Brazil's Steel City: Developmentalism, Strategic Power, and Industrial Relations in Volta Redonda, 1941-1964 9780804775809

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brazil’s steel city

Brazil’s Steel City developmentalism, strategic power, and industrial relations in volta redonda, 1941–1964

Oliver J. Dinius

stanford university press stanford, california

Stanford University Press Stanford, California © 2011 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved. This book has been published with the assistance of the Croft Institute for International Studies and the Department of History at the University of Mississippi. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press. Printed in the United States of America on acid-free, archival-quality paper Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Dinius, Oliver J. (Oliver Jürgen) Brazil’s steel city : developmentalism, strategic power, and industrial relations in Volta Redonda, 1941-1964 / Oliver J. Dinius. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-8047-7168-9 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Iron and steel workers--Brazil--Volta Redonda--History--20th century. 2. Industrial relations--Brazil--Volta Redonda--History--20th century. 3. Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional--History. I. Title. HD8039.I52B62 2010 331.7'669142098153--dc22 2010021475 Typeset by Bruce Lundquist in 10.5⁄12 Sabon

For my mother, Heinke Dinius and to the memory of my father, Dr. Gerhard Dinius

Table of Contents

List of Illustrations

ix

List of Tables

xi

Acknowledgments

xiii

Abbreviations

xix

Introduction

1

1. Inducing an Industrial Revolution: The Creation of the National Steel Company

14

2. Industry Comes to a Village, Villagers Come to an Industry

39

3. State Paternalism in the Making of a Company Town

70

4. From Construction to Production: Labor Management in Transition

98

5. Beware of the Communists: Political Policing and Labor Control

124

6. Power over Production: The Technical Division of Labor and Workers’ Strategic Positions in Steel

147

7. Strategic Power, Labor Politics, and the Rise of the Metalworkers Union

179

8. The Crisis of Developmentalism: From Union Hegemony to the Military Coup

206

Conclusion

233

Appendix

239

Notes

243

Bibliography

301

Index

317

List of Illustrations

Maps 2.1 Brazil and Its Southeastern Industrial Core

40

2.2 Origins of Migrants by Municipality and Skill (1941–1946)

44

2.3 Origins of Migrants by Municipality (1942)

44

2.4 Origins of Migrants by Municipality (1944)

45

2.5 Origins of Migrants by Municipality (1946)

45

Figures 2.1 Hiring, Dismissals, and Total Workforce at the CSN (1941–1947)

50

2.2 Hiring and Dismissals at the CSN—Week-by-Week (October 1943–April 1944)

53

2.3 Construction Workers Eating at the Canteen

56

2.4 Work at the Forging Shop during Mill Construction

63

2.5 Construction of Blast Furnace 2—Connecting Gas Tubes

64

2.6 Erecting the Steelworks—Lifting an Overhead Traveling Crane

65

2.7 Erecting the Slabbing and Blooming Mill

66

2.8 Panoramic View of the Mill

67

3.1 Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva

72

3.2 Original Layout of the Company Town

78

3.3 The CSN Marching Band

84

3.4 Robustness Contest (Concurso de Robustez)

87

4.1 Crew of One Million Tons

113

6.1 Steel Production at the CSN from Raw Material to Finished Product

154

x

List of Illustrations

6.2 Charging Machine at the Coke Plant

159

6.3 Casting Steel Ingots

161

6.4 Operators of the Slabbing and Blooming Mill

162

6.5 Cold-Rolling Mill

164

6.6 Hot-Dip Galvanizing Line

166

6.7 Rebuilding the Floor of the Blast Furnace

174

7.1 President Getúlio Vargas and CSN President Sílvio Raulino de Oliveira

184

7.2 President Vargas Talks to a Sheet Counter

185

7.3 CSN Workers Marching in the Labor Day Parade (1951) 186 7.4 Real Wages at CSN by Skill Level (in 1952 Cr$)

197

8.1 Union Leader Othon Reis Fernandes

208

List of Tables

1.1 The Advent of Industries in Brazil

16

1.2 Regional Disparities in Industrial Indicators (1940)

24

2.1 Dismissals by Cause (August 1942–July 1943)

51

2.2 Length of Stay with CSN by Skill Level (for Hires 1941–1944)

53

2.3 Skill Profile of Construction Workforce (1944)

54

2.4 Frequency of Work Accidents (1943)

57

2.5 Work Accidents by Cause and Type of Injury (for Four Months in 1943)

58

2.6 Work Accidents by Skill and Recovery Time (1943)

60

4.1 Skill Profile of Production Workforce (1951)

102

4.2 Skill Profile of Three Cohorts upon Hire and after Five Years

105

4.3 Number and Length of Suspensions (1944–1952)

117

6.1 Workforce by Department and Skill (1951)

157

Acknowledgments

Many people and institutions lent support over the years that this book has been in the making. Work on this project has been at the heart of a journey that took me from my native Germany to Brazil for research and to the United States for an academic career. This tricontinental existence has mostly been exhilarating, but at times also exhausting, which has made me appreciate the unwavering support from my family, friends, and colleagues all the more. My thanks go to all those people and institutions that have helped me on that journey. Keeping track of all the wonderful people I have met on a more than decade-long journey can be a challenge, so let me apologize in advance to all those who would deserve mention but have been left out. Numerous institutions provided generous support for research stays in Brazil. Most of the original archival work was completed in 1997–98 on a fellowship from the German Academic Exchange Service, partially funded by the Fundação Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES). Harvard University’s Graduate School of Arts and Sciences provided a supplementary grant at a time when the currency stabilization program made Brazil a very expensive place to live. The David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies at Harvard University awarded me several summer research grants funded by the Tinker Foundation, the Mellon Foundation, and a gift by Jorge Paulo Lemann. The Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. Fellowship in Business History partially funded follow-up research. A Mellon Fellowship for Latin American History and a Harvard Graduate Society Fellowship provided much-needed teaching relief. At the University of Mississippi, I have benefited from the generous support of the Office for Research and Sponsored Programs, which awarded me two faculty summer research grants. The College of Liberal Arts and the Croft Institute for International Studies each funded one summer research grant. The Department of History and the Croft Institute provided travel funds to several international conferences, giving me an opportunity to present my ongoing research. Both the director of the Croft Institute, Kees Gispen, and the chairman of the history department, Joe Ward, have been extremely supportive of my work, not least by agreeing to assume the cost of the subvention for the publication of this book.

xiv

Acknowledgments

Research in Brazilian archives remains in many respects an adventure that requires guidance from knowledgeable locals. The research in files of the political police at the Arquivo Público do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (APERJ) would have yielded incomparably less without the help of Leila Duarte and Paulo Roberto de Araújo, who kept their eyes open for pertinent documents in not-yet-catalogued fundos of the Acervo DOPS. Thanks also go to the helpful staff at the Arquivo Edgard Leuenroth at ­UNICAMP and at the Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil (CPDOC) in Rio de Janeiro. Many of the resident researchers at CPDOC generously shared their knowledge of the center’s vast archive and of scholarly work not readily available in U.S. libraries. Carlos Marx at the Arquivo Nacional de Brasília deserves special gratitude for making arrangements that allowed me to work my way through hundreds of boxes of largely uncatalogued documents from the Ministry of Labor in a very short window of time. Research at the Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional would not have been feasible without the generous support of José Vieira and Wladimir at the Central Archive, Delgado at the personnel archives, Marlene at the library, Alessandra at the photographic archive, and Zê Augusto in the industrial relations department. They made me feel welcome in a corporate environment, facilitated my research in an eclectic set of uncatalogued sources, and gave me the freedom to discover sources that they were not aware of themselves. I would not have been able to master the processing of large quantities of data from those sources without the excellent work of my local research assistant, Thamara Santos de Oliveira. Marcos Queiroga Barreto and Marina Castro de Abreu, at the CSN headquarters in São Paulo, walked me through the process of getting the authorization to use company photographs and responded speedily to requests for specific permissions. I relied on the generous help of Helton Fraga, José Vieira, and Solange Whehaibe in Volta Redonda to produce the high-definition scans required for publication. Special thanks go to Wilson Menegale at USINA GRÁFICA, who scanned the photos on short notice at no charge. My understanding of work and technology in modern steel mills owes much to conversations with retired workers and engineers in Volta ­Redonda. I am most grateful for the time they took to share their knowledge and memories. The engineer Elmo Coutinho deserves special praise for his willingness to field my often rather ignorant questions about steel mill technology. It is always a joy to return to his home for wide-ranging intellectual conversations. Several of the others I interviewed—Allan Cruz, Ervin Michelstaedter, and Waldyr Bedê—have since passed away, and I hope that this book will help to keep their memory alive. I had the good fortune that Rosalice Fernandes adopted me during my

Acknowledgments

xv

first visit to Volta Redonda and hosted me for subsequent research stays, including several months in 1998 when her house also served as headquarters for her campaign to be elected state representative. The stimulating conversations with Rosalice, João Pedro, Bartolomeu, and Isaque about the latest wrinkle in the trabalhista politics of the Sul Fluminense remain some of my fondest memories of my research year in Brazil. Fausto ­Ferreira and Solange Whehaibe hosted me during follow-up trips to Volta Redonda and put me in touch with voltaredondenses who had stories to tell about the old days. Solange and her husband Paulo always welcomed me for a bate papo at their bookstore, the Livraria Veredas, or at their home. For our good times in Campinas, São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro—se for para jogar bola, tomar um chope, ou pegar uma praia—I thank Adriana, Flávio, Gino, João, Lúcia, Lucila, Marcia, and Paulinho. I am also grateful to the Antunes family in São Paulo and my friend Ralph Teixeira in ­Niterói for hosting me on various occasions. The home of Fernando ­Teixeira da Silva has become my place to land in Campinas, and his friendship is a major reason why the Universidade Estadual de Campinas has become my academic home in Brazil. The greatest intellectual debt I owe to my academic mentor, John Womack, Jr. He provided the constant encouragement to pursue a project that satisfied my intellectual curiosities and took me into unexplored territory. Many of the questions that I try to answer in this book I could never have conceived of without his guidance. During my graduate studies, he was always most generous with his time, whether it was to discuss my current work, to help me overcome institutional hurdles and secure financing, or simply to talk Latin American and global politics. His advice has been invaluable at all stages of the writing of this book. John Coats­ worth’s cheerful support and incisive questions ensured that I did not get bogged down in even more archival detail. Most important, his vision and leadership at the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies created a welcoming, collegial, and supportive institution that became my academic home at Harvard. Michael Hall steered me toward the richest archival sources with uncanny judgment and kept me alert to innovative work by Brazilian scholars. He deserves special praise for his encouragement, now many years back, to pursue my doctoral studies at Harvard, despite the university’s lack of a strong Brazilianist tradition. He had perhaps less input in the early stages of this book than was possible, simply because he was thousands of miles away from the place where it was being written. In an ironic twist, however, he had the last word when he reviewed the manuscript for Stanford University Press. His comments and those of the other reviewer, Marshall Eakin, have been essential in revising the manuscript into a much

xvi

Acknowledgments

more balanced and readable text. Many thanks also to James Woodard for his incisive comments on my introduction, which would be conceptually fuzzier without his input. Norris Pope, my editor at Stanford, steered the book through the review process with great efficiency. That is no small matter, given that time was of the essence. I am truly grateful for his support of this project. It has been a pleasure to work with Sarah Crane Newman, the editorial assistant, and Emily Smith, my production editor, who kept me abreast of the book’s progress at all stages and always responded swiftly to questions. Mary Barbosa was thorough and consistent in the copy editing of the manuscript, and I particularly appreciated her excellent judgment when it came to resolving logical contradictions in some of the denser passages of the text. The history department at the University of Mississippi is a wonderfully collegial place to work, which more than compensated for the occasional sense of intellectual isolation as the only Brazilianist on campus. Nobody was more supportive than Charles Eagles, whose door was always open for me to come in with questions about English composition, university procedures, or the latest New Yorker article. He and several other colleagues were most generous with their time when it came to reading and critiquing some of my still rather Germanic writing. For that I thank Chiarella ­Esposito, Kees Gispen, Joshua Howard, Marc Lerner, John Neff, and Sheila Skemp, as well as my colleague Annette Trefzer in the En­glish department. Joe Ward, the chairman of the history department, knew what it would take to get this book published and steered me through the process with a sure hand. I would also like to thank the administrative assistants, Betty Harness in history and Glenn Schove at the Croft Institute, for their calm and competence in helping me with all the little things to arrange my travel and support my research. My colleague and friend Jeff Jackson in sociology came through when I needed some last-minute technical assistance on an illustration for the book. Oxford, Mississippi, is a small town and not always an easy place to live for an academic immigrant. That makes friends all the more important. I thank my fellow German Annette and her husband Mickey for great company and making their home a place where I was always welcome. Marc and Nina also have been wonderfully supportive. What would Oxford be without their Thanksgiving dinners? As a way to acknowledge all the others, let me just say: thank you, HYFA! My time at Harvard University would have been much less enjoyable without the friendship of Tina, David, Vanja, Aaron and Laura, Michael, Stefano, Patrícia and Patrick, Paul, Sabrina, Dan and Debra, Patricia, and Mónica. My most eventful and rewarding years were those as outings fellow for Dudley House, Harvard’s Graduate Student Center, which Susan

Acknowledgments

xvii

Zawalich—always good spirited and cheerful—fashioned into a place to experience true fellowship. My American host family, Ann and Mead Wyman, made their home my home by inviting me for Thanksgiving dinners and regular visits to their summer house on Martha’s Vineyard. The David Rockefeller Center would not have been the same without the company of my fellow Latin Americanists Aaron, Amilcar, Bill, and Isaac. My uncle Michael Hausser nurtured my curiosity about Latin America and instilled me with the Reiselust to pursue it. He and his wife Birgitt hosted me during my very first, exploratory trip to Brazil in 1993. The experience made the decision of which country to study an easy one—and I have not regretted it since. Most important of all was the unwavering support of my parents, Heinke and Gerhard Dinius. Without the certainty of their support, I may never have moved to a different continent to earn a Ph.D. and embark on an academic career there. The scholarly world always remained foreign to them and my life in the United States something of a mystery, but they supported my choices and helped me pursue my goals as best they could. Sadly, my father did not live to see the book completed. It is dedicated to his memory.

Abbreviations

AESP  Arquivo do Estado de São Paulo AIB  Ação Integralista Brasileira AN  Arquivo Nacional (Rio de Janeiro) ANB  Arquivo Nacional (Brasília) ANL  Aliança Nacional Libertadora APERJ  Arquivo Público do Estado de Rio de Janeiro APTIMBM  Associação Profissional dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias Metalúrgicas de Barra Mansa BIB  Batalhão da Infantaria Blindada CGTB  Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Brasileiros CLT  Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho CNT  Conselho Nacional de Trabalho CPDOC  Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação CSN  Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional CTAL  Confederação dos Trabalhadores da América Latina CTB  Confederação dos Trabalhadores do Brasil DASP  Departamento de Administração do Serviço Público DEOPS  Departamento Estadual de Ordem Política e Social DESPS  Delegacia Especial de Segurança Política e Social (Federal, 1933–1944) DFSP  Departamento Federal de Segurança Pública (Federal, 1944–1960) DGIE  Departamento Geral de Investigações Especiais (Federal, 1964–1983) DIN  Departamento da Imprensa Nacional DNT  Departamento Nacional de Trabalho DOP  Delegacia de Ordem Política e Social (Federal, 1945) DOPS  Divisão de Ordem Política e Social (Federal, 1964–1983)

xx

Abbreviations

DOPS-GB  Departamento de Ordem Política e Social (Guanabara, 1962–1975) DOPS-RJ  Delegacia de Ordem Política e Social—Estado do Rio de Janeiro DOU  Diário Oficial da União DPS  Divisão de Polícia Política e Social (Federal, 1944–1962) DPS/DF  Divisão de Polícia Política e Social/Distrito Federal DRT  Delêgacia Regional de Trabalho FGV  Fundação Getúlio Vargas JCJ  Junta de Conciliação e Julgamento MJNI  Ministério da Justiça e Negocios Interiores MTIC  Ministério de Trabalho, Indústria e Comércio MUT  Movimento Unificador dos Trabalhadores PCB  Partido Comunista do Brasil PSD  Partido Social Democrático PSP  Partido Social Progressista PTB  Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro SNI  Serviço Nacional de Investigações STIMMMEBM  Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias Metalúrgicas, Mecânicas e de Material Elétrico de Barra Mansa STIMMMERJ  Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias Metalúrgicas, Mecânicas e de Material Elétrico do Rio de Janeiro TRE  Tribunal Regional Eleitoral TRT  Tribunal Regional de Trabalho TSE  Tribunal Superior Eleitoral TSN  Tribunal de Segurança Nacional (1935–45) TST  Tribunal Superior de Trabalho UDN  União Democrática Nacional Abbreviations Specific to the CSN BSVR  Boletim de Serviço de Volta Redonda (Volta Redonda Service Bulletin) CTE  Central Termo-Elétrica (thermoelectric plant)

Abbreviations

xxi

DAS  Departamento de Assistência Social (Social Assistance Department) DCF  Departamento de Chapas a Frio (Cold Rolling Department) DCO  Departamento de Coqueria (Coke Plant Department) DCQ  Departamento de Chapas a Quente (Hot Rolling Department) DDC  Departamento dos Cilíndros (Roll Department) DDT  Departamento do Desbastador e Trilhos (Slabbing and Blooming and Rail Mill Department) DEL  Departamento de Eletricidade (Electrical Department) DEN  Departamento de Energia (Energy Department) DFU  Departamento de Fundição (Foundry Department) DME  Departamento de Manutenção Elétrica (Electrical Maintenance Department) DMM  Departamento de Manutenção Mecánica (Mechanical Maintenance Department) DPE  Departamento de Pessoal (Personnel Department) DPP  Departamento de Planejamento de Produção (Production Planning Department) DRE  Departamento de Refratário (Refractory Brick Department) DRI  Departamento de Relações Industriais (Industrial Relations Department) DSG  Departamento de Serviços Gerais (General Services Department) DTF  Departamento de Transporte Ferroviário (Railroad Transport Department) DTR  Departamento de Transporte Interno (Internal Transport Department) FDT  Folha de Descrição de Trabalho (job description sheet) LEI  Linha de Engenharia Industrial (industrial engineering) LNA  Lotação Numérica Aprovada (approved staffing levels) RD  Resolução da Diretoria (directorate’s order) RPE  Regulamento de Pessoal (personnel rules) RPR  Regulamento de Promoção (promotion rules)

brazil’s steel city

Introduction

This is a history of the National Steel Company (Companhia Sider­ úrgica Nacional; CSN), Brazil’s foremost state-owned company and its largest industrial enterprise in the mid-twentieth century. President Getúlio Vargas’s Estado Novo government (1937–1945) created the company in 1941 as the engine of import-substituting industrialization (ISI), a set of policies designed to expand domestic industrial production and reduce dependence on imported capital goods. The CSN built an integrated steel mill in Volta Redonda, a city in the interior of the state of Rio de Janeiro that came to be known as the Cidade do Aço (Steel City). It symbolized the state’s capacity to effect economic change. Once production began, in 1946, the CSN instantly became the country’s main supplier of steel, cutting imports by half, and it retained that dominant position throughout the postwar republic (1946–1964). Its output of bars and beams sustained the construction boom in São Paulo and Rio de ­Janeiro, and most of Brazil’s railroad companies came to rely on its production of rails for new track and replacements on existing lines. The CSN also supplied heavy plate, zinced sheet, and tin plate for a broad range of industrial applications from ship building to the manufacture of tin cans. Prestige projects such as the construction of the new national capital ­Brasília, the friendship bridge to Paraguay, the subways in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, and the Avenida Atlântica—the boulevard along Rio de Janeiro’s famous Copacabana and Ipanema beaches—all consumed steel made in Volta Redonda. The company’s significance was not purely economic, however. The Vargas regime wanted the CSN to set a shining example in the implementation of new social welfare policies for industrial workers. The CSN built Volta Redonda as a company town with subsidized housing and a wide range

2

Introduction

of urban services in order to foster peaceful labor relations and create a model for Brazil’s social development in the industrial age. The government also encouraged the CSN to apply the provisions of the 1943 Consol­ idação das Leis do Trabalho, a comprehensive labor law that guaranteed basic workers’ rights and created a framework for industrial relations. On the other hand, Volta Redonda served as an early testing ground for new institutions of labor control such as the political police, which kept labor organizers under surveillance in order to prevent subversive movements. The Estado Novo government reformed the state to foster industrial development and prevent violent class conflict, and Volta Redonda was the place where these agendas intersected. The CSN’s workers were simultaneously agents of Brazil’s state-led industrialization, beneficiaries of the Estado Novo’s new welfare policies, and targets of the state’s labor control. Their history illuminates the reach and the limits of Vargas’s reforms. While workers are the protagonists, this book does not offer a conventional labor history focused on strike movements. The history of Volta Redonda defies analysis in those terms because the CSN did not suffer a single strike during the postwar republic, a record that distinguished it from industries in Brazil’s urban centers. Rio de Janeiro and greater São Paulo saw persistent labor conflict that peaked in three strike waves: from 1945 to 1947, in the mid-1950s, and in the early 1960s. These strikes affected companies in the metalworking sector but never spread to Volta Redonda.1 The CSN appeared to be insulated from the industrial labor politics that shaped the history of the postwar republic through a series of deep crises and ultimately led to the 1964 military coup. To explain the CSN’s record, one might hypothesize that the steel industry itself was less prone to strike movements, yet the experience in other countries suggests otherwise. European steelmakers suffered many small-scale strikes in the postwar period, and companies in Japan and North America regularly faced extensive shutdowns.2 The steel industry in the United States experienced no less than five national strikes between 1947 and 1959.3 Neither national labor politics nor industry-specific patterns help explain the seemingly peaceful labor relations in Volta Redonda. Labor historians would attribute the absence of strikes either to a lack of worker solidarity or to highly effective labor control, under the assumption that successful strikes indicate a high degree of labor organization. The history of Volta Redonda in the 1940s appears to fit such a conventional interpretation. The CSN recruited a workforce made up primarily of rural migrants, built a company town to house them, and cooperated closely with the political police to prevent labor mobilization. Labor scholars have argued that rural migrants’ lack of socialization into an industrial working-class culture conspires against effective labor organization, and

Introduction

3

they have also noted that company towns are not conducive to mobilization because they lack spaces of sociability that are beyond company control.4 The control the CSN exercised over its property also facilitated repression that quashed any attempts at militant labor organization. Labor historians have shown that workers’ rural origins, resistance to the disciplinary regime of the company town, and the struggle against state repression can be sources of solidarity, but they would still not expect to find strong labor organization in a company town inhabited by rural migrants and subject to heavy policing. The events of the 1950s, however, do not sustain an interpretation of the CSN’s strike record as evidence for weak labor organization. The local metalworkers union became one of the strongest in the country and translated its growing bargaining power vis-à-vis the company into impressive wage gains and generous benefits for its membership. Real wages in Volta Redonda almost doubled from 1951 to 1958 and outpaced gains for industrial workers in the country’s urban centers. The question is how the union developed such bargaining power without industrial action and what compelled the CSN, a mixed-capital enterprise beholden to investors, to pay wages and benefits that made its employees a privileged group among industrial workers. The simple answer is that the CSN was unlike any other company. As a state-administered monopoly producer of a key industrial input, the CSN always had the support of the state, and its scale, technology, and capital-intensive production had no equal in Brazil. The CSN had a unique “factory regime,” to borrow a concept the sociologist Michael Burawoy developed to distinguish “apparatuses of production” under different political economies. He argues that factories under the advanced capitalism of the mid-twentieth century had very different “factory regimes” and corresponding “politics of production” from the ones Karl Marx had observed in the mid-nineteenth century. To understand the CSN’s factory regime, the historian needs to consider, in Burawoy’s terms, the specific “political and ideological apparatus of production” that “regulated production relations.”5 The ideological pillars of Brazil’s postwar state capitalism were desen­ volvimentismo and trabalhismo; literally, “developmentalism” and “laborism.” Desenvolvimentismo referred to the government’s policy to promote economic development via state-led industrialization in order to raise the nation’s standard of living. Trabalhismo designated the government’s social welfare policies specifically targeting industrial workers.6 In Burawoy’s Marxian terms, desenvolvimentismo was an ideology of production and trabalhismo the corresponding ideology of reproduction. Together, they defined the politics of production of Brazil’s postwar state capitalism. Burawoy identifies state intervention in the labor

4

Introduction

process—such as the existence of “social insurance legislation” and legal circumscription of “methods of managerial domination”—as a key characteristic of factory regimes of advanced capitalism. Such measures are “hegemonic” rather than “despotic” in that they persuade the workers to cooperate with management on the basis of consent, although never at the exclusion of coercion. The trabalhismo of the Estado Novo, with its social welfare legislation and comprehensive labor laws, was the Brazilian state’s hegemonic project for labor relations. Desenvolvimentismo and trabalhismo shaped the CSN’s factory regime in ambiguous and often contradictory ways. State agencies, company managers, and workers all professed to be inspired by developmentalist goals even as they brought their competing agendas to bear on labor relations. Desenvolvimentismo served all three groups of actors at different times in justifying measures that shifted the balance of power in industrial relations. Company managers cited the mandate of national development as rationale for implementing a rigid disciplinary regime; the Labor Ministry used it to defend a 1947 intervention in the metalworkers union; and the union demanded that workers be compensated adequately for their contribution to Brazil’s development. Trabalhismo, on the other hand, served primarily the interest of the workers as they tried to reconfigure the CSN’s labor management in the early 1950s. It competed with the company’s Catholic paternalism and principles of rational administration as an ideology for day-to-day labor management, yet trabalhismo also inflected the implementation of the paternalist and the rational programs of labor management. In the 1950s, for example, the metalworkers union used the trabalhista labor law to co-opt scientific management and spread its benefits. The workers, at once subjects and agents of desenvolvimentismo and trabalhismo, exploited that dual role in order to reshape the factory regime and open up new arenas of struggle. The scholarship on postwar Brazil has treated desenvolvimentismo and trabalhismo largely in separation and thus missed how connections and contradictions between the two political projects shaped the country’s production regime. This was not a matter of oversight or deliberate omission. Instead, contemporary political concerns and an academic division of labor have informed the scholarly approaches to the history of industrial labor. A succession of crises and the experience of the military regime (1964–1985) shaped the political socialization and intellectual concerns of Brazilian scholars. Above all, they have wanted to understand the causes of the 1964 military coup, from their perspective the defining moment in Brazil’s postwar history. Foreign scholars, especially those from the United States, often approached their studies with a Cold War agenda, trying to understand whether Brazil faced the risk of massive social unrest or even a

Introduction

5

socialist revolution. Social scientists thus focused heavily on the relationship between labor and capital and on the corresponding labor politics, whether it was to explain the failure of the postwar republic or to assess Brazil’s democratic prospects. The study of development policies (for example, desenvolvimentismo) and the political economy of development was a separate field, left to economists and economic historians. To make sense of the crisis in the early 1960s, most political scientists focused on the role of organized labor in national politics. Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier aptly summarized that line of scholarship in Shap­ ing the Political Arena, where they argued that Brazil possessed a “highly constrained industrial relations system, in which unions were particularly weak and dependent on the state,” and concluded that this resulted in the “displacement of the workers’ struggle into the political arena.”7 In an interpretation that focuses on organized labor’s autonomy from the state, they conclude that the Brazilian labor movement in the early 1960s was “constrained in the sphere of industrial relations,” but “managed to carve out an area of much greater political independence from state control than one might expect.”8 Despite the reference to industrial relations, they pay little attention to labor’s action in the economic arena and its impact on the politics of Brazil’s state capitalism. They treat industrial relations as an alternative arena for labor to demonstrate autonomy, but not as an entry point into a discussion of the interplay between developmentalist economic policy, workers’ power, and labor politics. The Colliers’ analysis echoes concerns that had informed the work of Robert J. Alexander, the first North American scholar to devote sustained attention to industrial relations in Latin America.9 Alexander’s 1962 study of labor relations in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, part of a wave of internationally comparative research, focused on the significance of industrial relation systems for the political stability of Western-style democracies. He lamented that Brazil had no “reasonably honest party of the democratic left with leaders capable of attracting the workers and the lower middle class” to counter the influence of the “particularly dangerous” Communists.10 In Alexander’s wake, social scientists writing in the 1960s and 1970s continued to stress the political role of organized labor in studies on the corporatist regime, populist politics, and industrial conflict regulation.11 A first generation of North American historians working on Brazil’s postwar political history incorporated the politics of organized labor into their analysis.12 Thomas Skidmore, in particular, blamed populist labor politics for undermining Brazil’s modernization and triggering the 1964 coup, but he did not discuss the impact of competing desenvolvimentista and trabalhista agendas on the crisis. He highlighted the industrial workers’ political articulation in support of President Goulart but paid little attention to their economic power.13

6

Introduction

As early as the 1960s, orthodox economists began arguing that desen­ volvimentismo based on import-substituting industrialization had failed as a strategy for sustained economic growth. These critics “felt,” as summarized by Werner Baer, “that the inefficient industrial structure resulting in the production of high-priced goods . . . would severely limit the prospects of industrial growth.”14 They lamented the stagnation caused by import restrictions and saw the greatest promise for the future in radical industrial rationalization and the promotion of agricultural exports.15 The nonorthodox (or “structural”) critics, on the other hand, believed that ISI had not addressed the underlying socioeconomic problems, such as the unequal distribution of income and the backwardness of the agricultural sector, and was therefore bound to fail after the initial dynamism had spent itself. In fact, some structural critics went as far as to argue that ISI had aggravated the very problems that it was supposed to help resolve.16 More recent critics of Latin American desenvolvimentismo often contrasted the inefficiencies of the ISI model with the supposed benefits of implementing the Washington consensus, rehashing the arguments of the orthodox economic critics.17 Scholars have since provided historical perspective on Brazil’s developmentalism. Joseph Love’s comprehensive analysis of Latin American development thought demonstrates that it was neither monolithic nor simply a variation (or companion) of modernization theory. The ideas that ultimately congealed into desenvolvimentismo and later into dependency theory preceded modernization theory, and they underwent significant transformation between the 1940s and the 1960s.18 Kathryn Sikkink traces how Brazil’s development strategy responded to changing domestic and international economic circumstances and to the political priorities of changing coalition governments in the postwar republic. She portrays developmentalism as “a response to and continuation of the Vargas policies” and argues that its adoption in the early 1950s came in response to “changes in the international and domestic economy.” She sees the high point of the developmentalist ideology during the government of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956–1961), who promised to advance Brazil “50 years in 5” and created the new capital of Brasília as a symbol of the country’s ambition.19 The impact of trabalhismo and labor politics on Brazil’s developmentalism lies beyond the scope of those nuanced studies, however. Brazilian sociologists in the 1960s came closest to integrating postwar social and economic policies, labor politics, and the collapse of the development model into a unified argument. They articulated a critique of modernization theory from a mixed structuralist and Marxist perspective as they tried to understand the particular weaknesses of Brazil’s industrial capitalism compared to the industrialized North Atlantic economies. To explain how rapid industrialization had contributed (and could further

Introduction

7

contribute) to Brazil’s social and economic development, they focused on the social conditions necessary to facilitate successful industrialization.20 In Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto argued that a populist coalition of the industrial working class with national and foreign capital sustained the temporary success of the developmentalist regime in the 1950s. They viewed the end of that coalition as a trigger for the regime’s collapse in the early 1960s.21 In a related line of investigation, Marxist labor sociologists studied the place of the industrial working class in Brazilian society to explain the lack of resistance to the 1964 military coup. They linked workers’ political apathy to the nature of Brazil’s industrialization process, which created a small, state-dependent industrial working class whose rural origins conspired against more sustained working-class organization.22 Histories of industrial labor in postwar Brazil based on archival research began to appear in the 1990s. They deemphasize labor’s relationship with the state and the classic issues of corporatism and populism. Inspired by the movement of the ABC metalworkers under the leadership of Luiz Ignácio Lula da Silva, these histories highlight workers’ ability to defend their interests without recourse to the state and its labor bureaucracy.23 The approach reflects the influence of British and American labor historians, who responded to the decline of unionized labor as a political force (and carrier of revolutionary hopes?) by adopting sociocultural approaches to complement the study of class and class struggle. Inspired by the work of E. P. Thompson and the new social history, scholars began integrating cultural approaches into the writing of labor history.24 Central concerns for these labor historians were workers’ ties of solidarity, their quest for citizenship, their ability to resist capitalist imposition, and a representation of their voices (in oral histories). 25 While the older school of social scientists emphasized the Brazilian working class’s cooptation by the state and its leaders’ cooperation with the state bureaucracy, this new generation of scholars highlights the workers’ ability to act independently of the state, resist capitalist domination, and advance ideals of democratic citizenship. My study is not easily categorized in the terms of the older social science literature or the more recent historiography. It attempts to step away from the politically and ideologically charged debates about union politics and workers’ autonomy vis-à-vis the state, which still resonate in recent studies of working-class culture(s) that conceptualize workers’ political choices as either resistance to capitalist exploitation and state repression or inte­ gration into a capitalist logic under state tutelage.26 This dichotomy fails to capture the position of workers in advanced industrial capitalism, even if one allows for “negotiation” and shifting between the two positions.

8

Introduction

The approach views industrial workers primarily as political actors and focuses on their role in labor unions, class-based parties, or social movements. While it does not assume that workers constitute an anti­capitalist vanguard, the approach implicitly preserves a core assumption of old revolutionary politics, namely that workers affect social and political change above all as political rather than as economic actors.27 Particularly in rapidly industrializing economies, however, industrial workers can wield tremendous economic power with serious political consequences, and that power is greatest in the most modern industries. The focus of my study is on the steelworkers of Volta Redonda as economic actors, not in the sense of the rational benefit-maximizing individuals we encounter in neoclassical economic theory, but rather as men whose daily labor sustained the country’s industrial expansion. These workers viewed themselves as key contributors to the nation’s economic development and believed that they deserved to receive their fair share of the CSN’s profits, both as a community and as individuals. In the 1950s the union entered the political arena—not to question the workers’ place in Brazil’s state capitalism, but above all to strengthen the union’s bargaining position and advance its members’ economic interests more effectively. The workers and their union pursued no revolutionary or even radically reformist agenda. They expected Volta Redonda’s social and economic development to reflect the power of the CSN, but they never intended to threaten the survival of the company that employed them and guaranteed a high standard of living. Still, the workers’ persistent push for higher wages and better working conditions placed a heavy financial burden on the CSN, which led to industrial conflict and contributed to a grave political crisis in the early 1960s. The history of industrial labor in Volta Redonda is thus above all a story of the political consequences of economically motivated action. It speaks to the power of these workers that their laying claim to the fruits of their labor interfered with the country’s development policies and reverberated in the politics of the nation. Rather than taking politics out of labor history, as it might appear at first glance, my study incorporates the politics of production in order to “undo” what Burawoy has called “the compartmentalization of production and politics.”28 His observation that studies of the process of production under advanced capitalism tend to underpoliticize production and overpoliticize the state certainly applies to the existing scholarship on Brazil’s postwar republic. A social history of industrial labor at the CSN, in contrast, constitutes a study of the “actual, specific and concrete interventions” of the state to create the “conditions for the reproduction of capitalism” while embedding the analysis of a specific labor process in the history of Brazil’s state capitalism.29 It is not only a case study of industrial labor

Introduction

9

under the postwar republic but also an analysis of the politics of production of the postwar republic. The attention to the unique politics of production at this state-administered enterprise distinguishes my work from studies by Brazilian sociologists, who have used the CSN as a case for the study of old versus new unionism under the questionable assumption that its capital-labor relations can be meaningfully compared to those at private companies in other industrial sectors.30 What set the CSN’s workers apart from their peers in other industries was their strategic position in Brazil’s postwar economy. The labor economist John T. Dunlop introduced the term strategic position as part of his work on industrial relations in the 1940s and 1950s.31 Dunlop aimed to analyze what he called an industrial relations system (IRS) in order to get an understanding of workers’ bargaining power depending on industryspecific technical contexts and country-specific economic, legal, and political contexts. In any IRS, Dunlop posited, a “hierarchy of managers,” a “hierarchy of workers and a potential spokesman” (for example, a union), and “specialized governmental agencies” interacted with each other and were constrained by three “environmental features”: (1) the technological characteristics of the workplace and the work community, (2) the market or budgetary constraints that impinge on the actors, and (3) the locus and distribution of power in the larger society.32 In those terms, the CSN—as the only modern steel mill in Brazil—constituted its own industrial relations system best understood as a “non-market unit” with “budgetary strictures” imposed by the state.33 CSN workers owed their strategic position(s) to the company’s place in the domestic economy (Dunlop’s “market context”) and to the technical division of labor in the integrated steel mill (his “technical context”). The company held a strategic position in Brazil’s industrial economy because a shutdown would have disrupted the functioning of the national economy with serious implications for national security. The workers who had the power to affect a partial or complete shutdown of the mill held technically strategic position(s) within the mill’s technical division of labor. Dunlop never developed a formal theory of strategic position, but he noted that the “technical context . . . shapes the relations among actors by indicating the extent of the power of strategic groups of workers to shut down an operation or enterprise.”34 He equated “strategic positions” with the “indispensability” of workers for industrial operations and their ability to stop many others from producing.35 Workers in strategic positions mattered not only for the execution of strikes but also for the reshaping of all aspects of the “web of rules” governing industrial relations. Dunlop noted that “[t]he bargaining power of wage earners depends upon their strategic position in dealing with the

10

Introduction

firm, and the strategic position of the firm depends in turn upon its dealings with the rest of the market [or industrial] mechanism.”36 He added that the “relative capacities” of workers to shut down operations and of managers to resist such shutdowns “influence their strategies in any conflict over the rules of the industrial relations system.”37 In other words, holding strategic positions empowered workers to wage the small and large battles of the class struggle. Unions that enjoyed the support of workers in strategic positions could bargain aggressively, reshape the factory regime, and potentially even alter the state’s politics of production. The historical record of the CSN—a profound transformation of labor relations without a strike—indicates that its workers must have held considerable strategic power. My analysis of the structure of Brazil’s industrial economy, the production process in steel, and the technical relations of work at the CSN sheds light on the sources of that power. As an analysis of industrial relations that recognizes the economically and technically conditioned power of industrial workers, my study contributes to a critical history of Brazil’s postwar state capitalism. Most historians of Latin American labor conceive of their work as a critical history of capitalism, but as long as class formation, political culture, and community remain the core categories of analysis, those histories will not develop their full potential. Rather than offer a specific analysis of labor’s place in the national and transnational development of industrial capitalism, they reinforce (and at worst rehash) a general critique of the capitalist exploitation of labor. Unless they consider the technical context, take strategic power seriously, and embed their analyses in the politics of production of advanced industrial capitalism, labor historians can offer little more than variations on the theme of the exploitative wage relationship. While interesting, that story is often not the most important one to tell if labor history is thought of as a contribution to the critical history of a specific form of industrial capitalism. Attention to the workers’ economically and technically conditioned power may in fact provide an avenue to reinsert labor history into broader debates about capitalism and to answer critics who charge that labor historians discarded Marx’s most relevant contribution to the critique of modern capitalism when they abandoned the study of political economy.38 The study of workers’ strategic power also speaks to a primary concern of the new social history of labor: “agency.” The case of the CSN demonstrates that workers in strategic industries could counter capitalist labor control, organize a powerful union, reshape the rules of industrial relations to their benefit, and defend the gains against political pressure. Workers in highly strategic industries or in strategic positions in any industry had the power to stand up to management; they were not condemned to be victims of capitalist exploitation. They could do more than engage in everyday

Introduction

11

acts of resistance, discourses of empowerment, or community-based social movements. In contrast to workers in less strategic positions, they had the power to get a better deal for themselves, to help build a strong union for aggressive bargaining, or in some cases even to join a movement to undermine capitalism.39 The analysis of economically and technically conditioned strategic positions combines history from the bottom up with attention to the shop floor (both dear to the new social history of labor) and with an analysis of the distribution of power in industrial society.40 The story of labor relations at the CSN, with profound change in just a few short years, illustrates the importance of external conditions for the workers’ ability to make their own history. The 1940s saw a paternalist developmentalism that aimed to combine the economic development for Brazil with social welfare for the people of Volta Redonda. During the CSN’s construction and for the first few years of its operation, labor relations were on company terms, aided by the government’s use of the political police to control labor. In the 1950s, the metalworkers union— benefited by President Vargas’s push for the full implementation of the labor law—brought the members’ technically strategic power to bear on industrial relations. The union extracted far-reaching concessions on wages and benefits, making the trabalhista promise of social welfare for the industrial worker come true in Volta Redonda.41 Throughout the 1950s and into the early 1960s, the union retained a very strong bargaining position and was able to defend most of the gains against the increasing inflationary pressure. In the end, however, the union’s sustained success—based in the workers’ strategic power—threatened to undermine a company that was central to Brazil’s industrial development regime. The chapters follow a chronological sequence with occasional overlap for the sake of thematic coherence. The first chapter provides background on the CSN’s economic significance and explains the company’s public image as a symbol of Brazil’s postwar industrialization. It analyzes the state of the country’s industrial economy in 1940 and illustrates why advocates of the national steel industry saw the building of the CSN as a major step toward an industrial revolution in Brazil. The analysis highlights the country’s extremely uneven development, with a thoroughly industrialized core in the southeast, to explain the choice of location for the mill. The second part of the chapter illuminates how Vargas’s Estado Novo government overcame the obstacles that had frustrated earlier attempts to establish a modern steel industry in Brazil. Expanded government powers, greater technical expertise, and diplomatic leverage created by World War II all played an important role. Overall, the chapter illustrates why the CSN became a symbol of national progress to all Brazilians, a status that protected it from partisan political squabbling until the late 1950s.

12

Introduction

The transformation of Volta Redonda from an economically depressed village into South America’s most modern industrial city is the focus of the second chapter. Building the steel complex pushed the limits of Brazil’s physical infrastructure and engineering expertise, and it required the recruitment of a large number of migrant workers. The chapter uses quantitative sources from the company archives to trace the workers’ origins, discuss the CSN’s labor regime during construction, and analyze high labor turnover. A look at living conditions and the disciplinary regime illustrates why the workers who stayed remembered the construction years as a time of sacrifice. The CSN planned Volta Redonda as a company town administered in the spirit of Catholic social doctrine. The third chapter probes the intellectual origins of this Catholic paternalism and analyzes how the company translated the ideology into social assistance programs to engineer a peaceful industrial community, the família siderúrgica (steel family). The chapter explores the reach of the assistance programs as well as their limits due to the mill’s operational needs and an inherent contradiction between the hierarchical order and general welfare. Despite these limits, the implicit social contract became an integral part of the community’s self-perception and shaped union discourse and demands in later years. The fourth chapter focuses on labor management in the late 1940s. Transitioning to steel production, the CSN had to build a workforce with the skill profile to operate highly specialized equipment, which required extensive training programs and experimentation with staffing levels. The company rationalized its labor regime by introducing personnel rules, staffing plans, and career ladders, while preserving basic tenets of the paternalist regime such as penalties for the failure to comply with work orders and merit-based prizes and promotions. In effect, the paternalist practices limited the workers’ access to some of the opportunities created by the career ladders as well as legally guaranteed benefits such as profit sharing. The inherent tension between the paternalist and rational tenets of the CSN’s labor management would feed into the revival of the local union in the early 1950s. The role of state institutions in controlling labor at the CSN in the 1940s is the subject of the fifth chapter. It focuses on two instruments of state intervention: the political police and the 1943 federal labor law. The federal and state political police spied on labor organizers in Volta Redonda and used accusations of Communist influence to justify repressive measures against suspected militants. The labor law allowed workers to create a union, in 1944, but also gave the state the bureaucratic tools to shut the union down as part of the anti-Communist crackdown in 1947. The records of the political police and the Labor Ministry show that these two strategies of labor

Introduction

13

control went hand in hand. The chapter shows that the CSN could count on the state’s unmitigated support for its strategy of labor control until the end of the presidency of Eurico Gaspar Dutra (1946–1951). The sixth chapter assesses the workers’ latent strategic power by analyzing the production process and the division of labor in the CSN’s integrated steel mill. The analysis uses technical reports, the company’s occupational descriptions, and publications on technically similar mills as a means of identifying potential bottlenecks in the production process that endowed entire departments and individual workers with the strategic power to disrupt production. The union leaders’ ability to think strategically and bring the steelworkers’ strategic power to bear in negotiations with the company led to fast-rising pay and expanded benefits throughout the 1950s. Over the course of the 1950s, the metalworkers union developed from a dormant body subject to state intervention into one of Brazil’s most power­ ful labor organizations. Chapter seven explains how the politics of the second Vargas presidency (1951–1954) led to the union’s recognition as bargaining agent and illustrates how its leaders translated the steelworkers’ strategic power into substantial material gains. The CSN opposed these changes to industrial relations, but it was outmaneuvered by a union with a superior industrial, legal, and political strategy. The narrative focuses on the two key union victories: the first collective labor contract in 1952 and the defeat of an attempted state intervention in 1955. Chapter eight analyzes how the union tried to use its bargaining power to extract concessions even under the worsening economic conditions of the late 1950s and early 1960s. As rising inflation and the company’s financial struggles diminished opportunities for general raises, the union tried to increase workers’ take-home pay by pushing the company to expand incentive pay. It pressured the CSN through direct negotiations and labor court actions, and it assumed a growing role in shop floor management. Industrial relations grew tenser as management warned about financial collapse while union leaders insisted that the company fulfill its obligations to the community. The 1964 coup—in which the army occupied Volta Redonda—resolved the conflict by curtailing union power, limiting workers’ control, and diminishing the CSN’s financial responsibilities. The conclusion briefly sketches the changes to industrial relations after the military coup and lays out the lessons we can draw from the study of the CSN for writing the history of postwar Brazil and other developmentalist regimes.

1

Inducing an Industrial Revolution the creation of the national steel company

The key to solving our economic problems and even to defining our political destiny lies in the establishment of a national steel industry. ­—Elysio de Carvalho, 1919 Brasil, potência mundial, opening sentence1

By 1940, the state of Brazil’s economy still posed major obstacles to fulfilling Elysio de Carvalho’s dream of a national steel industry. The economy was industrializing, not yet industrial. The use of mechanized power had begun in the mid-nineteenth century, spread more widely in the 1890s, and reached most Brazilian states after World War I. Still, by the 1930s, only the country’s southeast had a developed industrial economy, and even there the extensive use of industrial power remained limited to urban centers and the railroad corridors. The forces of mechanization had yet to transform the mode of production in the vast interior. Advocates of an industrialization policy, often military officers, became more vocal after World War I, which had taught them that the ability to fight a modern war depended on industrial development. They hoped that a modern steel industry would jump-start an industrial revolution in Brazil and ultimately help develop an industrial sector that could produce modern armaments. The advocates of a national steel industry found a champion of their cause in President Getúlio Vargas (1930–1945), who promised to provide the political, institutional, and financial support needed to set Brazil on a course of rapid and extensive industrial development. The first part of this chapter surveys the key features of Brazil’s industrialization up until 1940 to illustrate the structural obstacles the government faced in its push to implant heavy industry. The sketch of the country’s industrial geography focuses on the spread of mechanization and on the creation and growth of particular sectors as key indicators for industrial development. Topics that have dominated the economic historiography on Brazil—entrepreneurship, the “onset of modernization,” and the trajectory of economic growth—receive less attention because they do not speak di-

Inducing an Industrial Revolution

15

rectly to the technological state of an industrial economy.2 The argument is that Brazil’s state of industrial development until well into the twentieth century conspired against the creation of a large-scale steel industry, which depended on a developed transportation infrastructure, specialized technical expertise, and reliable supplies of industrially mined iron ore, coal, and minerals. The analysis thus illuminates why Brazilians celebrated the construction of the Volta Redonda steel mill in the early 1940s as a breakthrough. The observation that only Brazil’s most developed region offered the infrastructure and industrial expertise to support the creation of the steel industry, however, reminds us of the inherent limits of development policies based on rapid industrialization. The backward and forward linkages created by a modern steel industry initially benefited above all the region that was already most industrialized, thus reinforcing rather than diminishing economic disparities. The second part of the chapter casts light on how Vargas’s Estado Novo government (1937–1945) overcame political, diplomatic, and financial obstacles to create the National Steel Company (Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional; CSN). Very few Brazilians at the time had the technical expertise to contribute to such an ambitious project, and Vargas selected the best of them to lead the implementation of the steel industry. They relied on firm government support and used their national as well as international connections to overcome the political resistance at home and diplomatic obstacles abroad. They accomplished the task in a time of crisis, during a fast-expanding global war, which aided their effort on the diplomatic front but disrupted plans for the financing of the mill and the production of its equipment. The additional obstacles the government and its technical experts had to overcome because of World War II only added to the sense that the creation of the CSN was a national triumph and a sign of better (industrial) times to come.

Brazil’s Industrial Development to 1940 Brazil’s industrialization from the mid-nineteenth century to 1940 occurred in four phases (Table 1.1). The chronological divisions correspond to major shifts in national politics that changed the institutional framework for industrial capitalism. After the abolition of slavery in 1888 and the end of the Empire in 1889, the new republican government tried to jump-start industrialization in an economy dependent on the export of plantation crops. World War I (1914–1918) highlighted Brazil’s dependency on industrial imports and convinced the military leadership that the country needed to promote strategic industries. The overthrow of the republican government by

16

Chapter 1 table 1.1 The Advent of Industries in Brazil

Before 1889

1889–1914

1914–1930

1930–1940

Railroads Textile mills Sugar milling Coffee processing Hats and shoes Furniture Matches Shipbuilding*

Metalworking Flour milling Brewing Electrical generation Powder & cartridges Ports

Steel (charcoal) Coal mining Construction Meatpacking Cement Paper milling Rubber products Pharmaceutical

Synthetic chemistry Artillery shells Shipbuilding* Aluminum

*The decline of the shipbuilding industry after 1889 and its subsequent revival justify the inclusion in two columns. Source: Developed based on a table by Wilson Suzigan that covered only manufacturing industries and distinguished only two periods: “before” and “after World War I.” Suzigan, A indústria brasileira, 114.

Getúlio Vargas in 1930 resulted in a weakening of the federalist system that had benefited wealthy states such as São Paulo and ultimately replaced it, in 1937, with a stronger central state capable of a concerted industrial policy. Each of these political transitions did trigger a renewed sense of urgency among national elites and helped transform patterns of investment by domestic and foreign capitalists as well as the Brazilian state.3 The first extensive use of industrial machinery and mechanized power occurred on plantations that produced cash crops for export with slave labor. By the 1850s, steam engines powered sugar mills as well as mechanized processing equipment on coffee plantations (fazendas).4 Railroads, textile mills, light manufacturers, and metalworking companies were the drivers of Brazil’s first wave of industrialization. Investment in railroads took off in the 1850s, above all in the southeast, where they served the booming coffee economy.5 Railroad maintenance shops, private machine factories, and army arsenals all used industrial power to manufacture spare parts, and navy shipyards manufactured steam engines, propellers, pumps, and boilers for its vessels.6 By 1885, the southeastern states were home to thirty-three textile mills that used industrial power.7 Fast-growing food-processing and metalworking sectors, the expansion of ports, and the shift to electric power shaped the industrial development from 1889 to 1914. Twenty-two sugar refineries operated in Brazil by 1907; flour mills satisfied two-thirds of the domestic demand by 1914.8 The 1890s saw the founding of numerous metalworking companies, above all in São Paulo, which supplied railroads, coffee plantations, and construction sites. Most produced simple items such as nails, screws, hinges, and spare parts, but larger ones such as Companhia Mecânica e Importadora de São Paulo and Trajano de Medeiros in Rio de Janeiro manufactured steam engines, water turbines, and railcars.9 The two most important

Inducing an Industrial Revolution

17

ports, Santos and Rio de Janeiro, expanded, modernized their facilities, and greatly increased their use of industrial power in the 1890s and 1900s, respectively.10 The Mascarenhas textile factory in Juiz de Fora (MG) had pioneered the use of electric power in 1889, but it took large-scale investment by a Canadian company to demonstrate the full potential of the industrial use of electricity.11 In 1901, the São Paulo Tramway, Light, and Power Company—popularly known as LIGHT—inaugurated the first large hydroelectric plant at Parnaíba on the River Tieté; by 1907, its electricity powered 418 engines in 257 industrial factories in the city of São Paulo. LIGHT’s sister company, the Rio de Janeiro Tramway, Light, and Power Company, built a hydroelectric plant damming the Piraí River in the Serra do Mar near Riberão das Lages to supply power for public lighting, tramways, and industrial manufacturing in the city of Rio de Janeiro.12 By 1914, Brazil had not yet undergone its Second Industrial Revolution. The country had no chemical industry and no modern steel industry. Coal mining in the southern states was not industrial, construction companies used little industrial power, and the country had no cement industry. Domestic industry could not have supplied the inputs to build a modern steel mill, a chemical plant, or a large hydroelectric dam. The disruption of trade during World War I reinforced the existing industrial structure. It benefited light manufacturers that processed domestic raw materials, while companies that depended on imports for machinery, spare parts, and raw materials struggled.13 Domestic industry only met the demand for hats, shoes, textiles, bagging, fiber and rope, nails, iron and kitchen utensils, matches, rough paints, and wrapping paper, and it came close to meeting it for processed sugar, flour, and beverages.14 The textile industry remained dominant. Arthur Redfield’s 1919 survey of Brazil’s economic conditions devoted as many pages to the textile sector as to all other industries combined.15 The years after World War I witnessed a spurt in industrialization as domestic investment increased and foreign investment diversified. Multi­ national companies from North America and continental Europe invested in Brazil, thus diminishing the share of British capital, which had dominated investments in railroads, tramways, light and power, meatpacking plants, flourmills, and urban development companies. 16 Swift/Armour opened meatpacking plants, General Electric manufactured lightbulbs, and a joint venture of DuPont, Imperial Chemical Ind., and Remington produced shells and gunpowder. Unilever opened a soap factory, Philips assembled radios, and Pirelli produced insulated copper cable.17 Most significantly, the capacities in two industries that had been at the heart of the second Industrial Revolution in Western Europe and North America— electrical generation and iron and steel—expanded rapidly throughout the

18

Chapter 1

1920s and 1930s. The metalworking, construction, and mining industries saw growth as well. Brazil’s capacities to produce capital goods expanded. As railroads operated more trains on existing lines, accelerating wear and tear, they made more spare parts and began manufacturing their own rolling stock.18 The shops of the Mogiana Railway Company (Companhia Mogiana de Estradas de Ferro) in Campinas built railcars starting in the 1910s. The Central Railway of Brazil (Estrada de Ferro Central do Brasil; EFCB) took over Trajano de Medeiros in 1930 and merged the workshops to create an industrial complex that manufactured six hundred wagons and one hundred carriages annually. In the 1930s, LIGHT Rio de Janeiro created the Cidade Light, a maintenance city with bronze and iron foundries, a chemical test laboratory, and mechanical shops to produce tramcars, engines, and gas and water meters. It employed more than two thousand men.19 In response to import shortages during World War I, the armed forces established industrial metalworking shops in four of its nine arsenals.20 The cartridge and shell factory at Realengo had a small rolling mill, and the army arsenals in Porto Alegre and Rio de Janeiro manufactured portable arms.21 In the 1930s, the government opened an artillery shell factory in Andaraí that applied the principles of scientific management to its production.22 In a major expansion completed in 1930, the navy arsenal on Ilha das Cobras added a large dry dock, a foundry, its own generating plant, and shops for electrical repairs, machine tools, and armaments.23 It completed the first domestically manufactured reconnaissance ship in 1936 and built six minelayers and nine antitorpedo boats in the years to follow. By 1941, the arsenal had grown into the country’s largest industrial operation with more than five thousand workers.24 Port modernizations and urban reforms had triggered a construction boom in the 1900s, but until the 1920s large contracts usually went to foreign companies. British and French firms expanded the ports of Rio de Janeiro, Manaus, and Recife. British and American firms built the earliest hydroelectric dams in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. As late as the 1930s, LIGHT Rio de Janeiro chose Dwight P. Robinson & Co. from Philadelphia over domestic bidders to build its maintenance shops.25 The one exception had been the construction of the Santos docks and the Itatininga power plant, before World War I, by the Guinle family’s Companhia Docas de Santos. Domestic firms took a greater share of the market in the 1920s, when the Companhia Mecânica e Importadora de São Paulo built the new navy shipyards in Rio de Janeiro and Roberto Simonsen’s Companhia Constructora de Santos expanded army barracks all across southern ­Brazil.26 Large-scale construction became feasible with the use of reinforced concrete. Examples include the EFCB’s shops in Belo Horizonte (1924), the

Inducing an Industrial Revolution

19

warehouses in the Rio de Janeiro and Porto Alegre ports (1926), the Rio de Pedras dam near Cubatão (late 1920s), and the navy shipyards on the Ilha de Cobras (1931).27 Many Brazilian engineers considered reinforced concrete to be their profession’s greatest gift to industrial progress in the First Republic, and the country’s leading engineering schools all taught the applied mathematics of reinforced concrete.28 The statue of Cristo Redentor (1931), towering over Rio de Janeiro, became the monument to this new domestic expertise.29 By 1920, Brazil’s chemical industry remained so insignificant that the Commercial Encyclopedia listed it under “various minor industries.”30 The cement industry, which employed simple chemical processes, did not develop until the 1930s. Imports accounted for 97 percent of all cement consumption in 1926, a share that dropped to 82 percent in 1930, 34 percent in 1934, and 8 percent in 1938. The government offered financial incentives to domestic producers in the face of a construction boom. Brazilian Portland Cement Company opened the country’s first plant at Perús (SP) in 1926; the Portland Mauá National Cement Company, also a subsidiary of a U.S. firm, opened a second plant in São Gonçalo (RJ) in 1933. By the late 1930s, five plants were in operation and two more under construction. 31 Until the 1920s, the only important chemical industry was Du Pont’s factory in Piquete, opened in 1909, which produced smokeless gunpowder for the army.32 The production of rayon was the first industrial application of synthetic chemistry in Brazil. Indústrias Reunidas F. Matarazzo opened a plant in 1926, followed by Nitro Química and the Companhia Brasileira Rhodiaceta—Fábrica de Rayon in the 1930s.33 The fact that Brazil had to import all of its petroleum and all refined petroleum products hampered the development of a chemical industry. Three small refineries opened in 1935, two in Rio Grande so Sul, and one in São Paulo, but the nationalization of the sector in 1938 curtailed foreign investment.34 The expansion of hydroelectric power propelled industrialization in the 1920s and 1930s. It accounted for over 80 percent of overall capacity, which increased from 160 MW in 1910 to 357 MW in 1920, 779 MW in 1930, and 1,243 MW in 1940.35 In São Paulo, industry used over 7.7 million kWh per month, with textile mills (five million kWh), metalworking (560,000kWh), and food processing (500,000kWh) as the largest consumers. In the 1920s, LIGHT São Paulo responded to increasing demand by building the Rio de Pedras dam and the Cubatão hydroelectric plant. Also in the 1920s, LIGHT Rio de Janeiro built the Ilha dos Pombos hydroelectric plant on the Paraíba River, which generated 117 MW in the late 1930s.36 In 1938, LIGHT São Paulo and LIGHT Rio de Janeiro together generated 596 MW of electricity, or roughly 54 percent of national consumption. Further expansions more than doubled their plants’ capacities

20

Chapter 1

to 1,453 MW by 1942.37 General Electric’s subsidiary Electric Bond and Share Company (EBASCO) and its subsidiary, the American Foreign Power Co. (AMFORP), generated electricity and operated streetcars in Natal, ­Recife, Maceió, Salvador, Vitória, Belo Horizonte, Niterói, Curitiba, Porto Alegre, and Pelotas.38 AMFORP also owned the Companhia Paulista de Força e Luz, which had created a pioneering regional power grid for 106 municipalities in the São Paulo coffee zone.39 Otherwise, the southeast remained a patchwork of grids with different technical standards. LIGHT São Paulo and CBEE in northeastern Rio de Janeiro transmitted at 60 cycles; LIGHT Rio de Janeiro at 50 cycles. The Estado Novo failed in its attempt to impose a uniform standard, which delayed the integration of the grid until the 1960s.40 By 1940, electricity had become the prime mover of industrial engines. Three quarters of all engines ran on electric power compared to only 47 percent in 1920. The share of steam engines dropped from 36 percent to less than 20 percent and the shares of internal combustion engines (4 percent) and hydraulic force (2 percent) had become negligible.41 By the 1920s, most trains and many ships still ran on steam, and some factories still advertised the use of steam engines, but the cost of imported coal set limits for a dynamic industrialization based on steam power.42 The only exception were the southern states of Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina, where locally mined coal was burned in steam engines to generate electricity.43 In 1934, Brazil consumed 700,000 tons of liquid fossil fuel, all imported. The fleet of registered motor vehicles was small: 106,764 cars, 54,903 trucks, and 8,529 buses as of 1938.44 Diesel locomotives remained a rarity, as railroad companies converted directly from steam to electricity.45 Industrial power and mechanization had little impact on Brazilian mining until the 1940s.46 Only two gold mining companies had adopted industrial deep shaft technology: the British Ouro Preto Gold Mines Company in Passagem (MG) and St. John d’el Rey Mining Company in Morro Velho (MG).47 The industrial mining of coal and iron ore began after World War  I, when the government of President Epitácio Pessôa (1919–1922) offered incentives for the exploitation of strategic raw materials.48 In the late 1910s, the Companhia Nacional de Mineração de Barro Branco and the Companhia Carbonífera de Araranguá opened the first coal mines in the state of Santa Catarina. Overall coal production in Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina increased to 385,000 tons by 1930 and reached 1,336,000 tons by 1940, as railroads and electric companies in these southern states began using domestic coal as fuel.49 Tests conducted by a technical mission to France in the early 1920s did not establish conclusively whether domestic coal was suitable to make coke for use in steel mills, and the issue received no further attention until the early

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1940s.50 Brazil’s iron ore deposits, known since colonial times, remained underexplored until 1910, when an international report identified them as some of the richest in the world. Foreign investors scrambled to acquire concessions, but political struggles over subsoil rights prevented any iron ore mining at industrial scale until the early 1940s. Nationalist backlash against a concession to the British Itabira Iron Ore Company Ltd. halted exploration in the Vale do Rio Doce (MG), which had some of the richest ore.51 The Estado Novo government ultimately canceled the Itabira concession in the late 1930s and created a state-administered company, the Companhia do Vale do Rio Doce, to mine ore for domestic use and export. It began operations in 1943.52 The iron and steel industry developed slowly. The first attempt to establish large-scale iron production went back to the 1810s, when the Portuguese colonial rulers—then governing the Empire from Rio de Janeiro—created the royal ironworks in São João de Ipanema. That initiative failed, however, just like all subsequent attempts in the nineteenth century to jump-start an iron and steel industry in Brazil. In 1900, the United States put out ten million tons of steel, while Brazil produced no steel and just two thousand tons of pig iron.53 President Nilo Peçanha (1909–1910) sent General F. M. de Souza Aguiar on a fact-finding mission on the iron and steel industries of Europe and North America. His report highlighted Brazil’s potential as steel producer, which led the Peçanha government to offer incentives for companies willing to invest in a railroad to the ore reserves and an iron and steel mill.54 In 1920, President ­Epitâcio Pessôa (1919–1922) granted Itabira Iron Ore a concession to refurbish the Estrada de Ferro Vitória a Minas (Vitória–Minas Railway), expand its lines to the ore fields, and build a steel mill with an annual production of 150,000 tons.55 Political resistance by the governor of Minas Gerais, Artur Bernardes, and the collapse of financial markets in 1929/30 doomed the plan, however.56 In the meantime, smaller companies began producing steel domestically. In 1921, Acieries Reunies de Burback-Eich Dulange (ARBED) from Belgium took over the Companhia Siderúrgica Mineira, renamed it Companhia Siderúrgica Belgo-Mineira (CSBM), and began producing steel in Sabará. The mill operated two small charcoal-based blast furnaces and three Siemens-Martin furnaces to put out 40,000 tons of steel annually. CSBM also built a charcoal-based integrated mill at João Monlevade in Minas Gerais that began production in the late 1930s.57 Of the other twenty-six small iron and steel companies created in the 1920s and 1930s, the Companhia Brasileira de Usinas Metalúrgicas, with mills in Morro Grande (MG) and Neves (RJ), and the Companhia Brasileira de Mineração e Metalúrgica in São Caetano (SP) were the largest. Together with CSBM they accounted for 90 percent of domestic production. By the

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late 1930s, Brazil had an iron and steel industry, but its production fell far short of domestic demand.58 The lack of institutions to channel private savings into industrial credit remained an obstacle to Brazil’s development in the 1930s. The economy had rebounded well from the Great Depression and domestic demand for capital goods grew, but that did not translate into easier credit for industrial enterprises. The main sources of capital still were import houses diversifying into manufacturing, foreign investment, and the reinvestment of profits by industrial groups.59 José Ermírio de Moraes’s Votarantim group, for example, used its profits from the textile business to invest in the rayon, steel, and aluminum industries.60 LIGHT financed its expansion of capital assets in the 1930s entirely from earnings. Foreign groups could no longer legally invest in subsoil resources and strategic industries, however, which restricted new investments in mining, hydroelectric power, shipyards, public utilities, and banks.61 Brazilian stock markets were not yet the place to raise large amounts of industrial capital. Large and medium-sized companies registered for trading, but most were family enterprises whose principal owner controlled most stock and still managed operations.62 A major shift only occurred in the early 1940s, when trading in industrial companies quadrupled and trading in debentures doubled.63 Throughout the 1930s, banks remained unresponsive to the needs of an industrial economy. Roberto Simonsen summarized the misgivings of the nation’s leading industrialists: “[W]e do not have stable or elastic money. We do not have an efficient organization of credit . . . So, how can we create the productive apparatus to augment Brazilian acquisitive capacity when the monetary disorder and credit shortage create anarchy for production . . . ? . . . Our banking apparatus does not favor the financing of production . . .”64 The 1938 annual report of the Banco do Comércio e Indústria de São Paulo, an industrial bank by name, made no mention of credit to industrial companies. Its main business was financing the coffee stabilization program.65 The Banco Comércio e Indústria de Minas Gerais worked almost exclusively with agricultural credit.66 The Banco do Brasil financed agricultural businesses and only gave industrial credit to companies with close links to the agricultural sector.67 The restrictive lending practices began to change only in the early 1940s. By September 1942, the Banco do Brasil’s Department of Agriculture and Industry financed more than 738 million cruzeiros (Cr$) in industrial loans, two-thirds of them long term, while agricultural loans accounted for just over one billion ­cruzeiros.68 Industry still paid higher interest rates for long-term loans than agricultural businesses, however.69 Growing deposits by pension funds explained the Banco do Brasil’s newfound generosity toward industry. The pension funds, a centerpiece of

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Vargas’s welfare reforms in the 1930s, could originally buy only secure government bonds, but the Industrial Pension Institute changed that policy in 1937 and permitted investment in real estate mortgages and governmentguaranteed loans.70 Securing investors for industrial ventures nevertheless remained difficult. The report of the 1943 American Technical Mission to Brazil, commonly referred to as the Cooke Mission, blamed a tax code that favored investment in real estate and government bonds over corporate profits and private loans. The mission proposed a preferential rate for income from industrial sources, called for tax credits on reinvested industrial profits, and suggested differential exchange rates to facilitate the import of industrial machinery.71 After half a century of industrialization, Brazil still lacked the financial institutions to adequately support sustained growth. By 1940, Brazil’s industrial development remained extremely uneven (see Table 1.2). Parts of the southeast and some state capitals had an industrial economy, but artisanal and protoindustrial production still dominated the rest of the country.72 The workforce remained heavily agricultural. In 1920, 69.7 percent (6.4 million people) of the economically active population worked in agriculture and 13.8 percent (1.3 million) in industry. By 1940, the share of agricultural workers had declined to 66.4 percent (9.7 million), but the share of industrial workers had declined even more to 10.3 percent (1.5 million).73 The value of industrial production, however, surpassed the value of agricultural production at some point in the 1930s. According to a report by the Sheffield Mission, industrial production exceeded agricultural production in value by 1930. The census reported the value of industrial production for 1939 at Cr$17.5 billion, more than twice that of agricultural production (Cr$8 billion).74 Backward projections based on more reliable data from the 1940s suggest, however, that agriculture may still have accounted for a greater share of the gross national product than industry as late as 1939.75 Brazil’s southeast prospered during the coffee boom and received the lion’s share of industrial investment in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo were the undisputed leaders of early industrialization, as foreign capitalists financed railroads and urban services and local merchants reinvested in light manufacturing.76 The two cities were at the core of an industrializing region that included the state of Rio de Janeiro, the southern part of Minas Gerais, and the eastern part of the state of São Paulo. The sugar-producing region around Campos (RJ), the mining zone of Minas Gerais, and the Paraíba valley in both Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo all saw significant investment in industry, as did cities on major railroad corridors such as Duque de Caxias (RJ), Petrópolis (RJ), Teresópolis (RJ), Barra do Piraí (RJ), and Juíz de Fora (MG). In the state of São Paulo, industrialization extended beyond

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the Santos–São Paulo axis to the coffee districts of the interior, which had attracted substantial investments in railroads and electric power.77 Outside of the southeastern core, only the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul had seen substantial industrial development. Companies linked to the ranching economy had opened processing facilities in port cities of Porto Alegre, Rio Grande, and Pelotas. By 1940, the state had several meatpacking plants that existed alongside protoindustrial charqueadas producing jerked beef.78 The rest of Brazil had seen very limited industrialization. The northeast accounted for 35 percent of the country’s population but for only 10 percent of foreign investment and industrial production (Table 1.2). The railroads there formed no network; they only connected areas of cash crop production to ports. State capitals had electric power and tramway systems, but the region’s volatile export earnings did not fuel the development of a manufacturing sector. The productivity of northeastern sugar mills lagged far behind that of their competitors in São Paulo and abroad.79 The table 1.2 Regional Disparities in Industrial Indicators (1940) State or Region

SP

DF/RJ*

MG

RS

Northeast Rest**

As share of national total (unless otherwise noted)

Population

a

Industrial Workforce

b

Manufacturing Workforce b Value of Industrial Production Industrial Engine Power

c

c

Ratio Electrical to Steam Engines Electrical Generation d Electrical Generation Capacity Average Unit Capacity (kW)

d

d

c

17.4%

8.8%

16.3%

8.1%

35%

14.4%

25.2%

14.6%

10.3%

6.4%

26.4%

17.1%

30.6%

17.4%

9.9%

7.4%

24.7%

10.0%

43.5%

24%

6.7%

9.8%

10.1%

6%

37.4%

20.1%

8.7%

9.2%

15.8%

8.8%

100:7

100: 9

100:14

100:49

48.8%

23.6%

9.5%

4.4%

100:91 100:103 8.5%

5.2%

60%

15.7%

8.5%

3.8%

7.2%

4.8%

5,410

2,504

352

184

187

190

As share of the state’s or region’s economically active population

Industrial Workforce b Manufacturing Workforce

b

17.2%

21.9%

8.6%

10.3%

9.5%

15.5%

16.3%

20.4%

6.4%

9.3%

7.0%

7.1%

*Includes the Federal District and the state of Rio de Janeiro. **Includes the north (Amazonas, Pará, and Acre), the center-west (Goiás, Matto Grosso), and the states of Santa Catarina, Paraná, and Espírito Santo. Sources: Data from (a) Armin K Ludwig, Brazil: A Handbook of Historical Statistics (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1985), 47, 225; (b) IBGE, Recenseamento geral do Brasil (1.º de setembro de 1940): censo demográfico (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1950), 74–75, 110–53; (c) IBGE, Recenseamento geral, 1940: censos econômicos, 184–97; (d) IBGE, Recenseamento geral, 1940: censos econômicos, 194–95.

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economy of Brazil’s north had fallen into decay after the end of the rubber boom in the 1910s. Industries established in the 1890s, often with government subsidies, had long closed their doors.80 Steamship companies that had once sustained four machine shops and a shipyard in Belém allowed their vessels to fall into disrepair.81 In 1920, the Commercial Encyclope­ dia—a survey for the prospective British investor—had drawn a distinction between the land of opportunity “south of Bahia” and the less promising region from “Bahia to the north.” That distinction still rang true in 1940.82 Yet, some areas in Brazil’s south and southeast, such as Espírito Santo, Paraná, and Santa Catarina, did not share in the dynamic industrialization of the Rio de Janeiro–São Paulo axis.83 Indicators of industrial development (Table 1.2) illustrate the gap between the southeastern core and the rest of the country, and they still understate the real disparities. For Minas Gerais, for example, state-level census data obscures the difference between industrialized pockets in the south and an economy based on subsistence agriculture in the north.84 Moreover, the employment census exaggerated the level of industrialization by categorizing workers in extractive activities, such as Amazonian rubber tappers and northeastern fishermen, as “industrial” workers. The disparities in industrial development explain why the planners of the national steel industry considered only locations in the southeast. It was the only region that had the rail network to bring in raw materials and ship out products, the ports to receive imported coal, and a supply of hydroelectric power sufficient to operate a steel mill. The location also assured proximity to industrial customers and access to a labor pool: industries in the region employed workers with expertise in large-scale construction, mechanical and electrical maintenance, and the generation and distribution of electric power. Even the southeastern industrial core, however, lacked a developed capital goods industry. The equipment to build a mill and the machinery to produce steel would have to be imported. By 1940, Brazil did not even produce oil-based synthetic lubricants, essential for operating a rolling mill. Domestic companies mined iron ore, coal, limestone, and manganese, but not yet in the required quantities. It would take political will and leadership to mobilize the resources for the creation of a modern steel industry in Brazil.

The Estado Novo Tackles the Steel Problem By 1937, the Vargas government had made little progress in addressing the “steel problem.” It had appointed commissions and they had submitted numerous reports, but the country still lacked an integrated steel mill.85 The proclamation of the Estado Novo in November 1937 offered

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a new opportunity under a constitution that granted the president much more extensive powers. The closing of Parliament and the strengthening of the federal executive facilitated the pursuit of an ambitious industrialization policy. President Vargas declared in a 1938 speech on the Estado Novo’s economic plan that the creation of a modern steel industry had the highest priority. He also expressed a preference for state control.86 Vargas expected stiff political resistance from the same interests that had stymied earlier attempts to resolve the steel question.87 Domestic steel producers, all still in the charcoal age, steel importers, and foreign investors all stood to lose from the creation of a state-controlled modern integrated mill. Even proponents of a national steel industry still disagreed over the extent of foreign participation and the role of the state. Vargas asked two powerful federal economic councils to propose solutions for the steel problem.88 The Technical Council for Economy and Finances (Conselho Técnico de Economia e Finanças; CTEF), which advised the government on matters as diverse as international debt, the tax code, stock markets, deposit banks, and transport infrastructure, split over the steel question.89 The influential entrepreneurs Guilherme Guinle and Mário de Andrade favored a national solution, but Pedro Rache, head of the steel subcommittee, lined up majority support for involving foreign capital.90 They also disagreed on the idea of linking the export of iron ore to the creation of a steel mill. Those in favor of involving foreign capital argued that foreign investors would be willing to invest in domestic industry in order to gain access to Brazil’s rich iron ore fields. The nationalists, on the other hand, categorically refused—as they put it—to surrender (entregar) national resources to foreign capital and insisted that creating a national steel industry required national control over iron ore mining.91 Only one member of the subcommittee, Col. Lt. Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva, argued that the iron ore concessions should not be linked in any form to the creation of a steel mill. A commission of military and civilian engineers at the Federal Council for Foreign Trade (Conselho Federal de Comércio Exterior; CFCE) expressed an even stronger preference for national control of the steel industry than CTEF’s nationalist faction. It rejected any role for foreign capital and proposed to create the steel mill as a state enterprise.92 Moreover, to cut out Percival Farquhar, the representative of Estrada de Ferro Vitória a Minas, it proposed to use the EFCB to transport iron ore through southern Minas Gerais and the Barra do Piraí railroad junction in Rio de Janeiro state. The report recommended building the national steel mill in the Federal District and envisioned an expansion of the Rio de Janeiro port to handle greatly increased exports of iron ore.93 The CFCE report drew sharp criticism. The editors of the Observador Econômico e Financeiro, a widely read publication on industrial develop-

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ment, judged the proposals to be technically flawed, legally questionable, and economically detrimental. They predicted that it would be a logistical nightmare to send iron ore over the “roller coaster”—the railroad across the Serra do Mar. Although no friends of Percival Farquhar, the editors believed that the plan constituted a breach of contract with Itabira Iron Ore and ridiculed the belief that nationalized industries would generate windfall profits as “infantile passion.” They argued that the mixed financing scheme placed unreasonable demands on potential investors and risked leaving the company undercapitalized. Implicitly, they accused the nationalists of reinforcing the mistaken notion that foreign interests were to blame for Brazil’s backwardness: “We complain because we complain, and because it is easy to complain.”94 Farquhar, in turn, insisted on his “right” to fulfill the Itabira contract, but Vargas had made up his mind.95 ­Decree-law 1.507 (Aug. 11, 1939) declared the contract with Itabira Iron Ore null and void. Vargas did not endorse either the CFCE’s or the CTEF’s policy recommendations, however. He made a decision for a national solution and against involving foreign private capital, but the decree-law left the exact parameters of future financing for the steel mill open.96 Vargas appointed Macedo Soares to head the Preparatory Commission for the Steel Plan (Comissão Preparatória do Plano Siderúrgico) and guide its elaboration of a plan for a national steel mill. Macedo Soares personified Brazil’s quest for a national steel industry. His training and professional experience made him uniquely suited to the task. Born in 1901 into an elite Rio de Janeiro family, Macedo Soares had to take on responsibility early after his father’s premature death. At age ten, he passed the entrance exam for the Colégio Militar, which offered excellent education at low cost. The top student in his class, Macedo Soares earned ever-higher ranks of student officer and gathered leadership experience in commanding younger students. The curriculum emphasized military science as well as foreign languages (English, French) because few scientific texts had been translated.97 After graduation in 1918, Macedo Soares enrolled in the Escola Militar in Realengo to train as officer for the engineers’ corps.98 The course covered the classic subjects of military science: mathematics, physics, material science, electricity, hydraulics, and ballistics.99 As a result of recent reforms, the curriculum included applied subjects such as hygiene (i.e., public health) and international, constitutional, and administrative law.100 At these military schools Macedo Soares formed his world view and made friendships that would shape his career. At the Colégio he befriended Osvaldo Aranha, future foreign minister (1938–1944), and Carlos Luis Prestes, future head of the Brazilian Communist Party (Partido Comunista do Brasil; PCB).101 At the Escola Militar, Macedo Soares was close to

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Juarez do Nascimento F. Távora, a future presidential candidate (1955), as well as future presidents Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco (1964– 1967) and Arthur da Costa e Silva (1967–1969).102 These young officers wanted Brazil to realize its potential as an industrial power, and they believed it would take far-reaching economic and social reform to reach that goal. To usher that change, Macedo Soares and several of his friends joined a conspiracy of mid-level officers (tenentes) against the federal government. During the first tenente revolt in 1922, Macedo Soares commanded a unit of cadets from the Escola Militar, but he ended up in prison when the uprising collapsed. Soon after his release, in 1924, he participated in a second tenente revolt led by Carlos Prestes, but it too ended in defeat and imprisonment. After escaping from the Ilha Grande prison, Macedo Soares joined two of his cousins in exile in France.103 It was a dramatic, but ultimately fortuitous turn in his life. In Paris, Macedo Soares applied to study metallurgical engineering at the Conservatoire des Arts et Métiers. León Guillet, then France’s most distinguished professor in the field, was sufficiently impressed with Macedo Soares’s performance in the entrance exam to take him on as student. Metallurgy was a new course, taught in recently refurbished laboratories, and Guillet was by all accounts an inspirational teacher.104 Apart from his doctoral adviser Henri Le Chatelier, Guillet was France’s foremost expert on scientific management, and he passed on the lessons he had learned applying Taylorist time and motion studies as head of artillery shell production during World War I.105 Guillet also influenced Macedo Soares’s thinking on questions of labor management at the national and firm levels. The latter became convinced of the need for a national system of technical education and the central role of social services for the success of metallurgical companies. Guillet’s lessons went beyond the strictly professional. He advocated moral values, above all perseverance, patriotism, solidarity, and altruism in the Catholic spirit of the Society of St. Vincent de Paul.106 His inspiration prompted Macedo Soares to frequent the Union Sociale des Ingénieurs Catholiques, an association of Catholic engineers that urged its members to assume social responsibility for the workers in an age of rationalization and apply the teachings of the Catholic sociologist Frédéric Le Play to labor relations.107 His studies at the Conservatoire gave Macedo Soares a metallurgical training that had no match among Brazilians. After graduation, he completed specialization courses at the École de Chauffage Industriel on the thermodynamics of constructing furnaces (1928) and at the École Superieure de Fonderie de Paris on the operation of foundries (1929).108 He also interned at three metallurgical companies: Choisy-le-Roi and ­Chambéry in France, and BREDA in Italy.109 In 1930, Macedo Soares re-

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turned home as Brazil’s most broadly trained metallurgical engineer. He joined an army engineer’s unit in São Paulo, but then political events provided him with an unexpected opportunity to apply his expertise to national development. In November 1930, Getúlio Vargas—defeated in the presidential elections by the powerful electoral machine of São Paulo’s Republican Party—led a successful military coup and promised to implement ambitious social and economic reforms. He granted a general amnesty for officers implicated in the tenente revolts and appointed many of them to key government posts. Macedo Soares advised the government on industrial policy and a national defense industry. He served on the Military Commission for Metallurgical Studies (Comissão Militar de Estudos Metal­úrgicos), which recommended creating artillery shell factories, and on the National Steel Commission (Comissão Nacional de Siderurgia), which proposed to revise the Itabira contract and establish an integrated steel mill in Brazil.110 International missions became an important part of Macedo Soares’s work for the Vargas government. In 1932, he traveled to Europe, nominally as assistant to his cousin José Carlos, head of Brazil’s delegations to the International Labor Conference and the Conference on Disarmament, both held in Geneva. During the stay, Macedo Soares completed an internship as electrical furnace supervisor at BREDA’s San Giovanni mill and visited an Italian artillery factory, whose organization he studied in sufficient detail to later transfer it to the army’s new artillery shells factory in Andaraí. In the mid-1930s, as a member of the Commission for the Study of a Brazilian Military Industry (Comissão de Estudos para a Indústria Militar Brasileira), Macedo Soares visited Nazi Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Sweden. He directed Brazilian arms acquisitions in Germany, where he spent more than a year improving his German and building good relations with arms manufacturers such as Alfred Krupp. Macedo Soares also visited one of the world’s finest research facilities in his field at the metallurgical institute of the Technische ­Hochschule Aachen. He admired Germany’s technological expertise, but close encounters with the Schutzstaffel (SS) and Nazi followers led him to doubt the regime’s intentions and his own ideological affinity to the integral­istas, Brazil’s fascist movement.111 Throughout the 1930s, Macedo Soares applied his metallurgical experience both as administrator and as teacher. Designing the shells factory in Andaraí based on the Italian blueprint gave him an opportunity to apply Guillet’s lessons on scientific management to Brazilian military production. Later in the 1930s, Macedo Soares helped establish the military factories in Bonsucesso and Juíz de Fora.112 He was appointed professor for metal­lurgy at the new Army Engineering School (Escola de Engenharia do ­Exército) in 1932, and occasionally he taught courses on metallurgy at the

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Rio de ­Janeiro Polytechnic (Escola Politécnica do Rio de Janeiro) and the São Paulo Polytechnic (Escola Politécnica de São Paulo), two of the country’s most respected engineering schools.113 Macedo Soares returned to his true passion, the creation of a modern national steel industry, when Vargas appointed him to the CTEF in 1938. The political conditions then were much more favorable than in the early 1930s. The federal government had much more sweeping powers under the authoritarian constitution of the Estado Novo, and the new foreign minister—Macedo Soares’s old friend Osvaldo Aranha—had the ear of the president. Macedo Soares’s technical expertise and his experience with the domestic and international politics of steel made him the obvious choice to head the Preparatory Commission for the Steel Plan. The greatest challenge in planning the establishment of a national steel industry was to find a foreign government willing to authorize the export of modern steel technology on financially agreeable terms. Macedo Soares traveled to Europe to sound out whether Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, or Germany had an interest in importing Brazilian iron ore. He also evaluated to what extent the newest production technology was suited to Brazilian conditions and initiated negotiations about financing a mill. Initially, the German arms manufacturer Krupp showed the greatest interest. He offered to supply the technology both for an integrated steel mill and for a modern artillery factory. A recent order the Brazilian army had placed with Krupp for several large artillery pieces certainly facilitated the negotiations.114 The imminent threat of a war in Europe cut short Macedo Soares’s trip, however, and stymied Krupp’s plans.115 As soon as negotiations about the financing of the mill stalled, the government ordered Macedo Soares to continue his mission in the United States. Foreign Minister Osvaldo Aranha favored an American solution and had already initiated negotiations with U.S. Steel.116 Macedo Soares’s negotiations with U.S. Steel led to the creation of a joint commission of American and Brazilian engineers to study the project’s feasibility.117 They visited iron ore mines in the Rio Doce Valley, manganese deposits in Lafaiete (MG), and the recently opened coal mines in Santa Catarina to assess the quality of domestic raw materials. Their study of the transport system concluded that capacities and technical standards of both the ports and the rail network presented serious obstacles for the supply of raw materials and the access to domestic markets. As site for the future mill, the commission favored a location near Santa Cruz in the Federal District.118 Macedo Soares independently compared transport costs for Santa Cruz to other potential sites and concluded that costs would be lowest for Volta Redonda in the interior of Rio de Janeiro state. His written report stated explicitly that fear of German submarine attacks on a coastal mill played no role in his preference for Volta Redonda.

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Macedo Soares did believe that true military industries should be located in the interior, but he categorized steel as an industry for “production in peacetime.”119 The joint commission’s report represented a major step toward the creation of Brazil’s first integrated steel mill despite disagreements about the location. In late 1939 the government had reason for renewed optimism on the steel question. The outbreak of war in Europe had strengthened Vargas’s hand as both Germany and the United States looked for allies in South America. As early as July 1939, the U.S. military had communicated its interest in hemispheric security cooperation to Brazil’s army chief of staff General Pedro Aurelio de Góes Monteiro during an official visit.120 In October 1939, U.S. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall assured Góes Monteiro that the United States could supply artillery and anti-aircraft guns to substitute for canceled Brazilian orders from Europe, and he also expressed interest in importing Brazilian manganese. Implicitly, he proposed the exchange of arms for strategic raw materials that would be the basis of U.S.-Brazilian wartime cooperation after 1942.121 Diplomatic correspondence never explicitly linked Brazil’s support of the United States against Germany to the future of the steel project, but politicians on both sides treated them as intimately connected. By December, Vargas had concluded that it was best for the steel project if Brazil accepted American financial and technological support: “We now reach the stage of transforming the project into a reality, and we want to do that in cooperation with North America. We continue to receive other proposals and inquiries, among them from Krupp, but we will only consider them objects of study if the project should turn out to be unfeasible in that country, which we hope will not happen.”122 In January 1940, U.S. Steel unexpectedly withdrew from the project. Herman Greenwood, an engineer who had worked closely with the Brazilians, viewed the withdrawal as a response to the loss of a major investment when Soviet troops invaded Finland in the winter of 1939/40.123 Washington diplomatic circles interpreted the decision differently. U.S. Steel apparently feared that exchange rate volatility would affect the transfer of profits and that Brazil may someday expropriate foreign-owned companies, following in the footsteps of Mexico’s 1938 oil nationalization.124 The Hemisphere published the demands U.S. Steel had made to guard against these risks. They included unrestricted exchange transactions, a majority share in the venture, and the suspension of the mining code’s provisions that reserved subsoil exploration to the state.125 All three were unacceptable to the Brazilian government. Its ambassador to the United States saw more sinister forces at work than U.S. Steel’s concern about economic nationalism. He alleged that British foreign policy makers

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had pressured J. P. Morgan—a major banker for the British treasury and a co-owner of U.S. Steel—at the behest of Britain’s long-standing ally Argentina.126 An ambassador speculated that the decision was reason for a “dia de festa,” a daylong celebration, at the Argentine embassy.127 Officials in Washington assured the Brazilian ambassador of Roose­ velt’s continued support, however. Within a week, Martins Pereira had a meeting with the U.S. Secretary of Commerce and the heads of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Export-Import Bank to discuss alternative means of financing the mill.128 Offers by German manufacturers put pressure on the U.S. government to act. In January 1940, Gute ­Hoffnungshütte, a leading German metallurgical engineering firm, submitted a detailed project proposal complete with financing.129 Rumors about other German and Swedish proposals for the construction of the steel mill circulated in the international press.130 Vargas preferred an agreement with the United States, but he used German overtures as leverage. He instructed his ambassador in Washington that “[w]e neither deny nor confirm agreements with German or Swedish firms. We will await the results of the negotiations you are facilitating, and it will be desirable to speed them up once there are proposals on the horizon.”131

The Creation of the National Steel Company Vargas tried to speed up the process by issuing decree-law 2.054 (March 4, 1940), which created a national steel industry and committed the state to a strong role in the development of capital-intensive industries as part of an “economic renovation.” Most important, the decree-law created an Executive Commission for the National Steel Plan (Comissão Executiva do Plano Siderúrgico Nacional) that answered directly to the president. Vargas picked Brazil’s foremost industrialists and engineers to serve on this commission, each responsible for one aspect of planning for the national steel company. Commission president Guilherme Guinle worked on financing, vice-president Heitor Freire de Carvalho on an administrative blueprint, Macedo Soares on metallurgy, Oscar Weinschenk on land transportation, Ari F. Torres on city planning, and Adolfo Martins Noronha Torrezão on water transport.132 Part of Brazil’s small technical elite, all these men had committed their professional lives to the advance of industry and had spent considerable time in public service to promote national development. The Estado Novo government united their talent, provided institutional resources, and directed their focus to the steel project. For Guinle, Torres, and Weinschenk, it was the culmination of a lifetime’s commitment to the industrial cause. Guilherme Guinle, a civil engineer trained at the Rio de Janeiro Polytechnic, headed one of the country’s

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most important industrial groups, Guinle & Cia. It included the Companhia Docas de Santos, which operated Brazil’s biggest port, the Companhia Brasileira de Energia Elétrica, second only to LIGHT in electrical generation, and the Banco Boavista S.A., a bank that specialized in financing industrial and commercial development.133 Early in his career, Guinle had fought bruising battles over control of the Rio de Janeiro and Bahia electricity markets against LIGHT and its representative, Percival Farquhar. The experience led Guinle to oppose a prominent role for foreign capital in national industrial development.134 As director of the Santos Docks Company, a public utilities company with limited financial autonomy, he cultivated close relations with the federal government. Vargas regularly consulted Guinle on industrial policies and appointed him to the Technical Council for Economy and Finances, where he advocated a national solution for the steel industry and recommended investing social welfare funds into economic development. In the 1930s, Guinle occupied positions of leadership in the largest industrial associations, and he privately financed geological surveys in the Bahian Recôncavo to try to push the government toward investing in petroleum exploration.135 Ari F. Torres, a civil engineer with a degree from the São Paulo Polytechnic, made his name as Brazil’s foremost expert on reinforced concrete and a pioneer for technical standards. In 1925, he had gone to Europe on a scholarship to visit leading research laboratories and gather experience as a research assistant at one of the best, the Federal Analytical Laboratory in Zürich. Upon his return to Brazil, Torres became the founding director of the material science laboratory at the Institute for Technological Research (Instituto de Pesquisas Tecnológicas) in São Paulo.136 In 1928, after a stint at Léon Guillet’s laboratory in Paris, Torres published research on dosage in concrete mixtures that enabled Portland Cement to produce cement suitable for large-scale construction with reinforced concrete.137 The feat revolutionized the Brazilian construction industry. In the 1930s, Torres campaigned for a unified system of technical standards both in Brazil and across South America, founding the Brazilian Association for Technical Norms (Associação Brasileira de Normas Técnicas) in 1940. Torres decried the severe shortage of Brazilian industrial engineers and tried to draft young men into the profession through his public speeches and his teaching.138 Oscar Weinschenk, also trained as a civil engineer at the São Paulo Polytechnic, had devoted his career to the improvement of the Brazilian transportation system. He served on the board of the Estrada de Ferro Leopoldina, the country’s fourth-largest railroad company, and as technical director of the Santos Docks Company (1922–1931).139 In the 1920s, he headed the Roadways Commission (Comissão de Estradas de ­Rodagem)

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to promote improvements in road transportation and joined the Brazilian Congress for Coal and Other National Fuels (Congresso Brasileiro de Carvão e Outros Combustíveis Nacionais), an association of civil engineers to foster progress in the domestic fuel industry.140 The Vargas government tapped Weinschenk for the National Transportation Commission (Comissão da Viação Nacional), whose report on the nationwide movement of goods and people informed the 1934 National Transportation Plan, a blueprint to create a grid of roads, railroads, and waterways. Weinschenk also served on the Commission for the Study of Roads (Comissão de Estudos Rodoviários), whose call for an organ to enforce technical standards for road construction led to creation of the National Department for Roadways (Departamento Nacional de Estradas de Rodagem) in 1937.141 Macedo Soares, Guinle, Torres, and Weinschenk brought their technical expertise and administrative experience to bear in the Executive Commission for the National Steel Plan (Comissão Executiva do Plano Siderúrgico Nacional). Its July 1940 report settled on Volta Redonda as the site for the future mill and expressed a strong preference for a company financed by capital misto, a combination of state and private capital.142 Brazil still lacked the technology for an integrated steel plant, however, as well as the credit to purchase equipment abroad. The Roosevelt government proposed to finance the mill with credit from the Export-Import Bank, a U.S. government agency that had granted numerous commercial loans to Latin American companies in the 1930s.143 The only alternative, direct financing by the U.S. manufacturers, ran up against wartime restrictions under expanded state control over U.S. industrial production. Roosevelt ordered the head of the Federal Loan Agency, Jesse H. Jones, to identify U.S. engineering companies suitable to oversee the project developed by the Joint Commission.144 Brazil had its greatest advocate in Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, who lobbied the U.S. Senate to approve a US$20 million credit through the Export-Import Bank. At his suggestion, the Brazilian embassy urged members of the Executive Commission to engage in direct negotiations with U.S. officials.145 In late July 1940, Guinle, Macedo Soares, and Torres traveled to Washington, DC, where Sumner Welles introduced them to the key financial players: Jesse Jones, Warren Lee Pierson, head of the Export-Import Bank, and Herbert Feis, the Department of State’s Economic Advisor for International Affairs. The negotiations proceeded slowly and had their tense moments. Jones, to whom Macedo Soares referred privately as “financial dictator,” refused to approve the plan to make the mill 100 percent ­Brazilian-owned.146 But the Brazilians prevailed. After six weeks of negotiations, the Export-Import Bank signed a loan agreement with the Vargas government over US$20 million.147 Once Brazil’s federal treasury had is-

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35

sued a loan guarantee, in early 1941, the Export-Import Bank made the money available. The loan stipulated that the Brazilians had to purchase all equipment in the United States and pay the suppliers directly from a dollar account in New York. Vargas then authorized the incorporation of the National Steel Company (Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional; CSN), which was registered on April 9, 1941, the date henceforth celebrated as its birthday. CSN representatives and the Export-Import Bank signed the contract for the first US$20 million loan on May 22, 1941. The credit volume soon proved insufficient, however. As German troops swept across Europe, Roosevelt placed the U.S. economy on a war footing to build up the nation’s armed forces and lend support to Great Britain. Prices for heavy equipment rose sharply as a result. The CSN renegotiated the initial loan and signed a supplemental contract for an additional US$5 million in December 1941.148 The CSN raised half its initial capital domestically by issuing Cr$500 million in stock, divided equally between preference and common shares.149 Five large institutional investors purchased the preference shares. The Retirement and Pension Institutes (Institutos de Aposentadoria e ­Pensões; IAP) for industrial workers (375,000 shares), commercial employees (275,000), and bank employees (100,000) contributed Cr$150 million. In effect they invested the workers’ (forced) savings into industrial development. The country’s two largest savings banks, the Caixa Econômica Federal do Rio de Janeiro (150,000 shares) and the Caixa Econômica Federal de São Paulo (350,000), bought the remaining preference shares. Of the common shareholders, only one carried real weight: the national treasury subscribed to 1.1 million shares valued at Cr$220 million (88 percent of common stock). The government advertised the sale of the remaining common shares with an appeal to the industrial elite’s sense of national duty. All major domestic metallurgical, mining, railroad, and pharmaceutical companies bought at least some stock, as did banks and insurance firms with industrial customers. The country’s leading industrialists—Conde Matarazzo, José Ermírio de Moraes, Conde Crespi, and CSN president Guinle himself—bought shares through their companies and often individually as well.150 CSN shares never became a Volksaktie (literally, “people’s stock”), however, of the kind launched by Nazi Germany when it created Volkswagen. Brazilian workers owned a share of the CSN only indirectly through pension funds, savings accounts, and the federal treasury. Vargas tapped members of the Executive Commission for the National Steel Plan to lead the new company. As president he appointed Guinle, who appeared best prepared to steer the CSN through rough financial waters caused by wartime inflation in Brazil and the United States. On ­Guinle’s recommendation, Vargas named Torres as vice-president, ­Weinschenk as

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commercial director, and Macedo Soares as technical director. Weinschenk became vice-president after Torres resigned in 1942 to take over the industrial section of the Coordenação da Mobilização Econômica, Brazil’s equivalent of the U.S. War Production Board.151 The continuity in personnel insured familiarity with the CSN’s organizational blueprint, knowledge of technical detail, and close working relationships. Sílvio Raulino de Oliveira, an experienced metallurgical engineer, joined the team as head of the CSN’s office in the United States. His career resembled Macedo Soares’s. Raulino had also participated in the tenente movement and had gone into exile in France, where he studied metallurgy and worked in León Guillet’s laboratory.152 During their exile, Raulino and Macedo Soares became friends. In the early 1930s, they worked together on the Comissão ­Militar de Estudos Metalúrgicos and the Comissão Nacional de ­Siderurgia.153 ­Raulino remained involved with the “steel problem” throughout the 1930s and reunited with Macedo Soares in the Comissão Executiva do Plano Siderúrgico Nacional. Macedo Soares and Raulino jointly directed the CSN’s technical planning. In late 1940, with the Export-Import Bank loan secured, the executive commission solicited bids from engineering firms to design the mill, select the equipment, and supervise the construction. Based on an assessment of engineering expertise and estimated costs, the commission awarded the contract to Cleveland-based Arthur G. McKee & Company. The firm specialized in mill construction, heavy-equipment installation, and mill expansion. Its operations had expanded rapidly in the 1930s, despite the depression, as U.S. steel companies added capacity in preparation for an upturn. McKee’s past work on foreign contracts, such as building mills in India and England in the 1920s, reassured the Brazilians, who were wary of a repeat of the U.S. Steel debacle. In the early 1930s, McKee directed the construction of the Magnitogorsk Iron & Steel complex, a centerpiece of the Soviet Union’s industrialization drive under Stalin’s first Five-Year Plan.154 McKee celebrated the Volta Redonda contract as a milestone for its international business. By 1942, it was McKee’s only foreign contract outside of Canada; all others had been canceled as a result of the expanding global war.155 In January 1941, Macedo Soares, Raulino, and a group of younger Brazilian engineers moved to Cleveland to work directly with McKee on mill design and equipment purchases. These men would become the CSN’s technical brain for the next two decades because of the familiarity with the mill design and the technical parameters they acquired during their work in Cleveland. Macedo Soares (1941–1946), Paulo Cesar Gomes Martins (1946–1954), and Renato F. Rodrigues de Azevedo (1954–1961) all served as technical directors. Raulino de Oliveira (1946–1954) and

Inducing an Industrial Revolution

37

Macedo Soares (1954–1959) went on to become CSN presidents.156 The joint workgroup designed an integrated mill with an annual steel capacity of 300,000 tons and rolling mills to make a wide range of finished products: plate, rails, heavy beams, hot- and cold-rolled coils, wire, and tinfoil. The layout anticipated future expansions to an annual capacity of one million tons. The workgroup had to receive three competing bids from suppliers before it could place an order.157 To build the coke plant the engineers picked Koppers & Co., whose ovens and by-products plants were the industry standard. They chose McKee’s blast furnace design as well as Rust’s soaking pits and Brassert’s open-hearth furnaces for the steelworks. They split the orders for rolling equipment between the leading manufacturers: MESTA supplied the slabbing and blooming and the hot-rolling mills and U.S. Steel the plate and cold-rolling mills. The engineers chose Morgan Steel for the rail and structural mill and Wean for the tinning and the galvanizing line.158 Spreading the orders out over many suppliers was good politics: they all had a stake in the project and an incentive to lobby for the CSN in Washington. The increasing involvement of the United States in World War II interfered with the timely execution of the engineering work and the delivery of the equipment. The steel industry was highly strategic for national defense at a time when the United States and its allies needed tanks, airplanes, and ammunition.159 The U.S. Office of Production Management controlled all manufacturers of heavy equipment and assigned priority ratings to their contracts. Low ratings for the CSN’s orders threatened to halt the production of its equipment.160 Determined to satisfy its only foreign customer, McKee brought the situation to the attention of the Coordinator for ­Inter-American Affairs, Nelson Rockefeller. His letters to decision makers in Washington stressed the impact the delay could have on Brazil’s attitude toward the Allied cause. Apparently he hit the right note. In early October 1941, the CSN’s priority rating changed from A-10 to A-06, the same as for steel mills in the United States.161 The decision reaffirmed the importance of cordial relations with Brazil in a time of war.162 The military and economic mobilization in the United States nevertheless forced the CSN to improvise on occasion. General Electric, the CSN’s primary supplier of electrical equipment, could no longer produce the technical drawings for the installation after the U.S. military occupied its offices. The CSN had to set up an office in Volta Redonda and contracted GE technicians to assist Brazilian technical draughtsmen and engineers on site.163 The U.S. entry into the war after the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor complicated the situation further. The Iron and Steel Division of the War Production Board realized that it had assigned the highest priority rating to too many projects. It adopted a new system of ­allocating

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capacity in the nation’s factories to the twenty-five most important projects. Macedo Soares urged an immediate diplomatic response to secure allocations for the CSN: “I believe that now only a new approach, very vigorous and very persistent, can avoid great delays in our work, and in my view, this approach would be a personal message from President Vargas to President Roosevelt.”164 The CSN received its allocations, but the new system delayed the construction nevertheless. The production of the equipment began in late 1942 and the first shipments did not arrive in Brazilian ports until 1943. To make matters worse, German submarines sank several vessels with structural steel and equipment for the CSN. Originally, Macedo Soares had hoped to complete the installation of the heavy equipment by 1944, but he acknowledged that it would take until 1945 or 1946 under the new circumstances.165 Despite these setbacks, World War II was a blessing in disguise. The U.S. government may never have approved the Export-Import Bank loan and the transfer of modern steel technology to Brazil had it not been for its desire to secure an ally in South America. Vargas understood that the U.S. needed military bases and strategic raw materials and took advantage of his strong negotiating position. The window of opportunity to receive U.S. support for domestic industrialization would close again after World War II. In the late 1940s, the United States generally refused to support Latin American economic policies aimed at increasing industrial self-­ sufficiency. The CSN, however, had received its loans and equipment and continued to enjoy close ties with the Export-Import Bank and U.S. equipment manufacturers. The Estado Novo’s economic planning, the work of the technical experts, and skillful diplomacy had created the conditions for Brazil to take a big step toward its Second Industrial Revolution. Once the imported equipment had reached Brazilian soil, the success of the project and the future of the country’s heavy industry lay in the hands of Brazilian engineers and workers.

2

Industry Comes to a Village, Villagers Come to an Industry Brazil is tuned in on Volta Redonda. This is one of its great wartime industrial achievements. It would be a good-sized steel mill in the United States but for Brazil it is an undertaking of great proportions and the largest plant in all Latin America. ­­—José Silvado Bueno Foreign Trade Adviser, Pan American Union, 19461

The Estado Novo’s propaganda machine portrayed the construction of a national steel mill as a transformative event that would place the nation’s industrial economy on a new footing. For the people of Volta Redonda, unaware of the years of political wrangling, skillful diplomacy, and technical preparation, the arrival of the CSN meant sudden and dramatic change. The village of Santo Antônio de Volta Redonda was a sleepy place in the southeastern coastal range, the Serra do Mar, at an elevation of 1,280 feet.2 It was in the heart of the Sul Fluminense, a region on the western tip of the state of Rio de Janeiro, bordering Minas Gerais to the north and São Paulo to the west (Map 2.1). Administratively, the village belonged to the municipality of Barra Mansa, which had a population of 26,346 of whom 8,800 lived in the head town. According to the 1940 census, less than 5 percent of the municipality’s inhabitants had graduated from primary school and only 36 percent were literate.3 The municipal district of Volta Redonda had 2,782 inhabitants, the village about 1,000. It owed its name to the course of the Paraíba River, which made a volta redonda (full turn). The river split the village into two parts connected only by a wooden toll bridge and a ferry.4 The Paraíba also posed a health risk during heavy summer rains, when it flooded the village and caused outbreaks of malaria and typhoid. The regional economy had stagnated in the half-century since the end of the coffee boom. The 1940 census listed 38 percent of economically active men as working in agriculture, 21 percent in industry (manufacturing), another 21 percent in diverse services, and the remaining 20 percent in domestic and nonspecified activities.5 The former coffee fazendas in Volta Redonda had become orange plantations or dairy farms. Barra Mansa experienced some industrial development in the mid-1930s, when

Source: Insert map based on Wirth, Politics of Brazilian Development, 74.

map 2.1  Brazil and Its Southeastern Industrial Core

SOUTH

CENTER-WEST

NORTH

0

200

SOUTHEA ST

400

NORTH E A ST

600

N

800 mi

Industry Comes to a Village

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Nestlé opened a facility to process locally produced milk into milk powder and sweets. The city became the regional center for heavy industry when two new metallurgical companies, Siderúrgica Barbará and Companhia Siderúrgica Barra Mansa, opened to produce basic cast iron and steel products based on charcoal technology. Barra Mansa’s location on two interstate railroad lines helped attract this industrial investment. The Estrada de Ferro Central do Brasil (EFCB) provided direct rail service to Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, and the Rede Mineira de Viação railway connected Barra Mansa to the port in Angra dos Reis and the interior of Minas Gerais and Goiás.6 The region’s major railroad junction was about twenty miles to the east of Barra Mansa, in Barra do Piraí, where the ­EFCB’s trunk line from Rio de Janeiro split into lines to São Paulo and Belo Horizonte. The ECFB’s railroad yard and maintenance shops made Barra do Piraí the region’s most industrialized city into the 1930s. Railroad access had been a major factor in the decision to locate the national steel mill in the Barra Mansa-Barra do Piraí region. Volta Redonda was the only location in the region that offered enough space and the necessary proximity to the Paraíba River. There the river plain, surrounded by hills rising some 350 feet, stretched about two miles in an eastwesterly direction, enough for a mill of the projected size and capacity.7 The Paraíba carried enough water to supply both mill and town and also provided an outlet for the treated sewage. The local stop of the EFCB’s São Paulo line linked Volta Redonda to the sources for iron ore and minerals in Minas Gerais and the largest markets for steel products—the cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Coal shipments from Santa Catarina in southern Brazil and from the United States could reach Volta Redonda via the port in Angra dos Reis on the Rede Mineira de Viação railway. Another key advantage of the location was proximity to sources for electric power. Rio LIGHT, the regional provider, operated a hydroelectric plant about fifteen miles southeast of Volta Redonda in Piraí.8 It was the state’s largest generation facility at almost 140,000 kWh in the 1940s.9 The CSN’s planners knew where they wanted to build the mill, but the state did not yet own the land. The same was true for the mineral deposits in Minas Gerais and coal mines in Santa Catarina considered best suited to supply the future mill. The Estado Novo used its sovereign power to hand the CSN control over those lands. The Secretary of Agriculture Hélio de Macedo Soares e Silva, Edmundo’s brother, decreed the expropriation of the fazendas in Volta Redonda, coal deposits in Siderópolis and Tubarão, the Casa de Pedra manganese and iron ore mines, and the limestone deposits in Conselheiro Lafaiete. The Ministry notified the owners of the impending measure, citing the interest of public utility, offered the property’s assessed value as compensation, and instructed state authorities

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to proceed with the expropriation.10 The measures affected domestic as well as foreign landowners. Danish A. Thun & Cia., which mined 55 percent of Brazil’s iron ore and 30 percent of its manganese for export, lost all of its holdings.11 Decree-law 7.011 (Nov. 1, 1944) placed the company in federal receivership to prepare its liquidation and gave the CSN immediate access to the manganese and iron ore deposits at Casa de Pedra.12 The region saw a major overhaul of infrastructure to prepare for mill construction. The EFCB rebuilt and expanded its station in Volta Redonda to satisfy the CSN’s need for a large freight depot for construction materials. The Rede Mineira built a connector between the Volta Redonda and Barra Mansa stations, and it electrified its line to Angra dos Reis in order to facilitate the use of the port for coal shipments.13 The EFCB widened many of the sixteen tunnels on the line from Rio de Janeiro because heavy girders and columns for the steelworks and the rolling mills were too long given the tracks’ turning radius. Overall, the EFCB ran 675 trains with no less than 168,000 tons of imported steel equipment up the steep slopes of the Serra da Mantiqueira to Volta Redonda. Trains had to gain 2,000 feet in elevation, which limited the load per train to 500 tons, and the ones with the heaviest loads still took up to thirty hours for a distance commonly covered in less than five.14 In Volta Redonda, CSN subcontractors readied the site for the arrival of the equipment. Their crews worked throughout 1942 to level the area between the EFCB’s tracks and the Paraíba River and prepare the terrain for the construction of roads, the internal rail network, and mill buildings. They created preliminary water and sewage systems and installed an electrical substation, supplied by the EFCB, as well as transformers for the cement plant and for construction work on the rolling mill and gas tanks. The subcontractors built temporary facilities such as wooden sheds to accommodate the CSN’s offices and house the construction workforce, as well as permanent reinforced concrete buildings such as the electrical and mechanical shops and the foundry. Work also began on the company town located south of the EFCB’s railway tracks on the lands of the former Fazenda Santa Cecília.15

The Peopling of Volta Redonda The CSN had decided to carry out the construction of the mill with its own crews, which required an unprecedented mobilization of labor. The workforce for earlier large-scale projects such as the urban renewal of Rio de Janeiro and the construction of major railroad lines had peaked in the thousands, but the CSN’s short-term demand for labor reached a different scale. The number of workers never fell below 5,000 between late 1942 and the end of construction work in 1946, and it peaked at 13,790 in April 1945

Industry Comes to a Village

43

(see Figure 2.1).16 Barra Mansa and other neighboring municipalities did not have the labor surplus necessary to fulfill the CSN’s fast-rising demand. The company had to attract migrant workers from farther away and triggered a wave of migration that reached far beyond the Sul ­Fluminense. The CSN received a steady stream of migrants from the northeast that accounted on average for 7.2 percent of the migrant labor force during the construction period (1942–1946). Most of the northeasterners came from four states: Alagoas, Bahia, Ceará, and Paraíba. Migrants from the north, south, or center-west, respectively, never made up more than 1 percent of the workforce. The north and the center-west, in particular, had low population densities and did not have the transportation infrastructure to facilitate travel to Volta Redonda, which explains why altogether less than one thousand of the 48,000 migrants originated there. Foreign-born workers accounted for 10 percent of a still relatively small CSN workforce in 1942, but once the labor migration to Volta Redonda started seriously, their share plummeted to less than 2 percent. The overwhelming majority of the CSN’s construction workers, almost 90 percent, had been born in Brazil’s southeastern states. Almost 56 percent came from Minas Gerais, 22 percent from the state of Rio de Janeiro, 6 percent from Espírito Santo, 5 percent from São Paulo, and a little more than 1 percent from the Federal District.17 An economically and culturally rather homogenous zone centered on southern Minas Gerais became the CSN’s core migratory hinterland (Map 2.2).18 Over 75 percent of all CSN construction workers and 82 percent of migrants from the southeastern states had been born in an area that extended from the border between Minas Gerais and São Paulo in the west to southern Espírito Santo in the east. It reached about one hundred miles into Minas Gerais from the state’s southern border and about fifty miles south into São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, respectively. In Minas Gerais, this included three distinct zones: the Sul with its low mountains; the Zona Metalúrgica, encompassing the hilly uplands of the southern mining districts; and the Mata, which included the hills near Juiz de Fora, the upper Pomba valley, and the Serra do Caparaó. Disproportionate shares of workers came from towns and fazendas in the Paraíba valley, both in Rio de Janeiro and to a lesser extent São Paulo, the lower Muriaé and Pomba valleys in Rio de Janeiro, and the Serra do Castelo in southwestern Espírito Santo.19 The spatial and temporal pattern of migration to Volta Redonda corresponds to the economic opportunities. The great majority of migrants in 1942 came from neighboring municipalities in the Vassouras (RJ) region and neighboring regions such as Médio Paraíba (SP), Sul (MG), and the Baixada Fluminense (RJ), all within a hundred-mile radius of Volta Redonda (Map 2.3). Migrating over such a short distance carried little risk,

map 2.2  Origins of Migrants by Municipality and Skill (1941–1946) Source: Sample of CSN Personnel Files.

map 2.3  Origins of Migrants by Municipality (1942) Source: Sample of CSN Personnel Files.

map 2.4  Origins of Migrants by Municipality (1944) Source: Sample of CSN Personnel Files.

map 2.5  Origins of Migrants by Municipality (1946) Source: Sample of CSN Personnel Files.

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even without an employment guarantee by the CSN, as the cost of returning home was low. Over the course of 1943, the CSN’s labor demand increased sharply and the number of migrants from distant municipalities increased rapidly. The radius of the CSN’s migratory hinterland in the east and north expanded to about 350 miles (Map 2.4). The four regions closest to Volta Redonda still accounted for 32 percent of all migrants, but the majority of migrants now originated in the Mata (MG) and its neighboring zones: Muriaé (RJ), Serrana do Sul (ES), and the eastern parts of the Zona Metalúrgica (MG). The CSN’s labor demand began to decrease in 1945, and hires fell to half the 1944 level by 1946 (Map 2.5). The flow of migrants dropped most dramatically in the most distant areas. The number of migrants from Brazil’s northeast dropped by 50 percent from 1945 to 1946, and the most distant regions in the core migratory hinterland such as Espírito Santo, eastern Rio de Janeiro, the Mata (MG), and the Zona Metalúrgica sent many fewer workers. Fewer migrants from distant regions committed to a journey to Volta Redonda in a time of diminishing opportunity. Importantly, though, the migration from these distant places never ceased; once a town or region had become part of the migratory hinterland it remained part of it. The number of migrants from regions close to Volta Redonda remained steady or increased slightly, which indicates a return to a pattern of low-risk migration. Despite its proximity, the state of São Paulo sent few migrants to Volta Redonda after 1942. Its own fastgrowing industrial economy offered better jobs and higher pay than construction labor for the CSN. The parts of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and Espírito Santo in the CSN’s core migratory hinterland shared important economic and cultural traits. All had fallen on hard times by the 1930s. In the eighteenth century, fazendas and ranches in the Paraíba and Pomba valleys had prospered as food suppliers to the booming mining towns of south-central Minas Gerais. Many towns began as waystations on the expanding road network from the mines to the ports of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.20 Cattle ranching and dairy farming remained important for this area throughout the nineteenth and into the early twentieth century. The crop that shaped the history of this area in the nineteenth century, however, was coffee. It had first been introduced as a plantation crop near Taubaté (SP) in the Paraíba valley and soon spread to Vassouras, which became the most prosperous of Rio de Janeiro’s coffee counties under the Empire.21 Coffee plantations also triggered a nineteenth-century economic boom in the Sul (MG) and the agricultural triangle of Mata (MG), Muriaé (RJ), and Itapemirim (ES). Despite depleted soils, all of these areas still produced coffee in the early twentieth century. By the late 1920s, the cultivated area in Espírito Santo had been much reduced and coffee was no longer a significant crop in Rio de Janeiro

Industry Comes to a Village

47

and southern Minas Gerais.22 By the 1930s, the golden days of the cash crop boom had definitely ended and farmers had converted the former coffee lands into cattle pasture. Farms survived by supplying São Paulo, the Federal District, and the growing mineiro capital Belo Horizonte with cereals, poultry, and dairy products.23 Experiments with rice farms and orange plantations in the Paraíba valley generated only modest hopes for a new boom cycle.24 Most municipalities in the CSN’s migratory hinterland were rural, politically autonomous, and staunchly Catholic. Some had been founded as tax posts or waystations for the trade with the coast, but most originated as settlements for the laborers of the fazendas. The municipal head towns had not become thoroughly urbanized in the economically stagnant decades of the First Republic; by 1940, only 12 percent of the people in southern Minas Gerais lived in cities with more than five thousand inhabitants. At the same time, governmental power in the Mata, the Sul, and the Zona Metalúrgica became increasingly fragmented. Under the First Republic, many small towns founded their own municipalities, which entitled them to local self-government, a police force, and their own justice of peace and afforded a degree of political autonomy. Culturally, religion was at the center of life in these small towns, which often owed their existence to land grants by fazenda owners to the Catholic Church. Brazilians regarded Minas Gerais as staunchly Catholic, an assessment confirmed by the state’s vigorous movement for Church renewal under the First Republic.25 Volta Redonda thus grew as a city of mineiros, mostly men and women from rural backgrounds who referred to themselves as arigós—simple country people.26 They were part of a large migratory wave; many moved to the booming cities, above all Belo Horizonte, São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro, to work in construction. Estimates suggest that one in five mineiros left the state in the first half of the twentieth century. Migration to Volta Redonda was part of a larger flow from the Sul and Mata regions into the Paraíba valley that had begun under the First Republic. Both Sul and Mata had a high population density, over 100 inhabitants per square mile, which restricted economic opportunity and created incentives for migration. From 1920 to 1940, the population of both regions remained stagnant as the number of migrants equaled natural growth.27 Many in Volta Redonda erroneously believed that baianos, people from Bahia, made up a large share of the CSN’s workforce.28 They used the term baiano to denote a generic nordestino with darker skin and applied the label readily to blacks and pardos, which constituted a majority of the migrants.29 The 1940 census for the municipality of Barra Mansa counted 58 percent ­brancos, 17  percent pardos, and 24 percent negros, while the migrants were 36 percent brancos, 36 percent pardos, and 28 percent negros.30 The

48

Chapter 2

locals nicknamed the daily train that brought many of the migrants the “trem dos Baianos,” despite the many mineiros and capichabas (inhabi­ tants of Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo) that it carried. The word about the CSN’s labor needs spread through a variety of channels. The Estado Novo’s propaganda machine reported on the progress of the steel project, which alerted prospective migrants to the opportunities in Volta Redonda.31 The press and propaganda department (Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda), founded in 1939 to disseminate information about the achievements of the Vargas government, reached even the most remote areas of the southeast with its daily broadcast of Hora do ­Brasil (Brazil Hour) on shortwave radio. Cinemas screened the Cine-jornal brasileiro, which combined news and “typically Brazilian images” from all over the country.32 In communities without a cinema and few radio sets, word of mouth remained an important channel. Family members or friends of men who worked for the CSN spread the word, as did the migrant workers themselves when they returned home for vacation or after they stopped working in Volta Redonda. The more than 20,000 men that left the CSN between 1941 and 1944 recounted their experiences wherever they went next. The CSN had to defend itself against accusations that its labor recruitment undermined the southeast’s rural economy. Macedo Soares contended that the CSN had no control over the word of mouth, which he portrayed as the most effective form of advertising. In truth, the CSN did engage in active recruiting. Macedo Soares received a flood of letters from men who asked for financial support to make the trip to Volta Redonda, and he admitted in a letter to Rio de Janeiro’s governor Ernani do ­Amaral Peixoto that the CSN sent hiring scouts to arrange the passage once it had a number of requests from a particular municipality or region. He acknowledged that angry local employers accused the CSN’s men of operating like headhunters. In one incident, local police in Miracema (RJ) issued an arrest warrant for two hiring scouts. An outraged Macedo Soares blamed the fazendeiros and complained to the governor that a court of law had condoned the recruitment practice. In response to complaints by sugar cane planters from northeastern Rio de Janeiro, Macedo Soares assured Amaral Peixoto that he knew “just how important it is to keep man tied to the land” and added that the CSN had given orders to abstain from advertising because it “did not wish to validate . . . the claim that industry removes men from the fields.”33 He paid lip service to keeping people attached to the land, but he expected the rural working conditions to push the laborers toward migration. Macedo Soares had no patience for the fazendeiros’ attempts to exert political pressure to inhibit the CSN’s labor recruitment. He firmly believed

Industry Comes to a Village

49

that “Volta Redonda would cure many of the weaknesses of our [Brazil’s] economy” and decried the fazendeiros’ recourse to the police and the courts to create petty bureaucratic barriers: In all countries that erect large factories, labor recruitment is greatly facilitated. . . . In the United States, the heads of the basic industries simply request men, even skilled workers, and they receive them to ensure that the important work is completed. In Volta Redonda, the opposite occurred; despite my contacts with the governments of numerous states and municipalities, our needs are considered of equal importance as everybody else’s and not exceptional.

Macedo Soares warned Amaral Peixoto that the fazendeiros’ resistance could paralyze work on the steel mill and added that “the Brazil of the future (which would find all the abovementioned facts in the archives of Volta Redonda) would not understand why the work on such an essential project was not sped up.”34 He ridiculed the claim that competition from industry explained the lack of a steady rural labor force. “It will not be the [lack of] eight thousand men from the interior that we employ here that will weaken the agriculture in this region of Brazil,” Macedo Soares argued, but rather “the fazendeiros’ profound ignorance that drove workers off the land.”35 He advised the rural landholders to “develop methods to produce crops of higher value,” which would enable them to pay more than a pitiful Cr$3.50 to Cr$5 per day, only about twice as much as the CSN paid an unskilled laborer per hour.36

Labor Retention Building and maintaining a sufficiently large and stable workforce remained a challenge despite the economic opportunities the CSN offered. Labor requirements for this large and multifaceted construction project changed from day to day, which made it difficult to establish recruitment goals. The company directors decided that the CSN should hire every ablebodied man who found his way to Volta Redonda. The number of hires, a direct reflection of the number of migrants, shot up quickly in 1942 and remained steady over the next two years. Apparently, state propaganda and the word of mouth spreading in the hinterland had had their effect. The hiring patterns reveal minor lulls in migrant flow during religious holidays, but conveniently, these dips matched the reduced rhythm of work at the CSN. The number of migrants only began to drop substantially and permanently as construction activity slowed in mid-1945 (Figure 2.1). Workforce stability, on the other hand, remained an elusive goal. The CSN had only a small core of about three hundred salaried employees—office staff, engineers, and draftsmen—while the overwhelming majority of the

50

Chapter 2

Number of Workers

13,050

10,974

12,000

10,721

11,004

10,140

8,000 6,327

8,819

7,780

4,647

2,005

4,000

11,698 10,933

4,550

2,076

1,777

0

5,188

8,165

765

178

– 228

– 3,533

– 2,117

– 4,000

1,473 654 – 819

– 4,423 – 3,711

– 5,493 – 6,171

– 8,000

– 8,928

– 9,897

48 19

47 19

19

46

45 19

44 19

43 19

42 19

19

41

– 12,000

Year Hirings

Dismissals

Net Change

Total Workforce

figure 2.1  Hiring, Dismissals, and Total Workforce at the CSN (1941–1947) Source: Data from CSN, Grupo de Trabalho para Estudo de Venda das Casas, Relatorio (Volta Redonda: CSN, 1960), 30.

labor force consisted of workers paid by the hour.37 Turnover rates among the hourly wage earners remained extremely high throughout the construction years. In 1942, for example, the CSN recruited more than 10,500 men, but more than 6,000 left within the same year. In 1942/43, the company hired on average 185 new workers per week, but between 90 and 100 others left Volta Redonda during the same time. Between 1941 and 1946, a total of 46,838 migrant workers came to Volta Redonda; by the end of 1946, 35,140 of them had left.38 The CSN’s engineers and foremen never had the luxury of stable crews to facilitate the daily organization of work and efficient completion of tasks. Instead, they had to deal with tremendous fluctuations in the size and composition of their crews on a daily basis, which required them to count their men several times daily and, if necessary, request reinforcement from the pool of newly hired migrants. To create some stability, Macedo Soares issued an order in October 1942 stating that it was in the “interest of the company that, in all services, employees work as long as possible on the same job.” The only reason for reassignments was “absolute necessity for the work.”39 Most workers left the CSN on their own volition. The company’s daily bulletin (Boletim de Serviço de Volta Redonda) published a daily tally of dismissals that listed the causes, indicating whether workers left voluntarily or had been fired. In 1942, the first full year of construction, almost all dismissals fell into one of two voluntary categories: “requesting

51

Industry Comes to a Village

to leave” and “abandoning.” Voluntary dismissals also predominated in 1944 (92 percent), 1945 (88 percent), and 1946 (86 percent); their share never dropped below 80 percent for any quarter within those three years. Only 1943 presented an exception to the pattern of predominantly voluntary dismissals. The CSN had introduced the new involuntary category of “conveniência de serviço” (work convenience), which emerged as the single most common reason for dismissal in early 1943 (Table 2.1). In February, the daily bulletin listed work convenience as reason for 68 percent of all dismissals, and involuntary causes accounted for more than half the dismissals in the first quarter of 1943. For the year as a whole, involuntary causes added up to 36 percent of all dismissals, significantly more than for any other year during construction.40 It appears odd for the CSN to fire large numbers of workers at a time when it built its labor force and had to worry about its ability to retain migrant workers. A closer look at the dismissal statistics for 1943 reveals that the new practice represented a response to the company’s changed legal status rather than a shift in its approach to labor recruitment and retention (Table 2.1). Once Brazil entered World War II, the government classified Barra Mansa as a municipality of national security interest and the CSN as a company of military interest. The change of legal status made the table 2.1 Dismissals by Cause (August 1942–July 1943) Request

1942

1943

Abandoning

Desertion

Convenience

Misc.

Total

August

161 (92%)

14 (8%)

175

September

433 (98%)

7 (2%)

440

October

315 (100%)

--

315

November

520 (100%)

--

520

December

330 (100%)

--

330

January

102 (100%)

--

February

16 (8%)

16 (8%)

32 (15%)

140 (68%)

2 (1%)

206

March

--

61 (18%)

102 (30%) 158 (46%)

23 (7%)

344

April

--

45 (10%)

307 (66%)

92 (20%)

18 (4%)

462

May

--

10 (6%)

83 (47%)

80 (45%)

4 (2%)

177

June

--

25 (4%)

477 (75%) 126 (20%)

10 (2%)

638

July

--

8 (2%)

165 (46%) 179 (50%)

9 (2%)

361

Introduced as New Categories

102

Note: The miscellaneous category includes dismissals for “death,” “indiscipline,” “sabotage,” “illness,” “transfer,” and “free will.” Source: Computed from daily hiring and firing statistics. BSVR 091 (Aug. 2, 1942) to BSVR 132 (July 30, 1943).

52

Chapter 2

company’s workers equivalent to soldiers. If they abandoned work in Volta Redonda, with or without the company’s knowledge, they risked being persecuted as deserters.41 The CSN introduced new categories to reflect the changed legal environment, as the company could no longer grant dismissal upon “request” and risked persecution for the worker if it classified the dismissal as “abandoning.” “Desertion” became the primary category for voluntary dismissals in 1943. The CSN now listed under “work convenience” many cases previously classified as “request” or “abandoning” in order to avoid persecution of the worker and legal troubles for the company. The dismissal record cited “work convenience” much more regularly for skilled than for unskilled workers, which strongly suggests that the category served above all to protect workers from persecution and to keep alive the possibility of a rehire.42 Thus, most of the cases of “work convenience” should be understood as disguised voluntary dismissals rather than as involuntary dismissals. The CSN fired workers only for laziness, drunkenness, theft, or a lack of discipline, which together never made up more than 1 to 2 percent of all dismissals. After 1943, when the enforcement of the “desertion” rules effectively ceased, “abandoning” again became the dominant voluntary reason for dismissal. Fortunately for the company, the monthly turnover became relatively predictable. In 1943, 1944, and 1945, the CSN lost between 3 percent and 6.5 percent of its workers to out-migration every month. Only November 1943 (7.8 percent), May 1944 (13.3 percent), July 1944 (11.3 percent), and August 1945 (8.0 percent) displayed significantly higher attrition rates.43 There was little seasonal variation, even though many migrants from the southeast still maintained connections to their families that might have called upon them to help out with the harvest. Even months with major holidays such as Christmas, Carnival, and Easter saw no dramatic increase in the rates of dismissal. The effect showed only in the week directly preceding the holiday, when workers returned home to be with their families, but that pattern had little effect on the monthly totals.44 A record of hires and dismissals from October 1943 to April 1944 illustrates strong weekby-week oscillations in the workforce that complicated the CSN’s labor management (Figure 2.2). The inflow of migrants and the resulting number of hires remained relatively stable for weeks at a time. From late October to December of 1943, for example, the company hired between one and two hundred workers per week; in the first two months of 1944, the weekly totals oscillated between two and three hundred men. The number of dismissals, on the other hand, fluctuated wildly from one week to the next. Less than one hundred men turned their back on the CSN in one week, and then almost four hundred the next. The only discernable pattern for the voluntary dismissals was that more workers left in the second half of any given

53

Industry Comes to a Village 500 Number of Workers

400 300 200 100 0 – 100 – 200 – 300 – 400 October November December 1943 Hirings

January 1944

February

Firings

March

April

Net Change

figure 2.2  Hiring and Dismissals at the CSN—Week-by-Week (October 1943– April 1944) Source: Compiled from daily hiring and dismissal records in BSVR 178 (Oct. 1, 1943) to BSVR 81 (Apr. 30, 1944).

month. The net change in the workforce followed the pronounced fluctuations in dismissals rather than the moderate changes in hires. The retention rates varied by skill level, which helped the CSN build a sufficiently skilled workforce to meet the challenges of construction. The personnel department hired all able-bodied men independent of skill, but self-selection of the migrant workers shifted the labor force composition toward a higher average level of skill. Within the first two years of hire, the CSN lost 61 percent of the unskilled laborers and 55 percent of its semiskilled workers, but only 37 percent of its skilled workers (Table 2.2).

table 2.2 Length of Stay with CSN by Skill Level (for Hires 1941–1944) Skill Level Worked for CSN

Skilled

Semiskilled

  Unskilled

Entire Workforce

t < 1 year

13%

16%

24%

21%

1 year < t < 2 years

24%

39%

37%

34%

2 years < t < 3 years

15%

7%

11%

11%

t > 3 years

48%

38%

28%

34%

Total

100%

100%

100%

100%

Source: Sample of CSN personnel files.

54

Chapter 2

The majority of the arriving migrants had few formal skills. The personnel department immediately recorded the new hire’s trade (ofício), level of schooling, and previous work experience in order to channel workers with requisite experience into departments that needed them, but only 17 percent of the arriving migrants fell into the skilled category.45 Thirteen percent of the migrant workers occupied semiskilled positions, 2.5 percent had qualifications for clerical jobs, and the remaining 67.5 percent worked initially as simple laborers.46 Interviews with former workers suggest that these numbers may still overstate the CSN’s skill profile because the company assigned men with limited skill and experience to positions that exceeded their formal qualifications. One worker recalled that his father had worked for LIGHT São Paulo as an electrician’s helper. When he came to Volta Redonda, the CSN immediately classified him as an electrician and soon thereafter promoted him to foreman, a position that far exceeded his previous experience. Apparently, this was common practice.47 The skill profile of the CSN’s construction workforce in July 1944 reflected the differential retention rates (Table 2.3). Unskilled laborers made up 58 percent, down 9 percent compared to the entire migrant pool upon hire, while the share of skilled and semiskilled workers had increased to 42 percent from the original 30 percent in the migrant pool. The CSN enjoyed good retention rates in the most important construction trades. Carpenters and carpenter helpers accounted for 8.4 percent of the workforce in July 1944, although they made up only 3.7 percent of all hires before 1944. For stonemasons, the equivalent figures were 7 percent over 5.4 percent; for reinforcing-metal workers, 2.7 percent over 1.7 percent; and for plumbers, 1.2 percent over 0.4 percent. The classic construction trades dominated the workforce; more than half of all skilled workers were carpenters, masons, and reinforcing-metal workers, and more than half of all semiskilled workers were helpers to carpenters, masons, and reinforcingmetal workers. The other skilled occupations accounting for more than 2 percent of the overall workforce were mechanics and electricians, in high table 2.3 Skill Profile of Construction Workforce (1944) Foremen

Skilled

Semiskilled

Unskilled

Workforce

Construction

2 (>0%)

712 (22%)

617 (19%)

1,873 (59%)

3,204

Installation

21 (1%)

514 (30%)

352 (21%)

822 (48%)

1,709

Support

55 (1%)

993 (21%)

811 (17%)

2,984 (61%)

4,843

CSN (Total)

78 (1%)

2,226 (23%)

1,786 (18%)

5,680 (58%)

9,770

Source: Computed from “Pessoal Horista,” BSVR 144 (July 29, 1944), appendix.

Industry Comes to a Village

55

demand in the CSN’s installation and support departments.48 Despite all the fluctuation, the company gradually built a workforce that could handle the challenges of construction.

The Conditions of Work in Volta Redonda Workers had a variety of motives for leaving Volta Redonda. Personnel files and dismissal records occasionally provide a glimpse of individual motives to move on, but no comprehensive picture of the potential push and pull factors. Several files noted that workers requested dismissal in order to take care of the harvest or field work, suggesting that some treated their employment on the construction site as seasonal work.49 Some dismissal records (Cartas de Demissão) also identified the worker’s need to “return to [the] land” to till and plant as reason for a request to end or temporarily leave their employment at the CSN.50 Still, Macedo Soares certainly went too far when he blamed seasonal migration for the overall volatility of the CSN’s labor force in a letter to state governor ­Ernani do Amaral Peixoto: “The mineiros, capichabas and fluminenses appear at certain times and return (to their states) when it is time to plant and harvest; we never prevented anybody from returning home, when so desired.”51 The CSN encouraged workers who declared an interest in returning to Volta Redonda after their trip home, but it kept records on the worker’s attitude and included a recommendation on future rehire in the dismissal record. Regarding one “worker with good attendance record,” the note cautioned that “he is a small farmer and claims to return to Minas,” which made continued seasonal migration an issue.52 Many workers stated that they wanted to “return to live . . . with the[ir] family” or cited generic “family issues,” which gave the CSN no pretext to issue a recommendation against rehire.53 Men who admitted that they “could not handle the tools” or could not “get used to the work,” on the other hand, stood little chance to be endorsed for a possible rehire.54 Many workers left because they resented the living conditions in Volta Redonda. The first two years were inevitably difficult, however much the CSN invested in the construction of housing and social assistance programs. The thousands of workers whom it hired in 1942 and 1943 all lived in tents or simple wooden accommodations. The unskilled construction laborers, called chapinhas with reference to their badges, slept in bunk beds in the wooden barracks of the Acampamento Operário. They had no running water or electricity, and the straw mattresses were infested with bugs.55 A 1943 police report provided a dire assessment of the material situation, colored by cultural prejudice against rural people and the poor: “[T]he company puts them up, in large numbers, in simple collective accommodations.

56

Chapter 2

figure 2.3  Construction Workers Eating at the Canteen Source: CSN Photographic Archive, early 1940s.

There is a notable lack of hygiene and comfort in those accommodations, due to the differences in origins between the employees. The workers bearing the greatest sacrifice are accommodated provisionally in large barracks at a comfort level that fits their class—poor and without moral rules.”56 But the CSN did not have enough even of these primitive collective accommodations. Many workers had to live in the city of Barra Mansa or on nearby fazendas in rented rooms.57 Only workers with families could count on more comfortable quarters because they received priority for the new company housing in the Bairro Rústico. Even they had little privacy, however, because the CSN expected them to temporarily host single workers and even couples.58 Health care remained similarly precarious in the first two years, although the CSN had contracted specialists to implement a public health plan. The Paraíba River regularly flooded the Acampamento Operário causing outbreaks of typhoid and malaria.59 Workers attributed their health problems to the location: they asked for dismissal because they “had not adapted to the climate in Volta Redonda” or “could not work in the altitude.” Sick workers preferred to return home for treatment by family members rather than to rely on the CSN’s health services, which

57

Industry Comes to a Village

were initially simply overwhelmed.60 A former CSN worker told the political police in 1943 that four hundred to five hundred workers lined up every day at the hospital for treatment of a wide range of ailments.61 The 1943 police report suggested that the CSN initially struggled to supply safe drinking water and quality food: The water, heavily chlorinated, causes much harm for everybody, and is still the cause of almost all visits to the hospital. This problem has practically been resolved with the project to treat the water from the Paraiba River, which passes through several filters before it is properly channeled to the company. The nutrition is generally good for the office staff, whom the company supplies with foodstuffs. The same, however, cannot be said of the workers, most of whom are poorly served in canteens too small for their large numbers, and the food cannot be prepared well.62

The report emphasized that these “difficulties caused the [workers] to be very dissatisfied, and those unhappy are not few.” Testimony by a former worker confirmed that assessment. He told the police that the dissatisfaction of the workers was “due exclusively to the moral and material state” that they found themselves in.63 The nature of construction work posed significant additional health risks. High accident rates were standard in the industry, and the challenges of erecting a steel mill with often inadequate equipment made the job at Volta Redonda no safer.64 In 1943, ten to fifteen workers every day suffered accidents that required medical treatment, tallying 260 to 360 injuries every month (Table 2.4).65 Statistically, one in every twenty-eight workers suffered an accident each month, enough for the risk to weigh on the workers’ minds. Most had witnessed an accident in their crew or lived with someone in the table 2.4 Frequency of Work Accidents (1943) January

April

July

October

7,313

8,467

10,144

11,089

339

262

313

354

4.6%

3.1%

3.1%

3.2%

Workdays

26

25

25

27

Accidents per day (average)

13

10

13

13

Injured workers/workforce (each day)

0.18%

0.12%

0.12%

0.12%

Workforce Number of accidents Injured workers/workforce (each month)

Note: The last ten days of September substituted for the last ten days of October, which are missing on the microfilms. Source: Compiled from Fichas de Acidentes (accident reports) for January, April, July, and October 1943. CSN, Central Archive.

29

2.7%

434

40.5%

--

28

2.6%

--

--

--

24.8%

266

1.7%

18

0.2%

2

--

25

--

3

0.3%

2.3%

--

40 3.7%

43

4.0%

--

25 2.3%

50

4.7%

--

3.6%

39

9.8%

105

3.5%

37

Cuts, Lacerations

--

33

3.1%

--

--

213

19.9%

3

--

0.3%

63

5.9%

--

Contusions, Bruises

Burns

3.1%

33

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

3.1%

33

--

--

Foreign Body

2.9%

31

0.4%

4

--

--

--

--

0.4%

4

1.0%

11

0.3%

3

0.6%

6

0.3%

3

Fractures

16.0%

171

0.1%

1

--

--

--

--

0.4%

4

0.2%

2

11.2%

120

1.8%

19

2.3%

25

Perforation Wounds

6.6%

71

0.3%

3

--

--

4.4%

47

0.4%

4

1.2%

13

0.1%

1

0.1%

1

0.2%

2

Strain, Sprain, Dislocations

3.5%

38

0.1%

1

0.2%

2

0.6%

6

0.7%

7

0.4%

4

0.4%

4

1.2%

13

0.1%

1

Other Injuries

100.0%

1,072

5.2%

56

2.7%

29

5.2%

56

9.5%

102

9.8%

105

18.7%

200

36.7%

393

12.2%

131

Total

Note: Other causes include “car and vehicle accidents,” “poisonings,” “machines and engines,” and the CSN’s “miscellaneous” category. Other injuries include “intoxication,” “problems with the immune system,” “internal bleeding,” “amputations,” “inflammations,” “infections,” “ulcers,” and “traumas.” Source: Compiled from Fichas de Acidentes for January, April, July, and October 1943. CSN, Central Archive.

Total

Other causes

Heat, explosions, electrical current

Straining

Use of hand tools

Person falling

Stepping on or striking object

Hit by object

Handling material

Cause

Type of Injury

table 2.5 Work Accidents by Cause and Type of Injury (for Four Months in 1943)

Industry Comes to a Village

59

collective quarters who had suffered an injury. Fatalities also occurred, although fewer than might be expected in the construction industry.66 The most common injuries were contusions, bruises, cuts, lacerations, and perforations. Together, they accounted for more than 80 percent of all cases in 1943.67 Most contusions were a result of workers being hit by construction materials such as bricks, stones, rails, ties, beams, or rafters, or by tools such as cranks, hammers, or wrenches that another worker had accidentally dropped. One mechanic had his hand smashed by a roller, which left him unable to work for over six months.68 Unskilled laborers unloading construction material from railcars and trucks easily caught their fingers between bricks or pieces of timber or had their feet hit by falling tubes. Many contusions were self-inflicted with hand tools such as hammers, pickaxes, wrenches, or shovels (Table 2.5). It was easy to trip or stumble in the general disorder of the construction site. Most such mishaps only caused light bruises, but workers who fell off scaffolding, into foundation ditches, or off the backs of trucks often suffered severe bruises. The inherent disorder on the construction site also caused many perforation wounds; one in six accidents (16 percent) led to a perforated hand or foot. Many workers stepped on or hit protruding nails, which could easily lead to tetanus or blood poisoning. Falling bricks, timber, and iron bars caused cuts and lacerations, and in several cases heavy pieces of equipment, such as workbenches, tipped over and caused severe lacerations. No doubt the most unusual perforations the CSN’s medical staff had to tend to were bullet wounds from gunfights between workers on company grounds. For the injured worker, the full cost of the accident went beyond physical debilitation; he lost wages during the recovery time. The accident reports indicate that over a third of the men were back at work within four days and another quarter within seven days. The remaining 36 percent of accident victims, however, took anywhere from eight days to a full year to recover from their injuries (Table 2.6). The 1934 accident law obliged the CSN to provide free medical treatment, to pay the full wage for the day of the accident, and to pay an indemnity during the recovery time, although that often fell well short of the regular income.69 The reformed 1944 accident law guaranteed that temporarily incapacitated employees received 70 percent of their regular monetary income (art. 19) and nonmonetary benefits (art. 34).70 The specific rules for the indemnity’s calculation reduced that amount to less than 70 percent of the regular daily wage, however, because the law mandated calculation based on eight hours of work (art. 39) even though the CSN had a nine-hour workday. Moreover, the indemnity did not apply to the first day after the accident if the worker recovered in less than five days (art. 27), which reduced its overall value to between 31 percent and 47 percent of lost wages for those recovering in one to four

60

Chapter 2 table 2.6 Work Accidents by Skill and Recovery Time (1943) Skill Level

 

Recovery Time

Skilled

Semiskilled

Unskilled

Total

1 to 4 days

11.1%

4.5%

22.2%

37.8%

5 to 7 days

6.2%

2.2%

18.2%

26.6%

8 to 14 days

4.2%

1.9%

15.0%

21.1%

15 to 30 days

2.6%

1.1%

6.5%

10.2%

2 to 6 months

1.1%

0.4%

2.6%

4.1%

--

0.1%

0.1%

0.2%

25.2%

10.2%

64.6%

100.0%

> 6 months Total

Source: Compiled from Fichas de Acidentes for January, April, July, and October 1943. CSN, Central Archive.

days. Thus, even with the additional protections of the law, an accident still caused significant loss of income. The CSN also adopted accident-prevention measures to counteract potentially negative effects on its labor recruitment and retention. Its very first accident-prevention norm required department heads to designate workers to “pull out the reusable nails and to clinch the others in order to prevent further accidents.”71 The company provided protective clothing such as steel-capped boots and dust masks free of charge to those workers required to use them. It encouraged wage workers to purchase protective gear and established special credit lines for those who lacked the resources.72 The CSN also complied with the 1944 decree-law on work accidents that mandated the creation of a commission for accident prevention (Comissão para a Prevenção de Acidentes) in plants with over one hundred employees.73 The commission identified health hazards and oversaw the implementation of the relevant provisions of the accident laws, such as bonus pay for working with chemically hazardous storage batteries.74 These difficult conditions of life and work in Volta Redonda caused men to miss work and increased absenteeism. From 1942 to 1944, only 62 to 79 percent of the CSN’s wage labor force reported to work on any given day, with an average daily “attendance rate” of 75 percent.75 Workers recovering from accidents accounted for 1 or 2 percent of this absenteeism and those with other health problems for a significantly larger share, assuming the reports about daily lines at the hospital were accurate.76 Workers on leave or vacation accounted for 10 percent, a share that increased around holidays, when men took advantage of the CSN’s policy to facilitate family visits. Attendance around holidays could drop as low as

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65 percent.77 The remaining 5 to 10 percent of absentees must have been men who skipped work or men who had abandoned Volta Redonda, but were still on the rolls. To keep track of the number of available workers, the CSN introduced an extensive system of roll calls; at least four times a day, timekeepers checked on the gangs under their supervision, calling out all the names and recording absences.78 The CSN tried to reduce the outflow of migrant workers through material incentives and coercion. It paid attractive wages compared to agricultural work in its migratory hinterland, and even compared to industrial wages in the cities. Unskilled and semiskilled workers could expect to earn anywhere between Cr$1.40, for a common laborer, to Cr$2.20 for an electrician helper. In a nine-hour workday, they earned between Cr$11.60 and Cr$19.80, which compared very favorably to the Cr$3 to Cr$5 that agricultural laborers in the interior received for a day of work. The CSN’s hourly wages for workers trained in a trade ranged from Cr$2.40, for a stonemason with little experience, to as much as Cr$4.00 for an experienced carpenter.79 The company adjusted the wages to keep pace with the rising cost of living caused by wartime shortages; between 1942 and mid1945, it granted three modest general raises that increased the nominal wage by anywhere from 50 percent to 80 percent.80 The opportunity to work in the steel mill and secure a safe and well-paid job for life represented a delayed material incentive, especially for those with experience or trades needed for production. The higher retention rates for skilled workers suggest that they saw the sacrifice of the construction years as an investment in their economic future. To stabilize the workforce in the short run, the company relied on more than just the economic rationality of migrant workers. Brazil’s entry into World War II in August 1942 provided the CSN with a powerful new tool to retain labor. Decree-law 11.087 (Dec. 10, 1942) designated the construction site as a military installation of “national security interest,” and decree-law 4.937 (Nov. 9, 1942) introduced specific restrictions for employees of such military establishments, designed to “assure the full operation of civil and military factories that produced war materiel.”81 The decrees restricted the workers’ freedom of contract and freedom of movement. They had the legal standing of reserve soldiers and could not leave Volta Redonda against the CSN’s will, even if they never had a formal contract or if their contract had expired.82 Abandoning work for more than eight days equaled desertion, punishable under military law with one to four years of prison.83 For foreign employees the equivalent charge was sabotage, punishable with four to ten years of imprisonment.84 If three or more workers abandoned work collectively, for example in a wildcat strike, they faced two to six years of prison time.85 If the worker returned to work before

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the eighth day, the company could impose a fine equivalent to three days of wages for each missed day.86 The law helped retain workers with essential skills, for whom the CSN could invoke draft protection. “[C]arpenters, lathe operators, mechanics, welders, drivers, electricians, boilermakers, dredge operators, blacksmiths, coil winders, reinforcing-metal workers, connectors, rivet heaters, tinsmiths, foundry men, crane operators, panel makers, fitters, engine drivers, refractory brick layers, pile-driver operators, locksmiths, and bulldozer operators” all benefited from this provision.87 The CSN enforced the law immediately.88 Between January 1943 and January 1946, it fined on average eleven workers each week for missing work.89 In 53 percent of the cases, the CSN fined the affected worker exactly the prescribed minimum of three days’ wages, while 5 percent of the workers received fines anywhere from four to fifteen days of wages. Often, however, the CSN opted to limit the fine to one day of wages (35 percent of cases) or two days (7 percent), less than the legally prescribed minimum.90 The company applied the law with an eye toward labor retention: a worker burdened with a fine that would consume much of his next paycheck had less of an incentive to stay in Volta Redonda. Whenever the police arrested CSN deserters, the company used them to set an example and deter others from leaving. An ex-employee described the practice to the political police: “A worker who tries to escape will be imprisoned and will have to return to work under the vigilance of the internal police, earning a mere Cr$0.10 an hour, and he will return to the jail to spend the night.”91 The inmates had to perform hard labor on construction crews or inside the prison, where passing workers could see them carrying piles of bricks back and forth.92 The penal code required the payment of a nominal wage, but it was still labor on the cheap: Cr$0.10 per hour equaled an eighth of the CSN’s lowest regular wage.93 Workers who wanted to leave but feared a desertion charge had to find ways to provoke their dismissal. “A worker who desires to leave the company will succeed only if he is expelled due to disrespect or a similar reason,” the informant told the political police, adding that “[t]here are constantly conflicts between workers and their superiors, conflicts that aim at provoking the firing of the worker, who cannot want to be in that environment.”94 The application of the military emergency laws temporarily reduced outmigration. Monthly dismissals in early 1943 were down compared to November and December 1942, but by mid-1943 they had crept back up to previous levels. Nevertheless, the laws helped keep the attrition rate for 1943 to 4.4 percent of the workforce, significantly less than in 1944 (6.7 percent) and 1945 (5.7 percent), contributing to the stabilization of the workforce at a critical time during construction.95 After December 1943, the CSN applied the decree-laws much less rigidly. “Desertion” rarely accounted for more than 2 to 3 percent of all dismissals in 1944

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and 1945, and the company stopped using the category altogether in mid1945. Instead it introduced a new category, “free will,” which marked a return to its practice before the military emergency laws. “[A]bandoning” and “free will” became the most common dismissal categories for the remainder of the construction years. By 1944, the company also revived its old disciplinary regime, which punished unexcused absences with suspensions of one to fifteen days.96 In 1943, suspensions had been used exclusively to penalize indiscipline, negligence, and lack of dedication because the law required levying fines for absences.97

Constructing the Mill—Constructing an Image Engineers reigned supreme in the management of this construction labor force. Crews worked under the supervision of both U.S. and Brazilian engineers, who followed Arthur McKee & Co.’s blueprint for the mill.98 The CSN contracted eighty-five U.S. engineers, technicians, and skilled workmen, all selected by the equipment manufacturers, and it delegated control over the work to McKee’s engineers.99 The only areas under Brazilian supervision were topographical work, electrical installations, building water and sewage

figure 2.4  Work at the Forging Shop during Mill Construction Source: CSN Photographic Archive, early 1940s.

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systems, and erecting the mechanical repair shops, the power station, and the rolling mill.100 The CSN instructed all employees to support the work of the American engineers and technicians in “the most efficient manner and without delays,” to follow the “orders and recommendations of the general superintendent from McKee as if they came from the Technical Director,” and to carry out all orders with a “sense of responsibility and initiative in order to contribute to the success of an enterprise that the government entrusted to them and in which the entire nation placed great hopes.”101 American engineers and technicians trained their Brazilian assistants and prepared them to operate the heavy equipment.102 The contract with McKee expired in 1944, with the installation of the equipment far from complete, but the CSN decided not to renew it in order to avoid further dollar expenditure.103 Instead, it contracted the American technicians individually to help manage the transition to production and selected the most knowledgeable Brazilian technicians to fill the positions vacated by McKee employees.104 The CSN divided construction work into three sectors: the blast furnace, the steelworks, and the rolling mill.105 The sheer size and weight of the production equipment presented tremendous challenges to work crews, which had to install the machinery according to technical specifications using old and often inadequate construction equipment. One of the most difficult tasks was to create level foundations for the blast furnace and the

figure 2.5  Construction of Blast Furnace 2—Connecting Gas Tubes Source: CSN Photographic Archive, early 1950s.

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coke ovens in the soft soil. The furnace crews used reinforced concrete braced in the bedrock for stability, an engineering feat whose completion was among the most celebrated events of the construction years. The crews also built an extensive infrastructure that supplied the blast furnace with coke, iron ore, minerals, and fuel. Among the most dangerous tasks was the installation of tubes and ducts to connect the blast furnace with the coke ovens, the gasholders, the chemical by-products plant, and the CSN’s thermoelectric plant, which burnt the residual gas. The lack of cranes with sufficient range required simpler and more labor-intensive techniques to put the tubes and ducts into place; welders often worked at great heights without extensive safety precautions (Figure 2.5).106 The size and weight of the columns and the equipment presented the greatest challenge for the erection of the open-hearth steelworks. The CSN’s antiquated diesel cranes did not have the lifting capacity to raise the steel columns and beams that formed the frame of the building, and they could not lift the traveling cranes that had to be placed on girders high above the shop floor. The resourceful crews mounted temporary auxiliary structures for hoists and used several diesel cranes simultaneously to lift the heaviest pieces of equipment (Figure 2.6).107 Crews working on the rolling and finishing mills, a complex of buildings stretching a full mile, faced similar problems in erecting the steel structures and lifting the traveling cranes;

figure 2.6  Erecting the Steelworks—Lifting an Overhead Traveling Crane Source: CSN Photographic Archive, early 1940s.

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on average the cranes weighed less than for the steelworks, but there were many more to lift (Figure 2.7). Unique to the rolling mills was the need for an extensive electrical infrastructure. In contrast to the blast furnace and the steelworks, which employed chemical processes, the slabbing and blooming mill, the breakdown mill, the rail and structural mill, and the plate mill all used electric power to effect a physical transformation of the steel. The crews created a grid able to transmit the heavy loads and built separate electrical control rooms for each major mill. The mills also required an infrastructure to deliver large quantities of water for cooling the steel during and after rolling. CSN crews built a water treatment plant and a thermoelectric plant with steam-powered generators in order to supply the needed water and electric power for the mill as well as the future town. The workers and engineers that participated in the construction drew tremendous pride from their pioneering accomplishment. Living and working under difficult circumstances, they had overcome great logistical obstacles to complete the largest construction project in Brazil’s history (Figure  2.8). Macedo Soares liked to cite numbers to illustrate the sheer magnitude of the effort. It all began with plans that required some 30,000 drawings.108 The building of the mill consumed 48,000 tons of

figure 2.7  Erecting the Slabbing and Blooming Mill Source: CSN Photographic Archive, early 1940s.

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iron, 98.8 million cubic feet of wood, and 14.1 million cubic feet of concrete. Mixing that amount of concrete required three million sacks of cement, 6.4 million cubic feet of sand, and 12.9 million cubic feet of gravel. Crews laid 35 miles of internal railroad track and installed equipment that weighed more than 100,000 tons.109 Building more than 3,000 homes in the company town consumed more than 50 million bricks, 8.5 million tiles, and 257 kilometers of clay pipes and metal tubes.110 Macedo Soares emerged as the public face of the CSN. As technical director, he oversaw all aspects of mill construction and knew the technical requirements and on-the-ground conditions far better than the other directors. Macedo Soares’s decision to move his family to Volta Redonda and oversee the construction on site, rather than from the headquarters in distant Rio de Janeiro, demonstrated a personal commitment to the project that earned him the respect of his subordinates and the wider public. He insisted that administrators and engineers, himself included, observe the employees at work on a daily basis to facilitate the selection of the most capable as future heads of subdepartments, crew foremen, and specialized operators for the mill.111 Colleagues recognized Macedo Soares’s pivotal role. His successor as technical director, Paulo C. G. Martins, referred to

figure 2.8  Panoramic View of the Mill. Foreground: company houses; background: the rolling mills (left), the blast furnace (center), and the steelworks and maintenance shops (right). Source: CSN Photographic Archive, late 1940s.

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Macedo Soares as the “idealizador realizador Volt[a][Red]onda”—the man who “championed and realized Volta Redonda.”112 Macedo Soares used his technical and personal authority to shape the ideological construction of the CSN in public discourse. He became, in effect, the Estado Novo’s ambassador on both the national and international stage to extol the significance of a modern steel industry for Brazil and explain Volta Redonda’s contribution to the country’s social and economic future.113 He highlighted the direct benefits that the mill would bring to national industry; its products would become inputs for domestic metallurgical and construction firms, reducing dependence on imports, which in turn would benefit Brazilian engineering companies. The CSN would produce plates for use by domestic shipyards to build hulls for large vessels, rails for the maintenance and expansion of the domestic railway network, and the high-end steel to transform Brazil’s defense industry, which still produced nothing more sophisticated than artillery shells. The CSN’s by-products plant would produce Benzol, Naphta, and Toluol, key inputs for the production of explosives for military and nonmilitary purposes, as well as other basic inputs for a domestic chemical industry.114 For Macedo Soares, the building of the CSN symbolized nothing less than “the country’s industrial coming of age.” He even proclaimed that “Volta Redonda alone could give additional power to the United States during this war,” implying that Brazil was in a position to assist the most industrialized country in the world.115 Macedo Soares’s writings and speeches informed a discourse about Volta Redonda’s role for Brazil’s industrial progress that reinforced the ­Estado Novo’s development ideology and survived beyond the fall of that regime in 1945. The Brazilian Bulletin, a publication of the Government Trade Bureau, described the CSN’s first run of steel in 1946 as “the transition of Brazil from an agrarian to an industrial economy” and suggested that it proved those wrong who believed that “it ‘couldn’t be done’ in tropical Latin America, that heavy industry could not exist in a land flowing with milk and honey.” Volta Redonda would ensure that “the illusion of tropical languor” would “vanish”; Brazil was no longer just the country characterized by the “easygoing atmosphere of Rio de Janeiro.”116 Articles in North American technical journals echoed Macedo Soares’s optimism. C. H. Vivian opined in the Compressed Air Magazine that the “erection of an integrated mill . . . will go far toward making the South American republic virtually independent of imported iron and steel products.”117 Brazilian industrialists joined the choir of praise despite earlier misgivings about the Estado Novo’s intervention in Brazil’s economy. The introduction to a volume commemorating the visit of 120 prominent paulista industrialists to Volta Redonda in 1943 saw a “new Brazil . . . emerge along the majestic lines of the steel-city.” The text quoted Getúlio Vargas,

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who had proclaimed in a 1931 speech that the success of the steel industry was “intimately linked with life and the strengthening of nationality” in Brazil.118 Roberto Simonsen, Brazil’s leading industrialist and the president of the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo (Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo; FIESP), wrote in the foreword that the domestic production of steel would fundamentally transform the national industrial economy.119 Many of his fellow São Paulo industrialists believed that the CSN would exercise a profoundly positive impact on social relations. One visitor expected rising living standards as a result, which would result in “satisfaction and social tranquility of the general public,” while another highlighted the benefits of “good instruction and a physically and morally healthy life leading to cooperation, discipline, and the well-being of the collective.”120 Yet another expected Volta Redonda to bring “true social peace and undermine the motives to be rebellious,” which would prevent any dangerous ruptures in the industrial “equilibrium.”121 One sociologically minded industrialist even predicted that the expansion of the national transport system triggered by the construction of the steel mill would intensify contacts between individuals and groups across Brazil and thereby contribute to stability.122 Volta Redonda became a symbol of Brazil’s great future. The Estado Novo’s propaganda campaign had laid the groundwork by extolling the steel mill’s promise as the foundation of the country’s economic independence. As construction neared completion, Brazilians who had heard or read about the CSN came to expect that it would transform the country’s social and economic fortunes. In all its hyperbole, the propaganda captured and reinforced the spirit of pioneering accomplishment felt by the engineers and workers who made Volta Redonda. The promise of greatness informed the company’s self-representation, the employees’ self-perception, and the views of the many people who visited the construction site. For the workers who stayed in Volta Redonda beyond construction, these years of sacrifice created a strong identification with the company’s mission of social and economic development for Brazil. In later years, this loyalty born out of sacrifice translated into a sense of collective moral ownership of the company and an expectation that the company would share the fruits of success with the workers. Conversely, the CSN took to recognizing the pioneers (os pioneiros) as examples of the dedication and discipline it expected of all its employees. O Lingote, a CSN magazine created in 1953, ran a series that celebrated employees who had joined the company during construction and had had successful careers.123

3

State Paternalism in the Making of a Company Town Once it had been decided to locate the steel mill in Volta Redonda, the work began to integrate man into the collective, to discipline the masses for a great industrial task, the greatest ever realized in the country. It was necessary to regiment the men—in their majority rural laborers . . . —to imbue them with a new mentality, capable of becoming useful pieces in the industrial complex that was being built . . . ­—Paulo Monteiro Mendes Diretor Secretário of the CSN, January 27, 19591

As in the Soviet Union, Brazil’s state-led expansion of heavy industry went hand in hand with a government effort to engineer a new type of worker adapted to twentieth-century industrial society.2 President Getúlio Vargas conceived of Volta Redonda as the cornerstone of the country’s industrial modernity, in not only economic but also social and cultural terms. The steel town was to be the realization of his project to usher Brazil into an industrial revolution without violent class conflict. He provided the CSN with the political mandate, the financial resources, and the institutional power to engineer workers who combined technical skill, work discipline, and a commitment to social peace.3 The task for the CSN was to acculturate men of rural origins to work in a large industrial facility and to forge a community of working-class families. The social engineering began with the physical construction of the town and would continue long after the mill had been inaugurated. CSN management tried to shape the workers’ culture by adopting a paternalist strategy reminiscent of nineteenth-century Europe that combined the use of coercion with welfare measures. The ideological construction of the CSN’s paternalism, however, differed fundamentally from that of the nineteenth century. A personal relationship between the owners and the workers had become a fiction in the large-scale mining and metallurgical companies of the 1890s and was even less feasible in an integrated steel mill of the 1940s.4 A “discourse about the creation of the employee,” nurturing the identification with the company, replaced the owner’s physical presence.5 The discourse at the CSN stressed its integral role for Brazil’s de-

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velopment and presented the nation as the workers’ “collective ­padrone.”6 The state, as bearer of the nation’s interest and executioner of its collective will, assumed responsibility for the workers’ welfare to reward their contribution to national wealth. The CSN served as the state’s local agent in the administration of the welfare programs. This state paternalism had its father figure in President Vargas. In a 1943 speech in Volta Redonda, he praised the workers for their contribution to national progress: Considering the Volta Redonda steel plant is one of the most important accomplishments of my government . . . Gentlemen, I wish to congratulate you for what you have done on behalf of Brazil. This industrial city will be a mark of our civilization, a monument testifying to the ability of our people, an example so powerfully convincing that it will do away with any doubts and discouragements regarding the future, setting up in our country a new standard of life and a new outlook. To all of you; contractors, simple laborers, engineers—men of faith who are here devoting the work of your brain and your brawn to this gigantic undertaking—my congratulations and best wishes.7

The CSN’s technical director Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva (Figure 3.1) reaffirmed the special bond with Vargas by portraying the work for the CSN as a special mission from the president. On the occasion of Vargas’s birthday, Macedo Soares spoke in the name of the people of Volta Redonda to “convey expressions of our deep respect to the founder of the great national steel industry” and to “affirm . . . that we will place all our enthusiasm, all our vigor, and all our loyalty in the execution of the task that he entrusted to us.”8 The CSN sent more than one thousand workers to the government’s official 1943 May Day celebrations in Maracanã stadium, where they participated in the official parade under the eyes of President Vargas, greeting him as the “creator of Volta Redonda.”9 Macedo Soares’s role as local father figure in voltaredondense society closely mirrored that of Vargas in the nation. On the one hand, he had hierarchical control and the authority to use coercion. A company order stated unequivocally that “all CSN personnel in Volta Redonda respond[s] to the Technical Director with respect to discipline.”10 On the other hand, he tried to earn the workers’ respect and trust as a wise steward of the CSN with Brazil’s best interest in mind. The workers showed their reverence in a purportedly “spontaneous rally” on Christmas Eve 1943. Their speaker assured Macedo Soares that he could “count on [the workers] in the hours of calm as much as in the moments of trouble” and that they would get through all difficulties “with Your Excellency at the helm.”11 Macedo Soares imagined Volta Redonda as a community modeled on the family: the família siderúrgica (steel family). The CSN occupied the place

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figure 3.1  Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva. The CSN’s first technical director (1941–1946) and later its president (1954–1959). Background: map of the mill. Source: CSN Photographic Archive, mid-1940s.

of “a mãe CSN,” the caring mother, dispensing welfare benefits to workers and their families.12 Such maternal care complemented the paternal control exercised by the company directors and reconciled the promise of welfare with the principle of hierarchical order.

The Ideological Roots of the CSN’s Paternalism The CSN’s brand of paternalism had deep roots in Catholic social doctrine. Concerned about the industrial class conflict that erupted in midnineteenth-century Europe, Catholic intellectuals founded reform movements to address this new social question. One of the most influential figures was the French mining engineer Frédéric Le Play (1806–1882), seen

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as the founder of Catholic social science for his studies of the European working-class family.13 He started advocating a Catholic reform agenda in the aftermath of the 1848 revolutions and became more radical in 1871, in response to the class-based violence of the Paris Commune.14 His followers formed a committee of social reformers that organized Catholic Workers’ Circles and Catholic Employer Committees and supported the effort by the Brotherhood of Saint-Vincent de Paul to revive its associations for young workers.15 Le Play’s work influenced the members of the Union de Fribourge, an annual seminar of Belgian, German, French, Italian, and Swiss Catholic social reformers that convened from 1884 to 1891 and advised Pope Leo XIII (1878–1903).16 The social reform movement found doctrinal expression in Leo XIII’s encyclical Rerum Novarum (1891). It called for a corporatist social order centered on the family to replace a liberal order centered on the individual in order to overcome class divisions. It defined “[a] family, no less than a State” as “a true society, governed by . . . the authority of the father.”17 Pius XI updated Catholic social doctrine in Quadragesimo Anno (1931), which called for the “Christian reconstruction of human society” and posited that “true cooperation . . . for a single common good” would only be possible “when the constituent parts of society deeply feel themselves members of one great family and children of the same Heavenly Father.”18 Catholic social doctrine envisioned a society in which companies would create industrial communities governed by the same principles as the family. By that doctrinal logic, the família siderúrgica of Volta Redonda would be an important economic and social organ of the Christian nation of Brazil. Social Catholicism’s influence on the CSN’s paternalism had three interconnected sources: the adoption of reforms implemented by French Catholic industrialists, the revival of the Catholic Church in the 1920s and 1930s, and the Estado Novo’s welfare policies for industrial workers. Le Play’s reform ideas reached Brazil via Leon Harmel, leader of the Catholic entrepreneurial movement in France. He organized his factory according to Christian principles, promoted workers’ circles, and organized joint pilgrimages of workers and entrepreneurs to Rome.19 The pernambucano industrialist Carlos Alberto de Menezes visited Harmel’s factory, introduced his ideas to Brazil, and founded a Catholic Workers’ Circle in Recife in 1888. Menezes also lobbied Congress for labor legislation in the Christian spirit, which resulted in the first federal law regulating professional associations in 1907.20 Le Play’s social thought also influenced Brazil’s key social reformers in the 1930s. The architect of Vargas’s welfare policies, Francisco José de Oliveira Vianna, had learned about Le Play from his professor Sílvio Romero at law school in Rio de Janeiro.21 Romero had also taught Alceu Amoroso Lima, Brazil’s most eminent Catholic intellectual

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in the 1930s, when he served as adviser to both President Vargas and the archbishop of Rio de Janeiro, Cardinal Dom Sebastião Leme. Amoroso Lima disseminated Le Play’s ideas as professor of Catholic social doctrine at the Instituto Católico de Estudos Superiores (1932–1937) and as professor of sociology at the Universidade do Brasil in Rio de Janeiro after 1937.22 Roberto Simonsen, leading industrialist and adviser to Vargas on industrial policy, praised Le Play’s rigidly empirical studies of working class families and his “eminently humanitarian intuitions,” ranking him one of the three most important sociologists of all time on par with Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer. Their texts anchored the curriculum at the Escola Livre de Sociologia e Política de São Paulo, the country’s first school for social science founded by Simonsen in 1933.23 Social Catholicism played a central role in the revival of the Brazilian Catholic Church in the 1920s and 1930s. The hierarchy, led by archbishop Leme, reasserted the “natural rights and privileges of the Catholic Church in Catholic Brazil” and incorporated Rerum Novarum’s social agenda into the campaign.24 The Catholic intellectual Jackson de Figueiredo, founder of the Centro Dom Vital—a study center and discussion forum for Catholic lay intellectuals—and publisher of the monthly magazine A Ordem, advocated Catholicism as fundamental to Brazil’s heritage and presented its commitment to charity and justice as the proper response to the growth of atheistic socialism after the Russian Revolution.25 Jackson also supported the aggressive use of police power to combat (Communist) revolution, a position that shaped the ideology of Plínio Salgado’s Brazilian Integralist Action (Ação Integralista Brasileira; AIB).26 Its National Charter of Labor drew heavily on the social encyclicals, which led Cardinal Leme to praise Integralism as “one of the social forces best organized to defend God, nation and family against atheistic communism which, to use the phrase of Pius XI, constitutes ‘the most serious threat’ to Christian civilization.”27 After Jackson’s death in 1928, Amoroso Lima assumed the leadership of the Centro Dom Vital and the editorship of A Ordem, using both as vehicles to disseminate Catholic social thought in the spirit of Le Play.28 The Church gained in political influence after Vargas’s successful coup in 1930. Cardinal Leme regularly met the new president, presented him with the Church’s demands, and orchestrated public displays of faith to maintain political pressure.29 In 1934, Leme created a Catholic Electoral League (Liga Eleitoral Católica; LEC) that endorsed candidates for the elections to the Constituent Assembly if they committed to a “Decalogue” of political positions. Catholic voters elected enough of those endorsed candidates to shape the new constitution in the Church’s interest, most notably in a section on the “social and economic order” that provided a mandate for state intervention in the area of social welfare.30

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The Church also built a Catholic lay movement. The bishops’ manifesto for “social action” stressed the role of the laity: “We invite all Catholics and everyone who believes in God to join the steadfast work for an economic, social, political, and spiritual reconstruction of Brazil.”31 Inspired by the French philosopher Jacques Maritain, who argued that St. Thomas of Aquinas’s teachings and Leo XIII’s social doctrine offered a path to salvation from the perils of both unbridled Manchester liberalism and godless Soviet Communism, Amoroso Lima founded the Brazilian Catholic Action (Ação Católica Brasileira; ACB) in 1935.32 He wanted lay associations to provide social assistance to destitute families by creating maternity and childcare centers.33 Catholic Action created special associations for particular demographics. It encouraged the founding of Catholic Workers’ Circles (Círculos Operários Católicos; COC), which would—in the words of Quadragesimo Anno—“elevate the workers intellectually.” Rio Grande do Sul had had a strong circulista movement since the 1920s, and the archbishop of Porto Alegre, Dom João Becker, used his clout with Vargas to found workers’ circles in industrial cities across the nation in the 1930s.34 They had 31,000 members nationwide by 1937.35 The labor law did not permit the formation of Catholic unions, but the Church used the COCs to advise the secular unions in order to steer them away from socialism.36 Catholic Action gained in influence under the Estado Novo. Lay activists convened in Rio de Janeiro from November 8 to 14, 1937, for the first national Week of Social Action (Semana de Ação Social) and the 1st National Congress of Catholic Workers’ Organizations. They supported Vargas’s auto-coup on November 10, welcoming the Estado Novo as a social and economic order that conceived of state and society as an organic whole with a moral purpose and, implicitly, of mankind as united in the mystical body of Christ.37 Subsidies for the workers’ circles peaked under the Estado Novo, when Catholic politicians controlled the government’s newly created National Council for Social Service (Conselho Nacional do Serviço Social).38 The Week for Social Action became an annual event to reaffirm the Church’s commitment to the laity and to remind the government of Catholic Actions’ mobilizing power.39 The Church created a national secretariat to coordinate Catholic Action and the National Confederation of Catholic Workers (Confederação Nacional de Operários Católicos; CNOC), not least to retain control over the growing lay movement.40 The Estado Novo endorsed Catholic social doctrine by celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of Rerum Novarum in May 1941 as a “national and civic hallmark,” because “this directive—conducive to social peace— agrees with the policy for the protection of the worker that the national government adopted.”41 Under decree-law 7.164 (1941), CNOC became an official advisory organ to the Labor Ministry.42

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Labor legislation was a signature issue for Catholic reformers. LEC’s Decalogue demanded a “labor legislation inspired by social justice and the principles of the Christian order.”43 Quadragesimo Anno had called for “a social and juridical order [that] watches over the exercise of work” and endorsed syndicates “because such a system would be conducive to the peaceful coexistence of the social classes.”44 The Catholic hierarchy worked with successive Vargas governments to implement reforms that would improve conditions for labor.45 The Labor Ministry’s adviser on social economy, Francisco José de Oliveira Vianna, drafted the first version of Vargas’s labor laws in 1931.46 They instituted unions (­sindicatos) for workers and employers and developed the National Council for Labor (Conselho Nacional de Trabalho) into an organ to mediate disputes through representative local and regional councils.47 The government met key demands on the Catholic agenda, included in the 1934 constitution, when it introduced a minimum salary and created the Child Welfare Institute (Instituto de Puericultura) to support working-class children and their mothers.48 The labor ministers Vargas appointed to implement the welfare measures—Lindolfo Collor (1930–1932), Joaquim Pedro Salgado Filho (1932–1934), Agamemnon Magalhães (1934–1937), and Waldemar Falcão (1937–1941)—were all devout Catholics. The Estado Novo government expanded the reach of the reforms when it promulgated the equivalent of a labor code in 1943. The Consolidation of Labor Laws (Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho; CLT) united the laws passed in the 1930s into one comprehensive text that preserved the spirit of the Catholic reform agenda.49 The emphasis on Catholic principles in the creation of the CSN’s paternalist regime owed much to the personal influence of Macedo Soares, who believed in the need of a Christian social order for Brazil. Raised Catholic, he remained devout throughout his life and had a personal audience with every pope from Pius XI (1922–1939) to John Paul II (1979– 2005).50 Macedo Soares became familiar with Catholic social thought in the 1920s during his studies in France, where he joined the Union sociale des ingénieurs catholiques. That organization urged its members to apply the teachings of the encyclicals to the pressing social questions of the day in order to facilitate a dialogue between employers and employees and prevent open class struggle.51 After witnessing the social and political turmoil in Europe throughout the 1930s, Macedo Soares believed even more firmly that the Church’s teachings offered a path toward social peace, and he made it his mission to implement social assistance programs rooted in Christian social doctrine in order to make Volta Redonda into a cradle of industrial harmony. Under his leadership, Catholic paternalist ideology permeated almost every aspect of the town’s creation as a physical and social space: the urban design, company services, social assistance programs,

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leisure activities, and the disciplinary regime. Scarce resources and the technical parameters of production placed some limits on Macedo Soares’s project to build a model community, but he used every opportunity to promote Catholic ideology.

Building a Town The decision to build a company town was one of necessity because the village of Volta Redonda could not accommodate the CSN’s projected workforce. A minor railroad stop on the Rio de Janeiro to São Paulo line, Volta Redonda had been in economic decline since the passing of the coffee boom. A population of about two thousand made a living from dairy farms and citrus plantations.52 Technical requirements determined the company town’s exact location. The floor of the Paraíba valley offered just enough space for a cost-efficient layout of the mill’s internal rail network and production facilities, which meant that the town had to be built on surrounding slopes and in a side valley.53 The initial plan foresaw accommodations for 4,625 workers and their families. Full-scale construction began in mid-1942. By 1946, the CSN had completed 72 houses for engineers and top administrators, 500 for office staff, 1,878 for mill workers, as well as 120 accommodations for single employees and two hotels.54 The company town’s design embodied a paternalist order that combined social welfare with respect for authority. The location and the size of the houses mirrored the company hierarchy.55 Administrators and engineers occupied spacious villas on the Laranjal, a hillside with a constant breeze that made even hot summer days pleasant. The elevated location reflected the company’s vision of the engineer’s role as leaders and examples in civic life for the workers to look up to. Important visitors—CSN administrators from Rio de Janeiro and official guests—enjoyed similarly panoramic views of both mill and town from the four-star Hotel Bela Vista.56 The technicians and skilled workers lived in the Vila Santa Cecília, the heart of the company town near the mill’s main entrance. Its quiet side streets featured singlefamily brick houses with “all urban amenities” and front gardens, considered “more suitable for the way of life of the CSN employees . . . than apartments.”57 Vila Santa Cecília also housed the unmarried white-collar employees in the so-called hotéis dos solteiros, or bachelors’ hotels, built to “accommodate hundreds of employees . . . with comfort and hygiene in mind.”58 Semiskilled and unskilled workers lived in houses made of wood rather than brick that were less spacious, but still single-family homes with running water, sewage, and electricity. Located on the slopes alongside the mill, they had greater exposure to the intense sounds, smells, and sights of

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steel production around the clock. The Bairro Rústico, whose name evoked the houses’ “rustic” nature, was the first such neighborhood to be completed (Figure 3.2).59 The CSN insisted on the hierarchical division of neighborhoods and developed elaborate rules for the distribution of housing (Regulamento de Distribuição de Imóveis) to allocate the units. The basic ranking was by education: university, completed secondary, completed primary, no formal schooling. Departments submitted a priority ranking based on the employee’s family situation, seniority, and importance for mill operations. They received points for being married, for each dependent, and for the time they had waited since filing the housing application. Operational consid-

figure 3.2  Original Layout of the Company Town Source: Based on Vivian, “Brazil’s First Modern Steel Plant,” 6855; Longenecker, “Brazil Will Make Steel,” 1132; aerial photograph of CSN, CSN Photographic Archive, 1960.

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erations carried far greater weight than social criteria, however. Under the rules, workers received twice as many points for being on shift as they received for being married.60 Maintenance workers who responded to operational emergencies also had preference because the CSN wanted them living close to the mill.61 Skilled workers had the best chance to be assigned a house, which fulfilled the company’s operational needs but meant in practice that better-paid workers were more likely to receive subsidized housing.62 Ironically, the rigid assignment system made life complicated for employees who earned promotions. They had to reapply for housing that corresponded to their new position, which often meant starting over on another waiting list.63 In practice, the assignment rules determined above all whether an employee had access to company housing at all, since construction had fallen far behind schedule. Some workers apparently tried to grease the wheels of the housing bureaucracy with bribes.64 Vila Santa Cecília reflected the Estado Novo’s social vision for an industrialized Brazil. The design emphasized the interdependence between mill and town. The main street, Rua 33, ran from the mill through the commercial center, crossed residential streets, and ended in a large public square by the technical school.65 The design of residential areas emphasized cleanliness, peace, and quiet, in deliberate contrast to the work environment in the mill, which was messy, dangerous, and loud. The planners restricted motor vehicle traffic to central arteries; the cobblestone residential streets were for pedestrians and bicycles only. The design was reminiscent of the nineteenth-century garden city with its tree-lined residential streets, neatly cut front lawns, and open spaces set aside for parks. The company even planned to reforest the hilltops around the town.66 The grid pattern inspired Macedo Soares to compare Volta Redonda to the American city: “Streets of the community are numbered like those in New York City. The main thoroughfare, for example, is called 33rd Street, but 42nd Street, unlike its famous Manhattan counterpart, will be a quiet, landscaped residential section.”67 Vila Santa Cecília’s layout highlighted public buildings such as the hospital, the technical school, and a Catholic church. Located between the mill and these public buildings, the heart of the company town was an urbanistic expression of the Estado Novo’s program to usher Brazil into industrial modernity: commitment to (industrial) work, dedication to (technical) education, the promotion of (public) health, and a Catholic spirit of social peace and collaboration (Figure 3.2). Workers prized company housing for its subsidized rent and for the access it provided to urban services. For a simple house with two rooms and no servant quarters the company charged Cr$130 a month, equivalent to 25 percent of the average semiskilled or unskilled worker’s wage. The most luxurious houses for employees, with three rooms and full

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s­ ervant quarters, rented for Cr$350, which was very affordable even for technicians and skilled workers.68 The CSN operated the water and sewage system and delivered electricity from LIGHT Rio de Janeiro’s hydroelectric plant in nearby Piraí through its own grid. It charged only operating costs for these services and deducted all bills directly from the employee’s paycheck to avoid late payments.69 A 1943 police report noted that the CSN “monopolized the exploitation of everything under its control,” a practice presented as “a solution more affordable to both sides,” although it gave the company extensive control over employees’ financial affairs.70 The CSN also offered health care and education, services at the core of paternalist welfare project. By 1946, it operated a hospital, several health posts, two primary schools, a high school, and company stores for the sale of subsidized foodstuffs. The company also began creating an infrastructure for leisure activities with several parks and sports fields.71 Twice a week the company ran a shuttle to neighboring Barra Mansa to give locals an opportunity to purchase items not offered in the company stores.72 Workers who did not live in the company town had less access to these services, however, because they could not easily get to Vila Santa Cecília. They depended on local trains or buses operated by private companies that were slow, expensive, and lacked sufficient capacity. Rather than live the dream of urban modernity with all its comforts in Volta Redonda, they often spent hours every day getting to and from work.73 The company offered transportation only between the workplace and company-owned housing. It used “buses and pick-up trucks identified as Pick-apps or Píruas,” which one visitor to Volta Redonda called a “generally satisfying” solution. Bus transportation cost Cr$0.20 per trip, or about a tenth of the lowest hourly wage.74 The CSN knew about the problems with public transportation but nevertheless chose to strengthen individual mobility as more and more people moved to the city. In 1947, it instituted a program for employees to purchase bicycles. The price and the payment schedule excluded many of the company’s lowest earners, but the program nevertheless turned Volta Redonda into a city of cyclists.75 The CSN also facilitated the purchase of automobiles for the well-off and paved more and more of the streets and squares in the company town and the old village.76

Building a Community Despite the social segmentation of the company town by hierarchical position and social class, the CSN aimed to construct a community—the família siderúrgica—in the spirit of Catholic social doctrine. For

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Macedo Soares, a first step was to strengthen the Church’s institutional presence in Volta Redonda. Igreja Santa Cecília, the parish church, was the first permanent building to be completed. Macedo Soares, his wife Alcina, and their children set an example by attending mass every Sunday, always seated in the front row. The parish priest, Reverend Alfredo Piquet, welcomed the CSN’s generous support and returned the favor in the form of spiritual support for the construction of the mill. “He [the reverend] . . . invited them all to join in his prayers to the Divine Providence to support those who watched over the fate of Brazil, our state and the great mill in Volta Redonda.”77 Macedo Soares funded the promotion of the faith so generously that the bishop of Niterói nominated him for an ecclesiastical benefice. His letter of nomination to Pope Pius XII described Macedo Soares as “a grand benefactor of the Holy Church” who “had built a beautiful parish church and a house for the priest in Volta Redonda, in the value of 1.5 million cruzeiros.” The letter also stressed Macedo Soares’s reputation as a “sharp and biting enemy of atheist communism.”78 The Church played a prominent role in the city’s civic life. The bishop of Barra do Piraí, Signore José André Coimbra, celebrated an open-air mass in Volta Redonda for every major religious holiday and the CSN’s anniversaries.79 He blessed every new facility or major piece of equipment the company inaugurated. Even the Lojas Americanas, the city’s first commercial store, received an inaugural sprinkling with holy water followed by a mass at the local Brotherhood of St. Christopher.80 The bishop spent so much time in Volta Redonda that the Vatican eventually made the city the coseat of the diocese in 1955. For many of the workers and their families such a strong institutional presence of the Church was a new experience. Those who had come from rural parts of the migratory hinterland had likely never lived in a parish with weekly Sunday mass and a regular administration of the sacraments. The severe shortage of priests had led the Church to neglect rural areas. The rural regions of southern Minas Gerais—the heart of the CSN’s migratory hinterland—had remained strongly Catholic nevertheless and became centers of the Church’s spiritual revival under the First Republic.81 Migrants from these areas likely welcomed the Church’s strong presence in Volta Redonda, which helped them find their place in a new social order. The Church reached out to the workers through the local Catholic Workers’ Circle (Círculo Operário Católico; COC). The diocese had proposed the creation of a workers’ circle in the mid-1940s as part of a nationwide drive to expand the movement beyond its historic strongholds. The CSN supported the plan, hoping that the workers’ circle would help spiritualize local class relations at a time when radical labor militancy

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in the country’s industrial centers was at an all-time high.82 Padre Brentano, the movement’s national founder, visited Volta Redonda for the official inauguration in June 1946. The company donated a building to serve as the circle’s seat and as classroom for its courses. Macedo Soares, ­Sílvio Raulino de Oliveira (CSN president, 1946–1954), Paulo C. Gomes Martins (technical director 1946–1950, vice-president 1950–1954), and Paulo Monteiro Mendes (diretor secretário, 1954–1959) all joined the circle as honorary members to demonstrate their commitment to social Catholicism.83 Members gathered at the seat on weekends under the spiritual guidance of an ecclesiastical assistant to discuss labor questions.84 To broaden its appeal, the local circle also organized leisure activities such as Boy Scout groups. At the fourth Week for Social Action (IV Semana de Ação Social) in São Paulo in 1940, the Church had demonstrated how a combination of religious ceremonies with theater, films, and soccer games could promote the faith. The CSN generously subsidized the local circle in order to emulate that model in Volta Redonda.85 The Church and the CSN saw the circulistas as leaders and examples for other workers. The parish priest tapped them for special assignments in the congregation. In 1948, when Padre Brentano visited for a special communion, they led a procession of more than three thousand faithful through the streets of Volta Redonda. The circulistas carried an iron cross the CSN had cast in the very first tapping of the blast furnace to symbolize the bond between the company and the Church.86 The CSN aided the workers’ circle in the “careful and prudent selection” of its leaders. It wanted men who supported its social agenda and exercised a calming influence, so that it could assign them to advise fellow workers on labor questions. The circulistas looked for “honest and hard-working elements” free of “political passions harmful to the ideals and well-being of the Circle.”87 The CSN recruited Valentim Marques dos Santos, for example, a key figure in the local workers’ circle in the 1940s and 1950s. A former seminarian, he taught at a reform school in Valença, not too far from Volta Redonda. In 1943, Captain Edgard Magalhães da Silva, head of the CSN’s general services, invited Marques dos Santos to join the company because he liked his commitment to social causes. Marques dos Santos—who came to be known simply as Valentim—initially worked as transportation clerk, then briefly in accounting, before he joined Macedo Soares’s staff. His theological background and his volunteer work for the parish made him a natural candidate for circulista leadership. He served as its first secretary and later twice as president. The CSN assigned Valentim to work in social services in order to create a symbiotic relationship between the company’s and the circle’s programs.88

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Social Assistance Programs The CSN offered programs inspired by the Catholic social doctrine through its social assistance department (Departamento de Assistência ­Social; DAS). This was the CSN’s version of the Serviço Social da Indústria (SESI), a social service agency for industrial workers that the Brazilian state had created in 1946 in collaboration with employers’ federations.89 Roberto Simonsen’s speech at SESI’s inauguration captured the entrepreneurial vision of these social assistance programs: [I]n the industrial world of employees and employers, SESI will be an organ of harmony for the mutual comprehension and ties, and thus above functionary differentiations that society imposes for its own survival and progress, so that all recognize brothers in votive worship of the same God, the same flag, the same history of the fatherland, the same social and familiar ethic, and with the conscience of a common destiny and a common effort in the everyday work for the aggrandizement of the country.90

Simonsen defined SESI’s educational mission as “provid[ing] a Christian and Brazilian face to the cultural formation of our workers, to let them participate at the side of the other social classes in the enjoyment of the riches of the spirit.” Catholic institutions and associations such as the School of Social Work (Escola de Serviço Social), the Institute of Social Law (Instituto de Direito Social), the Institute of Social Work (Instituto de Serviço ­Social), the Catholic Workers’ Circles (Círculos Operários Católicos), and the Catholic Workers Youth (Juventude Operária Católica) cooperated closely with SESI in developing a social assistance agenda.91 DAS’s stated mission, in the spirit of Catholic corporatism, was to foster collaboration between employer and employees, provide means to appreciate (valorizar) workers, and promote their “associative and communitarian spirit.”92 During a visit by Labor Minister Alexandre Marcondes Filho, Macedo Soares described the CSN’s social assistance programs as an instrument for the “physical, moral and intellectual perfection” of the employees.93 In 1949, the social assistance department employed 335 people and had a budget equivalent to 1 percent of the company’s total payroll.94 The CSN requested an exemption from the mandatory contributions to SESI because it spent so much on in-house social programs. It preferred to use those resources to promote social development in Volta Redonda rather than elsewhere and insisted on retaining at least 60 percent of the amount owed to SESI to finance its own social assistance fund (Fundo de Assistência Social). The National Confederation of Industry urged the government not to grant such an exemption because it feared losing such a large contributor. The dispute remained unresolved into the early 1950s.95

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DAS organized and sponsored a wide array of leisure activities and social assistance programs. It helped finance the first athletic facility in Volta Redonda, the Ginásio Macedo Soares, which became the preferred location for recreational events and company celebrations. DAS also organized a local sports league and trained employees to become qualified athletic instructors.96 It subsidized social clubs, educational associations, and cultural associations whose missions corresponded to the CSN’s social ideology. The most generous subsidy went to the Catholic Workers’ Circle.97 The Clube dos Funcionários da CSN, a model for DAS sponsorship of leisure programming, organized an annual Carnival ball and the Festa Junina, a traditional rural folk festival to celebrate Saint John’s Day.98 To retain control over the activities of the sponsored associations, the CSN periodically reassessed whether the subsidies still served the broader social agenda.99 DAS also created acceptable spaces of sociability for workers to spend their free time. They could meet, play games, or write letters at the Recreio do Operário in the Vila Santa Cecília and the galpão de diversões (literally, “entertainment shed”) in the Acampamento Central.100 The company provided board

figure 3.3  The CSN Marching Band. Leading a parade to celebrate Brazil’s Independence Day. Background: the mill’s first blast furnace. Source: CSN Photographic Archive, early 1940s.

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games and allowed workers to bring their own, but it explicitly prohibited card games—presumably to prevent gambling. CSN-accredited associations could reserve the spaces for official business or events.101 DAS showed commercial movies as long as there was no privately owned theater in town.102 The CSN controlled public space and civic life in the company town tightly. Any association had to receive authorization to function in the company town, a power the CSN used as a means of political control. In August 1946, it canceled the permission for the Comitê Popular Democrático de Volta Redonda to hold its successful literacy course, which eliminated an important recruitment tool for the Communist Party.103 The CSN prohibited the operation of bars in order to limit the consumption of alcohol and control rowdy behavior. For a drink, the workers had to leave the company town and head to the old village of Volta Redonda. If they wanted a real night out, they had to make a trip to Rio de Janeiro on the Rápido Paulista, a daily express nicknamed the “train of joy.”104 The strategy to control public space appears to have worked. A police spy reported that he could not find any “particular spots [in the town] where workers hung out, gathered, or played games.”105 In a complementary effort, the DAS’s Division for Study, Diagnosis, and Social Treatment offered help to employees who experienced difficulties “adapting to the social order the CSN established in Volta Redonda.”106 Good health care for the família siderúrgica was a central promise of the paternalist regime. The company understood health to include individual well-being, disease control, and the more amorphous concepts of mental hygiene and social health. Macedo Soares laid out the reasoning and the CSN’s goals in a speech for the inauguration of the Child Welfare Center: From the beginning, when we first came here, we affirmed—and we continue to affirm—that man is the most important raw material. Man is the thought, the energy, the intelligence, the action, while the machine is merely the instrument. Without strong men, without physical health, without mental health it is impossible for a country to develop. From the beginning, we aimed to establish schools, to create medical services, to promote an environment for the establishment of a definitive hospital, to foster the creation of a health care center and to provide services for home visits to allow us to instruct our men about a healthy life.107

The CSN contracted the Instituto de Higiene da Universidade de São Paulo, the nation’s leading public health institute, to implement a comprehensive health plan in Volta Redonda. The most imminent task was to control infectious diseases such as malaria and yellow fever. Mosquitoes found ideal conditions in the flood-prone and swampy areas along the Paraíba River. The institute’s doctors paid regular visits to the Acampamento Operário near the river and to the Fazenda Sta. Cecília, where the

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CSN raised ­livestock to produce meat and milk.108 They administered vaccinations to all arriving migrants, but it took years to contain the spread of disease because of unsanitary housing. In 1946, the CSN finally declared the “sanitary situation of the city [to be] excellent,” although it still encouraged regular vaccinations to prevent any resurgence.109 The Instituto de Higiene established a full-service hospital that treated work-related injuries at no cost.110 The CSN charged employees and their family members for medical services at differential rates depending on the salary. Only those who had a monthly income greater than Cr$1,200 (single) or Cr$1,500 (married), a group limited to engineers and administrators, had to pay the full cost of treatment. Depending on the service, the CSN assumed between 30 and 50 percent of the cost for those who earned above Cr$500 (single) or Cr$800 (married), an income bracket that included mostly skilled workers. Workers with lower income received free consultations and 90 percent subsidy on transfusions and injections, and paid between 20 to 40 percent for all other services.111 The progressive fee structure suggests that the CSN cared for the less fortunate members of the família siderúrgica. The hospital services were by no means cheap for lowincome workers, however, even at subsidized rates. An unskilled laborer, for example, paid more than two days’ wages for a urine analysis or an x-ray.112 The CSN often waived the charges or offered additional subsidies if an employee could not afford needed treatment. Employees could also defer payment and authorize the company to discount it in installments from future paychecks.113 The CSN’s health care plan stressed good nutrition. In 1944, its canteens served 8,300 snacks and 6,621 full meals to workers each day.114 Employees purchased subsidized meal vouchers depending on income. Workers earning less than Cr$1.80 an hour had to buy second-class meals for Cr$1.60 a voucher; all others had the right to purchase first-class meals at Cr$2.50.115 On the lands of the Fazenda Sta. Cecília, the CSN’s ­Serviço de Subsistência produced meat, milk, vegetables, and fruit for sale in company stores at subsidized prices. During the general wartime scarcities in the early 1940s, the people of Volta Redonda enjoyed a more reliable and affordable food supply than most cities. Demand still exceeded supply, however, and people waited in long lines to make their purchases. The CSN encouraged its workers to grow fruits and vegetables in their own gardens but prohibited inhabitants of company houses from using their landscaped yards for that purpose.116 The 1943 labor law restricted the CSN’s freedom to manage its stores by proscribing a list of goods they had to carry, which diminished the company’s ability to supply the nutritional needs of the population. The law also mandated that stores had to be run as employee cooperatives, but the CSN delayed the handover until 1945

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and offered to reopen its stores for basic supplies (postos de ­subsistência) whenever the cooperatives experienced financial difficulties.117 In the 1940s, the CSN extended store credit only to its small number of salaried employees because the law prohibited the repayment through payroll deduction in order to protect workers against the coercive use of credit.118 The programs for social health and mental hygiene focused on the physical and mental preparation of children for work in modern industry. The Child Welfare Center (Centro de Puericultura) offered free advice and assistance to expectant mothers and those with newborn children.119 The term puericultura referred to a set of techniques designed to ensure the perfect moral, mental, and physical development of a child from gestation on. The center organized an annual Week of the Child (Semana da Criança) that culminated in the so-called robustness contest (concurso de robustez), in which experts selected the hardiest baby and presented the mother with an award for bringing up a model child (Figure 3.4). The center also provided children of all ages with regular milk rations to ensure their healthy growth.120 The local chapter of the Brazilian Assistance Legion (Legião Brasileira de Assistência; LBA), headed by Macedo Soares’s wife Alcina, administered the center in the spirit of the Catholic social doctrine. It in-

figure 3.4  Robustness Contest (Concurso de Robustez). Part of CSN’s social assistance programs. The tall person in the center is Paulo Monteiro Mendes, a physician at the CSN hospital and later the director for social services (1954–1960). Source: CSN Photographic Archive, late 1940s.

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vited another association with a religious agenda, the Company for the Protection of Childhood (Cia. de Proteção à Infância), to open a kindergarten on company grounds and provided subsidies to the state government to establish primary and secondary schools.121 To improve mental hygiene, the company offered programs to help working-class families improve their culture—in the broadest sense. This included courses to elevate the basic education of migrant workers, many of whom arrived with little formal schooling. The CSN supported the Catholic Workers’ Circle’s literacy courses and instituted its own basic literacy program in late 1944.122 The company’s vocational school taught adult courses on “cultural broadening” and personal hygiene (hygiene e cultura física), and the LBA offered home economics courses to strengthen the working-class family. Alcina de Macedo Soares, who believed that the família ­siderúrgica and the Brazilian nation as a whole depended on healthy families as its building blocks, taught the sewing classes herself.123 The CSN’s personnel policies reflected the ideological commitment to the family as the basis of voltare­ dondense society. The company granted newlyweds an automatic eight-day leave as a time to order their lives.124 The Centro de Puericultura distributed presents to children of poorer families at an annual Christmas celebration.125 Workers with more dependents had priority for housing assignment and received a greater share in the distribution of profits.126

Enforcing Paternalist Order The CSN’s primary vehicle to communicate its social vision for Volta Redonda was the daily company bulletin, the Boletim de Serviço de Volta Redonda (BSVR). It was both a military-style order-of-the-day and the CSN’s official organ to publish legally binding administrative decisions. The prominent role of officers in company management explained the military imprint. Macedo Soares firmly believed in the need to apply military practice to the organization of work in Volta Redonda.127 The BSVR included “general work orders” as well as a full record of hires, dismissals, transfers, promotions, occupational reclassifications, medical leaves, authorizations for vacation, and rewards for dedicated service. The instructions for the BSVR’s distribution stressed that it would “have mandatory circulation in all departments of the CSN as the official company organ to publish measures and resolutions of the president and the directorate, notices of general interest and dates and notices concerning personnel and services of the company. No employee has the right to claim ignorance of the matters published in the bulletin.”128 The company provided a copy of the bulletin to each of its more than one hundred admin-

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istrative units and ordered them to “to post the bulletin page by page on the notice board so that all workers in the sector could take notice of the orders issued by the technical director.”129 The BSVR became a pillar of the company’s paternalist project as it reinforced the CSN’s social ideology and offered the employees a moral compass. It regularly printed the full text of speeches that praised the company’s contribution to Brazil’s industrial progress. These texts reassured the employees that they served the greater good of the nation and validated their sacrifice. The texts often portrayed the workers as “soldiers of progress,” as in a speech by an employee to honor Macedo Soares: “We are soldiers . . . On our soil we engage in a constructive war whose triumph will bestow upon our country economic greatness. It is, therefore, the time of sacrifice, and we are willing to bring it. . . . we would like to pledge to Your Excellency our unrestricted loyalty and assure you that you can rely on your soldiers until the last trench is taken.130 This echoed Vargas’s imagery of the “platoon of workers” as an integral part of the defense of the fatherland in solidarity with the Brazilians who fought on the battlefields of Italy.131 A speech by Major Barreto Vianna impressed on his subordinates that construction work could only succeed by combining a clear mission with “military reasoning,” team spirit, and an understanding that all parts of the “machine” needed to work together “harmoniously.” Only the combination of dedication and discipline with the “conscientious effort by free men” “would result in the great victory that Volta Redonda represented for Brazil, showing the fifth columns of the world the first testimony of the country’s capacity.”132 On the pages of the BSVR the tragedy of serious work accidents turned into a public recognition of sacrifice for the greater good of Brazil. Those who died became martyrs for national progress: “We profoundly mourn the loss of these dedicated and industrious employees, whose lives were taken at their place of work, where they—with the same patriotic spirit that moves all of us—contributed to the continuation of this great enterprise that Brazil entrusted to us. The CSN’s Industrial Directorate leaves this record so that their names will remain engraved in the history of the construction of the mill in Volta Redonda as an example of the love of their work.”133 The BSVR also praised the “magnificent example of human solidarity and . . . brilliant comprehension of duty” of more than ninety workers who had helped evacuate families during the most recent flooding of the Paraíba in January 1946.134 Such coverage reassured the employees that the CSN took care of those who made sacrifices for their fellow man and the nation’s prosperity. The CSN reinforced its paternalism by publishing a record of disciplinary infractions and the consequent penalties in the BSVR. The company had created a system of penalties during construction to impose discipline on a workforce with little industrial experience. It had been part of a broader

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effort to foster the right spirit and habits for safe and productive industrial work. The system continued after construction ended, and the BSVR published a record of all penalties with the type (warning, reprimand, or suspension), the length of the suspension, and a detailed justification. Most penalties came in response to a specific work-related infraction, but the CSN took the liberty to impose penalties for actions that ran counter to its paternalist values, even if they took place away from the workplace. The CSN did not distinguish between the worlds of work and leisure in its effort at social engineering; it expected its employees to live by the values of the good industrial worker at all times. Even justifications for a work-related penalty often carried a broader message about proper behavior by highlighting how poor habits caused an error. By publishing a record of the penalty and its justification in the BSVR, the CSN reminded all workers of their responsibilities and illustrated the consequences of violating company rules. Penalties became a permanent part of the employee’s record that excluded him (rarely her) from bonuses and diminished the opportunities for promotion. The CSN used the penalty system to reinforce four values considered fundamental for the smooth operation of the mill: discipline, respect for authority, collegiality, and honesty. By “discipline” it meant respect for order. Any act that led to a breakdown of order or “compromised the level of discipline in the work environment” triggered a penalty. “Responding rudely to questions by a superior” or “provoking discussions during work hours” resulted at least in a reprimand.135 The CSN suspended workers who “fought in the line to punch the clock” and for the “undisciplined act of insubordination” of “throwing one’s lunch on the floor [and] splashing some colleagues.”136 One employee who “provoked disturbances at the workplace with inopportune jokes” earned a three-day suspension.137 Another worker overplayed his hand when he “used the emergency telephone for a joke, and—though aware of the fact that he was talking to the department head—carried on . . . , which caused problems for the work routine.”138 The CSN also suspended an employee who failed to impose order because he “slept on duty when responsible for the discipline in his area.”139 An employee who “had permitted undisciplined and anarchic behavior in the printing office when he was in charge due to the absence of the responsible supervisor” earned a ten-day suspension.140 Paternalism depended on respect for authority. The CSN expected workers to show respect on the shop floor by “comply[ing],” in the words of the general work order, “promptly with orders received from their superiors” and “perform[ing] the assigned work with promptness and care.”141 Insubordination triggered penalties. The CSN reprimanded an employee who “worked the night shift . . . despite explicit superior orders to the contrary” and suspended workers who “refused to carry out work orders by having

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switched the shift.”142 A worker who “had appeared at a checkpoint . . . on his day off, disturbed work and provoked the foreman . . . , ultimately trying to attack him as he got off work,” received a three-day suspension.143 “[D]isrespect toward a superior in the presence of colleagues” was a serious matter because it threatened order beyond the relationship between an individual employee and his superior.144 The CSN suspended a worker who “advised a colleague to rebel.”145 The penalty record reaffirmed, on the other hand, that authority carried responsibility. The CSN expected superiors to show restraint and penalized them more severely than their subordinates if they did not. “Exerting oneself in a fight with a hierarchical superior” drew a two-day suspension; “engaging in a fight with a subordinate during work hours” earned a four-day suspension.146 The company tried to foment a culture of collegiality and mutual respect among equals. It expected the employees to “treat [one’s] colleagues politely” and “maintain a spirit of camaraderie and the best cooperation.”147 The penalty reports presented two cases as particularly repugnant violations of these principles. One employee “put soluble oil instead of milk in a colleague’s lunch, who drank [it] and suffered the consequences.” Another “spoiled a colleague’s bottled milk in perverse fashion,” adding insult to injury by “provoking the colleague after the fact.”148 Both led to long suspensions. The company also suspended workers who “confront[ed] and assault[ed] a colleague at work” or “initiat[ed] a fight with another CSN employee outside of the grounds of the company over a work-related affair” for five days.149 A worker who “returned the aggression of a colleague using a knife (from work), injuring him on the arm,” earned an eight-day suspension.150 Social peace started with physical peace on the shop floor, and the CSN used the penalty regime to send that message. The CSN required its workers to be honest toward superiors and colleagues. It suspended men who “appealed with untruthful statements” because they undermined working relationships on the shop floor.151 Men who “gave false testimony” faced suspensions, such as an employee who “falsely claimed that the indicator glass for the water level was not sufficiently transparent” to explain the failure of an engine’s faucets. He received a five-day suspension.152 The CSN suspended an engine crew for three days after an accident because the engineer “had tried to cover up” the incident and the machinist “had made false statements about it.”153 Where the production process depended on accurate information, the CSN did not tolerate any manipulations. It suspended a worker in the coke plant who “tried to substitute an analysis completed at 21h for the one due at 23h” and another because he “had mixed coal of high volatility with coal of low volatility . . . and [then] blamed it on the foreman.”154 The CSN viewed attempts to deceive coworkers as violations of trust and

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suspended men “abus[ing] the good faith of the crew foreman by putting forward false motives to leave work,” “trying to deceive the tool keeper, and “trying to cheat the clocking-in staff.”155 Penalties for conduct off the job had the strongest moral overtones. The company suspended one employee who “had written words not to be recommended for good morals onto piles of material in one of the pedestrian passages” and another for “engaging in a forbidden act in the sleeping quarters.”156 “[A]n act of malice and licentiousness in his conduct” earned one employee a thirty-day suspension.157 The CSN also used penalties to try to contain alcohol abuse. An attempt to “introduce and sell alcoholic beverages in the residences for bachelors” earned a five-day penalty, and workers who “showed up drunk for work” received two-day suspensions to sober up.158 The mere use of “bad language” could be punishable, as in the case of an employee who earned a ten-day suspension because he “offended a nurse with bad language and even tried to hit her.” Merely “writ[ing] comments in bad language on the clocking-in card” constituted sufficient cause to suspend an employee for five days.159 The CSN also used penalties to force compliance with the rules of social assistance programs. An employee who continued to live in “house n.9 of group n.6 and did not vacate it despite an order by DAS” received a five-day suspension for the “violation [of] the CSN’s disciplinary norms.”160 The employee who “had installed an electric fence around his house with CSN material” earned an eighteen-day suspension for breaking the rules and stealing material.161 An attempt “to divert milk that had been supplied for consumption during work hours” triggered an immediate suspension because the act undermined the CSN’s nutritional regime.162 The publication of the penalties delineated the boundaries of proper conduct under the paternalist regime. The penalty record provided case-based interpretations of published rules and clarified how the administration understood and applied the rules laid down in the personnel regulation (Regulamento do Pessoal) and in general or specific work orders. The individual justifications for penalties did not constitute a strict precedent because the CSN’s directors exercised discretion in the application of penalties, but they gave workers a sense of standards and expectations. Each penalty, however specific, served as one interpretation of the rules of the paternalist regime as it applied to the workers’ daily lives on the shop floor and beyond.

Paternalism, Bureaucratization, and Citizenship The social construction of the família siderúrgica required the bureaucratic recognition and integration of the migrants. The instruments of the paternalist project, whether it was social assistance or the disciplinary

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regime, could not reach the workers unless they became identifiable to the company. The processing of paperwork created the conditions for the company to translate its ideology of a community governed by Christian social doctrine into social reality. In order to integrate migrants into the workforce—and thus make them part of the paternalist project—the CSN required that they provide personal information such as name, progenitors, and place of birth. The company used the birth certificate to verify the information before issuing the migrant an employee identity card. The CSN thus became an agent of the Estado Novo’s push toward bureaucratization, which Vargas considered essential for Brazil’s transition to a modern industrial society.163 Without bureaucratic registration the worker could not become a member of the família siderúrgica or the nation. The responsibility for the registration of new workers and the standardization of their records fell to the personnel department (Departamento de Pessoal; DPE). During construction, DPE agents waited at the train station to receive and register migrants arriving with the daily train on the Rio de Janeiro–São Paulo line. Often hundreds got off a single train and plunged the small station into chaos, but the DPE was there to create order—at least in a bureaucratic sense. Its agents created a personnel file for every able-bodied man willing to work at the CSN and classified the recruits by skill to channel them into the right departments.164 For Macedo Soares, registering the migrants was the initial step in a civilizing process: “They had to pass the physical exam; thereafter, almost always, they had to hand over the rags that they were wearing, in exchange for which they received overalls; then, they were subjected to norms of hygiene.”165 He saw the CSN as being on a mission that offered a new life to these men from backward regions of Brazil’s interior. The recruits had to complete the registration and the medical examination before they could sign a work contract.166 As the DPE added workers to the payroll, it recorded further personal information such as civil status, number and names of dependents, military reservist status, levels of literacy and education, and whether the new employee had relatives working at the company. To process the hundreds of men it hired every month during construction, the CSN employed IBM’s new Hollerith machines and a system called Addressograph.167 Over time, an employee’s personnel file grew into a work history. The clerks in the personnel department took note of changes in occupation, increased wages, promotions, reclassifications, ­special assignments, work accidents, medical leaves, vacations, penalties, and prizes. They also noted alterations in a worker’s civil status and registered the birth of children. The comprehensive character of the personnel files made them key pieces of legal evidence for pension claims and potential grievance filings in the labor courts. To be able to match a worker

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with his file, the CSN required workers to wear a metal identification plate (chapa) as part of the “normalization” of life in Volta Redonda. Starting in March 1943, all employees had to present identification to receive their pay and to use company transport.168 Registering their personal information ended in surprise for some workers. The CSN wanted unmistakable identification and carefully crosschecked information provided by the workers against official documents. Many migrants from rural areas with little state presence had no document other than their birth certificate, and often the name, birth date, or birthplace on that document did not match the information the worker had provided. Rather than intentional deception, these were likely cases of functionally illiterate people who had grown up in an oral culture. To their minds, the names their families and friends had called them by all their lives were truer than the names on the documents. The CSN, however, insisted on “rectifying” the situation and informed the respective employees of their correct names as well as places and dates of birth as listed on the certificate. The BSVR published lists of these “rectifications,” which often altered an employee’s name completely. One man who went by the name of Pedro Gonçalves Filgueiras learned from DPE that his real name was Pedro ­Napoleão Pimentel.169 Juvenal Peixoto Sobrinho became Juvenal Ferreira de Souza, Mario Geraldo de Oliveira became Mario Joaquim, and Samuel ­Porfirio became Edemundo Proferio Silva. Of the twenty-eight employees who had their registry rectified in February and March 1946, eleven had their names changed, three their birth dates, and fourteen both name and birth date.170 The process imposed a bureaucratic identity on men who had a defined personal identity that did not match their documents. Unfortunately, the available sources do not reveal whether these men embraced their bureaucratic identity and made it their personal identity—for example, by celebrating their birthday on the rectified date. The rectifications turned these workers into recognized natural persons under the law. The CSN, as the Estado Novo’s model company, required its employees to register with federal authorities, not least the Labor Ministry. The 1943 labor law had created a work card that documented employment and provided proof of contributions to the pension funds, thereby guaranteeing access to the benefits of the social security system. The social logic of the trabalhista regime was Laboro, ergo sum (I work, therefore I am), and its accompanying bureaucratic rationale was: I have a work card, therefore I receive welfare benefits.171 For CSN employees, recognition by the state made citizenship more concrete than for agricultural laborers or unregistered workers in private industry. On the downside, the CSN required its employees to pay their income tax and exposed those who failed to do so by publishing their names in the BSVR.172

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Conclusion The CSN tried to engineer Volta Redonda as a community that reaped the material benefits of industrial modernity and combined them with the spiritual certainty of neo-Thomist social doctrine. Vargas and the ideologues of the Estado Novo envisioned the city as a showcase for a Christian order that would allow Brazil to make the transition to an industrial society but prevent social ills and avoid class conflict. They hoped to create an industrial utopia to set an example for Brazil and beyond. Idealizing reports in newspapers referred to Volta Redonda as “Rio de Janeiro’s sweet Pittsburgh,” presumably made “sweet” by harmonious labor relations compared to its North American counterpart.173 To realize the utopia of a família siderúrgica, the CSN employed the coercive power of an authoritarian state, but always packaged it in an ideology of Catholic paternalism with an agenda of social and economic development. It promised to transcend the rationality of industrial capitalism. The material shortcomings of the paternalist project became evident by the late 1940s, however. Logistical challenges and temporary organizational problems limited the effectiveness of social assistance programs that were exemplary for Brazilian standards at the time. Nothing undermined the envisioned social order more than the failure to meet the demand for company housing. The CSN planned to build 3,700 units to house 15,000 people, but it had only completed 2,841 units by 1946 and did not finish the rest until 1950.174 At the same time, migration to Volta Redonda exceeded expectations. The municipality (Barra Mansa) grew from about 25,000 inhabitants in 1940 to more than 50,000 in 1950, almost exclusively on account of Volta Redonda’s growth.175 The CSN reported in 1950 that company housing accommodated 35,000 people, or 20,000 more than originally projected. Each unit must have had more inhabitants than originally projected, and the CSN now counted as company housing 349 “temporary quarters” that still accommodated many workers.176 What finally prompted the company to build an additional eight hundred homes was the shock of a 1950 study finding shantytowns (favelas) on company land.177 The directors asked the housing department to move the dwellers to better quarters and “repossess the shacks to fix or demolish them without major embarrassments.”178 The implementation of the social assistance programs displayed a pronounced class bias. The paternalist project drew on an ideology of social justice and carried an implicit promise that the mãe CSN would take care of all its workers irrespective of status. In fact, however, blue-collar workers had less access to social assistance. The CSN built fewer of the simple houses than it had originally projected, but it hired more workers in the

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respective pay class than originally anticipated. The salaried personnel— engineers, technicians, and office staff—had comparatively easy access to company housing, while many workers on hourly wages, the so-called chapinhas, still lived in wooden barracks by the late 1940s. Office staff commuted to work in buses, while blue-collar workers rode on the backs of trucks.179 Salaried employees had credit in the company store and enjoyed convenient repayment schedules for medical care. The company restricted purchase of its stock—a measure originally designed to strengthen the identification with the CSN—to salaried personnel, whom it offered an interest-free advance of up to 20 percent on the annual salary. Blue-collar workers, in contrast, could not buy CSN shares on company credit.180 The resulting social stratification went deeper than the design of the company town with its hierarchically ordered neighborhoods. Many bluecollar workers and their families would happily have taken their places in the originally projected spatial and social order, but the CSN failed to create the material conditions to incorporate them into the família siderúrgica by its own high standards. Although the company did not make administrative decisions on social assistance programs with the intent to reinforce class divisions, the paternalist social ideology with its respect for a natural hierarchical order made it easier to live with the unintended consequences of decisions that widened the gap. Once the CSN transitioned to production, in the mid-1940s, it looked at the social assistance programs from a more pragmatic standpoint. The annual report for 1947 noted that the “considerable progress . . . in the social assistance programs . . . contributed decisively to the retention of the specialized workforce so essential to the operation of the mill.”181 Publicly, the CSN maintained its paternalist commitment, and the directors tried to help whenever workers turned to the CSN in emergency situations. They regularly received requests reminiscent of the letters Brazilians from all walks of life wrote to Vargas, the nation’s patrão. No matter was too small. On one occasion, the CSN’s board of directors granted reimbursement to an employee who needed a new glass eye, and on another it agreed to furnish a refrigerator to an engineer until his own arrived. 182 The BSVR highlighted cases in which the CSN had shown compassion; for example, when an employee thanked Macedo Soares for permitting the use of a company ambulance—contrary to internal regulations—to transport his wife to the hospital.183 Macedo Soares and his successors had to balance the role as benevolent patrão to the família siderúrgica with the need to assure the smooth operation and financial viability of a modern enterprise. By 1950, the board called for “clear criteria for the granting of social assistance” to reconcile the operational needs of the mill with a culture of paternalism that was still thriving.184 Unlike the Estado Novo’s

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ideologues, the directors learned from practical experience that social development in the spirit of the Catholic social doctrine did not necessarily facilitate the running of a technically complex industry. The discourse of the família siderúrgica, of social justice, and of a united effort for national development under a Christian social order, however, became an integral part of the CSN’s public identity. It captured the imagination of the Brazilian nation, notwithstanding that the social reality in Volta Redonda never quite corresponded to the harmonious industrial community imagined by the CSN’s founders. Speeches, articles, and broadcasts projected an idealized image of Volta Redonda that reflected the dreams and aspirations for a new social order as much as the accomplishments on the ground. The CSN produced several documentaries on the construction years that highlighted the commitment to social assistance.185 Even before the end of construction work, it offered guided visits of the plant and the town that touted the scale and technical novelty of the mill as well as the reach of the social assistance programs. Visitors ranged from guests of state to school groups and civic associations, and the number of visitors reached 3,540 in 1945.186 The image of their city as the beacon of economic progress and a cradle of social harmony resonated with the people of Volta Redonda, although they knew that the CSN had fallen short of its ambitious goals.187 The scale and scope of social assistance programs set the city apart from other industrial centers in Brazil, and the discourse of Catholic paternalism became an integral part of the way voltaredondenses thought and talked about their city. The workers, in particular, made the company’s declared goals for social assistance the point of reference for critiquing shortcomings and requesting improvements. They held the CSN to its own standards, which in time would expose the inherent contradictions in the Estado Novo’s project of industrial modernity. The state wanted Volta Redonda to be the shining example of social development, but it also needed it to be the nation’s productive engine. The premise of Catholic paternalism was that Volta Redonda could be both because economic prosperity and social well-being went hand in hand. The workers, however, perceived that the CSN did not value social well-being for all as highly as economic success, an understanding that would shape their agenda for industrial relations in the 1950s.

4

From Construction to Production labor management in transition

Title I: Organization Art. 2: The president exercises the supreme administration of personnel at the National Steel Company . . . Title XIV: Duties of the Employee Art. 63: Beyond the duties inherent to his position . . . , the employee must: a) comply promptly with work orders received from superiors; b) perform the work that has been assigned with quickness and care; . . . d) treat everyone with civility; . . . f) maintain a spirit of camaraderie and the best possible cooperation with colleagues; g) avoid wasting work time with conversations . . . —CSN Personnel Regulation, 19461

The CSN began as a construction company and became a steel producer only in 1946. The transition required complex managerial decisions because of the fundamental differences in the profile of the workforce and the organization of work. Technical director Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva had prepared the transition all the while he oversaw the construction. One reason that he took up residence in Volta Redonda during the construction years was to have the opportunity to observe the men at work and recruit the most capable as the core of the mill’s future operational workforce. He instructed the engineers in charge of construction units to keep their eyes open for men who had the requisite skills and good work habits. In 1944, more than a year before the mill’s anticipated inauguration date, the company began training heavy-equipment operators and maintenance specialists. Despite all that careful planning, the transition remained a difficult task with many uncertainties caused by the ongoing world war and the poor state of the infrastructure, which made it difficult to anticipate the exact timing of the start-up of production. More uncertain, still, was how quickly the company would be able to elevate its steel output to the projected capacity with a labor force that had no experience

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working in a modern steel mill. The engineers anticipated that the first years of production would be a period of trial and error. Company administrators saw careful and efficient labor management as essential for a smooth transition. The company adopted a bureaucratized system of labor management to allocate personnel, assess performance, establish proper remuneration, and structure the employee’s career. It monitored the implementation of new internal procedures closely and made adjustments whenever necessary. The goal was a rational administration of labor in order to maximize production. At the same time, management incorporated some of the paternalist principles that had characterized labor relations during construction and that lay at the heart of the company’s social assistance programs. The personnel rules, the directorate’s resolutions, and the daily bulletins from the late 1940s reveal in detail how the CSN tried to build a labor regime that combined rational and paternalist elements. The documentation also provides the historian with a wealth of evidence on the specific conditions on the shop floor in this integrated steel plant. It presents the company’s perspective but reflects important aspects of the workers’ everyday experience more vividly, and in more detail, than most sources that are typically available to labor historians. The transition to production came at a time when theories of rational administration and scientific management were gaining currency in Brazil.2 In 1931, a group of industrial entrepreneurs in São Paulo, led by Roberto Simonsen, had founded the Instituto de Organização Racional do ­Trabalho (Institute for the Rational Organization of Work) in order to disseminate knowledge about theories of rationalization and their application.3 By the 1940s, Brazilian universities taught courses in administration that covered the cannon of scientific management thinkers from Henry Gantt to Frederick W. Taylor and from Elton Mayo to Henri Fayol.4 Fordism and Taylor­ism stood for the entire scientific management movement and exercised great cultural influence on the elite.5 For guidance on the day-to-day administration of an industry, however, Brazilian managers looked to the theories of Taylor and Fayol. They showed less interest in Fordism: João Bosco Lodi’s authoritative História da Administração, for example, did not even cover Henry Ford or Fordism.6 The scholarship on the science of administration covered Fayol in as much detail as Taylor. Luiz de Nogueira Paula, the chair for the Organization of Work at the Universidade do Brasil in Rio de Janeiro, saw Fayol’s theory as an essential complement and counterpart to Taylorism.7 His colleague in economics, Alvaro Pôrto Moitinho, used Fayol’s theory as the framework for his management textbook.8 The appreciation of Fayol’s ideas grew after the respected U.S.-based scholars Luther Gulick and Lyndall Urwick had included his work in the scientific management cannon.9

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The Department for the Administration of the Public Service (Departamento de Administração do Serviço Público; DASP), a key agency in the Estado Novo’s drive to strengthen the state, held symposia on the work of both Henri Fayol (1944) and Frederick W. Taylor (1945).10 Fayol’s work appealed to managers schooled in the French tradition of state tutelage for the economy and strong public administration, a model the Vargas governments tried to copy.11 Fayol had developed his theory based on experiences in multidepartmental enterprises similar to the CSN. He assumed the management of the ­crisis-ridden mining company Societé Anonyme de Commentry-­ Forchambault in 1888, turned it around, and oversaw a period of sustained prosperity into the 1910s. After a similar feat at the Société Nouvelle de Decazeville, he formalized his managerial practice as the theory of positive administration.12 He first presented his ideas in 1900 at the International Mining and Metallurgical Congress and published them in 1916 under the title Administration industrielle et generale: prevoyance, organisation, commandement, coordination, controle.13 The title spelled out the five principles of his theory: foresight, organization, command, coordination, and control. Fayol implemented long-term planning in the form of annual and ten-year production plans; he introduced a staffing plan to create order and ascertain that each man worked in the position best suited for him; he insisted that the principle of hierarchical command be followed; he held regular administrative meetings at different levels to guarantee the necessary degree of coordination; and he created more efficient accounting procedures to strengthen central control.14 Under Fayol’s system, bureaucratization—in the sense of an expanded role for white-collar employees in planning production—complemented hierarchical command. During the CSN’s transition from construction company to steel producer, managers focused on the organization of the enterprise as a whole. They had to shift from a military-style administration appropriate for organizing construction work to a system of labor management suited to organizing a constant flow of production in a very large and complex multi­departmental firm. A general theory of administration such as Fayol’s offered guidance for such a top-down reorganization of the firm. Most important, it reassured the CSN directors that a successful transition required the unrestrained exercise of their authority. Fayol’s work did not, however, provide a specific blueprint for a Weberian bureaucratization of companies’ internal organization to manage production. Company administrators selectively adopted ideas from the new fields of personnel management and industrial relations in their approach to labor management, but always under the umbrella of a military-style central command. One result was that the board of directors micromanaged many aspects of the

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company’s internal administration that could have been delegated.15 The directors also maintained their commitment to Catholic paternalism and the ideal of the família siderúrgica, which, at least in theory, required considering the workers’ human needs as much as their productivity. The goal of developing the CSN’s and Brazil’s human capital, however, was not always easily compatible with the need to build a workforce ready to produce at mill capacity.

Transitioning to Production The CSN initiated production in late April 1946 when the coke ovens discharged their first load. The vice-president of the Export-Import Bank and representatives of the coke plant manufacturer Koppers Co. went to Volta Redonda to celebrate the event.16 On June 9, 1946, the company charged the blast furnace for the first time. On June 22, it poured the first steel and rolled its first ingots.17 President Dutra officially inaugurated the mill in October 1946. For the first time, a Brazilian mill produced large quantities of high-quality steel, an event that CSN president Sílvio Raulino de Oliveira called historic.18 It took two more years, however, for crews to complete all the electrical installations in the rolling and finishing mills.19 The plate mill started production in February 1947, the continuous hotstrip mill with its 11,200 horsepower engine in September 1947, and both the pickling line and the continuous cold-strip mill in November 1947. The finishing mills came last. The CSN rolled its first tin plate on February 25, 1948, and the hot-dip tinning machines entered full production in March 1948. The foundry took even longer to complete. Its electric furnace produced its first steel on May 16, 1949.20 The first task of the transition to production was to reduce the number of workers. The company planned to reduce the workforce from its peak of about 13,000 in 1945 to about 8,000. It ended its practice of hiring every able-bodied man, which gradually reduced the numbers as workers continued to leave Volta Redonda voluntarily. Between August and December 1945, the CSN also fired large numbers of workers from the construction department, notifying them that they had reached the “end of [their] service.”21 Further waves of dismissals followed in May, November, and December of 1946, and again in May 1947. Even in those months, however, the number of outright firings never reached the level of voluntary dismissals.22 The dismissals were nevertheless unprecedented in scale for the CSN, which led fired workers to challenge their legality, but the labor courts backed the company’s position that workers who had signed temporary construction contracts had no claim to long-term

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employment.23 In October 1946 the directors ordered a complete hiring freeze and instructed departments to report any needs to the general service department, whose personnel unit would fill the vacancies.24 The freeze remained in place until March 1948, when hiring resumed at much smaller levels than during the construction years. The company introduced a trial period, commonly six months, during which it decided whether to hire an employee permanently. The measures stabilized the workforce at the desired level by the late 1940s. Workers still left Volta Redonda, but in much smaller numbers than during construction: annual turnover dropped to about 10 percent.25 The second goal of the transition was to build a skill profile adequate for the operation and maintenance of heavy equipment. The composition of the workforce in 1951 illustrated the new skill requirements (Table 4.1). Compared to the construction workforce in 1944, the share of unskilled laborers dropped from 60 percent to less than 25 percent, while the skilled occupations made up over 50 percent of the production workforce and the semiskilled occupations another 20 percent.26 That did not mean, however, that all skilled workers employed during construction could count on being retained. For production, the CSN needed many more mechanics, electricians, and machine operators than during construction, and many fewer carpenters, masons, and plumbers. To meet the new skill requirements in an economy without other integrated steel mills was difficult. While the CSN recruited some steelworkers from domestic mills that used charcoal and employed simpler technology, most of its production workforce was trained in-house. In late 1945, engineers began to pay close attention to the skills of their subordinate workers in order to assess their potential as future operators or maintenance specialists in the steel mill. They encouraged men who had proven to be good workers and possessed the requisite skills to remain with the company. Starting in 1946, the personnel department reassigned such workers

table 4.1 Skill Profile of Production Workforce (1951) Foremen

Skilled

Semiskilled

Unskilled

Workforce

Production

159 (5%)

1,415 (45%)

676 (21%)

905 (29%)

3,155

Maintenance

130 (6%)

1,503 (74%)

247 (12%)

163 (8%)

2,043

Support

68 (3%)

963 (40%)

610 (25%)

758 (32%)

2,399

CSN (mill only)

357 (5%)

3,881 (51%)

1,533 (20%)

1,826 (24%)

7,597

Source: Compiled from Quadros de Pessoal and Lotações Numéricas Aprovadas in BSVR, 1948–1951. For a full list of sources, see Table 6.1.

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to the newly created production departments and switched their payroll classification from hourly to daily rates. For the most accomplished workers, the transition created opportunities to advance directly from the status of a worker paid by the hour to that of a salaried employee, which among other benefits meant much more ready access to the social assistance programs.27 The company opened schools to train the employees it had selected. The technical school (Escola Técnica) offered courses for men who practiced a trade but lacked formal training. During construction, its curriculum had included “emergency courses” for trades in high demand, such as plumbers, but the school’s primary purpose was to prepare a workforce for mill operation. Workers with shop experience could train to become certified molders, core makers, foundrymen, blacksmiths, lathe operators, levelers, rollers, milling cutters, steam engine operators, ­fitter-electricians, machine operators, acetylene-torch welders, and electric welders.28 The technical school also offered courses for “adaptation to the work at the CSN” to men who had the skills but lacked experience in large-scale industry.29 Macedo Soares inaugurated courses for coke plant, blast furnace, and steelworks operators with a lecture called “The Education of Man for Large-Scale Industry” to remind workers of the enterprise’s magnitude.30 The CSN offered training programs at its vocational school (Escola Profissional) to secure the future supply of men with the requisite trades. Boys attended prevocational school and young men aged 15 to 24 pursued advanced courses to become mechanics, electricians, or metallurgists. Each trade prepared them for a range of occupations in the mill. Mechanics worked as machine operators, fitters, adjusters, or maintenance mechanics; electricians as installers, maintenance electricians, or general electricians; and metallurgists as molders, modelers, or foundrymen. The mill had such a steady demand for these specialists that men who successfully completed the courses could count on a lifetime job with the CSN. The vocational school also served as a trade school for clerical occupations and offered courses for technical assistants, thus creating additional opportunities for the children of the first generation of workers. Selecting operators for the mill’s heavy equipment required careful screening. These machines represented much of the CSN’s capital investment, and no other company in Brazil had ever used such equipment. In 1945, the CSN began recruiting operators for the coke ovens, blast furnace, and open-hearth steel furnaces. It encouraged workers interested in the jobs to register with the engineer in charge of their training. The candidates had to be between 18 and 35 years of age, literate, and Brazilian citizens. Their department heads had to attest that no “moral incompatibility” stood in the way of a long-term future at the CSN. To qualify for

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the training course, the candidates had to pass a written “intellectual test,” which covered dictation, basic math, and general knowledge, and it also tested the candidate’s familiarity with his prospective field of work. Those with the highest test scores then trained with engineers and experienced operators, many of whom were Americans on temporary contracts.31 Candidates for jobs in the rolling and finishing mills and support units had to fulfill the same requirements and display additional qualifications specific to their prospective jobs. For example, the CSN required future metallurgical inspectors to have a secondary-school education and a solid grounding in science.32 Trainees for jobs in the blooming mill, the rail and structural mill, the plate mill, and the hot-rolling mill had to demonstrate knowledge of temperature, weights and volumes, velocity, percentages, and units of measurement.33 Future operators of the thermoelectric plant had to meet the highest standards: proven experience with 150 horsepower boilers and 1,000 horsepower turbines, or past employment as marine machinist or hydroelectric plant operator. The department head’s testimony about the candidates’ “moral compatibility” mattered even more for the thermoelectric plant than for other departments because of the strategic importance of electric generation for mill operations. 34 Men who met the criteria for any of the courses had an excellent chance to be selected. The course for the hot-rolling mill, for example, had 172 applicants; the company invited 126 of them to enroll.35 These special courses and the company-run technical schools turned the CSN into one of the country’s premier training grounds for skilled industrial labor. In-house training opened a path toward social mobility for the first generation of workers and their children. For workers from rural areas or small towns, the training programs represented an opportunity to acquire industrial skills; those who had worked in industry already could have existing skills certified. The CSN’s steady demand for these skills provided job security and the chance of advancement in the career ladder as the company filled supervisory positions on the shop floor from its own ranks. The production departments offered greater chances for mobility, as there was almost no competition from an external labor market. The majority of men who stayed with the CSN after construction acquired new skills and moved up in the career ladder (Table 4.2). The three cohorts hired in 1944, 1945, and 1946 markedly improved their overall skill profile. Of the workers first contracted as unskilled hands, 39, 51, and 69 percent, respectively, moved up to semiskilled or skilled occupations within their first five years of employment. Even if we keep in mind that the difference between an unskilled and a semiskilled position might have been as little as a few weeks of on-the-job training, rather than formal skills acquired in a trade school and honed over many

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From Construction to Production table 4.2 Skill Profile of Three Cohorts upon Hire and after Five Years Cohort

1944

Unskilled

Semiskilled

Skilled

Supervisory

Upon hire

57%

17%

26%

--

After 5 years

35%

23%

31%

12%

1945

Upon hire

53%

19%

28%

--

After 5 Years

26%

22%

42%

10%

1946

Upon hire

71%

15%

13%

--

After 5 years

22%

27%

38%

11%

Note: The “Supervisory” category includes foremen, mestres, and technicians. Source: Sample of CSN Personnel Files.

years, the changes in the cohorts’ skill profiles nevertheless point to remarkable opportunities.36 After five years, 17, 24, and 36 percent of the respective cohorts had moved from the unskilled or semiskilled categories to skilled or supervisory positions. In the 1946 cohort, at least a third of the unskilled workers moved to skilled or supervisory positions by 1951.37 Anybody who came to Volta Redonda in the mid-1940s must have had a keen sense of the opportunities for medium and long-term professional advancement that opened up with the transition to production.

The Bureaucratization of Labor Management Administering the increasingly differentiated workforce required the CSN to move beyond the militarized labor regime of the construction years. The operation of a steel mill with its complex and interconnected production process required a labor regime that facilitated cooperation between departments, within departments, and between the members of the same work crew.38 The company could ill afford disruptions, slowdowns, or bottlenecks in units that provided supplies, services, or intermediate products to other departments, with potential ripple effects for the entire mill, and it hoped that effective labor management could make up for deficits in workers’ experience. For individual departments to reach the CSN’s ambitious production targets, they had to be staffed properly both in terms of the overall number of workers and the right proportions between different occupations. The lack of operational as well as managerial experience turned the initial bureaucratization of labor management into a guessing game. Last but not least, the new labor regime had to ensure the timely and effective contribution by work crews and individual workers in this interconnected

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production process. The challenge faced by those managing individuals was to provide the right incentives and to measure performance accurately. The CSN’s first personnel rules (Regulamento de Pessoal), published in May 1945, created the ground rules for the labor regime. Each of its eleven chapters treated a key aspect of the employment relationship; from admission and hours of work to penalties and the employees’ “duties and obligations.”39 In December 1946, the company replaced the original rules with a more comprehensive version. The opening paragraph stated its purpose as “establish[ing] the regulatory principles, rights, and duties in the relations between the CSN and its employees” in “accordance with Art. 19 of the [company] statutes.”40 It embedded the rules in the framework of the administrative hierarchy and added provisions on important aspects of labor relations that had received only scant attention in the earlier version. It clarified the department heads’ responsibilities vis-à-vis the workers (Title II) and the employees’ right to file objections to a superior’s decision (Title XV).41 The mere existence of personnel rules represented a departure from the militarized labor regime of the construction years, although the framework remained hierarchical and the focus above all on worker duties and company rights. The new personnel rules made no mention, for example, of a role for unions in labor relations, although a local metalworkers union had formed in 1944. In contrast to the 1945 version, the 1946 personnel rules took the form of a statute with titles, chapters, articles, paragraphs, and sections that aimed for legal consistency and terminological compatibility with the federal labor law, the Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho (CLT). Whereas the original personnel rules merely stated that a candidate for employment had to “be free of criminal guilt and have moral aptness,” the revised text required in legally specific terms that the employee “possess moral aptness documented by a certificate from a competent authority or by testimonials from two avowedly apt persons.” The document carefully cross-referenced interwoven rules to avoid ambiguities. An article on “penalties” referred back to titles on “attendance” and on “general duties of the employee” in order to clarify when exactly a verbal warning was appropriate. The revised text also included sections on two core issues of labor management that the old text had mentioned only in passing: “seniority” and “merit.”42 The 1946 personnel rules established the staffing plan (quadro de ­pessoal) as a key bureaucratic tool for the administration of labor. Starting in 1948, the CSN’s personnel department developed staffing plans for individual departments. These plans listed all the occupations subdivided into three major categories: positions of trust (cargos de confiança), career track (cargo de carreira), and wageworkers (diaristas). The plans also established the number of positions for each occupational category and the pay class for the

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employees on career track and the wageworkers. The twenty-nine pay classes ranged from “F” for common laborers to “9” for the highest-ranked engineers. Multiple pay classes could apply to the same occupational category: the foundry employed six different classes of furnace men, five classes of molders, and four classes of modelers.43 The mechanical maintenance ­department had five classes of boilermakers, four classes of maintenance mechanics, four classes of refractory brick layers, and four classes of welders. The different pay classes for the same occupation constituted a career path for workers who received promotions. A class J boilermaker in mechanical maintenance, for example, could receive up to four promotions as boilermaker before reaching the highest class (P).44 Only the cargos de confiança remained outside the new staffing system with its standardized salaries and promotion rules because those were temporary appointments at the discretion of the department heads. Workers feared that the introduction of staffing plans would reduce pay because the personnel department had to fit all the old wage levels into the new scale, which could well have resulted in pay cuts for some. The CSN eased the transition to the new system, however, with a guarantee that no worker would earn less than before. It created a special bonus to make up the “salary difference” between the new pay class and the old wage and paid the affected workers a wage in between regular pay classes.45 In October 1948, the board of directors decided to abolish the “salary difference” and moved all those who received the bonus into the next-higher pay class.46 The earlier, makeshift system did not correspond to the underlying goal of bureaucratization, which was to standardize and simplify the management of a large labor force. As part of the reform, the CSN also phased out hourly wage rates and began paying all workers based on daily rates. It soon became clear that many of the staffing plans did not meet operational needs. Revised plans increased the personnel in some departments and resulted in an internal redistribution of positions in others. Company documents do not reveal how the personnel department estimated the original staffing levels, although one would expect suggestions by equipment manufacturers and experiences at similar steel companies abroad to have figured into the calculations. Such estimates were very accurate for production departments, which used equipment with set capacities and produced to meet production targets. Any revisions in the staffing plans of those departments were responses to the steadily rising targets. The head of the steelworks, for example, cited preparations for increased production when he requested the approval of a new staffing plan in 1950.47 The cold-rolling department increased the number of positions for common laborers from 57 in 1948 to 368 in 1950.48 The hot-rolling department increased the number of positions overall in June 1949 from 332 to 420, mostly by adding

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operators and helpers.49 The foundry eliminated 91 positions and created no fewer than 484 new ones.50 The coke plant cut down on supervisory positions in its restructuring of the staffing plan. Of 47 positions for foremen, it eliminated all but 8 and added 28 positions for common laborers and 21 positions for helpers, which kept the overall staffing roughly stable. Clearly, there had been too many generals and too few soldiers.51 Revisions in the staffing of the maintenance departments were even more drastic. Estimating the proper staffing was more difficult for maintenance than for production, where the machine setup dictated personnel requirements. How often maintenance workers had to change rolls, lubricate machines, or replace broken parts, however, depended not only on preestablished schedules but also on the ability of operators to avoid excessive wear and tear to their equipment. At the CSN, where few operators had experience, the demand for both scheduled and emergency maintenance exceeded the needs in technologically comparable mills elsewhere. The personnel department soon realized that its original estimates did not match the demand. It increased the number of positions in the mechanical maintenance department by about 40 percent, from 1,050 in 1948 to 1,476 in 1950. The new plan added 200 maintenance mechanics, 58 refractory brick layers, and 59 master mechanics.52 For the electrical maintenance department (Departamento de Manutenção Elétrica; DME), the new plan raised the number of electricians from 206 to 302 but eliminated an equivalent number of foremen and operators to keep overall staffing roughly equal.53 The reorganization of the electrical department went deeper. Its staffing had been adequate for the installation of equipment but did not meet the demands of an operating steel mill. After 1948, the CSN reduced the number of electricians, helpers, and common laborers to fewer than half and split the department into two: a superintendency (­superintendência) responsible for the production and distribution of electricity, water, and steam, and another for telecommunications and clocks.54 Staffing plans for the maintenance departments indicate that the CSN was unable to fill many of the newly created openings there. The company needed more maintenance electricians and maintenance mechanics than it could train or recruit. As a result, it had to rely heavily on overtime work, which strengthened the bargaining position of the workers with the requisite skills.55 The CSN responded to the shortage by revising its staffing plans for the DME in ways that offered greater incentives. The revised plan cut the number of positions in the lowest pay scale of “maintenance electrician” in half and increased the number of slots in the higher pay scales dramatically.56 For the maintenance mechanics and electricians already working in these departments, the revision represented a collective raise at a time when the CSN refused to grant general raises and made

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workers earn them through individual merit or seniority. The constraints of the labor market forced the company to compromise on this principle of its labor management.57 As it revised staffing plans, the CSN introduced a new bureaucratic terminology that reflected its goal to rationalize labor management. It replaced the term “staffing plan” with “approved personnel allotment” (lotação numérica aprovada), which highlighted the function as an instrument of centralized control of departmental hiring.58 From then on any changes to the allotment had to be approved by the board of directors. The personnel department also standardized the use of occupational categories. Those in the original staffing plans had been descriptive of the specific work, such as the “operator of the hot saw,” while the revised plans merely identified the position by a general category and pay scale. In the new allotments, the operator of the hot saw appeared simply as one of many “operators.” The change made for much more concise staffing plans. The slabbing and blooming mill department, for example, listed fifteen different types of helpers in its 1948 plan but only four in 1951. The revised plans no longer used the categories “oficial” and “meio oficial” and thereby eliminated any reference to trade (ofício). What defined the worker in the eyes of the personnel department was his position within the mill’s production process and not a traditional craft. The CSN’s new bureaucratic terminology thus deskilled these occupations in that the categories no longer indicated a craft requirement for the position. Scholars of the labor process who define skill as very much rooted in a “craft heritage,” following Harry Braverman, might interpret such a reclassification as evidence of a real deskilling of workers who had learned a trade.59 The work, however, did not change and neither did the required skill. Instead, the reformulation of the staffing plans merely reflected the difference between the construction industry, still very much defined by craft tradition, and an integrated steel mill with many new occupations that had no equivalent in the world of traditional crafts. For many operative positions, the CSN hired workers with solid grounding in a trade, such as mechanics, but the occupational description still described the position in relation to the machine the worker had to operate rather than his qualifications. At least at this early stage, the CSN’s bureaucratization of labor management merely adapted the administrative practice to the technical requirements of an integrated steel mill. It introduced rational administration but not (yet) scientific management. It changed job designations but not job descriptions, which meant that it left the workers’ collective and individual skill profiles unchanged. The reorganization of the CSN’s departments in the late 1940s created ample opportunities for workers to move up in the occupational hier­archy

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and improve their financial standing. In fact, advancement on the career ladder was the only way to improve one’s salary between 1946 and 1951, years in which the CSN refused to grant any general raises despite substantial inflation. Employees had two avenues for upward mobility: a reclassification (reclassificação) moved the employee to a different occupational category or a different department, while a promotion (promoção) elevated him to the next-higher pay class in the same occupational category within the same department. Reclassifications depended entirely on operational needs, which meant that there was no set number in a given year and no entitlement to receive a reclassification even for workers with outstanding performance.60 The CSN used reclassifications extensively to reassign workers as it organized departments and revised staffing plans. Reclassification commonly resulted in a larger raise than a promotion because employees would skip pay classes or enter an occupational category with higher base pay. In the late 1940s, workers were more likely to improve their wages through reclassification than through promotion. Statistically, men hired between 1944 and 1946 earned 1.8 reclassifications for every promotion in the first five years, albeit with significant variations by cohort and by skill. The 1944 cohort earned 2.8 reclassifications for every promotion, a ratio that diminished to 2 for the 1945 cohort and 1.3 for the 1946 cohort as the CSN reassigned workers less frequently. The disparity was greatest for workers hired as unskilled laborers. Those in the 1944 cohort, for example, earned almost 4 reclassifications to every promotion. As a group, the 123 unskilled hires in the full sample earned 99 reclassifications but only 41 promotions in the first five years. Among the unskilled hires, occupational mobility was very uneven. Fifty-five men in the sample earned neither a reclassification nor a promotion, while the rest often earned more than one and in several cases as many as five raises. The pattern was similar for semiskilled and skilled hires. Between 45 and 50 percent did not benefit from either a reclassification or a promotion, while the remaining workers often enjoyed more than one.61 Success apparently bred more success. Once-promoted or reclassified workers could expect to rise even further in the CSN’s occupational hierarchy.

Merit and Occupational Mobility The new framework of labor management introduced individual merit as the main criterion for workers to receive additional pay, either as bonuses or in the form of a promotion. The personnel rules defined merit as “a) professional ability and attentiveness at work, b) a spirit of cooperation and initiative, c) productivity, d) efficiency, e) discipline, f) trustwor-

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thiness, and g) diligence.”62 In the daily practice of labor management, the question was how to assess the employee’s overall merit based on these disparate criteria. Some, such as professional ability, productivity, and efficiency lent themselves to objective measurement and a ranking, while others were by nature more subjective. Another question was how much relative weight the personnel department would assign to the different criteria in order to determine an employee’s overall merit. The CSN had to translate the general merit criteria into concrete policies for occupational mobility and bonuses, and it had to balance rewards for effort and loyalty with the imperative of capitalist rationality. The merit regime thus revealed much about how the CSN reconciled the goals to raise productivity and profit with the paternalist promise to take care of the basic needs of loyal employees. The 1949 promotion rules (Regulamento de Promoção) introduced a bureaucratized system of evaluating merit that determined eligibility for a promotion. In regular intervals, the company created a merit bulletin (­Boletim de Merecimento) to assess work performance and preparedness for positions carrying greater responsibility. The employee’s supervisor filled out a questionnaire that awarded points for good qualities and deducted points for lack of diligence, punctuality, or discipline. Supervisors faced severe penalties if they displayed bias in completing the merit bulletin.63 Most of the twenty-five questions corresponded directly to the criteria for merit established in the personnel rules.64 The supervisor had to assess whether the employee displayed “[dedication] to the work,” “loyalty to his boss and colleagues,” a “capacity to lead,” and an ability “to follow work instructions easily” and whether he “produce[d] a satisfactory quantity of work.” Other questions targeted general work habits. A worker who “frequently left the workplace . . . when the boss is not present” or “interrupt[ed] work frequently” showed a lack of discipline and undermined productivity. Whether a worker “learn[ed] to follow the work instructions easily” and “show[ed] interest in the improvement of work procedures” spoke to his dedication and potential for positions of greater responsibility, which also explains questions about “broader knowledge about the issues facing the unit” and the “capacity to systematize work routines.” The paternalist ideology and its respect for hierarchy showed in questions that asked if the employee was “polite and disciplined toward his boss” and if he “obey[ed] and carr[ied] out the work orders of his superiors promptly.” The personnel department translated the answers into a merit score. Employees earned four points for a “positive” answer, two points for a “more or less,” and no points for a “negative” assessment. Absences and penalties led to deductions. A full day’s absence or four partial absences counted one (negative) point. A warning yielded two, a reprimand four, a day of suspension six,

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and a temporary discharge thirty negative points.65 The employee needed a “good” (75–90), “very good” (90–95), “great” (95–99), or “exceptional” (100) score to be eligible for promotion. Employees with “­regular” (60–75), “deficient” (30–60), or “poor” (30) performance received no consideration. The final decision on promotions also depended on seniority. The CSN defined seniority as the time an employee had worked in a given pay class less any unauthorized absences.66 Employees became eligible for a promotion after two years, and at least two years had to pass between promotions. Under the original personnel rules, the company ranked eligible candidates from the next-lower pay class by merit (75 percent) and seniority (25 percent).67 The 1949 promotion rules abolished the weights and introduced a regime that alternated between promotions by seniority and by merit: the first vacancy was filled by seniority, the second by merit, and the third by seniority again. The system in effect reversed the old priorities. In years with an even number of openings in a given pay class, half the promotions depended on seniority and half on merit, but in years with an uneven number of openings, seniority determined more promotions than merit. Moreover, only employees in the top third of the seniority ranking of their pay class were eligible for merit-based promotions.68 Twice annually the promotion commission (Comissão de Promoções) prepared a list with three names for every opening. The company president made the final decision, preserving a degree of central control over an aspect of the labor regime that had been thoroughly bureaucratized.69 Employees who met the merit criteria but did not receive a promotion for three consecutive years automatically received a permanent bonus of 15 percent or the difference to the next-higher salary class, whichever was less.70 The bonus rewarded hard-working employees who lacked the breadth of skills and/or the personality to receive the highest ranking on the promotion lists. The criteria to earn bonuses for exemplary service made the residual paternalism of the CSN’s labor management even more evident than the promotion regime. Discipline and attendance counted; performance at the workplace did not. Employees with no penalties other than a warning, less than thirty days of leave, and fewer than thirty excused absences over five years received the Five-Year Award (Prêmio Quinquenal), which paid the equivalent of one month’s salary. The bonus doubled for employees without any penalties, leaves, and absences.71 Apparently, workers found it difficult to meet the criteria, however, prompting the company to make the rules less stringent. After 1947, it canceled one unexcused absence if an employee had twelve consecutive months without absences. As of 1950, the employee’s five-year clock started over whenever he received a major penalty.72 Employees could receive the Prêmio Quinquenal every five years. Those who earned it twice in their first ten years with the

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CSN also received the Ten-Year Award (Prêmio Decenal) and an additional month of paid vacation. Twenty years of dedicated service earned the employee the Twenty-Year Award (Prêmio Vigesimal) and an additional two months of paid vacation.73 The company held an awards ceremony to reinforce the awards’ effects as paternalist tools. Every prize-winning employee came forward to receive a diploma, and all winners united on stage to be recognized as shining examples.74 The company’s daily bulletin, the ­Boletim de Serviço de Volta Redonda (BSVR), published a list of the winners to remind all workers that the company rewarded loyalty. The diretor ­secretário’s praise for one of the first winners of the double bonus in 1946 explicitly urged others to follow the example: “The prize earned by the employee GERALDO MARTINS BRAGA, who diligently showed up for work for five consecutive years, not only provides us with the opportunity to devote this well-deserved eulogy to such an auspicious achievement, but also assures us that examples such as this can and ought to be imitated by all those who work for the greatness of the CSN.”75

figure 4.1  Crew of One Million Tons. The blast furnace crew that cast the one millionth ton of pig iron. Department head Eng. Renato Frota de Rodrigues Azevedo made a personal appearance to congratulate the workers and honor their diligent work. Frota de Rodrigues Azevedo would later serve as the CSN’s industrial director (1954–1960). Source: CSN Photographic Archive, 1949.

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The individual employee’s share of company profits also depended on merit and seniority. Brazil’s 1946 constitution had established profit ­sharing as a workers’ right. Congress passed the regulatory legislation in 1948, and the CSN was one of the first companies to comply with the law, albeit within the logic of its labor regime.76 As was the case for the CSN’s fiveyear, ten-year, and twenty-year awards, individual merit for the purpose of profit sharing did not take into account the employee’s productivity. The “instructions for the distribution of the bonus” established seniority, diligence at work, and “familial responsibility” as the three criteria to calculate a “salary point” factor, to be multiplied with the monthly salary and divided by forty to determine the worker’s profit share.77 The rules set the maximum for salary points at forty to create a ceiling of one month’s salary for individual shares. Every employee started with ten points and received up to ten more points for seniority and one point for each dependent, with a limit of ten. “Diligence at work,” defined as a lack of absences, determined the remaining ten points. For each missed workday or five partial absences the employee lost one of his ten points. The “diligence” score mattered most to recently hired employees with few dependents, who had a salary point ceiling in the low twenties.78 In 1949, the company strengthened the weight of merit in the calculation of the workers’ profit shares. It distributed about 40 percent of the overall amount based exclusively on merit as defined in the personnel rules’ general provisions. Instead of a share based on the formula, eligible employees received special merit prizes of Cr$5,000–50,000, depending on the salary class. The amounts far exceeded the monthly income of skilled workers, who all earned less than Cr$2,000, but a worker receiving a merit-based profit share remained a rarity anyhow. Engineers emerged as the major beneficiaries: most of the men who received the maximum meritbased allocation in 1949 went on to become CSN directors in later years.79 The revised rules brought the share of profits received by middle management closer to that of the CSN’s directors, who had never been subject to the formula or a ceiling on salary points. They received 0.5 percent of the company’s annual net profit, up to Cr$200,000 for the president and Cr$150,000 for the other directors, far in excess of their regular monthly salaries of Cr$18,000 and Cr$15,000, respectively.80 The profit sharing rules satisfied the company’s legal obligation, but there was no discernable effort to maximize the share going to the workers. The use of merit as criterion for material incentives in the late 1940s lacked a consistent managerial rationale. It reflected both a paternalist vision of the CSN as protector of the workers and their families and a more strictly capitalist approach aimed at increasing production and productivity. The rules for profit sharing and the criteria for one-time bonuses were

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true to the paternalist ideology; they considered above all workers’ perceived needs, the family situation, and company loyalty. Reclassifications, on the other hand, prioritized the company’s success as a state capitalist enterprise with little concern for the needs of all the workers. Reclassifications became the primary path to occupational mobility and material advancement for workers with the appropriate skill profile and a commitment to acquiring new skills. In the promotion regime, the CSN tried to strike a balance between its two missions: local social development in the spirit of paternalism and national economic development under a regime of state capitalism. The bureaucratized assessment represented a rationalization of the CSN’s labor regime, but the criteria for promotion still valued work ethic, discipline, and seniority more highly than productivity. Attention to social needs and rewards for effort and loyalty reassured workers who failed to move up in the career ladder that the CSN had not abandoned its paternalist promise. The managerial vision might not have been consistent, but the pragmatic approach to granting material incentives helped avoid dissatisfaction among loyal workers.

The Disciplinary Regime The material incentives rewarding effort and loyalty had their counter­part in a disciplinary regime that punished the failure to fulfill basic work duties. These penalties served a pragmatic purpose for day-to-day operations and reinforced the paternalist labor regime at the same time. They deterred negligence at work and thereby helped the company avoid production stoppages, protect its investment in machinery, and prevent injuries to workers. From 1947 to 1953, the daily bulletin published a notice of every penalty with a detailed justification as a matter of proper procedure, but also to warn all workers about the consequences of a lack of commitment or discipline. The directors hoped that the negative ­example would reinforce a culture of dedication and pride in the proper execution of one’s work duties. Imposing the penalty and making it public also renewed the company’s authority as paternalist protector, especially in cases when it justified the penalty with the harm or danger an employee’s actions caused to other workers. The daily bulletin became a veritable journal of operational mistakes and acts of indiscipline that disrupted day-to-day production. The company imposed such penalties for violations of the general work rules that required all employees to display punctuality, diligence, attentiveness, and reliability. The personnel rules provided guidance on how these qualities should translate into daily work on the shop floor.

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They instructed the workers “to take an interest in the good conservation of material the company entrusted to them” and explicitly threatened “penalties for the losses caused by the employee’s fault as judged by the administration.” It was punishable “to commit any act that, directly or indirectly, causes losses to the company or counteracts any of its explicit orders.” This included the obligation to “maintain secrecy about matters in the interest of the company” and a prohibition to “[organize or lead] collective manifestations, or [join] such manifestations, whether to show appreciation or disparagement . . . inside or outside the workplace.”81 The personnel rules also established the types of penalties the company could impose: warnings, reprimands, and suspensions without pay for up to thirty days. Minor violations commonly earned warnings or reprimands and suspensions only in the case of a recurrence. For severe transgression or a violation of multiple rules in one act, a suspension was automatic. Extreme cases even justified a dismissal with “just cause,” if the company could prove that the employee had not fulfilled his “duties with exactitude.”82 Department heads could impose warnings and reprimands, directors could issue suspensions, but only the company president had the authority to dismiss an employee for just cause. The employees had the right to appeal within fifteen days, which obliged the director to uphold, reduce, or forgive the penalty after consultation with the respective department. Both reprimands and suspensions became a permanent part of the personnel record.83 Penalties became an oft-used tool of labor management. From 1945 to 1948, the height of the transition from construction to production, the company imposed between 1,100 and 1,500 suspensions annually (Table 4.3). The company lost between 2,500 and 3,700 man-workdays each year to suspensions, and the penalized workers lost the corresponding income. The great majority of suspensions lasted three days or less. Five- and tenday suspensions were not unusual. The absolute number of suspensions began to decline in 1948 and dropped off sharply in 1951, while the average length of the suspensions decreased only very gradually from 2.7 days in 1944 to 2.1 days in 1952.84 The gradual decline in the late 1940s suggests that workers adapted to industrial work and the labor regime, as they gained experience and committed less costly errors. The change in the early 1950s, on the other hand, marked a diminished role for the disciplinary regime in the company’s approach to management. One-day suspensions became the default penalty after 1950: they accounted for almost 60 percent of all penalties in 1952 compared to only 30 percent in 1945. In the late 1940s, the CSN used the penalties to foster a work culture conducive to high productivity. The workers’ lack of time discipline was a prime target. Almost daily the bulletin reported penalties for “regular lateness to

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From Construction to Production table 4.3 Number and Length of Suspensions (1944–1952) Length

1944

1945

1946

1947

1948

1949

1950

1951

1952

1-day

250

342

419

623

521

359

489

312

216

2-day

153

247

303

275

242

182

194

103

67

3-day

339

426

456

345

237

179

165

71

41

4-day

16

9

28

20

9

10

14

4

7

5-day

75

71

124

118

103

89

86

21

25

6- to 9-day

15

15

27

18

9

8

15

3

1

10-day

53

8

21

20

22

8

7

6

8

15-day or more

3

1

12

5

2

2

5

2

5

Total Number

905

1,120

1,390

1,424

1,145

837

975

522

370

2,699

2,706

3,710

3,281

2,584

1,914

2,131

996

793

3.0

2.4

2.7

2.3

2.3

2.3

2.2

1.9

2.1

Total Days Average Length

Source: Compiled from BSVR 001 (Jan. 2, 1944) to BSVR 243 (Dec. 12, 1952).

work,” “not showing up for work,” “unexcused absences,” and “being absent for previously scheduled duty.”85 In contrast to the construction period, when the company had absorbed high rates of absenteeism, it could not afford to be as flexible as a steel producer. An unscheduled absence caused expensive equipment to sit idle, disrupted the shift system, and forced foremen to scramble for replacements to complete the work crews. Consequently, missing a full day of work resulted in an automatic reprimand, and the first recurrence resulted in suspension.86 Aggravating circumstances justified longer suspensions. An employee who “miss[ed] work and appear[ed] during the missed work hours to get some soup and then go to sleep” earned an immediate three-day suspension.87 The CSN could excuse an absence if the employee provided an explanation in writing within twenty-four hours, but it saw it necessary to clarify that “forgetting” to come to work was not a sufficient reason.88 The company showed some tolerance toward employees who left work temporarily to resolve private matters because it recognized how difficult it was to see a doctor or apply for a government document after work hours.89 Employees who left work for other reasons, however, received no special consideration. The bulletin reported suspensions for an employee who “[took] a shower before the regular time while officially at work” and another who was “absent from the workplace to read a newspaper.” Several employees earned suspensions after they “abandoned the workplace to play soccer in the factory yard.”90

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The company disciplined employees for their failure to fulfill specific work duties. Any penalty justified with the employee’s “negligence” fell into that category.91 Often, the reports specified that the negligence had caused a “work accident,” “disrupted the good progress of work,” or caused “losses for the CSN.”92 At times, the bulletin specified the damage, such as “constant . . . mistakes in the count of the tin plate,” “disruptions in the cast,” or “damage in the molding of three boxes.”93 Negligent acts that could cause major disruptions of production triggered an automatic suspension, as in the case of a worker who “failed to lubricate the traveling crane n.6” and another who was “asleep during work hours while the equipment under his responsibility was operating.”94 The length of the suspension depended on the damage done. A welder received a three-day suspension after he caused a gas explosion “[lighting] the burner incorrectly.” The company issued fiveday suspensions for an employee who drove “a truck without authorization from the superior, causing an accident and losses to the CSN” and another who caused a “barge with gravel to sink” in the Paraíba River.95 “[S]evere negligence in the fulfillment of . . . obligations” earned an employee a fifteenday suspension after “[l]oading the coke oven n.6 incompletely.”96 While charging a coke oven incorrectly may not appear to be as grave as sinking a barge, it carried a high cost because the entire oven-load was likely lost. The bulletin often listed the nature and value of the wasted material to highlight the gravity of the mistake and justify the penalty. One worker “dislocated the valve” of a ladle, which led to the loss of “90 tons of steel in the tapping hall.” Another “disregard[ed] operating instructions and transferr[ed] oil without closing the pressure valve” spilling “2,900 liters of oil.”97 Yet another “failed to heat a load to the right temperature, [which forced] the company to scrap 35 tons of steel.”98 The CSN suffered “losses in the amount of 17,401.60 Cr$” when a “railcar loaded with steel plate was sent off as empty.”99 The company justified these suspensions explicitly with the failure to exercise due care in the execution of routine tasks. One worker “failed to execute his work routine of lubrication, allowing an engine to run without oil in the bearings,” while another “worked negligently and [did] not pay attention to the signs given to him when he operated the recoiler, causing losses to the CSN.”100 One worker “caused a 30 minute delay at the blast furnace because he had derailed the skip while loading the shaft”; another accidentally “dumped a load of iron ore into the loading shaft” instead of the proper raw materials.101 The application of penalties, the company expected, would strengthen the workers’ awareness of the connections between their work and that of others and of their responsibility for production overall. This included knowing one’s place. “Interfering with work outside his abilities causing severe mistakes in the work of the laboratory” earned one employee a three-day suspension.102

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The company cracked down on workers who negligently or willfully endangered themselves, coworkers, or civilians. An employee who failed to “respect the traffic rules and drove a vehicle at excessive speed” received a three-day suspension.103 Reckless driving outside the factory also resulted in suspensions: one day for a driver who “made a passenger steer the car, which led to damages,” and five days for one who “disregarded the red light at the passage near the Central [and ended up] trapped between two tracks when a passenger train passed at high speed.”104 The suspensions were longest for driving a company vehicle without authorization or taking it outside of the factory against orders. “Driving a CA without . . . the necessary license . . . [and] ultimately running into a train resulting in losses for the CSN” drew ten days, while “driv[ing] the TM-9 outside of the grounds of the CSN and knocking it over” drew four.105 Operators of forklift trucks, the most common free-moving vehicle on the shop floor, often ran into similar trouble. The CSN issued three- and five-day suspensions, respectively, because one “caus[ed] damages at the uncoiler of the slab shear” and another used the “forklift truck without authorization . . . and knock[ed] over a wall.”106 Not even the bicyclist who “took a ride in the hot-strip mill” escaped a penalty.107 The company expected employees whose work linked different stages of the production process to exercise great care in fulfilling their duties. One such link was the internal rail network, which transported coke to the blast furnace, pig iron to the steelworks, and steel ingots to the rolling mills. For penalties imposed on these workers, the daily bulletin always provided detailed justifications and often highlighted the disruption caused to work in the entire mill. The worker who “let an engine under his signaling collide with another engine causing losses to the CSN” received a one-day suspension, as did a signaler who “[let] the locomotive CSN202 pass a switch in reverse position derailing the engine.”108 Two workers who abandoned their posts and “caused the breakdown of an engine” received four-day suspensions.109 The greater the skill level the stiffer was the penalty. The CSN suspended a machinist who had left “the work post before the arrival of the relief and . . . left the engine insufficiently clean and lubricated” for five days.110 The locomotive engineers had to meet the highest standard. One who “disregard[ed] the signal given by the operator, continuing to advance with the locomotive 303—which caused derailing and the breakdown of the engine” received a four-day suspension.111 Another who “ha[d] lacked the necessary care when responsible for engine CSN-304 and caus[ed] an accident” received a ten-day suspension.112 A second group of technically strategic workers were the operators of traveling cranes. The steelworks, the rolling mills, and the maintenance departments all depended on the traveling cranes to move material and heavy

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equipment, and even simple operational mistakes could cause long delays, costly losses of material, and severe injuries to workers on the shop floor. The penalty records show that the company cracked down on men who operated the cranes without the necessary training or failed to retain control over their equipment.113 “Performing work . . . in dangerous fashion” or “operating negligently . . . thereby causing a work accident” drew at least a one-day suspension, even when there was no major damage.114 Accidents that damaged production equipment drew heavier penalties. One operator received a five-day suspension for “disregard[ing] the foreman’s signals [and] cause[ing] damages at the rolling mill.” Another was out for four days after he had used the crane to push a railcar and ended up “blocking the track and derailing the car after a collision with an engine.”115 Cranes often shared the same track, which required the operators to anticipate the next move of the neighboring crane. One operator failed to exercise such caution and “let his rolling crane collide with the one of his colleague, almost causing a disaster.” One of the more bizarre cases involved an operator who apparently tried to settle a dispute in a high-stakes duel. He “pushed the traveling crane n.17 with n.16 [and] caused it to crash into a wall of the DPI laboratory.”116 The penalty regime of the late 1940s thus served a dual function with potentially contradictory objectives. The immediate purpose was to reduce waste and inefficiencies caused by operational mistakes as penalized worker(s), at least in theory, tried to improve their performance in order to avoid both a loss of income and reduced opportunities for future promotions or bonuses. The penalty regime appeared to obey the company’s goal of rationalizing its labor management. Spelling out principles for the application of penalties in the personnel rules created standards. Documenting imposed penalties in the daily bulletin served to remind the employees of these standards and assured a degree of transparency. On the other hand, the daily practice of imposing penalties preserved the spirit of the military-style disciplinary regime from the construction years, which had reinforced hierarchical control and a particular social order informed by paternalist ideology. The practice to punish acts that undermined order and discipline, even if they did not violate specific personnel rules, demonstrated the continued ideological commitment to a comprehensive agenda for social engineering that aimed to educate the workers and improve their work habits in a cultural sense.117 As the CSN introduced bureaucratic rationalization and greater transparency to its labor management, it still insisted on unchecked company control over labor relations with little regard for the industrial relations framework established by the CLT. The company used the penalties to dispense justice internally in order to guarantee productivity in the mill and

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defend the social order. Internal commissions conducted the investigation to decide on a penalty and the employee had no recourse to an independent authority to challenge decisions perceived as arbitrary. The only recourse was to appeal to the board of directors, which under article 27-A of the personnel rules retained full powers to cancel penalties as long as the employee had no more than one.118 The cancellation procedure mirrored the procedure to impose the penalty. The directorate consulted with the employee’s immediate superior, heard the employee’s explanation if it deemed that necessary, and then decided to grant or deny the request for cancellation.119 Given how heavily the merit score weighed penalties—diminishing the chances for promotion, denying the Prêmio Quinquenal, and reducing employees’ share in the profit participation—workers longed for a more transparent and rational disciplinary regime. But with the union under intervention, that demand remained unarticulated. The CSN strongly discouraged recourse to the labor courts, because grievance procedures would interfere with the company’s internal justice, attract unwanted public attention, and trigger labor mobilization. The company could not prevent employees from filing grievances in the courts, but it had a two-tiered strategy to discourage them. It threatened to fire anybody who filed a grievance, a serious consequence for employees who had less than ten years of service and therefore no job protection (­estabilidade).120 The CSN complemented the threat of dismissal with a strategy of preemptive information. The daily bulletin published state and federal legislation on industrial relations as well as opinions by company lawyers to illustrate that the personnel rules complied with the labor law.121 It reprinted favorable court decisions and full opinions for cases the CSN won against ex-employees to underscore that its labor regime was “just.”122 The company’s social assistance department organized talks on labor rights to “enlighten” the employees, maintained a library with binding court decisions, and cooperated with the industrial relations department on programs to discourage workers from filing grievances.123 The company maintained its internal system of justice as long as the workers lacked a strategy and the power to challenge the practice.

Conclusion The penalty regime’s ambiguity of purpose reflected a deeper change in the CSN’s vision of its role. During construction, the company justified military-style command, state paternalist management, and restrictions on labor rights with the contribution to Brazil’s industrial future both on the economic and social fronts. The CSN, so the reasoning went, needed

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full control over labor relations to transform culturally backward, insufficiently skilled, and inexperienced men into industrial workers ready to contribute to the country’s modernization. The paternalist ideology remained the guide for the CSN’s social assistance programs into the 1950s. Economic imperatives, however, became central in the late 1940s. The nation’s rising demand for steel and the obligation to post profits and repay loans made the company follow capitalist principles of efficiency and productivity and prioritize economic rationality at the expense of its social mission. The CSN’s personnel labor regime respected the individual worker’s human needs, but it still followed capitalist logic in treating labor above all as a factor of production when designing policies to build a stable production workforce and adopting an internal organization aimed at maximizing steel production.124 Raising production to mill capacity depended on building a highly skilled workforce and then implementing the proper incentives to raise productivity. Initially, that created tremendous opportunities for workers who stayed with the CSN during the transition from construction to production. Many acquired additional qualifications as the CSN trained heavy equipment operators and maintenance personnel in-house. These careers were open even to men without certified skills or formal technical training, as long as they could pass the entrance exam and demonstrate aptitude. Workers with the requisite skills, whether they had acquired them before joining the company or on-site, and strong work performance quickly moved up the career ladder by way of reclassification as the CSN continued to expand staffing levels. Many of these workers ended up in positions that they could never have attained in a more developed economy with a deeper labor pool. That wave of occupational mobility came to an end by 1951 because the company had filled most vacancies in the new staffing plans. In order to fill highly skilled positions, the CSN increasingly looked to graduates of its technical schools or men hired from the outside. It no longer trained heavy-equipment operators or maintenance personnel in-house. In order to fulfill its economic mission as primary producer of the nation’s steel, the CSN rationalized its labor management in the sense of a Weberian bureaucratization but tried to preserve paternalist practices that rewarded effort. The introduction of personnel rules, career ladders, and staffing plans standardized the labor regime and thereby depersonalized the relations between managers and workers. At the same time, the personnel rules’ definition of an employee’s merit valued steady work, discipline, and respect for hierarchy more than pure productivity, and rewards based on merit created an alternate path of material advancement for those who did not have the skills to climb the career ladder through reclas-

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sifications. The rules for promotions, profit sharing, and one-time bonuses such as the Prêmio Quinquenal all depended on attendance, discipline, and seniority in keeping with the paternalist promise that those who worked hard for the good of the nation would be rewarded. The CSN’s rationalization in the late 1940s subjected workers to a standardized labor regime that prioritized the needs of production, but it did not follow a rationale of profit maximization at any human cost. This was rational administration, not (yet) scientific management. By 1950, the vestiges of the paternalist labor regime increasingly appeared to restrict rather than enhance the workers’ opportunities for material betterment. In the absence of general raises and with occupational mobility diminishing, more and more workers depended on merit-based raises or bonuses to improve their take-home pay. The penalty regime, in particular, prevented many workers from earning promotions or one-time bonuses, as one suspension was often sufficient to exclude a worker from both for many years. The workers disliked that the CSN treated the constitutionally guaranteed profit sharing as a tool of labor management, with deductions for a “lack of diligence,” rather than as a fundamental workers’ right in the spirit of the legislation. Most important, the CSN did not place labor relations on the legal footing mandated by the federal labor law. It did not pay certain bonuses—for example, for night work—and did not consult worker representatives as long as the union remained under intervention. In the late 1940s, without effective union representation and no easy access to labor courts, workers had few options to challenge the existing labor regime and affect change in the balance between Weberian rationalization and paternalism. Only once political conditions changed, in the 1950s, would the workers push their own agenda for rationalization to get a greater share of the fruits of state capitalism.

5

Beware of the Communists political policing and labor control

It is obvious that we waged our most important struggle against Communism. We were always in the offensive, with determination, but without boasting, confronting the opponents’ ploys and the incomprehension of the pseudodemocrats. —Major Adauto Esmeraldo Director of the Federal Political Police, 19471

The concentration of industrial workers made Volta Redonda a potential hotbed for militancy. The Brazilian Communist Party (Partido Comunista do Brasil; PCB) saw the city as a target of opportunity in its effort to rebuild a working-class base when the grip of the Estado Novo began to loosen in 1943. The administration of the National Steel Company (CSN) feared radical labor organization and took preemptive measures from day one of the construction of the mill. Heavy-handed labor control came naturally to the company directors. Steeped in a military tradition, they saw repression of radical elements as a necessary complement to social assistance programs designed to foster social peace. To their mind, progress required order. The company’s security forces cooperated closely with the newly created political police at both the state and federal level to prevent the emergence of a militant labor movement. The 1943 labor law, which guaranteed the right to unionize, appeared to place limits on the police’s preemptive measures against militants, but the law also enhanced the role of law enforcement. The Labor Ministry used the political police to screen union officials’ political pasts and launched investigations into Communist influence on unions based on reports of its field officers. The political police became an integral part of the bureaucratic politics of labor control. Until the 1930s, the state had treated the policing of industrial labor as a matter of crowd control. It had used regular police forces and army units to break strikes and club down protests during waves of labor unrest in São Paulo, Santos, and Rio de Janeiro after World War I and in the 1920s.2 In 1933, Getúlio Vargas’s government restructured the police and created the Delegacia Especial de Segurança Política e Social (DESPS), a force to “protect the political and social order,” whose tasks included spying on unions.3 Instead of reactive crowd control, DESPS implemented

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the preemptive policing of militant labor organizations. To the supporters of the police reform, the successful repression of uprisings by the leftwing National Liberation Alliance (Aliança Nacional Libertadora; ANL) in 1935 and the right-wing Brazilian Integralist Action (Ação Integral­ ista Brasileira; AIB) in 1938 showed the necessity and the promise of this preemptive strategy.4 The crackdowns also helped improve the political police’s base of information. Seized archives, interrogation records, and transcripts of trials against militants generated a wealth of new documentation on suspected subversives that DESPS organized into an extensively cross-referenced file system.5 This archive—constantly updated with intelligence from field agents and other state agencies—became the backbone of the national security apparatus under the Estado Novo and beyond.6 The political police expanded further in the early 1940s. The government revamped the country’s security apparatus and created the Federal Department for Public Security (Departamento Federal de Segurança Pública; DFSP) to assume control over all federal police forces.7 The United States provided technical assistance to DFSP with an eye toward strengthening the continent’s defenses against potential sabotage of military and industrial installations by Axis nationals. The U.S. Special Intelligence Service (SIS) helped transform DESPS into a secret police with the necessary reach to fulfill its core mission: prevent “crimes against the state” and “crimes against the social order.”8 In 1944, the government extinguished DESPS and replaced it with a new agency, the Divisão de Polícia Política e Social (DPS), with the power to expand the force by creating specialized subagencies.9 The two most important were the Delegacia de Segurança Política (DSeP) to prevent “crimes against the political order, meaning acts carried out against the structure and the security of the state” and the Delegacia de Segurança Social (DSS) to prevent “crimes against the social order, in accordance with the stipulations of the constitution and the laws establishing the individual rights and guarantees and their civil and penal protection.”10 The delegacias relied on the Serviço de Investigações (SIv) and the Serviço de Informações (SI) for investigations and intelligence. SIv maintained files on suspicious individuals and organizations and prepared dossiers on “topics which, in their complexity, [went] beyond the capacities of the regular file system.”11 It also operated the “secret service,” coordinated clandestine operations, and condensed intelligence on the security situation into daily briefings for government officials, including the president. The SI had units to “carry out investigations concerning labor” and to “execute all services of prevention against the disturbance of public order and of personal rights of interest to the political police.” The mandates left much room for interpretation and were used to justify extensive intervention in unions and public life more generally.12

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Volta Redonda became an early testing ground for new policing procedures and coordinated action in the field of industrial security. The government put DESPS in charge of political policing and instructed both the political police of the state of Rio de Janeiro (Delegacia de Ordem Político e Social do Estado do Rio de Janeiro; DOPS-RJ) and the CSN’s internal police to assist in the effort. The key goal was to prevent any infiltration of the workforce by labor militants. Once Barra Mansa had been designated a national security district, in late 1942, the CSN made it policy to hire only men who had been issued an atestado ideológico by the political police to certify that they did not adhere to an ideology opposed to social and political order. The CSN submitted the names of potential employees to the political police, which checked its files to determine whether the person had an ideological past (antecedentes ideológicos).13 The process could be tedious in daily practice. The widespread use of saint names and a legacy of slavery made for many duplicate names among Brazil’s lower classes. It often took weeks to resolve whether someone with a common name such as Antônio Alves, Benedito Silva, José Alves, João Batista, and Sebastião dos Santos was indeed a “known subversive” with a police file or just a namesake.14 The company nevertheless required the atestado ideológico. In 1943, technical director Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva asked DESPS to carry out an ideological screening of all workers employed in the construction of the coke plant. Agent Milton Brandão obtained a complete list of the workers and took it back to Rio de Janeiro, where DESPS staff checked each and every one of the more than one thousand names against police files. His visit to Volta Redonda left Brandão deeply impressed with the organization of the CSN’s personnel files. He recognized them as an invaluable tool for labor control: “despite the great number of workers recently admitted (up to 5,000, according to my information, with the total workforce at 10,000), the different archives of the company are all joined together in one to allow better control and security for future consultations.”15 The personnel files were at once employment records and an instrument to police labor with the help of federal authorities. The fact that one man, Capitão Edgard Magalhães da Silva, headed the company’s internal police and its personnel department facilitated such dual use. The CSN also relied on federal authorities to persecute workers who left Volta Redonda in violation of decree-law 11.087 (Dec. 12, 1942), which made it an act of desertion (for citizens) or sabotage (for foreigners) to abandon work at a company of national security interest. In one case, the police arrested Luiz Pinto, a Portuguese citizen, in his home in Anápolis (MG), and escorted him back to Volta Redonda for punishment and re­ integration into the workforce.16 In March 1943, the CSN asked DESPS to

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arrest five Portuguese employees for sabotage because they had abandoned work. Officers detained three of them in the Federal District and arranged for DOPS-RJ to arrest the other two.17 On April 30, 1943, CSN president Guinle contacted the command of the first military region, headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, to request assistance with the persecution of deserters. He included a list with the names of 458 workers who had left Volta Redonda since mid-February without notifying the company and asked the military to assist in their capture.18 Justification for the emergency laws disappeared after the end of World War II, but that did not put a stop to the exchange of information between the CSN and the other state agencies. The company continued to collaborate with the Labor Ministry and the political police’s Labor Sector (Setor Trabalhista) throughout the 1940s and into the 1950s to prevent militant labor organization in Volta Redonda.

The Bureaucratic Politics of Labor Control The parameters of industrial labor control changed with the pro­ mulgation of the Consolidation of Labor Laws (Consolidação das Leis de Trabalho; CLT) in 1943. This was not a labor code in the strictest sense, but rather a compilation of the laws implemented by successive Vargas governments since the early 1930s. A commission headed by Arnaldo Sussekind, Rio de Janeiro’s regional attorney for labor affairs, revised the existing laws and consolidated them into a comprehensive body of legislation.19 The CLT set minimum standards for the “protection of labor,” established a legal framework for conducting industrial relations, created institutions to rule on grievances, and gave the Labor Ministry the power to manage labor relations and enforce the law.20 Labor Minister Alexandre Marcondes Filho, a close Vargas confidant and the architect of the Estado Novo’s trabalhismo, celebrated the CLT as a milestone: “the Consolidação constitutes a venerable mark in the history of our civilization, demonstrates the Brazilian calling for the law, and—in the darkness that surrounds humanity—represents the expression of a light that has not been extinguished.”21 Vargas signed the law on May 1, international Labor Day, and used his speech at the annual May Day Parade to proclaim a new age in labor relations. On paper, the CLT was a progressive law that established rights inconceivable only fifteen years earlier. The “General Rules concerning the Protection of Labor” regulated wages, vacations, and work hours and set standards for hygiene and work safety. The “Special Standards for the Protection of Labor” called for a nationalization of the labor force and established specific protections for the work of women and minors. The CLT

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established procedures for the organization of employer and employee sin­ dicatos and regulated individual and collective labor contracts. It also provided for the creation of a special labor judiciary and established grievance procedures. Last but not least, the law made the Labor Ministry the primary agency to oversee labor relations and enforce the law, if necessary, by applying administrative fines to punish violations.22 The CLT created a system of bureaucratic oversight for industrial relations, which gave the government the tools to strengthen or stymie labor organizations depending on its political interest.23 In July 1943, Vargas appointed Filinto ­Müller to head the National Labor Council (Conselho Nacional de Trabalho; CNT), which controlled the highest labor court and the national welfare agency.24 Müller had made a name as a repressive zealot during his tenure as the Federal District’s chief of police of (1933–1942).25 He had no patience for militant labor organization and facilitated the exchange of intelligence between the labor bureaucracy and the political police to defend the social and political order.26 The wartime regime justified suspending some of the CLT’s most progressive provisions: the right to vacation, the eight-hour day, and the progressive pay scale for extra hours.27 Official recognition as a union was the precondition for a worker association to claim the law’s benefits and protections. In mid-1943, workers at the CSN founded a professional association for metalworkers (­Associação Profissional dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias Metalúrgicas de Barra Mansa; APTIMBM). In November, its general assembly voted to initiate unionization procedures and request recognition as the Sindicato dos Trabal­hadores nas Indústrias Metalúrgicas, Mecânicas e de Material Elétrico de Barra Mansa (STIMMMEBM).28 It took until July 1944 to assemble the required documentation for the Labor Ministry.29 The application had to include the minutes of the assembly that voted to request recognition and the association’s membership list to prove that it represented at least one-third of the workers in the industry, as required by law.30 APTIMBM accounted for only 10 percent of the workforce in the three local steel companies (CSN, Barbará, and CSBM), however, and had to request an exemption. The application argued that many more workers believed in the need for a union but failed to understand the need of forming a professional association as part of the process of unionization.31 Much of the documentation served to reassure the Labor Ministry that the union would not become a platform for militants. The association’s directors, who had the right to stay in office once the union had been recognized, had to submit certificates of good conduct (atestado de bons ante­ cedentes), issued by the state’s criminological institute, as well as atestados ideológicos issued by DOPS-RJ.32 To comply with the CLT’s provision that “the union, as a body, would always collaborate with the state . . . to pro-

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mote social solidarity and to assure the subordination of any economic or professional interests to the national interest,” STIMMMEBM’s draft statutes included a commitment to “collaborate with the state in the development of class solidarity” (art. 3a), “rigorously observe the law and the principles of morals and the understanding of civic duties” (art. 4a), and abstain from “participating in international organizations” (art. 5).33 The draft statutes also obliged the union to “abstain from any [political] propaganda, including not only doctrines incompatible with the national institutions and interests, but also candidacies for electoral office outside the union” (art. 4b). The association waited more than three months for a first response from the Regional Labor Office (Delegacia Regional de Trabalho; DRT) in ­Niterói. The official assessing the application asked for modifications in the draft statutes to follow the wording of a model text suggested by the Labor Ministry. The association resubmitted the revised draft statutes in October 1944.34 DRT then asked the political police to reconfirm that none of the association’s directors “professed ideologies incompatible with the institutions or interests of the Nation.”35 In late January 1945, the application moved to the National Labor Office (Departamento Nacional de ­Trabalho; DNT).36 When its officials requested a count of metalworkers in Barra Mansa, the DRT noted that the Industrial Workers’ Pension Institute (Instituto de Aposentadoria e Pensões dos Industriários; IAPI) could not provide the numbers and offered a (very low) estimate of 1,500: “We are in favor of recognizing the union, given that it currently has more than 600 associates in its midst, which leads us to believe that it unites more than 1⁄3 of the professional category. . . . Since the other requirements have been met, it seems that it [could] be exempted of this requirement in light of the statement above.”37 The DNT endorsed the recommendation and the Labor Minister approved investiture on April 14, 1945, almost nine months after the original request.38 DPS had produced no evidence of a radical agenda. Two reports by field officers in March and April 1945 explicitly stated that the metalworkers association had taken no clear political stance.39 Macedo Soares’s handwritten “visto” (seen) in the margins of several documents indicate that he monitored the process closely but saw no reason to block recognition. The demographic profile of the membership suggests that the union attracted men looking for job security. They were older, more skilled, and socially more established than the average worker. The CSN’s workers were on average 27.5 years old, 22 percent of them were skilled, and only 30 percent were married. Union members were on average 31.4 years old, 56 percent of them were skilled, and over 47 percent were married. Most of the members worked in construction—masons, carpenters, plumbers, and unskilled

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l­aborers—rather than as mechanics, electricians, or metalworkers, which raised questions about their job prospects once the CSN would transition into production.40 They may have hoped for the union to develop into a powerful organization capable of defending its members’ jobs in the face of inevitable restructuring.

The Political Police Targets the PCB The political police, however, viewed the union first and foremost as a result of the Communist Party’s attempts to organize industrial labor in the Sul Fluminense. The PCB had begun regrouping in 1943, when cells of militants in Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo formed antifascist social movements to rebuild the party’s national organization. The PCB’s majority supported a Popular Front with unconditional support for Vargas, a line that provided the nascent regional and local committees with a degree of protection from police persecution.41 DPS first warned of a Communist presence in Volta Redonda as early as 1943. Some founders of the metalworkers association had ties with the local chapter of Red Rescue (Socorro Vermelho), an organization created by the Communist Party to mobilize against fascism.42 Police surveillance focused on Alcides Sabença, a member of the Communist Youth, who had helped organize a construction workers union in neighboring Barra do Piraí.43 Early reports about the political leanings of CSN workers, however, did not point to subversive activity: “the general environment is one of true comprehension of the norms delineated by our chefe, President Vargas . . . ; in summary, I cannot detect even the smallest wave stirring up the existence of men dissatisfied with the country’s regime.”44 An ex-CSN employee interviewed by the police acknowledged that many workers talked about Communism, but dismissed the notion that they were ideologically committed and explained their agitation with the dire material circumstances.45 The political police stepped up surveillance after the passing of the Ato Adicional (February 28, 1945), which scheduled the elections for president and Constituent Assembly, because it feared that the campaigns would create political space for the Communist Party.46 Its national committee (Comitê Nacional) deployed the seasoned organizer Joaquim Marcelino Nepomuceno to Barra do Piraí with orders to create a regional committee and organize municipal committees in the industrial cities of the Sul Fluminense.47 By mid-1945, the PCB had such committees in Barra Mansa, Barra do Piraí, and Resende, as well as a district committee in Volta Redonda led by Alcides Sabença.48 The police also kept a close eye on the PCB’s democratic committee (Comitê Democrático) inside the CSN, which ran a literacy course that the police viewed primarily as a recruiting

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tool.49 DPS knew the names of the regional and local Communist cadres and monitored potential targets for labor organizers, such as the electrical department and the powerhouse, units of great strategic importance to the mill’s operations. DPS suspected several engineers and even department heads of sympathizing with the Communists.50 The police struggled to substantiate these suspicions, however. In January 1945, DPS arrested Gentil Noronha, head of the CSN’s press office, and brought him to Rio de Janeiro for interrogation. Asked about the strength of Communism in Volta Redonda, he assured the officers that he had never seen political propaganda in Volta Redonda and declared his full support for Vargas’s government. The officers remained suspicious, however. [T]his Delegacia believes that his [Noronha’s] statements to the effect that he had not seen Communist texts or symbols at the company where he works are wrong to the absurd, because his occupation forces him to go through the company grounds regularly. We do not mean to suggest that the Communist propaganda—muffled, discreet, and thus dangerous—that appeared at the company was instigated by this outcast (marginal); but neither do we wish to declare him innocent, in the face of his history, not only here, but also in the state of Minas Gerais.51

DPS had its man but could not produce the evidence. Unbeknownst to the police at that time, Noronha served as the local PCB’s secretary for propaganda.52 In another case, the zeal to expose Communists led DPS officers to suspect a fervent anti-Communist. Their report cited a speech by Major Barreto Vianna, a military engineer, telling the workers in his construction unit that finishing the steel mill would lead Brazil out of its “state of backwardness” and “give the fifth columns of the entire world the first proof of our capabilities.”53 Barreto presented Volta Redonda’s success as a means to rebuff fifth columns, but the police were under the impression that he wanted to lead the Communist charge and listed him as an agitator.54 The reports’ language revealed just how much inherent subversive desire the police attributed to suspected Communists, even as it struggled to produce hard evidence. DPS warned of a growing threat as the December elections came closer. In a tactical move designed to enhance the Communist Party’s national standing, its leader, Luis Carlos Prestes, supported the movement for Vargas as presidential candidate. In August 1945, one DPS officer reported that Volta Redonda was “full of Communist posters” demanding a “Constituinte com Getúlio Vargas” (Constituent Assembly with Getúlio Vargas) and claimed that “almost all workers in the city favored the communist creed.”55 The CSN’s technical director Macedo Soares reinforced these fears when he told DPS officers that he expected the Communists to carry 60 percent of the vote among workers. The concern led the state’s Office

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for Public Safety (Secretaria de Segurança Pública) to deny permission for a rally with Prestes in November 1945, and Macedo Soares assured the local population “that the Directorate of the mill, with the support of the authorities, will find ways to maintain order and tranquility for the population that lives in the area under its responsibility.”56 Both DPS and the company overestimated Communist support because they failed to understand the party’s mobilizing strategy. The PCB held registration drives for working-class men and women who had never been eligible to vote before, but the fact that many voltaredondenses took advantage of this service did not assure the party of their electoral support.57 The election results did not confirm the police’s dire predictions. Vargas’s Brazilian Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro; PTB) enjoyed strong support among the Barra Mansa working class. Overall, it captured 26.7 percent of the vote in the municipality, trailing the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrático; PSD) with 33.1 percent and ahead of the National Democratic Union (União Democrática Nacional; UDN) with 22.9 percent.58 The PCB received only 11.5 percent of the vote in the municipality, about as much as in the entire state (12.2 percent), but much less than in older industrial centers such as Duque de Caxias (29.4 percent) and São Gonçalo (25.3 percent).59 The Communist share of the vote in the district of Volta Redonda likely exceeded that of the entire municipality, but the only measurable success was the election of Alcides Sabença to the Constituent Assembly.60 Still, the PCB’s electoral showing in the large industrial cities of the southeast gave the party political legitimacy, and the respectable result in Barra Mansa emboldened its local leaders. The district committee invited senator-elect Prestes to speak at a rally in Volta Redonda in March 1946. The CSN granted logistical support, but more out of Macedo Soares’s personal respect for Prestes—a fellow graduate of the Escola Militar—than out of a newfound political openness.61 In the aftermath of the election, the CSN, local police, and DPS tightened the screws on militants. In May 1946, the company prohibited political propaganda on factory grounds, threatening offenders with immediate dismissal, and forbade the establishment of any association or sports club in the company town without previous authorization.62 It rescinded the permission for the Communist Comitê Popular Democrático de Volta ­Redonda to run a school on company premises, which spelled the end for that organization’s successful literacy course.63 DOPS-RJ responded to the Communists’ political campaign ahead of the state elections in January 1947 with increased surveillance and systematic harassment. Weekly reports “on the activities of the PCB” in October and November 1946 focused on rallies to raise money for the newspaper Imprensa Popular, money that the police suspected to be destined for the Soviet Union.64 A

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rally on December 1 ended in turmoil when police officers disrupted the event by provoking and interrupting the speakers, among them PCB leader Sabença. The local chief of police, Italo Baroni, forced his way through the crowd in a car, pulled his gun, and insisted that the speakers abandon the stage.65 In the PCB’s version of events, Sabença tried to diffuse tensions after Baroni threatened to assassinate him. The party denounced Baroni’s “fascist” tactics in letters to the presidents of Brazil’s Senate and House of Representatives and to the head of Rio de Janeiro’s state’s Office for Public Safety. It also distributed fliers that accused Baroni of provoking a state of civil war as a pretext for further repression.66 DPS developed a protocol for the policing of rallies to avoid confrontations that fed into the PCB’s propaganda about systematic repression. Political rallies had to be approved by the state’s Office for Public Safety, which refused permission if it judged an event to endanger public order— notwithstanding the constitutional guarantee of free assembly.67 Whenever the state approved a Communist rally, DPS sent a field agent, deployed a unit of military police, and requested support from municipal guards. For large rallies, DOPS-RJ’s special police sent additional shock troops that usually gave the police overwhelming force in case of disturbances. 68 After the Baroni incident, DOPS-RJ refined its methods in order to avoid a “repetition of events.” At PCB rallies in Barra Mansa in mid-December, it deployed half a dozen of its agents, requested a unit of shock troops, and asked the local police and the CSN for full support. The goal, in police language, was systematic control and professional repression to achieve the “essential objective”: the “absolute maintenance of order.”69 These measures assured that the Communist Party in Volta Redonda never could take full advantage of the political opening after the end of the Estado Novo in 1945. The passing of a new constitution in 1946 did not change the repressive approach by the political police and its local henchmen.

The Union and the Local Communists Greater political freedom and the presence of a metalworkers union in 1945/46 brought procedural changes to industrial relations at the CSN, but management remained firmly in control. Between 1942 and 1945, the company had granted several raises that added up to an overall increase of between 80 and 120 percent for most occupations, well ahead of wartime inflation (about 45 percent).70 It had also implemented targeted raises for high-demand occupations that resulted, for example, in a 200 percent raise for electricians compared to a much more modest 50 percent raise for carpenters.71 Social justice and recruitment needs remained the underlying

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principles of labor management. The quickening pace of inflation, up from 12 percent in 1944 to 16 percent in 1945 and 1946, created pressure for further wage increases. Company and union agreed to set up a commission to study the cost of living and based periodical wage adjustments on its recommendations. The three raises in September 1945, March 1946, and in the fall of 1946 all followed a progressive formula that benefited the lowest income brackets disproportionately.72 Overall, these raises increased the income of workers and craftsmen by 135 to 155 percent, of salaried employees in lower-income brackets by 75 to 90 percent, and those of employees in higher brackets by 60 to 70 percent. If one includes the general raise in January 1947, hourly wages for the lowest income brackets increased about 250 percent for the entire construction period (1942–1947), well ahead of inflation (205 percent).73 The CSN consulted the union on wage policies but refused to subject its recommendations to negotiation. In September 1946, for example, the company drafted a new collective contract based on the findings of the costof-living commission without ever speaking to union officials. The proposed contract included tiered raises of 20 to 30 percent for hourly wages, 17 to 30 percent for daily wages, and 10 to 30 percent for monthly salaries, but the CSN planned to deduct an 18.5 percent raise on hourly and daily wages it had granted earlier that year to fulfill the constitutional mandate for a paid rest day. The company also wanted to restrict these raises to workers with good attendance records, a practice sanctioned by the labor courts. Workers with at least 85 percent attendance would receive the full raise; those with an attendance between 70 and 85 percent, a reduced raise; and those with less than 70 percent attendance, no raise at all. The union endorsed the proposals but insisted on putting them to a vote in a general assembly. Eager to settle the matter, the CSN’s industrial director Paulo C. Martins ended the work day early for an immediate assembly, where he took the floor to explain the rationale behind the company’s contract offer. The official report claimed that his speech drew applause, which the CSN interpreted as a sign that no further discussion was needed. Signatures by representatives of the commission, the union president, and the company sealed the agreement.74 STIMMMEBM focused its demands on working hours and workplace arrangements. It called for an end to the extended wartime work day that violated the eight-hour day proscribed by the CLT. In March 1946, the CSN finally agreed to reduce the workweek from 51 to 48 hours for workers employed in construction and the assembly and fitting of equipment for the steel plant.75 The union contract set a workday of 8.5 hours on weekdays and 5.5 hours on Saturday, which still violated the letter of the law but brought down the average length of the work day to 8 hours and

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lengthened the weekend. The contract also extended the lunch break in order to give the field kitchens more time to serve up thousands of meals and ease the pressure on workers, who often had to eat quickly and hurry back to work after waiting for their food in long lines.76 Later in 1946, the union inquired about legally guaranteed benefits such as the right to vacation, the paid rest day, absences because of sickness, and raises for promotion. The company assured the union that workers had the right to fifteen days of paid vacation annually, that they received pay for the legally required rest days unless they forfeited the benefit by missing work, and that their absences for medical reasons counted as work time as long as they filed the paperwork. The CSN also clarified that a promotion triggered an automatic raise to the standard wage in the new occupation, but added that raises from union contracts would not be cumulative.77 National politics injected tension into industrial relations in Volta Redonda. Soon after taking office, the government of President Eurico Dutra (1946–1951) moved decisively against the Unifying Workers Movement (Movimento Unificador dos Trabalhadores; MUT), a national labor organization founded by the PCB in defiance of the labor law. Dutra’s ­decree-law 9.070 (March 1946) severely limited the recourse to collective grievances and made strikes illegal; decree-law 9.502 (July 1946) altered the rules for union elections and further restricted unions’ political freedom. The government then deployed police and the military to crush strikes that were part of the largest labor unrest the country had seen since 1919.78 In September 1946, at the national union congress, MUT and allied PTB-affiliated unions founded a labor confederation, the Workers Confederation of Brazil (Confederação dos Trabalhadores do Brasil; CTB), and affiliated it with the Confederation of the Workers of Latin America (Confederação dos Trabalhadores da América Latina; CTAL) and the World Federation of Trade Unions. The Labor Ministry condemned the move as a “Communist conspiracy,” noting that the CLT explicitly prohibited affiliation with international confederations, and refused to recognize the CTB.79 The fact that the new constitution, signed on September 18, 1946, recognized the right to strike did little to alter the government’s line. The Labor Ministry continued to enforce decree-law 9.070.80 The government implemented an aggressive anti-Communist and antiunion strategy even in places that had not been affected by strikes. In Volta Redonda, the political police accused STIMMMEBM of endangering the social order under the provisions of decree-law 9.502, alleging that it allowed the local PCB to exercise undue influence over union affairs. As evidence, it cited the fact that Communist parliamentarian Alcides Sabença still played a prominent role in STIMMMEBM and that two of the union’s secretaries, Henrique Ferreira and Altino Naziazeno, served as directors

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of the PCB’s district committee. The Communist cadres assumed the lead at STIMMMEBM’s emergency assembly in September 1946, which was called to approve the 1947 budget—already three months overdue at the regional Labor Office. Members disagreed profoundly on spending priorities, but a clear majority finally decided to reallocate funds from the administrative and travel budgets in order to fund an expanded employee cooperative that would sell work clothes in addition to foodstuffs.81 Union president Antônio Frizzas submitted the budget to the DRT, justifying the delay with the need to call a general assembly to approve increased membership dues in the face of galloping inflation. The budget crisis spelled the end of Frizzas’s tenure and allowed the Communists to take control of the union. In the assembly, Sabença and other militants criticized STIMMMEBM’s lack of transparency and demanded a predistribution of copies of the relevant budget information to the membership.82 In October 1946, after further budgetary shortfalls, the members formally removed Frizzas from the presidency and expelled him from the union. His successor, Antonio Vieira Brasil, inherited empty coffers. The union had large debts to pharmacies and hospitals in Volta Redonda and Vassouras and had no money to pay rent for its offices or to finance promised tuberculosis treatment for some members. Communist candidates for the 1947 state elections blamed the crisis squarely on ­Frizzas, whom they denounced as a “traitor to the working class.”83 These internal divisions further weakened a union with few active members and invited closer scrutiny by the Labor Ministry and the political police.84 The DRT threatened to dismember STIMMMEBM by occupational categories. On November 3, 1946, the members voted to affiliate the union with CTB, raising the political stakes further.85

The Bureaucratic Politics of Repression In the meantime, relations between the CSN and STIMMMEBM soured as the company stopped hiring in mid-October 1946 and began laying off large numbers of construction workers. It fired 440 men in December alone.86 Among the first to be let go were Communist militants active in the union, such as Hélio Rocha and Arthur de Mattos.87 The firings disproportionately affected STIMMMEBM’s most numerous constituency, skilled construction workers, and the dream of many members to obtain lifetime employment in Volta Redonda came to a sudden end in late 1946. The CSN argued that it had the right to fire these men because they had signed contracts limited to construction work and that job had ended. The union unsuccessfully challenged the firings in the labor courts.88 The

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company also stopped cooperating with the union on the cost-of-living commission; the raise in January 1947 was the last under that agreement. The company refused to renegotiate wages in March 1947 even though the level of inflation would have justified another adjustment.89 The local PCB tried to translate the increasing tension into political capital ahead of the January elections by presenting itself as the true defender of social progress in Volta Redonda. The Communist newspaper Tribuna Popular ran a special feature entitled “Pavement and Hospital Aid—Two Great Needs of the Population of Volta Redonda” that lamented the shortage of supplies, long lines at stores, and the high prices for food, housing, and medical services.90 In another piece, the editors argued that only the proposals of the PCB’s Programa Mínimo, with its emphasis on the “development of the basic industries,” could return peace to the city.91 In January 1947, the Communist candidate Benedito Cavalcanti campaigned in the Acampamento Operário, the wooden barracks where most construction workers lived, warning of the imminent dismissal of 4,000 workers and asking the workers to support STIMMMEBM. When company guards discovered this “political agitation,” they removed Benedito from the premises and handed him over to local police.92 The PCB retained its share of the state’s vote in the January elections, but its position in Volta Redonda continued to weaken. The voters of the state of Rio de Janeiro elected the CSN’s former technical director Macedo Soares as governor with an overwhelming majority (90 percent).93 Initially, even the Communists welcomed him as a genuine defender of national industrial development, but soon they learned that he had no qualms about using the police against militants whenever he judged their actions to hinder national development. The CSN further restricted political activities of militant labor organizers. Rallies had to be held off company grounds, which reduced the attendance and thereby facilitated policing. A Communist rally in March 1947, moved to a remote location in the old town, drew such a small crowd that DOPS-RJ sent its ten-man support squad home. When brawls broke out between pecebistas and petebistas (members of the PCB and PTB, respectively) and someone fired shots at David Jensen, the PCB’s political secretary in Barra Mansa, the local police easily dissolved the rally.94 In early March, the state PCB held a meeting to reassess its strategy and to counter labor minister Morvan Dias de Figueiredo’s “skillful” anti-Communist unionization campaigns with a more aggressive line on the union front.95 The militants decided on a strategy to strengthen four key municipal committees, among them Barra Mansa.96 But the Labor Ministry had already prepared the final crackdown on Communist-led unions. It was to be an exercise in bureaucratic politics under the labor regime instituted by the CLT. In March 1947, the Labor

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Ministry expanded the authority of the DNT to regulate labor unions, federations, and confederations, which specifically included the power to approve or reject budgets (CLT art. 550) and to accept or reject election results (art. 532).97 STIMMMEBM became the very first union in the country to suffer the consequences. On April 5, 1947, the DNT refused to approve the 1947 budget and invoked article 528 of the CLT that authorized a state intervention under “circumstances that disturbed the functioning of the union.” More specifically, the governmental decree justified the intervention with the observation . . . that . . . STIMMMEBM was undergoing a tumultuous situation as result of the disorientation of its directorate, which through incompetent handling of finances had caused grave accounting irregularities that were harmful to the life of the body [the union]. . . . that under these conditions measures needed to be taken to restore normalcy to the body, to return it to its true purpose and to endow it with administrative organs capable to permit regular associative life and effective union action, restoring the necessary financial equilibrium; . . . that these facts resulted in the disturbance of the provision and development of the union; . . . that MTIC, as the organ to discipline, coordinate, and orient the activities of the syndical bodies, had the duty to take the steps necessary to preserve the goals of that body.98

The DNT appointed a governing board (Junta Governativa) to head the union and designated a DNT officer to assist the new directorate in developing and implementing measures necessary to “normalize the functioning of the union.”99 The CSN’s security chief, Assis Gomes, expressed relief at the decision. He had been concerned about the Communists’ attempts to take over the union and noted that it would now be much easier to “control” it.100 The intricacies of the CLT allowed the government to preserve the appearance of due legal procedure for a politically motivated intervention.101 Local PCB militant Jensen denounced the intervention as capitalist conspiracy against the nation: “Minister Morvan de Figueiredo, together with the [whole] government at the service of capitalism, intervened unduly, abusively, and indecently in STIMMMEBM to satisfy the whims of the CSN’s directors—the foremost enemies of the people, at the service of North America to sabotage the Brazilian steel industry.” 102 The real target of the government offensive, however, was the Communist Party. The move against STIMMMEBM foreshadowed a wave of repression that would gain speed after the Supreme Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral; TSE) outlawed the PCB on May 7, 1947. The government closed down the CTB for its alleged Communist ties and placed more than

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170 unions under intervention on the grounds that they were affiliated with the CTB.103 The logic of preemptive policing explained the earlier timing for the intervention at STIMMMEBM; the PCB had scheduled its Fourth National Congress to be held in Barra Mansa in mid-April 1947, which would have offered a dangerous opportunity for political agitation at the CSN.104 The intervention in the metalworkers union was followed up by a systematic crackdown on the local Communists. In April 1947, still before the Supreme Court’s decision to outlaw the Communist Party, DOPS-RJ impounded the local PCB’s files, which included a membership list and detailed descriptions of party activities. The material greatly facilitated further persecution.105 CSN security forces cooperated fully with the political police. Assis Gomes briefed a visiting DOPS-RJ agent on the strength of the local Communists based on detailed intelligence obtained by the company’s secret police, the Corpo Especial de Segurança (CES). His report confirmed that several PCB organizers still worked for the company, among them Mário de Azevedo, Raymundo Nonato, Altino Naziazeno dos Santos, and Henrique Manoel Ferreira, who all had played important roles in the union. Most local cadres, however, had been fired and received their upkeep from the PCB in order to continue their organizing work. CES estimated the number of Communists in Volta Redonda at 2,000 by looking at the number of PCB votes in the 1947 election, but in truth the number of card-carrying party members was much smaller—at best in the dozens.106

Repression by Overwhelming Force Despite the devastating success of the strike against the left and the apparent ease of its execution, the political police requested more resources for the struggle against the Communist specter. The director of DPS, Major Adauto Esmeraldo, laid out the rationale for more personnel in his annual report for 1947. An intense wave of propaganda, disguised in various colorings, followed upon the banning of the PCB, which obliged us to engage in a prolonged campaign of counter-espionage. . . . Although the situation now appears to be under control, the struggle has to continue, because the Bolsheviks began to operate almost exclusively in the shadow, as was to be expected. Because we have to adapt to any kind of struggle, it is only logical that our means need to be readjusted. The staffing is insufficient, more so than ever before, because inquiries multiply in the subterranean world, requiring a greater number of officers. The costs, on the other hand, are increasing as a consequence of the strong necessity to step up the number of infiltrations, not only in Rio de Janeiro, but also in some states.107

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Rather than proclaim victory, Esmeraldo argued in characteristic secret service logic that greater resources were needed to find and destroy a weakened enemy. Federal and state governments were apparently receptive to this reasoning. DPS and DOPS-RJ received significant budget increases to expand their forces in the fight against the remnants of the PCB.108 The security forces strengthened their presence in Volta Redonda. DOPSRJ assigned full-time agents to cities with potential for labor unrest or leftist political militancy. Austricliano da Silva, the agent for Barra Mansa and Barra do Piraí, resided there for at least ten years and developed great familiarity with local conditions.109 The CSN also expanded and reorganized its police forces. In late November 1947, it hired two dozen additional men, followed by a further expansion in December.110 The security forces also enjoyed greater freedom to act preemptively. The 1st and 2nd Armored Infantry Battalion (Batalhão da Infantaria Blindada; BIB), stationed in Barra Mansa, had always had the responsibility of protecting the CSN, but after 1947 the company requested military support more readily. In April 1948, for example, the local DOPS-RJ agent received an alert about suspicious activity in Volta Redonda. When he arrived on the scene, the army had already occupied strategic points in the factory and the company police had secured the city.111 In July 1950, the CSN’s industrial director Cyro Alves Borges asked the army commander in Barra Mansa to take precautions when militants organized a protest march and a rally against the Security Law (Lei da Segurança) and nuclear armament. The troops implemented a standard emergency plan, in which the 1st BIB occupied the CSN and secured the surrounding area while the 2nd BIB occupied the city of Barra Mansa to prevent the rally. The troops did not return to the barracks until four days later.112 Communist militants had to adapt to a clandestine political life and to a struggle against an even more overwhelming repressive force. One cover was to run candidates on tickets of legal parties. In September 1947, the old PCB cadre Henrique Ferreira won election as councilman for Barra Mansa on a PSD ticket.113 Communists who had been fired by the CSN often earned their living as petty merchants, selling items of everyday use to their former colleagues at local markets.114 The police believed that itinerant sweets vendors were at the heart of the “conspiracy”; labor organizers would visit the house of a local cadre, receive a tray of sweets, and sell them to workers they tried to win over for the Communist cause.115 Militants created movements around broader political causes, which the police could not easily dismantle because they had no direct links with the PCB. Members of O Petróleo é Nosso (The Oil Is Ours!) protested the sale of drilling concessions to foreign companies, while the campaigns Em Defesa da Paz (For the Defense of Peace) and Contra a Bomba Atómica (Against

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the Nuclear Bomb) denounced the risk of another devastating world war. Henrique Ferreira and another longtime militant, Benjamin Marques, organized these movements locally and took advantage of every opportunity to engage workers in political discussions.116 Overall, however, the PCB played a much less important role than before the crackdown. Nevertheless, CSN security chief Assis Gomes alerted his superiors that the apparent quiet could well be the “calm before the next storm.” In a report to Captain Magalhães that highlighted the company’s extensive network of informants, he warned that the communists continued to organize inside and around the factory. He suspected that the PCB had cells in the coke plant, the rolling mill, the steelworks, the blooming mill, the blast furnace, and the mechanical shop, and his sources reported on cells in the neighborhoods of Jardim Paraíba, Vila Santa Cecília, Vila Operária, and Casas de Blocos. Assis Gomes acknowledged that the CSN had dismissed most known Communists but noted that it still employed half a dozen in skilled occupations. He expressed concern about the CSN’s inability to suppress so-called comícios relâmpagos (literally, “lightning rallies”) on the shop floor. Two attempted strike movements had been detected early, however, and the company fired one employee in response. In a final note, Assis Gomes pointed out that Communists usually met in private homes, where they could use a spotter to warn the gathered militants of any detected surveillance, which made police operations more difficult.117 The security forces tried to get their hands on supposed Communist subversives whenever they had an opportunity in order to gather more intelligence. DPS and DOPS-RJ deployed its agents and special squads to rallies and other public events staged by suspected Communists, ready to intervene whenever they deemed public order to be at risk.118 Police stepped in, for example, when Communist militants joined Barra Mansa’s 1948 Carnival parade in a creative protest against the disrespect for the 1946 constitution. In the words of the local chief of police, “they . . . by means of their costumes, not only dishonored the country’s Constitution, which they had transformed in tattered newspaper pages, but also criticized representative Barreto Pinto and other municipal authorities in an obscene, vile, and shameless manner.” He accused the Communists of “always trying, in their partisan sadism, to cause confusion, be it at rallies, be it at meetings, or at whatever other event that they used to appear in public, always meaning to take advantage, with notorious disrespect for the law, the order they plan to subvert, and the society they wish to destroy.”119 DPS agents arrested the four perpetrators and took them to Rio de Janeiro, where they had to spend the night in prison and faced a thorough interrogation.120 Arbitrary arrests and the physical intimidation of alleged Communists was common in those years. The police took the liberty of making arrests

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any time they suspected a Communist of trying to subvert the social and political order. DPS gained a reputation for physical abuses against prisoners. After the arrest of three Volta Redonda militants in March 1950, Imprensa Popular wrote that CSN police “handed [them] over to the roughnecks of the Rua da Relação”—the address of DPS.121 Even holding an elected office was not always protection enough to escape the political police’s reach. Councilman Henrique Ferreira lent support to workers’ causes at the CSN, in other local steel mills, and at the railroad shops. DOPS-RJ arrested him at least once during his tenure, in early 1950, when he participated in a protest against the Security Law.122 No police operation illustrates the arsenal of repressive techniques and the imbalance of power better than the one against an alleged strike movement in July 1949. DOPS-RJ received word that local Communists were planning a strike for early August, and the Setores Trabalhistas of DOPSRJ and DPS responded immediately by deploying special squads to Volta Redonda.123 They “carried out several raids” and arrested seven suspected Communist militants whom DPS detained for over a week in Rio de Janeiro without informing their families.124 Several officers stayed in Volta Redonda to monitor further developments and intercepted a pamphlet with a “program of demands” that denounced the CSN’s handsome profits. It called for wage increases between 20 and 75 percent to compensate for the increased cost-of-living, up 150 percent since 1946.125 DPS and DOPS-RJ carried out more raids in the days before the suspected strike date, August 12, and arrested five men, mostly for their outspoken criticism of abuses in the earlier raids.126 The great coup was the arrest of one Ruben Santos de Oliveira, a recently hired CSN maintenance electrician, whom DPS identified as a “Communist infiltrator” with the “codename ‘Menelik.’” He aroused the agents’ suspicion because he wore a “­bigode tipo Stalin” (a Stalin-like moustache). His fate was sealed when they found a letter from PCB leader Luis Carlos Prestes in his house.127 The anti-­Communist newspaper O Globo played its part by running a sensationalist article that identified Menelik as the “brain of the Volta Redonda Communists” and asserted that he was a paid PCB organizer.128 Subsequent interrogations by DOPS-RJ revealed just how thoroughly the security forces had penetrated “Communist” circles. Two workers admitted that they had attended a meeting with Menelik in late July at the home of one Antônio Pereira to discuss the wage campaign and develop a strategy to gain control of the union. Both had informed CSN security of the meeting and denied any intention of getting involved in politics. 129 Pereira himself testified that Menelik had visited workers’ homes to “lecture” them on labor issues, invite them to join a wage commission, and rally support for the Communist Party, and that he had supplied the men

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at the meeting with pamphlets addressed “To the Workers of the Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional.”130 A fifth man who had attended the meeting, “Socata”—a pseudonym for José Nunes—revealed that he was a CSN spy. Even if Pereira was on Menelik’s side, as Nunes claimed, police informants were in the majority at the conspiratorial meeting! This would explain why “Captain Oswaldo [de Assis Gomes]” was, in Nunes’s words, “well informed regarding the most active elements among the Communists in Volta Redonda” and able “to pass on all information to the other authorities that then come in pursuit of these elements.” 131 The company’s secret police was so well informed that it seized the files of the PCB’s municipal committee, which included a “plan of national action,” a list of card-­carrying members, and documentation concerning the transfer of organizers.132 The CSN used the information gathered by the police to cleanse its ranks of militants. The prevalent legal interpretation was that companies could dismiss employees simply for being Communists. Altino Naziazeno dos Santos, for example, a veteran of both STIMMMEBM and the local PCB, was fired for “openly expressing communist ideas.”133 The personnel rec­ ords cited other grounds for the dismissal, but police reports left no doubt that “communist antecedents” were indeed the motive.134 The labor courts consistently ruled that inciting a strike and disseminating political propaganda on company premises were faltas graves (serious offenses), which allowed the CSN to claim just cause as it fired workers linked to alleged Communist campaigns.135 Dismissals based on strike action remained controversial because strikes were legal under the 1946 constitution. But as long as Congress failed to pass regulating legislation, the courts continued to apply earlier laws that outlawed strikes as recursos anti-sociais (antisocial measures). The courts also asked the political police to screen plaintiffs for ideological antecedents, which suggests that judges took into consideration whether the appeal had been filed by a “known Communist.” The practice limited the opportunities for labor militants to employ an industrial relations strategy that combined legal action in the labor courts with the threat of direct strike action.136 The political police had little to report on STIMMMEBM during the most intense years of the anti-Communist crackdown under the Dutra presidency. The union, governed by a Junta Governativa headed by José Maria Pimenta, had lost its most militant members and played no important role in the transition of labor relations as the CSN moved from construction to production. Police reports indicate that after the 1947 crackdown labor militancy concentrated on the two smaller steel companies in Barra Mansa: Companhia Siderúrgica Barra Mansa (CSBM) and Companhia Barbará.137 At a union assembly in August 1948, an estimated

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1,200 workers discussed responses to wage demands. CSBM, the only company to respond, rejected the workers’ demands outright, which led the DOPS-RJ officer Austricliano to believe that a strike there was only a question of time.138 The company had reaped unprecedented profits in 1947 and 1948 but owed back wages, which led to a wildcat strike in the rolling mill in May 1948. The Labor Ministry declared the strike to pose a threat to the economic order and ordered an occupation of the mill by police and military.139 The subsequent investigation by the Labor Ministry revealed that CSBM intransigence and worker militancy had become the norm; the company experienced numerous wildcat strikes and two fullblown strikes to push salary demands in early 1949.140 The political police feared that strikes in Barra Mansa would spread to Volta Redonda, but that never happened. More aggressive and comprehensive policing shielded the CSN from labor militants as it reasserted full control over labor relations once it no longer had to consult ­STIMMMEBM. To replace the company store with an employee cooperative, the Cooperativa dos Empregados da CSN, had been one of the union’s proudest achievements. In early 1949, however, the CSN cut off the cooperative’s funding by withholding the contributions it deducted from employee paychecks. A group of employees wrote an open letter to protest the CSN’s violation of the cooperativist principle, but the directors refused to reconsider, which spelled the end for the cooperative.141 On the other hand, the CSN used material incentives as tools of industrial relations to compensate for the lack of a general wage increase. Most important, the company announced on the occasion of its birthday, April 9, 1949, that it would introduce the long-promised profit sharing as mandated by the 1946 constitution. The police believed that any further delay might lead to a strike movement even at the CSN. Under the rules for profit sharing, most workers received the equivalent of a month’s wage, which diffused some of the lingering tension about the lack of wage increases in inflationary times.142 By 1949, at the latest, the political police could have declared victory in its struggle to extirpate Communist elements from the CSN. That it portrayed Menelik’s movement as the single greatest threat to social order in Volta Redonda in the late 1940s spoke to the sweeping success of state repression. To the extent that the union took any initiative, it focused on bread-and-butter issues and not on political causes advocated by the PCB and its surrogates. The few remaining Communist militants were well known to the police and always under surveillance. But the police always saw the next threat around the corner and portrayed the political realignments ahead of the 1950 general elections as a new opportunity for labor militancy. A DOPS-RJ report focused on an ongoing shift in the PCB’s organizing strategy, mentioned in materials the police seized from

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Feliciano Eugênio Netto. It appeared that the PCB had begun to form clandestine factory committees soon after the crackdown in 1947, which it now planned to coordinate in a statewide union commission. The usual Communist suspects from Barra Mansa urged CSN workers to form such cells as they prepared to participate in the commission’s first general assembly.143 The police reports offered little concrete evidence for the existence of such factory committees at the CSN, made no effort to assess the real threat, and did not speak to the impact such developments might have on industrial relations in Barra Mansa and Volta Redonda. Police action in the late 1940s had a tremendous impact on labor relations in Volta Redonda, greatly diminishing the opportunities for labor organization, but for the DPS and DOPS-RJ officers that was merely collateral damage. They saw themselves engaged in a much larger ideological struggle that cast the threat to Brazil’s social and political order in terms of the Communist contagion. The language of the police’s internal reports shows that the officers felt a deep-rooted aversion to Communism, too strong to be attributed to short-term indoctrination or an institutional interest in exaggerating the Communist threat. A DOPS-RJ report on the political situation in September 1950 alerted the state governor to “feverish activity of the Communist bosses in the entire territory of the state, where they held secret meetings.” It noted that two former PCB militants from Volta Redonda were candidates for the National Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Nacional; PTN) and portrayed their campaign rally as an attempt by the Communists to “undermine the efforts by federal and state governments to guarantee elections in an environment of freedom and confidence.” “After all,” the agent reasoned, “they attacked everything and everybody, giving the clear impression that they want either confusion or else the great Satalin to govern our endangered republic.”144 The linguistic hybridization of “Satan” and “Stalin” was not merely a spelling error; the agent saw the leader of world Communism as the manifestation of the greatest evil. The officers of the political police adhered to an ideology of Ordem e Progresso (Order and Progress) steeped in Catholic corporatism; they believed that their anti-Communist crusade in Brazil helped to defend the Christian world. It was indicative of the depth of these convictions that one officer signed a report with “Leão XIII,” the pope whose encyclical Rerum Novarum (1891) called on the faithful to halt the advance of Communism and Socialism among the working classes.145 CSN management welcomed the strong police presence. It minimized the risk of militant labor organization during the transition to production, a process that may have met greater resistance had workers been organized because it resulted in numerous firings and regular reassignments to new jobs. Managers valued the freedom to administer the company without

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interference. The company cooperated closely with state agencies to apply stipulations in the CLT that allowed for delays in union recognition and a debilitating intervention, taking full advantage of intelligence produced by federal and state political police as well as the CSN’s own secret service. The state created a veneer of legality in its campaign against the union and thereby allowed the CSN not to have to engage in outright repression. The government’s full support for the anti-Communist crusade and the Labor Ministry’s decision to subordinate the interpretation of the CLT to a Cold War agenda prevented the emergence of an industrial relations system that would have given the workers and their union a place at the negotiating table. The labor law, hailed by Vargas as the means to protect the workers and transform labor relations remained blunt as a tool for workers to demand basic rights. As long as the government adopted the perspective of the political police, whose officers thought of labor rights as inherently Communist, the CSN had no reason to sit down to negotiate with ­STIMMMEBM. For the company to take that step would require fundamental political change as well as an enhanced recognition of their strategic power on the part of the workers.

6

Power over Production the technical division of labor and workers’ strategic positions in steel

In case of a lack of electricity from LIGHT: a) Manually disconnect . . . the two switches (6,600V) for the entry of power from LIGHT; b) Verify the tension (6,600V) at the entry point for power from LIGHT and notify the thermoelectric plant that the reduction switches can be connected; c) Reconnect the entire system of the principal substation with the panel switches (32 switches) and monitor the relays that had been activated . . . —Occupational Description Operator, Principal Substation, CSN

This chapter analyzes the technical division of labor at the CSN’s integrated steel mill to help explain why the steelworkers' unions enjoyed such a strong bargaining position in the 1950s. The underlying questions are whether the steelworkers of Volta Redonda occupied a strategic position in Brazil’s economy and, if yes, which workers held technically strategic positions within the mill. The industrial relations scholar John Dunlop distinguished these two types of strategic positions: the position of the firm in the industrial economy at large and the positions of the workers in the mill’s internal division of labor. By 1950, the CSN had become one of Brazil’s most strategic industries. It accounted for more than 50 percent of domestic steel supply and was the country’s primary producer of rails, structural steel, and columns and beams for new industrial buildings and major bridges. It held a domestic monopoly for cold-rolled sheet, galvanized sheet, and tin plate.1 In the early 1950s, the company already underwent its second expansion to meet the growing demand by industrial consumers of steel. Developmentalist governments planned for the CSN to feed the growth of the nascent capital goods sector. To avoid stoppages or strikes in this strategic industry was both an economic and a political imperative.2 The workers of such a strategic industry held strategic power if they could credibly threaten to shut down production.

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Even in an industry as strategic as the CSN, only very few workers held technically strategic positions in Dunlop’s sense, however. The internal division of labor in the mill afforded only some positions the power to disrupt the production process in a crucial department and thereby soon in the entire mill. The industry’s strategic position in the domestic economy enhanced the significance of these technically strategic positions within the company because the actions of a few workers could have ripple effects throughout the entire economy. The great majority of workers held positions in the technical division of labor in which they could not disrupt production effectively. Many workers could do damage to equipment or cause production losses, but they could not singlehandedly bring the mill to a standstill. Although these workers may have shared in the strategic power derived from the CSN’s position in the economy, they could not project that power without the cooperation of workers in the technically strategic positions. Therefore, stating that “the CSN’s workers had technically strategic power” would have little analytical value because it implies (falsely) that all workers in the mill held strategic positions and that they all owed their power to the same technical circumstance. Strategic position was not a question of the individual worker’s skill, but rather a question of the worker’s position in the web of technical relations of production. Knowing a worker’s trade or the skill level required for a particular occupation is not sufficient to determine whether a position was technically strategic. Highly skilled workers often occupied strategic positions, but skill was no guarantee of a strategic position. The molders and pattern makers in the CSN’s foundry, for example, were true craftsmen and among the most highly skilled workers in the company, but they did not have the power to disrupt production in the mill. Conversely, workers in strategic positions did not necessarily have to have a trade or possess much formal training. Many of the operators of overhead traveling cranes had been selected from among the construction workers and received in-house training. Whether a position was strategic or not depended on the technically determined division of labor rather than the particular qualifications of the worker who occupied the position. In principle, men in strategic positions were substitutable by other workers with the same skills and experience, but in practice the damage to production and equipment would already have been done by the time the substitution took effect.3 How, then, does strategic position relate to job control and ­deskilling, key concepts for social historians’ analysis of the labor process under twentieth-century industrial capitalism? Labor historians have seen the preservation of craft traditions and specialized skills, and the associated professional pride, as important aspects of working-class identity and as sources of labor power. In theory, pride in one’s craft fueled trade-based

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labor organization, resistance against the imposition of factory discipline, and calls for the preservation (or extension) of “worker’s control.”4 Labor historians adopted Harry Braverman’s argument that in the twentieth ­century industrial workers gradually lost control over their job content as scientific management separated conception and execution of work. Braverman and others argued that Taylorism led to a deskilling of industrial workers and a dramatic loss of job control.5 New bureaucracies for personnel management and industrial relations, the argument went, usurped the knowledge of the production process and deprived the blue-collar workers of the basis of their organizational power, which made her/him more replaceable by other workers with the same formal qualifications. If strategic positions depend on the technical division of labor rather than on skill or job control, then changing the job content had less of an impact on workers’ power than Braverman would have us believe. Even under an increasingly bureaucratized labor management that segmented jobs, the technical division of labor still made some positions strategic. Workers in those positions had the power to shut down production, even if they had nominally been deskilled by the implementation of scientific management. New techniques of labor management and the organization of work under advanced capitalism defined job content more precisely to facilitate the training of replacements, but they did not reduce the power of all industrial workers. The case of the CSN demonstrates that workers and their union could even use their technically strategic power to limit the erosion of job control by negotiating the right to participate in the writing of job descriptions. Moreover, increased mechanization in the large-scale industries of the twentieth century increased the skill requirements and created new, highly strategic positions even as it standardized production tasks.6 The widespread use of electric power created strategic positions in generation and distribution, for example, and the introduction of new machines required more specialized maintenance. How can we determine whether a particular worker held a strategic position? The answer appears straightforward: the historian must gain an understanding of the division of labor and the technical relations of production in the industry. How to gain that understanding is much less clear. There are no historical handbooks of industrial production, and few historians—even historians of industrial labor—ever engage such technical questions. Dunlop himself offered only general suggestions for the analysis of industrial production and no guide to identifying strategic positions. He identified important facets of the technical context that could affect the “web of rules” in industrial relations, such as the size of the work group, the job content, the relation to machines, and the scheduled hours and shift—all aspects that differentiated the modern steel industry from other

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industries.7 But with the possible exception of “relation to machines,” these are aspects of the organization of work that do not reflect the dynamic and time-sensitive characteristics of the production process that make many positions strategic. Dunlop advised only that it takes much “grubbing” to understand the structure of industrial production.8 This chapter will attempt to get at the fundamental characteristics of the division of labor in an integrated steel mill in order to identify strategic positions.

The Division of Labor in Steel There are a variety of ways to illustrate the complex technical division of labor in an integrated steel mill. One is to highlight the degree of specialization by providing an overview of the machinery, the work process, and the workers’ skill profiles through summary statistics: the number of particular machines, a count of workers by occupation or skill, and the types and quantities of products.9 These figures provide a sense of the magnitude of the operation and of the multifaceted nature of production in a mill where many men who worked “in” steel only worked indirectly “with” steel. Another way to capture the complexity of the division of labor in a steel mill is to describe the production process, the sequence of chemical and physical transformations of raw materials into a final product. This requires breaking down the process into tasks performed by self-standing production units, which could be a single machine operated by one or two workers or a sequence of machines (such as the hotrolling mill or the tinning line) operated by a workgroup. This sequential description of transformations highlights the diachronic division of labor among workers in the same department and between departments. However, such a description of the production process from raw material to finished product does not capture one other key aspect of the work process in an integrated mill: the synchronic division of labor. Production, maintenance, and support departments all operated simultaneously and  continuously supplied other departments with intermediate products and services. The making of steel in this integrated mill consumed large quantities of electricity, water, and steam, depended on internal transport to move intermediate products, and required continuous maintenance of heavy equipment. The water treatment plant supplied water to the coke plant to spray the red-hot coke; the generating station supplied electricity to the rolling mills to power its engines; slag from the open-hearth furnaces went into the blast furnace loads; and the steelworks used scrap from the rolling mills for the open-hearth furnace loads and coke oven gas to fire the heat—to name just a few examples of this interdepartmental division

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of labor.10 The accounting for manufacturing expenses in the production departments reflected these interdepartmental relationships: operating costs always included power, steam and water, fuel, services, transport, and maintenance, and the rolling mills also included expenses for rolls supplied by the foundry and the roll shop. Often, these intersecting levels of integration saw triangular relations between departments. The blast furnace, for example, supplied gas to the power station, which burned it to generate electricity for the rolling mills.11 A synchronic division of labor was present within departments, too, as workers depended on the cooperation of highly specialized colleagues to perform their tasks. A heavy-machine operator, for example, could not produce anything if specialized maintenance workers failed to properly lubricate his equipment or to respond to technical emergencies. In day-to-day operations, management had to ensure the continuous availability and reliably high quality of these intermediate products and services in order to produce close to machine capacity throughout the entire mill at all times. Departments or smaller production units within departments tried to maintain a sufficient stock to guard against any disruptions in supplies. Most raw materials and intermediate products could be stored relatively easily to ensure supply at least for several hours, if not days. The coke plant kept coal in the oven bins; the blast furnace maintained a stock of ore, coke, and minerals; the steelworks stored pig iron as ingots or in the hot-metal mixer; the rolling mills stored ingots in the soaking pits and slabs and blooms in the storage yards. Large gas tanks ensured a supply for the firing of the coke plant, the blast furnace, and the openhearth furnaces. The foundry could build up a stock of rolls and spare parts to supply the rolling mills. Storage was not an option, however, for most of the support departments. It was technically impossible to maintain a reserve of steam or electric power, and the rolling mills consumed too much water to make decentralized storage tanks a feasible option. Maintenance and transport services were by definition not storable, although foresight in the planning of deliveries and scheduled maintenance could reduce the dependence on their uninterrupted availability. This synchronic division of labor, as imposed by the technical characteristics of the production process, presented the greatest challenge for the organization of work and labor management. Inter- and intradepartmental dependencies translated into a vulnerability to disruptions in other units. Management had to pay particularly close attention to the organization of work at potential bottlenecks, units where disruptions quickly affected other departments or even the entire mill. A slowdown or stoppage in one such technically strategic department could induce a domino effect of shortages throughout the plant, and thereby undermine a (full)

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utilization of production capacities. Within departments, particular occupational groups or even individual workers could create temporary bottlenecks in the flow of supplies or the availability of services and thereby induce a slowdown for the entire unit. The analysis of the work process highlights the significance of this synchronic division of labor as a source of power for particular occupational groups and individual workers on the shop floor. The German labor historian Thomas Welskopp uses the term Störmacht (disruptive power) to describe this ability of crews in American and German steel plants to slow down or block production at “neuralgic” points in the process, and thereby potentially shut down the entire mill.12 The recognition that many workers at the CSN held such potentially disruptive power raises the question to what extent the historical actors (management, workers, union) recognized it, and how the historian can discern the extent of their awareness. The surviving records of the local metalworkers union contain no direct reference to “strategic power” or an indication that the union leaders based their organizing strategy or their approach to industrial relations on a systematic assessment of the strategic positions of occupational groups, departments, or the industry. We can only speculate about the explanation for a lack of such references. The union leaders may not have conceptualized the workers’ power in technically strategic terms, or perhaps they shrouded their insights in secrecy. Workers who understood the power of their technically strategic positions likely guarded that knowledge as carefully as craftsmen guarded the secrets of their trade. They must have had an intuitive sense of their power, but it appears that the union in Volta Redonda never analyzed the labor process in terms of technically strategic positions even as it used its members’ strategic power to press demands. John Womack concludes in his comprehensive treatment of technically strategic thinking that union organizers never formalized the analysis of labor power in terms of technically strategic positions, even when they recognized that a particular organization of work endowed workers with greater or lesser bargaining power.13 Circumstantial evidence suggests that CSN management paid attention to workers’ disruptive power. The occupational description for the ingot buggy operator at the slabbing and blooming mill, for example, noted that “he directly influences the process and can create a bottleneck in the operation.”14 The description for the hot-saw buggy operator, in contrast, noted that he could only cause major havoc if he failed to fulfill his duties over an extended period of time: “The removal of the deposits from the pits with pumps influences the process once the accumulation of deposits causes stoppages.”15 The industrial engineers included these comments to alert the shop floor supervisors to vulnerable points in the production process, but implicitly, they were assessments of the (in these cases rather lim-

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ited) technically strategic power of specific occupations. The great majority of the CSN’s occupational descriptions, however, did not include systematic observations on the worker’s disruptive power, which is hardly surprising. The task of the industrial engineering was, after all, to study each occupation or workgroup in isolation to determine how the work could be performed more efficiently, rather than assessing the opportunities for the worker to wreak havoc on production in the department and beyond. The records of the industrial security department, if available, would be a much more promising source for such an explicit assessment of disruptive power and strategic position. The best the historian of labor can do in the absence of any smoking guns is to analyze the industry’s division of labor, identify technically strategic positions, and thereby map workers’ latent strategic power. A complete analysis of the diachronic and synchronic division of labor at an integrated steel mill such as the CSN is beyond the scope of one chapter, since it would require a detailed analysis of the work process of thousands of occupations in dozens of departments. In the 1950s, U.S. Steel tried to classify its workforce and produced a handbook that provides a glimpse of the degree of differentiation in integrated steel mills. It contained no less than 25,000 occupational categories to cover 150,000 employees.16 In 1951, the CSN employed only about 9,000 workers, organized into twenty-five departments and classified in well over a thousand occupational categories, but a full description of all its diachronic and synchronic divisions of labor would still be a book-length project. This chapter illustrates the deep significance of the specific division of labor through a summary description of the technology and workforce of CSN’s integrated mill and the analysis of the diachronic and synchronic division of labor for selected departments. The blast furnace, the steelworks, the slabbing and blooming mill, and the hot-rolling mill will serve as examples for an analysis of the diachronic division of labor. Description and analysis trace a series of physical and chemical transformations from the iron ore to rolled steel sheets. The energy department, which supplied production, maintenance, and other support departments with water, steam, and electric power, serves as the primary example for a synchronic division of labor across the entire mill. The reliance of other units on its supplies made it the single most technically strategic department in the mill, and many of its workers held technically highly strategic positions. Other important departments such as internal transport, roll repair, electrical and mechanical maintenance, and the refractory departments receive only brief treatment at the end of the chapter. This chapter suggests the parameters for a comprehensive analysis of the place of these departments in the mill’s synchronic division of labor and identifies their most important technically strategic positions.

Source: Adapted from CSN, Relatório da Diretoria, 1950.

figure 6.1  Steel Production at the CSN from Raw Material to Finished Product

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Production Technology and the Organization of Work The CSN operated an integrated mill with equipment that met the highest technical standards of the time.17 The demands of the small domestic market drove the CSN’s product line and its production schedule. In 1951, when steel production reached the originally projected 300,000 tons, the mill produced 85,000 tons of rails and accessories, 65,000 tons of cold-rolled sheets, 33,000 tons of steel plate, 33,000 tons of hot-dipped tin plate, 23,000 tons of structurals, 18,000 tons of hot-rolled sheets, 16,000 tons of hot-rolled coils, 16,000 tons of rerolling bars, and 12,000 tons of galvanized sheets.18 The relatively small size of the mill and the need to produce such a variety of products had the CSN adopt discontinuous production processes. It separated the hot-rolling mill from the roughing mill, for example, to be able to continue operating one whenever the other needed a roll change. This lowered productivity compared to large integrated steel mills in the United States that used the same equipment in continuous processes.19 It also added to inefficiencies caused by the space limitations in the Paraíba valley, which forced the CSN to adopt a mill layout that placed the blast furnace and steelworks side by side, rather than both lined up with the rolling mills. This lengthened the transport of intermediate products between departments and made production more costly. The basic production process and the underlying diachronic division of labor at the mill changed little from the late 1940s to the early 1960s (Figure 6.1). The implementation of Plano B (1950–1953) and Plano C (1956–1958) increased production capacities but did not introduce new equipment that would have altered the fundamental organization of production. The CSN originally operated only one blast furnace, then added a second in the early 1950s, and subsequently expanded the first for larger loads. Plano B also doubled the number of coke ovens, added more openhearth furnaces, and enhanced the capacities of the secondary rolling mills. The only new technology introduced under Plano B was an electrolytic tinning line in the cold-rolling department to complement the existing hot-dip tinning and increase tin plate capacity. Under Plano C, the company added still more coke ovens, two more open-hearth furnaces, and augmented the facilities for producing flat rolled products. The only new technology introduced under Plano C was a sintering plant to pelletize iron ore with fine coke dust, which increased the efficiency and throughput of the blast furnace. Both plant expansions increased the number of workers, but created few new occupations.20 The CSN had a complex administrative structure for the organization of production. By 1951, the company had adopted an organizational tree in

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which the industrial directorate (Diretoria Industrial; DI) oversaw twentyfive departments, each subdivided into several divisions with subordinate sections.21 Department sizes varied from a little more than one hundred workers to almost 1,500 workers for mechanical maintenance. Production and maintenance departments all belonged to one of three sectors: metallurgy, rolling, and maintenance. Their heads responded directly to the Superintendancy for Operations (Superintendência de Operação; SO), which also included the energy department, the roll department, and the telecommunications division. The sectors for supplies, general services, and industrial engineering and the departments for research and inspection, planning, and administration reported directly to the industrial director.22 The production planning department (Departamento de Planejamento de Produção; DPP) coordinated the operation of the different sectors and departments by establishing production schedules that aimed to maximize output and minimize the equipment’s idle time. Department heads, engineers, and some foremen were in constant communication with DPP and other departments to ensure proper supplies and the full utilization of the company’s resources. The head of the hot-rolling department (Departamento de Chapas à Quente; DCQ), for example, had to be in regular contact with no less than nine other departments and had to be prepared to work with twelve additional departments “whenever need arose.”23 The conditions of work in steel differed fundamentally from most manufacturing industries. The production technology imposed a demanding rhythm of work: the mill operated all year, seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day. Production crews and the majority of employees in maintenance and support worked in a two- or three-shift system. Few workers came into direct physical contact with the product, and those were mostly unskilled laborers cleaning, packaging, and loading the finished steel. Most other workers effected physical or chemical transformations of the product employing extreme heat and heavy machinery. Production employed most workers (3,155), but support (2,399) and maintenance (2,043) also made up a substantial share of the overall workforce (Table 6.1). The maintenance and support departments had a higher concentration of skilled workers and a much lower share of unskilled labor than production. In fact, all of the main production departments (coke plant, blast furnace, steelworks, rolling mills) had smaller shares of skilled and semiskilled labor than any maintenance or support departments. While skill is not a sufficient condition to qualify a position as technically strategic, a high concentration of skilled workers often indicates a technically strategic department.

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Power over Production table 6.1 Workforce by Department and Skill (1951) Foremen

Skilled

Semiskilled

Unskilled

TOTALS

Iron & Steel

79 (10%)

307 (39%)

134 (17%)

274 (34%)

794

Rolling & Finishing

63 (3%)

765 (41%)

478 (26%)

550 (30%)

1,856

343 (68%)

64 (13%)

81 (16%)

505

1,415 (45%) 676 (21%)

905 (29%)

3,155

25 (4%)

606

Foundry

17 (3%)

Production (Total)

159 (5%)

Electrical Maintenance

38 (6%)

453 (75%)

90 (15%)

Mechanical Maintenance

92 (6%)

1,050 (73%) 157 (11%)

138 (10%)

1,437

Maintenance (Total)

130 (6%)

1,503 (74%) 247 (12%)

163 (8%)

2,043

Production Planning

5 (4%)

95 (84%)

11 (10%)

2 (2%)

113

Quality Control

18 (6%)

164 (50%)

99 (30%)

47 (14%)

328

Electrical, Gas & Water

4 (2%)

136 (69%)

48 (24%)

9 (5%)

197

Internal Transport

18 (2%)

311 (40%)

240 (31%)

205 (27%)

774

Supplies

2 (0.5%)

10 (2%)

146 (31%)

318 (67%)

476

Equipment Installation

6 (5%)

85 (75%)

15 (13%)

7 (6%)

113

Construction

15 (4%)

162 (41%)

51 (13%)

170 (43%)

398

Support (Total)

68 (3%)

963 (40%)

610 (25%)

758 (32%)

2,399

CSN (Total)

357 (5%)

3,881 (51%) 1,533 (20%) 1,826 (24%)

7,597

Note: The table omits administrative departments (e.g., personnel, finance, purchasing), general services (e.g., industrial security, social assistance), as well as high administrative positions for all departments. Sources: Data for iron & steel units from “Quadro de Pessoal - DCO - Aprovação,” BSVR 015 (Jan. 23, 1950), 113-114 and BSVR 155 (Aug. 20, 1951), IV/V; “Departamento de Alto Forno,” BSVR 160 (Aug. 27, 1951), I-III; “Departamento de Aciaria - Lotação Numérica Aprovada [hereafter: LNA],” BSVR 160 (Aug. 27, 1951), appendix, II–III, “Departamento da Fundição,” BSVR 160 (Aug. 27, 1951), II–IV. For rolling and finishing mills: “Departamento Desbastador de Trilhos - LNA,” BSVR 160 (Aug. 27, 1951), VI–VII, and “Departamento de Chapas - LNA,” BSVR 162 (Sept. 5, 1951), I–IV. For maintenance units: “Departamento de Manutenção Elétrica & Departamento de Manutenção Mecânica - LNA,” BSVR 162 (Sept. 5, 1951), IV–VIII, and “Departamento de Cilíndros - LNA,” BSVR 169 (Sept. 10, 1951), II//III. For production support units: “Departamento de Energia - LNA,” BSVR 169 (Sept. 10, 1951), I–II, BSVR 051 (March 16, 1950), 459–64; “Departamento de Transporte - LNA,” BSVR 151 (Aug. 16, 1951), III–V, “Departamento de Tráfego Ferroviário,” BSVR 155 (Aug. 20, 1951), II–III, “Departamento de Material - LNA,” BSVR 155 (Aug. 20, 1951), appendix, I–II, “Departamento de Pesquisas e Inspeção - LNA,” BSVR 145 (Aug. 3, 1951), appendix, I–II, and BSVR 051 (March 16, 1950), 464–66. For building services: “Departamento de Obras - LNA,” BSVR 151 (Aug. 16, 1951), appendix, III–IV, “Departamento de Instalações e Montagens - LNA,” BSVR 151 (Aug. 16, 1951), II–III, and “Departamento de Serviços da Cidade - LNA,” BSVR 151 (Aug. 16, 1951), I–II.

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The Diachronic Division of Labor: From Iron Ore to Hot-Rolled Coils The core operations at the CSN’s integrated steel plant were the production of pig iron, its transformation into steel ingots, and the rolling of steel into a variety of structural and flat-rolled products. The production process from raw materials to hot-rolled coils provides examples of a diachronic division of labor and illustrates the demands placed on workers in these departments as a result of the continuous nature of the production. The production of pig iron occurred in the blast furnace in a process that could not be interrupted other than for maintenance every three to five years, when the entire interior of the furnace had to be rebuilt. The steelworks received the tapped pig iron from the blast furnace as hot liquid and transferred it into its open-hearth furnaces immediately. They operated around the clock, and the heat of an open-hearth furnace could not be interrupted without major damage to the furnace. In contrast to other integrated mills at the time, the CSN did not transfer the steel to the rolling mills in liquid form. Workers cast it into billets, which were then reheated before the first rolling in the slabbing and blooming mill. In the rolling mills, the greatest challenge was the coordination of work between machine operators who, in quick succession, performed different steps in the transformation of the product.24 The work at the blast furnace consisted of continuous charging and of tapping the pig iron in regular intervals. The larryman charged the furnace with the required mixture of coke, crushed iron ore, and fluxes, and he sometimes added small quantities of iron and steel scrap. He relied on the crews at the raw material yards and the coke plant (Figure 6.2) to keep the storage bins filled. Each trip, he loaded the scale car with a different material, weighed it, and charged the load through a chute to the skip hoist. He operated the skip system to move the materials into a silo on top of the furnace, and once the mixture of materials was right, he operated pneumatic controls to charge the load from the silo into the furnace.25 The burning coke provided the heat for the smelting, a process accelerated by hot air blown into the furnace from tuyeres in the lower walls. The coke reduced the ore to liquid pig iron that settled at the bottom of the furnace, and the fluxes reacted with impurities in the ore to form slag that floated on top of the molten iron. The cast house crew under the supervision of the blower foreman tapped the furnace four times per shift, alternating between slag and pig iron casts. The blast furnace keeper opened the furnacepouring hole by hammering a steel rod into the clay plug.26 The molten iron ran off through canals, which were lined with refractory material, into large pig iron ladles on railcars. The cinder snapper performed the

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tapping operation for the slag and adjusted gates, both for pig iron and slag casts, in order to redirect the flow to empty ladles whenever necessary. Between casts, the cinder snapper and several helpers prepared the casts, setting gates, lining spouts, lining canals with refractory brick and clay, and cleaning the ladles.27 The engineer of the slag train moved it to a dump area, where the cinder dumper used a hydraulic system powered by steam from the locomotive to tilt the ladles and dump the slag. The engineer of the pig iron train delivered the ladles with the molten iron either to the pig machine for casting ingots or directly to the steelworks.28 The basic process in the steelworks was oxidizing the impurities in the pig iron in order to reduce brittleness and thus create a more malleable and durable material: steel. The CSN operated eight 200-ton open-hearth furnaces, four on each charging floor. The mixer craneman hoisted the ladles with molten pig iron off the transfer cars and emptied them, assisted by the mixer crew, into the hot-metal mixer. Only on rare occasions would the foreman ask the craneman to charge the open hearth furnace directly from the transfer ladles. The mixer operator kept the molten pig iron in the hot-metal mixer within a specified temperature range by ­adjusting gas

figure 6.2  Charging Machine at the Coke Plant. Charging machine on top of the coke oven battery as an oven is being charged with coal. Background: coal tower (right) and gas tanks (left). Source: CSN Photographic Archive, 1950s.

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flow to the heating system. The mixer operator worked with his helper and the craneman to pour iron from the mixer into a ladle on a transfer car whenever an open-hearth furnace was ready for a charge.29 A locomotive pushed the ladle car from the mixer to the furnace, where a craneman lifted the ladle, tilted it, and poured the molten iron over a spout into the furnace. Inside the furnace, the molten iron mixed with the solid charge— scrap, ferroalloys, limestone, dolomite, and iron ore—that the charging machine operator had prepared from bins on the charging floor. Burning oil generated the flames that surged over the charge in the open hearth in order to drive the chemical reactions that removed the impurities and separated the slag. During the heat, which took between eight and eleven hours, helpers constantly monitored the furnace temperature and provided the laboratory with samples to analyze the chemical composition of the load. The furnace foreman responded with adjustments in the firing or the addition of materials to improve the mix whenever the samples did not meet specifications.30 The furnace foreman informed the melter foreman whenever the load was ready for tapping. Workers had already prepared the casting floor during the heat. The furnacemen lined the canals and the tapping spouts with refractory material. The ladle craneman positioned the steel ladle on the furnace ladle stand, where a crew of castingmen replaced the ladle’s stopper and the stopper rigging. Another crew, assisted by a craneman, set and fixed the ingot molds on flatbed cars that were then moved to the pouring platform. The melter foreman used a jet-tapper, a small lance with an explosive charge, to open the tapping hole for the liquid steel to run off into the ladle. The slag could be either tapped separately before the steel cast or siphoned off the top of the full steel ladle into a separate slag ladle.31 A craneman then hoisted the steel ladle and positioned it over the mold cars. The first castingman, from the pouring platform, directed the craneman to position the ladle over the mold and operated the stopper to open and close the nozzle in order to fill each mold with steel to the desired level (Figure 6.3). The first castingman’s crew applied necessary additions during the tapping, covered the mold top, and let the entire mold cool down.32 A locomotive moved the mold cars to the stripper area once the steel had solidified inside the mold. The stripper operator craneman used tongues to lift the mold off the steel ingots. If the ingot was stuck in the mold, he moved them to a designated area to loosen them by dropping them in controlled fashion. The empty molds went back onto railcars and to the mold yard, while an ingot buggy operator moved the steel ingots or billets to the rolling mills.33 The first rolling of the steel occurred in the slabbing and blooming mill. A craneman lifted the ingots off the buggies and placed them in soaking

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pits for reheating. The heater controlled the burners, fueled with a mixture of furnace gas and coke oven gas, to ensure that the ingots were hot and soft enough for rolling but did not liquefy.34 The pit craneman then hoisted the heated ingot onto a buggy while another crane secured the pit cover. The buggy operator drove the buggy to the slabbing and blooming mill and docked it to unload the ingot onto the first roll table. He weighed the ingot, repositioned it with the turner, if necessary, and operated controls to move the ingot to the blooming and slabbing mill approach table.35 The CSN operated a 2-high reversing mill, powered by a 6,000 horsepower electrical engine, with a high-lift of 54 inches suitable to roll a wide range of slabs, blooms, and billets. Two mill operators worked as a team to

figure 6.3  Casting Steel Ingots. The first castingman releases liquid steel from the ladle into ingot molds that sit on flatbed cars. Source: CSN Photographic Archive, 1950s.

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execute the DPP’s production schedule, which specified for each run the required metallurgical properties of the incoming ingots and the desired characteristics for the rolled product. The product usually had to conform to one of eighty standard specifications, but occasionally the schedule called for different shapes. The two operators constantly coordinated their work as they used levers and pedals to control the position and the speed of the reversing mill’s rolls to produce the desired shape (Figure 6.4). They followed a preestablished routine of passes but had to be prepared to recalculate the dimensions and make adjustments. Seated in a protective cabin above the approach table, they visually monitored the physical characteristics of the ingot throughout the process. The work required a high degree of concentration. For relief, the two operators regularly switched between main and auxiliary controls. The foreman served as substitute during the operators’ scheduled breaks.36 The roughed slabs and blooms moved on roller tables from the blooming and slabbing mill to the crop shear. The shearman operated a hydraulic press to cut the sections to the specified lengths, gave the hotbed stamper enough time to mark them, and then worked with the second weighman

figure 6.4  Operators of the Slabbing and Blooming Mill. The operators monitor the rolling process from a protective cabin and make adjustments to meet the desired specifications. Source: CSN Photographic Archive, 1950s.

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to move them to a scale. Once the weighman had recorded the weight of the slabs or bloom, a craneman moved it to the storage yard for cooling. Scarfers used oxyacetylene torches to burn out surface defects on slabs in order to prepare them for the next rolling sequence. Slabs and blooms that failed to pass the metallurgical inspection went back to the steelworks as scrap. Stockers color-marked the good slabs and blooms by steel grade (such as carbon content) and final use, and they guided the yard cranemen as he stored the slabs and blooms according to shape and order in the production schedule. The storage yard crews stocked the blooms near the rail and structural mill and the slabs near the entry table of the hot-rolling mill to facilitate the transfer for the next step in the production process.37 The rolling of slabs into flat-rolled products started at the plate mill. It served both as finishing stand for steel plate and as roughing stand for hot strip. In the early 1950s, the plate mill had one stand, a 36" and 49" by 72" 4-high reversing rougher powered directly by a 5,000 horsepower engine. Although physically separate, it lined up with the slabbing and blooming mill to minimize the distances for slab transfers.38 A craneman moved the scarfed slabs from the storage yards to the charging elevator or directly onto the reheating furnace’s entry table. Mechanical rollers moved the slabs through the reheating furnace at constant speed. The slab heater operated controls to adjust the air, gas, and oil flow depending on slab size and steel grade, and he monitored the heating process for unusual conditions. He knew from experience when the flames were too large or too small, when to use emergency procedures for the temperamental oil heating systems, and when to shut down the furnace for cleaning or repairs. The slab heater also rejected improperly heated slabs and sent them back to the storage yard.39 Properly heated slabs moved directly from the furnace exit to the plate mill approach table. The operation of the plate mill’s reversing roughly resembled that of the slabbing and blooming mill. The mill operator controlled the position of the rolls and their speed, the water-based cooling system, and the reversing rollers on approach and exit tables. The plate passed back and forth between two work rolls in the middle, each supported and protected against bending by a larger back-up roll. The operator adjusted the roll draft and the height of the tilting tables as the plate became thinner and thinner with each pass. Simultaneously, the edger operator straightened the plate’s edges. After the second and fourth passes, respectively, he activated a pair of vertical rolls at the entrance table and moved them close enough together to reduce the plate’s width.40 Once the plate had the desired thickness and width, the mill operator moved it to a shear, where the shear operator cut it to the specified length. The mill foreman decided whether the plate had the quality to be used in hot rolling and instructed the shear operator to

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separate all other plate either for delivery to customers or to be scrapped, depending on quality. The shear operator moved the plate destined for delivery to customers onto the hotbed for gradual cooling and then over the transfer run-out table to the finishing section. The hot-leveler operator straightened uneven or bent plate before it was cut to specifications in a second shear, stacked, and prepared for shipping by a crew of laborers.41 Mechanical roller tables moved the quality plate destined for hot rolling straight from the first shear to the hot-rolling train. Its four 4-high stands, each driven by a 2,500 HP engine, had 22.5" work rolls, 46" back-up rolls, and a rolling width of 54". The operators, one for each stand, prepared

figure 6.5  Cold-Rolling Mill. Operators at each of the four stands monitor the temperature, speed, and cooling system during the run. Overhead, a traveling crane moves finished coils. Source: CSN Photographic Archive, 1950s.

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the run by setting the roll draft. They monitored the stand’s temperature, speed, and cooling system during the run, always ready to respond to problems and make adjustments. As the steel strip passed through the successive stands it became thinner and thinner, which made it pass faster and faster. The four operators had to coordinate the stands’ speed settings to ensure uniform pull. The hot-strip mill foreman calculated the reduction percentages and the speeds for all four stands, set the control screws to those values, and informed the speed operator of the chosen settings. The rolled strip, now up to a quarter-mile long, passed under a series of cooling water sprayers as it shot out of the last finishing stand onto the run-out table. The strip had to be cooled evenly to ensure that it had the metallurgical properties for further processing in the cold-reducing mill.42 (Figure 6.5) Workers either sheared the cooled strip to make hot-rolled flat sheet or coiled it to make hot-rolled coils. For flat sheets, the operator sheared the strip, stacked the sheets in the stacking machine, and passed them on to the finishing section. The flat-sheet finishing crews operated two levelers and two shears to correct distortions that occurred during rolling, cooling, or shearing.43 Coiling the hot-rolled strip was a delicate operation. The coiler operator used electrical hand controls to start, stop, and regulate the speed of the rollers that conveyed the strip onto the coiler. The strip had to be coiled at mill speed, tightly, but without excessive tension. Once the entire strip had been coiled, the operator had to discharge the coil quickly and without damage onto the conveyers that moved it to the storage area.44 The CSN shipped some hot-rolled coils directly to customers, but more commonly, it processed them further into cold-rolled sheet. In terms of the demands placed on workers, the cold-rolling mill and tinning line resembled the hot-rolling mill; they consisted of several independently powered stands or machines that formed part of the same production process and required fine-tuned coordination to avoid making a low-grade product or scrap. As a workgroup, the operators of any of these mills or lines in the rolling departments had to cooperate and communicate effectively to fulfill production schedules and meet quality requirements. This brief sketch of the diachronic division of labor in the mill’s core operations suggests that few workers at the blast furnace, in the steelworks, or in the rolling mills had technically strategic positions as individuals. Many had other workers depend on their work and they could cause significant physical danger or financial losses by failing to perform their work properly, but they could not easily shut down an entire department or disrupt the production of the entire mill. The charging of the blast furnace or of an open-hearth furnace could stop for some time without major damage; similarly, delays in tapping did not cause major damage immediately. In the rolling mills, operators could delay production and adversely affect

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figure 6.6  Hot-Dip Galvanizing Line. A worker monitors the sheet as it emerges from the heated coating pot. Foreground: a pile of zinc ingots for the coating bath. Source: CSN Photographic Archive, 1950s.

the production schedule, but unless they sabotaged their equipment they could not easily undermine production in other parts of the mill. The operators of the slabbing and blooming mill had more technically strategic power than other mill operators. For the CSN’s steel to be transformed into any rolled product, it had to be processed in that one stand of the slabbing and blooming mill. If it shut down, the CSN could still produce steel ingots and finishing mills could roll the existing stock of slabs and blooms, but before long all rolling mills would have to shut down.

The Center of Technically Strategic Power: The Electrical Department The prime example of a technically strategic department was the energy department (Departamento de Energia; DEN), which supplied the ­entire mill with water, steam, electric power, and conditioned air. The coke plant, the blast furnace, the steelworks, the rolling mills, the foundry, the roll shop, and the maintenance departments all depended on the DEN for electricity to run their equipment. Overhead traveling cranes, mechanical rollers, and the rolling mills, in particular, required a reliable supply of

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electric power in order to operate. The head of the DEN worked closely with the heads of production, maintenance, and support departments to ensure his department could meet their demands. He oversaw the generation facilities and the distribution grids, which included water and steam pipes, power lines, and electrical substations. He also scheduled downtimes of these systems to allow for new installations and for maintenance.45 In the early 1950s, the DEN had a workforce of only about two hundred men to operate a power station, boiler rooms for steam, the water treatment plant, and the pump house, and to monitor all the lines and pipes.46 The energy department generated steam in the waste heat boilers at the open-hearth shop and in the blast furnace boiler house, which was part of the thermoelectric plant (Central Termo-Elétrica; CTE). It used surplus coke oven gas and blast furnace gas to generate the steam. During regular operations, most of the coke oven gas went to fuel open-hearth furnaces, soaking pits, and reheating and annealing furnaces, and most of the blast furnace gas fired the coke plant, the furnace itself, and soaking pits. The CTE usually received surplus gas with almost 120 million calories of energetic content to produce steam. In the early 1950s, the thermoelectric plant operated four boilers that produced 75,000 pounds of steam per hour, and in the mid-1950s it added two more with capacities of 90,000 and 100,000 pounds per hour, respectively. The open-hearth shop had seven boilers with a capacity of 15,000 pounds per hour by the late 1950s. The CTE used about 80 percent of the available steam to generate electricity in two 6,250 kW generators, a capacity it tripled during expansions in the 1950s by adding two 12,500 kW generators.47 The CSN generated between 35 and 50 percent of its electricity in-house and purchased the rest from the Rio de Janeiro Tramway, Light, and Power Company Ltd. (LIGHT Rio de Janeiro). In the early 1950s, the company’s own plant generated up to 12,500 kW, and LIGHT supplied up to 20,000 kW, mostly from the Fontes hydroelectric plant in nearby Piraí. By the late 1950s, the CTE had a capacity of 37,500 kW and LIGHT supplied up to 35,000 kW.48 Most of DEN’s workers spent their time monitoring the generation and distribution processes and inspecting equipment for damage or malfunctioning. The line inspectors, for example, checked all the power lines and the water, steam, and air pipes every week for “abnormalities.”49 The work of the operators required concentration rather than physical strength. They kept logbooks to report any irregularities in the operation of the equipment under their responsibility, and they had to respond quickly and decisively in the event of technical problems. Work in the thermo­electric plant, for example, required careful monitoring of boilers, turbines, and generators. Dozens of instruments provided data on the boilers and the physical properties of the steam. The boiler operator did a round every hour

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to check whether the gauges indicated any malfunction and to confirm that the steam met specifications. If they diverged too much, the operator manipulated valves and levers to raise or lower water levels, to raise or lower the temperature, or to release pressure. The “responsible operator” assumed control anytime an alarm indicated a major problem and worked on a solution together with the regular operator. Three or four times per shift, the operator switched the boilers over to a different fuel—from coke oven gas to blast furnace gas or from blast furnace gas to coke dust.50 Generators and blowers required monitoring for unusual noises, dust deposits in the valves, and overheating bearings, lubricating oil, or refrigeration fluid. Their operators adjusted the load to the demand for power and air, respectively.51 Starting up boilers and generators and shutting them down were tasks that required long experience. In preparation for starting the boiler, the operator opened the valves for the water supply, verified the water level and adjusted it, if necessary, before he opened the valves for the connecting pipes and the instruments. He ventilated the combustion chamber, checked the level of induced draught, drained the gas pipes, and introduced the torch into the chamber to initiate the combustion. He monitored the water supply and the fire as he brought the boiler pressure up to a test level, drained the steam pipes, and equalized the pressure between boiler and pipes. Only then would he bring the pressure in the boiler up to the level of regular operations and begin supplying steam.52 Generators of course depended on the availability of steam. The generator operator first started the ratchet to slowly start the turbine movement. Then he opened the steam valves to the turbine itself and waited until turbine speed exceeded ratchet speed before he switched off the ratchet. He carefully monitored the movement of the valves and the operation of the lubrication system before he opened the turbine’s main steam valve and ordered the auxiliary operator to start the compressor. As the operator brought the speed up to 500 rpm, he checked for vibrations and noises, always prepared to stop the operation immediately. With sufficient turbine temperature, he gradually increased the speed to 3,000 rpm and activated the refrigeration system to cool the lubricating oil. After a last check of the safety mechanisms, he authorized the electrical operator to connect the generator to the grid.53 The distribution of electric power had to be as reliable as its generation. The CTE supplied the smaller consumers such as the foundry, maintenance shops, the water treatment plant, the pump house, and the steelworks. Electricity purchased from LIGHT powered the rolling mills. The energy department maintained constant contact with LIGHT’s engineers at the Fontes hydroelectric plant and in Rio de Janeiro to coordinate the supply of electricity, report problems with frequency or voltage, and decide

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on a rationing schedule in case of power shortages.54 The CSN’s principal substation transformed the outside power down to either 6.9 kV or 35.5 kV, the voltage of the internal lines that delivered electricity to the departmental substations. Every rolling mill had a control house to manage the supply of power and monitor fluctuations in voltage and currents to prevent damage to the equipment. For the internal grid as a whole, the key task was to monitor the power supply and the loads at the substations to be able to adjust distribution. The head of the Electrical and General Distribution Division (Divisão de Eletricidade e Distribuição Geral) calculated the mill’s overall power consumption and coordinated the generation, receipt, transformation, conversion, and distribution of electricity.55 A technician carried out the calculations of power production, consumption, and the capacities of cables and power lines, and he paid daily visits to the substations to supervise their operations.56 Substation operators and electrical operators at CTE were among the mill’s technically most strategic positions occupied by workers rather than managers. Most strategic within that group were the operator of the principal substation (Sub-Estação Principal; SEP) and the foreman of the thermoelectric plant. The operator handled technical problems in the substation and responded to irregularities in the power supply, which could include disconnecting the entire mill or major parts from the outside grid. He also supervised the operators who maintained the two main power lines between LIGHT’s Volta Redonda substation and the CSN.57 The foreman of the thermoelectric plant had similar authority but had to cooperate closely with other workers to resolve problems with the power supply. He communicated any difficulties with the generation facilities to the head of distribution and passed on information about changed loads from the principal substation to the power station. He operated switches to link the LIGHTsupplied grid with the CTE-supplied grid, to connect the CTE’s alternators and generators to the grid, and to disconnect the lines from the principal substation to the thermoelectric plant.58 Subordinate electrical operators at the thermoelectric plant monitored alternators and generators to ensure that they supplied the correct voltage and strength of current.59 Operators of substations monitored a panel for each type of power line (6.6 kV, 2.3 kV, and 440V), reported their readings, and performed troubleshooting whenever a feeder circuit failed. Specific emergency protocols varied depending on the equipment and access to power supplied through the principal substation.60 The occupational description of the substation operator for the cold-rolling mill suggests that he had to respond to power emergencies rather regularly. The description laid out five scenarios for the handling of an “abnormality” at the second cold-rolling mill in order “to maintain it in normal operations.” The basic

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instruction for the operator was to switch power supplies between the thermoelectric plant and the principal substation in case either failed to deliver sufficient power for the operation of the cold-rolling mill. This required in all scenarios to connect the alternative power source and disconnect the failing power source, and to reverse the situation once the irregularity had been addressed by CTE or LIGHT, respectively.61 If the technical position of a substation operator enabled him to connect or disconnect power sources in emergencies, he also had that ability when there were no emergencies and could, in theory, disrupt the production of one of the major rolling mills and potentially cause havoc across the system through fluctuations in the power load.

Other Technically Strategic Positions: Transport and Maintenance Several other departments created links between production departments or provided essential services to production. More than seven hundred men worked in transport between the railroad department and internal transport, which operated all the motor vehicles. An even greater number of often highly skilled and specialized men worked in the various maintenance departments; the most important were the mechanical maintenance, electrical maintenance, and roll departments. Each of the maintenance departments had a shop to repair machinery or manufacture spare parts, but many of the men employed in transport and maintenance performed their work moving among departments or inside the production departments. In contrast to the blast furnace, the steelworks, and the rolling mills, work in transport or maintenance did not constitute a self-­contained production process with an extensive internal diachronic division of labor. Similar to the electrical department, maintenance and transport departments performed services across the entire mill. The workers in those departments stood in a synchronic division of labor with workers in the production departments. Shutdowns in rail transport or maintenance services did not disrupt production as quickly and profoundly as an electric power outage, but many of these workers still enjoyed considerable technically strategic power. The mill could sustain production for at least a few hours even if all the railroad crews or all the maintenance crews had stopped working at once. Steel production required moving large quantities of bulky, extremely heavy, and often very hot materials within and among departments. The department for railroad transport (Departamento de Transporte Ferro­ viário; DTF) operated ladle trains to move liquid pig iron from the blast furnace to the steelworks, flatcar trains to transport steel ingots from the

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steelworks to the rolling mills, and another ladle train to move slag from the blast furnace to the slag yards. By the early 1960s, DTF had 9 steam locomotives, 9 diesel locomotives, 6 rail-mounted steam cranes, 2  railmounted diesel cranes, 31 flat cars, 58 gondola cars, 51 hopper cars, 30 tilting side dump cars, and 9 tank cars. Internal tracks reached all large mill buildings in order to move supplies, to bring heavy equipment in for repair, or to load final products onto the railcars that would deliver them to the customers. Among the technically most strategic workers in the department were the engineers and firemen who operated the locomotives and steam-driven rail cranes. For the transport of molten pig iron and steel ingots, the CSN had no alternative to its internal trains. The internal transport department (Departamento de Transporte Interno; DTR) operated a fleet of 35 dump trucks and 64 freight trucks, but the trucks could not substitute the trains for these specialized tasks.62 Inside the major mill buildings the CSN moved most materials and machinery with overhead traveling cranes. With lifting capacities anywhere from 20 tons to 200 tons, these cranes moved anything from ladles with molten iron to steel ingots, finished coils, and replacement rolls. The steelworks in the early 1960s employed ninety-two men to operate no less than twenty overhead traveling cranes: three in the raw material yard, one at the hot-metal mixer, five on the charging floor, three on the casting floor, two for the ingot stripper, two on the ingot floor, three in the slag yards, and one in the calcination area.63 The rolling mills and the foundry also depended on their cranes. The Slabbing and Blooming and Rail Mill Department (Departamento de Desbastador e Trilhos; DDT) employed fifty-six men to operate thirteen cranes for its slabbing & blooming mill, the rail and structurals mill, the plate mill, and various storage yards. The hot-rolling department employed thirty operators to work six cranes, and the foundry (Departamento da Fundição; DFU) had thirty-six operators on the payroll for its eight cranes.64 The raw material yards and maintenance shops also relied on overhead traveling cranes to move material and heavy equipment. The electrically powered cranes ran on tracks anywhere from thirty to fifty feet above the shop floor. The operator worked in a cabin attached to the crane and used various levers to control travel direction and speed. He also controlled the crane’s hoist(s) with another set of levers. Many cranes had a main hoist and an auxiliary hoist, for example to tilt ladles; manipulating both simultaneously required considerable concentration because the operator also had to communicate with the crew on the shop floors.65 Safety regulations often explicitly prohibited traveling with the crane and lifting the load at the same time, but it was a matter of pride for the operators to display that level of coordination and experience. One tragic work accident at the CSN in 1962 illustrates the damage careless

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operation of the cranes could do, although the crane operator did not bear the responsibility in this case. A laborer on the casting floor in the steelworks had improperly hooked a ladle to the crane. As the crane operator lifted the ladle and began to move it laterally, the hook came loose, the ladle tilted, and molten steel poured onto the casting floor, instantly killing half a dozen workers.66 For good reason, the occupational description for operators of the overhead traveling cranes that moved ladles with molten steel stressed that the men had to “follow the safety norms rigorously.”67 The crane operators occupied technically strategic positions. Without the overhead traveling cranes, the steelworks, foundry, and rolling mills had to shut down their operations because they had no alternative means to move materials. An individual crane operator had less technically strategic power than an individual slabbing and blooming mill operator, because the CSN had more crane operators available as temporary replacements, but as an occupational group the crane operators were among the most powerful in the mill. Nominally subordinate to a department head and a foreman responsible for the overhead traveling cranes, they enjoyed a high degree of autonomy in practice. A retired engineer recalled that both the crane operators and the company were aware of their technically strategic position. Well into the 1950s, the CSN regularly forgave crane operators up to five unauthorized absences per month, keeping their personnel file clean and thus preserving their eligibility for bonuses, even though a replacement had to be called up every time this occurred. Some crane operators took advantage to stay away from work for ten days straight, the last five of one month and the first five of the next.68 The company’s electrical and mechanical maintenance departments rendered a wide range of highly specialized services to meet the needs of production departments. In terms of their internal organization, the mechanical maintenance department (Departamento de Manutenção Mecânica; DMM), the electrical maintenance department (Departamento de Manutenção ­Elétrica; DME), and the roll department (Departamento dos Cilíndros; DDC) resembled each other. Each operated a shop to carry out large-scale repairs, refurbish worn-out equipment, and produce spare parts. The mechanical maintenance and the electrical maintenance shops each had their own building, while the roll shops occupied a space in the rolling mill building. In addition, each department had specialized work crews that performed routine maintenance in the production departments and carried out emergency repairs to restore equipment to working order. Technically strategic equipment such as boilers, generators, overhead traveling cranes, and rolling mills received the most regular attention. Mechanical maintenance was the CSN’s largest department with more than 1,400 workers by the early 1950s. More than 600 of these were clas-

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sified as “maintenance mechanics,” and the department also employed about 100 toolmakers, 100 refractory brick masons, 50 boilermakers, 50 carpenters, and 40 welders.69 The maintenance department subdivided its shops into sectors to carry out repairs on machinery, boilers, railway cars, and locomotives. A separate unit performed maintenance of rolling stock (locomotives and railcars) for the internal railroad on-site. DMM also had organizationally separate maintenance subgroups for the coke plant, the blast furnace, the steelworks, the foundry, the slabbing and blooming and rail mills, the hot-rolling mill, the cold-rolling mill, and the electric power station.70 The proper lubrication of the mechanical equipment under their responsibility was a crucial routine maintenance task for all of these subgroups. Several of them had separate crews with anywhere from two to six men supervised by a foreman that worked exclusively on lubrication. The crew for the slabbing and blooming mill, for example, consisted of four maintenance mechanics and two helpers who used manual and mechanical pumps to inject more than a dozen different lubricating oils and greases directly into bearings or reservoirs.71 The example of the mechanical maintenance of the slabbing and blooming mill illustrates how the subgroups worked with their assigned production departments. The general foreman of the maintenance subgroup for the DDT directed a crew of more than sixty men who divided up the maintenance work on the slabbing and blooming mill, the rail and structurals mill, and equipment in the finishing section. The subgroup’s general foreman regularly communicated with the head of DDT to be aware of the department’s most urgent maintenance needs. The shift foreman supervised a crew of twelve mechanics to carry out the maintenance work on the slabbing and blooming mill. They replaced rollers, screws, and transmission axles on the first roll, approach, and exit tables, and they installed new bearings, levers, lobes, springs, and hoses for lubricants on the rolling stand. The occupational description for the shift foreman also listed the obligation to ensure regular maintenance on the slabbing and blooming mill’s “lubrication room.” The maintenance mechanic directly responsible for the slabbing and blooming mill had to clean all the oil piping in regular intervals.72 Since the equipment had to sit idle in order for many of these routine maintenance tasks to be performed, the subgroup had to coordinate closely with the production crews to make sure they could still meet their targets. The refractory brick masons worked separately from the rest of the mechanical maintenance department.73 Their work required specialized technical knowledge of refractory materials, which were used to line the inside of furnaces and ladles in the metallurgical departments, and ranged from minor repairs on smaller furnaces to a complete refurbishing of the blast furnace every three to four years (Figure 6.7). Some crews of refractory

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brick masons worked directly for production departments. At the blast furnace and at the steelworks, they closed tap holes and built casting canals. They refurbished the linings of the furnaces for the foundry and completed repairs on reheating and annealing furnaces for the rolling mill departments. They also maintained the refractory materials used throughout the mill for thermal insulation on pipes that carried water, steam, oil, or tar.74 The brick masons’ work included the physically demanding demolition of old lining prior to refurbishing a furnace.75 The refractory brick masons’ skills could not be easily replaced, yet similar to the foundry craftsmen, a failure to perform their work did not cause an immediate impact on production. The DDC maintained the company’s rolls in close cooperation with the foundry. Its shop had two specialized subdivisions, one for the rail and

figure 6.7  Rebuilding the Floor of the Blast Furnace. A work crew rebuilds the refractory lining of the blast furnace floor. Source: CSN Photographic Archive, early 1950s.

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structural mills, which used shaped rolls, and one for the flat-rolling mills, which—as the name suggests—used flat rolls. The DDC prepared rolls made in-house by the foundry for their first use, but its primary task was to “rectify” the surfaces of rolls that had already been used in the rolling mills. Every month, the department’s roll turners refurbished close to two thousand used rolls for flat-rolling and about twenty rolls for the rail and structural mill.76 Once the craneman had lifted the roll onto the roll lathe, the roll turner chose the proper grind tools for the job and installed them to prepare the cut. He manually adjusted the cutting speed in accordance with roll hardness and diameter, depth of feed, and width of cut. The finishing of the surface required great care because any mistake meant that the grinding work had to be completely redone.77 The DDC also performed the roll changes for the various rolling mills. The roll builder worked with overhead traveling crane operators to remove the roll together with its bearings and collars from the mill stand and moved it to a special area for disassembly. If the bearings or collars needed repair, he had them transferred to the roll shop. Otherwise, he worked with the crane operator to move a refurbished roll to the assembly area and mount the bearings and collars on the roll, a process that consisted of twenty distinct steps.78 Mistakes by the roll builder could ruin an entire production run and lead to more downtime to correct the situation. Electrical maintenance employed just over 400 workers, of whom more than 320 were electricians.79 The department had four organizationally distinct subgroups; one for the energy department and the metallurgical units (coke plant, blast furnace, steelworks), and one each for the slabbing and blooming mill, the hot-rolling mill, and the cold-rolling mill. The auxiliary maintenance subgroup worked wherever needed, often in support of a regular subgroup. The electrical maintenance work for the energy department illustrates the operation of the subgroups. The energy department relied on the maintenance electricians for larger repairs that required special equipment and experience in its use. The maintenance subgroup for the energy department (DME/DEN) had between ten and fifteen electricians to carry out scheduled maintenance operations on the equipment at the CTE, waste heat boiler house, pump station, water treatment plant, and all electrical substations.80 The maintenance electricians inspected, disassembled, tested, repaired, reassembled, and lubricated equipment as varied as engines, generators, contacts, contactors, coils, relays, voltage regulators, safety instruments, and magnetic pulleys. Mostly they installed spare parts and carried out on-site repairs, but occasionally they had to replace entire engines or control panels.81 Auxiliary electrical maintenance maintained the transmission lines and assisted DME/DEN in the removal and repair of generators, transformers, and oil switches. Its foreman had

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to be intimately familiar with the company’s internal power grid to “identify with certainty the ones [lines] that needed repair.”82 The technically strategic power of the maintenance departments depended on the equipment they served. The crews serving the energy department (DME/DEN), for example, held such power because they performed regular maintenance and emergency repairs on the boilers and generators that supplied the mill’s power. Electrical and mechanical maintenance crews assigned to the overhead traveling cranes held technically strategic power because only their specialized knowledge could resolve problems with cranes. Alternatively, if he so chose, the maintenance specialist could prolong or even create a disruption by dragging his feet or performing incomplete maintenance on such technically strategic equipment. The operators and the maintenance specialists serving their equipment thus shared in the technically strategic power that derived from the position of that equipment in the mill’s overall division of labor. The operator, to be assured of his strategic position, needed the maintenance specialist to do proper work and keep the equipment in order. The maintenance specialist could be certain of his assignment to the technically strategic equipment only if he satisfied his superiors and built a good relationship with the operator. Both fared best with a strategic alliance.

Conclusion The analysis of the diachronic and synchronic division of labor lets us appreciate the demands and challenges of everyday work in the steel mill. The image of the steel industry as a dirty and physically taxing industry held true for many of the CSN’s workers, who held jobs that exposed them to extreme heat, thick dust, and bright light. Many of the unskilled and some of the semiskilled workers exerted themselves physically as they swept floors or tracks, carried finished steel products, prepared linings, shoveled sand, or scarfed steel plate. The great majority of jobs, however, required little physical strength but rather experience operating heavy equipment, efficient coordination with other workers, and sufficient concentration to meet product specifications and avoid industrial accidents. Equipment operators and most maintenance workers never laid hands on the steel as they worked levers, panels, and buttons to control production or repair equipment. Some of the workers with jobs that least fit the image of the dirty and physically demanding steel industry held the technically most strategic positions. Electricians and overhead traveling crane operators did mentally demanding work, but in clean environments by the standards of a steel mill. In contrast, those who worked by the sweat of their brow did not occupy strategic positions.

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Mapping the technically strategic positions of the CSN’s integrated steel mill shows that the organization of its production, its internal division of labor, had numerous vulnerable points that gave workers there the latent power to disrupt production. The workers in the electrical department held the most strategic positions because they could shut down the entire mill, but overhead traveling crane operators, maintenance crews, and the slabbing and blooming mill operators also occupied strategic positions. Strategically minded men, whether they were managers organizing production or devising an industrial relations strategy, or whether they were workers looking for a better deal for themselves, a group of friends, or the union membership, paid close attention to those positions. The historical record shows that the union leaders displayed a keen awareness of the company’s strategic position in the national economy, and documents on the CSN’s implementation of scientific management as well as labor court records suggest that the union and the workers in those positions were aware of their latent strategic power. This chapter has established that the division of labor at the CSN created strategic positions, but it is less clear how this latent technically strategic power translated into the strong bargaining position the union held throughout the 1950s. Unfortunately, too few union documents survived to be able to assess whether its leaders engaged in targeted recruiting of workers in technically strategic positions. Membership lists and election results might shed some light on the place of workers in technically strategic positions within the union, but no such documents have been preserved. All Allan Cruz, the first elected union president in the 1950s, revealed in an interview about his organizing strategy was that he held regular meetings with the union’s cabos (point people) for each department. His insistence that the union had the muscle to execute a strike suggests that the union had the support of the workers in technically strategic positions. Otherwise, Cruz could (and should) not have been so sure. It is difficult to judge based on the available evidence how consciously union leaders in Volta Redonda tapped into the latent strategic power of steelworkers in these positions. Historians interested in the labor movement and militancy may be tempted to go further and ask whether workers in strategic positions displayed stronger militancy than others, but that would be a misguided question, implicitly assuming that the strategic position somehow became part of the individual worker’s social or political capital. Strategic positions were not the property of an individual worker who occupied it at a given point in time, but rather the property of a historically specific division of labor both in the mill and the national economy. If a worker wanted to keep “his” strategic position, he had to strike a deal with those

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who controlled it, those who had the power to fill it with someone of their trust—whether that was management, the union, or a particular occupational group. To understand the bargaining power of the CSN’s workers in the 1950s, it is therefore not all that important to determine which individuals held strategic positions and whether those individuals played a prominent role in union affairs. What needs to be understood is the mill’s organization of production and its division of labor, with its particular vulnerabilities that made certain positions strategic and opened up opportunities for effective industrial action. The union would demonstrate that it could take advantage of the vulnerabilities in the mill’s division of labor even without an explicitly strategic analysis and without a leadership composed of workers in strategic positions.

7

Strategic Power, Labor Politics, and the Rise of the Metalworkers Union The CSN, pride and example of Brazil’s industrial organization, must maintain—as the leading company of national industry—dignifying standards in the application of the letter and the spirit of our country’s labor law. Thereby, she will retain the special place that her peers assign to her and contribute, with her worthy conduct, to the realization of legitimate victories of social and labor legislation that forms part of our Constitution. —Letter from the Metalworkers Union to the CSN Directorate, August 19551

The presidential elections in October 1950 fundamentally changed the political conditions for labor mobilization in Volta Redonda. President Eurico Dutra (1946–1951), albeit originally elected by a coalition of the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrático; PSD) and the Brazilian Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro; PTB), had governed with the support of conservative forces on an antilabor platform. He had pursued much more economically liberal policies than Getúlio Vargas’s ­Estado Novo government and had placed less emphasis on the strengthening of domestic industry. Driven by Cold War logic, the Dutra government had engineered an anti-Communist crackdown on unions that rolled back the modest gains organized labor had made since the promulgation of the federal labor law in 1943. Dutra’s disregard for labor rights, which had been guaranteed by the 1946 constitution, and the blanket intervention in industrial unions had labor leaders across the political spectrum calling for change. The 1950 presidential race was a referendum on both Dutra’s presidency and on the legacy of the Estado Novo. The PTB chose Vargas as its presidential candidate. He had the support of the Social Progress Party (Partido Social Progressista; PSP), led by São Paulo’s governor Adhemar de Barros, who nominated João Café Filho from Rio Grande do Norte as Vargas’s running mate. The PCB, still operating clandestinely, instructed its supporters to abstain, but many members and sympathizers cast their vote for Vargas anyway hoping that his presidency would create greater political space for militancy. The parties that

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sustained the Dutra presidency were united in their opposition to Vargas but failed to agree on a joint candidate. The National Democratic Union (União Democrática Nacional; UDN) nominated Eduardo Gomes, already its candidate in 1945, and Odilon Braga as his running mate. Sectors of the PSD tried to renew the 1945 electoral alliance with Vargas’s PTB, but once that hope faded, the party nominated Cristiano Machado from Minas Gerais.2 Vargas, despite limited funds, campaigned all over the country and won the election handily with 3.85 million votes (48.7 percent), well ahead of Gomes (29.6 percent) and Machado (21.5 percent). Café Filho beat the UDN’s Braga for the vice-presidency by a much smaller margin: 2.52 million versus 2.35 million votes.3 Ideologically, Vargas’s victory signaled a renewed commitment to de­ senvolvimentismo and trabalhismo. He ran as a social democrat, promising to defend and expand the achievements of the Estado Novo in the areas of industrial development and social welfare. Specifically, he proposed to revive state-led industrialization policies and to extend the benefits granted in the federal labor law, the Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho (CLT), to agricultural workers. He also called for less orthodox fiscal policies and accused Dutra’s finance minister, Manuel Guilherme da Silveira Filho, of being a “great organizer of defeats.”4 Vargas’s promise to revitalize the Estado Novo’s industrial policies guaranteed state-owned industrial enterprises a prominent role and assured the CSN’s workers a place at the heart of Brazil’s developmentalism. Vargas’s electoral platform also promised industrial workers a fuller implementation of the CLT. Labor leaders hoped that adherence to the law would put industrial relations on a new footing, if still within the confines of the bureaucratic politics of the Ministry of Labor, Industry, and Trade (Ministério de Trabalho, Indústria e Comércio; MTIC). The steelworkers of Volta Redonda expected restrictions on labor organization to ease under a Vargas presidency. As long as the union, the Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias Metalúrgicas, Mecânicas e de Material Elétrico de Barra Mansa (STIMMMEBM) remained under state intervention, the CSN refused to negotiate, leaving pent-up grievances about wages and benefits unaddressed. The workers had not received a general raise since January 1947, while the cost of living increased by more than 60 percent over that period.5 Individual raises due to promotions, reclassifications, and the restructuring of career ladders compensated for some of the inflationary loss, but the average real wage still fell by 16 percent between 1947 and 1951 (Figure 7.4). The drop in real wages stood in sharp contrast to the company’s rising profits. Profit sharing, implemented in 1949, alleviated the discontent with the widening gap between company earnings and worker pay, but this one-time payment could not compensate

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for the inflationary losses suffered by workers who had not been promoted or reclassified. Workers also expected the CSN to meet its legal obligations on benefits. The labor law guaranteed a weekly rest day and the 1946 constitution mandated that it be paid like a workday. Congress had passed law 605 to regulate the paid weekly rest day in late 1948 and President Dutra had signed it on January 5, 1949. The CSN interpreted the law very restrictively, however, emphasizing article 6, which stipulated that “the pay for the rest day was not due if the employee, without just cause, failed to work during the entire week preceding the rest day, fulfilling his or her work schedule completely.” Company lawyers took that to mean that an employee lost eligibility for the benefit by missing any work time, whether it was a whole day or just enough minutes to result in a partial absence. The company also refused to pay the rest day in weeks with paid holidays. Moreover, the legal department argued that workers in Volta Redonda were not entitled to the benefit because they already received pay based on a thirty-day work month.6 Union militants condemned the practice to make benefits dependent on perfect attendance as a violation of law 605 and as an abuse of the diligence law (Lei da Assiduidade).7 Deteriorating living conditions contributed to the workers’ discontent. Brazil’s infrastructure had suffered under the Dutra government, which had no comprehensive industrial policy. One of the most serious consequences was the lack of reliable electric power, which the people of Volta Redonda felt more acutely than most Brazilians because of high levels of consumption. The steel mill used more electric power than any other industry in the country, and the average Volta Redonda home featured more electrical appliances than working-class households anywhere else in ­Brazil. The National Department for Water and Electrical Energy (Departamento Nacional de Águas e Energia Elétrica; DNAEE) ordered rationing in response to severe electricity shortages and assigned the CSN a monthly electricity quota. The company asked inhabitants to restrain consumption to avoid unintended stoppages in the rolling mills with potentially disastrous consequences for production. Whenever consumption reached critical levels, the CSN simply pulled the plug on certain neighborhoods and forced the inhabitants to get by with candlelight.8 In an open letter to the population, the company expressed regret that the blackouts always affected the same neighborhoods and blamed a general lack of consumer discipline. The letter also suggested specific measures to save energy and appealed to the people to reduce electricity consumption.9 The discontent with the Dutra government and the CSN came to the fore in the 1950 union elections. In July, the Labor Ministry decreed elections for all unions under state intervention since the 1947 crackdown.

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Rather than leave the task to his successor, potentially a more unionfriendly president, Dutra called the elections under his government’s watch hoping to control the outcomes.10 The decree set a date for each union election, spread out over the weeks between the presidential election in October 1950 and the inauguration of the newly elected president in January 1951.11 The staggered schedule facilitated the Labor Ministry’s management of more than one hundred union elections, not least with respect to their (political) policing. Dutra’s Labor Ministry required the atestado ideológico for all candidates in order to prevent electoral victories by suspected Communists. In protest, several unions refused to hold the elections and waited instead for Vargas to take power, knowing that his designated Labor Minister Danton Coelho opposed the atestado ideológico.12 STIMMMEBM had its elections scheduled for December 13. All the candidates had to travel to the state capital Niterói and present themselves at the headquarters of the state political police (DOPS-RJ) to obtain the atestado ideológico. The need to take a vacation day and the cost of the trip may well have discouraged some prospective candidates. Leading up to the elections, the independent Chapa Proletária (Proletarian Ticket) led by Allan Cruz enjoyed the broadest support. He ran on a platform that demanded full compliance with the labor law to create better working conditions. In retrospect, Cruz cited the CSN’s failure to deliver on basic welfare promises as the reason for his involvement in the union. He told the story of a coworker who would eat a plateful of cornflour mush (angu) before each night shift. When Cruz asked him why he never ate anything else, the coworker explained that he had seven children and could not afford to eat anything more expensive unless he wanted his children to go hungry. The experience motivated Cruz to research the benefits granted by the labor laws, and he began recruiting coworkers for the union.13 The platform of the Chapa Proletária aimed at improving the workers’ material standing. It demanded that the employers, which included the CSN and several small metallurgical companies, pay the weekly rest day according to law 605, grant a general raise to compensate for years of declining real wages, and pay the constitutionally guaranteed share of profits. Even more important in the long run was the demand that the companies comply with article 461 of the CLT, which mandated equal pay for equal work. Designed to assure workers of fair and equal treatment, the equal pay for equal work provision would stir much controversy in labor relations throughout the 1950s. The Chapa Proletária’s platform also targeted the CSN specifically with demands to provide free meals to workers on night shift and overtime, part of a campaign to move from eight-hour to six-hour shifts. The program of demands furthermore called for payment of the family bonus, full compliance with hygiene and safety legislation, and a solu-

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tion to the persistent housing shortage in Volta Redonda. It proposed that the CSN sell cheap plots to its employees and work with the Industrial Pensions Institute (Instituto de Adminstração da Previdência Industrial; IAPI) to provide credit for workers who wanted to build their own homes.14 The CSN tried to derail Cruz’s candidacy, but ultimately without success. In his retelling, the company supported a yellow union ticket (chapa de pelegos) and tried to have his ticket disqualified by the Labor Ministry. It convinced one of Cruz’s running mates to abandon his candidacy, but Cruz found a replacement in time to keep his ticket on the ballot. The Chapa Proletária won the vote decisively, but it had more bureaucratic hurdles to clear before taking office. The Labor Ministry had to certify the election, which required another round of ideological screenings. The political police raised no objections, clearing the way for the inauguration of the elected union directorate. The ceremony, at Cruz’s request scheduled for May 1, 1951, international Labor Day, should have been a mere formality, but the local labor inspector and the state-appointed union head, José Maria Pimenta, tried to stonewall the process. Both had to be present at the ceremony, but the labor inspector alleged that he had no transportation and Pimenta refused to hand over power without the CSN’s explicit orders. Cruz’s supporters paid a visit to their homes and found ways to convince them to attend, however.15 The inauguration of the elected directorate placed industrial relations on a new footing. The steelworkers gained legitimate representation and the union’s internal governance complied with the labor law. The approval of STIMMMEBM’s budget for 1951 offered the labor bureaucracy one last chance to undermine the union’s new-won independence. The union had to submit a provisional budget to the regional labor office accompanied by past budgets and the minutes of the assemblies that approved those budgets. Cruz and his fellow directors discovered that ­Pimenta’s governing board (Junta Governativa) had kept no records except for the minutes of a general assembly held in June 1950 to approve the 1951 budget. The minutes contained no attendance count, however, and they failed to report the exact vote tally on the budget, which led Cruz to conclude that the document “had been criminally forged.”16 The assembly had never taken place. The minutes presented a bombastic account of a fictitious meeting: After opinions had been exchanged, doubts resolved, and issues discussed, comrade José do Carmo—seconded by Zefarino Lemos—proposed that the budget for 1951 be approved. If the decision was unanimous, he stated, the members should rise to their feet and demonstrate their approval with a round of applause. The last words of comrade Zefarino Lemos were already drowned out by the thunderous applause of the attending members, who remained on their feet until the comrade president declared the budget approved.17

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Cruz called a general assembly for June 17, 1951, to discuss the real budget. The attending members voted to repudiate the fake minutes, take legal action against the former directorate, and name a commission to take stock of the union’s finances.18 By July, the union had a budget and submitted it to the Regional Labor Office (Delêgacia Regional de Trabalho; DRT). The DRT dragged its feet until mid-1952, when it finally bowed to the new balance of power in Volta Redonda and acknowledged that the union could not provide budgets and minutes that did not exist.19

The Politics of a Union Contract The new framework for industrial relations made the workers’ struggles for the economic fruits of their labor more complex. The government recognized the elected union leadership and thereby signaled that it intended to respect the CLT. The union adopted an industrial relations strategy that focused on legally guaranteed benefits, trying to force the company into negotiations on benefits where its practice violated the letter of the law. The CSN had implemented some of the labor laws vol-

f i g u r e 7 . 1  President Getúlio Vargas and CSN President Sílvio Raulino de Oliveira Source: CSN Photographic Archive, early 1950s.

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figure 7.2  President Vargas Talks to a Sheet Counter. Sheet counter was the only occupation in the mill for women. Source: CSN Photographic Archive, early 1950s.

untarily before 1951, but it had never been challenged to fulfill all of its legal obligations. As a state-administered enterprise, it had enjoyed unrestricted support from a federal government concerned above all with the CSN’s contribution to economic development. But under President Vargas, committed to both a developmentalist agenda and the principles of ­trabalhismo, the company had to develop a more carefully calibrated legal and political strategy. STIMMMEBM’s leaders understood that they needed to mobilize political support to make their legal arguments stick. The union soon confronted the CSN with demands from its electoral platform. On July 3, 1951, Allan Cruz and Aarão Steinbruch, the union’s lead lawyer, sent a memorandum to CSN president Sílvio Raulino de Oliveira. The preface reassured him of the union’s full cooperation and solidarity, but the body of the memo stated the union’s demands in no uncertain terms. Most important, it reminded Raulino of the CSN’s ­obligation to pay the constitutionally guaranteed rest day to all workers. It stressed

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that the workers on hourly and daily payroll did not receive the benefit, while salaried employees in Volta Redonda had been receiving it since September 1950, a differential treatment that violated the labor law’s “equal pay for equal work” provision. The union demanded that the CSN pay the benefit retroactively going back to January 1949, when President Dutra had signed law 605. The memo closed with an appeal that played on the CSN’s carefully cultivated image as dispenser of social justice. It urged Raulino to fulfill the demands because that “would once more give incontestable proof to its workers that [the CSN] understands their problems and that it acts in just and equitable spirit.”20 To the political police, the union’s initiative smelled of a strike movement. Alerted to Steinbruch’s presence in Volta Redonda, in June 1951, the local DOPS-RJ officer wrote a report that accused the lawyer of inciting a strike movement because “naturally . . . he, as lawyer, could take advantage.”21 The political police saw these fears vindicated when Steinbruch filed a grievance in local court, signed by more than 2,000 workers, to increase the pressure on the company to meet union demands. The

figure 7.3  CSN Workers Marching in the Labor Day Parade. The banner reads: “Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional—The steelworkers greet the creator of Volta ­Redonda,” a reference to President Getúlio Vargas, who was in attendance. National Labor Day celebration on May 1, 1951, Estádio São Januário, Rio de Janeiro. Source: CSN Photographic Archive, 1951.

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federal political police interpreted the events as a Communist-inspired, PTB-run “defamation campaign” against the CSN. The police report claimed that several PTB politicians, among them federal representative Daruiz ­Paranhos de Oliveira and state representative Hipolito Porto, spoke at public rallies in Barra Mansa and called “on the workers to revolt and to expel the current directorate.” The report noted further that Voz ­Trabalhista, a newspaper close to the PTB, supported the movement with “systematic attacks on the directorate in a violent and insulting tone.”22 In keeping with its ideological outlook, the political police portrayed labor mobilization at the CSN as a subversive act. The company countered the union demands with a formal legal opinion. It cited the fact that no worker had ever brought legal action on the issue of the paid rest day as evidence of the justness of the CSN’s practice. The company lawyers rejected the claim that the CSN failed to comply with the law, arguing that it had fulfilled the constitutional mandate by raising wages an equivalent amount in 1946 for all salaried employees and wage workers. They further argued that salaried employees had no claim to a paid rest day because the company already calculated their monthly pay based on thirty work days per month. The company opinion conceded that workers on the same step of the career ladder could indeed earn different salaries, but nevertheless insisted that the CSN paid truly equal work equally. In conclusion, the opinion dismissed the “complaints brought forth by STIMMMEBM” as “unfounded” because they “had no basis in law.”23 Behind this façade of legal certainty, the CSN tried to reassure itself of government backing. Raulino wrote to the new Labor Minister, José de Segadas Viana, to express concern about the reach of the union’s demands.24 Segadas Viana had been one of the CLT’s coauthors and knew the law intimately, which prompted Raulino to cite the company’s legal opinion in considerable detail to demonstrate that STIMMMEBM’s claims had no basis in the law. He lamented that Cruz’s and Steinbruch’s recalcitrant line prevented swifter progress despite the company’s willingness to engage in a give and take.25 To break the impasse, the CSN offered a 19 percent general raise modeled on a ruling by the Supreme Labor Court (Tribunal Superior de Trabalho; TST) to settle a collective grievance (dissídio ­coletivo) in the metallurgical industry in the Federal District. The devil was in the details, however. The CSN proposed to calculate individual raises based on 1948 wages and wanted to count any merit raises since then toward the 19 percent. That diminished the amount of the raise and violated the spirit of the merit-based labor management in the late 1940s.26 The CSN also wanted to make eligibility for the raise dependent on perfect attendance in July 1951, a condition that the union dismissed out of hand.27

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To curry favor with Vargas, who let it be known that he wanted to enhance the union’s standing (prestigiar o sindicato), the CSN promised the union directorate that it could take full credit for the raise. Neither Cruz nor Steinbruch had any intention of endorsing the company’s offer, however. They followed CLT procedure and called a general assembly to put the proposal to a vote by the union membership, but they left no doubt that they considered the proposal unacceptable. In front of more than 1,500 members, Cruz and Steinbruch reported on the negotiations, sharply criticized the company’s offer, and recommended that it be voted down. They stood by the demand for a paid rest day and insisted, moreover, that the company needed to pay overtime in compliance with the labor law. The assembly rejected the offer and authorized Cruz to ask Vargas and Segadas Viana to intervene on the union’s behalf in order to accelerate the negotiations. The union had a political strategy to counter the company’s influence in government circles.28 The union also opened new legal fronts to increase the pressure. It asked Segadas Viana to submit a legal opinion prepared by Geraldo Leal Ribeiro, the union’s other lawyer, for evaluation to the Labor Ministry’s Permanent Commission on Labor Law. 29 The opinion made the case that the regime of eight-hour shifts violated the CLT’s article 71, which stipulated that “after any continuous work whose duration exceeds six hours, it is mandatory to grant a break for rest or a meal.” Leal Ribeiro acknowledged that the steel mill’s production technology required continuous operation but stressed that no technically determined need could deprive the workers of the right to have at least one full hour of rest after six hours of work. He added that workers could not renounce this right voluntarily and dismissed individual and collective contracts signed to that effect in the 1940s as illegal. To comply with the law, he argued, the company had to choose between a three-shift system with seven hours of work and one hour of rest per shift, and a four-shift system with six hours of work and fifteen minutes of rest per shift. The opinion moreover alleged that the company failed to pay night work in compliance with the CLT, which established that seven-eighths of an hour of work during the night (midnight–8 a.m.) counted as the legal equivalent of one hour during the day. Since the CSN had never granted the rest and never paid night work correctly, Leal Ribeiro argued, it owed employees one hour of retroactive overtime pay for each shift and each night shift they had ever worked.30 The CSN faced massive extra expenditures if the union could make its arguments stick. As it expanded the reach of its legal argument, the union built political support in high places. Cruz presented the demands to state legislators and federal representatives for the state of Rio de Janeiro, who offered support

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and promised to arrange a meeting with President Vargas. Cruz traveled to Petrópolis for an audience in the presidential Palácio Rio Negro. In Cruz’s retelling, he waited in line all day and only succeeded to see Vargas after he entered the palace through the kitchen and pled his case directly with the president’s staff. He presented Vargas with a memo that detailed the grievances, listed the union’s demands, and reminded the president of Volta Redonda’s special place in his political project. Word of the encounter traveled fast. The next day, Raulino called Cruz into his office to propose that the union discuss the grievances with the personnel department. Cruz informed him that he saw no basis for a fruitful cooperation with the head of the personnel department, Dr. Leopoldo Monteiro, who still believed that complete company control was the best state of labor relations. Cruz made clear that the union would only negotiate if the CSN substantially improved its offer and warned that he would approach Vargas again if no progress was being made.31 In a letter to Segadas Viana, Raulino subsequently expressed his dismay at the union’s “hostile” attitude, reinforced by Voz Trabalhista in a series of articles that “attacked the directors and employees of the CSN.”32 He indicated that the company would make a new offer, a 20 percent raise based on 1946 wages, although not without reminding the Labor Minister that the company’s wages and benefits already far exceeded the regional average. He defended the CSN’s interpretation of the law concerning rest days and overtime, but the details of the letter suggested that he pondered the possible consequences of losing the argument. The CSN had encouraged the union to file a collective grievance in the labor courts, but the union had decided against such a course because “the raises set under a grievance procedure would be all but absorbed by the increases the CSN had already granted.” According to Raulino, STIMMMEBM’s leaders backed their demands with an implicit threat: “They declared that if they would not get what they asked for, they would provoke unrest among the workers to achieve these goals, and they insinuated that they would not hesitate to provoke a strike.”33 He also lamented that the union criticized the CSN for its administration of the company town, playing into the hands of extremists who aimed to foster indiscipline among the workers. The CSN management clung to the logic of welfare paternalism and failed to comprehend the new logic of industrial relations. Raulino’s memo to Segadas Viana contained a twenty-three-page exposé that reiterated the CSN’s caring attitude toward its workers and documented the extent of its social assistance programs. It focused on housing, nutrition, education, medical care, and leisure and listed no fewer than 123 specific occasions when the directors authorized support or subsidies for specific social ­programs,

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local associations, or individual workers in need. Raulino had difficulty explaining the union’s actions: [It] apparently fails to comprehend that the CSN is a mixed-capital enterprise whose principal shareholder is the federal government . . . and thus represents the government itself; that the defamatory attacks the union currently advances therefore also reflect upon the government and not only on its [the CSN’s] directors. Neither does the union recognize the benefits granted by the CSN to the workers as integral part of their income, and it does not hesitate to launch attacks that seem to serve only one end: to increase popular appeal to win office in the next elections.34

Raulino believed that STIMMMEBM’s leadership was jockeying for position ahead of upcoming union elections. He contrasted these allegedly political motives with the CSN’s noble goal to set an example for good relations between employers and employees in the interest of the Brazilian nation. Raulino highlighted that “the development of the national economy depended crucially” on the CSN and vowed to defend the interests of 42,000 private shareholders “against individual interests that could well collide with the national interest symbolized by the enterprise itself.”35 Raulino recognized the CSN’s strategic position in the national economy, but he could not comprehend that the union recognized it, too, and used that knowledge to try to gain benefits for its members. The CSN let Segadas Viana know that it would welcome a federal intervention. Raulino wanted President Vargas to authorize the Labor Ministry to find a solution to the “collective problems created by the union,” a request he portrayed as a matter of national interest: “Such guidance would not only have the advantage to impede the unpatriotic interference of outside interests, personal and demagogic, but also allow for a more direct and decisive application of the noble principles that guide the President of the Republic and his closest aides in the social area.”36 Raulino justified the request for an intervention with the CSN’s need to strike a balance between local welfare and national development, but he used terms reminiscent of the political police’s language of antisubversion. Implicitly, he argued that economic development should take precedence over social welfare. In a follow-up, Raulino expressed support for the government’s labor policies and acknowledged the importance of unions, but reminded Segadas Viana that the impasse between the union and the company over workers’ rights had an “inconvenient repercussion on the normal and efficient production of the mill.” He appealed to the government to respond to the union’s “more direct action” by “defend[ing] its interests—tied intimately to those of the CSN—to ensure that the relations between employees and the employer remained imperturbable and friendly.” Concretely, Raulino proposed that Segadas Viana convene a roundtable with representatives from STIMMMEBM and the CSN.37

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The Labor Ministry responded by sending an observer to Volta Redonda who prepared a report to Vargas. It concluded that workers were generally dissatisfied, that they considered the salaries to be too low, and that they held the Superintendência de Serviços Sociais (SSS) in low esteem; they joked that SSS stood for “Sombra, Sossego e Saliva”—Shade, Tranquility, and Dribble.38 The report mentioned that the union had filed a grievance about overtime pay in the labor courts, but it could not confirm the rumors of a strike movement. “To the contrary,” the observer found “an air of confidence in the government, which is evident from the echo your Excellency’s call for greater unionization found among the workers of the CSN, where the number of members jumped from 1,200 just last April to roughly 7,500 [now].”39 The unionization rate went from 11 percent to more than 60 percent in half a year. The report did not comment explicitly on why Vargas’s call for unionization echoed so impressively in Volta Redonda, but all sides involved understood that it was the result of effective organizing and the union’s promise of an aggressive campaign for higher wages and expanded benefits. The jump in membership provided the union with a mandate to stay its course of demanding concessions on multiple fronts. Company lawyers still tried to convince the Labor Ministry that they interpreted the law correctly, but an opinion submitted to the Ministry’s Permanent Commission for Labor Law (Commissão Permanente de Legislação do Trabalho) admitted to legal gray zones. With respect to rest time after six hours of work, the opinion acknowledged that the mill operated on three eight-hour shifts, reiterated that the technology of steelmaking required uninterrupted production, and stressed that article 71 of the CLT did not mandate an interruption of production to grant workers their rest. The CSN argued that the production process in steel did not demand continuous work, but rather intervals of intensive work interspersed with extended downtime that afforded the employees more rest than the legally stipulated hour. Rather than stick with a strictly legal argument, the lawyers reminded the MTIC that workers had never filed grievances against the practice and interpreted that fact as implicit support for the company’s legal position. The opinion dismissed the notion that production could be interrupted to grant the rest and asked, rhetorically, how the eight-hour shift was any different from the six-hour shift if the workers had time to rest and eat their meals at work. To counter union demands to pay night shift at overtime rates, the opinion stressed that the CSN paid workers in production better than their equally qualified counterparts in other departments. Neither argument stood on firm legal ground, however, and the CSN’s opinion admitted as much when it called on the government to “­decide the matter based on facts and not only on laws.”40

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The company lawyers recognized that the application of the labor law to work in an integrated steel mill posed technically specific problems. The assistant at the Labor Ministry who analyzed the competing legal interpretations put his finger on the problem when he noted that “[t]he steel industry displays specific characteristics that are irreconcilable with certain general norms of the labor law.”41 The authors of the CLT had drafted general rules rather than industry-specific regulations under the implicit assumption that they could be applied to all industries, but the organization of work in a modern steel mill differed so profoundly from other industries that the law had to be interpreted rather than applied. The union leaders understood earlier than the company lawyers that the CLT’s character as a general labor law invited a legal strategy that exploited its ambiguities, and they understood more clearly than the company directors that it took a comprehensive political strategy to build support for the union’s interpretation of the law. The struggle moved fully into the political arena when Vargas instructed the Labor Ministry to facilitate direct negotiations between the company and union. Segadas Viana convened a roundtable with representatives of both sides and asked Dr. Vicente Ferrer, director of the National Labor Office (Departamento Nacional de Trabalho; DNT) to preside over the negotiations. Cruz and the union’s lawyers prepared well for the first meeting. They embarrassed the head of the company’s personnel department by presenting compelling evidence that the workers had cause for their grievances. Cruz had gathered paychecks from coworkers to demonstrate that their income was too low for a decent living and that many received cheques amarelos (literally, “faded checks”) with large deductions to repay advances for medical services, transport vouchers, or purchases at the company stores. The paychecks also served as proof that the company did not pay the legally mandated rest day, overtime, and night work according to the letter of the CLT. Company lawyers countered that the CSN had granted general raises of equivalent amounts to fulfill these legal obligations, but conceded that they did not appear on the paychecks separately.42 The company nevertheless reiterated the argument that it had no obligation to grant the same benefit twice. At the second roundtable meeting, the CSN offered an economic argument to undermine union demands and insisted that it had always treated workers in the spirit of the labor law. A company lawyer read a memo that reminded all those present that “Volta Redonda was the cornerstone of Brazil’s economic emancipation” and that the “national economy would suffer a great shock if it were to stop operating even for a few days.” The memo portrayed the CSN as a tremendous technical, economic, and social success and provided a detailed description of its social assistance programs in an effort to sway the MTIC officials and shame the union

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into concessions. It tried to demonstrate that the company’s practices conformed to the law by reviewing the work regime, the day-to-day application of the CLT, and the arguments against the union’s case for the paid rest day, night work bonuses, and mandatory breaks. The CSN’s case stood on shaky ground, however. Its lawyer argued that production workers had “agree[d], if only tacitly,” to the production regime by signing their individual contracts and had therefore no right to a retroactive payment of benefits. The lawyer cited the “ground rule of hermeneutics” (!) to argue that a labor contract should be understood according to the way it is put into practice, which was the “best proof of its reach, the extent of agreement, and the covenant entered into by the contracting parties.”43 The lawyers proposed a hermeneutic reading of past contracts because they knew that the CSN did not fulfill its obligations to the letter of the law, but they hoped that the Labor Ministry officials would recognize and reward the company’s good intentions. CSN interim president Gen. Mario Gomes da Silva came prepared to make concessions, however. He promised a general raise within the company’s economic means and offered to pay the weekly rest day to wage workers, an additional 16 percent raise, out of “concern for their standard of living.” Gomes agreed to pay night work according to the letter of the law, two years retroactive, but insisted that the system of eight-hour shift remain in force. He promised further that the CSN would consider introducing the family bonus, would work on a new career ladder, and would review alleged violations of the “equal pay for equal work” rule.44 In exchange, the CSN asked the union to withdraw all grievances filed in court. STIMMMEBM’s leaders welcomed the proposal but insisted on the retroactive payment of the weekly rest day, predicting that such a concession would all but guarantee the workers’ approval of the agreement. Gomes rejected that demand, however.45 In the spirit of bringing the protracted negotiations to a close, the union’s counterproposal dropped ten of its eighteen original demands and made concessions on six more. The parties agreed that the two remaining issues, the future of the shift system and the nature of the raise, were “complex issues that involve[d] important interests, not only for the CSN, but also for the country’s industry as a whole with repercussions for the national economy” and adhered to Labor Minister Segadas Viana’s official recommendation to maintain eight-hour shifts and grant a fixed-percentage general raise.46 Company and union signed the contract on March 10, 1952. The CSN increased all salaries and wages by 20 percent with August 1951 as the baseline. It instituted the paid rest day for wage workers and committed to retroactive payment for thirty weeks. The company also agreed to pay the night work bonus and compensated workers for past night shifts with

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a lump sum equivalent to 240 hours of wages. Workers eligible for these retroactive payments received a full month of wages for the paid rest day and about five weeks of wages for the night shift bonus. The union’s legal strategy had paid off. The contract also set a scale for overtime pay: an additional 20 percent for the first two hours, 30 percent for the next two, and 50 percent after that. The CSN introduced a family bonus of Cr$100 for married employees, an additional Cr$200 for up to two children, and Cr$400 for three or more children. The CSN granted the union access to the shop floor and a right to post notices, and it promised to cooperate with the union on the question of equal pay for equal work. The implementation of the contract cost the company Cr$124 million, a figure written into the contract to justify price increases for its products.47 STIMMMEBM’s general assembly to approve the contract turned into a celebration of workers’ power under Vargas’s trabalhismo. The Labor Ministry and the national and regional labor offices sent representatives, and Rio de Janeiro’s major newspapers had correspondents on site. Cruz read out the contract and recommended its approval. He also asked the members to authorize the company to withhold 5 percent of all indemnifications and retroactive pay, which was the contractually set fee for union lawyer Leal Ribeiro. His excellent work made him rich. He received the equivalent of about five hundred monthly paychecks of an average earner at the CSN. The union members unanimously approved the contract and Leal Ribeiro’s compensation. Cruz thanked the members for their support, which “allowed the leadership to come to a secure and peaceful understanding with the CSN.” Several government representatives spoke to congratulate the metalworkers of Volta Redonda on their “great victory.” The DNT’s Roque Ferrer used the opportunity to highlight the importance of the government’s social policy and the respect shown by the contracting parties for those principles.48 Labor Minister Segadas Viana ratified the contract on April 8, 1953.49 The Revista do Trabalho, edited by Steinbruch, published the text as an “example to be copied.”50 The contract fundamentally changed industrial relations in Volta Redonda. Union leaders had demonstrated that they understood how the CSN’s central place in the national economy, the organization of mill work, and the government’s commitment to Volta Redonda enhanced the steelworkers’ strategic power. They had reached a level of labor organization that posed the credible threat of a crippling strike, and they had devised a masterly strategy to translate the strategic power into successful bargaining for higher wages and benefits. Under a banner that seemed uncontroversial—namely, respect for labor rights (reconhecer os direitos)— union lawyers skillfully exploited provisions of the CLT that had been written without the steel industry’s specific technical constraints in mind.

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The union thus combined a serious economic threat—to shut down one of Brazil’s most important industrial enterprises—with legal pressure to implement the labor law in its most expansive interpretation. The strategy hinged on the potential political cost for the government. Vargas’s authority and his political legacy depended on the success of both his desenvolvimentista and his trabalhista agendas, and the Volta Redonda steelworkers had the power to advance or undermine both. A strike at the CSN would have had ripple effects throughout the national economy and would have exposed the government to further criticism from both the radical left and the conservative opposition. A refusal to engage the union’s legal arguments and make significant concessions would have raised doubts about Vargas’s commitment to the labor law and undermined his support in the non-Communist labor movement. The decision to take the lead in the negotiations, on the other hand, allowed the government to claim ample credit for the successful outcome and strengthen its position with a core constituency. The union leaders had mounted the challenge to the CSN’s practices in a way that allowed all sides to keep face in the ultimate resolution, although the union contract represented a clear victory for the workers. In a game of the bureaucratic politics of labor, the union had not only defied the power of the state but rather manipulated it to serve the interests of its members.

A New Era of Industrial Relations The union contract made labor management less paternalistic and more transparent for employees. Prizes and penalties—among the CSN’s most important instruments to build loyalty, enhance performance, and establish discipline—lost in importance. In July 1952, the company implemented a process that allowed workers to petition for the cancellation of any penalty. The CSN assessed the merit of the petition based on testimony by the employee’s superiors and an evaluation of his overall performance.51 As a result cancellations of penalties became much more frequent. In October 1952, the CSN summarily canceled all fines workers had incurred under wartime law (1942 to 1946), removing a blemish from their records that made many ineligible for the Prêmio Decenal, a prize for ten years of dedicated service.52 After May 1953, the company’s daily bulletin, the Boletim de Serviço de Volta Redonda (BSVR), no longer specified the employee’s actions that led to the penalty and listed instead the relevant paragraph of the personnel rules (Regulamento de Pessoal; RPE).53 Rather than explain, for example, that the employee had “provoked—with inopportune jokes—disturbances at the workplace,” the BSVR noted bureaucratically that he had received a “[p]enalty—for violating Art. 21 § 1, item b

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of the RPE.”54 The personnel department instituted an information service to answer employees’ questions about specific aspects of the employment relationship such as promotions, reclassifications, leaves, transfers, prizes, absences, and the cancellation of penalties.55 The BSVR published detailed explanations of specific rules to help the employees understand their rights. For the paid rest day, for example, it clarified how absences would be deducted under the new salary scheme.56 The contract led to sharp increases in operational costs. It drove the CSN to introduce a new career ladder that reclassified all workers as salaried employees. The formula to convert hourly wages into monthly salaries was to multiply the wage by 240 (an eight-hour day multiplied by a thirtyday month) and then add 40.7 percent.57 The CSN directors estimated that higher labor costs accounted for 60 percent of the company’s increase in expenditure and calculated that a 15 percent price hike would be required to offset the added costs. As monopoly producer, the CSN could impose such price hikes, but the directors realized that the practice undermined the company’s mission to contribute to national development by supplying cheap steel. They increased prices for thick steel plate by 20 percent, but those for rails and tin plate by only 10 percent in order to limit the detrimental impact on the national economy.58 The union continued to drive a hard bargain. The 1953 union contract included a general raise of Cr$500, which translated into nominal salary increases of 10 to 12 percent for skilled workers and up to 33 percent for unskilled laborers. The contract also implemented overtime pay for all employees below section heads and a nighttime bonus of 20 percent for work between 10 p.m. and 5 a.m. Previously, only workers scheduled for night shift (midnight–8 a.m.) had received that bonus. The CSN agreed to provide workers on night shift with a warm meal by distributing lunch boxes and setting up stoves in suitable places. It also lengthened the lunch break to facilitate eating at home for all workers expect for production shifts and emergency staff. As a one-time concession, the CSN canceled all penalties for workers who had at least ten years of company time and no new penalties over the course of the previous two years. The amnesty made scores of employees eligible for the Prêmio Quinquenal, the prize for five years of loyal service. The 1953 contract increased the company’s operating costs by Cr$120 million.59 In 1954, company and union signed a supplementary agreement, which increased salaries and bonuses by 25 percent over levels in September 1953. The raise applied to all regular employees as well as the crews of the Núcleo da Expansão da Usina, who built the expanded facilities under Plano B.60 The transformation of industrial relations under the 1952 and 1953 union contracts prompted the company to adopt new personnel rules. It

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used legal terms corresponding to those of the CLT and spelled out the rules in more detail and with greater legal precision. The introduction of career ladders for all employees, for example, required completely revised sections on “filling positions and vacancies” as well as on “pay.” The new personnel rules included a section on benefits that listed no less than seventeen bonuses and other special payments, laying out eligibility rules for each one. The benefits section covered incentive pay (prêmio de incentivo), although it had not yet been widely introduced at the CSN, and stipulated that such incentive pay could be granted if it was in the interest of production. The personnel rules’ section on petitions laid out the rules for employees to dispute penalties or administrative decisions that adversely affected their eligibility for promotions or bonuses. The section on the “disciplinary regime” remained almost unchanged compared to 1946 and was therefore much less prominent in otherwise greatly expanded personnel rules. The minimum requirements for the cancellation of a penalty remained strict and the directors still had the final word, but more transparent procedures improved the penalty regime from the employees’ perspective.61 In the spirit of transparency, the 1953 union contract mandated that the CSN provide every employee with a copy of the new personnel rules. The 1952 and 1953 union contracts dramatically increased real wages and set the stage for further impressive gains in the mid-1950s. After four 4,500 4,000 3,500

Cruzeiros

3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500

19

4 19 1 4 19 2 43 19 4 19 4 4 19 5 4 19 6 4 19 7 4 19 8 4 19 9 50 19 5 19 1 5 19 2 5 19 3 5 19 4 5 19 5 5 19 6 5 19 7 5 19 8 59 19 6 19 0 6 19 1 6 19 2 6 19 3 64

0

Year All Workers

Skilled

Semiskilled

Unskilled

figure 7.4  Real Wages at the CSN by Skill Level (in 1952 Cr$). A cost-of-living index for the city of Rio de Janeiro was used to deflate the nominal wages. See endnote 62 for an explanation of the low values for 1960 and 1961. Source: Sample of CSN Personnel Files.

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years of stagnating or declining income (1947–1951), the contracts inaugurated a period of sustained growth (Figure 7.4).62 Between 1951 and 1957, the average real wage at the CSN increased by 93 percent. The raises set by union contracts amounted to between 65 and 85 percent, depending on the salary class. Promotions, bonuses, and incentive pay accounted for the difference.63 It serves as a testimony to the union’s successful management of industrial relations that the national minimum wage increased by only 53 percent over the same period. The workers in Volta Redonda had been among the highest paid in Brazil in 1950, and gains from the contracts in the mid-1950s further improved their real incomes. The trajectory of real wages at the CSN compared very favorably to the inflation-adjusted minimum wage and to real wages of industrial workers in the city of Rio de Janeiro and the state of São Paulo. The rather awkwardly named “maximum” minimum wage—assuming full employment at 240 hours of work per month—for the state of Rio de Janeiro was equal to the average CSN wage during construction (1943), about 40 percent the CSN average in 1951, and about half the CSN average in 1959. An index of real wages in industry in Rio de Janeiro shows that they increased by only 12 percent between 1946 to 1963, compared to a 68 percent increase at the CSN over the same period. From 1951 to 1959, industrial wages in Rio de Janeiro increased by 45 percent while wages at the CSN increased by 82 percent. A similar index for São Paulo shows a remarkably low 5 percent increase in manufacturing wages there between 1951 and 1959. From 1945 to 1962, the São Paulo manufacturing wages increased by 41 percent, still well behind the CSN’s 68 percent for the same years. Even exercising due caution in the use of these index numbers, which are constructed based on scattered data, real wages grew much more rapidly for workers at the CSN than for those in Brazil’s industrial centers, both in the 1950s and during the entire postwar republic.64

The Challenge to Union Power Events in 1955 tested the new balance of power established by the landmark contracts in the early 1950s. National political drama set the stage for the temporary breakdown of industrial relations in Volta ­Redonda. Starting in 1953, President Vargas, who ruled without a parliamentary majority, came under pressure from the conservative opposition and sectors of the armed forces to rein in the growing social unrest. Industrial workers protested the rising cost of living and called for an increased minimum wage, a movement that culminated in the 1953 strike of 300,000 workers in São Paulo. Under growing pressure, fueled by the suspicion that he had

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orchestrated an attempt on the life of his most outspoken opponent, Carlos Lacerda, Vargas committed suicide on August 24, 1954, to preempt a coup and save his political legacy. Vice-President Café Filho assumed power, appointed a center-right government, and radically changed course in labor policies. The new Labor Minister Napoleão de Alencastro Guimarães (PTB) resorted to repression. In response to major strikes in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Minas Gerais, the government intervened in the Leopoldina Railway workers union, had workers at LIGHT arrested, and outlawed the General Workers Union (União Geral dos Trabalhadores; UGT).65 1955 was a presidential election year, and labor militants closed ranks behind the presidential ticket of Juscelino Kubitschek (PSD). As vicepresidential candidate he chose Vargas’s political heir in the PTB, João “Jango” Goulart, who controlled the trabalhista machine in the federal labor bureaucracy. The majority of the PTB preferred the alliance with Kubitschek’s PSD, despite misgivings about its conservative elements, to a renewal of the popular alliance between PTB and PSP that had elected Vargas in 1950.66 The Juscelino-Jango ticket also had the tacit support of the clandestine Communist Party.67 The UDN ran Gen. Juarez Távora and Milton Campos, and the PSP fielded a ticket of Ademar de Barros and the PTB dissident Danton Coelho. The fourth notable presidential candidate was Plínio Salgado, a leader of the fascist integralistas in the 1930s, who had recast the movement into the Party of Popular Representation (Partido de Representação Popular; PRP). Throughout 1955, conservative military officers made thinly veiled threats of an intervention because the political parties refused to agree on a candidate of national unity. The officers expressed reservations about the leftist leanings of the Juscelino-Jango ticket, which, they feared, would revive Vargas’s policies. Constitutionalist factions in the military vowed to guarantee a peaceful vote without interference, however. The increasing polarization between the Café Filho government and labor militants who supported the Juscelino-Jango ticket cast a long shadow over the 1955 union elections in Volta Redonda. With the race wide open, the government saw an opportunity to rein in an increasingly independent and powerful union—with a little help from the political police and the CSN. The incumbent union president Walter Millen da Silva, in office since 1953, was far less popular than his predecessor Allan Cruz. The two leaders differed in style and in intellect more than in political persuasion. Both maintained friendly relations with the CSN directorate and cooperated with the political police against Communist militants. 68 Cruz had skillfully retained the trust of the workers, however, while Millen’s close relationship with CSN president Sílvio Raulino de Oliveira gave them cause for suspicion.69 Millen had political aspirations in the PSD but failed

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to win election to the state legislature in 1954 after the Anti-Communist Legion accused him of Communist leanings. Millen later learned that the union’s former lawyer, Aarão Steinbruch, had mentioned his name in a political rally organized by an allegedly Communist organization. Millen had fired Steinbruch a few months earlier and interpreted the comments as payback. His decision to distribute fliers criticizing Steinbruch backfired, however, and further eroded Millen’s support among the workers.70 As sitting union president, Millen had to organize the 1955 union elections. In March 1955, he proposed an election date to the Regional Labor Office and provided a list of trusted men to direct the different voting stations.71 He announced the elections in the local press and published a list of the registered candidates for the union’s directorate and for the Council of Representatives to the Federation.72 Millen also had to provide a list of the candidates and two documents for each of them: a signed declaration that they were eligible under the labor law to stand for election, and an atestado de ideologia política para fins sindicais from DOPS-RJ to certify that they had no ideological past.73 The Regional Labor Office apparently disregarded the fact that the Vargas government had abolished the atestado for union elections back in 1951. DOPS-RJ issued the atestado for all candidates in STIMMMEBM’s elections but one, the electrician Euclides Mendes de Souza, who immediately withdrew his name. He had run for vice-mayor of Barra Mansa in 1954 on a ticket of “popular candidates”—enough evidence for the police to categorize him as a “professional Communist agitator.”74 José Claudio Alves, a CSN maintenance mechanic, appeared set to defeat Millen’s handpicked successor, but Mendes de Souza’s withdrawal caused problems as the political police tried to portray him as the “brain behind the ticket.”75 Millen hoped that a disqualification (impugnação) of Alves’s ticket for Communist ties might secure his faction’s victory. Two weeks before the elections, a letter by a worker to the Regional Labor Office demanded that Alves’s ticket be barred from the elections because its members “adhered to ideologies incompatible with the interests of the nation and the regime” and thus violated the labor law. Millen, who had forwarded the letter, added that the ticket “ingeniously provided cover” for “subversive elements selected by Mendes de Souza.”76 The letter further accused Mendes de Souza of registering a ticket for the Council of Representatives to the Federation whose candidates served as mere stand-ins for the alternates Israel Santana and Ady Gigante, both “elements of the same stock as Mendes de Souza.”77 Millen speculated that Mendes de Souza took advantage of the official candidates’ “naïveté and good faith.” The Regional Labor Office disqualified both tickets tied to Mendes de Souza, but the candidates appealed the decision immediately.

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By election day in late April the legal challenge remained unresolved. Election officials decided to count all votes, including those for disqualified tickets, but to declare a winner only once the Labor Ministry resolved the impasse. The decision made for a tense vote count. When his tickets fell behind, Millen launched an official protest against the validity of the elections. He repeated the accusations against the disqualified tickets and cited irregularities that, he claimed, were the “sabotaging work of extremist elements.” The supposed irregularities presented sufficient grounds, he argued, to annul the elections in order to “avert the danger of handing over the union to suspicious elements or even militant Communists.” Alves rebutted the accusations and threatened to sue Millen for slander. Un­ deterred, Millen repeated his accusations and warned that these agitators, once in power, would “disrupt the tranquility of the class (da classe).” The vote count continued, however, and the appointed officials certified the final result. The disqualified tickets carried the day. Alves received 1,854 votes for union president and Hamilton Gomes da Silva 1,877 votes for representative to the federation. Millen and his protégés won the plurality of votes among tickets that had not been disqualified. José Pereira dos Santos received 1,750 votes for union president, over 1,000 more than the third-place ticket, and Millen himself had the second-most votes (848) for representative to the federation.78 The final decision was left in the hands of the Labor Ministry. Millen made his case for an annulment of the elections in a letter that he submitted together with the certified election results. He applauded the DRT’s earlier decision to disqualify Alves’s ticket in order to save the union a “red adventure” and repeated his assertion that the ticket violated article 530 of the CLT, which prohibited the election of “communist elements.”79 The Regional Labor Office consulted the political police to decide whether Millen’s accusations had basis in fact. DOPS-RJ concluded that Alves as well as his running mates Nestor Lima, José Bonifacio Castro, Rubem Frota, Luiz Antônio Leite, Antônio Nascimento da Silva, and Salomão Oliveira Mello all adhered to the Communist creed. According to “trustworthy sources,” they had engaged in subversive activities under the guidance of Mendes de Souza, who, the report added, had caused trouble in the union and had even “threatened Walter Millen da Silva with death.”80 The reporting officer must have had a sudden change of mind: just two months earlier, he had signed off on atestados ideológicos for Alves and all his running mates.81 In the absence of new evidence, he decided to classify the ticket as Communist out of political opportunism. In the case of Nestor Lima, for example, who had no record of political activities in his DOPSRJ file, ideological antecedents had become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The police created a file when Lima applied for the atestado ideológico to stand

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in the election, and after the elections the mere existence of that file served as evidence for an ideological past and a branding as “Communist.”82 The DRT analyzed the union materials before it passed them on to the Labor Ministry for a final decision on the certification of the election and the disqualification of the winning tickets. The analysis focused on disparities between voter signatures and deposited ballots, a lack of documentation from voting stations, and inconsistencies in the criteria for annulling entire ballot boxes. The DRT concluded that the election was “stained by incurable vices that guaranteed its invalidity” in light of the small difference in votes between Alves’s and Pereira dos Santos’s tickets. The memo warned that the elected ticket included people “antagonistic to the harmony of classes and the democratic order—adherents of the Marxist ideology,” and recommended that the elections be annulled.83 Interim labor minister ­Waldir Niemeyer, however, found the evidence insufficient to justify the annulment. He overturned the disqualifications, certified the election, and ordered the investiture of Alves’s victorious ticket.84 The head of DRT, ­Fenelon de Souza, installed the new directorate in late June. Millen refused to attend the legally required public inauguration in Volta Redonda in mid-July, but PTB representatives led by Aarão Steinbruch pressured Fenelon to hold the ceremony regardless.85 At the inauguration, CSN president Macedo Soares reassured the union that he wanted to maintain good relations and promised to study the workers’ future demands with the greatest care.86 The new union directorate immediately put the CSN to the test by launching a campaign for a new contract.87 In his inaugural speech, Alves lamented the “astronomical” increases in the cost of living and announced the creation of a commission to prepare contract negotiations.88 In August, the union held two assemblies to discuss wages, and members voted to demand a raise of 12 percent or a fixed increase of Cr$1,200, whichever was more.89 On August 23, 1955, Alves formally presented the company with the demand in a letter that included a sample family budget to make the case for a substantial raise. He also demanded the swifter resolution of equal pay for equal work complaints and proposed to make the mixed commission that reviewed such complaints a permanent institution to handle the growing backlog. The third major demand was for the CSN to pay all employees a minimum occupational salary (salário mínimo profissional) to ensure that old-timers not earn less than more recently hired employees. Specific examples of such “injustices” from the electric plant illustrated the problem. The union also demanded an automatic cancellation of up to five penalties for employees who had job protection and made recommendations to improve work safety, such as the use of buses instead of trucks for transport to protect the employees against bad weather and the heavily polluted air.90

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The volatile national political situation overshadowed the contract negotiation. When Macedo Soares appeared at a union assembly in early October to explain why the company rejected the union demands, Mendes de Souza assailed him as an “enemy of the workers.” The DOPS-RJ officer believed that the local Communists, who supported the KubitschekGoulart ticket, used the contract negotiations to gain ground ahead of the closely contested presidential vote.91 The CSN, on the other hand, took a calculated gamble by stalling the negotiations ahead of the presidential elections. A victory for UDN candidate Gen. Juarez Távora would have emboldened the political police and the Labor Ministry to take decisive action against the alleged Communists, undermining union strength and improving the company’s bargaining position. The losing candidate in ­STIMMMEBMVR’s presidential election, José Pereira dos Santos, called on Labor Minister Napoleão Alencastro de Guimarães to schedule a new election to protect Volta Redonda from Communist infiltration. He repeated the old accusations of Communist subversion against Alves and argued that the revised assessments by the police should outweigh the atestados ideológicos issued before the elections.92 The regional and national Labor Offices supported the request and recommended that the Labor Ministry appoint an intervener to administer the elections on STIMMMEBMVR’s behalf. Following the recommendation, Alencastro de Guimarães annulled the election and ordered the appointment of an intervener to call new elections within 60 days.93 The DRT informed Alves of the decision on October 7 and officially decreed the intervention on October 10.94 The decision triggered a showdown between the workers and the government. As soon as the news broke, union militants called an assembly to defend the union and vowed to remain in session until the crisis was resolved. Mendes de Souza rallied the members against this “act of state arbitrariness” and Israel Santana raised funds to sustain the protest after the Labor Ministry blocked union accounts. Angry workers prevented the appointed intervener from taking power by denying him access to the union offices. They accused Millen of complicity, but Allan Cruz defended him and blamed the CSN, which prompted one of its directors, Paulo Monteiro Mendes, to appear at the union assembly and deny the charge emphatically. He assured the workers of the company’s full support and offered to give them a day off to protest the decision in Rio de Janeiro. The next day, army and police sent more officers to Volta Redonda as militant union members organized the resistance. Mendes de Souza called on workers to demand the resignation of Alencastro de Guimarães and militants barred reporters of conservative newspapers, Tribuna da Imprensa and O Globo, from accessing union offices. Imprensa Popular, the only paper “favorable

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to the workers,” had exclusive rights to report on the ­unfolding events inside the union hall. Several clandestine Communists took advantage of the opportunity to demand the legalization of the PCB, but the resistance against the intervention was no Communist plot. The local commercial association opposed the intervention and Mayor Savio Cota de Almeida Gama (PSD) distributed a leaflet insisting that workers should have control over their own affairs.95 Even faced with such broad resistance, the political police still planned to install the intervener. Sílvio Solon Ribeiro, the head of DOPS-RJ, personally coordinated the operation. He commanded special squads to carry out the operation based on intelligence provided by the local DOPS-RJ officer Austricliano da Silva. The first attempt to take the union offices failed miserably. Da Silva, Solon, and his deputy Afrisio approached the premises by car under the protection of guards armed with machine guns. When the officers left their vehicles to walk to the entrance of the union building, workers formed a wall of bodies to shield the premises. Several workers punched and kicked Afrisio, who was most persistent, and one even “attacked him with an umbrella.” The officers retreated, regrouped in Barra Mansa, and requested reinforcements from DOPS-RJ headquarters. That evening, another six heavily armed officers arrived from Niterói and the military police (Polícia Militar; PM) sent a squad of shock troops. The workers redoubled their effort to protect the union building when they learned about the reinforcements. They organized a shift system to relieve those who had to go to work and called on family members to join them on the union premises, a practice the police described as “tática ­comunista.” The workers also set up checkpoints to search pedestrians and cars for weapons that could be used in a police operation. In response, Solon ordered his officers to drive through the steel mill because he no longer considered the public streets safe for police. That night, the CSN sent a food truck with bread, butter, and coffee for the workers guarding the offices. Worker delegations from Rio de Janeiro and several local politicians stopped by to declare their support.96 Some in the union favored negotiations while others insisted on a hard line. Union president Alves delivered a much-applauded speech in the union hall, proposing to create a governing board composed of the stateappointed intervener and two directors elected by the workers. He presented the proposal to the head of the political police, the mayor of Volta Redonda, and representatives of the Labor Ministry, who all agreed that the inauguration of such an interim directorate should take place the next morning. Distrust lingered among the workers, however. When time came to leave the union premises for the ceremony, one man shouted: “We will not abandon our union!” Militants joined the call, and the workers de-

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cided to stay put and preempt any police maneuvers. Taking the hard line paid off. A few hours later, the DRT revoked the decree to appoint an intervener after the leader of the state PSD, Ernani do Amaral Peixoto, had been assured by the state secretary for security that the police would not use violence. The assurance spelled defeat for the government in its struggle for control of the union. PSD and PTB politicians claimed credit for the defense of the union, but the local DOPS-RJ officer believed that the actions of the allegedly Communist militants, and Mendes de Souza in particular, had been decisive.97 The outcome of the presidential elections strengthened the position of the union leadership. Kubitschek received 3.1 million votes (36 percent) versus 2.6 million for Juarez Távora (30 percent) and 2.2 million for ­Ademar de Barros (26 percent).98 Goulart won the vice-presidential election with 3.6 million votes against Milton Campos’s 3.4 million and Danton Coelho’s 1.4 million.99 Kubitschek carried Volta Redonda with 48 percent of the vote compared to 36 percent for Ademar de Barros, whose PSP had built a strong following among workers. Goulart carried 71 percent of the vice-presidential vote in Volta Redonda.100 Only days after Kubitschek’s victory became official, the company and the union signed a new contract to replace the preliminary agreement from early October, which had included a provision voiding the contract in case of a change in union leadership. Most important, the new contract increased salaries by 20 percent, or at least Cr$1,000, and modified the family bonus to benefit workers with many children. Instead of a fixed amount (Cr$400) for three or more children, they now received Cr$200 monthly per child.101 Within five years, the workers of the CSN had transformed STIMM­ MEBMVR from a defunct union under state intervention into one of Brazil’s most powerful labor organizations. The political opening created by Vargas’s 1950 presidential run and his convincing victory had provided space for workers to organize and present their pent-up grievances from the late 1940s as a coherent set of demands. Allan Cruz, who led the union in the early 1950s, understood the strategic position of the CSN and its workers and mounted a campaign that translated strategic power into material gain. Supported by an excellent team of labor lawyers, he used the political leverage that came with the CSN’s strategic power to assure that the workers received all the benefits guaranteed by law. The 1952 and 1953 contracts set new parameters for industrial relations in Volta Redonda that allowed the union to negotiate with the CSN from a position of strength. The government’s attempt to subdue the union in the failed 1955 intervention made it more militant and less reliant on state patronage, and thus even more independently powerful.

8

The Crisis of Developmentalism from union hegemony to the military coup

In this instant . . . the Radio Siderúrgica Nacional . . . goes on the air to call on Volta Redonda, to send a warning to Volta Redonda, to tell Volta Redonda—represented by all the social classes, starting with the most humble workers— that this is a decisive moment . . . Volta Redonda, as part of our economic emancipation, cannot fail to participate in this instant when Brazil will choose its course, either the course of liberation or the course of enslavement. —Othon Reis Fernandes Leader of the Metalworkers Union April 1, 1964

The events of 1955 had strengthened the bargaining position of the metalworkers union. José Claudio Alves’s victory in the union’s presidential elections, finally confirmed in October after months of uncertainty, ensured that the union remained the workers’ legitimate representative for contract negotiations. Alves vowed to push for wage concessions and improved working conditions much more aggressively than his immediate predecessor, Walter Millen da Silva, who had lost all credibility by supporting the intervention in the union. Alves tried to rally the membership and generate momentum for a contract with gains comparable to those made in 1952 and 1953. He saw the CSN in a weak bargaining position because it had supported the intervention and been defeated. Nominally, the company had maintained neutrality in the conflict, but President Macedo Soares’s conduct during the standoff betrayed his sympathies. The union leaders expected the new federal government under President Juscelino ­Kubitschek and Vice-President João Goulart, scheduled to take office in early 1956, to support the workers’ cause. Most important, they expected Kubitschek to appoint a new company president from the PSD-PTB camp to replace Macedo Soares, who sympathized with the conservative National Democratic Union (União Democrática Nacional; UDN). Kubitschek, however, had his own plans for the CSN. He had campaigned on the slogan to make Brazil progress “fifty years in five,” and state-controlled industrial companies such as the CSN were key assets to

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realize that promise. Kubitschek prioritized accelerated industrial development and expected Volta Redonda to make its contribution. For the success of his ambitious plans for production targets (Programa de Metas), Kubitschek needed the CSN to increase production and improve the quality of its steel in order to supply new industries that he hoped to bring to Brazil, such as multinational automobile manufacturers.1 Macedo Soares had more technical expertise and managerial experience in the steel industry than any other Brazilian and appeared to be the best man to oversee the company’s continued expansion and focus on quality at the same time. He offered his resignation as CSN president, as was customary for political appointees when a new government took office, but Kubitschek asked him to stay on. The decision caused resentment in the union and the local PTB, which had expected a labor-friendly appointment in return for electoral support. The political outrage caught up with the president during his inaugural visit to Volta Redonda in January 1956. When Macedo Soares, Kubitschek, and U.S. vice-president Richard Nixon left the Hotel Bela Vista for a tour of the mill, the PTB leader Othon Reis Fernandes confronted them, pointed at Macedo Soares, and demanded of Kubitschek: “Your Excellence has to remove this man from here.”2 It only added to the embarrassment that Reis Fernandes was not just any worker, but the head of the company’s personnel department. Incensed, Macedo Soares demoted Reis Fernandes to office assistant at the Fábrica de Estruturas Metálicas (FEM), a subsidiary that built metallic structures from CSN steel. Only his impeccable work record saved Reis Fernandes from being fired.3 Still, the demotion hurt him financially. In his new job he made less than half his previous salary because he lost the bonus owed to a department head and went back to the base salary for his occupational category: administrative assistant. The labor law’s provisions against arbitrary salary reductions did not apply to employees leaving positions of trust (cargos de confiança) such as department head.4 Little did Macedo Soares know that his act of revenge, the humiliation of Othon Reis Fernandes, was the birth of a union leader (Figure 8.1). After the demotion, Reis Fernandes placed his administrative experience and his knowledge of personnel management at the union’s service. He knew the company as well as anybody. Hired in 1942, with little formal schooling, he embarked on an impressive career that saw him move from one position of trust to the next. During construction, he worked as controller at the concrete plant and built a reputation as a responsible and reliable employee. After construction, he joined the staff of the personnel department, where he earned two promotions and three reclassifications in five years. In 1952, the CSN appointed him head of the personnel department, a position that paid as much as an engineer earned for directing a

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figure 8.1  Union Leader Othon Reis Fernandes. Local metalworkers union president (1957–1961) and the union’s dominant figure until 1963. He also served as the CSN’s director for social services (1962–1964). Source: CSN Photographic Archive.

production department.5 By 1957, after ten years at the personnel department, Reis Fernandes had gained intimate familiarity with the company’s industrial relations policies and understood the intricacies of the labor law with respect to personnel matters. Reis Fernandes had also distinguished himself as a gifted public speaker. The CSN had regularly asked him to deliver speeches at official company celebrations. A longtime union member but never a militant, Reis Fernandes came to fame in workers’ circles because of the Kubitschek incident. His skill set transferred well to his new role. As his political police file put it: “By means of his activities and his intelligence, he made himself a leader.”6 STIMMMEBMVR entered the 1956 contract negotiations without legitimate leadership because of disputes among its directors. Nestor Lima, Israel Santana, and José de Bonifacio, all suspected Communists, distrusted union president Alves because he had been willing to compromise during the standoff in October 1955. When the union hosted the 1st National Conference of Brazilian Metalworkers, in April 1956, they conspired to exclude Alves from the proceedings.7 In July, they had him impeached by a general assembly, and Nestor Lima assumed the presidency.8 The new

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leaders then convinced the membership to support the demand for an unprecedented 50 percent raise. According to police records, they tried to stymie discussion of the company’s counterproposal. At the assembly in October 1956, Lima and Euclides Mendes de Souza prevented speakers opposed to their hard line from taking the floor, forcing them to voice their opposition by gathering signatures in favor of the counterproposal. Company and union ultimately agreed on a compromise that raised pay between 25 and 43 percent depending on salary class. Two other CSN concessions suggest that the union had a strong bargaining position despite its internal turmoil. The company permitted union representatives to attend weekly meetings of the Superintendency for Social Services and Industrial Relations, which represented a first, small step toward codetermination of shop-floor policies. The CSN also agreed to review the formula for annual profit sharing, which, the union argued, benefited those with the highest salaries disproportionately.9 Five opposition slates lined up to unseat Nestor Lima in the regular union elections in 1957. The political police believed that only Reis ­Fernandes’s Independent Ticket (Chapa Independência) stood a chance to defeat Lima, who was eligible to run for reelection under a new law that abolished the one-term limit for union officials. Reis Fernandes benefited from the personal vendettas of other candidates, as both Walter Millen and José Claudio Alves campaigned primarily against Nestor Lima. Reis Fernandes ran an effective campaign built around a newspaper, Zero Hora, which portrayed him as a champion of the workers.10 Local folklore has it that Reis Fernandes mounted loudspeakers on his bicycle and delivered his stump speech as he pedaled around the city. The election took place in late May in a tense climate with officers of the federal and state political police on site and ready to intervene. Reis Fernandes won with 3,216 votes (48 percent) to Nestor Lima’s 2,349 (35 percent). Reis Fernandes took the administrative and maintenance departments in landslides and lost only five of the twentynine polling stations overall. He had least support in the rolling mills, where Nestor Lima worked as maintenance mechanic. The margin of victory was comfortable but would still have allowed for an appeal to the Labor Ministry. The militants had learned the lesson of 1955, however. Nestor Lima declared that calls for an annulment would stain the elections and publicly congratulated Reis Fernandes, offering his full cooperation and assuring the new leadership of an orderly transition of power.11 Reis Fernandes took the reins of the union at a difficult moment for the CSN. The state of the national economy and stretched government finances limited the company’s freedom to make generous concessions on wages and benefits. The devaluation of the national currency squeezed the resources of a company that purchased much of its equipment and raw

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materials abroad. To make matters worse, the tariffs law (3.244, Aug. 14, 1957) stripped the company of the right to exchange currency for foreign coal, spare parts, and tools at a preferential rate, even as the government insisted that the CSN sell its steel for no more than half the price of imports. The company also suffered from rising inflation (20 percent in 1957). More and more customers failed to make timely payments for their purchases, which in effect meant that they received a loan at negative interest. The 1957 annual report warned that the company could not absorb further dramatic increases in the cost of supplies or the wage bill.12 Improving the quality of the product under these circumstances was a tall order. A shortage of imported rolls from the United States undermined the plan to change rolls more often and even threatened to shut down production altogether. An unsteady supply of iron ore had forced the steelworks to increase the share of scrap in its heats.13 In November 1957, the CSN had to revamp its quality control because too much of the production failed to meet specifications and had to be scrapped.14 The workers, on the other hand, saw their substantial salary gains from earlier years being eroded by inflation and expected the union to stand its ground. A conflict over profit sharing erupted just as Reis Fernandes prepared to take office. Union militants distributed a leaflet with a speech by state representative Simão Mansur, who accused the CSN and the government of arbitrarily reducing the amount set aside for profit sharing. Mansur asserted that the production for the year had fallen because “workers . . . no longer had an incentive for producing.”15 Mansur was wrong about the falling production. The real reason for the diminished share of profits was that the government as the company’s main shareholder had not approved the full amount requested by the directorate. Many workers stood to receive much less than they had anticipated. In years past, the CSN had guaranteed every employee at least as great a profit share as the previous year, but it abolished that guarantee in April 1957.16 The media echo created by Mansur’s accusations forced Reis Fernandes to address the issue at his inauguration as union president. He clarified that production for 1957 had not fallen, as Mansur claimed, but only grown less than the previous year, and he disputed that the workers carried any responsibility for the shortfall.17 The contract negotiations in 1957 and 1958 were first tests of Reis Fernandes’s ability to satisfy union members without overburdening the company. A record four thousand workers attended the general assembly in September 1957 and voted to demand a 31 percent raise, a proposal the CSN rejected instantly.18 The union then filed a collective grievance (­dissídio coletivo) at the Regional Labor Court (Tribunal Regional de Trabalho; TRT), which led to an arbitration ruling that allowed both sides to save face. The new contract increased salaries by only 15 percent, below

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the level of inflation, but it addressed other pending issues. It affirmed that workers on shift were entitled to a 45-minute meal break and established meal breaks missed for operational reasons would be paid as overtime. The company also agreed to study the reorganization of the staffing plans and career ladders to respond to increased workloads, above all in the maintenance departments.19 The raise in 1958 was again only 15 percent, but the CSN agreed to calculate the pay for the weekly rest day based on the workers’ overall income, which increased take-home pay for those who earned overtime, night shift bonuses, or incentive pay. The CSN also introduced a new formula for profit sharing that made the payments more proportional to the employee’s salary.20 Despite the concessions on benefits, the average worker’s real income stagnated after 1957 (see Figure 7.4). Unskilled workers, in particular, suffered the effects of two general raises that fell short of the level of inflation. Unskilled employees had fewer opportunities to earn overtime and nighttime bonuses because most did not work in departments that were on the shift system. The great majority of the occupations in the maintenance and production departments on the shift system required significant skill. Those workers benefited from the CSN’s concessions on bonuses and benefits because they received overtime, night bonuses, and incentive pay. As a result, the real income of the average skilled worker continued to increase in the late 1950s at almost the same pace as earlier in the decade. The real income of semiskilled employees remained flat between 1957 and 1959. Overall, the union contracts of the late 1950s widened the income gap between skilled and unskilled workers in a marked departure from the previous fifteen years. In good times, the CSN had looked out for the weakest members of the família siderúrgica (steel family) with a progressive salary policy. Raises in the mid-1940s and early 1950s had increased the income in lower pay scales by at least the same percentage as those of workers in higher pay scales, but under the new economic circumstances the distribution of income became more unequal. Preserving the steelworkers’ material standing in the face of rising inflation became Reis Fernandes’s primary goal for subsequent contract negotiations. A change in CSN leadership appeared to make his task easier. In October 1959, Macedo Soares stepped down in protest against government interference in the company’s financial affairs. He believed that companies of mixed private and public capital could best fulfill their mission for the national economy if they retained full managerial and financial autonomy. His successor was the man the government had appointed to the CSN’s board of directors to control the price setting, João Kubitschek de Figueiredo, a metallurgical engineer and the cousin of the president.21 Soon after Macedo Soares’s departure, the company agreed to a 44 percent

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general raise, which put the workers ahead of inflation (31 percent) for the first time in three years.22 The 1960 contract introduced a new mechanism to adjust wages for inflation. It created the Commission for Living Cost Research (Commissão de Pesquisa do Custo de Vida; CPCV), with company and union representatives, which prepared a monthly cost-of-living index based on local prices. The company authorized a salary adjustment whenever inflation exceeded 5 percent since the last raise. Three months had to pass between adjustments, mostly to control the workload for personnel and payroll departments, but the mechanism still made workers’ income much more predictable.23 Most retirees remember Reis Fernandes above all for the creation of the CPCV.

Toward Union Hegemony Reis Fernandes refined the union’s industrial relations strategy at a time when contracts no longer delivered the material gains workers had become accustomed to. Defending the members’ interests under less favorable circumstances than the union had enjoyed under Allan Cruz (1951–1953) required a more complex strategic vision. Reis Fernandes could not make the political argument, as Cruz had in his appeal to Vargas, that the government should support the union in order to enhance respect for the labor law and give workers a due share of the fruits of their labors. The core goals of trabalhismo—decent wages, comprehensive benefits, a strong union, and social assistance programs—had been realized more fully in Volta Redonda than anywhere else in the country. Politically, the company’s financial difficulties and the government’s focus on the CSN’s contribution to industrial development outweighed the union’s complaints about inflationary losses, unfair wage determination, and shortcomings in social assistance programs. Reis Fernandes could not count on the Kubitschek government to encourage the CSN to be more generous; to the contrary, the government expected the company to contain costs to keep prices low. The foundation for Reis Fernandes’s strategy was the steelworkers’ strategic power. The “market context” and the “technical context,” in the words of industrial relations scholar John Dunlop, had not changed since the early 1950s.24 The CSN was still a strategic industry for the national economy, even though the Kubitschek government tried to redefine and diminish its role by supporting the creation of two other state-owned integrated steel mills, USIMINAS in Ipatinga (MG) and the Companhia Siderúrgica Paulista (COSIPA) in Cubatão (SP). They would not begin production until the early 1960s, however, and Kubitschek’s development agenda therefore depended on steel made in Volta Redonda. The organiza-

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tion of work in the mill had not changed, either, and production remained vulnerable to stoppages by workers in technically strategic positions. The expansions in the 1950s had increased production capacity without fundamental technological change.25 The unionization rate at the CSN had remained impressively high throughout the 1950s, and Reis Fernandes’s strong leadership overcame the internal division of the 1955 and 1957 union elections. In 1960, the magazine Publicidade & Negócios (PN) noted that STIMMMEBMVR distinguished itself with the highest unionization rate (96 percent) among all Brazilian unions and an impressive ability to raise money from its 13,000-strong membership.26 Strong in numbers and united, with the technically strategic workers in the fold, the union had regained its muscle. STIMMMEBMVR faced a different “power context” from that of the early 1950s, however, which led Reis Fernandes to devise an industrial relations strategy that combined political mobilization with legal action. The union asserted its weight in electoral politics and broadened its appeal to the community by championing social assistance programs that benefited the entire population rather than only the inhabitants of the company town. Reis Fernandes tried to develop the union into a voting bloc for the PTB of Vice-President Goulart, who continued to exercise great influence over the labor bureaucracy. The union expected the PTB to guarantee the government’s respect for the labor law and fulfill a long-standing demand for the creation of conciliation and arbitration board (Junta de Conciliação e Julgamento; JCJ) in Volta Redonda, which would provide easier access to the labor justice system. As it was, the union had to file grievances in a regular local court, which rarely sided with labor.27 A local JCJ would facilitate the union’s dual strategy of extracting concessions on compensation and working conditions by combining direct negotiation with filing grievances in the courts. If we think of industrial relations as the battlefield of class struggle, the union engaged the company on multiple fronts with a unified strategy.28 It challenged the company in areas where it had enjoyed unquestioned primacy: the administration of the town, the discourse of social development, and control over the shop floor. Reis Fernandes aimed for union hegemony, and he recognized the significance of changes earlier in the 1950s that had diminished the CSN’s preeminence. The creation of the municipality of Volta Redonda in 1954 limited the company’s administrative control and established municipal government as a new arena of political struggle. The union had supported the “independence movement,” whose leaders accused the municipal government in Barra Mansa of spending too little of the tax revenue from the CSN on projects benefiting Volta Redonda. The union’s leader, Allan Cruz, belonged to the two nerve centers of the movement: the Masonic lodge

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I­ ndependência e Luz II, and the local Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrático; PSD).29 The PSD leaders, local cattle baron Sávio Cotta de Almeida Gama and state representative João Batista de Vasconcellos Torres, recruited Cruz for the union’s ability to deliver votes in a plebiscite.30 After stonewalling the process at first, the state legislature called the plebiscite about independence for June 1954; voltaredondenses voted overwhelmingly for emancipation from Barra Mansa (2,809 votes against 24).31 The union became a key player in local electoral politics. In the first municipal elections (1954), the people of Volta Redonda rewarded the independence leaders, electing Sávio Gama as mayor and Norival de ­Freitas, César Cândido Lemos (both PSD), and Jamil Rizkalla of the Social Progress Party (Partido Social Progressista; PSP) as councilmen. Otherwise, workers’ parties dominated. The PTB elected five councilmen, and the Brazilian Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Brasileiro; PSB) elected one.32 The first municipal government quickly addressed an issue of great concern to the workers. It opened up private land on the northern slopes of the Paraíba valley for construction, which allowed CSN employees without access to company housing an opportunity to buy lots in proximity to the workplace. The company’s power diminished as an ever-greater share of the population lived outside the company town and relied on the municipality for services. The two main workers’ parties, PTB and PSP, dominated Volta Redonda politics for the rest of the 1950s. The mayoral election in 1958 was a tight race between three candidates who all had labor ties. Cesar Cândido Lemos (PSP), with 5,486 votes, narrowly beat João Paulo Pio de Abreu (5,324 votes) and Wandir de Carvalho (PTB; 5,249 votes).33 STIMMMEBMVR built coalitions with local unions and expanded its geographic reach. In 1958, Reis Fernandes led the way to create the ­Inter-Paraíba Valley Union Accord (Pacto Inter-Sindical Vale do Paraíba), a coalition that fought for a higher minimum wage and committed to mutual support during labor conflicts. The alliance between metalworkers and construction workers unions benefited above all the men working on the mill expansion.34 In the early 1960s, the union extended its territorial basis to include metalworkers from the nearby municipalities of ­Resende and Barra do Piraí. The motion to affiliate with STIMMMEBMVR won overwhelming majorities in the respective assemblies. At Babcock & Wilson Caldeiras S/A in Resende, 262 of 268 members (98 percent) voted in favor; at the Fundição Barra do Piraí, 215 of 220 (98 percent); and at the Metalúrgica Barra do Piraí, all 21 members.35 In March 1960, ­STIMMMEBMVR’s general assembly voted unanimously to extend the union’s territorial base to Resende and Barra do Piraí. The decision gained the union (now STIMMMEBMVRRBP) 1,500 new paying members and greatly strengthened its political weight in the Sul Fluminense.36

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In Volta Redonda, Reis Fernandes used the union’s clout to promote changes that benefited the community at large, including those who lived outside the company town. His signature project was a reform of local primary education. All employers paid a contribution for the country’s educational spending proportionate to the number of employees, the socalled salário educação, which the federal Education Ministry (Ministério da Educação) redistributed to municipalities to help fund primary schools. Reis Fernandes brought together representatives of the Education Ministry, the state Secretariat for Education, and the CSN to broker a deal that allowed the municipality to retain the company’s contribution. This more than doubled the city’s education budget, enough to finance Reis Fernandes’s ambitious Primary Education Plan. School attendance rose to 100 percent as a result.37 Families living outside the company town benefited the most because their children had had no access to the heavily subsidized private schools. The initiative broadened the union’s support in the population at large. Under Reis Fernandes’s leadership the union stepped into a role that had been exclusively the CSN’s: it provided some social assistance programs for the people of Volta Redonda. The union also pressured the CSN to maintain its commitment to social assistance in areas such as housing, urban services, and medical treatment.38 The union leaders accused the company of reneging on its paternalist promise to provide the basic necessities for all the workers, not just those high enough up in the company hierarchy or with the requisite skills to be assigned a company house. The CSN still cultivated its image as the mother (mãe) of Volta Redonda society in O Lingote, a monthly company newspaper that provided news about the família siderúrgica, but the reality did not live up to the projected image. The company considered shedding responsibility for social assistance programs to ease the financial burden, as evident in a 1960 internal study about the possible sale of company housing to the employees.39 The union, on the other hand, positioned itself as the true defender of the workers and their families by supporting programs that benefited the entire community.

Career Ladders, Scientific Management, and the Labor Law The union’s political strategy and its community involvement, however, did little to stop the erosion of members’ wages and benefits under inflationary pressure. Reis Fernandes could not replicate the union’s strategy from the early 1950s, which had focused on legally owed benefits such as nighttime bonus, overtime pay, and the paid rest day to increase workers

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take-home pay. Those benefits had become part of the regular pay structure and no longer offered any legal leverage. Instead, Reis Fernandes had the union’s lawyers focus on the fairness and equity of the career ladders and salary structure. The pioneering 1952 union contract had transformed all workers into salaried employees on a uniform pay scale that used fourdigit numbers in the format XX.YY, with XX representing the broader salary class and YY the subclass.40 Every position in the mill had a defined occupational category and pay class, such as “Operador 25.09” or “­Operador 24.03,” establishing a career ladder with set paths for promotion. The CSN expected such standardization to result in a more rational and simpler labor management, despite the initial task of classifying more than one thousand technically specialized positions into a limited number of occupational categories and salary classes. The new pay scale’s high degree of standardization turned out to be a weakness, however. It permitted easy comparison of salaries, which opened the company up to grievances about salary parity under the federal labor law, the Consolidação das Leis de Trabalho (CLT). Its article 461 stipulated that equal work had to be paid equally: In the same occupation (função idêntica), performed for the same employer, and in the same location, the salary has to be equal for equal work, irrespective of sex, nationality, or age. § 1. Equal work is understood to mean, for the purposes of this article, work performed with the same productivity and the same technical perfection by people whose seniority differs by no more than two years. § 2. The provisions of this article do not apply in cases where the employer establishes a career ladder, in which case promotions should follow seniority and merit as criteria. § 3. In case the previous paragraph applies, promotions should occur alternating by seniority and merit, for each occupational class.41

Already during Cruz’s presidency, union lawyers had recognized that the new pay scale created opportunities to demand raises for individuals or occupational groups under article 461. The 1952 contract included a commitment on the part of the CSN to look into cases that appeared to violate article 461.42 The 1953 contract gave the union the right to refer such cases to an internal commission, which studied them and took the union’s suggestions for remedies into consideration.43 The union filed a complaint with the commission whenever it believed that the CSN had classified two employees in different salary classes even though they had the same occupation and performed equal work. The CSN commonly argued that the employees did not perform “equal work” or did not work with the “same productivity and the same technical perfection,” but the vagueness of the terms left room for argument.

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The members of the commission—which had included Reis Fernandes as the then-head of the personnel department—soon realized that they could not resolve many of the cases because they had no basis for comparing the job content of different positions. In 1955, the union formally complained about the backlog of cases that the commission had not been able to resolve.44 In July 1956, the CSN agreed to have its industrial engineering department prepare occupational descriptions for all jobs in the mill as a standard for comparison. These Folhas de Informações para Avaliação de Trabalho (literally, Information Sheets for the Assessment of Work), also known as Folhas de Descrição de Trabalho (Work Description Sheets) or Descrições das Funções (Functional Descriptions), specified the employee’s responsibilities, described the work routine, and listed equipment and personnel under the employee’s supervision. LEI’s engineers warned, however, that the process would take years to complete.45 The reform of the career ladders and the creation of work description sheets were specific aspects of a broader move toward scientific management. In 1951, the company had created an industrial engineering unit (Engenharia Industrial; EI) to analyze production costs, evaluate the performance of specific equipment, and standardize work processes. The directors saw it as an extension of the move toward rational labor management in the late 1940s, which had focused on the structure of departments and their staffing plans. The creation of the industrial engineering unit represented a shift away from the paternalist logic of improving performance through a regime of prizes and penalties toward labor management governed by purely economic incentives. The CSN hired the U.S. firm Bruce A. Payne & Associates to establish the industrial engineering unit and serve as consultant while it developed its programs. EI’s three main tasks were to create a rational pay structure, to determine standard production times by conducting Taylorist time and motion studies, and to develop plans for incentive pay to increase the productivity of individual workers, workgroups, or entire departments.46 EI began work with a staff of seven and grew rapidly as it faced an ever-expanding set of tasks in a rapidly growing company. By 1955, the industrial engineering unit (renamed Linha da Engenharia Industrial; LEI) had a staff of 85. In 1959, it employed 90 regular staff and 107 trainees in four specialized units: Industrial Studies, Incentives and Control, Work Organization, and the Center for Industrial Training.47 The introduction of scientific management created opportunities—some intended and others unanticipated—for workers to increase their takehome pay. The CSN expected production to increase if it offered incentive pay based on the industrial engineers’ time and motion studies. It was content to see salaries rise for workers on incentive pay, since—at least in theory—increased revenue would more than offset the higher labor cost.

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The introduction of scientific management did not follow textbook procedure, however, which created opportunities for the workers to increase take-home pay beyond the levels anticipated by the company. The foundation for an effective system of incentive pay was a rational pay scale, but under the political pressure to reach agreement on a union contract in 1952, the CSN had introduced a new pay scale before the industrial engineers completed a comprehensive study of the existing pay structure. As a result, the company had adopted a pay scale that violated the criteria of the salário técnico because it pushed real incomes above the “technically established geometric progression for an ideal system of salaries” according to the “current modern doctrine for similar industries in Europe and North America.”48 Moreover, EI’s limited resources made the introduction of incentive pay a slow and inherently uneven process, which invited union complaints about unequal treatment under the law. The industrial engineers completed the first time and motion study in 1952. The resulting incentive plan’s declared purpose was to “allow the crews at the open-hearth furnaces to earn extra pay for an efficient and productive operation of the furnaces.” The goal was to increase the productivity of the open-hearth furnaces by reducing the charging time, the only step of the production process that could be sped up since the heat’s physical and chemical processes took a fixed amount of time. The plan established standard production times for one ton of steel ranging from 14 to 16.6 hours, depending on the type of steel, including time for regular maintenance between heats. To calculate the workers’ incentive pay, EI divided the standard man-hours by the actual man-hours needed for production and multiplied that figure by the worker’s base salary. The incentive also applied to workers on the shift who were not nominally part of the furnace crew, such as overhead traveling crane operators, mixer operators, and workers on the casting floor and in the raw materials yard. It was a group rather than an individual incentive plan. Workers on crews who failed to beat standard production time received only their base salary.49 The plan for the steelworks included criteria that could reduce or cancel the incentive pay of the entire work crew or of individual workers. The company protected itself against shoddy work by discounting steel outside of specifications when it calculated production totals. Bad heats thus reduced incentive pay for the entire department. The CSN’s version of scientific management also incorporated disciplinary rules reminiscent of the paternalist labor regime in the 1940s. Workers forewent six days of extra pay for one unexcused absence, twelve days of extra pay for two absences, and all extra pay if they missed three or more days in a month. Any penalty reduced the number of steel tons the employee had credited to his incentive account. Disrespecting orders triggered drastic reductions in incentive pay, in particular

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if such indiscipline affected equipment, product quality, or overall production. The creation of the industrial engineering unit ushered a transition to rational labor management driven by economic incentives, but dedication to one’s work and respect for hierarchy remained an important part of the company’s definition of merit and a prerequisite for earning incentive pay. After the pilot study on the steelworks, the industrial engineers shifted their focus to time and motion studies for specific machines and work crews rather than entire departments. This was no textbook job standardization with the individual worker as the unit of analysis; rather, it divided up production into the smallest units with a measurable output.50 In January 1954, the industrial engineers presented a report on staffing and the work process at the foundry’s electric furnace, which concluded that the number of workers could be reduced from twenty-one to fifteen, saving 29 percent of operational costs (Cr$196,590 per year). The industrial engineers set production standards (padrões de produção) for the operation of the furnace and introduced incentive pay to raise productivity. The report listed the positions that EI proposed to create or eliminate. It recommended reassigning three of the five “excess” workers and dismissing two foundrymen who “had low productivity.”51 The average plan reduced the workforce by 10 percent, but EI recommended dismissals only if the employee had a history of poor performance. EI’s reorganization of the cold-rolling department’s electrolytic cleaning line, for example, eliminated nine of nineteen positions but did not lead to a single dismissal. The company transferred three operators to another department and classified a fourth as excedente, employing him without a defined position until he could be moved to a new workgroup. At the temper-mill, the rationalization cut the workforce from thirty to seventeen without lay-offs. The excess skilled workers all became excedentes to man a second temper-mill that was being built. In both cases, EI introduced an incentive plan that allowed the employees to earn up to a 25 percent bonus for production over quota. The study predicted savings of anywhere from 40 to 60 percent per ton of rolled steel.52 Only unskilled workers had to fear the rationalizations. For the tin plate inspection room, for example, a study recommended eliminating 22 of the 51 positions. The CSN could not easily reassign the low-skill counters and assorters, mostly women, and decided to lay them off. At the continuous pickling line, EI recommended retaining the eight skilled workers and firing the two unskilled laborers. The workforce at the rail mill only dropped from 119 to 110, but the nine unskilled excess workers all lost their jobs. What protected unskilled laborers against dismissal was the cost of severance pay once they had achieved job security (estabilidade), after ten years with the company. The study of the rail finishing section recommended ­reducing the workforce from 69 to 45, but the CSN opted to reassign many of the

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­ nskilled excess laborers to avoid the cost of severance pay.53 The compau ny’s official policy was to retain excess workers whenever possible, but the record shows that it made less of an effort to accommodate unskilled workers.54 Measured by the average qualification of the remaining workforce, the application of scientific management increased the CSN’s skill profile. The union embraced the introduction of scientific management. The 1953 contract extracted a commitment by the CSN to study the expansion of the Prêmio Estímulo, the company’s official term for incentive pay, to the entire mill.55 As long as the company transferred workers whose positions had been eliminated to other jobs, the only losers were a small number of unskilled laborers. Because of the technical characteristics of steel production, with most work done in crews, few operators had to subject themselves to individual time and motion studies. The standardization occurred at the level of the workgroup. The CSN set production targets for crews or entire departments, not piece rates for individual operators. Most important, the application of Taylorist methods and incentive plans did not depress base salaries. To the contrary, it created opportunities to increase take-home pay substantially. The equipment operators excelled at setting ever-higher production records and thereby increased the salaries for their entire shift. A former rolling-mill operator, for example, proudly recalled that “the record for hot-rolled coils is mine, for all three: the shift, the day, and the month.”56 The system created an incentive for operators to maximize machine utilization, often at the expense of needed maintenance. The engineers noticed that the production equipment showed much greater wear than it would have in normal operation.57 The union continued to demand incentive plans for the entire mill, and the company reaffirmed its commitment to that goal in several union contracts of the late 1950s.58 The industrial engineers’ work proceeded more slowly than anticipated, however. By July 1958, they had completed studies covering about 80 percent of workers in industrial operations.59 The remaining 20 percent included many of the mill’s most technically strategic workers, whose positions did not easily lend themselves to job standardization. The foundry’s overhead traveling crane operators, for example, did not have an incentive plan until 1959. The industrial engineers could not determine the crane operators’ productivity because they responded to fluctuating demand from the shop floor and produced no measurable output. Their workload had increased, however, because foundry workers received incentive pay—a situation that had led to tensions. LEI’s new study included the crane operators in the incentive plan because it would “create greater harmony” but noted explicitly that the measure would not result in any savings.60 Maintenance crews faced a similar predicament. Their efficient work helped equipment operators earn substantial incentive pay, but they did not

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share in the reward. The crews that replaced the rolls on the mills had no incentive plan until late 1957, although the CSN had long sought to reduce the monthly downtime of over 51 hours during roll changes. A reduction by one hour, LEI calculated, would pay for an incentive plan that allowed the roll builders to earn bonuses of up to 25 percent. This plan also applied to the template makers, whose workload had increased substantially after roll turners—for whom they made the measuring equipment—had been put on an incentive plan.61 The maintenance foremen, too, worked harder as a result of incentive pay for operators, and LEI included them in the plans to increase their “dedication” and “stimulate them.”62 In the maintenance shops, where only some machines had had incentive plans, LEI broadened their application in the hopes of doubling the productivity of newly covered workers and diminish a massive backlog of work orders.63 The decision to offer incentive pay to occupations whose output could not be measured made sense within the CSN’s state capitalist logic. The primary purpose of introducing scientific management was to increase production and supply more steel to the domestic market. The purpose was not—to put it in Marxian terms—the extraction of additional surplus labor in order to increase company profits. It was assumed that higher production at fixed levels of capital investment would reduce per-unit costs, but cutting costs was not a driving factor and LEI never studied the impact of the incentive plans on overall operational costs.64 In fact, at the CSN, the incentive plans allowed the workers to retain much of the surplus generated by their increased productivity. The labor law forced the company’s hand and effectively undermined any cost-cutting objectives the CSN might have had. The law prohibited employers from arbitrarily reducing salaries and established that a particular salary level became an acquired right (direito adquirido) once the employee had received it for three consecutive months. Thus, whenever an employee exceeded production norms for three consecutive months, the company had to incorporate the incentive pay into his base salary. Future incentive pay had to be paid based on that new salary, leading to an upward spiral. The CSN directors noted with astonishment that incentive pay enabled production workers to earn more than white-collar employees.65

The Union Takes to the Labor Courts Under Reis Fernandes’s leadership, the union developed great expertise in spotting weaknesses in the CSN’s pay structure that could be exploited with recourse to the labor law. To make sure that that company incorporated the incentive pay as an acquired right was only one aspect of

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the legal strategy. The union also confronted the company with complaints that incentive pay violated article 461, the equal pay for equal work provision, because it created salary differences between employees of equal seniority in identical occupational categories performing the same work. Union lawyers helped workers file grievances (reclamações trabalhistas) as part of a multipronged industrial relations strategy, hoping that the company feared costly court settlements enough to resolve matters more speedily in-house. Apparently the strategy worked: in the 1960 contract, the company agreed to include incentive pay in the calculation of the workers’ paid rest day and vacation pay, but only under the condition that the union abstain from legal action on the matter.66 The CSN preferred to give incremental concessions to risking a costly defeat over a collective grievance in court. The union strategy benefited from institutional changes in the labor judiciary. In August 1959, Rio de Janeiro’s state legislature passed a law that created a conciliation and arbitration board (Junta de Conciliação e Julgamento; JCJ) in Volta Redonda.67 It consisted of a three-person panel, one person each representing the union and the employers, and a third appointed by the Labor Ministry, all with considerable knowledge of industrial work. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, STIMMMEBMVR filed more grievances about salary parity and incentive pay than about all other issues (such as overtime, indemnification, rest day, meal breaks, and reinstatement) combined. The union lawyers used article 461 as a lever in grievance procedures (dissídios) about other aspects of compensation. Challenging reclassifications, for example, they regularly argued that the company’s practice violated the principle of salary parity. Two court cases illustrate the significance of the legal front within the union’s larger industrial relations strategy. The rulings did not set formal precedent, but they constituted an interpretation of the company’s labor management that limited its autonomy. Restricting the employers’ managerial prerogative in order to protect the rights of labor had been an original goal of the labor law, but this facet of trabalhismo only developed its full impact once workers filed grievances in the courts. Under Reis Fernandes, the union recognized the labor courts’ potential as more than an arbiter of industrial relations; they could be a lever to change the “web of rules” that governed industrial relations at the CSN. The case of João Barbosa, a master maintenance mechanic, began with a union request to regularize his occupational situation. The letter to industrial director Renato Frota de Azevedo explained that Barbosa’s colleagues in the same occupation were in salary class 35 while he remained in salary class 34. The union demanded that Barbosa earn the same as other master maintenance mechanics and noted that he would be willing to change de-

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partments if that made it easier for the CSN to meet the demand. To create a sense of personal obligation, union president Reis Fernandes reminded Frota de Azevedo of an assurance he had given to Barbosa: “you do not need to worry—I will take care of your case.”68 The company responded that Barbosa, although classified as master maintenance mechanic (Mestre de Manutenção Mecânica), in fact worked as lubrication inspector (Inspe­ tor de Lubrificação) and earned as much as other workers in that job. The response acknowledged, however, that the occupational class Mestre de Manutenção Mecânica included different positions that paid a range of salaries depending on responsibilities. It reminded the union, in an effort to put the moral onus on Barbosa, that he had declined a promotion two years earlier for health reasons.69 The union took the case to the courts. It filed a brief with the district judge (Juiz do Direito da Comarca de Volta Redonda) to request a session of the local conciliation and arbitration board to hear the grievance, attempt conciliation, and rule on the case’s merit. The union lawyer argued that the CSN’s 1959 revision of career ladders had illegally reclassified Barbosa into a lower salary class than his fellow “maintenance mechanics,” although they had all been in the same salary class before. The brief acknowledged that Barbosa did very different work from his former colleagues but emphasized that he had accepted this assignment at the request of the CSN—which should not come at a financial loss to him. The company lawyer insisted that the union had the facts of the case wrong. He argued that Barbosa had done the same work and received the same salary as the colleagues he cited as supposed models (pretensos paradigmas) only once, briefly, as a temporary replacement. Those workers received a higher salary because they worked as foremen with extensive responsibilities, while Barbosa had always performed more narrowly specialized tasks. The union’s claim of past equity, the company argued, was therefore false.70 The board interpreted the grievance as a request for salary parity under article 461 and ruled in the company’s favor because Barbosa did certifiably not perform the same work as his colleagues at the time of the complaint. The union appealed to the Regional Labor Court (TRT). Its brief reiterated that all the employees in question had at one point, before the reform of the career ladder, been classified equally both in terms of salary (23.10) and occupation. It reminded the judges that the CSN’s career ladder did not list an occupation of “Inspetor de Lubrificação” but only the broader category “Mestre de Manutenção Mecânica.” The brief noted that the grievance was at heart not about salary parity (article 461), but about correcting an injustice inflicted on Barbosa when the CSN reclassified him differently from his colleagues. As his “occupation (cargo) remained

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the same as that of his colleagues, even though he assumed different responsibilities,” the CSN should not have reclassified him to a lower rank (­padrão). To support its interpretation the brief cited a 1956 decision by the Supreme Labor Court (Tribunal Superior de Trabalho; TST): In case of a change to the organization of work—which is inherent to the managerial prerogative (poder de comando)—the company increased the salaries of employees who up to that point performed the same work and received the same salary, the increase has to be identical for all of them. The fact that the defendant [company] removed from some employees’ responsibilities a particular task (which all of them had performed before), does not give it the right to differentiate the salaries . . . (Proc. TST-RR 1.162/56, Relator Ministro Thélio Monteiro, acordão publicado em audiência de 5.12.1956)71

The decision referred to managerial prerogative as an inherent right, but in effect it limited the company’s freedom to set salaries. For the case of the CSN, the TRT accepted the union’s argument on the merits of the case and ruled in Barbosa’s favor. It agreed with the regional prosecutor, whose opinion (parecer) recommended annulling the earlier JCJ ruling because it misinterpreted the matter at hand.72 The TRT’s decision restricted the CSN’s managerial prerogative with respect to wage determination and labor management more broadly. A second case illustrates how a grievance filing could accelerate the introduction of incentive plans. In 1962, a group of maintenance electricians sent the CSN’s industrial director an open letter to express dissatisfaction with the lack of an incentive plan. The letter described their situation as “a great inequality in treatment, [especially given that it was] the same company and the same professional category.” It pointedly reminded the industrial director of the maintenance electricians’ technically strategic position: “to function [properly], production depends on maintenance the same way that the needle depends on the thread to sew.” The letter lamented that the CSN had only responded with “sophist arguments” to previous complaints about this great “injustice.” The authors reminded the industrial director that they, “the senior electricians of the CSN, had buried the best years of their lives there, in a risky and dangerous profession, always invisibly surrounded by the danger and death caused by the wires.” They made clear that their patience for being deprived of their rights had only “limited elasticity” (!) and blamed the company’s labor management for the situation: We lament that the CSN does not have a system of evenhanded planning for its diverse occupational categories. The heads of departments and groups are autonomous in their decisions, which creates divisions within occupational categories into privileged groups—in flagrant violation of human rights. It is not our inten-

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tion, however, to judge before a friendly agreement [can be reached], since we do understand that this regrettable state of affairs is not the responsibility of this directorate.73

The company directors considered the letter offensive, written in “inelegant and unacceptable language,” and refused to address its demands. In response to an earlier communication by the union, however, the CSN had asked its industrial engineering unit to look into the matter.74 The “senior electricians” asked the union lawyer to file a grievance. The brief to the local conciliation and arbitration board stated that the plaintiffs all worked as maintenance electricians in departments where production workers received incentive pay. It explained that the CSN offered incentive pay to many maintenance workers with the argument that “operation depends directly on maintenance to produce.” Maintenance electricians received incentive pay in some production departments, but not in the rolling mills, where most of the plaintiffs worked. As a result, the plaintiffs—highly skilled electricians—often had less take-home pay than unskilled laborers working under an incentive plan. They also received less pay for weekly rest day, less vacation pay, and smaller bonuses because those benefits were calculated based on the total salary, which included incentive pay. The plaintiffs demanded to receive the incentive pay not only in the future, but also for two years retroactively.75 In an attempt to diffuse the situation, the CSN began paying these electricians incentive pay about a year after the original grievance had been filed. The electricians did not withdraw their grievance, however, because they insisted on the retroactive payment. What had been a case about equal treatment became a case about the company’s managerial prerogative. By insisting on the retroactive incentive pay, the union in effect asked the courts to second-guess the company’s decision to introduce incentive pay step by step. The union lawyer argued that it was an injustice that needed to be remedied, while the CSN insisted that it could not possibly have introduced incentive pay in all departments at once. It reminded the conciliation and arbitration board that the company’s industrial engineers needed time to complete a careful study.76 The board agreed with the union, prompting the CSN to appeal the decision in the Regional Labor Court. Its judges argued that the company had kept its promise to study the problem and reversed the decision unanimously. They also rejected retroactive payment for the time between the grievance filing and the inclusion of the plaintiffs in the incentive plan.77 While the outcome in this case favored the CSN, the legal arguments still illustrate the union’s strategy to press cases in the labor courts in order to change the company’s labor management.

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Toward Workers’ Control Parallel to the court challenges, the union tried to expand its influence over shop-floor management. It proposed the creation of comissões paritárias, commissions with equal representation for company and union, to study the CSN’s labor management and make suggestions for improvements. The union wanted these commissions to study issues such as workplace safety, job training, incentive schemes, career ladders, and shop-floor management.78 In the late 1950s, the company directors steadfastly refused such requests because they would have lost some of their control over the workforce. The directors recognized, however, that the career ladders were in need of systematic revision, and they created a commission for the structuring of staffing plans and the standardization of jobs (Commissão Permanente de Estruturação de Quadros e Padronização de Cargos)—without worker representatives.79 The union continued to press the issue. A general assembly in October 1961 voted to demand a prominent role for union representatives in the restructuring of the career ladders.80 Changes in national politics, which resulted in the appointment of a labor representative to the company’s board of directors, diminished the resistance to such forms of coadministration. In late 1962, the CSN agreed to create a commission with union representatives to study career ladders.81 The union played an increasingly prominent role in the CSN’s labor management in 1962 and 1963. Most important, union representatives worked with the industrial engineering unit to revise the estimated three thousand occupational descriptions for the entire plant. 82 A union role in the process of creating occupational descriptions carried the potential benefit that its representatives enjoyed relations of trust with the workers whose position the industrial engineers tried to analyze. On the other hand, it opened up possibilities for the informants to undermine the purpose of the exercise. The workers had a vested interest in occupational descriptions that delineated their jobs in great detail, since that made it more difficult for the company to modify job content without a reclassification and the commensurate salary increase. Detailed occupational descriptions could serve as evidence in grievance procedures about violations of the CLT’s “equal pay for equal work” provision. It was no accident, then, that occupational descriptions from 1962 and 1963 had far more detail than those from the mid-1950s. They invariably included long lists of general responsibilities, a step-by-step description of the work process, often stretching over several pages, and an extensive list of the equipment used to perform the work.83 It was the ultimate irony of the rationalization program that workers in effect coadministered scientific management and used it to defend their material standing in times of tight company finances. The strong

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union presence in labor management impinged above all on the authority of the industrial director, Mauro Mariano da Silva, who experienced much less freedom to manage the workforce than his predecessors. National events bolstered government support for the union. The outcome of the presidential elections in November 1960 had initially appeared to favor the conservative forces as Jânio Quadros, supported by the UDN, won with 48 percent of the vote, well ahead of the PSD/PTB candidate General Lott (32 percent) and the PSP’s Ademar de Barros (20 percent).84 Voltaredondenses, however, preferred Ademar de Barros (47 percent) and General Lott (34 percent) to Quadros (19 percent). João Goulart (PTB) won the vice-presidential election. He was also the winner in Volta Redonda, although by a surprisingly slim margin (6,700 versus 6,521 votes) over Fernando Ferrari, the candidate for the Reformist Labor Movement (Movimento Trabalhista Renovador).85 Quadros pursued ambiguous labor policies. He signed a law that made the position of the director for social services (Diretor de Serviços Sociais) in state-administered industrial companies an elected office. The workers overwhelmingly voted for Othon Reis Fernandes, but Quadros disregarded their preference and appointed one of the alternates. It was Quadros’s resignation only months after taking office that turned the political tide. The union suddenly had a political ally in the presidential palace when Vice-President Goulart assumed office.86 He reversed Quadros’s decision and appointed Reis Fernandes as Diretor de Serviços Sociais.87 The appointment turned out to be a mixed blessing for the union. On the one hand, Reis Fernandes gained the power to implement measures that benefited the workers. He controlled the company’s social assistance budget and allocated funds to facilitate access to medical care, enlarge the hospital, expand the supply of subsidized foodstuffs, and improve the quality of the meals in the canteens. He committed a significant share of the budget to the construction of new company homes and reached an accord with the National Housing Bank (Banco Nacional de Habitação; BNH) to build one-family homes in Volta Redonda.88 On the other hand, Reis Fernandes was regularly outvoted on the board of directors by his colleagues who were government appointees or chosen by the shareholders. When Reis Fernandes reached compromise with his fellow directors to make some progress in advancing his agenda, opponents in the union used that to discredit him. His dual role as company director and union strategist created conflicts of interest that undermined his support among the workers. In the negotiations for the 1963 union contract, for example, he advised the union but also nominally represented the company.89 Reis Fernandes lost his hold on the union in 1963. A member of his group had served as placeholder president from 1961 to 1963, but Reis

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Fernandes ran again for the union presidency even though he remained a company director. The Labor Ministry annulled the results of the first vote because of irregularities. It handed the union administration over to a committee of three senior members, including Reis Fernandes, and ordered new elections for September. Reis Fernandes wanted to reform the union statutes to establish an electoral system in which members voted for a seven-person directorate rather than one presidential candidate, a reform that appeared tailor-made for his situation because it would allow him to run the union without being its figurehead. An assembly defeated the reform proposal, however, and an opposition slate led by João Alves dos Santos Lima Neto narrowly won the September vote.90 Reis Fernandes still carried the vote among CSN employees, albeit very narrowly, but decisive losses in the other factories spelled overall defeat.91 The inherent limitations of Reis Fernandes’s industrial relations strategy had become apparent under conditions of severe economic strain. Both the political strategy to build community support and the industrial strategy to defend the workers’ material standing began to crumble once the company’s finances made it impossible to extract further concessions. Even with the adjustments granted under the rules for the work of the cost-of-living commission, real incomes began to drop, especially for semiskilled and unskilled workers (see Figure 7.4). Lima Neto opted for radical confrontation with the CSN. At the general assembly, he opened the floor to any member who wanted to express a grievance or propose a demand for the upcoming contract negotiations.92 The union directorate incorporated these grievances into the list of demands, which the CSN predictably rejected. Lima Neto then met with President Goulart to request his support for the union’s demands. ­Goulart, already weakened in the face of staunch conservative opposition and factionalism among his supporters, agreed to support the demand for a 50 percent salary increase. The union also rehashed the demand for sixhour shifts, which the CSN had always rejected categorically. The fronts were too hardened for promising dialogue. As one union director put it: “There is no real strike in Volta Redonda, but the workers are in a moral strike; the struggle has not ended, since we can now finally embark on the conquest of the six-hour shift.”93 Ultimately, the company accepted a new union contract as a political dictate. President Goulart ordered the company president Admiral Lúcio Meira to implement the 50 percent raise he had promised Lima Neto, even though the cost-of-living commission had recommended a salary increase of only 33.8 percent.94 The CSN had entered dire financial straits even before the latest union contract. In December 1963, the board of directors heard a report about the reasons for the company’s struggles. Annual inflation reached 80 per-

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cent, with grave consequences for the current accounts. Suppliers insisted on immediate payment, customers defaulted on loans, and servicing foreign debt became ever more costly. Orders for the CSN’s products had fallen since midyear as the Brazilian economy was in the most severe recession since the Great Depression. For the first time in its history, the CSN failed to increase its production compared to the previous year. It nevertheless raised prices by 25 percent, which further reduced its ability to compete with sheet steel produced in COSIPA’s and USIMINAS’s more modern facilities. While the company lost market share in some product lines, it still produced above capacity in others, which resulted in a high rate of faulty production and scrapping.95 In the first months of 1964, the directorate tried to identify budget items that could provide savings, such as excessive overtime, but it ultimately fell back on further price increases.96 For a company that was accustomed to success, these were disappointing times. Industrial director Mauro Mariano da Silva presented his analysis of the failings in a meeting on March 26, 1964. He noted that the management of current accounts provided no basis for an effective planning of spending and investment priorities and added that the CSN did not even have a mechanism to force customers to pay their overdue bills. These difficulties, he argued, were greatly enhanced by the “unrestrained salary policies” that “had been imposed on the company in recent years.” To be able to invest in the improvement of its facilities—all the more necessary in a year in which the focus was to be on the quality of production (Ano de ­Qualidade), the CSN saw itself forced to reduce its purchases of raw materials and delay payments to suppliers. Mariano da Silva considered it unacceptable for the CSN to react to this crisis with layoffs and reduced production; instead, he urged his colleagues to redouble their efforts, because otherwise this crisis “might spell the end of the efforts by those, who—like this Diretor Industrial—gave 22 years of their lives to this beloved mill in Volta Redonda, the Usina Presidente Vargas.”97 Mariano da Silva and other CSN veterans on the board of directors supported the movement for a coup against President Goulart, which they saw as a solution to the company’s and the country’s crisis. Under increasing political pressure in the first months of 1964, Goulart had come to rely more and more on his supporters in the labor movement. The leaders of the Volta Redonda metalworkers union were among his staunchest supporters and sent a large delegation to the rally at the Central Station in Rio de Janeiro, on March 13, 1964, where Goulart appealed to the Brazilian people to defend his government. The political polarization was palpable in Volta Redonda, as radical militants hanged effigies of the company’s directors from a bridge in front of the mill.98

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On March 31, 1964, army battalions from Minas Gerais and São Paulo moved onto the federal capital Rio de Janeiro to oust President ­Goulart. The insurgency enjoyed broad support among the elites, the Catholic Church, and the conservative middle class, but the conspiring generals prepared for resistance from industrial workers. They feared that Goulart supporters might go on strike and shut down crucial railroad lines or paralyze industries that supplied electricity, fuel, or basic industrial inputs. The generals understood that strikes in these strategic industries could derail their coup. But they had made plans to seize control of strategic industrial facilities to prevent any such movement. In the early morning hours of April 1, units from the 1st Batalhão da Infanteria Blindada (BIB) and the Academia Militar de Agulhas Negras (AMAN) in nearby Resende occupied Volta Redonda. The soldiers took strategic positions in the city, established checkpoints at all entrances to the mill, and barred workers not scheduled for the six a.m. shift from entering.99 Collaborators in the CSN administration had taken measures to preempt worker mobilization. Mariano da Silva alerted the members of his staff and all department heads that they should prepare for possible disturbances that night. Department heads held emergency meetings with supervisors and foremen, ordering them to be on their post by six a.m. The CSN disconnected the union’s phones, cut communication between the mill and the outside, and ordered its operators to transfer internal calls only with Mariano da Silva’s previous authorization.100 Goulart’s political allies tried to rally resistance as the events unfolded. Othon Reis Fernandes went on the air with a passionate appeal: You are listening to the director [of the CSN] who holds this office by the ­workers’ free decision and by the trust of the constitutional president of our nation, President João Goulart. In this instant, this very moment, the Radio Siderúrgica Nacional—under my own and exclusive responsibility—goes on the air. It could not remain silent, our radio that is disposed to be free and disposed to participate actively and courageously in this dramatic hour for our nation. It goes on the air to awaken Volta Redonda with words that reflect, I am certain, the beliefs of the entire directorate of the CSN, above all its distinguished president Admiral Lúcio Meira. It goes on the air to call on Volta Redonda, to send a warning to Volta Redonda, to tell Volta Redonda—represented by all the social classes, starting with the most humble workers—that this is a decisive moment, that this cannot be a moment of doubt about the course we have to take. As I said in the waking hours today on Rádio Nacional and Rádio Mauá do Rio de Janeiro, Volta Redonda, as part of our economic emancipation, cannot fail to participate in this instant when Brazil will choose its course, either the course of liberation or the course of enslavement. Will it stop being plundered, or will it continue to be plundered as are to this day millions of Brazilians? . . .

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Workers of Volta Redonda, family of Volta Redonda, we call on you all in this moment and ask you to forget—for the time being—the conflicts that may exist now, that we may have had in the past, the differences, the disputes for political and union offices in our municipality and in the Paraíba valley. Let me launch an appeal for unity, as I am thinking this very moment about the rooms and corridors of our glorious union representing the metalworkers of Volta Redonda, and let me call on you—comrades old and seasoned in their work as well as us others—with my words and my voice to be united as one force. We can transform Volta Redonda, not into a bloody battleground, but into a field, a bastion, a fortress for the defense of legality, the defense of the constitutional ­powers of the Republic, the defense of the authentic, irrefutable, and undeniable heir to the founder of Volta Redonda, that is—whether you like him or not—the great President João Goulart.101

He called on the workers to come out on the streets to protect Volta Redonda as the patrimony of the nation and encouraged the army units in Barra Mansa to join them. He invited the workers to come to his residence and join those that had been gathered there all night to follow the news. He urged his fellow union members to come out and protect the union premises against a potential military occupation. Reis Fernandes presented his speech as a call to form a civic movement and explicitly warned against “rioting or disorder.” To rally the workers around a cause, he called for the defense of economic development, the defense of the nation, and the defense of the flag as Brazil’s national symbol. This president, whether his enemies—who are not really his enemies, but the enemies of national progress, of national development—like it or not, will transform himself into our reform president, one who will find a place in our history next to Princess Isabel, who abolished slavery. João Goulart will have to establish himself as the new abolitionist of slavery in this country (applause, “very good”). Just yesterday we heard his pledge, his affirmation of Brazilianness at the same ceremony where he said that his colors, the colors he defends, are the colors of the green and golden banner of our nation.102

Reis Fernandes acknowledged that Goulart had made mistakes, but nevertheless believed that only he offered hope for a better Brazil and called on the workers to rise in defense of the constitutional government. The popular mobilization never materialized. When military investigators questioned Mariano da Silva about strike activities during the “Revolution,” as the coup leaders called it, he replied that “[n]o incident worth reporting occurred over the days from March 31 to April 02, 1964.” There was indeed little resistance. Militants tried to defend the union offices, but soldiers of the BIB broke through their ranks and occupied the premises. They made about 90 arrests, including the entire union leadership. Soldiers shut down the radio station and arrested Reis Fernandes. In

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less than twelve hours, police and military had gained full control of Volta Redonda. Wandir Carvalho, local head of the Brazilian Labor Party and a CSN director, tried to coordinate resistance with the state government in Niterói. Unaware of Mariano da Silva’s cooperation with the insurgents, Carvalho called him to request that he work with the union to shut down the mill in an act of solidarity with Goulart. Mariano da Silva refused. Work at the coke plant and in support units suffered minor disruptions, but the overwhelming majority of workers covered their regular shift. The report of a subsequent military investigation listed only about two hundred workers as absent on April 1, 1964. It categorized seventy-eight as absent without justification and implicated only thirty-nine as collaborators in an attempt to paralyze the factory.103 It turned up no plans of sabotage and hardly any Communists.104 The new company directorate nevertheless upheld the story of a subversive plot in order to rid itself of perceived troublemakers. The military trials implicated all employees with a history of union militancy, irreverent of their participation in acts of resistance against the military coup. To build these cases, military investigators relied on the documentation on “subversive” activities gathered by the political police over the previous two decades. Questionable allegations about ideological antecedents that were too tenuous to justify police action under labor-friendly governments in the 1950s became key pieces of evidence for the military trials.105 The CSN also took advantage of the opportunity to fire employees who had recently taken legal action against the company in the labor courts. Among the supposed “revolutionaries” were a disproportionate number of drivers and designers whose unions had filed collective grievances in the early 1960s.106

Conclusion

After the coup, the CSN’s new directors placed industrial relations on a new footing. The military rulers had appointed mostly company veterans, all engineers, who deeply resented the erosion of managerial authority in the early 1960s. General Oswaldo Pinto da Veiga, the company’s former vice-president (1962) and director for raw materials (1962–1963), replaced the Goulart appointee Admiral Lúcio Martins Meira as CSN president. Coup-plotter Mauro Mariano da Silva retained his position as industrial director, eager to fully reestablish the managerial prerogative. His very first order after the coup was to dissolve the mixed commissions created to study and reform the company’s career ladders and labor management. No longer would union representatives participate in the writing of occupational descriptions, propose improvements on the shop floor to reduce accident risks, or work with company representatives to determine salary adjustments proportional to the cost of living increases. Mariano da Silva wanted to reassert managerial prerogative and reevaluate expenditure, not least on social programs, in order to free up money to modernize production and return the company to profitability.1 A thorough military crackdown on the union facilitated the transition to a new industrial relations regime. The commander of the 1st BIB, which had occupied mill and town, handed control of the metalworkers union to an intervener, Orlando Alvisi, and prohibited union elections until 1966. The military authorities tightly controlled the elections that did take place in 1966 and 1968. Wilton Meira, an opposition candidate linked by military intelligence to the resistance group Ação Popular, ran twice, only to have his slate disqualified by the Labor Ministry both times.2 In 1968, he won the majority of votes, but the Labor Ministry annulled the result and reappointed Orlando Alvisi as intervener with a mandate to hold new

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elections in 1969. The CSN fired Meira after the military regime issued Ato Institucional no. 5, which restricted basic civil liberties.3 The 1969 union elections brought victory for the much more conciliatory Olímpio Gomes, who remained at the helm of a much weakened union throughout the worst years of military repression (1969–1973) under the government of General Emílio Garrastazu Médici.4 With the union so tightly controlled, Catholic lay groups and the increasingly militant local bishop became the most vocal voices of opposition to the regime and the CSN. In November 1967, for example, two members of the youth organization Judica threw pamphlets denouncing the military regime onto the streets from the diocese’s VW minibus and were promptly arrested by a patrol of the 1st BIB.5 Bishop Dom Waldyr Calheiros stood up for his parish­ ioners and workers that had been treated unjustly, but that voice of courage could not replace a viable union. On economic policy, the military regime adopted a more stringently state capitalist logic that emphasized production and profit. It ended a policy that the state-owned companies such as the CSN could sell their products only domestically. In June 1964, two months after the coup, the new directorate signed an agreement to export pig iron to the United States. The military regime’s monetarist advisers, led by Roberto Campos, believed that Brazil could not grow any further if it shielded itself from the world markets. Therefore, they abolished the obligation for national manufacturers to purchase nationally produced basic industrial goods regardless of quality. The CSN no longer enjoyed the captive market that had sustained its privileged and strategic position through the entire postwar republic, and it gained serious domestic competition when USIMINAS and COSIPA began production in the early 1960s. These mills made mostly steel plate, of higher quality than the CSN’s because of greater specialization and newer technology. In 1966, the U.S. consulting firm Booz, Allen & Hamilton conducted a study of Brazil’s steel industry and recommended that the CSN specialize more and cede market share to USIMINAS and COSIPA, a proposal the CSN directors fought tooth and nail because it would have meant that their company would no longer be the largest producer in the country. The radical political change and the revised priorities in national development policy translated into much more gradual economic change for the CSN’s workers. The government placed wages on an index that nominally protected them against inflation but in reality permitted a slow and controlled erosion of real income. In an exercise to legitimize these losses the regime made the metalworkers union, even as it was under intervention, sign off on contracts that simply applied the index to the company’s salary tables. The CSN maintained its commitment to the scientific manage-

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ment practices introduced in the 1950s. The first union contract after the military coup declared the goal to expand incentive plans (art. 17) and promised a revision of occupational descriptions (art. 21).6 The descriptions from the late 1960s would be much leaner than those from the early 1960s in order to protect managerial prerogative and limit the opportunities for legal challenges. In the 1970s, when the Boston-based consulting firm ­Arthur D. Little advised the CSN on occupational descriptions, they became minimalist one-page documents that described employee responsibilities in the most generic terms. The postcoup union contract also explicitly recognized the 1952 personnel rules as the document governing industrial relations and preserved clauses of the last precoup contract on the distribution of profits (art. 3).7 Legally guaranteed social benefits such as the salário família (family salary) remained untouched.8 The directors preserved some social assistance programs and abolished others. The 1965 union contract guaranteed that the Centro de Pueri­ cultura would continue to offer services free of charge to employees with lower incomes, and the CSN continued to provide generous credit at the hospital and in stores.9 The decision to abolish the daily milk ration was the most symbolic change because it had been closely associated with the image of the CSN as caring mother. Apparently, too many workers used the ration to make sweets and sold them to supplement their incomes, which in the CSN’s eyes was not the purpose of its social assistance programs.10 The CSN also shed responsibility for the company town. It had commissioned a first report on the possible sale of the houses in 1960, but the years of the Goulart presidency had not been an opportune time to implement such sweeping change, not least because his government was closely allied with the local metalworkers union. The military rule opened a new window of opportunity. The CSN transferred its real estate to a holding company, the Imobiliária Santa Cecília S.A. (CECISA), which prepared the sale. The plan remained controversial and came to fruition only in the late 1960s after the company agreed to grant priority to current inhabitants and extend them credit at below-market rates to purchase their home.11 The scaling down of the assistance programs eliminated some of the vestiges of the Catholic paternalism and continued a push for a more rational labor regime. As for many of the earlier rationalization measures, those adopted in the 1960s had the most adverse effect on low-income employees. Many could not afford the house they lived in, for example, and had to move to less desirable neighborhoods in the city. The dissolution of the company town accentuated the socioeconomic differences between employees who had made a successful career with the CSN and those who merely worked there without the same prospects for professional and social advancement.

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Albeit gradual and incremental, the changes to the industrial relations framework and relations with the community represented a new factory regime driven by a different politics of production. The military regime and the veteran engineers leading the CSN wanted a revitalized desen­ volvimentismo with much less trabalhismo. They believed that the CSN’s primary contribution to Brazil’s development was to produce large quantities of high-quality steel and that the social welfare goals enshrined in the ­trabalhista agenda should not interfere with that mission. They saw the experience of the late 1950s and early 1960s, when the union’s strong political position and aggressive bargaining had made it—in the engineers’ view— impossible for the CSN to fulfill its original mission, as evidence that developmentalism had been hijacked by the laborist left. The union, serving its constituency, had given precedence to fulfilling the social welfare goals of trabalhismo for the people of Volta Redonda over broader national development objectives pursued by the Brazilian state. The military regime’s politics or production reemphasized desenvolv­imentismo at the expense of fulfilling the promises of ­trabalhismo. Under the guise of a rhetoric in favor of national development, the military regime subjected the CSN to a more stringently capitalist logic and abandoned the postwar republic’s social development agenda aimed specifically at industrial workers. Considering this general political reorientation, the implementation of a new factory regime at the CSN changed surprisingly little for most of the workers. The political defeat of trabalhismo altered the power context for industrial relations, but it hardly affected the technical context and had limited impact on the market context. The workers lost their political voice but they did not lose their latent strategic power or their privileged material conditions compared to workers in other industries. The national wage index led to a gradual erosion of real income, but it preserved the high wage levels compared to other Brazilian industrial workers as well as the wage differences within the company. The strategic workers saw no reason to risk dismissal, persecution, and possibly even torture for trying to revitalize the union in the first decade of military rule. For most of them the promise of trabalhismo had been fulfilled, and they had no personal investment in the broader developmentalist promise to bring economic and social development to the entire country. Under the postwar republic, their union had employed technically strategic power to assure them of the full benefits granted by the labor law and to provide them with a relatively high standard of living. Under the military regime, their strategic position allowed them to retain many of these gains. The fact that the union’s success in using the institutions of trabalhismo to extract higher wages and greater benefits helped undermine the development model of the postwar republic speaks to internal contradictions of

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the model and, in Burawoy’s terms, of the respective politics of production. Setting up strategic industries in order to accelerate the country’s industrial growth was the core goal of the developmentalist policy as conceived under the Estado Novo. However, the full implementation of the institutions of trabalhismo—chief among them the labor laws—in the 1950s created the conditions for workers in these industries to translate strategic power into concrete material gains and to reshape the factory regime for their benefit. They took full advantage of the CSN’s strategic position in the economy and their strategic power based on the division of labor in an integrated steel mill to advance their economic interests, utilizing the institutional framework created under trabalhismo to its fullest extent. These findings cast new light on the trajectory of Brazil’s developmentalism and invite comparison to other Latin American countries such as Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela, which also built large state-owned steel mills under their respective import-substitution industrialization programs. The case of Brazil and the CSN shows that the creation of strategic industries such as steel inherently produced a category of strategically powerful workers that could exploit their position in ways that undermined the economic viability of the industry and thus the original development model. Critics of Latin American development have identified inefficiency and corruption (however defined) as its major flaws, but the case of the CSN shows that the roots of the problem go deeper than mismanagement. Beyond Latin America, the study can serve as point of departure for a comparative analysis of steelworkers and their strategic power under a spectrum of political and legal regimes. The Soviet Union and India, for example, also had state-controlled steel sectors and adopted officially laborfriendly policies, but under very different market contexts and political regimes. Stalin’s state-led industrialization in the 1930s, for example, assigned the steel complex in Magnitogorsk a role that was not unlike the CSN’s role in Brazil’s economy under the postwar republic. Technologically, Magnitogorsk and the CSN were very similar, since both had been built by ­Arthur McKee. With respect to market context, the Russian economy was, if anything, even more self-reliant than Brazil’s, which enhanced the strategic position of the Soviet Union’s major steel complexes and empowered their workers. But what did it mean for steelworkers under Stalinism to have strategic power? Did it guarantee the workers certain privileges that the state tacitly agreed not to challenge as long as the workers did not disrupt production, not unlike the situation at the CSN after the military coup? In the North Atlantic economies and Japan, on the other hand, which featured developed, privately owned steel sectors and thus very different market contexts, one would expect the strategic position of a given mill and its technically strategic workers to have been comparatively weaker.

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The history of industrial labor in Volta Redonda offers lessons for the study of other strategic state-owned companies in Brazil such as the oil giant PETROBRAS, founded in the 1950s, whose labor history has received even less scholarly attention than the CSN’s.12 Otherwise, in the mid-twentieth century, the only entities with strategic positions comparable to the CSN’s were the major railroads, the ports of Rio de Janeiro and Santos, and the large electric companies. Scholars writing labor histories of those companies would be well advised to pay close attention to the industry’s strategic position in the national economy as well as its internal division of labor in order to assess workers’ strategic power. On the other hand, the lessons learned from this study of the CSN are less applicable to the manufacturing industries in greater São Paulo and in the city of Rio de Janeiro, even though they employed most of the country’s industrial workforce throughout the twentieth century. Not even the most technically complex of those manufacturing industries, such as the automobile assembly plants in the ABC, could rival the strategic position of core industries of the Second Industrial Revolution. Workers at the CSN, LIGHT, the Santos port, or EFCB had greater power to impact national politics and national development policy under the postwar republic than workers in less strategic industries, even if the latter displayed high levels of militancy, such as in the São Paulo textile industry.13 The existing scholarship on industrial labor in Brazil with its heavy focus on privately owned manufacturing industries in greater São Paulo has thus barely touched on an important dimension of the postwar economy: the power that workers derive from their industry’s strategic position and its internal division of labor.14 It is my sincere hope that this study of the CSN will serve as a stepping stone for future scholarship that reflects the complexity of the twentieth-century industrial economy, incorporates strategic analysis into labor history, and thereby renders a more nuanced history of industrial labor in postwar Brazil.

Appendix sampling procedure for the csn personnel files

The Archive The CSN keeps separate personnel files for the active workforce and for ex-employees. The company gave me access to the latter. This archive was subdivided into three sets of files organized according to the period when the respective ex-employee left the company. The CSN used a very simple form before 1960 (type A), then a larger and more elaborate card until 1972 (type B), when it switched to the folder format still in use today (type C). This variety of file types complicated the research for three reasons. (1) The kind of information available on the more elaborate forms (type B and C) was not always included on the simpler card (type  A). (2) Employees who worked with the CSN long enough had files of two types. To get complete information, my research assistant had to match the different files for the same employee. (3) In the switch to the most elaborate forms (type C), the personnel department had transferred all the available information from the older forms, but it often left the old files in the archives, creating duplicate records. Moreover, files in all three subsections were alphabetized by first name to avoid confusion caused by multiple last names.

Individual Files All three types of files contained the following information: 1) Demographics: (a) name, (b) sex, (c) birth date, (d) city, state, and country of birth, (e) previous schooling, (f) marital status, (g) number of children, (h) passport-type photograph. My research assistant (who categorized herself as negra) used the photographs to code skin color. I let her code all the photographs to preserve uniformity in what is at heart a subjective judgment. I used the place and state of birth from the files to code municipality and zone of birth and group the places of origins into clusters. The information about birth cities had to be thoroughly cleaned because of spelling mistakes, diverging spellings for the same place, and discrepancies between the listed birth city and state. Workers from border regions in Minas

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Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, and Espírito Santo often named a birth state that did not match the municipality of birth. 2) General Employment Information: (a) Employee ID number, (b) admission date, (c) dismissal date, (d) cause of dismissal. To simplify the data collection, I asked my research assistant to record only the year of admission and dismissal, which I used to calculate the number of years with the company. The CSN distinguished twenty-two reasons for dismissal, apart from specific contracts or legal decisions that prompted the dismissal. In the early years, the most important categories were “abandonment,” “by request,” “desertion,” “needs of the company,” and “free will.” Later, “retirement,” “just cause,” and “agreement” became important categories as well. 3) Career Information: The personnel files served as a logbook of the employee’s career. My research assistant summarized some of this timesensitive data for an employee’s entire career. Data that revealed more about individual careers and company policies was recorded in five-year intervals, always starting with the worker’s admission year. Summarized: (a) number of honorable mentions, (b) number of prizes for dedicated service by category (five years, ten years, twenty years, thirty years), (c) additional schooling during time with the CSN, (d) number of work-related courses completed during time with the CSN, (e) change in marital status, (f) change in number of children. Intervals: (a) occupation, (b) department, (c) wage or salary, (d) number of promotions, (e) number of reclassifications (to a new job), (f) number of work accidents, (g) number of work days lost due to accident(s), (h) number of grievances filed with the labor courts, (i) number of warnings issued by CSN (and whether later formally canceled), (j) number of reprimands (and whether later formally canceled), (k) number of suspensions (and whether later formally canceled), (l) overall duration of suspension(s). I created a “skill” variable distinguishing skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled workers based on the occupation. To make wage and salary figures comparable, both diachronically and synchronically, I categorized them by type (hourly or monthly) and converted them into equivalent monthly salaries based on the length of the standard work week. I then used a cost-of-living index to deflate the income figures, a process greatly complicated by the three different currencies Brazil used in the time period under study.

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4) Sampling Procedure: The division of the archive into three separate sets of files complicated the sampling procedure. The earliest files were the most numerous because they covered the construction years (1941– 1946) with its high turnover. The workforce was much more stable for the other two periods. I decided to use a greater sampling interval for the earlier files than for the later ones and assigned corrective weights. A) 1941–1960: About 60,000 employees left the CSN in this period. The sample size was 629 files out of that total population, or roughly one in every 90 files. Correspondingly, the assigned weight was 90. B) 1960–1972: Around 12,500 employees left the CSN in those twelve years. The sampling procedure was to record every 25th file (weight 25), which led to a sample size of 508. C) 1972–1991: Around 21,500 employees left the CSN in those years. The sampling procedure was to record every 23rd file (weight 23), which led to a sample size of 911.

Notes

introduction 1.  Timothy F. Harding, “The Political History of Organized Labor in Brazil” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 1973), 181–86, 280–301, 514–25. See also António Luigi Negro, Linhas de montagem: o industrialismo nacional-­desenvolvimentista e a sindicalização dos trabalhadores (São Paulo: Boitempo, 2004), 79–130; ­Hélio da Costa, Em busca da memória: comissão de fábrica, partido e sindicato no pós-guerra (São Paulo: Scritta, 1995), 163–98. 2.  Abraham J. Siegel, “Strike and Industrial Relations Experience in the Steel Industries of Selected Countries” (PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1961), 37, 97, 251, 289, 362. 3.  Jack Stieber, The Steel Industry Wage Structure: A Study of Joint UnionManagement Job Evaluation Program in the Basic Steel Industry (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959), xviii. 4.  For Brazil, the argument about the effect of rural origins was made most explicitly in Leôncio M. Rodrigues, Industrialização e atitudes operárias (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1970). 5.  Michael Burawoy, The Politics of Production: Factory Regimes under Capi­ talism and Socialism (London: VERSO, 1985), 8–12. 6.  The classic analysis of trabalhismo is Angela Maria de Castro Gomes, A ­invenção do trabalhismo (São Paulo: Vertice, 1988). 7.  Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Prince­ ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 508. 8.  Ibid., 511. My emphasis. 9.  Robert J. Alexander, Labor Relations in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (New York: McGraw Hill, 1962). 10.  Ibid., 40. Alexander dedicated the book to the anti-Communist crusader ­Serafino Romualdi, which speaks to his Cold War agenda. See also his Commu­ nism in Latin America (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1957). 11.  Harding, “Political History of Organized Labor”; Kenneth S. Mericle, “Conflict Regulation in the Brazilian Industrial Relations System” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin at Madison, 1974); Kenneth P. Erickson, The Brazilian Corporative State and Working-Class Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977). 12.  Thomas F. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964: An Experiment in De­ mocracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); Ronald M. Schneider, The Political System of Brazil: Emergence of a “Modernizing” Authoritarian Regime, 1964–1970 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); Michael Conniff, ed.,

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Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective, 1st ed. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982). 13.  Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 253–302. 14.  Werner Baer, The Brazilian Economy: Growth and Development, 5th ed. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 72. 15.  For an outline of the orthodox critique, see Mario Henrique Simonsen, “Brazilian Inflation: Postwar Experience and Outcome of the Post-1964 Reforms,” in Economic Development Issues: Latin America. Supplementary Paper no. 21 (New York: Committee for Economic Development, Aug. 1967). 16.  For a summary of the economic thought of Celso Furtado, the most prominent structural critic, see C. Furtado, Um projeto para o Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Saga, 1967). See also the chapter on “Furtado and Structuralism” in Joseph L. Love, Crafting the Third World: Theorizing Underdevelopment in Rumania and Brazil (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 153–71. 17.  For example, Jeffrey Sachs, “Consolidating Capitalism,” Foreign Policy 98 (Spring 1995), 50–65; Rüdiger Dornbusch, “The Case for Trade Liberalization in Developing Countries,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 6:1 (Winter 1992), 69–85. 18.  He makes this argument most poignantly in the chapter “Paths to Dependency.” Love, Crafting the Third World, 182–201. 19.  Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), quotes: 2, 60; chapter on Kubitschek: 122–70. 20.  Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Empresário industrial e desenvolvimento econômico (São Paulo: DIFEL, 1964); O. Ianni, Estado e capitalismo: estrutura so­ cial e industrialização no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1965); F. H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina: ensayo de interpretación sociológico (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno, 1969). 21.  Love, Crafting the Third World, 190–91. 22.  Leôncio Martins Rodrigues, Conflito industrial e sindicalismo no Brasil (São Paulo: DIFEL, 1966). Azis Simão, Sindicato e estado: suas relações na forma­ ção do proletariado de São Paulo (São Paulo: Dominus, 1966). For a critique, see Negro, Linhas de Montagem, 14–17. 23.  For two examples in English, see John D. French, The Brazilian Workers’ ABC: Class Conflict and Alliances in Modern São Paulo (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Joel Wolfe, Working Women, Working Men: São Paulo and the Rise of Brazil’s Industrial Working Class, 1900–1955 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993). 24.  For a pathbreaking study by an anthropologist, see José Sergio Leite Lopes, A tecelagem dos conflitos de classe na “Cidade das Chaminés” (São Paulo: Marco Zero, 1988). For a sociological approach, see José Ricardo Ramalho, Estadopatrão e luta operária: o caso FNM (São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1989). For review articles on these trends, see John D. French, “The Latin American Labor Studies Boom,” International Review of Social History 45 (2000), 279–308; Joel Wolfe, “The Social Subject versus the Political: Latin American Labor Studies at the Crossroads,” Latin American Research Review 37:2 (2002), 244–62. 25.  Some of the best work came out of the history department at the Univer-

Notes to Introduction

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sidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Fernando Teixeira da Silva, A carga e a culpa. Os operários das docas de Santos: direitos e cultura de solidariedade, 1937–1968 (São Paulo: HUCITEC, 1995); Costa, Em busca da memória; Paulo R. Fontes, Trabalhadores e cidadãos—Nitro Química: a fábrica e as lutas operárias nos anos 50 (São Paulo: Anna Blume, 1997); Paulo R. Fontes, Um Nordeste em São Paulo: trabalhadores migrantes em São Miguel Paulista (Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2008); Negro, Linhas de montagem. 26.  One study that did use the framework to its full potential in rethinking a country’s labor history is Daniel James, Resistance and Integration: Peronism and the Argentina Working Class, 1946–1976 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 27.  Some of the most innovative political history of labor has sought to understand the shop floor as a political arena. Alf Lüdtke, Eigen-Sinn: Fabrikalltag, Arbeitererfahrungen und Politik vom Kaiserreich bis in den Faschismus (Hamburg: Ergebnisse Verlag, 1993). 28.  Burawoy, Politics of Production, 122. 29.  Ibid., 128. 30.  Wilma Mangabeira, Dilemas do Novo Sindicalismo: democracia e política em Volta Redonda (Rio de Janeiro: Relume-Dumará, ANPOCS, 1993); Regina ­Lúcia de Moraes Morel, “A ferro e fogo. Construção e crise da ‘família siderúrgica’: o caso de Volta Redonda (1941–1968)” (PhD diss., Universidade de São Paulo, 1989). 31.  On the concept’s origins and evolution, see John Womack, Jr., “Working Power over Production: Labor History, Industrial Work, Economics, Sociology, and Strategic Position” (manuscript, available at www.helsinki.fi/iehc2006/papers2/ Womack.pdf), 50–82. Published in Spanish translation as Posición estrategica y fuerza obrera: hacia una Nueva Historia de los Movimientos Obreros (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2008), 49–76. 32.  John T. Dunlop, Industrial Relations System (New York: Henry Holt, 1958), 9. 33.  Ibid., 6. Dunlop chose open definitions to facilitate cross-national comparisons, and he acknowledged that nationalist development regimes in underdeveloped countries faced very different challenges. See pages 334–41. 34.  Ibid., 82. 35.  Womack, “Working Power over Production,” 30, 50. 36.  John T. Dunlop, “The Changing Status of Labor,” in The Growth of the American Economy: An Introduction to the Economic History of the United States, ed. Harold F. Williamson (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1944), 609–10, 621. 37.  Dunlop, Industrial Relations System, 82. 38.  Jerry Lee Lembcke, “Labor History’s ‘Synthesis Debate’: Sociological Interventions,” Science & Society 52:2 (Summer 1995), 137–73. For a call to re­ engage the big questions of capitalism, see Frederick Cooper, “Farewell to the ­Category-Producing Class?” ILWCH 57 (Apr. 2000), 60–68; also Don Kalb, “Class (in Place) Without Capitalism (in Space)?” ILWCH 57 (Apr. 2000), 31–39. For a pointed critique of the ways in which Marx’s theory of capitalism has been distorted to fit the needs of socialist and Third-World modernization regimes, see

246

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Robert Kurz, Marx lesen: Die wichtigsten Texte von Karl Marx für das 21. Jahr­ hundert (Stuttgart: Eichborn, 2001), 15–48. 39.  Dunlop, Industrial Relations Systems, 9–10, 33–61, 382–83. 40.  One study that reveals the potential of the approach is James P. Brennan, “Industrial Sectors and Union Politics in Latin American Labor Movements: Light and Power Workers in Argentina and Mexico,” Latin American Research Review 30:1 (1995), 39–68. 41.  The case of the CSN thus illustrates that the labor law was not always a “generosity akin to fraud,” as John French has argued in Drowning in Laws: La­ bor Law and Brazilian Political Culture (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 40. chapter one 1.  Obras de Elysio de Carvalho, vol. 1: Ensaios (Brasília: Universal, 1997), 185. All translations are by the author unless otherwise noted. 2.  A detailed narrative of the spatial dispersion of mechanization and the use of industrial power has to rely on disparate sources that rarely focus explicitly on industrial questions. See Oliver J. Dinius, “Work in Brazil’s Steel City: A History of Industrial Relations in Volta Redonda” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2004), 33–96. Most histories of Brazilian industrialization focus on aggregate economic effects, whether these are classic studies of economic development or new economic histories. See Carlos Manuel Peláez, História da industrialização brasileira; crítica à teoria estruturalista no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: APEC, 1972); Flávio Rabelo Versiani and José Roberto de Mendonça de Barros, eds. Formação econômica do Brasil: a experiência da industrialização (São Paulo: Saraiva, 1977); Stephen Haber, How Latin America Fell Behind: Essays on the Economic Histories of Brazil and ­Mexico, 1800–1914 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997); Gail Triner, Banking and Economic Development: Brazil, 1889–1930 (New York: Palgrave, 2000). 3.  On gradual industrialization under the First Republic, see Steven Topik, The Political Economy of the Brazilian State, 1889–1930 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987). 4.  Stanley Stein, Vassouras—A Brazilian Coffee County, 1850–1900: The Roles of Planter and Slave in a Plantation Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 36–37, 234–36; Peter Eisenberg, The Sugar Industry in Pernambuco: Modernization without Change, 1840–1910 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 38–44. 5.  Richard Graham, Britain and the Onset of Modernization in Brazil, 1850– 1914 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 52–72. 6.  Pedro Carlos da Silva Telles, História da engenharia no Brasil (Século XVI à XIX) (Rio de Janeiro: Clavero, 1994), 289–318, 403–5. 7.  Stanley J. Stein, The Brazilian Cotton Manufacture: Textile Enterprise in an Underdeveloped Area, 1850–1950 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 12, 21–24. 8.  Suzigan, A indústria brasileira, 190–202, 213–14. 9.  Commercial Encyclopedia, Third sectional Issue: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay; overseas supplement; Great Britain (London: The Globe Ency-

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clopedia Company, 1922), 583–96, 634–38, 642–44. Telles, História (Séc. XVI à XIX), 227–28. 10.  Alfredo Lisboa, Portos do Brasil, 2nd ed. (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1926), 418–56. 11.  Francisco de Assis Magalhães Gomes, A electrificação no Brasil (São Paulo: Eletropaulo, 1986), 3–5; Energia elétrica: diagnóstico preliminar (Rio de Janeiro: Ministério das Minas e Energia/ELETROBRAS, 1967), 63. 12.  Duncan McDowall, The Light: Brazilian Traction, Light and Power Com­ pany Limited, 1899–1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 134–50. 13.  Suzigan, A indústria brasileira, 195. 14.  Commercial Encyclopedia, 600; ibid., 217–25. 15.  Arthur H. Redfield, Brazil: A Study of Economic Conditions since 1913 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1920), 56–68. 16.  Commercial Encyclopedia, 352. 17.  Peter Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 109– 10. For a case of import substitution, see Theodore Geiger, The General Electric Company in Brazil (Washington, DC: National Planning Association, 1961), 39–41. 18.  Pedro Carlos da Silva Telles, História da engenharia no Brasil (Século XX) (Rio de Janeiro: Clavero, 1993), 53, 60–61, 64, 73–84. 19.  Telles, História (Séc. XVI à XIX), 227–28; “Uma cidade dentro da cidade,” O Observador Econômico e Financeiro (hereafter OEF) 10:109 (Feb. 1945), 99– 116; Telles, História (Séc. XX), 407. 20.  Jorge B. Crespo, Brasil: el ejercito y marina. 2 vols. (Buenos Aires: Juan Perrotti, 1919), 163–64; Stanley E. Hilton, “The Armed Forces and Industrialists in Modern Brazil: The Drive for Military Autonomy, 1889–1954,” HAHR 62:4 (Nov. 1982), 636. 21.  Crespo, Brasil, 158–68. 22.  “Exposição Nacional do Estado Novo,” OEF 3:36 (Jan. 1939), 80–85, 120. 23.  Frank D. McCann, “The Brazilian Army and the Pursuit of Arms Independence, 1899–1979,” in War, Business and World Military-Industrial Complexes, ed. Benjamin Franklin Cooling (Port Washington, WA: Kennikat Press, 1981), 253–55; Telles, História (Séc. XX), 276–85. 24.  A. de Miranda Bastos, “Construção naval,” OEF 6:72 (Jan. 1942), 10. 25.  Telles, História (Séc. XX), 258, 266, 271, 398–418; “Uma cidade dentro da cidade,” 99. 26.  Telles, História (Séc. XX), 278–79; Roberto Simonsen, A construção dos quarteis para o exercito (São Paulo, 1931). On the Cia. Constructora de Santos, see Commercial Encyclopedia, 659. 27.  Telles, História (Séc. XX), 276–85. 28.  Ibid., 473–82. 29.  Ibid., 533–35. 30.  Commercial Encyclopedia, 608. 31.  On import shares, see Simonsen, A evolução industrial do Brasil, 59; Humberto A. Bastos, “Indústria do cimento,” OEF 5:53 (Maio 1940), 11. On domestic producers, see Telles, História (Séc. XX), 223–25.

248

Notes to Chapter 1

32.  Hilton, “The Armed Forces and Industrialists,” 636; Egydio M. de Castro e Silva, As indústrias militares em nosso pais (Rio de Janeiro: Jornal de Comercio, 1940), 78–81. 33.  Paulo R. Fontes, Trabalhadores e cidadãos: Nitro Química: a fábrica e as lutes operárias nos anos 50 (São Paulo: Anna Blume, 1997), 25–36. 34.  P. Pisani Perroni, “Pesquisa e refinação de petróleo,” OEF 10:117 (Oct. 1945), 134–39. 35.  Gomes, A electrificação no Brasil, 4; Simonsen, A evolução industrial, 28, 50–51; J. R. Bradley, Fuel and Power in Latin America (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1931), 78; Brasil, Ministério da Agricultura, Indústria e Comércio; Instituto de Expansão Comercial, O Brasil atual: forças econômicas—pro­ gressos (Rio de Janeiro), 166. For a table with the number of plants and capacities, see Dinius, “Work in Brazil’s Steel City,” 70. 36.  Gomes, A electrificação no Brasil, 9–15. 37.  The South American Handbook (Bath: Trade & Travel Publications, 1942), 260. 38.  McDowall, The Light, 281; Energia elétrica no Brasil: da primeira lâmpada à Eletrobrás (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1977), 59; Allen Morrison, The Tramways of Brazil: A 130–year survey (New York: Bonde Press, 1989). Posted at , accessed on July 2, 2002. 39.  Telles, História (Séc. XX), 425. 40.  “O padrão de 50 cyclos,” OEF 4:37 (Feb. 1939), 122–23; Telles, História (Séc. XX), 202. 41.  Simonsen, A evolução industrial do Brasil, 28, 50–51; IBGE, Recensea­ mento geral do Brasil (1.º de setembro de 1940): censos econômicos, agrícola, in­ dustrial, comercial e dos serviços (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1950), 188. 42.  Examples included a “serraria a vapor” (steam-powered sawmill), “moinho a vapor” (steam-powered flourmill), and a “fábrica de chapéus a vapor” (steampowered hat factory). Telles, História (Séc. XX), 200. 43.  Bradley, Fuel and Power, 79, 86/7. 44.  OEF 4:44 (Sept. 1939), 133. That year, more than 31 million vehicles circulated in the United States. OEF 5:56 (Sept. 1940), 118. 45.  Telles, História (Séc. XX), 98; Bradley, Fuel and Power, 85–86. 46.  For a survey of the minerals and metals mined in the early 1940s, see Nuno Vieira, “Passado e presente da mineração,” OEF 8:94 (Nov. 1943), 33–47. 47.  Marshall C. Eakin, British Enterprise in Brazil—The St. John d’el Rey Min­ ing Company and the Morro Velho Gold Mine, 1830–1960 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), 16–17. On industrial operations, see 30–33, 46, 117. 48.  Vieira, “Passado e presente da mineração,” 33–34; Commercial Encyclope­ dia, 513–18. 49.  Eugênio Bondot, “Carvão mineral do Brasil,” OEF 8:93 (Oct. 1943), 24– 28; Telles, História (Séc. XX), 101–4; IBGE, Estatísticas históricas do Brasil: séries econômicas, demográficas e sociais de 1550 a 1988 (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1990), 501. 50.  Franciso de Assis Magalhães Gomes, História da siderurgia brasileira (Belo Horizonte: Itatiaia, 1983), 168–69; Bondot, “Carvão mineral do Brasil,” 25.

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51.  On the Itabira project, see Peláez, State, 211–18; and Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva, O ferro na história e na economia do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 1972), 51–55. 52.  John D. Wirth, The Politics of Brazilian Development, 1930–1954 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1970), 79–80. On the operation of the CVRD, see “O Brasil e o minério de ferro,” OEF 10:117 (Oct. 1945), 38–69. 53.  Humberto Bastos, A conquista siderúrgica no Brasil (São Paulo: Livraria Martins, 1959), 106. The best surveys of the history of Brazil’s iron and steel industry are Macedo Soares, O ferro; William S. Callaghan, “Obstacles to Industrialization: The Iron and Steel Industry in Brazil during the Old Republic” (PhD diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1981). See also Edward Jonathan Rogers, “The Study of the Brazilian Iron and Steel Industry and Its Associated Resources” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 1957). 54.  Decree-law 8.019 (May 19, 1910); Macedo Soares, O ferro, 54–60; ­Bastos, A conquista siderúrgica, 101; F. M. de Souza Aguiar, Indústria siderúrgica: relatório apresentado ao Exmo. Sr. Presidente da República (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1910). 55.  Contract between Itabira and the Ministério da Viação e Obras Públicas, May 29, 1920, based on Decree-law 14.160 (May 11, 1920). 56.  Charles A. Gauld, The Last Titan, Percival Farquhar: American Entrepre­ neur in Latin America (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, Institute of Hispanic American and Luso-Brazilian Studies, 1964), 289–90. 57.  Peláez, “O desenvolvimento da indústria do aço no Brasil,” 222–24; Telles, História (Séc. XX), 210; Drumm, “Brazilian Steel Plant,” 57, 83; “A siderurgia em Minas Gerais,” OEF 5:57 (Oct. 1940), 48. 58.  Rogers, Study of the Brazilian Iron and Steel Industry, 220–34, 240–49. 59.  Warren Dean, The Industrialization of São Paulo, 1880–1945 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969), 113–15; “Report of the American Technical Mission to Brazil,” vol. II-A: 19—Sources of Credit for New Enterprises, Apr. 1943, 15, Records of the Department of State relating to the Internal Affairs of Brazil, 1940–1944. 60.  Evans, Dependent Development, 111; Fontes, Trabalhadores e cidadãos, 25–36. 61.  Report of the American Technical Mission, vol. II-A, 9–13. 62.  Ibid., 5–7, 20–24. 63.  Ibid., 22a, 22b. Trading volume went from 61,690 shares to 278,115 and the value from Cr$17 million to $74 million. 64.  Cited and translated in Triner, Banking, 75, 116. Originally in Roberto ­Simonsen, As finanças e a indústria: Conferência realisada no Mackenzie College (São Paulo, 1930). 65.  “Banco de Commercio e Industrial de São Paulo,” OEF 4:41 (June 1939), 153. 66.  “Banco Commercio do Estado de São Paulo,” OEF 4:41 (June 1939), 147; “Banco Commercio e Indústria de Minas Gerais,” OEF 4:37 (Feb. 1939), 159. 67.  Report of the American Technical Mission, vol. II-A, 27–30. 68.  Ibid.

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69.  Ibid., 29b. 70.  Ibid., 24–25. 71.  Ibid., vol. II-A, 33–36. 72.  On the coexistence of technological stages, see Redfield, Brazil, 56–68; J. F. Normano, The Struggle for South America: Economy and Ideology (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1931). 73.  Annibal Villanova Villela and Wilson Suzigan, Política do governo e cresci­ mento da economia brasileira (Rio de Janeiro: IPEA/INPES, 1973), 94. Different definitions of industrial workers led to an overcount in 1920, but the increase to 1940 would still have been more modest than the increase in industrial production over the same years. On the difference in census criteria, see Werner Baer, The Brazilian Economy: Growth and Development, 4th ed. (Westport/London: Praeger, 1995), 41. 74.  Report of the Sheffield Industrial Mission to South America: August–­ November, 1930 (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1931), 31; IBGE, Recensea­ mento geral (1940)—censos econômicos, 7, 150. 75.  Claudio Haddad used data starting in 1947 and concluded that the industrial share of GNP in 1939 was 21.9 percent and the agricultural share 26.1 percent. C. Haddad, “Crescimento do produto real brasileiro—1900/1947,” in Formação Econômica do Brasil, ed. Flávio Rabelo Versiani and José Roberto ­Mendonça de Barros, 150. The Sheffield Mission’s report may have used export earnings as a proxy for agriculture, which would underestimate its value—not least because exports were sharply down in 1930. 76.  On the origins of industrial capital in São Paulo, see Dean, Industrialization, 19–33. Maria Bárbara Levy blames the relative decline of the Federal District on the higher cost of electricity, more expensive rail freight rates, and higher labor costs. M. B. Levy, A indústria do Rio de Janeiro através de suas sociedades anônimas (Rio de Janeiro: UFRJ, 1994), 204–9. 77.  On the impact of industrialization in Minas Gerais, see John D. Wirth, Minas Gerais and the Brazilian Federation, 1889–1937 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1977), 49–53. 78.  Stephen Bell, Campanha Gaucha: A Brazilian Ranching System, 1850– 1920 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 136–55; Cassiano Alberto L. Fernandez, “A indústria do charque,” OEF 5:49 (Feb. 1940), 57–64. 79.  Eisenberg, Sugar Industry; Gileno Dé Carli, “O assucar e a indústria,” OEF 5:51 (Mar. 1940), 122–24. 80.  José Carlos de Macedo Soares, A borracha: um estudo econômico e es­ tatístico (Paris: A.–D. Cillard, 1927). 81.  Moacir F. M. Silva, “Transportes na Amazônia,” in Amazônia brasileira: ex­ cerptos da “Revista brasileira de geografia” (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1944), 284–96. 82.  Commercial Encyclopedia, 352. 83.  For an exemplary historical geography of industrial development in a peripheral Brazilian state, see Gerd Kohlhepp, Industriegeographie des ­nordöstlichen Santa Catarina (Südbrasilien): Ein Beitrag zur Geographie eines deutschbrasil­ ianischen Siedlungsgebietes (Heidelberg: Geographisches Institut, 1968). 84.  The 1940 census did not provide data on industry by municipality. 85.  On the politics of the steel question in the 1930s, see Wirth, Politics, ch. 5.

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86.  “Problemas e realizações do Estado Novo,” speech, Feb. 19, 1938, in Getúlio Vargas, A nova política do Brasil, vol. 5 (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1939), 178–81. 87.  On the conflicts between the states and the federal government, see Robert M. Levine, The Vargas Regime: The Critical Years, 1934–1938 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970). 88.  On the politics of the commissions, see Wirth, Politics, 97–105. 89.  Geraldo Barros Mendes, Guilherme Guinle, 1882–1960: ensaio biográfico (Rio de Janeiro: AGIR, 1982), 114–17. 90.  Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva, Um construtor do nosso tempo. Depoimento ao CPDOC (Rio de Janeiro: Iarte Impressos de Arte, 1998), 76. The book uses excerpts from a much longer interview, which I consulted in the CPDOC archives. 91.  Callaghan refers to this discussion, which had taken place in various incarnations since the 1910s, as the “Great Debate.” Callaghan, “Obstacles,” 177–90, 377–93. 92.  Ibid., 77. 93.  “Nota editorial,” OEF 4:41 (June 1939), 3. 94.  Ibid., 4:42 (July 1939), 17. 95.  Macedo Soares, Um construtor, 93, 102. 96.  The CSN’s second president, Sílvio Raulino de Oliveira (1946–1954), later referred to the decree-law as a major step toward the realization of the steel mill; “Inauguração oficial da usina siderúrgica de Volta Redonda,” BSVR 201 (Oct. 21, 1946), 1640–47. 97.  Macedo Soares, Um construtor, 16–21. 98.  Alzira Alves de Abreu, “Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva,” Dicionario histórico-biográfico brasileiro, Pós-1930, coordenação de Alzira Alves de Abreu, Israel Beloch, Fernando Lattman-Weltman and Sérgio Tadeu de Niemeyer Lamarão (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV; CPDOC, 2001), 5511. Cited hereafter as DHBB. 99.  On the curriculum, see Instituto Militar de Engenharia, História da unidade (Rio de Janeiro: Ministério do Exercito, n.d.). 100.  Macedo Soares, Um construtor, 29–31. 101.  Ibid., 55, 73–74. 102.  Ibid., 74. 103.  Ibid., 38; Abreu, “Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva,” DHBB, 5512. 104.  Aimée Moutet, Les logiques de l’entreprise: la rationalisation dans l’industrie française de l’entre-deux-guerres (Paris: L’École des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 1997), 29–30; Macedo Soares, Um construtor, 45–46. 105.  Guillet and Le Chatelier coauthored a paper on the application of the Taylor method to heat treatment. León Guillet and Henri Le Chatelier, Mémoire sur de traitement thermique des obus (application de la méthode Taylor) (Paris: Janvier, 1916). Le Chatelier had pioneered the application of Frederick W. Taylor’s methods to metallurgy. See , accessed on May 9, 2004. 106.  Guillet discussed technical education in L’Enseignement Technique Supéri­ eur à l’Après-Guerre (Paris, Payot, 1918) and social services in La métallurgie et les

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mines (Paris: J. de Gigord, 1936), 207–25. On Guillet’s values and his commitment to teaching, see “Guillet, León Alexandre (1873–1946)—Professeur de Métallurgie et de Travail de métaux (1908–1942),” in Les Professeurs du Conservatoire Na­ tional des Arts et Metiers, Dictionnaire biographique, 1794–1955, ed. Claudine Fontanon and André Grelon (Paris: Institut National de Recherche Pédagogique, 1994), 615, 620. 107.  André Thépot, “L’union sociale des ingénieurs catholiques durant la première moitié du XXe siècle,” in L’ingenieur dans la societé française, ed. ­André Thépot (Paris: Les Editions Ouvrières, 1985), 222–24; André Grélon, “Der katholische Ingenieur und seine soziale Rolle zwischen den Kriegen,” in Ingenieure in Frankreich, 1747–1990, ed. André Grélon and Heiner Stück (Frankfurt: Campus, 1994), 283–87. 108.  Macedo Soares, Um construtor, 46. 109.  Abreu, “Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva,” DHBB, 5512. 110.  Ibid., 5513; Macedo Soares, Um construtor, 60. 111.  Macedo Soares, Um construtor, 64, 67–70, 75. 112.  Macedo Soares, O ferro, introductory biographical sketch. 113.  On the creation of the Escola de Engenharia do Exército, see Telles, História (Séc. XX), 24–25. 114.  Macedo Soares, Um construtor, 78. 115.  Ibid., 93, 102. John Wirth provides evidence that Macedo Soares favored a proposal by the British firm Brassert. Wirth, Politics, 106. 116.  Macedo Soares, Um construtor, 79–81. 117.  Abreu, “Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva,” DHBB, 5513. 118.  Macedo Soares, Um construtor, 83. 119.  See Macedo Soares’s confidential reports to the Ministério de Viação e Obras Públicas: Relatório sobre a) Exportação de minérios de ferro; b) organiza­ ção de uma nova usina siderúrgica. Apresentado por Major Macedo Soares e Silva (Rio de Janeiro, 1939), 59; and Observações a respeito do parecer da Commissão Especial do C.T.E.F. sobre: a) a exportação de minérios de ferro e manganês; b) a instalação da grande siderurgia (Rio de Janeiro, 1939), 8–9. Wirth did not provide conclusive evidence for his argument that defense considerations played a key role in the choice of location. Wirth, Politics, 120, 124. 120.  Pedro Aurélio de Góes Monteiro to Vargas, July 7, 1939, GV c 1939.07.07. 121.  George C. Marshall to Góes Monteiro, Oct. 5, 1939, GV c 1939.10.05/1. 122.  Vargas to Martins Pereira e Souza, Dec. 1, 1939, GV c 1939.12.01/1. 123.  U.S. Steel to Macedo Soares, Jan. 17, 1940; EMS f-publ 39.05.12, pasta 1. Reprinted in Macedo Soares, O ferro, appendix, XXVI. 124.  Telegram from Washington Embassy, Jan. 25, 1940, GV c 1940.01.09. 125.  “A Procura do Aço Brasileiro,” The Hemisphere (Mar. 15, 1940), GV c 1940.01.09. 126.  Martins Pereira e Souza to Getúlio Vargas, n.d., GV c 1940.01.09. The response, signed by Alzira Vargas, is dated Jan. 31, 1940. 127.  Telegram from Washington Embassy, Jan. 17, 1940, GV c 1940.01.09.

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128.  Telegrams from Martins Pereira e Souza to Vargas, Jan. 17 and Jan. 23, 1940, GV c 1940.01.09. 129.  Gute Hoffnungshütte Oberhausen, Vorprojekt Hüttenwerksanlage ­Brasilien-Kennwort: BRAHU, umfassend Kokerei, Hochofenanlage, Stahlwerk, Walzwerk, Kraftwerk, Nebenanlagen (Oberhausen: GHH—Werk Sterkrade, Jan. 15, 1940), CSN Central Archive. 130.  The New York Times reported on March 1, 1940, that Krupp had submitted a new proposal. The Hemisphere claimed that both Krupp and the Swedish Bofors group were “fishing” for opportunities to revive the negotiations. “A Procura do Aço Brasileiro,” The Hemisphere (Mar. 15, 1940), Newspaper clippings, GV c 1940.01.09. 131.  Telegrams exchanged between Martins Pereira e Souza and Vargas, Mar. 27 and 28, 1940, GV c 1940.01.09. 132.  For a short biography of Heitor Freire de Carvalho, see British Chamber of Commerce of São Paulo & Southern Brazil, Personalidades no Brasil—Men of Affairs in Brazil (São Paulo: São Paulo, 1932), 169–70. 133.  Barros Mendes, Guilherme Guinle, 7–11, 39–40, 86–88. 134.  McDowall, The Light, 165–77; Morrison, The Tramways, 60–65. 135.  Barros Mendes, Guilherme Guinle, 114–17, 134–43. 136.  Telles, História (Séc. XX), 540–41, 655–58. 137.  “Ari Frederico Torres,” DHBB, 5767; Milton Vargas, “O início da ­pesquisa tecnológica no Brasil,” in História da técnica e tecnologia no Brasil, ed. Milton ­Vargas (São Paulo: UEP, 1994), 221. 138.  Telles, História (Séc. XX), 204, 544, 660. 139.  Milton Vargas, “Engenharia civil na República Velha,” in Vargas, ed., História da técnica, 190. 140.  Telles, História (Séc. XX), 563–65, 647; “Oscar Weinschenk,” DHBB, 6121. 141.  Telles, História (Séc. XX), 109, 336, 571. 142.  Ibid., 217. 143.  On the bank’s relations with Brazil during the 1930s debt crisis, see Frederick C. Adams, Economic Diplomacy: The Export-Import Bank and American For­ eign Policy, 1934–1939 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1976), 143–52. 144.  Martins Pereira e Souza to Vargas, Mar. 16, 1940, GV c 1940.01.09. 145.  Martins Pereira e Souza to Vargas, July 6, 1940, GV c 1940.01.09. 146.  Macedo Soares to General João Mendonça Lima, Minister of Transport, Sept. 24, 1940, EMS f-publ 20.01.05. 147.  Wirth, Politics, 117. 148.  CSN, Relatório da Diretoria correspondente ao ano de 1941 apresentado à Assembléia Geral Ordinária (Rio de Janeiro: CSN, 1942), 3. 149.  Ibid., appendix. 150.  CSN, Ata da Assembléia de Constituição definitiva da Sociedade Anônima “Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional,” Rio de Janeiro, 1941. Published in the Diário Oficial da União (May 5, 1941) and in a corrected version in the DOU (May 10, 1941). 151.  “Ari Frederico Torres,” DHBB, 5767.

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152.  Macedo Soares, Um construtor, 45. 153.  Brasil, Comissão Revisora do Contracto da Itabira Iron, Revisão do con­ tracto da Itabira Iron: relatório e minuta de contracto organisado (Rio de Janeiro, 1934); Macedo Soares, Um construtor, 60. 154.  For a company history until the 1930s, see Charles E. Mills, Fifty Years of Engineering (Cleveland: Arthur McKee & Co., 1955), 28–36. 155.  Arthur G. McKee & Company, Annual Report, 1940 (Cleveland: Arthur G. McKee & Co., 1940), 3, 5. 156.  Macedo Soares, Um construtor, 91–94. 157.  Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva, “A usina siderúrgica de Volta Redonda,” Mineração e Metalurgia 7:39 (July/Aug. 1943), 131. 158.  Regina Lúcia de Moraes Morel, “A ferro e fogo. Construção e crise da ‘família siderúrgica’: o caso de Volta Redonda (1941–1968)” (PhD diss., Universidade de São Paulo, 1989), anexo A–iii. 159.  Macedo Soares, Um construtor, 91–94. 160.  Edward Stettenius, Director of Priorities, to Arthur McKee, Aug. 20, 1941: EMS f-publ 39.05.12, pasta 1. 161.  Curtis, Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle, Attorneys, to Macedo Soares, Oct. 01, 1941, and Macedo Soares to E. J. Earley, Division of Priorities, Oct. 01, 1941: EMS f-publ 39.05.12, pasta 1. 162.  Martins Pereira e Souza to Vargas, Dec. 3, 1941: EMS f-publ 39.05.12, pasta 1. 163.  “Organização para o desenvolvimento,” EMS/Soares, E., pi 64.07.14, 11–12. 164.  Macedo Soares to Ernani do Amaral Peixoto, May 9, 1942, EAP int 40.10.07. 165.  J. B. Gibson, “Unusual Erection Problems Encountered at Brazil’s Big Steel Plant,” Engineering News Record 137:4 (July 25, 1946), 89. Macedo Soares, Um construtor, 91–94; Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva, “Volta Redonda: gênese da idéia, seu desenvolvimento, projeto, educação e custo,” Revista do Serviço Público (Nov. 1945), 15. chapter two 1.  José Silvado Bueno, “Volta Redonda Opens New Economic Cycle for Brazil,” Bulletin of the Pan-American Union 80 (May 1946), 250. 2.  From 1939 to 1943, the federal government carried out a far-reaching municipal reform to shorten names and eliminate duplication. For most municipalities and districts, the reform eliminated the saint’s name and identified them exclusively by a geographic feature. Rio Preto replaced São José do Rio Preto, for example, and Volta Redonda replaced Santo Antônio de Volta Redonda. For a complete list, see IBGE, Divisão Territorial dos Estados Unidos do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1940). 3.  IBGE, Recenseamento geral do Brasil (1.º de setembro de 1940)—censo de­ mográfico (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1950), 74–75, 171. 4.  The first public bridge would not be built until the late 1940s. Alkindar Costa, Volta Redonda, ontem e hoje: visão histórica e estética, 3rd ed. (Volta Redonda: Sociedade Pró-Memória, 1991), 19–20.

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5.  The data for economically active men approximated the municipality’s socioeconomic make up, despite inclusion of artisan production in the category “industry.” The census categorized no less than 66 percent of economically active women in the category “domestic and nonspecified activities,” although they often worked alongside their husbands in agriculture or artisan production. IBGE, Re­ censeamento (1940)—censo demográfico, 74–75, 171. 6.  IBGE, Enciclopédia dos municípios brasileiros, vol. 22 (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1959), 196–202. 7.  Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva, “Volta Redonda: gênese da idéia, seu desenvolvimento, projeto, educação e custo,” Revista do Serviço Público (Nov. 1945), 19. 8.  For a detailed map of the entire state with municipal boundaries and the main communication lines, see IBGE, Enciclopédia dos municípios brasileiros, vol.7. 9.  Centro da Memória da Eletricidade do Brasil, A CERJ e a história da energia elétrica no Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro: Memória da Eletricidade, 1993), 139–40. 10.  For the full text of these documents, see Costa, Volta Redonda, 45–46. 11.  CSN, Relatório da Diretoria correspondente ao ano de 1944 apresentado à Assembléia Geral Ordinária (Rio de Janeiro, 1944), 7. The “1944” in the title is a typing error. This was the annual report for 1943. 12.  A. Thun was one of many foreign companies that had secured mining concessions under the liberal legislation of the 1910s; see Macedo Soares, O ferro. For the text, see Decree-law 9.002, Feb. 20, 1946, “Resumo de atos oficiais do governo federal,” BSVR 046 (Mar. 11, 1946), 379–80. As Minister of Transport and Public Works under President Eurico Dutra (1946–1951), Macedo Soares was instrumental in supporting several of these expropriations decrees; “Resumo de atos oficiais do governo federal,” BSVR 077 (Apr. 24, 1946), 597. 13.  Macedo Soares, “Volta Redonda: gênese,” 23. 14.  J. B. Gibson, “Unusual Erection Problems Encountered at Brazil’s Big Steel Plant,” Engineering News Record 137:4 (July 25, 1946), 89–90. 15.  CSN, Relatório dos trabalhos feitos até abril de 1942 pelo escritório de obras (Rio de Janeiro, 1942), 32–46. 16.  Computed from daily admission and dismissal statistics in BSVR 191 (Oct. 23, 1943) to BSVR 010 (Jan. 10, 1949). 17.  Percentages are based on a cross-tab of Birth-Region and Admission Year from weighted sample of CSN personnel files. For details on the CSN’s personnel archive and the sampling procedure, refer to Appendix I. 18.  “Migratory hinterland” is an adaptation of William Cronon’s “debt hinterland” from Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991). All data for the maps is from the weighted sample of CSN personnel files. 19.  On the geographic profile of the region, see Preston E. James, Brazil (New York: Odyssey Press, 1946), 7. 20.  Pierre Deffontaines, “The Origin and Growth of the Brazilian Network of Towns,” Geographical Review 28:3 (July 1938), 381–84. 21.  Stanley J. Stein, Vassouras: A Brazilian Coffee County, 1850–1900: The Roles of Planter and Slave in a Plantation Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).

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Notes to Chapter 2

22.  Preston E. James, “The Coffee Lands of Southeastern Brazil,” Geographical Review 22:2 (Apr. 1932), 227–30. 23.  John D. Wirth, Minas Gerais and the Brazilian Federation, 1889–1937 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1977), 7. 24.  James, Brazil, 96–99. 25.  Wirth, Minas Gerais, 23, 90–92. 26.  In some regions, arigó was used synonymously with caipira, best translated as “country bumpkin.” Another common usage of the term was for migrant workers employed in the construction of roads, railroads, or sugar mills. Antônio Houaiss and Mauro de Salles Villar, Dicionário Houaiss da Língua Portuguesa, 1st ed. (Rio de Janeiro: Objetiva, 2001), 287. 27.  Wirth, Minas Gerais, 11–12, 20–21. On the economy of the Médio Paraíba in São Paulo, see Joseph L. Love, São Paulo and the Brazilian Federation, 1889– 1937 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1980), 26–27. 28.  Interview with Allan Cruz, former president of STIMMMEBM (1951– 1953), Volta Redonda, Nov. 9, 1997. 29.  Paulo Fontes notes that paulistas (inhabitants of São Paulo) in the 1950s used baiano as a generic term for all migrants. Paulo R. Fontes, “Comunidade operária, migração nordestina e lutas sociais: São Miguel Paulista (1945–1966)” (PhD diss., Universidade Estadual de Campinas, 2002), 85–100. 30.  Recensamento Geral do Brasil (1.° de Setembro de 1940). Série Regional, Parte XV—Rio de Janeiro, 52. The figures for the migrants are based on the sample database of CSN personnel files. 31.  Regina Lúcia de Moraes Morel, “Os soldados de trabalho,” in Arigó: o pássaro que veio de longe (Volta Redonda: Centro de Memória Sindical, 1989), 28. 32.  For a brief history of the DIP, see Rejane Araújo, “Departamento de ­Imprensa e Propaganda (DIP),” Dicionario histórico-biográfico brasileiro, pós1930, coord. ­Alzira Alves de Abreu, Israel Beloch, Fernando Lattman-Weltman, and Sérgio Tadeu de Niemeyer Lamarão, vol. 2 (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV/CPDOC, 2001), 1830–33. 33.  Edmundo Macedo Soares e Silva to Ernani Amaral Peixoto, Feb. 19, 1945, Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação (hereafter CPDOC), Acervo Edmundo Macedo Soares e Silva (hereafter EMS), f-publ 39.05.12, pasta 2. 34.  Ibid. 35.  Ibid. 36.  The CSN paid unskilled hands between Cr$1.40 and Cr$2 per hour, semiskilled electrician helpers between Cr$1.40 and Cr$2.20, and skilled carpenters between Cr$2.60 and Cr$4. Boletim de Serviço de Volta Redonda (BSVR) 97 (May 23, 1944), appendix. 37.  José Silvado Bueno, “Volta Redonda Opens New Economic Cycle for Brazil,” Bulletin of the Pan-American Union 80 (May 1946), 254; Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva, “A usina siderúrgica de Volta Redonda,” Mineração e Met­ alurgia (July/Aug. 1943), 132. 38.  CSN, Grupo de Trabalho para Venda de Casas, Relatório (Volta Redonda: CSN, 1960), 30. The totals exclude subcontractors, who employed 1,646 workers in

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November 1943 and 1,985 workers by early 1945. “Movimento de pessoal,” BSVR 212 (Nov. 29, 1943), 1393; “Pessoal de empreiteiros,” BSVR 003 (Jan. 4, 1945), 19. 39.  BSVR 140 (Oct. 10, 1942), 510. 40.  Computed from dismissal records in BSVR 103 (Aug. 13, 1942) to BSVR 125 (July 1, 1946). For a table with rates by quarter, see Oliver J. Dinius, “Work in Brazil’s Steel City: A History of Industrial Relations in Volta Redonda, 1941–68” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2004), 190. 41.  Decree-law 4.766 (Oct. 1, 1942), art. 16, declared workers in a municipality of national security interest to be soldiers. 42.  BSVR 167 (Aug. 30, 1944); BSVR 013 (Apr. 18, 1945). 43.  Computed from daily records in BSVR 103 (Aug. 15, 1942) to BSVR 130 (July 8, 1946). For a table with dismissals as share of the overall workforce from 1943 to 1945, see Dinius, “Work in Brazil’s Steel City,” 173. 44.  Data for the holidays computed from daily hiring and firing statistics in BSVR 029 (Feb. 19, 1943) to 038 (Mar. 4, 1943), BSVR 065 (Apr. 16, 1943) to 072 (Apr. 29, 1943), BSVR 222 (Dec. 10, 1943) to 230 (Dec. 23, 1943), BSVR 020 (Jan. 29, 1944) to 031 (Feb. 11, 1944), BSVR 054 (Mar. 19, 1944) to 067 (Apr. 8, 1944), and BSVR 231 (Dec. 03, 1944) to 245 (Dec. 23, 1944). See also “Frequências,” BSVR 004 (Jan. 6, 1945), 34. 45.  On the processing by the DPE: Interview with Allan Cruz. 46.  Sample of CSN personnel files. 47.  Interview with Waldyr Amaral Bedê, union officer (1957–1963), Volta Redonda, Jan. 20, 1998. 48.  Based on the construction workforce in mid-1944, when the CSN had an about equal number of employees as in 1950–51. “Pessoal horista,” BSVR 144 (July 29, 1944), appendix. 49.  Examples of personnel files with an explicit mention of colheita (harvest) or lavoura (field work) are Antonio Sergio de Lana (Matricula 5388), Antonio ­Teodolino de Barros (1644), Francisco Bazilio (5445), and Geraldo Batista dos Santos (7081). 50.  Cartas de Demissão, João Valentin (Matrícula 145), João Pereira da Silva (Matr. 145). Quote from Carta de Demissão, José Alves de Oliveira (Matr. 7497). The examples stem from a small sample of the dismissal records. The CSN re­ assigned employee numbers after workers left, which explains why two employees could have the same number. 51.  Macedo Soares to Amaral Peixoto, Feb. 19, 1945, EMS f-publ 39.05.12, pasta 2. 52.  Carta de Demissão, José Ribeiro da Silva (Matr. 7468). For examples of recommendations, see the Carta de Demissão of Sebastião Alves 5 [sic] (Matr. 133), with an annotation that the “worker could be rehired in the future without any risk for the company,” in contrast to Manoel de Magalhães (7468), who “could not be readmitted,” because he was a “bad character” (mau elemento). 53.  Cartas de Demissão, Manoel Francisco Pereira (Matr. 7495), Leopoldino Fernandes da Cunha (Matr. 7463). Quote from Carta de Demissão Pedro Pio Chaves (Matr. 2203). “Alega questões de família” was used as standard wording.

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For examples, see Carta de Demissão, Jose Soares de Lima (Matr. 2188); Oriel de Oliveira (Matr. 2181). 54.  See, for example, Carta de Demissão of Jovelino Bruno (Matr. 148), Luiz Silvestre de Jesus (Matr. 2208), Agenor Candido da Silva (Matr. 2191), and Jose Messias Ferrare (Matr. 125). 55.  Transcript of interview with Ex-worker, 1943, Arquivo do Estado de São Paulo (AESP), Departamento Estadual de Ordem Política e Social de São Paulo (hereafter DEOPS-SP), 50-B-01. All translations are by the author unless otherwise noted. 56.  Report from Investigator Livio Fleury Curado to Divisão de Polícia Política e Social/Distrito Federal (hereafter DPS/DF), Apr. 10, 1943, Arquivo Público do Estado de Rio de Janeiro (APERJ), Divisão de Ordem Política e Social/­Departamento Geral de Investigações Especiais (hereafter DOPS/DGIE), Geral 21, Dossier 1, 142–44. 57.  Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva, “A formação técnica do brasileiro,” Conferência na CNC, June 7, 1979, EMS/Soares, E. pi 79.06.07, 1. 58.  BSVR 057 (June 18, 1942), 180. 59.  CSN, Relatório dos trabalhos feitos, appendix. 60.  Quotes from Carta de Demissão, Alcides Rodrigues de Souza (Matr. 7483) and Pedro Alcantara Benilha (Matr. 6816). Other examples include Carta de De­ missão, Neros dos Santos Ferreira (Matr. 7472), Lamartine Oberg (Matr. 124), Carlos Alberto Heluey (Matr. 134). 61.  Transcript of interview with ex-worker, 1943, DEOPS-SP, 50-B-0 1. 62.  Report from Livio Fleury Curado to DPS/DF, 143. 63.  Transcript of interview with ex-worker, 1943, DEOPS-SP, 50-B-0 1. 64.  Statistics gathered by the Chief Inspector of Factories in Great Britain for 1934 showed that the construction industry had the highest ratio of fatal to nonfatal accidents. A given accident was three times as likely to be fatal as in the next most dangerous industry (docks). H. M. Vernon, Accidents and Their Prevention (New York: MacMillan, n.d.). 65.  The CSN microfilmed all industrial accident reports from 1942 to 1968. I compiled a database in five-year intervals (1943, 1948, 1953, 1958, 1963, 1968) recording all accidents for four months in each year (January, April, July, and October). I selected the months to control for possible seasonal variation. 66.  The CSN’s photographic archive includes pictures of workers crushed by falling construction equipment. J. B. Gibson claimed incorrectly that the CSN suffered no fatalities during construction work. Gibson, “Unusual Erection Problems,” 89–90. 67.  The classification of injuries is based on the CSN’s original accident reports. 68.  CSN, Accident #3988, July 1943. 69.  Decree-law 24.637 (July 10, 1934) introduced comprehensive accident legislation in Brazil. It applied to employees in industry, commerce, or agriculture, both in the private and public sectors, irrespective of temporary or permanent employment status. However, it did not cover the self-employed, those working at home, public servants entitled to state pensions, or sharecroppers. See Brasil, Departamento Nacional de Seguros Privados e Capitalização, Seguro e fiscalização: acidentes do trabalho (Rio de Janeiro: DIN, 1942), 8. 70.  Decree-law 7.036 (Nov. 10, 1944). For the full text, see Bento de Faria,

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Dos acidentes do trabalho e doenças profissionais (Rio de Janeiro: Freitas Bastos, 1947), appendix. 71.  “Prevenção de acidentes—norma n.1,” BSVR 051 (Mar. 29, 1943), 352. 72.  “Prevenção de acidentes—norma n.2,” BSVR 054 (Apr. 1, 1943), 367; “Prevenção de acidentes—norma n.3,” BSVR 124 (July 20, 1943), 840; “Prevenção de acidentes—norma n.4,” BSVR 020 (Jan. 31, 1944), 162–63; and “Regulamentação aprovada para venda e fornecimento de material de proteção contra acidentes,” BSVR 183 (Sept. 24, 1945), 1709. 73.  Decree-law 7.036 (Nov. 10, 1944), arts. 77–79, 82, in Bento de Faria, Dos acidentes, appendix. The CSN reprinted the new decree-law (7.056, Nov. 11, 1944) when it announced the creation of its commission; BSVR 133 (July 12, 1945), 1259; “Organização atual da Commissão de Prevenção de Acidentes da C.S.N.,” BSVR 198 (Oct. 14, 1947), 1759. 74.  “Serviço insalubre,” BSVR 237 (Dec. 11, 1945), 2175–76. 75.  “Frequência,” BSVR 022 (Feb. 2, 1944), 179. The salaried office staff, in contrast, had an attendance rate averaging between 85 and 90 percent. “Frequência,” BSVR 034 (Feb. 18, 1944), 277 and BSVR 053 (Mar. 3, 1944), 452. 76.  In June 1945, for example, 1 percent of workers on payroll was recovering from accidents; “Movimento de pessoal na 2ª quinzena de Junho,” BSVR 129 (July 8, 1945), 1232. 77.  BSVR 057 (June 18, 1942), 180; “Frequências,” BSVR 004 (Jan. 6, 1945), 34. In December 1945, for example, on average 10.2 percent of the workforce were on vacation or leave. 78.  “Instrução para o serviço de ponto e de apropriação de mão de obra e de material, das obras, oficinas e demais departamentos do Escritório de Obras,” BSVR 075 (July 10, 1942), 229. See also CSN, Relatório dos trabalhos feitos, 49. 79.  BSVR 103 (June 3, 1944). The figures match wages in my sample of personnel files. For the agricultural wages, see Macedo Soares to Amaral Peixoto, Feb. 19, 1945, EMS f-publ 39.05.12, pasta 2. 80.  Computed from database with sample of personnel records. 81.  These decrees build on decree-law 4.309 (May 18, 1942), which had made the CSN a project of military interest. Macedo Soares to Amaral Peixoto, Feb. 19, 1945, EMS f-publ 39.05.12, pasta 2. The CSN retained this status until early 1946. 82.  Decree-law 4.937 (Nov. 9, 1942), art. 2a, 2b, and 3. For an annotated edition of all penal legislation related to the war, see Amador Cysneiros, Leis Penais da Guerra (Rio de Janeiro: Author, 1943). 83.  Decree-law 4.766 (Oct. 1, 1942), art. 16. 84.  Decree-law 4.937 (Nov. 9, 1942), art. 4, and decree-law 4.766 (Oct. 1, 1942), art. 42. There were too few foreigners to make accusations of sabotage a common occurrence. One case was that of Vladimir Grigenhor, a Soviet citizen, in 1945. The report also referenced an earlier case involving an American. BSVR 088 (Nov. 11, 1945). 85.  Decree-law 4.766 (Oct. 1, 1942), art. 33. The penal code established imprisonment of one month to one year for the same offense in peacetime. Brasil, Codigo Penal (Rio de Janeiro: Nacional de Direito, 1945). 86.  Decree-law 4.937 (Nov. 9, 1942), art. 2c.

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87.  “Operários especialistas sorteados, convocados para o Serviço Militar,” BSVR 093 (May 19, 1944), 821. 88.  BSVR 017 (Feb. 1, 1943). The CSN started enforcement before the decreelaw had been published in the Diário Oficial in April 1943. 89.  The averages are for the period from August 1943 to January 1946. The CSN first applied fines in January 1943 (BSVR 002, Jan. 6, 1943) and recorded them systematically starting in August 1943. The war ended in August 1945, but the legislation was not revoked until December 1945 and the CSN applied fines until January 1946. 90.  Fine distribution and averages computed from daily reports in BSVR 133 (Aug. 5, 1943) to BSVR 010 (Oct. 14, 1946). 91.  Transcript of interview with ex-worker, 1943, DEOPS-SP, 50-B-0 1. 92.  Interview with Allan Cruz, former president of STIMMMEBM (1951–53), Volta Redonda Nov. 9, 1997. 93.  Transcript of interview with ex-worker, 1943, DEOPS-SP, 50-B-0 1. “Regime dos estabelecimentos de internação,” Penal Code, art. 90, see Brasil, Codigo Penal (Rio de Janeiro: Nacional de Direito, 1945). 94.  Transcript of interview with ex-worker, 1943, DEOPS-SP, 50-B-0 1. 95.  Computed from daily records in BSVR 103 (Aug. 15, 1942) to BSVR 130 (July 8, 1946). For a full table with the overall workforce and dismissals from 1943 to 1945, see Dinius, “Work in Brazil’s Steel City,” 173. 96.  See, for example, a series of suspensions in September 1945, BSVR 174 (Sept. 9, 1945) to 176 (Sept. 11, 1945). 97.  See, for example, the case of José Loureiro (PE 284), who earned a fourday suspension without pay for “clocking in on days when he actually never appeared to work,” BSVR 013 (Apr. 23, 1942). The master carpenter Mario Rosas (PE 5425) was suspended for two days for “disobeying orders concerning the use of wood destined for the construction of houses in the Acampamento Rústico,” BSVR 077 (July 14, 1942). 98.  CSN, Relatório dos trabalhos feitos, 32–46. 99.  BSVR 100 (Aug. 13, 1942), 313/314; Macedo Soares to Amaral Peixoto, Feb. 9, 1942, EAP int 40.10.07. 100.  Macedo Soares, “Volta Redonda: gênese,” 17. 101.  BSVR 125 (Sept. 16, 1942), 425. 102.  BSVR 100 (Aug. 13, 1942), 313–15; Macedo Soares to Amaral Peixoto, Feb. 9, 1942, EAP int 40.10.07. 103.  “Contrato com Arthur G. McKee Co.,” BSVR 199 (Oct. 18, 1944), 1722. 104.  “Admissão de engenheiros,” BSVR 200 (Oct. 19, 1944), 1724. In 1945, the CSN hired three American engineers to serve as superintendents in three key areas: maintenance, the power plant, and mechanical services. “Apresentação,” BSVR 089 (May 14, 1945), 860. 105.  For a map of the original layout of the mill, see Charles Longenecker, “Brazil Will Make Steel in Brazilian Plant from Brazilian Minerals,” Blast Furnace & Steel Plant 31:10 (Oct. 1943), 1132. 106.  Photographs from the construction site show welders as they connect the exhaust and gas pipes of the blast furnace at almost 100 feet above the ground.

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107.  Gibson, “Unusual Erection Problems,” 89–90. 108.  Macedo Soares, “Volta Redonda—Gênese,” 16. 109.  Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva, “A usina siderúrgica de Volta Redonda,” Mineração e Metalurgia, 7:39 (July/Aug. 1943), 135. 110.  Speech by Macedo Soares as he left his post as technical director in early 1946. “Transmissão de cargo: direção técnica,” BSVR 019 (Jan. 28, 1946), 149. 111.  Interview with Alcina de Macedo Soares, Rio de Janeiro, Apr. 5, 1998. She stressed that the other directors rarely visited Volta Redonda unless they accompanied official delegations on a visit. Macedo Soares instead made the weekly trip to the CSN’s main offices in Rio de Janeiro for the meeting of the directorate. 112.  “Bateria de fórnos de coque,” BSVR 080 (Apr. 27, 1946), 615. The message was sent as telegram, which explains the lack of prepositions. 113.  His other articles in Brazilian publications included “Volta Redonda,” Bo­ letim do Ministério de Trabalho, Indústria e Comercio (June 1946), 109–33, and “Volta Redonda: gênese.” 114.  Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva, “Volta Redonda e o desenvolvimento industrial no Brasil,” Estudos Brasileiros (July–Dec. 1943), 62–66, 74. 115.  Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva, “Volta Redonda: Brazil’s Big New Steel Plant Symbolizes the Country’s Industrial ‘Coming of Age,’” Foreign Com­ merce Weekly (Nov. 27, 1943), 3. 116.  “First Steel Flows from Volta Redonda,” Brazilian Bulletin 24 (July 1946), 4–6. 117.  C. H. Vivian, “Brazil’s First Modern Steel Plant,” Compressed Air Mag­ azine 47:10 (Oct. 1942), 6852. See also Longenecker, “Brazil Will Make Steel”; Bueno, “Volta Redonda,” 250–55. 118.  Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo, A Cidade do Aço: im­ pressões de Volta Redonda (São Paulo: FIESP, 1943), 5, 6, 10. For CSN documentation of the visit, see BSVR 046 (Mar. 22, 1943), 322–24. 119.  Ibid., 13–14. 120.  Ibid., 168, 159. 121.  Ibid., 207. 122.  Ibid., 181. 123.  The first story ran the magazine’s second issue: O Lingote 1:2 (Apr. 10, 1953), 2. Every subsequent issue that year also portrayed one of the pioneers. The CSN invited veterans of the construction years to speak at the regular friendship lunches (almoços de amizade) as late as the early 1970s. “Almoço de amizade,” O Lingote 28:217 (Jan.–Feb. 1971), 11. chapter three 1.  Speech at the Instituto da Organização Racional de Trabalho in São Paulo. The full text appeared as “C.S.N. novo modêlo de assistência social,” Revista do Trabalho 27 (Jan.–Feb. 1959), 26–31. 2.  On the Soviet Union’s construction of a steel industry and the attempted engineering of the new industrial man, see Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as Civilization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). 3.  On the Brazilian industrialists’ role in this effort, see Barbara Weinstein, For

262

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Social Peace in Brazil: Industrialists and the Remaking of the Working Class in São Paulo, 1920–1964 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 72–96. 4.  On paternalism as managerial ideology, see Donald Reid, “Industrial Paternalism: Discourse and Practice in Nineteenth-Century French Mining and Metallurgy,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 27:4 (Oct. 1985), 579–607. On its evolution, see Gerard Noiriel, “Du ‘Patronage’ au ‘Paternalisme’: la restructuration des formes de domination da la main-d’oeuvre ouvrière dans l’industrie métallurgique française,” Le mouvement social 144 (July–Sept. 1988), 17–35; Michelle Perrot, “The Three Ages of Industrial Discipline,” Consciousness and Class in Nineteenth-Century Europe, ed. John Merriman (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979), 149–68. 5.  Donald Reid’s term, in Reid, “Industrial Paternalism,” 582. 6.  For the term “collective padrone,” see Eugene Genovese, Roll, Jordan Roll: The World the Slaves Made (New York: Random House, 1974), 662. 7.  Speech by Getúlio Vargas in Volta Redonda, Oct. 8, 1943, EMS f-publ 39.05.12, pasta 1. 8.  “Aniversario do Snr. Presidente Getúlio Vargas,” Boletim de Serviço de Volta Redonda (BSVR) 065 (Apr. 20, 1943), 443–44. 9.  “Representação da C.S.N. na concentração trabalhista de 1 de maio,” BSVR 080 (May 12, 1943). 10.  “Instruções para a execução de serviços em Volta Redonda,” BSVR 125 (Sept. 16, 1942), 417. 11.  “Festas de Natal,” BSVR 004 (Jan. 6, 1944), 22–23. 12.  Regina Lúcia de Moraes Morel, “A ferro e fogo. Construção e crise da ‘família siderúrgica’: o caso de Volta Redonda (1941–1968)” (PhD diss., Universidade de São Paulo, 1989), 75–80. 13.  Le Play’s most important works were Les ouvriers européens: Études sur les travaux, la vie domestique, et la condition morale des populations ouvières de l’Europe (Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1855) and La reforme sociale en France: deduite de l’observation comparée des peuples européens (Paris: H. Plon, 1864). 14.  On Le Play’s intellectual trajectory, see Catherine Silver’s introduction to Frédéric Le Play, On Family, Work, and Social Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 6. 15.  On Catholic associations in late nineteenth-century France, see Henri Rollet, L’action sociale des catholiques en France (1871–1901) (Paris: Boivin & Cie., 1947), 14–55. 16.  See A. R. Vidler, A Century of Social Catholicism, 1820–1920 (London: SPCK, 1964), 125–27. For its recommendations, see Leo-Gesellschaft, Beschlüsse welche von drei verschiedenen Studienkommissionen katholischer Sozialpolitiker in den Jahren 1882–1891 gefasst worden sind (St. Pölten: Katholisch-Patriotischer Volks- und Pressverein, 1903). 17.  Rerum Novarum—Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII on Capital and Labor (May 15, 1891). Official Vatican translation at www.vatican.va/holy_father/leoxiii/ encyclicals/documents. Accessed on Mar. 21, 2003. Quote from article 13. 18.  Quadragesimo Anno—Encyclical of Pope Pius XI on Reconstruction of the Social Order (May 15, 1931). Official Vatican translation at www.vatican.va/

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holy_father/piusxi/encyclicals/documents. Accessed on Mar. 21, 2003. Quotes from articles 78, 88, 137, 147. 19.  Vidler, A Century, 124–25. 20.  Carlos Alberto de Menezes, Ação Social Católica no Brasil: corporativismo e sindicalismo (São Paulo: Loyola, 1986), 21–24. 21.  Oliveira Vianna was a practicing Catholic, but Cruz Costa also identifies him as a positivist. João Cruz Costa, Contribuição à história das idéias no Brasil, 2nd ed. (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1967), 407–8. 22.  Marietta de Morais Ferreira, “Alceu Amoroso Lima,” Dicionario históricobiográfico brasileiro, Pós-1930, coord. Alzira Alves de Abreu, Israel Beloch, Fernando Lattman-Weltman, and Sérgio Tadeu de Niemeyer Lamarão (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV/CPDOC, 2001), 3129–31. Hereafter cited as DHBB. 23.  Roberto Simonsen, Rumo à verdade: sociologia—política—economia. Dis­ curso Oficial na fundação da Escola Livre de Sociologia e Política de São Paulo, a 27 de Maio de 1933 (São Paulo: Limitada, 1933). 24.  Archbishop Leme’s 1916 pastoral letter, as quoted in Margaret Patrice ­Todaro, “Pastors, Prophets and Politicians: A Study of the Brazilian Catholic Church, 1916–1945” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1971), 117. 25.  Todaro, “Pastors,” 92, 98–99, 117, 125. 26.  Alceu Amoroso Lima, “Catolicismo e integralismo,” in A ordem (Dec. 1934), 405. Quoted in Todoro, “Pastors,” 106. 27.  Quoted in Todaro, “Pastors,” 412. 28.  Ferreira, “Alceu Amoroso Lima,” DHBB, 3129–31. 29.  Margaret Todaro Williams, “The Politicization of the Brazilian Catholic Church: The Catholic Electoral League,” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 16:3 (Aug. 1974), 303. 30.  Todaro, “Pastors,” 324. For the text of the Decalogue, see Todaro Williams, “Politicization,” 305–6. On cardinal Leme and the Liga Eleitoral Católica, see Laurita Pessoa Raja Gabaglia, O cardeal Leme (1882–1942) (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1962), 319–22. 31.  Quoted in Jessie Jane Vieira de Sousa, “Valentim, O Guardião da Memória Circulista (1947–1958)” (Master’s thesis, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, 1992), 58. 32.  Todaro, “Pastors,” 212. On Maritain’s influence on Amoroso Lima, see Olivier Compagnon, “Aux sources de la démocratie chrétienne? Jacques Maritain (1882–1973) et las elites catholiques d’Amerique du Sud” (PhD diss., Université de Paris I, 2000), 146–51. Maritain’s most influential text in Latin America was Prob­ lemas espirituales y temporales de una nueva cristianidad (1934). 33.  Sousa, “Valentim,” 58. 34.  Todaro, “Pastors,” 212. 35.  Jessie Jane Vieira de Sousa, Círculos Operários: a Igreja Católica e o Mundo do Trabalho no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: UFRJ/FAPERJ, 2002), 203. 36.  Sousa, Círculos Operários, 190–92. 37.  For an emphatic interpretation of Ibero-American corporatism, see Howard J. Wiarda, Corporatism and Development: The Portuguese Experience (­Amherst:

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University of Massachusetts Press, 1977), 20–21. On the Christian order, see Quadragesimo Anno, art. 88. 38.  Kenneth P. Serbin, “Church-State Reciprocity in Contemporary Brazil: The Convening of the International Eucharistic Congress of 1955 in Rio de Janeiro,” HAHR 76:4 (Nov. 1996), 729. 39.  Sousa, Círculos Operários, 232. 40.  Jessie Jane Vieira de Sousa, “Da transcendência à disciplina: os círculos operários e a intervenção da Igreja Católica no mundo do trabalho (1930/1964)” (PhD diss., Universidade Federal Fluminense, 1999), 172, note 17. 41.  Decree-law 3.270 (May 14, 1941). Reprinted in Boletim do MTIC 82 (June 1941), 26. 42.  Sousa, Círculos Operários, 245. 43.  Todaro Williams, “Politicization,” 305–6. 44.  Quadragesimo Anno, art. 69, 91, 96. 45.  Luiz Werneck Vianna, Liberalismo e sindicato no Brasil, 2nd ed. (São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1978), 155–64. 46.  For a biographical sketch, see Luis Guilherme Bacelar Chaves, “Francisco José de Oliveira Vianna,” DHBB, 6038–40. 47.  On the influence of Catholic social doctrine on trabalhismo, see Sousa, ­Círculos Operários. 48.  Revista do Serviço Público 1:1 (Nov. 1937), 57–59. On Catholic demands, see Todaro, “Pastors,” 335. 49.  Brasil, Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho, Decreto-Lei n.o 5.452 de 1 de maio de 1943 (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1943). 50.  Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva, Um construtor do nosso tempo, ­Depoimento ao CPDOC (Rio de Janeiro: Iarte Impressos de Arte, 1998), 64. 51.  André Thépot. “L’Union sociale des ingénieurs catholiques durant la première moitié du XXe siècle,” in L’ingenieur dans la societé française, ed. A. Thépot (Paris: Les Editions Ouvrières, 1985), 222–24. 52.  For impressionistic portrayals of the village, see Edward J. Rogers, “Brazilian Success Story: The Volta Redonda Iron and Steel Plant,” Journal of InterAmerican Studies 10:4 (Oct. 1968), 646; Donald Edmund Rady, Volta Redonda: A Steel Mill Comes to a Brazilian Coffee Plantation; Industrial Entrepreneurship in a Developing Economy (Albuquerque, NM: Rio Grande Publishing, 1973), 111. 53.  For a map of the company town, see CSN, Relatório da Diretoria corre­ spondente ao ano de 1941 apresentado à Assembléia Geral Ordinária (Rio de Janeiro, 1942), 8–9. Reprinted in C. H. Vivian, “Brazil’s First Modern Steel Plant,” Compressed Air Magazine 47:10 (Oct. 1942), 6855. 54.  José Silvado Bueno, “Volta Redonda opens new economic cycle for Brazil,” Bulletin of the Pan-American Union 80 (May 1946), 255. 55.  Tomke Christiane Lask, “Ordem e Progresso: a estrutura de poder na cidade operária da CSN em Volta Redonda, 1941–1964” (Master’s thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 1991), 100. 56.  Such hierarchical ordering could also be found in American mining towns. Margaret Crawford, Building the Workingman’s Paradise: The Design of American Company Towns (London: Verso, 1995), 140–41.

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57.  Report by Livio Fleury Curado to DPS/DF, Apr. 10, 1943, DOPS/DGIE, Geral 21, Dossier 1. 58.  Report by Livio Fleury Curado to DPS/DF, 142. Claudia Virgínia Cabral de Souza, “O espaço urbano e a dominação,” in Arigó—O pássaro que veio de longe: a construção do sindicato dos metalúrgicos; a chegada da CSN e seu aparato de dominação (Volta Redonda: Centro de Memória Sindical, 1989), 33. 59.  On the company town’s layout, see CSN, Relatório dos trabalhos feitos até abril de 1942 pelo escritório de obras (Rio de Janeiro, 1942), 20–22. 60.  Lask, “Ordem e Progresso,” 100, 104. 61.  This practice was standard in U.S. industrial towns for operational reasons. Crawford, Building, 165–66. 62.  “Entrega de casas,” BSVR 167 (Sept. 2, 1946), 1346–47; “Entrega de casas,” BSVR 175 (Sept. 12, 1946), 1425. 63.  “Distribuição de casas,” BSVR 160 (Aug. 22, 1946), 1283. 64.  Lask, “Ordem e Progresso,” 124. 65.  See pictures A91-12 and A232-25, Arquivo Fotográfico da CSN (hereafter AF-CSN). 66.  On the Americanization of the Garden City, see Crawford, Building, 101–28. 67.  Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva, “Volta Redonda—Brazil’s Big New Steel Plant Symbolizes the Country’s Industrial ‘Coming of Age,’” Foreign Com­ merce Weekly (Nov. 27, 1943), 4. 68.  BSVR 122 (June 27, 1945), 1144. 69.  “Taxas de água e esgoto,” BSVR 238 (Dec. 12, 1945), 2187; “Taxas de água e esgoto,” BSVR 052 (Mar. 19, 1946), 421–22. 70.  Report by Livio Fleury Curado to DPS/DF, Apr. 10, 1943, DOPS/DGIE, Geral 21, Dossier 1, 142–44. 71.  Bueno, “Volta Redonda,” 255. 72.  “Onibus para Barra Mansa,” BSVR 157 (Aug. 8, 1944), 1335. 73.  Lask, “Ordem e Progresso,” 166. 74.  Report by Livio Fleury Curado to DPS/DF, 143; “Serviço de ônibus—­ cobrança de passagem,” BSVR 210 (Nov. 25, 1943), 1373. 75.  CSN, Resolução da Diretoria (RD) 490, Rio de Janeiro, Aug. 6, 1947; CSN, RD 720, Jan. 14, 1948. 76.  For the automobile purchases, see CSN, RD 419, June 2, 1947. The approval to pave the Praça Brasil, the central square of the future commercial district, came in 1947. CSN, RD 619 (Oct. 27, 1947). 77.  “Dia do Trabalho,” BSVR 083 (May 5, 1944), 745–46. 78.  Bishop Dom João de Matha Andrade e Amaral to Pope Pius XII; EMS f‑publ 47.04.02, pasta 3. 79.  Photos A89-5 to A89-8 show the missa de campo for the Dia da Inde­ pendência on Sept. 07, 1945. Series A89: Religião, AF-CSN. 80.  “Direção industrial,” BSVR 143 (July 29, 1947), 1293. 81.  John D. Wirth, Minas Gerais and the Brazilian Federation, 1889–1937 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1977), 23, 90–92.

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82.  Sousa, “Valentim,” 52. Angela Castro Gomes coined the expression “spiritualization of class relations” to describe the social agenda of Catholic intellectuals in the 1930s. Gomes, Burguesia e trabalho: política e legislação social no Brasil 1917–1937 (Rio de Janeiro: Campus, 1979), 209. On labor militancy in the ­industrial centers, see John D. French, The Brazilian Workers ABC: Class Conflict and Alliances in Modern São Paulo (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), and Leslie Bethell, “Brazil,” in Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944–1948, ed. L. Bethell and Ian Roxborough (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 56–60. 83.  Sousa, “Valentim,” 89–93. 84.  Jessie Jane Vieira de Sousa, “Igreja e Movimento operário: uma visão preliminarial,” in Arigó—O pássaro que veio de longe, 67. 85.  Sousa, Círculos operários, 232–33. For a summary of subsidies, see “Fundo de Assistência Social—Aplicação durante o mês de outubro de 1950,” BSVR 008 (Jan. 11, 1951), 71, appendix. 86.  Sousa, “Valentim,” 89. 87.  “Ata da reunião da Diretoria do Círculo Operário de Volta Redonda, 04 July 1946”, quoted in Sousa, “Valentim,” 74. 88.  Sousa, “Valentim,” 69–73. 89.  For an institutional history of SESI in São Paulo, see Weinstein, For Social Peace, 140–60. 90.  Roberto C. Simonsen, “O problema social no Brasil,” in Evolução indus­ trial do Brasil (e outros estudos). Seleção, notas e bibliografia de Edgard Carone (São Paulo: Nacional, 1973), 442–43. 91.  Ibid., 441–54. 92.  “Regulamento do Departamento de Assistência Social: da finalidade e atribuições,” BSVR 194 (Oct. 16, 1951). 93.  Speech by Marcondes Filho in Volta Redonda. “Ministro Marcondes Filho,” BSVR 073 (Apr. 19, 1944), 635. 94.  CSN, RD 2250, Dec. 8, 1950; “Efetivo de Pessoal em 30/06/1949,” BSVR 132 (July 12, 1949). 95.  CSN, RD 202, Nov. 11, 1946; CSN, RD 2188, June 24, 1950. 96.  “Ginásio Macedo Soares,” BSVR 054 (Mar. 21, 1946), 437; “Liga de Desportes de Volta Redonda,” BSVR 216 (Nov. 11, 1945), 1994. 97.  “Fundo de Assistência Social—aplicação durante o mês de outubro de 1950,” BSVR 008 (Jan. 11, 1951). 98.  “Expediente durante o Carnaval,” BSVR 036 (Mar. 4, 1943), 263; “Expediente de Carnaval,” BSVR 040 (Feb. 27, 1946), 343. 99.  CSN, RD 565, Sept. 29, 1947; CSN, RD 1.957, Feb. 13, 1950. 100.  “Cinema no Galpão de Diversões,” BSVR 191 (Oct. 5, 1944), 1651, “Recreio dos Operários,” BSVR 217 (Nov. 12, 1944), 1889. 101.  “Galpão de Diversões,” BSVR 174 (Sept. 12, 1944), 1501–2. 102.  The CSN solicited bids from commercial cinema operators starting in 1944, but Paramount withdrew its proposal to build two 2,000-seat moviehouses because of high construction costs. “Cinema do bairro de Santa Cecília,” BSVR 160 (Aug. 22, 1944), 1356.

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103.  “Organização,” BSVR 86 (May 7, 1946), 655; Recorte de Jornal—­ Tribuna Popular, Aug. 8, 1946, DPS, caixa 421, D155, 28. 104.  Lask, “Ordem e Progresso,” 162, 166. 105.  Report by Livio Fleury Curado to DPS/DF, 142. 106.  “Regulamento do Departamento de Assistência Social: da finalidade e atribuições,” BSVR 194 (Oct. 16, 1951). 107.  “Centro de Puericultura,” BSVR 021 (Jan. 30, 1946), 164–65. 108.  CSN, Relatório dos trabalhos feitos, 50–52. 109.  “Recomendação para revacinação,” BSVR 223 (Nov. 20, 1946), 1820. 110.  Article 14 of decree-law 7.036 (Nov. 10, 1944), the federal law on work accidents, mandated that companies with more than 500 employees provide their own medical service. For the full text, see Bento de Faria, Dos acidentes do ­trabalho e doenças profissionais (Rio de Janeiro: Freitas Bastos, 1947), appendix. 111.  BSVR 065 (June 27, 1942), 197–98. 112.  “Tabela de preços para exames de laboratório,” BSVR 139 (July 24, 1944), 1181–84. 113.  CSN, RD 848 and 850, both Mar. 29, 1948. 114.  “Movimento de refeições,” BSVR 170 (Sept. 2, 1944), 1453. 115.  “Cartões de refeitório,” BSVR 084 (May 8, 1944), 751–52; for prices in 1943, see BSVR 159 (Sept. 8, 1943), appendix. 116.  Lask, “Ordem e Progresso,” 157–60. 117.  “Passagem do armazem,” BSVR 074 (Apr. 19, 1945), 727. 118.  BSVR 188 (Dec. 18, 1942), 832; CSN, RD 2.536, Dec. 1, 1950; CSN, RD 2.691, Feb. 23, 1951. 119.  Photographs A81-11 to A81-14 show the handover of the facility. Series A81: Centro de Puericultura, AF-CSN. 120.  Photo A83, Series A83: Centro de Puericultura, AF-CSN. 121.  Photo A87-18 (1947), Series A87: Assistência Social, AF-CSN. 122.  “Curso de alfabetização,” BSVR 191 (Oct. 5, 1944), 1651. 123.  “Instruções ao encarregado do ensino profissional,” BSVR 213 (Nov. 30, 1943), 1400–401; Photos A85-1 to A85-11, Series A85: Assistência Social, ­AF-CSN; Interview with Alcina de Macedo Soares e Silva, Rio de Janeiro, June 1, 1998. She stressed that “[t]he constitution of the family makes for order; when there is order in the family, there is order in the country.” 124.  BSVR 119 (Sept. 8, 1942). 125.  “Festejos de Natal de 1942,” BSVR 038 (Mar. 10, 1943), 282–83; Photo A82-6, Series A82: Centro de Puericultura, AF-CSN. 126.  A letter from a CSN employee to then-governor Macedo Soares complained about the “unfair” advantage given to employees with many children. Frederico Breedveld to Macedo Soares, CPDOC, EMS f-publ 39.05.12, pasta 3. 127.  Renato Azevedo recalled how Macedo Soares told him that the doctrine of military leadership was the single most powerful influence on his administrative practice. Interview with Renato Frota de Azevedo, former technical Director of the CSN (1954–1961), Volta Redonda, Nov. 23, 1998. 128.  The opening page of the first BSVR is not preserved in the archive. The quote is from the CSN’s Rio de Janeiro bulletin, which was identical in structure

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and content. “Organização do Boletim de Serviço da Sede da CSN,” BSVR 147 (Aug. 5, 1946), appendix. My emphasis. 129.  “Distribuição de boletins,” BSVR 123 (July 1, 1947), 1120. 130.  “Festas de Natal,” BSVR 004 (Jan. 6, 1944), 22–23. 131.  Angela M. de Castro Gomes, A invenção do trabalhismo (São Paulo: Vertice, 1988), 237. 132.  “Discurso,” BSVR 191 (Oct. 4, 1945), 1778–81. 133.  “Baixa por falecimento,” BSVR 168 (Sept. 2, 1947), 1497. 134.  “Elogio,” BSVR 007 (Jan. 10, 1946), 52. 135.  BSVR 007 (Jan. 12, 1953), 46; BSVR 154 (Aug. 11, 1949), 1492. 136.  BSVR 020 (Jan. 29, 1948), 144; BSVR 116 (June 25, 1951), 993. 137.  BSVR 061 (Apr. 2, 1953), 453. 138.  BSVR 191 (Oct. 5, 1949), 1860. 139.  BSVR 059 (Mar. 28, 1950), 537. 140.  BSVR 156 (Aug. 17, 1950), 1528. 141.  BSVR 154 (Aug. 11, 1949), 1492. 142.  BSVR 105 (June 2, 1950), 1050. 143.  BSVR 103 (June 4, 1952), 757. 144.  BSVR 069 (Apr. 12, 1950), 616. 145.  BSVR 167 (Sept. 1, 1950), 1416. 146.  BSVR 132 (July 13, 1950), 1305. 147.  Regulamento do Pessoal (1946), Title XVI—‘Das Penalidades,’ 21, articles 66 to 72. 148.  BSVR 172 (Sept. 12, 1952), 1217; BSVR 070 (Apr. 13, 1949), 688. 149.  BSVR 071 (Apr. 14, 1949), 688. 150.  BSVR 082 (May 6, 1953), 602. 151.  BSVR 002 (Jan. 5, 1948), 11; BSVR 059 (Mar. 28, 1950), 537. 152.  BSVR 191 (Oct. 5, 1949), 1847; BSVR 060 (Apr. 1, 1953), 447. 153.  BSVR 104 (June 2, 1948), 790. 154.  BSVR 094 (May 22, 1953), 687; BSVR 113 (June 15, 1950), 1113. 155.  BSVR 176 (Sept. 13, 1949), 1715; BSVR 182 (Sept. 19, 1948), 1454–55. 156.  BSVR 098 (May 28, 1953), 717; BSVR 009 (Jan. 14, 1948), 58–59. 157.  BSVR 087 (May 11, 1951), 741. 158.  BSVR 156 (Aug. 17, 1950), 1528; BSVR 080 (Apr. 3, 1949), 778. 159.  BSVR 002 (Jan. 5, 1948), 11; BSVR 122 (June 28, 1948), 951–52. 160.  BSVR 029 (Feb. 10, 1950), 265. 161.  BSVR 191 (Oct. 5, 1949), 1860. See also BSVR 182 (Sept. 19, 1948), 1454–55. 162.  BSVR 077 (Apr. 23, 1948), 581. 163.  On Vargas’s administrative reforms, see Beatriz M. de Souza Wahrlich, Reforma administrativa na era de Vargas (Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 1983). 164.  Interview with Alcina de Macedo Soares e Silva. 165.  Macedo Soares, “A formação técnica do brasileiro,” Conferência na CNC, June 7, 1979, CPDOC, Arquivo EMS/Soares, E. pi 79.06.07, 3. 166.  The CSN made exceptions when it was shorthanded. A strict rule against

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hiring anybody not yet registered with DPE took effect only in 1946. “Admissão de Pessoal,” BSVR 075 (Apr. 22, 1946), 579. 167.  CSN, Relatório dos trabalhos feitos, 49; and Photo A252-1, Series A252: Holerith, AF-CSN. 168.  BSVR 053 (June 12, 1942), 172; “Aviso—Pagamentos de vencimentos ou salaries,” BSVR 053 (Mar. 31, 1943), 366; BSVR 100 (June 14, 1943), 671. 169.  “Retificação de nome,” BSVR 132 (July 30, 1943), 887. 170.  “Retificação de assentamentos,” BSVR 028 (Feb. 10, 1946), 241; “Retificação de assentamentos,” BSVR 046 (Mar. 10, 1946), 391. 171.  “Trabalhista regime” refers specifically to the powerful labor bureaucracy and the state’s social welfare policies for workers created by Vargas during the Estado Novo. They remained in place after his fall from power in 1945, and the bureaucratic logic of trabalhismo shaped the history of labor relations under the postwar republic (1946–1964). For an analysis of the fully developed trabalhismo of the Estado Novo between 1942 and 1945, see Gomes, A inven­ ção, 229–287. 172.  “Imposto de renda,” BSVR 056 (Mar. 23, 1945), 552. 173.  O Lingote 1:13 (Sept. 25, 1953). 174.  CSN. Relatório da Diretoria correspondente ao ano de 1947 apresentado à Assembléia Geral Ordinária (Rio de Janeiro, 1948), 3. 175.  IBGE, Recensamento Geral do Brasil (1.° de Setembro de 1940), Série Regional, Parte XV—Rio de Janeiro, 52; and IBGE—Serviço Nacional de Recenseamento, Série Regional, Vol. XXIII, Tomo I—Estado do Rio de Janeiro: censo demográfico, 1955, 67. 176.  CSN, Relatório da Diretoria correspondente ao ano de 1950 apresentado à Assembléia Geral Ordinária (Rio de Janeiro, 1951), 63. 177.  CSN, RD 2141, June 5, 1950; CSN, RD 2527, Nov. 24, 1950. The CSN classified wooden shacks without running water, sewage, or electricity as favelas. 178.  CSN, RD 2,913, June 15, 1951. 179.  Interview with Allan Cruz; report by Livio Fleury Curado to DPS/DF, 143. 180.  “Aquisição de ações da C.S.N.,” BSVR 145 (Aug. 1, 1944), 1226–27. Only Brazilian citizens could own CSN stock. “Subscrição de ações da C.S.N.,” BSVR 158 (Aug. 18, 1944), 1342. 181.  CSN, Relatório da Diretoria correspondente ao ano de 1947, 9. 182.  CSN, RD 1285, Dec. 17, 1948; CSN, RD 1399, Mar. 5, 1949. 183.  Unnamed CSN employee to Macedo Soares, 1944; EMS f-publ 39.05.12, pasta 1. 184.  CSN, RD 2250, Dec. 8, 1950. 185.  The company magazine in the 1950s, O Lingote, regularly referred to these films. 186.  “Visitantes,” BSVR 044 (Mar. 18, 1943), 307–8; Photograph of chart with annual number of visitors. Photo A102-8, Series A102: Organograma, Mapa, Gráfico e Planta, AF-CSN. 187.  Solange Maria Pimenta, “A estratégia da gestão: fabricando aço e construindo homens: o caso da Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional” (PhD diss., Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, 1989), 94–99.

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chapter four 1.  “Regulamento do Pessoal da CSN,” Boletim de Serviço da Sede (Rio de Janeiro) 038 (Dec. 11, 1946), 1, 19. Cited hereafter as “Regulamento de Pessoal (1946).” 2.  Rational administration, which includes the fields of psychotechnics, human relations, and personnel management, should be treated as distinct from scientific management, which applies above all to the improvement of work processes. 3.  Barbara Weinstein, For Social Peace in Brazil: Industrialists and the Remak­ ing of the Working Class in São Paulo, 1920–1964 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 66–71. 4.  A. P. Moitinho, Ciência da administração (Rio de Janeiro: Atlas, 1947); Luiz de Nogueira Paula, Racionalização econômica: systemas de organização scientifica do trabalho. Taylorismo, psychotechnica, fayolismo, fordismo, economia dirigida, 2nd ed. (Rio de Janeiro: Irmãos Pongetti, 1938). The first edition had been published in 1932 under the title Racionalização: esbôço de economia dirigida. 5.  Weinstein focuses on Taylorism and Fordism and characterizes all other theories of scientific management as their “correlates” (22), which underestimates the distinct influence of Fayol and Gantt. Weinstein, For Social Peace, 4–7, 21–22. Maria Antonacci, on the other hand, stresses the importance of Fayol as a corrective for the perceived excesses of Taylorism. Maria Antonietta M. Antonacci, A vitória da razão (?): o IDORT e a sociedade paulista (São Paulo: Marco Zero, 1993), 30–31. On Taylorism and Fordism as movements for industrial modernity, see Mary Nolan, Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 6.  João Bosco Lodi, História da administração (São Paulo: Pioneira, 1971). 7.  Nogueira Paula, Racionalização econômica, 42. 8.  Moitinho, Ciência da administração. 9.  Donald Reid, “Reading Fayol with 3-D Glasses,” Journal of Management History 1:3 (1995), 65–66. For an example of the appreciation of Fayol’s work in the United States, see Norman Pearson, “Fayolism as Necessary Complement of Taylorism,” American Political Science Review 39:1 (Feb. 1945), 68–80. 10.  For a reprint of the symposia proceedings, see Benedicto Silva, Taylor e Fayol (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio, 1960). 11.  Donald Reid, “Fayol: From Experience to Theory,” Journal of Management History 1:3 (1995), 32. On Brazil, see Beatriz M. de Souza Wahrlich, Reforma ad­ ministrativa na era de Vargas (Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 1983), 279–327. 12.  Reid, “Fayol: From Experience to Theory,” 21–36. For the term “positive administration,” see Henri Fayol, “L’administration positive dans l’industrie,” La technique moderne 10:2 (Feb. 1918). 13.  Henri Fayol, Administration industrielle et generale: prevoyance, organi­ sation, commandement, coordination, controle (Paris: Dunod, 1925), 5. This is the earliest edition as a book. It had originally been published as a special edition of the Bulletin de la Société de l’Industrie Minérale. On the publication history, see M.  B. Brodie, “Henri Fayol: Administration Industrielle et Générale—a Re-­ interpretation,” Public Administration 40 (Autumn 1962), 311–17. 14.  Fayol, “L’administration positive,” 74.

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15.  The Resoluções da Diretoria from the 1940s illustrate the broad range of issues discussed by the directors. Many appeared to be of minor importance and would have been dealt with at lower levels of the administrative hierarchy in a more established firm. 16.  “Bateria de fornos de coque,” BSVR 080 (Apr. 27, 1946), 614. 17.  “Operação da usina,” BSVR 106 (June 6, 1946), 818; “Início da operação do alto forno,” BSVR 111 (June 13, 1946), 859; “Inauguração oficial da usina de Volta Redonda,” BSVR 112 (June 15, 1946), 872; “Início da operação da aciaria e do trem desbastador,” BSVR 118 (June 24, 1946), 923–24. 18.  “Inauguração oficial da usina siderúrgica de Volta Redonda,” BSVR 201 (Oct. 21, 1946), 1640–47. 19.  For a full listing, see CSN, Relatório da Diretoria correspondente ao Ano de 1947 (Rio de Janeiro, 1948), 4–7. 20.  “Laminador de chapas grossas,” BSVR 039 (Feb. 27, 1947), 346; “Laminador de tiras a quente,” BSVR 137 (July 21, 1947), 1237. The engines for the coldrolling mill had 4,000 KW (5,600HP). “Laminador de tiras a frío,” BSVR 212 (Nov. 3, 1947), 1862; “Produção de folha de flandres,” BSVR 038 (Feb. 26, 1948), 278; “Seção de estanhamento,” BSVR 051 (Mar. 16, 1948), 375; “Fundição—Início dos trabalhos de operação,” BSVR 097 (May 23, 1949), 943. 21.  BSVR 206 (Oct. 25, 1945) to BSVR 209 (Nov. 1, 1945). 22.  Sample of CSN Personnel Files. 23.  The BSVR reported an exemplary decision that the CSN considered applicable to this case. “Rescisão de contrato de trabalho,” BSVR 180 (Sept. 20, 1946), 1465. 24.  “Admissão de serventuários,” BSVR 198 (Oct. 17, 1946), 1626. 25.  CSN, Grupo de Trabalho para Estudo de Venda das Casas, Relatório (Volta Redonda: CSN, 1960), 30. “Ausência de serviço—Demissão por abandono de empresa,” BSVR 133 (July 13, 1949), 1296. It could take years to process these dismissals. One employee who abandoned work in January 1947 was not officially dismissed until September 1949. “Ausência de serviço—Demissão por abandono de empresa,” BSVR 175 (Sept. 12, 1949), 1692. 26.  The ratio of skilled and semiskilled to unskilled workers matches the figures for the 1930s presented in a comprehensive study of industrial relations in the U.S. and German steel industries. Thomas Welskopp, Arbeit und Macht im Hüttenwerk: Arbeits- und industrielle Beziehungen in der deutschen und amerikanischen Eisen- und Stahlindustrie von den 1860er bis zu den 1930er Jahren (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1994). 27.  BSVR 115 (June 18, 1946). 28.  “Escola profissional da CSN,” BSVR 106 (June 6, 1945), 1011; “Instruções ao encarregado do ensino profissional,” BSVR 213 (Nov. 30, 1943), 1400–401. 29.  “Escola profissional,” BSVR 203 (Oct. 20, 1945), 1884–85. 30.  “Curso de operadores,” BSVR 125 (July 2, 1945), 1172. 31.  “Cursos de operação,” BSVR 114 (June 16, 1945), 1088; “Curso de operadores,” BSVR 117 (June 20, 1945), appendix; “Curso de operadores,” BSVR 125 (July 2, 1945), 1172. 32.  “Curso de inspetores do Departamento de Metalurgia,” BSVR 015 (Jan. 22, 1946), 121.

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33.  “Curso de operação—Laminação,” BSVR 009 (Jan. 14, 1946), 69; “Curso de operadores de laminação a quente,” BSVR 038 (Feb. 25, 1946), 318. 34.  “Curso de operadores para a Central Termo-Elétrica (C.T.E.),” BSVR 160 (Aug. 21, 1945), 1508. 35.  “Curso de operadores de laminação a quente,” BSVR 046 (Mar. 11, 1946), 378. 36.  Harry Braverman argued that the “semiskilled” category as applied by personnel managers to industrial operatives was “delusory” because it suggested that the respective worker’s skill level was halfway between his unskilled and skilled colleagues. H. Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), 430–31. 37.  The small sample size for each cohort does not permit drawing conclusions on individual patterns of occupational mobility. 38.  See chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of production process and the organization of work. 39.  “Regulamento de Pessoal,” BSVR 83 (May 3, 1945), 736–42. 40.  Regulamento de Pessoal (1946), 1–24. Quote from article 1. 41.  Employees had to submit complaints to their immediate superiors. Later, the CSN permitted employees to file complaints with the next-highest superior in order to prevent stonewalling and retributions. “Regulamento de Pessoal—Artigo 65—Direito de petição—Representação do recurso—Modo de encaminhamento,” BSVR 129 (July 10, 1950), 1276. 42.  Regulamento de Pessoal (1946), Title VIII and IX, 13–16. 43.  BSVR 160 (Aug. 27, 1951), appendix, III. 44.  “Departamento de Manutenção Elétrica & Departamento de Manutenção Mecânica—Lotação numérica aprovada,” BSVR 162 (Sept. 5, 1951), IV–VIII. 45.  CSN, Resolução da Diretoria (RD) 443, June 24, 1947. 46.  “Quadro de pessoal—Revisão de classificação—Pedido,” BSVR 184 (Sept. 23, 1949), 1790. 47.  CSN, RD 1911, Jan. 7, 1950. 48.  BSVR 096 (20 May 1948), appendix; compared to BSVR 059 (Mar. 28, 1950), 532. 49.  “Alterações no quadro do DCH-1,” BSVR 114 (June 15, 1949), appendix, I. 50.  “Quadro de Pessoal—DFU—Quadro definitivo,” BSVR 104 (June 1, 1949), 1000–1002. 51.  BSVR 096 (May 20, 1948), appendix; BSVR 015 (Jan. 23, 1950), 113–14. 52.  BSVR 096 (May 20, 1948), appendix; BSVR 051 (Mar. 16, 1950), 462. 53.  BSVR 096 (May 20, 1948), appendix; BSVR 051 (Mar. 16, 1950), 460. 54.  BSVR 051 (Mar. 16, 1950), 461. 55.  CSN, RD 2499, Nov. 10, 1950. 56.  BSVR 096 (May 20, 1948), appendix; BSVR 051 (Mar. 16, 1950), 460. 57.  The available evidence is insufficient to assess how often such special treatment was granted. Technically strategic workers had the power (and likely used it) to reshape the pay scales. 58.  “Quadro do Departamento do Desbastador e Trilhos (DDT)—Lotação

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numérica aprovada,” BSVR 096 (May 20, 1948), 8–9 and BSVR 059 (Mar. 28, 1950), 529–33. 59.  Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital, 6, 432, and 443. Paul Thompson summarizes the critiques of the craft-centered definition of skill. P. Thompson, The Nature of Work: An Introduction to Debates on the Labour Process (Houndmills: MacMillan, 1983), 95–108. 60.  “Regulamento de Promoção do Pessoal da Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional,” BSVR 180 (Sept. 16, 1949), appendix, I. Hereafter “Regulamento de ­Promoção (1949).” 61.  Sample of CSN Personnel Files. Includes only men who stayed at least five years. The occupational information (including reclassifications and promotions) was recorded as a summary figure for every fifth year in the employee’s career. 62.  Regulamento de Pessoal (1946), Title IX, article 38. 63.  Regulamento de Promoção (1949), Title II, article 8. 64.  Regulamento de Pessoal (1946), Title XIV, article 63. 65.  Regulamento de Promoção (1949), V–VI, articles 22–32. The penalties for absences and disciplinary infractions were modest compared to the original rules, which awarded up to seventy merit points and authorized deductions of ten points for an absence, fifteen for a suspension, and between five and ten for unspecified “violations of trust.” Regulamento do Pessoal (1946), Title IX, 14. 66.  Authorized absences included vacation time, marriage, mourning, military service, accidents, training, pregnancy, and holding public office. Regulamento de Promoção (1949), Title IV, article 21. The RPE, in contrast, has deducted all leave. Regulamento de Pessoal (1946), Title VIII, 13. 67.  Regulamento de Pessoal (1946), Title VIII, art. 25–26. 68.  Regulamento de Promoção (1949), Title II, art. 3 and 10. 69.  Ibid., X, art. 52. 70.  Regulamento de Promoção (1949), III, art. 16. 71.  Regulamento de Pessoal (1946), art. 33. Employees who served the company exceptionally well could request a cancellation of up to two absences to retain eligibility for the double bonus. “Da presidência—Regulamento de Pessoal— Interpretação do art. 33,” BSVR 047 (Mar. 11, 1947), 424. 72.  CSN, RD 312, Mar. 26, 1947; and “Regulamento de pessoal—Artigo 33— Nova redação,” BSVR 110 (June 12, 1950), 1070–71. 73.  Regulamento de Pessoal (1946), art. 33. 74.  CSN, RD 280, Feb. 10, 1947. 75.  One of the earliest lists was of employees who had completed five years by December 31, 1946, BSVR 040 (Mar. 10, 1947), appendix. Quote from “Prêmio Quinquenal—Concessão—Elógio,” BSVR 120 (June 27, 1947), 1104. Capitalization in original. 76.  Constituição da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil de 1946, art. 157, IV; and CSN, Relatório da Diretoria—1950, 66–67. In April 1949, the shareholders’ assembly voted to include profit sharing as a right in the company statutes (Art. 47). The shareholders also decided to retain the right to allocate the total amount for the distribution in a given year at their annual meeting (Art. 48). CSN, Estatutos (Rio de Janeiro, 1949), 15.

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Notes to Chapter 4

77.  “Instrucções para a distribuição do prêmio de que trata o artigo 48 dos Estatutos da CSN,” BSVR 193 (Oct. 6, 1948), appendix, I–III. 78.  These criteria matched the requirements established under the personnel rules. Regulamento do Pessoal (1946), art. 32, 12. 79.  Engineers receiving the maximum share included Renato Frota Rodrigues de Azevedo, Newton Coimbra de Bittencourt Cotrim, Antônio Carlos Gonçalves Penna, Mauro Mariano da Silva, Cyro Alves Borges, Oswaldo Pinto da Veiga, and Tarciso José Villela. “Prêmio—Concessão,” BSVR 090 (May 12, 1949), 873–74. 80.  CSN, Estatutos, 8, art. 22. 81.  Regulamento do Pessoal (1946), Title XVI—”Das Penalidades,” 21, articles 66 to 72. 82.  Ibid. 83.  Ibid., 22, art. 74, 75. 84.  CSN, Grupo de Trabalho, Relatorio, 30. 85.  For examples, see BSVR 002 (Jan. 5, 1948), 11; BSVR 006 (Jan. 9, 1948), 38; BSVR 009 (Jan. 14, 1948), 58–59. 86.  “Abono de faltas,” BSVR 045 (Mar. 8, 1945), 447. 87.  BSVR 103 (June 4, 1952), 757. 88.  “Justificação de faltas—Instrucções,” BSVR 141 (July 25, 1949), appendix, IV. 89.  “Aviso aos Serventuários,” BSVR 105 (June 5, 1945), 1002; “Ausência de serventuários,” BSVR 069 (Apr. 12, 1945), 667. 90.  BSVR 216 (Nov. 10, 1949), 2057; BSVR 176 (Sept. 19, 1951), 497; BSVR 205 (Oct. 30, 1952), 1485. 91.  For an example, see BSVR 002 (Jan. 5, 1948), 11. 92.  BSVR 020 (Jan. 29, 1948), 144; BSVR 176 (Sept. 13, 1949), 1715; BSVR 006 (Jan. 9, 1948), 38. 93.  BSVR 062 (Mar. 31, 1950), 560–61; BSVR 020 (Jan. 29, 1948), 144; BSVR 202 (Oct. 27, 1952), 1458. For further examples, see BSVR 101 (June 2, 1952), 745 and BSVR 216 (Nov. 10, 1949), 2057. 94.  BSVR 176 (Sept. 13, 1949), 1715; BSVR 105 (June 2, 1950), 1020. 95.  BSVR 043 (Mar. 5, 1952), 323; BSVR 141 (July 23, 1948), 1108; BSVR 138 (July 20, 1948), 1089. 96.  BSVR 073 (Apr. 22, 1952), 555. 97.  BSVR 051 (Mar. 19, 1953), 380; BSVR 101 (June 2, 1952), 745. 98.  BSVR 192 (Oct. 13, 1952), 1356. 99.  BSVR 061 (Apr. 2, 1953), 453. 100.  BSVR 059 (Mar. 28, 1950), 537; BSVR 172 (Sept. 13, 1951), 1463. 101.  BSVR 155 (Aug. 12, 1949), 1507; BSVR 107 (June 11, 1951), 912. For further examples, see BSVR 103 (June 1, 1948), 763; BSVR 154 (Aug. 11, 1949), 1492; BSVR 155 (Aug. 12, 1949), 1507; and BSVR 156 (Aug. 21, 1952), 1134; BSVR 054 (Mar. 20, 1952), 392. The transfer car appears to have been prone to accidents that caused major damage. See BSVR 002 (Jan. 5, 1953), 16; BSVR 182 (Sept. 19, 1948), 1454–55. 102.  BSVR 039 (Feb. 28, 1950), 351. 103.  BSVR 167 (Sept. 1, 1950), 1416.

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104.  BSVR 176 (Sept. 13, 1949), 1715; BSVR 095 (May 23, 1951), 807. 105.  BSVR 092 (May 20, 1951), 784; BSVR 164 (Sept. 2, 1952), 1184. 106.  BSVR 216 (Nov. 10, 1949), 2057; BSVR 191 (Oct. 5, 1949), 1847. 107.  BSVR 167 (Sept. 1, 1950), 1416. 108.  BSVR 076 (Apr. 27, 1953), 550; BSVR 081 (May 5, 1953), 594. For other examples, see BSVR 095 (May 19, 1950), 861; BSVR 103 (June 4, 1952), 757; BSVR 156 (Aug. 21, 1952), 1134; BSVR 081 (May 5, 1953), 594; BSVR 122 (July 4, 1952), 884. 109.  BSVR 141 (July 23, 1948), 1108. 110.  BSVR 112 (June 12, 1948), 876. 111.  BSVR 137 (July 19, 1949), 1346. 112.  BSVR 061 (Apr. 2, 1953), 453. 113.  In both cases, the company imposed a three-day suspension: BSVR 055 (Mar. 25, 1953), 418; BSVR 182 (Sept. 19, 1948), 1455. 114.  BSVR 101 (May 28, 1948), 764; BSVR 069 (Apr. 12, 1950), 616. One bulletin listed three independent penalties for negligent operation. BSVR 154 (Aug. 19, 1952), 1114. 115.  BSVR 029 (Feb. 10, 1950), 265; BSVR 197 (Oct. 20, 1952), 1419. 116.  BSVR 243 (Dec. 23, 1952), 1736; BSVR 203 (Oct. 19, 1948), 1650. See also BSVR 122 (July 4, 1952), 884. 117.  For examples of penalties imposed for the violations of moral standards, see chapter 3. 118.  “Prêmio de antiguidade e assiduidade—Nova redação do art. 33 do Regulamento de Pessoal,” BSVR 031 (Feb. 13, 1947), 274. A precedent was set in July 1947, when the CSN lifted penalties incurred between 1943 and 1945 to reward the employees’ good service. “Penalidades—Relevação,” BSVR 130 (July 10, 1947), 1177. Employees began to request such pardons more frequently in the late 1940s. CSN, RD 579, 29 Sept. 1947; BSVR 233 (Dec. 2, 1947), 2010; BSVR 116 (June 18, 1948), 898–99. 119.  The employee claimed that he had been penalized unjustly, since he had refused to work extra hours after he had already done a hard day of work. CSN, RD 2499, Nov. 10, 1950. 120.  Interview with Ervin Michelstaedter, former head of the CSN’s Engenharia Industrial, Volta Redonda, July 22, 1998. 121.  See, for example, an opinion on the right to paid vacation depending on attendance. “Férias—Concessão—Critério—Parecer do Departamento Legal,” BSVR 221 (Nov. 14, 1947), 1932. On benefits after a temporary dismissal, see “Regulamento de Pessoal—Artigo 58—Interpretação,” BSVR 234 (Dec. 2, 1947), 2011–12. 122.  One example was the case of an engineer who unsuccessfully sued the CSN to pay overtime for work on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays. “Justiça de Trabalho—Decisão,” BSVR 007 (Jan. 13, 1948), 50–51. 123.  “Regulamento do Departamento de Assistência Social: da finalidade e atribuições,” BSVR 194 (Oct. 16, 1951).

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chapter five 1.  Relatório Estatístico Anual Referente ao Ano de 1947, Dossiê 15, caixa 386. Cited in Leila Menezes Duarte and Paulo Roberto de Araújo, “História administrativa: DFSP—DPS” (manuscript, Rio de Janeiro: APERJ, 1998), 16. 2.  On the labor movement before 1930, see Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro and Michael M. Hall, eds., A classe operária no Brasil: documentos, 1889 a 1930 (São Paulo: Alfa Omega, 1979); Claudio H. M. Batalha, O movimento operário na Primeira República (Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Ed., 2000). John French showed that the leaders of the First Republic conceived of labor control as a “police matter.” John D. French, Drowning in Laws: Labor Law and Brazilian Political Culture (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 122–33. 3.  Thomas Jordan, “Policing the Unions: Social Police and Workers in Rio de Janeiro, 1930–64” (paper presented at the Midwest Association of Latin American Studies meeting, Charleston, Illinois, Nov. 7, 2003). 4.  On the ANL uprising, see Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, Estratégias da ilusão: a rev­ olução mundial e o Brasil, 1922–1935 (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1991), 287–97. 5.  An internal memo stated, not without pride, that the archive contained 20,211 well-organized files and address information on an additional 102,000 people as of 1941. Dossiê 1, Estados 20, Divisão de Ordem Política e Social/Departamento Geral de Investigações Especiais (hereafter DOPS/DGIE), APERJ. 6.  Duarte and Araújo, “História administrativa.” 7.  Arquivo Público do Estado de Rio de Janeiro (APERJ), “Ação e investigação: comunismo e polícia política no Brasil, 1945–64. Entrevistas com Cecil Borer, Hércules Corrêa dos Reis, José de Moraes e Nilson Venâncio.” Manuscript (Rio de Janeiro: APERJ, 2002), 13–14. 8.  On the interagency fight for control of the SIS, see Leslie B. Rout and John F. Bratzel, The Shadow War: German Espionage and United States Counterespionage in Latin America during World War II (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1986), 36–45. 9.  APERJ, “Ação e investigação,” 15. 10.  Duarte and Araújo, “História Administrativa: D.F.S.P.—D.P.S.,” 3. 11.  Ibid., 8. All translations are by the author unless otherwise noted. 12.  Ibid, 9. 13.  Relatório, DOPS/DGIE, Geral 21, Dossier 1 (CSN), 32–139. 14.  The atestado ideológico became illegal in 1951, but the CSN continued to request it nevertheless. 15.  Letter from Milton Brandão, Apr. 1943, DOPS/DGIE, Geral 21, Dossier 1 (CSN), 146. 16.  CSN to DPS/DF, DOPS/DGIE, Geral 21, Dossier 1, 160–61. 17.  Guilherme Guinle to the Chefe de Polícia do Distrito Federal, Mar. 2, 1943; internal memo by Chefe da Secção de Segurança Social to Delegado Especial, Mar. 20, 1943, DOPS/DGIE, Geral 21, Dossier 1, 26–30. 18.  Relação dos têrmos de deserção anexas ao ofício n. OP/125/02.112 de 30-4-1943, do Sr. Presidente da Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional ao Sr. General

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Comte. 1ª Região Militar, Arquivo do Exercito, Rio de Janeiro. The document was archived as part of Sílvio Raulino de Oliveira’s army personnel file. 19.  “Exposição de motivos do Ministro do Trabalho, Indústria e Comércio ao Snr. Presidente da República,” reprinted in Brasil, Consolidação das Leis do ­Trabalho Brasileiras. Promulgada pelo Decreto-Lei n.o 5.452 (01/05/1943)—­Atualizada até Fevereiro de 1960 (Rio de Janeiro/São Paulo: Câmaras Americanas de Comércio no Brasil, 1960). 20.  Brasil, Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho. Decreto-Lei n.o 5.452 de 1 de maio de 1943 (Rio de Janeiro: DIN, 1943). 21.  Ibid., 12. 22.  Ibid. 23.  On the CLT as industrial relations framework, see Kenneth S. Mericle, “Conflict Regulation in the Brazilian Industrial Relations System” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, 1974). For critiques of its political implications, see Evaristo de Moraes Filho, O problema do sindicato único no Brasil (seus fundamentos ­sociológicos), 2nd ed. (São Paulo: Alfa-Omega, 1978); French, Drowning in Laws. 24.  On the administrative structure of the CNT, see “Relatório do Presidente do CNT,” Revista do CNT 19 (Mar./Apr. 1944), 19; “Relatório do Presidente do CNT,” Revista do CNT 25 (Mar./Apr. 1945), 27. 25.  Renato Lemos, “Filinto Müller,” Dicionario histórico-biográfico brasileiro, Pós-1930, coord. Alzira Alves de Abreu, Israel Beloch, Fernando Lattman-Weltman and Sérgio Tadeu de Niemeyer Lamarão (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV/­CPDOC, 2001), 3995–96. Cited hereafter as DHBB. 26.  Margin notes in the files of DPS and the Labor Ministry prove that the agencies routinely exchanged information. 27.  Decree-law 4.868 (Oct. 23, 1942); decree-law 6.361 (Mar. 22, 1944). 28.  Ata de Assembléia, Nov. 21, 1943; Ministério de Trabalho, Indústria e Comércio, 413.126/46, DNT 51.001/44, Reconhecimento Sindical, 1945, caixa 120, Arquivo Nacional, Brasília (hereafter MTIC, Rec. Sind., 1945, caixa 120). 29.  José Calaça Gomes, President of the Associação Profissional dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias Metalúrgicas de Barra Mansa (APTIMBM), to the Labor Minister, July 26, 1944, MTIC, Rec. Sind., 1945, caixa 120. 30.  APTIMBM, Quadro e Número de Associados, MTIC, Rec. Sind., 1945, caixa 120. 31.  Gomes to MTIC, Augut 14, 1944, MTIC, Rec. Sind., 1945, caixa 120. 32.  Estado do Rio de Janeiro. Secretaria de Justíça e Segurança Pública. Instituto de Criminologia. Serviço de Identificação, Atestado de Bons Antecedentes, and Estado do Rio de Janeiro. Secretaria de Justíça e Segurança Pública. Delegacia de Ordem Político e Social. Atestado, MTIC, Rec. Sind., 1945, caixa 120. 33.  Estatutos do Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias Metalúrgicas, Mecânicas e de Material Elétrico de Barra Mansa, capitulo I, articles 3, 4, and 5, MTIC, Rec. Sind., 1945, caixa 120. For the legal requirement, see CLT, Art. 518. Brasil, Consolidação das leis do trabalho e legislação complementar: prejulgados do TST na integra, súmulas do STF e do TST, ed. Adriano Campanhole, 35th ed (São Paulo: Atlas, 1973), 138.

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34.  Gomes to the Delegado Regional de Trabalho, Oct. 26, 1944, MTIC, Rec. Sind., 1945, caixa 120. 35.  Xavier Sobrinho, Delegado Regional de Trabalho, to Dr. Alvim de Souza, Delegado Chefe do DOPS-RJ, Nov. 20, 1944, MTIC, Rec. Sind., 1945, caixa 120. 36.  DNT, Divisão de Organização e Assistência Sindical, internal memo, Jan. 30, 1945, MTIC, Rec. Sind., 1945, caixa 120. 37.  DRT, internal memo, Mar. 6, 1945, MTIC, Rec. Sind., 1945, caixa 120. Handwritten note on back. 38.  MTIC, Commissão do Enquadramento Sindical, DNT 51.001/44, Resolução, Mar. 20, 1945, MTIC, Rec. Sind., 1945, caixa 120. 39.  Relatório, Delegado de Barra Mansa, Mar. 1, 1945, and Relatório, Delegado de Barra Mansa, Apr. 20, 1945, APERJ, Delegacia de Ordem Política e ­Social—Estado do Rio de Janeiro (hereafter DOPS-RJ), caixa 704. 40.  The comparisons use the association’s membership list and a 1944 subset of the database of CSN personnel files. Associação Profissional dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias Metalúrgicas de Barra Mansa, Quadro e Número de Associados, MTIC, Rec. Sind., 1945, caixa 120. For tables with the full data, see Dinius, “Work in Brazil’s Steel City,” 287–88. 41.  Duarte and Araújo, História Administrativa: D.F.S.P.—D.P.S., 12–13. 42.  Regina Lúcia de Moraes Morel, “A ferro e fogo. Construção e crise da ‘família siderúrgica’: o caso de Volta Redonda (1941–1968)” (PhD diss., Universidade de São Paulo, 1989), 123. 43.  Serviço de Cadastro e Documentação—21/03/1966, Prontuário RJ— P.22.196—Alcides Sabença. On Barra do Piraí’s political culture in the 1930s, see John J. Crocitti, “Pearl of the Paraíba No More: The Limits of Industrialization and Modernization in Brazil” (PhD diss., University of Miami, 2001). On the political left, see 96–97, 242–45, 261–64, 276–80. 44.  Report from Investigator Livio Fleury Curado to DPS/DF, Apr. 10, 1943, DOPS/DGIE—Geral 21 Dossier 1, 144. 45.  Transcript of interview with Ex-worker, 1943, Arquivo do Estado de São Paulo (AESP), Departamento Estadual de Ordem Política e Social de São Paulo (DEOPS-SP), 50-B-01. 46.  Alzira Alves de Abreu, “Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB),” DHBB, 4268. 47.  PCB Report on Organization (apprehended by police), Sept. 17, 1945, APERJ, Divisão de Polícia Política e Social (hereafter DPS), caixa 530, D529, 8–11. 48.  Internal memo on PCB, DOPS/DGIE, Estados 20, 134/135. 49.  Internal File (Ficha), DPS, caixa 530, D529, 1–2; internal memo, Nov. 3, 1945, DPS, caixa 421, D155, 13. 50.  Internal memo, Nov. 3, 1945, DPS caixa 421 D155, 13. BSVR 169 (Sept. 1, 1944), 1443. 51.  Ficha Verde—Biografia, DOPS-GB, Prontuário P.9814—Gentil Noronha. 52.  Internal memo on PCB, DOPS/DGIE, Estados 20, 134/135; Termo de Declarações, Jan. 6, 1945, DOPS-GB, Prontuário P.9814—Gentil Noronha. 53.  “Discurso,” BSVR 191 (Oct. 4, 1945), 1778–81.

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54.  Internal Document DOPS (Dec. 19, 1946), DOPS/DGIE, Comunismo 06, Dossier 5, 5. 55.  Comunicação, DPS, caixa 421, D155, 1. 56.  Internal memo, Nov. 3, 1945, DPS, caixa 421, D155, 12–14. For the quote by Macedo Soares, see “A todos os serventuários da CSN, Volta Redonda,” BSVR 224 (Nov. 25, 1945), appendix. 57.  Interview with Allan Cruz, former union president, Volta Redonda, Nov. 9, 1997. The number of eligible voters in the state of Rio de Janeiro increased by 551 percent, from 69,522 in 1934 to 383,100 in 1945. Brasil, Tribunal Superior ­Eleitoral (TSE), Dados estatísticos: eleições federal, estadual e municipal—realizadas no Brasil a partir de 1945, vol. i/ii (Rio de Janeiro: DIN, 1950), 7. 58.  The vote in the nonindustrialized parts of Barra Mansa was likely similar in distribution to the results in neighboring Resende, where the PCB won only 3.6 percent. On the population of Volta Redonda, see “População,” BSVR 216 (Nov. 11, 1946), 1764. According to this internal CSN statistic, the city had 26,507 inhabitants as of November 1946. 59.  DOPS/DGIE—Estados 20—Dossier 1, 163; and Brasil. TSE, Dados es­ tatísticos, vol. i/ii, 19. 60.  Internal memo, June 17, 1946, APERJ, Departamento de Ordem Política e Social—Guanabara (hereafter DOPS-GB), Prontuário P.9308—Alcides Sabença; Parte de Serviço, June 14, 1950, DOPS-RJ, caixa 674, pasta 2. 61.  On Macedo Soares’s decision to support the rally, see Comitê Distrital de Volta Redonda (PCB) to Eng. Paulo Cesar Martins, EMS f-publ 39.05.12, pasta 3. 62.  A later reminder referred back to the original order issued in May 1946; “Propaganda política,” BSVR 005 (Jan. 8, 1947), 37. For the order on political and social organizations, see “Organização,” BSVR 086 (May 7, 1946), 655. 63.  Recorte de Jornal—Tribuna Popular (Aug. 8, 1946), DPS, caixa 421, D155, 28. 64.  Relatório das Atividades do PCB, Oct. 29, 1946, DOPS-RJ, caixa 645, pasta 3; Relatório das Atividades do PCB, Nov. 4, 1946, DOPS-RJ, caixa 645, pasta 3. 65.  Parte de Serviço—Barra Mansa, Dec. 11, 1946, DOPS-RJ, caixa 651, pasta 1. 66.  Recorte de Jornal—Tribuna Popular (Dec. 6, 1946), DPS, caixa 421, D155, 27; Recorte de Jornal—Tribuna Popular (Dec. 8, 1946), DPS, caixa 421, D155, 26; Boletim—Comité Distrital de Volta Redonda, Dec. 1946, DOPS-RJ, caixa 651, pasta 1. 67.  §11 do Art. 141 da Constituição Federal; Artigo 128 da Constituição do Estado do Rio de Janeiro. 68.  DOPS-RJ caixa 640, pasta 1. The folder contains many dozen requests for permissions to hold rallies and the orders for the DOPS-RJ officers policing the events. They clearly follow a standard operational procedure. 69.  Telegramas Internos Volta Redonda—Niteroí, Dec. 10–12, 1946, ­DOPS-RJ, caixa 643, pasta 7. 70.  “Salário—Compensação,” BSVR 228 (Dec. 22, 1943), 1509. The inflation index for the period 1940–1990 is calculated based on official price indices. IBGE,

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Notes to Chapter 5

Estatísticas históricas do Brasil: séries demográficas e sociais de 1550 a 1988 (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1990), tables 5.3, 5.14. 71.  Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva, “A formação técnica do brasileiro,” Carta Mensal do Conselho Técnico da Confederação do Comércio, Ano XXV (1979), appendix X, L. 72.  For the September figures, see “Preços de Mão-de-Obra,” Anexo X, in Edmundo Macedo Soares e Silva, O ferro na história e na economia do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 1972), L. The March figures are calculated based on wage information from the sample database of CSN personnel files. 73.  CSN, Resolução da Diretoria (RD) 260, Jan. 21, 1947. 74.  The original wording of the document suggests that the company considered the assembly superfluous: “o Snr. Diretor Industrial expoz minuciosamente a contra-proposta, tendo ao terminar, recebido manifestações de aplausos, com o que, deu-se por encerrada toda e qualquer discussão. . . . Acordo para reajustamento de salaries—Ata,” BSVR 200 (Oct. 18, 1946), 1630–32. 75.  “Decreto-Lei n.º 4.937,” BSVR 011 (Jan. 16, 1946), 92. 76.  “Horário de Serviço,” BSVR 045 (Mar. 3, 1946), 363. 77.  CSN, RD 227, Dec. 7, 1946. 78.  Mônica Kornis, “Movimento Unificador dos Trabalhadores (MUT),” DHBB, 3991. 79.  On the national events in 1946, see Leslie Bethell, “Brazil,” in Latin Amer­ ica between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944–1948, ed. L. Bethell and Ian Roxborough (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 56–60. 80.  The Dutra government argued that applying the constitutional provisions required regulating legislation, and the constitutional right to strike would pass only in 1964, after the military coup. Mônica Kornis and Marco Aurélio Santana, “Greve,” DHBB, 2639–42. 81.  Ata da Assembléia Geral Ordinária do STIMMMEBM, Barra Mansa, Sept. 22, 1946, Ministério de Trabalho, Indústria e Comércio, 465.612/46, DR 5265/46, Previsão Orçamentária, 1941/47, caixa 05, Arquivo Nacional, Brasília (hereafter MTIC, Previsão Orçamentária, 1941/47, caixa 05). 82.  Ata da Assembléia Geral Ordinária do STIMMMEBM (Sept. 22, 1946), Barra Mansa, MTIC, Previsão Orçamentária, 1941/47, caixa 5. 83.  Recorte de Jornal—Tribuna Popular (Jan. 7, 1947), DOPS-RJ, caixa 643, pasta 4. 84.  Only 186 voting union members attended the assembly in September 1946. Ata da Assembléia Geral Ordinária do STIMMMEBM (Sept. 22, 1946), Barra Mansa, MTIC, Previsão Orçamentária, 1941/47, caixa 5. 85.  Recorte de Jornal—Tribuna Popular (Nov. 7, 1946), DOPS-RJ, caixa 650, pasta 2. 86.  “Admissão de serventuários,” BSVR 198 (Oct. 17, 1946), 1626. Admission and dismissal statistics in the BSVR show that the hiring freeze remained in place until late March 1948. 87.  Serviço Secreto—Barra do Piraí, Jan. 27, 1947, DOPS-RJ, caixa 643, pasta 1; internal memo—PCB, Jan. 15, 1947, DOPS-RJ, caixa 674, pasta 2. 88.  For an exemplary ruling by the Tribunal Superior de Trabalho (TST), see

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“Rescisão de contrato de trabalho,” BSVR 180 (Sept. 20, 1946), 1465. The final verdict on STIMMMEBM’s suits came later in 1947. “Dispensa de empregados— Recurso extraordinário (Proc. T.S.T. 5.028/47)—Parecer do procurador do T.S.T.” BSVR 176 (Sept. 12, 1947), 1563–65. 89.  “Aditamento ao acôrdo para o aumento coletivo,” BSVR 015 (Jan. 22, 947), 142–43; CSN, RD 311, 26/03/1947. 90.  Recorte de Jornal—Tribuna Popular (Dec. 29, 1946), DOPS-RJ, caixa 651, pasta 1. 91.  Recorte de Jornal—Tribuna Popular (Dec. 16, 1946), DOPS-RJ, caixa 651, pasta 1. 92.  Recorte de Jornal—Tribuna Popular (Jan. 7, 1947), DOPS-RJ, caixa 643, pasta 4. 93.  Brasil. TSE, Dados estatísticos, vol. 1/II, 53. 94.  Relatório, Mar. 26, 1947, DOPS-RJ, caixa 671, pasta 2. 95.  For biographical information, see “Morvan Dias de Figueiredo,” DHBB, 2205. 96.  Relatório: resoluções comunistas, Mar. 5, 1947, DOPS-RJ, caixa 715, pasta 1. 97.  MTIC, Portarias de 20-3-1947, published in Diário Oficial da União (hereafter DOU), Mar. 25, 1947, 4042. Under the old rules of decree-law 8.080, revising the original wording of the CLT’s article 532, an election result had been automatically valid unless one of the candidates officially challenged it within fifteen days. Decreto-Lei n.o 8.080 de 11 de outubro de 1945, published in DOU, Oct. 13, 1945. 98.  MTIC, Portaria n.o 35 de 5 de abril de 1947, published in DOU, Apr. 10, 1947, 4874. The text used the Brazilian police’s language of order. The existence of “irregularities,” “severe disturbances,” and “the need to reestablish order” all served as standard justifications for an intervention. 99.  Ibid. 100.  Relatório interno da CSN, Dec. 15, 1947, DOPS-RJ, caixa 715, pasta 1. 101.  The DNT completed the paperwork only long after the intervention, which confirms that budget irregularities served merely as an excuse for the decision to intervene. The document making the legal case is dated Nov. 30, 1948, MTIC, Previsão Orçamentária, 1941/47, caixa 5. 102.  Relatório enviado à DOPS, Apr. 15, 1947, DOPS-RJ, caixa 671, pasta 2. Denunciation of undue American influence was a staple of PCB political discourse. Henrique Cordeiro Oest, PCB representative in the federal Câmara de Deputados, accused American engineers of sabotage because the blast furnace had been idle for twenty-two days after a melt-through. Recorte de Jornal—Tribuna Popular (Mar. 28, 1947), DPS, caixa 421, D155, 24. 103.  Decreto n.o 23.046 de 7 de maio de 1947. See Bethell, “Brazil,” 62–64. For an example of the reasoning, see the intervention in the transport workers union of the port of Rio de Janeiro (Sindicato de Carregadores e Transportadores de Bagagens do Porto do Rio de Janeiro) on May 08, 1947. MTIC, Portaria n.o 43 de 8 de maio de 1947, published in DOU May 10, 1947, 6409. 104.  Relatório enviado à DOPS, Apr. 15, 1947, DOPS-RJ, caixa 671, pasta 2. 105.  Relatório Externo, May 11, 1947, DOPS-RJ, caixa 680, pasta 1.

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Notes to Chapter 5

106.  Oficio n.50/47 Reservado, Apr. 17, 1947, DOPS-RJ, caixa 671, pasta 2. 107.  Relatório estatístico anual referente ao ano de 1947, Dossiê 15, caixa 386. Cited in Duarte and Araújo, “História Administrativa: D.F.S.P.—D.P.S.,” 16. 108.  DPS. Relatório Anual de 1948 da Divisão de Polícia Política e Social, APERJ. 109.  Austricliano da Silva remained in the Sul Fluminense at least until 1958. DOPS-RJ documentation for later years is too spotty to verify whether he stayed beyond that time. 110.  “Serviço de polícia,” BSVR 230 (Nov. 27, 1947), 1992, and “Serviço de polícia,” BSVR 234 (Dec. 3, 1947), 2018. 111.  Parte de Serviço, Apr. 20, 1948, DOPS-RJ, caixa 715, pasta 1. 112.  Internal Document, Aug. 9, 1950, DPS, caixa 421, D155, 7–9. 113.  Relatório Delegacia Especial de Polícia de Volta Redonda, Feb. 11, 1948, DOPS-RJ, caixa 715, pasta 1. 114.  Informação que presta o cidadão Elizeu Gonelli Filho, Sept. 13, 1949, DOPS-RJ, caixa 665, pasta 3. 115.  Parte de Serviço, Mar. 17, 1949, DOPS-RJ, caixa 695, pasta 2. They might have based their suspicions on the interrogation of João Batista de Assis, an unemployed carpenter who did make a living selling sundry sweets. Informação que presta—João Batista de Assis (Carpinteiro), Mar. 23, 1949, DOPS-RJ, caixa 695, pasta 2. 116.  Parte de Serviço, June 16, 1950, DOPS-RJ, caixa 674, pasta 2. Lincoln Cordeiro Oest, a former PCB representative, came to Volta Redonda for a public commemoration of the fall of the Bastille. Parte de Serviço, July 18, 1949, DOPSRJ, caixa 695, pasta 2. 117.  Relatório Interno da CSN, Dec. 15, 1947, DOPS-RJ, caixa 715, pasta 1. 118.  Parte de Serviço 63, Aug. 23, 1948, DOPS-RJ, caixa 644, pasta 1. For records of another rally for Brazilian oil held in Volta Redonda in 1948, see Parte de Serviço 76, Sept. 25, 1948, DOPS-RJ, caixa 645, pasta 7. 119.  Relatório Delegacia Especial de Polícia de Volta Redonda, Feb. 11, 1948, DOPS-RJ, caixa 715, pasta 1. 120.  Recorte de Jornal—A Noite (Feb. 13, 1948), DPS caixa 421, D155, 23. 121.  Recorte de Jornal—Imprensa Popular (Nov. 14, 1950), DPS, caixa 421, D155, 15. 122.  “Informações que presta” (Henrique Manoel Ferreira), Mar. 9, 1950, DOPS-RJ—Prontuário P.26.760—Henrique Manoel Ferreira. 123.  It was unusual to see close cooperation between federal and state political police. The CSN generally bypassed DOPS-RJ and worked directly with DPS. Legally, the federal police could not operate outside the Federal District without the permission of the respective state governor. DOPS-RJ’s local officer discovered, however, that these were “orders from high up” and acknowledged (with apparent envy) that DPS was much better equipped to carry out the operation. DPS could also hold suspect disregarding a habeas corpus for much longer than DOPS-RJ. Parte de Serviço, Aug. 13, 1949, DOPS-RJ, caixa 695, pasta 2. 124.  Parte de Serviço, July 10, 1949, DOPS-RJ, caixa 695, pasta 2; Recorte

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de Jornal—A Cidade (July 13, 1949), DPS caixa 421 D155, 22; Informações que presta o cidadão Elizeu Gonelli Filho, Sept. 13, 1949, DOPS-RJ, caixa 665, pasta 3. 125.  Internal memo, July 31, 1949, DPS caixa 421 D155, 10/11; Report by Investigator on Volta Redonda, Aug. 2, 1949, DPS caixa 421 D155, 5–7. 126.  Parte de Serviço, Aug. 19, 1949, DOPS-RJ, caixa 695, pasta 2; Internal Report, DPS, caixa 445, D47, Aug. 14, 1949, 31. 127.  Parte de Serviço, Aug. 14, 1949, DOPS-RJ, caixa 695, pasta 2. Growing a stalinesque moustache appears to have been the fashion among alleged Communists in Volta Redonda, if a picture of four arrested militants was any indication. Parte de Serviço, Aug. 19, 1949, DOPS-RJ, caixa 695, pasta 2. 128.  “Incumbido de um plano de sabotagem em Volta Redonda,” Recorte de Jornal—O Globo (Aug. 22, 1949), DPS, caixa 421, D155, 18/19. 129.  Termo de Declaração—Domiciano Monteiro de Castro (eletricista), Oct. 31, 1949, DOPS-RJ, caixa 669, pasta 1; Termo de Declaração—Francisco Pinheiro da Silva (encarregado de construção), Oct. 31, 1949, DOPS-RJ, caixa 669, pasta 1. 130.  Informações que presta—Antônio Pereira da Silva (encanador), Aug. 18, 1949, DOPS-RJ, caixa 695, pasta 2; Termo de Declaração—Antônio Pereira da Silva (encanador), Oct. 31, 1949, DOPS-RJ, caixa 669, pasta 1. 131.  Termo de Declaração—José Nunes (mecânico), Nov. 22, 1949, DOPS-RJ, caixa 669, pasta 1. 132.  Parte de Serviço, Aug. 14, 1949, DOPS-RJ, caixa 695, pasta 2; CSN to DOPS-RJ, Aug. 16, 1949, DOPS-RJ, caixa 674, pasta 2. 133.  Serviço Secreto, Apr. 21, 1950, DOPS-RJ, caixa 643, pasta 6. 134.  Parte de Serviço, Sept. 30, 1949, DOPS-RJ, caixa 669, pasta 1. 135.  BSVR 075 (Apr. 21, 1949), 723; BSVR 119 (June 23, 1949), 1153. 136.  Informação n.1045/49—S.S.S., Oct. 13, 1949, DOPS-RJ, caixa 669, pasta 1. 137.  Termo de Declaração—Francisco Pinheiro da Silva (encarregado de construção), Oct. 31, 1949, DOPS-RJ, caixa 669, pasta 1. 138.  Parte de Serviço, Aug. 12, 1948, DOPS-RJ, caixa 674, pasta 2. 139.  Termo de Declaração (João de Deus Avilla, diretor), May 15, 1948, DOPS-RJ, caixa 686, pasta 5; DOPS/DGIE, Estados 20A, 170. 140.  Relatório Interno, Feb. 9, 1949, DOPS-RJ, caixa 686, pasta 5; Parte de Serviço, Mar. 17, 1949, DOPS-RJ, caixa 695, pasta 2. 141.  Recorte—Diário do Congresso (May 24, 1949), Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação (hereafter CPDOC), EMS f-publ 39.05.12, pasta 3. 142.  Parte de Serviço, Aug. 12, 1948, DOPS-RJ, caixa 674, pasta 2; Parte de Serviço, Mar. 30, 1949, DOPS-RJ, caixa 695, pasta 2. 143.  Parte de Serviço, Mar. 18, 1950, DOPS-RJ, caixa 643, pasta 6; Parte de Serviço, June 19, 1950, DOPS-RJ, caixa 674, pasta 2. 144.  Relatório Reservado, Sept. 18, 1950, DOPS-RJ, copy filed in CPDOC, EMS f-publ 47.04.02. 145.  On the Catholic roots of Brazilian anti-Communism, see Rodrigo Patto Sá Motta, Em guarda contra o “Perigo Vermelho”: o anticomunismo no Brasil (1917–64) (São Paulo: Perspectiva, FAPESP, 2002), 18–29.

284

Notes to Chapter 6

chapter six 1.  Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional, Relátorio da Diretoria correspondente ao Ano de 1949 (Rio de Janeiro: CSN, 1950), 6. 2.  The primary criterion for a strategic industry is not the market value of its production, but the dependence of other industries on its product. In his comparative study of Latin American labor, Charles Bergquist selected industries for their contribution to the value of the country’s exports, assuming that workers in those industries wielded disproportionate power. Strategically, however, railroad and port workers that deliver export commodities such as coffee (Colombia), nitrates (Chile), or frozen meat (Argentina) to their markets possess greater power than the workers in the export industries themselves. Charles Bergquist, Labor in Latin America: Comparative Essays on Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, and Colombia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986). 3.  For an example of the significance of strategic position for industrial action in the automobile industry, see John Womack, Jr., “Working Power over Production: Labor History, Industrial Work, Economics, Sociology, and Strategic Position” (manuscript presented at the XIV International Economic History Congress, Helsinki 2006), 51–54. 4.  Jonathan Brown, in his introduction to Workers Control in Latin America, 1930–1979, does not distinguish workers’ control clearly from job control. He associates it with fights for dignity rather than—as the term “workers’ control” is commonly understood—the struggle for self-management and industrial democracy. Jonathan C. Brown, Workers Control in Latin America, 1930–1979 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 1–15. For a similarly soft use of the term, see David Montgomery, Workers’ Control in America: Studies in the His­ tory of Work, Technology, and Labor Struggles (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 1–7. 5.  Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974). Specifically on the steel industry, see Katherine Stone, “The Origins of Job Structures in the Steel Industry,” in Labor Market Segmentation, ed. Richard C. Edwards et al. (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1973), 27–84. For a comprehensive review of the literature and a critique of Braverman, see Paul Thompson, The Nature of Work: An Introduction to Debates on the Labor Process, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke, UK: MacMillan, 1989), 67–121; Michael Burawoy, The Politics of Production: Factory Regimes under Capitalism and Socialism (London: VERSO, 1985), 21–84. 6.  Thomas Welskopp’s comparative study of the steel industry in the United States and Germany from the 1860s to the 1930s demonstrates that the production workforce became more skilled after the 1920s. Welskopp, Arbeit und Macht im Hüttenwerk. Arbeits- und industrielle Beziehungen in der deutschen und ameri­ kanischen Eisen- und Stahlindustrie von den 1860er bis zu den 1930er Jahren (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1994). 7.  Dunlop, Industrial Relations System, 61. 8.  Ibid., 97. 9.  For a concise overview of the technology and economics, see Werner Baer,

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The Development of the Brazilian Steel Industry (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1969), 8–30. 10.  A nice illustration for this interdependence is the “Flow Diagram—Raw Materials to Finished Product” in Freyn Engineering Department, Koppers Company, Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional, Volta Redonda, Report for Plan C Expansion of Plant Capacity to 1,000,000 metric tons of ingots per year (Chicago, July 11, 1952), appendix. 11.  Ibid., 210–25. 12.  Welskopp provides examples of wildcat strikes at the departmental level in the 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s that took advantage of “Störmacht.” Welskopp, Arbeit und Macht im Hüttenwerk, 573–83. 13.  Womack, “Working Power over Production.” 14.  CSN, Folha de Descrição de Trabalho (hereafter FDT): Operador da 1.ª Balança e Carro Lingote (DDT-D), May 16, 1964. 15.  CSN, FDT: Operador do Carro de Pontas da Tesoura à Quente (DDT-D), Mar. 18, 1964. 16.  Jack Stieber, The Steel Industry Wage Structure: A Study of Joint UnionManagement Job Evaluation Program in the Basic Steel Industry (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959), xvii. 17.  Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva, “A usina siderúrgica de Volta Redonda,” Mineração e Metalurgia 7:39 (July/Aug. 1943), 131. 18.  Freyn Engineering, Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional, 50. For a listing of the products and the CSN’s production record for the years 1949–50, see CSN, Relatório da Diretoria—1950, 6. 19.  On the physical arrangement of modern mills and these trade-offs, see United States Steel Company, The Making, Shaping, and Treating of Steel, 6th ed. (Pittsburgh: U.S. Steel, 1951), 864–74. 20.  For a flow diagram of the production process and the utilized equipment before and after the implementation of Plano B and the projected lineup after the implementation of Plano C, see “Rolling Mills Flow Diagram,” in Freyn Engineering, Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional, appendix to section 1. 21.  The late 1940s had seen a series of changes to the organizational tree. For an example, see BSVR 132 (July 12, 1949), 1281–85. 22.  “Organograma da Direção Industrial,” BSVR 147 (Aug. 5, 1951), appendix, I–XVIII. “Efetivo de pessoal,” BSVR 004 (Jan. 5, 1951), 31–40. 23.  CSN, FDT: Chefe do DCQ, July 25, 1962. 24.  Useful sources to understand the division of labor in an integrated steel mill included manuals, occupational descriptions, and technical dictionaries. (1) U.S. Steel Company, The Making, Shaping, and Treating of Steel, 6th ed. (Pittsburgh: U.S. Steel, 1951) describes commonly used equipment as well as the physics and chemistry of the production process. It was the standard reference for any metallurgical engineer. (2) The CSN’s Engenharia Industrial created occupational descriptions (Folhas de Descrição de Trabalho) that listed the worker’s responsibilities, described the work process, and listed equipment under his supervision. To translate job titles into English, I used United Steelworkers of America (CIO) & U.S. Steel Corporation, Job Descriptions and Classification Manual for Hourly

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Rated Production, Maintenance and Non-Confidential Clerical Jobs, Jan. 1, 1953. (3) Useful technical dictionaries include Francisco J. Buecken, Vocabulário Téc­ nico: Português-Inglês-Francês-Alemão, 2nd ed. (São Paulo: Melhoramentos, 1952); Alfred Elwes, A Dictionary of the Portuguese Language (London: Technical Press, 1948); Dicionário Siderúrgico Trilingüe: Inglês-Espanhol-Português (Santiago de Chile: Instituto Latinoamericano del Fierro y del Acero, 1994); Michel Feutry/­Robert M. de Mertzenfeld/Agnès Dollinger, Dicionário Técnico In­ dustrial. Tratando de areas de: mecânica, metallurgia, electricidade, química, con­ strução civil e ciências exatas. Inglês-Francês-Alemão-Espanhol-Português (Belo Horizonte: Garnier, 2001). Illustrations to visualize the equipment used in steel mills are found in Dictionnaires Techniques Illustrés (En six langues: Français, Allemand, Anglais, Russe, Italien, Espagnol), Tome XI: Siderúrgie (Paris: Dunod, 1911). 25.  CSN, FDT: Operador de Carro Balança (DAF), Dec. 3, 1963; Standard Title (hereafter ST)—Larryman (Code BA 01970), USW, Job Descriptions and Clas­ sification Manual (hereafter JDCM), 85. 26.  CSN, FDT: Forneiro de Alto Forno (DAF), Nov. 19, 1963; CSN, FDT: ­Encarregado de Turno de Alto Forno (DAF), Oct. 18, 1962; ST—Keeper (Code BA 01940), USW, JDCM, 139. 27.  CSN, FDT: Escoreiro (DAF), Nov. 18, 1963; ST—Cinder Snapper (Code BA 05430), USW, JDCM, 105. 28.  CSN, FDT (DAF); USW, JDCM, 80–139. 29.  CSN, FDT: Operador do Misturador (DAC), May 26, 1965; ST—Mixer Operator (Code BA 03540), USW, JDCM, 181. 30.  CSN, FDT: Mestre de Forno S.M. (DAC), Oct. 2, 1962. 31.  CSN, FDT: Mestre de Fusão (DAC), Nov. 5, 1962. 32.  CSN, FDT: 1º Paneleiro Lingotador (DAC), Jan. 24, 1964; ST—First Steel Pourer (Code BA 04550), USW, JDCM, 175. 33.  CSN, FDT (DAC); USW, JDCM, 168–219. 34.  CSN, FDT: Mestre “A” de Fornos-Poços (DDT), Nov. 22, 1964; ST—­ Soaking Pit Heater (Code BA 01800), USW, JDCM, 223. 35.  CSN, FDT: Operador da 1ª Balança e Carro Lingote (DDT), May 16, 1964; ST—Ingot Buggy Operator (Code BA 03360), USW, JDCM, 221. 36.  CSN, FDT: Mestre do Laminador Desbastedor (DDT/D), Oct. 20, 1964; CSN, FDT: Operador do Laminador Desbastedor (DDT/D), Oct. 29, 1962; ST— Blooming Mill Roller (Code AG 04960), USW, JDCM, 337. 37.  CSN, FDT (DDT/D); USW, JDCM, 220–29, 334–58. 38.  In the 1950s, the CSN added a 2-high scale breaker and a 28" and 53" by 72" 4-high roughing stand to the plate mill, turning the old rougher into the second stand of a three stand setup. It also added two stands at the hot-strip mill. “Rolling Mills Flow Diagram,” in Freyn Engineering, Companhia Siderúrgica Na­ cional, appendix to section 1. 39.  CSN, FDT: Mestre de Fornos e Reaquecimento de Placas (DCQ), Nov. 12, 1962; and ST—Slab Heater (Code BA 01800), USW, JDCM, 461. 40.  U.S. Steel, Making, 755–62; CSN, FDT: Mestre dos Laminadores a Quente (DCQ), Dec. 17, 1962.

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41.  CSN, FDT: Encarregado do Acabamento de Chapas Grossas (DCQ/A), Nov. 13, 1962. 42.  CSN, FDT: Mestres dos Laminadores a Quente (DCQ), Dec. 17, 1962; ST—Speed Operator (Code BA 03980), USW, JDCM, 2008 and 2016; ST—Roller (Code BA 04960), USW, JDCM, 2010. 43.  CSN, FDT: Encarregado do Acabamento de Chapas Finas a Quente (DCQ), Jan. 16, 1963. 44.  U.S. Steel, Making, 866; and ST—Coiler (Code BA 00780), USW, JDCM, 2020. 45.  CSN, Descrição do Trabalho: Chefe do Departamento (DEN), Nov. 28, 1966. 46.  The CSN created DEN in the 1950s. It had been part of the Departamento de Combustão (DCB), which remained in charge of combustion (oil, gas). 47.  Freyn Engineering, Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional, 166–69, appendix “Fuel Distribution Chart.” 48.  Ibid., 173–78, appendix “Electric Single Line Diagram.” 49.  CSN, FDT: Inspetor de Linhas (DEN/V), Mar. 19, 1965. 50.  CSN, FDT: Operador de Caldeiras da CTE (DEN/V), Jan. 9, 1964); CSN, FDT: Operador Responsável Caldeiras da CTE (DEN/V), Jan. 31, 1964. 51.  CSN, FDT: Operador Responsável Turbo Soprador (DEN/V), 21/01/1964; CSN, FDT: Operador Turbo Soprador (DEN/V), Jan. 22, 1964; CSN, FDT: Op­ erador de Turbo Gerador (DEN/V), June 5, 1961; CSN, FDT: Operador de Turbo Gerador (DEN/V), Nov. 19, 1963. 52.  CSN, FDT: Operador de Caldeiras da CTE (DEN/V), 09/01/1964); CSN, FDT: Operador Responsável Caldeiras da CTE (DEN/V), Jan. 31, 1964. 53.  CSN, FDT: Operador do Turbo Gerador (DEN/V), May 5, 1961. 54.  CSN, FDT: Chefe da Divisão de Eletricidade e Distribuição Geral (DEN/E), Apr. 13, 1961; CSN, Descrição do Trabalho: Chefe do Departamento (DEN), Nov. 28, 1966. 55.  CSN, FDT: Chefe da Divisão de Eletricidade e Distribuição Geral (DEN/E), Apr. 13, 1961. 56.  CSN, FDT: Técnico de Distibuição de Energia Elétrica (DEN/E), July 22, 1966. 57.  CSN, FDT: Operador Eletricista A—SEP (DEN/E), Mar. 17, 1961; CSN, FDT: Operador Eletricista B—SEP (DEN/E), Mar. 18, 1961. 58.  The operation of these disconnecting switches at the SEP was done by a remote system, the so-called “Visicode.” CSN, FDT: Mestre da CTE (DEN-E), Aug. 17, 1966. 59.  CSN, FDT: Operador Eletricista “B”—CTE (DEN-E), Mar. 22, 1961; CSN, FDT: Operador Eletricista “A”—CTE (DEN-E), Mar. 21, 1961. 60.  CSN, FDT: Operador Eletricista—Subestação Coqueria (DEN-E), Apr. 10, 1961; CSN, FDT: Operador Eletricista—Subestação Oficinas (DEN-E), Apr. 10, 1961; CSN, FDT: Operador Eletricista—Subestação Casa de Bombas (DEN-E), Mar. 24, 1961. 61.  CSN, FDT: Operador Eletricista—Subestação LTF-2 (DEN-E), Apr. 11, 1961.

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Notes to Chapter 6

62.  Arthur McKee, Report for Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional, 4/19, 4/20. The CSN also operated trains to transport coal and iron ore to Volta Redonda and maintained a small fleet of freighters to ship coal from the United States and from Santa Catarina. Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva, “Volta Redonda—Gênese da idéia, seu desenvolvimento, projeto, educação e custo,” Revista do Serviço Público (Nov. 1945), 24; and Edward J. Rogers, “Brazilian Success Story: The Volta Redonda Iron and Steel Plant,” Journal of Inter-American Studies 10:4 (Oct. 1968), 647. 63.  CSN, FDT: Encarregado de Ponte Rolante (DAC), Dec. 6, 1962. 64.  CSN, FDT: Encarregado de Ponte Rolante (DDT), Nov. 9, 1964; CSN, FDT: Encarregado dos Serviços de Pátio e Forno (DCQ), Oct. 30, 1962; CSN, FDT: Encarregado de Ponte Rolante (DFU), Dec. 3, 1962; “Departamento de Chapas—LNA,” BSVR 162 (Sept. 5, 1951), I–IV. 65.  ST—Ladle Craneman (Code AD 00940), USW, JDCM, 175. 66.  CSN, Resolução da Diretoria (RD) 12.295 (Feb. 28, 1962). 67.  This was the only underlined word in hundreds of job descriptions that I looked at. CSN, FDT: Operador de Ponte PR’s 26,27 & 220 (DFU), Mar. 19, 1959. 68.  Interview with Ervin Michelstaedter, former head of the CSN’s Engenharia Industrial, Volta Redonda, July 22, 1998. 69.  “Departamento de Manutenção Elétrica & Departamento de Manutenção Mecânica—LNA,” BSVR 162 (Sept. 5, 1951), IV–VIII. 70.  By the early 1960s, the CSN reorganized these groups into a new department, the Departamento da Manutenção das Unidades (DMU). 71.  CSN, FDT: Contra-Mestre de Lubrifição (DMU/DDT), Oct. 13, 1962; CSN, FDT: Contra-Mestre de Lubrifição (DMU/DFU), Oct. 13, 1962. 72.  CSN, FDT: Encarregado Geral (DMU/DDT), Oct. 12, 1962; CSN, FDT: Mestre de Turno DMU/DDT, Oct. 15, 1962; CSN, FDT: Mecânico Encarregado do Desbastador (DMU/DDT), Oct. 13, 1962. 73.  In the early 1960s the CSN created a separate refractory brick department (Departamento de Refratário; DRE). 74.  CSN, FInAT: Pedreiro Refratário (DRE), Nov. 14, 1963. 75.  CSN, FDT: Pedreiro de Refratário no DFU-DOF (DRE), n.d.; CSN, FDT: Pe­ dreiro Responsável Laminação (DRE), n.d.; CSN, FDT: Pedreiro da ­Manutenção— Plantão DAC (DRE), n.d. 76.  CSN, FDT:Operador de Ponte 230 (DDC), Mar. 15, 1965. 77.  ST—Roll Turner (Code LQ 06010), USW, JDCM, 1290; CSN, FDT: Retifi­ cador de Cilindros (DDC), Mar. 26, 1965. 78.  CSN, FDT: Montador de Cilindros de Encôsto (DDC), Apr. 6, 1965. 79.  “Departamento de Manutenção Elétrica & Departamento de Manutenção Mecânica—LNA,” BSVR 162 (Sept. 9, 1951), IV–VIII. 80.  CSN, FDT: Mestre Geral (DME/DEN), Oct. 19, 1962. 81.  CSN, FDT: Eletricista de Turno (DME/DEN), May 10, 1965; CSN, FDT: Eletricista Auxiliar (DME/DEN), May 10, 1965. 82.  CSN, FDT: Mestre Geral da Manutenção Életrica Auxiliar (DME/A), Oct. 23, 1962; CSN, FDT: Mestre da Manutenção das Rêdes Aéreas e Subterrân­ nea (DME-A), Apr. 5, 1965.

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289

chapter seven 1.  STIMMMEBMVR to CSN directorate, Aug. 23, 1955, Acordos Sindicais, CSN, Gerência de Assuntos Trabalhistas. Cited hereafter as “Acordos Sindicais.” 2.  On the politics of selecting candidates, see Paulo Brandi, “Getúlio Vargas,” Dicionario histórico-biográfico brasileiro, Pós-1930, coord. Alzira Alves de Abreu, Israel Beloch, Fernando Lattman-Weltman and Sérgio Tadeu de Niemeyer Lamarão (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV/CPDOC, 2001), 5948–52. Cited hereafter as DHBB. 3.  The source provides neither percentages nor the number of valid votes for the vice-presidential election. For results, see Brandi, “Getúlio Vargas,” DHBB, 5952; and Vilma Keller, “Café Filho,” DHBB, 919. The Supreme Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral; TSE) never published presidential election results for 1950 by municipality, and the Regional Electoral Court (Tribunal Regional Eleitoral; TRE) in Rio de Janeiro did not archive the original election records. 4.  Brandi, “Getúlio Vargas,” DHBB, 5951. For the quote, see Thomas E. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964: An Experiment in Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 78. 5.  IBGE, Estatísticas históricas do Brasil; séries demográficas e sociais de 1550 a 1988 (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1990). Table 5.3: Indices do custo de vida nas ­cidades do Rio de Janeiro e São Paulo e de preços por atacado, 1940–1949, and Table 5.4: Indice geral de preços ao consumidor para o Brasil e algumas capitais, 1948–1979. 6.  “Repouso remunerado—Pessoal em ferias e acidentados,” BSVR 177 (Sep. 15, 1949), 1719. 7.  Parte de Serviço, June 19, 1950, DOPS-RJ, caixa 674, pasta 2. The primary purpose of the bonuses was to improve attendance and thus reduce disruptions in production. Interview with Luiz Paulino Bomfim, Bruce Payne consultant to the CSN in the 1950s, Rio de Janeiro, July 13, 2004. 8.  Interview with Waldyr A. Bedê, Volta Redonda, Jan. 20, 1998. He had come to the city in the late 1940s and remembered the regular blackouts in the early 1950s. 9.  “Racionamento de Energia Elétrica—Aviso a População,” BSVR 214 (Nov. 12, 1952), 1542. 10.  In June 1950, parliament debated a law mandating union elections. Dutra apparently decreed elections to preempt the passing of such a law. Recorte de Jornal— A Notícia, June 13, 1950, APERJ, Divisão de Ordem Política e Social/­Departamento Geral de Investigações Especiais (hereafter DOPS/DGIE), Administração 1-E, Dossier Fornecimento de Atestados de Ideologia. 11.  MTIC, Portaria 53, July 29, 1950, published in Diário Oficial da União (hereafter DOU), Aug. 1, 1950, 11249–54. 12.  On Danton Coelho, see Recorte de Jornal—Folha Carioca, May 2, 1951, in DOPS/DGIE, Administração 1-E, Dossier Fornecimento de Atestados de ­Ideologia. The Vargas government abolished the atestado ideológico for union officers on May 1, 1951. 13.  Interview with Allan Cruz, former union president (1951–1953), Volta Redonda, Nov. 9, 1997. 14.  In September 1951, PCB militants reprinted the Chapa Proletária’s platform

290

Notes to Chapter 7

on a leaflet designed to remind the workers how few of its demands had been fulfilled. Panfleto, Sep. 4, 1951, DOPS/DGIE, Geral 21, Dossier 1, 181/182. 15.  Interview with Allan Cruz. 16.  Allan Cruz to the Delegado Regional de Trabalho, Feb. 2, 1952, Ministério de Trabalho, Indústria e Comércio. Previsão Orçamentária—Sindicato, 1949/50, caixa 07, Arquivo Nacional, Brasília (ANB). Cited hereafter as “MTIC, Previsão, 1949/50, caixa 07.” 17.  Ata de Assembléia Geral Extraordinária do STIMMMEBM, Barra Mansa, June 29, 1950, MTIC, Previsão, 1949/50, caixa 07. 18.  Allan Cruz to the Delegado Regional de Trabalho, Volta Redonda, Feb. 2, 1952, MTIC, Previsão, 1949/50, caixa 07. 19.  Previsão Orçamentária STIMMMEBM, Dec. 20, 1951; Walter Millen, Interim President STIMMMEBM, to the Delegado Regional de Trabalho, June 30, 1952, MTIC, Previsão, 1949/50, caixa 07. 20.  Allan Cruz and Aarão Steinbruch to Sylvio Raulino de Oliveira, CSN president, July 3, 1951, Ministério de Trabalho, Indústria e Comércio. Processo Eleitoral de Sindicato, 1951, caixa 12, ANB. Cited hereafter as “MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1951, caixa 12.” 21.  Documento Interno, June 15, 951, DOPS-RJ, Prontuário P. 22237—Aarão Steinbruch. 22.  Internal Document, July 9, 1951, APERJ, Divisão de Polícia Política e ­Social (hereafter DPS), caixa 421, D155, 6. 23.  J. M. de Carvalho Santos, Consultor Jurídico da CSN, Parecer, Ref. n.º 128/3, Aug. 11, 1951, MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1951, caixa 12. 24.  Segadas Viana became Labor Minister in early September 1951 after Danton Coelho’s resignation. Mônica Kornis, “Segadas Viana,” DHBB, 6047. 25.  Raulino de Oliveira to José de Segadas Viana, Labor Minister, Sep. 25, 1951, MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1951, caixa 12, 1–2. 26.  CSN, Resolução da Diretoria (RD) 2601, Rio de Janeiro, Dec. 29, 1950. The CSN resolution referenced an agreement for the Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias Metalúrgicas, Mecânicas e de Material Elétrico do Rio de Janeiro (STIMMMERJ), published in the Diário da Justiça, Nov. 28, 1950, 3846–47. 27.  CSN, RD 3.025, July 27, 1951; CSN, RD 3.049, Aug. 3, 1951. 28.  Secção de Barra Mansa, Aug. 8, 1951, DOPS-RJ, caixa 642, pasta 2. 29.  Allan Cruz to Segadas Viana, Aug. 20, 1951, MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1951, caixa 12. 30.  Geraldo Leal Ribeiro, Advogado do STIMMMEBM, Parecer, Aug. 20, 1951, MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1951, caixa 12. 31.  Interview with Allan Cruz. 32.  Raulino to Segadas Viana, Sep. 25, 1951, MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1951, caixa 12, 5. 33.  Ibid. Emphasis added. 34.  Ibid., 8. 35.  Ibid. 36.  Ibid.

Notes to Chapter 7

291

37.  Raulino de Oliveira to Segadas Viana, Oct. 24, 1951, MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1951, caixa 12. 38.  Interview with Allan Cruz. 39.  Memo n.º 150.636-51/GM-841, Segadas Viana to President Getúlio Vargas, Dec. 31, 1951, MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1951, caixa 12, 3–4. 40.  Memo from CSN to Segadas Viana, Nov. 5, 1951, MTIC, Processo ­Eleitoral, 1951, caixa 12. 41.  Valente de Andrade, Assistente Técnico, Nota Pessoal, Nov. 27, 1951, MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1951, caixa 12. 42.  Interview with Allan Cruz. 43.  Memo by Frederico Gomes da Silva, CSN lawyer, Dec. 6, 1951, MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1951, caixa 12, 24. 44.  Ibid., 27–44. 45.  Ata da Reunião, Dec. 6, 1951, MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1951, caixa 12. 46.  “Reivindicações formuladas pelo STIMMME de Barra Mansa—­Resolução,” BSVR 067 (Apr. 9, 1952), 501/502. 47.  Acordo realizado perante o DNT, Mar. 10, 1952, MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1951, caixa 12. 48.  Ata de Assembléia Geral Extraordinária, STIMMMEBM, Mar. 16, 1952, MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1951, caixa 12. 49.  Homologação de acordo, José de Segadas Viana, Apr. 8, 1952, MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1951, caixa 12. 50.  “Movimento Sindical,” Revista de Trabalho 20:10 (Apr. 1952), 161–64. 51.  “Relevação de penalidade—Uniformização processual,” BSVR 141 (July 30, 1952), 1021–22. 52.  “Penalidades de multa, relevação—Aprovação,” BSVR 201 (Oct. 24, 1952), 1443–44. 53.  The last BSVR with the detailed penalty annotation was BSVR 098 (May 28, 1953). 54.  BSVR 103 (June 4, 1952), 757; BSVR 184 (Sep. 25, 1953), 1436. 55.  “Departamento de Pessoal—Serviço de Informações—Instalação—Aviso,” BSVR 138 (July 25, 1952), 1007. 56.  “Repouso seminal remunerado—Normas sôbre o pagamento—Solução de consulta,” BSVR 183 (Sep. 26, 1950), 1799–1801. 57.  “Instruções para a Implementação do Acordo Coletivo,” transcribed in CSN, Ata da 548ª sessão ordinária da Diretoria, Rio de Janeiro, Apr. 8, 1952. For the tables to convert hourly and daily pay scales into monthly salaries, see Acordo realizado perante o DNT, Mar. 10, 1952, MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1951, caixa 12, appendix. 58.  “Reivindicações formuladas pelo STIMMMEBM—Resolução,” BSVR 067 (Apr. 9, 1952), 501–4. 59.  Acordo Sindical entre CSN e STIMMMEBM, Aug. 30, 1953, clauses 1, 10, and 12, Acordos Sindicais. 60.  Termo Aditivo ao Acordo Sindical entre CSN e STIMMMEBM, Aug. 4, 1954, Acordos Sindicais.

292

Notes to Chapter 7

61.  CSN, Regulamento do Pessoal (RPE), N.º 1, published in the Boletim e Serviço da Séde 110 (May 19, 1954). 62.  I used the last salary figure recorded in the personnel files in a given year as the annual salary. In 1961 and 1962, the CSN implemented the union contracts in January, which meant that the recorded salaries for 1960 and 1961 reflect the low point of the real wage (eroded by inflation and just before the next raise). The actual average income for those years is probably close to Cr$3,000 for “All Workers.” 63.  Wage figures based on a large sample from the personnel files have the advantage that they reflect promotions and bonuses, which drove up labor cost, while the CSN’s official salary tables reflect only the contractually agreed raises. For the nominal salary increases, see CSN, Tabelas salariais da CSN, Acordos Sindicais. 64.  For the maximum minimum wage, see CSN, Tabelas salariais, 1953–1972, mimeograph. For Rio de Janeiro industrial wages, see Raouf Kahil, Inflation and Economic Development in Brazil, 1946–1963 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 65–67; for São Paulo industrial wages, Renato P. Colistete, “Productivity, Wages, and Labor Politics in Brazil, 1945–1962,” Journal of Economic History 67:1 (2007), 111. 65.  Vilma Keller, “Café Filho,” DHBB, 920–24; Regina da Luz Moreira, “Napoleão Alencastro Guimarães,” DHBB, 2702–4. 66.  Jorge Miguel Mayer, “Ademar de Barros,” DHBB, 546. 67.  On the internal debates in the PCB about the realignment after Vargas’s death, see Marco Aurélio Santana, Homens partidos: comunistas e sindicatos no Brasil (São Paulo: Boitempo, 2001), 89–100. 68.  The local DOPS-RJ officer, Austricliano da Silva, mentioned in a report on STIMMMEBM’s general assembly in August 1951 that Cruz had requested a meeting that he “judged to be resolved more satisfactorily with the assistance of the police.” Secção de Barra Mansa, Aug. 8, 1951, DOPS-RJ, Prontuário P. 22237— Aarão Steinbruch. 69.  Interview with Waldyr A. Bedê. 70.  Secção de Barra Mansa, Sep. 27, 1954, DOPS-RJ, Prontuário P. 22237— Aarão Steinbruch. 71.  Walter Millen da Silva, STIMMMEBM president, to the Delegado Regional do Trabalho, Mar. 29, 1955, Ministério de Trabalho, Indústria e Comércio. Processo Eleitoral de Sindicato, 150.217/55, 1955, caixa 24, ANB. Cited hereafter as “MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1955, caixa 24.” 72.  “Edital para Registro de Chapas,” Mar. 23, 1955, MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1955, caixa 24; “Edital de Publicidade de Chapas,” Apr. 4, 1955, Documento Interno, DOPS-RJ, caixa 643, pasta 2. 73.  The requirement had been established by MTIC, Portaria 11, Feb. 11, 1954. 74.  Requerimento, Mar. 17, 1955, Prontuário RJ—P.17.782—Euclides Mendes de Souza. Informação Secreta n. 1/55, Apr. 28, 1955, DOPS-RJ, caixa 643, pasta 2; and Ofício n.º 292/55, Lúcio Marçal Ferreira, Delegado Chefe DOPS-RJ, to ­Fenelon de Souza, Delegado Regional de Trabalho, May 9, 1955, MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1955, caixa 24.

Notes to Chapter 7

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75.  The CLT did not permit the reelection of incumbents (art. 530, Parágrafo Único). The PSD/PTB government abolished that restriction in 1956. 76.  José de Deus Alves to Delegado Regional de Trabalho, Apr. 6, 1955, MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1955, caixa 24; Walter Millen da Silva, STIMMMEBM president, to the Delegado Regional de Trabalho, n.d. (between Apr. 7 and 17, 1955), MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1955, caixa 24; 77.  Deus Alves to Delegado Regional de Trabalho, Apr. 6, 1955; Millen to Dele­gado Regional de Trabalho, n.d. (between Apr. 7 and 17, 1955), MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1955, caixa 24; Informação Secreta n. 1/55, Apr. 28, 1955, DOPSRJ, caixa 643, pasta 2. 78.  Ata da Apuração das Eleições Sindicais, Apr. 23, 1955, MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1955, caixa 24. 79.  Millen to Fenelon de Souza, Delegado Regional de Trabalho, Apr. 27, 1955, MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1955, caixa 24. 80.  Ofício n.º 292/55, Lúcio Marçal Ferreira, Delegado Chefe DOPS-RJ, to ­Fenelon de Souza, May 9, 1955, MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1955, caixa 24. 81.  DOPS-RJ, Atestado—José Claudio Alves, Mar. 17, 1955, and DOPS-RJ, Atestado, Nestor Lima, Mar. 22, 1955, MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1955, caixa 24. 82.  DOPS-RJ, Prontuário P.17.767—Nestor Lima. 83.  DRT to Ministro de Trabalho, May 24, 1955; DRT to DNT, June 10, 1955; DNT to MTIC, June 16, 1955. 84.  Brazilian administrative law required that Labor Minister Napoleão de Alencastro Guimarães, while he traveled outside the country, transfer power to his deputy Waldir Niemeyer. 85.  Têrmo de Posse, June 22, 1955, MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1955, caixa 24. 86.  Secção de Volta Redonda—Relatório (July 13, 1955), DOPS-RJ, caixa 645, pasta 5. 87.  In August 1955, the union expanded its territorial base to include the newly founded municipality of Volta Redonda and changed names from STIMMMEBM to STIMMMEBMVR. Nestor Lima to Diretor Departamento Orientação e Assistência Sindical, MTIC, Aug. 3, 1955. Ministério de Trabalho, Indústria e Comércio. Reconhecimento Sindical, 1945, caixa 120, ANB. 88.  Secção de Volta Redonda—Relatório (July 13, 1955), DOPS-RJ, caixa 645, pasta 5. 89.  Secção de Volta Redonda 210, July 29, 1955, DOPS-RJ, caixa 645, pasta 6; Secção de Volta Redonda, Aug. 9, 1955, DOPS-RJ, caixa 645, pasta 5; Secção de Volta Redonda 237, Aug. 25, 1955, DOPS-RJ, caixa 645, pasta 6. 90.  STIMMMEBMVR to CSN directorate, Aug. 23, 1955, Acordos Sindicais. 91.  Secção de Volta Redonda 282, Oct. 6, 1955, DOPS-RJ, caixa 645, pasta 6; Secção de Volta Redonda 283, Oct. 6, 1955, DOPS-RJ, caixa 645, pasta 6. 92.  José Pereira dos Santos to MTIC, Aug. 17, 1955, MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1955, caixa 24. 93.  Parecer, Napoleão de Alencastro Guimarães, Oct. 5, 1955, MTIC, Processo Eleitoral, 1955, caixa 24. 94.  MTIC, Portaria 89, Oct. 10, 1955, published in DOU, Nov. 17, 1955, 21161–62.

294

Notes to Chapters 7 and 8

95.  Secção de Volta Redonda, Oct. 23, 1955, DOPS-RJ, caixa 645, pasta 5. 96.  Ibid. 97.  Ibid. 98.  Only 59.7 percent of eligible voters cast a vote for president, the lowest participation in any state or federal election between 1945 and 1976. The remaining 40 percent either abstained or voted nulo (invalid) or branco (blank). Brasil, Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, Dados estatísticos, vol. 12: eleições municipais realiza­ das em 1976 (Brasília: DIN, 1988), 36. 99.  Marieta de Moraes Ferreira, “João Goulart,” DHBB, 2615; Sílvia Pantoja, “Juscelino Kubitschek,” DHBB, 2959–60. 100.  Brasil, Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, Dados Estatísticos, vol. 3-1: eleições federais, estaduais e municipais, realisadas no Brasil em 1952, 1954 e 1955, e em confronto com anteriores (Rio de Janeiro: DIN, 1956), 39–40. 101.  Acordo Sindical entre STIMMMEBMVR e CSN, Oct. 21, 1955, Acordos Sindicais. chapter eight 1.  Celso Lafer, JK e o programa de metas (1956–1961): processo de planeja­ mento e sistema politico no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2002), 133–45. 2.  Ministério de Guerra, 1.º BIB, to Secretário de Segurança do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Ofício n.º 36 S/2—Secreto, Barra Mansa, Sept. 15, 1966, Prontuário DOPS/DGIE 22.162—Othon Reis Fernandes, anexo n.º 2. 3.  Interview with Waldyr A. Bedê, former union leader (1961–1963), Volta ­Redonda, Jan. 20, 1998. 4.  Personnel File—Othon Reis Fernandes, CSN, Departamento de Pessoal, ­Arquivo Morto. 5.  Ibid. 6.  Resumo de Atividades, Sept. 15, 1966, Prontuário DOPS/DGIE 22.162— Othon Reis Fernandes, anexo n.º 5. 7.  Informações sobre ideologia politica: Euclides Mendes de Souza, Mar. 30, 1957, DOPS-RJ, Prontuário 40.497—Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional; also DOPS-RJ, Prontuário 14.387—pasta do Meio Sindical. 8.  Informações sobre ideologia politica: Nestor Lima, Mar. 30, 1957, DOPSRJ, Prontuário 40.497—Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional. 9.  Acordo Sindical entre STIMMMEBMVR e CSN, Oct. 31, 1956, Acordos Sindicais, CSN, Gerência de Assuntos Trabalhistas, articles 9–11. 10.  Parte de Serviço n.150—Volta Redonda, May 1957, DOPS-RJ, caixa 642, pasta 3. 11.  Parte de Serviço n. 150—Volta Redonda, May 1957, DOPS-RJ, caixa 642, pasta 3. 12.  CSN, Relátorio da Diretoria correspondente ao ano de 1957 (Rio de Janeiro: CSN, 1958), 5–8. 13.  CSN, Resolução da Diretoria (RD) 7.991 (Sept. 5, 1956); CSN, RD 8.016 (Sept. 18, 1956). 14.  CSN, RD 8.807 (Nov. 20, 1957).

Notes to Chapter 8

295

15.  Discurso do Deputado Simão Mansur, June 28, 1957, DOPS-RJ, Prontuário 40.497—Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional. 16.  CSN, RD 8.445 (Apr. 30, 1957). 17.  On production problems, see CSN, Relátorio da Diretoria correspondente ao ano de 1957 (Rio de Janeiro: CSN, 1958), 5–8; CSN, Relátorio da Direto­ ria correspondente ao ano de 1958 (Rio de Janeiro: CSN, 1959), 11, 13, 15, 17. For Reis Fernandes’s speech, see Pequenas Ocorrências, July 2, 1957, DOPS-RJ, ­Prontuário 40.497—Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional. 18.  Secção de Volta Redonda, Sept. 17, 1957, DOPS-RJ—caixa 692, pasta 2. 19.  Têrmo de Acôrdo entre CSN e STIMMMEBMVR, perante o TRT da Primeira Região (Nov. 11, 1957); and CSN, RD 8.829 (Nov. 27, 1957), both in BSVR 237 (Dec. 12, 1957), anexo. 20.  Acordo Sindical entre STIMMMEBMVR e CSN, Oct. 21, 1958, Acordos Sindicais, CSN, Gerência de Assuntos Trabalhistas, articles 4, 11, and 14; Secção de Volta Redonda, Aug. 6, 1958, DOPS-RJ, caixa 692, pasta 2. 21.  CSN, Relátorio da Diretoria correspondente ao ano de 1959 (Rio de Janeiro: CSN, 1960), 20. For more details on the leadership change, see CSN, RD 10.395 (Oct. 28, 1959). 22.  Acordo Sindical entre STIMMMEBMVR e CSN, Dec. 1959, Acordos Sindicais, CSN, Gerência de Assuntos Trabalhistas, articles 1, 9, and 11–15. 23.  Ibid., Dec. 19, 1960, articles 1 and 2. For examples of approved raises, see CSN, RD 11.737 (May 24, 1961); CSN, RD 11.898 (Aug. 9, 1961); CSN, RD 12.264 (Feb. 7, 1961); CSN, RD 12.361 (May 16, 1962). 24.  John T. Dunlop, Industrial Relations System (New York: Henry Holt, 1958), 9. Refer to my introduction for a more detailed discussion of Dunlop’s framework. 25.  Only the introduction of basic oxygen furnaces in the early 1970s would alter the production process fundamentally. Arthur McKee & Co., Plan for Expansion at Volta Redonda to 2.5 Million Ingot Tons per Year (Cleveland, Ohio, Aug. 1967). 26.  “Caixa alta,” Publicidade e Negócios (PN), July 4, 1960, 7. I thank James Woodard for providing me with this citation. 27.  Letter from Jayme de Souza Martins, PSD member in the 1950s, to Alkindar Costa, Oct. 21, 1988. Reprinted in Alkindar Costa, Volta Redonda, ontem e hoje: visão histórica e estática (Volta Redonda: Sociedade Pro-Memória, 1991), 173–74. 28.  Waldyr Bedê, union secretary in the early 1960s, highlighted Reis Fernandes’s commitment to research and careful preparation as key to his effective leadership. Bedê suffered persecution after the military coup. Interview with Waldyr A. Bedê. 29.  Bedê called the whole campaign a “trabalho da maçoneria,” a “work of masonry.” Ibid. 30.  Costa, Volta Redonda, ontem e hoje, 133–34. 31.  Ibid., 156–57. 32.  Ibid., 158–59. 33.  Ibid., 231–33. Lemos’s administration encountered serious financial difficulties, largely because it failed to renew the tax agreement with the CSN, and the city council ultimately impeached the mayor in March 1960.

296

Notes to Chapter 8

34.  Secção de Barra do Piraí, Nov. 16, 1958, DOPS-RJ—caixa 642, pasta 3. 35.  Othon Reis Fernandes to Delegado Regional de Trabalho, Feb. 17, 1960, MTIC, Reconhecimento Sindical, 1945, caixa 120. Includes as appendixes the respective “Atas de Assembléia Geral Extraordinária de 10 de fevereiro de 1960.” 36.  Ata de Assembléia Geral Extraordinária do STIMMMEBMVR, 20/03/1960, MTIC, Reconhecimento Sindical, 1945, caixa 120. 37.  Interview with Waldyr A. Bedê; CSN, RD 12.154 (Dec. 6, 1961). 38.  For the 1962 social assistance budget, see CSN, RD 12.204 (Dec. 28, 1961). 39.  CSN, Grupo de Trabalho para Venda de Casas, Relatório (Volta Redonda: CSN, 1960). 40.  Tabelas salariais da Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional, 1953–1972, CSN, Gerência de Assuntos Trabalhistas. 41.  Brasil, Consolidação das leis do trabalho e legislação complementar: prejul­ gados do TST na íntegra, súmulas do STF e do TST, ed. Adriano Campanhole, 35th ed. (São Paulo: Atlas, 1973), 119. 42.  Acordo Sindical entre CSN e STIMMMEBM, Mar. 10, 1952, article 4. 43.  Ibid., Aug. 30, 1953, article 4. 44.  Letter from José Claudio Alves to Macedo Soares, Aug. 23, 1955. 45.  CSN, RD 7.898 (July 18, 1956). 46.  CSN, RD 3.270 (Oct. 31, 1951). On the role of Bruce A. Payne & Associates: interview with Ervin Michelstaedter, former head of the CSN’s Engenharia Industrial, Volta Redonda, July 22, 1998. 47.  CSN, RD 6.888 (Mar. 2, 1955); CSN, RD 9.894 (Apr. 1, 1959). 48.  “Reivindicações formuladas pelo STIMMME de Barra Mansa—Reso­ lução,” Boletim de Serviço de Volta Redonda (BSVR) 067 (Apr. 9, 1952), 503. 49.  “Revisão de Plano de Incentivo,” BSVR 21 (Jan. 30, 1952). The plan revised an existing one from 1950, when the CSN had first begun to experiment with incentives to meet annual production targets. CSN, RD 2407 (Sept. 25, 1950). 50.  On principles and methods of job standardization, see L. P. Alford, ed., Cost and Production Handbook, 17th printing (New York: Ronald Press, 1943), 515–81. 51.  “Engenharia Industrial—Lotação Numérica Aprovada,” BSVR 145 (Aug. 3, 1951), appendix, VII; CSN, RD 5.773 (Jan. 15, 1954). 52.  CSN, RD 5.855 (Feb. 5, 1954); CSN, RD 6.113 (Apr. 23, 1954). 53.  CSN, RD 6.292 (June 19, 1954); CSN, RD 6.730 (Jan. 12, 1955), CSN, RD 6.896 (Mar. 16, 1955); CSN, RD 7.166 (July 20, 1955). 54.  CSN, RD 7.299 (Oct. 13, 1955) 55.  Acordo Sindical entre CSN e STIMMMEBM, Aug. 30, 1953, clauses 4 and 6. 56.  Interview with João Alves Pinheiro, former rolling-mill operator, Volta Redonda, July 26, 2000. 57.  Interview with Ervin Michelstaedter. 58.  Acordo Sindical entre CSN e STIMMMEBMVR, Nov. 11, 1957, clause 9; Acordo Sindical, Dec. 20, 1961, clause 9; Acordo Sindical, Jan. 13, 1963, clause 17. 59.  CSN, RD 9.304 (July 9, 1958). 60.  CSN, RD 10.021 (May 27, 1959).

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61.  CSN, RD 8.766 (Oct. 31, 1957); CSN, RD 8.852 (Dec. 11, 1957). 62.  CSN, RD 8.766 (Oct. 31, 1957); CSN, RD 8.672 (Sept. 4, 1957). 63.  CSN, RD 10.022 (May 27, 1959). 64.  Eng. Elmo Coutinho da Silva, former head of the rolling mills, interview by author, Volta Redonda, Nov. 28, 1998. 65.  Interview with Luiz Paulino Bomfim, former partner at Bruce Payne & Co. Brazil, consultant to the CSN (1955–1957), Rio de Janeiro, June 14, 2004. Bomfim maintained that the CSN made a mistake when it included stipulations on incentive pay in the collective contract. 66.  Acordo Sindical entre CSN e STIMMMEBMVR, Dec. 19, 1960, clause 6. 67.  The law also created JCJs in Duque de Caxias, Nova Friburgo, and Nova Iguaçu, doubling their number for the state. Before, only the capital Niteroí (two), Campos, and Petrópolis had had JCJs, all created in the early 1940s. Revista do TRT 1. Região 17 (Sept. 1997). 68.  Ofício 499/60, STIMMMEBMVR to CSN, Sept. 9, 1960. 69.  Ofício DI/872/02.02, CSN to STIMMMEBMVR, Oct. 20, 1960. The CSN had again altered its career ladders in 1959, replacing the four-digit numbers with a system of classes ranging from 1 to 67. 70.  Legal brief, STIMMMEBMVR to Juiz de Direito da Comarca de Volta Redonda, Dec. 8, 1960; Termo de Audiência de Instrução e Julgamento, July 7, 1961. 71.  Razões do Recorrente, STIMMMEBMVR to TRT, July 9, 1962. The Portuguese phrase poder de comando (literally, “right to command”) establishes a parallel to the power of a (military) commander: the captain of industry is given powers similar to those of a ship’s captain. “Managerial prerogative” is the best English equivalent. 72.  The union documentation includes no reference to a CSN appeal. There is no conclusive evidence that the CSN accepted the ruling, however, since the records are incomplete. 73.  José Claudio Alves (and other “senior electricians”) to Eng. Cyro Alves Borges, Oct. 7, 1962. Emphasis added. 74.  CSN to José Claudio Alves, Nov. 8, 1962. 75.  Reclamação Trabalhista, José Claudio Alves e outros, Oct. 29, 1963. 76.  STIMMMEBMVR, Razões de Recorridos, Tribunal Regional de Trabalho, June 24, 1964. 77.  Recurso Ordinário n.º TRT-1.674/64, Sept. 2, 1964. 78.  Interview with Waldyr A. Bedê. 79.  CSN, RD 11.680 (Apr. 5, 1960). 80.  Ata de Assembléia Geral Extraordinária do STIMMMEBMVRRBP, Volta Redonda, Oct. 22, 1961. 81.  Acordo Sindical entre STIMMMEBMVR e CSN, Jan. 1963, Acordos Sindicais, CSN, Gerência de Assuntos Trabalhistas, articles 12–13 and 20–21. 82.  CSN, RD 13.009 (Dec. 19, 1963). The CSN had to hire twenty-two additional employees for EI to carry out these studies. It was agreed that the work groups should first complete the occupational descriptions for the departments with incentive plans to make sure that all employees there could reap the benefits of those plans.

298

Notes to Chapter 8

83.  For examples of these occupational descriptions, see notes in chapter 6. 84.  Jorge Miguel Mayer and Libânia Xavier, “Jânio Quadros,” DHBB, 4823. 85.  Brasil, Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, Dados Estatísticos: Eleições Federais, Estaduais realisadas no Brasil em 1960, e em confronto com anteriores, vol. 5 (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1963), 63–64. 86.  Reis Fernandes was apparently a serious candidate for the post of Labor Minister in the Goulart administration. Interview with Rosalice Magaldi Fernandes, daughter of Othon Reis Fernandes, Volta Redonda, Oct. 1, 1998. 87.  Interview with Waldyr A. Bedê. 88.  For a sample budget of the Diretoria dos Serviços Sociais, see Zero Hora 5:95 (Feb. 1, 1963), 1. 89.  Ibid. 90.  Ata de Assembléia Geral Extraordinária do STIMMMEBMVRRBP, Volta Redonda, June 21, 1963. 91.  Interview with Waldyr A. Bedê. For a brief account of the 1963 elections, see Regina Lúcia de Moraes Morel, “A ferro e fogo. Construção e crise da ‘família siderúrgica’: o caso de Volta Redonda (1941–1968)” (PhD diss., Universidade de São Paulo, 1989), 392–94. 92.  Ata de Assembléia Geral Extraordinária do STIMMMEBMVRRBP, Volta Redonda, Dec. 15, 1963. 93.  Ibid., Jan. 14, 1964. 94.  CSN, RD 13.038 (Jan. 9, 1964). 95.  CSN, RD 13.021 (Dec. 19, 1963). 96.  CSN, RD 13.067 (Feb. 6, 1964); CSN, RD 13.080 (Feb. 27, 1964). 97.  CSN, RD 13.119 (Mar. 26, 1964). 98.  Interview with Waldyr A. Bedê. 99.  José Ventura, former activist of the Catholic Workers Youth (Juventude Operária Católica; JOC), interview by Regina Morel, cited in Moraes Morel, “A ferro e fogo,” 399–400. 100.  Mauro Mariano da Silva, Diretor Industrial CSN, to Ten. Cel. Luciano Salgado Campos, 29/04/64, internal CSN document DI/543.06.00, reproduced in Arigó: O passaro que vem de longe. Revista do centro da Memória Sindical, Volta Redonda: Sindicato dos Metalúrgicos de Volta Redonda, 1989, 45. 101.  Ministério de Guerra, Cel. Cmt. do 1.º BIB, to Secretário de Segurança do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Ofício n.º 36 S/2—Secreto, Barra Mansa, Sept. 15, 1966, Prontuário DOPS/DGIE 22.162—Othon Reis Fernandes e João Chiesse Filho, anexo n.º 3. 102.  Ibid. 103.  Mauro Mariano da Silva, Diretor Industrial CSN, to Ten. Cel. Luciano Salgado Campos, 07/04/64, internal CSN document DI/543.06.00, reproduced in Arigó: o passaro que vem de longe, 47–52. 104.  Interview with Rosalice Magaldi Fernandes. She recalled a conversation with the army captain in charge of the repression in April 1964, who confessed that it was truly difficult to find any comunistas. What saved his day, he told her, were militants who had come to the region from other parts of the state. 105.  The police used a very flexible definition of “comunista,” effectively syn-

Notes to Chapter 8 and Conclusion

299

onymous with “troublemaker.” Reis Fernandes’s file with the Departamento de Ordem Política e Social (DOPS) illustrates how little the ideological categorization really meant: several documents accuse him simultaneously of “peleguismo” and “fascisto-comunismo.” The police wanted and needed to know little more than that they were dealing with “elementos subversivos.” 106.  Personnel files of workers the CSN classified as “Revolucionários.” The metalworkers union had represented all professional categories in the CSN until the late 1950s. Under the Kubitschek and Goulart administration, however, smaller unions took advantage of the favorable political climate and pursued a more aggressive strategy demanding benefits for their members in independent negotiations. conclusion 1.  Interview with Waldyr A. Bedê, former union leader (1961–1963), Volta Redonda, Jan. 20, 1998. 2.  Internal Document, Nov. 16, 1964, DOPS/DGIE, DOPS 46 Dossier 2, 1–19. Letter from the CSN to DOPS, Aug. 1968, DOPS/DGIE, Secreto 25, 159–62. 3.  Internal Document, DOPS/DGIE, Secreto 25, 157–58. 4.  Recorte de Jornal—Ultima Hora, Aug. 7, 1968, DOPS—RJ, Prontuário 40.497—Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional; Interview with Olímpio Gomes de Oliveira, former union president (1969–1973), Volta Redonda, Nov. 11, 1998. 5.  Judica was an open Catholic youth organization that did not restrict membership by sex, age, or profession, unlike most other organizations under the umbrella of Catholic Action. O Bispo de Volta Redonda: memórias de Dom Waldyr Calheiros, org. Celia Maria Leite Costa, Dulce Chaves Pandolfi, and Kenneth Serbin, 2nd ed. (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2001), 93–98. 6.  Acordo Sindical entre CSN e STIMMMEBMVRRBP, Oct. 16, 1964, Acordos Sindicais, CSN, Gerência de Assuntos Trabalhistas, anexo. 7.  Ibid. 8.  Acordo Sindical entre CSN e STIMMMEBMVRRBP, July 1, 1965. 9.  Ibid. 10.  Interview with Ervin Michelstaedter, former head of the CSN’s Engenharia Industrial, Volta Redonda, July 22, 1998. 11.  Cláudia Virginia Cabral de Souza, “O espaço urbano e a dominação,” in Arigó: O passaro que vem de longe, Revista do Centro da Memória Sindical (Volta Redonda: Sindicato dos Metalúrgicos de Volta Redonda, 1989), 35; Interview with Rosalice Magaldi Fernandes, daughter of Othon Reis Fernandes, Volta Redonda, Oct. 10, 1998. 12.  One clear indication of the strategic position of Brazil’s state-owned industries was that the military regime assigned a high-ranking industrial security officer from the Serviço Nacional de Informações (SNI) to each of these companies soon after the 1964 military coup. 13.  Fernando Teixeira da Silva’s study of labor at the Santos port in the interwar period shows an awareness of the industry’s strategic position. Fernando Teixeira da Silva, Operários sem Patrões: Os trabalhadores da cidade de Santos no entreguerras (Campinas: UNICAMP, 2003).

300

Notes to Conclusion

14.  John Humphrey pays close attention to the differences the technically determined organization of work makes for labor movements, but he does not consider the strategic position of the industry or its workers. John Humphrey, Capital­ ist Control and Workers’ Struggle in the Brazilian Auto Industry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982).

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Index

Ação Integralista Brasileira (AIB), 74, 125 Aliança Nacional Libertadora (ANL), 125 Alves, José Cláudio, 200–204, 206–209 Amaral Peixoto, Ernani do, 48–49, 55, 205 Amoroso Lima, Alceu, 73–75 Aranha, Osvaldo, 27, 30 Arthur G. McKee & Company, 36–37, 63–64, 237 Article 461, CLT (equal pay for equal work): full text of article, 216; CSN commission on equal pay for equal work, 216–217; in grievances filed by STIMMMEBM, 222–223; and incentive pay, 222; and occupational descriptions, 226; union demands, 182, 186, 193–194, 202 Assis Gomes, Oswaldo de, 138–139, 141, 143 Associação Profissional dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias Metalúrgicas de Barra Mansa (APTIMBM), 128 Atestado ideológico: for hire at CSN, 126; for union elections, 182, 200– 201, 203, 276n14; for union recognition, 128 Azevedo, Renato Frota de Rodrigues, 36, 113, 222–223, 267n127, 274n79 Barra do Piraí: railroad junction, 26, 41; industrialization of, 23, 41, 214; political police, presence of, 140; seat of diocese, Sul Fluminense, 81; labor organizing in, 130, 278n43; local metalworkers joining STIMMMEBM, 214 Barra Mansa: economy, 39, 41, 80; election results, 132, 140, 200; military occupation of, 140; municipal government, 213–214; population of municipality, 39, 43, 47, 95; national security interest, municipality of, 51, 126; Par-

tido Comunista do Brasil, presence of, 130, 133, 137, 139, 145; political police, presence of, 140, 141, 144, 187, 204; strikes at steel companies, 143–144 Barros, Ademar de, 199, 205, 227 Batalhão da Infanteria Blindada (BIB), Barra Mansa, 140, 230–231, 233–234 Borges, Cyro Alves, 140, 274n79 Brazilian Communist Party. See Partido Comunista do Brasil (PCB) Brazilian Integralist Action. See Ação Integralista Brasileira (AIB) Brazilian Labor Party. See Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB) Burawoy, Michael, on the politics of production, 3–4, 8–9, 237 Café Filho, João, 179–180, 199 Catholic Church, Brazil: lay movement, 74–75, 82, 234 (see also Círculos Operarios Católicos (COC)); Liga Eleitoral Católica (LEC), 74–75; presence in Volta Redonda, 79–81; revival, role of social doctrine, 74; strength in CSN’s migratory hinterland, 47; support for military coup (1964), 230; Vargas government (1930–1945), relations with, 74–75 Catholic social doctrine: CSN paternalism, rooted in, 4, 72–73, 80–81, 95; and CSN social assistance programs, 83, 87–88; Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva, influenced by, 28, 76– 77; influence in Brazil, 73–74; political police ideology, shaped by, 145; labor legislation, impact on, 75–76; origins, 72–73; social encyclicals, 73, 75, 145 Catholic Workers Circles. See Círculos Operarios Católicos (COC) Central Railway of Brazil. See Estrada de Ferro Central do Brasil (EFCB)

318

Index

Círculos Operarios Católicos (COC): founding and national organization, 75; in Volta Redonda, 81–82, 84, 88; part of Catholic lay movement, 83 Coelho, Danton, 182, 199, 205, 290n24 Comissão Executiva do Plano Siderúrgico Nacional, 32–35 Comissão Preparatória do Plano Siderúrgico, 27, 30–32 Communists. See Partido Comunista do Brasil (PCB) Companhia Siderúrgica Barra Mansa (CSBM), 41, 128, 143–144 Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (CSN): administrative practice, 88, 98, 112, 116; Boletim de Serviço de Volta Re­ donda, 88–90; company town, creation of, 77–80; financial crisis, 209–212, 228–229; founding of, 32, 34–38; internal organization, 100, 155–156; presidents, 35, 72, 82, 127, 202, 206–207, 211, 228, 233; products, 1, 68, 147, 155, 165; significance for national economy, 189, 192, 207, 212; social assistance programs, 83–88; as strategic industry, 1, 3, 147, 206–207; technical/industrial directors, 36, 67–68, 72, 82, 113, 227, 229–231; transition from construction to production, 98–101; wages (1941–1964), 197; workforce, construction (1941–1947), 50; workforce, production (1951), 157 Company town, Volta Redonda as: company stores, 86–87; control of civic life, 85, 140; família siderúrgica, 71, 80–81; health care, 85–87; housing, 78–79, 95; leisure options, 84–85; paternalism, 70–72, 76, 88–90; presence of Catholic Church, 81–82; puericultura (child welfare), 87–88; rationale for, 77; social assistance programs, 82–85 (see also Departamento de Assistência Social (DAS)); social engineering of community, 80–82, 86, 92, 95–97; social segmentation, 77–79, 95–96; schools, 88; urban design, 77–79; urban services, 80 Conciliation and arbitration board. See Junta de Conciliação e Julgamento (JCJ), Volta Redonda Confederação dos Trabalhadores do Brasil (CTB), 135–136, 138–139

Conselho Nacional de Trabalho (CNT), 128, 277n24 Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho (CLT): article 461 (equal pay for equal work), 182, 216, 226; contract negotations at CSN, impact on, 187–193; CSN’s labor regime and, 106, 120, 197; drafting and promulgation, 76, 127; general rules, established by, 127–128; in Vargas’s electoral platform (1950), 180; instrument of labor control, 135, 137–138, 146, 183–184, 201; limitations of, 192, 194; union demands based on, 134, 182, 188, 192 Consolidation of Labor Laws. See Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho (CLT) Construction, CSN: accomodations for workers, 42, 56; expropriation of lands, 41–42; health problems, 56–57; logistical challenges, 41, 60, 64–65; materials consumed, 66–67; organization of, 63–66 (see also Labor Management at CSN, during construction); preparatory work, 42; public interest in, 68–69; work accidents, causes, 58–59; work accidents, frequency, 57; work accidents, cost to workers, 59–60; workforce, 42–43, 50 (see also Labor migration to Volta Redonda) Cruz, Allan: contract negotiations with CSN, 185–193; industrial relations strategy, 205, 212, 216; labor law, use of, 182, 186, 188, 216; municipal independence movement, leader of, 213– 214; political strategy, 188–189; union elections, 182–183, 199, 203; STIMMMEBM president, 177, 183–194 Delegacia de Ordem Política e Social— Estado do Rio de Janeiro (DOPS-RJ): atestados ideológicos, issuing of, 128, 182, 200–201; arrest of saboteurs, 127; Communists, preemptive policing of, 132–144 passim, 279n68; federal political police, cooperation with, 126, 141, 282n123; ideology of officers, 145; intervention in STIMMMEBM, support of, 203–205; labor militants, preemptive policing of, 126, 142, 186; permanent agent in Sul Fluminense, 140, 282n109

Index Delegacia Especial de Segurança Política e Social (DESPS), 124–126 Delegacia Regional de Trabalho (DRT): intervention in STIMMMEBM, 136, 184, 201–203, 205; recognition of STIMMMEBM, 129 Departamento de Administração do Serviço Público (DASP), 100 Departamento de Assistência Social (DAS), CSN: adaptation courses for migrant workers, 88; Catholic inspiration, 83; funding, 83–84; leisure spaces, 84–85; purpose, 83; sponsorship of clubs and associations, 84 Departamento de Pessoal (DPE): bureaucratic logic, 93–94; rectification of records, 94; as civilizing agent, 93; personnel files, 93–94, 239–242; registration of new hires, 93 Departamento Federal de Segurança Pública (DFSP), 125 Departamento Nacional de Trabalho (DNT): administrative oversight, STIMMMEBM, 136, 138, 192, 194; recognition of STIMMMEBM, 129 Department for the Administration of the Public Service. See Departamento de Administração do Serviço Público (DASP) Desenvolvimentismo: as ideology of production, 3–4, 236; critiques of, 6; and Vargas’s election (1950), 180; and trab­ alhismo, 3–4, 236 Divisão de Polícia Política e Social (DPS): arrest and detention of workers, 131, 141–142; cooperation with Labor Ministry, 277n26; cooperation with political police, Rio de Janeiro state, 282n123; creation of, 125; expansion, 139–140; internal organization, 125; preemptive policing against labor militants, 129, 132–133; preemptive policing of PCB, 130–132, 141 Dunlop, John T., on strategic position, 9–10, 148–150 Dutra, Eurico Gaspar: anti-Communist crackdown, 135, 143; government coalition (1946–1951), 179–180; inauguration of CSN, 101; labor legislation, 182, 186 Equal pay for equal work. See Article 461, CLT (equal pay for equal work)

319

Escola Politécnica de São Paulo, 30, 33 Escola Politécnica do Rio de Janeiro, 30, 32 Espírito Santo: economy before 1940, 24–25, 46; labor migration to Volta Redonda from, 43–46, 48; migratory hinterland, part of, 43, 46 Estado Novo: bureaucratization of the state, 93–94, 100; cooperation with United States, 30–32, 34–35, 37–38, 125; creation of CSN, 1, 15, 33–38, 41; industrial development policies, 2, 14, 21, 26–27, 30, 38; political policing, 125–126; relations with Catholic Church, 75–76; social welfare policies, 2, 76 (see also Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho; trabalhismo) Estrada de Ferro Central do Brasil (EFCB), 18, 26, 41–42, 238 Executive Commission for the National Steel Plan. See Comissão Executiva do Plano Siderúrgico Nacional Export-Import Bank of Washington, loan to CSN, 32, 34–36, 38, 101 Farquhar, Percival, 26– 27, 33 Fayol, Henri, 99–100 Federal Department for Public Safety. See Departamento Federal de Segurança Pública (DFSP) Federal District: industrialization before 1940, 24, 250n76; labor migration from, 43–46; as location for steel mill, 26, 30. See also Rio de Janeiro (city) Ferreira, Henrique Manoel, 135, 139–142 Gama, Savio Cota de Almeida, 204, 214 Góes Monteiro, Pedro Aurelio de, 31 Goulart, João: elections (1955), 199, 203, 205; elections (1960), 227; ousted by military coup, 230–232; president, 5; 227–233, 235; STIMMMEBM, relations with, 227, 230; vice-president, 206, 213, 227 Guillet, León, 28–29, 33, 36, 251n105, 252n106 Guinle, Guilherme, 26, 32–35, 127 Industrial development, Brazil: conditions for creation of modern steel industry, 15, 25; credit for industry, availability of, 22–23; foreign investment in, 18–19,

320

Index

38; key sectors, growth of, 14, 18–22; phases of (pre-1940), 15–18; policies, Estado Novo, 2, 14, 21, 26–27, 30, 38; policies, postwar republic (1945–1964), 8, 179–181, 195, 206–207; regional disparities, 23–25; state-owned companies, role in, 1, 27, 30, 180, 206–207; steel industry, importance of, 14–15, 180, 206–207 Industrial engineering, CSN. See Linha de Engenharia Industrial (LEI) Industrial relations: CLT as framework for, 120, 127–128; CSN as industrial relations system, 9–10; impact of union contracts on, 189, 194–196; national politics and, 133, 135, 183–184, 198, 233–236; political policing and, 145– 146; scholarship on Brazil, 5–6; union strategy for, 143, 152, 180, 198, 212– 214, 222, 228; and strategic power, 10–11 Itabira Iron Ore Company, 21, 27, 29 Junta de Conciliação e Julgamento (JCJ), Volta Redonda: creation; 222, 297n67; rulings, 224; union demand for, 213 Kubitschek, Juscelino: inaugural visit to Volta Redonda, 207–208; development policies, 6, 206–207, 212; presidential elections (1955), 199, 203, 205–206; STIMMMEBM, relations with, 212 Labor law. See Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho (CLT) Labor Management at CSN, during construction: absenteeism, 60–61; disciplinary regime, 62, 90–92; dismissals, 50–52, 101; hierarchical logic, 64; ideological screening of new hires, 126; organization of work crews, 64; paternalism, 71; pay, 61; personnel department, 92–93; recruitment, 47–49, 52–53 (see also Labor migration to Volta Redonda); rehire, 55; retention, 49–55, 61–63; wartime laws, impact on, 51–52, 61–62, 126–127; workforce fluctuation, 49–50, 52–53 Labor management at CSN , for production: career ladders, 107, 196, 216– 217, 226; disciplinary regime, 90–92, 115, 120, 197; dismissals, 101–102,

143; hierarchical logic, 100–101, 106, 116, 227; labor laws, impact on, 120– 121, 184–185, 187, 197, 221–224; merit, 106, 110–112, 114–115; mixed commissions, 226–227; occupational descriptions, 217, 226–227; paternalism, 115, 122–123, 195; pay structure, 107, 112, 196, 215–216, 220–221; penalties, 90–92, 111, 115–121, 195, 197; personnel rules, 99, 106–107, 110, 115–116, 196–197; prizes for dedicated service, 112–113, 195; profit sharing, 114, 180–181, 209–211; promotions, 110–112; rational administration, 99–100, 105, 109, 120, 196, 226–227; reclassifications, 110, 115; salary increases, 133–134, 180, 193– 198, 205, 210–212, 228; seniority, 106, 112; skilled workforce, building of, 102–105, 108–109, 122; staffing plans, 106–109; STIMMMEBM, role in, 134, 145–146, 209, 216–217, 226, 233 Labor migration to Volta Redonda: from Espírito Santo, 43–46; foreign workers, 43; from Federal District, 43–46; from Minas Gerais, 43–47; migratory hinterland, 43, 46; from North, 43; from Northeast, 43, 47; from Rio de Janeiro (state), 43–46; racial composition, 47–48; recruitment by CSN, 48; resistance by fazendeiros to, 48–49; return migration, 52, 55; from São Paulo, 43–46; scale of, 42–43; skill profile of migrants, 44, 54; spatial and temporal patterns, 43–46, 49–50 Labor Ministry. See Ministério de Trabalho, Indústria e Comércio (MTIC) Law 605 (paid rest day): promulgation, 181; implementation at CSN, union demanded for, 182, 186 Leal Ribeiro, Gerardo, 188, 194 LIGHT Rio de Janeiro. See Rio de Janeiro Tramway, Light, and Power Company Lima Neto, João Alves dos Santos, 228 Lima, Nestor, 201, 208–209 Linha de Engenharia Industrial (LEI): creation, 217; elimination of jobs, 219–220; expansion of, 217, 297n82; incentive pay, 217–221, 235; occupational descriptions, 217, 226, 233, 235; production standards, 219; tasks, 217;

Index time and motion studies, 217–218, 220; union demands for incentive pay, 197, 222, 224–225, 297n65 Macedo Soares e Silva, Edmundo de: anticommunism, 81, 126, 131–132; Catholic faith, 28, 76, 81; cooperation with police on labor control, 126, 129, 131–132; CSN president, 206–207, 211; CSN technical director, 36, 38, 48–50, 55, 66, 71–72, 88, 98, 103, 126; education, 27–28; governor of Rio de Janeiro state, 137; industrial missions to Europe, 29–30; local Catholic Church, support for, 81–82; planning the CSN, 30–36, 38; paternalist management, 71, 76–77, 83, 85, 93, 96; scientific management, application of, 28–29; shaping public image of CSN, 67–68; steel commissions (1930s), member of, 26–27, 29–30, 32, 34–35; STIMMMEBM, relations with, 202–203; studies in France, 28; tenente rebellion, participation in, 28 Marcondes Filho, Alexandre, 83, 127 Mariano da Silva, Mauro, 227, 229–233, 274n79 Mendes de Souza, Euclides, 200–201, 203, 205, 209 Metalworkers union, Barra Mansa. See Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias Metalúrgicas, Mecânicas e de Material Elétrico de Barra Mansa (STIMMMEBM) Military coup (1964): administrative changes at CSN after, 233, 235–236; impact on workers, 233, 236–237; industrial policies, new regime, 236; occupation of CSN, 230, 233; resistance in Volta Redonda, 230–232; subsequent represssion, 232–234; support among company directors, 229 Millen da Silva, Walter, 199–203, 206, 209 Minas Gerais: Catholicism, strength of, 48, 81; CSN’s migratory hinterland, part of, 43, 46–47; economy before 1940, 23, 25, 46–47; labor migration from, 43–46, 48; raw materials for steel production from, 21, 41; railroad lines, to Volta Redonda, 26, 40–41; steel companies in, 21

321

Ministério de Trabalho, Indústria e Comércio (MTIC), 138, 180, 191–192 Ministry of Labor, Industry, and Trade. See Ministério de Trabalho, Indústria e Comércio (MTIC) Monteiro Mendes, Paulo, 70, 82, 87, 203 Movimento Unificador dos Trabalhadores (MUT), 135 National Democratic Union. See União Democrática Nacional (UDN) National Labor Council. See Conselho Nacional de Trabalho (CNT) National Labor Office. See Departamento Nacional de Trabalho (DNT) National Liberation Alliance. See Aliança Nacional Libertadora (ANL) National Steel Company. See Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (CSN) Naziazeno dos Santos, Altino, 135, 139, 143 Night shift, CSN: bonus, retroactive payment, 188; company practice, paying, 191–192; in union contract, 193–194, 196, 211; union demands, 182, 188, 193 Oliveira Vianna, Francisco José de, 73, 76, 263n21 Overtime work, CSN: bonus, retroactive payment, 188; company practice, paying, 192; reliance on, at CSN, 108; in union contract, 194, 196; union demands, 182, 188–191 Paid rest day, CSN. See Law 605 (paid rest day) Paraíba River: course of, in Volta Redonda, 39; health risks posed by, 39, 56–57, 85, 89; hydroelectric plant on, 19; as water supply, 41 Paraíba valley: economy before 1940, 46–47; geography, in Volta Redonda, 77, 155, 214; industrialization, 23; Inter-Union Accord, 214; migration to Volta Redonda, 43–45; migration from Minas Gerais, 47 Partido Comunista do Brasil (PCB): Carlos Luis Prestes, leader of, 27; clandestine organizing, 140, 144–145, 204; CSN workers, members of, 131–143 passim; declared illegal, 138; elec-

322

Index

tions, 132, 137, 179, 199; STIMMMEBM, relations with, 135, 138, 204; support for Getúlio Vargas, 131, 179; target of political police, 130– 133, 135, 139–140, 142–145; Volta Redonda, organizing in, 124, 130, 132, 137, 139 Partido Social Democrático (PSD): creation of Volta Redonda as municipality, role in, 214; elections (1946), 132; elections (1950), 179–180; elections (1955), 199, 205; elections (1960), 227; STIMMMEBM, support for, 204–206 Partido Social Progressista (PSP): elections (1950), 179; elections (1955), 199, 205; elections (1960), 227; municipal politics, Volta Redonda, 214 Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB): competition with PCB, 137; elections (1945), 132; elections (1950), 179– 180; elections (1955), 199; elections (1960), 227; municipal elections, Volta Redonda, 214; political police surveillance, 187; STIMMMEBM, relations with, 202, 205–207, 213; unions, affiliated with, 135 Paternalism, CSN: company town, administration of, 70–72, 76, 88–90; Catholic social doctrine, roots in, 4, 72–73, 80–81, 95; daily service bulletin, instrument of CSN’s, 89–90; discourse of, 97; Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva, role of, 71; Getúlio Vargas, role of, 70–71; industrial relations and, 189, penalty regime, reinforcing the CSN’s, 90–92; rational administration versus, 96, 101, 112, 123, 235 Personnel department, CSN. See Departamento de Pessoal (DPE) Pinto da Veiga, Oswaldo, 233, 274n79 Political police, federal. See Delegacia Especial de Segurança Política e Social (DESPS); Divisão de Polícia Política e Social (DPS) Political police, state of Rio de Janeiro. See Delegacia de Ordem Política e Social—Estado do Rio de Janeiro (DOPS-RJ) Preparatory Commission for the Steel Plan. See Comissão Preparatória do Plano Siderúrgico

Prestes, Carlos Luis, 27–28, 131–132, 142 Profit sharing, CSN: in 1946 constitution, 114; formula for distribution, 114, 211; introduction at CSN, 144, 180; penalties diminishing share, 121, 123; professional criteria for, 114–115; social criteria for, 88, 114–115; union demands for fairness, 182, 209–210 Quadragesimo Anno, 73, 75–76, Rational administration, CSN. See Scientific management; Labor management at CSN, for production Raulino Oliveira, Sílvio: and Catholicism, 82; contract negotations with STIMMMEBM, 185–190; CSN president, 101, 184, 199; professional career, 36; steel commissions, 36 Regional Labor Court. See Tribunal Regional de Trabalho (TRT) Regional Labor Office. See Delêgacia Regional de Trabalho (DRT) Reis Fernandes, Othon: career at CSN, 207–208, 217; Director of Social Services, CSN, 227, 230–231; industrial relations strategy, 212–216, 228; Kubitschek incident, 207–208; labor law, strategic use of, 216, 221–223; resistance to 1964 military coup, 230–231; union leader, 210–215, 227–228; union elections, 209, 228 Remuneration, CSN: cost-of-living index, adjusted by, 134, 212; general raises, 61, 133–134, 193, 196, 198, 205, 209, 211, 228; incentive pay, 217–222, 235; pay structure, changes, 107, 216; paycheck deductions, for CSN services, 80, 86, 192; real wages (1941–1964), 197; stagnating incomes, 110, 180, 211; union demands, 202, 210. See also Article 461, CLT (equal pay for equal work); Labor management at CSN , for production Rerum Novarum, 73–75, 145 Rio de Janeiro (city): industrialization before 1940, 16–20, 23–25, 42; market for CSN products, 1, 41; railroad lines, to Volta Redonda, 40–42, 77, 85, 93; strikes in, 2, 124, 199; wages, compared to CSN, 198

Index Rio de Janeiro (state): CSN’s migratory hinterland, part of, 43, 46; economy before 1940, 46–47; elections (1947), 137; Juntas de Conciliação e Julgamento (1959), creation of, 222, 297n67; labor migration from Minas Gerais to, 47; labor migration to Volta Redonda, 43–46, 48; location for steel mill, 30; railroad lines, 26, 40 Rio de Janeiro Polytechnic. See Escola Politécnica do Rio de Janeiro Rio de Janeiro Tramway, Light, and Power Company: role in Brazil’s industrialization before 1940, 17–19, 22; technical standards, transmission, 20; supplier of electricity for CSN, 80, 147, 167–170; hydroelectric plants, Rio de Janeiro (state), 17, 19, 41, 80 Sabença, Alcides, 130, 132–133, 135–136 Salgado, Plínio, 74, 199 São Paulo Polytechnic. See Escola Politécnica de São Paulo São Paulo: attracting migrant workers, 46–47; CSN’s migratory hinterland, part of, 43; industrialization before 1940, 16–20, 23–25; labor migration from, 43–46; market for CSN products, 1; railroad lines, to Volta Redonda, 40–41, 77; strikes in, 2, 124, 198–199; wages, compared to CSN, 198 Scientific management: application at CSN, 179, 217–221, 226 (see also Linha de Engenharia Industrial (LEI)); Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva, experience with, 28–29; Henry Fayol, theories of, 99–100; impact on job control, 149; rational administration versus, 99–100, 109, 123, 270n2; reception in Brazil, 99–100; Taylorism, 28, 99–100, 149, 251n105, 270n5 Segadas Viana, José de, 187–190, 192–194 Siderúrgica Barbará, 41, 128, 143 Silva, Austricliano da, 140, 144, 204, 282n109, 292n68 Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias Metalúrgicas, Mecânicas e de Material Elétrico de Barra Mansa (STIMMMEBM): atestados ideológicos

323

for elections, 128, 182–183, 200–201; affiliation with CTB, 135; budgets, approval of, 136, 138, 183; Communists, involvement of, 135–137, 143, 205; collective contracts, 193–196, 205, 209–211; contract negotiations, 184– 193, 208–211; cooperation with other unions, 214; demands on wages and benefits, 185–186, 188, 196, 202, 228; demands on working conditions, 134, 188, 193; elections (1951), 182–183; elections (1955), 199–202; elections (1957), 209; elections (1963), 227–228; Getúlio Vargas, relations with, 186, 189, 194–195; industrial relations strategy, 184–185, 188–189, 194–195, 212– 215; intervention by Labor Ministry, 138–139, 180, 200–205, 233; internal power struggles, 135–136, 208–209, 228; labor courts, recourse to, 191, 221–225; membership, 129–130, 191, 213; military coup (1964), impact on, 230–232; political police, surveillance by, 129–130, 135, 143–144, 186–187, 200, 203; recognition by Labor Ministry, 128–129; strike threat, 189, 228; territorial expansion, 214, 293n87 Social assistance programs, CSN. See Departamento de Assistência Social (DAS) Social Democratic Party. See Partido Social Democrático (PSD) Social Progress Party. See Partido Social Progressista (PSP) Special Office for Political and Social Safety. See Delegacia Especial de Segurança Política e Social (DESPS) Steel industry, national: charcoal-based mills, 21, 41; development (pre-1940), 16, 21–22; government commissions, 26–27. See also Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional Steel production, CSN: diachronic division of labor, 150–151, 155, 158–165, 176; expansion of, 122, 155; maintenance departments, 172–176; operational mistakes, 118–120, 165; organization of, 99–100, 105, 107, 155–156, 215–221; production departments, 157–166; production planning, 98, 156; production process, 105, 154–155, 158–165; products, 1, 68, 147, 155, 165; raw materials

324

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for, 41; share of ­domestic production, 147; startup of, 98, 101; strategic positions in, 119, 147–149, 151–152, 166, 176–178; support departments, 166–172; synchronic division of labor, 150–153, 166–176; technology, 155; workforce requirements, 101–102, 105, 107–108, 153, 157 Steinbruch, Aarão, 185–188, 194, 200, 202 STIMMMEBM. See Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias Metalúrgicas, Mecânicas e de Material Elétrico de Barra Mansa Strategic position: concept, 9–10, 148– 149; of CSN in national economy, 147–148, 190, 205, 234; and division of labor, CSN, 165–167, 170–177; in modern industry, 149, 237–238; and skill, 148, 156; and the technical division of labor, 9, 147–150; technically strategic positions, CSN, 166, 169–170, 172, 176, 224; and union strength, 177–178, 194, 205, 212; and worker agency, 10–11; and workers’ power, 9–10, 148–150, 152–153, 176–178, 224. See also Steel production, CSN Strategic power. See Strategic position, and workers’ power Sul Fluminense: geography, 39; labor migration to Volta Redonda within, 43; labor organizing in, 130; STIMMMEBM expanding in, 214, 293n87 Supreme Electoral Court. See Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) Supreme Labor Court. See Tribunal Superior de Trabalho (TST) Távora, Juarez do Nascimento F., 28, 199, 203, 205 Taylor, Frederick Winslow, 99–100 Torres, Ari F., 32–36 Trabalhismo: and desenvolvimentismo, 3–4, 236; goals of, 212, 236; as hegemonic project for labor relations, 6, 194; as ideology of reproduction, 3–4, 236–237, 269n171; labor laws, 222, 237; and Vargas’s election (1950), 180, 185 Tribunal Regional de Trabalho (TRT): collective grievance, filed by

S­ TIMMMEBM, 210; individual grievances, filed by STIMMMEBM, 223– 224, 297n67 Tribunal Superior de Trabalho (TST), 187, 224, 280n88 Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE), 138, 289n3 U.S. Steel, 30–32 União Democrática Nacional (UDN): elections (1945), 132; elections (1950), 180; elections (1955), 199, 203, 206; elections (1960), 227 Unifying Workers Movement. See Movimento Unificador dos Trabalhadores (MUT) United States of America: advising Brazilian political police, 125; Brazilian industrial missions to, 30, 34–35; financing of CSN, 34, 38; government support for steel project, 31–32, 35– 36; production technology from, 37; Richard Nixon, visit to Volta Redonda, 207; wartime cooperation with Brazil, 31, 35–37 Vargas, Getúlio: administrative reforms, 93, 100; Catholic Church, relations with, 74–76; CSN, creation, 31–36; CSN and its workers, relations with, 71, 89, 180–192 passim; coup (1930), 16, 29; elections (1950), 179–180; Estado Novo government, 1, 15, 25–26, 30, 48, 93; industrial development policies, 2, 6, 11, 26–27, 180; labor laws, promulgation of, 11, 76, 127– 128; Partido Comunista do Brasil, support from, 130–131, 179; president (1930–1945), 14, 16, 29–30, 74, 124; president (1950–1954), 13, 185, 195, 198–199; organized labor, relations with 182, 191, 194 (see also trabal­ hismo); social welfare policies, 2, 21– 22, 70, 73, 76, 95, 180; steel problem, 26–27, 68–69; United States, relations with, 31–32, 34, 38 Volta Redonda: absence of strikes, 2–3, 135, 144, 228; Catholic Church, presence of, 81–82, 234; economy before CSN, 12, 39–40; municipal elections, 214; national elections, 132, 137, 205, 227; geography, 39, 41; health risks,

Index 56–57, 60, 85–86; Junta de Conciliação e Julgamento (JCJ), 213, 222; leisure options, 84–85; living conditions, 55–57, 79–80, 86, 95, 181, 183, 198, 212, 215, 227; location for steel mill, selection of, 30–31, 34, 41; migration, 42–47, 50, 55–56, 61–62, 101–102; military coup (1964) in, 229–232; military occupation of, 13, 140, 230; municipality, creation of, 213–214; Partido Comunista do Brasil, presence of, 85, 124, 130–133, 139, 143; policing, 126–127, 140, 142, 144–145, 186; population, 39, 47–48, 50, 95; showcase project, Estado Novo, 1–2, 15, 70–71; steel mill, building of, 1, 37, 42, 66–67, 89, 101; symbol of national progress, 68–69, 73, 79, 89, 230. See also Company town, Volta Redonda as Weinschenk, Oscar, 32–36 Work accidents, CSN: accident legislation, 258n69, 267n110; causes, during construction, 58–59; cost to workers, 59–60; frequency, during construction,

325

57; penalties for, 91, 118–120; risk, construction industry, 258n64 Work at CSN: general conditions of, 156, 158, 176; shift system, 156; blast furnace, 158–159; steel works, 159–160; slabbing and blooming mill, 160–163; plate mill, 163–164; hot-rolling mill, 164–165; energy department, 167– 170; transport department, 170–171; overhead traveling crane operator, 171–172; mechanical maintenance department,172–174; roll department, 174–175; electrical maintenance department, 175–176; dependence on electrical power, 166–167 Workforce, CSN: fluctuation, during construction, 49–50, 52–53; skill profile, 54, 102; origins, 42–43 (see also Labor migration to Volta Redonda); building skill profile, 54–55, 103–105, 108–109, 122; totals, construction (1941–1947), 50; totals, production (1951), 157 Workers Confederation of Brazil. See Confederação dos Trabalhadores do Brasil (CTB)