que le choix de ces deux éléments iconographiques n’était pas fortuit. Étant donné que les revers avec la représentation de la louve et du vexillum accompagnés du nom de la légion apparaissent sur les premières émissions des colonies susmentionnées, il faudrait les interpréter non pas comme étant le témoignage de stationnement sur leur territoire de la garnison d’une légion concrète, mais comme témoignage de la colonisation militaire qui avait été à l’origine de l’obtention du statut militaire par ces villes. Contre l’interprétation de la présence du vexillum sur les monnaies comme étant le témoignage du stationnement de la garnison, on pourrait aussi soulever l’argument que, sur le territoire de l’ensemble du Proche-Orient romain, mais aussi en Asie Mineure, sur les monnaies municipales comme dans le monnayage des colonies, la pratique de commémoration d’une manière aussi directe des garnisons des légions romaines, c’est-à-dire mentionnant le nom de l’unité militaire, n’avait jamais eu lieu.7 Et si dans le monnayage de nombreuses villes et colonies les chercheurs tentent de déceler des éléments iconographiques qui se rapporteraient à la présence des garnisons romaines, les différentes significations que l’on pourrait y donner ne permettent pas d’en faire des arguments suffisamment convaincants pour pouvoir formuler sur cette base des conclusions univoques.8 7

Dans le monnayage colonial de Aelia Capitolina, on peut déjà retrouver de nombreux accents qui se rapportent de manière évidente à la leg. X Fretensis qui stationnait à proximité. Cependant, au moins quelques-uns d’entre eux doivent être associés aux origines des premiers colons. 8 C’est pourquoi j’estime que les conclusions quant à l’utilité des sources numismatiques pour ce qui concerne la localisation des camps des légions, que j’ai présentées dans l’un de mes articles, doivent être revues, cf. Dąbrowa 2001, 80–81. Une prise de position différente en cette matière est présentée par O. Stoll (2001a, 380 sqq. ; 2001b, 65 sqq.).

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La présence, sur les deux types de revers mentionnés, de la représentation du vexillum, permet de constater que pendant la période qui s’étend de la moitié du IIe siècle jusqu’à la moitié du IIIe siècle apr. J.-C., à Singara, Rhésaina, Tyr, Sidon, Césarée-Arca du Liban et à Damas se sont installés des groupes de colons militaires et non pas des garnisons.9 Le bien-fondé d’une telle interprétation se trouve conforté par le fait que nous sommes aussi en mesure d’indiquer les causes probables pour lesquelles les empereurs avaient décidé d’envoyer les vétérans dans chacune de ces villes. Si nous admettons que la représentation du vexillum accompagnée de la scène de fondation de colonie avec l’image de la louve capitoline serait la preuve de la colonisation militaire, il nous est possible d’expliquer de manière plus crédible la signification de quelques-unes des émissions de monnaies très intéressantes provenant aussi bien des colonies de vétérans fondées avant Hadrien que des émissions plus tardives, car les tentatives d’interprétation, jusqu’à maintenant, étaient parfois divergentes. À l’époque du règne d’Élagabal, dans la monnayage d’Acco-Ptolemaïs – colonie fondée aux temps de l’empereur Claude et dont le premier groupe de colons était constitué par les vétérans de quatre légions stationnant à cette époquelà en Syrie – nous trouvons des pièces avec la version militaire du revers « founder type »; sur le vexillum présenté à l’arrière-plan de la scène de fondation figure l’inscription legio III Gallica.10 Il faut exclure le caractère commémoratif de cette émission car nous n’avons pas connaissance, pour ce qui concerne la période en question, de monnaies avec le nom des trois autres légions, à savoir legio VI Ferrata, X Fretensis et XII Fulminata. De même, en raison du type de revers, on ne peut pas l’associer au fait d’avoir installé à Acco-Ptolemaïs une garnison qui serait composée de soldats de cette légion. Dans le monnayage colonial de Tyr, nous retrouvons une émission similaire datant de l’époque de Philippe l’Arabe. Sur le revers de la pièce, on retrouve la représentation de la louve ainsi que le vexillum, sur lequel figure l’inscription leg. VI Ferrata. On doit cependant remarquer que sur les pièces frappées sous le règne de Septime Sévère, époque à laquelle la ville obtint le statut de colonie, sur le vexillum intégré dans la scène de creusement de sulcus primigenius, on retrouve l’inscription legio III Gallica.11 Il faut toutefois remarquer que dans l’iconographie des pièces qui proviennent d’autres colonies, on distingue certains éléments dont l’interprétation ne fait pas toujours l’unanimité auprès des chercheurs. L’un des exemples nous en est donné par le monnayage d’Aelia Capitolina, où la version militaire du revers « founder type » était l’une 9 Voir Dąbrowa 2001, 77 sq., 80 ; 2003a, 131 sqq. Une prise de position similaire a été aussi adoptée par R. Ziegler (1978, 512 ; 512–513, note 113). Cf. aussi Rebuffat 1998, 410. 10 Kadman 1961, 48–49 ; 122, nos 157–159. 11 BMC Phoenicia, 269, nos 367–368.

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des plus fréquemment utilisées. Sur les revers des premières émissions à l’époque d’Hadrien, la représentation de la scène de fondation de colonie est accompagnée d’un seul vexillum.12 À l’époque de Marc Aurèle,13 et plus tard, sous le règne d’Hostilien, est apparu un revers où figurent deux vexilla.14 Et comme l’iconographie des revers était soumise à des règles précises, on peut supposer que la présence d’un second vexillum n’était pas due à une erreur du graveur mais que cela constituait plutôt le symbole d’un nouveau groupe de colons militaires qui s’étaient installés à cette époque-là à Aelia Capitolina.15 Après avoir éliminé la présence des garnisons comme motif étant à l’origine de ces émissions, nous pouvons les considérer comme preuve de la mise en œuvre, ceci jusqu’à la moitié du IIIe siècle, d’une pratique bien connue des temps d’Auguste et de ses successeurs, consistant à envoyer les vétérans dans les colonies existantes. La présence des noms des légions sur les vexilla permet d’identifier la provenance des groupes de vétérans qui devaient s’installer dans les différentes colonies. De cette manière-là se trouve certifiée la participation, à l’action de colonisation, des soldats de quelques-unes seulement des légions stationnant sur le territoire de Mésopotamie, de Syrie et de Judée: legio III Parthica, III Gallica et VI Ferrata.16 Afin d’obtenir une image plus complète de cette colonisation, il faudrait essayer de répondre à la question: combien de groupes de vétérans de chacune des légions susmentionnées avaient été envoyés pour fonder de nouvelles colonies ou pour renforcer les colonies déjà existantes ? et aussi savoir quelle fut la chronologie de cette colonisation. Dans le premier des cas, il s’agit de déterminer si la colonisation avait le caractère d’une action systématique qui découlait de la nécessité de garantir des moyens d’existence aux groupes successifs qui terminaient leur service militaire, ou si elle avait été causée par d’autres circonstances ou par d’autres besoins. Les données dont nous disposons permettent d’établir que les vétérans de la legio III Parthica furent seulement à l’origine de la fondation de la colonie à Rhésaina.17

12 13 14 15

Meshorer 1989, 70, nos 2–2a. Meshorer 1989, 78, no 42. Meshorer 1989, 116, no 182. Le fait que dans la scène de fondation de colonie, répétée encore ultérieurement à plusieurs reprises dans le monnayage d’Aelia Capitolina, il n’y ait qu’un seul vexillum (cf. Meshorer 1989, 96, nos 113–113a ; 104, no 132 [Élagabal] ; 116, no 181 [Hostilien]), ne remet nullement en doute la conclusion présentée. La présence d’un seul vexillum devrait être liée à la fonction symbolique que remplissait cette représentation, qui devait mettre en relief le caractère militaire de la colonie. Nous ne disposons d’aucune preuve qui conforterait la thèse selon laquelle l’utilisation, par les différents empereurs, du revers représentant la scène de creusement du sulcus primigenius devrait être associée à la répétition du rite de fondation de colonie. 16 L’iconographie des monnaies coloniales de Singara nous permet d’estimer, avec une forte dose de probabilité, que le premier groupe de colons qui s’y était installé se composait de vétérans de la legio I Parthica, cf. Dąbrowa 2004a, 402 sq. 17 Cf. Castelin 1946, 14 sqq.

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Les colons originaires de la legio III Gallica ont créé les premiers groupes de colons à Tyr18 et Sidon,19 et ont d’autre part augmenté en nombre les populations coloniales d’Acco-Ptolemaïs,20 de Césarée Maritime21 et de Damas.22 Les vétérans de la legio VI Ferrata contribuèrent à la création de la colonie de Damas,23 alors qu’un autre groupe d’entre eux a « alimenté » la colonie de Tyr.24 Ce qui est intéressant, c’est la chronologie de cette colonisation: Tyr est devenue colonie vers l’année 198, sous le règne de Septime Sévère.25 À cette époque-là fut fondée aussi la colonie à Rhésaina. Sidon obtint le statut de colonie vers l’année 221, sous le règne d’Élagabal.26 De l’époque de son règne date aussi l’envoi d’un nouveau groupe de colons à Acco-Ptolemaïs.27 La fondation de la colonie de Damas28 et l’installation d’un nouveau groupe de colons militaires à Tyr29 eut lieu sous le règne de Philippe l’Arabe. Probablement, l’envoi du premier groupe de colons militaires à Césarée Maritime, qui avait le statut de colonie civium Romanorum depuis déjà les temps de Vespasien, eut lieu aux temps de l’empereur Dèce,30 et, à l’époque de Trébonien Galle, un nouvel envoi eut lieu cette fois-ci à Damas.31 Il faut ajouter que, au moins depuis l’époque de Philippe l’Arabe, le camp de la legio III Gallica était situé à Danaba,32 où, si l’on se réfère au témoignage de Notitia Dignitatum (Or. 32,31), il fonctionnait depuis une période plus longue. En tenant compte des autres cas de colonisation militaire qui avaient lieu sur le territoire de Mésopotamie et de Syrie dans la deuxième moitié du IIe siècle et pendant la première moitié du IIIe siècle apr. J.-C., où la provenance des vétérans n’est pas déterminée avec exactitude, nous pourrions encore ajouter à la liste des colonies 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

32

BMC Phoenicia, 269, nos 367–368 ; SNG Copenhagen: Phoenicia, no 359 ; Meshorer 1989, 45. Rouvier 1902, 264, nos 1508–1511 ; BMC Phoenicia, 195, no 301. Kadman 1961, 48–49 ; 122, nos 157–159; Dąbrowa 2001, 76 et note 16. Rouvier 1901, 222, no 1032 ; Kadman 1957, 128, no 157 ; 134, no 185 ; 140, nos 213–214. De Saulcy 1874, 53, no 10. De Saulcy 1874, 48, no 13 (cf. 43–44, no *5); BMC Syria, 286, no 25 ; Baramki 1968, 70–71, no 237 ; SNG Schweiz II, no 2156. Heymann 1963, 48 Dąbrowa 2001, 77. Dąbrowa 2001, 77–78. Rouvier 1901, 222, no 1032 ; Kadman 1961,122, nos 157–159 ; Dąbrowa 2001, 76, note 16. Cf. Millar 1990, 53 ; Dąbrowa 2001, 78; Sartre 2001b, 118 ; Dąbrowa 2003b, 76 sqq. Dąbrowa 2001, 77. Kadman 1957, 128, no 157. De Saulcy 1874, 53, no 10. L’iconographie des revers des monnaies de ces deux colonies diffère des types de revers coloniaux décrits ci-dessus. Le vexillum avec le nom de la légion occupe la partie centrale du revers. Des deux côtés de la hampe sont représentés deux aigles. Malgré cette différence, une telle représentation doit être considérée comme faisant appel à la colonisation. L’interprétation de ces revers comme témoignage de la présence de la garnison, ceci d’une part à la lumière des observations susmentionnées se rapportant au monnayage des villes dans lesquelles les camps des légions se trouvaient et, d’autre part, en tenant compte de la pratique du monnayage colonial, semble peu convaincante. CIL III 755. Selon E. Ritterling (1925, 1528), J.-P. Rey-Coquais (1978, 70) et F. Millar (1993,182, note 31) cette unité, après sa réactivation, fut envoyée là par Alexandre Sévère.

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militaires au moins Singara, qui avait obtenu le statut de colonie probablement sous le règne de Septime Sévère, ainsi que Césarée-Arca du Liban, qui le devait à Élagabal.33 De ce relevé que nous avons présenté, il découle que la majorité des actions de colonisation eut lieu à l’époque du règne de la dynastie des Sévères. Une attention particulière doit être accordée aux initiatives menées par Septime Sévère. Certaines de ses actions peuvent être considérées comme des démarches visant à renforcer la présence romaine sur les territoires nouvellement conquis de la Mésopotamie, alors que d’autres initiatives devaient favoriser une reconstitution et une reconstruction rapide de certaines villes de Syrie détruites pendant la guerre civile contre Pescennius Niger. Cette volonté visant à renforcer certaines villes pourrait aussi être décelée dans le cas de l’action de colonisation menée par Élagabal. Les actions de colonisation entreprises par Philippe l’Arabe pourraient s’expliquer par son intention de vouloir réaliser ses propres projets politiques et ses ambitions dynastiques. En revanche, il serait difficile de dire quoi que ce soit à propos des motifs qui ont déterminé les démarches entreprises par Trébonien Galle. En comparaison avec la période du Haut-Empire, l’échelle de cette colonisation militaire peut sembler particulièrement modeste. On ne peut cependant déprécier son importance, surtout lorsque l’on se souvient des possibilités matérielles et sociales relativement restreintes dont disposaient les empereurs qui voulaient mettre en œuvre une telle politique.34 Le fait que Septime Sévère et ses successeurs, malgré les moyens limités dont ils disposaient, décidèrent de fonder des colonies de vétérans, prouve leur détermination et constitue une preuve du rôle important que la colonisation militaire jouait dans la politique intérieure menée par ces empereurs. Cette dimension politique particulière est notamment perceptible dans l’utilisation fréquente, par les Sévères, à l’occasion des actions de colonisation des vétérans originaires de la legio III Gallica, qui étaient envoyés non seulement dans les colonies situées dans la province de Syrie-Phénicie, où cette légion disposait de son camp, mais aussi en dehors de ses frontières. La raison pour laquelle la legio III Gallica était traitée d’une manière exceptionnelle – et ceci en dépit des relations personnelles qui liaient Septime Sévère à la legio IV Scythica qu’il avait commandé vers l’année 180 apr. J.-C.35 – pourrait avoir, à l’origine, le comportement de cette unité pendant la guerre qui opposait cet empereur à Pescennius Niger, et la loyauté manifestée à l’égard de ses successeurs. Cette loyauté se traduisit par le soutien apporté à Élagabal considéré comme étant le fils présumé de Caracalla, et qui, en définitive, lui permit de s’emparer du trône.36 Et si, à la fin du règne de cet empereur, une tentative d’usurpation du trône par des prétendants originaires de cette légion a eu lieu, 33 Dąbrowa 2001, 80. 34 Cf. plus haut note 2. 35 Voir SHA Sev. 3, 6 ; Devijver 1998, 210, no 14. 36 Cf. Hérod. 5,3,9–11 ; Dion Cassius 78,31,2–32,4 ; Eadie 1996, 140 sq.

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il semblerait qu’elle n’avait pas rassemblé de nombreux partisans parmi les soldats.37 Probablement, la loyauté de la legio III Gallica envers la dynastie des Sévères a survécu à ces événements difficiles. Dans un tel contexte, c’est avec beaucoup de prudence qu’il faut se fier à l’opinion qui, depuis longtemps, est généralement adoptée et selon laquelle, dans le cadre des mesures de répression prises à cause du soutien apporté à ces usurpations, Élagabal aurait dissout la legio III Gallica en la condamnant à cette occasion à la damnatio memoriae, et que la renaissance et le retour de cette unité sur la liste des troupes de l’armée romaine auraient en fait été l’œuvre d’Alexandre Sévère.38 La vérification critique des preuves qui devraient conforter son bien-fondé éveille tout de même des questions justifiées quant à leur crédibilité, ceci notamment en raison du fait que, avant le règne d’Élagabal, nous ne connaissons aucun exemple de punition d’une légion sous forme de sa dissolution pour le soutien apporté à un usurpateur, ni ensuite la réactivation de cette même unité sous son appellation initiale. Pour la première fois, un tel cas eut lieu en 238, lorsque, en raison de la prise de position à l’égard de l’usurpation des Gordiens, a été dissoute la legio III Augusta.39 La réactivation de celle-ci n’était intervenue probablement qu’en 253, époque du règne exercé conjointement par Valérien et Gallien.40 Un doute supplémentaire apparaît avec la question de savoir si – puisque la dissolution de la legio III Gallica fut accompagnée de la décision de retirer son nom de la totalité des documents publics41 et de l’envoi des 37 L’un des usurpateurs fut son légat Verus; seule une partie de son nom a été conservée dans les témoignages historiques, cf. Dion Cassius 79, 7,1; Dąbrowa 1996, 283. Un autre a été le fils d’un des centurions (Dion Cassius 79,7,3). 38 Le relevé des prises de position en cette matière, présentées dans les ouvrages scientifiques antérieurs, cf. Ritterling 1925, 1526–1527. Plus tard, dans la littérature scientifique, ces prises de position ont été reprises sans modifications notables, cf. Speidel 1998, 174–175 ; Dąbrowa 2000a, 311. 39 Cf. Cagnat 1912, 155 sqq. ; Le Bohec 1989, 451–453. 40 ILS 531 (= CIL VIII 2482); 2296 (= CIL VIII 2634). Plus d’informations au sujet de la date de cette réactivation et de ses différentes causes possibles, cf. Cagnat 1912, 160 sq. ; Le Bohec 1989, 463–464. 41 L’argument en faveur du damnatio memoriae est fondèé sur plusieurs cas connus de martelage du nom de la légion sur les inscriptions provenant du territoire de Syrie et de Phénicie ; leur relevé est présenté par E. Ritterling (1925, 1526). Cependant, cet argument reste douteux car nous ne disposons d’aucune information qui permettrait, avec certitude, d’associer l’élimination du nom de la legio III Gallica aux événements qui se déroulèrent à l’époque d’Élagabal. Dans certaines des inscriptions citées, ce nom n’apparaît pas du tout (cf. CIL III 14385). Dans plusieurs cas, son élimination pourrait se référer à des événements tout à fait différents. Certaines d’entre elles contenaient le nom de C. Avidius Cassius (IGR III, 1113, 1116, 1179), qui a été effacé après la répression de son usurpation en 175 ; ce n’est que sur une seule d’entre elles que l’on a enlevé l’inscription III Gallica avec le nom du centurion qui, peut-être, s’était engagé de manière active, du côté de l’usurpateur (IGR III 1179). De plusieurs inscriptions datant de l’époque de Commode (IGR III 1116, 1128) ont a effacé aussi bien le nom de l’empereur que le nom de la légion. Il est difficile d’établir si le martelage de ces deux éléments a eu lieu au même moment ou à des époques différentes. Si toutefois le nom de la legio III Gallica avait été réellement touché par la damnatio memoriae, pourquoi alors apparaît-il intact sur les inscriptions des soldats de cette unité qui, comme on l’accepte généralement et pratiquement à l’unanimité (depuis 1865, lorsque W. Henzen, a présenté cette hypothèse pour la première fois, jusqu’aux publications les plus récentes,

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soldats qui y appartenaient en dehors des frontières de la Syrie-Phénicie42 – il était envisageable, en un temps si court, de reconstituer l’unité dissoute et d’arriver à ce qu’elle retrouve ses aptitudes militaires.43 Une telle situation aurait pu avoir lieu uniquement dans le cas où, à la suite d’une mort violente d’Élagabal, ses décisions relatives à la légion n’auraient pas encore été mises en oeuvre et Alexandre Sévère n’aurait fait que les annuler. Toutefois, indépendamment du fait de considérer cette variante comme probable ou non, à la lumière des sources dont nous disposons, l’hypothèse selon laquelle la legio III Gallica avait été dissoute par Élagabal et ensuite, peu de temps après, réactivée par Alexandre Sévère, ne trouve pas, selon nous, de fondements suffisamment solides. Les témoignages dont nous disposons, non seulement confirment que les Sévères et les empereurs qui lui succédèrent firent appel à la colonisation militaire en tant que moyen servant à récompenser les vétérans, mais aussi permettent d’y voir un instrument important de réalisation de différents objectifs de politique intérieure. Sans aucun doute, la colonisation favorisait la consolidation de la présence romaine sur les territoires nouvellement conquis mais, en fait, elle permettait surtout de renforcer la position de l’empereur et de la dynastie au pouvoir. La réalisation de ces objectifs n’aurait pas été possible sans une attitude loyale de la part de l’armée, et les empereurs successifs pouvaient l’obtenir en garantissant aux soldats une rémunération convenable, y compris sous la forme la plus intéressante, à savoir l’attribution de lots de terre. Compte tenu des possibilités limitées pour ce qui concerne l’application de ce mode de rémunération en contrepartie du service militaire, nous pouvons supposer que cette forme-là était réservée aux unités les plus fidèles et les plus loyales.

cf. Le Bohec 1989, 393 , 403, 507) – devait être, dans le cadre des répressions, pénalement envoyés en Afrique Proconsulaire (voir la note suivante) ? Sur les autres causes possibles de la présence de ces soldats en Afrique, cf. Ritterling 1925, 1527 ; Albertini 1939, 349. 42 Cette hypothèse serait confortée par une dizaine d’inscriptions militaires provenant de Lambèse: AE 1898, 13; CIL VIII 2904 + p.1740 (= ILS 2315), 3049 + p. 1740 (= ILS 2314), 3113, 3157 (= ILS 2317), Batna (CIL VIII 4310 (= ILS 2316), Thuburbo Maius (CIL VIII 23989), et contenant l’information sur le transfert des soldats de la legio III Gallica à la legio III Augusta. Aucune de ces inscriptions ne comporte cependant d’éléments chronologiques qui permettraient de les associer avec certitude à l’époque d’Élagabal. La pratique consistant à transférer les soldats d’une unité vers une autre était une pratique répandue dans l’armée romaine et n’avait rien à voir avec les actes de répression, cf. ILS 2318, 2319, 2320 (= CIL III 3472), 2369; AE 1991, 794 ; 1998, 1598 ; 1999, 1333. 43 La chronologie de la carrière sénatoriale de Q. Aradius Rufinus Optatus Aelianus permet d’établir avec certitude que la legio III Gallica figurait sur la liste des légions dans la seconde moitié des années vingt au IIIe siècle apr. J.-C., car il en était devenu chef vers l’année 226: cf. Dąbrowa 1996, 283–284.

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Military Colonization in the Near East and Mesopotamia under the Severi Establishing veteran colonies was a practice used from the time of Gaius Marius. Most scholars believe that it ceased completely after Hadrian.1 Thereafter, they maintain, the colonial status granted to various cities was simply titular and had nothing to do with settlement of veterans.2 Yet there is cause to question the validity of such views. First, it is difficult to imagine that military colonization, for centuries an important part of social policy, should suddenly cease and be wholly abandoned. Secondly, not all the pertinent evidence has been considered. For this reason, the question of the existence, or absence, of military colonization after Hadrian deserves reconsideration. Discussion here will be limited to the Severan period since a relatively large body of evidence can cast more light on whether or not organized military settlement existed in the second half of the 2nd and the first half of the 3rd century. An important piece of evidence is the coinage from colonial mints, whether these were veterans’ settlements or merely had titular or honorary colonial status. Apart from the Latin legends, common to all colonial coins, some distinct differences can be discerned on the reverse types of military colonies. As a rule, the reverses of coins of almost all veteran colonies feature signa militaria. Particularly popular was the vexillum. Its inclusion, sometimes with the name of the legion, or legions, in which the colonists had served, emphasized the military background of the settlers. The repeated occurrence of such imagery over time no doubt reinforced the message that must have been important to the colony’s community. Many believe that, since by then the establishment of veteran colonies had stopped after Hadrian, any instances * 

Military Colonization in the Near East and Mesopotamia under the Severi, [in:] N. Hodgson, P. Bidwell, J. Schachtmann (eds.), Roman Frontier Studies 2009. Proceedings of the XXI International Congress of Roman Frontier Studies (Limes Congress) held at Newcastle upon Tyne in August 2009 (Archeopress Roman Archaeology – 25), Archeopress Publishing, Oxford 2017, 373–378.

*  * I would like to acknowledge the friendly assistance of Professors E. Wheeler and Henry I. MacAdam with correction of the English of this paper. Any errors of fact or of interpretation remain strictly my own. 1

See Forni 1953, 41–43; Sherwin-White 1973, 413; Watkins 1982/1983, 319–321; Mann 1983, 18, 61, 65–67; Millar 1990, 7–9, 39–41; Brennan 1990, 491–493; Zahrnt 1991, 484; Pollard 2000, 63–64; Keppie 2000, 302, 311–312; Katsari, Mitchell 2008, 243–244. 2 A full list of colonies and cities in the Roman Empire’s eastern provinces which gained the colonial status either before or after Hadrian is given in Millar 1990, 10–12; Sartre 2001b , 112–119.

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of such vexilla should indicate the presence of military garrisons, rather than a military colony.3 This point of view is difficult to share. The reverse type showing the vexillum combined with the Capitoline wolf 4 first appeared toward the end of the 2nd century and continued in the first half of the 3rd century. The sheer gravity of both iconographic elements suggests that this combination could not be accidental. The she-wolf emphasized the colony’s strong links with the metropolis on the Tiber, of which the colony was supposed to be a small copy. It must be emphasized that the she-wolf/vexillum combination is known from coins of only a few colonies, mainly those which obtained their colonial status long after Hadrian. Since some of those coins have a vexillum with a legion’s name, and since we know that they were part of the first known issues of those colonies, they are more likely to present evidence that these cities were populated by veterans of a given legion, and not by having one stationed there.5 Further, the vexillum reverse type should not be interpreted as evidence for a garrison at a given location. In the entire Roman Near East and Asia Minor, the practice of commemorating legionary garrisons on coins, whether issued by cities or colonies, was never very popular. (Scholars are eager to find in the coinage of cities and colonies such iconographic elements as would confirm the presence of Roman garrisons there. Given the ambiguity of such elements, they are not always sufficient argument in favor of such speculations. For this and other reasons, I believe that my earlier statements about numismatic sources as being useful in locating legionary camps need revising.6 A different position in this respect is taken by O. Stoll.7 Aelia Capitolina is the only colony in the coinage of which elements may be perceived relating to the legion stationed nearby. However, it cannot quite be ruled out that some of them echo the first settlers’ military background.) Another type of image common on colonial coins was a foundation scene. This type of reverse, called ‘the founder type’,8 shows a priest with a team of oxen plowing a furrow to mark the colony’s borders (sulcus primigenius).9 During the Early Empire, it was common practice in nearly all colonies to feature this scene on the reverses of their first coins. In most cases, such iconography followed an almost unchanged 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Arguments against such interpretation have been addressed by me elsewhere: see Dąbrowa 2004a, 394–396. Cf. Dąbrowa 2004b. See Honigmann 1923, 2227–2228; Eissfeldt 1948, 1900–1901; Mann 1983, 43–44; Harl 1987, 50; Isaac 1992, 139 and note 191, 360 and note 169; Pollard 2000, 63; Stoll 2001a , 380–382, 399. Cf. Dąbrowa 2001, 80–81. Stoll 2001a, 380–382; 2001b, 65–67; 2009, 294–298, 302–305. This reverse type most often appeared on early colonial issues, even if a long time had passed since the colony was founded: Dąbrowa 2004c, 215–216; Papageorgiadou-Bani 2004, 35–37. Cf. Katsari, Mitchell 2008, 231–232. Other than on coin reverses, the colony-founding scene is only known from two reliefs: Brusin 1931, 473, Fig. 10 (Aquileia); Franken 2001, 485–487 (Cologne).

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pattern, except for slight alterations of secondary importance. The same scene also appears on the coinage of those cities which obtained colonial status after Hadrian. Every colony, whether an actual veterans’ settlement or a titular colony, had a right to place such imagery on the reverses of its coins.10 Supporters of the view that after Hadrian all cities in Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Judea with obtained colonial status were simply titular colonies ignore an important distinction: the presence of the vexillum, sometimes with a legion’s name above it, in the founding scene. This cannot be pure accident. The presence of a signum can only be justified if colonial status was awarded when the city became a veteran settlement.11 This interpretation of the founder-type reverses suggests that in the second half of the 2nd century and first half of the 3rd century, groups of veterans were settled in Tyre, Sidon, Rhesaina, Singara, Caesarea ad Libanum (Arca), and Damascus.12 It should be noted that, among these cities, only Damascus owed its colony status to Philip the Arab, while all the others obtained it from the various Severi. It poses no great difficulty to establish an approximate chronology of the awards of colonial status with its accompanying settlement program. Tyre became a colony c. 198 under Septimius Severus.13 During the same reign, colonies were established in Rhesaina14 and Singara.15 During the reign of Elagabalus, colonial status was extended to Sidon (c. 221)16 and Caesarea ad Libanum (Arca),17 and a new group of settlers was dispatched to Acco-Ptolemais.18 As already mentioned, the vexillum on the reverses of some colonies’ coinage occurs with a legionary name. This clue helps trace the origin of veteran groups in the respective colonies. An organized settlement program applied mainly to veteran legionnaires formerly stationed in Mesopotamia, Syria, and Judea: legio III Parthica, III Gallica, and VI Ferrata.19 To gain fuller insight into this program, it is worth considering how many veteran groups from each of these legions were sent to start new colonies or strengthen 10 For more on titular colonies as a legal category, see Vittinghoff 1952, 27–29, 31–32. 11 Cf. Dąbrowa 2004a, 399–401. 12 See Dąbrowa 2001, 77–78, 80; 2003b, 131–133. A similar position is also taken by R. Ziegler (1978, 512; 512– 513 note 113) and M. Sartre (2004, 312). Cf. Rebuffat 1998, 410. As to the cities Acco-Ptolemais and Caesarea Maritima, which had obtained their colonial status prior to the mid-2nd century AD, the founder-type coin they issued in the period in question should be seen as evidence for some new veteran groups being settled there. 13 AE 2006, 1584; 1606; Dąbrowa 2001, 77. 14 Millar 1990, 39; Pollard 2000, 58–59, 273–274; Dąbrowa 2004a, 401–402; 2004c, 77–78. 15 Millar 1990, 39; Pollard 2000, 58–59, 274–275; Dąbrowa 2004a, 402–403. 16 Dąbrowa 2001, 77–78; 2004c, 219. 17 Dąbrowa 2001, 80. 18 Rouvier 1901, 222, no. 1032; Kadman 1961, 122, no. 157–159; Dąbrowa 2001, 76 note 16. 19 The iconography of coins from Singara suggests that the original settlers consisted of veterans of legio I Parthica, cf. Dąbrowa 2004a, 402–403. For O. Stoll (2009, 324–325) it is rather an argument in favor of that this legion had its fortress there.

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existing ones. It would be particularly useful to determine whether colonization was meant to ensure livelihood to successive groups of ex-soldiers or was or rather was geared to other needs or circumstances. Based on available data for the Severan period, we may say that veterans of legio III Parthica only helped found the Rhesaina colony.20 Ex-soldiers from legio III Gallica made up the first settler groups in Tyre21 and Sidon22 and joined the colonial communities in Acco-Ptolemais23 and Caesarea Maritima.24 A group of veterans of legio VI Ferrata were dispatched to Tyre.25 Moreover, inscriptions tell us that veterans were settled in various regions of the Near East and Mesopotamia, even if their numbers are difficult to determine. Nor is it always possible to determine their service in specific legions, since inscriptions do not mention their names. Evidence of veteran groups from one unit being settled in various locations during the Severan era is an important argument to confirm that the rulers did pursue a settlement program. A further clue comes from those colonies which could not have developed without an inflow of settlers.26 More evidence for Severan colonization by veterans comes from cartographic data, aerial photographs, and epigraphic evidence. Based on an analysis of aerial photographs and maps of selected areas in Syria, researchers have concluded that the present landscape of these areas has preserved distinct traces of lotting division and centuriation. According to those scholars, at least some of those remains date back to Roman times.27 Although any conclusions are conjectural, since they have not been supported by field research, they still are worthy of consideration. One case unquestionably shows centuriation: near the city of Homs, or ancient Emesa, from which hailed Septimius 20 Cf. Castelin 1946, 14–16; Pollard 2000, 273–274; Dąbrowa 2004c, 217–218. Contra Stoll 2009, 268–269, 305–314. He presents arguments in favour of this opinion (against this proposed by other scholars, who are suggesting that leg. III Parthica was dislocated at Nisibis, cf. Dąbrowa 2004a, 401–403; Stoll 2009, 275 note 139), that leg. III Parthica had the fortress at Rhesaina. According to him strong proof of this is the presence of the name of the legion and many military symbols on the coins of Rhesaina. 21 BMC Phoenicia, 269, nos. 367–368; SNG Copenhagen – Phoenicia, no. 359; Meshorer 1989, 45; Dąbrowa 2001, 77; 2004c, 218–219. 22 Rouvier 1902, 264, nos. 1508–1511; BMC Phoenicia, 195, no. 301; Dąbrowa 2001, 77–78; 2004c: 219. 23 Kadman 1961, 48–49; 122, nos. 157–159; Dąbrowa 2001, 76 and note 16. 24 Rouvier 1901, 222, no. 1032; Kadman 1957, 128, no. 157; 134, no. 185; 140, nos. 213–214. 25 Heymann 1963, 48. 26 One example of such a colony is Philippopolis in Arabia. Before it received its colonial status from Philip the Arab, it was a large but insignificant settlement (Epit. de Caes. 28.4): Dąbrowa 2003a, 79; Darrous, Rohmer 2004, 17–19; Oenbrink 2006, 248–250. Without a settlement program and substantial means from the imperial treasury, it had no chance to become the city (Aur.Vict. 28.1) whose imposing remains still inspire awe, cf. Amer, Gawlikowski 1985, 1–15; Freyberger 1992, 293–295; 1999, 263–265; Darorus, Rohmer 2004, 6–8, 26–28, 31–33; Oenbrink 2006, 253–255. Regrettably, no fuller information is available on the social composition or background of Philippopolis’ inhabitants, which makes the settlement process there the subject of pure speculation. 27 See Van Liere 1958/1959, 55–58; Dodinet et al. 1994, 423–442; Tate 1994, 443–451; Abdulkarim 2007, 251–263.

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Severus’ wife. Emesa won its colonial status during the reign of Caracalla.28 Its coinage shows no military symbols; it was therefore a titular colony. According to scholars, its purely honorary colonial status meant that no characteristics of a regular colonizing program were in place. Yet the detected traces of centuriation contradict this claim. Taking into consideration the cases of Emesa and Philippopolis, we may venture the claim that efforts were made also in respect of titular colonies to increase their number of inhabitants and offer them conditions for development. In the absence of any chronological evidence, it is impossible to date the centuriation around Emesa, even approximately. According to M. Abdulkarim, it might have happened in about the mid-2nd century.29 However, a lion’s share of the inscriptions found near Emesa and referring most probably to settlers, come mainly from the end of the 2nd century and the first half of the 3rd century. It can hardly be imagined that the first settlers should appear there decades after centuriation. Tombstone inscriptions from around Emesa confirm that the settlers included, next to civilians, also a significant number of veterans.30 Perhaps their choices were influenced by some particularly favorable settlement conditions in that location: it cannot be ruled out that Julia Domna’s links with Emesa gave that city special favors with the Severan rulers. It is highly likely that the centuriation around Emesa occurred under Caracalla and was closely connected to his grant of colonial status to Emesa.31 In this context, it is worth considering other evidence to confirm Severan military colonization: specifically, a passage from the biography of Alexander Severus, in the Historia Augusta, and a reference in the 2nd–3rd century jurist Julius Paulus (Dig. 21.2.11). The Historia Augusta tells us: (4) sola quae de hostibus capta sunt, limitaneis ducibus et militibus donavit, ita ut eorum essent, si heredes eorum militarent, nec umquam ad privatos pertinerent, dicens attentius eos militaturos, si etiam sua rura defenderent. (5) addidit sane his et animalia et servos, ut possent colere quod acceperant, ne per inopiam hominum vel per senectutem possidentium desererentur rura vicina barbariae, quod turpissimum ille ducebat (HA Alex. Sev. 58,4–5). The lands taken from the enemy were presented to the leaders and soldiers of the frontier-armies, with the provision that they should continue to be theirs only if their heirs

28 Dig. 50.15.1.4: Imperator noster Antoninianus civitatem Emisenorum coloniam et iuris Italici fecit; cf. Dig. 50.15.8.6; IGLS V 1959. Cf. Millar 1990, 41; Dąbrowa 2003a, 75–76. 29 Abdulkarim 2007, 266. 30 Cf. IGLS V 2096, 2097, 2115, 2132. 31 In our opinion, M. Abdulkarim (2007, 265–266) is wrong to exclude a connection between both events.

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entered military service, and that they should never belong to civilians, for, he said, men serve with greater zeal if they are defending their own lands too. He added to these lands, of course, both draught-animals and slaves, in order that they might be able to till what they had received, and that it might not come to pass that, through a lack of inhabitants or the old age of the owners, the lands bordering on the country of the barbarians should be left uninhabited, for this, he thought, would be most discreditable (tr. D. Magie).

The text implies that its author attributes to Alexander Severus the decision to develop a military settlement program in order for the lands won from barbarians to be inhabited and farmed. In this way, soldiers in frontier units and their families would have means of subsistence, and the rulers a ready source of army recruits. The passage suggests that the program was to include soldiers in active service and veterans alike, and that it applied to most of the core units in the Roman army. An important issue here is whether such a program can really be attributed to Alexander Severus. If so, the next problem is to determine when it came into force and to what areas it applied. This passage may arouse incredulity since the Historia Augusta has been for more than a century the subject of dispute among scholars as to its authorship, date of writing, and purpose.32 Insofar as biographies of 2nd-century AD emperors are considered reliable, any information about those occupying the throne in the 3rd century merits only limited trust. Since any such reforms by Alexander Severus did not resonate in later tradition, we may further question their historical truth. However, before dismissing the credibility of this account, we must consider Julius Paulus’ mentioned ruling on a certain veteran from Germania.33 The status there described for that particular veteran resembles that planned for soldiers of frontier units from the time of Alexander Severus. Since the ruling comes from the same period, we may assume that the plans introducing new solutions concerning military resettlement must have been implemented, at least to some extent, in the 3rd century, if they merited legal regulation. There are no grounds to believe that the Near East and Mesopotamia should be excluded from such designs, even if their effects in the area remain unknown to us.34 32 It seems that M. Rostovtzeff (1957, 426, 724 note 50), followed and quoted by others, unquestioningly accepts the credibility of this account. 33 Dig. 21.1.11: Paulus libro sexton responsorum Lucius Titius praedia in Germania trans Renum emit et partem pretii intulit: cum in residuam quantitatem heres emptoris conveniretur, quaestionem rettulit dicens has possessiones ex praecepto principali partim distractas, partim veteranis in praemia adsignatas (…) [my emphasis]. Paul, Replies, Book 6: Lucius Titius bought lands in Germany beyond the Rhine and paid part of the price. His heir, when sued for the balance, put up the defence that by imperial command, part of the land involved had been sold and part assigned to veterans as their reward (tr. A. Watson). 34 M. Rostovtzeff (1957, 724–725 notes 50–52) cites sources he believes confirm that, at least in Africa, Germania, and on the Danube, the colonization program mentioned by the biographer of Alexander Severus was actually implemented.

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Our knowledge of any colonial activity by the Severan dynasty is sufficient to try to asses the various aspects of their decisions in this respect. Especially noteworthy are those of Septimius Severus. Some of his decrees may be treated as supporting the Roman presence in newly conquered areas in Mesopotamia, others as instrumental in quick reconstruction and recovery of some Syrian cities destroyed during the civil war against Pescennius Niger. Still others may be thought part of a social policy to ensure decent living conditions for veterans and their families. A desire to strengthen some cities can also be deduced in settlement programs introduced by Caracalla and Elagabalus.35 Compared to the Early Empire, the extent of military colonization of the Severi, of course as seen through the lens of our knowledge, may seem very modest. Still, there is no reason to deprecate its importance, especially considering the grave financial and social challenges the Severi had to face in attempting to pursue their colonizing endeavors. For this reason, the favors shown by Septimius Severus and his successors to individual veteran settlement, or establishment of veteran colonies, must be seen as an expression of their appreciation of soldiers, the best seen in the military reforms of Septimius Severus.

35 Dąbrowa 2005,40–43.

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Although much has been written about the role of veterans in the various periods of Roman history, this issue retains a firm grip on the attention of scholars. Among the reasons for this interest are the continued growth in the number of epigraphic, papyrological and archaeological sources, expanding our knowledge both of this social group and of the phenomenon of colonisation and its manifold consequences. We also know that some previous views on the subject of the role and place of veterans in the policy of Roman emperors need to be either amended or revised entirely. These include the frequently repeated opinion stating that the emperors brought an end to organised forms of settlement of veterans in the period after Hadrian, the role of veterans’ colonies in the provinces as instruments of Romanisation and a guarantee of law and order, and the common belief in the high status of veterans in local communities. Some of these issues, as well as those associated with the place of colonies in provincial life, particularly in the East, have been the subject of numerous studies in recent decades.1 The conclusions that can be drawn from them suggest that, although military colonisation in the Imperial era was subject to specific rules, we know of a number of deviations from them that merit close study. Among these is the problem of settlement of veterans in cities. Numerous references in surviving sources show that between the 1st and the 3rd centuries CE, such settlement took place both in Italy2 and in the provinces. Particularly interesting are the cases whereby emperors settled groups of veterans in cities that were already colonies, or which acquired colony status as a result of just such a move, as well as those in which the settlement of veterans did not lead to a change in legal status. In each case, it is not just the act of settlement that is significant, but above all the reasons and objectives that motivated the emperors. We know of the practice of settling veterans in cities in the Early Empire from references in Res Gestae Divi Augusti (RGDA) as well as Tacitus’ Annals. Augustus mentions his colonisation in both Italy and the provinces on several occasions.3 In the context of the problem at hand, the reference to settlement of veterans in their cities 1

See Keppie 1983 ; Keppie 1984 (= Keppie 2000d, 263–300); Todisco 1999; Pollard 2000; Keppie 2000c; Sartre 2001b (= Sartre 2014, 563 – 602); Salmieri, Raggi, Baroni 2004; Królczyk 2010; Filges 2015; Bru, Labarre, Tirologos 2016; Brélaz 2017. 2 Cf. Keppie 1984 (= Keppie 2000d); Keppie 2000c; Todisco 1999. 3 RGDA 3.3; 16; 28.

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of origin merits particular attention.4 Unfortunately, we do not know how many veterans returned home or how many cities were involved in this process, or what form such homecomings took (did they entail endowment of plots of land, or just financial compensation?). The return of Italian veterans with Augustus’ approval should not be treated as a manifestation of special favours to them, however. In fact, it was just one element of the emperor’s socio-economic policy, aiming to stimulate the development of the cities where the veterans were settled through the increased population and the greater amount of money arriving there with the soldiers’ payments. Augustus was able to encourage local settlement, not least because he was aware of the positive impact of the presence of veterans’ coloniae on the development of the regions of Italy where he had himself formed them in areas he had purchased.5 The overall scale of Augustus’ settlement activity remained unmatched in the entire later history of Imperial Rome. Yet there were exceptional circumstances that made it unique. The cessation of civil wars meant that there was no longer any sense in keeping a large army under arms, and yet sending soldiers of demobilised legions away without their anticipated payment could have unforeseeable socio-political consequences. The need to furnish numerous veterans with land meant that within little over a decade, the ager publicus, which had been used for colonisation purposes, was exhausted in Italy as well as the provinces. Augustus’ purchase of further state lands failed to resolve the shortages. The situation became so difficult that the emperor introduced a radical change in the way in which veterans were provided for, and from 13 BCE, rather than land, they began to receive financial compensation.6 The longterm effect of this change was a marked drop in the number of new veteran colonies established in Italy by Augustus’ successors7 Nonetheless, epigraphic sources and references in Tacitus’ Annals indicate that they did not entirely abandon the practice of rewarding veterans with land (missio agraria) in Italy. Tacitus writes of the events of 57 CE that in Capua and Nuceria, which both had colony status, new groups of veterans were settled there at this time.8 He also notes that the objective of this colonisation was to be to increase the population of the two cities. He does not, however, tell us the size of the groups of veterans settled, or which

4 5

RGDA 16.2: militibus, quo emeriteis stipendis in sua municipia deduxi, praemia numerator presolvi. RGDA 28.2: Italia autem XXVIII colonias, quae vivo me celeberrimae et frequentissmae fuerunt, mea aucto­ ritate deductas habet. [“Moreover Italy has twenty-eight colonies settled under my authority, which have been in my life time very busy and densely populated”; tr. A. E. Cooley]. 6 Dio 54.25.5. 7 After Augustus, coloniae of veterans were usually established in newly acquired provinces. 8 Tac. Ann. 13.31.2: ceterum coloniae Capua atque Nuceria additis veteranis firmatae sunt, …; Todisco 1999, 229. References in Liber coloniarum (232.12; 238.20) appear to indicate that similar settlement operations may have already taken place during Claudius’ rule in Cumae and Velitrae. But it is also possible that the author here was referring to either Tiberius or Drusus the Elder; cf. Keppie 1984, 80 (= Keppie 2000d, 266).

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regiments they were from.9 According to L. Keppie, the settlers in Capua might have been veterans from legions stationed in Syria, but this conjecture is yet to be satisfactorily confirmed.10 The scholar also notes that the settlement operation resulted in new titulature for both cities: coloniae Claudiae Neronenses. However, this usage is not confirmed by sources. Elsewhere in the Annals, in an account referring to the events of 60 CE, Tacitus refers to a similar settlement operation conducted by Nero in Antium and Tarentum.11 In a commentary accompanying his account of this event, he also mentions that the reason for the operation, as in Capua and Nuceria, was the depopulation of the two cities.12 The content of this commentary, although it mainly concerns the event described by Tacitus, refers to a much broader phenomenon. This interpretation is supported by the nature of the causes of the depopulation alluded to. According to Tacitus, the reason why the veterans settled in colonies were leaving them en masse was the difficulties they faced in adapting to civilian life, and they were therefore returning to the provinces where they had previously served in order to join their comrades living there. Tacitus’ reference to the mutual social ties between the veterans living in the two cities probably concerns the negative effects of relinquishing a practice often employed in the final years of the Republic as well as by Augustus, when in the colonies being established at the time veterans from the same legion were settled together with their commanders.13 Yet this overlooks the fact that Nero, in common with all of Augustus’ successors, was unable to follow such a rule of colonisation14 as the groups of veterans leaving the ranks of individual legions each year were simply too small.15 In Nero’s time, the colonies became communities in which the ties binding former comrades had lost all significance. 9 Based on inscriptions from Nuceria and dated to the second half of the first century CE, one can assume that at least some of the veterans settled there had served in legio IV Macedonica: Todisco 1999, 30–32; 229. 10 Keppie 1984, 81 (= Keppie 2000d, 267). This assumption is based on Tacitus’ report (Ann. 13.35.2) on Corbulo’s preparations for war in Armenia. In this time, he withdrew from the ranks of his legions soldiers unfit for service on account of age or health. The only arguments used to support this hypothesis are the coincidence of the settlement with the changes introduced by Corbulo, as well as an inscription from Capua containing the name of a veteran who served in leg. XII Fulminata (CIL X 3895), one of those which fought in Armenia. But there are various other reasons to date this inscription to a much later period: Todisco 1999, 15–16 and note 38; 27. 11 Tac. Ann. 14.27.2: veterani Tarentum et Antium adscripti ….  12 Tac. Ann. 14.27.2–3: veterani Tarentum et Antium adscripti non tamen infrequentiae locorum subvenere, dilapsis pluribus in provincias, in quibus stipendia expleverant; neque coniugiis suscipiendis neque alendis liberis sueti orbas sine posteris domos relinquebant. Non enim, ut olim, universae legiones deducebantur cum tribunis et centurionibus et sui cuiusque ordinis militibus, ut consensu et caritate rem publicam efficerent, sed ignoti inter se, diversis manipulis, sine rectore, sine adfectibus mutuis, quasi ex alio genere mortalium repente in unum collecti, numerus magis quam colonia. 13 Tac. Ann. 14.27.2. 14 Cf. Todisco 1999, 40–43. 15 Bearing in mind the stipulated time of service and average legion size, each year there may have been 100 to 200 veterans leaving its ranks: Keppie 1984, 105 (= Keppie 2000d, 291); Eck 2016, 129.

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Tacitus’ account of Nero’s settlement of veterans in Antium and Tarentum is complemented with additional details by Suetonius16 as well as the inscriptions found in Antium.17 These inscriptions show that veterans from the Praetorian Guard were settled there with their centurions; the latter were sent on the emperor’s orders. It is not entirely clear why this decision was taken: perhaps Nero was alluding to the former practice of settling veterans with their commanders.18 As a result of the settlement of veterans, Antium was accorded colony status. In the light of the facts given by Tacitus, however, the reason for the settlement of veterans in Antium does not seem entirely convincing. It is difficult to accept the information about the depopulation of the city, since from Augustus’ time onwards there was an imperial residence there in which Nero was born, and where he liked to stay as a result of its proximity to Rome. The presence of an imperial residence naturally made this place more attractive, appealing to representatives of the Roman elite. To paint a fuller picture, one should add that, in addition to settling veterans in Antium and awarding it colony status, Nero also developed the infrastructure of its port. All these factors together seem to suggest that the emperor was seeking to provide the city with the best conditions for further development, rather than to save it from decline. In Tarentum’s case too, epigraphic evidence allows us to determine who the veterans settled there were. Based on palaeographic criteria from Tarentum’s epigraphic corpus, a group of several inscriptions can be identified 19, dated to the second half of the 1st century CE20 and very likely to be connected to Nero’s settlement operation. They all belong to veterans serving in legions stationed either in Moesia or in the East.21 On the basis of the place where the various inscriptions were found, one can assume that the veterans made their living through the land allocated to them. The modest nature of these inscriptions suggests that in civilian life, with occasional exceptions, they did not achieve a great deal.22 The settlement of veterans did not result in a change in Tarentum’s status from municipal to colonial.23 Various types of sources suggest that the settlement of veterans in Italy during Nero’s rule might also have taken place in many other cities apart from those mentioned.24 Although we are unable to verify this data, there is no doubt that Nero used

16 Suet. Nero 9. 17 CIL X 6671, 6672 (= ILS 2020), 6673, 6674; Keppie 1984, 87–88 (= Keppie 2000d, 273–274); Todisco 1999, 24. 18 Cf. Keppie 1984, 86 (= Keppie 2000d, 272). 19 Keppie 1984, 109–111, nos. 7–15 = Keppie 2000d, 295–297); Todisco 1999, 37. 20 Keppie 1984, 83 (= Keppie 2000d, 269); Todisco 1999, 38. 21 Keppie 1984, 84–84 (= Keppie 2000d, 270–271); Todisco 1999, 40–41. 22 Keppie 1984, 85–86 (= Keppie 2000d, 271–272); Todisco 1999, 39, 54, 226. 23 Keppie 1984, 86 (= Keppie 2000d, 272). 24 See Keppie 1984, 81–91 (= Keppie 2000d, 267–277).

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settlement of veterans as a factor to support the development of Italian cities or as a way of protecting them from decline.25 An array of references concerning agrarian military colonisation in Italy concern the period of Vespasian’s rule. We know of at least three examples: Reate, Nola and Paestum. The presence in several inscriptions found in the environs of Reate (today Rieti) of the phrase deductus ab divo Augusto Vespasiano Reate shows that a group of legionary veterans,26 as well as of Praetorians,27 received allocations of land there. These were veterans from the detachments which had supported Vespasian during his struggle for the throne in 68–69 CE.28 We should also not exclude the possibility that part of the colonised area was apportioned from the land belonging to the Flavian family, while another part was unused land.29 There is no doubt that giving land to veterans was both an act of gratitude on the part of the emperor towards his loyal and distinguished soldiers and an opportunity to make use of the less economically attractive Samnium region, with which he had close associations. It is hard to speculate on the number of veterans settled in Reate on the basis of a few surviving inscriptions. What we do know is that their presence had no effect on the change in the city’s status.30 It is also difficult to determine whether the group settled in Reate was the only one to which Hyginus’ rather vague mention refers,31 or whether in fact it concerned other groups of veterans settled in Samnium. Regardless of which type of interpretation of this source we accept, it is clear that Vespasian did pay some attention to solving the region’s economic problems. The second city in which veterans, probably including those of Vespasian, received allocations of land, was Nola. This assumption is based on an inscription from this settlement dedicated to the veteran coh. XI urbana C. Germanius Valentinus, referring to his receipt of a plot of land from the emperor.32 Apart from this source, we do not have further information about either the scale of colonisation carried out in Nola or its participants. 25 Keppie 1984, 89–91 (= Keppie 2000d, 275–277). 26 CIL IX 4684 (= ILS 2460), 4685. See also CIL IX 4687, 4689. 27 CIL IX 4682–4683. 28 Keppie 1984, 94–95 (= Keppie 2000d, 280–281); Todisco 1999, 71–72. 29 Keppie 1984, 95 (= Keppie 2000d, 280); Todisco 1999, 63, 217. 30 Keppie 1984, 95 (= Keppie 2000d, 280). 31 Hyginus, De gener. controversiarum (= Blume, Lachmann, Rudorff 1848, 131–132): (…) hoc comperi in Samnio, uti quos agros veteranis divus Vespasianus adsignaverat, eos iam ab ispis quibus adsignati errant aliter possideri. Quidam enim emerunt aliqua loca, adiecerun atque suis finibus et ipsum, vel via finiente vel flumine vel aliquotlibet genere, sed nec vendentes ex acceptis suis aut ementes adicientesque ad accepta sua certum modum taxaverunt. 32 CIL X 1263. Only the first letter of the name of this ruler has survived, read by scholars as either an N or a V. Since the veteran served in legio XV Apollinaris, with which Vespasian was closely associated, the reconstruction containing his name, and not that of Nerva, seems more likely (deducto a Divo V[espasiano]); Keppie 1984, 95 (= Keppie 2000d, 281).

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In rewarding the soldiers of regiments that supported him in his struggle for power, Vespasian could not overlook those who had served in the two Italian flotillas and had made a significant contribution to the emperor’s success. Military diplomas and inscriptions demonstrate that veterans from the flotilla in Misenum were rewarded with land in Paestum33 and neighbouring cities.34 There is evidence to suggest that this settlement operation encompassed at least a few hundred veterans.35 A number of different references suggest that Vespasian’s colonising activity may also have encompassed other cities of Italy, probably also including Capua. But this is only conjecture, without firm evidence.36 Vespasian was the last emperor during whose rule the missio agraria in Italy, embracing veterans from various military formations, was implemented. Since this activity took place in the first years of his rule, one might conclude that its objective was to reward the soldiers of those detachments which made a prominent contribution to his securing power. Based on the data in the sources, we can deduce that this settlement programme was not intended as aid in reconstruction of the cities that suffered during fighting. And it contributed even less to the economic growth of less attractive areas of Italy with land resources suited to colonisation.37 In practice, the ruler and the veterans turned out to have completely different expectations regarding the benefits stemming from the settlement programme. The soldiers, especially those from the provinces, were not entirely satisfied with their land allocation. This is suggested, for instance, by the former centurion Liccaius’ decision to abandon his plot in Paestum and to emigrate to Pannonia Inferior, where he came from.38 The effects of the operations undertaken by Claudius (?), Nero and Vespasian to settle groups of veterans in the cities of Italy would appear to have failed to satisfy the hopes invested in them. The expectation was that settlement would help the rulers to solve immediate social and economic problems, and subsequently contribute to the development of the colonised areas.39 Yet this failed to take into account the expectations and attitudes of the veterans themselves. A large percentage of them came from outside of Italy. Owing to a lack of ties with their new surroundings and a sense of foreignness, as Tacitus mentions and epigraphic evidence confirms, after some time the veterans began to leave their allocated land and return home. The scale 33 CIL XVI 12–13, 15–16; AE 1997, 173 (= RMD IV 204); Keppie 1984, 98–103 (= Keppie 2000d, 284–289). 34 As proof, one can cite an inscription from Velia (AE 1978, 257): (…) C. Nervilius Iustus veteranus deductus Vellias militavit centurio in classe praetoria Misenense (…); cf. Todisco 1999, 58–59 and 59, note 14; Keppie 2000a, 324–325. 35 Cf. Keppie 1984, 103 (= Keppie 2000d, 289). 36 Keppie 1984, 96–97 (= Keppie 2000d, 282–283). 37 Cf. Todisco 1999, 217, 225–228. 38 In the province of Pannonia Inferior, close to the present-day town of Slavonski Šamac in Croatia, a diploma belonging to Liccaius was found: AE 1997,1273 (= RMD IV 204). 39 Cf. Keppie 1984, 106–107 (= Keppie 2000d, 292–293).

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of this phenomenon must have been so large that Vespasian’s successors stopped rewarding veterans with a missio agraria in Italy, realising that it was ineffective in meeting its economic and social objectives.40 We do have reason to believe, however, that the emperors continued this practice in the provinces. It is a difficult task to show the scale and circumstances of compensation of veterans with a missio agraria in the provinces, mostly due to the lack of narrative sources available with regard to Italy. The main type of evidence that we can use to this end is epigraphic sources and, on occasion, also numismatic and archaeological ones. This question is yet to be fully researched with regard to individual provinces, and it is therefore necessary to confine the following remarks to the area of the provinces of Mesopotamia, Syria,41 and Judaea–Palaestina. A considerable amount of evidence comes from these areas, shedding a great deal of light on the phenomenon of colonisation of veterans in cities in the post-Hadrianic period. Scholars of the history of Roman colonisation have long expressed the opinion that it was during Hadrian’s rule that the last veterans’ colonies were founded.42 All the others established in the time of his successors were solely titular colonies. This means that the emperor’s bestowal of the title of colony on a particular city did not entail any act of settlement, and was merely an honorary move designed to elevate its status.43 I have criticised this view elsewhere and there is therefore no need to repeat these arguments here.44 It is beyond doubt that both material limitations (lack of sufficiently large and attractive land resources suitable for colonisation) and lack of wider interest in this form of compensation among veterans were the reasons why subsequent emperors over the next few decades did not undertake to establish new colonies. They also had no particular reason to do so. A distinct change in this matter came only with the reign of Septimius Severus. The aftermath of the civil war with Pescennius Niger, as a result of which he gained power over the eastern provinces but which had an impact on many cities in the region, and the growth of the Roman Empire to include new acquisitions in Mesopotamia, forced Severus to take measures to provide lasting protection to the interests not only of the Roman state 40 Vespasian was the last emperor to implement settlement of veterans using the missio agraria: Todisco 1999, 229, 243. Yet the fact that the emperors no longer settled uniform groups of veterans in Italy does not imply that veterans were not interested in settling there. Epigraphic data shows an increase in their numbers in the late second century and over the course of the 3rd century CE in southern and northern regions of Italy. The main reason for this might have been the economic and fiscal policy of certain rulers, which was favourable for soldiers and veterans (cf. Herod. 2.4.6–7), as well as, to a lesser extent, their Italian origins: Todisco 1999, 243–245. 41 For clarity’s sake, let us add that the concept of Syria is used here in a broad sense. It refers both to the area that the province of Syria encompassed until Septimius Severus’ reforms, and the area of the provinces of Syria Coele and Syria Phoenice which he established. 42 See e.g. Mann 1983, 43–44; Isaac 1992, 61. Cf. Stoll 2015, 126–128. 43 Cf. Vittinghoff 1952, 28–33; Sartre 2001b, 124–126; Dąbrowa 2019, 264. 44 See Dąbrowa 2003a; 2003c; 2004a; 2012; 2019.

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in the East, but also of his own family; he had two sons, and it was clear that rule in Rome would pass into the hands of a new dynasty. A further reason for the interest of Septimius Severus and his successors in Syria was the connections between this province and certain members of the ruling house.45 Following his victory over Pescennius Niger, Septimius Severus punished severely many of the cities of Syria that had backed his rival by withdrawing their privileges. Among the cities to be affected by these repressions were Berytus46 and Antioch.47 On the other hand, he was benevolent with regard to Tyre and Laodicea, which had supported him and hence suffered greatly in the battles.48 The emperor undertook a series of initiatives with the aim of raising their status (both cities gained the status of colony49) and producing the conditions for their further auspicious economic development.50 In the case of Tyre, one of the elements of these initiatives was settlement of veterans there (for Laodicea there is no data confirming that veterans were also sent there). We find proof of their presence in Tyre in the minting of coins with colonial typology from the times of Septimius Severus and his successors.51 On the reverses of Tyre’s coins, a very characteristic image appeared at the time, depicting the colony’s foundation, with a furrow being ploughed by a team of oxen with a plowman as tiller (this type of reverse is often known as the founder type), with a vexillum with the inscription LEG III GAL(lica) in the background. Since such reverses were commonly used in the minting of many veterans’ colonies throughout the empire, there is no doubt as to its meaning.52 Septimius Severus was also presumably responsible for the foundation of the veterans’ colony in Rhesaena, within the part of northern Mesopotamia that he annexed.53 Rhesaena’s colonial status and the presence of veterans there are shown by its minting. The official name of the colony, Colonia 45 One need only recall that Julia Domna, Septimius Severus’ wife, came from Emesa. The later emperor probably met her during his military service in Syria, as a legate of leg. IV Scythica: SHA Sev. 3.6. Members of her family, meanwhile, originated in other cities of this province; cf. Dio 78.30.2–3. 46 The form of repression exercised on this colony was removal of the northern part of its territory with Heliopolis; cf. Millar 1990, 19–20, 32–33. Heliopolis itself gained the status of colony: Dig. 50.15.1.2. Yet this decision did not entail the deductio of veterans; cf. Dąbrowa 2019, 266. 47 Dio 75.14.3; Herod. 3.6.9; SHA Sev. 9.4; Malalas 12.22 (294). 48 Herod. 3.3.3–5; Malalas 12.21 (293). 49 Dig. 50.1; 50.1.3; 50.8.3–4 50 Cf. Dąbrowa 2019, 268–269. 51 Rouvier 1904, 66, no. 2300, 2302–2304; BMC Phoenicia 269, no. 367–368; 270, no. 371; 271, no. 377–378; 272, no. 380, 383; 274, no. 394–395; SNG Copenhagen – Phoenicia, no. 359; SNG Great Britain – Hunterian Museum 2, no. 3422. 52 Dąbrowa 2003b; 2004b; cf. Filges 2015, 243–250. 53 Based on Rhesaena’s minting, for a long time it was thought to be the fortress of leg. III Parthica: Castelin 1946, 6–8; Pollard 2000, 273–274, 290. This view was placed into doubt by D. L. Kennedy (1987, 61), who presented arguments to suggest that it was not this legion’s camp, but a colony of the veterans who served in his ranks that Septimius Severus located there. M. Sartre (2001a , 619, note 41) also supports these arguments..

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Septimia Rhesaina L III P, also indicates that Severus was its founder. Confirmation of possession of this status is provided by the image of a vexillum with the accompanying name leg. III P(arthica) S(everiana), found on the reverses of the first issues of Rhesaena’s coins, minted during Caracalla’s rule.54 Another type of reverse from this period is the image of the Sagittarius (the symbol of leg. III Parthica) against a vexillum with the name of this legion.55 We have certain reasons to suspect that Caracalla too might have settled veterans in tight groups. Archaeological data seems to suggest that one of his settlement operations could have taken place in Emesa, a city of particular significance for the Severan dynasty. Julia Domna, Caracalla’s mother, came from this city, upon which as early as the first months of his rule (certainly before 212/213 CE) he bestowed the status of colony and the privilege of ius Italicum.56 The traces of centuriation found in a large area around Emesa might show that bestowal of colony status came with settlement of a large group of colonists, although we have no specific information about its composition and numbers.57 Beyond any doubt, however, the emperor was seeking, apart from an increase in the population, to elevate the status of Emesa, previously a small, albeit popular in the region, centre of the cult of the god Elagabalus. The same motivation lay behind Heliogabalus’ decision to award Emesa the rank of metropolis.58 We have more certainty regarding the use of veterans as a demographic factor in the development of cities from the period when Heliogabalus was emperor. Numismatic evidence shows that Sidon and Arca ad Libanum (Caesarea ad Libanum) received colony status from him. Bestowal of this privilege was accompanied by the settlement of groups of veterans.59 This is confirmed by the iconography of the reverses of colonial 54 Castelin 1946, 16–17, nos. 1–4, 8–13. Cf. also Castelin 1946, 95–96, nos. 151–156 (= RPC IX, no. 1601). 55 Castelin 1946, 16, nos. 5–6. K. O. Castelin (1946, 17, no. 7) also includes among the issues made during the reign of Caracalla a coin with the images of two vexilla on its reverse. Owing to the coin’s condition, the content of the legend cannot be deciphered, but as this type of reverse is characteristic of the time of Heliogabalus’ rule, it should be catalogued under his name (cf. Castelin 1946, 18). 56 Dig. 50.15.1.4; 50.15.8.6. 57 Cf. Van Liere 1958/1959, 55–58; Abdulkarim 2002/2003, 261–272; 2007, 256–257, 259–264. Emesa’s minting is of little use in accounting for the question of settlement of veterans there. None of the reverses of its known coins contains even one iconographic element typical of the minting of a veteran colony. The legends on the issues dated to 215 CE are in Greek (ΕΜΙΣΩΝ ΚΟΛΩΝΙΑΣ), rather than Latin, which was the usual practice: BMC Syria, 238, nos. 9–11; SNG Deutschland – München 28, no. 814 (with a portrait of Julia Domna on the obverse); BMC Syria, 238–239, nos. 13–15; SNG Deutschland – München 28, nos. 817–820 (with a portrait of Caracalla). 58 BMC Syria, 239–240, no. 17–21. 59 The issues of coins from Rhesaena dated to the period of his rule (Castelin 1946, 19, nos. 14–16; cf. 17, no. 7), on the reverses of which two vexilla are depicted, may justify the supposition that he might also have settled a group of veterans there, but its correctness is hard to accept. The attribution of these coins and dating of these issues is based solely on the criteria of size, weight and type of imperial portrait, since they do not have any legend (Castelin 1946, 20). It is also worth noting that in the minting of other colonies we find issues of

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coins he minted. We know of two types of colonial coins from Sidon from the period of Heliogabalus’ reign which confirm the fact of this settlement. Both feature Latin legends as well as the standard scene of the colony’s foundation (the founder type) with a vexillum in the background. One type of coin bears the name LEG III GAL(lica),60 and the other LEG III PAR(thica).61 Although it is impossible to determine the exact year when the two issues were released, there is no doubt that in the course of his short reign Heliogabalus settled two groups of veterans in Sidon originating from various legions stationed in Syria. In the case of Arca ad Libanum, the settlement of veterans is confirmed by the scene of the colony’s foundation with a vexillum in the background on issues of its coins dating from the rule of Heliogabalus62 and later also Severus Alexander.63 Unfortunately, on none of these issues is the image of the vexillum furnished with the name of the legion from which the veterans came. In both cases, one can cite specific reasons for the emperor’s favourable attitude towards the two cities. During Heliogabalus’ rivalry with Macrinus for the throne, Sidon was on his side. Bestowing colonial status on the city and releasing it from payments in favour of annona militaris were therefore acts of gratitude on the emperor’s part. Sending veterans of the aforementioned legions should also be seen as an indication of his gratitude, since they (certainly, i.e., the leg. III Gallica) supported Heliogabalus. The reason for the advancement of Arca ad Libanum, as in the case of Emesa, was family ties, as this was the home city of Gessius Marcianus, the husband of Heliogabalus’ aunt Julia Mamaea,64 and Severus Alexander was also born there.65 Colonial status and settlement of veterans was without doubt intended to raise the city’s status and importance. The last known cases of settlement of veterans in the cities of Syria took place during the rule of Philip the Arab (244–248). As in the case of other cities mentioned above, we have numismatic evidence to thank for our knowledge of them. As a result, it is clear that settlement took place in Tyre66 and Damascus,67 which received colony status.68 The reverses of the two cities’ coins of interest to us are connected by the same

60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68

coins recording the numbers (and sometimes also names) of the legions from which veterans came, whereas in Rhesaena’s minting the reverse type with two vexilla never appeared again. Rouvier 1902, 264, nos. 1508–1510; 271, no. 1544; 277, no. 1576; BMC Phoenicia, 195, no. 301; SNG Great Britain – Glasgow 2, no. 3356. Abou Diwan 2013, 117. Rouvier 1901, 61, no. 734. Rouvier 1901, 63, no. 740 (= SNG Schweiz II, no. 2268). Dio 79.30.3. Aur. Vict. 24.1; SHA Alex. Sev. 1.2; 5.1; 13.5. Heymann 1963, 48. BMC Syria, 286, no. 25; SNG Schweiz II, no. 1810. This assumption is based on numismatic sources. The first time the title of colony accompanying the name of the city appeared on its coins was during the reign of Philip the Arab: BMC Syria, 286–287, nos. 22–27; SNG Copenhagen: Syria – Cities, no. 425; SNG Schweiz II, nos. 2154–2157; cf. Millar 1990, 53.

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iconography. They depict the Capitoline wolf feeding Romulus and Remus against the background of a vexillum with the name LEG: VI: F(errata). The somewhat different iconography of the reverses of these coins from the founder type leaves no doubt as to their content and ideological significance. This type of reverse appeared in the minting of the colony in the period of the 2nd–3rd centuries CE, simultaneously with the founder type, and gained considerable popularity.69 In the case of Damascus, we have not only the evidence of coins available, but also archaeological data. Traces of centuriation have been found near to the city.70 Arguments of a historical nature indicate that this might have taken place in the times of Philip the Arab, although currently it is difficult to verify this opinion from field research. It is highly probable that the settlement of veterans in Syria practised by Philip the Arab was part of his programme to create in Syria and Arabia a social, political and ideological base to support the dynasty he had founded.71 The manner in which certain elements of this programme were implemented was to a certain extent very similar to the Severi policies regarding selected cities in Syria. Analysing the numismatic evidence, we can conclude that settlement of veterans after Hadrian also took place in the province of Syria-Palaestina. In comparison with Syria, the scale of this phenomenon was considerably more modest. Evidence confirming it is provided by the minting of a veteran colony established by Claudius in Acco Ptolemais (Colonia Claudia Stabilis Germanica Felix Ptolemais).72 Thanks to one of the first issues of its colonial coins, we know that veterans of all four legions stationed in Syria at the time (leg. III Gallica, VI Ferrata, X Fretensis, XII Fulminata) were settled there.73 A coin with a founder-type reverse, depicting only one vexillum with an inscription referring to leg. III Gallica, derives from its mint from the period of Heliogabalus’ rule.74 This coin certainly cannot be treated as commemorating one of the groups of the first colonists. If it did, then one might expect that the veterans

69 Cf. Dąbrowa 2004a, 214–215; 2004c; Filges 2015, 232–237. 70 Cf. Dodinet, Leblanc, Vallat, Villeneuve 1990, 343–346, 350–353; Abdulkarim 2007, 253–254. 71 The realisation of this programme is demonstrated by the fact that the emperor’s modest family town was given the status of colony and the dynastic name Philippopolis, as well as a monumental urban layout. Owing to Philip the Arab’s brief reign, the project to transform Philippopolis into a dynastic centre whose core was to be the mausoleum of Julius Marinus, the emperor’s father, was only partially put into place. The architectural remains and layout of Philippopolis (today Shahba) give an idea of its planned shape; see Amer, Gawlikowski 1985; Millar 1990, 53–55; Freyberger 1992; Freyberger 1999; Burns 1999, 220–223; Darrous, Rohmer 2004; Oenbrink 2006, 254–260; Bru 2011, 118–120. In the iconography of the colonial issues of this city there are none of the elements characteristic of veterans’ colonies: Spijkerman 1978, 260–261, nos. 1–7; Meshorer 2013, 200. 72 Pliny, HN 5.75. 73 RPC I, nos. 4749 (= Meshorer 2013, 10, no. 134) – 4750 (= Meshorer 2013, 10, no. 131. 74 Kadman 1961, 122, nos. 157–159 (= Meshorer 2013, 13, no. 191).

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of the other three legions would be remembered in a similar way. The distinction of this legion by placing its name on a coin can be explained by the settlement in Acco Ptolemais of another group of its veterans. This decision might have been motivated by the desire to reward soldiers for the loyalty and supported provided to Heliogabalus in his struggle for power,75 as well as the desire to increase the number of residents of the colony. In the province of Syria-Palaestina, a city which experienced the effects of Philip the Arab’s urbanisation policy was Flavia Neapolis, which lay in Samaria, in the vicinity of Mount Gerizim. This city owed its origins and expanded territory to Vespasian. Yet it gained its colonial status, along with its new name,76 from Philip the Arab, and this was immediately reflected in its coins. Legends in Latin appeared on them, while the reverses bore images and symbolism typical of colonial minting.77 Among many types of reverses from this period, we also encountered the standard founder type.78 There are no elements of images of a military nature,79 however, but there are reasons to associate the foundation of this colony with settlement of veterans.80 Nonetheless, it is worth noting that such elements appear on the coins of Neapolis minted during the reign of Trebonianus Gallus. Their presence is intriguing as, probably after Philip the Arab’s death, Neapolis lost its colonial status for a short time.81 This is indicated by the fact that after Hostilianus came to power and in the first months of the rule of Trebonianus Gallus and Volusian, the coins minted by Neapolis again began to bear legends in Greek, with the city’s name missing the title of colony.82 This title appears again along with legends in Latin during Trebonianus Gallus’ rule (it is impossible to determine the date of this moment, however). Of the several types of reverses connected to this phase of Neapolis’ colonial minting, the most intriguing are those in whose iconography military symbols appear, and, importantly, the reverses are the only ones in all the minting of Neapolis with such symbolism. On the reverse, with the name Trebonianus Gallus, among many iconographic elements,83 a legionary standard and 75 Cf. Herod. 5.3.9–12; Dio 78.31.2 – 32.4. Owing to the number of groups of veterans settled in the cities and their relations with the Severi, leg. III Gallica can be regarded as such a privileged unit; cf. Dąbrowa 2005, 41–42. 76 Neapolis as a colony has many forms of its name. It appears most often as Colonia Sergia Neapolis, along with Colonia Iulia Neapolis or Colonia Sergia Neapolis, and exceptionally Colonia Iulia Flavia Sergia Neapolis (Harl 1984, 82, no. 54 = Meshorer 2013, 59, no. 186). 77 Harl 1984, 62–67. 78 Harl 1984, 82, nos. 50–51; 86, no. 76 (= Meshorer 2013, 59, no. 194); Meshorer 2013, 56, no. 132. 79 Cf. Harl 1984, 67: “(…) the coins seem to indicate that while Neapolis was raised to the status of a colony, it did not receive a substantial body of veteran settlers.” 80 See Eck 2007, 230–233; 2016, 139–140; Stoll 2015, 128. 81 Harl 1984, 70–73. 82 Harl 1984, 68. 83 Harl 1984, 96, no. 151 (= Meshorer 2013, 62, no. 234 = RPC IX, no. 2169): “Rev. COLN/E/P/OL Nude Poseidon stdg. r., in l., trident, in extended r., dolphin, r. foot on prow; to r., boar stdg. l. with military standard surmounted by eagle l. behind; star between; above, Mt. Gerizim.”

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a boar are depicted. The image of a standard is also found in the abundant iconography of another reverse, with the name of Volusianus.84 Religious symbolism dominates in the iconography of both reverses. Furthermore, in Neapolis’ minting from the time of Trebonianus Gallus, the founder type reverse does not figure at all. How, then, should we interpret the presence of military elements? The combination on the reverse of the coin with Trebonianus Gallus of the legionary standard and the boar, an animal not encountered in Samaria, demands explanation. The boar did appear on the standards of leg. X Fretensis as its symbol. Also known are numerous images of the animal on this legion’s stamps and on the coins of Aelia Capitolina.85 It is therefore possible that the military accents in the iconography of the reverses of the coins in question should be interpreted as an allusion to the appearance in Neapolis during Trebonianus Gallus’ rule of a group of veterans from leg. X. Fretensis.86 The evidence of the activity of Roman emperors regarding settlement in the Middle East laid out above shows that settling veterans outside of the colonies was not confined solely to Italy and to the rule of the first two dynasties. It continued to take place later on, from the late 2nd century CE until the mid-3rd century CE,87 and can be observed in Middle Eastern provinces. Settlement was one of several aspects of the urbanisation policy followed by various emperors ruling in this period.88 Sources suggest that as in the 1st century CE, the scale of the phenomenon was not particularly large. Both these phases had common characteristics and practically the same cause. The rulers of Rome treated colonisation of veterans in cities as a form of special distinction.89 The settlement operations in which they were involved served specific objectives which, though rather limited, were important from the emperor’s point of view. Among the leitmotifs of these operations was population increase and economic strengthening of selected cities. The latter goal was achieved by allocating land in areas belonging to the emperor or city on whose territory the veterans were settled. It is also possible that to this end, especially in colonies, plots abandoned by their previous owners were also used. In conquered territories, it was no great problem to acquire land for settlement of veterans. It is also difficult to ignore one more 84 Harl 1984, 97, no. 155 (= Meshorer 2013, 62, no. 249 = RPC IX, no. 2174 ): “Rev. In field COL/NEAPOL/I. Serapis in kalathos and long chiton stdg. r., in l., scepter and r. raised; on l., military standard surmounted by eagle r.; between, ram stdg. l. with wheat stalk sprouting before; above, Mt. Gerizim.” 85 Cf. RPC III, no. 3966; IV.3, no. 6404; IX, no. 2189. 86 Harl 1984, 68, 72. 87 It is worth noting that the programme of settlement of veterans implemented by Septimius Severus was not confined to Syria, but had a considerably wider geographical scope (also including Italy). There is no doubt that apart from those cases when it was to serve the interests of the ruling house, it was always subordinated to achieving economic objectives; cf. Todisco 1999, 230–231, 243–245. 88 Cf. Dąbrowa 2019. 89 Cf. Sartre 2001b, 124–126 (= Sartre 2014, 577–579).

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significant motive of settlement of veterans in cities, particularly visible in the decisions of emperors of the Severan dynasty as well as Philip the Arab regarding colonisation. This was the desire to elevate the status and significance of those cities from which the members of the ruling family originated. The various types of legal privileges bestowed upon certain towns did not in themselves offer opportunities for rapid development. It was also necessary to support them with imperial investments and to considerably increase their populations, which was difficult to do owing to the limited number of veterans who were amenable to resettlement. In terms of the revitalisation of cities and the policy of urbanisation of the provinces implemented by means of settlement of veterans in cities, it is hard to draw definite conclusions, owing to the lack of data on the fate of most settlers in later times. There is also a shortage of data showing how they functioned in their new environment. The cases of veterans settled in cities subsequently leaving them known from the time of Nero and Vespasian no longer had to happen. With regard to the veterans settled in the cities and colonies of Mesopotamia, Syria or Syria-Palaestina, we must remember that the soldiers in question had served in this region. The camps of their home legions were located not far from the places where they were settled.90 Unfortunately, we are unable to assess the consequences of the policy of settlement of veterans in the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire. We can only conjecture that the intended objectives of this policy could not be fully realised as a result of the political, military and economic crisis that hit the entire Roman Empire in the 3rd century, and whose effects were felt particularly acutely in the East, mostly as a result of several wars with the kings of Sasanian Iran that were waged in Roman territory as well as a conflict with the rulers of Palmyra.

90 Cf. Stoll 2015, 219–278; Eck 2016, 131–133, 137, 139.

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Index of Names

Index of Names

L. Aelius Lamia 72 Q. Aemilius Secundus 50 M. Agrippa 20, 21 Agrippa I, king of Judea 51, 58, 60, 61, 66 Alexander 53 Alexander the Great (Alexandre la Grand) 24, 79, 80 Alexander Severus (Sévère Alexandre) 28, 111, 112, 120, 125, 129, 130, 132, 145, 147, 148, 153, 154, 166 Amyntas 90 Annia Faustina 121 Antigonos (Antigone) 23 Antiochus IV, king of Commagene 70, 73, 76 Antoninus Pius 91, 93 M. Antonius Felix 53, 54 M. Antony (Marc Antoine) 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 40, 42, 100, 105, 106 Q. Aradius Rufinus Optatus Aelianus 148 Archelaus, king of Cappadocia 41 Archelaus, son of Herod 47, 48, 49, 50, 52 Artabanus II 17, 19, 39, 43, 44 Artavasdes 41, 45 Asclepiodotos 29 Athenodoros 28 Augustus (Auguste) 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 90, 91, 105, 106, 107, 119, 133, 134, 137, 140, 144, 157, 158, 159, 160 C. Avidius Cassius 147

Bar-Kokhba 62 C. Caesar 17, 42, 43 Caligula 22, 44, 50, 90 Caracalla 25, 27, 28, 110, 111, 120, 121, 122, 132, 136, 146, 153, 155 165, L. Cassius Caecinus 102, 109 C. Cassius Longinus 51 C. Cestius Gallus 51, 55, 59 Claudius 20, 50, 51, 53, 124, 143, 158, 162, 167 L. Clodius Macer 106 Commodus (Commode) 131, 147 Constantine the Great (Constantin le Grand) 128 C. Cuspius Fadus 51, 53, 55 Danymos 28 Diocletian (Dioclétien) 128 Domitian (Domitien) 73, 74, 90, 134 Cn. Domitius Corbulo 78, 159 Drusus the Elder 158 Elagabalus (Élagabal) (= Heliogabalus) Eleazar, son of Dinaeus 53 Gaius (= Caligula) Gaius Marius 127, 140, 149 Gallienus (Gallien) 147 Aelius Gallus 45 Germanicus 19, 22 43, 44 C. Germanius Valentinus 161 Gessius Florus 51, 55 Gessius Marcianus 125, 166

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Index of Names

Geta 121, 124 Gordian III 78, 112 Hadrian (Hadrien) 9, 65, 66, 90, 92, 93, 98, 103, 108, 112, 113, 115, 116, 123, 124, 127, 128, 139, 141, 143, 144, 149, 150, 151, 157, 167 Helena, queen of Adiabene 60 Heliodoros, stategos 28 Heliodoros, son of Diocles 28 Heliogabalus (Elagabalus) 91, 94, 111, 120, 121, 123, 124, 129, 132, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 151, 155, 165, 166, 167, 168 Herod 18, 19, 21, 47, 48, 49, 66, 134 Hostilian 122, 123, 130, 144, 168 M. Iunius Caesennius Paetus 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76 Izates 60 Judas of Gamala 50 Julia Domna 122, 132, 153, 164, 165 Julia Maesa 132 Julia Mammaea 125, 166 Julia Soaemias 132 Julian 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85 G. Julius Severus 72 A. Larcius Priscus 72 Liccaius 162 M. Licinius Crassus 17, 40, 42 Lucceius Albinus 54 Lysanias 28, 134 Macrinus 121, 166 Marcus Aurelius 91, 111, 123, 144 P. Marius, cos. a. 72 71 A. Marius Celsus, cos. suff. a. 69 71, 72, 74

Marius Celsus 71 Mithridates 39 Moses 53 Nebuchelos 33 Nero (Néron) 22, 78, 90, 100, 105, 106, 124, 159, 160, 162, 170 Nerva 69 Nicanor (Nikanôr) 23 Octavian (Octavien) 15, 16, 140 Otacilla Severa 121, 132 Pescennius Niger 98, 125, 146, 155, 163, 164 P. Petronius 50 Philip the Arab 121, 122, 132, 136, 143, 145, 146, 151, 152, 166, 167, 168, 170 Phraataces (= Phraates V) 42, 43 Phraates, son of Phraates IV 45 Phraates IV 16, 17, 19, 40, 44 Phraates V 42 Pliny the Younger 69, 74, 76 Cn. Pompeius Collega 72 Pontius Pilatus 52, 53 Porcius Festus 54 Remus 112, 132, 167 Romulus 109, 112, 132, 167 P. Quinctilius Varus 18, 48, 49 Sabinus 48, 49 Scarpus 100 Seleucos I Nicator (Séleucos Ier Nikatôr) 23, 24, 28, 79 Sennacherib 58 Septimius Severus (Septime Sévère) 78, 91, 98, 110, 111, 114, 120, 122,

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125, 132, 143, 145, 146, 151, 155, 163, 164, 165, 169 Shāpūr II 78 Stephanus 53 P. Sulpicius Quirinius 50, 55 Theodotos, chreophylakes 28 Theodoros, son of Athenodotos 28 Theomnestes 28 Theudas 53 Tiberius 15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 51, 72 Tigranes 41 Tiridates 16 Tiridates II 39, 40, 44, 45 M. Titius 44 Titus 58, 59, 61, 63, 64, 65, 68, 71, 74, 75, 76, 93 Trajan 69, 76, 78, 79, 81, 83, 122, 133 Trajan Decius (Trajan Dèce) 111, 130, 145

Trebonianus Gallus (Trébonien Galle) 121, 145, 146, 168, 169 M. Ulpius Traianus (Trajan the Elder) 69, 70, 72, 74, 75, 76 C. Ummidius Durmius Quadratus 54 Valerian (Valerien) 114, 121, 130, 131, 132, 147 C. Valerius Flaccus 100, 105 Ventidius Cumanus 53, 54 Lucius Verus 24, 34 Vespasian 22, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 145, 161, 162, 163, 168, 170 Vologeses I 70, 75 Vologeses (Vologèse) III 24 Volusianus 169 Vonones 17, 45 L. Vitellius 17, 39, 40, 44, 51 Zadok 50 Zenodoros 18, 134

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Index of Places

Index of Places

Acci 107 Acco-Ptolemais (Acco-Ptolemaïs) 49, 50, 107, 122, 124, 129, 143, 145, 151, 152, 167, 168 Achaiachala 82 Actium 15, 16, 140 Aelia Capitolina 66, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 110, 112, 117, 118, 122, 123, 124, 129, 142, 143, 144, 150, 169 Alexandria Troas (Alexandrie de Troade) 131 Anatha (Ana) 81, 82 Anatolia (Anatolie) 9, 16, 18, 41, 42, 92, 122, 128, 129 Anazarbus 118 Antioch (in Pisidia) (Antioche de Pisidie) 20, 21, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 102, 103, 107, 118 Antioch-on-the-Orontes 74, 78, 85, 164 Antium 159, 160 Apamea 50 Apulum 64 Arabia 17, 42, 45, 134, 167 Armenia 16, 17, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 70, 72, 77, 159 Aquileia (Aquilée) 102, 119, 141, 150 Aqunicum 64 Asia Minor (Asie Mineure) 99, 116, 131, 141, 142, 150, 151 Auranitis 18, 45, 134 Ayni 71 Babylon 80 Babylonia 78

Balkans 16, 21 Baraxmalcha 82 Batanea 18, 134 Batna 148 Berytus 20, 21, 49, 102, 134, 164 Beth-horon 53 Bostra 64, 136 Caesaraugusta 102, 107 Caesarea ad Libanum (Césarée-Arca du Liban) 103, 109, 114, 120, 125, 129, 143, 146, 151, 165, 166 Caesarea Maritima 52, 54, 56, 123, 145, 151, 152 Caesarea (Samaria) 117 Capua 158, 159, 162 Carnuntum 64 Circesium 81 Coche 83 Cologne 141, 150 Commagene 19, 70, 71, 73, 76 Constantinople 78 Ctesiphon 78, 79, 80, 84 Cumae 158 Cyprus 79 Cyrenaica (Cyrénaïque) 100 Damascus (Damas) 65, 103, 109, 114, 120, 121, 129, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 143, 145, 151, 166, 167 Danaba 145 Danube 18, 154 Dura Europos (Doura-Europos) 23–35, 81 Durostorum 64

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Edessa (Edesse) 24 Egypt 16 Emesa (Émèse) 94, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 152, 153, 164, 165, 166 Ephesus 118 Euphrates 17, 18, 19, 22, 25, 39, 40, 42, 44, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 84 Galatia 18, 20, 21, 42 Galilee 50, 53 Gaul 49 Germania Inferior 71, 72 Germany 21, 154 Heliopolis 20, 21, 73, 135, 164 Hierapolis 118 Iberia (Caucasian) 39 Illici 102, 107 Illium 118 Italia (Italie, Italy) 98, 157, 158, 161, 162, 163, 169 Italica 107 Jerusalem 19, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 92, 93, 94, 112, 123 Judea (Judaea, Judée, Syria-Palaestina) 18, 22, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 72, 74, 128, 134, 139, 141, 151, 163, 170

Mallos 129, 130, 131 Masada 64, 66, 67 Massalia 100 Media Atropatene 16, 41 Mesopotamia (Mésopotmie) 9, 17, 24, 39, 79, 82, 128, 139, 141, 144, 145, 146, 151, 152, 153, 155, 163, 164, 170 Miletus 69 Misenum 162 Moesia 160 Mount Gerizim 53, 118, 168 Naarmalcha 83 Neapolis (Samaria) 118, 168, 169 Nisibis 24, 111, 152 Nola 161 Nuceria 158, 159 Paestum 161, 162 Palmyra 170 Pannonia Inferior 162 Parthia (Parthian Empire, Parthian State) 9, 16, 18, 19, 25, 35, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 70, 75, 116 Patras 102 Persia 77 Philippopolis 117, 136, 152, 153, 167 Pirisabora 83 Ptolemais (= Acco-Ptolemais)

Lambaesis 148 Laodicea 164 Leptis Magna 132 Lystra 102

Reate 161 Rhasaena (Rhésaina) 102, 103, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 120, 129, 143, 144, 145, 151, 152, 164, 165, 166 Rhine 18

Macepracta 82 Machaerus 64, 66, 67 Maiozmalcha 83

Samaria 53, 54, 168, 169 Samnium 161 Samosata 71, 79

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Sarilar 71 Sarmizegetusa 64 Sasanian Empire (= Persia) Satala 64 Sebaste 52 Seleucia-on-the-Tigris 78 Sidon 103, 109, 114, 119, 120, 121, 129, 143, 145, 151, 152, 165, 166 Singidunum 64 Singara 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 129, 143, 144, 146, 151 Syria (Syrie) 9, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51, 55, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 76, 124, 128, 131, 133, 134, 135, 139, 141, 143, 145, 146, 151, 152, 159, 163, 164, 166, 167, 169 Tarentum 159, 160 Thapsacus 79

Thilutha 82 Thuburbo Maius 148 Thyateira 118 Tiberias 50 Tigris 77, 78, 79, 83, 84 Tiratan 53 Trachonitis 18, 134 Tyana 120, 122, 123, 129 Tyre (Tyr) 103, 109, 114, 119, 120, 121, 122, 125, 129, 143, 145, 151, 152, 164, 166 Velitrae 158 Viminacium 64 Volubilis 73 Vynen 71 Xanthen 71 Zeugma 19

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Index of Sources

Index of Sources

a) literary sources Acta Apost. 10: 1  52 27: 1  52 Ammianus Marcellinus 22.12.1 78 22.12.1–2 78 22.12.3–5 78 23.3.9 79 23.5.1 85 23.5.4 78 24.1.1 82 24.1.2–4 81 24.1.4 82 24.1.5 81 24.1.6  81, 82 24.1.6–9 82 24.1.8 81 24.2.1–2 82 24.2.3 82 24.2.6–7 82 24.2.8 83 24.2.22 83 24.3.11 80 24.3.21 83 24.4.6 83 24.4.9 83 24.6.1  77, 78 24.6.1–2  79, 83 24.6.4  81, 82 24.6.4–6 83 24.6.16 83 24.7.1–3 84

24.7.4 80 24.7.4–5 84 25.3.6–23 85 Appian BC II, 119–120  113 BC II, 120  103 Augustinus, de Civ. Dei 4.29 84 5.31 84 Aulus Gellius, Noct. Att. 16.13.8–9  115, 141 Bible 2 Kings 18: 17–19: 36  58 2 Chr 32: 1–21  58 Isaiah 36: 2–37: 38  58 Cato, Orig. Frg. 18  118 Cicero Leg. agr. II, 86  103 Phil. II, 102  103, 113 Digesta 20.1.11 154 21.2.11 153 50.1 164 50.1.3 164 50.8.3–4 164 50.15.1.1  120, 121 50.15.1.2 164

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Index of Sources

50.15.1.4  132, 153, 165 50.15.8.4  120, 125 50.15.8.6  132, 153, 165 Dio Cassius 44.51.4 113 54.8.1 40 54.9.4–7  41, 48 54.25.5 158 55.10a.1 43 55.10a.4 42 55.10.19 42 55.10.21 42 58.19.5 72 58.26.1–2 79 58.26.2 45 58.27.6 49 68.26.1–3 78 68.28.1–2  78, 79 69.12.1 93 69.12.1–2  92, 123 75.14.3 164 77.18.4 122 78.30.2–3 164 78.31.2–32.4  146, 168 79.7.1 147 79.7.3 147 79.30.3 166 Dion Hal., Bibl. Hist. 1.88.2  118 Dion Chrysostom 34.44  129 Epitome de Caes. 9.12  69, 75, 76 28.4  136, 152 Eutropius 7.9  40 Festus 28  80, 83

Flavius Josephus, Bellum Judaicum 1.20.4 134 1.398–400 18 2.16–18 48 2.18 50 2.39–40 48 2.40  15, 18, 22 2.41 48 2.42–54 49 2.66–68 49 2.68–71 49 2.72–73 49 2.75–78 49 2.79 49 2. 93–98  49 2.117  49 2.118 50 2.169–174 52 2.172–174 52 2.175–177 53 2.184–185 50 2.186 50 2.187–203 50 2.201 50 2.218–219 58 2.224 52 2.224–227 53 2.228–231 53 2.232–237 53 2.329 52 2.332 52 2.334 51 2.236 52 2.253–254 54 2.254–257 54 2.258–260 54 2.261–263 54 2.262 54 2.266–270 54 2.271 54

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2.272 54 2.272–276 55 2.293–308 55 2.318–319 52 2.408 52 2.484–486 52 2.527–530 59 3.12 52 3.289 72 3.309 52 5.54–55 61 5.55–66 61 5.109–119 61 5.133–134 63 5.147–148 60 5.149–152 59 5.152–155 58 5.269–270 63 5.299–300 62 5.301–302 59 5.302 67 5.302–303 59 5.303  57, 63 5.336 65 5.348–352 68 5.491–501 67 5.502–503 67 5.503–508 66 5.504  57, 59 5.509 67 5.510  65, 67 7.5 93 7.17  19, 93 7.58–59  70, 72 7.163 50 7.219 70 7.219–237 70 7.220–221 70 7.227–228 73 7.232–233 73

7.236–237 71 7.241–243 76 7.242 76 7.242–243 71 Antiquitates Iudaicae 15.10.1–2 134 17.250–251 48 17.251 18 17.252–253 48 17.254–268 49 17.286  15, 18, 22 17.286–288 49 17.288–291 49 17.292–293 49 17.295–297 49 17.299 49 17.318–323 49 17.355  49, 50 18.1–2 50 18.4 50 18.4–6 50 18.42 44 18.50 45 18.52 43 18.55 52 18.55–59 52 18.60–62 53 18.85–87 53 18.89 50 18.101 44 18.261–262 50 18.262 50 18.263–309 50 19.326–327 58 19.363 51 19.365 52 20.2 51 20.6 51 20.7  51, 55 20.7–14 51

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20.97–99 53 20.105–112 53 20.113–117 53 20.118–124 53 20.121 56 20.122 52 20.131 54 20.160–162 54 20.160–166 55 20.162–166 54 20.168–172 54 20.169–172 54 20.172 54 20.173–178 54 20.176 52 20.188 54 20.185–188 54 20.204 54 20.205–210 55 20.213–214 55 Vita 115 52 422 93 Florus 2.32  42 Gregor Naz., Or. 5.8 78 5.9 80 5.10 83 5.11 80 5.12 84 Herodian 2.4.6–7 163 3.3.3–4  120, 125 3.3.3–5 164 3.6.9 164 3.9.9–10 78 5.3.9–11 146

5.3.9–12 168 5.6.6–7 94 Hyginus, De gener. contr. 161 Isid. Charac., Mans. Parth. 1  23 Isidorus, Etym. 15.2.3  118 Julian, Ep. 98 (402a, ed. Bidez)  80, 85 Justinus 42.5.10 40 42.5.11 40 42.5.12  40, 44 Libanius, Or. 12.76–77 78 17.19 78 17.21 83 18.164 78 18.213 79 18.214–215 80 18.218 82 18.219 82 18.233  77, 78 18.244–247  79, 83 18.245 78 18.250–252 83 18.262 84 18.262–263 84 18.262–264 84 18.263 84 18.268–274 85 Liber coloniarum 232.12 158 238.20 158 Livy, Per. 141  40

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Index of Sources

Magnus of Carrhae (cf. Paschoud 1979, Appendix A) FGrH, no. 225, F 1  79 FGrH, no. 225, F 4  79 FGrH, no. 225, F 5  81 FGrH, no. 225, F 7  83 FGrH, no. 225, F 12–13  85 Malalas (ed. Thurn 2000; cf. Paschoud 1979, Appendix A) 12.21 164 12.22 164 13.21  79, 81, 83, 85 Notitia Dignitatum, Or. 32.31  145 Orosius 6.21.29  40, 44 7.3.4 42 Ovid, Fasti 5.545–598  41 Philo, Leg. 207  19, 50 Pliny, Naturalis Historia 2.168 42 7.75 167 5.78 20 6.141 42 6.160 42 Pliny the Younger, Paneg. 9.2 69 9.4–5 76 14.1  69, 76 16.1 69 58.3 69 89.2 76 89.3 69

Scriptores Historia Augustae Sev. 3.6  146, 164 9.4 164 Alex. Sev. 1.2  166 5.1 166 15.5  166 58.4–5 153 Gord. 29.2  78 Servius, Ad Verg. Aen. 5.755  118 Sozomenos, HE 6.1.5 83 6.1.7 83 6.1.9 84 Strabo 6.4.2 (288)  44 12.3.31 (557)  91 12.8.14 (577)  91 16.1.11 (741)  79, 80 16.1.28 (748)  41, 44 16.2.19 (756)  20, 21 16.2.20 (756)  134 17.1.54 (821)  41 Suda ἐπικλημα  69, 75 ναῦς  78, 81 Suetonius Aug. 21.3  40, 45 43.4 44 Tib. 9.1  40, 41, 48 41 72 Cal.   14.3 44 Claud. 28 51 Nero 9  160

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Vit. 2.4 44 Dom. 9.2 70 Tacitus, Annales 2.1.1–2.4 45 2.1.2 44 2.3.2  41, 48 2.4 45 2.4.1 17 2.4.3 43 2.57.1  43, 44 2.57.2 46 2.79.2 46 4.5.3 22 4.5.4 17 6.1–2 45 6.27.2 72 6.32.1 39 6.36.1–2 39 6.37.1 39 6.37.3 39 6.37.4 39 12.12.2 19 13.31.2 158 12.54  50, 54 14.27.2 159 14.27.2–3 159 15.23.3 72 Historiae 2.78 52

2.94.4  41, 48 2.101.1 42 2.101.2 43 2.101.3 43 2.101.1–3 42 2.102.2 42 Aurelius Victor, de Caes. 9.10  69, 75, 76 24.1 166 28.1  136, 152 Zonaras 13.5–9 84 13.7 84 13.8 79

Varro Ling. Lat. 5.143.1–2  118 Agric. 2.1.9–10  118

Zosimos 3.11.3 78 3.11.5 78 3.12.1 79 3.13.1 80 3.13.1–2 80 3.13.2–3 79 3.13.3  79, 80 3.14.1 82 3.14.2 85 3.14.3–4 82 3.15.1–2 82 3.16.1–17.1 83 3.17.3 82 3.17.5 83 3.24.2  77, 79, 83 3.25.1–4 83 3.26.2–3 84 3.28.4–29 85

Velleius Paterculus 2.91.1 40 2.94.2  41, 44

b) epigraphic sources Année Épigraphique 1898, 13  148

Theodoret, HE 3.25.1–4 84

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1903, 256  71 1908, 237  72 1929, 98  70 1942/43, 33  73 1977, 829  72 1978, 257  162 1979, 143  71 1986, 694  74 1991, 794  148 1997, 1273  162 1998, 1598  148 1999, 1333  148 2006, 1584  151 CIL III, 755  145 III, 3472  148 III, 6687  50 III, 14385  147 III, 14387i  73 VIII, 2482  147 VIII, 2634  147 VIII, 2904 + p. 1740  148 VIII, 3049 + p. 1740  148 VIII, 3113  148 VIII, 3157  148 VIII, 4310  148 VIII, 23989  148 IX, 4682–4683  161 IX, 4684  161 IX, 4685  161 IX, 4687  161 IX, 4689  161 X, 1263  161 X, 6671  160 X, 6672  160 X, 6673  160 X, 6674  160 XVI, 12–13  162 XVI, 15–16  162

IAM (= Inscriptions Antiques du Maroc), no. 497  73 IGLS I 66  71 V 1959  153 V 2096  153 V 2097  153 V 2115  153 V 2132  153 V 2212  134 V 2213–2217  134 VI 2796  71, 73, 76 VI 2798  73 IGR III, 173–174  72 III, 1113  147 III, 1116  147 III, 1128  147 III, 1179  147 ILS 531 147 1055 72 2020 160 2296 147 2314 148 2315 148 2316 148 2317 148 2318 148 2319 148 2320 148 2460 161 2683 50 2863 21 8903 71 8970 69 9198 73

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Index of Sources

9200  71, 73, 76 9221 129 9471 78 9477 111 MAMA VIII, 522  111 RMD IV, 204  162 SEG II 815  28 II 817  24, 28 II 818  28 II 824  28 VII 332  28 VII 347  23 VII 381–439  33 VIII 361  28 XVII 770  25 XVII 771  25 XXXV 1483A  74 XXXV 1483B  74 Res Gestae Divi Augusti (RGDA) 3  140, 157 16  140, 157, 158 28  157, 158 29  40, 41 32 44 33  17, 41, 45 Res Gestae Divi Saporis, l. 17  24 BCH 26, 1902, 206, no. 61 Crawford 1996, 393ff., no. 25  89 Feissel 1985, 79, no. A  74 Feissel 1985, 82f., no. B  74 Fränkel 1895, 301, no. 437  70 French 1994, 41–43, no. 1  71

Habicht 1969, 43, no. 21  70 JRS 66, 1976, 15  72 Rüger 1979, 196  71 Welles 1938, 398, no. 50  69 c) papyrological sources Rep. I (1929), 42, no. 1  25 Rep. II (1931), 83, no. H1  25, 27 Rep. II (1931), 91 sqq., no. H4  31 Rep. II (1931), 91 sq., no. 4  28 Rep. III (1932), 51, no. 149  28 Rep. III (1932), 54 sq., no. 151  23 Rep. IV (1933), 150 sq., no. 294  25 Rep. IV (1933), 170, no. 343  29 Rep. V (1934), 159 sqq., no. 481  32 Rep. V (1934), 218 sqq., no. 556  25, 27 Rep. V (1934), 221, no. 557  25 Rep. V (1934), 223 sq., no. 559  28 Rep. V (1934), 224 sqq., no. 560  25 Rep. V (1934), 226–227, no. 561  25 Rep. V (1934), 229 sq., no. 562  25 Rep. V (1934), 230, no. 563  25 Rep. VI (1936), 77, no. 629  27 Rep. VI (1936), 77 sq., no. 630  25 Rep. V (1936), 486, no. 809  32 Rep. VII/VIII (1939), 83 sq., nos. 845–846  25 Rep. VII/VIII (1939), 85, no. 847  25 Rep. VII/VIII (1939), 135 sqq., nos. 873–876  31 Rep. VII/VIII (1939), 172 sq., no. 876  33 Rep. VII/VIII (1939), 276 sqq., nos. 905–906  32 Rep. VII/VIII (1939), 279 sq., no. 909  25 Rep. IX,3 (1952), 107, no. 970  25, 27 Rep. IX,3 (1952), 110, no. 971  25

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Rep. IX,3 (1952), 112 sq., no. 972  25 Rep. IX,3 (1952), 115 sqq., no. 974  27 Welles, Fink, Gilliam 1959 126 sqq., no. 25  23, 28, 34 137 sqq., no. 26  25, 29 141 sq., no. 27  28, 29 149 sqq., no. 29  29 156 sqq., no. 30  25 166 sqq., no. 32  23, 28, 29 176 sqq., no. 43  25 191 sqq, no. 54  32 224, no. 60B  25 232 sq., no. 64B  25 d) numismatic sources BMC Phoenicia 109, no. 6  120 109, nos. 6–8  120 131, no. 16  124 132, no. 23  124 195, no. 301  145, 152, 166 269, nos. 367–368  121, 143, 145, 152, 164 270, no. 371  121, 164 271, nos. 377–378  121, 164 272, no. 380  121, 164 272, no. 383  121, 164 274, nos. 394–395  121, 164 BMC Syria 96 sq., nos. 11–15  122 98, no. 12  122 238, nos. 9–11  165 238–239, nos. 13–15  165 238–240, nos. 9–21  132 239–240, nos. 17–21  165 240, nos. 18–21  132

286 sq., nos. 22–27  121, 166 286–288, nos. 22–33  132 286, no. 25  121, 122, 132, 145 RIC (= Mattingly, Sutherland 1923) I, 149, no. 60  100, 105 RIC2 (= Sutherland 1984) I, 154, no. 68  100 I, 154, no. 80  105 RPC (RPC I = Burnett, Amandry, Ripollès 1992) I, nos. 70–71  107 I, no. 133  107 I, no. 143  107 I, nos. 189–191  102, 107 I, no. 199  107 I, nos. 304–310  102 I, no. 311  102 I, no. 314  102 I, no. 315  102 I, nos. 317–310  102 I, no. 319  102, 107 I, no. 322  102 I, no. 323  102 I, no. 325  102, 107 I, nos. 325–326  102 I, no. 326  102 I, no. 346  102 I, no. 357  102 I, no. 358  102 I, nos. 1252–1254  102 I, nos. 3429–3432  91 I, no. 3529  102 I, nos. 3530–3331  107 I, nos. 3538–3539  102 I, no. 4535  20 I, no. 4540  102

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I, no. 4541  20 I, no. 4543  102 I, no. 4544  20 I, nos. 4545–4546  102 I, no. 4547  20, 107 I, nos. 4749–4750  107, 124, 167 II, no. 1603  91 II, nos. 1603–1611  91 III, no. 1603  20 III, no. 3966  169 IV.3, no. 6404  169 IX, 1601  165 IX, 2169  168 IX, 2174  169 IX, 2189  169

Syria, no. 425  121, 166 nos. 425–426  132 SNG Deutschland: Pfälzer Privat­ sammlungen VI, no. 915  130 SNG Great Britain - Fitzwilliam no. 5127  118 no. 5133  118 no. 5140  118 nos. 5486–5489  122 SNG Great Britain – Glasgow 2, no. 3356 166 SNG Great Britain – Hunterian Museum 2, no. 3422  164

SNG ANS nos. 595–597  117 no. 601  117, 118 no. 1018  118 no. 1040  118 nos. 1402–1412  117

SNG Italia: Milano XII,4, nos. 140 sqq.  112

SNG von Aulock nos. 1462–1467  nos. 5727–5728  no. 6542  122 no. 6544  122 nos. 6544–6553  no. 6546  122 nos. 6548–6549  nos. 6548–6550  no. 6553  122

131 130

SNG München Ionien, no. 155  118 Lydien, nos. 675–677  118 Phrygien, no. 230  118 no. 234  118

122

SNG München 19 nos. 49–67  131

122 122

SNG Copenhagen Troas, nos. 98–117  131 Palestine, nos. 254–258  112 Phoenicia, no. 150  120 no. 359  121, 145, 152, 164

SNG München 28 no. 814  165 nos. 817–820  165 SNG Schweiz II no. 802  118 no. 1344  118 no. 1358  118 no. 1810  122, 166 no. 1811  122

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nos. 2154–2157  121, 132, 166 no. 2156  121, 122, 145 no. 2268  120, 166 no. 2341  121 nos. 2642–2647  112 SNG Switzerland I nos. 1286–1287  130 no. 1288  129, 130 nos. 1291–1294  129, 130 no. 1425  118 SNG Switzerland I – Supplément no. 309  129 no. 312  130 SNG Tübingen nos. 2631–2638  131 no. 4710  122 Abou Diwan 2013, 117  166

19 sq., nos. 14–18  103 90 sqq., nos. 94–104  111 95–96, nos. 151–156  165 Crawford 1975 I, 325, no. 321  102, 109 I, 381, no. 365  100, 105 I, 460, no. 441,1  100 I, 513, no. 497,3  100 I, 529, no. 525,2  100 I, 539 sqq., nos. 1–39  100, 105 I, 542, no. 1  100, 105 De Saulcy 1874 43–44, no. *5  122, 145 48, no. 13  121, 122, 145 53, no. 10  145 Giard 1988, 144, no. 238  100, 105 Giard 1998, 65, nos. 1–5  106

Baramki 1974 12, no. 52  117 12, no. 54  117 29, no. 58  118

Grueber 1910 I, 236 sq., nos. 1725–1741  102, 109 I, 504, nos. 3950–3952  100 I, 583, no. 1  105 I, 593–594, nos. 4314–4320  100 II, 388–390, nos. 1–26  100, 105 II, 410, nos. 96–99  100 II, 526, nos. 183–184  100, 105 II, 526 sqq., nos. 187–226  100, 105 II, 583, no. 1  100

Castelin 1946 16 sq., nos. 1–13  102, 103, 111, 165 16, nos. 5–6  165 17, no. 7  165 19 sq., nos. 14–17A  111, 165

Harl 1984 82, nos. 50–51  168 82, no. 54  168 86, no. 76  168 96, no. 151  168 97, no. 155  169

[Anonymous], 1963, 21–22  121 Baramki 1968 31, no. 108  121 31, no. 109  121 70–71, no. 237  121, 132, 145

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Hewitt 1983 68, nos. 1–2  106 68–69, no. 5  106 Kadman 1956, 80, no. 1  123 Kadman 1957 128, no. 157  145, 152 134, no. 185  145, 152 140, nos. 213–214  145, 152 Kadman 1961 110, no. 92  124 110, no. 94  124 110, no. 100  122 112, nos. 101–102  124 120, no. 150  124 121, nos. 151–152  124 122, nos. 157–159  124, 143, 145, 151, 152, 167 130, no. 199  122 Krzyżanowska 1970 136–137, nos. 1–10  103 137, rev. nos. 1–5  91 137, rev. no. 6  91 137, rev. nos. 7–9  91 138, rev. no. 10  91 138, rev. no. 11  91 138, rev. no. 12  91 138, rev. no. 13  91 138, rev. nos. 14–20  91 172, rev. nos. 1–5  91 172, rev. no. 4  91 176, rev. no. 1  92 183, rev. no. 90  92 186, rev. no. 5  92 189, rev. nos. 8–9  91 192, rev. no. 5  91 192, rev. no. 32  92

193, rev. nos. 11–12  91 194, rev. no. 1  91 195, rev. no. 14  92 209, rev. no. 53  91 Leypold 1993 63 sqq., nos. 1–2  111 63 sqq., nos. 3–4a  111 63 sqq., nos. 5–8  111 63 sqq., nos. 9–10  111 Meshorer 1989 70, nos. 2–2a  123, 144 70, nos. 4–6  95 70, nos. 18–19  93 72, nos. 10–11  94 72, nos. 13–13a  94 72, no. 14  94 72, no. 17  118 72, nos. 18–19  94 72, nos. 20–21  94 74, nos. 22–23  94 74, no. 24  94 74, nos. 25–26  94 74, no. 28  94 74, nos. 30–34  95 78, no. 40  94 78, no. 42  123, 144 80, no. 58  94 88, no. 83  94 96, nos. 111–113  123 96, nos. 113–113a  144 104, nos. 131–132  95 104, no. 132  144 104, nos. 133–133d  94 114, nos. 169–170  95 114, no. 171  94 114, no. 174  94 114, no. 175  94 116, no. 178  122, 123

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116, no. 181  144 116, no. 182  124, 144 116, no. 185  94 Meshorer et al. 2013 10, no. 131  167 10, no. 134  167 13, no. 191  167 56, no. 132  168 59, no. 186  168 59, no. 194  168 62, no. 234  168 62, no. 249  169 Rosenberger 1990/1991, 78–79, no. 5  132 Rouvier 1901, 61sq., nos. 734 ff.  120 1901, 61, no. 734  120 1901, 63, no. 740  120, 166 1901, 217, no. 1000  124 1901, 221, no. 1025  124 1901, 222, no. 1032  124, 145, 151, 152 1902, 264, nos. 1508–1510  166 1902, 271, no. 1544  166

1902, 277, no. 1576  121, 166 1902, 264, nos. 1508–1510  121 1902, 264, nos. 1508–1511  145, 152 1902, 271, no. 1544  121 1902, 277, no. 1576  121 1904, 66, no. 2300  121, 164 1904, 66, nos. 2302–2304  121, 164 1904, 69, nos. 2319–2320  121 1904, 71, no. 2331  121 1904, 81, no. 2392  121 1904, 94, no. 2473  121 1904, 101, nos. 2512–2513  121 Spijkerman 1978, 260 sq., nos. 1–7 136 Sydenham 1952 83, no. 594  102, 109 120, no. 747  100, 105 157, no. 973  100 185, nos. 1127–1128A  100 195 sqq., nos. 1212–1253  100, 105 200, no. 1279  100, 105 Ziegler 1988, 121, nos. 918–922  130

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