Burmese Administrative Cycles: Anarchy and Conquest, c. 1580–1760 069105407X

Table of contents :
Cover
......Page 1
Contents......Page 8
Acknowledgments......Page 10
Abbreviations......Page 12
Transcriptions, Dates, Terms, and Notes......Page 14
Maps......Page 15
Introduction......Page 21
1. Decline and Restoration of the Toungoo Empire, C. 1580-1635......Page 33
Section One. The First Toungoo Empire......Page 34
Section Two. Restoration of the Toungoo Dynasty, 1597-1635......Page 64
2. The Structure of Government in the Restored Empire......Page 81
Section One. Administration in the Nuclear Zone......Page 83
Section Two. Administration in the Zone of Dependent Provinces......Page 131
Section Three. Administration in the Zone of Tributaries......Page 148
3. The Decline of Royal Authority in the Nuclear Zone, 1648-1752......Page 157
Section One. Growing Ministerial Autonomy, 1648-1714......Page 160
Section Two. Disorganization of the Royal Population, c. 1660-1714......Page 170
Section Three. Princely Dissidence to 1714......Page 199
Section Four. The Final Reigns......Page 203
4. Ava's Loss of Control over the Outer Zones, 1660-1752......Page 217
Section One. Pacification and Decline in the Tributary Zone......Page 218
Section Two. The Manipuri Threat......Page 225
Section Three. The Revolt of Lower Burma......Page 229
Section Four. The Role of Neighboring Empires......Page 242
5. Alaùng-Hpayá's Reintegration, 1752-1760......Page 247
Section One. The Foundation of Alaùng-hpayá's Power in Upper Burma......Page 248
Section Two. Destruction of the Peguan Kingdom, 1754-1757......Page 259
Section Three. Administrative Measures......Page 268
Section Four. The Final Campaigns, 1758-1760......Page 282
Conclusions and Analogies......Page 289
Appendix I. List of Toungoo and Early Κόn-baung Kings......Page 311
Appendix II. A Note on Major Sources......Page 312
Bibliography......Page 319
Index......Page 341

Citation preview

BURMESE ADMINISTRATIVE CYCLES

BURMESE ADMINISTRATIVE CYCLES · Anarchy and Conquest, c. 1580-1760

Victor B. Lieberman

Princeton University Press I Princeton, N. J.

Copyright © 1984 by Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540 In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, Guildford, Surrey All Rights Reserved Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data will be found on the last printed page of this book ISBN 0-691-05407-X Publication of this book has been aided by a grant from the Whitney Darrow Publication Reserve Fund of Princeton University Press This book has been composed in Linotron Galliard Clothbound editions of Princeton University Press books are printed on acid-free paper, and binding materials are chosen for strength and durability Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey

To Sharon

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments ix Abbreviations xi Transcriptions, Dates, Terms, and Notes Maps xiv Introduction 3

xiii

CHAPTER ONE. DECLINE AND RESTORATION OF T H E TOUNGOO EMPIRE, C. 1580-1635 15 Section One. The First Toungoo Empire 16 Section Two. Restoration of the Toungoo Dynasty, 1597-1635 46 CHAPTER TWO. THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE RESTORED EMPIRE Section One. Administration in the Nuclear Zone 65 Section Two. Administration in the Zone of Dependent Provinces 113 Section Three. Administration in the Zone of Tributaries

63

130

CHAPTER THREE. THE DECLINE OF ROYAL AUTHORITY IN THE NUCLEAR ZONE, 1648-1752 139 Section One. Growing Ministerial Autonomy, 1648-1714 142 Section Two. Disorganization of the Royal Population, c. 16601714 152 Section Three. Princely Dissidence to 1714 181 Section Four. The Final Reigns 185 CHAPTER FOUR. AVA'S LOSS OF CONTROL OVER T H E OUTER ZONES, 1660-1752 199 Section One. Pacification and Decline in the Tributary Zone 200 Section Two. The Manipuri Threat 207 Section Three. The Revolt of Lower Burma 211 Section Four. The Role of Neighboring Empires 224

viii I CONTENTS

CHAPTER FIVE. ALAUNG-HPAYA'S REINTEGRATION, 1752-1760 229 Section One. The Foundation of Alaung-hpaya's Power in Upper Burma 230 Section Two. Destruction of the Peguan Kingdom, 1754-1757 241 Section Three. Administrative Measures 250 Section Four. The Final Campaigns, 1758-1760 264 CONCLUSIONS AND ANALOGIES 271 Appendix I. List of Toungoo and Early Κόη-baung Kings Appendix II. A Note on Major Sources 294 Bibliography 301 Index 323

293

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank those individuals and institutions who assisted me in the preparation of this study. The current work derives ultimately from a doctoral dissertation completed at the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London in 1976. My first debt is to Professor C. D. Cowan who, as dissertation adviser, introduced me to the Toungoo period and guided my researches. It has also been my good fortune to work with Mr. John Okell, lecturer in Burmese at the School, whose unusual combination of erudition, patience, and humor has made the study of Burmese sources a consistendy delightful experience. Professor HIa Pe and Mrs. Anna J. Allott helped to initiate me into the discipline of chronicle translations. Between 1977 and 1981 I obtained microfilms and transcriptions of hitherto unavailable primary sources in Burmese libraries and private collections that permitted me to undertake a systematic revision of the original dissertation. For their aid in procuring these materials I am grateful to Mrs. Allott; to Professor Than Tun of the University of Mandalay; to the Ven. Pyin-nya-zaw-ta of Taung-lei-lon Monastery, Amarapura; and to the staff of the Publications Section of the Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, the Toyo Bunko, Tokyo. Financial support for my research has been provided by the Social Science Research Council of Great Britain, which generously permitted me to undertake a year's research leave in 1979; by the Committee on Marshall-Allison Fellowships at Yale University; the Scholarships Committee of the School of Oriental and African Studies; the Research Committee of the Hatfield Polytechnic; the Society for the Humanities at Cornell University; and the Isobel Thornley Bequest of the University of London. My intellectual debts are yet more numerous. In addition to the aforementioned persons at the School, I am particularly grateful to Professor Michael Adas who, in written and oral comments on earlier drafts, helped to crystallize my thoughts and to stimulate wider historical perspectives. I would also like to thank Professor David K. Wyatt, Dr. Craig J. Reynolds, Dr. William Koenig, and Professor Michael Aung Thwin for their careful reading of earlier drafts and for their many thoughtful suggestions. Professor H. L. Shorto, Dr. WiI-

χ I ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

liam S. Atwell, Mr. Stephen Bodington, Professor F. K. Lehman, Dr. Donald Filtzer, Dr. Harvey Demaine, Professor M. C. Ricklefs, Pro­ fessor K. N. Chaudhuri, Professor Robert M. Somers, and Dr. Ian Brown assisted me on a variety of specialized historical problems, and in the case of Professor Shorto, graciously made available private trans­ lations from two early Mon documents. While participating in a sem­ inar on administrative cycles at Cornell University in 1978,1 benefited from the observations of Professor O. W. Wolters and of Professor Wyatt. The late Professor Harry J. Benda, a peerless teacher who in­ troduced me to Southeast Asia many years ago, provided a sense of commitment and excitement that remains the wellspring of my re­ search. My parents in innumerable ways have consistently supported and encouraged my work. Finally I wish to thank my wife Sharon for her steady optimism, and for her constructive reading of more papers than she or I care to remember. London October 1982

ABBREVIATIONS

A

Original Inscriptions Collected by King Bodawpaya in Upper Burma and Now Placed Near the Patodawgyi Pagoda, Amarapura AA-L Let-we-naw-yahta. "Alaung-min-taya-gyi ayeidaw-bon" AAm Hkin Hkin Sein, ed. Alaung-min-taya amein-dawmya AA-T Twin-thin-taik-wun. "Alaung-mln-taya-gyi ayeidaw-bon" B Inscriptions Copied from the Stones Collected by King Bodawpaya and Placed Near theArakan Pagoda, Mandalay BL OR 3464, etc. British Library, London, MS Orient. 3464, etc. BSOAS Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London CE, E/3 . . . India Office Records, London. East India O.C. 2058, etc. Company General Correspondence: Correspondence with the East, 1602-1753. Series E/3 . .. Original Correspondence no. 2058, etc. CXM Camille Norton, ed. and tr. Annales du Siam. Vol. III. Chronique de Xieng Mai Dal ReprintfromDalrympWs Oriental Repertory, 1791 7 of Portions Relating to Burma DCB 1679, etc. India Office Records, London. Records of Fort St. George. Diary and Consultation Book of 1679, etc. DPPN G. P. Malalasekera. Dictionary ofPali Proper Names GUBSS J. George Scott and J. P. Hardiman, comps. Gazeteer of Upper Burma and the Shan States HNY Hman-ndn-daw-u-dwin pyu-zi-yin-ya-thaw mahaya-zawin-daw-gyi. HS Samuel J. Smith, tr. History of Siam . . . 16571682 AJ)., 1682-1698 AD., 1698-1767 AD. I 1089, etc. Inscriptions numbered according to Charles Duroiselle, comp. and ed. A List ofInscriptions Found in Burma. Part I

xii I ABBREVIATIONS

IO 115, etc. IOR JAS JBRS JSS KBZ LBHK LFSG List MMOS MYG Nid NL 1950, etc. r. RCS-TvY RCS-TY RFSG RUL 45235 SHDMA TL UB UK v. wan. wax. ZOK

India Office Library, London. Burmese MS Chevilliot no. 115, etc. India Office Records, London Journal ofAsian Studies Journal of the Burma Research Society Journal of the Siam Society U Tin. Kon-baung-zet maha-ya-zawin-daw-gyi Thi-ri-u-zana. Law-kA-byu-ha kyan India Office Records, London. Records of Fort St. George. Letters to Fort St. George List ofMicrofilms Deposited in the Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies. Fart 8. Burma U Tin (Pagan Wun-dauk). Myan-ma-min ok-chokpon sa-dan Monywe Hsaya-daw. "Maha-ya-zawin-gyaw" H. L. Shorto, typescript translation of pp. 34-44, 61-264 of Phra Candakanto, ed. Nidana Ramadhipati-katha National Library, Rangoon. MS 1950, etc. recto Royal Commonwealth Society, London. Papers of Major Henry Burney. "Tavoy ya-zawin" Royal Commonwealth Society, London. Papers of Major Henry Burney. 'Taking ya-zawin" India Office Records, London. Records of Fort St. George Rangoon University Library MS 45235 Maung Thu-ta. Sa-hso-daw-mya at-htok-pat-tt Maha-dama-thin-gyan. Tha-thana-lin-ga-ya sa-dan Inscriptions Collected in Upper Burma U KaIa. Maha-ya-zawin-gyi verso waning waxing J. S. Furnivall and Pe Maung Tin, eds. Zam-budi-ρά ok-hsaung kyan

TRANSCRIPTIONS, DATES, TERMS, AND NOTES

In rendering Burmese terms and personal names into English, this study employs the system of "conventional transcriptions with ac­ cented tones" presented in John Okell, A Guide to the Romanization of Burmese (London, 1971). The transcription of place names follows Burma: Official Standard Names Approved by the United States Board on Geographic Names (Washington, D.C., 1966). In those instances where habitation sites have disappeared or been renamed, the original spell­ ings have been transcribed according to Okell's system. For basic Bud­ dhist concepts, such as sangha, kamma, and nibbana, Pali terms have been preferred to Burmese. Unless otherwise noted, dates are given in the Christian calendar according to the tables and procedures set forth in A.M.B. Irwin, The Burmese andArakanese Calendars (Rangoon, 1909), and Yi Yi, Myan­ ma ϊη-galeit pyet-hkadein, AD. 1701-1820 (Burmese and English Cal­ endars, AD. 1701-1820) (n.p., 1965). Following current usage, the term "Burman" is employed in this study to refer to the major ethno-linguistic group of the Irrawaddy basin. The term "Burmese" is used in a more general sense to refer to all groups that inhabit the basin and surrounding highlands, including Burmans, Mons, Karens, and Shans. Thus, for example, I characterize the Toungoo Empire as a "Burmese" empire because it was, in theory and fact, a polyethnic political formation. Scholars consulting footnotes in this study in conjunction with mi­ crofilms of palmleaf manuscripts preserved in the National Library, Ministry of Culture, Rangoon, should bear in mind that the paginated palmleaf at the top of each microfilm frame is verso, while the unpaginated palmleaf at the bottom of each frame is recto. For reel numbers of these microfilms obtained from the Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, Tokyo, see Bibliography.

MAP 1. Burma and South Asia

MAP 2. The Irrawaddy Basin and Adjacent Regions

MAP 3. Lower and Middle Burma

MAP 4. Upper Burma

BURMESE ADMINISTRATIVE CYCLES

INTRODUCTION

As he descended the Irrawaddy at the head of a vast armada in 1755, the Burmese king Alaung-hpaya issued a proclamation inviting the allegiance of headmen throughout the valley. It had been ordained by prophecy, he explained, that the tenth king of the previous dynasty would fail to honor the moral law and thereby would bring the coun­ try to ruin. But now Alaung-hpaya stood forth as a champion of reli­ gious truth who had founded a new capital and would confer renewed spiritual and material benefits on the people of the realm. All were urged to do homage under the Golden Feet. Thus Alaung-hpaya an­ nounced the founding of the Κόη-baung state and, by implication, the restoration of social and cosmic harmony.1 Restorations of this sort were unusual neither in Burma nor in other countries of Southeast Asia, for the waning and waxing of royal power constitutes a major theme in the political history of the region. In several areas over long periods, we find a pronounced cyclic tendency. At the outset of each cycle a figure of ability and force overcame his rivals and centralized authority. The vigor of his reign was usually sustained for one or more generations. But later rulers eventually proved unable to maintain the same military and administrative control. Do­ mestic challenges, often in combination with external invasions, mul­ tiplied until the fall of the capital and the collapse (more or less pro­ longed) of royal authority provided an opportunity for new strong men to start the process afresh. In Burma the four hundred years pre­ ceding Alaung-hpaya's rise saw at least three administrative cycles.2 In Siam, the "Black Prince" Naresuan and the general P'ya Taksin; in Java, perhaps Airlangga and Ken Angrok and certainly Sultan Agung; 1

AAm, pp. 9-10. Although the edict bears no day or month, it was probably issued at the start of his Prome campaign in early 1755. See Chapter 5 for chronology of Alaung-hpaya's reign. 2 Those of the Ava period (1365-c. 1555), which affected primarily Upper Burma; of the First Toungoo (c. 1530-1599) and Restored Toungoo (1597-1752) Dynasties, both of which affected the entire Irrawaddy basin; plus perhaps local cycles in the Delta prior to 1530. The decline of the first Burmese empire of Pagan (c. 849-1287) shows similarities to later administrative cycles, but early Pagan history is too poorly under­ stood to permit confident claims that Pagan constituted a "single cycle." See the Con­ clusion for further discussion.

4 I INTRODUCTION

in Vietnam, Le Loi and Gia-Long were politico-military figures comparable to Alaung-hpaya. Each inaugurated or markedly accelerated a phase of centralization and resource concentration that contrasted sharply with conditions at the end of the previous regime.3 Not surprisingly, fluctuations in royal power have provided a major focus for both precolonial and modern thinkers in their efforts to understand and organize the past. The concept of successive ruling houses, or min-zet, which we find in Burmese histories and to which Alaunghpaya alluded in his 1755 edict4 had its counterpart in the more structured Javanese chronicle tradition. At the end of each century, Javanese chronicles recorded that a dynasty or court ended only to be replaced after three years by a new ruling house or court.5 Although this precise schema sometimes did violence to what Western historians would consider objective truth, the emphasis on constant oscillations grew not only from inherited Indie cosmology, but more particularly from the unstable traditions of Javanese political life. According to Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, the Javanese distinguished sharply between two types of historical time, the "golden age" {djaman mas) and the "mad age" (djatnan edari). The former was characterized by royal glory and prosperity, the latter by anarchy and natural dysfunctions. The typical historical sequence was concentration of power—diffusion—concentration—diffusion without end.6 In less regular fashion modern historians 3 In some instances an "administrative cycle," characterized at the outset by a strong centralizing trend and at the close by the disintegration of royal control, was coterminous with the rule of a single family. But this was not invariably true: for example, the Late Ayudhya period in Siam (1569-1767), which exhibited certain cyclic characteristics, saw, according to some genealogical reconstructions, three families on the throne (those of Mahathammaracha, Prasatthong, and Phetracha); and the Ava period in Burma had two dynasties (founded by Min-gyi-swa-saw-ke and Mohnyin-thado). On the other hand, the house of Sultan Agung of Mataram survived the disintegration of the state in 1677. So too in Burma there was a genealogical link between the rulers of the First and Restored Toungoo cycles (although Burmese themselves usually regarded these two lines of kings as separate dynasties). For these reasons, the term "administrative cycle" is of wider application than the term "dynastic cycle." See the Conclusion for comparisons between administrative cycles in Burma and other Southeast Asian regions. 4 Min-zet (literally, "continuation of kings") did not invariably designate a genealogically continuous succession: it could also refer to a line of rulers not related by blood who occupied the same capital until the succession was terminated by military conquest. For both usages see LBHK, p. 2, written in the 1750s, probably at Alaung-hpaya's court. AAm, pp. 9-10 referred to the Restored Toungoo Dynasty in a cryptic prophecy as "the ten starting with Nyaungyan (Min)." 5 M. C. Ricklefs, Jogjakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi, 1749-1792: A History of the Division of Java (London, 1974), chap. 7. See too B. Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies: Selected Writings of B. Schrieke, II (The Hague, 1957), 92-95. 6 Anderson, 'The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," in Claire Holt, ed., Culture

INTRODUCTION | 5

have also tended to fasten onto the founding and collapse of dynasties and capitals to structure Southeast Asia's precolonial experience. Thus, for example, Thai historians write of the Early and Late Ayudhya periods, each terminated by the fall of the capital to the Burmese; the Thonburi period; and the Early Bangkok period.7 So too histories of premodern Burma and Vietnam are commonly organized around major dynasties and regional regimes.8 Despite the appeal of such periodization, however, few studies of agrarian Southeast Asia have attempted to analyze the recurrent process in close detail. On the one hand, we have a number of carefully constructed political histories, both surveys and monographs, not primarily concerned with the examination of institutional or social phenomena.9 On the other hand, we have a growing array of sophisticated institutional studies, dealing chiefly with social and political structures, which adopt a synchronic perspective.10 Obviously both of these catand Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, 1972), pp. 18-21. Transcriptions follow Anderson. It is not stated explicitly that these terms appeared in premodern sources. Javanese views on the oscillation of order and disorder are also discussed in Schrieke, Studies, II, 16 ff., 76 ff. 7 See Akin Rabibhadana, The Organization of Thai Society m the Early Bangkok Period, 1782-1873 (Ithaca, 1970), pp. 7-8. What is still probably the standard survey, W.A.R. Wood, A History of Siam Jrom the Earliest Times to the Tear AD. 1781 (1926, repr. Bangkok, 1959), is structured according to reigns and terminates with the inauguration of the Bangkok era. Note that Klaus Wenk, The Restoration of Thailand under Rama I, 1782-1809 (Tucson, 1968), p. 122, while focusing on the early "Bangkok period," emphasizes the limited policy and institutional significance of that division. 8 See, for example, Sir Arthur Phayre, History of Burma . . . from the Earliest Time to the End of the First War with British India (1883, repr., New York, 1969); G. E. Harvey, History ofBurma from the Earliest Times to 10 March 1824 (1925, repr., London, 1967); Htin Aung, A History of Burma (New York, 1967); Le Thanh Khoi, Le Viet-Nam: histoire et civilisation (Paris, 1955); Thomas Hodgkin, Vietnam: The Revolutionary Path (London, 1981); C. B. Maybon, Histoire moderne dupays d'Annam (1592-1820) (Paris, 1920). 9 See, for example, Wood, History; Theodore G. Th. Pigeaud and H. J. de Graaf, Islamic States in Java 1500-1700: Eight Dutch Books and Articles by Dr H. J. de Graaf as Summarized by Theodore G. Th. Pigeaud (The Hague, 1976); and especially the Burmese histories cited in previous note. 10 For example, Michael Aung Thwin, "Kingship, the Sangha, and Society in Pagan," in Kenneth R. Hall and John K. Whitmore, eds., Explorations in Early Southeast Asian History: The Oryjins of Southeast Asian Statecraft (Ann Arbor, 1976), pp. 205-56; Akin, Thai Society; H. G. Quaritch Wales, Ancient Siamese Government and Administration (1934, repr., New York, 1965); Nguyen Thanh-Nha, Tableau economique du Vietnam aux XVLT' etXVLTI· siecles (Paris, 1970); Alexander B. Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model: A Comparative Study of Vietnamese and Chinese Government in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1971); Soemarsaid Moertono, State and Statecraft in Old Java: A Study ofthe Later Mataram Period, 16th to 19th Century (1968, repr., Ithaca, 1974); Schrieke, Studies.

6 I INTRODUCTION

egories contain invaluable information on the dynamics of change. One need only mention, for example, B. Schrieke's analysis of the perennially unstable relation between central and regional authority in pre-modern Java, or Akin Rabibhadana's observations on the political ramifications of manpower dispersion during the Late Ayudhya period (1569-1767) in Siam.11 Yet poUtical-administrative cycles as such were peripheral to the primary research interests of Schrieke, Akin, and most other scholars, and the fact remains that the two approaches—political narrative and institutional analysis—have rarely been integrated into a detailed examination of administrative decline and regeneration.12 Consequently, for many regions of Southeast Asia a number of basic questions remain inadequately answered. At the level of elite politics and of popular mobilization, what were the principal constraints on the stable, long-term exercise of royal authority? Why, as dynasties progressed, did the personal caliber of rulers often appear to decline? What was the precise relation between domestic and external challenges? Why did recentralization commonly proceed in the aftermath of military collapse, that is, was it not possible to reverse decline in mid-cycle? Why, even in the same country, do we find wide variations not only in the duration of central power, but more especially in the periods of fragmentation preceding reintegration? Without detailed answers, it is impossible to determine the degree to which administrative processes throughout agrarian Southeast Asia exhibited a basic coherence. Nor can one attempt analogies between Southeast Asia and India and China, where of course cyclic tendencies were also well known. The problem of cyclicity is inevitably linked to that of linear development. By its very nature, a preoccupation with recurring motifs inclines one to ignore or to minimize linear trends—to accept Ranke's stereotype of "Oriental peoples" as den Volkern des ewigcn StiUstandes.13 11

Schrieke, Studies, esp. I, 170-85 and II, passim; Akin, Thai Society, chaps. 2, 9. Ricklefs, Mangkubumi, probably comes closest to answering this description, but it is primarily concerned not with cyclicity but with the stabilization of the political division of Java. See the Conclusion for references to Ricklefs' work. O. W. Wolters' classic studies Early Indonesian Commerce: A Study of the Origins ofSrivijaya (Ithaca, 1967), and The Fall ofSrivijaya m Malay History (London, 1970), represent a unique synthesis of economic and political analysis; but the greater sensitivity of maritime entrepots to fluctuations in international trade meant that the dynamics of change in such polities were not entirely relevant to states like Burma with a major agrarian component. Prof. Wolters himself, in Fall ofSrivijaya, pp. 47-48, makes a similar distinction. 13 Quoted in Arthur F. Wright, Buddhism in Chinese History (New York, 1965), p. 4. For a discussion of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century scholarly perceptions of Asian civilization as inert and immutable, see Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London, 1979), pp. 462-83. 12

INTRODUCTION | 7

Can we discern in particular countries modifications in the pattern of successive cycles that point to conscious innovation in administrative organization? That is to say, were Southeast Asian rulers aware of problems that had faced earlier dynasties and did they attempt remedies? Further, given Southeast Asia's traditional position as a commercial crossroads, how did developments in Asian trade influence the distribution of power within particular societies? Anthony Reid, in a perceptive essay, has suggested that an "absolutist" trend in certain maritime states in the early seventeenth century reflected changing demands of the commercial environment.14 S. J. Tambiah and Shigeru Ikuta have also called attention to the theoretical importance of trade in strengthening Southeast Asian polities.15 What evidence can we find for these patterns before the well-documented centralizing trends of the nineteenth century,16 and how did developments in one country correlate with those in nearby areas? Were there instances in which economic growth served not to strengthen, but to undermine the ruling house? Finally, to modify somewhat the question posed by A. H. Johns over twenty years ago,17 does the traditional emphasis on political chronology mask equally, or perhaps more, legitimate institutional or socio-economic criteria for periodization? This book offers a case study of poUticd-administrative cycles and their relation to institutional and economic change during approximately 180 years of Burmese history. By offering partial answers to these questions in the Burmese context, it seeks to identify patterns that may be applicable to the examination of other eras of Burmese history and of premodern Southeast Asia generally. The period under study embraces the decline of the First Toungoo Dynasty of Pegu in Lower Burma, which occurred amidst much slaughter and turmoil 14

'Trade and State Power in 16th and 17th Century Southeast Asia," Proceedings, Seventh IAHA Confirence (Bangkok, 1979), I, 391-419. See too idem, "The Origins of Southeast Asian Poverty," in W. E. Willmott, ed., Scholarship and Society in Southeast Asia (Christchurch, 1979), pp. 33-49. 15 Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A Study ofBuddhism and Polity in Thailand against a Historical Background (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 128-31; Ikuta, "Portuguese Trade between Malacca and Pegu in the Early Sixteenth Century," Shiroku, Kagoshima University 10 (1977): 55-62. See too Schrieke, Studies, I, 173-74, 184-85. 16 See, for example, Akin, Thai Society, chaps. 7-9; Fred W. Riggs, Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity (Honolulu, 1966), chaps. 1-5; Paul J. Bennett, Conference under the Tamarind Tree: Three Essays in Burmese History (New Haven, 1971), pp. 65-69; Oliver B. Pollak, Empires in Collision: Anglo-Burmese Relations in the MidNineteenth Century (Westport, Conn., 1979), chap. 6. 17 A. H. Johns, "Sufism as a Category in Indonesian Literature and History," Journal of Southeast Asian History 2, 2 (1961): 10-23, esp. p. II.

8 I INTRODUCTION

from about 1580 through 1599; the rise and prolonged decline of the next line of Burmese kings, known as the Restored Toungoo Dynasty, between 1597 and 1752; and the reign of Alaung-hpaya, founder of the Κόη-baung Dynasty, from 1752 until his early death in 1760. Considering the size of Burma and its pivotal importance within the interstate system of mainland Southeast Asia, precolonial Burmese his­ tory as a whole has suffered from scholarly neglect. But for one reason or another—perhaps because Toungoo kings left few great monu­ ments, perhaps because the Toungoo era was deemed less relevant to an understanding of colonial problems than the subsequent Κόη-baung era (1752-1885)—this period has been particularly ignored. The pi­ oneer historian of Burma Sir Arthur Phayre provided a single para­ graph on the crucial years 1673-1733.18 G. E. Harvey's standard sur­ vey offers ten sentences on two of the most important Restored Toungoo reigns.19 In 1928, D.G.E. Hall published Early English Intercourse with Burma 1587-1743.20 This is a careful, highly original reconstruction of diplomacy and trade; but its focus is Eurocentric, and for information on Burmese politics and administration it relies heavily on Harvey. Since the publication of Professor Hall's work some fifty-four years ago, only three Western-language articles on the Toungoo era have appeared.21 18

History, p. 140. Moreover, this paragraph erroneously conflated the reigns of Sanei (1698-1714) and Tanin-ganwei (1714-1733). 19 Those of Sanei and Tanin-ganwei. History, p. 207. 20 First ed., 1928; 2nd ed., with "The Tragedy of Negrais" as a new appendix, Lon­ don, 1968. 21 Actually of the following three articles on the period c. 1580-1752, only the first two can be considered studies of Toungoo history per se: Yi Yi, "The Last Days of the Nyaungyan Dynasty," The Guardian (Rangoon), September 1968, pp. 46-47; Than Tun, "Administration under King Thalun (1629-1648)," JBRS 51, 2 (1968): 173-88; Prince Damrong Rajanubhab, "Our Wars with the Burmese," U Aung Thein, tr., JBRS 38, 2 (1955): 121-96; 40, 2 (1957): 135-240; 40, 2a (1958): 241-347. Over half of Prince Damrong's history, a detailed survey of Siamese-Burmese warfare between 1539 and 1767, is concerned with the period of the present study. Although they are far less focused on Toungoo history than Prince Damrong's work, one might also mention the general surveys by Htin Aung, History, and Phra Phraison Salarak (U Aung Thein), "Intercourse between Siam and Burma as Recorded in the 'Royal Autograph Edition' of the History of Siam," JBRS 25, 2 (1935): 49-108; 28, 2 (1938): 109-76; and 28, 3 (1938): 232. Excluded from consideration are my own articles, whose arguments are incorporated in the present work. The chief Burmese-language publications on Toungoo politics and administration are Yi Yi's meticulously documented Myan-ma namg-ngan achei-anei, 1714-52 (Rangoon, 1973), which maintains the basic analysis developed in her English article, while providing much rich detail, including several appendices of primary documents; and Than Tun, "Tha-lun-min let-htet ok-chok-yei," JBRS 49, 1 (1966): 51-69, which is the original draft of the aforementioned English-language ar-

INTRODUCTION | 9

Nonetheless, despite this obscurity, as a study in cyclicity and institutional development, the history of the Irrawaddy basin between 1580 and 1760 offers an unusually accessible and coherent unit. Judged in terms of quantity, diversity, and reliability, Burmese materials from these years (and particularly from the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) compare very favorably to extant indigenous sources from Cambodia, Siam, or Malaya.22 In combination with foreign accounts, both European and Asian, they permit what may be the earliest detailed reconstruction of administrative and political change in an Indianized mainland Southeast Asian polity. Admittedly, sources on Toungoo history are inferior to those for later kingdoms such as Konbaung Burma, Siam during the Early Bangkok period (1782-1873), or Javanese Mataram (after c. 1650). But in contrast to these states, neither Toungoo empire had to face major European military or diplomatic intervention. Thus the dynamics and potentialities of the indigenous system, though clearly influenced by external factors, were not fundamentally distorted. Furthermore, in Burma the years 1580 through 1760 contained in close succession two examples of imperial decline and two of imperial integration. It is easier to identify recurrent motifs, to chart the relation between complementary phases, and to assess the impact of administrative reforms than if we were considering a single prolonged cycle as in the case of, say, Upper Burma during the Ava period (1365-c. 1555). Finally Toungoo history offers particularly intriguing parallels with adjacent areas. The sixteenth centicle concerning Tha-lun's reign. On the underdeveloped state of Toungoo historiography relative to other periods of precolonial Burmese history, see inter alia Than Tun, "An Estimation of Articles on Burmese History Published in the JBRS, 1910-70," JBRS 53, 1 (1970): 53-66; and Bardwell L. Smith, 'The Pagan Period (1044-1287): A Bibliographic Note," Contributions to Asian Studies 16 (1981): 112-30. 22 On Burmese sources, see Appendix II. On Cambodian, Siamese, and Malay sources prior to c. 1760, the reader is referred to Michael Vickery, "The Composition and Transmission of the Ayudhya and Cambodian Chronicles," in Anthony Reid and David Marr, eds., Perceptions of the Past in Southeast Asia (Singapore, 1979), pp. 130-54; Charnvit Kasetsiri, Thai Historiography from Ancient Times to the Modern Period," in Reid and Marr, Perceptions, pp. 156-70; David K. Wyatt, "Chronicle Traditions in Thai Historiography," in C. D. Cowan and O. W. Woiters, eds., Southeast Asian History and Historiography: Essays Presented to D.G£. Hall (Ithaca, 1976), pp. 107-22; Busakorn Lailert, T h e Ban PhIu Luang Dynasty 1688-1767: A Study of the Thai Monarchy during the Closing Years of the Ayuthya Period," Ph.D. diss., University of London, 1972, pp. 10-18, 336-65; R. O. Winstedt, "Malay Chronicles from Sumatra and Malaya," in D.G.E. Hall, ed., Historians of South East Asia (1961, repr., London, 1962), pp. 24-28; Barbara Watson Andaya, Perak, the Abode of Grace: A Study of an Eighteenth Century Malay State (Kuala Lumpur, 1979), pp. 6-9, 416-23; Leonard Y. Andaya, The Kingdom ofjohor, 1641-1728 (Kuala Lumpur, 1975), pp. 3-12.

10 I INTRODUCTION

tury saw the coastal sector enjoy increased influence not only in the Irrawaddy valley, but also in Arakan, north Sumatra, Java (to midcentury), and possibly Siam.23 Burmese provincial reforms in the early seventeenth century resembled contemporaneous developments in Siam.24 Within thirty-six years of the disintegration of the Restored Toungoo state, the other two principal empires of mainland Southeast Asia, Ayudhya and Le Vietnam, also collapsed. In this period, therefore, the hope that a close study of Burma will elucidate transitions of regional significance seems especially well founded. My analysis of Toungoo cycles focuses on competition for control of resources between different segments of the administrative elite, and more particularly on the changing distribution of resources between the throne and the elites. As in certain other Southeast Asian states, the throne aimed at the radical subordination of the principal elites— princes, ministers, governors, and headmen—to the person of the ruler. Styled "Lord of Life," the king was considered to be the ultimate owner of the resources of the country, while the administrative and military machine was regarded as his personal instrument. In theory all Burmese offices and incomes were temporary revocable grants; there was no feudal class whose political and landholding privileges enjoyed legal sanction against royal interference.25 In an edict of 1638, King Tha-lun (r. 1629-1648) explained his position within the state as follows: "I am the great and noble king who has dominion over eight 23

See M. S. Collis and San Shwe Bu, "Arakan's Place in the Civilization of the Bay," JBRS 15, 1 (1925): 34-52; Reid, 'Trade and Power," pp. 391-419; idem, 'Trade and the Problem of Royal Power in Aceh. Three Stages: c. 1550-1700," in Anthony Reid and Lance Castles, eds., Pre-Colonial State Systems in Southeast Asia: The Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Bali-Lombok, South Celebes (Kuala Lumpur, 1975), pp. 45-55; Schrieke, Studies, I, 7-48; M. C. Ricklefs, A History ofModern Indonesia c. 1300 to the Present (London, 1981), chap. 4; Donald F. Lach, Southeast Asia in the Eyes of Europe: The Sixteenth Century (Chicago, 1968), pp. 519-38. 24 See the Conclusion to this study. 25 Cf. the discussion of the traditional Javanese central government in Anderson, "Idea of Power," pp. 33-36, and Moertono, Statecraft, pp. 35 fF., 94; and the discussion of political theory and practice in the Late Ayudhyan and early Bangkok polity in Akin, Thai Society, chaps. 3, 4. See too the general description of Asian "patrimonial" states and of "sultanism" in Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York, 1968), I, 231-32, and III, chaps. 12, 13. Karl A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (1957, repr., New Haven, 1973) is particularly sensitive to the absolutist dimensions of Asian polities, although his failure to distinguish sufficiently between claim and reality and his ethnocentric judgments have come in for heavy criticism. For evaluations of WittfogePs model as applied to South Asia, see E. R. Leach, "Hydraulic Society in Ceylon," Past and Present 15 (1959): 2-26, and R.A.L.H. Gunawardana, "Irrigation and Hydraulic Society in Early Medieval Ceylon," Past and Present 53 (1971): 3-27.

INTRODUCTION | 11

realms that I have demarcated, and over every single person [who lives therein]. All people depend on the king alone [for their welfare] and there is no one who is not owned by him."26 Now it is easy to dismiss this as self-glorifying rhetoric, to point out that the ruler's sway diminished rapidly with distance from the capital and that even in the capital region, local authority was effectively hereditary, while kings themselves were often prisoners of capital factions. Yet the rhetoric of absolutism and proprietary control had this administrative significance: it indicated the ideal conditions under which the monarchy could function. By transforming the elites into reliable agents for the transmission of taxes and services from the population to the court, the throne sought to "free" the resources of the empire, that is, to prevent their falling under the exclusive control of individuals or groups that could readily refuse contributions.27 Insofar as this ideal condition was approached through appropriate personal, ideological, and institutional controls, central authority was strengthened. Insofar as the elites succeeded in converting nominally royal resources, particularly manpower, into their private possessions, the monarchy was impaired. Control of manpower tended to oscillate between an initial phase of concentration under royal auspices and a subsequent, more prolonged phase of dispersion into private hands. The cyclic tendency of Toungoo politics stemmed therefore from the recurrent crystallization of private power centers that had insufficient sanction in the formal hierarchy. As each cycle progressed, the concealed contradiction between the throne's absolutist demands for subordination, on the one hand, and its practical dependence on the elites, on the other hand, became increasingly obvious. Even at the outset of each dynasty, central and regional elites retained considerable functional autonomy. They were tied to the throne by a sense of personal obligation for royal patronage, by fear of offending successful warriors, by the desire to associate themselves with kings of obvious religious merit, and by a practical recognition of the benefits that strong government conferred. In varying degrees these basic integrative appeals continued to operate throughout the dynasty. Nonetheless, subsequent rulers generally lacked the same authority as 26

RUL 45235, Edict 78, 1000 tazaung-mon 3 wax., p. 67. Page numbers in this and subsequent notes refer to the manuscript copy of RUL 45235 prepared by Prof. Than Tun of the University of Mandalay. Cf. another good copy at NL 1612, ngaw r. On the identity of the eight realms or kingdoms (fyi-daung), see ZOK, pp. 8, 48. 27 Cf. the discussion of "free-floating resources" in S. N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires, London, 1963, pp. 26-28.

12 I INTRODUCTION

the dynastic founders. They rarely appointed new personnel to all the major posts at the capital and in the provinces, and therefore were less able to call on bonds of intense personal loyalty. Nor did most later kings enjoy the great hpon (charismatic glory) that military conquest conferred. Administrators at the capital and in the provinces were tempted, therefore, to appropriate taxes and manpower that properly belonged to the throne. The lack of fixed tenures at most levels of government encouraged a constant struggle to advance one's position in patron-client chains focusing on the court. The throne, of course, was the ultimate prize of interelite competition. Although they had no desire to impair royal authority per se—quite the contrary, they typically sought to capture and use the throne for their own purposes— ambitious princes and officials were nonetheless driven to inflict considerable damage on the system of centralized resource control. Elite autonomy facilitated, and at the same time was strengthened by, the popular inclination to avoid assigned obligations to the throne in favor of less onerous work routines. The founders of each dynasty gathered around the capital a large body of hereditary taxpayers and servicemen whom the crown attempted to control through an elaborate system of quotas and censuses. The Toungoo system of registration was subject to cumulative disorganization because of its very complexity. Even during the opening phase of the administrative cycle, commoners succeeded in minimizing their burdens by moving illegally from one platoon to another, or by becoming private retainers of powerful courtiers. But interelite competition accelerated the process. In their desire to amass resources that could buy political influence, capital and regional leaders exploited royal subjects beyond traditional norms, thus increasing the pressure to avoid royal service. By their willingness to convert royal servicemen into private followers, the same elites provided commoners with an avenue by which they could escape. A third factor influencing the pace of decline was the level of authorized royal demands on the population. Successful warrior-kings could usually obtain fresh supplies of captive manpower to compensate for the considerable losses their own men suffered. However, if Burma's adversaries were unusually strong, or if royal expeditions were understrength because of administrative disorder at the capital, fresh deportations obviously would not be forthcoming. This intensified pressures on those remaining in royal service, further encouraged factionalism, and prompted more rebellions in outlying areas. Eventually each dynasty collapsed under the weight of provincial rebellions and external invasions.

INTRODUCTION | 13

Destruction of the old order, with its unregulated private interests, created the preconditions for recentralization. Whatever tensions existed between the throne and the elites, fragmentation was fundamentally unacceptable to the latter. Invasions and domestic anarchy undermined agriculture, destroyed interregional trade, and scattered the common people on whose efficient organization the prosperity and authority of officials and headmen necessarily depended. Furthermore, the local elites' continuing need for acknowledged status required a central authority that would grant carefully ranked honors and that would offer opportunities for advancement within an integrated, religiously sanctioned political structure. The restoration of the monarchy therefore was never in doubt, merely the identity of the man who would resurrect it. After ruthless civil wars in the 1600s and again in the 1750s indicated which of several royal contenders was most powerful, local elites hastened to associate themselves with his cause. The conqueror then proceeded to pacify the frontiers, to reconcentrate the population, and to reorganize administration on terms favorable to central authority. If all three factors—elite autonomy, popular evasions, and royal demands—helped to destroy both the First and Restored Toungoo Empires, the contours of these problems and their relative importance were by no means unchanged. Strengthened by the appearance of Portuguese firearms and by an increase in Indian Ocean commerce that helped to drain political power from the interior to the coast, the kings of the First Toungoo Dynasty conquered a vast inland area in an astonishingly short period. By virtue of its maritime links, Pegu became the premier city of Theravada Southeast Asia. Yet the new emperors' absolutist pretensions found exceedingly poor institutional expression. The overextension of the empire and the lack of rudimentary administrative controls on regional leaders produced an endless series of territorial uprisings. In the Irrawaddy basin, these were generally led by Burman princes eager to ascend the throne at Pegu. During the 1590s the strain of endless campaigns finally destroyed the royal service system around the capital. Restored Toungoo kings achieved a more stable equilibrium between imperial objectives and internal resources. They abandoned claims to suzerainty over the more distant tributaries, obliged more princes to reside at the capital (now moved from Pegu to Ava), and reduced the autonomy of provincial governors in both the coastal and interior sectors. Yet it became apparent that regional insubordination had been curtailed at the price of increased ministerial autonomy. In order to take the throne, princely contenders living at the capital became de-

14 I INTRODUCTION

pendent on leading officials. Ministers themselves were split by departmental ties and by loyalties to future royal candidates, so no individual or group of individuals was able to restore the unitary principle that coordinated administration demanded. In ways that have already been outlined, factionalism and popular evasions fed on one another to the detriment of the military service system. Only after this process had reached a rather advanced state did regional leaders exploit the capital's weakness and rebel. Thus, in contrast to the first cycle, territorial uprisings were more a reflection than a cause of administrative disorders around the capital. The primary cleavages were between the leaders of vertical factions in the central administration rather than between heads of discrete territorial units. New patterns of princely training produced a generally lower caliber of royal leadership, but at the same time the process of imperial decay was necessarily slower than in the sixteenth century. Furthermore, whereas changing maritime patterns played no role in the sudden collapse of the First Empire, I shall argue that the continued growth of Indian Ocean trade in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries helped to destabilize the Restored polity by placing at a disadvantage that sector of officialdom whose income derived entirely from the agrarian economy. This apparendy disturbed the status hierarchy and aggravated endemic problems of factionalism and of tax abuse. Having examined the Toungoo pattern, the study concludes by using available secondary literature to place those findings in a wider regional context. It suggests that the dynamics of cyclicity in Toungoo Burma resembled in varying degrees those not only in other periods of Burmese history, but also in Javanese Mataram and Siam. Moreover, in Siam as in Burma we find a long-term trend toward centralization, facilitated perhaps by expanding inter-Asian trade, which altered the relation between throne and elites in successive cycles.

Chapter One

DECLINE AND RESTORATION OF THE TOUNGOO EMPIRE, c. 1580-1635 There is not a King on the Earth that hath more power or strength then this King of Pegu, because hee hath twenty and sixe crowned Kings at his command. Hee can make in his Campe a million and an halfe of men of warre. . . . This King of Pegu hath not any Armie or power by Sea, but in the Land, for People, Dominions, Gold and Silver, he farre exceeds the power of the great Turke in treasure and strength. This King hath divers Magasons full of treasure, as Gold, and Silver, and every day he encreaseth it more and more, and it is never diminished. Cesare Fedrici, merchant of Venice, on visiting Pegu c. 15691

The First Toungoo Dynasty, which ruled at Pegu near the Burmese coast from 1539 to 1599, was remarkable in several respects. Unlike subsequent dynasties that quickly reunited the Irrawaddy basin after the collapse of their predecessors, the First Toungoo kings joined Upper and Lower Burma after a period of fragmentation lasting over 260 years. The empire they erected was the first and last to be centered near the coast rather than in the interior of the Irrawaddy valley. Although the above encomium by the well-traveled Venetian trading prospector Cesare Fedrici tended to obvious hyperbole,2 Pegu's do1

"Extracts of Master Caesar Frederike his eighteene yeeres Indian Observations," in Samuel Purchas, ed., HakluyPus Postfmmus or Purehas His Pilgnmes (repr., Glasgow, 1905), X, 125. Purchas Anglicizes the Italian's name two different ways. Although the quoted entry is dated in this edition to 1567, references to Bayin-naung's second Ayudhya campaign and a comparison with detailed Burmese chronologies make 1568 or 1569 more probable. Fedrici's chronology is imprecise, however, and it is thought that he visited Pegu on three occasions up to 1578. For an evaluation of the Venetian's account, see Lach, Eyes ofEurope, pp. 498, 540-60 passim; Jarl Charpentier, "Cesare di Federici (sic) and Gasparo Balbi," Indian Antiquary 53 (1924): 53-54. 2 Even Mon and Burmese chronicles, which give notoriously exaggerated military figures (see Harvey, History, pp. 333-35), cited an army smaller than Fedrici's figure. Cf. Nid, pp. 178, 208 (pp. 105, 128 in Shorto's typescript translation—hereafter Nid

16 I TOUNGCKD EMPIRE, 1580-1635

main was certainly one of the largest, and perhaps by some measures one of the richest, empires in the history of precolonial Southeast Asia. Ironically, it also proved to be one of the most short-lived. Pegu's extraordinary fragility grew directly from its extraordinary success. During the sixteenth century a combination of domestic and external developments altered the traditional military balance between coast and interior in favor of the coast. In a mere thirty years, the kings of Pegu subdued not only all of Upper Burma, but also parts of modern Manipur, Yunnan, Laos, and perhaps most of modern Thai­ land. However, the empire's poor internal communications and the absolute novelty of subordinating so many formerly independent prin­ cipalities to a single center, especially a center located near the coast, created an insupportable tension between center and periphery. This tension was reduced to acceptable levels only in the early seventeenth century, following the collapse of the First Empire and its refounding in Upper Burma on more centralized and territorially modest bases. To understand the changing fortunes of Toungoo kings, it will be necessary to compare the resources of Upper and Lower Burma, and to examine those demographic, political, and institutional factors that rendered the First Empire such a brilliant anomaly. SECTION ONE. T H E FIRST TOUNGOO EMPIRE

Geographic Setting: The Two Zones of Empire Rainfall and elevation have divided the Burmese lowlands into two ecological zones that came to assume political and cultural significance at an early date in the history of the region. Every year from May to October, the southwest monsoon drenches the lower reaches of the Irrawaddy and Sittang valleys and the southeastern littoral with over ninety inches of rain as it sweeps in from the Bay of Bengal. The force of the monsoon is spent, however, as it ascends the valleys, while a series of highlands to the west create a "rain shadow" effect, sheltering the interior from fresh precipitation. As a result, the more northerly portions of the valleys commonly receive well under forty inches of rain. This inland dry zone, extending roughly from 19° to 23° north latitude, was the original home of the Burmans when they entered the lowlands in the ninth century A.D., and remained the heartland of Burman culture and economic life well into the nineteenth century; whereas typescript pages will appear in parentheses); UK, Π, 408-13; "Caesar Frederike," pp. I l l , 125.

FIRST TOUNGOO EMPIRE | 17

the wet coastal zone was the ancient home of the Mon population, who preceded the Burmans into the lowlands, and was traditionally the entrance area by which Indian Ocean contacts were most easily fostered. Throughout the history of the Irrawaddy valley—and in no period more dramatically than between 1500 and 1760—these two zones contended for supremacy.3 The interior dry zone had several advantages. All along the northwestern, northern, and eastern perimeter of the central basin runs a series of highlands dotted with upland valleys and plains. From a very early date these valleys have been inhabited by concentrations of sedentary, usually wet-rice cultivators. Strong leaders in Upper Burma traditionally sought to recruit Tais and other peoples from the upland area to augment their own levies. In several reigns, the availability of Tai (particularly Shan)4 auxiliaries proved to be a decisive faaor in campaigns against the Delta. Of course, proximity to upland peoples was a double-edged sword in that they tended to infiltrate the Irrawaddy basin and to disrupt the settled population in the absence of effective authority in Upper Burma. Still it was a potential strength not immediately available to Delta principalities. The latter lacked access to the highlands except in the southeast, where "wild" Karen and Lawa peoples, practicing shifting cultivation, were less numerous and less amenable to military control than Shan farmers on the perimeter of Upper Burma. Most importantly, notwithstanding the superior rainfall of the Delta, the balance of agricultural resources favored the north. Taming the Delta, with its vast swamps, seasonal floods, and heavy alluvial soils, was a formidable task. Malaria, endemic in much of the Delta, became epidemic in newly cleared jungle districts, and posed a major obstacle to agrarian development.5 Nor was there great incentive for individual agriculturalists to accept the risks entailed in clearing new districts: the urban population was generally too small to provide an attractive market, and the royal policy of distributing rice from government gran3

Charles Fisher, Smith-East Asia: A Social, Economic and Political Geography (London, 1964), pp. 430-33; J. George Scott, Burma: A Handbook of Practical Information (London, 1906), p. 25. In truth, this dichotomous classification is something of an oversimplification, for between the two zones lies a subdeltaic strip. Historically, however, this area was always subject to one of the major zones, usually the north, and never exercised independent control over the central basin. 4 Tai" is used here to embrace Shans, Liis, Yuans, and Khuns in accord with the classification set forth in Frank M. Lebar, Gerald C. Hickey, and John K. Musgrave, Ethnic Groups ofMainland Southeast Asia (New Haven, 1964), pt. III. 5 Michael Adas, The Burma Delta: Economic Development and Social Change on an Asian Rice Frontier, 1852-1941 (Madison, Wise., 1974), pp. 24-25.

18 I TOUNGOO EMPIRE, 1580-1635

aries in periods of shortage kept prices artificially low.6 It is true that a number of European visitors in the sixteenth century described pros­ perous rice-growing districts in the Mon country and noted that rice was exported to Malacca and other foreign ports. Tome Pires, writing about 1515, claimed that Lower Burma "is the most fertile land of all we have seen and known."7 Conceivably (although no data are avail­ able), foreign demand in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries encouraged some growth in local agriculture. Nonetheless, rice-grow­ ing districts identified in contemporary travelogues and in Toungoo census records were still concentrated in four relatively restricted bands of setdement within Lower Burma.8 Elsewhere, despite its great po­ tential fertility, the coastal zone seems to have been mosdy malarial swamp, jungle, and patches of low-yield shifting cultivation. Fishing, salt-boiling, fruit cultivation, and the collection of wild forest items such as resin, ivory, and honey were far more important to the local economy than they became after the British transformed the Delta into a vast rice monoculture.9 If we may judge from Κόη-baung patterns, no more than 10 percent of the Delta rice acreage of the mid-1930s was under cultivation in the sixteenth century.10 The relatively open vegetation of Upper Burma could be cleared 6

See, for example, UK, II, 393. Cf. Adas, Burma Delta, p. 23. Armando Cortesao, ed. and tr., The Suma Oriental ofTomi Pires .. . and the Book of Francisco Rodrijjues (London, 1944), I, 97. On agriculture and rice exports in sixteenthcentury Pegu, see also Ikuta, "Portuguese Trade," pp. 55-62; Mansel L. Dames, ed. and tr., The Book ofDuarte Barbosa: An Account of the Countries Bordering on the Indian Ocean . . . 1518 AD. (London, 1918-1921), II, 152; "Caesar Frederike," pp. 129-30; "Indian Observations gathered out of the Letters of Nicolas Pimenta . . .," in Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, X, 215; Ian A. Macgregor, "Notes on the Portuguese in Malaya," Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 28, 2 (1955): 7-8 n. 18. 8 In the western Delta around Bassein and Myaungmya, along the Martaban-Moulmein littoral, along the Irrawaddy from modern Myanaung to Danubyu, and along an arc from Dagon and Syriam to Pegu. See the previous note, plus ZOK, p. 41. Cf. nineteenth-century patterns described in Adas, Burma Delta, p. 21. 9 See ZOK, pp. 41, 50-51, 55, 58, 59. Cf. J. S. Furnivall, An Introduction to the Political Economy of Burma (Rangoon, 1957), p. 41. 10 Acreage figures from Adas, Burma Delta, pp. 21-22. There is no reason to believe that techniques or implements were more developed in the sixteenth than the midnineteenth century; the contrary seems likely. Nor, according to Dr. J. R. Flenley, De­ partment of Geography, University of Hull, has evidence come to light that would point to unusual desiccation favorable to Delta agriculture in the sixteenth century (personal communication, 9 March 1982). Although overseas exports may have been greater in the sixteenth century than in later periods, this was eventually offset by sizable annual shipments of rice taxes from the Delta to the dry zone, a practice that began only after the sixteenth century. See Adas, Burma Delta, p. 23; DaL I, 130-31; Harvey, History, pp. 350-51. 7

FIRST TOUNGOO EMPIRE | 19

more readily, and its generally lighter soils could be worked more easily than those of the Delta. Moreover, the dry zone afforded considerable scope for irrigation, particularly along the more manageable tributaries of the Irrawaddy. Three principal irrigation systems had been developed through popular or royal initiative by the close of the Pagan period (late thirteenth century) and continued to function with varying degrees of efficiency throughout the precolonial era. These were located in the Kyaukse basin, southeast of the great bend in the Irrawaddy; in the valley of the Mu River, northwest of the great bend; and in Minbu district on the middle reaches of the great river. Kyaukse, the most extensive system, irrigated well over one hundred thousand acres in the late eighteenth century.11 Ava was chosen as capital of Upper Burma in 1365 and remained the political center of the dry zone for almost four centuries, primarily because it was in a position to dominate the royal granary of Kyaukse and, to a lesser extent, the Mu valley system.12 Besides these major networks, more modest irrigation systems were constructed at smaller towns and villages throughout the area. Irrigated land was overwhelmingly devoted to rice, of which there were two or three principal varieties.13 In most districts, however, only a limited proportion of land was suitable for irrigation, so in these areas cultivators had to derive maximum benefit from summer rains, seasonal inundations, and cold-weather dews. Nonirrigated rice could be grown, albeit sometimes precariously, on the wetter fringes of the dry zone, as for example around Toungoo and Prome14 in the south or in Shwebo district in the north. Dry-zone alluvial tracts receiving annual inundations supported tobacco, onions, rice, or vegetables. In some interior districts toddy palms, yielding toddy and sugar, were much valued as an insurance against drought. Yet by far the most important nonirrigated crops were numerous pulses, sesamum, and especially various types of millet, which along with rice formed the staple diet of the interior. Burmans culti11 Burma Gazeteer: Kyaukse District, vol. A (Rangoon, 1925), p. 122 cites a 1784 figure of 68,266/»« (1 pe averaged about 1.75 acres). U Ba Thein, comp., Kd bkayaing thamaing (Mandalay, 1910), p. 61 cites a much larger figure, but specifies no date. 12 In addition, Ava was well situated to control communications with both the middle reaches of the Irrawaddy and the Sittang valley. 13 See references to kauk-gyi and kauk-ti, as well as dry season rice or mayin, NL 1944, Edict of 959 kahson 10 wan., H v. No doubt kauk-yin, known since Pagan times, was also grown. 14 As an exception to the principle of transcriptions set forth on p. xiii, the designation "Prome," enshrined in all historical literature, is retained in this study in preference to "Pye," which appears in Burma: Official Standard Names. Both transcriptions appear on the maps.

20 I TOUNGOO EMPIRE, 1580-1635

vated these dry field crops with special techniques and simple tools well suited to the light, sandy soils of the region.15 The success of this variegated pattern must not be exaggerated. Toungoo Burma suffered periodic food shortages and one or two ex­ tremely severe famines, the result both of poor rainfall and maladmin­ istration of the irrigation networks. Crop failures combined with wars, high infant mortality,16 adult diseases,17 and a tradition of compara­ tively widespread celibacy18 to limit rapid population growth. The ear­ liest extant valleywide census dates only from 1783, but it is reasonable to assume that the general evidence it provides of underpopulation in Upper Burma applies as well to the antecedent Toungoo period. Ac­ cording to this census, the population of the dry zone, that is, the lowland area north of about 19° latitude, numbered between 1,507,000 (assuming six people per household) and 1,758,000 (estimating seven people per household).19 This would have given it a population den15 O n dry-zone cultivation see 2X)K, sees. 2-3 passim; "Pagan myo 1127 sit-tan," JBRS 32, 1 (1948): 52-61; 33, 1 (1950): 39-57; and 33, 2(1950): 230-59; Frank N. Trager and William J. Koenig, Burmese Sit-tans 1764-1826: Records if Rural Life and Administration (Tucson, 1979), chaps. 8-10; Furnivall, Political Economy, chap. 2; Scott, Handbook, pp. 250-75. 16 Out of 120 of King Bo-daw-hpaya's offspring, 47 died in childhood. Cf. Norton Ginsburg, Atlas of Economic Development (Chicago, 1961), pp. 24-25, showing that in 1958 Burma had among the world's highest infant mortality rates. Manning and June Nash, "Marriage, Family, and Population Growth in Upper Burma," Southwestern Jour­ nal of Anthropology 19, 3 (1963): 251-66 also refer to accepted abortion practices in traditional dry zone villages. 17 HNY, pp. 341, 348, 371 refer to epidemics of smallpox and of diseases with symp­ toms recalling typhoid or dysentery. Cholera, malaria, and plague were also known. 18 Apart from the fact that perhaps 1 to 3 percent of the total population were in the Buddhist sangha, whose celibacy was scrupulously observed (see E. Michael Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma: A Study of Monastic Sectarianism and Leadership, John P. Ferguson, ed. [Ithaca, 1975], pp. 119-23; Father Sangermano, A Description of the Bur­ mese Empire, William Tandy, tr., [1885, repr., New York, 1969], pp. 115-16), an im­ portant edict from 1638 (RUL 45235, Edict 78, 1000 tazaung-mon 3 wax., pp. 6772) indicates that family patterns identified as characteristic of Upper Burma by modern researchers—late marriage, a high percentage of unmarried laymen, disinclination among widows and widowers to remarry—applied as well to the Toungoo period. Cf. Nash and Nash, "Population Growth," pp. 251-66. It should be added that illegitimate births in village society are rare. 19 See William J. Koenig, 1ThC Early Κδη-baung Polity, 1752-1819," Ph.D. disser­ tation, University of London, 1978, pp. 96-98 and app. II; H. Burney, "On the Pop­ ulation of the Burman Empire" (1842, repr., JBRS 31, 1 [1941]: 19-33). My calcula­ tion is based on the 296,057 households reported in Burney^ record for 1783, plus 4,286 for the trans-Martaban littoral, plus 10 percent said to be the standard amount of underreporting in census returns (John Crawford, Journal of an Embassy . . . to the Court ofAva [London, 1834], Π, 8). The total was then multiplied by .76, representing

FIRST TOUNGOO EMPIRE | 21

sity in the order of 22 to 26 people per square mile. In 1973, this same area, which remains one of the most lightly populated regions of South and East Asia, had a population of almost 9,500,000.20 The scarcity of manpower and the relative abundance of land ensured that theformerwas the most consistently valued resource in Toungoo Burma, and control of manpower the central problem of royal politics. Yet however underpopulated the dry zone may have been by contemporary standards, it had a large number of cultivators in comparison with Middle and Lower Burma. According to the 1783 census, the population of the Burmese empire as a whole (excluding the western area of Arakan and the upland Shan region) numbered between 1,982,000 and 2,313,000. In other words, over 75 percent of the population lived north of the nineteenth parallel. The Irrawaddy Delta, currently the most densely inhabited region of Burma, in 1783 contained only about 10 percent of the lowland population. During the sixteenth century, when the imperial capital was located near the coast, disorders in the interior and deportations to the south probably modified this ratio.21 But unless we assume that the interior was virtually depopulated, it is unlikely that such factors wrought a fundamental distortion, for even at the height of the Delta's fortunes, a census attributed to 1581 indicates that sixteen leading townships in Lower Burma had a combined population of less than 28,000 households. In fact, this points to a southern population in the same order of magthe percentage of people in lowland townships living north of 19°. It is reasonable to assume that in departmental jurisdictions at least 76 percent also lived in the north (see Trager and Koenig, Sittans, pp. 405-406, 420-21). The existence of nonregistered persons not liable to government tax or service—monks, vagabonds, and especially slaves living outside their master's household—would have increased thesefiguresto an indeterminant and possibly quite considerable extent. On the other hand, seven people per household may be overgenerous: although Crawfurd, Journal, II, 8 said the Burmese themselves assumed seven per household, Burney, "Population," p. 25 claimed that actual English surveys in Tenasserim revealed the average size was "no more than five and a fraction." It should also be noted that in 1783 in the early phase of Kon-baung rule, the slave population was probably rather limited. A total lowland population in the order of 2 to 2.5 million agrees with several informed nineteenth century European estimates (see Crawfurd, Journal, I, 97-98 and II, 234-38; Burney, "Population," pp. 22-31) as well as with Than Tun's estimate for the seventeenth century, "Administration under Tha-lun," p. 175. 20 Union of Burma 1973 census, unpublished results, typescript kindly provided by Dr. Harvey Demaine of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. 21 See below, this section. Furthermore the 1783 Delta figure may have been unusually low because of displacements resulting from Alaung-hpaya's conquest of 17561757; although it will be seen (Chapters 4, 5) that the dry zone also suffered heavily from the mid-eighteenth century wars.

22 I TOUNGOO EMPIRE, 1580-1635

nitude as that of 1783. 22 These demographic patterns had considerable significance in an era of limited military specialization, when the num­ ber of conscripted peasants a king could put into thefieldwas the best single indication of his military prospects. Unlike the dry zone, however, the Mon country enjoyed direct ac­ cess to Indian Ocean commerce. In thefirstmillennium A.D., maritime trade with India had allowed Lower Burma to develop what was prob­ ably the Irrawaddy valley's first urban-based Buddhist civilization;23 and seaborne contacts remained a valuable asset that to some extent compensated the south for Upper Burma's demographic superiority. The agricultural economy of the north could put into the hands of Ava's kings massive corvees for short periods, but could not supply the center on a sustained basis with resources commensurate with the potential of the dry zone. The extraction of agricultural surplus in­ volved a long chain of local and supralocal officials, each of whom was expected to appropriate a portion of the taxes (and services) on their route to the capital. Thus only a fraction of the original collections from districts outside his immediate control entered the king's coffers and granaries.24 By comparison with more or less autonomous terri­ torial units, the coastal ports were few in number, and their interme­ diary officials were highly restricted. The chief ports of the Toungoo period were Bassein (formerly Cosmin) in the west; Syriam near the southern capital of Pegu in the center;25 and Martaban, Ye, and Tavoy 22 ZOK, p. 41. For further discussion of this document, see Chapter 2 n. 109.1 have added 10 percent for underreporting and have used the larger figure whenever variable readings occurred, including the initial figure of 6,230. On Lower Burma's 1783 pop­ ulation, see Koenig, "Κόη-baung Polity," p. 459; Trager and Koenig, Sit-tans, pp. 41619. It is quite likely that the population of the entire basin was smaller in the sixteenth than in the late eighteenth century, though we have nofiguresfor the dry zone before 1783. 23 Michael Aung Thwin, "The Nature of State and Society in Pagan: An Institutional History of 12th and 13th Century Burma," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1976, pp. 15-17; U Myint Aung, T h e Capital of Suvannabhumi Unearthed?" Shtroku, Kagoshima University 10 (1977): 41-53. 24 Koenig, "Κόη-baung Polity," p. 312, estimates that official corruption deprived the crown of 10-40 percent of its revenue, but this was quite separate from large authorized commissions. Pollak, Empires, p. 117 claims that late Κόη-baung officials retained twothirds of all collections. Cf. Tambiah, World Conqueror, pp. 128-29. See too Michael Adas," 'Moral Economy' or OMitest State'?: Elite Demands and the Origins of Peasant Protest in Southeast Asia," Journal of Social History 13, 4 (1980): 521-46, for a discus­ sion of interelite competition. 25 Cortesao, TomiPires, I, 97-98, 101-102, mentions in the center only Dagon (mod­ ern Rangoon), but by the latter part of the sixteenth century, accounts by "Caesar Frederike," p. 128, and "Gasparo Balbi, his Voyage to Pegu, and observations there . . ." in Purchas, Hakluytus Post humus, X, 153-56 suggest that Syriam had come into greater prominence.

FIRST TOUNGOO EMPIRE | 23

in the southeast. According to early Portuguese sources, "Peguan" ports charged 12 percent on imports26 and 6 percent (at Martaban) on rice purchased for export.27 Furthermore, royal brokers controlled the distribution of all imports, and apparendy furnished foreign merchants with reserved commodities from royal godowns.28 Such activities yielded a steady income in precious metals and luxury goods, which could be used to support hireling armies and to manipulate domestic patronage. As the Ava-Pegu wars of 1385-1424 showed, northern rulers envied their southern counterparts' monopoly on maritime customs and trade.29 Pegu, having the most developed agricultural hinterland and the chief port of Syriam under its control, was the most powerful principality in Lower Burma. As such it commonly served as capital of the Mon kingdom when the region was independent. Yet (as in the dry zone) regional loyalties retained some vitality, for Bassein in the west and more particularly Martaban in the east had their own sources of rice and commercial wealth, and their own traditions of sovereignty. The Sixteenth-Century Unification of the Irrawaddy Basin During the Pagan period (c. 849-1287) and most of the Ava period (1365-c. 1555), the balance of demographic and economic forces favored Upper Burma.30 Pagan, whose empire was based in the north, appointed princely governors to rule the Mon country. Even after the south broke away at the close of the thirteenth century and challenged Ava in a drawn-out series of wars, coastal armies were rarely able to extend their authority farther north than the eighteenth parallel. Indeed, they were often hard pressed to defend the western Delta.31 In 26

Cortesao, Tonrf Pins, I, 99, and Ikuta, "Portuguese Trade," p. 59 cite the same figure, c. 1512-1515. In 1569 "Caesar Frederike," p. 130, said customs and freight charges together were 20-23 percent. 27 Macgregor, "Portuguese in Malaya," p. 7 n. 18 for 1512-1513. 28 See "Caesar Frederike," pp. 131-35; George Percy Badger, ed., The Travels ofLudovico di Varthema . . . AD. 1503 to 1508, John Winter Jones, tr. (London, 1863), pp. 219-22 (di Varthema may or may not have visited Pegu personally); "Account of the Journey of Hieronimo di Santo Stefano, a Genovese . . . ," in R. H. Major, ed., India in the Fifteenth Century, being a Collection of Narratives of Voyages to India (London, 1857), pt. IV, p. 6. 29 See UK, I, 435; Harvey, History, p. 90; and ZOK, p. 60, wherein an Ava king wistfully and quite inaccurately styled himself lord "of all the (maritime) harbors." 30 For further discussion of this section, see Victor B. Lieberman, "Europeans, Trade, and the Unification of Burma, c. 1540-1620," Oriens Extremus 27, 2 (1980): 203-26. 31 Although the main campaigns were concentrated between 1385 and 1424, desultory hostilities occurred throughout the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. The best English account of the early campaigns is Harvey, History, chap. 3 A-B.

24 I TOUNGOO EMPIRE, 1580-1635

the early sixteenth century, however, the kings of Toungoo gained control over the south, and within a relatively short period succeeded in conquering Upper Burma and reunifying the Irrawaddy valley. Thereby the Toungoo kings reversed, albeit temporarily, the historical tradition of several centuries. This achievement should be seen as the logical culmination of two long-term trends: the dry zone polity became increasingly disorganized, while the south strengthened its commercial and military position. Signs of Ava's decline in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries— its inability to defend the frontiers, the increased frequency of major provincial uprisings—are readily apparent in chronicle accounts. But in the absence of detailed administrative studies, the following discussion of causes is necessarily speculative. Upper Burma's loss of sovereignty over the coast evidently deprived the throne of valued cash income, and may have localized economic activity by impeding northsouth trade. The onset of Ava's debility coincides in a general sense with the unsuccessful conclusion in the early fifteenth century of its Peguan campaigns, which had been designed, in part, to secure control over the ports of the western Delta.32 Another weakness, possibly more debilitating, arose from the constant expansion of estates owned by the Buddhist monkhood, or scmgba. All religious landholdings were exempt from taxation, while the cultivators of such lands were free from poll taxes and military service. Despite the obvious implications for the kingdom's military potential, the rulers of Upper Burma found it difficult to arrest the growth of monastic lands because of their ideological obligation to protect the Buddhist faith and to acquire religious merit through continued donations.33 Religious endowments continued at roughly the same rate from the early thirteenth through the early sixteenth century.34 Two leading scholars have estimated that by 1300 anywhere from one-third to twothirds of Upper Burma's cultivated acreage had already been alienated to religious establishments.35 Thus the cumulative impact in the Ava period (even assuming a substantial loss of earlier grants) must have 32

See UK, I, 435, Harvey, History, p. 90. See Aung Thwin, "State and Society," esp. chaps. 1-4, conclusion, and appendix; and idem, T h e Role of Sasana Reform in Burmese History: Economic Dimensions of a Religious Purification," JAS 38, 4 (1979): 671-88. 34 See Victor B. Lieberman, "The Political Significance of Religious Wealth in Burmese History: Some Further Thoughts," JAS 39, 4 (1980): 759, Table 1. 35 Aung Thwin, "Sasana Reform," p. 677, Table 1; Than Tun, Hkit-baung myan-ma ya-zawm (Rangoon, 1964), pp. 181, 183. For a remarkably fine Western-language bibliography on Pagan (and indeed, post-Pagan) economic, social, and religious life, see B. L. Smith, "Bibliographic Note," pp. 118-28. 33

FIRST TOUNGOO EMPIRE | 25

been very considerable indeed. During the Ava period, unlike the Pagan era, the so-called Forest Dwellers overshadowed less acquisitive monastic groupings in the north. The Forest Dwellers were an indigenous sect of monks who developed extensive tax-exempt holdings both through lay donations and through systematic reclamation projects and purchases on their own initiative.36 Shans from the surrounding highlands were quick to exploit Upper Burma's vulnerability. Spurred perhaps by a general southward movement of Tai-speaking peoples, Shans became a major factor in Burmese politics starting in the late Pagan period. The kings of Ava themselves had Shan as well as Burman blood. Yet they proved unable to halt Shan intervention in the chaotic politics of the Avan realm. In 1527 the Shans of Mohnyin, a principality in the far north,finallykilled the king of Ava and placed their own prince on the throne. This irruption prompted a sizable southward migration of Burmans. Ava was soon reduced to the status of a minor Shan statelet, and Upper Burma came to rely for its defense on a politically unstable and geographically diverse coalition of Shan principalities. By contrast, the coastal sector was flourishing. Possibly because commercial wealth was more important to the southern economy than to that of Upper Burma, and also because the coast lay outside the core area intensively patronized by generations of Pagan kings, the problem of religious estates appears to have been far less severe than in the north. Furthermore, as noted, the south's geography offered effective protection against major Shan incursions. These partial immunities enhanced the south's relative power position. At the same time, Lower Burma derived great benefit from changes in international trade. Scholars of Asian commerce have called attention to the expansion in Muslim shipping eastward across the Indian Ocean in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Growing demand for spices in Europe combined with the decline of the overland "Mongol route" of Central Asia and the development of commercial relations between Venice and Mamluk Egypt to send an increasing volume over the route that ran from Europe to Egypt to Aden to Gujarat to Southeast Asia.37 In the early fifteenth century, the Ming Dynasty 36 On the Forest Dweller sect begun by the monk Mahakassapa, see Than Tun, "Mahakassapa and His Tradition," JBRS 42, 2 (1959): 99-118; idem, "History of Burma: A.D. 1300-1400," JBRS 42, 2 (1959): 119-34; Tin HIa Thaw, "History of Burma: A.D. 1400-1500," JBRS 42, 2 (1959): 135-51, esp. p. 147; Mendelson, Sangha and State, pp. 46-50. 37 Schrieke, Studies, I, 7-29; M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630 (The Hague, 1962), pp. 20-21; Reid, "Trade and Power," pp. 393-94; Ira M. Lapidus, Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), pp. 23-25; E. Ashtor, A Social and Economic History of the Near East in the Middle Ages (London, 1976), pp. 325-29.

26 I TOUNCXX) EMPIRE, 1580-1635

in China inaugurated a series of major trading expeditions to Southeast Asia that provided an approved tributary channel for commercial contacts that had been gradually expanding since the late Sung period. Despite the cessation of official trade, during the second half of the fifteenth century private merchants succeeded in maintaining the momentum of Chinese-Southeast Asian contacts.38 Thus as a result of stimuli from both the western and eastern termini of the inter-Asian system, Southeast Asian ports expanded their traditional functions as transshipment and supply centers. Although the most notable growth occurred after the 1430s at Malacca and commercially allied Javanese centers, a variety of indigenous and foreign sources suggest that the ports in Lower Burma were also affected. The Martaban ya-zawin baiing-gyok claims that the old port city of Ye south of Martaban was reclaimed from jungle and opened to maritime trade c. 1438.39 According to the Mon ya-zawin, starting in the 1450s and 1460s merchants "from distant towns and cities arrived in great numbers [in Lower Burma], [hitherto] unusual wearing apparel became abundant, and the people had fine clothes and prospered exceedingly."40 Mon and Burmese histories dwell at length on expanding diplomatic and commercial embassies in the second half of the fifteenth century,41 and refer to Indian Muslim mercenaries who, by virtue of their small firearms, contributed to Pegu's growing mili38

On Chinese-Southeast Asian trade in this period, see John E. Wills, Jr., Pepper, Guns and Parleys: The Dutch East India Company and China 1622-1681 (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), pp. 4-11; Shunzo Sakamaki, "Ryukyu and Southeast Asia," JAS 23, 3 (1964): 383-89; Wang Gungwu, "Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia: A Background Essay," in John K. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), pp. 34-62; Wolters, Fall qf&rivijaya, chaps. 5-12; Lo Jung-Pang, "The Emergence of China as a Sea Power during the Late Sung and Early Yuan Periods," Far Eastern Quarterly 14, 4 (1955): 489-503. 39 U Pyin-nya, ed., Martaban ya-zawin baung-gyok-hnin Martaban sit-tdn sa-haung kyan (Thaton, 1927), pp. 11-13. This is a collection of histories and administrative records attributed to the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries. 40 MOn ya-zawin (Rangoon, 1922), p. 66, referring to the early part of the reign of Queen Shin-saw-bu (1453-1472). The history goes on to relate an anecdote concerning seven boats from India attracted by Pegu's prosperity. This is a chronicle of the Mon country to 1539, and itself may have been written during the mid-sixteenth century. « See Mon ya-zawin, pp. 81-88; BL OR 3463, pp. 129-30, 136-58, 186-92; Nid, pp. 66-78 (11-20), referring especially to Dama-zei-di (r. 1472-1492). BL OR 3463 may have been composed c. 1766; but Nid, according to Prof. H. L. Shorto, personal communication, was probably written in part by the general Banya-dali, who died c. 1572. Cf. contemporary accounts of Peguan-Sinhalese intercourse in The Kalyani Inscriptions Erected by King Dhammaceti at Pegu in 1476 AD., Text and Translation (Rangoon, 1892), pp. 72-84; NL-1949, H v. ff.

FIRST TOUNGOO EMPIRE | 27

tary strength.42 Early European accounts also described Lower Burma as possessed of three or four fine ports that conducted a considerable trade in a variety of goods.43 By the start of the sixteenth century, this commerce had three principal components. The Mon country supplied the increasingly important port of Malacca (as well as north Sumatra) with rice and other foodstuffs, with locally built ships, and with a variety of luxury goods (rubies, sapphires, musk, lac, benzoin, gold) funneled to the Peguan coast from the interior. In return, Lower Burma imported Chinese manufactures and Indonesian spices. A second line of commerce focused on West Asia and India, particularly the Coromandel Coast, Bengal, and Gujarat. Merchants from these areas exchanged large quantities of Indian textiles for Burmese luxury products and for eastern goods that had originally been imported from Malacca and north Sumatra. Thus the direct trade between India and Pegu bypassed Malacca entirely. The third segment affected chiefly the southeastern ports of Martaban, Ye, and Tavoy, which were in land communication with the Gulf of Siam. If monsoon winds or political conditions in the Straits of Malacca were unfavorable, lowbulk items destined for the Indian Ocean could be taken overland to these ports more conveniently than they could be transported around the Malay peninsula.44 While Lower Burma's transshipment, rice-supply, and shipbuilding activities probably had little direct impact on the interior of the Irrawaddy basin, the sustained foreign demand for gems, musk, lac, and other such products drew the dry zone more closely into a commercial network focusing on the ports. After being collected by local residents in the highlands, these goods were transported to Ava, Toungoo, Prome, and other inland market towns, where they were bought by Indian Ocean merchants and local peddlers who had come up from the coast.45 « UK, I, 381, 410; II, 44, 47, 107, 171-73. Cf. M. Siddiq Khan, "Muslim Intercourse with Burma," Islamic Culture 10, 3 (1936): 426-27; and Badger, di Varthema, pp. 217-22. 43 See, for example, Dames, Duarte Barbosa, II, 152-59; Cortesao, TmU Pires, I, 97103, 110-11; 'The Travels of Athanasius Nikitin, of Twer," in Major, India in the fifteenth Century, pt. Ill, pp. 20-21; "Account of Santo Stefano," pp. 5-7; Badger, di Varthema, p. 222; Ikuta, "Portuguese Trade," pp. 55-62. 44 This was even more true of the shorter overland route between the Gulf of Siam and the Siamese dependency of Mergui. See the previous note, plus Maurice Collis, The Grand Peregrination, Being the Life and Adventures tfFernao Mendes Pinto (London, 1949), pp. 166-67; R. Halliday, "Immigration of the Mons into Siam," JSS 10, 3 (1913): 7-9. 45 Cortesao, Tomi Pires, I, 111; Dames, Duarte Barbosa, II, 159-62; T h e Voyage of Master Ralph Fitch Merchant of London .. . ," in Purchas, HaUuytus Posthumus, X, 194-95; T h e Travels of Nicolo Conti, in the East. . .," in Major, India in the Fifteenth

28 I TOUNGOO EMPIRE, 1580-1635

At the same time, Indian textiles available at these markets became the basic apparel of interior elites, and possibly even of sections of the cultivating classes.46 Because commercial exchanges were typically sub­ ject to heavy customs duties and/or various forms of royal monopoly, the economic interests of interior rulers became increasingly oriented toward the coast. The arrival of the Portuguese in the early sixteenth century further enhanced Lower Burma's position within the Irrawaddy valley both commercially and militarily. The Portuguese capture of Malacca in 1511 diverted Muslim traffic to more peripheral ports where eastern goods could be acquired free of Portuguese interference. Along with the Si­ amese dependency of Mergui on the west coast of the peninsula, it is likely that Martaban, Ye, and Tavoy increased their transpeninsular trade with the Gulf of Siam.47 The newly emergent anti-Portuguese centers of Aceh and Banten began to supply eastern commodities to Lower Burma, which continued to attract Indian merchants reluctant to make the long journey to Malay/Indonesian ports. In the 155Os Muslim merchants at Pegu formalized their community status by erect­ ing what appears to have been their first mosque.48 However, the principal contribution of the Portuguese to southern ascendancy was military. In the 1530s, bands of Portuguese freelance soldiers started to furnish rulers along the Asian littoral with warships, and more especially with arquebuses and small cannon superior to any Indian or Chinese weapons hitherto available. Portuguese cast-metal muzzle-loaders were less likely to burst, their trajectories were longer and more accurate, and their shots were heavier than those of Asian Century, pt. II, pp. 10-15. See too KaIySm Inscriptions, pp. 73-75, itemizing handicrafts from as far off as Haribhunja being sent to Ceylon. 46 Thus at Toungoo in the opening years of the seventeenth century, the only desir­ able textiles were those sold by Indian merchants; UK, III, 111. See too Dames, Duarte Barbosa, II, 159, referring to the importation to Ava from Gujarat c. 1518 of "Meca velvets," opium, and other luxuries; and Cortesao, Tome Fires, I, 111, referring to the importation to Ava and Chiengmai (?) c. 1515 of "damasks, satins, brocades, white cloths from Bengal." 47 On this point, see H. Cogan, tr., The Voyages and Adventures qfTernand Mendez Pinto (1653, repr., London, 1969), pp. 192-93; Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade, pp. 72, 127-28, 133-34, 165-66, 371 n. 261; Samuel Purchas, Purchas His Pilgrimage or Rela­ tions of the World, (London, 1626), p. 513; Lieberman, "Unification," pp. 209-10. 48 Nid, p. 169 (98). On trade with Aceh and Banten, see Schrieke, Studies, I, 43; "Caesar Frederike," p. 128; UK, II, 387 and ΠΙ, 182; D.G.E. HaU, A History qfSouthEast Asia (London, 1966), p. 357. Lower Burma's popularity with Muslim traders in no way impaired its traditionally profitable trade with Malacca, for the ability of Por­ tugal's foes to disrupt the supply of foodstuffs from Java and Siam rendered Malacca yet more dependent on Lower Burma's rice. See Lieberman, "Unification," p. 210.

FIRST TOUNGOO EMPIRE | 29

cannon of equivalent weight. Although Burman and Mon kings never acquired massive siege guns such as rendered stone walls and old-style castles untenable after about 1450 in Europe, they used Portuguese cannon to good effect by mounting them on high mounds or towers and then shooting down into besieged towns. By itself, this technique was seldom decisive. But when used in conjunction with large-scale conventional assaults and mining operations, it could clear the walls of enemy soldiers, demoralize civilians, and create gaps in wood and even brick defenses. Despite their cumbrous loading procedures, handheld arquebuses or matchlocks were also valued because of their light weight, superior penetration (compared to arrows), short-range accuracy, and intimidating noise. The Burmese learned to integrate arquebuses skillfully into both infantry and elephanteer units. Portuguese weapons proved particularly effective against northern Shans, who had limited experience with firearms.49 Tabin-shwei-hti (r. 1531-1550) was the first ruler in the Irrawaddy basin to employ companies of Portuguese mercenaries alongside the more traditional Muslim soldiers. Lest one exaggerate the significance of maritime resources, it is important to recognize that his original base of Toungoo was an interior principality, formerly a tributary of Ava, which depended on the coast for salt and textiles. Toungoo's original strength derived chiefly from its status as a refugee center for Burmans fleeing Shan incursions in the north; and its soldiery before 1535 were quite conventional. Yet Tabin-shwei-hti, perhaps because of Toungoo's growing commercial links to the coast, was quick to appreciate the value of maritime contacts and the advantages to be gained from uniting the ports 49 For dramatic sixteenth-century accounts of the effect of Portuguese and other firearms in Burma, see Nid, pp. 154-65 (84-95). Cf. "Caesar Frederike," pp. 124-25. Although Burmese soldiers themselves used large numbers offirearmsof both Indian and Portuguese design, Portuguese mercenaries in the mid- and late sixteenth century supplied and operated the best cannon and constituted Tabin-shwei-hti and Bayin-naung's elite musketeer units. On the technical merits of European compared to Asian guns at this time, see R. S. Whiteway, The Rise of Portuguese Power in India 1497-1550 (Westminster, 1899), pp. 36-41; Anthony Reid, "Europe and Southeast Asia: The Military Balance," paper prepared for the Asian Studies Association of Australia 4th National Conference, May 1982; Carlo M. Cipolla, Guns and Sails in the Early Phase ofEuropean Expansion, 1400-1700 (London, 1965), pt. II; C. R. Boxer, "Asian Potentates and European Artillery in the 16th-18th Centuries," Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 38, 2 (1966): 156-72; Damrong, "Our Wars," JBRS 38, 2: 138-39. On the signal contribution of Portuguese-type guns to the contemporaneous unification of Japan, see Edwin O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig, Japan: Tradition and Transformation (Sydney, 1979), pp. 74-78.

30 I TOUNGOO EMPIRE, 1580-1635

to their major supply centers in Middle Burma.50 On inheriting the throne of Toungoo in 1531, he chose to attack Pegu rather than Ava. After seizing Pegu in the late 1530s (with the aid of firearms apparently obtained through the western Delta), he abandoned the interior capital of his father to dwell at the coast. There Tabin-shwei-hti, a Burman, patronized Mon culture with great assiduity and succeeded in developing a genuinely polyethnic court. Further, he used Pegu's wealth to engage Portuguese mercenaries against other ports and interior market towns. Portuguese cannon contributed to his victories at Martaban (1540-1541), Prome (1542), and to his defeat of a northern Shan counterattack in 1544.51 At this point, he probably could have expelled the Shans from Ava and reunited the Irrawaddy basin. He chose instead to direct his energies against the prosperous coastal state of Arakan, on the Bay of Bengal, and against Ayudhya (Siam). Evidence from the chronicles suggests that one of his main objectives in attacking Ayudhya was to win control of the transpeninsular traffic with the Gulf of Siam, to which he had hitherto had only indirect access via Martaban and Tavoy.52 However, both campaigns failed utterly. Tabin-shwei-hti's guns were effectively neutralized at Ayudhya and the Arakanese capital by rival bands of Portuguese mercenaries, while his Burman and Mon levies were inadequate to surround these powerful cities and starve them into submission. It was Tabin-shwei-hti's successor Bayin-naung (r. 1551-1581) who recognized the necessity of supplementing the manpower of Middle and Lower Burma with that of the Tai-speaking highlands so as to overwhelm Ayudhya with a siege operation of unequaled magnitude. Pegu became the most successful kingdom in Southeast Asia in part because the Shan-Burman region against which it directed its initial assaults was already particularly disorganized, but also because Pegu was the first coastal state to apply the new military technology to systematic conquest of the interior. After a five-day artillery barrage, in 1555 Bayin-naung routed the Shan-Burman defenders of Ava. 'The reports of [his] cannon and muskets reverberated like . . . thunderbolts," a contemporary chronicler recorded. "Detonation followed det50 That is, more regular supplies could be obtained, and interior and coastal tolls could be monopolized by one authority. 51 See UK, II, 145, 181-89, 191-211; Cogan, Mendez Pinto, chaps. 50-52, pp. 211, 214, 237-38; Nid, p. 110 (46). 52 UK, II, 243. His motives in attacking Arakan are less clear. Possibly Arakan disputed control of Prome because Tabin-shwei-hti threatened Arakan's trade links to the middle Irrawaddy.

FIRST TOUNGOO EMPIRE | 31

onation till it seemed a man's ears would burst; no defender dared expose so much as a finger above the battlements."53 From Ava, Bayinnaung proceeded to subdue a great arc of Tai-speaking principalities from Kalei in the west to Chiengmai in the southeast. Then, with Portuguese mercenaries and the manpower of much of western mainland Southeast Asia at his disposal, he twice conquered Ayudhya, in 1564 and 1569. On the first occasion the divided Siamese court quickly surrendered, in part because they were unable to defend against an unprecedented array of large-caliber cannon; but in 1569 victory only followed a long and determined siege.54 Bayin-naung also established a shadowy suzerainty over parts of modern Laos and Manipur. In awe the Mons referred to him as "Victor of the Ten Directions."55 Without doubt, commercial objectives continued to help form Pegu's program of expansion. Stimulated by increased European demands, the prices of Asian spices doubled or tripled during the second half of the sixteenth century, while the volume of such exports from Asia also rose sharply.56 Wherever this trade and its allied branches touched the coasts of Burma and Siam, Pegu now drew a profit. The importance Bayin-naung attached to the transpeninsular traffic in particular is suggested by his detailed administrative arrangements at Tavoy and at Siam's erstwhile dependency of Mergui, where he appointed officials to supervise merchant shipping and erected accommodations for envoys arriving from India.57 At the same time, Pegu's conquest of Ava and the Tai states of the interior allowed Bayinnaung to impose tribute quotas in luxury export products (musk, gold, gems) hitherto supplied by private traders.58 Those goods not retained at Pegu could either be sold to visiting merchants or traded overseas directly by the king's factors, for in the 1570s Bayin-naung built a fleet 53 Nid, p. 155 (85-86). On Bayin-naung'sfirearms,see also the contemporary quotes and sources listed in Lieberman, "Unification," pp. 214-17. 54 On Bayin-naung's campaigns, see UK, II, 252-451 and III, 1-49; Nid, pp. 142264 (73-166); and Damrong, "Our Wars," pp. 142-72, which contains a carefully considered analysis of Bayin-naung's Siamese victories. 55 In Mon, Jamnah Duih Cab. H. L. Shorto, personal communications, August 1975 and January 1983. These were the four cardinal directions, the four intermediate points, and the spheres above and below the plane of the earth. 56 C. R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415-1825 (1969, repr., London, 1977), p. 59; Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade, pp. 133-34. 57 "Hanthawaddy hsin-byu-shin ayel-daw-bon," in Hsaya-gyl U Bi et al., eds., Ayeidaw-bon nga-saung-dwe (Rangoon, n.d.), pp. 436-37, 459. 58 UK, II, 306, 312, 323; "Gasparo Balbi," p. 160; Rev. A. Sauliere, tr., 'The Jesuits on Pegu at the End of the XVIth Century," Bengal Past and Present 19 (1919): 69-70. On the latter source, cf. P. Pierre du Jarric, Histoire des cboses plus memorables advenues tant ez Indes Orientales, que austres pais (Bordeaux, 1608), pp. 612-29.

32 I TOUNGOO EMPIRE, 1580-1635

of oceangoing vessels to undertake commercial voyages on behalf of the crown.59 Ayudhya had once rivaled Pegu as a regional power, but the latter^s wealth and authority were now unequaled. The Iberian historian Faria y Sousa, echoing enthusiastic observers, claimed that it "became the powerfullest Monarchy in Asia, except that of China."60 Administrative Weaknesses of the First Toungoo Empire The Burmese royal chronicles blamed Bayin-naung's son Nan-da-bayin (r. 1581-1599) for the collapse of the First Toungoo Empire.61 However, evidence from the chronicles themselves suggests that the disintegration was under way by the time of Bayin-naung's death. The conspicuous success of his military program was not paralleled by the development of institutions by which the realm might be securely integrated. Even in the Irrawaddy basin, the clustering of population around major centers of wet-rice agriculture favored a pronounced regionalism. Each of the principal towns in Upper and Lower Burma was capable of marshaling a substantial military population. Each, moreover, cherished a tradition of independent sovereignty, and continued to function as the economic, sacral, and administrative nucleus of a fair-sized hinterland. Although the growth of maritime trade encouraged economic integration, local exchanges between rice-growing villages, on the one hand, and villages specializing in particular handicraft or agricultural products, on the other, continued to absorb the attention of the average cultivator. These products were bartered in village markets; but a certain amount of exchange also occurred in provincial capitals, which were usually located on rivers offering easy access to surrounding villages.62 Private brokers (pwe-zas) in these small urban concentrations (whose populations probably averaged less than fifteen thousand) produced roughly shaped pieces of copper-alloy that served 59

UK, 111, 2 says that in 1574 at Pegu he inaugurated the construction of seven ships, each 63 cubits long and 16 cubits wide, which were loaded with goods and sent to trade for the crown at Me-lapok (location undetermined). 60 Manuel de Faria y Sousa, The Portugues Asia, Capt. John Stevens, tr. (1695, repr. Westmead, 1971), III, 117-18. This same claim appears in the early seventeenth-century Portuguese work, A. Macgregor, tr., "A Brief Account of the Kingdom of Pegu," JBRS 16, 2 (1926): 108. 61 For more detailed discussion of this section, see Victor B. Lieberman, "Provincial Reforms in Taung-ngu Burma," BSOAS 43, 3 (1980): 548-69. 63 On local economic exchange, see ZOK, pp. 50-51; "Caesar Frederike," pp. 13132; LBHK, p. 149; Dal, I, 171-75; Sangermano, Burmese Empire, pp. 216-17, and below, Chapter 2, Section 2.

FIRST TOUNGOO EMPIRE | 33

as units of exchange in nearby villages. European and Burmese ac­ counts describe how cultivators and peddlersflockedto urban pagodas for colorful religious festivals that functioned simultaneously as re­ gional economic fairs.63 Famous pagodas, associated with relics or vis­ its of the Buddha, symbolized regional tradition.64 Furthermore, it was to the walled provincial towns that headmen delivered taxes and took important legal cases. During parts of the Ava period (1365-c. 1555), each of the Irrawaddy basin's five main towns—Pegu, Ava, Martaban, Toungoo, and Prome—had in fact headed an independent kingdom. As Cesare Fedrici's introductory quotation suggests, and as a 1557 bell inscription by Bayin-naung shows quite clearly, First Toungoo kings found it difficult to conceptualize the extinction of these once sovereign realms. Bayin-naung in 1557 boasted that he controlled the "monarchies" (literally, "the white umbrellas of monarchs") of Toung­ oo, Pegu, Prome, Pagan, Ava, and the Shans.65 Nonetheless, these states continued to exist as separate polities. Annexation simply meant placing on the throne new nominees who then became tributary to Pegu.66 Bayin-naung and his successors governed directly only the Ir­ rawaddy Delta and lower Sittang valley. Ava, Martaban, Toungoo, and Prome (along with Chiengmai in the Tai highlands) were en­ trusted to senior royal relatives identified as bayin, meaning "chief or "sovereign."67 As late as 1590 the bayin of Ava, while acknowledging the preeminence of his father the High King (hpaya-shin tnin-taya) at Pegu, described himself as: The solar king [nei-min] Min-ye-kyaw-swa whose coming, prophe­ sied [by the Buddha(?), his subjects awaited] as a lotus awaits the sun, who conquers all his foes and who receives tribute and homage [from the vanquished] . . . a ruler in whose glory people take refuge, who possesses the royal signs, Lord of the Great State of Yadana63

See BL OR 3464, p. 138 r.-v.; I 1097 in UB, I, 361-62; "Gasparo Balbi," p. 155. For example, the Shwei-hsan-daw at Prome, the Shwei-hmaw-daw at Pegu, the Shwei-dagon at Dagon, the Shwei-zl-gon at Pagan. Cf. David K. Wyatt, ed., The Nan Chronicle, Prasoet Churatana, tr. (Ithaca, 1966), pp. vii-viii. 65 U Chit Thein, ed. and tr., Shei-hcmng mon kyauk-sa baung-gyok (Rangoon, 1965), pt. 2, p. 108 glosses the Mon original as min eikaya-ζά hti-pyu azm-mya. 66 Cf. H. L. Shorto, "A Mon Genealogy of Kings: Observations on the Nidana Arambhakatha," in Hall, Historians, p. 69. 67 It is unclear whether this term was invariably used by contemporaries. The only inscription known to this writer to entitle a vassal lowland ruler, I 1086 in B, I, 56-57, uses the term bayin. Unfortunately this is a later copy. I 1081, I 1084, and I 1087 include no prefatory title (unless we construe nei-min, "solar king," to be a tide). Bayin, or more occasionally bayin-hkan ("viceroy"), is the standard term in the UK. 64

34 I TOUNGOO EMPIRE, 1580-1635

pu-ra Ava, pinnacle of many lands . . . where generations of kings have received coronation, who like King Thi-ri-dama-thaw-ka [Asoka] . . . wishes to see the prosperity of the Religion and the world in­ crease, having conquered by means of his solar radiance, that is to say his royal glory, all darkness and ignorance, that is to say all his foes, [founds] the Si-gon-daw pagoda. . . . 6 8 The resplendent solar imagery, the analogy to the model Buddhist ruler Asoka, legitimation through prophecy, and the use of royal verbs that abound in this inscription identified the donor as a fit successor to the independent kings of Ava in the fourteenth through mid-six­ teenth centuries.69 In accord with this oudook, the bayins were allowed to display the same insignia—the so-called five royal regalia—that their sovereign predecessors had possessed.70 Wives of the bayins were com­ monly designated "queen" (tnt-baya), while the bayins of Toungoo (and possibly other centers) maintained the right of hereditary succession.71 Given the vitality of preunification tradition, it is not surprising that the High Kings failed to establish effective institutional controls over the bayins. During the Restored Toungoo period, High Kings regu­ larly dispatched a variety of officials to reside at major provincial courts, where they supervised specialized departments and monitored the loy­ alty of the resident governor.72 I have yet to find mention of such centrally appointed deputies at bayin centers in the sixteenth century. On occasion, First Toungoo kings appointed advisors or tutors (achidaw or abtein-daw) to accompany young princes serving as bayins, but this does not appear to have been an invariable feature.73 68

1 1084 in UB, Π, 237-38. Nor was this an arrogarion of royal status that Mln-ye-kyaw-swa sought to hide from the Peguan court, for Peguan officials and Bayin-naung himself used similar phra­ seology referring to lowland vassals. See UK, III, 50-51, 80-81; Chit Theln, Shet-haunjj, pt. 2, pp. 105-108. 70 UK, Π, 156, 183, 202, 270; "Hanthawaddy ayel-daw-bon," pp. 387, 391. Ac­ cording to Myan-ma-swe-zon kyan (Rangoon, 1964), IX, 243-44, the five regalia were the scepter, white umbrella, gold headband, yak-tailfly-flap,and footgear. Cf. LBHK, p. 219. These insignia were also displayed by vassal Tai kings at Mogaung, Keng Tung, and Ayudhya. 71 On the Toungoo succession, see BL OR 3416, kan v.; UK, II, 248, 249, 252, 257, 261, and ΙΠ, 76. Clearly the system of vassal lowland kings survived from the Ava period, as described by Tin HIa Thaw, "History 1400-1500," p. 142; Harvey, History, pp. 97-124. 72 See below, Chapter 2, section 2. 73 On tutors, see UK, ΠΙ, 80, 93, 116; Sauliere, "Jesuits on Pegu," p. 78. Nor has evidence come to light that military commissioners (sit-kes) who sometimes accompanied bayins in the field were appointed by Pegu to serve at bayin centers during peacetime. Whereas seventeenth-century sit-kis and other deputies were listed in the UK and in 69

FIRST TOUNGOO EMPIRE | 35

Aside from punitive military expeditions, the chief method of con­ trolling the bayins was by inculcating a sense of ideological and per­ sonal subordination. Apparently the High King alone was permitted to use certain exalted Buddhist royal epithets (including "King of Righteousness" and "Lord of Life") that designated him as agent of morality, linchpin of civilization, and universal benefactor.74 As we shall see in Chapter Two, it was assumed that if the High King failed to observe specific moral obligations, the realm would automatically plunge into chaos. Like lesser mortals, therefore, the bayins depended on the High King in a magico-religious sense for the welfare of their principalities.75 Beyond this, because the bayins received exalted offices as a grant from "The Lord of Life," they incurred a personal obligation (kyei-ζύ) that they had to discharge through faithful service. To rebel was to demonstrate base ingratitude for past patronage. Since the High King was usually the senior relative of the bayins, rebellion also vio­ lated the canons of respect that every Burman was expected to display to his superiors in the family hierarchy. Investiture and homage cere­ monies at Pegu specifically emphasized the element of individual loy­ alty,76 which was further strengthened in some instances by marriage ties (as between bayins and daughters of the High King). Given the personalized nature of central control, however, as soon as the High King died, those bonds that held satellite kingdoms to the capital necessarily dissolved. The bayins either withdrew from the im­ perial system, or challenged the heir apparent for succession to the imperial title. The fact that the bayins were usually of royal blood, and in some instances equal in lineage to the heir apparent, rendered them such provincial records as BL OR 3416, these same sources fail to mention them for the sixteenth century (though the UK goes into great detail describing bayin insignia). More positive testimony is provided by two eighteenth-century sources (UK, Π, 26162 and "Hanthawaddy ayel-daw-bon," pp. 387, 391) which indicate that Bayin-naung simply confirmed existing officials at bayin centers that he conquered in the 155Os. Note, however, that sit-kis were traditionally dispatched to the Tai highlands (UK, Π, 307, 312) and conceivably to some lowland towns inferior to bayin capitals. Thus an Ava edict dated 1367 (ZOK, p. 62) refers to oudying sit-kis; and a seventeenth-century edict (RUL 45235, Edict 45, 999 nadaw 5 wax., pp. 39-40) mentions sit-kis at secondary, non-bayin centers under Bayin-naung. 74 Note the consistent use of these tides when referring to the High King, and their absence when referring to subordinate rulers, in Chit Thein, Sbei-haung, pt. 2, p. 108; ZOK, p. 41; NL 1949, ka v.; I 1073,1 1081,1 1082,1 1084,1 1086, and I 1087. In comparable fashion, Shorto, "Mon Genealogy," p. 69, seeks to distinguish between the tides smin-ekarat and smth. 75 Conceivably, however, local traditions of sovereignty simultaneously conferred re­ sponsibility as cosmic pivots on the individual bayins. 76 See, for example, UK, HI, 53-54.

36 I TOUNGOO EMPIRE, 1580-1635

formidable opponents indeed. After Tabin-shwei-hti died in 1550, his favored successor Bayin-naung77 required two years to subdue royal challengers who shut the gates of Toungoo, Prome, and Pegu against him.78 In turn, on Bayin-naung's death his brother the Ava bayin organized a grand coalition of northern lords to oppose the accession of Bayin-naung's son and heir apparent, Nan-da-bayin. The latter had to organize a major imperial expedition to Upper Burma, the outcome of which was decided by personal combat: while their armies watched apprehensively from the sides, Nan-dd-bayin and his uncle locked giant war elephants in furious combat from which Nan-dd-bayin emerged triumphant.79 As subsequent events demonstrated, however, if he suffered serious military reverses, even an established High King would come under renewed pressure. Their sense of personal obligation notwithstanding, bayins could always justify rebellion through Buddhist notions that interpreted military defeat as evidence of the High King's moral failure.80 Not only the bayins but resident myo-zas frequently withdrew their support from Pegu during interregna or other periods of uncertain authority. Myo-zas—literally, "eaters of towns"—were both nonroyal followers and princes of junior grade whom the High King honored with appanage grants throughout the Irrawaddy basin. Generally these were places of secondary economic or strategic importance at some distance from the bayin towns.81 Some myo-zas (including juvenile princes and the heir apparent) resided at Pegu and enjoyed a purely economic relation with their appanages. But many, indeed one suspects the great majority, of mature princes were allowed to supervise and defend their districts in person, even in some instances to fortify them with the aid 77 There is no proof, however, that Bayin-naung received the formal title of ein-sheimin or heir apparent. 78 The most detailed and earliest extant account of the succession struggle on Tabinshwei-htl's death appears in Nid, pp. 114-42 (50-74). 79 Similar but obviously independent accounts of this batde are preserved in "Gasparo Balbi," pp. 161-62, and UK, III, 73-75. 80 See Chapter 2, section 1. 81 In contrast to bayin centers, myo-za estates (like Nyaungyan, Yamethin, Pagan, Myedu, Bassein, etc.) were not designated "royal dwelling places" (min-eikaya-za-di-i nei-ya nan-ti-myS), nor did their lords normally receive the five royal regalia. On the unique status of the five (in some lists Martaban is omitted, leaving four) bayin centers, see RUL 45235, Edict 45, 999 nadaw 5 wax., pp. 39-40; UK, II, 270, 396, 408-11; UK, III, 50-51, 68, 80, 84-85; Nid, p. 178 (105). The term myo-za is a convenient generic designation familiar to students of Burmese history; but whether these inferior territorial heads were invariably so designated by contemporaries is uncertain. Possibly min-gyi, min, thakin, or even myo-wun were also used. See, for example, A, p. 439; B, II, 589-91; and RUL 45235, Edict 45.

FIRST TOUNGOO EMPIRE | 37

of troops provided by Pegu.82 As was true of the bayins, their obligations to Pegu were restricted to the forwarding of specific tribute, the supply of troops for imperial expeditions, and the rendering of personal homage to the High King. These arrangements continued a tradition of resident myo-zas that had been followed by Mon rulers at Pegu and by Shan-Burman rulers at Ava for over two centuries. Such a system gave the sovereign an opportunity to rotate myo-zas and to form them into coalitions against the more powerful bayins,fromwhom they appear to have been organizationally distinct. But the system was unstable because certain princely myo-zas, like the bayins, had royal pretensions and exploited any disruption of central authority to enlarge their personal domains.83 As we shall see, the Restored Toungoo Empire itself was founded about 1597 by one of Bayin-naimg's lesser sons who built a kingdom around his myo-za estate in Upper Burma. Severe though they were, the problems early Toungoo kings faced with their relatives in the Irrawaddy valley were less imposing than those they encountered with formerly independent Tai-speaking kingdoms. Logistics, transport, and economic exchanges between Pegu and highland principalities were far less developed than within the valley. Four hundred miles of inhospitable terrain separated Pegu from Ayudhya, the most powerful Tai-speaking state. The kingdom of Lan Chang in modern Laos and other easterly Tai kingdoms were yet less accessible.84 Unlike most bayins, the rulers of Tai principalities were related to the High King, if at all, only by marriage, which gave them a diminished sense of familial responsibility. Moreover, whereas the central lowlands had a tradition of political unity dating back to the Pagan period, there was no precedent for Bayin-naung's attempt to integrate large eastern Tai-speaking principalities into a polity that was basically Mon and Burman.85 82

For references to resident myo-zas in the First Toungoo period, including the award of troops, see NL 1944, Edict of 959 tagu 10 wan., ka v.; UK, II, 211, 212-14, 21819, 279-80, 291-92; UK, III, 61, 71-72, 76, 95-96, 113-14; BL OR 3418, ka r.; Nid, p. 115 (50), 130-53 (63-84) passim, 172-73 (100-101); A, p. 436-37, 439; B, II, 58991. 83 This, despite the fact that princely myo-zas were typically of a birth inferior to that of the bayins. 84 In about 1563, Vientiane replaced Luang Prabang as capital of Lan Chang. On the sixteenth-century history of the region, see Paul Le Boulanger, Histoire du Laos franfois: essai d'une etude chronolqgique des principautes laotiennes (1931, repr. Westmead, 1969), pp. 70 ff. 85 Although some of the nearer Shan states such as Kalei, Hsipaw, and Mohnyin had probably acknowledged Ava's authority for various periods in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, this was certainly not true of Chiengmai, Keng Tung, or Ayudhya. Mon Pegu's pre-15 50 authority in the Tai world was yet weaker than that of Ava.

38 I TOUNGOO EMPIRE, 1580-1635

Bayin-naung attempted to forge cultural bonds to Pegu by intro­ ducing in the Tai-speaking realm Buddhist practices, literature, and measurements of capacity and weight such as were found in Lower Burma.86 Tai tributaries also received insignia and tides that integrated them into a status hierarchy focusing on the Peguan court. On a more practical level, Bayin-naung and Nan-dd-bayin deported Tai princes and noble hostages to Lower Burma, and stationed Burman-Mon gar­ risons in the highlands under resident military commissioners (sit-kes). There is no evidence, however, that they attempted to appoint advisers to Tai rulers, as was sometimes done with the bayins.67 As for the appointment of the rulers themselves, the hereditary principle was far better established than in the Irrawaddy-Sittang basin, despite occa­ sional attempts by Pegu to manipulate different claimants from the same ruling house.88 Secure control of the Tai-speaking realm thus proved impossible to attain, and Bayin-naung and Na-di-bayin became embroiled in an end­ less series of punitive campaigns. In the last years of his reign, Bayinnaung mounted four expeditions against Mogaung in the far north and three against Lan Chang in the extreme east. The local ruler either fled to the jungle or took an insincere oath that was binding only so long as troops remained in occupation. Following its second defeat, Ayudhya remained subservient for the remainder of Bayin-naung's reign. Shortly after his death, it again rebelled and Nan-da-bayin had to start afresh. Imperial Collapse In sum, the sixteenth-century empire was a vast assemblage of quasisovereign entities whose rulers were bound to the High King by per­ sonal and ceremonial obligations and ultimately by the threat of chas­ tisement. As more or less chronic revolts testified, the empire suffered both from severe overextension in the Tai region and from inadequate practical control mechanisms in the Tai region and the Irrawaddy basin. One solution to Pegu's growing difficulties would have been to cut its ties to the more distant Tai satellites and to concentrate imperial resources around the perimeter of the Irrawaddy basin and at the val­ uable peninsular ports. But if we can trust the usually well-informed 84

See UK, Π, 307, 312, 318; Nid, p. 173 (101). Possibly this was because the selection of advisers familiar to, and enjoying the confidence of, both parties was more difficult than with bayins. 88 The chief exception to this rule was Chiengmai, which after 1579 was ruled by a Burmese bayin of the same rank as the bayins of Toungoo, Prome, Ava, and so on. 87

FIRST TOUNGOO EMPIRE | 39

chronicler U Kala's early eighteenth-century reconstruction of Peguan policy, Nan-dd-bayin feared that to acknowledge Ayudhya's independ­ ence would be to invite yet more Tai rebellions, some perhaps closer to home. This would destroy his father's legacy, which he was deter­ mined to transmit intact to his own descendants.89 In the end, of course, the empire collapsed more quickly than if the kings of Pegu had admitted their limitations, because their constant campaigns placed an intolerable strain on the population of the Delta, the only area over which they exercised effective control. As noted, the limited agricultural-demographic resources of the south meant that it was particularly ill-suited to support continuous military expedi­ tions. Large numbers of cultivators were pressed into military and cor­ vee service even during the growing season, and many who marched against Ayudhya and Vientiane never returned to till thefields.Despite the reduced population in the Delta, the government refused to reduce its demands for rice, corvee labor, or military service—it probably in­ creased demands of this nature during wartime—so per capita burdens on the remaining cultivators increased. As early as 1564-1565, in the aftermath of the first Ayudhya campaign, Mon peasants in the Delta joined rebellious Shan deportees in an unsuccessful attack on the cap­ ital. In part they were protesting against their heavy obligations to the crown, for Bayin-naung stigmatized them as "no rebels, but mere slaves who ought to work but who refuse to accept their [assigned] bur­ dens." 90 During the next two to four years, as Bayin-naung concen­ trated labor in the capital for elaborate building projects, rice shortages at Pegu pushed prices to exceptional levels. Bayin-naung was forced to feed the indigent from royal granaries, and to send a special expe­ dition to seize the rice supplies of western Laos.91 The "Victor of the Ten Directions" was able to avert disaster be­ cause his conquests in the Tai realm, particularly against Siam, brought fresh supplies of captive manpower to Lower Burma, which eased the strain on the remaining population. But Nan-da-bayin's poor military record deprived him of this resource. Unfortunately for him, Ayudhya 89 See UK, ΠΙ, 80-81. On the eminent reliability of U KaIa for this period, see this chapter, n. 134 and Appendix Π. Sauliere, "Jesuits on Pegu," p. 73-74 also emphasizes Nan-di-bayin's inflexibility, and his determination to avenge the death of his son by the Siamese. 90 UK, II, 371. For similar disparaging references, see Nid, pp. 195-96 (117-18). 91 UK, Π, 393, 401 claims that the famines occurred because too many people were concentrated in Pegu city. Nid, pp. 203-204 (124-25), while offering no explicit expla­ nation for the famines, describes in detail construction projects at Pegu that preceded the shortages. So severe was the famine of 1565-1566, according to Nid, that people were reduced to cannibalism.

40 I TOUNGOO EMPIRE, 1580-1635

was undergoing a major administrative reorganization following its defeat of 1569, which increased its military potential beyond that which his father had had to face.92 Ayudhya chose to declare its independence and to menace Pegu in 1584, while Nan-da-bayin was in the north campaigning against his uncle, the rebel bayin of Ava. Although Nanda-bayin forced the Siamese to withdraw hastily from Lower Burma, over the next nine years he organized no fewer than five punitive expeditions, all of them unsuccessful.93 In 1586-1587, Nan-dd-bayin took personal command, but failed to master the complex of streams and canals surrounding Ayudhya or to break the spirited resistance led by the Siamese royal family. In 1592-1593, Nan-da-bayin's son, the heir apparent, led the attack, only to be killed by a jingal shot outside the walls of Ayudhya. Meanwhile, Mogaung and lesser Tai states also declared their independence. Administrative problems that Bayin-naung had arrested now resumed with full vigor.94 With each fresh reverse, territorial leaders outside the Delta became more reluctant to supply auxiliary levies, while Nan-da-bayin became less able to compel obedience. He therefore had to lean ever more heavily on the Mons of Lower Burma to fill his ranks. Whereas during the mammoth 1568-1569 campaign against Ayudhya, only sixteen of fifty-three regimental commanders had recognizably Mon tides,95 during Nan-da-bayin's 1586-1587 campaign twelve out of twenty-three fell in that category.96 By the late 1590s, Nan-da-bayin's forces were drawn exclusively from the Delta. Yet the greater the demands for rice and manpower, the more eager southerners became to escape compliance. It will be seen that various 92

See Akin, Thai Society, pp. 27-32, and the Conclusion to this study. See UK, III, 75-92. Cf. Damrong, "Our Wars," JBRS 40, 2 (1957): 135-68. 94 The ensuing account of Nan-da-bayin's difficulties derives from four categories of sources: a) contemporary Jesuit accounts: "Indian Observations," pp. 205-17 and Sauliere, "Jesuits on Pegu," pp. 64-80; b) seventeenth-century Portuguese accounts: Macgregor, "A Brief Account," pp. 99 ff. is an earlier source than Faria y Sousa, Asia, III, 119-22; c) UK, III, 69-105—the close agreement between European sources and the UK strengthens confidence in their common reliability; d) Siamese histories: O. Frankfurter, tr., "Events in Ayuddhya from Chulasakaraj 686-966," JSS 6, 3 (1909): 1-21, and accounts summarized in Wood, History, chaps. 9, 10. 95 UK, II, 408-12. In both this and the following note, I include Chiengmai commanders bearing Mon titles, as Chiengmai garrisons were normally rotated from Pegu. 96 UK, III, 81. Although twenty-four regiments are listed, only twenty-three names are given. Of course, the proportion of Mon troops was not necessarily the same as the proportion of commanders with Mon titles; nor can one assume that all commanders with Pali and Burmese tides were non-Mons. Yet, however crude, this is the only available index of ethnicity; and the trend it reveals is consistent with the well-documented fact that non-Mon principalities were the first to defect. 93

FIRST TOUNGOO EMPIRE | 41

forms of avoidance—especially flight and attachment to powerful pri­ vate patrons—were the most common peasant response to oppres­ sion.97 Naturally, however, these patterns ensured more defeats for Nan-da-bayin's army and yet heavier demands. Thus, at the same time as the percentage of Mon soldiers in imperial forces rose, the overall size of the army declined and its casualties became more severe. Disorders entered a critical phase during the last decade of the six­ teenth century. Following the rout of the heir apparent^ forces at Ayudhya in 1593, the king sought to prepare fresh invasions, but men of arms-bearing age fled to the jungle or to neighboring provinces. Soon the country districts were thick with vagabonds. Other youths entered the Buddhist monkhood {sangha) to avoid royal demands, as they had also done in the closing years of Bayin-naung's reign. Yet others mortgaged themselves as debt-slaves to important princes and officials who could shield them from royal exactions.98 The king's un­ cle took many impoverished people "under his protection and safe keeping," while the king's son (the new heir apparent) was reported to have had enough men in 1595 to work two or three thousand yoke of buffalo producing rice for his private granaries.99 No less than monks, private slaves and retainers were lost to the king for purposes of taxa­ tion and military service. In these ways the proportion of people within the Delta who were exempt, legally or otherwise, from royal exactions steadily increased. So too did the political and military influence of their lay patrons, including the king's uncle and the heir apparent. Nan-dd-bayin responded by sponsoring an inquest into monastic behavior in 1593 designed to force all but the most pious and learned monks to become laymen. When senior Mon abbots objected, he ex­ iled several of them to Upper Burma and the Shan country. Nan-dabayin also ordered an examination of lay census records in order that young men who had left their original occupation might be pressed into the army. To facilitate identification, he introduced, or what is 100 more likely expanded, a system of branding or tattooing. Hence97

Feasant reactions provide strong support for the theses presented in Michael Adas, "From Avoidance to Confrontation: Peasant Protest in Precolonial and Colonial South­ east Asia," Comparative Studies in Society and History 23, 2 (1981): 217-47. For discus­ sion, see below, Chapters 3, 5, and Conclusion. 98 "Some went to hide in forests, other sold themselves as serfs and slaves .. . ," "Jesuits on Pegu," p. 74. Cf. RUL 45235, Edict 63, 1000 1st wa-hso 8 wan., p. 59. 99 Sauliere, "Jesuits on Pegu," p. 74; UK, ΙΠ, 94. ioo "Indian Observations," p. 213 claims that all Peguans were to be "branded" on the right hand with their name, district of residence, and "condition"; whereas UK, ΙΠ, 92 notes that members of royal guard regiments were 'marked' or 'tattooed" (htd-hmat) with a letter indicating their status. Tattooing as a form of identification had apparendy been used as early as the Pagan period.

42 I TOUNGOO EMPIRE, 1580-1635

forth people wandering the roads were forcibly returned to their native villages, and military deserters were executed. These measures failed to stabilize the situation, for migrations from Pegu up the Sittang and Irrawaddy valleys and into Siam and Arakan continued unabated. With some agricultural districts practically deserted, the price of rice, already inflated, reached absurd levels. A plague of rats in 1596 swarmed on to the royal granaries destroying much of the remaining food stocks, until starvation threatened even the king's servicemen at Syriam and Pegu. Seeing the paralysis in the imperial heartland, Burman and Mon lords throughout the Irrawaddy basin now began to emulate Tai rulers in severing completely their ties to Nan-da-bayin. Weary of his endless requisitions, yet unable to stand alone against attacks by Pegu or other potential enemies, weak myo-zas hastened to convert themselves into vassals of whichever principality—Toungoo, Prome, Ava, or Ayudhya—seemed best able to protect them. For their part, powerful bayins were only too willing either to resume their role of independent regional kings, or what seems to have been more common, to lay claim to the imperial legacy of Pegu itself. The transfer of myo-za loyalties to large principalities outside Pegu's control paralleled on a territorial basis the transfer at Pegu of individual servicemen's loyalties to the monkhood or to private princely patrons. In effect, the old bayin centers and Ayudhya replaced Pegu as patrons to territorial clients. Both in the capital and in outlying areas, therefore, nominally royal manpower was steadily transformed into privately controlled manpower. Bayins and myo-zas could justify their withdrawal of support by claiming that Nan-dd-bayin, in violating his coronation vow to protect the lives of his subjects, was guilty of acaravipatti (failure of duty).101 It was widely assumed that the disasters facing the realm resulted from Nan-da-bayin's personal religious demerits, and that he had forfeited claims to religiously based loyalty. According to contemporary Jesuit accounts, Peguan monks, embittered by Nan-da-bayin's ill-treatment, advised the bayin of Chiengmai that so long as Nan-da-bayin was publicly honored, for Chiengmai to usurp the throne of Pegu would be an entirely legitimate act.102 In their contagious character and their essential opportunism, myo-za and bayin revolts of the 1590s resembled the lowland uprisings of 1550-1552 on the death of Tabin-shweihti, and of 1582-1584 on the death of Bayin-naung. Yet these new 101 See Than Tun, "Administration under Thalun," p. 173, referring to chronicle assessments of Nan-da-bayin's failure; and HNY, p. 111. 102 Sauliere, "Jesuits on Pegu," pp. 78-79.

FIRST TOUNGOO EMPIRE | 43

challenges were far more formidable because the High King's powers of resistance were much diminished. The first successful lowland uprising occurred in 1,594 at the southeastern coastal town of Moulmein. Local Mon leaders placed themselves under Ayudhya's suzerainty and, with the aid of Siamese troops, repulsed determined Peguan attacks. The raging Siamese king Naresuan seized control of the entire southeastern littoral, including Martaban and the prized peninsular ports. Eventually he threatened Pegu itself, with the apparent intention of converting Nan-da-bayin into a vassal of Ayudhya in reverse of the traditional relation.103 Prome and Toungoo followed suit. It is unclear whether the Prome bayin (Nan-da-bayin's third son by his chief queen) was content to resurrect Prome's early sixteenth-century royal domain or whether he too harbored wider ambitions. But surely Nan-da-bayin's cousin, the Toungoo bayin, was determined to supplant the High King. After declaring an embargo on the movement of foodstuffs from his own province to the imperial capital in 1596,104 the Toungoo bayin entered into negotiations with the king of Arakan to mount a joint attack on Nan-da-bayin. He chose Arakan as an ally, in part because Arakan alone possessed a fleet capable of sealing off the southern approaches to Pegu, but primarily because that distant coastal principality had never been included in the Toungoo empire and was unlikely to threaten his own aspirations. By sea and land, the two armies converged on the stricken capital.105 Pegu was still well supplied with foreign cannon, including 150 pieces bearing the arms of Portugal. Yet artillery was ineffective without strong conventional support forces. If we are to believe contemporary Jesuit reports, the miserable Peguans had now been reduced to cannibalism.106 With the defenses of the capital on the point of collapse, Nandi-bayin's heir apparent and then Nan-da-bayin himself negotiated terms of surrender with their perfidious relatives from Toungoo. Both were eventually murdered at the behest of the Toungoo heir apparent, who 103 His intention is explained at UK, III, 102, and Damrong, "Our Wars," JBRS 40, 2: 184. 104 The date is inferred from Sauliere, "Jesuits on Pegu," p. 77. 105 A likely date for the joint attack is April/May of 1598, but the sources are ambiguous and my reconstruction is tentative. Apparently Arakan seized Syriam some weeks before attacking Pegu itself. On the chronology of these campaigns, cf. UK, III, 97-98, 100 (which says Pegu finally fell in late 1599 or the opening days of 1600); Wood, History, pp. 150-51; Damrong, "Our Wars," pp. 184-85. 106 Sauliere, "Jesuits on Pegu," p. 77. Lest one immediately dismiss this as apocryphal, the contemporaneous Mon chronicle Nid, p. 204 (125) refers to cannibalism at Pegu under Bayin-naung.

44 I TOUNGCX) EMPIRE, 1580-1635

apparently feared they might stand in the way of his succession to the status of High King. (These murders occurred despite the Toungoo bayin's public declaration that he intended to reverence Nan-da-bayin "like a Buddha.") 107 After taking Pegu, the bayin ascended Nan-ddbayin's palace and awarded titles to his followers in a ceremony that emphasized his succession to Bayin-naung's authority. No doubt he would have entered into permanent occupation of Pegu were it not for the threat of Siamese attacks and the hostility of local Mons. In the event, he returned to Toungoo, where he contented himself with extending his domain and erecting buildings suitable to his enhanced majesty.108 Meanwhile his allies the Arakanese denuded Pegu of its remaining spoils and fired the splendid palaces and monasteries, once the wonder of the Theravada Buddhist world, before they too returned to their home region. However, the nearby port of Syriam, which had become Burma's chief maritime oudet and which, moreover, dominated com­ munications between Arakan and Toungoo, was too important to be abandoned. In early or mid-1600, therefore, the Arakanese king sta­ tioned at Syriam a corps of Portuguese soldiers led by one Filippe de Brito Nicote, hitherto a trusted official in the Arakanese service. For two decades Arakan had successfully adopted a similar arrange­ ment with Portuguese soldiers and traders on Arakan's northwest frontier. But de Brito would not remain subservient. He ceased send­ ing tribute. And when Arakan and Toungoo, in alliance with Prome, retaliated, he successfully defended his enclave with the help of modest naval reinforcements from Portuguese Goa—and, it is alleged, of a 109 fiery meteor that panicked his foes. By 1604 de Brito had won grudging recognition of his independence from the principal powers in the region. His naval patrols forced merchant vessels off the south­ ern coast to enter Syriam to the exclusion of other ports. Thus he denied Arakan and Toungoo the valued customs revenue from Delta ports and exercised a stranglehold on the distribution of textiles, salt, 110 and (one must suppose) firearms in the interior. 107 UK, m , 101, 102. 108 On the complex relations in this period between Arakan, Siam, and Toungoo, see Damrong, "Our Wars," JBRS 40, 2: 179-201. 109 Macgregor, "Brief Account of Pegu," p. 130; Faria y Sousa, Asta, ΙΠ, 130. 110 The effects of his intervention are spelled out at UK, III, 111: "Starting with [his victory] diplomatic and commercial intercourse between Arakan and Toungoo was rup­ tured .. . while the Toungoo bayin lost control over the ports of Bassein and DaIi. The people of Toungoo could no longer obtain quality textiles . .. and Toungoo had no good salt supplies."

FIRST TOUNGOO EMPIRE | 45

De Brito represented a type of Portuguese adventurer by no means uncommon in this period.111 These men organized autonomous maritime principalities with the aid of Portuguese and Eurasian followers, but were incapable of gaining authority over substantial sections of the interior. Although it is true that de Brito enjoyed some indigenous support—his forces included Burman and Mon auxiliaries—his selfconscious patronage of Christianity precluded his being accepted as a representative of Peguan imperial tradition. In any case, it is essential to remember that the population of the unhappy Delta was no longer sufficient to support a state with ambitions in the interior, however legitimate the credentials of its ruler. "It is a lamentable spectacle,'' wrote the Jesuit Andrew Boves in March 1600 after accompanying de Brito through the Delta, "to see the bankes of the Rivers . . . now overwhelmed with mines of gilded Temples, and noble edifices; the wayes and fields full of skulls and bones of wretched Peguans, killed or famished."112 Even allowing for literary exaggeration, this account of desolation agrees substantially with U Kala's history.113 The Syriam-Pegu area, formerly the political center of the entire valley, was reduced to a much-weakened enclave whose power, such as it was, derived from the sea and whose policies were oriented toward Portuguese Goa. Thus the southern sector of the Irrawaddy basin broke into four mutually hostile realms—Toungoo, Prome, Syriam, and the southeastern littoral under Siamese influence. By 1600 the region had resumed the general appearance of the early sixteenth century before Tabin-shwei-hti started his work of unification. Western mainland Southeast Asia had always been politically fragmented, and rarely more so than during the two centuries that preceded the First Toungoo unification. Without practical models on which to base their new empire—surely the sixteenth century kings knew little, if anything, about Pagan's internal structure—it is understandable that they should have failed to develop effective territorial controls. Nonetheless in retrospect we can see that the collapse of the 111

Gonsalves Tibao, self-styled king of Sandwip Island, and the less well-known leaders of Dianga near Chittagong are other examples. On de Brito see UK, III, 106-11, 159-66; Thi-ri-zei-di-yat-kyaw and Dom Ignacio (?), eds., Pdw-tu-gi ya-zawin (Rangoon, 1918), pp. 198 fF. (this is an anonymous seventeenth-century Burmese history of Portugal sympathetic to de Brito); Faria y Sousa, Asia, III, 127-34, 138-40, 154, 19194; Macgregor, "Brief Account," pp. 99-138 (this is a contemporary narrative lauding one of de Brito's lieutenants). 112 "Indian Observations," p. 216. 113 UK, III, 94 ff.

46 I TOUNGOO EMPIRE, 1580-1635

1580s and 1590s was a logical resolution to the contradiction inherent in Tabin-shwei-hti and Bayin-naung's original conquests. Between powerful vassal and High King there was an inadequate conceptual and practical demarcation: each might metamorphose into the other, and ambitious regional leaders were constantly tempted to accumulate sufficient strength to effect the transformation.114 The system of autonomous, quasi-sovereign entities was sufficiendy unstable in the Irrawaddy basin, but when extended to the basins of the Menam (Chaophraya) and Mekong, it was virtually impossible to preserve. It was in direct response to the pressure of endless punitive campaigns that the limited population base of the Delta became disorganized; although it is also clear that once imperial decay was well advanced, the growth of private manpower networks around Pegu and the withdrawal of resources in outlying principalities reinforced one another until total collapse. SECTION TWO. RESTORATION OF THE TOUNGOO DYNASTY,

1597-1635 The Creation ofNyaungyan Min's Northern Kingdom The northern dry zone was now in a position to resume its historic dominance, for those factors that had favored the south during the early and mid-sixteenth century no longer obtained. The coast still offered valuable access to Indian Ocean commerce and technology, as de Brito's career testified. But the political connection between coast and agrarian hinterland that underlay Toungoo dynastic power since the days of Tabin-shwei-hti had now been severed, and there was no immediate prospect of a powerful state reemerging below the nineteenth parallel. Prome and Toungoo controlled agricultural districts but no ports, whereas de Brito controlled ports but no significant hinterland. Martaban's port may have escaped the rigors of de Brito's blockade since its lord and de Brito were allied. Yet its countryside had also been laid waste by twenty years of warfare: "Martavan [is] now desolate by the Siamites warre no lesse then Pegu. But two hundred thousands of the Inhabitants lurke in Woods and Mountaines," a Jesuit observer Francis Fernandes claimed about 1599.115 The north was not unaffected by the turmoil and wars of the late sixteenth century. In 1582, while preparing to fight the Ava bayin, 114 115

Cf. Anderson, "Idea of Power," p. 35. "Indian Observations," p. 215. A paraphrase by Purchas.

RESTORATION, 1597-1635 | 47

Nan-da-bayin deported livestock and people from townships south of Ava.116 Again in 1594, the new Ava bayin, on departing for Pegu to become heir apparent, is reported to have brought with him "all [Ava's] inhabitants, irrespective of condition, age and sex."117 On the other hand, it is clear that the invasions by Siam, Arakan, Toungoo, and Prome bypassed the north completely, and the interior never supplied soldiers to Pegu on the same scale as the coastal zone. There is no indication that Nan-di-bayin succeeded after 1591 in ob­ taining military levies from districts north of Thayetmyo or Toungoo. On the contrary, soldiers and cultivators at Pegu, including many of those originally deported from Ava, began fleeing north in increasing numbers in the 1590s.118 Therefore, although the central lowlands as a whole probably lost population, relative to the south the north was in a stronger demographic position at the end of Nan-di-bayin's reign than at the outset. Furthermore, the problem of monastic estates that impaired royal authority in the dry zone in the Ava period appears to have eased during the course of the sixteenth century. According to chronicle accounts, the animist Shans who seized Ava in 1527 later massacred many monks and scattered the rest, burned religious manuscripts, and seized treasures from sacred pagodas.119 Earlier sources also suggest that Shan incursions, and the prolonged disorders that attended Ava's decline, impaired monastic organization and forced the abandonment of glebe lands. Many of these fell under the control of secular culti­ vators owing taxes and services to the crown. The organized sea of Forest Dwellers lost influence and prestige, and virtually disappeared from the historical record during the latter part of the sixteenth cen­ 120 tury. At the same time, the Shans themselves ceased to constitute a major 116

UK, ΙΠ, 71. Sautiere, "Jesuits on Pegu," p. 75. Cf. UK, III, 93-94; HNY, p. 99. 118 UK, III, 94 says Nan-di-bayin actually ordered the return of certain deportees. See too UK, IH, 93, 116. 119 UK, II, 139-40. 120 On the disorganization and secular appropriation of Upper Burma religious lands during the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, see inter alia I 1073 in A, pp. 365-66 (referring to "heretic Shan" religious depredations); Chit Theln, Shei-haung, pt. 2, p. 106 (forbidding further secular appropriations, 1557); MMOS, ΙΠ, 121; and RUL 45235, Edict 10, 992 nadaw 10 wan., pp. 9-10; Edict 44, 999 nadaw 2 wax., pp. 3839; Edict 89, 1000 tabo-dwe 5 wan., p. 79. On the concomitant decline of the Forest Dweller sect begun by Mahakassapa, see Than Tun, "Mahakassapa," pp. 99, 107, 116, 118; idem, "History 1300-1400," pp. 131-32; Tin HIa Thaw, "History 1400-1500," p. 147. Cf. Mendelson, Sangha and State, p. 50. 117

48 I TOUNGOO EMPIRE, 1580-1635

threat to Upper Burma as a result both of Bayin-naung's pacification, and of subsequent Chinese pressures on the powerful north Shan state of Along Mao. In 1604, Chinafinallydestroyed the Mong Mao ruling house. 121 North Shan principalities declared their independence in the closing years of the First Toungoo era, but attempted no fresh incur­ sions. The man who succeeded in exploiting Upper Burma's enhanced po­ tential and forging a new state in the north was the myo-za of Nyaung­ yan—Nyaungyan MIn—a son of Bayin-naung by a minor wife. The Ava dynasty of ten kings that he founded is known as the Restored Toungoo or, less commonly, as the Nyaungyan Dynasty. The prince of Nyaungyan chose his appanage, located on a tributary of the Samon River in modern Meiktila district, from a list of seven townships122 offered him by his father in 1581. According to the chronicle account (which may, however, have been a posthumous in­ vention), Bayin-naung was so impressed with the wisdom of his son's choice that he consulted his son's horoscope and discovered that he would "be just like me in the future," that is, a king. 123 Being an area of widespread irrigation works124 that had escaped (or resisted) Pegu's demands for military levies, the region around Nyaungyan probably had a sizable population relative not only to the south but also to other sectors of the dry zone. Nyaungyan MIn husbanded his forces in the 159Os. Following the revolt of Toungoo south of Nyaungyan, he never made so much as a gesture to rescue his half-brother at Pegu, but devoted his energies to improving his own military position.125 He gathered in Peguan refugees and deportees of diverse ethnicity (Burmans, Mons, Shans, Indians, Lao Tais, Siamese, Arakanese) and pur­ chased slaves—probably prisoners of war—whom he organized into 126 military service groups. 121 Henceforth the princely line was relegated to Mogaung. See Sao Salmong Mangrai, The Short States and the British Annexation (Ithaca, 1965), app. II, p. xiv. Cf. E. R. Leach, Political Systems of Highland Burma: A Study ofKaMn Social Structure (1954, repr., London, 1970), p. 257. 122 The text at UK, III, 61 refers to eight, but identifies only seven. 123 UK, ΠΙ, 61, 115. 124 Major works c. 1600 included the Meiktila Lake and most probably the Minhla Tank. The Nyaungyan or Zibinthaya Tank is only of nineteenth-century construction. Farther south, Yamethin district, which came under Nyaungyan Min's control at an early date, contained the Kyaukse Tank and Yamethin Lake. There were, of course, also numerous smaller works. See J.M.B. Stuart, Old Burmese Irrigation Works, being A Short Description of the Pre-British Irrigation Works (flipper Burma (Rangoon, 1913), pp. 810. 125 See UK, ΙΠ, 96, 113 ff. 126 Many of these refugees and prisoners may originally have been deported to Pegu

RESTORATION, 1597-1635 | 49

By the rainy season of 1597 he felt strong enough to expand from his original base west toward Pagan and then north toward Ava.127 He sent messages to two commanders whom Nan-dd-bayin had sta­ tioned near Ava, warning them that their suzerain at Pegu was in a hopeless state. This information, for which they apparently had inde­ pendent confirmation, impressed them; but less perhaps than the ad­ vice of a famed monastic astrologer who explained that Nyaungyan Mln's own father had predicted a royal career for him, and that various prophecies and omens pointed to his success.128 Forsaking their alle­ giance to Pegu, the northern commanders and three thousand soldiers at once did homage to Nyaungyan Min. As news of this triumph spread, villages and townships throughout the Mu, Chindwin, and upper Irrawaddy valleys also tendered their submission. Fearful of the anarchy that threatened after the departure of the Ava bayin in 1594, local headmen now welcomed Nyaungyan MIn as a strongman, a person ofhpon, who could restore order to the countryside. (U KaIa likened him to the first king of the world, the legendary Buddhist ruler Mahasammata, whom all the world's inhab­ itants beseeched to save them from darkness and misery.)129 In tradi­ tional royal fashion Nyaungyan MIn awarded loyal headmen with care­ fully ranked titles and sumptuary insignia, while welcoming their sons into the army and their daughters into his harem. Thus he cemented local ties. By the end of the rainy season in 1597, he had been recog­ nized as king by leaders from most of the principal irrigated districts in Upper Burma (the major exception being Minbu, still apparently loyal to Prome). After rebuilding the ruined walls and royal edifices of Upper Burma's ancient capital Ava, in early 1600 he formalized his by Bayin-naung—hence their diverse backgrounds. See BL OR 3418, kA r.-v.; UK, III, 116; RUL 45235, Edict 67, 1000 wa-gaung 10 wax., pp. 61-62, and Edict 69, 1000 wa-gaung 10 wan., p. 63. 127 At Pagan he received the homage of a rival my6-zd, another son of Bayin-naung. The threat from this half-brother may have forced Nyaungyan MIn to interrupt an earlier move toward Ava: in mid-1597 he set up camp at Tada-u, just south of the ancient capital, and may actually have taken possession of the city before heading against Pagan. As early as 959 tagu 10 wan. (c. April 1597) he had announced his assumption of sovereignty and his intention to dwell formally at Ava. See NL 1944, Edict of 959 tagu 10 wan., ka v.-ka r. 128 UK, ΙΠ, 114-15. The panegyrical quality of the monk's statement may point to posthumous composition. On the other hand, the use of prophecies to legitimate royal pretenders was exceedingly common. 129 UK, III, 113-14. See Chapter 2, section 1 on the Mahasammata myth. Cf. the excellent discussion of the traditional Burmese search for men of power as the foci of political loyalty in Manning Nash, The Golden Road to Modernity: Village Lift in Contem­ porary Burma (1965, repr., Chicago, 1973), pp. 275 ff.

50 I TOUNGOO EMPIRE, 1580-1635

status by entering the palace and accepting a Pali regnal title before his assembled courtiers.130 The new king devoted considerable energy to reorganizing the pop­ ulation around the capital. As during both the Ava and First Toungoo periods, military and nonmilitary personnel belonged to platoons that received land from the crown, and in return were obliged to perform hereditary service. On the efficient organization of such servicepeople (ahnu-dans) the strength of the monarchy ultimatery^depended.131 Nyaungyan MIn reactivated existing military platoons and organized new units among deportees from oudying areas. In order that Kyaukse and irrigated areas on the north shore might support a larger service population, he repaired damaged irrigation works and strengthened the complex administration of water facilities. Nyaungyan Min's relatives, the rival kings of Prome and Toungoo, were agitated by the rapid consolidation of his power in the north, but were too preoccupied with events in Pegu and with their mutual jealousies to undertake effective countermeasures. An attempted joint expedition against Ava in 1597 quickly degenerated into open warfare between the two Middle Burma kingdoms. This precluded the possi­ bility of future cooperation. Toungoo, acting alone, tried to retake Yamethin, but was driven out in 1600 with considerable loss.132 Secure on his southern frontier, Nyaungyan Min devoted the last five years of his life to subduing the Shan states that ringed the upper Irrawaddy valley. His decision to concentrate on the Shan highlands, rather than to proceed at once against Prome and Toungoo, was prob­ ably based on two interrelated strategic considerations. First, he wished to make certain that his rear was protected while he was campaigning in the south, and that there was no renewal of the Shan raids on Ava that had preceded Bayin-naung's conquest. Second, he wanted to draw on the manpower of the highlands. Because Ava, his base of opera­ tions, was relatively close to the Shan hills and because he pursued limited objectives that allowed him to concentrate his forces, Nyaung­ yan MIn achieved a more stable control over the nearer Shan princi­ palities than even Bayin-naung, with his far-flung commitments, had been able to obtain. No doubt he also benefited from simultaneous 130

His tide was Thi-hi-thu-ra-maha-damS-ya-za. On the rebuilding of Ava and the evolution of his royal status between 1597 and 1600, see RUL 45235, Edict 99, 1004 nayon 7 wax., pp. 88-89; UK, ΠΙ, 118-20; NL 1944, Edict of 960 taw-thalln 5 wax., ki v., and ibid., hU v. 131 See below, Chapter 2, section 1 for detailed discussion of abmu-dans. 132 UK, ΙΠ, 116-17,120-21.

RESTORATION, 1597-1635 | 51

Chinese pressure on Mong Mao, so that in effect Burma and China divided the area of Mong Mao between them. 133 Between 1601 and 1606, Nyaungyan MIn and his eldest son con­ quered the northern principalities of Mogaung and Bhamo—which had apparently paid tribute to Mong Mao—as well as the eastern king­ doms of Yawnghwe, Mong Nai, Mong Mit, and Hsenwi. Thus they subdued virtually the entire Tai region west of the Salween River. On most of these campaigns operational command lay with Nyaungyan Mln's son and heir apparent, the future King Anauk-hpet-lun (r. 16061628), who distinguished himself as an irrepressibly energetic war­ rior. After his advance guard was destroyed at Yawnghwe, Anaukhpet-lun, atop a famous war elephant, led a counterattack that seized the enemy fortress before defenders could shut the gates. At Mong Nai, oblivious to his father's counsels of caution, he is alleged to have sent his foe's war elephant shrieking in pain, and to have burst into the city at the head of his troops. So too at Mogaung he reportedly spearheaded the attack on a jungle stockade.134 After appointing more reliable Shan rulers, the victors in time-honored fashion ended each conquest with large-scale deportations to Ava. This served simultane­ ously to strengthen Upper Burma's military potential and to weaken future Shan resistance. Nyaungyan Min's Sons Complete the Empire Nyaungyan Min had learned from dreams and prophecies that he would fall victim to disease on the campaign against Hsenwi. Shortly before attacking that town, he was in fact stricken by a mysterious illness that 135 proved fatal on the return journey. (This seems to have become something of a family habit: forty-two years later his second son Thalun also took ill and expired at the appointed hour after receiving a 136 prophecy of his death from a learned astrologer.) 133

On Burman-Shan-Chinese relations in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centu­ ries, see Mangrai, Shan States, app. Π, p. xiv; Chinese accounts translated in GUBSS, II, 2, 347-49. 134 UK, III, 121-22, 124-25, 130. Although we lack other sources that would permit corroboration of these military details, a comparison of U Kala's accounts of sixteenthcentury battles and sixteenth-century European sources shows considerable agreement. Compare, for example, UK, III, 73-75 and "Gasparo Balbi," p. 161; or UK, III, 70102 and Sauliere, Jesuits on Pegu," pp. 71-80. On preparations for the final Shan campaigns, see NL 1944, Edict of 966 tabaung 10 wax., kan r.-v. 135 Both Harvey and Phayre have identified the year of his death as 1605, when in fact he expired 967 tabaung 11 wan., that is, c. March 1606. 136 See HNY, p. 253; RUL 45235, document no. I l l , n.d., pp. 98-100.

52 I TOUNGOO EMPIRE, 1580-1635

Anauk-hpet-lun, whose military record accorded him incomparable prestige among his father's followers, seized the palace before his brothers had even learned of their father's death. His hold on the capital secure, the new ruler now began to prepare large-scale offensives against the four successor realms that had arisen in the south: Prome, Toungoo, Syriam, and the trans-Sittang littoral under Siamese influence. As Bayinnaung^ conquest of the upper Irrawaddy had depended on Tabinshwei-hti's preliminary unification of the south, so in reverse geo­ graphic sequence, Anauk-hpet-lun's campaigns should be seen as the logical fulfillment of his father's program. He and his father had agreed by the rainy season of 1605, if not earlier, that the subjugation of the Shans was to be but an instrument toward reconstituting the empire of Bayin-naung and reuniting the interior with the coast.137 The out­ come of these campaigns was a foregone conclusion, since Ava's demographic resources were superior to those of any single state, and probably to those of all four combined. In any case, southern coordi­ nation remained elusive. After first subduing Prome, weakest of the successor kingdoms, in 1609-1610 Anauk-hpet-lun launched an elaborate pincer attack against the powerful state of Toungoo. Toungoo at this time was ruled by Anauk-hpet-lun's second cousin, Nat-shin-naung, son of the rebel bayin who had sacked Pegu in 1599. Nat-shin-naung has, with justification, been termed a "renaissance figure": scholar, poet, lover, mystic, war­ rior, he was above all a man of consuming political ambition who was as determined as Anauk-hpet-lun to assume the mande of the First Toungoo Empire. 138 Yet as siege stockades gradually encompassed his city, Nat-shin-naung recognized the impossibility of defeating the combined armies of Upper Burma, the Shan kingdoms, and Prome. At the urging of his courtiers, he surrendered to avoid a bloody sack. On meeting Nat-shin-naung, Anauk-hpet-lun expressed regret that they had not had opportunity to engage in single combat. His cousin reportedly answered that he too had looked forward to such a contest, but alas, a painful sore prevented him from sitting in one place, much less riding a war animal.139 Such levity aside, the surrender ceremony was somber enough: Anauk-hpet-lun intentionally modeled it on the 1564 ceremony in which Ayudhya surrendered to Pegu, as if to em­ phasize Anauk-hpet-lun's exclusive claim to the legacy of their com­ mon relative Bayin-naung. Furthermore, the ceremonial symbol of 137

UK, ΠΙ, 131, 135. Htin Aung, History, p. 137. It was he who had ordered the murder of Nan-dibayin and his son. For his biography see SHDMA, pp. 147-55. 139 UK, ΠΙ, 154-55. 138

RESTORATION, 1597-1635 | 53

sovereignty (hman-gtn) on the roof of the Toungoo palace was re­ moved; a garrison from Ava was quartered in the town; and fully twothirds of the population—including the elite soldiery and all those who had been carried off from Pegu—were now obliged to return with Anauk-hpet-lun to Upper Burma.140 These massive deportations created a vacuum that Anauk-hpet-lun's enemies were quick to fill. In 1612 Portuguese water forces under de Brito joined land troops under the lord of Martaban to sack Toungoo, whose reduced population could not even man the long walls of their city. There is strong evidence that Nat-shin-naung, smarting under his recent humiliation, secredy solicited this intervention in the hope of building an anti-Ava alliance with the Portuguese.141 Such hopes were ill-founded, for Anauk-hpet-lun's counterattack ex­ posed the essential weakness of de Brito's position. It is true that the defenders of Syriam ran short of gunpowder and were unable to use effectively their potent cannon. Yet it is most unlikely that European firearms alone could have halted the attack. De Brito probably had no more than four hundred Portuguese and Indian followers, and perhaps two or three thousand local auxiliaries; whereas both Burmese and Iberian sources, with considerable exaggeration no doubt, put the northern army at over a hundred thousand.142 Faria y Sousa claimed, moreover, that Anauk-hpet-lun obtained the services of Muslim sail­ ors. 1 4 3 With the city subject to nightly probing attacks, Mon and Burman defenders began to steal away until de Brito's original supporters could no longer man the walls. After Syriam fell, Anauk-hpet-lun cut open Nat-shin-naung's breast, and impaled de Brito on an iron stake, where he lingered in agony for two days in full view of his men. However, Anauk-hpet-lun chose to spare de Brito's followers, soldiers skilled in the use of European smallarms and cannon, that he might organize them into hereditary military units. He settled these troops in special villages northwest of Ava. They were later joined by perhaps a thousand sailors and gunners, mostly Indian Muslims, from ships affiliated to de Brito that wandered into the port after Syriam had fallen. Until the mid-eighteenth century, these captives and their descendants formed the backbone of Burma's artillery and, to a lesser extent, musketeer forces. Although their equip­ ment deteriorated with time, they overcame that heavy dependence on 140 Ibid., pp. 147-56. Cf. the curious chronology at RUL 45235, Edict 4, 969 nadaw 10 wax., p. 2. 141 See Thi-rf-zei-da-yat-kyaw, Paw-tu-gi, pp. 203-206; UK, III, 164-65. 142 See Faria y Sousa, Asia, ΙΠ, 191-92; UK, III, 162-66. ™3Asia, III, 191.

54 I TOUNGOO EMPIRE, 1580-1635

mercenary recruitment which characterized the First Toungoo period. They were less expensive and politically more reliable than their six­ teenth-century predecessors, and the obsolescence of their weapons could be countered to some extent through periodic arms purchases at the coast and/or short term mercenary recruitment for specific cam­ 144 paigns. Anauk-hpet-lun had now reunited the main agricultural and com­ mercial sectors of the Irrawaddy basin for the first time since 1596. De Brito's erstwhile ally, the lord of Martaban, hastened to sever his ties to Siam and to swear fealty to Anauk-hpet-lun at Pegu. The north­ ern forces then advanced along the coast against Ye, Tavoy, and Mergui in an effort to recapture the transpeninsular trade from Siam. After relinquishing control over thefirsttwo towns, the Siamese determined to hold Mergui, which was by far the most valuable port and which by tradition was most closely allied to Ayudhya. In early 1614 they succeeded with the aid of Portuguese galliots currendy in port in rout­ ing a much larger Burmese fleet.145 Anauk-hpet-lun may have toyed with the idea of a renewed offensive against Mergui in 1616, since that year he sent ambassadors to Goa to seek Portuguese support against Arakan and Siam. Yet he himself lost interest, and in the end nothing came of these negotiations.146 Northeast of Pegu in the Tai area between the Salween and the Mekong Rivers, Anauk-hpet-lun was more successful. Here he was able to concentrate forces against a more fragmented and conventional opposition than had greeted him at Mergui. In 1614-1615 he led a straggling column over difficult terrain to reconquer the old bayin cen144

Onfirearmsin the Restored Toungoo era, see Chapter 2, section 2. On the Syriam campaign and deportations, see UK, III, 161-66; Faria y Sousa, Asia, III, 191-94; Thiri-zei-da-yat-kyaw, Paw-tu-gi, pp. 206-17; A. Williamson, comp., Burma Gazeteer: Shwebo District, vol. A. (Rangoon, 1929), pp. 16, 62-63; J. S. Fumivall, ed. and tr., "The History of Syriam—Syriam ya-zawin," JBRS 5, 2 (1915): 49-50. 145 Faria y Sousa, Asia, ΓΠ, 197; UK, ΠΙ, 167-72; Damrong, "Our Wars," JBRS 40, 2: 214. 146 Faria y Sousa, Asia, III, 255-56. Cf. UK, III, 181. Wood, History, p. 164 and Damrong, "Our Wars," JBRS 40, 2: 214 claim that the Siamese then went on to retake Tavoy. Yet any Siamese occupation that did occur was short-lived, for a list of Tavoyan governors appointed by Ava includes regular entries after 1627, and Dutch accounts c. 1634-1642 referred to Siamese control of Mergui-Tenasserim but not Tavoy. See RCSTvY; L. F. van Ravenswaay, tr., "Translation of Jeremias van Vktfs Description of the Kingdom of Siam," JSS 7, 1 (1910): 41-43; and D.G.E. HaU, "The Daghregister of Batavia and Dutch Trade with Burma in the Seventeenth ΟεηηΗγ,* JBRS 29, 2 (1939): 146. So too a 1634 diplomatic letter from Tha-lun (UK, ΠΙ, 225) claimed dominion over Martaban and Tavoy but not Mergui-Tenasserim. Throughout the Restored Toung­ oo period the frontier seems to have stabilized south of Tavoy.

R E S T O R A T I O N , 1597-1635 | 5 5

ter of Chiengmai, which since Pegu's collapse had enjoyed an ambig­ uous position on the interface between Burmese and Ayudhyan con­ trol. 1 4 7 A Dutch source claims that Anauk-hpet-lun then went on to attack Ayudhyan border towns until supply difficulties and Siamese resistance forced him to retreat.148 Ayuhdya may have exploited this advantage to assert temporary control over Chiengmai in 1617 or 1618, 149 but by 1626 most sources agree that the city was again under Burmese suzerainty.150 In the early and mid-1620s Anauk-hpet-lun's generals also secured the allegiance of Nan, Keng Tung, and Kenghung in a series of long and arduous campaigns.151 These victories proved to be the last major conquests of the Re­ stored Toungoo Dynasty. It is unclear, however, whether this was primarily by design or accident. That is to say, did Anauk-hpet-lun and his heirs appreciate the danger of overextension in the Tai world as demonstrated under Nan-da-bayin? We lack contemporary evidence on the attitudes of seventeenth-century kings to Nan-da-bayin's failure. According to U Kala's early eighteenth-century chronicle, at the time of Anauk-hpet-lun's death in 1628, he still hoped to restore in toto the empire of his illustrious grandfather Bayin-naung.152 Yet the fact remains that Anauk-hpet-lun, despite numerous opportunities, never organized a sustained attack against either Ayudhya or Lan Chang. If U KaIa is correct, the difficulties he encountered reconquering Kenghung, and the stiff resistance his probes met at Mergui and other bor­ der towns must have introduced a note of caution into his calcula­ tions. 153 By 1634 negotiations between Siam and Anauk-hpet-lun's •successor Thalun (r. 1629-1648) showed that the latter accepted, if somewhat begrudgingly, the reality of Ayudhyan independence. Even " 7 See CXM, pp. 171-73; U K , III, 171-79. 148 Cornells van Neijenrode, cited in George Vinal Smith, The Dutch in SeventeenthCentury Thailand (De KaIb, 1977), p. 16. Neijenrode was the director of the Ayudhya office o f the V O C , 1617-1621. 149 See Smith, Dutch in Thailand, p . 17, and Wood, History, p . 166, referring t o a treaty by which Chiengmai fell under Siamese control while Siam recognized Anaukhpet-lun's rights t o Martaban. is*» See CXM, p . 173-75; Wood, History, p. 169; U K , ΙΠ, 175-76, 192, 206-207. 151 Chiengsen t o o seems t o have been subject t o Burmese military pressure and inter­ mittent political control. See U K , ΙΠ, 184-87; Keng T u n g Chronicle, in GUBSS, Π, 1, 405-406; CXM, pp. 173-75; Wyatt, Nan Chronicle, pp. 26-27; Sao Saimong Mangrai, ed. and tr., The Padaeng Chronicle and the Jengtung State Chronicle Translated (Ann Arbor, 1981), p . 250. 152 UK, ΠΙ, 189. 153 Van Ravenswaay, "Van Vliefs Description," p. 3 3 also emphasizes the advantage that the devastation of border areas and the general depopulation automatically con­ ferred o n the defense.

56 I TOUNGOO EMPIRE, 1580-1635

when Siam declined to return Mon rebels, Tha-lun refrained from fresh attacks.154 Thereafter all Toungoo kings (with the partial exception of Sanei, r. 1698-1714) saw their task as one of preserving rather than enlarging Anauk-hpet-lun's legacy. Unlike Bayin-naung's inorganic domain, the area over which Anauk-hpet-lun exercised authority at the time of his death—from Kenghung and Keng Tung in the east to the Arakanese Yoma in the west, from Mogaung and Bhamo in the north to Tavoy and Chiengmai in the south—was a realistic and integral unit. It had a primary axis in the Irrawaddy valley and did not extend in any direction to that point where Burma's supply lines were more vulnerable than those of her nearest lowland rival. The best testimony to the practicality of these strategic goals is the fact that the spheres of influence (they were not well-defined frontiers in the modern sense) which Anauk-hpet-lun es­ tablished survived until the early nineteenth century. Even Kon-baung rulers, despite their designs on Siam, achieved but limited alterations in Anauk-hpet-lun's imperial design: they annexed Mergui-Tenasserim and Arakan, and were forced to relinquish Chiengmai. Relatively little is known of Anauk-hpet-lun's administrative achievements, but as a warrior he had no parallel among Restored Toungoo kings. The following eulogy was written in the early eight­ eenth century while the empire he did so much to create was still in existence: So great were the glory, power, and authority of Maha-dama-ya-za [that is, Anauk-hpet-lun] that he often conquered his foes [merely by] laughing. When he waved his sword, incessant rains suddenly abated and even the tide dared not advance. And when his soldiers shouted to the foe, "We are the subjects of the great king Mahadama-ya-za," not only men, but even gods, U-Iu monsters, and ghosts 155 vanished [in terror]. A less flattering, if equally awesome, note was struck by two factors of the English East India Company, who met Anauk-hpet-lun at Pegu in 1617 and remained in the country for some time thereafter: ". . . and he of himselfe is a tyrant, and cannot eat before he hath drawne bloud from some of his people with death or otherwise."156 154

See van Ravenswaay, "Van Wet's Description," pp. 32-33, and UK, ΠΙ, 217-18. The latter quotes a letter from Tha-lun to the Siamese king, who is addressed as achitdaw, "my royal friend." The same term was used to address the independent king of Arakan, UK, ΠΙ, 225. 155 UK, ΙΠ, 188-89. 156 Henry Forest and John Staveley in William Methwold, "Relations of the Kingdome of Golchonda, and other Neighbouring Nations," W. H. Moreland, ed., Relations ofGokonda in the Early Seventeenth Century (London, 1931), p. 46.

RESTORATION, 1597-1635 | 57

Despite his reputation, Anauk-hpet-lun met a rather inglorious end. On discovering that one of his sons had impregnated a woman of the harem, he threatened to roast the culprit alive. Before he could execute this order, however, the offending prince came upon Anauk-hpet-lun as he slept with a palace concubine and beat him to death. He was eventually succeeded by his younger brother, the second son by Nyaungyan Mln's chief queen, known posthumously as King Tha-lun.157 Whereas Nyaungyan MIn and Anauk-hpet-lun had spent almost thirty years in more or less continuous military expansion, Thalun's reign was devoted principally to defending and consolidating the newly won territories. Having supervised several of his brother's Tai invasions, Tha-lun was actually an accomplished military leader. None­ theless, after 1628 he directed only two expeditions, both designed to pacify the empire in the aftermath of Anauk-hpet-lun's murder. The assassin, prince Min-ye-deik-ba, seized the throne at Pegu while Thalun was campaigning east of the Salween. Tha-lun therefore used the army under his command to press his own claims to the throne. His cause benefited from Min-ye-deik-ba's inferior birth (he was merely the son of a concubine), from the heinous act of parricide, and also from the fact that Anauk-hpet-lun had once promised Nyaungyan Min that Tha-lun would succeed. After seven months of warfare in the north, a pro-Tha-lun faction at Pegu overthrew Min-ye-deik-bd and invited Tha-lun to take the throne. 158 Having settled affairs at Pegu, the new king prompdy returned with his army to the trans-Salween area to subdue Chiengmai, whose lord had exploited the recent succes­ sion struggle to declare his independence. Tha-lun succeeded in reoccupying that principality and in installing a new Tai representative.159 The elaborate formal coronation that he held at Pegu on the con­ clusion of his eastern expedition was designed to impress the Mon population with his claim to sovereignty over the south, lately the scene of an unusually bitter succession dispute. Tha-lun also spent the years 1633-1634 strengthening military and adrninistrative arrange­ ments at Pegu and at Syriam.160 157 "Tha-lun" seems to have had a double meaning: a) under his rule the country was exceedingly peaceful, and b) he died peacefully. Besides such popular posthumous des­ ignations, each king had a Pali regnal title, which appears in the UK. 158 On the politics surrounding Anauk-hpet-lun's death and Tha-lun's accession, see UK, ΠΙ, 135, 188-99; MMOS, Π, 232-33; Shin San-daMin-ka, Μαηί-yadana-bon (Ran­ goon, 1901), pp. 566-69. "Anauk-hpet-lun" means he "died in the west (palace)" at Pegu. 159 While in the east, Tha-lun also conquered Malng-hkwin and received new tokens of allegiance from Keng Tung and Kenghung. 160 See Chapter 2, section 2 for discussion.

58 I TOUNGOO EMPIRE, 1580-1635

His position in the southern sector of the empire secure, he now laid plans to return to Ava, where in 1635 he received a second cor­ onation in a newly erected palace.161 Historians have tended to explain this change of residence by focusing on a revolt by Moulmein Mons in early 1634 that allegedly convinced Tha-lun that he could no longer expect cooperation from the southern population. Further, 1634-1635 is often presented as a watershed, marking a shift from an "enlight­ ened" outward policy to an interior, xenophobic perspective that ad­ versely affected Burma's relations with Europe in the nineteenth cen­ tury. 162 Both of these views seem oversimplified. While conceivably the Moulmein affair influenced the timing of Tha-lun's return, he had made clear his determination to dwell at Ava as early as November 1629, when following his victory over Min-ye-deik-ba, he began selecting wood for a new Ava palace.163 Throughout the period 1629-1635, he dwelled only in inferior structures known as "temporary palaces" (te­ non-daws) at Pegu. At the same time he and his diplomatic corre­ spondents consistency identified Ava rather than Pegu as the royal capital.164 From the outset, therefore, his sojourn in the south appears to have had a provisional, ad hoc character; and by 1634 those military and administrative problems which drew him to the south had been substantially resolved. Anauk-hpet-lun's commitment to Pegu was also provisional. Al­ though for various periods between 1613 and 1628 he remained at the southern city to supervise military and commercial affairs, he too dwelled in "temporary palaces" and refused to construct the official shvpei-nan-daw or "golden palace" that alone designated a Burmese royal city. Only Ava contained the requisite architectural assemblage. It was there that Anauk-hpet-lun returned on various occasions before 1627. By identifying Ava as the "abode of kings," pinnacle of all cities, site of the golden palace, and so forth, poems by Anauk-hpet-lun's court 165 bard further emphasized the city's official status. 161 This double coronation, for which a precedent may be found in Tabin-shwei-hti's reign, was probably intended to express Tha-lun's sovereignty over both the Mon and Burman sections of the empire. 162 See Htin Aung, History, p. 144; Hall, History of Soutb-East Asia, p. 356; idem, English Intercourse, pp. 11-12; Harvey, History, pp. 193, 248-49. »« UK, ΙΠ, 199. Cf. HNY, p. 203. 164 See UK, ΠΙ, 200, 217, 219-20, 225. These appear to be primary documents inserted into the text. See too RUL 45235, Edicts 7-15 passim, showing Tha-lun's identification with the line of Avan rather than Peguan kings. 165 Min-zei-ya-yan-dameik hso yadu-bnin Shin tban-hko hsoyadu (Mandalay, 1920), pp. 3-5, 10-11; UK, ΙΠ, 167-77, 187; Furnivall, "Syriam ya-zawin," pp. 49-50, 133.

RESTORATION, 1597-1635 | 59

One may argue, therefore, that Nyaungyan Min's restoration of Ava in 1597-1600 represented a major transition for which Tha-lun's jour­ ney upriver in 1635 was a belated and perhaps unavoidable confir­ mation. The reasons for this perduring attachment were both emo­ tional and practical. If, as seems likely, Anauk-hpet-lun and Tha-lun dwelt with their father at his appanage of Nyaungyan, they may have lacked prolonged contact with Mon culture until quite late in life. No doubt, too, they remembered the chronic Mon disafFection against their uncle Nan-da-bayin. Tha-lun, before his return to Ava, made clear his partisan identification with Burman as against Mon culture.166 At the same time, with the decision not to pursue Bayin-naung's dream of annexing Ayudhya, the Delta lost its importance as a staging point for eastern campaigns. The gradual silting up of the Pegu River throughout the sixteenth century apparently deprived Pegu of its com­ mercial importance compared to Syriam. The latter port was a logical choice for a new capital, but it lacked attractive historical associations. Syriam and other ports, which constituted Lower Burma's chief re­ source, were administered by a relative handful of officials who could be controlled more easily than hundreds of headmen spread through­ out the north. Moreover, in the event of rebellion, one could go downriver two to three times more quickly than one could ascend the Irrawaddy.167 Finally, the demographic superiority of Upper Burma, the key factor in Ava's rise to hegemony under Nyaungyan Min, re­ mained unshaken. Anauk-hpet-lun may have settled Tai prisoners around Pegu between 1616 and 1624, but these deportations could hardly compensate for the losses of the late sixteenth century. Indeed, they did not equal the deportations to Upper Burma which Anauk-hpetlun and his father organized. Given the loss of peninsular trade through Mergui and the return of the capital to Ava, it is not surprising that seventeenth-century kings should have been more absorbed in interior affairs than their First Toungoo predecessors. Yet this is not to argue that they ignored the political value of Indian Ocean trade andfirearms,or the fundamental lessons of Pegu's sixteenth-century dominance. Their understanding of these issues was apparent in the early determination of Nyaungyan MIn and Anauk-hpet-lun to annex Pegu, and in specific policy initia­ tives before and after 1635. Denied reliable access to the south coast 166

TL, pp. 170-71. For a detailed discussion of palace styles, their political import, and the role of Ava and Pegu in this period, see Viaor B. Lieberman, T h e Transfer of the Burmese Capital from Pegu to Ava," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland (1980), no. 1, pp. 64-83. 167 See, for example, travel dates for 1695-1696 in Dal, Π, 357-58, 385-87.

60 I TOUNGOO EMPIRE, 1580-1635

by the lord of Prome and by de Brito, Nyaungyan Min ordered the construction of roads across the mountains to Arakan "along which five persons may walk abreast," so that "trade goods could pass freely to and fro," and Ava could obtain "high-quality textiles from lands across the ocean."168 Anauk-hpet-lun, after taking Syriam, not only converted de Brito's followers into hereditary musketeers and artillerymen, but received embassies from a number of maritime centers, including Goa, Aceh, Bengal, Golconda, and the English East India Company at Masulipatam. To the latter he sent a missive "signifying his desire to give free trade and entertainment to the English nation, if they would with their shipping repaire unto his country."169 Similarly Tha-lun, after returning to Ava in 1635, treated representatives of the Dutch East India Company with the greatest courtesy, and promised them every facility if they would trade with his dominions. The Dutch, incidentally, found Tha-lun to be quite knowledgeable about commerce in general, and the gem trade in particular.170 In an inscription of 1638, Tha-lun styled himself lord "of the harbors where ocean-going vessels arrive," and boasted of his close relations with Aceh, the Europeans (bayin-gyt), and various states along the Indian littoral.171 To lend substance to these claims, he appointed new provincial officials in the south, established detailed procedures for collecting and reporting customs, and formed military units to guard the coast. In combination with the demographic shifts of the late sixteenth century, these measures permitted Restored Toungoo kings to reside in Upper Burma while maintaining relatively secure control over the revenues and firearms of the ports.172 Conduswn Commercial and military changes in the early sixteenth century encouraged an extraordinary lateral expansion of Peguan arms that was 168

India Office Library, London, The Henry Burney Collection of Paraiaiks, no. 30, excerpt from the Maha-myat-mu-ni Pagoda Inscription of s. 965. Presumably Nyaungyan Min's imports were sold through a royal monopoly and/or used within the court. To facilitate this trade, he entered into cordial relations with the king of Arakan, who sent him "fine quality textiles [originally] imported by ship" as a token of friendship. Both rulers must have shared an antipathy to de Brito's developing commercial policy at Syriam. My thanks to Prof. Michael Aung Thwin for bringing this document to my attention. 1 See Keng Tung chronicle, GUBSS, Π, 1, 395, 400; RUL 45235, Edict 59, 1000 kahson 12 wax., pp. 54-55; UK, ΙΠ, 171. Lebar^et al., Ethnic Groups, offers the most detailed classifications of Burma's hill peoples. 241 UK, ΠΙ, 173. So too Tha-lun was obliged to send troops to protect monks search­ ing for a sacred footprint against "wild" Chins in the western hills. RUL 45235, Edict 59, 1000 kahson 12 wax., p. 54. 242 In the 1690s, for example, Ava launched punitive expeditions to aid Mong Pai in attempting to assert control over Karen tribes. See Chapter 4. BL OR 3418,,/fi r. claims that hill (?) Karen leaders offered homage to Nyaungyan MIn, but it is unlikely that this was on a regular basis.

136 I STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

onistic, because the relative poverty of hill agriculture impelled uplanders to seek a variety of symbiotic relations with the more prosperous valleys: by exchanging hill products for rice, by working as serfs on Tai estates, by serving as mercenaries in Tai and Burman armies.243 Through such channels hill peoples learned to esteem and to emulate aspects of Tai and Burman culture. In much the same way as Shan saw-bwas looked to Ava for ritual and political norms, the Tai politicosocial order served as a model for "aristocratic" Kachin chieftains244 and for the Shan-style, ostensibly Buddhist rulers of the Palaung hill state of Tawngpeng.245 F. K. Lehman has shown that in this way hill peoples participated in a loose system of intergroup relations whose major focus was Burma proper.246 Moreover, as may have been true of the early Burmans themselves,247 valley dwellers were often descended from hill people who had settled in river basins and who in varying degrees had become integrated into "civilized" structures. In the Toungoo period as later, lowland villages of Karens, Chins, and perhaps Kadus, while choosing to maintain their original ethnic identity, nonetheless paid cash and produce taxes to provincial authorities on a basis analogous to that of Burman and Mon athis.248 Only through such arrangements and through more sporadic cultural, commercial, and political contacts in the uplands could animist groups be said to fall within the imperial orbit. Only through these channels could one credit the claim in a 1602 inquest that hill peoples were among seventy-five "nationalities" (lu-myd) over whom Burman kings traditionally exercised authority.249 243 See above, n. 180; Cortesio, TomiPires, I, 96; KBZ, pp. 225-26; Leach, Highland Burma, pp. 21-28, 186, 235, 246, 251 ff.; Lehman, Chin Society, pp. 25-28. 244 Leach, Highland Burma, chaps. 6-8. 245 On the Palaungs, whose unusual prosperity derived from tea cultivation, see Leslie Milne, The Home of an Eastern Clan: A Study of the Palaungs of the Shan States (Oxford, 1924), pp. 17-24, 312; ZOK, pp. 19, 32; Leach, Highland Burma, pp. 30, 49, 56-57. 246 Lehman, "Ethnic Categories," pp. 119-20; idem, "Burma: Kayah Society as a Function of the Shan-Burma-Karen Context," in Julian H. Steward, ed., Contemporary Change in Traditional Societies, vol. II: Asian Rural Societies (Urbana, 111., 1967), especially pp. 14-25. Ava's prestige was apparent in the remarkable treatment accorded Anauk-hpet-lun's brother when he fell into the hands of Lawas, HNY, p. 179. 247 See Luce, "Old Kyaukse," pp. 75-109. 248 The Kadus in question were almost certainly still animist. See RUL 45235, Edict 63, 1000 1st wa-zo 8 wan., pp. 58-60; BL OR 3416, hka t.-hka r.; Furnivall, "Syriam ya-zawin," p. 51; ZOK, pp. 11, 83, 98; RUL 45235, Edict 94, 1001 taw-thalin 10 wan., p. 82; Wilkie, Gazeteer Tamethin, pp. 26, 30-33, 45. This material does not support the hypothesis that major Karen movements into Lower Burma only followed British annexation. Cf. Keyes, "Karen in Thai History," p. 56 n. 16. 249 ZOK, p. 72.

TRIBUTARIES | 137

The relation of hill peoples to Ava illustrated in extreme form the uneven nature of royal control. The ideology of kingship posited a concentration of power in the sovereign. Yet in practice imperial administration was loosely integrated both vertically and horizontally, and power was diffuse. If for a moment we exclude Tai tributaries from consideration, the socio-administrative hierarchy contained eight main levels: the king, princes, appointed officials, headmen, ahmu-dans, atbis or Tais with responsibilities similar to those of athis, slaves, and hill peoples. At each inferior level (and also within each level), the association with the crown became less direct, royal powers of supervision tended to become less effective, and social prestige diminished.250 Moreover, with physical distance from Ava, the autonomy of each level increased, as did the demographic and political importance of people from inferior categories. In the zone of dependent provinces, for example, princes (serving as governors), appointed officials, and gentry headmen were more powerful than their nuclear zone counterparts. Princes, officials, and ahmu-dans were fewer in the provinces than in the nuclear zone, but gentry headmen and athis were more numerous. In the tributary zone the appointive element in the governing class virtually disappeared, as did ahmu-dans within the class of commoners. Hill peoples, of course, were integrated into the empire in only the most marginal and indirect fashion. The throne attempted to assert its authority ultimately by force, but on a day-to-day basis through ideological, institutional, and above all, personal controls. Religious theories, comprehensible to all Buddhists within the empire, inculcated habits of instinctive reverence for the king, and legitimated his right to supervise all aspects of government. In keeping with the throne's absolutist pretensions, administration was structured so as to weaken independent power centers and potentially refractory combinations. Though most developed in the capital administration, balanced and opposed moieties, crosscut jurisdictions, and so forth were also visible in outer areas. But for subunits to achieve tolerable coordination, newly ascended kings had to establish their personal ascendancy over major capital and provincial appointees, and use that authority to monitor administration at inferior levels. The first three kings of the Restored Dynasty were reasonably successful in exploiting the potential of their office. The great census of 250

Tai tributaries did not readily fit this schema, because although their prestige in many cases equaled that of Burman princes, in terms of association with the throne and practical autonomy, they were analogous to lowland headmen.

138 I STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

1635-1638, which remained a standard reference for almost 150 years, was a prominent indication of administrative vigor. Of more fundamental importance were the institutional reforms of the early seventeenth century, whose centralizing thrust drew strength from the longterm growth of maritime trade. Chief among these reforms were the modified system of princely appanage awards, the expansion of ahmudan ranks around the capital, and most especially, the new methods of provincial control. More research on the Ava period (1365-c. 1555) is needed before we can assess fully the originality of the first two reforms.251 Yet in comparison with the First Toungoo Empire there is no question that the Restored polity was more stable and centralized. For the first time since the thirteenth century, and possibly for the first time in Burmese history, newly ascended kings could remain in their capital without risking provincial rebellion and without jeopardizing control over either the agricultural heartland or the ports. The full significance of these patterns will become apparent when we examine the decline of the Restored Dynasty. On the one hand, because the outer zones still retained greater autonomy than nuclear zone districts, they were again the first to break away from the capital. On the other hand, in contrast to the First Toungoo period, centralization meant that revolts in outlying areas would no longer precipitate, but would now follow at a relatively late stage, disorganization of service units around the capital. Furthermore, so closely had provincial establishments been integrated into the central administration that successful rebellions would no longer be directed by senior princes or appointed governors, but by persons outside the official hierarchy. To the pattern of decline we shall now turn. 251

It is not impossible that Nyaungyan MIn and his sons revived or refined certain administrative practices characteristic of Upper Burma in the fifteenth century, so that some Restored Toungoo/First Toungoo contrasts reflected north/south regional traditions. Thus during the Ava period we find instances of powerful ministers controlling the succession (though the practical bases of ministerial power are by no means understood), and references to high ahmu-dan concentrations in the nuclear zone (see this chapter, nn. 108, 112). On the other hand, there is also unambiguous evidence from the Ava period of princely myd-zas resident at their appanages, quasi-sovereign vassal kings throughout the lowlands, and recurrent territorially based succession disputes— all characteristic of the First, but not the Restored, Toungoo era. Clearly it is premature to speculate about unilinear administrative trends throughout Burmese history. Literature on the Ava period is sparse, but the reader is referred to Harvey, History, chap. 3; Htin Aung, History, chap. 5; Than Tun, "History, 1300-1400," pp. 119-33; and Tin HIa Thaw, "History, 1400-1500," pp. 135-51, esp. p. 142.

Chapter Three

THE DECLINE OF ROYAL AUTHORITY IN THE NUCLEAR ZONE, 1648-1752 If this one-way flow of servicemen from low-status to high-status groups, from troubled and hot ones to calm and quiet ones, continues much longer, will there be anyone left whom we can still call an inferior-grade serviceman? Royal Edict cf 16941 The [last Toungoo] king ignored the Ten Royal Laws and violated the usages of former rulers. [Therefore] brigandage became rife and townships and villages were destroyed throughout the realm. Maha-dama-ya-za-dt-patt's ChiefMinister Thi-ri-u-zana2

After Tha-lun's death the dynasty entered a prolonged period of decline that culminated in the sack of Ava by invaders from Pegu in 1752. In broad outline, the problems that undermined the Restored Toungoo state resembled those that destroyed Nan-dd-bayin's realm. The throne proved unable to control subordinate elites whose appropriation of nominally royal resources placed a cumulative, and ultimately fatal, strain on the royal service population. In the locus of dissidence and the pace of decline, however, the two periods diverged. During the sixteenth century, the primary threat to royal authority was that of rebellion by Tai tributaries and lowland princes. In the early Restored Toungoo period, as noted, the problem of territorial dissidence was much reduced; but within the nuclear zone itself rivalry between vertical factions contributed to a gradual erosion of the monarchy's authority and resource base. It will be useful at the outset to sketch the process of internal decline, for it involved the complex interaction of three or four problems of essentially separate etiology. The most obvious source of instability 1

NL 1950, Edict of 1056 wa-zo 12 wan., si v. See below for complete quotation. LBHK, p. 4. This was written after Maha-damS-ya-za-di-patfs deposition. On Thirf-u-zana's biography, see Chapter 5 n. 140. 2

140 I DECLINE, 1648-1752

was the throne's continued failure to regulate the succession effectively. Simply stated, there was no binding universally accepted law of succession. The closest one finds to a formal rule appears in the 1711 investiture ceremony for the heir apparent, in which an edict from King Sanei observed that the royal line descended "son to grandson to great grandson."3 However another contemporary statement observed that the post of heir apparent was customarily conferred on "royal sons or royal younger brothers."4 Here indeed lay a source of profound ambiguity. A son born of a chief queen and a brother born of a chief queen had the same degree of royal blood and were therefore equally qualified in terms of lineage to succeed. After discussing the question with their chief ministers, kings selected whom they pleased as heir apparent. In practice, sons were usually preferred to younger brothers, elder sons to junior sons, and offspring by chief queens to those of junior queens or concubines. But dissenting voices were frequendy heard, and succession was often resolved if not by force then by the threat of force. Usurpation by princes other than the heir apparent could be sanctioned by notions of kamma. Princely rivalry afforded ministers opportunity to assume increased influence within the state, and in some instances to serve as kingmakers. The extension of central authority into the provinces, the new system of appanage controls, and the expansion of ahmu-dan ranks around the capital made it difficult for princes to launch credible revolts without the aid of strategically placed ministers at Ava. Nor could the heir apparent readily defend himself without their assistance. By throwing their support behind one of the princely contenders, ministers could ensure his accession. The system of capital residences may have lowered the general caliber of princes by denying them extensive military and organizational experience such as was enjoyed by their pre-1635 predecessors. But in any case, ministers tended to prefer young and pliable candidates to mature princes. Thus ineffective kings became dependent on their nominal inferiors, and the sense of personal obligation to the ruler, which provided an essential political cement at court, was eroded. If one or more powerful ministers had been able to establish unchallenged control, this development in itself might not have proved deleterious. Yet the ministerial class lacked a sufficient corporate iden3 UK, III, 396-97. Note too the claim that kings customarily conferred the heir apparency on their "precious and noble eldest [or chief] son {tba-gfi)" 4 LBHK, pp. 7, 9, 51. At the same time the LBHK like UK, m , 396-97, suggests that father-son descent was most common. Cf. AdMOS, II, 225 ff., discussing patterns of succession.

DECLINE, 1648-1752 | 141

tity to provide stable alternative leadership. Ministers from different departments could sometimes cooperate to place princes on the throne, but once that was accomplished, coalitions tended to fragment into clienteles headed by ministers of equal rank unwilling to concede preeminence.5 The intentional division of responsibility between (and within) public and privy administration encouraged such disunity and, in combination with the nonroyal lineage of prominent officials, militated against the emergence of a single reintegrating leader from within the ministerial class. At the same time, the perennial struggle for succession provided convenient rallying points for new coalitions of ambitious officials. Even if senior ministers worked out an efficient, stable division of authority among themselves, they (like the kings) could rarely exercise unchallenged control over all the princes so long as the rules of succession remained ambiguous. Princes opposed to the heir apparent readily attracted support from junior officials willing to scheme against the dominant faction. Factional struggles encouraged, and were themselves fueled by, disorganization in the royal service system. Already in Tha-lun's day, as we have seen, overburdened ahmu-dans sought to evade their obligations to the crown. Many of Tha-lun's service units were freshly formed, so their strength was maximal. Given the inadequacy of identification and registration procedures, one would expect disorganization to become more pronounced merely with the passage of time. The growth of ministerial authority and princely dissidence was, at least in part, symptomatic of a cumulative, self-generating movement from royal to private service. Factionalism, however, accelerated the process. In order to amass resources with which to please patrons, ambitious officials increased their exactions on royal servicemen under their charge. At the same time, they encouraged abmu-dans to escape their original status by allowing them to become debt-slaves or to register illegally in privileged units under the officials' personal control. Expanding maritime trade in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries probably intensified ministerial competition andfinancialabuse by widening the differential between those officials whose income derived from trade and those whose income came entirely from the agricultural sector. In the short term, administrative disorganization benefited some senior ministers who developed large private followings in addition to their 5 Cf. Nash, Golden Road, p. 79, discussing the indispensability of a man of hpdn if village factionalism is to be avoided. See too the well-documented case of multiple splits developing within the coalition that elevated King Thi-baw in 1878, and the role of personal loyalties within those ministerial alignments. Bennett, Conference, pp. 62, 7085.

142 I DECLINE, 1648-1752

official departmental charges. But more especially the diversion of royal manpower to private patrons aided princes and queens, whose followings by definition were composed entirely of private retainers. Aspiring princes at Ava were only too willing to shelter absconders from royal regiments. In turn, princely autonomy intensified splits between ministerial families allied with rival contenders for the crown. By the reign of Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati (r. 1733-1752), the expansion of private manpower networks and the concomitant decay of royal authority had reached the point where Upper Burma's military forces were no longer sufficiendy well coordinated or numerous to defend Ava against external assault. The ensuing discussion will explore these administrative problems— ministerial and princely autonomy, commercial changes, and service disorganization—on a thematic basis, while examining their relation to dynastic politics. SECTION ONE. GROWING MINISTERIAL AUTONOMY,

1648-1714

The decline of royal authority and the growth of ministerial autonomy became readily apparent within fifteen years of Tha-lun's death. His son and successor Pindale (r. 1648-1661) proved unable to dominate the court, and was eventually driven from the throne. In contrast to his father, Pindale did not purge the administration in the aftermath of conquest, but reappointed all those chief ministers who had held office at the time of Tha-lun's death.6 Notwithstanding ritualized expressions of obligation for renewed patronage, it was perhaps to be expected that senior officials, who in fact owed their appointments to Tha-lun, should have felt a diminished sense of personal subordination to his successor. The situation was comparable to that which Nan-da-bayin had faced on Bayin-naung's death: in both cases the son of a conqueror experienced difficulty preserving his father's authority. Unlike Nan-di-bayin, however, Pindale was not a man of hpdn for whom subordinates had instinctive respect. On the contrary, he appears in chronicle accounts—and it must be emphasized that these sources expressed no sympathy for Pindale's opponents—as an incompetent leader, disinterested in military affairs and unable to enforce elementary discipline among his followers.7 Ironically, as noted, this 6 7

LBHK, p. 200. See HNY, pp. 257-74; UK, III, 254-70.

GROWING AUTONOMY, 1648-1714 | 143

failing may have reflected in part the success of the centralizing reforms of the early seventeenth century, for after about 1635 no king or heir apparent found it necessary to leave the capital on military expeditions, and it is unlikely that Pindaie as a youth ever gained field experience. Certainly he was the first ruler in almost two hundred years who did not lead his troops in person. Later kings suffered from this same deficiency in education, which contrasts sharply with the background of the First Toungoo sovereigns as well as of Nyaungyan MIn and his sons. Although the sixteenth-century requirement that kings reconquer their own realms entailed obvious dangers, it nonetheless represented an effective form of competitive selection absent in the Restored Toungoo period. Pindale's inferior birth added another, in his case rather unique, element to the erosion of royal authority. It would appear that Thalun had no sons by queens, for Pindaie and all his half-brothers were born to concubines.8 Pindaie had formally been appointed heir appar­ ent,9 but the fact that he was not of pure royal descent may explain the extraordinary concessions he made to his half-brothers, who had equally valid blood claims. In effect, he shared power with them, al­ lowing one half-brother to retain the heir apparency in his immediate family,10 and establishing two other half-brothers at Prome and Toungoo, where they ruled with exalted honors as mins ("lords" or "rulers"). The use of this tide for resident governors rather than the more humble and customary title of myo-wun, together with their lav­ ish sumptuary insignia, indicates a reversion to the sixteenth-century bayin tradition, with its aura of independent sovereignty. Indeed, the ceremony by which Pindaie appointed these half-brothers was based 8

LBHK, p. 185 and local records preserved in BL OR 3418,^» r., specifically iden­ tify Pindale's mother as a concubine (ko-lok-daw). Of Pindale's seven half-brothers in the LBHK list (no list appears in BL OR 3418), three (including the future King Pye) were born to women also identified as concubines, and the other four to women with a title (kadaw) commonly used by concubines. None is identified as mi-baya or "queen." (Conceivably Tha-lun had no queens.) The assumption of concubine status for the latter women therefore seems justified; though of course if they were queens, it would only strengthen my argument about Pindale's insecurity. Note that the LBHK list of Thalun's wives and children agrees closely with UK, III, 252-53 and HNY, pp. 256-57. 9 See RUL 45235, Edict 88, 1000 tabo-dwe 5 wax., p. 79; Edict 106, 1009 kahson 10 wax., pp. 94-95. 10 The Pyinzi myo-ζά was made heir apparent, and on his death in 1653 or 1654, the heir apparency went to that myo-ztfs son. This was despite the fact that Pindaie himself had sons by his chief queen and by concubines for whom he could have reserved the post. See I 1105 in B, I, 270; LBHK, pp. 186-87; UK, III, 254, 261, 270-71.

144 I DECLINE, 1648-1752

directly on a ceremony of bayin appointment last used in 1579 by Bayin-naung.11 As in the late sixteenth century, these princes eventu­ ally joined forces to attack their half-brother. Yet Pindale would still have kept his throne but for a fourth factor, namely, the disruptions caused by Chinese invaders following the overthrow of the Ming Dynasty. Early in Pindale's reign, reports reached him that Ming loyalists from Yunnan had penetrated the northeast Shan area and had begun levying taxes on a number of rulers whom Ava considered to be in its sphere of influence. Pindale dispatched successive punitive expeditions, most of which performed dismally, while suffering heavy casualties from fevers as well as from battle. The loss of royal manpower accelerated once the Chinese broke through to the lowlands in early 1659. They occupied prime agricultural dis­ tricts south of Ava, burned monasteries and villages, and seized what­ ever rice remained unburied. Soon a sizable Burmese exodus was in progress from Kyaukse to the eastern hills and oudying provincial cen­ ters.12 Disorganization around Ava left Pindale vulnerable to pressure from the provinces. Toward the end of 1659, he summoned his half-broth­ ers, the governors of Prome and Toungoo, to participate in the de­ fense of Upper Burma. Both prompdy moved forces to the north, where they engaged the Chinese. Yet this turned out to be only a stepping stone toward the assumption of sovereignty by the Prome Prince—Pye MIn—about May of 1661. 13 The circumstances of Pye's elevation show that he was indebted to Pindale's leading ministers and commanders, and in effect took power through a palace coup that they organized. In this sense, Pye's usur­ pation differed from bayin revolts of the sixteenth century, for the latter depended entirely on provincial forces. A contemporaneous doc­ ument says that when they came to Upper Burma in 1660, the princes of Prome and Toungoo each brought only a thousand men, 14 which means that Pye could never have challenged Pindale without large11

For a detailed description of their appointment ceremonies and sumptuary insignia, see HNY, pp. 262-64; LBHK, pp. 186-87; UK, ΙΠ, 257-59. Cf. UK, ΠΙ, 52-54 on the 1579 ceremony. An aged monk invited to the 1650 investiture commented on the extreme anachronism and rarity of the event. Note too that the 1650 insignia were not awarded to Restored Toungoo my6-wuns. 12 UK, ΠΙ, 256-69; HNY, pp. 261 fF.; BL OR 3418, hku r.,#u v. Cf. Edward Harper Parker, Burma, with Special Reference to Her Relations with China (Rangoon, 1893), pp. 74-75, summarizing Chinese accounts. 13 1023, nayon 7 wax. 14 NL 1950,^« v.-gu v. This is an account of Pye's accession inserted in the midst of edicts from the 1650s and 1660s.

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scale defections from the royal service at Ava. According to U KaIa, the move to depose Pindale originated with his own forces at the capital, whose families were being slain in Kyaukse and who them­ selves had no food for two to three days at a time. Having refused to supply his soldiers from the royal granaries, Pindale nonetheless al­ lowed his concubines to set up scales in the palace grounds where they sold rice at scandalous prices.15 Hungry abmu-dan leaders therefore went to Pye and urged him to save the situation. They were supported by both of Pindale's chief ministers, his compound commanders, and various princes and departmental heads, so that in the end Pindale was supported only by a handful of attendants and guards. None offered effective resistance when Pye's soldiers forced their way into the palace to seize the terrified ruler, who had vainly attempted to conceal him­ self.16 Officials helped princes to take power, but usurpers frequendy paid a price at the expense of their own authority. After his accession, Pye lavishly rewarded his supporters and sought to contrast his own sen­ sitivity to the army's desires with the attitude of his predecessor: his brother, he alleged, had actually destroyed himself by ignoring the wishes of ministers and senior commanders. Only if military ahmudans were content would the king be secure, Pye concluded.17 Leading officials continued to influence the new ruler's policy. Having sworn to his half-brother after the coup that he would do him no harm, he confined Pindale and his immediate family in the chief queen's dwell­ ing, where he sent food daily. But Pye's bodyguard and senior officials warned that this arrangement would invite trouble, and eventually per­ suaded the reluctant king to drown Pindale, along with his family, in the Chindwin.18 Once rice supplies to the soldiery had been restored, 15

UK, III, 269. A later source, BL OR 3418, bku r., in what may be a different version of the same story, suggests that Pindale antagonized his soldiers by revoking their service lands as a punishment for cowardice. 16 U Kala's interpretation of these events is consistent with local histories in BL OR 3418, ,/f» v., which claim that the coup was organized by a cabal of bodyguards, shieldmen, and compound guards at Ava. 17 San-di-lin-ka, Μαηί-yadana-bon, pp. 626-27. Although this is a late (1781) source for whose authenticity we have no independent check, the thrust of this declaration agrees with the guilt-ridden, self-justificatory statement before senior monks at Ava as reported in UK, ΙΠ, 272. See below, n. 20, for contemporary references to concessions made by Pye to leading ministers, as well as UK, III, 273-75, detailing rewards to coup supporters. BL OR 3418, hku r.-v. claims that Pye also restored service lands confiscated by Pindale. 18 UK, III, 270, HNY, p. 274. Nor is there reason to believe that a sympathetic U KaIa sought to relieve Pye of responsibility by exaggerating the role of his ministers, for TJ KaIa likened Pye to the parricide ruler Ajatasattu (see DPPN, I, 31-35).

146 I DECLINE, 1648-1752

senior officials also advised Pye how to proceed against Chinese forces, now much weakened by fever and the general famine.19 Thus, if we can rely on chronicle accounts, the tone of ministerialroyal relations altered between 1648 and 1662. The reigns of Pindale and Pye apparently represented a transition between domination of ministers by the king under the first three sovereigns and the reverse situation under Mln-ye-kyaw-din (r. 1673-1698) and Maha-damd-yaza-di-pati. As if to symbolize this change, Pye granted leading ministers and princely supporters the much sought-after privilege of attaching arches or arched passages (moks) to resthouses, monasteries, and other religious donations. Tha-lun had specifically reserved to the crown this prerogative, which seems to have been a sensitive indicator of status.20 One could argue, of course, that the coup of 1661 showed the vitality of the political system: in shifting their allegiance, ministers and service leaders helped to remove a discredited leader in favor of a prince who was capable of curbing abuses by palace women and of providing some direction to government affairs in a period of acute crisis.21 Yet these arrangements were potentially dangerous insofar as they reversed the theoretical relation between ruler and ministers: Pye owed his authority to his principal officials, rather than vice versa. Moreover, the existence of multiple princely candidates dependent in varying degrees on ministerial support meant that in less critical circumstances ambitious officials could use the same procedures to elevate young and ineffective princes in lieu of potentially vigorous ones. In fact, this is what happened after the brief reign of Pye's successor. Pye died in March or April of 1672,22 whereupon his heir apparent, Prince Naya-waya, son of his senior (?) queen, ascended the throne. Naya-wayd was sickly, with no offspring, and died within a year of his father. Recognizing that Naya-waya's health was poor and that he had 19 The remnants werefinallydispersed in 1662, when a Chinese army entered Burma to demand the extradition of the last Ming pretender. See Harvey, History, pp. 200201. 20 TrUs honor, akin to the right to display specific sumptuary insignia, was granted in 1665 to the Right-Hand Compound Commander Let-ya-nan-dameik, possibly one of those compound commanders whose defection had been crucial to Pye four years earlier (see HNY, p. 277). Pye maintained a distinction, however, between royal and ministerial mob, and also reserved other architectural privileges for the throne. See NL 1950, Edict of 1027 tazaung-mon 4 wan., gaw v.-gan r., and Edict of 1036 nayon 12 wax., ga v. 21 In fact, Pye stopped profiteering by palace women, restored rice supplies to the soldiery, and helped to devise strategy against the Chinese and provincial rebels. 22 1034 tagu 2 wan.

GROWING AUTONOMY, 1648-1714 | 147

failed to make provision for the succession, his relatives hastened to construct alliances with ministerial families in expectation of the mon­ arch's demise. But those chief ministers who had held office under Pye, and their allies in the Privy Council, were not to be outmaneuvered. As soon as Naya-waya expired in early 1673, the senior interior min­ ister put a eunuch in charge of the palace with orders to prevent all communication with the outside. He then contacted the chief minis­ ters, and together they proceeded to select the next Burmese sovereign. They considered four candidates, a minor son each of Tha-lun, Pindale, and Pye, and a twenty-two-year-old first cousin of Naya-wayd entided Min-ye-kyaw-din. According to the account preserved in the Hman-n&n chronicle, thefirstthree had unsuitable characters: one was too slow-witted and ignorant of the law codes, another was too fond of cock-fighting and liquor, the third was too violent. But Min-yekyaw-din was said to be "pure in heart, dignified in manner, and loyal to his oath." Cynics might also note that he was almost certainly the youngest candidate and the possessor of the smallest princely retinue. Hence he promised to be a fit successor to Naya-waya from the min­ isters' standpoint.23 After they had made their choice, the ministers summoned Min-yekyaw-din to the palace as though Naya-waya were still alive, invested him with the status of heir apparent in the dead king's name, and then raised him to the throne. 24 Only at this point, when they were certain of a fait accompli, did they proclaim Naya-waya's death and summon the other princes to drink the oath of allegiance. Those who demurred were immediately executed. Min-ye-kyaw-din's supporters drew up lists of officials in territorial and departmental agencies to whom the young king dutifully awarded offices, appanages, and sumptuary insignia. If Min-ye-kyaw-din had 23 The ministers told Naya-wayi's sister that their choice had to be made on subjective grounds of personality because the candidates were "all of comparable lineage and age." But Tha-lun's son was one generation older than the twenty-two-year-old Mln-ye-kyawdin; and whereas the latter was merely Tha-lun's grandson, the other candidates were sons of former monarchs. One suspects that Pye's son, who was said to be violent and cruel, would have made the most effective king, but the ministers feared he would actually use power if they gave it to him. See HNY, pp. 296-97. The UK, ΠΙ, 295-96 sees fit to censor this tale, but the HNY narrative receives support from LBHK, p. 189, and MYG, pp. 12 ff. Note the parallels between this episode and ministerial selection of the young and ineffective Thi-baw, as described by Bennett, Conference, pp. 70-85. See too the discussion of constraints on the selection of assertive Malay rulers in J. M. Gullick, Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya (New York, 1965), pp. 54-55. 24 See what must be a fake royal order, issued the day of Naya-wayi's death (1034 tabaung 12 wax.), entrusting the throne to Mto-ye-kyaw-din. NL 1950,^0 r.-v.

148 I DECLINE, 1648-1752

succeeded in dominating his leading officials in the tradition of Nyaungyan Min and his sons, the development of ministerial patronage networks of this sort would not have constituted a danger to the freedom and authority of the crown. However, the limited materials available from his reign suggest that Min-ye-kyaw-din—true to his supporters' original expectations—proved unable or unwilling to establish effective control. In violation of the ancient emphasis on collegial decision making, he allowed a single chief minister to direct the Council of Ministers for an indeterminate period to 1685 or 1686.25 In 1695, when representatives from the English governor of Madras visited Burma, they found that another chief minister, Nei-myo-thihathu, ran the Council of Ministers, while a powerful interior minister directed the Privy Council. These were "the Two Chiefs, Governours," "persons, that, in a manner, ruled the Kingdom." It was common knowledge even in Lower Burma that they "were the only Persons, that could help [petitioners], or procure . . . any favours from the King."26 Nei-myo-thi-hathu was identified elsewhere as the "Principal Minister, without controul and is the mouth of the Court";27 while the interior minister, "the King's particular favourite," apparendy shared power in the Privy Council with none but his own brother.28 The English visitors were careful to give precisely the same presents to the heads of the Council of Ministers and Privy Council, and to treat the two men as equals. A picture emerges of two powerful networks that may have competed with one another for income and patronage, but neither of which was subject to effective royal control. D.G.E. Hall was correct in his study of the envoys' diary to conclude that Min-yekyaw-din was "apparendy litde more than afigure-head,whose policy and administration were mainly controlled by his ministers."29 The supposition that these officials threatened, or at least seriously constrained, royal power gathers support from events that transpired shortly after the king's death. Min-ye-kyaw-din was succeeded in 1698 by the eldest son of a junior queen (his chief queen was barren), known 25 This was a former interior minister, originally entitled Thet-shei-kyaw-din, who became a chief minister in 1676 or 1677. LBHK, p. 201. 26 Dal, II, 358-59. Italics added. "Nemeaseasee" or "Nemeaseasue" is the diary rendering for Nei-myo-thi-hathu. For his biography, see LBHK, pp. 201, 205-206. 27 Dal, II, 360. 28 Ibid., p. 360. The interior minister was "Serejeakeodang," which probably represents Thi-ri-zei-ya-kyaw-din in Okell's system of transcription. The complete record of Fleetwood's embassy appears in Dal, II, 337-95. 29 English Intercourse, p. 173. For a yet more forceful expression of this view see idem, Burma (1950, repr. New York, 1974), p. 69. My thanks to Rabbi Elias Lieberman for supplying the last reference.

GROWINGAUTONOMY, 1648-1714 | 149

posthumously after the day of his birth as King Sanei—King Saturday. The chronicles indicate that in contrast to his father, Sanei was a vigorous, even violent man.30 Moreover (apart from Naya-waya) he was the first heir apparent in fifty years to succeed his father, which meant that he had a strong aura of legitimacy and was not indebted to leading ministers for his accession. Sanei used these advantages to launch a frontal assault on Nei-myothi-hathu. For the first seven months on the throne, he allowed his father's chief minister to continue in office with high honors. Then suddenly, in late 1698 or early 1699, Sanei decided that, in the words of the chronicle, he "no longer trusted" Nei-myo-thi-hathu. Accordingly he executed Nei-myo-thi-hathu and his son, along with a hitherto obscure interior minister and his son. At the same time, one of his own half-brothers and a number of junior officials were exiled along with their followers.31 Sanei may have discovered that Nei-myo-thihathu's faction was plotting to replace him with his half-brother, and therefore determined to break the hold on administration that they had developed during the latter part of his father's reign. In carrying out these plans, however, Sanei allied himself with rival ministers who eventually came to assert more influence than Nei-myothi-hathu. If, as seems likely, Sanei had no independent base outside the heir apparent^ establishment, his initial reliance on existing officials would have been logical, perhaps necessary.32 As his reign progressed, this posture was reinforced by the problem Sanei faced with his younger brother. Before he died, Sanei's father had ordered Sanei to designate as heir apparent Sanei's younger full-brother rather than any of Sanei's own sons; and Sanei seems to have acquiesced, if only tacitly. When later Sanei decided to violate this order, he became obsessed with containing the challenge from his powerful brother,33 who was naturally hostile and who enjoyed strong support in leading min30 HNY, p. 363. 31 HNY, pp. 330, 334; LBHK, pp. 201, 206; UK, III, 351. To facilitate identification, I refer to the executed vntn-gyi as Nei-myo-thi-hathu, though in fact he had by this time undergone several changes in title and was known as Maha-thado-thi-hathura. 32 One suspects that Sanei sided with one of the two factions identified by the English in 1695-1696. The interior minister executed in late 1698 or early 1699 was probably allied with Nei-myo-thi-hathu against the dominant Privy Council element once headed by Nei-myo-thi-hathu's colleague and putative rival Thi-ri-zei-ya-kyaw-din (see above, n. 28). Interior ministers and chief ministers opposed to one another seem to have found natural allies in their rivals' junior deputies. 33 The myo-za of Nga Singu. On his awards and court career, see LBHK, pp. 19091.

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isterial circles. Sanei sought to ensure his son's accession by allowing a handful of loyal officials to develop ever more extensive privileges and by building an identity of interest between them and his young son, the future King Tanln-ganwei (r. 1714-1733). In this way, Sanei apparently reasoned, the growth of their income and authority would redound to his son's benefit and would ensure the son's elevation after his own death. 34 Thus, as in 1661 and 1673, princely rivalries strengthened ministerial autonomy. Those officials in whom Sanei placed his confidence were eventually led by a chief minister known as the Twin-thln-hmu-gyi. This man's in-laws and descendants constituted a virtual dynasty of chief ministers who attempted to direct the government for the better part of three generations. One of the Twin-thin-hmu-gyi's daughters married an of­ ficial known as Maung Pu (Brother Pu), whose father had preceded the Twin-thin-hmu-gyi as chief minister and had supported Sanei against Nei-myo-thi-hathu's faction during the execution crisis of 1698-1699.35 Three more of the Twin-thin-hmu-gyi's daughters probably became high-ranking wives to Sanei's son, the heir apparent,36 while a fifth daughter served as Sanei's concubine. At the same time, the Twinthin-hmu-gyi's son became an officer in the heir apparent's establish­ ment. Thus marriage ties and official appointments cemented a firm interest between Sanei and his heir apparent, on the one hand, and families of the Twln-thin-hmu-gyl and his predecessor, on the other. With substantial influence over both the Council of Ministers and the heir apparent's household, the Twin-thln-hmu-gyi became the chief pillar of Sanei's regime and the principal beneficiary of the heir appar­ ent's victory in the succession conflict that erupted on Sanei's death.37 If this interpretation of Sanei's policies is correct, his reign consti34

On the background and development of this dispute, see MMOS, Π, 233-34, which relies on records in Pagan Wun-dauk U Tin's private collection (cf. MMOS, I, 3), and section 3 of this chapter. 35 The rather of Maung Pu (also called Ko Pu and U Pu in the sources) was Nan-dikyaw-din, who was an assistant chief minister in 1698 and who became chief minister in 1702 (HNY, p. 343) or 1706-1708 (LBHK, p. 201). In keeping with the hypothesis presented in n. 32 above, in 1698-1699 Nan-di-kyaw-din may have sided with the old Thi-ri-zei-yi-kyaw-din taction against the dominant Council of Ministers faction led by Nei-myo-thi-hathu. On the marriage of Nan-da-kyaw-din's son Maung Pu to the Twinthin-hmu-gyi's daughter (unfortunately no date is given), see HNY, p. 375; MMOS, Π, 295. 36 For convenience I refer to Tanln-ganwei as heir apparent, though he received this formal honor only in 1711. On his three wives, see below this chapter, n. 186. 37 On the Twin-thin-hmu-gyi's career and family alliances, see LBHK, pp. 192, 201202, 206-209, 253; UK, IH, 396; HNY, pp. 359-60, 364, 366; and section 3 below. Under Sanei, his tide was Let-ya-yan-dameik.

GROWING AUTONOMY, 1648-1714 | 151

tutes an outstanding example of the interaction between royal person­ ality and long-term administrative problems. Sanei's decision to ally himself with Nei-myo-thi-hathu's rivals, and later to tie his son's for­ tunes to those of the Twln-thln-hmu-gyl, may have been logical and compelling. Ministerial networks were well established, Sanei's brother threatened his plans for the succession, and the royal service system was understrength. But the choices he made were by no means the only alternatives available. If he had been more jealous of his own authority and more determined to exploit his initial advantages, he could have controlled the Twin-thin-hmu-gyi in the same fashion as he had eliminated Nei-myo-thi-hathu, that is, by cultivating fresh allies within the administration and using them against existing officials. If he had been more daring, he could have risked a confrontation with his brother (the way Tha-lun attacked a younger brother in 1628) with reasonable prospects of success. Sanei chose not to offend loyal min­ isters late in his reign for fear they would desert his son. He refrained from attacking his brother because he deemed the political situation unfavorable. Yet if an alternate strategy had succeeded, perhaps Sanei could have reconcentrated some of the royal population lost to private service, and retarded the growth of ministerial and princely autonomy. His son and grandson enjoyed less favorable opportunities to reorgan­ ize nuclear zone administration, because after 1723 tributary and pro­ vincial uprisings placed an intolerable strain on royal resources. In Sa­ nei's reign the outer zones of empire were relatively quiescent. I have argued that structural changes in the early seventeenth cen­ tury—most notably the curtailment of bayin and myd-ζά autonomy— made it likely that Restored Toungoo ministers would expand their authority by virtue of their mediating role in succession struggles. Nonetheless, the rapid realization of this potential proceeded through a variety of unpredictable circumstances, all unfavorable to royal au­ thority. Sanei's weakness and errors of judgment were the latest in a series of untoward developments, starting with Pindale's stunning in­ competence, and including the sudden Chinese raids and Naya-wayi's debility. Sanei acceded to a number of important changes in ceremonial pro­ cedure which, in retrospect, appear to have ratified the shift in au­ thority between throne and ministers since the early days of the dy­ nasty. Until Sanei, chief ministers together with all ranks of officials and princes attended the king every day in the Council of Ministers to answer any questions he might pose. Under Sanei and his successors, senior courtiers were excused from daily audiences in the council be­ cause "the royal business was small." The king's military retinue for

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these appearances was reduced by 40 percent (a shortage of man­ power?) and the display of his ceremonial insignia was curtailed. Moreover, rather than receive the homage of the court and of tributary envoys in person, the last three Ava kings stayed in the Privy Council and let their officials supervise these receptions while they communi­ cated with the envoys by messenger. Although Sanei may have held regular audiences outside the Council of Ministers, these changes point to increasing stylization of the royal function, diminished royal super­ vision of affairs, and expanded autonomy for the king's agents.38 SECTION TWO. DISORGANIZATION OF THE ROYAL POPULATION, C. 1660-1714

The same years, c. 1660-1714, that saw an increase in ministerial au­ tonomy witnessed growing confusion in the organization of royal abmudans and athis. Ministerial autonomy had its own dynamic rooted, as we have seen, in the succession struggle. Disorganization of the royal population was even more obviously a self-generating process. At the same time these phenomena reinforced and supported one another. Three weaknesses in the system of manpower organization had be­ come apparent before Tha-lun's death.39 First, despite the system of written passes and headman reports, the crown had no genuinely ef­ fective method to prevent overburdened abmu-dans and athisfromfleeing the nuclear zone. Second, abmu-dans found opportunity to lighten the burdens that they bore while remaining in the royal service system within the nu­ clear zone. Typically, they bribed or otherwise persuaded the leader of a privileged service platoon to register them and/or their children in his unit. That is to say, they shifted patrons illegally within the de­ partmental network.40 Third, abmu-dans and athis in the nuclear zone escaped their obli­ gations to the crown entirely by becoming debt-slaves or private servants. While there were considerable variations within the slave population, 38

LBHK, pp. 166-68, 297, 309, 321. In the absence of close royal supervision, senior ministers tended to handle judicial cases in their private homes. In contrast to late Toungoo practice, Alaung-hpaya, founder of the Κόη-baung Dynasty, therefore restricted private handling of affairs and himself dominated envoy audiences in the most lively fashion. See Chapter 5, sections 1, 3. 39 Cf. Chapter 2, section 1, discussion of ahmu-dan controls. 40 For early seventeenth-century prohibitions on interplatoon mingling, see ZOK, p. 64; RUL 45235, Edict 19, 997 nayon 10 wan., p. 22; Edict 26, 997 nayon 10 wan., p. 26; Edict 27, 997 nayon 10 wan., p. 27; Edict 63, 1000 1st wa-zo 8 wan., pp. 5860.

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on the whole slaves' obligations must have been relatively light, for whereas abmu-diins and athis often sought to become debt-slaves, I have found no record of slaves who voluntarily entered royal service. As one would expect, Tha-lun's decrees suggest that the lowest-rank, most overburdened groups were the most likely to become slaves.41 Allied to the institution of slavery was that of private service, by which people simply ran away from their hereditary platoons to become retainers of powerful lords without bothering to contract debts. With or without a system of regimental tattoos, tracing absconders involved formidable difficulties. Nonetheless, the possibility of detection may explain the greater popularity of debt-slavery, because debt-slavery— unlike private service—was a legally sanctioned status that the crown normally respeaed. Moreover, debt-slaves, as a form of property, could be legally sold or inherited. Therefore the death of his owner did not automatically threaten the slave with return to royal service, for he could often continue to serve the dead man's heirs.42 So long as royal service entailed heavier obligations than other statuses, and so long as royal controls on the population remained imperfect, the crown was destined to lose increasing numbers. At the outset of the dynasty, when a vast array offreshlyformed service groups were at peak strength, the problem was least severe. With each generation, as more people found ways to escape their obligations, the burden on those remaining in royal service would increase. Lest the issue be viewed in too mechanistic a perspective, however, it is important to recognize that external factors could accelerate the rate of manpower dispersion. Before 1660 most of these problems appear to have been of sporadic concern to the crown. The Chinese raids of 1659-1662 caused a sudden deterioration in the royal service system.43 Thereafter unauthorized ministerial activities, in combination with periodic famine, placed a continuous and quite !insupportable burden on the most impoverished sections of the dry zone community. It has been seen that ministerial demands for private gratuities were endemic in a system chararterized by short-term appointments, no fixed 41

See RUL 45235, Edict 63, 1000 1st wa-zo 8 wan., pp. 58-60. Thus, for example, NL 1950, Edict of 1054 tazaung-mon 7 wax., sa v.-sa r. stated that slaves belonging to dead servicemen or athis were to be enrolled in royal platoons only if the master died without heirs. On the transferability of slave mortgages, see too Crawfurd,/ottrae/, II, 134. Entry into the monkhood constituted a fourth major avenue of avoidance to be discussed separately below. « See HaU, "Daghregister," p. 151; UK, III, 268-69; BL OR 3418, hktt r.-v.,^ v.; and below, this section. 42

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incomes,44 the dominance of individual over more abstract bureaucratic loyalties, and the intentional fragmentation of government into competing moieties with limited functional specialization. The decline of the king's personal authority and the growth of ministerial autonomy, which together constituted the most striking political trend of the late seventeenth century, aggravated the problem by removing the principal barrier to ministerial abuse. It is true, of course, that religious sanctions, a great body of administrative precedents, spies, and other institutional controls continued to provide an important measure of cohesion. Yet no official was in a position to perform adequately the royal functions of supervision and coordination, for none exercised titular or practical authority over all administrative subunits. Chief ministers and interior ministers were frequently locked in undeclared competition. As almost every coup attempt revealed, there were also tensions within both public and privy administration·, thus, for example, chief ministers jealous of a dominant colleague were tempted to ally themselves with the latter^s rivals in the Privy Council.45 In turn, ministerial rivalries were intricately linked to competition among princely candidates for the throne. As Nei-myo-thi-hathu's unhappy fate suggests—and as violent and ultimately successful challenges to the Twinthln-hmu-gyi's faction confirmed—no leader, however well entrenched, enjoyed genuine security.46 To enhance their position against potential rivals (and secondarily, perhaps, to acquire luxury goods not prohibited by the system of sumptuary insignia)47 ministers commonly sought to enlarge their income. Wealth allowed them to purchase debt-slaves and retainers, who could be expected to supply their owners with regular private gratuities and with emergency military support. More importantly, by buying the favor of influential allies and patrons at court, wealth allowed senior officials to improve their position within the formal administration, that is, to gain control over additional departments and to place relatives and clients at lower levels of government. The larger the number of client officials a minister controlled, the greater his status and 44 There were, as I shall emphasize, certainfixedtaxes on which officials were entitled to commissions. Even among officials so entitled, however, incomes varied over time, in part because the number of taxed householdsfluctuated,in part because the rigor of tax collection was determined by the individual official, and in part because the income of any given official was composed of commissions on both fixed and variable taxes. 45 See above, nn. 32, 35 and below, section 4. 46 See below, sections 3,4. After Pindale, within two years of his accession every king found it necessary to execute groups of prominent officials and/or princes. 47 For example, quality textiles,firearms,handicrafts, and mechanical curios.

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influence, hence, his ability to attract further support.48 Wealth filtered up the hierarchy through a system of graduated extortion. Junior of­ ficials (sometimes in cooperation with headmen) squeezed the popu­ lation directly. But as the price of continued office-holding, they were expected to deliver a portion of their income to senior patrons. During much of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the relation between senior courtiers and their proteges was probably comparable to that described by an informed English visitor during the last Toungoo reign: [The] Government . . . at present has a King, without any experi­ ence, and intirely [sic] ruled by Ministers, without any other knowl­ edge but a bare private Interest, which makes the Country in general wish for a change, because every petty Governour of Towns or Cit­ ies, if he can but satisfy the Minister at Court, can at his pleasure oppress the people under him, without any fear of Punishment.49 Such unrestrained exactions intensified the inclination among ahmudans and athis to seek more sheltered statuses as deserters, debt-slaves, private retainers, and so on. At the same time, ministerial autonomy widened the opportunities for commoners to escape their hereditary obligations. Ambitious officials naturally welcomed deserters from other jurisdictions, for this augmented the income, military potential, and political influence of the new patron and, ultimately, of the faction to which he belonged. As noted, officials at all levels were also willing to convert hard-pressed ahmu-dans, even from their own jurisdictions, into debt-slaves and private servants; for such dependents necessarily owed a larger share of their labor to their private patron than did royal ahmu-dans. At first sight it might seem puzzling that officials were eager both to abuse commoners and to offer them protection against abuse. Yet, in fact, inflating tax demands, encouraging desertion to higher platoons, buying debt-slaves, and recruiting private retainers were all forms of the same basic activity, that is, the unauthorized transfer of resources from royal to private control. In these ways min­ isters strengthened their private authority over the population at sub­ stantial, and no doubt unintended, cost to the structure on which their 50 corporate welfare ultimately depended. 48 Sec HNY, pp. 241, 297 and following note. Cf. Akin, Thai Society, pp. 148-49; Hanks, "Merit," pp. 1,249-50. 49 Dal, I, 130. Cf. BL OR 3464, p. 139 v. and following note. 50 For comparable and often well-documented examples of destructive ministerial abuse in the Κόη-baung period, see Koenig, "Κδη-baung Polity," pp. 301-13; W. S. Desai, History of the British Residency in Burma, 1826-1840 (Rangoon, 1939), pp. 251-52; Sangermano, Burmese Empire, chap. 12; Sir Charles Crosthwaite, The Pacification ofBurma (1912, repr. London, 1968), pp. 6-7.

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Such developments, readily apparent even in Tha-lun's day, arose from the nature of the indigenous polity. At the same time, by eroding the economic position of certain segments of the elite, maritime trade may have exacerbated interelite competition. Chapter 2 referred to the development of commerce during the Restored Toungoo period, and in particular to the growth of Indian Ocean trade. By comparison with the 1630s, that trade may have been depressed for some years after 1640.51 Starting in the last decades of the century, however, European records point to a sustained increase in Burmese intercourse with eastern India, which was always Pegu's chief maritime trading partner. The only consistently available index, numbers of ships, is cruder than tonnages or cargo values, but is nonetheless suggestive. From 1679 to 1690, the average annual number of ships of all types—Armenian, Indian, foreign Muslim, and European—arriving from Lower Burma at Madras (after about 1680 possibly the principal port for Peguan traffic)52 or departing thence for Pegu (that is, Lower Burma) was 3.63; from 1691 to 1700, 7.2; between 1701 and 1710, 11.7; from 1711 to 1720, it reached a peak of 16.4; from 1721 to 1730, it was 12.4; and from 1731 to 1740, 15.9.53 This increase was not offset to any significant degree by a fall during the late seventeenth century in Peguan trade with Pulicat and Masulipatam.54 Similarly, whereas from 51

See Dutch and English complaints about the diminished profitability of their Peguan trade in the 1640s and 1650s, resulting in the closure of the English factory at Syriam by 1657; and evidence that the flow of silver from the Philippines and Japan, which helped to lubricate trade along the inter-Asian network, fell off starting in the 1640s. Chinese incursions late in Pindale's reign also may have harmed foreign trade, though without systematic shipping records before 1679 there is no way to quantify such fluctuations. See reports summarized in Raychaudhuri, Jan Company, pp. 81-85; Hall, "Daghregister," pp. 144-51; idem, English Intercourse, chap. 4; Atwell, "Chinese Economy," pp. 87-90; and CE, E/3/22, O.C. 2246; E/3/23, O.C. 2343; E/3/24, O.C. 2515 and O.C. 2537. 52 RFSG, Despatches from England, 1701-1706 (Madras, 1925), p. 46, in a letter to Fort St. George, 9 March 1703, observed, "We understand that upwards of Twenty years ago ye: [trade] of Pegu was diverted from Metchlepatam to ye: Fort [by means of trade concessions to ruby merchants]." Cf. Hall, English Intercourse, pp. 8, 114-18. In 1683, the last year for which Masulipatam shipping records are available, that port had only three contacts with Pegu. RFSG, Masulipatam Consultation Book of 1682-1683 (Madras, 1916), pp. 27, 33, 63. In the case of Bengal, such statistics as are available (see below, nn. 55, 56) show that Madras-Pegu trade c. 1680-1730 also exceeded that between Pegu and any Bengali port. 53 DCB, 1679-1740, daily shipping registers. 54 Until the Dutch East India Company ceased trading with Burma in 1678, its factory at Pulicat appears to have sent but one or two ships a year. See Hall, "Daghregister," pp. 139-56; Raychaudhuri, Jan Company, pp. 81-85. On Masulipatam, see above, n. 52, and Dal, II, 345.

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1681-1705 Dutch records show that the chief Bengali ports of Hugli and Balasore together never had more than three annual contacts with Pegu, and in most years none at all,55 by 1738-1739 the new port of Calcutta was averaging well over six annual exchanges with Pegu.56 In the forefront of Burmese-Indian commerce throughout most of this period were Armenians, Indian Muslims and Telugus, and private European traders, working on profit margins smaller than those the large European companies were willing to accept. The continuing flow of European capital into the Indian littoral and the profits made by merchant middlemen in their dealings with Europeans contributed to the expansion of small-scale ventures to Pegu and other markets that remained peripheral to the main lines of European commerce.57 In the 1720s, however, the English and French East India Companies themselves showed increased interest in Lower Burma, where they began stationing semiofficial Residents. This was partly to obtain such commodities as rice, timber, and elephants for the Indian market, but primarily to build and repair ships at Syriam, whose excellent teak and cheap labor had long attracted Asian and private European shipbuilders.58 55

See Om Prakash, "The European Trading Companies and the Merchants of Bengal 1650-1725," Indian Economic and Social History Review 1, 3 (1964): 38-45, 54-55. Cf. Susil Chaudhuri, Trade and Commercial Organization in Bengal 1650-1720 (Calcutta, 1975), pp. 87-93. 56 IOR, Bengal Public Consultations, Range 1, vol. 13 (19 February 1737-24 December 1739), monthly shipping registers. (Vols. 4-12 for 1718-1737 were also examined without finding systematic shipping records.) No doubt six is a serious underestimate, as the origin and destination of twenty-eight non-English ships for 1738-1739 were omitted. Calcutta-Pegu trade started at least a decade earlier, for DCB, 1728, pp. 107-108 complained that the "Bengallers had lately sent a Resident to Pegue and carried on a great trade from thence," partly at Madras' expense. On the growth of BengalPegu trade, see too DCB, 1728, pp. 134-35; DCB, 1732, p. 6; DCB, 1734, p. 3; P. J. Marshall, East Indian Fortunes: The British in Bengal in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1976), pp. 29, 86. 57 On the identity of merchants trading to Pegu, see Hamilton, East Indies, I, 367, and II, 41; DCB, 1679-1740, passim. On Indian commercial developments, see Raychaudhuri,/«» Company, pp. 119-29, 213-14; Prakash, "Merchants," pp. 37-63; K. N. Chaudhuri, Trading World, chap. 9. On English private trade, see Hall, English Intercourse, chaps. 8, 10. Without mentioning Pegu specifically, Perlin, "Proto-Industrialization," p. 63 also refers to a major acceleration of Indian maritime trade conducted by both Asians and Europeans "from the later seventeenth century." 58 Although temporary "Chiefs of English Affairs in Pegu" had been posted earlier in the century, the first permanent "Resident" was appointed by Madras in 1724. Calcutta followed suit by 1728 (after complaints from Madras, however, he was later withdrawn); and in 1729 Pondichery obtained permission to open a regular "factory" at Syriam. On agents and shipbuilding (I have found record of at least thirteen English and French company vessels built by 1740), see Chapter 2 n. 176; plus Martineau,

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The Burmese eagerly encouraged such contacts. Coastal governors and Ava ministers offered a variety of concessions, and issued repeated invitations to foreign traders to visit the country.59 Furthermore, by the reign of Sanei if not earlier, the Toungoo court had moved beyond the role of host to foreigners by resuming trading voyages on its own account. From 1711 to 1733, Madras shipping records contain almost annual references to the arrival or departure of ships "belonging to the king of Pegu." Officered by Armenians, Englishmen, and Muslims (?) in the pay of the Burmese crown, at least five vessels in this period visited Madras and Vizagapatam, and perhaps other ports of which we have no record.60 Obviously the interest in commercial contacts had a basic financial motive: European visitors constantly remarked on the heavy gratuities they were obliged to pay if they were to obtain favorable treatment.61 Leading ministers received not only direct gifts from merchants visiting Ava, but also a percentage of the profits of trading voyages and of commissions paid to coastal officials and merchant-brokers. Scattered evidence raises the possibility that commercial wealth became a significant source of factional advantage in the mid- and late Toungoo period. Shortly after his seizure of power, Pye gave unusually exalted honors to eight Burmese (?) merchant-brokers. Possibly they financed Archives, I, 29-30; idem, Dupleix et I'Indefranfaise,I, 1722-1741 (Paris, 1920), 44; II, 1742-1749 (Paris, 1923), 163-64; IOR, Bengal Public Consultations, Range 1, vol. 12, Consultation of 29 December 1737; CE, E/3/104, pp. 671-72. 59 "A Country Ship, being lately arrived from Pegu, brought letters . . . inviting us to a Settlement, upon unusuall good tearms & priviledges, & that the King would grant us anything, wee could reasonably desire in a Settlement there." DCB, 1688, p. 46. 'The king is indeed ready to grant almost anything . . . for the incouragement of a trade." Thos. Bowyear to Fort St. George, 2 February 1700, in LFSG, VI-VII, 27. For comparable references, see Dal, II, 345-46, 374-80; DCB, 1695, p. 116; DCB, 1711, p. 22; Martineau, Archives, I, 29-30; and above Chapter 1 nn. 168-71. Although space precludes detailed inquiry, one suspects that Hall's effort to explain the commercial isolation of Burma compared to Siam in terms of the former's unyielding, "dog-in-themanger policy" (English Intercourse, pp. 11-12, 83, 184) is overdrawn; and that Siam's superior attraction derived more especially from her favored position on the trade routes to China, Japan, and the Indonesian world. 60 Presumably these ships exchanged Peguan goods for Coromandel textiles. See DCB, 1711-1733, shipping registers. As late as 1740 LFSG, XXVI, 9 also refers to "a ship at Syrian of the Burmore King of Ava." It will be recalled that Bayin-naung had built a fleet of merchant ships at Pegu in the 1570s for overseas expeditions on behalf of the crown. See Chapter 1 n. 59. 61 The English found in the 1730s that "exorbitant presents" destroyed the profitability of shipbuilding at Syriam. See DCB, 1738, p. 13; LFSG, XXVI, 8; Hall, English Intercourse, chap. 11; idem, "Daghregister," pp. 148-54.

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the resumption of food supplies to Pye's soldiery or provided rice from their private granaries at the capital.62 At various times between 1685 and 1737, Armenian traders are said to have enjoyed considerable in­ fluence in official circles at both Ava and Syriam.63 As assistant min­ isters (wun-dauks) in the Council of Ministers prior to their elevation as chief ministers, both Maung Pu's father and the Twin-thin-hmu-gyi were in a position to place clients in coastal administration; whereas in the late 1730s extortions from Pegu became a key source of income for Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati's principal (interior) minister.64 At the same time as maritime revenues expanded, agricultural pro­ duction, if it did not decline, suffered from considerable difficulties and appears to have been far less dynamic than the maritime sector. Frequent references to famine and widespread food shortages in Up­ per Burma (see below) provide sufficient testimony. This discrepancy should not be exaggerated. As a percentage of total court revenue (inkind and cash), maritime-based income was still modest in the period to 1700, when extant edicts complaining of tax abuses are concen­ trated.65 Nonetheless, in the context of existing factional disputes and impaired royal control over patronage generally, mercantile changes may have intensified the competition for income. In attracting desert­ ers, in extending loans to impoverished ahmu-dans, and in providing cash gifts to obtain the favor of senior patrons, headmen and appoin­ tive officials whose revenue derived entirely from the agricultural sec­ tor may have been increasingly disadvantaged compared to officials with access to trade or coastal administration. To compensate for the relative poverty of their tax base, they may have felt obliged to inten­ sify their exactions, to accept bribes, and to exploit more fully any opportunities that arose to convert royal followers into slaves and pri­ vate retainers. Growing complaints about appanage abuses and finan­ cial extortions in both the nuclear zone and the provinces (see below) are consistent with such an interpretation. Invariably, a desire for in62

UK, III, 273. HNY, p. 402, shows merchants maintained private granaries at Ava. « See DCB, 1721, 52-76 passim; DCB, 1738, pp. 12 ff.; Dal, II, 359; LFSG, VIVII, 27-28; John Anderson, English Intercourse with Siam in the Seventeenth Century (London, 1890), pp. 259-61, 271-72; Vivian Ba, "Catholic Missionaries," August 1962, p. 19. «* See Dal, I, 130; BL OR 3464, p. 139 v. Cf. Koenig, "Κόη-baung Polity," pp. 303-306 on the relation between Rangoon and the court. AAm, p. 255 shows mer­ chants to have been among those creditors to whom ahmu-dans commonly became indebted. 65 See the Conclusion to this study for some tentative ratios.

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creased cash revenue, as opposed to in-kind revenue, motivated rural tax abuse. This line of reasoning is strengthened when one considers that at the same time as the volume of imports grew, the unit price of imported cottons rose erratically but markedly. According to K. N. Chaudhuri, the price expressed as a linear trend of cotton textiles purchased on the Coromandel Coast increased about 45 percent from 1665 to 1700, and 111 percent from 1665 to 1750. In these same years, the price of cotton textiles from Bengal, which was probably Burma's second chief external source of supply, increased about 20 percent and 48 percent.66 As noted, fine muslins and other Indian textiles were an important component of elite display and political reward.67 Officials dependent on trade would have been effectively insulated against such inflation. They commonly received textiles as gratuities,68 while their cash income, consisting chiefly of commissions, also fluctuated with the value of imports. By contrast, certain agricultural taxes (hkun-thei), most athi and abmu-dan household taxes,69 as well as a number of handicraft and "occasional taxes"70 were calculated infixedcash amounts. To compensate for the declining real value of these imposts set against textiles (and possibly other luxury imports from India and West Asia)71 officials, appanage holders, and headmen again would have been inclined to assume unauthorized responsibilities and to increase their demands.72 Although it is unlikely that textile purchases were the principal category of elite expenditure, and although the annual rate of inflation was admittedly low, continuous price increases over a long period can only have eroded the real value 66

Trading World, Figs. 18, 20. See too pp. 99-100, chap. 8. Prices are quoted in pounds sterling. Between 1601 and 1760 the weight of the pound sterling in grams of fine silver was absolutely static. E. E. Rich and C. H. Wilson, eds., The Cambridge Economic History ofEurope, vol. IV: The Economy ofExpanding Europe in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 382, 405, and Fig. 4. Therefore Chaudhuri'sfiguresrepresent real increases in the amount of silver Burmese textile purchasers were obliged to pay. 67 See Chapter 2 n. 178. 68 See, for example, Dal, II, 352-95 passim; NL 2208, hkaw r. ff.; Trager and Koenig, Sit-tans, p. 74. 69 See Chapter 2 nn. 114, 136, plus NL 1950, Edict of 1042 tabo-dwe 10 wax., gd r.; Edict of 1051 thadin-gyut 6 wan., nga v.; Edict of 1051 thadin-gyut 4 wax., nga r.v. Under the rubric "household tax" are included ad hoc appanage charges. 70 See Chapter 2 n. 224, plus RUL 45235, Edict 3, 969 1st wa-zo 10 wax., p. 2. 71 It is known that firearms, fine porcelain, silks, opium and medicines, and some mechanical items were imported, although prices are not available. 72 Cf. Akin, Thai Society, p. 143; M. Athar AIi, "The Passing of Empire: The Mughal dsc,"Modern Asian Studies 9, 3 (1975): 388.

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of certain taxes and aggravated the destabilizing effects of a volume increase in maritime trade.73 Again, the throne's preoccupation with court disputes and its weak control over patronage would have militated against a smooth calibration of changing income and status. Nowhere is the competition for income, and the throne's inability to restrain abuses, more apparent than in a series of edicts on provincial taxation starting in the reign of Min-ye-kyaw-din. Since the early seventeenth century Ava had been levying two types of silver tax in the empire: a) those taxes, probably fixed taxes, collected by the capital silver tax minister from designated populations in the Shan country, the upper Irrawaddy, and the Pagan area; and b) those taxes, probably variable taxes, levied on villages in Martaban and Toungoo by provincial revenue officers.74 Although it was intended that the two imposts be distinct and separate, under Min-ye-kyaw-din the silver tax minister—whose income, if it was fixed, would have been particularly vulnerable to price inflation—attempted to gain control over those who paid taxes in Marta73

Apart from uncertainty about the percentage of official income devoted to textiles, various problems beset efforts to assess more precisely the political significance of textile price inflation. Textile prices at Syriam were normally calculated in lump silver. The effect of rising prices on incomesfixedin silver is therefore obvious; but without knowing how much copper appreciated relative to silver between c. 1665 and 1750, the impact of textile price inflation on copper-based incomes is unclear. It would appear that the rate of increases in textile prices in India considerably exceeded the rate at which the bimetallic ratio in Burma narrowed, but evidence is meager (see silver-copper ratios in Than Tun, "Tha-lun min," p. 62; Trager and Koenig, Sit-tans, p. 377). Nor do we know what percentage of ministerial incomes were fixed in silver and in copper. Other imponderables surround the separate question of domestic food prices. Historians of India have discussed the possibility that New World silver led to inflation in Indian grain prices as well as in export-oriented commodities. See Aziza Hasan, "The Silver Currency Output of the Mughal Empire and Prices in India during the 16th and 17th Centuries," Indian Economic and Social History Renew 6, 1 (1969): 85-116; K. N. Chaudhuri, Trading World, pp. 99-108, chap. 8; S. Chaudhuri, Commercial Organization, pp. 241-48. If a parallel movement occurred in Burma, obviously it would have compounded the problems of officials withfixed-silverincomes. But again systematic data are lacking: European sources for this period are silent on rice prices, whereas the chronicles cite prices only in abnormal periods of war or famine. It should be noted, however, that evidence of mass impoverishment (see below) may be incompatible with a strong inflationary trend in domestic food prices, because commoners grew their own rice or millet and (in the eighteenth century, at least) were frequently liable to imposts fixed in silver. Unless we assume that tax collectors extorted money at a rate higher than that of inflation, a fall in the value of taxes set against rice would have enriched most commoners even as it impoverished their overlords. 74 MMOS, IV, 312-13; ZOK, p. 82. The former source refers to taxes a and b in that order, and then says that they were fixed (hkun-thei) and variable (hkun-shin). The designations therefore seem to have been respective, though it is not stated explicitly.

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ban and Toungoo. Immediately he met with strenuous opposition from provincial authorities. Μϊη-ye-kyaw-din tried to clear up the matter repeatedly, but no one seems to have paid attention, for we read in a 1679 royal edict: The Martaban and Toungoo revenue officers [abkun-daw wuns] have been appointed [to oversee certain taxes] . . . and the silver tax min­ ister has been appointed to a separate jurisdiction for [other taxes] . . . Although I have repeatedly issued orders to this effect, they have gone unheeded, and as a result of this confusion of jurisdictions the common tax-payers are growing restless. Is this right? Let revenue re­ sponsibilities be administered according to the prescribed division of authority.75 This was hardly the end of the matter. Sanei, shortly after his acces­ sion, found it necessary to spell out the separation of authority once again.76 Then King Tanin-ganwei, after taking the throne, issued this complaint in 1715: Reports have reached the Golden Royal Ears that taxpaying subjects in Martaban have become totally disorganized and confused. The myowuns and revenue officers at Toungoo and Martaban have been granted a distinct jurisdiction to prevent such confusion. They must supervise all affairs connected with their [local] taxes, and the pro­ vincial secretaries must submit the customary collections.77 But competing claims persisted, for in 1736 Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati again lamented: The Royal Ears have heard that the silver tax minister and provincial authorities [myo-wuns and ahkun-wuns] in competition [?] with one another, have been collecting taxes from the same taxpayers at Mar­ taban and Toungoo; and as a result, the common people can hardly bear the burden. The silver tax minister has legitimate authority only over [the Shan country, upriver areas, Pagan, etc.]. He has no right to appropriate to himself and thereby inflict injury upon taxpayers of Martaban and Toungoo, for they will not remain quiet [in the face of such abuse].78 Administrative fragmentation—in this case between departmental and territorial agencies—could enhance the position of the monarch; but 75 76 77 78

ZOK, p. 82. Italics added. Ibid. Ibid., p. 98. Italics added. Ibid., p. 83. Italics added.

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when an ineffective king governed, it became a source of continuous instability. Overtaxation led communities in Lower Burma to revolt within four years of Maha-dama-ya-za-di-patfs warning.79 This prolonged competition between tax agencies may have mirrored a more basic conflict between senior officials, each acting as patron to a junior client. One of the most striking aspects of these decrees is that they consistendy supported the claims of provincial authorities against those of the silver tax minister at Ava, but somehow failed to gain compliance from the official nearest to hand. Perhaps successive silver tax ministers paid lip service to royal orders, but did as they pleased so long as they had the protection of patrons in the Council of Ministers or Privy Council. It has already been suggested that the latter part of Mln-ye-kyaw-din's reign was characterized by rivalry between his senior chief minister and interior minister; whereas the years immediately preceding Tanin-ganwei's edict of 1715 and Maha-dama-ya-za-di-patfs edict of 1736 saw yet more intense factionalism that divided the government into opposing camps. These edicts deal specifically with ministerial abuses in the provinces; yet undisciplined tax collectors posed a greater danger in the nuclear zone, where the population was most dense and the exploitable resources most concentrated. Both in Tha-lun's day and in the post1660 period, the great majority of decrees dealing with ministerial infractions focused on the area around the capital. In 1661 Pye complained that officers in the department of compound guards were treating their on-duty abmu-dam "like slaves," forcing them to execute chores of a private nature while their vital service work was neglected. "[Officers] must protect their followers the way a mother cherishes her own children, so that they are able to execute their royal duties," he intoned.80 In 1664 on two occasions,81 in 1667,82 and 1671, 83 he claimed that his ahmu-dans were not merely being treated like private servants, but in fact were becoming legally bound debt79

These edicts make no reference to the role of provincial headmen, but it must be assumed that the actual collections were executed by headmen who found it difficult to resist the rewards and threats of appointive superiors. Although individual headmen may have benefited from such an arrangement, ultimately their identification with the local community led the gentry in Martaban and Pegu to direct the anti-Avan rebellions. See Chapter 4. 80 NL 1950, Edict of 1023 nayon 7 wan.,^« r.-v. 81 Ibid., Edict of 1025 tabo-dwe 4 wax.,ge r.; Edict of 1026 nayon 13 wan.,gl v.gam r. 82 Ibid., Edict of 1029 tagu 9 wan., gan v.-j[a r. 83 Ibid., Edict of 1033 wa-gaung 4 wan., g& r.

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slaves. Owners included wealthy officials who enslaved members of their own departments.84 As one might expect, Min-ye-kyaw-din's reign produced an exceptionally large number of references to official abuses in the nuclear zone. In 1679 and 1689, for example, officials were said to be extorting illegal commissions from Upper Burma residents involved in legal disputes and inheritance cases.85 Another edict criticized various levels of officials for demanding bribes from servicemen who sought to hire substitutes. "Through such demands a great amount of money is being consumed, I have heard. This pattern cannot continue."86 In 1677,87 1681,88 and on two occasions in 1689,89 royal decrees excoriated greedy appanage holders (officials and princes) who obtained money from their appanage populations on a variety of spurious pretexts. So frequent and so heavy had these demands become that, in the words of the edicts, "the common people can no longer sustain themselves," "the townships and villages are being crushed to pieces by these demands," and athis and abmu-dans "are being reduced to wretched poverty."90 Like the aforementioned complaints about overtaxation at Martaban and Toungoo, these laments were more than stylized rhetoric. Min-ye-kyaw-din's reign saw an expansion in debt-slavery that had no precedent in the early seventeenth century. Moreover, a comparison of references to official abuses in the reigns of Tha-lun and Min-ye-kyaw-din shows that not only were such edicts more frequent than in Tha-lun's day,91 but the content was different. Tha-lun warned 84 Thus ibid., Edict of 1025 tabo-dwe 4 wax., ge r. specified the debts of seven members of a royal lancers regiment, five men and two women, who apparently had borrowed money from their regimental officer and had become his slaves. One suspects, however, that this was exceptional and that officials normally sought to recruit slaves from outside their own departments. Note too that although high officials and princes were the largest slaveowners, some humble soldiers and athis also owned bondsmen. See, for example, ibid., Edict of 1054 tazaung-mon 7 wax., sa v.-sa r.; AAm, pp. 24748. 85 See NL 1950, Edict of 1040 tabaung 13 wan., gi v.-gt r.; Edict of 1051 pya-tho 10 wax., ngi r.-v. 86 Ibid., Edict of 1054 wa-gaung 14 wax., ngan v.-nga r. This edict thereupon attempted to specify authorized gratuities. 87 Cited ibid., Edict of 1042 tabo-dwe 10 wax., gan v.-get r. 88 Same as previous note. 89 Ibid., Edicts of 1051 thadin-gyut 4 wax., nga r.-v. and thadin-gyut 6 wan., nga v.ngt r. 90 Oppression of appanage people hurt the crown because these people owed the king departmental taxes and military service. Moreover, the appanage could be resumed by the crown on the myo-za's promotion, deposition, or death. 91 Eleven out of 51 edicts from Min-ye-kyaw-din's reign, compared to 10 out of 114 extant edicts by Tha-lun.

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about the danger of excessive taxation and promised speedy punishment; but on no occasion did he complain that demands by ministers and appanage holders had actually caused widespread impoverishment. A similar contrast applies to unauthorized activities by gentry headmen. Whereas none of Tha-lun's edicts refer direcdy to the problem, Min-ye-kyaw-din's decrees indicate that headmen were guilty of a variety of frauds. For the most part, as befitted men with enduring local attachments, headmen executed these actions at the expense of the crown rather than of the local community. They confiscated the property of athis dying intestate that should have gone to pay taxes owed to the crown.92 They converted into private slaves and retainers ahmudans who entered their jurisdictions, regardless of department affiliation.93 Apparently they also acquired control over royal lands and akmudan holdings that were then rented to unregistered private tenants.94 Through such encroachments the gentry resumed some of the autonomy surrendered to Nyaungyan Min and his sons. In certain instances, however, headmen did not scruple to enhance their position at the expense of the community. This was true chiefly in those appanages where the gentry depended on the "eater" for political preferment. "Headmen should help athis . . . but instead they are looking only to the appanage holders and are giving them whatever they ask," Minye-kyaw-din complained.95 He ordered offenders, together with their entire families, to be burned alive. Yet to judge from the frequency of his laments, gentry leaders with suitable connections at court were well able to escape the flames. In combination with Chinese raids and recurring famine (see below), elite abuses aggravated those problems of manpower control which in Tha-lun's day had been of more occasional significance. The larger the exodus to private statuses, the heavier the work assignments of those who remained in their original units—hence the stronger the incentive for them to escape as well. Financial extortion had precisely the same impact. 92 NL 1950, Edict of 1054 tazaung-mon 7 wax., sa v.-sa r. These taxes could be owed either by the individual or his tamg. 93 Ibid., Edict of 1041 2nd wa-zo 3 -wax., get r. 94 See J. S. Furnivall, Report on the First Regular Settlement Operations in the Myingyan District, Season 1909-1913 (Rangoon, 1917), p. 64-70; Report on the Settlement Operations in the MeiktUa District, Season 1896-98 (Rangoon, 1900), pp. 51-52; GUBSS, I, 2, 350-51; Report on Operations in Shwebo, 1900-1906, pp. 89, 112; Koenig, "Kon-baung Polity," pp. 83, 283-84, 316. 95 NL 1950, Edict of 1051 thadin-gyut 6 wan., nga v.-ngi r. A similar complaint appears in Edict of 1051 thadin-gyut 4 wax., nga r.-v. See too Edict of 1054 wa-gaung 11 wax., ngaw v.-ngan v., indicating that certain athi headmen were artificially swelling in-kind tax collections and keeping much of the take themselves.

166 I DECLINE, 1648-1752

Clearly, therefore, in this period, as in the 1590s, peasants responded to elite exactions not by collective protest or violence, but by intensifying their endemic search for individual patrons who would demand a smaller share of their wealth than those platoon leaders to whom they were assigned in the formal hierarchy. Migration, illegal registration, debt-slavery, and private service all illustrated the peasant's preference for techniques of evasion and avoidance. The localism of peasant life, the Buddhist emphasis on individual kamma, the cultivator's habitual deference and vertical orientation to individual members of the elite, and the correspondingly weak bonds between members of different departments and platoons, all militated against horizontal, class-based movements.96 When, toward the end of the dynasty, commoners joined local revolts against Toungoo rule, they sought not to alter the established social order. Rather they attempted to strengthen it by supporting one or another pretender who seemed best able to alleviate popular distress by vanquishing external foes and by exercising effective control over domestic patron-client chains. Essentially the peasant's search for more attractive patrons resembled the behavior of members of the administrative elite (myo-zas in the 1590s, courtiers throughout the Restored Toungoo period) who also deserted declining protectors in favor of more powerful men. The mobility of clients at all levels thus underlay the fluidity of political authority. Migration after 1660 provided perhaps the most visible expression of peasant distress. The destructive Chinese raids drove both civilians and soldiers to abandon rice lands south of Ava in favor of forests, mountains, and more sheltered dry agricultural districts. Although many may have returned with the departure of the Chinese, flight from one's 96 This argument has been developed by Adas, "Avoidance to Confrontation," esp. pp. 226-28. See too Hanks, "Merit," p. 1,250. Presumably the fear of losing one's followers or incurring royal displeasure helped to moderate official demands; but as I have emphasized in the case of supragentry figures, these fears were balanced by the pressures of factional competition, by the hope that sufficient short-term gains would purchase a higher office with a broader base, and by the possibility of converting the victims of excessive exactions into private slaves and servants. Without knowing how effectively peasant evasion deterred extortion in the late Toungoo period, it is difficult to determine whether migration, debt-slavery, and so on, were conceived by the peasants themselves as forms of protest, or whether these actions were intended merely as an accommodation to deteriorating conditions with little expectation that they would alter elite demands. Feasant motivation rarely figures in Toungoo documents, and such references as do appear reflect royal preoccupations. Typically Toungoo sources stigmatize peasant evaders as lazy fellows motivated by selfishness. See Chapter 1 n. 90; Chapter 3 nn. 97, 132.

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ancestral village remained a viable option. Thus an edict of 1679 said that ahmu-dans from various units had illegally taken employment in new districts "because they seek to avoid royal service or because [their units] have become scattered . . . [these shirkers] want an easy life."97 Between 1668 and 1714 we have record of the formation of twentysix new local taxpaying units known as kyeik-su taings. All were organ­ ized in villages on the poor nonirrigated fringes of the nuclear zone or along the middle Irrawaddy.98 One hesitates to place too much reliance on interregional comparisons, as fewer documents have sur­ vived from localities closer to Ava. Nonetheless, since kyeik-su taings were composed of migrants to athi communities—that is, «this or ahmudans who had abandoned their original villages99—the formation of these units may indicate a drift of people from the capital area to less productive districts further south that were subject to less rigorous exploitation. Tha-lun, it will be recalled, had expressly warned tax col­ lectors that excessive demands would precipitate peasant flight;100 and in the 1740s and 1750s it is certain that Arakan and Pegu attracted substantial numbers of Upper Burma refugees.101 Migration, however, was a rather desperate move, involving as it often did the abandonment of laboriously irrigated fields and the sev­ erance of links with one's extended family. In practice, peasants were less eager to flee than to find protection within their original locales, chiefly through debt-slavery. Between 1664 and 1698 (when edicts in the National Library manuscript effectively terminate)102 there appear an unprecedentedly large and detailed number of references to debtslavery.103 At the same time one notes that ahmu-dans willing to enter this condition came from progressively more prestigious strata. The crown resorted to prohibitions, exhortations, and on one occasion, to 97

NL 1950, Edict of 1041 2nd wa-zo 3 wax.,£/ei r. See depositions from Taungzin, Taywindaing, and Ywatha in Trager and Koenig, Sit-tans, pp. 277, 280, 290; and from Taung-gwin and Malun-hse-ywa in IO 115, nga and ngt. The simultaneous organization of new athi taings at some of these townships may have reflected natural increase as well as the admission to full athi status of children born to earlier kat-pa entrants. 99 See Chapter 2 nn. 135, 136. 100 See Chapter 2 n. 84. 101 Dwayawadi Hsaya-daw, "Ayei-daw-bon," pp. 132, 134; MYG, p. 249; AAm, pp. 219-20. Remember too that large-scale migrations had attended Pegu's decline in the 1590s. 102 See Appendix Π on NL 1950. 103 Between 1664 and 1698, 16 of 73 edicts deal with debt-slavery, most in consid­ erable detail. Of 134 extant edicts from the period 1597-1648 (114 from Tha-lun's reign), I have found only 7 comparatively brief references to debt-slavery. 98

168 I DECLINE, 1648-1752

a program of departmental loans. Yet none of these responses pro­ duced a substantial amelioration in the people's economic condition. Nor did they alter the ability and willingness of wealthy patrons— principally ministers, princes, and headmen—to buy people who had fallen into debt. Despite the economic importance of slaves, it is by no means clear how they were organized. Did most enslaved ahmu-dans and «this con­ tinue to till their original allotments while performing service and making payments entirely to their new masters? Or did they abandon their original lands in favor of estates owned by their masters? Assuming such estates existed, how were they acquired and where were they located? Was the produce of such lands sold on the market or used primarily to support ministerial and princely households of full-time retainers? It is known that Κόη-baung officials and more especially headmen sometimes possessed family estates which, in poorer districts, could comprise well over a thousand acres. Consisting often of scat­ tered blocks fanned by slaves and free tenants, these were built up by mortgage, purchase, and royal gift. As such they were heritable and entirely distinct from temporary appanage grants. Some, amassed over generations, apparently started in the Toungoo period.104 In the 1740s we find a reference to private ministerial granaries at Ava105 and to heritable ministerial wealth of unspecified type. 106 But apart from such vague and indirect references, I have not been able to find information on private agricultural estates before 1750. If the disposition of slaves and private retainers is uncertain, how­ ever, the growth of private labor—and the serious consequences for government operations—are amply documented. In 1664, in the after­ math of Chinese raids, indigent members of platoons entrusted with 104

On private estates see sources in this chapter n. 94. Furnivall, Report on Operations in Myingyan, pp. 64-70, writing c. 1916, referred to a Talokmyo headman who when he died "ten generations" earlier had left an estate of several hundred acres; while Report on Operations in Meiktila, 1896-98, pp. 51-52 referred to a similar-sized hereditary head­ man estate farmed byfifty-onedebt-slaves in 1795. Most references to estates owned by appointed officials, however, date from the mid- or late nineteenth century. The king's nominal ownership of all land notwithstanding, heritable private land (bd-ba-baing myei) was a legally-recognized category. See MMOS, V, 29-32. 105 HNY, p. 402. 106 On the noted wealth of Minister Padei-thd-ya-za's in-laws, see SHDMA, pp. 18486. RUL 45235, Edict 36, 998 wa-gaung 14 wax., p. 32, refers to ministerial and princely slaves throughout the countryside; but these people could have cultivated either their original allotments or noncontiguous private lands. Cf. estates owned by princes and nobles in Siam and cultivated by slaves and departmental freemen, discussed in James C. Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand, 1850-1970 (Stanford, 1971), p. 14; van Ravenswaay, "Van Vlier^s Description," pp. 64-65.

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the feeding and training of royal elephants began to sell their children into slavery. Elephant keepers were lowly, economically vulnerable members of the so-called "ignoble platoons" (asu-kyan), and were therefore among the first to suffer from the combined effects of raids, exactions, and famine.107 Pye decreed that the sale of female children could continue; but that henceforth those who bought males would automatically forfeit both the slave and the purchase price. All those young males who had already been enslaved were to be redeemed immediately, apparendy with the aid of loans provided by the elephant minister. Parents (?) of redeemed youths had to repay the minister within a stated period, however, so it is difficult to see how their financial situation improved.108 Three years later Pye observed that other servicemen of unspecified affiliation, after borrowing money to live, had converted themselves into debt-slaves of wealthy courtiers. He denied, however, that indebtedness in itself justified becoming a slave: ahmu-ddns with small debts must be made to work off their obligations in their spare time while remaining in royal service. "If renegade abmu-dans [who get themselves into debt] make excuses to escape service, examine and discipline them," he concluded.109 Yet Pye failed to address himself to an obvious question: how could junior secretaries responsible for registering servicemen contravene the wishes of ministers and headmen purchasing slaves? This edict appears to have had little effect, for in 1671 Pye issued a blanket ban on the enslave­ ment of jailers (htaung-tha), gatekeepers (tagh-thh), and prison ward­ ers (let-ma-htaung-tha), three more of the "ignoble" service categories. Again the purchase price was to be forfeited.110 That Pye felt compelled to modify his father's procedures for the distribution of offspring born to mixed platoons suggests that disor­ ganization was indeed becoming serious, at least among the lowest groups. Tha-lun had recognized that platoons could not be completely endogamous, and had therefore laid down as a general principle that offspring born to parents from different units were to be registered on 107

Only the previous year, Pye had abandoned a project to build a new capital be­ cause the people of Upper Burma were "impoverished and consumed" by the recent disturbances. Hall, "Daghregister," p. 151. 108 NL 1950, Edict of 1026 nayon 13 wan.,ge v.-gaw r. Furthermore, offspring born to elephant-α»* adults while they themselves were slaves were to be taken from the slaveowner. 109 Ibid., Edict of 1029 tagu 9 wan.,gan v.-go. r. 110 Ibid., Edict of 1033 wa-gaung 4 wan. ga. r. Although it is possible that htmtngtha were guards attached to the four walls of the royal fort under htaung-hmus, the gloss of "jailers" accords better with the consecutive listing of jailers, gatekeepers, and warders in the asu-kydn index of 1679 at NL 1950, gu r.

170 I DECLINE, 1648-1752

the basis of their sex: girls in the same ahmu-dan platoon as their mother, and boys, with their father.111 As long as the government conducted regular censuses to register children of mixed unions, the male-female rule would ensure a stable distribution from one generation to the next. This was the theory. In practice, however, the lower groups were depleted much more rapidly than higher ones, chiefly through the spread of debt-slavery, but also because inferior people succeeded in registering themselves illegally in higher units. As noted, the growth of debt-slavery among the poorest ahmu-dans and the exodus of low-level people into higher platoons were mutually reinforcing, for both phenomena increased the burden on those unfortunates still in the lowest categories. Pye therefore abandoned his father's principle so as to enhance the strength of the lowest ahmu-dan groups at the expense of the higher. In 1664, the same year in which he complained about the enslavement of elephant keepers, he decreed that henceforth all children regardless of sex who were born to mixed unions involving elephant-corps women were to be registered with their mother.112 Two years later he extended this ruling to women who were hereditary crown serfs (lamaings);113 and in 1671, he extended it yet again to cover children born in the future to mixed unions involving men or women in three other "ignoble" categories depleted by debt-slavery.114 Although Chinese raids had provided a strong initial impetus, continuing disorganization after Pye's death reflected basic structural weaknesses. Min-ye-kyaw-din's earliest known edict warned parents who had fallen into debt to stop offering to sell their children into slavery, and prescribed the following picturesque humiliation for offenders: their hair tied in four knots, men and women were to be paraded around the capital to the beat of a gong.115 In 1679 a very lengthy 111

See Chapter 2 n. 128. NL 1950, Edict of 1025 tabaung 13 wax., ge r. Possibly because he assumed that his subsequent edict of 1026 nayon 13 wan. would succeed in redeeming elephantcorps youths from slavery and in stemming future debt-sales, on the latter date Pye restored his father's male-female principle for offspring born to elephant-corps women and outsiders. NL 1950,^ v.-gam r. Any such optimism was short-lived, however, for in turn the edict of 1025 tabaung 13 wax. was restored under Mln-ye-kyaw-din. 113 Ibid., Edict of 1027 tabo-dwe 6 wan., ^«w r.-v. Lemmings were another asu-kyan group. Pye said that all offspring born to lamaing women and six categories of nonlamaing men were to be registered with the mother, but mixed offspring involving a seventh category could still follow the male-female principle. 114 The aforementioned jailers, gatekeepers, and warders. Ibid., Edict of 1033 wagaung 4 wan., ga v. Again, Pye specifically contrasted his new registration procedure with the equal distribution procedure employed by his father. 115 Ibid., Edict of 1035 wa-gaung 5 wax., gA v. 112

DISORGANIZATION, 1660-1714 | 171

edict revealed that for the first time middle-rank soldiers and royal attendants, as well as over thirty "ignoble platoon" categories, were seriously affected by debt-slavery. Shieldmen, compound guards, infantrymen, Tai palace guards, artillerymen, musketeers, cavalrymen, royal palanquin bearers, and runners were among those contracting debts with the express intention of becoming slaves of ministers, princes, and other unnamed patrons.116 In many instances these debts were purely nominal, designed to deceive government registrars. Min-yekyaw-din therefore instructed the secretaries of service departments as follows: If when you are drawing up registers, a serviceman claims that he is a slave, don't automatically enter him on the slave register. Find out the size of his debt and then permit him to continue as a debt-slave only if that status seems justified. If he is just making excuses to avoid work, put him back into his unit and make him serve the crown.117 Similar orders applied to members of the "ignoble platoons."118 Yet the greater incidence of debt-slavery among these inferior groups is suggested both by Min-ye-kyaw-din's attempt to enforce a total ban (that is, not subject to qualification according to debt size) among additional "ignoble" categories;119 and by his unprecedented discrimination in the field of religion: henceforth no more "ignoble" abmudans from over thirty categories were to be ordained as Buddhist monks.120 At the same time Min-ye-kyaw-din extended Pye's discriminatory ruling on the registration of mixed offspring to cover all thirty 116

Ibid., Edict of 1041 kahson 12 wax., gu r.-v. warned officials not to allow members of thirteen specific units to take refuge in slavery without a genuine debt, and sought to control the offspring of such servicemen; whereas ^K V. referred to musketeers, cavalrymen, and shwei-pan-su guards who were incurring sometimes bogus debts with ministers and princes because they felt royal service was more onerous than debt-bondage. On the identity of military absconders see too Edict of 1055 1st wa-zo 6 wan., ge y.-gaw r., citing the 1041 edict. 117 Ibid., Edict of 1041 wa-gaung 6 wax., get r. See a similarly worded injunction affecting middle-rank groups in the Edict of 1041 kahson 12 wsx.,gu r. 118 Ibid., Edict of 1041 kahson 12 wax.,^« v. 119 Hitherto, so far as is known, only elephant-corps males, jailers, gatekeepers, and warders had been forbidden to become debt-slaves regardless of debt size. This prohibition was now extended to male servicemen in units concerned with the Western Court, various royal palanquins, royal horses, and with executions. See Edict of 1041 kahson 12 wax.,^f« v. 120 Those who were already monks could remain. Ibid., Edict of 1041 kahson 12 wax., gu r. Tha-lun had temporarily forbidden the ordination of any ahmu-dan or athi.

172 I DECLINE, 1648-1752

"ignoble" classifications. This too represented a departure from Thalun's policy.121 Furthermore, edicts from 1679 contained the first reference in over forty years to private service arrangements.122 Mln-ye-kyaw-din com­ plained that his military abmu-dms, without bothering to contract debts, were "coming and going and taking shelter with princes and officials because they are afraid of doing royal service."123 He oudawed this practice, but neither servicemen nor their patrons found it desirable to desist completely, for on three occasions in 1681 1 2 4 he forbade ahmudans in at least thirteen categories, including a surprising number of main-line military formations, "to take refuge" with royal relatives. All absconders were to be forced back to their original units, while those who had become genuine debt-slaves were to discharge their obliga­ tions through part-time labor. Whereas previously a sufficiendy large debt had been deemed justification for enslavement, henceforth abso­ lutely no private service or debt-sales among these groups were to be permitted.125 Like other edicts by Min-ye-kyaw-din, it is difficult to know by whom and for what purpose these decrees were actually composed. Ostensi­ bly they were devised by the king himself for the instruction of middlelevel officials in charge of registration. If so, they betray a naive faith that the pervasive shift of manpower could be halted by exhortation and written prohibition. Given Μϊη-ye-kyaw-din's ineffective control over senior officials, it is most unlikely such decrees would gain uni­ versal compliance.126 Perhaps some were actually drawn up at the be121 Ibid., Edict of 1041 kahson 12 wax.,^ r.-v. said that if any asu-kyan female mated with a compound guard, ministerial slave, or monastic attendant, all their offspring were to become asu-kyan. If an asu-kyan male, however, had an exogamous union, the malefemale principle would still apply. This edict also established detailed procedures by which children born of enslaved asu-kyans could be reclaimed for royal service. 122 On the contrast between private service and debt-slavery, see above, p. 153. Thalun in 1635 had claimed that the stewards of queens and princes were sheltering royal servicemen. 123 NL 1950, Edict of 1041 kahson 12 wax.,^« v. 124 Ibid., Edict of 1043 tazaung-mon 5 wax., ga r.-v. and Edict of 1043 tagu 8 wan., nga τ.-nga r. Both of these cite an earlier edict of 1042 tabo-dwe 6 wan. 125 At least not so far as royal relatives were concerned. Service groups covered by these edicts included thwei-thauk guards, cavalrymen, musketeers, shieldmen, compound guards, artillerymen, palanquin bearers, umbrella bearers, royal runners, and other groups of orderlies. 126 One is reminded how, during a period of royal debility in the 1830s, a jester was seen busily digging outside the gate of the palace. On the king's asking what he was doing, he replied that he was trying to find some of the hundreds of edicts daily sent out of the palace that were never heard of again. Yule, Narrative, p. 138 n. 2.

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hest of senior ministers themselves who sought to attack the activities of rival factions while they, their official and gentry clients, and princely allies continued to amass followers undisturbed. Unfortunately all edicts are directed at anonymous targets, so we have no way of relating them to factional conflicts in Min-ye-kyaw-din's reign, which in any case are understood only in vague outline. It is certain, however, that these prohibitions failed to stabilize the service system. In 1692 soldiers who had fallen into debt were being replaced by substitutes, often slaves, hired either by fellow platoon members or by relatives of the debtors. This practice maintained the nominal strength of each unit, but impaired its operational efficiency because the substitutes, often from inferior social strata, lacked a sense of group identification, not to mention specialized military training.127 Other references suggest that the nominal strength of many units was below the levels recorded in censuses in 1679 and 1683. As in earlier years, the lowest groups, which suffered from the combined effects of debt-slavery and upward mobility, were most seriously affected; whereas the highest ones were sometimes overfulfilled. Thus a 1691 edict de­ clared: I have heard that people belonging to the lady of Zei-ya-gyaw have entered the Shwei-pan-pan platoon [an elite royal guard unit] to do service. Great and noble kings have classified all their subjects into grades of low, middle, and high. If subjects belonging to one pla­ toon deceive ministers and secretaries and enter another platoon merely because they wish to do so, all my subjects will soon become dis­ ordered. Do not allow anyone from a low group or a middle group to indulge his desire to enter a high group. Only those who were registered [in the high group] in 1679 may remain. Anyone not so registered [together with his or her children] . . . shall be returned to the original low-status category. My infantry and cavalry platoons are now thoroughly confused, and the palmleaf registers are quite jumbled; and this has been going on for a long time. 128 Building on the work of Pye and on his own decree of 1679, MInye-kyaw-din proceeded to extend the discriminatory ruling on mixed ahmu-dan unions so that virtually the entire service population was officially programed for downward mobility to counteract the relent127 NL 1950, Edkt of 1054 wa-gaung 14 wax., ngan y.-ngk r. See too Edict of 1055 1st wa-zo 6 wan., gi τ.-gan r. In 1692, moreover, the crown established or confirmed procedures by which it could reclaim the services of legally sanctioned slaves whose masters died intestate. Edict of 1054 tazaung-mon 7 wax,. sA v.-sa r. 128 Ibid., Edict of 1053 kahson 11 wax., tigi v. Cf. HNY, p. 308.

174 I DECLINE, 1648-1752

less upward pressure. In 1691 he listed over two hundred ahmu-dan categories of all descriptions, which he divided into four broad strata (this despite the fact that his edict referred to "low, middle, and high"). Only if children were born to parents from different categories within the same stratum could they be registered on the basis of Tha-lun's old male-female principle. If the parents came from different strata, all their children would automatically be registered in the lower group.129 Similarly, Min-ye-kyaw-din modified the existing rule on the distribution of offspring born to female slaves and free male ahmu-dans. Whereas Tha-lun had ordered such offspring divided on the basis of the male-female principle,130 Min-ye-kyaw-din in 1686-1687 ordered them all put into royal service units.131 In short, we find two parallel but opposite movements: commoners sought to leave the main ahmudan groups to become either slaves or high-level ahmu-dans, while the crown sought to enlarge the main ahmu-dan units at the expense of both social extremes. Clearly the first movement continued to predominate, for the following note of desperation appears at the outset of an edict from mid1694: If this one-way flow of servicemen from low-status to high-status service groups, from troubled and hot ones \pu-ya] to calm and quiet ones [nyein-ya], continues much longer, will there be anyone 129

NL 1950, Edict of 1053 kahson 11 wax., ngi v.-nge r. The four strata were: a) elite guard and cavalry units (tbwei-thauk-sas and myin-sus); b) less prestigious guard and cavalry units, exorcists and doctors, and a variety of ceremonial attendants; c) compound guards, shieldmen, common infantrymen, artillerymen, lesser royal attendants, and hangers-on of officials; d) "ignoble platoon" people, including crown serfs, guards, jailers, boatmen, grasscutters, and keepers of horses and elephants. This edict reversed registration procedures established not only by Tha-lun, but also by Pye and Min-yekyaw-din himself. See this chapter nn. 112, 121 and NL, 1950, Edict of 1041 wagaung 4 wan.,gei v., which had permitted equal distribution of offspring born to certain "ignoble" males and females from six superior categories. The 1691 edict acknowledged its own innovative character when it permitted mixed offspring who had been registered according to earlier procedures in 1665-1666 or 1679 to retain their original registration. In other words, this new edict applied to people who were not registered in 1679 or who were born after that date. Cf. a variant text of the same edict in NL 627. 130 Cited in NL 1950, Edict of 1041 kahson 12 wax., gu r. The edict refers to an earlier ruling by Min-ye-kyaw-din's bo-daw, "royal grandfather," presumably Tha-lun. Registration of females with the mother may be deduced by comparing this edict with that of 1053 kahson 11 wax., ngei v. 131 Ibid., Edict of 1048 pya-tho 9 wax., nga r. Although the male-female principle was later restored for offspring of "ignoble" men and female slaves, the 1687 procedure apparently remained in force for all other units. Ibid., Edict of 1053 kahson 11 wax., ngei v.

DISORGANIZATION, 1660-1714 | 175

left whom we can still call an inferior-grade ahmu-dan> For generations kings have organized their subjects into platoons that are differentiated into hereditary grades of noble, medium, and base. . . . But many people, lacking self-control, have ignored these classifications and have done precisely as they please.132 This criticism of people who lacked "self-control" represented a rather damning indictment of the government's own inability to monitor the population. Alongside the inherent complexity and impracticality of the system of ahtnu-dan registration, corruption among departmental officers may explain the continuing ease with which low-level servicemen escaped their status.133 The edict of 1694 nonetheless introduced no significant change in the system of popular registration; it simply affirmed existing procedures and announced that a new census was underway to replace the now useless register of 1679.134 Palmleaf manuscripts that offer such rich administrative detail on the reigns of Tha-lun, Pye, and Min-ye-kyaw-din provide nothing comparable for Mln-ye-kyaw-din's son and successor, Sanei.135 However, several lines of indirect evidence suggest that this reign experienced continuing problems with ahtnu-dan organization. First, ministerial and princely autonomy under Sanei created the preconditions for tax abuses and factionalism. Second, when detailed edicts again become available in Tanin-ganwei's reign, the old problems of debtslavery, private service, and ahtnu-dan disorder are still very much in evidence.136 It is therefore unlikely that Sanei's reign would have witnessed any dramatic remission. Third, edicts by Tanin-ganwei and Mahadama-ya-za-di-pati indicate that their ancestor Sanei was concerned 132

Ibid., Edict of 1056 wa-zo 12 wan., si v. The aforementioned edict of 1691 lends support to such an interpretation, for it concluded by threatening "extremely severe punishment" (probably meaning execution) for any departmental secretary who failed to implement the new registration procedures strengthening main-line service units at the expense of higher ones. NL 1950, Edia of 1053 kahson 11 wax., ngei v. 134 MMOS, II, 60 claims that censuses were executed every ten years, but I have not found evidence of such regularity. After Tha-lun, references have been found to inquest documents (partial or complete) dated 1665, 1668, 1675, 1678-1679, 1683, 1685, 1694, 1698, 1709, 1711, 1714, 1732-1733, 1735, and 1737. However, it is not possible to determine which, if any, were part of a valleywide inquest comparable to that of 1635-1638, which were part of local or departmental inquests, and which were merely mechanical resubmissions of earlier documents. 135 Although NL 2208, ka v.-gu r. contains appointment orders from Sanei's reign, they are formulaic documents used throughout the Restored Toungoo and early Konbaung periods, with no information on conditions peculiar to the time of promulgation. 136 See below, section 4. 133

176 I DECLINE, 1648-1752

about disorganization in cavalry units and "ignoble platoons."137 Fourth, military reverses that began on a small scale in the early 1690s under Sanei's father continued during his reign, and more especially during the reigns of his son and grandson. These defeats stemmed in part from depletion of ahmu-dan ranks in the nuclear zone. Finally, only by making allowance for continuing manpower deple­ tion can one appreciate fully the agricultural problems that beset Up­ per Burma from Pindale's reign through the early eighteenth century. The irrigation system of Kyaukse (and possibly the Mu valley as well) required specialized maintenance operations throughout the year which were provided by a class of irrigation ahmu-dans organized in their own department. In addition, during two months in the dry season there was a mass levee of Kyaukse cultivators to clear silted-up irriga­ tion channels, to build new works, and to execute extensive repairs beyond the capacity of the irrigation servicemen. A medley of ahmudan units was obliged to provide materials and fixed quotas of men who labored under their own departmental heads and local irrigation officers.138 Now if the population registers that provided the basis for corvee assignments were seriously defective, if low and middle-grade ahmu-dans who provided the bulk of the corvees absconded, and if royal supervision over the irrigation service waned, thefragilenetwork of weirs and channels could only suffer. During the closing years of the Κδη-baung Dynasty, British officials estimated that up to 90 per­ cent of paddy land in some districts was removed from cultivation solely because of maladministration. Canals silted up, the mouths of channels widened into estuaries, and weirs were breached.139 A similar, albeit more gradual, decay may have affected certain dis­ tricts in the Restored Toungoo period. Starting in 1661—the year the Chinese ravaged irrigated lands on the south shore—one finds fre­ quent references to agricultural problems and unusually high rice prices 140 141 142 at Ava: such references appear in 1661, 1679, 1681-1682, 137

I O 3503, pt. 4,£/mv r. (p. 46 r.); NL 1950, Edict of 1090 1st wa-zo 14 wax., si

r.-v. 138

See discussion of irrigation administration in BL OR 3418, hkaw r.-iWv.; ZOK, p. 66; Bi Theln, comp., Ko-hkayaing, pp. 18-60 (early Κόη-baung records); Burma Gazeteer: Kyaukse, pp. 77-81, 122. 139 Searle, Gazeteer Mandalay, p. 104; Scott, Handbook, p. 255. Cf. Burma Gazeteer: Kyaukse, pp. 72-73, 80, emphasizing the fragility of precolonial weirs. 140 UK, III, 269: as a result of Chinese raids, one viss copper bought only 3 pyi of husked rice (about 13.5 pints). Several years later Pye was still complaining that the realm was in a "disturbed state" in the aftermath of the incursions. BL OR 3418,^» v. 141 UK, III, 303. That year a famed monk solicited rain by magical means on the north shore. Cf. Spiro, Buddhism, pp. 259-60. 142 UK, ΠΙ, 306. One viss copper bought 4 pyi of husked rice, but later none was available.

DISORGANIZATION, 1660-1714 | 177

1694-1695,143 1695-1696,144 and 1705-1706.145 Floods may have damaged irrigation works in 1714 and 1731,146 whereas in the 1740s the agricultural system virtually collapsed, large tracts reverted to waste, and royal granaries remained empty for years on end.147 In some of these years, poor rainfall was certainly the chief reason for rice shortages. The mid-1690s, for example, saw drought and famine in Siam as well as in Burma.148 Yet bad weather alone seems an insufficient explanation, for some years of famine in Burma saw abundance in neighboring Siam.149 Moreover, the contrast between the first sixty years of the Restored Toungoo Dynasty and the last ninety years is too striking to be interpreted without reference to administrative factors. Although the sources for the former period are far more detailed, I have found reference to but one famine before 1660—and this was due to severe drought that afflicted all lands around the Bay of Bengal for some years after 1630.150 Despite the very serious effects of this drought, it ushered in a period of centralization and administrative efficiency in Upper Burma, because Tha-lun devoted great attention to the irrigation network, and enjoyed better control over officialdom and the gentry than his successors. Indeed, the rapid expansion of the ahmu-dan population after 1635 presupposed a generally adequate rice supply. If this argument is valid, therefore, rice shortages at Ava during the latter part of the dynasty were, at least in part, a symptom of declining administrative efficiency. At the same time, of course, they must have become a major cause in their own right. Ahmu-dans and athis had to borrow money to buy rice for themselves and their families. This threw them into debt, made tax payments impossible, and obliged them to sell themselves and their families to powerful patrons. It cannot be coincidental that several years—most notably 1679-1682 and 1694— that saw high rice prices also produced lengthy edicts on indebtedness and ahmu-dan disorganization. It is against this background of poverty and periodic famine that the entire process of manpower dispersion must be viewed. 143

Ibid., p. 333. One viss apparently bought only 1.5 pyi. Ibid., p. 337; Dal, II, 375. One viss bought only 1 pyi. 145 UK, III, 379; HNY, p. 347. One viss may have bought only .25 pyi, though the monetary unit is not specified. 146 Yi Yi, Myan-ma, p. 5; MYG, p. 81. Cf. Burma Gazeteer: Kyaukse, p. 80. 147 See section 4, this chapter. 148 Busakorn, "Dynasty," pp. 43-44. 149 The reign of Narai, 1656-1688, in Siam was said to be prosperous agriculturally. HS, pp. 36, 41. 150 HaU, "Daghregister," pp. 140-41. 144

178 I DECLINE, 1648-1752

The Role of Religious Resources The attraction that monasticism held for many commoners in the late Toungoo period can also be explained only with reference to economic conditions. One will recall that in the 1590s and to a lesser extent in the 1630s famine and warfare had encouraged an exodus into religion as well as to secular refuges. The following anecdote attributed to Naya-waya's reign shows the same attractions still operating. A young monk in Upper Burma had been considering withdrawal from the Order when he chanced to overhear a young girl praying that she might never marry a lu-dwet, an ex-monk. When asked to explain this curious aspiration, she replied: How could a man who quits the Order not be a fool? Any monk can live comfortably with raiment and a shady dwelling donated by others. If he is the type who likes to study, he may. But if he wishes, he can also sleep to his heart's content wrapped (?) in his robe. Since this is so, there is no greater fool than a monk who volunteers for a life of toil to support a wife. If I should marry such a fool, wouldn't I be in a sorry state?151 That a monastic career appealed particularly to the poorest strata is suggested by Mln-ye-kyaw-din's prohibition on ordinations of men from "ignoble platoons." This ban was repeated by his son and grandson.152 Nonetheless, Tanin-ganwei's edict suggests that some low-class ahmu-dans succeeded in becoming monks, just as they succeeded in thwarting royal prohibitions on entering debt-slavery. Monastic disputes during the early eighteenth century also may point to declining control over both the quality and size of the scmgha. Not unlike gentry leaders who took advantage of lax central supervision to enhance their followings, in the absence of restraint from the capital senior monks of different monastic traditions were in the habit of laying down their own interpretations of the monastic code and forming their disciples into exclusive groupings. Sanei's reign saw a violent dispute between forest-dwelling and village-dwelling monks,153 as well 151

TL, pp. 179-80. See this chapter n. 120, and NL 1950, Edict of 1090 1st wa-zo 14 wax., si r. 153 HNY, p. 358; TL, p. 187. Forest-village rivalry dates back to the earliest phase of Burmese history, but it was usually benign. The forest monks of the eighteenth century, it should be noted, were organizationally and economically distinct from Mahakassapa's sect of the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries. The most sensitive analysis of monastic disputes in the late Toungoo period, and their relation to earlier monastic history, appears in Ferguson, "Symbolic Dimensions," pp. 173-82. See too Mendelson, Sangha and State, pp. 58-61. 152

DISORGANIZATION, 1660-1714 | 179

as the beginning of the famed controversy between those who believed that novices on going out to the villages for alms should wear the monastic costume over one shoulder, and those who favored covering both shoulders. Although the robe-wrapping dispute rent the sangha, "he who could have done something, the king [that is, Sanei], Patron 154 of the Faith, remained inactive." Neither of his successors enforced uniformity, so that by the end of the dynasty the one-shoulder and two-shoulder sects had become virtually separate sanghas, whose offi­ cials may have received royal confirmation.155 Writing of the last five Toungoo kings, the Κόη-baung religious historian Maha-damd-thingyan claimed, 'They showed no discrimination in their patronage; as they say, bricks and stones were all mixed together."156 The contrast is obvious between their behavior and Tha-lun's purges in the name of orthodoxy. At the same time, there is scant evidence to support the suggestion, derived from a study of early Burmese history, that the continuous transfer of resources from the secular sphere to the tax-exempt reli­ gious sector became the chief institutional cause of dynastic decline in the Restored Toungoo era. 157 Only two brief orders attempting to limit entry into the sahgha after 1660 have come to light,158 which suggests that in comparison with the explosion of debt-slavery, this problem was of limited import. As in the 1590s (or again, as during the Japanese occupation in World War II) the growing number of false monks was symptomatic of more fundamental and antecedent disorders in secular administration. Nor is there any indication that Toungoo religious institutions enjoyed exclusive control over a signif­ icant number of lay cultivators. During the Pagan and, apparendy, the Ava periods, monastic lands had been cultivated by religious slaves whose exemption from government tax and corvee obligations had made that status particularly attractive. However, by the eighteenth 154

TL, p. 186. TL, pp. 187-90; Law, History of Religion, pp. 122-27; MMOS, III, 16. The last source says Alaung-hpaya appointed separate officials, but it is unlikely that he initiated this practice, as his general policy was highly conservative. 156 TL, p. 184. Cf. Ferguson, "Symbolic Dimensions," p. 11: "the Sangha acts as a cybernetic sensor for the state of society. . . . Royal power and national success .. . are the most efFective correctives to further tendency toward reformist fissioning." 157 For more detailed discussion see Aung Thwin, "Sasana Reform," pp. 671-88; Lieberman, "Religious Wealth," pp. 753-69; and subsequent exchanges in JAS 40, 1 and 40, 4. 15 « NL 1950, Edict of 1041 kahson 12 wax.,^* r., and Edict of 1090, 1st wa-zo 14 wax., si r. The latter also refers to a no longer extant order by Sanei maintaining MInye-kyaw-din's ban. 155

180 I DECLINE, 1648-1752

century such slaves had become a small, semi-outcaste community, descendants of rebels and criminals, to whom self-dedication, if not unknown, was unusual.159 Most glebe properties were now farmed by members of the general population, ahmu-dans or athis, who paid the main land tax to the Religion but who were still liable to secular platoon leaders for personal service and for departmental dues. Of course, Restored Toungoo kings still lost the valuable land tax on religious properties. But it has been suggested that religious acreages in Upper Burma contracted during the sixteenth century.160 Thereafter fresh donations were made at a reduced rate: between 11,500 and 28,600 donative acres have been identified for the Restored Toungoo era.161 This compares to estimates for the Pagan period of between 62,000 and over 300,000 acres.162 Much of the merit Toungoo kings obtained arose through thefinancingof alms and construction projects out of current cash income. Such arrangements allowed the throne to amass good kamma for itself and for its subjects through static expenditure, without losing control over an ever increasing percentage of the kingdom's cultivated land.163 (Conceivably these donative patterns reflected the commercial tradition of Pegu, where the First Dynasty consolidated itself in the sixteenth century.) Finally, it should be remembered that the procedure whereby the ecclesiastical commissioner, rather than agents of local abbots, collected certain glebe land taxes also diminished the sanghtfs economic autonomy.164 As will be seen in Chapter 5, following the collapse of the Restored Toungoo state, Alaung-hpaya was able to build one of the most powerful military machines in Burmese history by reconcentrating secular resources. Regaining control over sangha lands through monastic re159 See inter alia Than Tun, "Administration under Tha-lun," p. 187; Koenig, "Konbaung Polity," pp. 128-29, 259; BL OR 3464, p. 139 r.; Sangermano, Burmese Empire, p. 156; I 1095 in B, II, 638. Several edicts—including NL 1950, Edict of 1043 tazaung-mon 5 wax., ga v.-nga r.; Edict of 1053 kahson 11 wax., tuju v.—show that matings between ahmu-dans and religious slaves took place. Yet no edicts complain that ahmu-dans sought to escape their duties by entering pagoda-slave status. 160 See Chapter 1 nn. 119, 120. 161 For sources, see Lieberman, "Religious Wealth," p. 760 n. 39. 162 Than Tun, Hkit-haung, pp. 181, 183; Aung Thwin, "Sasana Reform," p. 677. 163 Indeed, if Aung Thwin is correct that the "maximum cultivable land" in Upper Burma during the Pagan and Ava periods was 460,000 acres, the percentage of total land owned by religious institutions must have decreased appreciably after 1550. By 1885 the total cultivated acreage of Upper Burma was 3,000,000 but religious dedications after 1550 showed only a limited growth over sixteenth-centuryfigures(Lieberman, "Religious Wealth," pp. 755, 759). One suspects, however, that 460,000 acres was much too low even for 1300 A.D. 164 See Chapter 2 nn. 158, 159.

PRINCELY DISSIDENCE TO 1714 | 181

forms or confiscation was of no particular interest to him, which again argues for the limited political significance of religious wealth in the Toungoo period. SECTION THREE. PRINCELY DISSIDENCE TO 1714

Princes were a far greater threat than the sangha, for they, unlike the monkhood, had both political motive and organizational capacity systematically to enlarge their resources at the expense of the Restored Toungoo throne. Disorganization of royal administration appears to have aided the princes in three ways. If increasing burdens drove people to abandon irrigated service lands near Ava, less productive nuclear zone districts that were traditionally awarded princely myo-zas (such as Pyinzi, Badon, Amyin, Pindale) would have attracted a share of the migrants. This occurred on a significant scale during the crisis years 1659-1662, and may have continued thereafter. Despite the danger of abuse by appanage holders, the life of the average cultivator in these districts was probably easier than that of a royal serviceman living nearer the capital. Princely appanages normally did not furnish onerous corvees for irrigation works (they usually lay outside the main irrigated zones) or for the construction of city walls or major pagodas, which were the responsibility of the sovereign.165 Even if there were little migration and the decline in royal resources resulted entirely from in situ disorganization, princes stood to benefit if their own force levels merely remained static. But there is evidence that the princes' standing guard units and their household staffs at the capital (as opposed to their appanage populations) attracted a disproportionate share of debt-slaves and private retainers. Service duties in princely households, which were typically larger and wealthier than those of officials, were comparatively light. Further, they offered opportunities for rapid advancement in the event of a prince's coming to power. At least three edicts specifically criticized royal sons, grandsons, and other royal relatives for buying slaves and aiding deserters.166 Finally, as ministerial autonomy increased, princes found it easier to 165

It is possible that princes, like ministers, owned private estates apart from their official appanages, and that such estates also would have been settled with slaves and absconders. 166 NL 1950, Edict of 1043 tazaung-mon 5 wax., ga r.-v., quoting an earlier order; Edict of 1043 tagu 8 wan., nga r.-v.; Edict of 1090 1st wa-zo 14 wax., saw r. See too Edict of 1041 kahson 12 wax., ^K V., criticizing princes and ministers. One would like to know the degree to which Restored Toungoo princes profited from growing commercial wealth, but no information has come to light.

182 I DECLINE, 1648-1752

detach officials from their allegiance to the king and/or his heir appar­ ent. Despite the decay of administration, most princes still could not attempt coups without the support of guard units at the capital. They therefore sought to ally themselves with disgrunded elements in the Council of Ministers, the Privy Council, or departmental agencies in direct control of military units. The cost of unsuccessful conspiracies was formidable: rebel officials and ahmu-dans were turned over to the king's elephants, which were trained to torture their victims for some time before actually killing them. Disloyal princes, whose sacred blood could not be shed like that of commoners, were tied in a sack and dropped in the river167—the original political liquidation. Nonetheless, these deterrents became in­ creasingly ineffective after the mid-seventeenth century. Whereas the first six decades of the Restored Dynasty saw but three examples of princely dissidence,168 the years 1660-1715 witnessed at least eleven coup attempts and conspiracies. Although most aborted at an early stage, one in 1673—which left the palace haunted by ghosts of slain soldiers—nearly dethroned Min-ye-kyaw-din. To a considerable extent, this upsurge in princely dissidence was encouraged by a weakening of royal legitimacy. Neither Pye nor Μϊηye-kyaw-din had been born to a queen, nor had either been designated heir apparent by his predecessor. By contrast, the legitimacy of Sanei and Tanin-ganwei was beyond question, for both were sons of annointed queens and both had been formally chosen to succeed. After Sanei's accession, princely dissidence diminished. Yet it would be misleading to judge relations between the throne and the princes entirely in terms of royal descent and formal appoint­ ment, because even after Sanei's accession rebellions occurred more frequendy than in the opening phase of the dynasty, and kings made unprecedented concessions to their relatives. This reflected the contin­ ued growth of debt-slavery and the decline of royal administration, which altered the politico-military balance between the throne and the princes as a whole. However legitimate his original credentials, if a king seemed vulnerable, rival princes could justify usurpation in terms of their own and their victim's kamma. Thus when Pye invited senior abbots to sanction his coup, they tacidy complied by citing an apho­ rism: "Although a man strives for something, if his kamma is inadei«7 On punishments, see UK, III, 248; HNY, pp. 274, 275, 295-96, 305; Harvey, History, pp. 194, 338-39. 168 The revolt by Min-ye-deik-b4, 1628; the revolt by Shin-talok, 1647; and a sus­ pected plot that never reached the military stage by a prince-governor of Martaban, 1638 (RUL 45235, Edict 77, 1000 tazaung-mon 3 wax., pp. 66-67).

PRINCELY DISSIDENCE TO 1714 | 183

quate, he won't achieve it. And if he doesn't strive for something but he has lots of good kamma, he will attain it." 1 6 9 The throne's difficulties with princely opposition, and the relation of that opposition to more general problems of service disorganization and ministerial autonomy, found clear expression in Sanei's reign. The opening years of the eighteenth century were dominated by that king's uneasy association with his younger brother. Sanei, as we have seen,170 was loath to honor his father's dying injunction to designate his younger brother heir apparent, for he preferred his own son, the future King Tanin-ganwei. Yet a variety of factors argued against confrontation. The royal military system was under pressure from frontier uprisings, famine, and epidemics.171 Sanei's brother had a sizable appanage in­ come and a large body of private military retainers. Their father's tes­ tament gave the brother's claim considerable moral authority in min­ isterial circles. At the same time, he maintained a respectful posture toward Sanei, giving no cause for offense. Sanei therefore turned to stratagems and compromises by which he sought to preserve his young son's claims while avoiding an open rup­ ture. To pacify the opposition, he gave his brother the insignia and retainers of an heir apparent; yet he refused to designate the brother's dwelling by the title "Eastern House." 172 In 1711 Sanei again honored his brother by allowing him and his "queen" to establish at Pagan (downriver from Ava) an independent court in the tradition of six­ teenth-century bayins, with royal honors and without the usual pro­ vincial deputies. Later that year, Sanei formally elevated his son to the heir apparency at Ava and gave him suitable military forces. The stage was thus set for a confrontation between the brother at Pagan and the son at Ava following Sanei's death. 173 169

HNY, p. 276. Section 1 of this chapter. 171 On uprisings, see Chapter 4. On epidemics, which seem to have been most severe in the capital and its environs, see HNY, pp. 341, 348. There were also mysterious alarums, accompanied by prophylactic (?) noise-making, which may have been related to disease. HNY, pp. 345, 348, 350. Any disruption of normal service rotas, of course, would have increased the incentive to enter private service. 172 Moreover, although it was built on a site suitable for an heir apparent^ palace, certain decorations in the brother's dwelling were painted red, which seems to have departed from heir apparent tradition. At the same time Sanei promoted his son's au­ thority by conferring on him the exalted title "Lord of Great Hpon" (hpdn-hyi-thi-ashin). 173 HNY, p. 357, says the brother was awarded Pagan 29 October 1710 and took possession 20 January 1711. LBHK, p. 191, says the award was made October or November 1709; but a one-digit transcriptional error in the latter source probably ex­ plains this discrepancy. The account of Sanei's relation with this brother derives from MMOS, Π, 233-34; HNY, pp. 344 ff.; UK, III, 394 ff.; LBHK, pp. 9, 190-92. 170

184 I DECLINE, 1648-1752

It is instructive to contrast Sanei's evasive behavior with that of Anauk-hpet-lun in similar circumstances a century earlier. Anauk-hpetlun also broke a deathbed promise to his father that he would make his younger brother (Tha-lun) heir apparent. However, Anauk-hpetlun, a successful warrior in control of a yet vigorous administration, did not resort to stratagems to conceal his intentions; and his brother gained no recognition of his quite legitimate claims while Anauk-hpetlun was still alive. As expected, Sanei's death in 1714 precipitated a full-scale war between forces at Pagan and Ava not unlike that which had occurred in 1582-1584 between Ava and Pegu. This was the only such territorially based princely uprising of the Restored Toungoo era, which is not surprising given the unusual status of the Pagan uncle.174 Eventually abmu-dans loyal to Tanln-ganwei (who took no personal role in the campaign) succeeded in capturing Pagan and crushing the revolt.175 Yet not only in the broad concessions Sanei had felt obliged to make to his brother, but also in its denouement, this affair showed the weakened state of the monarchy. Commanders from Prome and Pegu were allowed to continue in office, although they had been equivocal in their support for Tanin-ganwei.176 These and other areas would shortly declare their independence. Within the nuclear zone the campaign of 1714 further disorganized ahmu-dan ranks without providing compensatory deportations. Moreover, Tanin-ganwei proved unable to halt the growth of ministerial autonomy as championed by the indomitable Twln-thin-hmu-gyi, the chief architect and beneficiary of victory. Thus the crown's problems between about 1650 and 1714 had a circular quality: disorganization of royal administration encouraged succession struggles, which in turn allowed ministers to hold the balance of power. Even officials such as the Twin-thin-hmu-gyi, who was committed to the heir apparent, benefited insofar as the crown developed their power as a guarantee of the heir apparent^ accession. Yet the insecurity of ministerial tenure, in combination perhaps with changing commercial patterns, led to manifold pressures on the royal population, further weakening the service system and encouraging factional competition. These problems would intensify and destroy the monarchy during the second quarter of the eighteenth century. 174 One will recall that Pye's usurpation, though it had elements of the traditional bayin challenge, was organized at Ava. So too Tha-lun's campaign of 1628-1629 was based not on a secure provincial seat, but on control of his trans-Salween field forces. 175 Although Smin Dhaw, leader of the Peguan revolt of 1740, claimed descent from the Pagan uncle, the uncle may have died after fleeing downriver from Pagan. See HNY, pp. 366-68, 383. '7* HNY, p. 368.

FINAL REIGNS | 185 SECTION FOUR. THE FINAL REIGNS

Tanin-ganwei's reign (1714-1733) was far from the period of har­ mony pictured in the chronicles' stylized eulogy.177 Most of the limited administrative materials that survive from his 178 reign speak of disorder and population losses. Edicts from 1715 179 and 1728 warned against ministerial practices that were causing hardship among the royal population. Furthermore, for the first time since the 1660s, military demands may have become a major factor driving people from royal service, for the throne suffered a series of stunning defeats after 1723 that heralded the dissolution of the em­ pire. 180 The longest extant edict of Tanin-ganwei's reign, dated 8 June 1728, 181 dealt primarily with the issue of population control. Once again "ignoble" servicemen were forbidden to become either slaves or monks. No more upward mobility of any type within the service hi­ erarchy was to be permitted.182 Slave children whose parents had been registered in military units were to be redeemed and returned to royal service.183 Slaves from various platoons who had been redeemed but who were hiding out were to be identified and disciplined. Freed slaves belonging to no service unit were to be turned over to royal officials for registration and enrollment. Most significantly, this edict shows that elite soldiers—cavalrymen, infantrymen, musketeers, royal body­ guards, shieldmen, and compound-guards—were still leaving govern­ ment service to seek protection under princes, princesses, and officials. Henceforth no more royal soldiers were to become slaves of the king's relatives or ministers; all those serving with ministers or headmen were 177

The eulogy, derived partly from Woodward, Book of Gradual Sayings, II, 84-85, appears at HNY, p. 375. Much as in Siam, a bitter determination to assign complete responsibility for the kingdom's collapse to the last ruler may explain the unrealistic appraisal of his predecessor. Cf. Busakorn, "Dynasty," pp. 348-50. 178 ZOK, p. 98, referring to double taxation at Toungoo and Martaban. See above, p. 162. 179 NL 1950, Edict of 1090 nayon 2 wax., su v.-sei r.; Edict of 1090, 1st wa-zo 14 wax., saw r.-v., referring to unauthorized commissons in legal cases and to excessive demands by appanage holders. 180 See Chapter 4. 181 NL 1950, Edict of 1090 1st wa-zo 14 wax., se τ.-san r. 182 However, servicemen already registered in a higher platoon could remain if a) this change of platoon had been recorded in the 1679 census (the same provision appeared in Mln-ye-kyaw-din's 1691 edict); b) their transfer had express authorization from a high-ranking minister. 183 This was one offivepossible situations for redemption of ahmu-dan children that the edict sought to define and regulate. If both parents were not of military ahmu-dan status, redemption was more difficult.

186 I DECLINE, 1648-1752

to be redeemed and, by implication, returned to their original platoons.184 Although, as usual, the targets of these edicts were anonymous, they probably reflected factional rivalries that again developed around the succession issue in the latter part of Tanln-ganwei's reign. The dominant faction was led by the old Twln-thin-hmu-gyl. As committed supporters of Sanei, he and his family had devoted themselves to securing the succession for Tanin-ganwei. The Twin-thinhmu-gyi himself played the leading role in the ceremony whereby Taninganwei had been made heir apparent.185 After the 1714 revolt was suppressed, passages in two reliable sources, the Law-ka-byu-ha kyan and the Htnan-nan chronicle, raise the possibility that Tanin-ganwei elevated all three of the Twin-thin-hmu-gyi's daughters to serve as senior queens.186 If so, this was indeed remarkable, for kings normally married close relatives to intensify their connection to the royal race.187 In addition to directing the Council of Ministers—which gave him ultimate responsibility for royal trading ventures and growing customs collections at Syriam—the Twin-thin-hmu-gyi took direct personal control of six major departmental agencies concerned inter alia with capital security and provincial taxation.188 There are strong hints in 184 The only exception concerned slaves attached to administrators in the provinces, who could remain in bondage pending their master's return to Ava. 185 Bearing the title Let-ya-yan-dameik (LBHK, p. 207), the future Twln-thln-hmugyl officiated at the appointment ceremonies described at LBHK, p. 192; UK, III, 39697; HNY, p. 359. 186 H N Y , p . 3 6 6 (as well as M Y G , p . 7 3 ) , says he elevated as queens three sisters, w h o were entitled Maha-min-gala-dei-wi, Thi-ri-dei-wi, and Sanda-dei-wi. They are n o t identified as his sisters, in contrast t o a w o m a n so identified w h o m he did n o t marry and w h o received the title o f Et-ga-mahei-thi. H N Y , p . 366, also refers t o t h e Twinthin-hmu-gyi as t h e king's "royal father-in-law" (yauk-bkama-daw). Further, L B H K , p . 2 5 3 , t h e earliest available source, explicitly identifies t h e second queen Thi-ri-(thudami-)dei-wi as the Twin-thln-hmu-gyi's daughter; and again contrasts her family status with that o f t h e king's younger sister Thi-ri-rnahei-thi ( = > Et-gS-mahei-thi). T h a t Tanln-ganwei's queens were t h e daughters o f t h e Twln-thin-hmu-gyl therefore seems clear. Unfortunately, however, H N Y , p . 3 7 4 , refers t o his second and third queens as his "royal father's daughters," indicating that they were offspring n o t of the Twin-thlnhmu-gyl, b u t o f Sanei. Unless passages were miscopied o r unless we make t h e unlikely assumption that w e are dealing with t w o different sets of queens, there seems n o way t o reconcile these interpretations. I n indirect support o f the first set of citations, a list of Sanei's daughters at H N Y , p p . 363-64, fails t o identify any o f them as married t o Tanin-ganwei. 187 There is no indication that either the Twln-thln-hmu-gyl or his wife had royal blood. 188 See LBHK, p. 207, MMOS, II, 295. His famous title derived from his control of interior palace guards known as atwin-thin. He also ate Pindale township, normally reserved for princes.

FINALREIGNS I 187

the chronicles that the old man dominated his putative son-in-law, who is portrayed as a placid, gende soul, easily influenced.189 To dominate the king in an era of princely and ministerial auton­ omy, however, was not the same as to control the court. The Twinthin-hmu-gyi wished to pass the throne to Tanin-ganwei's son, the future king Maha-dama-ya-za-di-patl. This prince had a small retinue, he was young and inexperienced, and he promised to be easily molded by the Twin-thin-hmu-gyi in the tradition of his father. However, Tanin-ganwei's younger brother, who was a mature prince with nu­ merous offspring and a substantial independent military establishment, also sought the succession. And a number of senior ministers opposed to the Twin-thin-hmu-gyi were quick to ally themselves with the brother in order to frustrate the chief minister.190 Thus a serious split devel­ oped that was almost an exact replication of the split in Sanei's reign: in both instances, the throne and leading ministers favored the king's son, but the sovereign's younger brother and an allied group of offi­ cials stood in opposition.191 Apparently issued at the height of the succession controversy,192 Tanin-ganwei's aforementioned edicts against slavery and private service may have been directed against the king's brother and/or his ministerial allies. The Twin-thin-hmu-gyi and his clients probably accumulated debt-slaves like everyone else; and it is unreasonable to imagine that they would have sought to deny them­ selves this facility. Presumably they were primarily concerned to keep intact those departmental agencies that they themselves controlled. 189 See t h e account of the fire at Ava in 1720, H N Y , p p . 369-70, and t h e eulogy at H N Y , p . 3 7 5 , which, t h o u g h stylized, contrasts with Sanei's eulogy. 1 9 0 See M M O S , Π, 254-56, 264, 276-77, 295-96; L B H K , pp. 192-94. Actually, Mahadamii-ya-za-di-pati was t h e second choice as heir. T h e death from smallpox o f his full elder brother, the eater of Yamethin, in t h e 1720s (?) apparently kindled t h e ambition of his uncle, the Badon prince. U T i n provides n o names of the uncle's clients o r sup­ porters, but they probably included the t w o chief ministers Zei-yi-thin-gyan and Letwe-bi-nan-thu, w h o were deposed in 1733. See L B H K , p . 2 0 2 . i9i wj,y (Ji(J Sanei burden his son with the same dilemma he had h a d t o face? T o bolster Tanin-ganwei's prospects against the Pagan uncle, Sanei had intentionally given Tanin-ganwei's younger brother the township of Badon and large forces so that the t w o together could overcome their uncle (Sanei probably failed t o give all these forces di­ rectly t o Tanln-ganwei for fear he might turn o n his father; balance between princes was t h e overriding strategy). Badon dutifully supported his brother in 1714, b u t there­ after t h e power that had been a blessing turned into a problem for Tanln-ganwei. 192 T h e chief edict was issued 8 June 1728. O u r earliest and generally most reliable source, L B H K , p . 195, indicates the Badon prince died in late 1728 o r early 1729. H N Y , p . 3 7 2 , claims h e died in 1727, in which case t h e edict, if it bore any direct relation t o t h e Badon prince, probably sought t o reorganize and recapture debt-slaves and retainers o w n e d by t h e dead m a n o r his clients.

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This time, unlike 1714, however, the issue was resolved peacefully. The king's brother died suddenly sometime between 1727 and early 1729, 193 whereupon Tanln-ganwei felt free to appoint his son Mahadama-ya-za-di-pati as heir apparent. Shortly thereafter the old chief minister and the king himself also passed away. Yet the polarization in government continued, because rival networks perpetuated their re­ spective allegiances under new leaders. Collapse under Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati Direction of the Twin-thin-hmu-gyi's faction now passed to his pow­ erful son-in-law Maung Pu (Brother Pu), who as we have seen came from an aristocratic family long allied to that of the Twin-thin-hmugyl.194 In the words of the informed author Pagan Wun-dauk U Tin, Maung Pu controlled "virtually half the kingdom" through his family's authority over strategic guard units and through his own position as capital governor (myo-wun).195 As soon as Maha-damd-ya-za-di-pati ascended the throne at the unusually young age of 18, 1 9 6 he agreed to name Maung Pu as chief minister, together with Maung Pu's brotherin-law. The latter was the son of the Twin-thln-hmu-gyl and, along with Maung Pu, natural heir to his father's wealth and authority.197 These two officials promptly moved against their enemies in the Council of Ministers, deposing senior men who had sympathized with Tanin-ganwei's brother, and incorporating junior officials into their own client network. We may gauge the uncertainty of political su­ premacy from the fact that for seven days after ascending the throne, Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati refused to eat anything from the palace kitchens for fear of being poisoned. Moreover, inside and outside the capital and on all roads leading to Ava, heavily armed troops were stationed to deter coup attempts by rival princes and their supporters.198 As Maung Pu's faction consolidated their authority, they showed scant regard for the young king's sensibilities. In 1735 they proceeded to organize an elite thousand-man military force without bothering to 193

See previous note. See above, section 1. 195 MMOS, Π, 295. In 1733 Maung Pu bore the title Let-ya-yan-dathu, which changed in 1734 to Thi-rf-zei-yi-naw-yahta. 196 HNY, p. 406. Note the obvious misprint. Cf. MMOS, II, 253; SHDMA, p. 198. 197 After promoting him from interior minister, Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati entitled the son Thi-ri-zei-y4-kyaw-din and awarded him at least two departments his father had directed. See LBHK, p. 209; IO 115 jet. r.-v. 19 « MMOS, II, 276-77. 194

FINAL REIGNS | 189

seek Maha-dama-ya-za-di-patfs authorization.199 It is uncertain whether these soldiers were abmu-dans who had left the king's service to become slaves and private retainers of Maung Pu and allied officials; or whether they were enrolled in royal regiments direcdy controlled by Maung Pu's clients. In either case, this project was a serious miscalculation, for it frightened the king and played into the hands of Maung Pu's enemies. Again, we lack adequate information on their political background. Most probably Maung Pu's opponents included officials who had once supported Tanin-ganwei's brother and who had escaped the purge of 1733. They were led, however, by a homo novus—Maha-dama-ya-za-di-patfs former tutor Ya-za-nan-da, whom the king had elevated to interior minister in 1733. In time-honored fashion, the interior minister used his unique personal influence over the king to frustrate the work of chief ministers. With some justification, perhaps, he apparently convinced the young sovereign that Maung Pu's formation of a private army was the first step toward usurpation of the throne.200 He persuaded Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati to break with Maung Pu's faction, and in January of 1736 succeeded in obtaining edicts of death against Maung Pu, the Twin-thin-hmu-gyl's son, an interior minister (who may have disputed Ya-za-nan-da's control of the Privy Council);201 the director of the Privy Treasury, the minister of infantry, and a sixth official of unknown rank. Before they could organize resistance, all these men—virtually the leading ministers in the kingdom—were suddenly arrested and executed. At Ya-za-nan-dd's instigation, the king also exiled numerous abmu-dAns and junior officials who had visited the "conspirators'" houses, while sending their families to join the elephant-fodder corps.202 Shortly thereafter, the Hman-nan chronicle claims, the countryside became unmanageable and royal authority declined yet further: When wise men learned [of these executions], they began to say, "Now the country will become disordered." And from that day the countryside became disturbed. As Ava's impending doom drew near, 199

Ibid., pp. 277-78, 295-96. MMOS, II, 295-96, claims Maung Pu intended to use the army against Mon rebels, but as the Pegu rebellion started only in 1740, this reasoning seems specious. MYG, p. 114, confirms that he was charged with plotting against the king. 201 Again this would accord with the hypothesis presented in this chapter nn. 32, 35. 202 MYG, pp. 114-15. Cf. more general accounts at LBHK, p. 209; HNY, p. 376; Dwayawadi Hsaya-daw, "Ayei-daw-bon," p. 135. None of these accounts explains what forces Ya-zi-nan-di relied upon to carry off his coup, or why it did not meet with more spirited resistance. In the event, it turned out to be a pyrrhic victory. 200

190 I DECLINE, 1648-1752

[the king] longed for his dead chief minister . . ., saying, "If Brother Pu were here now, things would not be like this." 203 As an official compilation of the succeeding Κόη-baung Dynasty, this chronicle had a vested interest in demeaning the last Toungoo king and enhancing the reputation of his victim, Maung Pu. Yet it is likely that the executions did contribute to a growing malaise among wide sections of the nuclear zone elite. Although Ya-za-nan-da quickly staffed senior positions with his own followers, patronage^nd family ties engendered strong residual loyalties among many officials and headmen traditionally allied to the Twin-thin-hmu-gyi. Moreover, among those motivated not by sentiment but by calculation, the realization grew that the purge was in fact symptomatic of the growing weakness and isolation of the crown. Already Maha-dama-ya-za-di-patfs forces had suffered major reverses against rebels in Chiengmai. Then, im­ mediately after the executions of 1736, Manipuris began raiding Up­ per Burma itself. In combination with the disorganization caused by the purge, these events further confused the service registers, under­ mined the military system, and kindled fears that mankind was revert­ ing to the dreaded anarchy that attended Nan-da-bayin's fall and that, by tradition, had preceded Mahasammata's election. Rumors began to spread that the king had fallen into the hands of evil men. Under Yaza-nan-da's influence he had allegedly begun to drink, to hunt, to fish, and to indulge in other ignoble practices contrary to the usages of former kings and to the obligations of a dhamma-raja.204 These were stylized charges205 significant not so much for their accuracy (no doubt they were highly exaggerated), as for their effect in undermining royal legitimacy and destroying popular respect for the king. It will be re­ called that the fortunes of the realm were considered an outer mani­ festation of the king's personal adherence to dhamma. As in the 1590s or 1660s, the appearance of major disorder, famine, or military re­ verses was ipso facto proof that the ruler had violated his coronation vows and forfeited claims to veneration. Agricultural collapse naturally deepened popular forebodings. Be­ cause it was preoccupied with factional disputes and tributary revolts, the throne may have failed to repair properly channels and weirs dam203

HNY, p. 376. Cf. LBHK, p. 4; MMOS, II, 264, 278-79. See, for example, Dwayawadi Hsaya-daw, "Ayei-daw-bon," p. 135, blaming Yaza-nan-da's son; LBHK, p. 4; AAm, pp. 3, 9; AA-L, p. 17; BL OR 3464, p. 139 v. 205 Before each fell from power, similar accusations were leveled at the last Mon king Taka-yut-pi (r. 1526-1539), Tabin-shwei-hti, and Singu (r. 1776-1782) in Burma, and at Ekkathat (r. 1758-1767) in Siam. On the political significance of royal intoxication in Java, see Schrieke, Studies, II, 88 Sf. 204

FINAL REIGNS | 191

aged by floods in 1731. In 1742 a second flood inundated capital districts, causing severe crop damage. The price of husked rice rose so that one kyat of silver bought only three pyi—apparently about 2 percent of its normal value—and many starved.206 Beginning that same year, Peguan rebels launched regular incursions into the north, which made cultivation in certain areas virtually impossible.207 The crown had to suspend its customary distribution of rice to famine-stricken civilians in order to conserve stocks for the army, then engaged north and south of the capital. By 1749 the price of rice was triple its 1742 level and showed no signs of stabilizing.208 Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati sought to compensate by increasing taxes on his remaining subjects, but this was obviously self-defeating. Instead of the time-honored tenth, collectors were authorized to demand a fourth of the rice crop.209 Royal agents also seized rice from private merchants, and threatened to enslave owners of fisheries and gardens who failed to meet revised tax schedules.210 In response to these pressures, migration, debt-slavery, and private service now reached epidemic proportions. The first year the Peguans ravaged Upper Burma over a thousand refugees entered the service of the king of Arakan.211 More followed in subsequent years, to Pegu212 as well as to the western littoral. Those remaining in the capital area attached themselves to whichever queens, princes, or ministers could supply them with rice and shield them from royal exactions. Thus the "Maha-ya-zawin-gyaw" chronicle relates: At that time [c. 1746] the common people sought protection by becoming retainers of various queens and princes such as the chief queen, the king's brother, his sons, and the northern palace ruler [Ya-za-nan-da]. . . . As the various groups of private retainers grew, they fell to quarreling with one another. Many were wounded and died, until their respective heads disciplined them and restored order.213 206 MYG, p. 145. Cf. Yi Yi, Myan-ma, pp. 27, 31. The latter dates the floods to 1741 and refers to a drought in 1742. *>7 HNY, pp. 385, 401-402. 208 MYG, p. 249. 209 MMOS, II, 258, 261. 210 Ibid., II, 258; Harvey, History, p. 211, quoting local tradition; Yi Yi, Myan-ma, pp. 98-99; HNY, p. 393. 211 Dwayawadi Hsaya-daw, "Ayel-daw-bon," p. 132. 212 MYG, p. 249; AAm, pp. 219-20. 213 MYG, pp. 172-73. According to Dwayawadi Hsaya-daw, "Ayei-daw-bon," p. 134, in 1753 three refugee ministers entering Arakan had a combined private following of 2,000 people.

192 I DECLINE, 1648-1752

Because the remaining royal servicemen were too exhausted to execute tasks that were normally the responsibility of the throne, the king had to request his relatives and ministers to commit their private slaves and retainers.214 In much the same fashion the retinues of Nan-da-bayin's relatives had mushroomed as the First Dynasty drew to a close. Although contemporaries blamed Maha-dama-ya-za-di-patf s lack of virtue for the dynasty's misfortunes, it may be argued that he himself was the principal victim of the administrative cycle. The traditional critique that as a youth he was frivolous and hedonistic is probably justified. The "Maha-ya-zawin-gyaw," a source sympathetic to Mahadama-ya-za-di-pati, goes into some detail describing how he lavished time and scarce resources on new palaces, entertainments, and pleasure gardens, even in the 1740s.215 On no occasion did he lead his troops in the field. Yet it must be borne in mind that all kings after Pye, if not after Tha-lun, lacked military training, and that Maha-dam&-ya-zadi-pati had been favored as heir apparent because of his inexperience. He had tried to protect his throne against Maung Pu, but he lacked a reliable base outside the heir apparency establishment. In any case, by the 1730s, the decline in royal population and the disintegration of the empire were too far advanced to be readily reversed. A turning point in Restored Toungoo fortunes had come in the reign of Taninganwei or even Sanei; and Maha-damd-ya-za-di-pati merely allowed earlier trends to reach their logical conclusion. As swelling numbers of abmu-dans placed themselves under princes, ministers, and bandits, he granted the heads of private manpower networks such extravagant honors as barely to leave intact the fiction of his own sovereignty. This too has been cited as an example of his irresponsibility.216 But given the political realities, one wonders how much room he had for maneuver. Indeed, his willingness to share the trappings of sovereignty may have protected him against attempts at total usurpation.217 Maha-damd-ya-za-di-pati authorized the unprecedented establishment of two viceregal (bnyin) courts within the nuclear zone. The appearance of these "parallel kingdoms," one under a prince, the other 214

For example, in rebuilding part of the city wall in 1748, royal followers constructed only 3,500 cubits, whereas retainers of the king's uncle built 2,100, those of each of his queens built 1,750, and those of various ministers built sections according to their respective strengths. 215 MYG, pp. 201 fF. Cf. Yi Yi, Myan-ma, p. 16-22, 32. 216 See Yi Yi, Myan-ma, p. 32; idem, "Last Days," pp. 46-47. 217 Two other factors probably militated against usurpation attempts: a) after a plot in favor of his younger brother miscarried in 1737-1738 (MYG, p. 120), he had no uncles or brothers born of chief queens in a position to challenge him; b) the military crisis may have convinced courtiers that further palace conflicts would aid the Mons.

FINALREIGNS I 193

under his interior minister, was a fitting, almost poetic denouement to a long-term trend toward expanded subordinate authority. Although some uncertainty surrounds the chronology of these appointments, the first was probably established in 1748 or 1749 at Singaing, about twenty-five miles upriver from Ava. This was the headquarters of the king's uncle and leading commander, Toungoo-ya-za, who directed the two-front war of the 1740s. In recognition of his services, which were dogged if not brilliant, the king renamed his headquarters "Toungoo" (possibly because this was the first home of the dynasty) and gave him the same retinue and architectural assemblage as the Ava ruler himself enjoyed. In some documents he was identified as "CoRuler" (min-byaing).21* The other court arose under Ya-za-nan-da, who emerged after the 1736 coup as principal civil administrator, with formal responsibility for all "affairs of the realm." By placing his son and other clients in key posts, Ya-za-nan-da developed an authority comparable to that of his old enemy Maung Pu. In 1749 or 1750 he was elevated to viceroy (bayin-hkan) at Sagaing, across the river from Ava.219 Maha-dama-ya-za-di-patfs direct authority thus contracted to the region south of Ava. An edict from April 1750 suggests that during his final years, at least, he was not particularly irresponsible (no more so than Mln-ye-kyaw-din or Tanin-ganwei, who have received kinder treatment from historians). He ordered noncavalry people to stop keeping horses so as to conserve fodder for plough oxen. He reorganized cavalry units to combat dereliction and inefficient use of resources; warned guards at the city gates not to admit suspicious characters; and took vigorous measures to suppress thieves and brigands and to protect debtors against abusive creditors. At the same time, as reality became ever more frightening, he took refuge in mystical prophecy. "I have heard that the people censure me [for their misery]," he confessed, "but they forget that all things accord with ordained cosmic cycles."220 Rumored to be an expert in astrology, portents, and the magical science of yadaya, Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati was convinced that he could thwart ordained catastrophes through the careful use of 218

See MYG, pp. 213-14; HNY, pp. 394, 397; LBHK, p. 199; SHDMA, pp. 217, 243-45; Yi Yi, Myan-ma, p. 102. 219 HNY, p. 385, says 1741 or 1742, but I follow LBHK, p. 199, an earlier source. Another date (1656-1657) at LBHK, p. 4, is an obvious error. As the dates in most sources are imprecise, it is not impossible that both viceregal courts were established simultaneously. On the career of Ya-za-nan-da, who before his elevation at Sagaing had already been given the insignia of an heir apparent and the illustrious title Bayin-naung, see too LBHK, pp. 4-5, 197-200, 203; MYG, pp. 102, 115-16, 172-74. 220 IO 3503, pt. 4, Edict of 1112 nayon 5 wax., pp. 45 r.-49 r. Cf. text at Yi Yi, Myan-ma, pp. 134-40.

194 I DECLINE, 1648-1752

sympathetic magic.221 Yet his interest in the occult lay within the mainstream of Burmese religious culture, and in itself did not distin­ guish him from Tha-lun or the famed Κόη-baung ruler Bo-daw-hpaya (r. 1782-1819).222 Emergence of Local Leaders As the court lapsed into impotence, a medley of cult figures, bandits, and gentry headmen established unchallenged control over the rural population. These figures, rather than courtiers, became the ultimate beneficiaries from the collapse of royal authority. Terrified by the an­ archy and invasions that the court could not stem, cultivators flocked to whichever local leader offered a reasonable prospect of security, be it psychological or physical. Headmen and platoon leaders transferred their ambitions from the court to the locality, where they husbanded resources in order to survive, and hopefully to profit from, the dynas­ ty's misfortunes. Ministers lost contact with their departmental charges, while princes became isolated from their appanage populations. Except for the environs of the three capitals, the nuclear zone severed its ties to the monarchy and reverted to the natural aclministrative-military units of township and village. One sign of declining central authority over the countryside was the proliferation of heterodox, local religious cults. It would be wrong to view such movements merely as vehicles of political or economic pro­ test, for religion is a self-contained system with its own perceptions of ultimate reality. Yet it is also true that in periods of political turmoil, those definitions of truth offered by soteriological sects became in­ creasingly attractive to wide sections of the peasantry.223 The best known cult leader of Maha-dama-ya-za-di-patfs reign, a monk named Wayazaw-dd, claimed that anyone who accepted his peculiar interpretations of Buddhism would automatically become a sotapanna, or "stream221

See SHDMA, pp. 189-90,198-99; HNY, pp. 405-406; MYG, pp. 107-109,127 ffi; TL, p. 190. On yadaya, see M. S. Collis, "The Strange Murder of King Thir-thudhamma," JBRS 13, 3 (1923): 236-43. Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati, moreover, was said to be a skilled musician and religious poet. For examples of his poetry yearning for Metteyya Buddha, see Hpo Kyi, ed., Myan-ma gon-yi (Rangoon, 1924), pp. 26-27. 222 For royal interests in magic bordering on obsessions, see NL 1949, ka v.-hka v.; RUL 45235, Edict 111, pp. 98-100; Than Tun, T h e Influence of Occultism in Bur­ mese History with Special Reference to Bodawpaya's Reign 1782-1819," Bulletin of the Burma Historical Commission, I, 2 (1960): 117-45. 223 Cf. Charles F. Keyes, "Millennialism, Theravada Buddhism, and Thai Society," JAS 36, 2 (1977): 283; Daniel L. Overmyer, Folk Buddhist Religion: Dissenting Sects in Late Traditional China (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), chap. 1.

FINALREIGNS I 195

winner." Such a person cannot be reborn in any of the subhuman worlds and will be reborn at most seven times before entering nibbana.224 Great numbers of male and female cultivators flocked to his movement, proclaiming their coming salvation. The cult may have had antidynastic overtones, for Maha-damd-ya-za-di-pati vigorously sought to suppress it by defrocking its monastic leaders and enrolling them in units that collected elephant and horse manure. 225 While Wayd-zaw-dd promised security in future incarnations, a bo­ gus monk known as the Hein Hpon-gyi combined religious appeals with a most profitable secular career of banditry. Insofar as it was an individualized peasant response to adversity that mushroomed in pe­ riods of privation and disorder and that involved attachment to a new leader outside the assigned hierarchy, banditry resembled not only cult movements, but illegal registration, debt-slavery, and private service. Banditry differed chiefly in its endemic violence and in the greater social and political isolation of its leaders. (Even the latter difference was relative, as successful bandit chiefs were sometimes incorporated into the local administrative structure.)226 Consisting of four to five hundred men bound to the chief and his lieutenants by patron-client ties, the Hein Hpon-gyi's band plundered a wide area south of Ava. In the mid-1740s they were lured into a fatal trap by the governor of Kyaukse, who deceived them with promises of golden raiment and titles from the king. Yet other oudaws with colorful names like "Forest Tiger Spirit" gatherd fresh bands of foodoose youths and continued to terrorize both the north and south shores of the Irrawaddy.227 To protect themselves against bandits and foreign invaders alike, headmen throughout the dry zone erected thorn enclosures and elab­ orate stockades. Having ceased to deliver labor or taxes to the court, 224 Spiro, Buddhism, p. 60; Nyanatiloka, Buddhist Dictionary, p. 213. More advanced members claimed to be sakadagamins, who will be reborn only once again. 225 MYG, pp. 177-78. After the original Waya-zaw-da died, disciples perpetuated the sect, using the master's name. On Burmese cult movements as a more general political phenomenon, see Adas, "Avoidance to Confrontation," pp. 234-36; idem, Prophets of Rebellion: Millenarian Protest against the European Colonial Order (Chapel Hill, 1979), pp. 101-102; Manuel Sarkisyanz, "Messianic Folk-Buddhism as Ideology of Peasant Revolts in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Burma," itwew of Religious Research 10 (1968): 32-38. It may be that the most economically marginal elements of rural society were disproportionately attracted to the cult, but we lack information. 226 See Desai, British Residency, pp. 252, 258-59, 282; MYG, pp. 170-72. On ban­ ditry, see too Adas, "Avoidance to Confrontation," pp. 236-38; Koenig, "Κδη-baung Polity," pp. 90-91, 132. 227 As with Waya-zaw-dd's sect, a disciple took the Hein Hpon-gyl's name and con­ tinued his work; and it was actually the disciple's group who were ambushed. On this and other bandit gangs see MYG, pp. 150, 170-72.

196 I DECLINE, 1648-1752

they also began raiding neighboring jurisdictions to acquire additional followers. Ineffective leaders were murdered or thrust aside by usurpers of a more martial disposition in what was clearly an era of pronounced social mobility. As bandits carved out protected spheres and as gentry figures mounted offensive raids, the distinction between the two categories eroded. The "Maha-ya-zawin-gyaw" identifies no fewer than thirty headmen and self-appointed leaders with independent base areas in the mid-1740s. 228 Some began to assume royal pretensions, for there was a widespread expectation by the close of the decade that since Maha-dama-ya-za-dipati had failed to prevent anarchy, a new man capable of honoring dhamma would have to establish himself as guarantor of social order. At Monywa, Kin-u, Mok-hso-bo, Okpo, Pegu, and other locales, people consulted omens and prophecies to identify the new ruler that they might quickly attach themselves to his cause.229 There was, therefore, no great distance between various forms of intensified peasant evasion characteristic of administrative decline (such as migration, debt-slavery, private service under local headmen, banditry), on the one hand, and on the other hand, peasant support for antidynastic rebels who promised to revitalize the monarchy. Much as in 1661, when hungry ahma-dans had shifted their allegiance from Pindale to Pye, avoidance metamorphosed naturally into opposition to a ruler who, in the simplistic but canonically orthodox popular estimate, was held personally responsible for social disintegration. 230 Unable to retard the growth of local autonomy, Maha-dama-ya-zadi-pati vainly tried to accommodate himself to it. He bestowed tides and insignia on the most successful headmen and bandit chiefs in an attempt to assert nominal control over their forces. Thus in 1745-1746 he rewarded local leaders, while authorizing them to amass arms and men in their own districts. Of the six names listed in this order, five231 were on the north shore between the Chindwin and upper Irrawaddy, where famine and invasions were least debilitating and where in consequence headmen could marshal the largest followings. This, of course, was the home area of Alaung-hpaya, the most famous headman in 228

MYG, pp. 150-51, for 1743. See, for example, AA-L, p. 18; IO 3503, pt. 4, pp. 47 r.-48 v.; KBZ, p. 72; Hsaya Chit, Mmywa-myo thamatng (Monywa, 1936), pp. 27-30; BL OR 3464, p. 138 V.-141 r.; and below, Chapter 5. Cf. Nash, Golden Road, pp. 275-76. 230 See below, Chapters 4, 5 for detailed discussion of popular support for anti-Toungoo rebels. 231 The heads of Kin-u, Thazi, Sitha, Kyaukka, and Kan-pauk. The sixth was at Salingathu. HNY, p. 388. 229

FINAL REIGNS | 197

Burmese history, who was destined to replace the Toungoo Dynasty and to revive the tradition of centralized empire. By 1752 structural tensions apparent at the outset of the dynasty had become intolerably acute. Despite nominal royal supervision of gentry succession, headmen always derived their authority primarily from their position in the local community. As the court's ability to monitor the gentry and to bestow desirable rewards declined, it was to be expected that the latent cleavage between court-appointed and community-based leaders would widen to the exclusion of the former. So too, although the crown required that tax and service obligations be fulfilled on a hereditary basis, the excessive rigor of royal as opposed to most forms of private service encouraged a constant movement away from the royal sector. Without effective self-policing caste restrictions, stable platoon segregation proved exceedingly difficult to maintain. Finally, the Restored Toungoo political system demanded a degree of personal and institutional subordination to the ruler that conflicted, at least in the long run, with the extensive authority over succession that ministers acquired under the seventeenth-century system of provincial and princely controls. Because leading ministers could seldom obtain personal loyalty from all princes and fellow officials, ministerial autonomy tended to intensify factionalism and service disorganization. The population shifted from assigned platoons to a variety of alternate statuses not directly amenable to royal control. At the same time, the unified structure of patronage dissolved into ill-coordinated, increasingly localized networks. None of this is to suggest that decline was irreversible. It was by no means impossible that one of the later kings could have disciplined the elites and reconcentrated the service population. Sanei's reign, in particular, seems to have been something of a watershed in terms of lost opportunities. Nonetheless, four factors have been identified that made successful royal initiatives rather less probable late in the dynasty than at the outset. Whereas Nyaungyan Min and his sons had created the empire by force of arms, the new territorial system denied future princes wide military and political training, and (in contrast to the sixteenth century) no longer provided a reliable mechanism by which ineffective leaders could de deposed by provincial challengers. Beyond this, ministers were sometimes in a position to select intentionally the least assertive contender. Third and most obviously, the aforementioned weaknesses had a cumulative mutually reinforcing character: dissidence among one sector of the elite strengthened the autonomy of other

198 I DECLINE, 1648-1752

sectors, while elite and popular ambitions fed on one another. Finally, during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries internal difficulties were aggravated to an indeterminate but possibly considerable extent by the growth of maritime trade, which disturbed the existing correlation between status and wealth, intensifying pressures for private acquisition. Successive kings late in the dynasty therefore tended to operate from a smaller resource base against a more intractable array of private interests. Modest energy that in an earlier generation would permit a king to retain his throne was, by Maha-dama-ya-za-di-patfs reign, of limited avail. The growing constraints on royal action will become yet more apparent if we turn to an examination of tributary and provincial revolt.

Chapter Four

AVA'S LOSS OF CONTROL OVER THE OUTER ZONES, 1660-1752 Hurling themselves forward, showing no hesita­ tion, the Manipuris smashed the [Burmese] force at the Ya-za-mani-su-la Pagoda. The defenders were destroyed, utterly scattered without discipline or order. Many were wounded and many were slain. Hman-ηάη Chronicle, Year 1739-1740

The weakening of Ava's authority over non-Burman peoples in the outer zones of the empire stemmed primarily from administrative dif­ ficulties at the core. Tha-lun's administrative and military reforms enabled the monarchy to suppress a series of provincial and tributary revolts in the 1660s. In subsequent decades, however, as the capital became absorbed in factional disputes, the system of provincial controls ceased to function efficiently. With the support of ministerial patrons at Ava, governors abused their powers of taxation, thereby antagonizing out­ lying populations. Moreover, since ahmu-dans in Upper Burma had become disorganized and government had come under the sway of factional leaders rather than tested warriors, Ava's ultimate instrument of control—military intervention—became less credible. In the early eighteenth century, successful revolts spread from the extreme upland perimeter of the empire to major Tai centers and finally to the Irrawaddy basin. If nuclear zone aclministration determined the rhythm of imperial decline, the ability of outlying principalities to capitalize on Ava's dif­ ficulties was a function of local circumstance. Some formerly hostile empires like Arakan and Ayudhya were in the eighteenth century themselves subject to internal disorders that impaired their offensive capacity. All along the interface between Ava and Ayudhya arose a number of independent principalities. On the other hand, the hitherto obscure Manipuris, who had experienced a profound religious and political transformation, became a major threat to the Irrawaddy basin for the first time. So too the people of Pegu by mid-century had re-

200 I AVA'S LOSS, 1660-1752

covered sufficiently from the devastation of the First Toungoo era to resume their challenge to Avan hegemony. In 1752 a polyethnic force in the mold of Bayin-naung's ever-victorious army swept up from Pegu and overwhelmed the capital. To understand the collapse of the Restored Empire, therefore, we shall have to consider briefly the history of non-Burman peoples both within and without the Irrawaddy basin. SECTION ONE. PACIFICATION AND DECLINE IN THE TRIBUTARY ZONE

The 1660s saw a severe challenge to Avan hegemony in the southeast seaor of the empire. During the invasion of Upper Burma by Ming partisans, the Tai country around Chiengmai and the trans-Sittang littoral centering on Martaban both threw off their allegiance and intrigued with Ayudhya. Traditionally these two regions were most likely to defect to the Siamese because they lay closest to the Siamese zone of control. Between 1660 and 1665—as in the 1590s and again in the second quarter of the eighteenth century—their wavering loyalties became a sensitive indicator of military events in the Burmese heartland. The relation between local leaders at these principalities and the kings of Ava or Ayudhya was entirely analogous to fluctuating clientpatron ties within the nuclear zone. Ever sensitive to shifts in relative power, the junior partner was quick to change allegiance from a man of waning influence to one of greater power. Only when, as in the mid-eighteenth century, neither Ava nor Ayudhya was able to offer effective military protection or to threaten credible chastisement, were Chiengmai and other such principalities likely to opt for independence. Chiengmai's position was well illustrated in 1660 when the local ruler (a Tai prince installed by Ava)1 heard incorrectly that Ava had fallen to the Chinese. As the Mon-Burman garrison had been withdrawn to defend the capital, he sent an envoy to ask that he be allowed to become a vassal of Ayudhya and to beg the support of Siamese troops. The Siamese royal chronicle claimed that he reached this decision after a revered Buddha image in Chiengmai turned its face toward Ayudhya.2 Meanwhile a similar shift was occurring at Martaban. Sensing that Ava's power was in permanent decline, Mon gentry lead1

See CXM, p. 176; Damrong, "Our Wars," JBRS 40, 2: 233; and Chapter 2 n. 238. HS, p. 10. Cf. Damrong, "Our Wars," pp. 233-34. In the event, Chiengmai's rulers again changed their minds, and the Siamese entered the town only after a sustained military campaign. See Wood, History, pp. 191-93, which dates Chiengmai's fall to March 1662; and UK, III, 280, which places it a year later. 2

DECLINE ESI TRIBUTARY ZONE | 201

ers refused to support an expeditionary force to save Upper Burma from the Chinese. When the Burman governor subsequently threat­ ened to burn alive all dissenters, enraged leaders captured him and fled with a large following to Siam. There fellow Mons stood ready to welcome them. An expedition sent by Pye to retrieve the fugitives was defeated shortly after entering Siamese territory.3 Heartened by these victories, in the latter half of 1662 King Narai of Ayudhya organized an ambitious three-pronged counterinvasion of Burma. As might be expected, Siamese and Burmese accounts differ widely as to the success of this effort. Siamese chronicles claim that Narai's forces nearly captured Ava, whereas U KaIa says they never got beyond Martaban.4 On balance it seems unlikely that the Siamese pen­ etrated in force west of the Sittang River, because this marked the western boundary of their sphere of influence in the 1590s when the Burmese monarchy was far more debilitated than in the 1660s. Moreover, whatever their initial success, it is certain that the Sia­ mese gained no permanent advantage. Freed from the Chinese threat, Upper Burma forces were able to concentrate on the south, so that by late 1664 or early 1665 Martaban was again under Avan control.5 In the latter part of 1664, the leaders of Chiengmai also ejected the Sia­ mese and petitioned Ava to resume authority. Accordingly, Pye sent a new garrison under a Burman courtier who may have been Chiengmai's first myo-wun.6 Thus, although severely tested in the 1660s, the administrative and military system was sufficiently vital to retain areas of primary strategic significance. In most instances Pye's victorious expeditions had at their core nuclear-zone troops led by princes or officials from Ava. Given the growing inefficiency in the service system as described in Chapter 3, one might assume that the ensuing decades would have seen a renewal of major tributary and provincial challenges. In fact this was not the case. Although ahmu-dans around the capital became dis­ organized in the latter part of the century, at first only nonmilitary groups were seriously affected. Chiengmai and Martaban had under3 1 have relied on the following accounts, no two of which agree in all particulars: R. Halliday, The Ttunings (Rangoon, 1917), pp. 15-16; UK, III, 279-80; HS, pp. 1416; Damrong, "Our Wars," JBRS 40, 2a: 241-44; H. L. Shorto, unpublished paper on Mon historical sources, SOAS Seminar, 14 March 1973. 4 Cf. HS, pp. 22-28; Damrong, "Our Wars," pp. 244-49; UK, ΠΊ, 280-81; Wood, History, p. 194 n. 1. Possibly the extravagant Siamese claims were developed after the fall of Ayudhya in 1767 to assuage wounded national pride. 5 Same as previous note, plus Hall, "Daghregister," pp. 154-55. « See UK, III, 280, 282-83; CXM, pp. 176-77; HS, pp. 28-30. Although the gov­ ernor was Burman, a Mohnyin prince replaced him later in the decade. UK, ΠΙ, 286.

202 I AVA'S LOSS, 1660-1752

estimated Ava's strength in the 1660s and had suffered for their rash­ ness during the fighting that raged across their territories. They were not likely to repeat that mistake while memories were painfully fresh. Possibly, too, the warfare of the 1660s had disorganized the popula­ tion in oudying areas as much if not more than at Ava.7 Such losses would have taken time to redress through natural increase; we also know from European and Burmese accounts that Lower Burma was already depopulated through the wars of the late sixteenth century. Furthermore, the new system of centrally appointed provincial subor­ dinates seems to have operated with some success, for in the 1670s two governors were executed on the strength of reports by provincial spies (ηά-hkans). Thus the general lull in Lower Burma and the Tai area is not difficult to explain.8 It was not until the closing years of the century that the first indi­ cations of a long-term decline appeared, and even then problems arose not at major tributary centers but on the most obscure marches of the empire. (In much the same way ahmu-dan disorganization in the nu­ clear zone began with "ignoble platoons" that had the weakest ties to the throne, and spread gradually to major military units.) In 1692 animist-Hindu Manipuris from beyond the Chindwin in the northwest launched a major raid on one of Ava's Tai vassal states, Thaungdut. Manipuri history will be examined later in this chapter. For now it is enough to say that ever since Bayin-naung, Burmese rulers had claimed a suzerainty over the plain of Manipur that Manipuri chronicles were reluctant to acknowledge.9 Ava responded to the Thaungdut raid by organizing three punitive expeditions, all of which seem to have suf­ fered humiliating defeats.10 By this time inaccurate population regis­ ters had been a serious problem for some time, and two decades of relative peace may have blunted the martial skills of Ava's command­ ers. Sanei in 1702 persuaded the Manipuris to present a virgin princess 11 to his harem, but there is no record of fresh military operations. One 7

From Martaban alone HS, p. 14, claims over 6,000 people voluntarily entered Siam about 1661. 8 The docility of the outer zones is suggested by the fact that when hostilities were renewed near Martaban and Chiengmai in 1675, local subjects no longer showed any inclination to desert to Ayudhya. See UK, III, 299-300. 9 On pre-1692 Burmese-Manipuri relations, see UK, II, 335-38; India Office Library, Henry Burney Parabaiks, no. 30; HNY, pp. 221, 251, 321. Cf. Jyotirmoy Roy, The History of Manipur (Calcutta, 1958), p. 38. 10 UK, III, 328-29. Hence the dispatch of successive reinforcements; hence the lack of victory claims; hence the bald admission with reference to the 1693 Thaungdut campaign: "the affair was not successful." 11 HNY, pp. 343-47 passim. She arrived at court in 1705.

DECLINE IN TRIBUTARY ZONE | 203

can only conclude that the Manipuris were allowed to consolidate their hold on frontier districts and to develop their state apparatus undisturbed. Shortly after the Manipuris defied Ava's armies on the upper Chindwin, hill tribes in the southeast ravaged another Tai vassal state and went unpunished. Like other non-Buddhist hill peoples, Karen groups around modern Kayah were loosely incorporated into the Burmese imperial system through the intermediary of a Tai-speaking ruler, in this case the saw-bwa of Mong Pai, to whom they paid nominal tribute. According to the Mong Pai chronicle, in 1692 "Karen," Yinbaw, and Padaung tribesmen, unwilling to execute what they deemed unjustified labor demands by the Mong Pai saw-bwa, murdered that prince in his palace and dispersed his followers.12 Despite a generous use of muskets,13 probably unavailable to their isolated opponents, seven imperial expeditions composed of Burmans and Shans failed to halt the attackers, whose raids carried far to the north. Sanei may have organized a final campaign in 1698, but thereafter abandoned the struggle. Apparendy he concluded that these elusive hill people, like the Manipuris, did not warrant a further commitment of limited manpower. Such a policy was dangerous, however, for by failing to halt tribes in and around Kayah, Ava may have allowed these unstable and frequendy 12 Mong Pai chronicle, GUBSS, II, 2, 441-42. Cf. Nigel Brailey, "A Re-Investigation of the Gwe of Eighteenth Century Burma," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 1, 2 (1970): 33-47. Although the Mong Pai chronicle was written down only in 1896, its claim that Mong Pai's suzerain, the king of Ava, dispatched a punitive expedition in 1696-1697 receives strong support from UK, III, 332, 339-40, 348: this early eighteenth-century source refers to seven Avan expeditions organized between 1694 and 1697 against yins or yin-sits, who had "risen up" and launched destructive raids. The Shan (hence Mong Pai) generic term for Karen is yang, which would be highly significant if U Kala's chronicle preserved the terminology of Shan reports submitted to Ava. Burmans themselves use the term yin (or possibly yin) to refer to the Riang, that is, groups who are linguistically close to the Mon-Khmer speaking Wa but who show a general cultural similarity to Karens. Tins were often regarded by Burmans, Shans, and Mons as a type of Karen; but it is uncertain whether one should go further and attempt to identify the yin-sit in the UK with that specific group of Riang known to the Shans as yang-sek who about 1900 dwelled in some strength just east and north of Mong Pai. The Yinbaws and Padaungs mentioned in the Mong Pai chronicle are speakers of minor Karen dialects still prominent in the Mong Pai region. See Lebar et al., Ethnic Groups, pp. 58-59, 129; G. H. Luce, "Introduction to the Comparative Study of Karen Languages," JBRS 42, 1 (1959): 4; Scott, Handbook, pp. 138-39; A. R. McMahon, The Karens of the Golden Chersonese (London, 1876), p. 33; F. K. Lehman, "Who Are the Karen, and If So, Why? Karen Ethnohistory and a Formal Theory of Ethnicity," in Keyes, Ethnic Adaptation, pp. 215-53. My thanks to Prof. H. L. Shorto for sharing with me his knowledge of Karen and Karen-related tribes.

'3 UK, III, 339.

204 I AVA'S LOSS, 1660-1752

hostile groups to infiltrate the valleys of the Sittang and lower Irrawaddy. As we shall see, there is some suggestion that this policy had important repercussions during the Peguan uprising of 1740. If non-Buddhist peoples on the farthest reaches of the empire were the most poorly integrated in the imperial system, logistical considerations also posed substantial problems of military control over Tai principalities. It was, in fact, among the Tais that the next signs of a long-term deterioration in Ava's position appeared. Sanei devoted considerable effort to campaigns in the southeast Tai region, and actually seems to have strengthened Burman influence over Nan, Chiengsen, and Keng Tung.14 However, the succession struggle that enveloped the upper Irrawaddy on Sand's death led Tanln-ganwei to withdraw forces from oudying areas to defend the capital. The northern Tai state of Wuntho reverted that year from being a directly ruled principality under military commissioners (sit-kes) to a tributary state held by representatives of the local Shan dynasty.15 More importantly, Tanin-ganwei lost control over Chiengmai, on which Pye had lavished his attentions. In 1718 a new Burman governor (myo-wun) and military commissioner (sit-ki) were sent to Chiengmai, where they eventually precipitated a revolt through their unrestrained tax demands. As noted, declining royal authority over ministerial patron-client chains also encouraged a regime of official extortion in the lowland provinces and Upper Burma at this time. "Ruinous taxation'' does not appear to have been merely a propaganda charge invented by the people of Chiengmai to justify their defection, for it figures only in Burmese accounts. Thus Thi-ri-u-zana, an official at Tanin-ganwei's court, wrote that Chiengmai revolted because the new commissioner "severely oppressed the people and ground them down."16 So too the Hman-nan chronicle noted that Chiengmai rebelled due to "heavy taxes and levies."17 14 Sanei also received high-ranking defectors from Ayudhya and Lan Chang. On the other hand, he failed to exploit the fragmentation of Lan Chang, and a projected invasion of Ayudhya was notably unsuccessful. See UK, III, 359 ff., 376, 378, 385-88, 391; CXM, pp. 178-79; Wyatt, Nan Chronicle, pp. 28-29. 15 History of Wuntho, GUBSS, II, 3, 360. 16 LBHK, p. 194. There is no indication that Thi-ri-u-zana was a political foe of the governor, eager to blacken his reputation. 17 HNY, p. 372. Curiously, CXM gives no motive for the rising. The question arises, how could appointed officials without prior roots in the community succeed in enforcing such demands even temporarily? The sizable Mon-Burman garrison in Chiengmai must have given them considerable power in the immediate environs of the city, which was probably the wealthiest part of the state. In more outlying areas, patron-client ties with headmen eager to advance their position in local disputes may have given them some leverage; though ultimately, of course, most chiefs identified with the local community against Ava. Cf. Chapter 3 n. 79.

DECLINE IN TRIBUTARY ZONE | 205

The residents of Chiengmai must have known about the Pagan uprising of 1714, as well as a serious Burmese defeat at the hands of the Manipuris in 1724. Sensing that the chances of effective intervention by Ava were small, in 1727 they defeated Ava's garrison and slew both the governor and his military commissioner. After a period of confused in-fighting, a former prince of Luang Prabang (in modern Laos), who had been living in Chiengmai with three hundred followers, took the throne of Chiengmai and ruled under the name of Chao Ong Kham.18 Ayudhya's debility at this time rendered it unlikely that Chao Ong Kham would solicit Siamese protection in the fashion of the 1660 Chiengmai leader. Like his famous son-in-law and fellow rebel at Pegu Smin Dhaw (whose career we shall discuss shortly), Chao Ong Kham sought to invigorate a concept of regional sovereignty last championed effectively in the sixteenth century. He established himself in the tradition of earlier rulers as an independent Buddhist monarch, and succeeded in assembling a broad-based following that initially included not only Chiengmai and Luang Prabang Tais, but also local Mon and Burman leaders.19 When Tanin-ganwei learned of these developments, he promptly dispatched infantry, elephant, and cavalry units to recapture the town. The most detailed account, in the Hman-nan chronicle, claims that the Burmese actually succeeded. However, they were persuaded with the help of rich presents to withdraw from the town, whereupon they were treacherously assaulted.20 In 1731 or 1732 Tanin-ganwei mounted a second expedition, which was overwhelmed at a narrow point on the approach to Chiengmai.21 After Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati came to the throne, he sent a third and final expedition, but this army too was obliged to withdraw after failing to penetrate the city walls.22 Thus Chiengmai, the largest and most important of Ava's Tai dependencies, became independent for the first time in a century (apart from the brief interlude of 1660-1664). If the testimony of the Burmese chronicles be accepted, Ava's commanders proved to be both corrupt and incompetent. Their willingness during the first expedition 18 CXM, pp. 179-82; HNY, p. 372. On Chao Ong Kham's early biography, see Le Boulanger, Laosfranfais, pp. 179-88; M. L. Manich, History if Laos (including the History qfLtmnathai, Chiengmai) (Bangkok, 1967), pp. 158-68. 19 See previous note. 20 HNY, p. 372. CXM, p. 182 says the two armies fought ineffectually for two months in 1728 or 1729, whereupon, their rice exhausted, Ava's troops withdrew. « HNY, pp. 372-73. 22 MYG, p. 102, and CXM, p. 182, appear to agree on this expedition.

206 I AVA'S LOSS, 1660-1752

to accept bribes recalls the venality of the previous governor and his commissioner, and seems to have been symptomatic of growing min­ isterial autonomy throughout the empire. Tanin-ganwei, in a fury, ordered molten silver poured down the throats of his guilty com­ manders. Yet, in contrast to Nyaungyan Min and his sons, neither Tanin-ganwei nor Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati ventured to lead the troops. In addition to the decline of martial virtue among kings and their generals, Manipuri raids23 and pronounced disorganization within the military service system hindered Ava's effort to recapture Chiengmai. The forces Tanin-ganwei and his son sent across the Salween were relatively small. The expedition of 1733 reportedly totaled only ten thousand.24 By comparison, the famed Κόη-baung conqueror Hsinbyu-shin (r. 1763-1776) thirty-three years later succeeded in planting at least forty thousand soldiers under the walls of Ayudhya—even though Ayudhya was considerably farther from Ava than Chiengmai, and Hsinbyu-shin's forces were simultaneously engaged against Chinese invad­ ers. The Chiengmai uprising was the first in a series of defections by Tai principalities eager to escape their tax and military obligations to Ava. In 1727 or 1728 a leader of the Chiengmai revolt received military support from the eastern state of Nan, although it must have been known that this man had murdered the Burman governor of Chieng­ mai. 25 Northwest of Nan, in about 1739 Keng Tung expelled Ava's nominee as ruler, a Tai prince who had been born and educated at the Burmese court and who in consequence appears to have had weak ties with the local population. An Avan expedition or diplomatic mission that sought to reinstate him had no success. The next ruler of Keng Tung took the precaution of obtaining recognition from Ava, but it may be doubted whether he was under effective constraint.26 In 1734 or 1735, the northern kingdom of Mogaung revolted against Maha23

See below, section 2. CXM, p. 182. The bulk of these forces may, in fact, have been Peguan. MYG, p. 80, claims 22,000 for the first expedition, but offers nofiguresfor the third. 25 CXM, p. 181. It is unclear, however, whether the ruler of Nan himself authorized this support. Wyatt, Nan Chronicle, pp. 30 ff., 42 says Ava consented to the installation of a new Nan ruler in 1726, but offers no information on Ava-Nan relations between 1727 and 1752. 26 Two rather discrepant chronicle accounts of these events appear in GUBSS, II, 1, 406 and Mangrai, Padaeng Chronicle, pp. 252-55. The latter identifies the deposed rul­ er's successor as one Mohgbl, whose accession was eventually sanctioned by the Toungoo court. Mongbf in turn was succeeded by his son Mongsam, apparently in the early Κόη-baung period. The former and less detailed source omits reference to Mongbi and dates Mongsam's accession, with Ava's consent, to 1742. 24

MANIPURITHREAT I 207

damd-ya-za-di-pati with the help of the Manipuris.27 About the same time, in the far northwest, Thaungdut was also lost to Ava in the aftermath of fresh Manipuri raids.28 The Kbn-b&ung-zet chronicle summarized the general situation in the Tai uplands during the dynasty's closing years in these words: "Day by day and month by month, the great tributary sta.tes that made up the empire—the crowned sow-bwits and [Tai] myo-zos—broke away and deserted the king. Each withdrew and fortified himself within his own principality."29

SECTION TWO. THE MANIPURI THREAT

While Ava struggled unsuccessfully to retain control over Tai principalities, the second quarter of the eighteenth century also saw a serious challenge from Manipur, whose peoples sought not merely to throw off Ava's restraints, but to raid and even to occupy parts of the nuclear zone. Tai and Manipuri threats were mutually reinforcing in that the Manipuris diminished Ava's prestige in the eyes of the Tais, who in turn declined to continue aiding Upper Burma troops in policing the northwest frontier. The Manipuri raids, however, inflicted more severe damage on the military service system. Further, the sight of Manipuri horsemen ravaging pagodas and galloping at will across the Mu valley did more to destroy Maha-dama-ya-za-di-patf s reputation for sanctity and power in the eyes of his followers than any defeat, however humiliating, in the distant Tai uplands. If the Toungoo state had been in the opening phase of its administrative cycle, one may reasonably assume that the Manipuris would never have penetrated the northwest defenses. The Manipuri ruler Jai Singh (r. 1764-1798) was second only to Gharib Newaz (r. 1714-c. 1750) in terms of his authority within Manipur.30 Yet whereas the latter devastated northwest Burma, in Jai Singh's reign the early Konbaung kings turned the tables and reduced Manipur to a state of utter desolation.31 So too challenges in the second quarter of the eighteenth century from Chiengmai and Pegu, which proved beyond the powers 27 R. B. Pemberton, Report on the Eastern Frontier ofBritish India. With a Supplement, by Dr. Bayfield, on the British Political Relations with Ava (Calcutta, 1835), pp. 115-16. On the identification of "Pong" in Pemberton's account with "Mogaung," see Mangrai, Shan States, pp. 34-36. 28 GUBSS, II, 1, 177; MYG, pp. 113-14. 29 KBZ, p. 20. 30 Roy, Manipur, p. 50. 31 See Harvey, History, chap. 7; Roy, Manipur, chap. 5.

208 I AVA'S LOSS, 1660-1752

of Ava to contain, were swiftly and easily eliminated by the invigorated Κδη-baung state. Yet if Burmese weakness invited Manipuri success, it is also true that before the eighteenth century the Manipuris had never been a factor in Burmese history despite periods of notable Burmese debility. A brief digression into Manipuri history may be permitted, therefore, for the dramatic raids of the 1730s climaxed a long movement toward unification that gave the Manipuris the ideology and organization nec­ essary to challenge the more advanced Burmese empire.32 The Manipuri plain comprises only about 650 square miles, but it is well watered and fertile, capable of supporting a large rice-growing population. In thefifteenthcentury, when we first gain a reliable glimpse of Manipuri society through Shan chronicles and local ballads, the valley was divided into a number of warring clans, each run by a tra­ ditional leader in consultation with animist soothsayers on a pattern still similar to that of neighboring hill tribes. As a result of contact in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries with Indianized peoples in adjacent regions (including the Koch kingdom in Assam), new technological and cultural concepts began to filter into the valley.33 Among these innovations, the most potentially revolutionary change and the one on which other reforms depended was the gradual intro­ duction of Hinduism through brahmans employed by tribal leaders. By associating themselves with Hindu gods and by exploiting the rit­ ual paraphernalia of their brahman advisers, Manipuri leading chief­ tains could challenge the religiously based authority of rival leaders and thus extend their control over the population. Significantly per­ haps, Manipuri raids on the Burmese frontier in 1647 and 1692 co­ incided with incipient centralization under a dynasty of quasi-Hindu leaders who styled themselves rajas and who were probably acknowl­ edged by fellow chieftains as primi inter pares. When the raja who proved to be the scourge of Burma, Gharib Newaz, ascended the throne of Manipur in 1714,34 these trends were still at an early stage. Gharib Newaz deliberately set out to undermine the surviving authority of rival leaders and soothsayers by encouraging 32

The following account derives from Roy, Manipur; Yi Yi, Myan-ma, pp. 49-52; and from ethnographic studies and travelogues, including Pemberton, Eastern Frontier, William McCulloch, Account of the Valley of Munnipore and of the Hill Tribes, Selections from the Records of the Government of India, Foreign Dept., no. 27 (Calcutta, 1859); T. C. Hodson, TheMeitheis (London, 1908). 33 Gunpowder, new clothing styles, polo sports, a new system of measures, and pos­ sibly bell-metal coinage are said to have appeared in this period. 34 1709 in some accounts.

MANlPURI THREAT ) 209

a religious syncretism in which the old gods were identified with Hindu deities whose propitiation was the special preserve of royally appointed brahmans. With the aid of missionaries from Sylhet, he declared Vaishnavism the state religion and attempted to reform burial, dietary, and clothing customs to conform with Hindu practice. But the proponents of the old faith would not submit meekly, so he reportedly burned their scriptures and banished their followers to separate-caste villages. In the course of this struggle, he reorganized the state administration and achieved tighter control over local service groups. The brahmanically sanctioned changes that Gharib Newaz introduced in political organization, in personal devotion, in diet and dress inspired the Manipuris with a vast energy and missionary dynamism. Gharib Newaz' raids against Burma were concentrated in the latter part of his reign after he had inaugurated his reforms, and these raids at once took on a religious justification. The Burmese chronicles noted that the Manipuris raided Sagaing because "their great brahman Mahatharahpu had preached that if they drank and bathed in the water of the Irrawaddy at Sagaing, all danger and evil would vanish [from their lives]."35 Later Gharib Newaz wrote as follows to the Burmese commander to explain his latest incursion, which, despite his protestations, was anything but pacific: 'The people of Manipur and Ava . . . have often fought one another, inflicting death and injury. [Now] we live in accord with the doctrine given us by our teacher Maha-tharahpu, who has taught us not to eat any flesh or fish [sic]. Our present advance is because we wish to discuss peace."36 In 1743 the famous Maha-tharahpu himself and a group of followers arrived at Ava intending inter alia to instruct the Burmese king and his court in the Hindu faith.37 Gharib Newaz bears comparison with rulers of the Koch kingdom and the Ahom kingdom in Assam, and rajas in the western state of Cachar, whose political and military successes were intimately linked with the progressive Hinduization of their respective realms. In fact, Manipuris conversion may be seen as the latest episode in a centuriesold process of Hinduization in northeast India, which happened to reach Burma's frontiers at a particularly inopportune time from Ava's standpoint. 35

HNY, p. 380. Maha-parahbu in some sources. Ibid., p. 382. 37 See Yi Yi, Myanma, pp. 49-52, 65-66; HNY, p. 386. Yi Yi suggests that there were actually two separate missions by different brahmans bearing the same name, one in 1743 and the other starting in 1744. Both were well received by Maha-dama-ya-zadi-pati. 36

210 I AVA'S LOSS, 1660-1752

With its debilitated government, Upper Burma proved an irresistible attraction for Gharib Newaz' combination of religious zeal and military ambition. At first his superb horsemen sought only captives and booty, but when they met feeble resistance, they seem to have contemplated more permanent conquest.38 Hostilities started in 1723-1724 when Gharib Newaz offered to send another Manipuri princess to the Ava harem to accompany the one presented to Tanin-ganwei's father. This was merely a ruse, for when the Burmese reception party reached the agreed rendezvous point, they were swept off into captivity. To avenge this studied insult, Taninganwei sped a large force from the Irrawaddy basin and Shan states. But they returned in disgrace, having been ambushed in mud swamps beyond the Chindwin, and decimated by an epidemic of smallpox or measles. After an unexplained lull in major hostilities, in 1736 Gharib Newaz started a series of annual incursions into the Burmese heartland. His followers, whose sturdy little ponies39 afforded a unique striking power over less mobile Burmese forces, breached irrigation tanks, fired villages, and carried off cultivators. At first the Burmese tried offensive tactics in order to halt the invaders near the northwest frontier, but they were repeatedly outmaneuvered. Maha-dami-ya-za-di-pati then ordered forward towns, including Myedu and Tabayin, to be garrisoned. In late 1739 the Manipuris simply bypassed these outposts, galloping as far as Sagaing opposite the capital. They slaughtered an elite garrison defending Tha-lun's famed Kaung-hmu-daw (Ya-za-manisu-la) Pagoda, and pillaged shrines and sacred libraries along the north shore. Only their lack of boats and their wariness of cannon that Mahadama-ya-za-di-pati hastily assembled north and west of the city prevented them from crossing the great river to attack Ava itself. Still the capital was alive with fear. As had been true on the Chiengmai campaigns, Ava's generals were often of very poor caliber, unable in some instances to enforce basic discipline. The Hman-nAn chronicle claims that on one occasion the Burman commander was drunk,40 though this may be a stylized indication of moral failure. More credibly, the Manipuris are said to have been surprised and encouraged by the small size of Ava's forces, which points to Tai defections and to continuing disorganization in abmu38 The following narrative is based on HNY, pp. 370-82; MYG, pp. 113 ff.; Yi Yi, Myan-ma, pp. 33-66; and Roy, Manipur, chap. 4. Pemberton, Eastern Frontier, pp. 37 ff. adds little to Burmese sources. 39 For a description of their horses, see Pemberton, Eastern Frontier, pp. 31-32. 40 HNY, p. 377.

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dan and athi ranks. Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati threatened personally to slit the throats of defeated commanders. But he confined his swordwielding to the council chamber and still declined to lead his troops. Gharib Newaz, who by 1740 had consolidated control over a zone of northern Shan tributaries formerly loyal to Ava, now concluded that a full-scale conquest was within his grasp. At the end of the rains he advanced with a combined Manipuri-Cacharese41 army said by the Burmese to have been twice as large as their principal defense force. Yet the invasion miscarried. The Burmese attributed its failure to their improved defense. Probably of equal importance was the fact that Gharib Newaz' enemy the ruler of Tripura exploited Gharib Newaz' absence to menace the valley of Manipur from the west. Gharib Newaz hastily withdrew, therefore, to secure his position in his home area.42 Starting in 1741, to forestall Burmese hostility he sent a series of embassies to Ava. Through limited effort of their own, Ava's forces thus won a respite. The lull proved temporary, however, for no sooner did the Manipuris withdraw than rebellion spread to Pegu. Moreover, Gharib Newaz would return before the end of the decade. SECTION THREE. THE REVOLT OF LOWER BURMA

Much as Tai revolts and Manipuri invasions reinforced one another, these challenges in turn encouraged uprisings in Lower Burma. Mon soldiers played a conspicuous role in campaigns against Chiengmai and Manipur, so they well knew that other sections of the empire were restless. According to Burmese sources, reports of the Manipuri raid on Sagaing precipitated the 1740 revolt at Pegu.43 Having spread from the hill tracts to tributary centers, rebellion now reached the Irrawaddy lowlands. By this time the extreme political imbalance between Upper and Lower Burma that had characterized the early Restored Toungoo period had diminished. Although until 1740 the lion's share of customs collections and maritime profits flowed directly to Ava, the expansion 41 Burmese chronicles identify Gharib Newaz' chief allies as coming from Eka-bat, of uncertain location. Roy, Manipur, p. 40, says he was aided by troops form Cachar. Probably his new Shan vassals also contributed levies. 42 Roy, Manipur, p. 40, relying on the Manipuri chronicle, dates this campaign to 1739, but other details indicate that it was the same unsuccessful venture dated in Burmese sources to late 1740. Roy also claims that Gharib Newaz offered his daughter to Maha-dami-ya-za-di-pati at this time, but Burmese chronicles describe detailed negotiations over the presentation of his daughter later in the decade. See Yi Yi, Myanma, pp. 50 ff. 43 HNY, p. 380.

212 I AVA'S LOSS, 1660-1752

of Indian and European commerce and shipbuilding, and the development of royal trading ventures, enhanced the potential viability of an independent coastal kingdom. Commercial revenues could supplement the Delta's limited agricultural wealth, and the latest European guns could compensate somewhat for its small population. When the rebellion of 1740 began, both the Burman prince of Syriam and the rebels vigorously courted English assistance.44 Negotiations with English and French representatives throughout the 1740s and 1750s revolved around Burman and Peguan attempts to obtain cannon, muskets, and ammunition. Invariably the Peguans, by virtue of their geographic position, were more successful.45 Moreover, by the mid-eighteenth century the south had had opportunity to recover from the demographic disasters of Nan-da-bayin's reign. Not only did Middle Burma and Pegu emerge unscathed from the Chinese incursions of 1659-1662,46 but these areas, along with the trans-Sittang littoral, benefited from the southward drift of nuclear zone residents and perhaps from the periodic migrations by Karens and other groups from the eastern hills.47 Chronicles and inquest records show that areas around Pegu and Martaban which in 1600 had been deserted were again under cultivation by the late seventeenth century. The Martaban revolt of 1661 and the tentative aid that Pegu gave Pagan in 1714 were perhaps early indications of a southern resurgence. As Lower Burma's potential for disaffection grew, the activities of provincial deputies increased the likelihood that this potential would be realized. As noted, tax abuses by short-term appointees who looked to Avan patrons for advancement had already caused unrest at Toungoo, Martaban, and Chiengmai in this period. The problem was no less severe in the Delta. The Burmese translation of the Mon history writ44

See LFSG, XXVI, 8-9, 35-37. Burmese-European relations are by far the best researched aspect of Burmese history in this period. The standard work is Hall, English Intercourse, chap. 11 and appendix, "The Tragedy of Negrais." See too B. R. Pearn, A History ofRangoon (1939, repr., Westmead, 1971), chap. 3; Philippe Preschez, "Les relations entre la France et la Birmanie au XVIlI' et au XIX* siecles," France-Asie/Asia 21, 3 (1967): 285-94; and documents from Archives des Colonies preserved in Henri Cordier, ed., "Memoires sur Ie Pogou," Revue Ae I'Extreme-Orient 2, 4 (1883): 505-16. 46 Of course, Martaban outside the Delta had not been so fortunate in this period. 47 See HNY, pp. 382-83; ZOK, pp. 83, 98; Wilkie, Gazeteer Tamethin, pp. 26, 3033, 45; Martaban Land Rolls of 1766, unpublished Mon-language document in possession of Prof. H. L. Shorto, referring to Karen and/or Riang activities at Martaban in 1663-1664 and 1716-1717; BL OR 3464, 140 v.141 r. 45

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ten by the monk of Athwa, who was residing at Pegu in 1740, has this to say of administration under Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati: In that king's reign throughout Hanthawaddy [Pegu] the royal taxes were exceedingly heavy. [Tax collectors] followed their selfish inclinations and ordered that taxes be collected on every plantain tree, every chili plant, every brinjal plant, every loom. They even taxed the breasts of suckling mothers at the rate of two mats of silver for women whose breasts had fallen and one mat for women whose breasts had not fallen. . . . And so [because of this taxation] all the people, monks and laymen, of the Ra-manya country [land of the Mons] had no comfort and were in great distress.48 Even allowing for anti-Avan partisanship and for florid literary exaggeration, this agrees substantially with the picture presented in Burmese royal decrees,49 as well as with the following account written about 1750 by an anonymous English observer, quoted again in extenso: [People are] chusing rather to live among the Wild Beasts, than be at the Mercy of the cruel and tyrannical Government, which at present has a King, without any experience, and intirely ruled by Ministers, without any other knowledge but a bare private Interest, which makes the Country in general wish for a change, because every petty Governour of Towns or Cities, if he can but satisfy the Minister at Court, can at his pleasure oppress the people under him, without any fear of Punishment, which has caused the Revolt of the richest and largest Province of this Kingdom [Pegu], who for this last 10 Years has baffled all the attempts that have been made by all the King's Forces to bring them again under Subjection; having at present no hopes to accomplish it, being quite disheartened by their continual losses, which are wholely owing to the bad Government all over the Kingdom.50 48

BL OR 3464, p. 139 v. One mat equals .25 kyat, or about 4.1 grams. Mothers whose breasts had fallen paid a heavier tax because they could suckle and work (at their looms?) simultaneously, so in theory they were richer. No doubt this was a stylized example of cupidity, not to be taken literally. On the monk of Athwa's career, see Halliday, "Immigration," pp. 6-7; idem, TaUungs, pp. 133-35. 49 See Chapter 3 nn. 75-78. 50 Dal, I, 130. Italics added. On the authorship of this quotation, see Hall, English Intercourse, pp. 283, 286. By emphasizing the weakness of the Burmese regime, the author of this document sought to increase support for his own proposal of a settlement on Negrais. But again the unambiguous references to ministerial autonomy can hardly be ignored.

214 I AVA'S LOSS, 1660-1752

Although some Mon headmen and inferior officials in the provincial establishment at Pegu may have profited from this financial regime,51 on the whole unrestrained exactions failed to benefit leading ministerial families in the south, whose share of major royal appointments decreased following the shift of capital from Pegu to Ava.52 This decline was probably an inevitable result of geographic considerations rather than of a conscious policy of discrimination against Mons and southern Burmans. It was natural that official families nearest the capital would have had the ear of the king and his favorites. Nonetheless, decreasing patronage opportunities within the central administration must have alienated Delta leaders and reinforced the impression created by ruinous taxation that Ava's government no longer functioned in the interests of southern society. Peguans gave ear to rumors and omens which proclaimed that the people of the south "will again be replete with glory (hpon), power {tago), and mystical energy («-««bow), and [an independent] king will again reign over the three regions of [Ra-manyd]," that is, the ancient Mon country comprising Bassein, Pegu, and Martaban.53 The history of the monk of Athwa indicates that to identify oneself as a "Mon" at Pegu in 1740 was to be loyal to Ra-manya and hostile to the Burman court and to its local agents.54 Although Ava's governor at Pegu, a recently appointed commoner from Upper Burma named Ngi-tha-aung, had been preeminendy responsible for local abuses, somehow he convinced himself that he could turn Ava's difficulties to his own advantage and reign as king over the south. Accordingly, in late May of 1740, after news of the Manipuri 51

HNY, p. 380, refers to local headmen who conspired with the Peguan governor in 1740. Cf. this chapter, n. 17. 52 Tha-lun and his sons Pindale and Pye had a significant number of Mons serving as chief ministers or as senior commanders. Ava's last known Mon chief minister (Banyalaw) was apparently appointed in 1662. Thereafter Mln-ye-kyaw-din continued to reward men from the Delta with lesser offices, but his son and grandson honored a mere handful of Mons. Not only positions at Ava, but also major provincial appointments appear to have gone to northerners with some regularity. See HNY, pp. 229-408 passim; LBHK, pp. 200-15. 53 BL OR 3464, p. 138 v. The chronology for this passage is confused, but a similar prophecy ibid., p. 140 r., can be dated reliably to mid-1740. On the tradition of separate sovereignty in Ra-manya, see Shorto, "Mon Genealogy," pp. 63-72. 54 BL OR 3464, p. 139 V.-140 r. Lest one imagine that the judgment of the Mon chronicler, writing after Pegu's fall, was unduly influenced by post-1740 Mon-Burman polarization, a similar picture of Mon hostility toward "the governing Burmars" emerges from communications sent to Fort St. George by English East India Company agents who witnessed the overthrow of Ava's garrison at Syriam in December 1740. See LFSG, XXVI, 8-9, 35-37.

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raid on Sagaing strengthened the popular conviction that Maha-damaya-za-di-pati had abandoned dhamma, Nga-tha-aung murdered his leading deputies and declared his independence. He was soon slain, however, by local leaders who resented his heavy-handed treatment of dissent and who, no doubt, remembered his record of tax abuse.55 Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati now sent a small pacification force to Pegu to install a new governor. As a deterrent to other rebels, the northerners burned alive Nga-tha-aung's family and impaled his putrifying head at a crossroads. Mon dignitaries were suitably obeisant. But once the northern force returned to defend Ava against the Manipuris, the second governor also was assassinated, on 18 November 1740.56 A political vacuum had thus been created which Ava was unable to fill. The man who succeeded in occupying Pegu and making himself the first king of Lower Burma in the eighteenth century was a fascinating personality best known by his royal title of Smin Dhaw Buddha Kesi, or simply Smin Dhaw.57 Although a good deal of uncertainty surrounds his origins and identity, most accounts agree that he began his career by building a jungle stockade north of Pegu, where he gathered a strong military following and developed a reputation for magical powers that impressed the local populace. According to the Siamese Prince Damrong Rajanubhab's account based on a Tai history: At that moment there was a priest [that is, Buddhist monk] by the name of Sa-lar [that is, Tha-hlS, Smiri Dhaw's personal name]. . . . He was acquainted with the knowledge of spells, charms, magical incantations and exorcisms. . . . The fame of priest Sa-lar spread far and wide as a person having supernatural powers, impenetrable to weapons and invulnerable. . . . When [Mon leaders at Pegu] heard of the supernatural powers possessed by priest Sa-lar, they made further inquiries and found that he was the son of the prince of [Pagan], the uncle of [Tanin-ganwei], who had revolted [in 1714] and disappeared. The Mons were very pleased to discover him and 55 The account of Nga-tha-aung's forty-five-day reign contained in RCS-TY and BL OR 3464, p. 140 r. is generally supported by HNY, p. 380, and R. Halliday, ed. and tr., "SIapat Rajawan Datow Smin Ron—A History of Kings," JBRS 13, 1 (1923): 63. On the other hand, MYG, pp. 130-31 claims that his overthrow was precipitated not only by his domestic policies, but also by the active opposition of the loyal governors of Prome and Syriam and by the dispatch of a punitive force from Ava. 56 This is one of the few dates supported by both European and Burmese sources. See LFSG, XXVI, 36; RCS-TY; and BL OR 3464, p. 140 v. 57 "Smin Dhaw," Mon equivalent of the Pali Mamma-raja, was the title used by a respected Mon pretender who had also been an ex-monk in 1550-1551.

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. . . invited [him] to govern Muang Hongsawadi [Pegu] with the name of Sming Paw. 58 On 4 December 1740, barely a week after Smin Dhaw was acclaimed king at Pegu, his followers slaughtered the northern garrison at the chief port of Syriam. Ava's officials at Martaban also fled in the face of local opposition, so that by early 1741 the entire Mon country had rendered allegiance to Smin Dhaw.59 It is important to recognize the difference between these events and those that precipitated the collapse of the First Toungoo Dynasty. In the late sixteenth century, revolts at Ava, Nyaungyan, Prome, Toungoo, and Chiengmai were all led by Burman princes who, although originally appointed by the imperial court, had come to embody local sovereignty by virtue of their exalted lineage, long-term residence, and autonomous control over provincial patronage rewards. By contrast, Ngd-tha-aung, a temporary appointee and a mere commoner who was closely identified with the unpopular and politically unremunerative Ava court, was unable to win significant support. Before the local Peguan leadership could be mobilized against the capital, Ava's representatives had to be swept aside by someone whose personal qualities, putative lineage, and sympathy with provincial aspirations would allow him to build enduring ties in the indigenous community. This was Smin DhaVs achievement. A similar split between Ava representatives and community-based rebels occurred at other provincial centers. At Martaban,60 Tavoy,61 Syriam,62 Toungoo,63 Prome,64 and Chiengmai, centrally appointed governors were all murdered or otherwise displaced in the years 1727-1743 by opponents unconnected to the current Ava court. The parallels between Smin Dhaw and Chao Ong Kham at Chiengmai are particularly intriguing: both filled a vacuum created by the murder of Ava's extortionate representatives, both 58

Damrong, "Our Wars," pp. 285-86, following the history by Krom Somdet Phra Paramanuchit. Cf. HNY, pp. 382-84; MYG, pp. 137-40; RCS-TY; BL OR 3464, p. 140 V.-141 r.; Halliday, "Slapat," p. 63. These six sources disagree as to the relation between the assassination of the second governor and Smin Dhaw^s accession. The first three claim that local Mons, exasperated by the second governor's attempt to root out opposition, killed him and only then discovered Smin Dhaw. The latter three versions of the Mon history suggest that local leaders and Smin Dhaw joined forces with the express intention of killing the governor and elevating Smin Dhaw. 59 LFSG, XXVI, 8-9, 35-37; HNY, p. 384. 60 HNY, p. 384; Damrong, "Our Wars," p. 287; Martaban Land Rolls of 1766. 61 HS, pp. 96-97; RCS-TvY; Brailey, "Gwe," p. 35. 62 See above n. 59. 63 Yi Yi, Myan-ma, p. 76. "Ibid., p. 81.

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championed local autonomy, both claimed royal descent, both relied initially on a private military retinue. The situation at Pegu, Chiengmai, and other provincial centers was also analogous to the cleavage that we have observed in the nuclear zone between community-based headmen and appointed officials. The changing character of provincial rebellion between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries thus testifies eloquendy to the Restored Toungoo success in neutralizing the princes and tying the top stratum of provincial officials to the Ava court. As defender of Ra-manya against Avan domination, Smin Dhaw appointed Mons to most leading positions. Although details on their backgrounds are scanty, most were probably headmen or provincial deputies with their own patron-client networks in the Mon community.65 Yet Smin Dhaw's movement was by no means exclusively Mon. According to Professor H. L. Shorto, perhaps 40 percent of the Delta population identified themselves as Karens, Burmans, or Shans.66 In Middle Burma, Burmans probably outnumbered Mons, whereas of course the north was overwhelmingly Burman. It was Smin Dhaw's ambition not merely to assert the independence of the coastal kingdom, but to recreate the valleywide empire of the sixteenth century in which all sectors had owed allegiance to Pegu. To that end he sought to build a genuinely polyethnic following of communities opposed to Ava. Because each leading official was bound to the king by separate personal bonds, there was no need for a uniform "horizontal" or national identity.67 At the same time, to enhance his authority over the population at large, Smin Dhaw emphasized universal religious themes68 which proved his ability to honor dbamma (sadly neglected by Mahadama-ya-za-di-pati) and to confer renewed material and spiritual benefits on his subjects. In particular his multi-faceted expertise in the magical arts, an expertise which in later periods is known to have characterized "royal" harbingers of Utopian prosperity and harmony,69 65

See appointment lists, HNY, p. 383. Personal communication, 1974. Note, however, that neither source cited in Brailey, "Gwe," p. 44 n. 75, is relevant to the demographic situation in the Delta prior to 1750. 67 Of course, this was true of most Southeast Asian states. See Lieberman, "Ethnic Politics," pp. 455-82. Cf. Hanks, "Entourage and Circle," p. 200. 68 His lavish patronage of Buddhist shrines in the south, his acquisition of a sacred elephant with striped or variegated {kya) markings, his knowledge of astrology, charms, and bei-din magic. See BL OR 3464, p. 140 v.141 r.; HNY, p. 384; Kamahtan Kyaung Hsaya-daw, Shwei-hmaw-daw tbamaing akyin-gyok (Rangoon, 1917), pp. 58-59. 69 See E. M. Mendelson, "Observations," pp. 797-98, 804; idem, "A Messianic Buddhist Association in Upper Burma," BSOAS 24 (1961): 566-80; idem, 'The King of the Weaving Mountain," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 48 (1961): 229-37; Sarkisyanz, Buddhist Backgrounds, chaps. 14, 21, 22; Spiro, Buddhism, pp. 171-80; John 66

218 I AVA'S LOSS, 1660-1752

raises the possibility that Smin Dhaw sought to invoke millennial traditions. Astrologically based prophecies in the 1740s foretold the imminent appearance of a righteous king who would restore the religion and radically improve the fortunes of the long-suffering people of the south.70 Such millennial traditions were familiar not only to Mons and Burmans, but also to Tais and probably to animist peoples in contact with Buddhist civilization.71 A non-Mon tribal people known to contemporaries as "Gweis" in fact formed the core of Smin Dhaw's following at the jungle stockade. A number of hypotheses have been presented as to the ethnic background of this group: they have been identified as a type of Shans,72 as Lahus,73 and as Lawas.74 Nigel Brailey, who examined the problem in some detail on the basis of the Siamese Chronicle of the Burmese Mons, claimed that the Gweis were a group of Karens, possibly Taungthus, who had recendy arrived in force from the eastern hills, where Burmese control had eroded following the collapse of Mong Pai.75 No P. Ferguson and E. Michael Mendelson, "Masters of the Buddhist Occult: The Burmese Weikzas," Contributions to Asian Studies 16 (1981), esp. pp. 67-73; Theodore Stern, "Ariya and the Golden Book: A Millenarian Buddhist Sect among the Karen," JAS 27, 2 (1968): 307-308, 324. 70 See BL OR 3464, pp. 138 v., 140 r., 141 v., and below n. 92. So too, although the chronologies do not correspond particularly well, strong coincidences of early biography, age, and hill-tribe origins raise the possibility that Smin Dhaw invented or exploited an early eighteenth-century prophecy, attributed to the Buddha, foretelling the appearance of a Peguan king who would bring Utopian prosperity and physical rejuvenation after a period of great misery. The prophecy is recorded at Uppanna Sudhammavati Rajavamsaiatba (Pak Lat, Siam) I, 45-46, 94-99 and translated by H. L. Shorto, private typescript, pp. 18-19, 57-61. 71 For discussion see below, Chapter 5, section 2, plus Keyes, "Millennialism," p. 291, referring to pre-modern Thai millennial uprisings; and Stern, "Ariya," pp. 297328, discussing nineteenth- and twentieth-century patterns among the Karen. So too Prof. F. K. Lehman, personal communication, 7 November 1978, refers to "messianic religious-cum-political movements" among eighteenth-century Lahus. 72 Damrong, "Our Wars," p. 285; Wood, History, p. 234. 7J See below n. 75, plus G. E. Harvey, "Gwe," JBRS 15 (1925): 130, par. 7. 74 Harvey, "Gwe," pp. 129-30, pars. 3, 7. Cf. Keyes, "Karen in Thai History," p. 56 n. 17, suggesting Gweis were a Mon-Khmer tribal group. 75 Brailey, "Gwe," pp. 33-47. Lehman, "Who Are the Karen?" p. 249 n. 2 and personal communication, 7 November 1978, has raised inter alia two major objections to Brailey^ theory: the Taungthus did not come from an area sufficiendy far in the northeast to tally with Prof. Lehman's reconstruction of Smin Dhaw's origins, and there is in the literature no reference to Taungthus or other Karens as "Gweis." Prof. Lehman favors a Lahu, specifically a Yellow Lahu, identification: Lahus came from the northeast sector of the empire, and certain Lahu-speakers were called by the Keng Tung Khun "Gwe/ Kwe/ Kui" (cf. Harvey, "Gwe," p. 130 pars. 7, 8). The last point is indeed significant, for there is no explanation which would readily connect Karens to the term

REVOLT OF LOWER BURMA | 219

precise or confident identification is possible, given the vagueness of eighteenth-century terminology, and in particular the tendency for lowlanders to classify as "Karens" both Karen-speakers and small groups of Mon-Khmer speakers with a general cultural similarity to Karens.76 A Karen linguistic and/or cultural identification, however, is strengthened by Burmese reports that Smin Dhaw gave his first five court appointments to men with recognizably "Karen" names,77 by the fact that the Hman-nan chronicle refers to Smin Dhaw's original supporters as "Gwei-Karens,"78 by the historic pattern of Karen migrations to the southern lowlands, and by the well-documented alliance between Mons and certain Karen groups in later struggles against northern domination.79 No less curious, in view of the undeniable expressions of Mon-Burman antagonism in this period, was Smin Dhaw's ability to win support among southern Burmans. As Prince Damrong's above-quoted account indicates, Smin Dhaw himself claimed to be the son of Taninganwei's uncle who in 1714 had allegedly fled to a Gwei village where he had cohabited with a local woman.80 This genealogy, like that of many a low-born pretender, was almost certainly spurious. But the claim to royal ancestry exercised a strong appeal to all ethnic groups, and particularly to those Burmans opposed to Maha-dama-ya-za-dipati but who nonetheless wished to maintain allegiance to the ancient line of Burman kings. Presumably they viewed Smin Dhaw as an "GweP; but apart from the coincidence of names, I am not happy with the evidence that Smin Dhaw and his supporters came from the northeast Tai country. References to his origins at HNY, pp. 367, 383 and Phayre, History, p. 140 point rather to the southeast Shan-Karen area or even the Pegu Yoma. Tan Po', cited in Uppanna Sudbammavati, p. 95 was in the same southeast region (cf. n. 70 above). Symes, Embassy, p. 13 (cited by Prof. Lehman) refers only to the Gweis of Okpo-Madaya ("Muddora"), which is just north of Ava. In any case, it is by no means certain that the Okpo Gweis were in origin identical to Smin Dhaw's people: HNY, pp. 382-83 refers to the latter as "Gwei-Karens," but KBZ, pp. 63-64 refers to the Okpo people as "Gwei-Lawas." See this chapter n. 95. 76 That is, Riangs. See this chapter n. 12. 77 HNY, p. 383. My thanks to Mr. John Okell for his assistance with these identifications. 78 HNY, pp. 382-83. It also refers to "Gwei-Karens" from a "Karen village." 7 ^ See Stern, "Ariya," pp. 302, 306; Crawford,Journal, II, 30, 36; Dal, I, 139-40. Note too that the respected Martaban historian U Pyin-nya, Kayin ya-zawin (History of the Karens) (Rangoon, 1929), pp. 145 ff. identified Smin Dhaw as a Karen. On Karen migrations to the lowlands, see this chapter n. 47, and Luce, "Comparative Study of Karen Languages," pp. 2-3. The Land Rolls refer to yin rebellions and irruptions at Martaban in 1663-1664 and 1716-1717. This term normally refers to Karens, though as noted, it can also identify Riang tribes. 80 The claim is presented in greatest detail at HNY, p. 383.

220 I AVA'S LOSS, 1660-1752

eighteenth-century counterpart to Bayin-naung. Smin Dhaw's governor at Martaban and two of his chief commanders were identified by contemporaries as "Burmans."81 At Toungoo and Prome, Burmans and Mons joined forces to deliver the towns to Smin Dhaw.82 There was also an influential Shan who became Smin Dhaw's chief minister with the honored title Banya-dala.83 In sum, then, although it clearly drew most heavily on Mon support, the uprising of 1740 should be seen as a religiously sanctioned regional revolt that succeeded in uniting individuals from various ethnic communities.84 As soon as he had consolidated his hold over the coast, Smin Dhaw began to push up the Irrawaddy-Sittang corridor. In 1742 his armies overran Toungoo and swept to the very outskirts of Ava. The next year they seized Prome, which had close commercial links to Pegu,85 and in 1745 ravaged the rich irrigated districts of Minbu and Salin. Several factors undermined Ava's efforts to stem the southern advance. No doubt the north retained its basic demographic superiority, but by the 1740s the problem of manpower dispersion, and its corollary, political fragmentation, had reached an acute stage. Maha-damaya-za-di-pati was unable even to rebuild Ava's walls without help from the private retinues of his relatives and officials. Shan tributaries became reluctant to supply troops, while migrations to Pegu and Arakan multiplied. Whereas Maha-dama-ya-za-di pati, according to the Hmannan chronicle, sent only five thousand troops to pacify Pegu when it revolted, according to this same source, the expedition that seized Ava in 1752 numbered forty thousand.86 Loss of manpower was both cause 81

» Martaban Land RoUs of 1766; KBZ, p. 55; MMOS, II, 242-43; HNY, pp. 391-

92.

82 83 84

Yi Yi, Myan-ma, pp. 76, 81. HNY, pp. 383, 392; LBHK, p. 5; AA-T, p. 209. Cf. Lieberman, "Ethnic Politics," pp. 462-69; Keyes, "Karen in Thai History," p.

33.

85

During the 1596-1610 interregnum Toungoo and Prome had become independent kingdoms that had sought to seize the imperial mantle for themselves. Why during the 1740s interregnum did they rapidly fall under Peguan control? Three possible explanations present themselves: a) whereas in the late sixteenth century Pegu had experienced more severe military losses than Middle Burma, in the 1740s the situation was rather the reverse; b) so too de Brito's intervention at Syriam in the opening years of the seventeenth century had neutralized the commercial-political potential of the coast and invited independent risings in the interior; c) the continued development of maritime trade during the Restored Toungoo period may have rendered the area around Prome (and to a lesser extent perhaps, around Toungoo) more economically dependent on the coast. On this last point see DCB, 1721, pp. 52 ff.; Dal, I, 173-74. 86 HNY, pp. 380, 400. BL OR 3464, p. 141 V.-142 r. places the 1752 force at 60,000; whereas a contemporary French account claimed that in August 1751 the Peguan heir apparent said he would attack Ava with 25,000. Cordier, "Mimoires sur Ie P6gou," p. 510.

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and symptom of Upper Burma's deepening agricultural crisis. After 1743 deliveries to the royal granaries ceased, so Ava lacked the rice reserves necessary to supply large-scale offensives. Poor leadership and command rivalries added to the north's difficulties. With factionalism rife and Maha-damd-ya-za-di-pati enfeebled, there was no one to enforce that iron discipline for which Alaung-hpaya later became famous. In November 1743, a northern expedition recaptured Syriam, only to lose it as well as Prome because of indiscipline and (it is alleged) drunkenness among the troops.87 Part of the northern forces then fell back to Malun, but in 1744 or 1745 this post too was lost because jealous colleagues murdered one of Ava's few genuinely effective commanders.88 Finally, Pegu's superior access to foreign ordnance constituted a major advantage. A 2,700-pound cannon affectionately called "Piercer of a Heap of Enemies" (yan-pon-hkwin), which the Mon minister of the port at Syriam purchased from an Arab ship in the 1740s, became the Delta army's most prized possession, the arbiter of numerous encounters in Middle and Upper Burma, and the recipient of gold leaf, liquor, and fine foods from its reverent owners.89 The English envoy Michael Symes claimed that arms procured from European traders, and the services of renegade Dutch and Portuguese soldiers, were largely responsible for Pegu's victories in 1750-1751.90 By contrast, the north's artillery was limited to whatever had been brought upriver before 1740, for there is no evidence of ordnance manufacture at the capital. Ironically, despite Ava's vulnerability and the striking early success of Peguan arms, Smin Dhaw never reigned long enough to conquer the north. The "Gwei king" was overthrown by a coup in January 1747 while hunting elephants east of Sittang. He was succeeded by his principal minister and son-in-law Banya-dala, whose support had probably been instrumental in securing the throne for Smin Dhaw in 1740. A Shan elephanteer originally appointed by Ava, Banya-dala was director of the Pegu elephant corps in 1740 and was thus well placed 87

See HNY, pp. 385-86; H. Dodwell, Calendar of the Madras Records 1740-1744 (Madras, 1917), p. 434. 88 HNY, pp. 386-87. 89 KBZ, pp. 111-12: "in battle with Burman forces it was superior to any other cannon . . . every time it was fired it hit the foe, and if it struck the stem of a boat, it penetrated clear to the stern. Such was its fame that [the southerners] wrote 'Piercer of a Heap of Enemies' on each cannon ball before firing it, .. . and [soldiers] offered it fragrant scents, perfumes, food, and liquor." 90 Symes, Embassy, pp. 5-6. A 1754 draft treaty (never implemented) between Pegu and Madras included a provision whereby Pegu was to employ East India Company troops. Hall, English Intercourse, pp. 307-308. See too "Memoires sur Ie Pegou," pp. 505-16.

222 I AVA'S LOSS, 1660-1752

to expand his influence in subsequent years. Siamese accounts suggest that he and Smin Dhaw became estranged in the aftermath of a marriage alliance between Smin Dhaw and Chao Ong Kham of Chiengmai, which apparently threatened Banya-dala's position at court.91 Clearly the coup was motivated by personal rivalry, not pro- and anti-Mon sympathies, as has been alleged, for factional alignments continued to cut across ethnic lines: Smin Dhaw in his effort to raise forces against Banya-dala enjoyed Mon and Tai support, whereas Banyadald patronized individual Karen-speakers as well as Mons and Burmans. In effect, Banya-dala maintained much the same polyethnic clientage as his predecessor, and appealed to the same tradition of Ramanyan sovereignty. He too invoked local religious portents, and in particular a prophecy attributed to Gotama Buddha that in 1746-1747 a king honoring the Ten Royal Laws would confer great prosperity on the people of the south.92 Although the following words, allegedly spoken by Banya-dala after his coronation ceremony, may well be an invention of the monk of Athwa, the basic themes are no doubt authentic, as that chronicler was a knowledgeable contemporary observer and exponent of Mon tradition: Our country of Ra-manya, the great state of Hanthawaddy, is one over which former sovereigns full of glory have held sway; it is the city about which our Lord Buddha Himself prophesied and which the god Sakka93 named. It is the royal city wherein in former times the King of Many White Elephants [Bayin-naung] received homage from umbrella-bearing rulers, and where other ancient kings for successive generations also recognized their vassals. The Lord of the Golden Palace at Ava has not joined us in friendship and has not sent tokens of tribute. This is not right. The kings of Chiengmai, Mong Nai, Mong Mit, Hsipaw, and Keng Tung have all offered homage. Therefore we shall attack and seize Ava.94 Banya-dala succeeded in this boast within five years of his accession. Ava's nuclear zone administration was so enfeebled that it virtually 91

The coup date follows BL OR 3464, p. 141 r. On Banya-dala, the coup, and Smin Dhaw^s subsequent career, see too Brailey, "Gwe," pp. 35-37; Yi Yi, Myan-ma, pp. 8995, 99; HNY, pp. 383, 389-93; LBHK, p. 5; CXM, p. 183; HS, pp. 99-100. 92 For references to this and other Buddha prophecies legitimating Banya-dala, see bell inscription in Chit Thein, Shei-haitng, II, 109; AAm, pp. 56, 83; letters in Yi Yi, Myan-ma, pp. 177-78. Although for convenience I refer to him as Banya-dali, on accession he took the regnal title Bya-maing-di-ya-za-naya-di-pati. 93 Patron of Burmese kings. See Chapter 5 n. 59. 94 BL OR 3464, p. 141 v. Whether all the named Tai principalities and especially Chiengmai recognized Peguan suzerainty may be doubted.

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collapsed of its own weight, whereupon Delta forces arrived to administer the coup de grace. In 1747 a colony of Gwei deportees at Okpo, some twenty miles north of Ava, revolted under their local headmen because royal officers threatened to enslave families of those who refused higher tax payments.95 Coming after Chiengmai in 1727 and Pegu in 1740, Okpo constituted the third example of a revolt precipitated by tax demands. In cooperation with a nearby colony of Mon deportees, the Okpo Gweis seized control of the entire northeast bank of the Irrawaddy. This presented Ava with an impossible strategic situation, because as soon as Ava shifted forces to contain the threat from the northeast, the southern flank lay exposed. As though these problems were insufficient, in December 1749, the Manipuris returned after a nine-year absence. In the event, Gharib Newaz' campaign miscarried, partly because of feuds within the Manipuri ranks. Yet this surprising victory in itself could scarcely banish the fear and hunger that stalked the people of Upper Burma. Agriculture was in such a state that a tin (about one bushel) of rice, which cost sixteen kyats of silver in 1749, could not be obtained for eighty kyats by 1751.96 Many farmers, in defiance of royal orders, devoured their plough buffalos and horses, while others ate the corpses of animals that died at watering holes. At night men posted letters on the Ava courthouse warning of impending catastrophe.97 Fearing the collapse of the monarchy, a key official, Ye-gaung-san-kyaw, and his family deserted to Pegu.98 When the rains stopped in 1751, the new king of Pegu determined finally to take Ava, and assembled an invasion force from throughout Lower Burma and the southern half of the dry zone. Although described in contemporaneous sources as "the Talaing [Mon] army," according to these same sources it included significant numbers of Burmans in both command and subordinate positions.99 By December, 95

Scholars have usually assumed that these Gweis were related to those who supported Smiri Dhaw. However, apart from the common term "Gwei"—which could have been a loose generic designation for hill people—there are no strong Karen associations for the Okpo people. Moreover, in contrast to Smin Dhaw^s early supporters, the Okpo Gweis had probably been organized as stable lowland communities since the start of the dynasty. See 1638 census deposition at ZOK, p. 39. Note that Harvey, Hall, and Brailey have erroneously dated this uprising to 1740 or 1741. 96 MYG, pp. 249, 251; Yi Yi, Myan-ma, p. 31. 97 IO 3503, pt. 4, pp. 45 v., 47 r.; Yi Yi, Myan-ma, p. 31. 98 HNY, p. 400. 99 See BL OR 3464, p. 141 v.; MYG, p. 250; KBZ, p. 55. Cf. Phra Phraison Salarak (U Aung Thein) tr., 'The Testimony of an Inhabitant of the City of Ava," JSS 45, 2 (1957): 32, referring to Burmans fighting for Pegu in early 1752.

224 I AVA'S LOSS, 1660-1752

southern land forces had smashed their way into the Kyaukse basin, while a vast armada pushed toward the capital along the Irrawaddy. Maha-damd-ya-za-di-pati summoned his uncle Toungoo-ya-za from the northern front, but the situation was hopeless. Peguan forces, assisted now by soldiers from Okpo, promptly invested Ava. With refugees from die surrounding countryside crammed inside the walls, food supplies gave out and the defenders were reduced to a diet of boiled leaves and roots. By February of 1752 roots and leaves were virtually exhausted. The besiegers were about to return to avoid the approaching rains, when they learned from prisoners of the desperate situation inside the walls. They therefore redoubled their efforts and on 11 March broke into the inner citadel, whose defenders were too famished to raise their weapons.100 After a frantic search throughout the city, Burman defectors ferreted out Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati and all his family, except for two sons who escaped. Thus ended the mighty Toungoo Dynasty, which itself had united the Irrawaddy valley with an expedition from Pegu against Ava two centuries earlier. SECTION FOUR. THE ROLE OF NEIGHBORING EMPIRES

As was apparent in the case of Manipur and Pegu, the degree to which a given polity was able to exploit Ava's difficulties depended on the vigor of its own administration. If Ayudhya had been more dynamic, quite possibly she and not Pegu would have dealt the final blow to the Toungoo Empire. When in the 1660s Ava faced what proved to be a very temporary threat from the Chinese, Ayudhya had launched a full-scale invasion of Lower Burma. By the mid-eighteenth century, however, when Ava was in the grip of a truly insoluble crisis, the Siamese empire itself had become too moribund to expand. Two students of the late Ayudhya period, Akin Rabibhadana and Busakorn Lailert, have drawn attention to the accelerating loss of royal service people (phrai luang) to princely establishments during the late seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth centuries. This process contributed to an increase in factional strife at the capital, and a corresponding decline in the empire's military potential.101 Siam's internal difficulties, reinforced by concern with developments in Cambodia after 1737, inclined King Borommakot (r. 1733-1758) to adopt a cautious policy toward developments in Lower Burma. Although for two centuries Ayudhya and the Toungoo Empire had been ioo HNY, pp. 401-404; MYG, pp. 250-52. See Conclusion for further discussion.

101

NEIGHBORINGEMPIRES I 225

mortal foes, when the uprising occurred in 1740, Borommakot instinctively opposed the rebels. In late 1741 or early 1742 he gave refuge to the deposed Burman governors of Martaban and Tavoy.102 In 1744 he graciously received what may have been the first Burmese diplomatic embassy since Tha-lun, which was designed to obtain Siamese aid, or at least neutrality, in the struggle with Pegu. Borommakot assured the envoys of his good will and sent a high-level return mission to Ava two years later. At the same time, he sternly rejected a request from Smin Dhaw to wed an Ayudhyan princess. Although Borommakot was undoubtedly offended by Smin Dhaw's base origins, his policy reflected his abiding conviction that a vigorous Delta kingdom posed a greater threat to Siam than the enfeebled Ava empire, to which Siam had grown accustomed. He was particularly anxious lest the Mons of Pegu enlist support among their confreres in Siam, which could deprive the realm of manpower and which might also foster disaffection within Siam. His fears seemed justified after Smin Dhaw's deposition, when one of Smin Dhaw's lieutenants sought to collect arms and men to march on Pegu. He was prompdy executed. In 1750 Smin Dhaw himself turned up in Ayudhya, only to be deported to China.103 In the seventeenth century, of course, Ayudhya had welcomed Peguan exiles, figuratively speaking, as a bridge across which Siamese forces could invade Ava's dominions. Ayudhya's inactivity permitted the rise of independent principalities that in the 1660s Ayudhya had sought to annex. To the north, Chiengmai paid homage neither to Ava nor Ayudhya after 1727.104 To the west, Tavoy maintained a similar independence after 1741.105 Though nominally loyal to Pegu, Mon-speaking Martaban and Ye also lay in something of an intermediate zone, so that Pegu in 1752 feared that villages east and south of Martaban might be scheming with Siam.106 Not until the rise of Alaung-hpaya was either side strong enough to fill this vacuum along the interface between Burma and Siam. On Burma's southwestern flank, the ancient kingdom of Arakan also 102 The reference to both towns follows HS, p. 96. Damrong, "Our Wars," p. 287, mentions only Martaban. 103 This date follows Busakorn, "Dynasty," p. 97. Material on Siam's external relations derives from the same, pp. 94-99; Brailey, "Gwe," pp. 35-36; HNY, pp. 388-89; HS, pp. 96-101; MYG, pp. 180-96; Damrong, "Our Wars," pp. 286-90. 104 Similarly, I have found no record of Ayudhyan moves against Nan or Chiengsen. 105 See RCS-TvY, discussing military relations with Pegu; Dal, I, 115-16; RFSG, Public DespatchesfromEngland, 1753-1754 (Madras, 1963), 31 January 1754, p. 37. 106 AA-L, p. 17.

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ignored the challenge of Ava's disintegration, because she too was ab­ sorbed with internal problems. Although Arakan had helped to sack Pegu in 1599, three subsequent developments—the consolidation of Mughal control on Arakan's western border, the eclipse of Portuguese military and naval power on which Arakan's frontier defenses were partly dependent, and the erosion of royal authority following the murder in 1638 of the last representative of Arakan's ancient dy­ nasty—combined to undermine the stability of the government. The capital Mrauk-u saw an endless round of assassinations, with new ad­ venturers raised to the throne every few years by palace guards.107 Given this internal situation, Arakan was as likely to become a vic­ tim of Burmese aggression, as was the Irrawaddy valley to suffer from Arakanese incursions. Burmese cavalry raided Sandoway in southern Arakan in 1707, apparently carrying off a number of Muslim sol­ diers. 108 Shortly thereafter an Arakanese noble made himself king with the title Sanda-wi-zaya, and effected a brief renaissance of Arakanese power. In 1719, while Tanin-ganwei sat on the throne of Ava, Sandawi-zayd reportedly raided towns along the middle Irrawaddy.109 After his death in 1731, however, the court entered a period of intense factionalism, and Arakan ceased to figure in the history of the Toungoo Dynasty except as a haven for refugees from the chaos and wars to the east. Unlike Siam and Arakan, the Ch'ing Empire reached the peak of its vigor in the mid-eighteenth century; but she too adopted a policy of nonintervention in Toungoo affairs. The contrast between Peking's pacific policy in the first half of the eighteenth century and her quick belligerence in the 1760s, when she launched four invasions of Bur­ mese territory, is striking and atfirstrather puzzling. Two explanations present themselves. A casus belli for the 1765-1769 invasions arose through the early Κόη-baung efforts to exact tribute from Shan vassals near Yunnan who had grown unaccustomed to Burmese control in the late Toungoo period, and who now invoked China's protection.110 Such friction was rare in a period when Ava's influence in the Tai world was declining. Moreover, until the 1750s Manchu armies were still involved with 107 See Collis and San Shwe Bu, "Arakan's Place," pp. 44-46; and Collis, "Strange Murder," pp. 236-43. 108 UK, ΙΠ, 384. The so-called Delhi immigrants mentioned in Wilkie, Gazeteer Yamethin, pp. 44-45, actually may have been deportees from that raid. 1( » BL OR 3465 A, pp. 214 V.-215 r. Cf. Phayre, History, p. 181. 110 See Luce, "Chinese Invasions," pp. 118-19; Koenig, "Κόη-baung Polity," pp. 5556.

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campaigns in Central Asia to forestall the development of a military threat from the steppes. Not until these campaigns in the northwest had been completed did Peking feel free to engage in what were really police actions on the southern and eastern frontiers of the empire, including the four expeditions against Burma, and similar actions against Taiwan, Nepal, and Vietnam.111 An expedition from Yunnan in 1662 to demand the extradition of the last Ming claimant was the only exception to the early Ch'ing policy.112 This was obviously a matter of urgent and quite legitimate concern to leaders still uncertain of their grip on southern China. Thereafter Peking studiously avoided involvement. For example, in 1691 and 1708-1709 Yunnan refused sanctuary to rebel Tais fleeing Ava's forces—even though (or perhaps because) Burmese pursuers on the latter occasion had been so bold as to ravage some of China's Shan vassals. In the last years of the dynasty, Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati made desperate efforts to obtain armed assistance from China; yet Peking (or perhaps merely the Yunnan governor) in 1750 (?) authorized a small-scale mission without significant military value.113 Thus on three out of fourflanks—withSiam, Arakan, and China, but not Manipur—rival empires were unwilling or unable to profit from the decay of Ava's authority. Along with the events of the 1590s, the pattern of Restored Toungoo disintegration confirms S. J. Tambiah's analysis of premodern Southeast Asian empires as "galactic polities'': assemblages of autonomous entities held in orbit around central planets whose fields of influence were subject to frequent pulsation.114 In the zone of competing influence between rival empires, weakly held satellites sought to minimize their vulnerabilities and to maximize their advantages consistent with the demands of their powerful neighbors. Thus Ava's Tai vassals in the northwest found it profitable temporarily to become vassals of Manipur; but in the northeast, southeast, and east, the pull of nearby empires was insufficient and breakaway principalities preferred independence. Furthermore, as Ava's coercive power declined, the first areas to leave the imperial orbit were naturally at the 111 Edwin O. Reischauer and John K. Fairbank, East Asia: The Great Tradition (Boston, 1960), pp. 356 ff., 390-91. 112 See above, Chapter 3 section 1. »3 On Sino-Burmese relations 1662-1752, see HNY, pp. 311, 321-22, 352-53,400; Parker, Relations with China, pp. 75-79; John K. Fairbank and Ssu-yii Teng, Ch'ing Administration: Three Studies (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), pp. 135-78 passim; Luce, "Chinese Invasions," p. 117. 114 World Conqueror, chap. 7, esp. pp. 112-13. Cf. Anderson, "Idea of Power," p. 35.

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most distant reaches of the empire (hill tracts near Mong Pai, Manipur, and Chiengmai) followed at a relatively late stage by principalities in the Irrawaddy basin. So too in the late sixteenth century imperial disintegration had spread from the most distant Tai tributaries to lowland bayin and myo-za centers. In its opportunistic and cumulative character, the political behavior of oudying principalities during both Toungoo periods resembled that of peasant and elite clients in the nuclear zone. At the same time it is clear that within the tradition of the "galactic polity," the Restored Toungoo state achieved a more compact and efficient organization. Ava finally lost control over the outer zones because factional strife at court encouraged provincial appointees to engage in self-destructive tax demands; and because the central military system suffered from inexperienced leadership, command rivalries, and rampant desertion. Nonetheless, these failures cannot gainsay the demonstrated merits of the system earlier in the Restored Dynasty. The relative docility of the outer zones for well over a century, the capital-based nature of most succession conflicts, the political lassitude of Burman princes late in the dynasty, and the changed character of rebel provincial leadership all provide sufficient testimony. By displacing provincial appointees who had been integrated into the Ava patronage network, and by appealing to ancient traditions of local sovereignty over and against Upper Burma hegemony, Chao Ong Kham and Smin Dhaw sought to reverse the administrative trends of generations. Their anachronistic experiments would abort as soon as the nuclear zone recovered its vigor.

Chapter Five

ALAUNG-HPAYA'S 1752-1760

REINTEGRATION,

When the time arrived for Ava's destruction, the former Ava king failed to uphold the Law. . . . In accord with prophecies, I [therefore] founded my great capital Yadana-thein-ga Κόη-baung and erected a royal palace, whereupon many tributary chiefs did homage. . . . As a result of my charis­ matic glory (hpdn) .. . all the people obtained comfort and peace of mind as though they clasped a cool pot of water to their breast. I made valid asseverations of truth (adeik-htans), and repeatedly I vanquished all those who harm the state by their immoral actions. Alaung-hpaya Edict, April 17551

Pegu's leaders confidently expected to establish a long-term dominion over Upper Burma, but in fact their invasion revitalized the dry zone polity. The destruction of the Ava ruling house and the chaos that attended the southern incursions favored a number of local leaders whose authority, in contrast to that of Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati, de­ rived from their charisma and their demonstrated military skill. The most effective of these warriors, Alaung-hpaya was able to satisfy the popular yearning for a man of great hpdn, to crush opposition by force of arms, and thus to reorganize the population under a more tightly unified patronage structure. In essential respects his achievement resembled that of Nyaungyan MIn and his sons. As the devastation of Pegu in the 1590s had facili­ tated a shift in the political center of gravity to less disturbed areas, so in the 1750s the ruination of Kyaukse and riverine districts around Ava encouraged a shift to the valleys of the Mu and Chindwin. Nyaung1

AAm, pp. 3-4. Before each battle, Alaung-hpaya was in the habit of making an adeik-htan, that is, a recitation of his past religious merits, from the truth of which success in his forthcoming campaign was to result. Thus, for example, he would pray, "If I am truly worthy of promoting the faith, may I triumph." Date follows AAm, p. 5 n. 8.

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yan MIn and Alaung-hpaya were both self-made men thrown up in a period of enhanced social mobility, though of course the former's hereditary claims were considerably stronger than those of the head­ man of Mok-hso-bo. Alaung-hpaya's conquest pattern—starting with the dry zone and extending into the provinces of the south and the tributary zone—recapitulated the campaigns of the early seventeenth century. Above all, his internal administrative achievements recall those of Nyaungyan Min and Tha-lun. Unlike the early seventeenth-century kings, however, Alaung-hpaya was content to resurrect his predecessors' administrative structure with only minor changes. In terms of institutional history, therefore, the opening years of the Κόη-baung Dynasty should be seen as an exten­ sion of the Restored Toungoo era. SECTION ONE. T H E FOUNDATION OF ALAUNG-HPAYA'S POWER IN UPPER BURMA

Upper Burma's Condition after Ava's Fall Invaders from the Delta seem to have destroyed, albeit temporarily, much of Middle and Upper Burma's agricultural base during the last decade of Toungoo rule. The damage was concentrated in a great arc between Prome in the south and Kyaukse in the north. In 1745 the well-irrigated, normally fruitful area around Salin was so disrupted that the invaders themselves had to withdraw for fear of starvation.2 During the great offensive starting in late 1751, the southern army— whether by accident or design is unclear—wrecked a number of major weirs and irrigation channels in Kyaukse. They also carried off local cultivators.3 After Ava itself fell in March of 1752, the invaders de­ ported to Pegu numerous soldiers, the leading monks, and virtually the entire Ava court, who were obliged to swear fealty to the Peguan king and to serve the southern government. The total number of de­ portees may have exceeded twenty thousand.4 Another indeterminate number died or fled to the wilds. It was a period, as Alaung-hpaya recalled five years later, "of destruction and disorder throughout the countryside, when mothers could not find their children, nor children 2

HNY, p. 387. MMOS, ΙΠ, 16; HNY, p. 401. 4 See references to Avan abmu-dan deportees in the Delta, KBZ, pp. 19, 104-105. On the desolation of Ava and parts of Middle Burma, see too Dal, I, 170-73; Dwayawadi Hsaya-daw, "Ayel-daw-bon," p. 135. 3

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their mothers, when the Mon rebels carried off people, selling and reselling them as slaves."5 This then was the demographic background to political developments in the early 1750s. Since the principal population centers between Prome and Ava had been ravaged, there was little prospect of effective resistance to Pegu's authority anywhere south of Ava. Some southern centers away from the river in Meiktila and the eastern part of Myingyan districts may have been spared, but they were isolated enclaves, and at any rate, were easily accessible to Pegu's main army in the Delta. Thus, although we hear of three resistance leaders south of the great bend in the Irrawaddy, none had any notable success.6 Only the region northwest of Ava was sufficiendy distant from Pegu, and sufficiendy unharmed by a decade of warfare, to be in a position to challenge Pegu's hegemony. It is true that the valleys of the Chindwin and Mu had suffered from Manipuri, Gwei, and perhaps even Mon incursions. A number of irrigation tanks had been breached. Nonetheless, since the principal invasions had come from the south, the system of military levies remained relatively intact. The growing importance of this area had become apparent as early as 1745, when five out of six local commanders to whom Maha-damd-ya-za-di-pati gave tides came from townships on the north shore of the Irrawaddy and east of the Chindwin.7 In 1752, shortly before the capital fell, a list of Maha-dama-ya-za-di-patfs gentry commanders again showed the predominance of people north and west of the capital.8 The position of the Mu and Chindwin valleys in 1752 was thus comparable to that in 1597 of Meiktila, Yamethin, and Myingyan districts, which became the nucleus of Nyaungyan Min's state. Why did Pegu fail to appreciate the potential importance of the 5

AAm, p. 219. Cf. KBZ, pp. 45, 65. These three leaders were: a) Toungoo-ya-za, Maha-dama-ya-za-di-patfs uncle and leading general, who was rescued from Peguan captors by his followers disguised as fishermen. He escaped to the hilly Yaw area west of the Irrawaddy, where he led a forlorn guerrilla band pledged to restore his nephew. Toungoo-ya-za died in late 1753 or early 1754. See HNY, p. 405; KBZ, pp. 62, 83-84; b) the headman of PIn and Madi; and c) the headman of Salin-gathu, both of whose jurisdictions were south of the Chindwin junction. These men opposed Pegu not out of loyalty to the Toungoo house, but from personal ambition. When confronted by a large Delta army in 1754, however, both abandoned their original plans. See HNY, p. 388; AA-L, pp. 48-49; KBZ, pp. 86-87. 7 See Chapter 3 n. 231. 8 HNY, pp. 402-403. So too at least twenty-three of thirty local leaders listed at MYG, pp. 150-51 as being dominant in the 1740s were in the Mu, Chindwin, or upper Irrawaddy areas. 6

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north and to launch a large-scale campaign to destroy its irrigation works and depopulate its principal places? To the southern command­ ers the Mu valley must have seemed rather inconsequential compared to Ava and other Burman centers that had already been subjugated. The Mu River irrigation system of the mid-eighteenth century de­ pended on uncertain rainfall, and the population, though significant, was normally thinner than in districts further south.9 Moreover, unlike the old bayin centers of Prome and Toungoo in Middle Burma, the north lacked a tradition of political independence. Many local head­ men had rendered homage, and Pegu's leaders saw no reason to expect anything more arduous than "mopping up" operations. As both Bur­ mese chronicles and a contemporary French account reveal, Pegu's judgment in this respect was heavily colored by fears of Siamese in­ cursions and tributary rebellions in the southeast. The main body of the army was needed in that quarter to protect the kingdom's heart­ land, for the strategic value to Pegu of the Mu valley was incomparably less than that of Martaban and Tavoy.10 Therefore, shortly after Ava had fallen but before Alaung-hpaya had offered any sign of resistance, thirty out of forty-five regiments re­ turned to Pegu. The remaining forces were placed under the authority of a prominent Mon commander from Martaban named Dalaban, at the ruined capital of Ava. It became apparent that Dalaban's forces were spread too thinly for effective occupation, so from the start he had to rely on auxiliary levies supplied by local leaders, both hereditary gentry figures and newly risen strongmen. Before long a complex mosaic emerged in which Da­ laban, although nominally head of Upper Burma, was in fact merely primus inter pares. If one leader seemed inclined to oppose the south­ 11 ern forces, that man's immediate neighbors were likely to cooperate with Dalaban in order to stanch the ambitions of their local rival. At the same time, there is evidence that even some headmen who pledged allegiance to Pegu entertained royal ambitions and regarded the Peguan alliance as a matter of temporary convenience. Such seems to 9 On Mu valley irrigation and agriculture, see Dal, I, 169-70; Williamson, Gazeteer Shwebo, pp. 3-5, chap. 4; Smart, Burmese Irrigation, pp. 11-12. 10 See AA-L, p. 17; RCS-TvY; Cordier, "Memoires sur Ie Pegou," pp. 511-12. The last source is of particular interest, as it was based on interviews in late 1751, before the conquest of Ava was complete. 1 ' Although Alaung-hpaya was the most famous northern opponent of the Peguans, others included Gonna-ein, head of the Gwei colony at Okpo, which had revolted against Ava in 1747; a Mon general, Ya-za-di-ya-ζά, who developed an independent base in the far northwest; and the headman of Monywa in the lower Chindwin valley.

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have been the position, for example, of the headman of Kin-u (a vil­ lage about fifteen miles north of Alaung-hpaya's base at Mok-hso-bo), who proved to be Alaung-hpaya's most implacable and resourceful opponent.12 In short, in the absence of thoroughgoing Peguan paci­ fication, the political localism and interelite rivalries of the final years of Maha-damd-ya-za-di-patfs reign continued more or less unabated. Alaung-hpaya's qualifications to recentralize Upper Burma and to expel the Peguans were, in early 1752, no more imposing than those of numerous other northern bandit chiefs and headmen. His native place Mok-hso-bo was described by both the English visitor Captain George Baker and by one of Alaung-hpaya's ministerial biographers merely as a "village" rather than as a "town." 13 The list of local leaders whom Alaung-hpaya entided in early 1752 included the names of about thirty-seven villages, but it is unclear whether these places were tradi­ tionally subordinate to Mok-hso-bo, or whether they had formed an ad hoc alliance under Alaung-hpaya's leadership.14 Even if we conclude that Mok-hso-bo was the hub of a township (myo) embracing 37 sat­ ellite villages, it was not a large township by local standards. Talokmyo, for example, had 145 subordinate villages. His official position at Mok-hso-bo was that of kyei-gaing, equiva­ lent to township or village headman.15 Apparendy his ancestors had held petty local office in the Mu region since the fifteenth century.16 Like other gentry leaders, Alaung-hpaya relied on his family network in organizing resistance. In 1755 he boasted that he had "upwards of 100 near Relations,"17 many of whom figured in his early appointment 12

Like other royal pretenders, the Kin-u-za (that is, "eater" of Kin-u) sought to exploit a prophecy current in the north in 1752: "Of three bos, one will shine like the sun." The first bo (the word means "general," but was intended to have a double mean­ ing) was Alaung-hpaya of Mok-hso-£>o; the second, Gonni-ein, from Ok/w>; whereas the Kin-u-za was born at Nagafeo. See AA-T, p. 173; Williamson, Gazeteer Shwebo, p. 19. On the Kin-u-za's career, see KBZ, pp. 42-84 passim. 13 Baker in Dal, I, 163; and Let-we-naw-yahta, AA-L, p. 13. However, KBZ, p. 27 calls it a myo, or township. 14 See KBZ, pp. 33-34. BL OR 3464, p. 143 v. says Alaung-hpaya at first adminis­ tered his oath to only sixty-nine warriors; MMOS, III, 208 says Mok-hso-bo tradition­ ally supplied two hundred fighting men. 15 Yi Yi, "Κδη-baung hkit," p. 76 n. 3; Crawfurd, Journal, II, 281; Judson's BurmeseEnglish Dictionary, Unabridged, rev. and enlarged by Robert C. Stevenson and Rev. F. H. Eveleth (Rangoon, 1966), p. 1,064. 16 AA-L, p. 13. Although this is an official biography designed to boost Alaunghpaya's royal credentials, the royal connection is very remote, and the post-fourteenthcentury element of the genealogy is entirely plausible. 1 ^ Dal, I, 152.

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lists.18 Yet his ability to capitalize on these connections depended more on force of personality than on hereditary prerogative, for he was by no means the senior member of the family. According to Pagan Wundauk U Tin, before he could establish unchallenged authority, he had to slay a maternal uncle in full view of local residents.19 Relatives and nonfamily members alike were eager to become clients of Alaung-hpaya (or U Aung-zei-yd, as he was known before he became king) because, in the words of a royal biography, reports spread throughout the north that "in matters of speech and action, and in his ability to make reasoned judgments, he was decorous and capable as befitted a king."20 Less flattering European accounts portray him as vengeful, exuberantly self-adulatory, shrewd but unsophisticated and direct (as befitted a self-made peasant leader), and possessed of inexhaustible energy. Given the fluidity of power in the 1750s, these were valuable, if not essential traits. "See this Sword," he boasted to Captain Baker, representing the English East India Company at a court audience in 1755, it is now three Years, since it has been constandy exercised in chastising my Enemies; it is indeed almost blunt with use, but it shall be continued to the same, 'till they are utterly dispersed; don't talk of Assistance, I require none, the Peguers I can wipe away as thus (Drawing the Palm of one Hand over the other.) I told him I was convinced of his potency. . . . He answers, See these Arms and this Thigh (drawing the sleeves of his Vesture over his Shoulders, and tucking the lower part up to his Crutch) adds, amongst 1000 you won't see my match. I myself can crush 100 such as the King of Pegu.21 Baker described him as about 5 feet 11 inches high, of a hale Constitution, and sturdy . . . his Visage somewhat long . . . a little pitted with the Small Pox . . . his Temper (if I have made right inferences from my Conversations with the People . . . ) is hasty; and disposition, severe, or rather cruel: . . . for he always causes, and often sees, all corporal, or capital, Punishments to be executed, to the utmost rigour of the Sentence.22 18 See Ya Gyaw, Myan-ma maba, pp. 191-94; AA-L, p. 13; KBZ, pp. 24, 28-32; Dal, I, 167. Cf. the discussion of extended kin relations with their strong optional component in Nash, Golden Road, pp. 59-73. 19 MMOS, III, 9-10. It is also known that the Sitha min-gyi, Alaung-hpaya's brotherin-law, exceeded him in terms both of family seniority and rank in the Toungoo administration. 20 AA-L, p. 14. 21 Dal, I, 151-52. 22 Ibid., I, 166-67. Cf. accounts of Anauk-hpet-lun, above, p. 56.

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Two years later, on meeting another English envoy, Alaung-hpaya asked, "Does your King go to the Wars and expose his Person as I do?" He solemnly explained that "if a nine pound Shot was to be fired out of a Gun, and come against his Body, it could not enter"23—a claim that points to the use of charms or tattooing to procure invulnerability.24 Although the growth of his military power during the Toungoo period is poorly documented, chronicle accounts suggest that as in Monywa, Okpo, and other districts, the process began in the 1740s, as Ava's control over the countryside dissolved. About 1749 three monks allegedly interpreted a series of prophecies to claim that the founder of a new dynasty would appear in the north, where Alaung-hpaya's base was situated.25 At some time prior to December 1751, Toungooya-za, hearing stories of Alaung-hpaya, summoned him and (according to later tradition, at least) asked him to confirm or deny the rumor that he had "the smell of a king about him."26 By the time Ava fell, he had amassed arms and provisions, trained a large body of men, and erected a palm-log stockade at Mok-hso-bo complete with parapets and moat. He was thus prepared when on 9 April 1752, a month after Ava's fall, a delegation from Dalaban arrived to administer an oath to the king of Pegu—only to be ambushed and slain. During the ensuing weeks, the men of Mok-hso-bo defeated two large-scale expeditions of Mons and Burmans who attempted to seize their stockade. Alaunghpaya's chastened opponents27 then adopted a strategy of confinement so as to prevent him from drawing on the rich districts north and west of Mok-hso-bo. In a celebrated series of campaigns between June and November, Alaung-hpaya smashed their encirclement. The key victory occurred at Kin-u, where soldiers from Mok-hso-bo overcame the combined resistance of local Burmans and three thousand Mons hastily sent up from Ava.28 After consolidating his position in the Mu valley, in late 1752 Alaung-hpaya also seized the lower Chindwin, where he vanquished Pegu's most loyal northern supporters, the headmen of Kyaukka and Yonga townships.29 23

Robert Lester's embassy, Dal, I, 212-17. A common practice employed also apparently by Smin Dhaw. See Harvey, History, pp. 314, 344. « AA-L, pp. 14-15. 26 AA-T, p. 155; AA-L, p. 14. Alaung-hpaya reportedly answered that these were only mischievous rumors put about by his enemies. 27 Following his early failures, Dalaban was replaced in mid-1752. 28 For exhaustive military accounts, see AA-L, pp. 19-36; KBZ, p. 22-58. 29 KBZ, pp. 58-61. 24

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How can one explain this extraordinarily rapid success against a numerically superior coalition? Alaung-hpaya was a superb tactician who combined resolution andflexibility.Enemies found it impossible to contend with an ever-changing mix of behind-the-lines cavalry raids, ambushes, and frontal assaults. He was also a methodical organizer, subjecting his men to specialized training that may have been unusual by Burmese standards.30 On a social and psychological level, his men enjoyed a unique cohesion. Whereas the opposition was fragmented into various commands without a strong attachment to a single leader, Alaung-hpaya's followers hailed from the same locality and shared an ardent devotion to a man of exceptional character. Alaung-hpaya's lavish use of relatives to fill key civil and military positions reinforced this effect.31 But the cohesion of his forces was perhaps most obvious in ethnic terms. Alaung-hpaya alone adopted from the outset a systematic policy of ethnic appeals in order to undermine support for such Burmans as the leaders of Kin-u, Kyaukka, and Yonga who cooperated with the Delta army. Alaung-hpaya hardly introduced the dichotomy between "Burman" and "Mon" as political categories, for this was a basic, if at times muted, distinction from the opening days of the Peguan revolt. Following the collapse of Ava, however, the population of Upper Burma was no longer attached to a single political center. In seeking to reunify the region, Alaung-hpaya found it necessary to refer with unprecedented vigor to that common tradition—their role of being "Burman"—which distinguished the vast bulk of the northern population from their southern neighbors. His appeals for "Burman" unity were strengthened by the fact that the north was suffering from an appalling degree of social dislocation as a result of the invasions and the collapse of the Toungoo house. The Peguan army, to be sure, was quite heterogeneous. But Mons were the most visible element, and the misery of these years nurtured a xenophobic reaction against "Mon" invaders that Alaung-hpaya was quick to exploit. Writing to the head of Kin-u, Alaung-hpaya declared, "Although you are a Burman . . . in planning to remain a subject of the Talaings [Mons], you are betraying both your lineage (amyb-ahnwe) and your abilities."32 At his first vic30

See KBZ, p. 18. In deciding to join Alaung-hpaya rather than to pursue his own royal ambitions, the lord of Monywa allegedly observed that the chief difference between himself and Alaung-hpaya was that the latter alone had a great wealth of relatives who constituted the "teeth" with which the "dog of state" bites his foes. Chit, Monywa, pp. 28-29. The political contribution of numerous relatives also receives emphasis at KBZ, p. 18; AAT, p. 232. Cf. this chapter nn. 17, 18. 32 AA-L, p. 29. Cf. AA-T, p. 162. 31

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tory outside Mok-hso-bo, Alaung-hpaya spared Burman and Shan prisoners, but no consideration was given to Mons.33 In 1754 at Prome, his men unfurled their topknots to show soldiers with whom they could not communicate verbally that they were fellow Burmans (Mons typically cut their hair round in front and shaved the back part of their heads).34 Ethnic identity never determined political allegiance as completely as many historians have assumed. Local ties, family traditions, the charismatic appeal of particular leaders, religious inspiration, and above all, sheer opportunism continued to cut across ethnic boundaries as in the pre-1752 period. Thus a handful of Alaung-hpaya's most trusted followers—including a hero of the battle of the Mok-hso-bo stockade—were Mons, apparendy from Upper Burma; whereas a significant number of self-styled Burmans from the Delta continued to scorn his cause out of personal loyalty to the Peguan king. What Alaung-hpaya apparendy succeeded in doing, however, was to give ethnic considerations greater prominence than they had previously received. Having started in the north, this emphasis on ethnic loyalty then spread into Middle and Lower Burma. Insofar as he polarized allegiances, Alaunghpaya ensured the collapse of the Pegu kingdom, for those who considered themselves to be Burmans were in a heavy majority in the valley as a whole. The Growth ofAlaung-hpaya's State and the Early Problem of Legitimacy Hand in hand with Alaung-hpaya's military conquests went his administrative reorganization of the northern population. The chief foci of private control over manpower, the leading ministers and princes at Ava, had all been swept away by the war and subsequent deportations, and gentry leaders who had tried to fill the vacuum were rigorously subordinated to Mok-hso-bo. Alaung-hpaya now gathered in large numbers of refugees and assigned them to closely supervised ministries. During the rainy seasons of 1752 and 1753 he sent his soldiers in all directions to collect people hiding in the wilds. Prisoners and deportees as well as voluntary immigrants who were fit to serve as military ahmu-dans received rice, clothing, and land allotments. He 33 AA-L, p. 28; KBZ, p. 44. So too at the battle of Tidaw, his basic strategy sought to split Mons and local Burmans fighting in mixed formations. 34 AA-T, p. 186; KBZ, p. 122. Male body tattoos were the other chief distinguishing mark of Burmans. For further anecdotes and documentation of contemporary attitudes, see Lieberman, "Ethnic Politics," pp. 472 ff.

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encouraged resettlement operations not only around Mok-hso-bo, which had a limited agricultural potential, but also in the north as far as Wuntho and Kawlin, and in the west in the lower Chindwin valley. Here he created new ahmu-dan units and reactivated Toungoo military formations under loyal departmental headmen.35 As his authority expanded, Alaung-hpaya necessarily took an interest in nonmilitary affairs. In late 1752 and 1753, Mok-hso-bo received a number of low- and middle-level officials from the old Ava adminis­ tration who had escaped to their native villages after the city's fall. They provided much-needed expertise in ceremonial, literary, and legal affairs.36 He also appointed an ecclesiastical commissioner and invited a learned local monk, Atu-la, to serve as his adviser on religious ques­ tions. With the tatter's encouragement, he forbade monks to observe the teachings of the two-shoulder sect and proscribed other ostensibly heterodox forms of monastic and popular religious observance.37 In reorganizing the population and in purifying the religion, Alaunghpaya was fulfilling the traditional functions of a Buddhist sovereign. He sought to formalize that status during a lull in his campaigns by officially transforming the erstwhile village of Mok-hso-bo into a great royal capital. At the propitious moment suggested by astrologers on 21 June 1753, he inaugurated the construction of seven symbolic sites and designated his capital 'The Great State of Yadana-thein-ga Konbaung."38 This ceremony was part of a systematic program to increase Alaunghpaya's legitimacy in the eyes of the population. The Toungoo Dy­ nasty, which had ruled Burma for over two hundred years, naturally had tremendous prestige, with which Alaung-hpaya, a petty gentry J

5 KBZ, pp. 43-44, 57-58, 69-70. See SHDMA, pp. 210, 215 ff., 235 ff.; KBZ, pp. 70-71. In mid-1753 he issued a law on theft that shows evidence of having been based on Toungoo procedure. 37 See KBZ, pp. 70-71; Nan-zin-pok-hsa-amei-abpyei kyan (Rangoon, 1915); Dagon Nat-shin, Sa-byu sa-hso fok-go-gyaw-mya at-htok-pat-ti (Rangoon, 1955), pp. 68-70. Cf. the early acts of Taksin, discussed in Frank E. Reynolds, "Civic Religion and National Community in Thailand," JAS 36, 2 (1977): 269-70. 38 The seven sites were wall, palace, moat, tank, pagoda, spirit (not) shrine, and time-drum. "Yadana-thein-ga" derives from the Pali for "pinnacle of precious things." "Κόη-baung," whence the dynasty's name derived, was the traditional name for the countryside around Mok-hso-bo. "Shwebo," the third and most popular name for Alaunghpaya's capital, is a compound of the royal epithet shwei ("golden") and the last syllable of Mok-hso-bo. (In the same way, Ava was known in the seventeenth century as Shweiwa.) Chit, Monywa, p. 29, and BL OR 3464, p. 144 v. suggest that he also underwent a coronation ceremony and opened the doors of his throne in formal audience, but the chronicles date the opening of the royal doors to November 1754. See AA-L, pp. 3940; KBZ, pp. 65 ff., 115; MMOS, III, 13. 36

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figure, had difficulty competing. The official chronicles pretend that Alaung-hpaya was acclaimed king the moment Ava fell, but there is reason to suspect that at the outset of his career he had to rally the people on the basis of loyalty to the old Ava house. This would explain the hospitable reception that Alaung-hpaya initially accorded the Shwedaung prince, a son of the last Ava king who had escaped from the Mons and who came over to Mok-hso-bo some time in mid-1752. According to one observer, on the prince's arrival "all the neighbouring Country united with them."39 As Alaung-hpaya's success grew, he felt strong enough to break with the prince, whom he forced to flee from Mok-hso-bo eastward toward the Irrawaddy later that same year. Nonetheless, Alaung-hpaya remained sensitive about the inadequacy of his royal credentials vis-a-vis both the Shwedaung prince and the captive king Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati, to whose restoration some former Ava officials were still committed. The metamorphosis of Alaunghpaya's pretensions, and his continued insecurity, are revealed in this passage from the diary of Captain George Baker, writing in late 1755: Being thus successful in the Wars, he began now to take a Princelike-state on him and to receive the Compliments, and Courtesies usually paid to Sovereigns, in this Country; (which before he absolutely refused, saying, God would send the People a Prince, he for his part was only as an Introduction to a Revolution.). . . Thus is the rise of the present King, of the Buraghmahns, (for he is now generally allowed as such, all Officers taking their Oaths of Allegiance to him; and none now durst put him in mind of his having said, God would appoint another King).40 The problem of royal ancestry was something with which Nyaungyan Min and his sons had not had to contend, but which was familiar to their ancestor Min-gyl-nyo, a local upstart who had founded the First Toungoo Dynasty in the latefifteenthcentury. Like Min-gyi-nyo, Alaung-hpaya promulgated an official genealogy early in his reign, which claimed he was descended from the sacred race of kings going back through the rulers of Pagan.41 Nonetheless, he realized that his hereditary credentials were vasdy inferior to those of the Shwedaung prince or Maha-damd-ya-za-di-pati, so he based his primary claims to leadership on other grounds. In one of his earliest extant edicts, from early 39

Baker in Dal, I, 164. Cf. AA-T, p. 163; KBZ, p. 47. « Dal, I, 165-66. 41 See AA-L, pp. 11-13. Cf. this chapter n. 16. The pre-fifteenth-century element may be spurious, as the epigraphic researches of G. H. Luce and Than Tun have questioned the existence of the Pagan king Nara-thein-hld cited in the genealogy.

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1755, he said that ancient omens had warned that the Restored Toungoo Dynasty would collapse after ten kings, to be replaced by a dynasty whose founder was a "guinea-pig king," that is, a king born on Friday, Alaung-hpaya's birthday.42 Alaung-hpaya also claimed that the Buddha himself had predicted in the presence of an ascetic named Gavampati that Alaung-hpaya would arise and found the capital of Yadana-thein-ga.43 His capacity to fulfill these prophecies, that is to say, his power and his charismatic glory (hpon), were simply reflections of good kamtna amassed through countless acts of merit in previous existences. Alaung-hpaya repeatedly boasted that he was "master of glory [by virtue of his] kammaT (hpdn-kam-ma-shin).4* By contrast, Mahadamd-ya-za-di-pati had neglected to uphold the Ten Royal Laws, and the glory and kamtna of his line were played out. The Toungoo Dynasty therefore had to yield to Alaung-hpaya in accord with another proverb he was fond of quoting, "When a man of [great] glory arises, those who lack glory must give way."45 But Alaung-hpayi's kammatic attainments were not restricted to past lives, for as upholder of dhamma and the Ten Royal Laws, he was even now accumulating fresh merit. Without doubt he was destined to become a Buddha at the end of some future incarnation, when his good kamma and his spiritual Perfections were fully developed. The new sovereign was therefore an Embryo Buddha. His regnal title "Alaung-min-taya-gyl" means 'The King of Righteousness Who Is an Embryo Buddha."46 These claims were hardly unique, for as we have seen, Toungoo kings (as well as the contemporary ruler of Pegu) habitually claimed to be Embryo Buddhas. By constantly emphasizing his glory and good kamma in preference to the purity of his royal descent, however, Alaunghpaya was able to fight the ideological battle, so to speak, on his own terms. Given the assumptions of popular Buddhist metaphysics, no one could deny that his superior military success was a measure of superior religious merit and of unrivaled prospects for Buddahood. As 42 AAm, pp. 9-10. See too KBZ, pp. 17, 34-35. For the Burmese astrological scheme that links Friday, the guinea pig, and the north, see Shway Yoe (Sir George Scott), The Burman: His Life and Notions, 3rd ed. (London, 1910), pp. 7-9. 43 See Inscriptions of Pagan, Pinya andAva: Translation, with Notes (Rangoon, 1899), p. 15; TL, pp. 191-92; AAm, p. 16; KBZ, pp. 34-35. Cf. the prophecies recorded at BL OR 3464, p. 143 v. and Chapter 4 n. 92. 44 AAm5Pp. 12,32,75. 45 Ibid., pp. 3-4, 9-10, 25, 212. 46 KBZ, pp. 34-35 says he took his regnal title at the first battle of the stockade, but one suspects it was not until late 1752 or 1753. "Alaung-hpaya" is a posthumous designation that, like his regnal title, means "Embryo Buddha."

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if to underscore the point that the universe itself sanctioned his ascendancy, Alaung-hpaya's partisans in hundreds of villages spread stories of miracles and portents: when he was born the earth quaked;47 as Alaung-hpaya slept his right arm glowed like fire; at the battle of the stockade Mok-hso-bo's guardian spirits were seenridingwhite steeds in pursuit of the foe, and so forth. SECTION TWO. DESTRUCTION OF THE PEGUAN KINGDOM,

1754-1757 By the middle of 1753, then, Alaung-hpaya had formalized his position as the principal power in the north, king in name as well as in fact of a great region bounded by the Chindwin and the Irrawaddy up to the twenty-fourth parallel.48 When the rains stopped, he quickly crushed his last gentry rival (at Okpo) and mounted a successful threesided attack on the isolated, ineffectual Peguan garrison at Ava. On 3 January 1754, he took formal possession of the ancient capital. Thus he consolidated his conquest of the Upper Burma heartland. The Peguan court, however, had no intention of allowing this upstart to deprive them of their conquests without a serious challenge. Preoccupied by his relations with Tavoy and Siam, the Peguan king may not have appreciated the gravity of the situation in the north until Ava had fallen. He now assembled from throughout Middle and Lower Burma a second great invasion force that rapidly invested Ava, then garrisoned by one of Alaung-hpaya's sons. The Delta commanders promptly laid plans to redress their fatal decision of 1752 not to depopulate the area north and west of Ava. While part of the army maintained the siege of the ancient capital, a large naval contingent under Dalaban carried fire and sword up both banks of the Irrawaddy. Alaung-hpaya refused to be ruffled by the invaders' early success and prepared a methodical counterattack. Official biographies claim that his naval forces were heavily outnumbered;49 a less partisan estimate by a contemporary Burman observer suggests that the northerners actually enjoyed a slight advantage.50 Yet when the two armadas met 47 KBZ, p. 16; AA-L, p. 14. Such an event was of great significance for an Embryo Buddha, as the conception, Enlightenment, and parinibbana of Gotama Buddha had been attended by earthquakes. In fact HNY, p. 362, records a major quake on 8 August 1714,fivedays before Alaung-hpaya's birth. 48 Unless otherwise noted, the narrative of this section derives from AA-L and AA-T. 49 AA-L, pp. 55-56; KBZ, pp. 94-95. 50 If I understand this confusing passage correctly, Phraison Salarak, "Testimony," p. 34 says that the number of combatants on both sides was the same, but the Burmans had a 3:2 advantage in warcraft.

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below the riverside jetty of Kyaukmyaung on 24 May 1754, it was strategy and not numbers that gave Alaung-hpaya the victory. His boats cleverly maneuvered Dalaban's fleet toward the east bank, where land-based musketeers unleashed a deadly fire. The southern fleet was routed. Panic seized Pegu's land forces. Three days later, the Delta army lifted its siege and sped downriver. From the batde of Kyaukmyaung until the collapse of Pegu some three years later, Alaunghpaya was constantly on the offensive and the Delta army was never in a position to do more than delay the final verdict. This victory had immediate repercussions in the Peguan kingdom. The numerous officials and ahmu-dans who had been deported to the Delta now reasoned that the fortunes of the Lower Burma king were in irrevocable decline, while those of their erstwhile sovereign Mahadama-ya-za-di-pati, captive in Pegu, were fated to improve. They may have given undue credence to reports still circulating from the opening phase of Alaung-hpaya's resistance that he was dedicated to restoring Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati.51 In any case, a conspiracy was now formed by a group of ex-Ava courtiers to seize the Peguan palace and to install Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati as king. Yet one of their number betrayed them. The hapless Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati and "several hundred"52 Ava courtiers and servicemen were promptiy executed, and a yet larger number were placed in confinement. The frightened Peguan court also required those Burman servicemen still at large to cut their hair in Mon fashion, and to wear in their ears an amulet with the stamp of the Pegu heir apparent as a token of loyalty. Thus, in reaction perhaps to the explicit ethnic element in Alaung-hpaya's movement, the hitherto polyethnic character of Delta politics became muted. At the time of Maha-dama-ya-za-di-patfs execution, an omen began to circulate at Pegu that although the head of the fish (that is, the king) had grown putrid, the tail of the fish (that is, the Burman people) was yet vital and would flap about.53 51

As late as September 1753, the English at Negrais heard that the northern rebellion sought to restore the Ava house. Letter from David Hunter to Madras, cited in Hall, English Intercourse, pp. 300, 305.1 have searched unsuccessfully for the text of this letter in IOR, Madras Public Proceedings, Range 240, vol. II (1753). 52 1 follow the conservative estimate of Symes, Embassy, pp. 12-13. KBZ, p. 104, says "over a 1000" were killed. 53 AA-T, pp. 183-84 implies the omen appeared after Maha-dam4-ya-za-di-patf s execution, whereas KBZ, pp. 104-105 and BL OR 3464, pp. 142 V.-143 r. claim it preceded his death. It is important to recognize that the original plot to install Mahadami-ya-za-di-pati enjoyed some Mon support, and that despite increased ethnic polarization after his execution, many Burmans in the Delta continued to serve the Peguan court. For detailed discussion see Lieberman, "Ethnic Politics," pp. 477-79.

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Maha-dama-ya-za-di-patfs execution played directly into Alaunghpaya's hands. Headmen and officials opposed to Pegu who had hitherto hesitated to support the usurper from Mok-hso-bo now had no one else to whom they could turn (if we except the ineffectual Shwedaung prince). In the words of an English observer, Maha-dama-yaza-di-patfs execution "joined all the Buraghmahns under the Banner of [Alaung-hpaya]."54 As soon as the reprisals started, a former Ava minister fled to an area of heavy Burman settlement just north of the Delta, where he laid plans with other ex-Ava officials and Burman headmen to slay leaders loyal to Pegu and to join themselves to Alaunghpaya's cause. They also wrote to Burman leaders farther north, urging them to marshal their followers for an attack on the powerful Mon garrison at Prome. These coordinated uprisings were initially successful. The key centers of Prome, Tale-zi, Lun-zei, and Danubyu changed hands.55 The rebels thereupon sent a delegation to Alaung-hpaya beseeching him to defend them against the expected Peguan counterattack. Although he sensed that his forces currently under arms were inadequate to undertake a systematic conquest of the south, the northern king acceded to this request. He won a series of striking victories in Middle Burma (where the Peguans in fact had retaken some rebel strongholds), and was soon able to penetrate into the Delta. His army occupied the largely Burman area around Prome despite bitter Peguan opposition in January and February 1755. Alaung-hpaya then entered Lun-zei, Danubyu, andfinallyin April, the village of Dagon opposite Syriam. To commemorate his victories and to intimidate his foes, he renamed Lun-zei, calling it Myanaung—"Swift Victory"—and Dagon, which now became "Yan-gon," that is, Rangoon, 'The Enemy Is Consumed" or 'The Enemy Will Be Consumed."56 Once he sought to move across the river from Rangoon to seize the 54

DaI 5 I, 102. AA-L, pp. 62-63 and KBZ, pp. 105-107 emphasize victories at thefirsttwo towns, whereas Symes, Embassy, pp. 13-14 refers to Prome, Lun-zei, and Danubyu. No doubt smaller townships also saw insurgent victories. 56 Technically he founded a new city, Rangoon, some 1,400-8,400 cubits west of the old site of Dagon, but the new name apparently came to embrace both places. The usual translation of "Rangoon" is "End of Strife," which has a conciliatory message. Yet with years of fighting in the Delta still ahead of him, it is far more likely that Alaung-hpaya sought to demoralize his foes by boasting of his prowess. The translation "Enemy Is (Will Be) Consumed" accords with other commemorative place names (including Myanaung) he bestowed in the south at this time, and with the explicit explanation of the Rangoon naming ceremony preserved in the chronicles. See KBZ, pp. 134-41; AA-L, p. 77; AA-T, p. 190. 55

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chief port of Syriam, however, his string of easy victories ended. Syriam was a walled town, protected on two sides by water. The Mons were now fighting a desperate rearguard action. They were better supplied with guns and ammunition, and they had the further advantage of assistance from French ships under a French agent at Syriam. Alaunghpaya attempted to play off the Europeans against one another by securing arms from the English East India Company. Yet although the English returned his diplomatic mission, they declined to supply a substantial number of cannon.57 Alaung-hpaya's victory stemmed ultimately from the superior manpower at his disposal, for whereas his forces were drawn from throughout the Burman and the more accessible Shan areas, the Peguans could rely only on their own rapidly shrinking sector of the Delta. A fresh levy of forty thousand58 that Alaung-hpaya raised in Upper Burma during the latter half of 1755 and early 1756 permitted him to devastate systematically the agricultural environs of Syriam, to overwhelm the city's naval defenses with small craft, and thus to institute a highly effective food blockade. Convoys of rice ships bound from Pegu to Syriam now fell into the northerners' hands. As hunger gnawed at the defenders, they began defecting at the rate of fifty or sixty a day. To deepen the fatigue of Syriam's supporters, Alaung-hpaya also resorted to psychological warfare. He sought to disseminate a chain letter, dated 9 April 1756, which was allegedly written by Sakka, king of the second Buddhist heaven and personal patron of Burmese monarchs.59 The conqueror from Upper Burma was no ordinary ruler, Sakka warned the people of the south, but the very king of whom Gotama Buddha had prophesied, "He shall exalt the Faith. . . . the Mons and Shans shall serve him, nor shall the Chinese, Siamese, or Indians [kola] escape his dominion." The Mons now had sufficient proof that Alaung-hpaya was a true Embryo Buddha: every time they had fought, in innumerable engagements, he had emerged victorious. And yet some fools refused to draw the necessary conclusions. If the Peguan king failed to present Alaung-hpaya with a daughter as a sign of submission, the kingdom would soon suffer an unprecedented catastrophe. Only those who fled at once to the wilds, there to practice 57

The English had recently established a base on Negrais Island near the south of the Bassein River. On European involvement see AAm, pp. 3-4, 52-53; KBZ, pp. 168-69; and sources cited in Chapter 4 n. 45. 58 Seefiguresat Dal, I, 166; AA-L, p. 90. 59 On Sakka (Burmese: Thagya), see DPPN, II, 957-65; Michael Aung Thwin, "Jambudipa: Classical Burma's Camelot," Contributions to Asian Studies 16 (1981): 53-57.

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the religious precepts, would survive. Anyone finding Sakka's letter who failed to make copies for circulation would surely go to the lowest Buddhist hell.60 If the Mons were at all superstitious, this clever communication would have further depopulated the towns and villages of the south, thus weakening Syriam's defense.61 That same day, 9 April, Alaung-hpaya's three sons also addressed an open letter to the officials and soldiers of Lower Burma. Thus far their father had failed to destroy Syriam merely because, as an aspirant Buddha, he was full of compassion for all creatures. The defenders of Syriam, however, should not misinterpret this restraint to assume there was the slightest chance they could escape annihilation if Alaung-hpaya chose to attack, for he was an invincible cakkavatti favored by Sakka. Have you not heard that he possesses the Ayein-dama Golden Flying Lance, the cakkavatti weapon, given him by Sakka to promote the welfare of the Religion?. . . . Do you imagine that any ruler on the face of Jambudlpa [the southern isle of mankind], let alone [the ruler of] Syriam, will remain ignorant [of his mission] or escape his control?. . . . In no [secular or religious] text is there any precedent of an enemy's being able to conquer cakkavattis who are lords of the cakka weapon, by means of swords, spears, muskets, or other weapons fashioned by [human] blacksmiths.62 According to Burmese interpretations of the Buddhist cyclical conception of history, mankind will enter a period of increasing immorality and disorder, marked by the neglect of dbamma, severe oppression of the population by their rulers, drought, and famine. After conditions have reached their nadir, there will appear a supremely powerful cakkavatti (derived from the canonicalfigureof Sankha) who will overcome the divisions that split mankind and inaugurate an age of astounding material abundance. The classical symbol of dominion, the cakka or flying wheel of empire, was in Burma transmuted into the Flying Lance. Armed with this weapon, the cakkavatti in turn will herald the next Buddha Metteyya, whose preaching will transport those 60

AAm, pp. 28-30. Cf. Yi Yi, "Additional Burmese Historical Sources (1752-76)," The Guardian (Rangoon), November 1968, pp. 33-34. 62 AAm, pp. 32-33. Hton-san shi is clearly an error for htdn-san mashi. The Burmese term for cakkavatti is set-kya min. According to AA-L, p. 92, and AA-T, p. 198, on 9 April, Alaung-hpaya sent to Syriam an elite squad of seventy to seventy-five men whose task it may have been to plant copies of these letters. On 25 April, another threatening prophecy was affixed near Pegu city itself. See AAm, pp. 35-37; KBZ, pp. 166-67. 61

246 I REINTEGRATION, 1752-1760

who hear Him to the bliss of nibbana.63 The year 1756 hardly corre­ sponded to traditional calculations of the cakkavatti% appearance; but as E. Michael Mendelson and Melford E. Spiro have shown, popular thought has a way of tampering with Buddhist orthodoxy to fit its expectations.64 In particular, since the cakkamtti will oblige the world to honor dbamma in preparation for Metteyya's coming, it must have been most tempting after a period of famine and anarchy unparalleled in living memory for Alaung-hpaya and his followers to imbue his spectacular reconstruction of the empire with messianic significance. Not only did Alaung-hpaya require subjects to swear homage before an actual golden lance in fulfillment of the cakkavatti paradigm,65 but his sons justified his dominion with specific reference to the Anagatavamsa, a Pali poem well known in Burma which describes the wan­ ing of the Buddhist faith, the end of the world, and the coming of the future Buddha Metteyya.66 By the end of his reign there are indica­ tions that Alaung-hpaya was presenting himself not merely as the prophesied cakkavatti, but as an embryo form of Metteyya Buddha himself.67 The growing emphasis on these themes after 1755 in edicts 63

On Buddhist tradition that formed the background for Burman-Mon beliefs, see Davids, Dialogues of the Buddha, III, 59-76, according to which the cakkavatti Sankha will appear at a time not of disorder but of increasing prosperity and longevity; DPPN, I, 832-33 and II, 660-62; Sarkisyanz, Backgrounds, pp. 88-91, 150-52. On Burmese transmutations of those traditions, see Aung Thwin, "State and Society," pp. 75-78; Sarkisyanz, Backgrounds, pp. 63-64, chaps. 14, 21; Koenig, "Κόη-baung Polity," pp. 169-83; Spiro, Buddhism, pp. 171-80; Mendelson, "Messianic Association," pp. 56080; idem, "Weaving Mountain," pp. 229-37. 64 See previous note. Cf. Sarkisyanz, "Folk Buddhism," pp. 32-38, and Keyes, "MiIlennialism," pp. 283-302. 65 AAm, p. 154. Cf. Davids, Dialogues of the Buddha, III, 63-64. Prof. Stanford Tun Aung Chain of the University of Rangoon informs me that Alaung-hpaya transported his lance on a special platform, surrounded by eight lion figures, before which headmen and officials swore homage. In an earlier era the Ayein-dama Lance had reportedly been given by Sakka to kings of great renown such as the legendary Dut-ta-baung of Prome. 66 AAm, p. 33. On the authorship of this work, see DPPN, I, 66. A printed Pali edition, collated from four Burmese MSS, appears at J. Minayeff, ed., "Anagata-vamsa (History of the Future)," Journal qfthePali Text Society, 1886, pp. 33-53. For a Burmese translation, in which form the poem was probably known to Alaung-hpaya's sons, see Ana-gatawin kyan, especially pp. 6-26. In keeping with Davids, Dialogues of the Buddha, III, 71-73, Ana-gatawin, pp. 8-9 claims that when anarchy is most profound, people will escape to the wilds for seven days. This action will inaugurate the gradual upswing in morality and prosperity which will precede the arrival of the cakkavatti Sankha. Alaunghpaya's admonition to the Mons to flee to the wilds and there practice religious duties, AAm, p. 29, may have been an attempt to precipitate and foreshorten that gradual improvement so as to justify the cakkavatti% premature appearance. Cf. following note. 67 See below, section 4. Note that Mendelson, "Messianic Association," pp. 560-80; idem, "Weaving Mountain," pp. 229-37; and idem, "Observations," p. 798 identifies in

DESTRUCTION, 1754-1757 | 247

and public proclamations68 suggests that Alaung-hpaya was appealing to an emotive millennial tradition, familiar to Mon as well as Burman peasants, which gathered strength with the success of his arms.69 Such vivid pretensions must have swelled his following even as they shriv­ eled the hoped of Syriam's defenders. In less dramatic form, I have argued that headmen and peasants supported earlier royal claimants whose success after periods of disor­ der also marked them as men of outstanding religious merit, capable of restoring cosmic and social harmony: Nyaungyan MIn, Pye after the Chinese raids, Smin Dhaw, and Banya-dala.70 Indeed the latter two kings seem to have appealed to much the same millennial expec­ tations as Alaung-hpaya, although his superior hpdn and kamnta gave his claims an awesome credibility. By mid-1756 Alaung-hpaya's chain letters, Burman probing attacks, and above all, the food blockade had done their work: Syriam was ready to fall. After disabling the Mon's European vessels with the aid of traditional warboats and a large Western-style ship that Alaunghpaya had had constructed at Rangoon, the northerners crossed the Pegu River to the walls of the city. During a thunderstorm on the night of 25 July 1756, an elite company, wearing special helmets to the esoteric 1950s cult three elements that appear to have been central to Alaung-hpaya's public persona: a) an implicit mystical identity between the cakkavatti and an embryo form of Metteyya b) appearance of the cakkavatti at a relatively "bad time" to clean up the world for Metteyya c) Sakka's patronage of the cakkavatti. Although Mendelson tentatively dated the set-kya-min cult to the early nineteenth century, he recognized that it may have had earlier antecedents. 68 Besides AAm, pp. 28-34, see KBZ, p. 237; AAm, pp. 12, 16-17, 75-76, 85; AAL, p. 122; and sources in section 4 below. 69 The Κδη-baung chronicle, Law, History of Religion, p. 128, declares: And when they saw his victories, "all the inhabitants of [Upper Burma] acclaimed him as: This king of ours is a Bodhisatta.'" It may be indicative of popular expectations that MahadamS-ya-za-di-pati himself, while captive in Pegu, wrote poems yearning for Lord Metteyya's dispensation. See H p o Kya, Myan-ma gon-yi, pp. 26-27. According to Spiro, Buddhism, pp. 172-73, as late as 1961-62 a large percentage of Upper Burma peasants firmly believed in the coming of a Future King who would implement a Utopian Bud­ dhist society. See too Adas, Prophets of Rebellion, pp. 97-102, and Stern, "Ariya," p. 307. 70 Precisely the same analogy to Mahasammata's rescuing mankind from anarchy was used by chroniclers to describe Nyaungyan MIn and Alaung-hpaya. UK, ΙΠ, 113-14; AA-L, p. 18. See too the akmu-dans' complaint to Pye, HNY, p. 273: "Because your brother has given us no food, the soldiers will soon starve. The Chinese are massacring our families. . . . Only if you, lord, save us, shall we have an object of reverence." Wayizaw-da's sotapanna cult, discussed in Chapter 3, was yet another, albeit nonpolitical, manifestation of the yearning for renewed integration. Cf. prophecies that Smin Dhaw and Banya-dali would inaugurate an era of prosperity for the sorely-tried people of Pegu, Chapter 4 nn. 70, 92.

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ward off boiling liquids, finally scaled the walls and opened the gates to their comrades massed outside. They seized a considerable store of European and Indian war materiel. This was supplemented two days later when two French vessels, laden with military supplies from Pondichory, fell into Alaung-hpaya's hands, together with their entire crews. The capital, Pegu, itself now lay but forty miles from the Burman front lines. Peguan forces built an ingenious series of stockades and positioned fortified boats across the Pegu River to block the advance. However, given the disparity in manpower and the fact that Alaunghpaya after his Syriam triumph enjoyed superior armament, the most determined resistance was doomed. Gradually the besiegers completed a string of forts from which Alaung-hpaya's newly captured French gunners could cannonade the town night and day. European artillery pieces were the pride of his army, for as the chronicles note, they could fire up to a hundred times a day without overheating, and a single explosion could kill or maim fifty or sixty close-packed Peguans.71 In late December 1756, the king of Pegu, at the urging of his ministers and monks, sent a pathetic letter in which hefinallyoffered to present a daughter in token of submission.72 This should have marked the end of hostilities. Yet in fact the siege continued for five dreary months. A group of dissident ministers who feared that Alaung-hpaya would never forgive their past enmity deposed the king of Pegu and closed the city gates rather than proceed with the surrender. They may have gambled that if they could hold out until the rainy season, the northerners would have to withdraw. But Alaung-hpaya would not be denied this last prize, and on the night of 6 May 1757, picked troops succeeded in scaling the walls and firing the wood structures inside. Guided by the light of the flames, war drums and gongs beating wildly, the main body smashed their way into the town. According to contemporaneous accounts, the ensuing sack was a ghastly affair, with bodies piled so high in the gates that people within the city could not escape.73 The very thoroughness of the sack, coupled with Alaung-hpaya's emphasis on Burman loyalty, convinced some historians that Alaunghpaya sought to extinguish Mon leadership and culture.74 As cakka71

K B Z , p p . 2 1 1 , 2 2 5 . T h e chronicles offer considerable technical information o n artillery used at Pegu, a n d note that Alaung-hpaya's m e n could cast their o w n cannon. 72 See A A m , p . 8 8 ; K B Z , p p . 2 1 9 ff.; AA-T, p p . 2 1 4 ff. 73 See B L O R 3 4 6 4 , p p . 148 v.-49 r.; RCS-TY; AA-L, p . 1 3 1 . 74

See Harvey, History, pp. 234-36; The British Burma Gazeteer, 2 vols. (Rangoon, 1879-80), II, 168, 481; Mabel Haynes Bode, The Pali Literature ofBurma (1909, repr., London, 1966), p. 83. Cf. the interpretations in Hall, History of South-East Asia, pp. 365, 381-86.

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vatti and dhamma-raja, however, Alaung-hpaya considered himself someone much grander than the leader of a particular ethnic commu­ nity. Those self-proclaimed Mons willing to acknowledge his claims to religious veneration were readily incorporated into the northern mili­ tary and political structure. Mons fought for Alaung-hpaya during his 75 campaigns in both Upper and Lower Burma, and after Pegu's fall, prominent Mons received valued appointments in preference to Burman aspirants.76 There is no suggestion in any of Alaung-hpaya's vo­ luminous biographies or extant edicts that he encouraged Mon follow­ ers to adopt Burman customs or speech, much less that he issued a binding law on the subject. Similarly, Alaung-hpaya respected the pe­ culiar customs of captive Europeans, Manipuris, Chins, Shans, and so on. Indeed, he gloried in their diversity as a validation of his increas­ ingly prominent universalist pretensions.77 In a broader sense, however, it is true that Alaung-hpaya's defeat of Peguan separatism created suitable conditions for the further decline of Mon ethnicity.78 Proclaiming a "Mon" identity had been a com­ mon, though (as I have emphasized) by no means indispensable expression of support for Pegu. To weaken southern regional loyalties, Alaung-hpaya razed the walls of both Syriam and Pegu and established Rangoon as the administrative, economic, and military capital of the Delta.79 From its inception, Rangoon became a symbol of northern ascendancy. Under the circumstances, some bilingual southerners who had hitherto identified themselves as "Mons" may have found it politic to become "Burmans." With the disruption of Mon communities dur­ ing this and subsequent revolts, and with the immigration of increas­ ing numbers of dry zone residents later in the dynasty, Mon assimila­ tion accelerated. This occurred partly through emigration but more especially through intermarriage and linguistic adaptation.80 The ad­ ministrative and eventual ethnic incorporation of Lower Burma into the dry zone polity under Κόη-baung rule therefore continued that trend toward valleywide integration which had started in the First Toungoo era. 75

BL OR 3464, p. 144 r.; AA-L, pp. 25-26; AAm, pp. 9-10, welcoming Mon ad­ herents; KBZ, pp. 176, 187-89, 191, 250, 254, 256. 76 See KBZ, p. 257, on the appointment of Daw-zwe-yi-set; and Symes, Embassy, pp. 38-39, on Dalaban. 77 See KBZ, pp. 225-26, 237; AAm, p. 28. For further discussion, see Lieberman, "Ethnic Politics," pp. 474-77. 78 See Chapter 2 n. 184 for evidence of gradual Burmanization in the Delta before Alaung-hpaya's conquest. 79 KBZ, pp. 257-58; Yi Yi, "Κόη-baung hkit," pp. 72, 106; Pearn, Raryoon, pp. 4748. 80 The best discussion is Adas, Burma Delta, pp. 16-19, 57. See too Koenig, "Κόηbaung Polity," pp. 99-102.

250 I REINTEGRATION, 1752-1760 SECTION THREE. ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES

After receiving the homage of southeastern districts and forming new military units to guard the coast, Alaung-hpaya returned to Shwebo (royal name for Mok-hso-bo)81 in September 1757. When some two years earlier, during Alaung-hpaya's last residence in Upper Burma, the English envoy Baker had visited the capital, it had still been a cramped, unimposing little town. Ceremonial arrangements had been amusingly undignified.82 Now the conqueror determined to erect a capital suitable to his enhanced majesty. He undertook the repair or construction of a large number of monasteries and pagodas, and ex­ panded the walls of the city. Further, to supply his new moat and to irrigate surrounding lands, in early 1759 Alaung-hpaya attempted to dam the Mu River near Myedu. The latter project, however, defied the skills of Alaung-hpaya's en­ gineers, and work on the dam and moat appears to have been aban­ doned after his death.83 Shwebo proved to be an impractical choice of capital for reasons other than the insufficiency of its water supply. The local soil, even if irrigated, tended to clay or sand and was not partic­ ularly fertile. With no significant accession of territory to the north, Shwebo lay exposed to frontier raids. Moreover, it was seventeen miles from the empire's principal artery, the Irrawaddy, which meant that communication was difficult with the increasingly important commer­ cial center of Rangoon. With good reason, therefore, Alaung-hpaya's son and successor Naung-daw-gyi (r. 1760-1763) rehabilitated Sagaing, on the Irrawaddy opposite Ava, to serve as a second capital alongside Shwebo. Thereafter Shwebo was abandoned, and Kon-baung capitals remained on the upper Irrawaddy, at Ava, Amarapura, or Mandalay. Reorganizing the Population Although Alaung-hpaya's choice of capital proved ephemeral, other reforms to which he devoted himself after his return from the Delta were of more permanent significance. In particular, his reorganization of the ahmu-dan population, which he had started in 1752, laid the foundations for the Κόη-baung system of military service. Chronicles, inquest records, and the compilations of the Kon-baung 81

See this chapter n. 38. See Dal, I, 148-70; and AAm, p. 289, inquiring as to proper royal procedure. 83 On the dam, moat, and other renovations, see KBZ, pp. 265, 301; AAm, pp. 11718, 142, 183; MMOS, III, 16; Stuart, Burmese Irrigation, pp. 11-12. 82

ADMINISTRATIVEMEASURES I 251

official U Tin refer to at least seventeen regiments organized de novo during the course of Alaung-hpaya's reign. These were chiefly mus­ keteer units, with a leaven of cavalrymen, archers, and lancers.84 He also may have organized hereditary warboat and elephant regiments whose names have been lost. As in the Toungoo period, each regiment was composed of a num­ ber of platoons {asus), containing on average about fifty men. The regiments themselves were by no means uniform: the Musketeer Reg­ iment of the Left, for example, consisted of 1,848 men organized into 33 platoons, while others may have had as few as fifteen platoons. Normally 10 percent of each regiment was expected to be on duty at the capital in peacetime, but during war the entire complement often took the field to protect the king's person and to form the nucleus of the main army. These arrangements also followed Toungoo practice. Six of the largest musketeer regiments85 were known, presumably by virtue of their task of guarding the outer gates of the royal fort, as the "Six Outer Regiments" or the "Six Chief Regiments," and until the end of the Burmese monarchy in 1885, continued to be regarded as the backbone of the Κόη-baung infantry.86 In Alaung-hpaya's own day, freshly formed regiments may have constituted a third of the total standing army, that is, about three thousand troops out of some nine or ten thousand. This represented a notable increase in ahmu-dan strength after a century when few new regiments were created and when the strength of existing formations was steadily declining. The activity of the 1750s was exceeded only under Nyaungyan MIn and his sons. 84

LiSt compiled from MMOS, III, 18-19, 44, and IV, 265-71; KBZ, pp. 57-58, 185-86, 290-91, 294, 308: 1-2. Musketeer Regts. of Left and Right 11. Mail-clad Cavalry Regt. 3-4. Select Musketeer Regts. of Left and 12. Tin-gyei-swe (meaning unclear) Regt. Right 13-14. Archery Regts. of Left and Right 5-6. Nat-su Musketeer Regts. of Left and 15-16. Golden Lancers Regts. of Left and Right Right 7. Musketeer Regt. of Rear 17. Cudgel Regt. 8. Royal Glory Musketeer Regt. 9. Musketeer Regt. of European Youths 10. Manipuri Cavalry Regt. AA-L, pp. 115, 130 refers to four regiments (the Left and Right Courageous Regts. and the Left and Right Chief Regts.) not in the above list, but it is possible these were alternative names for some so included. Alaimg-hpaya also created a sizable number of nonhereditary infantry asus outside the regimental system. 85 The first six in the above list. 86 Cf. Langham-Carter, "Burmese Army," p. 272, referring to them as apyin chaiAsu. Technically, certain other musketeer and cavalry units could also be called su-gyi, "chiefunits (regiments)"

252 I REINTEGRATION, 1752-1760

Burmans already residing within the nuclear zone apparendy formed the bulk of these new units. The Six Outer Regiments, on which we have most detailed information, were organized over an eight-year period. The first two regiments began with 330 men from the Shwebo area whom Alaung-hpaya molded into elite guards in 1752 at the time of the battle of the Shwebo stockade. During his Peguan campaign he created the nucleus of two more regiments from 410 northern youths who had distinguished themselves in battle. Following his return to Upper Burma, in order to provide himself with a suitable guard for his enlarged capital, Alaung-hpaya authorized a vast expansion of these four regiments by taking into royal service over 4,300 youths recommended by various Upper Burma headmen. The last two Outer Regiments were started during his Manipuri and Siamese campaigns in 1758-1760. Their original membership, drawn from the other four regiments, was probably enlarged by Alaung-hpaya's sons after his death.87 As in the early seventeenth century, however, Upper Burma residents were by no means the sole source for new ahmu-dan groups. On Alaunghpaya's return from Pegu in 1757, his armada included substantial, though unspecified, numbers of southern prisoners, among whom were Mon artisans formerly attached to the Pegu palace. These men now received service lands in the immediate environs of the new capital and as far east as Kyaukmyaung.88 Other deportees may have helped to resettle Kyaukse, where Alaung-hpaya, en route from Pegu, sought to restore damaged irrigation works.89 Skilled French and Muslim gunners captured at Syriam were sent to villages around Monywa, Shwebo, and Ava to join the descendants of foreigners whom Anauk-hpet-lun had taken at Syriam 144 years earlier.90 After the Manipuri campaign, royal officials awarded land for residence and cultivation to between one and two thousand Manipuri equestrians, who remained Burma's premier cavalry force well into the nineteenth century. Other Manipuris served the throne as silkweavers, boatmen, and astrologers.91 Al87

The expansion of these groups is chronicled at KBZ, pp. 32-33, 212, 290, 294, 308. Cf. the somewhat garbled account at Burma Gazeteer: Kyaukse, p. 32. Although the KBZ does not mention the conferring of specific regimental designations before mid-1758, AA-L, pp. 115, 130 identifies Regiment nos. 3-4 in the list of seventeen by their full tides as early as 1756. 88 AA-L, pp. 132-33; Williamson, Gazeteer Shwebo, p. 25; RCS-TY. 89 KBZ, p. 262; MMOS, III, 16. 90 J. P. Hardiman, comp., Burma Gazeteer: Lower Chindwin District, Upper Burma, vol. A (Rangoon, 1912), p. 35; Crawfurd, Journal, I, 140-41; Report on Operations in Shwebo, 1900-1906, pp. 14, 16-17. 91 AA-T, p. 228, Report on Operations in Sagaing, 1893-1900, p. 4; Roy, Manipur, p. 52; KBZ, p. 301.

ADMINISTRATIVEMEASURES I 253

though the total number of new ahmu-dan villages organized between 1752 and 1760 seems to have been smaller than under Tha-lun, it nonetheless represented the most sizable deportations for over a cen­ tury. In addition to creating new units, Alaung-hpaya made strenuous efforts to resurrect ahmu-dan groups organized during the Toungoo and Ava periods. The task of reorganization was hopelessly compli­ cated by the fire at Ava in 1752, which destroyed palmleaf records of hereditary obUgations stored in the Privy Treasury. Ministers were obliged to reconstruct the old system by collecting worm-eaten, fre­ quently miscopied inquest documents wherever they could be found: in provincial courthouses, monasteries, the houses of local headmen. Parts of the early Κόη-baung collection known as the Zam-bu-di-pA ok-hsaung kyan were probably assembled in this fashion.92 The Κόηbaung scholar Pagan Wun-dauk U Tin claimed, and there is every reason to accept his view, that Alaung-hpaya made military and nonmilitary ahmu-dans, even those from units founded as early as the thir­ teenth century, serve in strict conformity with hereditary obligations.93 Insofar as original platoons could be traced, those who had become slaves or had entered higher platoons in defiance of Toungoo royal edicts were now returned. Although Alaung-hpaya's attentions necessarily focused on nuclear zone ahmu-dans, he also reorganized the predominantly athi popula­ tion in the area of dependent provinces in an effort to maximize the government's tax base and its reserve military potential. In the Yamethin district south of Kyaukse near the Shan foothills, royal agents introduced a measure of prosperity unknown since the sack of Toungoo in 1610. Deserted villages and towns such as Aungtha and Si-gyi-swe were resetded under royal patent, while new vUlages provided the foundation for yet larger colonization efforts under Alaung-hpaya's son Βό-daw-hpaya.94 South of Yamethin in Toungoo province, the court appointed new headmen in townships and villages where the office had become vacant during the recent troubles, includ­ ing at least one jurisdiction where the headmen "gathered people to­ gether and founded a [new] village."95 Thus the eastern corridor was reorganized and repopulated to some extent, and the barrier strength­ ened against Shan or Karen encroachments from the highlands. To facilitate contact with the southeast, royal officials are said to have opened a road between Ava and Toungoo, which joined an earlier cart 92

See Appendix II and MMOS, III, 45. « MMOS, ΙΠ, 19, 45. 94 Wilkie, Gazeteer Yamethin, pp. 33-34. 95 BL OR 3416, hki v.-ga r.

254 I REINTEGRATION, 1752-1760

track built by Tabin-shwei-hti from Toungoo toward Pegu. In effect this provided the crown with an overland route for communications and troop movements all the way from Ava to the southeast coast.96 Of course the principal north-south artery remained the Irrawaddy, so along its banks as well Alaung-hpaya sought to reverse the damages from two decades of warfare. In June 1755, as he ascended the river to gather fresh troops, he ordered the headmen of Middle and Upper Burma to collect people whom the disorders had forced into hiding.97 He encouraged colonists from the dry zone to settle at the old town of Kyangin north of Myanaung; in Myanaung itself, where he laid out a new market and military stockade; and south of Myanaung at Kanaung, which was apparendy founded in the 1750s.98 At the former Mon stronghold of Henzada, Alaung-hpaya may have planted another Burman settlement, for during a Delta uprising in 1759, the governor of Rangoon fell back on Henzada to regroup.99 In Rangoon the pop­ ulation consisted of Mons (including refugees from Pegu) and newly formed Burman ahmu-dan units from upriver. In the western Delta, as well, Alaung-hpaya's officials resettled "a great number" of Mon families displaced by the recent fighting.100 These projects were sys­ tematically expanded by Kings Hsin-byu-shin and Bo-daw-hpaya. As for the great eastern plateau, an edict from December 1759 sug­ gests that there too Alaung-hpaya promoted re-settlement: The inhabitants of the Shan country and the Yuan country [around Chiengmai] scattered to the jungle and mountains when the Toung­ oo empire disintegrated, and fell into a state of anarchy and civil strife. Therefore I gathered in the people and reorganized them. Now let them fulfill their traditional obligations.101 Controlling Administrative Elites Equally symptomatic of recentralization were Alaung-hpaya's efforts to strengthen authority over headmen, whose power in many areas 96

BUmUi Gazeteer: Toungoo District, vol. A (Rangoon, 1914), p. 56, relying on local tradition. If the attribution of this road to Alaung-hpaya is correct, it was probably built during the Pegu campaigns when Alaung-hpaya's brother marched via Toungoo rather than along the Irrawaddy. 97 Dal, I, 166. 98 British Burma Gazeteer, II, 168, 175-76, 224; 286; AA-L, p. 74; KBZ, pp. 13435; W. S. Morrison, comp., Burma Gazeteer: Henzada District, vol. A (Rangoon, 1915), pp. 16-18. 99 Symes, Embassy, p. 42; Morrison, Gazeteer Henzada, p. 18. 100 See Dal, I, 204; Yi Yi, "Κδη-baung hkit," p. 72; British Burma Gazeteer, II, 55354, 601; KBZ, p. 258. 101 AAm, p. 133.

ADMINISTRATIVEMEASURES I 255

had grown quite considerably during the late Toungoo era. The new ruler never challenged the control over local administration that the gentry class as a whole exercised. Weary of the chaos that endangered their own positions, the gentry of Upper and Middle Burma had (in the words of one of Alaung-hpaya's officials) flocked to him as to a new Mahasammata;102 and he had welcomed their support on traditional terms. That is to say, he freely honored their right to marshal the population, to collect taxes, and to succeed one another on an essentially hereditary basis. Naturally, however, if Alaung-hpaya objected to a particular leader, he was quick to remove the offender without reference to hereditary privilege. Thus, for example, the headmen of Kin-u, Kyaukka, Yonga, and perhaps Myanaung were all exiled or executed because of their support for Pegu.103 At the township of Nyaungbinzeik in Middle Burma, the king, rather than remove an apparently unreliable headman, created three subordinate officials with whom he had to share judicial and taxation duties.104 As in the early seventeenth century, the crown could expect maximum loyalty from newly elevated officials who were indebted to the throne for their privileges. Thus not only in townships where incumbents were removed or circumscribed, but also in freshly organized communities, new headmen must have been particularly reluctant to cheat on tax reports, to expand their jurisdictions without authorization, or to countenance illegal departmental transfers. In the overwhelming majority of established townships, of course, incumbents remained in office.105 Yet even in these cases, efforts to reconstruct Toungoo jurisdictions probably helped to check unsub102 See AA-L, p. 18. Cf. KBZ, p. 135. > See KBZ, pp. 59-61, 83-84, 135; MMOS, III, 17-18. Presumably close relatives allied with the deposed headmen were also barred from succession. 104 British Burma GazeUer, II, 432. 105 For example, in Pagan only one of eleven senior township officials was removed (even this is not entirely certain), and no hereditary lines of junior officials or village headmen were broken. Many headmen, however, apparently received fresh appointment orders in 1753-1754 or 1757-1758. See "Pagan-myo sit-tan," JBRS 32, 33. In Toungoo the lines of twenty-three of thirty-one village headmen were the same in 1783 as three generations earlier. Alaung-hpaya merely filled vacancies in four lines that had died out (the other four were filled by his predecessor or successors). BL OR 3416, hki v.ga r. At Prome, Ngathayauk, Singu, Taungzin, Taywindaing, Talokmyo, Kyauksauk, Pyinzi, Sale, Kyaukpadaung, Taungtha, Son, and Myadaung, no royally sponsored interruption in hereditary succession has been detected on either the township or village level. See Trager and Koenig, Sit-tans, chaps. 7-9; KBZ, pp. 61, 134-35, 261-62. The court apparently appointed a new headman in Moksogyon, however. AAm, pp. 24749. 1( 3

256 I REINTEGRATION, 1752-1760

stantiated pretensions. Alaung-hpaya emphasized that the throne had to "investigate, supervise, and appoint thu-gyis, kalans, ahsaws, akuts, agyis, and (Ms [all gentry leaders] with unceasing vigilance."106 An edict sent to the headman of Moksogyon village in Shwebo district shows that he took a keen interest in details of service quotas, corvee organization, fire and theft prevention, and so on.107 No doubt as a former headman he was well versed in these problems. In the Shan and Yuan country as well, the court attempted to resolve confusions involving the territorial jurisdictions of local leaders.108 Of more direct importance to the integrity of the central administration than control of the gentry was Alaung-hpaya's ability to dominate his ministers. On a day-to-day basis, of course, they continued to serve as the administrative and personal link between the throne and the gentry. The relation between Alaung-hpaya and leading officials was quite the reverse of that which had obtained in the first half of the eighteenth century, for Alaung-hpaya, like Nyaungyan Min, selected a radically new clientele. Indeed, most of his major appointees lacked previous governmental experience. The core of Alaung-hpaya's following was a fraternity of sixty-eight warriors known as the myin-yin-tet,109 whom he organized shortly before the battle of the stockade in April 1752. All were local residents who had proven themselves particularly loyal and/or competent. Eight were relatives of varying degrees of affinity; three were probably territorial officers subordinate to Mok-hso-bo. The others had no apparent formal connection to Alaung-hpaya. By late 1752, when he awarded tides to the fifty-five surviving myin-yin-tet, they included numerous bo-hmu and tat-hmu, that is to say, senior officers in the army. In conjunction with Alaung-hpaya's eldest sons, the two principal commanders—Minister of Musketeers Min-hla-min-gaung-gyaw, and MInhla-mln-gaung—directed virtually all of Alaung-hpaya's early campaigns. "If we can catch these two men," the king of Pegu is alleged to have said in 1755, "the Burman king will have lost both of his forearms."110 Mln-hla-min-gaung-gyaw, in fact, died of a musket shot at Syriam, after which a number of second-rank myin-yin-tet com106

Letter to his son 6 March 1760, AAm, p. 183. Ibid., pp. 247-48. 108 KBZ, p. 301. 109 AA-L, pp. 22-23 and KBZ, pp. 27-33 use this term, which translates poorly, but may mean something like "genteel horsemen." AA-T, pp. 158-59 refers to them in some instances as myin-lyin-tat, "force of swift horsemen." This fraternity was modeled on an organization of twenty-eight (according to some accounts, thirty-six) warriors under Tabin-shwei-hd. 110 AA-L, p. 87; KBZ, p. 158. Mln-hla-mln-gaung is better known by his subsequent tide of Mln-gaung-naw-yahta. 107

ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES | 257

manders came into greater prominence during the Pegu, Manipuri, and Siamese campaigns.111 While these men supervised military affairs, other members of Alaung-hpaya's original following devoted them­ selves to civil administration. All four of his chief ministers were myinyin-tet,112 as were a sizable proportion of his governors, compound heads, and departmental ministers.113 Presumably each leading myinyin-tet had his own clientage of junior officials and relatives, many of whom also hailed from the Mok-hso-bo area. The intense identification with Alaung-hpaya's cause, and the sense of personal gratitude that all the myin-yin-tet felt from the outset of his resistance, remained a major source of cohesion at court and within the army. No myin-yin-tet considered himself a rival to Alaung-hpaya, for the relation was ever one of unquestioning subordination.114 When he criticized his commanders, in the stylized words of the chronicles, "all of them, even the minister of musketeers [Min-hla-min-gaunggyaw], shuddered as though a thunderbolt were about to strike their heads." 115 The envoy Baker reported, "I don't remember to have heard any instance of his Justice . . . that deserves to be more remembered for its impartiality than severity."116 Yet to those who served him well, he was unfailingly generous and solicitous. When Min-hla-min-gaunggyaw lay dying at Syriam, Alaung-hpaya rushed to his side, touched the man's wounds, and saw that he had the most expert astrologers and doctors in attendance.117 As his realm expanded, Alaung-hpaya naturally gave appointments to a growing number of non-myin-yin-tet officials and commanders, including some who had served the Toungoo dynasty.118 Nonetheless, 111

These commanders included Nei-myo-shwei-daung, Min-din-naw-yahta, Min-hlaya-za, Mln-hli-naw-yahta, and Kyaw-din-shwei-daung. 112 Min-gyaw-ya-za, "Wun-gyi hmii-gyi-mya achaung," JBRS 45, 2 (1962): 146. 113 KBZ, pp. 28-32 lists ministerial posts held by fifty-five myin-yin-tet during Alaunghpaya's reign and apparently also under his sons. The totals are as follows (some held multiple appointments): twelve territorial and capital myo-wuns; four compound com­ manders, four chief ministers, one minister of athis, five senior generals, one minister of musketeers, one minister of Kaung-han guards, one minister of irrigation, one of cav­ alry, one treasury minister. Clearly the myin-yin-tet formed an inner circle throughout the early Κόη-baung era. See Min-gyaw-ya-za, "Wun-gyi," pp. 146 ff. In much the same way, the first foreign merchants to attach themselves to Alaung-hpaya's cause, the Ar­ menians Gregory and Zachary, dominated maritime affairs throughout his reign. i " Cf. Nash, Golden Road, p. 79. " 5 KBZ, p. 47. i 1 6 Dal, I, 167. I 1 7 K B Z , p. 180; AA-L, p. 96. 118 For example, the former Ava official Kyaw-din-thet-taw-shei, who organized the 1754 revolt in Middle Burma, served at Shwebo; the eater of Kandaw under Mahadamd-ya-za-di-pati became a capital secretary; and the former xmn-gyi and eater of In-

258 I REINTEGRATION, 1752-1760

as a rule Alaung-hpaya remained suspicious of latecomers to his cause, particularly senior Ava officials. This distrust seems to have been based on two interrelated factors. There may have been an instinctive social distance between former aristocrats and the low-born gentry leader that both parties found difficult to bridge, Buddhist sanctionsforAlaunghpaya's achieved status notwithstanding. At the same time, Alaunghpaya may have feared that some Ava ministers, by exercising undue influence over their old supporters, would recreate foci of independent authority. With one possible exception,119 he therefore declined to place Ava officials in positions of influence comparable to those which his leading myin-yin-tet enjoyed. Moreover, he subjected them to the most arbitrary discipline. Three important figures from the former regime who had refused Alaung-hpaya's oath finally did homage after his capture of Ava in early 1754. Though welcoming their support at the time, within a relatively short period the new ruler found excuses to execute all three and to redistribute their followers. In each case their stated offense was less serious than that for which myin-yin-tet people received only corporal punishment.120 Alaung-hpaya sought to formalize his authority over the ministerial class by rescinding a number of privileges from the late Toungoo period. He had reliable information on Toungoo court politics through his brother-in-law and others who had served Tanln-ganwei and/or Maha-damd-ya-za-di-pati. Some of these changes therefore may have reflected detailed inquiries into the problems of Toungoo government, although other controls were dictated by mere common sense. None of these innovations was a major organizational change comparable, for example, to the early seventeenth-century policy of curbing bayins and myo-zas. Alaung-hpaya did reduce the size and prestige of the Privy Council by eliminating eight senior offices and by depriving another category of first-grade appointment orders.121 Similarly he yon Thi-ri-u-zana served Alaung-hpaya as secretary for provincial revenue and as hlutdaw secretary. 119 His chief steward, Bayd-thei-na, whose background is unknown. On his career, see AAm, pp. 225, 230, 238, 252, 255, 260, 273, 278, 280, 294-95. 120 The three victims were a relative of Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati, executed for speaking "unsuitably" in 1755; and Ye-gaung-san-kyaw and Ya-za-di-ya-zi, two Ava commanders executed for cowardice during the Delta campaign. In passing sentence on the last named, Alaung-hpaya explicidy contrasted his opportunism with the fidelity and discipline shown by "my man from Mok-hso-bo," the minister of musketeers. See KBZ, pp. 80-84, 123, 143-44, 151-52; AA-T, pp. 194-95. 121 Four atmn-wun-dauk and four than-daw-it-tin-sit posts disappeared, and officers known as than-daw-zins lost first-grade appointment orders. MMOS, IV, 18-19 says these changes in Privy Council organization characterized all eleven (sic) Kon-baung reigns, so it is logical to conclude that Alaung-hpaya initiated them. Cf. NL 2208, hi r.

ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES | 259

discontinued the customary appointment of an athi investigator (athisit) to assist the minister of athis with taxes; and he deprived five departmental ministers of first-grade appointment orders.122 In instituting these changes, Alaung-hpaya probably sought to demean his officials and to minimize the number of potential plotters, which was consistent with his emphasis on discipline. In the case of the Privy Council, he also may have sought to enhance the relative authority of the Council of Ministers so as to forestall competition between patrons of equal stature. These policies contrasted sharply with developments under Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati, whose last years had seen a great expansion in the ranks and privileges of senior officials. Yet the structure of capital administration remained basically unaltered, for the various departments, though reduced in prestige, continued to fulfill precisely the same functions. So too provincial administration123 and myo-za controls124 were taken over essentially intact from the Toungoo era. The majority of Alaung-hpaya's administrative decrees dealt with the problem of financial abuse, which he policed with a severe and jaundiced eye. Usually he intervened on an ad hoc basis after specific problems had arisen. In November 1757, for example, he discovered a discrepancy in the accounts of riverine toll stations and immediately ordered an inquest to determine whether the fault lay with the collectors or the treasurers.125 His reform of judicial procedures, however, was rather more systematic and prophylactic. Toungoo officials had frequently judged legal cases in their private homes, where they sold justice to the highest bidder and apportioned fees to suit themselves rather than the treasury. Alaung-hpaya sternly forbade ministers and princes to handle in their own houses any criminal case, or any civil case involving property in excess of a specified sum. To enforce this 122

The ministers of inheritances, warboats, foreign relations, palace provisions, and the ecclesiastical commissioner. MMOS, IV, 3, 69. Cf. NL 2208, kn v., referring to the post of atbi-sit in the Toungoo era. 123 Alaung-hpaya may have expanded to a modest degree the use of nonroyal personnel to serve as provincial myo-wuns, for the heads of Rangoon, Martaban, Prome, Tavoy, and possibly Mindon and Sagu were commoners. However, Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati also had at least three commoners serving as myo-wuns outside the nuclear zone. At the same time, Alaung-hpaya entrusted Toungoo to his brother Thado-thein-gathu. 124 For lists of Alaung-hpaya's offsprings' estates, and on the system of princely retinues, see KBZ, pp. 264, 267, 323-24; Ya Gyaw, Myan-ma maha, pp. 191-94. 125 AAm, p. 273. Similarly, in January 1758 he ordered a public examination to determine whether a goldsmith was squandering royal treasure in the preparation of gold leaf for a pagoda. AAm, p. 242. See also ibid., p. 275, reviewing riverine toll procedures; and ibid., p. 280, promising to amputate the hand of dishonest hlut-daw secretaries.

260 I REINTEGRATION, 1752-1760 ruling, in 1757 he ordered his chief steward to submit monthly reports detailing what fees and gratuities had been paid to judges (that is, ministers) or secretaries attached to the major courts at the capital, regardless of whether the case had been setded in public or in private. The steward had power to summon judges, secretaries, pleaders, and litigants as witnesses. 126 Further, to strengthen control over judicial proceedings in oudying areas, Alaung-hpaya in May 1758 empowered a special officer known as the Chief Golden Royal Spy to supervise inferior spies (na-hkcms) at provincial courts. 1 2 7 Like Tha-lun's efforts to control judges and pleaders, these measures served a dual purpose. Most obviously, they reduced the percentage of taxes and treasure that ministers withheld from the crown. At the same time they curtailed unauthorized exactions, and thereby reduced pressures on taxpayers to migrate, or to become private retainers and debt-slaves. Alaung-hpaya seems to have been particularly concerned to prevent the recrudescence of widespread slavery and debt-slavery. As we have seen, slavery was one of the main avenues by which abmu-Aans had escaped royal service in the late Toungoo period. At Mok-hso-bo in 1752 he ruled that prisoners and deportees could not be converted to private slaves, but instead should receive provisions and residence sites from the crown so as to be incorporated into the service system. 1 2 8 At Pegu he issued a decree freeing all ahmu-dans and athis captured in Upper Burma who had been sold into slavery.129 On his return to the north, in order to prevent officials and other creditors from intimidat­ ing indebted servicemen who might thereby be reduced to debt-slav­ ery, he decreed: Ministers, officials, and other judges when listening to lawsuits, cases of debt, disputes, and such petitions, . . . must act with perfect im­ partiality. In cases involving a loan of money by ministers or offi­ cials . . . to commoners, provided such cases do not involve criminal infractions, the debtors may not be confined with tethering-ropes or 130 foot-fetters. They shall not be restrained. 126

Ibid., p. 260; Symes, Embassy, pp. 51-52. His chief steward (achok-akaing) was Baya-thei-ηέ. Princes settling civil (?) cases at their homes were also covered by this edict. 127 AAm, p. 236. 128 KBZ, p. 58. Thu-kyei, tbu-kyun, and kyei-kyun were standard terms for private slaves. 129 AAm, pp. 219-20. This was a military as well as an administrative act, designed in pan to encourage defections from the embattled city. '*> Ibid., p. 255. Cf. RUL 45235, Edict 50, 999 pya-tho 7 wax., p. 43.

ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES | 261

In the same spirit, Alaung-hpaya prohibited influential creditors from demanding debt repayment from a particular group of royal body­ guards until he had personally returned to the capital to hear argu­ ments in the case. At the same time he decreed that no "debt which my common subjects [anywhere] in the countryside have incurred be­ cause their livelihood is inadequate" could be collected until it had been outstanding at least ten months. 131 In some instances the new sovereign reduced popular burdens at the expense not of private parties, but of the crown itself. Thus in January 1758, he ordered a reduction of tolls levied on merchants and boatmen plying the Irrawaddy because existing rates were inhibiting trade: in large consignments every third good or every fourth boat would henceforth be exempt.132 More importantly, he issued detailed restric­ tions on corvees assigned to ahmu-dans constructing the moat and walls at Shwebo so that agriculture would not suffer.133 By contrast, Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati had been forced to confiscate merchant prop­ erty without compensation, and to raise the rice tax from 10 to 25 percent. As there are no systematic statistics before 1783, it cannot be proven that per capita tax and service burdens were less under Alaung-hpaya than under his predecessors. In Katha Shan principality in the far north and in a small state in the Shan foothills, Alaung-hpaya actually in­ creased gold and silver taxes;134 while in most localities surviving in­ quest records suggest that he (and his sons) were content to reestablish Toungoo obligations. What does seem reasonably clear, however, is that Alaung-hpaya was willing to authorize reductions when he deemed it in the royal interest; and more importandy, that he was in a sufficienriy strong political position to prevent officials and senior headmen from adding to the authorized rates with special demands and bloated commissions. Thus the de facto per capita burden (as opposed to the authorized burden) throughout the empire probably was less, and the incentive to avoid one's obligations to the crown correspondingly re­ duced. In sharp contrast to decrees from the late Toungoo period, 131

AAm, p. 137, In a similar spirit he sought to stop unauthorized demands by officials and boatmen on the Irrawaddy (AAm, p. 186), and by officials in the Tai region (AAm, p. 133). 132 Ibid., p. 275. Cf. ruling ibid., p. 262. 133 Ibid., pp. 142, 183. 134 γ ; Yi5 «Κδη-baung hkit," p . 102; G U B S S , I I , 1, 169-70. This may have been primarily intended, however, t o strengthen political authority over peripheral areas rather than t o raise revenue.

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none of Alaung-hpaya's hundred extant edicts complained that ahmudans were seeking to become debt-slaves or to move into higher pla­ toons. Religious and Legal Affairs As he reordered aspects of secular administration following his victory in the south, so Alaung-hpaya directed his attention to the sangha. He was, as he averred in a letter of 1760, mindful of his royal obligation to "promote the welfare of all the people in this and future incarna­ tions." 135 Since, as we have seen, alms to the monkhood was the chief method by which laymen accumulated good katnma, and since that kamma was proportional to the sanctity of the monastic recipient, en­ forcing high monastic standards was of obvious value to the popula­ tion. Even while besieging Pegu, Alaung-hpaya had found time to honor a learned monk and to organize Pali monastic examinations. On his return to Shwebo, he intervened more forcefully in the robe-wrap­ ping dispute to assist the one-shoulder sect, of which his monastic adviser Atu-la had always been a partisan. According to one source, the Sasanavamsa, the king permitted Atu-la to humiliate elders of the two-shoulder sect, while he himself persecuted an uncompromising advocate of the same teaching. Yet while this activity (if the Sasana­ vamsa is accurate)136 reflected an increase in royal supervision com­ pared to the last three Toungoo reigns, the two-shoulder sect ulti­ mately triumphed under Alaung-hpaya's son Βό-daw-hpaya, so the significance of his intervention remains problematic.137 Alaung-hpaya's policy on religious lands was no more decisive. Al­ though he built several pagodas that probably had tax-exempt lands attached thereto, he undertook no examination of earlier donations with a view to resuming control over improperly or uncertainly marked holdings. Glebe land surveys may have started on a small scale under 135

AAm, p. 173. See too p. 183. LaW, History of Religion (Sasanavamsa), pp. 128-31. It should be noted that this account does not appear in TL, pp. 191-92, an earlier source from which the Sasana­ vamsa derived. Moreover, MMOS, III, 16 says Alaung-hpaya at some unspecified time actually patronized both sects. 137 The one-shoulder group may have contributed to lineages that participated in later rivalries, but as an organized sect committed to a particular vinaya observance, it apparendy disappeared under Βό-daw-hpaya. On sect resilience under Alaung-hpaya and the elusive nature of sangha unity, see Ferguson, "Symbolic Dimensions," p. 183 ff. Cf. idem, "The Quest for Legitimation by Burmese Monks and Kings: The Case of the Shwegyin Sect (19th-20th Centuries)," in Bardwell L. Smith, ed., Religion and Legiti­ mation of Power in Thailand, Laos, and Burma (Chambersburg, Pa., 1978), pp. 66-86. 136

ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES | 263

his successor Naung-daw-gyi, but it was not until the reign of Bodaw-hpaya (1782-1819) that Κδη-baung kings organized a thorough inquest into the status of religious lands and cultivators attached thereto. This reform, whose economic benefits to the crown remain uncertain in any case, occurred after the dynasty had already passed its military and political zenith. 138 The fact that Alaung-hpaya and the celebrated conqueror Hsin-byu-shin (r. 1763-1776) were able to bring the polity to maximum vigor without addressing themselves in sustained fashion to the problem of religious lands strengthens the argument in Chapter 3 that this problem was of limited significance to the decline of the Restored Toungoo polity. Alaung-hpaya's concern for Buddhist orthodoxy and his desire to revitalize administration found more fruitful expression in his patron­ age of religiously sanctioned law codes. During the Peguan conquest of Upper Burma, many legal texts had been lost ,at Ava and other centers of learning. It thus became necessary to search out surviving copies and to undertake systematic compilations. The best known code of the entire Κόη-baung period, the Μαηύ-kye danmthat, was written by Alaung-hpaya's minister of the moat, possibly at the urging of Alaunghpaya himself after his return to Shwebo. The Μαηύ-kye is less a digest of the law than an encyclopedic record of all existing law and custom. Though rambling and contradictory, it served well its intended pur­ pose of providing a compilation in easy-to-read Burmese that judges could understand.139 The treatise on Toungoo court punctilio, Law-ka-byu-ha kyan, had a similar didactic function. Its respected author Thi-ri-u-zana, who entered Alaung-hpaya's court after his victory at Pegu, had served the last three Toungoo kings and had risen to be chief minister under 140 Maha-damd-ya-za-di-pati. His lengthy treatise, written at Alaunghpaya's request, describes inter alia how new kings ascended the throne, how they conducted themselves in the Council of Ministers and Privy Council, how they awarded insignia to courtiers, received ambassa­ dors, supervised religious festivals, and organized the establishment of « 8 See G U B S S , I, 2, 441-43; M M O S , I I I , 55-56, and V, 36-38; Ferguson, "Sym­ bolic Dimensions," p p . 199-200; Burma Gazeteer: Kyaukse, p. 1 2 1 ; Koenig, "Κόη-baung Polity," p p . 260-62. O n Κόη-baung decline after about 1776, see Koenig, chaps. 1, 7. For more detailed discussion, see Lieberman, "Religious Wealth," p p . 765-69. 139 T h e Μαηύ-kye was t h e most popular b u t n o t t h e only legal code compiled under Alaung-hpaya. See Forchhammer, Jardine Prize, p p . 90-109; S H D M A , p . 1 9 3 ; J. S. Furnivall, " M a n u in Burma: Some Burmese Dhammathats," JBRS 30, 2 (1940): 36270; Lingat, "Evolution," p p . 20-22. 1 4 0 See L B H K , Preface and pp. 5-6, 2 1 5 ; and Mln-gyaw-ya-za, "Wun-gyi," p . 1 4 5 .

264 I REINTEGRATION, 1752-1760

the heir apparent. This was an invaluable guide for a ruler whose origins were decidedly provincial, and helps explain the conservative character of much of Alaung-hpaya's policy. An edict of 1754 suggests that the new king's early ignorance of court etiquette was exceeded only by his anxiety that he be seen to follow the correct procedure.141 In essence, then, Alaung-hpaya's administrative work was restorative and overwhelmingly designed to reconcentrate secular, as opposed to religious, resources. He reorganized ahmu-dans, stabilized the atbi system, and asserted effective authority over local and courtly elites. At the same time he left the structure of Restored Toungoo administration basically intact. SECTION FOUR. THE FINAL CAMPAIGNS,

1758-1760

After focusing on internal affairs, Alaung-hpaya devoted the closing years of his life to renewed military activity, this time against the Shans, Manipur, and Siam. These campaigns were a natural culmination to his conquests through 1757, for they sought to restore and extend imperial control over the highlands and the peninsular districts surrounding the central basin. The late Toungoo period had shown that control of the tributary zone was a precondition for security in the Irrawaddy valley. These campaigns were also an outgrowth of Alaunghpaya's administrative reorganization insofar as they depended for their success on the efficiency of the new military service system. The first expedition, in the northeastern Shan country, was essentially defensive. While dwelling at Shwebo in January 1758, Alaunghpaya learned that loyal Shan villages had been plundered by a coalition led by his old foe the Gwei headman Gonna-ein.142 He therefore dispatched columns that succeeded temporarily in pacifying the northeastern region between the Irrawaddy and Yunnan, and in forcing Gonna-ein into Chinese territory.143 Alaung-hpaya's commanders also established a measure of control over the southeastern Tai area, thereby reversing the deterioration that had started with the destruction of MongPaiin 1692.144 141

AAm, p. 289. See this chapter nn. 11, 12. " ' KBZ, pp. 269-72. Cf. GUBSS, I, 1, 249. Alaung-hpaya's forces had earlier penetrated the Shan area, first after the capture of Ava, and then prior to the Peguan campaign. For lists of Shan vassals contributing troops to Alaung-hpaya's southern offensives in 1755-1759, see KBZ, pp. 117, 161, 302. 144 On control over Yawnghwe and Mong Nai, see KBZ, pp. 268, 302; on control over the Myei-lat west of Yawnghwe, see GUBSS, II, 1, 169-70, and II, 2, 528; and on the reconstitution of Mong Pai, which was probably not completed until the reign 142

FINAL CAMPAIGNS, 1758-1760 | 265

East of the Salween, however, Alaung-hpaya never penetrated in force. He received tribute from at least three trans-Salween principal­ ities, intended perhaps as insurance against future invasions. But Chiengmai remained defiant. He himself freely admitted the inade­ quacy of his control, for on setting out for Siam toward the close of 1759, he wrote to his eldest son that he planned to seize "Tavoy, Tenasserim, Ayudhya, Lamphun, and Chiengmai, and to instruct them in the Law [taya = dhamma\. Then I shall tour the eastern Shan coun­ try and return to the capital."145 He died, of course, before these ob­ jectives could be realized. Alaung-hpaya was content to pursue a "minimalist" policy in the eastern uplands, because by 1758 he was already laying plans to con­ centrate his forces for an invasion of Manipur. Manipur was closer to the nuclear zone than the major Tai states, and traditionally repre­ sented more of a threat, especially to Shwebo, exposed as it was in the northwest where Manipuri horsemen had galloped at will in the 1730s. Moreover, trans-Salween principalities could be subdued only after a major effort involving thrusts against Siam as well, whereas Manipur was in turmoil and practically called out for Burmese intervention. Following the murder of Gharib Newaz by a rebellious son, the Manipuri court, whose penchant for self-destructive factionalism ex­ ceeded that of Ava, lapsed into a series of coups and countercoups. At some point prior to 1758, an unsuccessful contender fled to Alaunghpaya to seek aid. Although he died soon after his arrival in Burma, Alaung-hpaya cited this request—along with his own obligation as cakkavatti to spread Buddhism among the Hindus—as justification for the decision to invade Manipur. In keeping with his religious preten­ sions, along his line of march Alaung-hpaya had his men carve out niches in large trees that were thenfilledwith Buddha images.146 Later he sent messages to the current raja explaining that he had entered Manipur because the god Sakka had entrusted him with the magic lance of a cakkavatti that he might crush heresy and promote True 147 Doctrine (samma-ditthi) . Unimpressed, the Manipuris attempted to halt the advance. The Burmese, however, brushed them aside, seized of Naung-daw-gyi, see GUBSS, Π, 2, 442. Note that AAm, p. 236, refers to Mong Nai, Hsenwi, and Mong Mit myo-wuns who apparently were appointive officers quite distinct from the local saw-bwas (cf. KBZ, pp. 161, 302). 145 AAm, p. 117. See the similar boast at KBZ, pp. 213-14. 146 KBZ, p. 295, between his camps at Tamil and Ket-sein. 147 He urged the Manipuri ruler to accept instruction, just as nine Shan rulers alleg­ edly had already done. Ibid., pp. 298-99; AA-T, pp. 226-27. On the invasion see too AA-L, pp. 135-41; Roy, Manipur, pp. 49-52; AAm, pp. 106-107.

266 I REINTEGRATION, 1752-1760

the virtually deserted capital, and began hunting down refugees. Although they captured a large number of commoners and even some members of the Manipuri royal family, the current raja eluded them. Little more could be achieved by occupying an empty city, and events in Lower Burma demanded Alaung-hpaya's attention. Therefore on 22 January 1759, a mere ten days after the capital fell, the Burmese began to withdraw. This brief invasion, the second148 in a series that continued to 1819, was unsuccessful insofar as Alaung-hpaya failed in his stated goals of regulating the succession and converting the raja to Buddhism. It succeeded, however, in devastating the central valley and in carrying off large numbers of horsemen and artisans who were organized as abmudans in Burma. As soon as Manipur recovered from this incursion, it was subjected to fresh invasions under Alaung-hpaya's sons, and was thus never again in a position to threaten its powerful neighbor. At the same time, Alaung-hpaya strengthened his control over Tai principalities along the upper Chindwin that had fallen away from Ava's orbit in the late Toungoo period. According to the late eighteenth-century English envoy Michael Symes, a fresh revolt in Lower Burma induced Alaung-hpaya to terminate prematurely the Manipuri venture.149 Taking advantage of the king's absence in the northwest, Mons suddenly expelled the governor of Rangoon and seized that port city. Although Burman forces succeeded in crushing the insurrection without Alaung-hpaya's assistance, he determined to visit the area personally in order to reassert through public ceremonies his sovereignty over the restive coast. In July 1759, he left Shwebo with his family and a great military following and proceeded to patronize the main religious shrines of the south with considerable panoply. Meanwhile, he laid plans to invade Siam. The roots of his hostility toward that kingdom are less obvious than in the case of Manipur, for Ayudhya had studiously refrained from exploiting Burma's weakness in the 1740s. It is true that Alaung-hpaya charged Siamese authorities at Mergui-Tenasserim with giving refuge to Rangoon rebels and to defeated opponents from Tavoy (whose ruler, tributary to Alaunghpaya, had exploited the disturbances at Rangoon to declare his in148

In 1755 a Burmese force had attacked Manipuri eastern frontier to protect Alaunghpaya's flank during his descent to Prome. KBZ, p. 124; Symes, Embassy, pp. 25-26; Dal, I, 152. 149 Symes, Embassy, pp. 41-43. Although KBZ, pp. 300 ff. omits reference to the revolt in Lower Burma, AAm, pp. 149, 172 confirm that a Mon uprising occurred at Rangoon during the closing phase of Alaung-hpaya's Manipuri campaign.

FINAL CAMPAIGNS, 1758-1760 | 267

dependence).150 Yet Siamese participation in these affairs was limited and inadvertent, and it would seem that Alaung-hpaya actually welcomed such involvement to justify his own aggression.151 As in the sixteenth century, there may have been an element of commercial rivalry between the Delta ports and Mergui, which remained an entrepot of some importance. Alaung-hpaya, who sponsored royal trading ventures from Rangoon, complained at one point that Siamese officials obstructed ships traveling between peninsular ports and Rangoon.152 More basically, however, Alaung-hpaya had built a potent war machine that he was determined to use in order to extend his practical authority and, in the process, to substantiate his cakkavatti pretensions. He probably sensed that Ayudhya was vulnerable, as suggested by Siam's inactivity in the peninsula and by renewed factional conflict attending Ekkathafs accession at Ayudhya in 1758.153 Whether before leaving Shwebo Alaung-hpaya had determined to invade the Menam valley is unclear. However, as the above-quoted letter to his eldest son reveals, when he left Rangoon in early or late December 1759, he had undoubtedly come to regard Ayudhya as one element in a far-reaching program to conquer virtually the entire trans-Salween Tai area.154 His ambition recalls that of Tabin-shwei-hti and Bayin-naung, whose exploits must in some measure have inspired him. Ironically, his strategy flew in the face of sixteenth-century experience, which showed that an attack on Ayudhya itself was practical only if invaders first gained control over Chiengmai and provincial centers 150 On the Tavoy revolt and Alaung-hpaya's complaints, see AAm, pp. 146, 149-50, 164; KBZ, p. 305; AA-T, p. 229; Damrong, "Our Wars," pp. 298-99; Symes, Embassy, pp. 49-50. 151 AAm, pp. 117, 164 indicate that the Tavoyan incidents occurred almost a month after Alaung-hpaya had announced in a letter to his son his intention to conquer Siam. Indeed, as early as 1756-1757 Alaung-hpaya had included Ayudhya in his visions of universal conquest. See KBZ, pp. 213-14, 237; AAm, pp. 28-33. 152 KBZ, p. 305; AA-T, p. 229; HS, p. 106. On his interest in maritime trade, see AAm, p. 172; Dal, I, 211-12; KBZ, pp. 268, 304-305. 153 On Siamese conflicts, see Wood, History, pp. 238-39. A letter from Alaung-hpaya to Ekkathat in February 1760, chiding the Siamese king for killing relatives, shows Alaung-hpaya had some knowledge of Ayudhyan politics, though he was misinformed on detail. AAm, pp. 175-76. 154 See this chapter, n. 145. On the precise date of his departure from Rangoon, which seems to have been delayed repeatedly, see AAm, p. 119 nn. 10, 11, and AAm, p. 167. Prince Damrong, "Our Wars," pp. 299-301, was probably wrong, therefore, when he claimed that Alaung-hpaya determined to invade Ayudhya only when he discovered how inept Siamese forces were in the peninsula in early 1760. AAm, pp. 160, 166, 168 indicate that Siamese forces at Mergui and Tenasserim could not have been assaulted before February 1760.

268 I REINTEGRATION, 1752-1760

in north Siam. Bayin-naung, striking down the Menam basin from the north after systematic pacification, succeeded twice where Tabin-shweihti, whose entire army came via the Three Pagodas Pass further south, had failed.155 Alaung-hpaya's astrologers and advisers allegedly warned him that all the signs were unfavorable.156 Supremely confident of his good kamma, however, he assumed he could overawe the Siamese with a lightning thrust across the peninsula. His luck was indeed excellent, for if the Siamese had been but moderately resourceful, they could have trapped Alaung-hpaya's main force as it marched along a narrow corridor on the east peninsular coast hemmed in between the sea and a range of hills. Yet once the Burmese reached Ayudhya, the impracticality of his strategy became painfully apparent. Without north Tai auxiliaries and supplies, his army could not organize a systematic blockade. His siege guns were inadequate to pierce the walls. Nor was a frontal assault feasible against caltrops, artillery, and a mass of protecting streams and canals. Although the Siamese had been routed in the south, their losses could be made good from as yet untouched provinces north and west of the capital. By contrast, Burmese ranks were constandy being thinned by pestilence, and Alaung-hpaya himself soon took ill.157 As was their custom, Alaung-hpaya and his generals issued proclamations explaining that Alaung-hpaya was an Embryo Buddha and a cakkavatti, ordained by prophecy, who was touring the world with the sole objective of making more radiant the Buddha's religion. To Alaunghpaya's great distress, the Faith had recently become rather dim in Siam. The Burmese urged the king of Siam to offer homage suitable to a man of such obvious religious merit. Explicidy or implicidy they may have claimed that Alaung-hpaya was destined to be reborn as Metteyya, for the Siamese replied that if Alaung-hpaya's claims to be an Embryo Buddha were valid, he should be in Tusita Heaven rather than outside the gates of Ayudhya. According to orthodox thought— though not according to some popular Burmese traditions—it is in Tusita, the fourth Buddhist heaven, that Metteyya dwells in anticipation of his coming appearance on earth.158 155 This experience was confirmed by Hsin-byu-shin's north-south pincers attack on Ayudhya in 1764-1767. 156 AA-T, p. 229. Appearing in a posthumous account, however, this warning must be treated with caution. 157 BL OR 3464, p. 149 v., and Phraison Salarak, 'Testimony," p. 38 say he had venereal disease; Symes, Embassy, p. 51, says scrofula; and Wood, History, pp. 241-42 says he was wounded by a cannon burst. 158 In truth, the Siamese retort only made sense if Alaung-hpaya specifically claimed to be Metteyya, for no Buddhist would deny that Alaung-hpaya could be an incarnation

FINAL CAMPAIGNS, 1758-1760 | 269

The Siamese could afford to dispute Buddhist theory, for they knew that the impending rains would soon destroy the siege. Consequendy they pretended to negotiate in order to prolong a stalemate that was working in their favor. When the Burmese realized what was happen­ ing, they decided to retreat while their army was yet intact and their king still alive. So hasty was their decision that they had to bury or discard their heaviest guns, which fell into Siamese hands. Burmese and Siamese sources suggest, however, that the Siamese were too frightened to mount an energetic pursuit, so the main body of troops was able to retreat toward Martaban virtually unhindered.159 Alaung-hpaya may have hoped to reach Rangoon to settle the succession publicly before his death, but on 11 May 1760 he expired at the litde settlement of Kinywa in Martaban province. Although his Siamese campaign had brought him small glory, he had in a shorter period than any other Burmese ruler succeeded in uniting the Irrawaddy valley and the surrounding highlands from Manipur to Siam and from the borders of Arakan to China. He was more entitled to the funeral of a cakkavatti than any monarch since Bayin-naung. Alaung-hpaya's sons were destined to strengthen their hold over the eastern Tais and to annex Arakan, but by his death the essential achievements of early Κόη-baung rule had been realized. The intro­ duction to this chapter called attention to parallels between his reign and those of Nyaungyan Min, Anauk-hpet-lun, and Tha-lun. Alaunghpaya's career may also be summarized in terms of the pronounced inverse symmetry between it and the last century of Toungoo rule. Whereas the factional intrigues of the late Toungoo era had favored courtiers who were politically adept but militarily ineffective, the crisis of mid-century smashed the existing political leadership and promoted a new class of proven warriors, among whom Alaung-hpaya was most successful. Expanding from the nuclear zone to Lower Burma and of any of the countless future Buddhas who will succeed Metteyya. It was the orthodox requirement that Metteyya dwell now in Tusita (see DPPN, I, 1033-34, and II, 66062) that caused objection. However, Mendelson, "Messianic Association" pp. 574-76, "Weaving Mountain," p. 233, and "Observations," p. 798 has shown that in the view of certain Burmese messianic cults, embryo forms of Metteyya can dwell on earth even now in the person of the coming cakkavatti. Possibly it was on these traditions that Alaung-hpaya drew. It is also well known that Alaung-hpaya's son Βό-daw-hpaya ex­ plicitly claimed to be both a cakkavatti and Metteyya Buddha come to earth. See Fer­ guson, "Symbolic Dimensions," pp. 200-203; Koenig, "Κόη-baung Polity," pp. 181-83. The claims and counterclaims outside Ayudhya are preserved in AAm, pp. 175-76,18384, 212-13; AA-T, p. 230; AA-L, p. 150; KBZ, pp. 311, 313. 159 AA-L, pp. 141-52; Damrong, "Our Wars," p. 307.

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then to Manipur and the southeast Tai region, Alaung-hpaya's armies reversed the basic geographic pattern by which the imperial territories had come apart. Whereas the disasters of Maha-dama-ya-za-di-patf s region had led contemporaries to shun him as a man unable to uphold the Ten Royal Laws, Alaung-hpaya's victories nourished his astounding claims to be a cakkavatti who would introduce Metteyya Buddha, if not a preliminary incarnation of Metteyya Buddha himself. So too his internal administrative achievements reversed those trends most characteristic of late Toungoo rule: he halted the 'Svastage" of manpower to private service and debt-slavery; enlarged the royal service and athi populations that in the late Toungoo era had suffered serious attrition; reasserted control over the refractory gentry class; and created a unified system of ministerial patronage whose strength derived from the intense personal attachment of leading officials to the king. Private power centers were restricted, and the formal structure again approximated the actual distribution of authority between the king and his chief ministers.

CONCLUSIONS AND ANALOGIES

As a historiographic category, the administrative cycle has uses and limitations. It allows the historian to integrate a mass of otherwise disparate facts into coherent patterns and to ground kaleidoscopic po­ litical events in enduring institutions. It also invites meaningful com­ parisons between cultures and between different periods of the same culture. On the other hand, if improperly used, it can obscure linear trends, exaggerate the deterministic quality of events, and exclude heteronomous factors of great significance. It is with these strengths and limitations in mind that I have attempted to explain Toungoo and early Κόη-baung political history in terms of administrative oscilla­ tions. The period under study comprised four principal phases: imperial decline in the late sixteenth century; reintegration under Restored Toungoo kings, 1597-c. 1648; prolonged decline lasting to 1752; and Alaung-hpaya's recentralization, 1752-1760. I have argued that the alternation between these phases proceeded in part from internal struc­ tural contradictions: centralization demanded a degree of elite subor­ dination to the throne that conflicted, in the long run at least, with the extensive prerogatives retained by the elites at the beginning of each cycle. But fragmentation encouraged recentralization, for it un­ dermined the system of order on which the welfare of the elites, no less than of the monarchy, ultimately depended. Even under dynastic founders, the relation between king and ad­ ministrators was not one of simple dictation, but of reciprocity and delegated authority that carried with it the potential for elite obstruc­ tion. Ministers, princes, headmen, and tributaries were bound to the dynastic founders by the desire to identify with conquerors of manifest charisma, by gratitude for royal patronage, by institutionalized forms of personal subordination, by a lively fear of chastisement, and by an appreciation of ordered government following a period of chaos. Although these same factors continued to operate throughout the dynasty, later kings were rarely able to exercise the same powerful appeals. Unless they embarked on a program of endless military ex­ pansion—a course that entailed obvious dangers—later kings, by def­ inition, could merely preserve the imperial legacy bequeathed them by

272 I CONCLUSIONS AND ANALOGIES

their ancestors. This testified to less merit and automatically called forth less religious veneration. Although in theory each ruler appointed his own administration de novo, in practice only the dynastic founder(s) selected substantial numbers of new personnel either at the capital or in outlying regions. Most incumbent officials therefore felt a diminished sense of obligation for personal patronage. Furthermore, it may be that with the passage of time, local authorities failed to appreciate those services which the monarchy had performed initially. Less willing than their predecessors to contribute to the monarchy's support, they felt less compunction about falsifying census records and withholding resources. Finally and perhaps most importandy, the growth of private interests and the decay of central authority were encouraged by endemic competition among the elites. In strengthening their control over manpower, regional and central elites sought to enhance their personal interests within the network of patron-client clusters centered on the court. Typically, factional and interregional conflicts focused on the vexed question of royal succession. Except in the case of the more distant Tai tributaries, none had any desire to undermine royal authority per se. Yet in its cumulative impact, unrestrained interelite competition had precisely this effect. In the late sixteenth as in the mid-eighteenth century, rebellions in oudying areas, and the consolidation of princely and ministerial autonomy in the nuclear zone, nourished one another. The cultivating classes were by no means an inert element in the undeclared competition between different sections of the elite and between the elites and the throne. Much as ambitious territorial heads and departmental officials attached themselves to more powerful patrons, so peasants sought protectors who would demand a smaller share of their labor than the headman/platoon leader to whom they were originally assigned. Restored Toungoo materials suggest that this was an endemic aspect of peasant behavior, not necessarily dependent on famine conditions or elite abuse.1 The voluntary movement from 1

Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century edicts are in no way adequate—nor have I attempted—to construct a comprehensive picture of Burmese peasant behavior. By their very nature Toungoo documents are primarily concerned with problems of service evasion, and tend to ignore elements of village cohesion and cooperation. Surely the latter elements were of some significance, not only for local defense, but also for shared economic concerns, particularly in those Upper Burma villages where communal work routines were needed to maintain irrigation works. For a classic discussion of reciprocity and communal solidarity in Southeast Asian peasant society, see James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Feasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven, 1976), esp. pp. 26-29, 40-44, 60-61, 167-92. At the same time the constant emphasis

CONCLUSIONS AND ANALOGIES | 273

royal to private service provided a material basis for elite autonomy, particularly in the capital area. Simultaneously, however, elite autonomy accelerated popular disorganization by widening the opportunities for service evasion, and by increasing the labor and tax burden on those remaining in royal regiments. Thus myopic peasant ambition reinforced that of the elites. In the 1590s and 1740s, the royal population dissolved into numerous ill-coordinated private units. In assessing the performance of individual monarchs, one cannot ignore these problems of cumulative, symbiotic decay. Judged in terms of military leadership and practical policy, Nan-da-bayin was probably not much inferior to Tabin-shwei-hti. Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati was almost certainly more talented and enterprising than either Naya-waya or Pindale. Yet only Nan-di-bayin and Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati presided over the collapse of empire. However, if structural factors created a predisposition to cyclic decline, it is also true that this potential was realized through a specific combination of decisions, deferred actions, and accidents. Precisely because political loyalty was highly personalized, later kings had some room to maneuver in the face of inherited difficulties.2 If Nan-dd-bayin had brought himself to acknowledge Ayudhyan independence, the First Empire might have continued rather longer with its capital at Pegu. If Tha-lun had chosen his heir apparent more carefully, if Naya-wayi had not been a cipher, if Sanei had been more assertive, ministerial autonomy in the Restored Toungoo era might have been constrained. So too unpredictable external events—Ayudhya's rejuvenation under Naresuan, ManipuPs Hinduization under Gharib Newaz—aggravated problems of resource control within Burma. Although it is true that rival polities were constandy probing for weaknesses in one another's defenses, in the absence of dynamic military leaders in Ayudhya or Manipur it is unlikely that either Toungoo polity would have collapsed so precipitously.3 Once royal administration dissolved, pressures on the elites to promote recentralization intensified. Prolonged disorder undermined agin extant Toungoo sources on ill-restrained competition between individual ahmu-dan households and between patron-client chains on the local level is also consistent with much research on Southeast Asian village politics. See, for example, Nash, Golden Road, pp. 79, 274-90; Adas, "Contest State," pp. 527-28; Popkin, Rational Peasant, chaps. 13; and Jack M. Potter, Thai Peasant Social Structure (Chicago, 1976), pp. 23, 42-50, which calls attention to fierce intravillage feuds and divisions alongside a cooperative ethic. 2 Cf. Weber, Economy and Society, III, 1042. 3 Maritime commercial influences may be seen in somewhat the same light as external military developments. See below.

274 I CONCLUSIONS AND ANALOGIES

riculture, the basis of the economy, and impeded valuable interregional trade. It threatened unmartial leaders with loss of support, if not outright displacement. Further, it destroyed the royal system of tides and awards that legitimated local political status and gave that status a wider significance. Burmese politico-religious thought could not conceive of settled government in other than monarchical terms. Even while enfeebled kings remained on the throne at Pegu and Ava, pretenders arose promising to fulfill the royal function more effectively than the incumbent. Headmen and former officials hastened to support whichever aspirant seemed most capable. In the 1590s as in the 1750s a new king emerged in a peripheral area whose demographic base was relatively undisturbed by the wars that liquidated the previous dynasty. (A comparable shift, it should be noted, occurred on at least two earlier occasions in Burmese history: in the 1530s, when Toungoo replaced Ava as the political center of the Burman world, and in the 1290s and early fourteenth century, when Kyaukse supplanted Pagan.) Although the population at large was excluded from direct participation in political decision making, insofar as the king guaranteed social and cosmic harmony, the peasantry also had a vital stake in restoration. Certain forms of evasion that Michael Adas has characterized as typical peasant responses to intensified elite demands4—banditry, migration, attachment to new patrons—metamorphosed naturally into support for royal pretenders who seemed best qualified to redress peasant distress characteristic of the closing phase of the administrative cycle. In other words, there was a natural progression, a smooth continuum, between the endemic search for more attractive patrons, intensified evasion in periods of dynastic decline, and open support for antidynastic rebels in periods of central collapse. Peasants could advance the interests of a particular claimant by enrolling in his forces, by migrating to his base area, and by popularizing stories of his religious merit. Alaung-hpaya's career offers the most striking example of a movement that drew strength from the deteriorating condition of the cultivating classes. His religious appeals confirm, and at the same time place in an earlier historic context, the observations by E. Sarkisyanz,5 Adas,6 Charles Keyes,7 and others that in periods of dislocation 4

Adas, "Avoidance to Confrontation," esp. pp. 226-39. Sarkisyanz, Backgrounds, esp. chaps. 21, 22. 6 Adas, Prophets of Rebellion, esp. intro. and pp. 99-102. 7 Keyes, "Millennialism," pp. 283-302. In particuiar this study lends support to Keyes' central contention that "millennial movements are caused primarily by a crisis centering around political power" (p. 284). 5

CONCLUSIONS AND ANALOGIES | 275

and deprivation Buddhist millennialism could express deeply felt peasant aspirations for political and social reintegration. Although surviving materials are inadequate to identify with any precision the material content of Alaung-hpaya's promised "millennium," clearly it was conceived as a radical alternative to conditions under Maha-damii-ya-zadi-pati. In less dramatic and articulate form perhaps, the rebellions by Nyaungyan MIn, Pye, Smin Dhaw, and Banya-dali appear to have offered their followers similar prospects of revitalization. Obviously none of these rebellions was a horizontal class-based movement. All sought to elevate individual princes to whom limited sections of the peasantry were linked indirectly via patron-client chains. Yet because these rebellions replaced ineffective rulers with men better able to restrain official abuses, to restore agriculture, and to defend the frontiers, peasant support for insurgencies in the 1590s, 1660s, and 1740-175Os proved to be eminendy successful acts of self-interest.8 If the general pattern of dynastic decline was the same in the First and Restored Toungoo periods, there were also major differences arising primarily from the territorial contraction and institutional modifications of the early seventeenth century. The Restored Toungoo kings abandoned their claims against Lan Chang and Ayudhya, and moved their capital from the coast to Upper Burma. At the same time they restricted princely myo-zas, increased nuclear zone ahmu-dan concentrations, and reduced the functional and ceremonial privileges of provincial governors. It would seem that one result, quite unintended, of these changes was to lower the caliber of royal leadership. Not only did the selection of bayin competition cease to operate, but in certain circumstances, Ava officials were able to choose the least effective royal candidate so as to make him an instrument of ministerial rule. The growth of ministerial influence, and the concomitant decline of regional autonomy, also altered the character and timing of elite insubordination. In the sixteenth century the principal initial threat arose from Tai tributaries and lowland Burman princes. Only in the aftermath of repeated territorial rebellions did manpower disorganization—and the authority of private patrons—around Pegu become pronounced. During the Restored Toungoo period, however, rivalries between ministerial-led factions within the capital helped to undermine the military system and invited tax abuses by short-term provincial governors who depended on Ava for patronage. It was largely in reaction to these problems that oudying regions revolted (though once underway, of course, regional and nuclear zone disorders rein8

Cf. Chapter 5 n. 70.

276 I CONCLUSIONS AND ANALOGIES

forced one another). Enhanced centralization meant, furthermore, that imperial decay was necessarily more gradual than during the First Dynasty: the Restored polity lasted over twice as long. At the same time, when Chiengmai and lowland districtsfinallydid break away, successful revolts were led not by Ava's original representatives in the manner of sixteenth-century bayins and myo-zas, but by newly risen, community-based leaders such as Chao Ong Kham, Smiii Dhaw, and Alaunghpaya. In other words, dynastic collapse had more visible repercussions on regional power structures because their upper layer had been more effectively co-opted into the national system. Finally, there is no indication that changing economic patterns contributed to imperial decline in the brief period between 1580 and 1599; but I have suggested that this was the case in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. By enhancing the position of officials whose authority rested on trade revenues and by impoverishing in a relative sense those whose income derived exclusively from the agrarian economy, growing maritime trade apparently helped to destabilize relations within the official class and to aggravate agrarian exploitation. The principal impact probably was felt in terms of increasing volume, but inflated luxury import prices also may have been a factor of some significance.9 It would be interesting to test the material on Burma against more amply documented price trends in other Southeast Asian polities. This leads to the more general issue of the impact of commerce on Toungoo development. If maritime contacts helped to destabilize the polity during a period of diminished royal control over patronage, in a wider historic context they must be seen as a spur to centralization. Although he was primarily concerned with island principalities, Anthony Reid's suggestion that the postclassical expansion of Southeast Asian trade strengthened indigenous political authority, and in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries underlay a movement toward royal "absolutism," receives support from the Burmese experience.10 More than any other factor, commercial expansion and the appearance of European firearms explain the unprecedented unification of the Irrawaddy basin under coastal auspices during the sixteenth century. Pe9

Cf. M. Athar AIi, "The Passing of Empire," p. 388, referring to India and Iran. See Reid, "Trade and State Power," esp. pp. 403-408; "Southeast Asian Poverty," pp. 38-44; "Power in Aceh," pp. 45-55. Of the four factors—competition with European monopoly traders, the increased role of Chinese merchants, the introduction of European firearms, and an evolutionary trend toward institutionalized government— which Reid cites to explain growing absolutism in such states as Aceh and Banten, the third and fourth were most applicable to Burma. 10

CONCLUSIONS AND ANALOGIES | 277

gu's collapse provided the necessary conditions for a return to dry zone hegemony. G. E. Harvey11 and D.G.E. Hall 12 were probably correct in believing that the balance between agriculture and commerce in the political economy of the Restored Empire was weighted more heavily toward agriculture than was the case during the First Empire. But to go further and to characterize post-sixteenth-century Burma as "isola­ tionist," static, unaffected by and disinterested in external trade—a characterization entrenched in self-justifying British imperial views of the traditional state13—is to risk dangerous oversimplification, cer­ tainly for the Restored Toungoo and early Κόη-baung periods. Rulers from Nyaungyan Min through Alaung-hpaya showed an appreciation of the military and political value of maritime contacts, and frequently sought to widen those channels. Without the sustained contribution of maritime trade and imported silver to commercial integration, and without Ava's continued control over the firearms, revenues, and lux­ ury imports of the coast, it is most unlikely that the Restored Empire could have been maintained. Herein lay the chief significance of the early seventeenth-century provincial reforms: they allowed Toungoo kings to reside in the main agricultural districts without endangering reliable access to the coast. As such, these reforms were both cause and symptom of the ongoing decline of regional loyalties, a trend that gathered strength under the Κόη-baung kings.14 British colonial rule has usually been analyzed in terms of the pro­ found discontinuities it introduced. Yet one may argue that by elevat­ ing central norms over local traditions of sovereignty, by strengthening the coercive power of the state, and by subjecting outlying populations to more effective regulation, the First and Restored Toungoo Dynas­ ties adumbrated administrative trends in the colonial era. If the fif­ teenth-century fragmentation of the Irrawaddy basin and the British colonial unification represent opposite poles, the First Toungoo and Restored Toungoo Empires constitute successive intermediate stages, closer, obviously, to the fifteenth century but nonetheless transi11

Harvey, History, pp. 248-49. Hall, English Intercourse, pp. 11-12; idem, History of South-East Asia, p. 356; idem, Burma, pp. 65-66. 13 See previous two notes. Echoes of this characterization appear even in the writings of so sympathetic an observer as J. S. Furnivall. See his Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India (1948, repr., New York [?], 1956), pp. 212, 538. 14 That is, through the accelerated decline of Mon ethnicity in Lower Burma, and perhaps also through provincial reforms in the mid-nineteenth century. See Chapter 5 n. 80, and below, n. 15. 12

278 I CONCLUSIONS AND ANALOGIES

tional.15 As in the colonial era, so in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the impetus and wherewithal for centralization derived in part from the maritime and commercial sector. In short, Burma during the period under study experienced both linear and cyclic trends. Phases of resource dispersion and concentration alternated. Yet the nature and duration of successive cycles changed, because the institutional and economic bases of the polity were by no means static. This line of analysis may be extended to earlier eras of Burmese history. A comparison of Toungoo and pre-Toungoo cycles suggests, in fact, that institutional changes of the early seventeenth century were less significant than those which occurred sometime between the close of the thirteenth century and the beginning of the First Toungoo era. Michael Aung Thwin, in his studies of the Pagan era (c. 849-1287), has argued that Pagan declined ultimately because of the growth of tax-free religious estates. In their capacity as dbamma-rajas, Pagan rulers felt obliged to acquire good kamma by donating an ever larger percentage of the kingdom's land and cultivators to the sangha. But this had obvious implications for the strength of secular authority. Royal efforts to reconcile the material interests oiscmgha and treasury through programs of orthodox religious purification proved ultimately unsuccessful. The precise proportion of lands alienated to religion is the subject of debate that turns on a number of technical problems,16 but no one would deny that the rapid growth of such property in the late Pagan period helped to create conditions for successful challenges to the throne; and it is against this background that one is tempted to interpret the enhanced autonomy of secular leaders, Pagan's failure to defend itself against the Mongols, and the ensuing fragmentation of the Irrawaddy basin. As noted, Than Tun and Tin HIa Thaw, in their articles on Burmese history between 1300 and 1500, have also called attention to the economic power of the s&ngha and the potential complications this introduced in relations with the crown.17 By contrast, during both Toungoo cycles monastic lands were a relatively minor factor in dynastic decline. The basic pattern of cyclicity may have been the same in the Pagan and Toungoo eras: the throne depended, ide15 Furthermore as Pollak, Empires, chap. 6, and Bennett, Conference, pp. 65-69 have shown, shortly before the British annexation of Upper Burma the reign of Mindon (1853-1878) saw additional, if ultimately largely ineffectual, measures of modernization and centralization based partly on European models. 16 For discussion, see sources listed in Chapter 1 n. 35, and Chapter 3 n. 157. 17 For sources on the late Pagan through Ava periods, and the status of religious lands to about 1550, see Chapter 1 nn. 33-36.

CONCLUSIONS AND ANALOGIES | 279

ologically or politically, on privileged elites who used their preroga­ tives to acquire an ever increasing percentage of the kingdom's re­ sources. But it would appear that the relative importance of religious and secular factors altered fundamentally. One hastens to add that our perceptions of early Burmese develop­ ment are particularly heavily influenced by the problem of sources. For the Pagan and much of the Ava periods, virtually the only contem­ porary materials are inscriptions recording religious donations. There­ fore religious institutions necessarily bulk large in any reconstruction, while secular factors are obscured. Nonetheless I have drawn attention to certain developments that would give this putative change in cyclic dynamics and church-state relations an objective basis: Shan incursions and unprecedented Shan persecutions of the monkhood combined with economic regression and the general disorder characteristic of the late Ava period to disorganize monastic communities and to destroy reli­ gious estates, many of which appear to have come under subsequent lay control. Though originally symptomatic of monastic autonomy, the anemia of royal authority in Upper Burma during the first half of the sixteenth century deprived the stmgha of its natural protector. Later during the Restored (and perhaps also the First) Toungoo era, in­ creased royal reliance on cash rather than landed donations, more cen­ tralized procedures for the collection of religious revenues, and the deteriorated status of religious slaves (which inhibited self-dedications) all militated against a recrudescence of monastic economic power com­ parable to the late Pagan or Ava periods. This tentative institutional periodization receives some support from the independent research of W. J. Koenig into cyclic trends in the early Κόη-baung period (1752-c. 1820). The persistence of Toungoo ad­ ministrative patterns led to a renewal of early eighteenth-century pres­ sures. According to Koenig's analysis, between 1783 and 1812 the number of royal ahmu-dans and «this fell by at least 20 percent through a combination of deaths, vagabondage, and enrollment as debt-slaves, monks, and private retainers. Again, population decline was most pro­ nounced in the historic centers of irrigated agriculture, where the ser­ vice system was most developed. People left government employ be­ cause of four mutually reinforcing problems familiar to students of Toungoo history: recurrent natural calamities; excessive royal demands for military and construction projects; unauthorized ministerial and gentry exactions; and factional competition revolving around the succession struggle, which induced princes and ministers actively to recruit private followers. Although the monkhood again provided an escape for hard-pressed ahmu-dans and athis, it was by no means the

280 I CONCLUSIONS AND ANALOGIES

major refuge, and such importance as it did assume was symptomatic of more fundamental and antecedent strains in secular administration. Nor, in Koenig's view, was the growth of religious lands a significant problem.18 Thus if one seeks to order precolonial (that is, pre-1824) Burmese history on the basis of structural and institutional criteria rather than political cycles per se, future research may confirm that the late Ava period was the major divide, followed in importance by the early seventeenth century.19 Yet perhaps the most intriguing comparisons involve not other pe­ riods of Burmese history but adjacent administrative systems, and in particular Javanese Mataram and Siam. Together with Burma, these states constituted the three most populous and powerful Indianized realms in precolonial Southeast Asia. Such parallels, so far as I know, have not attracted attention. The following comments are nec­ essarily schematic, but they seek to stimulate more substantive treat­ ments. The early history of Mataram bears comparison with that of the First Toungoo Empire in several respects. In part because of growing inter-Asian trade and in part because of disorders peculiar to the in­ terior of each region, in both Burma and Java the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries saw an expansion of coastal power at the expense of more inland-based principalities. The newly risen interior states of Mataram and Toungoo then succeeded in reorganizing surrounding districts and in conquering the port towns. Despite their very consid­ erable success both in the interior and on the coast, however, the farflung, heterogeneous nature of their domains and the resulting auton­ omy of regional heads left both empires subject to severe center-pe­ riphery tensions. Not surprisingly perhaps, both collapsed within a generation of their principal victories. In the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries the decline of the celebrated Javanese empire of Majapahit inaugurated an era of relative fragmentation during which the north coastal ports, drawing strength from the archipelago-wide trade in rice, spices, and textiles, enjoyed 18 Koenig, "Κόη-baung Polity," chaps. 1, 2, 7, and apps. II, III. By 1802, the regis­ tered population had fallen by 18 percent. A massive, unprecedented famine in 18051812 caused further heavy losses. Although exactfiguresare lacking, 20 percent is there­ fore an extremely conservative figure. 19 To appreciate the provisional character of these observations, one need only recall that the Ava period remains virtually unexplored. Further, although it is clear that the early Κόη-baung kings preserved Toungoo territorial structures, we have litde infor­ mation on the political ramifications of commercial and agricultural development in Lower Burma.

CONCLUSIONS AND ANALOGIES | 281

increased influence in Javanese affairs. By the late sixteenth century, however, the coastal ports as well as the SaIa and Madiun River basins had to face systematic attacks from the young state of Mataram, which was based on rich ricelands in south central Java. Like Toungoo, this surprisingly underpopulated district apparently experienced a substantial demographic increase prior to and during its initial conquests.20 Under Sultan Agung (r. 1613-1646)—equivalent in terms of seminal achievement to Bayin-naung—Mataram's program of expansion culminated in the subjugation of the coastal centers of Tuban and Surabaya as well as Madura. Whether because of anti-mercantile traditions or because the interior of Java was in a more flourishing condition than was central Burma at the time of Tabin-shwei-hti and Bayinnaung^s victories, Agung failed to move his capital to the coast or to attempt a coastal-interior cultural synthesis in the fashion of the First Toungoo kings.21 Nonetheless, Mataram drew strength from the use of European-type firearms,22 and more especially from the continued export of Javanese rice to Malacca, Banten, and other archipelago ports.23 In these ways maritime contacts, if they did not represent the foundation of Mataram's power, helped to sustain the most formidable Javanese empire for over two hundred years. At the time of his death, Sultan Agung was overlord of Madura and every indigenous principality on Java except Banten. Despite the brilliance of his reign, however, the new empire, like that of sixteenthcentury Pegu, was inherently fragile, an assemblage of self-sufficient, replicated entities, with varying political traditions, religious sensibilities, and economic interests, all linked to the court through personal ties to the sovereign. Java's population (probably well under four million) was concentrated in more or less discrete clusters (on major plains, in river valleys, at the coast) separated by forested uplands or swamps. 20 Pigeaud and de Graaf, Islamic States, pp. 21-22; Ricklefs, Modern Indonesia, p. 37. It is unclear, however, to what extent this increase was the result of deportations, and to what extent (as at Toungoo), the result of voluntary migrations. 21 See Schrieke, Studies, I, 266 n. 558 on Mataram's agrarian orientation. Symptom and cause of regional tensions were differing Islamic sensibilities: the coast was more self-consciously Islamic, while the court, though also Islamic, remained closer to HinduJavanese traditions. For discussion see Ricklefs, Mangkubumi, chap. 1. 22 See Reid, "Military Balance," p. 9; Schrieke, Studies, I, 61 and II, 122-25. Cf. Ricklefs, Mangkubumi, pp. 258-59. Even if Javanesefirearmsin the seventeenth century were deficient compared to European arms—and this is by no means certain—as in Burma, superior access to cannon and matchlocks gave imperial authorities a decided advantage over more traditionally equipped opponents. 23 See Ikuta, "Portuguese Trade," p. 61; Schrieke, Studies, I, 29, 59, 60, 62, 67, 75, 76, 80; Ricklefs, Modern Indonesia, pp. 15, 45, 66, 68.

282 I CONCLUSIONS AND ANALOGIES

Roads, where they existed, were impassable much of the year. Although Mataram's empire was smaller than that of Bayin-naung, the resultant problems of communication and control imposed a familiar political pattern of pronounced localization. Agung ruled directly only the nagaragung, or core area, analogous to the nuclear zone of sixteenth-century Burma. Oudying regions were entrusted to governors who retained the right to appoint local subordinates, to maintain their own armies, and to support retinues that duplicated those of the Mataram court.24 Some governors, particularly on the coast, were officials dispatched by the court, but others were members of the autochthonous nobility, with strong local ties.25 As M. C. Ricklefs and S. Moertono have shown, so long as their functional autonomy was respected and so long as Agung remained invincible, most local elites had every reason to support the Mataram court and to associate themselves with the aura of stability, glory, and legitimacy that it seemed to embody.26 Nonetheless (as uprisings that followed Agung's defeat at Dutch Batavia in 1629 suggested), the extensive autonomy retained by local administrators meant that the realm could easily disintegrate if the king were unable to satisfy elite expectations. It was the intention of Agung's son and successor Amangkurat I (r. 1646-1677) to reduce the potential for rebellion by centralizing institutions. Whereas his father had caused leading local aristocrats to reside at court and had bound them to himself through marriage ties, Amangkurat assassinated numerous noble opponents and sought to place provincial administration more completely in the hands of appointed, rotated officials. He attempted to make money taxation the norm and farmed out provincial revenues that he might increase royal income, while taking draconian measures to enhance control over the north coastal ports. Yet his attempts to centralize authority by murder and decree succeeded only in undermining that elite consensus on which the monarchy ultimately rested. A king could attract allegiance by a ^Moertono, Statecraft, pp. 6, 101-11; Schrieke, Studies, I, 80-82, 184-85, and II, 188-94, 218-22. 25 Same as previous note, plus Pigeaud and de Graaf, Islamic States, pp. 40-41. Note that in contrast to arrangements in sixteenth-century Burma, princes of the blood had no regular administrative function, resided at court, and probably had their appanages in the core area (cf. Ricklefs, Mangkubumi, p. 160). On Mataram's history to c. 1646, see Pigeaud and de Graaf, Islamic States, chaps. 1-3; Ricklefs, Modern Indonesia, chap. 4; Ann Kumar, "Developments in Four Societies over the Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries," in Harry Aveling, ed., The Development of Indonesian Societyfromthe Coming of Islam to the Present Day (St. Lucia, Queensland, 1979), pp. 29fF. 26 Ricklefs, Mangkubumi, chap. 1, esp. pp. 21-26; idem, Modern Indonesia, p. 16; Moertono, Statecraft, chap. 2.

CONCLUSIONS AND ANALOGIES | 283

demonstration of success, but he could hardly compel obedience with a frontal assault on the traditional prerogatives of the elites as a whole. Amangkurat became isolated, unable to raise substantial armies from oudying areas. A rebellion began in the northeast under a Madurese prince Trunajaya, who enjoyed covert support from dissatisfied elements at the Mataram court. Coastal resentment of central Javanese authority combined with the general elite conviction that Amangkurat had destroyed his own legitimacy to bring ever wider sections into rebellion. As his forces advanced, Trunajaya (not unlike Alaung-hpaya) displayed messianic characteristics promising reintegration after a period of profound disorder. In 1676-1677, Trunajaya's forces finally shattered Amangkurat's army and captured his court.27 Thus although Nan-da-bayin's initial failure was military (his inability to resubjugate Ayudhya) whereas Amangkurat's was political (his ill-judged efforts at centralization), neither was able to preserve the fragile legacy of his father. It will be noted that certain of Amangkurat's attempted reforms resembled Tha-lun's measures. Why did Amangkurat and his heirs— who regained the throne with the support of the Dutch East India Company in the 1680s—fail to match the contemporaneous achievements of the Restored Toungoo kings? What elements favoring centralization in Burma were absent in the Indianized realm of Java? Most basically, the geography of Java was less propitious, and the isolation of population centers more pronounced. Despite the inorganic structure of the First Toungoo Empire, the Irrawaddy basin afforded a natural axis of potential unity. Once the Restored Toungoo kings recognized the necessity of abandoning designs on Lan Chang and Ayudhya, it became possible to concentrate resources in the Irrawaddy valley and highland perimeter. In Java, however, although the Brantas and SaIa Rivers afforded limited access from the interior to the coast, there was no single communications artery comparable to the Irrawaddy.28 (Even in Burma, one will recall, reforms of the Restored Toungoo Empire did not extend outside the basin to the relatively inaccessible Shan highlands.) Beyond this, the disruption of maritime trade in Java during the seventeenth century was more severe and prolonged than that which occurred in Burma. Whereas Anauk27

On Amangkurat and Trunajaya, see Pigeaud and de Graaf, Islamic States, chaps. 46; Ricklefs, Mangkubumi, pp. 18-20; idem, Modern Javanese Historical Tradition: A Study of an Original Kartasura Chronicle and Related Materials (London, 1978), pp. 5-7; idem, Modem Indonesia, chap. 7; Schrieke, Studies, I, 184-85, and II, 92-95, 195-207. 28 See Schrieke, Studies, I, 173, and II, 102-20; Ricklefs, Modem Indonesia, pp. 1415.

284 I CONCLUSIONS AND ANALOGIES

hpet-lun, following his conquest of Syriam, quickly revived commerce, Agung and Amangkurafs efforts to subjugate the coast devastated that region, impeded normal economic activity, and actually helped to shift the vital spice trade from Java to Macassar.29 Thus Mataram's rulers unwittingly constricted cash resources needed to centralize patronage. Ironically, the superior strength of the coastal sector in Java compared to Burma inspired this more ruthless policy. Finally, it must be emphasized that Europeans played a very different role in Burma and Java. Lying outside the main trade routes, Burma attracted comparatively little European involvement, and such intervention as did occur aided centralization: by neutralizing the coast, de Brito facilitated Anauk-hpet-lun's reconquest. In Java, however, the Dutch decided in 16761677 to rescue the Mataram dynasty from Trunajaya and other domestic foes. This ostensibly successful intervention was followed by other expensive campaigns on behalf of princely claimants to 1757. In return for their support, the Dutch demanded increasingly effective control over Java's ports, maritime imports, and the purchase of its agricultural surplus.30 The Company thereby placed a ceiling on Mataram's cash revenues, broke its economic self-sufficiency, and in general compounded the effects of Mataram's own actions against the ports. At the same time, Dutch military intervention, in Ricklefs' words, produced a fundamental distortion of Javanese political life. Kings who lacked sufficient Javanese support to exercise real authority could nonetheless be kept on the throne by Dutch troops.31 Given the fact that no other Javanese ruler until the mid-eighteenth century was politically effective, Dutch intervention precluded the installation of a new and potentially more creative leadership such as Nyaungyan Min and his sons represented.32 29

Amangkuratfs measures at the coast may have been designed partly to destroy coastal interests so as to monopolize the profits that could derive from dealing with the Dutch, and partly to reestablish what he construed as the "vassal" relationship of the Dutch to Mataram. On Mataram's policy at the coast and the decline of Javanese trade, see Schrieke, Studies, I, 59-77; D. H. Burger, Structural Changes in Javanese Society: The Supra-Village Sphere, translated by Leslie H. Palmier (Ithaca, 1956), pp. 7-14; Reid, "Southeast Asian Poverty," p. 44; Ricklefs, Modem Indonesia, pp. 41-42, 45, 68-69. 30 See Ricklefs, Matujkubumi, chap. 2; idem, Modem Indonesia, pp. 73-94; Moertono, Statecraft, pp. 150-51; Burger, Structural Changes, p. 9. 31 Ricklefs, Historical Tradition, p. 7; idem, Mangkubumi, pp. 30-36, 415. 32 To a considerable extent, the same internal contradictions as informed political life in early Mataram or the First Toungoo Empire also explain the chronic instability of the weak precolonial states of Western Malaya, as described by J. M. Gullick, Political Systems, pp. 1-22, 44-54, 61, chaps. 5, 7, 8. Cf. Ricklefs, Mangkubumi, p. 23 n. 82. The dispersion of settlement and the inability of the Malay sultans to obtain more than a small proportion of the taxes on tin were the main factors underlying the autonomy of

CONCLUSIONS AND ANALOGIES | 285

The geographic, economic, and political situation of Siam, however, was closer to that of Burma than to that of Java, and as such was more favorable to centralization. As in the Burmese kingdom, a circle of highlands surrounded a great alluvial basin whose main river system effectively linked local population centers. Tensions between commercial coast and agrarian interior were far less pronounced than in Java or even than in Burma, for the capital Ayudhya, located at the southern extremity of the floodplain of the Menam (Chaophraya) River, served simultaneously as an important international entrepot and as the focus for a major rice-growing region. Furthermore, after the collapse of the French position in Siam in 1688-168933 (cf. de Brito's failure in 1613), no European power was able or willing to intervene in Ayudhyan politics. As in Burma, commercial profits therefore remained substantially under indigenous political control. Under the influence of such factors—reinforced perhaps by periodic intercourse between contiguous Theravada kingdoms—the administrative histories of Siam and Burma between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries exhibited a number of important convergences.34 The Early Ayudhya kingdom lasted from 1350 to 1569, much longer than the First Toungoo Dynasty. Nonetheless, like the First Toungoo Empire and Mataram, Ayudhya suffered from a loose provincial organization that was a major source of weakness. Until 1424, princes of the Ayudhya ruling house were allowed to govern such provinces as Suphanburi, Lopburi, San, and Chainat with an autonomy similar to that of tributary rulers. Like the bayins and princely myo-zas of Burma, they apparently enjoyed unbridled authority over the population within their districts and were bound to the king merely by ties of family and personal allegiance. As potential claimants to the throne of Ayudhya, the district chiefs. Like Burmese bayins or Javanese territorial heads, powerful chiefs were loath to relinquish any of their authority to the center. But neither were they willing to consider the abolition of the sultanate; for that institution legitimated their local status, facilitated trade and communications in each state, and represented the main prize in recurrent civil wars. The Western Malay states in the period before British annexation thus experienced frequent political alternations within the existing institutional structure. See too the discussion of eighteenth-century tensions in B. Andaya, Abode of Grace, pp. 22-35. 33 Wood, History, chaps. 13, 14. 34 The ensuing discussion is based chiefly on Charnvit, Ayudhya; Busakorn, "Dynasty"; Wales, Administration; Akin, Thai Society, esp. chap. 2; Tambiah, World Conqueror, chaps. 7, 8; Wood, History; David Joel Steinberg, David K. Wyatt, et al., In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History (New York, 1971), chaps. 6, 7, 13, for which sections on Thailand I assume Prof. Wyatt was primarily responsible; Sarasin, Tribute, esp. chaps. 1-8.

286 I CONCLUSIONS AND ANALOGIES

these prince-governors were involved in frequent succession disputes, moving their troops to the capital to fight among themselves for a vacant throne, or deposing and executing weak claimants. After 1424, Ayudhya's kings apparendy restriaed the appointment of senior princes to the northern viceregal town of Phitsanulok, while other towns were entrusted to inferior princes or to high officials.35 However, the princegovernor of Phitsanulok could still pose a serious threat to the sovereign at Ayudhya. In 1533-1534 the king's son and successor was killed by the prince of Phitsanulok; while in 1569 Mahathammaracha of Phitsanulok helped Bayin-naung to capture Ayudhya, where he was placed on the throne. The bayins of Burma played a similar role: indeed, the bayin of Toungoo schemed with Siam against Pegu in the late 1590s. As in Burma after 1599, so in Siam the fall of the capital led to further measures of centralization. The immediate causes were military and political. Excessive regional autonomy was seen to constitute a military liability. In winning the loyalty of northern nobles, Mahathammaracha and his famous son Naresuan (r. 1590-1605) were in a stronger position than their predecessors, for these rulers had blood ties to the old ruling house of Sukhotai in the north as well as to the previous Ayudhyan dynasty. Hitherto rivalry between northern and southern houses had been a barrier to fuller integration.36 In a broader context it is conceivable that (as in the Irrawaddy basin) growing commercial exchanges between the coast and interior increased the relative economic power of the coast and reinforced the move toward political integration. The question has yet to be investigated. Charnvit Kasetsiri, however, has called attention to the economic and political advantages which a location in the Menam basin near the Gulf of Siam afforded Ayudhya (and her forerunner Ayodhya) in competition with other Thai states during the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries.37 Although Ayudhya's overseas commerce was disrupted by Bayin-naung's conquest, the decades after 1610, when certain provincial reforms were 35 This follows Busakorn, "Dynasty," pp. 164-66. Cf., however, Wales, Administration, p. 105, indicating senior princes could also rule Sawankalok and Kamphaengphet after about 1460. 36 Wood, History, p. 126; Charnvit, Ayudhya, pp. 141-42; Damrong, "Our Wars," JBRS 38, 2: 179-82; Smith, "Thailand and Vietnam," pp. 19-20. 37 Charnvit, Ayudhya, pp. 79-86, 111-14. Cf. John K. Whitmore, 'The Opening of Southeast Asia, Trading Patterns Through the Centuries," in Karl L. Hutterer, ed., Economic Exchange and Social Interaction in Southeast Asia: PerspectivesfromPrehistory, History, and Ethnography (Ann Arbor, 1977), pp. 146-47; Yoneo Ishii, ed., Thailand: A Rice-Growing Society, translated by Peter and Stephanie Hawkes (Honolulu, 1978), pp. 28-30, discussing foreign trade in the Early Ayudhya period.

CONCLUSIONS AND ANALOGIES I 287

apparendy still at an early stage, saw a revival of trade and the introduction of measures aimed at strengthening royal control over commerce.38 One notes also David K. Wyatt's observation that the subsequent extension of provincial reforms from the Menam basin to the peninsula and to areas adjacent to Cambodia reflected the importance of oudying districts in international trade. In the far south, for example, local dynasties and ruling families yielded to governors from Ayudhya as the economic value of the peninsula grew with a rise in maritime trade during the seventeenth century.39 In general, the provincial reforms attributed to Naresuan and his successors were more radical than those undertaken in the Irrawaddy basin. Although the early Restored Toungoo kings restricted the authority of princely governors and expanded the appointment of commoners, they still sent princes to rule oudying areas on a regular basis. Under Naresuan, apparendy, the appointment of princely governors in the Menam valley ceased completely. Provinces were henceforth placed under resident high officials, while princes were obliged to reside in special palaces at Ayudhya.40 By the latter part of the seventeenth century, if not earlier, legal officers and household stewards were also appointed to reside in provincial towns in order to monitor local governors in somewhat the same fashion as Burmese spies (nahkans), military commissioners (sit-kes), and so forth balanced the authority of provincial governors. Furthermore, specialized departments at Ayudhya gained increasing control over sectors of the provincial populations who had once been uniformly subject to the governors.41 Did the Burmese or Siamese borrow from one another? There are too many uncertainties, including the precise dating of the Siamese 38 See Smith, Dutch m Thailand, pp. 8-9; Charnvit, Ayudhya, pp. 80-81, 90 n. 17 (relying on a dissertation by Suebsaeng Promboon); Sarasin, Tribute, pp. 19-22. 39 Steinberg, Wyatt, et al., Search, p. 63. The impact of guns on centralization in Siam has received yet less attention, though it is known that Portuguese instructors were attached to the Siamese army shortly after 1518, and that in the 1560s Ayudhya was well equipped with firearms. See Lach, Eyes of Europe, p. 521; Lieberman, "Unification of Burma," p. 216. 40 This is the view propounded by Wales, Administration, pp. 108-111, and Akin, Thai Society, pp. 27-28 (assigning the changes to "the beginning of the Late Ayutthaya period"), and accepted by Tambiah, World Conqueror, pp. 136-38. However, van Ravenswaay, "Van Vliet's Description," pp. 60-61 throws some doubt on the abruptness of Naresuan's reforms, for as late as the 1630s the four most important provinces were still said to have been "due to princes of the blood and only if these fail are they given to the greatest (nonroyal) . . . men." Van Vliet also claimed that Prasatthong experimented with allowing provinces to be administered in situ by inferior deputies, while the governors themselves were kept at Ayudhya. 41 See Wales, Administration, pp. 111-15; Akin, Thai Society, pp. 28-30.

288 I CONCLUSIONS AND ANALOGIES

reforms, to allow an answer at this stage. Certainly the courts of Ava and Ayudhya in the early seventeenth century had reliable information on one another, through Mon intermediaries and diplomatic embas­ sies. On the other hand, convergences of this sort could have been determined by the exigencies of a common institutional heritage. Anal­ ogies can also be drawn between Burmese or Siamese reforms and those attempted in Java under Amangkurat, which were clearly of in­ dependent origin.42 In Siam as in Burma the opening years of the new dynasty saw a substantial increase in royal manpower, which materially strengthened the process of centralization. In Siam this increase seems to have de­ rived from two principal sources: deportations from non-Siamese areas such as Lower Burma, and the sudden creation of phrai luang follow­ ing the death of their lords during the chaos attending Ayudhya's fall in 1569. A phrai luang was a commoner obliged to perform royal corvees six months of the year. By contrast, a phrai som was a man who belonged to a private lord and who was exempt from the king's service. Following Ayudhya's fall, a great number of private lords were killed and captured, so there was a sudden increase in phrai som lacking patrons. Most were automatically converted into phrai luang and as­ signed to military and civil departments. In combination with the program of provincial reforms, this in­ crease in phrai luang contributed to Ayudhya's military vigor through the latter part of the seventeenth century. Under Naresuan and his successors, the monarchy was able to restore its external zones of au­ thority and to resist fresh Burmese incursions. Within the kingdom, Ayudhya easily dominated provincial centers. Moreover, as was true to some extent under Tha-lun, the period of centralization gave birth to a corpus of legal and administrative works that served as a standard reference throughout the dynasty. In Siam as in Burma, integration yielded eventually to an era of manpower dispersion. Within the central administration de facto power centers arose that enjoyed no sanction in the formal hierarchy. Ac­ cording to Akin and Busakorn, this development flowed basically from the unceasing efforts of phrai luang to escape their exceptionally oner­ ous duties in favor of more protected statuses. Administrative materials from the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries point to a chronic and possibly cumulative loss of phrai luang. In 1690, for ex­ ample, a law gave lengthy orders to departmental officials to seek more 42 See too more general analogies in a wide variety of places and times as described by Weber, "Defenses of the Patrimonial State Against Disintegration,'' in Economy and Society, ΠΙ, 1042-44.

CONCLUSIONS AND ANALOGIES | 289

phrai and to arrest those who had absconded. In 1748 King Borommakot acknowledged that the severe depletion in phrai luang ranks was due to their excessive burdens; yet he offered no effective remedy. Chronicle accounts paint a similar picture of population disorganization.43 What happened to these missing servicemen? Like Burmese ahmudans, some became monks, vagabonds, or debt-slaves, or else avoided registration by bribing officials. Yet it would seem that the most popular form of evasion was to become the private retainer (phrai som) of a powerful prince or minister who could protect his dependents against royal demands.44 The obligations such retainers bore their masters were generally lighter than those of phrai luang to the crown. Moreover, private retainers, unlike phrai luang, had the right to change their lords. Leading courtiers used the wealth that numerous dependents (as well as commercial contacts) provided to win over junior officials and to build factions pledged to rival princely candidates. In 1733, when King Thaisa died, four thousand private retainers loyal to his younger brother, the future King Borommakot, and a much larger force, including phrai luang registered with ministers supporting two of Thaisa's sons, fought pitched battles that lasted for several days at Ayudhya. On Borommakoifs death in 1758, severe, if less sanguinary, conflicts again arose. Undoubtedly the continuous loss of royal manpower and the insecurity of factional competition weakened the crown, diverted attention from provincial and military administration, and thus contributed to Ayudhya's poor performance against the Burmese in 1760 and 1767.45 In at least six areas, the patterns of decline in Burma and Siam diverged, because administrative and economic structures were by no means identical. Whereas in Burma ahtnu-dans sought refuge chiefly by becoming debt-slaves and illegal entrants into higher service units, in Siam the available literature indicates that these methods were relatively uncommon. Second, the model of administrative decline presented for Burma involved a complex interdependence between elite autonomy and popular evasion; but Busakorn and Akin pay little attention to elite activities as a cause of popular evasion. In their view the instability of popular organization proceeded essentially from the imbalance in work routines between phrai luting and private retainers. 43 Akin, Thai Society, pp. 33-38; Busakorn, "Dynasty," pp. 295-319. Certain efforts to halt the loss of royal people, such as a law of 1723 altering procedures for distributing mixed oflspring, show remarkable similarity to contemporary Burmese decrees. See Akin, p. 37. 44 Akin, Thai Society, pp. 37-39, 151, 174-76; Busakorn, "Dynasty," pp. 298-99, 31419. Private retainers of the princes could also be known as kha luang or kha thunla-ong. 45 See Akin, Thai Society, pp. 39, 151, 176; Busakorn, "Dynasty," p. 319.

290 I CONCLUSIONS AND ANALOGIES

(Whether this analysis will sustain more detailed research remains to be seen.) Third, in Burma hereditary township and village leaders con­ tributed to administrative decline by appropriating state resources, and themselves became the ultimate beneficiaries of royal collapse. In Siam their role seems to have been fulfilled at a higher territorial level by provincial governors who sometimes enjoyed hereditary status com­ parable to the Burmese gentry. Fourth, because Burmese princes were still appointed provincial governors, some princely revolts—such as the Pagan uprising of 1714—assumed a territorial character absent in Siam after about 1590. Fifth, imperial collapse in Burma had a greater aura of self-generation and autonomy. The Peguan uprising that de­ stroyed Ava represented the revolt of a lowland province traditionally subordinate to Ava, which had been goaded into rebellion in part by administrative developments at the capital itself. Given a modicum of effective organization in Upper Burma, the Peguan—and even the Manipuri—challenges were ephemeral. By contrast, although Siamese weakness in the peninsula whetted Burmese ambition, the Burmese campaign of 1764-1767 was a formidable invasion by an external sov­ ereign power. Sixth, it is likely that the autonomy of the Burmese experience was also more pronounced in relation to foreign trade. I have suggested that commercial growth helped to destabilize the late Restored Toungoo polity. Yet in fact Siam's political economy was considerably more sensitive to such changes. The earliest comparative statistics indicate that the percentage of total revenue which the Burmese court derived from trade was a fraction of that obtained by its Siamese counterpart, and that the Burmese economy as a whole was more agrarian.46 Sarasin Viraphol has drawn attention to the importance from the 1680s and more especially from the 1720s of vigorous Sino-Siamese trade, focusing eventually on the provision of Siamese rice.47 Sarasin was not 46 Between 1782 and 1824 Siamese kings "got most of their revenues from the profits of trade" (Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand, p. 27, citing King Mongkut); whereas Koenig, "Κόη-baung Polity," pp. 240-41 calculates from English and Burmese sources that by the 1790s "agricultural and related revenues [cash and kind] from the provinces alone must have been many times greater than commerce-derived income." Sarasin, Tribute, pp. 18-19, says King Narai (1656-1688) derived about one-third of state in­ come through royal trade monopolies. Steinberg, Wyatt, et al., Search, p. 52, cite a figure of roughly one-fourth for the late Ayudhya court. Ishii, Thailand, p. 33, goes so far as to claim that the "outstanding characteristic of the 'medieval' state is probably its commercial nature." 47 Sarasin, Tribute, chaps. 3, 5, 7. It was perhaps not coincidental that the period 1680-1750 also saw an expansion of Burmese-Indian trade, though the links between these stages of the inter-Asian network have yet to be explored.

CONCLUSIONS AND ANALOGIES | 291

directly concerned with domestic repercussions. Is it not possible, however, that increasing maritime trade—and the concomitant commercialization of the southern Siamese economy—strengthened ministerial families with access to maritime income, thus encouraging the movement of phrai luang to the service of wealthy patrons? The reliance of leading families on trade revenues and the political influence of foreign merchants at Ayudhya, located near the sea, are more easily demonstrated than in Toungoo Burma.48 No doubt further research will modify and enlarge our understanding of the difFerences between late Toungoo and late Ayudhyan decline. Yet at this stage the similarities seem more striking, if only because they have been obscured by specialization. After a centralizing phase, in both Burma and Siam princes and more especially ministers began to increase their effective control over sections of the population at the expense of the crown. In both countries, various forms of private service were more attractive than royal service, which was exceedingly rigorous. Factionalism thrived on ambiguities in the succession law, for in Siam and Burma as in other Indianized states, sons of the reigning monarch were frequently locked in competition with their uncles and (half-)brothers.49 As private authority developed and provincial administration deteriorated, the kingdoms' defenses grew weaker until both polities fell to invasion. Predictably, the last king in each country was made to bear moral responsibility for a long process largely beyond his control.50 Following the destruction of the old state ap48 1 am indebted to Prof. David K. Wyatt for introducing me to these perspectives; personal communication, October 1978. Cf. Akin, Thai Society, pp. 140-49. On the political impact of foreign trade in the Late Ayudhya period, see inter alia Anderson, English Intercourse, pp. 425-26; Smith, Dutch in Thailand, pp. 36, 107; Busakorn, "Dynasty," pp. 62-74; Sarasin, Tribute, pp. 2, 3, 47-48, 59, 141, 160 if., 243-45; Akin, Thai Society, p. 165; Ishii, Thailand, pp. 29-33. 49 See references to succession patterns and disputes in Jeremy Kemp, Aspects of Siamese Kingship in the Seventeenth Century (Bangkok, 1969), pp. 41-45; Wood, History, chaps. 10-15; and David K. Wyatt, ed. and tr., 'The Abridged Royal Chronicle of Ayudhya of Prince Paramanuchitchinorot," JSS 61, 1 (1973): 41-50. One hastens to note, however, that inefFective kings of the caliber of Naya-wayi and Min-ye-kyaw-din were more easily dethroned in Siam than in Burma and that Siamese figurehead rulers were comparatively short-lived. Conceivably this difference reflected, first, the weakness in Siam of genealogical and religious barriers to usurpation by officials with poor or nonexistent blood claims to the throne (such as Prasatthong and Phetracha—cf. Maung Pu and Ya-za-nan-di, neither of whom displaced Maha-dami-ya-za-di-pati); and second, comparatively inefFective administrative checks in Siam on the military activity of capitalbased princes. 50 On the Siamese situation, see Busakorn, "Dynasty," pp. 348-50, and Akin, Thai Society, p. 50.

292 I CONCLUSIONS AND ANALOGIES

paratus, reconstruction began under successful warriors thrown up in a period of intense insecurity and enhanced social mobility. The selfmade warrior hero P'ya Taksin (r. 1767-1782) expelled the Burmese, extended Siam's zone of vassal principalities, and performed basically the same integrative role as had Alaung-hpaya to the west. Once again de facto authority coincided with the formal organization of govern­ ment.51 Precolonial Indianized Southeast Asia has long been recognized as possessing a loose coherence in terms of cultural heritage, and military and commercial interaction. This preliminary analysis suggests that there were also significant commonalities as regards internal political proc­ esses. It remains to be determined through more detailed studies how widespread and genuine these paraUels were, and how they compared with cyclic and linear trends in adjacent regions. 51

It would appear that discontinuities attending dynastic transition were more pro­ found in Siam than Burma. Although P'ya Taksin and his successor Rama I revived Ayudhyan administration, David K. Wyatt has shown that the fall of Ayudhya initiated an intellectual revolution that sought to erect the monarchy on more rational, open, explicitly Buddhist bases. Admittedly limited research on late eighteenth-century Burma (Chiefly Koenig, "Κόη-baung Polity," chap. 3) offers no parallel. See Wyatt, "The 'Sub­ tle Revolution' of King Rama I of Siam," in Wyatt and Alexander Woodside, eds., Moral Order and the Question of Change: Essays on Southeast Asian Thought (New Haven, 1982), pp. 9-52. On continuity, cf. Wenk, Restoration, p. 122; Busakorn, "Dynasty," pp. 34546; and B. J. Terwiel, 'Tattooing in Thailand's History," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland 1979 no. 2, pp. 158-59.

Appendix I

LIST OF TOUNGOO AND EARLY KON-BAUNG KINGS

Ruler

Regnal Dates

Relation to Predecessor

First Tounaoo Dynasty Min-gyi-nyo Tabin-shwei-hti Bayin-naung Nan-da-bayin

1486-1531 1531-1550 1551-1581 1581-1599

son brother-in-law son

Restored Toungoo Dynasty Nyaungyan Min Anauk-hpet-lun Tha-lun Pindale Pye Naya-waya Min-ye-kyaw-din Sanei Tanin-ganwei Maha-damd-ya-za-di-pati

1597-1606 1606-1628 1629-1648 1648-1661 1661-1672 1672-1673 1673-1698 1698-1714 1714-1733 1733-1752

half-brother son brother son half-brother son cousin son son son

Early Kdn-baung Dynasty Alaung-hpaya Naung-daw-gyi Hsin-byu-shin Singu Bo-daw-hpaya

1752-1760 1760-1763 1763-1776 1776-1782 1782-1819

none son brother son uncle

Appendix II

A NOTE ON MAJOR SOURCES

Although Burmese sources from the mid-sixteenth to mid-eighteenth centuries compare favorably in variety and detail with those of other Southeast Asian regions, by comparison with other periods of Bur­ mese history the volume of some major classes of materials is actually rather limited. The tradition of lithic inscriptions that has facilitated the study of the Pagan (and to a lesser extent, the Ava) period apparendy began to die out in the late fifteenth century, as religious landed donations declined and also, perhaps, as ephemeral writing materials became more popular. Compared to over thirteen hundred inscrip­ tions dated prior to 1550 A.D., barely sixty from 1580 to 1760 are available. These are of some value in examining ideological aspects of the monarchy and in tracing the growth of religious grants, but shed little light on social and economic conditions. Although the compila­ tion of census records (sit-tans) from 1581-1735 known as the Zambu-di-pA ok-hsaung kyan has been published,1 again they are a fraction of inquest records available from the Κόη-baung Dynasty. For the First Toungoo era they contain but a single document.2 The accuracy of the Zam-bu-di-ρά ok-hsaung kyan, moreover, was impaired by the circumstances of its compilation: when Ava fell in 1752, many of the royal archives were fired, and some documents are garbled transcrip­ tions of copies assembled at a later date. Extrapolations from early Κόη-baung sit-tdns are possible; but our knowledge of demography, of produce and commercial taxes, and of agricultural and social organ­ ization on the village level during the Toungoo period remains mea­ ger. By far the most profitable and exciting sources on Restored Toung­ oo administration are hitherto largely unexploited collections of royal edicts preserved in the National Library, Ministry of Culture, Ran­ goon and the Rangoon University Library, and to a lesser extent in private collections in Burma and in the India Office Library, London. 1

That is, the ZOK. ZOK, p. 41. I have accepted J. S. Furnivall and Pe Maung Tin's dating of this document to 1581, but even this record contains a reference (s. 983) at variance with the concluding date. 2

MAJOR SOURCES | 295

Unlike the Zam-bu-di-pd ok-hsaunpf kyan, these edicts deal primarily with central as opposed to local affairs; we see Burma through the eyes of the court rather than of the township or village headman. All told, these palmleaf manuscripts contain over two hundred edicts, the equivalent of perhaps 350 closely printed pages. They represent a frac­ tion of edicts surviving from the early Κδη-baung Dynasty, but a vast increase over the Ava and First Toungoo periods. Restored Toungoo decrees may be classified into four chronological headings: 1. Edicts of the Three Kings, that is Nyaungyan Min, Anauk-hpetlun, and Tha-lun. The most comprehensive version, MS 1944 in the National Library, Rangoon, bears the title on the penultimate palmleaf "Nyaungyan min-taya let-htet-taw-ga-thi Anauk-hpet-lun Tha-lun-mintaya-taing min-thon-ba amein-daw (Edicts of the Three Kings, from the Reign of Nyaungyan Min through Anauk-hpet-lun and Tha-lun)," and contains 130 edicts dated between 1597 and c. 1648. The docu­ ment itself was transcribed in February 1788.3 Although this manu­ script is not without scribal errors, particularly as regards numbers, most of the edicts—and all of those from Tha-lun's reign—can be checked against one of five separate versions of the same material: National Library, Rangoon, MS 1611 and MS 1612, both entided 'Tha-lun min-taya-gyi amein-daw (Edicts of King Tha-lun)";4 a col­ lection of fifteen edicts by Anauk-hpet-lun and Tha-lun in the private collection of the Ven. Pyin-nya-zaw-ta of Taung-lei-lon Monastery, Amarapura;5 an edict by Tha-lun published in Hpaya-byu Hsaya-daw, Tha-thand bahu-thu-td paka-thani, pp. 169-70;6 Rangoon University Library MS 45235, bearing a tide similar to that of MS 1944 in the National Library, and containing the last 111 edicts of MS 1944, dated between 1606 and c. 1648.7 In theory, perhaps all six versions could derive from a spurious pre-1788 text.8 Yet it is difficult to imagine a motive for forging such documents. No suspicious interpolations have 3

Abbreviated as NL 1944.1 have read this and all other National Library manuscripts on microfilm obtained from the Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, The Toyo Bunko, Tokyo. In the bibliography the microfilm reel and part nos. are provided for each entry according to List ofMicrofilms Deposited in the Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies. Part 8. Burma (Tokyo, 1976). 4 N L 1611 and NL 1612. 5 Entitled "Nyaungyan hkit amein-pyan-tan (Nyaungyan Period Edicts)." 6 Published in Rangoon (1928) from unspecified manuscript sources. 7 Full tide is "Nyaungyan min-taya let-htet-taw-ga-thi Anauk-hpet-lun (min) Tha-lunmin-taya-taing min-thon-zet amein-daw." Abbreviated as RUL 45235. Among the man­ uscripts listed in this appendix, RUL 45235 has received most scholarly attention. See Professor Than Tun's excellent article "Tha-lun min." 8 Transcription dates for the versions other than NL 1944 are not available.

296 I APPENDIX II

been detected. Furthermore, discrepancies in the arrangement of the edicts as well as minor differences in spelling and content between the six versions argue for different lines of transmission.9 As the most legible and accurate of the six versions, the last-named manuscript, Rangoon University Library MS 45235, has been the source for most of my citations of Tha-lun edicts. 2. Edicts of the Seven Kings, that is, Tha-lun through Tanin-ganwei. These are preserved in National Library, Rangoon MS 1950, which contains 123 edicts dated between 1638 and 1728.10 Although as far as I know only one copy of this document is extant, and that of late vintage (transcribed in 1845), confidence in its reliability derives from the fact that this manuscript and Rangoon University Library MS 45235 seem to have been part of a continuous series: the first 34 edicts of MS 1950 are, with minor discrepancies, the same as the last 34 edicts of MS 45235. It is also possible to demonstrate that an edict dated 1053 kahson 11 wax. in National Library MS 1950 is a more accurate and complete version of the same edict preserved in a manuscript fragment, National Library, Rangoon MS 627.11 3. A series of detailed appointment orders for major officeholders throughout the empire, National Library, Rangoon MS 2208. These particular orders date from Sanei's reign.12 They were thoroughly stylized, however, and similar orders probably could have been issued by any ruler after Anauk-hpet-lun. 4. A 1750 edict by Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati, transcribed in 1833, and preserved in the India Office Library, London, MS 3503, Part 4 13

Issued in the name of the kings to their ministers, these four groups of edicts deal with such topics as popular mobilization, ministerial jurisdictions, inheritance and other legal cases, indebtedness, royal taxation, religious aspirations, ceremonial procedures, sumptuary awards, and military organization. They reveal the formal structure and ideo9

Nor has the leading authority, Professor Than Tun, questioned their authenticity. Entided "s. 1000-pyei Tha-lun-min let-htet-ga-thi auk-ko hset-ywei hman-nan-shin 1-nwei-min nan-tet 14 hnit-taing htok-pyan-thi amein-daw-dan." Abbreviated as NL 1950. All but two edicts are dated prior to 1698. 11 Cf. NL 1950, ngi v. ff., with NL 627 ("1053 kahson 11 wax. amein-daw"). See Chapter 3 n. 129. 12 NL 2208. Although this MS is entided "Tha-lun min amein-daw," in fact the men appointed to serve as chief minister-cum-cavalry minister and as Prome myo-wun are known to have served Sanei. The last section of the MS also contains material on relations with Kenghung in 1728-1729. 13 Leaves 45-49 of the MS. This is one of the few Restored Toungoo edicts to have been published. See Yi Yi, Myan-nm, pp. 134-40. 10

MAJOR SOURCES | 297

logical foundations of government; but most importantly, they draw our attention, sometimes quite dramatically, to internal problems that eroded the crown's vitality. They indicate with considerable precision the evolution of royal concerns and the effective limits on royal power, especially between 1597 and 1698, in which period the edicts are con­ centrated. If edicts are our principal source on administration, for the genea­ logical, political, and military framework of Toungoo history we must turn to indigenous chronicles. The earliest extant chronicle relevant to our purposes is a Mon-language work published in Pak Lat, Siam in 1912 under the tide Nidana Ramadbipatt-katha, a translation of sec­ tions of which has kindly been provided by Professor H. L. Shorto.14 Apparendy a collation of once separate accounts, this narrative covers the history of the Mon kingdom from the mid-fifteenth century through Bayin-naung's death in 1581. Internal evidence strongly suggests that the account of Bayfn-naung was composed by one or more of his courtiers.15 As a florid panegyric, the account of Bayin-naung is guilty of the usual excesses; but the chronological precision that characterizes this entire work, the contemporary accounts of European firearms, and the lengthy descriptions of commercial and diplomatic relations, succession struggles, and military organization all merit careful atten­ tion. Another early chronicle, more useful because of its broader chron­ ological scope, is the Burmese Maha-ya-zamn-gyi, completed during the reign of Tanin-ganwei by the celebrated historian U KaIa, who covered inter alia the same ground as the aforementioned Mon history, 16 while taking the story of the Toungoo kings to 1711. No chronicle dealing with the Restored Toungoo period antedated U Kala's work; and shortly after his death, many of the records on which he seems to have relied disappeared in the sack of 1752. For these reasons, and also because U KaIa wrote in the best prose style, his work was ac­ cepted as a standard reference. It was incorporated almost verbatim 14

The translation covers pp. 34-44, 61-264 of Phra Candakanto, ed., Nidana Ramadbipati-katba (or as on binding Rajawamsa Dhammaceti Mahapitakadhara) (Pak Lat, Siam, 1912). Abbreviated as Nid. 15 See Nid, p. 152 (82). Professor Shorto, personal communication, has suggested that the famed general Banya-dala (c. 1518-1572) was one author. 16 UK, III, terminates the continuous narrative in 1711. A brief supplement describes the heir apparent^ appointment in 1729. On U KaIa, the sources from which he com­ piled his history, and Burmese chronicle traditions in general, see SHDMA, pp. 17981; UK, Π, intra.; U Tet Htoot, T h e Nature of the Burmese Chronicles," in Hall, Historians, pp. 50-62; Tin Ohn, "Modern Historical Writing in Burmese, 1724-1942," in Hall, Historians, pp. 85-93.

298 I APPENDIX II

into later chronicles such as the Hman-nan maha-ya-zawin-daw-gyi17 and the "Maha-ya-zawin-gyaw";18 so in effect there is only one history of the Toungoo kings from 1581 to 1711. In some ways this is un­ fortunate, for U KaIa treated the Restored Toungoo period with un­ accustomed brevity. Still he provides an indispensable, if dry and un­ inspiring, record of appointments, campaigns, genealogies, and succession conflicts. Apart from the inevitable citation of omens, ex­ aggerations of military forces, and a disturbing tendency to employ formulaic descriptions and speeches, U Kala's history seems generally reliable. A private scholar who apparendy wrote for his own edifica­ tion rather than for a royal patron, U KaIa demonstrated a concern for factual accuracy that became yet more pronounced among Burmese chroniclers during the early Κόη-baung period.19 A comparison of his history of Pegu's decline in the 1590s with contemporary European accounts shows substantial agreement as regards principal actors, chro­ nology, sequences of events, and even minor details of political disor­ ganization.20 That U KaIa should have been interested in these Euro­ pean sources, much less have had access to them, seems out of the question. For the last forty-one years of the Restored Toungoo era, the most important chronicles are the aforementioned Hman-nan maba-ya-zawin-daw-£iyi and the "Maha-ya-zawin-gyaw," which continue the style and format of U Kala's history. Both were apparently completed in the 1830s.21 The two accounts are virtually the same for Tanin-ganwei's reign, but the "Maha-ya-zawin-gyaw" describes in uniquely rich detail the decay of empire under Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati. I have sought to corroborate the "Maha-ya-zawin-gyaw" by consulting chronicles from centers that rebelled against Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati, such as Pegu, Tavoy, and Martaban. Among these local histories, that of Pegu by the Mon monk of Athwa Monastery is most interesting, as it offers a contemporary Mon perspective on the great rebellion of 1740 and the 22 ensuing years of destructive civil war. 17

Abbreviated as HNY. This is the well-known "Glass Palace Chronicle." Written by the Monywe Hsaya-daw; abbreviated MYG. This too has been read on microfilm from the Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies. 19 See the discussions in U Tet Htoot, "Burmese Chronicles," pp. 54-56; Tin Ohn, "Historical Writing," pp. 86-90. The suggestion by Vickery, "Ayudhya and Cambodian Chronicles," pp. 152-53, that a "concern with historical fact" in Siam was due originally to European or Chinese intellectual influences does not seem applicable to Burma. 20 See Chapter 1 nn. 94, 134. 21 On dates and authorship of these chronicles, see U Tet Htoot, "Burmese Chroni­ cles," pp. 54-56. The Monywe Hsaya-daw, who wrote the "Maha-ya-zawin-gyaw," was also a leading contributor to the Hman-nan chronicle. 22 Three versions of the Pegu chronicle are available: a) BL O R 3462, 3463, 3464, 18

MAJOR SOURCES | 299

Also of value in corroborating and supplementing standard chroni­ cles is the Law-ka-byu-ha kydn, the book of court punctilio written in the 1750s by the former Ava minister Thi-ri-u-zana. It offers an au­ thoritative account of Toungoo court procedure, but more impor­ tantly, it furnishes detailed royal genealogies as well as a thumbnail biography for every chief minister between 1635 and 1752. U KaIa provides only fleeting references to most high officials. Thus the Lawka-byu-ha kyan represents the single most important source for the study of ministerial mobility, factionalism, and patron-client relations. As it was written by a prominent official with access to court records, its factual reliability must be rated highly.23 Turning to the reign of Alaung-hpaya, one finds a greater concen­ tration of primary Burmese sources than for any Toungoo reign. In 1964, the Ministry of Culture in Rangoon published ninety-nine Alaunghpaya edicts dated between 1754 and 1760.24 These edicts, which have never been incorporated into a systematic study of Alaung-hpaya, constitute the earliest source of information on Alaung-hpaya's relations with his ministers, his program of popular organization, his ideolog­ ical pretensions, and his numerous military campaigns. Of some­ what later vintage than the edicts are two detailed biographies or ayeidaw-bon, by ministers who had served under the Κόη-baung founder. Internal evidence suggests they were written in the reign of Alaunghpaya's son Βό-daw-hpaya (1782-1819).25 Both biographies must be treated with considerably greater caution than U Kala's history, for they were designed as eulogies, exaggerating Alaung-hpaya's victories, hiding his reverses, disguising the continued political appeal of the fallen Toungoo house, and assigning an unreasonably early date to his assumption of royal status. The official account of Alaung-hpaya in the a Burmese translation of the Mon original, which is by far the longest of the three extant chronicles; b) Halliday, "Slapat," a Mon text with English translation; c) RCSTY, a Burmese translation of a Mon text substantially the same as that in Halliday, "Slapat." The last two texts were originally completed in December 1766. Thefirstmay have been completed at the same time, but no date is provided, and a continuation takes the history well into the nineteenth century. Halliday, "Immigration," pp. 6-7 notes that the monk of Athwa was still writing in the reign of Singu (1776-1782). 23 Abbreviated as LBHK. As noted, Richardson, Μαηύ-kye, which was also written in the 1750s, serves a similar recapitulatory function in thefieldof legal literature. 24 This was edited by Hkin Hkin Sein, and is abbreviated as AAm. National Library, Rangoon MS 2209, "Alaung-min-taya-hpaya amein-daw," contains nine complete and three fragmentary edicts by Alaung-hpaya, at least ten of which appear in AAm. 25 The first biography, by Let-we-naw-yahta, is abbreviated as AA-L, and the second, by the Twin-thin-taik-wun, as AA-T. Although they are traditionally attributed to dif­ ferent men, a pronounced similarity of organization and content raises the possibility that they were in fact extended and condensed versions of the same work by the same author.

300 I APPENDIX Π

Hman-nan maha-ya-zawin-daw-gyi chronicle (subsequently incorpo­ rated into the dynastic history known as the Kim-baung-zet mahaya-zamn-iaw-gyt) is essentially a coUation of these two biographies, although it also includes a certain amount of useful material from un­ identified sources. In addition to primary Burmese materials, I have employed with much profit the monumentalfive-volumework on royal administra­ tion by Pagan Wun-dauk U Tin entided Myan-ma-min ok-cbok-pon saddn.26 U Tin, who served the last Burmese sovereign before the British annexation, had access to primary sources no longer available. Despite their rather chaotic organization, his volumes are a mine of informa­ tion on administration and factional intrigues in the Toungoo period. Finally, there is a not inconsiderable body of primary materials in non-Burmese languages. The chronicles of Ayudhya, Chiengmai, Nan, Keng Tung, Mong Pai, and a number of other Tai-speaking kingdoms have been translated into English or French, and have been used to supplement and check Burmese sources. Professor H. L. Shorto has kindly supplied information from the Martaban Land Rolls of 1766, as well as translations from two Mon-language chronicles, the afore­ mentioned Nidana Ramadhipatt-katha, and a section containing Bud­ dha prophecies from Uppanna Sudhammavati R&javamsakatha.27 Con­ siderable use has also been made of travel accounts by Portuguese, Italian, Dutch, and English visitors from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, and of French and more especially English East India Com­ pany records to 1760. The latter are particularly valuable in providing fresh political perspectives on official Κόη-baung histories, and in de­ scribing the development of Burma's maritime relations with India and West Asia, a topic on which Restored Toungoo sources themselves are often imprecise. Only European records provide statistics, however crude, on Burmese commerce. 26

Abbreviated as MMOS. Pages 26-99 of the first volume of chronicles issued under that title at Pak Lat, Siam. Apparently of eighteenth-century origin, these chronicles may be relevant to Smin Dhaw's career. See Chapter 4 n. 70. 27

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INDEX

assumes sovereign status, 238-39; base Aceh, 28, 60, 276η area of, 196-97, 229-30, 233, 235; Adas, Michael, 112, 274-75 character and appearance of, 234-35; Aden, 25 compared to Nyaungyan MIn and administrative cycles: in Burma 1580sons, 63, 229-31, 251, 256, 260, 269, 1760, 3, 7-14, 129, 192, 207, 271-75, 275; conquers Middle and Lower and passim; as general phenomenon, 3Burma, 2 In, 243-49, 266; conservative 7, 63, 271, 292; in other periods of administrative policy of, 230, 255, Burmese history, 3, 9, 278-80; in 259, 264; death of, 8, 269; early ad­ Siam, 3, 5, 6, 14, 285-92 ministrative acts of, 237-38; edicts by Agganna Suttanta, 65 and sources on, 259-62, 299-300; eth­ agriculture: in coastal zone, 17-18; com­ nic policy of, 236-37, 248-49; family pared to trade, 14, 159, 276, 277; dif­ network of, 233-34, 236; historic ficulties in Restored Toungoo era, achievements of, 229-30, 269-70, 292; 159, 176-77, 190-91, 220-21, 223; in as homo novus, 230, 238-41, 258, dry zone, 18-20, 32; integration with 269, 276; interest in maritime con­ maritime sector, 64, 277; in tributary tacts, 267, 277; invades Manipur, 265zone, 131, 134-36. See ako famine; ir­ 66; invades Siam, 225, 266-69; legal rigation; rice; taxes, agricultural and administrative compilations under, Agung, Sultan of Mataram, 3, 4n, 281253, 263-64; monastic and religious 84 affairs under, 180-81, 238, 262-63; ahmu-dans (servicemen): classifications policy in Tai uplands, 264-65; reforms and gradations among, 97, 101-102, Privy Council, 258-59; relations with 168-74, 174n, 185; concentration in local leaders, 237-38, 254-56; relations nuclear zone, 53, 97-100, 105, 137, with ministers, 221, 256-61; religious 250-53; evasions by, 103, 152-53, claims of, 3, 70, 239-41, 244-49, 265166ff; labor and tax obligations of, 70, 274-75, 283; reorganizes service 97, 100-102, 129, 168ff, 176, 251, and athi groups, 237-38, 250-54, 264, 261; land grants to, 100, 102; mili­ 270; sons of, 245-46, 252, 259n, 261, tary, 97, 100, 102, 127, 171-76, 185, 265-67, 269; taxes under, 261; transla­ 250-52; origins of, 97-98, 226, 252tion of name, 24On; victories in Upper 53; in provinces, 113, 127, 129; segre­ Burma, 235-36, 241-42 gation and control of, 103-105, 15253, 163-75; in socio-administrative hi­ Amangkurat I, of Mataram, 282-84, 288 erarchy, 74, 97, 107, 137. See ako cen­ Amarapura, 250 sus inquests; deportations; "ignoble Amyin, 181 platoons"; service system; tattooing Anagatavamsa, 246 Anauk-hpet-lun (r. 1606-1628), 80, 135, Ahom kingdom, 209 293; census under, 111; conquers Airlangga, of Java, 3 Middle and Lower Burma, 52-54, Akin Rabibhadana, 6, 83n, 224, 288, 283-84; death of, 57, 110; deporta­ 289 tions by, 51, 53-54, 59, 76, 97, 113, Alaung-hpaya (r. 1752-1760), 4, 8, 293;

324 I INDEX Anauk-hpet-lun (cont.) 252; edicts by, 295-96; extent of em­ pire under, 56; and maritime embas­ sies, 54, 56, 60, 118; promise to father, 57, 184; and provincial con­ trols, 52-53, 114, 128; relations with ministers, 76-77; reputation and suc­ cess of, 56, 112-13; Tai campaigns of, 51, 54-56, 61-62, 135; taxation under, 125 Anderson, Benedict R. O'G., 4 appanages, 36, 75, 107; abuses at, 91, 93, 159, 164-65, 181; ministerial, 7273, 90, 91, 96, 186n; income from, 72-73, 90, 100-101, 106; of princes reformed in Restored Toungoo period, 64, 78-82, 86, 113, 116-17, 124, 128, 130, 138, 140, 151, 258, 275. See also myo-zas Arakan: in Κόη-baung era, 21, 56, 269; prior to 1613, 10, 30, 42-44, 47, 226; in Restored Toungoo period, 54, 60, 118, 123, 127, 167, 191, 199, 220, 225-27 Arakan Yoma, 56, 65 Armenians, 126, 156-59, 257n Asoka, 34, 115 assistant ministers (wun-dauks), 87, 159 athis (free nonservicemen), 94, 99n, 113; and alas, 105n-106n; duties and local organization of, 101, 105-107, 167; growing pressures on, 107, 152, 153, 165, 177, 279; investigator of, 259; minister of, 87n, 89, 257n, 259; pre­ dominant in provinces, 100, 113, 127, 129; reorganized in early seventeenth century, 107, 113; reorganized in 1750s, 253, 260; in socio-administrative hierarchy, 74, 97, 107, 137; taxes on, 101, 106-107, 125, 127, 129, 132, 136, 160, 165 Athwa, monk of, 212-13, 214, 222, 298 Atu-la, monk, 238, 262 Aung Thwin, Michael, 24n, 6On, 11On, 180n, 278 Aungrha, 253 Ava: commerce and prices at, 27, 28n, 31, 60, 88, 119-25 passim, 159, 17677, 191, 223; in communication with provinces, 116, 124-25, 128; con­

quered by Bayin-naung, 30-31; during Restored Toungoo decline in Upper Burma, 139-98 passim; and First Toungoo Empire, 33-34, 36, 38n, 40, 42, 46-47, 61, 184, 216; as focus of Restored Toungoo administration, 63138 passim; geographic advantages of, 19, 59; and Κόη-baung kings, 241-42, 250, 252; major agencies within, 8690; princely uprisings at, 81-82, 92, 141, 144-45, 182-83; prior to 1555, 19, 22-30 passim, 33, 34, 37, 47, 61, 132, 274; replaces Pegu as imperial capital, 13, 49ff., 58-60, 62, 214, 274; and revolts against Restored Toungoo rule, 199-228 passim; royal family within, 78-83, 140, 142; sack of 1752 and Peguan control over, 139, 222-24, 229-32, 235, 237-39, 253, 294, 297; service concentrations around, 99-100, 105 Ava period (1365-c. 1555): as adminis­ trative cycle, 3n, 4n, 9; gentry during, 94; and later periods compared, 80, 100, 138, 278-80; regionalism during, 23, 33, 34n; religious lands during, 24-25, 47, 111-12, 179, 180n, 27879; service groups during, 50, 98, 100, 253; sources on, 138n, 279, 294 Ayein-dama Golden Flying Lance, 245, 246 Ayudhya (Siam), 37n, 102, 168n, 177; and commerce, 14, 27, 117-18, 28591 passim; and First Toungoo Dynasty, 30-32, 34n, 37-47 passim, 52, 61, 273; history compared to Burma, 3, 5, 6, 910, 14, 61, 185n, 285-92; independ­ ence recognized, 54-56, 59, 62, 64, 275, 283; internal decline of, 199, 205, 224, 288-91; Κόη-baung inva­ sions of, 56, 125, 206, 244, 252, 26469 passim; relations with Pegu after 1740, 224-25, 232, 241; relations with Toungoo state after 1635, 56, 127, 199, 200-201, 202n, 204n, 22425; sources on, 9, 298n, 300 Badon, 181, 187n Baker, Capt. George, 233, 234, 239, 250, 257

INDEX I 325 Balasore, 157 banditry, 192, 194-96, 233, 274 Banten, 28, 276n, 281 Banya-dali: early career of, 220, 221-22; as king of Pegu, 222-24, 234, 235, 240-44 passim, 248, 256; as restorer of harmony, 222, 247, 275 Bassein, 18n, 22, 23, 36n, 44n, 117, 129n, 214 Batavia, 282 Baya-thei-ηά, chief steward, 258n, 260, 260n Bayin-naung (r. 1551-1581), 126, 293; administration under, 31-33, 34n, 35n, 37-40, 41, 63, 144; awards Nyaungyan MIn, 48; and Buddhism, 38, 133; compared to Sultan Agung, 28183; conquests of, 15n, 30-33, 37, 39, 46, 48, 50, 52, 56, 59, 202, 267, 268, 281, 286; contemporary history of, 297; death of, 32, 36, 42, 61, 75, 142, 269, 297; as imperial model, 39, 44, 52, 55, 61, 200, 219-20, 222, 267; maritime trade under, 31-32, 121n, 123n, 158n; revolts against, 36, 38, 39, 82, 117; and Tai realm, 30-31, 37-38, 131-33 bayins (exalted governors): authority and status of, 33-38, 82, 132, 232; com­ pared to Siamese governors, 285-86; and First Toungoo decline, 40-49 pas­ sim, 52, 228, 276; replaced by mydwuns, 65, 78, 113-16, 127, 151, 258, 275; revived tradition of, 114-15, 14344, 183-84, 192-93 Becker, Alton, 73n-74n Bengal, 27, 28n, 60, 119, 156n, 157, 160 Bhamo, 51, 56, 131n, 133-34 "bishops" (gaing-oks), 110-11 Βό-daw-hpaya (r. 1782-1819), 20η, 68n, 125, 194, 269n, 293, 299; religious affairs under, 262, 263; settlement projects under, 253, 254 Borommakot, king of Ayudhya, 224-25, 289 Boves, Andrew, 45 Brailey, Nigel, 218, 223n Brantas River, 283 British colonial rule, 277-78

Buddhism: cult movements within, 19495, 246n-247n, 269n; individual ori­ entation of, 90, 166; and polyethnic political integration, 38, 69-70, 13335, 137, 215-18, 222, 244-49, 26570; and royal legitimation: previous pp., plus 34-36, 42, 65-68, 71-76, 239-41, 274-75. See tdso cakkavatti; Mamma; Embryo Buddhas; kamma; millennial appeals; prophecies Buddhist monkhood: lands owned by, 24-25, 47, 111-12, 179-81, 262-63, 278-80; as refuge from royal service, 41, 109-10, 178, 179, 279-80; royal "purification" and supervision of, 63, 69, 110-13, 171, 178-81, 238, 26263, 278-80; services to throne, 109, 182-83; size of, 20n Burmans: Alaung-hpaya's appeals to, 236-37, 242n, 243, 248-49; alle­ giances during anti-Ava revolt, 214, 219-24 passim, 235; compared to Tais and hill peoples, 134-36; and de Brito, 45, 53; denned, xiii; fish omen con­ cerning, 242; lowland distribution and southern Burmanization, 16-17, 19-20, 25, 30, 120-21, 214, 217, 243, 249, 254, 277n; millennial traditions among, 218, 245-47, 268, 269n; physical appearance of, 237, 237n; as Restored Toungoo provincial appoint­ ees, 134, 201, 204, 212, 214, 225; Shan pressures on, 25, 29; in six­ teenth- and early seventeenth-century empire, 30, 37, 42, 48, 59, 70, 98; in Tai area, 134, 205 Busakorn Lailert, 224, 288, 289 Cachar, 209, 211 cakkavatti (World Ruler), 69-70; Alaunghpaya as, 245-49 passim, 265-70 passim Calcutta, 157 Cambodia, 9, 224, 287, 298n cannon, see firearms census inquests: Κόη-baung, 20-21, 294; to 1638, 18, 21-22, 41, 94, 99, 104, 107, l l l n , 128, 137-38, 294; from 1638 to 1752, 173, 175, 294 Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, xiii, 295n, 298n

326 I INDEX Chao Ong Kham, of Chiengmai, 205, 216-17, 222, 228, 276 Charnvit Kasetsiri, 61, 286 Chaudhuri, K. N., 160 chief cavalry minister, 87n, 88-89 chief ministers iypun-gps), 87, 257; biographies of, 299; in competition with interior ministers, 89, 141, 148, 149n, 15On, 154, 163, 189, 259; and Restored Toungoo politics, 75-77, 86n, 140, 142, 145-51 passim, 186-88, 190 Chiengmai, 37n, 300; annexed and lost in Kon-baung era, 56, 207-208; and First Toungoo Dynasty, 31, 33, 38n, 4On, 42, 61, 216; as independent state from 1727, 190, 205-206, 211, 212, 216-17, 222, 225, 228, 265, 267, 276; provincial reforms at, 131, 134, 201, 217; in Restored Empire, 54-57 passim, 135, 200-202, 204 Chiengsen, 55n, 204, 225n Chin Hills, 65 China, Chinese, 6, 28, 32, 72n, 244, 269; and maritime trade, 25-26, 27, 121n, 158n; overland trade with, 125, 131; 1659-1662 raids on Upper Burma, 126, 144-46, 151, 153, 165, 166, 168, 170, 176, 181, 200-201, 212, 224, 247; relations with Burma after 1662, 206, 226-27; and Tai area, 48, 51, 133, 226-27, 264 Chindwin River, valley, 49, 98, 145, 210; mid-eighteenth century importance of, 196-97, 229-31, 235, 238, 241; Tai states in, 131, 134n, 202203, 266 Chins, 135, 136, 249 coastal zone, 16-18, 25, 47. See also Delta; Lower Burma; Pegu; Ra-manya commerce, 22, 44, 267, 300; administration and taxation of (both maritime and domestic), 23, 28, 30n, 31, 59-60, 73, 117, 118, 119, 122-28 passim, 130, 158-59, 261; assists centralization in other Southeast Asian countries, 7, 276, 281, 283-87; assists Restored Toungoo centralization, 59-60, 64, 117-27, 130, 138, 277-78; enhances Lower Burma kingdom in 1740s, 21112, 220n; growth of, 25-28, 31, 11724, 156-57; impact on Restored

Toungoo factionalism, 14, 141, 15661, 166n, 175, 186, 198, 276; principal exports, 18, 27, 31, 119-20, 157; promotes sixteenth-century unification, 13, 25-32, 46, 62, 276-78, 286; in royal ships, 31-32, 158 commoners (hsin-ye-tha): abuse and protection of, 94, 97, 109, 155, 164, 260-61, and passim; in socio-administrative hierarchy, 73, 92, 97, 112-13, 129, 137. See also abmu-dans; atfm; slavery compound commanders (win-hmiis), 89, 91, 145, 257 concubines, 57, 78, 82, 115, 140, 143, 145, 150 copper, copper-alloy as medium of exchange, 32-33, 121-22, 125, 161n Coromandel Coast, 27, 118, 119, 158n, 160 Cosmin, 22 Council of Ministers (hlut-daw): functions and jurisdiction of, 87-90, 96, 151-52, 186, 259, 263; in Restored Toungoo politics, 148, 150, 159, 163, 182, 186, 188 Dagon, 18n, 22n, 32n, 243. See oho Rangoon Dalaban, general, 232, 235, 241-42, 249n Damrong Rajanubhab, Prince, 8n, 215, 267n Danubyu, 18n, 243 de Brito Nicote, Filippe: controls Syriam and coast, 44-46, 60, 117; defeated, 53, 54; impact on Toungoo reunification, 123, 22On, 284, 285 debt-slavery, conditions of, 108, 152-53, 166f£ See also slavery Delta, of Irrawaddy, 23, 30, 33, 64, 214, 221, 225, 249; agriculture and trade in, 17-19, 22-24, 122, 211-12; population of, 21-22, 39, 40, 41, 45, 46, 59, 129, 212, 217, 244; strategic value of, 59; and wars of 1750s, 223, 23031, 236, 237, 241-49 passim. See also Lower Burma departmental agencies, 87-91, 162, 182, 186, 259

INDEX I 327 departmental jurisdictions, 74, 88, 90, 91, 94-95, 128-29 deportations: to Pegu, 21, 38, 39, 48n49n, 59, 98; to Upper Burma in Konbaung era, 252-53, 266; to Upper Burma in Toungoo era, 48, 51, 53-54, 59, 97-98, 113 dhamma, as regulating principle of mon­ archy, 66-68, 74, 75, 77, 86, 190, 196, 215, 217, 240, 245, 246, 265 dhamma-raja: duties and prerogatives of, 66-69, 77, 110, 130, 190, 278; as fo­ cus of loyalty, 72, 86, 249 diseases, epidemics, 17, 18, 20, 183, 210 dry zone, 48, 64, 79, 111, 153, 195; ag­ riculture and trade in, 18-20, 27, 12223, 176-77; compared to coastal zone, 16-24, 46-47, 61, 8On, 277; defined, 16; emigration from, 120-21, 249, 254; fighting in, 195, 223, 229ff. See also nuclear zone; Upper Burma Dutch, Dutch East India Company, 54n, 55, 60, 92, 118, 124, 127n, 221, 28384, 300 Early Ayudhya period (1350-1569), 5, 285-86. See oho Ayudhya (Siam) Early Bangkok period (1782-1873), 5, 9, 10η Eastern Court (shet-yon), 88, 89, 91-92 ecclesiastical commissioner (maha-dan wun), HOn, 111, 180, 238, 259n ein-shet-min, see heirs apparent Ekkathat, king of Siam, 19On, 267 Embryo Buddha(s): Toungoo kings as, 70-72, 240; Alaung-hpaya as, 240, 244-46, 247n, 268-70 English, English East India Company: commercial and military activities of, 60, 157, 158, 212, 221n, 244; records and accounts by, 56, 118, 119, 124, 148, 155, 156, 214n, 221, 233, 23435, 242n, 243, 250, 266, 300 ethnicity and political loyalty, 30; in 1740s anti-Ava revolt, 214-24 passim; after 1752, 236-49 passim Europe, Europeans: accounts by, 9, 18, 21n, 27, 33, 4On, 202, 234, 298, 300; military role of, 9, 28ff, 53, 126-27, 212, 221, 244-49 passim, 276, 284, 285; trade with, 25, 31, 58, 60, 118,

156-58, 212. See also Dutch; English; French; Portuguese; Venetians factionalism, 299, 300; at Ayudhya, 224, 289, 291; sources of, 12-14, 92, 13942, 146-61 passim, 184, 197-98, 27273, 291; as spur to popular disorgani­ zation: previous pp., plus 161ff., 17273, 175, 186-87, 228 famine: in Lower Burma, 42, 178; in Upper Burma, 20, HO, 153, 159, 165, 176-78, 183, 190, 191, 223, 224 Faria y Sousa, Manuel de, 32, 53 Fedrici, Cesare, 15, 33, 121 Fernandes, Francis, 46 financial abuse: Alaung-hpaya's attention to, 259-61; effects on nuclear zone administration, 12, 90-94, 141, 15355, 159, 163-66; precipitating Okpo revolt, 223; in provinces, 117, 159, 161-63, 199, 204, 212-15, 228 firearms: of de Brito, 44, 53; in fifteenthand sixteenth-century Burma, 26-31 passim, 43, 126, 276, 297; in Mataram, 281; in Restored Toungoo era, 53-54, 59-60, 92, 98n, 117, 126-27, 130, 203, 210, 221, 277; in Siam, 30, 268, 287n; in wars of 1750s, 212, 244, 248, 268, 269 First Toungoo Empire: achievements and conquests of, 13, 15-16, 29-32, 130, 249, 276; coastal-interior synthesis un­ der, 30, 281; collapse of, 7-8, 13, 16, 38-46, 61, 64; service system in, 99100; sources on, 9, 40n, 294-95, 297, 298; territorial administration within, 32-38, 45-46, 78-80. See also Bayinnaung; Nan-da-bayin; Tabin-shwei-hti five royal regalia, 34, 36n, 115 Forest Dwellers, 25, 47, 178n French, French East India Company: and eighteenth-century wars, 212, 244, 248, 252; records and accounts by, 118, 119, 22On, 232, 300; shipbuild­ ing and trade with, 157; in Siam, 285 Furnivall, J. S., 99 garrisons in Tai region, 38, 132, 133, 200, 204n, 205 Gavampati, 240 gentry: abuses by, 93-94, 165; and

328 I DiDEX gentry (ami.) Alaung-hpaya, 237-38, 252, 254-56; growing autonomy in 1740s, early 1750s, 194-97, 231-33; and nuclear zone administration, 64, 92-95, 104, 112, 255-56; political relations with superiors, see patron-client ties; ranks, titles, and grades among, 92-93, 93n, 256; in Restored Toungoo provinces, 113, 128-30, 163n, 200-201, 214; within sodcHadministrative hierarchy, 73, 74, 137; succession to office, 93, 95-96, 129,197, 255 Gharib Newaz, ruler of Manipur, 20711, 223, 265, 273 Gia-Long, of Vietnam, 4 Goa, 44, 45, 54, 60 Golconda, 60, 122 Gonni-ein, Gwei headman, 232n, 233n, 264 Gotama Buddha, 70-71, 218n, 222, 240, 241n, 244 governors, see bayins, myo-wuns Granary Department, 90 Gujarat, 25, 27, 28n Gulf of Siam, 27, 28, 30, 286 Gweis: in Lower Burma, 218-19; at Okpo, 219n, 223, 231, 232n, 264 Hall, D.G.E., 8, 148, 158n, 223n, 277 Hamilton, Alexander, 122, 125 Hanthawaddy, see Pegu Harvey, G. E., 8, 5 In, 223n, 277 headmen, see gentry Hein Hpon-gyl, 195 heir(s) apparent: in conflict with other princes, 82, 140-41, 181-82, and pas­ sim; dependent on Restored Toungoo ministers, 140, 149-50, 184, 186, 187; establishments of, 78, 81, 183, 192; in First Toungoo period, 35, 36, 40, 41, 43, 47; in Κδη-baung period, 263-64; lineages of, 83, 140; of Min-ye-kyawdin, 149; of Nyaungyan MIn, 51, 76; of Pindale, 143; of Pye, 146; of Sanei, 183-84, 186; of Tanln-ganwei, 188; of Tha-lun, 143, 273 Henzada, 254 hill tribes: and anti-Ava revolts, 127, 203-204, 218-19; ecology of, 131,

135; relations with valley-dwellers, 135-37, 208. See also Chins; Karens; Lawas Hindus, Hinduism, 208-209, 265 hlut-daw, see Council of Ministers Hman-nan chronicle, 186, 189-90, 199, 204-205, 210, 219, 220, 298, 300 hpdn (charismatic glory), 141n, 142, 183n, 214; of Alaung-hpaya, 229, 240, 247; associated with military suc­ cess, 12, 49, 77; as reflection of good kamma, 72, 75, 240 Hsenwi, 51, 132, 133n, 265n Hsin-byu-shin (r. 1763-1776), 293; cam­ paigns of, 206, 263; resettlement un­ der, 254 Hsipaw, 37n, 133n, 222 Hugh, 157 "ignoble platoons" {asu-kyan):firstserv­ icemen to become disorganized, 169fF., 202; prohibitions on monastic ordina­ tion of, 171, 178, 185; slavery and in­ debtedness among, 168-72 passim, 176, 185; types of, 169-72, 174n lkuta, Shigeru, 7, 123n India, 6, 226; currency changes in, 122n; early contacts with, 22; expanding trade in Restored Toungoo era, 60, 118-19, 156-58, 160, 211-12, 29On, 300; price inflation in, 161n; silver im­ ported via, 121-22; trade in fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, 25-28, 31. See cdso Bengal; Coromandel Coast; textile imports interior ministers (atwin-wuns): jurisdic­ tion of, 89, 91; and Restored Toun­ goo politics, 147-49, 154, 159, 189, 193 Irrawaddy River, basin: as commercial artery, 119, 122-23, 261; in early Κόη-baung era, 3, 231, 239, 241, 254, 264, 269; geography and preToungoo history of, 16ff., 33, 123, 277-78; in late First Toungoo era, 3346 passim; as natural axis of empire, 56, 123, 250, 254, 283; in Restored Toungoo era, 9, 46-59 passim, 113, 115, 161, 167, 195-228 passim, 264, 287; sixteenth-century unification of, 9-10, 15, 23-32, 52, 224, 276, 286

INDEX I 329 irrigation, 101, 176; Alaung-hpaya's at­ tention to, 252; declining efficiency of, 20, 176-77, 230, 231; early Restored Toungoo attention to, 50, 98, 109, 177; main areas with, 19, 48, 181, 232 Italians, 27n, 28n, 300 Jai Singh, of Manipur, 207 Japan, 29n, 156n, 158n Java, 6, 10η; cycles in, 3, 4, 6; and mari­ time trade, 9-10, 26, 280-84. See dso Banten; Mataram Johns, A. H., 7 Kachin Hills, 65 Kachins, 135, 136 Kadus, 119, 136 KaIa, U, chronicler, 39, 45, 49, 51n, 55, 103n, 145, 201, 297-98, 299 Kalei, 31, 37n, 131 Kama, 120 kamma: as buttress of royal authority, 71-72, 180, 240, 247, 268, 278; as justification for rebellion and social mobility, 75, 76n, 83-84, 90n, 140, 166, 182-83, 240; royal responsibility for people's, 68-69, 262 Kanaung, 254 Kani, 64, 92n Karens: contrasted with nontribal peo­ ples, 17, 135; in lowlands, 136, 204, 212, 217, 253; and Mong Pai collapse, 135n, 203-204, 218; and Okpo rising, 223n; possible involvement in Peguan revolt, 204, 217-19, 222 Katha, 261 kat-pas (entrants to athi communities), 105n, 106n, 107, 167n Kawlin, 238 Kayah, 203 Ken Angrok, of Java, 3 Keng Tung, 300; in mid-eighteenth cen­ tury, 206, 222; prior to 1600, 34n, 37n; and Restored Toungoo control, 55, 56, 57n, 131, 132, 133n, 204 Kenghung, 55, 56, 57n, 131, 133 Keyes, Charles, 274-75 king: administrative position in Restored Empire, 72-78, and Chapter 2 passim; in competition with elites, 10-14, 41,

46, 61-64, 112-13, 137-42, 197-98, 269-74, and passim; as focus of unsta­ ble loyalty in First Empire, 33-38, 4546; impact of personality on dynastic fortunes, 38-39, 76-77, 142-43, 15051, 192-94, 234, 257, 273; and recentralization process, 13, 61-64, 229-30, 269-70, 273-74; in socio-administrative hierarchy, 73-74, 137; theoretical pretensions of, 10-11, 35, 65ff. See abo Buddhism, and royal legitimation; pa­ tron-client ties Kin-u, 196; headman of, 233, 235, 236, 255 Kinywa, 269 Koch kingdom, 208, 209 Koenig, W. J., 279-80 Kon-baung, Alaung-hpaya's capital, 229, 238 Kon-baung Dynasty (1752-1885), 3, 8, 18, 21n, 168; agricultural problems under, 176, 279, 280n; cyclic trends during, 63, 263, 279-80; Delta rice acreage under, 18; early achievements of, 269-70; historical materials from, 9, 190, 294, 295, 298-300; maritime trade during, 277; nuclear zone administration during, 85, 96, 111-12, 176; outer zones of empire under, 56, 116, 134, 207-208; princely grades and appanages during, 78n, 80, 81n, 259; religious inquests during, 26263; system of military service during, 100, 105, 250-51; valleywide integra­ tion during, 249, 277 Kon-baung-zet chronicle, 207, 300 Kyangin, 254 Kyaukka headman, 196n, 235, 236, 255 Kyaukmyaung, 242, 252 Kyaukse: ahmu-dan settlements and or­ ganization in, 50, 98, 99n, 176, 252; and Chinese raids, 144-45; damaged in 1750s, 224, 229, 230, 252; governor of, 92n, 195; as Upper Burma's chief granary, 19, 125, 274 iyeik-su taings (taxpaying units), 106n, 167

Lahus, 135, 218, 218n-219n Lamphun, 265

330 I INDEX Lan Chang, 37, 38, 55, 62, 204n, 275, 283 Laos, 16, 31, 37, 39 Late Ayudhya period (1569-1767), 4n, 5, 6, 1On, 286-91. See ako Ayudhya (Siam) law codes, 66, 263 Lawas, 17, 135, 218 Law-M-byu-ha kyan, 186, 263-64, 299 Le Loi, of Vietnam, 4 Lehman, F. K., 136, 218n-219n literacy levels, 104 Lower Burma, 128, 148, 224; cities and ports of, 22-23, 27, 116, 117-18; de­ portations from, 97, 107, 288; history prior to 1600, 15, 16, 18, 22-32, 38, 40, 99, 121; integrated into dry zone polity, 113-30, 216-17, 228, 249; population of, see Delta, of Irrawaddy; post-1665 docility of, 202; and Re­ stored Toungoo trade, 59, 117-20, 123, 130, 156, 157, 211-12; and re­ volt of 1740-1752, 127, 129, 163, 211-24; and revolt of 1759, 266-67; and wars against Alaung-hpaya, 22949 passim. See ako coastal zone; Delta; Pegu; Ra-manya Luang Prabang, 37n, 205 Lun-zei (Myanaung), 18n, 120, 243, 254, 255

Macassar, 284 Madaya, 64, 219n Madras, 148, 156, 158, 221n Maha-dami-thin-gyan, author, 179 Maha-damS-ya-za-di-pati (r. 1733-1752), 273, 293, 298; administrative and ag­ ricultural crisis under, 142, 162-63, 177, 188-98 passim, 212-15, 220-24, 261; background to accession of, 18788; captivity and execution of, 224, 239, 242-43, 247n; compared to Alaung-hpaya, 229, 270, 275; contem­ porary critiques of, 67, 139, 190, 192, 193, 196, 213-15, 240, 270, 291; edicts by and sources on, 175-76, 19394, 296, 298; fails to halt Manipuris, 207, 210-11; fails to suppress Lower Burma revolt, 212-24 passim; loses control over Tai states, 205-207; rela­

tions with local leaders, 196-97, 233; relations with ministers, 146, 163, 188-93, 258, 291n; seeks Chinese aid, 227 Mahasammata, legendary first king: later kings likened to, 49, 247n, 255; as physical progenitor of Burmese kings, 83; provides institutional charter for monarchy, 66, 67, 72-74, 113, 190 Mahathammaracha, king of Siam, 4n, 286 Maha-tharahpu, of Manipur, 209 "Maha-ya-zawin-gyaw" chronicle, 191, 192, 196, 298 Majapahit, empire of, 280 Malacca, 18, 26-28, 281 Malaya, 9, 27, 28, 284n-85n male-female principle, see service system, registration procedures Malun, 127, 221 Mandalay, 250 Manipur: attacks Toungoo Empire in 1690s, 202-203; attacks in 1723-1749, 126n, 127, 190, 199, 205-11 passim, 214-15, 223, 227-28, 231, 265, 290; captives from, 249, 252, 266; Hinduization of, 199, 208-209, 273; Konbaung invasions of, 207, 252, 264-66, 269, 270, 290; relations with Burma to 1692, 16, 31, 202, 202n Manu, code of, 66 Μαηύ-kye damathat, 263, 299n maritime commerce, see commerce Martaban: history before 1540, 18n, 23, 26-28, 33; history from 1540 to 1613, 22, 30, 33, 36n, 43, 46, 53, 61, 22On; history from 1740 to 1760, 214, 216, 225, 232, 259n, 269; Restored Toun­ goo commercial and political eclipse of, 117-18, 123; Restored Toungoo provincial establishment at, 115-16, 182n; 1660s revolt at, 200-202, 212; sources from, 212n, 219n, 298, 300; taxation and financial abuse at, 12 In, 161-62, 164, 212; yields to Anaukhpet-lun, 54, 55n Masulipatam, 60, 156 Mataram, compared to Toungoo Burma, 4n, 9, 14, 280-85 Maung Pu, minister, 150, 188-90, 192, 193, 291n; father of, 150, 159

INDEX I 331 Meiktila district, 48, 231 Mekong River, 46, 54, 65 Menam River, basin, 45, 61, 267, 268, 285-87 Mendelson, E. M., 110-11, 246, 269n Mergui, Mergui-Tenasserim: and Alaunghpaya, 265-67; in Restored Toungoo era, 54-56, 59, 117, 118; in sixteenth century, 27n, 28, 31 Methwold, William, 122 Metteyya Buddha, 194n, 245-46, 268, 270 Middle Burma, 17n, 128, 241, 255; de­ mography and economic activity in, 21, 30, 113, 122, 130, 212, 217, 230, 254; tradition of political independ­ ence in, 232; warfare in, 50, 127, 221, 237, 243. See also Prome; Toungoo migration, as response to elite exactions, 41-42, 47, 152, 166-67, 181, 191, 196, 220, 260, 274 military commissioners (sit-kes): First Toungoo, 34n-35n, 38, 115; Restored Toungoo, 116, 127, 132n, 204-206, 287 military leadership, Restored Toungoo decline in, 140, 143, 197, 199, 202, 205-206, 210-11, 221, 228 military system, see ahmu-dans, service system millennial appeals: of Alaung-hpaya, 24547, 268, 274-75, 283; of Banya-dala, 222, 247; in periods of social and po­ litical crisis, 274-75; of Smin Dhaw, 217-18, 247 millet, 19, 161n Minbu district, 19, 49, 220 Mindon, 114n, 115, 259n Ming Dynasty, see China Min-gyi-nyo (r. 1486-1531), 239, 293 Mln-hl4-mln-gaung, commander, 256 Mln-hli-mln-gaung-gyaw, minister of musketeers, 256-57, 258n ministers: and Alaung-hpaya, 256-61; growing authority in Restored Toun­ goo period, 13-14, 77, 92, 113, 14055 passim, 181-93 passim, 197, 206, 213, 259, 275; income of, 90-92, 117, 148, 153-65, 259-61; organization and supervision of, 73, 76-78, 86-92, 259-61; origins and recruitment of,

83-86, 95; in socio-administrative hier­ archy, 74, 83, 137. See also factional­ ism;financialabuse; private service Min-ye-deik-ba, king at Pegu, 57, 58, 82 Min-ye-kyaw-din (r. 1673-1698), 182, 193, 293; factionalism and tax abuses under, 148, 161-65; as figurehead ruler, 146-48, 291n; and gentry succession, 95-96; service disorganiza­ tion under, 170-75 Mln-ye-kyaw-swa, Ava bayin, 33-34, 12On Moertono, S., 282 Mogaung, 34n, 38, 40, 48n, 51, 56, 131, 133-34, 206-207 Mohnyin, 25, 37n, 134n Mok-hso-bo (Shwebo): as Alaunghpaya's original base, 196, 230, 233, 235-39, 241, 252, 256-57, 258n; be­ comes royal capital, 238; derivation of term "Shwebo," 238n; in last years of Alaung-hpaya's reign, 250, 252, 26067 passim Moksogyon village, 255n, 256 money economy, 32-33, 119, 121-23. See also copper; silver Mong Mao, 48, 51 Mong Mit, 51, 132, 222, 265n Mong Nai, 51, 222, 264n, 265n Mong Pai, 133n, 135n, 203, 218, 228, 264, 300 Mong Pan, 133n Mons, 205, 266, 297; centered in coastal zone, 17, 18, 22, 23, 27, 120, 217; contrasted with hill peoples, 135; and de Brito, 45, 53; ethnic assimilation of, 249, 277n; hairstyles of, 237, 242; Κόη-baung resettlement of, 254; mil­ lennial traditions among, 218, 247; obtain decreasing share of Restored Toungoo appointments, 214; relations with early Restored Toungoo kings, 56-59; in 1660s revolt, 200-201; role under First Dynasty, 30-31, 37-44 pas­ sim, 59; as sedentary cultivators, 1718, 134-35; in Siam, 201, 225, 288; supporting Alaung-hpaya, 237, 249; supporting Pegu in 1740s and 1750s, 214-24 passim, 231, 236-37, 241-49 passim; in Upper Burma, 48, 98, 223,

332 I INDEX Mons (cont.) 237, 252; Tabin-shwei-htl's patronage of, 30 Monywa, 196, 232n, 235, 236n, 252 Moulmein, 18n, 43, 58 Mrauk-u, 226 Mu River, valley, 49, 98, 207; enhanced importance in 1750s, 229-35, 250; ir­ rigation in, 19, 176, 232 musketeers, minister of, 89.126n, 256,257 musketeers and artillerymen: in Alailnghpaya's forces, 242, 248, 251-52; in First Toungoo forces, 28-31; Muslim and European captives serving as, 5354, 60, 248, 252; in Restored Toun­ goo forces, 53-54, 89, 98, 126-27, 171, 172n; training of, 100η Muslims: as soldiers, 26, 29, 53, 226, 252; as traders, 25, 28, 126, 156-58 Myanaung, see Lun-zel Myedu, 36n, 64, 92n, 96n, 210, 250 Myingyan district, 98, 231 myin-yin-tet fraternity, 256-58 myo-tbu-gyis (township headmen), see gentry: ranks, titles, and grades among myo-wuns (governors): Alaung-hpaya's use of, 25 7n, 259n, 265n; increasing frequency of appointment, 113-14; modest status of, 113-15, 143, 144n; provincial distribution of, 115, 134, 201, 259n; responsibilities and author­ ity of, 65, 124, 127, 128, 132-33, 162, 204; in Restored Toungoo nu­ clear zone, 92n, 95n, 188, 195; in six­ teenth century, 36n, 113, 114n; super­ vision and deputies of, 115-17, 12425, 162, 202, 215 myo-zas (appanage grantees): in Ava pe­ riod, 37, 138n; in First Toungoo pe­ riod, 36-37, 42, 48, 49n, 82, 84n, 166, 228, 276, 285; in Restored Toungoo and Κόη-baung periods, 7881, 93n, 151, 181, 258, 259, 275

97; and First Toungoo collapse, 3844, 49, 82, 113, 139, 190, 192, 212, 273, 283; as imperial model, 6 1 ; pol­ icy toward Siam, 38-39, 40, 55; pro­ vincial changes under, 113-14; surren­ der and execution of, 43-44, 64 Nan-da-yaw-da, minister, 77, 9On Narai, king of Ayudhya, 177n, 201, 29On Naresuan, king of Ayudhya, 3, 43, 273, 286-88 National Library, Rangoon, xiii, 167, 294-96 Nat-shin-naung, of Toungoo, 52-53 Naung-daw-gyi (r. 1760-1763), 250, 262-63, 265n, 293 Naya-wayi (r. 1672-1673), 178, 293; in­ effectiveness of, 7On, 146-47, 151, 273, 291n; legitimacy of, 149 Nei-myo-thi-hathu, minister, 148-51, 154 NgS-tha-aung, Peguan governor, 214-15, 216 Nidana Ramadbipati-katha, 297, 300 nuclear zone, 129, 228, 265, 282; col­ lapse of royal authority within, 18898, 222-24; compared to provinces, 64-65, 113, 117, 128-29, 137; de­ fined, 64; gentry within, 92-96, 112, 113, 194-96; invaded in late Restored Toungoo era, 207, 209-11, 220-24; ministerial and princely autonomy within, 142-52, 181-84, 186-88, 19798; popular reorganization within, 96107, 250-53; post-1648 administrative disorders within, 144, 152-81, 185-86, 197-98, 220-21; relation between nu­ clear zone disorders and revolts in outer zones, 138, 139, 199-201, 217, 228, 269-70, 272, 275-76; sovereign and royal family within, 65-83, 11213; structure of officialdom within, 8392, 112-13. See tdso Upper Burma

Naga HiUs, 65 Nan, 55, 131, 204, 206, 225n, 300 Nan-da-bayin (r. 1581-1599), 47, 59, 77, 293; accession of, 36, 46-47, 117, 142; assessments of, 32, 42, 67, 273; efforts at popular control, 41-42, 63,

Nyaungbinzeik, 255 Nyaungyan, appanage of, 36n, 48, 59, 216 Nyaungyan Dynasty, see Restored Toun­ goo Dynasty Nyaungyan Min (r. 1597-1606), 4n, 114n, 206, 293, 295-96; censuses un-

INDEX I 333 der, 94, 99n, 111; conquests of, 5052, 57, 61, 64, 131; early career and accession to power, 48-50, 59, 80, 105, 231, 247, 275; and gentry, 9495; promotes trade, 59-60, 277; rela­ tions with ministers, 76; reorganizes service and athi units, 50, 63, 94-95, 97, 98, 102, 103, 105, 112; as re­ storer of harmony, 49, 247, 275; and sons, achievements of, 63-64, 76-78, 86, 112-13, 137-38, 147-48, 165, 197, 229-30, 251, 256, 269, 284

ration, 196, 246-47, 274-75; responses to economic/political pressures, 40-42, 112, 166n, 166fF., 191, 196, 272-75. See also banditry; migration; millennial appeals; patron-client ties; slavery Pegu, 18n; chronicles from, 298, 299n; declining value as a port, 59; 15991600 sack of, 43-44; as First Toungoo capital, 7, 13, 15, 30-52 passim, 61, 62, 79, 109, 180, 184, 224, 254, 27377, 298; and First Toungoo/Restored Toungoo interregnum, 44-46, 52, 53, 55, 61, 229; mosque at, 28; in Re­ stored Toungoo period, 54, 56-59, officials, see ministers 115, 118, 156-57, 184, 212; service Okpo, 196, 219n, 223, 224, 232n, 235, system around, 41-42, 63, 99; and 241 1740-1752 revolt, 139, 167, 191, 196, one-shoulder sect, see robe-wrapping dis­ 199-200, 204, 207-208, 211-24, 290, pute 298; 1757 sack of, 248-49; as tradi­ tional capital of Lower Burma, 22, 23, Padaung tribesmen, 203 26-27, 33, 214; and wars against Pagan, prince of (Tanin-ganwei's uncle), Alaung-hpaya, 229-37 passim, 241-49 183-84, 187n, 215, 219 passim, 252, 257, 260. See also Lower Pagan, township and principality of, 33, Burma 36n, 49, 274; gentry of, 96n, 129n, 255n; 1714 uprising at, 184, 205, Pegu River, 59, 247, 248 212, 290; taxes at, 121n, 161, 162 Perfections (paramis), 70-72, 240 Pagan Empire, Pagan period (c. 849Phayre, Sir Arthur, 8, 5 In 1287), 19, 23, 25, 41η, 100η, 121n, Philippines, 121, 156n 128, 239; as administrative cycle, 3n, Phitsanulok, 286 278; internal organization of, 23, 27, phrai luang, in Siam, 224, 288-89, 291 45; religious lands in, 25, 111, 179phrai som, in Siam, 288, 289 80, 278-79, 294 Pin and Madi, 23 In Pakangyi, 113 Pindale, appanage of, 181, 186n Palaungs, 136 Pindale (r. 1648-1661), 176, 293; depo­ palm cultivation, 19, 129, 130 sition of, 144-45, 196; son of, 147; "patrimonial" states, 10η, 86 weaknesses of, 142-44, 146, 151, 273 patron-client ties: among officials and Pires, Tome, 18 princes, 73, 84-86, 90, 116, 154-55, Pondichery, 157n, 248 159, 163, 166, 187-90, 193, 257, population: of Burmese empire in 1783, 272; between commoners and local 21; changes in northern in 1750s, leaders, 85, 102-103, 112, 166ff., 195230-32, 274; of dry zone and coastal 96, 217, 272-75; between headmen zones compared, 20-22, 46-47, 52, 59, and superiors, 85, 93n, 95, 128, 165, 61, 113, 220, 244; of Java, 281; of 204n, 214; between king and cour­ north reorganized by Alaung-hpaya, tiers, 12, 75-77, 84, 86, 112-13, 166, 237-38, 250-54; of Nyaungyan and 272; between territorial rulers, 42, Ava, 48, 50, 52; in provinces in 166, 200, 227-28; under Alaung1660s, 202; of Rangoon, 254; re­ hpaya, 229, 234, 257, 270 gional clustering of, 32; of south, see Delta Pe Maung Tin, 99 Portugal, Portuguese, 300; commercial peasants: contributions to political resto­

334 I INDEX Portugal (cant.) impact of, 28, 44, 118; and de Brito, 44, 45, 53; military role in sixteenth century, 13, 28-31, 43, 287n; in Restored Toungoo era, 54, 126, 221, 226 price inflation, 160-61, 276 princes: in First Toungoo period, 13, 3337passim, 41, 61, 275; grades and lineages of, 36, 37n, 78, 82-83, 115; new patterns of training in seventeenth century, 14, 140, 142-43, 192, 197, 275; prerogatives and establishments in Restored Toungoo period, 78-82; private followings of, 41, 78, 81, 142, 168, 171, 172, 181, 183, 185-87, 191-93; relation to Restored Toungoo ministers, 13-14, 76, 140-51 passim, 181-88 passim, 197; Restored Toungoo controls over, 73, 74, 80-82, 116, 128, 138, 275; in Restored Toungoo provinces, 81n, 82, 115, 143-44, 182n, 212, 290; Restored Toungoo revolts by, 75, 81, 82, 140-46 passim, 182-84, 192n; in socio-administrative hierarchy, 74, 83, 137. See also appanages; succession disputes private service: compared to slavery, 153; in eighteenth century, 142, 175, 18592 passim, 195, 196; in First Toungoo period, 41; growth in late seventeenth century, 141-42, 152-55, 159, 166, 172, 173, 181; in Tha-lun's day, 172n privy administration, 86-90 passim, 141, 154 Privy Council (bye-daik): functions and jurisdiction of, 87, 89-90, 152, 263; in Restored Toungoo politics, 147, 148, 163, 182, 189; restructured by Alaung-hpaya, 258-59 Privy Treasury (shwei-daik), 89-90, 189, 253 Prome, agriculture and trade at, 19, 27, 30n, 120, 22On; and First Toungoo/ Restored Toungoo interregnum, 4447, 49, 50, 60, 61, 216, 22On; history before 1597, 27, 30, 33, 36, 38n, 42, 43; history from 1740 to 1760, 3n, 216, 220, 221, 230-32, 237, 243, 255n, 259n; permanent eclipse of,

123; in Restored Toungoo Empire, 52, 76, 113, 115, 143, 144, 184; transcription of name, 19n prophecies and royal legitimation, 34, 49n, 196, 233n; and Alaung-hpaya, 235, 240, 244, 268; and Nyaungyan MIn, 49; at Pegu, 214, 218, 222; and Tha-lun, 71n provinces, see zone of dependent provinces public administration, 86-90 passim, 141, 154 Pulicat, 156 P'ya Taksin, king of Siam, 3, 238n, 292 Pye (r. 1661-1672), 192, 293; accession and politics under, 82, 144-46, 15859, 182-83, 196; minor son of, 147; provincial affairs under, 201, 204; as restorer of harmony, 247, 275; service disorders under, 163-64, 169-70 Pyinzi, 181, 255n Pyu-zaw-hti, 83 queens: of bayins, 34, 115; grades and lineages of, 78n, 82-83, 140; of particular Restored Toungoo rulers, 57, 143, 145, 146, 148, 182, 186; private followings of, 142, 191 Ra-manya, land of the Mons, 213, 214, 217, 222. See also Pegu Rangoon (formerly Dagon), 22n, 247, 254, 269; founding and naming of, 243, 249; governor of, 254, 259n, 266; revolt at, 266; trade at, 125, 250, 267 Rangoon University Library, 294-96 Raychaudhuri, Tapan, 118 Reid, Anthony, 7, 276 Restored Toungoo Dynasty, Empire (1597-1752), 4n, 8; administrative reforms in, 13-14, 62-65, 78-82, 99100, 113-17, 130, 131, 138, 275, 277; collapse in 1751-1752, 223-24; decline contrasted with First Toungoo pattern, 13-14, 139, 142-43, 197, 216-17, 228, 275-76; declining royal authority in nuclear zone, 138-98 (see also factionalism; nuclear zone; service

INDEX I 335 system); enhanced stability compared to First Empire, 13, 16, 64, 116-17, 123-24, 138, 228, 275-77; foundation and early vigor of, 37, 46-60, 63-64, 137-38, 229-30, 271 (see also Nyaungyan MIn; Anauk-hpet-lun; Tha-lun); as "galactic polity," 227-28 (cf. 6465); as institutional model for early Κδη-baung Dynasty, 64, 100, 230, 251, 253, 255, 258-59, 261, 263-64, 279; loses control over provinces, 21121; loses control over tributary zone, 200-11; reduced scope compared to First Empire, 13, 55-56, 62, 64, 275; regional integration within, 64, 117ff.; relations with adjacent empires after 1660, 224-28; sources on, 9, 294-300; structural weaknesses in, 13-14, 76, 139-42, 152-53, 197-200; zones of empire, 64-65 retainers, see private service Riang tribes, 203n, 212n, 219n rice: domestic trade in, 17-18, 12On, 122-23, 145, 176-77, 191, 223; ex­ port of, 18, 27, 120, 125n, 157; main areas of cultivation, 18-19; shortages of, see famine; varieties of, 19. See also irrigation Ricklefs, M. C, 6n, 282, 284 robe-wrapping dispute in monkhood, HOn, 178-79, 238, 262

Sagaing, 126n, 193, 209-11, 215, 250 Sakka, king of the gods, 222, 244-45, 247n, 265 SaIa River, 281, 283 Salin, 114n, 115, 129n, 220, 230 Salin-gathu, headman of, 196n, 23 In salt, 44 Salween River, 51, 54, 57, 131, 133, 134, 206, 265, 267 Samon River, 48, 76 Sanda-wi-zaya, king of Arakan, 226 Sandoway, 226 Sanei (r. 1698-1714), 8n, 293; adminis­ trative problems under, 162, 175-76, 178-79, 182, 192; assessments of, 150-51, 197, 273; ceremonial changes under, 151-52; edicts by, 140, 175n,

296; maritime voyages under, 158; military activities of, 56, 202-204; po­ litical conflicts under, 148-51, 182-84 sangha, see Buddhist monkhood Sankha, the cakkavatti, 245, 246n Sarasin Viraphol, 290-91 Sarkisyanz, E., 274-75 Sasanavamsa, 262 saw-bwas (Tai rulers), 131-32, 207, 265n Schrieke, B., 6 service system: compared to Siamese sys­ tem of manpower control, 288-91; dis­ organization in first half of eighteenth century, 142, 175-77, 181-87, 190-99 passim, 206, 210-11, 220-24, 228; dis­ organization in late seventeenth cen­ tury, 14, 139-45 passim, 152-53, 16377, 197-98, 201, 202; early K6nbaung administration of, 100, 237-38, 250-53, 260-62, 270, 279-80; expan­ sion in early seventeenth century, 50, 64, 95, 97-100, 113, 116-17, 138, 140, 251, 253, 275; gradations within, 101-102, 169-71, 174; prior to Re­ stored Toungoo Dynasty, 13, 39, 4042, 50, 98-100, 138n; in provinces, 113, 127, 129; registration procedures and illegal registration within, 12, 103104, 141, 152, 166, 169-75 passim, 185, 190, 195, 197, 202; structural weaknesses in, 103, 141, 152-53, 175, 197. See also abmu-dans sesamum, 19, 122 Shans, 21, 123, 134, 144, 204, 283; and Alaung-hpaya, 237, 244, 249, 253, 254, 256, 261, 264-65; as auxiliary troops, 17, 52, 203, 210, 244, 264n; between Burma and China, 47-48, 5051, 226, 227; decreasing threat of, 4748; deported to Upper Burma, 48, 51, 98; ethnic classification of, 17n; and First Toungoo kings, 33, 39, 48, 7980; as model for hill tribes, 136; resi­ dent in Lower Burma, 217, 218, 220; Restored Toungoo conquest of, 50-51, 61; revenue from, 121n, 125n, 132n, 161, 162; sixteenth-century influence in Upper Burma, 25, 29, 30, 37, 132, 279. See also Tai-speaking states Shin-talok, prince, 77n, 80n, 81, 92, 127

336 I INDEX shipbuilding at coast, 27, 31-32, 118, 120, 157, 212 Shorto, H. L., 26n, 31n, 203n, 217, 218n, 297, 300 Shwebo district, 19. On Alaung-hpaya's capital, see Mok-hso-bo Shwedaung, 122, 129n Shwedaung prince, 239, 243 Siam, see Ayudhya Si-gyi-swe, 253 silver, silver-alloy: imports of, 121-23, 161n, 277; as medium of exchange, 121-23, 125, 130, 161-63, 191, 213 silver tax minister, 161-63 Singaing, 193 Singu (r. 1776-1782), 19On, 293, 299n Si-tha, 196n, 234n Sittang River, basin, 16, 19n, 33, 38, 42, 52, 64, 113, 200, 201, 204, 212, 220, 221 "Six Outer Regiments," 251-52 slavery, 48, 63, 113, 159, 189, 279; categories and conditions of, 107-109; reduced scope under Alaung-hpaya, 26062, 270; as refuge from taxes and services in First Toungoo period, 41; as refuge in seventeenth century, 91, 108109, 112, 141, 152-55, 163-74 passim, 181; as refuge, 1698-1752, 175, 182, 185-87, 191-92, 195, 196; on religious lands, 105, 107-108, 179-80, 279; and socio-administrative hierarchy, 97, 107, 137 Smin Dhaw: early career and putative ancestry of, 184n, 215-16, 219, 223n, 235n, 276; as king of Pegu, 205, 21622, 225, 228, 30On; as restorer of harmony, 217-18, 247, 275; subsequent fate of, 222, 225 socio-administrative hierarchy, 73-74, 107, 112, 137 "solar race" of kings, 83 spies: in nuclear zone, 74, 81; in provinces, 116,202,260,287 Spiro, Melford E., 246 "sub-bishops" {gaing-aauks), 110 succession dispute(s): on Anauk-hpetlun's death, 57; on Bayin-naung's death, 36, 40; general patterns of, 3536, 74-75, 82-83, 116-17, 139-42,

184, 272, 291; and Mln-ye-kyaw-din, 182; on Naya-waya's death, 147; in Sanei's reign, 149-51, 183-84; of 1661, 144-45; on Tabin-shwei-hti's death, 36; in Tanin-ganwei's reign, 186-88 Sumatra, 10, 27 Sumedha, 70-71 Surabaya, 281 Sylhet, 209 Symes, Michael, 221, 266 Syriam: Alaung-hpaya's siege of, 244-49, 252, 256, 257; and anti-Ava revolt, 212, 216, 221; commerce and shipbuilding at, 22, 23, 44, 59, 118, 120, 124, 125, 157, 158n, 159, 186; falls to Anauk-hpet-tun, 53, 60, 113, 252, 283-84; history prior to 1613, 18n, 22n, 23, 42-45 passim, 52, 6On; Restored Toungoo administration of, 57, 59, 115, 118, 124, 186 Tabayin, 92n, 210 Tabin-shwei-hti (r. 1531-1550), 58n, 254, 293; campaigns of, 29-30, 45, 46, 52, 64, 267, 268, 281; compared to Nan-dd-bayin, 273; death of, 36, 42, 75, 190n; myin-yin-tet fraternity under, 256n taings (taxpaying units), 106n, 129n, 165n, 167n Tai-speaking states: and Alaung-hpaya, 264-70; ecology of, 131; ethnic classifications of, 17n; and First Toungoo Empire, 30-31, 37-40, 42, 61, 275; internal structure of, 131; leave Restored Empire, 199, 202-207; levies and revenue from, 31, 124, 131, 132; Restored Toungoo campaigns against, 50-51, 54-55, 57, 131, 133, 204fF.; Restored Toungoo controls over, 73, 132-34; succession patterns in, 132, 133n. See also Shans Takings, see Mons Tale-zi, 243 Talokmyo, 96n, 168n, 233, 255n Tambiah, S. J., 7, 227 Tanin-ganwei (r. 1714-1733), 8n, 192, 293; administrative and political patterns under, 151, 162-63, 185-88,

INDEX I 337 192, 258; background to accession of, 149-50, 182-84; edicts and other sources on, 175, 185, 296, 298; merchant debts of, 126; military reverses under, 204-206, 210, 226 tattooing, 41, 105, 153, 235 Taungthus, 218 Tavoy: and Alaung-hpaya, 259n, 265-67; chronicle from, 298; history to c. 1613, 22, 27, 28, 30, 31; under Restored Toungoo control, 54, 56, 115; after Restored Toungoo collapse, 216, 225, 232, 241 Tawngpeng, 136 taxes: agricultural andfishery,67, 88, 100, 106, 125, 127, 129-30, 160, 191, 213; collection and transmission of, 22, 87, 88, 90-95 passim, 127-30, 154n, 161-63, 191, 204, 212-13; commercial and "occasional," 95n, 102, 108, 119, 124, 125, 130, 158, 160, 261; on households or persons, 24, 100-101, 106, 122, 160, 213, 261 (see ako «this, taxes on); levels under Alaung-hpaya, 261 Ten Royal Laws, 66-67, 7On, 139, 222, 240, 270 Tenasserim, see Mergui-Tenasserim territorial agencies, 87-88, 91, 162 territorial jurisdictions, 74, 91, 93n, 9495 textile imports, 26, 27, 29, 60, 158n; rising prices of, 160; sale and distribution of, 28, 44, 60n, 119; types of, 119n Thaisa, king of Ayudhya, 289 Tha-lun (r. 1629-1648), 131, 177, 194, 273, 288, 293; accession of, 57, 82, 151; administrative weaknesses under, 92, 108-109, 152-53, 156, 163-65, 167; appanage awards under, 79-82; athis under, 107, 113; and controls on monkhood, 110-11, 179; death of, 51, 76, 139, 142; edicts by, 10-11, 63, 73, 295-96; expansion and control of servicemen under, 95, 97-98, 103-105, 113, 169-70, 174, 253; his exposition on government, 87; and gentry, 94-95, 128; interest in maritime contacts, 60, 118, 124; interest in the occult, 51,

194; military policy and campaigns of, 55-57, 62, 109; minor son of, 147; model census of 1635-1638, see census inquests; provincial reforms under, 114-17; relations with ministers, 7678, 90-92, 146, 260; relation to Pegu and Ava, 57-59; slavery under, 108109, 153; success of, 63-64, 112-13, 137-38, 199, 283, 288; uprising against, see Shin-talok Than Tun, Hn, 21n, 24n, 239n, 278, 295n, 296n Thaungdut, 202, 207 Thayetmyo, 47 Thi-rf-u-zana, minister and author, 139, 204, 257n-258n, 263, 299 Thi-ri-zei-y4-kyaw-din ("Serejeakeodang"), minister, 148n, 149n, 150n Thonburi period, in Siam, 5 Three Pagodas Pass, 268 Tin, U, Pagan Wun-dauk, 114n, 150n, 187n, 188, 234, 250-51, 253, 300 Tin HIa Thaw, 278 Toungoo: agriculture at, 19; Anaukhpet-lun's conquest of, 52-53, 76, 113; in First Toungoo period, 24, 2936 passim, 38n, 42, 253-54, 274, 280, 281; and First Toungoo/Restored Toungoo interregnum, 43-48, 50, 61, 216; history from 1740 to 1760, 216, 220, 232, 253, 255n, 259n; as new center of Burman world, 29, 274; permanent eclipse of, 123; Restored Toungoo administration at, 110, 115, 116, 143, 144; taxes at, 121n, 161-62, 164, 212; trade of, 27, 28n, 29, 44n Toungoo-ya-za, commander, 193, 224, 23 In, 235 townships (myas), as administrative units, 78, 93, 94, 128, 164, 194, 233, 25556 Tripura, 211 Trunajaya, of Madura, 283, 284 Tuban, 281 Tusita Heaven, 268, 269n Twln-thin-hmu-gyl, minister: daughters of, 150, 186; in Sanei's reign, 150-51, 159; son of, 150, 188, 189; in Tanlnganwei's reign, 154, 184, 186-88, 190

338 I INDEX two-shoulder sect, see robe-wrapping dis­ pute U Aung-zei-ya, 234. See Alaung-hpaya Uppanna Sudhammavatt Rajavamsakatha, 218n, 219n, 300 Upper Burma: as Alaung-hpaya's base, 229-41, 244, 252-55 passim, 290; en­ hanced early seventeenth-century strength of, 46-49, 5 1 , 52, 59, 61, 113; in First Toungoo period, 15, 16, 30-32, 36, 37, 4 1 ; gentry in, 92fF., 128, 237, 254-56; geographic and de­ mographic advantages of, 17-23; in­ vaded 1736-1752, 207-11, 220-24; markets and shortages in, 122, 159, 176-77, 221; population movements to, see deportations; pre-1555 condi­ tion of, 9, 24-25, 94, 180; as Restored Toungoo heartland, 46fF., 59-61, 64, 77, 228, 275; service units in, 96£F., 109, 126, 152ff. and Chapter 3 passim, 250-53. See oho dry zone, nuclear zone Venetians, Venice, 15, 25 Vientiane, 37n, 39 Vietnam, 4, 5, 10, 227 villages (ywas), as administrative units, 78, 93, 94, 97, 128, 129, 164, 194, 233, 255n, 256 Vizagapatam, 158 Waya-zaw-da, monk, 194-95, 247n Weber, Max, 86 Western Court, 88n, 171n Wittfogel, Karl Α., 10η Wolters, O. W., 6n Wuntho, 134n, 204, 238 Wyatt, David K., 285n, 287, 291n, 292n

Yadana-thein-ga, 229, 238, 240 Yamethin, 36n, 48n, 50, 64, 113, 231, 253 Yawnghwe, 51, 264n Ya-za-di-ya-ζί, general, 232n, 258n Ya-za-mani-su-la Pagoda, 199, 210 Ya-za-nan-da, minister, 189-91, 193, 291n Ye, 225; commerce of, 22, 26-28; under Restored Toungoo control, 54, 115 Ye-gaung-san-kyaw, minister, 223, 258n Yinbaw tribesmen, 203 Yonga headman, 235, 236, 255 Yuans, Yuan country, 17n, 254, 256 Yunnan, 16, 131, 144, 226, 227, 264 Zam-bu-di-ρά ok-hsaung kyan, 253, 294, 295 zone of dependent provinces: administra­ tion contrasted with other zones, 6465, 113, 117, 128-34 passim, 137; Alaung-hpaya's policies in, 253-54, 260; changing character of rebel lead­ ership in, 216-17, 228, 276; defined, 64-65; economic and military value of, 117-30 passim; rebellions in 1660s, 199-201; rebellions starting in 1740, 211-24; Restored Toungoo adminis­ trative reforms in, 10, 13, 34, 64, 11317, 124, 130, 138, 202, 275, 277. See also financial abuse, in provinces; Lower Burma zone of tributaries: defined, 65; ethnic groups and political organizations within, 131-36; reintegrated under Alaung-hpaya, 230, 264ff.; Restored Toungoo rebellions within, 199-211; value to lowland kings, 31, 131, 264. See also hill tribes; Tai-speaking states

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Lieberman, Victor B., 1945Burmese administrative cycles. Derived from author's doctoral dissertation, University of London, 1976. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Burma—Politics and government. I. Tide. JQ448.L53 1984 959.1Ό2 83-13716 ISBN 0-691-05407-X