Beyond the Horizons: The Lockheed Story 031224438X

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THE

RON

Oy

BEYOND THE

HORIZONS Story

The Lockheed

Walter

J.

Boyne

THOMAS DUNNE BOOKS ST.MARTIN’S GRIFFIN

NEW YORK

THOMAS DUNNE BOOKS.

AnimprintofSt.Martin’s Press. BEYOND THE HORIZONS: THE LOCKHEED STORY. Copyright © 1998by

Walter J.Boyne. Allrightsreserved. Printed intheUnited States ofAmerica. Nopartofthisbookmaybeusedorreproduced in anymannerwhatsoever withoutwrittenpermission exceptin the caseof briefquotationsembodiedin criticalarticlesor reviews. Forinformation, addressSt.Martin’s Press,175Fifth Avenue, NewYork,N.Y.10010. BookdesignbyRichardOriolo Library ofCongress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Boyne, Walter J. Beyond thehorizons :theLockheed story / byWalter J. Boyne. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references andindex. ISBN 0-312-19237-1 (he) ISBN 0-312-24438-X (pbk) 1.Lockheed Aircraft Corporation—History. 2.Aircraft industry—United States—History. 3.Aerospace industries—United States—History. _ I.Title.

HD9711.U63L595 1998 338.7'6291334'0973—dc21

98-19397 CIP

FirstSt.Martin’s GriffinEdition: December 1999

P09

8°76 5.4 3 271

Beyond theHorizons

ALSO BYWALTERJ.

BOYNE

NONFICTION

Beyond theWild Blue Clash ofTitans: World WarIIatSea ClashofWings: World WarII intheAir SilverWings

TheSmithsonian Illustrated History ofFlight TheLeading Edge Power Behind theWheel Boeing B-52:ADocumentary History

Weapons ofDesert Storm TheAircraft Treasures ofSilver Hill Phantom inCombat: ADocumentary History ArtinFlight:TheSculpture ofJohnSafer FICTION

TheWildBlue(WITH STEVEN L.THOMPSON)

Trophy forEagles Eagles atWar AirForce Eagles

This book is respectfullydedicated to all the men and womenof the Lockheedfamily, includingall those who have flownor used the products of that historic company.

Contents Foreword / ix Preface: Leaders, Timing,and Technology / xiii

Author’sNote / xxi Acknowledgments/ xxv : In the Beginning,ThereWereTwoBrothers : TheVega:First Star of a MajorConstellation

19

: Rebirth and Resurgence

52

: LockheedBuildsto Meetthe NeedsofWar : Remoldingfor the PostwarWorld

130

: TheSkunkWorks

170

: Progress at Burbank

188

: ExpandingHorizons

219

: The GoldenOpportunity:Missilesand Space

264

10: LMSC:ScientificBreakthroughsand the Challengeof Peace

307

11: FamilyStrength OvercomesAdversity

331

12: Changesin ManagementStyleAllowLockheedto Flourish

369

13: TheRebound:1975to 1995

428

14: The Mergerof Equals

464

AppendixI: SomeNotableLockheedAircraftFlights / 487 AppendixII: Aircraft and Fleet Ballistic MissileCharacteristics / 494

Contents

= viii

Appendix III: Lockheed Corporation Subsidiaries, Affiliates,Divisions,and Groups / 500 AppendixIV:An Insight into a Few Important Lockheed Companies / 520

AppendixV:AListofLockheedTestPilots / 524 Bibliography / 529

Index / 535

Foreword

|

oc Thenamefirstentered myconsciousness inthelate 1930s, whenIwasa boyinterested inmodel airplanes. Then,so many years ago,forreasons Ican’texplain, thenamestoodoutforme fromthoseofalltheotheraircraft companies. Whether itwasLockheed’s airplanes, itsimage, orsimply thedistinctive name, Ican’tsay. Ijustknew withtheassurance ofaneight-year-old thatLockheed was

special. (Today, withequalassurance, I knowthatcountless thousands feelthesame.) In lateryearsI washiredbyLockheed, andbeganto learnits

history andappreciate itsproducts, people, andleaders. Now,some fortyyearsafterI firstpinnedabadgewiththewinged startomylapel,

thereisnolonger aLockheed inthesense therewaswhenitsairplanes setrecords whichstillendure anditsmissiles andspace systems deterred devastating conflict during thecoldwar.Instead, theNewYork

Foreword = x

Stock Exchange listsasuccessor company, Lockheed Martin, aproduct ofthedramatic reshaping oftheU.S.aerospace industry inthe1990s. MuchofwhatLockheed wasabout—its culture, reputation for

cutting-edge technology, head-turning products, andglobal presence— remainsasa richveinin LockheedMartin,yeta thresholdhasbeen crossed.It isa thresholdthatcallsfora fresh,comprehensive Lockheed

history, thefinalchapter. Inthepages whichfollow, Walter Boyne tackles thedaunting taskofchronicling Lockheed’s history fromthedayswhentheLougheadbrothers’ Model Gbiplane graced thewaters ofSanFrancisco Baythrough themerger which created (atthetime)theworld’s largest aerospace anddefense company. Thestorydefies completeness inthe spanof just a fewhundredpages,and somewillfindtheirfavorite

person,event,airplane, missile, orsatellite accorded lessattention than theywouldlike.It defiescompleteness because foroversixtyyears

Lockheed touched thelivesofhundreds ofthousands ofemployees andtheirfamilies, creating aninfinite reservoir ofstories andmemories. The companysupportedour nation’sdefenseof democracy

through fivewars, adapting towrenching downturns indefense spendingfollowing eachconflict. Itflourished intheearly daysofcommercialaviation, butultimately leftthemarket, skirting bankruptcy before L-1011 in1983. Itbranched closing theproduction lineofthesuperb

fromits aviationroots,anticipatingthe boomin missilesandspace

thatfollowed Sputnik, andultimately sawthesenewactivities grow larger thantheheritage aircraft business. Though theproducts were different, Lockheed’s stature asatechnology leader wasenhanced. Thehistory ofLockheed isanimmense canvas painted withbold

strokesandvibrantcolors.Ina sensetheoriginal paletteandcompo-

sitiontracetothefounder ofthemodern Lockheed, Robert E.Gross. Hisimpact wastowering, hislegacy enduring. Gross’s vision, dignity, andethical values defined thecompany during histenure and—despite rareandisolated departures—long afterhehaddeparted. Some saythatGross created atechnology company. Viewed externally thisappears true,butwhatofthesource ofthetechnology andtheproducts forwhichLockheed wassowellrecognized? They sprang fromtheminds andthehands andthededication ofcountless menandwomenwho,drawnby Gross’svision,affiliatedthemselves

withthecompany, someforyears, manyfordecades. Thisistheir history,onewrittendaybydayovermorethansixtyyears,in times

goodandbad,through wars,economic cycles, technology upheavals,

Foreword

= xi

andglobalization oftrade.Itisahistory worthrecalling, aprofile of achievement, atriumph worthy ofGross’s vision to“Look ahead where thehorizons areabsolutely unlimited.” DanielM.Tellep Chairman andCEO

Lockheed Corporation 1989-1995

Preface: Leaders,Timing, and Technology

[Tes twentieth century willberemembered formanythings, and among thebestofthesearethetrulyremarkable achievements in airandspace technology. FromtheWright brothers’ firstflights on December 17,1903,totheeveofthenextmillennium, aviation’s incredible journey hascarried overthewindswept sands ofKitty Hawk,

beyondthestillbeautyofspace,totheroaring turbulence ofnewborn

stars.Aboxcamera’s lenscaught thefirstmoment ofOrville’s 120footflight, preserving itforusforever inblack andwhite. Today, only ninety-plus yearslater,theoptics oftheHubble telescope reachout

notonlyindistance butintimetotheverybeginning oftheuniverse.

No one knewit at the time,but Orville’sflightwasjust the first

tentative steptoward thestarsasaviation carried allscience forward. Inthatroyal progress, asmany astenthousand companies around theworld,withhope,passion, andfull-page advertisements, have

Preface

= xiv

brought theirskills andmoney totheworld ofaviation. Mostofthese firmsdisappeared swiftly, sometimes within weeks oftheirbrave announcements, veryoften within ayear. Onlyafewwere abletoprosper foranextended period before theintense competition thatdefines the worldofaerospace business forcedthemto shutdownor to be absorbed byanother company. Heroic names abound evenamong thosethateventually succumbed to events,including suchimportant foreign entities as Sopwith, Hawker, Bleriot, Breguet, Handley Page, andFokker. Inthe UnitedStates, evensomeofthemostfamous aviation firmsclosed theirdoors orwereabsorbed, companies suchasCurtiss, which dominated theindustry forsolong,NorthAmerican, thatgreatbuilder of fightersandbombers(andrecentlyrebornasBoeingNorthAmerican), and Consolidated, ReubenFleet’sfamouscreation.Whentheywere

intheirprime, selling thetopaircraft intheirfield, itseemed thatthey would prevail against allodds. Buttheaviation worldiscruel, andaging companies aresubject to illsnotunlikethoseofaginghumans: hardening ofmanagerial arteries, lossofcorporate memory, andmostinsidious ofall,toostrong

atendency toconservatism. These contribute tothesingle mostimportantfactorincompany failures: a lackoffinancial success. The ultimate success oftheLockheed Corporation revolved around itsbold decisions coupled withwiseandfarseeing financial management.

Averyfewcompanies notonlyhavesurvived thehardcombats

ofthetwentieth century, butrenewed themselves inthestruggle so thatanother onehundred years ofincreasingly scientific endeavor isa bright andpleasing prospect. Oneofthemostsuccessful ofthese began in1913whentwobrothers—the Lougheads—designed andbuiltan aircraftin SanFrancisco.That firstaircraft,and the smallcrewthat

builtit,contained inmicrocosm theelements that,despite setbacks, wouldpersevere tobecome thefamiliar Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.

Times weretoughinthose veryearly daysofaviation, anddespite thetechnical excellence oftheLoughead brothers’ aircraft, thefirm wasforced togounder. Thebrothers would returntoaviation again andagain, andoneofthem,Allan, wouldbecome a founder ofthe original Lockheed Aircraft Company in1926,itsnamespelled toreflectitspronunciation. Thatorganization would alsobuildsuperb aircraft,recordsettersthatwereinternationally recognized fortheir excellence andflown bythemostfamous pilotsintheworld. Butit

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wouldnotbeabletosurvive thetwineffects ofitssaletoalargerfirm

andtheGreatDepression ofthe1930s. Unlike mostcompanies thatmetthesame depressing fate,Lockheedwould riseagain witharesilience thatwould come tocharacterize it inthefuture,whenbesetbyeventsevenmorethreatening thanthe

depression. Overthenextsixdecades, itwould achieve anunprecedented record ofsuccess, leading toamerger in1995withanequal, complementary partner, MartinMarietta, tobecome theLockheed Martin Corporation, adominant aerospace firmintheworld today. Itsgrowthintheintervening yearsbetween itsrebirthin 1932

anditspresent preeminent position werepossible onlybecause ofa unique corporate culture, alegacy ofBobGross, oneembraced bythe term“theLockheed family.” Thisculture, while difficult todefine as itchanged tomeetnewneeds, nonetheless maintained certain consistent,identifiable traits. TheLockheed corporate culture involved brilliantpeople working together atalllevels, strong individuals whowere willing tosacrifice theirtime,andinsomecases, theirlives, tothe ideals ofthecompany. Formostofthem, company loyalty wasasimple metaphor fortheirloyaltyto theircountry,fortheyknewthatthe

United States depended uponLockheed products toa critical degree. Fromtheearlydaysoftheproduction ofthefamousP-38fighterto

theremarkable success ofitssubmarine-launched ballistic missiles to thegreatintelligence triumphs ofitsspyaircraft, spysatellites, and stealth planes, Lockheed hasbeenabsolutely vitaltothesecurity ofthe United States. Meeting theendless crises involved inproducing advanced weapons meant working twelve-hour daysandseven-day weeks formonths onendasamatter ofcourse. Itwasa strenuous butfulfilling regimen thatbecame anaccepted, evenaddictive, wayoflifefor everyone fromtheshopfloortotheboardroom. Aninvaluable, indeeddefining,resultofLockheed’s uniquecor-

porate culture hasbeenthealmost unerring selection oftherightleadersattherighttime,whointheirturn,inmostinstances selected the righttechnologies topursue. Inamanner unusual foranairandspace company, Lockheed hasformostofitsexistence hada nonengineer asitschiefexecutive officer. Aformer president oftheLockheed California Company, Willis Hawkins, wasoneofaviation’s greatest engineers, aLockheed stalwart, andakeenrivaloftheworld-renowned Clarence “Kelly” Johnson, perhaps themosthighly regarded engineer inthehistory ofaviation. (Itspeaks tobothLockheed’s wealth oftalent anditsunique culture thattwosuchtowering geniuses couldhave

Preface

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worked together sowellforsolong.) Hawkins believed having anonengineer asthetopmantobeavaluable company characteristic. He hascommented thatalthough Lockheed oftenhadengineers tohead divisionsofthecorporation, thetopexecutive camefroma different,

usually financial oroperational, environment. Theresult wasthatthe CEOwaslesspersonally aware ofpossible engineering hazards—the dreaded “unknown unknowns”—and wasthuslessconservative. Because theCEOassumed theultimate responsibility fordecisions, the engineers feltfreetotakemorerisks, andforallofthehistory ofair andspace,successful riskmanagement hasbeentheessential keyto

progress. Since therebirth ofthepresent Lockheed company in1932, only eightmenhaveheldthetopexecutive position.Eachofthesehas

operatedina differentmanner,foreachonefaceddifferentchallenges

withdifferent resources, andprovided solutions unique totheindividual. Theresults forLockheed havebeenremarkable, forithasmanagednotonlytokeepinthetechnological forefront ofaviation, but alsotoleadallcompetitors around theworld byasmuchastwodecades infieldssuchasreconnaissance andstealth.Ithascreated aircraft such

astheSR-71, oneofthefewaircraft tobecome almost acultobject interms ofpopular following, andinthemorethanthirtyyears since itsconception, onethathasnever hadanaeronautical equivalent. With theexception ofonedolefultwelve-year period(1965-77), theLockheedCorporation remained inthetopechelon ofitsindustry inprofits,

prestige, andinfluence. Yet,overtime,thegeneral nature ofitsleadership style hasmanifested adistinct change, onethatechoes asimilar change notonlyin thegeneral American population, butalsowithintheU.S.military services. During thefirsthalfofthecompany’s existence, fromitsfirst chairman, Robert Gross, downthrough thereignofboardchairman Daniel J. Haughton, leadership wascentralized andauthoritarian. One,two,orthreetopmanagers made decisions, andmerely informed a boardofdirectors, mostlyinsiders, whatthosedecisions were.Subsequent toHaughton’s tenure,theinfluence oftheboardofdirectors

hasbeenconsiderably expanded, withmanymoreoutside directors involved. Theresult hasbeen a lessauthoritarian, moredecentralized management styleformostoftheorganization, onemoreintunewith thechanging national lifestyle. Fortunately, therightmanagers were chosen ateachpoint. Lockheed’s goodfortune inleadership hasnotbeenconfined to itschiefexecutive office, forithasalsoattracted andretained thetop

Preface

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science andtechnology talentintheindustry, yearafteryear.Thereis bothcause andeffect inthis.Thetopmanagers werewiseenough to seekout,employ, and,mostofall,endure theirtopengineers, forthe latterweremenofstrongwillandcharacter, difficult tocontroland oftenpainfulto dealwith.Theengineers, tough,outspokenmenin-

cluding Clarence “Kelly” Johnson andBenRich,aswellasmany others, recognized theirmanagers’ tolerance—if notalways theirbrilliance—and asa result,worked evenharder,knowing thatlesspermissive managers atotherfirms would haveinhibited theirdazzling forays beyond contemporary engineering frontiers. Onecurious aspect

ofLockheed’s history isthatitfielded agroupofmanagers andengi-

neersin itsMissiles andSpaceCompany whowerein everyrespect

equaltothoseoftheaviation side,butwerelesswellknown because ofthesecurity requirements oftheirmission. Theseincluded mensuch asEugeneRoot,HerschelBrown,StanleyBurriss,LouisRidenourand

JamesPlummer alongwithotherswhobroughtintobeingscientific

systems andequipment thatwerethought tobeimpossible tocreate. Through theirefforts, andtheefforts oftheirteams, theyplaced the United States firmly intheleadinintelligence-gathering withincrediblesatellites, evenastheycreated themosteffective deterrent yet,the fleetballistic missile system. Theircontributions wereoftennoteven known tooneanother, muchlesstotheiracademic peers. Eventheir closest family members weredenied allknowledge ofwhattheywere doing. Yettheypersisted, because theyknewtheywerebreaking new ground inthemostimportant fields ofmilitary workinournation’s history.

Thebestengineers wereattracted toLockheed because theyknew theywould beallowed toworktotheirlimits. Intheearly years, they werespared mostofthebureaucratic digressions typical oftheaviation industry; inlateryears things inevitably became morebureaucratic— andthecomplaints fromolderLockheedians areloudaboutthis—but stillrelatively lesssothanatotherfirms. In simplestterms,Lockheed’s leadersencouraged theiroutstand-

ingengineers to gobeyondtheboundsofordinary aeronautics and astronautics to achieve thegreatairandspacemilestones. Thesein-

cludethefirstAmerican operational jetfighter, theP-80;theMach2

F-104;the greatcargoplaneslikethe C-130,C-141,and C-5;the

U-2andSR-71 spyplanes; theAgena launch vehicle; theDiscoverer (CORONA) andotherspysatellites; thesubmarine-launched ballistic missiles; theF-117A stealth fighter; andtheF-22Raptor, plusother, still-classified programs. ToquoteHawkins, whowasinfluential on

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boththeaircraft andthespace sideofthehouse, “Lockheed cameup withirresistible products.” Anyoneofthese would havebeenthehigh pointofthecareers ofordinary engineers inanordinary company; at Lockheed, theywerebutpartofacontinuum oftechnological excellencethatextends fromitsfirstglimmerings inSanFrancisco Bayon outtoward tomorrow’s stars. Thestyleofleadership provided bytopmanagers andfirst-rate engineers wascontagious, permeating theLockheed environment so thatemployees atevery level feltashared responsibility forthesuccess ofthefirm.Thefactthatgoodmorale wasbothwideanddeepprovided thecompany aflexibility itwould needinmeeting thechallenges inherent inthenewfields it elected toexplore, andthestrength to endurethefinancial andethicalstormsthataroselikeback-to-back hurricanes inthe1970s.

Foralmost halfitsexistence, Lockheed hasbeendiversified into fields farfromaviation, andhasachieved thesame degree ofexcellence inmostofthese. Some—like shipbuilding—were bynature morepedestrian, andthusparadoxically areachtoofar.Whenitwasapparent thattheycouldnotbemanaged ina satisfactory manner,theywere

given up.Nonetheless, onefacetoftheunique corporate culture has beenthecross-fertilization ofengineering andmanagerial talent among several varied fields. Itisperhaps notextraordinary thatthegreat LockheedGeorgia enterprise, whichbegan withrebuilding B-29s forthe Korean Warandcontinues todayasa production centerfortheven-

erable butever-new C-130transport andtheF-22fighter, began with awholesale transfusion ofpeople atalllevels fromCalifornia. Noris itunusual thattheboundless energy oftheLockheed Missile andSpace

Division wasgivenitsstartfromtheparentcompany ina similar way. Whatissurprising isthewaythateachofthesenewcompanies has

provided thetraining andthechallenges tofashion itsowncadreof leaders, whoinmanycasesreturned totoppositions intheparent company. These transfusions oftalent weresometimes aspainless asa

kiss,sometimes aspainfulasa bonemarrowtransplant,but haveto

datebeensoremarkably successful astoleadtothecreation ofoneof theworld’s largest aerospace firms. Theauthorwantstostatemostemphatically thatthepeople namedinthisbook—executives, engineers, managers—are themselves

metaphors fortheteamstheyled.Manyprojects persisted foryears,

sometimes decades. Inthecourse ofaproject, thereareseveral people wholeaditormakemajorcontributions toit.Space limitations precludenaming eachone,sothereader mustseethatwhena chairman

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ora project engineer ismentioned inassociation witha project, he stands forallthemanymenandwomen whocontributed toit. Initslongjourney fromasingle-engine floatplane inSanFran-

ciscoBaytothecreation oftheX-33VentureStar, potential successor tothespaceshuttle,themenandwomen oftheLockheed Corporation

haveworked withworthy counterparts inAmerican andinternational industry andgovernment. Thecartoonists andtheeditorial writers wholampoon thateasytarget, the“military-industrial complex,” have noideahowstringent therulesofmilitary procurement canbe;nor howdifficult it istomeetdemanding specifications withvirtually im-

possible schedules andstillmakea profit.Proofoftherigoriseasily foundinthethousands ofcompanies thathavegoneunder. Lockheed wasfortunate thatwhileitdidnotalways dowellonitscommercial aircraft, itscontracts formilitary aircraft wereforthemostpartprofitable. TheLockheed Missile andSpace Company proved tobehighly profitable overtheyears.* Inthecommercial world,outside theinfamous butmisunderstood“complex,” onefindsthattheairlines areequally valuable, equally difficult partners, foreachonenaturally seekstoobtainthe besteconomic advantage foritselfinthepurchase ofanewairliner, as whenLockheed hadtodealwiththeeternally eccentric butundeniably brilliant Howard Hughes. Even dealing withindustry vendors isalways conducted atthesame level ofstress andatsurprising degrees ofhazard, asLockheed foundoutinitsrelationship withRolls-Royce. Despite thesedangers, within theaviation community asawhole thereexists a desire toprogress andtosucceed thatmakes thework exciting andfulfilling. Areciprocal trustwasestablished among the people atLockheed, inindustry, andinthemilitary services. Itwas thisfaithintheircounterparts thatenabled allthreeelements toadvancefurtherinairandspacetechnology thananyone couldhave anticipated, andfarbeyond thebestanycompeting system intheworld

hasaccomplished.

Oneunusual aspect ofthefirstfiftyyears ofLockheed’s progress wasthatmuchofitsdynamism camefromhard-driving workers who “came upthehardway.” Mostofthesecamefromdistinctly unprivileged backgrounds. Manynotonlylacked college degrees, butoften evencollege orhigh-school attendance. Theylearned onthefloorand intheair,andacquired confidence along withtheirhard-earned skills. *Thenameofthiselement oftheLockheed Company changed continuously overtheyears. Itisalways shown asitwascalled atthetimeinquestion.

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Yettheseproducts ofrough-and-tumble apprenticeships rallied toa morepatrician executive groupafter1932toformaperfect combinationtodealwiththe“eastern establishment” ononelevelwhile putting outproducts ofcreative western excellence atanother. After World WarII,thissituation began tochange, butformany years there wasa leavening ofold-timers whosawtoitthatthebasic rawelegance oftheLockheed working style wasnotcompromised. Intime,farmore advanced managerial methods became necessary, asa morecerebral approach wasrequired toboththeengineering andthefinancing necessary fordealing withadvanced aeronautics andastronautics. Inthefollowing pages, wewillcharttheprogress oftheLockheed company fromitsveryearliest days. Wewillexamine howitsleadershipqualities adapted tothetimes,comparing theproducts ofthe evolving technology withthoseofcontemporary competitors. Wewill

looktothewords ofthemenandwomen ofLockheed toexplain just howitsmanysuccesses aswellasitsoccasional—but verypainful— failures cameabout.Theterm“Lockheed family” willbeseenagain andagain,to explain howthetriumphs wereachieved and,perhaps moreimportant,howthebadtimeswereendured.

Author'sNote

'['

reader willfindrepeated references inthebooktothe“Lockheedfamily”—so many, infact,thatI havesomeconcern that thephrase willbelooked uponasmerely anoverworked literary device.

However,in thecourseofseveralhundredinterviews, telephoneconversations, faxes,andE-mailswithLockheed alumni,itwasimpossible

nottobeimpressed bythegenuine familial sensethatthevarious Lockheed corporations engendered intheiremployees atevery level overtheyears.

Theessence ofthisfamilial senseisdifficult toconvey. Lockheed veterans recallincidents andpeoplewiththegreatest affection, and

witha senseofnostalgia engendered bythelongrelationship they enjoyed. Oftenthemostcherished events depend uponanintimate knowledge ofthesituations andthepeople involved. Someofthese slicesof the Lockheed fabricaredifficultto reconstitute in a few

Author’s Note

= xxii

paragraphs—they aretoooftenacaseof“youhadtobethere.” But others bearretelling well,particularly whentheyinvolved some ofthe major Lockheed personalities. Itismoreimportant toremember thatthisLockheed family was inmanywaysresponsible forthepresent security andprosperity of theUnited States. Lockheed, morethananyothersingle commercial corporation, hadresponsibilities forthekeyoffensive anddefensive weapon systems ofthecoldwar.Without fearofcontradiction, itcan besaidthatthecombination oftheLockheed intelligence-gathering resources, including theU-2andSR-71 spyplanes andtheCORONA— andsubsequent—-spy satellites provided information ona scale beyond theconception oftheSoviet Union. Thisvastintelligence superiority enabled theUnited States tometeritsdefense expenditures atarate thatallowed thecivilian economy toprosper aswell. TheSoviet Union didnothavecomparable systems, anditsmilitary expenditures were toomuchfortheinherently faulty Communist economy tobear. Lockheed alsoproduced extremely effective offensive weapons, mostnotably themanygenerations oftheFleetBallistic Missile system.

Therewereothersaswell,greatfighters andcargoplanes, butthe Polaris, Poseidon, andTrident series ofsubmarine-launched ballistic missiles became thestrongest—and mostelusive—element ofthe United States’ strategic triad. Thestrength thatLockheed’s formidable technological leadership imparted totheUnited States wasvitaltowinning thecoldwar.Ironically,that coldwarvictorycouldhavemeantthe endof Lockheed,

geared asitwastodefense production. However, theleaders atLockheedhadanticipated theproblem andsetinmotion planstoaccommodate to thepost—cold warsituation. Thanks to thespiritand capabilities ofitsemployees, Lockheed wasabletocompete inthenew

commercial arena withequal success. Theeighty-five-year history ofLockheed wasnotwithout itsfailures,bothtechnical andhuman. Thisbookrecords thosefailures as well,butthereader willnotethatthecompany anditspeople succeeded farmoreoftenthantheyfailed. Itwillalsobeevident thatin every caseoffailure, nomatter howdifficult forLockheed atthetime, thefirmcamebackrapidly, togreater achievements. Thatability to perform wellafteradversity is,likethegeneral pattern ofLockheed successes, attributable directly tothepatriotism ofemployees atevery level.Theircomplete devotion totheircompany wasinlargepart because theyfelttheircompany wasessential to thedefense ofthe

United States.

Author’s Note

= xxiii

Therecognition ofthiscombination offamilial loyalty andpa-

trioticdevotion todutyisabsolutely fundamental tounderstanding thehistory ofacorporation thatgrew fromanawkward-looking flying boattestedonSanFrancisco Bayintooneoftheworld’s mostsuccessful corporations. Thesuccess ofLockheed fartranscended com-

mercialconsiderations, andthedegreeofthissuccess maybefoundin

thememories ofitsloyalalumni. These memories, disclosed sofreely intheinterviews andreplete withsomuchinformation, anecdotes, recollections, andinsights, are awonderful resource todrawupon—but thereisadownside. There isabsolutely nowaythatthehistoryofLockheed, extending fromits

originin 1913to the mergerwithMartinMariettain 1995,canbe

compressed intoa single volume. Inthosemomentous years, there wereliterally thousands ofprojects—aircraft, missiles, satellites, anda vastarrayofotheradvanced equipment. Hundreds ofthousands of people worked ontheseprojects, someasmanagers, someashandsonworkers ontheline.Eachhashisorherstorytotell. Thusthemostdifficult taskwasdeciding whathadtobetold, andwinnowingout, no matterhowreluctantly, thingsthatwerein

myperception slightly lessimportant orinteresting. Sometimes materialwhich wasequally important, andequally interesting, hadtobe

leftoutforotherreasons. Itriedtoobtainareasonable balance between

thevarious companies anddivisions which composed Lockheed over theyears. Security considerations alsoplayed apart,formuchofthe workundertaken byLockheed Missiles andSpace inallitsmanyincarnations isstillclassified.

I havenodoubterredoccasionally inmyjudgment; I amsure thatsomepeople oftheLockheed family willbebewildered thata

particular projectora particular personwasomitted.I askbothun-

derstanding andforgiveness, andcanassure youthatitwasdoneonly withgreatregret. Therewasmaterial enough fora twenty-volume history, butmycharter wastocompress time,people, andevents into asingle volume. Because ofthis,I would liketomake itclearthatthepeople and theprojects thatarenamed within arenotonlystories inthemselves, butaremetaphors foralloftheteammembers whomadeimportant, thrilling events happen atLockheed. Some programs—the FleetBallisticMissile program, forexample—have beeninexistence fordecades, undertheleadership ofmanygreatmanagers, andsucceeding onlybecause thereareandhavebeenthousands ofdedicated workers. Itisimpossible totrackalloftheseinasingle volume. Thuswhena

Author’s Note

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famous namelikeKelly Johnson’s ismentioned, noonewould know betterthanhethathisnameisbutametaphor forthecracking good teamthatworked forhim.Inasimilar way,theconstraints ofspace forcemetoattribute toindividual leaders—Robert andCourtland Gross, DanHaughton, RoyAnderson, Larry Kitchen, DanTellep— many momentous events. Theirnames aresymbols fortheteams they ledtoLockheed’s triumphs. AndthereweresomanyLockheed triumphs thatthereiscredit enough forall,mentioned orunmentioned. Tohavebeenapartof theLockheed family istohavebeen a partofoneofthemostinnovative, progressive, andsuccessful aerospace firmsinhistory. Walter J. Boyne Ashburn, Virginia

Acknowledgments

Ts

almost joyous senseoffamily mentioned inthepreface was characterized bythetotalcooperation ofeveryone atLockheed, fromthemostsenior executive downtothehardworking troops who ferreted outboxafterdustyboxofinformation stored sowellandso systematically atRyeCanyon. Therearesomanypeople tothankfortheircooperation thatI amcertain thatI willomitsomeone’s name.Letmebeginwiththe senior management ofLockheed. I received enthusiastic support and information fromRoyA.Anderson, Lawrence O.Kitchen, Daniel M.

Tellep,VincentN. Marafino,andWillisHawkins.I alsoreceived their

mostthorough reviews, advice, andsuggestions. It isworthnoting herethatWillis Hawkins, younger inhiseighties thanmostareintheir thirties, twice wentthrough every pageofthemanuscript, initialing eachpage,andmaking voluminous suggestions andcorrections ina

Acknowledgments

= xxvi

handwritten printasprecise asanIBMtypewriter’s. ThatWillis found timetodosobetween building hisGlastar aircraft andflying hisBeech Bonanza isremarkable. It should benotedthatwhilethefivemen mentioned above reviewed themanuscript carefully several times, it waswiththecomplete understanding thattheauthor hadthefinalsay onwhatandhowmaterial wouldbepresented.

Invaluable inputsandguidance werereceived fromsenior executives whotooktimefromtheirbusyschedules tobeinterviewed and to reviewmywrittenmaterial.TheyincludeMinoru“Sam”Araki,

Norman R.Augustine, MelBrashears, Kenneth D.Cannestra, Vance D. Coffman, Jack$. Gordon,CarlHaddon,DougKenyon,Carl Kotchian, JohnR.Kreick, JohnN.McMahon, ElsieMerrihew, Sher-

manN. Mullin,FritzOder,SusanM. Pearce,ValP. Peline,James W. Plummer,JackReal,DeraldStuart,andAnthonyG. “Jerry”Van

Schaick. Thevolume ofinformation resulting fromtheseinterviews wasoverwhelming. Itcomplemented themarvelous Lockheed oralhistoryprogram created andmanaged byWilliam D.Perreault. Inaddition, thereweredozens ofindividual Lockheed employees

whosehelpwasinvaluable, includingJuliusAlexander, VinceArkangel,RayAustin,HughBurns,VirnellBruce,RobertBurgess,Robert

Clayton, Marie Castillo, Steve Chaudet, David R.Corbeil, David Ferguson, Douglas Heydon, PeterHarrigan, Gaylen Hogan, Ralph Hurvitz,BobLeeper, RonaldLindeke, Michael W. DeNeal, Justin Murphy, Buddy Nelson, Alex Osorio, DonParker, RayPasson, M.W. “Marty”Phillips,TomPugh,RossReynolds, JeffRhodes,LeeRogers,

Yvonne Rossi, Lorraine Sadler, CliffSchaefer, EricSchulzinger, Eric Solinger, Garfield Thomas, Denny Thompson, JohnTurner, andJan Wrather. Danielle DeSoto wasalways totally helpful andtotally patient.EricSchulzinger combined hisphotographic artistrywiththe

marvelous digital filing andretrieving system thatmadephotographic research apleasure. Hewasablyassisted byEricSolinger, BoEdwards, andDenny Lombard. Itwasmygoodfortune toknowClarence L.“Kelly” Johnson, BenRich, andAnthony “Tony” LeVier many longyears before Ibegan workonthisbook,andIcalled uponmymemory inwriting ofthem. Ms.Marlaine Lockheed andJohnLockheed gave meinsight into thelivesofFloraHaynes Loughead, Victor Lockhead, andAllan and Malcolm Lockheed. Theirintimate knowledge wasunavailable anywhereelse.

I amgratefultoothersoutsideLockheed, too,includinghistorian andfriendGerryBalzer,historianWarrenBodie,notedattorneyBrian

Acknowledgments

= xxvii

Freeman, CargillHalloftheOfficeofAirForceHistory, AnnHas-

singer oftheUnitedStates NavalInstitute, George S.McKenzie of theGoleta AirMuseum inSantaBarbara, Wally Meeks forhisusual goodideas, S.Katherine Schneider, National Reconnaissance Office,

HenrySnelling forhisalways excellent editorial work,andDr.George WatsonoftheOfficeofAirForceHistory.

Mydaughter Katherine Teague helped withresearch onSanta Barbara, while another daughter, Molly Boyne, assisted withthefiling,

bibliography, andmostespecially, transcribing themanyhoursof tapedinterviews. I owesincere thanksalsotoJacques deSpoelberch, a superbagentand friend,publicistJoe Rinaldi,and my editors,

Thomas Dunne andPeteWolverton, andtheirableassistant, Kristen Nardullo. Imustgivespecial thanks toSusan Pearce forinitiating thisproject,andforguiding methrough it.Among themanynicethings she didwastoputmeintouchwithTrudySibley, whohasworked long, hard,andwiththegreatest diligence toprovide invaluable assistance andsuggestions. TrudywasablyaidedbyClaire Bunnell. Therewas norequest toodifficult forthesetwowomen whoepitomize theLockheedspirit. Andthebookwouldnothavebeenpossible withoutthediligent,

intelligent research donebyBirch Matthews. Birch, anaccomplished author inhisownright,dugdeepandlongformaterial, driving long hourstoRyeCanyon, Burbank, Palmdale, andelsewhere. Hisknowledgeofthesubject, andhisstubborn engineer’s drivetogetitright, enabled himtowinnow thewheat fromthechaff, sothatI waspresented withtherichest material fromthegreatquantity thathesurveyed. Birch alsoconducted several valuable interviews. Agreatfuture by-product ofhiseffort willbehisownbooks based onhisresearch. Many people werehelpful tomyaceresearcher, including Gerry Balzer, VinceArkangle, CliffSchneffer, AlexOsorio, DonParker, GregAustin, ElsieMerrihew, CarlHaddon, JackReal,andDave Kenyon.

Idalsoliketogivespecial thanks toMarjorie Pearson, Corporate Librarian, whomadesomuchmaterial available forsolongatime. Toalloftheabove andmoreIamgrateful beyond words. IfI’ve forgotten someone, donotjustforgive me—write meandtellme!

Beyondthe Horizons

CHAPTER 1

Inthe Beginning, There WereTwoBrothers

(

alifornia hasalways beenthepromised landofmilkandhoney, fromthedaysofthefirstSpanish explorers totheunforgettable invasion ofthegoldrushminers to thepresent day.Itsgreenfields andrebounding economy stillbeckon—some saytoostrongly—to people ofevery nationality. But,nowas then,Californiacan be difficult,the landyielding

itsbountyonlyto thosewhoworkit hard,witha livingwagefrom

crops being aselusive asaliving wage fromthegoldfields. Onefamily thatwouldgivethreemenimportant to theaviation worldwould experience thathardness, betempered byit,andwrest fromCalifornia

fameandatransient wealththatwassavored to itsfullest—while it lasted.

Thethreemenwereallsonsofa remarkable woman, Flora Haines Loughead. BornonJuly12,1855,in Wisconsin, at leasta

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 2

and ofJohnPenly hertime,Florawasthedaughter before century a sthe early bent—as futuristic hada strong Herfather MaryHaines. oftheautomobile—and thefuturedominance hepredicted 1860s, by laterevidenced genius mechanical o f the thesource wasprobably aninsatiable with individualist boys.Abrilliant thethreeLoughead atage inIllinois University fromLincoln lustforlife,Floragraduated hadfivechildren threetimes, married Shewasajournalist, seventeen. thirty-five farmed c laims, herownmining worked bytwohusbands, taught books, her andmorethana dozen wrotemanyarticles acres, be thatwould ina manner behaved andingeneral athome, children atthetime. u nheard-of todaybutwas applauded widely Charles 1875andmetthearchitect around toDenver Shemoved thatsameyear.Hewas inSacramento Theyweremarried E.Aponnyi. asajournalist herself a ndshesupported a tbest, husband anindifferent sons,Victor a ndtwo Hope, May adaughter, evenassheboreAponnyi

ended Themarriage whodiedasaninfant. andJohnHaines, Rudolph herphyshadabused forAponnyi 1883, in indivorce acrimoniously icallyandthendesertedher;yearslaterherdiariesrevealedhowmuch shehad cometo loathehim. In 1886shemarriedJohn Loughead,

wasof Scots-Irish Loughead thechildren. adopted whoapparently a t lived thathisfamily theheadofa lake. thenameindicating descent, 15,1886, bornonNovember JohnandFlorahadtwosons,Malcolm, andAllan,bornon January20, 1889.Thesechildrenwereborn in about Niles,California,near the MissionSan Josede Guadalupe,

choseto spellhis Victor (Inexplicably, milesfromOakland. twenty in hismother's when,laterinlife,hefollowed nameasLougheed “Lockwerepronounced awriter.Bothspellings andbecame footsteps

willbe heed.”To avoidconfusion,themorefamiliarnameLockheed

designations.) orcompany usedfromthispointon,evenwithaircraft camphereighties, into in mining herinterest Floramaintained neartheNevada-California inmines foropals ingoutassheprospected independent, life.Fiercely long of her decade aslateasthefinal border as sealing i npartby y ears herfinal aliving in livingalone,shemade that paperweights glass half-round insmall, opals asthreedozen many Herfascination each. dollars tofive forup stores soldindepartment grandchildren. toher a nd ontohersons waspassed withprospecting ifnotmaterial ofherlife,richincontentandachievement Inthecourse

shehadcontinuedto prospectfor husbandsaswell;her possessions,

littleisknown. ofwhom A.Gutierrez, thirdwasDavid while wereandarereticent; family oftheLockheed Members notto talkaboutthemselves. tendency thereis a familial friendly,

In the Beginning, There Were Two Brothers

= 3

Perhaps forthisreason, thestoryofMayHope’s lifeisobscure, and thedetails ofFlora’s marriages arenotwellknown—particularly their dissolutions. TheLockheeds lived inSanta Barbara, thescene offuture successes, untilabout1898,and thenreturnedto the Oaklandarea forfouryears. In 1902,Floramoved thefamily—sans husband—to a thirty-five-acre ranchnearAlma,California, onlyabouttenmiles fromtheLockheed MartinCorporation’s present Sunnyvale properties.Theresheraisedgrapes asa principal crop,supplemented by

prunesandotherfruittypicalofthearea.

Attheturnofthecentury, making alivingona ranchofthis sizewasdifficult, butFlora wasabletodrawonherownconsiderable personal resources, writing feature articles forareanewspapers, includingtheSanFrancisco Chronicle, andformagazines, including Sunset. Shealsobegana successful book-writing career.In herlifetime she wrotebothfiction andnonfiction, andamong hernovels wereThe ManWho Was Guilty, TheBlack Curtain, andTheAbandoned Claim— thelastonea children’s bookfeaturing agirlheroine named “Hope” afterherdaughter. Shealsowrotetwostandard library reference works, TheLibraries ofCalifornia andTheDictionary ofGiven Names; the latterremained inprintatleastuntil1934. Shehad a scientific aswell asadomestic bent,writingTheNatural Sciences andQuick Cooking, thelatterdedicated to “busy housewives.” Thisindomitable mother ofanaviation family diedonJanuary 27,1943,theapparent victim ofheartfailure. Malcolm wentto SanFrancisco in 1904toworkforthelocal WhiteSteamer Cardistributor, forspeed hadavisceral appeal forthe

Lockheed boys.Malcolm’s innatemechanical abilitywasrecognized, andhewassoonplacedin chargeoftestingengines aftertheyhad

beenrepaired, a weighty responsibility forsucha young man.Atthe ageofseventeen, Malcolm conceived ofaninvention thathasaffected thefutureofautomobile design, thehydraulic four-wheel brake. Itwas

a remarkable strokeofgeniusforsomeone whohadneverhadany formalengineering training.Although it tookhimseveral yearsto

perfect theconcept, heeventually obtained a patentandcreated the Lockheed Hydraulic Brake Company tomanufacture hisinvention.

ThefirstLockheed four-wheel hydraulic brakes appeared asaseventy-

five-dollar optional equipment itemonChalmers carsinthelatefall of1923andwereadopted asstandard onthebrand-new Chrysler line

ofcars,introduced inJanuary1924.

Malcolm, wealthy bythestandards ofthetime,andcertainly by thestandards oftheLockheed family, soldhiscompany andsome

BEYOND THE HORIZONS

= 4

in1932fora“comfortable Corporation totheBendix patents fifty-six itwasnotsufficient theamount, Whatever sum”saidtobe$1million. muchmore extracted B endix his life; all himincomfort tomaintain and, toCalifornia, thanhedid.Hereturned fromtheinvention profit evertheoptimist,begangoldminingagainat hisIlexmine.He lived

Hill,inCalaveras ofhislifeatMokelumne years thelasttwenty-nine untilhisdeath recipient awelfare tobecome forced eventually County, instubbornly 13,1958.Itwasasadendfora great—if onAugust dependent— inventorandentrepreneur.

Allanwasnotstrongasa boy,andFlora brother Hisyounger butreceived school, grammar finished Henever himathome. tutored thatcomreading and from his mother from education awell-rounded skills. It andengineering wasan mechanical hisnatural plemented butonethatstoodhimwellinlaterlife,whenhe upbringing, unusual

earthquake. astheSanFrancisco asgreat shocks personal endure would to footsteps in Malcolm’s hewasreadyto follow Atageseventeen, seekhisfortune. in 1906hehadtobeconWhenAllanarrivedinSanFrancisco aweek. tendollars store, withajobinahardware earning tentinitially which deals—in manyofhislaterbusiness In a movethatpresaged afourtook considerations—he monetary joboutweighed o f the love shop.Thepay repair paycuttoworkinanautomobile dollar-a-week Scotch didnotbotherAllan,whosefrugaltastesreflected cutprobably

hewashiredbyanautomobile ashisredhairdid.Adaredevil, ancestry exhiinhill-climbing bricks t he rough over to hurtleupward dealer automobile. Corbin thejaunty“FullJewel” racing bitions, Malcolm,andVictor—hadthenatural The threeboys—Allan,

people inclined bymanymechanically possessed in aviation interest wasthefirsttoparticipate. butVictor offlight, years early these during ofthe member founder man—a a n intelligent was brother oldest The M odern of Some Trends of andauthor Engineers ofAutomotive Society

Vehicles booksonaviation. Hewrotetwoseminal Design. Automobile firstin 1909,wasinprintforanumberof oftheAir,whichappeared

book, as1995.Thesecond asrecently andhasbeenreprinted years, to themanybudding gaveadvice forAmateurs, Designing Aeroplane oftoday’s andwasa harbinger thecountry around builders aircraft wildly successful Experimental Aircraft Association. VictorworkedforJamesE. Plew,a wealthyChicagodistributor

to andwassentbyPlewto SanFrancisco ofWhitecarsandtrucks, F. James o f Professor d esign glider tandem obtaintherightsfora

In the Beginning, There Were Two Brothers

= 5

Montgomery. Hisideawastoinstall anengine andcreate a salable powered aircraft. Thisproved nottobefeasible, butPlewhadalso tasked himto acquire a Curtiss biplane. ThiswasCurtiss’s fourth

production aircraft, andwasshipped toPlewfromtheCurtiss factory in Hammondsport, NewYork,onNovember30,1909,forfourthou-

sanddollars. Victor sawtoitthatAllan washiredtoworkonthetwo-aircraft fleetinChicago. (Sadly, thepreviously cozyandsupportive relationshipofthethreebrothers cametoanabruptendina bitterquarrel thatpittedAllan andMalcolm against Victor. Theynever reconciled.)

Learningthe HardWay iE proved impossible evenforAllantoputanengine intheMontgomery glider, however, andheinstead concentrated onmaking the Curtiss pusher airworthy. Intheprocess, Allan learned howtoflyin thesamemanner thathelaterlearned todesign airplanes: justdoing it.Hejoined a groupoffellow enthusiasts whobelonged totheAero ClubofIllinois andhadasmall flying fieldattheintersection ofFiftysecond Avenue andTwenty-second Street, nexttoarailroad marshalingyard.Thiswasa veritable hotbed ofaviation, withseveral exotic designs along withthelatest aircraft fromWright andCurtiss, despite thefactthattherewerenoterminals, runways, radios, orlanding lights—the principal pieceofequipment wasa mower tocutthetall marsh grass. Asmightbeexpected, James Plewwasclubpresident. Allan’s firstopportunity toflycame whenhemetGeorge Gates, whohadcobbled together hisownversion ofaCurtiss pusher, modifiedwithastrange control system inwhich themidwing ailerons, the rudder, andtheelevators involved separate control movements. Gates hadbeenunable togettheaircraft offtheground; eachtimehetried, awingtip dugin.Hesolicited Allan’s assistance ascopilot tohandle theailerons while hehandled therudder andelevators. Withragswrapped around hishandssothattheaileron control cables would notcuthim,Allansatbehind therudder/elevator man andinfrontofthepulsating four-cylinder fifty-horsepower engine that Gateshadbuiltfromautomobile engine parts.Theymadethreeor fourstraightaway hops,andbothwerevastly pleased withthemselves. Theunique control system wasnever usedagain, however. Allancontinued working onPlew’s Curtiss biplane, installing a

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 6

newengine init.AfterPlew’s regular pilots failed togettheCurtiss in theair,Allan spenttwofulldaysadjusting therigging oftheaircraft andpreparing theengine toobtain itsfullthirty-five horsepower. Alltheaircraft ofthisearly period wereextremely difficult tofly.

Themarginbetween topspeedandstalling speedwasverysmall— oftenaslittleastenmilesanhour—and thismarginwasreduced by

a turn.Controls wererelatively insensitive. Tochange direction or attitude, thepilothadtomakelargecontrol movements andthenbe prepared immediately toreturnthecontrols toneutral toavoid overcorrecting. Theconcept ofstallrecovery waslargely unknown evento themostexperienced pilots. And,although theaircraft didnotgovery highorveryfast,a crashwasoftenfatalbecause thepusher engine

wouldripforward fromitsstrutmounting tocrushthepilot.

NoneofthisbotheredAllanLockheed, whowascertainthathis

automobile-racing aptitude would betransferred toflying. Onhissecondattempt hebecame fullyairborne, andfoundhimself circling tightlyto staywithintheconfines oftheracetrack fromwhichhe’d takenoff.He landedsuccessfully in theinfield,andlatersaid,“Itwas

partlynerve,partlyconfidence andpartlydamnfoolishness. Iwasnow

anaviator.” Hisnewstatus,ladenwithbothprestige anddanger, inspired himtomarry hislongtime sweetheart fromSanFrancisco, Dorothy

Watts,inJune1911.Theyhadtwochildren,FloraElizabeth,bornin

June1913,andJohnAllan,borninMay1915.Dorothy passed away

in1922. Aspersistent inmarriage ashewould beinmanufacturing, Allanmarried Evelyn StarrLeslie in 1924.Thismarriage endedin divorce. In 1939hemarried HelenKundert; onesonwasborntothis union,AllanHainesLockheed Jr.(thefamily namedhadbeenchanged legallyin 1926).ForAllan,marriageand homelifehad to takea

backseat tothebattles involved incarving outacareer inanentirely new,highly speculative, andterribly riskyindustry: aviation. PlewnowownedtwoCurtiss aircraft, andduringtheearly months of1911, Allan rebuilt themboth.Plew hoped torecoup some ofhismoney bya successful exhibition season. Allan successfully testflewoneaircraft, butthesecond crashed, killing itspilot.Itwasthe laststraw forPlew, whosoldthesurviving Curtiss andwithdrew from flying.

With a totalflyingtimeof oneand one-halfhours,Allanwas

hiredbyanautomobile dealer named SamDixon asaninstructor pilot fortheInternational Aeroplane Manufacturing Company ofChicago andto flythe“headless pusherCurtiss”(i.e.,noforward elevator).

In the Beginning,

There Were Two Brothers

=

7

Therehemeta brilliant Czechoslovakian namedAnthony Stadlman,

whohadjustwielded ahacksaw tomodify astandard pusher intothe newconfiguration. Stadlman wouldlatergainfamepioneering the concept ofa “flying wing”aircraft. Allan’s $25-per-week salarywasexcellent forthetimewhena

secondhand Curtisscouldbepurchased for$1,500.Allannextbecame

anexhibition pilotatcounty fairs.Thisworkwassodangerous that pilotsreceived 25percent ofthegross, which wasoftenguaranteed at $500perday.Tocollect, pilots hadtoflyforatleastfiveminutes, not

aneasytaskiftherewasmuchwindorrain. YoungLockheed provedtobea naturalflier.Ononeoccasion,

he tooka brand-newCurtissup foritsfirstflight.At itsconclusion,

themanagers attheairfield suspended hisflying rights forfivedays— notbecause hewascareless, butbecause heflewtoowell,andthey wereafraid thatlessqualified people mighttrytoimitate him. Yethiswifewasconcernedaboutthedanger,andherarguments

prevailed: Allanquitexhibition flying, anddecided tobuildhisown aircraft. Thecouple returned toSanFrancisco, where theywere joined byMalcolm.

A Significant Start heLockheeds hada no-nonsense approach tolifeandtoengineer-

ing.Theyhadtomakealivingwhilebuilding theiraircraft, and settoworkintheiroldprofessions, Allanfeeling nolossofstatusin changing fromintrepid aviator toautomechanic. Theirconcept ofa newaircraft wasequally pragmatic. Allanhadalready hadcloseencounters ofanear-fatal kindinpusher aircraft; hedecided immediately thathisaircraft would beofthemoremodern tractor type,withthe engineupfront.Bothmenknewthatto makeanymoneyfromthe aircraft carrying passengers, itwouldhavetocarrytwopassengers plus thepilot.

Inamanner thatwould befollowed ofteninthelaterLockheed Aircraft Corporation, thetwobrothers madesketches ofseveral designs, labeling themfromAtoG.Theyselected thelastdesign, and theLockheed Gwasconceived asaverylargethree-place wood-andfabricseaplane. Looking notunlikethelaterCurtiss JN-4training planes, itwasdistinguished bymidwing ailerons andtheBreguet controlsystem. Thebrothers purchased a seventy-horsepower Kirkham

six-cylinder engineequippedwitha handsome horseshoe-shaped

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 8

Althoughits structure appears crude by today’sstandards, the LockheedModelGwas veryadvancedfor its time, and had a most unusual characteristic for the period: it mademoney.

radiator. Charles Kirkham would goontodesign manyexcellent enginesanda fewdelightful airplanes, butthisengine wasa lemon, splitting itscrankcase aftera fifteen-minute run.Itwasreplaced byan eighty-horsepower CurtissV-8.

TheLockheedG wastheessenceof simplicity, withwingsofa

typethatcouldbe“builtbythemileandcutoffbythefoot,” simple rectangular structures withnotaperordihedral. Thefuselage usedan economical triangular section (i.e.,onelongeron andattendant bracing eliminated) notunlike laterAeronca lightplanes. Thesingle sled-type pontoon wasaugmented bystabilizing floats undereachwing. Itwasthelargest seaplane yetbuiltinAmerica, andmarginally larger thanthetwo-place Curtiss Model Fpusher flying boatsbeing manufactured inNewYork. InEurope, theSopwith, Short, andA.V. RoeCompanies eachconstructed biplane seaplanes ofsimilar sizeto theModelG,butallweretwo-seaters designed forthemilitary byfar

larger, better-financed firms. Finance loomed large withtheLockheeds, too—it always would. Allan wasthemoreoutgoing ofthetwobrothers, andhewaslargely responsible forobtaining backing fromtheproprietor oftheAlcoCab Company, MaxMamlock, whohelped themformtheAlcoHydroAeroplane Company witha $1,200 investment tosupplement their

In the Beginning, There Were Two Brothers

= 9

In 1919, the LougheadAircraftManufacturingCompanyof Santa Barbarabuilt this CurtissHS-2Lfor the Navy.MalcolmLougheadis in the gun turret, whileNormanS. Hall, AnthonyStadiman,BertonR. Rodman,AllanLoughead,and John K. Northroppose in front. (Lougheadhad not yet been transformedinto Lockheed.)

own$1,800—and theirsweat-equity. Otherinvestors contributed an additional $1,000. Malcolm, moreretiring thanAllan, tookthelead inthedesign effort. Neither brother hadtraining asadesigner orasa draftsman. Theaircraft wasbuiltina smallwooden garage atthe

cornerofPacific andPolkStreetsneartheSanFrancisco waterfront.

Theyhadselected aseaplane foranumber ofreasons—a wider choice oflanding fields, and,inSanFrancisco, proximity toalarge, adventuresome boating community thatwould betempted byachance to fly.There were some disadvantages. Aseaplane hadtobestrongly built towithstand theoftenchoppy waters ofSanFrancisco Bay,andthis meanta heavier structure. Alandplanecouldsuffera minoraccident

andbequietly gathered upforrepairs, while aseaplane could havethe sameaccident andsinkbeneath thewaves.

Muchwasridingon theventure,foronJune1, 1913,Dorothy

gave birthtoFlora. Exactly twoweeks later,onJune15,theLockheeds trundledtheModelG ontoa rampatthefootofLaguna Street,near

FortMason. Allan rantheengine up,bounced downtheramp,taxied outintothebay,andtookoff—the firstflight ofaLockheed aircraft.

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 10

Threeflights weremade, thesecond carrying Malcolm andthethird withR.L.Coleman oftheAlcoCabCompany. Thelasttwoflights weretwenty-minute toursofthebay,taking inAlcatraz andSausalito anddelighting theonlookers below inSanFrancisco. TheModel G wasnotfast,withatopspeed of63mph,butitcruised thebayat51 mphanditwastheonlyaircraft theretodoit. Laterintheyear,theModel Gwasdamaged inalanding ata society galainSanMateo. ItwasthelaststrawforMaxMamlock, whoseizedtheaircraftandputit instorage. Allanresumed workas

anautomechanic, tryingtodrumupthe$500needed forrepairs, untilMalcolm dragged himofftotheYuba County goldfields forsome moreprospecting. Withtheirquickly minedgold,theyplanned to redeemtheModelG fromMamlock.Likemostminersofthetime,

however, theymadebarelyenoughtoliveon,andAllanreturnedto

turning wrenches foraliving while Malcolm embarked onaseriesof adventures. Inthelastofthese, hewenttoMexico, where heserved asanadviser toaone-plane airforce. Itbelonged toGeneral VenustianoCarranza, whoserevolutionaries werefightingthefederales of President Victoriano Huerta.Malcolm camebackfromMexico with

nothing toshowforhisefforts butabullet-ridden Paige roadster that hadserved Carranza asa fieldcar.ThePaige wouldbeliterally the vehicle forMalcolm’s greatest triumph—hydraulic brakes. TheLockheed lucktookasharpturnforthebetterin1915at thePanama-Pacific Exposition. WithhelpfromPaulMeyer, anAlaskanpioneer whohadmade money outofthegoldrush,notbymining, butbyrunning arestaurant andbakery, thetwobrothers bought the Model GfromtheAlcoHydro-Aeroplane Company andrefurbished it.Allan puthiseasygoing personality towork,talking upthejoyof flying ontherampandinducing people tofly.Hewasgood.Injust fiftydaysofflying passengers fromtheYacht Harbor, theycarried six hundred people at$10aride(andasAllan laterexpressed it“about anequalnumber offreeloaders”), grossing $6,000. Theybought out theirpartner, Meyer, whohaddonewellonhisinvestment, andwere abletoplace $4,000 intheiraccount. TheModel Ghadsetaprecedent forfuture Lockheed aircraft byearning money.

Backto Momand Santa Barbara heirmothernowlivedin SantaBarbara,wheresheworkedforthe

SantaBarbara Independent, andherboys’ preoccupation withavi-

In the Beginning,

There Were Two Brothers

=

11

ationsuitedherownadventuresome soultoaT,asdidhertwogrand-

children. It wasa splendid time.SantaBarbara in 1916wasanidyllic California townofaboutsixteen thousand, complete withluxurious touristmagnets likethefamous HotelPotter,whereroomratesreached anastronomical $4a day.Thepopulation wasgrowing rapidly and thereweremanydesirable neighborhoods where residential building lotscouldbepurchased atprices ranging from$500to$2,500. Makingmotion pictures wasoneoftheprimary industries, withtwoop-

eratingstudios.Silent-film starMaryMilesMinter,oftheFlyingA Studio,wasalways available forpublicity shotsofactivities atthefac-

tory.(Film fanswillremember herperformances inDimples andAnne ofGreenGables—or possibly herinvolvement in thestill-unsolved murder ofherlover, filmdirector William Desmond Taylor.) TheoneareaofthecitywithwhichtheSantaBarbara cityfathers

werenottoopleased wasStateStreet, whichhadbecome an ugly mishmash ofsmall townarchitecture, muchofitunsightly anddilapidated. Nonetheless, theLockheed brothers foundtheneighborhood

pricesjustright,andestablished theLoughead Aircraft Manufacturing

Company intherearofWilliam L.Rust’s garage at101StateStreet,

onlythreeblocksfromthewaterfront.

Thistime,theirplanswerea littlemoreambitious, andthey sought bothfinancial andengineering help.In bothinstances they found remarkable success. Alvin Oviatt, an“Akron oilcloth king” who livedin an estatein Montecito, oneoftheposher neighborhoods, provided mostofthefinancing, along withalocal physician, Dr.W.P. Lindley, andsalesmanager James A.Farra.Burton Robert Rodman, asuccessful machine-shop andauto-rental-service owner, alsobacked thebrothersandbecamethe presidentof thefirm.Allanwasvice

president, while Malcolm wassecretary-treasurer. Bynow a faithfuloldsoldier, theModelG setsomerecords, including thefirstflightto PelicanBayintheislands acrosstheSanta BarbaraChannel.Moreimportant,it continuedto generateincome,

catrying passengers at fivedollars eachfora rideovertheChannel Islands, anddoingfilmworkforthelocalmotion picture studios. The Model Gwould continue toearnitskeepthrough 1918, whenitwould bebroken upanditsengine sold.It wasalmost certainly themost profitable flying boatoftheera,establishing a rateofreturnoninvestment thatwould bedifficult toduplicate inthefuture. YettheLockheed brothers hadanevenmoreambitious aircraft in mind,a twin-engine flyingboatcapable ofcarrying tenpeople,

BEYOND THE HORIZONS

= 12

Model ifthethree-seat wassimple: thepilot.Theirreasoning including profitmore even be would aircraft a ten-seat G couldmakemoney, able. they ontheirnewproject, Oneday,asthesmallgrouplabored if sumas hesitating backandforth, a youngmanwalking noticed camein andwasgreeted nerveto enter.Hefinally enough moning people, as“pleasant later r ecalled he whom Lockheeds, bythe warmly spotto onthe H ired with.” acquainted andbecome easyto contact hewasJohn inhistory, careers aviation beginoneofthemostfruitful withexwho, m an young reticent a fair-haired, Northrop, Knudsen a 1974 In engineer. tobea superb proved training, highschool cellent saidthathe“drew Northrop Balzer, Gerald withhistorian interview it anddid andstressanalyzed designed upthewingtrussstructure, andallthe d rawings t hree-view i ncluding thedrawing everybit of

fortheairplane.” andpartsthatwerenecessary drawings fitting detail andmost mostdifficult, to dooneoftherarest, Hisstatedability unusual. most is analysis, stress the time, tasksat ofaviation necessary inhigh isnotnow)taught wasnotthen(andofcourse analysis Stress alsonota highschool ofcalculus, a knowledge andrequires schools,

subject. Aircraft withDouglas goontoabrilliantcareer would Northrop andoftendidfreelance Corporation, Aircraft andthelaterLockheed headedhisowncompany, Heeventually workforothercompanies. withtheflyingwing.In later andwouldbecomeforeveridentified withtheflyingwing years,Northrop’sfameforwhatheaccomplished

whohad Stadlman, to hiscolleague concern wouldbeofgrievous t o hisgrave andwent himself, concept oftheflying-wing conceived thefamethatwasduehim. hadgained thatNorthrop believing ofthe buildthehullandwings and helped designed Northrop theF-1.Witha seventy-four-footwasdesignated which newaircraft, lowerwing,the F-1was spanupperand forty-seven-foot-span another ScottA-5aengines, Hall withtwo150-horsepower equipped having wasdistinctive, twin TheF-1’sdesign product. California booms and atripletail. for manager andsalespromotion S.Hall,advertising Norman was release A news o f publicity. ofthevalue thefirm,hadakeensense theUnited whenthekeeloftheF-1waslaidin 1916.Before issued volunteered p ublicly Allan and Malcolm b oth the war, entered States “inevent tothegovernment services plantandpersonal theiraircraft Theyeventhrewintheirsecret power.” withanyforeign oftrouble the probably partsofseaplanes, the metal rustproofing of newmethod

TheF-1was the secondventure of Allanand MalcolmLockheed,and it too was a success. Giventheir lack of experience,the choiceof buildinga large twin-engine seaplanewas daring, to say the least.

mostvaluable offertheycould make. Hallsawthattheiroffer gotwide coverage. Thewarreached outtotouchtheminotherways—John Northrop became aprivateintheSignal Corps. AftertheUnited States entered thewaronApril6,1917, Allan wenttoWashington togeta contract forthemassproduction ofthe F-1.Hewasabletoimpress thelegendary Jerome Hunsaker, thena lieutenant commander running theAircraft Engineering section, and managed tocomehomewitha promise ofa contract tobuildtwo single-engine Curtiss HS-2L flying boatsandtheagreement ofthe navytotesttheF-1.Itwasthestartofthealways bittersweet relationshipbetween industry andgovernment. Onthestrength ofthecon-

tract,Allantooktwocrucialpersonnel actions.He hiredTony Stadlman asfactory superintendent andwasabletosecure Northrop’s

release fromhis$21-per-month jobintheSignal Corpstoreturnto SantaBarbara anda$1,800 annual salary. TheLockheeds hopedtogetbignavyproduction contracts for

BEYOND THE HORIZONS

= 14

theirownaircraft, butworkwasslow,andtheF-1didnotmakeits firstflightuntilJanuary 1918.Itsperformance wasremarkable, being abletocarry auseful loadof3,100pounds. Itseemed obvious toAllan andMalcolm that,oncetheF-1wastested, thenavywould buyitin quantity.

Norman Hallbrought offa mostsensational Lockheed public affairs triumph intheformal public“rollout” ceremony ofthenew aircraft. OnMarch 28,1918,a massive celebration washeldatthe launching ramponWestBeachbetween BathandCastillo Streets as

theF-1wasplaced onviewbefore a crowd ofthousands liningthe beach andboulevard, withspeeches bySanta Barbara’s mayor, H.T. Nielson, prayers bya minister, anda christening bytheubiquitous MaryMilesMinter(withawinebottlefilledwithwaterindeference totheno-alcohol rulingofJosephus Daniels, thesecretary ofthenavy).

Asa coupdethéatre, ninewhitepigeons werereleased; theycircled theaircraft quickly andthenlanded onitsnearly nine-foot-long propellers. Despite thehoopla—perhaps campynow,butthentouching in its patrioticsincerity—the F-1wasreadyforaction,provingit in a

record-setting delivery flighttothenavyinSanDiego onApril12, 1918,flying the211-mile distance nonstop in 181minutes. Allan, Malcolm, andCarlE.Christoffersen wereonboard;thelastnamed

madesandwiches forthegroupontheflightdown,andsoratesa mention asperhaps thefirstflight attendant inhistory. TheLockheeds demonstrated another probable industry first, and anexceedingly advanced technique forthetime:anaerial testbedfor flightcontrols. TheF-1wasfittedwiththeDeperdussin control system,whichthearmed services hadstandardized inAugust 1916.(It isthetypestillusedtoday, withpedals tooperate therudders anda centralstickorwheeltocontroltheailerons andelevators.) Allanwas

bynowmostfamiliar withtheBreguet system usedontheModel G. Toprepare himself fortheF-1,hemodified thecontrols ontheModel Gtoconform totheDeperdussin system, andthenpracticed flying it. While thenavytested theF-1,thecompany washumming, employing eighty-five menona seven-day workweek. Itdidanexcellent jobturning outthetwoCurtiss flying boats, which werelaterpraised bythenavyforthequality oftheirfitandfinish. Theaveragepriceforall1,117HS-2Lsdelivered to thegovern-

mentwasabout$30,000; thelarger firms likeCurtiss, which produced 675oftheairplanes, naturally hada learning curvethatpermitted production economies. TheLockheed contractfor2 aircraft wasfor

In the Beginning,

There Were Two Brothers

=

15

$90,000,andtheystilllostabout$5,000onthecost-plus-12.5 percent

contract, fortheyexpended funds experimenting withways toimprove theaircraft, forwhich thegovernment feltnoneedforreimbursement. Whentheyrealized thatnoproduction contract fortheF-1

wouldbeforthcoming, theLockheedbrothersdeterminedto convert

theflying boattoalandplane andmake a sensational transcontinental flighttoWashington, D.C.JackNorthrop supervised theconversion, which costalmost $10,000. Oneofhisengineering techniques wasto placeredesigned partsin a largeglasstube,thenhavecigarsmoke blownin at oneend,sothathe coulddeterminetheairflow patterns.

Hisresults weregood; thetopspeed ofthemodified aircraft, now called theF-1A, wasincreased by10mph.Twopilots, Aaron R.“Bob” Ferneau andOrvarS.T. “Swede” Meyerhoffer, weretaskedforthe

trip,along withamechanic, LeoG.Flint.Meyerhoffer wasreputed tobeabletoswear inseven languages, andhehadtheopportunity to usethemall.Withflashguns popping, theytookofffromwhatisnow

a factorysitein Goleta,California,on themorningofNovember23, 1918,butwereforcedtolandsixhoursandtenminuteslateratTacna, Arizona,whenanenginerockerarmgaveway.Thepartwasreplaced,

buta precautionary landing wasmadeatGilaBendtorefuel. On

takeoff, theF-1Aagainlostanengineandcrashedintoa riverbed, severely injuringMeyerhoffer andFlint.Luckily theaircraftdidnot

burn,butFlint’s lifehunginthebalance forthreedays.Theletter theyhadbeencarrying fromMissMinter toPresident Woodrow Wilsonwasnever delivered. Theplane wasbrought backtoCalifornia andrebuilt toitsoriginalflying-boat configuration, andwasusedforcarrying passengers andfilmworkagain. Thelatterwasespecially profitable, astheLockheedscharged $150anhourforflighttimeand$50anhourfor standby time.TheF-1hadabriefmoment offameinOctober, when theStateDepartment chartered theaircrafttogiveKingAlbertand QueenElizabeth ofBelgium a flighttotheChannel Islands. Theflight

wassuccessful, andAllan andMalcolm wereawarded theBelgian OrderoftheGolden Crown. ThiswasalmosttheendoftheflightpathfortheF-1,whichwas

soldtoanother grouptostartacharter service toCatalina Island. The

venturenevermaterialized, andtheF-1,a remarkable aircraft, wasleft

torotonthebeach atSantaBarbara. Malcolm wasbeginning totireofaviation, forhehadperfected hisfour-wheel hydraulic brakes onthePaigecarhe'dbrought back fromMexico andextensively rebuilt. HetestedthePaigeonSanta

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 16

Barbara’s streets, boasting thathecould“stopthecaronadimeand havea nickel change leftover.” Heproved itbyroaring intoastorage garage at35mphandscreeching toahaltjustbefore hecrashed into thewall.Hisoldfascination withautomobiles hadreturned,butthere

would beonemoreventure withaircraft atSantaBarbara before he tookhisinvention east.

TheLockheed S-1:ALookintothe Future 7 iseverything. TheF-1came alittle toolatetofinditsway intothenavyproduction scheme. TheLoughead Aircraft Manu-

facturing Company’s next—and last—airplane, theS-1,wouldcome toosoonafterthewarended,withitsmeritssubmergedin theflood

ofwarsurplus aircraft thatdeluged themarketplace. YettheS-1was revolutionary inmany ways, notleastofwhich wasthespiritinwhich itsprincipals approached theirtask. OnJuly28,1919, Allan andMalcolm Lockheed, JohnNorthrop, andAnthony Stadlman signed a lengthy formal agreement. They promised toshare inallpatents andinventions connected withaviation developed byanyofthem,andbymajority vote,determine which patents andinventions would bedeveloped. Asthemeninvolved had produced onlyfourairplanes overa six-year period, thepaperspoke volumes fortheirappreciation ofoneanother andfortheirexpectations ofthefuture. Andforthem,thefuture wasthestillundiscovered holygrailof aviation—“everyman’s airplane.” Theywanted tocreate asafe,simple, inexpensive aircraft thatwould betheaeronautical equivalent ofthe FordModel T.Theyarrived ata newmethod ofconstruction that would produce a streamlined aircraft ofgreat strength atlowcost,when manufactured inquantity. TheLockheeds developed a fuselage withmonocoque (singleshell) construction, inwhich thestructural strength stemmed fromthe outside skinratherthaninternal bracing. Theyusedaconcrete mold oftheS-1fuselage’s desired sizeandshape, andlaidupa shellusing threelayers ofspruce plywood strips, allwelllacedwithcasein glue. Long discussions were heldonthebestwaytoapply auniform pressure totheplywood sothatitwould cureproperly, andwithout anyweak spotscaused byentrapped air.Stadlman wasaproponent ofapplying pressure bymeans ofanairbag,andhisargument carried theday. Thewood waspressed against theformbyanairbag,which washeld,

In the Beginning, There Were Two Brothers

= 17

inturn,byacover bolted tothemold’s framework. Therubber bag wasinflated, placing a uniform pressure offifteen totwenty pounds persquare inchontheplywood strips fortwenty-four hours, untilthe plywood shellhadcured. Twosuchshells couldthenbeassembled aroundalightweight framestructure offormers andstringers toform

astrong, lightweight, highly streamlined fuselage. Theotherthreepartnersassisted inthedevelopment ofAllan’s idea,which would prove

to bevaluable onlysevenyearslater.Allanhadpreferred a circular fuselage, butNorthrop heldoutforanelliptical shapeasmoreefficient.

Northrop hadturned tonature inthedesign ofthewings, dumpingbreadnearthewaterfront, andstudying thewaygullsmanaged low-speed flight. Theresult wasalower wingdesigned sothatitcould beturned toavertical position toactasanairbrake. Thelower wings

werealsodifferentially operated sothattheyeliminated theneedfor

conventional ailerons. TherestoftheS-1wasfairly conventional, with strut-braced biplane wings thatcould befolded parallel tothefuselage side,sothatitcould beeasily towed orstored. Theshape oftherudder andverticalsurfacewouldreappear,withthemethodofbuildingthe fuselage, on thelaterLockheed Vega.

Thedepthofthegroup’s talentwasdisplayed initsreaction to thenewsthattheS-1’s planned Green engine fromEngland wasnot going tobeavailable. Theysimply designed andbuiltawater-cooled, two-cylinder, horizontally opposed four-cycle, valve-in-head power plantoftwenty-five horsepower. Called theXL-1Aircraft Motor, it featured twinmagnetos (unusual forthetime)andtwohigh-pressure oilpumps, yetweighed only90pounds. Thecompact engine fitwithin theS-1’s streamlined fuselage, withonlythecylinder heads protruding.

Theradiator wasneatlyfairedintothebottomofthefuselage. Theaircraft’s performance wasexactly on themark.Withan

upper wingspan of28feetandalower wingspan of24feet,itweighed only375pounds empty, and600pounds fullyloaded. Although the topspeedwasonly70mph,itcouldcruiseat52mph,andhad astall

speedof25mph.Strongly built,itwasstressed for6 gs.Fuelconsumption wasonlyonegallon perhour,remarkable forthetime. Allan hadgrown waryoftest-flying hisownproducts, andhired aveteran airmail andtestpilot,Gilbert George Budwig, totesttheS-1.

Budwig reportedthattheS-1wasexceptionally pleasant to fly.The tinylittleaircraft landedsoslowly thatrotatingthelowerwingtobe

anairbrake would rarely berequired. Yetittranspired thatnotonlydid“everyman” notwantanairplane, butthosewhodidcouldfindplenty ofwarsurplus JN-4sfor

BEYOND THE HORIZONS

= 18

Likemanyother manufacturersof the period,the Lockheedbrothers found that their product, the excellentS-1biplane,could not competeagainst inexpensive war-surplusJennies.

$350orless.TheS-1wasfarmoreeconomical tooperate butitsinitial priceof$2,500 madeitimpossible tosell. Thefirmhadspentalmost$30,000in creatingtheS-1,and

foundabsolutely nobuyers. Thelureofthefour-wheel brake wastoo muchforMalcolm, whotookhisinvention easttoDetroit, where he founded theLockheed Hydraulic Brake Company. Allanworked as

theCalifornia distributor forthebrakes, andalsosoldrealestate. Jack

Northrop moved to SantaMonica, whereheworked forDonald Douglas, and,among otherthings, designed thefuelsystem forthe Douglas WorldCruisers of1924, thefirstairplanes toflyaround the world.Stadlmanfoundotherwork,bidinghistimeforAllanto come

upwitha newventure. Theonlytangible partoftheS-1thatremains todayisitsengine,

owned byMonteandPatricia Groves ofSunnyvale, California. The intangible remains oftheS-1areenormous. Itledinjustseven years totheformation oftheLockheed Aircraft Company. Itsmostimportantfeature, themolded plywood fuselage, wouldbefoundonthe record-breaking aircraft inoneofthemostexciting periods ofaviation.

CHAPTER 2

TheVega:

FirstStarofa MajorConstellation

Timing IsEverything heLockheeds hadbeenunfortunate intheirtiming bothforthe F-1,builttoolatein thewartoreceivea productionorder,andfor

theS-1,whichcouldnotcompete inthepostwar market.ButAllan

Lockheed wasresilient, andwould demonstrate onceagain hisability towork a full-time jobtoearn a living andatthesametimelaborto create anewaircraft. By1926, hiseffort wasabouttopayoff,forthe timing forhisnewplane-building venture wasexactly rightonseveral counts. Likea surfer certain ofhiswave, thenewLockheed Aircraft Company would catchthesurgeinaviation precipitated bytheNew York-to-Paris flightofCharles Lindbergh onMay20-21,1927.

BEYOND THE HORIZONS

= 20

Organizing forSuccess eee twenty-six wasa yearofincorrigible optimism. American automobileproductionledtheworld,andtherewere9 million

carsonthegrowing number ofstreets. Hollywood hassurvived the deathofRudolph Valentino, andwasturning itseyesonnewstars likeDickArlen. Thefilmspectacle BenHurwaspacking themin ($1.50bestseatintheevening, 50¢balcony seatatthematinee), and

BabeRuthwashitting homerunswithregularity. Allan organized his newcompany asaNevada corporation inDecember 1926. Thefirm would produce themostsensational lineofcommercial aircraft ofthe

decade asitgrewinsizeandreputation, onlytobeabsorbed bya larger corporation. Initially, timingwasalsopropitious forfinance, asthe

greatboomofthe1920s washurtling onitsintoxicating upward curve andtheOctober 1929stock-market debacle wasbeyond imagination.

And,equally important, thetimewasrighttousethesensational new WrightWhirlwind J5enginejustcomingontothemarketaftermore

thansixyearsofdevelopment. Theair-cooled Whirlwind engine offered anewlevelofperformance, inlargepartbecause itwasnotburdened withaheavy, draginducing, leak-prone radiator withallitsassociated hoses andclamps. The$6,000 J5developed about220horsepower, weighed lessthan sixhundredpoundswithlubricantsand accessories, and couldrun

nightanddaywithout failing. TheJ5,itsdevelopments, anditssosimilar competitors fromPratt& Whitney wouldrevolutionize the commercial andmilitary aircraft markets, havingspecial effectonthe designofcarrier-based aircraft. Thetermwasnottheninvogue,butnetworking playeda great

roleinforming thenewcompany, which cameaboutalmost directly asaresult ofthestrong associations made bymembers oftheoldSanta Barbara firm.Gilbert George Budwig hadinstructed fortheAirService before doingsometestworkontheF-1.Another AirService instructor,

W.Kenneth Jay,haddropped bytheplantin1919, metwithMalcolm Lockheed andNorthrop, andinspected theF-1.Jaywasanalmost prototypical accountant, a slight, balding, soft-spoken manwithan excellent eyeforfigures.Hewasa financialadviserto FredS.Keeler,

a well-to-do brickandtilemanufacturer fromtheMidwest. Keeler

owned stockintheEmpire ChinaCompany, which hadafactory in Burbank, where theLockheed firmwould eventually settle. By1926,Budwig hadmoved intotheupperranksofaviation,

The Vega: First Star of a Major Constellation

= 21

becoming anassistant secretary withtheDepartment ofCommerce,

which,empowered bynewlegislation, wasjustbeginning tomakeits

influence feltonaviation. Budwig introduced JaytoAllan Lockheed, whohadbeenworking withNorthrop todevelop afour-place passengerplane.

Theenergetic Northrop wasdoing a greatdealofmoonlighting fromhisregular jobat theDouglas Aircraft Company, always with thepermission ofDonald Douglas. Hehadreengineered thewingof

theM-1monoplane forClaudeRyan,increasing itsstrength andreducingitsweightbytwohundredpounds,anddirectly preparing the

wayforDonald Hall’s design oftheSpiritofSt.Louis. Healsocontributed heavily tothedesign ofVance Breese’s series ofmonoplanes. Northrop andLockheed drewontheirpatented manufacturing technique ofusinga concrete moldandaninflatable rubber bagto buildthefuselage oftheirnewaircraft, knowing thatitwouldlend itselftothecreation ofaroomy transport withaminimum ofinterior bracing. Itwould alsoreduce production costs—if morethanoneVega could besold.Thetwomenhadsome disagreements; Allan wasagainst usinga cantilever wing,believing thatthepublic would notaccept a wingstructure without obvious strutbracing. Northrop, whowasfamiliar withTonyFokker’s designs, insisted thattheaircraft beasclean aspossible. Theself-effacing Northrop wonhispoint,asheoftendid. Hewas arathershort,slightly built,shy,soft-spoken individual, but whenhewasdetermined tohavehisway,thepower ofhisintellect anda temper thatcouldsuddenly blazeupwiththeferocity ofan unmasked battery ofgunslentforcetohispersonality. Northrop knewthata stoutly builtplywood-covered wooden cantilever wingwithout theusualmultiplicity ofstrutswasessential tothecleanlineshesought. Theweight penalty overconventional wood-and-fabric construction wasslight, andthereduction indrag waslarge. Ifonecasually compared theexternal appearance ofawing fromeachmanufacturer, onemightbetempted tosaythatNorthrop hadborrowed hisideasliberally fromFokker. Infact,thetaper,spar placement, andinternal construction oftheNorthrop wingweresignificantly different fromtheFokker’s andinmanywaysforecast the construction oftheall-metal wings hewould laterbuild.Northrop’s confidence inhisdesign wasperhaps reinforced byhisknowledge that hisfather, Charles Northrop, amaster carpenter, would helpbuildit. Itwasthemolded wooden fuselage thattrulydistinguished the newaircraft andthatgaveitanunprecedented manufacturing versatility.LiketheS-1,thefuselage wasmadeupoflaminated spiral strips

TheVegaproductionline was quite modernfor its day.In less than a decade,Lockheed productionwas to soar into the thousands.

ofvertical-grain spruce. Theinnerandouterlayers wereabout'/«of ply tail. Thecentral nose t o from ran longitudinally a nd inch thick an Each plies. other t wo tothe andranatrightangles spruce was46-inch plywasliberally coated withthebest-quality waterproof casein glue via applied pressure, tons of 1 50 u nder eight h ours f or andbonded shellof%2—%c-inch rubberbag,intoa smooth thecustom-shaped thickness. Theshellswerethenappliedbymeansofcement-coated barbedbrassnailstoa seriesofcircular laminated sprucediaphragms

(formers) thatprovided greatstrength atalightweight. Atpoints of mountandwingandtail suchastheengine loading, concentrated wereusedtodisdiaphragms stiffening heavier attachments surface tribute loads. (Years aftertheVega wasoutofproduction, testswere runontheformers andtheywerefoundtobestronger thansteelfor theirweight.) Thestrength ofthesemimonocoque construction permittedengines ofasmuchas650horsepower tobeinstalled inlater variants ofthebasicdesign.

The Vega: First Star of a Major Constellation

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23

Another assemblyof giants: from left, Allan Lockheed,John K.Northrop, AnthonyStadiman,and GerardVultee.

Theresulting fuselage wasclean, streamlined, andamazingly flex-

ible,forholescouldbecutintoit almostanywhere foraccess hatches,

navigation stations, anddoors, thereby customizing it foranydesired use.Repairs in thefieldwerealsoeasy,andcrashes werelesslethal because therewereno longerons tocrumple andpiercecreworpas-

sengers.In addition,thestandardfuselage, whoselengthanddiameter werefixedbecauseof itsmethodofconstruction, nonetheless lentitself

toavariety ofwingplacements, cockpit positions, andundercarriage types. Performance increased overtime,fromthecreditable 135-mph topspeedoftheoriginal Vegato the226-mphOrions.Rangeand altitude capabilities alsovaried widely, forthebasicLockheed could beconfigured asrequired foritsmission.

OneFuselageMold:ManyDifferent Aircraft Ithoughout of chronological order,it willbe helpfulhereto ex-

plainthevarious typesofsingle-engine Lockheeds thatwillbe referred tolater.Allofthewooden-body Lockheed shells wereturned

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 24

A truly great pilot, RoscoeTurner realizedthat flyingan airplane was no longer enough for the Americanpublic.Theydemanded

showmanship, andhedelivered. HerehestandswiththeBendix,

Harmon,and Thompsontrophies.

bag,whichhada camold/pneumatic concrete outfromthesingle pacityofsixshells(threefuselages) perweek. numbers, Vegawasbuiltin greatest high-wing Thetraditional imhadalmost Northrop m anufactured. witha totalof 129being single-float a low-wing, oftheExplorer, begunthedesign mediately thanthatofthe feetlonger andone-half withawingseven aircraft only4 andultimately however, was delayed, Vega.Itsmanufacture in be placed liketo pilots Airmail float. werebuilt,nonewitha single would ofacrash sothatmuchoftheenergy therearofthefuselage, Air E xpress, the w ith it was and so them, itreached before beabsorbed on fuselage the above fashion parasol itswingmounted carried which ledtothe aircraft foraspecial requirement Lindbergh’s Charles struts. 15Sirius o f A total below. in detail described b e whichwill Sirius, aSirius essentially totheAltair, werebuilt,andtheyleddirectly aircraft firstofits gear—the landing retractable operated witha hydraulically 1 Siriuses; c onverted 5 were which of b uilt, were kind.Only6Altairs Altair, inturn,wasconverted toanOrion. wasthe airliner, TheOrion,a swiftandverymodern-looking 35were and Lockheeds, wooden-body the low-wing of mostsuccessful of rebirth the upon effect built.TheOrionwastohaveanimportant

The Vega: First Star of a Major Constellation

= 25

The LockheedExplorerwas an earlyJack Northropvariationon the basic Vegadesign. Thisis the Cityof Tacomaflownby AlbertH. Bromley.

theLockheed firm,asweshallsee.Onefinaldesign wastheendproductoftheoriginal Lockheed formula, theXP-900 fighter, aremarkable airplane thatlooked tenyearsaheadofitstimewhenit appeared in 1931. Withthevarious conversions, atotalof198single-engine Lockheeds wereproduced between 1927and1937; inthatsametime period,theLockheed organization would undergo evolutionary changes internally whilebeingsubjected to revolutionary changes externally. Internal changes included engineering oversight, asJackNorthrop was

succeeded byGerardVultee, whoturnedthereinsoverto Richard A.

VonHake, whowasprimarily responsible fortheOriondesign.

Keeler:AGoodJudgeofAirplanes— andthe StockMarket

t wasthebasicoriginal Lockheed Vegadesign thatimpressed Jay, however, andheprepared a prospectus intended to raise$25,000 forthenewcompany. Jay’s original intentwasto bringfourorfive investors in,butwhenFredKeeler sawtheprospectus, heoffered to putuptheentire$25,000. Asthings developed, heputup$2,550 for 51percent ofthecommon stockand$20,000 forallofthepreferred.

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 26

in1926than moregenerous werenotsignificantly capitalists (Venture chiefengibecame Northrop $2,450. Allaninvested theyaretoday.) heearned t heone by$7.50aweekover wasincreased neer(hissalary at Douglas),andAnthonyStadlmanwasrecruitedto be the factory

far was Stadlman engineer, a self-taught Apilotand superintendent. assigned. atthetask morethanthat,butheexcelled the didnotprevail, wishes Northrop’s inwhich In aninstance he felt t hat Northrop a dopted. was Company Aircraft nameLockheed repown his of theaircraft; forthedesign responsible wasprimarily havelikedtohavetheplant andhewould waswellestablished, utation inthe value commercial saw businessman, the forhim.Keeler, named

of theaircrafttheyhadbuiltpreviname,in partbecause Lockheed brakebusihydraulic Lockheed Malcolm’s because ously,butprimarily ness,in which Keelerwasalsoan investor,was nowuniversallyknown.

fromEddieBellande A Thumbs-up Vegawasrolledoutofthetiny ofthefirstLockheed be fuselage DrivenearthecornerofSycamore plantat 1001NorthOrange onatruck wereplaced Thewings inHollywood. Streets andRomaine I fieldnearnglewood. tailfirst,toavacant wastowed, andthefuselage KnownasMinesFieldin honoroftherealestateagentwhohandled

ofLosAngeles thelocation became itssaletothecity,it subsequently International Airport. andreadied wasbeingassembled Vega Whilethesleek-looking one Bellande, Antoine Edward by examined closely was it forflight, nerves w ith but stocky, and Short oftheday. testpilots oftheforemost needed were improvements toinferwhatdesign ofsteelandtheability the Curtiss at w ork t est h isfirst haddone Bellande fromatest flight, asaninstructor Hehadserved NewYork. inHammondsport, factory asa worked WarI, andsubsequently World pilotinthenavyduring Hewas p ilot. test anditinerant duster, crop skywriter, barnstormer, heflew notleastbecause circles, flying in California veryprominent DeMille JL-6monoplane. Larsen Junkers all-metal CecilB.DeMille’s

wasanardentaviationenthusiast,andBellandeworkedforhimatthe

inLos andFairfax ofWilshire atthecorner located Airport, Rogers flying’s survived Bellande testpilots, manyoftheearly Unlike Angeles. cora successful become starvation—to and twindangers—crashes porateexecutive. manwho wasaserious Bellande grin,theswarthy aready Despite

The Vega: First Star of a Major Constellation

= 27

Edward‘‘Eddie”’Bellandemade the first flight in the Vega;he pronouncedit a success. Bellandewas not onlya famous test pilot, he was part of Hollywood’shigh society.

knew exactly howmuch wasriding onthefirstflight ofthenewVega. Thefeverforaviation hadbeenbuilding intheUnited States since thewar,fueled inpartbythespeculative nature ofthestockmarket, which looked toaviation asthenextgreatgrowth industry, onethat wouldrivaltheautomobile. Lindbergh’s epochal flighttoParis, followedbyhiswinning theheartsofallAmericans withhisboyish, modest manner, hadsetoffavirtual orgyofraces, bothintheairand in thestockmarket.Iftheflighttestwassuccessful, thenewLockheed

Aircraft Company hadanexcellent chance tosurvive andgrow. Ifthe testswereunsuccessful—the airplane crashed, orperformed sopoorly thatinvestors werefrightened off—it would probably betheendof thelinefortheinfantcompany. Withaneyeonpublicity, thetestflight ofthefirstLockheed was scheduled forJuly4,1927. TheVega impressed Bellande, foritsclean lineswerea departure fromevery otheraircraft initscategory. Made entirely ofwood, except fortheengine mounts, theaircraft wasbeautifullyfinished, andcarried a largeLockheed starinsignia onits triangular-shaped vertical surface, thefirstinstance ofitsuse.Theday

washot,andBellandewaiteduntil4:00P.M.to makethefirstflight

inanaircraftthatheknewwasfasterandmoredemanding thanany

hehadeverflown. Thetakeoff wasuneventful, andinanhour’s flight heputtheVegathrough aseries ofmaneuvers thatdidnotpressits envelope, butnonetheless demonstrated itssuperb handling qualities.

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 28

Thestartling beautyof the prototypeVegaseems commonplacetoday.At the time, its streamlinedfuselageand cantilever,strutless wingswereconsideredrevolutionary. Leftto right: Jack Frost, EddieBellande,Jack Northrop,AllanLockheed,unknown.

Whenhelanded, heclimbed outoftheaircraft andgavetheendorsementexpected oftestpilots: “Boys, she’s adandy. Arealjoytofly.” Hehadsome otherwords forJackNorthrop, a pilothimself, and whoflewthesecond flightasthefirstofthemanypassengers Vegas would carry overtheyears. Bellande toldNorthrop thattheprototype Vega “hadabitofawobble,” andindicated thatitneeded lessrudder and a larger vertical surface. Northrop would redesign theempennage (tailsurfaces) of subsequent wooden-body Lockheeds to givethem theirdistinctive curvedvertical surface andrudder.

Lindbergh Fever Le famous flighttoParissimply ignited theflameofan aviation firethathadbeensmoldering foryears. Many factors prepared, thenstoked, thebonfire. Theglutofwar-surplus aircraft was

almostexhausted. Thelifespanofwood-and-fabric aircraft waslimited,evenifcontinually protected fromtheelements byagoodhangar.

The Vega: First Star of a Major Constellation

= 29

Thoseaircraftremaining in war-surplus storagewerebecoming se-

verely deteriorated andincreasingly expensive tobringtoflying condition.Theywerealsoveryoldhatina country determined tobe modern inallthings.

Lindbergh’s flightwasexploited bythousands ofentrepreneurs, whoflogged songs,books,sheetmusic,candybars,paintedplates, and

every imaginable souvenir thatwould accept aphotoorapainting of Lindbergh orhisRyan.Theeffectupontheaviation industry was dramatic. Alloverthecountry, backyard manufacturers builtaircraft

tocashinonthecraze.Theireffortswereoftenseizeduponbypromoterswhosoldstocktoanenthusiastic (readgreedy) public. Ninety-

ninepercent ofthetimetheaircraft wascapable ofonlyindifferent performance andfoundnomarket. Thenewcompany usually folded quietly afterthestockpromoters hadprudently removed theirtake fromtheendeavor. Theexploitation ofLindbergh’s flight byothers would continue onintothedepression years. Themadness reached itszenithearly, withJames D.Dole’s May25,1927,announcement ofanofferof $25,000 tothefirstflierand$10,000 tothesecond fliertocross from theNorthAmerican continent toHonolulu withinoneyearfromthe

startdate,August 12,1927.(August 12wasa Hawaiian holiday, celebrating itsbecoming aU.S.territory in1898.) Coming onlyfourdaysafterLindbergh’s triumph, theannouncementthrew abarrelofgasoline upontheaviation bonfire. Theprize money wasa greatinducement ($25,000 thenbeingtheequivalent perhaps of$250,000 ormorenow),buttherealattraction wasthe possibility ofmetamorphosing fromanunknown laborer inaviation’s ill-paying vineyard intoLindbergh. Itwasanintoxicating prospect, andpilotsfromallwalks oflifeexamined theequipment available to them,discounted theodds,andentered therace,which wasimmediately labeled theDoleDerby, afterthepineapple kinghimself. Dole’s announcement hadanimmediate effect upontheLockheedAircraft Company when William Randolph Hearst’s son,George, agreed tobuyaVega forthebargain priceof$12,500. TheVega had already cost$17,500, andpreparing ittotheelaborate Hearst specifications would costevenmore.However, theentireLockheed team understood thattheprestige andpositive coverage theHearst newspaperorganization wouldbringwasworthmanytimesthelossin revenue. TheHearst teamwaslooking foracrewtoflytheVega, andJay recommended a former student ofhisfromWorld War I pilottraining,

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 30

theexceedingly likable JackW.Frost,aspilot,andtheyoungbutvery

capable Gordon Scottasnavigator. Frost wasadapper gentleman, with amustache and a smile notunlike thatofthegreatracing pilotRoscoe

Turner,anda similarpenchantforflashyclothes.Unfailingly cour-

teous, evenunderthestress ofpreparing fortherace,Frostgenerated copyfornewspaper stories likeanicemachine makes ice,acontinual bite-size flowofinteresting itemsandevents. Scottwasonlytwentyfour,butwasa respected engineer atDouglas whohadpractical experienceon the route,havingnavigatedtheyawlJubiloin a raceto

Honolulu theprevious year.

Oncetheydecided to taketheplunge—a deliberately ominous

phrase—the Hearst teamcalled forsomeremarkable, farsighted mod-

ifications totheaircraft. Anearthinductor compass generator, likethe oneLindbergh hadused,wasinstalled, andthenavigator’s compartment was cramped, with seat, instrument panel, Pioneer speed and

driftindicator, radioreceiver, andcharttable.Overhead, ahatchwas cutintotheVega’s fuselage sothatScottcouldusehissextant. Asa nicetouch,asmallfolding windshield raised automatically whenthe

hatchwasopenedtomakeusingthesextanteasier.Aliferaft,complete withtheusualfood,water,anddistresssignals,wasplacedbehindthe

navigator, aswastheradiotransmitter. Itwould beremoved laterto saveweight—perhaps, inthelightoflaterevents, afatalerror. Twomainfueltankswereplaced inwhathadbeenintended as

thepassenger compartment, nearthecenterofgravityanddirectly

below the160-gallon wingtank.Twoflotation bagswereinstalled, oneforward andoneaft.Northrop designed amechanism toinflate theflotation bagsinlessthanaminute withcompressed carbon dioxide. Combined withemptyfueltanks(astheywould presumably beifforced downatsea),theflotation chambers could support 8,500 pounds—almost 4,000pounds morethantheplane’s gross weight. If alanding atseawasimminent, thelanding gearcouldbejettisoned. Theaircraft fuselage waspacked withcork,andrubber caulking strips hadbeensupplied tosealdoors andwindows intheunlikely event of a landingat sea.Takentogether,themodifications weredesignedto

keeptheVega afloat foratleastthirtydays—if itsurvived theimpact oflanding intheopenocean. Yettheprospect ofcoming downatseaseemed remote. Lindbergh’s engine hadrunflawlessly formorethanthirty-three hourson themuch-longer 3,600-mile flight toParis. Itwasonly2,439miles to Honolulu, which theVega, withits110-mph cruise speed, could make easily inlessthantwenty-four hours. There wasoneimportant differ-

The Vega: First Star of a Major Constellation = 31

ence,however. Lindbergh’s navigation hadbrought himunerringly to Paris, butifhehadmadeanerror,hecouldnothavemissed landfall somewhere ontheEuropean continent. Hawaii wasbuta merespeck

in thevastocean,anda navigation mistakeofaslittleasthreeand one-half degrees—scarcely morethana needle’s widthonthecompasses of theday—would sendanerrantaircraftoffintotheendless

voidofthePacific.

TheGoldenEagleGlistens a

delighted withtheperformance oftheVega, thelittle Lockheed teamworked hardtobring ituptoHearst specifications,

whichrequired thatit bepainteda brightorangewithredtrim.The nameGolden Eaglewaslaterpaintedin largelettersonthefuselage sides.Frost’s andScott’s fullnameswerealsoneatlyletteredonthe

fuselage neartheirstations, insmaller print.Eddie Bellande hadtested theGolden Eagle asmuchastimewouldallow, checking fuelconsumption anddoingtheinevitable trimming thata newaircraft requires. Hesetseveral point-to-point records, onea three-hour-andtwenty-minute flightfromRogers Airport to Oakland withAllan, Northrop, andJayaspassengers. It wasa splendid aircraft, clearly moremodern thantheother seven entrants intheDoleDerby, forwhich excitement continued to buildeventhoughit hadbeenrendered soanticlimactic bytwoprevious flights thatit should havebeena nonevent. The firstOakland-to-Hawaii flightwasmadeon June 28-29, 1927,by Lieutenants LesterJ. MaitlandandAlbertF.Hegenberger

intheAtlantic C-2ABirdofParadise, essentially aFokker FVIla-3m builtinthecompany’s American plant.Theylanded atWheeler Field aftertwenty-five hoursandfiftyminutes intheair.Farfrombeing a stunt,the difficultflighthadbeenplannedforyears,andcalledupon alloftheArmy AirCorpsresources tomaketheattempt. Thecrew encountered bothclouds andicing, andevenwiththemodern equipmentinstalled probably would nothave beensuccessful ifHegenberger hadnotbeenamaster navigator. Hewashelped bydirectional beacons

specially stationed at CrissyField,California, andnearPaia,Maui, whichenabled himtocheckhiscoursebothoutbound andinbound.

Thearmystressed thatthetriphadlongbeenplanned, andhadno connection withtheDolecontest; Maitland andHegenberger refused anofferoftenthousand dollars totelltheirstorytothepress—dquite

BEYOND THE HORIZONS

= 32

toabouttwicetheircombined thatitwasequivalent given a sacrifice, annual salaries. backed aircraft, AirCorps hadbeenanArmy of Paradise TheBird pilot Twocivilians, oftheWarandNavyDepartments. bythesupport decided Bronte, Emory shipnavigator ErnieSmithandex—merchant for wait notto andelected tomaketheflight, tobethefirstcivilians forthe toforgotheprizemoney willing Dolerace,being theofficial 6000 Air Travel prototype silver beautiful In the f irst. of being honor they B eech, Walter bytheredoubtable manufactured CityofOakland, of o n theisland injury without tookoffonJuly14,andcrash-landed andthirtyhours oftwenty-five dayafteraflight thefollowing Molokai thatit the acclaim r eceived never Theirachievement sixminutes. theBirdofParadise accorded thepraise shouldhave,beinglostbetween crewandthetragedy oftheDolerace.

evenafterthree unabated, TheDoleDerbymaniacontinued of two themwithfatal enroutetoOakland, crashed entrants would-be 16,1927,onlyforty-three beganonAugust Theracefinally results. assembled daysafterthefirstflightoftheVega.Of theeightaircraft for the race,onecrashedon takeoff,twowereforcedto return,and

Hawaii. onlytworeached tostart.Ofthefourwhodeparted, onefailed Travel firstintheirblue-and-silver landed andBillDavis ArtGoebel thirty-threeseventeen-minute, Air6000,aftera twenty-six-hour, turned a shipcaptain andPaulSchluter, Jensen Martin flight. second Aloha, B reese yellow thebright in s econd were flight, this for navigator minutes. hoursandsixteen theflightintwenty-eight making theGolden Vega, NowordwaseverheardofthefirstLockheed asdidthe of theearth, face the from vanished whichsimply Eagle, John pilot only not Thelatterhadcarried MissDoran. Buhlbiplane VilasKnope,butalsoandquiteirraPedlarandnavigator “Augie”

forwhom Doran, youngMildred thebeautiful a passenger, tionally a ndhadmade o ld, years t wenty-two Shewas theplanewasnamed. Erwin William Major Inagrislyepilogue, to“besomebody.” theflight monoa Swallow Spirit, werelostintheDallas Eichwaldt andAlvin two that was k nown i t a fter even planethatsetofftomaketheflight radio, a It carried andtwoweremissing. hadbeensuccessful aircraft thatit wasina revealed t ransmission last poignant andEichwaldt’s fatalspinintothesea.

The Vega: First Star of a Major Constellation

= 33

TheVegaMakesHistory Sey lossoftheGolden Eagle mightwellhavedestroyed thefledgling Lockheed Aircraft Company if,priorto theDolerace,it hadnot

madesuchatremendous impression upontheaviation community in general anduponanAustralian explorer, Captain George Hubert Wilkins,inparticular.

Wilkinswasstaringidlyout of hisSanFrancisco hotelroom whenhesawtheGolden Eagle flybyononeofitstestflights.Hewas

accustomed to flying theconventional aircraft ofthetime,andthe Vega looked tohimlikesomething fromthenextcentury. Herecalled theincident withthewords, “Itgavemaethrill thatanother might experience ifhesawhisidealwoman intheflesh.” Wilkins ferreted outtheidentity oftheaircraft andpromptly drove totheLockheed plantanddecided onthespotthathewanted aVega. Heagreed to thepurchase priceoffifteen thousand dollars, forthepower andperformance oftheVegaoffered greatpossibilities

for scientificresearch.Wilkinshiredthe firstairmailpilotin Alaska, BenEielson,forwhomEielsonAirForceBasewaslaternamed.Fielson

shared Wilkins’s vision ofestablishing Arctic airroutes, aconcept then asfaroutascontemporary talkaboutflights toMars. Theytooktheaircraftto Barrow,Alaska(nearwhere a laterhybridLockheed would carryWiley Postandcomedian WillRogers to theirdeaths), andtheorange-and-blue Vega, christened Detroit News, made acolorful addition totheforty-eight-degree-below-zero weather.

A hazardoustakeoffwasmadeon April15, 1928.WilkinsandEielson

madescientific historyinthefirstthirteenhoursoftheir2,200-mile

flight whentheyconfirmed thattheso-called Atlantic LandMassdid notexist.Seven hourslater,ablinding blizzard forced themtomake aprecautionary landing ona desolate windswept beach ofDeadMan’s Island offSpitsbergen, Norway. Theyweretrapped bytheblizzard for

fourdays,andto theoutsideworldit seemedthattheDetroitNews

hadsuffered afatalanonymous disaster ashadtheGolden Eagle. When theblizzard lifted,theyhadto digtheaircraft outandtrampdown thesnowtomakea runway. Afterseveral nerve-wracking attempts, theVegacarried themona five-minute flightacross openwaterto

reachthecoal-mining settlement atGreenHarbour, Spitsbergen. Theworldwentwildoverthepair’sachievement againstsuch

greatnavigational, meteorological, and geographical odds.King George Vknighted Captain Wilkins, andEielson received theHarmon

Thecombinationof the Vegaairframeand the WrightWhirlwindengine proved to be irresistible to explorersand record seekers. GeorgeHubertWilkinsonand CarlBen Eielsonwonfamewith their epic flightacross the frozenNorth,from Point Barrowto Spitsbergen,in April1928.

of1928, achievement aeronautical forthemostoutstanding Trophy Army. States fromtheUnited Cross Flying withaDistinguished along by e xtolled were andversatility comfort, stamina, speed, TheVega’s Orders advertisements. thepress,andLockheed’s thetwoexplorers, forVegasbeganpouringin.

of nexttotheexploration Hubertnow—turned Wilkins—Sir a secbought frombackers offunding andwithplenty theAntarctic, wassograteful Company Lockheed The onfloats. one this Vega, ond thatitsold Vega onthe focused had Wilkins attention forthepositive Gerard personality, new tohimatcost.Asignificant aircraft thesecond fromtheCalifornia aftergraduating hadjoinedLockheed F.Vultee, conpontoons twin the e ngineered Vultee ofTechnology. Institute o fthe many d esign laterhewould oftheVegatoa seaplane; version followed. which aircraft low-wing Lockheed toflythesecond pilotJoeCrosson bush t hefamed hired Wilkins and 1928, inNovember operation theirAntarctic Theybegan Vega. flightof1,300 Onaninitial history. tomakeexploration proceeded

The Vega: First Star of a Major Constellation

= 35

miles intheoriginal Vega, Wilkins wasabletophotograph androughly mapsome100,000 milesofpreviously unknown territory. Itwasa mammoth accomplishment, onascalenever achieved before, anddone

withthe utmosteconomy.On thistrip,Wilkinsreciprocated Allan

Lockheed’s kindness byexercising hisprerogative asan explorer to

nameunknown geographical points. Thushegave thename Lockheed toarangeofmountains, andWhirlwind (after hisengine) toahuge glacier. Withaglance attheLockheed organizational chart, hecreated CapeNorthrop andCapeKeeler, afterthecompany president.

TheHighTideofWoodenLockheeds L wasasunnytimeforthenewfirm,asAirAssociates ofNewYork

placed a$250,000 orderfortwenty Vegas. Theworld nowbeatsuch

apathtothecornerofSycamore andRomaine thatamovetoBurbank wasmadein 1928.ThereKeeler located twentythousand squarefeet

offactory space inabuilding partially occupied bytheMission Glass WorksonSanFernando Road.Nowsurrounded byhundreds of square milesofstreets andbuildings, atthetimeit wasa bucolic paradise where farmers coaxed alivingfromthesoilbyirrigating and tilling whathadbeendesert. Itwasflat,andjusta milefromthenew factory wasanareathatbecame theUnited Airport in1929;itwas subsequently known astheUnionAirTerminal, theLockheed Air Terminal, andfinally theBurbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport. Along withtheshiftinthemanufacturing sitecamesomekey personnel changes. Northrop sawthattheeraofwoodwasover,and

wishedto executehisaerodynamic ideasin metal,withallitsadvan-

tages ofhandling, durability, weather resistance, andstrength. Northropin laterinterviews indicated thathis energies werebeing misdirected intolobbying forhisideasinstead ofdesigning aircraft, primarily because ofinternal disputes withinthetinyLockheed staff. Withhistypical forthrightness, hequit,andKenJayjoined him.The newNorthrop firmwould havealonghistory ofbeautiful commercial andmilitary aircraft thatincluded theAlpha, Beta, Gamma, andDelta, andperhapsmostimportant ofall,thebasicdesignoftheDouglas SBD,whichwontheBattleofMidway. GerryVulteereplaced Nor-

uponNorthrop’s thropaschiefengineer inJune1928andexpanded ideas foralineofaircraft structurally similar totheVega. andapeak TwoVegas werebuiltin1927, twenty-nine in1928, forthetime.The ofsixty in1929, extraordinary production quantities

BEYOND THE HORIZONS

= 36

quantity ofsalesandtheeconomical manufacturing techniques permitted theWright-equipped Vegas tosellforaslittleas$14,750, while thePratt& Whitney—engined versions costabout$19,000. (These werebargain prices; forcomparison, atop-of-the-line Cadillac custom Imperial sedan cost$4,450 atthefactory.) Lockheed washeldprivately fromitsorigininDecember 1926

untilJuly 1928,whenit wentpublic,its stockbeinglistedon both

theLosAngeles andSanFrancisco CurbExchanges. Atthetimeit

wentpublic, therewere17,500 shares ofpreferred and21,250 shares InNovember 1928,theshareholders ofcommon stockoutstanding. authorized anincrease inClass Bcommon stockfrom25,000 shares to 150,000 shares, andcurrent shareholders hadtheopportunity to purchase 5sharesofthenewcommon stockat$6pershareforevery shareofstocktheythenowned. Allpreferred stockwasretiredthrough

thefive-for-one purchase option. Although theexactamount ofstockthatKeeler owned atthis timeisunknown, it isestimated thathemayhaveheldasmanyas 55,590shares.Thiswouldundoubtedlyinfluencehisdecisionsin the

monthstocome,forthestockmarketfeverthathadfacilitated Lockheed’sgrowthnowintervened tochangeitsdirection. Thedesireto

create a “General Motors oftheAir”hadsetoffseveral acquisition andmergerbinges.TheCurtissWrightCorporation, runbyformer

Wall Street Journal editor Clement M.Keys, consisted ofCurtiss Aeroplane andMotor, Wright Aeronautical, Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, Keystone, Curtiss-Caproni, Curtiss-Robertson, Moth,andTravel Air. TheUnitedAircraft andTransport Company comprised Boeing, Boeing AirTransport, StoutAirServices, Chance Vought, Hamilton Metalplane, Hamilton AeroManufacturing, Stearman, Sikorsky, Northrop, Pratt& Whitney, andmanymore.TheDetroit Aircraft Corporation (D.A.C.) wasbyfarthesmallest, withassets inDecember

1929ofabout$6.5million. Bycomparison, UnitedAircraft and Transport hadtotalassets of$41.3million, andgiantCurtiss-Wright had$78.4million. Anxious tocatch up,D.A.C. made aquick series ofmoves, taking overestablished aircraft manufacturers andrelated industries, and makingthemdivisions. Theseincluded theLockheed Aircraft Cor-

poration; Ryan;Eastman; Blackburn; Grosse IsleAirport, Detroit; ParksAirCollege,nearEastSt.Louis;Gliders,Incorporated; theAvi-

ationToolcompany; theMarine Aircraft Company andtheWinton Aviation Engine Company. Edward S.Evans waspresident ofDetroit Aircraft,whichplanneda $20millioncapitalization figure,basedon

The Vega: First Star of a Major Constellation

«= 37

theissuance of2 millionsharesofstock.Thedirectors ofthefirm

included many notables, among themC.F.Kettering, inventor ofthe automobile self-starter andvicepresident ofengineering forGeneral Motors; Harold H.Emmons, whohadledthedevelopment ofthe Liberty engine; Edsel Ford;Ransom E.Olds;Henry M.Leland, founderofCadillac andLincoln; andRoyD.Chapin ofHudson.

Evanspromptly declared thattheDetroitAircraft Corporation

would beanoperating company inevery sense oftheword,andthe heavy automobile experience reflected intheboard would helpD.A.C. apply Detroit industrial methods tobuilding aircraft ofevery description,from“$3,000 training ships to$6,000,000 dirigibles.” Thelatter example referred totheZMC-2 metal-clad dirigible builtfortheU.S. Navyandflown atthe1929Cleveland AirRaces. Allmanufacturing andselling activities were tobedirected fromtheDetroit headquarters. Plans weremadetopermit existing automobile distributors tobecome selling agencies forD.A.C. aircraft. D.A.C. washeavily intoall-metal construction, notonlywiththeZMC-2 andtheMarine “metalclad” flying boats, butalsowiththedesign ofmetal fabricating equipment, including automatic riveting machines foraircraft. Detroit exchanged oneandone-third shares ofstockinthenew corporation foreachshare ofLockheed stock. Allan Lockheed opposed thetakeover, butKeeler wasthemajority stockholder andakeen-eyed businessman whomayhaveperceived thecoming crash. TheD.A.C. stockhadaninitialcapital value of$15;theone-and-one-third share exchange ratiowould havemeant thatLockheed stock wasevaluated, forthisdeal,at$20pershare. ThepriceofD.A.C. stock would plunge totwelve andone-half centsa shareinthestockmarket debacle. Muchdiscomfited, Allanresigned, soldhisholdings at$23per share, andorganized anewcompany, theLoughead Brothers Aircraft Corporation. (There isnolittleironyinthefactthatafterhaving changed hisnametoLockheed, Allan couldnolonger useit,andhad torevert totheoriginal spelling forhiscompany.) Theformal takeover tookplace onJuly23,1929. Keeler wasreplaced byEvans aspresident, butwasretained asadirector. James WorktookLockheed’s placeas vicepresident. Workhadformerly runtheNaval Aircraft Factory in Philadelphia. Asunpalatable asthetakeover musthavebeentotheoriginal Lockheed employees, Detroit Aircraft conferred a signal favorupon thecompany bysending oneofitsownemployees, CarlB.Squier, to begeneral manager. Normally anewguyfromtheacquiring company isa hatchet man;Squier wasanything but,andwouldeventually

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 38

A man of infectiousgood humor, CarlSquierbecamea formidable salesmanof Lockheedproducts.

become oneofthemostbeloved employees oftheLockheed Company. (Ononeoccasion, funds were verytightwiththenewcompany. Squier wonallhearts byselling hiscarandstanding atthedooroftheplant, dispensing $10toeachoftheemployees leaving workfortheday.) Squier wasborninDecatur, Michigan, onApril17,1893; after twoyearsattheUniversity ofMichigan, heentered theU.S.ArmyAir

Service,* trainedat Rockwell Field,andservedwiththe90thObser-

vation Squadron inFrance. Hehadawidevariety ofcivilexperience inaviation, working withMartin andStinson andoperating hisown Squier AirServices. HejoinedtheEastman Aircraft Corporation as salesmanager, tosellthesesquiplane seaplanes thatTomTowle (of FordTri-motorfame)designed.He cameto Lockheedin 1929,and

itwassaidofhimthathadtherebeennoCarlSquier, therewould havebeennoLockheed Aircraft Company, forhewas,indeed, one hellofasalesman, whose mottowassaidtobe“Make aFriend, Sell a Plane.”

Vulteeremainedas chiefengineer,assistedby Von Hakeand

James Gershler, tohelpSquier expand analready celebrated product line.ThenameLockheed, already distinguished bytheWilkins explo*In1926,theU.S.Army AirService changed itsnametotheU.S.Army AirCorps, then totheU.S.Army AirForces in1941,andfinally totheU.S.AirForcein1947.

The Vega: First Star of a Major Constellation

«= 39

A constellationof historic Lockheedproducts. Fromthe left, AmeliaEarhart’sVega, CharlesLindbergh’sSirius,WileyPost’s Vega,and an Orionin whichHalRoachflewa 16,500-mileround-tripfrom LosAngelesto BuenosAires.

rationefforts andArtGoebel’s record-breaking nonstop west-to-east transcontinental record ofjustundernineteen hours, became almost synonymous withrecordsetting. Famous pilots—or pilotswhowished tobefamous—turned toLockheed almostautomatically. Records fell

inaveritable cascade ofdaring flights. Itwasthefashion then(andto a surprising extent, stillis)forpilotstosetpoint-to-point records. Lockheeds setnumerous nonstop records toandfrommany different cities. NewYorkwasafavorite jumping-off spot,andrecord flights

weremadeto LosAngeles, Mexico City,Hungary, theCanalZone,

Berlin, Norway, andelsewhere. Thenames ofthefliers whoknew“Ittakesa Lockheed tobeat

a Lockheed”(inAllan’sfamousphrase)includedsuchluminaries as

FrankHawks,JimmyMattern,LauraIngalls,RuthNichols,Lou

Reichers, SirCharles Kingsford-Smith, Michael Detroyat, Francisco Sarabia, andothers. Butthebest-remembered records werethoseestablished bya fewtrulyeliteaviators, including CharlesandAnne

Lindbergh, Amelia Earhart andWileyPost.Fortuitously, thethree Lockheeds thattheserecord breakers flewallsurvived andnowbelong totheNational AirandSpaceMuseum.

Lindbergh GetsSirius harlesandAnneMorrow Lindbergh tookadifferent, moredelib-

erateapproach, notseeking tosetrecords buttomapthewayfor future commercial flights. JackNorthrop hadalready designed alowwingversion oftheVega,calledtheExplorer, andVultee adapted thisin 1929to Charles Lindbergh’s specifications fora low-wing-

BEYOND THE HORIZONS

= 40

Charlesand AnneLindberghused their speciallybuilt LockheedSirius in a series of route-provingflights. In April 1930 they flewfrom Glendaleto NewYork,setting an unofficialspeed record in the process. Fromthe left: CarlSquier,unidentified, Charlesand AnneLindbergh,GerardVultee.

monoplane. Thesame moldturned outthefuselage skins, butinstead oftheVega cabin, twoconventional cockpits wereinstalled. (Later, at Mrs.Lindbergh’s suggestion, asliding canopy wasdesigned byVultee togivethecockpits protection fromtheelements. Lindbergh wanted theSirius tobeadaptable toengines ofincreased power andtothe installation oftwinpontoons. Already thinking ofthefuture, healso

askedthattheydesigna wingthatwouldincorporate a retractable landing gear,a feature thatthenappeared ontheverysuccessful Orion

series. Marshall “Babe” Headle conducted thetest-flying, withLindbergh’s assistance. During thetestperiod ontheaircraft, anumber of improvements wereintroduced, including handsome wheel pants,a hydraulically controlled adjustable propeller, andMrs.Lindbergh’s sliding canopy. OnApril20,1930,Colonel andMrs.Lindbergh, onwhatwas basically afamiliarization flight, setatranscontinental record offourteenhours,forty-five minutes, andthirty-two seconds fromGlendale toNewYork,with a briefrefueling stopinWichita. Thefollowing

The Vega: First Star of a Major Constellation

= 41

Famouspilots naturallygravitatedto Lockheed.HereLindberghsits in the front cockpitof his Sirius.

year,a 575-horsepower Wright Cyclone engine wasinstalled, along withtwinEDOfloats. Carrying almost thesameregistration number (NR-211) asthe now-retired SpiritofSt.Louis(N-X-211) theSiriuswouldtakethe

Lindberghs onsurvey flights offuture overwater routes forPanAmericanAirways. Theymadeahazardous tripfromChina viaAlaska and theNorthPacific inthesummer andearlyfallof1931,onlytohave theSirius dropped byacraneintotheYangtze River nearHankow. TheLindberghs jumped freeintotheverypolluted Yangtze, onwhat wasjustoneofseveral hair-raising adventures theyexperienced. Shipped backtotheUnited States andrebuilt, theSirius hada 710-horsepower Wright Cyclone engine andacontrollable-pitch propeller installed, making themostadvanced exploration aircraft inthe

worldinJune1933.Thusequipped, theybegana thirty-thousandmilesurvey flightaroundtheNorthandSouthAtlantic thatwasin-

valuable forPanAmerican. AnneLindbergh supplemented her fortitude andgoodhumor withradioandnavigational skills throughoutthegrueling flight. TheSirius, christened Tingmissartog (theone whoflieslikeabigbird)inGreenland, eventually became aprimary exhibit intheNational AirandSpace Museum’s Milestones ofFlight gallery.

BEYOND THE HORIZONS

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MoreThanLadyLindy i

1928,AmeliaEarharthadreceived whatshefeltwasunearned

famebybeinga passenger onthetransatlantic flightoftheFokker trimotor seaplane theFriendship. Shewasdetermined tomakethe flightonherown“forthefunofit,”inthephrase sheusedtoturn awayinquiries abouthermotivation. Working withveteran pilotBernt Balchen,shehad the twenty-second Lockheed(andtwentiethVega)

prepared fora transatlantic soloflightwiththeinstallation ofanew 420-gallon fuelsystem anda supercharged Pratt& Whitney Wasp engine of450horsepower. Painted deepredwithgoldtrimandregistered NC7952,Earhart’s planetookofffromHarbour Grace, New-

foundland,on May20, 1932,the fifthanniversary of Lindbergh’s

flight, andlanded inanIrishfieldnearCulmore, afteraflightoffifteen hoursandeighteen minutes. Threemonths later,shemadethefirst woman’s solotranscontinental nonstop flightfromLosAngeles to Newark,NewJersey,in just nineteenhoursand fiveminutes.The

following year,shesoldtheaircraftfor$7,500andit wasplacedon

exhibit attheFranklin Institute inPhiladelphia. Itwaslateracquired andrefurbished bytheNational Air&Space Museum, where it is currently exhibited, theoldest Lockheed inexistence. Earhart purchased asecond Vega, aHi-Speed Special 5Cmodel, NC965Y, installed theengine fromheroriginal ocean-spanning Vega init,andhadit painted inherfavorite red-and-gold colorscheme. WithPaulMantz ashermentor thistime,shetookofffromWheeler Field, Hawaii, andflewtoOakland injusteighteen hoursandsixteen minutes, thefirstperson toflytheroutealone. ThestoryofEarhart’s lastflightinaLockheed willbetoldina following chapter, butitshould benotedthatinpersonal appearance, manner, anddegree ofadulation, shewasverysimilar toCharles Lindbergh, andsoinevitably wascalled “Lady Lindy” bythepress. The nickname, while intended tobeflattering, wasunfair, forEarhart deserved tobehonored onherownmerits. Shewaslessfortunate than Lindbergh inherchoice ofaspouse, George Putnam, forwhile Anne Lindbergh wasalways supportive, Putnamtendedtobeexploitative. Amelia Earhartwasa feminist, andtirelessly laboredto improve the

lotofwomen bydemonstrating thatawoman could compete inwhat hadbeenconsidered tobeexclusively aman’s world.

AmeliaEarhart, with CarlSquierand LloydStearman,with her Vegain front of the Lockheedhangar in Burbank.Thecar is a HudsonTerraplane,for which Ameliaservedas spokesperson.

WilyWiley O nefloorbelowAmelia’s aircraft intheNational Air&Space Mu-

seumisthemostfamousVega,theglistening white,blue-trimmed Winnie Mae.WileyPost,a grumpyone-eyed pilotofconsiderable skill,

nativeintelligence, andlatentscientific talent,flewtheWinnie Mae intohistory withtworecord flights around theworldfollowed bya series ofinnovative high-altitude flights thatwereyears ahead ofcontemporary understanding.

Theconcept of globaljourneys hadbegunwithMagellan andreached itsfirstaeronautical heightin JulesVerne’s famous novelAround theWorld inEighty Days. Thefirstsuccessful aerial

WileyPost modifiedhis globe-girdlingVegawith a droppablelandinggear to improve performance.A skid was built into the bottom of the fuselagefor landing.

circumnavigation tookplacein1924,whenfourAmerican Douglas WorldCruisers began andtwocompleted anepic175-day trip.The mostsuccessful German airship, thehydrogen-filled Graf Zeppelin, had flown insedate majesty around theworld in21days, covering twentyonethousand miles, carrying twenty passengers at70mphforabout threehundred airborne hours. Wiley Postknewthathecouldmake thetripinmuchbettertimeflying theVega Model 5Bpowered bya Pratt&Whitney Waspengine. Owned byhisboss,Mr.Florence C. Hall,theaircraft wasnamedWinnie MaeforHall’s daughter. (Itwas Hall’s second Vega, bothhaving bornethenameWinnie Mae.) Postteamed upwithnavigator HaroldGattyanddida thoroughlyworkmanlike jobofpreparingforthetrip,includingintensive

physical preparation forthestrainexpected fromlonghoursofflying andthechanges induced bythetimezones theyhadtotraverse. They tookofffromRoosevelt FieldonLongIsland onJune23,1931,and begana grueling journey thatkeptPostatthecontrols forhours,

The Vega: First Star of a Major Constellation

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battling winds andweather, badlanding fields, hazardous takeoffs, and almost hysterical receptions everywhere theylanded. Theysurvived Russian mud,Pacific storms, anda bentpropeller inAlaska. When theytouched downagain atRoosevelt FieldonJuly1,theyhadflown around theworldineightdays, fifteen hours, andfifty-one minutes. Itwasnotenough forPost,whoimmediately began planning a solotrip.OnJuly15,1933, hetookofffromFloyd Bennett Fieldin NewYork, and,aidedbyanearlySperry automatic pilotandadirectionalradioborrowed fromtheAirCorps, hesetanincredible pace. Bone-weary, hesetasolononstop record asheflashed across theAtlantic toBerlin. After facing almost continuous storms andtheterrible landing facilities oftheSoviet Union,hehadanother landing accident

inAlaska, where onceagainhispropeller wasdamaged. Afterquick repairs, hemanaged tocomplete thetripintherecord timeofseven days,eighteen hours, andforty-three minutes. Postbecame fascinated withhigh-altitude flight, forheknew that withasupercharged engine, aircraft could flyfaster where theairwasless dense. Hewasalsoamong thefirsttoconsider using whatcametobe known asjet-stream winds ataltitude toenhance hisground speed. Hedevised hisownspecially builtpressurized suit,working with theB.F.Goodrich Company. Hemadetwoattempts toexceed the existing altituderecordof47,352feet,thenheldbyItaly.Onthefirst,

hispropeller control froze, butonthesecond hereached anunofficial height of55,000 feet.Therecord wasnotofficially recognized because ofabarograph failure. TheWinnie Maewasthenspecially modified foranattempt onthenonstop transcontinental record, beingfitted withadroppable landing gear, ametal skidtobelly inon,andahighly supercharged engine. Shortly afterhistakeoff fromBurbank, theWinnieMae’s engine failed andhehadtomake aforced landing onMuroc DryLake, where his“manfromMars” pressure suitatfirstterrified hisrescuers. Theengine hadbeensabotaged. Someone, stillunknown, haddumpedtwopoundsofemerydustandfilingsintotheintake manifold.

Postmadethreesubsequent attempts foracoast-to-coast record, butfatewasagainst himeachtime.Intheprocess, Posthadflown the Winnie Maeatspeeds inexcess of340mph—an incredible advance overthe135mphofthefirstVega, andanindication thattheadvances inaviation technology couldyieldimprovements inperformance beyondanything yetcontemplated. Wiley Postlosthislifewithcomedian WillRogers, whoatthat timewasa celebrity ofimmense importance, asortofcombination of

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 46

Notformallytrained, WileyPost was an intuitiveengineerwhodid pioneeringwork in a pressurizedsuit that presagedthose wornlater by astronauts.

LenoandLehrer inthemanner inwhich hemined thepolitical scene forcomedic content. Posthadpurchased a hybrid “Orion/Explorer” aircraft fromthefamedaircraft brokerCharles Babb.Thecombination ofanex-TWA Orionpassenger-plane fuselage andanExplorer wing

wasashoplash-up, lacking anyengineering basis, andwhich theLockheedAircraft Company disclaimed before andafter thealmost inevitable accident. Postalsolocated someEDOJ-5300floatsthathadbeenfirst

usedbyaPacific Alaska Airways Fairchild 71,andweretobeinstalled

inSeattle. Pratt8¢Whitney furnished afree550-horsepower Wasp,and

athree-bladed controllable pitchpropeller wasinstalled. PosthiredPacific Airmotive inBurbank toinstall theinstruments andequipment, fittheill-assorted partstogether, andfinishit ina WacoRedwithsilver trimpaintscheme. Thecompleted aircraft was attractive, butitsbeautyconcealed a fatalflaw.It wassoexcessively

nose-heavy thatitcould notbecontrolled atlowspeeds without power. Postmusthaverealized thisfromthefirsttestflight, anditmusthave beena burden tohimallduring theflightfromBurbank toAlaska. He flewon, nonetheless,untillatein the afternoonon August15,

1935,hemade afinal takeoff, thistimefromWalakpa Lagoon, near

The Vega: First Star of a Major Constellation

= 47

Theaircraft WileyPost lashed together for his last flight was madeup of LockheedOrionand Explorercomponents,but was definitelynot a Lockheeddesign. Post must haveknownthat it was fatallynose-heavy, but chose to flyit anyway. Heand the famedhumorist WillRogerscrashed to their deaths at Point Barrow,Alaska, on August 15, 1935.

PointBarrow, Alaska. Theengine apparently failed atabouttwohundredfeet,withtheaircraft ina nose-high attitude. It immediately nosed downandcrashed, killing bothmeninstantly. Itwasa sadandtotally unnecessary endfortwomen,eachgreat inhisfield. Theaccident would nothavehappened iftheaircraft had beenproperly engineered, andtheLockheed Aircraft Company went togreatlengths topointoutthatalthough components fromLockheed aircraft hadbeenused,itwasdefinitely notaLockheed design. Itwas infact,noone’s design atall.

TheOrionLegacy S ingle-engine Lockheeds would beusedbyforty-eight domestic and

elevenforeignairlines, including thepredecessors ofsuchfamous

namesas UnitedAir Lines,AmericanAirlines,PanAmerican,and

Swissair. Somewererelatively simple “one-Vega” operations, while others employed Vegas, Orions, andAirExpresses tocomplement their larger Ford,Boeing, andDouglas airliners. TheVegaandAirExpress hadbothbeensuccessful airline

JimmyDoolittleand his famousOrion,the Shellighining.Usedby him as an executivetransport, the metal-bodiedOrioneventuallyfounda home in the SwissAir TransportMuseum.

aircraft, theformerspecializing inairmail andfreightandthelatterin

charter work. TheVega, inparticular, allowed pioneer airlines likethe Alaska Washington Airways, Braniff Airways, Wedell Williams Air Service, Bowen AirLines, andNevada Airlines tosurvive, ifnotto prosper. (Nevada Airlines, withitsLosAngeles—Reno route,quickly became known asthe“theAlimony Special.”’) ItwastheOrion,however, thatmadethemostimportant contribution. Firstflown inearly1931, itfeatured thepatented Lockheed flush-fitting retractable landing gear,anNACA cowling, andseats for sixpassengers. Witha topspeedof226mphand asizzlingforthe timecruise speed of175mph,theOrionhadnopeerintheworld. Aspreviously noted, atotalofthirty-five Orions weremanufactured,allwithwooden bodies, andonemetal-fuselage Altair wasconvertedto anOrion.Thisaircraft laterbecame JimmyDoolittle’s famous Shellightning, andisnowintheSwiss Transport Museum at Lucerne, finished asSwissair’s firstOrion. Atotaloftwelve U.S.airlines operated theOrion,butitwas Varney Speed Lanes AirService thatbridged thegapbetween the Lockheed Division ofthefast-expiring Detroit Aircraft Company and theLockheed Aircraft Corporation, which cameintobeingin1932.

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Walter T.Varney wasacolorful wheeler-dealer whohadactually made moneyin theairlinebusiness, a rarefeatforthetime.In 1926,his original Varney AirLineshadcarriedmailontheroutesnooneelse

wanted—Elko, Nevada,toPasco,Washington, viaBoise,Idaho—and he soldhisholdingsto UnitedAirTransport(laterUnitedAirLines)

for$2million in1930. Henextformed Varney Speed Lines AirService inCalifornia, operating Lockheed Orions, andsetting thestagefor Lockheed’s lifeafterbankruptcy, foritwasinVarney’s interest thata Lockheed plantbekeptoperating sothatreplacement aircraft andparts

wouldbeavailable tohim.And,asthefutureowners ofthenew Lockheed Aircraft Corporation would bequicktounderstand, ifVarneyneeded parts,sowould theoperators oftheother150-plus Lockheedaircraft stillflying.

TheFirstLockheed Fighter y1930,theonlyelement oftheDetroit Aircraft Corporation, the would-be “General Motors oftheAir,”thatwasoperating ata profit wastheLockheed Division. Funds fromLockheed were drained tosustain thecorporation’s otherenterprises, butthecollapse ofthe stockmarket, thedepression, andthegeneral demise oftheaircraft market spelled doomforD.A.C. Inanefforttosecure amilitary contract, D.A.C. useditsownfunds

todevelop anaircraft tomeettheArmy AirCorps requirement foratwoplace fighter toreplace itsaging Berliner Joyce P-16s. Robert Woods, whowould latergainfame withtheBellP-39,designed aslimfuselage housing anin-line, liquid-cooled Curtiss Conqueror engine ofsixhundredhorsepower, andmated ittoanAltair wingandtail.(D.A.C. had previously builtmetal fuselages fornineVegas andoneSirius.) CalledtheXP-900, it hada sensational topspeedof235mph, 46mphfasterthanthecontemporary Boeing P-12Ebiplane fighters.

TheAirCorpsagreed to buytheaircraft astheYP-24, andthen awarded a contract for$250,000 forfiveYIP-24 fighters andfour Y1A-9 attack aircraft. (The“YP-24” designation wasananomaly; normally theprogression ranfromXPtoYIPtoP.) Unfortunately, onOctober19,1931,onelandinggearoftheYP-

24refused tocome down, andthepilot,Lieutenant Harrison Crocker, wasordered to abandon theaircraft. Crocker couldprobably have made asafe landing ononegear,sustaining onlyminordamage, but

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TheXP-900,Lockheed’sfirst fighter aircraft, used a standard Orionwingcoupledto a metal fuselage.Despitean accident to the prototype,the advanceddesign was eventuallymodifiedand put into productionby Consolidated.

HarveyChristenwas the veryfirst employeeof the Lockheed AircraftCorporation,whichhe servedwith distinction for manyyears.

theAirCorpswasunfamiliarwithretractablegears,and feltthat it

wasmoreprudent toabandon theaircraft. Itdidnotreally matter toDetroit Aircraft, foritcould notfulfill thecontract. Ithadlostmorethan$700,000 in1929andhadseen thevalueofits$15parvaluestockdropto 12'%¢; therewasno

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alternative butreceivership. TheLockheed Aircraft Corporation came

underthecontrol oftheTitleInsurance andTrustCompany ofLos Angeles. During thereceivership, CarlSquier would goondirecting askeleton workforce, which managed tobuildtwomoreOrions and anAltair. Inaddition, partsfortwoVegas were acquired bytwogroups offormer employees. Firman Graydirected acrewwhich completed oneVegainMay1932, whileDickVonHakecompleted another in Marchof1933.Inbetween thesedates,onJune16,1932,thecompanywasclosed. Onlyonemanwasemployed inthefactory, Harvey Christen,whoservedasmechanic,supplyclerk,sweeper,andnight

watchman. Hewouldgoontodomuchmore.

Itwasaxiomatic thatafirmwiththepotential toproduce sen-

sationaldesigns liketheVega,Sirius,andOrioncouldnotbekept

closed. Onlyfivedaysafterthesadceremony ofshutting itsdoors, a newLockheed Aircraft Corporation would beborn.

CHAPTER 3

Rebirthand kesurgence

Atioset

twoof themenwhodidsomuchto launcha great

aviationfirm,AllanLockheed andRobertEllsworth Gross,came

fromtotally different backgrounds, eachmanaged toarrive atexactly therighttimefortheLockheed company. Aspreviously noted,Allancamefroma familypoorinmaterial

goodsbutrichin mentalresources. Robert,themanwhowouldlead

therebirthofLockheed in 1932,couldtracehissurname toEnglish

records asfarbackas1273.TheEllsworth lineofthefamily wasno lessdistinguished, withSirJohnEllsworth’s name being recorded dur-

ingthelifeofEdward III(1312-77). TheEllsworths wereinAmerica

by1646,andthetwolinescametogether earlyinthenineteenth century. Robert’s father,RobertHavenGross,wasbornin 1864and

married Mabel Bowman Bell.Thetwochildren bornofthisunion,

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Oneof the most beloved executivesin Lockheedhistory, RobertE. Grosswas knownfor his dapper wardrobe,his interest in art, and his business acumen.

Robert andhisyounger brother Courtlandt Sherrington Gross, would leadLockheed toevergreater heights. AllanandRobert weresimilar inthreerespects. First,eachwas taught byhismother athome. Allan never received anyformal schooling,butafterfouryears ofhometutoring, Robert entered elementary school. Onhisfirstday,hewasstarted inthefirstgrade, butwas rapidly moved uptothefifthbyday’s end.Second, theywereboth fascinated byautomobiles, withAllanracingCorbins, andRobert owning a succession ofexotic foreign carsincluding a Mercedes, a Voison, andaHispano Suiza—all automobile companies withstrong aviation associations. Laterintheirlives, eachshared a thirdquality, theability topickexactly therightkindofpeople tomeeta current organizational need. Robertwasgraduatedfromthe WestNewton,Massachusetts,

highschool, andwenttotheexclusive St.George’s Preparatory School. Hewasgraduated fromHarvard in1919, having distinguished himself athletically ifnotacademically—the “gentleman’s C”wasverymuch themode.Hecaptained boththebaseball andhockey teams, andin theinnocent manner oftheday,sofarremoved fromtoday’s commercialized college sports, sometimes served ascoach aswell.Onlyfive feetseven andone-half inches tall,butstrongly built,Robert hada

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ruddycomplexion anda quicksmile,a personathatservedhimwell

indramatics, where henodoubtpicked upskills thatwereuseful to himinnegotiations inlateryears. Enlisting asaprivate during World

WarI, heroseto therankoffirstlieutenant;thewarendedbeforehe

couldgooverseas.

Hisfather hadbeenhighly successful inthecoal-mining business, andwaspresident oftheNewRiver Company. Asaboy,Robert traveledwithhisfather through theWestandtheSouth, sometimes sitting ona Suitcase ina tent,listening tohisfatherhandle management problems, picking upinformation thatwouldprovetobeuseful to himwhenhelaunched hisentrepreneurial career. Hewonhisfirstjobonthebaseball diamond atHarvard—a friendofhisfather,GeorgeLee,watchedhimplay,likedwhathesaw,

andinvitedhimto a jobaftergraduation withLee,Higginson &

Company, aninvestment firm.Robert worked forthemforeight years, inavariety ofpositions, anditwastherethathefirstbecame exposed to aviation,travelingaroundtheUnitedStatesandEurope. In 1927,hewassentbyhisfirmto lookat theCanon-Reliance

FuelCompany ofCanonCity,Colorado, which hadnotbeenoperatingprofitably. Grossexamined theproperties, and,basedonthe knowledge hehadacquired ofthebusiness, hebought thecompany for $120,000.He managedto bringhis coalcompanyaroundto a

veryprofitable state,primarily byselling coaltotheSantaFeRailroad, andwithoutleavingLee,Higginson.Informalreportsindicatethathe

wasa millionaire inhisearlythirties. Laterthatyear,oneofhisassignments forLee,Higginson took himto theStearmanAircraftCompany,inWichita,Kansas.Therehe

madehisfirstflight,ina Stearman biplanepilotedbyLloydCarlton

Stearman andincompany withMacV.Short,twomenwhose lives wouldlatermeshwithhisown.Stearman already hadcarved outa distinguished career, having beenchiefengineer forE.M.“Matty” Laird andthen,in1924, joining withWalter Beech andClyde Cessna to createTravelAir.(Theaviationworldwasa smallone;Cessnahad

flown thefirstplaneStearman hadeverseen,andBeech hadtaught himhowtofly.) Stearman leftin1926tocreate hisowncompany, Stearman Aircraft,at Venice,California,but returnedto Wichitain 1927.There

hebuiltandsoldnofewer than249ofhisrugged series ofbiplanes—a hugenumber forthetime.Ironically, themostfamous aircraft tobear hisname, theStearman Model 75,thefamous “Kaydet,” wasmanufactured afterhisdeparture fromthefirmbytheStearman Division

RobertE. Grosshad headedthe VikingFlyingBoat Companyprior to coming to Lockheed.TheVikingwas an adaptationof the FrenchSchreck aircraft that had been built in large numbers.

oftheBoeing Company. Although elements fromLloyd Stearman’s previous designs wereused,theKaydet wasdesigned byHarold Zipp andJackClark.

Grossnot onlyboughta $20,000interestin StearmanAircraft,

butalsopurchased anaircraft. Inoculated withaviation fever, in1928 heandhisyounger brother Courtlandt formed theViking Flying Boat

Company, a Delaware corporation, tomanufacture alicensed version

oftheFrench Shreck pusher biplane flying boatinNewHaven, Connecticut.In 1931,heformeda secondVikingFlyingBoatCompany, a Connecticutcorporation, to financebuildinga hangaronNewHa-

venAirport. Thefirstcompany leased thesecond company’s hangar, thenacquired theBourdon Aircraft Corporation, which builtthedelightful littleKittyHawkbiplane (“Flies Likea Hawk, Lands Likea Kitten”’).

Withtheseinvestments, whichbysomeaccounts totaledmore

than$400,000 overtime,Gross should havemademoremoney than hehadincoalmining. TheStearman company wasacquired byUnited

BEYOND THE HORIZONS

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Aircraft andTransport inastocktransaction thatyielded afinepaper profit. TheKittyHawk waswellliked, itsrelatively small dimensions imparting animbleness thatmadeitfuntofly.Thewell-proven fourplace Viking flying boatshould havebeenextremely successful, forthe originalfirm,FBA(Franco-British Aviation),had builtalmostfour

thousand similar aircraft foravariety ofairforces. Afewweresold, including fivetotheU.S.Coast Guard in1936atapriceofjustunder $5,000 each.Givenserialnumbers V-152through 156,thesewere giventheunusual designation 00-1.Somewagssuggested thatthe hyphen wasa minus sign,given thesmall sizeoftheflying boats. The CoastGuardorder,whichhadbeenfacilitated byFranklin Kurt,a prototypical sportsman pilotoftheperiod andexpert onwater flying,

resulted in a netprofitof$5,846.98, minusa $2,000royaltyfeeto FBA.Theaccounting picturewasnotassatisfying, because thebook

value oftheunfinished boatsthathadbeenusedtosatisfy thecontract was$27,190, resulting ina netlossofmorethan$23,000 ontheir manufacture. Grosswastoexperience ontheEastCoastandinWichita what

theLockheed Division ofDetroit Aircraft wasexperiencing inCalifornia: theDepression. Thestockmarket crash wiped outGross’s investment inStearman andreduced sales forViking, although thelatter firmstayed inbusiness untilthedemands ofanexpanding Lockheed firmwoulddrawCourtlandt westin 1940.Thefinancial debacle did

notalterRobert’s faithinStearman, nordiditdiminish hisfascination withaviation. Notapilot,anddefinitely notanengineer, Gross had aloveforaviation thatenabled himtopersevere inadversity. More importantly, thatlovegavehimanintuitive sense ofwhatthemarket required, andenabled himtomake aseriesofcorrect decisions over thenextthirtyyears thatwould bringhimtothetopofhisindustry. Thewordmostfrequently usedbyhiscontemporaries todescribe Gross was“visionary,” andheisremembered withdeepaffection by allwhoknewhim.

VarneySpeedLanes alterVarney hadpurchased thelastLockheed aircraft toleave the plantbefore itsdoors were closed, agleaming white, red-trimmed Orion.Varney Speed Lanes (hechanged thenamefromSpeed Lines) operated a fleetofsixOrions between LosAngeles andSanFrancisco. TheswiftOrions madethetripintwohoursandfifteen minutes ata

Rebirth and Resurgence

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speedthatwas50to75mphfasterthanthecompeting Fordsand Fokkers. (Current airline timetables showthatmodern 500-mph jet airliners makethesametripinonehourandtwenty-seven minutes— savingonlyforty-eight minutes.Thisrelatively smalldifference in elapsed timecanbeattributed tothefactthattheOrionshadfarless

complex departure andcontrol procedures—they simply tookoff,flew totheirdestinations at a lowaltitude, landed, andtaxiedupto the

terminal.) Varney invitedGrosstocomeoutandinspect hisoperation and providefinancial advice,a highcompliment givenVarney’s demon-

strated record ofbuying andselling atopportune times. Gross’s price wasright—he received nosalary, andhisjobwas,inhiswords, “to

sit aroundwithno obligations and no title,makingan occasional suggestion astohowtheairlinecouldbepulledoutofthered.”Varney alsowantedLloydStearman todesign a slightly largerreplacement for

theOrion.On September 16,1931,thethreemenformedthe Stearman-Varney Corporation, intending to manufacture a singleengine all-metal aircraft ofStearman’s design. Thecompany hada tremendous asset:ayoungmannamedHallHibbard, whohadworked

forStearman inWichita, andwould become oneofLockheed’s engineering legends, fathering theElectra, theHudson, theP-38—and thecareer ofayoung mannamed Clarence Johnson.

Backin Burbank Br

inBurbank, anunpaid CarlSquier wasfighting desperately to

keephisoldcompany’s assetstogether asanentity,andavoiding

theirbeingsoldoffoneitematatimeuntiltherewasnothing leftto Lockheed butthename. Accounts differastohowSquier andGross met;some attribute themeeting toatelephone callfromSquier, others to Gross’sinitiative.It doesn’tmatter,forGrosswasimmediately in-

terested andflewdownto“checkthebricks.” Hefoundsomerepair

workgoingon,including a$4,011 jobonaBoeing Model100that wasbeingmodified forHoward Hughes—the firststeptoward his longandprofitable, ifsometimes turbulent, relationship withLockheed. Squier, whousedtheterm“Cheer without interruption” asan upbeat catchphrase, hadacomplete inventory ofevery tool,spar,bolt, andchairthatremained behind theLockheed doors, plusa precise evaluation ofmaterial instockandworkinprogress. Aconservative

The LockheedOriondemonstratedhow far the basic design of the Vegacould be stretched. Operatedby VarneySpeedLanes,the Orionwaswelllikedby both pilots and passengers.

Hall Hibbard,an extremelytalented aeronauticalengineer himself,had a gift for extracting the most fromthe peoplewhoworkedfor him.

Rebirth and Resurgence

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tallyindicated exactly $129,961 inassets, plusthepotential ofdoing repair andreplacement business withVarney andalltheotherLockheedowners. Squier, whosoonbecame knowninformally asthe world’s greatest airplane salesman, nowundertook tosellRobert Gross ontheideaofreviving Lockheed.

Gross waswellaware thatLockheed hadalmost always madea profit onitsownoperations, andthatonlyitsdebilitating relationship withDetroit Aircraft hadforced itintoreceivership. Inexamining the Lockheed Aircraft operating statements forNovember andDecember 1931andJanuary1932,he foundthatLockheed hadincomeof

$191,159 fortheperiod, andanetprofitof$23,956. Further investigation revealed tohimthatLockheed hadabout$63,000 inaccounts payable, leading himtobelieve thatthefirmcouldbeprocured for about$60,000 orless.(Itmustberecalled thatin1932bankruptcies

wereincreasingly common, andcreditors wereoftendelighted toget

tencentsonthedollar, forthealternative wasoftennorepayment at all.) Oddlyenough, hewasstrongly counseled against buying Lockheedinanimpassioned five-page letterfromhisbrother Courtlandt. (Thecorrespondence betweenthetwobrothersandthefatherreveals

adeepaffection andgenerosity. Itwas““Courtie” and“Bobbie,” and theysigned theirletters withtheterms “affectionately” or“bestlove.” Onecangeta truepicture ofRobert Grossinmanywaysfromhis letters, foreven whendealing withsopersistently exasperating aperson asGeorge Putnam—Amelia Earhart’s husband—he wasunfailingly considerate andfriendly.) Courtlandt Gross argued thatbuying theLockheed planttomake metalStearman aircraftdidnotmakesense.Healsocautioned that

Gerry Vultee wasdeveloping anaircraft forE.L.Cord(ultimately the Vultee V-1A) andthatBoeing wassurely going todevelop something fromitsMonomail prototype. Courtlandt notedthatwithalldue respectto StearmanandHibbard,“thedayis pastwhenoneor two

mencandesign asuccessful airplane.” Hemade anadverse comparison oftheirownKittyHawk withaWacotodrivehispointhome—the KittyHawkwasa goodairplane, butdidnotcompare totheWaco in engineering detail.In theend,headvisedhisbrotherto stickwith

Varney intheairline business andletthemanufacturing sidego.

YetRobertGrosshadnotsensedtheauraofcooperation and

vision thathehadexpected tofindintheVarney Speed Lanes operation.Hethusdiscounted Courtlandt’s advice andwasprimed tobe receptive toSquier’s salesmanship. Herecognized theimplicit value

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 60

ofthecompany’s name,and,although hebelieved thatatleasta few

moreofthewooden Lockheeds couldbesold,hesaw,asNorthrop

had,thatthefutureofaviation layinmetalaircraft. (OnMarch31,

1931, aTWAFokker F10A crashed inaviolent storm, carrying Notre Dame football coach Knute Rockne tohisdeath. Thesubsequent BureauofAirCommerce inspection requirements foraircraft with wooden wingspars andribsweresoonerous thatairliners soequipped became tooexpensive tooperate.) Inalaterinterview, Robert Gross said,“Ithought I would get Lockheed bought, getStearman andHibbard settled, andthengoback Eastandresume myactivities there.” TheDepression hadbeencruel, butGrosswasabletoformaninvestment groupthatincluded Walter

Varney,whoput up an initial$10,000,andthen,whenit lookedas

thoughthefunding wouldbeinsufficient, another$10,000. Randolph

C.“Bob” Walker, amutual friend, introduced Gross toCyrilChappellet. Walker wouldcontribute $5,000 inhiswife’s nameandMr. andMrs.Chappellet contributed $10,000. Afinal$5,000 wasreceived fromThomasFortuneRyanIII. Anorganizational structure wasdrawnup,withLloydStearman,

whowanted tokeephishandontheengineering tiller,aspresident andgeneral manager. Squier wasvicepresident andsalesmanager, Gross wastreasurer, Chappellet wassecretary, Richard VonHakewas chiefengineer, andHibbardwasassistant chiefengineer.

Othergroupswereinterestedin Lockheed,one of thembeing

ledbyAllanLockheed himself. Allanwantedto besurethathehad

enough money towinthebidding andsethissights onwhatproved tobeanimpossible goal:raising $100,000. Theirrepressible Roscoe

Turneralsosoughtto enlistEarlGilmore’s financial aidto buythe firm.Bothfailed.

Thus,onthemorning ofJune21,1932, intheU.S.district court inLosAngeles, thethirty-five-year-old Gross would submit abidof $40,000 onbehalf ofhisinvestors forthedefunct Lockheed Aircraft Company. Therewerenootherbids,andJudgeHarryHollzerac-

cepted theofferwiththewrycomment, “Young man,I hopeyou knowwhatyouaredoing.” TheLockheed Aircraft Corporation was reborn. Theexact method ofitsrebirth isinteresting. TheTitleInsurance andTrustCompany asreceiver soldtheproperty andassets ofthe Lockheed Aircraft Company toWalterVarney astrusteefortheother

investors for$40,000 cash.OnJune20,1932, afteritsincorporation, 4,000oftheauthorized 50,000 shares ofthenewLockheed Aircraft

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Corporation’s stockwereexchanged foralltheproperty andassets of theLockheed Aircraft Company. (Anancillary agreement wasmade totheeffect thatVarney agreed tobuyallthetransports heneeded

fromLockheed, andLockheed agreednotto sellanyaircraftto his

competitors.) The4,000sharesweredividedsothatVarneyreceived

2,000,Chappellet 1,000, Ryan500,andJacqueline Walker 500.On thesamedate,Gross, Stearman, andVarney agreed topurchase 800 shares ofLockheed Aircraft Corporation capital stockinexchange for alltheproperty andassets (i.e.,thedesign fortheten-passenger allmetalsingle-engine aircraft) ofStearman-Varney, Incorporated. The

shareswereto beissuedto RobertGross.(Stearman-Varney, Incor-

porated, wasapparently thenallowed tolapse, noformal action being takentodissolve thecorporation.) Robert Gross’s generous naturewasrevealed againinaletter

writtenon thesameday,givinghalfhisLockheedstockandhalfhis

Viking stocktoCourtlandt. Suchwasthenature oftheirrelationship that“Courtie,” muchtouched, refused theoffer“unconditionally.” Allbrothers should getalong sowell. OnJuly1,1932, anofficial board meeting washeld,withStearman,R.C.Walker, andCyril Chappellet named asdirectors andGross aschairman oftheboard. Hewastoreceive aminimum salary of$300 permonth, andanoption tobuy500shares ofstock at$10pershare. Stearman received a $400-per-month salary, anda similar stockoption.Squier received $400permonth aswellasa1percent commission onthegross amount ofsales. Itwasalsoagreed that5,000shares of stockbeauthorized atapriceof$10pershare, andthat2,000shares beoffered forimmediate sale.Thiswasquickly amended toauthorize offering theentire5,000shares forsale.

AnInvestmentBonus t wasalmost immediately apparent thatinaddition to $10,000, Chappellet would addagreatdealtothefirm,forhewasthatrare hybrid, theadventurer-businessman, whocombined astrong driveto flywithanentrepreneurial bent.LikeGross,hisfatherhadbeenin

theminingbusiness,andlaterwentintopetroleum,wherehebecame

aclose friend ofHoward Hughes’s father. Thisrelationship aided both CyrilChappellet andLockheed later. Theyoung Chappellet wasoriented toreality early inlife,doing summer workasanoil-field roughneck whenhewasonlyfourteen. A

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Lockheedwas blessed through its historywith excellentleaders. In 1934 they included, from left, RonaldKing,assistant treasurer; CarlB. Squier,vicepresident-salesmanager; LloydStearman,president;RobertGross,chairmanof the board and treasurer; Cyril Chappellet,secretary,and HallHibbard,vice president and assistant chiefengineer.

Bstudent inhighschool, hewenttoStanford andstudied mining engineering briefly before switching overtoeconomics. Heflunked

outinhisfirstyearbecause hehadpoorstudyhabits,butreturned to graduate ingoodstanding in 1927.

CyriljoinedtheU.S.ArmyAirCorpsasa Upongraduation, ofhisclassmates being analready cadetandgraduated in 1929—one Chappellet elected tojointhereserves rather taciturn CurtisLeMay. gotajobwithWestern Air thangoonactive duty,andimmediately

Express flyingthetrimotorFokkerF-10.(Western AirExpress later

merged withTranscontinental andWestern tocreate Transcontinental andWestern Air,Incorporated—TWA—potentially oneofLockheed’s strongest customers.) Chappellet enjoyed flying forTWA,but,deciding hewanted a careerinbusiness, heestablished a partnership andwitha capitalin-

vestmentof$500createdtheAirlinesConsolidated TicketOffice,the

world’s firstticketagency dedicated exclusively to airtravel. The agency prospered anda branch office wassetupinSanFrancisco. Therehe madefriendswithRandolphWalker,whointroducedhim

toGross.

Deciding earlyonthathewanted to“hitchhimself toGross’s risingstar,”Chappellet wouldprovetobethekeeloftheLockheed ship,keeping itstable through itsmanyrapidchanges ofcourse over thenextseveral decades. Chappellet wasa perfect complement to Gross, whose ebullient optimism sometimes needed asteadying influence.Together, theywouldcreate anunbeatable team,taking Lockheedthrough theworstdepression inhistory asitgrewinjusteight

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yearsfrom a risky$40,000 venture in1932toahugecorporation with

itsstockvalued at$40million in1940.

GrossTakesa GiantStep neofthemany greattributes paidtoRobert Gross laterinhislife wasthathe“knew whatkindofanairplane tobuild.” Thistalent

manifesteditselfearlyin thelifeof theLockheedCorporation,when

Gross resolutely putbehind himthethought offurther development

ofthewoodenLockheedmodels,eventhoughfourVegas,oneAltair, andseventeenOrionswouldbe builtbetween1933and 1937.(The

Orions werethemainstay ofthecompany during theearly years, earninglaurels inexploration, gathering news, and,oddly enough, incombat.Asmanyasfourteen Orions wenttoSpain toserve withSpanish Republican (Loyalist) forces; onlyonesurvived thewar.Theveryfirst OriontoenterSpain hadbeenbuiltfortheracing pilotMichael Detroyat, andlaterplaced atthedisposal ofauthor-diplomat André Malraux.Ononeofitstripsto Madrid it carried RobertCapa,the photographer whowouldbecome world-renowned forhisworkin Spain.OtherLockheeds servedtheLoyalists, includinga Vega,a Sirius,andtwoElectras.)

Back intheechoing empty baysoftheLockheed factory in1932, Gross hadtoconsider theadvice ofVarney, Stearman, andHibbard, allofwhombelieved thattheirdesign fora single-engine all-metal aircraft wasnotonlya goodone,buteconomically feasible. Gross undoubtedly knewthatBoeing’s Monomail was,asCourtlandt had warned, leading tothedebutofanewtwin-engine airliner, theModel 247.Moreover, ina letterofSeptember 12,1932,toCourtlandt, Gross wrote,“WegotthejumponTWA’s ideasconcerning alarge transport planesomethreeweeksago,andhavebeenin receiptof

a lettertwo or threedays[sic]fromTommyTomlinsonalongthe

sameline.”Hisreference istoTWA’s solicitation toLockheed andto Douglas foranairliner witha betterperformance thanthatofthe Boeing 247.

Asaresult, Gross haddecided tocancel thesingle-engine Stear-

mandesignandcommitto a “bi-motor,”in thephraseof thetime.

Itwasaninspired decision. TheBoeing andDouglas airliners had madesingle-engine designs obsolete. TheBureauof AirCommerceissued a regulation, effective October 1,1934,thatforbade

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In 1933, the LockheedAircraftCorporationwas still small enoughto haveall its employeesgather together for a single group photograph.

single-engine transports operating in theUnitedStatesto carrypassengers onscheduled services at nightor overterrainunsuitable for emergency landings.

CorporateGrowth mmediately afterthefoundingoftheLockheed AircraftCorporation,

Thomas F.Ryan IIIhadpurchased anadditional 500shares ofstock atthe$10parvalue, andWilliam L.Graves acquired 700shares at thesameprice.Sixthousand shares weretransferred totheLockheed Aircraft Corporation ofDelaware, which laterbecame known asthe Southern California Aviation Corporation. In 1933anadditional 500,000 shares wereissued atparvalue of$1.(The6,000shares held bytheSouthern California Aviation Corporation wereexchanged for 90,000 ofthenewissue; thus,eachholder oftheoriginal 6,000 shares gota nominal50percentreturnin lessthana year.)

ByApril1934,289,741shareswereonthemarket.Lockheed

hadmade a netprofitof$25,962 during1933. Thevalue ofgetting inearly wasrevealed ina lettertoGross byFrederick M.Warburg in

July1958.Warburg hadinvested $8,000intheissueof$1parvalue

stock. Inhisletter,hesaid,“Ihave,thanks toyourworkandthatof yourgreatorganization, beenabletogivea $25,000 Harvard scholarship inmemory ofHankFlower’s son;$5,000 toLenox HillHospital;$5,000 toMiddlesex School, anda$250,000 gifttoaprogram forHarvard College.” Thismightnotbeallthatresulted fromthe original investment, butearning $285,000 from$8,000 isnotbad.

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Enterthe Electra he Orionhadofficially beentheModel9; to preservecontinuity,

thefirstproduct oftheLockheed Aircraft Corporation wasthe Model 10.ThenameElectra alsorepresented stellar continuity, being thenameofoneofthesixvisible starsinthecluster ofheavenly bodies

knownasthePleiades intheconstellation Taurus. Thankstothebreathtaking importance andalmost unimaginable

scope ofhiswork,theimage ofClarence “Kelly” Johnson inrecent yearshasbeensooverwhelming thatthedesign andsuccess ofthe Model10isattributed primarily tohimalmost bydefault. Johnson certainlymadeimportantcontributions, ofwhichmorelater,butthe

aircraft thatemerged reallystemmed fromHallHibbardandRichard

VonHake(primarily responsible forthewooden Lockheeds stillbeing builtandrepaired, butdesigner oftheElectra landing gear)and,toa lesser degree, Lloyd Stearman. Hibbard recalled Stearman ashaving a “fabulous, almostintuitivesenseof proportion anddesignsense.”

OtherfamousnameswerealsoinvolvedasLockheed aircraft,forthe

firsttime,stopped being theproduct ofanindividual primary designer butinstead weretheproducts ofhighly qualified design teams. James Gerschler didmuchofthegeneral design andstress workontheElectra.George Prudden designed themainsparsandotherimportant elements ofthestructure. C.F.“Carl” Beed worked withPrudden on thewingsparsanddesigned thefuselage. JackInfield worked onthe Electra cockpit andinstrument panel. Theultimate success ofthenewLockheed linestemmed inpart fromthefactthatit became thehometo manyengineers whohad triedtheirhandat manufacturing theirownaircraft,andwhohadnot

founda Grosstoguidethem.Prudden hadworked withBillStout andthenwentontodesign hisownall-metal aircraft. Morton Bach hadbuiltcommercial aircraft ofhisowndesign. HenryOgden built andtriedtomarket atinytrimotor, butwould findhisgreatest satisfaction asapivotal figure inLockheed’s firstoverseas operations. There weremanyothers. TheModel10wasamajordeparture fromprevious Lockheed practice, withtheonlyimportant aerodynamic similarities beingthe NACAcowlingsandthe useof modifiedClarkY airfoil,similarto

thatusedonthewoodenLockheeds. TheElectrawasanall-metal,

low-cantilever-wing monoplane, withseating fora crewoftwoand tenpassengers. Hibbard imparted enormous integrity tothedesign by

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building thewingstubsintegral withthefuselage, withaheavy truss toconnect thewingspars. Although thetrusstookupcabin space, its strength permitted heavier loads, gavelonglifetotheairframe, and permitted growth tolarger designs. Asanexample oftheaircraft’s longevity, in1937,aLockheed 10Asoldfor$73,000 toTrans-Canada

Airlines, aforerunner ofAirCanada. Afterserving fortheairline, the Royal Canadian AirForce, anda variety ofcivilian owners, it was repurchased in1983byAirCanada (price thistimewas$75,000—a $2,000appreciation overforty-sixyears)refurbished, andflownwith

itsoriginalmarkings ongoodwill flights.It wasscheduled to retire

again in1997,aftersixty years ofservice. TheModel 10hadplaced itself intheforefront ofairliner design

byusingeveryavailable engineering advance. Exceptional attention waspaidtotheintegration oftheNACAcowlings, nacelles, wing,and

fuselage. ThePratt&Whitney Wasp Jr.radial engines wereratedat 450horsepower attakeoff and400atcruising altitude. Twobladed variable-pitch propellers wereused.Theinternal structure wasof24 STduralumin while24STAlclad wasusedforthestressed-skin cov-

ering, including thecontrol surfaces—an unusual—(and much advertised)feature forthetime.Theelectrically operated landing gear

retracted rearward toaposition behindthestreamlined engine nacelles. Thewingswerefittedwithsplittrailing-edge flapstoreducelanding speed.

Theoriginal design hadasingle finandrudder, large wingfillets

(verymodish atthetime),andawindshield witharearward rake.(Five

production aircraft were equipped withtherather odd-looking forward rake,buttheseweresubsequently modified tothestandard shape.) A largefifty-five-inch wingspan model oftheaircraft wastestedinthe University ofMichigan eight-foot-diameter windtunnelinMarch 1933, underthesupervision ofProfessor Edwin A.Stalker. Oneofhis assistants wastwenty-three-year-old Clarence Leonard Johnson, who wouldbecome internationally renowned as“Kelly” Johnson.

Johnson hadcometoLockheed in1932,seeking employment. DickVonHaketoldhimthatnothing wasavailable atthemoment, buttoreturninayear.Johnson secured afellowship andreturned to theUniversity ofMichigan forayearofgraduate study, studying such subjects—then esoteric—as supercharging, boundary layercontrol, andtheairflow around anaircraft’s fuselage wings andtail,allofwhich would standhimingoodsteadatLockheed. Hisgenius wasalready wellrecognized ashemoonlighted doingwind-tunnel testsformajor firms.

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Thefirstreports onthewind-tunnel testing received byLockheed

indicated thattheoriginal design wassatisfactory andwithin thenormalbounds ofstability. WhenJohnson returned toLockheed, hewas hiredasatooldesigner ateighty-three dollars permonth. Never shy, healmostimmediately toldHallHibbard thathedisagreed with Stalker’s wind-tunnel testreports, andthathewassurethattheaircraft wouldbeunstable. Hibbard wasbeloved byhiscoworkers, onereason beinghisexcellent control ofhistemper. Onlythirtyyears oldatthetimehimself, andwithamaster’s degree inaeronautical engineering fromMIT,he couldhavebeenforgiven anaturalreaction totossJohnson outonhis

ear.Instead, helistened tohim,andovertheensuing decades, asJohnson’s starroseandhisreputation surpassed hisown,Hibbard continuedtomanage himpatiently, getting thebestoutofhimforLockheed. Hibbard’s patience mayhavestemmed fromhisupbringing. The sonofa Presbyterian missionary, hespentthefirstthirteen yearsof hislifeinaremote section ofthePhilippine Islands, somesixhundred milessouthofManila. Hereturned to hisbirthplace inFredonia, Kansas, togotoschool, completing bothgrammar school andhigh school. Always fascinated bythingsmechanical, heknewhehada natural engineering bent,andachance flightinanairplane confirmed hisdesire tobeanaeronautical engineer. Hegraduated fromtheCollegeofEmporia, Kansas, withabachelor’s degree inmathematics and physics in 1925,andfromMITin 1927.Hemarried IreneCurtiss onJune1,1928,andeverafterattributed allhisimportant career decisions toher,including hisdecision tojoinLockheed. Hebegan workatStearman asa draftsman, hisfirstjobbeing cutting rollsofdrafting paperintostandard sizes, andinthecourse of thenextthreeyearsrosetobecame project engineer. Partofthistime hespentinNewHaven, Connecticut, working asaconsulting engineer onBobGross’s Viking flying boat,which wasfoundtorequire some redesign andneeded tohavea drawing system setup.Hehaddriven toNewHavenwithhiswifeintheirfirstnewcar,a FordModelA.

Whilethere,Hibbard wasimpressed byGrossandinfected with Gross’s loveoffinecars,beingparticularly smitten byhisRolls-Royce andcustom-bodied Hispano Suiza. Ashiscareer progressed, Hibbard toobegan toindulge himself incars; justbefore World WarII,hehad modified a maroon1940LaSalle sothatit wasthreeincheslower

slung, andfeatured acutoutonitsexhaust.

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Wind-Tunnel Warriors ohnsonworked hardoverthefirstfewmonthsofhisemployment.

Impressed, Hibbard, whobecame chiefengineer in1933, senthim backtotheUniversity ofMichigan foradditional wind-tunnel tests. Inthecourse ofmorethanseventy runsinthewindtunnel, Johnson discovered thatvertical surfaces placed nearthetipsofthehorizontal tailincreased tailefficiency remarkably. Thetipfins,which weresup-

plementary totheconventional verticalfin,modifiedthevortexcreated.

bytheflowfromthehigh-pressure sideofthetailtothelow-pressure side,improving longitudinal stability. Johnson thensuggested making thetip surfacesactasthefinandrudder,removingtheoriginalcenter

vertical surface. Theremoval ofthecentralfinfurtherimproved flow overthehorizontal stabilizer. Thenewfinandrudderplacement also madethe aircraftmucheasierto controlduringsingle-engine flight,

forcontrol effectiveness wasincreased. Placing eachrudderdirectly behindanengine insured thatthepilotcouldusethefulleffectof increased poweronthe“good” engine tomaintain directional con-

trol—the physical manifestation ofthe“dead-foot, deadengine” rule.

Johnson wasalsosurprised tofindthatpitchstability wasimproved substantially, anunexpected butwelcome result. TheModel10’sempennage hadevolved intowhatwouldbecomeaclassic Lockheed signature, theoval-shaped twinfinandrudder thatwouldappearonsuccessive transports, bombers, andfighters. In

Burbank, Hibbard wasoverjoyed withhissolution, which waseasyto engineer andinexpensive tomanufacture. Hewrote toJohnson, thankinghimandnotingthatitwas“animportant discovery andI think itisafinethingthatyoushould betheonetofindoutthesecret.” Johnson’s analysis alsotookissuewiththewingfillets, showing thattheyincreased dragbyasmuchas20percent athighangles of attack,andalsowiththeforwardrakeofthecockpitwindshield,but

thesewereretained onthefirstprototype. Construction oftheprototype waspressed withenthusiasm and speed; drawings werekepttoaminimum, withveryclose cooperation

existing between thecraftsmen in theshopandtheengineering department. Thelackofdrawings wouldbetroublesome laterinthelife

oftheModel 10,asmuchoftheinformation needed forconstruction hadbeenkeptin“littleblack books” ofthevarious foremen. Alesson waslearned: subsequent Lockheed aircraft allhadcomplete drawing coverage.

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Trulya legendin his owntime, ClarenceL. “Kelly”Johnson is shownhere in the Universityof Michiganwindtunnel. It was here that Johnson saw that a single-tail versionof the Electrawouldhavestabilityproblemsand suggested that a twin-taildesignbe adopted.

Withthe construction number1001,registration number X233Y, theprototype Electra flewonFebruary 23,1934,withMarshallHeadle atthecontrols. Flighttestswereverysatisfactory, with theexception ofthewingfillets, which weresubsequently deleted, and theforward-raked windshield, which waschanged toamoreconventionaltypeonthefifthproduction aircraft. Gross hadknown theriskhewastaking, committing hisnew, untried, andstillundercapitalized firmto building a sophisticated twin-engine airliner.He wasawarethatBoeing,longa leaderin the

military field,hadbuiltupconsiderable transport experience withits Model 40andModel 80aircraft. Ithadalsodeveloped thetwoMonomails, all-metal, low-cantilever-wing single-engine types, andthevery advanced Y1B-9 bomber, atwin-engine aircraft withretractable landinggear.While theproject waskeptundertightwraps, itwasknown thatBoeing wasbuilding theModel 247,which wouldbethefirst truemodern airliner. Douglas hadbuilta largenumber ofmilitary aircraft, including transports, andhadassembled asuperb teamthat

oo

departure fromthe woodenLockheedsthat had precededit. This Model10 is shownin the liveryof an airline that becamea good Lockheedcustomer, the Chicago& Southern.

wasusingJackNorthrop’s ideasonmetalstructure to buildthe DC-1. The247andtheDC-1werebothlarger thantheprojected Electra,which Gross sawaswhatwould becalled today a “‘niche-market” airliner. Hewantedittobeusedbythesmaller airlines, whichdidnot

require anaircraft aslargeaseithertheBoeing ortheDouglas. He hoped thatthecombination oflower initial price, lower totaloperating costs(ifnotnecessarily seat-mile costs), andmorethananything, speed, would appeal tosmaller U.S.andforeign carriers. Grossproved tobeexactly onthemoney. AJune6,1935,analysis

ofcompeting aircraft showed thatat$.2756 permile,theElectra was farcheaper tooperate thantheDouglas DC-2($.3860), Boeing 247D ($.3537), CurtissCondor($.4746), orStinson A ($.3307). Theseat-

milecostintheElectra was$.0276, lowerthananybutthemuch larger fourteen-passenger DC-2, which had a seat-mile costof$.0272. But,asGross wasquicktopointoutinhiscorrespondence, aircraft rarely flewwithalltheirseatsfull;iftheDC-2hadanempty seat,it wasmoreexpensive tooperate thantheElectra. TheDC-2andtheElectrawerefasterthanalltheothers,witha

TheLockheedengineersand shop personnelbecameadept at buildingmockups.This talent wouldservethem wellwhenit cameto sellingthe British Purchasing Commissionon the Hudsonbomber.

block(i.e.,takeoffto landing)speedof 170mph.Andwhenit came

to cost,theElectra at $54,500 wasmoreexpensive onlythanthe $42,000 Stinson, aneight-place, 145-mph, fabric-covered trimotor. TheElectra cost$31,000 lessthantheDC-2,$19,000 lessthana 247D,and$13,500lessthantheantique-looking CurtissCondorbi-

plane. Northwest Airways ordered theprototype withanoption fortwo

moreModel10sevenbeforetheElectra’s firstflight,and,asNorthwest Airlines,thecompanywouldlongbea goodLockheedcustomer.The firstaircraftwasdeliveredon June 29, 1934,eventhoughthe De-

partment ofCommerce’s Approved TypeCertificate No.551wasnot issueduntilthefollowing August11.

Despite a$25,692 profit in1933andadvance sales of$335,900, thecostofproducing theprototype andgearing upforproduction wasdraining Lockheed’s resources, anditwasforced togotothenew Reconstruction Finance Corporation togeta$200,000 lineofrevolvingcredit. Gross alsohadtomanage some personnel changes. Hewrote to hisfatheron December21, 1934,that“I hadto sliptheknotwith

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LloydStearman. Although theordealwasharrowing andquitea wrench, Ihadtodoit.”HewentontosaythatStearman worked best inanorganization devoted toexperimental work, andthat“theeasy-

goingenvironment hereinCalifornia isalsoperhaps notconducive to bringing outhisbesteffort.”Grosssucceeded Stearman aspresident

onDecember 15,1934.Walter Varney haddisposed ofhisstockin May1933, andsubsequently protested overthesaleofElectras toother airlines, saying thatsuchsales violated hisagreement. Lockheed lawyers treatedit asa bogusissue,andit didnotdeterVarneyfrombuying

Lockheed planes lateron.

Perspective hemagnitude ofGross’s achievement canscarcely beoverestimated. Hetookoverabankrupt company withaging, inadequate facilities, atatimethatmanypeople consider theverydepthofthedepression. Hethenentered competition withtwoestablished rivals, bothofwhom hadstrong military contracts, large engineering departments, andcomparatively easyaccess tofinancing. Hiscompetitive toolwas a totally newaircraft, foreign totheexperience ofeveryone onhisstaffinterms ofmaterial, size,andcost,andladen withalltherisks implicit inanadvanced newdesign. ByDecember 29,1934,11Electras hadbeendelivered, 6 to Northwest Airlines and5toPanAmerican Airways. Built astheModel 10-A,10-B,10-C,and10-E,Electras weretailored tocustomer requirements fordifferent or morepowerful engines. Whenthelast Model10hadbeendelivered inJuly1941,a totalof148aircraft had

beensold,74todomestic and74toforeign users, including thirteen airlines. (UsedElectras tendedtomigrate toforeign owners.) Ofthe

total,101wereModel10-As. WithintheUnited States, theElectra wassoldtoeightairlines aswellastoprivate owners andtheU.S. military. Gross couldnothavehoped formore,norcould Lockheed’s stockholders andcustomers. Yetthetimeswerenoteasy.In1934,development costsofthe Electra caused Lockheed tolose$190,891, despite sales of$562,759. Sales almost quadrupled in1935,toalmost $2.1million, and a profit ofmorethan$217,000 wasrealized. Against thebackdrop oftherelentless Depression, during which established companies werefolding likeflowers inthefall,suchperformance wasremarkable.

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Military Variants L ockheed’s priorexperience withthemilitary hadbeenverylimited, confined totheill-fated YP-24 andahandful ofAltairs andVegas. and activities, likeacloudoverallbusiness loomed YettheDepression itseemed prudent tosolicit orders formilitary versions. Lockheed had proposed amilitary version oftheoriginal Electra toAnthony Fokker evenbeforetheElectra’s firstflight.Preliminary development wasalso

underwayforthreelightbombers andamultiplace fighter intended forground attack equipped witha37-mm cannon below thefuselage to theflowofairfor exposed andcompletely and“fullyaccessible customer, wasthepreferred theU.S.military Although cooling.” Lockheed would havebeengladtosellthese warplanes toanynation, ifallowed todoso.Theywould havebeengoodperformers, forwith would topspeed Wasps, Twin-Row Pratt&Whitney 750-horsepower haveapproached 270mph. Noneoftheproposals elicited anyorders, buttheU.S.military wasquicktoorderstandard transport versions plusafewunusual “one-

off”types. TheAirCorpsordered threeY1C-36’s andoneY1C-37 asstafftransports. Thenavypurchased two,theXR20-1 andXR30of 1 (thelatterforthe CoastGuard).Whenwarcame,Lockheeds

of undera variety service intomilitary manytypeswereimpressed designations. Themostunusual andimportant ofthemilitary variants wasthe and cabins pressurized testing for aircraft a research XC-35, C orps Air high-altitude operations. Project engineer Ferris Waydesigned anespecially strengthened circular-cross-section fuselage, butusedthestanand werenotinstalled, Windows wingandempennage. dardElectra The inwas s ought. differential pressure a ten-pound-per-square-inch ofup speeds ground well,andtheplaneachieved worked novations Air T he Army feet. t housand twenty of an altitude at 350mph to the sponsoring for i n 1937 Trophy theCollier Corpswasawarded awaiting todayisinstorage Theaircraft oftheXC-35. development Space Air and the National of aspartofthecollection restoration Museum.

EventhoughfewmilitaryElectraswerebuilt,noneasgenuine

to andconfidence experience gained thecompany aircraft, combat l ead w ould that proposals military uponfurther permitit toembark tothecreation oftheversatile Hudson justa fewyearslater.

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 7

AmeliaEarhart flewto further fame in her next Lockheed,a speciallymodifiedElectra. She disappearedin the aircraft in 1937 on an attempted flight around the world.

PrivateOwners nquestionably themostfamous Electra—and oneofthemostfamousaircraft ofalltime—was theModel 10-Epurchased bythe Purdue Research Foundation forAmelia Earhart. George Palmer Put-

namwasthedrivingforce—and thecheckwriter—behind thepur-

chase, andheceaselessly negotiated withthemakers ofengines, tires, instruments, andeverything elsetoprovide theirequipment andser-

vicesat actualcost,withoutprofit,evenashelobbiedLockheed to reduceitsprice.Heplaceda ten-thousand-dollar checkfordownpay-

mentwhich promptly bounced; whenpresented again, itwaspaid. Putnam hadbeena thorninLockheed’s sideforyears, ashehad apenchant forseeking commissions onsales withwhich hehadlittle ornothing todo.Inthecourse ofthenegotiations for“Miss Earhart’s airplane,” ashetermed it,heplaced anorder forthreeLockheed Model 14s,whichwerejustcoming downtheproduction line.Hewould neverfulfilltheorder,butallowed Lockheed tokeepbumping his delivery dateback.

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Paul Mantz,whowouldearn fame flyingaircraft for the motionpicture industry,was Earhart’s mentor and friend. Fromleft, GeorgePutnam (her husband), Mantz,and Earhart.

Earhart’s 10-Ewassubstantially modified withadditional gasolinetanks,special cockpit soundproofing, insulation, andnavigation equipment. Lockheed wouldguarantee a rangeof4,000miles with 1,050gallonsof fuel,and4,500mileswith 1,200gallons,withthe

aircraft cruising atfourthousand feetat145mphforbestrange. With theheavier fuelloadandadditional equipment, gross weight wasabout 16,141 pounds, anastounding 5,641pounds (a54percent increase!) morethanthestandard 10-E. Gross hadasked Putnam tocommunicate withCyrilChappellet directly, andPutnam inturnhadasked Chappellet toconsider Paul Mantz asPutnam’s primary representative atthefactory. InoneplaintivelettertoPutnam, Chappellet listed thechanges totheaircraft and theireffectonweight. Hesaid,“Wewishtopointouttoyouthatthe

above grossweight ofyourElectra hasreached thepointwhere we would deemithighly inadvisable toaddanything moretoit.”Gross indicated to PutnamthatwhileLockheed wasnotconcerned about

theflying qualities oftheheavyweight Electra onceairborne, thecriticalcondition wastakeoff, whenheavy loads would beplaced onthe landing gearandcenter section. Thepointwasamply demonstrated whenEarhart crashed onherattempted takeoff inHonolulu. Earhartflewtheaircraft,NR16020,withHelenRicheyascopilot

Facedwith strong competitionfromDouglas,Lockheedopted for a strategy of providing smallerbut faster aircraft. ThisSuperElectrawas purchasedby BritishAirways.

inthe1936Bendix Race, placing lastbehind threeoldrivals. Louise Thaden andBlanche Noyes woninaBeech Staggerwing at165mph; Laura Ingalls wassecond inaLockheed Orionat157mph.Richey, Earhart’s copilot, hadwonfameasanendurance pilot;latershebecame amember oftheBritish Women’s FerryCommand duringWorldWar

II.Sadly, shecommitted suicide inNewYorkattheageofthirtyseven. Thecontroversy andmyths surrounding thestoryofAmelia Earhart’s lastflightarebothtoowellknown andtoocomplex torepeat here.It issufficient to saythatfacedwitha dauntingnavigation task,

Amelia Earhart apparently didnotexercise alltheprudence thatshe mighthave,especially intermsofbecoming proficient operating her radios. Sheandhernavigator, FredNoonan, disappeared onJuly2,

1937,ontheirflighttotinyHowland Island,adotinthevastPacific. A secondcommercial Electra,NC 16059, a sistershipto Ear-

hart’s, hada happier career. ItwasusedbyEastern Airlines captain H.T.“Dick” Merrill andJ.S.Lambie foraspecial round-trip crossing

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oftheAtlantic inearlyMay1937.Ontheeastbound legtheycarried newsreels ofthecrashoftheGerman zeppelin Hindenburg toGreat Britain; onthewestbound leg,theybrought thefirstphotographs of thecoronation ofKingGeorge VI.

Upsizing andDownsizing heModel10Electra, veryfastandpleasant tofly,hadatoniceffect

uponLockheed’s balance sheet. Itproved tobeanimmensely flexiblebasicdesign, capable ofbeingreduced orexpanded inscale with equal success. Scaling anaircraft downisgenerally moredifficult than scaling it up.Whenscaled down,theModel10yielded theElectra Junior, theModel 12.Whenscaled up,andmadeconsiderably more sophisticated, itbecame theModel 14Super Electra. Independent research bysupersalesman Squier indicated thatan aircraft smaller thantheElectra couldbesoldtofeeder airlines. This wasconfirmed byaninvitation fromtheBureau ofAirCommerce to

manufacturers tosubmit designs forjustsuchanaircraft. Theby-nowproven teamofHibbard andJohnson quickly cameupwiththesixpassenger Model12,designated theElectra Junior.Wingspan was reduced andweight waspareddownabout18percent. Thegreatest difficulty inscaling downa design isencountered withthereduction ofwingarea,which goesdownbythesquare. Inthisinstance, wing areawasreduced from458square feetto352square feet—a whopping 23percent. YettheElectra Junior, powered bythesame engines asthe Model-10A, retained itsdelightful handling characteristics, while delivering atopspeed of225mphandacruiseof213. Thiswashotperformance, butLockheed wasnowcompeting againstitself(andwithotherentrieslikethe BeechModel18),and

only130Model 12sweredelivered overthesixyears between itsJune 27,1936, firstflight totermination ofproduction in1942. Mostwere acquired byprivate operators orgovernment agencies. Almost half wenttomilitary customers. Thelargest single procurement wasfrom thegovernment oftheNetherland EastIndies, which tookdelivery of 36aircraft. TheUnited States Navypurchased 7Electras, designated JO-1 andJO-2.AnotherstandardLockheed Model12wasfittedwitha

non-retractable tricycle landing gearfortestwork;designated the XJO-3, it hada flyaway priceof$67,500. Itwastestedaboard the

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= 7

USSLexington, buttheroutine useoftricycle-gear aircraft would not comeuntilthejetageafterthewar.

KlectraJunior:TheSpiritual Fatherofthe U-2 hemostglamorous ofalltheModel 12swerethetwoaircraft purchased byBritish Airways forusebyalegendary figure, Frederick Sidney Cotton. Asacaptain intheFirstWorld War,Cotton gained fame withhis“Sidcot” flying suit,which wasawell-padded mechanic’s coverall. It wasmuchwarmerandfarmorecomfortable thanthe

leatherjacketsthathadbeenthevogue.Buckingtradition,regulation,

andRAFpropriety withequalabandon, Cotton wasdirectly responsiblefortheestablishment ofthePhotographic Development Unit (laterPhotographic Reconnaissance Unit)oftheRoyal AirForce. As

WingCommander Cotton,he“charmed twoSpitfires outofDowding,”thenstrippedandpolished themsothattheywouldcruiseat

thirty-five thousand feetwitha rangeof1,750miles, immune from German interception. Cotton’s rogue behavior hadtheimplicit backing ofthechiefof

theAirStaff,AirChiefMarshal SirCyrilNewall, whohadenabled himto cuthisphotographic reconnaissance teethonLockheed 12s beforethewar.TheBritishgovernment, actingonbehalfoftheFrench

intelligence service, usedBritish Airways asacover andCarrBrothers, Incorporated, ofNewYork asanagent. Theypurchased thefirstElectraonNovember 16,1938.Astandard Lockheed 12wasmodified withtheinstallation oftwoadditional forty-eight-gallon fuselage tanks andbyplacing aforty-centimeter-square opening inthebottom ofthe fuselage, equipped withahatchthatcouldbeopened andclosed in flight. Aremovable hatchwasprovided inthecabinfloor. Theprice oftheaircraft, including shipping viatheSSBritannic, was$53,383. Correspondence reveals thatLockheed relished theassignment. Thefirmreadily accepted thecover storythat“Mr.S.Cotton hasa lot of oil interestsin Iran (Persia)and expectsto usethis 12Ain

connection withhisoilcompanies inthatterritory, andforthepurposes oftaking aerial photographs, mapping andsoforth.” Anorderforanidentical Model12wasreceived byLockheed’s European sales representative, Ferris M.Smith, onJanuary 11,1938. ThefirstElectra Juniorwasassigned theBritish registration letters

Rebirth and Resurgence

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G-AFKR, whilethesecondreceived G-AFPF. AthirdElectra Junior

wassubsequently acquired froma privatesource, andregistered G-AFTL. (ThefirsttwoElectras weresubsequently turnedoverto France, asF-ARQA andF-ARPP, respectively.) Cotton,whowouldhavefitinquitewellwiththebuccaneers of

theSpanishMain,hadthreeF-24camerasmountedintheLockheed,

onepointing straight down,andtwomounted atanangletotake obliques.(Later,additionalLeicacamerasweremountedintheleading

edge.) HehadtheLockheed painted an“exquisite duck-egg green,” which madeitalmost invisible attheheights heflew. Operating outoftheairport atHeston, hethenbegan a long series ofimportant reconnaissance flights through theMediterranean, onwhichhetookphotographs ofLibya, Eritrea, Sardinia, andthe Dodecanese. Later,heflewintoGermany often,onsomeoccasions

giving curious Luftwaffe officers atreatbyflying theGermans in“Der kolossal Lockheed,” andcovertly snapping photographs astheywent sightseeing overGerman defense installations. HeleftonhislastmissionfromBerlinonAugust 24,1939.

Itwasa“kolossal” intelligence coup, andshook upanindifferent Royal AirForce bureaucracy withtherequirement foradvanced photo intelligence services. Cotton’s workalsopresaged Lockheed’s post— World WarIIfuture, whenitsname would become synonymous with covertintelligence-gathering.

NewProjectsPrepareLockheed forExpansion Soya; beyond theModel10andModel12,Lockheed wasincreasingly interested inexpanding itshorizons bydealing withthe

military. Sketches hadbeendrawnofa proposed twin-engine fighter,

tentatively called theXPW-1, circaMay1936. Thatsame year,Lockheed’s XFM-2 multiplace fighter lostahotlycontested competition to Bell’s striking XFM-1 Airacuda by a fraction ofapoint.Thelosswas probably abenefittoLockheed, forspecifications wereunrealistic and

the Airacudaprovedto be a resoundingfailure,as the multiplace

fighter concept wasanaeronautical deadend. In1937,however, Lockheed responded toanAirCorps invitation to participatein Design Competition X-608, for a twin-engine

high-altitude interceptor. Theterm“interceptor” wasnewin Air

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 80

Corps procurement anddiffered markedly fromtheEuropean concept ofshort-range, fast-climbing aircraft tointercept bombers (e.g.,the Supermarine Spitfire). Twinengines werespecified because theonly available liquid-cooled engine, theAllison V-1710, could produce only aboutonethousandhorsepower, whichwasinadequatefortherange,

speed, andarmament theAirCorps planners hadinmind. After studyinganumber ofconfigurations, some veryradical, Kelly Johnson createdatwin-boom, twin-tail aircraft withthecockpit inacentral nacelle asLockheed Model 22.Asthefollowing chapter willshow,aftera longdevelopment period, itbecame theimmortal P-38Lightning.

Enterthe SuperElectra oeing hadoutsmarted itselfintheairliner market byreserving the firstsixtyproduction 247sforUnited Airlines; otherairlines, unwilling toletUnited become theonlyairline operating amodern airliner,turnedtoDouglas andtoLockheed. TheDouglas DC-2had beenasmashing success, andbythefallof1935, thefirmwasatwork ontheDST—Douglas Sleeper Transport—and theDC-3.Lockheed management knewthatithadtorespond withanairliner larger than theElectra orbeedgedoutofthemarketplace. Newfunding was required, andtwostockissues raised $1.6million incapital, someof which wasusedtopurchase thefactory facilities ithadbeenrenting. Douglas hadtoogreataheadstartforLockheed totrytoduplicatethetwenty-one-passenger carrying capacity oftheDC-3. Instead, Hibbard andJohnson optedforascaled-up, morerotund version of theModel10thatwouldcarryfourteen passengers ata maximum speed of247mphand acruisespeed of215mph.TheDC-3cruise speed wasofficially listedat180,butinpractice itusually cruised at about160-170 mph. Togainthesignificant 45-mph speed advantage, theLockheed engineers accepted a high-wing loading and a relatively shortwing. TheDC-3,withitsninety-five-foot wingspan, hadalmost twicethe wingareaoftheLockheed. Toreduce approach andlanding speeds toareasonable level, very sophisticated Fowler flapswereused,a feature thatwould appear in manysubsequent Lockheeds. Inanaircraft withconventional split flaps, theeffective camber (airfoil curvature) ofthewingisincreased bymoving thetrailing edgeoftheflapdown. WithFowler flaps, the flapsmoved back,alsoincreasing wingarea,astheyrotated downto

Rebirth and Resurgence

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changethecamberofthewing.TheFowlerflapswereperhapstoo

thattheyshouldonlybeexrevealed flighttrialsquickly effective; thattheSuper revealed Experience of60percent. a maximum tended

of slotsin itshighly Electrawouldbenefitfromthe incorporation

edgeofthe justaftoftheleading Thefiveopenings wings. tapered wingsmoothed outtheairflow anddelayed tipstall. ontheModel14. engineer project d esignated was DonPalmer 12 wastight,andtheModel money because slowly Workproceeded sophistication growing YetLockheed’s wasstillin process. program wasevident.It wasmanagingto produceand sellthreeairliners,plus

Construction fighter. tobea contract-winning whatproved develop didnotgetunderwayuntilearly1937. superElectra oftheprototype chieftest pilot,MarshallHeadle,madethe firstflightof Lockheed’s

crowd theSuperElectraonJuly29,1937,infrontofthecustomary ofcheering Lockheed employees.

in1913. StateCollege fromMassachusetts hadgraduated Headle W arI,and World army d uring withtheFrench asasoldier Heserved totheU.S.AirService hetransferred Subsequently toflythere. learned After inFrance. Issoudon and a t Tours pilot instructor an became and Lockheed’s b ecoming until thewarheflewwiththeU.S.Marines of logthousands wouldultimately chieftestpilotin 1929.Headle As Lockheed aircraft. of types ofdifferent fly hundreds and hours flying experheada staffofseventy-five would builtup,Headle production imentalandproduction testpilots.

although Thetestprogramforthe SuperElectrawasuneventful,

asitspredecessors orlanding ontakeoff wasnotasdocile theaircraft AnApproved pilots. forlow-time wasnotanaircraft hadbeen—it 15,1937,the onNovember No.657wasawarded TypeCertificate Airlines Northwest theaircraft. of variants firstoffourATCsgiven ultimately fortheSuperElectra, wasonceagainthefirstcustomer were (Things f light. first the before o f them eight eleven, ordering Airlines N orthwest gave Gross onJuly13,1937, inthosedays; simpler forthesumof Electras offourmoreSuper anoptionforthepurchase onehundreddollars.)ByNovember17, 1937,lessthanfourmonths

fortheModel inorders had$5million Lockheed afteritsfirstflight, ofthatamount forlessthan1percent sumforafirmstarted 14,aheady

fiveyearsbefore.

ocwithtencrashes stalktheSuperElectra, would Yetdisaster

3, 1939.Fourofthese January10,1938,andJanuary between curring

andtwowerecraftofthePolskie aircraft, Airlines wereNorthwest LinhjeLotnicze(LOT),the Polishairline.At leastsixof thesewere

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 82

caused bypiloterror,including oneinwhich a British Airways pilot crashed whilebuzzing hisson’sschool. Butthetail-flutter problem thatKelly Johnson hadworried aboutin theModel10manifested itselfintheJanuary 10,1938,crashofaNorthwest Super Electra at Bozeman, Montana. Theflutter problem wassolved bytheinstallation ofbalanced control surfaces. Eventhough at leasttwoofitscrashes wereclearly caused by piloterror,Northwest withdrew theSuperElectra fromservice, replacing itwiththeDC-3. OnlyoneotherU.S.carrier, tinySanta Maria Airlines, wouldbuytheaircraft newfromLockheed, andonlyContinental Airlines purchased usedaircraft fromNorthwest, buying two. YettheSuper Electra would betransformed into aline ofhighly successful military aircraft. (Itisasadcoincidence thatalittleovertwenty yearsafterthe firstflightof the SuperElectra,the Model188turbo-

propElectra flewonDecember 6,1957.Itwould alsobesotarnished bymechanical difficulties thatit toowouldbea commercial failure, butjustlikeitsnamesake, itwould leadtoaverysuccessful military

aircraft,theP-3Orion.)

Lockheed ultimately built112Super Electras, ofwhich 81were soldtoforeign customers. Japanacquired 30forairline use;these were giventhecodename“Toby” undertheAllied designating system. Tachikawa acquired amanufacturing license, andbuilt64examples. Kawasaki builtanadditional 55,thesebeing designated TypeLO,and called “Thelma” bytheAllies. Aftercomplaints aboutthetakeoff and landing characteristics, Kawasaki produced 121ofa redesigned version,theKi-56 “Thalia,” which incorporated many ofthesame design

changes Lockheed woulduselaterin itsLodestar. OnefinalJapanese versionof theSuperElectra, theTachikawa SS-1,featured a circular

pressurized cabin, similar inconcept tothatusedontheXC-35.

FameandInfamy woSuper Electras received worldwide notice. Thefirstofthese was a Model14-N,powered by 1,100-horsepower WrightCyclone engines, specially modified to Howard Hughes’s requirements and christened NewYork World's Fair1939. Atthisstageofhislife,Hughes hadsolidly established hisreputation asmotion picture maker, financier, andpilot.OnSeptember 13,1934,hehadestablished aworldspeed record forlandplanes of 352mphintheH-1racer, tothedesign ofwhich hehadcontributed

After a carefulsurveyof availableaircraft, HowardHughespurchased the Super Electra for his record-settingflight around the worldin 1938. Hugheshad a long and sometimesturbulent relationshipwith Lockheed,and his interest was influential in the decisionto producethe Constellation.

year,hesetatranscontinental 19ofthefollowing much.OnJanuary versionof the aircraft,crossingthecountry recordin the “long-wing”

seconds. andtwenty-five minutes, injustsevenhours,twenty-eight flight, a round-the-world His nextgoalwasto set a recordfor

He Electra. ontheSuper settled manyaircraft, and,afterconsidering w as which 19 Electra, the number on of$12,287.60 adeposit placed onasaspecial linetobeworked outoftheproduction pulled promptly of fuelinstalled, hadextratanksfor1,200gallons Hughes project. With equipment. radioandnavigation withthemostadvanced along inthreedays, flight madetheround-the-world acrewoffour,Hughes Bennett Floyd f rom off Taking minutes. fourteen and hours, nineteen Fieldon July 10, 1938,Hughesflewa relativelyshort 14,672-mile

himfromNewYorktoParis,Moscow, ona routethatcarried distance widow), hewasmetbyWileyPost’s (where Fairbanks Omsk,Yakutsk,

to landagaininNewYorkonJuly14.Hisflight andMinneapolis,

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 84

timeofseventy-one hours,elevenminutes,andtensecondstranslated

intoanaverage speed of206.1mph, a tribute tothecleandesign of theSuper Electra. Thesecond Super Electra toreceive world acclaim didsoonan

ignominious assignment. Thefirstofaninitialpurchase offourModel

14sbyBritish Airways, G-AFGN, wasusedtocarryBritish prime minister SirNeville Chamberlain onthelasttwoofhisappeasement flights toGermany. (Hisfirstflighthadbeenina Lockheed Model 10,G-ABPR.) Chamberlain, whohadneverflownbeforeandhadto

steelhimselfto maketheattempt,wasdetermined to finda wayto

haltHitler’s aggression. OnSeptember 13,1938, hedisembarked from hisSuper Electra onitsreturnfromtheMunich conference thathad sobrutally sacrificed Czechoslovakia, carrying theinfamous “scrap of

paper”that,hesaid,promised“peacein ourtime.”

Fortunately forLockheed andtheworld,thebasicdesignofthe

SuperElectra wastogainimmense importance inanairplane that would flylessthanninetydaysafterChamberlain’s returnfromMunich.ItwastheModel B14L, named fortheexplorer Henry Hudson, whichpropelled Lockheed toa majorposition intheindustry and enabled ittomakeitsgreatcontributions towinning World WarII.

A LookBackat the Final LockheedBrothersAircraft tee thegreatcontributions ofAllanandMalcolm Lockheed to theorganizations whichpreceded theLockheed Aircraft Corpo-

ration,itisonlyfairtoreview theirefforts withintheaircraft industry

aftertheformation ofthenewfirmin1932. Allan wasterribly disappointed whenRobert Gross made hissuccessful bidforthebankrupt Lockheed Aircraft Company. Hewasalso

understandably hurtthatthenewmanagement didnotfinda place forhimintherejuvenated firm.But,withhisusualenergyanden-

thusiasm, hedeveloped anewaircraft design, thenhiredsomeengineering consultants, including thefamed Walter Diehl, toassist him. Thedegree ofMalcolm’s assistance isunknown, although thereisspec-

ulationthathehad a financial interest inthenewenterprise. Gathering

together anucleus ofkeyworkers, heusedhisownfundstosetupin 1929a firmwhichwaslatercalled Alcor,fortheAllanLockheed Corporation.

Rebirth and Resurgence

= 85

Allanand MalcolmLockheedmadeanother attempt at the aviationbusiness with their OlympicDuo-6.Basicallya Vegafuselageadaptedfor an unusual close-settwin-engine installation,the aircraft crashed on a low-speedpass at RosamundDryLake.

Thefirstofhisdesigns wassimilar to,butslightly larger than, theoriginal Vega, usinga circular crosssection instead oftheVega’s ovalshape togainthemaximum cabinvolume. In1930,hedecided toinstall twoMenasco C-4Pirateengines of275horsepower each. Theengines werelaidontheirsideandspaced justfarenough apart toprovide abouttwelve inches’ clearance between thepropellers. Lockheed’s intentwasthesame asHallHibbard’s some fiveyears laterwith theVega Starliner (seenextchapter): toprovide twin-engine reliability while minimizing thehazards ofsingle-engine operation. Lockheed named hisnewaircraft theOlympic Duo-4. Heused thesameconstruction techniques onitthathadbeensosuccessful on theVega—one-piece cantilever wooden wingand a fuselage builtwith thesameconcrete mold/vacuum bagtechnology usedontheVega. Theaircraft wasquitehandsome, except fora ratherstalky landinggeararrangement, andflewforthefirsttimeonMarch18,1931,at

Rosamund DryLake. Unfortunately, itcollided withaphotographic truckplaced atthesideoftherunway andwasturnedover.Itwas rebuilt withtwosix-cylinder Menascos astheDuo-6, butfailed tofind amarket. Stillundeterred, AllanformedtheAlcorAircraftCorporation

again inFebruary 1937inOakland, California. Therehedirected the construction ofaverysleek six-passenger feeder airliner—again a paralleltotheStarliner—and again brought Anthony Stadlman inasshop

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Thefirst product of the newlyformedVegaAirplaneCompany,the Starlinerwas intendedto be a feederaircraft for smallerairlines. It was unusual in that it had two Menascoenginescoupledto drivea single propeller.

superintendent, withHaroldE.Webbaschiefengineer. Designated theAlcorC.6.1(commercial, six-passenger, firstmodel)JuniorTrans-

port,itwasa sleekall-wood aircraft constructed intheusualVega method. Themanner inwhich itsslender Menasco engines were faired into thewingsgaveit a futuristiclook,especially in flightwiththe

gearretracted. Thetwoengines werelaidontheirsidesandpositioned closely together, asontheDuo-6,withtheirpropellers onlytwelve

inches apart,placed onlyeighteen inches forward ofthefuselage. ThefirstflightoftheC.6.1tookplaceonMarch 6,1938, with MikeCasserly atthecontrols. Theaircraft proved tobethoroughly satisfactory, andthedeanoftestpilots,EddieAllen,washiredforthe

finalflight testsforDepartment ofCommerce certification—ten hours attenthousand dollars. AlanLockheed actively marketed theaircraft, quoting apriceofjustunderthirtythousand dollars, andacruise speed

of200mph.Single-engine performance wasveryimpressive; theaircraftcouldmaintain levelflightataltitudes uptotwelve thousand feet

witheitherengine out. Against Lockheed’s express orders, testpilotCasserly andengineerWebbtooktheJuniorTransport outfora testflightonJune27,

An extremelymodern-lookingaircraft for the time, the AlcorC.6.1was AllanLockheed’s valiantlast attempt to manufactureaircraft. TheC.6.1featured closely-set twin engines, to simplify“‘engine-out”conditions.It was lost on an unauthorizedtest flight on June 27, 1938.

1938.Theytooktheaircrafttosixteen thousand feetandthendove

it,reporting speeds ofover300mph.Theaircraft encountered aileron flutter andbegan tobreak up.Casserly managed toslowitdown, but recognized thatitwasnotcontrollable. Bothmenbailed outsafely and

theC.6.1plunged intoSanFrancisco Bay. ItwasthefinalblowtoAllanLockheed’s aviation career. Finan-

cially wiped out,heturnedtoselling realestate while doingaviation consulting ontheside,asadfinale foramanwhohaddevoted hislife toaviation.

CHAPTER 4

LockheedBuildsto Meetthe Needs ofWar

ie

intervenes withcompanies justasit doesinthelivesofindi-

viduals. It developed thattheLockheed Aircraft Corporation’s ability toinitiate, thenmaster, itshugewartime expansion wasfacilitatedtoaverygreatextent byanexternal circumstance, thefailure of Britishplanning. Because ofitshorrendous losses suffered atthehandsoftherel-

atively primitive German U-boats inWorld WarI,GreatBritain had in theinterwar yearsdeveloped theantisubmarine warfare device ASDIC, essentially asoundranging system thatpermitted detection ofsubmarines underwater. Sogreatwasitsfaithinthissystem(and

inconvoys) thatitconsidered theU-boat problem solved, andsofailed todevelop moreeffective antisubmarine measures. Itpossessed fartoo fewescort vessels andneglected tobuildupamodern long-range maritimereconnaissance aircraftforce,eventhoughit haduseda huge

Lockheed Builds to Meet the Needs of War = 89

fleetof685planes and103airships inthisroletohelpcontain the submarine menace in1918. When warcame, theGerman U-boat fleet employed surface tactics thatlargely negated ASDIC’s effectiveness, andtheRoyalAirForceCoastal Command hadnothingwithwhich tocounterthenewsubmarine threat,beingforcedtorelyuponfewer

than200tinyAvroAnsons formaritime reconnaissance andantisubmarine work, withjusta handful ofShortSunderland flying boatsin prospect. Although theAnsonwasconsidered modern whenpurchased, beingtheRAF’s firstmonoplane toentersquadron service and

thefirstaircraftwitha retractable (albeithand-cranked) landinggear,

ithadsevere limitations. The“Faithful Annie,” asitwasaffectionately termed, hada nominal topspeedof188mph,butinservice was forbidden toexceed thespeedof170knotsunderanyconditions.

Violentmaneuvers werealsoproscribed, makingflakevasiondifficult.

TheSunderland wasawonderful aircraft, butfortoolongwouldbe

toofewinnumber tobeeffective. Oneof England’s great—if largelycontroversial—patriots, Canadian-born William Maxwell Aitken, LordBeaverbrook, whounderWinston Churchill would headGreatBritain’s aircraft production effort, wasalready attempting tostimulate hisnation’s aviation effort. Beaverbrook wasadoer.Having attained hisgoalofamassing £5millionbytheageofthirty-one, notalways bythemostaltruistic of methods,hemovedtoEnglandandbecamea memberofParliament.

Newspapers andaviation became thefocusofhisinterest, andhehad

hischiefpilotmakeinquiries toLockheed abouttheModel14in February 1938. Lockheed wasalsobeingcourted bytheusualwolfpackofentrepreneurs whowished tosellitsplanes abroad onacommission basis, andbyanumber offoreign countries. Connerton Triamerican Aviationdangled anorderfor“100bombers forFrance. Alsobombers for England, quantity unknown.” J.H.MillarofAviation Corporates, Ltd.,pressed torepresent Lockheed forunspecified sales. BobGross’s longtime friendJackGillies, whowasonceprincipal intheLongIsland

Country CluboftheAir,laidaside hisresponsibilities assoledistributorfortheGrumman G-21amphibian totrytosellLordBeaverbrook threeSuper Electras atprices ranging from$89,425 to$93,325, de-

pendingonenginechoice.(Beaverbrook already owneda G-21.)Ja-

pan’sprocurement ofaircraft andlicense rightshasalready been mentioned. Sales wereenvisaged tonineBritish airlines, fromBritish Airways totheIsleofManAirServices. Czechoslovakia attempted to arrange asale,predicated uponBritish financial support, andinterest

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 90

wasexpressed forsomeadditional purchases byChina, Romania, and Poland. (These matters wereconsidered important enough thatsome

wiretraffic wasconducted incode,inwhichfive-digit blocks ofletters wereusedforcertainwordsandphrases, e.g.,OKPYO being“stop,”

AIGIT “appears tohave,” andsoon.)Italy’s AlaLittoria S.A.sought amanufacturing license, initially fortheradical Lockheed Model 27, a twin-engine,canard-surfaced (horizontalstabilizeron the nose)

twenty-four-to thirty-five-passenger aircraftthatwasneverbuilt,and

thenfora four-engine pressurized aircraft ofaboutthirty-passenger capacity. Lockheed hadthefour-engine Model44Excalibur inthe works, butitwasnotpressurized, andsonoorders resulted. (Willis Hawkins maintains thattheModel 44wasalmost purely camouflage to maintaintheConstellation asa secret.)

Lockheed wasalready standing ontiptoeinanticipation oflarge

orders fromFrance andEngland, andearly in1938issued aninternal memo onthearrival oftheBritish AirCommission inNewYork. Sir HenrySelfheaded boththeJointAnglo-French AirCommission and the BritishAirCommission, withAirViceMarshall H.N. CaveBrowne-Cave astheBritish AirMinistry representative. Thebeginning

ofwhatbecame atraditionalpolish wasputtotheproceedings by Kenneth SmithoftheLockheed salesdepartment. Hehadobtained photosofeverymember ofthevisiting Britishgroup;whentheyar-

rived,heintroducedeachonebynameandtitletotheotherLockheed

representatives.

TheBritish Purchasing Commission’s ostensible interest wasa navigation trainer, buttheywereobviously opentosuggestions, and

Lockheed hadseveral tomake.Kelly Johnson hadapproved alengthy reporton a “Convertible Transport Bomber” versionoftheSuper Electraalmosta yearearlier,on April9, 1937.Otherstudieshad

followed, andLockheed wassowellprepared torespond totheBritish needs thatitwasabletocreate awooden mock-up inahectic fivedays ofround-the-clock work.(Aspreviously noted,Lockheed hadalready

considered several military versions ofitsall-metal aircraft, including aproposal forabomber version oftheModel 10toAnthony Fokker himself, apparently forresale totheSoviet Union. TheModel 212s soldtotheNetherlands EastIndies incorporated single gunsinadorsal turretand fixed,firing-forward, and underwingbombracks.)The

mock-up wouldhavetoberevised tomeetspecific British requirements asthedetails ofthecontract werenegotiated, butthefactthat itwasavailable andonhandforinspection impressed theBritish representatives, andraised Lockheed fromitsprevious position inthe

Lockheed Builds to Meet the Needs of War = 91

WestCoast shadow ofDouglas andBoeing totherankofaprincipal contender forthefloodofcontracts abouttobeunleashed fromEurope. Throughout thisperiod oftrulyheady excitement atthesuccess of itsproducts, Lockheed management waswaryof takingon any

additional commitments, pending wordofa decision bytheBritish Purchasing Commission (BPC). Theoriginal Lockheed proposal to the BPCfor a bomberretainedthe wings,empennage,and power-

plantinstallation ofastandard Super Electra, withthefuselage modifiedto includea bombbay(originally specified bytheBritishtobe

largeenough fortwofive-hundred-pound bombs, butlaterincreased tomakeroomfortwelve one-hundred-pound bombs) andequipped withamodest armament ofthreemachine guns.Single flexible guns werelocated inthenoseandthetailandanother waslocated inthe navigator’s compartment aftofthebombbay. TheBritish didn’tcareforthecrewplacement, andasked that thenavigator beplaced closetothepilotsothattheycouldwork together onreconnaissance missions. Themanwhowaslatertocommandthe RAF’sBomberCommand,SirArthurHarris,wasinvited

toreturntoseethechanges afewdayslater.Harris demurred because hestillhadtovisittheConsolidated andBoeing plants. Later hewrote, “Tomyastonishment, onlytwenty-four hourslatera cararrived to fetchmeouttotheLockheed works, andthereIsawamock-up ofall ourrequirements inplywood, fittedcomplete inevery detail, withtwo alternative noseshingedon to a realaircraft allreadyforour inspection. . . .I wasentirely convinced thatanyone whocouldproduceamock-up intwenty-four hourswouldindeedmakegoodallhis

promises—and thisLockheed mostcertainly did.” TheskillanddriveHibbard andJohnson gavetheirteamwas manifested inLockheed’s willingness tosubordinate allproduction effortstotheswiftmanufacture ofHudsonaircraft forGreatBritain. On May25,1938,topLockheed managers weredispatched to En-

gland viatheSSQueen Marytonegotiate thedeal,including CourtlandtGross, CarlSquier, Richard VonHake, attorney Robert Proctor, andaClarence L.Johnson soyouthful inappearance thattheBritish hadtobereassured thathewasactually qualified torender opinions onthediscussions inprogress. (Johnson, atwenty-eight-year-old farm boyofSwedish extraction whoseacquaintance withluxurywasmini-

mal,suddenly foundhimself onboardtheQueen Mary, enrouteto poshquarters intheMayfair CourtHotelinLondon. Farfrombeing intimidated, hespentpartofhistimeonboardfillinganotebookwith

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 92

hisredesign ofthe Queen Mary,thentheworld’s fastestliner.Ona

similar triplater,heremembered spending thetimemoreenjoyably, dancing withhisattractive young wife, Althea.) Inthejetage,wetendtoforget howmuch longer ittooktotravel andhowmuchmoredifficult communication was,andhoweachinfluenced thewaybusiness wasconducted. Ocean-liner sailing schedules

werethekey,andthecorrespondence fromtheperiodshows how carefully theywereconsidered forbothmailandtravel. Some business wasconducted, ironically enough givenLockheed’s pro-British mission,ontheGerman linerBremen. Costswerecarefully monitored;

whenLockheed’s NewYorkrepresentative, GeorgeSwayne, madea transatlantic telephone calltoCarlSquier, hefollowed itwithaletter explaining whyhehadthoughtthemattersourgentasto incurthe

expense. Lockheed wasalready assessing thefullimport ofalarge contract withGreatBritain, andhadbegunplanning theestablishment ofa facility inLiverpool whereaircraft couldbeassembled, tested, and modified. Thiswouldbecome animportant partofLockheed’s total

business inthenot-too-distant future, butforafirmformed butsix years before onascratched-up capital of$40,000, itwasremarkably farseeing. In the courseof negotiations,the Britishhad askedthat a

Boulton-Paul dorsalturretreplaceLockheed’s proposed installation andtwofixedforward-firing Browning .303machine gunsbeplaced

inthenose.Uprated Wright Cyclone engines of1,100horsepower wereselected, andtheperformance, especially compared to“Faithful Annie,” wasexcellent, asthefollowing tableshows: AvroAnson

LockheedHudson Mk.I

Maxspeed

188mph

246 mph

Cruisespeed

158mph

220 mph

660 miles

1,960miles

360 pounds

1,200pounds

Range Bombload

Lockheed’s position wasundoubtedly strengthened byanincreasinglybellicose Hitler. Finally, onJune23,1938, acontract wassigned fortwohundred Model B14Ls atapriceof$25million. Atthetime, itwasthelargest contract eversecured foraforeign salebyanAmerican

Lockheed Builds to Meet the Needs of War = 93

company, anditincluded aremarkable incentive provision. Thecontractcouldbeexpanded toinclude asmanymoreaircraft ascould be delivered byDecember 1939,uptoa maximum offiftyadditional planes. Courtlandt Gross hadledtheLockheed negotiating team, and hereturned intriumph ontheNormandie, hissatisfaction withthe dealheightened bythecongratulatory telephone messages hereceived frombothhisbrother Robert andtheirfather. Itshould benotedthatthe$25million contract cameatatime whenLockheed hadonly$334,000 incash,andlimited creditconnections. Themostimportant ofthesewasCharles A.Barker Jr.,a mild-mannered manwhose neatsuitsandsmall mustache were perfect forhisroleasvicepresident oftheCalifornia Bank. Already onthe boardofdirectors, Barker cameovertoLockheed astreasurer, and withGross, exploited thecontract togainmorethan$1million in loans. Hewould provetobeinvaluable intheyears tocome, oneof themanyexecutives atLockheed whowouldbeinvisible tothepublic atlarge,butalways tobefoundatthecenterofanyimportant deal.

sober Celebration heabsolute joythatattended thecontract signing, withallthatit presaged forthefuture, wastinged withtherealization thatthere

wasanenormous amountofworktodoandrelatively limited resources withwhichto do it. Thefirmwasstillsmall;at theendof 1937,it

hadonly1,989employees, andRobertGross’s almostrelentless vision

ofthefuturehadsetit onanexpansionary trackthatwasalready straining theavailable factory-floor area.It tookgreatefforts onthe partofCyrilChappellet andothers tokeepemployment down tolevels

that couldbe managedwithinthe currentcashflow,whilestillre-

sponding toGross’s callsforexpansion. Meanwhile, theprototype XP-38 wasintheprocess ofconstructionandwouldberolledoutinDecember 1938;thebrilliance of Hibbard andKelly’s twin-boomed design wasalready apparent, and itseemed inevitable thatlargeorders would result. Workwascontinuingon largefour-engine transportdesigns,oneofwhichwouldul-

timately evolve astheimmortal Constellation. And,influenced by Hibbard andperhaps bymemories ofthesuccess oftheOrion,Gross wasstillenamored oftheideaofa smallfeeder airliner. During the "previous year,onAugust 17,a wholly owned subsidiary, theAiRover

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 94

Company,hadbeenformedwithMacV.F. Shortasitspresident,to

create theplaneGross hadinmind.

AiRover becomesVega ockheed hadenjoyed along,almost familial, relationship withAl Menasco, whose Burbank Menasco Manufacturing Company produced powerful butexpensive engines formanyofthesmaller racing aircraft andforhigh-performance private planes. Twoyears priorto

theformation ofAiRover, HallHibbardhadtalkedwithMenasco

aboutthefeasibility ofcoupling twoofhissix-cylinder inline engines toa single propeller. Theobject wastoreduce drag,provide twinenginereliability, andeliminate theproblem ofasymmetric thrustif

oneengine failed. Menasco developed theideaandbecame theprincipalpatentholder, butheshared onepatentwithHibbard onthe multiple-motor drive forairplane propellers. After agreatdealofwork overcoming design flaws intheclutches thatengaged anddisengaged theengine toandfromthepropeller, theUnitwin reached a highlevel ofreliability. (Thiswasnotaneasyaccomplishment. Othercountries approached theproblem withmixed success, themostnotorious failure being thatoftheDaimler BenzDB606coupled engine employed on theHeinkel He177bomber. Thedifficulties associated withtheengineearned theHe177thenickname “Luftwaffe’s lighter” forits manyin-flight fires.) Inlate1937, aLockheed Altair, rather unimaginatively named Flying Test Stand, wasassembled frompartsonhand, andthefirstoftheMenasco Unitwin engines wasinstalled. Morethan onehundred hoursoftest-flying proved theunitwassuccessful, and adecision wasmadetoproceed withthenewfeederlinerdesign. The

Flying TestStand waslatermodified withaWaspradialengine and soldasastandard Altair D. Lockheed’s relationship withMenasco tooka moredirectturn inthesummer of1938, wheninBobGross’s words theengine company“practically blewupinourfaces.” Gross would havepurchased Menasco Manufacturing, butLockheed finances didnotpermit this atthetime,despite thefactthatthecompany wasonitswaytorecord

profitsof$442,111onnetsalesofmorethan$10million.(Lockheed

hadposted positive netincome every yearsince1933withtheexceptionof 1934,whenthedevelopment costsoftheElectraresultedina $190,891loss.)Instead,twoofLockheed’s originalinvestors, Mr.and

Mrs.Randolph C.WalkerfromSanFrancisco, withsomefriends put

Lockheed Builds to Meet the Needs of War = 95

up$75,000 andobtained warrants to purchase additional shares in thefloundering Menasco Company. TheWalkers madea condition thatCyrilChappellet andGrossbeelected totheboardofdirectors andberesponsible forthemanagement ofthecompany. Theyselected Gardner W.Carrtobepresident, while AlMenasco became vicepresident,sales. Afriendly arrangement, onethatassured asupply ofen-

ginesto Vega,it had a salutaryeffectuponMenascostock,liftingit

from$.85a shareto$2.00. AsGross andChappellet hadbeencompensated jointly withanoption tobuytwenty-five thousand shares of stockat$1.00,it wasalsoquiteprofitable.

By1938,therathertrickynameAiRover (badaircraft fromthe company wouldundoubtedly havebeencalled“airdogs”) hadfallen

outoffavor, andthesubsidiary wasrenamed theVega Airplane Companyasatribute totheoriginal Lockheed monoplane. Hibbard created averymodern low-wing, tricycle-gear monoplane, withtheby-now signature Lockheed twin-fin empennage. It waspowered bya 520horsepower Unitwinengineandwasgiventhefelicitous name“Starliner.”A propeller malfunction on takeoff caused testpilotVern Dorrell tomakea forced landing justofftheedgeoftherunway on itsfirstflight onApril22,1939. Theaircraft suffered minimum dam-

age,andflighttestingcontinued. DuringJuly,theaircraftwasreworked extensively. Flighttestinghadrevealed thatwiththetwinfins

outside thepropeller slipstream, directional control couldbemaintained onlybytheapplication oftherightbrakeastakeoff power was reached, hardly a desirable situation, especially ona shortrunway. A singleverticalsurface,witha smalldorsalfin,wasfitted,andthecabin andcowling contours werereworked. TheStarliner suffered onemore minor accident before successfully completing aneighty-five-hour test program. Ahandsome aircraft, looking somewhat likeamodern Bonanzaonsteroids andendowed withanexcellent performance, the

Starliner ranintotwoinsuperable obstacles andwascanceled. Thefirst wasa lackofinterestonthepartofairliners—with onlyfourorfive

passenger seats, theaircraft wastoosmall forthebooming airline traffic ofthelate1930s. Thesecond wasmoreimportant: every square inch ofthenew750,000-square-foot plantbeingbuiltjustonemilefrom themainLockheed plantinBurbank wouldsoonberequired forthe production ofmilitary aircraft. TheStarliner ended itsdaysasaprop formotion picture studios, thefateofmorethanoneCalifornia protoys Courtlandt Gross wasfinally brought westandinJuneof1940 wasmadepresident oftheVega Aircraft Corporation. Aswillbenoted

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 96

i

*

Developedfroma design purchasedfromNorth American,the Vega35 was attractive, but did not possess the flyingqualitiesdesired for a trainer.

Fortresses, andFlying Harpoons, later,VegawouldbuildVenturas, in engaged fully becoming Before theNeptune. andwouldinitiate engage would Corporation Aircraft theVega however, programs, these

fourVega35s,a sleek-looking including projects, insomeindividual

35wasevalTheVega byNorthAmerican. designed trainer low-wing ofaccounts, onanumber asa trainer,andrejected bytheUSAAF uated andbeing cockpits, too-small having beingunderpowered, including with converted B-17 a VegalaterbuilttheXB-40, unstable. spirally tohaveinandtheXB-38,a B-17Econverted armament, additional It alsobuiltfiveModel40targetdrones. engines. lineAllison

bylessthantwo existence itscorporate ThenameVegaoutlived the ofwarhadremoved 31,1941,thepressures ByDecember years. Vega so products, new civilian to develop subsidiary for a requirement by tradingthreesharesofVegaforone wasmergedwithLockheed meaningitseemed 30,1943, ByNovember stock. ofLockheed share asan Corporation oftheVegaAircraft thefiction lessto continue theLockheed into reabsorbed simply andit was entity, independent Corporation tosimplify bookkeeping. Aircraft fromitslowpointof334 hadexpanded workforce TheLockheed

1938.Theexpansion 3,000byDecember in 1934to nearly people

Lockheed Builds to Meet the Needs of War = 97

would haveanimplicit long-term benefit forthefirm,unrecognizable at first,butpalpably evident in lateryears.Duringthisperiodof growth,someofLockheed’s mostbrilliant leaders enteredthefirm’s employment,workedhard,succeeded,survivedthe postwarreduc-

tions,andwentontokeypositions. It issalutary tolookatjusta sampling ofthisinflux ofgenius togainanimpression ofhowdeep

Lockheed’s rootsreachedoutto allAmerica,andhow,in themidstof

themostterrible foreign warinournation’s history, therapidly grow-

ingcompany wasabletosustain itssense offamily relationship between management andlabor, and,perhaps even more difficult, among members ofmanagement.

Nascent Management Stars healmost obsessively loyalnature ofLockheed employees maywell

havestemmedfromtheegalitarian selection processthatcame

aboutastheWorldWarII expansionbegan.Foralmosta decade,the

country hadbeengripped byadepression, andjobshadbeendifficult toobtain.Youngmen—for women werenotyetentering theaviation industry insignificant numbers—who mightordinarily havegoneto

college, giventheirintelligence andtheirfamily background, found themselves working atrelatively menial jobs,andweregladtohave them. Thebuildup at Lockheed thusserved to attractthebestand brightest young people available. Among themwereindividuals who

wouldrisetothetopmanagement jobsinthecompany. Formostof

them,the trajectoryof theirrisewouldbe constant,but theircareer

paths would oftenswing widely fromonediscipline toanother inwhat would prove tobetheLockheed system ofnatural selection. A.CarlKotchian wasfromtinyKermit, NorthDakota, atown sosmall thatitdisappeared completely whentherailroad passed itby, thewoodandbrickfromitsbuildings being carried away tobuildnew homes where thetrackran.Kotchian symbolizes inmanywayshow Lockheed casta widebutfinenetforitstalent.Heworked hisway throughtheGraduate SchoolofBusiness at Stanford—a longreach

fromKermit—andthen,in hisindustriousfashion,tooktherequisite

courses tobecome a certified publicaccountant. ManytopLockheed

people would come fromStanford, including Chappellet, Barker, Ted Rathman, andothers, butfewcametoLockheed asKotchian did— thinkingit wasanotheraircraftfirmentirely.In January1941,

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 98

Rathman askedKotchian ifhewouldliketocometoworkforVega. Somehow Kotchian, abig,heartymanthenandnow,understood him

Rathbutfollowing outforDowney, andstarted tomean“Vultee,” man’s driving instructions. Hewound upinBurbank, nonplussed to and nonetheless Heapplied Vega. wasactually findoutthat“Vultee” washiredatthethen-princely sumoftwohundred dollars amonth, actingasfuture career, controversial, goingontoastellar,ifultimately

chairman DanHaughton’s balance wheelmuchasChappellet had performed thatroleforGross. TheUniversity ofMichigan wasanother richsource ofLockheed KellyJohnsonandWillis thosepremierengineers talent,providing Hawkins,andalsoKenCannestraandCarlHaddon.Haddongrad-

uatedin 1931withabachelor ofscience degreeinaeronautical engi-

neering. InthedepthoftheDepression, whenunemployment wasat of Company, Aircraft gotajobwiththeKeystone itspeak,Haddon Bristol, Pennsylvania, thenthesolepurveyor ofbombers totheArmy

AirCorps.TheKeystones wereponderous twin-engine biplanes, not

muchimproved inperformance overWorld WarI Gothas, butthey represented twoimportant thingstoHaddon: airplanes anda meal including ofcompanies, a number hiswaythrough Heworked ticket. Consolidated andStearman-Hammond, andthenwentto Swedenin

1938tohelpestablish amodern aircraft industry, whichthenincluded

Svenska Aeroplan AB,which subsequently became SAAB, andisnow andchose inearly1940, States backtotheUnited came Haddon Saab. Lockheed ashisnextplaceofemployment. Theemployment process

wasfardifferentthantoday’swithitstailoredrésumés,interview process,andbackground checks.Then,he recalls,the “biggestobstacle

wasthereceptionist, whowasalsothetelephone operator andgeneral handygirl.”ShewasVeraDoan,whomarried themanwhoatthe formerLockheed Company’s nadirwasitssolepaidemployee, Harvey Christen. Haddontoldher,“I’vegottenyears’ designexperience in

airplanes, andIwanttoseethechiefengineer aboutajob.”Shesent himrightintoseeHallHibbard, whohiredhimonthespot—no interviews, noreference checks, nowaiting. Hiscareer pathtothe presidency oftheLockheed Aircraft Corporation would involve runningprograms asvaried astheExcalibur, theConstellation, theF-104, theSST,andtheL-1011. Kotchian andHaddon werebothsupportive ofanother newcomerto Lockheed, DanHaughton,whoworkedhiswayfromchop-

pingwoodformine-shaft supports attheageofnine,graduating to coal-mine “wood-chuting” crewsbeforeentering theUniversity ofAl-

Lockheed Builds to Meet the Needs of War = 99

abama, totheLockheed Aircraft Corporation inFebruary 1939. There, thealmost unbridled power ofhispersonality andhisrigorous operatingmethods would hurtlehimtothetopasheexpanded thecompany, brought greatsuccesses, and,underthepressure ofevents (many ofhisowndoing), staved offimminent bankruptcy. Theboywhohad cuttreesintominetiesatthreecentsapiece wound uphiscareer in successful direct negotiations withtheprime minister ofGreat Britain, theCongress oftheUnited States, thebanking industry, andtheairline world.HistimeatLockheed, which willbecovered indepthlater, hadanalmost operatic quality intermsofitshighdrama, hubris, triumphs,anddefeats.

Noteveryone whogottothetopatLockheed camefromStan-

ford,Michigan,or indeed,anycollegeat all,and thereis no doubt

thatthecompany wasenriched bytheinflux oftalented people who battled toovercome theproblems oftheDepression toreachhigh management levels without thebenefit ofacollege education. Oneof these,amaninevitably remembered kindlybyhiscolleagues, isFrank Frain,whograduatedfromhighschoolin 1930to takea jobasbank

messenger. Heworked hiswayuplearning thebanking business and cametoLockheed in 1942asa financial analyst. Frainwentonto becomeoneof Lockheed’s mastersof finance,supervising the com-

pany’s various forays intodiversification, andhelping Haughton stave offthefinancial disasters ofthe1970s. Thousands morecametoLockheed asitexpanded, sometostay onlyforthewaryears, otherforfullcareers. Astheypercolated to manylevels throughout thecompany, theyconferred uponita distinctive culture ofcooperation andfriendliness thatwasnurtured duringthetumultuous process thatbegan withtheLockheed Hudson.

TheImpactofthe Hudson heHudson wastherightplaneattherighttime,benefiting first fromthefundsoftheBritish Purchasing Commission, andthen fromthelavish largesse ofthelend-lease program, described byWinstonChurchill asthe“mostunsordid act.”Lockheed wasalsothe beneficiary ofhaving therightmanagement already engaged inthe correct process ofexpansion. Robert Gross believed thatanother great watwasimminent, buthecouldnotknowtheexacttiming, and despite thesuccess oftheElectra, thelateyears ofthe1930s werenot atotally convincing basisforexpanding thefirm.Just91aircraft had

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 100

TheHudsonbomberwas a huge success, and it inspired many variants like these AT-18gunnery trainers. TheHudsonestablished Lockheedas a top manufacturer of qualitycombat aircraft.

beendeliveredin 1937,and 101in 1938.The difficulties withthe

SuperElectra would probably haverendered it unmarketable inanotheryearortwo.Yetalloftheseproblems evaporated withtheHudson.In1939,Lockheed delivered 287Hudsons, along with65other aircraft, foratotalof352.These werenumbers thatcould, quiteliterally, betakentothebankandtothestockmarket. Studies fortheexpansion wereunderwayevenbefore thearrival

oftheBritishPurchasing Commission. Oneofthesewasbroughtto

fruition in1940, whenLockheed purchased theUnion AirTerminal inBurbank fromUnited Airlines for$1.5million, andestablished Lockheed AirTerminal, withChappellet asPresident. Itwould bea profitable operation overtheyears, andultimately wassoldtothe Hollywood-Burbank AirportAuthority for$51millionin 1978.

Thesigning oftheBritish contract launched afurious effort by Lockheed tomeetandexceed thecontractual requirements. (Italso caused furious resentment inGreatBritain, where itwasdeemed un-

patrioticto purchase anyaircraftnotdesigned at home.)Lockheed expandeditsworkforce, whichwouldreach7,000bytheendof1939,

climb toalmost 17,000 in1940, andgoontopeakat90,853 in1943. During thisperiod thecompany wasforced tobegin doing whatwould formerly havebeenanathema: farming outsubstantial elements of worktosubcontractors suchasRohrAircraft. Alltheefforts were successful. Theprototype Hudson, fitted with

Lockheed Builds to Meet the Needs of War = 101

amock dorsal turret,firstflewonDecember 10,1938, withdeliveries ofproduction aircraft beginning inFebruary 1939. Tooling problems caused aslowbuildup, withonly50aircraft completed byJune1939. Eventually, however, theproduction rhythm accelerated sothatthe 250thHudson rolled outthedoorbymid-November 1939, andLockheednotonlycollected handsomely ontheBritish contract’s incentive

provisions butreceived asecond orderforanadditional 350aircraft. Itwasbutthebeginning ofaflood of2,941Hudsons thatwould pour fromBurbank. TheBritish Commonwealth purchased 1,338, and,in addition, 1,302 weresupplied bylend-lease. Three hundred were built specifically fortheUSAAF, andonewasbuiltforU.S.civilusebythe SperryCorporation.

Aswithallaircraft involume production, improvements, additionalarmament, newequipment, andmorepowerful engines were introduced astimepassed. Thus,while theHudson Iweighed 17,500 pounds fullyloaded, hadamaximum speed of246mph,andarange of1,960miles, theHudson IVweighed inat22,360 pounds, hada topspeedof284mph,andarangeof2,160miles. AllHudsons retainedtheirpassenger windows—Lockheed elected nottobother to remove them. Although theSuper Electra’s teething problems inairline service hadmarred Lockheed’s reputation, theHudson, somodern andso desperately needed, waswelcomed bytheBritish withopenarms.Its highwingloading madetakeoffs andlanding moredemanding than withaircraft suchastheAnson, butthiswasa small pricetopayfor thevastly improved performance. TheHudson hadenormous organizational consequences. Lockheedhadestablished atentative field-support organization tosupport overseas customers oftheLockheed Models 10,12,and14.Thisconcepthadblossomed fromtheoriginal handwritten notesandin-thehallconversations toatinyoffice nearthefinalassembly linetoahuge facility atLiverpool toreassemble Hudsons astheyarrived inEngland.

(Asimilar plantwascreated inAustralia.) Additional bases weresetup inScotland atAbbotsfinch andRenfrew, while anenormous maintenance andoverhaul basewasestablished inIreland atLangford Lodge, nearBelfast, which grewswiftly intoahugeorganization. Inthenext

threeyearsthesixthousand workers at thatfacility wouldassemble,

modify, orrepair battle damage on22,500 aircraft ofmorethanthirty different types. TheLockheed Overseas Corporation wasformed to operate theestablishment underthedirection ofthesupersalesman CarlSquier. (Squier hadfought foryears toobtain orders foraircraft

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= 102

TheLockheedHudsonperformedan invaluablerole in anti-submarinewarfarefor the UnitedKingdom.It did muchto blunt the effectivenessof GermanU-boatattacks.

bytheones,twos,andthrees; itmusthaveseemed incredible tohim tohaveorders forthousands ofaircraft flocking infasterthanthey couldbebuilt.)TheLockheed Overseas Corporation provided great depthandbreadth ofexperience inoverhaul andmodification work, andwasessential tothelaterestablishment oftheverysuccessful LockheedAircraft Service Company. Aclassic bitofLockheed management stylewasdemonstrated

whendifficulties arosewiththemanagement oftheoverseas venture. The facilitymanager,whileefficient,wasprovingto be too hardon

personnel, andmorale wasbad.Courtlandt Gross(whobecame pres-

identoftheVega Aircraft Corporation in1940) surveyed thesituation andsummarily replaced themanwithGeneOgden (designer ofthe trimotor Ogden Osprey). Itwasalldonewithaminimum offuss,but adelicate situation wassaved byGross’s prompt intervention. Ogden quickly gotthingssmoothed out,theoriginal manager wasreleased withtwomonths’ pay,andmorale shotup. Theexperience would prove ofimmense postwar benefit toLockheedwhentheLockheed Aircraft Service Company wasestablished asa wholly owned subsidiary. It proved tobeextremely profitable,

Lockheed Builds to Meet the Needs of War = 103

providingservicesthat rangedfromairportoperationto airline

management. Itleddirectly toLockheed’s involvement withforeign contractors injointventures thatresulted ina technology transfer

thatenabledcountries thathadbeenprostrated bythewarto developindigenous aviationindustries. A company originally formed withthe intentionof supporting a handfulof foreignModel10s

and14swastransformed intimeintoa high-tech service provider forcustomers worldwide.

TheHudsonin Combat herearehundreds ofstories abouttheHudson incombat, some apocryphal,but mostbasedon realevents.It wasrugged,and

earnedthenickname “OldBoomerang” foritsabilitytotakepunishmentandreturnfrommissions. It wasthefirstaircraftofAmerican

design todestroy anenemy aircraft. OnOctober 8,1939,aHudson oftheRAF’s No.224Squadron shotdownaDornier Do18Dpatrol planeoffJutland. OtherHudsons participated almost anonymously insome ofthe opening actsofthewar.ANo.220Squadron Hudson spotted the Altmark, theGerman oilerthatwasattempting tobringhometoGermany theBritish sailors captured bytheAdmiral GrafSpee. Itdirected HMSCossack totheAltmark, andtheBritish sailors wererescued. Hudsonswerereportedly usedto strafeandbombthe encircling Germantroopsat Dunkirk.On August27, 1941,theversatileLock-

whena heedbomber became thefirstaircraft tocapture a submarine ofsquadron leader Hudson ofNo.269Squadron underthecommand Hans J.H. Thompson forcedU-570,commanded byLieutenant bya Consolidated Rahmlow, tosurrender. TheHudson, supported Catalina fromNo.209Squadron, circledovertheslightly damaged submarine untilsurface shipsarrived totakeoffthecrewandtowthe

U-570toport.Lessthanamonthlater,U-570 wasputintoservice bytheEnglish navyasHMSGraph.

Another antisubmarine-warfare firstwasscoredbya Hudsonof No.608Squadron, whichfiredrockets fromitsunderwing racksto

sinkasubmarine offNorthAfrica. AndthefirstArmy aircraft tosink a U-boat wasa Hudson; anA-29fromthe396thBombSquadron sankU-701(captained byLieutenant Commander Degen, whohad

justsunktwoshipsanddamaged adestroyer andtwotankers) onJuly 7, 1942.

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TheHudson wasexcellent atantisubmarine warfare forthesame reasons thatitwasattractive asanairliner. Ithadthesamepower as themuchlargerDC-3,butwastenthousand pounds lighter, and, unlike theAnson, couldbethrown around withfighterlike abandon,

enabling it to makemorethanonepassbeforea submarine could submerge. Single-engine performance wasexcellent. Iftheplanehad

adrawback itwastheprecision required onlanding, butpilots quickly adapted tothis. Themostsignificant eventin Hudson antisubmarine-warfare workoccurred earlyinitscareer andwentalmost unnoticed because oftightsecurity. ByJanuary 1940,twelve Hudsons wereequipped withairborne radar,ASV-1 (AirtoSurface Vessel MarkI).Despite theprimitive nature oftheequipment, which forced theHudsons to flyaslowastwohundred feet,it heralded a revolution inantisubmarinewarfare thateventually wouldovercome thethreatofU-boats.

Hudsons evenjoined theWellingtons, Hampdens, andWhitleys ontheRAP’s firstthousand-aircraft raidsagainst Hitler’s Festung Europa. Butbrilliant actsofwarwerenotthenormal Hudson role.Most

oftenit soldiered underdifficult conditions doingroutineantisub-

marine patrol, ground-attack work, photoreconnaissance, andordinary passenger andcargotransport. Ittookabeating intheearlymonths ofthewarintheFarEast,whenitwasthrown intobattleagainst the onrushing Japanese. When thetideofthePacific warshifted, theHudsondidwellinreconnaissance, bombing, andsupply roles. Asthewarprogressed, theHudson became relatively obsolete, andwasrelegated tocrewtraining, air-sea rescue, weather reconnaissance, andoccasional clandestine operations. Besides GreatBritain, it wasusedwithpridebytheairforces ofAustralia, Brazil, Canada, China, NewZealand, andtheUnited States. Toward theendofits active service withtheRAF,manyHudsons werestripped oftheir armament andreequipped astransports, theroleforwhich theyhad originally beendesigned. Inmanyways, thewardealttheHudson a similar roletothe Curtiss P-40.Bothairplanes hadthegreatadvantage ofbeing inquantityproduction, andthusavailable, sothattheywereusedinmany theaters eventhough theiropponents wereoperating aircraft withsuperior performance. Therewasa greatdifference inonerespect, however.TheP-40represented theapogee ofthefortunes oftheCurtiss Company, whichwasneverabletogeta follow-on fighterintopro-

duction, andafterthewarsoonremoved itself fromtheaircraft business.In contrast, theHudsonprovedto bea starting pointfor

Lockheed Builds to Meet the Needs of War = 105

Lockheed,teachingthefirmhowto buildqualitymilitaryaircraftin

quantity, manage change, expand, and,moreimportant, create new products thatwould meetemerging market needs. Lockheed’s much-honored engineer, WillisHawkins, madea

thoughtful summary oftheHudsoninhis1983WingsClublecture. HesaidtheHudsonwasasuccess because Lockheed hadtakenarisk

withitstechnology inintroducing theFowler flapstopermit ahigh

wingloading.(Hawkinsknewthiswell,ashewasthedesignerofthe

conspicuous flaptracks thatwereatrademark oftheHudsons andlater

Lockheedaircraft.)Butmorethanthat,Hawkinsnoted,theHudson

taught Lockheed truesystems management, notthepaperwork science ofthe1960s, butthehands-on type,getting totherightguywhois incharge andcanmake decisions. Hecitedanexample. Atonepoint, afailure ofthegovernment todeliver thecorrect government-furnished equipment—in thisinstance, generators—had undeliverable Hudsons parked alloverBurbank. Thefailure todeliver hadhalted government payments, andLockheed wasfastexhausting itscashanditscredit. Lockheed’s management wenttotheArmy AirForces withtheconcept ofprogress payments toallaythefinancial crisis, andagreed topick upresponsibility forinsuring thatallGFEarrived ontime.Hudsons began tobedelivered again, evenasthetempo increased onthemost

wellremembered Lockheed productofthewar.Hawkins thusputhis

finger onLockheed’s simple buteffective formula forsuccess: taking risks backed bytechnological andscientific capability andanaggressive management thatcouldleaditspersonnel tomakethings happen in adifficult marketplace, whether government orcivilian. Theformula

wouldbeusedofteninthefuture.

TheP-38 ewaircraft havecaptured thepublic imagination moreswiftly or

heldit longerthanthebeautifultwin-engine, twin-boomairplane

withwhich Lockheed began itslongandsuccessful history offighter production. Theutterly distinctive shape oftheLightning bristled with innovations, including tricycle landing gear,heavy firepower concentratedin thenose,turbo-superchargers, Fowlerflaps(thefirstona

fighter), andablistering performance. P-38s were demanded byleaders inalltheaters ofwar,andearned therespect ofboththeGermans and theJapanese. Itfunctioned inawidevariety ofroles, some farbeyond theimagination of eitherJohnsonor Hibbard,andits traditional

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 106

Lockheed qualityandruggedconstruction enabled it toreturnhome

overlongdistances despite heavy battle damage. ThetwotopAmerican acesofthewarbothflewP-38sexclusively. Eventoday, theelegant Lightning stilldraws cheers atitsincreasingly rareair-show appearances. Theunusual natureoftheXP-38isnotsoobvious now,but whenthedesign wassubmitted totheAirCorps asLockheed Model 22-64-01 inApril1937, itwassoradical thatmany ofthoseassessing itregarded itasimpractical tobuildoruse,andincapable ofachieving itspredicted performance figure of400mph. Workingasa team,HibbardandJohnsonhadselectedtheun-

usualconfiguration froma varietyofevenmoreradicalchoices (includingsuchexotica asburiedengines, push-pull engineplacement,

andsoon).Yettheunique twin-boom, center-nacelle concept was perhaps theleastsophisticated element ofthecarefully thought-out design, manycomponents ofwhich—such asthedistinctive wing planform, inspired bythatoftheElectra—would findtheirwayinto laterLockheed products. Therequirement fortwoengines wasstraightforward enough. Toreachthedesired AirCorpsspecification of360mphattwenty thousand feet,about2,000horsepower would berequired, andthere werenotyetengines ofthatpower inproduction orevenintestprograms.Theavailable enginewastheAllisonV-1710,whichhadbegun

itsdevelopment in1930asapotential replacement fortheMaybach

engines usedindirigibles. OnFebruary 12,1935,theverydaythat

thefirstAllison engine wasavailable fordelivery, thegiantairship Macon crashed intothePacific, ending thenavy’s infatuation with dirigibles andforcing acancellation ofitscontracts withAllison. The company wasthensoldtoGeneral Motors, where engineer Ronald M. Hazen(another University ofMichigan graduate) hadtheV-1710 turning outonethousand horsepower by1937.ThegreatDonavon Berlin triedthenewAllison intheCurtiss XP-37 (ithadpreviously beentestedin a Consolidated A-11)andagainin theP-40,thus launching theprimary American-designed liquid-cooled engine ofthe SecondWorldWar.Someforty-seven thousand wouldbebuiltby

war’s end,andmanyareinusetoday.

WhenHibbardandJohnsonselected theAllison foruseinthe

P-38,ithadahorsepower potential of1,150. Theycoupled ittoan exhaust-driven turbo-supercharger, so that its powercouldbe maintained ataltitude. (Theturbo-supercharger wasGFEandwasnot agoodmatch fortheP-38ataltitude, where theturbocharger tended

Lockheed Builds to Meet the Needs of War = 107

tomalfunction. Takeoffs would bemade inhumid conditions; athigh altitude, themoisture condensed andfroze, leading tofalse pressuresensor readings. Thisresulted inexcessive manifold pressure whenthe aircraft descended. Theexcess manifold pressure could damage anen-

gine,andcaused manyaP-38toflyhomeononeengine. Theturbo-

supercharger worked wellfortheairplane atlowandmedium altitudes, where theengines could beleftathighpower settings forlongperiods oftimewithoutdamage.)

Despite itslongdevelopment period, which stretched backtothe bewhiskered Sandford Moss’s experiments at General Electric after

WorldWarI, theturbo-supercharger (whichwasalsothekeyto the

success oftheB-17andB-24) wasanextraordinarily riskychoice at thetime,given theturbine blade materials available andtheverylimitedexperience withthedevice, ofwhich fewer thanonehundred had beenbuilt.YettheP-38’s twin-boom design wasperfect forthein-

stallation oftheturbo-superchargers andtheirelaborate ducting, and

offered otheradvantages aswell.Thebooms provided roomforthe engines, mainundercarriage members, andradiators, andthelong moment armresulting fromtheirlengthmadeit possible tohave smaller finandrudder assemblies. Thegreater length alsoresulted in theP-38beinga verystablegunplatform, animportant butoften overlooked design element forfighters. Thepropellers rotated inopposite directions, thuscanceling theirtorque effect andalsocontributingtothestability ofthegunplatform, aswellasmaking takeoffs

easiertohandle.

Theslender, tapered wings hada veryhighaspect ratio(wing length-to-width ratio)forafighter, andtheirdistinctive shape would laterbefoundonthemuchlarger Constellation. While efficient, the fifty-two-foot wingspan naturally inhibited therateofrolloftheheaviestfighter yetproposed totheAirCorps. Atitsmaximum gross weight of 15,164pounds,theXP-38wasmorethantwiceas heavyas the

thenfirst-line fighter, theCurtiss P-36,whichweighed inat6,010 pounds. Inlaterproduction aircraft, beginning withtheP-38)series, therollratewasfacilitated byailerons assisted byahydraulic boost

mechanism thatrequired only17percentofthemanualeffortneeded previously.

Theunique center nacelle notonlyprovided maximum visibility forthepilotandprotection ontwosidesfromenemy fire,it also allowed installation ofa20-mm cannon andfour.50-caliber machine guns.(A37-mm cannon hadbeenproposed fortheXP-38.) Notrequiredto firethrough thepropellers, thesewereunhampered by

Oneof the most distinctive,and arguablythe most beautiful,of WorldWarII fighters, the LockheedP-38’selegant lines werederivedfrom functionalrequirements.

TheAmericanaircraft industrywas revolutionizedby the influxof womenworkers,who provedto not onlybe equal to the men they replaced,but in manyinstances rendereda performancesuperior to them.

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synchronizing gearandprovided parallel streams offireuptoathousandyards’ distance. TheP-38would prove tobetheonlytwin-engine single-seat fighter tobeproduced inquantity, only112being builtof itsnearest competitor, theRoyal AirForce’s Westland Whirlwind. Ultimately, 9,925Lightnings would bebuiltbyLockheed, withanother113delivered byConsolidated-Vultee’s Nashville operation, for atotalof10,038. ThefullforceofJohnson andHibbard’s genius wasnotconfined totheexternal details, butalsoaddressed production andperformance considerations. Flush riveting andprecisely butted jointsmade forthe smoothexternal surfaces, whichbecamea Johnsontrademark. The

metalskinsections thatcover anaircraft areofvarying thickness to

suitthestrengthrequired ofthem.Tocompensate forthisvariance,

theinternal structure oftheP-38wasadjusted sothatwhatever the thickness oftheskin,theexternal surfaces retained asmooth contour. Likethetransports, butunlike otherfighters oftheperiod, allcontrol surfaces weremetal-covered. Thisseemingly innocuous detailisan

indication ofhowfarseeing Johnson was;onehasonlytoreadPierre Closterman’s account oftheincredible increase inthemaneuverability

oftheSpitfire withtheintroduction ofthemetal-covered surfaces to

appreciate Johnson’s vision,farinadvance ofanyreportsofcombat

experience. Suchconsiderations wereimportant, fordespite thesuccess with thetwin-engine transports, thenewfighter wasamuchmoredifficult production challenge. Whenthecontract wasawarded foroneprototypeXP-38onJune23,1937,JamesM.Gerschler beganthedetail

design process, integrating manyelements thatwereforeign topast Lockheed experience, includingthe GeneralElectricturbosuperchargers, heavy armament, tricycle landing gear,andtheincorporation of muchstandard military equipment. Nonetheless, by December 1938,theXP-38wascompleted andtransported indeepest

secrecyto MarchFieldin Riverside, whereone of America’s great

unsung heroes, andatremendously important advocate fortheLightning,Lieutenant Benjamin S.Kelsey, wasstanding bytoconduct the initialtests. AnMITgraduate likeJimmyDoolittle, Kelsey wasoneofthe

totheAirCorps thathestayed indespite thelowpay, mensodevoted opportunity, andgenuine hazard. Hehadentered lackofpromotion safety pilotonthefamous theAirCorpsin1929,flewasDoolittle’s experiments, andbecame headofthefighter projects “blindflying” atWright Field. Despite manyoffers ofoutside employment, branch

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hewastotally undismayed bythefactthathewasstillafirstlieutenant aftertenyearsofdistinguished service. Kelsey wasfullyabsorbed ina

jobhebelieved in,exercising authority thatexceeded thatofmanyof thecountry’s topexecutives evenashesubsisted onthehardscrabble pay.Whenwarbeganhisrisewouldbeswift,andhewouldretireas

abrigadier general in1955, ironically atatimewhenbrigadier generals typically hadlessresponsibility thanhehadexercised asafirstlieutenant.Hewasa thoughtful man,withabiggrinandthedevout belief inhisownabilities, which ranged frombuilding hisownairplanes to tailoring hisownsuitsfromwooltakenpersonally fromhisownflock ofsheep. (Theairplanes wereexquisitely crafted andbeautifully finished,andwererelatively betterin appearance thantheheavytweed

suitshewore.Thesehadthecutandfitofoutfitswornbyvaudeville comedians, a factofwhichhewaseithertotallyunaware, orchoseto

ignore, forheworethemproudly.) Kelsey supervised theassembly ofthehot-looking fighter, and

initiatedtaxiteststhatrevealed seriousdeficiencies in theaircraft’s wheelsandbrakes.Preliminary fixesweremadeandKelsey tookoff

onthefirstflight onJanuary 27,1939—and promptly encountered a second problem, violent vibration oftheflaps. Kelsey elected tomake a long,lowapproach thatendedsafely ina spectacular “four-point landing” thatsentacascade ofsparks flying. Keeping thenosehighto provide dragforbraking, hehadtouched downonthetwomain wheels andthebumpers fittedtothebottom ofthetwinfins. Theflapproblem wassolved quickly ina manner thatKelsey latersaidfollowed theprecepts ofthefamousdesigner WilliamB. Stout,whichwas“Simplicate andaddmorelightness.” Problems con-

tinuedwiththebrakesystem, anda marginal longitudinal stability problem wascuredinlaterproduction aircraft bya7percent increase intheareaofthehorizontal stabilizer. Thecleandesign andheavy weight oftheP-38would yieldfurther problems laterinthetestregime,whenthe aircraftdivespeedswouldbuildup to the pointof

compressibility, acondition predicted ina1937report byKelly Johnson.Ina dive,theP-38wasflirting withthesoundbarrier; asit approached itslimiting Machnumber, severe buffeting would cause lossofcontrol.Thebrakesandflapdifficulties wererelatively easyto

solve; overcoming thecompressibility problems would takemonths of testsbefore asolution wasdiscovered byWardBeman, whodevised a smallelectrically operated diveflapundereachwingtocounteract a strong nose-down pitching moment athighspeed. Despite theobvious hazards, apolitical decision wasmadethat

Lockheed Builds to Meet the Needs of War = 111

theXP-38 would gainmuch-needed public visibility ifKelsey would makea record runtoDayton. General HapArnold approved, specifying thatifallwentwell,theairplane wastoberefueled foratripto

NewYorkinanattempttobreakHowardHughes’s transcontinental speedrecord.It wasanextraordinarily riskyproposition, giventhat

thecomplex XP-38 hadlogged lessthanfivehoursoftesttime.

On February 11,1939,Kelsey tookoff,refueling atAmarillo,

Texas,andlandingat Dayton,recordinggroundspeedsin excessof

400mphenroute.Approval wasgiventoproceed toNewYorkinthe recordattempt.Routine trafficatMitchel Fieldrequired himtomake

anextended approach during which hehadtoaddpower toreach the field.Whenheadvanced thethrottles, therewasnoresponse onthe rightengine andonlyapartial response ontheleft.Slow, withflaps andgeardown,he knewthatapplyingfullpowerto thegoodengine

wouldcauseanuncontrollable roll.Hewasforcedto crash-land on

theColdStream GolfCourse atHempstead, Long Island. Unhurt but terribly dejected, heclimbed outtosurvey thewreckage. Thedamaged planewastotally destroyed whenitwascutuptobetransported ina

closedtruck.Theelapsedtimeofsevenhours,forty-three minutes failedto beatHughes’s recordof sevenhoursand twenty-eight

minutes; theflying time,however, hadbeenonlyseven hours andtwo minutes.

Despitean exhaustiveinvestigation, no absolutecausefor the

crashwaseverestablished; Kelsey believed ittobeeithervaporlock orcarburetor icing.Curiously, thecrashhadnolasting adverse effect onP-38production, fortheAirCorps hadproved thatLockheed had builta 400-mph airplane inresponse toa requirement foronly360 mph.Thelossof thesoleprototype didof courseinhibitthetest

program. Thefirstconcrete evidence ofAirCorps approval came onApril 27, 1939,with the awardof a $2,180,275contractfor 13YP-38s

(fondly called ““Yippees” byLockheed employees). Thisconformed to standard AirCorpspractice ofbuying 13service testaircraft before committing toproduction. TheYP-38 wascompletely redesigned in preparation foraproduction runthatRobert Gross estimated would notexceed 80aircraft. Butasthesituation inEuropegrewevermore

serious, U.S.production orders of66andthen410followed. InApril 1940,the indispensable Anglo-French Purchasing Committee awarded acontract for667aircraft forFrance andGreatBritain. Two monthslater,following France’s defeat,theentireorderwasassumed

bytheBritish. Theexportmodels differed innumerous respects, but

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principally intheiruseofunsupercharged Allison engines, which reduced performance ataltitude. Inaddition, thesize, weight, andcomplexity oftheLightning wereforeign toBritish experience, andafter testing, allbut3oftheorder werecanceled. Thecanceled aircraft were readily accepted bytheUSAAF asP-322s (andbecause theylacked superchargers werereferred toas“castrated P-38s”), someforoperationaluse,andsomebeing usedonlyfortraining. Thenineteen longmonths before theYP-38’s firstflighton September 17,1940,sawmanychanges atLockheed. “Dick” Pulver replaced Gerschler asproject engineer, asthelatterwashaving some difficult personal problems. Haddon became Pulver’s assistant. Lockheedsuffered asignificant losswhenlongtime chieftestpilotMarshall HeadlewasinjuredinLockheed’s ownlow-pressure altitudechamber

inadecompression accident. Thedisaster sofatally impaired hishealth thathediedin1945attheageoffifty-two.

Lightning Strikesthe

Lockheed AircraftCorporation heimpact oftheseries ofcontracts forfirsttheHudson andthen

theLightning launched Lockheed Aircraft intoafrenzy ofactivity.

Bytheendof1940,thefirmthathadbegun lifewithitsoffices ina shabby ranchhouse anditsfactory inafailed pottery factory had1.6 million square feetoffloorspace undercover; thatareawould peakin mid-1943 atanincredible 7.7million square feet.Oneacquisition was colorful—Robert Gross secured thepurchase oftherambling G.G.G. distillery, justnorthoftheairportonSanFernando Road,wherethe

firstP-38swouldbebuilt.Thenumber ofpersonnel increased ina corresponding fashion, rising fromalmost seventeen thousand atthe endof1940toapeakofalmost ninety-one thousand inmid-1943. Ninety-one thousandpeoplemeantninety-one thousand pay-

checks, anddespite theaccelerating sales(almost $700million in

1943)andprofits(awartime peakofover$8million in1942),ittook

alltheefforts ofChappellet andBarker tomaintain anadequate cash flow.Lockheed hadtocompete forengineers andskilled personnel in thebooming aviation market. Theexpanded workforce brought an entirely newsetofproblems involving training, promotions, security, andthelike.Thetrained workforce hadlongsincebeenabsorbed;

Despitemassiveconstructionefforts, Lockheedmanufacturingfloor space could not keep up with the demandfor aircraft, and productionlines spilled outside into the Californiasunshine.

mostofthepeopleentering theworkforce weredoingsoforthefirst time.Barriers werebrokenaswomenandminorities werehiredtodo

jobsthathadalways beeninthewhite-male province. Asmuchpressure wasexerted ontheengineering staffasonthe production people, fortheinitiation ofLockheed aircraft firsttoservice andthentocombat usebrought aboutarequirement forcontinuous changes andimprovements. Asthepaceofproduction grew, a supplier’s failure toprovide acritical partcouldmeanthathugenumbers ofincomplete aircraft wouldbestashed inevery available spotonthe airfield. Engineering changes hadtobegrouped andexecuted inblocks sothatcontrolofdrawings andtechnical orderscouldbemaintained.

At Lockheed(aselsewhere) a systemevolvedin whichaircraftwould

emerge fromtheproduction lineonlytoentera modification lineand

receive thelatestupdates priortobeingreleased forservice.

Afterthe stunning attack on Pearl Harbor,the fear of a similarstrike on the WestCoast was veryreal. Aircraftfactorieswere camouflagedwith netting that was replete with trees, houses, and so on to make the area look like a rural countrysidefrom the air.

Lightning in Combat lighttestandproduction ofthefirstP-38s occurred almost simultaneously asWorld WarIIunfolded withitslongseries ofdisasters totheAllied cause. Although theEuropean warhadgoneonformore

thantwoyearsbythetimeofPearlHarbor,theUSAAF, likeallthe

American armed services, waswoefully unprepared. Amassive expansionhadoccurred since1939,whentheAirCorpshadonlyabout eighthundred airplanes infirst-line service, andwastraining pilots at therateofthreehundred peryear.ByPearlHarbor, thetraining goal hadbeenliftedtothirtythousand pilots peryear—one hundred times thepeacetime total—and although thereweremorethanfiftycombat groups, mostweremerecadres around whicha fighting unitwasto beformed, andeventhesewerespreadoutaroundtheUnitedStates

Lockheed Builds to Meet the Needs of War = 115

Despitehavingfar greater manpowerreserves,the United States employedwomenin factoriesearlier and on a far greater scale than did totalitarian NaziGermany.Womenworkers wereimmortalizedas ‘‘Rosiethe Riveter’ in story and song.

aircraft. combat withfirst-rate Nonewasequipped anditspossessions. B-17sand Boeing in service, aircraft EventheverybestAmerican armorand of standards to European n ot up werestill P-40s, Curtiss armament. decommanders werein thewind,andcombat Butchanges any were before l ong P-38 theLockheed receiving on priority manded IraEaker General ofthewarMajor Inthefirstyears forcombat. ready where AirForceinEurope, thatP-38sbesenttotheEighth insisted theirlongrangemadethem desirableasescortfighters,whilein the

thattheybesent wasadamant Kenney George General Major Pacific,

fighter totheFifthAirForce,wherehecouldusethemonlong-range

sweeps. theaters. andPacific wereslowinboththeEuropean Deliveries bytheendof1941;another1,421would Only266hadbeendelivered andpartswereoverofproduction problems as in 1942 bedelivered

wouldriseto 2,497in 1943,peakat an deliveries come.Lockheed in 4,186in 1944,andtaperoffto 1,553in1945,Success incredible care required P-38s the complex as g radually, a lso come would combat Intheend, support. andlogistic maintenance andexpert inassembly asissooftenthecaseinwar,theroleoftheP-38wasfardifferent orfailure Thesuccess designed. fromthatforwhichitwasoriginally engine/turboof the on theoperation of the aircraftdepended tooktimetomature. which combination, supercharger

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Engine problems sometimes mitigated theeffectiveness oftheP38.Fortunately, thebasic design created byHibbard andJohnson was

sostrong,andso capableof growth,thatit wasableto prevailover

theinadequacies ofitspower plantandprove itsmettle indozens of rolesfarbeyond anyone’s original concepts.

Combatagainstthe Japanese 4 ee P-38would seeaction against theJapanese first.Inthefollowing threeyearsofwaritwould demonstrate itsprowess inevery part ofthegigantic Pacific theater, whichrangedfromAlaska inthenorth to ChinaandIndochina inthefarwesttoAustralia andthemyriad islands oftheSouthPacific.

ThefewP-38s weredistributed equally atfirst,ahandful going totheSouthPacific, someasreconnaissance types. InAustralia, the greatest American reconnaissance pilot,Captain KarlPolifka, ledAFlightofthe8thPhotographic Squadron inlong-range sortiesfrom

April16,1942, on.(Polifka fought inboththePacific andEuropean theaters during World WarIIandwould ultimately belostoverNorth Koreain 1951.)The8th Photographic Squadron usedLockheed F-4s, essentially P-38Es stripped ofarmament andfitted withfourK-17 cameras andtwoadditional seventy-five-gallon fueltanks.TheF-4s

alsohadadriftsightandanautopilotandwerepainted abeautiful cerulean blue.Polifka seta patternthatwould befollowed in every theater ofwar.TheF-4sandF-5swouldpenetrate deepintoenemy territory “unarmed andunafraid” to bringbackmillions ofphotographs thatpavedthewayforfuturebombing raids,invasions, and defensive preparations. AfewearlyP-38sweresenttothe11thAirForceinUmnak,

Alaska, wheretheirfirsttryat combatcameonJune6, 1942,when they—inerror—attacked a Sovietfreighter. ThefirstLightning kills

tookplacein theAlaskan theater onAugust 4, 1942,whenSecond

Lieutenants Kenneth W.Ambrose andStanley A.Longofthe54th

Fighter Squadron destroyed twoKawanishi H6K“Mavis” four-engine Japanese flying boatsnearAtka. The39thFighter Squadron ofthe35thFGbegan receiving its aircraft inAustralia inthelatesummer of1942. Operational missions began inOctober, andbyDecember, theP-38s wereabletointervene overNewGuinea. Second Lieutenant Richard Bong, a highspirited, cheerfulyoungmanfromPoplar,Wisconsin, wasonloantothe39th

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fromthe 9thFS.He scoredthefirsttwoof hisfortyvictories on

December 27,knocking downanAichiD3AValanda Misubishi AG6MS Zero.Acolleague, FirstLieutenant Thomas Lynch, alsoscored twovictories, shooting downtwoNajajima Ki43Oscars. Lynch rose to therankoflieutenant colonelandscoredtwentyvictories before

crashing tohisdeathonMarch 9,1944. TheLightning proved tobeparticularly suitable tocombat in theSouthPacific fora numberofreasons. It hada remarkable range,andat lowaltitudes, wheremostcombats tookplace,its supercharger-engine matchup worked well.Itwasveryrugged, able to sustain majordamage andreturnto base.Thecomplex Lightningwasrelatively difficult tomaintain, butitsground crews took prideintheirwork,knowing thatthetwin-engine layout gavetheir pilotsconfidence. Theyknewthat if theylostoneengine,theother couldbe dependedupon to get themhomeacrossthe long,cruel

stretches ofthePacific, thetangled junglemasses, or therugged mountains oftheChina-Burma-India theater, where theTenthand Fourteenth AirForces operated. ItwastheLightning’s long-range capability thatearned itsrole inthemostdaring mission ofthewar,oneforwhich drama, intrigue, andélanrivaled theDoolittle raidonTokyo. Madeaware bycode breakers thattheinevitably punctual Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the manwhohaddevised theattackonPearlHarbor, wasplanning a routine inspection triptoBougainville, atop-level decision wasmade toassassinate him.ThetaskfelltoThirteenth AirForceP-38sbecause

nootheraircraft inthetheater, Army orNavy, hadthecombination ofrange, speed, andfirepower toflylowovertheocean for435miles fromGuadalcanal tointercept Yamamoto’s Mitsubishi G4M1Betty asitflewtoBallale, atinyisland offthecoastofthesouthern tipof Bougainville. MajorJohnW.Mitchell, commander ofthe339th Fighter Squadron, wasgiven theresponsibility fortheattack. Heled sixteen P-38Gs, equipped withlong-range droptanks,onafive-leg, two-hour-and-forty-five-minute flight overtheocean. TheLightnings arrivedthirty-five milesoffBallale, justin timeto interceptYama-

moto’s flight, which consisted oftwoBettys andsixZeroescort planes. BothBettys wereshotdown, Yamamoto’s plane crashing inthejungle. (After thebattle, atotalofthreeBettys andthreeZeros wereclaimed. Japanese records indicate thelossonlyofthetwoBettys.) Theattack finished offYamamoto without alerting theJapanese tothefactthat theircodewasbroken. Butitalsostarted another fight,stillgoing on today, astowhoshothimdown. Captain Thomas G.Lanphier made

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thefirstclaimandwasforalongtimeassumed tobethevictor;Lieu-

tenantRexBarber always believed thathehadscored thevictory, and inlateryears compelling evidence wasamassed tosupport hiscase. (In 1960,theUnited States AirForce historians assigned one-half credit

to Lanphierand to Barber,thusdispleasing everyone.)One thingis

certain: Yamamoto wasshotdownbyapilot flyinga Lightning.

TheP-38became thebackbone oftheArmy AirForce’s fighter groups inthebrutalcampaigns thatforced theJapanese backfrom theireasyconquests. TheLightnings hadtotakeofffromprimitive, dust-laden fields withheavy loadsthatwould allow themtoflylong distancesto engagetheenemy.Initially,theLightningsquadrons were

distributed among threegroups inGeneral George Kenney’s FifthAir Force.

One of these,the 475th,wascommandedby ColonelCharles

McDonald, thethird-ranking P-38aceofthewar,withtwenty-seven victories. McDonald hadthepressure andtheprivilege ofinitiating Charles Lindbergh intocombat. Lindbergh, delighted tobeemployed inmeaningful warworkafterhisill-favored attemptatpacifist politics

beforethewar,hada longacquaintance withLockheedproducts.His

cruise-control methods oflowrpmandhighmanifold pressure were widely adopted, extending therange oftheLightning toseven hundred miles. Lindbergh wasflying withMcDonald’s flight ofeightP-38s on

July28, 1944.Theyencountered twoJapanese Ki51Soniarecon-

naissance planes; inalong,confusing dogfight, Lindbergh found himselffiring atoneSonia thatkeptturning intohim,finally passing under himbylessthantenfeet.Hisshotshadgonehome, however, andthe Sonia crashed intothewater below. Kenney ultimately hadfivegroups fullyequipped withLightnings(the8th,18th,49th,347thand475th).Morethanonehundred

pilotsbecameacesin theP-38in thePacific, wheretheLightning

claimed 1,358victories, morethananyotherfighter. Among those aceswasMajor Bong, farmoremature nowthanbefore thewar,when hisjoyful exuberance hadledhimtoflyundertheGolden GateBridge andearnareprimand fromGeneral Kenney. Bong wasdeadly serious incombat, doingthreetoursandscoring fortyvictories torankhim asthehighest-scoring American aceofalltime.Among hismany decorations wastheMedalofHonor,butheremained unaffected by them,retaining hisebullient goodnatureandpleasant manner. In August 1945,afterhetookoffina newP-80,a fuel-pump failure causedhimtocrashfatallyatBurbank, California.

His strongestrivalwasMajorThomasB. McGuire.McGuire,

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MajorRichardBongwas America’sleadingace in WorldWarII, with 40 victories, all achievedin the P-38. He is shownhere with famouslong-distanceflyer JimmyMattern,a Lockheedtest pilot.

whowiththirty-eight victories wassecond onlytoBonginvictories, wasfromRidgewood, NewJersey.In hisfirstcombathe shotdown

threeenemy aircraft, andbecame anacethreedayslaterwithtwomore kills.Determined tooutscore Bong, theirascible, talkative McGuire flewwithreckless abandon, andonDecember 26,1944,scored seven victories inonedayoverthePhilippines. McGuire losthislifeon January 7,1945, whenhecrashed while attempting toassist acomrade whowasbeing attacked byanOscar. TheLightning wasprogressively developed duringitsservice in the Pacific, andlatein thewartheP-38Mtwo-seat nightfighter

evolved. Equipped withanASH-type radarmounted underthenose, theP-38M’s performance wasalmost asgoodasthesingle-seater’s. Beloved bypilotsandbyitsground crewmen, theLightning distinguished itselfunderconditions fardifferent fromthoseforwhichit hadbeenconceived. TherangeoftheLightning proved asvaluable against Japanas itwould beoverEurope, andallowed theplane totakeitstollofenemy aircraft andinstallations fromIndochina toOkinawa. Itsrangealso

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conferred uponit thedistinction ofbeingthefirstAllied aircraft to onAugust 25,1945,Colonel Clay landinJapanafteritssurrender; landed atNittagahara, Japan, supposedly due Ticeandhiswingman to“engine problems,” butmoreprobably outofsheercuriosity.

Combat againsttheEuropean AxisPowers heP-38suffered notonlyfromslowdeliveries butalsofrombeing

thepawninthepolitical warsthatflared upbetween theEighth AirForceandUSAAF headquarters. General Eaker wanted P-38sas long-range fighters toescort hisbombers intoGermany, buthewas

forcedtorelinquish themforOperation Torch,theinvasion ofNorth Africa.Thisdelay,coupledwithengine-supercharger problems en-

countered inthemoist, coldairfoundinEurope forsomuchofthe year,protracted theLightning’s development asa premier fighter plane. Yetthebrilliance oftheaircraft’s design madeit suitable for missions thathadneverbeenenvisioned andwereoftentotallydifferentfromthoseofthePacific theater.

ThefirstLightning victory intheWestcame onAugust 14,1942, whenSecond Lieutenant ElzaShahan, based inIceland withthe27th FS,attacked a Focke WulfFw200,theaircraft thatChurchill had termed“theScourge oftheAtlantic.” Shahan sharedthevictory with SecondLieutenant JosephD.R. Shaffer, whowasflyinga Curtiss

P-40C forthe33rdFS.ItwasthefirstofmanykillsofGerman and Italian aircraft. Shipping wasstilla critical problem in1942, andthelongrange oftheP-38senabled themtobeferried toEngland viaahazardous 2,965-mile routethatledfromPresque Isle,Maine, through Goose Bay,Labrador; Bluie West1,Greenland; andReykjavik, Iceland, to Prestwick, Scotland. Forthemovement, aircraft wereorganized into squadrons ofthreeflights each,eachflighttohavetwoelements, and eachelement consisting ofa B-17and4 P-38s.Outofa totalof186

P-38s dispatched during 1942, only7werelost,farfewer thanthe10 percent rateexpected. Ofthese, 6wereforced toland,along with2 B-17s, ontheicecapontheeastern coastofGreenland. (Some of thosewerefoundagaintwohundred feetbelow Greenland’s iceand snowinawell-publicized aircraft archaeology attempt). Although the longtripwaslatermadethousands oftimes, theimplicit hazards kept itfromeverbeingroutine. TheIstand14thFighter Groups carried theLightning towar

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TheP-38s fought in every theater, but wereat their best advantagein the Pacific,where

combattookplaceat altitudes and weatherfor whichthey werebest suited.

inNorthAfrica inmid-November 1942,doinglong-range bomber escort, ground attack, andreconnaissance work.Asgreenunits,still working outthedifficulties encountered inmoving toanewtheater ofcombat, initialresults werenotentirely satisfactory. TheGerman Messerschmitt Bf109GandFocke WulfFw190fighters theymet wereflown byseasoned veterans whose tactics dictated combat atfifteenthousand feetandbelow,wheretheLightning’s sizeputit at a disadvantage inmaneuvering.

TheLightnings weretoscoretheirgreatest successes inNorth Africa overthesea,decimating incoming formations ofGerman transports, anditwasinthisvenue thattheyearned theirGerman sobriquet derGableschwanz Teufel—‘the fork-tailed devil.” Andthephoto-recce Lightnings ofthe3rdPhotographic Groupdidpatient, dangerous workpreparing fortheinvasions ofSicily andItaly,mapping huge areas ofenemy territory inmorethanthreehundred sorties. No one—notevenHibbard,Johnson,or Kelsey—could have

everimagined in 1937thatsevenyearslatertheirP-38“interceptor”

would bedoing long-range combat, level bombing, dive-bombing, and reconnaissance onsuch a scale, orthatultimately, Lightnings would beabletorange allthewayacross theGerman Reich inshuttle missions totheSovietUnion.

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Operations fromEngland -38operations overEurope hadbeencurtailed whentheaircraft werediverted toparticipate inthefighting inNorthAfrica. Itwas notuntilOctober 15,1943,thatthe55thFGbecame operational withtheVIIIFighter Command; itwasfollowed inshortorderbythe 20thFG.TheP-38H’s range nowpermitted ittopenetrate ahundred milesfartherintoGermany thantheRepublic P-47scould,andthere

werecontinuous attempts toimprove onthatfigure. The55thgotoff toa goodstartbyscoring threevictories withnolosses onitsfirst mission toWilhemshaven onNovember 3.Ultimately, therangeof theP-38wasextended to thepointthatit couldescortbombers all thewaytoBerlin.

Meanwhile, fighter operations inEurope werestillencumbered bythestrictinjunction to“stay withthebombers,” which meant that attacks couldnotbeinitiated against enemy fighters thatwerenot attacking,norcouldenemyfightersbefollowedoncethey’dbeenen-

gaged. Inaddition, theLightning pilotssuffered frominadequate cock-

pitheating (theengines’ beinginthebooms instead ofjustinfront ofthecockpit’s firewall, asinsingle-engine aircraft, reduced thetransferofheat)andhadtowearsomanylayers ofclothing thattheir

movements wereinhibited. TheAllison engines alsosuffered problems withtheturbo-superchargers, andthereweredifficulties withtheop-

eration oftheintercooler controls. TheP-38alsobecame anextremely effective ground-attack aircraftinthe20thFG,particularly suited tobeating upGerman airfields.

TheLightning wassoongivenadditional tasks.In the55th,some P-38Jsandsubsequent models hadtheirstandard nosereplaced byan

extracrewposition withaNorden bombsighttousethrough aPlexiglasnoseenclosure. Called “Droop Snoot” Lightnings, theyledformations ofP-38s, eachoneofwhich carried twotwo-thousand-pound bombs—the samestandard bombloadasa B-17! Thiswasfurther developed withtheintroduction ofradarintotheleadaircraft. Forreasons ofrange, standardization, andeconomy, theNorth American P-51wasselected asthestandard long-range escort fighter, replacing theP-38inJuly1944. Although manypilots welcomed the change,manyothers,havinglosttheonlyenginetheMustang had,

devoutly wished theywerebackintheLightning. TheNinthAirForce usedtheP-38ina tactical role,beginning inApril1944, withthe474thFGandthensoonafterwiththe367th

Engines,alwayscritical to aircraft design, take longer to developthan airframesdo. The Lockheed XP-49 was to have had Continental engines; they did not materialize

and the project wasdropped.

and370th.The474thusedtheLightning untilwar’s end,theother twogroups converting toP-47sinMarch 1945. Twothings contributedtotherelatively greater success oftheLightning withtheNinth. Combat usually tookplace atlower altitudes andhence warmer temperatures, where theAllison engines worked betterandthepilots did notsuffer somuch. Thesecond factor wasthedecline inthequality ofGerman pilottraining. TheP-38s werethusgenerally abletohold

theirowninfighter-versus-fighter combat, evenastheyconcentrated on ground-attack workthat includedstrafingairfields,pillboxes and

otherfortifications, andtrainsandtrucks. In Europe, asinalltheaters, Lockheed reconnaissance planes would betheworkhorses tothelastdayofthewarandbeyond. Inthecourse ofitsdevelopment through many models andmodification intomany variants, theP-38’s performance wascontinuously improved. Maximum speed didnotgoupverymuchovertime,but rangewasgreatly extended totheP-38L’s 2,600miles. Maximum weight increased byathirdto21,600 pounds intheLmodel. More important, reliability wasgreatly improved astheaircraft matured. Follow-on models totheP-38included theXP-49 andXP-58; neitheroftheseaircraft hadafairchanceatdevelopment because the

tomaterialize. JoeTowle madethe engines intended forthemfailed XP-49 onNovember 14,1942, and firstflights inbothaircraft—the ineachcase, bothtimeandrequiretheXP-58 onJune6,1944—but ensued. ments hadpassed theaircraft byandnoproduction

Continuallychangingmissionrequirementsand the failureof the WrightTornado engine resulted in the two-seat,pressurizedcabin XP-58ChainLightningnot being placedinto production.Onlyone was built.

Backin Burbank henextpartoftheBurbank storyrequires aslight retrogression to 1940.ThenLockheed wasfaced withthecomparative failure of theLockheed Model 14.Aspreviously noted, Northwest Airlines had

disposedof its fleet,andsaleswereslow,in partbecausethe Super

Electra hadahighseat-mile costcompared tothecompeting Douglas airliners. Ateamledbyengineer JayCowling redesigned theModel 14by increasing itslength byfiveandone-half feet,which provided space forfifteen oreighteen passengers, depending onwhether ornotthe airline elected tohaveagalley installed. Thealteration required anumberofmodifications tosecure thedesired flying characteristics; these included raising thehorizontal stabilizer byonefootandaltering the

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TheLodestarwasa logicalextensionof the Electra.Passengersare boardinga NationalAirlinesplane to fly“‘theBuccaneerRoute.”

trailing edgeofthewing.Theresulting aircraft wasdesignated the Model18andcalled theLodestar, todisassociate itfromtheSuper Electra’s reputation. Theredesign succeeded inreducing theseat-mile operating cost tobecompetitive withtheDC-3,although itcaused areduction in bothtopandcruising speeds ofabout25mphcompared withthe SuperElectra withthesameengines. Evenso,domestic saleswere slight, only33goingtoU.S.airlines and10toprivate customers. Foreign governments andairlines, manycutofffromtheirnormal sources ofsupply, bought atotalof96Model 18s.Theremainder of the625Lodestars thatweremanufactured during itsthree-year productionrunwentto themilitary services undera varietyofdesigna-

tions. Some ofthese weretransferred under lend-lease toGreat Britain. ButjustastheHudson bonanza grewoutoftheModel14,so didtheVentura andHarpoon series arisefromtheModel18,with 3,028being produced, just87morethantheHudson. Robert Gross’s visioninestablishing theVegaAirplane Company andfunding its seven-hundred-thousand-square-foot factory wasamply repaid when firsttheVentura andthentheHarpoon rolledfromitslines,along with2,750Boeing B-17Fs andGsbuiltasapartoftheBoeing-VegaDouglas pool.Vega achieved thelowest man-hours peraircraft inthe

Stretch is an implicitindicationof the qualityof the design,and Lockheedalwaysbuilt planes with “‘stretch.’’TheVenturawas a developmentof the Lodestar.It had a substantiallybetter performancethan the Hudsonand becamea mainstayof the RoyalAir Force,the USAAFand Navy,and severalforeignair forces.

pool,andold-time Lockheed employees swear thattheUSAAF preferred Vega-built B-17s above allothers. TheVentura wasoffered totheBritish AirMinistry aseithera replacement fortheHudson inthegeneral reconnaissance role,using the sameenginesthat poweredthe civilianLodestar,or as a light/

medium bomber withengines ofuptotwothousand horsepower. TheVentura proved tobenotverywelllikedbytheRoyal Air Force, which received itsfirstdeliveries inSeptember 1941, andbegan using itasamedium bomber. Although ithadanoverall attrition rate ofabout3.6percent, which wasaverage forBomber Command atthe time,alargepercentage ofthetotalVenturas lostwasincurred injust twoorthreedisastrous raids, where theextent andquality ofGerman opposition proved tobetoomuch. Venturas intheEuropean theater werewithdrawn fromBomber Command intheautumn of1943and allocated toCoastal Command, charged withtheno-less-demanding tasks ofreconnaissance andmaritime patrol. Ironically, Allied Venturas intheMediterranean theater wereinitially intended forconvoy coverageandreconnaissance butproved tobeverysuccessful whenop-

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As the war progressed,the Lockheedworkforcebecameincreasinglyproficientat adapting newdesigns to productionstandard. HereNavypersonnellook overa Venturaemergingfromthe productionline.

eratedas mediumbombers.The Venturawasalsousedby the Australian, Brazilian, Canadian, FreeFrench, NewZealand, andSouth

African airforces. TheUSAAF madeonlylimited useoftheVentura asB-34s as trainers foravariety ofschools. Itwasmuchmoreattractive tothe

UnitedStatesNavy,whichfoundthatthespeedoftheVenturaoffered

anelement ofsurprise invaluable inattacking surfaced submarines. TheU-boat lookouts wereskilled inaircraft detection, andhaving sightedan enemyaircraft,couldsubmergein whatseemedlikemere

seconds. Afastreconnaissance planelikethePV-1,asthenavydes-

ignated it,gavea tremendous advantage. AVentura madeitsfirst U-boat killoffthecoastofNewfoundland, whenLieutenant Thomas Kinaszczuk andhiscrewfromVP-82(laterVP-125)sanktheU-174.

Thesubmarine, captained byCommander Ulrich Thilo, hadsunkfour

vessels initsseventeen-month career.

TheVentura alsoperformed wellasabomber. APV-1fromVB136madethefirstAmerican offensive sweep overJapan since theApril 18,1942,Doolittle raidwhenitflewapatroloverParamushir, inthe

TheHarpoonwas a Venturawith newoutboardwingpanels, revisedverticaltail surfaces, and other modifications,includingincreasedfuel capacityfor increasedrange. It was a powerfulweapon.

KurilIslands. Harassing raidswereflown byVB-135, VB-136, and VB-139 untiltheendofthewar.Radar-equipped Aleutian PV-1s also actedaspathfinders forUSAAF B-24operations. TheVenturas wereasadaptable astheP-38s, andwereusedas patrolplanes, bombers, andground-attack aircraft using rockets. The marines adapted several asnightfighters using theSCR-5217A radar. Rushedintoactionbythefallof 1943,theall-black Venturascored

itsfirstvictory onNovember 13,shooting down aJapanese Betty fifty miles southofEmpress Augusta Bay. Thenavy expressed interest inadevelopment oftheVentura, and inthecourse oftimetheVega Model 15,theHarpoon, materialized. Thenewaircraft featured aseventy-five-foot wingspan, nineandonehalffeetgreater thantheVentura’s, andlarger vertical surfaces. Fuel loadwasincreased by20percent, andarmament wasgreatly increased—the PV-2hadeightforward firing guns. Thebombloadwas uppedtofourthousand pounds.

The Harpoonmadeits firstflighton December3, 1943,with

BudMartin,FrankOsberg, andJimKendrick asitscrew.Production

wasslowed bylabordifficulties anditwasnotuntilMarch 1945that itwentintocombat, going totheAleutians withVPB-139. Bothcom-

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batandengineering testsrevealed someweaknesses inthewing,which

caused further production delays. Arebuild ofthewingsolved the problem.

Although it didnotseea greatdealofcombat,theHarpoon provedto beverywellliked,andwascontinued inproduction after

thewar’s end, a totalof535beingbuilt.Itwasusedextensively by reserve unitsinthepostwar U.S.Navy, aswellasbyItaly, Japan, the Netherlands, Peru,andPortugal.

ButthePV-2’s importance wentfarbeyonda 535-aircraft productionrun.Withits four-thousand-pound bombloadandtwo-

thousand-mile range, itsolidified thenavy’s thinking about land-based aircraft replacing flying boatsastheprincipal typeofreconnaissance andantisubmarine aircraft. TheHarpoon waspartofawartime con-

tinuumthatleddirectly totheP2VNeptune, whichputLockheed in theleadingpositioninthepostwar marketplace astheprimary pro-

ducerofpatrolaircraft. TheNeptune would formonelegofabrilliant postwar marketing triadforLockheed, withtheConstellation andtheP-80Shooting Star

beingtheothertwolegs.Allthreeaircraftwerebegunduringthewar,

andallthreewould notonlyprove tobeextremely successful intheir respective classes, butwouldleadtofuturedevelopments. One,the P-80,would bringintoformal existence themostunique, productive, andinventive engineering departments ofalltime,anassemblage of free-spirited geniuses whowouldbeknownformally as“Advanced

Development” butcolloquially wouldbereferred toasthe“Skunk Works.” Thesethreeaircraft, andthefollow-on designs theywouldgen-

erate,wouldenable Lockheed toprosper inthehighly competitive postwar years, enabling ittotakeitsfirsttentative stepsleading not onlytonewproducts, buttowhole newdivisions thatwould create trulyamazing triumphs inaircraft, missiles, andsatellites.

CHAPTER 5

Remolding forthe PostwarWorld

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endofWorldWarIIpresented theAmerican aircraft industry

withproblems ofincredible magnitude. Ithadgrown beyond all imagination inthenumbers andtypes ofaircraft being produced. Beforethewarbegan in1939,theU.S.aviation industry wasstraining toproduce 3,000aircraft ayear,allofa relatively smallsize,powered byengines ofmoderate horsepower andequipped inthemostSpartan

manner. By1944,theindustry wasproducing ata rateof100,000 aircraft ayear.Forthemostpart,thesewerelarger andfarmoresophisticated designs, equipped withsomeofthemostpowerful reciprocating engines thatwouldeverbebuilt.In1939a simple aircraft radiowasconsidered exotic; bywar’s endplanes wereequipped with aformidable arrayofradios, radarsets,radaraltimeters, andahostof othergearthatrequired thebacking ofahugeindustry tocreate and supportit.

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Fromitsproduction runof5 aircraft in 1932,Lockheed had expanded morethanathousandfold toawartime peakof5,864 aircraft delivered in1944;thefirmwould deliver a total19,077 aircraft betweenJuly1, 1940,andAugust31, 1945.Employment peakedat morethanninety-four thousand inmid-1943, butimprovements in

productivity andarational reduction inproduction effort astheneeds oftheservices weremetallowed Lockheed toreduce employment selectively bytheendof1944tolessthansixty-three thousand. Theendofthewarbroughttheabruptcancellations ofcontracts.

Aircraft deliveries fellto2,828in1945, andthento465in1946, less than10percent of1943deliveries. Employment fellcorrespondingly, fromjustoverthirtythousand in1945tojustoverseventeen thousand in 1946. Thevastchange ofscalewasatremendous challenge toLockheed management, particularly toRobertGross, whoselettersoftheperiod

reflect hisanguish athaving toaddress thedecisions tobemade about whom tokeepemployed, andhowtoreconcile thedecisions withthe twenty-four thousand Lockheed employees whohadbeeninthearmed forces andwhowereentitled tofirstconsideration forreemployment upontheirreturn.Fewcompanies havehada chiefexecutive like Gross, whose undoubted competitive nature andwillingness toriskall onacompany project werematched byhisgenuine concern forhis peopleandtheirwell-being. Asa directresultofGross’s compassion, Lockheed wasnotas

ruthless asitcould—and probably should—have beeninthereduction ofitspersonnel intheuncertain climate thatfaced it.Despite thehuge volume ofbusiness from1941through 1945,rising wages, inflated costsofgoods, taxes, andwartime regulations keptprofits low.Lockheedearned about$32million on$2.4billion innetsales, amiserly 1.3percent returnovertheentire period ofthewar.Intheimmediate postwar years, Lockheed management hadtonegotiate canceled contracts,closedownbut stillmaintainunusedfactoryandofficeareas,

andbegintheinvestment innewproducts forthepostwar marketplace.

Theyear1946wasbrutal fromafinancial standpoint. Even after afederal income taxcreditof$11.2million, Lockheed stillposted a lossof$10.7million. Thecompany hadanticipated theproblems and setupa$15million reserve fund;$13.8 million ofthiswastransferred toreport a$3.1million netincome, apurely illusory figure given the circumstances. Thereserve fundhaving beendepleted, Lockheed was unable toperform thesame bookkeeping operation thefollowing year, andhadtoposta $2.5million loss,thefirstsince1934. Anetincome

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ofmorethan$6.2million wasreported in1948,butLockheed was stillintrouble withexcessive loans,highinventory, anddisproportionate costsinsales andadministration. Grossalsofacedacutepersonalproblemsduringtheperiod,high-

lighted bythedeathofthevicepresident ofengineering, MacV.Short,

whocollapsed anddiedfroma heartattackonlyfortyminutesafter

leaving a meeting withGrossinAugust 1949.Short,onlyfifty-one wasverywelllikedintheaviation community, andhisdeathcameas a shock.

decisions. CurtissGross alsohadtocontend withmajor business Wright hadmadeearnest attempts tomerge during 1943, withGross promised control, butthedealdidnotgothrough. There wasnoloss ofgoodwill, however, forin1946,Curtiss-Wright, delighted tohave Lockheed asa customer foritsR-3350engines, aidedin financing

TWA’s purchase ofConstellations. Veryserious negotiations wereundertaken foranadvantageous purchase oftheaircraft operations of Consolidated-Vultee, a company approximately equaltoLockheed in termsofbothassets andbacklog oforders.InaSeptember 1946letter

toRandolph Walker—asking himtobeprepared toresign asadirector intheevent thedealwentthrough—Gross indicated thatadealwould beconsummated thatfall,andthatLockheed would bethesurviving

firm.(Asimilardealwasconsummated decadeslater,whenLockheed

purchased theaircraftdivision ofConvair’s successor firm,General

Dynamics.) Somepreliminary discussions onmerger werealsoheld withVought. Neither ofthesecame tofruition, butitisinteresting to speculate onwhatmighthavebeen,given thefortunes ofeachofthe companies intheyearstocome. AllofCharlieBarker’s bankingskillswerecalledupon,andan increasingly reluctant bankingindustry continued tosupplyloansto

keepoperations going. Therewerefewbenefits fromallthefinancial problems, butthedownsizing inpersonnel hadanunforeseen bright side.Byveryclosemanagement, thereduction inforcepermitted a refined selection process toretaintheverybestpersonnel. Fewcould beretained intheirformer positions, butthesewerethechildren of thedepression, andtheyunderstood thenecessity foreconomy. They accepted positions lower inrankandpaywithgrace, andthenworked

hardtogobackuptheladderwhenconditions improved.

Theprocess ofrefining thepersonnel oreatLockheed hadone verycurious aspect, extremely desirable insomerespects, butfraught withhazard ifnotmanaged properly. Thiswastheinescapable fact thatLockheed hadwithinitsranksseveral menforwhomtheterm

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“genius” wasnotanexaggeration; further, itwould acquire others of thesameorderinthenextfewyears. Thus,Lockheed would enjoy the services ofextraordinary andextraordinarily diverse people suchasHall Hibbard,KellyJohnson,WillisHawkins,BenRich,NathanPrice,

IrvingCulver, DanTellep,andmanyothers.Anyoneofthesewould

havebeenastaronhisownatanyothercompany—and anyoneof themmighthavehadtrouble inacorporate environment otherthan Lockheed’s. Thepersonality soinfluenced Lockheed’s management styleandcorporate culturethatagenuine senseoffamily wascreated, enabling everyone toworktohisfullcapacity sidebysideonawide

spectrum ofproducts. Thisisnottosaythattherewasnotanoccasional dustup whentheirstrong personalities clashed, northatthere werenotoccasional manifestations ofego-based rancor, butonthe

whole,theymanaged to findthespacewithinLockheed toworkto themaximum oftheirownabilities—and thuscarrythefirmforward

further andfaster thananyone mighthaveimagined. Theterm“Lockheed family” hastheringofa public-relations ploy,asaccharine description ofordinary goodmorale, butthisisnot thecase.Ininterview afterinterview, thetermemerged spontaneously

frompeople employed atevery levelwhoechoed theimportance of thesense ofbelonging thatBobGross hadinstilled. Anundeniable, close-knit sense offamily heldthecompany together, allowing itto excelingoodtimes,and,aswillbeshownsubsequently, ensuringthat

itstayed together inbadtimes. Andtoday, evenamong people who didnotknowhimpersonally, thissenseofidentity isattributed to BobGross. TheresultofLockheed’s precipitate drawdown wastotally differentfromthewartime demobilization ofthearmedforces, which wasdonewithsuchreckless abandon thatthemilitary strength ofthe nation wasreduced toanegligible quantity. Lockheed emerged from

theforce-reduction eraasanefficient, highlycompetitive organization,

lean,taut,andstaffedwithmenandwomenwhohadearnedtheir

spurs inthewarandwere nowcommitted tomaking Lockheed aleader inpeace. Theywereaidedbya management wiseenough toallow itselftobeenergized byitsrichconcentration ofmenofengineering genius yetstrong enough tocontrol thedirection oftheireffort. Yet it isfairtosaythatevenLockheed’s management hadnoideaofhow

farandhowhightheresources thusemployed would ultimately reach. Despite thephenomenal wartime growth, Lockheed’s topleadership teamhadremained fairlysmall, theonlysignificant addition being Courtlandt Gross’s move totheWestCoast tobecome president

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oftheVega Airplane Company in1940. TheGross brothers wereto maintain tightcontrol during theexpansion because oftheirpolicy of delegating authority andidentifying promising young talent. Thepostwarsuccess ofthefirmresulted fromsomechance situations aswell, forasevents transpired, Lockheed would betasked toproduce three aircraft thatwould bevitalintheimmediate postwar period.

TheRightProductsat the RightTime C ircumstances hadworked greatly toLockheed’s favor inthatthree ofitsmajor product lines—the Constellation transport, theNep-

tunepatrolplane,andtheP-80jetfighter—all filleddefinite postwar needs.Eachof thesehadcomeintobeingduringthewar,andeach

onewouldreachmaturity inthepostwar years, giving Lockheed the boostitwould needtosustain itself inavastly different environment. Eachonewould alsohavelasting psychological effects within thecompany,fortheConstellation wouldinspirea lingering—and costly— hungerto remainin thecommercial air-transport business andthe

Neptune would make Lockheed premier intheantisubmarine-warfare business, whiletheP-80wouldnotonlyleadtoahostofderivative aircraft,it wouldbethebeginningofthemostdistinguished aeronau-

ticalengineering groupin history,thejustlyfabledSkunkWorks. Knownearlyonandmoreprosaically astheAdvanced Developments

Project Group,theSkunk Works wouldprovide theUnited States with a series ofaircraft soadvanced thattherewasliterally nocompetition forthemanywhere intheworld. Thefirststudiesonwhatwouldbecome thebest-known ofthe

threeaircraftuponwhichLockheed wouldbaseitspostwarrecovery,

theConstellation, began in1938.Douglas haddominated thetwinengine airliner market, tothedetriment ofLockheed products, and nowthreatened todothesamebyintroducing theDC-4(laterdes-

ignatedtheDC-4E),alargeforty-two-passenger aircraft thatfeatured

atripletaildesign tomeettheheight limitations imposed byexisting maintenance hangars. TheDC-4Eproved tobea failure, andwas neverputintoproduction. (Itwaspurchased bytheJapanese, and ultimately usedasthebasisforthedesign ofoneoftheirfewfourengine bomber prototypes, theNakajima G5NShinzan, alsoacompletefailure.) ThefirstLockheed four-engine transport project wastheModel 44Excalibur, theinitialmodel ofwhich would havecarried twenty-

Remolding for the Postwar World = 135

at a topspeedof 262mphat 15,500feet.Airline onepassengers wasaninsufaircraft tothisfirstoffering—the n egative was reaction eventually studies design overtheDC-3.Subsequent advance ficient versionoftheModel44whichwasto havehad ledto an advanced at a speedof300mph.Pan to carryfortypassengers the capability

and intheExcalibur, veryinterested thenbecame Airways American onceagain whencompetition wereprogressing negotiations contract athirty307Stratocruiser, theModel introduced Boeing intervened. passenger pressurized withamoderately transport 246-mph three-seat, cabin feet,withaninternal at 18,000 it tocruise cabinthatallowed the307by hadcreated ofonly8,000feet.Boeing altitude pressure fuselage, toa circular ofa B-17C andempennage thewings adapting thefirstofthewide-bodies. ThefamedDanielWebb“Tommy” Tomlinson haddoneexten-

hisboss, workforTWA,andconvinced high-altitude siveexperimental

hadtobepressurized ofairliners JackFrye,thatthenextgeneration andweather comfort, passenger fueleconomy, ofspeed, forreasons bringing for thecompetition, Fryeturnedto Lockheed avoidance. withhiminthesuminTWA, stockholder a major Hughes, Howard itsExcalibur to gofarbeyond Lockheed merof 1939.Theywanted coast-to-coast a nonstop with transport apressurized specifying design, a speedofat least250mph,andasix-thousand-pound capability, to getasupersought oftimeHughes (Fora period capacity. cargo the provide would that transport twenty-seven-passenger luxurious, playedalong, Lockheed transportation. richandfamouswithexclusive

forluxuryitemsforthe thatthepoundsHughesallocated knowing

intoseatsfor eventually couldbetranslated passengers twenty-seven fortyormore.)

whichhadreachedthewind-tunnel Workon the Excalibur,

22,1940, butaslateasAugust wasdeferred, stage, andmock-up model

wasgoingtobe thattheproject memoindicated aninterdepartmental whoinsistedonsecrecy in sixmonths.ThissuitedHughes, revived

TheExfortheConstellation. asacover theExcalibur andregarded astheModel tothenewaircraft wastransferred designation calibur’s as assigned were J ohnson andKelly Hall H ibbard A. Excalibur 49 D on while respectively, engineer, andchiefresearch chiefengineer maintains (Hawkins engineer. theroleofproject laterassumed Palmer 44wasto serveasa Model oftheExcalibur thatthemainfunction workbeingdoneonthe fromthesecret anddivertattention decoy Constellation.)

formuchofthe credit beengiven theyears hasthrough Hughes

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 136

HowardHughesfollowedthe developmentof the Constellationclosely,and is shown here with TWA’sJack Frye.The two men flewa LockheedC-69to a newLosAngelesWashingtonrecord of 7 hours and 3 minutes on April 17, 1944.

designoftheConstellation, particularly itsunusualS-shaped fuselage,

usually reported ashaving been“scrawled onthebackofanenvelope.” Itisagreatstory, but,likemostsuchstories, untrue. Although Hughes already hadunorthodox working habits,beinggivento nocturnal

phonecallsandmeetings inout-of-the-way places, hewasstillfarfrom beingtheeccentric thathewouldlaterbecome. Hewasinfluential in

determining theperformance specifications, anddidmake suggestions aboutdetails ofthecockpit design, butotherwise didnotinterfere withtheprocess. People whoworked withHughes invariably report thathewaspleasant, highly focused onthebusiness athand,andable tounderstand fullyengineering discussions anddecisions. TheModel 49naturally drewheavily onpastLockheed experience,usingthebasicExcalibur layout, andessentially scaling upthe wingoftheP-38,usingthesameairfoils andincorporating Fowler flaps.Thecontrols werehydraulically boosted, another legacy from theP-38.Thehydraulic controls wereintended togetthemaximum effectfromtheminimum-size controlsurfaces. Atricycle landing gear

wasadopted, aswas a triplevertical tailsurface, thelatter(aswiththe

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TheConnie,as it was inevitablyknown,providedhigh speed, reliability,passenger comfort,good operatingeconomics,and tremendouspopularappeal.

DC-4E) sothattheaircraft could fitinexisting hangars. Theeccentric elliptical shape oftheModel14’svertical surfaces wasadapted tofacilitate identity asaLockheed product. Thesingle greatest visual difference between theConstellation andallothertransports, before orsince, wasinthedelicate curve of itsfuselage. Ordinarily, thehorizontal centerline ofatransport-aircraft fuselage isasimple straight linefromnosetotail.TheConstellation’s nosedipsdown,andthefuselage flows inaverylazyStotherear,

whereit turnsup.Anintenseyoungengineer namedWardBeman

wasresponsible forthedesign. Hisgoalwastohavethefuselage shape accurately matchtheflowofairalongthebodyoftheaircraft, soas toavoiddisrupting liftoverthewing.Whenhemadehisfirstcalcu-

lations, itwasapparent thata fuselage sodesigned wouldrequire a nosegearof inordinatelength.Asa result,Bemansweptthe nose

down. Attheotherendoftheninety-five-foot-long fuselage therewas arequirement toliftthetailsurfaces toavoid theunfavorable effect of slipstream onthehorizontal surfaces, andtokeepthetailofthefuselage andthebottoms oftheoutboard finsfromscraping therunway on landing. Thenetresultwasanaesthetic triumph. Theaircraft, withits unusual fuselage, slim,high-aspect-ratio wing,andtripletailtouched

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areceptive chordintheaviation community. Theoverall image was enhanced bythenameConstellation, which wasinstantly shortened totheaffectionate “Connie.” Yetthefuselage wasnotaseasytobuildasaconventional design, making thestandardization ofpartslikeaccess panels andhatches more difficult. HallHibbard toldofanembarrassing triphemadeasan airline passenger onanearlyConstellation. Somehow, before takeoff, anescape hatchfelloffintohislap.Takeoff wasdelayed sothata replacement couldbeinstalled; thefirstthreepartsthatwerebrought outtobeinstalled didnotfit.(Hibbard wascareful nottorevealhis

position atLockheed totheotherexasperated passengers.) Lockheed hadpioneered cabinpressurization withtheXC-35 of

1937,andon theConstellation useda four-pound-per-square-inch differential toprovide asix-thousand-foot cabinaltitude whilecruising

ateighteen thousand feet. Thedesign effort proceeded swiftly andtheperformance potentialgrew. Bythefallof1939, Lockheed wasready tooffertheairlines twoversionsoftheModel49,eachwitha forty-four Passenger capac-

ity,a topspeed of360mph,and acruisealtitude oftwenty thousand feet,which wasthendescribed charitably asbeing “over theweather.” Passenger capacity wasexpanded overtimetoasmanyassixty, but thereweremany variations tomeetspecific airline requests. Achoice ofeitherPratt& Whitney Double WasporWright Double Cyclone engines wasoffered, bothtypesproviding twothousandhorsepower. Afterobtaining permission fromTWAtoofferthe aircraft tootherairlines, 84orders camein,40eachfromPanAmericanandTWA,plus4 morefrom a still-unidentified source; thiswas

deemed sufficient tolaunch theprogram. Creating theModel 49tooktime,andalthough thethreat ofwar intervened, Lockheed wasauthorized toproceed withtheconstruction ofthreeprototypes onMay4,1941.Forthenextyear,considerable confusion ensued, asinitially Lockheed wasgoingtobeallowed to deliver the80aircraft onordertoPanAmandTWA. These wereto begovernment-owned andairline-operated, andweretobefollowed byanadditional 180C-69transports fortheUSAAF. InMay1942, a decision wasmadetoprocuretheaircraftfortheUSAAF, thefirst 50versions tobeessentially liketheoriginal civilian Model49Con-

stellation, while thenext180weretobeC-69B “Airborne TaskForce” cargo planes. Aseries offurther changes ensued; ultimately theUSAAF ordered atotalof313Constellations. Afterallthechaos, postwar cancellations

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resulted inonly15ofthesebeingdelivered totheUSAAF, butthe commercial airline market would beready andwaiting. Thefirstflight oftheConstellation wasmade onJanuary 9,1943, fromtheLockheed AirTerminal. Thetest-flight crewwastrulydis-

tinguished, withEdward T.Allen onloanfromBoeing. Allen wasthe mostsought-after “large airplane” testpilotinthebusiness; sadly, he would losehislifeinthecrash ofthesecond Boeing XB-29 onlythirtysevendayslater.Hewasaccompanied bycopilot MiloBurcham, Lock-

heed’schieftestpilot,but a manwithlittlefour-engineexperience.

R.L.“Rudy”Thoren(alsoaMichigan man)wasflightengineer and

Richard Stanton wasthecrewchief.Thorenwasinvaluable forhis workindesigning andinstalling thetestequipment withwhichthe airplane wassoliberally equipped. Healsosettheprecedent forthe carefulin-flighthandlingof theWrightR-3350engines,whichwere

extremely sensitive andpronetoprompt failure ifthecorrect operating procedures werenotused.Theversatile Kelly Johnson wasalsoon board,performing a roleheliked,thatofflight-testengineer.Landing

atMurocDryLake(nowEdwards AirForceBase) aftera fifty-minute flight,Allenthoughtthe airplaneperformedsowellthat he wasno

longer needed, andreturned toSeattle. Afteranextensive testprogram, Hughes andFryetookaleafout ofthepublicity flights oftheprevious decade onApril19,1944,by flying thenumber twoConnie fromBurbank toWashington’s National Airport nonstop insixhours, fifty-seven minutes, andfifty-one seconds, anewtranscontinental speed record. Theyaveraged 331mph ata 65percent power setting. Theimportoftheflightwasnotlost onairlineoperators. Itwasinthisairplane (serialed AF43-10310) that

Orville Wright madehislastflight, handling thecontrols forabrief period oftime.Thewingspan oftheConnie wasthreefeetlonger than Orville’s 120-foot firstflightin1903. Atotalof233oftheearlyModel 049Constellations would be builtthrough 1951;ofthese,28would bepurchased bythemilitary. Among thesewereVIPtransports forGenerals oftheArmyDouglas MacArthur andDwight Eisenhower. Aspresident, Eisenhower used VC-121A Columbine IIandVC-121E Columbine III;thelatterison exhibit attheUSAFMuseum inDayton, Ohio.Puttingtheconverted

military version oftheConnie intothefieldgaveLockheed aleadover Douglas, whose pressurized DC-6would makeitsfirstflightin1946, withdeliveries toairlines beginning inNovember ofthatyear. TheConstellation enteredcommercial service on February 3,

1946,flyingPanAmerican’s NewYork-to-Bermuda route.TWA

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Intendedas a revolutionarycommercialtransport, the Constellationwas pressed into militaryserviceas the C-69.ThemilitaryConniesservedwelland helped to provethe aircraft for civilianservice.

OnApril26, 1944, OrvilleWright took the controls of a Lockheed C-69after its take off from WrightField.It was his last flight, made more than four decadesafter he and Wilburhad their success at KittyHawk.

encroached onwhathadbeenPanAm’sturfbyinaugurating trans-

atlanticservicebetweenNewYorkand Parison February6, 1946. OthercarriersusingConnieswouldsoonfollowsuit.On March1, TWAbegantranscontinental servicewith the Constellations. Their

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TWAfeatured Constellationservice,and promotedit extensivelyas with the staged photo of passengers boarding.

greater speed enabled themtocuttwotothreehoursofftheen-route timeoffered bytheDouglas DC-4s ofAmerican andUnited. Airlines usingtheConstellation lostsomeoftheirinitial advantagewhentheCivilAeronautics Board grounded theConstellations fromJuly12toSeptember 20,1946,because ofcrashes. Thefirst occurred onJune18,1946,whenaPanAmConstellation onaNew

York-to-London flightwasforced tomakeanemergency landing at Willimantic, Connecticut. A severed supercharger driveshafthad flailedaround,shearingthe enginemountsso that the numberfour

engine dropped completely offtheairplane. (Thecrewshowed its aplomb andmade headlines aftertheprecautionary landing byserving thepassengers alightlunchalong withteaandcoffee.) There wereas

yetnorepairfacilities fortheConstellation intheEast,sothelightly

loaded aircraft wasflown backtoBurbank onthreeengines. Less than amonth later,onJuly11,anelectrical fireoccurred onaTWA training flight. Smoke filledthecockpit, andfiveofthesixpeople onboard werekilledin thecrashlanding. (Thenextyear,theDC-6wasto suffera similargrounding aftera firecausedbya fuelleakintothe

cabinheater system.)

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Despitethe Constellation’s higher speed, sleeper comfort was still desirableon verylong flights. Thisconfiguration was intendedfor long overseasroutes.

Thedelayinproduction hadanadverse effectonLockheed’s financial position, andwasa significant factorinmaking thecivil Constellation program a financial failure. ThefirstpurelycivilConstellation wastheModel649,which

featured improved passenger comfort items andwasnicknamed “Gold Plate.” Aswitheachofthesuccessive Constellation improvements, the maximum gross takeoff weight wasincreased. Theoriginal Model 049 hadamaximum gross takeoff weight of85,000 pounds; thisroseultimately to 160,000 poundsintheModel1649.

Competition fromtheDC-6induced Lockheed tocreatethe Model 1049Super Constellation, ofwhich 579military andcivilversionswould bebuilt.Thefuselage wasstretched byeighteen feetfive inches togainaninety-two passenger capacity, thesmall roundwindowsgavewaytoa largerrectangular type,andmaximum takeoff weight wentupto120,000 pounds, some 35,000 pounds greater than theoriginal. Higher speeds werenottheprimary objective; thenumerous design refinements wereintended toprovide ahigher degree ofpassenger comfort and,ultimately, “brandloyalty’”—repeat custom-

ersweregoodfortheairlines andforLockheed. Theinitialseries of1049s wereunderpowered, astheintended turbo-compound version oftheWright R-3500 Turbo-Cyclone enginewasnotyetavailable, andthestretched Connie didnotfarewell

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At a time beforethe conceptof politicalcorrectness had intervenedin advertising, Lockheedand its customers—inthis instance KLM—liked to use pretty women to introducenewaircraft. Herewomenin Dutchcostumes line up beforethe newModel1049 SuperConstellation.

being onlytwenty-four DC-6B, withtheDouglas inthecompetition on the available became engines turbo-compound sold.Thecomplex Model 1049C andimparted greatly enhanced performance, atthecost from power to recover hadthreeturbines Eachengine ofreliability. to the back power to feed couplings thesedrovefluid theexhausts; speed cruising The1049C’s outputby20percent. increasing engine, of the that eclipsed its performance a nd 330 mph, to increased was DC-6B.

Despitethe threatof thejetairlinerloomingon thehorizon,

refinements, further introduced oftheConstellation models successive Lockheed 13, 1955. o n June DC-7B the introduced evenasDouglas service onNoentered G,”which “Super withthe1049G wasready theantewith raised PanAmerican while withTWA, 1,1955, vember the “SevenSeas”)on June 1, 1956. the DouglasDC-7C(inevitably

theenplaced span,which hadanextra10-foot wings TheDC-7C’s imTheplanebecame outfromthepassengers. ginesfivefeetfarther t hanits s lower it wasslightly popular,eventhough mensely

Eventhe installationof a huge radar domedid not mar the beautiful lines of the LockheedRC-121DWarningStar airborneearly-warningaircraft.Theradar permitted the aircraft to functionas an airbornecombatinformationcenter.

predecessor. Lockheed responded byputtinga brand-new 150-foot-

spanwingonitsSuper Constellation tocreate theultimate aircraft in itsline,theL1649A Starliner. TheWright Turbo-Compound engine continued tobeusedby bothDouglas andLockheed, despite engine failures sonumerous that theyledto thegenericnickname “theworld’s fastesttrimotors” for

theproducts ofbothmanufacturers. Although Douglas wonthecommercial market racebyselling 878examples oftheDC-6/7, compared withonly510versions ofthe Constellation, thelatterexercised thegreater holdonpeople’s minds andhearts. Therewassomething aboutitsmagic linesandtripletail thatmadeitthemostglamorous andbest-remembered ofthepiston-

enginetransports.

Asnotedpreviously, theConstellation wouldnothavebeena profitable program forLockheed haditnotbeenforthe346aircraft soldtothemilitary andusedovera twenty-six-year period. Theywere

employed bythenavyandtheairforceforpersonnel andcargotrans-

port,reconnaissance (photographic, electronic, andweather), airborne earlywarning, VIPtransport, electronic relay, electronic countermeasures,anda variety ofspecial dutiesincluding mapping theearth’s

magnetic field.

Theversatility andendurance oftheConstellation wasputto itsmostproductive military usein Southeast Asia,whereairforce

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flew13,391 BigEye)taskforce Eye(originally oftheCollege EC-121s their primary I n time. hoursofcombat 98,777 andamassed sorties in an wouldstationthemselves theEC-121s Eyemission, College overtheGulfofTonorbitaboutfiftymilesfromHaiphong elliptical withthegoalof airactivity, onenemy o n information kin,passing The MiGattacksonF-105andF-4formations. surprise preventing

hascommented Ritchie, Steve pilotace,thenCaptain USAF leading was thedirectresult M iG-21s over oneofhisfivevictories thatevery Eyeaircraft. ofinformation furnished byCollege nearthePlain overLaos pattern flysimilar would OtherEC-121s andLaos, V ietnam North over airoperations directing ofJars.Besides which through relaystations communications theyactedasairborne theoperTheydirected results. strike couldtransmit aircraft combat air aswellastheMiGcombat onstrikes, escorts ationsof fighter fordowned efforts in rescue assisting Otherdutiesincluded patrols. aircrafttowaitingtankers.It washot, crewsanddirectingfuel-hungry crews,whowouldspendas eighteen-member the work for grueling

positions theircrew toleave unable hoursonamission, assixteen many poshrole formostof thattime.Andit wasfarfromtheoriginal, inan only theelite transport to intended fortheConnie; envisaged also Constellation ajobit didwell,thegraceful ofluxury, atmosphere upon. turned toanddidawarrior’s workwhencalled

ALongtime Lockonthe Market stable wastheP2V stellar postwar inLockheed’s aircraft hesecond Design venture, aas private workhadbegun uponwhich Neptune, 1941. This 6, December on Corporation A ircraft the Vega at V-135, deevolutionary fromtheongoing departure wastobea clean-sheet Thevice of aircraft. series andVentura of theHudson velopment thenew that d etermined was V . Short, Mac ofengineering, president ordnance carryalarger range, havea muchlonger would patrolplane speed andlanding approach yethavealower load,andbemuchfaster, then W assall, to Jack t he assignment gave andhe thanitspredecessors, codesigbecame andLouHeight R.A.Bailey atVega. chiefengineer allprecedent broke asitwascalled, TheNeptune, nersoftheaircraft. patrolplanefromthestart,although asaland-based bybeingplanned

wouldasaircraft otherland-based period, itslonggestation during didnot was—it period Andaslongasitsgestation sumesuchduties. controls, at the Towle J oe with 17, 1 945, May itsfirstlightuntil make

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Twomen whohad managed

Lockheed’s growthfroma 40,000dollar speculationinto a multimilliondollar empire,Hall Hibbard,left, and RobertGross.

The Hudsongot Lockheedinto the anti-submarine business,and the P2VNeptune wouldconfirmits hold on the discipline.TheP2Vbecamethe anti-submarine weaponof choicefor manyU.S.allies.

someforty-one months afterShort’s go-ahead—it would havea far longerproduction run.It wasmanufactured at Lockheed through 1962, andthelastexample ofthederivative model builtinJapan, the P2J,didnotcomeofftheproduction lineuntil1979,morethana thirdofa centuryfromthestartdate. TheNeptune thussignaled a newerainwhich aircraft became regarded asplatforms forothertechnology, andassuch,hada far

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greaterlongevity thaneverbefore.UnliketheHudson,whichhad

andlegendary theNeptune inthefrontlineforaboutfiveyears, served A-6 C-130,andGrumman B-52,Lockheed liketheBoeing aircraft This had dreamed. thantheirdesigners alife spanfarlonger achieved long-lived utilitycameaboutbecause theperformance ofthebasic

aircraft design wasexcellent, andtheairframe wassusceptible tomodification. Suchabasic change wasbound tohaveatremendous impact ofLockinthethinking a change foster andwould ontheindustry, fornewbusiafield themtolookfurther causing management, heed’s ness.Theexpansion ofinterest wouldcomeslowly, butwhenitcame, itwouldprovetobethesalvation ofthecompany bothfiscally andin

termsofitsfuturemanagement. TheNeptune’s development hadbeendelayed because ofthe priority accorded totheHudson, Ventura, andHarpoon aircraft. All oftheseweredevelopments ofcivildesigns, buttheNeptune broke newground. Itscleanlinesremained almost unchanged overitshistory,despite theaddition ofmuchequipment. Theperformance growth possibilities oftheNeptune weredemonstrated brilliantly ina flightthatbeganonSeptember 29,1946, modheavily P2V-1, Theveryfirstproduction Australia. fromPerth, andweighpoundsofgasoline ifiedtocarrymorethanfiftythousand

inganastounding eighty-five thousand pounds, wasboosted offthe

groundbyfourrocket-assisted takeoff(RATO) bottles.It thenflew

nonstop toColumbus, Ohio,tosetanabsolute world’s distance record of11,235.6 miles. Named TheTurtle, butforever remembered byits press-generated nickname Truculent Turtle, theNeptune tookonly fifty-five hoursandseventeen minutes forthetrip. aftertheNeptune’s onlyfourmonths thatthewarended Given proTheinitial wellhavediedaborning. might thedesign firstflight, duction orderfor116P2Vs wasslashed to51inanticipation ofthe postwar drawdown. Yetthenavywasinatimeoftrial.Thebudgetary UnitedStatesAirForcemadeit absothreatofa newlyindependent

a ofcarrying capable forthenavytohaveanaircraft lutelyessential only was t he The Neptune strikes. long-distance for weapon nuclear study Acareful it couldbeflownoffcarriers. candidate—if possible ontakeoff clearance thatthiscouldjustbedone—wingtip indicated were carriers M idway-class of three the decks afew feet—and o nly was P2V-2. modified ofanextensively theweight tohandle strengthened offtheUSSCoralSea.OnApril28, trialswereconducted Carrier 1948,CommanderThomasD. Davies(whohadalsoflownTheTurtle

the withdecktospare, madea RATO flight) onitsrecord-breaking

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firstcarrier launch ofanaircraft oftheNeptune’s sizeandweight, and setting apattern forseveral generations ofaircraft tofollow. TheNeptunes werealsousedforelectronic reconnaissance, cruisingupanddown offthecoast ofChina, thenturning directly inbound sothattheirsensors couldpickupChinese radar.Whentheyapproached thecoastthey’ddoa quick180-degree turnandheadout

tosea. These andothersimilar demonstrations oftheaircraft’s capability keptitinproduction, although inrelatively small numbers. Fivewere

deliveredin 1946,47 in 1947,74 in 1948,and 34 in 1949.The adventof the KoreanWar on June25, 1950,broughtnewtasks—

Neptune squadrons flewthirteen toursofdutyduring thewar—and

newproduction orders.Eventually, a totalof 1,051Neptunes were produced byLockheed, plusanother130byKawasaki inJapan. Thesoundness ofthedesignwasreflected intheincrease ofits

performance overtime,andinitsadaptability. ThefinalU.S.version, theP2V-7(latertheP2-H)hada maximum grossweightof79,895

pounds, a topspeedof403mph,anda maximum rangeof5,930

miles.Itspowerhadbeenvastlyincreased asit became a four-engine

aircraft. ThetwoWright R-3350 reciprocating engines werecontinuously upgraded, withtheR-3350-32W Turbo-Compounds of3,500 horsepower eventually beinginstalled. These wereaugmented onthe

P2V-5andfollowing aircraft bytwo3,250-pound static-thrust Westinghouse J34jetengines mountedin underslung wingpods.These wereusedfortakeoff andlanding, andfordashspeeds incombat.

Theadaptability wasdemonstrated in itsmultiple missions, which included long-range nuclear attack, antisubmarine warfare, polarexploration (equipped withskis), combat support, VIPtransport, cruise-missile launch,drone-vehicle launchand control,targettow,

sowellindoandelectronic surveillance. Fewaircraft havesucceeded ingsomanytasksoversuch along period oftime. Notonlydid TheNeptune wasdoubly important toLockheed. Lockheed tomaintain a theinflux ofcashfromitscontracts permit

workforce ina timeofrecession, it alsoestablished along-lasting relationship withtheUnitedStatesNavy.Thiswasenhanced whenthe

Neptune wasreplaced forpatrol duties byanother Lockheed product, theP3V(later P3)Orion. Thepatrol planes thusputLockheed onsolid ground withthenavy, establishing alongandcordial relationship that would continue during thecourse ofworkonthethreefamously successful submarine-launched missiles, thePolaris, Poseidon, andTrident. Thereplacement ofP2VsbyP3swasphased overtimesothat

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TheNeptuneand its natural quarry,the submarine.TheP2Vbecamea platforminto whichever-moresophisticatedanti-submarinewarfareequipmentcouldbe fitted.

theNeptune wasreturned tocombat inSoutheast Asia. ThelastNeptuneleftnavy service inApril1978, afterthirty-one years ofoperations. Theversatility oftheNeptune permitted ittobeafour-service aircraft, being usedbytheU.S.Army astheAP-2E forspecial missions, bytheUSAF astheRB-69A, andbytheMarine Corps astheP2V-2. TheRB-69A wasessentially a Neptune extensively modified bythe Lockheed’s SkunkWorkssothatit couldbeusedfora widevariety

ofclandestine operations, including deeppenetrations ofRedChina byTaiwanese crews. TheNeptune wasalsousedbytenothernations forpatrol andantisubmarine duty.WhentheP2Vs wereatlastretired, manyfoundworkinCanadaandtheUnitedStatesasforest-fire fight-

ers.About twodozen survivors areondisplay inmuseums around the world andafewareinthehandsofprivate collectors.

TheShootingStar:TheKeyto RkandD herehavebeendozens ofkeyfighter planes inaviation history, fromtheFokker Eindecker andtheNorthAmerican Mustang to

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theMiG15.Onlyoneaircraft, however, wasnotonlydistinguished initsownright,siting ahostofderivative aircraft thatwerealsogreat, butalsoestablished thebasic foundation forthemostinnovative, most successful, andmostimportant aircraft-development facility inhistory. Thatfighter istheLockheed P-80Shooting Star,andthefacility isthe fabledSkunkWorks,nowofficially theLockheed MartinSkunk Works. BoththeP-80andtheSkunk Works came aboutasadirect result oftwophenomena. Thefirstwastheoftenmentioned BobGross’s establishment oftheLockheed corporate culture, which hadtheconfidence andthevision topermit theexistence ofaconcept group that notonlycontravened normal in-house organizational mores, butran counterto thoseofthecustomer aswell.Theotherwasthetitanic geniusof KellyJohnson,whocombined in oneforceful personality

theabilities ofanincredibly brilliant engineer, afarseeing production expert, a hands-on expert, anda charismatic workforce leader who coulddriveasheinspired andinspire ashedrove. Hewillbeprominentinthefollowing pages.

TooMuch,TooSoon QO:August 27,1939,FlightCaptain ErichWarsitz liftedoffthe ground attheMarienehe Airfield ina Heinkel He178,forthe firstjetflightinhistory. Thelittleplanewaspowered bya Heinkel HeS3engine of838pounds ofthrustanddesigned bytheyoung Dr. HansJoachim Pabst vonOhain. Oneyearandonedaylater, onAugust 28,1940,thefamed racing pilotMariodeBernardi flewtheItalian Caproni-Campini, a two-seat all-metal monoplane witha 900horsepower Isotta-Fraschini radialenginedriving a variable-pitch ducted-fan compressor. Fuelinjectors forced fuelintothecompressed airflow, whereit wasignited,andprovided thethrustforwhatmay

havebeentheslowest jetinaviation history. OnMay15,1941,the Gloster E.28/39 tookofffromtheairfield atCranwell toprovide the Royal AirForcewithitsfirstjetaircraft. Gloster’s chieftestpilot, P.E.G.“Gerry” Sayer, wasatthecontrols, andtheBritish inventor ofthe850-pound-thrust Power Jetengine which powered it,Squadron LeaderFrankWhittle,wason handto watch.GeneralHenryH.

Arnold became interested injetpropulsion, andaforced-draft effort resulted intestpilotRobert Stanley flying thefirstAmerican jet,the BellXP-59, fromMuroc DryLakeonOctober 1,1942.Itwaspow-

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Electric 1-Aengines of1,400pounds ofthrust eredbytwoGeneral directly fromWhittle’s design. Unfortunately, thebasic andderived inadequate forafighter andthefiftyproduction airframe wastotally wererelegated totrainer status. P-59A and B aircraft ThepromiseoftheHeinkelenginewasnotrealized because of

engineering andpolitical problems. Despite itsmany contributions to thewareffort, theHeinkel firmwasoutoffavor withtheNazis, and wasovertaken byothermanufacturers intheGerman jetindustry. The Caproni-Campini wassimply anengineering deadend.OnlytheEnglishjetengine wouldleadtofurther developments inEngland and

alsoin theUnitedStates,wherethefailureoftheBellP-59design wouldbodewellforLockheed. AtthetimeWarsitzmadethefirstflightintheHeinkelHe178

in1939,thekeypersonnel atLockheed werealready evincing aninterest injetpropulsion, andwithin months wereworking notonlyon ajetengine, butontheaircraft touseit.ItwasRobert Gross’s custom andprerogative occasionally tohirepeople whose ideasheliked, and givethemfreerein.SuchwasthecasewithNathan “Nate” Price, in WillisHawkins’s words“abigtallAiredale” ofa man,anamiable genius whowasanexpert inturbo-superchargers. (Price wasanamaz-

ing visionary;in the 1950s,he had designeda_ballistic-missile

passenger-transport system, complete inevery detail including asystem forrapidbaggage retrieval aftera half-hour transcontinental trip.) In1941, Price waswellintothedesign ofanextremely advanced jetengine, onethatwasinallrespects yearsaheadofanyofthose mentioned above. Ithadathirty-seven-stage low-pressure compressor, a twenty-five-stage high-pressure compressor, anintercooler, afourstageturbine, statorblades cooled byfuel,andwithonlyatwo-foot diameter, wastobecapable initially of3,500pounds ofthrustwitha potential fordevelopment to 5,500pounds ofthrust.Johnson was impressed bytheengine design (designated L-1000 atthetime,and laterinitsdevelopment astheXJ37)andledHawkins, PhilColman, GeneFrost,andothersinthecreation oftheModelL-133,whichwas

designed tohavetwoofPrice’s engines—a totalof7,000pounds of staticthrust.Theaircraft wasextraordinarily advanced, madelargely ofstainless steelandequipped withacanard surface (horizontal surfaces onthenose), boundary layercontrol, anda blended wingand bodyreminiscent ofthepresent-day F-16fighter. A600-mph top speed. wasprojected. Johnson andHibbard, withsomeotherLockheed teammembers,

tooktheL-133 fighter design toWright FieldtosellittotheUSAAF,

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HallHibbardexaminesa circa 1940LockheedL-1000turbojetenginedesignedby the brilliantengineerNathanPrice.Theenginewaspromising,but the pressuresof war forcedLockheedto workwithGeneralElectricfor an enginefor its first jet plane.Price later inventedan intercontinental-ballisticpassenger-carryingmissilesystem.

andmetwithnointerest—the project wasconsidered tooadvanced toberealized intimetohelpthewareffort. Nonetheless, components oftheL-1000 werebuiltandtested by theMenasco Company. Lockheed realized itcould notafford tobuild thefacilities totestandmanufacture suchanadvanced engine, and thegovernment wasopposed tohaving airplanes andengines manufactured within thesamecorporate structure. Anauction washeldfor thedesign rights. These werepicked upbytheCurtiss-Wright Corporation, butlittlewasdonewiththem,andtheproject wasallowed tolapsein1952. Thegrowing evidence ofGerman success indeveloping jetaircraftforced a USAAF decision toseeka countermeasure. Lockheed’s interest injetaircraft wasrecalled, andthechiefoftheEngineering Division oftheMateriel Command, andoneofthegreatunsung heroes oftheAmerican military, thenBrigadier General Franklin O. Carroll, metonceagain withJohnson andHibbard onMay17,1943. TheUSAAF tendered Lockheed anopportunity tobuild a jetfighter ofitsowndesign around thedeHavilland Halford H.1BGoblin jet engine ofanominal rating of3,000pounds ofthrust. TheGoblin wastheproduct ofMajorFrankBernard Halford, whowasthedesigner ofthelongseries ofdeHavilland Cirrus and Gypsy engines, aswellasthefarmorepowerful Napier Rapier, Dagger,

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andSabre power plants. TheBritish government hadgiven himaccess toWhittle’s work,andtheresultwastheHalford H.1,which went fromdrawings inApril1941tosuccessful runsat3,010pounds of thrustayearlater,andflightintheGloster Meteor prototype onMarch 5, 1943.Thefreehanded useofWhittle’s workwasundoubtedly the

result ofthepressures ofwar,butitwasfinancially unfair toWhittle. Lockheed accepted thechallenge tobuildanairframe immediately, andlessthanamonthlatersubmitted aproposal fortheLockheedModel L-140. Theproject received theWright Field designation ofMX409 andtheaircraft wassubsequently designated XP-80. Officialapproval wasgiven onJune17,andworkwasunderwayimmediately. Inthesedaysof$2billion bombers, theXP-80’s contractual costof$642,404 hasacertain poignancy. Thisamount wastoinclude building aprototype aircraft, wind-tunnel models, flighttesting, and a fixedfeeof$22,584. Theaircraft wastobedelivered in 150days.

Theurgency ofthecontract played intoKelly Johnson’s hands. Hehadlongbeenadvocating establishing anexperimental group un-

derhisdirectsupervision. Hisgoalwasto havethedesigners and expertworkmen workin closeassociation, witha minimum ofpa-

perwork andnooutside interference. Ordinary bureaucratic problems stemming fromsupport functions likepurchasing oradministration

wereto be eliminated.In effect,he wantedto be ableto translate

drawings intometaldirectly bytheclosecooperation ofdesigners and workers, witha minimum ofinterference fromthecompany or the

customer. WithGross’s go-ahead, henowestablished theprototype organization forwhatwouldbecome knownfirstasthe“Skonk

Works”andlaterthe “SkunkWorks.”In Johnson’smind,theideal

situation wouldarisefromthecustomer telling Johnson whatwasdesiredandwhenit wasneeded,andagreeingto keephishandsoffuntil

itwasdone.TheSkunk Works would thenworkwithafreehandat providing thecustomer’s needsorbetter,ontime,andonthenegotiated budget. Thefacetious name“Skonk Works” derived fromJohnson’s nec-

essarily obsessive needforsecrecy andthemostinfluential comic strip oftheera,AlCapp’s Li?Abner, which had a political pointofview andanintellectual following corresponding tothoseofGarryTru-

deau’sDoonesbury today.Johnsoninsisted thathissmallbandof123 engineersandworkersnot tellanyonewhattheyweredoing,or even

where theywereworking. Capp’s comic stripfeatured anOzark-like localecalledDogpatch, wherethemainindustry wasthe“Skonk Works,” headed byBigBarnsmell, the“inside manat theSkonk

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Works.” (Other Cappcharacters included Hairless JoeandLonesome Polecat, buttheydidnothavethesecurity clearance necessary for employment attheSkonk Works.) Yetanother Lockheed engineering genius,IrvingCulver,aboutwhommuchwillbe saidlater,observed

Johnson’s requirement forsecrecy byjokingly answering thetelephone withthesalutation “Skonk Works, inside manCulver.” Aprincipal player inthedesign oftheXP-80 structure, Culver laterreported that Kelly Johnson wasnotamused, buteventually cametoaccept the name.(Inthe1960s,Capp’s lawyers objected toLockheed’s useofthe term,and the phrasewaschangedto “SkunkWorks,”a namethat

wascopyrighted byLockheed in1973.) Thenewexperimental groupreported directly toHallHibbard,

whowasnowvicepresident andchiefengineer, butJohnson wasthe guidingfigure.Heestablished thegroundrulesfortheorganization:

theprototype wastobecompleted in150days; theworkforce, which wasnever toexceed atotalof123men,wassworn tosecrecy. Itwould worktenhoursa day,sixdaysa week, withnoworkonSundays. Workingconditionswereabysmal,for the teamwasforcedto usea

scrap-wood andcanvas-roofed temporary building nearthewindtunnelatPlantB-1. Asimportant asthenewproject obviously was,itrepresented but

a smallpartofLockheed’s totalannualsalesofalmost$700million

and1943production of5,223aircraft. Fortunately, theUSAAF regardedtheprogram ashaving thehighest priority, andfollowed through bydelivering allgovernment-furnished equipment (instruments, control stick,tires,guns,andsoon)immediately. Onlyone government employee waspermitted intotheSkunk Works facility—a condition ofthecontract negotiated byJohnson.

WorkontheXP-80 proceeded swiftly, despite delays inthedelivery ofasuitable engine. Inthemeantime, Lockheed andtheUSAAF werelooking tothefuture. Anagreement wasreached thattheproductionaircraftwouldusethe GeneralElectricI-40engine.(The

I-40drewheavily ontheexperience GEhadgained building advanced versions oftheWhittle engine. Theresult wasafour-thousand-poundthrustcentrifugal-flow engine ofaquitesophisticated design forthe period.) Production aircraft werealsogoingtobelarger andheavier thantheXP-80, withpressurized cockpits andanarmament package tobedefined aftertestswiththeprototype. Routine considerations for production aircraft, including easeofproduction andmaintainability, inevitably called forwhatamounted toanentirely newaircraft, the

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Lockheed Model L-141; theUSAAF referred tothenextprototype as theXP-80A. WithJohnson following every stepintheprocess, theXP-80 cametogether quickly; itwascompleted andaccepted 143daysafter

thecontract hadbeensigned, exactly 7daysaheadofschedule. Persistent engine troubles werebeing encountered, andflight-testing was delayed whentheairductsleading totheHalford engine collapsed duringrun-up. Theengine hadtobereplaced, butchieftestpilot

MiloBurchamwasabletomakethefirstflightonJanuary8, 1944,at

9:10A.M. Itwasa crucially important dateforLockheed andtheUSAAF, andbothwererepresented bytheirtoppeople, including Robert Gross andCyrilChappellet, eachofwhommusthavebeenthinking what progress thesleekfighterrepresented fortheiralmosttwelve yearsof

labor. Burcham’s firstflightwassuccessful butwasonlysixminutes longbecause hecouldnotgetthegeartoretract. Thefailure hasbeen attributedto a safetyswitchthatBurchamforgotabout,whilethelog

entryforhisflightattributes it to a maladjustment of thescissors-

switch. Thefueltankwastopped off,andGrossbrokethetension withhisusualsenseofhumor.Hecommented ontheshortflight followed byarefueling bycalling outtoKelly Johnson, “Great range, Kelly.” It’snotrecorded whether ornotJohnson laughed. Burchamtook off for a secondflight,this time for twenty

minutes, andshowed theappreciative crowd theamazing maneuverability andspeedoftheXP-80. Subsequent flight-testing proved the general suitability ofthedesign, although someminorfixes wererequired tocorrect poorstallandspincharacteristics, high-stick forces, andotherimportant butnotintractable difficulties. TheXP-80, paintedan unusual spinach green,wentonforsomethirty-four months ofservice before beingretired. Itwasrestored andplaced in theNational AirandSpaceMuseum in 1976. TheXP-80A asdeveloped hadwingstwofeetlongerinspan,but

slightly narrower inchord. Gross weight wentupbyabout50percent, to 13,780 pounds. Internal fueltankage wasincreased, andwingtip tankswerefittedonthesecond aircraft. Thirteen service testYP-80As

wereordered, alsopowered bytheGEI-40engine.

Aswasinevitable, accidentsmarredtheXP/YP-80 testprogram.

ThefirstYP-80A waslostonOctober 20,1944.Lockheed’s chieftest pilot,MiloBurcham, hada flameout justaftertaking offfromthe

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Thefirst product of the SkunkWorks,the LockheedP-80 put the companyin the forefrontof the jet age. Seenhere (left to right) are KellyJohnson, TonyLeVier, and MiloBurcham,whomadethe first flight.

Burbank Airport; hecrashed intoagravel pitandwaskilled instantly. Thefuelpumphadfailed andtherewasnoemergency backup. On March 20,1945,aceracing pilotTonyLeVier wasflying thebeautifullyfinished firstXP-80A—known astheGrayGhostbecause ofits lightgraycolor—when aturbine failed;thedisintegrating enginelit-

erallychopped thetailofftheaircraft. LeVier bailedoutbutbrokehis

backwhenhehittheground. Laterintheyear,onAugust 6,the P-38expert andleading ace,MajorRichard Bong, waskilledina P-80A. AswasthecasewithBurcham, theaccident wasattributed to a sheared fuel-pump driveshaft. Anelectric backup pumphadbeen installed asresultofBurcham’s accident, butBonghadfailedtoturn

ontheswitch. Thetrendwasalarming; bythetimeofBongs’s death,eight aircraft hadbeendestroyed andseven damaged, andsixpilotshad

beenkilled.BySeptember 1946,morethansixtyaccidents hadoccurred,primarily duetopiloterror.Thenewaircraft, whiledeceptively

simple toflywhenallwasgoing well,wasdemanding ontakeoff and landing andintheeventofamalfunction. Itwasevident thata transitiontrainer wasrequired, andthiswouldbefulfilled inTP-80C,

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Clarence‘‘Kelly”’ Johnson shakes test pilot MiloBurcham’shand after first flight of XP80 on January8, 1944. Theaircraft was completedonly 143 daysafter contract award.

whichTonyLeVier firstflewonMarch22,1948.It wouldbecome theimmortal T-33.

Nonetheless, accidents wereregarded asawayoflife.Theengines werenewanduntried, aswastheairframe, andthespeed, altitude, andhandling qualities oftheShooting Starallmadedemands upon thepilot.It shouldberemembered thattherewereonlytokensafety

programs available intheAirForce atthetime,andtraining standards werelowcompared tothestringent requirements oflateryears. Theproduction P-80As were powered bythe3,850-pound staticthrustGEJ33 engines(alsobuiltbyAllison).GeneralHapArnold

wanted towresttheworld’s speedrecord away fromtheBritish and allocated fundstoprepare theXP-80R. OnJune19,1947,Colonel Alvin Boyd puttheXP-80R through thespeed trapsatMuroc toset anewworld’s speed record of623.8mph—the firsttimetheUnited States hadheldtherecord since1923, whenAlWilliams hadflown a Curtiss R2C-1 at267mph.Boyd’s speed translated into1003.6 kilometers perhour,making himthefirsttobreak the“1,000-kilometer barrier.”

TheP-80production program hadbeenkicked offwithinitial

Thehot-performingShootingStar gavethe UnitedStates a firmfoundationupon which to build its jet fighter force.Exhibitingthe same growthpotential of the Lockheed transports, it was modifiedto servemanyroles.

contracts for500,500,and2,500aircraft. WhenV-JDaycameon

August 15,1945,theseorders werereduced toa totalof917aircraft. Overtime,additional contracts werelet,andinitsseven-year productionlife,1,742Shooting Starswouldbebuiltina widevariety of variants. Power andweight bothwentup,asdidperformance. TheAirForcechanged thedesignation fromP-80toF-80in 1948.BothF-80sandRF-80s didstellar workinKorea; 75percent ofenemy losses duetoairattack wereattributed toF-80sinthefirst months ofthewar.AShooting Starflown byLieutenant Russell Brown shotdown aMiG-15 in thefirstjet-versus-jet battle inaviation history. Lockheed F-80s would shoot down thirty-seven enemy aircraft incombatwhilelosing onlyfourteen, buttimeandswept wings hadpassed themby,making thembettersuitedtoground-support workthan dogfighting. Alltold,theF-80s flew98,515 sorties inKorea. TheNavyandMarines acquired F-80sfromtheAirForceto facilitate theirconversion tothejetage.SixSouthAmerican nations (Brazil, Peru,Chile,Colombia, Ecuador, andUruguay) obtained sur-

plusF-80sfortheirairforces; thelastoneswerephased outofoper-

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Becauseit was so revolutionary, the P-80 allowedLockheedto maintainviableproductionlines after the war,whenmanyother

firmswereforcedto shutdown. TheseP-80s are shownat the Burbankplant, waitingfor their enginesto be installed.

ationin Uruguayin 1975,to cap a distinguished thirty-one-year

career. Kelly Johnson’s experimental grouphadphased outastheP-80 hadenteredfull-scale production, but theSkunkWorksconcept

wouldremainingrainedin Lockheed’s consciousness, and would emerge, fullyformed, a fewyearslaterwhenrequired.

Aspreviously noted,theaccident rateoftheP-80called fora transition trainer, andthisbecame theTP-80C. (Thedesignation was changed firstto TF-80C andthenT-33A.) TheT-33hada longer fuselage toprovide roomforthestudent’s cockpit, andareduced fueltankcapacity. Itwasanimmediate success and a financial bonanza for Lockheed, with5,691being produced. Variants werebuiltinCanada (656)andJapan(210).TheT-33becamethejet trainerof thefree

world,withLockheed delivering 1,058aircraft toa numberofcoun-

triesasapartoftheMilitary Assistance Program. It wasusedasan

attack(AT-33) andreconnaissance (RT-33) aircraft byseveral smaller

aitforces. ThelastT-33inUSAF service wasretired in1997.

An improvedversion,the T2V-1,wasbuiltfor the navyas a

result ofaprivate venture instigated byLockheed astheModel L-245. Basically animproved T-33witharaised rearcockpit toprovide the instructor withabetter view and alargervertical surface tocompensate fortheincreased canopy area, theaircraft incorporated significant aerodynamic improvements. These cameintheformofleading edgeslats

The P-80 was stretchedinto the two-seatT-33trainer, whichprovedto be slightly faster than the originalShootingStar. TheT-Birdbecamethe standard jet trainer of the West. Morethan 6,500 T-33swerebuilt, includingthose producedin Japan and Canada.

hadstud(theverythingJohnson system control andaboundary-layer thatreofMichigan) attheUniversity program iedinhisadvanced and visibility lower Theimproved speeds. andtakeoff landing duced for strengthened thenavy,and,suitably interested speeds approach

Unfortu150T2V-1swerepurchased. andtakeoffs, carrierlandings to maintain, difficult was s ystem control boundary-layer nately,the

contracts ensued. andnofollow-on Affectionately called the“T-Bird,” theT-33wasa delight tofly, asthe harder t hat g rew seat a ratheruncomfortable itsonlydrawback flightgrewlonger.ManyT-Birdsareflyingstill,andtherehavebeen

with thebasicdesign firmstorevamp byoutside attempts occasional newengines.

All-Weather Fighters nNovember 1948, Russell Daniel, thenchief engineer oftheSkunk

Works,wasgivenwhat seemedto be a relativelystraightforward

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TheT2V-1SeaStarwas a more sophisticatedversionof the Navy’sTV-2version of the T-33.A total of 150 were built.

problem, thedevelopment ofthebasictwo-seat TF-80Cairframe into

anall-weather fighter equipped withradarandcarrying a radarobserver. Daniel’s taskwasfraught withdifficulty. Theincreased weight oftheaircraft,designatedtheYF-94Starfire,requiredtheinstallation

ofanafter-burning version oftheAllison J33engine, which increased power to6,000pounds ofthrust, butupsetthestructure, aerodynamics,andcenter ofgravity oftheTF-80C ancestor. Amodest armament package offourBrowning M-3.50-caliber machine gunswasinstalled, along withtheHughes E-1firecontrol system. Daniel andhisteamresolved themajor problems, andultimately 854Starfires werebuilt,including 387of thefundamentally rede-

signed F-94C. Virtually anewairplane, theF-94C hadthemorepowerfulPratt&Whitney J48engine, which generated 8,750pounds of thrustwithafterburner, andcoulddrivetheaircraft to supersonic speeds—in adive. Topspeed inlevel flight was640mph.Thelaminar flowwingwasmuchthinner, andtheadvanced Hughes E-5firecontrolsystem wasinstalled. Perhaps themostradical change wasthearmament. Twenty-four “Mighty Mouse” 2.75-inch Folding FinAircraft Rockets wereplaced

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TheF-94 Starfireevolvedfrom the T-33and was the USAF’sfirst all-weatherjet fighter. A total of 854 Starfiresof all types werebuilt.

in the nose.Thesewereunguided,andhada disconcerting tendency to flameouttheenginewhensalvoed,but theywerea stepalongthe

missile highway. Later, wingpodsweredeveloped thatcarried twelve rockets each,foratotalofforty-eight. Thenewarmament completely altered fighter-versus-bomber tactics, which werenever really resolved untiltheadvent ofmoresophisticated missiles. TheF-94wasaninterim aircraft, pressed intoservice withavailableelectronic gearwhile laterinterceptors suchastheConvair F-102 andF-106 wereintheprocess ofdevelopment. Nonetheless, itserved fortenyears, notbeing phased outuntil1959.F-94As andBsserved during theKorean War,downing threeenemy aircraft bygunfire and onebyanunfortunate midair collision thatalsodestroyed theF-94.

OtherEarlyPostwarProjects hethreemajor aircraft series covered above—the Constellation, the Neptune, andtheF-80anditsderivatives—strengthened Lockheed

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immeasurably asitrecovered fromtheimmediate postwar slump. Sales rosetoover$820million by1953,employment hadgrown backto morethanfiftythousand, andnetincome reached a record$15.4

million.Butnotalltheprojects ofthepostwar yearsweresuccesses. Spacelimitationsprohibitan in-depthdiscussion, but eachonede-

serves acapsule summary.

LittleDipper A single-place aircraft designed byJohnThorp(later wellknown forhishome-built designs) caught theeyeofMacShort, andwithGross’s permission a prototype wasbuiltastheLockheed Model 33inApril1944, whenitwasfairly evident thatthewarwas wellonitswaytobeing won.Although theaircraft wasbeing builtat Lockheed expense, approval wasobtained fromthearmytobuildthe prototype asa single-place, twenty-five-foot-wingspan “aerial flying motorcycle” called theAirtrooper forarmyuse.TheLittle Dipper was flown inAugust 1944, andproved tobepleasant tofly,gaining a100mphtopspeed fromitsspecially builttwo-cylinder Franklin engine. Atthewar’s end,thearmylostallinterest intheproject, andinthe ensuing months, Lockheed foundtherewasnocivilmarket forthe aircraft.

BigDipperFaced withthecertainty ofcontract cancellations, many aircraft manufacturers wished tobreak intowhatseemed certain tobe theboominpostwar civilaviation. Thetwo-place “BigDipper,” also designed byJohnThorp, wasequipped with a tail-mounted propeller driven bya 100-horsepower engine. Avicious stallwasencountered during testing, andawingfilletwasdesigned toeliminate this.Unfortunately, on February6, 1946,a careless takeoffaccidentinwhich

thestallplayed apartdestroyed theprototype, andinjured thecrew, pilotPrentice Cleaves andproject engineer Frank Johnson. Theproject wasdropped. SaturnThecivilairline market hadanirresistible appeal toLockheed management, despite thedifficulties ofearning aprofittherein. With theConstellation wellsituated forthemajor airlines, Lockheed sawa

marketforan aircraftthatwoulddowhattheoriginalElectraand

Lodestar haddone:serve thesmaller airlines sothattheycouldfeed thelargeairlines. DonPalmer wasproject engineer, andhisteamcreatedtheworkmanlike twin-engine high-wing monoplane Saturn, whichwasfirstoffered inthefallof1944ateighty-five thousand dollars toanapparently receptive market. Conditional orders forno

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Thedesire for postwarcivilianbusiness led to the developmentof the “Little Dipper’ and the “BigDipper.’’Bothaircraft performedfairlywell,but the civilianmarket for light planes did not developas expected,and both projects werecancelled.

fewerthanfivehundredoftheaircraftwereplaced,andTonyLeVier

madethefirstflightonJune17,1946.Fourteen months later,in August 1947,alltesting problems ofthetwoprototypes hadbeen overcome andLockheed hada228-mph, fourteen-seat airliner ready tosellforonehundred thousand dollars. Unfortunately, thepostwar market wasdeluged withthousands ofDouglas C-47s, many virtually new,thatwereonlyslightly slower andsoldforaquarter oftheprice. Despite being a goodairplane, theSaturn wascanceled, withalossof $6million.

ConstitutionOneofthemostbeautiful large aircraft everbuilt,the Model 89shows theartfulhandofWillis Hawkins inevery line.Built underanavycontract astheXR60-1, andnamed theConstitution by Robert Gross himself, theaircraft wastohavebeenpowered by5,500 shaft-horsepower WrightTyphoon turbineengines. W.A.“Dick” Pulver wasproject engineer, andhisteamcreated anexcellent aircraft, buttheWright engines werenever developed. Whenequipped with fourofthemostpowerful pistonengines available, thePratt&WhitneyR-4360“corncob”radialof3,500horsepower, therewasinsuffi-

Despiteintensivemarket surveysthat indicatedotherwise,Lockheedfoundthat surplus militaryaircraft filledthe feederairliner market for whichthe handsomeSaturn was intended.Onlytwo werebuilt.

cientpower todeliver theperformance implicit intheairframe. Joe

TowleandTonyLeVier madethefirstflightonNovember 9, 1946, withRudyThorenasflightengineer. Thehugeaircraft, designed to

seat180passengers, tookoffinlessthantwothousand feet,andafter atwo-hour-and-seventeen-minute testflight, landed atMuroc, demonstrating its80-mph landing speed. IftheTyphoon turboprop engine hadmaterialized, theConstitution would havebeentransformed and almost certainly beenbought inreasonable quantity byboththemilitaryservices andtheairlines. TwoConstitutions werebuilt,andthey served thenavyfora fewyearsbefore beingdeclared surplus. Both werepurchased bycivilowners forunderonehundred thousand dollarsandwereultimately scrapped.

XF-90Thebloody skies overRegensburg andSchweinfurt hadconvinced theUSAAF thatlong-range escort fighters wereabsolutely necessary inthejetage.InJune1946,ata timewhenP-80swerestill newinsquadron service, theUSAAF awarded Lockheed a contract for twoXP-90prototypes.

Kelly Johnson hadexamined a twin-engine jetandproposed it to theUSAAF in late1945,initially withNathanPrice’s L-1000

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Test pilot TonyLeVierand flight engineerRudyThorenstand in front of the Model75 Saturn.

engines andsubsequently withGEandWestinghouse engines. WorkingwithHawkins andmostofthekeyplayers oftheSkunk Works team,Johnson wasdistressed tofindthatthecloserelationships and

efficient(ifunorthodox)workingmethodsof theSkunkWorkswere

difficult tomaintain. Thiswould haveanimpact onlaterprograms, butwould beresolved toLockheed’s ultimate advantage. Aseries ofdesigns evolved, including variable geometry (swingwing) anddeltaconfigurations, withthelatterbeing preferred bythe USAAF. Extensive wind-tunnel testsledthemto decidethata con-

ventional fixed, swept wingwasmostabletomeetthedesired specifications, which weresoaltered overtimethatthecompetition became moreoriented toaground-attack planerather thanalong-range penetrationfighter.Thecontradiction in missions couldnothavebeen

moremarked. Apenetration fighter needs lotsoffuel,meaning abigger airframe designed toobtain maximum range. Aclose-support aircraft needs tobeagile, abletocarrylargeloads ofordnance externally, and abletooperate outoffields nearthefrontforaquickturnaround. As aresult ithaslessneedforrange andcanbesmaller insize.

ThebeautifulXR60-1Constitutionrequiredmore powerfulenginesthan were availableat the time. TheConstitutionwas the largest Lockheedaircraft until the adventof the C-5Galaxy.

Onceunderway theP-90project wasbesetbyavariety ofproblems,internal andexternal, thathurtmorale andspunthefirstflight dateouttoJune3, 1949—nearly fouryearsafterJohnson’s initial design proposals hadbeentendered. Along,confusing competition washeldagainst theMcDonnell XF-88 andtheNorthAmerican XFduring haddifficulties oftheF-86.Allthreeaircraft 93,adevelopment thecompetition, buttheXF-88 wasultimately declared thewinner on itled directly but c anceled, too was time, i t 11,1950.In September tothesuccessful F-101. TheXF-90 proved tobeahandsome aircraft, superbly built,but overweight, 50percent heavier thantheXF-88. Itwasthuscomparforonemission conceived and,mostimportant, underpowered atively

It waswithmorereliefthansadness another. against andevaluated thatLockheed putit tobed.Oneoftheprototypes survived three atomicblastsduringtestingin 1952in Nevada,whiletheotherwas

usedasastructural testspecimen byNACA.*

XFV-1 Since thedaysofLeonardo daVinci, theprospect ofaverticalrising aircraft hashadagutappeal, andtonoonemorethantheUnited States Navy,whichinthepostwar yearsenvisioned vertical-takeoff to the (NACA)wasthepredecessor CommitteeforAeronautics *TheNationalAdvisory

National Aeronautics andSpace Administration (NASA).

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Thedesire for a fighter that could take off and land vertically led to the developmentof the XFV-1“PogoStick.’’Insufficient powerrequiredthat the aircraft be tested with a fixed undercarriagefor conventional takeoffsand landings.

fighters rising fromsmall platforms todefend thefleet.Theadvent of jetengines made a vertical-takeoff fighter possible, andwhenawarded a development contract,Lockheedassignedthe taskto Art Flockas projectengineerin August1950.Termed a “‘tail-sitter,” theXFV-1

wasdistinguished byaportly fuselage, stubtrapezoidal wings, twohuge contrarotating propellers, anda largecruciform tailuponwhichit rested. Theterminally ill-starred Allison XT40engine of5,800shaft horsepower, uponwhichsomanycompanies forlornly pinned their

hopes,provideda 1.2:1power-to-weight ratio.Thecontractcalledfor

twoprototypes. Thebasic unsolvable problem wasthatwhile itwasnotespecially demanding forthepilottotakeoffvertically, itwasvirtually impossible

forhimtolandvertically, particularly ontoa pitching deck.

Thefamous Lockheed testpilotHerman “Fish” Salmon madea firstflightonJune16,1954,theXFV-1 beingequipped withastalky temporary fixedundercarriage to permita conventional takeoff. No vertical takeoffs or landings wereeverattempted at groundlevel, though theseweresimulated ataltitude. Manytransitions fromhorizontal tohovering flight weremade. Theexcessively longdevelopment program, thefailure ofthe Allison engine tomature toitsprojected 7,100-shaft horsepower rat-

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ing,andtheinherent landing difficulties caused theprogram tobe canceled onJune16,1955,toeveryone’s relief.

Poisedfor a NobleFuture fos we successes farexceeded thefewfailures mentioned above, andthestrong Lockheed engineering andmanagerial staffnowwas poised forthelasthalfofthetwentieth century. Theimportance of thetightsecurity oftheoriginal “Skonk Works” wasnewly appreciated,andwould beasserted inthefuture. Longbefore theeraofveryhigh-speed flight wassignaled toallbytheOctober 14,1947, breaking of the soundbarrierbythe BellXS-1,Lockheed wasexamining the

possibilities ofhypersonic flightina testvehicle fora ramjetengine. TheendresultwouldbetheX-7,a ramjettestvehicle thatwouldbe

thesmallbeginning thatwouldleadLockheed intoitstremendous accomplishments inmissile manufacture andspace flight. Thefirm would continue topioneer withaircraft, andsome oftheverygreatest ofthemwerebuta shortdistance intothefuture.Perhaps mostim-

portant ofall,Lockheed’s management wasabletomoldthesynergy ofthecompany’s potential, theneeds ofthecoldwar,andtheunfoldingadvances intechnology intonew,virtually unlimited horizons be-

yondanything thateventhegreatvisionary RobertGrosscouldever haveimagined.

CHAPTER 6

TheSkunkWorks

ik

special natureofthefabledSkunkWorksrequires adigression

fromthegeneral chronological approach ofthisbook. Conceived, andlongdesired, byClarence Johnson, itwasbrought intobeingto create theUSAAF’s firstoperational jetfighter, theP-80Shooting Star. Originally termed simply “theexperimental group,” theorganization in timewasgiventhemoreformal designation Advanced Projects Development, which became adivision before beingnamed theAdvanced Projects Development Company in1990. Butinthepostwar period, astheP-80turned from a secret projectintoa mass-production effort,thephysical manifestation ofthe

Skunk Works wasallowed tolapseastheinevitable reductions occurred inLockheed’s sizeandscope. Yettheefficiency—and indeed theconceptual beauty—of theSkunk Works persisted, inlargepart because ofKelly Johnson’s native initiative andpenchant forsecrecy.

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TheSkunk Works’ philosophy andmethodology were applied toother Lockheed projects, including theF-104 fighter, butblossomed in1954 withtheadvent oftheU-2program anditsconcomitant requirement fora secret production line.Ithasremained inexistence eversince, producing themostimportant andsophisticated aircraft weapon systemsinhistory. AllofthemajorSkunk Works products (those that arenotstillclassified) willbediscussed inlaterchapters. Theimpact oftheSkunk Works uponLockheed, themilitary services, ourcountry, andtheworldhasbeensogreatthatitisdesirable

tolookatitinaspecial way,including anappreciation ofseveral of thetopSkunkWorks engineers andmanagers. Inmanyways, the fortunes andthematuration oftheentire Lockheed Company maybe found inmicrocosm inthemanner inwhich these successive managers ledtheSkunk Works. Theycreated itsmystique andtheygoverned boththedemands madeuponitsworkers andtherewards thatwere provided them. Amajor difficulty toovercome inthisanalysis istogiveinsight intojusthowtowering apersonality Kelly Johnson was,without diminishing inanywaythelargenumber ofextraordinarily talented people whoworked withhim.Although Kelly Johnson retired in1975, hispresence lingered on,firstasatwo-day-a-week consultant andthen asanalmost deified memory afterhisdeathin1990. Itispresent even todayinthethoughts andmindsandespecially theconsciences of current Skunk Works employees. Alloftheelements relating toKelly—his genius, hissize,his strength, hispersonality, hismanagerial methods—are somuchlarger thanlifethatitisdifficult torelate justhowaccomplished wereother members oftheSkunk Works, without seeming topoachonKelly Johnson’s mythicturf.Yet,indisputably, no otheraeronauticalengineering organization intheworldpossessed suchawealth ofdiversetalentoversoextended a period. HallHibbard, enormously talentedhimself, hiredJohnsonandwashismentor;herecalls thathe

induced Kelly toleadratherthandrivethepeople whoworked for him.Hibbard always saidthatJohnson could spottrouble better than anyone, thathecould“seetheair”todetermine iftheairflow wasbad oriftherewasa flutterproblem. ButHibbard gaveyetanother dimension toJohnsonwhenpressed tostatetheman’ssinglefinestchar-

acteristic. Hibbard, thebrilliant engineer, waswellacquainted with leading industrial, military, andpolitical figures; hehadobserved Johnsonforfortyyears, andhadperhaps asgreataknowledge ofandappreciation forJohnson’s engineering geniusasanyone.YetHibbard

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sawinJohnsona noblecharacteristic thattranscended hisabilities as

anengineer. Choosing hiswords carefully, Hibbard responded that Johnson “wasintensely patriotic. ..a magnificent American.” No praise couldhavepleased Johnson more. Anothergreatengineer,WillisHawkins,wasJohnson’scontem-

porary, andafourth leading figure, BenRich, worked forJohnson for twenty-five years. Bothmenwere asqualified asJohnson inmany ways andexcelled himincertain areas—yet bothmenalways madetheir deference toandappreciation forJohnsonveryevident. Hawkins saidthatJohnsondeveloped acultureofgettingthings

done,inpartbyswiftdecision making. Whenasked ifJohnson was stubborn, Hawkins replied hewas“stubborn cumlaude,” buthastened to addthatwhenconvinced thathewaswrong, Johnson boreno animusandgladlyadopteda bettersuggestion. Hawkins statedthat

Johnson seized thecreative leadership rolefromHibbard, whothen functioned asthemiddleman between Johnson andRobert Gross, whose lackoftechnical background might wellhaveexcited Johnson’s temper. ItwasJohnson’s failing thathe,inHawkins’s words, “was not necessarily a gentleman in allconversations withsomebody he felt

intellectually impaired, ifyouwill.” Gross hadthegreatest admiration forHibbard, whobecame theconduit formatters passing between

JohnsonandGross.And,asgreatasHawkins’s admiration forJohnsonis,he alwayspointsoutthatJohnsonrecognized thathe had

many gooddesigners working forhim.Hawkins considers himtohave beentheworld’s all-time-great program manager, whoknewwhen andwhere totaketechnical shortcuts tokeepaprogram moving on schedule. Thereweremanyotherengineers atLockheed whose lightwas contained underthebushelofKellyJohnson’s personality, andwho

understood andaccepted thatfact,feeling privileged toworkforhim. Perhaps themostfortunate (butleastnoted) aspect ofJohnson’s ability,

personality, anddemeanorwastheirhaloeffectuponotherengineers at theSkunkWorkswhomayhavebeenlessgiftedthanhe,or Haw-

kinsorRich,butwerenonetheless capable. (They wouldnothave beenthereatallhadtheynotbeencapable, asJohnson would have seentoitpersonally.) Inspired byJohnson, andgiven theopportunity toachieve undertheprojects heconceived, theyrosetofargreater heights ofengineering excellence thantheymight havedoneelsewhere undermorebenign, butlessrigorous, leadership. Thedegree ofsecurity thatJohnson insisted onwasincredible. Menworked theirentirecareers attheSkunk Works without ever

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oncetelling theirwives anything aboutwhattheyweredoing. People whoweregoodfriends atthefactory, atelunchtogether, andshared hobbies likebowling orfishing afterworknonetheless maintained an absolute silence onwhattheyweredoingatwork,eveniftheyworked inadjacent spaces. Security became morethanawayoflife,it wasa

codeofethics andhonor,andeven a trivial breach wasnotonlyunacceptable, itwasoutrageous inthemores ofthe“Skunks,” asthey called themselves. Eventoday, whenthedemise ofthecoldwarhas permittedsomeoftheolderstoriesto betold,veteranSkunksarestill

obviously uncomfortable discussing thingsthatwereoncetopsecret

andarenowdeclassified. Inthefinalanalysis, it waspsychologically beneficial thatthis codeofsilence waspreserved sowell.Itmayhavebeentheonlything

thatprevented such acriticalmassofintellectual brilliance—and often larger-than-average humanegos—from exploding underthepressure

ofworking forJohnson. Looking back, itisnowobvious thatthebroad spectrum oftheSkunkWorks’ achievements provided morethan enough credittogoaround foreveryone whoworked there.Forthis reason, Kelly Johnson’s well-deserved reputation canretainevery bit ofitssheen, evenwhile thegreatinnovative engineering workdoneby others isbrought tolightandpraised.

Kelly larence L.“Kelly” Johnson wasborninIshpeming, Michigan, on February 27,1910,theseventh oftheninechildren hisSwedish immigrant parents would bringintotheworld. Hisfather, Peter, had cometotheUnited States inabout1890,attheageoftwenty-eight; hewasanexpert carpenter andbricklayer, andfromhimKelly gained hisappreciation fortoolsandprecision craftsmanship. Johnson always didwellatschool, getting excellent grades in everything butgym.Hisfirstschoolyard fightcameaboutwhena

larger boypersisted incalling him“Clara” ratherthanClarence, and finally bullied himintoafight.Itwasa mistake; thesmaller Johnson brokethebully’s leg,promptly earning therespect ofhisclassmates,

who,in thefinelogicoftheschoolyard, thenbestowedthenickname

“Kelly” uponhim,taking itfromapopular songofthetime,“Kelly withtheGreen Necktie.” Johnson’s earlylifewasSpartan butrewarding; heworked hard at a variety oftasks,fromcutting woodto picking berries, while

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expanding hishorizons atthelocallibrary. Inthatrather cozy pretelevision era,library shelves werefilled withtheexploits ofTomSwift andotheryoung fictional heroes whose plotscentered uponthelatest inventions. Kelly devoured these andbecame fascinated withairplanes, drawing themandsubsequently building hundreds ofmodels. Hedecidedattheageoftwelve thathewould design aircraft, andpromptly created hisfirstdesign—the Merlin Ibattle plane, placing itinascrapbookonaviation hecreated. Itwasagoodeffort, rather likeastreamlinedBristol fighter ofWorldWarI,wellproportioned, and,hadit beenbuilt,itwouldundoubtedly haveflown.Helaterbuiltawooden

model ofitthatwonhimatwenty-five-dollar prize—a hugeamount inthosedays.Somefortyyearslater,hislastdesign, theLockheed SR-71,wouldbeunlikeanyaircraftin history,witha performance thatsurpassed allothers—and hasyettobesurpassed.

Aftergraduating fromFlintCentral HighSchool inFlint,Michigan,Johnson attended FlintJuniorCollege andtheUniversity of Michigan, graduating fromthelatterin1932.Heworked hard,and heexpected topgrades. Onthefewoccasions whenhedidn’tgetthem,

hewould argue hiscaseforhigher marks—and usually win.Itspeaks wellofhisfamily’s industry andprudence—and hisownfrugal habits—that animmigrant carpenter’s soncouldbeallowed togoaway toworkhiswaythrough college. Hemanaged tolivea Spartan but interesting lifebyworking a combination ofjobsthatranged from washing dishes tosubcontracting outtheuniversity’s windtunnel for moneymaking projects ofhisown. Heandhislongtime friend andcolleague, Donald Palmer, contracted withthethen-powerful Studebaker Corporation totesttheair resistance ofcarbodies. Theclassic PierceSilver Arrowdesign wasone

productof hisconsulting,whileanotherwasthestreamlined bodies

placed onfive85-percent-stock Studebaker racers forthe1933Indianapolis 500.KellyandPalmer hadusedwooden bodies fortheir wind-tunnel work,carefully sculpting streamlined shapes tosmooth outtheairflow. Theirdesignwasverysuccessful, reducingairresistance

andraising theracers’ average speeds about10mph(about 10percent) overtheprevious year’s. Onesmallglitchoccurred, however, when thefull-sized carswereraced. Inthestandard racing-car bodies ofthe

time,thewindwhistled through thecockpit, blowing awaythebuildup of engineheat.In Kelly’s design,theairflowwassosmoothoverthe

bodiesthatit sweptaroundtheopencockpits evenasthebigStude-

bakerengine pumped inheat.Asa result, thedrivers andtheirmechanics (whorodewiththeminthosedays) hadtopullintothepits,

The Skunk Works = 175

where slitswerehacked intothesidesofthebodies toprovide ventilation. Nonetheless, allfiveoftheStudebaker racers finished therace, placing seventh, ninth,tenth,eleventh, andtwelfth—a goodshowing foranystableofcars,andparticularly fineforsemistock racers.

TheUniversity ofMichiganwasgoodtohim(andtoLockheed),

andhelearned basic skills therethatcarried himfar.Heattributed the techniques hedevised tousetitanium asabasic structural metal inthe Blackbird series ofaircraft topractices hehadpicked upwhilein

school. Aspreviously noted,youngJohnsoninterviewed withLockheed

in1932,andwastoldthatalthough therewerenocurrent jobopenings,heshould tryagain. Hereturned totheUniversity ofMichigan andobtained hismaster ofscience degree inaeronautical engineering, alongwithsufficient confidence togobacktoLockheed andnotonly geta position, butquestion thefirstdesignofitschiefengineer, Hall

Hibbard. Hewasabletogetaway withthisinpartbecause Hibbard was atolerant, patient manwhorecognized thefierce integrity andintel-

ligencethatemanated fromJohnsonevenasa youth.Hehadhired

Johnsononthebasisofhisscholastic recordandhisrecommendations,

and,ashelaughingly recalled later,because theyneeded another player fortheirballteam.Kelly Johnson became thesixthengineer onthe Lockheed engineering staff. Physically prepossessing, he seemedmuchtallerthanhisfive-

foot-eleven-inch height andmuchheavier thanhistwo-hundred-pluspounds weight (inhisprime). Hisposture, walking orsitting behind a desk,wasaggressive, leaning forward asifbattling awind—and winning.Inhisbiography, hisfriendandprotégé BenRichattributes Johnson’s greatphysical strength tohisyearsofconstruction work, carrying bricks.Johnsonhimselfsaidthathisabilityto winalmost everyarm-wrestling matchcamefromstrengthacquired makingand

putting uplaths—the thinnarrow boards usedtosupport plaster inthe daysbefore drywall. Johnson recalled thathecould earntendollars by putting uptwothousand laths.Inasmuch asputting upeachlathin-

volved fourtosixnails,atremendous amountofmuscle wasrequired.

KellyJohnsonthe Husband co wastotally obsessed byhiswork,anddedicated himself to it almost without respite. It wasfortunate thathefoundinhis

BEYOND THE HORIZONS = 176

family lifeastrength andinspiration thatrecharged him.Itisfairto saythatJohnson wascoddled athome—he needed tobetakencare of,andhewas. Hisfirstwife, Althea Louise Young, wastheassistant treasurer at

Lockheed whentheymetin1933.Theysharedaninterest inhorseback

riding, dancing, andeating well,andmadeuptheirmindstomarry assoonasKelly earned enough tosupport her—he didnotwanther towork. Afterafour-year courtship, theyweremarried in1937. It waswellshedidnotwork,forlifewithJohnsonwasa full-

timejob,givenhispenchantforoverwork,and,laterin hislife,some

healthproblems. Yettheyhadahappy lifetogether, firstinahome Johnson designed andlaterontheranchproperties theypurchased. The firstwasthe 226-acreLinderoRanch,abouttwentymilesfrom

Encino,California, whichwasultimately overtaken bysuburban creep.

Theythenboughta 2,000-acre spread aboutthirtymilesnorthof Santa Barbara. Althea became illin 1964,andpassed away inDecember 1969, a victimof cancer.Beforeher death,shehad urgedJohnsonto re-

marry—she knewhowheneededtohavesomeone smoothoutlife’s

ordinary perturbations. Hemarried Maryellen Elberta Meade inMay 1971,onlytosuffer another tragedy. Afterayearoftrulyhappy companionship, shetoobecame unwell from a preexisting diabetes condition.Ina longordeal,shebecame progressively moreinfirm,losing hersightandbeingconfined toawheelchair afteranamputation. She

diedonOctober 13,1980. DuringMaryellen’s longillness, theJohnsons hadbeenbefriended byNancy Powers Horrigan, whooftentookcareofherwhen Kellywasawayat work,or whenhe,too,wasill,forhe hadsuffered

fromchronicstomachproblems aswellashavingto endurea triple

bypass heartoperation. Inthecourse oftime,Nancy andKelly had grown close, andtheybothrealized thatheneeded hercompanionship tocarry on.Despite some concern abouttheappearance ofhaste, they

decided tomarryinNovember 1980.

ThePeers of a ManWhoHadNoPeers Jaze accomplishments during hisforty-two years atLockheed aresoformidable thateventhesimplest recounting oftheminevitably seems likegross exaggeration. Therefore, before citing examples

The Skunk Works = 177

Perhapsthe best-known aeronauticalengineerin history, KellyJohnsonwastruly a legend in his owntime.

thathe himbynoting tohumanize itmightbeprudent ofhisgenius, beloved—alfault,andthathewasnotuniversally wasnotwithout foolsat didnotsuffer Johnson respected. hewasuniversally though rude.He andsometimes hewasoftenimperious all,muchlessgladly; close came he o n occasion that itis said and temper a hair-trigger had he a nd notlike, he did a response actionagainst to takingphysical of,rather to dosomanytimes.Hewassolicitous threatened certainly

Overtime,ashislonglist andrecognition. to,publicity thanaverse andthere impatient, became he grew, awards distinguished ofhighly Later withothers. in his ofhubrisin hisdealings wassomedegree them bytelling customers potential alienated hesometimes career, they what them o f providing i nstead whathe knewtheyneeded butthenetresultwas in hisviews, Hewasoftencorrect wanted. pressures theimmense Given he loved. corporation to the detrimental of hisjob,and the socialmoresof the time,it shouldbe no surprise

thatJohnsonoccasionally hada bittoomuchtodrink.

to solutions forseeing Johnson YettherewasnoonelikeKelly accomplish to workforce a motivating andfor demands impossible othergeniuses goals.Hewasadeptatselecting unattainable otherwise

in heexcelled toworkwithhim.Mostimportant, andneargeniuses those of i nadvance w ere that systems weapon S tates theUnited giving

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 178

ofcompetitors, sometimes byanincredible margin ofthirtyorforty years, adegree ofascendancy unparalleled inanyotherscientific discipline. Hepossessed anintuitive engineering senseofgreatprecision. Hewould, andoftendid,analyze a project andmakea preliminary estimate oftheworkhoursinvolved, andwasalmost always exactly correct. Hisintuitive expertise worked eveninesoteric areas; hecould estimate thetemperatures thata leading edgemightreachundercertainconditionsofflight,orthenumberofcyclesthatastructurecould

endure before failure, andalmost always hewasproved tobecorrect bylaterempirical evidence. Thiscertitude would givehimtheconfidenceto embark uponseemingly impossible tasks(suchasthoseset forhimbytheCentral Intelligence Agency andtheUSAF laterinhis

career)andcarrythemout.It alsomadehiminclinedto rejectsug-

gestions fromothersifhedidnotseetheirmeritatonce.Hewas difficult toconvince thathewaswrong, butifsoconvinced, headopted a bettersolution withenthusiasm andnorancor. Hedrovehimself harderthananyone, andquiteliterally livedforhiswork. Herecorded hisworkin a dailylogthatoutlinesin brilliant

simplicity thedifficulties andthetriumphs implicit ineachday’s work. Itisstartling toexamine thelogbooks andsee,forexample, howhe could visualize aconcept foranentirely newaircraft suchastheradical A-12progenitor oftheBlackbird family inthemostcomprehensive detail.Hewouldrecordhisideasandmathematical calculations in

clear, regular handwriting without striking outoroverwriting anyentries.Hewould layouttheplanform, dimensions, weight, materials, manufacturing times,performance, eventheprobable problems, in clear, succinct language; hisestimates would laterprovetobealmost exactly onthemark.Hedid,asHibbard suggested, “seetheair,”but healsosawtheheat,thestrength, theheft,thefatigue, andeven elements asesoteric ashowtheshape would appear onradar. Theproudpantheon ofaviation-engineering genius isfilled with menandwomen ofgreatability. Yetthereisageneral consensus that onemaniswithout peer,andthatmanisKelly Johnson, theonlyindividual evertowintheprestigious Collier Trophy twice—in 1959for theLockheed F-104 fighter andin1964fortheLockheed YF-12, the predecessor oftheSR-71. Suchwastheforce ofhispersonality thathe notonlyimposed it uponthesmalladvanced development group known astheSkunk Works, heextended it throughout thecorpora-

tion.Further, theculture hecreated became self-sustaining; afterhisre-

tirement in1975theSkunk Works continued tofunction inthestyle

The Skunk Works

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personaleventhoughledbymenofverydifferent thathedemanded,

ities. thebest, itrequired andrigorous; direct, Thatstylewassimple, was men—it of crew a small from effort unflagging mostdiligent as selected werecarefully beforethedaysofequalopportunity—who engipoolofLockheed fromthegeneral candidates thebestpossible

rulesthat operating offourteen asystem Overtime,heevolved neers. thanin better butnever manytimesinthepast, havebeenrecounted DevelAdvanced bytheLockheed 1992paperprepared anAugust DetoAircraft Approach Works The S kunk entitled Company, opment velopment andSupport. air,notingthatJohnson's Thereporthasanalmostingenuous

environment, toa modern applicable mightnotbeentirely language straight-from-thefor his explanation a parenthetical andproviding astheserulesarefroma program Asimportant maxims. shoulder froma societal moreimportant areeven they viewpoint, manager’s partofthe thatis o f a company forthesearetherules viewpoint, therulesarethoseofacompany Further, complex. military-industrial arenotopentothepublic i ts books i.e., black,” “in the thatoperates Andyet andgovernment. inCongress circle orto anybuta limited ofthefirm, totheadvantage thesecircumstances farfromexploiting

the todeliver uponthecontractor demands thegreatest therulesplace Following schedule. o n theswiftest cost at thelowest product finest thataretheexact results toproduce Works theSkunk hisrulesenabled capitalist thebloated showing cartoon political ofthetypical opposite As asimple trough. the public at gorging general decorated andhighly reliathesurprising wascompleted, whentheU-2program example, spare ofsufficient inanaccumulation hadresulted oftheaircraft bility still was a nd Kelly d one w as This aircraft. partstobuildsixadditional program. ona$22million $2million abletorefund ofthe pointsthatworksowellto theadvantage Thefourteen always has W orks theSkunk for alsoworkwellforLockheed, nation thanitsotherdivisions, earneda higherrateofreturnoninvestment despitethegreater challenges it hasfaced.

TheFourteenPoints werenotformally Johnson ofKelly points” “fourteen hefamous ofhisown Theywereanamalgamation setdownuntilthe1950s. thathe rules of a series a nd time” be on bequiet, of“Bequick, credo

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 180

andDonPalmer, hisfriendfromthewindtunnelattheUniversity of

Michigan, created fortherapidexecution oftheP-80project. These provided forthecloseinterrelationship oftheproject engineer, the mencuttingmetaland buildingtheaircraft,purchasing, andthe customer.Theyalsoemphasized a minimum amount ofdrawings and paperwork. Thedrawings andmemoranda thatwerecreated, however, hadtobeclear, concise, andcomprehensive. In typical Johnson fashion, thesefourteen rulesareshortand concise, yetembrace allaspects ofSkunk Works effort, including pro-

grammanagement, organization, contractor-customer relationships, documentation, customerreporting,specifications,engineeringdraw-

ings,funding, costcontrol, subcontractor inspection, testing, security,

andmanagement compensation. Reading theruleseasilyevokes the imageofJohnsonthevisionary athisbest—creative, responsible, de-

termined,frugal,comprehensive, and, unquestionably, autocratic.

Johnson’s basicrulesfollow, withthelater1992Lockheed expansion oftheirmeaning initalics. Theauthor willoccasionally insert hisown comments inparentheses afterLockheed’s statements. 1. TheSkunkWorks’ manager mustbedelegated practically complete control ofhisprogram in allaspects. It isessential thatthe program manager have authority tomake decisions quickly regarding technical, finance, schedule, oroperations matters. 2. Strong butsmall project offices mustbeprovided bothbythe customer andcontractor. Thecustomer program manager musthave similar authority tothatofthecontractor. (Theproviso onthesizeof thecustomer’s project office wasdifficult to enforce, andtotally oppositeto theprevailing trendin military and/orintelligence organizations. Insomeinstances, thesizeofthecustomer’s project grewso rapidly—and turnedoversooften—that theessential magic ofthe SkunkWorkswasdiluted.)

3.Thenumber ofpeople having anyconnection withtheproject mustberestricted inanalmost vicious manner. Usea smallnumber ofgoodpeople (10to 26percent compared to theso-called normal systems. Bureaucracy makes unnecessary workandmustbecontrolled brutally. (Following thisrulecarefully wasoneoftheprimereasons thattheSkunk Works sooftenreturned ahigher returnoninvestment thanotherdivisions.)

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4. Averysimpledrawing anddrawing release system withgreat

flexibility formaking changes mustbeprovided. This permits early work bymanufacturing organizations andschedule recovery iftechnical risks involve failures. (Thevalueofthisruleisindisputable, butcounterto themassive issueofAirForceregulations [375series]. Thesesought to establishanabsoluteconfiguration controlsystem,andwereascen-

dantjustatthetimethatKelly Johnson began having difficulties selling hisconcepts totheAirForce.) 5.Theremustbeaminimum ofreports required, butimportant

workmustberecorded thoroughly. Responsible management doesnot requiremassive technical andinformation systems. (Thisrule,initsturn,

flewinthefaceofthemassive reporting madepossible bytheadvent ofcomputers. Given thatperhaps 90percent ofallcomputer-generated reports proceed fromcomputer towastebasket without being read, rule 5ismoreimportant todaythaninthecarefree precomputer dayswhen

it wascreated.Unfortunately, myriadgovernment requirements make

adherence totheruleincreasingly difficult.)

6. Theremustbeamonthly costreview covering notonlywhat

hasbeenspentandcommitted, butalsoprojected coststotheconclusionoftheprogram. Don’thavethebooks ninety dayslateanddon’t surprise thecustomer withsudden overruns. Responsible management does require operation within theresources available. 7.Thecontractor mustbedelegated andmustassume morethan

normal responsibility togetgoodvendor bidsforthesubcontract on theproject. Commercial bidprocedures areveryoftenbetterthan military ones. Essential freedom tousethebest talent available andoperate withintheresources available. (Theitalicized comment seemstobea

nonsequitur. Thiswasindeed apioneering insight, onethatpreceded arevolution inquality-control concepts.) 8.Theinspection system ascurrently usedbytheSkunk Works, which hasbeenapproved byboththeAirForce andNavy, meets the intentofexisting military requirements andshouldbeusedonnew

projects. Pushmorebasicinspection responsibility backtosubcontractors andvendors. Don’tduplicate somuchinspection. Eventhe commercial world recognizes thatquality isindesign andresponsible operations—not inspections.

9.Thecontractor must bedelegated theauthority totesthisfinal product inflight; hecanandmusttestit intheinitialstages. Ifhe

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doesn’t herapidly loses hiscompetency todesign othervehicles. Critical,ifnewtechnology andtheattendant risks aretoberationally accommodated. (Thisisanother areathatprovoked Kelly’s ragewhenhisAir Force customer stipulated thatflight testswould bedonebyAirForce pilots.) 10.Thespecification applying tothehardware mustbeagreed toinadvance ofcontracting. TheSkunk Works practice ofhaving a specification section stating clearly whichimportant military specifications willnotknowingly becomplied withandreasons therefore is highly recommended. Standard specifications inhibit newtechnology and innovation andarefrequently obsolete. (Military project offices are staffed byhumanbeings withtheirownagendas andpriorities; the desireto “hobby-shop” a newaircraftwithchanges iseverpresent,

andrule10provides ameans forinhibiting this.Oneofthegreatest achievements oftheSkunk Works hasbeenthereduction inspecification size.Whereas theC-5andtheF-15required literal carloads of

paperwork to conveythespecifications, theSkunkWorkstailored specifications onthe1954U-2to35pages;themorecomplex SR-71 of1962required 54pages.TheHaveBlueprototypes of1975gotby

with25pages; theF-117required 77pages in1977;andtheTR-1 [anadvanced version oftheU-2]needed91pagesin 1979.)

11.Funding a program mustbetimely sothatthecontractor doesn’t havetokeeprunning tothebanktosupport government projects.Rational management requires knowledge of,andfreedom touse,the resources originally committed. (Analmost wistful rule,andoneviolated mostoftenbecause controlling fundsnotonlycontrols theproject, it controls thepeopleandtheorganization. Management isnotalways rationaloutsideoftheSkunkWorks.)

12.Theremustbeamutual trustbetween thecustomer project organization andthecontractor withveryclose cooperation andliaison ona day-to-day basis.Thiscutsdownmisunderstanding andcorre-

spondence toanabsolute minimum. Thegoalsofthecustomer and producer should bethesame—get thejobdone well. (Asthings transpired overtime,theSkunk Works underKelly begantolosethemutual trustbetween contractor andcustomer. Partoftheproblem wasthat thecustomer [particularly theUSAF] changed itsrepresentatives too frequently, sothataworking rapport wasdifficult toestablish. But another partoftheproblem waswhatonlycanbecalled hubris onthe

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partofKelly, whooftendidknowbetterthanhiscustomers whatthey

really needed, butwasunable toconvince themofthefactdiplomatically. LaterSkunk Works managers would becharged toworkmore

closely withthecustomers.) 13.Access byoutsiders totheprojectanditspersonnel mustbe

strictly controlled byappropriate security measures. Thisisaprogram manager’s responsibility even ifnoprogram security demands aremade—a costavoidance measure. (There isalmost a naive, plaintive quality to thisrule,giventhemonstrously difficultsecurityregulations thatex-

ternalbureaucratic forceslatercausedtobeimposed, andwhichcost somuchintime,money,andmorale.)

14.Because onlyafewpeople willbeusedinengineering and mostotherareas, ways mustbeprovided toreward goodperformance bypaynotbased onthenumber ofpersonnel supervised. (Kelly’s italics.)

Responsible management mustberewarded andresponsible management does notpermit thegrowth ofbureaucracies. (Thealmost piousitalicized addition overlooks thestarktruthofrule14:people buildempires to getmorepay.Lockheed’s management wisely sawtoit thatSkunk Works personnel received higher compensation thantheircolleagues insimilar jobsinotherdivisions ofthecorporation.) Thesuccess oftheruleshasbeendemonstrated overtheyears,

butitgoeswithout saying thattherulesthemselves would bemeaningless iftheproduction process theygoverned werenotdriven bythe burning genius ofKelly Johnson andhissuccessors. Andwhile succinct andsimply stated, therulesembraced allofthemyriad elements that madeupthefunctioning Skunk Works.

LessIs More hetypicalSkunkWorksprogram officeiskeptsmall.Evenforso sophisticated aprogram astheF-117A stealthfighter, theLockheed

management teamnever exceeded thirtypeople. Inthisinstance, the corresponding AirForce System Program Office (SPO) wasofabout thesamesize.When,aswasthecasewiththeF-117A, theSkunk Works isalsoaproduction facility, thenumber ofemployees might reach fourthousand—all carefully selected fromthebestresources the parentcompany hastooffer. Thesupport thatistypically organic to a program office—health andsafety, legal,environmental, etc.—is

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provided totheSkunkWorksprogram managers fromcentralized company sources. KellyJohnsonwasa masterofmanydisciplines, andtheSkunk

Works’ engineering practice stillrequires itsengineers tobeacutabove merespecialists intheirfields. Although engineering design iscrucial, it isequally important totakeproduction andmaintenance factors intoconsideration early on.Engineering drawings arerequired tohave allnecessary informationincluded,fromprocurement throughman-

ufacture, test,inspection, acceptance, andmaintenance. Theprocess isswift, withdrawings released withina day,because engineers have direct interface withtheirmanufacturing andsupply counterparts, and canalterdrawings onthespottomeetneeded changes. In somerespects, theSkunkWorks’ manufacturing process anticipatedbyfortyyearsthesituationthatcurrently prevails in the

world, thatis,theextensive useoftechnology demonstrators, lowrates ofprocurement fornewsystems, andextensive upgrading ofexisting systems. Theuseofelaborate mock-ups wasalmost always avoided; withtoday’s computer-aided designandmanufacturing systems, they arerendered almostunnecessary.

TheSkunk Works teststhecomponents ofitssystem oftenand early, andinanintegrated fashion, todetermine howtheyaremutually affected inoperation. Astandard feature ofSkunk Works operations thatisbeingadopted widely throughout theindustry istheintegrated laboratory testingofsystem avionics, including sensors, coreavionics,

cockpit controls anddisplays, andsoftware, touncover problems early. Because theproducts oftheSkunk Works, suchastheU-2or theSR-71, areproduced inrelatively small numbers, itisoftenmore cost-effective forthecustomer to contract withLockheed forfield service support. InthecaseoftheF-117A, theAirForceelected to createitsownmaintenance andsupport organization. Likeallthe armed services, however, theAirForce hasarelatively highturnover rateinpersonnel, andgettingF-117A maintenance andsupportupto

thedesired standard required extraeffort andperiodic assistance from Lockheed.

ThePayoff simple chartreveals withstartling clarity thespeed withwhich the SkunkWorksincorporated outstanding examples ofadvancing aviation technology.

The Skunk Works = 185 Aircraft

Year

Months from Go-ahead

Technological

to FirstFlight

Advances

XP-80

1944

4 (143days)

Jet propulsion

XF-104

1954

13

Mach2 aerodynamics;sophisticatedengineinlets;Gatling gun

U-2

1955

8

Ultrahighaltitude;lightweightstructure

A-12

1962

32

Titaniumstructure;advanced propulsion;Mach3 speed

SR-71

1964

24

Sameas A-12withsophisticated guidance and sensor packages

Have Blue

1977

18

F-117A

1981

30

Stealth Stealth; precision guided mu-

nitions;passivefire control YF-22

1990

46

Stealth;supersoniccruise, agility;multipleweapons capability

Inassessing these figures, itmight beremembered thatittypically takessixtymonths forGeneral Motors orFordtodevelop andintroducea new-model automobile.

ThoseWhoCameAfter i

reached theageofsixty-five in 1975,and,underLockheed

rules,hadtoretire.Themanhepersonally pickedtosucceed him

wasBenRich,withwhom hehadworked fortwenty-five years. The mencouldnothavebeenmoreunlike inpersonality. Where Johnson wasaloof,withdrawn,andforbidding,Richwasgregarious, outgoing,

andinviting offriendly visits.Kelly’s progress downthehallway tohis

officewasfollowedbya waveofsilenceaspeoplescuttledto theside;

Ben’s progress wasfollowed bygrowing echoes oflaughter fromeach office doorasheimproved onthecurrent bawdy storyhewastelling. Kelly likedtodictate exactly howworkwastoproceed; Richpreferred

BEYOND THE HORIZONS = 186

tooutline thegoalandleave themethods totheengineer. Kelly rarely admitted thathecould learnfromhisengineers; Richmade theirteachinghimacondition oftheiremployment. YetRichhadotherqualities, and,asweshallsee,theywerequalitiesneeded bytheSkunk Works andbyLockheed whenhesucceeded Kelly. Mostimportant ofall,Richmaintained theSkunk Works traditionofexcellence inadvancedprojects,aswouldhissuccessors, ShermanMullinandJackGordon,bothofwhomwe'llmeetlater.

The environment in whichthe SkunkWorksdid business

changed drastically afterJohnson’s departure, andRichfoundthat someofhispredecesor’s ruleswereobsolete. InRich’s opinion, the advent ofcomputer-aided design andproduction programs stifled creativityandforcedmanyengineers tochangefrombeingsystem engi-

neerstospecialists. Italsomitigated theutility ofKelly’s rule4.Ina similar way,rule11wasmadeobsolete bythesheernumber ofgovernment agencies, bureaucrats, andregulations, which forced costsharingforprogram development andrequired potential competitors to

worktogether onjointprograms.

Richalsodeveloped hisownmanagement philosophy thatwas insome ways diametrically opposed toJohnson’s. Hebelieved inone strongleader(himself) butonewhoreliesona dependable staffto

develop alternatives tosolve problems. Thatleader mustalsoconcentrateondeveloping teamwork, andhavetherighttopickhisown personnel. Richbelieved strongly indelegation—he preferred togive atasktoatrusted subordinate, andleave himtogetonwithit.He avoided directing every detail ofaproject, realizing theenormous psychicandmoral value obtained byanengineer creating hisownsolution toaproblem. Farmoreinterpersonally aware thanJohnson, Richsystematically praised people fortheirefforts, andpublicly gavecreditforsuccesses. Yethecould bestern; anyethical orprofessional lapse wasswiftly dealt with.

Johnson andRichwereverymuchalikeinonerespect: they thoroughly enjoyed theirwork,buttheyregistered theirpleasure differently. Johnson internalized thejoyhefeltinworking, maintaining anexternal coldintensity thatceaselessly boredownontheobjective.

Richwasa moregregarious man,withahappy, joking manner that served tolighten everyone’s spirits. Bothmenserved theSkunk Works well.

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TheSkunkWorksToday Mz” elements havecombined thatmighthavechanged thevery natureoftheSkunk Works. Theendofthecoldwarremoved thesingle enemy, theSoviet Union, against whom mostofitsefforts hadbeendirected. Theconsequent downsizing ofthearmed services andthereduction indefense spending alsohadeffect. Thefactthatit became aseparate company, rather than a division, in1992alsoaltered someofitsmethodofoperation.And,in 1995,themergerofequals

resulting inthecreation oftheLockheed MartinCorporation brought aboutfurtherchanges,including,forthe firsttime,thepursuitof a

commercial, nonsecret program, theX-33prototype forthespace shuttlereplacement. YettheheartandsouloftheSkunk Works remain thesame, as dotheattitudes ofitspeople. Thesame desire forundiluted excellence atareasonable priceisstillthere,asistheprideinbeingpartofan aeronautical tradition. And,although noonecanadmitit,theremust be,justasinthepast,secretprograms goingon,stillintheblack, ahead ofallothers, andbearing theproudlogooftheSkunk Works. In thecourseof the following chapters,we'llpickup thestory

ofthepeople andtheproducts oftheSkunk Works astheyevolved over time.

CHAPTER 7

Progressat Burbank

Lovet hadgrown upinBurbank. Allan Lockheed moved the firmfromrentedquarters inHollywood toEmpire Avenue in Burbank in1928,where itshared abuilding withtheMission Glass Works. There thefirstairstrip, allof1,500 feetlong, wasgraded. When Robert Gross andhisbackers tookoverthemoribund Lockheed firm in1932, theyoccupied thesamesite.By1936, Gross wasabletobuy theplanthehadbeenleasing; in1939, hebuilta750,000-square-foot plantforitssubsidiary, theVegaAirplane Company, aboutonemile

away andadjacent totheUnion AirTerminal. Itwould become known asPlantA-1. Acontinual process ofexpansion followed formany years tomeet wartime demands. In1940,Lockheed purchased theUnion AirTerminal(previously owned byUnitedAirLines) for$1.5million, an amazing figure intermsofaforty-thousand-dollar start-up company

Progress at Burbank

= 189

beingabletoswingsucha dealalmostoffthebackofitshand.The

fieldwasrenamed Lockheed AirTerminal, andoperated asasubsidiary.CyChappellet wasnamed president, following thepattern setat Vega, andunderlining theneedforacorporate umbrella tomanage theexpansion ofcompanies. Thepurchase wasatruerealestate success

story;in 1978,Lockheed soldthefacility totheHollywood-Burbank

Airport Authority for$51million. Even when discounted forinflation, itwasaveryniceprofit.

Wartime expansion hasbeendiscussed previously; Lockheed reached apeakof7.7million square feetby1943,a65-fold increase! Oneoftheunique facets ofthewartime plantplanning wasthecreationofanenormous camouflage system inwhicha miniature suburban/rural areawascreatedona chicken-wire-and-canvas structure

above theplant.HadanyJapanese bombers appeared, theywould not haveseentheLockheed plant,butinstead, houses, trees, andcows. At least,thatwasthehope.

Itwasaccepted asroutineatthetimethatLockheed wouldown,

ratherthanlease,thesemassive facilities, accepting theattendantmain-

tenance costs. Thispoint,innocuous then,would loomlargelaterin major decisions onLockheed’s operations when itoperated large leased facilities. AstheLockheed Corporation grew, expanding to,forexample, Marietta, Georgia, andSunnyvale, California, thecorporate headquarters grewmorepowerful. Acleardistinction hadtobedrawn between theLockheed Aircraft Corporation (CALAC), which wasin thebusiness ofmaking aircraft, andtheLockheed Corporation (CORLAC), theumbrella forallitsoperating companies. Being located on thesame field, andeveninthesame building, CALAC would getmore thanitfeltwasitsshare oftopmanagement attention. Themainoffices ofthetwoorganizations, CALAC andCORLAC, wereseparated by twomassive swinging doors,andthephrase“smashing throughthe swinging doors”cametoindicate avisit—usually unpleasant—by cor-

porate management. Because oftheirdistance, plants inGeorgia and Sunnyvale, California, werenotsimilarly afflicted. Therewasanother reason besides proximity thatcaused Lockheed’stopmanagement to lavishattentionon LAC.TheBurbank

plantwasbuilding thekindofairplanes thatLockheed lovedto build—advanced fighters, exotic Skunk Works products, andairliners. Thefirmhadanalmost unreasoning fondness forthelatter, given that it hadnevermadea profitonitscivilairliners, although theytradi-

tionally became moneymakers whenadapted toamilitary role.Not

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As KellyJohnson was to engineeringat Lockheed,so also was Lockheed’sfounder,Robert EllsworthGross,to management. Grosswas belovedby his employeesand highlyrespected in the industry.

eventhe company’spride-and-joy airliner,the Constellation, made

money—until military production orderscamealong.

ThestoryofLockheed necessarily revolves around itspeople and theirproducts—planes, missiles, satellites, andmore. And,asitsleadersdetermined itsproducts, itisinstructive tomatch theleaders and theproducts theychose tobackwiththeprogress ofthecompany. AtBurbank, theLockheed tradition wastobuildairplanes that weretechnically advanced andendowed withperformance thatoutstripped thoseofcompetitors. Itwasimplicitly ariskypolicy, forthe chances offailure withaveryadvanced aircraft arenaturally greater thanwithamoreconservative design. Some oftheriskwasminimized because Lockheed’s management hadremained amazingly stableover

theyears, withRobert Grossstaying firmly incontrol. Gross, while notanobsessive workaholic likeHaughton, nonetheless remained fully focused, eschewing hobbies andtravel, divining whatthenextgenerationof aircraftshouldbe, and, always,concentratingon the well-

beingoftheLockheed family. Gross waschairman oftheboardof directors fromDecember 1933untilhedied,muchbeloved byfamily, friends, andindustry colleagues, onSeptember 3,1961,avictim of

pancreatic cancer. HisbrotherCourtlandt remained hisablenumber twofromJune

26,1940, on,whenCourtie became president oftheoldVega Airplane

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Company. Whenthatfirmwasabsorbed in 1943,hebecame acorporate vicepresident andgeneral manager. Hewaspromoted toex-

ecutive vicepresident ofthecorporation in1952andthentopresident in 1956.He succeededhis brotheras chairmanon September13, 1961.CourtlandtGrosswouldserveaschairmanuntilMay2, 1967,

whenHaughton succeeded him. During thetwenty-two postwar years oftheGross brothers’ reign astopmanagement, theLockheed Corporation blossomed. Aswillbe

shownin subsequent chapters, thecorporate character wouldbedi-

versified andrefined byitsexpansion inGeorgia, Sunnyvale, andelsewhere. Allthewhile,Lockheed-California, asthe“home plant”in Burbank wastermed, would continue tomakehistory withadvanced designs, troubled airliners, andoutstanding military aircraft. Thedesign,testing,andproductionofsomeofthese,suchastheF-80,Con-

stellation, andNeptune, havebeenpreviously discussed, butasthe 1950s arrived, newandmoreexotic aircraft wereintheworks. Theseaircraft wouldhavea crucial importance andbeutterly different intheirimpact thanprevious planes fromLockheed. Inthe past,Lockheeds hadoftenaffected aviation history; inthefuture, certainLockheeds would affect world history.

TheSkunkWorksRidesAgain: TheLockheed F-104 Fever Lockheed possessed a hostofexcellent engineers and designers whowereassigned toimportant duties, thereisnoquestionthattheSkunk Works, asled,driven, inspired, cajoled, andcuffed byKelly Johnson, wastheparamount forceincreating newandadvanced aircraft products. Likea booming bassdrumina marching band,Johnsonseta fastpaceforothersto keepupwithor beleft behindinthedust.Themenwhoworked forhimpickeduphistempo

andpassed iton.Therewasa resonance totheenergy andthrustof theSkunk Works thatpermeated theBurbank plant.Fortunately, the topmanagers at Lockheed—the Grossbrothers, Haughton, and Kotchian—were protected inlargepartbyHallHibbard’s ability to handle therawenergy Johnson radiated, andsotheysupported Johnson’sefforts withthenecessary equipment, finances, andmarketing. In another, lessunderstanding environment, Kelly Johnson might never haveachieved whathedid.Forexample, itishardtoimagine

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hisreaching thesame peaks atBoeing, where hiscontemporaries would havebeenbrilliant engineers likeEdward C.Wells, George Schairer, George Martin, andJackSteiner, among others. AtBoeing, people characteristically worked ina calm,collegial atmosphere, nolessdemanding,but lackingthe freewheeling flamboyance of the Skunk

Works. Johnsonhadnotedthe excellent performance of theMiG-15

fighter inKorea, andsawitgenerate agroundswell ofinterest inthe lightweight fighter allaround theworld. Thearguments foralightweight fighter wereappealing—then andnow.Alightweight fighter wouldbelessexpensive tobuy,build,andmaintainonlyifthedesigner choseto cut backon certainfeaturesof largerfighters,e.g.,lessfuel, lessarmament,and lessradar,in orderto meetthe reducedweight

goals. Johnson intended todesign anair-superiority fighter, onethat would secure dominance overtheenemy intheclassic dogfights that

hadcharacterized bothWorldWarII andtheKoreanWar.Initially, hisconceptwasdifficultto sellto theUnitedStatesAirForce,which

traditionally preferred larger fighters withlonger range, redundant systems,andmultiple missions—in short,aheavyweight fighter. Johnson understood thecounterargument. Therewerecertain fixedelements ofdesign thatwould always beproportionately larger

inasmallaircraft thaninalargeone,andthusimpairtheperformance

ofasmaller fighter. These included thepercentage relationship ofthe weight ofcertain specified equipment (radar, radios, guns,etc.)tothe totalweight oftheairplane. Thesizeofthepilot,andforgoodvisi-

bility,thesizeofthecanopy,werealsoa “given”thatcouldnotbe reduced. Jetengines werestillinarelatively newstateofdevelopment,

andmorethrustwasusually obtained withabigger engine, which in turnmeant larger size, more weight, andincreased fuelconsumption— meaning morefuel,morefueltanks, moreplumbing, andsoon. YetJohnsonbelieved theseobstacles couldbeovercome, notleast

because testdatafromtheDouglas X-3Stiletto research planehad beenprovided bytheUSAF. TheX-3hadbeen a failure because of itsengine installation, buttheprogram clearly demonstrated thatshort, verythin,straight wings wereappropriate forthesupersonic regime. These datahadbeencorroborated byLockheed’s ownexperience with theX-7testvehicle. Johnson intended toapply thisinformation toa newjet-fighter design, theCL-246, using razor-thin (andrazor-sharp!) wings which wereonly3percent asthickastheirchord(roughly, the widthof thewing).

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Johnsonwasnotonly a brilliantengineer, butalsoa brilliant

salesman. InNovember 1952, hesentanunsolicited proposal toLieutenantGeneral Donald L.PuttinthePentagon, whereunsolicited proposals areoftengiven shortshrift. Thesubject ofsuchproposals is usually notcovered byanexisting requirement, andexisting require-

ments arealmost always inexcess ofavailable funds. Unsolicited proposals carry ahazard totheissuing company aswell; ifsuccessful, they cangenerate a competition withothercontractors, theoutcome of

whichisuncertain. YetPuttwas a brilliant thinkerwhowoulddowellinthemilitary

andinhissubsequent civilian career. Hewaswellversed inresearch anddevelopment, andhewaswilling totakerisks—particularly when Kelly Johnson wasinvolved. AGeneral Operational Requirement was created, andthreeothermanufacturers—North American, Northrop, andRepublic—submitted entries. Lockheed wonthecompetition, and a lettercontract wasissued onMarch12,1953,fortwoprototype XF-104 aircraft. TheLockheed team’s design wasbreathtaking, calling foraMach 2 capability atcombat altitudes oversixtythousand feet.Dogfights

wereforeseento be of shortdurationat Mach2, andsoa newgun wasinstalled,thesix-barrel, 20-mmVulcancannon,popularlytermed

the“Gatling gun.”Itwas a firststepintherightdirection, butF-104 armament would require anewfirecontrol system andmissiles tobe fullyeffective. Johnson andHibbard hadcreated theinitial proposal, receiving support fromastrong teamthatincluded Willis Hawkins andGene Frost asdeputy design managers. Othermembers included theveterans IrvCulver, DickHeppe, andPhilipColman. Workontheengine installation wasassigned toarelative newcomer whowasintheprocess ofmaking anameforhimself, BenRich. William Ralston wasnamed chiefproject engineer. Aformal Skunk Works modus operandi was instituted withthesameground rulesthathadbeenusedontheP-80 program. Thestunning single-engine XF-104 prototype appeared tobea simple aircraft, butappearances weredeceiving. Johnson selected a midwing configuration, which wasrarely usedonfighters because of structural considerations. Heattached thetinythinwings (which extended onlyseven feetoneachsideofthefuselage!) totheXF-104’s ratherslenderengineinlet ducts,whichin turn wereattachedto

thefuselage. Themidwing position gave12percent lessdragthan anotherwise similar low-wing installation. Thevertical surfaces were

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verytall,withthehorizontalstabilizermountedalmostat thetop.To

offsettheadverse rollanticipated withrudderdeflection, thewings weregiven cathedral (angled down) ratherthanthenormal dihedral (angled up). TheF-104 wasputthrough anintensive wind-tunnel program, usingbothLockheed andtheNational Advisory Committee forAeronautics (NACA) facilities. Flutter became adreaded engineering complication almost assoonasaircraft speeds exceeded 150mph,andthe supersonic F-104promised tohaveitsshareofproblems. Extensive studies helped determine therelative placement ofwingandtailsurfaces, aswellasthepositive effects ofusingtiptanks,sothatproduction

F-104s werealmost exempt fromflutter.

Johnsonenvisioned theuseof GerhardNeumann’s advanced

General Electric J79engine inproduction models oftheF-104, but wasforced toinstall thelesspowerful 10,500-pound-thrust Wright J65-B-6 turbojet inthefirstprototype. ThefirstXF-104 flew onMarch 4,1954, withtheveteran testpilotTonyLeVier atthecontrols. The aircraft'sperformance, evenwiththelesspowerfulengine,

wasexceptional. Testing proceeded swiftly, despite thelossofthesecondprototype onApril18,whentestpilotHerman “Fish” Salmon became thefirsttousetheF-104’s controversial downward-ejection whenfiring thegunshook thelatches forthe seat.Theoccasion arose fuselage panelundertheejectionseat,blowing it out.Salmonwas

wearinga pressuresuit;his facemaskfoggedand his headwasim-

mobilized. Hecouldseethelefthorizon, andkeeptheaircraft relatively

level, butcouldnotdetermine hisdirection. Ahurried conversation withTonyLeVier resulted inadecision toeject. Seventeen YF-104s wereordered asservice testaircraft. These weresubstantially redesigned toaccommodate theGeneral Electric J79 engine of9,380pounds ofthrustdryand14,800 pounds withafterburner. Aspecial airintake withhalf-cone center bodies wascreated toaccommodate thenewengine’s voracious appetite forair(andfuel),

andthecockpit wasredesigned toaccommodate anupward-firing ejection seat.Theseaircraftestablished manynewrecords,includingan

altitude record of91,249 feet,setbyMajorHoward C.Johnson on May7,1958,andaclosed-course speed record of1,404.19 mphset byCaptain Walter W.IrwinonMay16. TheUSAF production orders thatfollowed successful testssoon mounted toatotal of722Starfighters, astheaircraft wascalled. The firstorderwasfor17YF-104 service trialaircraft. Despite theF-104’s sizzling Mach2 performance, theTactical AirCommand wasinthe

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process ofchanging itsrequirements, havinga newcharterto carry

tactical nuclear missiles. Asaresult, AirForce orders werecutbackto atotalof296,including 153F-104As, 26F-104Bs, 77F-104Cs, and 21 F-104Ds. The USAFhad in factheldtrue to its heavy-fighter bias,and

withreason. ItwasthenatureoftheUSAF mission tohavetopenetrate

deepwithinanenemy country, engage inairbattle, andreturn. The F-104 didnothavetherange forthismission, anditwasnotadaptable totheheavy bombloadscarried byrivalaircraft suchastheRepublicF-105,whoseemptyweightwasmorethantwicethatoftheStar-

fighter. Fortunately forLockheed andNATO, European countries did needafighter withtheF-104’s characteristics. Theaircraft waseased intoEuropean service undertheMilitary Assistance Program andin

buysfortheGermanAirForce.Eventually, theaircraftwasbuiltunder

license inBelgium, Canada, Germany, Italy,Japan,andtheNetherlands. Asubstantial coproduction effort wasundertaken fortwo-seat versions withBelgium, Germany, andtheNetherlands. TheF-104 hadalongseries ofaccidents inGermany untiladequate training was provided tothepilotsandadequate training programs wereestablished.

Themostimportant version oftheStarfighter wastheF-104G, ofwhich1,127werebuilt,including thosemanufactured inEurope andCanada. ThefirstF-104G builtbyLockheed andfirstflown on

June7, 1960,featuredamorepowerfulengineandadifferentmission.

Instead ofbeing a lightweight air-superiority fighter, theF-104G was conceived asamultirole, all-weather fighter, thelattercapability conferred byafarmorecapable electronics suite. TheF-104G’s empty weight hadclimbed onlyabout600pounds overtheinitial-production F-104As, butitsgross weight hadrisenby 3,200pounds, primarily because ofanincreased weapons capability.

TheF-104wasnowin thesameweightcategory astheRepublic

F-84F Thunderjet. Yetthedesign stillhadgrowth potential. TheItalian AirForce worked withLockheed tocreate theF-104S, which hadcapability both as an interceptorand as a ground-attack aircraft,withan addedre-

connaissance role.Thelastof246F-104Ss wasdelivered in1980— twenty-seven yearsaftertheLockheed design hadbeenselected for production. TheStarfighter sawlimitedcombat inVietnam. Fourteen foreign

nations operated theF-104: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany,

ThehighlyadvancedLockheedF-104Gwas used effectivelyby the newGermanLuftwaffe.

Greece, Italy,Japan,Jordan,theNetherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Spain, Taiwan, andTurkey. Inevery airforce inwhich theStarfighters wereoperated, theirpilots wereconsidered tohavethe“hottest” airplane.

Curiously enough, itmightbesaidthatthetwogreatest contributions thattheF-104 design madetotheUSAF wereentirely derivative. Thefirstwastoinstitutionalize themethods oftheSkunk Works asa permanent featureat Lockheed. Thesecondwasto serveasa

departure pointforwhatwouldbecome thefirstofthetwomost significant reconnaissance planes inhistory, theLockheed U-2. TheU-2wouldbringchanges thatseemed to contradict the Skunk Works’ experimental nature: therequirement forfull-scale production ofanaircraft withunprecedented—and whatmanyconsid-

eredunachievable—performance.

TheU-2 athering intelligence ontheSoviet Unionproved tobefarmore difficult fortheUnited States thanithadbeentogather intelli-

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genceonJapanduringWorldWarII.Thevastsizeofthecountry,

thetraditional Russian mind-set, andSoviet counterintelligence efforts lefttheUnited States virtually voidofinformation atthemostcritical period ofitshistory. Numerous efforts weremade toprobe theborders

of thegiganticcountrywithvarioustypesof intelligence-gathering planes,andseverallossesoccurred.Butthe heartof the countrywas

stilla mystery. JohnMcMahon, ofwhom we'lllearnmorelater,was theformer deputy director oftheCentral Intelligence Agency aswell aspresident oftheLockheed Missiles andSpace Company. McMahon recallsthatmuchoftheanxiety generated bythecoldwarstemmed fromthislackofvisibility intotheSovietUnion.Ourclandestine intelligence amountedto nothing,and the bestinformationwehad

fromdefectors wasalways stale.Theconcern aboutthebomber and missile gapwasreal,andtherewasanimperative needtoobtain hard intelligence onCommunist activities. TheSoviet Union hadexploded itsfirsthydrogen bombonAugust12,1953,yearsinadvance ofthetimethattheUnitedStates thought itpossible. Anewheavy bomber, theMyasishchev M-4(codenamedBisoninNATO,calledMolot[hammer] bytheSoviets) made itsdebutto theworldoverRedSquareonMay1, 1954.It wasan extraordinary efforteven,aswasdiscovered muchlater,if it did not

fullymeetitsdesign requirements. TherapidrateofSoviet rocket experiments resulted inthelaunch ofSputnik inOctober 1957,an eventthatwould shock theworld. Thus it seemedevidentthat, for the firsttime since1812,a

foreign power would soonpossess themeans toattack thehomeland oftheUnited States. Andsuchanattack would notbea raiding party, withtheburning oftheWhiteHouseasitsmostheinous offense. Popular magazine andnewspaper accounts superimposed thepostblast imageofHiroshima onaerialphotosofNewYork,Washington, and othercitiestogiveanapproximation ofthedevastating damage tobe

expected fromsuchanattack. Itbecame absolutely necessary tocreate anaircraft thatcould fly overtheSovietUniononstrategic photoreconnaissance missions to determine howclosetheenemywastolaunching anattack.Therisk

wasgreat,fortheever-distrustful Sovietleadersremembered thatGer-

manyhaddoneexactly thesamethingpriortoitsJune22,1941, invasion.

Fortunately, atthesametimethatsuchreconnaissance became

aninevitable military requirement, technology hadevolved tomakeit justpossible, andMajorJohnSeaberg, working atWright-Patterson

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AirForceBase,beganadvocating sucha design.He sawthatthepo-

tential forjet-engine operation athighaltitude wasbecoming better understood, andthebasic airframe design necessary wasclearly within thestateoftheart.Theaircraft potential wasmatched bythreesi-

multaneous developments in therequisite on-board equipment: Dr. EdwinLand(ofPolaroid fame)haddeveloped high-resolution cameras

abletousenewHycon Corporation lenses, andEastman Kodak had created thenecessary Mylar-based film. InMarch1953,Seaberg helped theAirForceestablish design requirements foraweapon system thatwould havethecapability to undertake missions ofa 1,500-mile radius, atanaltitude ofatleast seventy thousand feet,carrying uptoseven hundred pounds ofpayload,thatis,sophisticated cameras forphotoreconnaissance. Weight

considerations dictateda single-place aircraft,althoughthisplacedin-

ordinate demands onthepilot. Itwasassumed thattheaircraft would bedifficult todetect and impossible to intercept. Threecompanies wereinvitedto bidon

WeaponSystem MX-2147, code-named BaldEagle:Bell,Fairchild, andMartin.Largercompanies suchasBoeingandLockheed were

excluded onthebasisthatthesmaller firmswould givetheproject a higher priority. Byearly1954,theMartinentry,a highly modified version oftheCanberra bomber withamuchlarger wingandusing Pratt& Whitney J57engines, wasaccepted asaninterimmeasure, twentyRB-57Ds beingordered. Theratherungainly-looking Fairchild entrywasdropped.

Thewinning Bellentrywasdesignated theX-16; whenthecontractwassubsequently signed inSeptember 1954,twenty-eight were ordered. Construction gotunderwayimmediately uponsigning. The X-16(thedesignation wasselected forsecurity reasons) wasa very advanced aircraft withafragile, foreign appearance, notunlike avery refined Bison. Itslongwings seemed disproportionately wideforits sailplane heritage, whileitsfuselage seemed tobeatoncetooshort andtooslender. J57engines wereplanned, anditwastohaveaninflightrefueling capability. Thecontract meanta greatdealtoBell, whichhadnoconventional aircraft inproduction andwasmoving steadily toward becoming aspecialistmanufacturer ofexperimental research planes andhelicopters. ButtheAirForce hadnotreckoned withKelly Johnson.

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APrivateOffering requirements, aware ofthemilitary’s wasoftenintuitively oftenbefore themilitary was.Hehadbegun design workin1953 toseeiftheexisting F-104configuration couldbemodified tothe Phil C role,assigning olman reconnaissance long-range high-altitude, andGeneFrostofthepreliminary design department tothetask. Under thecompany designation CL-282, theSkunk Works team (ten to wing high-aspect-ratio witha verylong, anaircraft developed tothoseof similar essentially andempennage toafuselage one)mated rocket 163Komet Me Messerschmitt the earlier Like theXF-104.

a.

plane(andtheFrenchSudEstS.E.5000Baroudeur), theCL-282was

touseajettisonable wheeled dollyfortakeoff, andskidsforlanding, gear. landing fora conventional required andspace theweight saving r elying pilot the wastobeunpressurized, theX-16,thecockpit Unlike wasnotyettheU-2— TheCL-282 suitandhelmet. onafull-pressure butitwasanattention getter. AtthisstageofhiscareerJohnsonwasstillwarmly received by

withthe contacts andhemadepreliminary hisAirForcecolleagues, Bernard general t hen—brigadier including shakers, a nd movers proposal a detailed prepared he Withtheirencouragement, Schriever. forhe asinitsengineering, sense initsbusiness thatwasasadvanced and servicing maintenance complete take Lockheed have to offered and Thiswasanewconcept inthefield. fortheaircraft responsibilities onethatwould laterprove invaluable inotherprograms. Johnson’sproposalarrivedon May 18, 1954,twomonthsafter

inpart itwasrejected, Notsurprisingly, theX-16hadbeenselected. Johnson butalsobecause beenmade, hadalready aselection because Other plant. power as the engine J73 Electric theGeneral hadpicked going,as persisted, KellyJohnson menmighthavebeendiscouraged. hesooftendid,topeopleattheverytop.

ofthe (thenincharge V.Charyk thesewereDr.Joseph Among u ndersecand later programs research Agency’s Intelligence Central acerbic thebrilliant, Gardner, retaryof theAirForce)andTrevor Gardanddevelopment. oftheAirForceforresearch secretary assistant

balintercontinental theUSAF mastermind would ner,withSchriever, listicmissile (ICBM) programs.

James ofTechnology, Institute ofMassachusetts Thepresident

Committee, ScienceAdvisory R. Killian,chairedthe President’s

withits Thatgroup, committee. theKillian enough, naturally called,

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absolutely first-rate scientists, voiced itsconcern aboutNorthAmerica’s vulnerability toa surprise Soviet ICBM attack. It advocated an

immediate acceleration ofAmerican ICBMandIRBM(intermediate

rangeballistic missile) programs andputforward a requirement to obtain hardintelligence onSoviet capabilities andtargets. Theconcept ofahigh-altitude reconnaissance aircraft thatwouldtraverse theSoviet Unionreceived approval frombothPresident Eisenhower andCIA Director Allen Dulles. Theirparticipation inaprogram ofthisnature meant thatthesecurity requirements would beextraordinary. Inasubsequent series oftop-level meetings, analysis ofthecom-

petingaircraft showed thattheLockheed CL-282wouldbecompet-

itiveifredesigned toaccommodate theJ57engine. Thedecisive factor

wasKellyJohnson’s pledgetohaveanaircraft in theaireightmonths aftergo-ahead,areflection bothof the urgencyof the situationand

Johnson’s unbridled confidence inhisteam.Richard Bissell, anecon-

omist, wasnominated asDulles’s special assistant todirecttheCLA’s program, code-named Aquatone. Bissell’s AirForcecounterpart was to be ColonelOsmondJ. “Ozzie”Ritland.(Later,Brigadier General LeoP.Geary would become theUSAF pointman.) These menwould workwithLockheed onevenmorecrucial programs inthenot-toodistantfuture.TrevorGardnervisitedLockheed on December 9, 1954,togiveformalauthorization toproceed.

In hismemoirs, Kelly recalls lunching witha largegroupthat included AirForce Secretary Harold Talbott andCIADirector Dulles. Asked bluntly whyhethought Lockheed could buildtwenty airplanes forabout$22million andhavethefirstoneflying ineightmonths, hewasabouttoanswer whenGeneral Puttintervened with,“Hehas proven it threetimesalready—on theF-80,F-80A, andF-104.” The statement reflected Putt’s integrity, forhecouldnothavebeenhappy about a rivalhigh-altitude aircraft beingintroduced that,asthings turnedout,killedtheAirForce’s X-16program.

TheU-2Program bee U-2program wasbegunundera cloakofsecrecy thatcharacterized theSkunk Works anditsproducts. Thedesignation U-2 wasgiventoconvey thatthiswas a utilityaircraft liketheAirForce version oftheCessna 310,which inAirForce service wasdesignated theU-3.Ed“Baldy” Baldwin sketched outthebasicconfiguration. TheCL-282 wasredesigned withalonger fuselage, toallow additional

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spaceforfuel,accommodate thelargerJ57engine,andprovideamore

commodious equipment bayforthecameras andotherintelligencegatheringdevices.In the process,it receiveda bicycle-style landing

gearwithtwomainwheelsandtwintailwheels—still unusual,but lessradicalthanthetakeoffdolly/skid combination. Themaingear

wassupplemented byoutrigger gear.Thesedropped ontakeoff and werereinserted bytheground crewuponlanding. Thelong,tapered, high-aspect-ratio (10.2to1)winglooked as ifithadbeenliftedfromasailplane. Thecombination of565square feetofwingareaandexcess power endowed theU-2witharemarkably swiftandsteepclimbcapability. Weight control, a science thatwouldeludeLockheed insome lateraircraft,wascarriedto—andas someaccidents revealed, beyond—the boundsofsafety. Thefragile U-2wingweighed onlythree poundspersquarefoot—about one-third theweightofaconventional

jet-aircraft wing.Thefragility imposed severe g-load limitsuponthe aircraft, just2.5gpositive and1.5gnegative—less thancommercial airline practice atthetime.The“Angel,” astheU-2became known, wouldhavetobeflownwithdelicate hands.

Kelly carefully chose hisengineering team,which initially numbered about fifty, andultimately reached justovereighty. Theyworked indarkest secrecy ina roominPlantB-6,nexttotheexperimental manufacturing area.TheusualJohnson whipwascracked tosolvethe inevitable problems inherentinsoradicala flyingmachine.

FirstFlight sia development oftheU-2aircraft wasdoneinparallel withthe testandinstallation ofmission equipment along withtheacquisitionofa secrettestareanorthwestofLasVegas,Nevada.Thelocation

hadbeenscoutedbyTonyLeVier flyingthecompany Bonanza, and

promised goodsecurity. ThefirstflightoftheU-2wasmadequitebyaccident onJuly 29,1955, whentheaircraft casually leaped intotheairduring ahighspeedtaxitrial.TheofficialfirstflighttookplaceonAugust1, 1955.

LeVier wasthepilot,withJohnsonandBobMayteflyingchaseina

T-33.

LeVierand Johnsonhad had heateddiscussions overthe

proposed technique forlanding theU-2.Johnson asked thattheaircraftbelanded onitsmainwheels first,although thiswasexactly the

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opposite ofthetechnique learned thehardwayonthebicycle-gear Boeing B-47,where itwasessential totouchdownonthereargear firsttoavoidporpoising. LeVier disagreed, butfollowed Johnson’s

instructions.

Theforty-five-minute testflight wentoffwithout incident, except forthelanding, whenthelightweight andlargewingareaconferred anextreme amountof“float” —even atidlepower,theaircraft simply

didnotwishtostopflying. Whentouching down onthemainwheels first,theaircraft bounced intotheair,andLeVier tookitaround. A second tryhadthesame results; onthethirdtry,LeVier didithisway, bleeding airspeed closetothestallandflying withanose-up attitude sothattheaircraft settled totheground, tailwheels first,followed by alightbounce andthenasmooth rollout. Kelly Johnsonhadnotquitemadehisprediction ofeightmonths

fromcontract signing tofirstflight, buthewasclose—only onemonth off. Testing proceeded rapidly asconstruction ofthefirstbatchof

twentyaircraft continued. TheU-2wasdemanding toflyandtoland, andthecriteria forbecoming aU-2pilotwerehigh.Themissions were

longandtherequired full-pressure suitwasnotonlyuncomfortable, butalsoapotential source ofdanger. ThefirstU-2casualty occurred whentestpilotRobert Sieker, flying theprototype aircraft, hadthe faceplate ofhishelmet blowoutathighaltitude. Helostconsciousness andtheaircraft crashed, killing him. Despite theobvious hazards, thechallenge ofthemission was irresistible tomilitary pilots, whohadtodropoutoftheirownservice

andpretendtobeemployees ofLockheed todisguise theirCIArelationship.Theprocess wascalled“sheep-dipping,” andthepilotsretainedtheirseniority andpromotion possibilities. Oneofthem,Gary

Powers, would gaininternational attention.

CIAOperational Use hepotential useoftheU-2induced President Eisenhower toproposehisfamous “Open Skies” planattheJuly1955Geneva sum-

mitmeeting. Hesuggested thattheSoviet UnionandtheUnitedStates andtheiralliesputforward theirexisting forcestructures, whichcould

thenbeverified byaspecified number ofreconnaissance flights each year. TheSoviet Unionhadmoretolosethangain—it hadrelatively

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unfettered access toU.S.information, while itretained anironcurtain ofsecrecy overitsown.Inthepast,ithadhandled Western reconnaissance attempts roughly, shooting firstandrefusing toanswer questionslater.Itdowned almostfiftyintruding aircraft inthedecade after

thewar,someofwhichhadsimply strayed offcourse. Eisenhower’s offer wasignored, andthepresident wasvirtually forced intoaposition inwhich hehadtosanction U-2operations, asfraught withriskand uncertainty astheywere.TheSoviets couldeasily consider thema causabelli,forthethinveneerof “civilian operation” postulated by theCIAcouldhavebeenexposed orignored.

Appropriately enough, thefirstU-2mission wasflown onIndependence Day,1956;it wasnotknown thatthefinaloverflight mission would beflown onanequivalent Soviet holiday, May1,just fouryears later.Thefirstsortie wasmadefromWeisbaden, Germany, ona routethattookitoverMoscow andLeningrad. Theresults were allthatcouldhavebeenhopedfor—photographs thatrevealed otherwise unobtainable secrets aboutSoviet defenses andindustrial capability. ThehopesthattheU-2’smission profile wouldeludeSoviet radar

proved tobeunfounded, foraftera second overflight, theSoviet foreignministry protested vehemently. TheUnited States wasprepared fortheprotest, andanticipated thattheSoviets would beabletopreventfutureU-2operations withintwoyears. Fortunately, theU-2 would beabletotraverse theSoviet Unionforfouryears, making at leastthirtyoverflights aswellasmanyflights ontheperiphery ofthe country.Electronic sensors became asimportant ascameras onthese

missions, astheUnitedStatesmoved furtherintotheelectronic-

warfare age.

Theoperation gathered immense amounts ofinformation, including somethat,ironically enough, wouldprovea burden tothe Republican administration. TheU-2flights revealed thattheSoviet bomberfleetwasnotasimpressive ashadbeenthought.Italsoshowed that whilethe potentialenemyICBMthreatwasveryreal,and de-

manded thattheUnited States accelerate itsownprograms, thetremendous “gap”claimed bytheDemocratic presidential candidate,

John F. Kennedy,did not exist.Eisenhowercouldnot refutethe

charges forsecurity reasons, andKennedy hammered onthesubject

throughout hisultimately victorious campaign. TheUnited States stonewalled Soviet protests even asitfrustrated

enemycountermeasures, whichincludedrigorous diplomatic efforts

andthethreatofmilitary reprisals iftheflights didnotcease. Prestige

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Thefate of the LockheedU-2seemedsealedwiththat of GaryPowerswhenthe latter wasshot downoverthe SovietUnion.TheU-2wenton to becomeone of the longestlivedreconnaissanceaircraftin history.Powerswasreturnedto the UnitedStates, onlyto lose his lifewhileflyinga helicopter.

prevented theSoviet Union fromgoing public withitsprotests, sothe

UnitedStateswasableto containthemwithinordinarydiplomatic

exchanges. TheSoviets wereoutraged thatanenemy aircraft could gather intelligence withimpunity, andterribly embarrassed thattheir vaunted missile andinterceptor forcecouldnotoperate effectively at theheights atwhich theU-2flew. Itwasdifficult foramanasvolatile asPremier Khrushchev tokeephisemotions contained withinthe pressure cooker oftheKremlin, andtheSoviet military desperately sought countermeasures.

May1, 1960 rancis GaryPowers wasa USAF pilot,temporarily transferred to theCIA.Heenjoyed theclandestine workandhadflown many U-2missions, including several overflights oftheSoviet Union. Soviet ICBMactivity hadaccelerated, anda mission wasapproved forthe greatMay1holiday, whenitwashoped thatthedefense systems might belessvigilant.

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Powers tookofffromhisPakistan baseofoperations atPeshawar tobeginaflightofalmost fourthousand miles; hisplanned recovery pointwasBodg,Norway. Enroute,hewastophotograph Soviet ICBMinstallations, including thoseatPiesetsk andSverdlovsk.

At thelattersite,(alsoknownasYekaterinburg, wheretheczar

andhisfamily wereexecuted), atanaltitude ofabout seventy thousand feet,Powers’s U-2wasbroken upbytheblasteffect ofnofewer than fourteen surface-to-air missiles, thetelephone-pole-sized and-shaped SA-2s thatwould become sofamiliar inVietnam. Powers wasalmost trapped inthecockpit, managing toescape aftera harrowing fallof morethanfiftythousand feet.Hewascaptured andlaterplaced on trialbythejubilant Soviet government. Khrushchev, withtypical histrionics, usedthenewstovilify President Eisenhower withdemands foranapology. Eisenhower refused, andtheParissummitbrokeup indisarray onJune17.

Powers wasformally charged withespionage andgiven a typical

Sovietshowtrial.On August17,hewassentencedto tenyearsin a

laborcampforespionage. Aftertwoyearsofcovert negotiations, he wasreleased inanexchange forthenotorious Soviet spyRudolf Abel. Powers wasaccompanied onhisrelease byJohnMcMahon, thenwith theCIAandlatera topexecutive atLockheed. Although overflights oftheSoviet Union werebrought toa halt, theU-2continued operations elsewhere andtheaircraft wascontin-

uously developed overtime.Control oftheaircraft, aftertheusual jurisdictional disputes, waseventually passed totheAirForce, with thelast(known) CIAmissions taking placeinOctober 1974. Despite therestrictions onoverflying theSoviet Union(which ledinturntoother,evenmoreimportant developments atLockheed) theU-2remained atthecenter ofintelligence activities andcontinues inthatroletothepresent time.Itdistinguished itself overRedChina in operationsfromTaiwan,includingmissionsthat wereflownby

specially trainedpilotsoftheNationalist Chinese airforce.

Themostimportant missions oftheU-2tookplaceoverCuba inAugust of1962. These provided clear photographic evidence ofthe installation ofSoviet IRBM sitesandledtothehistoric confrontation between JohnF.Kennedy andNikitaKhrushchev during which the Soviets “blinked.” OnOctober 27,thepilotofoneonthese missions, Major Rudolph Anderson, wasshotdown andkilled byaSAM missile. U-2sservedwithdistinction throughout the VietnamWar,

flying hundreds ofhourspermonthunderdifficult conditions. Constantly modified, theywouldserveboththemilitary andscientific

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communities overthenexttwenty years, including excellent service in theGulfWar.

TheU-2’sIncredible Versatility oranaircraft designed withonespecific mission inmind,ultrahigh-

altitude long-range reconnaissance, thebasic U-2design proved to beextraordinarily adaptable formilitary andciviluse.Itwasqualified aboard U.S.aircraft carriers, fromwhichoperational missions were flown. Modified forin-flight refueling, itsalready prodigious range (2,800 to3,500miles) waslimited onlybypilotendurance. Itbecame theworld’s premier“sniffer,” sampling airathighaltitudes todeter-

minehowandwhenandwhatkindofnuclear explosions hadtaken place. Later itwasequipped forlaunching missiles andejecting capsules forlaterrecovery. Awidearrayofsensors wasfittedforeverything fromelectronic snooping to oceanreconnaissance. NASA (andits predecessor, NACA) usedit foranequally broadspectrum ofcivilian

tasks, ranging fromweather reconnaissance toexperiments inatmospheric physics. Although themodifications varied theexternal appearance ofthe U-2overtheyears, thebasicsizeandshape oftheairplane remained intact, themostobvious change being theaddition ofasecond cockpit fortheU-2CT, thetwo-seat trainer version. Aircraft power wassignificantly upgraded whenthePratt& Whitney J75engine wasinstalled intheU-2Bseries. Avirtual redesign occurred withtheU-2R, whenthewingspan wasincreased to103feetandthefuselage lengthened to63feet.The larger dimensions resulted inanaircraft moreclosely matched tothe power outputoftheJ75engines, andprovided muchgreater space for equipment. Thiswasaugmented bytheaddition ofwingattachment pointsthatcouldsupport largeequipment pods.TheUSAF ordered twenty-five U-2Rs in1968;theseroutinely would havebeenthelast production versions oftheaircraft. Fortunately, Johnson andhisteamhadtheforesight tostore ratherthandestroy theU-2tooling, forin1979,theUSAF ordered thatanadvanced version, theTR-1A, beplaced backintoproduction. Thismarked thefirsttimeeverthata USAF aircraft hadbeenplaced backintoproduction afterthelinehadbeenclosed. Themanymodel designations include theU-2,U-2A, B,C,D, E,F,G,J, R,andEP-X,aswellastheER-2,TR-1A, andTR-1B.In

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December 1991,theairforcerenamed theTR-1A theU-2Randthe TR-1B theU-2RT. Thedesignation forNASA’s ER-2didnotchange. ThecoloroftheU-2series didnotchange quiteasoftenasdesignations,and rangedfromplainaluminumto the morefamiliardark

matteblacktoglossblacktowhitetoa simplecamouflage.

Time,deliberate security subterfuges, theuseofthesameserial number bydifferent aircraft, andthegeneral highsecurity oftheprogramobscure exactly howmany ofthetypewerebuilt.A“best-guess” estimate ranges from114to120,thelatterfigureincluding thosebuilt

upfromspares. Morethan40havebeenlostinaccidents, a record thatreflects thedangerous nature oftheirmissions andthestructural compromises necessary toachieve thedesired performance. Mostof all,it underlines thebraveryoftheU-2pilots,whoenduregreathard-

shipandexposethemselves to constantdangerunderconditions of anonymity.

Itisfitting thatanaircraft thatcameintobeing toflyashighas possible overenemy territory would finditsuseful lifeextended byits ability tointerface between specialized equipment ontheground and satellites basedinspace. TheTR-1A andU-2Rdistinguished themselves intheGulfWar,where theyprovided high-altitude surveillance. Thematte-black-painted aircraft flewoutofTaifinSaudi Arabia, and, usingtheirASARS-2 nose-mounted radar,searched deepwithin enemyterritoryto detectenemyvehicles, muchin themannerofthe

morewellpublicizedJ-STARSaircraft,but gatheringintelligence

ratherthancontrolling thebattlefield. TheTR-1As andU-2Rs were alsousedtointercept Iraqimilitary communications andforphotoreconnaissance.

WhenTonyLeVierfirstflewtheU-2in1955,itsoperational lifewasoptimistically estimated tobeabouttwoyears. Thedemonin advances andtheinevitable oftheU-2platform capabilities strated electronics equipment willkeepit infront-line service wellintothe twenty-first century. EvenKellywouldbesurprised.

ALockheed Commentary Ts topexecutives atLockheed atthetimetheU-2wasinitiated in 1955wereBobandCourtlandt Gross. TheU-2program repreand newterritories risk,in thatit wascharting a substantial sented might wellnothavesucceeded. Lockheed’s leadership elected toallow itstopengineering talent,asrepresented byKelly Johnson andhis

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staff,to commit themselves fullyto a program thathadaninitial contract valueofabout$22million, atatimewhenLockheed’s net U.S.sales amounted tojustunder$674million. Inotherwords, the Gross brothers chose toplacethecorporation’s mostpowerful engineering talent onaprogram thatrepresented only3percent ofitstotal

business.

Thereason theydidso,ofcourse, wassheerpatriotism. The investment intalentandfacilities attheSkunk Works could havebeen farmoreprofitably usedincommercial ventures, thebestexample of which might havebeen ajet passenger linercompetitive withBoeing’s 707.Theissue simply didnotarise. TheUnited States hadamilitary requirement thatLockheed feltitwasbestsuitedtofill,andRobert Grosssawtoit thathiscompany responded totheneed.

ARetrograde Step Co hashad a lifelong infatuation withcommercial airliners despiteitslongandlosingbattleswithDouglas. JustastheDC-2

andDC-3preempted theprewar piston-engine transport market, so didtheDC-6andDC-7dominate thepostwar market. Thelastand finestoftheLockheed piston-engine airliners wastheModel1649

Starliner, whichwasthemostbeautiful ofalltheinnately attractive

Constellation series. The1649wasintended tocompete withthehighly successful Douglas DC-7C, butdidn’tenterthemarketplace untila yearafter itsrival—and onlyfifteen months before Boeing’s 707would sweep

theboardclean.

TheStarliner hadanentirely new150-foot-span wingwiththe capacity for50percent morefuel,butretained theprevious series Constellation fuselage andempennage. Despite theirmaintenancetroubled history, WrightR-3350 TurboCyclone engines wereinstalled because asuitable turboprop engine wasnotyetavailable. Failing inthecompetition withDouglas, andfalling behind de Havilland andBoeing intheraceforajetairliner, Lockheed turned to theturboprop. It soughtto buytimebygainingexperience with

turboprops viatheinstallation ofPratt&Whitney YT-34 turboprop engines ontwonavyR7V-2 andtwoairforce YC-121Fs, bothmilitary versions oftheConstellation. Theconversions were successful, andthefourmilitary turboprops werethefastest propeller-driven transports intheworldatthetime.

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tomarket attempted Lockheed Usingthedatafromtheseprograms, butthere havehadbothspeedandrange, thatwould a civilversion ofthe andthelastvariation thejetagewasimminent, werenotakers:

venerable Constellation wasnotabletocompete.

probthemarket analyzed memorandum Lockheed Aninternal wasthatthe Theconclusion Constellations. lemswiththelater-model compeDouglas thatthe low and t oo priced hadbeen basicairplane In addition,theWright titionwasstrongerthanhadbeenanticipated.

aswellastheyshould hadnotperformed engines turbo-compound

have.Themostimportantfinding,however,wasthat marketresearch

appreciation tocustomer inregard particularly hadbeeninadequate, Lockinfluence would Thislattermiscalculation ofpurejetaircraft. heed’s nextproject aswell.

RobertGrossandtheElectra: IntegrityunderDuress jet anentryin thefirst-generation | esate founditselfwithout 707orDougBoeing's witheither tocompete sweepstakes airliner theC-130 with experience s uccessful itdidhave However, DC-8. las’s had andEastern, American andat leasttwoairlines, turboprop, hadordered Airlines Capital airliner. inaturboprop interest expressed notably been had and turboprop, afour-engine Viscount, Vickers the be would airliner withit.It washopedthata turboprop successful tooperate bedifficult itwould where sectors onshort-haul profitable thatthe150-to 200jets.Grosswasconvinced thefirst-generation

notbeimportant would ofjetsoverturboprops differential mphspeed runswhichwereunderthreehundred ofairline onthe75percent The miles. wereunderfivehundred which percent andthe87 miles, (evenin ontheshorterrunsweresignificant oftheturboprop savings

the dayswhenfuel priceswerelow),and Grosssaid,“The airlines

passuptheeconomical meanafford—to I really afford—and cannot ofspeed.” the glamour on exclusively toconcentrate turboprop Airlines forAmerican transport ofaturboprop Thefirstrendition vicepresibyAmerican’s on theC-130.It wasrejected drewdirectly becausehedidn’tapproveofthe BillLittlewood, dentforengineering,

(Itdidnotmatterthat aircraft. ofhigh-wing ditchingcharacteristics

Airlines byAmerican bodyofwatercrossed at thetimethelargest routeswastheMississippi.)

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TheturbopropModelL-188Electrawas intendedto provideairlines with a short-tomediumrange transport. An unfortunate designproblemwith the enginesled to an earlyterminationof the airliner versionof the aircraft. The problemwas remedied, and the aircraft was modifiedto becomethe stalwartP-3 Orionpatrolplane.

TheElectrawascreatedbyvirtually thesamegroupthathad

donetheC-130,includingWillisHawkins,GeneFrost,andBillStat-

ler.Thenextseries ofdesign studies resulted inwhatwould becalled theModelL-188, a low-wing, four-engine aircraft withaportlyfuselage. Willis Warddidthethree-view layouts, ashehadbeendoing foralmost allofthenewLockheed aircraft. Thenewplanewassubstantially largerthantheViscount andelicitedordersforthirty-five planes fromAmerican andfortyfromEastern. Theturboprop engines andthelatestwingdesigns produced anaircraft thatlacked allthe elegance andgrace oftheConstellations.

RobertGrossnamedit the Electra,in honorof thefirstaircraft designedby his firm,and bestowedhis directcreativeinput on it.

Statler tellsa storyofGross coming around, aswashishabit,tolook overtheengineers’ shoulders. Statler hada threeviewoftheElectra onhisboard; atthattimethevertical surface oftheaircraft wassquared

off.

Gross looked atitandsaid,“ItlookstoomuchlikeaDC-7.Do youhaveoneofthosecurvythings?” Statler opened hisdeskdrawer andtookoutaFrench curve, which Gross thenusedtochange thetip ofthevertical surface toanelliptical shape. Whenhe’dgone,Statler

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drawn tailcontour thatread,“Thisvertical putanoteonthedrawing byRobert Gross. Don’tanybody everchange.” allthehelpitcouldget.With needed appearance TheElectra’s feetshorter oftheC-130,itwastwelve reminiscent a rotundfuselage Thewing eighty. to f orsixty s eating thanthe 1649,withnormal

T56enwiththeAllison short,particularly disproportionately seemed forthrusting theirlong,leannacelles welloutboard, ginesmounted propeller. a hugefour-blade wardandsupporting

designandwasfirstflown wasa straightforward YettheElectra

on December6, 1957,eightweeksaheadof schedule,by test pilot

Louis flightengineer RoyWimmer, copilot Salmon, “Fish” Herman used TheElectra Spreuer. William andflighttestengineer Holland, flawless a virtually made and takeoff on runway only1,800feetof wereput Fouraircraft minutes. flightofonehourand.twenty-seven Aviation intheawardofa Federal whichresulted intoa testprogram

Thefirstproduc22,1958. onAugust typecertificate Administration 5,1958, December on Airlines toAmerican wasdelivered tionaircraft which with Thecelerity a yearafteritsfirstflight. justonedaylessthan amazed anddelivered built,certified, hadbeendesigned, theaircraft sucmoderately hadbeen e ffort sales Anextensive rivalcompanies. tobringthe 54moreaircraft, buying withfourmoreairlines cessful, unfolded, Asevents totalonorderto129bythetimeofthefirstflight. only170would bebuilt. withthree TroublestalkedtheElectraalmostfromthebeginning, crashesoccurringby March17, 1960.The firstcrashoccurredon

service, hadentered onlya weekaftertheElectra Airlines American aircraft, a Braniff was to piloterror.Thesecond andwasattributed thethirdwasaNorthwest while Texas, 28,nearWaco, onSeptember andthirdcrashes Thesecond planeonMarch17,1960,inIndiana. thattore failures structural in-flight theresultofmassive wereclearly theaircraft apartintheair. became instantly almost which ontheElectra, focused Themedia andformer aviator thatfurtherordersdriedup.Veteran sounpopular oftheFedwastheadministrator Quesada Elwood executive Lockheed

meenormous resisted Hecourageously Administration. eralAviation he Instead, to groundtheaircraft. pressure diaandcongressional whilethe speed cruising limitontheaircraft’s a 295-mph imposed accidents wereinvestigated.

werefar accidents airspeed, atthelower It wasa goodsolution; werestillabletousetheaircraft. andtheairlines tohappen, lesslikely theyknewthatthey because mystified, wasatfirstutterly Lockheed

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hadinvestigated theproblems associated withtherelatively light,long engine withthepropellers mounted welloutfromthewing,anddesigned thewingstructure tohandle allexpected loads. Investigation revealed thatundercertain conditions ofengine nacelle or power-plant damage, a phenomenon knownas “whirl mode” couldoccur. “Whirl mode” refers totheresults oftheapplication ofaforcetogyroscopic characteristics ofarotating propeller. Whensuch a forceisapplied, precession occurs; thatis,likeagyroscope, thepropeller reacts ninety degrees outofphase totheapplied force.Thiscauses thestructural resistance of theengine mounting system toapplya nose-down pitching moment. Thisforces thepropeller disc(asviewed fromtherear)toturntotheleftduetoprecession.

Thisin turncausesa nose-down propeller discyawingto theright, whichcauses a nose-up pitch,completing thecycle. Thiscombination

ofeffects istermed the“whirl mode,” anditsdirection ofrotation is opposite tothatofthepropeller.

In a normalaircraft,thewhirlmodecouldoperateonlywithin the limitsof the flexibilityof the enginemounts.If, however,some

structural element ofthepowerplant,thepower-plant mounting sys-

tem,orthenacelle wasinadamaged orweakened condition, thewhirl mode would notdampout,butcouldbecome more violent, increasing damage tothestructure, andcouldapproach thenatural frequency of thewing.Thiswould perpetuate thewhirlmodeinaformofinduced

flutterandleadtocatastrophic failure.

JohnMargwarth, another University ofMichigan man,wasdirectorofsafety forLockheed, andit washisinsight thatledto an investigation revealing thattheElectra’s fatalflawwasin thethree-

member structure connecting thegearbox andtheengine,apartsuppliedby the enginemanufacturers. Whenone memberof that

structure failed, theengine mountbecame flexible. Onanoutboard engine, attheElectra’s original cruise speed, failure ofthestrutinduced thattorethewingoff. immediate, violent flutter Technically, Lockheed couldhavepassed theproblem offtothe engine manufacturer, disclaiming responsibility. Instead, itredesigned thewingstructure sothatit wouldnotflutterwhensuch a failure

occurred.(Allisonalsoredesigned the strutso that it wouldnot fail.)

Additional mounts wereaddedtostabilize thepropeller intheevent

thatanymountfailed,orif breakage occurred between thegearbox

andthepower section. Thenacelle structure wasalsostrengthened by anddiagonal braces. theaddition ofreinforcements Lockheed wasrocked bythethreecrashes andtheiradverse pub-

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licity.Forweekstherewasonemeetingafteranotherto handlethe

latestproblem. Itwassoonevident thatengineering thewingmodification wasnotgoing tobeasdifficult asfinding awaytopayforit. CarlKotchian recalled coming outofameeting withRobert Gross,

thelattersunkdeepinthought.(Grosshadbeenunderconsiderable

strainforsometime;hewould dielessthantwoyearslater.)Inthe garage, Grossasked, “Howmuchdoyouthinkthemodification is goingtocost?” Kotchian hesitated andsaid,“Well, I thinkit’sgoing to costmaybe$25million.”Grossturnedwhite,thenreplied,“Well,

we'vegottodoit.” AndLockheed did,instituting theLockheed Electra ActionPro-

gram(LEAP) andmodifying allElectras atitsownexpense, whether theywerewithinwarranty ornot.TheLEAP program cameinjust underKotchian’s $25million estimate. Kotchian further recalled thatGross’s forthright decision totake responsibility paiddividends later,whentheywereselling theL-1011 TriStar wide-body jet.Customers whohadbenefited fromGross’s forthright decision ontheElectra wereconvinced ofLockheed’s integrityandthusmoreinclined tobuytheL-1011.

ByDecember 31,1960, theFAA hadlifteditsspeed restrictions, andallaircraft, nowcalled Electra IIs,returned toservice. Thewindow ofopportunity fortheElectra hadbeensmall tobegin with,given the imminent success ofjetairliners, andtheaccidents effectively foreclosedanyfurthersales.Nonetheless, theElectras thatwereinservice

proved themselves assafe,capable performers. Onshorter routes, jets didnothavea significant speedadvantage, andtheElectras werefar moreeconomical toflyastheyusedsomuchlessfuel. Justasmisfortunes withtheModel 14Lodestar hadbeensalvaged bymilitary orders, sowould thetroubles withtheElectra bemorethan offset bylarge U.S.Navy orders foritsdevelopment, theP3V-1 Orion patrolplane.

TheOrion hemanner inwhich Lockheed manufactured andserviced itsaircraftinduced strong customer loyalty, andthiswasnowhere more evident thaninsalesofpatrolandantisubmarine aircraft tonaval air forces around theworld. Services thathadbegun tolearnthemaritime patrolbusiness withtheHudson hadbeenbrought togreater heights ofefficiency withtheVentura, Harpoon, andNeptune.

TheOrionbecamethe free world’sdefinitiveanti-submarinepatrol aircraft, servingin dozenof countries. It providedboth detectionequipmentand offensiveweaponry on a scale neverbeforepossiblein a patrol aircraft.

Theproblems withtheElectra airliner hadnotsurfaced in1957, whenLockheed responded toanavyspecification foramodern maritimepatrolaircraft withamodified version oftheL-188. Lockheed wasintheverysatisfactory position ofhaving eliminated itstraditional competitors, Martin andConsolidated, fromthefield. ThefirstOrionflewonNovember 25,1959, andaninitial productioncontract wasletforsevenP3V-1s inOctober1960.TheElec-

tracrashes provided thepressandCongress withanargument for canceling Orionprocurement onthebasisthatitwasnotsafe.The Navy, fullyinformed onthenature ofLockheed’s proposed fixes, held itsground, andOrionproduction wentforward. ThefirstOrion wasactually thethirdElectra prototype, modified bya seven-foot section beingremoved fromtheforward fuselage. Muchoftheproposed navyavionics equipment wasinstalled, along withthefourteen-foot magnetic anomaly detector (MAD) boompro-

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truding fromtherearofthefuselage. WhenthefirstOrions entered U.S.Navysquadron service onAugust 13,1962,theywereredesignatedP-3A, inlinewiththenewDepartment ofDefense system. TheOrionwasa perfect platform fortheswiftly evolving elec-

tronicequipment usedinantisubmarine warfare. Itsperformance with

the4,500-shaft-horsepower Allison T56engines wasexcellent, having atopspeed of405mphand a range of5,570miles. Moreimportant foritsmission, however, wasitsability toflyatlowaltitudes and relatively lowspeeds forlongperiods oftime,withample roomfor sparecrewmembers. Overthemorethanthirtyyearsofitsproduction, theOrionhas

hadmorethansixteen designations toreflect changes inequipment andmission. Themostradical change occurred withtheCanadian

version, theCP-140Aurora, whichusedtheavionics systems andthe data-processing capability ofLockheed’s lateraircraft, theS-3AViking.

Theadaptability oftheOrionmade itinvaluable during thecold war,whenthethreatofSoviet submarines wasatitspeak.Fourteen nations operated theP-3,anddeveloped a remarkable portfolio of missions thatproved tobeuseful inthepost—cold warperiod. Newequipment, including special imaging radar,infrared, lowlight-level long-range videocameras, andextensive radioequipment torelay communications permit theOriontodoitsworkatadistance, outofrangeofhostile forces. Theaircraft isanextremely flexible platform, withitslongrange, longduration, large payload, andability toflyeconomically atbothhighandlowaltitudes. TheP-3Cversion

oftheOrionwasinfacta majorLockheed turning point,inthatit hadthefirstdigital, computer-based, software-controlled avionics systemdeveloped byLockheed. Thiswould leadtoalongseries offuture advanced digital systems intheS-3A Viking, F-117Nighthawk, and

F-22 Raptor.

DuringDesertShieldandDesertStormin1991,amultinational

Orionforcemonitored compliance withUnitedNations’ shipping restrictions intheregion, thenprovided surveillance andbattle-damage assessment during theairandground war.MorethanhalftheIraqi

shipssunkbyalliedwarplanes resulted fromP-3detection andiden-

tification.TheOrionsflewmorethan 1,200combatsorties,logging

twelve thousand flighthoursduring thecampaign. Tension intheBalkans provided another opportunity forthe Orions toexpand theirrole.TheOrions monitored movements of troops andequipment inBosnia, while usingelectronic emission sensorstokeepwatchonmissile andartillery sites.Special Orions have

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beenfittedwithlong-range videocameras toprovide real-time intelligence tosenior U.S.andNATO leaders. Pilots flyaW-shaped flight pathtogetthemovertheirtargeted areas withminimum exposure to possible hostile actions. ThesightofaP-3Cstreaking through troubleladenBosniaskies,itsself-defense packagespittingoutflaresandchaff

tospoofpossible surface-to-air missiles, wasawelcome patontheback

fortheaircraft designers andsystem engineers. TheOrion’s varied equipment iseffective incombating drugsmuggling operations alongthesouthern U.S.border. Theon-board sensors candetectnotonlyillegal airtraffic, butalsosuchground activities asdrugproduction andshipping. Despite theseadditional missions, undersea warfare remains an important taskfortheOrion,astheultimate subhunterforboth nuclear anddiesel-electric boats. Improved submarine equipment and tactics havemade undersea warfare anevenmoredemanding task,one thatrequires thehunteraircraft tostayaloftforlonghoursatatime. TheOrion,withitswidevariety ofsensors andweapons, ishunter andkillerinone.

TheOneThatGotAway—Fortunately hen,inAugust 1963, theFederal Aviation Administration issued arequest forproposal forasupersonic transport, Lockheed was wellprepared torespond, having studied theconcept formorethan seven years. Itsinitialoffering, theCL-283, wasfora218-passenger transport witha450,000-pound gross weight. It,withanentryfrom Boeing, wasselected forthesecondphaseofthecompetition.

Anew,largerversion,theLockheed L-2000-7,emergedasa266-

passenger, 590,000-pound double-delta-wing design. Thedoubledeltawingwaschosen fora widevariety ofreasons, including its combination ofswift-transonic acceleration andexcellent low-speed handling characteristics. In1965dollars, Lockheed expected theaircrafttohavedirect operating expenses ofaboutonecentperseatmile, whenoperating atitsfour-thousand-mile range. Thiswascompetitive withcontemporary subsonic jetairliners. Theaircraft wouldhave earned a profitwitha 55percent passenger loadfactor. Thetotal market forsupersonic airliners wasestimated tobeaboutninehundred aircraft—which would havejustrecouped theinvestment ofthegovernment andthecompany intheproject. Boeing’s entryusedavariable-geometry (swing-wing) design, and

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Althoughit did not seem so at the time, it provedto be fortunate that Lockheeddid not win the contract for developinga supersonictransport, as it was not the time to do so technically,economically,or environmentally.TheLockheedL-2000design was elegant. A similarconfigurationwas later adoptedby Boeing,the contest winner.

despite theopinion ofmany thatLockheed’s design wassuperior, won thecompetition. Further alonginthedevelopment process, Boeing switched toadouble-delta design notunlike Lockheed’s. Losing thecompetition wasultimately beneficial toLockheed, forthesupersonic transportprogram wascanceled fora varietyof reasons, including environmental andeconomic concerns. Giventhat

onlysixteen oftheAnglo-French Concorde supersonic transports were purchased, thenine-hundred-aircraft requirement wasprobably avast overestimate, andalower number would havecaused significant losses to Lockheed.

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AManagement Review y 1961,whenCourtlandtGrossbecamechairmanand Dan Haughton president oftheLockheed Corporation, thecompany

hadmorethanseventy thousand employees, netsales of$1.4billion, andanetincome of$26million. Intermsofproduct, theNeptune wasstillinproduction, withtheOrionjustgetting underway.The F-104production linewascontinuing ata healthy rateoffourper month. TheElectra problems hadbeenmet,theLEAP program contributing asubstantial portion of1960’s $42million loss.Anewventureintothehelicopter business looked promising, andtheSkunk Workswasoccupied with,amongotherthings,theU-2anditssupersecret successor, ofwhich,morelater.

Therewerealsoa variety ofsubsidiary businesses thatwillbe addressed inanappendix, including theill-fated Lockheed ShipbuildingandConstruction Company, theLockheed Electronics Company, theLockheed Engineering andManagement Services Company, and others. Inaddition, therewere twoothermajor elements ofthecompany, whichwillbedealtwithin succeeding chapters, andwhichwere spawned almost simultaneously bythemother organization inBurbank.Thefirstofthese wasLockheed Georgia, where theC-130, one ofthegreatest aircraft ofalltime,intermsofitsperformance andits profitability, wouldbe manufactured. Thesecondof thesewasin Sunnyvale, California, wheretheLockheed Missiles andSpaceCom-

pany(LMSC) woulddevelop highly classified products thatwould include fleetballistic missile systems andawidevariety ofsatellites. LMSC wouldnotonlygenerate anunending stream ofprofit,but wouldmoldawhole newcorpsofLockheed executive talentwhich wouldguidethedestiny ofthecompany formuchofthetwentieth century, andprobably muchofthetwenty-first.

CHAPTER 8

Expanding Horizons

Azer character isshaped bymanythings, including leadership, management style, product, public appreciation, clientele, media relations, and,notleast,thecultural makeup oftheworkforce. AtBurbank,Lockheed wouldbesubjecttoalloftheseinfluences

asit tentatively—almost accidentally—expanded itshorizons at its

newplants inMarietta, Georgia, Sunnyvale, California, andelsewhere. Thenewplants would begin withastrong Burbank influence, butthis would bemoderated overtimebythefactors indicated above tocreate

totallydistinct—and in somerespects, totallydifferent—industrial personalities. Yeteachwouldretainanabsolutely fiercesenseofbeing

partoftheLockheed family. Thistenacious loyalty alsooftenencompassed aprideofplace, anabiding sense thateachonewasthemost important element ofthecompany. Thiswasonlyafirst stepinacontinuing evolution, fortherewas

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a continualinterchangeof executives amongthe Burbank,Marietta,

andSunnyvale sites(andotherlocations aswell).Thisfreeexchange

oftalentwould shape Lockheed’s corporate destiny inamanner that would exactly suitthevision ofRobert Gross, whosought andfostered talentasamaster gardener mightseekandfoster exotic plants. Inevitably (because humans were involved), thisinterplay ofmanagerial style, talent, energy, andvision wasspiced byoccasional arroganceandhubris.Thisresulted inoccasional turbulence forLockheed as it reachednewheights,encountereddifficulties that causedit to

droptounaccustomed depths, andthen,tempered bythebattering of fate,soared again toitspresent loftyposition intheindustry.

Thecauses oftheserisesandfallsweremany,including thetype ofcontracts beingpursued, thenatureoftheproduct,thequalityof

competition,thedegreeofcooperationfromthecustomer,theexcel-

lence—or lackthereof—of themanagement, andtheresponse ofthe workforce. Justasa ship’scaptain isawarded creditfora record crossing butheldaccountable forrunning aground, soarethetop executives of a company accorded thepraiseor theblameforthe company’s fortunesundertheirleadership. In thefollowing pages,

we'llseemany magnificent achievements accented withinfrequent but sometimes appalling failures. Bothsuccesses andfailures willbeattributedtothetopmanagers ofthetimeinquestion, butwithfullrecognitionthatmanymorefactorsthanjustmanagerial leadership are

involved. Theneedforclarity andthedemands ofspace make itnecessary toresort toanironlawoffame: whoever isincharge isawarded thecredit ortheblame fortheevents thathappen onhisorherwatch. In1951, fortune andademonstrated trackrecord would dictate thatLockheed wouldexpand itsaircraft business toGeorgia. Thisnew business wasclosely alliedtoitsexperience, andrepresented a relatively

straightforward expansion ofitsexisting base.Lockheed would again be buildingbigairplanesfor a familiarcustomer,the UnitedStates

AirForce. A corporate decision wasmadeto establish a separate Missile

Systems Division to“expand ourcurrent operations inthedesign and building ofpilotless aircraft andtheirsystems.” Theitalics aretheau-

thor’sandreflectthenaive,almostinnocentlackofawareness ofexactly

whatitwasstarting. Thefirmthatwould become theLockheed MissilesandSpace Company (LMSC) inSunnyvale haditsgrounding in “pilotless” aircraft, butfrom1951would grow intoaninfinitely more sophisticated company whose scientific successes weremorethanan

orderofmagnitude greater thananypreviously developed byLockheed

Expanding Horizons

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oranyotheraerospace firm,andwhose history willbedealtwithin thefollowing chapters. MostofLMSC’s assignments would betotally

foreigntoallofLockheed’s pastexperience, andthemagnificent triumphsit achieved—only a fewofwhichcanberelatedeventoday,

forreasonsofsecurity—are a tributeto themanagers,engineers, and

scientists whotookonunprecedented challenges. Unlike theGeorgia company, where therewasthenormal tightsecurity ofadefense plant, LMSC would beplunged intothe“black” worldofsupersecurity as ironclad asthatoftheSkunk Works. Itsprograms would notjustbe secret—their veryexistence wouldbedenied. Theurgentdemand foraccomplishment oftasksabsolutely vitaltothenational interest andtheavailability ofvirtually unlimited funds would bereminiscent oftheSkunk Works approach, witha similar beneficial managerial fallout. Boththeneworganizations wouldhaveprofound economic, po-

litical, andcultural impact ontheirrespective communities. TheGeorgiaplantspurred thesouthern industrial revolution thatcontinues to thisday,while theSunnyvale plantwastheseedcornforwhatisnow SiliconValley,the heartofAmerica’s strengthin theworldof com-

puters, software, andtheotherexotica thatwillshape thetwenty-first century. Andfromtheferment ofthesetwoorganizations, both growing toformidable sizeinaverybriefperiod, wouldbedistilled thefuture leadership oftheLockheed Corporation. Bothfirms would become, ineffect, campuses of“Lockheed University” forgrooming managers forhigher positions within thecorporation. And,mostimportant ofall,bothcompanies wouldallowthe Lockheed Corporation tomake whatmany consider tobethegreatest ofallindustrial contributions towinning thecoldwar,byproviding multiple means toenforce theU.S.policy ofdeterrence andcontainmentoftheSoviet Union. Lockheed’s productswerevitalin manyareas,butfour—spy

planes, satellites, fleetballistic missiles, andairliftaircraft—were especially so.Deterrence would befurthered byitsfamous spyplanes, theU-2andtheSR-71, which provided otherwise unavailable infor-

mationontheSovietUnion.Thefantastic resultsofthespyplanes

would bevastly exceeded bytheinformation provided byLockheed’s incrediblespysatellites,beginningwithCorona,and thengoingfar

beyond eventhatformidable achievement. These would laybaremost ofthemajorsecrets oftheSoviet Union, enabling theUnited States notonlytoevaluate thepotential threat, butalsotometer itsreaction tothatthreateconomically. While theplanes andthesatellites differed

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 222

vastly intheirtechnology, theyshared onecommon feature: most people believed thesemodern instruments couldnotbebuilttoperformasintended. Afurther andperhaps decisive deterrent camefromtherevolu-

tionarysubmarine-launched ballisticmissiles(SLBMs), Lockheed-

designed and-built,fromthefirstPolaris tothelatest Trident. Again, nothing similar hadeverbeenachieved, andthereweremany whosaid thetaskwasimpossible, thataballistic missile couldnotbelaunched

fromasubmarine. YettheLockheed/navy team,working withother companies, solved theproblems tocreate thestealthiest andmostinvulnerable element oftheAmerican strategic triadofSLBMs, ICBMs, andbombers, anddidsoinanamazingly shorttime.Perhaps themost important benefitofthetriadwasthatit deterred theSoviets from exercising thefirst-strike doctrine, inwhichtheirmilitary leaders be-

lieved andwhichtheywouldhaveexecuted ifnotkeptincheck by thethreatofmassive retaliation fromtheUnited States. Thepolicy ofcontainment wasfurthered byLockheed transports, including theC-130,C-141,andC-5.Theirunmatched globalreach

permitted theUnited States toconfront andcontain Soviet-sponsored initiatives bytransferring troopsandarmstocritical areas, aswhen Lockheed transports brought thetanksandgunsthatenabled Israel to survive in 1973.Compassionate missions flownto disaster areas around theglobe wereanequally important element ofcontainment. Theworld watched inaweasanendless procession ofhugeLockheed transports brought infood,water, andmedical supplies toareas struck byearthquakes orsuffering theresults ofcivilwars. Operations continued atthe“home” plantinBurbank, where vitalcontributions tobothcivilandmilitary aviation weremade. Inevitably, however, thebenefits oftheexpanded horizons inGeorgia andSunnyvale wouldredound tothegreater benefit ofthemother firm.

TheGrossBrothers: Looking AheadforLockheed nthe1940s, thegreatest single accolade abusinessman could receive wastobeonthecover ofTime magazine. Thishonorwasaccorded toRobert Gross onJanuary 14,1946.Hisbrother Courtlandt would bepaida.similar tribute justovertwenty years later,onFebruary 11,

Expanding Horizons

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223

1966.Thetwo-decade interval wouldseeLockheed’s continuing growth undertheguidance oftheGross brothers, butwould alsosee itsfuture shaped bythementheychose foruppermanagement.

Thearticleaccompanying the 1946covercapturedtheessence ofRobertGrossandforesaw thefutureofLockheed in a fewpithy

paragraphs. It beganbydetailing thewidepublicacceptance ofthe Constellation, andthencommented onthe“star-shooting career of theLockheed Corporation.” Itnotedthatin13years, Lockheed had grown froma$40,000, fifteen-employee gamble toagiantwith$50 million inworking capital, thirty-two thousand employees, andabacklogof$215million, unprecedented forthetime. Time statedthatamong “plane-making tycoons, predominantly aninbredandindividualistic groupofonetime designers andpilots, BobGross isasport.Heisnotapilot.Heknows littleaboutaerodynamics. Asaproduction manandadministrator heisjustso-so. Yet hehasonetalent which morethanbalances these apparent deficiencies. Hehasaseemingly intuitive salesman’s sense ofknowing whatplanes

willbewanteda fewyearshence,andthenbeingreadytodeliver them. On topofthis,he hasa knackforgettinghisideasacross,anda flair

forpicking menwhocantranslate themintoplanes.” Gross, ofcourse, wasdoingfarmorethanthat,forwithhis brother hewasestablishing aculture thatwould continue topickthe rightmenwhocouldtranslate evenmoreadvanced ideasthanhisown

intoevenmoresophisticated equipment thanaircraft. Whentheyounger Gross appeared ontheTime cover in1966, hewaschairman oftheboard.Hepresided overanevenmoreimpressive increase inthegrowth oftheLockheed Corporation, agrowth thatwasfedinpartbythecoldwarandinpartbythehotwarbuilding inVietnam. Hisprincipal instrument inmanaging whatwasnowthe Defense Department’s biggest single contractor wasa manhehad personally picked forthejob,Daniel J.Haughton. Haughtonwouldbecloselymonitored bytheGrossbrothers. Bothmenwantedto besurethatthemanagement ofthecompany

would beleftingoodhands aftertheyretired, andtothemgoodhands meant aperson totally devoted toevery aspect ofLockheed’s expanding business, andonewhowouldtakecareofthe“Lockheed family.” Haughton clearly filledthatbill.

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 224

Revolution inGeorgia Wee

WarII foundMarietta,Georgia,stilla sleepytown.Located

justa fewmilesnorthofAtlanta, Marietta waslocked inthe traditions oftheOldSouth, theprospect ofmore“Yankees” arriving tobuildanaircraft factory intheirmidstraising theimage ofGeneral Sherman andhisinvaders. Fortunately, theinveterate patriotism ofthe population fortheWorldWarII effort—and theprospect of thousands ofhigh-paying jobs—quickly brought public sentiment into line.Therewasgeneral acceptance ofadecision bytheDefense Plant Corporation tobuildagovernment-owned plantinMarietta, where theBellAircraftCorporation wouldbuildBoeingB-29s.AirForce PlantNo. 6 openedon March15, 1943,whenits firstfivehundred

employees cametowork.Themainproduction building washuge: 1,000feetwideand2,000feetlongandstanding fourandone-half stories high,itwasatthetimethelargest aircraft assembly building undera singleroof.Ultimately, thefacility wouldcovermorethan4.5

million square feet.Themainbuildings wereair-conditioned, anincredible innovation atatimewhensuchcomfort could befoundonly inpremier motion picture theaters. Onecanimagine howthefeature wasappreciated bythenewworkforce, many ofwhom hadpreviously spentthehotsummers sweltering inthefields oflocalfarms. After theplantwasinproduction, ayoung attorney from Atlanta, James V.Carmichael, wasselected toheadtheoperation. Theproduction ratebuiltupslowly toward itsgoalof40aircraft permonth, andbywar’send,368B-29shadbeenbuilt.Manyin theworkforce

hadcometothenewplantcompletely untrained, never having seen anaircraft factory, a machine tool,orevensheetaluminum before. Theirskillgrewsorapidly thatBellexecutives elected tochange from thestandard industry cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF)contract tocontracts

setting aflatpriceforanaircraft. TheBellgamble paidoff;production efficiency soared, andBellmadealmost10percent ofthecontract priceversus the2percent generally earned onaCPFFcontract. WiththeendofWorldWarII, the factorywasclosed,but the

advent oftheKorean conflict inJune1950caused ittobereopened. FoundwantingbecauseoftheU.S.postwardemobilization frenzy,the

AirForcedidnothaveenough bombers onhandtomaintain the deterrent forceoftheStrategic AirCommand andfighttheKorean War.Aircraft hadtobescavenged fromthedesertboneyards, and reservists hadtoberecalled toflythem.

Expanding Horizons += 225

TheAirForce tasked Lockheed toreopen theMarietta plantin January 1951,torefurbish 120B-29s thathadbeenlanguishing in plastic cocoons atPyote, Texas. Lockheed waschosen because theAir Forcehadbiggerplansforit—theproduction of theBoeingB-47 bomberunderlicense. Lockheed’s Vegaunithadparticipated with

Douglas inbuilding B-17sduringthewarintheso-called B-V-D (Boeing-Vega-Douglas) committee (theacronym wasslylyfunnyin 1944,whenBVDswerean old-fashioned brandoflongunderwear).

Carmichael wasbroughtbackinitially tosupervise operations asgen-

eralmanager. Hewasfirstassisted andthenreplaced by arisingstar intheLockheed family of“high-potential” executives, theenergetic DanHaughton. A southernerhimself,Alabama-born Haughtonhadenteredthe

aircraftindustry working asanaccountant at Consolidated Aircraft. Hemusthavedonewell,forwhenhisboss,P.E. Ryker,leftConsol-

idated toworkforDickVonHake, Lockheed’s vicepresident ofmanufacturing, heinvited Haughton tocome along. Theyounger mandid

soaboutayearlater,justastheproduction tempoonHudson bombers wasbuildingup.There,he initiatedtwoof hismanylong-lasting

relationships, forHaughton wasa manwhoinspired loyalty andadmiration. Thefirstwaswithhissecretary, Monte Orman, whostayed withhimforthenextthirty-five years, andthesecond waswithCourtlandtGross.Montewouldbecomehisvirtualalterego,scheduling his

busydaysandshielding himfromless-important demands onhisprecioustime.Courtlandt would seehimtobetheperfect mantowhom topassthereinsstillheldsotightly bytheGross brothers.

Theirfirstmeeting setthetoneforwhatbecame a verysympatheticrelationship. Haughtonrecalled in an interview thatthefirst timehemetCourtlandt wasintheofficenexttohisown.Grosswas

sitting inanoffice swivel chairtalking onthetelephone. Heleaned backtoofar,catapulting himself tothefloor, butwithout interrupting histelephone call,andblithely ignoring Haughton’s amused reaction. Notwithstanding thisunique introduction, Gross would become one ofHaughton’s mostimportant mentors.

ItwasHaughton’s styletolearnmorethanthenutsandboltsof theorganization—he learned thecutofthethread, thepounds of

torque,howmanydropsof oil wereneeded,and always,the most

economical usageof everypartandeveryman-hour. He neverat-

tempted topasshimself offasamachine operator oranassembler, but hecould observe amanufacturing process andoptimize it.Hebecame expert atsystematizing production atthelowest level, and,asherose

BEYOND THE HORIZONS

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DanielHaughtonwas selectedby Robertand CourtlandtGrossto succeedthem. Haughtonwas a gifted manager,totallydevoted to Lockheed.

widebasisat each in rank,he practicedhis talenton an increasingly

he ladderto thetop.Ultimately, inclined newrungonhissteeply ina similar manner, insisting on wouldruntheentirecorporation and deficiencies, and knowingall the details,spottingirregularities

demanding improvement. Whathedidoncebyroaming categorically fromplant thecountry across floorhedidlaterbyroaming thefactory and inGeorgia meetings inonedayearly-morning to plant,holding around revolving meeting each in Burbank, meetings late-evening hadtoknowtheir charts.Hismanagers scoresof information-laden

jobsashe knewhis,andthatmeantin depthandbreadthandwith

passion.

Despite hisrigor,Haughton wasconsidered bymanytobeat in thepotential, whoretained gentleman Southern hearta charming

thewordsofLockheed groupvicepresident CarlHaddon,to“getout hisblowtorch” whenthesituation demanded it.Thefeeling ofaffec-

mixed withrecognition ofhissometimes blistering tionforHaughton, ischaracteristic ofmostofthosewhoworked withhim.Many tactics, byhowobviously Haughton wasdevoted tohiswife.In weretouched disease, thelateryears,whenshewasstrickenwithan incapacitating

heattended tohertenderly andpersonally, arranging hisotherwise schedule tobewithherattheevening meal. relentless

AllanandMalcolm Lockheed inthecapacious cockpit oftheirModelF-1,oneofthelargestseaplanes in the worldat thetimeofitsconstruction.

TheAquilaremotely pilotedvehicle, aforerunner ofan ever-more important discipline.

Flaresdesigned tospoofinfrared missiles trailbehindaHercules. TheC-130,designedasawarplane,hasfunctioned

inmanymorehumanitarian rolesthanhadeverbeenenvisaged forit.Itisideally suitedformanyCoastGuarduses.

the Galaxyhasproveditselfto be equally Bornin a swirlof controversy, indispensable to combator compassionate missions.

wasa magnificent “Ofallsadwords...”The Cheyenne its time.It fellvictim o f advance andin innovative helicopter,

toaprotracted development andrisingcosts.

Theperformance oftheprototype CL-475 helicopter encouraged Lockheed toincrease itseffortstoestablish a foothold intheindustry.

TheversatileConstellation lentitself

toawidevariety oftasks.

TheD-21dronewasahigh-risk attemptto extend

theutility oftheSR-71A; it proved tobetoodangerous to useinthemannershown. D-21sweresubsequently usedsuccessfully byB-52motherplanes.

Ss, f

TheDarkstar pointsthewayto

Theenormous success

whatmaybe oftheU-2inamilitary rolewas thefuture ofreconnaissance,equalled bythesuccess ofitssister ship theuninhabitedaircraft.

ER-2,operatedbyNASAfor peacetime missions.

Thegreatsuccess oftheoriginal Electra ledtothedevelopment ofa slightlysmaller,moreaffordable Electra,Junior.

TheF-104Starfighter becameanintegralpartofthenewGerman

Luftwaffe, operating inavariety ofroles.

Thedisconcerting angularity oftheF-117A Nighthawk ispartofthe reasonforitsstealthcharacteristics. TheF-117A’s complex computer system manages toendowitwithexcellent

flying characteristics.

wentsmoothDivision FortWorth Dynamic’s ofGeneral Theacquisition lyandtheF-16Fighting Falcon became a stalwart addition tothestableofLockheed fighters.

they Together eachwithdistinctcapabilities. shapes, Threeverydifferent forma formidable arsenaloffighteraircraft.Fromthe left,theF-16,theYF-22,andtheF-117A.

Theincredible stealthcharacteristics ofthediamond-shaped F-117A

model wereproven inthissculptural setting.

Theimmortal Hudsonbomber wasvitaltoGreatBritain initswar

against Germany's submarines. Itwasthekeyinstrument in

transforming Lockheed intoamajormanufacturer ofcombataircraft.

Ofallthegreat

leapsforward in

astronomy, theHubble

Space Telescope

remainsthemost astonishing.

Thephotographs fromtheHubblecombine art,philosophy, science, andtheverybasis forreligion inasinglecomposition. Foreach answer theyprovide, theyraisea thousand morequestions.

Itisalmostimpossible to comprehend theenormous

distances, thevastsizes,and theincredible durationof timesinvolvedin

photographs likethese.

Thebeautiful Lockheed L-1011 wasbeloved by pilotsandpassengers. Anunquestionable success asan aircraft,it encounteredinsurmountablemarketing

problems thatdoomed it toeconomic failure.

Lockheed always managed to“stretch” itsaircraft sothatthe

maximumperformance wasextractedfromthebasicdesign.The LodestarcarriedtheoriginalElectra’s configuration to itslimits.

TheAgena spacecraft wasoneoftheunsungheroes

ofthespaceage.Reliable, versatile, andusedin hundredsof

applications, theAgenadidfortheexploration ofspacewhat theDouglasDC-3didforcommercial airtransportation.

TheMILSTAR

satellite system provides military

communication capability.

Thehazards implicit inatotally newengine designdidnotdeterKelly Johnson andhis SkunkWorkengineers. Whenpresented withthebrand-new jetengine, theydesigneda classicairframeto useit,

theP-80Shooting Star.

Antisubmarine warfare assumed anunparalleled importance withthe adventofnuclear submarines capable of launching nuclear weapons. TheP-3Orion established itselfastheworld’s premier anti-submarine aircraft.

Fast,powerful

andversatile, theS-3Viking becamethe

mostcapable

carrier-based anti-submarinewarfare aircraftin

history.

TheSeaShadow represented notonlyarevolution inshipdesign, withits stealthcharacteristics, butalsoin shipconstruction techniques.

-Theproducts oftheSkunkWorksarranged inastaroutline:fromthetwelve o'clockposition:SR-71A;F-94C;U-2;F-104,F-117A,andtheF-80.

Timeseems tostop atthebeginning of aSpaceShuttle launch. Then,ina burstofflameand

vapor, thebeautiful spacecraft launches fromearth.

TheSpace Shuttle poisedonthe Earth’s horizon likeagigantic monument

tohuman

imagination.

Atoncethemostmysterious andmostrecognizable ofaircraft, theSR-71’s beautyisaccented bythepower implicit intheflameofitsengines.

Almost every Lockheed transport ultimately sawmilitary duty, andnoneserved betterthantheConstellation. TheNavy’s T2V-1SeaStarwasa carrier—based development oftheAirForce’s T-33.

Theimmortal

Lockheed Vega beganitscareer

settingrecordsand

endeditserving asa difficulttargetfor radarto track.

TheTridentsubmarine— launched ballisticmissilereacheda levelof

TheX-17wasapioneernotonly

proponentofFleetBallistic Missiles wouldnothavedreamedofevena decadebefore.

engineering andmanagement

forthenewanduntriedworld

sophistication thateventhemostardent of missiles,but alsofor Lockheed

techniques. Itdidwellin bothtasks.

TheYF-22won oneofthemost demandingfighter

competitions in history, emerging

astheUSAF’s premierfighterfor

the21stcentury.

TheYF-22 prototype’s beautylentitself todramatic photographs; thisseemstobeasmucha

sculpture asanaircraft.

Expanding Horizons

= 227

HaughtonMarchesto Georgia ee 150people weredetailed withHaughton fromtheBurbank operation toinitiate thereopening oftheformer Bellplant. Among themostimportant ofthemwasA.CarlKotchian, whobrought about twenty people withhimasassistant director offinancial operations. He

wouldsucceed Haughton asgeneral manager in 1956.Thetwomen

would work closely together overtheyears andwould together rise(and, sadly, fall)withLockheed’s fortunes, withKotchian succeeding Haughtonaspresident oftheLockheed Corporation whenthelatterbecame chairman oftheboard. Theywere recognized andrespected bytheircoworkers asanextraordinarily effective, ifsometimes rough, team. Employment soonsoared to abouttenthousand, onceagain breathing lifeintothelocaleconomy. Theoriginal charter ofLockheed’s Georgia Division’ operation specifically ruledouta separate engineering ormarketing organization; theseweretoremaininCalifornia.Yetthedistance fromBurbank provided theGeorgia managementwitha moderatedegreeofindependence, whichit enhancedby

anoutstanding performance. Theproduction oftheB-47wasphased injustastherefurbishmentoftheB-29 wasbeing completed. Boeing hadprovided parts toasInan B-47Es. 386 toproduce on went and Lockheed B-47Bs, 8 semble unusually benevolent gesture, given thenormally cutthroat competition oftheindustry, Boeing hadshared itscost-of-production information withKotchian, whopromptly putittogooduse.Lockheed wasableto price itsbidontheB-47s lowenough fortheAirForce toagree toit,but highenough toearnasubstantial profit whenHaughton’s managerial talents envoked highperformance fromthenewworkforce. Itwas.an auspicious beginning forLockheed Georgia andforHaughton. TheB-47contract wasstructured asa CostPlusIncentive Fee InaCPIFcononeofthefirstofthisnaturewithLockheed. (CPIB),

tract,ifyoubettered yourcontractual estimates, yourprofits went Justasit hadbeen wentdown. them,profits ifyouoverran up—and inWorldWarII,theGeorgia plantproved tobeexceptionally productive, making thecontract highly profitable forLockheed. Haughtonrecalled thatabout$200million ofthetotalestimated contractual amount of$750million wasreturned totheAirForce, andhebelieved 1. LikeLockheed Missile andSpace,thenameoftheLockheed operation in Georgia changed asitgrew.

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 228

thatsuccess ofthismagnitude wastheprincipal reasonthatRobert

andCourtlandt Gross agreed toallow production oftheC-130 transportinGeorgia. Theallocation ofC-130 production toGeorgia made itnecessary tobuildupanengineering andsales staff, andthusestablishacompletely integrated airplane division ofthecompany. Thisin turnwouldserveastheplatform fromwhichtolauncha dynasty of

AirForce transport aircraft. Haughton’s stylewasimpressed upontheGeorgia Company earlywiththefirstLockheed management incentive plan.Theinitial portion oftheB-47contract called forabout25million man-hours ofworkatanaverage of$5perhour.Haughton wasconvinced that thistimecouldbereduced ifmanagers couldshareintheresulting profit.Itwasa revolutionary ideaatLockheed, andtooksomepersuasion togetinplace—part ofthepersuasion beingHaughton’s excluding himself fromparticipation. Inthefallof1956, Courtlandt Gross paidathree-day visittothe Georgia Division. Inhisusualquiet,gentlemanly style, hewentover theentireoperation carefully withHaughton, including theongoing transfer ofC-130manufacture fromBurbank toGeorgia. Then,only fifteen minutes before hewastodepart inhisplane backtoCalifornia,

hesaid,“Dan,I’dliketohaveyoucomebacktothecorporation asexecutivevicepresident,and run all the divisionsfor us.” Haughton

agreed immediately, leaving fortheWestCoastonOctober 1,1956. Therehewould oversee Lockheed’s general expansion andimpose his management methods onmost—but notall—of theorganization. Despite thewhirlwind sixteen-hour-per-day, seven-day-per-week

stylebywhichheexercised ironcontrolovertheaircraft sideofLock-

heed,Haughton, aswewillsee,could never impose onwhatultimately became theLockheed Missiles andSpace Company thesamedegree ofmicromanagement control thathedidonotherdivisions. Thiswas inpartbecause oftheintense security ofLMSC’s operation, where

“needto know”wasrigorouslyenforced,andin partbecauseof the natureofLMSCscientistsandengineers, whoseculturewassodiffer-

entfromthatofthepeople onthemanufacturing floorofanaircraft plant.Some saythatHaughton didnotentirely grasp thebreadth of LMSC’s systems, whichextended farbeyond finished hardware. As thingshappened, Haughton’s “benign neglect” vastly benefited first LMSC andthenthecorporation asawhole. Despite hispersonal inclination to micromanage, Haughton seemed to understand that Sunnyvale personnel mightnotrespond to themethods thathad worked sowellforhiminGeorgia.

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Georgia's Hercules: TheBeginning ofa NobleTransport Dynasty uringtheKoreanWar,theoperationsoftheUSAF’s FarEastern

AirForces Combat CargoCommand hadbeenheroic, andin some instances absolutely crucial, butwereformostofthewarterribly handicapped byinadequate equipment. Itsmostmodern operational

aircraft, theFairchild C-119,provedto beonlymarginally moreeffective(andmuchlessreliable)thanWorldWarII DouglasC-47sand

Curtiss C-46s. TheAirForcesought toremedy thesituation onFebruary 2, 1951, witharequest forproposal foramedium-weight transport issued toLockheed, Boeing, Douglas, andFairchild. Inbroadterms, theAir Force’s General Operational Requirement (GOR) called foratransportableto 1.carryninety-two infantrymen orsixty-four paratroopers ona

mission withacombatradiusof1,100nautical miles,or,alternatively,

athirty-thousand-pound cargo over960miles; 2.operate fromshort,unprepared airstrips ofclay,sand,orhumussoil;

3. slowdownto 125knotsforparadrops andevenslower for assault landings; 4.havebotharearrampoperable inflight forheavy-equipment dropsandsidedoorsforparatroop drops; 5.handle bulkyandheavy equipment including bulldozers, artillery pieces, andtrucks; and 6.flyevenwithoneengine out. Thislastrequirement wascritical. Previous transport aircraft, op-

erating withheavy loadsoutoftheshortfields intheforward area, oftencouldnotsurvive thelossofanengine ontakeoff—there was notenough power tokeepthemairborne. Willis Hawkins, thenheadofpreliminary design, acted asgeneral supervisor forLockheed’s proposal, Kelly Johnson being preoccupied withwhatwouldbecome theF-104fighter. Eugene FrostwasHawkins’s deputy forTemporary Design Designation L-206, latercalled

BEYOND THE HORIZONS

= 230

Oneof the most brilliant aeronauticalengineersof all time, and an excellentmanager as well, Willis Hawkins has

receivedinnumerableawardsfor his manycontributionsto Lockheedand to the aerospace industry.Hawkinsrose to prominence in both the

aeronauticaland the missile sides of Lockheed.

theModel82.ArtFlockandDickPulverweretaskedto leadthe

project intothedevelopment stage forprototypes. Ultimately, thepatentfortheC-130would beassigned toBillStatler andGeneFrost. AswasthecasewithmostLockheed projects—and decades before the modern“integrated productteam’? concept—most ofthemenwere specialists intheirfieldwhohadworkedtogether closely before(e.g.,

Pulver andFlock onthehugeConstitution four-engine transport, or FrostandHawkins onNatePrice’s L-133 jetproject). Johnson’s penchant forhigh-speed, high-performance aircraft wassogreatthathealways argued against research aircraft suchasthe BellX-1ortheNorthAmerican X-15,believing thataircraft should bedesigned bothtohaveoutstanding performance andtoperform an operational mission. Thus,itisnotsurprising thattheprospect ofa strictly utilitarian transport didnotexcite him.AsitwasJohnson’s tendency tobetotallyfocused onhisownwork,thedevelopment of

theModel 82progressed rapidly without hisoversight. Likeeveryone else,Johnson wasunaware thatthefateofthe Georgiaoperation,andindeed,the fateof Lockheeditself,rodeon

thesturdy ifunprepossessing wings ofwhatwastobecome theC-130 Hercules. Andit transpired thatthefateoftheC-130rodein turn

uponthejudgment andcourage ofHallT.Hibbard. Hibbard wasvitally important toLockheed because ofhisengineering talentandhisstrong relationship withRobert andCourtlandt

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Gross.It wassaidofHibbardthat he was“theirarbiterofrisks,their

ofnewvensuccess onthevalueandprobable ofjudgment source tures.” Lessthan four monthsafterthe Air Force’sRFP, Hawkins

broughttheModel82proposal toHibbardforapproval. Hallasked,

seenthis?” Whentoldno,Hibbard sentforJohnson. Kelly, “HasKelly syndrome, tothe“not-invented-here” immune notentirely perhaps thedrawings andthemodel, turnedtohisboss,andsaid, examined “Hibbard, ifyousendthatin,you'lldestroy theLockheed Company.”

Hibbard Hethenwalkedout.Alwaysthegentleman, theembarrassed hemmedandhawedandfinallysaid,“Well,the modelcertainlyhasa

onit.” nicefinish persisted, andintheend,Hibbard signed off—a ButHawkins courageous thingto do, giventhe powerfulinfluenceof Johnson’s

fora prorequest totheAirForce’s response opinion.(TheLockheed

years Onlyfourteen ofaninchthick. waslessthanthree-quarters posal proposal foraproposed AirForce transport would later,theLockheed TheAirForceevaluated thecompeting weigh sixthousand pounds.) proposals swiftly andawarded acontract toLockheed onJuly2,1951,

fortwoYC-130 prototypes. era— ofanearlier toanobject refers usually design A“classic” such suchasthe1937Cord812oranaircraft anautomobile perhaps initstime,thatit still socorrect wassohandsome, astheP-38—that debymoremodern evenafterit hasbeensuperseded looks“right” of thenewLockheed appearance workmanlike signs.Thesimple, aclassic itseverbeingconsidered against militated C-130transport m ade t heterm C-130 of the career Butthe bythisdefinition. solely “classic” irrelevant asitredefined theconcept ofaircraft beautybythe faithfulservice it rendered. Withverylittlechangeinshape—a nose

indimension, change nosignificant jobhere,a tailtuckthere—and atitstask,evenasit C-130hasneverbeensuperseded theLockheed unexamples life.(Some ofproduction a halfcentury toward reaches derlinehowremarkable thisis.It isasif Rickenbacker’s 1918Spad orLindin 1968 dutyinVietnam wouldstillhavebeenperforming

With in1977.) oceans wasstillcrossing ofSt.Louis 1927Spirit bergh’s misand design ahundred almost produced, morethan2,150aircraft the ofnations, forscores performed built,andservice sionvariants

aircraft It hashadimitations, competitor. stillhasnogenuine Hercules suchas the TransallC.160,whichborrowedits generalshapein a

foraircraft andtheC-130isstillusedasa model version, twin-engine Large Aircraft Future suchastheEuropean forthefuture, projected

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The prototypeYC-130Herculesturboproptransport first flewat Burbankon August 23,

1954.Developed continuously, thetypehasremainedinproduction eversince, becomingthe Westernworld’smost importantcargo aircraft.

(FLA).But no otheraircrafthasevercomecloseto beingableto do

whattheC-130 doessowellandsoeconomically. Noteventhegenerally similar appearing butlesscapable Antonov An-12 “Cub,” some 900ofwhich werebuiltfortheSoviet blocbefore itsproduction run ended in1973, equaled theC-130. Theonlyprospective replacement fortheC-130isthenewC-130J, a highly refined butstillclearly related descendant oftheoriginal YC-130. TheRoyal AirForce, much tothedistress ofitsEuropean neighbors, hasalready expressed pref-

erenceforthehere-and-now C-130Jovertheyet-to-come FLA.

Aswithmany greatdesigns, formhadfollowed function. Theair forcehaddemanded, among otherthings,a large,easily accessible cargo area.Theproposed concept began withasquare-shaped 4,500cubic-foot boxthathadalmostexactly thedimensions of a standard

railroad boxcar. Structural andvolumetric considerations andtheneed tooperate fromroughfields dictated theuseofa highwing.The requirement to avoidimpinging onavailable cargospace, plusthe hazard ofrough-field operation, ledtotheadoption ofanextremely simple butrugged dual-tandem-wheel landing-gear system mounted in streamlined stub-housings at thebottomof thefuselage. Even though arelatively narrow gear,thelowcenter ofgravity oftheaircraft precluded thecrosswind handling problems thatdogged previous similarinstallations.

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233

formoftheC-130 theexternal function, theutilitarian Despite Fromthetipofthetailfinto thesleek attractive. was,if notsleek,

togivegreatvisibility windows nose,withitstwenty-three greenhouse aresmooth o ftheHercules thelines toshortfields, forsteepapproaches

andstraight. WorldWarII,and during appeared cargogliders Rear-loading suchasthe planes cargo withrear-loading hadexperience theairforce onall improved buttheC-130design C-119andC-123, Fairchild previous attempts. wasveryproudof reservations, hisinitial despite Johnson, Kelly were HetoldastoryofhowheandHallHibbard C-130. therugged at building engineering f our-story built anewly through shown being proud Themanwasparticularly architect. bythebuilding’s Lockheed

of the strengthof the building,tellingthem,“The flooris designed

foot.”Hewentontonotethatthefloor persquare for250pounds rodsspaced reinforcing with%-inch of concrete inches hadtwelve ateachotherand looked andHibbard Johnson inches. twelve every

knewthattheflooroftheC-130,madeoutofthindural smiled—they structures,was designedto withstand300-pound-per-square-foot

a hadtobeabletorestrain tie-downs compartment Thecargo loads. cockpit the through forward on driving from bulldozer 25,000-pound Anditallhadtobebuiltatthelowest intheeventofacrashlanding. didn’t forhiswork—and weight.Theypraisedthearchitect possible tellhimabouttheC-130’s floorloading.

wasparengines turboprop T56-A-1 offourAllison Thechoice for power morethanadequate fortheyprovided fortunate, ticularly operation. one-engine-out those f or especially requirements, initial the evenastheyengoodfueleconomy demonstrated Theturboprops almost topspeed, fora360-mph withthepotential theaircraft dowed of power Thesurplus predecessors. W ar II thatofitsWorld double includingthe thefourturbopropenginespermittedtheentirefuselage,

cavernouscargocompartment,to be pressurized.Thepressurized.cargo

toa thataccrue toobtaintheadvantages wasnecessary compartment c abin a safe m aintaining while altitudes, athigher engine turboprop that structure Therugged orparatroopers. forpassengers environment tough alsogavetheC-130anexceptionally required pressurization inthe ofoperation therough-and-tumble abletowithstand airframe, fieldoverseveral decades. Aswiththe werebuiltin Burbank. aircraft ThefirstYC-130 a firstflight, t he m ade that prototype B-52,itwasthesecond Boeing to AirTerminal Lockheed tripfromBurbank’s sixty-one-minute

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Edwards AirForce Base onAugust 23,1954. Stanley Beltz waspilot, RoyWimmer copilot, JackReal(later formanyyears aclose confidant ofHoward Hughes) flighttestengineer, andDickStanton flightengineer. Kelly Johnson, nodoubtrepenting hisearlierdoubtsaboutthe aircraft, flewintheaccompanying Neptune chase plane. Thenumber oneYC-130 wouldserve aas statictestarticle before making itsfirst flightonJanuary 21,1955. Testsquickly proved thatflightcharacteristics wereexcellent, and

performance wasmuchbetterthanhadbeenprojected inallparameters—cruising speed, takeoff distance, climbrates,service ceiling, andlanding distance. Themaximum payload of40,000 pounds exceeded airforce requirements. Lockheed hadestimated thattheaircraft

wouldhavea grossweightof 113,000 pounds,butbroughttheairplanein at 108,000pounds,a 5,000-poundsaving.The aircraftthat

would induecourse benamed theHercules was,inshort,awinner. While flight testing proceeded, awhirlofactivity surrounded the transferofmanufacture to theMariettaplant,wherea teamledbythe

newprojectengineer, AlBrown, prepared totacklethefirstairforce

contract forsevenproduction aircraft. TheMarietta workforce had almost doubled, tojustlessthantwenty thousand, andC-130s began totakeshape attheheight ofB-47production in 1954, when143of the six-jetbomberswerebuilt.It wasan idealproductionsituation, for,astheB-47s phased down,C-130production builtup. Therollout ofthefirstproduction model onMarch10,1955, wasgraced bythepresence ofGovernor Marvin Griffin, whomade

threefutileattempts tochristen theaircraft withabottleofwaterfrom thenearbyChattahoochee River,succeeding onlyonthefourthtry. ThefirstflighttookplaceonApril7, 1955.Thisaircraft wasseverely

damaged aweek lateronitsthirdflight whenaloose quick-disconnect fuel-hose coupling started a firein thenumber twoengine; it was gavelongservice. ultimately repaired andsubsequently Otherdifficulties occurred withtheCurtiss-Wright electric pro-

pellers, which werechanged firsttoanAeroproducts design andfinally, on theC-130B series, to a Hamilton Standard. Oneneardisaster occurred whenanaftrampblewoutwhileundergoing ground pres-

surization tests,anincident thatledtoperforming pressurization tests underwater inhugespecially builttanks.

The initialseriesofAirForcecontactscalledfor 204C-130As,

andthefirstaircraft wasdelivered tothe463rdTroopCarrier Wing atArdmore, Oklahoma, onDecember 9, 1954.TheinitialC-130As hada plain“Roman nose,”thatis,theoutline ofthenosewasan

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unbroken forward-slanting line.Thiswassoonchanged tothe“Pinocchionose”withtheadditionoftheAN/APN-59 radardome.

Therewassomeconcern that,inHaughton’s words, “thestring

wouldrunout”andtheAirForcewouldnotorderanymoreC-130s. (Australia bought12C-130As, thefirstofmanyforeign sales.) Heand

CarlKotchian advocated thedevelopment ofafollow-on andinvested. several million dollars inthepreparation oftheC-130B, which had moreinternal fuelandmorepowerful Allison T56-A-7 engines of

4,050-shaft horsepower. Thelandinggearandthegeneralstructure werestrengthened and takeoffweightwasincreased to 135,000 pounds. TheUSAF bought123Bmodels, and33weresoldtoforeign

countries, sustaining aninternational trendwhichcontinues tothis day. Overtime,theavailability ofmorepowerful versions ofthetrusty

AllisonT56,plustheneedforlongerrange,ledto morepowerful

variants withincreased internal andexternal fuelcapacity. Thus,the C-130E’s internal fuelwasincreased toalmost 7,000gallons, supplemented bythetwo1,360-gallon external underwing tanks. (Pilots still

debatethenetresultsoftheexternal wingtanks;someclaimtheextra weightanddragdetractfromperformance enoughto negatetheir

value.) TheAllison T56-A-7 engines wereretained. ThefirstC-130E flew onAugust 15,1961. Atotalof490Emodels were built,including 377fortheUSAF,four(asC-130Gs)forthenavy,and109forforeign

customers. Theutility oftheaircraft wasvastly increased withtheintroductionofthelow-altitude parachute extraction system(LAPES) forthe delivery ofcargo.Lateraircraft received theAWADS (adverse weather aerialdelivery system), whichpermitted pinpointnavigation forairdropsunderdifficult conditions, asoccurred in thereliefeffortsfor Bosnia.

Another increase inpower, thistimeto4,508-shaft horsepower,

distinguished theC-130H,whichwasunusual inthatitwasdelivered firstto a foreignservice,the RoyalNewZealandAirForce.The C-130HfirstflewonNovember 19,1964,andhasbeendelivered to

morethanfiftyairforces. It remains inproduction today, andwill continue tobesoformanyyears tocome. Space limitations preclude morethanthebriefest account ofthe

seventy-plus variations oftheC-130.Itsdutiesinclude thoseoriginally programmed forit asa mediumtransport,plusthoseofgunship,elec-

tronicwarfare, search andrescue, tanker, airborne command post, Antarctic delivery system, battlefield illumination, bomber, forest-fire

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airtanker, weather reconnaissance, airborne earlywarning, airborne battlefield command andcontrol, airborne radioandtelevision relay, special forces operations, special operations, airborne emergency hospital,dronelaunch andcontrol, andmanymore.It isusedbythe USAF, theU.S.Navy, theU.S.CoastGuard, andtheU.S.Marines, andatpresent count, sixty-four foreign countries. Inaddition toitsmilitary uses,morethanonehundred civilian

versions havebeenbuilt.TheL-100wasessentially a demilitarized C-130E,thedesignation changeservingto makeitssaleto foreign

countries morepalatable. Twostretched versions, theL-100-20 and L-100-30, werebuilt,andsome oftheearly L-100s havebeenmodified toL-100-20 standard. These civilian versions areinusebyeight foreign airforcesandthirtyciviloperators, including fiveintheUnitedStates.

At the time this iswritten,more than 2,150 C-130shavebeensold.

TheC-130Hercules wasthesubject ofnumerous development programs, including extensive experiments withboundary layercontrol.Twoadditional Allison T56engines wereinstalled inplace ofthe

external tanks;theseblewairthrougha ductingsystemovertheflaps andallcontrolsurfaces. Therestoftheaircraftwasstandard,withthe

exception ofanenlarged ruddertomaintain control atlowspeeds.

Themodified Hercules achieved trueSTOL(ShortTakeoff andLand-

ing)performance, getting offtheground in750feetandlanding in

700.OnJune19,1984,flighttestsbeganonanindependent Lockheed project,theHighTechnology TestBed(HTTB).

TheHTTBaircraft wasa converted Lockheed L-100-20, and wasequipped withextensive telemetry equipment. Overaneight-year period, theaircraft wasmodified inmanydifferent ways, including drooped wingleading edges(tomaintain aileron control withthe plannedverysteep,low-speed approaches), double-slotted, fast-acting

flaps(toincrease liftcoefficient), newengines, newpropellers, anda hostofothervariations. TheHTTBwaslostonFebruary 3, 1993, whenduring a high-speed taxitestitinadvertently became airborne, swervedto the left, and crashed.

ThemostradicalofalltheC-130modifications wasmadeunder

theCredible Sportprogram. Threestandard C-130H aircraft were selected formodification foruseinrescuing thehostages fromthe American embassy stillbeing heldbyIranin1980. Themodification included installation ofnofewerthanthirtyrocketmotors:eightfor

assisting takeoff, eightforreducing sinkrate,eighttoreduce thelandingdistance, andsixforpitchandyawcontrol atlowspeeds. Minor aerodynamic changesweremade,includingextending the leading

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edge,theflaps, andtheailerons. Exotic radarandnavigation equipmentwasadded, aswasanin-flight refueling capability. Thetaskof theC-130apparently wastolandwithina football stadium area,so thatarescue couldbeeffected. Unfortunately, thetestaircraft crashed on October29, 1980.AfterIranreleased thehostages in timefor

President Reagan’s inauguration, theCredible Sport program wascanceled. Given theextraordinary demands placed onaircraft andcrew, theprogram would havebeenbetternamed “Incredibly Sporty.” NowthefuturefortheHercules lieswithitsC-130Jmilitary and L-100Jcommercial improvements. Thenewaircraftis fifteenfeet

longer thanthestandard C-130, andhasnewpropulsion andavionics systems. TheJ model offers a 40percent greater range, 40percent highercruising ceiling, 50percentimprovement intimetoclimb,21 percentincrease in maximum speed,and20percentdecrease inthe maximum takeoffrun.NewAllisonAE2100D3 engines,ratedat

4,591shafthorsepower, are15percent morefuel-efficient. Anallcomposite six-blade Dowty-Aerospace R391propeller system islighter inweight andhasfewer moving partsthanprevious C-130 propellers. Themodern flight station hasliquid crystal display (LCD) instrumentation, holographic heads-up instrument displays, andmultifunctional heads-down LCDdisplays thatarecompatible withspecial nightvision devices, enabling operation inareas oftotaldarkness whenconditionssodictate.

TheC-130JmadeitsfirstflightonApril5, 1996,andiscurrently

inproduction fortheRoyal AirForce, U.S.AirForce, andRoyal Australian AirForce.

TheHerculesas Warrior heHercules wenttowarinVietnam asatrooptransport, andwas soonfoundwherever therewasfighting. Itwasengaged inaction

in a bewildering variety ofroles,including clandestine operations, alloverSoutheast Asia.TheUnitedStateswouldbenefitenormously asit transpired thattheincredible bravery oftheaircrews wasmatched bytherugged adaptability oftheaircraft. Pressed into one periloussituationafter another,operatingunder the worst

weather conditions andalways, evenwhenat rest,subjectto enemy

attack, bothaircraft andcrews distinguished themselves throughout thelongyearsofthewar. IntheVietnam “warwithout afront,” theC-130s weretasked

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tosupply isolated outposts where short,rough landing strips hadbeen hacked fromthesurrounding jungles. Landings andtakeoffs wereroutinelymadeunderenemyfire,thepilotssometimes sneaking outfor

takeoff between incoming mortar rounds. Whenrunways were closed, theC-130s wentinatlowlevel todoparachute extraction drops amid ahailofantiaircraft fire.TheHercules oftentookhitsthatwould have downed aless-rugged aircraft, flying backtobasewithgaping holes in the airframe,enginesknockedout, fuelstreamingfrompunctured

tanks, andtireshanging inshreds. Afewgotcaught bydirect hitsfrom heavy weapons anddidn’t comeback. Afewspecific examples willindicate thevariety andthestrength

oftheC-130s’achievements. In OperationBirmingham, onApril24, 1966,C-130sflew56 sortieson the firstdayinto a 4,600-footdirt

stripthatseemedto bethesizeofa postage stampwhencontrasted

withtheenveloping green ofthesurrounding jungle. The130s would notonlybringintroops, butsupply themaswell, asduring Operation

JunctionCity.On February 22, 1967,theonlyfullbattalion-sized dropofAmerican paratroops tookplacefromHercules transports.

Onceontheground andengaged indesperate fighting, cutofffrom anyresupply fromtheground, thetroopers ofthe173rd Brigade were sustained bymorethanfiftyC-130s dropping equipment andsupplies. Laterthatyear,inNovember,250C-130sortieswereflowninto

DakTo,wheretheasphaltstripwastornintoshredsbyenemyfire,

andtakeoffs andlandings hadtobesteered around jagged holeslike askierslicing through aslalom run.There, onNovember 15,enemy shelling blewupanammunition dump, destroying twoparked C-130s

andturningtheentireareaintoa roaringfurnacethatspewed forth oneexplosion afteranother. Itseemed inevitable thatathirdHercules,

parked within thefirestorm, would goupinflames aswell.Without regard fortheirownsafety, Captain Joseph K.GlennandSergeant Joseph F.Mackleaped intheaircraft andtaxied itfromtheinferno tosafety, anactforwhichtheywereeachawarded theSilver Starand

theDistinguished Flying Cross. Early thenextyear,NorthVietnamese general VoNguyen Giap hopedtorepeat his1954victory overtheFrench atDienBienPhu. Hisforces hadsurrounded American andSouthVietnamese troopsat KheSanhonJanuary21,1968.TheAmericans weredetermined to

resistatwhatever cost,andduginastheNorthVietnamese sappers pushed theirtrenchlinesevercloser. TheAmericans called inB-52s asflying artillery, andplaced theirdependence uponairlift aircraft for resupply.

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TheC-130s reached apeakeffortatKheSanh,landing tooffaslongasconditions andtakeonwounded andsupplies loadtroops permitted, andthengoingontomakebulkdeliveries byparachute extraction methods whentheNorthVietnamese troops hadadvanced soclosethatlandings werenolongerpossible. Groundradarwasused

toguidetheC-130s totheirprecise droppoints, which theHercules thattheentirerun-inwasawash ignoring flewwithprecision, crews insheets ofantiaircraft firefrombelow andfrombothsidesofthe courseline.C-130saccounted for90percentofthetotalsupplies that

werebroughtin to sustainthedefenders at KheSanh,enablingthem

towithstand Giap’s assault andeventually break thesiege. Elsewhere inVietnam, some C-130s were delivering troops, food, andmunitions tothetroopsontheground, whileothersactedas

airbornebattlefieldcommand-and-control posts,covert-operations

transports, tankers, rescue aircraft, andevenasbombers. Inthatunlikely role,never envisioned bytheairforce orLockheed, C-130s were used. todropthefifteen-thousand-pound BLU-82 blastbombs that decimated enemy troopconcentrations orcreated instant helicopter landing padsinthejungle. TheHercules alsodropped BLU-82s in thePersian GulfWar,thistimetoclearminefields. Inafeatofbrilliant engineering, theHC-130s oftheAirRescue HHtheSikorsky thatcouldservice intotankers weremodified Service

(Theprospectofhelicopters 3EandHH-53BandCrescue helicopters.

conducting aerialrefueling hadneverpreviously beengivenserious ofthehazard interms wereenormous Thedifficulties consideration. ofspeeds ofthehoseorboomtotherotordisc,theincompatibility the receiving of placement and the a nd helicopter, tanker between to advanced were s ufficiently andtheHH-3s TheHC-130 receptacle. The inflight.) forrefueling andequipment thetechnique develop far a teamthatflewmissions became Greens” andthe“Jolly “Herks” behind enemy linestorescue downed aircrew members. bywhichAmerican process, Asa partoftheVietnamization forces weresystematically withdrawn asSouthVietnamese forces were

Vietnamese totheSouth wereprovided C-130As builtup,thirty-five fromSouth ofthesewereusedtocarryrefugees Nineteen AirForce. camein 1975,butthirteen whenthecollapse to Thailand Vietnam intoitsairforce. andintroduced byNorthVietnam werecaptured fromsustaining fullcircle, waspushed theHercules ThusinVietnam, anallytoreinforcing theerstwhile enemy. inVietnam, sowellproven oftheC-130, qualities Thefighting executed againonJuly4, 1976,in thesuperbly weredemonstrated

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Operation Thunderbolt. Ontheprevious June27,anAirFrance AirbusA300B2 on aflightfromTelAviv toParis landed atAthens. There itwasboarded byfourterrorists, whohijacked theaircraft aftertakeoff and orderedit to Benghazito refuel,beforetakingit to Entebbe,

Uganda, where theterrorists knewtheywould receive support from President IdiAmin.The12crewmembers and256passengers were takenofftheaircraft andhoused inanoldairport terminal building. After12morepersons hadjoinedtheterrorist group, theydemanded therelease of53convicted terrorists detained inIsrael, inexchange for thehostages. TheIsraeli government refused to bargain withtheterrorists. Instead,theIsraeliAirForceusedfourC-130s,accompanied bya Boeing 707electronic-countermeasures aircraft, inanelaborate rescue effortthatsucceeded beyondallexpectations. TheHercules aircraft

swept intoland,andinabrilliantforty-minute foray, 245commandos killed thehijackers andabout20ofthecooperating Ugandan troops, andrescued thehostages. Sadly, 3ofthehostages hadbeenkilled in

theinitialfirefight. Thecommandos thendestroyed sevenMiGfighters—toprevent pursuit—and theC-130scarriedtheIsraeli forces and

theerstwhile hostages backtoTelAviv. Itwasastunning achievement, madepossible onlybytheC-130s’ range, speed, andcarrying capability. Overtheyears,theC-130s havesinceproved themselves inmany

otherconflicts,largeandsmall.Theseincludetheongoingbattlesin

Lebanon; in Africa, including SouthAfrica, Rhodesia, Angola, and elsewhere; intheMiddle East,inthelong,bitterconflict between Iran andIraq;intheIndian subcontinent inwarsbetween IndiaandPakistan;andelsewhere. In thebrief,furious1982Falklands campaign, theHercules

servedboththeBritishRoyalAirForce(RAF)andtheFuerza Aerea Argentina (FAA). TheRAF’s Hercules flewmorethanthirteenthou-

sandhours, including forty-four refueled airdrops toBritish ships and ground forces. TheArgentine C-130s flewinasurveillance radarstationinthefirstwave oftheattack andthentookonastandoff reconnaissance roleduring which oneoftheirnumber wasshotdown. TheUnitedStatesemployed theC-130in Operation Urgent FuryinGrenada in 1983,andagain inOperation JustCause, inPanama,in1989. Itserved withgreatdistinction inthePersian GulfWar, flying inthousands oftonsofequipment andsupplies, andoperating withadeparture reliability rating ofmorethan96percent. Against thisbackdrop ofmilitary operations, itmustnotbefor-

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gottenthattheworkoftheHercules hasresulted infarmorelives saved thankilled. It hasflownthousands ofhumanitarian missions carrying heavy equipment fordisaster relief, fuel,clothing, food,and medicalsuppliesto Somalia,Bosnia,Rwanda,the formerSoviet

Union,Paraguay, Haiti,andscores ofotherdestinations. Itdidnot matter whether thecatastrophe wasman-made ornatural, theresult of earthquakes, famines, floods,or fire—the Hercules couldbe counted ontodropinandunloadwhatever wasneeded, from“instant

hospitals” towaterpurification plants tosimple sacks ofstaples such asriceorflour.Formuch of itslife,theC-130s couldhavebornethe RedCrosssignofmercy asappropriately astheyworethestar-andbarinsignia oftheUSAF. TheC-130hasalsosaved morelivesandhundreds ofmillions ofdollars ofproperty initsfire-fighting efforts. AirNational Guard andairforce reserve unitsoperate C-130s equipped with a special aerial fire-fighting apparatus called theModular Airborne FireFighting System(MAFFS). TheMAFFScanbeloadedon anystandardC-130in

twohours.Theunitsdisperse a fire-retardant chemical called PhosChekD-75,adrypowder composed offertilizer saltsandacoloring agent manufactured byMonsanto. Mixed withwater, itforms agumlikesolution thathasanexcellent droppattern andadheres totrees andbrush. Ineffect, thePhos-Chek inhibits thecombustion potential oftreesandshrubs byproviding achemical barrier. Itisastirring sight toseeaformation oftwoC-130s, slowed downto140mphandonly 150feetofftheground, flyintotheheartofaraging forest fire.The twoaircraft canspray fifteen tonsofPhos-Chek overanareathesize offivefootball fieldsinlessthansixseconds.

Ski-equipped C-130s served wellinthepolarregions, and,in civiluse,helped buildtheAlaskan pipeline. Thus,theC-130 became anunending source ofrevenue forLockheed Georgia, andofcourse forthecorporation asa whole.Thereweresomeotherconcurrent projects that,despite theirpromise, didnotquiteyieldthesameresults.

It wasonlywhenGeorgia stucktoitsmilitary transport gunsthat fortune smiled.

TheIncomparable C-141StarLifter neofthehappiest, mostfondly remembered programs inLockheedGeorgia history wastheC-141StarLifter program, which required thetransfer ofadditional personnel fromBurbank. The

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TheHerculesis extremely versatile,and has servedas a rescue aircraft, gun ship, drone launcher,and airborne commandpost.

StarLifter rescued theairforce’s Military Airlift Command (asthe former Military AirTransport Service wasredesignated inJanuary 1966)fromterminalobsolescence andwouldthendemonstrate its

efficiency formorethanthreedecades. TheMilitary Airlift Command (MAC)had been doing a yeoman’swork with its slow,high-

maintenance fleetof Boeing C-97s,Lockheed C-121s, Douglas C-118s, andDouglas C-124s. TheC-124—“Old Shaky,” asitwas fondlycalled—was perhaps themostversatile, withitsabilitytohaul

outsized cargo, butthegrowing crisis inVietnam dictated theacquisitionofmodern jettransports. TheC-124tookninety-five flying hoursandperhaps threetimesthatmanymaintenance hourstogo fromTravis AirForceBase,California, to Saigon andback,with 20,000 pounds offuel.It madethetripatlowaltitudes, pounding through allthemassive weather problems thatcoulderuptalong the longroute.TheC-141, flying inrelative comfort above mostofthe weather, couldcarrythesamecargo thesamedistance inthirty-four hours, withfarlessmaintenance effort. TheC-124 hadtobeunloaded bythetraditional railroad methods ofhandtrucksandmuscle power, buttheC-141incorporated thenew463Lmaterials-handling system,

Oneof the best-likedcargo aircraft in Air Forcehistory,the LockheedC-141was almost trouble-freeduring developmentand production.Later,its capacitywas expandedby stretching the fuselageto raise internal volume.

of pounds asmuchas68,500 tooff-load theaircraft permitted which withinthehourittooktorefuel. cargo TheC-141wasoneofthefewmilitary procurement programs fullbacking andassistance fromthensecretary ofdefense to receive S.McNamara. Thiswould beonlytemporary, however, forby Robert hehadreversed hisfieldandpressed thelatterpartoftheprogram, forthetermination oftheC-141infavorofthelargerC-5AGalaxy.

TheC-141andDesegregation heC-141program wasnoteworthy foranother, lesswellknown, reason: it wasthevehicle bywhichLockheed desegregated the thestatelawsthenobtaining. taskgiven adifficult operation, Georgia to see orders hismarching GrosshadgivenDanHaughton Robert thattheplantcomplied withnewfederal lawspromoting integration. Haughton passedontheinstructions andDickPulverandhiscrew

Thesigns andwithsubtlety. aboutindirectly desegregation brought thathadindicated segregated restroomsanddrinking fountains by wereplaced Papercupsbythethousands removed. werequietly alldrinking fountains, andnoonechallenged thechange. Thesegregatedlunchrooms weresimplyabandoned, andcartswereplaced worked, approach the food.Theindirect to provide in hallways Theperanyupheaval. butovertimeandwithout notimmediately s upervisors and black increased, steadily ofblackemployees centage

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became increasingly common. Theprocess ofchange didnottakeplace overnight, butitwassustained, andtheefforts weresuccessful.

TheMenbehindtheWinning Airplane ie May1960,theUSAF issued aSpecific Operational Requirement (SOR)foran aircraftcapableof carryinga maximumloadofover

sixtythousand pounds overa 3,500-nautical-mile distance. Thiswas followed inDecember ofthesameyearbya RFPfortheLogistics Transport System 476L. Lockheed entered ahard-fought competition

withBoeing,Convair,andDouglas,andwasdeclaredthewinneron March 13, 1961.

F.A.“Al”Cleveland, chiefadvanced designengineer, hadmade

significant contributions tothewinning proposal. Asaresult, hewas firstmadeassistant chiefengineer, andthenC-141engineering programmanager. Hislongtime colleague Chuck Wagner would become theprogram manager.

ThestoryofChuck Wagner isworthtelling atsomelength because itistypical ofthelivesofmanyofthepeople whosubsequently madeLockheed, andespecially Lockheed-Georgia, great. Italsoreflects

thecarewithwhichLockheed management, evenveryearlyon,nurturedhigh-potential employees. Likesomanyofhiscolleagues, Wag-

nerwould follow a classic Horatio Alger career path.Inhiscase,his progress ledtohisbecoming program manager oftheC-141, themost advanced jettransport intheworld atthetime.

Bornin SanAntonioonAugust10,1909,Wagnerreceived his high-school educationin California.Fromhisearliestyears,he fol-

lowedthepractice ofworking andgoingtoschool simultaneously, working atnightwhile inhighschool, going toschool atnightinhis college years. Heworked ata widevariety ofjobs,including grunt laborintheBakersfield oilfields, allthewhilepicking upjuniorcollege

credits. Wagner became amachinist in1928,andthentookcourses froma cultural gemoftheDepression, onethatrescued manyan industrious ladfromtheranksoftheunemployed, theInternational Correspondence School.(ICSadvertisements maystillbefoundin manymagazines, theirstylevirtually unchanged fromtheDepression

years, buttheircourse content upgraded tocomputers andelectronics.) Thistraining would beinvaluable tohimintheaircraft industry, and inparticular, intheC-141 program. Whilecontinuing hisdualtrackofdaytime workandnighttime

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school, helearned toflyatJohnNagle’s famous EastSideAirport in LosAngeles, taughtbythemanwhowould become Lockheed’s premiertestpilot,TonyLeVier. Wagner joinedLockheed in 1936as employee number 400,making 69¢perhour,working onthetooling usedfortheModel 10.Hepaidforhisflying bycommuting towork byplane, thengiving asmanyasthreefellow employees shortflights aroundtheairportatlunchtime for$2a flight.Wagner wouldeathis ownsandwich asheflew.Helaterjokedthathemade$5.52foreight hours’workand$6foronehourofflyingatlunch.

Wagner worked oneachoftheLockheed aircraft asitappeared, moving upintheorganization ashedidso.Hegained theconfidence ofmanagement tothedegree thathewassent,withDanHaughton, totheHarvard Business School in 1946—quite astepupfromInter-

national Correspondence courses. ButitwasatGeorgia, ontheC-141, thatallofWagner’s expertise cametothefore,fortherehepersuaded theUSAF thattheaircraft’s manufacture couldbeengineered tousenumerically controlled machinery—if theservice couldputthemachine toolsinplace.TheAir

Forceagreed,andmillionsofdollars’worthofthethen-newnumeri-

cally controlled machine toolswereinstalled intheplant.Theresults, interms ofefficiency andprecision, wereseeninallsubsequent Lockheedproduction inGeorgia. ItwasWagner’s greatest personal triumph asaprogram manager forLockheed, fortheC-141 wasproduced on timeandunderbudget.

Engineering the C-141 hetwoprevious American jettransports, theBoeing 707andDouglasDC-8,weresleeklow-wing aircraft withthirty-five andthirty

degreesofwingsweep,respectively. Insteadoffollowingthispattern, the C-141adoptedengineering cuesfromthe C-130,resultingin a

highwingwithtwenty-five degrees ofsweep and a lowaircraft floor witha largehydraulically operated clamshell doorintherearanda ramptopermit vehicles todriveonboard.Unlike theC-130, these externaldoorswerenot designedforcabinpressureloads;aninternal

pressure doorwashingedsothatitcouldretractintoarecess overhead.

TheC-141’s wingfeatured anewairfoil section thatwasinfact a forerunner ofthesupercritical airfoil. Theplanealsoincorporated load-canceling wingspoilers thatextended allthewayfromthefuselage totheailerons, andwould beuseful inrelieving stress loadsinflight.

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At aboutten feetwideandninefeethigh,its crosssectionwas

notmuchdifferent fromthatoftheC-130. However, thecargo compartment wasseventy feetlong,thirtyfeetlonger thanthatofthe Hercules. Forpower, theC-141 hadthebenefit ofthenewly developed Pratt&Whitney TF33-P-7 turbojets oftwenty-one thousand pounds ofthrust. Theengines, developed fromthoseusedontheB-52H, were avastimprovement overprevious practice, withgreater power, rapid throttle response, andlower specific fuelconsumption. Cleveland was particularly proudoftheinnovative design ofthenacelles, which housed longductsfromthefanoftheengine allthewaybacktothe exhaustnozzle,an installation thatworkedwellon therelatively low-

bypass-ratio TF33. TheC-141tookthefirststeptoward today’s glasscockpit by including adigital computer asastandard partofitsavionics. Italso incorporated anall-weather landing system. Under Cleveland’s direction, theGeorgia teamusedsystems anal-

ysistochoose theoptimum cruisespeedofabout.767Machandthe relatively modesttwenty-five-degree wingsweepofthenewtransport.

Secretary McNamara andhisbandofwhizkidsattheDepartment of Defense werenolonger seeking topperformance interms ofspeed or range, but rather were demandingdesignswith improvedcost-

effectiveness overthe lifecycleof the aircraft.In the caseof the StarLifter,it wasfortunatethat theydid,forso muchwouldbe de-

manded oftheC-141oversolong a period oftimethatitsextended lifewould havebeendifficult toachieve withmorerigorous performancerequirements. Perhaps themostradical element oftheC-141wasitsuseofthe

T-tail,asadvocated byFrankWilson andhisaerodynamics division atLockheed-Georgia. Aircraft withT-tails havethepotential problem oftheso-called deepstall,whenairflow overthetailgetsblanketed by thewing,eliminates elevator effectiveness, andmakesstallrecovery impossible. Wilsonandhisgroupwereawareofthehazard, andtheir

design incorporated vortex generators and a stick-shaker towarnthe pilotnottoexceed certain critical angles ofattack. ThefirstC-141A flewatMarietta onDecember 17,1963,cel-

ebrating thesixtiethanniversary oftheWrightbrothers’ firstflight.

The160-foot spanoftheC-141 was40feetlonger thantheoriginal flight, andwhile theWright Flyer weighed some 600pounds andflew atlessthan40mph,theStarLifter hadamaximum takeoff weight of 323,100 pounds and a topspeed of565mph.TheC-141A epitomized theincredible progress ofsixdecades offlight.

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serviceUse he StarLifter enteredoperational service withtheMilitary Airlift Commandon April23, 1965,andwasimmediately put to good

usecarrying troops andequipment toVietnam. There, thedemands ofthewarhadaccelerated agrowth from33,779 passengers and9,123 tonsofcargopermonthin 1965to65,350 passengers and42,296 tonsofcargoby1967.

The C-141wasplungedintocombatoperationsfromthestart,

airlifting menandequipment directly fromHawaii tohotspotsin Vietnam. Newtactics weredeveloped tomaximize theutility ofthe aircraft. InOperation Eagle Thrust, inNovember 1967, C-141s flew 10,365troopsofthe 101stAirborne Division, withalltheirequip-

ment,directfromFortCampbell,Kentucky,to BienHoaAirBase,

South Vietnam. Anexpedited off-loading process reduced theaverage C-141 ground timeatBienHoatoanincredible 7.4minutes. TheC-141s soldiered allthrough theVietnam War,flying vitally needed equipment inandfrequently beingusedasaeromedical evacuation aircraft onthereturntrip.Theyalsoserved tobringbackthe saddest cargo, thebodies ofU.S.servicemen killed incombat. When thewarwasover, theydistinguished themselves again, first withthereturnof588American prisoners ofwarreleased fromtheir yearsofconfinement inVietnamese prisoncamps inFebruary and March1973.Thesecond wasduringOperation Frequent Windin April1975,theevacuation fromSaigon ofAmerican andVietnamese personnel toavoid theircapture bythevictorious Communist forces. TheStarLifter continued todistinguish itselfincombat situations.During the1973YomKippur War,whentheIsraeli forces had beendecimated anddesperately needed resupply, C-141As delivered morethantenthousand tonsofsupplies in421missions. Aswould happen oftenincrisis situations, “friendly” European nations denied theUSAFstaging pointsforrefueling. Itwasevident thattheAirForce

needed additional transport capacity, fittedwithin-flight refueling equipment.

Anunusual solution ameliorated theproblem, andwasbrought intobeing through aninspired sales campaign toboththeDepartment ofDefense andtoCongress. Lockheed managers showed howthebasic C-141A design couldbeimproved bytheinsertion ofathirteen-foot four-inch fuselage plugforward ofthewingandaten-foot plugaft, increasing theusable volume ofthefuselage byalmost 33percent. An

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in-flight refueling boomreceptacle wasinstalled tovastly enhance the aircraft’s range characteristics. Although boththeCongress andDOD wereinitially reluctant tospend moremoney ontheprogram, itsoon became apparent thatthiswasanefficient waytoincrease USAF airlift capacity.

Theaircraft modified fortestfirstflewonMarch 24,1977, and

theresults weresosuccessful thatthe270existing C-141As weremod-

ifiedinasimilar manner toC-141B status. Theresult wasequivalent totheaddition of90oftheoriginal C-141As tothefleet, atafraction ofthecostofpurchasing newairplanes. Theutilization ofC-141s remained high,andtheUSAF, concerned aboutexceeding theoperational lifeoftheaircraft before it

couldbereplaced, begana numberofconservation programs tolimit

itsflying hoursandreduce thegross weights carried. Aseries ofcrises worked against thisprogram, beginning withtheoperations inGrenadaandPanama. Allconservation planswerethrown tothewinds withtheadvent ofOperations Desert Shield andDesert Storm, in whichthehardyStarLifters onceagaindistinguished themselves. Thescopeoftheresupply effortin thePersianGulfwasenor-

mous.WhenSaddam Hussein sweptthrough Kuwait onAugust 2, 1990,therewerenoU.S.forces in theregion. Sixmonths later, 525,000 Americans andtheirattendant—sometimes luxurious— equipment werereadytobeginDesertStorm.

Themission wasextraordinarily demanding, fortheflightpath tooktheC-141Bs fromtheUnited States toaEuropean staging point before flying intoSaudi Arabia. Theaverage round-trip tookthirtyeighthours.The MilitaryAirliftCommand’s entirefleetof 265 C-141sand85 C-5swasthrownintothefray,andat thepeakofthe

round-the-clock operations, oneofthesegiantaircraft waslanding at Dhahran every seven minutes. TheLockheed giantsweresupplemented byC-130s, Douglas KC-10s, airliners fromtheCivilReserve AirFleettodeliver almost 5 billion ton-miles ofpersonnel andcargoduringthesixmonths of intense operations, dwarfing thealmost 700million ton-miles flown during thefifteen-month-long Berlin Airlift. Assuccessful astheC-141program was,forboththeAirForce andLockheed, theairplane specifications hadnotconsidered therequirement tocarrylargepieces ofequipment fortheArmy, suchas mainbattle tanksordismantled helicopters. Even astheC-141 hehad sought wasbeingproduced, Secretary ofDefense McNamara intervenedagain, demanding a newtransport. Thistimeheinsisted on

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249

procurement requirements sorigorous thatitwould impact thedesign ofthenewaircraft, theeconomic futureofLockheed, andtheAir Force’s airlift capability.

TheC-5Galaxy Mie”

aircrafthavebeencontroversial; fewhaveeversufferedthe

intensity anddurationof thecontroversy thatsurrounded the C-5program fromthestart.Fortunately, theGalaxy survived thetur-

moilandwasabletoprovebydecades oftrulydistinguished service thatitsdesign wasinherently correct. Theproblems intheprogram, aswillbeseenbelow, stemmed fromawidevariety ofsources, some governmental, somefromLockheed, butmanyfromthemedia,which

foundtheGalaxy anevergreen sourceofsensational stories.It isto

Lockheed’s credit,and,toalesserdegree,tothecreditoftheAirForce,

thattheprogram wascontinued toitsultimate success whenonso

manyoccasions itseemed thatcancellation wouldhavebeenaneasier alternative.

Alloftheproblems, andeventheneedfortheaircraft itself, could havebeenavoided ifallArmy requirements hadbeenfactored intothe original design process fortheC-141, andithadbeenproduced with agreater volumetric capacity. Thisdidnothappen, andVietnam made itpainfully clearthata gargantuan newtransport wasrequired, one capable ofcarrying thelargest andheaviest equipment possessed by theArmy. President JohnF.Kennedy had,forreasons ofeconomy andthe changing worldpolitical situation, beguna policy ofreducing U.S. forces overseas. American military presence wastobeexchanged for military flexibility, inwhich U.S.-based forces could betransported to

overseas destinations in sufficient quantityquicklyenoughto deter conflict.

Design efforts forthisverylargeaircraft, initially designated CX-4,butlatercalled theCX-HLS (Cargo, Experimental—Heavy Logistics System) began in1963withadaunting requirement tocarry 125,000 pounds ofcargo eightthousand miles, withamaximum pay-

loadcapability of250,000poundsovera shorterdistance. Atmaxi-

mumgross weight, theaircraft hadtobecapable oftaking offfrom

aneight-thousand-foot runway,andto landona four-thousand-foot-

longsemiprepared airfield inthecombatarea.(Thelastrequirement

wasnot adequately considered, forit shouldhavebeenobviousfrom

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thestartthattheairforcewouldbereluctant tobringsovaluable— and so vulnerable—an aircraftintoa forwardcombatzone.)A key

requirement, onethatwould beundone bya hostofotherfactors, was adesign lifeofthirtythousand flying hours. Onceagain, Boeing, Douglas, andLockheed competed, butthere wasanadditional aspect tothecompetition, onethatwould beseen againinthefuture. Thiswasa competition fortheengine between Pratt&Whitney andGeneral Electric. Asevents transpired, Lockheed andGeneral Electric wereselected aswinners, withtheC-5becoming thebeneficiary oftheGeneral Electric TF39-GE-1, a40,000-poundthrusthigh-bypass-ratio turbofan engine. TheC-5Aresembled theC-141ingeneral configuration, butwas almosttwiceas big,with a maximumtakeoffweightof 769,000

pounds.LiketheStarLifter, thewinghada twenty-five-degree sweep

and,initially, noleading-edge high-lift devices. Later,leading-edge slatswerefittedandanActive LiftDistribution Control System (ALDCS) wasinstalled. TheALDCS isa computer system thattakes inputsfromaccelerometers mounted invarious strategic locations, an-

alyzes thedata,andinresponse toairplane maneuvers orgustairloads, commands symmetrical deflection oftheailerons toreduce wingbending.Thisreduces fatigue andextends thelifeoftheaircraft evenasit provides abetterride. TheGalaxy wasconsiderably fasterthantheStarLifter, havinga

topspeed of564mphand acruisespeedof506mph.Theneedto transport heavy armyequipment wasmetinpartbythehugecargo compartment, 19feetwide,121feetlong,andranging inheight from 9feet6 inches beneath thewing-box structure to13feet6 inches in theaftsection. Itcouldhandle anM1Abrams mainbattletank,four M551Sheridan lighttanks,ora CH-47Chinook helicopter. The upperdeckofthefuselage houses theflight crew offive(pilot, copilot,

flightengineer,andtwoloadmasters), a fifteen-man reliefcrewcom-

partment withbunks, and,inaseparate compartment behind thewing carry-through section, rearward-facing seatsfor73passengers. (The authorhasflownasa passenger intheC-5andcanreportit isthe mostcomfortable airliner intheair,barnone.)Thelowerfuselage section normally carries cargo, butcanbeequipped withpalletized seatstocarry290passengers.

Inaddition totheby-now traditional Lockheed aftfuselage/cargo doorconfiguration, theC-5incorporated aforward cargo doordistinguished byitsability toswing uplikeavisor. Thispermitted cargo to beloaded fromeitherend,andallowed easyon-andoff-loading of

In contrast to the C-141,the C-5AGalaxywas plaguedduring developmentand productionby problems.Overtime, however,the design matured and it became one of the most efficientcargo aircraft in history.

heavyequipment. Ithasmorethanfivetimesthecargocapacity ofthe

C-141. Although notusually assigned suchduties, theGalaxy canbe employed todropairborne troopers andtheirequipment. Inanexercise atPope AFB, NorthCarolina, onJune7,1989, aC-5B dropped fourSheridan tanks(each lowered toearthbyeightG-11parachutes) andseventy-three paratroopers foraworld record of190,346 pounds. Theelaborate landing gearoftheC-5A, which included acrosswindlanding feature andkneeling, wasdictated bytheneedtoland onsemiprepared fields. Aftermorethan2,600variants of660basic undercarriage configurations hadbeenreviewed, thefinaldesign consisted offoursix-wheel mainbogies thatretract intothefamiliar fuselagesidesponsons,anda four-wheel nosegear.

WingFixesandNewOrders heconsiderable difficulties withtheexecution oftheC-5contract

willbecovered in a laterchapter.It issufficient to sayherethat

Lockheed asked theAirForce ifitwould accept anincrease inweight, iftherequired performance wasmaintained byanincrease inengine thrust,whichcouldhavebeendoneforabout$5million. TheAir Forceadamantly heldtotheweight requirements, telling Lockheed thatitcould increase theengine thrustatitsownexpense ifitwished, butthattheweight goals would havetobemet. Theresult wasaweight-reduction program thatsignificantly reducedthestrength ofthewing,andconsequently, theservice lifeof

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theaircraft. Laterthishadtobecompensated forbyamodification. In1980, Lockheed wasgiven acontract tobuildcompletely newwing torsion boxes fortheentirefleetofC-5s.Fleetretrofit began in1982 andwascompleted by1987. Bythenthesterling performance oftheGalaxy intheunremitting hardservice oftheMilitary Airlift Command proved thattheaircraft wasnotonlyindispensable but,against allarguments tothecontrary, inshortsupply. Tooffset this,theAirForce favored procurement offorty-four McDonnell Douglas KC-10s andfiftyLockheed C-5Baircraft, while continuing research efforts ontheproposed C-17transport. Boeing naturally opposed thisidea,proposing amodification of the747transport forthetask.Theproposal wasrejected bytheDe-

partment ofDefense. Despite this,under Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson’s leadership, theSenate adopted anamendment tothefiscal year 1983authorization billtosubstitute 747sforC-5Bs. Futurechairman LarryKitchen recognized thatanimmediate efforthadto be madeto persuade the Houseto recommend the C-5Bsinitsownversion oftheauthorization bill,andtodosobya

largemajority. Hefeltthatinthesubsequent committee negotiations, theC-5Bwouldbeselected forthefinalauthorization bill.Kitchen thenworked tirelessly todirect amassive campaign tovisitevery congressman andtheprincipal staffpersonnel toeducate themonthe comparative values oftheC-5Bandthemodified 747.These efforts weresuccessful, fortheHousewasoverwhelmingly infavorofthe C-5B, andthisviewprevailed inthejointcommittee hearings. ThusitwasthatfiftyC-5Bs wereordered anddelivered by1986. TheC-5Bhadaconsiderably improved performance, withmorepowerfulengines anda maximum gross weight of837,000 pounds and a maximum payload of291,000 pounds overa 3,400-mile range. It dispensed withtheC-5A’s complex crosswind landing gear,and introduced an improved automatic flightcontrolsystem (AFCS) anda malfunction detection andanalysis andrecording system (MADAR II).

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TheC-5in Service—tThe Miracleof the ImmensePlanes hefirstC-5A flew, amidconsiderable pompandceremony, onJune 30,1968. There wasequal ceremony attending thefirstdelivery of aC-5A toMAC, madeonDecember 17,1969, andembellished with theslight embarrassment ofhaving oneofthetwenty-eight wheels fall offonlanding. Theaircraft became operational inSeptember 1970,

withthedelivery ofeightaircraftto Charleston AirForceBase,and

wassoonflying withits“little” brother, theC-141, onbothEuropean andAsian routes. Seventeen yearsandforty-one daysafterthefirstflightofthe original C-5,theC-5BtooktotheaironSeptember 10,1985, with firstdeliveries toMACbeginning onJanuary 8,1986. Atthetimethis iswritten, 126C-5s(76C-5As and50C-5Bs) arestillflying, serving ineleven squadrons: sixactive, fourreserve, andoneNational Guard. Withproposed updating, theywillundoubtedly beserving untilwell intothetwenty-first century. Afterthewingfix,theC-5sdidnot encounter thefatigue problem thathasbesettheC-141, andwhich dictates thelatter’s retirement inthenot-too-distant future. TheutilityoftheGalaxy wasproven foralltimeduringthe Vietnam War.ItmadethefirstofmanytripsonJune5,1970, when itlanded atCamRanhBay.Itserved withdistinction fortheremainderofthewar,andafterward insupport oftheSouthVietnamese, being particularly effective reacting totheCommunist Easter offensive inthespring of1972.Itscareer wasmarred byoneofthesaddest events oftheentireSoutheast Asianconflict. OnApril4, 1975,a C-5AtookofffromTanSonNhutAirBaseasapartofOperation BabyLift,a maneuver inwhich250Vietnamese infants weretobe airlifted totheUnited States. Justafterclimbing totwenty-three thousandfeet,theC-5Asuffered amassive structural failure intheareaof therearcargo door.Thepilot,Captain Dennis Taylor, byextraordinarily skillful airmanship, managed tocrash-land thecrippled aircraft neartheSaigon River. Twohundred sixpeople, including mostofthe infantsandtheirescorts,werekilled.

Halfaworld away, theC-5shaddistinguished themselves inthe Israeli airliftofOctober 1973.Egyptian andSyrian forces surprised theIsraelis witha massive jointattack. Itwassoonevident thatthe Israelis hadmiscalculated themilitary consumables itneeded toresist

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the dualassault,and a cryforhelpwentout to Washington.There

theAirForce Chief ofStaff, General George Brown, made aunilateral decision tosendtwosquadrons ofMcDonnell F-4Phantom fighters, andprovide theairlift necessary tosendammunition andothersupplies. Theoperation, called“Nickel Grass,” routedMACaircraft through theAzores directly toLodAirport inIsrael. (A“competing airline” operated bytheSoviet Unionfunneled supplies totheArab invaders.)

TheC-5completely vindicated itself inNickel Grass, carrying in M-48andM-60tanksaswellasmajor sections ofaircraft. Whenthe normally stoicIsraeliprimeministerGoldaMeirsawthefirsttank

beingdeliveredbya C-5A,shewasovercome withemotionandsaid, “Forgenerations tocome,allwillbetoldofthemiracleoftheimmense

planesfromtheUnitedStates.”

Theeffectiveness oftheAmerican airlift during theGulfWarwas notedpreviously inthediscussion oftheC-141. TheC-5fleetflew 42percent ofthecargoand18.6percent ofthepassenger missions. Theability oftheC-5tocarryentirehelicopters ready foroperation assoonastheywererolled offtherampandserviced wasvitally important totheU.S.Army. Inproving themselves again, theC-5salsoproved thevalidity of theUSAF “Total Force” concept, forthehugeaircraft wereoperated

withdistinction bybothAirNationalGuardandAirForceReserve

units.OneC-5A flown byreservists ofthe433rd Military Airlift Wing (MAW)fromKellyAirForceBasecrashedatRamstein,Germany,on

August 29,1990—the onlytransport lostintheairlift, andthefifth Galaxy tobelostinitshistory.

A StepBackin Time:OtherGeorgiaProducts shewastodooftenlater,CarlKotchian succeeded Haughton at Georgia,becominggeneralmanager.(Overtheyears,the names

ofcompanies anddivisions withinLockheed havebeenalteredmany timestosuittheexpansion orcontraction ofbusiness; thesameistrue

oftitles.Afewyearslater,forexample, Kotchian wouldhavebeen president oftheGeorgia Company, ratherthangeneral manager of theGeorgia Division.) Aspreviously noted,underthecombined B-47/C-130 productioneffort, employment attheGeorgia planthadclimbed toalmost

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CarlKotchianworkedwellwith the demandingDanielHaughton to expandLockheed’sinfluence. Kotchianwas a great salesman, and one of the prime movers behindthe L-1011project.

twenty thousand. A slight decline hadbegun in1956, theyearHaughtonleft,andthiscontinued through 1960, when employment dropped backtojustovertenthousand. Aircraft deliveries hadfallen aswell, fromaspikeof149in1957downto55in1960. Itisunderstandable, then,thattheGeorgia plant, newly endowed withitsownengineering andmarketing capability, would wishtohave somenewproduct linestobolster production andprofit. And,while Kotchian hadbegunhiscareerasanaccountant andlearnedmanu-

facturingunderHaughton’s guidance,hewasathearta salesman who enjoyedtraveling,makingcontacts,andmostofall,makingsales.This

talentwould reach itspeakwithhischampioning ofthelaterL-1011 TriStar airliner, amagnificent, ifstar-crossed, aircraft.

TheC-140JetStar .A.“Dick” Pulver succeeded Kotchian asvicepresident andgen-

eralmanagerinAugust1959,withC. S.“Chuck”Wagnerashis

assistant. Pulver hadbeenchiefengineer; whenhemoved up,henominated ArtFlocktoreplace him.Flock wasalways remembered asa manwhohad alot offeeling forthehuman interests ofhispeople,

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whileatthesametimebeinga topengineer. Theseexecutives would

leadGELAC (asLockheed Georgia wascalled) through bothmajor andminorprograms foralmost adecade. Lockheed Georgia’s initialforayintoanother product linefollowed thepattern oftheC-130, inthatthefirsttwoexamples ofwhat became theJetStar executive jettransport werebuiltinBurbank with theusualSkunkWorksstyleandenthusiasm. Thepatentforthe

JetStarwasassigned to.BillStatlerandKelly Johnson. Production was subsequently turnedovertoGeorgia. Thereisstilla lingering senseofhurtatLockheed—“betrayal”

isthetermoftenusedininterviews—over theJetStar project. Thefirm hadbeenledbytheAirForce tobelieve thatsubstantial orders ofup to300aircraft would begiven tothewinner ofacompetition forthe UCX,orutility transport, experimental. Asevents transpired, theAir Force would buyonly16oftheveryadvanced aircraft. Lockheed had optednottoentera similar competition beingheldfortheUTX,or utility trainer, experimental, anaircraft aboutone-half thesizeofthe

proposed UCX.Thisprovedtobea mistake, forthesmaller aircraft

would be“more affordable.” NorthAmerican wontheUTXcontest withwhatbecame theT-39Sabreliner, andultimately sold211militaryversions oftheaircraft.

Although theAirForce dragged itsheels onC-140 procurement, initially buying only5,withtheNavypurchasing 2more,theLockheedsales forcebrought inorders for29morefromcivilcorporations andtheCanadian government, enough tobegin production. Lockheed management couldnotforesee thattheproduction ratewastobe strungoutovera longtwenty-three-year periodduring which204

JetStars wouldbebuilt.Itwasashame,foritwasanexcellent aircraft,

wellahead ofitstime,butcaught inthecombined gripofadecline inmilitary budgets andanichemarket where fewaircraft ofitssize wererequired. Thehistory oftheC-140 program issomewhat controversial, for itwasconsidered byitsSkunk Workcreators tobea totalsuccess, whilethestaffatGeorgia whoinherited theprogram foundittobe riddled withproblems. Chuck Wagner recalled inaninterview that theaircraft didnothavethecross-country capability itclaimed, and theGeorgia engineers couldnotgettheirhandsontheprototype for further testing because it wasbeingusedforotherpurposes bythe SkunkWorks.

Ajettransport wasnotanewconcept atLockheed, which had

donemanystudiesonjet-powered airliners. By1950,drawings and

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models oftheL-193, asixty-four-passenger swept-wing jetwithfour engines mounted underthefuselage, wereshown toseveral airlines, butelicited littleinterest. WorkontheL-193 wasnotwasted, however, foritprovided datafromwhich would bederived theCL-329, asthe UCXentrywouldbedesignated byLockheed, andinwhichitwould

invest $6million tobringittoproduction. Kelly Johnson imposed theSkunkWorks’ methods andpace upontheCL-329, scheduling afirstflight forthecompleted prototype inonlyeightmonths. Hemaintained hisusual constant pressure upon theengineering personnel andtheworkforce rightuptothemorning ofthefirstflightonSeptember 4,1957.Theeffectiveness ofKelly’s efforts might bemeasured against thecompetition, McDonnell, whose

four-engine entrydidnotflyuntilnineteenmonthslater.TheMc-

Donnell Model119looked likea miniature version ofa Douglas DC-8.Thelackofa suitable power plantdelayed itsdevelopment, anditspylon-mounted engines weresocloseto thegroundthat foreign-object ingestion wasa major problem. Kelly’s taskhadnotbeeneasy. Thelayout chosen fortheJetStar wasveryadvanced andquitereminiscent ofthenewly introduced French airliner, theSudEstS.E.210Caravalle. LiketheFrench aircraft, itsclean swept wings were unencumbered byengines, which were mounted aftonthefuselage. Itshorizontal surfaces weremounted directly totheoversize (inappearance) vertical stabilizer. Kelly favored theaft-mounted engines foranumber ofreasons, including theirrelativeimmunity fromforeign-object damage whiletaxiing, theease withwhichpilotscouldmanage engine-out operations, evenatlow speeds, andthereduction ofnoise inthepassenger cabin. Johnson also hadsome private concerns about whattheeffect ofawheels-up landing mightbeonpylon-mounted engines onalow-wing aircraft. AswithMcDonnell, engine selection wasa majordesign prob-

lem.Thelightweight engines fromGeneral Electric andothermanufacturers thatwouldcometobetheengines ofchoiceformanylater

executive jetaircraft werenotyetavailable. Johnson cuttheGordian design knotbychoosing Bristol Orpheus turbojets of4,850pounds ofthrust. These weretobemanufactured underlicense bytheWright

Aeronautical Division oftheCurtiss-Wright Corporation. Thelicens-

ingagreement fellthrough, andwhile bothprototypes were flown with twoBristol Orpheus engines, lateraircraft werefittedwithfourofthe smaller engines thathadbecome available bythen. Intermsofperformance, theC-140/Orpheus engine combinationwasa goodone.InFebruary 1958,theprototype flewnonstop

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Lockheeddid not haveas much luck marketingits smaller aircraftas it did withits larger cargoaircraft.TheJetstar wasone of the first executive jet transports, and the Jetstar Il shownhere was an improvedversion.

fromCalifornia toMarietta, Georgia, injustthreehoursandtwentynineminutes.

Thesecond prototype wasthefirsttohavefourengines, flying forthefirsttimeinJanuary 1960, withPratt&Whitney JT12-A-6s of3,000pounds ofthrust. InGeorgia, Lockheed engineers pioneered acomplete wind-tunnel surface-pressure model thatrevealed thatthe four-engine-nacelle configuration presented severe aerodynamic problems.Afterextensively redesigning the nacelles,mostof the mutual

interference andtranssonic buffet waseliminated. Thesubsequent excellent results withtheJT-12s ledtotheirinstallation onsubsequent production aircraft. Therangeoftheaircraft wasextended bythe installation of565-gallon slipper tanksoverthewings. Atotalof164JetStars werebuilt,including thetwoprototypes. Thesewerefollowed by40JetStar IIs,whichhadmorepowerful 3,700-pound-thrust Garrett turbojets andamodified wingtank. TheJetStars weremuchbeloved bytheircivilandmilitary cus-

tomers,whofoundthemfast,dependable, andveryversatile. However,

theonlypersonbelieved to havemademoneysellingtheJetStarwas

Howard Hughes, whose last-minute midnight negotiations enabled himtobuyaircraft early intheprogram, whentheirpricewaslowest. Hethenlaterresold themtocustomers fora profit.Hughes hada special hangar builtinGeorgia forhisairplanes. Hewould havethem

TheLASA-60Santa Mariawas the first aircraft to originateout of the Lockheed-Georgia facility.A six-placesingle-enginelight utility transport, it was first flown on September15, 1959.

parkedinside,andneverflown. Atwenty-four-hour guardkeptevery-

oneout,evenLockheed executives. When Hughes died, JackReal, one ofthefewmenwhohadHughes’s complete trust,hadtheaircraft removed fromthehangar, refurbished, andsoldataprofit. Inkeeping withhischaracter, Hughes, despite hisplethora ofJetStars, always borrowed Lockheed’s aircraft whenhewanted tomake a trip. Itisashame thatJetStar sales didnotmatch itsperformance, for theaircraft would goontosetscores ofrecords, including anonstop ten-hour andtwenty-six-minute flightfromNewOrleans toBonn, Germany, byJacqueline Cochran—a distance of4,938miles.

LASA-60SantaMaria ockheed-Georgia’s firstoriginal aircraft wastheLASA-60, ahighwing, six-passenger, fixed-gear aircraft thatresembled aCessna 185 onsteroids. Theaircraft would notsubstantially improve Lockheed’s profitpicture, butitdiddiversify Georgia’s interest inmanufacturing, andpioneered theconcept offoreign manufacturing agreements that would become veryimportant onlyafewyears later. TheSantaMaria wasa product oftheMooney brothers, Aland Art.Theirdesign efforts extended allthewaybackto 1922andincluded suchsterling aircraft astheMonocoupe. TheSantaMaria was

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intended tomeetaspecification prepared byGeneral JuanAzcarate of Mexico, whoalsosought tohavetheaircraft produced inhiscountry. Design workbegan inJanuary 1959. Anticipating bythirty years theconcept ofoutsourcing toreduce production costs, Lockheed management knewthatthecompany’s overhead would maketheLASA60tooexpensive, andnotonlyacceded toAzcarate’s request, but sought otherlicensees elsewhere where laborcosts werelow. Theaircraft wasfirstflown atMarietta onSeptember 15,1959, powered. bya 250-horsepower Continental engine andcapable ofa topspeed of167mph.Thesecond Marietta prototype wasdelivered to the foreigncompanyin Mexicoin whichLockheedhadinvested,

Lockheed-Azcarate, where itwasusedasapattern aircraft fortheeighteenproduction versions thatfollowed. Thebasicdesignmetwithmoresuccess inLockheed’s partner-

ofthe shipwithAeronautica Macchi ofItaly.Thefirm,adescendant racers greatcompany thathadmadethefamous Schneider Trophy witha andthefighters ofMussolini’s airforce, developed thedesign ofthe seriesofmorepowerful engines. A much-modified version

Aermacchi-Lockheed ALGOB-1, asit wascalledin Italy,becamethe

Aeritalia-Aermacchi AM.3C forward-air-control aircraft. TheAMC.3 wassubsequently builtunderlicense inSouth Africa, where itwasalso redesigned andenlarged forotherwork. Thecombined production of allLASA-type aircraftwasapproximately 170,a reasonable number fora largetransport perhaps, butunprofitable forsmaller designs.

AndNowforSomething Completely Different eorgia’s independence fromtheBurbank operations canbein-

ferred fromits1961proposal totheU.S.Armyfora midwing VTOL (Vertical Takeoff andLanding) research aircraft. TheLockheed VZ-10(XV-4)Hummingbird wouldordinarily havederivedfromthe

SkunkWorks. Theaircraft wasintended asaprototype forabattlefield surveillance aircraft thatcouldbestationed forward withthefront-line

forces. TheHummingbird wasanattractive, ifunusual-looking, two-

placeaircraft,witha thick,bulkyfuselage, rathersmall,narrow-chord

wings,anda tallT-tail.It originally usedtheprinciple of jet augmentation developed byClemson graduate Frank Sutton, anexpert inthermodynamics, toincrease thestaticthrustofitstwoPratt& Whitney JT-12jetengines. Theideawasthatanejector system could

Te

TheUnitedStates Armywasveryinterestedin vertical-liftaircraftin the late 1950s, and Lockheed-Georgia respondedwiththe VZ-10Hummingbird.First flight wason July 7, 1962.A secondversion,the XV-4B,wastested by the USAFin 1968,but no orders ensued.

bebuiltsothattheexhaust fromanengine, ifejected vertically through alargenumber ofnozzles, would entrain additional airfromoutside theaircraft, augmenting thetotallifting capacity byasmuchas50 percent. Inlaboratory tests,gains inpower ofasmuchas230percent

wereachieved,but in actualtestsoftheVZ-10,thenetaugmentation

proved tobeonlyabout15percent, andvertical takeoff wasimpossible. Amuchmodified second version, theXV-4A, achieved vertical takeoff onMay28,1963.Thetwoprototypes weredelivered tothe U.S.Army. Onesuffered afatalcrash onJune10,1964, andtheother

wasrelegatedto testworkbeforebeingstored.The Hummingbird,

somewhat surprisingly givenits unorthodox configuration andthe

highdragofitsbulkyfuselage, wasexpected tohavea topspeed of 518mphandarangeofsixhundred miles. TheAirForce expressed interest intheconcept, andthesurviving prototype wasmodified withanevenlarger fuselage intotheXV-4B,

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theHummingbird II.Withtheadvent ofmorepowerful smaller engines, theconcept ofjetaugmentation wasabandoned, andnoless thansixGeneral Electric J85engines fora totalthrustofeighteen thousand pounds were installed. Fourofthese were lift-jet engines (i.e., theyweremounted vertically in thefuselage andpointed straight down) while twowereusedforeitherlift,bydiversion downward by a valve,or propulsion. Theengines weresmaller thanthejetaugmentation mixing chambers hadbeen,sotherewasroomforadditional fuel.Thebulkier fuselage degraded performance, andthe expected maximum speed dropped to463mph. Flight trialsofthemodified XV-4B began inAugust 1968,but theaircraft waslostinanaccident onMarch 14,1969, bringing about program termination.

TheNuclear Airplane |

ore spentoverthreeyearsonWeaponSystem 125A, a proposednuclear-powered supersonic bomber,workingwith Pratt&Whitney. Thenuclearreactorwouldhavebeenmountedin

theaftfuselage, behind thebombbay.Theprogram, which hadstarted intheCalifornia Company preliminary design department underAl Cleveland, andwastransferred withhimtoGeorgia, wasultimately canceled. Lockheed would continue toconduct design studies, andin 1958responded toanAirForce request forproposal foracontinuously airborne missile launch andlowlevel system (CAMAL) thatwasalso canceled.

TheFutureofLockheed-Georgia hefutureofLockheed-Georgia restsprimarily ontwoprograms. Thefirstistheevergreen C-130, nowbeing offered astheC-130J, and,barring some stillunknown revolution inaerodynamics orengine technology, destined perhaps foranother halfcentury ofproduction inever-modified form. Thisforecast might seem optimistic wereitnot forthefactthatanexpanding worldeconomy willbringmanymore nations tothepointwhere theywillrequire military andcivil transports withtheC-130’s utility. Aseachofthese nations emerges, thepotential forneworders increases. Thesecond program istheLockheed Martin F-22.Destined to

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bethestandardairsuperiorityfighterof theUnitedStatesAirForce,

theYF-22 madeitsfirstflightonSeptember 29,1990.Thehistory oftheYF-22 anditssuccessful testprogram willbedealtwithlater, butthecurrent production program willnotbecompleted untilthe second decade ofthetwenty-first century. TheLockheed-Georgia facility willalsocontinue tomodify the P-3OrionandS-3Viking aircraft, andthereisevery possibility that newproduction offollow-on aircraft willberequired inthefuture.

CHAPTER 9

TheGolden Opportunity: Missiles andSpace

Re

hasanindustrial giant,sovitaltoournational security for somanydecades, hadsuchatentative start.ThegreatLockheed Missiles andSpace Company, which hasserved assword andshield forthedefense ofthefreeworld, waslaunched afterthewarinan offhand manner. RobertGross, verymuchaware ofthepotential shown byGerman V-1andV-2weapons, expressed anopinion that Lockheed hadbetterlookintothe“pilotless aircraft business.” Indiscussions withHallHibbard itbecame apparent thatLockheed didnot havetheexperience to dothetarget-seeking andweapons guidance

sideofthemissile business. Thecompany instead optedtobeginby building thetestvehicles—what laterbecame known as“platforms.” Whether bychance orforesight, thisbrilliant move would paydividends fordecades. (Gross wasalways careful tovalidate hisideas, par-

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ones,withwhatbecameknownasthe ticularlythemorefar-reaching

itwascomposed toGross, Inaddition Committee. Policy Corporate and Barker, Charles financier H ibbard, Hall Courtlandt, ofhisbrother Thesemenknew CyrilChappellet. andcounselor investor longtime

theyalsoknew whento reinBobGrossin—butmoreimportantly, whentolethimrunwithanidea.)

butthefirstmajoropporimmediately, beganalmost Research

led inearly1947,whenWillisHawkins occurred tunityforbusiness flyingtest aneffortto respondto an airforcerequestfora pilotless

ofsubecapable onethatwould engines, oframjet bedfora series engine ofthejetage,theramjet period (Atthisearly speeds. personic powerandits forenormous potential of its because appealing was theneed butwithout likea turbojet, operated simplicity—it relative wastherequiredrawback Itsprincipal orturbine. fora compressor

highspeed,approximately toa relatively mentforittobeaccelerated

run.) 300mph,before itwould wasremarkable, giventhat Thescopeoftheairforcerequest and impossible, to be flight supersonic c onsidered still p eople many

putthemyth Yeager to dosountilCaptainCharles wouldcontinue toreston October14,1947.Thetest ofthe“soundbarrier”forever

times thespeed 3—three ofMach speed wastobeabletoreach vehicle ofoperation m inutes three a t least for thisspeed sustain ofsound—and strong, feet.Italsohadtobeimmensely offiftythousand atanaltitude from fullvalue Torealize an8-gturnattopspeed. abletowithstand be recoverable. had to andtestinstruments thetests,theengine wastasking itselftodesign aMach3 Pilotless ornot,Lockheed degrees nine hundred up to temperatures sustain t o one able airplane, thesortofchallenge I twas t oearth. r eturned andbesafely Fahrenheit a teamofkeypeople. liked,andheonceagainassembled Hawkins whowassaidtohave aman Irv Culver, the brilliant i ncluded These a superbaeroAlCleveland, inventedhisownsystemof mathematics;

nuclear andaproposed withgianttransports whoseefforts dynamicist

AirForce aretired andFredJenks, beennoted; havealready airplane drop during a P-38 who flew inmathematics, withadoctorate colonel program andwhobecame oftheproject models testsofone-third-scale instrufine and expert a wind-tunnel Richter, E. O.“Rick” manager. in oftelemetry thescience expanded whogreatly engineer mentation

the courseof the program,was alsoa keyman. (AmongRichter’s

oftherotating theantecedent wasonefortheRotodome, patents WarningandControlSystem antennausedlateron theAirborne

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[AWACS]). Curiously,althoughthisselectteamhadtheinsightto be

abletomeettheoverwhelming technical challenges oftheproject, noneofitsmembers thensawmuchdevelopment potential init. Progress onthefull-size missile wasnotswift. Some oftheearly experimentation wasalmost laughably primitive, aswhen AlCleveland launched smallaluminum models oftheX-7byabungee cordfrom aditchattheBurbank airport. Theaircraft wasbuiltintheAdvanced Development Projects facilities, andwasshipped toWhiteSands for thetestprogram. Hawkins recalls withgreatgoodhumor theirearly

testsofmodels fortheX-7.Two-by-fours wereknocked intoa crude

launch platform, andaJeepwasusedasablastshield. Thefirsttime theytriedtofireit,theydidacountdown—because theyhadseenthis

doneinotherlaunches atWhiteSands.Whenthebuttontolaunch waspressed—nothing happened. Theywereafraidtoapproach itbe-

cause itmightblowup.TheAirForce offered topostaguardaround themissile, andtheLockheed representatives spentthenightconsideringwhattodo.Finally TomDudley, anengineer, figured outthat the boostercouldbe disengaged, becausetherewasan externalline

thatwentfromthebattery tothebooster igniter. Dudley brought a rifle,andatonehundred yards’ range, hecuttheexternal linewitha bullet. Encouraged, theyapproached themissile tofindthatthemissile timerhadbeenstopped whenitshands wereheldupbyanoversized

screwprotruding throughthecase.Thingsweresimpler inthosedays. Production wasundertaken atPlantB-6in Burbank, anditwas

notuntilApril26,1951,thatthefirstfull-scale testflight tookplace. Likesomanymissile firstflights, itwasa failure. Lockheed persisted, andeventually theX-7became aworkhorse. Thebasicairframe thatemerged wassimple andslender—a needlelikefuselagefittedwithshort,thin, taperedwings,not unlike

thosethatwouldappear onthelaterF-104, andsimple, squared-off tailsurfaces. However, whenthetestengine andthenecessary booster

rocketwereattached, theX-7ensemble assumed analmostgrotesque appearance because ofthehugeaerodynamic surfaces required bythe

booster. Launching theX-7fromtheground wasfeasible, butatthe costofreduced topspeeds. Maximum performance wasobtained by dropping theX-7froma Boeing B-29carrier aircraft. Thebooster’s disproportionately largeaerodynamic surfaces madeit impossible to launch fromthebombbay,a laYeager’s BellX-1.Instead, a pylon wasplaced between thenumbers threeandfourengines ontheleft wing,towhichtheX-7wasattached, itsneedle noselancing forward between thearcofthepropellers.

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Therather innocuouslookingX-7researchmissilebecamethe basis for the formation of whatbecamethe extraordinarilysuccessfulLockheedMissilesand SpaceSystemsorganization.

Launch tookplace fromthemother shipataltitudes upto40,000 feet.Theaft-mounted rocket booster generated 100,000 pounds of thrust, which tooktheX-7tospeeds atwhich theramjet could operate

fortheremainder ofthetest.It flewinaracetrack patternaroundthe WhiteSandsMissileRange.Latermodelshadtwinboosters witha

combined thrustof105,000 pounds. Ofallitsradical aspects, therecovery procedure wasperhaps the mostunusual, andasmightbeexpected, proceeded fromIrvCulver’s radical thinking. Protruding fromtheX-7’s nosewasa longspike, which alsoserved tomount theinstruments forspeed andaltitude and asanantenna. Attheendofa flight, aseries ofparachutes deployed atprescribed altitudes, andtheX-7floated downtonose-spike itself intheground.Withtheparachutes drapedoverit,thespikedX-7was

saidtoresemble thefamous Joshua cactus. Ground impact, while minimized bytheparachutes, wassevere, buttherecovery system worked sowellthatsomeX-7sflewmanymissions; therecordwasthirteen. Oneofthemostimportantbutleastrecognized aspects ofthe

X-7program wasthetesting andimagination required tobuildcomponents ableto withstand thecolossal stressof rocketlaunches, atmospheric heating, high-g turns,andrugged recoveries. Testsstandards wereprimitive—one engineer fired.22riflebullets atashielded

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capacitor, while IrvCulver usedajackhammer tovalidate thetoughnessofabooster socket. TheX-7platform wasdesigned tobeadaptable toanever-larger seriesofMarquardtramjetengines,andwasa keyelementin making

thelong-lived BoeingBomarcinterceptor missilepossible. A rede-

signed version, theX-7-3A, wasequipped withanewwingandfitted withtwinboosters mounted underthewingroots.Thesedispensed withthehugeaerodynamic surfaces required forthesingle-booster system, andenabled launches tobemade fromthebombbayofanew mother ship,aBoeing B-50. TheX-7series repeatedly setnewspeed andaltitude records in atestprogram unmatched anywhere intheworld, reaching atopspeed of2,881mphandaltitudes over106,000 feet.(Itmustbeemphasized thatthiswasallterraincognita forLockheed—and everyone else—

before Hawkins launched theprogram. Itisonethingtodevelop a newtransport thatisperhaps moderately moreefficient thanitscom-

petitors,andquiteanotherto leapintoan entirelynew,unknown scientific world,andto do sowithextremesuccess.) Theywereunawareofit at thetime,buttheX-7engineers were

already demonstrating thephilosophical approach thatwouldmake thecompany great.Theyrecognized thatnothing hadbeendonein thepasttocompare withtheirnewchallenges, sotherewerenoprecedentsto stifletheirimaginations. If a testarticleneededto be

“bulletproof” theytestedit byfiringa bullet,realormetaphorical. Andalthough theX-7program didhavefollow-ons, including theQ5andKingfisher target drones (which hadthedrawback ofbeing faster thanthemissiles forwhich theyweretargets), itsrealimportance was in beingtheleadhorseforLockheed in a totallynew,utterlydemandingenvironment. WhatbecameLMSC,thereemerged a free-

thinking, open,innovative system of doingbusiness thatwasa complete departure fromthecodified methods thattherapidexpansionoftheaviation sector ofthebusiness hadrequired. Itisperhaps allthemoreremarkable thatthissystem developed underorganizationalrulesofsecrecy thatrivaled thoseoftheSkunk Works. Thenew methods thatweregenerated almost spontaneously byeager scientists andengineers working onextremely demanding projects would first bringLMSC totheforeinthecorporate structure, andthen,through a seriesofleadersgrounded in this“school,” goonto permeate the entirecorporation.

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ARisingStar a

important astheX-7program wastotheAirForce, itwasab-

solutely critical tothedevelopment ofLockheed’s burgeoning ex-

pertise. It fostered a tolerant mind-set onthepartofLockheed’s admittedly airplane-oriented topmanagement to esoteric projects. Onceagain,a formidable intellect wouldmaterialize tohelpshape Lockheed’s destiny.In 1953,an engaging, good-humored, recently arrivedbut alreadyrisingstar,L. EugeneRoot,suggestedthatLock-

heedformaseparate division topursue workonballistic missiles and evensatellites—then sorevolutionary anideaastobetinged witha touchofscience fiction. Rootcame fromfarming stock; bornin1910inLewiston, Idaho, hemoved withhisfamily toCalifornia, andgraduated fromStockton High,where heplayed onthefootball teamforfouryears. After high school, hehelped hisfather onahugeone-hundred-thousand-acre peat farmand,inclassic Horatio Alger fashion, rananewspaper routeon theside.Oneofhiscustomers admired hisindustry andagreed toloan himmoneyto supplementhisscholarships, enablinghimto enrollin

theCollege ofthePacific, where healsoplayed football andengaged incampus politics. Forthelatter, heoncehadhimself flown lowover thecampus todropcampaign literature directly onthestudent body. HedidsowellattheCollege ofthePacific thathewasurged by nolessa sponsor thanDr.Robert A.Millikan totransfer totheCalifornia Institute ofTechnology justasitwasbeginning itsgreatleap forward intheworld ofaerodynamics. Millikan, CalTech’s president, hadinduced Dr.Theodore vanKarman toheadtheGuggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory, where anewten-foot windtunnel, hugefor itstime,wasbuilt.Itwasheady company forafarmboyfromStockton, but Rootrelishedit. He excelledagainat CalTech,graduating

in1934withtwomaster’s degrees, oneinmechanical engineering and asecond inaeronautical engineering. Hewentdirectly totheDouglas Aircraft Company, where heworked happily for$24.48 a week with stellar engineers suchasArthurE.Raymond, themanprimarily responsiblefor the designof the DouglasDC-1,-2, and -3 airliners.

There,Rootovercame a tendency tobeairsick toactasflighttest engineer ontheDC-2,helping thecompany resolve someinstability problems. Hissolution, applying aerodynamic balance tomoving con-

trolsurfaces, wasgranted a patent—not badforatwenty-five-year-old

newcomer, andcertainly aportent forhisfuture.

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RoothadabrilliantcareerwithDouglas, culminating inanim-

mediate postwar tourofGermany torecover scientific data.Hewas particularly takenwithinformation ontheGerman rocket programs, whichhewouldsoonputtogooduse,firstwiththeRandProject, andlatertheRANDCorporation, wherehealsobecame a strong proponent ofin-flight refueling. RAND wasanindependent nonprofit organization designed tostudydefense security problems forthebenefitofindustry andgovernment. Rootserved asRAND’s representative inthePentagon, working withthen-Colonel Bernard A.Schriever, the father ofAmerican intercontinental ballistic missile programs. Hebecamea special assistant totheU.S.AirForcedeputy chiefofstaff, development, and alsoservedon theAirForce’sScientific Advisory

Board. Rootwasat thePentagon whenhe caughttheeyeof Robert

Gross, whoinvited himtocometoLockheed ascorporate developmentplanner, atypical example ofGross’s vision. (Insomerespects, Robert Gross andGeneral oftheAirForce HenryH.“Hap” Arnold

wereverymuchalike.Neithermanwastechnically adept,butboth

could seewhatwasrequired forthefuture, andpickthekeypersonnel tofulfill thoserequirements.) Rootwastoheadagroupofspecialists whowouldadvise management onindustrial andeconomic trends, along withthebestopportunities forthefuture. Uponarrivalat Lockheed,Rootwentthroughthenormalprocessing,andwasasked,“What’syourdepartmentnumber?”Withtyp-

icalebullience, heresponded, “There isn’tany—but let’scallitthe Rootdetootdepartment.” Thenamestuck withthedepartment over theyears. Hisadvent atLockheed would, through aninvolved setof circumstances, puthiminaposition tohavea tremendous influence overnotonlyanimportant sector ofthecompany, butoverthedevelopment ofexecutive talent. Thestandards ofmanagement, leadership,andethicsthatRootestablished wouldenableLockheed to become apremier contractor inmissiles andsatellites. Those standards

wouldalsotrainthepersonnel whowouldleadLockheed’s recovery fromthedisastrous situation inwhichitbecame embroiled inthelate

1960s toitspresent position ofeminence.

LMSD rossannounced theformation oftheLockheed Missile Systems Division(LMSD)in January1954.Thenewdivisionhada

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271

$400,000 backlog ofworkontheX-7project, andsixty-five people wereemployed inanoldengineering loftinBuilding B-1atBurbank. Onlya yearlater,thedivision hadrecorded salesof$7.2million, almostallofitinthepreviously nonexistent ramjetmissile technology business.ByAugustof 1955,thebacklogofworkhadsoaredto $29

million, allinafieldinwhich Lockheed hadlittleprevious experience.

Aninterimmovewasmadein May1954,to a seventy-seven-acre

facility inVanNuys,butitwasapparent thatmuchlarger quarters wereneeded. Asthecompany grew, sodiditgenerate newoperating elements,includinga baseat CapeCanaveral, Florida,to augmentits

testfacility atAlamogordo, NewMexico. Unfortunately, allwasnotwellinLMSD’s initial administrative arrangement. Gross’s normally prescient management vision hadbeen

cloudy whenheselected retiredAirForceLieutenant General Elwood P.“Pete”Quesada toheadtheneworganization asvicepresident and

general manager. Whilepersonally popular, Quesada created anexplosive management situation byhisunusual, andtosome, eccentric, hiringandmanagement methods. Hewasintentonacquiring alarge staffofscientists, andtherapidgrowth ofbusiness required hiring an equally largestaffofengineers. Quesada wasperceived tohaveapreference forscientists overengineers intheworkprocess. Hewasmaladroitinassigning projects, sometimes assigning similar tasks tomore thanoneindividual, andinotherinstances notmaking anyassignments atall,leaving largenumbers ofhigh-paid professionals without anything todobutcollect theirpaychecks—probably theworst thing possible fortheirmorale. Theresulting confusion caused arift between scientists andengineers thatculminated inmany ofthescientists leavingina body.(Manyveterans ofLMSCconsider thistohavebeena

blessing indisguise. Theybelieve theinitialprojects atthefacility demanded adegree ofhardheaded common sense thatwasoftenmore readily foundinengineers thaninpurescientists.) Thesituationwasexacerbated because Quesada didnotcom-

municate withtheGrossbrothers, nordidhegetalongwiththat keystone ofLockheed engineering, WillisHawkins, whonominally washisassistant, along withHerschel Brown. (Retired chairman Roy Anderson would sayofHerschel Brown thathehadthegenius ofGene Rootandthesteady industry ofStanBurriss combined—a formidable combination.)Eventually,the courtlyCourtlandtGrossaskedQue-

sadatoleave,andhisplacewastakentemporarily byHallHibbard.

Hibbard wouldlaterselect Roottobecome thegeneral manager of LMSD, withtheprofound results alluded toabove. (Quesada went

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WillisHawkinsexcelledin every fieldof endeavor,and was as importantto the innovativenew missilesand space side of Lockheed’sbusiness as he had been to the aircraft side. Heread and initialedeverypage of the manuscriptfor this book twice, offeringinnumerablevalid suggestionsand corrections,all hand printed as preciselyas an IBMtypewriter.

on to becomethe firstheadof the FederalAviationAdministration,

where, ashasbeenshown, hetreated Lockheed fairly whentheElectra problems surfaced.)

X-17:Hypersonic Keyto Reentry ee creation ofanintercontinental ballistic missile required solving thousands ofproblems, andofthese, oneofthemostdifficult was thatofthewarhead’s reentry intotheearth’s atmosphere. Thetre-

mendousheatandturbulence generated bya bodyreentering the

atmosphere wouldturnawarhead intoa self-consuming falling star unless thecorrect shape andmaterials wereusedtoprotect it.InNovember 1954,theUSAF awarded Lockheed asole-source contract to helpsolve thisproblem, andonceagain Hawkins, stillLMSD’s directorofengineering picked FrankBednarz fortheproject. TheLockheed teamfollowed IrvCulver’s concept andfashioned arelatively simple vehicle consisting ofthreesetsofsolidrockets. The firststageoftherocketboosted thevehicle toaboutfivehundred thousand feet,butwasnotseparated fromthesecond andthirdstages. Thevehicle, stabilized bythebooster, thenfellbackintotheatmosphere pointing straight down. Ata designated altitude, usually betweenseventy thousand andninetythousand feet,thefirststagewas

The X-17as a three-stagesolid-fueltest vehiclethat playedan important role in solvingthe problemof reentryto the atmosphere.

inwhat werefiredinsuccession andtheothertwostages jettisoned unimaginable Previously technique.” a “pile-driver termed Hawkins themissile In effect, a chieved. 20 were Mach ofMach11to speeds ofreentry, forthehighvelocity oflowaltitude thehighdensity traded andheatratewere temperature ofairflow sothatthesameconditions As c loser totheearth. andmuch e xpensively, l ess butmuch attained, fromtelemetry. couldbeobtained a resultmoreinformation

andhalf-scale oftestswithquartera series undertook Lockheed 26, on August launched was missile f ull-scale and thefirst vehicles, not appearance wasingeneral theX-17,thevehicle Designated 1955. although SA-2, suchastheSoviet missiles latersurface-to-air unlike stage The first shape. atapered provided rockets of its thethreestages stage thesecond had ofthrust; pounds 48,000 generated oftherocket thethird while ofthrust; pounds 33,900 eachgenerating threerockets rockets t hree All of thrust. pounds of35,950 rocket hada single stage Justoverfortyfeetlong, Company. bytheThiokol weremanufactured about12,000 finsattheirbaseandweighing fittedwithfourstabilizing

and Florida fromCapeCanaveral, werelaunched theX-17s pounds, was TheX-17 California. AFBandPointMagu, fromVandenburg missile mobile notunlikea modern trailer, on a transport carried made nineteen these, of were l aunched; X-17s Twenty-six launcher. usedbytheairforce theinformation flightsthatgenerated successful

weresuccessX-17s Additional foritsICBMs. thewarheads todesign thePolaris for warheads help design to for thenavy fullylaunched caprecovery of inthedesign Thedatawouldalsobecrucial SLBM. sules fromspacecraft. whohadbeen oftheX-17camefromIrvCulver, Theconcept

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in thefirstgroupof Lockheed engineers to movefromaircraftto missiles. Thescientist whodirected andanalyzed thereentry bodydata wasDanTellep.

Later intheirlife,theX-17s demonstrated anunusual versatility; instead oftheirclimb-and-dive trip-hammer mode, theysimply blasted upward ashighasthreehundred miles,thereto explode a nuclear warhead in an experiment to determine if nuclear explosion byproducts would betrapped intheearth’s magnetic field.

Onto Sunnyvale n November 4, 1955,lessthantwoyearsafterLMSD’s tentative launch,Lockheed announced thepurchase ofa 275-acre tractof

landnearthebucolic hamlet of Sunnyvale, andcloseto thegreat airship hangars atMoffett Field. PaloAltowasonlyseven miles away, andtheproximity ofStanford University wasa realattraction, given thatmanytopLockheed managers werealumni. Twenty-two additional acres wereacquired intheStanford Industrial Park. Thelocation andthegeography oftheacquisition permitted Lockheed tobuilda series of research laboratories withseparate adjacent manufacturing andtestfacilities whichwouldbevirtually self-contained, andthus abletooperate underthestringent requirements ofsecrecy thataflood of defense contracts wouldbring.Lockheed hadembarked upona program ofsupplying high-speed, high-altitude vehicles ofunprecedented performance, anditneeded thelaboratories andthepeople to re-create thephysical forces andatmospheric conditions underwhich theseweapons wouldoperate. Implicit in theircreation wasanun-

precedented requirement fornewelectronic andopticaltestingequip-

ment.Thisnewtestequipment wastobecreated ona scale solarge andsosophisticated thatentirely newdisciplines hadtobedeveloped to meetthetask.(Oneincredible by-product ofthisdemand forintellectual resources wasthegrowth of whatis nowcalledSilicon

Valley.) Thechallenge wasdaunting, buttheGrossbrothersandDan

Haughton, thelatternowengaged inmanaging allofthebusinesses, plunged ahead withtremendous courage. Theyknew better thananyonehowpolitical events couldsuddenly dryupa wellofcontracts, andthatthehugeinvestment beingmadeinLMSD(by1958,the

acronymstoodforLockheed Missiles & Space[notSystems] Division)

couldnever berecouped byanything butdefense business.

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Thetraditional shovel waspushed asideatSunnyvale onMay detonated byascientifically wasbroken ground 17,1956;instead, trailsofLockthefieryrocket onethatsymbolized charge ofpowder,

heed’sfuture.Duringtheceremonies, Lockheed’s president, Courtlandt Gross,announcedthat the plantwasgoingto be threetimes

theaccelerating to accommodate announced, largerthanoriginally by insales $60 million reached backlog (LMSD’s ofbusiness. growth bytheendof 1957.By1959,it theendof 1956and$160million largestdivisionin termsof sales[$362million] becameLockheed’s

venture aircraft” “pilotless RobertGross’s [18,966].) andemployment

fortheColdWar,inallitsfuryandduration, toprosper, wasdestined over. times many wasrepaid investment insure thatLockheed’s would

TwoDirections:BothCorrect ee

capascientific developing Division’s andSpace Missiles

and ofDefense, bytheDepartment bilitywasnotedwithapproval Thescope seriesof newchallenges. endless bya seemingly rewarded

place andtheywould wasstaggering, andnatureofthesechallenges in the ofbeinganactivepartner position in theunique Lockheed open f rom Union the Soviet deterring of first, policies national official ofpolitical sphere itscurrent itwithin containing andsecond, warfare, influence. general thedivision’s laterbecome whowould Brown, Herschel t was task:“Onechallenge obuild LMSD’s stated succinctly manager, a missilethat couldbe launchedfroma submergedsubmarine;the

a capsule.” fromwhichwecouldrecover a satellite otherwastobuild

business, andmissile thespace hadjustentered thatLockheed Given assignments. theseweresobering the ofbeing hadthepotential (FBM) Missile Ballistic Fleet The w as the AirForce When inhistory. weapon deterrent mosteffective ofrolesandmisthequestions in 1947, service madeanindependent thisquestion address t o was m ade An attempt p aramount. were sions James ofthe secretary navy, andformer ofdefense bythenewsecretary it moretoaknifefight likened (participants ata conference Forrestal, than a meeting)of the servicechiefsin KeyWest,Florida,in 1948. of the ICBMwasassignedto theAirForce, There,the development

missile rangeballistic of the intermediate whilethedevelopment andtheAirForce to boththeArmy(Jupiter) wasassigned (IRBM) A keytoalleviating f urious. itwas a nd l eft o ut, was TheNavy (Thor).

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thesituation camein1955, whentheNational Security Council recommended thatatleastpartoftheIRBM forcebesea-based. Thesecond challenge wasevenmoredaunting, foritwasthe

foundation ofa space-based intelligence-gathering systemofalmost

unimaginable complexity, undertheauspices firstoftheAirForce and subsequently alsotheCentral Intelligence Agency. Although theinitial requirements were primitive bytoday’s standards, theywere light-years beyond thestateoftheartatthetime.Thesuccessful fulfillment of

these,andofsubsequent evermorerigorousrequirements, wasperhaps

themostimportant element oftheAmerican policy ofcontainment. TheygavetheUnited States unparalleled insight intoSoviet activities, andenabled ittofashion themosteconomical, cost-effective responses. HadtheUnitedStatesnotpossessed thiscapability, it mighthave bankrupted itselfonmilitary spending, astheSoviet Unionultimately

did. LMSDbecame theLockheed Missiles andSpaceCompany (LMSC)inJune1961,to reflectthetwinpathsfatehadthrustupon

it.LMSCwouldhaveaMissile Systems Division (MSD)andaSpace

Systems Division (SSD), andwhiletherewouldalways bea strong economic, moderatemanagerial, and limitedtechnical crossfertilization between thetwoentities, theabsolute needforthestrong-

estsecurityrequirements resultedin theirgrowingup as distinct entities.Onlytheverytopmanagers ofonedivision knewanything

abouttheworkoftheircounterparts intheotherdivision; everyone elsewasisolated onthestrictest “need-to-know” basis. Andbecause security wassorigorous, eventopmanagement atcorporate headquarters hadonly alimitedinsight intothemechanics oftheprograms. Thatlimited insight cameto beregarded assufficient, forLMSC quickly proved tobeagreatcashcowthatwould sustain thecompany during tougheconomic times. Lockheed’s senior management could comfortably letLMSC’s innerworkings remain aclosed bookaslong astheprofitscontinued toflow.

Missile Systems Division and the FleetBallisticMissile hestoryofthecreation, development, test,anddeployment ofthe submarine-launched ballistic missile iswithout question thestory ofhowwellthemilitary-industrial complex canwork.Theterm

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gained notoriety whenit wastakenoutofcontext fromPresident Eisenhower’s speech, andisglibly usedasacodewordforthewayin which themilitary andindustry aresupposed toconspire tobilkthe public oftheirhard-earned taxmoney. TheU.S.Navy/contractor cooperation onthedevelopment ofthefleetballistic missile system proved conclusively howfalseaperception thisis. Overtheyears, therehaveundoubtedly beenabuses ofthedefenseprocurement system, butforthemostpart,thedefense industry hasnotbeenkindto manufacturers, a condition witnessed bythe

thousands offirmsthathavegonebankrupt trying tosupply military needs. Amuchsmaller number offirms haveprospered overtheyears, butobjective investigation reveals thattheaverage returnoninvestmentissignificantly lower thanfornondefense counterparts. Themilitary-industrial complex’s existence isnotbased onthe profit motive, butrather onthefactthatmodern weapon systems could notbeproduced without extremely close cooperation between themilitaryandindustry. Itwould beimpossible forthemilitary services to communicate theirneedswithouta deepunderstanding ofindustrial

capability, anditwould beequally impossible forindustry torespond tothoseneedswithout a broadunderstanding ofmilitary requirements. Theverybestillustration ofboththeneedforandthepositive results ofthemilitary-industrial complex istheFleetBallistic Missile system. TheFBMsystem resulted infivegenerations ofsubmarinelaunched ballistic missiles, andwasderived fromanintimate, enduring relationship between theU.S.Navy, Lockheed, anditsmany subcontractors. These programs weredelivered almost without exception on timeandwithin thebudget. Thisoutstanding mutual effort brought abouttheSLBM asthethirdlegofthestrategic triaduponwhich the United States depended forthedeterrence oftheSoviet Union. The

Soviet Unionwasnotonlydeterred, itultimately collapsed—primarily

because itsownmilitary-industrial system failed tofunction correctly. TheSoviet government wasunable tocontinue flogging itscorrupt, chaotic economic system tosustain thenecessary military development tooppose thatoftheUnitedStates. Deterrence worked, anditworked

because ofthestrategic triad.Inthefinalanalysis, thefactthatit worked alsomadeitrelatively inexpensive, forifithadfailed, thecost would havebeenincalculable.

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TheBeginning: FromJupiterto Polaris It 1955,theNavywasassigned thetaskofproviding a sea-based support system fortheJupiter IRBM developed bytheArmy. Despiteitssubsidiary nature, itwasnonetheless apointofentryintothe missile business. OnNovember 17,theSecretary oftheNavy created aSpecial Projects Office (SPO) tohandle thetask,and,notincidentally,toberesponsible fora newhigh-priority program: a sea-based IRBM. Admiral Arleigh “Thirty-knot” Burke assigned thedetailto the newlyfrockedRearAdmiralWilliamFrancis“Red”Raborn. Burke,a leaderin the“RevoltoftheAdmirals” in theB-36/carrier controversy, latersaid,“I didnotwanta technical expert,because a technical expertwouldbetoonarrow-minded. I wantedanaviator

because ifthismissile weresuccessful, itwould jeopardize theaviation branch. . . .Ichose RedRaborn because hewasahard-working man.” Raborn, a 1928Naval Academy graduate, hadwonhiswings at Pensacola in1934.Hebecame anaerial gunnery expert, andparticipatedinfastcarrier operations aboard theUSSHancock inbattles against theJapanese throughout thewarzone. Afteratourofcombat inKorean waters, heserved inaseries ofstaffpositions thatledtohis promotion torearadmiral in1955.Laterinlife,hewasdeputy chief ofnaval operations, andafterhisretirement, served asdirector ofthe Central Intelligence Agency from1965to1966.Hediedin1990at theageofeighty-four. Thedegree ofBurke’s backing fortheIRBMproject maybe inferred fromthewayheallocated Navyresources. Whenmoneywas

tight,hecutbacktheNavybyfifteen thousand personnel, killed the Martin Seamaster jet-flying boatprogram, andterminated theRegulus missile program. Hespelled outhisintentions inaDecember 2,1955, letter, which isquoted inpartbelow: 3. IfRearAdmiral Raborn runsintoanydifficulty with which I canhelp,Iwillwanttoknow aboutitatoncealong withhisrecommended courseofactionformeto take.If moremoneyis needed,wewillgetit. If heneedsmore

people, thosepeople willbeordered in.Ifthereisanything thatslows thisproject upbeyond thecapacity oftheNavy Department wewillimmediately takeittothehighest level andnotworkourwayupthrough several days.

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Burke’s paragraph 5isequally illuminating: Thenextreportonthisshould bemadebysomebody who

isenthusiastic, whogivesevidence ofhisenthusiasm, and whoseknowledge demonstrates thathehasathorough grasp

oftheproblem andispushing aheadfaster thananybody elsecould. It wouldsoonbeevidentthatBurkehadfoundhismaninRa-

born,whowasred-haired, barrel-chested, quickwitha quip,andable

togetalongwithpeople evenunderconditions ofgreatstress. His stature enabled himtoendure toughcongressional inquiries andwin crucial votesofconfidence withhiscandor andthecredibility ofhis promises. Raborn wasgranted a“hunting license” topickfortycivilian andmilitary people forhisteam.These werethefirststrands inthe industry-government teamRaborn knittedtogether, usingmanagementmethods notfoundinanybooks. Hedidnotbelieve ingiving rewards forsavingmoney—he gaverewards forthingsthatadvanced thein-commission date.Heexpected people toworksevendaysaweek

ifnecessary—when heheardcomplaints thatpeople wanted tospend timewiththeirfamilies, hesuggested thattheybringtheirwives into workonSaturdays. OneofRaborn’s greatgiftswastomakedecisions onthespot, andletthechipsfallwhere theymay.GeneRootcharacterized Raborn’s methods asdemanding, butsatisfying, because they“required complete intellectual honesty.” StanBurriss wassoimbued withthe teamconcept thathemadethedecision togiveupa $45million contract Lockheed hadsigned forageneral-purpose computer toanothercompany, simplybecause heknewitwasbestfortheprogram.

Inothercircumstances, amanager making such a decision would have beenfiredonthespot—at LMSD itwasgreeted withroarsofapproval because itmadesense. Admiral Burke hadequally stringent requirements forcontractors,andRaborn began theprocess ofselection assoonashetookover onDecember 5,1955. Within twenty dayshehadselected themajor FBMcontractors onthebasisoftheirone-day presentations, and LMSD wasselected astheprimecontractor/system integrator. Undeterred bytheirabsolute lackofexperience inthearea,onDecember

13,1955,Robert Gross, Hawkins, andHibbard offered theUnited States Navy aplantomanage thefleetballistic missile weapon system.

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Theywereauthorized todosoonDecember 17,andtendayslater, Lockheed, withothercontractors, attendeda briefingby Rabornin

Washington. Wishing toinfuse someexcitement, Raborn asked the companies thatweregoingtojoinhisproject tocomeforward and writetheircompany nameonhisbriefing blackboard. GeneRoot madeittotheblackboard first,wrote “Lockheed” inlarge letters, then turnedandsaid,“We're ready. Who’s next?” Itwastheattitude Rabornwanted. Raborn’s team’s initialtaskwastodevelop theJupiterintoa 1,500-mile-range missile thatcouldbefiredfromshipboard andbe

operational fiveyearslater,onJanuary1,1960.Asubmarine-launched version wastobereadyinanotherfiveyears,onJanuary1,1965.This schedule wouldsoonseemlaughably lenient.

TheJupiter required cryogenic liquid fuels thatwould beextraorhazardous onshipboard andalmost certainly lethalonasubdinarily marine. Another important factorwasthestability ofthelaunch platform—when arocket waslaunched, theinitial acceleration wasso slowthataroughseamightcausetheshiptoslamupintothedeparting missile.

Inthenextfewmonths, fortune would smile oftenontheprogram. Thefirstinstance wasitsacquisition ofCaptain Levering Smith,

whowasto directthe development of the missileandits solidpropellant boostsystem, tobesupplied bytheAerojet-General Company.Then a seriesoftechnical developments intervened topermita

farbetteralternative thantheJupiter. Thefirst,andperhaps mostimportant, technical development wastheassurance fromDr.Edward Teller oftheAtomic Energy Commission thatfuturenuclear warheads couldbemadefarlighter than previously thought, onlysome30percent oftheweight oftheJupiter missile’s payload. (Thesamebreakthrough enabled Colonel Bernard Schriever toaccelerate theAtlasintercontinental ballistic missile.) The second wasDr.Charles StarkDraper’s development ofasmallinertial

guidance system foruseinmissiles, only15percent oftheweight of theJupiter’s guidance system. Thethirdwasanadvance inthepower tobederived insolid-propellant fuelbytheaddition ofmetallic aluminum.

Dr.Derald A.Stuart, oneofthemostbrilliant menevertowork atLMSC, made acrucialobservation. While theenergy perpound of liquidrocket systems wasmuchgreater thanthatofsolidsystems, the energy percubic footwascomparable, andinshipborne missiles, it wasenergy percubicfootthatcounted.

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Captain Smithwastasked todesign a newmissile thatwould takeadvantage ofthesedevelopments. Working withLockheed and

theothercontractors, heproduced in oneweek’s timetheessential detailsofa two-stage solid-propellant nuclearmissile witha 1,500milerange.Themissile wasapproved bythesecretary ofdefense on

December 8,1956,andAdmiral Raborn gaveitthenamePolaris. ThePolaris concept’s apparent simplification oftheprogram brought about anaccelerated schedule calling foraninterim submarine

capability byJanuary1,1963.Themajorconcession totheschedule

change wasa reduction inrequired rangeto 1,200miles; Admiral Burke wasineffect trading range fortime. Recent generations ofAmericans cannot begintograsp thecul-

turalshockthattherevolutionary arrivalofSputnik I onOctober4, 1957,haduponournation.Thecountrywasquiteliterally stunned, andwhilecomedians jokedthattheSovietUnionsucceeded onlybe-

cause“theirGerman scientists werebetterthanourGerman scientists,” therewasa sense ofnational shame andurgency thathadnever beenfeltbefore, andhasnever beenfeltsince. Thisurgency wasimmediately incorporated intheschedule for thePolaris. Theinterim capability wastobeachieved byJanuary 1, 1961,andthefulloperational Polaris Model Bwastobereadyby

June1963.

While Lockheed wasfocused onthedevelopment ofthemissile itself,theNavyhadto address thecreation oftheSSBN(ShipSubmersible-Ballistic-Nuclear powered).The newsubmarinewould

havethecapacity tocruise submerged forsixtydaystopointsfrom which themissiles couldbelaunched against specific targets uponthe receipt oftheordertofire.TheNavy provided aninterim solution for theSSBN bytaking a submarine already ontheElectric Boatways, theGeorge Washington, splitting itjustaftoftheconning tower, and inserting a130-foot-long midsection thatcontained roomfortworows

ofeightmissiles. Theareabecame knownas“Sherwood Forest” aboard

shipforthetalltree-trunk-like appearance ofthelaunch tubes. The number ofmissiles wasarrived atbya sortof“Kentucky windage” analysis,tradingoff technicaland operationalfactorsto arriveat a

reasonable solution. TheGeorge Washington anditsfoursistershipsof

the 598classwere380feetlongand 33 feetwide,displacing6,700

tonswhensubmerged. Theycarried a crewoftenofficers andone hundred men,andweredriven bysteam turbines powered byawatercoolednuclear reactor.

Therewerenumerous otherchallenges associated withcreating

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thisnewclass ofsubmarines, butthesewerewellwithinthegrasp of naval designers anddidnotapproach theproblems facing theRabornRootteam.Threeinertial navigation systems wereinstalled toprovide navigation capability forthesubmarine andto enablethemissile to

belaunched fromaspecific spot.Oneofthemostimportant decisions motortobe andallowtherocket wasto usegasto ejectthemissile airwas Compressed in theair,wellclearofthesubmarine. ignited usedforthefirsttenboats,butthiswasreplaced laterbya gasgenerating propellant. Curiously, underwater launch turned outtobe wasa the submarine for launch, surface farsafer—than better—and steady platform andthefluiddynamics ofthelaunch werenotso troublesome ashadbeenimagined.

ThePolarisSeries hedimensions ofthemissile sectionofthesubmarine hullhadto

conformto the hull’soriginalsize,and thisin turn dictatedthe

limitsonmissile size.Itwasagreed thatthemissile diameter wouldbe fixedat 54 inches,lengthat 28.5feet,andweightat (ultimately)

thanthemissile, tubewas3 feetlonger Thelaunch pounds. 28,500 toaccommodate ancillary equipment andpotential growth. Theseweretheonlylimitations ontheimagination oftheplan-

Task astheSpecial 7,1957, nerswhometforthefirsttimeonJanuary accompaPlan,” Development Master senta “Polaris LMSD Group. Louis Dr. Bednarz, Frank Burriss, Stan burr-cut niedbyHawkins, Ridenour(headofLockheed’s Research Laboratories), SidBrown,and WillyFiedler,oneof“ourGermanscientists,” whohadmanagedthe

V-1pilotless bombprogram inWorldWarII.Adecision wasmade

early ontomake themissile performance requirements flexible, sothat available. became components asimproved could beachieved increases LMSD expanded onceagain, thistimewithahuge4,400-acre tested thefacility byArtHubbard, Cruz.Managed atSanta testfacility Theproblems firings. captive inmorethanthreehundred thePolaris fromtheveryfirstV-2 development missile inballistic encountered included nozzles, thrustandvector control, terminating thrust,and general missile configuration. Submarine deployment addedtothese

withproblemsofstorage,maintenance, underwaterlaunch,andfirst-

stageignition.

Asmorethanoneveteranoftheprogramhasremarked,ifallthe

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TheSovietUnionconstantly increasedthe numbersand the accuracyof its intercontinental ballistic missiles,to the point that U.S.land-basedmissilesand bomberswere in jeopardy.The incredibleresponsewas the Polaris, a submarine-launched ballistic missilethat revolutionizedthe strategy of deterrence.Thefirst Polariswas launchedfromthe submerged USSGeorgeWashingtonon July 20, 1960.

problems hadbeenknownat thebeginning, noonewouldhave started.

BySeptember 24,1958,theflighttestofthePolaris AX-series ofprototypes began atCapeCanaveral withtheusualinitial failures. Yetthesefailures wereessential topinpoint problems thatnever could havebeenimagined,muchlesssimulated,in a laboratory setting.For

example, itwasfound thattheexpanding exhaust gases fromtherocket behaved differently atlowaltitudes andspeeds thantheydidathigh

altitudes andhighMachnumbers. At upperelevations andhigher speeds,a backflow ofhotgasescauseda concentration ofheatthat disrupted theairflow aroundthemissile anddamaged equipment.

Ina similar way,it wasdetermined thattherocketcouldbe controlled bythrustvectoring, using WillyFiedler—designed “jetevators,”metalquadrants activated intherocketexhaust. Thecrucial timingof thrusttermination, absolutely essential foraccuracy, was

effected bysimple blow-out portsonthefrontoftherocket. These andotherproblems were solved bythefirsttrulysuccessful

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flightoftheAX-6onApril20, 1959.ByAugust27,thePolariswas

successfully launched atseafromthetestshipObservation Island.

Thesecond series ofprototypes wastestedona largescalethrough

thenextyear;outoffortyflights, onlytwenty-eight werecompletely successful; eleven were partly successful andonewasafailure. Prudence might havedemanded moretesting toinsure success, buttheschedule

wasrunningout,anda decision wasmadetolaunchthefirstopera-

tional Polaris Almissile fromtheGeorge Washington onJuly20,1960. The1,000-mile flight downtherange wasasuccess, andinwhatsome called bravado butwasreally well-earned confidence, a second suc-

cessful missile waslaunched threehourslater. Rabornsent“success” messages fromthesubmarine tothepresidentandto Navyofficials. Oneparagraph ofhismessage reflected thenationalattitudetowardtheuseofa nucleardeterrent. It said:

havetousethisnewandpowerful sea “Godgrantthatwewillnever butwillbeallowed tokeepitbelow theoceanic curtain starinanger, greatest hiding place, ona silentpeace patrolforfree intheworld’s men.”Therewasa bitofapoetintheadmiral. Thus,in just underfourand one-halfyears,the programhad

gonefromconception to reality, foronNovember 15,1960,the George Washington sailed fromCharleston, South Carolina, forthefirst FBMpatrolinhistory. BytheJanuary1, 1961,deployment date,thePolarisAl had

met all the interimrequirements, includinga 1,200-nautical-mile

range. Theimpact ofthedeployment ofanSSBM onthestrategic scenewasequivalent tothatofSputnik onthescientific scene. The international strategic equation wasaltered forever, asaninvisible, almost invulnerable deterrent wasdeployed, onethatprovided anunassailable second-strike capability toguarantee “assured destruction” oftheenemy.

TheSoviet Union reacted withtheskillandintensity itmustered atthetime,anddiverted vastresources tocreating andsustaining a similar fleet.Thelaterbreakup oftheSoviet Union caused aninterim declineinsubmarineactivity,butRussia,inthefaceofitsdiminished

defense spending, hasrecently decided togivepriority toitsfleetof nuclear missile launchers asbeingitsmostsustainable, mosteffective

strategic weapon.

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Subsequent Developments hebynowexperienced Navy-Lockheed teamwasabletobringthe

Polaris A2swiftly intoservice. Theprincipal changes werelength-

eningthefirst-stage motorbythirtyinches, andenhancing theperformance ofthesecond stage byreducing itsinertweight through the useofglass filament—-wound chambers, increasing itspower andintroducing a rotatable nozzle forcontrol. These improvements combined togivethePolaris A2a 1,500-mile range. Thefirstsubmarines designed fromthekeeluptohandle ballistic missiles cameintoservice withthe608class, ofwhich theUSSEthan Allen wasthefirstoffive.These hadalength of410feetandasubmerged displacement of7,900tons,andretained the33-foot beam width.Boththe598and608classusedthecompressed-air ejectsystem forlaunch.Workwasimmediately begunon the616class,ofwhich

31would bebuilt.These were15feetlonger thanthe608class boats, anddisplaced 8,250tons,submerged. Thecrewwasincreased to14 officers and126enlisted personnel, andthemissiles usedagas-steam generator ejectsystem. ThePolaris A3wasapproximately an85percent newdesign, intended toachieve a60percent increase inrange without anyincrease inoverall size.Implicit inthegreater rangewasa requirement for greater accuracy aswell. Advanced engineering introduced newthrust-

vectorcontrols, revisedreentry-body materials, theuseof a nylon-

phenolic ablative shield, andmorepowerful propellants. Thesingle

warhead wasreplaced bythreereentry bodies. Thesecovered thetarget

areamoreeffectively andreduced thepossibility ofinterception. Aftera somewhat troubled testperiod, theA3missile became operational onSeptember 28,1964. TheA3wasdelivered ayearahead oftheoriginal schedule andits2,500-mile rangecovered theentire Eurasian landmass, andopened upvastnewareasoftheoceanfor purposes ofconcealment. IfLockheed’s LMSC andthenavyhaddonenomorethanbring theA3intoservice, thatfactwould havebeenconsidered anextraor-

dinaryexample ofindustrial proficiency. It wasinfactjusta starting pointforthecontinued development of fleetballistic missiles that wouldtipthebalance inworldpower.

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TheFleet BallisticMissile programwas one of the most successfuldefenseprogramsin history.It resulted in a successionof SLBMthat included the Poseidon,a major improvementon the Polaris,and first sea-launchedin 1970.

ThePoseidonC3 heSoviet Unionwasadeptatcountermeasures, anddespite the potentcapability ofPolaris missiles, itwasnecessary forthenavy tolooktothefuture. Ithadbeendetermined thattherequirements forshock-mitigation ofthemissiles within thelaunch tubescouldbe reduced. Thispermitted missile diameter tobeincreased fromthe Polaris’s fifty-four inches toasmuchasseventy-four inches, andmade possible improvements inrange, payload, andaccuracy. It soonbecameapparentthatthe mostefficient newmissile

would beamultiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV). Called thePoseidon C3,thenewmissile usedthefullseventy-four inches available fordiameter, wasthirty-four feetlong,andweighed a massive sixty-four thousand pounds—well overtwice asmuchasthe original Polaris. Efficiency wasgained byaPostBoost Control system thataccurately metered reentry-vehicle separation anddeployment. TheC3couldcarryuptofourteen smallMk3 reentry bodies, each ofwhichcouldbeindependently targeted. Independent analysis indicated thatthePoseidon would beeighttimes aseffective asitsPolaris predecessors.

ThefirstPoseidon launch fromasubmarine tookplace onAugust 3,1970,fromtheUSSJames Madison. Thirty-one 616-class subma-

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TheTridentrepresents the fifth generationof SLBMs,and is carried on the huge Ohioclass nuclear submarines.

rinesweremodified tocarrythePoseidons, whose effectiveness wasa forcemultiplier, easing patrolandmaintenance schedules whileimposing fargreater challenges onthedefenses oftheSoviet Union.

TheTridentSystem YY . theimproved missiles offered a muchgreater strategic capability, thesubmarines carrying themhadnotreceived asimilar degree ofimprovement. Soviet anti-submarine warfare efforts hadintensified, anditwasnecessary tocounter them.Theproposed answer wastheUndersea Long-Range Missile System (ULMS), which would consist ofnewsubmarines, muchquieter because ofimproved hulland propulsion designs, andanewmissile. Inearly1972, theULMS was redesignated Trident 1(C4).TheTrident testprogram, based onthe greatexperience ofthepast,wentsmoothly, andfirstwenttoseain October 1974, ontheUSSFrancis Scott Key. TheUSSOhio wasthefirstofthenewTrident-class submarines, which werestealthy, required lessmanpower, andwereendowed with athirty-year service lifethatrequired overhauls onlyevery nineyears.

TheTrident-class submarine is 560feetlong,42 feetwide,hasa

submerged displacement of18,700 tons,andcancarry twenty-four of thelarger Trident missiles. TheTridentis a muchmoresophisticated missile thanthe

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Poseidon,with a morepowerfulthree-stageengine,decreasedinert

weight,andmoreefficient energymanagement. Thelatterwas achieved bygeneralized energy management steering, which involves shaping thetrajectory byburning allboostpropulsion stages toburnout, ratherthanusingthrustterminationwithblow-outpanels.Ad-

ditional range wasachieved inpartbyincreasing propellant volume byadding thethird-stage rocket motorwithinthenosefairing. The range wasalmost doubled, tonearly fivethousand miles, yettheTridentcarried thesamepayload withequalaccuracy. Theadditional rangeremoved therequirement fortheexpensive andpolitically volatileforward-basing policy. TheTrident missile wasalsothebeneficiary ofthegeneral gain in missileelectronics. Thispermitted theinstallation of additional equipment, including a stellar-inertial guidance system, andimproved

navigation andfire-control systems. Similar improvements inmaterials technology allowed thesubstitution ofcomposite graphite-epoxy materials tobuildstructures at40percent oftheirweight ifdonein aluminum. Thescience ofaerodynamics contributed anunusual and unexpected improvement withtheinvention ofadeployable aerospike, aneedlelike extension extended shortly afterlaunch thatreduced the frontal dragofthemissile by50percent. TheTrident(C4)wasthirty-four feetlongandseventy-four inches indiameter; itweighed 65,000 pounds. Ithadachieved twice therange ofthePoseidon, andwasbrought inonschedule, within 6 percentoftheoriginal costestimates.

Nomatterhowsuccessful thelastprogram, progress demands

change,andit camein theformoftheTridentII (D5),onwhich

Lockheed began advance design workin1978. Thenavy issued a letter contract onOctober 21,1983,andaformal contract wassigned on March 12,1984, foratotalamount inexcess of$5.7billion foreightytwotestandproduction missiles. TheTridentII is significantly larger, weighing in excess of 120,000 pounds, andhaving alength ofjustoverforty-four feetand a diameter ofeighty-three inches. Performance details areclassified, butequal orexceed thoseoftheoriginal Trident. Thestructure ofthe Trident IIhasbeenlightened bytheextensive useofgraphite-epoxy structures inthefirstandsecond stages. Perhaps thegreatest, andhardest-earned, tribute fortheTrident IIcamefromRepresentative LesAspin, thenchairman oftheHouse Armed Services Committee, andamannotedforhisvigilant oversight ofdefense programs. Aspin stated, “Ofallthestrategic weapon systems

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thatwehavelookedat,we’vegiventhisonethehighestmarks.”He

attributed theTridentII’ssuccess tofivefactors, whichwere:

1.Thenavy program management created ano-cover-up culture. 2.Theprogram hadcontinuity ofmanagement. 3. TheStrategic Systems Project Office (SSPO) hadauthority commensurate withitsresponsibility. 4.TheSSPO hadresponsibility notonlyfortheproduction of theTrident, butforitsreliability andlogistics aswell. 5.TheD5program avoided novelty foritsownsake.

Reflections heFleetBallistic Missile program wasanalmost miraculous accomplishment, squeezed intoa timetable thatanysensible manager would havedeemed impossible. Anditwasduetotheincredible cooperation—and ability—of theNavy-Lockheed team,whohadnot addressed butassaulted problems toinsure theirsolution. Theauthor, asaretired AirForce officer, mustreluctantly admit thatthesystem usedbytheNavyinstaffing theFBMproject office wassuperior tothecorresponding system management efforts bythe AirForce. Thedifference wasintenure. TheNavy would assign personnel foranaverage ofsixyears ontheproject, while atypical project officer would average onlytwenty-seven months onacomparable Air Force program. TheNavy oftenplaced itsofficers indeputy positions, thenadvanced themtoprogram officer whentheincumbent left,givingevenmoreexperience. Thelonger tenure enabled strong relationshipstodevelop between Navyandcontractor personnel. Putbaldly,

Naval officers could embrace asingle program forasubstantial portion oftheircareer without fearthattheircareer progress would beinhibited;AirForce officers didnothavethesameassurance. Rabornservedin themostadmirable stylefromDecember 5,

1955,throughMarch8, 1962,carryinghim throughthe PolarisAl

andA2programs andmostofthewaythrough thePolaris A3.Hewas succeeded byVice Admiral I.J.“Pete” Galantin, whohadsunk23,820 tonsofenemy shipping ascommander ofthesubmarine Ha/butin World WarII.Galantin, theonlysubmariner todirecttheprogram,

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served forthreecrucial years, during which thePoseidon C3waswell launched. Galantin wassucceeded byRaborn’s right-hand man,Captain Levering Smith, among whose decorations wasonefortransforming research onsolidrocket propellants intoreality. HecametotheSPO inApril1956andbecame director oftheStrategic Systems Project Office(astheSPOwaslaterrenamed) inFebruary, 1965.Heretired fromtheNavyasa viceadmiralon April1, 1972,but agreedto be

recalled andremained onactivedutyinthesamepositionuntilNovember15,1977.Histwenty-one-year tenureisprobably unmatched in anyweaponsystemin U.S.history,andcoveredtheentirePolaris,

Poseidon, andTrident missile programs.

Thereweremanyothernavalofficers whoinfluenced thefleet ballistic missile program, buttwostandoutforboththeiraccomplish-

ments andtheirlongstewardship oftheprogram. Rear Admiral Robert H.Wertheim worked ontheprogram from1956to1961,andagain from1965untilhisretirement in1980.Hewas“thewarhead man,” coordinating effortswiththeAtomicEnergyCommission. RearAdmiralGlenwood Clark,a nuclearphysicist, wasinvolved infleetballisticmissile workfrom1966to 1985.Thecontinuity andfocusthat

suchlongevity inleadership positions confers isofincalculable value. Itwasmorecustomary forcontractor personnel tobewithprograms longer, andthefleetballistic missile program wasblessed by having people fromLockheed whowerefullyequalinability and dedication toRaborn andhiscolleagues. DanTellep, whowould rise totheverytopofLockheed andthentheLockheed Martin Corporation, began workonX-17missile reentry flight experiments in1955, anddeveloped high-temperature insulation materials thatwerelater usedontheSpaceShuttle.Hemadegreatcontributions totheFBM andcontinuedthroughwithLMSCuntil 1986,andofcoursemain-

tainedhisinterestfromhissubsequent corporate positions. StanBur-

risshadalsohadaprominent position intheX-17program, asflight testdirector,andbecamedirectoroftheFleetBallisticMissilesystem

in1956.BobFuhrman joinedthePolaris program in1958androse totheposition ofgeneral manager oftheMissile Systems Division in 1969,before goingontoothersenior positions. Derald Stuart wasa tenured professor atCornell, consulting onsolidrocket propulsion, anditwashewhohelped persuade Admiral Raborn ofthepotential efficacy ofsolid-fuel rockets. StuartjoinedLockheed inFebruary 1958

asPropulsion StaffManager, andcontinued withtheFBMprogram untilhisretirement in 1987.

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Otherstrong managers andboldpersonalities lefttheirimprints ontheFBMprogram. Typical ofthisbreedweremenlikeLloyd Wilson, RayMunson, KenSmith, ArtHubbard, Howie Burnett and DaveMontague.

Thetremendous success oftheFBMprogram mayfairly beattributed tothefactthattheoft-derided military-industrial complex wascomposed ofbrilliant, dedicated menandwomen onbothsides. Theyworkedwithoutregardto clock,paycheck,and in someinstances,theirhealth,to assurethat the weaponsystemsthe nation

needed wereprovided intheshortest possible time. Theachievements oftheMissile Systems Division weresogreat, soswift, andsoprofitable thatitwould ordinarily seemunlikely that itsorganizational counterpart, theSpace Systems Division, would be abletodoequally wellunderthedemanding circumstances ofspace flight—but suchwasthecase.

SpaceSystemsDivision(SSD) ecurity considerations make itimpossible even intoday’s post—cold warworldtotellmorethanthesmallest percentage ofthemany

contributions theSpaceSystems Division hasmadetothedefense of thefreeworld.Onlytheveryfirstachievements, thosethatbeganin

theearly1950s, havebeencleared fordiscussion. Therearemany people fromLockheed whoparticipated inwhatwasunquestionably themostimportant anddecisive intelligence campaign inhistory, one thateffectively opened theSoviet Uniontocomplete inspection. Unfortunately, forreasons ofsecurity, theyarestillunable totellexactly whattheydidorhowtheydidit.Evenwhena program hasbeen declassified, itsparticipants remain unwilling todivulge information asamatter ofhabit,andbecause ofconcern thattheymightinadvertentlystrayoutside thebounds ofdeclassified material. Lockheed’s involvement intheblackworldofgathering intelli-

gencefromspacebeganin theimmediate postwar years. Anearly RAND Corporation studyentitled Feasibility andUtility ofSatellite Vehicles hadinduced a tepidlevel ofinterest atLockheed. Theplaintive beeps ofSputnik I brought aboutasuperheated atmosphere inwhich Lockheed wouldmorethanrisetotheoccasion—it wouldrisebeyond

allknown boundaries inspace withexotic equipment thathadnever before beenconceived of,andmostofwhich remains topsecret today.

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Opening ClosedSkies ps

Eisenhower understood thatPremier Khrushchev’s rebuff oftheOpenSkiesproposal meantthatmoreinformation hadto

beobtained onSoviet intentions. Onealternative, exercised hundreds oftimesbutkepta closely guarded secret fordecades, wasthepresidentially authorized overflights oftheSoviet Unionanditsallies by NorthAmerican RB-45s, Boeing RB-47s, andLockheed Neptunes.

Theseweresupplemented byProject GENETRIX, withmethods that

harkened backtoWorld WarIIandtheJapanese efforts tobombthe United States withincendiary-laden balloons. Beginning onJanuary 22,1956,camera-carrying balloons, launched frombases inTurkey andflyingat altitudesupto forty-thousand feet,driftedacrossthe

Soviet Union, taking photographs. Theywere recovered inmidair over thePacific. Morethanfourhundred balloons were launched andfortyfivewererecovered. Thephotographs wereuseful primarily formapping.(In1957,a single attempt wasmadetousethejetstreams to launchballoons fromthePacific, to flywestovertheSovietUnion

andberecovered inWestern Europe. Theinitial balloon camedown justinside theEastGerman border andimmediately wasplaced on exhibit inRedSquare asanexample ofanAmerican provocation.) TheU-2provided aninterim capability, buttheadvances in Soviet technology demonstrated bySputnik I andSputnik IIpointed thewaytothefuture. Thelatter,besides beinga stunning scientific achievement, wasalsoa masterstroke ofpublicrelations because it carrieda dog,Laika,thefirstanimalto travelin space.Theseorbital

flightscausedthesecretary ofdefense, NeilH.McElroy, toaccelerate

aprogram begun evenbefore thefirstSputnik, inOctober 1956. At thattime,theAirForce’s Ballistic Missile Division hadgiven Lockheed acontract todevelop anadvanced military satellite system (WS-117L). WS-117L hadthreeprograms: Discoverer, aboutwhichmore

later,SAMOS(stillclassified), andMIDAS, asatellite communication

system. Toitschagrin, Lockheed losttheMIDAS contract toTRW &Hughes intheearly1960s. Itworked veryhardtowinthecontract backformany years, andfinally succeeded withtheaward oftheSpace BasedInfraredSystem(SBIRS),to bediscussed in thenextchapter.

TheWS-117L upper-stage vehicle weighed several thousand pounds andwascapable ofin-orbit propulsion andcontrol. Thisbecame theworkhorse satellite ofthespace age,named forthestarAgena,

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otherwise known asBetaCentauri, andperpetuating theLockheed custom ofusingstellar phenomena fornames. ALockheed technical papersuccinctly describes thesystem. It says: Matedto a rocketbooster,Agenaconsistedofa three-axis

gyroguidance andcontrol system withcorrection inputs fromhorizon sensors thatenabled precise cold-gas valve firings;anelectrical system withsixone-hour batteries; atelemetry, command andtracking system; arecovery system ofathermally protected reentry capsule witharetro-rocket, cold-gas spin-stabilized attitude control system, power supply,telemetry linkandacquisition beacon, sequence timer andparachute; andapropulsion system using a Bellrocket engine delivering 16,000 pounds ofthrustfororbital injection.Avertical looking, reciprocating, 70-degree panoramic Itekcamera exposed theEastman Kodak filmbyscanning atrightangles tothelineofflight. Thefirstcamera useda 24-inch focal-length, f/5.0Tessar lens,withimage motion compensation. Theimagery wasretrieved byaircatchfollowing ejection byasequence timeroftheGeneral Electric reentry capsule containing thefilm. Thethree-axis stabilization created a thermal problem, forthe uppersurface wasexposed continuously todirect sunlight during part ofeachorbit,whiletheentirevehicle wouldbecloaked infreezing temperatures during otherparts. Apassive cooling system wasinstalled thatusedconduction andradiation techniques tocontrol temperatures.Thetechnique wassubsequently adapted forallU.S.satellites andspace probes. Inmarked contrast, theSoviet Union usedanactive thermal system, which wasfarlessreliable. Agenamadeits firsttrip into orbitin 1959,and subsequently

achieved scores ofspectacular firsts, including thefollowing: 1.firstspacecraft toachieve a circular orbit; 2. firstspacecraft toachieve apolarorbit; 3. firstto bestabilized in allthreeaxesin orbit;

4.firsttobecontrolled inorbitbyground command;

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5.firsttoreturnaman-made object fromspace; 6.firsttopropel itselffromoneorbittoanother; 7.firsttopropel aspacecraft onsuccessful Marsflyby; 8.firsttopropel aspacecraft onasuccessful Venus flyby; 9. firstrendezvous anddocking oftwospacecraft; 10.firstspacecraft toprovide propulsive powerforanother.

Theseastounding featswereachieved bya company withno previous experience inthefield,anduponitsfirstventure intothe discipline. TheAgena wasusedindozens ofprograms inthecourse ofhundreds ofmissions, carrying outthemajority ofspacemissions

forboththeAirForce andtheNational Aeronautics andSpace Ad-

ministration (NASA). It hascarriedonmorediversified experiments

andbeenusedonmoredifferent boosters thananyothersatellite, yet

itsnameisonlymoderately familiar tothepublictoday.Therearetwo reasons forthis.Oneissecurity, whichcloaked manyofthemissions insecrecy, sothatnopublicity wasgiven.Theotheristhatmostof

theAgena missions (withtheexception ofitsroleasatarget docking

devicein Gemini-Agena missions)had no obviousrelationshipto

tocapture widespread interest. manned space flight, andthusfailed technical success, serving asthe TheAgena wasa remarkable vehicles (Atlas, Thor,andTitan) upperstage ofmany standard launch primary andsecondary payloads. andasthesatellite platform formany

TherocketmotoroftheAgena hadbegunlifeastheBellModelLR81-

BA-1 rocket engine andhadbeenintended togivea stand-off capabilitytoabombpodplanned forusewiththeConvair B-58Hustler supersonic bomber.

TheAgena’s success wasachieved atatimewhenitscomponents werestillbasedon pretransistor technology. Minoru“Sam”Araki

worked hiswaythrough theranksasa systems engineer tobecome president ofLMSC andavicepresident oftheLockheed Martin Corporation. Samlaughingly recalled ina 1997interview thattheorbital sequence ofearly Agena spacecraft wascontrolled bymylar punch tapes notunlike thepapertapesusedina player piano! Curiously, inthe lightofallthesuccesses oftheAgena program, Araki expressed acommonLockheed feeling thattherepeated success oftheAgena had actually beendetrimental tothefirm,inthatitinduced a“standard production model” mentality thatinhibited thinking onsomelater

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TheAGENA orbital vehiclebecamethe workhorseof the space program,used as the upper stage on standard launchvehicleslike the Atlas, Thor,and Titan. It was the satellite platformfor manyprimaryand secondarypayloadsin both civil and militaryapplications.

proposals. There wasinfacta “Standard Agena,” theAgena-D, which wastwenty-three feetthreeinches long,fivefeetindiameter, weighed 674pounds empty, andhadathrustof17,000 pounds fromitsBell rocketengine.Agenas wouldlaunch362times,witha 90percent

success rate.(Fred O’Green, amanwhomany predicted would become

chairman ofLockheed, butwhoinsteadbecame chairman ofLitton

Industries, wasproject engineer fortheStandard Agena.) TheAgena isasimportant foritseffect onLockheed asforits achievements in space. Arakirecalls, “Inthelate1950sandearly 1960s, wewereinapioneering stage, because nobody hadgoneinto spacebefore, andnobody evenhadthebasicscientific andphysics knowledge togointospace. Soinasense, wehadtoinvent science, inventengineering methods andinventmanagement methods tobuild anddevelop systems forspace.”Theprocess of“inventing science”

wouldbecome a wayoflifeforSSD,a mental setthatpermitted biddingon contractsthatdemanded achievements thatordinarily wouldhavebeendeemed impossible. Of allthevitalmissionstheAgenaaccomplished in itslifetime,

nonewasmoreimportant orambitious thanthatundertaken under thecodenameDiscoverer, butwasactually aderivative oftheoriginal Weapon System 117L, withitsowncodename, CORONA.

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Fiveearlierachievements madeit practical to proceed with

CORONA.Thesewere:

1. theavailability oftheprovenThorbooster;

2.thesuccessful development oftheAgena spacecraft; 3.thetechnology available fromballistic missiles toprovide reentryvehicles toshield thepayload onitsreturntoearth; 4. improved cameras derived fromtheGENETRIX program; and 5.equipment andtechniques foraerial retrieval ofpayloads, also derived fromtheGENETRIX program. WS-117L hadenvisioned aseries ofseparate systems usingsatellites tocollect photographic, infrared, andother, stillclassified, forms ofintelligence. Anextensive testprogram wasplanned, withWS-117L

beingtransferred totheStrategic AirCommand foroperation in1960. Worldeventsmovedmoreswiftlythanthetestprogram hadenvi-

sioned, andtheverysizeoftheprogram hadbrought agreatdealof public attention, including aptmedia speculation thatWS-117L was tobeatrue“spyinthesky.”Because ofthis,theDiscoverer “cover” fortheCORONA program laterhadtobesubstantially enhanced by

announcements thatthetestlaunches would include biomedical experiments, including recovering liveanimals fromspace. ByMarch 21,1958, adecision hadbeenmade atthepresidential leveltotransfer thephotographic element ofWS-117L toaseparate program, ProjectCORONA. Anewagency, theAdvanced Research Projects Agency(ARPA), wasestablished on February 7, 1958,to

exercise authority overallmilitary space projects. CORONA wasto becarried outundertheauthority ofARPA andtheCIA,withthe support andparticipation oftheAirForce. (Asa resultofthis,the CORONA program lacked theclearlinesofmanagement authority thattheU-2program enjoyed, andtherewasbureaucratic friction later between theAirForce andtheCIA.) Theobject wastocreate aphotoreconnaissance satellite, thefirstinhistory. Inessence, theARPA/CIA/

AirForceteamwouldtaskLockheed anditssubcontractors toachieve whathadneverbeenattempted beforewitha spacebooster, a spacecraft,a reentryvehicle, a camera, film,anda controlnetwork—none

ofwhichhadeverbeentested. Thepermutational chances offailure wereastronomical if yousimplymultiplied theknownchances

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offailure against eachother. Ifyouthenmultiplied theresultant numberbythechances offailure fromsometotally unknown event,it mighthaveseemed obvious thattheobjectives oftheCORONA programcouldneverbeachieved. Fortunately, bothgovernment andindustry wereendowed with

strong, supportive leaders whobelieved—in factinsisted—that the program couldandwould bedone,because itwasabsolutely vitalto

the nation’ssecurity.The CIAleader,RichardBissell(whokepthis mindsharpbymemorizing railroadtimetables), hadbeeninstrumental in theU-2program,ashadairforcemajorgeneralOsmond“Ozzie”

Ritland.(JohnMcMahon, whowasa topmanatboththeCIAand

thenLockheed, characterized Ritland as“animaginative general who didn’t worry aboutwhogotcredit. .. .Hewasreally ateamplayer.”) Bothmenknewhowto getthingsdoneon thegovernment side,

without intruding unnecessarily onthecontractor side.Thesimplicity oftheapproach wascharacterized bytheApril25,1958,CORONA workstatement, aone-page document. Asan indicationof the exotic,occasionally eccentricnatureof

theprogram, Bissell laterrecalled thathehadfirstlearned oftheprogramandhisfuturerolein it informally fromDr.EdwinLand. Land—the developer ofthePolaroid process—was deeply committed totheconcept ofreconnaissance. Landwasinvolved intheU-2and laterintheA-12/SR-71 programs, andthusknewoftheprogram before itsdirector. AtLockheed, James W.Plummer wasCORONA program manager,withoverall responsibility fortheproject. McMahon stated that “whatKellyJohnsonwasto theU-2program, JimPlummer wasto

theCORONA program.” Therespect withwhich Plummer washeld byhisLockheed andgovernment colleagues isremarkable; hehadthe giftofamanagement style which elicited thebestfromeveryone bya process ofexample. Ininterview afterinterview theauthor conducted at alllevelsofmanagement, Plummerwasreferredtowithadmiration

thatborders onawe. BorninIdahoSprings, Colorado, in1920, Plummer moved with hisfamily toCalifornia whenhewasayoung boy.Hegraduated from theUniversity ofCalifornia in1942withabachelor’s degree inelectricalengineering, justin timeto becommissioned in thenavy.After beingsentto Harvardforadvancedelectronics, andthento MITfor

secret training inradar, heputhistheoretical knowledge touseflying withthen—Lieutenant Commander, laterAdmiral, BillMartin, apioneerinnavalairnight-fighting tactics. Plummer flewinGrumman

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torpedo planes, training personnel ontheuseofradarfornightlowlevelbombing. Afterthewar,Plummer gained hismaster’s degree in electrical engineering andwenttoworkforLockheed, where hisfirst program wastheX-17.Hewasthengiven responsibility forthepayloadsection oftheWS-117L program, butwassoonpulled offand assigned towhatwasdescribed tohimasan“underground” program. Hewasrequired totellhisfriends thathewasleaving Lockheed and thentoavoidanycontact withhis“former” Lockheed associates. A cover storywasfloated thathehadbeenassigned toanuclear project.

Plummer wasassigned a newoffice—in theFlamingo MotelonPalo Alto’sfamous maindrag,ElCaminoReal—and therestartedthepro-

cessofdesigning thepayload forCORONA.

Hisoriginalcriterialedto a spinningsatellite,a football-shaped deviceaboutsixfeetlongand twoand one-halffeetin diameter;it

hadareentry bodyinthenoseandacamera inthemiddle. Plummer’s original concept wasreplaced whena proposal wasreceived fromthe ItekCorporation, aBoston University spin-off. Itekproposed alongerfocal-length camerathantheoriginalFairchildcamera,carriedwithin

anearth-center stabilized pod.Thiswasa significant scientific chal-

lenge, happily metbyAgena’s three-axis stabilization. Itbecame the standard forsubsequent photo-reconnaissance systems. Plummer’s staffgrewtofourengineers, twoadministrators, and a shopcrewof ten,andtheymovedto quartersleasedfromHiller

Aircraft inPaloAlto.During thisperiod, hewasallowed tohavecontactwithonlyperson atLockheed, GeneRoot.Rootwaspresident ofLMSC andcommitted thetotalresources ofthecompany tothe CORONA program. HewastheonlytopLockheed executive tobe fullybriefed ontheprogram objectives. Plummeris a slender,veryathleticmanwitha strongpresence:

whenhewalks intoaroom,people takenotice. Heismodest, andit isdifficult togethimtotalkabouthisowncontributions—he insists thatit wasa totalteameffortinwhichheplayed buta part.His reticence stems inpartfromtheheavy security underwhich theprogramwasconducted, andwhich wasnotlifteduntiltheproject was declassified onFebruary 24,1995,twenty-three yearsafterthelast CORONA mission. However, Plummer isquicktocredithiscolleagues, including Willis Hawkins, whowonplaudits forhiscommonsense approach toesoteric engineering, andparticularly FredO’Green, who,aspreviously noted,managed thedesign, manufacture, andtest oftheAgena vehicle forCORONA. O’Green wasfamous (perhaps infamous) forcalling people induring theearly-morning hours towork

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onatechnical problem. Buthewasthereatallhourshimself, andno onecomplained. Plummer givesenormous creditto Dr.Frederic C.E.“Fritz”

Oder,whosebackground wasperfectforCORONA andsubsequent

inthe programs. Oderhadentered theAirForcein 1941,serving where Pacific theater. Afterthewar,theAirForce senthimtoUCLA, hecompleted hisPh.D.Asassistant tothecommander, AirForce inthe Western Development Division, hehadfigured prominently development oftheAtlas,Thor,Titan,andMinuteman missile sys-

tems,andwasthefirstdirectoroftheAirForceAdvanced Reconnais-

sanceSystem (WS-117L). Afterretiring fromtheAirForceasacolonel

in 1960,heworked forsixyearsatEastman Kodak before joining LMSC in1966asvicepresident, Space Systems Programs andEngineering. Hiscoworkers placehimonthesamesortofpedestal asPlum-

mer,andnotethathehadanuncanny knack forpicking talent, both

toworkonhisownprojects,andtobenominatedforswiftprogression

atLockheed.

Lockheed’s principal government contacts intheCIAwereBissellandJohnParangosky, whowasfirstdeputy, thenchiefofthe CORONA Program Office Development Staff. Within theAirForce, Plummer worked primarily withRitland andColonel Clarence L.

“Lee”Battle,whoguidedday-to-day management oftheprogram. He alsocreated“Battle’sLaws,”a setof ten management principles

designed to achieve thesameworkresultasKellyJohnson’s rules.

Although Plummer maynotbeforthcoming abouthisownrole, hiscolleagues arequick topointoutthatitwashisleadership qualities thatkeptmoralehighduringthealmostendless interval whenthings didnotgowell,andhisintellectual qualities thatkepttheprogram on

course. Plummer isalsoalways verycomplimentary aboutthecontributions ofthemajor subcontractors. These include Itek(which under theleadership ofWalter J.Levison developed thetwelve-inch, f/5panoramiccameraknownasHYAC);GeneralElectric(whichcreatedthe satelliterecovery vehicle[SRV]); andEastmanKodak(whichprovided

thetechnical solutions required whenitwasfoundthatlowtemperaturesandvacuum ofspace caused thewaterinthecamera filmto evaporate, makingit brittleandeasytotear). Plummer’s reputation wassuchthathewascalledto headthe

topsecret National Reconnaissance Office in1973; heleftLockheed reluctantly, anddidsoonlybecause hefeltit wasinthenational interest.

Itisdifficult toremember now,buttherewasneither real-world

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noracademic experience uponwhich todrawforthispioneering endeavor, except forthebasicprinciples ofphysics andengineering. Plummer andhisLockheed engineers hadtolearnhowtoanalyze, design, build,test,andoperate inspace literally fromscratch. There werenocomputers; thedesign toolsweresliderulesandmechanical calculators. Thestateoftheartofcomponents consisted ofvacuum tubesandelectric-driven motortimers.

ManyFailures—Then Success ee thephotoreconnaissance missionoftheCORONA hadto be

conductedin a nearpolarorbit,therewerefewsuitablelaunch

sites.Itwasdecided touseVandenberg AirForceBase, eightmiles northwest ofLompoc, California, where themajor drawback wasthat launches hadtobetimedto occurbetween theregular passage of Southern Pacific Railroad trains.

TheCORONAmissioncalledforalaunchofthemissile,which

wasatfirsttheThor/Agena, fromVandenberg to orbit,wherethe reconnaissance would beundertaken. Whentheinformation hadbeen gathered, therecovery sequence began. TheAgena vehicle (which had beenyawed 180degrees immediately afterithadbeeninserted inorbit) wouldbepitched downthrough 60degrees toposition thesatellite recovery vehicle(SRV)forretrofiring. Thesatellite recovery vehicle

wouldbeseparated fromtheAgena andspin-stabilized. Theretrorocket wouldthenbefired,slowing downtheSRVintoa descent

trajectory. ThespinoftheSRVwouldbeslowed, anditsretro-rocket

thrustcone, heatshield, andparachute cover would bejettisoned. The

deceleration parachute wouldbedeployed, andthenamainparachute

would open. Thenthesecond partofaprofoundly Rube Goldbergian recovery operation began. Prepositioned recovery aircraft, initially Fairchild C119sandlaterLockheedC-130s,wouldcatchthe parachutewitha

trapezelike collection ofcables between twolongpoles hanging down fromtheopenaftcargodoor.Thecables hadhooks withwhichto snagtheparachute. Oncecaught, theparachute andrecovery vehicle wouldbewinched onboard.Notsurprisingly, ittookanenormous amountofpractice andthedevelopment ofspecialized equipment to makethisrecovery system work.

Thefirstlaunch,on January21, 1959,retroactively designated

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DISCOVERER 0,was a failure assmall solidpropellant ullage rockets fired.(Theullage rockets wereintended toinsure thatliquidAgena propellants werepushed against thebottom ofthetankssothatproper flowtothepumps would occur.) Thedamage wasnotcatastrophic, andtheproblem waseasily identified andsolved. President Eisenhower called Bissell inforapersonal report onthesituation. OnFebruary 28,DISCOVERER Iwaslaunched withpartial success. TheDISCOVERER Iis believed tohavelanded somewhere near theSouthPole.

Eleven straight failures followed. DISCOVERER I ejected itscapsuleprematurely, anditfelltoearthnearSpitsbergen. DISCOVERER IIIwastheonlyonetocarry liveanimals, fourblack mice. TheAgena misfired, driving thevehicle intothePacific Ocean; nomouse survived, and,asmight beexpected, therewasanoutcry fromtheBritish Society

Against CruelSports. Thefirsttocarrya camera wasDISCOVERER IV,launched on

June25,1959,butitspayload didnotgointoorbit.DISCOVERER Vattained orbit,butlowtemperatures caused thecamera tofail.The recovery capsule didejectatthecorrect time,butdisappeared, onlyto bediscovered, stillin orbit,morethanayearlater.DISCOVERER VI

hadbothacamera andaretro-rocket failure. DISCOVERER VIIfailed togointoorbit,whileDISCOVERER VIIIwentintoaneccentric orbit,thecamera failed, andtherecovery parachute failed toopen. Asmightbeexpected, pressure began tobuildonallconcerned, forfailures hadoccurred inevery element ofthevehicle. Plummer recalls today thattherewasnodoubtinanyone’s mindthattheywould ultimately succeed; theyalsoknew theywould havetheirbosses’ backing,fortherequirement forintelligence thatcouldbeobtained from aworking CORONA system wasoverwhelming. NooneintheWest knewforsurehowmanyBisonandBearbombers theSoviets possessed, wheretheywerebased,orhowmanyICBMs wereoperational.

fromNovember 20, Theeightfailures caused a stand-down thecauses offailure. OnFebruary 1959, toFebruary 1960, toanalyze andfailed toachieve orbit. 4,DISCOVERER IXwaslaunched 19,andforthefirst DISCOVERER XwasflownonFebruary time,filmwasrecovered froma CORONAvehicle,but undermis-

erable circumstances. TheThorrocket booster hadtobedestroyed by therange safety officer fifty-two seconds afterliftoff; thepayload came downa mileaway.

On April15, DISCOVERER XI waslaunched;the orbitwas

Perhapsone of the greatest intelligencecoups in all history, the CORONA reconnaissance satellite systemprovided invaluableintelligenceon a scale neverbeforeconsideredpossible— and in the deepest secrecy. President DwightD. Eisenhower was a primarymovingforce behindthe CORONA program.

The CORONA capsulecontainingthe intelligencedata, was captured by this improbable method—snatchedout of the sky by a C-130transport.

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perfect, thecamera worked, andthefilmwasexposed andthentransferredto therecovery capsule. Unfortunately, thespinrockets exploded, andthepayload waslost. Theurgency surrounding theprogram wasreinforced onMay1,

1960,whenGaryPowers’s U-2wasshotdown.Anotherstand-down

wascalled, anda decision wasmadetolaunchDISCOVERER XII purelyasa diagnostic flight,carrying instrumentation instead ofa camera. Unfortunately, it failedtogointoorbit.Theconcept was repeated withDISCOVERER XIII,launched onAugust 10,1960, without filmandcamera. Thevehicle completed seventeen orbits, and capsule ejection wasnormal. Thecapsule camedownabouteighty miles fromthepredicted impact point,butfloated andwasrecovered. Thesuccessful recovery wasgivenmassive publicity, withmany

shotsofPresident Eisenhower beaming atthecapsule priortoitsbeing given totheSmithsonian Institution. Thenextmission justified thefaiththathadbeenplaced inPlummerandhiscrew.DISCOVERER XIV,launchedonAugust18,1960,

wasacomplete success, making seventeen orbits around theearth, then ejecting 20pounds offilminitscapsule, tobesnatched outoftheair at8,500feetonthethirdpassbyaC-119 ofthe6593rd TestSquadron,flown byCaptain Harold E.Mitchell. The filmwasanalyzed,and whileit lackedthe resolutionof

U-2photos, it covered areasoftheUSSR neverpreviously photographed. Thesingle mission hadproduced photocoverage ofagreater areathanalltheU-2missions combined. Itwasanoutstanding accomplishment, andit bodedwellforthefutureasequipment, launch techniques, andfilmwererefined. Atwenty-four-inch camera witha

newPetzval lenswasinstalled, andresolution wasimproved fromforty feettotwelve feet. SamArakicommented laterthat“failure byitselfisnotnecessarily bad,ifyouaredisciplined tolearnfromit,andimplement what isneeded tofixtheproblem. TheCorona program pioneered many concepts, andthelaunch padwasactually ourfactory.” The145thandfinalCORONA launch tookplaceonMay25, 1972,withrecovery onMay31oftworeentry vehicles carrying 160 pounds offilm.Theresolution wassuchthata printseven feetwide byonehundred feetlongwassharpfromendtoend.CORONA had provided photographic coverage of750millionsquarenautical miles

oftheearth’s surface. Thecameras hadimproved fromasingle camera

witha forty-foot resolution totwin-camera panoramic system witha

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ground resolution ofsixtotenfeet.ByJuneof1964, CORONA had photographed alltwenty-five Soviet ICBM complexes, andhadthoroughly debunked thebomber andthemissile gap.Itisnottoomuch tosaythatCORONA provided military intelligence thatmayhave precluded theUnited States frommaking afatalmiscalculation about Soviet intentions. Itwasthusofalmost equalbenefit totheUnited States andtheSoviet Union. Unfortunately forthepurposes ofthisbook,thesuccessors to CORONA areallstillclassified, eventhough some ofthemhavebeen superseded inoperation bylaterequipment. TheLockheed/Air Force/CIA teamthathadworked together so wellintheCORONA program hita rockyspotduring theBayof Pigsfiascoin 1961,in theaftermathofwhichBissellwasfired.Pres-

identKennedy appointed JohnMcCone to runtheCIA,andhe elected togetoutofthereconnaissance business, giving thereconnaissance budget (which roughly equaled alltherestoftheCIAbudget)to theAirForce,alongwiththeresponsibility. Anunusual situation

fol-

lowed: boththeAirForceandtheCIAgaveLockheed contracts for theCORONA program. Lockheed management sentbothcontracts backandsaid,“Wewillruntheprogram atourexpense untilyou decide whoisgoingtobeincharge.” Andtheydidso,forseveral months, untiltheAirForce finally issued thecontract. Afterthirteen years, theprogram ended,butrecently released National Intelligence Estimates reveal thatCORONA 1. imaged allSovietmedium-range, intermediate-range, and ICBM complexes; 2. imaged eachSoviet submarine class fromdeployment toop-

erational bases;

3.provided inventories ofSoviet bombers andfighters; 4. revealed thepresence ofSoviet missiles protecting theSuez Canal inEgypt; 5.identified Soviet nuclear assistance tothePeople’s Republic of China; 6.monitored theSALT I Treaty; 7.Uncovered theSoviet antiballistic missile program; 8.identified Soviet atomic-weapon storage installations;

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sites; 9. identifiedPeople’sRepublicof Chinamissile-launching

missile airdefense of Soviet locations precise 10.determined batteries; 11.observed construction anddeployment oftheSoviet ocean surfacefleet;

andnet12. identifiedSovietcommandandcontrolinstallations works;

and targeting AirCommand forStrategic mapping 13.provided

bomberroutes;

northofMoscow. TestRange, Missile thePiesetsk 14.Identified intoa worldaeromadeLockheed andlaterefforts CORONA prorelay, inthecollection, expertise withunparalleled leader, space and of space and control analysis, fusion,dissemination, cessing, ground information systems.

Innovation andDiversity: LMSC’s KeyStrengths

andthereMissile D uringtheperiodinwhichtheFleetBallistic wasinLMSC developed, weresuccessfully satellites connaissance oneof each importance, great of p rojects other of hundreds in volved (and, limitations often, ofa bookofitsown.Space whichisworthy allofthem.In each evennaming prohibit considerations) security Lockheed/government/ and posed, were problems case,formidable ofthese sampling them.Justthemerest teamsovercame subcontractor includethe useofAgenaon manyNASAlaunches,includingRanger

studmining; ofundersea oftechniques thedevelopment andMariner; space ata a ttempt anearly Laboratory, Orbiting iesontheManned forusein generators of nuclear-powered thedevelopment station; a prototype of creation the Orbiter; the Lunar o f launch the space; of the launch the (DSSV); SearchVehicle DeepSubmergence oil forremoving system Sweep theClean satellite; weather Nimbus-D theHughes S huttle; theSpace on be used to theinsulation spills; debutinreality vessel, abottom-mining ostensibly Explorer, Glomar

signedto recovera sunkenSovietnuclearsubmarine;the creationof

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militaryandcommercial satellitesystems;antiballistic missiledefense;

andthelistgoesonandon.

Alltheprograms werenotableinmanydistinctive ways,butone

bearsmention because it illustrates LMSC’s ability to pioneer new

technologies. On June 10, 1984,the Missilesand SpaceCompany

conducted a watershed testin whichitsexperimental ground-based interceptor (called theHoming Overlay Experiment) waslaunched fromaremote atollinthePacific. Itsuccessfully intercepted adummy wathead launched onanICBMbooster fromVandenberg AirForce Base.Described asabullethittingabullet,thedebrisfromthe20,000 mile-per-hour impact(which occurred nearly100milesabovethe earth)felltoaswath ontheocean somefortymileswideandeighty miles long.Thisdramatic demonstration waspivotal inourcountry’s commitment tothedevelopment ofballistic missile defenses. LMSC’s success wasingreatmeasure directly responsible forthe

victorious outcome ofthecoldwar.While otherelements ofthefirm provided strong weapons intheformofbothaircraft surveillance and antisubmarine-warfare aircraft, LMSC hadgoneto theheartofthe matter.It haddesigned,built,andlaunchedthe satellitesystemsthat gathered theinformation withwhich todetermine thecapabilities and intentions oftheSoviet Union. LMSC hadbacked upitsreconnaissance efforts withthestrong fleetballistic missile forcethattheSoviet Unionfounddifficult, ifnotimpossible, tocounter.

TheironyofLockheed’s greatachievements in helpingtowin thecoldwarlayinthefactthattheendofthecoldwarmeantasharply

diminished military requirement forLockheed products. Diminished requirements meantmorethanjustdiminished profits; theveryexistenceofLMSC andLockheed wassuddenly at stake. Adownsizing wasinevitable; thegreatquestion waswhether Lockheed couldcompeteinthenewmarketplace whenthedownsizing hadrunitscourse. Lockheed management realized thatLockheed wouldhaveto reinvent itself.It wouldhaveto adoptentirely newwaysofdoing business tosurvive inthecommercial marketplace. Morethanthat,it would havetodevelop newproducts, newcustomers, andevermore efficient waysofdoingbusiness. Manyobservers feltthatitwouldbe difficult, if notimpossible, fora longtime defense contractor, one whose workwasconducted primarily “intheblack” withverylittle scrutiny, tocompete inthecruelworld ofcommercial business. LMSCledthewayforLockheed toprovethemwrong.

CHAPTER 10

LMSC: Scientific Breakthroughs andthe Challenge ofPeace

triedtobutcontinually management Lockheed’s vertheyears, government other with contracts with business defense i ts tress companies. withcommercial state,andlocal—and agencies—federal, ofthis at thistaskandthepurpose mostdiligent wasalways LMSC

()

andhow howfaritseffortsledthecompany, chapteristo illustrate

asa wholeforthe butLockheed notonlyLMSC wellit prepared thesimulincluded Thatpreparation Marietta. withMartin merger and military civil into new capabilities ofLMSC’s extension taneous programs,bothbeforeandafterthedateofthemerger.

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TheCosmicTimeMachine neofthemosttechnically significant—and philosophically satisfying—steps toward thegoalofsecuring contracts otherthanfor

defense hasbeentheHubblespacetelescope, whichbecame asymbol

ofLockheed’s ability toadapttheexperience gained initsdefense efforts toworthy civilprojects. Called “aCosmic TimeMachine,” theHubble Space Telescope

hascaptured theimagination oftheworld,atfirstbecause ofthesheer

audacity oftheconcept andthenbecause ofthedrama attendant on itslaunch. Theinitial difficulties andsubsequent repair efforts heightenedtheexcitement. Finally, bothscientists andthemaninthestreet werestaggered byitsmind-expanding penetration oftheuniverse. Developed undertheleadership ofValPeline, BillWright, andBill Bulkin, theHubble Space Telescope continues toamaze andconfound theworld withitsglimpses ofinfinity. TheHubble Space Telescope wasfirstproposed bythelateLymanSpitzerJr., a Princetonastronomer, whosuggested in 1947that

scientific instruments ofallsortsbeplaced inorbit.In1954, hesuggested thata telescope besoplaced, anideaasradical asanythen appearing incontemporary Buck Rogers orFlash Gordon comic strips. Planning began inthe1960s, andworkbegan inthe1970s and1980s. TheSpace Telescope became operational inthe1990s, afteritslaunch bythecrewofthespace shuttle Discovery onSTS-31, April25,1991. Thenewspace telescope wasnamed forEdwin Powell Hubble, theastronomer whofirstidentified galaxies outside ofourownMilky Wayinthe1920s, anddetermined thattheyarespeeding away from us.Thisworkprovided thebasisforthe“bigbang”theoryofan expanding universe moving away fromtheprimal eventof15billion to20billion years ago. Approximately thesizeofa railroad tankcar,theHubble is43.5 feetlong,14feetindiameter, andweighs 25,500 pounds. Inorbit,unimpeded bythedistortion oftheearth’s atmosphere, thespace telescope gave astronomers theopportunity tolookback14billion lightyears to theverybeginning oftheuniverse. Itwould, inasingle stroke, expand theobservable universe 350-fold, anunimaginable bonanza toastronomers. Lockheed wasresponsible forbuilding theunitandintegrating the sophisticated scientific instrumentation thatmade itfunction. Thephysicaldemands ontheSpace Telescope, withallitsintricate equipment, wereastounding; it orbitstheearthevery ninety-five minutes, encoun-

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TheHubbleSpaceTelescopecontinuesto awethe worldwiththe beautyof its photos and the almostimponderableimportanceof the informationthey render.

tering temperatures ranging fromover150degrees Fahrenheit tominus 150degrees. Thetelescope’s electronic sensors weredesigned tocollect lightatincredibly lowlevels; theimages captured weretobeconverted andsentbyradio waves totheGoddard Space Flight Station. Designed asapermanent, space-based observatory, theHubble

wasequipped to beserviced andrefurbished in orbit.Itsequipment

includes aWideField/Planetary Camera, aFaintObject Camera built bytheEuropean Space Agency, a FaintObject Spectrograph anda HighResolution Spectrograph. Following thetelescope’s launch,scientists weredismayed tofind

anaberration in itsmain2.4-meter (94-inch) mirror.A tinydistortion—themirror(manufactured bythePerkin-Elmer Corporation)

wastooflatneartheedgebyaboutone-fiftieth thewidthofahuman hair—resulted inthelightcollected bythemirror being spread intoa fuzzy halo.

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Afterinitialproblemswererectified,the HubbleSpaceTelescopehas providedan endlessstream of data that has revolutionizedscientificthought.

TheSpace Shuttle Endeavour, onSTS-61, launched fromCape

Canaveralon December2, 1993.Its crewof sevencarriedout the

repairs. TocorrecttheHubble’s vision,alargedevicecalledtheCorrectiveOpticsSpaceTelescope AxialReplacement (COSTAR) was

installed. COSTAR usedtencorrective mirrors torectify theerror. While therepairs wereunder way,anewWideField/Planetary camera wasinstalled andotherrepairs weremade.(Sam Arakichanged the popular repair analogy fromcorrecting astigmatism toaheart-bypass operation: therepairs putinanew,correct, optical pathtocorrect the problem, bypassing theoldoptical system.) Atthetimeofthiswriting, theHubble Space Telescope has circled theearthmorethanthirty-seven thousand times, inapaththat totalsmorethan800millionmiles;itsdataarestoredon hundredsof

opticaldisks,andithasobserved eightthousand celestial objects. Every

observation fromtheHubble hasexpanded scientific knowledge. It hasbeenlearned thatmassive black holesarereal,andarecommonly

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Lockheed’sinvolvementin space includeits shuttle processingactivities.

foundinthecoresofgalaxies; thatplanetformationiscommon among

stars;thatthereisa thinoxygenatmosphere onJupiter’s icymoon,

Europa; andthatabeltofhundreds ofmillions ofcomets encircles the solar system. Itis,inshort, acornucopia ofscientific data,andLMSC’s roleintheproject isoneofLockheed’s proudest achievements. TheHubble program alsoreadied thecompany foramajor shift initsoperating methods.

TheColdWarEndsandtheChanges Begin heMissiles andSpace element ofLockheed hadlongbeentremendously important foritscontribution tothefirm’s profit.Inthe ten-year periodfrom1983through 1992,LMSC accounted for46 percent oftotalcorporate sales of$96.1billion, andfor72percent of thetotalearnings fortheperiod of$2.8billion. Theseexcellent earnings hadbeenjustified bythenatureof LMSC’s workinboththemissile andspacesidesofthehouse. It should beunderscored thatthedefense contracts hadnotbeengolden handshakes. LMSC hadtoperform tocontract specifications thatwere probably beyond thecapability ofanyotherdefense firmandstill submit tothesametypeofrigorous review ofprofits thatother,less

technologically premier,firmsdid.LMSChadachieved profitability

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bybeinghighly productive, delivering ontime,andpaying closeattention toincentive clauses forperformance. Lockheed wascomfortable withitsearnings fromgovernment contracts, butnever stopped trying todevelop commercial interests as well,eventhough previous efforts byaviation companies toundertake bothcommercial andmilitary workinthesamefacility almost always failed. Mostdefense firms found thatthedemands ofcommercial work weretoodisparate, notonlyintermsofquality-control methods and record keeping, butincompetitive pressures. Asaresult, commercial endeavors usually encountered costoverruns thatmadethemunprofitable.LMSC,facedwiththe samechallenges that had undermined

othercompanies, would overcome them.

Victoryin the Gulf:WhatNow? hesuccessful conclusion ofthePersian GulfWarwasamajor factor intheultimate dissolution oftheSoviet Union. TheSoviet military realized thattheimpressive power demonstrated bytheUnited States intheGulfWaramounted tonothing lessthanspace-based warfare. Theleaders oftheSoviet Unionknewthattheirnation’s wretched economy couldnolongersupportthemilitary apparatus necessary to

compete withtheUnited States atthenew,higher standards thathad beeninvoked. World WarIIhadbeenwonbyattrition andtheapplication ofoverwhelming industrial might, andthiswasthepremise for U.S.success formuch oftheColdWar.Invivid contrast, theGulfWar waswonasan“information agewar,” andallfuture warsinwhich the United States participates willprobably befought onthisbasis. TheendoftheColdWarthuspresented Lockheed withanentirelynewsituation. Aspatriots, members ofmanagement weredelighted thatthelongperiod ofstruggle hadbeenresolved without a nuclear exchange, andwereproudofLockheed’s major—one could almost saydominant—role inachieving thathappy outcome. Butas businessmen,the sameleadersrealizedthat the new politicalera

brought withitanewbusiness era,onethatmeant acomplete change inthinking, methods, andproducts. AsSamAraki said,“Wespenttheyears from1991tothepresent toreinvent thecompany, tohavea newstrategy, anewwayofdoing business, andmoreimportantly, tocapture markets wenever sought before.” Todothis,LMSC hadtocreate standards ofquality control

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andproduction ofsucha highlevelthattheycouldbeusedforboth

commercial andmilitary contracts. Duringthecoldwar,Lockheed products hadbeenconcerned

withtreatymonitoring, theverification ofnational capabilities ofthe Sovietbloc,andenabling theU.S.Navyto deliveranoverwhelming nuclearstrikebysubmarine-launched missiles. Space-based systems

hadbeenoriented togathering information andproviding therequisite support foraretaliatory nuclear attack. Withthevictory intheGulf War,thefocus shifted, andtheprimary value ofspace-based systems became theirabilitytogatherandcontrolinformation andtoprovide themeansfortheuseofprecision guidedmunitions.

YettheColdWarvictory meant thatdefense spending wasgoing tobereduced byasmuchas40percent. LMSC, recognizing thatit hadtobothremain competitive inmilitary contracts andobtain new commercial business, reacted withacost-cutting program thatreduced

itspersonnel strength bymorethan50percent. Thepainful downsizingwascomplicated byathirdfactor. Toobtain commercial business, LMSC hadtomakedrastic changes initsmethod ofoperation, particularly intheways thatitdesigned andbuiltsystems. Wellbefore then—undersecretary ofdefense William Perryand thenewDODdirector ofacquisition, PaulKaminski, hadissued their callfortheadoption ofcommercial standards inlieuofadherence to theevermorecomplicated “Mil-Spec” (military specification) standardsforprocurement, Araki hadinsisted onintroducing commercial

practice intoLMSC.Theeffects uponLMSCweretraumatic atfirst,

andthenactedlikea tonic,making theentireMissiles andSpace Group muchmorecompetitive. Theprevious workLockheed haddoneasprimecontractor for theStrategic Defense Initiative placed it inanexcellent position to winthevitally important $1billion contract fromtheUSAF forthe MILSTAR MilitaryStrategic AndTacticalRelayprogram. Thatexperience, in turn,prepared Lockheed fortheintensecompetition of

thecommercial marketplace, foritusedMILSTAR asapilotprogram foracquisitions reform. Thiswould bethepattern forthecompany’s futuresuccess. Eachnewprogram wouldbetechnically morede-

manding thananyinthepast,butthecumulative learning frompast programs served asanadequate launchvehicle toachieve newtechnical

andsystem management heights. Araki isgiven creditbymanyforthesuccessful acquisition and execution oftheMILSTAR program. Thevenerated FritzOderhas

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called Araki thebestsystems engineer inthespace business, andoneof thefewwhobecame averyablemanager. Araki, amanwithaninfectioussense ofhumor, tellswithgreatrelish thestoryoftherevolution

withinLMSCthatwasnecessary towintheMILSTAR contract. Lockheed hadattempted togetintothecommunications satellite business fora numberof years,but hadfailedmiserably in many

competitions. Arakiattributes thefailures toLockheed’s having becomesocomfortable doingbusiness withitsmilitary customers on classified contracts thatitforgot howtobidonnewproducts. Top LMSC management recognized thesituation, andtooffset it,created anewinternal organization called Advanced Programs andDevelopment(APD).ThepurposeofAPDwastobreakoutofthehabitsof thepastandcapturenewcustomers withnewproducts.

TheMILSTAR competition promised tobeexceptionally difhcultbecause thetwocompanies thathaddonevirtually allprevious communication satellite programs, TRWandHughes, haddecided to teamfor it. On the adviceof the APDorganization, Lockheedin-

formedtheAirForceSystems Command thatitwasnotgoingtobid, because theTRW/Hughes teamwastoostrong.Othercompanies fol-

lowed suit,and,tosecure competition, theAirForcedecided that TRWandHughes wouldhavetofurnish thepayload ofelectronics forallcompeting teams. Itwasa crucial blowtoTRWandHughes, whoweresuffering fromthesameproblem ofintellectual arrogance thathadprompted Lockheed’s creation ofAPD.Theyhadwonso manycompetitions inthepastthattheywerenotabletorespond adequately underthenewground rules. Lockheed tookthepayload, redesigned it,andwonthecompetition handsdown. IntheMILSTAR program, Lockheed wastodesign, develop, andproduce a highlysophisticated, jam-resistant globalsatellite com-

munications system forusebyallthreemilitary services forcommand andcontrol. MILSTAR willalsobethefirstcommunication system toallow allbranches oftheU.S.armed forces tocommunicate with oneanother onthesamesecure network. Given thecurrent mandate forjointoperations bytheservices, suchinteroperability isessential. MILSTAR isalsothefirstsystem toprovide satellite-to-satellite communications without theneedforcostly—and vulnerable—overseas ground relaystations. Thisfeature, termed “crosslinking,” letsusers connect directly atanyspotaroundtheworldwithouttime-consuming groundrelays. Thecrosslinks alsoimprove security, ensuring thatthe

intersatellite communications willnotbejammed. Thisfeature enables theater commanders toestablish andcontrol theirowncustomized

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networksfroma singlelocation,usingone or moresatellitesas the

network’s processing hub. MILSTAR isessentially a “switchboard inthesky,”providing

USS.jointforcesaroundtheworldwithvoice,data,imagery,facsimile,

andvideocommunications. MILSTAR meetstheessential command, control,andcommunications (C*)mission byusing a six-satellite con-

stellation placed innearequatorial geosynchronous orbitatanaltitude of22,500 miles, withthesatellites equally spaced toprovide uniform

coverage. Thenetwork ofsatellites wasdesigned tobereconfigured to accommodate specific communication needs.Whileearliermilitary communication satellites werevulnerable tojamming,MILSTAR was

designed tomaintain secure andsurvivable communications, evenin wartime. MILSTAR isalsoresistant tonatural andman-made scintillation. ThefirstMILSTAR satellite wasboostedintoorbitbya Titan

IVrocket withaCentaur upper stage inearly 1993. Follow-on satellites (MILSTAR II) weremodifiedto incorporate someof the lessons

learned during Desert Storm. Surprisingly, ascomplex asthesystem ofsatellites, service terminals, andassociated equipment is,itcanbe operated aseasily asanordinary telephone. Deployed inspace,a MILSTAR satellite isa sculptural workof

art,withagrace thatbelies itsten-thousand-pound weight. Inorbit, withantennae andsolararrays extended, thesatellite measures 52feet across. Theflexible solararrays areamiracle ofspace utilization, foldingoutfromtinyfive-inch-thick boxes toextend toa 108-foot-long structure whenfullydeployed.

TheSystemofSystems Concept heproliferation andcontinual growth ofmilitary satellite systems occurred before andafterthe1995Lockheed Martin merger. Both Lockheed andMartin Marietta hadbeensuccessful insatellite operations; ittranspired thattheirproduct lines, including various weapon, communications, navigation, weather, andothersystems couldbe combined intoa singlearchitecture. Thismeantthateverysystem

couldoperate asapartofanoverall system ofsystems, withimmense advantages accruing intermsofreliability, redundancy, colocation of program offices, andtheability tofoster growth inlaterdevelopments. Forexample, thepreexisting Defense Satellite Communications System(DSCS),usedsosuccessfully in thePersianGulfWar,canbe

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A MILSTAR satelliteweighssome 10,000pounds,is deployedin a geosynchronous orbit at 22,500 milesabovethe earth, and providesunprecedentedmilitary communicationscapability.

managed andoperated inconjunction withthenewMILSTAR system. (TheDSCSsatellites werea product oftheMartin Marietta Valley Forgeplant.)Ina parallel manner, theTheater HighAltitude Area Defense(THAAD)systembeingdeveloped fordefenseagainsttheater

ballistic missiles bothinsideandoutsidetheearth’satmosphere also

canbeoperated within theoverall satellite system. THAAD isintended toengage enemy missiles atlongrange and athighaltitudes, andtogivetheUnited States anditsallies multiple

opportunities to interceptincomingmissiles.The approximately

1,900-pound missile isovereighteen feetlong,andusesaninfrared terminal guidance seeker tomakeitsprecision “hit-to-kill” collision withtheincoming missile. THAAD isthefirstsystem developed todefend against theater ballistic missiles. Itisdesigned tointercept incoming ballistic missiles attheperiphery oftheearth’s atmosphere, toprotect thedefended areaagainst missile debris. TheTHAAD system involves themissile itself, thelauncher, battlemanagement command, control, communications, andintelligence (BM/C*l), andradarsystem. Contractor responsibility forthesystem extends throughitsentirelifecycle,from

initialconcept tofinaldisposition. Integrated Product Teams (IPTs)

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Defenseagainstballisticmissiles is moreimportantthan ever, giventhe proliferationof weaponsof mass destruction. TheTHAAD (TheaterHigh AltitudeDefenseSystem)is an advancedsystemfor the destructionof incomingmissiles.

areformed witheachofthemorethansixtyotherfirmsinvolved in creating thesystem.

THAAD wasundertaken deliberately asahigh-risk development effort because oftheurgent requirement foritsdeployment. Overtime,theTHAAD missile hasnotperformed flawlessly, andfourteen yearsaftertheoriginal Homing Overlay Experiment demonstration ofexoatmospheric intercept, Lockheed stillworked to develop theminiaturized technology tomake feasible thedeployment ofeffective theater nuclear defense. Anevenmoredemanding requirement exists fornational missile

defense, andLockheed MartinjoinedwithRaytheon andTRWto formtheUnitedMissile Defense Company, dedicated exclusively to

developing aneffective defense against ballistic missile attack onthe United States. Thecompany didnotwinthecompetition. Theexperience withTHAAD development helped furnish the expertise which enabled Lockheed Martin towinin1996thecontract

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forthedevelopment ofanessential component oftheSpace-Based InfraredSystem(SBIRS), the next-generation missilewarningand

tracking system. SBIRS willmeetthefourbasicneedsofspace and missile warfare: missile warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, anddefining thecharacter ofthebattleareaintermsoflaunch point, trajectory, predicted impact point,andtheactive andpassive defenses available. Itisintended toprovide theinitialdetection ofaballistic missile attack ontheUnited States, itsdeployed forces, oritsallies, an increasingly importantmissionasballisticmissiles andweapons of

massdestruction continue toproliferate. Whatever shortcomings the leaders oftheformer Soviet Unionmighthavehad,theywereatleast rational, andknewbetterthantoinitiate a nuclear war.Intoday’s world, thepossibility ofanunauthorized nuclear launch bya terrorist grouporbya roguenationismuchgreaterthaneverbefore.

TheSBIRS program isbothevolutionary andrevolutionary. In itsinitial stages, itwilluseexisting satellite systems andtheirassociated infrastructure. Subsequently, newsatellite systems willbedeployed, andthesewillbeabletouseexisting commercial ground stations for processing communications. Thefivegeosynchronous satellites will incorporate manycommercially provencomponents to reduceboth

costandrisk.Ultimately thesystem willconsist ofsatellites deployed inhighlyelliptical orbits(HEOs)andlowearthorbits(LEOs), using

relayground stations andground terminals. LikeMILSTAR, SBIRS willbeabletobeusedbyallthemilitary services, tofacilitate joint operations. ThenewA2100 commercial satellite buswillbeusedfor thefirsttimeforamilitary requirement. InPentagonese, SBIRS isthefirstmajorprogram toapplyacquisition streamlining toDefense Acquisition Board documentation. ItusedtheSingle Acquisition andManagement Plan(SAMP), asingle

thirty-nine-page document which replaced seventeen documents that usuallytotaledoveronethousandpages.In real-timeterms,it took

onlythreemonthstoreachthefirstsignificant management milestone;

previous practice would haverequired twelve months forthesame task. Aswithevery modern weapon system, SBIRS callsuponthefull

strengthofU.S.industry tomeetitsgoals.Lockheed MartinMissiles

&Space istheprime contractor, systems engineer, andintegrator, and provides thepayload. TheAerojet Corporation ofCalifornia and Northrop Grumman ofNewYorksupply theprimary infrared sensor payload. TheHoneywell Corporation’s Clearwater, Florida, division manufactures theonboard spacecraft andpayload processors, while

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Lockheed Martin andAerojet teamtoprovide ground systems, satellite telemetry, tracking andcontrol, andmobile ground elements. And,again likeMILSTAR, theexperience gained inSBIRS will

beusefulin commercial satelliteoperations, whichareproliferating at

anamazing rate.WhenSputnik madeitsfirstbeeping sounds, the world wasimpressed, butnoteventhemostfarseeing visionary ofthe timecouldhaveforeseen thatwithin fiftyyears theheavens would be

so filledwith satellites that prioritiesfor orbitalpositions would become hotlycontested.

MovingfromDefenseto Commerce s theMILSTAR system movedfromconcept tofruition, a revo-

lutionoccurred in personal communication: theadvent ofthe cellular telephone. Thesuccess ofacquisition reform intheMILSTAR program hadengendered sufficient confidence forLMSC toundertake a high-risk commercial venture. It became asubcontractor totheMo-

torola Corporation tobuild125buses tocarry theIridium global telecommunications payloads—the biggest satellite production jobin Lockheed’s history—for theIridium system. Previously, building as many assixidentical satellites wasconsidered amostunusual production run. Themotto“OneWorld—One Telephone” captures theIridium concept. Thesystem isintended tomakeconversation onhandheld telephones possible anyplace intheworldbymeansofaconstellation

ofsixty-six satellites ina loworbitonly420milesabove theearth’s surface. Therelatively small satellites (onlyabout1,500 pounds) will beelectronically interconnected toprovide userswithinstantaneous global telephone transmissions ofalltypes, including voice, data,fax, andpaging. Iridium isintended torevolutionize communications for

businessprofessionals, residentsofruralareas,travelers, disasterrelief

teams,or anyonewhoneedsa wireless handheld telephone witha

single worldwide number. Onecanvisualize troops incombat insome distant foreign landputting downtheirrifles totakeacallfromhome in theirfoxhole,forthelocationofthesubscriber doesnothavetobe

known—the satellite-based system willtrackthelocation ofthetelephonecontinuously. TheIridium telephones willalsointerface with computers andothercommunications equipment.

~Whilethereweremanytechnical innovations, themostradical

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Thephrase ‘‘oneworld—one telephone”encapsulatesthe essenceof IRIDIUM, a satellitebased wirelesspersonal communicationsnetworkfor any type of transmission—voice, paging, fax, or data.

change forLMSC wasinthecontract: itwasfixed price, notcostplus fixed fee.Thetwoterms—fixed price versus costplusfixed fee—sound somewhat alike, butdiffer greatly inriskinvolved. Intheformer, the product isdelivered withmuchmoreregard tothecostofitsmanufacture, forifthecontractor spends toomuch,hehastoabsorb the loss.Inthelatter,costscangoup,buttheyarestillcovered, anda fixed feewillbeearned. Thenewsatellites weretobeproduced forlessthan$7million perbus,including nonrecurring costs, aunitcostsubstantially below anycomparable satellite builtinthepast.Lockheed’s solution, under Araki’s leadership, wastomeldalloftheknowledge andbestpractices tobegained fromprevious classified programs andcombine themwith Motorola’s “Six-Sigma” quality assurance program. Amajor effort was toreduce thecycle timebyhalfbycutting theschedule formilestones suchaspreliminary design review, critical design review, andtestprograms. Integrated product teams weregiven authority to“getthings done” using commercial practices instead oftime-honored—and timewasting—government practices.

Thenewmethods shaped a newculture, onethatwaseasily adapted fromIridium tootherprograms.

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Tradingwiththe (Former)Enemy r.MelBrashears recalls astaffmeeting themorning aftertheBerlin

Wallhadfallen. Inithespeculated withwhathecalls today anaive projection: “Theworld isgoing tobedifferent! Itwouldn’t surprise me ifGermany wasreunited inthreetofiveyears, andthattherewouldn’t

beanySovietUnionbytheendofthecentury!” Helaughsnowthat hisprojection wasoffbysomuch,forGermany wasreunited thatsame

year,andtheSoviet Union collapsed onChristmas Day,1991. Thesudden interest inRussia wasprompted byaLockheed board member, Dr.James Gibbons, deanoftheSchool ofEngineering at Stanford University. Duringa boardmeeting inwhichTellep was reviewing Lockheed’s strategic direction inbroadening itscommercial business, Gibbons asked “Have youconsidered doing business inRussia?” Theanswer wasaprompt “no.”Gibbons wentontoexplain that Dr.William Perry—at themeeting asaconsultant toLockheed—had

beentraveling frequently in Russiaandbelieved thatunderproper circumstances therecouldbe worthwhile businessrelationships.

Within hours thegroup hadconcluded thattheRussian Proton rocket would fitprecisely withinthestrategic direction Lockheed washeading.TheProton’s reliability wasoutstanding, andtheprojected numberof satellitelaunches wassogreatthattherewasa gapthatthe

Proton couldfill. Lockheed wasmindful ofthegreatsuccess oftheFrench firm Arianespace, whichhadgoneina decade froma zeroshareofthe world’s commercial launch market toperiods wheretheypossessed 100percent ofthemarket. TheUnited States hadadopted theSpace Shuttle asitsprimary shuttle launching technique, andtheChallenger accident of1986puttheUnited States atarealdisadvantage inthe commercial launch world. By1992,Lockheed’s forecasts indicated ahugemarket growth intelecommunications, remote sensing, andglobal positioning, just threeofthemanytypesofsystems thatwould beneeded. Abusiness proposal wasprepared andBrashears andPerrywenttoMoscow in September 1992.TheRussians didnotknowtheprecise reason for Lockheed’s visit,butwelcomed themwithopenarmsanyway.

Onthefirstday’s meeting, Brashears outlined Lockheed’s conceptofcooperation withEnergia, thefirmbuilding theProton. The general ideawasthatajointventurewouldbecreatedinwhichLock-

heedwould invest capital andresources inexchange fortherightto

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theProton rocket. Thegoalofthenewventure wastomarket thevery successful andreliable Protonlaunch vehicle inamarket thatisdemanding moreandmorelaunch capacity. TheProton hasthecapabilitytolaunch a twenty-ton payload intolowearthorbit. Thefirstsentence oftheRussian response wastotheeffect that “Wecansignthisdealtoday.” Thiswasthestartofwhatbecame an outstanding partnership, Lockheed-Khrunichev-Energia-Interna (LKEI), which injustfiveyears hasgenerated morethan$2billion of business inthecommercial market.

Lockheed continued todevelop andmarket itsownlaunch ve-

hicles,including theAtlas,whichhadbeenpioneered byGeneral Dy-

namics. Allthese, combined withtheProton, have generated $4billion of business. Thisis equivalent to a 50 percentshareof theworld market,a markedandwelcomeincreasefromthezeropercentof1992.

Brashears paystribute toGibbons andPerry forfostering theearly instincts forcooperation withRussia. Perry(who hadalsoinspired the acquisitions reform process) believed thatthebestwaytostabilize U.S.Russian relations wastoembroil thetwocountries inmutually profitable business arrangements. Lockheed Martinhascontinued toexpand the

relationship withRussian enterprises tothepointthatthepartnership includes theRussian government aswellasRussian factories. Brashears recalls thatontheveryfirstdayoftheirfirstMoscow meeting, theywereentertained inthetypical lavish Russian fashion at dinner.It developed thattherewereremarkable similarities inthehis-

toryofLockheed andKhrunichev. Bothfirmshadconcentrated primarily onaircraft atfirst,andbothbecame involved inspace asapart ofthedefense effort. Brashears saidthatLockheed hadbeenaware of Khrunichev’s defense activities andalways admired thequalityoftheir

product. TheRussians responded thatin1960,whenGaryPowers’s U-2wasshotdown, theSoviet defense ministry distributed pieces of thewreckage toanumber ofindustries. Khrunichev received many of thesamples andwasamazed attheadvanced stateoftheU-2’s materials andtheprocesses bywhichtheymusthavebeenmade.The mutual revelations boded wellforthefuture. Lockheed extended thepartnership bysigning anagreement with Energia Scientific andIndustrial Corporation tocooperate onfuture spaceprograms.The new consortiumwas calledLockheed-

Khrunichev-Energia International (LKEI). InJune1997anewjoint

venturewasformedwithanorganization withtheintriguing,nostalgic

nation nameofIntersputnik. Aconsortium oftwenty-two nations, led

byRussia,Intersputnik corresponds to theWesternInstelsat system.

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The newfirm,LockheedMartin—Intersputnik, has accessto many

orbital slots. Therewillbemoresuchventures inthefuture, notleast because thejointventures havebeenmassively significant intrans-

formingtheRussian economy. AtthetimeofBrashears’s andPerry’s firstvisitto Moscow, thestreetsweredrabandthestoresemptyof

merchandise. Allthathaschanged, andtheancient cityisteeming withactivity, dueinnosmall parttothenewjointventures.

TheFullSpectrum sLMSCwastransformed intoLMMS(Lockheed MartinMissiles

&Space) overthecourse ofthemerger itbecame apparent that

thenewcompany hadexperience andexpertise ineveryareaofspace operations. LMSC,andthenLMMS, hadcreated andoperated launch

sites,conducted shuttle operations, developed afamily oflaunch vehicles, andcreated a widevariety ofsatellites. It alsopossessed the necessary ground equipment andpersonnel tomanage thesystems and utilize theinformation derived fromthem. Theprocess wasunquestionably synergistic; eachnewcontract wonbrought newexperiences andenabled thecompany toraiseits technology toaneverhigher level. Perhaps themostobvious example liesintheCommercial Remote Sensing System (CRSS), which was sustained afterLockheed’s original $150millioninvestment. CRSSis actually threeprograms inone.Thefirstisthespacesegment, inwhich LMSS willdevelop twosatellites andlaunchthemonaLockheed MartinLaunch Vehicle (LMLV-2) Athena. Thesecond isthegroundseg-

ment,inwhich threeground stations willbedeveloped. Thethirdis oneofthemostimportant services provided byLMSS, thesystem design andintegration. LMMS isbuilding thesystem forSpace Imaging, EOSAT, afirminThornton, Colorado, inwhichLockheed Martinhas amajorinvestment. Witha digitalcamerafromEastmanKodak,the IKONOS I satellitewill provideone-meter-resolution black-and-white (panchromatic)andfour-meter-resolution color(multispectral) digitalim-

ageryforcommercial andgovernment contractors worldwide. The digital camera (orscanner) passes overthetarget ataprecise, controlled speed andreads outelectronic charges atspecified intervals oftime.In justtwoseconds, thecamera scans anareaeleven kilometers square— aboutthesizeofSanFrancisco—and produces 2 billion bitsofinformation. Thisinformation iscompressed to600million bitsand

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transmitted viaanX-band antenna totheground station intwoseconds,thusdelivering digital images fromspace in“nearrealtime.” Thesystem willhaveapplication tothemapping required for civilengineering, construction, realestate, landmanagement, agricul-

ture,mining,environmental monitoring, taxassessment, transportation,andinfrastructure planning. Asa simpleexample ofitsutility,

Space Imaging EOSAT willofferrealestate andinsurance agencies a CD-ROM which covers theSanFrancisco BayArea. Theimagery will letusers discern objects ontheearth’s surface assmall asonemeter in size;cars,boats,sidewalks, swimming pools,andotherfeatureswillbe

clearlydepicted. Theuseofsuchimagery isespecially valuable in a

before-and-after situation, whendamage assessment hastobemade aftera naturaldisaster. Insidersat LMMSbelieve thatthehigh-resolution satellite im-

agery market isjustgetting started, andis,relatively, where thecellular phonemarket wastenyears ago.

A ThousandNewFrontiers fechas drawing oftheprogress fromtheearlydaysoftheX-7 tothepresent wouldbesimilar toaninverted pyramid tree,for

eachnewventureservedasthebasisforthelaunchofseveral others, andthese,in turn,launchedstillmore.Therewereseveralelementsin

LMSC’s physical makeup thatfacilitated thisever-expanding progress. Leadership wasparamount, ofcourse, andwillbeaddressed inthe following section. Thephysical layout ofLMSC, withitslarge, con-

veniently locatedcampusofbuildings thatcouldeachbesegregated forsecurity reasons, lentitselfto a varietyofprograms. LMSCalso

created specialized facilities atavariety ofothersitestomeetemerging program needs. Theseincluded plantsatAustin, Texas, (fortheAir Forces Precision Location/Strike System andsubsequent systems such astheRemotely Piloted Vehicle); theresearch laboratories inPaloAlto; theHuntsville Research andEngineering Center inAlabama; andthe Lockheed Ocean Laboratory inSanDiego. Theseeffortspermittedmanyboldventuresintocommercial

space,withIRIDIUM,Commercial RemoteSensingSatellite(CRSS)

andtherelationship withtheRussians tomarket Protonrockets as examples. Ithadalsomoved forward withafamily ofnewsmall launch vehicles, andwaswell-positioned inupcoming military satellite competitions. Thequestion waswhether ornotthesenewventures would

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payoffintimetooffset continuing declines initstraditional programs. Thisissuedisappeared withthemerger withMartin Marietta. Intercontinental ballistic missiles continued topresent anunparalleled threat,especially astheirnumbers grew.Thecredibility ofmassiveretaliation asa deterrent wasdependent upontheabilityofthe

United States todetect amissile attack insufficient timetolaunch a response. Thebest—the only—way todothiswasfromspace, and thisledtotheMIDAS system, thenation’s first-generation surveillance

system,whichwasintroducedin the mid-1960s.ForMIDAS,sur-

veillance meantmaintaining a vigilant watchovereverysquareinch

oftheearth’s surface twenty-four hoursa day,365daysa year.The taskwasmadepossible bytheintroduction ofnewtechnology that permitted infrared cameras tobeplaced onsatellites inlowearth(two hundred—plus miles)orbit.Theinfrared cameras, rudimentary bytoday’sstandards, weresensitive to heatandcapable ofdetecting the

launch ofanICBM. Complete coverage oftheearth’s surface wasnecessary because missiles couldreadily beconcealed inthevastexpanse oftheSoviet

Unionanditssatellite countries. Theintroduction ofthesubmarinelaunched ballistic missile meantthatoceanshadto bemonitored as

well. Cameras inlowearthorbitpassed overthesurface oftheearth aboutevery ninety minutes, andmadeadequate surveillance moredifficultto achieve. Bythelate1960sit became evidentthattheideal

solution wastoplaceadvanced infrared cameras overtheearthata geostationary altitude—a pointintheskythatrotates precisely with theearth,sothatthesatellite isalways inplace. Fromtheapproxi-

matelytwenty-two-thousand-mile altitudeatwhichitisplaced, asin-

glesatellite cancover about43percent oftheearth’s surface. TheDefense Support Program (DSP) wasdeployed inthe1970s to achieve thismodeofsurveillance. TRWhasbuilttwenty-four of the five-thousand-pound satellites, whicharedesignedto detectand

trackallICBM, IRBM, space launches, andnuclear explosions, aswell asthelaunch ofsmall tactical missiles. Thesystem worked wellduring theGulfWar.DSPisoperated bytheTwenty-first Space Wing,locatedat Peterson AirForceBase,Colorado, anditswarnings arerelayedtotheNorthAmerican AirDefense Command (NORAD) and

U.S.Space Command. Even asDSPwasbeing placed intooperation inthe1970s, effort

wasalready underwaytocreatea third-generation system witheven

greater capability. Itwasrecognized thatwhile DSPhaddetected Scud

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launchesduringtheGulfWar,tacticalmissiles ingeneralhaveasmaller

plume, andsoare“less observable,” inthejargon oftheindustry. Thequestfora newsystem gained momentum in 1983,with President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, withthestart-up ofthe Boost Surveillance andTracking Systems (BSTS) program. Lockheed hadbeeninvolved atevery stepoftheway,butin1985,DanTellep called Dr.MelBrashears andtoldhimthathewasassigned toBSTS. Budgets andrequirements keptchanging, andBrashears, now president, space andstrategic missiles forLockheed Martin, recalls that by1991, theBSTS program wastransferred fromtheStrategic Defense Initiative OfficebacktotheAirForce.Theprogram wasreconstituted in 1991astheAdvance Warning System (AWS), whichfortuitously

became oneofthefirstsystems tobenefit fromtheacquisition-reform tidalwavethatwassweeping thedefense industry.

Overthenexttwoyears theprogram wasredefined forthethird time.AWS wasdropped andtheSpace-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) wasborn.Theprocess ofmoving fromBSTS toAWS toSBIRS took almosta decade,andduringthatperiod,Lockheed workedclosely with

othermanufacturers, particularly Hughes, withwhomitwasteamed toproduce theinfrared camera. WhentheLockheed Martin merger occurred in1995,Hughes withdrew fromtheteam,andanewcompetition tomanufacture theinfrared camera wasrequired. TheLockheedMartinteamwonthiscompetition, andthenwentontowinthe SBIRScontract,whichisestimatedto havea valueof$17billionto

$20billionoverthenexttwentyyears.Underthenewcontract, Lock-

heedMartin willprovide thesatellites, ground stations, andsystem integration needed fora totalsystems solution against thethreatof

eitherICBMor theaterballistic missiles. Thecontractawardwas

strongly influenced bytheexcellent results ofLockheed’s acquisitionreform experience withAWSandwithMILSTAR. SBIRS isacollection ofsatellites thatarejudiciously placed around theequator atgeostationary altitudes. Foursatellites cover allthepertinentareasoftheglobe.Thecameras onboardthesatellites takepic-

turesevery fewseconds. Thepictures areimmediately translated into digital images oftheearth,andtheinformation istransmitted tothe ground station inDenver, Colorado, forprocessing anddisplay.

Ifthereisa rocketlaunchofanykind,anythingfromthetakeoff oftheSpaceShuttleto a testofanintermediate rangeballisticmissile,

thecameras immediately pickitup.Itisdisplayed withwarnings and indications totheCommander inChief ofSpace Command, whohas theresponsibility todecide whatisoccurring andwhatthenational

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response should be.Theinformation includes precisely locating the missile launch, determining itstrajectory, andpredicting where itwill impact, allwithin sixtyseconds ofthelaunch.

SBIRS issodesigned thatitcanreadily incorporate anydefensive systemagainstmissiles ifa decision ismadetodeployit.Itsdesignis

entirely treatycompliant asit stands, because it isa passive system, butithastheinherent accuracy tobetheeyes andbrains ofadefensive system ifrequired. There aremany otherprograms withgreatportent forthefuture, suchas theAirborneLaser,an aircraft-mounted lasercapableof de-

stroying enemy missiles almost immediately afterlaunch; theInternational Space Station Centrifuge andGlobebox, toprovide on-orbit research capability; SOFIA, theStratospheric Observatory forInfrared Astronomy—the listislongandvaried. Thisnecessarily succinctcatalogof space-based projectsonly touches thesurface ofLMSCactivity, butillustrates anotherphenom-

enon.Where fordecades individual projects haddominated Lockheed thinking, fromthefirstElectra totheFleetBallistic Missile program, theLockheed (andofcourse,nowLockheed Martin)mind-set isnow

devoted towhole families ofscientific disciplines within which individualprojects canbepursued. Perhaps reasonably enough, theindividual projects thatarenowpursued invariably involve alarge portion ofthe previously mentioned family ofscientific disciplines themselves.

LMSC’s Management Pool hetaskofmanaging thesemultifaceted programs wasandisdaunting,butLMSC hasproved tobeanendless source ofprofit, of innovative newdisciplines, andmostimportant, ofsystems concept

andengineering, thecoreofsuccessful management forspacesystems.

Lockheed hasbeeninanalmost constant process ofgrowth and evolution sincethe1960s, withsomedivisions ofthecompany prospering,whileotherswentthroughperiodicdifficulties. Theresultwas

thatpositions varied intheirimportance overtime;forexample, itwas

possible foravicepresidency atonecompany tobeamoreimportant

position thanapresidency atanother. Asaresult, Lockheed hashadto redesignate positions andtitles oftopmanagers toreflect those changes. Thus,therehasbeenamigration fromgeneral managers topresidentstogrouppresident tocorporate president astheorganizations grew insizeandcomplexity. Mostofthefuture leaders oftheLockheed

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RobertA. Fuhrmanbeganwith Lockheedin 1948as a member of the Polaristeam. His managerialand engineering skills sawhis rapidrise to the top of LMSC.

Corporation would gainexperience andexposure working theirway uptheLMSC ladder, sometimes becoming acorporate officer, also, ontheway.Insomeinstances theywouldmovetopositions ofresponsibility (andnotalways intheirownfield) atLockheed-Georgia, orsomeothercenter.Sometoppedoutverycomfortably aspresident

ofLMSC orelsewhere, forthemanagement pyramid always narrows toward thetop,andtherecould beonlysomany chairmen, presidents, andvicepresidents oftheLockheed Corporation overtheyears.

Afewstellarperformers fromLMSCwouldfollowthispath,but withthepositionofpresident or chairman oftheLockheed Corpo-

rationastheirfinalachievement. Among themwould beBobFuhrman,RoyAnderson, LarryKitchen, andDanTellep. Eachofthese menwouldbequicktopointoutthathissuccess waspossible only because oftheexcellence ofhiscolleagues’ performance. Space limitations prevent telling thefullcorporate progression of eachofthefourmennamed intheprevious paragraph, butBobFuhrman’s career canserve asaquick illustration ofthesometimes labyrinthinepathtothetopatLockheed. Fuhrman wasborninMichigan onFebruary 23,1925,andgrad-

uatedfromthatspawning ground ofLockheed engineers, theUniversityofMichigan, in 1945witha bachelor’s degree inaeronautical engineering. Heserved intheU.S.Navyasa pilot,thenearned a

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master’s degreeinfluidmechanics anddynamics fromtheUniversity

ofMaryland in 1952.HejoinedtheRyanAeronautical Company, where hehelped develop theX-13jet-propelled vertical takeoff aircraft. Fuhrman joinedLMSC in1958asamember ofthePolaris systems development staff.Hebecame chiefengineer oftheMissile Systems Division in1964andwaselected vicepresident andassistant general manager oftheMissile Systems Division in1966.Threeyears later, hewaselected aLockheed corporate vicepresident andnamed general manager oftheMissile Systems Division. Then,inwhatwould become a typical Lockheed method ofencouraging personal growth, hewasnamed president oftheLockheedGeorgia Company in 1970.Thefollowing yearhebecame president

oftheLockheed-California Company, while twoyears laterhebecame executive vicepresident atLMSC. Hebecame president ofLMSC in 1976, serving until1984; atthesame time,hewassenior vicepresident ofthecorporation. In 1979hebecame chairman oftheboardof LMSC,and waselecteda memberof the LockheedCorporation’s

boardofdirectors inMay1980.Hebecame group president, missiles andspace systems, in1983,thenserved asLockheed’s president and chiefoperating officer in1986. In1988, hewaselected vicechairman oftheboardandchiefoperating officer oftheLockheed Corporation. He retiredin 1990,but continuedto serveasadviser.

TheBasisforPremierTechnology: ResearchLaboratories I wouldberoughly correct tostatethattheresearch laboratories established inPaloAltoin 1956areforLMSC whattheSkunk Works wereforLockheed’s aeronautics business. Thelaboratories, like otherLockheed units, havehadaseries ofname changes overtheyears, buttheheartoftheirmission hasalways beentomaintain Lockheed

noton,butbeyond, theverycutting edgeoftechnology. Located intheStanford Industrial ParkinPaloAlto,thelaboratories grew from arelatively small, butstrong, technical staffintowhat

laterbecameknownas the AdvancedSystemsDivisions(ASD).In 1962,the organization consistedof fourmajorlaboratories and five

engineering directorates whoseprimary missions wereto supportthe

majormissile andspace programs. IntheElectronic Sciences Labora-

tory,research ledtoasuccessful information retrieval system,DIALOG,

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whichby1981hadbecome thelargest on-line information retrieval system intheworld. Otherexperiments pioneered theuseoflaser communications anddigital image-processing techniques. TheMaterial SciencesLaboratory conducted research in a numberof disciplines, including electrochemistry, metallurgy, andfluidmechanics. Experiments ledtothedevelopment ofthethermal insulating material selected foruseontheSpace Shuttle. ThePhysical Sciences Laboratory investigates nuclear physics, astronomy, andspace physics, anda further reorganization created theResearch andDevelopment Division under E.P.Wheaton, whodirected effortstofindnewmarketopportunities

andnewproduct lines. In1963, thelabswere supplemented inAlabama bytheHuntsville Research andEngineering Center (HREC), which

gavedirectsupporttobothDODandNASA programs. Bythe1970s,thelaboratories wereengaged inawidespectrum of exoticactivities,includingmannedspacesystems,silentaircraft,

information systems, ballistic missile defense, andmanymore. Theevents selected inthischapter arebutafewofthethousands thatoccurred inmorethanfourcreative decades ofLMSC history. Thepersonalities mentioned arebutafewofthethousands ofimportantpeople whomade LMSC greatastheycreated complex, andoften highly classified, systems. It isnecessary nowtoretrace ourstepsthrough averydifficult period forLockheed during the1960s and1970s. Thenitseemed to manythatthegrandoldfirmwouldnotsurvive, whenitsequitywould

bedriven toperilously lowlevels andwhenitseemed certain thatthe aircraft divisions ofthefirmwould havetobesoldoff.Lockheed did survive, andthenprospered inphenomenal style, butonlybecause of thetremendous depth ofmanagerial talent thatwasdeveloped atLMSC.

CHAPTER 11

Family Strength Overcomes Adversity

Aree theperiod began withwhatseemed tobeanexceptionallyfavorable combination ofcircumstances, theyears from1965 to 1977marked themosttroubled timetheLockheed Corporation would everexperience. Thecompany wasclearly attheveryforefront ofaircraft technology, withtheU-2inoperation, thebrilliant SR-71 inproduction, theF-104 reaching itsproper station inlifeinforeign markets, theC-130 themainstay ofairlift units,theC-141 becoming operational, andtheOrioninsteady production. We’ve justexamined theincredible achievements ofLMSC, withitsregal procession ofFleet Ballistic Missiles intheworks ononesideofthehouse andanendless series ofhighly classified—and highly profitable—satellites—satellit coming fromtheother.Withotheroperating unitsdoingwell,1965 sales reached acomfortable $1.8billion level, though profits were typically modest at$53.8million in1965. Thefigure represented just3

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Fewaircrafthavecapturedthe publicimaginationas has the U-2,and evenfewer havehad so distinguisheda historyoverso longa period.It is the onlyaircraft that the USAFeverreintroducedinto production.

percent ofsales, aboutwhatgrocery stores wereexpected todo,and hardly theusurious rip-off oftheAmerican public thatisoftenimputedtoaerospace manufacturers. Things werelooking goodforthefuture.Lockheed hadwon hotlycontested competitions fortheAirForce’s largeairlifter, theC5AGalaxy, andtheArmy’s attack helicopter, arevolutionary design thatwouldbedesignated theAH-56A Cheyenne. Thelureofthe commercial airliner wasstillstrong, andtheworkalready doneonthe C-141 andtheC-5studies combined withtheadvent ofthenewhighbypass turbofan engines sothatdesign studies couldbegin ona250seatwide-body transport tobeusedonU.S.domestic routes. Thecompany wasalsocontinuing itspolicy ofdiversification. TheLockheed Aircraft Service Company hadstarted asa customer service deskinBurbank in 1937. It hadgrown tobea worldwide organization, operating morethantwenty-five service centers onsix continents. Thecorporation alsodiversified intoshipbuilding, rocket motors, andotherventures, ofwhich morelater. Asmightbeexpected, withthisseries ofongoing successes and glowing prospects, thepersonnel atLockheed corporate headquarters wereconfident. TheGrossbrothers hadcreated a vehicle thatthe rigorousmanagement styleof DanHaughton,ablyassisted byhis

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faithful, industrious number two,CarlKotchian, couldsteerintoa profitable future. Itwasindeed apowerful dynasty, madeupofmenofgreatand

diverse talent.Thevisionary RobertGrosshaddiedin 1961,andhis moredetail-and management-oriented brotherCourtlandt succeeded

himaschairman, retaining thatoffice until1967.Bothmenhadabsolute confidence inHaughton, ataskmaster whoworked himself and everyone elseendlessly, paying excruciating attention toevery detail. Haughton wasnamed president in1961andchairman andCEOin 1967,whenKotchiansucceeded himaspresidentandchiefoperating officer.Kotchianwasa mastersalesman, bothofideaswithinthecom-

panyandaircraft outside it. Although theseleaders hadexperienced sometrying times, their trackrecord hadbeenremarkably consistent. Profits hadbeenearned everyyearsince1948,withthesoleexception of 1960,whenthe

Electra wingfailures caused a$43million loss.ButeventheElectra program hadbeenturnedtogoodaccount fortworeasons. Thefirst wastheabsolute integrity withwhich Lockheed remedied theElectra’s deficiency, andthesecond wastheaircraft’s subsequent military success astheOrionpatrolandantisubmarine-warfare plane. Unfortunately, disaster loomed aheadinmanyoftheprograms thatwerebegun withsuchconfidence. Thetroubles arose fromavarietyofsources, buttheproblems ofthevarious programs wereunderstandably interrelated, giventhattheyallshared Lockheed’s top corporate management philosophy andallhadtodrawwater fromthe samefinancial well. Thescale ofthedifficulties Lockheed would encounter iseasiest tounderstand ifeachprogram isdealtwithindividually. Thesource oftheirproblems canbeanalyzed andtheircumulative effects upon theLockheed Corporation canthenbemeasured.

TheG-5 hesuccess oftheC-5asa military aircraft hasbeendemonstrated

inevery partoftheworld. LikeotherLockheed transports, ithas gained a greatdealofitsreputation intheexecution ofmissions of compassion, butwhenithasbeencommitted tocombat, ithasdone superbly well. YettheC-5program itselfwasanagony forLockheed andfor thegovernment. Thereisplenty ofblame toapportion forthetrouble.

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Despite disclaimers atthetimeandlater,Lockheed wascertainly too optimistic abouttheeasewithwhich itcouldhandle theproject. The C-5proved tobefarmorethana“scaled-up C-141.” TheHaughton

management style,whichreverberated downthroughtheranks,wasa

negative factor. Atevery level, supervisors could befound whofollowed Haughton’s authoritarian practice; therewasa tendency toinsistthat orders weretobefollowed exactly, evenwhenfeedback fromthefloor indicated otheractions werenecessary. TheLockheed reporting system wasflawed inthatreliance wasplaced in“catch-up” operations that caused optimistic reports toberendered bothinternally andexternally. Itwasperhaps notevident atthetime,eventothoseatthesource of thetrouble, butthehardtruthsabout many subjects—costs, schedules, changes, etc.—were sometimes blurredbywaffled reporting, to the extentthatnooneknewtheexactstatusofmanycritical areasofthe

program. NorwastheAirForceimmune fromblame. Themostcritical errormadebytheAirForce wasattheverybeginning oftheprogram.

Aftera decisionhad beenmadeto awardthe contractto Lockheed,

theAirForceinformed thecompany thatthelandingdistances pro-

jectedbyLockheed wereinaccurate andprovided itsownestimates. Tobringtheaircraft performance uptotheAirForce figures, Lockheedwasforced toagreetoa majorredesign ofthewing,andto guaranteethe newperformancefigures.Lockheedobjected,on the basisthatit believeditsfiguresto becorrect,andbecauseit couldnot,

inthetendaystheAirForcehadallotted, redesign thewingandcheck thefigures.

TheAirForce wasadamant—and wasthecustomer. Lockheed agreed toredesign thewing,whichstarted theprocess ofincreased weight anddragthatwouldultimately cause somuchoftheC-5A’s problems. TheAirForce alsogavetheC-5A program fartoomuchsupervision. Change orders cameinanendless flow, andtheC-5itself was ladenwithfeatures (suchastheelaborate landing geardesigned to permit rough-field operation) thatproved nottobeuseful underthe actual conditions underwhich theaircraft would operate. Andjustas Lockheed reporting wasflawed, sowasthatoftheAirForce. Insome instances, inferences tobemade fromtheadmittedly ambiguous Lockheedreports werefurther slanted inaneffort toprotect theAirForce pointofview. Inshort,bothsides wereoftencaught upinfinger-pointing con-

Family Strength Overcomes Adversity

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troversies whentheirmutual interests would havebeenbetterserved bymoreintelligent, completely opencooperation. Theheartoftheproblem wascontractual. BothLockheed and theUSAFhadagreedto thecontract; bothhopedthatit wouldbe

possible toexecute. Yetthecontract wasanunfulfillable monstrosity thatworked against theinterest ofthegovernment andthecontractor withalmost equalferocity. Fewwillbesurprised tolearnthatitoriginatedintheofficeoftheSecretary ofDefense.

TheWould-be MagicWandofCompetition: TotalPackageProcurement heintensity ofallmilitary competitions washeightened bythe introduction ofanewconcept fromSecretary McNamara’s quantitatively oriented DODprocurement agencies. Called “Total Package Procurement” (TPP),thenewconcept required manufacturers tocom-

peteforan entireprogram,fromresearchanddevelopment through

production, allundera single contract. Standards weretobesetfor price,schedule, andperformance, anditwasmadewellknown that thegovernment didnotintend tobudge fromtheagreements. TPPwasa well-intentioned approach toconsider aprogram in itsentirety, prevent costoverruns, andinsure thatcontractors metall contractual requirements. Aclause stipulated thatthecontractor was responsible forthecomplete system performance, including engines, andwasrequired totakeaction tocorrect anydiscrepancies. Itshould havebeenobvious thatthiswasclearly beyond thebounds ofany contractor’s ability inafirm-fixed-price development/production contract,butitwasnonetheless anintegral partoftheTPPconcept. (Larry Kitchen latercommented thatTPPwasessentially afirm-fixed-price development program.) Robert H.Charles, whowasappointed assistant secretary ofthe AirForce forinstallations andlogistics byPresident Kennedy in1963, wastheprincipal creator oftheTPPprogram. Charles hadworked for McDonnell Aircraft foreighteen years, seven ofthemasvicepresident. Thereissomeironyinthefactthathislongexperience onthecontractorsideimbued himwitha passionate beliefthatmilitary procurement neededdrasticreform—he knewwherebodiescouldbe

buried. Apopular catchphrase ofthetime,“holding thecontractor’s

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feettothefire,”became aparticularly aptdescription ofTPP—unfortunately, noonerealized thatTotalPackage Procurement insured mutual immolation. TPPbecame a petridishforthecultivation of adversarial relationships, ratherthanamedium forobtaining weapon systems ata reasonable costona timely basis.It carried analmost Orwellian BigBrother approach toanextreme, andfailed toconsider elements thatshould havebeenobvious, giventhelongandoften dismal history ofaircraft procurement. TPPfailed toanticipate the effectofrapidinflation(inevitable in theVietnamWarera),thecus-

tomarychangesin AirForcerequirements, andthe everpopular

“hobby-shopping” asAirForceadvocates introduced newandoften unnecessary elements intotheprogram, eachonerequiring changes.

Worse,it didnotprovide a readymechanism forsettling disputes in an equitablemanner.Thegovernment couldstickto itsguns,and,if

itsodesired, couldliterally bankrupt acontractor. Inretrospect, thereisnoquestion thatLockheed (andprobably itstwocompetitors) wasguiltyofoveroptimistic pricing. Givenits excellent experience withtheC-141,Lockheed expected thestate-of-

the-artC-5tobea similar iflarger program. Things werenotthat simple, foravariety ofreasons, including thesheer sizeoftheaircraft. Moresignificant, perhaps, wasa general hardening ofmanage-

mentarteries.Companiesaremuchlikehumanbeings,and success

tendstobreedhabitpatterns thatmayworkwellinoneinstance, but

wheninstitutionalized, adversely affect performance. Andcompanies change astheygrow older; atLockheed-Georgia, aclimate ofcronyism hadbegun todevelop, onethatwasreflected injobassignments, promotions, anddecision making. Thisisa perfectly normal business happenstance, butitdidnotmakehandling themyriad management andproduction problems oftheC-5anyeasier. These problems would persist untilthearrival ofnewideas andnewconcepts frommanagers schooled inSunnyvale’s LMSC methods.

TPPwasdesigned toprevent thecontractor from“getting well” onthechange-order process, analmostroutineeventinprevious com-

petitions. Changes areinevitable, andthecontractor isinaposition totakeadvantage ofthechanges withhigher prices. ButwhenTPP triedto“level theplaying field,” itinstead bulldozed apotential burial ground forLockheed, asitwould haveforanycontractor. (There are thosewhodispute theefficacy ofacontractor usingchange orders to improve itsbusiness position, butmostpeopleagreethatit isaninfluential factorinthedefense business.)

Family Strength OvercomesAdversity += 337

Onthesurface, TPPseemed togiveahammer tothegovernment withwhich tobeatthecontractor, anditwassoused.Nooneinthe Department ofDefense sawthatthegovernment-contractor relationshipwassointertwined thatthegovernment wouldfeelanypaininflictedon the contractor,for theAirForceneededthe C-5,andthe

long,costly competition hadalready shutoutanyalternate source. TheTPPconcept alsoresulted inoneofthegreat aviation ironies.

Thewinnerof thecompetition, Lockheed, wouldtaketremendous

financial losses inproducing justeighty-one oftheC-5As underthe original contract. Theloser,Boeing, wouldconvertitseffortintothe

design ofthecommercial 747andthenbuildmorethanathousand large passenger transport inhistory. ofwhatbecame themostsuccessful hadbeenaclose one,and Thecompetition fortheC-5contract itsownproduct wasthebest,price although eachcompetitor thought

provedtobecritical. Lockheed bid$1.9billionfortheentirepackage, whileDouglas bid$2billionandBoeing$2.3billion.TheAirForce

likedboththeLockheed andBoeing designs, butdidnotfavorthe Douglas entry.Lockheed wasselected. Secretary McNamara ordered a comprehensive review ofthebidding, andfoundnoevidence ofa Lockheed “buy-in.”CourtlandtGross,thenchairmanofthefirm,later

recalled thatLockheed hadplanned aprofitmargin ofabout10percent,anestimate inwhich Haughton concurred. Unaware ofthecomingeconomic andcontractual turbulence, theyhadcommitted Lockheed toaneight-year program thatinvolved thedesign ofavery sophisticated airplane, andthefirstuseofa complicated andpotentially disastrous newcontractual arrangement. Itproved tobefareasier tomaketheC-5flythantomastertheTPPprocess.

Lockheed’s TPPcontract fortheC-5called fortheproduction ifthese aircraft; by“RunA”of53production followed of5aircraft weresatisfactory, a “RunB”of57couldbeaddedonforatotalof 115aircraft.Astheprogramdeveloped, designchangescalledforby theAirForce,andinflation,resultedinatotalcostof$5.2billioneven

though RunBwasreduced to23aircraft. Theincrease incostandthe parallel increase inunitpricesetLockheed uptobethetarget forthe media andCongress.

Theagonyofthecostoverruns wasexacerbated bytheprotests

ofanAirForce civilservant, Ernest Fitzgerald, who,inmusical terms, firstblewthewhistle andthentooted hisownhorn.Attempts tomollify—or muzzle, according toyourpointofview—Fitzgerald were clumsily handled, andheemerged afolkhero,hisnamea synonym

BEYOND THE HORIZONS = 338

forbucking themilitary-industrial complex. AllofFitzgerald’s efforts weredwarfed, however, bythose ofSenator William Proxmire andthe media, whoenjoyed a fielddayatLockheed’s expense. Unfortunately, asaccusations werehurledandhearings were

held,noonerecognized thattheextreme riseincostwasinfacta lesser

problem thantheresult ofthecontractual decisions madeunderTPP guidelines. Ashappens withmostaircraft during thedesign process, theC5Aexperienced a growth inempty weight thatimpaired itsperformance, causing a dropinitsrangewitha payload ofonehundred thousand pounds toonly6,720miles. Lockheed sought permission to regain thelostperformance byusing newly available engines ofgreater

thrust,at a costof aboutan additional $5million.TheAirForce refused, insisting thatLockheed undertake amassive weight-reduction

program instead. Itaddeda proviso: Lockheed couldundertake the engine change atitsownexpense ifitwished, butitstillhadtomake theoriginal weight stipulation. Thiswassheerlunacy onthepartof theAirForce,inwhichanuntriedcontractual concept wasgivenprecedence overprudentengineering andstandard aviation practice.

Theweight-reduction program involved, amongmanyother things, thechemical milling ofwingspars toreduce theirweight. This costlyandtime-consuming process involved tapingthemammoth wingspar,thendipping it inanacidbath,removing it,untaping, cleaning, retaping, andredipping. Eachdipintheacidbathreduced weight byafraction—but alsoreduced strength. Theresult wasthat theplanned thirty-thousand-hour lifespanwascuttoeightthousand hours,andeventhisshortened lifewasattainable onlybylimiting payload tofiftythousand pounds, except underemergency conditions.

At thetime,Lockheedengineers werenotawarethatthereductionin

strength wouldbesogreat;theybelieved thattheywereremoving only

thesafety margin thattheyhadbuiltintotheinitialcalculations. As thesituation developed, means werefoundtomitigate theproblem notonlybylimiting thepayload, butalsobyimproved flighttechniques using so-called active ailerons controlled bycomputers. Themath,ifugly,isfairly straightforward. Thechange tothe morepowerful engines would havecost$5million, avoided themost drastic elements oftheweight-reduction program, andprovided a

thirty-thousand-hour life.Thedropfromthethirty-thousand-hour

life-span figure toeightthousand works outtobeabouta73percent reduction. Ifthatsame 73percent figure isapplied against theultimate programcostof $5.2 billion,the resultis a wasteof $3.79billion.

Family Strength OvercomesAdversity «= 339

TotalPackage Procurement provedtobecounterproductive onaco-

lossal scale. YetTPPwasabanner under which critics suchastheWashington PostandSenator Proxmire rallied, somehow construing themethod ofcontracting tobea malevolent conspiracy masterminded bythe contractor tobilkthegovernment ofmoney, instead ofagovernmental chokecollaronthecontractor. Theprovisions fordetermining the that claimed Critics Run A. cost o f the upon B depended priceofRun Lockheed haddeliberately inflated itsinitial costs sothatitcould cash astohowmany—if inonRunB,eventhoughtherewasnoguarantee any—aircraft wouldactually beprocured inthesecondincrement. It

should havebeenobvious thatnocontractor would haveworked deonthefirst lossof hugeproportions a certain to achieve liberately procurement inthehopeofrecovering onasecond procurement, given thattheterrible costofthefirstrunwouldprejudice thecustomer against anadditional buy. Unfortunately, logic didnothaveheadline appeal, andLockheed culpable a tmost i twas when villain, a deliberate wasmadetoappear oftheproject tocopewiththescale andaninability ofoveroptimism andtherising priceindex. Lockheed hadnochoice buttocontest the negotiations of painful series and andalengthy termsofthecontract, tookplaceatWright Field.

ProductionDilemma atLockheedIr contrastto thecritics’contentions,the management

tobuildtheC-5asecointhestruggle wasfullyinvolved Georgia at a airplanes Therewasnopointto building aspossible. nomically his continual and them, reminded constantly loss,asDanHaughton he Thepressure theproblem. maywellhaveexacerbated oversight intherelatively isreflected management onLockheed-Georgia exerted manager wasgeneral DickPulver ofthetopleaders. rapidturnover “ramp-up” theinitial from1959toMayof1967,during (president) until byTomMay,whoserved Hewassucceeded to production. who inturnbyRobertFuhrman, 1970.Maywassucceeded February

Larry chairman 1971,whenfutureLockheed untilNovember served Kitchen tookover. werenot thefirstto joinLockheedandKitchen Furhman theveryearlydaysoftheC-5A In 1965—in fromLMSC. Georgia who laterbecamechairmanand chief Anderson, program—Roy

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 340

executive officer,wassentto GeorgiafromLMSCtostrengthenGeor-

gia’s financial andbusiness management. Anderson, highly respected forhisfinancial acumen, wasinstrumental insurfacing theemerging C-5problems andrecognizing thesignificance oftheirpotential. But

histimein Georgiawaslimited,asthegrowingfinancialproblemsat

corporate headquarters resulted inhistransfer tothecorporate staffas assistant treasurer in1968. Hewould play acriticalroleinnegotiating thefinalsettlement ontheC-5A contract in1971. Therapidturnover reflected theanxiety overtheC-5,butalso portended another trendwithin theLockheed Corporation, onethat

wouldhaveenormousimpacton its future.BothFuhrmanand

Kitchen wereproducts oftheLockheed Missiles andSpace Company.

Bothhadproventheirskillsin thehighlysuccessful FleetBallistic MissileProgram. WhenFuhrmanwasselected to goto Georgiaas

company president, heasked Kitchen toaccompany himasvicepresidentoffinance andadministration, eventhoughKitchen’s backgroundwas primarily technical. Beginning withAnderson’s appearance inGeorgia, LMSC would haveanincreasingly pervasive

effectuponLockheed’s uppermanagement.

Ina recentinterview, Kitchen recalled hisdismay onhisfirst visitstotheC-5production lineaftercoming fromtherelatively orderedefficiency oftheFleetBallistic Missile effort: “I'dgodownand gothrough thefuselage. YouknowhowbigaC-5is,andIcould notseethrough thefuselage—it wasjam-packed withpeople. Some would bemaking initialinstallations andsomewouldbemaking changes; behind themwould beanother crew, ripping outwhattheyhaddone andputting inanother change.” Kitchen, ano-nonsense manager, analyzed thesituation andrealized thattheengineering department wasinundated withchanges. Configuration controlhadbeenlost.Kitcheninsistedon a stand-

down,stopping production sothatengineering couldcatchupand restore order. Thestand-down wasresisted bothbytheAirForce and byLockheed corporate leaders, buthemadeitstick.

Fuhrmanhadalsodesignated Kitchentobethehatchetman,and he setto workparingdowntheworkforce. Whentheyarrived,there

wereovertwenty thousand people andproduction chaos. Whenhe leftin1975,tenthousand people wereemployed ona rational production line,anumber consistent withthecurrent workload. Hehad raised theoperating profitoftheGeorgia planttoabout9 percent, andwasthenchallenged byCarlKotchian to getit to 11percent.

Withhischaracteristic energy, Kitchen andhisteamwererunning a

Family Strength OvercomesAdversity = 341

streamlined operation, nowproducing C-130s primarily, butstilldoingagreatdealofmodification work, uptoarecord 21percent level. Therewerea series ofgreattriumphs, including “stretch” ofthe C-141andthesuccessful effortsto selladditional C-130swhenit seemed thatthelinewasabouttobeshutdown.Kitchen alsowasable

toretrieve theC-5Aprogram byselling theDepartment ofDefense onthemodification program thatprovided anewwingandyears of additional service life. Kitchen regards thefouryears heserved aspresident oftheGeorgiaCompany asthemostrewarding ofhiscareer, eventhough hewent ontoholdthetopposition ofthecorporation. AtLockheed-Georgia, heimitated Haughton—a manheadmires immensely—in onerespect, byhaving staffmeetings every morning atseven o'clock witha small number ofkeypeople. Unlike Haughton, whoattimes worked

withhis transmitterbuttonlockeddown,Kitchenlistened,running

hismeetings asacollegial teameffort. Eachday,problems would be surfaced anddecisions wouldbemadeasthemanagement styledeveloped atLMSC wasgradually applied. Kitchen carefully reviewed theorganization chartatGeorgia andcutdownthenumber oflevels ofmanagement, combining oreliminating organizations. Hesoonhad themanagerial trendlinesgoinginthecorrect direction—overhead down, quality up,costsdown, schedule ontrack. Thevastdifference inmanagement styles between LMSC and Lockheed Corporate orLockheed-Georgia wasillustrated inanincidentthatKitchen stillregards asa management coup:persuading Haughton nottovisitsooften.

ItwasHaughton’s custom toflydown inhisJetStar every Sunday morning toholdhisownseven o'clock meeting, reviewing every aspect oftheprogram. Aclassic micromanager, heknewthedetails ofthe programs aswellasanyoftheGeorgia managers, whowereterrified byhisdomineering, taskmaster manner. Theyfoundthemselves spending mostof theirtimeputtingtogether “Haughton-proof” briefings fortheSunday inquisition. Kitchen toldHaughton frankly thathisvisits weretaking toomuchtimeaway fromhismanagers and werekeeping themfromgetting theirjobdone.Haughton called Kitchen a“smart-ass,” andthenreluctantly agreed tocome onlyonce every twoweeks. Kitchen eventually persuaded himtomakethevisit monthly—and production picked upaccordingly. Alleighty-one C5Asweredelivered byMay1973,amidahurricane ofcontroversy that

would resonate foryears. Withguidance fromHaughton andAnderson, a Georgia team

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ledbycorporate executive vicepresident William Rieke andincluding Kitchen, DickTaylor, andothers renegotiated theC-5Acontract in 1970. Therenegotiation created, ineffect, acost-plus-fixed-loss contract(thefixedlossbeingabout$250million)fortheC-5Aprogram.

Itwaspartofaglobal settlement withtheDOD. Kitchen’s leadership created atotally newatmosphere ofgenuine teamwork atLockheed-Georgia. Oneresultofthiswasanimproved

productivity andqualitycontrolthatresulted inanenormous saving (approximately $150million)to theAirForceestimate to complete theremainder of thecontract. A secondresultwasa changein the

Georgia corporate culture thatwasreflected inthemodifications later doneontheC-141, therapidandcost-effective production oftheC5B,andtheenduringC-130production. In retrospect,it isevidentthatifTotalPackageProcurement had

focused ontheneeds oftheservice rather thanoncircumventing possiblecontractor inequities, theC-5As wouldnothaveneeded tobe rewinged. In addition,theC-5Bscouldhavebeenincludedin the initialproduction runat anadvantageous price.TotalPackage Procurement wasultimately abandoned, eventhoughitsprimaryadvocate,RobertCharles, insisted totheendthatitwasthecorrectwayto

dobusiness. TheC-5wasbutthestarting pointofLockheed’s timeoftrouble. Asdevastating asthelosses wereontheprogram, theirmostlonglasting anddebilitating effects wereonanintangible element: thecredibility ofLockheed’s leaders.

TheAH-56ACheyenne heVietnam Warhadamixedeffectupondefense contractors. On

theonehand,it broughtaboutincreasedprocurements ofexisting

weapon systems andtheformulation ofrequirements fornewweapons; ontheother, itconsumed somuch ofthedefense budget thatprograms werealways candidates forcancellation if theydidnotproveout quickly andeconomically. Theearlysuccess ofhelicopters inVietnam hadinspired the Army toholdtheAdvanced Aerial FireSupport System (AAFSS) competition toobtain aswift, heavily armored andarmed battle helicopter. It toowastobea TotalPackage Procurement contract andit too wouldbeimpossible tofulfill.

Toughrequirements wereset—the helicopter wastohavea top

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speed of220knots(253mph), a ferryrange of2,100miles, andthe ability tohover outofground effect atsixthousand feet—a realchallenge.

Oftwelve companies thatsubmitted entries,twowereselected,

Sikorsky, withitsmodelS-66anditslong,distinguished history of helicopter development, andLockheed, withitsmodel CL-840. Lockheed’s helicopter history waslimited, butadventuresome. TheLockheed CL-475 debuted in1959withtypical IrvCulver innovations. Culver hadbuilta radio-controlled model helicopter with arigidrotor,anditserved asabasis foratwo-seat helicopter featuring a rigidrotorcoupled toagyroscope system. Afterinitialdifficulties, thepiston-engine-powered CL-475provedtobeveryeasytofly,and inspiredtwosecond-generation designs,theModels186and286.

These continued theuseoftherigidrotor,thistimeincombination withjetengines. While theCL-475 hadbeen a simple design, without muchaerodynamic refinement, thenewdesign wasa fourseataircraftof verycleanlines,and featuringretractablealuminum

alloylanding skids.Thegyroscope ringoftheCL-475, whichhad beensoconspicuous a departure fromotherhelicopter designs, was nowreplaced bythreeweighted armsmounted above thethree-blade rotor. Aseries offivecustom-built prototypes evolved fromtheoriginal

CL-475.Slightly modified, thenewtwo-seat designwasdesignated

XH-51A, twoexamples ofwhich wereevaluated byboththeArmy andtheNavyin 1962.Onceagain, therigidrotorprovided avery stable, easy-to-fly aircraft, onewithatopspeed of174mph. Toseejusthowmuchspeed could beobtained from a rigid-rotor helicopter, theArmy funded themodification ofthesecond prototype intotheXH-51A Compound, thedesignation referring toitsincorporationofanadditional jetengineforpropulsion. Astubwingof seventeen-foot spanwasadded,anda Pratt&Whitney J60turbojet

wasplaced ontheleftsideofthefuselage. ByJune29,1967, theXH51ACompound hadreached 302.6mph,aspeed absolutely unheard offorhelicopters. NASAacquireda thirdModel186,and usedit as a research

vehicle. Lockheed alsobuilttwoModel286sasaspeculative venture.

These five-seat aircraft wereintended forcommercial useandreceived FAA certification in1966.Despite theirhighperformance (topspeed of206mph)theyfailed togaincivilorders. Yeteventhisslimhistory provided thebasisfortheCL-840, subsequently designated theAH-56A Cheyenne. (TheArmypreferred

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XH-51Acompoundhelicopterfeatured a stub wingand a Pratt &WhitneyJ60 turbojet installedon the port side.

naming itsaircraft afterIndiantribes, apractice thatinrecent years hasseensomeobjections raised byNative Americans.) TheCheyenne

wasunique;it wasa “compound” helicopter witha pusherpropeller

atthetailtoprovide thrustathighspeed. Itwasveryhandsome, with along,slender fuselage andsmall wings ofalmost twenty-seven-foot span.Thepurpose ofthewings wastooff-load therotorduring highspeedflight; atzerolift,therotorwasusedonlyforpitchandroll control. Powered byaGeneral Electric T-64jetengine, theCheyenne hada four-blade rigidrotorwitha diameter offiftyfeet,fiveinches.

The crewof twosatin tandem,the pilotraisedabovethe gunner-

copilot. Theforward armament wasinstalled inastabilized platform thatcouldswivel through 360degrees, andcould befittedwitha40mmAeronutronic grenade launcher, a 30-mmAeronutronic cannon ora7.62mmminigun. Thereweresixunderwing attachment points forTOWantitankmissiles or2.75-mm rocketpods.Aiming devices

wereextremely sophisticated forthetime,withanearlyhelmet gun sightandnight-vision equipment. Initialtrialswerepromising, withthefirstflightoccurring on

TheAH-56ACheyennewasone of the most advancedhelicoptersof its era, and featured a radicalfour-bladerigid mainrotor, a derivativeof engineerIrv Culver’sthinking.

September 21,1967.Stability problems wereencountered, bothat

lowaltitudes andathighspeeds.

Eventually, boththelow-altitude andthehigh-speed instability wereremedied. Lockheed continued topursue theprogram, andconsiderable progress wasmade,although unitcostultimately increased byalmost 50percent morethanhadoriginally beenestimated. The program eventually succumbed to thegeneral shortfall ofdefense money duetotheVietnam War,andageneral mutual disenchantment between Lockheed andtheArmy. ByAugust 1972,theprogram was terminated, andthepotentially powerful Cheyenne wasrelegated to footnotes inhistory. Oneof thosefootnotes waswrittenbyWillisHawkins, who

stoutly maintains thattheprogram wasstopped prematurely. Hebases hisargument onthedifficulty thattheArmy encountered laterwhen it onceagainsoughtanadvanced attackhelicopter. In Hawkins’s math—and heisaveryaccurate engineer—the Armycouldhavepur-

chased morethan2,700Cheyennes, withallproblems solved, forthe moneyit spentdeveloping thenewhelicopter, theHughes (later McDonnell Douglas) AH-64A Apache. Heiscareful topointout thattheCheyenne, despite itsbeing designed twenty years before, was faster,carried morepayload, andwasmuchmoreagilethanthe Apache. TheCheyenne wasa $150million strike twoagainst Lockheed.

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Lockheed Shipbuilding and Construction Company histemporary lossoffocus could probably befiledundertheheading“Itlooked likeagoodideaatthetime.” Thevenerable Puget Sound Bridge andDredging Company wassoldtoLockheed in1959. Thecompany hadalonganddistinguished record ofbuilding ships thatextended backto1898;itwasalsoanimportant factorinconstruction inthePacific Northwest. Thename waschanged in1965to reflect thenewownership. Lockheed undertook tobuildandrepair shipsfortheU.S.Navy,andmadeheavycapitalinvestments innew machinery. Despitesuccessful effortsinbuildingforty-four ships,in-

cluding icebreakers, submarine tenders, andlanding ships, Lockheed wasneverableto integrate theshipyard operations intoitsoverall plans, norwasitabletomake theshipyards profitable. Onefactor was therelativecostoflabor,whichwasmuchhigheron theWestCoast

thanintheSouthortheEast.Thedrainfromtheshipyard coincided withothermajorshortfalls fromtheC-5AandCheyenne programs, andthebusiness wasdiscontinued in 1987,tothegeneral reliefof everyone inthecompany.

OtherProblemAreas a 1960, Lockheed hadentered therocket-engine fieldandtheLockheedPropulsion Company wasinvolved inthedesign oftheSR75LP-1two-stage solid-propellant motorfortheBoeing AGM-69A SRAM(Short-Range AttackMissile). Thisair-to-surface missile car-

rieda 170-kiloton W69nuclear warhead, andwasforStrategic Air Command bombers whattheMIRVwasformissiles, amultiplier for

thedelivery system. TheSRAMs were a stand-off attack against the primary Soviet defense installations, clearing apathforeither free-fall bombs orair-launched cruise missiles. TheSRAM rocket motorproved tobedifficult, andLockheed hadtomakeaclaim foranadditional $50million underitscontract to Boeing;thiswasultimatelysettledfor $20million,the difference

beingabsorbed byLockheed asa loss.TheSRAMs wereoperated successfully foranumber ofyears, buthadtobeprematurely retired whentherocket motors proved tobeunstable instorage.

Seriousattempts at diversificationbroughtLockheedinto the ship buildingbusiness. It did verywelluntil risingcosts of WestCoastlabormadeit impossibleto competewithshipyardselsewhere.

Lockheed wasnowengaged withtheDepartment ofDefense in thedispute ofover$500million inthesettlement ofcontracts onthe C-5A, Cheyenne, SRAM, andships. DODplayed hardball; Lockheed wanted tonegotiate thesettlement oftheCheyenne, butpursue the C-5A arguments incourt. TheDefense Department refused. Lockheed hadtonegotiate asettlement forallthecontracts ornone. Intheend,Haughton andAnderson, whowasnowcorporate controller,recognized thattherewasno alternativeto a globalsettle-

ment.Negotiations commenced undertheArmedServices Procure-

mentRegulations. Thesettlement, madewithDavid Packard atthe highest levels oftheDOD,cameinthelastdaysof1970—and was notamoment tooearly. Lockheed’s precarious financial position worsened,andLockheed’s bankers werepersuaded onlywithdifficulty not

toabandon ship. Thiswasa milestone inAnderson’s career. It demonstrated his ability towintheconfidence ofthebanks, andprovided thegroundwork

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forintense negotiations which weretocome overthenextseveral years asLockheed fought toavoid bankruptcy andchartacourse forthefuture. Thesettlements hadthefollowing financial impact onLock-

heed:

C-5A

$247million

AH-56A

124million

Ships

89million

SRAM

24million

Total

$484million

These pretax losses adversely affected netearnings sothatLockheedincurred a netlossfor1970ofalmost $86million onsalesof $2.5billion.Thesettlement wasthelargestlossevertakenbya de-

fensecontractor,and if nothingelse,shouldhavedrivena stake

throughtheheartof thecanardof a profit-mongering militaryindustrial complex. During thelongnegotiations leading uptothesettlement, and intheaftermath oftheagreement, Lockheed wassubject toafirestorm

ofcriticismin Congressandthemedia.DanHaughton,alwaysa per-

suasive witness nomatterhowdirethecircumstances, attempted to alleviate thesituation bypointing toLockheed’s pastandcurrent accomplishments. Henotedthatsinceitsfounding, Lockheed hadde-

liveredmore33,000militaryandcivilaircraftandmorethan1,600 missiles andspacecraft. (ItmusthavegalledHaughton nottobeable to talk aboutthe stunningachievements of LMSC,mostof which

weresoclassified astobeunknown totheCongress andthepress.) Hecitedtherecords setbytheF-104, U-2,SR-71, andotherLockheed aircraft.HetoutedthesuccessoftheC-130,C-141,andP-3C,noting

thatthe composite recordof theseaircraftshowedthattheywere

within1 percent oftheirtargetcostsandschedules. Theaircraft on which Lockheed hadsignificant costoverrun problems (theC-5A and Cheyenne) werebothproducts ofthenewTotalPackage Procurement system. Despite security restrictions, LMSC offered himfertile ground forrelating Lockheed’s prowess. ThePolaris hadbeendelivered two andone-half years ahead ofschedule withcostsonly0.5percent over target. Hespoke ofthelaurels oftheAgena satellite program, which

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= 349

hadachieved a92percent success rateonitslaunches. Theongoing storyofthespysatellites couldnotbetold. Lockheed’s presentations weresuccessful withinCongress, even iftheywereflayed intherecord andinthepress, andwould laythe groundwork forlatertalks whenLockheed’s veryexistence wasatstake. Itsnetworthin1968hadbeenalmost $371million; bytheendof 1970thiswasreduced to$235million, severely affecting itsability to borrow justwhen,forthefirsttime,Lockheed desperately needed to borrow significant sums. Lockheed’s problems withmilitary procurements weresoonto beechoed bydifficulties inthecivilian marketplace.

TheSirensSingAgain hesirensongofcommercial aircraft hadbeenheard again in1963, whentheFederal Aviation Administration announced a phased competition fordesign studies ofasupersonic transport. Boeing and Lockheed responded. Lockheed eventually hadaportfolio ofdoubledelta-wing Mach3 designs. Thebeautiful Lockheed L-2000 design wasgenerally regarded by

the airlinesto be the mostfeasibleconcept,but the awardwentto

Boeing onDecember 31,1966.Ironically, Boeing’s winning swingwingdesign wassubsequently modified toaconfiguration verysimilar totheLockheed L-2000. Thedecision mayhavereflected thegovernment’s interest inapportioning contracts evenly, forLockheed hadjust won the C-5 contest,whileDouglashad won the contestfor the

Manned Orbiting Laboratory, anearly space station concept. Asevents transpired, theideaofasupersonic transport wasabandoned bytheFAA inthefaceofenvironmental pressures andthenear certainty thata supersonic transport wouldnotbeprofitable inthe longrun.TheAnglo-French Concorde, amuchsmaller Mach2 airplane,proved thepointexactly. Onlysixteen Concordes werebuilt, andalthough theyperformed brilliantly, therewasnohopeoftheir everbeing abletorecover thetotalcostsofresearch anddevelopment andproduction. ThelossoftheSSTcompetition freedupaconsiderable number ofLockheed engineers atatimewhentherewasa growing interest in entering thejetairliner market. Lockheed-California design teams had prepared design studies foralargetwin-engine antisubmarine-warfare aircraft asalogical follow-on totheOrion. Thisdesign didnotcome

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 350

tofruition, fortheNavyelected tostaywiththeOrion,butitdidgive

Lockheed confidence inresponding toanAmerican Airlines requirementforawide-bodied 250-seat airliner touseondomestic routes. American’s chiefengineer, Franklin W.Kolk, generated therequirement,whichcalledfora twin-engine aircraftthatwouldoperate overroutessuchasLosAngelesto Chicago(1,750nauticalmiles)or

Chicago toNewYork(640nautical miles). Kolkwastohavegreat influence ontheultimate competition between Lockheed andMcDonnell Douglas, asdidRobert Rummell, hiscounterpart atTWA. Rummell hadworked forLockheed inthepastandwasoneofthefew

people withwhom Howard Hughes dealtdirectly. Kolk’s initial requirement would growovertimetobemodified bytheneedsofAmerican andfourothermajorairlines—United,

TWA,Delta,and Eastern.Eachairlineinvolvedits engineersin the

process tocreate a setofspecifications. Given thestateoftheart,it wasinevitable thatthetwocompeting airframe companies, Lockheed andMcDonnell Douglas, would evolve verysimilar aircraft, interms ofdimensions andperformance. Onlya professional couldexamine thetwoaircraft anddetermine thattheL-1011 wasclearly moread-

vancedtechnicallyandwasa bridgeto the future,whilethe DC-10

wasa moretraditional aircraft, based heavily onpastDC-8andDC9practice. (Work wasbegun byGreatBritain, France, andGermany ontheAirbusIndustrie A-300wide-body transport inJuly1967.It

would havesignificantly different configuration. GreatBritain would eventually withdraw fromtheconsortium.)

TheOneMistake heexecutives whomanaged Lockheed formostofthepastthirty

years wereproducts ofLMSC. Some ofthemworked directly with

Dan Haughton,and thosewhodid admirehim.However,allagree

thatHaughton didmake atleastonemajor error, onethatheadmitted to:hefailed totakethesteps necessary topurchase theDouglas Aircraft Company before McDonnell didsoinApril1967. Theprospect ofLockheed’s acquiring Douglas hadbeencarefully reviewed byuppermanagement. Itwaseconomically feasible, andthe elimination ofcompetition fromthemarketwouldhavemadeLock-

heeda muchstronger player against Boeing. Itwasrecognized that Douglas hadsomeinherent production problems reflected inthelate

deliveries ofbothDC-8andDC-9aircraft,andthattheircostswere

Family Strength Overcomes Adversity

= 351

reportedly outofcontrol. Thesewerefelttobemanageable difficulties

thatLockheed couldturnaround. Onereason given forthedecision nottobuywasa desire toletDouglas gounderandthenpickitup forabargain price. Butaccording tomany whowerethereatthetime, Haughton declined totakeactionprimarily because “Lockheed did notwanttobuildaircraft someone elsehaddesigned.” Itwasfeltthat themerger wouldcreate a situation inwhichLockheed would concentrate onmilitary aircraft whileDouglas would betheleadonthe commercial side.Thuscorporatechauvinism, pureandsimple,carried theseedsofdisaster.It mightnothavebeenHaughton’s onlymistake,

butitwasa sufficiently grievous error.

ohiftingCircumstances, RubberRequirements |i, aspen founditselfincompetition withMcDonnell Douglas, as thenewfirmwasknown, foranas-yet tobefullydefined aircraft tofitamarket nichebetween the707/DC-8 andthe747.William M. Hannanwasnamedprojectengineer fortheLockheed-California team. Thedominant factors fortheoriginal concept oftheL-1011 were thenumber ofpassengers andthedesign range. American Airlines wanted highpassenger capacity andaone-stop transcontinental range, forexample, NewYorktoChicago andChicago toLosAngeles. This could havebeenachieved withtwoengines. Otherairlines wanted the same passenger load,butforlong-distance flight overtheoceans, three engines wererequired. Twoengines werealsoconsidered inadequate foroperation outofairports athighelevations (e.g.,Denver) when outside airtemperatures werehigh. Theadvent ofa newseries ofhigh-bypass engines (which had beenbroughtaboutbytheC-5competition), thePratt&Whitney

JT9D, the GeneralElectricCF6,and the Rolls-Royce RB.211,put

another critical variable intothedecision equation. TheCF-6wasa development oftheTF39usedintheC-5A, andtheJT9Dhadbeen

adoptedbytheBoeing 747.TheRolls-Royce RB.211 wasaveryadvancedengine,butwasnotasfaralongin itsdevelopment aseither

ofthetwootherentries. (Engine designations arearcane; inthisinstance, RBstoodforRolls-Royce Barnoldswick, theoriginal turbineengine factory site,while 211wasthenumerical sequence oftheengine intheRolls-Royce lineup.) Perhaps themostcritical element wasthe factthatLockheed needed helpto funddevelopment, andwhile

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 352

neither Pratt&Whitney norGeneral Electric would offerany,RollsRoyce did. Every airline proudly advertises itschoice ofaircraft, extolling its

virtues. Every manufacturer proudly liststhelogosandcolors ofairlines thatflyitsequipment. Onewouldnevergatherfromthesemutual

expressions ofadmiration justhowviciously thecompanies negotiate witheachothertoobtain every possible edge. Thenegotiations become fiercest whenitisperceived thattheotherpartyisinsomedifficulty. Relations between aircraft manufacturers andtheirsuppliers— enginebuilders,equipment providers, serviceproviders—are con-

ducted inexactly thesamemanner. Theresult isthattheselection of anaircraft suchastheproposed Lockheed L-1011 TriStar andthe McDonnell Douglas DC-10 becomes aseries ofsmall wars, complete

withespionage, propaganda, disinformation, andbloodybattlesatthe negotiating table,withnoquarteraskedorgiven.Thespiritofcombat

issuchthatcompanies oftenignore long-term advantages intheinterestofsatisfying short-term victories. Aseventstranspired,McDonnellDouglasenteredthe racefor

thewide-body transport a littlelaterthanLockheed. BoththeMcDonnell Douglas andtheLockheed teams synthesized alloftheavailableinformation, andbothconcluded thatthenewairliner would have tohavethreeengines, rather thantwo. Thiscreated anengine-placement problem, whichinturnwas affected bythedimensions oftheengines beingconsidered foruse.

Thehighly successful three-engine Boeing 727hadplaced thethird engine intherearofthefuselage, usinganS-shaped ducttorunair fromtheintake, through theengine, andouttherear.Thismethod wasadoptedbyLockheed. Although thereweresomeproblems associatedwithdirectingthe airflowthroughthe S-shapedduct,the in-

stallation wasmorestreamlined andwaseasier tointegrate withthe fuselage structure. McDonnell Douglas chose toplacetheirengine tenfeetupon thevertical surface, wherenoductwasrequired. (Theneedtobe perceived as“different” probably mattered aswell.) Theposition did require anextremely strong vertical surface, andthatmeant increased weight. Moreimportantly, itreduced thesizeoftherudder. Togain engine-out control, thewingengines hadtobemoved inboard. Because ofthewingsweep, thisalsomoved themforward, andprecluded theuseoftwoforward passenger doorsashadbeendoneontheL1011.Theresult wasalessflexible interior configuration. Airlines placegreatimportance uponthechoice ofengines. A

Family Strength Overcomes Adversity

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paramountconsideration is cost,of course,but suchfactorsas past

experience withthemanufacturer, fuelconsumption, maintenance requirements, andcommonality withotherequipment allinfluence decisions. Lockheed wasoffering customers thechoice ofeither General

Electricor Rolls-Royce engines,but it clearlyfavoredthe latter,not

leastbecause ofRolls-Royce’s offerofdevelopment assistance.

TheRB.211 seemed tohavebeendesigned specifically fortheL1011, interms ofweight, power, anddimensions. Gerhard “Herman theGerman” Neumann, General Electric’s combination superengineer

andsupersalesman, triedto convinceHaughtonto usetheGECF6.

HearguedthattheRolls-Royce wasa “paperengine”andthatthe claimsbeingmadeforit wereimpossible to accomplish withinthe

proposed schedule. Forhispart,Haughton deemed theCF6tobetoo longforplacement intherearfuselage; theL-1011 would havetobe redesigned toaccommodate it.

A complex, intensestruggle ensued,in whichthecompetition

between airlines overlapped thecompetition between theaircraft and engine manufacturers. Inarational world, anagreement would have beenreached inwhich alloftheairlines would haveselected oneaircraftusingonetypeofengine. Thiswould haveprovided theairlines

withthelowest-cost meansoftransportation, andthewinningengine

andaircraft companies withaviable product fromwhich a profit might bemade.Eventhelosing aircraft andengine manufacturers would havebenefited, fortheycould havecuttheirlosses andturned toother products.

Itwasnottobe,forreasons ofpersonal preference, brand loyalty, and,sadtosay,greed, inwhichevery company sought togainthe largest piece oftheprofit piebysqueezing every othercompany. AmericanAirlinesassumedthat as the instigatorof the competition,its

decision onwhich aircraft andwhich engine tobuywould befollowed bytheotherairlines.

Americanalsofavoredthe Rolls-Royce engine,as did United, TWA,andEastern.DeltapreferredtheGEengine,asdidMcDonnell

Douglas. Lockheed interpreted American’s preference fortheRollsRoyce asastrong signthattheyalsopreferred Lockheed. Haughton didnotknowthatKolk,American’s chiefengineer andthe“father”

ofthewide-body program, wasdisappointed thatLockheed haddecided nottobuildatwin-engine aircraft andwasnowdetermined that American would buytheDouglas aircraft. ItwasnotthattheDC-10 wassuperiorto theL-1011;mostengineers, pilots,andpassengers will confirmthat theoppositewasthecase.Kolk,andAmerican,melded

TheLockheedL-1011was verymuch liked by its pilots and by passengers. Unfortunately,it entered the market against a formidablerival,the DouglasDC-10,at a time whenrising labor costs and other factors madeprofitabilityimpossible.

theirdisappointment withLockheed andtheirconfidence inDouglas intoa decision tobuytheDC-10. Haughton’s continued beliefthatKolkfavored theTriStarwas fostered byAmerican’s entertainment ofsuccessively lowerbidsfrom

Lockheed. In thehardball gameof aircraft sales,American was using Lockheed merely asafoiltoforce thepriceoftheDC-10 down, eventhough itnever intended tobuytheTriStar. Sosimilar werethe aircraft, andsointense wasthebidding, thatthepricevariant ona roughly $15million airplane wasonly$200,000—just over1percent. OnFebruary 19,1968, Haughton sought toicethedealbymakingalast-minute significant priceconcession toGeorge Spater, American’s president. Tohismounting horror, he,andhischieffinance man,FrankFrain,werekeptwaiting outsideSpater’s office foralmost twohoursbeforehewasinformed—by anAmerican vicepresident,

Donald J. Lloyd Jones—that American hadjustpicked McDonnell Douglas. Thepurchase wasfor25aircraft andanoption for25more. ItwasbothablowtoLockheed andanapparent calculated insultto Haughton, whowasoutraged.

Hisimmediate reaction wastogotoAmerican’s competitors and offeranevengreater pricereduction; hewould sellthefirstL-1011s

Family Strength Overcomes Adversity

= 355

tothefirstbuyerat$14.4million, apricebasedonangeranddesper-

ationandnotonpractical economics. Theinitial results werestartling: Eastern andTWAmade a joint

announcement thattheywerebuyingL-1011s, equipped withRollsRoyceengines, foranamountover$2billion.Eastern’s orderwasfor

25aircraft and25options, TWA’s for33aircraft and11options. Deltasoonfollowed suit,ordering 24 L-1011s, equipped with RB.211s, eventhoughtheystillpreferred GEengines. Northeast (which wouldmergewithDeltain 1971)ordered 4.

Thescope ofHaughton’s planning wasillustrated bythearrangements hemadetodampen American concerns aboutthepurchase of foreign engines. AsmallBritish firm,AirHoldings, Ltd.,normally actedasanairline sales agentformanufacturers. Haughton’s connectionsallowed himtocreate anelaborate offset scheme bywhich he couldannouncethesaleof50L-1011stoAirHoldings,Ltd.,bringing

totalordersto 144.Theorderserved toquietcongressional rumblings

byshowing thatsignificant foreign money would flowtotheUnited States tobuyairframes, andthusoffset theoutward flowoffundsto purchase engines. Every aspect ofthedealwaslegitimate; funding was available andadownpayment wasmade. YetwhatAirHoldings was really buying wasdelivery positions ontheproduction line,along with options tobuy.Itwassetuptodoexactly whatHoward Hughes had donesoprofitably withtheJetStar. Thesituation wasaheroic triumph forHaughton. Hehadturned whatheregarded asAmerican’s perfidious dealings intoabonanza of sales,andto makeit sweeter,isolatedAmerican,McDonnellDouglas,

andGeneral Electric intheprocess. Yetthebasic circumstances ofthedealwerebizarre. Mostpeople believed thatthemarket (generally estimated torequire nomorethan 750wide-body aircraft) couldnotsupport boththeTriStar andthe DC-10, norcouldthecombined L-1011/DC-10 production support morethanoneengine manufacturer. Everything nowdepended upon thedecisionbyUnitedAirlines,forif it optedfortheL-1011,Amer-

icanwould havetorecant, cancel itsDC-10 orders, andjointheparade toBurbank evenasGEandMcDonnell Douglas folded theirrespective tents.

Itwasnottobe.General Electric offered extraordinarily favorable financial termstoUnitedsothatit wouldselecttheCF6enginefor

eithertheL-1011 orDC-10. Haughton toldUnited thathewould notredesign theTriStar toaccept theGeneral Electric engine, aneffort thatheestimated wouldcost$100million. (Rolls-Royce provided a

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 356

completepackage—engine, fanairflowreverse,podcowlingsandre-

latedsystems, noise-attenuation devices, etc.General Electric didnot, andBoeing hadspurned anattempt byHaughton topurchase the747 GEinstallation package.) Butmoreimportant thananything was Haughton’s overoptimism. Hefeltstrongly thatUnitedwouldseethe

follyof a dividedmarket,acceptthe RB.211engine,andchoosethe

L-1011—case closed. Itwasa catastrophic mistake, basedinpartona sheepish approach byAmerican’s Spater toobtainbackup positions ontheL-

1011lineifMcDonnell Douglas exercised itsoptionnottoproceed

with the DC-10.If Americanwasnowtiltingto Lockheed,could

United dootherwise? Haughton should haveperceived thatUnited wasnowina perfectposition todictatetermstoboththeaircraft andtheengineman-

ufacturers, anditproceeded todoso,whipsawing eachcompany to driveprices down. Thetactics worked sowellthatUnited could purchase either planeoreitherengine atessentially identical prices.

Lockheed wasnowadministered a seconddoseofwhatit regardedastreacherous industrial behavior. Havingmaneuvered itself intothecatbirdseat,United,likeAmerican,didwhatit hadplanned

todoallalong: buytheMcDonnell Douglas DC-10, basedonits preference forproducts fromthehistoric Douglas line.Itannounced thatitwould purchase 60DC-10s withanoptionfor30more.The market wasnowdivided in a waythatwouldinsurethatneither McDonnell Douglas norLockheed would reach abreak-even pointin theirproduction, norwould theengine manufacturers haveaslargea market astheyneeded tomake a profitatthereduced prices theyhad quoted. Andtherewerefurthertroubles ahead.

DoneInbya Seagull he RB.211wasa highlysophisticated engine,usinga three-stage

low-pressure turbine (itscompetitors usedtwostages). Itwasbuilt upofseven modules, eachoneeasily changed formaintenance, and itsdesign permitted theuseofcomparatively shortrotating assemblies, whichmeantthatoverall engine dimensions werereduced. Itsweak linkwasa single-stage eighty-nine-inch-diameter fanwithtwenty-five widebladesmadeof Hyfil(carbon-fiber composite), whichgreatly

reduced weight, notonlyinthefan,butinotherengine partsaffected

Family Strength Overcomes Adversity

= 357

bytheweightofthefan,primarily thefanbearings andtheirstructural

housings.

In1969, thestandard testforsusceptibility tobird-strike damage

wasmade. Threedead(butnotfrozen, ashappened ina latertestto

anotheraircraft)chickens, designated “BostonSeaGulls”bytheFAA,

werepneumatically firedintoanoperating RB.211. TheHyfilsus-

tainedthestrikebeautifully, butthebearing andhousing failed and thefandeparted theengine. Rolls haddeveloped abackup solidtitaniumfanwhich wasidentical aerodynamically butwasmuchheavier andrequired a newheavier housing andbearings, increasing totalengineweight. (Thisfandidnotevenhiccupwhenexposed tothe“Bos-

tonSeaGull”test.)Theeconomies implicit in a lighterengine vanished, andwithittheRB.211’s competitive edge. There were many otherproblems, including leaking sealsandbearing problems, but theseweretypical ofnewengines andsusceptible toengineering cures.

TheTriStarFlies hileallofthedifficult political gameswerebeingplayed, Lock-

heed’s superb engineering created averyadvanced aircraft, which

wasfirstflownon November16, 1970.The pilotwasH. B. Dees,

assisted bycopilot R.C.Cokeley andresearch anddevelopment engineer G.E.Fisher. Theaircraft flewverywell,andthroughout itshistory, flight crews, maintenance personnel, andpassengers havelauded theL-1011 asperhaps themostuser-friendly ofthewide-body aircraft. TheprototypeL-1011wasretained byLockheed asa development vehicle for improvedmodels,ofwhichtherewerethree,theL-1011-100, -200,

and-500.Atotalof249production Tristars werepurchased newby eighteen airlines, while usedL-1011s wereusedbyanumber ofothers.

TheRoyalAirForcepurchased 6 fromBritishAirways and3 from PanAmerican andconverted themto tankersforin-flight refueling. (McDonnell Douglas wouldbuild446DC-10sovera twenty-year

production span,proving thatthemarket estimate for750aircraft was justaboutright.) Butinasoap-opera twist,thefateoftheTriStar wasnotinthe handsofitsbuilders oritscustomers, butrather inthoseofitsengine manufacturer, Rolls-Royce. Theengine onwhich Haughton hadstaked Lockheed’s corporate lifehada troubled development, having difficulty indelivering its

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 358

ThegracefulL-1011TriStarbecamean economicdisaster for Lockheed,one that could not be readilyterminatedbecauseof commitmentsto customers.

required performance. Theseproblems wereeventually worked out, andtheRB.211 didwellinservice. Butbefore theengines couldbe proven effective, Rolls-Royce fellvictim tothetremendous competitive

pressures (applied primarily byGeneralElectric, butreinforced by

Lockheed) thatdroveengine saleprices downtothepointthatthe venerable firmwaslosing money ata tremendous rate.Ina bitof theater asdramatic asanyseenbefore intheaircraft industry, RollsRoycedeclared itselfbankruptonFebruary 4, 1971.Asbadasthis

news was, it created the backgroundfor what can only be described

asHaughton’s greatest role,thatofsavioroftheBritish aircraft-engine

industry.

ADolefulChronology hecomplex Lockheed financial situation isbestunderstood bya bare-bones presentation ofthefactsinchronological order.The following listisoversimplified, forthereal-world situation wasinfi-

nitelymorecomplex, withpolitics, personalities, andcompany rivalries

allimpinging onevents, buttheseitems willserve asaschematic outlineofwhathappened.

1969 MAY: Aware thattheL-1011 program wouldconstitute a drainon resources foranumber ofyears, Lockheed arranged fora$400million lineofcredit.

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1970

JANUARY: Rolls-Royce, acknowledging acash-flow problem, laysoff 3,500employees. MARCH: Lockheed announces thatit isin severefinancial difficulty because ofdisagreements withtheAirForceonthecostoftheC-5A.

Rolls-Royce dropped fromstockindex ofLondon Financial Times because offinancial problems. APRIL: Rolls-Royce announces L-1011 engines willhavetitanium ratherthanHyfilblades. MAY: British Industrial Reorganization Corporation, a government agency, provides Rolls-Royce with$24million in returnfora 12 percentequity.

JULY: Lockheed dedicates astate-of-the-art $50million plantatPalmdaletoproduce L-1011s. AuGUST: McDonnell Douglas DC-10makesfirstflight;L-1011 prototype isrolled out. SEPTEMBER: Lockheed announces a $500million creditarrangementwithatwenty-four-bank consortium. NOVEMBER: Rolls-Royce announces RB.211 development costs have risenfromoriginal estimate of$168millionto $324million.

TheL-1011 makes firstflightatPalmdale.

1971 Rolls-Royce announces HyfilbladeshavefailedbirdJANUARY: impacttests.

FEBRUARY: Rolls-Royce declares bankruptcy.

Lockheed laysoff4,000employees atBurbank and2,000atPalmdale; L-1011production heldinabeyance fortenmonths. Haughton urgesBritishgovernment tosustainRolls-Royce.

Thenewly formed “Rolls-Royce (1971),” owned bythegovernment, isregistered onLondon Stock Exchange. MARCH: Secretary oftheTreasury JohnConnally meets withBritish officials todiscuss conditions forcontinuation ofRB.211 andL-1011 projects.

GreatBritain agrees tocontinue RB.211 project ifU.S.government orU.S.banks guarantee thatLockheed willbuildtheL-1011.

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Lockheed agrees topayasmuchas$120million moreforengines if British government continues RB.211 production. APRIL:Lockheed meetswithtwenty-four creditorbanks;Secretary

Connally states thatthebanks willnotbesatisfied without agovernmentloanguarantee. British primeminister Edward Heathsaysthat unless aloanisguaranteed toLockheed, theBritish government will notproceed withRB.211 program.

MAY: Treasury Secretary Connally announces thattheWhiteHouse

willaskCongress toguarantee $250million inbankloanstoLockheed,inasmuch as24,000 jobsand$1.4billion ininvestment are involved. Lockheed agreestopay$575millionfor555engines.

AUGUST: President Richard Nixon signstheEmergency LoanGuaranteeAct,Public Law92-70. SEPTEMBER: Emergency LoanGuarantee Board approves Lockheed application forgovernment guarantee of$250million. Lockheed isto payacompetitive interestrate,including 2percenttothegovernment

asaguarantee fee.

TheOtherSideof the Street ho

wasathisverybestbefore Congress; hemesmerized the chairman oftheHouse Banking Committee, thecurmudgeon— butfellow Alabaman—Wright Patman, withSouthern charm andhis usual command offacts. Hesucceeded inpersuading Congress topass theEmergency LoanGuarantee Actoverthemostardent opposition ofSenator William Proxmire andanavalanche ofarguments against theideafromGeneral Electric. Atthesame time,Haughton, Kotchian, Anderson, andtheirtrusted aides hadbeenwooing therepresentatives oftwenty-four banks andtheairline customers tokeepfaith.Finally, onSeptember 14,1971,representatives ofthebanks, airlines, RollsRoyce, theEmergency LoanGuarantee Board, andLockheed metat theNewYorkFederal Reserve Bank, theretosigndocuments tocompletea $650million financing package. Theloanguarantee wasimmediately characterized bytheunin-

formed inthemedia asacolossal government handout toLockheed. Infact,theloanswereprivate commercial loans, andthegovernment notonlyneverhadtoputupanymoney, it earned $31million in

Family Strength

Overcomes Adversity

+= 361

Lockheedemployeesloyallysupported their companyin its struggle to stay afloat during the crisis with Rolls-Royceand the L-1011program.

guarantee fees.Theriskto thetaxpayer wasalways minimal. There

weremanyprecedents forthefederal guarantee—at thetimeitwas issued, thefederal government wasalready guaranteeing andinsuring loans which totaled $137billion. During thistimeoftrial,Brian M.Freeman wassecretary tothe Emergency LoanGuarantee Boardandfinancial counselor tothegen-

eralcounsel oftheTreasury Department. Hehadcome toWashington fromanappointment attheHarvard Business School to,inhiswords, “avoid traditional work.” Hefoundhimself plunged formorethan

fouryearsintotheintricacies thatoccurwhengovernment intervenes in (orfor)business—a practicehe disapproves of froman economic

andbusiness perspective, butacknowledges asappropriate political action. Inthecourse ofthattime,heessentially managed notonlythe Lockheed loanguarantee program, butalsothatoftheChrysler Corporation andtheprograms ofdirect andindirect financing toConrail. TheauthoraskedFreeman forhisimpression ofLockheed, its principals andtheirprinciples, andthemerits ofitscase. Heresponded thatLockheed was,toalarge degree, avictim oftheguarantee program

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because oftheongoing congressional frenzy over, andtheprevious bad publicity surrounding, costoverruns bydefense contractors. Inthat

regard,he maintainsthat therewassignificantdoubtthat Lockheed

wastheprimary partyatfaultontheoverruns, andthathaditfought

thebattleincourtithadasubstantial potential forprevailing. Hisview ofLockheed’s management wasextraordinarily positive. Theywere“honorable people, insomewayslikeBoyScouts, who always dealtwellwithallparties intheguarantee program. Theyspent significanteffortto be responsive, and that includesHaughton,An-

derson, Marafino, et.al.” Freeman saysthathadheheaded Lockheed, hemightnothave allowed thecorporation tobeabused bytheCongress andtheadmin-

istration tothedegree itwasattimes,because itwassubject togreater scrutiny anddifferent standards thanotherAmerican corporations. At

thetime,however, theattitude ofLockheed’s management wasthat “Lockheed was a significant beneficiary ofgovernment defense programs, andinthatcontext, should dowhatthegovernment wanted, evenwhenthegovernment wasclearly wrong.” In regardto theforeign-payments scandal, Freeman statedthat

Lockheed wasdoingbusiness exactly asthevastmajority ofother American companies weredoingit intheforeign markets. Heremarked further thatifithadnotbeendoingbusiness inthatmanner, Lockheed’s management might havebeencriticized forbeing seriously atfault.Infact,itsactivities werefarlessegregious thanmany others’. Theruleschanged midstream. Freeman’s views wereknownatthetimeinternally. However, he

couldnotmakehiscomments publicly because hedidnotviewthat

ashisrole.Moreover, anywordswouldhavebeenoverridden bythe

almost universally badpress Lockheed wasreceiving. Yetitisinteresting,andvaluable, togetanobjective view fromthemanwhomanaged thegovernment’s loanguarantee program atthetime. Lockheed wassaved—but itstroubles werenotover. Before going intothenextseries ofproblems, itisappropriate tobriefly examine the actions ofDanHaughton inwhatmany consider tobehisfinest hour.

ColdFishforBreakfast ne

wasalways praised forhiscourtly Southern manners whennegotiating. Hewasbeloved inEngland, particularly bythe

Family Strength OvercomesAdversity = 363

rank-and-file Rolls-Royce personnel, whowerealways amazed athis ability toremember theirnames. Hisfriendly attitude wasnotoften foundamong theleaders atRolls-Royce. In an interview,Haughtonrecalledthat he and severalof his

colleagues wenttoEngland inearlyFebruary 1971,stillexhausted fromsettling theDefense Department claims. Thepurpose ofthetrip wasto review thestatusoftheRB.211 program. Theyarrived at Heathrow at about10:00A.M.andweremetbya Rolls-Royce representative whotoldthemtherewasto bea luncheon in theRolls-

Royce hotelsuite.Haughton andFrankFrainwentdirectly tothe meeting, suffering fromjetlag.Itwasabout4:00A.M. California time, buttheyhadtotoywiththeirsherry andaluncheon ofcoldsalmon. The groupsatdown,andbeforetheyhadfinishedtheirlunch,

Rolls-Royce announced thatitwasgoingintoreceivership. Aprincipal

consideration oftheRolls-Royce executives wasanEnglish lawthat madeit a felony fordirectors ofa firmtospendmoney theydidn’t have—and Rolls-Royce wasclearly inthatposition.

Haughtonwasshocked,but retainedhis composure,and im-

mediately wenttoworktorectify thesituation. Hebegan withawhirlwindseries ofmeetings, working hiswayuptheBritish government’s chainofcommand. OnFebruary 3,1971,theonetime coal-miningcampbratreceived a callfromtheprime minister ofEngland, Edward Heath.Haughton andFrainmetwithHeath,anddidtheirbestto persuade himthatplacing Rolls-Royce intoreceivership would have disastrous effects uponbothGreatBritain andtheUnited States. They werenotimmediately successful—the decision hadalready beenmade, andRolls-Royce wentintoreceivership onFebruary 4.YetHaughton hadmadeafavorable impression thatwould soonpaydividends. Within tendays, Haughton wasbackinLondon, persuading the British toseewhatcouldbeworked outbetween theBritish government,Rolls-Royce, andLockheed. Alongseries ofnegotiations followed,culminating witha meeting at the Britishembassy in Washington.Haughton,Carl Kotchian,RoyAnderson,and a few

otherLockheed personnel metwithLordCarrington andhisBritish team.Theagreement theyreached saved Rolls-Royce andwasa keystoneforthesubsequent Emergency LoanGuarantee Act. ManyoftheLockheed personnel whowereinattendance atthe meetings withtheEnglishrepresentatives wentontotoppositions at

Lockheed. Theyallgivefullcredit toDanHaughton forsaving RollsRoyce, andindoingso,saving Lockheed.

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 364

A Combination ofProblems n thethirteen-year period from1960through 1972,theLockheed Corporation recorded over$26billion insales. Ineightofthose thirteen years, itmade a totalprofit of$364million. Butlosses infive critical years amounted to$209million, sothatthenetprofit overthe

periodwas$155million.Thusthirteenyearsofhigh-risk, arduous

effort andtremendous achievement attained arateofreturnofabout 0.6percent. Inthissameperiod, theMissiles andSpace Company accounted for36percent oftotalsales, and128percent ofthecon-

solidated after-tax netearnings. LMSCwas a lifepreserver. Despitealltheproblems, theL-1011linewasrestarted, andby October1971,4,500employees hadbeenrehired. FAATypeApproval

wasreceived onApril12,1972. Eastern Airlines began scheduled servicewiththeTriStar onApril24.Unfortunately, production costs

continued toescalate foravarietyofreasons thatincluded concurrent incorporation ofnewtestengineering changes withearlierproduction

activities, therefurbishing ofearly flight testaircraft tomeetcustomer requirements, theacceleration ofefforts toreduce delays indelivery, andtheretraining ofemployees. Productionof the TriStarpeakedat 41 in 1973,thendeclined to modestlevels,rangingfrom8 in 1978to 24 in 1980.Despitethe

factthatstockholders’ equity hadfallentoa lowof$26.5million, Lockheed maintained anoptimistic frontaslateas1974, estimating a

totalsalesof350L-1011aircraft,with260beingtheestimatedbreak-

evenpoint.Bythistime,ithadinvested morethan$500million in development costs,andhopedtoachieve $2.7billion insales. The extended-range version oftheaircraft, theL-1011-500, wasexpected tobringinanadditional $1.8billion insales of100aircraft.

Itshouldhavehappened, fortheTriStarwasanexcellent aircraft, economical tooperate, andpreferred bymostpassengers totheother

wide-body transports. Butthedesired sales didnotmaterialize, andby 1981itwasclearthat,painful asitwas,theTriStar hadtobephased out, at a costof $730millionbeforeanytaxwrite-offs.Lockheed’s

equity hadbuiltupovertheperiod, primarily fromtheactivities of LMSC, butwasnowreduced to$141million. Phasing outwasnot easy, forTriStar production wasofcourse directly tiedtoLockheed’s financial strength, andthetiming ofthephasedown hadtobegeared toLockheed’s equity position. Lockheedhadlost$2.5billionon the L-1011program,an av-

Family Strength Overcomes Adversity

= 9365

eragelossof$10million perairplane, excluding thecostofthemoney.

Thelosses incurred bytheTriStar soaked upearnings byotherelementsofthecorporation, notably LMSC andGeorgia, andnaturally hada deleterious effect oncorporate morale, foritdestroyed theincentive program forexecutives. Yetthesense offamily wassostrong atLockheed thatfewkeypeople jumped ship,although many ofthem werewooed byoutside firms. Earlyin 1970and1971,whenthesignificant losses fromthe defense programs wererecognized andwhentheneedforadditional financingwasso evident,Haughton,Kotchian,andAndersonwere

quietlyseeking mergerpartners. Onmanya Sunday, whenthecor-

porate offices werelargely deserted, meetings wereheldwithkeyrepresentatives ofmajor corporations. ButLockheed’s financial story was notimpressive, andthebetonthefutureseemed tooriskyforthe potential partners. In1973and1974,whenL-1011 costsweregrowing andwhen it became obvious thatfinancing wasinjeopardy, themerger alternativereappeared atthesuggestion ofArthurYoung & Company, Lockheed’s auditors. Haughton sentRoyAnderson toinvestigate the possibility oftheTextron Corporation becoming amerger partner. Haughton negotiated withthechairman ofTextron, G.William Miller(latertheU.S.secretary ofthetreasury), andthetwomencame

veryclose toagreement. Textron wastohaveacquired about50percent ofthecompany forabout $50million inshares, andanother $50million inconvertible debentures, withMiller becoming chairman. Anderson recalls Haughton receiving aphone callfromMiller inFebruary 1975 declining theopportunity, almost certainly because ofconcerns overthe fateoftheL-1011, andtheknown difficulties withtheSeattle shipyard. Negotiations anddiscussions hadgone onforoverayear without success. Inretrospect, thiswasbeneficial totheLockheed shareholders. Thebanks, exhausted withefforts tofindawaytomitigate the financial riskstheyhadundertaken withLockheed credit,became par-

tiesto a newfinancialpackagewhichwouldextendfinancing,convert

subordinated debentures toequity, andprovide thefoundation fora long-term financing agreement. There waslightattheendofthetunnel.Mayof1975 wasabanner month—it wasnowapparent thatLockheedwould remain independent. (Anderson’s relief attheturnofevents wasreflected whenheatlastallowed futureViceChairman Vince Marafino toturninhisfive-year-old company carforanewone.) Unfortunately, Textron’s decision andtheTriStar’s difficulties werenottheworstnewsofthedecade forLockheed.

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 366

TheTimeof Scandals a 1975,theNorthropCompanywasbeinginvestigated forpossible

improprieties intheconduct ofitsforeign sales. Although anyform ofbribery wasstrictly illegal intheUnitedStates, it wasa matter ofcommon business practice inmanyareasoftheworld.Certain concessions hadtobebuiltintocontracts toprovide payment for intermediaries whowereessential to secure thedeal.Thepractice waswidespread, and,whenaskedaboutit ina congressional hearing,Northrop’spresident,TomJones,madea remarkto the effect

thatNorthrop wasnotdoinganything thatLockheed didnotdo.The effectofJones’s offhand comment uponthemediaanduponcongressional investigators waselectric: Lockheed became a newtarget. Curiously, mostmembers ofLockheed’s uppermanagement were

notconcerned, beingconvinced thatLockheed hadnotengaged in practices suchasthoseNorthrop wasaccused of.Theirfaithwassoon shattered. InJune1975,asthenewly negotiated financing arrangements

werebeingfinalized withSECfilings,Lockheed management was

faced withwhatturned outtobeanimpossible request. Vincent N.Marafino, whoultimately became vicechairman of Lockheed, stillwinces asherecalls theincident. Helearned thatLockheedexecutives werebeing asked bytheirindependent auditor tosign a letteraffirmingthat (1)allpaymentsweremadein accordance with

official agreements andrecorded inLockheed’s books; (2)noemployee orofficial ofanyforeign government, oranydirector, officer, oremployee ofacustomer waspartytoanyoftheagreements; and(3)no director, officer, ormanagerial employee ofLockheed oranyofits subsidiaries hadanyknowledge ofthedisposition ofpayments made

toconsultants.

Atthetime,Marafino wascertain thattherewould benotrouble meeting theserequirements andcheerfully hadappropriate letters

madeup.Thefullimportof thesituationwasrealized whenDan

Haughton refused toallow hisofficers tosignthem. Itwasthenrevealed thatcontracts tosome foreign countries were designed tohave, asapartoftheirprice, a series ofpayments toconsultants whohadhelped facilitate thedeal.These consultants, inturn, allegedly paidbribes topeople inpositions ofresponsibility. Among the

morenotorious ofthosewhowerealleged tohavereceived thebribes

were Japan’s Yoshio Kodama, andPrince Bernhard oftheNetherlands.

Family Strength Overcomes Adversity

+= 367

VincentM.Marafinois regarded by his colleaguesas a financial genius whoexpertlyguided Lockheedthrough the darkest days of its troubles to the heights that it reachedin the 1990s. Hewas a team player, highlyregardedby every Lockheedcorporateexecutive.

Thebribery scandal, coming ontopofthelongseries ofdif_iculties withtheC-5,theCheyenne, andotherprojects, shocked Lockheedpersonnel tothecore.Itseemed thatthescandal mightbethe laststraw, jeopardizing Lockheed’s financial position. Thescandal created animmense amount ofdamage, farbeyond theactual dollar amounts involved. Onewould haveexpected sonotorious aneventtohaveinvolved millions ofdollars; whenthefacts wereknown, a totalof$750,000 hadbeenplaced “outside normal channels offinancial accountability” between 1968and1975. Ofthis amount, only$290,000 hadbeendisbursed ascommissioned. Interms ofthemodernviewofethics,even$1wouldhavebeenwrong,butin termsofthehugedollaramounts ofthecontracts involved, theamount seemsalmostlaughably small.

HaughtonTakesthe Fall hesense ofLockheed family extended toHaughton, whowasregarded asastern, demanding, sometimes overly tough father figure,

butonewitha heartofgold.Hissubordinates admiredhistender solicitude forhiswife,whowasillandrequiredhiscare.Kitchen,

whocandidly termsHaughton a micromanager witha tendency to

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 368

intimidate hisemployees, nonetheless stands byhimasa greatleader. RoyAnderson, theabsolute epitome ofagentleman, holdsHaughton inequally highregard. Whenasked directly ifLockheed’s problems at thetimemightnothavestemmed fromHaughton’s hubris, Anderson replied, withasmile,thatitwasexuberance, andnothubris,thathad

precipitated thedifficulties. Yetthefacts seem clear. Haughton ranatightship.Hedemanded andreceived absolute control. Hewasablysupported inthisbyCarl Kotchian, whotothisdayisunapologetic aboutconducting business asothercompanies did.AsaresultofHaughton’s leadership, Lockheed,notwithstanding itsenormous technical successes, became immersed ina series offinancial andethical problems thatalmost caused itsdemise. Itwassaved inlargepartbythepervasive sense offamily, anapttermno matterhowoftenused,andbyatotal changeofman-

agement andmanagement styletoenable thefirmtorecover. Wearied byevents, andaware ofhisresponsibilities, Haughton resigned aschairman oftheboardonFebruary 13,1976.Kotchian, asvicechairman andpresident, alsoresigned. Thetwomensigned a

poignant letteroffarewell.

Lockheed nowcompletely revised itsboard ofdirectors, andcarefullyselected newtopleaders whose integrity would beunquestioned. YetthiswasbutthestartofaneweraforLockheed, onethatwould takeittotheverytopoftheaerospace world. Forthenexttwoyears, asitsnewmanagement strove toreinstate Lockheed’s reputation for integrity, thecompany hadtosuffer theslings andarrows ofthemedia. Anyreportofanewdifficulty intheaviation industry wasinevitably linked insomemanner topastLockheed problems. Themembers of theLockheed public relations stafftriedvaliantly tocounter thesereports,butit tookyearsofeffort, spectacular newachievements, and thedemonstrated integrity ofitsnewleaders toremove theodium of thepreceding decade. Othertroubles would ariseintheformofattempted hostile takeovers, butthenexttwenty yearswouldseethe steady riseoftheLockheed Corporation totheverytopoftheindustry, positioning itforwhatwould betermed “themerger ofequals” with theMartin Marietta Corporation. Andtherestless paceofevents did notstopthere; instead, thenewLockheed Martin combination would expand further, absorbing essential partsofLoralbefore announcing itsintention toacquire NorthropGrumman.

CHAPTER 12

in Management Changes StyleAllowLockheed to Flourish

madeit essential decade oftheprevious problems ‘T's cascading toesbe sufficient n ot It would itself. to re-create forLockheed with the itself hadtoredefine Thecorporation a“newimage.” tablish task and(themostdifficult themilitary, theCongress, world, financial equipf irst-rate made L ockheed that doubted one No ofall)themedia. own ment;toomanydoubtedthefirm’sintegrity,forevenLockheed’s of thesuccession hadequated releases department publicrelations the In manyrespects, troubleswithTeapotDomeandWatergate. haddonenothingillegal,but the wereunfair.Lockheed comparisons

arguments publicized tothewidely asaclimax came scandal payments theseries of effect cumulative the and of Defense, Department the with ofadverse stories hadtobeovercome. ofthe a newchairman Thefirstorderofthedaywasto select alsoa and Lockheed a t theranks f rom risen hadnot one who board,

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 370

person whohadanimpeccable national andinternational reputation. Notsurprisingly, Lockheed turnedto a manwithanirreproachable record offinancial probity, Robert W.Haack. Haack shared thesimple, basic American background andearly workexperience ofmanyLockheed employees. Hehadbeenbornin Milwaukee in 1917,the sonof a Germanfatherand Dutchmother whoraised himina veryreligious environment. While atHopeCollege,in Holland, Michigan, heworked part-time asa machinist for theAllisChalmers Company. Therehe became a member of the United Automobile Workers, aCIOunionthatwasheavily dominated

byCommunists—unusual foramanwhowouldbecome a notedfinancier.

In1940,hebegan working ataninvestment company, andwith

theexception ofthewaryears,stayed thereuntil1964.Aprivate pilot,

heentered thenavyin 1942,intentonflying training. Unfortunately, aphysical condition associated withhigh-altitude flightcaused himto begrounded. Hedida tourinthePacific ina ground job,picked up malaria anddenguefever,andwassentbackto SanDiegotoconvalesce. Afterrecovering, hewentto Maineto workwitha torpedo squadron, andthenwasreleased toreturntohisposition withRobert W.Baird&Company inMilwaukee. There, hehadalongandsuccessful career, enhanced byarecord ofoutstanding public service that prompted hisselection in 1963aschairman oftheboardoftheNationalAssociation ofSecurities Dealers. Hemoved to Washington, D.C.,to headanassociation ofaboutfivethousand firmsforthree years andthereundertook abadly needed series ofreforms thatgreatly improved thepublic’s position intrading over-the-counter securities. Recognition ofhisexcellent workresulted inhisappointment in1967 totheprestigious andpowerful position ofthepresident oftheNew YorkStock Exchange. There, in 1970,headvocated theestablishment ofaschedule of competitive commissions ratherthana standard setcommission, a proposal thatinitially rocked theindustry butsubsequently proved to beextremely beneficial, reinforcing Haack’s reputation forhonesty. Thedailyroutine ofbeingachiefexecutive officer ofastock exchange hadbegun towearonhim,however, andhedecided toleave. Hehad beenapproached byseveral companies tobecome a director, and,as helaterremarked, attheageoffifty-five hefeltdueforachange. He became director ofanumber ofcompanies, andinAugust 1972Dan Haughton askedHaacktojoinLockheed’s board.Haughton had somewhat belatedly realized thatLockheed’s board ofdirectors needed

Changes in Management Style Allow Lockheed to Flourish

= 371

withtalentfromtheoutside,andHaackwasan to bereinvigorated

idealcandidate. and 13,1976,whenHaughton Thusit wasthatonFebruary chairthe new to be choice logical t he w as Haack resigned, Kotchian manof the board.(Helaterrevealedthe conditionsunderwhichhe bedone only“ifitcould agree Hesaidhewould theposition. accepted andwiththeabnon-disapproval, withDan[Haughton]’s gracefully, transpired, Asthings oftheboard.”) support fullunanimous solute, wasvery gentleman, asa Southern truetohisreputation Haughton, graciousaboutresigning.CarlKotchian,however,resistedthe idea,

hisnewposition notassume thathewould hadtoindicate andHaack RoyA.Anwassettled. theissue before alsoresigned Kotchian unless wasdesigKitchen whileLarry asvicechairman, wasselected derson officer. natedpresident andchiefoperating inmanyways.Allthreemen significant Thechangewasterribly

was Haack andintegrity. fortotalhonesty reputations hadestablished repthe company’s burnishing O utside,” theroleof“Mr. toassume andKitchen Anderson andthemedia. world withthefinancial utation moraleand thecompany’s bothassumed“Mr.Inside”roles,salvaging

repairing relations withthecustomers. that manner hiseffortwitha calm,stalwart Haackconducted personnel thatLockheed believed Hepersonally confidence. restored to thefirm thought thatthey the scandal, by weretoomuchaffected was.Haackwasagoodbusinessthanit actually bemorestigmatized

recustomers civilandmilitary man,andheknewthatLockheed’s the the way and its products, forthecompany, taineda highregard recHaack moreimportantly, them.Perhaps stoodbehind company depthofmanagerial a formidable possessed thatLockheed ognized for thetopjobsunder Kitchen and Anderson Hehadselected talent. ahost had inparticular, parented thatLMSC, him,buthewasaware wellinthefuture. thecorporation serve whowould ofkeymanagers heldthefundahe b ecause eased was roleaschairman Haack’s fortherewas illegal, haddonenothing thatLockheed belief mental thathad thesortofpayments making noU.S.lawatthetimeagainst the ideaof w ith Hetoyed c ountries. other in beenmadeto persons it. His against goingtocourtto provehispoint,butthendecided thatif the madehimaware ofthestockmarket knowledge intimate stockwould courtcasewenton foryears,asit easilycould,Lockheed’s

suffer theentiretime.

As a memberof the board,he had longsincebeen awareof

the Aschairman, senseof family. oftheLockheed theimportance

BEYOND THE HORIZONS

= 372

commitment anddetermination ofhisexecutives wasdrivenhometo

himinshortorder, andhelateroftentoldthestoryofbringing anew member oftheboard, Wilson Newman, outtoseeLockheed forthe

firsttime.It wasa Saturdaymorning,andhe said,“Wilson,I’mgoing

toshowyousomething you'veneverseenbefore.. . anexecutive park-

inglotinwhichthereisn’ta space tobehadonSaturday morning.” Theyrolled uptoaparking lotjammed withcars,confirming hisbelief thathismanagers werepassionate aboutreversing Lockheed’s fortunes. Perhaps evenmoreimportant than a fullexecutive parking lot wasthe factthatnotopexecutive leftduringthistimeoftrouble, despite thefactthattherewerenobonuses orstockoptions, while therewasevery prospect thatthecompany would collapse, andwith

it,ofcourse, theirretirement dreams. Aschairman, Haackbecamemoreintimately acquainted with

thedepthofcapability thatthefamily possessed. Under hisdirection, a high-level strategy committee onpublicrelations wassetup,and

largeamounts werespentoncorporate adsinmajornewspapers inthe UnitedStatesandaroundtheworld.Theadvertisements werecon-

vincing because theydealtwithproducts ofextraordinary performance, suchastheSR-71, thespace vehicles, theTrident missile, theTriStar, theS-3A Viking, theC-141, theC-130,theC-5,andtheCanadian

versionofthe Orion,the CanadairCP-140Aurora.It wasaportfolio

ofproducts ofwhichanycompany couldbeproud.Ironically, given

thatHaackwouldlookto it forleadership, LMSC wasproducing another family ofproducts ofperhaps evengreater importance that couldnotbeevenhintedatbecause oftheirsecurity classification. Haack proved tobea convincing speaker, andhetraversed the country talking aboutthe“newLockheed.” Onespeech, given atthe Commonwealth ClubinSanFrancisco, wassosuccessful thatoneof Lockheed’s mostvehement critics, the Washington Post,reprinted muchofitundertheheadline “Lockheed Revisited.” Aschairman, Haack pushed forachange innameonSeptember 1, 1977,to theLockheed Corporation, to reflectthataircraftand

related services accounted foronly58percent ofsales—and to give impetus totheideaofa changed Lockheed. Itwasnotlongbefore Haack, whohadaccepted theposition withtheunderstanding thathe would notremain longinoffice, began tofeelthathisinexperience in manufacturing operations obligated himto makewayforsomeone else.He lefton September29, 1977,by whichtimehe hadcalmed

Lockheed’s troubled waters, preparing thewaynotonlyforhisimmediate successors, butalsoforthefollowing generations ofleaders.

Changes in Management Style AllowLockheed to Flourish

= 373

Theboardhadbeenreconstituted sothattenoftheseventeen members wereoutsiders,anda management succession committeewasformed

toensurecontinuity.

A BeneficentChoice A

outside firmhadbeenhiredtodevelop alist ofcandidates for

thepositionofchairman. Thesuccession committee, withHaack

asitshead,whittledthelistdownto fiveleadingcandidates, andthen

tothree.Oneofthese wasfrom a large Southern California company, andHaack hadarrived atahandshake agreement withhim—until the matter ofcompensation wasdiscussed. Thecandidate promptly backed down.Anotherchoicewastheheadofa largeautomotive firmfrom

theMidwest. Haack posed a question: Ifthejobwereoffered tohim, howlongitwould taketo“gethisarmsaround thismonster,” meaning thegigantic, far-flung Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Whentheexecutive replied “twotofourweeks,” hewasquickly bundled offona planebackeast—Haack knewfrompersonal experience thatthejob wasmuchbigger thanthat. Haack nextconducted aninformal interview withRoyAnderson, atthetimechieffinancial officer. Hethenheldaquick board meeting. Whenhereturnedfromthemeeting,hewalkedintoAnderson’s office

andsaid,“You're it.”Itwasundoubtedly thebestchoice hecould havemade. Anderson recalls thedaywitha twinkle inhiseye.Hedrove home,eager tosharehisnewswithhisfamily. Whenhearrived, his

eight-year-old sonranoutto thecarandtriumphantly announced,

“T’m president ofmyclass.” Anderson spenttheevening focused on that,anddelayed tillthenextmorning telling hissonabouthisown promotion.

Triedin the Fire oyAnderson wasborninRipon, California, onDecember 15, 1920,thefourthofsixchildren ofafarming family. Hisparents

had beenbornin Sweden,and his fatherwasa trainedandcapable

carpenter withaninsatiable yearning tofarm.Thefamily’s income derived principally fromthesaleofmilkandeggs, although hisfather supplemented thisbybuilding houses.

BEYOND THE HORIZONS = 374

Upongraduation fromhighschool inthemidstoftheGreat Depression, heenrolled inaone-year business school. Thenheworked asastenoclerk foranoilcompany inStockton, California. Heenlisted inthenavyinFebruary 1942andwasassigned totheTwelfthNaval

District Intelligence Office. Hewasoneoftwomenoutofthatfacility selected tobecome a candidate forofficer training intheV-12program.Initially hewassenttoKansas StateTeachers College inPittsburg,Kansas, andthentoTulane University forsixteen months. His academic record qualified himtobesenttotheHarvard Graduate School ofBusiness forthemidshipman-officers course. Aftercompleting theschooling andashorttermofseaduty,he lefttheservice inApril1946asanensign intheU.S.Naval Reserve. Anderson returnedto California andentered,assomanyofhis subsequent LMSCcolleagues woulddo,StanfordUniversity. After

graduating withamaster’s degree inbusiness administration inMarch 1949, hedecided tobecome a certified public accountant andwentto workwithaPaloAltoaccounting firm.Hehadmaintained hisreserve statusandwascaughtbytheKorean War,beingrecalled toactiveduty

inOctober 1950. Onceagain hisskills andhisreputation wereaugmented by a bit ofluck,andhewasselected fortheNavalCostInspection Service, which eventually ledtoanassignment atWestinghouse, inSunnyvale. Hisperformance therewassuchthatWestinghouse offered himajob afterhewasreleased fromdutyinOctober1952.Anderson hadbeen

contemplating returning toStanford foradoctorate, buttheWestinghouseofferwassogoodthathefelthecouldnotrefuse. Heandhis

wife,Betty,whomhehadmarriedinJune1948,purchased a new three-bedroom homein RedwoodCity,California,for $10,450,a

hugepriceforthosedays. Theyloved California, andwhenhiscareer began totakeoff,hewasoffered promotions atWestinghouse’s headquarters inPittsburgh. After heturned down thethirdoffer, herealized thathe hadto findanotherposition,forthenasnow,refusalofpro-

motionispoisonin thecorporate world.Justashewasmullinghis

alternatives, Lockheed’s Missiles andSpace Division began operations. Anderson joinedLockheed inOctober 1956,spentabriefperiod at VanNuys,andthenreturned toSunnyvale. Hefoundthathefitin wellwiththeLockheed systemandbegantoworkwithfourmenhe

admired tremendously, andwhowouldinfluence hisownmanagementstyle: Herschel Brown, StanBurriss, Gene Root, andWillis Hawkins.They,along withHallHibbard, hadfostered aclimate atLMSC thatpermitted bright young managers todowell. Anderson often com-

Changes in Management Style Allow Lockheed to Flourish

= 375

mented laterontheimportance ofthesemen.HesaidthatRootwas vitalbecause ofhisvision andhisrecruitment ofkeypersonnel. Brown hadagreatability toadminister andcontrol aburgeoning giantofa company ladenwithsomanytechnical geniuses whodemanded in-

dependence ofaction. Burriss’s contribution washisability toleadthe FleetBallistic Missile program andestablish suchgreatcredibility with

notonlythecustomer, butalsowiththecorporation anditsemployees. Finally, henotedthatHawkins’s aeronautical geniustranslated easily

intoleadership ofthespace programs. Anderson’s career prospered, firstwiththeStandard Agena program, thenwiththeclassified programs oftheSpace Systems Division.

TheFireHeatsUp sapartoftheemerging pattern ofexecutive training, Anderson

movedto Georgiain October1965,asdirectoroffinance,justas

theC-5program wasbuilding up,andbeforethedevastating impact

ofthenewTotalPackage Procurement contract wasrealized. Lockheed haddeveloped aprogram management system tocorrespond tothat oftheAirForce, andasaresult, program managers were superimposed uponthe normalGeorgiafunctionalorganizations, resultingin an awkwardduallineof reporting.This,in turn,causedreportingand

analysis tobecome confused, andAnderson recalls thatitwasnotuntil mid-1966 thathereally began tounderstand whatwashappening— andwhatwaswrong—with theC-5program’s design andproduction

costs.Healsorecallsthatitwasthenthathishairbegantoturnwhite,

forherealized thatanadversarial relationship haddeveloped withthe AirForce. Costs wererising, inpartduetoinflation, butalsobecause oftheinefficiencies thatLarry Kitchen would subsequently uncover. Theproblems boiledoverwhenthe“safety valve” oftheTPPcontract,

thepurchase ofasecond runofaircraft withthepricerecalculated on thebasisofthefirstrun,wasnottotally fulfilled.

Fromthe FryingPan y 1968, corporate management began tofeeltheburden ofprob-

lemsdeveloping withinmajorDODprograms andtheL-1011

program. InSeptember, Anderson wasasked toreturntoBurbank as assistant treasurer, acorporate office. Hewasthuswellpositioned to

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 376

learnoftheproblems thatwereabouttofalluponLockheed from every direction. Hebecame thepointmaninthedesperate survival efforts, whichincluded settling thegovernment’s claims, negotiating successively higher lines ofcredit withthebanks, andproviding backup toHaughton andKotchian inthesalvage ofRolls-Royce andtheL1011program. Inallofthese situations, many ofwhich were distasteful intheextreme, Anderson soconducted himself astowintherespect, andeventheaffection, oftheorganizations withwhichhewasnegotiating.Thus,whenHaughtonand Kotchianleft,he wasa logical

person tosupport thenewchairman, Robert Haack. Anderson was muchmoreknowledgeable aboutLockheed’s manufacturing operationsthanHaack, ofcourse, buthisbackground wasprimarily business andfinancial management. Itmade sense topairhim,asvicechairman, withLarry Kitchen aspresident asapartofthe“newLockheed” salvageteam,forKitchen(whocamefrom a financial andoperations

background) hadproduction experience bothatLMSC andGeorgia.

TheHaack-Anderson-Kitchen trioprovedtobea paradigm for Lockheed’s management future.Haackallayed fearsandplanned the

reorganization oftheboard andthecompany. Anderson would achieve success basedonhisbusiness experience, leadership capabilities, and financial background. Hewashighly respected forhisaccurate financialforecasts, whichtookintoconsideration realisticcosts,anticipated revenues, andtheresultantcashflows.Andersongivesmuchcreditto

Vince Marafino andhisstafffortheirconstant support andforMarafino’s ability tounderstand complex financial issues andpresent them withclarity tothefinancial community.

(ItshouldbenotedherethatMarafino’s relationship toAnderson

isbutoneexample ofthehundreds ofsimilar relationships thatexisted allthrough Lockheed, andthatatoncedefined boththeefficiency of thefirmanditsfamilial loyalty. EachofLockheed’s leaders developed

a teamofcapable executives tosupporthisefforts. Mostoftheseexecutives operated ina loyal,supportive capacity tomorethanoneof

theleaders. Marafino’s career inmanywaysisa metaphor forthis phenomenon. Hehadallthequalities tobechairman himself, proven inhissupport ofHaughton during thefighttosaveRolls-Royce and toobtain andthenrepay thehugeloans thatLockheed needed. Atthe sametime,hewasworking withandforAnderson intheseandother projects. Hewasequally essential toLarry Kitchen, DanTellep, and manyothers, allthewaytothetimeoftheLockheed Martin merger, andbeyond. Marafino isa symbol ofboththequalityandthedepth

ofLockheed’s leadership. Thereweremanypeople atLockheed who

Changes in Management

Style Allow Lockheed to Flourish

= 377

performed similar roles,butspace limitations preclude naming each one.Please understand, then,thatwhenwespeakofAnderson or KitchenorTellep,wearereallyspeaking oftheirteams,whichthey

wouldbethefirstto acknowledge wereessentialto theirsuccess.)

In Kitchen’s case,he wouldleadhisteamusingthebestof

Haughton’s hard-nosed tactics, combined witha realsensitivity to personnel issues thatmadeworking forhimfarlessintimidating.

A NewCOO | aoe lefttheGeorgia Company inlate1975, and,aspreviously noted,wastapped tobepresident oftheLockheed Corporation onFebruary 13,1976.Kitchenlateradmitted freelythathehadto

makea majoradjustmentto his attitude.Whilein Georgia,he had

feltthatLMSC wasgetting adisproportionate shareofcorporate resources, particularly atatimewhenhisownsuccess wasbased inlarge

partonunrelenting cutstotheGeorgia workforce. Andalthough his

experience atGeorgia hadbeenextremely successful andsatisfying, the hazards implicit inhisnewjobaschief operating officer were daunting. Thepublic relations disaster oftheforeign-payments scandal wasat itsheight. TheAirForce wasstillunhappy aboutthecostsoftheC5 contract,andtheL-1011programwasnotrecovering fromthetwin

setbacks oftheRB.211problems andcompetition fromMcDonnell Douglas. BobHaack hadinitiated anewLockheed. Kitchen wasanxioustojoinRoyAnderson inmoving Lockheed forward. Kitchen wasbornin 1923inFortMill,SouthCarolina. The

oldestofsixchildren,he,likesomanyotherfutureLockheedexecutives,experienced the fullpinchof the Depressionyears.Bothhis

mother andfather worked, butondifferent shifts, sotherewasalways parental guidance. InJanuary 1942hejoined theMarines, serving in maintenance in a fightersquadron in theSouthPacificfortwenty months.Afterthewar,he tooka low-paying civilservicejobwiththe U.S.Navy’sBureauof Aeronauticsin Washington,just to remain

associated withaviation. Despite hislackofacollege education, over thenexttwelve yearsheadvanced tothegradeofGS-13, serving as chiefofstafftotheadmiral inchargeoffleetreadiness.

WhenthePolaris program gotunderway,heexhibited thekind ofrisk-taking determination thatwould distinguish hiscareer. Hegave uphis“safe” government position andjoined Lockheed, atnoincrease in pay.Therehe benefited fromthesameassociations ofwhich

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Anderson speaks sohighly—Hawkins, Root,Brown, andBurriss. Kitchen latercharacterized themsomewhat differently thanAnderson, butwithequal praise. Hesaid:“Gene Rootwastheentrepreneur, the technical guy,andHerschel Brownwasreallya people-oriented guy,

averybasic businessman, andsotheyreally complemented eachother. StanBurriss wasjustanall-around typeguy . . .toughtoworkforbut always fair.... Burriss really groomed guyslikemeandBobFurhman.”

Given theresponsibility forsetting upthePolaris’s logistic organization, Kitchen inthenextnineyears builtupalarge,functional groupthatserved wellforthefleetballistic missiles thatsucceeded Polaris. Aftercarefully training hisreplacement, hewenttohisboss, BillStevenson, andtoldhimbaldlythathewanted tomoveintoLockheed’srotational trainingprogram forhigh-potential executives. He

laidoutamanagement planforhiscareer, andintypical fashion told Stevenson thathedidnotwantapayincrease, hejustwanted achance to provehimself.If he failed,hewouldexpectto befired.

Stevenson agreed. Kitchen wassentto a management courseat

theUniversity ofPittsburgh, andthenbegan theprocess ofrotating through a series ofmanagerial assignments thatweresixmonths or moreinduration. Theseleddirectly tohisassignment—and subsequentsuccesses—at theGeorgia plant,which,inturn,prepared him fora pathtotheverytop.

OtherLeadersin the Ranks hesuccess achieved byAnderson andKitchen canbeattributed toa

fortunate management system thatrecognized talent, nurtured it, letitcompete sothataprocess ofnatural selection tookplace, andthen rewarded itwithincreasingly responsible positions. Thecompetition wasformidable, andthereweremanyexecutives atLockheed who couldhavedoneverywellin theverytoppositions,butinsteadserved

outtheircareers aseither presidents ofoneofthecompanies, orasvice presidents inthecorporation. Attheriskofbeing repetitive, thereason forthisabundance oftalent wasthesense ofLockheed family. Many of thosewhoremained whenitwasobvious thattheywerenotgoingtobe

selected aschairman didsobecause theyloved thecompany, andpreferred having a lessthannumber onejobtheretoleaving tobechairmanofadifferent—and nodoubtlessfamilial—firm. EvenasAnderson andKitchen weresettling intotheirnewroles,

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otherfuturestarsweremaking themselves known. Theyincluded, among others, Robert Fuhrman, DickHeppe, BobOrmsby, BenRich, Daniel Tellep, Vance Coffman, SamAraki, JohnMcMahon, Kenneth Cannestra,JamesA. “Micky”Blackwell, ValPeline,FredO’Green (whomAndersoncharacterizes as“theclosestcloneofKellyJohnson”),

JamesPlummer, andmanymore.

AnIncredibleLeapForward iventheunrelenting tideofdifficult business situations, itisrefreshing tolookbackatthepurely technological world ofairand space inwhich Lockheed achieved anutterly dominant position. Itisunfortunate thatthedeepblacksecurity inwhich mostof

LMSC’s programs weresoimmersed prevents discussion ofthemany

projects afterCorona. Thecommanding leadtheUnited States possesses inintelligence-gathering, meteorological, communication, and navigational satellites wasnotdueentirely toLockheed’s efforts, but it isequally truethatitwouldnothaveoccurred ifLMSC hadnot beeninvolved. Thus,theachievements ofengaging, learned leaders suchasSamArakiordynamic executives likeValPeline canonlybe inferred fromthefactthattheyattained veryhighlevel executive positions, havereceived manydistinguished awards, andarehighly regarded inthebusiness community. Itisalittledisconcerting forthe authorofahistory ofLockheed toconfess thathehasabsolutely no ideawhattheprojects were,howtheyexceeded Corona’s capability, orwhatcapabilities theyhadbeyond intelligence-gathering, butthat

isthecase.TheLockheed personnel interviewed forthisbookwereso security-conscious thattheywerereluctant todiscuss itemsthatthey

knewhadbeendeclassified, forfearthatsomeinadvertent disclosure mightgiveawaya secretinanother area.Onecanonlyhopethat within a reasonable passage oftime,thegreattriumphs ofLMSC, so fantastic intechnology thattheymadetheincredible achievements of theCorona project mundane enough toreveal, willbedeclassified so thattheircreatorscanreceivethecreditduethem.Inmarkedcontrast,

manyofthefurther achievements ofKelly Johnson andhissuccessors attheSkunkWorkshavebeendeclassified andcanbediscussed freely. Theseachievements aresoremarkable forthedegreeof their

technical ascendance overallcompetition thattheywillbedealtwith insome detail, withaview ofconveying justhowadvanced theywere. Thegreat spyplane, theSR-71, andthefantastic F-117A stealth fighter

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wereincredibleachievements, madepossibleonlybecauseLockheed’s

management waswilling torisklargesumsofmoney onthetechnical genius resident intheSkunk Works. These programs, andtheircor-

respondingclassified programsat LMSC,enabledtheLockheedCor-

poration tocomeroaring backfromadversity. Thereweremanyotherelements ofthecorporation thatcontributed firsttoLockheed’s recovery andthentoitsrisetothepeakof industrial power. There werealsootherdifficulties encountered. Both ofthesefacets ofLockheed’s history willbedealtwithinthenext chapter. Whatfollows isanattempt tohighlight theextraordinary technological leapsthatLockheed madeattheSkunk Works, toemphasize thatthesewerenotmerelyearlyadvances thatwouldbedu-

plicated elsewherein a matter of months. Instead, Lockheed

engineering placedthefirmmanydecades aheadofallotheraircraft

firmsintheworld. Never before, andnever anywhere else,hassucha dramatic leapbeenmade. Insimple aircraft terms, where therewasa

Wrightbiplane,a Curtisshadevolvedsoonafter;theGermanAlbatros

wassoonmatched bytheBritishSopwith Camel;theMesserschmitt Bf 109wasequalledbythe Spitfire;the MiG-15andthe F-86were

closely comparable—the listcould goon.Butnever inaviation history havetwoaircraft emerged thatweresomanyyearsinadvance ofall competition astheSR-71 andtheF-117A. ThatLockheed could followthesetriumphs withtheF-22Raptor,whichagainoutstrips all competition, simplyconfirms the resurgent engineering andfiscal

health ofthecompany. Thereisanother important element torecord. Throughout the Skunk Works’ existence, abasic question wasimplicit: Could itsurvive andoperatewithoutKellyJohnson? WhenJohnsonreached theage of sixty-fivein 1975,he pickedhis ownsuccessor,BenRich.Ben

proved, inspades, thatnotonlycouldtheSkunk Works survive and operate underhisleadership, itwould prosper.

ColdWarCasualty heendoftheColdWarhasbeena wonderful circumstance for

mankind, proving tobeevenmorebeneficial forthestates ofthe

formerSovietUnionanditsalliesthanit hasbeenfortheWestern

powers. Thestatesthatembraced Communism forthatlongdark periodsuffered terribly asallofthebestandbrightest werepoured intomilitaryandspacesystems, whiletheconsumer economy was

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virtually neglected. ItmaybethattheendoftheColdWarwillpermit areversal ofallofCommunism’s unseen anddeadly legacies—rapidly diminishing lifespans, terminally polluted waters, and a totally corrupt andmisallocated economic system being justa fewofthem. Thefactremains, however, thatformorethanfortyyearsthe

UnitedStatesanditsalliesweredirectly confronted bytheSoviet UnionandtheWarsaw Pactnations, whose armedforces hadbeen builtuptoafantastic extent withbothconventional andnuclear weapons.TheCommunist powers hadanenormous superiority inmanpower, tanks,artillery, andaircraft. Formuchofthetime,thetanks andartillery, atleast, werequalitatively superior also,andinthelater years, theiraircraft reached atleastparity ifnever superiority inquality. Moreimportantly,boththeEastandtheWesthadmassivenuclearforceson thealert,theirtargetsdetermined,andawaitingonlya

signalto beunleashed. Bothsidesbuiltanenormous numberofde-

livery systems andwarheads, sothatthemultiple effects ofa true mutual exchange, including theresidual radiation, would havealmost certainly destroyed civilization onaworldwide scale. Whatever elsethe faultsoftheleadership oftheSoviet Union, itwasrational enough nottoattempt toimplement itsfirst-strike doctrine. And,perhaps solely through goodfortune, therewerenofreak accidents orincidents thattriggered anexchange. Therehasbeenonecasualty ofourvictory intheColdWar, however, andthatisthememory oftheAmerican public forjusthow deadly serious thethreat was. Withtheadvantage ofourpresent insight intotheutterly disastrous statethatCommunism brought theSoviet economy, wehavehada tendency todenigrate thethreatthatthe Soviet Unionposed. Thequestion isasked: Iftheenemy ofsomany years wasunable toadequately feed,clothe, andhouse itspeople, how capable anopponent couldithavebeen? Theanswer, ofcourse, isthattheSoviet Union wasenormously powerful, equipped bythelateryears oftheColdWarwithintercontinental ballistic missiles superior toourowninnumber, accuracy, throwweight, andhardening. It alsohada smallbomber force, capable, butalesser threatthanthehundreds ofmissiles thatwere aimed againstus.Curiously, American leadership wasableto handlethe

knowledge oftheSovietstrengthwithsomeaplomb,forbythattime

ourintelligence-gathering capability—in largemeasure courtesy of Lockheed—enabled ustogauge enemy intentions withahighdegree ofaccuracy. Itwasnotsointheearlydays,whenallweknewwasthatthe

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Soviet Unionhaddeveloped nuclear andthermonuclear weapons far moreswiftly thanwethought possible, andhadthengoneontoscore adazzling series ofspace triumphs. Premier Nikita Khrushchev trumpetedbothachievements inblustering speeches, warning darkly that Yury Gagarin wasnottheonlycargo thattheSoviet Union could place inspace—it couldalsosendthermonuclear weapons thatcouldbe directed toanyplace onearth.Itwasabaldthreatandhemeant every wordofit. Theabsolute lackofverifiable intelligence onSoviet capability hadledtothefortunate combination ofcircumstances that,aspreviouslynoted,permitted KellyJohnson andtheSkunkWorkstocreate

theU-2.TheU-2wasabletooperate many years longer thananyone

hadplanned, butwhenGaryPowers wasshotdownonMay1,1960, overflights oftheSovietUnionwerecanceled. Areplacement wasur-

gently required. Asmightbeexpected, theSkunk Works hadbeen addressing theproblem formanyyears, wellbefore theU-2’sfirst flight,butnotalways withviablesolutions.

TheFadedSuntan L ockheed hadbeenbrought into a highly classified project toprovide theairframe foraprojected series ofliquid-hydrogen-fueled engines tobebuiltbytheGarrett Company, based ontheideas ofRandolph Samuel Rae,a British engineer whoworked fortheSummers Gyro-

scopeCompany inSantaMonica. TheGarrettengines weredeemed toocomplex, andJohnsonputforward a proposal tobuildanaircraft usingmoreconventional engines, butpowered byliquidhydrogen.

Thetaskwasassigned toPratt&Whitney, whiletheSkunk Works wastoprovide theaircraft, underthecodenameSuntan andwith theLockheed designation CL-400. Theaircraft wastobeabletocruise atMach2.5atonehundred thousand feetaltitude formorethan 2,500miles. Johnson guaranteed firstflightwithin eighteen months, iftheby-now sacrosanct SkunkWorksprocedures wererigorously adhered to. Yetby1957, Johnson wasconvinced thattheproject should be dropped, foranumber ofreasons. Theaircraft’s range wasdeficient, andtherewasnoapparent waytoimprove it.Thelogistical support oftheaircraft withliquidhydrogen promised tobeanightmare. Inflightrefueling wasnotpossible, andtheexpense ofestablishing the

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Someof the most interesting Lockheedprojectsnevercame to fruition.TheLockheed CL-400was intendedto be a successor to the U-2.It was to havehad engines fueledwith hydrogen.Thealmost completeprototypewas scrappedwhen the programwas cancelled.

necessary ground support torefuel itatairfields around theworld was astronomical. Theprogram persisted foranother twoyears, and$96million in unexpended funds werereturned tothegovernment when itwasfinally killed atJohnson’s insistence. Themultimillion-dollar expenditure was notatotalloss,forit provided immense dataonliquid-hydrogen systemsthatwerelaterputtouseontheCentaur rocket program. Itgave Pratt& Whitney practical experience inbuilding a hydrogen-cycle engine. Anditalsoshowed thattheSkunk Works coulddevelop and

builda largesupersonic, high-altitude,long-range aircraft.

StepstowardtheBlackbird wo of the leadingfiguresin theU-2program,RichardBisselland

Kelly Johnson, hadasearlyas1955decided toexplore afollow-on

aircraft thatwould seektoremedy theU-2’s unexpected flaw—its easy

tracking by Sovietradar.A numberof studiesledto theconclusion thatthebestdesignforanaircraftto overfly theSovietUnionwith impunity wasa planewitha relatively lowradarcrosssectionthat

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Inotherwords,a atveryhighaltitudes. wouldflyat veryhighspeeds

later withwhatwould aircraft Mach3,ninety-thousand-foot-altitude cometobecalled stealth characteristics. andlongest-lived thatthetwomosteffective It thustranspired would Works, by theSkunk bothproduced aircraft, reconnaissance described, TheU-2was,aspreviously antithetical. beaerodynamically The sailplane. ajet-powered essentially aircraft, builtsubsonic alightly Athe b ecome would t ransformations aftermany which newaircraft, wasalarge,heavy, theSR-71), version, 12(andina moresophisticated

atMach3 inafterburner tocruise designed aircraft strong immensely forhoursonend. ofpossible theusuallongseries ledhisteamthrough Johnson arrow paper-airplane-like from a slender thatranged configurations B-58HusthatlookedmuchliketheConvair shapetoconfigurations

GaryPowers andtendaysbefore years tler.ByApril21,1958—two fora Mach haddrawnupa proposal beshotdown—Johnson would a range feet a ndhave t housand a t ninety c ruise w ould that 3 aircraft “And ubbed had been U-2 Asthe miles. ofmorethanfourthousand design Therewereadditional gel,”heusedthecodenameArchangel. aircraft asa large135,000-pound IIemerged andArchangel studies, andtwo engines J58turbojet by twoPratt& Whitney powered Air bythe Force received Itwasnotfavorably ramjets. seventy-five-inch because itrequired anexotic fuelfortheramjets. performance desired disheartening—the was not Therejection ofiterations number to makea expected wassogreatthatJohnson months,Johnson's Intheintervening atthesolution. beforearriving

working forsuccess, theformula elucidated teamslowly project small goingbackto incorporate to thenext,sometimes fromonedesign intoa newone.Timeshavechanged; fromanolderdesign features with todaytheworkwouldbe doneon dozensof computers, afteranoneiteration working quickly systems design computer-aided of style,witha fewcomputers other.Thenit wasdonein classic but mostlywithsliderules standards, by today’s capacity laughable

hand anengineer’s requiring drawing andwithevery andcalculators, to thesliderulehehadused referred board.(Johnson onthedrafting at Mercifully, computer.”) “my Michigan a s days university sincehis was. slowtheprocess howpainfully thetimenoonerealized befullyexploited testshintedatwhatwould Lockheed Internal radarwaves deflecting of effect hadthe shapes inthefuture—wedge andreducing theradarsignature. Onemodel in theseries, theA-7, signaalaterBlackbird andalsofeatured thistechnique incorporated

Lockheed’sSkunkWorksset a standard neverequaledby anyother firmanywherein the worldwith the introductionof the A-12.TheMach3.0 single-seataircraft was intendedfor use by the CIA.

turenote,vertical surfaces cantedinward. Furtherdesigneffortledto

theA-11,anaircraft thatsuperficially resembled theB-58,withan engine slungbeneath eachwingandasinglevertical surface. TheA11hadexcellent performance, andthedesignation persisted formany

yearsin themythssurroundingtheaircraft,in partbecauseofa later

reference tothetypebyLyndon Johnson, who,forsecurity reasons, wasadvised tousetheearlier nomenclature. TheA-11’s comparatively highradarsignature caused ittoberejected bythecustomer. Tooffset this,elements of theA-7wereintroduced intotheA-11designto createtheA-12. BenRichrecounts thatheledasmallsix-man engineering team

thatincluded noaircraft designers atallthrough theendless iterations toarrive atthefinalconfiguration. Theyworked onadoorstretched between twodesks, laying outtheinformation thatwasderived from theintensive wind-tunnel tests.Fromthedata,theshape oftheA-12 wasderived. Thelongfuselage wasgivenchines toobtainlift.To reducetheradarcrosssection,theengineswerelocatedin theirmid-

wingposition, sothattheshockwaveatthedesign cruise speedof Mach3.2wouldjustmisstheinlets,andtheoutboardsectionofthe

wingsweregivena conicalcamberto relievepressure. Whenthey showedthe proposedshapeto KellyJohnsonhe said,““That’s it—

you'vegotit.”

Johnson appointed DickBoehme asprogram manager, although itwasa taskhehimself relished andneverreally relinquished. Once again,Richard Bissell andJohnParangosky represented theCIA

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interestwhileBrigadier General LeoGearyactedfortheAirForce.

Bissell established anevaluation teamheaded byDr.E.M.Land(of Polaroid fame) tomonitor theprogram, which hadreceived thecode nameGusto. It soonbecame evidentthatradartechnology hadremained far

inadvance ofradarcountermeasure technology. Itwasdeemed impossible tocreate anaircraft thatwould beinvisible—or almost so— toradar, andthedesign requirements werechanged torecognize this. (Notwithstanding this,theresulting design wasinfactthefirststealth aircraft, aswillbediscussed below.) OnAugust 28,Johnson wasinformed thatLockheed’s latestdesign, theA-12,hadbeenaccepted, withtheproviso thatworkbeintensified onmeans toreduce further theradarsignature.

TheA-12wasa radicalaircraft,withtwolarge-diameter Pratt&

Whitney J-58engines midmounted onthemodified deltawing.Distinctive all-moving vertical tailsurfaces wereplaced above theengine nacelles andcanted inward. ItwastobeabletoflyatMach3.2at altitudes approaching onehundred thousand feetoverarangeof3,800

miles.Atfirstglance,themostunusualelementofthedesignappeared

tobetheelongated nosewithitsspeedboatlike chines thatgaveitthe appearance ofahooded cobra. Itwasmutually agreed thattheSkunk Works approach would prevail, andthatthesecurity measures thathadworked sowellforthe U-2weretobemadeevenmorestringent. Johnson setthefirstflight datejusttwentymonthsin thefuture.ProjectGustowasterminated;

thenewproject wascode-named Oxcart. Although Lockheed wascautionednottomakelargecommitments offunds,it wasgranted a contract tobuildfiveA-12s for$96.6million overthenexttwentyfourmonths.

Mountainsto Climb ewaircraft havesocaptured theimagination oftheworldasthe Lockheed Blackbird, astheA-12/SR-71 series became known. The mystery surrounding itscreation andemployment, itsstarkly beautiful sculptural shape, anditsabsolute dominance inaircraft performance formorethanthirtyyearshasgiven theBlackbird aplaceunique in history asbothaninstrument oftechnology andasauniversal cultural icon. Although many people arenowfamiliar withitsshape andsound, asrendered inathousand television presentations, mostareunaware

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thatthetaskassigned Kelly Johnson andhissmallteamwould have beenconsidered impossible byanyotherengineering establishment. Inthemorethanthreedecades thathavepassed since thedecision was madetoproceed, noothercountry hasbeenabletocreate anaircraft thatexceeds theBlackbird’s operational capability. Thescopeoftheproblem wassummarized inaJuly1969paper

presented byJohnson totheAmerican Institute ofAeronautics and Astronautics, detailing theproblems andsolutions oftheYF-12A aircraftfromhisperspective. (TheYF-12A wasaproposed fighter version of theA-12,whichfirstflewonAugust7, 1963,andwhich,forour purposeshere,wassimilarin mostrespectsto the basicA-12.)His

remarks givesomedimension tothechallenge heaccepted fromthe CIAandtheUSAF, andtohisremarkable optimism inpromising to meetthechallenge withthedelivery ofa flyable aircraft intwenty months.(Inhisearlynotes,Johnsonapologized forselecting twenty

ratherthaneighteen months foradelivery date,noting thatPratt& Whitney would require theadditional timetoproduce abypass version oftheextremely sophisticated—and notyetflown—J58 engine. He was,foronce,unduly optimistic.) Johnsonnotedthatit mighthavebeenexpected thatotherad-

vanced aircraft ofthetime,suchastheNorthAmerican XB-70 orX15,wouldhaveprovided anenormous amount ofuseful datatohis team.TheOxcart project progressed sorapidly thatitbothsurpassed anddiverged fromtheXB-70 program. Andbecause theX-15was rocket-powered andconducted flights ofveryshortduration, it did notencounter theproblems ofair-breathing power-plant inletdesign orofextremely highsteady statetemperatures. Thepowerplantswereinitially leftto Pratt& Whitney, for whom Johnson expressed thegreatest admiration; later,hisownteam, ledbytheinimitable BenRich,would havetointervene. Theengine would ultimately become oneofthemostsophisticated intheworld, packaged inbyfarthemostsophisticated nacelle. In hispaper,Johnsonnotedthatthestructural engineers were

concerned abouttheanticipated hightemperatures, ranging from 1,050 degrees Fahrenheit inthenacelle to585degrees atthenoseand aslowas470degrees atthetail.These hadtobeendured foraprolonged duration intheA-12.Thisledtoadecision touseunconventional titanium alloys inastructure thathadtobeopenforequipment installation, inspection, andmaintenance. Heat-resistant titaniumwasasstrongasstainless steel,atapprox-

imately 50percent ofitsweight. About93percent ofthestructural

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weightof the aircraftwastitaniumalloy,whichhadan ultimate strengthofupto twohundredthousandpoundspersquareinchin

latermodels. (Theremaining 7percent ofstructural weight wascomposed ofRadar Absorbing Materials [RAM] toreduce theradarcross section. Asbestos andironferritesformeda largepartofthesemate-

rials.) Ultimately, thecomposite materials wereusedforthevertical

finsinsteadof titanium,the firstuseof suchmaterialsfor a major

aircraft component. Lockheed hadexperimented withtitanium overtheyears, and

soughttoobtainahighstrength-to-weight ratioatverylowcost—an objective thatprovedimpossible. Insmallapplications, thedifficulties

inherent inusing titanium weretractable; onaone-hundred-thousand-

poundairframe,therewerealmostinsuperable difficulties in forging,

welding, riveting,or even drilling the material.Titanium was scarce

and costly,and 80 percentof the initialdeliveries of BetaB-120ti-

tanium alloyfromthemanufacturer, theTitanium Metals Corporation,wererejected forcontamination. Itwasnotuntilthecompany officials weremadeawareof theintendeduseof thematerialthat qualityproblems weresolved.

Johnson’sright-handman and successor,Ben Rich,reaching

backtohisuniversity courses, recalled thatblack paintcould beaheat emitter aswellasa heatabsorber. Afewquickcalculations showed thatusing a softer alloy oftitanium andpainting itblack would greatly easeconstruction difficulties. Itwasthisdiscovery thatledtotheaircraft’snaturalnickname,Blackbird.Eventhoughit ran counterto

Johnson’s fanatical obsession forreducing weight, thesixty pounds of paintrequired couldreduce internal temperatures byasmuchas86 degrees Fahrenheit. Thepainthadanadditional advantage, foritcontainedtinyironmicrospheres thatdissipated electromagnetic radiation.

Temperature wasa vitalconsideration inmanyotheraspects of thedesign. Atordinary ground temperatures, thesurface ofthewing hadcorrugated ridges running chordwise (fore andaft);inflight, ther-

malexpansion caused theaircraft toexpand, theskinwithit,stretching

outthecorrugated ridges intoa relatively smooth surface. Standard readily procurable equipment suchaselectronic gear(particularly wires, plugs,andtransducers) werenotdesigned forsustained high temperatures. Therewerenohydraulic fluidsorpumpsthatcould operate at600degrees Fahrenheit continuously. (Onehydraulic fluid product wasoffered toJohnson thatdidoperate at600degrees; its

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drawback wasthatfromroomtemperature upto200degrees itwas justawhite powder.) Grease thatcould sustain hightemperatures had thecharacteristics ofconcrete atordinary temperatures. Special heat

exchangers hadtobedevised toreduce1,300-degree-Fahrenheit bleed airfromtheenginesdownto a moderate 30degrees Fahrenheit to coolthecockpit.Noescapedevices—parachute, dragchute,orejector

seat—had beendesigned thatwouldtaketherangeoftemperatures thatwould bedeveloped inthecourse ofaflight. Tocounteract the inevitable thermal expansion andcontraction ofcontrol-cable runs, theyweremadeoutofthesamematerialusedinwatchsprings,Elgiloy.

Thecockpit andthecamera system hadtobefittedwithquartz glass panels thatwould provide clearvision inspiteoftheimmense heat. Evensuchmundane matters asradomes, antennae, andaccess plates hadtoberedesigned tousenewmaterial andnewconstruction techniques.Onecurious resultoftheextreme cycleoftemperatures during thecourseofeveryflightwastheannealing ofthetitanium,which

madetheBlackbird’s outerskinstronger andstronger. Oneofthemostdaunting aspects ofthehigh-temperature flight regime wasthattherewasnofuelavailable thatcould takethecontinuoushightemperatures andnotclogtheengine fuelsystem. TheA12carried eighty-five thousand pounds offuelinfivenoninsulated wingandfuselage tanks,wherein-flight temperatures wouldreach about350degrees, inpartbecause fuelwasusedasaheatsink.The fuel,whichwassometimes tobeoff-loaded froma KC-135tankerat

anambient temperature of—60 degrees Fahrenheit, andtheninjected intotheengines athighpressure anda temperature of350degrees Fahrenheit, wasdeveloped jointly byAshland, Shell, Monsanto, and Pratt&Whitney. Called JP7,itwasa safe,high-flash-point fuelthat would notvaporize orblowupunder thetremendous heatandpressure towhichitwould besubjected. Italsocontained chemicals thatenhanced stealth characteristics byreducing the“shock diamonds” that formed intheexhaust atspeed. Tankers hadtobededicated tocarrying JP7fuel,whichultimately hadtobestocked inspecial fuelfarms around theworld. Thelowvolatility oftheJP7wassuchthatalighted match would beextinguished ifdropped intoit.Thiswasfortunate, astheBlackbird leaked likeasieve ontheground, fuelspilling through thestructural gapsnecessary toaccommodate thethermal expansion ofthemetal athighspeeds. Whenthemetal expanded, therewereno leaks. Onesideeffect ofafueltailored totheA-12/SR-71 requirements wasthatitwasdifficult toignite atlowtemperatures andhighaltitudes

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bymeans ofconventional ignition systems. Instead, achemical ignition system usingflash-sensitive tetraethyl borane wasinstalled incasea restart wasrequired eitherontheground orintheair. Rich’s teamcreated whathecalleda “smartfuel”system inwhich

sensors placed inthetanksandfuellinescontinuously sensed thefuel temperature, always routing thewarmest fueltotheengine intakes while routing thecoolest backintothetanks forwarming. Thelanding gearretractedinto wells,wherethe heat fromthe tiresand brakes

wouldbetransferred byradiation cooling intothefueltanks.Fuelwas

alsousedtomaintain thecenter ofgravity, being pumped foreoraft asrequired totrimforchanges inspeed. Thehightemperatures hadequally grave implications forthefuel

pumps,thefuellines,andthefuel-purging system. Johnsonsummarizedthesituation byremarking that“everything ontheaircraft, from

rivetsandfluidsupthrough materials andpower plants, hadtobe invented fromscratch.” BythetimethelastBlackbird hadrolled out

(ata costof about$17millioneach),theAdvanced Development Projectshadmanufactured 13millionseparatetitaniumparts.AlthoughtheSkunkWorkshatedpaperwork, theuseoftitaniumon

suchascale required thateverything berecorded abouteachbatchof material, fromthemillpourrightdowntothedirection ofthegrain ofthemetalinthesheetfromwhich thepartwasmade. Inabrilliant confirmation oftheadage “Less ismore,” thenumberofdesign engineers intheAdvanced Development Projects was considerably lessthantwohundred atthepeakofthedesign effort. Among themwereEdBaldwin doingthedesign layout; EdMartin acting assupervisor andworking onsystems; DickBoehme, RayMcHenry,andHenryCombson structures;DaveRobertsonon thefuel

system; DanZuckonthecockpitdesign(withexpertassistance ren-

deredbyLockheed’s chieftestpilot,LouisSchalk); aerodynamicists DickFuller andBurtO’Laughlin working atNASA’s high-speed wind tunnel; Mervin Healcomputing theweight; Lorne Cassfiguring the loads; andBenRich(with young David Campbell) onthermodynamicsandpropulsion. Itwasa small butformidable team.

Kingine Problems imilarsmallteamswerealsousedatPratt&Whitney, whosechief

designer, William Brown, worked wellwithRichandhispeople. ThehugeJ58wasascaled-down, 80percent version oftheevenlarger

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JT9enginethathadbeendeveloped fortheXB-70. Theenginehad

accumulated someseven hundred hoursofrunning timebefore the Navy attack aircraft forwhich ithadbeenintended wascanceled. The original J58produced twenty-six thousand pounds ofthrustusing an

afterburner, andwastheoretically capable ofpropelling theattackplane atMach3fora fewseconds ona bombrun.Bythetimeithadgone

through thealmost totalrevision required forincorporation inthe Blackbird, theJ58wasputtingout32,500pounds ofthrust.The

analogy mostpreferred byLockheed engineers wasthattheengines

produced asmuchthrustasthefourhugeturbines oftheQueen Mary oceanliner.

TheBlackbird required muchmoreoftheengine thantheattack

planewouldhave.Insteadofbeingusedforabriefburstofpoweron

takeoff andonabombrun,theafterburners wererequired tooperate

forextendedperiods,gulpingeightthousandgallonsoffuelperhour.

Itisinteresting tocompare thedemands madeontheJ58withthose made onotherengines ofthetime.Thebestfighters during theperiod oftheJ58’sconception werepowered eitherbythePratt&Whitney

J57orJ75engines. Theseengines couldpushtheaircraft tospeeds of

Mach2 fora maximum offifteen minutes (normally formuchless) andoperate atapeakaltitude offifty-five thousand feet.Incontrast, theJ58wouldberequired tooperate atspeeds overMach3 ona

continuous basisataltitudes uptoonehundredthousand feet. Theextraordinary performance required oftheJ58necessitated

somanyextensive changes tothebasicengine thatitwasnotready onschedule, andthefirstexamples oftheBlackbird hadtomakedo withthemuchsmaller J75engine fortheearly testwork. Therevision oftheJ58involved thecreationofwhatbecame knownasa bleed

bypass engine. Theredesign effortwasledbyRobert Abernathy of Pratt&Whitney. Thebleed bypass design, while complicated inboth mechanical andelectronic terms, avoided anumber ofmajor problems encounteredat highMachcruisingspeeds,includinginducedcom-

pressor stall,stress tothecompressor blades asa resultofthestall, unacceptably hightemperatures, reduced thrust,andincreased fuel consumption. Abernathy, Rich,andJohnsonwouldworkclosely togethertomeettheextraordinary challenges tothehighlyclassified J58

power plant. security requirements fortheA-12weresogreatthat Theoverall impossible toconduct flightoperations outofEditwasconsidered where mostairforceexperimental flighttests wards AirForceBase, Tenairforcebases thathadbeenslated forclosing wereconducted.

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 392

wereconsidered asalternates, butnoneproved tobeacceptable. Some ofthebasing requirements werealmost contradictory. Thebasehad tobesecure, andwellaway fromcivilandmilitary airways, andyetit hadtobeeasilyaccessible byair.Goodweather allyearroundwasan imperative, aswasaneight-thousand-foot runway.Thebasehadtobe

capable ofaccommodating largenumbers ofpersonnel, andhavefuel facilities bothfortheBlackbird andfortheconventional aircraft to supportit.

Theanswer wastoreturntothesecret Nevada basebuiltfor testing U-2s,andupgrade ittoaccommodate thenewaircraft. Almost simultaneously, a program began forselecting thepersonnel required tomantheunitthatwouldoperate theA-12s. The

AirForce,theCIA,andKellyJohnson allhelpeddevelop thecriteria. Pilotselection wasrigorous. Candidates hadtobebetween twenty-five

andfortyyears ofage,lessthansixfeettall,andlessthan175pounds. Theyhadtobemarried, emotionally stable andextremely wellmotivated, haverecent experience inhigh-performance aircraft, andbeexpertsinaerial refueling. Equally highstandards weresetforallother personnel, fromthecommanding officer totheground-crew men. Throughout theoperation oftheA-12anditssuccessor SR-71, the individuals selected tooperate theaircraft werethebesttheAirForce andtheCIAhadtooffer. AswiththeU-2program, theofficers selected were“sheep-dipped,” thatis,converted frommilitary toostensiblecivilstatusina covert waythatdidnotaffect theircareers in termsofseniority andrank.

FirstFlight hileallthemultitudinous related taskswerebeingdealtwith, production difficulties continued tofrustrate Johnson, hisSkunk Worksteam,andmoreimportantly, theUSAF andtheCIA.The titanium proved evenmoredifficult toworkthanhadbeenthought, andmaterial continued toberejected forcontamination. Theplanned production schedule begantoslip,andJohnson toldtheCIAthat Lockheed’s difficulties withwingassembly andPratt& Whitney’s problems withtheengines wouldresultina delayofthreeorfour monthsin theschedule. Hepromptly received a rocketbackfrom

Richard Bissell: “Ihavelearned ofyourexpected additional delay in firstflight from30August to1December 1961. Thisnews isextremely shocking ontopofourprevious slippage fromMaytoAugust andmy

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understanding asofourmeeting19December thatthetitaniumex-

trusion problems wereessentially overcome. I trustthisisthelastof suchdisappointments shortofasevere earthquake inBurbank.” (Unfortunately forBissell andforLockheed, hewouldbethevictim,not ofanearthquake, butoftheabortive BayofPigsinvasion ofCubain

April1961.Hehadsupported it,andwhenitfailed, hehadtoleave. Lockheed losta gooddependable friend whohaddeflected manyof Secretary McNamara’s defense cuts.) Suchcausticcomments fromtheusually unflappable Bissell indicatedhowimportant theA-12wasinCIAplanning. Thecontem-

porarySovietpolicyof expansion byencouraging revolutions in countries around theworld hadtobemonitored andcontained, and theA-12wasessential tothatprocess. Thedifficulties continued, particularly at Pratt& Whitney, where delays became soextreme thatJohnson decided toadapttheA12totheJ75engine forpreliminary testpurposes. Thiswastimeconsuming andexpensive ina program inwhichcostswerealready soaring outofsight,butitwasa sensible fallback position. Theprototype A-12wasdisassembled andmovedbyroadtoits

testsiteina caravanoftrucksandaspecialtrailer,arrivingonFebruary

28,1962. Thereitwasassembled, onlytogiveimmediate disappointment;thefuel-tank sealant hadfailed toadhere tothetitanium, and theaircraft poured fuelontheground. Repairs tookmorethana month.It wasnotuntilApril25thattestpilotLouSchalkwasto

undertakehigh-speed taxitests,witha plannedmomentaryliftofffol-

lowed byanimmediate landing ontherunway. Thetaxitestswent offwell,butassoonasSchalk liftedoff,theaircraft wallowed erratically,oscillating laterally,longitudinally, anddirectionally. Withtotal

disaster onlymilliseconds away,ittookallofSchalk’s skillstoestablish

control, chopthethrottles, andlandinahugecloudofdustonthe salt-lake bed,wellofftherunway. Thelowhophadreached nomore thantwentyfeetin theairandtoucheddownin littleovera mile, rendering Schalk unabletomakethetraditional upbeatfirst-flight test report.Thetroubleturnedoutto beanimproperfuelloading,which

putthecenterofgravity toofaraft;onsubsequent flighttests,the airplane flewverywell.Thisincredible lapse inoversight wasthesort ofinexplicable errorthatdrives engineers andpilots crazy, butnevertheless lurkslikea greatwhitesharkaroundeveryprogram.

The“official” firstflight forCIAandUSAF representatives took

placeon April30, 1962,and wentoff smoothly.Eightdayslater,

Schalk tooktheA-12supersonic forthefirsttime.

BEYOND THE HORIZONS A

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TheA-12was developedinto the two-placeSR-71Afor use by the Air Force.The manufactureof the aircraft was as sophisticatedas its enginesand its aerodynamics.

ThenextfiveA-12sarrivedbyDecember 1962,andthetests wereaccelerated. Thesewereallequipped withtheJ75engines, includingthefourthaircraft,a two-seater thatwasintendedfortraining,

andnicknamed the“Titanium Goose.” While otheraircraft weresubsequently retrofitted withJ58engines, the“Goose” retained theJ75s throughout itsservice. Thefirstflight ofanA-12withtwoJ58engines installed occurred onJanuary15,1963;anA-12equipped withone

J75andoneJ58hadflown previously onOctober 5.Thedeliveries ofJ58engines remained slow, andtestflights revealed serious problems thathampered theA-12’s attempts toreach itsdesigned performance limits.

OtherVersions Lee theagonizing attenuation ofthetestprogram, theA-12’s potential forgrowth wasobvious, andbothfighter-interceptor and

bomberversions werestudied,theAF-12(laterYF-12)andRB-12,

respectively. Thelong-sought Department ofDefense goalofcom-

Changes in Management Style Allow Lockheed to Flourish

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TheYF-12Awas intendedto be a long-rangehigh-speed interceptor.It was used to set numerousspeed and altitude records.

monality would havebeenlargely achieved, fortheaircraft were almost identical except fortheforward fuselage sections, which were modified to thesuitthemission. Thefighter version featured anadvanced Hughes radarsystem, afullcomplement ofmissiles, andalltherelated fire-control system required. Thebomber version carried asmall but potentloadofhigh-yield nuclear weapons. ThreeYF-12s wouldbe builtwhiletheRB-12 remained onpaperbecause it represented a budgetary threattotheAirForce’s ill-fated B-70. It isnotsurprising thatwithsucha radically advanced aircraft,

thetesting process wasfraught withincident. Ofthefifteen A-12s and threeYF-12s thatwerebuilt,fiveA-12s andtwoYF-12s werelostin accidents, adaunting 39percent lossrate.Twotestpilots werekilled. Kelly Johnson hadtofacetheadditional complications ofaccident investigation evenasheattempted tosurmount thecomplexities of production andtestwork.Thathewasabletoprevail wasa tribute notonlytohim,butalsotohissuperiors, HallHibbard, DanHaughton,andtheGross brothers. Theyrecognized thegreatfinancial risk

involved, buttheyallowed himtoproceed, confident inhisabilityto

ultimately deliver theaircraft thatthecountry sodesperately needed,

andwilling toriskhugesumstobackthatconfidence.

Experience Builds heutility oftheU-2hadbeendemonstrated intheCuban crisis, aswasitsvulnerability; onOctober 27,1962,MajorRudolph

BEYOND THE HORIZONS

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Anderson wasshotdown byanSA-2 missile. Thetragic incident added urgency totheA-12’s flight testprogram, andtheBlackbird’s performance envelope waspushed closer tothedesign requirements. Mach byJuly1963,andthedesignspeedofMach3.2 3 hadbeenreached wasreached inNovember.

Theexistence oftheaircraft waspublicly revealed forthefirst timeonFebruary 29,1964.President Lyndon Johnson hadbeenthe targetofclaims byRepublicans thathewasneglecting defense issues,

andheresponded byannouncing theexistence ofthe“A-11,which hasbeentestedinsustained flightsatmorethan2,000milesperhour wentontodescribe of70,000feet.”Johnson inexcess andat altitudes

whatwasactually theYF-12 fighter version; hisuseof“A-11” has

variously beendescribed asan astutesecurity measure or a simple misunderstanding ofKellyJohnson’s inputs.

First Noticeof the RS/SR-71 be

thanfivemonthslater,President Johnson wouldmakeanan-

nouncementconcerning thenextversionoftheBlackbird, which

bytheAir RS(reconnaissance-strike)-71 wasatthetimedesignated Force. Inhistalk,hetermed it theSR-71, andthedesignation was

quicklyadoptedandSRcameto standforstrategic reconnaissance.

(BenRichdelighted inrecalling thatthepresident’s slipofthetongue required Lockheed tomakechanges onthirty-three thousand drawings.)

TheUSAF hadchaffed athaving to relinquish itstraditional

strategic reconnaissance roletotheCIAintheA-12program. It had notstintedonitsassistance totheCIA,andhadsupported theOxcart

tohavestrategic thatitwished fully,butthefactremained program reconnaissance within theprovince oftheStrategic AirCommand— anotunreasonable request. Lockheed waseager tosupply itsneeds, andKelly Johnson did hisusual inimitable series ofpresentations. OnFebruary 18,1963, the AirForce authorized Lockheed toproceed tobuildsixR-12s, witha contract fortwenty-five moretofollow. Theprogram received thecode nameSeniorCrown.Theaircraft’s R-12designation wassupplanted bySR-71,whichwillbeusedherebecauseit ismorefamiliar.

Kelly Johnson’s ability tocompartmentalize hisvarious projects wasamazing. Eachversion oftheBlackbird—A-12, YF-12, F-12B, RB-12, R-12, M-12, M-21, SR-12, andRS-71/SR-71 among them—

Changes in Management Style AllowLockheed to Flourish

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TheD-21dronewas developedto impartevengreater immunityto enemyactionthan the Blackbirdalreadypossessed.ThemotheraircraftwasdesignatedM-21.

haditsownsecurity requirements, anditsownspecialist teams who

knewonlytheirpartsof theproject.Therewerealsoothermajor programs,suchasSeniorBowl,whichinvolvedthedesign,construc-

tion,andtestofthethirty-eight D-21dronevehicles forunmanned strategic reconnaissance. Looking likea“baby” A-12, theD-21(codenamed Tagboard) hadarange of1,250 miles andatopspeed ofMach 4 at ninetythousandfeet.Poweredby a MarquardtRJ43ramjet,it

waslaunched fromspecially builtM-21aircraft (anA-12modified witha position fora launch control officer andtherequisite dorsal pylontomounttheD-21).Itwasintended tooverfly territory that wastoodangerous ortoosensitive foroverflight bythepiloted A-12s. Testsproved theair-launch process tobetoohazardous. OnJuly 20,1966, offPointMagu, California, aD-21hititslaunching aircraft immediately afteritsrelease atMach3.25.Asmightbeexpected, the M-21brokeup.BothM-21crewmembers ejected, butthelaunch control officer, RayTorick, drowned whenhispressure suitfilled with water. Johnson immediately decided thatthelaunch technique was toohazardous tocontinue andrecommended thatitbestopped. The D-21wassubsequently modified forlaunch bytwospecially equipped Boeing B-52H aircraft ofthe4200th TestWing, operating outofBeale AirForceBase,California. Atleastfouroperational missions were flown; nonewassuccessful, onecrashing inChina, resulting inaheated diplomatic protest fromBeijing. Inthemidstofthesemyriad efforts, Johnson wassolving problems ranging fromselecting engineers to

BEYOND THE HORIZONS = 398

getting theSR-71 ready forflight. Inalloftheseprograms andmore, Johnson hadtobeabletomaintain thesecrecy, yetdoanoptimal job ofsharing keyinformation. Senior Crown madeperfect sense totheAirForce, butwasared flagtothebudget police, who,reasonably enough, couldnotunderstandwhytheCIAoperated anA-12reconnaissance fleetandtheAir Force operated anSR-71 fleet,eachwithvirtually identical missions. Theprincipal difference inthetwoaircraft wastheaftpressurized cockpitfora secondcrewman in theSR-71.ItsSR-71fuselage was

stretched andequipment wasrearranged tooptimize theuseofspace andtoaccommodate thesecond crewmember and2,434gallons of additional fuel. Allofthehardlessons learnedin theA-12program paiddividendsastheSR-71construction progressed smoothly, withBobGil-

lilandmaking thefirstflightoftheaircraft onDecember 22,1964. Theaircraft performed well,presaging abright future intheStrategic AirCommand, butbecause ofpolitics andbudgets, inevitably casting a longshadow overtheA-12program.

Blackbirds intoAction heperformance oftheYF-12simproved rapidly,andbyMay1, 1965,the,airforcewaswillingto attemptto seta numberof international records.(Forobvioussecurityreasons, theCIAnever

usedtheiraircraft tosetrecords.) TwoYF-12As wereemployed inthe attempts, andtheresults amazed theworld. Inshortorder,theYF12Asestablished an absolutealtituderecordof80,258feet,andthree

speedrecordsincluding the 15/25-kilometer closed-course recordof

2,070.102 mph.Itwasanincredible performance, andshould have resulted inorders forasmanyastwohundred aircraft inthefighter, reconnaissance, andbombercategories. Alas,it wasnotto be,forrea-

sonsofpoliticsandbureaucratic timidity.

Despite theserecords, therewerestillserious concerns aboutthe performance oftheJ58engine. Inajetengine, itisdesirable thatthe airflow entertheintake nacelles inasmooth manner, thenstream back through theengine witha minimum ofturbulence. Earlyjetswere relatively slow, andthedistance airhadtoflowfromthesimple open nacelles totheengine wasshort.Asspeeds increased, andthelength oftheducting fromintake toengine increased, controlling theflow became moreofachallenge. Asupersonic jetcreates ashock wave that

Changes in Management Style AllowLockheed to Flourish

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mustbeslowed tosubsonic speeds beforeaircanbeadmitted tothe

engine. IntheA-12, airflow intotheengine wasmodulated byaHamiltonStandard hydromechanical spike. Thespike wasprogrammed to movea totaldistance oftwenty-six inchesforeoraftasrequired. It operated inconcert with a seriesofbypass doors,bleedports,suck-in doors,tertiarydoors,and ejectorflapsto customizethe flowof air

through theengine andkeepitsvolume constant asspeed progressed fromengine starttoMach3.2.Oncethrough theengine, theairhad tobeaccelerated againtothesamespeedatwhichtheaircraft was traveling, bymeansoftheejectorsystemandtheafterburners. The

process ofadjustment tookanimmense amount oftesttimebefore theproper synchronization ofinlet-spike movement andengine-door opening andclosing sequences waseffected. Inthemeantime, the pilots hadtocontend withthehazard ofamismatch between theinlet spikeandtheengine’s requirement forairflow. A mismatch would

cause an“upstart,” aviolent “backfire” ofthenormal shock waveof inletair.Theaircraft tended toswing itsnosesharply tothedisturbed engine, although thiswaslatercountered bytheDigital Automatic FlightandInletControlSystem(DAFICS). Duringearlytests,the

pilotwould havetomanually openthebypass doors andresetthespike togettheairflowing smoothly again. These troubles weremostoften encountered intheMach2.4to2.8speed range(notwhere youwish toinduce violent movement oftheaircraft). Rich, whowasresponsible forintakedesign,decided thatthefaultlaywiththeHamilton Stan-

dardspike, themovable coneusedtomatchtheshock wave withthe inlet.Heobtained anelectrically powered actuator forthespike from theGarrettCorporation, andtheproblems weresolved overnight. Whenalloftheairflow devices werefinally fine-tuned, theaircraft gained inthrustandreduced drag,sothatspeedwentupandfuel consumption wentdown. Afterhisretirement, Richusedtogivetalkstoyoung, newLockheedengineers ontheSR-71, andinparticular itspower plant. Always engaging, headnodding andarmsflailing toindicate apunchline,he wasgiventojokesthatwouldnowbedeemed slightly politically in-

correct. Yethismannerenabled Richto describe theremarkable power-plant conception inveryhumanterms. Hekepttheaudience laughing evenashediscussed theintricate engineering details derived fromhisthousands ofhoursofwind-tunnel study.Herelished ques-

tions,themorearcane thebetter. Whenasked whythenacelles ofthe Blackbird wereround,ratherthansquare asonsomanysupersonic fighters, hereplied: “Because it’sapressure vessel. Youdon’tseetoo

BEYOND THE HORIZONS = 400

manysquare pressure cookers.” Andthenhewouldexplain how,at speed, theprocess ofmetering theairflow bythespike-and-door combination created asituation inwhich 54percent oftheengine’s thrust wasbeingexerted bythepressure differential intheforward nacelle pressing against theroundafter-portion ofthecenter body,thespike. ‘Twenty-nine percent wasproduced bytheejector system andonly17 percent bythebasic J58engine itself. Richwould jokethattheinlet wasreallypulling theengine, andcharacterized theengine-nacelle combination asa “supercharged ramjet.”

Rich’s innovations andotherimprovements intheaircraft’s performance madeitpossible todeclare itoperational inNovember 1965. (Ironically, during thesamemonth, theBureau oftheBudget firedits

firstshotacross thebowsoftheA-12andtheSR-71. Theaccountants couldtellprecisely howmuchthetwoprograms cost,buthadnoidea

ofthevalueoftheinformation generated byBlackbird overflights.) Ithappened thattheA-12wasreadyfordeployment justasurgentrequirements surfaced. TheCIAcalled fortheemployment of theA-12overChina,andshortly thereafter theDepartment ofDefense soughtit forreconnaissance overNorthVietnam. Plansweredrawn

upforanoperation called Black Shield thatcalled forA-12s tooperate outofKadena AirBasein Okinawa ona temporary basisatfirst, followed byapermanent deployment. TheOxcart detachment would benamed the1129th Special Activities Squadron, andgiventheaffectionate nickname “theRoadRunners.”

By1966, theA-12hadreached relative maturity andwasmeeting mostofitsspecified requirements. Itssister ship,theYF-12, wasdemonstrating itsability tofiremissiles atthespeed ofMach3.2andbring downBoeing QB-47droneaircraft. Yetnostepsweretakentodeploy theaircraft, because Secretary ofDefense RobertMcNamara denied

permission. Hewasbecoming increasingly committed tofighting a ground warinSoutheast Asia,andrefused tomakeuseofairpower toitsfullest extent because hedidnotwishtoantagonize RedChina. Inhisjudgment, theuseoftheA-12wassomehow moreriskythan thecontinued useoftheU-2,although thelatterwasfarmorevulnerable toenemy surface-to-air missiles. Inconsequence, thefunding fortheA-12wasreduced. Astheperceived threatofSoviet bombers haddiminished, theYF-12 program wascanceled. YetevenMcNamara couldnotignore thecontinuing buildup of NorthVietnamese capability. ByMay1967, thesurface-to-air defenses aroundHanoihadreached a pointatwhicha U-2wouldalmost certainly beshotdown,andanagreement wasreached to usethe

Changes in Management

Style Allow Lockheed to Flourish

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A-12overNorthVietnam. Thefirstmission wasflownoutofKadena

onMay31,andinathree-hour andthirty-nine-minute flight, photos 190 surfaceNorth V ietnam’s of ofmorethanone-third wereobtained to-airmissilesites.SixmoremissionswereflownbyAugust15,and whilesomeradaractivitywasobserved, nosurface-to-air missiles were

launched attheBlackbirds. TheBlackbird performed welloverVietnam andNorthKorea. Communist opposition increased, andmissiles werelaunched onsevuponepiece picking damage, OnlyoneA-12sustained eraloccasions.

ofshrapnelontheOctober30,1967,sortieoverNorthVietnam.The

of oftheseizure wasusedoverNorthKoreaintheaftermath aircraft

theUSSPueblo onJanuary 2,1968. Thelastoperational flight oftheA-12 wasmade onMay8,1968, ona missionoverNorthKorea.TheBlackShieldunitwasbrought werestored Oxcartaircraft backtotheUnitedStatesandtheremaining

ina hangar formorethantwodecades before sevenofthemwere finally given tomuseums andanAirNational Guard unitfordisplay. onewasgiven toan SR-71C, onewasconverted (OfthethreeYF-12s, to theAirForceMuseum,and one crashed.)Underthe cooperative

handsoftheCIA,theAirForce,andLockheed, theA-12became an

life service active withapotential system weapon capable incredibly itsuseand inhibited mismanagement ormore.Political ofthirtyyears grounded itprematurely.

TheAirForceandthe SR-71 -

risesastowhytheAirForcesimplydid immediately question

not taketheA-12intoservice,insteadof optingfor the SR-71.

foranaircraft called which requirement, istheAirForce Theanswer a andtheneedfora“back-seater,” payload, larger range, withgreater yield officer(RSO),to obtainthemaximum systems reconnaissance to slightly waslengthened Thefuselage equipment. fromtheaircraft’s

wereenlarged. fueltank,andthechines anadditional accommodate took 22,1964,thefirstflight onDecember noted, Aspreviously as known version a trainer was aircraft butthefirstoperational place, theSR-71B,whichwasdeliveredto BealeAirForceBaseon January

fortheinstructor cockpit second hadanelevated TheSR-71B 7,1966. pilot. ofthehigh because wasdifficult oftheSR-71 Theproduction curve didnotdropasforecast, Thelearning oftheworkforce. turnover

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andmistakes weremade. YetbyDecember 1967, allthirty-one ofthe SR-71s hadbeendelivered to theNinthStrategic Reconnaissance Wing(SRW) atBeale. Twosquadrons, theIstandthe99th,whose histories gobacktooperations withGeneral Pershing’s 1913efforts against Mexico, operated theBlackbirds. (The9thSRW hadreplaced the4200th SRWonJune25,1966.) Despite theA-12experience, thehighperformance andsophisticationoftheSR-71ledtoa seriesofaccidents andincidents, only

oneofwhich resulted ina fatality. Nonetheless, unlike theCLA’s somewhattentative useoftheA-12,SACbegan employing the“Sled” (as theSR-71 wascalled byitspilots) extensively, andbytheendof1969 hadflown morethanonehundred operational missions. TheVietnam

Warmadeexceptional demands upontheaircraft. It wasalsoused intensively fromitsbaseatRAFMildenhall intheUnitedKingdom.

Missions included surveillance oftheMiddle East,including Libya, Lebanon, andYemen. Special assistance wasrendered toIsrael during theYomKippur War.InSoutheast Asiamanyflights weremadeover

NorthVietnam, wherethecameras couldreturnphotosofcargoon

Atypical flight over thedecks andintheholdsofshipsintheharbor. but,reportedly, therewere NorthKorea lastedonlyseven minutes, hundreds ofmuchlonger flights overRedChina. themilitary tothe Theusefulness oftheSR-71 wentbeyond

diplomatic tables.DuringtheYomKippurWar,HenryKissinger askedthattheSR-71makereconnaissance flights overthebattlearea.

UnderU.S.pressure, Israeli premier GoldaMeirhadsaidthather troopshadhalted. Toherembarrassment, Kissinger wasabletolay twoBlackbird photos infrontofher,takenonsuccessive days, which showed theadvance wascontinuing. Everything thusconspired tomaketheSR-71 legendary almost instantly. Itwastopsecret; itflewhigher, faster, andfarther thanany aircraft inhistory; anditcovered enemy territory withimpunity, apparently invulnerable to surface-to-air missile attacks, andcertainly unapproachable evenbyinterceptors asadvanced astheSoviet MiG25.Assophisticated asitwas,itflewfromrelatively primitive forward operating locations, bases without theusualinfrastructure, without difficulty. It alsobrokeitssistershipA-12’s records, establishing an altitude record forsustained levelflightof85,069 feet,a record for speedina straight lineof2,193.17 mph,anda speedovera onethousand-kilometer closed circuit of2,092.294 mph.Many otherrecordswereset,allunbroken tothisdate. Yetitwasexpensive tooperate theSR-71, andby1989, budget

Changes in Management Style AllowLockheed to Flourish

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theendoftheprospelled clearly a shiftinleadership and concerns chiefof to bethenextAirForce certain gram.Themanconsidered staff,GeneralJeromeF. “Jerry”O’Malley,waskilledin April1985

T-39Sabreliner in whichhewasbeing whentheNorthAmerican

hehad AsMajorO’Malley, crashed. engagement toaspeaking flown flownthefirstoperational flightoftheSR-71 onMarch 21,1968, Themanwhobecame oftheaircraft. a strongsupporter andhewas LarryD.Welch, chiefof staffinhisplaceonJuly1, 1986,General

wasopposed totheSR-71 asbeing tooexpensive tooperate atthirtywas spending when d efense perhouratatime dollars eightthousand onthedecline. Theaircraft wasofficially retired onJanuary 26,1990, The well. served It had disapproval. unofficial and official tomuch of time, o f flight h ours totalof53,490 a combined logged SR-71s 3,551 hadbeenspentatMach3 plus.Theyhadflown which11,675 operational sorties foratotalof17,294 hours, during which morethan missiles hadbeenfiredatthem.Allmissed. a thousand surface-to-air

Twelve SR-71s werelost,butonlyonecrewman waskilled, atribute totheejection seatsandlife-support systems. was in 1990,a decision theSR-71 WhentheAirForceretired National Institution’s to theSmithsonian madeto giveoneexample speed seta newtranscontinental Theaircraft Museum. Air&Space fifty-four minutes, 2,404statutemilesinsixty-seven record,traversing

seconds, aremarkable flightforamuseum piece. wasalsoanexcellent theBlackbird capability, itscombat Besides Administration and Space Aeronautics TheNational aircraft. research work,having operatedbothYF-12andSR-71aircraftforexperimental

test assupersonic trainer andthesoleSR-71B twoSR-71As obtained until operationally it s ustained SR-71 the use of NASA’s platforms. year in thefiscal theAirForce$100million provided theCongress use. backto operational to bringthreeSR-71s budget 1995defense thefirstSR-71was refurbishment, OnJune28,1995,afterextensive

tothe9thSRWforitsnewtourofdutyandtothegeneral returned andthepublic. acclaim oftheservice

ALookBackat Kelly inmasterefforts Johnson’s Kelly theA-12andSR-71, hs reviewing developing oftheaircraft, models ofthemultiple thedesign minding test coordinating scale, and such a o n tousetitanium thetechnology butequally havebeennoted.Lessobvious, efforts and.production

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 404

important, washisoverall supervision oftheselection andinstallation ofthesophisticated systems intended fortheaircraft. These wereoften asadvanced state-of-the-art astheaircraft andengines, andrequired anincredible capacity tounderstand themanydisciplines involved. Justa briefsurvey ofa fewofthemoresophisticated systems will underline thebreadth anddepthofJohnson’s genius. Theyincluded ultrasophisticated fire-control systemslikethat incorporating the

HughesAN/ASG-18 radarandHughesGAR-9rocket;advancedsys-

temsforlaunching air-to-air missiles atMach3.2;radical rotary bomb baysfordropping nuclear weapons; theAstro-Inertial Navigation Systemfornavigation; sophisticated thirty-thousand-dollar pressuresuits

forthecrewmembers; terminal radarfortheuseofair-to-ground missiles; the “Mach3.2aircraftcarrier”fortheD-21;ramjetengines

forthelatterproject; modifications totheD-21tomatewiththeB52H;advance guidance systems; theadvanced synthetic aperture radar system; advanced systems forNASA, including aversion oftheSR71Aequipped withanexternal burning“scramjet”—a supersonic

combustionramjetengine;exoticcameras;electronicintelligence-

gathering systems; datalinksforair-to-ground andair-to-satellite op-

eration; earlyefforts atglobal positioning systems (GPS); andmany more.Hewasnotresponsible forthedesign ofallthesevaried items byanymeans, buthewasresponsible forknowing exactly whateffect eachofthemwouldhaveonthecarrier aircraft, andheexecuted his responsibilities fully.

TheMidlifeCrisis 1.

CIAapproved theOxcart project in1960; theAirForce retired theSR-71 in 1990,albeittemporarily. Themidpoint ofthistumultuous thirty-year period ofdesign, development, construction, and operation oftheSR-71 was1975—the yearinwhichKelly Johnson retiredfromhispostasseniorvicepresident atLockheed, and,of course, astheheadof theAdvanced Development Projects—the Skunk Works. InKelly’s forty-two yearsatLockheed, hehaddesigned, orsubstantially contributed tothedesign of,fortyLockheed aircraft. Hewas showered withhonors, including twoCollier Trophies, aviation’s most prestigious award. Thefirstwasin1959, forhisworkindesigning the

F-104;thesecondwasin 1965,forhisworkontheYF-12A. Inthe pantheon ofAmerican aviation luminaries, heundoubtedly rankswith

Thetwo greatest reconnaissanceaircraft in history showntogether: U-2and SR-71. Bothwereproducts of Lockheed’sSkunkWorks.

leaders suchasJohnNorthrop, Donald Douglas, Glenn Martin, Reu-

benFleet,JamesMcDonnell, andEdwardWells.AllofJohnson’s

colleagues havecommented onJohnson’s intuitive ability andonhis willingness tobackhisopinions withabet—usually aquarter—and theyalladmitthattheypaidhimfarmorequarters thantheyreceived. Butbeingalmost always correct hadadownside aswell.There isnoquestion thatKelly’s experience andknowledge gradually imparted a degree ofhubris tohim,sothathewasnotalways politic in dealing withhiscustomers. Thismight havebeenfineifhiscustomers didnotalsohaveegos.Kelly didnotrecognize thatindealing with threeandfour-star generals, andtheircivilian equivalents, hismanner hadtobeadjusted fromthatusedfordealing withhissubordinates.

Hehadbecome high-handed, telling customers whattheyneeded, rather thanlistening tohearwhattheywanted. Overtime,anadverse reaction setin,anditbecame difficult forKelly tosellhisideas tothe military, evenwhenhewasabsolutely right.Theresult wasthatLockheedwasfrozen outofthefighter business, andcontracts thatcould havebeenwonbyexhibiting alittlemoreflexibility werelost,justat atimewhentherewerefewer contracts available tobidfor. Hisretirement didnotmeanthathecutallrelations with

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oftheboardofdirectors, and Lockheed. Hecontinued asamember Works. Therehewould conhewasprovided anoffice attheSkunk andaproblem forthemanwhonowran tinuetowork, bothanasset Project office—Ben Rich. theAdvanced Development

BenR. Rich:ThePerfectNewBroom Peers thegreatest testimony toBenRich’s engineering andleadershipabilityisthatKellyJohnsonselected himasa successor in

spiteoftheiralmost totally opposite approaches tohuman relations. Former colleagues recall thatwhenJohnson walked (hurtled isprobablya betterdescriptive term)downa hallway, othersinthepassage hada tendency tofreezeupagainstthewall,WestPointcadetstyle, ratherthantosayhello.Johnson didnotcometootherpeople’s offices

tochitchat orpassthetimeofday,andifyouweresummoned tosee him,youknewthatyoueitherhadaproblem orwereabouttoget one.WithRichitwasjusttheopposite. Hewashail-fellow-well-met, andhiscoworkers fondly recall thathispassage down anoffice hallway wasmarked bysequential pealsoflaughter, hisownleading thelot, asheimproved onhiscurrent jokeateachcubbyhole. Thepersonality differences wereechoed intheirphysical presence; Johnson, asnoted, wasabigbullofaman,whoseemed tofilluparoom when heentered. Richwasshort,slender,and had an ingratiatingly diffidentmanner

thatdidnotconceal hisshrewd assessment ofeverysituation.

Richdescribed himself as “ebullient, energetic, a perennial schmoozer andacheerleader withanendless supply ofone-liners and farmer’s daughter jokes.” Moreimportant, hewasapproachable; he likedpeople, andhewasacutely conscious oftheneedtogivethe customer whathewanted.Thisbasicunderstanding wasa refreshing

change totheAirForceandconsequently toLockheed. Richalso understood hisowntalents andhislimitations. Hedidnotconsider himself agenius inKelly Johnson’s class, andtoldhiscolleagues that although hewasgoingtocontinue adhering toKelly’s workrulesand methods,he wasnot goingto makeeverydecision.Instead,he was

going togivethemtaskstoaccomplish anddelegate boththeresponsibility andtheauthority todoso. Yet,in hisownway,Richwasundeniablyalsoa genius.Hewas

atremendously capable engineer whomadegreatcontributions tothe

power-plant installation ontheF-104, U-2,andSR-71, andwould

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Althoughpossessed of a totally differentpersonalitythan the man he replaced—Kelly Johnson—BenRichwasa leader and a brilliant engineerwhofilledJohnson’s shoes better than anyoneelse could have.

havethevision andthecourage togoontoachieve oneofthemost dramatic breakthroughs inaviation history, thecreation oftheF-117A stealth fighter. BenRich’s family background differed markedly fromthatof mostofhiscolleagues. Hisfather, Isidore Rich,hadsuperintended a hardwood lumber millinManila. Hemarried Annie, abeautiful young FrenchgirlwholivedinAlexandria, Egypt,afteryearsofromanceby

correspondence. Benwasbornandraised inthePhilippines under his father’s sterntutelage, which helaterrecognized hadprepared himfor working forKelly Johnson. Thefamily,worriedbytheJapanesethreat,hadreturnedto Los

Angeles justbefore WorldWarIIbegan. Father andsonworked in machine shopsduringthewar,withBennotentering college until afterV-JDay.Hegraduated fromtheUniversity ofCalifornia at Berkeley in 1949witha degreeinmechanical engineering, andwent ontogeta master’s degreeinaerothermodynamics atUCLA.It was ahappychoice, asit nettedBenbothabride,FayeMayer, andashot

atajobwithLockheed, where hewassoonselected foratemporary jobwithKelly atBuilding 82—the Advanced Development Projects building. HewouldstaywithADPforthirty-six years,becoming in

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hisowntimeassynonymous withtheSkunk Works asKelly hadbeen inhis.AndjustasKelly would havehisgreatCollier Trophy defining moments inthesun,sowould Ben. Hisfirstsuccess,however,wasin the minorkey.He convinced

General DavidC.Jones,thenchiefofstaffandlatertwo-term chair-

manoftheJointChiefs ofStaff, thattheU-2production linehadto berestarted. Jonesagreed, andanimproved version, called theTR-1 togetaway fromtheU-2’s spy-plane notoriety, entered production.

Thirty-seven wouldbebuilt,andtheywouldultimately bedesignated

U-2R(orU-2RT forthetwo-seat version). Theyhaveserved nobly aroundtheworld,including actionintheGulfWar,andstandas another example oftheSkunk Works’ ability todeliver, service, and

maintain uniqueaircraft unapproached bythoseofanyothercountry. TheSovietUnionattempted tobuilditsownU-2-typeaircraft, and

failed utterly.

TheApproachto Stealth I wasnotedearlier thattheinitial design requirements forwhatbecametheBlackbird specified aninvulnerability toradardetection. Although thiswasnotfullyachieved intheA-12ortheSR-71, itis worthrepeating thattheBlackbird wasthefirststealth aircraft. In 1962,it hada verylowradarsignature compared withitscontem-

poraries suchastheB-52,actually approximating thatoftheB-1B of twodecades later.Forcomparison purposes, theradarcrosssection (RCS)oftheB-52isestimated at 1,076squarefeet,whilethatofthe

B-1Bisonly11square feet.Generally, lowradarsignatures derive

about65percentfromtheshapeand35percent fromradar-absorbent coatings.

Despite itslowRCS,theSR-71 wastracked byenemy radar, and missiles andaircraft attempted interception. Whatwasdesired wasan aircraft thatwouldabsolutely defydetection, andtherefore beunavailable asa targetforanytypeofinterception. Intelligence reports revealed thattheSoviet Union’s radarwasrapidly improving, andthe prospects forsuccess bylow-level penetrators liketheB-1B werediminishing. Itthusbecame thegoaloftheDefense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) toelicit fromindustry anaircraft thatwould besoinvisible toradarthateitheritwould notbedetected atall,or ifdetected, itwouldnotbeabletobetargeted byeithermissiles or interceptors. Under thecodename HaveBlue, in1973fivecompanies

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withrecentexperience designing fighters wereaskedto bidon the

unclassified project. AsinthecaseoftheU-2,Lockheed wasnotasked toparticipate, butinstead, invited itself totheparty. Thistime,instead ofJohnson’s brusque insistence onthevalidity ofhisideas, Richwent to workwithcharmandguile,revealing to DARPA howadvanced

Lockheed’s previous stealth effort was,andagreeing tocompete withoutanygovernment funds. Richknewthatheheldtwotrumpcards, andLockheed, theoutsider, wonthebid.

Experienceand ExoticMathematics t thetimeoftheHaveBluecompetition, Lockheed already had moreexperience increating aircraft withalow-radar cross section thananyothermanufacturer, butitwasa breakthrough insight into asetofmathematical formulas thatwould giveitthekeytoultimate success. Theinsightcamethroughtheeffortsof DenysOverholser, a

mathematician andradarspecialist. Hehadbeendoingsomelight

readingin a papercalled“Methodof EdgeWavesin thePhysical

Theory ofDiffraction,” authored byPyotr Ufimtsev, thechief scientist attheMoscow Institute ofRadioEngineering. Thepaperwasabstruse in theextreme,andindecipherable to a layman.Publishedin 1966in

theSoviet Union, ithadonlyrecently beentranslated bytheForeign

Technology Division atWrightPatterson AirForceBase.Overholser

worked witha retiredLockheed mathematician, BillSchroeder, to develop acomputer program theynamed ECHOI;itwastobecalled the“Rosetta Stone” ofstealth. Schroeder had investigated the century-old workof Scottish mathematician JamesClerkMaxwell, andtheelaboration onit done

byArnold Johannes Sommerfeld, aGerman electromagnetics expert. Theircalculations predicted themanner inwhicha given geometric configurationwould scatter(or reflect)electromagnetic radiation.

Ufimtsev haddeveloped a simplerapproach thatconcentrated on

electromagnetic currents at theedgesofgeometric shapes. It was Schroeder whosawthattheshape ofanaircraft couldbereduced to afinitesetoftwo-dimensional surfaces thatcouldbeanalyzed bythe formulas ofthethreemathematicians theyhadstudied. Thiswasthe strokeof genius,the recognition thatby “faceting,” a threedimensional aircraft couldbecreated outofacollection offlatpanels, ratherthanbytheusualFrench-curve shapes ofthepast.

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Schroeder postulated thatiftriangular panels wereusedtoform avehicle surface, thenumber ofindividual radarreflection calculations could bereduced toa figure thatcontemporary computers could manage.Thenextstepwastoangle eachflatsurface atanangle ofthirty degrees,in otherwords,in sucha mannerthat anyincomingradar

beamwouldbereflected awayfrom,ratherthanbackto,itssource. Thequestion thatremained waswhether anaircraft sofashioned would alsofly. Inhismemoirs andinspeeches, BenRichusedtoliketopretendthathe didnotunderstand Overholser’s andSchroeder’s cal-

culations whentheywereinitially explained tohim.Thefactwas thatheunderstood enough to knowthatif Overholser werecor-

rect,Lockheed hada productthatwouldyieldbillions ofdollarsin salesoverthenextfewdecades. Benwasbothblessedandcursed byKellyJohnson,whocamein twicea weekona consulting basis

and,whilemuchmoreapproachable, wasstillfreewithhisopinions.Hewarned Richthatheshould notattempt sucha high-risk venture ashisfirstproject—his reputation wouldberidingonit. Moreimportantly, Lockheed wasstillimmured in its financial troubles, anditschairman, BobHaack, wouldhavetothinklong andhardaboutfunding a costly project thatmightnotproveout. Notwithstanding this,Richwasconvinced thatOverholser’s approachwouldwork,andif so,thatit wouldbeinvaluable. As events transpired, company president LarryKitchen andvicechairmanRoyAnderson bothsawthepotentialmeritin theideaand

supported Rich’s request forfunds.Byscraping thefinancial cupboardalmostbare,theymanaged to provide Richwiththe$10 million heneeded, at a timewhenLockheed finances werenear theirlowest ebb.Thisshowed remarkable insight andcourage on thepartofuppermanagement, justrecovering fromthelongsiege ofanti-Lockheed publicity. Theytookgraveriskswhenutterconservatism wasa saferchoice; andtheydidsobecause theyknew Lockheed needed tobeginselling aircraft tothegovernment again, andbecause theyhadfaithin RichandtheSkunkWorks. Ina superheated five-week period,Overholser usedECHO I to

solve fortheradarcross section oftheshape Schroeder hadenvisioned, andtopredict howsuch a faceted aircraft shape would appear onradar. Theconcept wasvalidated whenanidealized aircraft model(nicknamed the“Hopeless Diamond”) wastested andfound tohave alower radarcross section thananypreviously tested shape. (Lockheed didnotintendtorelysolely onshapeforstealth; it

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wouldalsomakeliberaluseofradar-absorbent materials[RAM],which

absorbed, ratherthanreflected, incoming radarenergy.) Models oftheproposed HaveBluedesign weretested, andin

April1976Lockheed wasawarded thecontractforaprojectthatwas immediately catapulted tobeyondtopsecrettoa compartmentalized

status of“special access required” (SAR). Onlyafewpeople were made aware ofthescope oftheentireprogram. Northrop wasalsoawarded a contract tobuildtwoTacitBlueaircraft. These wouldassume an entirely different, whalelike shape, andbekeptsecret forlonger than eithertheHaveBlueaircraft ortheF-117A fighter thatresulted from them.TheTacitBluewasdesigned asa reconnaissance vehicle, and while itflewsuccessfully andmadesomecontributions totheNorthropB-2stealth bomber, itdidnothavetheimpact ortheimportance ofHaveBlue.

Rich,the Supersalesman D uringtheearly daysoftheproject, extensive testsoffull-size modelsoftheLockheed andNorthrop concepts hadbeenrunatthe AirForce’s Ratscat Backscatter Measurement Range atWhiteSands, NewMexico. Apole-mounted thirty-eight-foot-span wooden version oftheHopeless Diamond hadtheapproximate radarsignature ofa golfball.Inotherwords, anincoming aircraft theshape oftheHopeless Diamond(aswe'llsee,thesizedidnotmatter)wouldhavenomore

reflectivity toanenemy radarsetthanaTitleist Professional. Forall

practical purposes, thismeantthattheaircraft, movingatnearsonic

speeds, would beimpossible foranyradartoacquire andtrack. Inthecourse ofthetesting, some false datawereintroduced that indicated thatinstead ofagolf-ball-size RCStheHopeless Diamond hadtheRCSofanordinary marble. ThisgaveRichanewshtick; he boughtsomemarble-size ballbearings,andwhenhewouldvisitinthe

Pentagon hewould rolltheballbearings onageneral’s deskandsay, “Here’s theobservability ofyourairplane onradar.” Itwascorny, and mildly incorrect—but itgottheAirForce’s attention, somuchsothat a contract wasawarded tobeginworkonwhatbecame theF-117A onemonthbeforetheHaveBlue’s firstflight.

Rich’slongtimefriend,mentor,andpetannoyance, KellyJohn-

son,didnotjustlookoverhisshoulder atthestealth project, but forcibly expressed hisopinion withawell-aimed kicktoRich’s rear, insisting thatsouglyanairplane would never fly.ToRich’s immense

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satisfaction, hewona quarter betfromJohnson overwhichaircraft would havethelowest RCS—the D-21droneorthenewdiamondshaped aircraft. Models ofbothaircraft wereplaced inatestchamber, andtheHopeless Diamond wasstealthier thanthedronebyanorder ofmagnitude. Richthenshowed Johnson thatthenumbers revealed inthetestcorresponded exactly toOverholser’s computations. Johnson’sintuition hadfailed himattheedgeofthecomputer age.He simplycouldnotbelieveOverholser’s assertion thattheamountof radarenergyreturnedtoasenderisindependent ofthetarget’s size—

thatabomber, a fighter, oralightplane ofthesame shape would have

anidentical radarcrosssection.Intime,Johnsonbecame a reluctant

convert, accepting thenewconcepts onstealth, butstillclinging tohis

contention thattheuglydiamond shapecouldnotbemadetofly. Despitehisstature,hewashuman.It mayhaverankled Johnson

thatRichhadnotonlypassed hisfirsttest,securing a production contract byleading histeamtothesuccessful creation ofaradically newaircraft, theHaveBlue, buthadalsoingratiated himself withthe

AirForce,repairing damage thatJohnsonhaddone.

Moreimportantly forthefuture, Richhadproven himself tothe old-timers attheSkunk Works whohaddoubted hisability tofill Kelly’s shoes. Withtheexception oftheirfearof,andfascination with,

Johnson,mostof theindividualmembersof theSkunkWorksteam

hadalways hadwhattodaywouldbecalled“anattitude.” Theyhad

always beenirreverent, questioning, supremely confident intheirown capabilities, andeager topuncture anyinflated egothathappened to cross theirpath.Sherman Mullin, whosucceeded Richasheadofthe Skunk Works in1991,recalls walking through astrangely quieten-

gineeringsectionandthinking,“Theinsubordination levelisn’thigh

enoughtoday.”

AndwhilehisteamfollowedRich’sleadwillingly enough,hewas

acutely conscious thathewasontrial.Hissuccessful saleofHaveBlue to Lockheed’s management andtheAirForcegavehimthestature

needed toensure thattheproduction contract would bewellexecuted. Lockheed received acontract tobuildtwoprototypes. These were tobetwo-thirds-scale aircraft eachpowered bytwoofthetime-proven General Electric J85engines. EdBaldwin, whohadbeensoimportant onthelayout andthestructure oftheU-2,designed theaircraft. It hadanuglyindustrial appearance thatwascompletely unlike anything Lockheed haddoneinthepastwithitshistory ofglorious Constellationsandglamorous SR-71s. Thenewairplane looked likea giant lawndart,witha fuselagetwiceaslongasthewings.

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Theunconventional shaperequired a quadruple-redundant computer-operated fly-by-wire system thatcontinuously corrected for itsinherent instability, thequality thatimparted a maneuverability

essential forasuccessful fighter.

Rich’s teamapproached theHaveBlueaircraft intheirusual comprehensive style, attending toamultitude ofproblems never before

contemplated inwhatwasnowcalleda VeryLowObservable (VLO)

aircraft. Theengine inletshadtohavescreens yetpermitanample flowofair.Thejetexhausts hadtobearranged topresent aminimum infrared signature andinhibitradarreflection fromthefaceofthe turbine. Noflaps, speed brakes, orhigh-lift devices werefittedtothe modified deltawings. Elevons, acombination ofailerons andelevators thatdatedbacktothedaysoftheNorthrop flying wings, wereused incombination withtwoall-movable, inward-canted vertical fins,similarinconcept tothoseoftheSR-71. Amovable, two-position tail surface, called the“platypus,” wasusedtooffset angles ofattack (the anglebetween thewingchordandtheflightpath)ofgreater than twelve degrees. Although government bureaucracy intruded moreandmoreon theSkunk Works’ operation, Rich’s teamworked withitscustomary drivetoproduce thetwoprototypes forabargain $43million. Thefirstairplane, designated HB1001(andalsoknown asthe XST-1 forexperimental stealth technology), wasflown toitstestsite inside aLockheed C-5A onNovember 16,1977, foraflight testprogramunderthedirection ofDickMiller. OnDecember 1,Lockheed testpilotBillParkmadethefirstflight, justtwenty months aftercontractaward. Wearing a dazzle camouflage scheme reminiscent of World WarI shipstodisguise itsshape, theHB1001wasintended onlyasa flight-test vehicle, withnointensive attention giventoits stealth characteristics. Thenumber twoaircraft, HB1002,afterextensiveground-testing ofmodels, wouldberefinedto testitsVLO characteristics andpaintedananonymous gray.

Tofacilitate construction andin keeping withSkunkWorks practice, Richhadauthorized themaximum useofoff-the-shelf equipment,including aNorthrop F-5undercarriage, aGeneral Dynamics F-16fly-by-wire system andside-stick controller, andthetwoGEJ85 engines fromaRockwell T-2BBuckeye trainer. Afterfivemonthsofsuccessful, ifsometimes exciting,flighttest,

HB1001damaged itslanding gearwhendropped from a height of seven feet,touching downtoohardonalanding attempt. Parkmade a successful go-around, butthegearwasjammed ina half-retracted

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position.Inanamazingly braveandskillfuldisplayofflyingtechnique,

heattempted togetthegeardown andlocked bybouncing down hard ontheextended gear—no easytaskgiventhetouchystability ofthe HaveBlueaircraft. Thegearstayedhalf-extended. Aftera climbback to ten thousandfeet,an enginefailedandhe electedto bailout.Se-

verely injured during theejection process, hehadtogiveupflying, butstayed onasLockheed’s director offlightoperations. (Parkhad probably useduphisquotaofluck;onJuly9,1964,hehadsuffered a complete hydraulic failurein anA-12ashecamein to land.He

ejected safely.) Thesecond aircraft, XST-2, akaHB1002, wasmodified toincorporate lessons learned withthefirstprototype andwasflown on

July20,1978,byLieutenant Colonel Norman“Ken”Dyson.Itflew fifty-two timesoverthenextyear,validating Lockheed’s VLOdesign, andensuring thatafollow-on contract wouldbeawarded forafighter.

Onwhatproved tobeitsfinalflight, theHB1002caught fire;Dyson wasabletoejectsafely. Thetwocrashes didnotdiscourage theAirForce. General Robert Dixon,a manwhodidsomuchto revitalize theTactical AirCom-

mand, personally toldRichthatLockheed would receive afixed-price

contract forfivefull-scale development (FSD)andfifteenproduction

aircraft. Theprogram wasnamed Senior Trend, andthestealth fighter

wasunderway.

TheBlackJet BY an unusualtwistoffate,thenbrigadiergeneralLarryD.Welch,

afuture chiefofstaffandthemanwhowould laterterminate the SR-71 program, wastheprincipal AirForce contact fortheproposed stealth fighter, which wouldbedesignated theF-117A. (TheF-117 wasfirstpainted gray, thenincamouflage, thengrayagain, andfinally injetblack. During testoperations, toavoid a security compromise, it cametobecalledthe“Black Jet,”andthisbecame itsnickname.)

Welch became theprogram’s strongest advocate, keeping AssistantSecretary ofDefense William Perry fullyinformed ofitsprogress. ButtheAirForce’s contractual termswererigorous. TheF-117A had

tomeetorexceed thestealth characteristics ofthewooden mock-up, aswellasmeetallofitsspecified performance requirements—and the firstfighter hadtobetest-flown withintwenty-two months ofthe contract. Itwasa challenge worthy oftheSkunk Works.

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Richhad faith in the stealth concept,and pushedLockheedto back experimentsin the discipline.Thefirst of these wasthe HaveBluetest aircraft.

RichdesignatedNormanNelson(whowouldheadthe Skunk

Works from1984to1986) asprogram manager. Nelson selected veterans fromtheHaveBlueprogram toassist him,including asuccessor, AlanBrown, whowasthegroup’s “lowobservables” expert, andthus ina positionto calltheshotsonsomedecisions. TheSkunkWorks’

challenge wastoproduce afighter-bomber aircraft thatwould beinvulnerable toenemy detection. Thismeant asuppression ofitsradar andinfrared signatures andmaking theaircraft difficult toseeby means ofcamouflage, andbyelimination ofengine smoke trailsand, moredifficult, contrails. Theaircraft soundhadtobereduced toa minimum, anditselectromagnetic emissions fromonboard equipment eliminated. Eachsituation called foradifferent approach. Thebasicshapeandmaterials usedinitsconstruction werethe principal methods ofavoiding boththeradarandinfrared signatures. Themodern General Electric F404engine selected forusedidnot havea smokeproblem,andcontrails couldbeavoidedbycarefully selectingaltitudeandweatherconditions. Passiveelectromagnetic

emissions werelargely eliminated bynotincorporating anonboard radar, while othersignals wereminimized byuseofspecial antennae. TheF-117A’s configuration, although moreconventional in

somewaysthanthatof theHaveBlueaircraft,wasstillstrikingly

unusual. Thetriangular fuselage satonthe67.5-degree swept wings liketheturretoftheCivilWarMonitor stuckonitshull.Instead of inward-canted vertical surfaces, it adopted a swept-back V design, canted outward. Construction wasforthemostpartentirelyconventional alu-

minum, except thattheexternal surfaces werecovered withplates of

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radar-absorbent materialattachedby an epoxyadhesive or, when

needed, bysprayed-on RAMmaterial. Thecockpit wasconventional withtheexception ofthegoldfilmcoatings thatwereincorporated in thecanopy glass. (Iftherewasnowaytoreflect theradarenergy, the pilot’s headwould havedwarfed theentire aircraft ontheradar screen.) AsontheHaveBlueaircraft, theengine intakes werecovered with gridstoreflect incoming radarenergy, andtheengines were exhausted through awide“platypus’-style duct.Thelatterproved tobea tremendous design hazard formonths, cracking understress, untilGeneralElectric solvedtheproblem.

Theformulas thatOverholser andSchroeder hadincorporated intECHOI weredemanding intheextreme, andrequired thatthe aircraftbebuiltwithexcruciating attentionto detailandto finish. Eventheslightest deviation fromthetightfinishwork—ageardoor

cracked open,afewscrews nottightened flush—and theairplane was suddenly visible ontheradarscreen. Maintenance workers hadtoadd anewconcern totheiralready demanding tasks—having tomake sure thatallaccess plates wereexactly inplace andthattheRAM material

wasnotabraded bya maintenance stand.

Richunderstood verywellthat,despite itsdesignation asa fighter, theF-117A’s mission wastomake a stealthy attack anddrop precision-guided munitions onhard-to-reach targets. Although quite maneuverable, it wasnotgoingto mixit upindogfights, norwasit

goingtoberequired todoclosesupport work.Thisenabled Rich’s teamtomake some compromises onspeed, range, andmaneuverability infavorofstealth characteristics. Itwastypical ofBenRichthathe didnotattempt toforcehisdecisions ontheindividual members of histeam;asaresult, hehasbeencalled “aperfect manager—he was thereforthetoughcalls,andemergencies.”

Unfortunately, Richwashimself suffering from a series ofemergencies. Hiswife,Faye, whohadlongbeenunwell, passed away on

August18,1980.It wasa devastating blowto Rich,whowasableto

sustainhimselfonlybythrowing himselfevenmorerelentlessly into hiswork.

FirstFlight usteighteen months aftertheproduction contract hadbeensigned, BenRichgota significant fifty-fifth birthday present. OnJune18, 1981,Harold “Hal”Farley Jr.tookoffinthenumber oneF-117A.

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Theaircraft flew fairly well, butexhibited directional-stability andcontrolproblems thatledtoa15percent increase inthesizeofthevertical fins.More aircraft wereordered, bringing thetotaltofifty-nine aircraft, fora totalprogram valueofmorethan$4billiontoLockheed. Itwas asweetvictory forRich;hewasnowunquestionably hisownman,in

charge oftheSkunk Works inspiritaswellasinfact. TheF-117As werebuiltatanexcruciatingly slow—tread expensive—rate ofabouteightaircraft peryear(Richtermsthis“building aircraft bytheseason”), withthelastdelivery onJuly12,1990. Notwithstanding theslowrate,theSkunk Works’ discipline wassuchthat agoodlearning curve wasachieved, andprogram profits were excellent. Bytheendof1984,twenty-one Nighthawks hadbeendelivered to theTactical AirCommand. Manythingshappened duringthisperiod, including thetwo

yearsbetween March1984andAugust1986,whenRichwastasked

toserve aspresident oftheLockheed Advanced Aeronautics Company.

Duringhis absence,he wassucceededfor threemonthsbyveteran

DickHeppe (who would retire aspresident oftheLockheed California Company) andthenbyNormNelson. Theironsecurity thathadbeenmaintained during thetestand production oftheF-117A wascontinued through itsoperational deployment. During thissameperiodofextreme security, theSkunk Works wasgrowing insize,reaching 7,500employees, andbeing progressively infiltrated byonebureaucratic functionary afteranother. Organizations thatwouldhavedrivenKelly Johnson to drinkorto murdernowbesetthe SkunkWorks,includingthe Environmental

Protection Agency, theEqual Employment Opportunity Commission,

theOccupational Safety andHealthAdministration andothers. Many

oftheseagencies’ requirements werediametrically opposed totraditionalSkunk Workneeds forsecurity andforspecialized skills. The neteffectoftheseagencies—especially thetonsofpaperwork they required—was tosignificantly change thenature oftheSkunk Works overtime.Thelawofthelandmade itimpossible torunADPasKelly Johnson hadrunit.Thenational importance ofSkunk Works productsdidnotmatter:execution of thebureaucratic regulations did.

Organizational changes would alsoaffect howtheSkunk Works was run,butnomatter whatoutside influence therewas,thereremained, tousetheirownterm,abandofSkunks tocarryonitsmission.

Likethe SR-71A,excellentsecuritywas maintainedon the F-117Astealth fighter. Whenit was finallyrevealedto the public,manypeoplefoundit difficultto believethat the angular aircraft couldreallyfly.

Operational Use hesecurity ontheF-117A wassocomplete thatfewpeople inthe USAF besides theactual operators knew ofitsexistence. Asthefive

full-scale development (FSD)aircraft(nicknamed “Scorpions” bythe groundcrew)beganto entertestduring1981-82,themilitaryunitto

usetheproduction aircraft hadtobeestablished. The4450thTactical Group,underthecommandofColonelJamesS.Allen,movedto an

airfield atTonopah TestRange, aboutthirty-two milessoutheast of thetinyNevada townofTonopah. Training began atonce,andthe

initialoperational capability (IOC)cameonOctober28,1983.The arduous trainingwasconducted entirely atnight,topreserve secrecy.

Theaircraft, contrary toreports, wasnotdifficult tofly—it wasnever called the“Wobblin’ Goblin” byanyone butimaginative reporters. Likeanymodern jetfighter, itwasdemanding, andsowerethenew precision-guided munitions withwhichitwasequipped. Theunitalso hadVoughtA7Daircraftfortrainingandasa security cover.These werelaterreplaced byNorthrop T-38trainers. Newtacticshad to be devised,for the F-117A’smissionwas

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unlikeanyotherin aviationhistory.It wasto beableto fly,alone,

against theheaviest enemy defenses andwithtruesurgical strikes destroy“high-value assets,” thatis,theenemy’s leadership, command andcontrol systems, communication andtransportation centers, and otherkeyelements.

On October5, 1989,the 37thTacticalFighterWing(TFW)

tookoverfromthedeactivated 4450th, withthreesquadrons ofF117As—the 415th,416th,and417th.Thewinglaunched theF117A’s combat debuttwomonths laterinOperation JustCause. Six

F-117sweresentonthemissionthatsoevolved thatonlytwowere requiredtodropbombs,onafield nearthebarracks ofPanamanian

Defense Force troops atRioHato.Thetwocarried outtheirmission, which wasintended to“stun,disorient andconfuse” theopposition, butopponents ofdefense spending seized uponthe“miss” asgrounds tocriticize. Theaircraft wasgivenitsfirstpublicdemonstration at Nellis AirForceBase, Nevada, onApril21,1990—many weredisappointed thatthemultifaceted F-117A didnotlookatalllikethe Testor Corporation’s sleek, smoothly rounded “F-19Stealth Fighter” plastic model, which hadsoldbythethousands.

Owning theNight heNighthawks, astheyhadbecomeknown,nextdemonstrated

theirlegsinanamazing transfer fromTonopah totheKingKhalid AirBase inKhamis Mushayt, Saudi Arabia, inpreparation forcombat against theinvader ofKuwait, Saddam Hussein. Departing onAugust 19,1990, twenty-one Nighthawks (including threespares) ofthe37th had flownfirstto LangleyAirForceBasein Virginia,and eighteen

hadthenmadetheapproximately fifteen-hour flight nonstop toSaudi

Arabia,refuelingfromKC-10tankersseveraltimesen route.They

were reinforced byanother eighteen F-117s onDecember 4.TheSaudi Arabian base(which seemed muchlikethehomebaseatTonopah in terms ofclimate andgeography) wasninehundred nautical miles from Baghdad, which meantthatevery mission would alsorequire atleast threeaerial refuelings. Itdidnotmatter; BenRich’s gamble would pay offamillion timesoverinthepyrotechnic-filled skies overBaghdad. LedbyColonel AltonC.“Al”Whitley Jr.,the37thTFWwrote anewchapterinairwarfare beginning intheearlymorning ofJanuary

17,1991, whenMajor Gregory Feest dropped a laser-guided weapon onanIraqiradarcenter. (Feest haddropped thefirstbombinPanama,

TheF-117Aproveditself for all time in OperationDesertStorm,whereit brokethe back of enemydefensesin the first hours of the war.

aswell.) TheNighthawks weretheonlyaircraft sentoverBaghdad, andtheypenetrated aseemingly impassable flakandmissile barrage

withoutanycasualties, andwithouteventakinganyhits.Thereisno

indication thatIraqiradarevertrackedoneof theF-117As at any

time. Theresults werespectacular, andbroadcast totheworld inalmost realtime.TheF-117As tookonthetoughest jobsfirst,knocking out thirty-seven high-value targets, including theair-defense headquarters withitsheavily redundant air-defense infrastructure. Although the Nighthawks mountedlessthan3 percentofthetotalsortiesflownon

thefirstdayofthewar,theytookoutmorethan30percent ofthe

targets.In 1,271combatsortiesduringforty-three daysofincessant combat,theymade1,669hits on pinpointtargets,includinghigh-

valueassetsliketheOsiraknuclear facility. Theydidtheirtasksowell

thatwithindaystheyhadrunoutofthemoreimportant strategic targets forwhich theyweredesigned, andwereassigned tolesser but stillworthy taskssuchasdestroying bridges orsupply depots. Assophisticated as the aircraftwas,its highlymotivatedmain-

tenance teams keptitsmission-capable ratetojustbelow 86percent, evenbetterthanthepeacetime average of82percent. Saddam Hussein hadexpected theAmerican public tofallvictim

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Thepilots whoflewthe F-117Athrough the dense flak overBaghdadwereamazed that none had sustained damage.Theywerereceivedas heroes whenthey returned to the UnitedStates.

totheVietnam syndrome anddemand therecall ofitstroops. The exultation feltatthetelevised results oftheNighthawk’s bombing extinguished anypossibility ofthis.Whenvictory cameafterfortythreedaysofairaction andonehundred hoursofground combat, the American public decided thatitliked winning warsthisway—cleanly, quickly, withfewU.S.casualties. Theconcept wassoontaken a step further:futurewarsshouldbewonina similarmanner,quickly,with

fewU.S.casualties—and withanamazing corollary: withfewenemy casualties,as well.The onlywayto accomplishthis is withstealth

aircraft andprecision-guided munitions—and inthis,BenRich’s F117A hadshown theway. TheNighthawk’s success incombat wasevenmorepleasing to Richthanhisreceipt oftheCollier Trophy fortheaircraft in1989,

or forthemanyaccolades hehadreceived since.Thefactthatthe

aircraft flewcontinuously without incurring anycasualties waseven moreimportant tohimthanthefactthatit completely fulfilled is promise ofeluding radaranddelivering precision munitions.

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TheRewardforWinning ik mighthavebeenexpected thatthegreatsuccess oftheF-117in theGulfWarmight havegained further orders. TheU.S.Navy was badly inneedofastealth aircraft, itsA-12project having failed, and Lockheed madeproposals foranF-117N navalized version ofthe Nighthawk, buttonoavail. Great Britain expressed aninitial lowlevel ofinterest andthenbacked away. AndeventheUSAF declined further

purchases, citing theexpense ofoperating theF-117 asonereason, the samerationale ithadusedagainst theSR-71. Infact,therealreason underlying therefusal ofbothservices topurchase F-117s wasthatit threatened procurement ofnewsystems, theF/A-18E forthenavy, andLockheed’s ownF-22fortheAirForce.

TheF-22Raptor A! advanced astheF-22Raptorisaerodynamically, itsgreatest im-

portance isastheharbinger ofanentirely newerainwarfare. The overwhelming victory inthePersian GulfWar,withallitsimportance forthevictory inthecoldwar,heralded thisnewage,inwhich control ofinformation—and denial ofinformation totheenemy—is thekey towinning. TheF-22isthefirstproduct oftherevolution incomputingcapability andinonboard electronics. TheRaptor’s incredible combination ofspeed, stealth, andagility gives ita dominance over every fighter intheworld, including thelongtime U.S.standards, the

McDonnell Douglas F-15andtheNorthrop Grumman F-14.(Agility goesbeyondtraditional maneuverability—it speaksto an aircraft’s

ability tomoveaboutitsflightenvelope quickly fromonepointto another, changing themagnitude anddirection ofthevelocity vector intheshortest interval oftime.) Itslethality isimmeasurably enhanced byitsenormous computing power, which willallowit toexchange information atanincredible ratewithsatellite, airborne, andground

stations.

Theprogram thatultimately ledto thistwenty-first-century fighter began in1981, whentherequirement foranAdvance Tactical Fighter (ATF) wasformally identified bytheUSAF. It speaks volumes forcurrent planning andprogramming techniques thattheinitial operational capability willnotbeachieved untilaftertheturnofthe century. TheUSAF wanted tominimize riskbyallowing ample time

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fortechnologies tobeintegrated andproven before being committed toproduction. BenRich’s successor attheSkunk Works, Sherm Mullin, was theLockheed program manager forwhatwastheATF.TheAirForce hadpresented Lockheed andothercompetitors witha newandun-

welcome situation intheATFprogram. TheAirForceaskedthat Lockheed cost-share 50percent ofthedevelopment program’s $1.8 billion projected cost.Kitchen immediately protested thatnocompany couldundertake toinvestalmostabilliondollars inacompetition that it mightlose.Itwasessentially bettingthecompany onthepossibility ofawin.Conversations withGeneral LarrySkantze, thencommand-

ingAirForce Systems Command, revealed thattheAirForce's position wasfirm:development costs hadtobeshared. Kitchen thenproposed teaming withotherfirms, tospread therisk.TheAirForce wasagainst this,forfearitwould diminish competition. Intheend,however, Kitchen’s viewpoint prevailed, andfrom 1986,Mullin ledtheindustry teamcomposed ofLockheed, Boeing, andGeneral Dynamics ina head-to-head competition witha team composed of NorthropandMcDonnell Douglas.Bothcompeting teamsworkedcloselywithPratt&WhitneyandGeneralElectric, who

weresimultaneously conducting acompetition foranengine topower theATF.

Mullin’s teamdefined theATFinrevolutionary terms. Itwas intended tobethedefinitive fighter aircraft intheworldformostof thetwenty-first century. Itwastohave a first-look, first-shoot, firstkillcapability against anyconceivable threat, withatremendous emphasison beyond-visual-range capability. TheAirForceissued stringent low-observable requirements, andthesewereincorporated intothethinking. TheATFwastohavethecapability tocruise at supersonic speeds (“supercruise”) without usingtheafterburner, and

haveextrememaneuverability at high speed.Lockheedselected vectored-thrust engines (inwhichanozzlecanbepointedineitherup ordowndirections todirectthrust),whileNorthropdidnot.

Balancing theserequirements wasnoteasy. Shaping theaircraft forstealth characteristics hasaneffect onpotential speed, range, and

especially, maneuverability. Allsoftware andavionics wereto beextremelyadvanced, andallsystems wereto havehigh-reliability/lowmaintenance characteristics. Somewhat optimistically, theaircraftwas

intended toweigh onlyfiftythousand pounds attakeoff gross weight andhavea flyaway costofonly$35million (in1985dollars). Toachieve thesegoals, Mullin’s teamhadtoassume thatawide

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TheLockheedMartinF-22willbe the primaryfighterof the twentyfirst century.Shownhere is the prototypeLockheedYF-22. Stealthy,but less angularthan the F-117A,the YF-22combines agilityand supersoniccruise capability.

arrayofadvanced technology currently underdevelopment wouldbe

available whenneeded. In1987,theteamdecided thatanextensive redesign wasrequired, andafterthreemonths ofevermoreintensive effort, theconfiguration oftheATFwasfinally decided upon.His teamwould useablended wingandbodydesign withinternal weapons

baysandsufficient internalfuelforlong-duration missions. Thewing

wasa modified diamond shape,whichprovided greatstructural strength andhighfuelvolume. Itslarge areaenhanced maneuverability andreduced bothtakeoff andlanding distances. Thewingwas equipped withfull-chord leading-edge flaps, ailerons, andflaperons. Thelargevertical tails,notall-moving asontheSR-71 andtheF117A, butequipped withlargerudders, werecanted outward, andthe horizontal tailswereallmovable. Theengines hadtwo-dimensional, convergent-divergent exhaust nozzles withpitchaxisthrustvectoring, twentydegreesup or down.Pitch-only thrustvectoring permitted

smaller horizontal tailssaving fourhundred pounds inweight, and facilitated theirdifferential useforhighrollrates. Theuseofcompositesin35percent ofthestructure resulted ina 25percent weight reduction overanall-aluminum aircraft. TheF-22resembles theF-117A mostinitsfrontquadrant, where stealth ismostimportant. Thedesign teamwasabletodepart from thestrictly flatplatephilosophy oftheBlack Jetbecause itnowhad access toaCraycomputer, which couldhandle thethousandfold ad-

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Style Allow Lockheed to Flourish

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425

Theadventof forward-firingheat-seekingmissilesmakesit necessaryfor an air superiorityfighterto havestealth characteristicsand advancedarmament. TheYF-22pointedthe wayfor both.

ditional calculations required todetermine thestealth characteristics ofcurvedsurfaces.

The YF-22facedstiffcompetition fromthe Northrop— McDonnell Douglas team,which produced theYF-23. TheYF-23’s stealth characteristics derived fromthesamephilosophical andmathematical baseastheNorthrop B-2stealth bomber. TheNorthrop— McDonnellDouglasteamchosenot to usethrustvectoring,andthis

mayhavemadetheaircraft slightly lessagilethantheYF-22. Thetest results areclassified, butitisprobable thattheYF-23 wasslightly faster. Asa resultofthetwocompetitions, airframeandengine,theAir

Forceannounced theselection oftheLockheed YF-22/Pratt &WhitneyF119enginecombination asthewinner. TheRaptorhadnotbeen,

strictly speaking, aSkunk Works project, because ofthepotential size oftheproduction program, andtherequirement forsharing informationwiththeotherteammembers.Nonetheless, theSkunkWorks providedmanyof the engineers,the methods,and the spiritthat

moved thecompany toyetanother highpoint. TheLockheed system ofmoving high-potential managers now proved itself again. Sherm Mullin assumed theleadership oftheSkunk

Worksin 1991,whilea relativenewcomer,clearlyon the fasttrack,

andalsoassumed responsibility fortheF-22.

Micky Blackwell caught theeyeofatoughtaskmaster, KenCannestra, attheGeorgia plant.Cannestra likedhimbecause, although a Southerner, hewasnotoneoftheoldguard, whose cronyism had causedhimproblems.Blackwell wasanexcellentengineer,capableof

Nonationin the worldpresentlyhas the capabilityto fielda fighter withthe Raptor’sprowess.

motivating people togetthejobdone.Cannestra brought himalong swiftly, giving himmoreresponsibility, andBlackwell wassoonvice president ofengineering. Therehedida stellar job,revamping the organization, bringing innewblood—a difficult taskatanyorganization—yet building teamwork atthesametime.Hisexpertise wasso evident thatwhenthebudding F-22program gotintosomedifficulties,he wassentto Californiato bring,as Cannestraputsit “more

engineering flair”to theCalifornia organization. Heworkedclosely

withSherm Mullin. Whenthelatterwaspromoted toheadtheSkunk Works (andsubsequently induced tospend twoadditional years there before retiring) Blackwell tookovertheF-22program. Undertheperennially reorganized Lockheed system, Cannestra wasnowserving astheAeronautics Group president andpresident of theGeorgia Company. Cannestra, verymuchinlovewithhisnewlife in Atlantaanddeterminedto retirethere,broughtBlackwell backto

become president oftheGeorgia Company. Hewasthuspositioned wellto assume furtherresponsibilities whentheLockheed Martin merger tookplace.

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Those future responsibilities would include guiding theF-22programthrough themany congressional hurdles toachieve funding, even withalloftheproblems implicit inbringing sucharadical newcombinationofaircraft,engine,andequipmentto productionstatus.Sig-

nificant progress wasrecorded onSeptember 7,1997, whenPaulMetz tookthefirstproduction F-22A intotheairforthefirsttime. ButevenastheF-22program proceeds, theessential taskof winning thecompetition fortheproposed newJointStrike Fighter willhavetobemastered. Similar challenges weretobefoundinevery

aspect ofLockheed’s business, which hadaltered sodramatically for thebetterinjusttwenty yearsthatitwasobvious thatthecompany waspoised atthebeginning ofanewera. Thefollowing chapter willdealwiththefullmeasure ofthat change, charting thecompany’s remarkable rebound from1975to 1995,and,intheprocess, highlighting theamazing diversity ofthe company’s components andtheirproducts.

CHAPTER 13

TheRebound: 1975to 1995

[: 1975,theterm“survival ofthefittest” hadadismaying ringto theleaders ofLockheed, forthecompany washardly fit,having suffered grievous wounds overthepastdozen years. Despite arepeatedlydemonstrated technological mastery, itstillhadtofaceimmense

difficulties in termsof customerrelations,publicperception,andfi-

nances. Theresignation ofincumbent officers offered littlecomfort to shareholders, whose stockfellfromover$13.00 to$3.75a shareon theNewYorkStock Exchange.

Despitedeep-seated problems,themenandwomenofLockheed

persevered, clinging to BobGross’s conceptof familyevenasthey

underwent agonizing changes andreorganizations thataffected almost every employee. Overthenexttwenty years, thenewcompany leaders sailed a variety ofcourses, tacking withthebusiness windsandeven occasionally changing goals. Strategic planning efforts convinced them

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thatLockheed, inaddition toitstraditional strengths inaeronautics anddefense business, should adoptobjectives intheonceforeign fields

of space,systems integration, information systems, andothercom-

mercial systems. Astotally unforeseen events transpired, theseobjectiveswould havetobemodified. Oneconstant factor among thenewleaders wasadetermination toremoldthecompany sothatit remained strongindefense sectors,

butbecame competitive innondefense markets. Thetactics theyused wereatonceconservative anddaring. Theydiversified intonewmarketsandsought tocapitalize onnewdevelopments inadaring manner, butifthings didnotworkout,theyquickly cuttheirlosses andpulled back.Otheraircraft companies hadproved howriskydiversification couldbe,aswithBoeing anditsurbantransportation systems or Grumman withitsprivate planes andcanoes. Butalmost allofLockheed’s newventures wereinhigh-technology fields. By1995,Lockheed hadnotonlysurvived, butconclusively proved itself tobeamong thefittest ofallaerospace companies. Itnow stoodpoised uponthebrinkofnewbusiness undertakings ona scale farbeyond anything eventheirmostadventuresome planners hadever dreamed of.Itisinstructive toreview Lockheed’s adeptchanges over thetwenty-year period inwhich itrevolutionized itsrelative standing intheindustry. It isnocoincidence thatthetwenty years werealso characterized bytheemergence ofmany ofitstopmanagers fromthe ranksoftheLockheed Missiles andSpace Company. Theevents ofthisfruitful two-decade period maybeconveniently aligned intofive-year segments in orderto makethephenomenal growth thataccompanied thechanges incourse moreeasily understood.

1975-1979 espite1975beinga yearoftrialwhose events led,inFebruary 1976,totheresignation ofthechairman, Daniel J. Haughton,

andthevicechairman, A.CarlKotchian, Lockheed nonetheless recordedmorethan$3billioninsalesforthesecondconsecutive year.

The1975earnings werealmost double thoseof1974,butat$45.3 million, stillremained atalow1.5percent ofsales. Additional evidence offinancial stress wasrevealed inthestockholders’ equity, which had fallen tothedangerously lowlevelof$75million, making Lockheed vulnerable toatakeover.

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Theold guardand the new.Fromthe left, old-guardmembersDanielHaughtonand Carl Kotchian,then the newguard:LarryKitchen,RoyAnderson,and RobertB. Ormsby,Jr.

Haughton’s successors inthenewly named Office oftheChief Executive recognized theirdifficulties. These included thequadruple onusoftheforeign-payments scandal, thecontinuing losses stemming fromtheL-1011TriStarprogram,thehugelong-termdebtof more

than$800million, andthealienation ofa principal customer, the UnitedStates AirForce. Asnoted,thenewchairman, Robert W.

Haack,wouldremainwithLockheed onlybriefly, tobesucceeded in early1977byRoyA.Anderson aschairman andchiefexecutive officer.

Lawrence O.Kitchen remained corporate president andchiefoperatingofficer. Thechoice ofAnderson aschairman would beaturning pointforLockheed. Thecompany would beonanewcourse providing thefoundation foritssuccesses overthenexttwentyyears. Anderson’s greatsuccess derived fromhiscredibility bothwithin

TheUnitedStates Navyhas foundthe LockheedS-3Vikingto be extraordinarily adaptable.First flownon January21, 1972, the twin-jetcarrier-basedpatrol plane also does electroniccountermeasureswork.

andwithout thecompany. Hisleadership andknowledge enabled Lockheed toachieve financial survival during thetrouble-filled years ofthelate1960s andthefirsthalfofthe1970s. ItwastrustinAndersonthatledtwomajorbanks,BankofAmerica andBankers Trust,

toprovide Lockheed withthebacking topursue itsstrategic objectives. Despite thevicissitudes oftheprevious decade, Anderson andhis management teamhadmuchtoworkwith.Company loyalty hadkept almost alloftheessential managers andworkers onboardduring the difficult years. Withtheexception oftheL-1011, almost allofthe Lockheed programs wereprofitable, including suchconsistent money-

makers asthe“black” satellite programs, thefleetballistic missiles, the P-3,CP-140, andS-3A antisubmarine-warfare aircraft, andtheC-130 transport. Thefundedbacklog exceeded $4billion, andtherewerenew

programs onthehorizon thatpromised much.Oneofthesepromiseswasillusory—the revitalization oftheTriStar program bythe launchoftheshortened L-1011-500 in 1976.Undertaken onthe strengthofsixfirmordersandanoptionforthreemoreaircraftby

British Airways, itanimated theTriStar program onlybriefly. Incontrast,deliveries oftheunsung butversatile SA-3 Viking hittheirpeak, withfiftyaccepted bythenavyin1975andforty-four in1976. TheViking program forecast thefuture inmany ways. Realizing thatit lacked carrier-based aircraft experience, Lockheed elected to

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 432

teamwiththeLTVCorporation andtheUnivac Federal Systems Division ofSperry Rand, which specialized inantisubmarine-warfare systems. Many moreteamefforts would follow. Lockheed anditspartners wonthecompetition andanorderfor187aircraft. ThefirstViking flewonJanuary 21,1972, withthelastdelivery being made inAugust 1978. Theaircraft wascontinuously updated overtheyears, andprovidedanunexpected bonuswhenitsadvanced electronic suitewas adopted forincorporation intotheP-3aircraft selected byCanada for long-range maritime patrol work. The$697million contract forwhat became theCP-140 Aurora aircraft wasatthetimethelargest single export saleinLockheed history. Eighteen Auroras weredelivered betweenMay1980andMarch1981.

AndersonandKitchen,backedup byVincentN. Marafino,seniorvicepresident,finance,andanotherLMSCalumnus,provedto

besoformidable acombination thattheywere abletopronounce 1977 as“truly ayearofregeneration.” Sales hadexceeded $3billion forthe

fourthconsecutive year,andprofitshadrisento $55million.Longtermdebthadbeenreducedto $417million,andtheU.S.loanguar-

anteewasendedwitha $31million profittothegovernment. One major result oftheimproved situation wasanincrease instockholder equityto$219million. Thesituation wasnotedbytheNewYork Stock Exchange, where Lockheed stockhitanunaccustomed highof justover$19. Thenewmanagement hadnotyetbeenabletoalterthemixof Lockheed’s business significantly. Itremained, asinthepast,heavily dependent upontheU.S.government, fromwhich itderived 62percentofitssales.Salesofaircraft andrelatedservices fordomestic customers—$266 million—had dwindled toonly8percent oftotalsales.

Foreign customers provided 30percent ofLockheed’s business, with $1.03billion insales. Theproduct mixwasalsounchanged. Aircraft andrelated services amounted to58percent ofsales, whilemissiles, electronics, andspaceearned 36percent. Othersources, including shipbuilding, accounted fortheremaining 6percent. Anderson andKitchen bothsawthesituation asachallenge. To capitalize onitsexpertise andtransfer ittonondefense sectors, Lockheedhadtofollow a toughpath,denying dividends tostockholders evenwhileplowing money intoresearch anddevelopment andnew facilities.(Dividendson commonstockwerenot resumeduntilthe

second quarter of1984.) Thistookcourage ofahighorderforthetop management. Theirconfidence wasbased uponthebelief thatLockheed’s strengths weretransferable tootherindustries. Thisphilosophy

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waslaterwellexpressed bythedeanofLockheed engineers, Willis M. Hawkins, whosaid:“Thewealth oftechnology essential tomajor aerospace systems inevitably becomes awarehouse oftalent formany seeminglyunrelated tasks.Arobotresponding tothedelicate motions ofa humanhanddoesnotsuggesta fly-by-wire plane,butthecontrol

technologies areverysimilar.” Inaparallel comment, Hawkins stated, “Searching fordebris inspace andcreating apureatmosphere inwhich toassemble optics fortheHubble Space Telescope mayseemremote

fromthetaskofmonitoring andcorrecting man-made damage toour environment, butthetechnologies matchandtheyareapartofLock-

heed’s talent, historically nurtured bythecompany’s commitment to research anddevelopment.” BothAnderson andKitchen knew intuitively thattherewere vast newfields opening towhich Lockheed couldapply itstalents. Itwas theirtask,alongwiththeirmanagement team,to findthem,evenas

theymastered thenever-routine details ofoperating ahugecompany. EarlyinhistenureAnderson focused onstrategic issues andsetin motion a planning teamtoconsider options fordiversification and growth.However,outstandingdebt,limitedequity,and a common

stockthatdidnotyetreflectitsvaluein themarketplace inhibited

execution oftheirplans. Nonetheless, important strides were made. Thecities ofBurbank, Glendale, andPasadena agreed topayLockheed $51million forthe Hollywood-Burbank Airport, infusing capital andeasing a managementburden. TheTridentmissile wasdeployed on schedule in October 1979,following themostsuccessful development flighttest program inthetwenty-five years ofthefleetballistic missile program. Orderswereon handfor 146Tridentmissiles,and theA-3Polaris

andC-3Poseidon missiles werestillbeing serviced andsupported. TheSpace Systems Division continued togenerate profits on “black” programs ofwhich thepublic, thestockholders, andmostof

Lockheed’s management were(andinmostinstances, stillare)totally unaware.Other,morevisible,spacecontractswerepickedup. The

company washardatworkonSEASAT-A, anocean survey satellite, anditplayed animportant roleinthelaunch oftheViking spacecraft thatlanded onMars, building theshrouds thatprotected thespacecraft during launch. Withinthedepthsoftheocean,Lockheed pursueda contractfor

ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC), anappealing wayofderivingenergy fromocean surface layers heated bythesun.Theheatwas usedto vaporize a working fluidsothata turbine wasdrivento

BEYOND THE HORIZONS

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generate electricity. And,where manhadcontaminated theenvironmentwithanoilspill,Lockheed wasready withits“Clean Sweep” unittoscoop uptheoil.Morethanahundred ofthesedevices were soldtonations allovertheworld. BothOTECandCleanSweep typified LMSC’s initiative todiversify, butbothwereunsuccessful because theydidnotcouple afinancially soundplantothetechnology. HadLockheed captured the worldwide market foraClean Sweep-like device, theworkwould not haveemployed morethanonehundred people. Lockheed management sawthattomaintain stable employment levels atLMSC, itneeded to beinvolved inlarge-scale projects. ThetrioofAnderson, Kitchen, and Marafino began anintensive campaign tomakesuretechnology and finances werematched.

Therewerehundredsofothercontracts,manyforrelatively small

amounts. Some ofthese weredeveloped intolarger projects, some were merely completed andforgotten, andsome clearly indicated directions inwhich Lockheed didnotwishtogo.

Oneofthemostimportant challenges, scientifically, financially, andphilosophically, camewhenLMSC wasselected tobuildtheHub-

bleSpace Telescope, launched bytheSpace Shuttle inorbitmorethan threehundred miles above theearth’s surface. TheHubble would notbetrouble-free, butasitwasdesigned to

beserviced inspace,itstroubles couldbefixedanditscapability en-

hanced.The Hubble’sinitialdifficulties, in whicha tinyflaw(pro-

duced andtested byasubcontractor, Perkin-Elmer) inthedimension ofthelensobscured theoptics, actually addedtothedramaofthe greatadventure, humanizing thegreat43-foot-long space telescope. Looking back14billion light-years wasdifficult fortheaverage layman tocomprehend—astigmatism wasnot.Whencrews fromtheSpace Shuttle conducted therepairs, thehuman-instrument interfaces were rightly heralded asspace triumphs. Lockheed’s willingness to investinresearch facilities oftenpaid

offin a surprisingmanner.A huge(535,000-cubic-foot) cleanroom

hadtobebuiltfortheHubble,sothatparticles downto0.5microns (twenty-millionths ofaninch)couldbeexcluded asitwasassembled

andtested. Oncebuilt,thecleanroom(which wascleaner thanany hospital’s surgery byorders ofmagnitude) hadothercustomers lining uptopaytouseit,turning whathadbeenatoolintoaprofit center. LMSC wasalsodeeply involved intheSpace Telescope’s launch vehicle, foritwasmaking special tilestoshield theSpace Shuttle from theheatofreentry, attherateoffivethousand permonth. Another

The Rebound: 1975 to 1995

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wing. array solar flexible ofa105-foot-long firstwasthecreation space protowas a and blind, venetian likeanunending unfolded Thedevice

typeforsimilar arraystobeusedonthespacestation. constantly Company, andSpace Duringthisperiod,theMissiles enteredthefieldofaeronautics itsbroadbaseof technology, exploiting

vehicle piloted a remotely todevelop waywithacontract inamodest

(RPV)fortheU.S.Army.CalledtheAquila(andlater,TADARS),

ofperforming capable a platform to become theRPVwasintended canceled, wasultimately thecontract Although missions. manytactical to anincreasingly a greatdealthatcouldbeapplied learned LMSC importantfield,thatof “uninhabitedaerialvehicles” (UAV).

hadnotyet which (LEC), Company Electronics TheLockheed forthe contract p roduction large a secured to expectations, performed

todirectgunandmissile controlsystems, weapon Mark86shipboard ships.LECwasneverto surface-combat firingonmanyofthenewest

foravastexasthenucleus massbutserved itsowncritical acquire firm,wasacelectronics first-rate a Associates, S anders when pansion Sanders, bid”for a “take-out proposed quiredin 1986.Lockheed byLoralat thesametime,andthefirm whichwasbeingpursued RoyAnbusiness. expanded ofavastly the core became subsequently its consolidation andoversee thecompany tosurvey wasasked derson intotheLockheed fold. the inthewindshowing werestraws programs varied Allofthese They forLockheed. hadcharted andKitchen thatAnderson direction

themselves prove would newmanagers bywhich werealsothevehicles t hefirm. within ofleadership positions to further advance to ready linestalp roduct usual Lockheed f ront,the On the aeronautic ofthefive-year goingfortheremainder wartskepttheregeneration about36 averaging to sell, continued transports Hercules The period. 1979. the endof by peryear,andalmost1,600hadbeendelivered totheworkaddition wasawelcome ThenewC-5wingmodification stretched C-141B to the C-141s of the all tomodify load.Acontract TheJapawell,asdidtheCP-140contract. proceeded configuration

offorty-five P-3 nesesigned a licensing agreement fortheproduction came USAF The Japan. i n t obe built were f orty-two ofwhich aircraft,

backforanimprovedversionoftheU-2,withcontractsfortwoTR-1A

AeroaircraftfortheNational aircraftandoneER-2earthresources

were moreTR-1As Twenty-four Administration. andSpace nautics synergy of interorganizational In a manner oncontract. laterplaced Loona Precision worked LMSC familiar, increasingly thatbecame cationandStrikeSystem (PLSS) forusewiththeTR-1As.

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Lockheed’sactivitiesextendto manydiverseareas, includingdevelopment and operationof airports.LockheedAirTerminal,Inc.developedthe Trilliumterminal,in Toronto.

Twooftenoverlooked elements of theaeronautic group,the

Lockheed AircraftService(LAS)CompanyandtheLockheed AirTer-

minal(LAT)continued tocontribute tothebottomline.

LAS haditsrootsinthefacilities setupinEngland during World WarII to assemble andmodify aircraft. Established in 1946asa wholly-owned subsidiary to service andmodify Lockheed andother aircraft, LASbegan in 1958toproduce flightdatarecorders, andby 1979hadmanufactured morethanthreethousand ofthemforairline service. Afarmoreimportant portion ofitsbusiness wasconducted in thedeepest secrecy, preparing “black” aircraft modifications forair

forceaircraft, primarily special versions oftheC-130fortheSpecial Forces. It alsomanaged service andmaintenance facilities overseas. TheLockheed AirTerminal supported commercial airlines with

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refueling andservicing attwenty-five airports intheUnited States and abroad. LATandLASwereaugmented in theAerospace Support Group bycontracts withseveral foreign governments, including Saudi Arabia, Greece, Iran,Taiwan, andothers. Saudi Arabia proved tobe an exceptionally valuablecustomer,withLockheedsellingitsC-130s,

thenproviding thetraining andmaintenance necessary fortheirupkeep.Lockheed alsowasa substantial partner intheSaudi Arabian GroundEnvironment Program (GEP),whichencompassed theradar systems usedfordefense andfortrafficcontrol.

TheAgony oftheTriStar espite theseaeronautical successes, theL-1011 stillhunglikean albatross aroundLockheed’s neck.Although it heldonlyslight promise forafuture return, theprogram hadtobecontinued tomeet commitments tocustomers andsuppliers, andbrave statements were made inannual reports andinadvertisements. Itwastrulyaremarkable aircraft,with a veryhighin-servicerate,averagingas highas 98.1

percent reliability. Already atechnology leader, itwasimproved with theaddition ofitsextended wingandactive aileron controls, coupled toa newFlightManagement System. However, evenwhenthings picked up,aswhenthirtyfirmorders werereceived in 1979,other problems intervened. Production costswentupwhenrawmaterials andpartsweredifficult toobtain, andskilled manpower wasscarce. Therelentless annual program losses weredebilitating, ranging from $94million in 1975to $199million in 1979,andtotaling $646 million forthefive-year period. Overthatsameperiod, Lockheed’s netearnings fromallotheroperations werelessthanhalfthat amount—$264.4 million. Timingtheseemingly inevitable production shutdown fortheL-

1011wascrucial, fornotonlywerecustomers withpriced options involved, butalsosuppliers, thebanks, thestockmarket, and,most important ofall,theemployees. Lockheed’s management, particularly

Anderson,Marafino,andDickTaylor,theL-1011programmanager,

continually weighed allofthefactors, looking forawindow ofopportunity whenthelinecouldbeshutdownatthelowest overall cost. During theentireprocess theyhoped invainformeans torevive the program.

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1980-1984 io

sales hadfirstbroken the$1billion levelin1959.Itrequired seven years before theyexceeded $2billion andeightbefore reaching the$3billion markin1974, where theyremained until1978. In1979, the$4billion level wasbreached, andin1980, sales exceeded $5.3billion—33 percent morethantheprevious year.

Thesewereheadynumbers—but profitin 1980haddropped to $28million, lessthanhalfthatof1979,inlargepartduetothe$199 millionlostontheTriStarprogram. A $28millionprofitonmore than$5.3billioninsalesand$2.5billioninassets was,toputitkindly, trivial,andit hadtobeimproved. Despite this,by1980Lockheed wasinanexcellent position, one

marked bytheadvent ofanew,modernized logo,which reflected the hightechnology ofthefuture, linked tothefamiliar winged starofthe past.Thecompany wasthesoleprimecontractor forfleetballistic missiles,for fixed-wingantisubmarine-warfare aircraft,and for all

strategic-airlift aircraft. It dominated intelligence-gathering withthe

SR-71 andU-2series aircraft andwiththelonglineofsurveillance satellites thatweretoosecretfortheirnames oreventheirproject numbers toberevealed. Thusit mighthavebeeneasyforAnderson tobealittle easyon

himself,tomilktheexistingcontractsforprofitsandpayoutdividends

tomakestockholders morecontent. Hechose nottodoso.Instead, heremained committed tofinding newproducts andtoinvesting millionsinresearch anddevelopment, andplantandequipment additions. Theseexpenditures weredifficult to explain to shareholders who wanted dividends paid,andpromptly; itrequired bothtactandcouragetopursue thiscourse. Thesteady adherence tobothRandD expenditures andinvestment innewfacilities would bearfruitoverthe nextfiveyears. ThecourseLockheed followed laidthegroundforimportant futureworkinantiballistic missile defenses withtheHomingOverlay Experiment (HOE)contractfortheArmy,intendedtoseeifincoming

nuclear warheads couldbedestroyed bya “silver bullet” directhit ratherthanbydefensive nuclear warhead explosions. Thissuccessful experiment wascoupled withleading-edge technology inoptics and precision pointing andtracking systems developed inthePaloAlto Research Labs, andenabled Lockheed tobeamajor contractor when

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TheHomingOverlayExperiment demonstratedthe abilityto defendagainstincoming intercontinentalballisticmissiles on June 10, 1984,at the KwajaleinMissileRange.AHOE interceptormissiledestroyedan ICBMlaunchedfromVandenberg AirForceBase,California.

thehighly controversial Strategic Defense Initiative wasannounced by theReagan administration. Lockheed wasalsodealing withenvironmental issues, broadening thescope ofitstechnology toinclude large-scale experiments withsolar energy andinextracting energy andminerals fromtheocean floor. Asa partofthewidetechnological netAnderson andKitchen werecasting, Lockheed enthusiastically embraced thecomputer revolution. Unlike somecompanies, inwhich a management intimidated bytechnology oftenpaidonlylipservice totheadvent ofcomputers, Lockheed management sawtoitthatcomputers wereusedinternally toa maximum degree. It alsocreated theComputer-graphics Augmented Design andManufacturing system (CADAM), which became thefocalpointforallactivities involving development, design, manufacture,and assemblyof products.CADAMwouldbe continually

refined andextended, andwouldbeadopted bycompanies allover theworld. Lockheed alsoemphasized software development foruse internally andforsale.Thesophisticated software forLockheed’s

DIALOG information retrieval system madeitintothelargest on-line systemintheworld.

These twodevelopments inparticular demonstrate thetechnical andfinancial acumen ofLockheed’s topmanagement. Anderson and Kitchen would allow Lockheed toinvestigate suchproduct lines, spend thenecessary money todevelop them,andraisethemtoaprofitable

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status. Andthen,ifitturnedoutthattheselinesnolonger complemented Lockheed’s mainthrust, theywould besold—as CADAM and DIALOG ultimately were. Under Anderson’s leadership Lockheed created multiple product linesthatwerebothcloselyfocusedandhighlyprofitable. Notall

initiatives succeeded, andoverthenextdecade, management showed anevenswifter disposition tocutcostswhenthings werenotgoing

well.

andthenewfrontiers beingexDespite therushofexpansion management wasnotforgotten. Larry plored, theissueofethical foranantisubmarineKitchen relates a storyofa latercompetition Lockheed wasproposing anadvanced version ofthe warfare contract. Orion,calledtheP-7.In thecourseofthenegotiations, Kitchenbe-

cameaware thata Lockheed employee hadcomeintopossession of thecompetitor’s proposal, which contained allthepreliminary details oftheirentry’s performance andpricing. Kitchen immediately called theSecretary oftheNavy, andinaface-to-face meeting toldhimthe

wholestoryandoffered todropoutofthecompetition. TheNavydid

notthinkLockheed’s possession ofthedocument hadcontaminated thecase,andthecompetitor's CEOagreed—and complimented Kitchen onhishonesty. (TheP-7project waslatercanceled whenit became apparent thatitwould betoocostly andnotasufficient ad-

vanceovertheP-3.)

Cutting theGordian Garrote hen the timewasright,Anderson,Kitchen,and Marafinohad

thecourage tobitethebulletontheL-1011. Thiswasanextremely emotional issue,asLockheed hadalways viewed itselfasa prime supplier ofpremier airliners, anditwasdifficult toabandon the field.OnDecember 7,1981, Anderson, withthesupport ofKitchen andMarafino, decided tophase outL-1011 operations. Theirdecision wasbased onthedepressed sales ofwide-body transports ingeneral (a downturn of50percent in1981) andthegloomy projection thatthe L-1011 couldnotbeproduced ataprofitable ratebefore 1986. The company hadbuiltupsufficient equitytoabsorb theonetime loss, andhadreestablished itscreditratingsothatitwould befeasible to borrow, ifnecessary. Thenumber ofworkers laidoffwasreduced by theneedtoprovide continued support andsparepartsforcustomers operating theL-1011.

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Theprogram cancellation inlate1981resulted inanetlossof $289million fortheyear,butwasa genuine epiphany forthecorporation. Freeatlastfromthecontinuing struggle withtheTriStar, thecompany nowclearly sawthewaytothefuturewithnewtechnologies thatwould make itincreasing powerful, withgreater sales and greater profits. Thechange wasdulynotedinthestock market. Those whohadinvested atthe1975lowof$3.75werehappytoseethe market hitahighof$84.25 in1982.Itwasjustthebeginning ofan upward spiral. BothAnderson andMarafino werefinancial experts whose vision andenergy matched thetechnological genius ofthetopLockheed engineers, andwhoseefforts wereequally necessary tothecorporation’s progress. Theymadedecisions thatresultedinlong-term debtbeing reducedevenasshareholder equityrose.TheL-1011losseshadre-

ducedequity to$105million, butit rosesharply thereafter, adding morethanonebillion inequity inthreeyears toreach $1.152 billion by1984.Itwasa stunning fiscal achievement, oneaccompanied by thecarefully planned change inamixofbusiness. Lockheed continually reorganized overtheyears, andthephaseoutoftheTriStar permitted arestructuring ofthecorporation in1981 intofourgroups. Italsosawthefirstyearinwhich aircraft andrelated services werenottheprimary source ofsales bythecompany. In1981, theAircraft andRelated Services Grouphadsalesof$1.9billion,or

thirty-seven percentoftotalsales.TheMissiles,SpaceandElectronics

Group hadmoved totheforefront, withsales of$2.5billion, afortysevenpercent share.TheAerospace Support Groupfellsharply to twelve percent ofsales, with$600million inbusiness, while theShipbuilding andOtherGroup fellto$200million and4percent ofsales. Therewould beotherchanges offocus inthefuture, buttheMissiles, Space andElectronics Groupwouldcompete withtheAeronautics Group toremain intheforefront ofLockheed’s activities.

TheReaganYears ikealldefensecontractors,Lockheedbenefitedfromthehugede-

fense spending oftheearly years oftheReagan administration. The

conversion of theStarLifter fleetto theC-141Bconfiguration was

completed ona$450million contract. Thefirmexperienced considerable satisfaction infixing theC-5A’s wingproblem witha $1.2

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billion modification program thatwasfinished onschedule andproved tobeprofitable. LarryKitchen tookup residency in Washington forseveral months, tocounter Boeing’s effort tosellthemilitary cargo version of the747inplaceoftheC-5B.Helaunched a superlative campaign based onundeniable facts toshow thattheC-5B could serve theUSAF betterthanthemodified 747.Aided byRichard Cook, vicepresident ofLockheed’s Washington office, andbacked upbyastream ofdata fromtheGeorgia Company, Kitchen visited numerous senators and representatives, aswellasDODandUSAF officials. Hetoldaconvincing story,armed withfactual chartsandhandouts, keeping Anderson informed allthewhileofhisprogress andfrustrations. The finalresultwasa $7billioncontractforfiftyaircraft. Theseweredelivered inabrilliant manner, onschedule andunderbudget,providing

ahealing contrast totheturmoil oftheoriginal C-5Acontract. TheC-5Bs areaperfect illustration oftheeffect thatmanagers trainedat theLockheed Missiles andSpaceCompany cameto have uponthe aeronautical sector.KenCannestracameto Lockheed-

Georgia in1983andbecame president in1986. Hewasappalled that aircraft werebeingcompleted withfifteen ortwenty “squawks,” or defects, perairplane. TheGeorgia people triedtoexplain tohimthat airplanes weredifferent thanmissiles, andthatanaverage ofonlyfifteendefects peraircraft wasgoodwork.Cannestra responded thaton a missile, youcouldhaveonlyzerodefects, because oncelaunched, youcouldn’t bringitbackforrepairs. Hetheninsisted thattheGeorgia aircraft goalalsobezerodefects, andpromptly heardhimself being referred toas“thisquackfromCalifornia.”

Hebegan a rigorous process ofquality control called TQIP— TotalQuality Improvement Program—in anattempt tobringaircraft quality control efforts tothelevelofthoserequired forspacecraft. A caseinpointwasthemating ofthetailsection oftheC-5Btothe fuselage. Theboltsthatsecured thetailsection inplacehada large tolerance, anda rangeofshims wereavailable tomakethefit.The concept ofashiminstead ofaprecision fitenraged Cannestra; heshut downtheproduction lineandhadhisengineers examine allthesteps

whereerrorscouldoccur,andwherea “laperror”orcumulative error couldbuildup. Overtheprotestsoftheairforce,theworkforce, and

Burbank, hekeptthelineshutdown forfourteen dayswhile theproblemsweresorted out.Whenthelinewasstarted again, thetailsection would dropintoplace andbebolted inwithnoshims atall. TheTridentII missile,thesixthgenerationofFleetBallistic Mis-

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siles,begandevelopment, andalthoughit encountered problemsinits

initial underwater launches, itproved tobethemostreliable ofallthe fleetballistic missile family. Itsproduction should extend tothenext century, providing asteady inflow offunds. MILSTAR hasbeendiscussed inaprevious chapter, butasecond newlineofbusiness wasanequally remarkable coup.LMSC beatout theincumbent contractor, Rockwell International, tosecure thecontracttomanage allground processing ofthespace shuttle fleetatthe Kennedy SpaceCenterin Florida. Lockheed alsoparticipated inthe

AirForce activation ofVandenberg AirForce Base forshuttle operations.Thespace shuttle ground-processing contracts hadapotential $6billion value, andpositioned Lockheed foranevencloser associationwithNASA.

Twocontracts oflesser dollar value butofimmense technological

importancestemmedfromtheStrategic DefenseInitiative(SDI),Pres-

identReagan’s plantodefend against ICBMattack. (SDI)metwith fierce opposition andwasunfairly andpejoratively termed “Star Wars”

by the media.The DefenseAdvanced Research ProjectsAgency (DARPA)awardedtwocontractsto Lockheedforthedemonstration

ofspace-laser programs. Theintentwastodevelop thetechnologies necessary tomakedirected-energy antiballistic missile defense systems possible. Onecontract wasforTalonGold,anorbital acquisition, pointing, andtracking experiment. Thesecond wasforLODE, a classified ground-based experiment todevelop anddemonstrate beam controlconcepts forlaserweapon systems. Theseprograms, parallelling thetheworkonthearmy’s Homing Overlay Experiment, placed Lockheedattheforefront ofspace weapons technology. (TheHOEwould demonstrateits capabilityon June 10, 1984,whenit trackedand

located anunarmed ballistic missile warhead 100miles above thePacificOcean anddestroyed itwithadirectimpact velocity of20,000 mph.)Andalthough SDIwouldrunintomedia opposition andlegislative trouble, Lockheed learned muchthatwouldassist itinlater contracts. Theadvent ofextremely sophisticated systems posedadifficult problem togovernment agencies thatwereunable topaythesalaries necessary toattractworkers withhigh-level skills. Theresultwasa trendtowardsubcontracting highlyspecialized services to industry,

andLockheed’s diversification efforts were enhanced byproviding such services toboththemilitary andNASA. And,despite apprehensions aboutthedifficulty oftransferring research, development, production, andmanagerial methods learned undergovernment contracts to

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private industry, Lockheed found thatintherealm ofhightechnology, itcould provide services notobtainable elsewhere tocommercial companies. Asanexample, theMichigan BellandNewYorkTelephone companies entered intocontracts withLockheed foraudioresponse equipment.

Earningsreached$344millionin 1984,the third consecutive

record since theTriStar hadbeenstopped. Anderson waspleased with therecordearnings andsales.Earnings benefited bythedecrease in

interest expense asdebtdeclined andinterest ratesdecreased. They alsofeltconfident thatLockheed’s currentascendancy inspacewould

bemaintained, forthecompany hadtheedgeoverallcompetitors in fourvitalareas: thermal andattitude control, datamanagement, communications,and tracking.

TheMarineSystems Groupcontinued to supplyconventional

Island, shipswithhigh-technology features suchastheUSSWhidbey anewLSD-41 class ofamphibious support ship,butwasalsobreaking newground investigating small waterplane-area twin-hull (SWATH) andversatile, ableto ships. TheSWATH shipswereextremely stable perform asferries, cutters, oroceanographic/hydrographic research ves-

sels.TheSWATH configuration wouldemerge againin theSea Shadow, a stealthtechnology vehicle.

wasa veryadvanced vessel,sponsored by The SeaShadow

LMSC approached itsdesign andconstruction asitdidmisDARPA. andtheshipwasbuiltfaster andatlower cost,and silesandsatellites, witha muchsmaller crew.Inconventional shipcouldbeoperated aframe isbuilt,andequipment isjammed intoit.Withthe building,

LMSCphilosophy, theshipisdesigned fromthemission pointofview

andtheship’s shellismolded toaccommodate therequired equipment. Thestealthy SeaShadow worked well, butitapparently presented theNavywithsomeinstitutional problems andwasrejected. Araki maintains thattheSeaShadow construction philosophy andtechniques

couldbeusedtoadvantage throughout theNavy’s construction program. WhenDARPA studied theconstruction ofthenewarsenal ship, theSeaShadow wasusedasaparadigm. A neworganization, LockheedCorporationInternational,was

formed toseeknewmarkets forestablished products abroad andto explore newproduct opportunities. And,building ontheextensive efforts madeinthepast,Lockheed increased itsinvestment innew plants andequipment andinresearch anddevelopment tothelevel of $900million ayear.Theprevious investments intheseareas hadper-

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ThestealthySea Shadowwasnot onlya dramaticnewshapefor Navyships, but featuredradicalnewtechniquesin constructionand in operation.Hereit emergesfromthe secret housingin the HughesMiningBarge.

mittedthedevelopment ofopportunities incomputer systems and software forboththemilitary andcivilmarkets. Atthesametime,the

entiremanagement teamengaged ina massive efforttolowercosts throughout thecorporation. Lockheed leadership wasdetermined to growbig—but notfat. Asasadpostscript tothisperiod, thecompany wasrocked bya stunning losswhenMr.andMrs.Courtlandt Grossweresavagely murdered onJuly15,1982. Theirhousekeeper wasalsokilled inwhat appeared tobeaninterrupted burglary. Gross hadbeenLockheed’s chairman from1961to1967,andremained amember oftheboard until1977. Hehadfostered thegrowth ofthecompany, andwaswell

likedandrespected byhisfellowLockheedians.

1985-1989 R” Anderson’s career atLockheed paralleled theblossoming ofthe spaceage.HejoinedLockheed inOctober 1956,a yearbefore Sputnik. Overthenexttwenty-nine years, hewould contribute hisall tothefirm,andseeitssalesgrowfrom$742million tomorethan $9.5billion. Afterretiring inDecember 1985,aftera nine-year term

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RoyAndersonwasone of the most widelyadmiredLockheed executives.Hisfriendlymanner, and his abilityto orchestrate large companyefforts,madehim the linchpinof Lockheed’s spectacularrecovery.

aschairman andCEO,hewould remain ontheboardthrough 1990, andthenbecome chairman, emeritus. Hestillprovides insight and information tothefirm.

Beyond these successes, Anderson’s years ofleadership andservice

aschairmanseta courseand confirmed a cultureforLockheedthat

served asanunderlying basis forLockheed thatstilllives on.Hisability to identify leaders, hisopenness andaccessibility, hispatience and

willingess to listen,hisforesightandvisionto seethevalueandpotentialinLockheed’s assets—employees, technologies, andproducts— andhisunwavering dedicationcreateda newLockheed,onethat its

founders would havebeenproudof.Anderson wastherightmanat

therighttime,andin Marafino’s words,“hewasa rolemodelfor

many, enormously capable andcredible, andwithawitandpersonality thatareunmatched. Hewaseveryone’s friend.”

Kitchensucceeded Andersonaschairmanoftheboardandchief

executive officer, whileRobertA.Fuhrman, oneofLockheed’s stal-

warts,wasdesignated presidentandchiefoperatingofficer.Fuhrman, a technicalgenius,hadbeenKitchen’s mentoratGeorgia,andthetwo menworkedwelltogether. Kitchen,whohadbeenpresidentfortenyears,startedhisthree-

yeartermaschairman andCEOatahappy time;1985wasthefourth consecutive yearthatLockheed hadreported record earnings, withnet earnings up17percent, to$401million. Alessdriven executive might

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LarryKitchenservedas both presidentand chairmanof Lockheed,and wasinstrumental in creatingsomeof the most importantdealsin the company’shistory.

havebeensatisfied withthestatusquo,forLockheed hadnofewer than250space-related contracts, including thosefortheimportant MILSTAR andshuttle processing programs. Moremature programs

suchastheTridentII, theSpaceTelescope, andtheC-5Bweregoing

well,andunderwraps wasthehighly classified venture, theF-117A stealth fighter. ButKitchen wasnotinclined toaccept theexpenditure ofalmost $3billioninresearch, development, andfacility fundstoruninplace;

hewasinterested inexotic fields thatincluded space surveillance, militarycommunication satellites, advanced defense electronic systems, largespace-astronomy platforms, andadvanced missile technology.

Thesewerebeingvigorously pursued bytheMissiles andSpaceGroup andtheElectronic SystemGroup.Theaeronautic sidewasnotne-

glected, withemerging programs thatincluded theadvanced tactical fighter, tactical airlift aircraft, reconnaissance planes, andtheaerospace plane, which intimewould receive thecatchy butinappropriate label of“theOrientExpress.” Theaerospace planewasintended toflyin space liketheshuttle, butcarryitsfuelinternally, andtakeoffand landfromconventional runways.Itwastoogreata reachforLockheed,

butespecially fortheCongress, andwasultimately canceled. Allofthese programs would becharacterized byuncertainty, long leadtimes, andhighdevelopment costs. Inthefollowing years, anew

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anddisturbing element wouldemerge thatwouldmakeLockheed morecautious inaccepting defense contracts. TheDepartment ofDefense, sensing theinevitable decline inappropriations, began toask contractors to “cost-share” development contracts. Theywerealso asked toabsorb otheraddedrisks, andatthesametimewererefused theopportunity togaincommensurate rewards. Inessence, thegovernment toldcontractors, “Ifyouareserious aboutgetting business, youwillhavetoinvest indevelopment programs, eventhough your costs willnever berecovered ifyouarenotselected asthecompetition winner.” Liketheill-fated TotalPackage Procurement concept, the ostensible purpose wasto“cutthefat”fromcontracts. Therealresult wastocutmargins, sometimes tothevanishing point.Theprocess wassobering, onethatledcontractors toteamwherever possible, even thoughteaming carried implicit hazards ofcoordination andofsharing

proprietary information. During August 1986Lockheed Corporate headquarters moved fromtherathersmall andcrowded building atBurbank tonewquartersatCalabasas, California. Hawkinsremembers, withsomeglee,that

anunheralded advantage ofthismovewasthattheCalifornia Com-

panywasnowseparated bymanymiles fromcorporate headquarters, andCALAC presidents could nowrunthecompany without corporate talentsurging through theswinging doorsto“help.” TheairforcechoseLockheed asoneofthetwocompanies to compete inthefirstphaseoftheadvanced tactical fighter(ATF), which

intimewould become theF-22.TheATFwasanexample ofthefruit bornefromsignificant R&Dspending inprevious years. Sherman Mullin, whowould laterheadtheSkunk Works, wasincharge ofthe

ATFprogram,andwoulddo an incrediblejobin thefaceofextreme

challenges andextraordinary competition. Mullin wassupported by thebeloved BenRichattheSkunk Works andbyversatile DickHeppe oftheLockheed California Company. Aspreviously noted,James “Micky”Blackwell wouldsharehonorswithMullininwinningthe F-22competition.

InAugust, Lockheed augmented itsElectronics Group withthe acquisition ofSanders Associates, a NewHampshire firmthatwas expert intheelectronic countermeasures usedbyallfourarmed services,andincomputer graphics. Sanders hadprovided equipment installed intheViking antisubmarine-warfare aircraft, andanexcellent working relationship haddeveloped. PartofSanders’s appeal wasits management’s uncompromising attitude toward technical excellence andleadership. Theprimary reason fortheacquisition, however, was

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theperception thatthedefense electronics market wasgrowing ata faster ratethanthedefense budget itself. Lockheed’s strategy embraced payloads aswellasplatforms, andthisacquisition wasa significant

stepforward. Inaddition, Sanders’s CalComp division manufactured computers, plotters, digitizers, andgraphic display terminals, andthus fitneatlyintoLockheed’s rapidlyexpanding information system pro-

grams. Larry Kitchen called RoyAnderson backfromretirement totransitionSanders intoLockheed, andafterfivemonths ValPeline was selected aspresident ofSanders andLockheed Electronics Company. Eventually Peline merged theexisting Lockheed Electronics Company intoSanders. Hethrew himself intohisusual hectic routine, andalong withtheSanders team,madeitintoaprofitable andsuccessful acquisition,onewhichmovedLockheedinto thevitaldefenseelectronics

marketplace. Lockheed hadcomea longwayfromthedayswhenit

wasmerely a provider ofplatforms; it hadembraced theelectronics industry withbotharmsandwould move toexpand itsmarket share. Still,notalldevelopment efforts ledtoimmediate success, sometimesfortechnical andsometimes forpolitical reasons. Thesuccess withtheHoming Overlay Experiment hadresulted ina$493million contract fortheSDIprogram tovalidate thetechnology fortheERIS (Exoatmospheric Reentry vehicle Interceptor Subsystem). ERIS,although providing animmense amount ofknowledge, would ultimately havetobeputonholdastheSDIprogram itself wasdismantled. In anothercontractorteamingeffort,Lockheed wastheprimecontractor,

withHughes, IBM,andHoneywell asassociates, tobuilda Boost Surveillance andTracking System(BSTS). Thesystem wastodetect a ballistic missile attackbydetecting thelaunchofenemyvehicles.

ANewEraBegins L arryKitchen stepped downin 1988,afterserving tenyearsaspres-

identandchiefoperating officer andthreeaschairman andchief executive officer. During theseyears, Lockheed hadbeenreinvented, changing fromacompany dominated byaeronautical systems toone dominated byspace,missiles, defense electronics, andcomputer activities.Hewassucceeded byDanielM.Tellepaschairman andchief

executive. BobFuhrman became vicechairman andchiefoperating officer, whileVinceMarafino wasnamed vicechairman andchief financial andadministrative officer. AsLockheed grew,thefinancial

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considerations inlargecontracts became almost ascomplex astheengineering aspects, andMarafino’s rolebecame increasingly important. Kitchen wentoutwithabang, forthelastyearofhisstewardship wasthebesttodateinthecompany’s history, withnetearnings of $624million, including nearly $200million fromthesaleofassets, and$10.4billion insales. Theshareholders’ equity, ascanty $75millionin1975, hadrisentojustunder$2.5billion. Butthereweremajorproblems brewing. Thefixed-price developmentcontractforthe P-7antisubmarine-warfare aircraftwasin

trouble, andahostile suitorbegan accumulating largeblocks ofLockheedstock. Thenewchairman, Tellep, hada quiet,reserved persona that beliedhis innerfire;he wasdeterminedto makeLockheedthe best

company in theindustry. Agraduate oftheUniversity ofCalifornia

atBerkeley, heearned hisbachelor’s andmaster’s degrees inmechanicalengineering in1954and1955,respectively. Hebegan hiscareer atLockheed in1955asaprincipal scientist fortheveryproductive X17missile reentry flightexperiments, aremarkably responsible position fora twenty-four-year-old newcomer. Beingonthecuttingedgeof

missile reentry systems, a newdiscipline thatwasjustcoming into enormous demand bytheDepartment ofDefense, stoodhimingood stead, andhewasquickly promoted tomanage otherprograms dealing withthisfieldofexpertise. Heworked onFleetBallistic Missile programs forovertwenty years, learning muchaboutprogram managementfromthetypically strongleadership oftheMissile Systems Division. Herosetotheposition ofvicepresident ofLMSC’s Advanced System Division in1975, became president ofLMSC in1984, andwasnamedpresident oftheMissiles andSpaceSystems Groupin 1986.

Hisachievements atLMSC clearly forecast hisfuture success as chairman. Inhisfirstyearaspresident ofLMSC in 1984,salesincreased byalmost $700million to$3.4billion, representing 41percent ofLockheed’s totalsales. InhislastfullyearasheadofLMSC, sales hadincreased to$4.6billion. Perhaps moreimportant, hebrought newkinds ofbusiness toLMSC, including thecritical C?I(Command, Control, Communications andIntelligence) programs inwhich, unbeknownst toanybutthemostprescient, thefuture ofwarfare lay. Tellepsoonputhisownimprintaschairman onLockheed by

introducing ageneral restructuring inApril1989,onethattookinto

account anexpected 2to5percent annualdecline indefense spending.

Tellep’s appraisal ofthebusiness balance showed thatinthefu-

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ture,atleast50percent ofsales would comefromspace andmissiles, 30percent fromcommercial andforeign salesandonly20percent fromaeronautical systems. Fourmajoraircraft production programs,

includingtheC-5,TR-1,F-117andP3,hadbeenphasedout.Lock-

heed’sairplane business wasindifficulty andpresented asevere chal-

lenge. Thenewstructure called foraMissiles andSpace Systems Group

(MSSG),an Aeronautical SystemsGroup(ASG),an ElectronicSystemsGroup(ESG),andatotallynewdivision,theTechnology Services

Group(TSG).Eachwouldbegivena newroleinthecorporation. Inanunusual departure fromLockheed’s strongtradition ofpro-

moting onlylongtime company personnel whenever possible, Tellep andtheboardofdirectors selected a relative newcomer, JohnN.Mc-

Mahon, tobecome group president ofMissiles andSpace Systems and president oftheLockheed Missiles andSpace Company. McMahon hadenjoyed abrilliantcareer withtheCentral Intelligence Agency, where, in 1982,hewasappointed byPresident Reagan tobecome deputy director. IntheCIA,hehadofteninterfaced withLockheed products, mostnotably theU-2andtheCORONA project. (Aspreviously noted,he escorted GaryPowers duringtheclandestine exchange fortheSoviet agentAbel.) Ina recent interview, hestated thathehadalways beendetermined nottoenterindustry afterhis retirement fromtheCIA,butrathertoestablish a firmofhisown. Despite thewealth oftalent within LMSC, Tellep hadbeenimpressed byMcMahon overtheyears, andpersuaded himtojoinLockheed in 1986asvicepresident, plansandprograms, attheMissiles andSpace Systems Group.McMahon’s persona istotally unlikethestandard image ofaCIAexecutive; openandcourteous, withagreatsense of humor, hehasanavuncular quality whichmasked hishard-driving management style. TheAeronautical Systems Group, headed since1988byKen Cannestra, wasrealigned tocreatetheLockheed Aeronautical Systems Group.Relocatedto Marietta,Georgia,fromBurbank,it consistedof

theLockheed Aeronautical Systems Company inMarietta, theLockheedAdvanced Development Company (akatheSkunk Works) in Palmdale, andtheLockheed Aircraft Services Company inOntario, California.

ThenewTechnical Services Group, headed byDonald C.Jones, wasa majormove outside thebounds ofprevious Lockheed business experience. Joneshadbeena strong leader, andcontinued todemonstrate hisprowess. MorethanhalfofTSG’s workwasforNASA,

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 452

John McMahon,longan importantfigurein CIA operations,becamean effective and popularleaderat LMSC.

whichrepeatedly recognized Lockheed’s efficiency in spaceshuttle processing withformal awards, including thecoveted andrarely given NASA Excellence Award. Thespace shuttle processing contract and therefurbishment ofVandenberg AirForceBaseto supportTitan IV/Centaur launches constituted thebulkofTSG’seffort,butenvi-

ronmental remedial programs weretargeted tothetuneofcontracts valued at$5billion overthenextseveral years. InToronto, TSGled asLockheed became anequity partner andoperator oftheworld’s first privatized airport terminal, theLester B.Pearson International Airport. Because itwasevident thatnewaircraft startswouldbebothfewer

innumber andseparated bylonger intervals, adecision wasmadeto increase Lockheed’s investment incommercial aircraft modification andrepaircenters. Anewfacility wasbuiltinTucson, Arizona, to maintain oldercommercial aircraft suchastheBoeing 707and727. (Forsomeairline business diehards, therewasa bitterironyinLockheed’s opening a repairfacility forBoeing aircraft.). Another such facility,similarin scopeandpurpose,wouldbeopenedthefollowing

yearatNorton AirForce Base, inSanBernardino, California, torepair 747s.These excursions intothefieldofairliner repair proved tobeill timedwhena downturn incommercial airline operations tookplace, andbothoperations wereultimately phased out.

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ValPeline ledtheElectronic Systems Group, which wasengaged inthemostrapidly changing competitive market thatLockheed faced. Peline hadbeena majorfigure inLockheed’s cost-cutting program,

reducinghisworkforceby33 percentandelectingto concentrate resourcesin a fewmajorareas,particularlyadvancedavionics.ESG

wasparticularly important intheF-22competition. Itprovided the radarandmissile warning capabilities, thecockpit control display systems, mission planning andautomated testequipment—in essence the electronic heartofthefighter’s combat capabilities. Astheseneworganizations weretaking shape, thecombined corporate sales declined in1989to$9.9billion, andnetrevenues melted awayto a mere$2million.Thereweremanyreasons, butthemost

important werewrite-offs thathadtobetakenonfixed-price programs—the baneofadefense contractor. Thetightpricing originally negotiated proved disastrous whenthebusiness basedeclined and higher production costs wereencountered. TheAeronautical Systems Grouphadtoabsorb a $300million write-off ontheill-starred P-7 antisubmarine-warfare aircraft program. Atthesametime,theadvanced tactical fighter competition demanded acontinued highlevel ofinvestment. Inanefforttocutcosts, Tellep madeoneofthemostdifficult, psychologically demanding decisions ofhiscareer whenheauthorized themovement ofoperations fromBurbank tothemoreefficient facilities builtfortheL-1011 atPalmdale, aswellasthose atRyeCanyon, California, andMarietta, Georgia. News ofthisdecision reverberated likethunder through thecompany—Lockheed leaving Burbank was likeGeneral Motors leaving Detroit. Manywerehorrified thatthe greattradition ofimmortal aircraft flying firstfromBurbank runways would cometoanend.Itwasaterribly emotional issue atevery level, andanenormous amount ofattention hadtobepaidtoworker concernsaboutthemove.

Tellepwent personallyto the Burbank,Palmdale,and Rye

Canyon facilities toexplain thepainful logicofthedecision tothe employees. Inonehugehangar hemetwithsome twothousand workers,theirmoodranging between sadness andanger. Tellep’s natural distress wasrelieved onlyslightly when,afteroneofhistalks,afew employees approached himandsaidtheyunderstood thatsomething hadtobedone. Financially, itwasaneasydecision tomake. Therewasnoproduction going onatBurbank, where Lockheed owned thefacilities and

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 454

Despitehis quiet demeanor, DanielM.Tellepprovedhimself to be a fighterwhenit became necessaryto defendLockheed against an unfriendlytakeover attempt.As chairmanof the board,Tellepused an expert team to lead Lockheedto its peakin the industry.

hadtoundertake theirincreasingly costly maintenance. Incontrast, two-thirds ofthefacility inMarietta wasowned bythegovernment andonlyleased byLockheed, greatly easing maintenance costs. KenCannestra ofLockheed Aeronautical Systems Company originated theideaofmoving aircraft production toGeorgia, andsold Tellep ontheconcept. Herecalls thatmanyprotested themove, but abouteighthundred employees transferred, andfortunately, almost all ofthemfellinlovewiththeAtlanta area.Cannestra, leanandfit, proved tobeexactly whatLockheed-Georgia needed tomove itfrom thedaysofHaughton’s autocracy toaplantcapable ofmanufacturing themostadvanced fighter intheworld.

1990-1995 Toe reticence belied hisstrong control ofthecompany overthe seven years ofhistenure aschairman, aperiod thatsawtheendof theColdWar,withallitsadverse consequences fordefense business. Lockheed hadtotransition itsspaceactivities fromaColdWarstatus

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inwhich itmonitored existing treaties andverified national capabilities toa situation inwhichspace hada primary valueingathering and controlling information. President BushandSecretary ofDefense

Richard Cheneymadeanalmostimmediate cutof$50billionindefensespending. FirstJohnMcMahon andthenSamArakiledLock-

heed’s response atLMSC, cutting backproportionately morethanthe defense cuts,andreinventing LMSC tocompete forcivilian business. Aswillbeshown, thisincluded moving aggressively totheIridium satellitesystem,remotesensing,and commercial arrangements with

firms intheformer Soviet Union, including thepreviously mentioned relationship withKhrunichev andEnergia.

Baptismof Fire E 1990, Tellep hadtoendure whathetermed his“baptism offire,” thefirstoftwoattempts atahostile takeover byaTexas investor. In theprocess, Tellep tradedhisreserve fora heroic gunfighter image, readyto shootit outat theboardofdirectors corral.Heralliedthe

employees andtheshareholders tofightsharp, no-holds-barred battles against amantheyregarded asapredator. Thewealthy Dallasinvestor, billionaire HaroldC.Simmons, op-

eratedunderthenameofhiscompany,NL Industries,whichowned

lessthan19percent ofLockheed stock.Simmons hada reputation bothasaraider andasamanwhose tactics couldrevitalize moribund companies. Lockheed assumed thathisintention wastoacquire control andthenterminate thecompany’s pension plan,usingtheresulting $1.5billionsurplusto reducethecostof acquisition.Thisof course

struck attheheartoftheLockheed family, andTellep, Marafino, and therestofLockheed’s topmanagement weredetermined toprevent

Simmons’s takingcontrol. Itwasnoteasy.Simmons maintained initially thathewasjustan

interestedinvestor.Intime,hisaidesletit beknownthathisintentwas

toretainLockheed’s corebusinesses andselloffallnondefense ventures,thusreversing thestrategy thatTellep waspursuing. Inearly 1990,Simmons struck.Hesoughtoutdisgruntled investors, fileda

lawsuit,anddemandedsixseatson theLockheedboard.He begana

proxy fight,saying thatheintended tofilehisownslateoffifteen directors fortheLockheed board. Some institutional investors wavered, andforatimeitlooked asifhemight win.ButTellep traveled across thecountry incessantly torallyinvestors tohisside.Vince Marafino,

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 456

thefinancial architect ofsomanyofLockheed’s major decisions, and theboard ofdirectors worked ceaselessly withTellep, asdidLockheed’s newvicepresident ofinvestor relations, WaltSkowronski. Oneoftheir major gambits wasthecreation ofanemployee stockownership plan thathadtheeffect ofmaking atakeover lessattractive. Tellep, Marafino, andtheentire management teamhadgenuine concerns thatSimmons mightsucceed intaking overLockheed, and apolling firmshowed thatthevotemightbeprecariously close. Fora number ofmonths themanagement worked seven daysaweek, dividingtimebetween running thecompany andfighting theproxy battle. Lockheed’s boardofdirectors wasdeeply involved, andspecial meetingsandtelephone conferences keptitsmembers apprised ofdevelopments onaweekly basis.

To cut downon the timeSimmonshadto solicitvotes,Tellep

advanced thedateoftheannual stockholders’ meeting byfiveweeks, toMarch 29,1990. Heasked Anderson andKitchen tohelpkeepthe employees informed. Whentheresults ofthevoting wereofficially announced atthesubsequent April16meeting, Tellepandhisboard

hadwon aclear victory, withSimmons getting lessthan37percent ofthevote. Simmons washurt,forhehadbought inatahighprice. Ayear later,hebegan thetakeover process again, thistimedemanding three seatson Lockheed’s boardof directors.(Somemaintainedthat his

actions werenotsomucha genuine takeover attempt astheywerea ploytobolster Lockheed’s stockprices sothathecould bailoutwithouttoogreata loss.)Hehadclearly underestimated theLockheed

management, whichwasnowbattle-hardened andinthefighttowin. Agenuinecrusader inthecauseoftheLockheed family, Tellepwas

certain thatSimmons intended tolootthepension fundandwould probably selloffthecompany inpieces. Toprevent Simmons’s gaining control, hehadprepared well,leading acorporation-wide cost-cutting exercise. Hepareddowntheworkforce from82,500to73,000,and

transferred expensive California worktoGeorgia. Sales weremaintained atjustunder$10billion andnetearnings were$335million. WallStreetgauged thefutureforLockheed andfoundit positive, sendingthestockup9 pointsto topoutat 41bythetimeofthe annualstockholders’ meeting.

ItwastoomuchforSimmons, whoendedhisproxyfightby selling 12million ofhis12.5million shares, andtaking a $42million loss.Thiswasa timewhenoneissue—the potential takeover ofLockheed—touched allemployees. Thesense offamily mentioned earlier

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wasneverstronger, andduringthetwoyearsofproxybattles, one could sense apalpable cohesiveness throughout thecorporation. With theexception ofahandful ofemployees, noonewanted toloseLockheedtoaTexasraider. ThevictorywassweetforTellepandhisteam.Hehadbeen

responsible formany highly successful programs, andhehadguided a majorcompany togreatsuccesses, butthesewerelesspersonal triumphs. ThefightwithSimmons hadreached himata visceral level, andhehadenjoyedthebrutallyhardbutexhilarating challenge of outhinking andoutworking hisformidable opponent.

ThetoughtwoyearsoftheSimmons fighthadbeenoffset by other,veryproductive developments. Lockheed’s tradition offunding research anddevelopment combined withanaggressive sales andmat-

ketingprogram to wincontractaftercontract. In 1990,production programs werecomplemented bynolessthan625customer-funded

R & D contracts, witha totalvalueof$3.8billion. TheStrategic Defense Initiative’s BoostSurveillance andTracking System, which wasstillinthecompetitive stage,hadevolved intotheAirForce’s

Advanced WarningSystem(AWS),latercalledSBIRS,whichhada

potential valueof$7billionovertwentyyears.Anentiresuiteofna-

tionalsecurity space programs hadevolved, ledbytheMILSTAR satelliteprogram, which offered somuchpromise forthefuture interms ofbothscienceandeconomics, andwhichwouldleadto a latercom-

mercial venture.

Eachprogramwasstillchargedwithdrama,andnonemoreso

thanERIS, whichoffered promise ofanantiballistic missile defense. ERIS intercepted adummy ICBM warhead onitsfirstflight, anevent described asa “bullethittinga bullet.”

Andasnewprograms cameintobeing, oldprograms flourished. Incredibly, given theshorttimeinwhich ithadbeenconceived and thepressures underwhich ithadbeenborn,thefleetballistic missile program celebrated itsthirty-fifth anniversary bycontinuing tobea smashing success. Thecreation ofthePolaris system anditssubsequent

deployment hasbeencalled a miracle oftechnical andmanagement judgment bythegovernment, underWilliam F.Raborn andLevering Smith, andbyLockheed, ledbyBurriss, Fuhrman, andHawkins. The otherballistic missile systems liveduptothePolaris example, andthe Navyhappilymadethemaximum incentive awardsforthesehighly

classified programs. Inotherareas, theintegration ofSanders wasgoing well, andthat company wasproviding anadvanced electronic suiteforLockheed’s

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single mostimportant future project, theF-22,which hadapotential of$30billion insales overthenexttwenty years. And,likethefable ofthesaltmillandthesea,the“black” programs continued togenerate revenue inanendless stream. Therewerehugeachievements andnewcontracts onthecivil side,aswell.OnApril25,1990,theHubble Space Telescope was deployed atlonglastfromtheSpace Shuttle Discoverer. Although difficulties wereencountered withthePerkin-Elmer mirror, NASA considered Lockheed’s worksoefficient thatitawarded 97percent ofthe

maximum feepossible. Contracts werereceived forworkonSpace Station Freedom, andthefirststudies wereundertaken onNASA’s proposed “Mission toPlanet EarthProgram” andonthe“Space Exploration Initiative,” thelattercalling formannedbasesonthemoon andMarsbytheyear2020.Largecontracts werealsowonforcom-

puterintegration workinthenondefense government sector. Theyear1991hada tripledistinction: thefinalvictory over

Simmons, winningtheF-22competition againsta verytoughcompetitor,andthemagnificent showing madebyLockheed products duringthe GulfWar.Theintelligence-gathering, meteorological, and

communications satellites to whichLockheed hadcontributed so muchwerenotonlyindispensable, theyforecast thefuture. Themost compelling television broadcasts inhistory showed howthebombing ofBaghdad hadbeenspearheaded byindividual flightsofLockheed F-117As, weaving theirwaythrougha seemingly impenetrable hailof

fire.Less visible, butequally important, werethecontributions ofthe C-5s,C-141s, andC-130s. NolessthanninetypesofLockheed aircraftoperated inthetheater, including U-2s,TR-1As, SA-3s, Italian

AirForceF-104s,andRoyalAirForceL-1011tankers.Onewould

liketothinkthattheGross brothers, Kelly Johnson, andalltheother Lockheed greats whohadtakentheirlastflight werelooking down on thisremarkable andsatisfying showing. OnceSimmons’s secondtakeover attemptwassquelched, Tellep explored otherpossibilities forexpansion.

A GallfromFortWorth hedissolution oftheSovietUnionhada traumatic psychological

effect uponthedefense industry thatexceeded theactual financial effects ofthereductions indefense spending. Companies thathad alreadyexperienced somedifficulties, or didnotfeeltheyhadthe

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resources todevelop newproduct lines,elected toleave theindustry, turning theirresources toothertasks. Onesuchcompany wasGeneral Dynamics, thenheaded byformerApolloastronaut William Anders.Thefirm’shistorywentback

to1923, whenReuben Fleetformed Consolidated Aircraft Corporation.AWorld WarIImerger withVultee Aircraft ledtotheformation ofConsolidated Vultee(Convair), whichin 1953became oneoffive

divisions oftheGeneral Dynamics Corporation. Theboard ofGeneral Dynamics gave approval toAnders’s stated intentofincreasing thevalue ofthecompany’s stock. Heaccomplished thetaskinvirtuoso manner, inpartbydoingessentially whatanoutsideraider mighthavedone:ruthlessly breaking upthecompany and selling itscomponents. Traditionalists decried thepassing ofanother

greataviation name,butAnders wassimplyreading thewritingonthe

Department ofDefense wall. Cannestra remembers a callfromGordon England, whowas managing General Dynamic’s FortWorthoperation, where theF-16 fighter wasbuilt.England flewintoGeorgia inhisownairplane and proposed thatLockheed purchase theGeneral Dynamics operation. Cannestra called a grouptogether toanalyze thesituation. Hefound itpromising andrecommended toTellep thatthedealbemade. Thechairmaninitiallyhadsomereservations. In thenottoo

distant past,hehadseriously contemplated selling offLockheed’s aero-

nauticinterests togenerate cashandmoreclosely focusthecompany’s

business. Now,theF-22program wascoming along, andhewasconcerned thatthemanagement inGeorgia mightbestretched toothin. Ontheotherhand,General Dynamics wasalready apartner intheF22team,andthepurchase would giveLockheed atwo-thirds interest intheprogram. Cannestra hadnotedthatGD’smanagerial andproduction methods wereverymuchlikeLockheed’s, whichmitigated concern aboutintegrating thetwoworkforces. Tellep soonsawthattheF-16program was,inhisterms, a“good franchise,” inthattherewereanexcellent product, anongoing production line,somesixhundred backorders fortheaircraft, and,most important, therequirement toservice andmaintain thethousands of F-16salready inthefield. Thedecision marked Lockheed’s returnto apremier position inthefighter market, withtheF-16,F-117A, and F-22initsportfolio. Cannestra hasremarked thatwithin sixmonths, theFortWorthDivision wasoperating asifithadalways beenapart ofLockheed. Theacquisition ofGeneral Dynamics’ tactical military aircraft business atFortWorth, concluded onFebruary 28,1993, for

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 460

Thedeclinein defensespending dictatedthat somefirmsmerge. LockheedacquiredGeneral Dynamic’sfighterinterests at Fort Worth,includingthe fabled F-16 Fighting Falcon.

$1.52billion, alsoinfluenced Tellep’s thinking. Thedefense industry

wasshrinking, butasit didso,moremanufacturers werebailingout.

IfLockheed wentagainst thetrend,andinstead sought toexpand within theindustry, itcould verywellsucceed andbecome oneofthe few—but powerful—survivors. TheFortWorth Division raised Lockheed’s totalsalestoabout$13billion, andraisedtheformerly declining aeronautical corebusiness toa robust$6.5billion.

Expanding Interests—and Improving withUse | Peveae growth insizewasinfactexceeded byitsgrowth in

capability. Thecorporation hadreacheda criticalmassinwhich thecomponent companies complemented oneanother’s strengths in almosteveryprogram. Everytechnology, evensomething asexoticas

stealth, improves withuse.Lockheed’s experience wasnowsobroadbasedthatitcouldbidwithconfidence uponvirtually anysophisticatedcontract, military orcivil,and,evenmoreimportant, create

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products forwhich therewasasyetnoknown demand. Asacasein point,a Lockheed scientific teamattheLockheed Research Laboratories inPaloAltocreated anintegrated robotic X-ray inspection systemforuseontheF-22production line.Theteamwasabletodoso onlybecause Lockheed hadwithinitsowninternal system thecapabilityto integrate therequired optics,computer software, chargecoupledsemiconductor devices, robotics, material sciences, and artificial intelligence.

Theyear1993proved thevalidity ofLockheed’s basicstrategy, withsalesof$13.1billion anda record profitof$844million from programs, withnetearnings of$422million. Themixofbusiness had changed again,toa ratioof64percent U.S.defense contracts, 23 percent nondefense, and13percent foreign military. Themostimportant commercial development wasprogress ontheIRIDIUM venturewithMotorola toplace sixty-six commercial satellites inorbit.

Positioned byStrategy fa

ae hadmoved fromnear-bankruptcy intheearly1970s toa position ofgenuine strength. Acombination ofproven products

(suchastheC-130,theTridentII,andtheMILSTAR satellite) was

complemented byfuturesources ofincome liketheF-22andcommercial telecommunications. Inthetwenty-year journey, extensive ex-

periments hadbeenmade indiversified industries, butinthelongrun, defense andcivilgovernment contracts proved tobethecompany’s strongsuit.

Tellep recalls thathewasoftenasked byemployees ifmanagementhad astrategicplan,andhewould shock thembyresponding, “No.”Hewouldthengoontoexplain thatLockheed didnotdevelop aonce-a-year, five-hundred-page strategic plan;instead, strategic plan-

ninghadtobedoneonadailyorweekly basisbecause oftherapid anddramatic changes taking place intheindustry. Hethenfine-tuned atraditional Lockheed five-point strategy thathereferred toasa“guide star”orpoints onacompass. While theconcepts behind thefive-point strategy were verycomplex,bothontechnical andfinancial grounds, theywereexpressed as follows: 1. Focuson corebusiness—this wasthetechnicalandfinancial

engine ofthecorporation.

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2. Maintain premiertechnology—by whichLockheed wasdis-

tinguished fromitscompetitors. 3.Enterrelated newmarkets todevelop amorebalanced business base. 4. Capitalize onacquisitions thatenhance Lockheed’s technical

andfinancialstrength.

5.Reduce costs/improve competitiveness—always animperative. Of thesefivepoints,number4, “capitalize on acquisitions that

enhance Lockheed’s technical andfinancial strength,” would soonas-

sumeanimportance thatovershadowed allothers.In 1994,DanTellepwouldbegincrafting theagreements thatledfirstto “themerger

ofequals” withMartin Marietta, andsubsequently tofurther acquisitions. Italsosetanindustry pattern thatisstillbeing played out. Topursue the“merger ofequals” wasa difficult decision for Tellep andMarafino. Itmeanttheendofanera,andthebeginning ofanewLockheed asLockheed Martin.Itwouldrequire theblending

together oftwocultures andtwoworkforces intoone.Itwouldbe difficult, because ofsizealone,to maintainthesenseoffamilyand

comradeship thatwasa Lockheed tradition. And,whilemuchhasbeenwritten abouttheLockheed Martin merger andcredithasbeengiven tomanyformasterminding it,the factremains thatthemerger wasinitiated byLockheed andDanTellep.Itwastheproduct ofanevolving strategic planthatrecognized existing market realities andexpectations. Revolutionary consolidation wasnecessary toensure preservation ofcritical defense assets andto insure thegrowth andprosperity forLockheed shareholders andemployees.

TheDevilIs in the Details Eotheveryearlystages ofthemerger planning, Tellep hadoutlined theprobability oftheconsolidation ofLockheed andMartin Marietta’s fourspace operations intotwo.Vance D.Coffman’s taskwasto conduct thedetailed studies andtheplanning. Inmanyways, amerger isjustanother formofprogram management: therearemilestones toachieve, eachwitha measurable financial consequence. Butwhereas a program isoftenemotionally

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neutral, theprospective merger wasnot.Although thetopmanagementwanted toeasethepainatevery level, themerger would result infactories being closed, people losing jobs,andfamilies being forced tomove.It wasnotaneasytask. Coffman, whohadbeenhandpicked byFritzOderandthen

selected forthecorporate office byTellep, knew themeaning ofhard work: hisfirstjob—at theageofeight—was plowing anIowa cornfield fortwenty-five centsanhour.Afterpicking upabachelor ofscience degree inaeronautical engineering fromIowaStateUniversity, heenteredinto somehardballnegotiations withLockheed’s recruiting teams.Coffman wasattracted toLockheed because it hada graduate

studyprogram atStanford. Lockheed wasinterested inCoffman because ofhisgrades andreputation, buthadapolicy thatstudents in theStanford graduate studyprogram hadtoputintwoyears ofwork first.Aftera numberofinterviews, Coffmanlaiddownhisultimatum:

eitherheentered thegraduate studyprogram immediately, orhewas going elsewhere. Lockheed finally acceded tohisrequest, andhespent thenextsixandone-half years working nearly full-time forthecompany,whilepicking upmaster’s anddoctoral degrees inaeronautics andastronautics atStanford. Thesuperheated pacecharacterized hisprogress atLMSC, where hewasquickly recognized asboth a brilliant engineer andatalented manager—a combination ofskillssorareintheindustry thatswift promotion wasassured. Coffman’s detail-oriented personality wasperfect forhissystems manager rolein“black” satellite programs. Hiscoworkers foundhim tobeeasy todealwith,andinanindustry thatwasbased onclandestine andsometimes cloak-and-dagger activities, theylikedhisguileless, diThesewouldstandhimin problems. tomanagement rectapproach goodsteadintheturbulent years ahead, whenhewastasked tostagemanage someofthemostimportant aspects oftheLockheed Martin

merger.

CHAPTER 14

TheMergerofEquals

3 ockheed officials regarded theendoftheColdWarwithmixed

feelings. Theyweredelighted thattheircompany haddoneso muchtowinthebloodless victoryovertheSovietUnion,butrecog-

nizedthatthefalloftheBerlin Wallalsosymbolized thefallofthe market structure uponwhich theveryexistence ofLockheed hadbeen based. Lockheed wasnotalone, ofcourse. Theentiredefense industry wasnowinanapparently irreversible decline. Inconstant dollars (i.e., discounting forinflation) thedefense budget wasdownabouttwothirdsfromits 1980s peak.In termsofdefense spending asa percentage ofgross national product, thebudgets werebelow pre-World WarIIlevels. Themassive decline leftbehind theremnants ofthe massive military buildup ofthecoldwar.Therewasa huge,closely

The Merger of Equals

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465

interrelated infrastructure ofthemostmodernfacilities, staffedbythe

of Theefforts in history. workforce andskilled trained mosthighly ofthe thelimits beyond technology hadpushed thepastfourdecades layman’s imagination; since theendofWorld WarII,humankind had even l eaving beyond, gone f ar had machines and its gonetothemoon, had beeping butintimidating repetitive Sputnik’s thesolarsystem. usedforintelligence ofsatellites system foranintricate beenthegenesis satEntire and navigation. communications, meteorology, gathering, the use,monitoring to environmental werededicated ellitesystems eventwenty inawaythatwasinconceivable andtheoceans atmosphere asagriculture; asbasic some benefited, Many sciences before. years insteadof the massivemutualdestructionso longfeared,the Cold

thelotof meanstoimprove genuine generated Warhadinadvertently

people theworld over. Thechallenge tothedefense industry nowwastomake decisions andconthattheColdWarhadspawned thecapabilities onretaining topreimperative absolute w as a n T here use. themtocivilian verting on c oming were forcompetitors leadership, U.S.technological serve subsidized heavily were Many ofthese andAsia. inbothEurope strong that price a dvantage t hem a gave o ften which bytheirgovernments, couldbeovercome onlybysuperior performance andservice. In conference withtheirtopexecutives, DanTellepandVince wouldmakeoneor moreachaddecidedthatLockheed Marafino

a more andhelpcreate linesofbusiness, existing tobolster quisitions forthesakeof Theydidnotwishtogrowsimply portfolio. balanced DyofGeneral wantedtoavoidtheexample size,andtheycertainly

might Suchaprocess selloffpartsofthecompany. andsimply namics hada managers intheshortterm,butLockheed shareholders benefit c ustomers. to their well as as e mployees totheir ofloyalty sense strong ofexpansion byapolicy benefit would Overthelongterm,everyone poswhenever industry to thedefense alternatives thatalsoexplored

survival feltthatthepathto ultimate sible.Tellepandhisassociates player principal bea would whereLockheed wastoattaina position

theindustry. whoelsehadtoleave matter contracts—no indefense there with LMSC, u p had grown who leaders o f the many For almost hadseemed LMSC ofchange. sense poignant wasaparticularly wascaught buteventually cutsinitially, budget to postwar immune generasuccessive six producing and A fter developing upinthetide. to therewastobenofollow-on systems, missile tionsoffleetballistic satellites inbuilding theirverysuccess Inspace, system. theD5Trident

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 466

withincreased reliability andlongevity meantthattheoncerobust classified space business would shrink, andhave littleprospect offuture growth. Lockheed devised a setofcriteria todetermine ifacompany was desirable foracquisition. Thecriteria included acompatible managementstyle,complementary products, goodprospects forthefuture, and,notleast,awillingness tobeacquired. AfterthebitterSimmons experience, Lockheed didnotintend toembark upon a hostile takeover ofitsown. Theworkwasdoneinsecret, involving members ofsenior management andwiththehelpofMorgan Stanley &Company asadvisers.

Eventually, nolessthantwentythree-ring binders werecreated, dossiersona largenumberoffirms,someofwhichwereassessed much moreintensely thanothers. Adiscouraging patternhademerged. Most

companies didnotmeetthecriteria, anddiscrete inquiries oftwothat didweredisappointing. Ofthetwocompanies thatmatched Lockheed’s criteria foracquisition, Hughes wasthepreferred candidate because ofitscomplementary classified space business, itsgrowing position incommercial telecommunication satellites, anditsexcellent technology. Themanagement atLMSC, including bothJohnMcMahon andSamAraki, expressed astrong preference fordoingbusiness withHughes. Tellep called MikeArmstrong, CEOatHughes, andsuggested thattheyexplore ways inwhich theymightputtheirtwospace busi-

nessestogether.Fromtheoutset,Lockheedrealizedthatit wouldbe

impossible toacquire allofHughes because ofthesizeoftheenterprise anditsvalueinthemarketplace. Inaddition, theirstockhadbegun toadvance inpricebecause ofpositive news aboutDirecTV, itsdirect broadcast television venture. Aftermonths ofstudy, inwhich every conceivable means ofengagement wasconsidered, fromjointventure tosimple teaming arrangements, it seemed evidentthattherewasnoviablewaytodefine

a relationship. Tellep latercommented thatitwas“likelooking ata shinynewcarina showroom, wanting it intensely, andultimately realizing thatdespitethedesire,youwerenotgoingtobeabletoget

it.

Tellepthentriedtointerest JoeGorman, theCEOofTRW. Gorman simply didnotwishtodobusiness, anddidnotevencommunicate Lockheed’s interest inTRWtohiscolleagues untilafterthe announcement oftheLockheed-Martin Marietta merger. Itwasdis-

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andto manyatTRW,forLockheed-TRW to Lockheed appointing

combination. havebeenanoutstanding would March19, onSaturday, session Attheendofoneall-morning 1994,Tellepindicatedthatalthoughit hadbeena goodmeeting,no

ended hadbeenmade.Whenthemeeting towarda decision progress andmostof thestaffhad lefttheroom,the twomen inconclusively,

if theycould asked andJonAyers, JimStyne Stanley, fromMorgan liketotry saidtheywould Thebankers andMarafino. seejustTellep Marietta. withMartin ofequals a freshidea:amerger in 1993ina joint M withMartin arietta hadworked Lockheed ofLTV, businesses andaerostructures themissiles effortto acquire the M arietta Martin a nd side aircraft in the i nterested being Lockheed t hey had t hat found ofthetwocompanies side.Themanagers missile apthefactthatbothhada disciplined including a lotin common, ofmualargemeasure established Theexercise proachtoacquisition.

tualtrust. thatthe out,butit wasobvious TheLTVdealhadnotworked andTellepgotalongwellwith twocorporatecultureswerecompatible,

CEO.Theshiftin Lockheed’s MartinMarietta’s NormAugustine, Tellep madeallthedifference. to “merge” from“acquire” mind-set madein “Thisis a marriage bysaying, histhoughts summarized Tellep d iscussion, abrief be. A fter t o prove andsoit would heaven,” andtherewasa good werecompatible, thatthecultures commented it Overall, o f competition. areas afew only with o fproducts, match f or had, companies thatboth r ecognized Tellep interesting. sounded butdisciplined proactive bothbeing paths, time,beenonparallel some intheirsearch foracquisitions. wasnotin,but Augustine upthephoneandcalled. Hepicked for andasked interest back.Whenhedid,heexpressed sooncalled timetodiscuss itwithafewkeyadvisers. andnoted Monday backagainthefollowing called Augustine withitskeymanagers a meeting wasplanning Marietta thatMartin bring thatTellep suggested Augustine inthenearfuture. inPhoenix comb e kept w ould which thematter, todiscuss a teamto Phoenix pletely secret asamatter ofcourse. onMarheavily leaned Tellep thesedevelopments, Throughout VinceMarafinohadfora long afino’sadvice,ashad hispredecessors.

distinction theunique having roleatLockheed, a pivotal timeplayed underthree (CFO) officer chieffinancial asthecompany’s ofserving Marafino Anderson, With Tellep. and Kitchen, Anderson, chairmen:

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 468

helped steerthecompany through thestresses oftheL-1011 program andwasinstrumental inthedecision toterminate theeffort. During Kitchen’s three-year tenure aschairman, Marafino helped pulloffthe acquisition ofSanders, greatly enhancing theelectronics capability of thecorporation. WithTellep, Marafino’s finalyearswiththecompany continued to involve high-stakes issues, including theproxybattles against Simmons, theacquisition ofGeneral Dynamics’ fighter division,andnow,themerger withMartin Marietta. Witheachchairman, Marafino served inafarbroader capacity thanimplied byhistitle.His financial skillsearned himthereputation ofbeingoneofthefinest CFOsintheindustry. Inaddition, hisability tothinkstrategically and toseetheorganization fromallvantage points made himaninvaluable

addition to theexecutive suite.Seenbysomeasatough-minded manager,thosewhoworked withhimclosely cametoknowhimasa person

totally dedicated tothebestinterest ofthecompany andpossessed of adelightful sense ofhumor.

Martin Marietta le

potential partnerin themerger hadanequally long, distinguished history. Founded in 1912byGlenn L.Martin, who haddesigned, built,andflownhisownaircraft threeyearsbefore at theageoftwenty-three, thefirmhadfollowed a pattern ofmeeting changing business needsbychanging itscorporate status,justasthe

eatlyLockheed (Loughead) Aircraft Manufacturing Company had done.Aircraft weredesigned andbuiltonthebasis ofthelatestavailableinformation andwereflown atairshows. AlsoliketheLockheed

brothers, Glennhadaneyefortalent.Overtheyearssomeofthemost famous namesinaviation wouldgettheirstartwithMartin,including

suchstellar figures asCharles Day,Charles Willard, LarryBell,Eric Springer, James“Dutch” Kindleberger, Donald Douglas, andJames McDonnell, tonamebutafew. There hadbeenremarkable similarities inthetwocompanies over theyears. Bothhadmajorfailures inthecommercial aircraft market before leaving thearena; bothhadbeensuccessful inmissiles andspace efforts; bothhadattempted diversification andachieved mixed results; bothhadtobattlehostile takeover attempts; andbothpursued acquisitionsvigorously. In 1993,Martin Marietta hadsales of$9.4billion, anegotiated backlog of$16.7billion, andnetincome of$450.3 million, andem-

The Merger of Equals

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469

Whenfurther mergerswere seen to be necessary,Lockheedturned to MartinMarietta,a firm foundedby GlennL. Martin.

ployed94,000people. Thecorresponding figures forLockheed forthe

same yearwereasfollows: sales, $13billion; negotiated backlog, $28.9 billion; netincome, $422million; andemployees, 83,500.

TheMergerIs On O ncethemerger hadbeenagreed uponinprinciple, anintense series ofnegotiations inthedeepest secrecy wasnecessary tobringthe

dealoff.VinceMarafino recallsthatduringthelong,hardweeksin

which allofthemyriad details necessary foramerger ofsuchamagnitude wereworked out,therewasonlyoneinstance whentherewas

overtdoubtaboutitsbeingexecuted. Thisoccurred duringabriefing

byTellep ofabouttwenty ofthetopmanagers atLockheed, when Val Peline voiced hisdoubts aboutthewisdom ofthemerger. Hewashis usualarticulate selfandmadehispoints well.Ithappened thatTellep andMarafino werecalled awayfromthediscussion foranhourto meetwithNASA administrator Daniel Goldin. Before leaving theGoldinmeeting, Tellep asked thegrouptoprepare atop-level summary ofthepositives aswellasthenegatives withtheintentofestablishing agroupconsensus ofwhether ornottoproceed. Theycamebackin aboutan hour,andTelleppolledthe

BEYOND THE HORIZONS

= 470

managers toseehowtheyfeltaboutthemerger. Tohissurprise, they wereunanimously forit—even Peline hadbeenwonover.Fromthat pointon,theissue wasnever indoubt.

TheTwenty-first-Century Corporation ik soondeveloped thatiftheLockheed—Martin Marietta merger was

notmadeinheaven, itwascertainly madeinWallStreet,forevery-

thingthatcouldhaveposeda majorproblem wasresolved withan almost preternatural ease. Thedesirability ofthemerger fromabusinessstandpoint became immediately apparent, foralthough thetwo firmscompeted insomeareas,theirproductlineswereforthemost partcomplementary, andbothfirmshadactivities indefense andnondefenseareas.Eventhelaunchvehiclefield,whereit seemedthatthe

newLockheed venture withtheProton launcher mightcompete with theTitan,wasnotanissue—the product linesmeshed smoothly.

Inshort,themerger provided a single, stronger entitywithwhich tocompete forinternational business. Atthesametime,itwasevident

thattherewerelarge savings tobemadeinreduction ofoverhead, the consolidation ofefforts fromseveral plants toasmaller number, and, inevitably, a reduction inthetotalnumber intheworkforce. The personnel cutbacks wouldbethemostdifficult todealwith,forthey involved thehumanequation,andwoulddemandthefinestinhuman-

relation skills.

Othersocial factors—those thatstemmed fromindividual egos orcorporate amour propre—were resolved moreeasily. Lockheed had already considered moving itsheadquarters totheEastCoast, where themajority ofitsbusiness wasgenerated, sogeneral location wasnot anissue. Toensure thatthemerger wasperceived asoneofequals, it wasinitially decided thata newbuilding would befoundsothatboth companies would moveintoatotally newenvironment. Intimethe Lockheedboardobjectedto the expenseof a newbuilding;Martin

Marietta already owneditshandsome headquarters inBethesda, Mary-

land,soacompromise wasmade. Lockheed’s corporate staffwould in factmoveintotheMartin Marietta headquarters building, butallof Martin Marietta’s people would move outoftheirpresent offices and newoffices would beassigned tothenewcombined management team. Theideawastomakeeveryone feelthatitwasa new—and equal— beginning. Whatcould havebeenamajor problem—who would bethefirst

The Merger of Equals

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chairman andchiefexecutive officer ofthefirm—was resolved inan equally painless manner. Tellep wassenior toAugustine byfouryears, andhadalready beencontemplating retirement. Anagreement was

madethatTellepwouldbechairman andCEOforthefirstyearof themerger,thenretirefirstasCEOanda yearlateraschairman.

Augustine washappy withthisarrangement, andwould surprise everyonein1997, whenheannounced hisownpending retirement. Marafino, whowasplanning toretirewithinayear,indicated nointerest intaking a permanent position inthenewcompany. Theverynameofthecompany couldhavebeenanissue. Itwas decided tousethealphabet asthekey,andtodropMarietta fromthe merged company’s name. Thealternative “Martin Lockheed” didnot ringabell,andasoneinvestment banker participating inthenegoti-

ationsnoted,it wouldultimately comedownto “MartyLockheed,” whichsounded likesomething outofahighschoolyearbook.

Anintensive studywasmadetogettherightlogo.Historically,

bothcompanies hadused a starintheirrespective logos,althoughboth

logos hadchanged overtheyears. Theproposed logothatgained consensus managed tocapture thenewcompany perfectly, withtwovectorsjoinedtocreatea futuristic imagesuggesting a star.

Bothcompanies hadagreed thatevery effort should bemadeto conclude themerger arrangements within a year,andthattheoperationshould workseamlessly andeffortlessly onthefirstdaythenew company beganbusiness. Theyrecognized thatthenewcompany would besolarge thatneither company’s previous organizational structurewould serve. Theydecided togroupactivities intofoursectors:

Aeronautics, Electronics, Information& TechnologyServices,and Space& Strategic Missiles. Later,a fifth,Energy&Environment, was

added. These sectors would belocated intheBethesda headquarters. Itwasagreed thattheLockheed Martin corporate headquarters would beneither aholding company noranoperating company. Instead, its

topmanagers wouldstayclosely involved witheachsector,andwould

seetoitthateachsector leader hadwhatwastermed a“dualvision,” bywhich hewould seektomaximize hisefforts forbothhisindividual sector andthecorporation asawhole.

A newtwenty-four-person boardof directors wasestablished, withrepresentation divided evenly between MartinMarietta andLock-

heed.Board committees werecreated tohandle suchmatters asethics, compensation, andfinance. Again, themembers ofeachcommittee cameinaboutequalnumbers fromeachfirm. Equalattention waspaidtotheorganization andleadership of

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 472

thecorporate staffandeachofthesectors. Selection ofthekeymanagement positions wasmadebyTellep, Augustine, andtheirkeyadvisers. Thegoalwastodivide leadership positions between thetwo companies onafifty-fifty basis. Whena decision wasmadeastowho would leadastafffunction oraparticular unit,thatperson wastasked togetwithhisopposite number fromtheothercompany anddecide onstructure andstaffing. Asitworked out,thedivision ofleadership positions andkeystaffing worked outalmostexactly fifty-fifty.

Thepersonalities ofthetwochiefexecutives played apartinthe progress ofthemerger. Tellep wasfromahands-on operating background, andwasveryinterested inevery detail, especially those dealing withintegration andconsolidation. Though Augustine wasinvolved in numerous outsideactivities andcommitted to a heavyspeaking schedule, heparticipated incriticaldecisions. Thepairbecame good

friends andworked effectively together insomething ofaMr.Inside andMr.Outside relationship. Theypresented anauthentic, collegial relationship to theorganization andcontinually stressed thatthe merger wasoneofequalpartners. Thefactthatthemanagement suc-

cession planhadbeenannounced inadvance defused potential tensions andprovided a stabilizing influence inatimeofmonumental change. Anexecutive council wasformed consisting ofTellep, hiscounterpartatMartinMarietta, Norman R.Augustine, Marafino, Tom Young, andMarcus C.Bennett. Decisions weremade astowhowould leadeachofthefoursectors. These wereperhaps themosthotlycontested positions, foritwasfromtheirranksthatthefuture corporate leaders would come. Thedivision came nearly evenly, asthefollowing werenamed president andchiefoperating officers oftheirrespective sectors: AERONAUTICS: JamesA.“Micky”Blackwell (Lockheed) ELECTRONICS: ThomasA.Corcoran(MartinMarietta) INFORMATION & TECHNOLOGY SERVICES: PeterB.Teets (MartinMarietta)

SPACE & STRATEGIC MISSILES: VanceD.Coffman (Lockheed)

Whenthepersonnel decks hadbeencleared away, amyriad of details remained. Theserelated tosuchmundane issues asoperating policies, theconformance ofthetwoseparate accounting andcomputer systems, thecombination ofpersonnel/benefits, andallsuchsimilar

The Merger of Equals

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473

mechanisms ofasophisticated firm.Inaddition, dozens ofothertask forces wereformed toaddress specific integration issues. Eachofthe sector presidents wascharged withthetaskofpreparing consolidation andcostreduction plansfortheirsector.

AnAnalysis oftheMerger r, 1992,TellepandAugustine hadattended a meeting inthePen-

tagonatwhichtheywerebriefed bymembers ofthesecretary of

defense’s staff.Thethrustofthebriefing wasthenecessary downsizing

ofthedefense industry. Charts were produced toindicate thatalthough therewerefivemanufacturers oftactical aircraft, futuredefense budgets

would support onlytwo.Inthespace launch vehicle business, there werethreecompetitors; again, thefuture would support onlytwo.Of thefivemanufacturers ofspacecraft, onlytwocouldbesupported in thefuture. Itwasanominous briefing, onethatindicated twoalternatives: leavetheindustry ormergetogetalargershareofthedimin-

ishedpie.These considerations wereweighed heavily bybothTellep andAugustine.

ATripleCrownWinner a

leaders weresubsequently careful toemphasize thattheirnew venture wastobea“merger ofequals,” atermtheydefined as“a strategic combination oftwosimilarly sized, usually complementary business entities.” It wasestablished earlyandoftenthatbothcom-

panies conceded eachother’s possession of“premier technology,” a termthatdescribes theircapability to operate in thevanguard of science,undertakingthe most demandingtasksof defense,space exploration, andadvancedelectronics.

Bothweremajorplayers inthedefense market, witheachcom-

panyhaving justover60percent ofitssales totheDOD.Curiously, thetwocompanies’ mostcomplementary skills were inareas thatcould beexploited forthenondefense market—these included information systems, energy programs, government services, environmental pro-

grams,andthecommercial sideofbothspaceandelectronics. Given

theanticipated continued decline indefense spending, thiswasofvital importance.

Bothcompanies hadexperienced theagonies ofattempted hostile

BEYOND THE HORIZONS

= 474

NormanR. Augustineand Daniel M.Telleporchestrated the mergerof two industry giants, Lockheedand MartinMarietta, into the formidableLockheed MartinCorporation.Tellep describedthe ‘“‘merger of equals” as “‘amarriagemadein heaven.”

takeovers, andbothweredetermined tomakethemerger aspainless andaspositive aspossible. Thefinancial strength ofthenewcompany wasbothobvious and immense. Initially, thecombined saleswereexpected toexceed $23 billion andthecombined backlog toexceed $43billion. Thetotal assets ofLockheed Martin exceeded $17billion, while theshareholders’equity hadreached $6.4billion. Aclose analysis ofthetwoorganizations indicated thatcurrent Lockheed shareholders should receive 1.63shares ofstockinLockheed Martin foreachshareofLockheed stock,whileMartinMarietta shareholders wouldgetshares inthenew

company ona one-for-one basis. There weretwoadditional important financial factors tothedeal:noadditional debtwasrequired, andthe merger would beaccounted forasapooling ofinterests. Inthepressconference announcing themerger, Tellepmade threepoints.ThefirstofthesewasthatbothLockheed andMartin

Marietta hadachieved comparable positions ofleadership intheirindustry. Thesecond wasthatthemerger would leadtomorevalue to theshareholders, thecustomers, andtheemployees (aphenomenon thatAugustine referredto as“theTripleCrown”).Thethirdwasthat

The Merger of Equals

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withitshighly diversified advance technology, Lockheed Martin would beverycompetitive intheglobal marketplace. WallStreet accepted themerger withenthusiasm. Onannouncement,Lockheedstockincreasedfrom$66 to $78.75a share,a 19

percent increase. MartinMarietta stockincreased 5 percent, from $48.25 to$50.875. Theindustry wasstunned bythesheer audacity ofthemerger— whocouldmanage suchagiant? And,asmightbeexpected, alarms weresounded abouttheeffect upondefense procurement andonthe possibility ofantitrust problems. TheDefense Department hadinfact invited industry consolidation, andlooked upontheLockheed Martin merger withsomesatisfaction. Lockheed hadgiven anexample ofthe possibilities ofimproving performance underdefense contracts onthe F-16program. In 1987,underGeneral Dynamic’s management, 280

F-16shadrolledofftheassembly line.By1994,thedemand forF16shadreduced production toonly50peryear,lessthan20percent oftheprevious rate.YettheLockheed teamhadadoptednewmanufacturingtechniques,includingthe LeanManufacturingInitiative

adapted fromtheToyota automobile company practice, andwasable toreverse theusualsituation ofhaving higher unitcostswhenproduction ratesarelowered. Itsucceeded totheextent thatitcould offer newF-16sto the airforceat a firmunitpriceof $20millioneach,a

goodharbinger ofthefuture. Agreatdealofeffortwasplaced intoproviding thenecessary information tosatisfy therequirements oftheHart-Scott-Rodino Act overthecourse oftime,andallquestions regarding theantitrust aspects ofthemerger wereresolved withonlyminoradjustments. Alessob-

vious butmoreimportant problem wasthatofconfidentiality among themany teams presently competing forcontracts. Lockheed belonged tosometeams andMartin Marietta toothers, andtherewasconcern thatthenewfirmofLockheed Martin might haveanunfair advantage. Theagreements arrivedat in theprocess ofexamining theantitrust

aspects ofthemerger solved thesedifficulties. Hardheaded reporters were particularly interested infirstdefining whatsavings mightbepossible, andsecond, asking whatbenefits would accrue tothegovernment (andhencethepublic) fromthem. Some savings wereobvious andimmediate: therewould beonlyone headquarters, onecomputer system, oneinformation system. Other savingswerelessobvious,but Augustinehadafavorite illustration,

saying thatitwasbettertohavethreefactories working atfullcapacity thansixworking athalfcapacity. BothTellep andAugustine were

BEYOND THE HORIZONS

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candid thattherewould befurther downsizing oftheorganization to achieve economies. Theypointed outthatthiswould haveoccurred eveniftherehadnotbeenamerger, andthegreater goodofalarger number ofemployees would besecured byhaving a larger, viable com-

pany,onethatwouldbeginaddingjobsasit grew.

Ininterview afterinterview, topofficials ofthenewfirmmade it clearthattheprimary concerns aboutthemerger—loss ofjobs, reduction in competition, possible decrease in innovation—were

thedirectresultof thedownsizing ofthedefenseindustry,notofthe

mergeritself.Theystressed thatthemergerwasa reactionto the

reduction inthedefense industry, andanattempt toameliorate its worsteffects. Eventhoughabsolutely accurate, theseweredifficult pointsforthepublicto understand, comingastheydidfroma new corporategiant,thelikesofwhichtheworldhadneverbeforeseen.

Themerger wasofficially consummated onMarch 16,1995, and, ashoped andpredicted, thenewcompany wasoperating asanentity onthatdate.Given theenormous scope ofthenewfirm,thefactthat it wasoperating at allwasalmosta miracle. Withinthefourmajor

sectorstherewerealmostfiftymajoroperatingcompanies. Inaddition,

therewerefivemajor subsidiaries orfirms inwhich Lockheed Martin

heldlargeinvestments.

Despite thecomplexity anddiversity oftheoperation, thenew

firmwasverysuccessful in obtainingnewcontracts,winningmore

than60percent ofthecompetitive bidsit pursued. Inharddollar terms,in 1995netearnings reached $682million, andcashfrom operating activities, thelifeblood ofanexpanding company, wasal-

mosttwicethat,at$1.3billion. Sales hadremained steady atjustunder

$23billion, while thenegotiated backlog declined slightly to$41billion. Theshareholders weremoreencouraged bytheperformance of

thenewLockheedMartinstock,whichincreasedin valueby95 per-

centduring1995.Shareholders ofbothcompanies couldlookback

onlyafewyears toremember aperiod whenbothfirms’ stockprices werepitifully lowforlongperiods oftime. Thepress andthegovernment were watching Lockheed Martin’s consolidation efforts toseeifthegains Tellep andAugustine hadpromisedwould beforthcoming. Bytheendofthe1995, thecompany was abletoannounce thatabout$5billion insavings would bemadein thefirstfiveyears afterthemerger, andthatsubsequent savings would amount toabout$1.8billion peryear.

The Merger of Equals

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Thesuccess oftheLockheed—Martin Marietta merger toalarge measure resulted fromDanTellep’s insistence fromthebeginning on

threeelements. Thesewere(1)consolidation andcostsavings mustbe anindispensable result,(2)a schedule andprogram mustbeputin placetoprovideoperation asasinglecompany onthedayofclosing, and(3)consolidations mustbedefinitized andactionplansinitiated

nolaterthanthreemonths afterclosing. During thelatterdaysof1994,whentheproposed merger was beingdefendedbyLockheedandMartinMariettaexecutives, theterm

“synergy” wasoftenusedasa reasonto merge,theargument being

thatthetwofirmscombined couldoperate synergistically ina way theycouldnotdoascompetitors. Thepractical results ofthatsynergy maybeillustrated byasingle example, theVentureStar, which isdescribedbelow.Thekeytechnologies requiredforsuchanadvanced designwereprovided inalmostequalmeasure fromtheoldLockheed

andMartin Marietta heritage firms. Neither firmcould havewonthe bidalone, andteaming mightnothaveproduced thesameresults as theconsolidated efforts ofthenewLockheed Martin company. Overall, Tellep andAugustine hadreason tobepleased withthe results oftheirefforts, buttheyknewthattherewasmoretobedone.

MoreMergersUnderWay . January 1996,Lockheed Martin stunned theworld withtheannouncement ofastrategic combination withtheLoral Corporation. It seemed impossible thatthefirmwouldundertake another major expansion sosoon,butthemerger wasproceeding well,andtheacquisition ofsomeelements ofLoralplayed animportant partin strengthening Lockheed Martin’s position intheindustry. Thedeal

wasquiteinvolved,buthadatotal estimatedvalueof$9.4billion.In brief,LockheedMartinacquiredthe defenseelectronics, systemsin-

tegration, andcertain otherbusinesses ofLoral forabout$9.1billion, including$2.1billionin assumeddebt.Of thisamount,$7 billion

waspaiddirectly toLoral shareholders through atender offerof$38 pershareofLoralcommon stock. Anewly formed company, Loral Space& Communications, issuedoneshareofstockforeachshareof

Loralcommon stockpreviously held.Lockheed Martin alsomadea $344million investment inLoralSpace, equivalent toabouta 20 percent share ofthecompany.

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 478

AnotherGiantStep O nJuly3, 1997,a jointannouncement wasmadeontheproposed unionoftwoofthelargest firmsintheaerospace industry—firms

whose names werecomposed offourofthegreatpioneering aviation companies. Theirrespective boards ofdirectors hadapproved aproposalthatLockheed MartinandNorthrop Grumman bejoinedin whatwastermed a strategic combination withestimated 1997 revenues of$37billion andnearly 230,000 employees. Northrop Grumman shareholders weretoreceive 1.1923 shares ofLockheed Martin commonstockforeachshareoftheirstock. While thelarger firmwould becalledLockheedMartin,it wasnotedthatthenamesNorthropand

Grumman wouldendurewithinthecorporation.

Itwouldbeashame iftheydidnot,fortheUnited States has depended upon aseriesofsuperb aircraft fromthetwocompanies

overthe years,includingthe Grummanfighters(Wildcat,Hellcat, Tomcat,andothers)andtheNorthropBlackWidowandB-2stealth

bomber.

Thechairman ofNorthrop Grumman, KentKresa, hadbrought hisfirmtoitsstrong position intheindustry through aseriesofmergers andonthestrength ofitsengineering. Given thesizeofLockheed

Martinanditsprincipal rival,Boeing, it wasa logicalsteptoseekto improve itsrelative status.Kresa wouldbecome vicechairman ofLock-

heedMartin andserve onitsboard. Theproposed merger wasseenasthelogical nextstepinthe

overall consolidation ofthedefense industry, butwasgreeted bysome concernovertheantitrustimplications ofthedeal.Lockheed Martin

hasexpressed confidence thatthecombination willbeapproved. In March 1998thegovernment sought tostopthemerger. Thegrowth ofLockheed Martin wasparalleled bytheexpansion ofitslongtime rival, Boeing. OnJuly25,1997, theMcDonnell DouglasCorporation votedtoapprove aproposed merger withtheBoeing Company. Thenewcompany dwarfed evenLockheed, withitscombined1995revenues of$43.8billion, combined backlog of$130.3 billion, andmorethan200,000 employees. Whenallmergers areapproved, thedefense industry willhave threeprincipal domestic companies incompetition: Lockheed Martin,

Boeing, andRaytheon. Someforeign officials havealready expressed concern thatthesecompanies, individually orinconcert, maybeso powerful thattheywillbeabletodriveEuropean aerospace rivals out

The Merger of Equals

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ofbusiness. Ironically, European companies areusing Lockheed Martinasamodel fortheirownconsolidations evenasLockheed Martin forges stronge alliances withforeign firms.

1996Resultsand Productsforthe Future hemottoFPluribus Unum (From Many, One)applies toLockheed

MartinalmostaswellasitdoestotheUnitedStates. Thenewfirm is farmorethanthesimpleconsolidation of Lockheed andMartin Marietta,withtheirsubsequent acquisitions. Beforethe proposed

NorthropGrumman combination, Lockheed Martinofficially counted seventeen “heritage firms” asa partofitscorporate background. Amoredetailed analysis ofthecompany genealogy shows that it extends tomorethansixtyorganizations, rangingfromgiantssuch

asFordAerospace, Vought, RCA, andSanders tolesser-known firms. Eachcontributed to theLockheed Martingenepoolwithideas, traditions, andmethods. Thenewcorporation employed almost 200,000 people bythe

endof1996,andtheircombined effortsresulted inLockheed Martin

beingchosen asoneoftheonehundred best-managed corporations byIndustry Week. It wasnotanaccident, butrathertheresultof assiduous planning andtightcontrol. In1996, itsfirstfullyearofoperation, Lockheed Martin enjoyed $26.9billion insales, up$4billion. Earnings percommon sharealmostdoubled, from$3.05to $6.04,andtheyear-end stockprice increased 16percent toreach$91.50 pershare. Backlog hadrisento morethan$50billion, anencouraging figure thatAugustine translated intoa management goad:it meantthat$1million innewbusiness hadtobeaddedevery fourminutes justtosustain therevenues. Theriseinsharepricewasanexternal appreciation ofinternal actions, formanagement hadmovedswiftly initsefforts toconsolidate andacquirenewbusiness. Theconsolidation effortswereatoncethe

mostnecessary andthemostpainful. Lockheed Martin hadimmediatelyclosed anumber ofunneeded facilities, butmanaged tokeepthe number ofjobseliminated downto1,600, lessthan1percent ofthe workforce. Eachjoblostwaspainful totheindividuals concerned, but given thescaleoftheoperation, thetotalwassmaller thanhadpreviously beenestimated. Those whowerelaidoffweregiven severance packages, job-relocation assistance, andothersupport. Therelatively smallnumber ofjobslostwasduein partto

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 480

Lockheed Martin’s ability toofferpositions elsewhere within thefirm asaresult ofwinning newcompetitions. In1996,thecompany won 68percent oftheprograms uponwhichit bid,a trulyremarkable effort. Among thesenewprograms weremanythatpromised much forthefuture.

Venturestar elected byNASA tobuildademonstrator foracompletely reusable

launchvehicle,Lockheedrespondedwitha companyorganization

suitable tothetask.A selectteamfromallpartsofthefirmwasestablishedtoworkasa “virtualcompany,” onewhosemembers didnot

havetoconcern themselves withtraditional organizational boundaries. TheX-33Reusuable Launch Vehicle Demonstrator isahalf-scale suborbital flight vehicle demonstrator fortheVentureStar, theworld’s firstsingle-stage to-orbit(SSTO) vehicle. Theprimary goalof VentureStar istoreduce thecostoflaunching payloads tolowearth orbittoonethousand dollars perpound, ascompared toanestimated tenthousand dollars perpound ontheSpace Shuttle. TheVentureStar willserve asaprototype fora futurecommercial fleetofSSTOReusable Launch Vehicles (RLVs) toreplace thespace shuttle andmany ofthecurrent expendable launch vehicles, which alldatebacktomid1950s technology. Theproduction vehicle willbe127feetlong,will weigh closeto 1.8million pounds atthetimeofitsvertical takeoff, andwillhavethecapability toplacepayloads weighing uptoforty thousand pounds inorbit. Thecurrent program willcostmorethan$1billion through the year2000,andwillresult inthesubscale demonstrator vehicle, theX33,making itsfirstflightin1999. TheVentureStar usesa lifting bodyconfiguration powered by linearaerospike engines fedbyliquidoxygen andliquidhydrogen propellants.The aerospikeengineis designedforhighperformance, minimumweight,andlonglife,andisadaptableto thrustvectorcon-

trolinbothpitchandroll. Asadvanced astheVentureStar is,itsengineering derives froma longhistory ofprojects atbothLockheed andMartin Marietta, many ofwhich addressed individual elements oftheRLVchallenge inother applications. Theadvanced engineering required fortheVentureStar resulted initsbecoming theveryfirstnonclassified Skunk Works proj-

The Merger of Equals

ae

= 481

he

Oneof the manyprojects of LockheedMartinis the VentureStar,a reusable single-stage to-orbit (SSTO)launchvehiclethat is intendedto open newcommercial markets by loweringthe cost of getting into space.

ect,aneventthathashadafundamental effect uponboththeSkunk Works andLockheed Martin asawhole. TheVentureStar iscomplemented byLockheed Martin’s selectiontocompete fortheevolved expendable launch vehicle (EELV) program, intended todevelop afamily ofexpendable launch vehicles toreplace Delta, Atlas, andTitanspace launch vehicles.

TheJointStrikeFighter alledbysomethemostimportant military aircraft program ofthe twenty-first century, theJointStrike Fighter (JSF) isbeing devel-

opedto replace several different typesoftacticalaircraftintheU.S.

Air Force,U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps, and in Great Britain’s

RoyalNavy.Lockheed Martinreceived oneoftwoconceptdemon-

stration contracts forthenext-generation aircraft. Aninitial totalrequirement forthreethousand aircraft ispredicted torisetoalevel of

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 482

Teamingwith other companies, LockheedMartinis also an entrant in the important Joint Strike Fighter competition,which mayimpactthe F-22program.

fivethousand bymidcentury. TheSkunk Works willalsohavere-

sponsibility fordesigning andbuilding theJSFprototypes.

Boeing,the companythat nowbidsto be LockheedMartin’s

primary competitor foralmost alldefense contracts, wastheother winner. Ina manner similar totheAdvanced Tactical Fighter competition thatresulted intheF-22, bothcompanies willbuildtwoflying concept-demonstrator aircraft todemonstrate threeconfigurations of theproposed fighter. Thebasicconcept behind theJSFistoprovide anaffordable family ofmultiservice aircraft byengineering commonality andmodularity intothedesign. Commonality hasbeenattempted before, and multiuse aircraft suchastheMcDonnell Douglas F-4Phantom IIhave beensuccessful. TheJSFisthefirstaircraft toincorporate suchvery different mission modes inonebasic design. Oneversion willhaveto havetheshort-takeoff, vertical-landing, hover, andtransition characteristics oftoday’s McDonnell Douglas AV-8B, while another version willhavetherangeandload-carrying characteristics oftheLockheed Martin F-16orMcDonnell Douglas F/A-18 aircraft. Thefirstdelivery ofanoperational aircraft isplanned forfiscal year2008;inthemeantime, Lockheed Martin findsitself intheunenviable position ofcompeting against itselfforlimited defense budget fundswiththeF-22andtheJSF.

Inaddition tothesemajorprograms, therearea hostofnew

ventures suchastheJointAir-to-Surface-Standoff Missile(JASSM)

andanewattack submarine tocomplement thelonglistofstandard

The Merger of Equals

= 483

Lockheed Martinproducts. Thelatterinclude notonlyworkhorses liketheF-16andC-130aircraft, butawhole portfolio ofprograms intheElectronics, Information Services, andEnergy & Environment Sectors.

ANewLeaderEmerges achmerger andacquisition brought withitnotonlynewprograms andskills, butnewpersonnel tofilltheincreasingly demanding

toppositions of Lockheed Martin.In recentyears,it hasnotbeen

unusual foranexpanding company tolookoutside itsrankstofinda chiefexecutive. Lockheed Martin hasproceeded counter tothistrend, and,given thewealth ofmanagerial talent available toit,willcontinue

todoso.

D.Coffman, whohasnever SuchisthecasewithDr.Vance Identified byDanTellep asa worked anywhere elsethanLockheed. himaschairman, Coffman wascarefully primecandidate tosucceed andTellep tutored andmentored. HehaddoneverywellatLMSC, broughthimupto headquarters to gainexperience. Therehedem-

onstrated whatMarafino hascalled “thecapacity togrow.” Hequickly learned hisnewduties tothepointthathewasabletoreturn toLMSC aspresident during theinterval priortothemerger. Coffman, naturally enough, hadtoviewthemerger withmixed emotions. Since hehadalready beenplaced incontention forthetop jobatLockheed, themerger appeared tomuddy thewater, forinthe Lockheed Martin Corporation, hisrankandseniority would probably entitle himonlytoaposition aspresident ofasector. Likemany others, Coffman putasidehispersonal concerns, recognized thatthemerger wasthebestthingforLockheed, andpressed forward withit. Asthemerger progressed, Coffman waspresented withoneof themostdifficult tasks.Therewasexcess capacity atLMSC’s Californiafacility,andthismeantthattheolder,higher-cost facilities inEast

Windsor, NewJersey, andValley Forge,Pennsylvania, hadto be closed. Bothplantshadrecently benefited byaheavy investment in equipment, andbothwereoperating atfullcapacity. Theywereof immense importance totheirrespective communities, and,naturally, theirstrong, loyalworkforces didnotwishtolosetheirjobs. Coffman studied thesituation withhisusualattention todetail andcametotheinescapable conclusion thatthecostsavings involved in closing thetwoplantsandcombining theiroperations in the

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 484

VanceD. Coffman,president and vicechairmanof Lockheed Martin,provedhis abilitiesat LMSC,and during the process of the merger.

Sunnyvale facility weretoolargetoforgo. Hetookit uponhimself personally togivethebadnewstothetwoplants, andsawtoitthat themostessential employees received attractive packages toinduce themtomovewest.

Doing anexcellent jobofhuman relations inanalmost impossibletask,Coffman softened hisusualbusiness persona andmanaged toconvince theformer Martin Marietta workforce thattheclosings

hadtobemade,butthateveryeffortwouldbetakentoreducehardshipstoanabsolute minimum. Asa result,pioneeringcompanies thatbuiltthefirstsatellites at

thedawnofthespace agehavejoined forces intheLockheed Martin merger toblaze a newtrailforthetwenty-first century. Consolidation inSunnyvale, California hasbrought withitinvestment inthemost innovative andtechnologically advanced production facilities inthe industry. Thecenterpiece: a 65-million-dollar Commercial Satellite Center fortheproduction andtesting ofspacecraft thataresetting new standards forpowerandperformance. Gleaming white,ultra-clean, andcovering anareathesizeoftwofootball fieldsunderfifty-foot high ceilings, this“factory ofthefuture”features co-located testfacilities todramatically reducesatellite costandtimetomarket.

Today, Lockheed Martin Missiles andSpace builds onalegacy ofmorethan700satellites successfully launched andorbited. The company isengaged inthedesign andproduction of19different types ofspacecraft andsatellites. Theyrangeinsizefromthe600-pound Lunar Prospecter spacecraft, placed inorbitaround themooninJanuary1998,tomilitary systems suchasthe10,000-pound MILSTAR

The Merger of Equals

= 485

communication satellite ingeosynchronous Earthorbit.Between its commercial, NASA andgovernment customers, Lockheed Martin Missiles andSpace manages overtwodozen separate spacecraft contractswithalong-term valueof2.5billiondollars. Coffman haddonehisjobsowellthatbyJanuary1996hewas

advanced totheposition ofexecutive vicepresident andchief operating officer oftheLockheed Martin Corporation, being succeeded byMelvinBrashears attheSpace &Strategic Missiles Sector. In1997, when

Augustine retired,Coffman wasselected tobecome vicechairman and chiefexecutive officer.Oneyearlaterhe becameChairman of the

Lockheed Martin Board ofDirectors.

A LookBackto the Future hehistory oftheLockheed Company inallitsmanyguises isinspiring. FromAllanandMalcolm Lockheed’s earlyefforts, tothe vision thatgaveRobert Grossthecourage tosecure fortythousand dollars toinvest intheLockheed name,tothedazzling successes of Lockheed products inWorldWarIIandtheColdWar,totheincredible series ofmodern mergers, thefirmhasperformed inasterling manner. Somehow, despite itsastronomical growth insize,Lockheed managed toholdontoitssense offamily, andtotransfer thistoits new,largerentityasLockheedMartin.

Ithasbeenabletodosoonlybecause ofthepeopleofLockheed,

whohaveworked solong,soloyally, andwithsuchunselfish patriotism. Itdidnotmatter iftherewaspeace orwar,prosperity ordepression, goodtimes orbad,thepeople ofLockheed notonlyendured but,continuing to create, theyprevailed. Fromtheirrankssprang thegreatandnecessary leaders tohandle change. Thepeople ofLockheedMartinwillcarryoninthetraditionofRobertGross,whosaid,

decades earlier, “Look ahead, where thehorizons areabsolutely unlimited.”Lockheed Martin isnowpoised tolookbeyond thehorizons, intoafuture thatisutterly boundless. On July16,1998,asthisbookwasgoingto press,LockheedMartin

announced thetermination oftheproposed merger. Lockheed Martin hadbeensurprised atthestrong opposition tothemerger bytheDepartment ofJustice andtheDepartment ofDefense. TheDepartment ofDefense had,since1993, urged consolidation ofdefense contractors

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 486

inthepost-Cold Warenvironment. Lockheed Martin’s Chairman and CEO,Vance Coffman, statedthat“Continuing thelitigation atthis pointissimply notinthebestinterest ofLockheed Martin’s customers, shareholders oremployees.”

APPENDIX I

SomeNotableLockheed AircraftFlights

Date

Pilot

Plane

Event

Result

Apr.1928Capt.George Vega HubertWilkins, Lt.BenEielson

20.5hrflying time Flew2,200mi across topofworld (onestop) fromPointBarrow, AK,toSpitsbergen Apr.1928ArthurGoebel and Vega NewYorktoLos 23hr,45min(one HarryTucker stop);24hr,20min Angeles elapsed time June1928LeeSchoenhair Vega SanDiego,CA,to 15hr,10min

Harrisburg, PA

Aug.1928ArthurGoebel and Vega HarryTucker

LosAngeles to NewYork

Sep.1928 Robert W.Cantwell Vega

ClassC winner,

transcontinental

derby,NewYork

to LosAngeles, NationalAirRaces

nonstop; average speed158mph 18hr,58min nonstop; average speed142mph

BEYOND THE HORIZONS

Date

Pilot

Plane

= 488

Event

NewYorkto LosAngeles

Result

Oct.1928Capt.C.B.D. Vega Collyer, HarryTucker Dec.1928Capt.George Vega HubertWilkins, Lt.BenEielson

24hr,51min nonstop

Firstexploratory 9.5hr flightover Antarctic, 1,200mi

Hawks, Air Feb.1929Capt.Frank

LosAngeles to

18hr,21min,59sec

Express NewYork OscarGrubb nonstop flight, Eckman Vega Firstnonstop Apr.1929Anscel SeaplaneSeattle toJuneau, AK May1929Lt.HerbertFahy = Vega Soloendurance 36hr,56min,36sec record Round-trip flight, Easttowest,19hr, June1929Capt.FrankHawksAir Express NewYorktoLos 10min,32sec;west Angeles, andreturntoeast,17hr,38 toNewYork min,17secnonstop; onestopinLos Aug.1929Roscoe Turner Aug.1929HenryBrown

Air LosAngeles to Express NewYorkwith fullpayload Air Nonstop Los Express Angeles-toCleveland Derby

Angeles

18hr,55min, including threestops 13hr,15min, 7 sec; 154.091 mph

winner

Nov.1929Amelia Earhart Vega

Speedrecordfor women

Average speed184.17 mph;fastest mile 197.8mph

Feb.1930 Col.andMrs.

Glendale,CA,to

14hr,23 min,27sec

Charles A. Lindbergh May1930Roscoe Turner

Sirius

LongIsland, NY nonstop

NewYorkto Air 18hr,43min,34sec Express LosAngeles FL, 31hr,57min June1930W.S.Brock, Vega Jacksonville, E.F.Schlee toSanDiego,CA, andreturn mphwith June1930Amelia Earhart Vega International speed 174.897 171.438 recordforwomen, _ nopayload;

100 km

Aug.1930Capt.FrankHawks Air

Aug.1930WileyPost

Solorecord,

mph with 1,102 Ib

payload (500kg)

12hr,25min,3 sec

Express __LosAngeles to NewYork 9hr,9min,4 sec Vega Nonstop Los 192.326 mph Angeles-to-Chicago Derbywinner

Some Notable Lockheed Aircraft Flights

Date

Pilot

Nov.1930Capt.RoyW. Ammel Dec.1930RuthNichols

Dec.1930 RuthNichols

Plane

= 489

Event

Sirius NewYorkto Panama Canal

Result

24hr,35min

Zone

Vega

Vega

First 16hr,59min,30sec transcontinental

flightbya woman, Mineola,NY,to Burbank,CA First 13hr,21min transcontinental flightbya woman,

Feb.1931GlenKidston

Vega

LosAngeles to NewYork London toParis

Mar.1931RuthNichols

Vega

American altitude 28,743ft

Mar.1931VanceBreese

Altair

SanFrancisco to

Apr.1931RuthNichols

Vega

July1931WileyPostand HaroldGatty

Vega

July1931 Capt.George

EndressandCapt.

72min

recordforwomen

LosAngeles

1hr,30min,40 sec,

withanaverage speedof235mph International speed210.636 mph recordforwomen Firstaround-the- 8days,15hr,51 worldflightof min 15,474mi

to 26hrnonstop Sirius Newfoundland

Alexander Magyar July—Aug. Col.andMrs. Sirius| 1931 Charles A. Lindbergh Oct.1931RuthNichols Vega

Hungary,3,600mi

Washington, D.C., across Bering Sea toTokyo International 1,977.6 mi distance recordfor women,Oakland, CA,to Louisville, KY

Feb.1932RuthNichols

Vega

May1932Amelia Earhart Vega

July1932JamesMattern and Vega BennettGriffin

Unofficial world 19,928ft altitude recordfor Diesel-powered airplane Firstsoloflight 15hr,18min across theAtlantic byawoman, Newfoundland to Ireland Fastest Atlantic 17hr,30min crossing,

Newfoundland to Berlin

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 490 Date

Pilot

July1932 AmeliaEarhart

Plane

Vega

Event

Result

Transcontinental 17hr, 59min recordforwomen,

LosAngeles to

AmeliaEarhart Aug. 1932

Newark,NJ

Vega

International 2,447.8miin 19hr, distance record 5 min forwomen, Los Angeles toNewark, NJ;firstnonstop transcontinental

flightbyawoman July—Dec. Col.andMrs. CharlesA. 1932

Lindbergh July1933 WileyPost

Sirius

29,000-mi

29,000 mi

Vega

Recordaroundthe-worldflight of 15,596mi

7 days, 18 hr, 49.5

7,365miflight

54hr,49 min

Oct.—Nov. Charles KingsfordAltair 1934 SmithandCapt.P.

G.Taylor

survey flight

fromBrisbane, Australia, to Oakland,CA Firstwomanover

Feb.—Apr. LauraIngalls 1934

Air Express Andes; longest

Jan.1935 AmeliaEarhart

Vega

LauraIngalls Sep. 1935

Orion

min

16,897 mile flight

flightbyawoman; firstsoloflight aroundSouth America; firstflight byawoman from NorthtoSouth

America

Firstsoloflightby 2,408mi 18hr,16min

a womanfrom Honoluluto Oakland

Newnonstop

transcontinental recordforwomen, Burbank, CA, to

13hr, 34min

Newark,NJ Feb.1935 WileyPost Vega Unofficial altitude Approximately record 55,000ft Apr.1936JamesH.DoolittleElectra Setspeedrecord 5 hr, 55min

overChicago &

SouthernAirline routefromChicago to NewOrleans

Some Notable Lockheed Aircraft Flights Date

Pilot

Nov.1936 MaxAitken,

Plane

= 491

Event

Electra Setrecordfrom

Result

1hr,2 min

NV,to Average speedof256 Marshall Headle, Junior LasVegas

BrianAllen,and Burbank,CA RayBuckminster May1937 DickMerrilland Electra NewYorkto JohnLambie Northweald, England,for coronationof

20hr,48 min

May1937 DickMerrilland JohnLambie

24hr, 55min

mph

KingGeorge VI

Electra Southampton, England,to

Squantum, MA,

returnflightfrom coronation

Record around- 3days,19hr,9min July1938 Howard Hughes Super—_ Electra_ the-world flight Feb.1939 BenjaminKelsey XP-38

Sep.1946 Cmdrs.Thomas

Davies, Eugene

Rankin,andWalter Reid,andLt.

Cmdr.Roy Tabeling

Jan.1946 Col.William

Councill

Unofficial 2,460-mi7 hr,43 min

transcontinental § Average speedof speedrecord, 356mph

MarchField,CA, to MitchelField, NY P2V-1 Distancerecordof 55hr, 17min

11,235.6 mifrom

Perth,Australia, to PortColumbus,

OH

P-80A Nonstop

4 hr, 13min,26sec

transcontinentalAverage speedof speedrecordfrom 580.93mphovera LongBeach,CA, to NewYork

distanceof2,453.8 mi

Apr.1946Capt.MartinSmithP-80A Speedrecordfrom 20min,15sec NewYorkto

Washington, D.C. June1946Lt.HenryJohnsonP-80A— 1,000-km speed 426.97mph record

Aug. 1946 Col. LeonGray

FP-80A BendixTrophy

Racewinner, Jet Division

4 hr, 8 min, 18 sec

494.779 mph

Sep.1946Lt.W.J. Reilly

P-80A Weatherhead Jet 578.360 mph SpeedDash Sep.1946Maj.GusLundquist P-830A Thompson Trophy515.853 mph Racewinner,Jet

Division

June1947Col.AlbertBoyd P-80R Absolute world speedrecord

623.608 mph

BEYOND THE HORIZONS = 492

Date

Pilot

Sep.1947Capt.Bernor

Plane

Event

FP-80AAllison Trophy Racewinner

Sep.1947Anthony LeVier P-38L—_ SohioTrophy Racewinner

Result

494.277 mph 360.866 mph

Sep.1947Col.LeonGray

FP-80A Bendix Trophy 4hr,2min,34sec mph Racewinner, Jet 507.255 Division Sep.1947Lt.Col.R.L.Petit P-80A Thompson mph Trophy500.704 Racewinner,Jet Division

May1958Maj.Howard YF-104A Worldaltitude 91,249ft Johnson record May1958Capt.WalterIrwin YF-104A mph Speedrecordover 1,404.19 15/25kmcourse Dec.1958 unknown

F-104A Threetime-toclimbrecords

world May1958Capt.WalterIrwin F-104A Absolute speedrecord Dec.1959 unknown

F-104C Worldaltitude record

May1964Jacqueline CochranTF-104G Women’s speed recordover15/25 kmcourse Women’s speed June1964Jacqueline CochranTF-104G recordover 100-km course June1964Jacqueline CochranTF-104G Women’s speed recordover 500-km course May1965Col.Robert YF-12AAbsolute world Stephens speedrecord Apr.1971 Maj.ThomasEstes SR-71

andMaj.Dewain

Vick

July1976 Capt.RobertHelt SR-71

andMaj.Larry Elliot July1976 Capt.EldonJoersz SR-71 andMaj.George Morgan Jr. July1976 Maj.Adolphus SR-71 BledsoeandMaj. JohnFuller

Sustained

horizontal flight

3,000m (9,842ft) 41.35sec;15,000m (49,212ft) 131.1sec; 25,000m (82,020ft)

266.03sec 1,404.09 mph 103,389ft (31,513m)

1,429.3 mph 1,303mph 1,127mph 2,070.115 mph 15,000mi

with in-flight refueling Heightin sustained85,069ft

horizontal flight

Speedinastraight 2,193mph line Speedovera

1,000-kmclosed circuit

2,092mph

Some Notable Lockheed Aircraft Flights

Date

Pilot

Plane

Event

= 493

Result

Sep.1976Maj.JamesSullivanSR-71 Beale AFBtoRAE 1hr,55min,42sec andMaj.Noel Farnborough 3,490mi Widdifield nonstop withinflightrefueling Sep.1976Capt.Harold 1,487mph SR-71_—_ London toLos Adams andMaj. Angeles nonstop 5,645mi William Machorek within-flight refueling Oct.1977DarrylGreenamyer F-104RBLow-altitude 3-km 988.26mph speedrecordfor ClassC.1,Group

IIIaircraft

APPENDIX II

Aircraftand FleetBallisticMissile Characteristics

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APPENDIX III

Lockheed Corporation oubsidiaries, Affiliates, Divisions, andGroups

Manyorganizations, withtheiracronyms,haveexistedwithinLock-

heedovertheyears.Overtime,thesameacronyms weresometimes

applied tolateranddifferent organizations. Someorganizations apparently werenotgiven acronyms, oratleastthoseacronyms havenot beenfoundintheauthor’s research. Thefollowing listhasmost,but undoubtedly notall,ofthemany companies thatwerepartandparcel ofLockheed life.Theygivesomeideaofthescope ofthecompany, andalsotheimpossibility ofrecording every event ofeighty-five years ofhistory inasingle volume.

Lockheed Corporation Subsidiaries, Affiliates, Divisions, and Groups

= 501

Subsidiaries

OrganizationalTitle

d-Access Graphics, Inc. d-AGT Holdings, Inc.

ACCESS

f-CALCOMP A.B. f-CALCOMP A/S

AGT CAAB

f-CALCOMP Australia PTY.Ltd.

CALAS CAPL

f-CALCOMP B.V.

CALBV

f-CALCOMP CanadaLtd. f-CALCOMP Espana S.A.

CALCAN

f-CALCOMP Europe B.V. f-CALCOMP Europe Ltd. d-CALCOMP European Management

CCESPANA

CEBV GALEL

CEMCO

Corporation

CFSC CGESmbH f-CALCOMP GmbH CCGmbH f-CALCOMP Graphics Peripherals Ltd. CGPL f-CALCOMP Graphics Peripherals (China) Ltd. CGPL CHINA d-CALCOMP Inc. CALCOMP f-CALCOMP JapanProcurement KK CJPKK f-CALCOMP LIMITED CALLIM d-CALCOMP Pacific, Inc. CPI f-CALCOMP S.A. CALCOSA CASPA f-CALCOMP S.p.A. d-CALCOMP Technology andProcurement,CTPI f-CALCOMP Foreign Sales Corporation f-CALCOMP Ges.m.b.h.

Inc.

d-California Computer Products, Inc. d-CSL Leasing Corporation d-DATACOM Municipal Systems of Pennsylvania, Inc.

f-FORJOHN Ltd. d-domestic f-foreign

CCPI CSL DMSP

FORJOHN

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS

502

Subsidiaries

Organizational Title

f-FORMTEK Europe, N.V.

FENV FORMTEK FORMTEKINTL

d-FORMTEK , Inc.

d-FORMTEK International, Inc. LECCE d-LFC CreditCorp. LACI d-Lockheed Aeromod Center, Inc. LASES d-Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Employment Services Company, Inc.

d-Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Support

LASS

Company

LAPI LAUS LAI d-Lockheed Aircraft, Inc. LAIL f-Lockheed Aircraft International Ltd. LASI d-Lockheed Aircraft Service International LBV f-Lockheed B.V. LCAN f-Lockheed Canada Inc. d-Lockheed Commercial Aircraft Center, Inc. LCAC d-Lockheed Commercial Electronics Company LGEC d-Lockheed Commercial Space Company Inc. LESG d-Lockheed Engineering &Sciences CompanyLESG d-Lockheed Aeroparts, Inc. f-Lockheed Aircraft(Australia) PTY.Ltd.

(Lockheed Martin Engineering &Sciences) LESAT d-Lockheed Environmental Systems & Technologies Company (Lockheed Martin Environmental Systems &Technologies)

d-Lockheed Foreign Enterprise Company, Inc. LFEC LFSG f-Lockheed Foreign Sales Corporation d-Lockheed FortRucker,Inc.

d-Lockheed FortWorthInternational

LFRI LFWIC

Corporation LHSA d-Lockheed-Hellas S.A. LHCI d-Lockheed Ho-Chin Incorporated d-Lockheed IdahoTechnologies Company LITCO

(Lockheed Martin IdahoTechnologies)

Lockheed Corporation

Subsidiaries,

Affiliates, Divisions, and Groups

Subsidiaries

Organizational Title

f-Lockheed Information Management ServicesLIMSCA CanadaInc. f-Lockheed Information Management Services LIMS(UK)

(UK)Ltd. Information Technology CompanyLITC d-Lockheed Integrated Solutions Company LISC d-Lockheed LIGmbH International G.m.b.H. f-Lockheed LIET International Ltd.Taiwan f-Lockheed LISIC International Service and d-Lockheed Corporation Investment LISI International Services, Inc. d-Lockheed LIC Investment Corporation d-Lockheed Martin Finance Corporation LMFC d-Lockheed LMIMS Martin IMSCorporation d-Lockheed LMIL Martin International Ltd. f-Lockheed LMISA Martin International S.A. f-Lockheed Materials Processing Company LMPC d-Lockheed Mercator Information Company,LMICI d-Lockheed Inc. f-Lockheed Middle-East Services

d-Lockheed Missiles &Space Company, Inc.

LMS LMSC

(LockhedMartinMissiles& Space)

d-Lockheed Mortgage Corporation d-Lockheed Nevada Company

LMC LNC LOTI d-Lockheed ofTurkey,Inc. d-Lockheed Sanders, Inc.(Sanders, a LockheedSANDERS

Martin Company) d-Lockheed Services Company, Inc. d-Lockheed Shipbuilding Company

LSC LSC LSOC

d-Lockheed Space Operations Company (Lockheed Martin Space Operations) d-Lockheed Support Systems, Inc.(LockheedLSSI MartinLogistics Management)

503

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS

504

Subsidiaries

Organizational Title

LSCI d-Lockheed Systems Company, Inc. LIEG d-Lockheed Technical Enterprises Corporation d-Lockheed Technical Operations Company, LTOC

Inc.(Lockheed MartinTechnical Operations)

d-Lockheed Technical Services Company, Inc. ETS f-Lockheed TechnicalServices(Malaysia) S.B.

d-Lockheed Transport Systems, Inc. d-Lockheed-Vance, Inc. d-Lockheed Worldwide Support Systems, Inc.

LTSM LTSI LVI LWSS

f-Mountaingate DataSystems GmbH

MDS GmbH

d-Mountaingate DataSystems,Inc.(CA)

MOUNTAINGATE MDS MDSIreland

d-Mountaingate DataSystems, Inc.(NV) f-Mountaingate DataSystems Ireland, Ltd. f-Mountaingate DataSystems U.K.,Ltd.

d-Murdock Engineering Company f-NSCALCOMP Corporation

f-N.V.CALCOMP S.A.

d-Quality International Services, Inc.

d-Sanders Associates International, Inc. d-Sanders Development Corporation d-StarReconveyance Corporation

d-Tristar Parts, Ltd.

MDS UK

MURDOCK NSCC NVCALSA QISI SAII SDC SRC TPL

InactiveSubsidiaries andAffiliates

d-CALCOMP International, Inc. d-Colby Crane&Manufacturing, Inc. (capitalization) f-General Dynamics Kabushiki Kaisha f-Guam AirTerminal Corporation

CII COLBY GDKK GATC

(capitalization)

d-Puget Sound Bridge &DryDockCompany,PUGET Inc.(nocapitalization) d-Vega Aircraft Company (nocapitalization, w/ VEGA assets)

Lockheed Corporation

Subsidiaries,

Affiliates,

Divisions, and Groups

=

505

Affiliates

OrganizationalTitle

f-Aeroplex ofCentral Europe

ACE

f-Airport GroupCanadaInc. f-Airport GroupInternational GmbH

AGICAN AGIGmbH

d-Airport Group International, Inc. d-Airport Group International, Ltd. d-Airport Group NewYork, Inc. f-Airport Group United Kingdom Ltd. f-Airod Sendirian Berhad d-Arnold W.Thompson Corporation

AGIINC AGILTD AGINY AGIUK AIROD

AWT

CAPI d-California AirportPartnerships, Inc. GAMECO f-Guangzhou Aircraft Maintenance Engineering

Company, Ltd. GULFTECH f-Gulf Technology Systems Group HBDIC f-Hellenic Business Development &Investment Company, S.A.

d-International Launch Services (formerly Lockheed Khrunichev Energia)

ILS

f-LAHLtd.

LAH LETLOCK f-Letlock Saudi Arabia Company Ltd. LATSA f-Lockheed AirTerminal S.A. f-Lockheed Investment HoldingCompany A.S. LIHCAS (Lockheed YatirimHoldingsA.S.) PAC f-Pacific Aerospace Corporation Ltd. SII d-Space Imaging, Inc. CO d-ThompsonConsultantsInternational, Inc. TUSAS f-TusasAerospace Industries,Inc. LimitedLiabilityCompany

d-Airport Group International Holdings, GE. d-domestic f-foreign

AGILLC

506

BEYOND THE HORIZONS

PartnershipCorporation

OrganizationalTitle

d-Vought Corporation

VOUGHT

NonprofitCorporation

d-Lockheed Leadership Fund

LLF

Divisions

Lockheed Advanced Development Company LADC (Lockheed MartinSkunkWorks)

Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Company

LASC

(Lockheed MartinAeronautical Systems)

(Lockheed Aircraft Service Company

LAS

(Lockheed MartinAircraftServices)

Lockheed FortWorthCompany (Lockheed LFWC MartinTacticalAircraftSystems)

Lockheed Properties Division

LPD

FormerSubsidiariesand Affiliates

Colby Crane&Manufacturing, 100%owned byPugetSound Inc. Bridge &Drydock (Formerly Colby Steel& Incorporated 1911— Manufacturing, Inc.) Washington 100% owned byPugetSound Dissolved June30,1961 Bridge &Drydock

Commercial SteelFabricators, Inc.

Lockheed Electronics Company

(LEC)

(Formerly StavidEngineering, Inc.)

100% owned byLockheed Aircraft Corporation Incorporated August 27, 1959—Delaware Merged withLACAugust 29, 1961

d-domestic

f-foreign

Incorporated September 28, 1949-—Washington

Dissolved August 3,1962

(NOTE:EagleManufacturing

Company, formerly a subsidiary ofColby Steel &Manufacturing, Inc., merged withthat company asofDecember 23,1960).

Lockheed Corporation

Subsidiaries,

Affiliates,

Divisions, and Groups

=

507

FormerSubsidiaries andAffiliates

Lockheed Aircraft Service, Inc.

100% owned byLockheed

Aircraft Corporation Incorporated November 29,

1946—California Merged withLACMay7, 1962

Incorporated March 16, 1964—Argentina

LAISA soldallitsequity interest

to

IKA-Renault S.A.I.C.F., an

Argentine company,

June 12,1968

Systems, Inc. Lockheed Aircraft Service-New Transportation 50%owned b yLockheed York,Inc.

(Formerly LASI— namechanged in1959) Owned byLockheed Aircraft

Aircraft Corporation

Service,Inc.

Incorporated March3,1961— Georgia LAC’s interesttransferred to

7, 1962

72.323%byLAISA; 27.766%

Lykes Corporation Incorporated August 2,1948— March26, 1969 NewYork Merged intoLAS, Inc.,May Lockheed Azcarate, S.A. byLAC

Lockheed Propulsion Company Incorporated December 10, (Formerly GrandCentral Rocket 1958—Mexico Co.)

100%ownedbyLockheed

Dissolved January12,1970

Impulsora de Aircraft Corporation asof Compania Industrias Mexicanas, S.A. August 30,1961 Incorporated August 14, Incorporated May21,1957— 1961—Mexico California Sold August 31,1970 Merged withLACFebruary 4, 1963 Ventura Manufacturing Company Aviones Lockheed—Kaiser S.A. 100% owned byLockheed 50%owned byLAISA Aircraft Corporation Incorporated April1,1960— Incorporated March 26, Argentina 1968—Texas Transferred toIKASeptember SoldApril1,1971 29,1963 IndustriaLatinoamericana de AccesoriosS.A.

AffiliateofLAISA

Comet,S.A. 70.016%ownedbyLAISA; 12.672%ownedbyLSA;

17.312% owned by“others”

BEYOND THE HORIZONS

FormerSubsidiariesand Affiliates

Incorporated November 22, 1963—Mexico

SoldJune24,1971

Network Finance Ltd. (Formerly Hooker Finance Company Ltd.)

10.4%ownedbyLAI,Inc.

Incorporated June6,1951— Australia SoldJuly15,1971

NihonLockheed MonorailK.K.

8.33% owned byLAIL Incorporated May4,1961

= 508

Incorporated April10,1974 Dissolved September16, 1976

Aviquipo, Inc.

100% owned byLockheed Corporation

Incorporated October27,

1933—New York

Dissolved August 21,1978 Estalsa, S.A. 8.33%ownedbyLAI Incorporated December 31, 1965

Dissolved December 2,1976 Dissolved AsianExport Aviquipo Domestic InternationalLockheed Company SalesCorporation

Lockheed Corporation—no shares issued Inc. Incorporated February 24, Incorporated April 28,1975— 100% owned byAviquipo,

Nevada Dissolved December19,1975

1978 Dissolved March5, 1979

Aeronautica Macchi S.p.A. byLockheed International Sales Corporation 20%owned Corporation 100%ownedbyLAC 1912 Incorporated April28,1975— Incorporated Lockheed Domestic

Nevada

Dissolved December 19,1975 Lockheed WesternSales Corporation

100% owned byLAC Incorporated January 31, 1974—Nevada

Dissolved December19,1975 Lockheed International Limited Taiwan

100%ownedbyLAIL

(Lockheed Aircraft Company

interest acquired November 27,1959,n/o

LAISA andtransferred n/oLACJune28,1967)

SoldFebruary 22,1979

AviacoTradersLimited

100% owned byLockheed Corporation

Incorporated November5,

1969

Dissolved October31, 1979

Lockheed Corporation Subsidiaries, Affiliates, Divisions, and Groups

«= 509

FormerSubsidiariesand Affiliates

Lockheed Petroleum Services, Ltd. 100%ownedbyLPS,Inc. Incorporated August11, 1969—Vancouver, B.C.(a

BritishColumbia

corporation)

SoldDecember20, 1979

Lockheed Petroleum Services,

Inc.

100% owned byLockheed Corporation

Incorporated May8,1978— California SoldDecember 20,1979

Lockheed Petroleum Services (U.K.)Limited

asubsidiary ofLPSLtd. Incorporated January 9,

1976—United Kingdom SoldDecember 20,1979

Lockheed Equipamentos e Servicios Ltda.

asubsidiary ofLPSLtd. Incorporated November 21, 1975—Brazil SoldDecember 20,1979

Lockheed AircraftNederland

B.V.(formerly N.V.)

100% owned byLockheed

Corporation—Holland Dissolved February 14,1980

Formerly Lockheed Aircraft

(Mid-East) S.A.—name

changed September 13, 1978

Incorporated June29,1971— Switzerland

Merged intoLockheed

Aircraft (Europe) S.A.

December19,1980 (LAESA becameLockheed

Corporation International

S.A.asofJanuary 13, 1981)

Lockheed S.A.deC.V.

100% owned byLockheed

Corporation Incorporated September 22, 1958—Mexico

Acquired byLACNovember 3,1968 Liquidated January 12,1983 AlaskaStateFuelingFacilities Corporation(ASFFC)

Incorporated April30,1981— Alaska

Dissolved February 18,1983 LFCCreditCorporation (New

York)

Merged intoLockheed

Finance Corporation July

23H A282

Lockheed (Africa andMid-East) Airarms Incorporated

S.A. 100% owned byLockheed Corporation

100% owned byLockheed Aircraft Company Incorporated April27,1940

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 510 FormerSubsidiariesandAffiliates

Fueling Facilities Acquired byLACAugust 31, SanFrancisco 1942

Dissolved August19,1983

Lockheed Systems S.A. Incorporated December 12,

1974—-Switzerland Dissolved August22,1983

Corporation (SFFFC) Lockheed AirTerminal, Inc.— nosharesissued

Incorporated July2,1981— California Dissolved June12,1984

TricitiesProtectiveServices,Inc.

Lockheed Properties, Inc. (TPSD— 100% owned byLockheed 100% owned byLockheed Corporation AirTerminal,Inc. Incorporated August 24,1970 Incorporated April26,1982— Merged intoLockheed California Corporation August 29, Dissolved June12,1984 1983 HonoluluFuelingFacilities Lockheed AircraftInternational, Corporation(HFFC)

S.A. 100% owned byLockheed Corporation

4.6%owned byLockheed Air Terminal,Inc.

Incorporated August 25, Incorporated August 28, 1979—Hawaii 1959 LATreturned stockin 1984 Dissolved August 16,1983 Portland Fueling Facilities LDSCorporation Corporation (PFFC) 100% owned byLockheed 10%owned byLockheed Air Corporation

Incorporated March 19,1984 Merged intoDatacom Systems Corporation May 17,1984

Terminal, Inc.

Incorporated November 18, 1971—Oregon

Stock returned in1984 RenoFueling Facilites

LosAngeles Fueling Facilities Corporation(RFFC) Corporation(LAFFC)

Lockheed AirTerminal, Inc.— nosharesissued

Incorporated December 21, 1981—California

Dissolved June12,1984

Lockheed AirTerminal—no sharesheld

Incorporated December 28,

1979—Nevada No LATinvestment—closed

1984

Lockheed Corporation Subsidiaries, Affiliates, Divisions, and Groups

= 511

FormerSubsidiaries andAffiliates

Lockheed Technology S.A. (LTSA) Incorporated December 12,

Lockheed Overseas Capital N.V. (LOCNV)

Oklahoma Fueling Facilities

Incorporated June15,1979— Netherlands Antilles Dissolved December 29,1985 Datacom Municipal Systems of

1974—-Switzerland Dissolved July14,1984

Corporation (OFFC)

100%ownedbyLockheed AirTerminal,Inc.

100%ownedbyLockheed Corporation

Texas,Inc.(DMST)

Incorporated August 8,1980— 100% owned byDatacom

Oklahoma Dissolved December 12,1985 OceanMinerals, Inc.(OMI)

Systems Corporation

Incorporated March 28, 1983—Texas

December 30,1985 39.71% owned byLockheed Dissolved Missiles &Space Lockheed Aircraft International, Company Inc.(LAT) Incorporated November 4, 100% owned byLockheed

1977—Delaware Renewed February 29,1984— Delaware Dissolved December 12,1985

Corporation

Incorporated November 22, 1943—California

Dissolved January 28,1986

Lockheed Domestic PanelLockHomes(Phil)Inc. International Sales Corp.II (PHIL) (LDISC I) 34%owned byLockheed 100%owned byLockheed Corporation Corporation Incorporated October 10, Incorporated August 4,1983— 1967—Philippines Nevada Dissolved December 18,1985

Lockheed acquired shares fromLockheed Aircraft International, A.G.

Datacom Municipal Systems of September 24,1976 Ohio,Inc.(DMSO) Allstockdisposed ofApril9, 100% owned byDatacom 1986 Systems Corporation Incorporated August 10, CTLCorporation(CTL) 1982—Ohio 50%owned byLockheed Dissolved December 27,1985 Corporation

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 512

FormerSubsidiaries andAffiliates

Fueling Facilities Incorporated May17,1978—Arizona Corporation ( AFFC) Cayman Islands Dissolved March31, 1986

Pontifex Acquisition

Corporation (PONTIFEX)

100% owned byLockheed

Affiliate ofLockheed Air Terminal,Inc.

Incorporated January 23, 1979—Arizona

Stockreturnedin 1986

Corporation

Incorporated July7,1986— UtahFuelingFacilities Corporation (UFFC) Delaware Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.— Merged intoSanders noshares Associates October6, 1986

Incorporated August28, 1980—Utah

in 1986 Coventry Business Systems, Inc. Dissolved 100% owned byDatacom Martemis Systems AG Systems Corporation (MARTEMIS) Incorporated January 15, 100% owned byMetier 1979—New York Management Systems Dissolved November 19, Holding BV 1986 Incorporated 1982— Switzerland Sanders Securities Corporation LiquidatedDecember31, (SSECCO) 1986 100% owned bySanders Associates, Inc.

Macrodata Corporation

Incorporated December 12, 100%ownedbyDatacom 1984—-Massachusetts Systems Corporation Merged intoSanders Incorporated June29,1983— Associates December 1, California 1986

Dissolved June,1987

Collections Systems Calcomp S.A.deC.V.(CSACV)Datacom

49%owned bySanders Associates

Incorporated May1980— Mexico

Soldduring FY1986to privateparty

Corporation(DCSC)

100% owned byDatacom Systems Corporation

Incorporated April7,1971— NewYork Dissolved July28,1987

Lockheed Corporation Subsidiaries, Affiliates, Divisions, and Groups

= 513

FormerSubsidiaries andAffiliates

Brophy &Associates, Inc. (BROPHY)

100%ownedbyDatacom Systems Corporation

Incorporated May5,1982— Delaware Dissolved August19,1987

DiconN.V.(DICONNV)

100% owned byMetier Management Systems Int’l N.V.

Incorporated 1982— Netherlands Antilles

Liquidated August 28,1987 MetierManagement Systems International N.V. 100%ownedbyMetier,Inc.

Incorporated April19,1982 Liquidated August 28,1987

Lockheed SaitElectronics S.A.

(LSE) 50%owned byLockheed

Incorporated August 25, 1980—California

Soldto Knight-Ridder InformationServices, Inc.,

August31,1988

SandersInternational Sales Corporation(SISCO)

100%ownedbySanders Associates, Inc.

Incorporated March 22,

1982—Delaware DissolvedSeptember13, 1988

S.A.SalesCorporation (SASCO) Incorporated May19,1982— Delaware

Dissolved September 13, 1988

TerakCorporation(TERAK)

100%owned byCalComp Inc.

Corporation

Incorporated December

DatacomConsultants,Inc.

Lockheed AircraftInternational,

1978—Delaware Incorporated June14,1973— Dissolved November15, Belgium 1988 Liquidated October 20,1987

(DCI)

100%ownedbyDatacom Systems Corporation

Incorporated August 30,1979 Dissolved June24, 1988

A.G.(LAIAG)

100%owned byLockheed Corporation

Incorporated July8,1960—

Switzerland LiquidatedDecember2, 1988

Dialog Information Services, Inc.(DIALOG) Lockheed CanadaInc.(LCAN) 100%ownedbyLockheed Corporation

100%ownedbyLockheed Corporation

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 514 FormerSubsidiariesand Affiliates

Incorporated June10,1974— California SoldtoJeppesen Sanderson,

Incorporated September 9, 1939—Canada

Amalgamated withSanders CanadaInc.andceasedto existon December25,

1988

SandersCanadaInc.(SACI)

100%ownedbyLockheed Corporation

Inc.,December4, 1989

Memrykord Limited (MEMRYKORD)

91%ownedbyLockheed DataPlan, Inc.

Incorporated April11,1985—

9%owned byLockheed

Corporation Incorporated July15,1977— Amalgamated withLockheed England CanadaInc.andceased to Soldto TM Holdings,Inc., Canada

existonDecember 25, 1988

ImageResource Corporation

(IMAGE) 100% owned byCalComp Inc.

Incorporated January 15, 1971—California Dissolved January 5,1989

December 4,1989

Austcad Pty.Ltd.(AUSTCAD) 10%ownedbyCADAM Inc.

Acquired August 18,1986 (Australia)

SoldtoIBMJanuary5, 1990

CADAM Inc.(CADAM) 100% owned byLockheed GetexInc.(GETEX) Corporation Lockheed Corporation—no Incorporated July23, shares issued 1981—California Incorporated November 19, SoldtoIBMJanuary 5,1990 1982—Georgia Dissolved April25,1989 CadamDeutschlandGmbH ArtemisMiddleEastE.C.

100% owned byMetier Inc.

Incorporated March1, 1983—Bahrain

(CDGmbH)

100%ownedbyCADAM

Inc. FormedDecember11,1986—

Germany Liquidated May22,1989 SoldtoIBMJanuary 5,1990 Lockheed Dataplan, Inc.(LDI) FranceSARL(CFS) 100% owned byLockheed CADAM Corporation 5%owned byCADAM Inc.

Lockheed Corporation Subsidiaries, Affiliates, Divisions, and Groups = 515

FormerSubsidiariesandAffiliates

Formed December 16,1985— France Soldto IBMJanuary5, 1990 CADAMInternationalB.V.

(CIBV)

100%owned byCADAM Inc.

FormedOctober17,1986— theNetherlands

SoldtoIBMJanuary 5,1990

CADAMPacificLimited(CPL)

100%ownedbyCADAM Inc.

FormedOctober3, 1986—

HongKong

SoldtoIBMJanuary5, 1990 CADAM Systems Company

(CSC) 50%owned byCADAM Inc.

100%owned byArtemis Management Systems

HoldingsLtd. Incorporated August12,

1981—Australia

Acquired byLockheed Corporation May20, 1985

Soldto LucasIndustries,Inc., March30, 1990

Dicon A.G.(DICONAG)

100%ownedbyDicon HoldingNetherlands B.V

Incorporated October 26, 1982—Switzerland Acquired byLockheed Corporation May20,

1985 SoldtoLucas Industries, Inc., March30, 1990

Incorporated April2, 1984— DiconHoldingNetherlands

B.V.(DICONBV) 100% owned byDicon N.V. Incorporated June5,1981— 1990 theNetherlands Artemis Management Systems Acquired byLockheed Holdings Limited Corporation May20, 100%ownedbyMetierInc. 1985 Soldto LucasIndustries,Inc., Incorporated May29, Japan SoldtoIBMJanuary5,

1981—Hong Kong

Acquired byLockheed

March30, 1990

Metier,Inc.(METIER) 100%ownedbyLockheed Corporation Soldto LucasIndustries,Inc., Corporation May20, 1985 March30, 1990

Artemis Management Systems Pty.Limited

Incorporated June7,1985— California SoldtoLucas Industries, Inc., March30,1990

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 516

FormerSubsidiaries andAffiliates

Metier Management Systems Benelux B.V. 100%ownedbyMetier Management Systems HoldingBV

Incorporated August 27, 1982—the Netherlands

Acquired byLockheed Corporation May20, 1985

100% owned byMetier, Inc. Incorporated 1983—the

Netherlands Acquired byLockheed Corporation May20,

1985 SoldtoLucas Industries, Inc., March 30,1990 Metier Management Systems,

SoldtoLucas Industries, Inc., Inc. 100%ownedbyMetier,Inc.

March30,1990 MetierManagement Systems

Deutschland GmbH 100% owned byMetier

Management Systems HoldingBV Incorporated— West

Germany Acquired byLockheed Corporation May20,

1985 Soldto LucasIndustries,Inc., March30, 1990

Metier Management Systems FranceS.A.R.L. 100%ownedbyMetier Management Systems

Holding BV Incorporated June8,1978— France

Incorporated June8, 1978—

Delaware Acquired byLockheed Corporation May20,

1985

Soldto LucasIndustries,Inc., March30, 1990

Metier Management Systems International Limited 100%ownedbyArtemis Management Systems

Holdings Ltd. Incorporated December 31,

1981—Hong Kong Acquired byLockheed Corporation May20,

1985 SoldtoLucas Industries, Inc., March30, 1990

Acquired byLockheed MetierManagement Systems Corporation May20, ItaliaS.R.L. 1985 100% owned byMetier SoldtoLucas Industries, Inc., Management Systems March 30,1990 HoldingBV

MetierManagement Systems

Holding B.V.

Incorporated July4,

1984—Italy

Lockheed Corporation Subsidiaries, Affiliates, Divisions, and Groups = 517

FormerSubsidiariesandAffiliates

Acquired byLockheed

CorporationMay20, 1985 Soldto LucasIndustries,Inc., March30, 1990

Corporation May20, 1985

Soldto LucasIndustries,Inc., March30, 1990

Metier Management Systems Metier Management Systems (R.S.A.) (Proprietary) Limited Limited 100%ownedbyMetier Management Systems Int’l

Ltd.

Incorporated June25,

1981—Japan

Acquired byLockheed Corporation May20,

1985 SoldtoLucas Industries, Inc., March30,1990

MetierManagement Systems

100%ownedbyMetier Management Systems

Holding BV

Incorporated 1984—South Africa Acquired byLockheed Corporation May20, 1985

Soldto LucasIndustries,Inc., March30, 1990

MetierManagement Systems

Scandinavia A/S Limited 100% owned byMetier 100% owned byMetier Management Systems Systems, Ltd. Holding BV Incorporated December 6, Incorporated June28, 1976—England 1982—Norway Acquired. byLockheed Acquired byLockheed Corporation May20, Corporation May20, 1985 1985 SoldtoLucas Industries, Inc., Sold toLucas Industries, Inc., March 30,1990 March30,1990 MetierManagement Systems

Pte.Ltd. 100% owned byArtemis Management Systems

Holdings Ltd.

Incorporated March17,

1981—Singapore

Acquired byLockheed

Metier Management Systems Sweden Aktiebolag 100%ownedbyMetier Management Systems

Holding BV Incorporated November, 1984—-Sweden

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 518 FormerSubsidiariesandAffiliates

Acquired byLockheed Corporation May20,

HighPointRealty Corporation (HIPOINT) 1985 Incorporated April5, Soldto LucasIndustries,Inc., 1967—New Hampshire March30,1990 Merged intoLockheed Sanders, Inc.,January 15, Metier Systems, Ltd. 1991 100% owned byMetier, Inc. Hi-Tension Realty Corporation Incorporated June24, (HITENSION) 1985—Delaware October 13, SoldtoLucas Industries, Inc., Incorporated March30,1990

Avicom International, Inc. (AVICOM)

Incorporated November 16,

1979—California Acquired byLockheed Air

Terminal,Inc.,May29,

1985 SoldtoHughesAircraft June 13,T990 Avicom International, Inc.S.A.

(AVICOM SA) Incorporated March 20, 1984—Mexico

Acquired byLockheed Air Terminal, Inc.,May29,

1985 SoldtoHughes Aircraft June 13,1990

1960—Delaware MergedintoLockheed Sanders, Inc.,January15,

1994 Lockheed Electronics

International Operations, Inc. (LEIO)

100% owned byLockheed Sanders, Inc. Incorporated August 9, 1979—New Jersey

Dissolved April29, 1991

Lockheed Aircraft Service Singapore Private Limited (LASS)

100% owned byLockheed Corporation

Incorporated February 23, 1970—Singapore Dissolved March9, 1992

Lockheed Electronics Company,Transnational Housing Inc.(LEC) Company(TCH) Incorporated November 23, 48%owned byLockheed 1970—California Corporation Merged intoLockheed Incorporated August23, Sanders, Inc.,July1, 1977—-Cayman Islands 1990 Dissolved March 31,1992

Lockheed Corporation Subsidiaries, Affiliates, Divisions, and Groups » 519

FormerSubsidiariesand Affiliates

Lockport Marine (LOCKPORT)MergedintoLockheed Sanders, Inc.,February 100%owned byLockheed 27;1993 Corporation Incorporated May1,1985— Oregon InternationalDisarmament Dissolved April27,1992 Corporation (IDC)

Lockheed Systems &Services, Inc.(LSASI)

100% owned byLockheed IMS

Incorporated September 26, 1991—Louisiana

Dissolved September21,

1992

33¥%3% owned byLockheed Engineering & Sciences Co. Incorporated January21, 1992—Delaware Stocksoldto B&WEnergy Investments October14,

1994

LockheedEmployment Services,

Analytyx Electronic Systems, Inc.(LESI) Incorporated October 4, Inc.(ANALYTYX) 1991—California 100% owned bySanders Associates, Inc.

Incorporated April28, 1976—New Hampshire

Soldto LockheedFederal CreditUnionNovember

29,1995

APPENDIX IV

AnInsightintoa Few ImportantLockheed Companies

Lew almost continuously adapted theframework ofitsorganization tosuitchanging business needs. Forexample, wehave

seenhowtheestablishment oftheLockheed Missile System Division

inJanuary 1954grewrapidly intotheLockheed Missiles & Space

Division inJanuary1959,andthen,inJune1961,became theLock-

heedMissiles &Space Company. InAugust 1971, thecompany was incorporated asLMSC, Incorporated, andwentonfromthere. Thisphenomenon ofgrowth andproliferation occurred aswell ontheaeronautic sideandwiththose companies formed during Lockheed’s periodic attempts todiversify andtogarner ahigher proportion ofnondefense business reach. Lockheed alsoformed oracquired many companies whose business complemented thoseoftheparent corporation. Manyofthesecompanies hadlong,distinguished, andprofitablehistories, butspacelimitations preclude morethana brief

An Insight into a Few Important Lockheed Companies = 521

andworkers theirleaders instances here.Inmany description summary firm,andtheyneverfeltany Lockheed hadbeenpartoftheoriginal lossofidentity. Inthecaseofacquisitions, itsometimes tookacon-

organization oftheacquired periodoftimebeforemembers siderable

feltthattheyweretruemembers oftheLockheed family. Thefollowing listgives someinsight intothedepthandbreadth ofLockheed activities beyond thoseofmaking air-andspacecraft.

Lockheed Aircraft Service Corporation (Now Lockheed

depotsetup MartinAeronauticsInternational)Fromasmall ofLockheed inAmsterdam in 1938tofurnish European operators the pressures base, andmaintenance handy s ervice with a equipment togrow into ofwarcaused theLockheed Aircraft Service Corporation Inthesameyear,a basehadbeensetupin organization. a worldwide

Hudsonbombers.Asimto reassemble GreatBritain,nearLiverpool,

in1939.Whenwar inAustralia unitwasestablished ilarreassembly in andRenfrew atAbbotsfinch wereestablished bases came,further anda corinIreland, nearBelfast Lodge, andatLangford Scotland, responding establishment wascreated inDallas, Texas. Theexpansion ofeffortledtotheformation oftheLockheed Overseas Corporation, headed bytheproductive Lockheed salesman wereinvaluable CarlSquier.Whenthewarended,theseorganizations

in1946. (LASC) Company Service Aircraft theLockheed forforming LASC wasthefirstofitstypetobeestablished byanaircraft aircraft included Itsmainlinesofbusiness company. manufacturing maintenance andmodification; building aircraft systems trainers fora techandtheSR-71; theF-117A including ofaircraft, widevariety fieldsertechnical companies; toforeign andtraining transfer nology andgunnery andbombing ofairports theoperation vice(toinclude missiles); and ofaircraft and modification service asthe aswell ranges equipment. and associated datarecorders offlight andthemanufacture history,it hasprocessed In the courseof itsmorethanfive-decade

ofeverymajormanufacturer. aircraft thousand twohundred nearly particall Whilemuchoftheworkwasroutine, ofitwasimportant, ofthemodificaSome aircraft. ofpresidential themaintenance ularly tionsperformedwereexotic,includingthe installationof theGerard

P.Kuiper Airborne Observatory onNASA’s C-141transport.

Inrecent years, thecorporation hasbeenattheleading edgeof ofexoandmodification integration, systems inthedesign, technology With operations. and special reconnaissance, forintelligence, ticaircraft LASC Airport, International (California) attheOntario headquarters

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 522

hasanumber ofotherLockheed subsidiaries reporting toit,including LockheedAircraftServiceInternational(LASI).A numberof joint

ventures withforeign countries, including ChinaandHungary, made LASC intoaglobal operation before itsmerger withtheSkunk Works. LockheedAirTerminalIn 1940,Lockheed purchased theUnion

AirTerminal fromUnited AirLines for$1.5million, withCyril Chappelletbeingnamed president ofthenewcompany. Atthattimethe airport wasthemajorterminal forairlines inSouthern California. Lockheed’s ownership oftheproperty facilitated itsrapidexpansion duringthewartime years.Thelessons learnedat Burbank permitted

theoperation toexpand toservices including fueling attwenty-five additional airports intheUnited States, Panama, andGuam. Aspreviously noted,afteryears ofsuccessful operation, theairport wassold in1978totheHollywood-Burbank Airport Authority for$51million. Memories oftheairport linger, however; contemporary environmental concerns reachbacktothemoreinnocentdaysofindustry whenthe disposition of fuels,paints,andothersubstances wasnotgiventhe

attention thatitistoday. Theresult isaseries oflegal disputes about theresponsibility forcleaning upsome oftheenvironmental problems inthearea. LockheedEngineering and ManagementServices Company (LEMSCO)(Later the Lockheed Engineering and Sciences Companyand nowLockheedMartin Space Op-

erations)Organized onthelastdayof1979,LEMSCO absorbed

several previous Lockheed entities intoaneworganization designed to providegovernment agencies, including NASA, witha varietyofen-

gineering, scientific, computer-related, andmanagement services. The company derived fromanearlier effortbyasmallteamfromStavid Engineering, before ittoobecame partofLockheed. Astimepassed andtechnology progressed, theorganization became increasingly sophisticated asithandled allspace shuttle ground processing operations. Lockheed Electronics Company(LEC)(Nowthe Lockheed Martin Electronics Sector) Lockheed startedsmallwith

the1959acquisition ofStavid Engineering, asmall electronics firmin Plainfield, NewJersey, merging thefirmintotheLockheed Electronics andAvionics Division. Thecompany wasa leader initsfield,producing abroadproduct lineofradarandradar-based weapon control systems, airtraffic control systems, computer components, andother

An Insight into a Few Important Lockheed Companies

= 523

electronic devices. Itsdiversification efforts ledittocontracts inboth commercial areasasmundane asbuilding computing registers foroil delivery trucks, andexotic fields liketaperecorders forsatellites on

NASA’s deepspacemissions. In itslateryears,thecompany’s most notablesuccess wastheMark86shipboard fire-control system forthe

U.S.Navy. Recognizing theneedtoattainamoreprominent position inthe electronics field,Lockheed acquired theSanders Corporation inAugust 1986to createLockheedSanders,Inc.The firmis nowcalled

Sanders, aLockheed Martin Company.

Sanders hadbeenfounded in1951asSanders Associates byelev-

enassociates fromtheRaytheon Corporation. Within tenyears ithad become oneofthenation’s toponehundred defense contractors. The company builta reputation fortechnical excellence andpioneered in thefieldofelectronic countermeasure systems. Itbecame noted during theVietnam Warforitsability toreactquickly tonewrequirements. DuringDesertStorm,morethantwothousandAlliedtacticalaircraft

wereprotected bySanders-built systems.

Sanders builttheelectronic warfare suitefortheF-22fighter and hasrecently secured contracts forthenextgeneration ofelectronic countermeasures equipment. Itspresident since1988,Dr.JohnR.

Kreick,isrecognized internationally forhiscontributions toelectronics

countermeasures andforhismanagement skills.

LockheedShipbuildingand ConstructionCompanyLock-

heed’s involvement withshipbuilding wasbriefly described inthetext. Thecompany haditsorigins withtheestablishment in1889asthe Seattle division oftheSanFrancisco Bridge Company. Founded to helprepairthedevastation ofa firethatleveled Seattle’s downtown area,thecompany branched intoshipbuilding, launching itsfirstship in 1898.By1899,thefirmhadchangeditsnameto thePugetSound

BridgeandDredging Company. Overthenextsixtyyearsit would

establish anenviable reputation, building 146ships andbuilding major civilian andmilitary installations. Lockheed acquired thefirmin1959, andchanged itsnametotheLockheed Shipbuilding andConstruction Company in 1965.Despite successful completion ofmanyprojects, thecombination ofhighlaborratesanda technology thatdiverged fromthemainthrustofLockheed’s endeavors caused thecompany to discontinue operations in 1987.

APPENDIX V

A ListofLockheed TestPilots

AY testpilots carry thecloak ofglamour withthem,butLockheed testpilotsoccupy a special nicheinaviation history. Theirfame isextraordinary because theyhadthemostextraordinary aircraft tofly. Lockheed products wentfarbeyond “pushing theenvelope” —they extended theenvelope toentirely newfrontiers. Noothercompany hadsuchanexotic series ofaircraft totest,beginning withtheVega, andextending downthrough theP-38,P-80,F-104, U-2,SR-71, F117,F-22,and,almostcertainly, beyond.

Among themany Lockheed testpilots aresome truegiants, men towhomthisentirebookcouldhavebeendevoted, andwhoeither haveorwillhavebooks written aboutthempersonally. Itisimpossible tochoose themostcapable fromthelonglist,buttheall-time all-stars include suchexperts asEddie Bellante, MiloBurchan, Jimmy Mattern, Marshal Headle, TonyLeVier, FishSalmon, Avery Black, StanBeltz,

A List of Lockheed Test Pilots

= 525

JimEastham, DaveFerguson, DonSegner, DarrylGreenameyer, Bill

Park,Sammy Mason, VernPeterson, LouSchalk, JoeTowleand more.

Thelistthatfollows includes mostLockheed testpilotsandthe planeswithwhichtheywereclosely associated. Pilot

Major Aircraft Tested

Harvey Adams

C-130,B-47

BobAkers

C-130

JesseAllen

C-130,C-5,C-141

HarlandArmitage KenArmstrong OlinBankhead

C-130,C-5,L-1011 C-130,B-47 C-130(diedin HTTBcrash)

EddieBellante

Vega

StanBeltz AveryBlack HomerBlalock

YC-130,P2V,Constellation SuperConstellation, P2V-7,WV-2,RC-121 C-130,C-5,C-141

VanceBreese

Altair,P-38(contract testpilot)

JimBrownIII MiloBurcham JimButtram HerbCatlin JohnChristensen ErnieClaypool DickClinton JackClower

F-117A P-38,XP-80(diedinYP-80crash) C-130,JetStar various S-3A P-80(diedin P-80accident) C-130 C-130,JetStar

O.J.Copeland

C-130

HankDees

C-130,C-141,C-5,L-1011

Lloyd Adsit

Ray Crandall

C-130

U2

D.K.Dishew

C-130

FredDorr

C-130

Raleigh Drennon

C-130,JetStar

R.E.Dunai

C-130

JackDunn

C-130,C-5,JetStar

Bernie Dvorscak

C-130, C-5,C-141, Hummingbird

Jim Eastham Ralph Evans

YF-12,SR-71 C-130, B-47

JackEverett

C-130

HaroldFarley Jr. HerbFaye

F-117A various

Dave Ferguson

F-117A,YF-22A

BEYOND THE HORIZONS Pilot

= 526

MajorAircraftTested

JackFrancis

C-130

W.N. Frazier JoeGarrett

C-130 C-130,B-47

BobGilliland

F-104,SR-71

KevinGootee RayGoudey

C-130 XF-104,JetStar,U-2

GlenGray

C-130,C-5,C-141

MikeGreen

C-130

DarrylGreenameyer SR-71 KennyGrubbs FrankHadden IvanHandley

MB-334,P-3 C-130,C-5,C-141 C-130,B-47

Barret Hanley

C-130, C-5

ArtHansen

C-130,JetStar,B-47

LloydHarris AlHead

C-130,B-47 C-130

MarshallHeadle Walt Hensleigh

Electra,ElectraJr., Super Electra,P-38 C-130, C-5, C-141

LesHewitt BobHill

C-130,JetStar,B-47 C-130,C-5,JetStar

SkipHolm

F-117A

CarlHughes J. L.Jenkins

C-130,C-5,C-141,B-47 C-130

HaroldJohnson RickJohnstone BillyJones

various C-130,C-5 C-130

DaveKerzie WarrenLee

L-1011 C-130,JetStar,B-47

R.E.Lemke

C-130

TonyLeVier

P-38,P-80,XF-90,F-94,F-104,Constellation

Ted Limmer

C-130, C-5, C-141

AllanLoughead

EarlyCurtiss Pusher, F-1Flying Boat

BretLuedke

MB-334,F-22

BobLuther ChuckMahoy BudMartin Sammy Mason RobertMassey

C-130, JetStar, B-47 C-130, JetStar C-130,Model33(LittleDipper)

JimmyMattern

BobMatye

Cheyenne, Constellation various P-38 U-2

A List of Lockheed Test Pilots

Pilot

= 527

Major Aircraft Tested

JohnMcClure

C-130

GeorgeMcEntire “Slim”Menafee

various various

RayMeskimen

Constellation

PaulMetz DonMills GeorgeMitchell DonMoor RalphMoore TomMorgenfeld

F-22 C-130,B-47 C-130(diedin HTTBcrash) L-1011 C-5 F-117A,YF-22A

BillyMorrell

C-130

“Red”Mulvahill S.B.Murray J. M.Myers JoeOzier BillPark

various C-130 C-130 various F-104,A-12,YF-12,HaveBlue

Swede Parker LloydParsons

P-38 C-130,JetStar

AlfonsoPersley

C-130,B-47

ArtPeterson JeffPeterson

F-104 C-130

VernPeterson

C-130,C-141,C-5,JetStar,B-47

WileyPost

Vega(contract testpilot)

FrankPowers BobPrice HankPrice

U-2 C-130 C-130,C-5,C-141

HalQuamme

C-130,Hummingbird

BobRiedenauer

U-2,SR-71,F-117A

WayneRoberts Kenny Rooke

C-130,P-3 C-130

RobRowe

U-2

Herman Salmon

C-121, P-80, F-104,Constellation

DonSegner LyleSchaefer

Cheyenne C-130,P-3

LouSchalk DickSchieber BobSchumacher RalphScott

A-12,F-104 JetStar U-2 C-130,B-47,JetStar

CarlSetili JimSiberell

JetStar C-130,B-47

BEYONDTHE HORIZONS = 528 Pilot

MajorAircraft Tested

RobertSieker WendalStultz LeoSullivan JimThomas R.L.Thomas WilliamThomas MickThornstenson

U-2(diedin U-2accident) C-130 C-130,C-5,C-141 F-117A C-130 various C-130

Jim Towery

C-130,JetStar

JoeTowle RoscoeTurner

P-38

Vega, AirExpress (contract testpilot)

RalphVirden

P-38(diedin YP-38crash)

VannWarren BillWeaver H. L.Webber KenWeir JimWhite GeneWhitton DickWigton

C-130,JetStar

RoyWimmer RoyWinter DonWright EdWycoff

SR-71,L-1011

C-130 S-3A,U-2,F-104,A-4S P-38,YP-80 C-130,C-141,B-47 JetStar

YC-130, Constellation various C-130,JetStar,B-47

C-130, JetStar, B-47

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D.J.Haughton, January 11,12,19,1982, andApril5,1982. R.W. Haack,April13,1982.

M.C.Haddon, February 5,1982. W.M.Hawkins, February 1-2,1982. H.L.Hibbard, February 2,1982.

J.K.Hull,February8, 1982. February 4,1982. F.S.Jacques, May7and8,1982. V.A.Johnson, i O. Kitchen,January27, 1982. February 10,1982. A.C.Kotchian, A.W.LeVier, January 26,1982. A.G. Meyer,February23, 1982.

R.I. Mitchell, February 26,1982.

ErikNelson,April13,1982.

R.J.Osborn, February 9,1982. G.E.Rice,March 25,1982. L.E. Root,February19, 1982.

L.Sullivan, May28,1982.

Anthony Stadlman, March 31,1982. C.S.Wagner, February 24,1982. W.R.Wilson, April1,1982.

Index

Abel,Rudolf,205,451

Abernathy, Robert,391

Aitken,WilliamMaxwell,Lord Beaverbrook, 89 Albert,Kingof Belgium,15

Allen,Edward T. “Eddie,” 86, 139

430-35, 437-41, 444-46, 449, 456,467

Anderson, Rudolph, 205,395-96 Aponnyi, Charles E.,2 Aponnyi,JohnHaines,2 Aponnyi,MayHope,2, 3

Aponnyi, Victor Rudolph, 2.See alsoLockheed, Victor

Allen,JamesS.,418 Ambrose,KennethW., 116 Amin,Idi,240

Araki,Minoru“Sam,”294,295,

Anderson,Roy,xxiv,271,328,

Arnold,HenryH.Hap,111,150,

Anders, William, 459 Anderson, Betty,374

339-41,347-48,360,362-63, 365,368,371,373-78,410,

303,310,312-14, 379,455, 466 Armstrong, Mike, 466 157,270

Aspin,Les,288-89

Index

Augustine, Norm,467,471-77, 479 Ayers, Jon,467 Azcarate, Juan,260 Babb,Charles,46 Bach,Morton,65

Bailey, R.A.,145 Balchen, Bernt,42 Baldwin, Ed“Baldy,” 200,412

Balzer,Gerald,12 Barber,Rex,118

Barker, Charles A.,Jr.,93,97, 112, 1325265

Battle,ClarenceL.“Lee,”299 Bednarz,Frank,282 Beech,Walter,32 Beed,C. F. “Carl,”65 Bellande,EdwardAntoine “Eddie,”26-28,31

536

Budwig, GilbertGeorge, 17,20-— 21 Bulkin, Bill,308 Burcham, Milo,139,155-57 Burke, Arleigh, 278-81

Burnett, Howie, 291

Burriss,Stanley,xvii,271,279,

282,374,375,378,457

Bush, George, 455

Campbell,David,390 Cannestra,Kenneth,98,379,425—

26,442,451,454,459

Capa,Robert,63

Capp,Al,153-54

Carmichael, JamesV.,224,225

Carr,Gardner W.,95

Carranza,Venustiano,10

Carrington, Lord,363

Beltz,Stanley, 234

Carroll,FranklinO., 152 Cass,Lorne,390

Bennett, Marcus C.,472

Cave-Browne-Cave, H.N.,90

Beman,Ward,110,137

Bernardi,Mariode, 150 Bernhard,Princeof the Netherlands,366 Bissell,Richard,200,297,299,

301,304,383,385-86,392, 393

Blackwell, James A.“Micky,” 379, 425-26,448,472

Boehme,Dick,385,390

Bong, Richard, 116-19, 156 Boyd, Alvin, 157

Brashears, Mel,321-23,326,485 Breese,Vance,21

Bromley, AlbertH.,25 Bronte,Emory,32 Brown,Alan,234,415

Brown, George, 254

Brown,Herschel,xvii,271,275,

374,375,378

Brown,Russell,158 Brown,Sid,282 Brown,William,390

Casserly, Mike,86-87

Chamberlain, SirNeville,84

Chapin,RoyD.,37 Chappellet, Cyril,60-63,75,93, 95, 97.1005 1125155, 189,

265 Charles, RobertH.,335-36,342

Charyk, Dr.Joseph V.,199 Cheney, Richard, 455

Christen, Harvey, 50,51,98 Christoffersen, CarlE., 14

Churchill, Winston, 99,120 Clark,Glenwood, 290 Clark,Jack,55 Cleaves,Prentice,163

Cleveland, F.A.“Al,”244,246, 265,266 Closterman, Pierre,109 Cochran,Jacqueline,259

Coffman, VanceD.,379,462-63, 472,483-85 Cokeley, R.C.,357 Coleman, R.L.,10

Index

Colman, Philip,151,193,199 Combs,Henry,390 Connally, John,359,360 Cook,Richard, 442 Corcoran, Thomas A.,472 Cord,E.1359 Cotton,Frederick Sidney, 78,79 Crocker, Harrison, 49-50 Crosson, Joe,34-35

Culver, Irving, 133,154,193, 265,267,268,272-74,343

Daniel,Russell,160-61 Daniels,Josephus,14 Davies,ThomasD., 147 Davis,Bill,32 Dees,H. B.,357 Degen,Lt. Comm.,103 DeMille,CecilB.,26

Detroyat, Michael, 39

Diehl,Walter,84

Dixon,Robert,414 Dixon,Sam,6 Doan,Vera,98

Dole,JamesD.,29 Doolittle, Jimmy,48,109,127 Doran,Mildred, 32 Dorrell,Vern,95 Douglas,Donald,18,21,405

Draper, Dr.Charles Stark, 280 Dudley, Tom,266

537

Erwin,William,32 Evans,EdwardS.,36-37

Farley, Harold, Jr.“Hal,”416-17

Farra,JamesA., 11 Feest,Gregory,419-20

Ferneau, AaronR.“Bob,”15

Fiedler, Willy, 282,283 Fisher,G. E.,357

Fitzgerald, Ernest, 337-38

Fleet,Reuben, xiv,405,459

Flint,LeoG., 15 Flock,Art,168,230,255-56 Flower,Hank,64

Fokker, Anthony “Tony,” 21,73,90 Ford,Edsel,37 Forrestal, James,275

Frain,Frank,99,354,363 Freeman,BrianM., 361-62 Frost,Eugene“Gene,”151,193, 199, 210, 229-30

Frost,JackW.,28,30 Frye,Jack,135,136,139 Fuhrman, RobertA.“Bob,”290, 328-29,339,340,379,446, 449,457

Fuller,Dick,390

Gagarin, Yury,382

Dulles,Allen,200

Dyson,Norman“Ken,”414

Galantin,I.J. “Pete,”289-90 Gardner,Trevor,199,200 Gates,George,5 Gatty,Harold,44

Eaker,Ira, 115

GeorgeV, Kingof England,33

Earhart, Amelia, 39,42-43,59, 74-76 Eichwaldt, Alvin,32 Eielson,Ben,33, 34

Eisenhower, Dwight,139,200, 202;203,205,277,292,301— 5

Geary,LeoP.,200,386

George VI,KingofEngland, 77

Gerschler, JamesM.,38,65,109, 12

Giap,VoNguyen, 238,239

Gibbons,Dr.James,321,322

Gillies, Jack,89 Gilliland, Bob,398

Elizabeth,Queenof Belgium,15

Gilmore,Earl,60

Emmons,HaroldH., 37

Goebel,Art,32, 39

Ellsworth, SirJohn,52

Glenn, Joseph K.,238

Index

Goldin,Daniel,469 Gordon, Jack,186 Gorman, Joe,466 Graves, William L.,64 Gray,Firman,51 Griffin,Marvin,234

Gross,Courtlandt Sherrington “Courtie,” xxiv,53,56,59,61, 63,91,93,95-96,102,13334, 190-91,207,208,218, 222-23, 225-26, 228, 230,

265,:27 1, 2748275;.592. 333; 337,395,445

Gross,Mrs.Courtlandt,445 Gross,MabelBowmanBell,52 Gross,RobertEllsworth“Bob,”x,

xv,xvi,xxiv,52-65,67,69-72, 81, 84,89, 93-95,99, 111-12,

538

Hawkins,WillisM.,xv—xvi, xvii—

xviii,90,98,105,133,151,

164,166,172,193,210,229-

31,265,268,271-73,279, 282,298,345,374-75,378,

433,457 Hawks,Frank,39

Hazen,RonaldM.,106 Headle, Marshall “Babe,” 40,69, 81, 112 Heal,Mervin,390 Hearst,George,29, 30, 31

Heath,Edward, 360,363 Hegenberger, AlbertF.,31-32 Height,Lou,145 Heppe,Dick,193,379,417,448 Hibbard, Hall,57-60,62-63,65-— 68,77,80,85,91,93-95,98,

125, 131-33, 146, 150-51,

106710912612335

188, 190, 207-9, 213, 220,

7251759178,193;,230-31,

153,155,163-64,169,172, 222-23,226,228,230-31, 243,264-65,270-71,274-75,

279,332-33,395,428,485 Gross,RobertHaven,52 Groves,MonteandPatricia,18

Gutierrez, DavidA.,2

T35$

138, 146, 151-52, 154, 171-

233,264-65,271,279,374, 395 Hibbard, IreneCurtiss, 67 Holland,Louis,211

Hollzer, Harry, 60

Hubbard, Art,282,291 Huerta,Victoriano,10

Haack,RobertW.,370-73,376,

Hughes, Howard, xix,57,61,82—

Haines, Mary,2

259,305,350 Hunsaker, Jerome,13

377,410,430 Haddon,Carl,98, 112,226

84, 111,135-36,139,234,

Halford,FrankBernard,152-53

Hussein,Saddam,248,419-21

Hall,NormanS.,9, 12-13 Hannan,WilliamM., 351 Harris,SirArthur,91

Ingalls,Laura,39,76 Irwin,WalterW., 194

Hall,Donald,21 Hall,Florence C.,44

Haughton, DanielJ.,xvi,xxiv,9899, 191, 218, 223, 225-28,

235,243,245,254-55,274, 332-34,337,339,341,347— 48,350-51,353-58,360,36263,365-68,370-71,376-77, 395,429-30

Infield, Jack,65

Jackson, Henry“Scoop,” 252

Jay,W. Kenneth,20, 21,25, 29,

31,35

Jenks,Fred,265

Jensen,Martin,32

Johnson, Althea Louise Young, 92, 176

Index

Johnson,ClarenceLeonard

“Kelly,” xv,xvii,xxiv,57,65— 69,77,80,82,90-93,98,106, 109-10,116, 121, 133,135,

139;150255;:157,. 159;165= 67,170-83,186,190-94,198202,206-8,229-31,233-34,

256—57, 379-80,382-88,392—

93,395-98,403-6,410-12

Johnson,Frank,163 Johnson,HowardC., 194

539

Kolk,FranklinW., 350,353-54

Kotchian, A.Carl,97-98,191,

213; 227; 25431255;3335:340;

360,363,365,368,371,376, 429,430 Kresa,Kent,478

Kurt,Franklin, 56 Laird,E. M. “Matty,”54 Lambie,J. S.,76-77

Johnson, Maryellen Elberta

Land,Dr.EdwinM.,198,297, 386 Lanphier, Thomas G.,117-18

Johnson, Nancy PowersHorrigan,

Leland, HenryM.,37

Johnson, Lyndon, 385,396 Meade,176 176

Johnson, Peter,173 Jones,DavidC., 408

Jones,DonaldC.,451 Jones,DonaldJ. Lloyd,354 Jones,Tom,366 Kaminski, Paul,313

Keeler,FredS.,20, 25, 35-37 Kelsey,BenjaminS., 109-11,121

Lee,George,54

LeMay,Curtis,62 LeVier,Tony,156-57,165-66,

194,201-2,207,245

Levison,WalterJ., 299 Lindbergh,AnneM., 39,40-41

Lindbergh, Charles, 19,24,27— 31,39-41,118 Lindley, Dr.W.P.,11 Lockheed, AllanHaines, Jr.,6

Kendrick, Jim,128

Lockheed, Allan(Loughead), xiv, 2, 4, 5-14,.16—21,:23, 26,28,

304,335 Kenney, George, 115,118 Kettering, D.F.,37

Lockheed, Dorothy Watts, 6,9

Kennedy,JohnF.,203,205,249,

Keys, Clement M.,36

Khrushchev, Nikita,204,205,

2925382

Killian,JamesR., 199 King,Ronald,62 Kingsford-Smith, SirCharles,39 Kirkham,Charles,8 Kissinger, Henry,402 Kitchen,Larry,xxiv,252,328,

335,339-42,367-68,371,375— 78,410,423,430,432-35, 439,440,442,446-47,44950,456,467,468 Knope, Vilas,32 Kodama, Yoshio, 366

31,35,37,39,52,53,60,84— 87,188

Lockheed, Evelyn StarrLeslie, 6 Lockheed,FloraElizabeth,6, 9

Lockheed, FloraHaines (Loughead), 1-4,10-11

Lockheed,HelenKundert,6

Lockheed, JohnAllan,6

Lockheed, Malcolm(Loughead), 2— 5, 7-11, 14-16,18,20,26, 84

Lockheed, Victor (formerly Victor Aponyi),2, 4, 5

Long,Stanley A.,116

Loughead, John,2 Lougheadbrothers,xiv.seealso

Lockheed, Allan;Lockheed, Malcolm

Lynch,Thomas,117

Index

540

MacArthur, Douglas, 139

Moss,Sandford,107 Mullin,Sherman,186,412,423-—

McDonald,Charles,118 McDonnell,James,405

Munson,Ray,291

McCone, John,304

McElroy, NeilH.,292

McGuire,ThomasB., 118-19 McHenry,Ray,390 Mack,JosephF., 238 McMahon,JohnN., 197,205,

297,379,451-52,455,466 McNamara, RobertS.,243,246, 248-49,335,337,393,400 Maitland, Lester J.,31-32

Mamlock,Max,8, 10 Mantz,Paul,42, 75 Marafino,VincentN., 362,365—

67,376-77,432,434,437, 440-41,446,449-50,455-56, 465,467-69,471-72 Margwarth, John,212

26,448

Nelson,Norman,415,417

Neumann, Gerhard, 194,353 Newall, SirCyril,78 Newman,Wilson,372

Nichols, Ruth,39

Nielson,H. T., 14 Nixon,RichardM., 360

Noonan,Fred,76

Northrop,Charles,21 Northrop,JohnKnudsen“Jack,”

9, 12-13,15-16,18,20-21, 23,25-26,28,30-31,35,39, 60, 70, 405

Noyes,Blance, 76

Martin,Bud,128 Martin,Ed,390

Oder,Dr. FredericC. E. “Fritz,”

Martin,Gill,297 Martin,George, 192

Ogden,Gene,102

Martin,GlennL.,405,468,469

Mattern, Jimmy,39,119 Mayte,Bob,201 Meir,Golda,254,402 Menasco,Al,94, 95 Merrill,H. T. “Dick,”76 Metz,Paul,427

Meyer, Paul,10 Meyerhoffer, Orvar S.T. “Swede,” 15

Millar, J.H.,89

299,313-14,463

Ogden,Henry,65

O’Green,Fred,295,298,379 O’Laughlin, Burt,390 Olds,RansomE.,37

O’Malley, JeromeF.“Jerry,” 403 Orman,Monte,225

Ormsby, RobertB.,Jr.“Bob,” 379,430 Osberg,Frank,128

Overholser, Denys, 409,410,412, 416 Oviatt,Alvin,11

Miller,Dick,413

Miller,G.William, 365 Millikan, Dr.RobertA.,269 Minter,MaryMiles,11,14,15 Mitchell,HaroldE.,303 Mitchell,JohnW., 117 Montague,Dave,291

Montgomery, James F.,4—5 Mooney, Al,259 Mooney, Art,259

PabstvonOhain,HansJoachim,

150

Packard,David,347 Palmer,Donald,81, 135,163, 174, 180

Parangosky, John,299,385-86

Park,Bill,413-14

Patman,Wright,360

Pedlar, John“Augie,” 32

Index

Peline, Val,308,379,449,453, 469-70

Penly, John,2

Perry,William,313,321,323,414 Plew,JamesE.,4—6 Plummer,JamesW., xvii,297—

300,379 Polifka, Karl,116 Post,Wiley,33,39,43-47 Powers, Francis Gary,202,204-5, 303,322,384,451

Price,Nathan“Nate,”133,15152,165;230

Proctor, Robert, 91

Proxmire, William, 338-39,360 Prudden, George, 65 Pulver, W.A.“Dick,”112,164, 230,243,255-56,339

Putnam, George Palmer, 42,59,

74,75 Putt,DonaldL.,193,200

Quesada, Elwood P.“Pete,”211, 271-72

Raborn,WilliamFrancis“Red,” 278-82,284,289-90,457

Rae,Randolph Samuel, 382

Rahmlow, Hans,103 Ralston, William, 193 Rathman, Ted,97-98

Raymond, Arthur E.,269

Reagan, Ronald, 237,326,439, 441-43,451 Real,Jack,234,259 Reichers,Lou,39 Rich,Annie,407

541

Ridenour,Louis,xvii,282

Rieke, William, 342 Ritchie, Steve,145

Ritland,OsmondJ. “Ozzie,”200, 297,299 Robertson,Dave,390 Rockne,Knute,60

Rodman, BurtonRobert, 9, 11

Rogers, Will,33,45-47

Root,L.Eugene, xvii,269-71,

279, 280, 282, 298, 374, 375, 378

Rummell, Robert, 350 Rust,William L.,11

Ryan,Claude,21 Ryan,ThomasFortune,III,60,

61,64

Ryker, P.E.,225 Salmon,Herman“Fish,”168, 194, 211

Sarabia,Francisco,39

Sayer, P.E.G.“Gerry,” 150 Schair,George,192

Schalk, Louis,390,393

Schluter,Paul,32 Schriever, BernardA., 199,270, 280

Schroeder, Bill,409-10,416 Scott,Gordon,30

Seaberg, John,197-98 Self,SirHenry,90

Shaffer, Joseph D.R.,120

Shahan,Elza,120 Short,MacV. F., 54,94, 132,

145,163 Simmons, HaroldC.,455-58, 466,468

Rich,Ben,xvii,133,172,175, 185-86,193,379-80,385,387— Skantze,Larry,423 88,390,396,399-400, 406— Skowronski, Walt,456 17,419,421,423,448 Smith,Ernie,32 Rich,FayeMayer, 407,416 Smith,FerrisM., 78 Smith,Kenneth,90,291 Rich,Isidore, 407

Richey, Helen, 75-76

Richter, E.O.“Rick,” 265

Smith,Levering, 280,281,290,

457

Index

Sommerfeld, Arnold Johannes, 409 Spater, George, 354 Spitzer, Lyman, Jr.,308 Spreuer,William,211 Squier,CarlB.,37-38,40, 43,

51,57,59-62,91,92,101-2

Stadlman, Anthony “Tony,” 7,9, 13,16,23,26,85-86 Stalker, Edwin A.,66,67

Stanley, Robert, 150 Stanton, Dick,234

Statler,Bill,210-11,230,256

Stearman, LloydCarlton, 43,54— 55,57,59-63,65,72 Steiner, Jack,192 Stevenson, Bill,378

Stout,William B.“Bill,”65,110 Stuart,Dr.Derald A.,280,290

Styne, Jim, 467 Sutton,Frank,260

Swayne, George, 92

Talbott,Harold,200

Taylor, Dennis, 253

Taylor,Dick,342,437 Teets,PeterB.,472 Tellep,DanielM.,xxiv,133,274,

2907321; 326;'328;:376; 377, 379,449-51,453-63,465-77, 483

Teller,Dr. Edward,280

Thaden, Louise, 76

Thompson,J. H., 103

Thoren,R.L.“Rudy,” 139,165, 166 Thorp,John,163

Tice,Clay,120

Tomlinson, DanielWebb “Tommy,”63, 135

Towle, Joe,145,165 Towle,Tom,38

Turner,Roscoe, 24,30,60

542

Ufimtsev, Pyotr,409 VanKarman, Dr.Theodore, 269

Varney, Walter T.,49,56-61,63,

72 VonHake,Richard A.,25,38,51, 60,65,66,91,225 Vultee, Gerard“Gerry,” 23,25, 34,35,38-40,59 Wagner,C. S. Chuck,244-45,

255,256 Walker, Jacqueline, 61,94 Walker, Randolph C.“Bob,”6062, 94, 132

Warburg,FrederickM., 64 Warsitz,Erich,150,151

Wassall, Jack,145 Way,Ferris, 73

Webb,HaroldE., 86-87

Welch,LarryD.,403,414

Wells,EdwardC., 192,405

Wertheim, RobertH.,290 Wheaton, E.P.,330 Whitley, AltonC.,Jr.“Al,”419 Whittle,Frank,150,151,153 Wilkins,GeorgeHubert,33-35 Williams,Al, 157

Wilson, Frank,246

Wilson,Lloyd,291 Wilson,Woodrow,15 Wimmer,Roy,211,234 Woods,Robert,49

Work,James, 37

Wright, Bill,308

Wright, Orville,xiii, 139, 140

Yamamoto,Isoroku,117

Yeager, Charles, 265 Young,Tom,472

Zipp,Harold, 55 Zuck,Dan,390

$19.95/$30.99 Can. is the story of

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ISBN 0-312-24438-X

THOMASDUNNEBOOKS ST. MARTIN’SGRIFFIN

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