Arrows in the dark: David Ben-Gurion, the Yishuv leadership, and rescue attempts during the Holocaust, Vol. 2 9780299175535, 9780299175504

Table of contents :
Frontmatter
Acknowledgments (page ix)
Introduction (page 3)
Part I. Confronting the Information
1. Phases of Acknowledging: Information, Consciousness, Mental and Emotional Processing (page 15)
2. Protest: Political Tool or Substitute for Action (page 77)
3. Lightning Rod: Establishing the Rescue Committee (page 125)
Part II. Rescue Plans
General Introduction (page 139)
4. "Or We Shall Have No Repentance": Plans to Rescue Children (page 143)
5. Dealing with the Devil: The 1942 and 1943 Ransom Plans (page 195)
6. Between the Hammer and the Anvil in 1944: Continuing Efforts to Rescue Children and the Struggle for Immigration to Palestine (page 239)
7. The Secret Partnership (page 261)
Notes (page 357)

Citation preview

ARROWS IN THE DARK

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David Ben-Gurion, the Yishuv Leadership, and Rescue Attempts during the Holocaust

VOLUME 1

Tuvia Friling Translated by Ora Cummings

THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN PRESS

This book was published with the support of Ben Gurion University of the Negev and the Shalem Center in Jerusalem. The University of Wisconsin Press 1930 Monroe Street Madison, Wisconsin 53711

www.wisc.edu/wisconsinpress/ 3 Henrietta Street London WC2E 8LU, England Copyright © 2005 The Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System All rights reserved

54321

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Friling, Tuvia. [Hets ba-arafel. English] Arrows in the dark: David Ben-Gurion, the Yishuv leadership, and rescue attempts during the Holocaust / Tuvia Friling [translated by Ora Cummings]. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-299-17550-2 (hc) 1. World War, 1939-1945—Jews—Rescue. 2. Holocaust, Jewish (1939-1945) 3. Jews—Palestine—Politics and government—20th century. 4. Ben-Gurion, David, 1886-1973. I. Title. D804.6 .F7513 2003 940.53/1835—dc21

2003008907

In memory of my father, Haron Ben-Avra’am, and my mother, Ida-Yehudit May they rest in peace

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Contents

Acknowledgments ix

Introduction 3

Part I. Confronting the Information 1. Phases of Acknowledging: Information, Consciousness,

Mental and Emotional Processing 15 2. Protest: Political Tool or Substitute for Action? 77 3. Lightning Rod: Establishing the Rescue Committee 125

Part II. Rescue Plans General Introduction 139 4. “Or We Shall Have No Repentance”: Plans to Rescue Children 143 5. Dealing with the Devil: The 1942 and 1943 Ransom Plans 195 6. Between the Hammer and the Anvil in 1944:

Continuing Efforts to Rescue Children and the Struggle

for Immigration to Palestine 239 7. The Secret Partnership 261

Notes 357

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Acknowledgments

or the research presented herein, I should like hower, and Truman, and from the Hoover Insti-

E.. thank colleagues and friends. Special — tute Archives. Other archives include the Bund thanks to my mentor, Professor Yehuda Bauer. Archive and those of the Joint Distribution ComA distinguished combination of researcher and — mittee and the Zionist Archives in New York City,

highly inspired teacher, Professor Bauer fol- as well as the American Jewish Historical Society lowed all stages of this research and provided archives at Brandeis University. The British Pubinvaluable comments regarding the manuscript. _ lic Record Office (P.R.O) at Kew were also an imProfessor Shlomo Aronson of the Hebrew Uni- __ portant source of documentation. I hereby exversity of Jerusalem and Professor Yoav Gelber press my thanks to the directors and staff of all of Haifa University alsoread the manuscript and _ these archives.

made valuable and important suggestions, for In the course of my research, I was a guest which I am extremely grateful. Professor Aron- — of the Meyerhoff Center for Hebrew and Jewish

son placed at my disposal important documen- Studies and Hebrew at the University of Marytation relating to the secret ties between the land, College Park, and the Center for Hebrew Yishuv and American secret service organiza- and Jewish Studies at Yarnton, Oxford. I should

tions; his generosity has not been taken for like to thank Professor Bernie Cooperman of

granted. Washington, D.C., and Emeritus Professor

My research is largely based on archival _— David Patterson of Oxford for their hospitality material in Israel and abroad, andI would liketo and support.

take this opportunity to thank the following di- Also, I would like to thank the heads of the rectors and their staff: Yoram Miyorek and the —‘ Friedan Foundation (Hebrew University of staff at the Central Zionist Archives in Jerusalem; Jerusalem), the Karni Foundation (Yad BenBaruch Tor-Raz at the Labor Party Achives in Beit Gurion, Tel Aviv) and the Max and Rita Heiber Berl; Dr. Irit Kenan and Neri Arieli at the Ha- Foundation (The Herman Institute for Contemganah Archives in Tel Aviv; and Dr. Eli Tsurand = porary Jewry at the Hebrew University of staff at the Heritage Archives in Givat Haviva. Jerusalem) for their support throughout this The archives at the Ben-Gurion Research Center, project. Sede Boger Campus, were my primary source of During the final stages of my research, I was documentation; I should like tothank HanaPin- helped by two excellent research assistants: shaw, director of the archives, and Leana Feld- |§ Smadar Rothman and Milca Har-Tal, both of man for their invaluable assistance and friend- | whom helped me wade through the sea of details ship. Thanks, too, to Lily Adar, director of the that are part and parcel of this type of activity. library at the Ben-Gurion Center, and her team _— Hadas Blum also worked painstakingly, with infor their professional assistance. Much foreign credible devotion and skill, on the English verdocumentation was supplied by the National sion, and thank her for her very important conArchives and the Library of Congress in Wash- __ tribution. ington, D.C. Information was also derived from Thanks to my editor for the Hebrew edition of the presidential archives of Roosevelt, Eisen- the book, Avi Bareli, in appreciation for fascinating

ix

Acknowledgments

dialogue and warm friendship throughout ourcol- —s mings, for her help in making this English version laboration. Thanks to Mr. Henry Krawitz my edi- _ possible.

tor at the University of Wisconsin Press for his To my wife, Dina; my daughter, Yonat; and enormous contribution to the English edition. my sons, Itai and Ealon. Iam happy to express yet Thanks also to my agent and translator,OraCum- — again my thanks for their love and their fellowship.

x

ARROWS IN THE DARK

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Introduction

Te phrase “Arrow in the Dark” is mentioned events in Europe and the way in which use was

in the report Eliezer Kaplan presented tothe = made of information reaching the Yishuv. This Jewish Agency upon his return from Turkey. — process began with a sense of doom when Hitler Kaplan, the agency’s bursar and senior executive —_ rose to power. It came to an end during the final member, was sent to Turkey at the end of Febru- months of 1942 and the beginning of 1943, which ary 1943, three or four months after the Yishuv = marked a turning point in the awareness of the (pre-State of Israel Palestine) published an offi- | Yishuv leaders, who decided to warn not only cial declaration regarding the systematic annihi- —_ their own community but the free world and its lation of the Jews of Europe. His mission was _ leaders by officially announcing that the Jews of to examine various ways of helping the Jews — Europe were being systematically exterminated.

trapped in Europe and perhaps even to save This part also examines the preparations leading them. Kaplan’s general impression after meeting up to the expression of fury and protest against with activists, diplomats, and intelligence agents the events in Europe by the Yishuv. The question based in Turkey was that the big rescue plans _is raised as to whether these were merely political were either too complex politically and strategi- _ tactics, or a kind of substitute for action. The Rescally or too far-fetched. He was convinced that |= cue Committee and its responsibilities are examthese plans had little chance of success and that —_ ined in order to determine whether it was the their inner logic is their failure. Nevertheless, he |= main tool for organizing rescue operations, as decided that it was necessary for the Yishuv to ___ was originally intended, or merely an outlet for adopt a policy of shooting in the dark; evenifthe | the Jewish public in Palestine to vent its anger chances were slim, the arrow might strike some and frustration.

target after all. Part 2 is devoted to reconstructing, describThis book reconstructs and analyzes the aid _ ing, and analyzing the Yishuv’s own rescue operand rescue activities of the Jewish communityin _ations as well as other rescue initiatives in which Palestine, operations in which the yishuv wasin- — the Yishuv was involved. Consisting of nine volved, and the part played by David Ben-Gurion __ chapters, it is the book’s densest part and is inand his colleagues in these ventures. Italsoexam- _ tended to give the reader a clear understanding of ines the role of these activities within the overall = the complexity of the rescue programs.

agenda of the Yishuv and its leadership during Among other topics, this part deals with the latter half of the Second World War to de- __ the various plans for the rescue of children, intermine whether, and to what extent, Kaplan’s cluding attempts at opening additional chan-

phrase accurately reflects the actual policy of | nels by dispatching Shalom Adler-Rudel to Ben-Gurion and his colleagues in the Yishuv Sweden and Wilfrid Israel to Portugal. Mention

leadership. is made of the strident polemical debate in the THE BOOK’S STRUCTURE Yishuv surrounding the integration within the community of rescued children—the same poThe book consists of three parts. Partifocuseson — lemic that reflected the optimistic expectations

_ Clarifying three main spheres of interest. First, it of the imminent rescue of large numbers of examines the gradual yet growing awareness of children.

3

Introduction

Jewish Agency ransom plans devised during This study concludes with a detailed analysis the final thirty months of the war—the Transnis- —_ of the theory and methodology of the Yishuv’s tria scheme, the Slovakia plan, and the Europa _— and Ben-Gurion’s role in the aid and rescue acransom plan—are closely examined, asisthedis- _ tivity. It also analyses the negative image that has patch of Joel Brand and the mysterious offshoots —_ attached itself to the Yishuv and the State of Israel of this affair, the two proposals received by Mena- __ with respect to their part in rescuing the Jews of hem Bader, a key emissary in Istanbul, toconduct — Europe, as well as the place of this image among separate negotiations with the Nazis. Other res- the foundations of Israel’s constantly developing cue efforts and ransom plans are also examined, _ national and cultural identity. The conclusion of including feelers sent out at the end of 1944 and _ this study deals with the methodological and theearly 1945 through representativesin Genevaand __ oretical aspects—the advantages and disadvanStockholm that culminated in a meeting with — tages—of intelligence materials that are being Himmler in the spring of 1945, justasthe war was __ used in large parts of this book.

ending. Also discussed is the connection between CHRONOLOGY these ransom proposals and the desire of various groups within the multifaceted Nazi elite to con- | Twelve densely packed years—from 1933, when

duct separate negotiations with the West. the Nazis rose to power in Germany, to May 1945, This part also examines the secret coopera- when Germany surrendered and the war ended tion that existed between the Yishuv’s intelligence | in Europe—are examined. Most of the aid and services and British and American intelligence rescue programs were implemented during these services involving aid and rescue operations—a _years, although it was only at the end of 1942 that Key issue, since it is tied to all the major rescue it became clear what was actually happening in operations and helps explain them—the Para- —_ Europe. Only then did aid and rescue activists rechutists’ Scheme being the prime example of this _alize that new concepts would have to be formucooperation. The Yishuv also took advantage of lated if Jews were to be saved. Western intelligence services in its courier opera- For an even closer look, these years can be tion, which played a major role in the ransom grouped according to the following periods: (1) plans. In essence, the aid and rescue operations § From 1933 up to the beginning of the war in Sepdepended on the existence of a complex relation- tember 1939. (2) From the beginning of the war ship with foreign intelligence and espionage serv- __ up to the start of systematic annihilation, which ices, including groups in the Nazi elite. This part —_is generally agreed to have begun in mid-1941. (3)

of the book concludes with a consideration of | From the start of systematic annihilation until Ben-Gurion’s and the Jewish Agency’sattitudeto- _ this fact was officially made public at the end of ward bombing the death camps and their access November 1942. (4) From the end of November

roads. 1942 until the liberation of most of eastern, Part 3 deals with the financial aspects of the aid southern, and central Europe at the end of 1944

and rescue operation and discusses the role it and the beginning of 1945.

played in the Yishuv budget. It describes fund- This chronological period can also be diraising methods and ways in which funds were _ vided up differently. Thus: (1) From the begintransferred via the nonaligned states into occupied —_ ning of the war up to the time when the idea of Europe. The importance of secret cooperation is __ territorial concentration and forced emigration again stressed: whereas certain branches of West- _ of the Jews was rejected and replaced by the Nazi ern intelligence hindered rescue activities, others leadership’s decision to annihilate the Jews of Eu-

were extremely helpful in transferring funds. rope; one school of thought holds that this mo-

4

Introduction

ment took place in March or April 1941. (2) From and constituted 31 percent of the country’s total the moment when the annihilation became ofh- —_ population. According to these same statistics, cially known at the end of November 1942 until | young people under the age of twenty-nine conthe disappointing results ofthe BermudaConfer- _ stituted more than half the Jewish population of ence in the spring of 1943. (3) The time between Palestine in 1943; an additional 30 percent were the testimony of Auschwitz escapees Rudolf | aged between thirty and forty-four, together repWarba and Alfred Wetzler until information was __ resenting roughly 80 percent of the Jewish populeaked of the mission of Joel Brand and Bandi _lation. It was, by all accounts, a very young comGrozs in July 1944. (4) The liberation of most of | munity. Of the entire Jewish population at that eastern, southern, and central Europe at the end time, almost half were of European origin, with

of 1944 and the beginning of 1945. 10 percent from Asia and North Africa; the reThe empirical examination of the aid and — mainder were native born. According to the same

rescue operations should be placed within the statistics, 44 percent of the Yishuv population context of general historical developments, as —__ were classified as “supporting themselves and well as within the geographical scope oftheseop- their families with income from employment, erations. Only then is it possible to understand __ business, grants, support, etc.” The main sources the methods used by the decision makers to pro- —_— of income were as follows: 29 percent worked in

cess data and to analyze the precise pattern of — industry and skilled professions; over 13 percent their thinking leading up to their ultimate deci- —_ worked in agriculture; some 11 percent were emsions. Thus, in examining the question of why it = ployed in commerce; and about the same percenttook until the end of 1942 for them to understand age were clerks and office workers. The remainder what was happening in Europe, the fact that the | were employed in various other branches of the systematic annihilation began only months ear- = economy, such that the professions accounted for lier should also be taken into consideration. Sim- — some 8 percent of the working population and inilarly, consideration should be given to the — vestments and finance an additional 3 percent.!

conflicting influences resulting from the distri- Since the end of the First World War, the bution of American intelligence services in the — country had been under British Mandate and Middle East and Europe. It might have been pos- — was dependent on Britain’s policies and the way sible to take advantage of these services, but this | in which these were implemented by Britain’s would have involved monitoring the activities of | representatives, headed by the high commisthe Jewish Agency. Such ties would only have sioner. During most of the war years (1938-1944) magnified the transparency of the Yishuv’s activ- | Sir Harold MacMichael served as the British high ity. Moreover, preparations by the Allied forces | commissioner for Palestine. He was notorious for the Normandy landings and the opening of for his hostile and unrelenting attitude toward the western front were weighty considerationsin the Jewish community and for his scrupulous addetermining the position of the Western powers _herence to the policies outlined in the White Pa-

with respect to Brand’s rescue programs. per. His attitude became all the more stringent

THE YISHUV AND THE“RULES with the outbreak of war and the adoption of

OF THE GAME” ON THE EVE emergency laws. | |

OF THE WAR AND DURING IT The points of conflict between the Jewish

community and the Mandatory authority re-

According to the Jewish Agency’s Statistics De- | volved around three main issues: restrictions on partment, the Jewish population of Palestine at land purchases; deportation of illegal Jewish imthe end of 1942 comprised 485,000 individuals migrants; and searches for illegal weapons in

5

Introduction

arsenals belonging to the Haganah (the Jewish — sources would not be “spread around” and the underground movement). The official announ- —=means would not be made available for rescue cement of the annihilation occurring in Europe _ efforts. (2) The end of the war would require the gave new significance to the blockade against unconditional surrender of Germany; this made Jewish immigration to Palestine—in effect be- | any obvious or clandestine attempts at negotiatcoming a death sentence for all those who re- ing with the enemy illegal or even treasonous. (3)

mained in Europe. The refusal to admit that the Jews were destined British policies regarding the Jewish com- __ to have a special fate in this war, which meant munity in Palestine during the war were prima- __ that requests were rejected for special action to rily based on the 1939 White Paper, which deter- be taken to save the Jews even though their fate mined that Britain had generally fulfilled its | was determined both as a group and as individobligation to assist in the establishment of ana- __ uals, unlike other nations in Nazi-occupied Eutional homeland for the Jews. This document rope. (4) The refusal to transfer money to occualso included a precise timetable coveringimmi- _ pied areas; every rescue operation, whether large

gration quotas and land purchases, ensuringthat or small, depended on the transfer of such Jews would not exceed one third of the total pop- — money. ulation of Palestine. The White Paper was based on the assump- _In addition, one should not lose sight of the fact tion that the Arab world wasthe moreimportant __ that Britain and the United States led the struggle

element in guaranteeing stability in the region, against the Nazis. It is obvious what this struggle which would be breached in the event of interna- meant in terms of the fate of world Jewry. This tional tension and, ultimately, full-scale war—in | ambivalence made it hard for decision makers in other words, if Britain did not appease the Arab the Yishuv and the Zionist movement to define

community by restricting immigration and their attitude toward Britain during the war, withdrawing, at least for the time being, fromthe — while carrying out activity in the “gray areas.”

plan to establish a Jewish national homeland in The Yishuv at the time was a complex strucPalestine. This extended beyond the Middle East _ ture, based primarily on voluntary activity. A seand the Arab world: the British were wary of __ ries of self-governing institutions were active in Muslims all over the world, especially in India; — the Yishuv, placed there thanks to the public’s they were not about to jeopardize their position _ faith in its elected leaders and without the usual in India as a result of generosity to Jews in the checks on sovereignty. The broadest institution Middle East. As far as the present study is con- —_—- was Knesset Israel (Community of Israel), the or-

cerned, the ultimate result of British policy wasa ganization that politically embraced the entire virtual blockade of Jewish refugee immigration Jewish population of Palestine, which represented during the most fateful period of the Second some 95 percent of the public, including the Revi-

World War. sionists and excluding the ultra-Orthodox AguMoreover, the overall policies of the Allied dat Israel party. It consisted of two main entities: countries in handling the war had a direct and __ the Elected Assembly, a broad representative body definitive influence on the Yishuv’s rescue efforts that included representatives of local organizaand on the fate of the Jewish nation during the _ tions, ethnic groups, political parties, and various war. Four policies adopted by the Allies and __ other sectors; and the National Council, the execBritain were especially critical in this respect: utive body that operated according to the instruc(1)The main war effort should focus on victory __ tions and policy of the Elected Assembly. During over Hitler; this explained why forces and re- __ this period, the Knesset was headed by Yitzhak

6

Introduction

Ben-Zvi, who was joined by fourteen elected rep- = bor Department. Emil Shmorak (General Zion-

resentatives.” ists, B) and Rabbi Leib Yehuda Fishman-Maimon Parallel to the Knesset Israel was the World (Mizrahi) headed the Commerce and Industry Zionist Organization (WZO), which represented Department. Eliyahu Dobkin (Mapai) and the Zionist parties in Palestine and the Zionist Moshe Shapira (Hapoel Hamizrachi) both held movements in the Diaspora, with the exception __ the position of “deputy member” in the JAE and of the Revisionist party, which broke away in were jointly responsible for the Immigration De-

1935. Here also there were two active units: the partment.’ Zionist Executive and the Zionist Actions Com- The JAE had branches in England and the mittee, a representative and legislative body, | United States. There was no clear delineation of which the Zionist Congress appointed foratwo- _ tasks, a fact that sometimes caused conflict. The year term. The Jewish Agency was formed in __Yishuv held that overseas branches were not free 1929, and subsequently the Zionist Executive was to act in the best interests of the Zionist movejoined by non-Zionists with a yearning forana- — ment and that there was a danger of a “twin loytional homeland. From that point on the Zionist —_alties” syndrome, which was common during Executive became known as the Jewish Agency __ times of war. The tension and open hostility beExecutive (JAE). Throughout most ofthis period — tween David Ben-Gurion and Chaim Weizmann, the JAE was headed by David Ben-Gurion. In __ president of the Zionist movement, affected the

1933 Ben-Gurion moved into a semi-sovereign movement’s branches in the United States and position following elections to the Zionist Con- —_ England and exacerbated the difficulties in their

gress. He joined the JAE, which was convenedin = working relationships, resulting in quarrels their wake. In 1935 he was elected to a term as JAE among the Jerusalem, London, and New York

chairman. branches over who held ultimate authority. The

The JAE was entrusted by the WZO withthe — debates described in this book are laced throughtask of ensuring the founding and strengthening — out with Ben-Gurion’s attempts at imposing the

of a national homeland. It was therefore involved authority of the Jerusalem leadership on the with immigration and integration, Zionist activ- overseas branches, to base operational discipline ity in the Diaspora, land purchases, development for all the elements involved in the political of settlements, and fund-raising for the national —_ struggle on his own leadership and on the leaderfunds that financed its work. It also saw itself as a ship of the Jerusalem JAE.

spokesman for the Zionists in Palestine and the Other disagreements arose from an impreDiaspora against the Mandatory authorities, the cise delineation of tasks performed by Knesset Is-

British government, and foreign powers. rael and the Zionist Organization. Even when the The JAE was a coalition body consisting of definitions were clear, the sides did not always re-

various departments and jobs, with power dis- spect them. There was obvious tension surtributed among the different parties that com- —_ rounding the question of who represented the prised the coalition. Needless to say, the key posi- —-_ Yishuv against the British and who determined tions were taken up by the largest and strongest — the Yishuv’s policy, although the National Counparty in the Yishuv, Mapai (Jewish Labor party). cil usually acquiesced to the Jewish Agency’s sen-

Its chairman was David Ben-Gurion. Moshe _ ior position. By establishing the Rescue CommitShertok (later Sharett) headed the Political De- _ tee, the Jewish Agency became larger and even partment. Eliezer Kaplan was the treasurer and § more cumbersome, introducing yet another conhead of the Finance Department. Yitzhak Gruen- _ troversial element in the Yishuv’s already chaotic

baum (General Zionists, A) was head of the La- power structure.

/

Introduction

The Yishuv was heterogeneous in several The shake-ups, the pressures, the tensions, ways: it consisted of religious and secular Jews; — and the hesitations in opting for rift or unity urban and rural (farming) communities; veter- when there was no true common denominator— ans and new immigrants; Sephardic and Ash- _all these combined to form a backdrop to Benkenazic communities; and some forty sectarian | Gurion’s activity during the first half of the forimmigrant organizations (Landsmannschaften) ties. Thus, although Ben-Gurion depended on acting on behalf of their own people, both his own party, he could not always be certain that within the country and abroad.‘ The various _his party would back him up, and he often found offices of this independent government had no _s himself standing alone. The most dramatic exmeans of enforcement at their disposal aside pressions of this are his many threats to resign, from public pressure. This fact sheds light ona —_ including several actual resignations from the central issue of this book: the ability to function party leadership during the course of the war.

effectively and the leadership qualities them- Two other Jewish organizations were closely selves of the man who headed this problematic — connected to the issues discussed in this book: and conflicting hierarchy, which included dissi- the World Jewish Congress and the Joint Distrib-

dent groups, the ultra-Orthodox community, ution Committee. Both maintained ties with the and non-Zionists in the United States, to men- —_ Jewish Agency— particularly on issues of aid and

tion just a few of those who did not recognize | rescue—and both were considered “philan-

Ben-Gurion’s authority. thropic” and “ex-Yishuv” and were thus not unLike all democratic leadersand organizations der the jurisdiction of the Jewish Agency.

based on democratic principles, Ben-Gurion and The World Jewish Congress (WJC) was his colleagues also drew most of their power from — founded onlysix or seven years before the issue of

their party. Ben-Gurion depended heavilyonMa- _ aid and rescue became a primary task of the napai, the Yishuv’s central and dominant political tional agenda. Its objectives had been to “ensure party at that time. When it was founded in Janu- the existence of the Israeli nation and to develop ary 1930 (through the merger of the two Zionist its unity.” Its activists included Julian Mack, Socialist parties, Ahdut Ha’avoda and Hapo’el Stephen Wise, and Nahum Goldmann. Wise was Hatsa ir), it consisted of five thousand members chairman of the Congress Executive and Goldand grew steadily to twenty thousand members mann was chairman of its Administration Comby 1942, possessing the largest representation in —_ mittee; both also served as senior members of the all the major offices of the Zionist movement and U.S. branch of the Jewish Agency, like the WJC a

the Yishuv. Zionist body in every sense of the word. This Mapai had two far-reaching objectives: re- | phenomenon is typical of the period under disnewed independence for the Jewish people and _ cussion: the same individuals often acted within the establishment in Palestine of a superior social —_ various organizations that held conflicting ideorder based on Socialist values. During the war _ ologies and differing operational concepts.

years it experienced a severe rift in its ranks. At Unlike the World Jewish Congress, by the the October 1942 party conference, the left-wing | outbreak of the Second World War the American

branch of the party formed its own Faction B, Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) was a very which drew most of its power from the United — experienced organization. An American Jewish Kibbutz Movement (UKM) under the leadership _ philanthropic organization, it had been in operof Yitzhak Tabenkin. Faction B broke away from _ ation since the First World War and continued its Mapai in spring 1944, causing deep shock waves _ activity between the two wars and throughout

that left the party reeling. the period under discussion. People like Paul 8

Introduction

Baerwald (JDC president at the time), Joseph leader’s (or leaders’) pronouncements and actual (Joe) Schwartz (head of the JDC’s European deeds. I have tried to break down the story of aid branch), and Dr. Yehuda Leib Magnes (president —_and rescue activity and to examine all its politiof the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and head cal, economic, social, logistical, and miscellaof the Jerusalem branch of the JDC) were en- neous components. I have attempted to examine gaged in various aspects of aid and rescue from __ the role played by rescue activity in the Yishuv's locations throughout the world (New York, Lis- agenda, the financial resources allotted to it, and bon, Geneva, Stockholm, Jerusalem, and Istan- _—_‘ the way in which the logistical and diplomatic asbul). There were obvious differences with respect pects were handled (including clandestine as well to their attitude toward the Jewish Agency andits —_as overt operations).

emissaries; some preferred close and harmo- A second research hypothesis utilized here nious cooperation with the Yishuv leadership, involves the importance of concentric circles. while others chose to conduct power struggles. The aid and rescue activity cannot be understood During this period Ben-Gurion’s position | without an examination of its connection to grew stronger, and he eventually established other matters: (1) the “final solution” and its himself as the central authority in the Zionist bearing on military developments in the relevant movement. But the Ben-Gurion ofthe fortieswas fronts of the Second World War and the growing still not the same as the Ben-Gurion of the fifties, | awareness of Germany’s regression within cerand it would be misleading to view him through _ tain groups of the Nazi elite; (2) the general polthe perspective of the charismatic leader he __ icy of the Allied forces during the war and its efwould later become when at the height ofhis po- —_—‘ fect on ideas and plans for saving the Jews; and litical power: after declaring the State of Israel, _ (3) the policies of the Allied forces concerning the

following Israel’s victory in the War of Indepen- _ refugees in Europe—especially the Jewish dence, and after taking his place in history as “Is- | refugees—which were influenced by immigrarael’s founding father.” Among other things, the — tion quotas to the West, as well as the Palestine

main objective of this book is to examine Ben- _ issue. (An outstanding example of the fusing Gurion’s activity as a democratic leader atatime of these concentric circles and the internal conof grave crisis: to look at the ways in which he __ tradictions resulting from such a complexity of used his vast reserves of power to position him- _issues is illustrated in the story of Joel Brand’s self within the complex reality ofa heterogeneous mission.) Throughout this study I hope to demYishuv, whose offices were supported by volun- _— onstrate how these concentric circles break and tary foundations, under foreign rule, under try- _—srejoin.

ing international circumstances, and in the face A third research hypothesis deals with the of a world war and a holocaust that was eradicat- —_ nature of the operations. Most had to be carried

ing his people. out under the cloak of absolute secrecy. They had RESEARCH METHODS to be hidden from the watchful eyes not only of the Nazis and the countries occupied by them but

AND SOURCES also from the Allies, the western states, and even

It should be clear from the preceding that Ihave — the nonaligned countries. It soon became evident chosen to reconstruct and analyze Ben-Gurion’s __ that a large and important part of my findings and his colleagues’ involvement in the aid and —_ would be coded and fragmented—if they could rescue issue by constantly shifting between the _ be located atall. After examining resources in varmicroscopic and macroscopic views, between __ ious archives in Israel and abroad, I came to the

strategy and tactical components, between a conclusion that even important documentation,

9

Introduction

such as records of Jewish Agency Executive meet- | amounts of information he needed in his work ings in Jerusalem, would not document every- —_and in the decision-making process. It contains thing that had been said or done. Ihave therefore —_ reports, summaries, the “homework” he did to made a conscious effort to uncover the untold prepare for meetings, discussions, and decisions. story, the secret act, reckoning that even if docu- | Hesummed up lengthy meetings in his diary and mentation were found, it would have to be pieced even copied into it endless data-filled tables. This together. In this respect, the historical processde- important information proved extremely valuscribed here is in no small measure a “secret his- able. With the aid of the diary (but not exclutory,’ involving undercover operations by gov- _ sively), I tried to reconstruct the “picture” underernmental or other organizations. With this lying Ben-Gurion’s decisions, in other words, the understanding, I set out to search for the stories | events he observed in real time and to undernot under the glaring streetlights but at the point — stand the ways in which he operated.> Had Ben-

where they were hidden by shadows. Gurion used his diary as a tool for “embellishing” historical events and left us a diary full of distor-

The first Israeli archive I consulted was at the tions, he would have been sabotaging his own Ben-Gurion Heritage Institute’s Archive at Sede —_ work, since the diary was for him an important Boger, in the belief that the officeofthe chairman tool.

of the JAE would be an excellent source of data Another important source was the Central regarding the rescue issue. A special section of | Zionist Archives (CZA) in Jerusalem. The docuthis archive contains Ben-Gurion’s personal di- = mentation available here is mainly from Benaries. This documentation is important for sev- | Gurion’s office and pertained to his role as Jewish eral reasons. First, the diary format best reflects | Agency Executive chairman. I also obtained docBen-Gurion’s thoughts at the time. Theremaybe — umentation relating to Eliezer Kaplan, the Jewish researchers for whom this level of transparencyis | Agency’s treasurer, and Moshe Shertok (Sharett), not sufficient, but, apart from a few extremely _ head of the Political Department. Here I studied personal letters that Ben-Gurion wrote to people the minutes of Jewish Agency Executive meetings who were very close to him, the man’s wordsashe __ in Jerusalem and its New York branch as well as wrote them in his diary areascloseasanyonecan __ those of the Zionist Actions Committee. I also exget to deciphering his thoughts. Unfortunately, | amined the files of the Rescue Committee, the Im-

there are sections where the diary is extremely § migration Department, and the Jewish National fragmentary, and in several instances I even at- | Funds (JNF), among others. I was mainly con-

tempt to explain this fragmentation. cerned with the Jewish Agency Political DepartSecond, the diary can also serve those who _ ment, especially records relating to the “Special wish to study Ben-Gurion’s agenda and take an _— Tasks Department,’ as it is called throughout this accurate look at his “desk.” Sometimes the diary _ study. These records chronicle both the secret and supplies the tail end of another piece of vitalin- — overt activity of such people as Reuven Zaslani

formation. Ben-Gurion would sometimes write (Shiloah), Eliyahu Golomb, Shaul Meirov (Avi“T wrote to” or “I was visited by” or “I spoke at,’ — gur), Teddy Kollek, Ehud Avriel, and Ze’ev without providing details or mentioning names, = Schind. This important documentation has only but the experienced researcher knows howto fol- —_— recently been made available to the public.

low a hint that will lead him to another section or The Israel Labor Party Archive at Beit Berl

another archive. supplied us with material on the main sectors of

Third, Ben-Gurion also made extensive use Mapai. The Israel Labor Movement Archives at of his diary as a working tool, recording vast — the Lavon Institute contain material on the His-

10

Introduction

tadrut (General Labor Federation). I also col- _—_ ditional documentation of this type, I traveled to lected data from the Yad Vashem Archive, Mena- _ Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and reviewed the personal

hem Bader’s personal archive at the Heritage archive of General William Donovan, who was Archive, Ya’ari Center at Giv’ at Haviva, and the OSS chief at the time. I also consulted two presi-

Haganah Archive in Tel Aviv. dential archives in the United States, that of Dwight D. Eisenhower in Abilene, Kansas, and I naturally assumed that the Allied forces’ intelli- that of President Harry S Truman in Indepengence services would logically follow the moves — dence, Missouri. Eisenhower was supreme commade by representatives of the Yishuv in every- — mander of the Allied forces in Europe. I had to use thing relating to the rescue of Jews from Europe. —_a secondary source to obtain data on President

Any significant achievement in this respect Franklin Delano Roosevelt. In order to locate would have forced the Allies to confront masses | documentation on the connections between the of immigrants and would have threatened their §_Yishuv leaders and the International Socialist immigration policies and those laid out in the © movement concerning the rescue of the Jews of British government’s 1939 White Paper. There Europe, we scanned the relevant documentation was also the fear that the Yishuv’s interest in sav- _— at the personal archive of Walter Schevenels of ing the Jews of Europe would result in financing — Belgium, secretary of the International Socialist activity that could undermine the West’s general |= movement which is preserved at the Hoover Instimanagement of the war. No one could have fore- —_‘ tute Archives at Stanford University, California.

seen in which direction the protest activity would We also rummaged through scores of Jewish lead and how the Jews would channel their anger = archives in the United States: the Zionist and helplessness when faced with the annihila- = Archives, the Bund Archive, and the JDC tion of their brethren. The Yishuv’s “red” image = Archives—all in New York; the American Jewish during the thirties and forties also motivated the — Historical Society archives at Brandeis UniWestern intelligence services to take aninterestin versity; and the American Jewish Archives in the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine and the overt as Cincinnati; relevant documentation from Cin-

well as secret activity of its leaders. cinnati was subsequently transferred to the All these theories reinforced my sense that archives at Sede Boger. what was not recorded in the Yishuv’s documenta- At the British Public Records Office (PRO) tion—for fear of leaks or espionage—would be —_ in London I found much documentation relating found in the archives of these same intelligence to my research. It was here that I reviewed mateservices, who also followed closely the rescue ac- rial on Britain’s Foreign Office, Colonial Office, tivity of the Yishuv and helped them in this area. | andthe Admiralty in connection with the various These assumptions were confirmed in the course —_ aid and rescue attempts. I also examined minutes

of my research, and the two years I spent in the — of cabinet meetings and those of professional United States plus several months at Oxford were __ bodies in the Foreign Office. This documentaextremely helpful. The National Archivesin Wash- _ tion was copied and brought to the archives of ington, D.C., was my main source for uncovering — the Ben-Gurion Research Center at Sede Boger; relevant documentation, especially that relatingto | for example, the “Ben-Gurion File” contains re-

the War Refugee Board, the American Consulate ports of intelligence “tails” conducted by the in Jerusalem, the documentation of the Office of British authorities in Palestine. War Information (OW]), and, above all, the Office Additional primary source material I used of Strategic Services (OSS), the most important of included the local press and other publications of America’s intelligence services at the time. Forad- _ the time. I also made use of eyewitness accounts

1

Introduction

and memoirs published immediately after the | and Hava Eshkoli-Wagman on how the Mapai war, which recounted events in “real time,” as — handled information on the Holocaust; Shlomo opposed to verbal testimonies, which recorded = Aronson and Richard Breitman on the activities

them at a greater remove in time. and motivations of the Americans and Nazis with regard to ransom efforts and attempts to Just as culture develops in stages, soitiswiththis forge ties with the West; Dina Porat, whose study, which rests on an important and com- significant breakthrough established new chanprehensive foundation built up by a long and nels of research regarding this difficult and tordistinguished line of researchers who plowed, _ tuousissue; and, last but not least, Yehuda Bauer, sowed, and harvested this field before me: Yoav __ with his long list of books and articles (especially Gelber on the Hebrew armed forces and the de- _his last book Jews for Sale?). The repeated menvelopment of the Yishuv’s intelligence services; tion of these scholars’ contributions to the field Dalia Ofer on the illegal immigration operation — is but a modest expression of my appreciation during the Second World War; Yechiam Weitz — and admiration.

12

PART 1

CONFRONTING THE INFORMATION

BLANK PAGE

1

Phases of Acknowledging Information, Consciousness, Mental and Emotional Processing

SIGNS OF ILL OMEN snow-capped hills and no single moment In early summer 1936 Ben-Gurion flew from resembles another; and before you have

Rome to London. In his diary he wrote: managed to take in one splendid sight,

hin ther galloping t dYe Of all the many flights I have made an Se ee ON eps eas , , , ; and in an instant is gone, because a new

airplane, this was the most interesting. ... . ,

lake spreads itself out below, with new About halfway between, hills Rome and Milan, to decorate it and;snow-covered

the ground below waspeaks, covered with , ; and mountain follows mountain, clouds, and it Lo looked likevalley veryhides beautiful , and one behind. another. ...

soapsuds. There was asnow-covered brief glimpse of a ;are , And then the hills green island, which soon disappeared. ... , replaced by Po the monotonous landscape As we approached the River I saw not . of Germany ... only green fields and vil-

the sky but the land, and the ofof rail;, ; lages and rivers and whole narrow strips northern Italy was revealed to you me inreach all its ; Frankfurt. ; ; ways—until green and fertile glory. The hills, the val-

And

. the charmand fades away andcovall you rememleys,; the mountains slopes—all age . only , ber is Hitler... and the swastika; and

ered with grass and fruit trees. Not athe sin.. , after you have left behind you rising gle stretch andofuntended. ; bearis onbarren the banks the Rhine The River; and streams leading to the Po cut across the

land. coloring the landscape. But this was cross over Cologne and approach the ANC COPOTNNB ENE TANESER ewe flatlands and the canals of Holland can

merely an introduction to what was to , ; you heave a sigh of relief and you can... come after Milan. All the voluptuous

; step outmountains, off at Amsterdam splendor of the snowy theand Rotter, dam, [which are] not like Frankfurt and lakes sparkling in greens and _ blues,

, Cologne.!

squares of forest between the mountain-

ous ridges, dark abysses sprawling be- This highly lyrical description constitutes a detween rocky slopes, white strips of water parture from Ben-Gurion’s usual stern and meandering and disappearing into the rather dry image, leading one to question the exsteep hills and villages—as small as chil- tent to which he introduced into his writing and dren's playthings—drowning among speeches expressions that might be construed as stretches of woodland that look like one containing a sense of foreboding and of immibig garden spread over the depths, and nent catastrophe. Was Ben-Gurion—whose supagain lakes and white-topped mountains porters and enemies alike often endowed him

and green mountains ... and here and with exceptional political intuition and outthere layer upon layer of clouds floating standing powers of perception and foresight— above and between the hills—and all this aware of the evil winds blowing across Europe? is below you, while above the wide green What was his analysis of developments in the and blue haze of endless sky stretches out international arena since Hitler’s rise to power, to the horizon. You are flying above the and how did he see the repercussions vis-a-vis the

15

Confronting the Information

Jews? How did Ben-Gurion become aware of the Hitler’s would not limit his war to the Jews of

Holocaust? Did he “prophesy” it? Germany alone: the entire Jewish nation would There are plenty of references in documents _fall victim to Hitler’s anti-Semitism. Ben-Gurion

concerning Ben-Gurion to suggest that he felt also foresaw an exact timetable: there were Hitler's increasing power in Germany was omi- — “maybe four or five years [if not less]” separating nous. At a meeting of the Mapai Council in Jan- —_us and that “terrible doomsday.” Throughout uary 1933—two weeks before Hitler was elected 1933 and 1934 Ben-Gurion would make many

chancellor of Germany—Ben-Gurion pointed similar declarations. out the “existential danger” to the Jews of Poland An outstanding example of homo politicus, and Germany. During a visit to Poland for elec- |= Ben-Gurion followed each and every main intertions to the Zionist Congress in April1933—only —_ national event, not only because it was in his two months after Hitler’s rise to power—Ben- __ character to do so but because of his position and Gurion referred to an imminent world war that __ the sense of mission that had been with him from would bring with it a terrible catastrophe for the _his first steps in the political arena. During the six Jewish people, who would be the first victims of years that separated Hitler’s rise to power and the the Nazi oppression and dictatorship. He be- _ beginning of the Second World War, Ben-Gurion lieved that this world war would wreak globalde- — witnessed a constant and systematic process of struction and even declared unambiguously that —_ dissolution of the democratic world in the face of

Jews would be slaughtered.’ increasing pressures from Nazism and Fascism. Shortly after the publication of Hitler’s Mein Ben-Gurion’s foreboding came in the wake Kampf at the end of August 1933, Ben-Gurion _ ofaseries of large and small international crises in bought and read this programmatic book. Based — which Germany played a central role. In Benon the ideological platform he found in this — Gurion’s opinion, they all added up to a rearguard book, at the beginning of 1934 Ben-Gurion stated — war by the democratic world against Hitler’s viothat “the calamity of the Jews of Germany isnot lence and aggression. “Satan,” “Hooligan,” and restricted only to Germany’s borders,” and that “leader of a gang of thugs,” or “the housepainter,” this government is a danger to the entire Jewish “the gangster,” and “Attila the Hun” were words nation. From this point on, Ben-Gurion was to _he used to refer to Hitler on various occasions adopt an important and constant motiveforclar- _—_ during those years.’ ifying the reasons for an inevitable collision be- Ben-Gurion observed a system and a plan in tween Nazism and Judaism. The most significant — Hitler’s moves. He was convinced that Hitler was difference between Judaism and Nazism, heheld, — acting according to a carefully written script, was Hitler’s (and his henchmen’s) deep and in- —__ with an early phase anda late phase, based in part grained hatred of Judaism and all it symbolized. | ona thorough knowledge of his (Hitler’s) people In his desire to force the German race on the en- and so deep an understanding of the character of tire world, Hitler made an ideological compari- | democratic nations that he was able to “pluck the son between the Jewish nation—advocates ofthe strings of their slackness.”> Hitler was familiar ideals of righteousness and peace, libertyandhu- —_ with the weakness of the democratic system, the man dignity—and “Satan.” According to Ben- _ process of decision-making within a democracy, Gurion, war was fundamental to German gov- _and especially the complexity of the decision to ernment; without war it could not exist. As soon declare war. Thus, according to Ben-Gurion, as he could, Hitler would begin a war; the de- _— Hitler gradually but systematically began to vio-

struction and horror resulting from this war late the military and political boundaries imwould prove costlier than any previous one. posed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. He

16

Phases of Acknowledging

worked constantly to undermine and release __ years leading to the war were the Ethiopia crisis himself from the confines of the agreement that (1935), the Spanish civil war (1936), the Anschluss nationalist Nazism saw as an expression of Ger- or annexation of Austria by Germany (March many’s defeat and betrayal in the First World 1938), and the Sudetenland crisis and Munich

War. Pact that followed in its wake (September 1938). As those six years between Hitler’s rise to. For Ben-Gurion these were all links in a chain of power and the outbreak of war passed, Ben- = developments that intertwined to form a comGurion added layer upon layer to hisanalysisand _ plete historical structure, with its own internal his description of Hitler’s “salami” methods — logic—albeit worrying and insane—all of which against the democratic states. At every stage he | would lead toa war and to a dreadful catastrophe would push a tiny bit further, basedonthesound _for the Jewish nation.’

hypothesis that each such “push” would not be In February 1938, one month before Gerenough to serve as suitable casus belliagainst Eu- |= many annexed Austria and seven months before

rope’s new tyrant. the Munich convention—apex of the capitulaWithin the framework of this systematic vi- _ tion process and later the symbol of appeasement olation of various aspects of the Versailles treaty, | of the aggressor—Ben-Gurion described these

Ben-Gurion pointed out a series of stepping- = events with great accuracy: “England is constones—including a violation of the treaty’s mil- cerned with serious international problems. The itary clauses regarding the German navy andes- war with China, the war in Spain. Germany is pecially the submarines—that had played so swallowing up Austria—and tomorrow it will be decisive a role in the First World War. The world — Czechoslovakia’s turn.”® Indeed, Czechoslovakia press carried reports of Germany’s new subma- _—_ soon had its turn: Hitler completed the process of

rine fleet and strengthened air force. England, — taking over this country in March 1939. Under France, and Italy, all members of the League of — the watchful eyes of the Western powers, CzechoNations, reminded Germany of its restrictions slovakia was added to the Reich that was to last “a under the Versailles treaty. Hitler responded with — thousand years.” Within a week the Lithuanian

a rhetorical “peace” speech, delivered at the — province of Kleipete-Memel was also added to Reichstag on 21 May 1935. The Times of London __ the Reich, and yet another stone was laid on the

received the speech with satisfaction. Ben- structure that Ben-Gurion was pointing at.? Gurion, unable to overcome a cynical tone, wrote Ben-Gurion saw the “swallowing up” of in his diary that Germany had “promised” En- — Czechoslovakia as a supremely significant move gland not to deviate further from the rules ofthe | toward the erosion of democracy and capitulatreaty. “What is the value of sucha promise once __ tion to Nazi pressure. In September 1938 BenGermany has dug in?” Within a short time Hitler | Gurion was in London, where he witnessed advanced a step further in his ongoing processof Neville Chamberlain, prime minister of England breaching the treaty. Germany now demandeda_ _and the chief protagonist of appeasement toward parity of forces, insisting that its forces be equal | Germany, trying to contend with the Sudetenin number to those of Britain. To this end, Hitler land crisis.

demanded official recognition of his right to Encouraged by Germany, the large Germanbuild submarines openly. Ben-Gurion was wise speaking population of the Sudetenland—which enough to note that “the shadow of war is un- was part of the Czech, Bohemia, and Moravia

doubtedly darkening and thickening.” segments—began demanding special status in Among the big international events that, for © Czechoslovakia and special relations with the Ben-Gurion, determined the character of the six motherland. In less than a year it became clear

17

Confronting the Information

that what at first had seemed a limited local ac- _ cratic states such as Britain and France had tion was, in fact, no more than a further stagein knuckled under to Germany’s demands. They Germany's plan to take over the whole of central |= handed Czechoslovakia over to the Nazis, and by Europe and to annex the strongest country be- _ shaking the belief in treaties and promises, they tween Germany and the Soviet Union. Aided by __ increased Hitler’s prestige and the aura of totaliKonrad Henlein, the leader of the Nazi partyin __ tarianism. Clearly, these actions would “carve this region, Hitler proceeded to bite off one part — deeply into the hearts of the Arabs and facilitate after another of Czechoslovakia until there was ___ the work of the agents of Hitler and Mussolini in

nothing left of the independent state. the near East.” Ben-Gurion made a connection The annexation of Czechoslovakia was an _ between events in Europe and those in the Middle important stage in the violation of the balanceof East; he foresaw a tightening of bonds between power in Europe. It canceled out two important — the mufti, Haj Amin al Huseini, and the leaders of international political arrangements: the defense — the Nazi government. Moreover, the American agreement between France and Czechoslovakia — tendency to remain aloof from events in Europe in effect since 1925 and the mutual defense agree- would increase, the nations of central Europe ment signed by Czechoslovakia and the Soviet |= would be quick to make peace with the Nazis, and Union in 1935. The Munich convention was con- “a new and terrible catastrophe would befall Euvened on 28 and 29 September 1938 as part ofan —_—srropean Jewry.”

effort to appease the “rising bear on the banks of He also noted the political analysis he and the Rhein.” At this convention Germany’s right | Chaim Weizmann had received from Malcolm was recognized over those actions demanded by Macdonald, the British colonial minister. MacCzechoslovakia, and it was thus that thiscountry donald believed that this time the Germans “did was left to its fate. After the Munich convention, have a case,” since they were entitled to the it became clear that there was no longer any real §Sudetenland. According to Macdonald, there validity to international agreements. For Ben- — were two opinions on Hitler. The first goes “yesGurion this was the clearest possible indication — terday Austria, today Czechoslovakia, tomorof what was to happen in the future: the smaller © row Poland or Alsace, the next day the conations would be abandoned. After Czechoslova- | lonies—and in the end the entire world. The

kia, the others would follow suit. second has it that Hitler is a wise and practical In London Ben-Gurion followed the diplo- —_ man; his objective is to liberate the Rhein area,

matic process closely. He reserved his grave | annex Austria and the Sudetenland—and that’s thoughts and feelings for his diary and his closest _ all?” Macdonald, tended toward the second verassociates. On 14 September 1938, when the BBC __ sion, which is one that ensures world peace. In

broadcast the dramatic announcement that | summing up Macdonald’s analysis, Ben-Gurion Chamberlain was about to fly to Berchtesgaden, wrote, Weizmann asked the British minister if Hitler’s vacation mountain retreat, fora meeting __ he had read Hitler’s Mein Kampf. Ben-Gurion with the German leader, Ben-Gurion wrote: “Itis | thought to himself, “God help a world whose

hard to believe that Chamberlain’s pretty eyes fate is determined by the likes of these!” will change Hitler’s mind. And who knows what Through all the crises—Ethiopia, Spain, China, price the Czechs will have to pay for the British | and Czechoslovakia—Ben-Gurion went on in

prime minister’s sudden flight.”'° his letter to Sharett, Britain and the rest of the In a long and bitter letter to Moshe Shertok democratic world were “constant” in their ca(Sharret), head of the Jewish Agency’s Political pitulation to the aggressor—and thus also in Department, Ben-Gurion described how demo- the matter of the Jews. “In this day and age,” aid

18

Phases of Acknowledging

to the Jews is not a “negotiable currency. Hitler In time the Munich Pact would come to broke the backbone of the Jews—the job was symbolize miserable submission, the relinquishcompleted with the handing over of Czechoslo- _ ing ofa friendly nation to the enemy, the denial of

vakia.... Hitler will gain control of Europe... | agreements and international pacts, short-term the Jews of Europe no longer have anything to _—_and shortsighted policies that mortgage and en-

lean on.”!! danger the future, and immoral cynicism. In Ben-Gurion also described to Sharett the — time everyone would become aware of all this. helplessness of the Jews of Europe and the trap = Ben-Gurion noticed it as it happened: “In my into which they had fallen: on the onehand,adi- —_ opinion, today is one of the blackest days Europe

rect or indirect Nazi threat and the unfounded, has ever known,” he wrote to Eliyahu Golomb, illusory belief that there is one friendly nation — the uncrowned head of the Haganah, “and who that would never let them down; on the other is to tell if, after the ‘peaceful’ Czechoslovakia hand, an inability to act. What could they do? ‘settlement, it won't be our turn soon.” “And it’s Protest? And if they were to protest, “how would — good that there’s peace. But what a peace! And for their protest get by the various censors? And ifit | how long? Is this peace not merely a brief respite did reach the government, would Malcolm Mac- __ to enable the German robber to increase his arse-

donald or Neville Chamberlain read an articlein _nal, to enlarge his army, with which he will one Hayent or hear the words of protest spoken in _—_ day attack his prey like a wild animal? Sad days.” !

Pinske” 2 Elsewhere he wrote: “We the Jews will not be As he closed his analysis, Ben-Gurion urged = among the last victims of this Nazi victory. Not Sharret to be prepared, since there was no know- only the Jews of Czechoslovakia, but the Jews of ing “what the next few days hold in store forus.I | Europe and Asia and perhaps even of America can imagine such worldwide catalyses as willturn will feel the victory of evil?!”

everything upside down.” The precedent set in Czechoslovakia, conOn 30 December 1938 the Western press — cluded Ben-Gurion, proves that this is a period published the details of the Munich Pact agree- —_ devoid of honesty that has no justice, no respect ments between Chamberlain and Eduard Dal- __ for the law or for international political commitadier, France’s new prime minister, on the one ment. The time has come for a politics of force, side, and Benito Mussolini, Fascist Italy’s tyran- _ since “physical power is what counts, only physi-

nical ruler, and Adolph Hitler, on the other. — cal power.’!§ During this period the ears of the France and England recognized Germany’srights —_ leaders were closed and thus unable to hear any-

to the Sudetenland and reconciled themselves to thing but the sound of the cannon. The Jews of

its annexation. the Diaspora have no cannon, concluded Ben“The drama is over—for the time being,” Gurion.!9 and the immediate danger of war has been post- Based on the Czech affair and similar crises poned, wrote Ben-Gurion in his diary. But the — and the way in which they were “settled,” Bencost! “On the first of October, Hitler’s blackboots | Gurion developed an acute sense of approaching will march into the Sudetenland. There is peace — calamity; his comments reflect this. Even though for the wicked! Czechoslovakia is paying the it was not possible for him to foresee the exact deprice,” and not only Czechoslovakia, which is tails and the force of the calamity, Ben-Gurion only another link in the process of withdrawal,in _ believed that all the conditions were geared for the process of giving in. Moreover, “Isuspectthat _ it.2° In October 1938, one month after the Munich now our turn will come. All the signs are boding —_ Pact, Ben-Gurion announced unequivocally that

ill.”'4 the Jewish nation was in danger of annihilation: 19

Confronting the Information

No one knows exactly what the world can mation showed that this was part of a growing re-

expect in the next few years—what lationship between Arab and Palestinian circles, changes are possible not only in interna- on the one hand, and Nazi leaders in Germany, tional relations but in the internal gov- Fascists in Italy, and the intelligence services of ernment of nations. The outbreak of a both, on the other. This activity made use of exworld war—which the Arabs are so vehe- patriate Germans and Italians in Palestine, spemently in favor of—will place us once cially planted agents, German and Italian conagain in danger of abandonment and ab- sular staff, and senior Nazi and Fascist officials solute siege. .. . Hitler is not only the en- visiting Palestine. Among the names uncovered emy and annihilator of the Jews of Ger- through research were those of Adolph Eichmany. His sadistic and jealous desire is to mann and Baldor von Schirach, the Hitler Youth

annihilate the whole of world Jewry.*! movement leader.” The Sudetenland crisis and Britain’s slackThe shriveling of democracy in Europe was __ ness before the Munich convention made it posechoed in events in the Middle East and Pales- _ sible for the Yishuv’s intelligence services to learn

tine. At the end of 1938, when Ben-Gurion’s that German agents from the Moslem states had words were being intoned, the third year of the — taken part in a conference in Nuremberg on Arab rebellion—largely aimed at the Jewish — 12 September 1938. The Jewish Agency’s Political

Yishuv in Palestine—was coming to an end. Department had also accumulated information Since the beginning of the rebellion in1936, more — on the personal involvement in these preparathan 480 Jews had been killed all over the coun- tions of Jerusalem’s mufti. Signs of ties between try.? In 1938 it was already possible to distinguish = him and the German Nazi party and the Italian signs of a growing friendship between Nazi Ger- _ Fascist party were unequivocal. Reuven Zaslani many and Fascist Italy, on the one hand, and (later Shiloah), one of the Yishuv’s intelligence

Palestinian and Arab circles, on the other. Ger- heads, reported on the mufti’s fund-raising many and Italy gradually deepened theirinvolve- — efforts in Germany, and other information ment in the region. By 1936 rumors were rife that pointed to extensive cooperation between the Germany and Italy were already making attempts § mufti and the Nazis in preparation for a time to entrench themselves in the Middle East and = when war would break out in Europe and the that the Axis forces had fired up the rebellionand Middle East.

helped finance it. After May 1938 there was a In July 1938 a consignment of German steady stream of information confirming this. weapons intended for the mufti’s men in Palestine The Jewish Agency’s Political Department — was discovered and confiscated at Constanza in and the intelligence services of the Haganah and Romania. Here was further proof that these ties the IZL (the Jewish nationalist military organiza- | were more than merely “ideological seminars.” In tion in Palestine) were accumulating detailed in- __ time the ties between the mufti and his German formation on the activities of Nazi and Italian benefactors deepened to such an extent that some undercover agents in Palestine and their support of the ransom plans included a clear-cut condiof the Arab rebellion. This support consisted of tion: Jews would be released only if they were not fund-raising in Europe and the direct financing — brought to Palestine. The source of this condition of activities by Germany and Italy, the transfer of | lay in promises made by the Nazi party to the weapons from Europe to Palestine, political as- | mufti on the eve of the Second World War.”4

sistance, support propaganda, as well as espi- In the summer of 1936, while in Alexandria onage and sabotage. The varied sources of infor- _—_ on his way to visit Britain, Ben-Gurion received

20

Phases of Acknowledging

fresh intelligence information regarding Italian bassy in Paris—was part of a larger four-year subversion in Palestine. According to these plan to increase the financial pressure on Jews sources, the Italians were acting from their basein —_ and, by so doing, force them to flee Germany and Egypt. Upon arrival in London, Ben-Gurionasked —_ Austria. Hermann Goring was put in charge of

the local branch of the Jewish Agency to pass on _activating the plan, which was a direct outcome the information to Sir David Ormsby-Gore, the __ of the failure at the Evian Conference held in July British colonial secretary. Chaim Weizmannsenta ofthat year. The purpose of the conference was to memo in the wake of this information, further find a solution to the Jewish refugee problem, but pointing out Fascist Italy’s machinations in the _ it ended with no results, proving that the powers Middle East. The information was also passed on were not trying to find any kind of solution for to the British Foreign Office. From that point un- —__ the Jews trying to escape from Europe. A large til the end of 1938, Weizmann and Ben-Gurionhad — number of Jews were arrested during that night at their disposal large quantities of intelligence of rioting and were thrown into concentration

information on the dangerous connections be- | camps that had been prepared in advance in tween Nazi-Fascist Europe and Arab circlesinthe | Dachau, Buchenwald, and Sachsenhausen. The

Middle East.*5 streets of Germany and Austria were filled with As far as Ben-Gurion was concerned, this — broken glass from the thousands of shop winwas not a case of groundless speculation. His fear | dows shattered during the rioting, which gave that the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine would also __ rise to the misleading title given to that night: suffer as a result of Britain’s lackadaisical attitude — Kristallnacht.

toward Europe was not unfounded. He was con- As far as Ben-Gurion was concerned, Krisvinced that Britain’s attitude would make the _tallnacht was just another stage in the decline and Palestinians bold and, indeed, that there was a — submission of the democratic world to the presthreat of increased Palestinian aggression during — sure of Nazism and Fascism. After the Anschluss,

the “disturbances” and a real danger that they — the Evian Conference, and the Munich convenwould join up with Nazi Germany and Fascist — tion came Kristallnacht. He repeated his warning Italy in the event of a real war. Ben-Gurion feared __ that the Jewish nation would be the victim of this an additional scenario: Britain’s tendency to ap- _ process. In a congress held in Jerusalem in 1939, pease the Palestinians by way of the same kindof | Ben-Gurion made his feelings public: peacemaking tactics used with another aggressor,

namely, Hitler. The price of this appeasement, From time to time, we experience a new too, would be paid by the Jewish Yishuv in Pales- date that will go down in history. We were tine. All these fears motivated Ben-Gurion to sure that 1933 was a new date in the history come back in order to underscore the connec- of the persecution and torture of the Jews.

tions between Hitler, Mussolini, the mufti, and We Zionists, who completely deny any

the Palestine issue. possibility of living in the Diaspora... The night of 9 November 1938 marked an- naturally did not underestimate the exother step on the path to the destruction of the tend of the calamity that befell the Jews of Jews of Europe. On that night emissaries of the Germany and of the world in 1933. Nazi government and their supporters attacked But even the most pessimistic among us shops belonging to Jews all over Germany and could not have imagined what to expect Austria. This “spontaneous” act—ostensibly an from this government of evil and murder, angry response to the attempted murder of Ernst and November 1938 is yet another new vom Rath, the third secretary in the German em- date, or new chapter—one that probably

21

Confronting the Information

has no precedent in the history of the speeches and actions during this period, which Jews. Not persecution, not deporta- are an essential background to the debate. Bention—this is organized extermination, Gurion built a layer-upon-layer explanation for physical annihilation, accompanied by the connection between the political and military sadistic subjugation . . . [of] the 600,000 events in Europe and the Middle East, on the one Jews of Germany and Austria. But there is hand, and the growth of anti-Semitism in the more. The Nazi pogrom of last November world, on the other. But he was not satisfied with is a signal for the destruction of the Jews mere theory and analysis; this was not his main of the world. I hope I will prove wrong. objective. What he wanted was to reach political But I suspect that this German pogrom is and operational conclusions and to formulate but the beginning. It started in Germany. Zionist policy in keeping with the extent of the Who knows what will happen tomorrow cataclysm. in Czechoslovakia, . . . in Poland, in Ro- Ben-Gurion called for a political framework mania, and other countries? Until now of some kind that would make possible escalated even Satan did not dare to carry out such Jewish immigration to Palestine. He repeatedly a plan. Now everything is permissible. stated that in the absence of such action, there Our blood, our honor, our property. .. . would be no choice but to embark upon a violent There are no limits as to what can be done and outspoken struggle, where a “fighting Zion-

to the Jews.6 ism” would confront the British authorities in

Palestine and lead to an “immigration revolt.” In Ben-Gurion repeated the “prophesy” of destruc- 1934 Ben-Gurion had said that the Jewish Agency tion in various forms and even used the term __ sees “the fulfillment of Zionism as the salvation “Holocaust.” In June 1939, three months before the of the Jewish nation and the main task of our genoutbreak of war, he alluded to the term while ad- __ eration.” Against the circle of helplessness in dressing his colleagues in the Zionist ActionsCom- —_- which the Jews found themselves, he defined the mittee: “Hitler isafactandhecanberelieduponin Jewish Agency’s main objective for the years to this regard. If there isa world war andhetakescon- —_ come: “To create an immense force in Palestine.” trol of Europe, he will carry out this thing; first of | That same year Ben-Gurion presented to the

all he will annihilate the Jews of Europe.”’ mufti’s representatives his idea of forming an What kind of a prophesy is this? What isthe | Arab Federation—which would include a Jewish real meaning of those feelings of foreboding and —_ state—with the capacity to integrate six to eight what did they really embody? From the begin- —_— million Jews. In 1935 he called for the rescue of a ning of 1933 up to the outbreak of war, Ben- __ million Jews from Germany and Poland and sugGurion often made use of expressions such as _ gested bringing them to Palestine.”* This plan in“calamity,” “extermination,” “devastation,” “cat- cluded the negotiations between the Zionist or-

aclysm” and even “the physical annihilation of | ganization and Nazi Germany on the “transfer the entire Jewish race.” This type of speech was —_ agreement,” which was mainly aimed at arrangprobably more typical of him than of any other —_ ing for the emigration of the Jews of Germany Zionist leader. Did he really “prophesy” or fore- | and Austria to Palestine together with all their see a systematic mass murder of the Jews of Eu- _ property. In 1936, one year after the Nuremberg rope? That there would indeed be a “holocaust” Laws—which so shook the status of the Jews of

as we conceive it today? Germany at a time when the Berlin Olympic Before grappling with this question, one | Games symbolized a remission of sorts in antimust examine other aspects of Ben-Gurion’s Semitic pressure in Germany—Ben-Gurion an-

22

Phases of Acknowledging

nounced, “We have no time to wait. The immi- — and carefully examine the way in which he gration issue . . . is now a question of life and processed the information he received during the death for the Jewish nation and for [the Jewish various stages of the “final solution.” Let it suffice

Yishuv in] Palestine.” here to say that Ben-Gurion did indeed foresee This same sense of urgency led Ben-Gurion __ several of the events that would take place, to support adopting the recommendations ofthe | whereas there were other events that he could 1937 Peel Commission to partition Palestine be- never even have imagined. tween the Jews and the Arabs. At the time he was Ben-Gurion was on target in his “prophecies convinced that a political framework, however of war,” including the devastation that this war small, would make it possible to save largenum- — would bring to Europe; he was accurate in his as-

bers of Jews from troubled areas in Europe. Ina sessment of the dangers surrounding Hitler and letter written in October 1938 to Supreme Court __ the clear indications of his plans and acts of agJudge Louis D. Brandeis, a Jewish American gression; he was correct in assuming that the demleader, Ben-Gurion compared the political situa- | ocratic world would abandon the Jews; he made a tion to earth being pulled from under the feet of | point of describing the helplessness of the Jewish the Jews of Europe. Anti-Semitism is springing people and the trap into which not only the Jews of up all over the world, even in the free countries, | Europe had fallen but also those of the free world. he warned, and a second world war is imminent. On the other hand, Ben-Gurion did not foresee “What we need more than anything else” hecon- _ the extent of the approaching calamity. He neither cluded, “is massive immigration within a few — sawnor was able to predict how a murderous ide-

years.” ology could be translated into an all-encompassIs it possible, based upon the aforemen- ing systematic annihilation.

tioned evidence cited above, to determine whether Ben-Gurion foresaw what was going to BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND

happen to the Jewish nation at the hands of that UNDERSTANDING

pest rising up on the banks of the Rhein * Can FIRST NEWS:

this be gleaned, for example, from Ben-Gurion’s SEPTEMBER 1939-MAY 1940

systematic and accurate analysis of the process leading up to a war in Europe and the radical § War broke out in September 1939.*° Like many changes that had to be introduced into Zionist others, Ben-Gurion felt this was inevitable. The policies? Or from his use of the term “Holocaust” _ first part of the scenario had materialized; there

on many occasions during the prewar years? And — was more to come after the Rheinlands, Austria, what is the significance of his expressions? Did = and Czechoslovakia, and there would also be a he, when talking about a “holocaust,” mean what war. How did Ben-Gurion receive the news of the was later to be known as the “Holocaust”? From —_ war? How did he react to the information that the accumulated weight of the facts presented started to stream in about the war and the plight here, can we assume that Ben-Gurion foresawthe of the Jews?

annihilation, the horrors of the “final solution,” Before responding to these questions, I shall and that this is what he meant when he referred § examine four areas relating to them: (1) Bento “devastation”? What, in fact, did Ben-Gurion —_Gurion’s travel schedule during the first part of the mean by his warnings during those prewar years? — war through 1942; (2) the stages of the “final soluIn order to supply as complete an answer as ___ tion” and the need for periodization; (3) the diffipossible, one must take a close look at how Ben- _ culty of deciphering the ultimate objectives of the Gurion became aware of the situation in Europe —=—- Nazi government, which were not homogeneous

23

Confronting the Information

and whose policies toward the Jews did not de- _ ginning of the war until mid-1941, encompassing velop in a linear manner and were not decided __ the beginning of systematic mass murder, first by upon “in one go”; and (4) the connection between —_ shooting and sometime later by gas poisoning in

organizational issues, concerning the flow and __ the industrialized death camps; and (2) from evaluation of information, and epistemologicalis- | mid-1941 to the end of November 1942, beginsues, which must be clarified in order toexamine _ ning with the onset of systematic annihilation the way in which Ben-Gurion became cognitively | and ending when news of the events in Europe aware of the fact that the Jews of Europe were be- —_ were made public.

ing annihilated. Another relevant subperiod consists of the Three years separated the outbreak of war,in time between the beginning of the war and the September 1939, from October-November 1942, decision to embark upon systematic annihilation months that formed a turning point in the pro- _at the expense of other “solutions” to the Jewish cess of understanding the Holocaust: that it was — problem. Until then use had been made of other something essentially different from anythingin “solutions,” such as territorial concentration Jewish or human experience. In the course of in ghettos and on “reservations.” For example, those three years, Ben-Gurion left the country _ ninety-five thousand Jews had already been conthree times. The first, and shortest, trip consisted centrated in the Nisko-Lublin area in Poland. of a ten-day visit to England. The second, to —- Forced emigration was another “solution” that Britain and the United States, beganin April1940 —_ was rejected once a decision was reached favoring and ended in February 1941. Five months later —_ annihilation, as was the plan to deport the Jews to

Ben-Gurion made his third journey, again to Madagascar. One school of thought has it that the Britain and the United States, which lasted from —_ decision to embark upon a course of systematic

July 1941 to October 1942. murder was made in March—April 1941, but this, It is clear from Ben-Gurion’s itinerary that too, remains debatable. Recognition of the he did not receive all the information flowing chronological stages in the development of the into his office in the country [Palestine—trans.]. “final solution” up to the beginning of systematic The reason for this is obvious: Ben-Gurion was —s murder reduces the time frame in which it was not in the country for most of the period central _ possible to be aware of it; after all, no one could to the debate over the question of “awareness.” —_ have known about the mass murders before they Conversely, he was exposed to otherinformation had actually begun in mid-1941. that arrived first in Britain and the Unites States A third area concerns the objective difficulty and only later in Palestine. If the development — ofanalyzinga reality riddled with contradictions. of Ben-Gurion’s awareness of the Holocaust dif- | There were already signs of contradiction even fered somewhat from that of the Yishuv in gen- _ before the decision to systematically murder all eral, this could be explained by the variedtypesof the Jews of Europe; and even after the decision information involved and the different levels of | had been made, it was possible to grasp several

information to which he was exposed. contradictions in the practical implementation Periodizing the stages of the “final solution” — of the decision while not comprehending the dein Europe is crucial to any debate over the ques- _cision’s satanic nature. This was due, in part, to

tion of how the Yishuv explained events in Eu- __ the large number of constituents that made up rope. In order not to become enmeshed in the _ the Nazi camp, many of which were involved in lengthy debate surrounding the division oftheis- the Jewish issue. As we shall see, they did not all sue into periods and subperiods, I shall differen- | “broadcast” the same message. Even in the politiate between two key periods: (1) from the be- _ cies of the great powers it is possible to detect

24

Phases of Acknowledging

mixed signals whose cumulative weight wascon- —- were merely connected with it—made a habit of fusing, making it hard to develop a clear aware- _ passing along to him all political, intelligence, or

ness of what was going on. It laterturnedoutthat = other information they received, depending on these confusing signals were deliberately sent by | how important they considered the information the Nazis as part of a policy of deceit aimed at —_ to be and how worthy of his attention.

supplying a cover for their real activities and During the period under debate, Benachieving for themselves a measure of “industrial | Gurion held three important offices: (1) he was

peace” —in all its horrible implications. chairman of the Jewish Agency (and head of the The fourth and final area involves distinc- Zionist leadership); (2) he served as leader of Mations that must be made in the debate amonga __pai, the Yishuv’s largest and most important ponumber of spheres of interest over “what Ben- _ litical party (although he shared this position Gurion knew.” First, there is the flow of informa- with Berl Katzanelson, who died in 1944, and tion to him and the mechanisms that facilitated possibly also with Yitzhak Tabenkin, who held a this flow; second, there is the quality ofthe mech- _ senior position in the Mapai leadership until the anisms used to analyze the information; and, spring of 1944); and (3) he was also leader of the third, there is understanding the ways ofintellec- | Zionists’ Labor Movement. The two latter positually and emotionally processing the informa- —_ tions meant that Ben-Gurion continued to retion. The debate oscillates, therefore, between ceive reports and guide and direct the most imquestions that are technical and those that are —_ portant moves of the Yishuv even after resigning epistemological, based on the laws of awareness, _—_ from the Jewish Agency. His not infrequent resig-

and especially the ways in which information was nations and demonstrative leaves of absence (he

to be sifted, processed, and put in proper per- tended to fall out with his colleagues over disspective concerning a phenomenon that had = agreements in policy) did not prevent him from never previously been part of human experience. _ leading the party, which included key figures in And, of course, in the background to this debate —_ the Jewish Agency: Sharett, chairman of the Polooms the question of the relationship between _litical Department (“Foreign Minister”); Eliezer the information that reached Ben-Gurion and ___ Kaplan, the Jewish Agency’s treasurer (“Finance the way it was processed, on the onehand, andits = Minister”); and Eliyahu Dobkin, head of the Im-

place in Ben-Gurion’s list of priorities—given migration Department (“Minister of Immigrawhat we know about how passionate he was tion and Integration”), who held a less senior staabout the approaching calamity—on the other. __ tus. The senior officials in those same “offices” If information did indeed reach him, it must be — were also members of Mapai, Ben-Gurion’s poassumed that he was equipped with the appro- _litical party. priate means by which to absorb and process it.! Both because of his personality and his sta-

BEN-GURION’S SOURCES tus in the a and the party, Ben-Gurion OF INFORMATION served as the sounding board for the heads of all

the operative systems in the Zionist left, includThe available documentation on this subject and —_ ing such groups as Haganah, Mossad le Aliyah an examination of Ben-Gurion’s work routine _ Bet (the illegal immigration operation), and the prove explicitly that Ben-Gurion received virtu- _ various intelligence authorities that were begin-

ally all the information available, whether or ning to form. This was of great importance not it was important. The various offices of the — within the voluntary, quasi-sovereign structure Jewish Agency, which Ben-Gurion headed— ___ of the Yishuv at the time, since Ben-Gurion was whether they operated from within the system or one of the main unifying forces with regard to all

25

Confronting the Information

those elements and organizations. They “fed” — tions, deportations, and (later) mass murders him information and consulted with him on key were also published in newspapers based abroad, issues—even when he did not hold any official = such as the New Palestine, Zionist Review, Jewish “government” position. They also assumed that = Chronicle, as well as Yiddish newspapers in the in the end differences would be settled and Ben- — United States and later even non-Jewish newspaGurion would return to his post at the Jewish __ pers such as the Daily Telegraph or the New York

Agency. Times.*?

It is clear, therefore, that Ben-Gurion was Press agencies, such as the Jewish Tele-

major juncture in the flow ofinformation, thatis, | graphic Agency (JTA), or Palestine Corresponany information that seemed sufficiently impor- —_ dence, which belonged to the Jewish Agency it-

tant. A review of the quantity and quality of in- self, were also a source of daily reports. The formation to reach Ben-Gurion reveals that most | Mandatory government censored reports supof the people who worked with him useda “tobe _ plied by the important British news agency, on the safe side” method. In other words, if in Reuters, and monitored publications in Palesdoubt, they just passed along all information to __ tine. In general, the Mandatory authorities pre-

Ben-Gurion’s office. vented the publication of provocative informaThe Yishuv’s “government” was beginning __ tion during the war, including, of course, any to solidify at about this time, although mattersof news on the deteriorating situation of the Jews in hierarchy, task definition, and delegation of au- — Europe, since it could be assumed that such news thority were still unclear between the Jewish would arouse the wrath of the Jews in Palestine. Agency’s various departments and the different | Nonetheless, news agency reports from Palestine organizations and authorities within the Zionist also included hints of the deteriorating situation. movement and the Yishuv. Since the same people —_— Information also arrived through the various ra-

frequently filled several positions and belonged __ dio stations; Ben-Gurion tuned in to them, like to a number of organizations, Ben-Gurion often _—_ everyone else in those days, both in Palestine and

received identical information from different | when he was abroad. He heard some important

sources. reports on the BBC, on American radio stations,

It is worth noting the quantity and availabil- | and even broadcasts from Radio Rome and Radio ity of information. On theeve ofthe waranddur- _ Berlin.*4

ing its early stages, the Jewish Agency had at its Palestine Offices. The Palestine offices all disposal the largest “spy web” in the world. Prac- over Europe were another part of the aforemen-

tically every Jew in Europe had contact with tioned “web.” In addition to their other tasks, members of his family in Palestine or elsewhere they collected and processed various types of inin the world and poured out his troubles to them. formation, which they sent on to the Jewish Alongside this “web,” the Jewish Agency received | Agency. As the war spread and most of Europe information on events in Europe through an — came under German occupation, these Palestine

elaborate network of more established chan- offices were closed down one by one, so that

nels:*2 those remaining in Istanbul, Geneva, and (later) The Press and Press Agencies. As early as _—_ Portugal became the most important centers for

1940, anyone who read a newspaper (Ben- __ the transmission of information.

Gurion was an avid reader) would have found in Couriers. This was another institution the Yishuv press the testimonies of refugees ar- _ whose task it was to collect and transfer informariving in Palestine or reports sent from the occu- _ tion to Palestine. These consisted mostly of nonpied areas in Europe. Information on persecu- _ Jewish press reporters, merchants, businessmen,

26

Phases of Acknowledging

and diplomats who carried out missions on be- =movements in the Diaspora and their headhalf of the Yishuv while conducting their ordi- | quarters in Palestine. These included the relinary business. These people played an impor- — gious movements Agudat Israel and the secular tant role in rescue efforts. At one stage there was = pioneer movements Po’alei Zion, Hano’ar haa proposal to “formalize the courier arrange- § Zioni, Hashomer Hatza ir, and Dror-Hahalutz.*®

ment with established headquarters in Geneva. | Ben-Gurion was supplied with information Ben-Gurion supported such proposals.” The — from these sources either through corresponmaterial that arrived from the Palestine offices | dence or from meetings with immigrant organand the couriers was sent to the Jewish Agency’s _izations, who appealed to him for help in cop-

various departments as well as to Ben-Gurion, ing with local bureaucracies. Thus, he was who was usually the main recipient.Some mate- —_— informed of the situation in Europe by Romanrial was not passed on to all members of the JAE, —_ ian, Czechoslovakian, Bulgarian, and Yugoslaeither because of the material’s secrecy ratingor | vian Jewish immigrant organizations, as well as

its subject matter.*> by members of the Kaldovo-Sabac convoy, who Committee of Four. This was another group ___ were trapped in the occupied region on their that concentrated and distributed information.It | way to Palestine.*? Most political delegations had been formed shortly after the outbreak of | hoped Ben-Gurion would use his influence to war in order to deal with the issue of Poland’s _ reduce local red tape. Based on the information Jews and was staffed by the following members of he received from these sources, Ben-Gurion the Jewish Agency Executive: Yitzhak Gruen- — was able to draw up an accurate picture of the baum, Moshe Shapira, Eliyahu Dobkin, and Dr. situation in Europe.” Emil Schmorak. One of the committee’s inform- World Union of Zionist Socialists. This cenants was Dr. Ignacy (Yitzhak) Schwartzbrat, — ter gathered information that came from Mapaia member of the Polish National Council and affiliated organizations all over the world, includthe Polish government-in-exile in London. He ing Hakkibutz Hameuhad, Hano’ar Hatzioni, passed on information from the Polish under- Hashomer Hatzair, Gordonia, and immigrant

ground through the government-in-exile.*® organizations. The center edited the incoming Two members of that committee main- information and copied letters from Europe betained ongoing working relationships with Ben- _ fore distributing them. As Jewish Agency chairGurion: Gruenbaum, who was a senior member man and Mapai leader, Ben-Gurion received inof the Jewish Agency Executive and Ben-Gurion’s — formation from the center, whose officials often permanent deputy; and Dobkin, who was a _ consulted with him and asked for his assistance member of Ben-Gurion’s party and head of the —_— in conducting their affairs.*!

Immigration Department. It may therefore be Bulletins. The Committee of Four, the assumed that information from Schwartzbrat offices of the World Union of Zionist Socialists, also reached Ben-Gurion either through official |= and the Kibbutz Hameuhad collected informachannels or personally through Gruenbaum or __ tion and published semimonthly bulletins that Dobkin. Moreover, Ben-Gurion and Schwartz- — _ were sent to key people in Mapai, the Jewish brat maintained a correspondence both before | Agency, members of the National Council, and

and during the war.*” others. Mapai leaders Berl Katzanelson, BenParty Connections and Ties with Immi- Gurion, and Yitzhak Tabenkin headed the distrigrant Associations. In addition to preexisting bution list. Not meant for widespread distribucommunication channels, there were ties _ tion, these bulletins supplied Ben-Gurion with maintained between branches of Zionist youth an up-to-date picture of the situation.”

27

Confronting the Information

GLEANING INFORMATION progress of the war. It is important to stress here The Yishuv’s “intelligence system” just prior to _ that all information considered significant by the the Second World War consisted of anumber of — Jewish Agency’s Political Department was rouinstitutions and offices that would in time be- _ tinely placed on Ben-Gurion’s desk in Jerusalem come the State of Israel’s intelligence system. It —_ or sent to him abroad.“

had been established in order to cope with two National Intelligence Service. This agency, challenges: the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab —_— knownas Shai, was operated by the Haganah be-

states and the British Mandatory government. fore and during the war and obtained informaNo one could have imagined that a major partof tion on events in Europe. Lessons learned from their activity would involve evaluating the Jewish the Arab revolt revealed a need for a central intelsituation in Europe, espionage behind enemy _ligence organization. The Haganah established a lines, or rescuing Jews from occupied Europe. body responsible for counterintelligence activity, Political Department of the Jewish Agency. | known as the Ran. Palestine was an arena for

This department gathered and evaluated infor- | German and Italian espionage activity, and mation and distributed it among the agency’s ___ British espionage activity had to be counteracted various branches.*? During the period under dis- —_ bya Jewish organization. It was soon evident that cussion, the department was headed by Moshe __ the Americans were laying down their own intelSharett, who was assisted by Reuven Shiloah, __ ligence web in the region. It was thus necessary to Eliyahu Elath, Teddy Kollek, and Ehud Avriel. A __ keep tabs on all this activity and to safeguard study of Ben-Gurion’s modus operandi shows _ against it.

that these people were his principal aides and Shai was established in mid-1940, with the that Kollek and Avriel had been his operational __ risk of the war spreading to the Middle East as its supporters since the early forties. During the first —_ principal backdrop. The Jewish Agency’s Political half of the war Eliyahu Epstein (Elath) madesev- | Department was responsible for the establisheral trips to Turkey, where he was exposed toin- — ment of this new body, which was supposed to telligence arriving from Europe. Once the Yishuv — operate mainly in the Middle East. However, it became aware of the genocide being carried out —_—-was also exposed to information from Europe, by the Nazis against the Jews of Europe, Shiloah, and some of its members, who had carried out Kollek, and Avriel set up an intelligence and res- purely Yishuv-focused activity in the course of

cue ring in Istanbul. their work with Shai and the Ran, were later sent The Political Department carried out a on European missions. For example, Yehuda number of intelligence tasks before the Second Arazi, who founded the Ran, was sent shortly World War, such as running informers and _ thereafter to Romania on a reconnaissance and couriers and collecting information from the sabotage mission. The latter can here serve to ilPalestinian and international press, from diplo- _lustrate the connection between the Yishuv and mats, army officers, and from foreign intelligence | the European arenas and the Yishuv-based intelstaff stationed in Palestine, the Middle East, and __ ligence organization.*

elsewhere in the world. The Political Department Hiding behind the Press. The local and forwas also active in Egypt, Turkey, Britain,andthe eign press often served as cover for the Yishuv’s United States; it weighed the practical aspects of | espionage activity in the Middle East and Europe. establishing a Jewish force that would take partin —_—_ Press reporters were also informers and couriers the war as part of the Allied forces. The depart- —_ in the service of the Political Department. Intelli-

ment’s cooperation with the Allies exposed its | gence and rescue emissaries in the Yishuv, whose people to news of events in Europe and the _literary talents did not exceed the writing of brief

28

Phases of Acknowledging

letters and memos, were planted in the editorial —_ arriving for family or financial reasons, among offices of these newspapers and sent into action ~— others. The bureau collected information from under the guise of roving reporters. The rationale | anyone who knew anything about military or inwas obvious: part of a reporter’s daily routine is dustrial objectives and was able to supply politi-

to go out and collect news; nothing was more cal secrets or to report on the population’s econatural, therefore, than to see a zealous reporter nomic situation and social state of mind. The

carrying out his “job.” bureau was headed by Emanuel Yelan (Vilensky), Since the early twenties Gershon Agronsky — who was included in the secret cooperation (Agron), senior reporter and editor of the Pales- | agreement between the Yishuv and the British tine Post and later mayor of Jerusalem, had been intelligence forces. The bureau was constantly active in the Arab Department of the Zionist Ex- —_ growing in scope during the war as it took on adecutive. Twice the Manchester Guardian and the _ ditional tasks and increased its staff, including

Christian Science Monitor had sent him ontours Gideon Roper (Raphael), who was later apof Syria following the revolt there in 1925, buthe — pointed director general of the Foreign Office.

used his time to work for the Political Depart- | The bureau’s work ethic was both professional ment as well. His web of activity was later ex- | and methodical, and over the years it produced panded, both among the press and the intelli- more than two thousand reports and reviews, the gence organizations in Palestine.“ Agronsky’s = most important of which were also passed on to part in the top secret Brand affair was that of | the Jewish Agency’s Political Department and go-between for Ben-Gurion in Jerusalem and from there to Ben-Gurion. Information included Sharett in London. At various times before and __ in these reports clearly pointed to a deterioration during the war, the Palestine Postalso served asa __ in the plight of European Jews.

cover for other go-betweens. Nahum Vilensky, ;

, , COMMUNICATION CHANNELS

one of the heads of the Yishuv’s intelligence serv. BEN-GURION 9 PERSONAL

ices, worked in Egypt as a reporter for the

Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung and reported to the — Ben-Gurion political status gained him access to

Jewish Agency on events there. Vilensky was the information channels not available to his colman Ben-Gurion depended on for firsthand in- —_ leagues in the Jewish Agency. He also formed formation on Italian activity in Palestine. Teddy |= many personal ties during his many trips abroad Kollek and Venja Pomeranz were sent on mis- both before and during the war. His leadership sions to Istanbul masquerading as news re- —_ qualities and inquisitive, studious personality porters, Pomeranz for Davar and Kollek for the — also made it possible for him to glean informa“important” Kibbutz Ein Gev bulletin. Shai set —_‘ tion from independent sources. He also sought itself up in the Davar officesand severalmembers — information on issues that appeared of marginal of its staff were given jobs as reporters. The paper §_ importance to others and took an interest in Davar Hayom also occasionally supplied a cover subjects that were not necessarily under his aufor espionage missions on behalf of the Yishuv.*” thority. This was simply the nature of the man

Haifa Interrogation Bureau. This bureau and the way in which he worked. He was not was another important source of information. satisfied with established communication chanFounded in July 1940 for the purpose of extract- _— nels or with the material it yielded either on the ing information from people arriving in Pales- _crisis in Europe or on other issues. If he felt an tine from Europe, including British soldiers and _issue to be of importance, he would make inairmen escaping from POW camps, refugeeswho —§ quiries and demand answers, as was the case had managed to escape from Europe, and people ____ with the present issue.

29 |

Confronting the Information

In terms of Ben-Gurion’s personal connec- __ ceived from the Union of Pioneer Organizations

tions, Zaslany, Epstein, Kollek, and Avriel have (Brit hairgunim hahalutzi’im) on 1 November already been mentioned. They were joined by 1939 informed Ben-Gurion of the situation in Shaul Meirov (Avigur) and Eliyahu Golomb, Poland and the steps that had to be taken immeamong others. A portion of the informationthey diately after occupation.*® Dr. Moshe Kleinbaum supplied came through the Histadrut and the —_ (Sneh) also sent a letter from Kovna at the end of Agricultural Workers’ Federation, some of whose the month describing the state of those Jewish members were involved in various undercover __ refugees who had managed to escape to Lithuaactivities. Zvi Schechter (Yehieli), who was later nia and telling of the organized aid for the ten appointed to liaise with the British over the para- thousand Jewish refugees already there, among

troopers’ activity, was among the latter. them two thousand Zionists. Foreigners, military and secret service per- Dr. Kleinbaum—at the time a prominent sonnel, and diplomats whom Ben-Gurion metin __ public figure in Poland and soon to become a key Palestine and on his trips abroad were also good _sfigure in the Yishuv’s security system—was not sources of information. Members of the Socialist _ satisfied with mere reporting. He proposed that International were an important source ofinfor- | Ben-Gurion escalate the Yishuv’s efforts at rescumation and served as efficient channels for pass- _— ing Zionist leaders from Germany and the Russianing on messages. Although the organization’s —_ occupied regions of Poland. Those still trapped activity decreased significantly during the war —_— in areas under German occupation were destined years, its members established opposition cellsin —_ for “destruction and death,” while those trapped various parts of occupied Europe through which __ in the regions under Soviet control were facing intelligence information was transmitted. Ben- _ certain imprisonment because of the Soviets plan Gurion had ties with at least three people in the —_ to destroy Zionism and the Hebrew language in Socialist International’s underground political — those areas. Although he offered concrete courses web: the Belgian Walter Schevevnels, the British — of action to rescue Zionists from Poland, KleinJohn Brown, and the Bulgarian Georgi Dimitrov. | baum did suppress his feeling that such action Material reaching Ben-Gurion while he was out __ was probably futile. Once he arrived in Palestine, of the country was always couriered to him, and Kleinbaum promised Ben-Gurion, he would tell

during his stays in the United States he received him all about the “many problems” resulting information from Palestine through alocalclan- —_— from the “catastrophe of the Jews of Poland.”>!

destine communications system he had helped to Any discrepancies in Kleinbaum’s description establish.*? It can be deduced, therefore, that the were smoothed out by a Zionist activist from Yishuv maintained enough channels for the col- —~Vilna, who wrote Ben-Gurion the following letter:

lection and processing of information to make

most others unnecessary. What you have read, and certainly MERCILESS DESTRUCTION heard, is nothing compared with the cruel facts... . Around thirty thousand

What was the nature of the information that people were killed and tens of thousands reached Ben-Gurion from the time that war are wounded. Hundreds of homes have broke out until he set off on his journey abroad in been destroyed and thousands of famiMay 1940? As soon as war broke out, Ben-Gurion lies are living “a dog’s life.” Things are received information on the situation in Poland, going from bad to worse, and if this conwhich was the first scene of combat and the first tinues we shall be faced with the annihito fall under German occupation. A letter he re- lation of a million and a half Jews. Apart

30

Phases of Acknowledging

from forcing Jews into ghettos, persecu- fiercest blow of all.] After the Great War, we lost tions had begun in the various towns the Jews of Russia. This time we have lost Polish and cities... . Jewish economic life was Jewry ...and who knows what the next day will badly affected and hunger was much in bring.”>? evidence. Many people are being press-

ganged into forced labor and women are By then Ben-Gurion had already been made suffering terribly. Members of the Zion- aware of events in central Europe from a long ist movement, including the training meeting, held at the end of November 1939, with camps at Lodz and Bendin tried to ex- Dr. David Paul Meretz, Czech leader of the Ziontend assistance and the JDC also helped ist movement, who told him that the state of the by setting up soup kitchens. The others Jews in the protectorate, the region controlled by mostly dispersed. Those who managed Germany, had deteriorated badly since July, to escape to the Russian zone are in dan- which marked the arrival in Prague of Adolf ger of destruction (in other words, a to- Eichmann, the Gestapo’s “Official for Jewish tal split from the Jewish nation). Those Affairs.” According to Meretz, Eichmann anwho remain in the German side can look swered directly to Heinrich Himmler and was

forward to “physical destruction.” not subject to the authority of the protectorate. He immediately put in force a series of rules that In the letter the Yishuv was called upontoextend = adversely affected the local Jews as well as the material aid and assistance in obtaining immi- __ refugees. Based on experience gained in Austria

gration certificates and organizing international after the Anschluss, he set about organizing the protests. The Yishuv was asked to enlighten the — forced migration of Jews. Among other things, “best of humanity, America,” about what was _—_ Eichmann ordered the arrest of all stateless Polish happening to the Jews and to call on Jews both —_ Jews who had escaped to Czechoslovakia. He also inside and outside of Palestine, who “continue —_ required the confiscation all radios belonging to living their lives as usual without finding the _ Jews, the registration of all Jewish property, anda strength or courage to cry out or to make de- _ night curfew for all Jews.

mands.” The letter also hypothesized something Ben-Gurion learned from Dr. Meretz about that would later—too late—prove to be all too —_‘ the expulsion of the Jews of Czechoslovakia to the horribly true. “I realize that we are in a war, so _— southern Polish regions of Nisko and Lublin. Exthat we tend to confuse concepts: war victimsand __ pulsions were carried out at the height of discusvictims of anti-Semitism. We would not have left sions to concentrate Jews in “reservations” as a our homes and our jobs were it merely a matter — way of solving the “Jewish problem.” The plan—

of bombs.” to cram thousands of Jews into the Nisko-Lublin From Ben-Gurion’s reply to a letter, dated —_ region and to keep them in appalling conditions

December 1939, Dr. Ignacy Schwartzbart (a so that many of them would die of cold, hunger, member of the national council affiliated with and disease—originated in an order from Hitler the Polish government-in-exile in London) we _ to Reinhard Heydrich. It was only partly successcan learn how he internalized the information _ful, for in the end only ninety-five thousand Jews he had received: “I do not have to tell you how —__were concentrated in that region. Goring and much we all... feel for your suffering, which — Hans Frank, the region’s Nazi governor, rejected this time is not the suffering ofa single individ- the plan mainly for financial reasons and it was ual [We stand at the beginning of the war—and — dropped in March—April 1940 and no longer used

the Jewish nation has already received the asa “solution” to the “problem.”™

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Confronting the Information

According to Meretz’s report, the deporta- Earlier, roughly 1,000 people had been deported tion of Czech Jews began on 12 October 1939, to that protectorate on 18 October. A further conwhen between five and six thousand Jews were __ signment was supposed to leave on 28 October, sent to the “reservation.” They weretransported but did not—probably because of organizational “over two days in a closed railroad carriage, with — problems and internal disputes among the Nazis no water.” On arrival at Nisko-Lublin, the depor- —_ over the Nisko-Lublin plan. The women’s protest

tees put up huts to shelter them from the harsh _ had no influence over events, nor did any activity weather. The Zionists among them immediately — on the part of community leaders, neither of embarked on pioneer training. Others, especially | which prevented the dispatch of the deportees.

those without children, managed to escape to A few days later Ben-Gurion met and talked Russia. The Germans did not halt the flight to | to members of two Zionist missions upon their Russia and the Russians did not preventtheiren- —_— return from Europe. Throughout the war he held

try. Unlike the people fortunate enough to es- | many such meetings, from which he managed to cape, those over the age of forty-five were in seri- extract information.*” Meretz’s report arrived beous trouble. They were expelled from the camp _fore the one sent in December 1939 by Richard and warned that they would be shot if they tried — Lichtheim, the Jewish Agency representative in to reenter. The condition of the elderly was by far | Geneva. Lichtheim’s letter confirmed the picture the worst. Meretz reported to Ben-Gurion that | Meretz presented of the deteriorating conditions the plan to send the women to Nisko on their — of the Jews. That same month Ben-Gurion also own was revoked at the last moment, after the talked with an Italian resident of Palestine, newly women announced that they were not leaving _ arrived from a visit to Germany and seeking help without their children—even if this meant being in returning there. Her objective was to enter shot. In the meantime, the whole idea of areser- | Poland from Germany and to organize the rescue vation at Nisko-Lublin was dropped. Like many — of Polish children. The Hadassah organization, people inside and outside the German-occupied _ she said, was prepared to foot the bill for the chilterritories, Meretz, too, had no way of knowing __ dren’s upkeep. Ben-Gurion told her he would exthat the next stage in the “solution” to the “Jew- — amine the proposal.*°

ish problem” would be so much more extreme. The reports Ben-Gurion passed on to the He described what it was now like to be a Jew in JAE did not usually include the information he Czechoslovakia and asked the Jewish Agency for received in such meetings. He preferred to pass immediate aid. Ben-Gurion’s reply was that the = along portions of this information—using his Jewish Agency would do all it could, “as if we, | own discretion—to specific colleagues for whom ourselves, were sitting inside the inferno.”°6 the information was relevant to their sphere of Meretz’s report is typical of those Ben- operation. Only on his return from trips abroad Gurion received from Zionist activists and other — did he make a habit of presenting lengthy and community leaders. Meretz’sinformationwasup __ detailed reports on his activity. Thus, one can be to date and generally accurate. He clearly de- —_ almost certain that in this way Ben-Gurion obscribed the “reservation” at Nisko-Lublin andthe tained at least as much information as the other situation in Czechoslovakia, including the dete- | members of the Jewish Agency Executive— rioration in the Jews’ situation. However, his which is probably an understatement. numbers were incorrect. Between 20 and 26 Oc- Throughout 1940 this channel of informatober 1939 there were two consignments of de- tion remained active and Ben-Gurion held reportees from Vienna to the reservation, the first peated meetings and correspondence with emisconsisting of 912 people and the second of 672. _saries and community leaders. Copies of letters

32

Phases of Acknowledging

and telegrams sent to the Jewish Agency, or the ber 1939) and a vacation in Kalia, a vacation site secretariat of the Organization Department or its north of the Dead Sea (end January 1940—11 Febhead, Leo Lauterbach, also arrived routinely on ruary 1940). On 16 February he was back and Ben-Gurion’s desk. This is how copies of letters chairing a JAE meeting.

reached him from Bialopolsky from Lithuania At the 11 February 1940 meeting of the JAE, and Lichtheim from Switzerland in January 1940, Ben-Gurion missed a detailed report by Apolli-

as well as many other reports and analyses of nary Hartglas, president of the Zionist Federaevents in Europe. A direct appeal to Ben-Gurion tion in Poland, and engineer Moshe Kerner. He on 28 February 1940 reflects his special position did, however, read their reports in the minutes of in the Yishuv establishment. The appeal referred — the meeting, as well as in the summary he reto copies of letters sent by Perlis and A. Gebleber ceived on his desk or possibly even in the local from Vilna, pointing out that, although not a __s press. Hartglas’s report concluded that “through “money man,” Ben-Gurion is the man who pro- _ naked cruelty, the Polish [Jewish] population is vided the necessary “means” to help Jews in Russ- being annihilated, barbaric means are being used

ian occupied territories.>? to destroy them. . . through physical and moral The JAE meetings also supplied importantin- —_ terror, mass murder, starvation, the creation of formation on the situation in Europe. These meet- conditions for the spread of disease and by reings were, of course, chaired by Ben-Gurion, who — moving their will to live.” The report also pointed

was also responsible for their agenda, andit was out that the Germans were using systematic in this way that he received firsthandinformation = methods to obtain an overall objective. Hartglas on the Jews in Austria and Czechoslovakia from declared that if this activity were not stopped in Dobkin’s 30 October 1939 report. The situation in time, the whole of Polish Jewry would be eradiPoland was reviewed atameetingon2November __ cated.*!

1939. Six days later Ben-Gurion held a private In various parts of Europe, Palestine offices meeting with Berl Locker, of the Jewish Agencyin — were actively collecting information and passing

London, who gave him the outline of Chaim it back home. All-important reports reached Weizmann’s report of a visit to France and — Ben-Gurion. In January and February 1940 the Switzerland in October 1939. Ben-Gurion imme- Geneva office sent information that confirmed diately convened the JAE at his home and Locker _ news already received by Ben-Gurion from other

repeated Weizmann’s report to the other mem- sources. Dr. Fritz Ulmann, a Czech Jewish jourbers. In his report Weizmann described the per- nalist who had worked with Lichtheim in the secution and murder of hundreds of Jews by Jewish Agency office in Geneva, sent out reports, drowning or starvation. Weizmann tended to __ based on reliable sources in the occupied territoblame the suffering of the Jews more on the war _ ries, reviewing the situation of the Jews in Poland than on Nazi persecution, which was directed — andstressing that “the grave situation is the result only at Jews. During the early stages of the war, __ either of the state of war or the barbarian behavthis line of thinking was reassuring, a viable —_ior of the Nazis.” Ullman reported a change in the means of dealing with the horrible news from _ relationship between Germany and Russia: Jews

Europe. were no longer being permitted to cross from Between September 1939 and May 1940 Ben- German to Russian territories. The reports also Gurion took an active part in meetings wherein- |= mentioned the Nikso-Lublin plan, which Benformation was handed out on the state of affairs | Gurion could have learned about at his meeting in occupied Europe—with the exception of two — with Meretz. According to Ullman, the plan, absences: a brief stay in London (13-24 Novem- which had been devised by the Gestapo, was

33

Confronting the Information

rejected due to the objection of certain German __ the occupied territories and the adjoining counauthorities. One can see that Ullman’s sources __ tries. Even if this proved expensive and dangerwere more accurate than Meretz’s in explaining __ ous, there was no excuse for not doing so.

the rejection of the Nikso-Lublin plan.” This, “THE ONE RELIABLE RESCUE” plus other information that continued to flow in from the same source, was reasonably accurate During the first months of the war, information and on the whole produced quite a reliable pic- __ trickled in regularly from Europe and reached

ture of the situation.” Ben-Gurion, who was constantly being updated Varied information on the situation in Eu- by _emissaries, Zionist activists, and ordinary rope was concentrated at Mapai’s World Unionof —_ people, some of whom even approached him Zionist Socialists and was passed on initsentirety —_— personally. The question of availability of infor-

to Ben-Gurion, the party’s senior leader, either |= mation on events in Europe is not a main issue verbally or in writing. In all his meetings within- —_ here. Information arrived and, as we have seen, formants Ben-Gurion made a habit of discussing was fairly accurate. The Yishuv leaders received the situation in Europe. The aid issue was also dis- —_ reports on the first stages of the “ghettoization” cussed, as was the Jewish Agency’s potential role and “territorial concentration.” Ulman’s people in all this. In February 1940 Ben-Gurion met with —_ in the occupied territories were even able to idenMelekh Neustadt, political secretary of Mapai’s __ tify the finer points of disputes that took place World Union, one of the first such meetings dur-_ _ behind the scenes on the fringes of the Nazi hiering the period under discussion. Neustadt asked — archy. The issue here is to determine what was the Zionist leadership for aid to the “Union” both — done as a result of this information. Does Benin Palestine and abroad and agreed to draw upa —_ Gurion’s activity suggest that the information

list of issues requiring support. was indeed absorbed and processed? Is there any Most of Neustadt’s requests focused on the __ evidence for preparations being put into action, Mapai World Union's being another way ofcom- __ or even for the existence of activity of any kind?

municating with various European Jewish com- At this stage (up to May 1940) Ben-Gurion munities during the war years. The help he _ was taking all this information very seriously. His wanted involved assurance of the continued exis- conclusions were immediate and were centered tence of the party’s offices, reorganization (which — within three main areas. First, he called in all the became necessary in Budapest), and dispatching §_ Yishuv’s military experts to discuss the implicaemissaries to various places in Europe (Lithua- _ tions of a war against Hitler from the Yishuv’s and nia, old Romania, Serbia and Transylvania, Hun- __ the region’s point of view and to determine how gary and Carpatho-Rus and the Balkan states). the Yishuv could participate in such a war. (One Neustadt pointed out the importance of main- —_ should not forget that both Ben-Gurion and the taining ties with key party members—especially | Yishuv had experience establishing the Jewish diin Poland—and stressed the importance of pub- _ visions during the First World War.) Second, he lishing the party’s news bulletin Ha-ihud. This concluded that immigration to Palestine was the

bulletin contained extensive information on best possible means of rescuing the Jews of Euevents in Palestine, in the Zionist world, and in rope. Third, since he and his colleagues assumed the labor movement and was distributed gratisto that in time many regions in Europe would be some four hundred people worldwide, as well as —_ closed, various ways were examined for collecting to the movement’s offices and to the Jewish press. information from areas under Nazi occupation.

Neustadt concluded that it was vital to establish In his speeches Ben-Gurion hinted that the communications and aid stations throughout —_Yishuv’s tiny Jewish community would now have

34

Phases of Acknowledging

to bear too big a burden and that it would be un- __ tary matters. There was nothing dramatic in able to save all the Jews from an inevitable fate. It Ben-Gurion’s words at his meeting that afternoon was a difficult thought to bear and harder still to | with the Jewish Agency, where a proposal was accome to terms with, especially for the leader of a cepted to recruit young people of military age and movement that was considering arevolutionand to publish a manifesto concerning the situation the building of a nation-state. Indeed, other created by the newly declared war against Gerspeeches he made at that time, as well as his poli- = many. The manifesto, published that same day, cies and the activity they generated, show that — contained none of the high drama one would Ben-Gurion was doing his best to overcome his _ have expected under the circumstances.

sense of desperation and that he succeeded most Later Ben-Gurion explained to Haganah

of the time. commanders why the outbreak of war came as no Ben-Gurion’s no-nonsense attitude toward __ surprise to him, stressing that it was important to events leading up to the Second World Waris ob- _ pinpoint the beginning of any momentous historic vious from his very first reaction to the news that — event before it took place. The war declared on war had broken out. Obviously, no one could 3 September 1939 had began with the occupation of have known at the beginning of September 1939 = Czechoslovakia by Hitler, or perhaps even with the what we now know today: the war was goingtobe —_ annexation of Austria or when the German army a world war, it was going to last almost six years, | marched into the Rheinland. There was a sense in and it would take an enormous tollin bloodshed. _his words to his colleagues that his burden was too Nonetheless, Ben-Gurion’s reaction seems heavy to bear, which might indicate that he was late slight—even feeble. It was as if he was not sur- _ to internalize the intensity of the challenge and the prised at what was happening in Europe, asifthe — gravity of the times: “The general turn of events in prophesied outbreak of war wasa certainty asfar the world is not bringing good tidings and it is our as he was concerned, something predetermined. duty to concentrate on local matters, because today

His reaction was balanced and to the point. concern for the Jewish nation and its Diaspora is In September 1939, on the eve of the out- beyond human power.’® break of war, Ben-Gurion returned from the last At a meeting of the National Council, BenZionist congress and arrived in Palestine on Sat- = Gurion returned briefly to a description of immi-

urday evening, 2 September. The following nent calamity. He said, among other things, that day—Jjust two days after the German army had __ the Yishuv, too, could sense the “signs of a Holo-

invaded Poland—Ben-Gurion met Eliyahu caust” and so it must do everything in its power Golomb, Dov Hos, Dov Joseph, and Eliezer Ka- to continue the immigration operation—the plan in Jerusalem, where they discussed the pos- “one true rescue”—since “none of the Jews of sibility of establishing a two-pronged Jewish — Europe is secure... his property is not safe; his army, one to defend the Yishuv and the other— _life is not safe; hundreds of thousands of the Jews

to include Jews from other countries—to help of Poland are already being slaughtered. And fight Hitler. In the middle of the meeting, news — who can promise that the hands of the destroyer arrived that Britain had declared war against will not reach neighboring countries?” Compar-

Germany. ing the two world wars, he concluded that we Ben-Gurion’s “war prophesy” had material- “lost the Jews of Russia” in the first and now we ized and his immediate reaction was nothing if were losing Polish Jewry—and “who knows what not practical: he called Ya’akov Dostrovsky (Dori) | tomorrow may bring?”®?

and Yohanan Rattner, two senior Haganah lead- Ben-Gurion spent much time and effort ers, for consultations and clarifications of mili- _ during the first months of the war to instill in his

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Confronting the Information

colleagues and the public in general what he saw striction would become quite clear in all its as the most appropriate political course of action — ramifications.

given the present situation: immigration to a During the next few months Ben-Gurion Jewish homeland in Palestine as the best means _ continued to point out the ways in which the Jews of rescuing the Jews of Europe.” This objective in Europe and in Palestine were placed in an imhad to be met; Jews had to be rescued from Eu- _ possible situation with respect to the Germans

rope even if this meant open conflict with | andthe British. Nevertheless he stated, “We must Britain. It is important to note that his call for _ help the [British] army as if there were no White immigration to Palestine came even before the — Paper, and we must fight the White Paper as if outbreak of war. It is significant— especially in there were no war.’ He was always aware of light of the accusations hurled at the Yishuv fol- _Britain’s role in blocking the path of Nazism and lowing the war—that open conflict with Britain Fascism, and in time his respect for Britain grew,

concerning immigration was avoided during the especially after Winston Churchill replaced war in return for political benefits after the war. Chamberlain as prime minister. At the same Ben-Gurion’s call for Jewish immigration __ time, he stressed his own duty and the Yishuv’s was aimed at Britain, ruler of the region and ar- _ right to fight for increased immigration even if chitect of the four-month-old government White this meant a violent struggle against Britain.”

Paper. This document, which was published in Ben-Gurion also began taking real action to May 1939, was not unconnected to the recently | advance the matter of mass emigration from Euended Arab rebellion. As Ben-Gurion saw it, the — rope. On a brief visit to London in November White Paper was a further expression of Britain's | 1939—before most of the cries of help had even conciliatory attitude toward the aggressorin Eu- _ arrived from Jews in Europe—he asked the reprope and only confirmed his fears that Britains —_ resentative of the Ukrainian Federation, who was Middle East policies would similarly reflect its | about to leave for Vilna, to contact the local Zion-

tendency to appease the aggressor. ist organization and look into possible emigraBen-Gurion was wrong with regard to the __ tion channels through Russia.”? With this objec-

military reaction, for Britain was very firm in tive in mind, Ben-Gurion sent Enzo Sereni (a quelling the Arab revolt. However, he was right |= member of Kibbutz Giv’at Brenner, one of the in assuming that Britain would exercise a soft paratroopers who did not return from an underpolicy in the Middle East in order to appease the — cover mission to Europe) to organize representaArabs. Indeed, the White Paper signaled to the _ tives of the nonaligned states to visit Poland and

Arabs that Britain was aware of their fear of examine the situation of the Jews.” Palestine being overrun by Jews escaping from In an attempt to advance the issue of mass Europe and would do whatever was necessary to | emigration from Europe, Ben-Gurion gave inavoid any demographic changes betweenthetwo __ structions to see if it was possible to take advanpopulations in the region. Thus, the White Paper ___ tage of the relationship between Dr. Magnes, restricted the immigration of Jews into Palestine president of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, by issuing only seventy-five thousand immigra- and Laurence Steinhardt, U.S. ambassador to tion certificates over the next five years. The rate | Moscow, in order to urge the American diplomat of immigration—fifteen thousand immigrants __ to seek the assistance of the Russian government. per year—was also fixed. In time the horrors of | The idea was to ask the Soviet government to perthe Holocaust in Europe would be exposed, to- —s mit the safe passage of Yishuv emissaries trapped gether with Britain’s general policyontheimmi- —_in Russian-occupied Poland and of Jews from gration issue. By then the significance of that re- | Europe through Odessa on their way to Palestine.

36

Phases of Acknowledging

In all, there were some two thousand Yishuv Jews their activity and hear their assessments of future in Soviet-governed Poland, thousands of ref- —_ organizational needs. Much of what he heard at

ugees escaping Germany and other occupied those meetings was jotted down carefully in his countries, as well as other refugees from Lithua- _—_ diary. These consultations resulted in a series of

nia or Latvia with British-issued immigration decisions that indicated a clear trend to accelerate certificates. The Soviet government was also activity and the decision to dispatch two Mossad asked to release several Zionist activists from the |= members, Ze’ev Schind and Joseph Barfal, to RoSoviet part of occupied Poland.” Shortly there- = mania and Zvi Schechter (Yehieli) to Geneva.

after Steinhardt was appointed ambassador to Some of these meetings were clandestine Ankara, where he became one of the main play- = and notall the issues discussed or decisions made

ers in a crucial part of this story. were subsequently passed on to the Jewish Following the same principle of immigra- | Agency. Secrecy was necessary in order to avoid

tion as a means of rescuing Jews from Europe, information being leaked to the British. BenChaim Weizmann asked Britain’s colonial secre- | Gurion repeatedly complained about the “lack of tary, Malcolm MacDonald, to allowtwenty-four _a talent for discretion.” A typical Ben-Gurion rethousand Polish Jewish children into Palestine. mark went: “No one seems to know the secret of MacDonald refused, claiming that sucha move __ keeping a secret.”” Ben-Gurion also kept the inwould be harmful to England and her allies. It | formation to himself for fear that his firm and agmust be stressed that Weizmann’s request ex- _ gressive activity on behalf of immigration—even pressed one of Zionism’s main objectives during _at the price of conflict with the British—would the war: the rescue of Jewish children. An emer- not be acceptable to his colleagues at the Jewish gency rescue program began to take shape im- = Agency.

mediately after the outbreak of war, based on the Ben-Gurion was also involved in establishpremise that the most effective way of saving ing a secret communications network between Jewish lives was to remove them from high-risk Palestine and Europe, something that had been

areas. initiated by Chaim Weizmann, who was helped On 18 and 24 September 1939 Ben-Gurion __ by several British intelligence personnel. On his

held two meetings with the Immigration Com- arrival in Palestine in November 1939, Berl mittee—which consisted of Eliyahu Golomb, — Locker reported to Ben-Gurion, and the latter Eliyahu Dobkin, Yitzhak Gruenbaum, Moshe discussed the details of the matter directly with Shapira, and Moshe Agami-Averbuch—to dis- | Weizmann during a brief visit to London.” Bencuss the possibility of Palestine being blocked to = Gurion next decided to devote himself and the

Jewish immigration due to the restrictions im- Jewish nation to raising funds, aware of the posed by the White Paper andtoexaminetheop- _ financial aspect of the approaching crisis. In a tion of illegal immigration. On 9, 20, and30 Oc- — manifesto published in 1940 he said that for the tober Ben-Gurion raised the subject with the — second time in this century Europe has been Jewish Agency. On 25 October he discussed it — thrown into a bloodbath. He called on his fellow with Shaul Meirov (Avigur), and on the follow- —s Jews to join the supporters of Zionism and to ing day, in a larger forum, he involved Shaul contribute money. Preparations needed be made Avigur, Eliyahu Golomb, Zvi Schechter (Yehieli), | for the future, since the war in Europe could Eliyahu Dobkin, and Eliezer Kaplan.Some ofthe — spread to other countries.”2 Thus, Ben-Gurion participants at these meetings were leading ac- | was not surprised by the outbreak of war; indeed, tivists in the illegal immigration operation; Ben- _he had been asking himself when it would hapGurion wanted to study the smallest details of | pen and how much it would cost.

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Confronting the Information

His reaction was to sharpen the message that —_ also reach Palestine? Ben-Gurion spent several the only way to save Jewish lives was by bringing _ long periods in Britain during the war. He was them to Palestine. He did not rule out open __ there before the outbreak of war and followed the conflict with Britain if this proved unavoidable. _ crises closely. He was also present when ChamIn order to implement his policies, he formed a _ _ berlain’s government fell and watched Churchill working alliance with the Yishuv’s top military take control of the Conservative party on 10 May experts and devised the following plan: whilethe = 1940 and form a broad coalition government Jewish Agency would do everything necessary to —_ with the Labor and Liberal parties. Thus, Ben-

take advantage of immigration quotas deter- | Gurion had a unique opportunity to observe the mined by the White Paper—no more than fifteen = way in which the British people and their politi-

thousand immigration certificates were to be is- cal leaders responded to the enormous chalsued during the first year—the Mossad le Aliya _—_ lenges they were facing. The power of British Bet would continue bringing in as many people = democracy in time of crisis and the nation’s love as possible above this quota. Ben-Gurion feltthat of liberty left a deep impression on Ben-Gurion neither Arab demands nor British consent were _and greatly inspired him.*!

going to determine the scope of the rescue or of He arrived in Britain at a time when German immigration flow, which would be determined __ flash victories were coming fast and furious and by the number of Jews saved from occupied Eu- toppled what had been known as the “Phony rope. It was impossible at the time to anticipate = War.” In1940 Denmark and the southern part of the difficulties involved in rescuing Jews fromoc- = Norway were occupied in April, Holland surren-

cupied Europe. dered on 15 May and Belgium soon followed on MONTHS AS “BITTER AS DEATH”: 28 May, and France collapsed within a short time. All of Norway surrendered on 9 June. And the

MAY 1940-FEBRUARY 1941 war effectively came to the Middle East when Ben-Gurion flew to England in April 1940, right ‘Italy joined Germany on 10 June.

in the middle of a fierce debate regarding the “Each week brings us a new and grimmer surYishuv’s reaction to the Lands Law. Following _ prise,’ wrote Ben-Gurion, “and I wonder at the publication of the law,” the Haganah called for composure and inner confidence of this wonderful several violent anti-British demonstrations. De- —_ nation. Nothing ruffles them, nothing shakes them bates over its content caused a rift in the Yishuv | and nothing challenges their faith and certainty

leadership. Ben-Gurion supported the strongest that victory will come eventually. . . . Every Enpossible reaction to the law, which, if imple- _ glishman that I meet does indeed fear the troubles mented, would damage the economicinfrastruc- ahead, but has no doubtas to the final result and he ture necessary for the integration of mass immi- is ready for a lengthy struggle—no matter what!”*®?

gration. But he was alone in his call for a “fighting Ben-Gurion was also impressed by Britain's Zionism ... not a Zionism of words” and once ___ leaders. His admiration for the British governagain tendered his resignation. The Zionist Ac- | ment did not fade even when he was in conflict tions Committee rejected the resignation by a with Britain. He was fascinated by Churchill’s large majority, and Ben-Gurion remained am- _— powerful leadership and the way in which the bivalent about officially reassuming his post. In- _ British people withstood the mounting German stead, he set off on a ten-month trip to Britain _attacks.*? He personally witnessed the devastat-

and the United States.®° ing attacks by the Luftwaffe and the courageous What information did Ben-Gurion receive struggle of the British Royal Air Force. He was in during his stay abroad and did this information | England during the dramatic events at Dunkirk

38

Phases of Acknowledging

(4 June 1940) and heard Churchill’s brilliant panding its circle of supporters and was reserving rhetoric. Ben-Gurion minutely documented his _an especially bitter fate for the Jews. Thus, he impressions of Britain’s struggle, carefully | concluded that the Jews had every right to estabrecorded whole sections of Churchill’s speeches, lish their own army. The Jewish people had a and sent them to friends and relatives.*4 He fo- _right to fight for their honor and for peace in light cused on Britain’s fateful struggle after the fallof | of the dubious uniqueness attached to them by France. He never lost hope that in the end “the —_—Nazi doctrine.

greatest human catastrophe and Hitler’s domi- With Italy now in the war, Palestine was in nation—will finally be stopped.”® Yet he de- _—_— even greater danger of invasion—and this would

scribed the first two months of his stay in Eng- _ not involve mere occupation, since the Jews of land as having been “bitter as death. Each day _ Palestine would suffer the same fate as those of brought greater troubles than the one before, | Europe. Whereas other countries under German and there is no one who can say that the cup of | occupation were not in danger of extinction,

poison is full.”8 “this would not be the fate of the Jews: even Ben-Gurion was also encouraged by the short-term occupation of Palestine by the enemy

slow but sure changes that were taking place in —_- would result in total annihilation of the Yishuv, American policy toward the war. America’s an- —_ through the combined efforts of the invaders and

nouncement that it would supply Britain with their local supporters.” * There was no point in fifty destroyers in return for the use of naval bases —__ waiting for the final victory, and it would be far in the British Empire seemed to him a step of ma- better to allow the Jews their natural right of self-

jor political and moral importance.*’ defense, especially since this would also be in Notwithstanding his deep respect for keeping with Western interests in the Middle Churchill and the British people, Ben-Gurion East. was afraid that the British government would re- News of the Italian bombing of Tel Aviv on ject his proposal to establish a Jewish army. Much 9 September 1940 reached Ben-Gurion in Lonof his time was spent trying to obtain Britishcon- don in the form of a telegram from Eliyahu sent to the proposal.§§ Such an army was one of | Golomb. In his diary he wrote that this was what Ben-Gurion’s main objectives at the outbreak of he had anticipated, that the Italians had begun

war, and he was supported in this by Chaim their destructive activity against the Jewish Weizmann and Dov Hos, a member of the Ha- _—Yishuv. According to Golomb, “the results of the ganah leadership with good connections in the = bombing... had been about 100 dead and about British Labor party. His mission to London was —_—_ 160 wounded, several houses destroyed and large

to gain support for a Jewish army.*? numbers of huts burned to the ground.”?! THE CHANGING MEANINGS OF | This diary entry provides further proof that THE TERM “DESTRUCTION” information was being channeled to Ben-Gurion (he was simultaneously receiving similar reports Ben-Gurion was deeply concerned by Italy’s en- —_— from Sharett),°2 but its main significance lies in

try into the war and once again pointed out,ina _his use of the word “destruction,” indicating his paper published in London, the uniqueness of —_ conviction that the Jews of Palestine would share

the Jewish issue in Nazi doctrine. In his opinion the same fate as their European counterparts. Germany's war against the Jews was one between Ben-Gurion was to repeat this sentiment Nazi concepts and Jewish morality. Heconnected — throughout the war. It should be pointed out, Italy’s entry into the war with the fact that Ger- however, that here the concept of “destruction” many was using anti-Semitism as a tool for ex- _ refers to the death of several hundred civilians in

39

Confronting the Information

an enemy air attack, something that was com- __ to study the ways of American democracy. On mon in world wars.” This special use ofthe term —_ two previous occasions—in 1916, when Democdid not yet include the meaning it would gradu- —_— rat Woodrow Wilson was running against Re-

ally assume after November 1942, when the fact — publican Charles Hughes, and now, when of the systematic destruction and annihilation of Franklin Delano Roosevelt was running against

European Jewry became officially known. Wendell Wilkie—he had spent time in the Whereas Ben-Gurion made frequent refer- _ United States during an election campaign Both ence to the suffering of the Jews of Europe until the 1916 and 1940 elections took place in the the spring of 1940, he rarely mentioned the issue — middle of world wars, a fact that supplied Benduring his period in London. One reason for this |= Gurion with a common denominator for comcould have been his sense that the Jews of Europe __ paring the two periods and the two campaigns. did not, after all, have a unique fate in compari- = The conclusions of his comparative analysis were son with other Jewish communities, since the _ notat all encouraging with regard to the power of

same fate would befall the Jews of Palestine as the Jewish community in the United States. had befallen their brethren in Europe, the differ- According to Ben-Gurion, the two situations ence merely being a matter of Nazi timing. All _—_ differed completely. Germany under Kaiser Wil_ this, of course, was being considered at a time — helm was not Hitler’s Germany just as the Europe when there was still no conception of the depth, of 1914-1918 was not the Europe of 1936-1940. In magnitude, and totality of the plot against the __ the earlier war even czarist Russia and Germany

Jews.”4 showed a certain measure of humanity and fair-

Ben-Gurion may also have been influenced __ ness. No one could have envisioned anything reby London, which had become a battle front. His | sembling a Nazi government and ideology. This ability to follow at close range the transition from current war was different: “It is not a question of “Phony War” to “War between Gog and Magog” __ whether this or that country will win, but if the may possibly have blocked out everything else in world, the whole world, will remain free or subhis awareness. London during the blitz, the stoi- | jugated—a subjugation of the kind previously

cism of the British people, and the charismatic | unknown to mankind. Not only countries but leadership of Churchill—with all this on his world views and basic ethics are now fighting for mind, it would have been easy to assumea posi- _ their lives.” Ben-Gurion added that never “has tion of waiting out this colossal war, which — the world been under such total threat from

dwarfed everything else in the world. Hitler’s arrogant desire to rule the world and THE JEWS IN AMERICA ARE AFRAID to trample underfoot all that is precious to

mankind and to liberty.” It was vitally important,

On 22 September 1940 Ben-Gurion set offforthe | under such circumstances, to determine who United States. The objectives of this trip were | would lead the United States.”

threefold: “(a) To inform a number of people of Ben-Gurion also analyzed the situation in my position on the situation here and in Pales- _ the United States in terms of its awakening antitine, and what we can expect in the near future. | Semitism and Fascist trends. He was, of course, (b) To see with my own eyes what we can expect = exaggerating when he commented that “Wilkie’s from America during the war. (c) To see what |= camp encompassed all America’s reactionaries, contribution American Jews are willing to make _all of the followers of Hitler and Mussolini, all the

to their people.”® haters of democracy in America and the world, The United States was in the throes ofagen- _all the anti-Semites and protagonists of racism— eral election and Ben-Gurion was onceagainable —_ and these are not few.” All told, Ben-Gurion was

40

Phases of Acknowledging

singularly outspoken in his descriptions of |= mental in founding the United Jewish Appeal in

Wilkie and his followers. 1938 and was a key activist with the UJA until One thing was clear to Ben-Gurion: the Jews 1944. In 1943 he served as chairman of the Emerin the United States were afraid of Hitler, of the gency Committee for Zionist Affairs and spearwar, and of peace. The Zionists were afraid ofthe | headed the American Zionist Federation’s efforts

non-Zionists; the non-Zionists were afraid of — to found a Jewish state in the aftermath of the the non-Jews.®? Nevertheless, Ben-Gurion be- | Second World War. Ben-Gurion also met with lieved that the right leadership could bring | Henry Montor, deputy president of the UJA, as about change within the American Jewish com- well as with Emanuel Neumann, an American munity. Most of his time in the United Stateswas Jewish activist and president of the American spent promoting two objectives: the study of the Zionist Federation from 1947 to 1949. He met leading activists within the Jewish community, — with many other prominent figures in the Amer-

including their power and their ties with the ad- = ican Zionist community, including Hadassa ministration, and the balance of power among _leaders, Po’alei Zion, and Mizrahi. He particithem. He wanted to locate the points at which __ pated in their congresses and forged ties with the general Jewish public connected with its their members. Some of his new acquaintances leadership; he worked at convincing the Ameri- — updated him on events in Europe gleaned from can Jewish community of the vital need for the = important sources in the U.S. administration.! establishment of a Jewish state after the war even From afar Ben-Gurion followed the draif this resulted in a confrontation with Britain, |= matic progress of the illegal immigration ships which continued to pursue the policies of the = Milos and Pacific, which arrived in Haifa at the

White Paper. beginning of November with some 2,000 refBen-Gurion made a close study of American —_ugees on board. The British authorities removed

Jewry by holding many meeting with leading the refugees from their ships and loaded them figures in the community. He met Stephen Wise, on an old passenger ship, the Patria, with the aim a founding member of the Zionist Federation in of deporting them to Mauritius. The miserable

the United States, who in 1942 would be ap- affair became more complex with the arrival pointed chairman of the Emergency Committee — of another illegal immigrant ship, the Atlantic, for Zionist Affairs, established at the beginningof with 1,730 refugees on board. The British would

the war by the Zionist Federation accordingtoan not budge from their intention to expel the earlier decision by the Twenty-first Zionist Con- _ refugees, notwithstanding the protests of the engress. The committee was later joined by repre- __ tire Yishuv and its leadership. The Haganah or-

sentatives of Mizrahi, Hadassah, Po’alei Zion, ganization proposed sabotaging the Patria and and other organizations. He also met with Zion- — postponing its departure. The action failed, ist members of former Supreme Court judge |§ and more than 200 people were trapped and Louis Brandeis’s circle, which included Supreme drowned at sea. Court judge Felix Frankfurter, a prominent Jew- The British decision to expel illegal immiish figure, and Ben Cohen, adviser to the Roo- __ grants on board the three ships signaled an exsevelt administration, who carried out various — treme and ominous change in policy. Until then

missions on behalf of the president. such refugees had been held in the detention One of the more important of Ben-Gurion’s camp at Atlit, in northern Palestine, and the meetings was with Abba Hillel Silver, who was — numbers were subtracted from the immigration just beginning to establish himself within the | quota issued by Britain in accordance with the American Zionist movement. Silver was instru- 1939 White Paper, which allowed seventy-five

41

Confronting the Information

thousand Jewish immigrants to enter Palestine.It | the Yishuv newspapers were even closed down was Britain’s intention to expel the Atlantic briefly for defying the orders of the censor. Next refugees no matter what, and the implementa- Ben-Gurion telegraphed Berl Locker in London

tion of this objective rekindled the debate regard- | and suggested he intervene directly with ing a suitable response to British policy. Thusthe | Churchill. At the same time he asked Stephen polemic, which had subsided somewhat after the | Wise to use his connections in the British em-

Lands Law, was renewed. bassy in Washington to warn Britain’s represenAfter 12 November echoes ofthis unfortunate _tatives of the negative impression such an expulepisode gradually started reaching Ben-Gurion in sion could have in the United States. Wise did United States. After hearing of it from news agen- _ indeed talk to the deputy British consul, who cies, the information was verified in a telegram —_ promised to telegraph London immediately and from Berl Locker in London, who added detailson _ pass on the warning. He also cabled Locker and the ships and the number of passengers. Locker — Sharett.!°2 In the meantime, it seemed as if the also mentioned that the Jewish Agency office in _ cork had been pulled out of the bottle as inforLondon was taking action, although he gave no —_— mation began to flow to Ben-Gurion, including a details as to what type. Ben-Gurion wrote in his _ further report on a meeting of the Yishuv leader-

diary: “I wonder where the ships came from and ship as well as other telegrams supplying details

how they managed to sail in these [troubled] about the ships.!%

times.”!0! The American Emergency Committee for Ben-Gurion was completely engrossed in Zionist Affairs also tried to prevent the deportathe affair. He was convinced that the results ofa __ tion of the refugees. The committee confirmed confrontation between the Yishuvand the British | Wise’s activity and decided to increase its pressure authorities could determine the fate ofthe escape on British parliamentary circles. To this end, they route, which at that time seemed to be the main turned to William Green, president of the Americhannel for the Jews of Europe. A British victory can Trade Unions Federation, and asked him to could prove disastrous, first and foremost forthe intervene with his old friend Ernest Bevin, former Jews of Europe and secondarily for the Zionist | Trades Union activist in Britain and currently movement. From Ben-Gurion’s point of view, minister of labor in Churchill’s government.!% this episode also served as a test of the strength §=Onig9 November Weizmann cabled Ben-Gurion and ability of the American Jewish communityat — that Lord George Lloyd Ambrose, the colonial

that time. secretary, had informed him that the ships anBen-Gurion went into action immediately. — chored in the Bay of Haifa were only the first larks He cabled Dobkin, his “Immigration Minister,’ —_and that others were already making their way in to check on the condition of the immigrants; in — the same direction. “According to the [British] truth, he was probably calling for preparationsto | government,’ wrote Weizmann, “this is a Nazi be made for their entry into the country. In an- initiative, following their control of Romania, to other cable Ben-Gurion chided Sharett for wait- speed up the deportation of Jews, to create fricing two weeks before sending his report. Ben- _ tion between us and the British, to increase Arab

Gurion should have realized that the British pressure on Britain and to introduce their agents censor would have blocked earlier attempts at —_— into the region. Doing my best to clarify and allesending him telegrams or publishing the storyin — viate the situation; do your best to prevent anger

the Yishuv press, thereby hoping to avoid the in the Yishuv. Cable your suggestions.”!% commotion they knew Ben-Gurion would stir up Discussions concerning the growing crisis in the West and in the United States. Several of continued between Berl Katznelson, Moshe

42

Phases of Acknowledging

Sharett, Eliezer Kaplan, and the Haganah leaders, tims of inhumane persecution were being deas well in the Jewish Agency offices in London, __ ported from Palestine simply because any protest headed by Weizmann and Ben-Gurion in the _ on their part would not please the governments United States. Ben-Gurion sent a lengthy — and people of Britain and the United States. He telegram detailing what he considered to be the —__ was surprised that on one occasion Ben-Gurion significance of the growing conflict between the —_ could insist that everything must be done to help

Jews and Britain. He wrote that a distinction Britain in its war effort, while on another he must be made between the ships already an- |= would propose a protest action that would chored in Haifa and those that were on their greatly embarrass Britain.!”” way—if Ambrose’s information proved correct. Ben-Gurion tried his luck elsewhere. In his As for those in Haifa, they had been checked at main speech to the American Federation of Latheir port of departure and there was nothing to __bor’s annual fund-raising congress, held on fear from Nazi infiltrators. If there still was a fear 22-24 November 1940, he began by referring to of something like that occurring, then all the — the deportation plans. His rhetoric was flawless children were to be removed from the ships to = and created such an atmosphere of drama that he avoid possible harm. (This issue was later to take — succeeded in bringing about a special decision on

center stage in the rescue attempts.) As for the — the Jewish refugee issue, together with a sharp adults, anyone who proved suspect in any way _ censure of British policy.!°8 This limited victory would be held in a special camp in Palestine. Ben- = preceded a gradual change in American policy Gurion had no desire to embarrass the British toward the war in the wake of information regovernment in any way, but he insisted that all garding the state of the Jews in Europe. Roosevelt illegal immigrants be permitted to disembark in managed to steer his country from a “business as Palestine. As for the other ships making their way usual” attitude to one in which the United States to Palestine, these could also be checkedimmedi- _ defined itself as “the arsenal of democracy.” The ately following their departure and during their |= same militant proposal that was accepted on 24 voyage under British escort.!°° As we shall see, | November under Ben-Gurion’s influence also Britain continued to insist that the Nazis would preceded the news of the Patria tragedy (25 Noplant spies among the thousands of refugees, | vember), the sinking of the Salvador (12 Decemwhile Ben-Gurion’s repeatedly denied this possi- _ ber), and the deportation of the Atlantic refugees

bility. (26-29 December). It also preceded news of He demanded a public response to the _ the deteriorating state of the Warsaw ghetto, British decision from the American Emergency — pogroms in Romania, and the worsening condiCommittee for Zionist Affairs and even prepared tion of the Jews of Czechoslovakia and Huna draft of his own. But he soon realized that such _gary.!°? In any case, the cumulative weight of

a response in the American press as well as a __ these events created the kind of pressure that protest against Britain was no simple matter. At —_ could be aimed at the Zionist leadership in the

meetings of the Emergency Committee andina United States to require a change in policy, in series of discussions and arguments on the issue, | accordance with Ben-Gurion’s demands. In the Ben-Gurion’s position was admittedly weak. — end, the 22 December Zionist forum published Everyone called on him to practice restraint and — the same protest against British policies that Benrejected his cries for a confrontation with Britain. | Gurion had demanded several weeks earlier.!!°

Wise, for example, described Ben-Gurion as be- But Zionist pressure did not change Britain’s ing unable to accept the idea that American Zion- position, and on 26 November 1940 the New York

ists could sit back and do nothing while the vic- Times published the decision to expel the

43

Confronting the Information

refugees. Britain would not permit the entry of — published later in New Palestine (17 January illegal ships into Palestine (this decision also ap- 1941), Ben-Gurion presented a way to avoid the plied to ships already in Haifa). “The declaration suffering of millions of victims in Europe withmay even be worse than the act of deportation,” out having to depend on traditional philan-

Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary. “The cruelest | thropy and handouts, namely, by founding a phrase is the one that [says that] even after the | “Jewish Homeland.”!"4

war, refugees would not be allowed to enter To sum up, information reaching the United

Palestine.”!!! States that was made available to the Zionists of

It would appear, therefore, thatnewsonany- = America was also made available to Ben-Gurion. thing that happened in Palestine, Britain, and —_ Based on the manner in which this information Europe reached Ben-Gurion—albeit not eas- was internalized and processed, the following picily—through various channels and from differ- ture emerges. The Nazis were carrying out a pol- : ent directions: the press (the New York Times,the __ icy of persecution and depression, whose main New Palestine, and the Palcor News Agency); — objective was to banish the Jews from Europe. news broadcasts (British, American, and even This information also served as the basis for acbroadcasts from Rome and Berlin);!!2 and tion, most of which consisted of Ben-Gurion’s attelegrams (from London and Palestine, from tempts to instill in the Jewish community the idea Stephen Wise and other Zionist leaders and ac- _ of a Jewish state. The suffering of the Jews in Eutivists in touch with various U.S. governmental rope and the events in Palestine served as the babodies). Throughout his stay in the United _ sis for his petition.!!5 This period ended in FebruStates, Ben-Gurion’s behavior indicates that he —_ ary 1941, and over the next few months the “final was well informed and that this information was _ solution” was to undergo a tragic transformation. being processed and translated into action. He Indeed, although by February there were already emphasized matters that seemed pivotal: public __ clear signs of escalation in the scope of the mass objection to the White Paper and its escalating § murders, there still was not a discrepancy berepercussions, which in effect meantanembargo __ tween the concept of reality and reality itself.

on all remaining options for rescuing Jews from “TWO THINGS THAT EVERY

oP concept of founding a Jewish CHILD OUGHT TO KNOW”: state ne in Palestine. Some of these ideas were included in his FEBRUARY 1941-JUNE 1941 public speeches and in conversations in more — Ben-Gurion left the United States in mid-January, confined circles. For example, in his speech to the arriving in Palestine on 13 February 1941 after a annual Histadrut fund-raising congresshe spoke lengthy journey. He left with a heavy heart, since about the destruction of the Jewish people taking _ his findings in the course of his visit verified his place in Europe, although he was mistaken inhis earlier fears with regard to the American Jewish assessment that millions of Jews would surviveas | community. In a letter to Hadassah president refugees after the war. In his speech at the meet- | Tamar De-Sula Pool, he cogently summarized his ing of the Poalei Zion Central Committee (12 De- _fears and also referred to the harsh situation of the cember 1940), he described the task of “Eretz Is- Jews of Europe and the fate that awaited them.!'° rael” (pre-State of Israel Palestine) as taking in _Later, after another trip to the United States, he the refugees from Europe, which he named “the = summed up this particular trip as having been a bloody continent.”!!3 In his important speech to _ failure: “Twice I set out to awaken the Jews of

the National Executive Council of American America to a solution to the State of Israel. The Zionists (5 January 1941), as well as in an article first time I failed, the second I succeeded.” !!”

44

Phases of Acknowledging

Upon his return to Palestine, he reported his — chairman. Ben-Gurion had resigned the position activity to the JAE, the Actions Committee, and __ of chairman before setting off on his latest trip to to Mapai colleagues. He pointed to the political | Britain and America and had not agreed to revoke conclusions that had to be reached with regardto _his resignation. When the Yishuv leadership pro-

the harsh situation of the Jews of Europe, and posed sending him to coordinate their political (possibly inadvertently) touched on the main _activityin London, Ben-Gurion himself objected, problem that would accompany the process of saying that he would not be able to carry out the coming to terms with the Holocaust: cognitively —§ mission under the prevailing circumstances. He and emotionally processing the accumulating ~ was referring to his ongoing conflict with Chaim facts and internalizing their full significance. To | Weizmann, with whose policies—Weizmann

his Mapai colleagues he said: supported a moderate attitude toward Britain—

, ,since Ben-Gurion did not agree. One ;should also not Ever my return, I have the impres-y 4: , , , forget that Weizmann resided in London.

sion—the same impression I had in , Nonetheless, Ben-Gurion announced that, America—that people here are unaware a 5 ae : since there was no choice,” he would be willing of two things, two that every mission child 7imposed ., on to things undertake any political ought to know: .(a) That there’s a world , « him. He wanted only to be able “to say to the war on, a terrible war that has known no i, Zionists what I saw, what I felt, what should be precedent. (b)destruction That no one estimate , the , seen: the of thecan Jewish nation and the enormity of the destruction of the ase , , to , _ possibility of rescue.”!2° He returned and tried Jewish, people. .. Of course of there is in- . ,for an , persuade. his colleagues the necessity formation available onpolitical all this,plan butofpeople , an en. agreed-upon action .and here are not living out these matters. suing strugele That’s the proposals impressionwere I get,discussed that here by thethe S ;Jewish Be , ; , , _ . His

Yishuv is not living out these things.!!8 ; Agency Executive, and on 23 March 1941 he

From these sentiments, which he repeated on drafted a memo entitled “An Outline of Political various occasions, Ben-Gurion came to the fol- Zionism.” In this memo, as in the Jewish Agency

, plan.!?!

lowing conclusion: discussions that preceded it, Ben-Gurion linked the situation of the Jews of Europe to the Zionist

What we must do now, more than any-

thing, above ,all and before anything, for co, in Cethis, aye not was nothing innovative ourselves and There for,;the Diaspora, that same oa. « - 4None even in his use of the word “destruction.” small Diaspora still left to us... tois some [create] , oe . ; , was expected according historians, Zionist tension. ..- in .since, And another thing , March 1941 the Nazis had already made the de-

must be done: we must exhibit more - ae , cision to proceed with systematic annihilation

unity. ..., but These areyetthe basic conclusions ; Syshad not begun to execute their plans.

that I have arrived at based on all that I ,

, , tematic only three months later. have seen in themurder world:began from the terrible iy , , Ben-Gurion’s words, like those of his colleagues world warYishuv to the leadership, destruction of the Jewish ; , ,; , , in the pointed to a calamity nation, and ;apart from these two, were as far aswithin aL:the ; whose and character I am concerned, therescope is nothing else in ; ,still ; the world.19 conceivable and did not deviate from far-reaching persecution and expulsion. They could not, He tried to instill this attitude in his JAE col- _ of course, have been referring to the industrialleagues during the interval when he was not __ ized murder before it actually began.

45

Confronting the Information

“FIVE MILLION JEWS ARE BEING wants to destroy us, and he has the power to EXTERMINATED” “A NAZI INVASION physically destroy us.” As proof Ben-Gurion re-

OF PALESTINE” lated some late-breaking news about the German Even the numbers mentioned by Ben-Gurionin- —army’s invasion of Greece and the danger this dicate no change in outlook. For example, he implied to the Jews of Salonica: “At this moment stated that “five million Jews will be annihilated,’ —_ there is the cry of five million, and since this afbut according to him those same annihilated — ternoon these are joined by an additional fifty Jews would remain in Europe after the war.!” thousand from Salonica...and who is to tell how This is also obvious in his claim that the British |= many more will be added? This is the cry. Anyone administration in Palestine was a ““Naziadminis- — who does not hear this cry day and night is not a tration.” He made use of this phrase at a Jewish Jew, is not a human being.”!*5

Agency meeting; one of its members, Dr. Werner The situation deteriorated during April. In Senator, reprimanded him for his choice of | March Bulgaria had joined the Axis nations. On words.!?3 Even Ben-Gurion realized that despite | 6 April the German army invaded Greece, which the existence of such language inthe awarenessof surrendered twenty-one days later. On 17 April his colleagues—Kristallnacht, the Nisko-Lublin | Yugoslavia surrendered and on 24 April Bulgaria

deportations, limited murders and persecu- conquered Thrace in northern Greece. Meantion—there was still no comparison between — while, the German general Erwin Rommel was these events and the White Paper, the Lands Law, = advancing across North Africa.

the illegal ships transporting immigrants, and There was renewed fear of a German invaeverything that followed. Still, this comparison sion of Palestine. Ben-Gurion, determined to points to the fact that no matter what Ben- maintain his cool composure, told the Histadrut Gurion said about the Nazi phenomenon at that = Council that he had no desire to put the fear of time, he himself did not grasp its full meaning God into the Yishuv, but with the battlefront apand was unable to comprehend what monstrous __ proaching there was a greater threat. Recalling developments were looming. Once this under- the bombing of Tel Aviv and the panic and near standing did sink in, he never repeated the com- _— evacuation of the town, he added: “We may now

parison, even at the very height of the conflict | experienceacalamity...a Nazi invasion of Pales-

with Britain. tine,” which is no longer a mere figment of the All this time more information kept flowing imagination, and anyone can guess approxiin, the most important of which was shared with —= mately what will happen here.!”°

the JAE.!24 In April 1941 there was a glimmering This fear was not unfounded. Many historisuspicion that the improved economic situation ans agree that there was a real danger of a Nazi inand the fact that the war was so faraway wereno __ vasion of Palestine had Hitler changed his war more than a temporary respite. Ben-Guriontook — plans and invaded the Middle East before atadvantage of the Forty-third Histadrut Council tempting to take Russia. Rommel’s forces would meeting the second week of April to awaken the —_ have advanced from the south and others would

Yishuv to the dangers: “This war is something have moved in via Syria or Greece and Cyprus quite terrible . . . first because something like from the north. In any case, with respect to BenHitler is unprecedented in our times... not for | Gurion’s awareness of events in Europe, his humanity, and not for the Labor movement and __ speeches expressed extreme fluctuations in outnot for the Jews and not for the Eretz-Israel.... look within very brief periods. It was also obvi[In] this war we have a single concern...tode- —_ ous that he was terrified that the Jews of Palestine

stroy this enemy of humanity... because Hitler were destined to suffer the same fate as those of

46

Phases of Acknowledging

Europe, and that it was only a matter of time.!*- presented at JAE and Zionist Actions Committee However, as has already been noted, that com- meetings.'39 Requests for aid, personally addressed mon destiny was not immediately apparent. to Ben-Gurion, also supplied news from Europe.'?! In his role as supreme leader or avant-garde Ben-Gurion worked on developing a system of revolutionary, Ben-Gurion continued to stress | communication between the Yishuv and the outthe Yishuv’s important task in solving the overall —_—_ side world. People he trusted were used as couriers

problem of the Jewish nation. This was how the __ to carry secret messages on their trips abroad. On Yishuv’s leaders saw themselves. At meetings of | 22 April 1941, for example, John Brown, a member the Histadrut Council, at a meeting to discuss of the International Federation of Socialist Trade unity in the Yishuv, and even at a meeting with — Unions (who first met Ben-Gurion the same day) members of the General Zionists party Ben- — was entrusted with a verbal message to Weizmann

Gurion warned against the danger of becoming and other Zionist activists in the United States. too self-involved, which he called “Yishuvism”: | Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary that “I arranged “Yishuvism’ means seeing the Yishuv as existing | with him to develop relations with the United only for ourselves... having concernonlyforthe | States’—nothing more, which was typical of him ‘here’ and the ‘now. Apart from the ‘here, there on such an issue.!32 Both he and Weizmann had should also be a ‘there, a place where thousands used similar methods of relaying information in of our people are being slaughtered; instead of __ the past, proving that a courier system was in exis‘now’ there should also be a ‘future’; our efforts tence that few people used and not everyone knew must be geared to the days to come, not to the — about.

distant days of the Messiah but to the end of the Eyewitness accounts from Poland and letters

war. 128 and press reports from the free world were reachAt one meeting Ben-Gurion pointed out ing Zionist centers and the Jewish Agency’s Comthat the Yishuv was no better than any other Jew- —s mittee of Four for Polish Matters (founded at the

ish community, that its people were no more __ beginning of the war by Gruenbaum, Dobkin, _ Valuable than the Jews in any small town in — Shapira, and Schmorak).!°? It was all brought to Poland, and that concern only for the fate of the | Ben-Gurion’s notice, including a report by a Yishuv is “anti-Zionist.” He had expressed the —_Po’alei Zion member who had escaped from same sentiment during his last visit to the United — Poland. The report, which was published in the States at a Po’alei Zion meeting.'2? Once again he — United States, included an analysis of conditions insisted that the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine was __ in forty ghettos. The writer of the report warned not an end in itself or a solution for those living — that without any change in the situation there in it; rather, it is a “pioneer before the camp,” or |= would beno one left alive. This was sent, together avant-garde, whose objective is to create a basis — with other letters, on the regular distribution for alleviating the suffering of the entire Jewish _list.!34 nation. These sentiments—which he expressed often and in various forms throughout the war —_ The four months that separated Ben-Gurion’s reyears—are especially important in the light of turn to Palestine and the German invasion of the

accusations hurled at Ben-Gurion and his col- USSR in June 1941 were typical, as far as Benleagues that the Yishuv was introspective and §_ Gurion’s awareness of the situation in Europe alienated from its brethren trapped in Europe. was concerned, in the sense that anything that Between February and July, when Ben-Gurion could happen in Europe could also happen to the next left the country, he receivedinformationfrom _Yishuv, the assumption being that by persecuting various sources, including investigative reports — the Jews the Nazis were only carrying out their

47

Confronting the Information

lethal ideology and taking the war a step further. | awareness process: the differentiation between the In those days, however, the practical significance _ availability of information and the cognitive proof this ideology was still seen in terms of ghet- | cess—the intellectual and emotional process— toization, concentration, deportation, harsh per- —_— that makes it possible to extract the meanings

secution, and localized instances of murder, rooted in the information and react to them in a which, however horrific, were not total. Itisim- _ practical way; and the differentiation between the portant to bear this in mind, since the systematic various levels of ability to produce different meanannihilation itself, at we know it today, only be- _ ings from the same information.

gan at the end of June 1941 with Operation Bar- Ben-Gurion claimed that he was better able barossa, signaling the invasion of the USSR. to “sense” the approaching calamity because his A study of documentation of the time—in- —_ exposure to the information differed from that of cluding the JAE, Zionist Actions Committee, and __ the rest of public, and the significance he attached Mapai—reveals that this was how most of the __ to this information was different from that of the Yishuv leadership saw the situation.'> Ben-Gurion general public. But in the comparisons that he and his colleagues preferred to concentrate on |= madeandthe numerical data he presented, he was fulfilling Zionism’s political objectives, that is, es- | proving nothing other than that he was swaying tablishing a process of immigration andsettlement more intensely than others between understandand a political framework within which to facilitate ing and not understanding the available informathis activity. In the face of horrendous anti-Semitic | tion—out ofan inability to place it in a heretofore

persecution, mass murder, and dispossession—a familiar sphere (the cognitive-intellectual aspicture of the situation that was emerging at that —_ pect), and because of an inability to conceive the

time—the Zionist leadership and the Yishuv — shocking meaning of the information, without seemed to believe that the most appropriate action — the shock harming his ability to respond and take

they could take was to prepare Palestine for the action (the emotional aspect).Thus, what took mass immigration and settlement of millions of place could be likened to a cognitive pendulum al-

Jews remaining after the war. ternating between knowledge and lack of knowlIt is worth noting, however, that Ben-Gurion’s — edge, emotionally swinging between comprehen-

attitude during those months was beginning toos- — sion and denial. It should be pointed out that cillate between two extremes. On the one hand,he |= emotional comprehension can either paralyze or was arriving at the realization that Jews were actu- act as an incentive; at the same time, denial can ally being murdered in the thousands, while,onthe _ lead to disregard or serve as an incentive to act in other hand, he continued to believe that such a __ the belief that “all is not lost.” In any case, it would thing was not possible. In discussions with his col- appear that there was not enough of this swaying leagues upon his return to Palestine, Ben-Gurion between the two extremes, and however gifted identified a sort of “epistemic measure” of aware- Ben-Gurion thought he was in this area, it did not ness of what was happening in Europe and placed __ give him any advantage over other members of himself on a higher level of awareness than that of the leadership in interpreting what was about to his colleagues, and certainly than that of the rest of | happen in Europe.

heYshurpopdainHecmedtopses2b8 4p NEWS AND MEANDERING although there is information in the Yishuv, he AWARENESS: JUNE 1941-OC TOBER 1942 said, the Yishuv was not “living” it. Thus, he was On 22 June 1941 the German army invaded the also pointing, in a circuitous way, attwoimportant | USSR. This invasion, known as Operation Bardifferences in research into the various stagesofthe _barossa, also signaled the beginning of the sys-

48

Phases of Acknowledging

tematic annihilation of the Jews of Europe: a — own people.” Presumably he believed that by belarge German force comprised of four opera- —_ ing deployed over such a large area, Germany’s tional units (Einsatzgruppen), other subsidiary | armed forces would be weakened. He probably units, and many supporters from among the lo- _also hoped that by being forced to join Germany’s cal population set about murdering hundreds of | enemies, the USSR would eventually help bring thousands of Jews. At first the mass murders were about a defeat of the Nazis. At this stage he felt carried out mainly with machine guns,amethod _ there was no point in rushing off to dispatch used along the entire length of the front, fromthe — emissaries, as someone had suggested.!9”

Baltic Sea in the north to the Crimean peninsula At a meeting of the JAE held around the in the south. Whole communities were wiped same time (summer 1941), Ben-Gurion, who no out. Babi Yar, the site of the death of more than _ longer depended on the war and the opening of a thirty-three thousand Jews on the outskirts of | new battlefront to ensure salvation for the Jews, Kiev, became a symbol of this new stage in the __ pressed for political action. He demanded that

murderous “final solution.” Russian diplomats in Washington and London Until the summer of 1941, the free world had be made aware of the condition of the Jewish received no reliable information on the genocide. refugees escaping from Nazi-occupied regions The reasons for the delay in broadcasting infor- —_ into Russia, and that these diplomats be asked to

mation of the genocide were the Soviet ban on convince their government to allow refugees to information of any kind; the proximity of the — emigrate to Palestine. genocide to the battlefront, and the murderers’ This idea had been discussed earlier, when policy of keeping their activity secret. The belief | attempts were made to seek the help of Laurence at first was that the Jews inthe German-occupied — Steinhardt, U.S. ambassador to Moscow. This areas of the USSR would share the fate of Jews in time Ben-Gurion also referred to the Jews in other parts of occupied Europe. Thus, it was ex- — Poland. Their condition will get worse, he said, pected that it was only a matter of time beforein- because “the war is being conducted in regions formation began leaking out. In any case,assoon — where there are many Jews and there are many as the first refugees began arriving in Palestine victims.” We must appeal to the Polish governfrom these regions, it was generally assumed that = ment to allow Jews to leave Poland . . . especially all details would be confirmed. Even the infor- the Zionists.!38 Ben-Gurion did not explain how mation that arrived during the first two or three —_— he expected the Polish government, now exiled in months—revealing that many thousands of Jews London, to take action to rescue Jews from occuwere being killed—was not considered a sign __ pied Poland, or how they were to contact the rethat something new was happening in the occu-. _— mainder of the Polish government still in the ocpied areas; such acts of murder were still not ex- _—cupied territory. Shortly afterward Ben-Gurion ceptional at that time. Thus, even these signs did _—_ arrived in London, where he met the American

not signal any change in Nazi policy.!% and Russian ambassadors. The men exchanged In the interval between the invasion and his —_— impressions and Ben-Gurion revealed to them

next journey abroad, Ben-Gurion analyzed the _his political programs. new stage in the war and its possible effect on the At a special meeting of the Mapai Center Jewish situation in Europe. He also participated meeting held the day before his departure, Benin several discussions. At a meeting of the Mapai = Gurion said that at this stage no one could tell Secretariat three days after the beginning of the = how the war would turn out. “As for the Jews... invasion, Ben-Gurion assumed that the opening _ those millions living near the battlefront . . . will of this new front would “save the world and our _ suffer most.”!3? The suffering he referred to here

49

Confronting the Information

is the usual kind experienced in the course of a _ these reactions how the Yishuv dealt with news of war. Even the solutions offered by Ben-Gurion _attacks against Jews. Today we can point to two and others at the time—to attempt to rescue the — main types of reaction: placing the new informa“pioneers” (Zionists); to ask the Russian govern- __ tion in its “rightful context,” versus comparing

ment to allow refugees to immigrate to Pales- — these acts with the crimes committed by the

tine—show that all the information thus far Nazis. received by Ben-Gurion and his colleagues con- On 13 June 1941 Ben-Gurion responded to cerning the situation in eastern Europedidnotde- __ the news by saying that “the Baghdad riots bring viate from those solutions other periods in Jewish to mind the massacre at Kishinev, Arab-style, of history. These meetings were again summed up __ course.”!4! On 9 July Sharett informed a Mapai with a detailed outline of his political program. | Center meeting that in each instance five hunOther participants also expressed their fears, but dred people had been killed and proposed “not to nothing out of the ordinary was said, either con- _ be too hasty in doubling that number.” He went ceptually or in nomenclature, and there were no —_ on to add that the number of victims was “an ex-

practical proposals.!* aggeration [notwithstanding] the fact that Jewish RIOTING IN IRAQ AND ROMANIA: a had been spilled like water.” Golomb “THE SAME OLD STORY” pointed out that reports from Baghdad Jews were in a style similar to Bialik’s “City of Death,” and In June 1941 a new element was added to the pat- that the number of casualties was one thousand.

tern of destruction. Jews were attacked in Bagh- Other reports described the murders as “abomdad by violent supporters of Rashid Ali al- — inable,” of the kind, in Golomb’s words, “not Kailani, Iraq’s new pro-Nazi ruler. Similar events | even committed in Nazi Germany.’ !4”

took place in the Romanian city of Yassi, under News from Baghdad reawakened fears in the the pro-German leadership of the Fascist Mar- _ Yishuv. There was increased concern that the shall Jon Antonescu. In Yassi Romanian and Ger- — Arabs would take advantage of the war to attack man soldiers attacked Jews, killing thousands in —_ Jews. The Yishuv leaders suspected that the polit-

their homes and on the streets, while thousands _ ical overthrow in Iraq meant a general trend in more were arrested and taken to police head- the Arab world and could result in Britain being quarters, where many were shot the following — expelled from the Middle East, after which the day. The 4,330 survivors were placed in sealed Arabs would join forces with the Fascist Nazis. railroad cars, where more than half died of suffo- These fears were based on information accumucation and thirst. Over 10,000 Jews were mur- lating in Yishuv intelligence channels since al-

dered in the Yassi riots. Kailani’s rise to power in early March 1941. The In Baghdad the rioting began oniJune1941. _ fact that the mufti of Jerusalem had close ties An excited mob, together with Iraqi troops an- — with the new Iraqi ruler had been known for gered at their defeat by the British, attacked Jews some time. in various parts of the city: 179 Jews were killed Rumors of an increased flow of money and and 2,118 injured in the course of exceptionally | ammunition from Germany to Palestine also cruel rioting; 242 children remained orphans; aroused fears that the Iraqi revolution was a bad

and 48,584 people were robbed. omen. The attacks against the Jews of Iraq, said News of the Baghdad riots (on 1—2 June 1941) Ben-Gurion, were proof of what could be exand the attacks against Romanian Jews in Yassi pected for the Jews of Palestine if al-Kailani and (25 June 1941) aroused varied responses in the his ilk continued to succeed. Britain was quick to Yishuv leadership; it is possible to glean from _ put an end to al-Kailani’s rule in Iraq, but it is

50

Phases of Acknowledging

possible that the fears aroused by the riotsinIraq | forward. Winant promised to help arrange a meetmanaged to draw the Yishuv’s attention away __ ing for Ben-Gurion with a senior American offifrom the knowledge that a new stage had been _ cial—perhaps even President Roosevelt, although

reached in German atrocities against the Jews.!# available documentation does not completely About a month after the invasion of the — confirm this. On 12 November Ben-Gurion left USSR, Ben-Gurion decided to go abroad to London. This, it would seem, was the end of the gather support for his political program, espe- “Great Britain era” as far as Zionist foreign policy cially in the United States. He felt that he had = was concerned. From now on Ben-Gurion was deused up his ability to gain such support from __ termined to concentrate on the United States, the within the confines of the Yishuv. He had done _ superpower that was carving for itself a central po-

his best to get the program accepted in the sition in the world and in the Middle East.!**

Yishuv, and now he wanted the support of Little can be found in Ben-Gurion’s diary reBritain’s and America’s Jews and their govern- _—_ garding his stay in London. According to his

ments. !“4 schedule (the only remaining record of this trip),

A FRUITLESS VISIT TO LONDON his days in London were filled. Descriptions supplied by people he met and other sources indicate

Ben-Gurion left Palestine on 28 July and arrived that he was close to information channels and

in London about a month later, following a that he took steps to cement ties that served his lengthy and arduous journey across Africa. His = purposes. He met twice with Lionel Cohen, an first impressions of London were optimistic and _ official in the Economics War Office, who was re-

gave away nothing of what was to come during sponsible for some of Britain’s espionage servhis brief visit.!45 During the first couple of days he ices; with James Middleton, one of the leaders of

barely felt the effects of the war in London.!*° the Labor party; with Arthur Creech-Jones, LaBen-Gurion’s hopes for British support of a. —_ bor Party member and secretary to Ernest Bevin, Jewish army proved fruitless. He met twice with who was minister of labor at the time; with Pro-

Lord Moyne, the new colonial secretary, but fessor Harold Beeley from Oxford, member of achieved nothing. Lord Moyne’s attitude wasthat the Foreign Office research department and later after the war the Jews should concentratein parts | adviser to the foreign minister on Palestinian of East Prussia once the Germans had been ex- _ affairs. His meeting with Sigmund Gestetner was pelled from those areas. Neither were plans fora devoted to the issue of “defense,” according to

Jewish military force approved by the British | Ben-Gurion’s diary, but he did not elaborate. government, who informed Weizmann that they Gestetner was the son of the man who invented had been overruled. At a meeting with a senior — the copying machine and ran the family factories British official in Cairo whileenroutetoLondon, —froman early age. A gifted industrialist and a pasBen-Gurion argued that a Jewish force would do sionate Zionist, he was very active in aid and reswhatever the British army told it to. Itwasanold — cue operations, especially involving children. argument,!4”7 and now it seemed the proposal §_ During the war years his industrial plants were

would be shelved. converted to war-related production.!”

During his stay in London Ben-Gurion had Ben-Gurion also met with Sir Stephen Elliot three meetings with John Winant, U.S. ambassa- Luke, a senior official in the Colonial Office, dor to London, and one with Ivan Maisky, the whose work was closely tied to the issue of Jewish Russian ambassador. Maisky received a detailed § immigration to Palestine. Luke recorded the memo from Ben-Gurion containing his political | minutes of one of Ben-Gurion’s meetings with program and asking for assistance in pushing it the colonial minister. At the end of the meeting,

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Confronting the Information

Luke walked Ben-Gurion to the door and told Most of Ben-Gurion’s London visit, therehim that he disagreed with him. Ben-Gurion, _ fore, was devoted to promoting his political plans who was interested in obtaining information on —_ and examining the possibility of founding a Jewthe inner workings of the Colonial Office, pro- _ ish fighting force. But he was clearly also trying to posed a meeting that eventually supplied Ben- _—_ glean information on events in Europe and to unGurion with information and estimates relating derstand the British government’s assessment of to Russia, Germany, the Unites States, and Pales- —_ these events. He also worked on extending his in-

tine. With respect to the issue at hand, Ben- _telligence network. Documentation on this visit Gurion pointed out to Luke that “concern forthe gives no indication as to whether Ben-Gurion reJews of Palestine is not the only thing, and not __ ceived information regarding the mass murder of even the main thing, that we are dealing with.” Jews in Europe, that same systematic slaughtering

Teddy Kollek was also in London at that that started in June and had been going on for time, having been sent to handle various issues | anywhere from three to five months. Today we concerning the transfer of money and property —_ know that at that time (summer 1941) news had from eastern Europe. Kollek was already laying _—_ already reached Britain—albeit fragmented and the foundations for an extensive communica- — unclear—of mass murder on a scale previously

tions network, in collaboration with British unheard of.!52

intelligence personnel, that would shortly be In London Ben-Gurion met with various expanded to include American counterparts. people, including press reporters, senior governKollek and Ben-Gurion were embarking upon a ment officials, ambassadors, and ministers, all of

very special working relationship.!° whom could have served as a natural channel for Ben-Gurion’s meeting (15 September 1941, the transfer of information. Did information acaccording to his schedule) with the reporter — tuallyreach Ben-Gurion? It is possible that the anLeonard Jacques Stein, editor in chiefofthe Lon- _ swer is contained somewhere in his lost diaries.!5> don office of the Manchester Guardian, is of spe- _—_ At his departure from Great Britain, neither his cial interest. Stein was a veteran Zionist. In the _ actions, nor his evaluations, nor even his public years 1920-1929 he even served as secretary ofthe speeches reveal that he had any sense of anything Zionist leadership in London. Two years earlier | unprecedented taking place in eastern Europe.

Mandatory government in Palestine, where his BEN-GURION IN THE UNITED STATES: relationship with the Yishuv intelligence estab- THE BOND REPORT AND THE RINGER AND STERNBUCH TELEGRAMS lishment began.!! Stein’s paper was fiercely pro-Zionist and its | Ben-Gurion’s trip to the United States lasted ten Palestine reporter was none other than Gershon months and was packed with political activity, Agronsky, who was also involved in the Yishuv’s __ climaxing in the passage of the Biltmore Program intelligence services. Agronsky was, among other (having been approved at a Zionist conference things, Ben-Gurion’s courier for special missions. —_ held at New York’s Biltmore Hotel)—an imporStein, now head of the paper’s London office, was __ tant expression that change had taken place in the

therefore another link in the intelligence chainlo- _ political orientation of the Zionist movement.

cated in the editorial office of the Manchester News of the annihilation of Europe Jewry was Guardian. Ben-Gurion wanted to hear Stein’s _— pouring in at an increasing rate and the Amerievaluation of the situation as a press reporter | can Jewish community was beginning to organworking in a major city; he also wanted toensure —_—ize protests. News arriving from Europe caused suitable press coverage for his political program. the most significant change in understanding of

52

Phases of Acknowledging

what was happening there. The Bund Report and The complex negotiations that preceded the the telegrams from Ringer and Sternbuch that Biltmore Convention included the connection reached the United States during Ben-Gurion’s _ between the war and plans for the future. Over visit made it clear that what the Germans were _and over it was stressed that after the war two or conducting was an organized and systematic an- three million Jews would emigrate to the pro-

nihilation in eastern Europe. posed Jewish state in the Middle East.!>> At the Ben-Gurion, an avid consumer of data, had convention (9-11 May 1942) Ben-Gurion made a all the news channels at his disposal and, like | speech based on Weizmann’s information from most people in time of war, made a point of lis- — the day before, namely, that a quarter of the Jews

tening to the radio, from which he gleaned im- of eastern and southeastern Europe would no portant information. Did Ben-Gurion’s activity longer be alive by the end of the war, and only two in the United States express his grasp of thisin- — to four million Jews would remain.!*° This was formation, including its comprehension andin- __ the accepted state of affairs in the United States in

ternalization? May 1942. It was reckoned that the Jewish nation In order to implement his political program, |= would lose anywhere from one to three million of which at that time was the same as Chaim Weiz- _its people in Europe. At this stage, after more mann’s, Ben-Gurion needed statistics to estimate | than ten months of systematic annihilation and the number of refugees remaining in Europe af- | twenty months since the outbreak of war, they ter the war. It is logical to expect that Ben-Gurion —_ were already reckoning on a death toll of over a wanted to know all he could about the Jews upon million Jews, but this was still viewed as part of whom he based his plans for a Jewish state. What _ the effects of the war.

data did he use in May 1942, just before and dur- In the course of his meetings with officials

ing the Biltmore Convention? in the U.S. administration, Ben-Gurion was exBen-Gurion presented the first draftofhispo- posed to different kinds of data that were not litical plan at the beginning of December 1941 to _available to the general public. On various occanon-Zionist circles in the United States, especially | sions he met with Colonel William Donovan,

the American Jewish Committee. The two-part head of the Intelligence Branch of the newly plan provided both for a state of war and for a time formed Office of Strategic Services (OSS). (These of peace. In it Ben-Gurion linked the current posi- —_ meetings are discussed in the chapter on clandestion of the Jews to a future political program. The _ tine cooperation.) He also met with William Bulfirst part, which referred to “a state of war,’ stressed _ litt, former U.S. ambassador to France, and with the necessity to “ensure moral and financial sup- § Sumner Welles, the deputy secretary of state, “a port... and constructive aid for all the needy Jew- _— fair and humanitarian man.”!°’ His busy schedule ish communities in the world.” The peacetime pro- = included meetings with many administration

gram emphasized the need to “help any Jewish __ officials, including Housing Minister Nathan community that suffered during the war.”!*4 Strauss, Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt (reIn both parts the assumption was clear that cently returned from Moscow), and Robert Patafter the war there would still be Jews in Europe. —_ terson and John McCloy of the Defense DepartThere was no unusual prognosis, and both parts = ment.!58

of the program still mentioned “persecution.” Ben-Gurion shared his political program News of actual annihilation, which started flow- __ with all these men and stressed its importance as ing in at the end of June i941, had not yetreached _a solution to the terrible suffering of the Jews of Ben-Gurion, and any that did made no difference Europe. He repeated what he had said to Colonial

in terms of his attitude or mindset. Office official Sir Stephen Luke, namely, that the

53

Confronting the Information

welfare of Europe’s Jews lay at the heart of the transfers from the United States to occupied terZionist movement.!*? He also managed to extract —_ritories in Europe. An embargo on business classified information from his meetings with — transactions with Nazi-occupied _ territories Jewish activists close to the Roosevelt adminis- — means that these were illegal; they were therefore tration. For example, Supreme Court Judge Felix |= camouflaged and combined with legal fundFrankfurter “leaked” to him that Churchill and raising activities, which complicates things for his advisers had arrived in the United States for the researcher. talks on the war, an item due to be published the Many others were involved: Henry Montor, following day.'® Frankfurter was, on the one — deputy president of the United Jewish Appeal; hand, a close adviser to President Roosevelt and, —_ Isaac Hamlin, national secretary of the Histadrut on the other, a pillar of the American Jewish and — Labor Federation fund-raising; Lazer Schatz-

Zionist community. Members of the World — ufkovitch, who was active in the Polish Jewish Zionist Congress were another source of useful _ leadership in Palestine, having escaped to Palesinformation; they reported to Ben-Guriononthe _ tine in time via the USSR and Japan; Walter testimonies of Polish Jewish leaders who had ar- _— Schevenels, secretary of the Socialist Interna-

rived in the United States.!°! tional, a Belgian politician Ben-Gurion had Ben-Gurion also received information from known long before the war; Richard Lichtheim Israel Mereminsky (later Merom), Histadrut del- and Alfred-Abraham Silbershein, Jewish Agency egate in the United States and a key activistinthe | representatives in Geneva; and Berl Locker, a organization’s American fund-raising drive. A |= member of the Jewish Agency’s London branch. letter from Memerinsky to Ben-Gurion, dated — It seems that Dr. Ignacy Schwartzbart, a member early January 1941, reveals a series of money trans- of the National Council of the exiled Polish govfers to Europe in which Ben-Gurion was involved |= ernment in London, was also involved in the in one way or another. The letter also discussed __ transfer of funds to the occupied territories by financial support for Zivia Lubetkin’s “Hehalutz” — way of his ties with the Polish underground. office in Warsaw and complained that notenough — Considerable fund-raising activity was con-

was being done to get money through. — ducted in the United States by the Histadrut as Mereminsky complained to Ben-Gurion about — well as by the American Palestine Trading Corthe hardships encountered in working with his — poration (AMPAL), which was founded in the Histadrut superiors and asked himtointervenein —_ United States at the beginning of 1942 with Hispassing on information on past and futurealloca- _tadrut affiliations.'®

tions. He informed Ben-Gurion of two letters Even if the diary entries for this period did from Warsaw complaining about discrimination — indeed refer mostly to money transfers from the in support allocation and even telegraphed an —_— United States to occupied areas of Europe, it is urgent request for clarification from Nathan __ possible that they referred to other money transSchwalb, the “Hehalutz” representative in Ge- _ fers as well. They may describe circuitous transneva, who was supposed to send support fundsto —_actions for financing the rescue of Jews from the

Poland. Mereminsky was worried about ship- occupied territories, especially Poland, using ments from Lisbon to Warsaw asking the JDC to money that had been “frozen” in countries such

participate in this campaign.!© as Romania. Such activity was handled by the Ben-Gurion’s diary entries from this period |= economic branch of the American Zionist Emer-

are hard to decipher; the handwriting is unclear gency Committee, headed by Rehavia Lewinand the ink has run or faded over the years. Still, | Epstein. My documentation reveals that this orthe diary reveals a complex process of money ganization was purely economical in nature. Jew-

54

Phases of Acknowledging

ish communities in Europe had been transferring = Nazi crimes that were especially cruel toward the money even before the war and continued doing —_ Jews. In mid-March reports by Hungarian solso throughout the war. It has already been men- _ diers returning from the front were published, tioned that Teddy Kollek was sent to London to claiming that the Gestapo had murdered a quar-

supervise the transfer of money belonging to _ ter of a million Jews in the Ukraine, including Czech Jews, and there were others involved.!® those deported there from central Europe. On This organization took advantage of previ- = 3: April 1942 Reuters reported the use of gas, basous ties with various bodies and individuals, in- ing its information on Dutch circles in London. cluding the Socialist International. John Brown, All this varied information pointed to the fact a member of the International Federation of So- — that mass murder was being carried out in a cialist Trade Unions met with Ben-Gurion, asdid __ specific region.!® It is difficult to believe that the Belgian Schevenels, who was also mentioned — Ben-Gurion did not have access to this informain documentation and appears to have been a ___ tion, which was available to all. link in the chain of money transfers to the occupied territories. Ben-Gurion’s ties with the Bul- |= The Bund Report was the first official and accugarian Georgi Dimitrov were also putto gooduse —_— rate document to record the ultimate plan to an-

here. The pair had first met in Palestine and met nihilate the Jews of Poland. The Bund, a nonagain later during Ben-Gurion’s visit to Bulgaria Zionist Socialist Jewish organization, issued its

at the end of 1944. report from Warsaw in May 1942, in which it deThe organization of money transfers to var-_ —_ termined that “the Germans had embarked upon

ious Jewish communities in the occupied territo- | an operation to physically destroy the Jewish ries requires more intensive investigation, but = population on Polish soil.” The writers of the reone can already hazard a cautious conclusion: port detailed the way in which the murder proBen-Gurion was involved—at least in terms of — cess had spread and estimated the number of knowledge—in clandestine deals concerning aid = murdered Jews thus far at seven hundred thouand rescue of European Jewry. This would have sand. Following are the main stages through been expected, given the state of European Jewry — which the report had to pass after leaving Poland

at the time, and was a reactiontothescrapsofin- and entering the public domain. formation flowing piecemeal out of the occupied territories, which, when consolidated, formed a m 2 June. The BBC broadcast an abbreviated verhorrible and ominous reality that was only partly sion of this report to Europe. On 10 June the

conceivable. Polish National Council of the exiled Polish

All the time news was reaching the West that government in London published a manifesto Jews were being slaughtered in eastern Europe. to all the Allied parliaments that included all The Jewish Chronicle in England and the Zionist the main points of the Bund Report. Thus, the Review and New Palestine in the United States, as report reached the American ambassador to well the Yiddish press, were publishing stories on the Polish government-in-exile. mass murders. By March 1942 the non-Jewish 25 June. The Daily Telegraph published the re-

press in America was publishing items on mass port and referred to it again the following murders in Vilna and on conditions in the War- week. Urged by two Jewish members of the saw ghetto. The beginning of January 1942 saw Polish National Council, Arthur Zigelbaum the publication of a letter from Soviet Foreign and Dr. Schwartzbart, the council published Minister Miacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov to another manifesto regarding the slaughter of ambassadors in the Soviet Union, describing Jews that was again aimed at all the Allied

55

Confronting the Information

parliaments. On 27 Junea Polish White Paper = government-in-exile, apparently including the containing this information was distributed. prime minister, General Wladyslaw Sikorsky. AcThe Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA) sup- cording to Katani, the Poles had said that Hitler plied more information on the mass mur- __ was going to solve the Jewish problem and that ders, especially in the Balkan countries — there would be no more Jews in Poland after the (which had taken place in 1941 but were only war. If Hitler did not complete his objective, they

now being reported). were quite determined to finish off the job themm 30 June. A spokesman for the World Jewish selves. Ben-Gurion wrote that he believed Katani Congress issued a statement on Americanra- was horrified at what he had heard. dio reporting that at least one million Jews Who, then, is this Katani, who had such suchad been killed. On 9 July a press conference —_ cess among state leaders, even if they were in exwas held in order to present the Bund Report. —_ ile? Why would they pass on to him this kind of

In addition to Jewish representatives, the | information and why would they tell him their conference was also attended by the British | wishes? And who was Roseshansky? There are no propaganda minister, Bernard Bracken, and —_ answers to these questions. Ben-Gurion went on

the Polish minister of internal affairs, | to point out in his reports that he assumed that Stanislav Mikolajcik. The JTA passed all this | Katani was an American or British “agent” on a

information to the United States.!® mission for his employers,!®” but even this remark sheds little light on this particular event.

When did this important report reach Ben- Before attempting to uncover something Gurion and how did he react to it? There is clear — that might illuminate these meetings, I return to evidence from several sources, both direct and __ the date of the first meeting on 9 July. On that

indirect. The three direct sources are Ben- same day a press conference took place in which Gurion’s reports of a visit witha mancalledFran- information was presented about the report, cis Katani, who brought him theinformationin- —__ with the JTA participating in this transfer of included in the Bund Report. Two sources are real- | formation. Moreover, the information had been time reports: two brief notes in Ben-Gurion’s _ passed along for some time in various places.

diary and a memo written after the meeting with This being the case, what was so significant Katani. The third source, the report Ben-Gurion about this meeting, and why was Ben-Gurion so handed in to the JAE on his activity in the United shocked? Indeed, this information could alStates, is slightly later; it was presentedsometime ready have been in Ben-Gurion’s possession be-

after his return to Palestine. fore his meeting with Katani. Although we do In his diary Ben-Gurion mentions two meet- —_ not know for sure how and when it reached him,

ings with Katani, who told him about the Bund _if it was not Katani who first brought it to him, Report. From details supplied by Ben-Gurion — perhaps what appalled Ben-Gurion was the about the man and from what I have managed to __ source of the information: Katani was close to discover, Katani was apparently a Lebanese Arab _intelligence circles. Catholic. A Jewish inhabitant of Haifa by the name To briefly dwell on one aspect of this issue, a of Roseshansky was probably the man who intro- _single-page memo written by Ben-Gurion after duced Katani to Ben-Gurion for the first time on his second meeting with Katani reveals that he 9 July 1942. The two met fora second privatemeet- could not make up his mind whether the man ing over lunch on 29 July 1942. Documents show was a British or American agent. He wrote that all that Katani told Ben-Gurion that whilein London the time Katani spoke against the British and he had spoken to several Polish leaders from the = made him suspicious. Ben-Gurion’s fear of being

56

Phases of Acknowledging

under surveillance by intelligence agents was not _—ing regarding the Jews of Poland. This could unfounded. He knew that he was an important _ possibly have meant that Katani’s potential operintelligence source. Baggage searchesonhisCairo —_ ators were interested in knowing about Benstopover en route to London, on his current trip, Gurion’s programs and to what extent his reand on all his other trips were but one indication sponse, the response of the Zionist movement, of this. Like any other key figure in a nationalist | and hence that of the American Jewish populamovement in an area of strategic importance, tion might embarrass the American administraBen-Gurion understood that his movement’s ob- _ tion. This assumption is no wild guess, especially jectives, intentions, plans, and activities would __ if one considers the activity of the Foreign Naarouse the interest of the intelligence organiza- __ tionalities Branch and compares the documentations of the superpowers, and this interest would __ tion in its archives on the activity of the Zionist naturally be heightened when there was a world movement and on the American Jewish commuwar on. American intelligence had a special inter- nity with documentation on other national miest here: the nationalist movement of which Ben- _ norities in the United States.!®© Gurion was one of the chief leaders commanded a Having examined direct sources that point significant potential reserve of supporters within — to the fact that the Bund Report reached Bena fairly large ethnic minority within the Unites Gurion, I will now focus on indirect sources. On 21 States. In Ben-Gurion’s meetings with various —_ July, between his two meetings with Katani, Bengovernment heads, they wanted not only tospeak | Gurion took part in a sympathy and protest rally, to him but also to hear his assessments and tobe — sponsored by American Jewish organizations, in made aware of his intentions. Summaries of Ben- — New York City’s Madison Square Garden. The rally

Gurion’s speeches at such meetings fill highly had been organized in response to news that Jews classified reports in British and American ar- —_ were being murdered en masse in Europe on a scale

chives. that was unprecedented even in the long history of The newly formed Foreign Nationalities persecution suffered by the Jewish people. Letters Branch of the OSS followed Ben-Gurion on his __ of solidarity from Churchill and Roosevelt were visits to the United States. William Donovan, __ read aloud to the demonstrators and the rally was head of the OSS, Harold Hoskins, and other — widely covered by the American media.

members of the U.S. intelligence community met Clearly, all the information that motivated with Ben-Gurion and even listened to his de- _ the organizers to hold the rally was also available tailed proposals regarding military and intelli- | to Ben-Gurion. It was also relayed to the crowd of gence cooperation with the Yishuv. They didnot protesters. From the Bund Report Ben-Gurion come merely to listen to these proposals; they received confirmation that at least seven hundred also wanted to learn what the Zionists were upto, | thousand Jews had been killed in Europe.!®

figuring that any successful Zionist activity Why, then, was Ben-Gurion so shocked by would reflect directly on U.S. interests and in- — what Katani had to say? It is possible that Katani volve the United States in matters that were not had managed to break down some barrier of de-

its immediate concern. nial erected to protect Ben-Gurion against the It is possible, therefore, that Kataniwasona __ fear of helplessness. The tendency to deny knowl-

mission on behalf of the Foreign Nationalities | edge that is hard to cope with is a well-known Branch or some other organization, such as the one. This denial was common to many people, Office of War Information (OWI), inordertofeel | including Ben-Gurion, especially after it became out Ben-Gurion and get his response to the polit- _ officially known in Palestine that genocide was ical messages and the information he was receiv- _— taking place in Europe. Ben-Gurion may also

5/

Confronting the Information

have been terrified that the Poles would indeed —a Nazi advance, Ben-Gurion drew a comparison wish to “pick up” where the Germans left off. Ac- _ that, in retrospect, has proved very important: cording to available information, it was Katani “Time is ata premium, and while I still hope that who left the greatest impression on Ben-Gurion, they do not conquer Egypt in the next few days a fact that is especially interesting because their and that Palestine can still be saved, it must be

meeting took place two days after the rally. understood that any invasion of Palestine [by the Ben-Gurion was involved in various activi- Nazis] can signal the end of our nation. During ties in July 1942, wrote some letters, and sent a _ the last war, under the eyes of German generals, memo to Roosevelt indirectly, all of which pro- —_— over one million Armenians were murdered by vide additional proof that he was completely up- —_— the Turks. Now the German generals will do the dated on developments in the war and the Jewish same to the Jews.”!7!

situation in Europe. During late June and early At the beginning of July 1942 Ben-Gurion July he met several times with William Bullitt, | presented his thesis to Supreme Court Judge Felix

former American ambassador to France, John Frankfurter, one of the leaders of the Brandeis McCloy, and Robert Patterson. McCloy and Pat- — group of American Zionists and adviser to Presi-

terson, senior officials in the U.S. Defense De- dent Roosevelt. Arthur Lourie, secretary of the partment, supplied him with information and —__ Jewish Agency’s American branch was party to assessments on developments in Europe andthe — Ben-Gurion’s secret activity. A letter from Ben-

North African front. He shared with them his Gurion to Frankfurter included a copy of the concerns regarding the new situation caused by | memo he wrote at McCloy’s request, which BenRommel’s successes in North Africa after the fall | Gurion asked Frankfurter to pass on to Roosevelt. of Tobruk. Ben-Gurion received some valuable —_In his memo he warned of a German invasion of information from Bullitt, who agreed that with- —_— Palestine that would end in the destruction of the out Britain’s help the Yishuv would find itself fac- | Yishuv. The mufti and his men would be partners

ing “a terrible tragedy... not only to the Jews of in the bloodshed.!”

the Yishuv but also the British Empire.”!”° By the beginning of July 1942, therefore, Ben-Gurion’s four sessions with McCloy — Ben-Gurion was quite well versed concerning and Patterson over eight days were devoted to — events in Europe. This can be verified cirdiscussions of the military significance of the — cuitously from things he said to McCloy, Lourie, Nazi advance in North Africa, the possibility of a Frankfurter, and later to other members of the Nazi invasion of Palestine, and the importanceof | Emergency Committee. For example, his growarming the Yishuv. Ben-Gurion wanted to link —_ ing awareness is reflected in his warnings that the

the Yishuv’s immediate security needs to his | German army would annihilate the Jews, in craving for a Hebrew army. His recent visit to | which he referred to the genocide of the ArmenLondon had left him with a bitter tasteasaresult | ian people and emphasized the part played by the of his unsuccessful attempt to gain support fora | Germans in this evil event. His intelligence base Jewish army. John McCloy asked Ben-Gurion to —_ expanded during early summer 1942 with the draft a memo describing his argument forthe es- —_— publication of information by the BBC at the be-

tablishment of a Hebrew fighting force, whichhe ginning of June and the Polish announcement of promised to pass on to the Chief of the joint —_10 June, which also reached him. Meetings with American forces and British generals visiting the | Defense Department officials, with Bullitt and United States. Patterson suggesting passing the others, and the actions taken afterward all prememo to the president as well. Eager to prove to ceded Ben-Gurion’s first meeting with Katani McCloy the dangers of wasting timeinthefaceof (9 July) and preceded the preparations for the

58

Phases of Acknowledging

rally at Madison Square Garden. Taken together, — Fithrer’s headquarters to concentrate the Jews of these constituted his intelligence base and served eastern Europe and, in one fell swoop, to murder

as the background to Ben-Gurion’s reaction to between three and four million; the operation Katani’s news at their second meeting (29 July). was planned for the following autumn; “Blue Up to this point my discussion has focused — Prussian Acid” would be the medium used in the on the Bund Report, which constitutes the first | extermination process. Reigner stressed that this and most important piece of information to be —_ information was not yet fully confirmed.

published on the situation in Europe. I shall now The Americans questioned the reliability of examine the Reigner and Sternbuch telegrams, — the information and decided not to pass it on—as two additional sources of information that con- Reigner had requested—to Rabbi Stephen Wise, tributed to a change in concept. The telegrams, | an American Jewish leader and head of the World sent by Dr. Gerhardt Reigner and Isaac Stern- = Jewish Congress, unless confirmation could be

buch, arrived while Ben-Gurion was in the obtained from other sources. However, Wise did Unites States.!73 Were the contents of these receive the information on 28 August from Sidney telegrams brought to Ben-Gurion’s attention be- _S. Silverman, British M.P. and chairman of the fore he left the United States on 18 September — London branch of the World Jewish Congress.

1942 to return to Palestine? Reigner had sent a copy of his telegram to London, and the British Foreign Office saw no way of

To begin at the end, when Ben-Gurion was leav- _ preventing Silverman from learning of its coning the United States the Reigner telegram had _tents.!”4 Wise agreed not to make the information not yet been published (it was published in No- _ public, but in September he spoke out against the vember), so Ben-Gurion could only have re- — mass murder of European Jews without mentionceived the information that it contained through __ ing Reiger’s telegram. Reigner claimed that Dr. one of the channels previously described. Most Paul Guggenheim, a member of the World Jewish likely Stephen Wise or Nahum Goldmann passed — Congress residing in Geneva, had forced him to on the information; it is even possible that the —_ include the misgiving about the accuracy of the contents were passed on in the course ofadebate information in his telegram.'” in the Emergency Committee. (It may safely be assumed that all the discussions of the Emer- _Isaac Sternbuch, representative of ultra-Orthodox gency Committee have not been preservedinthe — Jewry in Geneva, sent a telegram to Jacob Rosenrecords currently at the disposal of researchers.) heim, Agudat Israel president in the United States, On 8 August 1942 Dr. Gerhart Reigner, rep-_ —- which arrived on 2 September 1942.!” The follow-

resentative of the World Jewish Congress in ing are the key points covered in the telegram: reSwitzerland, sent a telegram to New York and _liable sources have it that the Warsaw ghetto has London that was later acknowledged as the first | been evacuated and some hundred thousand Jews official announcement that the Jews of Europe murdered; the mass murders are continuing; inwere being annihilated. This information was _ dustrial use is made of the bodies; a similar fate is passed on to Dr. Reigner by the Zionist journalist to be expected for the remaining Jews of Poland Benjamin Segalovitz, whose source was the Ger- _—_ and other occupied areas; do everything you can man industrialist Eduard Schulte, who had con- __ to arouse the United States to put a stop to the nections to the German war machine and access = murder.

to classified information. The Sternbuch telegram was important beThe following are the key points covered in cause it confirmed previous intelligence inforthe telegram: a plan was being discussed in the —_ mation, especially that contained in the Reigner

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Confronting the Information

telegram. Rosenheim passed on the information shared by such State Department officials as Paul to several Americans as soon as he received the — Culbertson, Elbridge Derbrow, and Ray Athertelegram, including: President Roosevelt and his ton; as well as many Jewish leaders, both Zionist wife, Eleanor, who was involved in various hu- and otherwise; and American politicians. It is not

manitarian activities; James Macdonald, former feasible, therefore, that the information was “high commissioner for refugees”; the British | withheld from Ben-Gurion. ambassador; and the ambassador of the Polish I have in my possession a fragmented schedgovernment-in-exile. The contents of the — ule that probably does not cover all of Bentelegram were also known to Ivan Maisky, Soviet | Gurion’s meetings, but even this schedule proves ambassador in London, and Eduard Benes, the __ that he attended meetings with people who were

exiled Czech leader. aware of the contents of the Reigner and SternRosenheim convened an emergency meet- —_ buch telegrams. The Reigner telegram was ing of the American and Canadian Congress of — passed around U.S. government circles during Orthodox Rabbis and invited Wise to attend. _ the first half of August, and by the end of that Wise reported on the contents of the Reigner §monthit had reached Stephen Wise. During that telegram. On 6 September 1942 Wise and Rosen- time Ben-Gurion met with Sumner Wells (12 Au-

heim convened a second meeting, thistimeinvit- gust); several times with Wise; with Nahum ing representatives of such other key Jewish or- Goldmann; with Judge Samuel Rosenman, who ganizations as B’nai Brrith, the Jewish American was a close adviser to Roosevelt; with Zionist Committee, the Council of Synagogues, Agudat —_ leader Abba Hillel Silver; and with members of Israel, and other Zionist organizations. The two — the Emergency Committee. Did all these parties telegrams were again discussed and the partici- refrain from expressing suspicion, concern, fear, pants of the meeting decided to form a three- — or wonder in the course of their talks with Ben-

month temporary emergency committee.!”” Gurion? Certainly Rosenman, who was experiReturning to the question of whether Ben- __ enced in aid and rescue activity on behalf of EuGurion received this information from anyother — ropean Jews, must surely have confided to source or directly from Wise, several days before | Ben-Gurion the new information on serious denews of the exterminations was published inthe — velopments in Europe.!”

Yishuv, Ben-Gurion mentioned that he had Moreover, two days before leaving New heard something of the kind while he wasin the — York, Ben-Gurion met with Nahum Goldmann United States. He said he believed the informa- |= and Weizmann. The day before his departure, he tion was part of the Nazi horror propaganda.!”8 __ bid farewell to the Emergency Committee and This was at the height of the emotional contro- — spoke vehemently on the urgency of announcing versy caused by the testimonies of the exchange an immediate plan for rescuing two million Jews group, and it is unclear whether Ben-Gurion was from Europe.'®° It is hard to believe that Benreferring to specific information or to all the in- | Gurion’s audience were hiding the news from formation that reached American Jewry. There is him; after all, once the Bund Report had been no direct testimony to provide a clear-cut answer published, everyone had a heightened sensitivity

to this question. and awareness of the possibility that something It is highly unlikely that Ben-Gurion, of all | unprecedented and terrible was happening.'®! people, could have been the only one not privy to It is impossible to believe, therefore, that by the information, or that he was unaware of the the time he left the United States (18 September furor that developed around the Reigner and 1942) Ben-Gurion was unaware of the contents of Sternbuch telegraphs. It was an open secret the two telegraphs. Yet there is no conclusive evi-

60

Phases of Acknowledging

dence that he knew of their existence.!8? Upon his “THE LEAP IN AWARENESS”: return to Palestine, Ben-Gurion included himself OCTOBER-—NOVEMBER 1942 among the American Jewish leaders who remained — Ben-Gurion left the Unites States on 18 Septemunaware of what was really happening in Europe. ber 1942 and arrived in Palestine on 2 October the

same year. On 23 November 1942 the Jewish In summing up this section, it is safe to say that | Agency officially announced that Jews were being Ben-Gurion’s final act before leaving the United = murdered in a systematic fashion to exterminate States—his announcement that the Emergency European Jewry. Between 2 October and the end Committee had to prepare for a mass transfer of | of November there was a kind of “leap” in the Jews out of Europe—was an expression of the — awareness of the Yishuv leadership and in that of fact that he was beginning to internalizethetruth — the Yishuv in general, and some time later in that behind the calls for help coming from Europe. If of the entire free world, at which time the full this was an indication that he had absorbed the — meaning of the terrible process that had been takinformation, then it might be possible to answer _ ing place in Europe for more than a year (at least the question of how far Ben-Gurion had ad- _ since June 1941) finally became clear.

vanced in the process of becoming aware of the Two “leaps” can probably be distinguished: Holocaust. Both he andthe populationin general _at first, scraps of information were collected and

had taken one more step on the way to under- = combined to form a picture, although at that standing that the information flowing toward _ stage the picture was no more than a sequence of them was based on events that were unprece- —_— rough data; the shift to a state of awareness occurs

dented in human experience. only in the act of compiling the information and We have no way of knowing whether the —_ becoming aware of its significance. Later, mean-

Reigner and Sternbuch telegrams were included —_ing is attached to the picture; although the in the data that Ben-Gurion was now processing. awareness is based on previous experience, the It is not clear why, upon his return to Palestine, main part of the process focuses on the second he mentioned the Bund Report and his meetings “step,” the cognitive acceptance of a totally differwith Katani but made no mention ofthe otherin- —_ ent concept, by observing a new element in hutelligence that had reached the United States on |= man experience. Familiar words such as “de-

the eve of his departure. Nevertheless, it can be struction,’ “extermination, “annihilation, and assumed that this additional information did in- “holocaust,” which had been used to describe deed reach him before he left for Palestine. harsh situations in the past, had become too narWhy did the “twilight” time in Ben-Gurion’s —_ row to contain the new meanings that were being

awareness process not come to an end at that attached to them. Nevertheless, people contintime? Why was there no end to his fluctuating be- —_ ued to use these words; in time their new meantween being exposed to information and under- —_ ing supplanted the old one and took over the standing the significance of this information and — words.

why did he not convene the Yishuv’s leaders im- This issue forms part of a widespread epistemediately on his return? Why didhe wait another —=mological debate and is linked to a series of questwo months, together with his colleagues in the __ tions involving a cognitive theory that cannot adYishuv leadership and, in fact, the restofthe pub- — equately be elaborated upon here: What is reality lic, before beating their breasts and asking each — and _ what is the connection between reality and other, how could we not have seen, how could we — what we are seeing, hearing, sensing? What role not have understood? We shall devote the follow- does imagination play in the process of decipher-

ing paragraphs to answering these questions. ing reality? What kind of imagination was needed

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Confronting the Information

in understanding the reality that we are dealing — given to Ben-Gurion on 4 October, was one of with here? What role do imagination, hope, fear, these.!84 Lauterbach, head of the Jewish Agency illusion, and disappointment play in forming a Organization Department, received a brief letconcept of reality? What is requiredofusinorder _ ter of his own: “Re: The state of the Jews of

to figure out the “regularity” behind a series of | Europe. Enclosed is some new information facts? At what stage does the depth of change of received at our Geneva office, on the latest reality enable us to identify a new regularity? persecution of the Jews of France, Bulgaria and How do these stand up to our need fora level of | Romania. According to Mr. Lichtheim, the perprogressions order to acclimatize ourselves to —_ secution is not merely for the purpose of dechange and understand the new regularity that it | portation, but for the actual extermination of enfolds within it? To what extent does need for __ the entire Jewish population of Europe.”!8° sequence and graduals affect the tendency to go In his report Lichtheim described the situaback and force old factors into traditional con- _ tion in Romania and the growing interest of the cepts? How long does it take for such a dramatic | German pressin the country’s Jews. He examined change to occur in the concept of reality? the size of the various Jewish communities in RoAll these questions spring directly from the = mania, compared the numbers from 1939 with cognitive “leap” that took place in the October-___ the current figures, and explained the discrepNovember 1942 and the reckoning and denial = ancy in the numbers. Lichtheim reviewed the that preceded it. Thus, 1am here examining the | German press, which threateningly prophesied change that took place in the deciphering of the — that during 1943 Romania would also become same information that had been trickling in for § “Judenrein” (literally “clean of Jews”), like Geralmost two years from the occupied regions. The — many.

main aspect of this change lies in the under- Lichtheim also described a “system,” a kind of standing that what was happening in Europe de- = “model” that characterized the Nazi machine dur-

viated from anything previously known to hu- _ing the previous few years. It begins with anti-

manity. Jewish legislation. Next the Jews are collected in “DISAPPEARING IN LARGE NUMBERS concentration camps. Finally, they are deported to

IN SOME WAY” Poland—first those who are not natives of the re-

gion and then the rest of the community. In Poland

What was happening during those months? __ they “disappear in large numbers in some way.”

Where was Ben-Gurion during that period? After describing the situation in France, BulUpon his arrival in Palestine and for several __ garia, and Italy, Lichtheim summed up his report days thereafter, Ben-Gurion could have found —_ unequivocally: “[T]here is no doubt as to the exin his office information on events in Europe istence of a master plan to deport and extermithat had arrived through various channels. Ad- _ nate the Jews of Europe.”

ditional information arrived from Lichtheim This report was also based on the contents and Silbershein, two Jewish Agency representa- _—_ of the Reigner telegram, and its conclusion fur-

tives in Geneva, confirming the contents of the | ther emphasized what was contained in that Reigner telegram,'*® which, to the best of my _ telegram and others subsequently sent by knowledge, were passed on to Ben-Gurion Lichtheim and Silbershein. Indeed, there was while he was still in the United States. Otherlet- —_ plenty of proof that a process of extermination

ters and reports were also made available to — was under way in Europe. Why, then, did Benhim both in the United States and upon his re- = Gurion and the Yishuv leadership wait until the turn to Palestine. Lichtheim’s report, which was — end of November?

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Phases of Acknowledging

In order to understand why they waited,one _ Hitler.” However, he continued to mention “sevmust consider the difficulty of penetratingsome- __ eral million. . . at least two million Jews, homething that had never previously been within the __less and deprived of property, who should have

realm of human experience. This drove the been brought immediately [to Palestine].”!8” AcYishuv leadership and Ben-Gurion to grasp at __ cording to this logic, if two million were brought every possible doubt with respect to the reliabil- _— to Palestine, or even if efforts were made to bring ity of the information at their disposal. Some — them, there would certainly be more left behind.

of the reports occasionally appeared to contain His colleagues expressed similar sentiments. dubious information. The recipients therefore | They were still talking about large-scale “rutended to reject the information as being exag- —= mors,” “persecution,” or “attacks on people and gerated or false. Ben-Gurion, too, was infected property.’ Nothing they said was in keeping with

with these doubts and said so later. 1% the spirit of the Bund Report and the Reigner and There was probably also a fear that mass hys- | Sternbuch telegrams.!*°

teria—which would be attributed to the leader- This attitude by Ben-Gurion and his colship—would break out if this information leagues also dominated his meetings with Shaul turned out to be false. One of the more outspo- _— Meirov (Avigur), head of the illegal immigration

kenly negative stereotypes of the Jews—which — operation Mossad Le Aliyah Bet, and Zvi Jews themselves tended to admit to—was the Schechter (Yehieli), who was one of the Mossad’s “Jewish” tendency to overreact. Jews always exag- — emissaries in Istanbul. Nor was there a sense of ur-

gerate, so everyone said, and this particular | gencyinthe words of these men. Indeed, at a meetstereotype upset the natural process of internal- = ing with Ben-Gurion they did point to “some [reizing the information that poured in from Eu- — maining] cracks” but reported that exit from rope. Many people believed the Jews tended to Romania was still permitted, and that Jews could overstress their suffering, or to use exaggerated __ still make their way to Palestine via Teheran. They descriptions in an attempt to draw attention to — discussed the necessary preparations, which retheir problems. The Yishuv leadership wasthere- —_ quired maritime training and suitable equipment, fore wary of appearing hysterical, and their cau- _—_— but there was not even a hint in their conversations

tion in this respect also contributed to their re- of any new development in Europe. Even these duced confidence in the terrible information people, who had devoted their lives to intelligence,

coming from Europe. espionage, and data processing, could not break Thus, even when all this information down the barrier that prevented them from propreached him and his colleagues, Ben-Gurion __ erlyevaluating the situation and arriving at the obcontinued to waver between preconceived ideas — vious conclusions that should have been drawn and the conclusions that, in the end, were made with regard to that situation.!®° necessary because of the situation. There had still THE BILTMORE PROGRAM

not been an “about-face,” things had still not

taken a “leap,” and Ben-Gurion’s words were still | Another possible reason for this denial could be within the scope of the acceptable. For example, | Ben-Gurion’s attempt to persuade the Yishuv

at a meeting of the Zionist ActionsCommitteeon leadership to accept the Biltmore Program, 15 October, five weeks before the announcement, which was later to become known as the he said: “He who does not see what Judaism is Jerusalem Plan. He returned to Palestine from facing at this time is blind and is not a Jew and is the Unites States convinced that the time was not a human being....[T]hey may all be mur- __ ripe, and that nothing should prevent the Biltdered. I don’t know if any Jews will remain after © more Program from becoming the flag of the

63

Confronting the Information

Zionist movement. He felt it made more sense to stated that more than one third of the Jewish naget to the root of the suffering he was hearing __ tion are “in Nazi concentration camps... thouabout from every quarter than to treat its side- sands are being executed in forests, on roadsides, effects. The first three meetings of the Jewish — in closed cattle cars... . Jewish property is being Agency were devoted to reports on his activityin confiscated and destroyed.” He presented a clear the United States andadiscussion ofthe Biltmore _ picture of the persecution yet reverted to the kind

Program. The program was ultimately ap- of terminology commonly used until then:

proved.!” “Everything is at risk. The liberty of mankind, the Ben-Gurion also wanted his Mapai party to _ physical existence of our people, the beginnings reach a decision and demanded a conference;he = of our new homeland, the soul of our movedid this despite the risk that this might causearift | ment—it is all at risk.”!* in the party. Yitzhak Tabenkin and his powerful A FEAR OF INVASION faction were opposed to a Jewish state in the near future because this would require partition be- —_ The possibility of the Yishuv being in danger of a

tween Jews and Arabs in Palestine. Moreover, Nazi invasion was further reason for diverting atBen-Gurion may have anticipated that this con- —_ tention from incoming information or casting ference would reveal the unflattering faceofadi- | doubts onits reliability. And it was a very real danvided party, which might disclose the real dimen- ger indeed, one that caused the Yishuv to turn in sions of the public base upon which he was __ on itself and to reject any information that might

depending. lower public morale. Ben-Gurion expressed his Thus, Ben-Gurion may have been willing to fears for the Yishuv in letters to Frankfurter, to risk some internal party dispute ifthis meant get- | Lourie, and in a memo to Roosevelt at the begin-

ting his program accepted, especially given the ning of July, when Rommel’s troops were staplight of the Jews of Europe and even if he was __ tioned in the Tobruk region. By October 1942 they

not yet fully aware of the full significance of the |= had almost reached Egypt. Other forces were situation. The B faction voted unanimously __ poised to join them from the north. Ben-Gurion against the Biltmore Program, and from herethe stressed the danger on several occasions: “The rift in the party widened, until the B faction ap- — Nazis are not far away, but we are being threatpeared as an independent list in the 1944 His- ened not only by Rommel in North Africa. We are

tadrut elections.!! also in danger of invasion from Syria and even It is possible, therefore, that Ben-Gurion’s fo- —_—sIraq and Turkey.” So real was the danger in Ben-

cus on this political issue is a good indication of | Gurion’s eyes that he even considered ways of the complexity of the period and ofits tragic dual- confronting it: “We can either surrender to it... ity. By focusing on the political struggle involved —_ or choose the option of underground activity, of in getting his plan passed, he chose to divert his at- | maintaining our Jewish humanity, even from tention from the full meaning of the information — within Hitler’s ghetto.”!°? Here the speech clearly at his disposal, even though he consideredthe plan _ reveals that Ben-Gurion was still not aware of the to be best way of dealing with the root ofthe prob- _ full meaning of what the Nazis were doing to the

lem as reflected in that information. Jews. They were leaving the Jews no possibility of In his speech to the Mapai Convention in _ survival; the Jews of Europe were not given the Kfar Vitkin, Ben-Gurion discussed the complex- choice of reconciling themselves to slavery “even ity of the times. Although still full of the old ter- from within Hitler’s ghetto.” minology, the speech also contained hints of new At that stage of the “final solution” the Nazis attitudes and perhaps even signs of change. He —_ had completely stripped Ben-Gurion of any con-

64

Phases of Acknowledging

trol over the fate of the Jews. Their fate was final _—_ forces in Palestine built large fortresses near Jeri-

and absolute and even the methods the Nazis — cho with the help of the Jewish company Solel were using—death by gas poisoning—was sym- ___ Boneh, and preparations were made for blowing bolic of their view of the Jews as the basest of an- —_ up bridges in the event of a possible invasion.'"4

imals and not solely an efficient method for ex- |The German shadow over Palestine even terminating them. At that moment in time — prompted Yishuv representatives to start a diaBen-Gurion was still cognitively unaware of all logue with Arab moderates in the hope of disthis, notwithstanding all his own prophesies — suading them from joining the Germans in extersince the thirties and on the very eve of the war. minating the Jews of Palestine.!* Previously He continued to use words that were full of pre- prepared defense plans dating from 1940 and 1941 monition and significance, but he never delved — were now reexamined by the Yishuv’s political into their real meaning so that everyone would __ leaders and Haganah officers. The fear of invaunderstand what was really going on in Europe. sion could thus have made it difficult to properly The fear of a German invasion of Palestine process the information arriving from Europe. was indeed real, yet in order to understand how _—_ Only after the fear had abated somewhat was it long it persisted one should stress that onlyretro- _ possible to return to this information, and only spectively—often weeks, months, or even years __ then was there a “leap” in cognitive awareness.

later—is it possible to understand how a certain More information arrived at Ben-Gurion’s battle had the power to change the course of a _ office in November. During the first week he rewar. For example, the Battle of El Alamein, which ceived a number of letters and telegrams, includended with a British victory on 2 November1942, ing a report on the deportation of Jews from was recognized only later asaturning pointinthe — France and the situation in Austria, and news outcome of the war. Even after the victory at El about a meeting scheduled for October, arranged Alamein, a whole week after Ben-Gurion’s speech —_ by Stephen Wise and Nahum Goldman, between at the Mapai Convention the Yishuv could not —_ Reigner and Lichtheim and the American attaché

have known that the battle had been a historical in Geneva. From the same source came news that milestone and that Palestine was no longer in __ the Geneva office of the Jewish Agency was asking danger of German occupation. In those days, for help from London in passing on information even after suffering defeat, an army could lickits | from Geneva.!*° There was nothing new in these wounds, reorganize itself, attack—often withthe — telegrams; they merely confirmed that the sysfury of defeat—and win. Today, in hindsight, we — tematic murder of European Jews was in full know that it was that battle that stopped Rom- _ swing. mel. In its early stages the war itself was known as

the “Phony Wan” 4 it took a while for the world SABER RATTLING: THE TESTIMONY OF to understand that it was another world war and that it would take a terrible toll in bloodshed. | Rumors were rife around mid-November that an Thus it was in Palestine in late 1942; it took a —_ exchange group was on its way to Palestine. It

, THE EXCHANGE GROUP

while for the threat to sink in, and then more __ was the testimony of this group that prompted time was needed for the public to accustom itself the Jewish Agency to announce to the world that

once the threat had passed. the Jews of Europe were being systematically The fear of a Nazi invasion of Palestine was = murdered. The exchange concept is as old as war not only expressed in worried speeches. In order _ itself: each of the warring factions exchanges to anticipate the potential evil, several actions — those of its people who had been “left behind”

were taken. Among other things, the British in enemy territory for various reasons. When

65

Confronting the Information

rumors started flying of the imminent arrival of These testimonies were not all received with such a group, Ben-Gurion was inundated with — complete faith, even though some of the “newappeals from colleagues in the leadership to in- |= comers” were born in Palestine, were kibbutz and clude their friends and relatives in subsequent moshav members, in other words, were “serious” exchange groups. Predictably, the usual termi- —_— people. And there were still lingering doubts even

nology (“Nazi hell,’ “starvation and annihila- _— after the testimonies had been checked and tion’) was used to support the urgency of these — rechecked. At one point a woman slapped

appeals.!%” Eliyahu Dobkin’s face for doubting her aff-

The group arrived in Palestineon16 Novem- __ davit.!%? Stories recounting the systematic murber 1942 and consisted of seventy-eight people, — der of children, the elderly, and the sick, of the sixty-nine of whom—mainly women and chil- “technology of murder,” which today we are able dren—vwere nationals of British Mandate Pales- to “understand,” Dobkin and others refused to tine. They brought with them news from various _ believe. No wonder it took a slap in the face to places, including Warsaw and Sosnovietz, Pio- — shock him into acceptance. terkov and Treblinka, Sobibor and Auschwitz, as On 22 November the Jewish Agency met to well as news about the Jewish population de- discuss the new evidence. Ben-Gurion was sick ported to the east from Holland, Belgium, Vi- —_ and unable to attend. One of his biographers has

enna, and Berlin.!% explained the sickness as exhaustion resulting At this stage of the war it was routine to sub- _ from agitation at learning the horrific news from

ject all new arrivals in Palestine from Nazi- — Europe.”°! After receiving Dobkin’s report, the occupied Europe to exhaustive interrogation in =, Jewish Agency had no choice but to publish an order to extract as much information as possible official announcement on the annihilation of about the condition of the Jews, including mili- | Jewsin Europe: “The JAE has received detailed intary, economic, and political matters, appraisals | formation from trusted and reliable sources reof the enemy’s morale—any scrap of informa- _ garding acts of slaughter and murder against the tion that might help in the efficient deployment —_Jews of Poland and the Jews of central and western against the enemy. Interrogations, which usually | Europe expelled to Poland. ... A special committook place in “interrogation offices” specially set tee has been established [in Poland] that is reup in Istanbul, Aleppo (in Syria), and Haifa, were sponsible for the annihilation of Jews. .. . [T]his part of the behind-the-scenes cooperation estab- | committee travels all over Poland and oversees the lished between the Yishuv, the United States,and annihilation process.” The Jewish Agency there-

Britain throughout the war. fore announced the fact that Nazis were murderThe group was interrogated at length by, _ ing Jews, that “groups were being deported to un-

among others, Eliyahu Dobkin and Moshe — known destinations,’ and that there was “an Shapira of the Jewish Agency’s Immigration De- _ alarming decimation of the Jewish population” in partment. This in itself is proof that there was a various places. It also announced its decision to special feeling in the air; under normal circum- = form a committee to coordinate and organize acstances professional questioning in Haifa would _ tivity on behalf of the Jews of Europe.” have been sufficient. In fact, this group was spe- The communiqué was distributed among the cial. The newcomers testified to acts ofexpulsion, _ editorial offices and news agencies and constituted

deportation, and murder that decimated entire | animportant “leap forward” in awareness.’? The communities and left only a few alive, thereby __ testimonies of the sixty-nine members of the exconfirming that earlier information from other — change group constituted a sword that rent the

sources had been reliable. fabric separating the two worlds of awareness. A 66

Phases of Acknowledging

“holocaust” of the kind being perpetrated in Eu- _ the JAE. In subsequent meetings (29 Novemrope had never before been a part of human expe- ber, 6 and 13 December 1942) he referred to it at rience. All that was known about the depthsofhu- —_— length and discussed the means necessary to man evil did not include the possibility that an _—_—carry out rescue operations: “We must do everyideology, however murderous, with political,eco- thing we can, and we must not say in advance that nomic, religious, or other aims, no matterhowex- __ there is no chance of rescue.’

treme and uninhibited, could lead to Zyklon-B gas In researching this phase, I encountered a or concentration and death camps, in which an shortage of primary sources. I could not, for entire nation would be exterminated indiscrimi- | example, find a description of Dobkin and nately. Human experience already encompassed _— Shapira’s hasty journey to Ben-Gurion after their acts of mass murder and even genocide. Nowthese —_ meeting with the exchange group, nor any docuwere being joined by the “holocaust” and were be- —s mentation on discussions held prior to the Jewish

ing brought one more horrific step forward. | Agency meeting. Nor is there anything to link the Morality was being turned upside down: the Ger-_ —_—s new evidence with Ben-Gurion’s sickness. What

man nation was carrying out what it described as __ exists is Dobkin’s brief comment, made several a “moral” act of “charity” toward the entire world —— days after his meeting with the group, that imby “weeding out” the “germs,” by exterminating § mediately after the meeting he had done “his utthe “vermin,” by getting rid of the “plague.” Today = most to inflame and arouse the Jewish Agency, we know that an operation of this magnitude is — the Histadtrut, the Party and the entire world.”

part of the history of human behavior, is within One also knows that on 22 November Benthe range of things that human beings are capable | Gurion sent several warning telegrams to various of carrying out, another objective with which to __ people, including Justice Frankfurter. That day challenge themselves. In 1942 they didn’t know; __ the JAE met in his absence. It can be determined

they were just beginning to understand. that he sent the telegrams before the Jewish It required a powerful leap in awareness. The = Agency decided to go public with news of the an-

mental and emotional tools had not yet been nihilation. However, I possess no documentation forged to permit such a step. It tooka longtime — of a meeting between Ben-Gurion and Dobkin. to produce these tools, and they were gradually —§ Nor have I any documentation to show that the consolidated and reached a peak of maturity to- § Jewish Agency asked for Ben-Gurion’s permisward the end of November 1942. Only then was it sion to make the announcement.

possible to come to terms with the scraps of in- Still, anyone familiar with Ben-Gurion’s formation that had been accumulating over the = working methods and his relations with his colyears. The depositions of the exchange group __ leagues, would be justified in assuming that the presented them in a new light. Still, doubts were _ latter consulted with him before deciding to make not easily dispelled. Despite the Jewish Agency's | so momentous an announcement. Nor would announcement, the information was not yet fully | Ben-Gurion have contacted anyone had he not digested. The process of understanding and in- __ been privy to the decisions. Thus, one can safely ternalizing the information would continuelong assume that most of the proposals to be decided after that announcement in late November 1942. on with regard to the new policies had been soIn Warsaw, Vilna, Lvov, and Lodz the same pro- _lidified in the course of preliminary consultations cess was gradually taking place. There, too, many — within the narrow management forum and, be-

Jews were still refusing to believe.?4 fore that, among the senior members of the JewBen-Gurion routinely received all this infor- ish Agency’s main Mapai party. It may be asmation, including details of the debate held by — sumed that the inner circle included Ben-Gurion,

67

Confronting the Information

Berl Katznelson, Sharett, Kaplan, Dobkin, and _ing the painful truth that the Jews of Europe were possibly also Shaul Meirov (Avigur) and Eliyahu __ being murdered in the millions as part of a plan Golomb. It may also be assumed that later or si- _—_— to wipe out the Jewish nation.2%

multaneous consultations were held with other After finally becoming fully cognizant of the people, including Hapoel Hamizrahi member _ situation, Ben-Gurion’s first reaction was to deMoshe Shapira and Yitzhak Gruenbaum, one of _ clare that everything must be done to save as the General Zionists leaders, who were naturally |§ many Jewsas possible. Starting at the end of 1942,

involved in these matters. he would repeat this sentiment at every opportuHow did Ben-Gurion make this leap in _ nity. He passed this message on to Jewish Agency awareness? Something of what he felt is hinted at branches in the United States and England. In his in his diary entries after a meeting with Moshe _letters and telegrams he stressed the importance Prager, an expert on Poland at that time. Hereis — of rescuing Jews and proposed many ways of dowhat he wrote twelve days before the Jewish —ingso. His newattitude is revealed ina letter from

Agency issued an official announcement on the “Amos’s father” (Ben-Gurion’s code name) to annihilation: “Prager is getting material from — Judge Felix Frankfurter: the Polish government on the situation: on the homelessness, deprivation (he has no informa- To Arthur [Lourie, secretary of the New tion on physical extermination).”2°? What does York branch]. Ask Miriam? to send the this entry signify? Ben-Gurion states categori- following letter to FF. [Felix Frankfurter] cally that Prager has “no information on physical on behalf of Amos’s father: Hitler’s deci-

extermination,” but this is not the way people sion to annihilate all the Jews of Poland deny something they have no reason to fear. appears to be the first step in annihilating What information was Ben-Gurion trying to the Jews in all the occupied countries, and push aside or confirm? Did he have another view unbelievable acts of horror against chilof the situation, and was he just trying to obtain dren and women were confirmed beyond an expert opinion? Moreover, if the information all doubt by [people] who arrived [in supplied by Katani cast a dark shadow over the Palestine] from Poland... and by the Polquality and attitude of the Polish government-in- ish Deputy Prime Minister, Kott, who is exile, why did Ben-Gurion choose to trust mate- now in Jerusalem and who received infor-

rial that Prager had obtained from the same mation from the Polish government in source? It is possible that from Ben-Gurion’s Poland. . . . I doubt if anything can point of view Prager’s words were no more than a influence Hitler, although the massacres kind of life belt that he still wished to cling to, if appear to be carried out not by the army only to avoid coming to terms with a reality that but by the Gestapo and the Nazi party’s

was so horrible and hard to believe? special Storm Troopers, and it is possible Ben-Gurion’s diary entry signals the point in that a serious reprimand from the Presitime where he was on the verge of dispelling the dent to the German military leaders that hope that the news from Europe was exaggerated, they assume personal responsibility for inaccurate, and inconceivable. He, too, experi- the acts of horror might have some effect. enced a leap in awareness during the two weeks There might be a chance to rescue the between this meeting and the Jewish Agency’s children and perhaps even the women by official announcement. Together with others in exchanging them for women and chilthe Yishuv, he underwent a painful cognitive dren of German extraction in the Allied process. In the final analysis, there was no escap- countries. The Yishuv is ready to adopt

68

Phases of Acknowledging

50,000 children or more if possible [Ben- and dramatic speech, Ben-Gurion consolidated Gurion erased the word “possible” and information on the events in Europe and empha-

wrote “necessary’| and we are already sized the complexity of knowing about them: making all the necessary preparations for “The world was in the throes of a war of unprece-

this. dented dimensions, although it would obviously Special action must be taken to save end with the total downfall of Hitler’s rule. the Jews of the Balkans, Hungary, and Nonetheless, no one could say if the ‘victory of western Europe, where there is still no di- democracy and liberty and justice’ will not leave

rect Nazi government, or where the Nazi Europe a huge battleground strewn with the government is still not behaving with the bones of our people. .. . [I]ts men, women, chilsame cruelty as in eastern Europe. A dren, old people, and our dying nation are calling warning issued by America to the govern- on the conscience of mankind to stand trial before

ments of Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria history.” might have some effect, even though It was a world war and many nations sufthese states are under treaty to Hitler. At fered, said Ben-Gurion, but right at the outset of least the women and children can be res- Hitler’s rule Germany had singled out the Jews cued from these countries, and pressure while there was still “peace” in Europe. Hitler had must be placed on the British govern- announced a war of destruction against the Jews.

ment to permit entry into the country Before so much as a single bomb had been [Palestine] to all the children that can be dropped over Poland, Norway, or any other taken from those countries. ... Yesterday country, fire was already raging in Jewish synaI was informed by the [British] govern- gogues. While no other nations were the victims ment in confidence... that it would per- of deprivation and looting, the Jewish commumit the entry of 4,000 children accompa- nity in Germany was already subject to disposnied by 500 women from Bulgaria to session, scorn, and plunder. This distinction was Palestine. This is a small percentage of the the result of the radical difference in values bechildren who can be saved and who can tween the Jewish and Nazi “ethic.” (This motif

easily be integrated in Palestine. repeatedly surfaced in Ben-Gurion’s speeches long before he became aware of the enormity of

Ben-Gurion also demanded, in the name of the the fate assigned to the Jewish nation by the Jewish nation, the basic right reserved to every Nazis.) The Jews instilled in the world the notion nation, namely, the right to fight for its life, and that man was born in the shadow of God; stressed his words referred to his desire to establish a Jew- —_ the sanctity of life and the value of the individual,

ish military force. He signed off with a call to —_ expressed in the commandment “Thou shalt not President Roosevelt to do all in his power to save =commit murder” [This commandment is comthe live of the Jewish nation and its honour! ~—s monly (and incorrectly) translated as: “Thou From Ben-Gurion’s point of view, Frankfurter shalt not kill’—trans.], by according the same

was the main conduit to Roosevelt. laws to Jews as to gentiles; and by living according Another approach was to appeal tothe “con- __to the edict “Love thy neighbor as thyself.” The science of the free world” and to local publicopin- —_— Nazis, on the other hand, spread their gospel of a

ion. One week after the official announcement, a super race and of lesser nations; glorified war and special session of the Emergency Convention of bloodshed; and preached hatred for others and the Elected Assembly was convened, with Ben- _ forall opinions and ideas that did not conform to Gurion as the main speaker. In a brazen, painful, —_ their own.

69

Confronting the Information

Ben-Gurion pointed out that the Nazi edict — our country that is being built and redeemed.”?!! was not only incongruent with the values of the | Ben-Gurion’s words also summed up the motley Jewish nation but also with the principles of the |= information that reached the Yishuv and reFrench Revolution, the values of the English- _ flected a concept of cognitive and emotional prospeaking nations, and the ideals of Soviet Russia. cessing. The dramatic call for prompt and firm Nonetheless, it was only against the Jewish nation —_ action expressed the long distance Ben-Gurion

that the Nazis were perpetrating these acts. Only |= and his counterparts had journeyed in their they were being specially singled out. The Jews — growing awareness during the last two weeks of were being made to stand apart ina way thatno |§ November 1942. other nation was being asked to do. The rest of the world was also responsible for the plight of the Jews. All the cruelty aimed at other nationsby — In the Yishuv these announcements aroused a the Nazis was kind in comparison with what they __ sense of guilt?!” as well as a storm of accusations

a | PUBLIC RESPONSE IN THE YISHUV

were doing to the Jewish nation: against the leadership for having failed to prop-

; erly read the situation in Europe and«taking part Only our children, only our women, our nee oy P 5 P ee ina deliberate “conspiracy” to hide facts from the brethren and old are being singled public. Thefolk, accusations were aimed mainly out for,; oq: special treatment, to be buried in , at Yitzhak Gruenbaum, member of the JAE’s Comgraves outofbyFour, theirand ownlater hands, to be ,of, the Rescue ol,dug mittee chairman burned in incinerators, to suffocate to , ,;

Committee,” the body whose establishment was death, to be shot down by machine guns,Agency ,, ; oo. announced with the official Jewish rewith éno justice, no of purpose, no reason, lease of news the genocide. However, the atfor no,; ;crime, even according to the Nazi tacks were also aimed at Ben-Gurion, book of ,crimes, except for one single mis-who ; ; . was chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive and demeanor: that these children are the , children of Jews, because only thecame Jews ; directions: oo, from Accusations from all

. leader of Mapai.

have no defense, no support, because the and ; - the secular. - , the right, the left, the religious,

Jews have, a.no political status, there no . for . exHashomer Hatzair leader Meiris Ya’ari,

Jewish ,army, there no Jewish indepenample, had neverisdisplayed any outstanding prior

ish homeland. ;

dence, and there is of no the safesituation. and open Jewwae not among ; understanding He was the first to analyze the information that had been

Ben-Gurion called on the world leaders at war — supplied to all public figures—himself inwith Hitler—the British prime minister andthe — cluded—and he did not deviate from the trend of U.S. president, the prime minister ofthe USSR— —_ misconstruing the events in Europe that was char-

to do their utmost to prevent the total annihila- _acteristic of all of them. Nevertheless, he had no

tion of the Jewish nation. He concluded his reservations about attacking the way in which speech with a kind of oath: “And the last wordis | Ben-Gurion handled the information on the aimed at our dear brothers and sisters, those tor- genocide: “[I]n the meantime, Ben-Gurion was tured martyrs in the Nazi ghettos: Your tragedy is | away in Washington, toying with the idea of a Jewour tragedy. Your blood is our blood. We shalldo —_ish army and the Biltmore Program. You have to everything in our power to wreak your revenge —_ ask yourself. .. what has happened to the Zionist and we shall not rest until we rescue you fromthe |= movement? Can we have lost all measure of conNazi furnace and from the decadent Diaspora, __ science.” Such sentiments were also published in and we shall bring you, all of you, here to us, to _ the right-wing press.”!4

70

Phases of Acknowledging

At a meeting of Mapai activists, Ben-Gurion was not the distribution of information but the lashed out not only against his accusers (“those —_ cognitive understanding of its meaning. It is apblackguards”) in the paper Hamashkif (or “per- _— propriate, in this connection, to recall the words haps some other tabloid”) but also at his col- written about “Hazal” [Judaism’s learned sages— leagues in the Mapai leadership, who, out of __ trans.], which say that wise men do not demand some “sadistic instinct,’ blamed the catastrophe __ that things be written according to what is done not on Hitler but on the leadership, particularly —_ but rather that things be done according to what on Gruenbaum: “What is all this debate about _is written, that they do not see things as they apthat only began now? Why didn’t they shout be- __ pear to their own eyes but in accordance with fore?” he asked. Did they not read Mein Kampf? what is said about them in books.?!8

Wasn't it mentioned that Hitler planned to anni- Still, Lauterbach, Dobkin, and others felt the hilate all the Jews? No speech and no propa- _need to respond to the accusations and they did ganda—and there had been plenty of propa- __ so at the aforementioned meeting of Mapai acganda—on Hitler could have had the same __ tivists, where they lodged a counterattack aimed shocking effect as the testimonies of those people = at _the right-wing papers Haboker and Hawho came from Poland. Without them there = mashkif?!9 Dobkin repeated that the Jewish could have been no change in awareness as to — Agency had published all the material in its poswhat is happening in Europe. Ben-Gurion called _ session. He recalled that he had rushed to Atlit to

a halt to the search for a scapegoat, to stop this welcome the first witnesses and, on his return, “sadistic campaign ... because we have enough had “done everything possible to arouse and troubles without this one,’ and demanded of his —_ warn the Jewish Agency, the Histadrut, the party, audience to remember that the source of the —_and the entire world.” He referred to a long list of

tragedy was Hitler and that everything possible | speeches made at various other gatherings and “must be done to save” Jewish lives.2!5 Similar meetings that dealt with the murders, plus the

sentiments were also expressed by Yitzhak fact that the Histadrut’s own paper, Davar, did

Tabenkin.*!6 not find it necessary to report on any of them. He There were many who felt left out. One of — suggested that everyone should do his own stockthese was Lauterbach, head of the Organization taking and not try to place the blame on others, Department, an important site in the distribu- _ since “until the eyewitnesses arrived, none of us tion of information among the various offices. _ believed. We thought the information was exagHe was quick to reject the claim that the Execu- _ gerated.” Summing up, Dobkin asked, “Shall we tive had been withholding information or was _ not, even in this tragedy, be united in a real atparty to a conspiracy to withhold information — tempt at rescue? Must we rather continue to eat from the public. A copy of Lauterbach’s response _ each other’s flesh and hinder all mutual efforts .. . was passed on to Ben-Gurion. It raised three __ ina futile search for ‘scapegoats’?”2”

main points: (1) information first arrived in Lon- Representatives of the Polish governmentdon and the United States; (2) all information in-exile also saw fit to add their own accusations. found to be reliable was published immediately, | These basically amounted to an advance counor following further analysis; (3) inanyevent,the terattack regarding potential implications about focus of activity was either Britain or the United —_— Poland’s role in the genocide, a preemptive strike

States.2!7 and an attempt to “share” with the Yishuv lead-

Lauterbach’s reaction reflects a dissatisfac- ership the blame for having withheld information with systems that are not operating as they —_ tion. Ben-Gurion met with Stanislav Kott, the should. It is unjustified since the main problem __ Polish deputy prime minister in exile, who was

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in Palestine at the time. He expressed to his Jew- —_ experienced the horrors often described them in ish Agency colleagues his feeling that Professor — the same surrealistic way. The writer K. Zetnik

Kott was trying to blame them, insisting that | declared that Auschwitz was “another planet.” they knew of the situation concerning the Jewsin The Holocaust was a satanic phenomenon that Europe as long ago as July and September and —_ cannot be understood in rational terms, and did not cry out.”*?! Ben-Gurion repeated whathe __ there is no point in trying to pin responsibility had been told by Francis Katani, namely, thatthe — for something as enormous as the Holocaust on Poles he spoke to hoped the Nazis would con- _anall-powerful Satan. But there is a danger in this tinue their genocide against the Jews of Poland. line of thinking because it does not apply only to Ben-Gurion and his colleagues insisted that the victims and their families in Palestine and the the material was generally available, that every- _ rest of the free world; it also applies to the murone was equally to blame for not having under- _derers and to those who were accessories to murstood its significance. This is a claim that en- __ der, to those who claimed they did not know, did compasses the leadership’s feeling that the whole —_ not understand, who were manipulated by a saissue of processing the information onthe geno- —_ tanic and omnipotent leader. Some of these indicide was unique, since human civilization had __ viduals are hiding behind such claims to this day.

never experienced the Holocaust, nor had any Therefore, those people who claimed that the memory with which to compare it. Therefore, it | Holocaust was an inconceivable phenomenon was unreasonable to expect publicleaderstoun- sowed a dangerous seed, the outcome of which derstand such a unique event any better than __ was difficult to foresee.

anyone else. What was Ben-Gurion’s part in this issue?

This is not entirely true. Not all the material | Howdid hecome to terms with the epistemic obwas available to the general public. Moreover— _stacle presented by early knowledge of the indusand this is even more important—the informa- __ trialized annihilation of the Jews of Europe? A tion from Europe was virtually impossible toun- — review of documentation relating to, and the derstand even by those who had all of it at their | sequence of events following, the Nazi rise to disposal; they were thus unable to help othersin = power in Germany (especially during the war) the Yishuv’s hierarchy shorten their cognitive proves that Ben-Gurion, probably more than any process with respect to the sensitive information, | other Zionist leader, did sense the approaching let alone help the general public come to terms = danger. However, he was unable to move out of

with it. his sphere of comprehension to a place that was Ben-Gurion and his counterparts reacted— = beyond human experience. The communicaalmost certainly unconsciously—by mystifying tions and rescue channels that Ben-Gurion was the phenomenon they were facing. They defined _ involved in establishing during the early stages of it as “strange,” “extraordinary,” “inconceivable, —_ the war did not equip him with the special tools

“magical,” “beyond the familiar course of necessary for understanding events differently events.” This was how they explained why even _— from other members of the Yishuv leadership. confirmed material was understood or believed = Neither he nor his colleagues were indifferent to

only much later. Such feelings about the Holo- the writings of German poets, novelists, and caust were not illogical, and even today there are _ public figures on the spirit of the German people those who consider the Holocaust anextrahistor- or to events in Germany. Several examples can be

ical event. mentioned here of revelations that were available Even Jews who had been closer than anyone to any reader of books at that time. Heine deelse to the affected area and who had personally _ scribed the wild wind blowing across the German

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Phases of Acknowledging

nation, one “that burns books and willeventually false and exaggerated information was published also burn human beings.” Kafka described the | and rumors were spread in order to instill fear

horrors of destruction in his works The _ or foster empty hopes. Ben-Gurion, too, was Metamorphosis and The Trial. Uri ZviGreenberg _ influenced by the claims that information on the predicted in Albatross in 1923 that only one tenth — genocide was no more than expressions of psyof the nation would survive the furnaces andthe chological warfare.

gas chambers. Similar sentiments were expressed Then there was the traditional image of Gerby the poets Itamar Ben Hur and Yitzhak many, whichatleast since the nineteenth century, Katznelson, who perished in the Holocaust.One — and even into the third decade of the twentieth could also mention Shaul Tschernichowsky, the — century, had made valuable contributions to huAmerican Jewish writer Ben Hecht, Herzl Nor- man culture. This nation had produced men of

dau, Jabotinsky, and even Trotsky. letters, writers, scientists, and extremely imporAll these revelatory statements did not differ | tant musicians. It was difficult to connect the insignificantly from Ben-Gurion’s own cognitively | formation coming from Europe with the image based vision, which he described, suffered, and of Germany as an enlightened and civilized na-

spouted intuitively. He often did this more tion. Today we know that in perpetrating that vile sharply than the writers and novelists. In hind- crime, Germany had the complete support of sight we are aware that his words were prescient, most of its population, including intellectuals, but at the time of writing their content was “or- _ writers, poets, and scientists. This was not known

dinary,” “old,” or “familiar.”?? at the time. Even the Jews of Germany, who were Thus, Ben-Gurion spoke of approaching ca- in the very eye of the storm, did not believe, durtastrophe without knowing at the time what the _ing the early stages of the “final solution,’ that extent or character of this catastrophe would be. | Germany was capable of sinking to such a level of Like all his contemporaries, he tried to grasp at _ bestiality.

any sign that would moderate the threatening in- It is worth pointing out that while antiformation; he, too, tended to doubt the validity | Semitism had indeed been on the increase, there of the information itself and the reliability of | were also periods in which it had dropped conthose who brought it. It could be said that all — spicuously. A graph would show a steady rise but those talents and virtues that even hisopponents _also periodic drops in anti-Semitic pressure. At saw in him—his great analytical powers, fore- the time it was believed that these drops indicated

sight, sharpened political sense—were not that the Nazis were relaxing their anti-Semitic enough to enable Ben-Gurion to overcome the __ policies before completely implementing them. deep rift between the words he himself used (cut- For example, on 1 April 1933 a boycott was institing though these were) and their heretofore un- _ tuted against Jewish shops, but this only applied precedented significance. He was no betterinthis | to Saturdays, when most Jewish shops were

than any of his peers. closed for the Sabbath. It was thought at the time Defensive mechanisms were at work in the that boycotting Jewish shops on Saturdays was an background; slumber and confusion disturbed attempt by the Nazis to appease the Jewish orthe processing of the information. There were _ ganizations in the United States. those, for example, who were convinced that in- Jews even saw certain positive aspects to the formation coming from Europe at various stages | abominable 1935 Nuremberg Laws. First, the staof the war was false, part of the propaganda ma- __ tus of the Jews was finally defined by a law; it was chine typical of modern warfare. Their experi- —_ indeed a bad law, discriminatory and humiliatence was that of the First World War, where much ing, but it was a law all the same. One should not

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forget the ethos of abiding bythe lawin Germany, — which permitted a certain degree of freedom and the fact that German Jews considered them- among all the semi-independent “strongholds” selves law-abiding citizens. Second, compared __ that acted within Hitler’s kingdom.

with Mein Kampf and other anti-Semitic publi- Thus, it was very difficult for those who recations, the Nuremberg Laws were mild; some __ ceived data from Europe to sketch the necessary people saw in them a compromise between what __ outlines of a general, systematic, determined systhe Nazis wanted to do and said they would do "tem. They found it especially hard to be certain when they were still an opposition party and = about such a conclusion. In the absence of cerwhat they could actually do nowthattheywerein __ tainty, they tended to prefer other possible inter-

power. It seemed to many people that the _ pretations that were less far-reaching. It would Nuremberg Laws defined the “boundaries ofper- _ take time before it was fully understood that the

secution” possible in a country like Germany. Nazis had every intention of carrying out their Many believed that Nazi rule would not last for- “master plan” (in its fullest sense), and that they ever, that it would be succeeded bya government — were indeed going ahead and doing so. And it that would repeal those laws, so that the damage = would take even more time for it to be under-

done by the Nazis was only temporary. stood that this totalitarian and irrational estabThe 1936 Berlin Olympic Games also moti- _ lishment was prepared to carry out the “final sovated the Nazis to modify their anti-Semitic pres- —_ lution” even if this meant relinquishing obvious

sure. The negotiations on the “transfer agree- | Nazi interests—even at the cost of hitting Germents” were viewed as proof that it was possible |= many’s interests in the war. Also, one can assume to speak to, and even to reach agreements with, that in the background there was also the issue of this extreme group. Following the July 1938 Evian __ the “Jewish” stereotype. Motivated by a desire to Conference, Hitler derisively announced that he |= minimize the Jewish tendency to exaggerate its wanted to throw the Jews out of Europe, a decla- troubles, Jewish leaders became extra cautious in

ration that symbolized Germany’s policy. So interpreting the information that flowed from were the forced emigration plans and the later —_ Europe.

plans to create territorial concentrations, the In connection with denying this informaMadagascar Plan and the Nisko-Lublin Plan, __ tion, it should be recalled that during the period which were beginning to take shape. These mis- —_—in question most of the Yishuv’s population was leading interpretations, which were certainlyrea- | young and Ashkenazi. Those left behind in Eu-

sonable at the time, were all part of a recurring | rope were the brothers, sisters, fathers, and trend to place the acts and plans of the Nazisinto mothers of Zionist revolutionaries or those who a formula familiar in Jewish annals, namely, that emigrated to Palestine for reasons that were less of exile, deportation, persecution, and so on. ideological. For many of these leaders the places The Nazis’ mode of action was also mislead-_ _— and the people in question were an integral part ing. It was hard to understand what was goingon _ of their lives, a piece of their former identity. As within the totalitarian “Kingdom of Evil”: it ap- _ recently as five, ten, or twenty years earlier a conpeared to be a highly organized and regimented __ siderable number of the senior politicians in the hierarchy, but there were frequent instances of — Yishuv, as well many of the leaders of the forty miscoordination based on dubious delegations § immigrant societies, had been prominent memof power. It was hard to determine which side _ bers of their communities in the Diaspora. Who would win the upper hand in the Nazis’ policies | were Gruenbaum and Kleinbaum, Dobkin and against the Jews: the totalitarian, organized side | Schmorak, Avraham Gebelber and Hayim Weiss-

or the feudal-like aspects of the government, burg, Menahem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir

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Phases of Acknowledging

(Yezernitsky), Natan Yellin Mor, and many oth- cognitive difficulties regarding the information ers like them? For many of them, dealing withthe — that continued to stream in from Europe during Diaspora was not something isolated or remote. the course of the war. An outstanding example of Many of them took advantage, either consciously — this can be found in Ben-Gurion’s letter, dated or unconsciously, of any means possible to deny — February 1943, to his secretary and good friend the information and to avoid what was contained — from his Washington days. Revealing to her the in it, fearing to consider the fate of their families | innermost secrets of his heart, his words substanwho were still in Europe. During the Holocaust _tiate the complexity of the process of internalizaand even after it, many writers and poets werere- tion and emotional comprehension, which luctant to get personally involved, even though § demanded a total rejection of his natural inclinathey did so with profound sensitivity.23 This was tion to deny the truth behind the terrible inforeven more true when it came to other people. mation and the ability to delve deeply into the isThese, then, were the main epistemological sues and to continue to live with them: obstacles to the Yishuv’s process of making itself

aware of the Holocaust, from the moment that in- I am unable to rid myself of the nightformation started trickling in, at first bit by bit and mare that has fallen upon us once again later in a steady stream, culminating in that mo- last week with the arrival of a group of ment of aroused awareness that took place upon fifteen people from Poland. One of these

hearing the testimony of the exchange group. is a young girl, a member of “Hehalutz” On 17 December 1942 the Allied forces made in Szosnovitz. ... The day before yestera public announcement that the Jews of Europe day I traveled to Haifa to meet her, and were being annihilated, which effectively closed for three hours I listened to a story of such the circle that had begun with the announcement horror, one that no Dante or Poe could by the Jewish Agency. From that moment on, the ever dream up, and you feel completely fact that the Germans were carrying out genocide helpless and you can't even let go of your against the Jewish people was known to the sanity—the sun continues to shine in all Yishuv, to the superpowers, and to the Jewish its glory and you have to go on with your public in the free world. Nonetheless, even these work as usual... . And it’s not easy, please confirmations did not counteract the doubts and believe me.””4

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2

Protest Political Tool or Substitute for Action? When no cure is available, witchcraft is not an option. —David Ben-Gurion

FURY AND FRUSTRATION Although analogies tend to flatten the One week after the official statement on the anni- uniqueness and complexity of the historical pichilation of the Jews, the National Assembly con- ture, it is worth recalling that other societies exvened an emergency session. Marking the first — perienced similar tensions. Both before and after organized act of protest on the part ofthe Yishuv, |= the Holocaust various societies faced the same it expressed the fear, anger, pain, and confusion dilemma as to whether to take open action—inof a leadership searching for the “correct” way to —_ cluding public protest—or to apply more subtle react, just as an individual responds when faced _ pressure in the form of diplomatic activity. This

with the news of a terrible tragedy. also applied to the Holocaust, where no “suitThe deeper the understanding grew that able” reaction was appropriate in every respect. what was happening in Europe deviated from § Thus, from the remove of time—and even anything known until then, the more the issue of — through the eyes of those who were there—any the “required” or “proper” response was debated. —__ response might have been viewed as feeble, conMoreover, the Jewish population in Palestine was fused, and inappropriate in comparison with the a very multifaceted and varied one: Ashkenazic § magnitude of the Holocaust. This chapter will and Sephardic communities; young and old; es- | examine Ben-Gurion’s and the Yishuv’s indecitablished residents and new immigrants; revolu- _ sion as to the form their protest should take in an tionaries and ordinary citizens; the Orthodox — attempt to understand why they never succeeded and the secular (even atheists); those ontheright in formulating a response with which they them-

and on the left; intellectuals and blue-collar selves could be satisfied. workers. It therefore took some time for a con- RESPONSIBILITY, BLAME, AND RESCUE sensus to be reached with regard to an acceptable

expression of mourning and outrage. The JAE and other bodies in the leadership deWas the objective of the protest to vent pain _cided to stage a protest demonstration six days and frustration or to initiate a process that would _—_after the official statement was released that

lead to an aid and rescue program? These Jews were being annihilated. Ben-Gurion delivtwo conflicting and contradictory possibilities | ered the main speech at that first and most impresented the community’s leadership with a portant event. The demonstration expressed the labyrinthine quandary: Should restraint be exer- emotional turmoil in the Yishuv at the time and cised, with pain and anger channeled into more __ was intended to rally public opinion throughpositive forms of action, or should the outrage be — out the free world to put pressure on foreign unleashed even at the cost of possible rescue at- | governments. Ben-Gurion’s speech was full of tempts? In hindsight it is now apparent that those —_ accusations. He attacked the indifference of the who had to struggle with the issue at the time—in free world, holding it responsible for the plight

real time—emerged empty-handed onallcounts: — of the Jewish nation, and demanded that the they hesitated, they contained their pain and frus- | “world’s conscience” be tried before the “throne tration, and they failed in their rescue attempts. of history.”

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Confronting the Information

Not satisfied with expressions of fury and The fact that Ben-Gurion delivered this protest, Ben-Gurion also presented a list of ac- | speech to the National Council was no coincitions that could be taken with the aim ofrescuing dence. The Yishuv’s protest was included in the Jews, especially transporting them from the “val- = National Council’s sphere of responsibility, in acley of death” to neutral or Allied countriesand,of | cordance with a semiofficial delegation of tasks course, Palestine. He even stressed the necessity between the council and the JAE; to this end, the

to rescue the Jews from their situation of help- = former provided an important public platform.’ lessness—without counsel, without any political | Indeed, Ben-Gurion’s involvement in protest acstatus or an army to protect them—andtoestab- _ tivity was also characterized by attempts to chanlish their liberty ina homelandthat wasopenand _ nel most of this activity into the National Coun-

secure. cil’s arena.

He called on the Jews of Palestine and the Di- This meeting of the National Council and

aspora to accept responsibility for the danger of — the outcry that surrounded it expressed the fury annihilation facing the Jews of Europe. All Jews, and pain of the Yishuv during the first few days

he said, should swear an oath not to rest until following the news from Europe. It was also a “the evil arm is broken, until Hitler’s rule is re- —_— large-scale public expression of an organized moved, until the pure blood is avenged, untilthe | cognitive-emotional process of awareness of the world is governed by righteousness, liberty and = Holocaust, of the Yishuv society’s facing up to the

honesty... and until the wandering people of Is- rumors and fears that were now irrefutably rael are returned to their land and liberty, and — confirmed, and the beginning of an attempt to that which is promised to each and every nation = come to terms with this terrible truth.

in the world, is promised to the Jewish nation. I PROTEST ACTIVITY AND OBJECTIVES These feelings shaped his attitude, creating

a pattern that he would return to repeatedly |§ Some of the questions accompanying the protest throughout the war: delegation of responsibility | issue throughout the war were already raised in for the fate of the Jews, fierce accusations, and __ the preliminary debates relating to the aforemensuggestions for rescue methods. First, Ben- — tioned meeting of the National Council. Who Gurion stressed the responsibility of the leaders — was to become the object of the Yishuv’s protest? of the free world to do their utmost to save the = The Nazis? The adjoining countries? The unsym-

Jewish nation from the clutches of the Nazis. pathetic and alienated Allied countries? Britain, Second, he placed double blame on the super- _ the most logical choice, had plenty of representapowers: for perpetuating the anomalous situa- tives all over Palestine, a military presence, and a tion of the Jewish people, a nation with no polit- fully staffed high commissioner’s residence in ical independence and military power, which —_ Jerusalem. Any protest against these could easily allowed the tragedy to happen; and for standing — have become confrontational. It was Britain, af-

by cynically as the blood flowed. Third, Ben- __ ter all, that was bearing the brunt of the war Gurion was quite clear asto whathadtobedone _ against the Nazis. By its very nature protest is an to counteract the Nazi murder industry: while expression of outrage seeking an outlet through the war was still being conducted, the enlight- —_ which to burst, so that it is not always control-

ened world must open its gates to Jewish lable. It could have overstepped its defined refugees and relocate them wherever possible, | boundaries and put at risk the Yishuv’s relationincluding Palestine; at the end of the war, the po- _ ship with Britain and the United States. Without

litically anomalous situation of the Jews had to the cooperation of these two powers, it would

be changed.’ have been inconceivable to plan any kind of 78

Protest

significant aid and rescue for the Jews of Europe. __cial statement. His own concern was with how far At those same meetings debates were held onthe _ protest activity could be permitted to go, beyond dual issues of public protest and aid and rescue _ simply being a means of letting off steam, while

activity, and even then it was clear that too stri- __ still remaining a viable political tool. He readent a protest would seriously jeopardize any at- —_ soned that protest expresses pain and frustration

tempt at rescue. and is therefore a means of demonstrating soliWhile organizing protest activity, the Yishuv — darity with the suffering of the Jews of Europe. leaders faced a difficult problem: How were they — Nonetheless, the actual saving of Jewish lives was

to permit protest without losing control of its for hima significant way to test the ultimate value public content? Put differently, what kind of — of the protest. Protest has positive value only to protest could be permitted that would notendan- __ the extent that it is part of a wide spectrum of acger other, more important activity? This dilemma _ tivity that leads to the rescuing of Jews from the was not foreign to the Yishuv leaders. Notwith- —_ Nazis. If there were a danger of protest activity standing the difference between the publication harming rescue efforts, it would be best to stifle of the 1939 White Paper and the terrible news __ the pain and postpone the urge to protest. Benfrom Europe, it is still possible to note a similar | Gurion was convinced that Yishuv society’s abilkind of tension surrounding the questionof“how ity tosurmount and contain its pain in return for to respond,” in the midst of a war, tothe banon —_ a chance at saving Jews was also a test of its politimmigration decreed by the White Paper. It is —_ ical maturity.

with this in mind that Ben-Gurion made his fa- We have seen that long before the outbreak mous statement: “We must help the British as if | of war, Ben-Gurion had been concerned with the there were no White Paper and we must fight the —_ extent to which protest could be used as a politi-

White Paper as if there were no war.’ Itwasanun- cal tool. He had witnessed the dramatic change successful attempt verbally to resolve the contra- =‘ that Churchill had achieved in his nation diction embedded in the reality of the times. Now, through the use of brilliant rhetoric. He may also with the official statement on the annihilation in _ have heard or read of Roosevelt’s “fireside chats” Europe, this contradiction was back in full force. during America’s economic crisis, and his atThe Yishuv leaders therefore had to gauge — tempts to counter the Depression by means of the the extent to which they could direct, or even |= New Deal program. Ben-Gurion thus had a high

control, the public’s protests. Not wishing to regard for words, especially when aimed inleave the public arena ungoverned, they had to __ wardly at his own public. But despite this he was decide on the most desirable forms of protest. | not convinced that words and protest would have Should these take the form of demonstrations, any significant effect on the policies of the major strikes, or petitions? Where was one to drawthe _ players ina world based on power, as was demon-

line in terms of the level of demonstrations? strated earlier in Czechoslovakia.*

Should armed conflict between demonstrators As part of the discussions prior to the outand British policemen or attacks against British | break of war, Ben-Gurion attempted to define the soldiers be allowed? Another issue that con- term “struggle” and how it differed from protest. cerned the Yishuv leaders was whether the Jewsof He objected to the tendency to distort it by affixthe free world—and U.S. Jews in particular— ing various connotations to it in the public decould be considered full and effective partnersin _ bate that was raging at that time in the Yishuv. In

the protest? his opinion the word “struggle” was improperly Ben-Gurion participated in discussions held applied to political activity such as speech- and by the JAE during the months following the offi- —_ decision-making. Even hurling verbal abuse

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Confronting the Information

upon an opponent did not constitute struggle. | less democratic than during peaceful times; at Ben-Gurion’s position was clear-cut: “Struggle | such times the public tends to close ranks around equals machine guns.”> He was convinced that —_its government. Both these aspects are even more protest against the White Paper was ofvalue only —_ acute in time of crisis, when governments are when it was part of the overall struggle (in the = more attentive to military and operational contrue sense of the word) and not when “struggle” —_ siderations and tend to minimize public opinion;

was merely a verbal substitute for the real thing. while the public itself tends not to worry too Ben-Gurion used the same logic with regard = much about moral considerations that do not dito the issue of protest against the murder of Jews. __ rectly relate to winning a war. The existential The connection he made between protest and __ threat works itself out on governments as well as struggle against the restrictions of the White Pa- — on nations, even when those nations believe in per is similar in form to what he sawas the con- _liberal ideals.

nection between protest and the rescue of Jews. Nonetheless, it is clear that public pressure Just as the logic of real struggle was definitive,in does not disappear even in time of crisis. Demohis eyes, concerning the role that protest played — cratic governments tend to protect themselves in the Yishuv’s and the Jewish world’s reactionto — through emergency legislation, deliberate misinthe White Paper, so the logic of rescue andallthat | formation, and censorship. Thus, the British did was involved with it were, as far as he was con- _ their utmost to withhold or blur any information cerned, the main criterion in deciding how to they felt could have incited the Yishuv, the Jews in alert world opinion to the annihilation of Jews in the free world, or those same sectors of British

Europe. and American society that were sympathetic to

The analogy between these two definitive the Jews. I have already mentioned the way inforjunctures is not complete, however. Unlikeinthe |= mation was withheld about the illegal immigraperiod during which the Yishuv struggled against — tion ships Milos, Pacific, and Atlantic. This patthe White Paper, on the eve of the war and at its — tern was adopted by the British on many other outset the Yishuv was unable to utilize aggressive issues as well. Thus, the Mandatory censor deleted

activism of the kind proposed by Ben-Gurion — the following incendiary phrases from Bento counteract the policies of the White Paper. | Gurion’s speech at the special meeting of the NaIndeed, in everything concerning the rescue of tional Assembly on 30 November: “one huge JewJews, Ben-Gurion was not an “activist” in the _ ishbattlefield... rescind the criminal order... your narrow sense of the word, for the simple reason. —_ own hands will be covered with Jewish blood.”¢

that rescue in all its forms depended almost ex- Ben-Gurion’s definitions of the term “strugclusively on the goodwill of the United Statesand gle” were not created by a linguist, whose main

Britain, whereas the struggle against the White _activity consists in studying the meaning of Paper involved a direct confrontation with — words, nor by a logician, even though BenBritain. As we shall see, Ben-Gurion’s brand of | Gurion was a man whose behavior was based on activism was much more secretive and complex. logic. They were forged in the heat of activity and

Ben-Gurion’s stance on the issue of protest argument; in other words, operational needs was also affected by the weighty fact that the demanded these definitions, which had to be power of protest is weakened in time of war. The = modified frequently. He supported struggle, or main objective of protest activity is to engender __ the use of “words” in struggle, if he felt that they public pressure directed at governments. How- —_ could influence what the gentiles would do. ever, in time of crisis even the most democratic (What they did was very important to him, as was governments are more elitist or oligarchic and —_ what they said if this hinted at what they would

80

Protest

subsequently do.) He himself resorted to verbal = of Europe and the efforts being made to rescue protest on many occasions—even during the — them. He was not always successful in this effort. Holocaust—in the hope that he could convince —_ Usually those who wanted to increase the level of Britain and the United States to rescue the Jews. protest were the ones who came out on top.

Nevertheless, it is still possible, at this early While discussing the testimony of the exstage, to see that Ben-Gurion was reserved about — change group, the JAE was already considering overestimating the power of protest. His main —_ various means of protest suitable for its public. point was that the outcome ofa war cannotbede- — Most of the proposals were later called “constructermined solely by words, congresses, and rallies. __ tive steps,” including lengthening the workday, He preferred to focus his major efforts on other = and. a few involved various types of protest activmeans. Moreover, even at this early stage, and __ity, such as demonstrations, distribution of inlater with the establishment of the Rescue Com- _—‘ formation, holding days of mourning, and mittee, he was already able to discern the limits of | protest in the Yishuv.’” On the other hand, there his power and that of the JAE. Neither he nor the — were also those who proposed concentrating on

constitutional body he headed had the ability to “helping the living.” Someone suggested temleave any significant stamp on the character of __ porarily shelving the need to protest in order to protest activity. Feelings ran high and protest was __ collect material on the situation and quietly pass a grassroots means of expression, both inexpen- _it on to the appropriate governments and offices. sive and available to all. Throughout the ranks of | These proposals represented the broad outlines

the Histadrut (General Federation of Labor), ofthe debate that continued throughout the war. within the political parties,andamongtheimmi- _—_At the conclusion of the discussions (22 Novemgrant organizations the question of how to re- _— ber 1942), the Committee of Four, which became spond, how to protest, was on everyone’s mind. the Committee of Five when it added Dr. Bernard

EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH Joseph (Dov Joseph, adviser and secretary of the JAE’s Political Department), was entrusted with

PROTEST PATTERNS formulating proposals for action—including Every division of the Yishuv’s multifaceted quasi- protest—and presenting these to the JAE.

government felt itself entitled and committed to These preliminary discussions took place in decide on the form its mourning and protest | an atmosphere of outrage typical of the first days would take. This situation continued throughout —_ following the official announcement of Jewish the war. Ben-Gurion was aware of the abundance annihilation. There were already signs of growing of administrative bodies and authorities, as well | public discontent, which blamed the Yishuv leadas of the deep-seated feelings that churned that — ership for collaborating in a “conspiracy of sipersonal and organizational whirlpool. He un- _ lence” with regard to events in Europe (this was

derstood that his own task in designing the probably due to the public’s lack of information protest was limited; from the very beginning he rather than a misreading of available informahad his doubts about the efficacy of protest. He tion). It was the kind of criticism that went on made do, therefore, by maneuvering betweenthe | even within the ranks of the Mapaz itself. It is poswants and needs of the various parties. Hisinter- _ sible, then, that public pressure and confusion on est was twofold: to adapt the pattern of protest to the part of the leadership are sufficient explanathe character of Yishuv society as heenvisionedit tions for the changes that took place immediately and, more important, to define the boundariesof after the statement; for example, a prior decision protest so that the latter did not endanger other __ to holda single day of mourning was changed to important activity or interfere with aidtotheJews a three-day official period of mourning.°

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Confronting the Information

On 27 November 1942 the National Council protest meetings, which contradicted the com-

presented its decision on arrangements for mon belief that they were indifferent to these mourning. There would be protest meetings, a events. Third, ethnic and national origins were sit-down strike, hunger strikes, and public prayer — weighty issues in the Yishuv hierarchy during the meetings. These varied activities were adoptedto | Holocaust. Ethnicity was instrumental in formsuit the pluralistic nature of the Yishuv’s pop- __ ing the Rescue Committee. It was also one of the

ulation.!° Ben-Gurion did not participate in the reasons for the importance of this committee. discussions held on 22-27 November. He was Gruenbaum headed this committee, and his cominvited to all the meetings but only agreed to _ plaints regarding representation according to the speak at the main event involving the three-day __ origins of immigration at the protest rallies were mourning period!! and to participate in the JAE —_ to boomerang with a vengeance (see chapter 3).

debate the day before. Dov Joseph and Yitzhak On 30 November 1942 the three days of Gruenbaum, members of the Committee of Five, | mourning began. A special meeting of the reported on a series of demonstrations that had — Elected Assembly was attended by the JAE, the , already been held in order to convey the Yishuv’s __ chief rabbis, representatives of the settlements, outrage to the rest of the world. These included: — and local authorities. Also present were representelegraphing information to the JAE’s offices in _tatives of the diplomatic consulates in Manda-

London and the United States; publishing a call tory Palestine. The prayer “All-Merciful God” plea to the pope; an attempt by Hadassah leader ~— was said after Ben-Gurion’s speech, and the Henrietta Szold to reach Eleanor Roosevelt, the |= meeting ended with an oath that the Yishuv USS. president’s wife; and a call plea to the Jewsof = would not remain silent or inactive. The assemEurope. Ben-Gurion outlined what he believed __ bly also published a manifesto calling on the Alhad to be done to rescue Jews, especially children. —_ lies and Jews worldwide to rescue and avenge the

He also mentioned the issues he was going to death of innocent Jews.'!* Ben-Gurion’s speech at raise in his speech to the Elected Assembly the __ that gathering and the assembly’s manifesto had

following day. included similar principles, ending with a deGruenbaum, offended by the fact that no ——- mand addressed to the “world’s nations, leaders

representative from the former Polish Jewish and allies all! Allow not the shedding of our community had been invited to give a speech, —_blood.’'? The final two days saw gatherings threatened to boycott the rally—even though the |= among all the local authorities. The last day was latter was organized to protest the “annihilation devoted to fasting and prayer. All entertainment of the Jews of Poland.” If this was not remedied, — was canceled. Transportation ground to a halt threatened Gruenbaum, he would not take partin —_and all industrial activity not essential to the war the protest meeting. Ben-Gurion tried to appease effort was terminated at midday.

his colleague but rejected his claims, insisting that “A N EASY ESCAPE FROM THE SADNESS the “tragedy of the Jews of Poland is the tragedy of

us all.” Ben-Gurion himself had been born in the AND BITTERNESS THAT HAD Polish town of Plonsk and the JAE had several ACCUMULATED WITHIN US Polish-born Jews among its leadership. Following three days of mourning, there was genThis would have been of no importance were eral consensus that the events had indeed reflected it not for three facts. First, even at the height of the the special feelings of the Yishuv. There was a difoutcry, there was plenty of this kind of bickering. _ ference of opinion as to whether all available Second, community leaders were waging a con- means of protest had been exploited, given that the stant struggle for their own personal statusinthe —_ danger was not over and was unprecedented in the

82

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annals of human history. Atasummary meeting _ the Allied leaders to arouse world public opinion

of the JAE, Gruenbaum said that protest was by way of press conferences and organized very important, adding that “mutual Jewish and demonstrations. In contrast, David Werner SenPolish protest, or a general strike, might have —_ ator, representative of the non-Zionists in the

slowed down, or even put a halt to, the mas- | JAE, who had earlier opposed the proposed sacres.”'4 Eliyahu Berlin (a member of the Na- _ protest activity, now claimed that thus far it was _ tional Council, which was also represented atthe |= measured and appropriate to the situation.

meeting) agreed that protest activity should Ben-Zvi was very reserved despite the fact continue and that large-scale demonstration — that he headed the National Council, the body should be held in Palestine, the United States, usually responsible for various kinds of protest and South Africa. He proposed holding aninter- _ activity and demonstrations. According to him, national Jewish day of protest and suggested the “there was no value at this time to demonstrapossibility of declaring a day of mourning every __ tions in Palestine, nor did they have any effect.”

Thursday to remind the world of the tragedy Rather than conduct protests, it would be more

confronting the Jewish people. effective to promote activity that rescued Jews. _ The view that protest activity should con- —- He suggested, for example, that a commitment tinue was shared by other participants at the — be demanded of Britain and the United States to meeting. Dobkin proposed having a book pub- _ evacuate Jewish refugees from the neutral counlished in various languages and distributed tries immediately after the war so as not bea burworldwide that recounted the horrors. David Re- den on them. In this respect Ben-Zvi and Benmez, one of the more outspoken supporters of | Gurion took a very similar position. increasing protest activity, called for shifting the At this meeting Ben-Gurion repeatedly reemphasis to protest in the United States. He pro- ferred to issues relating to the rescue of Jews posed sending a delegation from the Yishuv to —_ and remained constant concerning his position

83

Confronting the Information

on the matter of protest. He stressed the At a meeting of his Mapai party, BenYishuv’s duty to “do everything possible and § Gurion reemphasized his reservations concernnot to say in advance that there is no hope to __ ing the Yishuv’s response. He did agree that the rescue |Jews].” He warned against the “kind of protest had been both morally and politically protest activity that would supply an easy es- _ correct, inwardly and especially outwardly, in cape from the sadness and bitterness that had __its aim to alert the Jewish people and world

accumulated within us.” The three days of — public opinion. Nonetheless, he continued to mourning had been “something great,’ “anim- — warn that protest activity could not, in his portant response,’ but they lacked the “neces- opinion, reflect what it did not contain: “If this sary Zionist aspect” because the admittedly aw- is the be-all and end-all of [our response], not ful tragedy of the Jews of Poland was no more __ to be repeated—much of its value will be inthan a symptom of the problem that he hadre- __ valid. “Ben-Gurion went on to explain what ferred to in his speech at the protest rally: the —_ had to be done and how he viewed the culture anomaly of the Jewish nation. Again he re- __ of protest: “What has to happen [now] is not a peated his basic position: acts of protest should repeat of the same thing but rather activity trigbe weighed according to their contribution to __ gered by the horror.”

advancing the basic solution to the problem, Ben-Gurion rejected the decision to instill a which would consist in a homeland for the Jew- religious note in future protest activity, a proish people, political power, and independence. __ posal that had been supported by the majority of It was the root of the problem that needed im- __ the leadership during preliminary discussions. mediate attention and not its offshoots. Even §_ Many of these individuals later realized that reliwhen Jews register their protest, the fact re- | gious keening was not appropriate to the largely

mains that they are “in an inferior position, | secular Yishuv. But Ben-Gurion had other having to appeal to Roosevelt to carry out thoughts regarding the involvement of God. [their] mission and never knowing for sure — Rabbi Isaac Halevy Herzog, the Yishuv’s Ashke-

whether or not he will.” nazic chief rabbi, had said at the protest rally that Ben-Gurion also feared that even individu- —_ the Holocaust was God’s punishment for Israel’s

als or units from within the leadership might sins. Ben-Gurion, refusing to accept the connecexaggerate the importance of protest. Atthe end tion between the Holocaust and sins supposedly of the meeting he therefore supported only | committed by the people of Israel, lashed out at Dobkin’s proposal to publish a “book of hor- —_ Rabbi Herzog: “I am neither observant, nor am | rors, translated into a variety of languages and §=amember ofthe Mizrahi party, and I am also not distributed in large quantities throughout Pales- _ tied to the rabbis—I was ashamed of Rabbi Hertine and abroad. In publishing the book, the JAE —_zog’s speech at the rally.”

did not deviate from its established pattern of re- In order to expand the circle of people who sponse.'6 Ben-Gurion’s concept was clearly ex- | found Rabbi Herzog’s sentiments distasteful, pressed in his letters to JAE branches in London Ben-Gurion referred to Rabbi Fishman-Maimon, and New York. He stressed that it wasindeedim- __ one of the leaders of the Mizrahi party, recalling portant to motivate public opinion to put pres- _ the latter’s sharp attack against Rabbi Herzog in sure on governments, but it was also necessaryto —_an article he published in Bamishor. Fishmantake firm action in the form of real rescue at- | Maimon wrote, “It isa major sin to try to connect tempts rather than noncommittal declarationsof the Holocaust to sins that Jews have or have not

support. Here, too, Ben-Gurion distinguished | committed.” Ben-Gurion believed that Rabbi

between words and actions.!” Fishman-Maimon’s article was proof that Rabbi 84

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Confronting the Information

Herzog’s speech was not representative of the re- —_ cornerstone of Zionist ideology is blamed for the

ligious community. '8 delay in internalizing the fact that Jews were beA ZIONIST SOLUTION, OR TAKING ing slaughtered in Europe. immediately after the ADVANTAGE OF THE TRAGEDY? news of the annihilation taking place in Europe was made public, the claim was heard that the At the Mapai debate Ben-Gurion also com- _—_ Zionist leadership’s insensitivity was, in part, the plained that the protest events did not haveadis- __ result of this “Diaspora denial,” which played a tinctive Zionist character: “Never before has the central role in shaping thought patterns in the tragedy of the Jewish people been revealed asthe —_Yishuv. The Zionist movement, said some critics, tragedy of so small a minority, a nation lacking —_ sunk together with its Zionist “narrow” objecindependence, lacking a homeland,” and it was tives, based them and their realization on “Diasfor this very reason that there was no needtofear —_ pora denial,” so that it did not “see,” nor was there

and to go out and stress the fact that only the = any chance that it would “see” anything but Zionist movement was offering a fundamental — them. Here you have a simple explanation for all

solution to the problems of the Jews.!% the past and present sins of Zionism. These were no empty words. Ben-Gurion Ben-Gurion understood that all these claims was referring to the fear, already prevalent in _ constituted a kind of lightweight and comfortthose days, that the Zionist movement might be —_ able “weapon” in the hands of those opposing the

trying to make political hay out of the plight of | Zionists from within and without the Yishuv. It the Jews of Europe. This claim was already being = was much harder ideologically to explain that used both by the Right and the Left to attack the = “Diaspora denial” did not, in fact, mean leaving political center. Ben-Gurion was unabashed by _ the Diaspora to its own devices. It was even more the attacks, which gradually became fiercer, and ___ difficult to explain how it was possible to main-

continued to stress that the tragedy in Europe tain a “Diaspora denial” ideology while doing was only sharpening the necessity for a Zionist | everything possible to rescue Jews who were still

solution. living in the Diaspora. Nevertheless, Ben-Gurion

Ben-Gurion was criticized mainly by those — encouraged his colleagues not to recoil from the who believed that his call fora fundamental and criticism, which he saw as unfounded, and called long-term solution to the plight ofthe Jewishna- —_ on them to push forward with the Zionist solution necessarily meant opposition to rescue ac- __ tion in the face of the Holocaust.

tivity from which the Zionist movement would The protest issue was discussed by the not benefit in the short term. We shall see that §_Yishuv leadership throughout December 1942. Ben-Gurion actually did support activity that | By mid-December, following the three days of did not always benefit the Zionist movement, |= mourning, it had already been decided to hold a and did not direct Jews to Palestine, althoughthe = much larger and longer-lasting event—a month movement did, of course, aim at maintainingthe | of mourning. In the background there was a existence of communities that it movement — growing public demand for a sharper response. hoped to liberate; he could certainly be “ac- = Information continued to stream in about events cused” of such “nationalistic particularism,” but —_in Europe. The one item that attracted the most not of “Palestinocentrism,” which meant prefer- — attention said that Himmler had issued an unring the needs of the Yishuv over those of the | ambiguous order to annihilate the remainder of

Jewish nation. the Jewish community in Poland and Jews in the The fear of Palestinocentrism was also areas of the Reich in Austria, Germany, and linked ideologically to “Diaspora denial.’ This | Czechoslovakia by 1 January 1943. It was decided

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that the month of mourning would be held be- referring to the rescue of Jews. He was thus

tween December and January.” obliged to issue a further statement announcing EDEN’S ANNOUNCEMENT that, apart from punishing the guilty parties, the

Allied governments would also take concrete On 17 December 1942, one day before the com- measures to rescue Jews. Gruenbaum therefore mencement of the month of mourning, Anthony _ proposed that the JAE refer publicly to the Allies’ Eden, Britain’s foreign secretary, informed Par- commitment to help with rescue operations. Dr. liament on behalf of the Allied countries that “the Joseph, secretary of the Political Department, German authorities were no longer content with = was aware of the sensitiveness of the issues denying the Jews basichuman rightsinthecoun- _— involved and recalled the response of Josef tries under the barbaric control of the Nazis. | Goebbels, the Nazi propaganda minister, who They were now carrying out Hitler’s oft-declared claimed that the Allies’ declaration was one more intention to annihilate the Jews of Europe.” He sign of their knuckling under to the “Jewish plot,” said that the Allies condemned these acts and _ proving that the Allies were fighting a “Jewish promised punishment for the culprits. The de- —_ war” in the service of the Jews.

bate ended with the entire assembly rising to its Goebbels’s response expressed one of the feet and observing a moment of silence toexpress Nazis’ favorite propaganda methods: manipulatits solidarity with the Jews. A similar debate took ing the anti-Semitic sentiments inherent in all place in the House of Lords and astatement was __ the free nations. Throughout the war the Nazis published the same day in the Allied press and constantly repeated that this was not a war for

over the radio.?! world freedom but one fought on behalf of the

This followed the news of Jews being annihi- Jews. Thus, Joseph opposed Gruenbaum’s prolated in Europe andthe ensuing storminLondon _ posal to issue a response to the Allies’ statement, and the United States, where Jewish and non- _ arguing that it was significant all by itself and that Jewish persons and organizations called on their nothing should be added to it.4

political representatives to take a stand on the is- Ben-Gurion believed that no JAE declarasue. With events following each other in rapid __ tion was necessary, although his reasoning was succession, the impression was formed that the different. He believed that if the Yishuv concenstatement came in the wake of pressure on the _ trated on protest activity, this would be at the expart of the Yishuv.”2 A joint communiqué issued __ pense of rescue activity. The London branch of by the JAE and the National Councilimmediately — the JAE had already published a statement fol-

after Eden’s statement mentioned that the lowing that of the Allied governments. The decYishuv’s outcry toppled the walls of silence sur- _laration had also been published in the Yishuv, so rounding the terrible slaughter perpetrated by there was no further need to stress what was blaHitler against the Jews.“ It was convenient forthe tantly obvious, namely, that “at long last Israel’s

supporters of active protest in the Yishuv to outrage had been registered.”

maintain such a connection. Clearly Ben-Gurion was convinced that if Eden’s statement was discussed three days the declaration issued by the Allied powers exlater by the JAE. Although the statement was wel- _ pressed a process of reevaluation of their position comed, the JAE decried the fact that no mention on aid and rescue of the Jews, it was best to take was made of the rescue of Jews. Gruenbaum pro- _full advantage of this opportunity by demanding posed publishing an additional response, calling —_an increase in aid rather than attempting to exon the Allies to clarify their position. Inthe Allied tract amended declarations. Ben-Gurion also becountries themselves Eden was criticized for not _ lieved in the importance and moral weight of the

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Confronting the Information

Yishuv's protest activity and that it was instru- —_ based on the anti-Semitic theory that made it posmental in motivating the Allies to issue theirdec- _ sible to blackmail “the Jew” by threatening to exlaration. He held firm to his positiononthe merit _ pose his so called true character. Ben-Gurion was of real rescue activity, and after his speech thede- _so far from this anti-Semitic stereotype that it was bate turned to this issue. This approach was ex- impossible to blackmail him. This affair therefore

pressed in JAE decisions: whereas four clauses expressed the resistance of self-respecting Jews dealt with rescue operations, only onereferredto against anti-Semites. But it was made quite clear protest, and here, too, Ben-Gurion’s position that too vigorous a protest against the Poles might prevailed and the Executive left it to the National — endanger any future rescue activity, which would Council to decide on further demands regarding _ have been impossible without the cooperation of Eden’s statement,”> which the National Council __ the Poles.

did the following day.” Those who claimed that, at least on the quesTHE POLISH THREAT tion of protest, the Yishuv had considerable freedom of movement were clearly mistaken. Even a At the end of December 1942, a new aspect devel- government-in-exile—whose power was so infe-

oped in the debate surrounding the Yishuv’s rior to that of sovereign states, such as the neutral protest activity. Annoyed at the accusatory tone — countries, not to mention powers such as the directed at the Polish people, the Polish govern- United States and Great Britain—was able to ment-in-exile in London tried to placethe blame curb the Yishuv’s freedom of movement when it for events in Europe on the JAE. Stanislaw Kott, | came to protest activity. At that time the extent to a senior minister in the Polish government-in- — which the Allies would have reconciled themexile and a close associate of its prime minister, —_ selves to Jewish protest in the free world without Wladislaw Sikorsky, was in Palestine at the time — a similar response to the aggressive protest of the for talks with Yishuv leaders, including Moshe _ Poles could only have been assumed.

Kleinbaum (Sneh), Avraham Stupp, Anshel Reiss Although Ben-Gurion was not put off by and Eliahu Epstein (Ealth) of the Political De- Kott’s outspoken threats, he was probably both-

partment. He met Ben-Gurion twice. ered by the hidden threat in the Pole’s words, Kott found himself discussing potential res- | namely, the fear that Poland would withhold its cue activity on the part of his government inoc- — cooperation in saving the Jews. The reasoning cupied Poland, while facing criticism against the — behind the cautious line of protest was to prevent Polish nation and his government-in-exile. Kott, such a situation from even arising.”8 Jewish nawho was sick of what he referred to as Jewish ag- _ tional pride, which Ben-Gurion certainly had in gression against the Poles, threatened to publicize © abundance, did not have the power to force the certain activities of the Jewish police (probably a Poles to help. He therefore rejected proposals to reference to the cruelty of some members of the _ increase protest activity, making do, for the time Judenrat toward the Jews themselves), broadly _ being, with those that had been planned.”

hinting that such information could make a very Harold MacMichael, the high commisbad impression on the rest of the world. To Ben- _ sioner, was among those who “recommended” Gurion this was blackmail, and he responded by __ that the Yishuv observe restraint. He realized that saying that “we do not have to beg them not to _ overt protest activity might result in the leadermake things public. It does not change...the — ship losing control ofits population, which could

facts. Every nation has its own quislings.”’ lead to actual armed conflict with the British. By The threat to go public concerning the evil — issuing their White Paper policies, the British doings of some Jews in occupied Europe was __ leaders hoped to instill peace within the Arab

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Protest

community in the Middle East and peaceamong _ Criticism was hurled at Ben-Gurion and other the Muslims in North Africa and India. There members of the Yishuv leadership from all sides, was now a growing fear that the pain and frustra- regardless of political affiliation.*!

tion of the Jews might complicate this plan, CRITICISM IN THE MAPAI which was based on the assumption that the Jews were in Britain’s pocket anyway because of their = The sharpest criticism relating to public protest

mutual war with Hitler. activity was hurled at Ben-Gurion and the other With respect to the special protest session, | Mapai members of the JAE by the second and MacMichael wrote that he sympathized with the __ third benchers of their own party. The rescue isYishuv and the Jewish nation and expressed his sue was discussed at length at a Mapai meeting own fear and disgust, as well as that of the civi- held on 10 February 1943, three months following lized world, at the atrocities committed by the — the news from Europe. Ben-Gurion was attacked

Nazis. MacMichael also reminded the Yishuv for “not showing maximum concern for this that the Allies were committed to “freeing the = matter.” It was also argued that his own and his world from oppression and to arouse its con- _ colleagues’ activity in London and the United science.” He called on the Yishuv to avoid “excite- States “is governed by some general characterisment,” “hasty acts,” and “tears,” urgingittoadopt __ tic of intelligence and understanding that is not a line of “patient and outraged persistence,’ co- | compatible with the huge tragedy.”

operation, and to work “heart and soul for vic- Abraham Haft, a fund-raising activist intory.’30 The sanctimoniousness and arrogance of volved in the enterprise known as Koffer Hay-

his tone was obvious. ishuv (redemption for the Yishuv) explained that Throughout the month of mourning debate _he, too, did not know if public response “was or continued on the protest issue. Changes were ap- _ was not of value,” but he stressed that “for the parent in the debate’s international and internal —_ Jews this was the only concern .. . the only thing political aspects; new arguments were added __ that can give anything to Zionism.” The Yishuv both by those who held that expressions of pro- —- must therefore accelerate its protest activity and test were too moderate and those who considered _ not silently accept the denials and evasions of the the protests to have been too hysterical. It was Jews of the United States regarding outspoken claimed that the protest had been too organized _protest.?* Haft’s example was that the JAE did not and ritualistic where it should have been sponta- put sufficient pressure on the Allied powers to neous. Complaints were lodged that the burden _ force the authorities in the liberated areas of was not being shared fairly, and that certain sec- North Africa to reinstate the rights of the local tors were being forced to shoulder most of the — Jews. No protest was heard there. Since “tomorstrikes. Others believed that the protest activity | row could see the liberation of Bulgaria, Romawas endangering the Yishuv’s relations with the |= nia—who’s to guarantee that anti-Jewish leg-

British and promoting conflicts with the Arabs; _islation is not continued there, too, after there was a risk of sliding into extremist behavior, __ liberation?”

which would play into the hands of the Yishuv’s The JAE is divided, Haft went on, “and must radical political fringe. On the one hand, people __ be freed of the negative influence of Gruenbaum were claiming that the overly moderate protest | and Joseph... governed by a kind of skeptical faactivity was damaging fund-raising effortsforaid — talism. . . . [S]ome serious change must take and rescue operations, while, on the other hand, _ place.” He did not notice that his own words con-

there were claims that the outspoken protests tained a very Palestinocentric note; he was not were harming actual aid and rescue attempts. | worried about the effect protest activity could

89

Confronting the Information

have on the actual rescue of Jews, believing as he Moreover, Ben-Gurion was probably more did that protest “was the only thing that can give —_ aware than anyone of the Yishuv’s real strength in

anything to Zionism.”>4 the international arena—or, to be more precise, its Golda Meir (Meyerson), who at that time _ limitations, especially in wartime. He knew that he was a member of Histadrut ExecutiveCommittee —_ had to lead the Yishuv and his movement through and its Political Department, tried to be reassur- _ this mazelike reality even if the task seemed quite ing by saying that it would bea bad thing tocon- — unappealing during such terrible times. He had to centrate on useless arguments. Meir called fora | put up with Gruenbaum’s hurt feelings, public discussion of the financial side of rescue activity, | servants demanding representation in all the varipointing out the uncomfortable connection be- _— ous bodies and organizations in the Yishuv, and so

tween protest and fund-raising. Playing down on. protest activity and the secret rescue operations When the muse inspired him, he used his might harm efforts at raising desperately needed — own inimitable rhetoric to remind his attackers of funds; by its very nature protest activity arouses _ this duality.>” His colleagues were displeased. They

sympathy and increases one’s willingness tocon- did not like to hear that they, together with the tribute, so that publicizing realaidand rescue ac- _ general public, were enflamed by banal matters of tivity could only benefit fund-raising efforts to _daily reality. Their criticism was largely the result

finance these activities.*° of ignorance of the facts, frustration based on Eliezer Kaplan, one of Mapai’s leaders, JAE _ helplessness, and an unenlightened emotional

treasurer, and close associate of Ben-Gurion, state. firmly rejected the bitter tone and the accusations.

He presented the difficulties and laid out possible OSCILLATING BETWEEN HOPE AND courses of action. Ben-Gurion avoided polemic, al- DISAPPOINTMENT: THE BERMUDA though the attacks were aimed mostly at himself. CONFERENCE AND ORGANIZED

He stressed in detail what had been done in various PROTEST fields. In response to Haft, he presented a decision _A¢ the beginning of spring 1943, the Yishuv beadopted by the secretariat: “Clarifications would = Game aware of the fact that the governments of be made regarding public and political activity vis- Britain and the United States were planning to a-vis the tragedy in Palestine and abroad.” He ap- convene a special conference to discuss possible peared to be trying to express his understanding of solutions to the “immigrant problem.” This fol-

the public's stormy frame of mind.” lowed hot on the heels of Eden’s statement of DeIn February 1943 there were three rescue — cember 1942, which was received in the Yishuv plans waiting to be put into action: two basedon —with_mixed emotions. It was also a time when ransom and a third aimed at the rescue of chil- many feelers were being sent out with regard to dren. All three relied heavily on help from the in- large-scale rescue operations. The confusing realternational powers, without which they would ity of the times and the leadership’s restricted freehave been impossible to carry out. They were — dom of movement resulted in a tendency to grab

based on tenuous cooperation between the at anything that might signal a change for the betYishuv, the Americans, and the British. Ben- ter. Gurion, Kaplan, and others in the Yishuv leader- News of the conference was received with ship knew that unrestrained protest activity would mixed feelings. The hope that its intentions were jeopardize this cooperation. Ben-Gurion and Ka- serious was accompanied by the fear that it was plan were aware of all these possibilities at a time —_ittle more than a ruse. The press was similarly di-

when they were under attack from their parties. vided. The Observer, for example, headlined the

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Protest

event as “The Bermuda Conference—A Cruel no negotiations with the Nazis; for example, it

Mockery.”38 was forbidden to negotiate on ransom plans at The conference opened on 19 April 1943. the very time that the “Europa Plan” was being Most historians now believe that it was convened considered. The conference did not recommend in order to soothe public opinion in Britain and = warning Germany a second time regarding the the United States. In Britain the publicdemanded _—_ annihilation of Jews; nor did it decide to ask for that real action be taken in order to save the Jews help from the Vatican or find it necessary to ask being slaughtered in Europe, seeing the confer- —_— the neutral countries for help in accommodating ence as no more than a public relations “trick.” In —_ escaping refugees in return for a promise that the hindsight everyone remained convinced that this Allies would reward their efforts after the victory.

conference, like the Evian Conference, should To complete the subterfuge, it was publicly never have taken place. In this view, there wasno _hinted that positive conclusions were being kept difference between the skeptics and those who under a cloak of secrecy. It is clear from all this earlier had had high hopes. The conferenceended _ that the final decision was to do nothing out of a with nothing having been resolved. The Allies _ fear that any rescue plans would use up resources

now believed that “these people are in a state necessary to accomplish the main objective—to where they cannot be saved,’ and that, according = win the war as soon as possible.*! This policy was

to Britain’s secretary for internal affairs, the — perfectly logical from an operational-military United Nations can do virtually nothing for the — standpoint, but it often tended to provide an ex-

masses under Hitler’s control.*” cuse for evading aid and rescue activity that actuIn terms of its conclusions, the Bermuda __ ally did not jeopardize the primary aim of overConference also resembled the Evian Confer- —_ throwing Hitler.

ence. The problem was not merely a Jewish one With respect to protest activity, the conferbut of refugees in general, and it was impossible — ence hada mixed influence. News of the impendto extend help to everyone. There wasalsoarein- | ing Bermuda Conference encouraged the Yishuv

carnation of the Intergovernmental Committee — to place greater emphasis on protest activity. on Refugees (IGCR), which had been convened —= While there were calls for increased activity in during the Evian Conference.“ One positive con- this area, there were also claims that the conferclusion emerged from the Bermuda Conference: ence proved that even moderate protest was it was decided to establish acampin North Africa —_ proving fruitful and that the Yishuv should now for refugees who escaped to Spain, in the hope __ wait to see how things developed.”

that if refugees were to leave Spain, Franco’s gov- Those calling for increased protest activity ernment might be encouraged to take in other __ included the Revisionists, the Hashomer Hatzair

refugees instead. movement, members of Po’alei Zion Left, and the The other conclusions were mainly negative —_ ultra-Orthodox Agudat Israel party. Most were and were kept secret for fear of angering public —in opposition to the leadership and remained

opinion: no ships could be allotted for taking | unaware of the secret rescue attempt being refugees out of Europe; no food consignments — discussed by the former. They probably also could be sent to areas under Nazi control; there —_ attached less importance to the need for mainwas to be no negotiating with Nazisregardingthe taining friendly relations with the Allies on the fate of civilians. Thus, the Bermuda Conference ___ rescue issue.

repeated the decision of the Casablanca Confer- Public pressure on this issue affected memence held the previous February: the “uncondi- _ bers of the JAE to varying degrees. As chairman tional surrender” policy allowed for absolutely of the Rescue Committee, Gruenbaum was more

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exposed than his colleagues to public opinion, — Kaplan, Shapira, and others on the various aswhich remained perplexed as to why there wasin- _ pects of rescue activity. In the end, Gruenbaum’s sufficient protest activity.Gruenbaum wasunable _ proposal was rejected. At this stage the Executive to supply information on all the classified plans = managed to stand up to public pressure and not and activities being carried out at the time, while —_ change its policies.

still having to convince his colleagues that the THE PROS AND CONS OF PETITIONS Executive was receptive to their opinions. As a

member of the Executive, he was exposed to con- AND PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS tradictory claims and to the repercussions in- _ Echoes of public unrest at the Executive’s decivolved in increasing protest activity from the sion were heard at the JAE meeting on 11 April point of view of the British and the Americans. 1943. Gruenbaum had returned to the Rescue Thus, caught between opposing interests, Gruen- Committee, where he was urged by his colleagues baum concluded that the imminent arrival ofthe _ not to give up and to continue pressing their deconference required an escalation in protest activ- | mands for increased protest activity. This time he ity. The Rescue Committee was demanding ade- —_—_ was more successful. He told them that the Res-

cision on new requests: a general strike; mass cue Committee had been entrusted with prepardemonstrations in Jerusalem opposite the high ing a memo to be presented at the Bermuda Concommissioner's palace; and demands presented _ ference. There was also a proposal to recruit the

to the high commissioner himself. support of British MPs sympathetic to the Heading the opposition to increased protest —_Yishuv’s struggle.4

activity was Eliezer Kaplan, who had just re- Gruenbaum’s tone reflected his bitterness turned from Istanbul, where he had studied the _ after the Executive rejected all proposals to escafeasibility of rescuing Jews from occupied Eu- _late the Yishuv’s protest activity. He said it was rope. He was well aware of the possibilities and —_ time the Yishuv considered the wishes of a body the difficulties. He believed that there wasnoreal _it had itself established, a broad representation of practical or political valueto demonstrationsand _all the circles in the Yishuv entrusted with disstrikes, since these were unable to bring about a _ cussing issues such as the one before them. He change in Britain’s position. “However bitter the — did indeed realize that “the petition would not feeling,” Kaplan told his colleagues, the leader- _ save us [but if] such a petition does not help, it ship must discuss the issue “from the point of | woulddono harm.” He called on the JAE to reject

view of practical and political benefits.” its policy of refusal and to listen to the public. His Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, chairman of the National |= demands focused on setting up a petition and Council and leading member of Mapai, warned convening a mass protest rally. against “anarchy,” a reference to the loss of control As the debate proceeded, it became obvious of the public, especially the extreme Revisionist that the Executive was split between the two procircles. Mizrahi leader Rabbi Yehuda Fishman- _posals: rejection of the petition and acceptance of Maimon was constant in his opposition to in- _ the protest rally idea. It was a slow process that creased protest activity. Werner Senator, repre- _ ripened during the weeklong interval between senting the non-Zionists in the Executive, even the two meetings. Ben-Gurion, too, agreed that threatened to go to the media to oppose any deci- __— the two proposals should remain separate. He sion to increase such activity, thereby eliciting a | adopted Ben-Zvi’s reasoning regarding the po-

reprimand from Ben-Gurion. tential damage presented by a petition: instead of At this particular meeting Ben-Gurion made _ the Yishuv leaders speaking on behalf of the hundo with listening to the debate andthe reportsof — dreds of thousands Jews in Palestine, they would

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Protest

be forced to be spokespersons only for those who — event, which would include members of the signed the petition. He supported the organiza- = Zionist Actions Committee and representatives

tion of a mass rally to take place around thetime | of the Rescue Committee and the National of the Bermuda Conference. Later, at the begin- | Council, among other organizations. Gruenning of 1945, it was again proposed to preparea § baum wanted a Rescue Committee subcommitpetition and to present it to the British; thistime, tee to draw up a memo that would be sent to the too, Ben-Gurion rejected the proposal for the | Bermuda Conference, but Ben-Gurion’s position

same reasons. won out and the Executive decided to entrust the Ben-Gurion tried to reorient the proceed- —_ JAE’s Political Department with the job.””

ings: it would not be a mass demonstration, A week later, the Bermuda Conference was where events are hard to anticipate, but rathera once again on the JAE’s agenda. This time the meeting of the Zionist Actions Committee and __ discussion concerned the political steps necesrepresentatives of other Yishuv organizations. In sary for presenting the Yishuv’s position and this way he hoped to avoid being swayed by ex- __ ways of putting pressure on its participants. Dr.

tremist circles, who were liable to use the pain Joseph reported on a memo that informed Lonand frustration as a platform for attacking the |§ don and New York of the Yishuv’s ability to acYishuv leadership. On the agenda atthatmoment cept ninety-five thousand refugees a year and on was Britain’s “Reconstruction” plan, which Ben- — work in London and the United States on the Gurion saw as blatantly opposed to the efforts of —_ refugee issue.

the Yishuv to establish a strong Jewish commu- Again Gruenbaum found himself in a delinity. This, too, could have contributed to an un- cate situation, wedged between two bodies whose

controlled agitation against the JAE. activity was not coordinated and often seemed Ben-Gurion therefore changed hismindand __ contradictory. He informed his colleagues in the supported a special meeting of the Rescue Com- _JAE that the Rescue Committee had news of the

mittee. Remaining true to his position, he be- imminent destruction of the Krakow ghetto. lieved that any activity, including this one, hadto | Gruenbaum related that the Revisionist reprebe part of an overall struggle organized by the _ sentatives in the committee were insisting that Yishuv and not opposed to it. This was the main they be allowed to demonstrate. Furthermore, reason he wished to remain in control of all — the National Council demanded the right to send protest activity and to direct the form it took. He a telegram to the Bermuda Conference indebelieved that it had to be handled differently from —_ pendent of the JAE’s memo. Agudat Israel, which

the way in which it had previously been con- was represented on the Rescue Committee but ducted: he wanted there to be no keening, no not on the National Council, informed Gruenprayers, but rather concrete demands for action.** baum that if the National Council were to send a The proposal for a petition was rejected, but —_ telegram, it would follow suit, claiming that it it was agreed that the JAE would conveneatadate | would refrain from sending a telegram only if the close to that of the Bermuda Conference. Ben- |= Rescue Committee were to send one on their beGurion, as chairman, had managed to gainassur-_ _ half. A memo from the JAE was not sufficient for ance that the JAE would be responsible for con- —_ Agudat Israel.

vening such a meeting without the intervention In order to appease all sides, Gruenbaum of the National Council or the Rescue Commit- suggested that the JAE entrust him and Dr. tee. He also reserved for himselfthe broadest pos- —_ Joseph with drafting a telegram on behalf of the sible control over internal and external political | Rescue Committee. His proposal aroused oppo-

repercussions that might be generated by the _ sition, and he was once again in trouble. Losing

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Confronting the Information

patience, he insisted that “the fact cannot be ig- National Council published its own list of denored that there is a joint Rescue Committee; it | mands in addition to that sent by the Political can be disbanded but for the time being no one —_— Department.*® Ben-Gurion and his supporters in has suggested this; if it exists, it must be allowed — the JAE were unable to avoid abashment style the

to act.” If the JAE did not wish to influence the | Evian Conference, where a large number of Jewcontents of the telegram, it must accept his pro- _ish organizations had tried to present their deposal regarding a drafting committee. In any |= mands; and this time, in the case of the Bermuda case, he could not avoid sending a telegram on — Conference, the Yishuv leadership could not probehalf of the Rescue Committee andinthename __ vide a single, distinct, clear response.

of all the participating bodies. Indeed, at the very THE AFTERMATH OF THE FAILED moment that Gruenbaum was asking for the

“permission” of the Executive to draft and send BERMUDA CONFERENCE the telegram, the latter had already been com- _As discussions continued on how to present the

posed. Yishuv’s position, the Bermuda Conference Ben-Gurion did not help Gruenbaum. Like _ took place and dispersed without the Yishuv other participants at that meeting, he did not _ having had a chance to take any action. Now the accept what appeared to be an ultimatum (“if _ bickering began over how to react to the concluthere is a representative of ours there”), since it sions. The Bermuda Conference once again

was proposed that Sharett, who was in the demonstrated the real problems of the Jewish United States at the time, would represent the people and the Yishuv. It proved that public JAE at the conference,’ nor does the proposal _ protest, even when most intense, would never that we send telegrams seem effective.” There be able to lift the burden associated with conwas no need to turn the telegram intoademon- _fronting these problems. It also drove home the stration or protest activity. These messages _ futility of all the commotion that took place bewould be transmitted by the Executive toitsrep- — forehand. resentatives, who would disseminate the state- The various sides of the debate did not desert ments of the conference's participants.* Ben- _ their positions, but the interorganizational arguGurion gave the impression that someone had __ ments did die down briefly. The meeting of the promised that Sharett or any other representa- —_ Zionist Actions Committee and other bodies was tive of the Yishuv or the Zionist movement who _ planned by the JAE for 28 April, immediately afarrived in Bermuda would indeed be allowed to _ ter Passover, in the mistaken belief that it would appear before the conference’s participants. In _ precede the Bermuda Conference.*! The National fact, no one had suggested any such thingtoany = Council announced a meeting of the Elected AsJewish organization. Again Ben-Gurion’s posi- _ sembly, and its first plenary meeting would be tion won out, and it was decided to maintaina _—_ decreed a joint meeting of the Elected Assembly moderate stance regarding protest activity and = and the Zionist Actions Committee.

to leave the JAE to handle the rescue issue and The conference convened on 3 May1943 with

Zionist struggle. a speech by Ben-Zvi, who defined his objective in This “victory” was extremely short-lived.” _ terms of “assessing the situation with regard to Ben-Gurion’s maneuvers and intentions did not _ the question of saving Jews in the Nazi diaspora prevent other elements active inthe Yishuv from _ after the congress.” Sharett, who had recently rebypassing the JAE—and Ben-Gurion himself— _ turned from England and the United States, proand acting as they saw fit. In the end, the Rescue _ vided a detailed description of the serious efforts Committee also sent a memo of its own andthe _ being made to pressure governments into help-

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Protest

ing the Jews of Europe; he suggested transform- man of the Rescue Committee, and David Reing “the Bermuda failure into a lever for action.”*= mez, who was one of the heads of the Histadrut A statement published at the end of the con- and the National Council—represented bodies ference expressed the Yishuv’s deep disappoint- that were more exposed to public pressure and ment at the results of the Bermuda Conference — consequently tended to give in more readily.

and the position taken by the enlightened world, There was thus an increase in individual which had replaced the “conspiracy of silence” _ protest activity that, in fact, bypassed the JAE, the with “empty words that would not lead to actsof | Rescue Committee, and the National Council. It rescue.” The congress called on “anyone with a _—_—-was found that avoiding pressure on the great human feeling in his heart not to prevent the pos- —_ powers and the Bermuda Conference actually exsible rescue of the remaining people of Israel” — plained the poor results. Remez, for example, and not to focus on “finding proof that there was again criticized the protest activity and reported nothing to be done” and evading action byclaim- —_ to Mapai’s Political Committee that the Histadrut ing a contradiction between rescue attempts and __ planned to hold a meeting of workers’ committhe war effort. “No country at war,’ the statement tees that would be devoted to “matters of the Diwent on bitterly, “would have behaved thus to- —aspora.” He demanded suitable information on ward the victims of Nazism had it seen those vic- __ the activity planned by the Yishuv, intending to

tims as its own sons.” pass it on to representatives of the workers’ comThe conference repeated its demandtoopen — mittees to prove that the Yishuv leadership was all possible gateways to Jews who had succeeded _ not satisfied merely with “words,” which he pracin escaping, including the Allied countries, the _ tically viewed as “bearing false witness.’*4

neutral nations, and also the gates of the Jewish Of course, Remez and the others had good homeland. The Yishuv leadership never madeits intentions. He proved that even people who were intervention in helping to rescue Jews condi- __ relatively close to the top leadership tended, out tional upon the latter coming to live in Palestine. | of compassion, to come up with hopeless proEven priorities were not Palestinocentric; in fact, | posals. What plans, exactly, did Remez intend to the Jewish Yishuv was the third-choice destina- describe to his colleagues, who were worried over tion for immigration, per Ben-Gurion’s com- _ the fate of their brothers in Europe? Could he ment on 30 November 1942, shortly after the offi- have told them about the secret negotiations cial statement on the annihilation: “Let them aimed at saving the Jews of Romania, Slovakia, into the neutral countries! Let them into your and perhaps the other Jews of Europe? Or that the countries! Let them in here, to our homeland!” neutral countries were contravening the rules of News of the Warsaw ghetto uprising also __ neutrality by allowing rescue agents to operate highlighted the discrepancy between the Yishuv’s _—_ from within their territories? Should he have told

response and the superpowers’ position, on the — them about the relationship between the Yishuv one hand, and the rebels’ struggle, on the other. | emissaries and criminals from the twilight zone Was it not symbolic that the uprising took place between occupied Europe and the neutral counat the same time as the Bermuda Conference? __ tries? Or the fact that Allied agents were prepared The eve of Passover, marking the exodus from __ to defy the ban on passing money into occupied Egypt, also lent a symbolic air to events, with the —_ areas and to close their eyes to forbidden negotiYishuv leadership again under pressure toextend — ations with representatives of Nazi Germany and its protest activity. It is interesting to note that _its satellites? The list of absurdities was endless.

two of the more outspoken proponents of in- Two months earlier the Yishuv had become creased protest—Gruenbaum, who was chair- aware of what had happened when its leaders, no

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Confronting the Information

longer able to bear the pressure, told representa- matter of rescue, in the event that the debate in tives of the public about secret negotiations sur- the [British] parliament does not amend the sitrounding a ransom plan to save the JewsofRoma- _ uation.” It was also stressed that “the job of exenia. Within a week virtuallyevery Romanian-born __ cuting the decision would be given to the JAE and Jew in the Yishuv knew about secret negotiations | National Council” and not to other bodies.%

with the Nazis and Ion Antonescu, the Romanian In discussions held by the JAE at the end of ruler. Remez’s demand, therefore, was certainly | May and during the first half of June, Gruennaive and possibly even stupid. It can be under- — baum reported on “joint and coordinated” prepstood only if the pain and frustration that moti- _—_arations between the National Council and the vated him and others like him are taken into con- _—_—‘JAE in organizing protests in response to “the

sideration. horrors in Poland and the heroism of the Jews in

The results of the Bermuda Conference also the ghettos.” In fact, there was neither cooperacaused unrest among British parliamentarians, tion nor coordination. Each body acted accordwho pressured their government into conduct- __ ing to its own understanding. In the end it was ing a parliamentary debate on the issue.» Three = decided to hold a one-day strike (“Warsaw days before this debate (16 May 1943) the JAE —- Day”), a mass demonstration, and to prepare a considered Gruenbaum’s proposal to precede it _petition.°° with the publication of an appropriate manifesto. Thus, Ben-Gurion was no longer able to After some preliminary argument, Gruenbaum __ keep protest activity under the control of the JAE, achieved a limited victory and his proposal was __and he caved in to public pressure.*! However, adopted. The participants finally realized that if | Gruenbaum managed to wrangle for himself and the Rescue Committee was not taken into ac- —_— Dr. Joseph (of the Political Department) the right

count, it would act on its own initiative. Gruen- to word the petition so that it would include baum and Sharett were entrusted with wording = some of Ben-Gurion’s ideas; since protest was a the manifesto.>* The following day the JAE called _ political tool and should be treated as part of the on Britain’s Parliament to rescind decisions ac- _ overall struggle, the Political Department had to

cepted at the Bermuda Conference.*” be included in wording the petition.

PUBLIC PRESSURE FOR The new direction resulting from this development was clear: the trend was for protest activ-

INCREASED PROTEST ACTIVITY ity gradually to become more extreme and for its The Zionist Actions Committee metin Jerusalem organizers to bypass the leadership and its decithe day before the parliamentary debate to dis- sions. This trend was aided by the anger at the cuss the matter of protest and the most suitable | Bermuda Conference and the difficulty involved way to respond to the Bermuda Conference. in instilling authority on a nonsovereign society. During the meeting criticism was hurled inalldi- | The news of the Warsaw ghetto uprising also inrections— at the JAE, the National Council, and creased dissatisfaction with the disparity bethe Rescue Committee; even within the Zionist tween the heroic struggle of the ghetto fighters Actions Committee it was not at all clearwhode- —_ and the daily routine in the Yishuv.

cided what. On 15 June 1943 the petition was signed by

The bickering continued on the issue of — 253,491 adults. A heartrending children’s version protest activity, with Gruenbaum, Sharett, and __ of the petition was signed by 58,855 students all Ben-Zvi taking the brunt of the criticism. Inthe —_ across the country. On 2 July Yitzhak Ben-Zvi end a compromise was reached on “the need for —_ handed the petition to the high commissioner, mass public response to the inactivity on the — together with a memo outlining the rescue de-

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Protest

mands. The high commissioner leafed through — forces recruitment offices. This symbolized a the papers and asked why the Yishuv was appeal- _—ikind of negation of the Yishuv’s contribution to ing only to Britain, and what should bedonewith — the general struggle of the free world against

the thousands of Jews rescued from the occupied Hitler. The British also continued to reject recountries. Ben-Zvi pointed out that it had been — quests for the establishment of a brigade of rethree months since the Yishuv had appealed to __cruits from among the Yishuv population. All His Majesty’s government and that inthe mean- __ this reinforced the impression that the British time the Bermuda Conference had convened and — were not afraid of confrontation with the Yishuv, dispersed with no results. Although allthe coun- — discouraging those who believed that petitions

tries under Nazi occupation were suffering, itwas | and demonstrations could ultimately bring the Jews who had been singled out by Hitler. The | about a change in British policy.

88a

high commissioner promised to pass the petition THE NATIONAL COUNCIL VERSUS on to his government; it was also passed on to the

U.S. government and the League of Nations THE RESCUE COMMITTEE through the help of Lowell C. Pinkerton, the U.S. Before summarizing the positions taken by Benconsul in Jerusalem.® Thus, the petition reached — Gurion during the time frame under discussion, various diplomatic representatives in Jerusalem, _ it is worth pointing out a feature of establishment

including those of Egypt, Sweden, Yugoslavia, thinking that accompanied the protest issue. Greece, Belgium, and France.® Another petition Ben-Gurion preferred to have the National was composed by Rabbi Abraham Mordechai Al- — Council lead the protest activity rather than the

ter of Gur, which he gave to Chief Rabbi Isaac Rescue Committee, a preference that largely

Halevy Herzog. stemmed from the political and social difference

Shortly after the news reached the Yishuv of _ between the two bodies. The Rescue Committee, the mass murder of Jews in Europe, a JAE clerk _ established asa result of the wave of fury and pain placed a proposal on Ben-Gurion’s desk in the _ following the news of the mass murders, eventuform of a petition to be signed by “all the men _ally consisted mainly of representatives of immi-

and women serving in the British and Allied _ grant organizations. Indeed, most of these had armies in the Middle East” and “allthe[maleand _ been elected, but the election processes in these female} Jewish workers ... who are directly con- _ organizations were not as orderly as they should nected with the war effort.” The petition called have been. The representatives were often local on the Allied countries to issue a warning to the _ political functionaries who had emigrated, to-

murderers and their partners that Jewish — gether with their positions and their conrefugees would be allowed to enter allthe neutral _ stituents, from Europe. This local community as well as the Allied countries. Itended withare- —_ leadership thus arrived in the Yishuv without quest to the military authorities not “to oppose _ adapting to the new reality.

the signing of this petition [since] these were hu- The Rescue Committee was a less premanitarian and not political demands.”® dictable kind of organization, less manageable During the spring and summer months of | and more vulnerable to unexpected pressures 1943—-around the time of the Bermuda Confer- and emotional demands—notwithstanding the ence—the British increased pressure on the fact that it was founded around five members of Yishuv, a fact that directly affected the Jewish the JAE at its core, one of whom was actually its population’s protest activity. Britain redoubled — chairman. On the other hand, the election proits efforts at finding weapon slicks belonging to _cess and development of Knesset Israel (comthe Haganah and closed down British armed _ prising the Elected Assembly and the National

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Confronting the Information

Council) were slower to act and more bureau- not force those who can to do more than cratic. Thus, it would appear that those elected they are doing already. Those who can are to Knesset Israel were better versed in the Yishuv not here but in London and Washington,

experience in all its myriad aspects. and they will not give in to the kind of The two bodies also differed in terms of the pressure you propose; and in London and

power apportioned among the parties and the Washington you will find no one to various organizations within them. The Na- demonstrate. Even when no cure is availtional Council was more in tune with the posi- able, there is no point in resorting to tion determined by Ben-Gurion and his col- witchcraft. ... Immigration must be faleagues in Mapai and the JAE. Mapai was the cilitated and demands must be made of chief party and its leader, Ben-Gurion, was also those who are able [to help]. It is not so the JAE chairman. He and his close colleagues dramatic: our feelings here are not at Kaplan and Sharett naturally influenced (but did stake but rather the fate of our brothers not control) National Council chairman Ben- and sisters over there; and our efforts Zvi and other Mapai representatives in that must be directed at rescuing them, their body. They had less influence over people such welfare and their support—we have to as Rescue Committee chairman Gruenbaum, al- use means that will help us to achieve this

though he, too, was a member of the JAE. Of objective.® course, they had less influence on Agudat Israel or the Revisionists, whose weight in the Rescue — Ben-Gurion expressed similar sentiments to the Committee was significant. This political con- | Rescue Committee of Bulgarian Jewry, who com-

figuration explains why Ben-Gurion preferred plained about the discrimination toward their that the National Council be responsible for | community in the allocation of funds for the resprotest activity. However, the National Council cue of Bulgarian Jews and the fact that they had did not merely rubber-stamp Ben-Gurion’s de- _no representative in the rescue delegation in Iscisions, and even the JAE did not always “jump ___tanbul. So great was their frustration that they

to [his] attention.”® even considered a sit-down strike in front of the

DOUBTS JAE offices in Jerusalem. Ben-Gurion replied that

if he thought such a strike would help save BulBen-Gurion’s doubts concerning the value of — garian Jews, he would participate himself; the protest lingered throughout 1943, even after he suffering of the Jews in Bulgaria was far more had reconciled himself to the public’s demandto __ effective a means of putting pressure on him.” escalate protest activity. In a letter written during The following were the main points of Benthe summer of 1943, in response toa note calling | Gurion’s position on protest: (1) the key to rescue for such activity, Ben-Gurion clearly defined his _ activity lay in the hands of the great powers; (2)

position on this issue: protest activity was essentially incapable of changing positions; (3) since the main objective

You are not the only one to feel pain and was to rescue Jews, the means to this end had to insult at a lack of activity compatible with correspond, and “when no cure is available, the enormity of the tragedy. But your witchcraft is not an option”; and (4) as long as he proposal is impractical. It might express was convinced of the value of protest, he would

the final refuge for the suffering in our be the first to carry it out. Indeed, when Benhearts .. . the least we can do. But these Gurion chose to participate in protest activity, he protest demonstrations you propose will did so in the belief that it was not “witchcraft,”

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Protest when there was special significance to his partic- did not satisfy the needs of the fund-raisers, nor pation as Yishuv leader. For example, his partic- did it alleviate public pressure. The trend to inipation in “Solidarity Month” was restricted to _ crease protest activity continued, and in the end activity that would increase financial donations. it was decided to hold mass public demonstra-

Professional fund-raisers had drawn the Execu- tions during 1944.” , tive’s attention to the fact that a slowdown in _ PASSING OVER THE TWO CLAUSES

protest had affected their fund-raising efforts,

which depended on an atmosphere of outrage.” It is not easy to keep track of Ben-Gurion’s posiThese experts also noted the discrepancy be- _ tion on the question of protest activity. At first tween, on the one hand, their own activity, which —_ glance it would appear to be contradictory: he re-

necessitated publishing data on the gravity ofthe jected most of the proposals to increase the activsituation, and, on the other, the “material” that —_ ity, but he did not boycott the more important “was known conspiratorially and therefore se- | meetings that met with approval by the Execucret.” Much of the rescue activity had to remain _ tive. Other events were attended by Sharett or secret because any publicity, however modest, — other representatives of the Executive, and most

might endanger these efforts. were probably in agreement with him. The Yishuv leaders wanted to counteract the The impression of contradictoriness in_ discrepancy by means of “conspiracy propa- creases when one examines Ben-Gurion’s ganda —to present the most essential factstothe | speeches at protest rallies. On several occasions largest donators. This method was adopted and he vehemently attacked the superpowers, thus

Ben-Gurion did indeed appear before a very — deviating from the boundaries he had set for small group of donors, to whom he reported on __ himself. It would appear that Ben-Gurion pre- : | the condition of the Jews in Europe and effortsto ferred the following tactic: when he was unable to rescue them.”! But this “conspiracy propaganda” —_ change the focus of a certain event or to cancel it

=—s Se ue

UNWIN £9.1939-19.194F + Poster of “Poland Jewry Day” (CZA, poster collection).

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Confronting the Information

altogether, he would participate, imparting to it — conflicting demands and an understanding that

the character that seemed proper to him. these stemmed from the impossible situation in Anyone trying to find consistency in Ben- —_ which the Jews found themselves during the SecGurion’s behavior might even be surprised to | ond World War, it was unable to serve as a signdiscover that in order to express his protest, Ben- _—s post for a large and confused public caught in the Gurion took advantage of a series of meetings —= middle of a war, the likes of which had never exand events that were arranged for completely dif- _—_isted, and facing an inconceivable tragedy.

ferent purposes. To Ben-Gurion, it would ap- Ben-Gurion’s famous slogan touched dipear, all things were interconnected: the tree _ rectly on the matter of protest, since the British planted, the goat purchased, and every dollar | were the main target. Although at that time transferred to the occupied territories in Europe __ Britain was the only nation that bore the burden were all part of a larger plan, the basic solution of the struggle against Hitler, other parties were involving the establishment of the Jewish na- _also affected. First, the policies of the White Pa-

tion’s future society. per literally shut the gates of Palestine to refugees. A CONTRADICTORY SLOGAN The harsh fate dealt the Struma, the Patria, and IN THE FACE OF THE JEWISH the Atlantic, which carried illegal immigrants, NATION’S PREDICAMENT deeply shocked the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine.

Second, the British were regarded as enemies In public meetings Ben-Gurion enunciated his |= when they went searching for weapons belonging protest based on his tripartite role of chairmanof to the Haganah; as far as the Yishuv was conthe JAE, member of the Zionist leadership, and _ cerned, its weapons were part of its effort to shake key figure (with no specific title) in the Yishuv. _ off the sense of helplessness that became utterly He did this in his own characteristic fashion, as if real with the news of the mass murder of Jews in to say: “If there has to be protest—thenI shalldo — Europe. Pictures of persecution and deportation it my own way.” He may even have supposed or __ easily merged with deportations from the shores hoped that the resolute (or “proud,” asthe Yishuv — of the Mediterranean and from Palestine. The often put it) words he spoke in the name of his |= German soldier, armed with powerful weapons public would help some people give vent to their = used to murder and persecute Jews, was placed emotions and thereby prevent their uncontrolled alongside the British soldier, who blocked all atescalation. Ben-Gurion may have been using his — tempts at rescue and confiscated the means for leadership qualities to tone down mass reaction. the Yishuv’s defense. The British were also the Thus, Ben-Gurion penetrated a field of ac- closest target against which to vent anger and tivity to which he himself was not reconciled by _ frustration.

trying to change things “from the inside.” It was In the face of the need to lash out at an adbut one revelation of his attempt to bridge the — versary, Ben-Gurion stood up and uttered a gap created by these internal contradictions, statement that may have been a marvel of rhetowhich were born of reality itself. Another washis _ric but was difficult to measure against reality. He famous slogan involving the British and their _ tried to hold on to both ends of the stick. Having White Paper, on the one hand, and the Nazisand __ no choice, and being unable to let go of one of the Jews, on the other: “We must help the British them, he tried to stop, to maintain his composure as if there were no White Paper and we must fight | and to moderate the protest and the fury at the the White Paper as if there were no Hitler.” This world’s indifference. This contradiction and his slogan was too sophisticated for many. Although ___ efforts to resolve it pass like a fine thread through it was grounded in a penetrating analysis of the | Ben-Gurion’s many speeches and reports. It did

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not stem from confusion but rather from the —_ action following the conclusion of the war, it tragic reality of the Jewish nation, forced to fight | appeared to be highly ambitious, promising, virtually bare-handed on several fronts simulta- | among other things, expanded social services neously and to parry head-on attacks and sneak —s and a new water-supply system. Historians are

attacks at the same time. now convinced that its true purpose was to Ben-Gurion did not participate in the freeze the national homeland and to prevent its protest rally that took place in February 1943, expansion, to maintain the agricultural characwhere the chief speakers were Ben-Zvi, Gruen- ter of Palestine, to prevent industrial growth, baum, and Zalman (Rubashow) Shazar.He had _and to use Jewish capital to finance the developjust resigned from the JAE and may have wanted = ment of agriculture in order to benefit the Arab to leave the field to Gruenbaum.” On the other |= community. Ben-Gurion saw the plan as such hand, in March 1943 he delivered the main speech and firmly rejected it. at the meeting of the Elected Assembly,” where The plan’s major benefits, such as expanded he recalled the protest activities already held in _ social services, were reserved for the Arabs. Land the Yishuv during the preceding months andtwo _ preservation and improved irrigation facilities “outwardly” directed meetings of the Elected As- | would have benefited the Arab owners of 97 persembly, the aim of which was to articulate the — cent of the land in Palestine and the Lands Law Yishuv’s horror at the slaughter occurringin Eu- _ further restricted the ability of Jews to purchase rope. Ben-Gurion added: “It seems to me that — land. On the other hand, the plan asked for a cut[this time] we shall have to speak to ourselves.” ting back of industry, which was almost entirely He mentioned the three tragedies that befell in the hands of Jews.”

the Yishuv, “one greater than the other: the White Despite this dangerous trend, once again Paper, the war, the slaughter.” He warned against | Ben-Gurion did not overlook the positive aspects

one tragedy drawing attention away from the involved. No matter how complicated and comnext, which was an especially dangerous possibil- —_ plex the relationship between the Yishuv and ity because the Yishuv stood alone andcouldlean _ Britain, the latter’s war against the Nazis was also only upon itself. Britain and the other Allies sim- — the Yishuv’s war. Nevertheless, Ben-Gurion reply shrugged their shoulders at the plight of the = mained firm in his resolve that the Yishuv would Jews. Britain even proceeded with the White Pa- _ not reconcile itself to “the closing of the gates of per policies and refused to consider establishinga | our homeland and will not allow our homeland Jewish military division. Ben-Gurion even char- —_ to become a ghetto.” He referred again to the imacterized the superpowers’ declaration as “con- |= minent Bermuda Conference, in which the Allies soling some friends” and repeated that “wordsdo — were being called upon to take real action; if they not save the lives of slaughtered children [and] we did not, it would be too late and history would

are left on our own.” judge them for their acts and for their failures.”® In his own inimitable way, Ben-Gurion de- This was the real “strength” of the Yishuv: it scribed at length the various causes of the crisis | could only accuse the free world before the tribuand stressed the role of the Allies in setting a _ nal of history. In March 1943 Ben-Gurion spoke trap for the Jews and preserving the anomalous to the nation on another, more symbolic occasituation that led to one catastrophe after an- _ sion: Tel Hai Day. In an almost mythical setting,

other. The “Reconstruction Plan,” announced ~— while standing beside the grave of Joseph the day before by the high commissioner, Sir _Trumpeldor, Zionist icon and symbol of the Harold MacMichael, was a new expression of __ spirit of the “New Jews,” Ben-Gurion repeated his British policy in Palestine. Intended asaplanof accusations against the Allied countries.

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AN “INCOMPARABLY past, present, and future, so that energies could COMPLEX” REALITY not be concentrated on a single issue. The Yishuv In April Ben-Gurion was forced to contend with — could not wait for victory over the Nazis, nor the paltry results of the Bermuda Conference. This could it be content solely with victory.” In the time he took advantage of a meeting of second- —_ course of war, political order can be determined generation members of his own Mapai party, | and might be proved irreversible.

consisting of youngsters who had been recruited In his many speeches during 1943 Benor were about to be recruited into the British | Gurion used both a standard approach and a forces. He tried to explain his famous sloganand —_ more flexible one that he adapted to the particuits double meaning, including why restraint was _lar event, time, and audience. He constantly and essential even in face of the position taken by __ repeatedly used certain motifs, hammering in his

, Britain and the United States at the Bermuda _ ideas until the message sank in. First, he con-

Conference. stantly emphasized the radical difference be-

Ben-Gurion called on his audience to avoid tween Nazi doctrine and Jewish morals. Second, oversimplified analyses and to look at the “in- —_ he repeatedly emphasized the complexity of the comparably complex” situation as it actually ex- _ historical, multifaceted work being done by the isted. The Yishuv was working on several differ- Allies, especially Britain. He refused to talk in

ent yet equally important fronts involving the terms of black and white or good and bad; there

WZ4 | May 1, 1943, protest activity (CZA, poster collection).

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Protest

was insensitivity and callousness, but there was WARNING AGAINST THE FINAL

also “a human conscience.” Each Jew in the BATTLE SYNDROME Yishuv, said Ben-Gurion, should bear in mind Another element in Ben-Gurion’s speeches durmore than his own personal pain and frustration. ing this period was a kind of warning against

Thus, when the Yishuv considered using force what may be called the “final battle synagainst the British, it must remember that it can- drome”—a situation characteristic of desperate

not remove itself from the overall war in which times. In order to illustrate this point, Benthe free world was involved, or give the impres- Gurion drew a comparison between the Jews in sion that the Jews of the Yishuv were indifferent Palestine and those in the Warsaw ghetto: “The and free of worry. The Yishuv had to think itsac- —_ problem with the Polish ghetto was simple: they tions out very carefully and to consider not only _ had reached the end of the road. The Jews were the “here and now” but also to think about the —_— facing a cruel adversary who knew no pity... Jews of Europe and their fate during the war and _and they decided: at least let us die the death of after it. The Yishuv had to cooperate with anyone _ heroes. That, too, was not so easy, but there was involved in the war against Hitler, to maintain a — simply no choice.” The Yishuv was luckier in the sense of solidarity, andto avoidanyharmcoming _ sense that it did not have to face a similar situa-

to its allies. Ben-Gurion even went so farastosay tion; the British and the other Allied countries that anyone who harms a soldier fighting against ~— were not a cruel adversary forcing the Yishuv to Hitler—even if only indirectly and far from the —_ choose the death of heroes.

battlefield—is Hitler’s helper. Ben-Gurion, however, believed that this fact The tension between the Yishuv and the _ did not make reality any easier. On the contrary, British Mandate in Palestine reached a peak things were much more complex, since the “enwhen the British army escalated its search for | emy was simultaneously the enemy and not the weapons. Two Jews, A. Reichlin and L. Sirkin, enemy.” It was therefore essential both to fight were arrested and accused of dealing in arms __ the British and, at the same time, to work tostolen from British army bases. Ben-Gurion gether with them. These were not empty words. called it “a modern-day Bailis trial” and ac- —_ He was hinting at cooperation with the British cused the British of waging a campaign of anti- | and the Americans in establishing an extensive Semitism and provocation aimed at denigrat- system of undercover aid and rescue activity. It ing the Zionist movement and its leadership —_ was no coincidence that he said of the British: in the free world and especially in the United “[E]ven if we have to take arms, they will join

States.”8 ranks with us.”®° Undoubtedly he was referring to

Nonetheless, he called on the Yishuv not — some of Britain’s secret agencies. to forget the main issue: to participate in “a war... On one occasion Ben-Gurion was asked for against the rule of blood and tyranny of the Nazis.” —_—shis position on the mounting conflict with the

Ben-Gurion also called for restraint because of — British authorities in Palestine. People probably what he called “the other England”—that of Josiah = wanted him to supply them with a credo they Wedgwood (a non-Jewish British Zionist who sup- could refer to in times of need, a kind of “leader’s ported the Zionist cause in Parliament) and Bal- _— response,” a “solution” to the situation. Any wise four, the England of those British officers whom _leader knew that no such off-the-cuff solutions the youngsters of the Yishuv were willing to follow __ exist. Instead of a “little red book” or a list of con-

“through thick and thin,’ people like Orde crete recipes for action, Ben-Gurion repeated a Wingate and others involved in the secret partner-_ _—ikind of all-inclusive formula: the Yishuv would

ship with Britain.” not accept things lying down; certain situation 103

Confronting the Information

require the use of weapons, and the British must Another recurrent motif in Ben-Gurion’s realize that, if the Yishuv were faced with such sit- speeches during this period reflects his attempt uations, it would take up arms—even in the __ to cope with the tension surrounding the prinmiddle of the war Britain was waging against the ciple of “Diaspora denial” in Zionist ideology. Nazis. Ben-Gurion did not precisely define | Many people tended to assume that this was what the situation, consciously shrouding itinaneces- —_ motivated the Yishuv to support only those plans sary degree of ambiguity. Nonetheless, he ex- _ that promoted Zionism, or those that would lead plained that the Yishuv would have to be aware of to the immigration of Jews to Palestine. It was a the restrictions inherent in the use of force, espe- _— painful and troublesome accusation at the time cially when the intention is not obvious orislim- | and became even more so as time went by. Benited to slogans such as “we won't put up with” or — Gurion’s view of the Yishuv’s relationship with

“we'll never give in.”?! the Diaspora was based on a paradox typical of Still, Ben-Gurion provided some general __ the times, according to which a large and wealthy guidelines to ensure that the use of force would section of the Jewish nation that lived in the free indeed achieve its objectives. First of all, it was | world was unable to exercise purely Jewish internecessary “nottouseforceinaplaceandatatime __ ests, free of other considerations. Other nations where it was not necessary. ... [T] here was noth- were able to act on behalf of their own interests, ing more dangerous than the use of force.” Sec- while the supposedly free and liberated Jewish

ond, a distinction must be made between nation was unable to do the same. The Jewish wartime and the postwar period, between mili- —_—- Yishuv, on the other hand, which was subject to tary and civilian. Third, the Yishuv must not use _— foreign rule and under constant danger, was able all the means at its disposal asifit wereindeedthe —_ to act in accordance with purely Jewish consider-

“final battle.” ations. Thus, believed Ben-Gurion, the Yishuv

After the war, when the Yishuv was strug- was fulfilling the task assigned to it, namely, repgling against the British, Ben-Gurion intensified resenting Jewish interests. According to Benhis warning against the final battle syndrome by — Gurion, Palestinocentrism was not a matter of adding another concise catchphrase: “Neither — the Yishuv’s egotism but rather an expression of Masada, nor Vichy [which symbolized Pétain’s the Yishuv’s commitment to the Diaspora, which surrender of France],” in other words, neither an stemmed from its role as essential center of the act of mass suicide nor one of shameful surren- Jewish nation. According to Ben-Gurion, the der.®* In this way he sketched the path he would _‘Yishuv was responsible for the Diaspora, the two

take after the war. “At a time of war I shall think being inseparable.

many times before I enter a conflict,’ but things “THERE IS NO SEPARATE will be different once a war is Over since “there EXISTENCE FOR THE HEART”

will then be only a Jewish war; the human war will be over.” That same “war after the war” will — In saying this, Ben-Gurion emphasized the negarequire a clearer outlook and an intellectual flex- _—_— tive aspect of Palestinocentrism, of which he had ibility that can adapt themselves to the “most dy- —_— been accused. It was as if he preempted and re-

namic reality in the history of mankind.” Fur- _ jected the accusation that Palestinocentrism led thermore, in order not to mislead anyone into __ to disregard and neglect. As far as he was conadopting any tempting short-term plans orcom- __ cerned, the Yishuv in Palestine was indeed cenpromises that might prove undesirable in the __ tral, but in a way that contradicted the concept long run, he promised political uniformity and _associated with him. It was central both because

discipline in action.*® of its mission concerning the Diaspora and be104

Protest

cause ofits special status, which allowed it to bear uation could thus have arisen from which there the real solution for the entire nation. A central would have been no turning back, and which the body that serves, not one that exploits, and cer- Allies could have decided to perpetuate even betainly not one whose people and leaders ignore __fore the end of the war. Nevertheless, rescue atthe rest of their nation perishing in the furnaces —_ tempts had priority over the struggle against the

of Europe: this is the essence of Ben-Gurion’s _ policies of the White Paper. As Ben-Gurion conception of the centrality of the Yishuv. Ashe clearly stated, “What value does this country have,

stated, with all its mountains and valleys, if the Jewish , , ,isnation does not for finda within it its salvation?”® There no existence body without a concern; Ben-Gurion also had things to say heart and there is no separate existence ;

, , ingJewish another aspect of the is debate that would for the heart., emerge The Yishuv re; 5s later on, namely, the Yishuv’s attitude sponsible for... the renaissance of thethe en; to; , ward the Jews of Europe. He rejected claims tire; nation. Without this, the Yishuv has , of those who demanded escalation of the protest no existence, and the nation has... no -

; ; activity even at the cost an armed confrontareliable support aside from theof Yishuv. ; ; ws: , could ; , , tion with the British. This accusation be

Without the Jewish nation abroad, we are , heard then, but it gained momentum after the

no more than one ofthethe countries of state’s ex- , , war, especially years offate the ile, and we canduring expectexistence. toearly share the of , . It formed part of the social and politithe Jews of Poland, Yemen, and Iraq.*4 cal struggle over the character and identity of the

The Yishuy, entrusted with fulfilling the vision of | country and who would control it. Those who reinstating the Jewish nation, had to plant the raised it at the time hinted at a “conspiracy of sifirst seed of independence in its homeland. Its lence” between the Yishuv leadership and the suspecialized responsibilities demanded that “with — perpowers, insisting that the Yishuv had agreed open eyes we must look at all sides... because we to turn a deaf ear to events in Europe and took a

are standing on several fronts.” vow Of silence and restraint in return for a promEven when describing the fronts on which ise that Britain would reward it after the war. the Yishuv was fighting, Ben-Gurion rejected | Ben-Gurion fiercely denied this accusation durPalestinocentrism as long as it represented ing the war, insisting that there was no agreement Yishuv egocentrism. He consequently preempted and certainly no conspiracy. According to him,

and apparently “participated” in a debate that, the recruitment of Yishuv young men and over time, gravitated to the question of whether |= women did not occur “so that we could serve the

he demonstrated Yishuv egocentrism in his Allies, England, America, Russia, and other choice of words or the stance headopted. Thepo- —_ countries fighting against Hitler .. . and receive sition he assumed was most certainly the oppo- —_—our reward once the war is over. Not for that!”®8 site. In his opinion, the Yishuv’s first task was to |The Yishuv cooperated with the Allies because

mount “a desperate attempt to save [Jews] from it was the war of the Yishuv and of the Jewish the Nazi furnace.” Next, and in some ways linked — people—as well as for another reason that Bento this, was the struggle against the White Paper, | Gurion neglected to mention at the time. By bewhich could not be dealt with after the war, dur-__ing recruited to serve in the British army, younging peace talks, since there was no guarantee that —sters from the Yishuv would be getting the the issue of Palestine would ever be raised; inthe — military training necessary for the establishment

meantime the British were implementing the ofa Jewish fighting force, thus avoiding the trap policies of the White Paper on a daily basis. A sit- of death and helplessness for the Jewish nation.

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Ben-Gurion was also indirectly accused of __ plan for saving the children was formulated, the skirting the issue of saving children. He and his _full horror of the extermination was known and colleagues were forced to stand by helplessly as__ the position of the Yishuv and the entire Zionist they watched the cynical games played by the |= movement was clear: children had to be saved — British. In one of his emotional speeches onthe even at the expense of immigration certificates British government's policy toward the rescue of for adults, and even if this meant taking them to Jewish children, he insisted that even the politi- |= a country other than Palestine. Faced with a cians in London knew that by agreeingtoalim- _ tragic choice, the JAE announced that it was willited quota of children, they would not be ableto _ing to allocate the remainder of the immigration buy the silence of the Yishuv, and that they had = quota to children, who had to be fed and looked better not assume there would be “many, even —_after—which was contrary to the “interests” of among the leaders, who were so naive astosup- _‘ Palestinocentrism and opposed to able-bodied

pose that the thirty four thousand [children] adults coming to help build the country and dewould be brought in and that would be the end _ fend it. This statement, and not his misguided

of it.”87 sentiments of 1938, is the one that faithfully repNevertheless, the British “trick” largely resents the attitude of Ben-Gurion and the lead-

succeeded in creating a false picture of things, cre- ership; at the time of their utterance, his words ating the impression that the Yishuv’s interests— — did not have the same meaning that was later at-

bringing in adults from Europe to Palestine— tached to them. conflicted with the rescue of children; that it was Not only did the British make no promise of the Zionists who objected to the rescue of chil- _ political rewards in return for the silence of the dren and not the British. No special insight is re- | _Yishuv, they even forced the Yishuv to give up imquired to comprehend Ben-Gurion’s unfortunate = migration quotas for adults. Admittedly it was utterance of 7 December 1938, when he told the —_ only on paper; in the end only a handful of chilaudience at the Mapai Center: “If 1 knew that it | dren were rescued from Europe, but at the time it

were possible to save all the Jewish children of was a painful renunciation, the Yishuv leaders Germany by transporting them to England but _ having no idea that it was not actual. Even when only half of them by transporting them to Pales- __ the possibility of rescuing children was first being tine, I would choose the latter —because we face — discussed, Ben-Gurion defined the position of not only the reckoning of those children’s livesbut the leadership: First of all we shall take out the the historical reckoning of the Jewish people.” He children, and then, if we can take out more Jews, said this long before it was clear thatleavingthem — we shall do so. There was no silence and, anyway,

in Germany meant extermination. The catalyst there was no promise ofa reward fora silence that for this speech—which was delivered just after | never existed. There was restraint. And the reKristallnacht—was the refusal of Britainto make straint stemmed from all-inclusive, operative a special gesture and allow ten thousand Jewish __ considerations, all concerned with the issue of children to leave Germany and Austriaandenter __ rescue. Palestine. The refusal was based on a fear that such permission might put a stop to the St. James At the end of October 1943 Ben-Gurion anConvention, which was supposed to take placein = nounced his resignation as chairman of the JAE. London the following month, in January 1939.% Though it came as a surprise, it was preceded by For years Ben-Gurion’s critics cited this a lengthy period of conflict with Chaim Weizstatement out of context even though the “hard mann over the management of Zionist policy. facts” prove that the opposite was true. Whenthe After his resignation Ben-Gurion and the leader-

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ship became the target of increased criticism. | Europe during the war. The main issues were David Remez described the situation as “a con- | howto motivate them and where to draw the line stitutional crisis. The matters are political, the — in the case of extreme forms of protest.

time is atime of urgency. ... Often by delving too In this debate, too, consideration must be deeply into our own internal affairs, we some- _ given to the various stages the process of becomtimes find ourselves .. . forgetting the external § ing aware. For American Jews, as for Jews in Palsituation. Thus, anything that can be done to _istine, this process was gradual, with the “jump” settle the constitutional crisis must be done; we in the U.S. community’s awareness also taking should not be held responsible for wasting an _ place between the summer of 1942 and the begin-

hour.’®? ning of 1943. A distinction must thus be made beThe situation dragged into November and tween the protest of the American Jews before December and nothing could make Ben-Gurion and after the end of 1942. News of the systematic change his mind. He refused to return to his post = extermination of the Jews of Europe was ununtil an arrangement could be agreed upon for = known before the end of 1942. The earlier protest him and the Executive in Jerusalem to handle — of American Jews aimed at gaining support for affairs as they saw fit. He felt that matters were far Zionist demands; only later was it intended to too grave at that time for them to be left solelyin —_— put pressure on the U.S. administration to atthe hands of Weizmann and his assistants. His tempt to save the Jews of Europe.

assessment had public as well as personal reper- AN AWKWARD GUEST:

nn Nevertheless, even then Ben-Gurion THROUGH THE END OF 1942 did not refrain from propaganda activity.”!

During his first two visits to the United States,

THE AMERICAN JEWISH PROTEST both of which occurred during the first half of the In the first chapter I described Ben-Gurion’s — war, Ben-Gurion tried to “win over” the Ameriopinion of America’s Jews during his very first | can Jewish community to the Zionist cause. The wartime visit to the United States, namely, that = Jewish illegal immigration ships Patria and Atthey were a divided and frightened community, lantic provide a test case for researching Benterrified of Hitler and of the anti-Semitesintheir | Gurion’s own position, on the one hand, and that homeland.” Still, he was aware of the potential of the Zionist leadership in the United States, on in this large and wealthy community, which, de- —__ the other. At the end of 1940 and the beginning of

spite its limitations, was awaiting a leadership —_ 1941, Ben-Gurion either initiated or supported

able to tap it. This motif—how to induce the “fighting” plans. He tried to coerce American Jews of America to protest against the extermi- —_—‘ Jewry into taking decisive action. He was an en-

nation of the Jews of Europe—recurs through- __ thusiastic activist who had no qualms about

out this period. clashing with British interests in the United

The efforts of America’s Jews in saving their States, which was similar to the stance he took in co-religionists and in promoting Zionist policies Palestine over the Lands Law.

have been analyzed in numerous studies and will Ben-Gurion learned that the Jewish Ameribe discussed elsewhere in this book.% HereI shall can leadership could be very firm in its opposifocus on Ben-Gurion’s assessment of the ability tion to outspoken protest activity if it believed of America’s Jews to wage a public protest in or- __ that the latter might damage the American Jewder to motivate their government and, indirectly, | ish community’s status. The Emergency Comthat of Britain on behalf of the policies of Zion- —_—s mittee established at the beginning of the war re-

ism, or to help in attempts to rescue the Jews of | jected out of hand Ben-Gurion’s proposal to

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publish a sharply phrased manifesto against On his second visit (22 November 1941 to Britain and to hold protest rallies across the 18 September 1942), which constituted one of his United States. The committee did agree tosenda |§ most important political moves, Ben-Gurion delegation to the British consulate but decided — succeeded in achieving his objective: to create a that it should adopt a moderate tone. The com- __ united front of Zionists and non-Zionists in demittee was very critical of Ben-Gurion. “Fatal | manding a Jewish state. The Biltmore Program stupidity” was how Rabbi Stephen Wise, the — was approved in May 1942, following months of committee’s chairman and one of the leaders _ fierce and often frustrating debate.” of American Zionism, described Ben-Gurion’s Ben-Gurion devoted much of his time durdouble slogan about waging a dual war against __ ing this visit to “Zionist preaching,’ participating

the White Paper and the Nazis.” in as many meetings and conferences as possible Ben-Gurion often succeeded in “skipping —_ and talking directly to the general public. He reover” the heads of the American Zionist leaders _ peatedly called on America’s Jews to apply presand following a line of protest that was more de- sure for the establishment of a Jewish fighting cisive and overt, although his success might be __ force and the cancellation of the policies of the due to America’s growing awareness of eventsin | White Paper.®? He also strove to establish a Europe, which affected large sectors of American “Washington office,” which would be limited in society, including Jews and Zionists. Up to this scope and staffed by energetic “young people” for

point the Jews had been afraid of openly sup- — the _purpose of “political activity.” This was porting America’s new attitude toward Europe __ clearly an attempt at bypassing the Zionist estabfor fear of being accused of dragging the United —_ lishment in New York, which was in no hurry to States into a new world war and reawakening the — follow Ben-Gurion’s lead, as he learned during demons of anti-Semitism. Americans viewed the his previous visit. He decided to press for this issue of Jewish refugees more asathreat toitsre- office as soon as the United States announced it cent rescue from the financial crisis ofthe thirties | entry into the war following the attack on Pearl

and less as a humanitarian challenge. The shock- Harbor. ! ing affair of the refugee ship Saint Louis is an out- As attempts at dissuading him from estabstanding example of the power system that — lishing the Washington office increased, Bencaused the failure of the Evian and Bermuda Gurion promised to “coordinate” his activity

Conferences.” with the existing activists, but he informed the

In his attempts to recruit support for open § American Zionist leaders that he did not require protest, Ben-Gurion was supported by Abba Hil- _ their approval and was reserving for himself freelel Silver, whose reputation had grownamongthe |= dom of movement. He would decide whether to community as one who was willing to “stick his —_ report on his meetings retroactively—and only neck out” on behalf of the Zionist cause even at to a few members of the Emergency Committee. the expense of conflict with the American ad- —_ His behavior caused considerable waves among ministration and the British government.” Still, American Jews. The Jerusalem leadership of the Ben-Gurion was very disappointed with the re- — JAE called on Ben-Gurion to cooperate with the sults of his first visit to the United States. Eventhe |§ American Zionist leadership, but he did as he little he did achieve did not erase his impression _ pleased.

of the “general cowardice” of America’s Jews. Thus, Ben-Gurion was not an easy guest in They listened to him “patiently,” he told his col- —_ the United States and made life hard for his hosts, leagues upon his return, and then “went back to —_ overstepping the bounds of what they considered

their daily routine.’*” their own territory, trying to capture their audi108

Protest

ences, and ignoring their pleas for moderation.: - to the United States and to arouse the Jews to During both visits he was militant and strove to _ protest and aid activity. Based on his two visits,

make his impress upon public opinion. Ben-Gurion rejected the proposal, although he This approach escalated with the rekindling — suggested inviting a delegation from the United

of the competition between Ben-Gurion and States and other places in the free world to disChaim Weizmann some time after the two coop- cuss the danger awaiting the Jews of Europe and erated and succeeded in convincing the Zionist | Zionism. He hinted that the discussions would be Conference, which convened in New York’s Bilt- _ fruitful only if the delegates were affected by the more Hotel, to adopt a plan of the same name. = atmosphere in the Yishuv—in other words, if Following a brief “armistice” between the two, they lost their fear of “dual loyalty” and were not Ben-Gurion waged a new attack on Weizmann— _ subject to Weizmann’s influence.!™ “political murder,” as Weizmann defined it. Here, Contrary to his image of omnipotent leader, too, Ben-Gurion showed that he had no qualms —_ Ben-Gurion remained in the minority. It would about using outspoken methods when he was __not be the first time, nor the last. The Executive convinced of their necessity. In this case he was _ decided to send a delegation, whose composition motivated by an inability to come to terms with —= would be decided at a joint meeting of the JAE Weizmann’s mode of activity, a fierce competition | andthe National Council. Nonetheless, it was deover seniority and, it would appear, a powerful —_ cided to act toward implementing Ben-Gurion’s jealousy on the part of Ben-Gurion toward Weiz- _ proposal.!°4 No delegation left the Yishuv for the

mann! United States because the various groups could

Political activity before and after Biltmore, not decide on the composition of the delegation. the attempt to establish the Washington office —_ Instead of sending out a single delegation, they when the United States joined the war, and the __ sent their own representatives,!° which was rempersonal and political conflict with Weizmannall —_iniscent of other developments involving protest served as a background to Ben-Gurion’s need for _activity.!®

extreme public protest activity in the United Ben-Gurion promptly sent out urgent letters States even before the official statement on the to branches of the Executive in the Unites States annihilation. It was the way he did things both — and London, effectively ignoring the decision to when the objective was to promote the political send a delegation from the Yishuv to the United objectives of Zionism and when it was to arouse _ States. He invited delegates of the free states to public opinion to cry out against the suffering of visit Jerusalem.!© In his own inimitable way, he

the Jews of Europe. continued to “define” the Executive’s decision in WHERE WAS THE MAIN the spirit of his original proposal: The opinion FOCUS OF ACTIVITY? of the Executive and that of the National Council

was that following the important Yishuv demonThe question of American Jewish aid for the Jewsof stration, there would be a need for an internaEurope was discussed immediately after the news __ tional Jewish protest rally and the only place suit-

of the annihilation in Europe, shortly after Ben- able . . . is Palestine, where a free Jew can say Gurion’s return from the United States. Once again everything that is on his mind, since in America the debate included the matter of protest, the issues | andin England a Jew has not the courage to speak

under discussion expressing Ben-Gurion’s am- only asa Jew.”!0

biguous attitude toward American Jews. His intent was clear: to establish the leaderA discussion in the JAE on 6 December 1942 ship in Jerusalem—the focal point of political acraised a proposal to dispatch a Yishuv delegation — tivity—with branches in England and the United

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Confronting the Information

States being under its command. Herepeatedthis = anti-Semitic’—-would support the president’s demand, which had been rejected, pointing out —_ evasion of activity on behalf of Jewish refugees.

the disagreement between himself and Weiz- How different things were then on Capitol Hill mann, the lack of dialogue, and the need for the |= compared with today’s situation concerning the delegation to come to Jerusalem.'° We have no _ Jews! Wise’s analysis of Roosevelt’s wavering situway of knowing if Ben-Gurion believed in his —_ ation also reached Jerusalem, where it influenced ability to incite a spirit of protest within America’s — opinions about the extent to which American Jews from Jerusalem; we know that he found it Jewry could be motivated to act. A similar analyhard to achieve even when he was in the United ___ sis concerning the “anti-Roosevelt reaction” was States. It would therefore appear that his insis- | brought to Ben-Gurion’s attention at the end of tence on a delegation coming to Jerusalem was 1943. The president himself, it was rumored, be-

aimed at ensuring subjection to the JAE in lieved that under existing circumstances he had Jerusalem. Weizmann’s freedom of action in the —_ no chance of being reelected, and that the adUnited States contributed to his determination.!!® — ministration would pass to the Republicans,!" Like any other human being, Ben-Gurion — who were much less sympathetic to Jewish con-

claimed credit for his successes and attributed cerns. some of his failures to others, in this case to Weizmann and his political activity in the United THE KOOK (BERGSON) GROUP States. His tendency to blame Weizmann for — Ben-Gurion’s unwillingness to urge America’s American Jewry’s timid behavior was not com- Jews to engage in protest demonstrations during patible with his own analysis of the complex state 1943 did not stem from a nonrecognition of their of affairs involving that same Jewry, of which power, nor was he unaware of the possibility of Weizmann was not the cause. Indeed, his col- —_— influencing American public opinion by way of leagues in the JAE and the Mapaileadership usu- _—s mass protest activity. Rather, Ben-Gurion’s reluc-

ally did not make this connection.!!! tance was probably based on his unrewarding

crt - experience during his two visits to the United HE'S STILL OUR FRIEND AFTER ALL States. He told Hadassah leader Tamar De-Sula

Another aspect of the issue was the status of Pres- Pool that even among the American Zionists he ident Roosevelt in his own country. There wasa — did not find “sufficient awareness of the gravity common fear that demonstrations and protest of the tragic and desperate hour in the history of rallies against him would strengthen less friendly _ Israel.” and more manipulative elements. Basically, Pres- Moreover, it seemed that the American Jewident Roosevelt’s administration stood behind — ish community would only succeed in raising American Jews in their battle against American _—_ funds and applying behind-the-scenes pressure anti-Semitism. Many people believed that out- —_ to advance the cause of rescue programs. This spoken protests during a sensitive stage in the kind of clandestine activity would not embarrass war might present American Jews as ungrateful — the administration, would supply no evidence to to the man who supported them. Stephen Wise, — substantiate the Nazi war machine's claim that one of Roosevelt’s staunchest supporters in the this was a “Jewish war,’ would not arouse any American Zionist leadership, expressed this fear suspicions of “dual allegiance” and, most imporina letter to Goldmann concerning the Bermuda _ tant, might result in the rescue of Jews. In other

Conference issue.!! words, Ben-Gurion was well aware of the relative

Wise believed that the U.S. Congress—“bit- _ benefits to be derived from working with the ter, hostile and to a certain extent downright |= American Jewish community; he wished to take

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Protest

full advantage of these rather than forcethecom- _ group, consisting of U.S. members of Irgun Zvai munity into activity that it consideredharmfulor — Leumi (National Military Organization; hereafter

beyond its scope. the Irgun) led by Hillel Kook, started operations A group of young, talented, and energetic — even before the outbreak of war. Its objective at Jews led by Hillel Kook (who was known as Peter _ that time were to conduct political propaganda in Bergson) disagreed with this analysis. The activ- _ order to open the gates of Palestine to Jewish imity of this group within the American Jewish — migration, to raise funds for the illegal immigracommunity and the public in general did not __ tion operation, and to convert local Jews to the Irconform to Ben-Gurion’s description ofthe cow- —_— gun cause. In 1940 Ze’ev Jabotinsky decided on a ardice of the American Jews and their general —_ new objective: the establishment of a Jewish army

inability to express extreme protest. Most re- _ that would fight alongside the Allied forces. After searchers, as well as people who lived and worked —_Jabotinsky’s death in August 1940, Hillel Kook’s during that period, point to the professionalism, | group, whose members were mostly young people

initiative, resourcefulness, and chutzpah dis- in their twenties, continued this activity. Although played by this small group in attempting to they were not familiar with the United States and put pressure on the American adminstration.!'4 — did not speak English, they soon became very Those who are willing to address the question of — influential within the American Jewish commuwhat would have happened had the majority of nity and helped to keep these issues simmering, American Jewry adopted these methods feel that —_ first demanding a Jewish fighting force and later the president, the senators, and the majority of | engaging in activity on behalf of European Jewry.

the public would have given in to demands to The Bergson group adopted a system of help the Jews of Europe. Some even go so far as = commercial publicity and professional propato claim a direct causal relationship between the —_—_ ganda, which was highly developed in American

pressure exerted by this group and Roosevelt’s _ society at the time. This, coupled with the fact decision to establish the Committee for War — that they were an antiestablishment organiza-

Refugees at the beginning of 1944. tion, ensured their success. Moreover, the group There were others, however, who believed — was never put off by the constant opposition that at a time when the blood of American and from the Jewish and Zionist establishment and English soldiers was being spilled on various succeeded in bypassing them with great cunning fronts, no one would have been particularly up- = and_ resourcefulness. Several American Jewish set by the cries of Jews that the blood of their —_ leaders (such as Abba Hillel Silver and Henry brethren was also being spilled; after all, the col- © Monsky of B'nai Brith) learned from this group lective soul of the superpowers was hardly in- —_ and adopted their methods.!!°

clined to get involved in the “finer points.” Why, then, did Ben-Gurion not give his Still others who clung to the belief that blessings to this or similar groups? After all, didn't protest was the only weapon left tothe Jewsofthe he himself try to involve the American Jewish free world claimed that no protest could have |§= community in increased protest activity? What significantly changed the situation; it would | was Ben-Gurion’s attitude toward this group, merely have boosted the spirits of those who lived — which personified the absolute opposite of the at the time as well as those who live and suffer to- cowardice that he so despised? Ben-Gurion met day. Even if protest was “an easy way out,’ as Ben- —_—with Hillel Kook only once during his second visit

Gurion put it, it would have at least provided the |= (November 1941-September 1942). He later met sense that they had protested, cried out in every — senior representatives of the group. The two possible way, as did the Bergson group.!!5 This = meetings took place when the group’s objective

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Confronting the Information

was to found a Jewish army—before the fact of answer to the JAE was unfounded [Meir

the annihilation of European Jews had been Grossman was the founder of the “State acknowledged in people’s minds. The meeting Party” in the United States and a member took place as part of negotiations between the both of Bergson’s Committee for a Jewish

Bergson group and leaders of the American Army and the Emergency Committee].

Zionist movement. (2) The committee was answerable to the The Bergson group was interested in coop- Irgun. (3) Any connection with this band erating with the Zionist movement and tried to is out of the question.!!8 conceal its subversive image and to limit the Zionist establishment’s involvement in its fund- — All _ these things were self-evident. Since this raising efforts on behalf of arms purchases forthe |= meeting was unfruitful, the group decided to Irgun in Palestine. At firstit met withoutrightre- bring in some “heavy artillery” in a further atjection. Stephen Wise responded that he and his — tempt to persuade Ben-Gurion. He was invited colleagues would not cooperate with a splinter — to a meeting with the well-known Dutch-born organization that refused to toe the line. How- American writer Pier Van Passen, who was chair-

ever, given the stream of information on the man of the National Committee for the Estabworsening military situation in Europe and the lishment of a Jewish Army, which had been Middle East, the American Zionists agreed to as- founded by Kook’s group. This meeting, which

sociate itself with the Bergson group.!!” was more relaxed than its predecessor, also proA few days after his arrival, Ben-Gurion was duced no results. Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary: invited to join the secret negotiations bythelocal “The only real result of the meeting was a gift of Zionist leadership. Given his experience in nego- —_-Van Passen’s book Our Times, which I have not tiating with the Revisionists, the local leadership yet read, and a friendly dedication.”

probably wanted either his blessing or to hand Although no consensus was reached, it aphim over to the opposition, depending on the __ pears that occasionally Bergson’s people were turn the negotiations took. Thus, Hillel Kook — willing to accept Ben-Gurion’s terms. When he was invited to a meeting with Ben-Gurion, who __ described to Van Passen all the JAE activity inrecorded the following in his diary concerning volved in founding a Jewish army, Van Passen his visit to Emanual Neuman’s home, where the surprised his guest by agreeing that it would be

meeting was to take place: only natural for the JAE to oversee the activities of the committee for a Jewish army. Ben-Gurion

Peter Bergson, apparently from the Irgun pointed out that in such a case the JAE would ap... who came to Palestine in 1921 and left point the committee’s key functionaries, such as

for America before the war. “head secretary and treasurer.’ The committee’s I asked him who was behind the representatives, Van Passen and Josef Breinin, “Committee for a Jewish Army” and who agreed to this. Although everything appeared to do they answer to and he replied: Friends have been settled, they refused to produce an of a Hebrew Land of Israel, founded by official written agreement and the meeting ended the Irgun, although the committee an- with nothing having been achieved.

swers only to itself. Ben-Gurion’s report to the Rescue CommitWhat did he want from us? tee on his second meeting was less restrained: Reply: Help, cooperation... “The committee for a Jewish army is made up of We parted. I was told that: (1) Gross- children and will only harm military matters.”!!’ man’s promise that they were prepared to He did not need a second meeting in order to de-

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Protest

cide that negotiations should not continue with ADMIRATION TOGETHER this group. The second meeting only reinforced WITH FIRM OPPOSITION his feeling that the group’s intentions were not Nonetheless, Ben-Gurion’s reply to Bergson’s “serious” and that its harmful activity should be communication (summer 1943) included a hint halted and there should be no further coopera- — of admiration for the group’s activity: “Thank

tion with it. you for your words. I appreciate the spirit that The American Zionist leadership did not — prompted you to write, but I fear that your breakagree with him and continued to negotiate with away tactics are harmful to our common goal.’!?! Hillel Kook and his people. The debate ontheis- |§ There is no way of knowing why Ben-Gurion sue, which is beyond the scope of this study, — chose this time to express regard for Bergson, reached fever pitch. The main point is that Ben- _ leader of “the group.” Ben-Gurion often distinGurion was convinced that Irgun representatives | guished between firm opposition to the activity in America were not to be trusted andtheirterms and opinions of his adversaries guarded approval were not to be agreed to. Several members of the _ of the fighting spirit and devotion they showed in American committee partially agreed with his __ their struggle.!?* This behavior may also have mir-

position. rored the disdain he felt for the American Zionist Ben-Gurion believed that the group’s inten- _ leadership at the time. Be that as it may, anything tions to place itself under the JAE’s auspices were — else Ben-Gurion had to say on the subject was not honest. The main point to be madehereisthat — sharp and final, as in May and June of 1941, when Ben-Gurion did not reject the group because ofits the JAE discussed the possibility of cooperating style or methods of operation but rather because — with the Revisionists over aid and rescue. Benof its political orientation, which he considered to Gurion raised negative associations of the Bergbe that of a dangerous underground movement, — son group’s activity, stressing the refusal of the and the fact that it did not accept the authority of | Revisionists—including Kook’s people—to acthe Zionist leadership. He knew that membership cepted general authority, that of the JAE, and the in the Irgun meant being subject tothe Irguncom- —_— way this caused friction within the Zionist movemand in Palestine, which would nullify any decla- ment.!23 Thus, the more he feared the potential ration regarding subordination to the JAE. Ben- damage of the Bergson group, the sharper were Gurion did not meet Hillel Kook during the war, —_ his outbursts against them: He described the although the latter made direct or indirect contact group as a “gang of immoral Revisionist or Irgun with him and other members of the Zionist lead- members, who defile the name of Israel among ership and presented further proposals for coop- _ the gentiles. This gang is doing everything for the

eration. These offers were similarly rejected. sake of publicity and fund-raising and no one Reports on the group’s activityin the United |= knows what they spend their money on.” AlStates and of the various attempts on the part of | though much of this was pure rhetoric, a single the American Zionist establishment to block sentence sums up his position: “It has taken us a them reached Ben-Gurion during 1943 and 1944. quarter of a century to get the gentiles to look American Zionists boycotted meetings with gov- | upon us asa nation. We have even managed to get ernment officials or made efforts to have such international approval, and we must not allow meetings canceled ifmembers of the group were _ this gang to ruin all that.” This, then, was the reaalso invited. They even tried to have Kook ex- son for Ben-Gurion’s sharp opposition to cooperpelled from the United States and to get him ation with Hillel Kook’s group: the fear that a didrafted into the army or placed on trial. Reports _ vision in Zionist political activity would cripple

of all these activities reached Palestine.!2° the leadership’s ability to act.

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Confronting the Information

Ben-Gurion also related to the matter ofthe | Zionist movement in the United States and group's autonomy and its ties with the Revision- _Palestine.!° ists. He rejected the local Revisionists’ claims that People in the American Zionist leadership they had no connection with this group. The _ reported to Ben-Gurion on the group’s activity damage, said Ben-Gurion, has been done, since _—_ and called on him to react to it. For example, those who wish the Jews harm are only too ready Nahum Goldmann asked Ben-Gurion, the JAE, to use any excuse to weaken the Jewish national and the National Council to issue a suitable releadership, and Kook’s group was supplying rea- sponse and promised that the Jewish Congress, son enough by its very activity. He wasconcerned — which he headed with other leaders, would decry about the possible negative image projected by _ the group’s pretentious and sectarian behavior. the Zionist movement, fearing that it would be — Ben-Gurion told his colleagues in the JAE that seen as a national movement whose leaders were — Gold and Lewis Lipsky, both leading American not in complete control of its various consti- Zionists, asked the movement for a power of attuents. Such a negative image wouldserve thein- —__ torney to “sue the Bergson group.’ Ben-Gurion terests of the Zionist movement among Western _ was not sure if the group could be sued, but he politicians and supply them with additionalam- _ felt it should certainly be condemned for “desemunition to attack Zionism and the leadership’s __ crating Israel’s name in America.” !?6 attempts at getting the Western powers to act on Thus, Ben-Gurion was opposed to the group

behalf of European Jewry. and its activity because it contradicted what he Ben-Gurion summed up the leadership’s _—_ considered to be the most important doctrine, position as follows: “As long as there is no guar- —_— namely, that of a unified national effort in carryantee that the Revisionist party is committed to —_—ing out all aspects of the political struggle. He

not carrying out any activity in Palestine, Lon- _ repeatedly spoke out against the anarchist tendon, or America that could undermine our polit- — dency as one of the leading causes of the weakical struggle, we must not cooperate withitinany ness of the Jewish effort in his political dealings. way. I am referring to the Irgun in Palestine and —_ This stance was even more pronounced during the Bergson gang in the United States. If we co- _ times of crisis such as the Second World War. The

operate with them, without the necessary guar- tense relationship between the Yishuv leadership antees, we will be seen as being two-faced. !*4 and the Revisionists reached its nadir with the Ir-

These words served as a backdrop to a gun “rebellion” and the Haganah’s part in supnumber of acts on the part ofthe Bergson group _ pressing it. After June 1944 “Shai,” the Haganah’s that especially angered the Zionist leadership in _ intelligence department, habitually passed along the United States and Palestine, including the —_ information on the Irgun’s planned operations establishment of an “embassy” to represent Jew- — against the British. It was Ben-Gurion’s belief ish affairs in Washington. In this, too, the group __ that any armed confrontation in Palestine would

knew how to manipulate the media and the have put anend to British or American aid in resleadership by renting a building in the heart of — cuing the Jews of Europe.

Washington’s embassy row. The Bergson group Thus, it was not the Bergson group’s fierce started referring to itself as “the Hebrew Com- _ propaganda that Ben-Gurion was so opposed to mittee for National Liberation,’ declaring thatit (the issue of protest was only marginal as far as represented the Jews of Palestine who were un- — Ben-Gurion was concerned), but rather their able to speak freely because they were under for- _ lack ofa firm stand with respect to the doctrine of

eign rule. By denying its national legitimacy, it | national obedience. and a fear of the consewas a virtual declaration of war against the | quences resulting from the unsynchronized ac-

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Protest

tivity of the Irgun and the Revisioninst move- — dency described thus far was characteristic of ment. He was afraid of their plans to actinawavy — Ben-Gurion’s position regarding protest activity that would endanger efforts to rescue the Jews of | during the first half of 1944 up to the July speech. Europe and confuse the political management of With respect to his participation in protest the Zionist movement. He summed up this atti- events, the first was a special session of the tude very clearly at a meeting of the Zionist Ac- Elected Assembly dubbed “To Be Alert and to tions Committee in early spring 1944.1?” Rescue,” which took place on 12 January 1944. Al-

“ Another The JAE committee decided to cable its U.S. matter on the agenda concerned cooperation — branchandaskit to cooperate with the Red Cross with the JDC and financing, the idea beingtoex- in removing these obstacles, appointing Dov pand the circle of fund-raising in order to gain —_— Joseph to meet with the Swiss consul in order to the funds necessary for rescuing the children, an —_ request his help. The committee was also inoperation which was enormous in relationtothe formed that Chaim Barlas, the Jewish Agency’s

Yishuv capacity at that time.” representative in Turkey, was about to return to The committee received areportonobstacles Istanbul, where he would organize the immigra-

involved in the transfer of children from the tion of the four thousand children whose entry Balkan states through Turkey and on problemsin _ into Palestine had been approved by the British. the countries of origin. Turkey has announced — He was to beassisted in this by Dr. Joseph Goldin, that it was not permitting the passage of groupsof head of the Yishuv’s office in Turkey, as well as more than fifty children and allowed each new _ other emissaries.”’

group to enter only on the condition that its pred- Dov Joseph met Mills, head of the Mandaecessor had departed. The Turks were afraid that — tory government’s Emigration Department, and the children might wind up being “stuck” on — gave him a memo containing the JAE’s request Turkish soil as a result of complications in trans- — for twenty-five thousand immigration permits port and British and Arab oppositiontotheentry for refugee children. There was also no delay in of Jewish children into Palestine, in which case the carrying out the JAE’s decision to request that the care and responsibility for these children would _ neutral countries permit the entry and tempo-

fall to Turkey. rary sojourn in their territories of Jewish surIt is important to clarify the significance _ vivors. Sharett, who was in London at the time, of the Turkish restrictions. A group consisting of | made sure the request reached its destination.”8

fifty children could enter Turkey through its The JAE met three days after the announcenorthwestern border only after a similar group —s ment by the allies of the mass murders occurring had crossed its southeastern border. Assuming it in Europe (17 December 1942).2? Ben-Gurion did

would have taken at least a week to traverse not wish to concentrate on attempts to extract

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Rescue Plans

from the Allies declarations of support and sym- ship was actually “doing something” to rescue pathy in lieu of motivating them to take real ac- _—Jews. tion on the issue of rescue. His position was based At a fund-raising rally Ben-Gurion reviewed on Britain’s apparent willingness to assist in the __ the steps taken by the JAE to encourage those in rescue of children and repeated requests for de- attendance to make generous donations, this betails on rescue plans. Activity on the part of ing the objective of the meeting. He pointed out Oliver Stanley, the new colonial secretary, and that they must be patient, that results would not Sharett’s reports from London also gave causefor be apparent immediately, and that their contri-

optimism. butions should not be based upon early signs of

In December 1942 Stanley replaced Lord success. Ben-Gurion described the activities carCranborne and embarked upon aseries of proce- _ ried out thus far: an appeal to the Red Cross to redures based on the assumption that British aidin | quest that the “German authorities allow Jews the rescue of Jews would be correct both froma __ out, especially children”; a request of the neutral humanitarian and political standpoint. It would countries (Turkey, Sweden, Portugal, Spain, and fend off certain public pressure in London, while — Switzerland) to allow Jews to pass through or reits “cost”—Jewish immigration to Palestine— main briefly in their territories; and an appeal to would not be so great as to overstep the limita- — the Polish government-in-exile to persuade the

tions of the White Paper. No one in the British neutral countries to permit this to occur. Algovernment at that time was prepared to deviate — though the results were “very weak,” still “there

from the White Paper policies. was reason to be grateful” that Switzerland, “that The JAE decided not to respondtothesuper- — small country in the middle of Nazi Europe,” was powers’ declaration and to apply to the govern- __ responsive to some of the requests and Turkey ments for aid in rescuing the Jews of Europe, as___was willing to allow the passage of a few hundred well as to establish an international body to this _—_ refugees. (Ben-Gurion did not mention the re-

end. (This was a variation ona previous attempt _strictions.) The other countries had not yet reto place Eleanor Roosevelt at the head of sucha —_ sponded. body.) Its third decision was more important: the Ben-Gurion stressed that negotiations were JAE would be responsible for the upkeep andin- _ being carried out involving thousands of refugees tegration of immigrant refugee children and this |= “whom we are able and are authorized to bring

would be made public in due course.*? over from the Balkan states,’ and that it appeared

FACING THE “CRIES OF THE that the only destination lett was the “Tittle

> homeland,” whose hands are “tied” and “over

BUTCHERED CHILDREN which we have no sovereignty.” His main sentiBy the beginning of January 1943, Ben-Gurion ments were expressed in the following sentence: realized that it would be harder to get the Jew- “Following all the horror, the blood cries of the ish children out of Europe than it had at first millions, the cries of the butchered children, we appeared. His great plans and hopes met with are now being given a mere few thousand and the one pitfall after another. He started to breakhis _ trials are many that we are subject to before we own and others’ previously agreed-upon rules can evacuate them, until we can transport them of secrecy regarding the rescue of children. The across neutral countries and until we can bring

four thousand permits issued by the British them here.”! were already fairly common knowledge. He Ben-Gurion was here pointing to the greatmay have decided to reveal some information est obstacle facing the rescue teams, especially because he had to demonstrate that the leader- those involved in the rescue of children: obtain-

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“Or We Shall Have No Repentance”

ing passports or temporary resident permits. suggested that they assume that Smuts had reThe countries in question—Switzerland, Turkey, — ferred to Jewish refugees, especially children, Sweden, Spain, and Portugal, and to a certain since most of the Jewish children whose rescue extent South Africa—were closest geographically was at stake were from Poland, and to apply dito the occupied countries and their status as neu- rectly to the South African government. Dov tral countries made them a logical choice forthe |= Joseph mentioned South Africa’s delicate interJAE to appeal to. This difficulty revealed itselfin _ nal situation, pointing out that it was “interested all its complexity over time and Ben-Gurion re- _in taking in Polish children but not Jewish chilferred to it often. As was mentioned, atthe meet- — dren.”*4

ing of the JAE Committee for Child Immigra- Ben-Gurion’s reservations were even greater. tion, Dov Joseph was entrusted with asking the He believed that the JAE should not embarrass Red Cross and the Swiss consul for aid in evacu- _—‘ the Jewish community leaders in South Africa

ating the children.*” and Prime Minister Smuts. Although the Polish Switzerland was asked to permit Jewish chil- | government-in-exile had promised that Polish dren temporary residence until they could be children could return to Poland at the end of the evacuated from Europe. This provision was part — war, Ben-Gurion noted that “we, unfortunately, of the previously mentioned Pinkney Tuck plan, | can make no such promise to the government of but there was almost no chance ofthis request be- | South Africa.” Ben-Gurion explained Smuts’s ing granted. Ben-Gurion clearly understood this — vulnerability: since most of the whites in South by early December, and in describing the JAE’s _— Africa were English and the minority were Boers, activity to Mapai activists he argued that “evenif | Smuts, who belonged to the latter group, had to Switzerland were to be more generous—and it | maneuver between the two communities. Inis quite generous—we must understand that deed, his position had improved because the proSwitzerland would be acting against its constitu- | Nazi camp among the Boers could no longer tion; there’s a limit to the generosity of aforeign | boast of Hitler’s victory in the war, but “he state, especially such a small one, that is sur- should not be made a target for our arrows, now rounded on all sides by a Nazi government.”*? As__ ofall times.”

early as the beginning of 1943 Ben-Gurion al- It was an accurate and up-to-date analysis. ready had his doubts about surmounting all the | South Africa’s internal political situation made it

obstacles as they presented themselves. clear why Smuts did not declare that his country Another country that should be mentioned — was willing to accept Jewish children as well. with regard to saving Jewish children was South — Eight months later Gruenbaum went to South

Africa, but even here the assumption that it Africa and personally looked into the possibility would help was doubtful. The idea of being — of bringing in Jewish refugees. He discovered for helped by South Africa was based on the coun- _himself how right Ben-Gurion and Joseph had try’s prime minister, Jan Christian Smuts, who been.* declared that his country was willing to give Ben-Gurion suggested moving up consultarefuge to a certain number of refugees from tions with Nikolai Kirschner, the chairman of the Poland. His declarations were heard bymembers South African Zionist Federation and members of the JAE, who hoped that Jewish refugees, in- —_ of the federation. He may have feared an anti-Secluding children, might be included inthe quota. —_ mitic reaction to the request for shelter for Jewish The possibility was thoroughly checked, al- — children, which might weaken the status of the though doubts arose right from the beginning. At = Jewish community in South Africa and hamper a JAE meeting on 10 January 1943 Gruenbaum _eits ability to contribute financially to the rescue

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Rescue Plans

operation. The South African Zionist Federation | Minister Churchill and his ministers. The high was noted for its ability to raise funds for Zionist | commissioner was required to act according to causes, and the rescue plans largely depended _—_Stanley’s directives, and the British Foreign on expectations from that quarter. South African _ Offfice contacted Bulgaria through Switzerland, law forbade the removal of money from the — where agreement to the plan was forthcoming. country, so any troubles with the government Nonetheless, Stanley pointed out that the probcould have jeopardized the expected transfer of | lems would almost certainly be great. He was money, which also depended on the govern- _— mainly hinting at Bulgaria’s announcement that,

ment’s turning a blind eye. notwithstanding the agreement, it would be hard Moreover, the tendency to avoid complica- —_ to implement the plan—perhaps a reference to tions with the Jewish community in South Africa’) German opposition. Stanley also reported on and with Smuts was tied to the desire for the | arrangements to bring 270 children to Palestine AZF’s support of the Biltmore Program. It was from Romania and Hungary, some of whom important to Ben-Gurion not to get into trouble —_—-were already on their way.

with the local Jewish community or Smuts, who Two days later Stanley repeated this inforwas seen as pro-Zionist. As far as Ben-Gurion mation to Prof. Lewis Namier and Blanche was concerned, the two were connected. Success _— (“Baffy”) Dugdale, both members of the London

in creating a united front in support of the plan. branch of the JAE. He stressed that his anwould constitute the first stage in providing a §nouncement in Parliament came in response to fundamental solution to the suffering of the Jew- the JAE’s request that “at least the children of Eu-

ish nation. rope’ be saved. He also stressed that the governTWENTY-NINE THOUSAND ment would not permit all surviving Jews to enter Palestine and would not permit disorganized

CERTIFICATES immigration—in other words, illegal immigraAt the beginning of February 1943, the British | tion by adults—to take the place of children and government published its official agreement to _ interfere in their rescue.*° This was an obvious

allocate the remaining permits to children. hint of Britain’s intention to make use of its anBritish colonial secretary Stanley announced in nouncement by creating a connection between Parliament that Britain was permitting the entry _ its willingness to bring in Jewish children and the into Palestine of four thousand Jewish children | unwritten commitment ofthe JAE to discontinue from Bulgaria and an additional five hundred illegal immigration activity in the near future.

adult escorts. He reported on the successful ne- Stanley’s announcement brought to the surgotiations with Bulgaria and on arrangements _ face the two-month-long negotiations between for carrying out the transfer. If the necessary the JAE and Britain regarding the rescue of chilmeans of transport were obtainable, Britain | dren. Britain's attitude to the rescue of children would permit the entry of Jewish children into had been an open secret in the Yishuv for some Palestine escorted by proportionate numbers of time. Behind the scenes the Mandatory authoriadults. The numbers would be limited to the five- _ ties struggled with the question of producing a year immigration quota, due to end on 31 March _ suitable response to the annihilation of the Jews 1944, and would not exceed the twenty-nine of Europe. Restricted immigration was part of thousand allotted to “Jewish immigration ac- __ their regular line at that time, but there was a fear

cording to the White Paper.” of the high political cost that Britain would have The plan had been presented earlier to the to pay for blocking Palestine to those Jews who British cabinet, where it was approved by Prime — could be rescued from Europe. No one could

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“Or We Shall Have No Repentance”

foresee where the Yishuv’s protest would lead, _in time of war. Many had been confiscated for the nor the political pressure of persons and groups ___ war effort and those that had not were extremely

in England and the United States. expensive due to their scarcity and the enormous In any case, the British approval did not ex- _ risks involved in sea travel. Golomb therefore beceed the limits of the White Paper, and this was _ lieved that most ships should be leased but that the main flaw in Stanley’s announcement. No some should also be purchased and placed at the special quota had been set up for children; they — disposal of the Yishuv in time of need, such as would be brought at the expense of the remain- _ high-risk missions.

ing permits allocated according to the White Pa- Kaplan, on the other hand, was reserved reper. Stanley also made it clear that Britain was — garding the idea of purchasing ships and preonce again avoiding confronting the full conse- _ ferred leasing. The purchase of ships was a comquences of the systematic murder of Jews in Eu- __ plex and expensive business. Moreover, leasing rope and was not showing sufficient humanitar- — ships would provide the Yishuv with an addiian concern regarding efforts to rescueevenafew __ tional advantage in the “kind of connections that

of them. we don't have and, included in the price they are Three days after Stanley’s announcement, asking, they throw in these things, too.” Connec-

the JAE discussed it at length in Ben-Gurion’sab- _ tions with high officials were indeed very imporsence (he had taken a “vacation” asa result of a —_—‘ tant at such times in the Balkan states. Kaplan was disagreement with Weizmann and other JAE __ probably hinting at Turkey—the land of bakshish, members). At the beginning ofthe debate the Po- __ that is, of a tacitly accepted system of under-

litical Department presented a declaration, — the-table payments for services and favors. Kasigned by Ben-Gurion, making it clear thateven plan made it known that he had allocated ten when he was on “vacation”—a kind of resigna- — thousand Palestinian pounds to Golomb’s retion—Ben-Gurion was never out of the game — quest for the purchase of ships and concluded

and still called the shots.37 that “on the matter of bringing in children, orItis worth mentioning that EliyahuGolomb, — ders must be issued immediately to Kushta [the Eliezer Kaplan, and David Ben-Gurion all be- _—_ delegation in Istanbul] to lease ships and to go lieved that the plan for rescuing children had the _into action.” greatest chance of succeeding. They were in pos- The only way to transport the children, said session of the most comprehensive information Ben-Gurion, was through Turkey, either by train or on what was happening behind the scenes and __ by sea, but “bringing several thousand over by were not guided merely by wishful thinking. — train—is something that will take at least several Golomb headed the Haganah and thushadoper- — months.” This was a serious matter “since at that ational experience concerning the issues under _ stage in the war there was a danger that we would discussion. Golomb analyzed the obstacles and _ not be able to bring them because the situation at pointed to three that he considered decisive in _ the front in Europe can change within a month... determining the fate of the plan to rescue chil- _—_ in which case a massacre can take place... and the dren: first, “to what extent the governments will Nazis can order that all the Jews be butchered .. . permit the exit of children,” in other words, exit and if we don't bring those that we could have permits; second, passports; and, third, trans- —_ brought over, we shall not be forgiven.

portation, which was by then a “very serious Ben-Gurion stressed the importance of matter indeed.” Overland and overseas travel was _—_— action no matter how limited. It was important,

very expensive and required many permits. | among other things, to show the British that the There was an obvious difficulty in securing ships | _Yishuv was capable of carrying out so complex an

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enterprise. Any process, from bringing in immi- In fact, Ben-Gurion failed in his attempts to grants to the final stages of their social integra- impart a certain character to the rescue delegation, would illustrate the Yishuv’s continual tion in Turkey. In the end public pressure by varclaim that it was capable of supplying a funda- _ious organizations won out. During 1943 the mental solution to the suffering of the Jews. “If rescue delegation increased in size, becoming a we find a way to bring the five thousand, we can _large, top-heavy, uncoordinated body that was demand that the British fulfill their promises, a often strife-ridden, just like the Rescue Commitfurther twenty-four thousand ... this would bea tee in Palestine. At the end of 1943 several attremendous achievement... itis urgent because | tempts were made to set down guidelines and to we don't know how much time we have left.” coordinate activity within this body. But the misOthers at the meeting addressed the issue of trust among the various emissaries remained, as the hardships involved in taking children out of did their desire to channel rescue efforts in a diEurope. A proposal was made to obtain ships __ rection that favored the community each reprefrom neutral countries by political means andto sented. The growth of the Istanbul delegation, upgrade activity in Istanbul by sending out one __ coupled with public pressure and inherent interof the JAE members. This demand was repeated _ nal tension, transformed it into an impotent several times in the course of the war. Kaplanand _ organization.

Sharett did, in fact, go to Istanbul several times Thus, important operations were not coorwhen it was necessary to establish a kind of _ dinated by the broad delegation but by a smaller “advance command headquarters” on a ““minis- —_ group within it. The need for secrecy led to this

terial,’ decision-making level. development. The emissaries actually responsiIn summing up, Ben-Gurion returnedtothe ble for the complex and secret operations were proposals for purchasing ships: “I say whenever Teddy Kollek and Ehud Avriel, some of the possible purchase and quickly. We must recruit | Mossad Le Aliyah Bet people, such as Ze’ev the people in the know on those mattersandsend §Schind and Zvi Schechter, as well as Venja them out to places where there are shipstobehad = Pomeranz (Hadari). This group even bypassed and to buy them up.” A three-man committee | Chaim Barlas, the official representative of the consisting of Kaplan, Joseph, and Golomb was _JAE, and received its covert instructions directly formed to appoint emissaries to Istanbul. The — from Ben-Gurion, Sharett, Kaplan, and Meirov committee was important to Ben-Gurion, as is —_ (Avigur). Barlas was the official representative evident from the individuals he appointed to it. | and therefore had to take greater care not to overThe Rescue Committee was getting involved in _ step Turkish law, although this sometimes hapshaping the Istanbul delegation, and from the __ pened to him too. Another reason for bypassing start there was pressure from various quarters — Barlas was the bad blood between him and this that wished to be included. Ben-Gurion wanted — group of emissaries, which viewed him as a oldto avoid the clumsy patterns of operation of the — fashioned, conservative clerk. His special relaRescue Committee. He also hinted at his inten- — tionship with Gruenbaum may also have con-

tion to expand the Yishuv’s delegationtoIstanbul tributed to the tendency to leave him out of at a time when it consisted of JAE emissaries —_ important operations.

Chaim Barlas and Dr. Joseph Goldin, Venja Turning to the decisions taken by the Mapai Pomeranz (representing the Kibbutz Hameu- Secretariat on 10 February 1943 and to Benhad), Menahem Bader from the Hashomer Hat- —_ Gurion’s assessments, it would appear that by za ir, Ze'ev Schind and Zvi Schechter (Yehieli), | then his prophesies regarding the success of the emissaries of the illegal immigration operation.*® — plan to rescue the children were dimming, al-

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though he still believed one should make every | Germany, through Switzerland (Britain’s repreeffort to carry out the plan. Kaplan and Golomb sentative in Germany), to allow Jews out of the

shared his assessment and position. occupied countries. Within only two days, however, Ben-Gurion There were two reasons for the renewed rebegan receiving reports that appeals for aid to — quest: first, the evacuation of children through some of the international organizationshadbeen Sweden required the permission of Germany; unsuccessful. Richard Lichtheim, the Jewish second, there was a fear of wasting unused perAgency representative in Geneva, reported the mits if, at the Yishuv’s request, Britain allocated failure of appeals to George Thelin (chairman of — immigration permits to children whose departhe International Organization for Child Wel- ture was not permitted by the Nazis. A permit fare) and to the Red Cross. Both organizations __ issued to a certain child was marked, reserved, informed him that they were unable to do “any- — and subtracted from the total quota. If for any thing to transport the children out of the occu- _— reason it was not used, the permit could be pied states.” Thelin nonetheless agreed to travel — given to another child, but only after having to the Balkans and other countries in order to —_ been “thawed” or “released” for further use. help in rescuing children if he received entry per- §_ This process took up too much valuable time mits, and in any event he promised to appeal to —_—and there was always the fear that children who

the heads of other branches ofhis organizationin might have been saved would be sent to their Ankara, Budapest, and Bucharest for help in res- deaths in the meantime. cuing children. He reckoned that “because of the The JAE did not invent anything: time and general situation” in the Balkans and the Nazi- — again it became clear that with each step it had to

occupied satellite states, there was no point in make sure that the Yishuv did not trip up or enmaking it known that his organization was sup- —_ danger other rescue activities.*! Fear of having

porting the rescue of Jewish children.*? permits issued for children who could not be resThe reports from London also bore bad tid- — cued and the prevention of these permits being ings. Churchill was very busy and thus unable to _ used for others dogged all the debates on the resmeet Ben-Gurion and Joseph. Colonial Minister cue of refugees and was a source of renewed tenStanley announced his government’s decision to —_ sion between the Yishuv and the British.

start cutting down the number of permits allo- At a Mapai Center meeting on 24 February cated to children rescued from the Balkans, thus 1943 Zvi Schechter (Yehieli) delivered his report reducing even further the quota of permits for on activity in Istanbul. A key figure in the rescue children to be rescued from other regions—if | operation, Yehieli was a member of the Mossad such opportunities even arose.Some consolation — Le Aliyah Bet and the Histadrut’s Agricultural could be found in Britain’s agreement to allocate Center, which also served as a cover for his ina few permits to adults, mainly veteran Zionists | volvement in many rescue and illegal immigra-

caught in the danger zones.” tion operations. Much of this activity was conThe JAE was opposed to this new develop- ducted from his office in Tel Aviv. Yehieli ment (Ben-Gurion was still on “vacation” ), fear- described the difficulties involved in the rescue

ing that this would block the path to rescuing § operation—especially of children, which inchildren from other occupied areas, with Sweden cluded a new complication: parental opposition

presenting a major opportunity. At the same _ to the removal of their children for fear of a time, Shalom Adler-Rodel, the Jewish Agency tragedy at sea. The Palestine Office in Sofia reemissary to Sweden, was checking this out. The _ ported on its inability to overcome this obstacle JAE decided to again suggest to Britain that itask | just when the rescue of children seemed possible.

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The situation of the Jewish community in of January 1943. In his discussions with Turkish Bulgaria at that time was relatively stable, which leaders, he proposed cooperation and the posmight partially explain the parents’ objections. __ sibility of advanced weapons, promising to atThe Jews of Bulgaria hoped for the best. As tempt to alleviate the tension existing between Yehieli described the parents’ fears and pointed Turkey and the USSR. Churchill also asked the out how hard it was to persuade them, Ben- Turks to permit Allied aircraft to land in Turkey Gurion butted in and claimed that this was “non- —_ on their way to bomb targets in eastern Europe sense.’ He obviously believed that the Jews of — (especially the oil fields in Ploesti in Romania).”

Bulgaria would not be saved if they did not leave TURKEY UNDER Europe in time.

Yehieli also described at length the obstacles CONFLICTING PRESSURES created by the Turks. Ben-Gurion had already =A convoluted explanation lay behind Turkey’s mentioned what he described as Turkey’s terrible meandering position on the Jewish issue as well attitude. The negotiations had taken nine asits late alliance with the Allied forces at the end months before the first group could leave, and _ of the war. Bitter memories of the damage Turkey the process was still complicated. Only now had suffered following the First World War were still the Turks been good enough to increase from _fresh. The Turks feared that the terrible new war fifty to seventy-five the groups that could pass = would end with the loss of what they had through their territory, and only two trains were _ achieved since the end of the previous one. They arriving at the Syrian border each week. The bor-__ were wary of annoying Hitler in any way in the der post there reported to Ankara thatagroup of unsettled period during the early days of the war, refugees had crossed the Turkish border on its _ especially with the Germans winning one victory

way south. Only then was an order sent to the _ after another.

capital of the country with instructions to issue Another of Turkey’s large neighbors, the travel permits through Turkey for the next group USSR, posed a constant and great threat. During of children and escorts, who were waiting pa- _ the early years of the war the USSR did not stand

tiently. Based on those travel permits, the chil- against Germany either, a fact that added to dren and their escorts received exit permits from — Turkey’s hesitance. In addition, Turkey avoided that country. Asa result of this cumbersome pro- —_— open and outspoken identification with the Alcedure, it took six weeks for one group to be fol- _ lies because of a complex tradition of ties, on the lowed by the next. The rescue of twenty-fivehun- — one _hand, and hostility, on the other, that it

dred children would have taken at least a year. maintained with the Arab world, especially its Ben-Gurion described in great detail the _ neighbors Iraq and Syria, both of whom tended JAF’s activity regarding the rescue operation and _ to adopt a pro-Nazi stance. There was also some stressed the importance of struggling “against — concern over the activity of the German embassy time,” since the annihilation was continuing and _in Turkey, headed by Ambassador Franz von Pathere was the possibility of a new front opening _ pen. A dynamic group of intelligence personnel up. He mentioned Churchill’s visit to Turkey as — at the embassy managed to influence Turkish being an clear sign of this trend. Ben-Gurion, of _ policies through the financing of local pro-Nazi course, could not have known the details, buthe —_ circles. The latter manipulated public opinion was right about the trend: Churchill arrived in _ into sympathizing with Germany and preventing Turkey at the end of January in order to winthe —‘ Turkey from joining the Allies.

latter over to the Allied side, invoking the spirit of Moreover, the policies of Britain and the the Allied decisions at the Casablanca conference — United States did not exactly encourage Turkey

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to express any special sympathy for the Jews.On —_ Istanbul. Only two emissaries, Chaim Barlas and the contrary, the Turks were aware of the failure § Dr. Joseph Goldin, were recognized as official of the Evian Conference and what followed atthe — representatives. The remainder were defined as

Bermuda Conference. They read in the press of press reporters or merchants, although they were the adventures of the St. Louis along the U.S. _ actually dealing in rescue and intelligence operacoast. They knew that the United States was _ tions. The Turkish security services (Emniyet) adamant in upholding its policy of closing its | was aware of most of this activity. The Turks gates to Jews, as was Britain. They were surely fa- |= maintained a conspiracy of silence with regard to miliar with Britain’s policies of greatly restricting the activity of Jewish rescue organization such as the entry of Jews into Palestine and had heard of — the JDC, which helped refugees and the local the tragic accidents that resulted from Britain’s | community. They even silently agreed to limited

stubborn attitude. Under those circumstances, operations for rescuing the Jews of Greece, which Turkey could certainly have asked why it had to might have been due to the involvement of take in Jewish children, thereby risking beingin- |= American and British intelligence services in undated by Jews at a time that was farfromcom- _ these activities. fortable economically. Its activity, therefore, was Throughout most of the war Turkey walked guided by self-interest, as was the casein many _a tightrope between the constant and continuous other countries, and it refused to accept many _ pressure exerted by the Nazis, on the one hand,

Jews into its territories. and Britain and America, on the other. Both were Like Britain, Turkey also tried to introduce | competing to win Turkey over to their side in the controlled changes into its policies as long asthis — war. Ben-Gurion’s fear of a new front was the redid not put it at risk. In February 1941 the Turk- _ sult of his inability to foresee which side Turkey ish parliament passed a law that allowed Jewish — would join. He returned from his “vacation” at

refugees of Nazi persecution to pass through _ theend of February and took his place at the head Turkey. However, the law stipulated that passage — of the JAE. The rescue issue was on the agenda at

would be permitted only to people with entry __ the first meeting Ben-Gurion chaired. The matpermits to their countries of destination. Anyone _ ter of transport, which posed the greatest probarriving in Turkey without a permit would be _lem, was again discussed. A proposal was made to expelled immediately or imprisoned for long send railway carriages from Syria and Palestine to periods. Turkey even forbade Turkish ships— _ reinforce Turkey’s sparse train service. Some specifically their owners and crew—from engag- might even be built in Palestine, although this ing in the transfer of refugees. Anyone disobeying = would depend on the Mandatory government, this law risked imprisonment and confiscation of |= which controlled raw materials.

his ship. Also discussed was the possibility of asking Turkey was caught in a web of conflicting the Turks for an increase in permits for each

pressures. When Nazi Germany encouragedemi- —_— group; it had already been demonstrated that the gration, Britain forbade Turkey from cooperating § immigrants were not remaining in Turkey. There with the Nazis in order not to flood Palestine with — was also a proposal to continue efforts to obtain escaping Jews. When Britain gradually changed _—aneutral ship to transport Jews to Palestine. Ben-

its policies and the Nazis forbade the emigration Gurion believed that the governments of Britain of Jews, Turkey was under pressure to do so— _and the United States should be asked to supply

with similar results: frustration of activity. ships for transporting immigrants. “There is no Nonetheless, Turkey turned a blind eye to __ value to rescue only in theory,” he said, and the activity carried out by the Yishuv’s delegationin §_Yishuv would also appeal to “our friends the

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Americans, to explain the situation to them and ties were hostile to the Jewish matter (as proof he also the possibility of saving 29,000 Jews—chil- _—_ cited their attitude toward Turkish Jews) and dren and adults—to prove to them that it de- _ transport in Turkey was slow and complicated.

pends only on them, if only they wish it” andif | Knatchbull-Hugessen even felt it would be they “understand the urgency of the matter.” He | worthwhile to examine the effect of widespread wanted to demonstrate what the Jews of England __ rescue operations on the supply needs of the and the United States could do besides lobbying _ British army within so shaky a transport system.

in the corridors of power, such as hiring a Por- RESCUING CHILDREN AND

tuguese ship to transport immigrants. In time it

became clear to Ben-Gurion that, by itself, the THE QUOTA GAME Yishuv was incapable of transporting the chil- _A sharp-eyed observer of British strategies at the dren who were at arm’s reach, and he therefore _ time could point to three facts. First, two Rohoped that the Jews of the United States and — manian ships (the Transylvania and the BessaraBritain could obtain the ship quickly. In this bia) captured by the British navy in 1941 sat idle spirit the JAE decided to cable its people in the in Istanbul, and yet no use was made of them to

United States and Britain “to try to obtain a ship transport the Jewish children waiting in the in order to transfer immigrants from Turkey.” Balkans. Stanley had asked for the ships to transMarch brought conflicting signals: waiting fer the children, but the Economics and Sea for the results of Kaplan’s delegation to Turkey _— Transport Ministries refused. Second, the high versus a call for the JAE to change its policieseven commissioner was in no hurry to agree to the rebefore his return. Kaplan, one of the JAE’s senior — quest that the Mandatory authorities relax the members, went to Turkey to gauge that country’s _ process of issuing immigrant permits and adapt potential in the rescue operation. Besides the _ them to the needs of the hour. Third, at this time plan for rescuing children, there were also two —_— Reuven Zaslani (Shiloah), Ze’ev Schind, and othransom plans under discussion during his visit, ers were considering other options and had even as well as other aid and rescue matters. Kaplan’s _ signed a secret collaboration agreement with mission was also a response to the demand to up- Colonel Tony Simmonds, head of a British intelgrade the delegation in Turkey, which was heard _ligence unit. From the Yishuv’s point of view, the

repeatedly in different arenas in the Yishuv. agreement was meant to profit from British intelBy the beginning of March 1943, Ben- __ligence in the rescue operation. The immediate Gurion had begun to convince the JAE of the _ plan under consideration involved an attempt to need to abandon the British plan as formulated rescue a thousand Jewish children each month by Stanley. Stanley himself was beginning toreal- — from Romania.

ize that certain elements within the British gov- The watering down of Stanley’s charmed ernment were working to thwart the changes he _—_ declaration had apparently begun in the JAE was trying to effect in British policy. This, for ex- London branch, which was the first to sense the ample, was the background to the preparations _— contradictory messages wafting in from the made by Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen, Britain’s _ British government. Ben-Gurion added his own ambassador to Turkey. He reckoned that on a _accentuations from Jerusalem and leaned toward practical and theoretical level it would be very — ending cooperation with Britain based upon difficult to carry out the plan to rescue children _—_— what appeared to bea wily stratagem. By allocat-

and believed that it should be viewed from the _ing entry permits to children whose rescue was more general perspective of Britain’s relations _ not at all certain, Britain would win respect for with Turkey in time of war. The Turkish authori- _ purely logistical and political reasons. Whether

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or not the children were rescued, adult refugees Ben-Gurion wanted to avoid the following would not be immigrating to Palestine because trap: in Istanbul Kaplan would learn that the almost all the permits were meant for children _ logistical problems were insurmountable; the and only 10 percent were reserved for escorts. All _ certificates, issued by region only to children this would be achieved without changingthe pol- —_—s from the Balkans, would be wasted because these

icy and without increasing the quota established — children could not be rescued; the remaining by the White Paper, with Britain extricating itself certificates would not be sufficient for those chilfrom the danger of losing its hold in the Arab —_— dren who could be rescued; given the lack of ad-

world. equate numbers of certificates, the possibility for British governmental circles believed that rescue would not be realized, causing the Jewish the plan was inoperative, so that from Britains children, the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine, and the point of view the risk was not great. Itcouldclaim — entire Jewish nation to emerge empty-handed. its own goodwill, and the Arabs had no grounds ___ The British, meanwhile, would stick to their 1939

for complaint since in the end neither Jewish restrictions, so that the real consequence of the children nor adults would be arriving in Pales- trap would be a total embargo on immigration tine. Moreover, it knew that the Yishuv would —_ and rescue. Ben-Gurion was sure that not reactaim its criticism at those who thwarted the plan, ing would be construed as an acceptance by the not at the British. It is possible that some govern- —- Yishuv and the JAE of the British tendency to inment personnel were sincere in their declarations clude the rescue of children in a game of quotas on behalf of rescuing Jews, but in all government and restrictions on the immigration of Jews to circles the accepted rule was that any kind of res- _ Palestine.

cue plan was not to be considered separately In order to escape this trap—and perhaps from general war needs and that it was not solely = also to deviate from the routine request that

Britain’s business. Britain change its policy—Ben-Gurion sugBen-Gurion suggested that Britain might be —— gested informing the British that the Yishuv was trying to mislead the Yishuv. He sawthat the chil- | now demanding that the certificates intended for dren were not arriving and considered the possi- —_ the rescue of children be used to rescue Jews from bility that all the permits were being allocated to the eastern Mediterranean countries of Yemen, children who had no chance of being rescued. _Iraq, and Syria. They, too, were in danger, for “if This suspicion had already been raised by the __ there is disquiet in Palestine after the war, these JAE following Stanley’s announcement that all — Jews are liable to be the first to be exterminated.”

permits would be assigned to children from Moreover, “in Iraq there is also a tradition of the Balkans.** Now Ben-Gurion repeated hisown _ slaughtering minorities [Assyrians] and the fact words from March 1943 at a JAE meeting: “It goes of the murder of Jews elsewhere in the world without saying that it is our duty to rescue as =would make it easier for the Iraqis to carry out the many Jews as possible from the Nazihellhole, but slaughter of Jews in their own country.”

unfortunately the issue of certificates is mere the- Ben-Gurion was supported in this view by ory, since there is no promising that we can use _his colleagues in the JAE. Some of them thought them to evacuate this many Jews from the occu- _ that the British should be asked to cancel restricpied countries.” The British announcement “is a tions on the number of Jewish refugees to be kind of nice gesture” and no more, sinceitsother __ given shelter in Palestine, as gleaned from Stan-

meaning is that “by issuing these certificates itis ley’s conditions and declarations. They deeffectively completing Jewish immigration to manded that the JAE make a public announcePalestine according to the White Paper.’4° ment that it would not reconcile itself to Britain’s

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policies to restrict the scope of rescue plans by _—_— nounced that the Yishuv would not accept the

upholding the terms of the White Paper quota. policy trend expressed by Stanley’s announceAt the meeting the participants debated —= ment, according to which “once the 29,000 chilwhether they should now request certificates for | drenand their escorts arrive in Palestine... there immigrants from the eastern Mediterranean will bea total block on immigration and the gates countries or be satisfied with a general declara- _ of Palestine will be closed to Jews.” tion that such a demand could be made. They Directives and memos in this spirit were also also discussed what kind of Jews could be trans- sent to Jewish and non-Jewish parties, such as the ported from these countries. Gruenbaum felt §= JAE branch in London, the JDC in New York, and that, given their present needs, the twenty-five the Times in London. In all of them the JAE thousand certificates were negligible and that a _ stressed that it rejected the certificate limitations request should be made to increase that number. — for rescue mentioned in the White Paper, as well Any remaining certificates could be used forim- _as the restrictions limiting the rescue operation migration from Iraq and Yemen. Ben-Gurion __ tochildren or specific regions. The JAE said it beproposed informing the government that “our _ lieved that all Jews should be saved who could be

appeal regarding the 25,000 certificates [is] only saved, regardless of age or country of origin. a provisional plan. Andifittranspiresthatwecan Since Palestine was a key destination for the resindeed evacuate children from the occupied cue of Jews, all entry restrictions had to be lifted countries—we shall demand an increase inthe _and logistical difficulties overcome that were prenumber of certificates for adults and children _ venting the rescue of children and adults alike.>! and we shall not restrict ourselves to the White It is worth noting that these messages refute Paper number.” The debate was brought to a the claim that was later made regarding a so-

close on this note.*® called conspiracy between the Yishuv leadership The JAE decided not to wait for Kaplan’sre- —_ and the British on the issue of rescue.* According

turn, not to base continued immigration on to this claim, the JAE silently reconciled itself clarifying the chances of success, but rather to —_ with the White Paper policies and by doing so reject the British concept andtodemandcontin- _ neglected the plight of the Jews of Europe, in reued immigration—even if this was not for the — turn for which Britain offered compensation in purpose of saving Jewish childrenandnotneces- __ the form of political arrangements after the war. sarily Jews from Europe. It can safely be assumed This claim could not be further from reality. that this decision reflected the growing fear that | Ben-Gurion and his colleagues quickly recogthe British were double-dealing by striving to _ nized the danger that the British might be leading

thwart the rescue of even the few Jews they had them into a trap. It took them less than approved in accordance with the twenty-five three months after Britain agreed to allocate thousand certificates. On the other hand, the _ certificates for four thousand children and less JAE feared—or harbored a growing suspicion— — than one month after Stanley made his public that efforts to rescue thousands of children were |= announcement. destined to fail. It consequently decided to “go With Kaplan’s return from Turkey, the JAE

all out.”4° was made aware of the real difficulty involved in

In an extremely decisive speech delivered a _ rescuing children who had been permitted to enfew days later at the Elected Assembly on the “re- _ ter Palestine. Nonetheless, Kaplan was convinced

construction plan” under discussion at the time, that for the time being there was no danger of a Ben-Gurion repeated his determination not to —_ new front opening in the Balkans. This was a de-

reconcile himself to British policy. He an- cisivelyimportant fact. A new front in the Balkans

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would have seriously jeopardized ship crossings the transport of Jewish refugees. Indeed, several in the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean. shipping companies were willing to lease them Kaplan reported that Germany’s weakened __ cargo ships. Then a new problem surfaced: Turkstate and lowered expectations of Hitler’s victory ish authorities were unwilling to permit the ships had caused several satellite countries to relax _—_ to transfer refugees without the permission of their policies toward the Jewsand permitthemto Britain. The latter had not yet received final dileave or to pass through their territories.» The — rectives on the matter, and the temporary inRomanian government, for example, was willing _ structions it did have were negative.

to permit the release of five thousand orphaned In terms of successes, Kaplan reported that children from Transnistria if the JAE agreed to __ the Red Cross had agreed to take the ships under transport them out of Romania. Kaplan had al- _its auspices and that the Soviet had promised not ready set aside two thousand certificates for the to harm refugees during their journey across the orphans, after which additional certificates | Black Sea. These conditions were essential for the would be allocated as needed. He alsocommitted sea transport of refugees, but they were not suffhimself to participate in their upkeep. Based on _ cient. It was not clear whether the Soviets or the

his commitments, the Romanian authorities Nazis were directly responsible for the February agreed that “the children would pass from 1942 sinking of the Struma in the Black Sea, and Transnistria to old Romania for sometimeinor- __ there was a real fear of a repeat of such events. der to improve their health somewhat and also so Kaplan also reported on a series of attempts by that nothing will go wrong at the last moment.” —_ emissaries to create an efficient passage for the sea Kaplan had made a comprehensive study of transport of Jewish refugees by hiring or purchasthe transport issue. He discovered that the grave ing ships from various countries. None of these reports sent by the emissaries had understated the __ efforts proved successful. The emissaries suggested real situation. Turkey was completely clogged,and that neutral Swedish ships sail from Romania or its railway system was in disrepair.Evenimportant — Bulgaria (one of these countries had been promcargoes belonging to the Allies were arriving in _— ised a “vast sum”), but they were told that “solemn northern Turkey two months after being unloaded = commitments had been made to Germany that in the southern ports. “We demanded five railway these ships would be used only for the transportacarriages a week,” said Kaplan “and this would __ tion of food, and the International Red Cross saw have allowed us to transport, albeit uncomfort- —_— no way of violating this commitment, nor of negoably, 300 to 350 children a week.” Even this request _tiating changes in this commitment.”°6

was not fulfilled, and the Turks would not even It was not simply because of Turkey that the promise railway carriages for two hundred chil- —_ rescue operation did not succeed. Some of the dren a week.® The rest of Kaplan’s report on the —_ people the emissaries spoke to in Turkey did exhardships of overland transport conforms with press goodwill, but they were all acting within the what has already been described. The Mandatory unrelenting restrictions of their foreign offices or authorities also rejected the proposal to send rail- | other government agencies. They were acting

way carriages to Turkey from Palestine. within a complex system of conflicting interests BLOCKAGES IN TURKEY that did not produce a single constant, firm, and definitive response favoring the rescue of Jews

AND IMPASSABLE SEAS from the certain death awaiting them at the Kaplan confirmed reports that sea transport was _ hands of the Nazis in Europe. also almost completely blocked. Yishuv represen- To take just one example, neither British nor tatives were prepared to pay exorbitant prices for | any other documentation contains any evidence

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that Churchill signaled to the Turkish authorities his key position in the leadership “triumvirate.” ) (during his visit in late January 1943) that Britain | Kaplan met with Johan Macpherson, the deputy would take a positive view of any help extended _ high commissioner, and with Mills, head of the by Turkey in the rescue of Jews. There isnoindi- | Mandatory government’s Emigration Departcation of any expression of general willingness, | ment. He shared with them details of his efforts let alone commitment, no evidence of any real _—_ during his visit to Turkey and asked for assistance pressure exerted to facilitate the passage across _in organizing his trip to London (no easy matter Turkey. Nor is there any mention of British guar-__—_ in time of war). In London Kaplan hoped to work antees to Turkey that any child arriving in Turk- —_ with Colonial Minister Stanley toward resolving

ish territory would be removed quickly. the delays and complications in carrying out the Moreover, there is no sign that Churchill or- _ plan for rescuing children.

dered Britain’s ambassador, Knatchbull-Hugessen, Macpherson replied that he could see no to follow to the letter the new directives issued by _ point to Kaplan’s trip to London but would help Colonial Minister Stanley and not to neutralize — in arranging it if Kaplan insisted on going. He them and make them ineffective bymeansofanin- promised to look into all the information Kaplan terpretation that actually prevented the rescue of — had brought with him and said that the British children. Nor is there even a hint that Britains | government was taking its own steps to promote

prime minister left unequivocal instructions to the rescue operation. For example, it had apwork toward a solution for the transport problems. _ proved an additional 12,500 immigration certiIn fact, there is no sign that information arriving _ficates, and together with the quota described by from Europe on the trail of the systematic murder _—_ Stanley in February, there were now 17,000 imof all the Jews there had motivated Britain into de- = migration certificates at the Yishuv’s disposal ciding to increase efforts to rescue Jewish children. __ valid through 1 July 1943.

Kaplan and his colleagues knew nothing of Kaplan also learned from Macpherson that the existence of these contradictory instructions. the immigration certificates were not being isNevertheless, they sensed the influence ofa polit- | sued only for children from Bulgaria but for ical line of thought whose overall purpose was __ those rescued from each of the occupied counthe delay and prevention of the rescue of adults __ tries. Nonetheless, the British were convinced under the pretence of prioritizing the rescue of that it would be best to focus on countries close children. They sensed opposition to any exten- _ to Palestine first, since it would be easier to rescue sive move that might jeopardize whatever the children from them and bring them to Palestine. various branches of British government defined = Macpherson’s words proved that Britain had alas Britain’s national interest. In any case, the ready received the JAE London branch’s demand “plug” was not released: Jewish adults or children _ to reopen the issue of certificates and was aware could arrive at the ports on the Black Sea—even _ of the Yishuv’s discontent (expressed in Ben-

as far as Istanbul—but no further.*’ Gurion’s address to the Elected Assembly on 24 Representatives of the JAE’s Political De- March 1943). Britain’s response consisted of an partment, Kaplan among them, applied to repre- avowed relaxation of sorts: it no longer insisted sentatives of the British government in Palestine, on certificates being issued only to children from Egypt, and London and asked them to pull the —_ Bulgaria and it increased the quota. plug. (It is worth noting that both during his visit Macpherson informed Kaplan and his coland on his return Kaplan did not act solely asa _ leagues that the British intended to distribute the Jewish Agency treasurer but mainlyasa member certificates among the various countries and age of the Political Department—an indication of — groups according to the following formula: 85

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“Or We Shall Have No Repentance”

percent would be allocated to children, 10 per- —_— who feared that assigning certificates to a specific

cent to adult escorts, and 5 percent to veteran — geographical region would adversely affect the Zionists, doctors, rabbis, and so on. Britain __ possibility of transporting Jews from other reagreed to let the JAE be responsible for these 5 gions—the Middle Eastern countries, for expercent as well (it clearly wanted to avoid having |§ ample—as Ben-Gurion and Dobkin had sugto enter this kind of minefield). Macphersonalso _ gested in early March. Others wondered how the reported that Bern and Ankara had received the JAE would deal with the outrage that would renames of three Jews authorized to give the con- _ sult if, for example, it reassigned five thousand suls of Switzerland (Britain’s representatives) in certificates designated for Polish Jews to Jewish Bucharest, Budapest, and Sofia the lists of chil- children from elsewhere. Would it be able to andren and their escorts. Based on these lists, the | nounce that this had been done because it was consuls would issue temporary permits that impossible to rescue Jews from Poland? would later be replaced by Turkish transit visas. Ben-Gurion brought the debate to a close by Moreover, any Jew able to reach Turkey __ reiterating Dobkin’s proposal: to demand that would subsequently be permitted entry into the British government allocate a regular quota Palestine. Even people who were under suspicion _ of certificates in addition to that allocated to Jews would be allowed to come to Palestine andinves- —_ rescued from Europe. If this were refused, the re-

tigations would be carried out while they werein | quest would then be for at least two thousand a detention camp. The feeling in the Yishuv was _ certificates to be placed at the disposal of immithat this was an extremely important develop- _ grants from countries other than those of occument. Macpherson also explained to Kaplan that — pied Europe. The proposal was adopted. BenBritain was trying to solve the transport problem | Gurion suggested considering if “there was any and that the British foreign secretary had ordered __ point to further efforts in London.” This probahis ambassador in Ankara to “grab all means to _ bly reflected doubts as to the reliability of promexpedite the rescue of the people.”>’ Barlas cabled = ises made by the deputy high commissioner Kaplan that positive moves were being made in —_—when he attempted to dissuade Kaplan from

the area of transport arrangements. making his journey to London. Since the activity Kaplan pressed the matter, asking if British | ofthe British authorities in Palestine had thus far ships could transfer Jewish refugees from the _ not fostered a sense of mutual trust, Ben-Gurion

Turkish ports of Mersin and Alexandretta to preferred direct efforts in London. Palestine or, alternatively, if ships purchased or In order to increase pressure on the British leased directly by the Yishuv could be used forthe |= government, the Yishuv’s demands were incorsame purpose. These requests had already been __ porated in a manifesto, which was presented to

presented to the representative of the Marine — the high commissioner during his visit with Transport Office and Macpherson promised to ‘Yitzhak Ben-Zvi and Golda Meir, who headed strive for a positive response. Kaplan also raised —_ the National Council delegation. The British and

the possibility of improving overlandtransporta- other Allied governments were required to take tion by means of railroad carriages sentto Turkey action to ensure suitable transportation of by the Yishuv. Macpherson promised to discuss — refugees and to encourage neutral countries to

this with the rail authorities in Palestine and si- open their borders to children. Ben-Gurion multaneously to apply directly to representatives stressed that Britain was to promise the neutral

of the executive in charge.°? countries that any refugees in their territories During the first week of April the JAE dis- | would be removed quickly and would not becussed Kaplan’s findings. There were still those | comea burden.°!

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This pledge was also reflected in the efforts Britain’s policies. His preliminary good feeling of the London branch of the JAE to clinch a was based on the speed with which the British Swedish agreement to take in Jewish children — government asked for numerical assessments of from the occupied areas. Itisimportantindeter- _ the Yishuv’s ability to integrate refugee children. mining the question of whether the Yishuv’s — He also assumed the plan for rescuing children efforts at rescuing Jews were dependent on the —_ would be received more generously. During his immigration of the refugees to Palestine. It is | stay in London, Sharett was impressed by expossible to see in Ben-Gurion’s speech at the first pressions of sympathy: the declaration of the protest rally on 30 November 1942 an unwavering powers on 17 December 1942, which appeared

position taken by the JAE and the National to herald the British government’s retreat beCouncil to rescue Jewish children and to bring _ fore public pressure; the demonstrations in parthem to any country willing to give them refuge. liament, including standing at attention and The British deputy high commissioner — emotional parliamentary speeches. Within the atpromised that the manifesto would be trans- | mosphere of evil and madness prevalent in the ferred to London and stressed that his country — world, there was a tendency to grasp at these geswould act to the best of its ability toimproveand tures and hope that they would now be followed

simplify transportation within Turkey.* The by action. manifesto also included a memo from the JAE to Moreover, Sharett’s hope was based mainly the British government mentioning the need _ on Britain’s decision, announced secretly at the to help in the rescue of children in time for the — beginning of December 1942, to allocate immi-

Bermuda Conference.® gration certificates to four thousand children and EFFORTS IN GREAT BRITAIN five hundred adult escorts, which | followed shortly after the news of the situation in Europe

AND THE UNITED STATES and caused Ben-Gurion, Sharett, and their colWhile activity was taking place in Palestine fol- leagues to believe that a new chapter had begun. lowing the leadership’s understanding of what _—_‘ The secret nature of the announcement also imwas happening in Europe, Moshe Sharett, head —_— parted a sense of operational decisiveness and the

of the Jewish Agency’s Political Department, set | hope that the British meant to keep their promoff on a broad political campaign in London and ise. It is clear, therefore, why Ben-Gurion hurried the United States. He left for London on 23 No- to chastise Dobkin for leaking the information to vember 1942, just as evidence was being supplied § Mapai activists on 8 December.®

by the “sixty-nine,” and received his first in- However, early on Sharett and Ben-Gurion structions from Jerusalem while he was under- realized that their hopes were unfounded. Upon way. By the time he reached Egypt, Sharett had his return to Palestine, Sharett described at already received orders to raise the issue ofrescu- _ length the stages of his enlightenment. He arrived

ing children, along with other matters, in his in London after the announcement of the fortydiscussions with Sir Harold Rupert Alexander, __ five hundred certificates. This had been Britain's commander in chief of the British forces in the | response to the Yishuv’s first appeal, which inMiddle East. Upon his arrival in London, he — cluded a demand to rescue children from all the joined in the efforts of the local JAE branch and _ regions and not to limit the rescue to the stipulaeven made a personal attempt to overcome vari- __ tions of the White Paper. The British, however,

ous difficulties. announced that they were restricting the alloca-

Sharett’s first reports were optimistic. Only __ tion of certificates solely to the rescue of children later did he fathom the internal contradictionsin _ and to a single country (Bulgaria).

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“Or We Shall Have No Repentance”

In his talks with Stanley, Sharett gradually Sharett left Britain for the United States, came to understand that the latter would con- where he joined Weizmann in his efforts at prosider any attempt to deviate from these restric- |= moting the plan for rescuing children. Prior to tions as “ungratefulness at his great act, that he = this, Weizmann had met Edward Halifax, had achieved the possibility of removing 4,500 _ Britain’s ambassador to the United States, who children from Bulgaria.” When Sharett insisted, | promised to recommend that his government Stanley told him that the issue wouldforcehimto — permit ten thousand Bulgarian Jews to enter “go to the War Cabinet.” This hinted at the dis- _ Palestine. cord among the various arms of the British gov- At the end of his U.S. visit, Sharett felt that a ernment concerning the correct response to the —_ certain move forward had taken place. For one murder of Jewish children in Europe. In practical — thing, Roosevelt had promised a delegation of terms, the transfer to the cabinet would have Jewish congressional members that he would deadded complications and a dragging of heels. It | mand that Hitler release Jewish children, stating is also worth mentioning that Ben-Gurion’s re- _ that “he is willing to feed people if they are being quest to meet Churchill to discuss the rescue of to be butchered in order to save food.” His listen-

children from Europe was refused.°*” ers also gathered that he was prepared to help on Sharett also tried to cancel the banonevac- __ the issue of ships, since “it was nonsense to say uating adult Jews from occupied Europe for fear that there are no ships for removing people; the that the Germans would use this channeltosend ships are coming back empty and they are leaving in spies. He said that the JAE was convinced that |= America full, but they are bringing back nothing immigrants had to be checked to make sure that | to America and something can be arranged.” no spies had infiltrated, but that they should not = There were also rumors that Britain was about to be denied entry into Palestine. He asked for “one | demand that Turkey set up transit camps until example, one instance of spies entering Palestine — the transport problems could be resolved.”! disguised as immigrants.”® As we have seen, Mac- Two months later there were still no tangible pherson informed Kaplan of the lifting of the |= manifestations of Roosevelt’s verbal promises.”

ban. Behind the scenes contradictory activities were The deeper Sharett delved, the clearer it be- being pursued by various British authorities. The came to him that the JAEhad beentrapped bythe overall result was a general dragging of heels in British government’s announcement of the allo- —_‘ the plan to rescue children. The Zionist movecation of immigrant certificates for the rescue of | ment began to doubt if the British intended to children. His own assessment of Britain’s activity fulfill their promises. In the end, it was clear to all was identical to Ben-Gurion’s and the rest of the — that Britain’s declarations were not reflecting JAE leadership in Palestine. However, Sharett did their activity, although it was hard at first to unstress two important points. First, Britain re- derstand the difficulties involved in overcoming vealed a willingness to help the Yishuv negotiate —_ logistical and official restrictions.”

the awarding of exit permits and travel visas.© For example, Britain did not invest too Sharett had personally experienced the weakness = much effort in simplifying the complex ruling for of the Zionist movement in political negotiations —_ distributing travel visas. The permits were sent to with hostile or semihostile states. Second, Sharett Bern, Switzerland (Britain’s representative in the

saw a positive change in Britain’sagreementtoal- | Axis countries), and, after examination and locate certificates to adults from occupied coun- confirmation, were dispatched once a month by tries (15 percent of the certificates, and not only to courier to various destinations. Any hitch would

the children’s escorts).” delay the dispatch by a month. Sharett asked if 167

Rescue Plans

the permits could be sent directly to the capital | Foreign Office and Adolf Eichmann on behalf of city of the recipient’s country and was favorably — the Central Reich Security Office. Eberhard Von impressed when his request was granted, but §Thadden, who was responsible for Jewish affairs nothing was ever done.” It gradually became in the German Foreign Office, ordered the Gerclear that various branches of the British govern- | manambassador in Romania to make Germany’s ment were sterilizing the decision to soften up —_ objections clear on the emigration of Jews from official policy and that in the end there would be = Romania. The Nazis also put pressure on Ankara

no real progress in rescuing Jews from Europe.” to prevent the entry of Jewish children into

GERMANS FORBID THE EXIT Turkey ann Eichmann announced Germany’s willingOP JEWISH CHILDREN ness to exchange five thousand Jewish children Notwithstanding the dissent among the various _ for twenty thousand combat-ready, able-bodied British government branches, even the Germans Germans. It was an empty offer: it was obvious reduced the number of chances of the successive that the powers would reject it even if that many rescue plan. It appeared that the fears the Nazis | Germans could be found who were willing to rewould not make exceptions of the children were turn to Nazi Germany. The head of the southern well founded, both because children represented | command of the German navy, Admiral Kurt a continuation of the “evil” and the “rot” andbe- —_—_‘ Fricke, issued operative orders preventing the cause they constituted a burden and were useless. | departure of ships bearing Jews from the ports of With the news of the exit of the first groups | Romania and Bulgaria and, where necessary, of children from Hungary,” Germany instructed even to sink them.

its ambassadors in Bucharest, Sofia, and the In March 1943 the Nazis proved that they other southern European capitals to help Adolf | were serious about preventing the exit of children Eichmann’s henchmen in preventing the exit of | by arresting a group of Romanian children at the additional groups. This happened after the fact | Bulgarian border town of Svilengrad who were

became known among diplomats and intelli- on their way to Turkey through Bulgaria. They gence personnel in Istanbul and had been pub- imprisoned two of the group and sent them east. lished in the Yishuv and the Western press. After this event, the German embassy representaSeveral reasons were given. First, permission tive in Bucharest made it clear that Germany was

to remove Jewish children from Europe would dealing with an overall solution to the Jewish render the “final solution” incomplete. Second, | problem in Europe and that this included chilthe involvement of the satellite countries in the | dren. The German diplomat warned that any atexit preparations might serve asa precedent and _ tempt to leave would meet a similar fate. It was a awaken or reinforce their feeling of reneging on — position Germany upheld.”

their ties with Nazi Germany. Third, the children Today we know that it was the unrelenting were liable to pass on military and political se- | stand taken by the Nazis toward Jewish children crets. Fourth, the removal of Jewish children that proved to be the main obstacle preventing would counter promises given to the Palestinian their rescue. Were it not for this relentless posimufti, Haj Amin al-Husseini, and upset German __ tion, the British would have found themselves

policies in the Arab world. during that spring and summer of 1943 facing a Thus, senior German officials prevented the series of promissory notes that they themselves exit of Jewish children from occupied territories. | had handed out and that they would very probaThis was done by Karl Rademacher and Fritz bly have had to pay off. They were saved from this Gebhardt von Hahn on behalf of the German “embarrassing” situation by the Nazis. The point

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“Or We Shall Have No Repentance”

must be stressed that it was the Nazi’s relentless —_ Their silence probably meant that the JAE memactivity that thwarted the rescue plans for Jewish bers assumed Sharett had actually tried to crack

children in occupied Europe. Without German the British “nut,” to foil their trap and to make it interference, it is possible that the other obstacles —_ clear to them that they would not achieve their could have been overcome and thousands of objective to bring about a change in policy, to deJewish children could have made their way from _viate from the White Paper quota and to allocate

Europe to Palestine. a special quota of immigrant certificates to chilAlthough in his speech to the Elected As- dren. Reflected in Sharett’s firm decision was the sembly Ben-Gurion referred to the fatal singular- | same harsh modus operandi forced on the Zionity imposed on the Jewish nation andits children ist leadership and the unrelenting reality the by the Nazis, at the time the Yishuv leadership —_ leadership now found itself in.

had no idea of the preventive activity being car- WHO SHOULD BE RESCUED?

ried out by the Nazis. Nor were the emissaries engaged in saving Jewish children aware of this. Sharett’s decision was not arrived at in a vacuum. Fearing a Nazi reaction, they asked that their — The difficult question of who should be rescued activity not be made public. Everyone knew the _ was constantly floating in the air. When it bemurderous potential of Nazi ideology, especially | came clear that all Jews could not be saved, other toward Jewish children, and many repeated this _—_ directions were explored: Should the nation’s publicly. Still, it was easier to wallow in the illu- _ leaders be saved at the expense of ordinary folk? sion that Germany would allow the children to Should people be saved whose professions were

escape its murder machine. essential to the Zionist enterprise? Should the criThe obstacles discovered inthe course oftry- _ teria be that of political affinity, family, or ethnic ing to rescue the children and the needto choose __ origin? Should devoted veteran party members

between rescuing children and adults led the be rewarded by having their lives saved? leadership to a fierce debate, with several of its There were no simple answers. It was cermembers taking firm stands. When Sharett be- _ tainly impossible to arrive at a consensus. From a came aware of the trap—when he knew that moral point of view, this issue had no solution Britain was not about to allocate a special quota = and continued to be raised throughout the Holofor children but to devote all twenty-nine thou- —_—caust years, although it must be stated that the sand remaining certificates to the rescue of chil- | outcome was meager, since the Yishuv managed dren after deducting the first five thousand—he __ torescueavery small proportion of Jews from the instructed Barlas in Istanbul to prefer children —_ ovens. Confrontation could be likened to putting aged fourteen to sixteen over those aged ten to _— one’s hand in the fire, although Jewish leadertwelve. He assumed that Britain wasinterestedin ships in Europe and Palestine could not avoid it. avoiding the immigration of able-bodied adults | Concerning the issue of rescuing children, the and burdening the Yishuv with the task of inte- —_ horror was unbearable even to those experienced grating young children, explaining that “for this in confronting it: Who would defend these chilreason I cabled Barlas and not only so that we — dren, many of whom were young orphans, and would have smaller educational expenses, less _ battle on their behalf?”

years of an inactive Yishuv.”7 Nonetheless, attempts were made to reply Sharett’s decision was presented to the JAE _ to the question of whom to save. They were dis-

and did not elicit a response. His colleagues must tributed, in written form, among the senior have understood his motives. No one asked him members of the Yishuv leadership, including Ben-

if he had conferred with anyone beforehand. Gurion. Apollinary Hartglas, political secretary

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of the Rescue Committee and close associate of bring” there is a hint of the fear that it would not Gruenbaum, made a suggestion ina memo ad- _ be possible to save them.

dressed only to “Zionist elements,” in other Ben-Gurion’s belief was that after the chilwords, only to members of the Zionist Federa- _ dren, it would be possible to bring in the adults as tion and not Agudat Israel or the Revisionists. At __ well, and that the Yishuv would never reconcile that time both these groups were full participants _ itself to limiting the scope of immigration to acin the Rescue Committee; this restriction demon- commodate the directives of the White Paper. In strates the kind of realignments that developed =a _ speech shortly after Hartglas’s memo, Ben-

in that committee. Gurion informed his audience that “we had been

Hartglas was unyielding: in determining the — granted 34 thousand certificates, especially for

criteria for rescuing Jews, “Zionist” calculations children,” but he made it quite clear that “it must be made. Candidates for rescue must be —_ would be naive of Britain to believe that the graded according to their usefulness to the | Yishuv would be content with bringing in that Yishuv—according to Hartglas, in other words. | number and that would be the end of it.”®!

Still, the writer of the memo tended toward the Ben-Gurion obviously felt it necessary to rescue of children and explained this preference evacuate the children, both for humanitarian as being one of usefulness: “First and foremost, and practical reasons. First, they would not be children must be saved since they constitute ex- coming at the expense of adults and must be cellent material for the Yishuv [like] pioneer given priority because of their greater vulnerabilyouth,” although only those who have received _ ity; it was an unconditional position, whose Zionist training are suitable, “from a spiritual § motives were principally emotional and moral. point of view, for Zionist Labor.”8° One has al- — Second, the rescue of children would pave the ready seen that such shameful considerations of way for the rescue of adults. usefulness Hartglas raised in his revolting memo Ben-Gurion did not doubt the intelligence could lead to a controversial conclusion, namely, of the British and knew they were aware of the that the immigration of children was not really _fact that after the rescue of children they would worthwhile, since they would only constitute a —_ have to contend with the struggle of the Yishuv financial and organizational burden and would _—_and the Jewish world over the rescue of adult

be unable either to work or to fight. Jews, but from the beginning he believed there These were not Ben-Gurion’s conclusions. __ were signs of Britain’s tendency to relax its immi-

According to his public outcry and his subse- _ gration policies in Palestine. British policy conquent instructions to the Jewish Agency in the __ tinued to mislead the JAE and the emissaries. An United States and London following the official | outside observer had no idea where things were announcement of the murders, his position was __ really leading.®? The British repeatedly attempted

unequivocal and determined: the childrenhadto — to repackage old “goods” and to quote a new be saved, first and foremost, whatever the cost. __ price. He said that there would be no forgiveness if they Kaplan, the Jewish Agency’s treasurer, and were left to fend for themselves: “If we do not Sharett, head of the Political Department, were bring those that we were able to bring, we shall | Ben-Gurion’s senior colleagues in handling the have no repentance.” These words werespokenin __ political-operational aspects of the rescue atan atmosphere of outrage following the news —_ tempts. Kaplan continued to be the primary coming from Europe. It was still not clear how — wheeler-dealer on these issues, and not merely on hard it would be to rescue children from Europe, the financial side. During the second half of May, but in his words “those that we were able to —_ Kaplan left for Egypt since nothing had resulted

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“Or We Shall Have No Repentance”

from the meetings with Macpherson and Millsin quest for permission to establish a transfer camp. Palestine. The main issue on hisagenda wastrans- = Knatchbull-Hugessen also supported an idea portation within Turkey: “He wasinvitedtoCairo that the Turks allow Turkish ships to transfer to the office of the state minister [Richard Casey], Jewish refugees. Kaplan summed up the situation so he said, on the matter of a ship for the immi- _as follows: “Thus, we have obtained promises of grants.’83 In Cairo Kaplan spoke with several offi- help from the British. Only time will tell if this cials in addition to Casey, the resident British also motivates the Turks to help us.”*4

minister for Middle Eastern affairs and the high- THE BRITISH DILEMMA: SYMBOLIC est ranking British diplomat in the region. Casey GESTURE OR COMPLETE FREEZE promised to cable instructions to the British am-

bassador in Ankara to promote, to the best ofhis | Casey’s promises to Kaplan and Knatchbullability, the effort to obtain ships forthe rescueop- | _Hugessen’s activity were a result of pressure on eration. He declared that if necessary he was pre- __ the part of Stanley, the colonial minister, who

pared to “take personal responsibility for the since his appointment in 1942 had been trying to transfer of immigrants from Alexandretta [onthe change Britain’s policies on the rescue issue. He Syrian border] to Palestine.” Kaplan was alsotold believed that action on the part of Britain would that the British embassy in Ankarahad appointed — enhance its political standing, would be a hua special official whose job it was to help immi- —manitarian gesture, and would help to alleviate

grants reach Palestine. pressure from the Jews, the Zionists, and their Compared with Casey’s promises, his reser- | supporters—such as Eleanor Rathbone and vations appeared quite reasonable: the British | others in the United Kingdom and the United government was unable to facilitate the exit of | States—without easing restrictions defined in

Jews from the Balkan states and could only the White Paper. influence the Turkish government into facilitat- In March 1943, five months after Stanley being the crossing. Nor could it promise to place —_ gan his campaign of change, he noticed that offi-

British and American ships at the Yishuv’s cials in Palestine and Ankara were not carrying

disposal at the port of Mersin (on Turkey’s out his instructions in full. He repeated that Mediterranean coast). If necessary, the British — Britain’s “political interests” required that his government would undertake responsibility for | proposals be promoted. Cables to this effect were overland transportation of people from Alexan- _ sent to the high commissioner in Palestine, Casey

dretta to Palestine. in Cairo, and Knatchbull-Hugessen in Ankara. The commitments and declarations from The latter was ordered to help with transportaCairo seemed promising, accompanied as they __ tion both by sea and land. were by reports by Barlas that this time there were Stanley’s instructions were ignored, and he indeed positive signs and the British embassy in _ increased pressure. He appealed to Foreign MinAnakara was beginning to help in organizing the _ ister Anthony Eden with a request for support for crossing in Turkey. Barlas suggested testing vari- _his initiative and asked him to appoint Casey co-

ous possibilities regarding ships but recom- ordinator of the operation. Eden joined Stanley, mended that the Yishuv wait a few days until — but Casey was nota Foreign Office man and Eden things became clearer. He referred to the growing — was reserved about appointing him, as was

thawing in British ambassador Knatchbull- | Knatchbull-Hugessen. The latter believed that Hugessen’s attitude. Together with the local _ the issue of rescuing Jews through Turkey should American ambassador, Laurence Steinhardt, the not be separated from other British interests in

ambassador had applied to the Turks with a re- the region and claimed that he had recently

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managed to advance the rescue plan. Itseemed at _ British interests: it was a far better idea to permit the time that there were positive results to Stan- _ the entry of from four to five thousand children, ley’s demands for British help in sea transporta- _ thus creating a certain respite, than to have to

tion. Two ships were considered, the hospital | contend with seventy thousand Jewish refugees ship Sontay and the two trapped Romanian ships —_ knocking at the gates of Palestine—and who the Besservia and the Transylvania. Thenavyand — knows how many would follow.

admiralty stopped objecting to the transfer of Kaplan was not too enthused by the positive Jewish refugees from Europe to Palestine. attitude he met in Cairo. Past experience, knowlThree more developments that influenced — edge of the feeble results of the Bermuda ConferStanley’s position should be recalled. First, in _ ence, and his own suspicions led him to ask Casey March 1943 there was already knowledge in the _ to arrangea flight to London for him. Casey tried Yishuv and in Britain of two ransom plans under _ to wriggle out of it (like Macpherson before him), discussion; the first mentioned the rescue of sev- _ stressing that anyway these matters “sort thementy thousand Jews from Romania, while the sec- _ selves out here in the Middle East.” This was a

ond considered the rescue of the entire Jewish typical response, for, when they wanted to, the population of Slovakia. By February 1943 the _ British made a point of sending the Yishuv heads British were already leaking to the pressinforma- — and _the emissaries to London for answers, this tion on the proposal to exchange the lives of __ being the source of authority. Casey was clearly seventy thousand Jews for a monetary ransom, __ trying to mislead Kaplan: the focus of pressure

which put an end to that plan. for getting things done was London, in Stanley’s Second, at the same time that Britain held dis- office. The winds from Palestine, Ankara, and cussions with Yishuv representatives on the fateof | Cairo were blowing cold. the Jews trapped in Europe, it was also announc- Either way, Kaplan had few choices. He had ing at the Bermuda Conference that Palestine was _lost his faith in the British long before, like most not to be the main destination of the refugees. The —_ of his colleagues in the Yishuv leadership, but this

results of the conference were leaked and there time he could only hope that they would make were already signs of renewed public pressure in —_ good on their promises. As Kaplan said upon his the Yishuv, the United States, and Britain. These —_ return, “On our part, everything has been done in developments also help to explain the meaning __ order to rescue the refugees. We are knocking on

behind the positive atmosphere created by the every open and closed door, but it does not deBritish in Cairo at the end of May 1943: they were pend on us.” In order to increase the effectiveafraid of a negative reaction to their efforts to —_ ness of “knocking on doors,” Teddy Kollek went

thwart the mass rescue of Jews from Europe. to Istanbul and joined the emissaries’ activity. Third, the JAE shared with the British all in- Kollek was the special tasks man in the Jewish formation on its activity in Sweden by way ofthe = Agency’s Political Department and a member of JAE London branch. Shalom Adler-Rudel, Jewish — the limited-activity operation arm headed by Agency emissary to Sweden, tried to persuadethe = Ben-Gurion. He left for Istanbul in order to Swedish government to accept twenty thousand __ strengthen the secret cooperation with British children. At the time it appeared that the Swedes = and American intelligence services in the region.*

tended to agree, and the British would have ap- Reports flowing in from various JAE peared to be the nation thwarting efforts at sav- | branches during May and June 1943 were mixed.

ing children. Among the positive signs were Portugal’s willingThus, in May 1943 it seemed that Stanley’s _ ness to harbor Jewish refugees until the end of the

approach was the one that would best serve — war and the issuance of entry permits by Latin

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“Or We Shall Have No Repentance”

American countries to children it had previously had not been exhausted. (At the time there were a been impossible to take out of Germany.®’ Asim- _little over twenty-five thousand certificates unasilar agreement had been obtained in the Pinkney __ signed.) The information was passed on to the

Tuck negotiations. London branch on 5 July 1943. On 16 July MacThere was also a report on Shaul Meirov’s _ pherson reneged on this policy at a meeting with (Avigur) talks with the Russians in Tehran in or- Sharett in Jerusalem.

der to persuade them to increase the exit rate of The announcement seemed important and Jewish refugees, especially children, from their __ far-reaching in several respects. First, it actually territories.*8 This was a continuation of the talks blurred the distinction between a legally recogin Tehran, Haifa, and Jerusalem between Dob- nized refugee and a refugee who had no legal sta-

kin, Sharett, and Ben-Gurion and the Polish tus. Anyone who managed to make his or her way minister Kot. Another positive signal came from to Turkey would be recognized as a refugee and Sweden, whose government had announced its _ allowed to enter Palestine. It constituted a change willingness to take in twenty thousand children _ in the line of thinking that had reached rock botunder certain conditions. All those involved in —_ tom with the Struma. (This was the ship that had Jerusalem, London, and the United States were arrived at the coast of Turkey laden with refugees, waiting for the latter’s and Britain’s response to —- was not permitted to continue on its way, and

the Swedish conditions. was sunk by a Soviet torpedo while waiting for a There were also negative reports reaching — change of policy.) Second, it was also a firm the JAE. Attempts at obtaining ships in the _ British declaration that for the time being there United States had failed, contradicting Sharett’s | was no need for illegal immigration. Anyone esoptimism upon his return. There was a sad end- caping from occupied Europe would be recoging to efforts at persuading the U.S. administra-_ _ nized as a legal refugee—at least until such time tion to ask the Germans for permission tolet Jews that the quota was filled. Third, if every Jew arout or, alternatively, to permit the establishment —_riving in Turkey could enter Palestine, this meant

of a feeding program for starving Jews. that there was no longer a restriction on the resNothing happened on the matter ofrescuing —__ cue of adults as a result of certificates being allo-

refugees from the Balkans. Sumner Welles, the cated only to children.”

U.S. undersecretary of state, announced at a It was therefore decided that Sharett would meeting that his government and that of Britain —_ be sent to Turkey and Egypt, where he would ex-

were doing all they could to secure immigrant amine the practical significance of Stanley’s new certificates to save children and adults. Certain | announcement. It was a hurried mission, since proposals for activity were rejected because of — Sharett had only just returned from a journey to “high level” political considerations or because __ Britain and the United States. Ben-Gurion em“the time was not right.” In the midst of all this, | phasized the importance of this trip, which was hopeful news was received that France had per- _ arranged through a series of meetings and corre-

mitted the exit of two thousand children to — spondence.

oer ane and action was being taken to trans- THE “ALIYAH BET

ws BALFOUR DECLARATION”

There was a positive turn of events at the

beginning of July 1943. Stanley announced offi- — By the end of March the British had informed the cially that any Jew who managed to reach Turkey —_ Yishuv leadership that they would make a prewould be allowed into Palestine. This was possible —_ liminary check of any Jews who succeeded in esonly as long as the quota of White Paper certificates caping the Balkans and arriving in Istanbul, and

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Rescue Plans

if they were not a spies or enemy agents they _—_ some in the British government who genuinely would be allowed to enter Palestine.?! In Palestine wanted to help in the rescue of children. None-

they would be placed in a transit camp where theless the British had a firm basis to believe they would be examined again. If the refugees _ that there was no fear of Turkey being flooded by were found to be “clean,” they would remain in =‘ Jewish refugees, which allowed them to make Palestine as legal immigrants whose entry was —_ new promises and to announce fine-sounding permitted while certificates from the White Pa- —_ but empty changes in their polices.

per quota were still available. What was different As far as the British were concerned, there in the British announcement? It appeared that —_ was no dangerous risk here: first, they could rely

they were only repeating their habit of selling | on the Bulgarian borders being blocked by the

“repackaged” goods. Nazis; and, second, they had control over the timIn addition to the fact that there was no _ ing of announcements to Turkey concerning polchange, the British announcement contained icy changes, which they delayed from summer within it signs that the government was attempt- 1943 to spring 1944. Thus, there was only a slight ing to ensure for itself a swift and quiet way out. — chance of promises being fulfilled, which was The first sign was the demand that thischangein _ probably the motive behind the declared change policy be kept secret. (This request was explained __ in British policy toward the rescue of Jews. Basias necessary for the good of the refugees, and _cally, the slight chance that the British would ever there was indeed a reasonable fear that the Ger-_ —_— have to make good on their promises also explains

mans and Arabs might hamper the operation.) other changes in their positions, which were also The second sign could be found in the British | demonstrative and not necessarily realistic.%

government’s determination that it would go Did the Yishuv leadership not see through back on its promises in the event of unforeseen _ this or did it decide to ignore its suspicions and

difficulties. grasp at the announcement? The answer, it These two signs were included in the an- — would appear, was that it hoped that this was

nouncement itself, but they meant nothing ex- _—_—s indeed a change for the better and, besides, since

cept that the British were being extremely cau- _— there weren’t too many choices available, one tious and reserving for themselves the right to — should make the best of it. Sharett therefore left withdraw if necessary. After a while something _—_ for Egypt harboring a cautious hope.

else emerged that proved the British had not, in Before he left, an announcement came from fact, made any changes in their rescue policies: — Bulgaria that it was permitting a thousand adults they informed the Turks of their changed policies and children to leave. When the proposal first only eight months later—in March 1944! With- arose at the end of 1942 and early 1943, it was beout Turkey’s agreement to the entry of Jews, lieved that the process would be relatively easy Britain’s decision to permit them to enter Pales- —_ thanks to Bulgaria’s geographical proximity and, tine was worthless. It was Britain itself, therefore, | to a certain extent, Bulgaria’s somewhat inde-

that emptied its promise of all significance.” pendent character. In February even Stanley was

Thus, the practical and demonstrable announcing that Bulgaria was allowing Jewish change in British policy toward attempts at res- — children out. The Bulgarian announcement now cuing Jews from extermination developed gradu- _—_—joined other positive signs, with hopes rising that

ally. It would appear that this change wasbrought _ the thousand Jews in question would be the first about at least in part by increased pressureonthe in an ongoing process.

part of the Yishuv and Britain’s desire to release Sharett went to Egypt at a time when the this pressure by redirecting it. Perhapsthere were — emissaries in Istanbul and JAE members in Pales-

174

“Or We Shall Have No Repentance”

tine were working on implementing the Bul- The emissaries’ plan was based on a deal garian announcement and promoting the large —— with a Bulgarian businessman named Jordan ransom plan that was connected to the Jews of | Spassof, which was launched in May, shortly after Slovakia. At the same time, it was understood in the Bulgarians’ announcement. Spassof promthe Yishuv that this was a large-scale program.In _ ised to obtain the appropriate permits and to orMay money was transferred for this purpose. _—_ganize the exodus. As his reward, he would reThus, Sharett’s presence in Turkey was essential ceive a loan from the emissaries provided the and his journey took place against the back- __ purchase of a ship was successful. Spassof was an ground of Britain’s declaration, which was easy _ elderly ship dealer that Teddy Kollek, Ze’ev

enough to believe in. Schind, Zvi Yehieli, and others had tried to inAs we shall see, this was an expression of the volve in the Yishuv’s sea rescue operation. The re-

permanent working pattern of the Ben-Gurion- —_ lationship with him had been engineered by Kaplan-Sharett triangular operational leader- = another shipowner named Stefano Dandria, an ship. When there seemed to be a real chance at _Italian who had contacts with Yishuv emissaries rescue activity, they formed a kind of “forward — even before the war. Although Spassof had lost command post” at the location in question. This _ his property, he was knowledgeable and experitime Sharett set off for Turkey and headed the __ enced, and the Yishuv wanted to take advantage command post. In February-March 1943 Kaplan of his connections in the world of shipping. His was there. From what we have seen so far, it is _ ties with the Yishuv presented a sure way to reinclear that Kaplan’s and Sharett’s activity was __ state his status: he would buy a ship with Yishuv closely coordinated with Ben-Gurion, as wasthat money, transport refugees, and eventually the

of the emissaries in Istanbul. ship would become his own property. It was a Two obstacles blocked the way to the rescue ___ deal that was agreeable on all sides, the kind that

of the thousand Jews from Bulgaria. First wasthe Kaplan, upon his return from Turkey, favored need for official permits to evacuate them. The — when he spoke about the advantages of leasing Bulgarians’ announcement was not sufficient. It _—_— ships instead of buying them indirectly.

had to be translated into a thousand actual per- Zeev Schind and Teddy Kollek hosted mits, one for each candidate for escape. Second, — Spassof, giving him a “proper conversion” and a

it was necessary to organize transportation. | “seminar in Zionism,” with appropriate food and Britain’s declaration regarding three ships to be —_ drink. They still had some doubts, but in the end placed at the disposal of the rescue operation was __ they decided to solidify the connection with the

yet to be put to the test. man. Anyway, they had few other options. With The emissaries worked on two levels. First the money they gave him, Spassof bought a ship

they simultaneously applied to the JAE in — called the Maritza, and the emissaries sought Jerusalem and to the London branch, asking both other such ships. for their intervention; this was the background to Spassof encountered obstacles in his attempts Sharett’s arrival in Istanbul and to Weizmann’s _to obtain the exit permits he had promised. Alappeal to Noel Baker, Britain’s minister for Ma- _ though at the beginning of the year the Bulgarians rine Transport. *4 Second was the transporting of | had promised to permit the departure of four children and adults from Bulgaria. A group of — thousand children and five hundred adults—inemissaries in Istanbul attempted anindependent —_ deed, the thousand now in question were included or semi-independent action, as we shallseeinthe in the original forty-five hundred—nevertheless debate on the ransom plan (especiallythe onein- _ the exit permits could be obtained only in return

volving Joel Brand). for payment. In the meantime, an additional ship 175

Rescue Plans

had been purchased, the Milca. The idea was to Maritzaand Milca would return for the rest. This transfer five hundred people each time, half on plan required coordination with British intellieach ship. Getting the ships ready for such avoy- _— gence sources.

age was time-consuming. All this indecision was aggravated by the The constant pressure of time constraints — British embassy in Ankara. The latter’s expericaused the emissaries to fear that their plan _ ence, suspicions, and perhaps also a fundamental would fail if it were to become known publicly — difference in approach between it and Stanley that the permits had been bought in return fora | caused the embassy to check the legality of the bribe. There was reason to believe that they were — permits. Ambassador Knatchbull-Hugessen oractually counterfeit or that the man whose signa- —_—_ dered Foreign Office personnel to examine them

ture appeared on them was not authorized to __ in Bulgaria if they appeared questionable. The sign them. There was an even greater fear ofafur- | operation was once again facing a crisis.

ther appeal containing an official request for Why did Knatchbull-Hugessen examine the more valid documents than those obtained by __ permits? Was such scrutiny necessary in the atSpassof; a deal brokered in the complex Bulgar- = mosphere of confusion prevalent in wartime Isian hierarchy could have been “sealed” behind _tanbul? Did he do it out of ingenuousness, fear-

closed doors and thus might have faltered if ing the Bulgarians might uncover what he had someone inadvertently noticed an unnecessary discovered and halt the operation at the last mo-

official request. ment, frustrating any possibility of rescuing chilThis indecision was not easy. When, in Feb- —_—_ dren? In any case, at that time the British were not

ruary 1943, Britain asked the Bulgarians for help —_ overly scrupulous in their efforts, for example, in rescuing four thousand children, Stanley de- —_— to rescue imprisoned British pilots. There is no clared that they had responded favorably to the —_ doubt that real action was taken by the British to request and had even discussed arrangements for | promote the possibility of rescuing Jews from transport. Since several months had elapsed and _— Bulgaria, and the Sontay was handed over for that this plan had not materialized, the time mayhave purpose. However, it was also clear to the emcome to assume that the agreement with Bulgaria _ bassy staff in Ankara that the scrutiny of permits was still valid, despite the long delay in its mate- —_ could jeopardize or at least hold up the entire oprializing, and that it was also valid for the thou- _ eration.

sand Jews affected. Knatchbull-Hugessen was highly experiAnother question that arose was whether to — enced. When the Struma was anchored along the rely on the two ships purchased or to ask the —_ Turkish coast and public pressure was mounting

British to supply the ones they had promised. _ against Britain, he recommended allowing the The British had made the supply of ships condi- _—_— ship to continue on her way south even if this

tional on the Yishuv’s ability to obtain exit per- meant that her passengers arrived in Palestine as mits, which was a sensitive issue. Other alterna- _ illegal immigrants. He was reprimanded for this tives were considered, such striking a deal withas | by Lord Moyne, the colonial secretary, and a Swedish shipowner with whom Schind negoti- | MacMichael, the high commissioner. The Forated. There was also a much more complex plan _ eign Office demanded that the overly independinvolving the transfer of refugees in mid-sea to | ent ambassador return to the Turks and explain the Lilly, a small pleasure boat purchased in __ that Britain felt that the refugees should be sent Turkey in November 1941 by the illegal immigra- _ back to their port of origin. tion operation Mossad Le Aliyah Bet. The Lilly In late summer 1942 the ambassador found would continue on to Palestine and the ships _ himself in a similar position. When refugee ships

176

“Or We Shall Have No Repentance”

continued to arrive in Turkey, he reacted by in- _ he was no longer interested in “taking chances” forming Romania that any refugee not bearinga _after realizing that the agreement on the immisuitable permit to another country would be re- _ gration of hundreds or thousands of refugees turned. Not wanting a second Struma incident, | would mean that he and Britain would have to

the British were not pleased with this turn of deal with tens of thousands.”

events. Lord Cranborne, who replaced Lord Returning to the thousand Bulgarian Moyne in 1942, had already announced there _ refugees and the Yishuv’s ties with Spassof, would be no repeat of that affair, and the British echoes of the affair even reached Palestine. Sha-

government declared that it viewed itself as rett was summoned by Macpherson and asked morally responsible for Jewish refugees. It also | about the deal. He admitted that the exit permits instructed Turkey not to turn back ships without —_ had been obtained through bribes but demanded prior notification. On the other hand, there was _ the right to continue the operation and to make no mention made of backing down from the __ use of the two ships obtained by the emissaries.

White Paper restrictions. He also asked the British to oversee the overland Unlike other British government ministers, | passage from Turkey to Palestine. Sharett was Knatchbull-Hugessen was able to see with his reprimanded by Macpherson, who supposedly own eyes what a refugee ship looked like. He was _ pointed to the rules governing such activity. His often called upon to explain his country’s politi- | behavior was clearly unfounded, however. In an cal contradictions. On the one hand, he had to —_— atmosphere of war and under the special circumaccept moral responsibility and, on the other, — stances demanded by rescue operations of this to water it down for fear of straying from the — kind, Macpherson’s observations were officious restrictions of the White Paper. It was a difficult | and his manner somewhat gloating.

task, which was reflected in an angry letter to his In the Yishuv preparations were being made superiors in which he asked for clear definitions — for the possibility that the Jews from Romania of their position on unorganized emigration. He — would be in the vanguard, to be followed by wrote again in October 1942, once again asking § many others. Negotiations began between the

for a clarification of British policy.” JAE and the American Joint Distribution ComThe British Colonial and Foreign Offices mittee (JDC), and it was agreed that the latter tried to formulate a joint agreement during No- —_—-would participate in funding the rescue operavember 1942. Shortly thereafter it was decided __ tion. In Istanbul Teddy Kollek was subsequently

that Britain would agree to accept any Jew arriv- = sent an authorization by Shaul Avigur and ing in Turkey, but Ambassador Knatchbull- Eliyahu Dobkin, representatives of Kaplan and Hugessen did not see in this agreement the final __ the JAE in the negotiations, to purchase a vessel

word or a clear political stance, since at that very at a cost not exceeding twenty-five thousand moment there was a proposal foraransom plan _— Palestinian pounds. They stressed the importo rescue seventy thousand Jews from Transnis- _ tance of arranging transportation for the rescue tria. As far as he was concerned, this did not rep- of a thousand Jews from Bulgaria.” resent a clear declaration but rather thousands of July 1943 therefore appeared full of hope. In

refugees knocking on the door. Jerusalem, Istanbul, and London Yishuv leaders Could Knatchbull-Hugessen have beencon- —_ and emissaries were preparing for the next step.

fused by the aforementioned developments? | Ben-Gurion had determined that it was imporCould he have been more sensitive to reality’s tant for Sharett to go first to Turkey and only later conflicting developments or the contradictory — to Egypt.” Sharett set off for Turkey on 26 July

trends within the British government? Perhaps 1943. Upon arriving in Egypt on his way to

177

Rescue Plans

Turkey, the British authorities went out of their _ persuade the British to hold the Sontay in Turkey, way to help him to reach his destination. A series _ but the British informed him that they could not of snags were resolved with maximum speed. His _—_ do so. However, they repeated their promise that place on a Turkey-bound plane was arranged by _as soon as the permits were issued, they would removing another passenger—no easy matterin __ bring in ships to transport refugees.

wartime. All this effort could be interpreted as a Upon his return to Palestine, Sharett expositive sign that the British were seriously con- _ pressed his feelings to his colleagues in the JAE: sidering helping in the rescue of a thousand Jews. “All I managed to achieve for myself and for you

On the other hand, it could have been looked was a clarification of the situation, but I was unupon with suspicion by someone as experienced _—_ able to move the matter forward.” In the mean-

as Sharett. But he had no suspicions at that time, — time, the JAE and the JDC had prepared the in the course of his visit, or immediately after his funding for integrating the thousand refugees, return. His suspicions were aroused only at the _ proving that the Yishuv was still hoping that the

end of the month. rescue would go through.!

| In Istanbul the emissaries presented the en- RESCUING JEWISH CHILDREN

tire picture and explained to Sharett that the delay

was due to problems in Bulgaria. They also men- FROM ROMANIA tioned their fears concerning the dubious permits While in Istanbul, Sharett tried to advance a plan Spassof had obtained for them. Sharett decided —_ for rescuing Jews—mainly children—from Rothat the Bulgarian authorities should be asked for —_ mania. Such plans had been discussed repeatedly

legal permits. It was again decided to ask the since the Transnistria Plan was leaked to the British to guarantee transportation, which had _ British and American press in February 1943, and indeed been promised (the Sontay was waiting for it became clear that a ransom plan of that scope

the children’s exit permits from Bulgaria). would not take place. Plans for rescuing children The JAE’s leaders heard complaints about —_ were discussed even then, especially one involv-

the function of the Palestine office in Istanbul _ing transporting some of them from the remote and Sharett tried to investigate matters more _ region of Transnistria into Romania and then out closely. He also tried to bolster the spirits of the of Romania. In his March 1943 visit to Istanbul, rescue emissaries, who had suffered several dis- | Kaplan advocated this plan, but it was clearly imappointments in the past. Another of Sharett’s _ practical due to German objections. missions was to prove to the Jews of Bulgaria that When Sharett arrived in Turkey, he was prereal efforts were being made to rescue them, and _ sented with an official announcement by the

that their exit was now as safe as possible and Romanian deputy prime minister, Mihai Aneven assured, since this time even the British were tonescu, that his country would permit Jews to involved and the ship was a seaworthy vessel. He _ leave if means of transportation were found. He also had to prove this to the ex-Bulgarian organ-_ — even promised to make sure that neighboring izations in Palestine. During this trip to Turkey, countries (Bulgaria or Turkey) allow the Jews to Sharett also dealt with what came to be knownas cross their territories. Based on this, Sharett in-

the Slovakia Plan. structed the JAE London branch to demand that Sharett left Turkey before the official exit —_ the British government dispatch ships to trans-

permits had been received from Bulgaria. His port these Jews—first and foremost the four efforts to obtain permits by way of an appeal to — thousand _children—in accordance with Stanthe Bulgarian consulate, the British embassy, and _ley’s announcement, which was frequently menothers had been unsuccessful. Sharett tried to _ tioned in the course of discussions.

178

“Or We Shall Have No Repentance”

The London branch replied that the British | and made an official appeal to Bulgaria for exit government had informed it that it had already —_ permits. On the other hand, they tried to operate applied to the Romanian government in Mayand __an independent, illegal alternative course conJune 1943 and had received no reply. Sharett urged _ sisting of Yishuv-owned ships, forged exit perhis colleagues in London to stress the official Ro- — mits, and Yishuv and JDC funding. As we shall manian announcement that Jews would be per- __ see, this pattern would be repeated in preparamitted to leave if they were assured a means of __ tions for the Joel Brand rescue plan, which was transport, and that Britain had promisedtosupply also based on cooperation between the Yishuv this. This appeal, too, recetved no response. and the JDC. Its main objective was to counter The emissaries tried an alternative plan. They __ the possibility that one of the players—the Turks,

instructed people from the Jewish community in — the Balkan states, or Britain—would upset the Romania to try to obtain aship in Romania. They _ rescue process along one of its many links.

considered purchasing the Smirni, a tugboat, but Why did the British try so hard to express were hesitant at first for fear that the Romanian their willingness to help Sharett on his way to authorities would not allowa tugboat to sailinthe | Cairo and Istanbul? Did this really reflect an open seas; its owners also demanded a large sum —_— overwhelming change in the entire British estabof money. It flew the Greek flag, a country at war _ lishment, consisting of the Colonial and Foreign

and therefore a possible enemy, andthe attemptat Offices, the office of the resident minister in transferring ownership to a person of neutral cit- Cairo, the high commissioner in Jerusalem, and

izenship proved unsuccessful. the ambassador’s office in Ankara? Did all of In the end, the emissaries said they would — them undergo a radical change and gain a sense put the Maritza and the Milca at the disposal of | of humanitarian awareness with regard to the the operation, since neither were being used due __ rescue of children?

to problems in Bulgaria. Then it was announced Britain’s behavior could be explained by that the Romanians would not allow the shipsto _ things said in the course of conversations Sharett sail, under the pretext that ifa Soviet submarine _ held with the British in Cairo. Britain appeared sank them in the Black Sea, this could be blamed concerned that the JAE would be unable to re-

on Romania.!°! strain extreme elements in the Yishuv and that

Thus, Sharett dealt with two rescue opera- things would get completely out of hand. Such tions simultaneously, neither of which suc- fears also arose after the Struma affair. Underceeded. The matter of exit permits definitively | ground pictures of the high commissioner caphalted the rescue from Bulgaria and madeitnec- — tioned “Wanted: Murderer,” editorials, leaders’ essary to start the whole procedure over again. | speeches—all expressed great fury, pain, and And it was probably the Germans who prevented deep frustration. Intelligence reports on unrest the rescue of Jews from Romania. Germany re- —_— in the Haganah ranks and other underground orpeatedly demanded that Jews be prevented from _ ganizations increased Britain’s concern.

leaving Romania. It is also known that toward the During the spring and summer months of summer the anti-Semitic atmosphere increased —_1943, the Yishuv was hoarding weapons and the

in Romania. underground movements were increasing in Sharett and the emissaries worked intwodi- _ strength. Fears grewas Allied troops continued to rections—Bulgaria and Romania—and on two — move from the Middle East to the new battle-

levels—open and above board versus illegally fronts: at first to North Africa, then to Italy, and and clandestinely. On the one hand, the British finally into western Europe.!® Sharett was asked helped them to obtain politicalsupportand ships point-blank questions, to which he replied:

179

Rescue Plans

There is nothing further from our minds takes like this. They were the result of an enor-

than engaging in a political quarrel with mous need to cling to any sign of hope.!% [you] in time of war. Had you settled Nonetheless, disillusionment was quick to arrive. matters in a status quo, we would not During August 1943 the feeling grew that the plan even have raised the question in wartime. for the rescue of children had reached an imYou have attacked us, and we have had to passe, although it had been given top priority save ourselves. But we want to end the among the other rescue plans and much effort

quarrel between us by diplomatic and had been invested in it. public means. I must add just one more SOUTH AFRICA WON’T HEI P thing: if the day comes when you are ab-

solutely determined to carry out the di- Eight months after the possibility of cooperation rectives of the White Paper, no matter with Smuts, South Africa’s prime minister, was what, saying that you'll close Jewish im- first raised, it became clear that Ben-Gurion’s and migration to establish Arab rule, then I Joseph's observations had been accurate. Gruencan’t say how things will turn out, and baum left for South Africa in search of new rescue

this must be clear. ! channels after synchronizing in full with BenGurion, but Smuts directly or indirectly rejected

The British apparently wanted to soften their his requests. harsh policies by exhibiting signs of concern for Gruenbaum explained to Smuts that the the refugees, but this willingness and these prom- __ various rescue plans were not being carried out ises could never be carried out because of obstacles because the JAE was not succeeding in arranging unconnected to them. It should be remembered _ the transportation of refugees and their tempothat the British did not commit themselves to res- _—_—s rary asylum. He shared with him information he

cuing more than the forty-five hundred Jews, and __ had received from Sharett concerning attempts only five hundred of these were adults. This was —_ to rescue a thousand Jews from Bulgaria as well as

clearly a calculated risk. There was nowarevivalof other rescue attempts in Romania and HunStanley’s approach among the British authorities —_ gary,! and asked the South African government in Palestine and Cairo. It would appear that they _ for help in getting the operations moving.

had a growing sense of having overstepped the Smuts wriggled out of any commitment. For mark in sealing off Palestine to rescued refugees. example, when Gruenbaum stated, “We are unThey felt a need to soften the impression theywere able to understand how ships carrying Italians making of objecting to the ransom plans, which can be sent from Ethiopia yet those same ships they viewed as a threat of mass immigration, by cannot be used to bring children from Europe,”

helping to rescue a few Jews. Smuts replied, “Those are Italian ships and they The fuss they were making over Sharett belong to the Allied Powers. The Allied Powers camouflaged the fact that the British were unwa- __ only allowed those ships to travel from Ethiopia vering in their policies toward the Jews of Europe __ to Italy. Gruenbaum continued, “T said to him and had made no significant concessions. Their __ that ships are being sent to Greece with food supbehavior was enough to deceive even cynicaland _ plies and they return empty and asked why they experienced people like Ehud Avriel: “The Aliyah — could not be used for the rescue of Jews. To this Bet Balfour Declaration” was how he described _he replied: “Yes, those are Swedish ships.” In Britain’s announcement that any Jew arrivingin other words, according to the guidelines of neuTurkey would be allowed entry into Palestine. In __ trality, since they were bound by contract, Swehindsight, it is possible for us to understand mis- = den was only allowed to transfer food. When

180

“Or We Shall Have No Repentance”

Gruenbaum directly suggested that Smuts — chner himself refused to present this demand, arranged the transportation of children, he but other delegation members did. Upon his rereplied, “I have agreed that Jewish childrencome _ turn, Gruenbaum told his colleagues in Palestine:

to South Africa. But .I They was unable overcome theSmuts .. startedtotalking with about

problems of transport and this to daySouth I was Africa, un- , . , bring . entry permits fortoJews able ;to« them.” Gruenbaum could not ac. ; . , .and andwent following hishim negative reply they cept this on: “I told I did not un. 4: rg ,; asked that at least eighty refugee families, derstand this. I know that Polish children haveand a ; supported , waiting in Mozambique been to South Africa,of so Deputies, why is it so hard , ; ,brought , — ; by the Board be allowed to

to bring Jewish children?” HisAfrica question remained , the , enter South for the duration of

unanswered. Gruenbaum told war. hisHiscounterpart , ; oa reply to this was negative. ‘It is aboutwe the_Romanian agreement to release Jews aa; impossible, he said.in“You haveHe to. realize on condition they not remain Turkey. ; _ we ; , that there is a fear of anti-Semitism; stressed that if Smuts were to promise Romania ;; 4. have many refugees from India, Palestine that he was opening his country to these refugees, ; there are financial hardships, and they could be saved, but Smuts fobbed himandoff by ;

,;were theirtowell-being and thatheofwould the country saying that if he receive a memo, ;;.; .; requires the avoidance of introducing

; ; new Jew e ,

look into the matter. !6 Jews to the Union 108 From South Africa Gruenbaum continued

to London, where he met with a minister in the | Smuts, it would appear, felt that his explanations Polish government-in-exile, who shed more light | and excuses were farfetched and decided to aim

on the matter. After hearing from Gruenbaum at an international solution. He brought up the about his conversation with Smuts, the Polish | Bermuda Conference, which had long been forminister told him thatithad beenSmutswhohad ~~ gotten by Ben-Gurion and the Yishuv, and given the order not to include Jewish children pointed out that it had not been valueless—after among the Polish children. Gruenbaum believed __all, one of the decisions had been to establish

the Polish minister.!” the Inter-Governmental Refugee Committee, of Smut’s position was clarified in two further — which South Africa was a member. The commit- : meetings with delegations from the Board of tee “was looking for a way to save Jews and place Deputies and Labor party representatives in them in various countries, and if this committee South Africa. Kirschner, chairman of the South could apply to him with the request that he take African Zionist Federation, synchronized posi- —_— in some Jews to his country, it would do so.”!°

tions with Gruenbaum before the meeting and The accomplishments of the committee estabwas instructed to demand entry permitstoSouth lished after the Evian Conference were not brilAfrica for ten to twenty thousand Jews. It would _liant, from the Jewish point of view, and there thus be possible to assure Turkey and Sweden ___was no apparent reason to suppose that this new that South Africa would be the country of desti- — body could produce results that would add addination for the Jewish refugees and that the Jewish tional prestige to the countries that founded it.

Agency would accommodate them temporarily Ben-Gurion’s and Joseph’s real doubts led in their territory. The idea was presented to rep-_ _—i them to a bitter but wise conclusion: it was necresentatives of the Turkish and Swedish govern- __ essary to exploit Zionism’s relative advantage in ments, and it would appear that Sweden even ul- | South Africa—its fund-raising ability—and not

timately adopted it on the condition that South _to risk it by placing ineffectual pressure on the Africa commit to taking in the refugees. Kirs- | community to bring about the opening South

181

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Africa’s gates to Jews. Ben-Gurion’s December __ handed. They discovered the trick contained in 1941 speech was very accurate as to Smuts’s mo- __ the JAE’s request to temporarily assign those

tives: certificates already earmarked for potential im; ; . migrantspatient able to make it totoPalestine Weizmann’s appeals history ,to , Jews , from the Middle East. By canceling unused and toeewisdom are an old weapon. Theto 7the5 JAE that .. , certificates, they were “signaling”

world’s politicians aretrick listening , , ; their was but not doing goingoo. to succeed and they

nothing. .. . Let Weizmann continue to ; ; - of , were not going to permit the immigration court Roosevelt and Sumner in East and . thousands of people fromWelles; the Middle

the endallow people willtohave act—even ; then the JAE cometoback with a request friends such as Churchill and Smuts and ,

;rest—in , for more certificates for children and adults Amery and the accordance with . ; , fromand occupied Europe. They interests. probably felt that their national international aq: the new rules would force the JAE to withdraw They will be unwilling to help the Jews on , ,

,; its cunning demands and request a return a rainy day. ... situation, Only the thus Jews themselves, . _, degree ato the ; , original retaining a certain only concentrated power in of Amer, te ; . . and ; ;their ofPalestine, control over theremain channeling remaining ica will constant in ,., , certificates. The British left the JAE the choice all situations, for in the endbetween thebeing movei, in a definite trap and one that was

ment can rely only virtually on itself.!!° , unavoidable. The British announce-

Ben-Gurion was being overly optimistic. The = ment led Sharett to realize that a crisis was neartruth was that even the concentrated powerofthe ing between the Yishuv and the British governJews in the United States and the Yishuv could — ment. His meetings with Mills and Macpherson not help them given the situation in which they — were of no use: the British were determined

found themselves during the Holocaust. not to rescind the new ruling.!!! One trap was

offered in exchange for another: first they said eiNEW RESTRICTIONS ON ENTRY | : a ther children or adults and now they were saying

INTO PALESTINE ; iD either from Europe or from nowhere else.

At the end of August, it became clear that Ben- In September JAE member Dr. Emil Gurion’s tactics—demands for some of the im- | Schmorak attended a commercial fair in Turkey, migration certificates to be allocated toimmigra- | where he of course checked on rescue activity.

tion from the Mediterranean countries—were Upon his return he reported to the JAE, which not bringing about positive results. The British | again learned firsthand of the various obstacles responded with new restrictions. First, there | and frustrations in the rescue of children from would be no renewal of certificates issued but | Europe. Schmorak reported Bulgaria’s official renot used. Second, issued certificates would be — sponse to the list of 1,300: all the able-bodied men “saved” only for Jews from occupied countries. | and women (between the ages of fifteen and This was further proof that Britain’s announce- _ sixty) had been removed from the list. Only 420 ment in July was not an “Aliyah Bet Balfour Dec- | names remained, and these depended on Ger-

laration” and that no change had occurred. In man approval. fact, the British remained firm in their determi- After it became clear that this time the Bulnation to prevent any dismantling of the 1939 garians were the ones thwarting the operation, framework: seventy-five thousand andno more. _ Barlas turned to the Turkish authorities, who The British fully understood Ben-Gurion’s promised that three hundred Jews leaving Hunfears that the Yishuv would emerge empty- gary would be allowed to pass through Turkey.

182

“Or We Shall Have No Repentance”

The law required British approval, but it took a primary reason for the failure to rescue Jewish while for the British to send the request on to children. London. Schmorak’s report and the debate that

, , , , MISSION TO SWEDEN

followed resulted in Ren. Gurion’ proposal to es- SHALOM ADLER-RUDELS tablish a subcommittee to examine the issues.!!°

Two days later Ben-Gurion met representa- _ The rescue of twenty thousand children through tives of the special rescue committee, whosemem- = Sweden was one of the secret attempts Benbers were of Bulgarian origin (as opposed to the — Gurion hinted at when he talked about the JAE’s Yishuv’s Rescue Committee). Like all expatriate desire for more action and less words. He applied

groups in Palestine, the Bulgarian group de- __ publicly to the Allied powers and the neutral manded that the Yishuv first rescue the Jews of — countries, asking them to open their gates to JewBulgaria. Their committee had many complaints, _ ish children. He also instructed the JAE branches the most notable being that of the 160,000 Pales- —_ in New York and London to facilitate this effort. tinian pounds sent by the Yishuv to finance rescue Sharett traveled to London to take part in acactivity, only 200 were set aside for Bulgarian Jews. _ tivities there.!!6 During his stay he was involved They insisted on the need for an ex-Bulgarian in _in an attempt to make an official request of the Istanbul, and that their committee had a specific _ neutral governments of Portugal and Sweden to

person in mind. declare that they were willing to admit Jewish Ben-Gurion was aware that his interlocu- _ children. The London branch sent Wilfrid Israel tors were unable to understand why Bulgarian _ to Portugal and Shalom Adler-Rudel to Sweden. Jews—especially children—were not arriving in Adler-Rudel, a Youth Aliyah activist in GerPalestine. Assuming that this would be blamed — many and a member of the JAE London branch on bad will or inefficiency, he tried to reassure _ personnel, was born in Czernowitz in Bukovina, them by describing the various obstacles, espe- |= Romania. He had served as Po’alei Zion secretary cially “Bulgaria’s announcement that no able- _ in his hometown and managed Jewish workers’ bodied people would be allowed out and that —_ welfare and emigration organizations in Berlin. release depended on approval by the Germans.” —_ Adler-Rudel had formed his first ties with Youth

He made sure not to promise anything he could — Aliyah, the Jewish Agency, and other aid and not deliver: he would ask the Yishuv’s Rescue __ rescue organizations while he was still general Committee to look into the financial issue and secretary of the central organization for German whether there really was aneed for anex-Bulgar- —_ Jewish communities headquartered in Berlin, the

ian Jew in Istanbul.!!4 Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland Several days later, Ben-Gurion spoke at a _— (Reich Association of Jews in Germany).

Mapai meeting, where he referred to the com- In 1936 Adler-Rudel shifted the focus of his plexity of the rescue attempts in general and that —_activity to London, where he represented Gerof children in particular. He also rejected the crit- |= man Jews in a number of international welfare icism hurled at him and the other Mapai mem- organizations and worked closely with the JDC, bers in the JAE.!!° Ben-Gurion delivered an ab- Youth Aliyah, the World Jewish Congress, the breviated description of the efforts to obtain exit Central British Fund for Relief and Rehabilitaand transit permits and safe passage certificates, tion of German Jewry (CBB), and the Inter-Govand of the pressure exerted by the Germans on _ ernmental Refugee Committee, among others.!!” their satellite nations to prevent the exit of Jews | Members of these bodies cooperated with the from their territories. It was an insurmountable —_ Jewish Agency and with Jewish representatives of obstacle. The Germans were again blamed asthe — governments-in-exile of Poland and Czechia in

183

Rescue Plans

attempts to help Jews—especially children— __ tine, but later returned to England and to res-

trapped in the occupied countries.!!8 cue and aid activity. At the end of 1941 he was Adler-Rudel’s connections and his vast ex- | appointed adviser in the German Department of perience made him the perfect candidate for or- the Research and Foreign Press Service, part of ganizing rescue activity through Sweden on be- _ the Royal Institute for International Affairs, half of the Jewish Agency. It was a possibility that | which conducted research activities for the had been discussed in late 1942 and early 1943. In British Foreign Office. At the same time, Israel accordance with instructions from Jerusalem, — continued his activity with Youth Aliyah, and by the London branch asked the British Foreign the autumn of 1942 he had already asked to be Office for assistance in dispatching Adler-Rudel __ sent to Portugal. In January 1943 it appeared that to Sweden and Israel to Portugal—especially in —_ the groundwork had been laid for such a mission.

terms of issuing entry and exit permits.!!° Israel received his entry permit to Portugal On 30 January 1943 the Foreign Office re- on 26 March and set off immediately. His task was sponded that it was prepared to help Adler-Rudel = multiple: to persuade Portugal to admit addi-

and Israel and had informed its embassy in tional Jews from France; to make temporary Stockholm of the former’s imminent arrival. It | arrangements for those Jews who had managed to also advised him to maintain connections with escape into Portugal; and to arrange immigration the embassy. The JAE’s Political Department in __ certificates—-and transportation—for refugees Jerusalem and Eliezer Kaplan received reports of | who opted to continue on to Palestine. the British government’s positive response from He was also entrusted with examining ways the London branch. In a letter to Kaplan, it was — of rescuing children from the occupied coun-

stressed that Sharett had been asked in London tries—Holland, Belgium, and France—and how the activity was supposed to be financed, to transporting them to neutral countries. He manwhich he replied that he had “no doubt that the — aged to study the proposal to transfer children matter of financing... was the responsibility of | from Europe, through France and Portugal, to

the Executive in Jerusalem.”!”° Africa and perhaps from there to Palestine. He Israel, a citizen of Germany and Great discovered that roads in Africa were impassable Britain and scion of a well-known German fam- before November because of the rainy season. ily of merchants, had the necessary social and __In his efforts to find various rescue channels financial ties to engage in activityamong various __ through the Iberian peninsula, Israel met Joseph Jewish and Christian organizations. He madeuse — Schwartz, European director of the JDC and an of his connections to rescue children—especially | important partner in the Yishuv’s various rescue Jewish children—from occupied Europe. Forex- __ enterprises.!!

ample, together with Ludwig Tietz and Recha Israel spent only two months in Lisbon. On Freier he helped rescue Jewish children from 1 June 1943, on his way back to London, his plane Germany through the National Committee of | was shot down by the Luftwaffe over the Bay of Jewish Youth Organizations, which later became _ Biscay. All the passengers perished. He was forty-

the Youth Aliyah enterprise. four. Before setting out, Israel had left the British In 1937 Israel started working with the Ger- | embassy in Madrid a memo outlining the possiman Jewish Aid Organization. He helped rescue _ bility of rescuing Jews through Portugal.!”*

Christians of Jewish origin and worked with the The attack remained a mystery, although Quakers to rescue thousands of Jews from Ger- —_ some linked it to two of the plane’s passengers. many. In 1940 he joined the management of the |= One was the British-born Hungarian Jewish actor ICA (Jewish Colonization Association) in Pales- — Leslie Howard, star of many war films, whom

184

“Or We Shall Have No Repentance”

Goebbels made the target of propaganda cam- _help the Jewish Agency urge the Swedish govern-

paigns. The other was Howard’s accountant, ment to announce that it was prepared to admit Alfred Chanhalls, who was obese, smoked cigars, Jewish children rescued from Europe.'”

and resem ee en ae came ee THE PRECEDENT OF gence knew that Churchill was about to fly back to England from North Africa through Gibraltar. '* THE GERMAN CHILDREN Adler-Rudel left on 20 February bound for Following efforts on the part of the Jewish comScandinavia. He was equipped with letters of | munity and the Swedish public, Adler-Rudel recommendation to the Swedish welfare minister | was granted an audience with Gustav Miiller, the and Sir Victor Mallet, Britain’s ambassador in Swedish minister for social affairs. He presented Stockholm. On 21 February 1943 the London __ the Jewish Agency’s official request that Sweden branch reported to the leadership in Jerusalem — permit the entry and temporary stay of twenty that Adler-Rudel had received an entry permit to | thousand Jewish children. Adler-Rudel reminded

Sweden and was on his way. the minister that after the First World War Upon arrival in Sweden, Adler-Rudel con- Sweden had opened its gates to German children tacted the chief rabbi of Sweden, Dr. Marcus and could now ask Germany to return the favor (Mordechai Ze’ev) Ehrenpreis, and Gunnar and release German Jewish children. Josephson, the head of the local Jewish commu- By acquiescing to several Nazi requests durnity. Both men welcomed him and promised to _ ing the first part of the war, Sweden had in effect

help. deviated from its neutrality. Sweden had even alRabbi Ehrenpreis even introduced Adler lowed German steel and troop transports across Rudel to the local committee he had founded in _sher territory. Relations between the two counorder to rescue Jewish children from occupied _ tries therefore appeared comfortable enough for Europe. During 1943 and even later, the commit- Sweden to present the request to Germany.

tee would transfer funds to Gruenbaum and Nonetheless Miller remained unsure that this Henrietta Szold for the purpose of rescuing chil- —_ course of action was possible. In any event, he dren. Josephson told him that the Jewish com- —_— promised to discuss the idea with the Swedish

munity had already asked Sweden’s Foreign prime minister. Adler-Rudel reported this conOffice to intercede on its behalf and that the for- — versation to Rabbi Ehrenpreis and the British eign minister had told it that he had conferred = embassy. Throughout his mission he maintained with the Nazis on the matter. By then Sweden contact with British diplomats in Stockholm. had gained a reputation as a country that opened Adler-Rudel now felt that the time had come its gates to refugees; the appeal to Sweden there- _— to exert some pressure on the Swedish diplomats

fore seemed quite natural.!*4 by way of local public opinion. He was aided in Adler-Rudel embarked on a series of meet- —_ this by Countess Ebba Bunde, daughter of Jakob ings with various groups: the British and Ameri- — Wallenberg, head of the prominent banking famcan ambassadors; representatives of the Polish, ily, anda relation of Raoul Wallenberg, one of the Czech, and Dutch governments-in-exile; exiled heroes of the rescue operation in Hungary. Rabbi Jewish community leaders, such as the Austrian Ehrenpreis introduced Adler-Rudel to the countsocialist Bruno Kreisky, who would later become __ ess and she immediately arranged a soiree at her

Austrian chancellor; representatives of aid and home to which the press and diplomatic corps in rescue organizations; members of the press; politi- Stockholm were invited. cians; and Swedish government personnel. At his Adler-Rudel lectured on the state of the Jews meetings he repeated the same request, namely,to | of Europe, with special emphasis on the need to

185

Rescue Plans

rescue the children. He mentioned the Jewish concerning the practicability of the plan. Indeed, Agency’s request that Sweden admit twenty onio March 1943 Miiller called Adler-Rudel and thousand. Ebba Bunde would later playakeyrole __ officially informed him that Sweden could not in the rescue of the Jews of Denmark. Adler- — agree to the Jewish Agency’s proposal. AdlerRudel expressed similar sentiments in along se- — Rudel would not give in. He asked Miiller to ini-

ries of meetings with various public figures, _ tiate another discussion and Miller agreed. artists, and Swedish intellectuals. His objective In the meantime, Jerusalem’s instructions to was to create enough public pressure to motivate the American branch were yielding positive repolitical leaders in Sweden to respond to the Jew- sults. The latter had done its work, and on 5 April ish Agency’s request.!*° He was aided in his efforts | American secretary of state Cordell Hull inby the Jewish Congress’s representative in Stock- structed his ambassador in Sweden to signal to holm, Hillel Storch, a wealthy businessman born __ the Swedish government that the United States in Riga, who was Adler-Rudel’s right-hand man. __ expected that it would look favorably upon the A rescue activist in his own right, he and Adler- — Jewish Agency’s request.!28 Rudel attempted to rescue the Jews of Hungary at Sweden’s attitude changed after the arrival of

the end of 1944. this cable. On 13 April Miiller called Adler-Rudel While waiting for Miiller’s reply, several Jew- and told him that his government had agreed to ish youngsters managed to escape from occupied admit twenty thousand Jewish children. He inDenmark. They crossed the stormy sea and arrived structed Adler-Rudel to clarify the matter with in Sweden. The German occupation authoritiesin the Swedish government’s head secretary, Erick Denmark warned the local Jewish organizations, Boheman, who was of Jewish extraction. Adlerand stories of the daring escape in the Swedish — Rudel spoke to Boheman and received the folpress embarrassed the latter’s government, which lowing reply: the Swedish government was prewas Offering refuge to escapees. The fear arose pared to ask the Germans for twenty thousand that Sweden would prefer to avoid rescue attempts Jewish children on condition that the governon a larger scale. Since it was also an asylum for —= ments of Britain and the United States inform the non-Jewish refugees from occupied Scandinavian Swedish government that this is their will. It was countries, it was reasonable to fear that Sweden __ clear to Adler-Rudel that this was just more heelwould not be overjoyed at the prospect ofmassesof dragging.

refugees storming her borders. He applied to the British and American amThe daring escape led to consideration of a __— bassadors and asked them to confirm that their much more comprehensive plan: the rescue of | governments were in favor of Sweden’s consent to Danish Jews by smuggling them across the bor- __ the Jewish Agency’s request. Both did indeed der into Sweden. One effort was the purchaseofa state that their governments were committed to local fishing boat, the Julius, with funds supplied — removing the refugee children at the end of the by wealthy locals. Several Jewish sailors from the — war. Adler-Rudel also told Miller about the new

Hehalutz movement operated the boat, and it “minefield” in Boheman’s comment. Miller assuccessfully rescued Jews from Denmark. Even sured him that there was no connection between before the purchase, Adler-Rudel had reported — the Swedish government’s position and those of the plan to the London branch, and fromthereto — Britain and the United States and promised to Jerusalem. Both London and Jerusalem wanted = modify Boheman’s comments.

details on the progress of the deal.!?’ On 18 April Adler-Rudel met Boheman. Adler-Rudel had another conversation with — This time the latter’s welcome was warm and the Miller. The Swede’s doubts were again obvious __ two decided that efforts to clarify the situation

186

“Or We Shall Have No Repentance”

would continue. On 20 April Adler-Rudel and All this occurred at the height of the Miiller finalized the technical details of the oper- Bermuda Conference. We now know that no proation. First, the Swedish government would in- posal was raised or adopted at the conference reform the German government that it was per- —_ garding Sweden temporarily admitting Jewish mitting the entry of twenty thousand refugee — children—despite the fact that the American secchildren aged five to fifteen from Nazi-occupied ___ retary of state instructed his ambassador in SweEuropean countries. Second, for practical rea- _—_—_ den to signal to the Swedes that the United States sons rescue of children from western Europe — was strongly supported such a proposition. Un-

would begin first, after which children from fortunately, the JAE in Jerusalem and London did eastern European would be transported. Third, = not know what we know today. They were probthe governments of Britain andthe United States _—_ably fixated on the aforementioned numbers. It would finance the children’s upkeep for the du- —_—- was only natural that they would connect the ration of their stay in Sweden and would helpin __ present initiative with their own ideas, as they

bringing food into Sweden (special wartime hoped would be the case at the conference. It arrangements were required). Fourth, Britain took time for everyone to realize that this was not and the United States would do everything nec- __ to be. essary to evacuate the children from Sweden af- The general consensus was that good news

ter the war.!?° could be expected from Sweden, judging by the The London branch also aided Adler-Rudel level of Adler-Rudel’s and the London branch’s by meeting with London-based representatives _—_ activity involving the purchase of the Julius and of the American government and those of the — other arrangements for sea transport for the governments-in-exile of Poland and Holland in refugees. Based on their genuine belief regarding order to appeal for help in advancing his efforts — the good intentions of the British, the JAE proin Sweden. Adler-Rudel received reports of these — vided their Stockholm representatives with a

meetings. !3? systematic report, and the JAE London branch Exactly two months after leaving for Swe- reported to the authorities on Adler-Rudel’s

den, Adler-Rudel felt that his mission was com- _activity.!°* The feeling that things were starting to pleted. At that time he was already aware thatthe happen also provided the stimulus for rescuing Mandatory authorities had informed the Jewish children from Poland and a thousand from HolAgency that no deviation would be permitted — land. The London branch discussed the matter from the quota of thirty thousand and that no —__ with the Dutch representative in London, who immigration certificates would issued to adults, | promised financial aid and help in transportawith the exception of a handful of women and __ tion. Chaim Weizmann and Arthur Lourie, secveteran Zionists.'°! The JAE in Jerusalem cabled __ retary of the Emergency Committee for Zionist

Stockholm about this. Affairs, were called on to advance the matter, and In light of the convoluted terms of those bit- | they were joined by American Zionist leader ter days, Adler-Rudel’s news appeared relatively | Stephen Wise.!%?

sweet: twenty thousand children would be al- All these positive signs caused Adler-Rudel lowed to pass into Sweden; four to fivethousand __ to believe that the first stage of his mission had would pass from the Balkans, through Turkey, — been successfully completed. Retraining to Loninto Palestine; and several thousand—the bal- —_ don, he threw himself into an all-out effort to ance of the remaining thirty thousand certificates persuade the British and American governments reserved for children—would reach Palestine by to agree to Sweden’s terms. On 29 April Joseph

way of Tehran. Linton, secretary of the London branch, cabled 187

Rescue Plans

Chaim Weizmann in the United States and __ ise that the children would leave Sweden at the end Sharett in Jerusalem an interim summary of ofthe war. In order to close ranks with the AmeriAdler-Rudel’s mission. He pointed out that one _cans, the British ambassador asked his American of Sweden’s conditions was that funding would _ colleague to share with him the gist of the U.S. pobe based on one dollar per child per day. He also _ sition before outlining it to Sweden. Earlier the claimed that Sweden was confident that the Ger- _ British ambassador had tried to determine why mans would permit the exit of Jewish children if | Sweden, which was so generous toward refugees, they were assured that the latter would ultimately = was now asking for detailed international com-

leave Europe. mitments that these particular refugees would not Linton also mentioned the “spirit” of the | remain in Sweden after the war.!35

Bermuda Conference—this at a time when no The Jewish Agency would not give up. In one knew what the actual tenor of the conference |= London Adler-Rudel and Lewis Namier, a mem-

was and when there was still hope that the ber of the London branch of the JAE, met with Swedish plan would mature in time and thatthe — British Foreign Office representatives. Adlerconference would seek real solutions. Linton — Rudel also talked with Emerson and then with his again asked Weizmann to get his people in the = deputy, Gustav Kullmann. At his meeting with State Department to press the administration | Emerson, Adler-Rudel raised another possibility into officially announcing that it had agreed to under discussion, namely, to transfer Jewish

the Swedish terms. Linton told the JAE in _ children from France to Switzerland. Emerson Jerusalem that the London branch had already __ rejected the proposal on the grounds that Switappealed to the British Foreign Office on the —_zerland was demanding that refugees admitted matter and that now the whole thing had to be ~— would be removed as soon as possible, which the kept secret. In the meantime, Adler-Rudel tried | committee was not in a position to agree to do. to arrange a meeting with John Winant, the — Hesaid that use could be made of the seven thouAmerican ambassador to Britain, and Sir Herbert — sand unused entry permits issued to the “PinkEmerson, chairman of the Inter-Governmental — ney Tuck” children. Refugee Committee, the new high commissioner With the help of Eleanor Rathbone, Adlerfor refugees, in order to ask them to encourage = Rudel managed to meet John Winant on 30 July. their superiors to support the Swedish terms.!*4 He told him that he had never heard of the matFrom this point on began the typical drag- _ ter. It wasa bad omen. All the people Adler-Rudel ging of heels—with an occasional hurdlethrown had spoken to—of which only a handful have in. On 19 May the American ambassador in been mentioned—had expressed interest in the Stockholm reported on his conversations with — plan and appeared sympathetic; some even made the British ambassador regarding the rescue of — suggestions to advance it, but no more. Time was Jewish children. Among other things, the British § running out and the promised commitments ambassador told him that he had informed the were not forthcoming from the governments of Swedish government that Britain respected its | Britain and the United States regarding the fate of humanitarian gesture. Britain was also willingto the children after the war.!°

help Sweden in dealing with the committee re- Prompted by the American branch, Wise sponsible for maritime siege in order to supply — asked the U.S. government about its commit-

food for twenty thousand children. ment to Sweden. On 16 August the London Nonetheless, according to the Americanam- —_ branch asked Ambassador Winant if there was bassador’s reports, the British ambassador had _any change in the administration's position. He told the Swedes that his country could not prom- —_— informed them that the matter was being given

188

“Or We Shall Have No Repentance”

serious consideration, but that there was still no | those who wished to hinder, between friend and reply. On 20 August Linton told Alec Randall of — foe. An outstanding example of this can be found

the British Foreign Office that the London ina letter written by Leo Cohen of the Jewish branch had learned that the Americans had Agency Political Department to his boss, Moshe agreed to Sweden’s conditions. He asked if | Sharett. Cohen was well versed in all aspects of Britain had decided yet. Randall repliedthat they — the operation and did not hide his disappointwere still reviewing the issue. On 27 August Lin- — ment. Although the letter is filled with operaton contacted Randall again with the news that __ tional proposals, a hint of no confidence can be

the Swedish plan had been approved. '*” detected even here. Things continued in this way until 11 Octo- In the letter Cohen swings between a sense ber, when Hull, the American secretary of state, that the JAE is doing everything it can and the informed Winant in London that further elucida- — diametrically opposite view. For example, he tion was needed of the various meaningsincluded points to the successful rescue of young nonin the Swedish demands. Itnow became clearthat | Jewish Frenchmen from hard labor. Why did this the positions of Britain and the United States on succeed, whereas the Yishuv’s efforts did not? Bethe rescue of Jewish children and the latter’s ad- —_ ing familiar with the powers that thwarted the mission into Sweden were compatible with the Yishuv’s attempts, Cohen concludes that the JAE cold winds blowing in from the Bermuda Confer- _ effort failed because the operation had not been ence. At the same time, there was a deterioration solid enough. Cohen advises the JAE to learn this in the relations between Sweden and Germany, lesson and prepare for an operation “in much which significantly reduced the chances of carry- broader areas and much more intensively than ing out Adler-Rudel’s plan. The Swedish govern- heretofore,” and proposes “fundamental adminment’s commitment to provide asylum to Nor- _istrative corrections.” wegian refugees also lessened its willingness to On the whole, there was little that was new stick to its agreement to admit Jewish children. in Cohen’s proposals, which had been tried out Thus, another plan for saving Jewish chil- — unsuccessfully before. For example, Cohen prodren was dropped from the agenda. Ithad begun _—_— posed that Weizmann meet personally with at the end of 1942 and continued, accompanied by — Churchill. The same proposal had been raised at

much hope, throughout 1943.8 In his speeches _—_ the beginning of the year when Ben-Gurion during 1943, Ben-Gurion often hinted at rescue asked for a meeting with Churchill. In July it was efforts involving neutral countries—a reference raised again in Jerusalem, when the JAE sugmainly to the missions of Adler-Rudel and Israel. gested that Weizmann try to talk to Churchill. Toward the end of the war, after Admiral Mikl6s | Cohen also proposed reminding the Allied govHorthy, the Hungarian leader, had announced — ernments in no uncertain terms that they had to that he would allow Jewish children to leave his assume responsibility for the rescue of the Jews of country, new attempts were made to evacuate | Europe, not from a “bureaucratic or civilian children through Sweden, and Adler-Rudel was _ point of view, but as part of the war effort.” Here,

again involved. too, there was no need for advice, since the JAE FROM FRUSTRATION TO SELF-BLAME was bent on proving that there was no contradiction between acts of war and those of rescue. One of the consequences of the obfuscation and § There was even a tendency to recognize this

convoluted policies practiced by BritainandGer- —_— within the British government.

many’s satellite countries was the inability to dis- Leo Cohen’s letter is important mainly betinguish between those who wished to help and cause it expressed the confusion within JAE

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Rescue Plans

circles and revealed that even someone privy _ cially the Jewish Agency—faced operational to fairly detailed information could have found __ hardships due to the absence of a suitable man-

it extremely difficult to comprehend the _ agerial tradition and the JAE’s inability to imsignificance of the obstacles confronting the pose its authority on the public. The lack of leadership. Cohen’s sentiments are entirely un- —_— funds for financing broad-based rescue opera-

derstandable when he complains “it is absurd __ tions presented a significant obstacle. No less that for the past six months it has been impossi- —_ daunting was the difficulty in properly analyz-

ble to arrange even one ship to transfer refugees. | ing the pronouncements of the more experiIt is absurd that out of 30 thousand children = enced and sophisticated governments of the

whose immigration has been approved, it has Allied countries, in particular the British been impossible to bring so much as one child.”.. government. The Yishuv leadership tried to Indeed, it was absurd, but as we have seen, the — contend with an extremely complex historical failure was not due to any weakness of will on __ incident with only limited means at its disposal

the part of Ben-Gurion and the JAE. and through a fundamental weakness that was Cohen had nothing new to say despite his __ virtually impossible to surmount. broad and multifaceted description of the agen- Cohen had conveniently ignored these facts cies at work in the Yishuv. In suggesting that a __ in his letter. For example, consider his proposal clear hierarchy should be established, an unam- —_ that Churchill and Roosevelt appoint “a high biguous delegation of powers both within the | commissioner for the rescue of Jews.” In practical Yishuv leadership and among the emissaries in __ terms, this meant imposing upon the Allied powIstanbul, he ignored—or did not know—how _ ers an external supervisor who would determine impossible it was for Ben-Gurion and the leader- _ the policies they should follow—on an issue they ship to introduce order into the disorder.Cohen’s themselves repeatedly tried to dodge. It was an description was another example of a situation | empty proposal. Cohen did not take into considthat Ben-Gurion, Kaplan, and Sharett were well _—_ eration the real power of the Zionist movement aware of, and they handled it by stretching rules —_ and that of the Allied powers to stand firm on to the limit, including those of lawful public ad- what appeared to be a question of self-interest. ministration, and playing the “game” while re- = A_ possible practical outcome might have remaining within the democratic system of which — sembled the Inter-Governmental Refugee Comthey were a part and through whose power they — mittee established after the Evian Conference— acted. They did what they were capable of within —_ that same dubious concept that was renewed at the restrictions in the level of self-rule permitted | the Bermuda Conference.!%?

to the Jewish Yishuv, which did not enjoy sover- Reality confounded even the experienced

eign rule. and practical Ben-Gurion. While the Yishuv was

Some of Cohen’s suggestions—establishing | attempting to break through the vicious circle of a system for collecting intelligence, monitoring _ logistical obstacles, a somewhat surprising pro-

the implementation of instructions, creating posal was brought before Ben-Gurion. The idea planning institutions—had been realized even __ was to salvage ships that had sunk on the oppobefore he had raised them in the letter, while — site eastern Mediterranean coast, restore them, others were theoretically noteworthy but im- —_and return them to their owners in return for an practical. In those days the JAEF’s ability to act, | agreement that the Yishuv could use them for both internally and externally, was a far cry — transporting refugees. Ben-Gurion liked the from that of a sovereign government. Some of __ idea. He had long been trying to find solutions the bodies already existing in the Yishuv—espe- _ for the transportation problems and was even

190

“Or We Shall Have No Repentance”

planning to establish a commercial naval fleet. Barlas had returned with news that had alHe scribbled the following question inthe mar- _ ready been supplied to the JAE. Antonescu, had gin of the letter: “How do we get hold of the in- —_ signed an order allowing Jews to leave Romania if

struments and experts?” In his official reply, | suitable means of transport were found, and it Ben-Gurion thanked the author of the proposal, | seemed the Romanians were eager to speed up describing the idea as “interesting and worthy, the exit of the five thousand children who had without a doubt, of consideration” and signed been permitted to leave in May 1943. Additional off by asking where the necessary means could __ official signs of an improvement in the status of be found for carrying out the enterprise. Ben- |§ Romanian Jews involved those Jews who had Gurion, ever the wise realist, was completely se- | been deported to Transnistria and had survived.

rious in looking into so imaginative a pro- Barlas reported on positive signs from Turkey,

posal.!40 whose consuls in Bucharest and Sofia had been As 1943 drew to an end, there was still no asked to inform the governments of Romania breakthrough. Relations between the British and Bulgaria that Turkey was interested in saving and the Yishuv had deteriorated. In September —_Jews, would allow them to pass through Turkish

there was a highly publicized trial involving territory, and would welcome the removal of all Avraham Reichlin and Ayre Sirkin, two Ha- obstacles preventing Jewish refugees from crossganah members accused of possessing large __ ing Bulgaria. quantities of illegal weapons; they were subse- In Bulgaria, however, things had gone from quently given lengthy prison sentences. The __ bad to worse since the suspicious death (by poiYishuv was incensed when the British carried — soning?) of Czar Boris III. Government officials out a search for illegal weapons in Ramat __had been replaced, and it was necessary to begin Hakhovesh in mid-November and fired shots __ certain stages in the operation over again. A good into a crowd. One man was killed and thirteen example is the government’s disappointing reinjured. The JAE was simultaneously facing an- — sponse to the list containing thirteen hundred other crisis involving Ben-Gurion’s resigna- —_ Jews. Even those remaining in the abridged list tion, this time over Zionist policies and his re- _—- were not allowed to leave. Barlas also recalled at-

lations with Weizmann. tempts at evacuating three hundred children from There was no change in the gloomy reports | Hungary and said he had heard from London that coming in to the JAE from the emissaries. Chaim _ British approval had been sent and there was hope Barlas, the JAE’s senior representative in Turkey, that they would be rescued within a few weeks. Al-

arrived in Palestine in October and reported on though Barlas felt that there was still a chance to two contradictory processes resulting from the _ save Jews, in practice nothing had changed and growing instability of NaziGermany.Ontheone __ there were no positive results to point to.!*! hand, as a result of uncertainty among the satel- The picture Ze’ev Schind drew at the end of lite countries concerning their status following —_1943 was also grim. Here and there some links in the eventual defeat of Germany by Allied forces, | the chain had improved, but not the entire chances had improved for rescuing Jewsandnew _ structure. Efforts were moving forward in Hunpossibilities had opened up. On the other hand, _ gary; groups of Jews were leaving, and there was the conflicts among the surviving Jewsin Europe _ hope that within weeks children would also be and German war refugees and collaborators _ let out. In Romania the emissaries were trying to placed the former at risk, complicated transport get hold of ships in order to take advantage of

gry Jews. leave. !42

operations, and held up food shipments tohun- the authorities’ tendency to permit Jews to

191

Rescue Plans

DON’T RISK THE POSSIBLE the chance of bringing in Jews from occupied Eu-

FOR THE IMPOSSIBLE rope as well as from secure places. They could In the last months of 1943 the JAE reexamined its therefore not reject the logic behind the demand

position on the thirty thousand certificates that for certificates for immigrants from northern had not been used thus far. Again the question = Africa and the Middle East. arose as to whether one should wait for a break- Ben-Gurion was sure that if a chance arose of through or risk taking a chance that might pre- —_ rescuing children from Europe, it would be posvent the immigration of other Jews. The alterna- _ sible to renew the demand to bring those children tive was to firmly demand certificates for any Jew to Palestine even if the certificates had already able to immigrate, including the elderly and Jews _ been used for bringing Jews from elsewhere. He from Middle Eastern countries and northern probably hoped that the British would be unable

Africa. to withstand the public pressure in Palestine and The debate resumed as a result of the loom- | would eventually ease the strictures of the White

ing “deadline” of 31 March 1944, the date on Paper. which the five years designated by the White Pa- In November 1943 Stanley informed Parliaper came to an end. It was feared that if the | ment that the British government had decided to certificates were not used, immigration would — extend the White Paper period until the thirty cease and the leadership would have to face the | thousand quota had been used up. There is no British head-on in the middle of the war. Ben- | documentation to confirm the direct connection Gurion again felt that the Yishuv should insist | between this news and the JAE’s decision to

that the British government allow these adopt the position taken by Ben-Gurion. (Sharett certificates to be allocated to every possible can- _—_ aligned himself with it in late August.) It is more

didate.!8 It would appear that the main reason _ likely that Stanley's announcement reflected the for this position was the understanding thatthere strengthening of his own brand of British policy

was only a slight chance that the remaining toward the Jews trapped in Europe. certificates would be used for rescuing children Be that as it may, it can be asserted with ceror adults from Europe. Ben-Gurion believed that tainty that the British understood the growing there was no point in risking the possible by fu- —_- unrest in the Yishuv, the JAE’s decisions, and the

tilely awaiting the impossible. He therefore called fact that adoption of Ben-Gurion’s position on his colleagues both within and outside the = might jeopardize their own interests. They realparty to drop the debate about integrating the —_ized that the Yishuv was not about to reconcile it-

children who had not arrived. It could be re- _ self to the nonrescue of the Jews of Europe, the sumed “if we have a miracle and we are given the closing of all immigration gates in the face of children.” Anyway, it was far better for them to non-European immigrants, and—with the end receive bad treatment in Palestine than to be _— of the legal immigration period fast approach-

cared for by the Nazis.!4 ing—the total shutdown of immigration withAs we have seen, Ben-Gurion adamantly be- out the thirty thousand approved immigration lieved that the British were under no illusion that certificates having been used. It was clear to the the Yishuv would be satisfied with the remaining —_ British that the JAE was still interested, first and certificates from the White Paper quota—if, in- foremost, in rescuing children from Europe, but deed, a dramatic turn occurred in the rescue __ it was not about to be led astray and would not operation. The British understood that it was in- agree to let thirty thousand certificates drown in conceivable for the Yishuv both to fail in its | a sea of crocodile tears. Ben-Gurion clearly forefforts to rescue Jews and to agree to relinquish mulated his position on several occasions: a total

192

“Or We Shall Have No Repentance”

ban on immigration would lead the Yishuvintoa — road would be impassable. Nonetheless, his over-

bitter struggle and would break all bonds be- _all instructions remained “leave no stone un-

tween him and Britain. turned.” He directed all his political efforts at the United States, Britain, and the neutral countries

At the end of 1943 all the children who could and instructed the emissaries to purchase ships have been evacuated had not been. The reasons __ that would provide the Yishuv with greater flexiwere many and varied, the main one being pre- _ bility in advancing rescue plans.

ventive action taken by the Germans. They had The Yishuv’s emissaries explored every posno special sentiments for children and did _ sible avenue in their attempts to rescue children: everything in their power to parry their rescue. __ they tried to rescue the children of Poland, who Germany’s satellite countries agreed to the exo- —_—shad made their way eastward through Russia and

dus of children yet repeatedly reneged on the — southward from there to central Asia and Tehran; final approval; after approving the exit, they — they tried to rescue the children from the Balkans avoided carrying out intermediate steps that | through the important center of activity in Istan-

were essential for the approval to be imple- bul; they tried to rescue the children of western mented. Even if these obstacles were overcome, |= Europe through Sweden and the center in others took their place in the countries of tran- | Geneva by means of the London branch and the sit and of temporary sojourn, such as Turkey special emissaries to Portugal and Sweden. and Switzerland, Sweden and Portugal, Spain Efforts at rescuing children were overseen and South Africa. The British, with their highly — from Jerusalem, London, New York, and Wash-

contradictory policies, were often a major ington. The leadership at every level was involved: source of hindrance. All these factors taken to- | Weizmann and Ben-Gurion, Kaplan and Sharett, gether utterly frustrated efforts at saving Jewish _ Felix Frankfurter, Eltyahu Dobkin, Moshe Shapira

children from Nazi Europe. and Yitzhak Gruenbaum, Joseph Linton and Hopes were dashed in the Yishuv and else- | Nahum Goldmann, Shalom Adler-Rudel, Wilfrid where that those involved would consider their —_Israeland Arthur Lourie. All the “parallel systems” positions on the rescue of children in accordance were also involved, from Shaul Avigur (Meirov), with a special set of rules. The efforts of the emis- | Teddy Kollek, and Eliahu Epstein to Menahem saries and the Yishuv leaders proved virtually — Bader, Zvi Yehieli, and Venja Pomeranz.

useless. The broad-based plan outlined by Ben- Every possible destination was considered: Gurion at the Mapai Conference in December — Sweden, Spain, Portugal, the countries of South 1942, where the twenty-five thousand mentioned America, and Lorenzo Marques en route to South at first culminated in a huge enterprise aimed at — Africa. They were all potential countries of refuge, rescuing halfa million children, was graduallyre- — and the fact that rescued children might be geoduced to a few thousand children from Romania, graphically separated from Palestine did not even

Bulgaria, and Hungary, plus a handful more remotely cause the Yishuv to disqualify any of

from elsewhere. them.

Ben-Gurion never totally abandoned his be- The Yishuv and the Zionist movement tried to lief that the Yishuv would succeed in rescuing __ recruit every international element possible: PresiJewish children from the clutches of the Nazis, dent Roosevelt and his wife Eleanor, Churchill and but by January-February 1943 hishopeshad been _his senior cabinet ministers, the prime minister of replaced by a grave yet lucid sense that the road = Sweden, ministers of the Polish governmentto rescue would be strewn with obstacles. His —_in-exile and other governments-in-exile. They apspeeches already revealed hints of his fear thatthe pealed to Smuts, who was considered a friend of

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Rescue Plans

Zionism, and to heads of state in South America. With the plan for rescuing children on the They even had brief hopes for some sympathy — agenda, two additional rescue plans were disfrom the Nazis and the satellite countries. They — cussed simultaneously: the ransom plan in Slovatried to obtain the cooperation of Herbert Emer- kia and the plan to rescue the Jews of Romania. son and Gustav Kullmann, both heads of the Inter- = The plan to rescue children was part of a larger

Governmental Refugee Committee. system-wide attempt at aid and rescue, which The JAE—especially Ben-Gurion, Kaplan, included secret collaboration. It is now easier to and Sharett—oversaw attempts at secret diplo- | understand Ben-Gurion’s repeated calls for remacy or bribes in order to achieve their objec- _ straint and a holding back of the weapons of tives. They tried public pressure and publicopin- _ protest, which he feared might have boomion. Nothing was overlooked. The main Jewish __ eranged. It was imperative not to endanger the organizations—the Jewish Agency, the Ameri- rescue plans. We have seen the extent to which can Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, and the stand taken by the Allied and neutral counthe World Jewish Congress—all cooperated in tries proved critical in the eventual success or one way or another in advancing plans forrescu- _ failure of rescue operations. Ben-Gurion and his ing children. In addition to these larger organiza-_ _ colleagues refrained from protest as long as there tions, there were also local initiatives, like that of was the slightest chance of obtaining help from

Rabbi Eherenpreis in Sweden. these countries.

194

>

Dealing with the Devil The 1942 and 1943 Ransom Plans

ewish history is strewn with rescue attempts in- Needless to say, all the ransom plans failed. Jooiving the payment of ransom money. From __ Given the fact that the removal of tens of thouthis point of view, there was nothing new inthe "sands of Jews from Europe was an extremely ransom proposals that appeared on the Yishuv’s complex operation to carry out in wartime, this agenda during the war. At least four ofthem were _ failure could almost have been predicted. An inlarge-scale in nature. Even with allthe documen- credibly complex plan from a logistical standtation now available and the research that has __ point, it had no chance of succeeding given the

continued unabated, it is hard to determine the = opposition of the Nazis, on the one hand, and sincerity of the proponents of these plans. Re- Britain and the United States, on the other. At searchers who examined the ransom plans both __ that stage of the “final solution,’ the Nazis did not from the point of view of the Nazi murderers and want to allow Jews out, whereas Britain and the from the political angle of the satellite countries | United States were not interested in admitting and the Allies are still divided as to the ultimate such large numbers of Jews. We have seen that intentions of those who proposed them. New re- __ children did not escape this trap even when their search only deepens the puzzle, which remains — numbers were relatively small.

unsolved to this day. The Yishuv leadership understood the enorThe first two ransom plans for saving the — mous political and logistical hurdles involved in Jews of Europe found their way to the Yishuv’s such plans, but at the very least it hoped to buy agenda at about the same time (late 1942-early time and delay the annihilation process. But even

1943), when the free world and the Yishuv as the leadership attempted to get these plans off underwent a change in awareness and people __ the ground, it became aware of powerful opposistarted to understand what was taking place in _ tion blocking their success.

Europe. The first proposal, the Transnistria THE TRANSNISTRIA PLAN Plan, focused on Jews who had been expelled to

this remote, poverty-stricken area between the At the beginning of September 1940, there was a Ukraine and Romania. The second plan, origi- deterioration in the condition of the Jews of Ronally called the Slovakia Plan, was aimed at sav- —s mania that had begun two years earlier. Jon Aning only Slovakian Jews; it later developed intoa — tonescu rose to power with the help of the fascist,

broader plan, the Europa Plan, whose objective anti-Semitic party Iron Guard. The figurehead was to save all the Jews still strandedin Europeat ruler King Carol II abdicated in favor of his son that time. The third plan, “Goods for Blood,” the and escaped. About a month later Romania was best known and most complex yet also the most — overrun by German forces on the pretext of havclandestine one, was brought from Hungary by __ ing to guard the oil fields. During the last week

the emissary Joel Brand. Placedontheagendain of November Romania joined the triangular the spring of 1944, its lasting influence on the |= Germany-Italy-Japan pact, thereby becoming one history of the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine andthe — of the Axis powers.

future State of Israel far outstripped that of its The changes in Romania’s status brought predecessors. (This plan is discussed in detailin | about a deterioration in the situation of Roma-

chapter 8.) nia’s Jewish population. Approximately 120 Jews 195

Rescue Plans

were murdered in Bucharest during riots thatoc- = matic acts aimed at persuading the British to alcurred 19-20 January 1941. The Jews of Bukovina _locate the remaining certificates from the White and Bessarabia were murdered and tortured in —‘ Paper quota to the Romanian Jews. At that time the thousands throughout the summer of 1941, the quota stood at roughly forty of the original

and many were deported to Transnistria, where seventy-five thousand. Within one year this they starved or froze to death. After the German —_ would decrease to thirty thousand, with Britain invasion of the USSR in June 1941, the Russian reserving these certificates for the rescue of Jew-

army retreated from Bukovina and Bessarabia _ ish children.

and the Romanian army returned and started It is worth recalling that this diplomatic murdering Jews accused of treason and ofCom- struggle was conducted before the Yishuv and munist leanings. Thousands of Jews perished, Jews and non-Jews in the free world were fully and the Jewish population suffered unspeakable —_ aware of the fact that Jews were being systemati-

persecution and torture. The first wave of depor- cally murdered in Europe. In December 1941, tations to Transnistria began in northern Bukov- __ shortly after the death of Secretary of State for the

ina and Bessarabia. Those deportees that were Colonies Lord Lloyd and before the appointment not persecuted or murdered frequently died of | of Lord Moyne, Weizmann applied directly to starvation, cold, and disease. In addition to the Churchill. He stressed that thousands of Jews deportations, the civil situation of the Jews in ___ were in a state of fear and desperation in RomaRomania proper also deteriorated. They were _ nia, and that many of them had been tortured or forced to wear the yellow Star of David, were very shot to death in acts of mass slaughter. He men-

restricted in their movements, and were strictly tioned the immigration quota and warned regulated in terms of their ownership of property against the uncontrolled exodus of thousands of and their ability to conduct business. In some = Romanian Jewish refugees. (This clearly hinted Romanian provinces Jews were even forced to _at the illegal immigration operation.) Weizmann perform hard labor. In May 1941 all the residency | went onto warn Churchill that unless Britain expermits granted to Jews in transit in Romania __ tended its aid, it would lose the respect of the en-

were canceled. tire Jewish world.

Throughout this period the Fascist govern- Weizmann’s appeal produced a routine sement was willing to permit the Jews of Romania __ ries of discussions at various levels within the to emigrate and thereby be rid of them, although — Foreign Office and the Colonial Office. Typical it started preparing for “other solutions, like the allegations were again raised by British authorifatal emigration of the Jews of Bukovina and __ ties: transport was blocked; the exit of Jews was Bessarabia. When the Yishuv and other Jewish forbidden; Palestine was economically restricted communities received news of events in Roma- _in its ability to integrate immigrants; Romania nia, the number of fatalities was exceptionally | was an enemy country and refugees from there large, but this was simply viewed as part of the could be spies. As we have seen, British officials larger and yet familiar picture, merely another _—_also used these excuses and similar ones when

instance of Jew-baiting.! discussing the rescue of children. The Yishuv started preparing for the rescue British officials pointed to practical obstaof the Jews of Romania by means ofthe illegalim- cles. Because relations between Romania and migration operation and both openly and se- _ Britain had been severed, all procedures for discretly put political pressure on Britain to allow __ tributing certificates had come to an abrupt the integration of Jews from Romania in Pales- _— halt in Romania; roundabout ways were now tine. Weizmann concentrated a series of diplo- —_ necessary, and these were cumbersome and time-

196

Dealing with the Devil

consuming. Freedom of movement in Romania country, since it was highly dangerous sailing was greatly restricted, and it was difficult to de- — without such a neutral flag in a sea infested with part for another country. The Black Seawasnow — enemy submarines.’ It was the first stage in a plan

full of warships and submarines as a result of to renew the exodus of Jews from Romania, alother countries joining the war. The Germanin- —_ though throughout 1942-1943 few Jews were acvasion of Bulgaria resulted in the closing of the _ tually rescued.

overland passage southward from Romania, in- The Romanian Jews themselves were makcluding the Bulgaria-Turkey railroad, the pri- _ ing similar efforts. The community’s leadership

mary thoroughfare. called on Britain to help those Jews who already Still, Britain’s principal consideration was __ had certificates to leave. Groups of youngsters

political. Its sights were set on the Arabs and it and others from the Jewish community indewas worried, first and foremost, about deviating § pendently made preparations for an illegal exofrom the White Paper. This was clearly expressed dus from Romania. They bought small boats and

in one of the government’s internal memos, _ outfitted them; some even managed to set sail which typified the response Weizmann received —_ and, after many trials and tribulations, actually

to his letters: reached Palestine.‘

. , The of the Struma was the tragic low The ae. main linesinking in the, policies of the White i. ; 5 ; . point in the efforts of Romania’s Jews to extricate

Paper was that the needs of Outrage Jewish their country. refugees. themselves cannot infrom themselves serve as a in ; ;the ;

naecriterion - free world caused the various sides to rethink fair for determining the scope of ; . ; ,; ow, . , , their policies and their working methods. The

immigration permitted into Palestine. . logic “ ; .of es, Jewish communities reconsidered the Helping ;the Jews would be unfair to the , ; i dangerous ; ; caping from their countries in such Arabs unwise the point of view . , The ae , ,and ways before from exhausting all other options. of Britain’s interests in the Middle East. , ; eee

; ; Ww i

,be Yishuv andinto the illegal immigration operation beThe Arabs must,cautious taken ; came more withconsiderarespect ,to, the level of tion. There could be no doubt that the risk they were willing to take in organizing such

Arabs ,of Palestine and other Middle East.; ’ declared Sy e , operations. The British changed their ern countries would now see in the ad; . a policies, with the new colonial secretary, Lord mission of large numbers of Romanian , , ,into Cranborne, announcing thatofthere would not be Jews Palestine a blatantAs breach “ .seen, oy . a “second Struma.” we have Britain’s declared policies to arrange Jew- i. , ” , the contra-

logical.’ ,

eee immigration . dictions in British policy caused Knatchbullish in a way that is just and ., Hugessen, the British ambassador in Ankara, to demand clarifications.

While exerting political pressure, the illegal im- While the situation involving the Jews of Romigration operation in Turkey was simultane- = mania gradually deteriorated, Ben-Gurion was ously examining ways of secretly removing Jews _ active in the United States. During that particular from Romania. In September and October 1941, _ visit (1941) he was less involved in the diplomatic

illegal immigration activists Zvi Yehieli and Ze’ev activity surrounding the plight of Romania’s Schind left for Istanbul. They purchased a small —_ Jews, his main objective being to convince Amerpleasure boat and named her the Lilly; this was _ican Jews to support the notion of a Jewish state. the same vessel they had planned to use in the _ His efforts during this first visit were not successrescue of children during 1943. The main prob- _— ful, and Ben-Gurion was obviously disaplem was obtaining the patronage of a neutral —_ pointed. He did not manage to recruit the Jews of

197

Rescue Plans

America, nor even the Zionist movement, into Around 148,000 Jews were expelled from waging an affirmative-action campaign against northern Bukovina and Bessarabia to TransnisBritish policy.° Success was ultimately achieved __ triashortly after the Red Army retreated following during his second visit in 1942, when the Bilt- Germany's invasion of the USSR. The province of more Program was accepted by the Zionist Con- _— Transnistria, a meager land area between the

ference held in New York. rivers Dneister and Bug, was annexed to Germany During both his visits Ben-Gurion based his in the summer of 1941. The civil government was claims for the need for unrestricted immigration in Romanian hands, while the military governto a Jewish state on the suffering of the Jews of ment was in the hands of the German-controlled Europe. He tried to incite American Jews into Romanian army, acts of public protest against the calamities fol- There were other reasons for the deportation lowing Jewish efforts to scuttle the Palestinian ofthe Jews from northern Bukovina and Bessara-

embargo imposed by Britain. bia. Romanian leader Ion Antonescu was the A PROPOSAL FROM ROMANIA moving force in this operation—and he simply

decided to murder the Jews there. Certain condiWhile the British were still bandying about their —_ tions made this possible, as well as a special com-

contradictory policies toward the Jews of Eu- bination of circumstances that arose in the rope, a proposal arrived from Romaniathat once — course of war. Primary among the former was again reshuffled all the cards. Romania was sig- |= Romania’s ethnic history, particularly the posinaling that in return for a ransom and advance __ tion of the Jews there. Romania was traditionally arrangements with the country of destination, anti-Semitic to the point of displaying murderRomania would permit the exit of seventy thou- — ous tendencies. The Romanians wanted to exsand Jewish survivors who had been deported to _hibit their loyalty to Nazi Germany and were also Transnistria. Only now were the British getting = motivated bya desire to lay their hands on propused to the new line being promulgated by Colo- _ erty belonging to deported Jews. The new govnial Secretary Stanley (who had replaced Cran- ernment was interested in getting rid of the Jews, borne): a controlled and measured tactical flexi- | who wereseenasa political and economic threat. bility when facing a new challenge. Stanley never § Some historians might even add that Romania’s imagined having to take inso many immigrants. —_ hold on Bukovina and Bessarabia was not someKnatchbull-Hugessen found himself in an im- __ thing that could be taken for granted and that the

possible situation. Jews put this at risk, since these were areas that The Romanian proposal was not carriedout — were very ethnically mixed and most of the Jews and large numbers of children were never res- — there spoke German, Russian, and Yiddish but cued from Romania. This failure was not the re- not necessarily Romanian.

sult of any position taken by the Yishuy, nor of a The deported Jews lived under terrible conspecific act or failure to act. It was the Germans ditions and were exposed to all kinds of weather; and the British who thwarted the ransom plan with little or no food or appropriate clothing, for the rescue of seventy thousand surviving __ theyeasily fell victim to starvation and disease. In Jews of Transnistria. Britain’s main motive, of addition, they were cruelly persecuted by the Rocourse, was a fear of masses of Romania the im- =manian army and the Volksdeutsche, the local migration quotas established by the White Pa- —_ population of German extraction. As we have per, thereby exposing Britain to the fury of the seen, this kind of “solution” had already been Arabs and jeopardizing its status in the Middle _ tried in the reservation Nisko-Lublin. Within a

East. year the number of deportees decreased from 198

Dealing with the Devil

148,000 to 70,000, with more than half perishing Recent research has shown that several verin Transnistria; among the survivors were many __ sions of the rescue plan existed. According to one

orphaned children.° of them, Ion Antonescu agreed to release seventy In October 1942 discussions concerning thousand Jews from Transnistria in return for what came to be known as the Transnistria Plan two hundred thousand Romanian lei (currency) (also called the 70 Thousand Plan) were held be- for each Jew; another version has it that the cost tween the leaders of Romanian Jewry and various — was five hundred thousand lei per person.’ Folother persons in Romania. On the Jewish side, lowing a series of talks in Romania, local Jewish representatives included members of the follow- —_— leaders determined that the proposal did indeed

ing: the Center for Romanian Jews (Centrala come from Ion Antonescu’s circle and was supEvreilor), a body established by the Romanian __ ported by deputy prime minister Mihai Anauthorities and inspired by the Germans; the — tonescu and members of the royal family—esWorld Jewish Congress; and the Palestine Office pecially the queen mother. Jewish emigration in Bucharest. Wilhelm Fildermann, who headed would be carried out by ship from the Black Sea the Organization of Jewish Communities in Ro- _ port of Constanta; the ships would be guaranteed mania was the key person among Jewish leaders. “safe conduct” because the Germans were partHis counterparts included: Mihai Antonescu, the __ ners in the plan.

Romanian deputy prime minister; Radu Lecca, Based on past experience, doubts remained the secretary of state for Jewish affairs, who wasa_ _as to the seriousness of the proposal and the pos-

senior official in the Romanian government, a___ sibility of carrying it out. Nonetheless, FilderNazi agent, and later also a Soviet agent; and mann and his colleagues decided to pass along Konstantin Bursan and Arthur Tester, both busi- information on the ransom plan to Jewish instinessmen, the latter of whom was alsoa member __ tutions in the free world and to suggest a meeting of the German army’s intelligence branch (Ab- —_ with the emissaries who were to present the prowehr). (Bursan may also have belonged to the __ posal on behalf of Romania. They wanted to give

Abwehr. ) the impression that the proposal was being seriAs we shall see, the involvement of the Ab- _ ously considered.

wehr in such affairs increased amidst an internal Knowing full well that Ion Antonescu was struggle over the status of the Abwehr within the — keen on ridding himself of his country’s Jews, Reich. Both Bursan and Tester claimed owner- __ they feared that rejection of the plan would enship of a shipping firm known as Konrad Star, danger the lives of the Jews remaining in Transwhich had passed into German handssometime _nistria. In addition to wanting to verify the seriearlier. According to American documentation, — ousness of the proposal, they were interested in Tester’s son-in-law was one of the managers of — buying time. The Jewish leaders hoped that crethe S.A.R. Kulke company, which provided a__ating the illusion of serious consideration of the cover for intelligence operations carried out by —_ ransom plan would postpone deportations and the Axis powers within and outside Romania.’ It |= murder and moderate anti-Semitic persecution. is possible that Konrad Star was one of aseriesof | These hopes were based primarily on the as-

sham companies purchased by the Germans in sumption that the Nazi leaders or heads of the Europe in order to provide a cover for their intel- _ satellite countries were behind the ransom proligence and espionage activity. Their links to __ posal. Tester and Bursan could therefore be considered The recommendations were passed on to Isan operational advantage or even a sign thatthe — tanbul on 26 November 1942. Dr. Wilhelm Fis-

affair was coordinated with Germany. cher, representative of the World Jewish Congress

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in Bucharest, telephoned Dr. Joseph Goldin, one — with Fischer and from his conversations with of the Jewish Agency’s official representatives in | Schmidt and Gier, which he quickly dispatched Turkey, informing him of the Transnistria ran- to Ben-Gurion and Gruenbaum in Palestine. He som plan. Fischer informed Goldin thatanemis- | summarized the details of the plan and its backsary would present the proposal, that he should — ground, stressing that members of the Jewish be received with respect, and that the proposal —_ leadership in Romania were also asking for it to

should be relayed forthwith to Jerusalem.’ be given serious consideration. Another memo Indeed, on 30 November 1942 two emissaries on the same subject arrived simultaneously from arrived in Istanbul. The first was Gier,a reporter Eliezer Leder, emissary of the Committee of Four, with the Swiss information agency. He wasanac- | Gruenbaum’s representative in Istanbul. Barlas, quaintance of Barlas and a courier for Leccaand the Jewish Agency’s senior emissary in Turkey,

the Abwehr. Gier met Goldin and Barlas, in- also arrived in Palestine with similar informaformed them of the talks in Bucharest regarding __ tion.!* This was a recurring pattern of action in

the future of the Transnistria deportees, and _ the attempt to rescue the Jews of Europe.

added that a message would be delivered soon by GRASPING AT STRAWS another courier. That same day saw the arrival of a courier named Schmidt, a Dutch subject and §=The Romanian proposal was discussed by Ben-

manager of the Philips plant in Turkey and the Gurion and Gruenbaum before being raised for Balkans. Schmidt met with Goldin and, on behalf discussion at the JAE plenum. Ben-Gurion’s held of Lecca and Dr. Nador Ghingold, secretary ofthe — the view that “it was doubtful if the plan could be

Jewish Council (Jewish Center), presented him carried out because the Allied governments with an official proposal for the release of seventy | would not agree to handing money over to en-

thousand Jews in return for ransom money.! emy states, [yet] negotiations should be conSchmidt laid the plan before Goldin: in re- — ducted in order to clarify the issue.”

turn for two hundred thousand lei (then equiva- The plenum met for an extraordinary seslent to four hundred U.S. dollars) per head, the — sion on Wednesday (meetings were usually held government of Romania was prepared to permit | on Sunday), 23 December 1942, in order to rethe emigration of seventy thousand Jews from ___ ceive the first report on the plan to rescue Jews Transnistria aboard Romanian ships. He said from Transnistria. Ben-Gurion was absent from that Radu Lecca, the Romanian secretary of state this meeting (he was probably at a Mapai meetfor Jewish affairs, was interested in getting rid of ing), but his position was presented by GruenJews in a way that would not result in murder, | baum, his permanent deputy.'? The JAE was insince he believed that a German victory was no — formed that although Ben-Gurion believed the longer a certainty. The Germans had approved __ proposed plan was dubious, it ought to be rethe ransom plan and Dr. Ghingold would set off | viewed and negotiations conducted to determine soon for Geneva and Lisbon to conduct negotia- its chances of success. One version had it that the tions with the JDC over funding for the plan. ransom sum under discussion was in the area of Schmidt reported that Vatican representativesin fourteen billion lei (the equivalent of twentyRomania had agreed to the ships flying the Vati- _—_ eight million U.S. dollars). Another version gives

can flag. This added weight to the proposal and =a sum 2.5 times higher (at least seventy million bolstered hope that safe conduct would indeed be dollars). Nonetheless, Ben-Gurion was con-

assured. !! vinced that negotiations should be held to see if

Goldin drew up a memo on the material he _ this was marked a breakthrough in the rescue of had gleaned from the telephone conversation — the remaining Jews of Transnistria.

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In this respect, both Ben-Gurion in Jeru- consequently prone to failure). The JAE hoped to salem and Dr. Fildermann and others in Bu- achieve three objectives: overcome the problem charest shared the same view: they realized ata of having to raise such large sums of money in very early stage that this was an extremely com- _ one go; temporarily bypass the ban on transferplex plan and that the chances of its success were —_ ring money to Axis powers; and avoid immediate

slim. Still, they believed that everything should conflict with British opposition to the immigrabe done to carry it out—at the very least to buy _ tion of so many Jews into Palestine. At the end of time—and that it should not be rejected out of the debate, the JAE decided to entrust Barlas with hand, since this could worsen the condition of negotiations in Istanbul and instructed him to

the Jews in Romania. demand that the Romanians allow the Yishuv to The JAE intensively debated the proposal. send aid to the Transnistria deportees.

They discussed the issue of transportation for The JAE also decided to provide the British thousands of refugees, the difficulty of whichhad — government with details of the proposal. In fact, just begun to sink in after the Yishuv had failedto Britain was already aware of it because Goldin’s

transfer several hundred children. Fears were | memo had been sent by the British consulate in raised concerning the Yishuv’s ability to integrate Istanbul and its contents had been made known such large numbers of refugees in one attempt; at beforehand to British diplomats. The British may the same time debates were being held on the —_ also have known about the proposal through

plan to rescue twenty-nine thousand children. their own intelligence sources and others in spyThe JAE also considered the possibility that the _filled Istanbul, or from their routine bugging of proposal was no more than a trick to extort — the JAE’s telegraphic correspondence. One way money, a suspicion that grew when it turned out or another, Knatchbull-Hugessen, Britain’s amthat some of the persons involved were unreli- _ bassador in Ankara, reported to the foreign secable. Today researchers know just how justified retary on the Transnistria Plan on the very same those doubts were. Gier, for example, was a —_ day the JAEconvened for its special debate. Thus, Gestapo agent who passed along detailed infor- _in this affair the Yishuv’s activities were again mation of his talks with rescue emissaries in Is- transparent to Britain—at least at first. tanbul to Gustav Richter, Eichmann’s representa- Once again the JAE entrusted Gruenbaum

tive in Bucharest. to travel to the United States in order to raise the

Also, information arriving in Palestine on necessary funds. It was also decided to keep dethe vicious and murderous anti-Semitism ram- _ tails of the plan secret and to share them with pant in Romania did nothing to bolster faith in only one member of the association of Jews who a proposal that came from a government that immigrated from Romania in Palestine. Disclostreated its Jews so cruelly. Nonetheless, the gen- —_— ing the secret to the Romanian representative was

eral opinion was that the plan should be investi- intended to pacify criticism of the JAE that the gated thoroughly and, if necessary, funds should — leadership was not doing enough to rescue Jews,

be risked in the process.'4 but it certainly had no operational logic.! It was suggested at the JAE meeting to split An intermediary summary of the Yishuv leadthe proposal into two stages: firstremovethe Jews _ ership’s handling of the affair shows that, as soon as from Transnistria and return them to Romania _ information was received in Istanbul, it was relayed proper (a relatively inexpensive operation) and _ to Palestine. Because of its importance, Barlas also

then transport them from Romania and from came to Palestine. Ben-Gurion was the first to reterritories belonging to the Axis powers (an ex- _ ceive the information, together with Gruenbaum, tremely complex and expensive operation and _—_and the two met for a preliminary meeting to

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investigate the matter and to synchronize posi- _ turned from Transnistria, which, for many thoutions. A special meeting of the JAE was convened, sands of Jews, was equivalent to the valley of where Ben-Gurion’s position was accepted. death. Their removal from the confines of RomaThe leadership instructed its representatives nia and the other Axis countries was an operation in Istanbul to demand the transfer of the depor- | whose chances of success appeared doubtful tees from Transnistria to Romania in order to _ given the enormous political and financial obstareceive aid from the Yishuv. It thereby hoped to _ cles that stood in its path. Ben-Gurion and his

overcome problems of transport and the ex- colleagues did not wish the return of the deporpected political obstacles. Barlas returned to Is- —_ tees from Transnistria—which appeared more tanbul for negotiations, while Gruenbaum set off likely and was extremely important—to be defor the United States to raise the necessary funds. | pendent on an operation whose chances of sucIt should be remembered that in addition to the —_ cess were not as assured as they should be. The ransom the Yishuv was required to prepare — tendency to handle such matters in stages also ilthe necessary arrangements for integrating vast —_lustrates the similarity between Dr. Fildermann’s numbers of adult immigrants as well as thou- _—_ analysis in Romania and the one that guided the sands of children. Both plans would strain the JAE in Jerusalem.!6

Yishuv’s economic resources to the breaking By letting the British in on the secret, the point, and within a short timeathird planfound __ leadership also touched on one of the issue’s key its way onto the Yishuv’s agenda—much larger _aspects, for without their assistance it would have in scope that its predecessors—involving the res- _—_ been unfeasible to carry out so complex a logisti-

cue (in return for ransom) of masses ofJewsfrom cal process, culminating in the admission of

Slovakia and other parts of Europe. thousands of people into a region over which the The decisions made by Ben-Gurion and his _ British were in sole control. British approval was colleagues were based on information that was __ therefore a key factor in the plan and an essential much less detailed and comprehensive than that _ prerequisite for its success. Moreover, at that very available to today’s researchers, yet they managed |= moment the JAE was discussing the rescue of to deal with the main points. First, they were — twenty-nine thousand children, a plan that also guided by an understanding ofthe appallingcon- —_— required British approval. Under the circum-

dition of the deportees and the belief thatimme- _ stances, there was no justification for hiding diate action had to be taken to save them, either these operations from the British—it might even by sending aid or transferring them out of the have been extremely damaging. area. Second, they did not believe that German The JAE had no confirmed information on support for the plan was “in the palms of their — the position of the Romanians and Germans, hands” and understood that a rescue operation = which was a source of doubt to Ben-Gurion and could well meet German opposition. Third, they his colleagues with respect to the feasibility of the foresaw that the British would be inno hurry to _ proposal.!? The JAE could not have known that at aid an operation whose success was liable toover- —_ the very moment they were discussing Romania’s turn the immigration restrictionsimposed bythe — proposal the German ambassador in Bucharest White Paper, and their experience to date also —- was saying that he did not believe that it would be

forced them to consider transport shortcomings § approved in Berlin, and that Radu Lecca, the that could thwart a massive rescue operation. double agent, had been lying knowingly when he There was a certain logic behind the JAE’s __ said that the Germans had already approved it.

decision to split the operation into two parts. The Today we know that he was lying and that idea was that the deportees would at least be re- _—_— the JAE’s doubts were justified. Several days after

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Lecca presented his government’s proposaltothe — succeeded in foiling it. One cannot exaggerate the

Jewish representatives in Romania, he also in- importance of this fact. Although it was not formed Baron Manfred von Killinger, the Ger- known at the time, its effect on the way events de-

man ambassador in Bucharest, that Ion An- veloped was to prove decisive. tonescu had instructed the Jewish community to Indeed, everyone understood the impororganize the emigration of seventy-five to eighty | tance of maintaining secrecy with regard to the thousand Jews to Palestine in return for asizable —_ proposal, but news still managed to leak out and ransom. The German ambassador had immedi- ___ reach other bodies in the Yishuv. It may have ate reservations. He pointed out that the emigra- —_ been the result of a general inability to maintain tion of Jews to Palestine would violate Nazi Ger- _ secrecy within the Yishuv leadership and a desire

many’s commitment to the Palestinian mufti, to join the circle of activity on behalf of rescue Haj Amin al Husseini and Rashid Ali al-Kailani, operations. It could also have been a case of a lack

Iraq’s former pro-Nazi prime minister. of confidence in the leadership, a fear that with The JAE could therefore not have known no public pressure the latter would not do its utthat as they were discussing the plan, Radu Lecca ~_— most in following up all leads to rescue the dewas already promising the German ambassador _portees. In fact, it was the Yishuv leadership itself that no moves would be made to implement it — that had decided to share the secret with one of before the German government had announced the leaders of the Romanian Jewish Association its position. Von Killinger informed the Foreign _in Palestine. In no time the news spread through Office in Berlin of Lecca’s commitment. He was ___ the political parties, the National Council and the not mistaken in his evaluation of the Nazis’ posi- —_ Histadrut, the Romanian Immigrants’ Association. On 9 January 1943 he received firm andun- __ tion, and even among sectors of the general pub-

equivocal written orders from Martin Franz __ lic. Quite likely this process was exponential in Luther, a department head in the Foreign Office, _ nature. to frustrate the plan, which, said the letter, would Because the JAE was not aware that the plan upset Germany’s Allies in the Middle East and _had already been removed from the agenda, it would signal a weakness in the pact between Ger-_ _—rwass wary of letting it become common knowl-

many and Romania. The letter also hinted that — edge for fear of losing the support of essential the initiators of the plan were intending to use it —_ partners.!® Gruenbaum, Dobkin, and others dein order to create an opening for negotiations be- —_— nied the existence of such a proposal.” Bentween Romania and the Allies. German military | Gurion had always advocated secrecy. As he said headquarters also instructed von Killinger tode- | during the Mapai debate on the rescue issue: mand of the Romanian authorities that they not = “We were told by colleagues—and this is a firm to approve the plan.!8 As we have seen, itishighly | requirement of everyone present in this hall, probable that Gier also reported the matter to —_ whether or not they are with the press—not to

Eichmann’s representative in Bucharest. divulge anything of what is overheard here, since There can be no doubt that the instructions — any leaking of information could endanger the of the German Foreign Office and the military — channels of assistance.”?!

headquarters were totally unknown to the JAE. In the meantime other emissaries arrived We now know unequivocally that the ransom from Istanbul and reported on the plan. Some plan to save the deportees had been aborted at the had faith in its potential success, while others very moment the JAE was discussing the planon — were more reserved.” The idea that extraordithe slim chance of continuing with the negotia- | nary measures should be employed—a holdover tions. The Germans rejected it out of hand and _—s from the time when news from Europe first

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Rescue Plans

arrived—was still generally accepted. Thus, dis- the Yishuv. Most of the critics knew that the JAE cussions occurred in various quarters on allocat- had decided to conduct the plan in all its aspects. ing the large sums of money that would be neces- —s Information on the plan was usually available to sary toimplement the plan. A preliminarysumof — them, too. The critics nevertheless claimed that two hundred thousand dollars was mentioned. It the leadership did not understand the great powas small fare compared with the cost of the en- __ tential in the Romanians’ proposal and only tire project: estimates ranged from twenty-eight — tended to consider those possibilities that apmillion dollars and even as high as seventy mil- —_— peared to be sure bets. It was also claimed that the

lion, depending on which version one ac- __ leadership was not doing enough to raise money cepted—no mean sum from the standpoint of | from public contributions; the latter would be the Yishuv’s budgetary resources. These pre- —_ happy to make any sacrifice, even if only to trans-

liminary discussions were conducted while fer Jews from Transnistria to Romania proper. clarification and details of the Romanian pro- Kaplan and Ben-Gurion rejected the critiposal were being sought and responses from _ cism and declared the leadership had not overBritain and the United States, to whom infor- —_ looked anything; they ordered that no rescue mation had been delivered officially, were ex- _ plans be jeopardized because of lack of funding

pected.*4 and that anyone who knew the enormity of the SHARP CRITICISM OF BEN-GURION planned burden could understand that it was im-

AND HIS COLLEAGUES _ ;

possible for the Yishuv and the JAE to carry out such activity on their own. Ben-Gurion called on

While the Yishuv was still awaiting responses his critics to distinguish between the rescue of from Britain and the United States as wellas new, Jews from Europe and their immigration to detailed information on the Romanian proposi- Palestine, on the one hand, and aid to those Jews tion, news arrived from Europe detailing thehor- | who could not be transported out of Europe, on rible state of the Jews: an escalation in deporta- the other. He explained that at that very hour JAE tion from the Balkans and central and western _— emissaries were trying to rescue the first fortyEurope anda speeding up of the slaughter oper- five hundred children out of a total of twentyation. Hitler’s plan was to annihilate five million | nine thousand, with all that this effort entailed Jews and Himmler was instructed to exterminate from a political, financial, and logistical point of all of Poland’s Jewry by the beginning of 1943. view. Ben-Gurion announced that the TransnisThis information and the emissaries’ reports __ tria Plan was included in an aid program for Jews caused an increase in public pressure against the | who could not be evacuated from Europe and leadership in general and Ben-Gurion in particu- therefore could not be considered, since the JAE lar. The critics claimed that Ben-Gurion, Kaplan, was not able to take part in “paying ransom to and Gruenbaum were not properly aware of the avoid strictures.” He was here referring not only gravity of the situation, and there were repeated to the Transnistria Plan but probably also to the demands for funding for rescue operations. The — Slovakia Plan.

scorching criticism drove Ben-Gurion and his Why did Ben-Gurion say this? After all, in colleagues to give public vent to the rescue issue | December he had instructed the JAE emissaries

in general, including the Transnistria Plan, to examine how far the plan could be implewhich, after being leaked, had made its way tothe |= mented. Moreover, he knew in mid-January that

public’s agenda. the Yishuv and British intelligence were conductDuring February there was a conceptual ing secret negotiations concerning the possibility break between the leadership and other bodiesin of a joint operation to transport Jews from

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Dealing with the Devil

Romania. He knew through Reuven Zaslani extra certificates for the seventy thousand Jews of (Shiloah) that a secret agreement had recently Transnistria.

been signed between Schind and Zaslani and Second, because Britain was not prepared Colonel Tony Simmonds, British intelligence of- to allocate certificates to Jews rescued from ficer and commander of a special war captive res- Transnistria, there would be no necessity to allocue unit. The key to the agreement was the possi-_ _—_— cate funds that the Yishuv was unable to allocate

ble mutual benefit involved in such cooperation. __ in the first place. Funds would therefore be allo-

Simmonds was interested in smuggling out cated for the rescue of children within the frameBritish pilots who had fallen over enemy territory | work of the plan to rescue the twenty-nine thouand had somehow managed to escape imprison- _ sand.

ment. He hoped to include them in groups of im- Third, Ben-Gurion was doubtful concerning migrants. In return he was prepared to help with __ the practicality of the plan; he assumed that im-

rescue operations. plementing it would involve enormous financial The details of the agreement with Sim- and logistical obstacles. It was clear that even if monds were as follows: each month small Ro- — the problem of certificates were resolved, the manian sailing vessels would transferathousand Yishuv would be unable to shoulder both the Romanian Jews to the edge of Romania’s territo- = Transnistria Plan and the children’s rescue plan rial waters, beyond which they were forbidden to —_ on its own. As far as he was concerned, these were travel due to a ban on Romanian shipping in ef- —_ two colossal and extremely expensive operations. fect since the middle of 1942. At that point the — Like many others, he also knew at the time that Jews would board ships obtained by the Yishuv — the Germans had forbidden the sailing of Roand make their way to Palestine. If this proved = manian ships until the end of February.”°

impossible, they would be taken to Turkey. Sim- As for the first stage of the Transnistria monds, whose help was requested in obtaining |§ Plan—the readmission of the deportees into RoBritish or other ships, informed Schind that he |= mania proper—Ben-Gurion was probably the knew of six or seven ships that were for sale, but first to realize that the JAE would have to expand that at that stage he was unable to offer any real __ the circle of those participating in the funding, help. Experienced in such activity, he felt the plan both within and outside the Yishuv. Moreover, was practical but doubted it could be repeated.”5 those who were most eloquent in criticizing the In that case, why was Ben-Gurion so nega- —+ JAE were not exactly breaking down the doors to tive? First, there was Stanley’s reservations con- _ participate in financing rescue operations, a situcerning the rescue of children. A few days earlier | ation Ben-Gurion may well have been trying to he had announced in Parliament that there — underscore with his sharp words.”’

would be no deviation from the White Paper At the end of February, Ben-Gurion spent quota even for the immigration of refugee chil- | much time on the rescue issue. He described the dren. This implied that the British were washing — two main channels of assistance as “aid to the

their hands of the Transnistria Plan, which in- Jews in countries under Nazi occupation” and volved tens of thousands of refugees, and were “emigration from these countries.” This signaled giving negative responses to questions asked of — a change in his position. This time he did not them during December. If immigration certifi- conclude that the Transnistria Plan would not be cates were to be issued in larger numbers, they — on the agenda. He again distinguished between would be allocated solely to children and only as __ the transfer of Jews to Romania proper and the part of the twenty-nine thousand remaining — removal of Jews from Romania to a country of from the White Paper quota. There would be no refuge. He announced that the JAE would also

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cooperate with operations for helping Jews sur- Ben-Gurion, Kaplan, and Sharett had decided vive based on the payment of ransom money. _ to expand this activity in collaboration with Ben-Gurion continued to believe that there was British and American intelligence webs. Kalittle hope of removing seventy thousand Jews __ plan’s and Epstein’s trip again reveals an imporfrom Romania, although he had changed his __ tant concept underlying the Yishuv’s secret acmind as to the chances of transferring the depor- __ tivity: whenever a real chance at conducting

tees out of Transnistria and into Romania _ rescue activity arose, Kaplan or Sharett were

proper.” sent to the relevant region. It would appear that the cumulative impact ,

of the cmissaries reports, public pressure, and KAPLAN 'S GRIM REPORT

the realization that the JAE had to ensure inter- FROM ISTANBUL mediary funding for such operations led Ben- _—‘ Kaplan returned at the end of March following a Gurion to change his position. He may also have _ lengthy series of activities and meetings. He told

been utilizing tactics adopted by Kaplan and his JAE colleagues that his trip to Turkey had Ben-Gurion, namely, to create an illusion of op- — taught him that there was no place for “extraorposition to ransom and thereby increase public — dinary measures” and that the Transnistria Plan

pressure, which would stimulate fund-raising. “was found to be lacking in seriousness and unThe need to examine the feasibility of action realistic.’ Kaplan was outspoken and deterin Istanbul and to decide on the spot onthe type = mined. He wanted to remove all doubt and emof action and its cost led to the decision to send __ phasized that the plan collapsed because it was Eliezer Kaplan, the Jewish Agency treasurer, to “unrealistic from the start” and not because of Turkey. He set off during the first week of March. leaks or carelessness. Counteractivities by the It will be remembered that Kaplan was a key | Germans and a dearth of ships in the region (the leader in Mapai and a senior member of the JAE, Germans controlled most of them), a ban on one of Ben-Gurion’s two closest and most reli- —_ transportation, and the failure of certain tactics able colleagues in the management ofaidandres- by the British in Turkey—all these eliminated

cue issues. any chance of rescuing the surviving deportees

Kaplan’s traveling companion on this trip from Transnistria. Dr. Fildermann, head of the was Eliahu Epstein (Ealth), a member of the Jew- Union of Romanian Jews, among others, had reish Agency’s Political Department. Duringa pre- _alized this back in January.

vious term of service in Turkey between 1940 Kaplan’s recommendation joined those of and 1942, Epstein had forged ties with foreign dip- | Ben-Gurion, Yehieli, Bader, and others to conlomats, Turkish officials and government min- tinue the illegal immigration operation aimed at isters, and British intelligence personnel, who rescuing as many Jews as possible from the occuhelped the Yishuv with rescue matters. One of __ pied areas, but not necessary as part ofa large ranthese was Commander S. Wolfson. Epstein was — som plan. The Mossad Le Aliyah Bet had indeed sent to Turkey in July 1940 to serve as representa- renewed its activity in Turkey several months eartive of the Jewish Agency’s Political Department. lier. News of the deteriorating conditions of the In October 1940 and March 1941 he made addi- = Jews—especially those of the children in Romational visits and stayed there for several months — nia—added weight to this tendency. This some-

beginning in the spring of 1941.” what desperate activity underscored the contraEpstein’s job was to smooth the path for Ka- _—_ diction between Kaplan’s impression that mass plan’s talks with important people and tohelpin rescue from Romania was impossible and his feelexpanding the Yishuv’s secret activityinIstanbul. ing, shared by Ben-Gurion and the others in the

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Dealing with the Devil

March 1943| | (Lavon Institute) Eliezer Kaplan and Chaim Barlas, Istanbul,

JAE, that the Yishuv and the Zionist movement _ penny to rescue operations, as someone dubbed had to shoot an “arrow in the dark” and use every Kaplan during a Mapai debate. One should recall

means available to rescue Jews.°° | that he was also involved in attempts to obtain Kaplan reasoned that there was a good _ ships for rescuing children. Upon his return, Kachance of success as well as benefit in the modest _ plan insisted that it was “imperative to proceed”

plan to transfer the deportees into Romania with this plan and “experience would determine” proper by way of ransom payments or by taking —_ whether it was to be the first step in the rescue of advantage of the desire of certain persons in Ro- _ additional refugees.2!

mania to obtain for themselves an “alibi” for the There is no indication in the minutes of the possible defeat of Nazi Germany. It was expressed JAE meetings of reports on other missions conin his order to the emissaries to take advantage of ducted by Kaplan; he may either have provided |

the change that had sprung up while he was still verbal reports (these would not have been in Istanbul and to transfer five thousand Jewish recorded in the minutes because of their sensitivchildren from Transnistria to Romania. The cost _ ity) or avoided giving reports for fear that these for this operation was estimated at seventy-five would be leaked. Kaplan did not report that he to a hundred thousand Palestinian pounds. Ka- _ and Epstein had met witha long list of diplomats plan instructed the emissaries to take any action | and American and British intelligence personnel,

, deemed necessary and assured them that he — with whom they discussed various forms of sewould obtain funding. This was the so-called — cret collaboration that might benefit all sides. stingy treasurer unwilling to allocate a single Britain and the United States were interested in

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Yishuv-supplied intelligence and sabotage serv- _ cided to wait, during which time Kaplan pitched ices, whereas the Yishuv was interested in opera- more modest proposals in Istanbul.

tional aid from British and American secret serv- Once again it was revealed that important ices as part of their rescue operations. The Yishuv —_ decisions concerning the fate of the Jews were hoped to bypass the politicians by means of di- — made by Britain and the United States in their rerect ties with diplomats and British and Ameri- _ spective capitals—naturally without consulting can intelligence and sabotage units personnel. — with the JAE. With the agreement of the British Kaplan and Epstein introduced their counter- = government, the U.S. State Department decided parts to Teddy Kollek, a member of the JAE’s Po- _ to publish in the Swiss press and that of other litical Department, who had been sent to Istan- _—neutral countries the Allies’ response to the probul to coordinate secret collaboration activities posals put forth by the Romanians and their ilk. there.** There is once again no mention of these __ It was stated that the Allies have conducted no meetings in the annals of the JAE, although they —_ negotiations over the release of Jews in return for

were recorded briefly in Ben-Gurion’s diaries. ransom. Anyone conducting negotiations based As far as Ben-Gurion was concerned, there —_ on giving in to attempts at extortion on the part was nothing new in Kaplan’s outspoken remarks — of the Nazis and their partners risked coming on the impracticality of the Transnistria Plan. He = into contact with the enemy and violating the had already expressed this view at the beginning —_ ban on transferring monies to its territories. Deof February, following Stanley’s announcement tails of the plan and the accompanying warnings that his government would impose the same re-_ —_—_— were published in the New York Times on 13 Feb-

strictions on all Jewish immigrants from Europe —_ruary 1943.*4

to Palestine. They were important because of the WEIZMANN’S FINAL ATTEMPT person who said them, Kaplan being a close asso-

ciate of Ben-Gurion and a man whose opinions = The appearance of such an announcement before were valued by many. His testimony from the an official reply was sent to the JAE exposed the field made it clear that the Transnistria Planinits true political powerlessness of the Zionist move-

wider form was no longer on the agenda. ment. Nonetheless, the hope of reversing course Britain and the United States were impor- was not abandoned. Following the announcetant partners, and as soon as the proposal arrived —§ ment, the JAE increased its pressure on Britain in

in Palestine, it was sent to Sharett, who was in _ the hope that it would reconsider its position. London at the time. He tried to persuade Britain | Weizmann tried to act from the United States. He to help in promoting the plan and permit theen- —_—_ wrote to the British ambassador, Lord Halifax, try of refugees into Palestine. A roundabout — enclosing an article from the New York Times, and negative response was contained in Stanley’s Feb- —_ asked His Majesty’s government to reconsider its ruary speech. Anyone could glean from Stanley’s — decision “in order to carry out the Romanian public address and from what he said in private —_ proposal, if this is at all possible.”

that if Britain had no intention of deviating from Weizmann pointed out that Hitler had not the restrictions of the White Paper—even to ad- —_ withdrawn from his original intention “even in a mit rescued children into Palestine—it was far time of defeat, and probably because of it, to anless likely to allow seventy thousand adults into _nihilate the Jews of Europe.” If the British govthe country. And Ben-Gurion did indeed under-_ — ernment did not rescind its decision, the fate stand Stanley’s meaning. Since Britain did not of the Jews of Romania and of the other Jews in actually reject the proposal to rescue the depor- = Europe would be similar to that of the Jews of tees in return for ransom money, the Yishuv de- Poland and other countries. He called on Britain

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Dealing with the Devil

not to adhere to the immigration restrictions ata within the British government, whose purpose time when “the lives of tens of thousands are in _ was to reject the proposal without arousing sharp

danger.” public criticism in Britain and the United States.

Weizmann recognized the difficulties—the | The less sympathetic viewed this as an attempt at opposition of the Arabs and the fear that spies —_ extortion, while others considered it a threat to would mix in with the refugees—but asked that — the White Paper policies. These discussions supthese be overcome so as not to thwart “alargehu- _ ported the conclusion that the changes in British manitarian operation.”>> He admitted that the policy requested by Stanley were very limited, proposal may have beenno morethananattempt __ rhetorical, and insignificant. Their objective was on the part of the Nazis and their satellites to trap | merely to widen the field for public maneuvering the Allies and embarrass them with animpossible that would permit the British government to foil proposal that they themselves were not interested — broad-scale rescue attempts like the Transnistria

in implementing. Nonetheless, he believed that Plan without causing Britain and the United the chance of saving the lives of several thousand _ States any fallout politically.

individuals was worthy of serious consideration. “From any point of view there is no jusHe distinguished between the refugee issue and _ tification whatsoever for us to give in to Rothe political dissent over immigration to Palestine = manian blackmail” was the dominant tone of inand promised not to exploit the special situation ternal British debates in London. In the end, the

in order to force the British government into — Foreign Office advised Halifax and other em-

changes in policy.*° bassies that Weizmann’s proposal was an attempt It was an important commitment: Weiz- at extortion and no country would surrender to mann actually announced that the Zionist move- _ directives of this kind; giving in to it would create ment would drop the rescue issue out of the po- a precedent in the sale of Germany’s “surplus citlitical game between it and Britain. In fact, he —_izens” that would constitute a surrender to “a sysdeclared that if Britain agreed to remove the po- —_— tem of blackmail and slave trading that could litical restrictions on emigration from Europe, — harm the successful continuation of the war.”

the Zionist movement would not use this hu- = Moreover, the British government had already manitarian gesture as a springboard for urging — opened the gates of Palestine as wide as possible cancellation of the restrictions imposed by and, together with the other Allied countries, it Britain on immigration to Palestine and would — would examine ways of helping Jewish refugees not contravene plans to grant an independent — without harming the war effort. In truth, the government to the Arab majority in Palestine. “Jewish problem, important as it is, is not the Weizmann’s commitment was highly sig- — only problem.” It arose as a result of Germany’s nificant given the debate over the extent to | conquest of Europe, and the best solution to the which the Zionist leadership was motivated by problems of the Jews and other related matters in “Palestinocentric” considerations (and not those — Europe would come with victory.°*”

of the Jews of Europe) in advancing immigration Sharett operated from London. Although to Palestine and, as a result, determining the strug- | the London branch felt it would be futile to apgle with the Arabs over the fate of Palestine. Weiz- —_— peal to government offices, he again insisted on

mann’s commitment also expressed the move- _ clarifying the issues and appealed to the Foreign ment’ primary objective of saving Jews by any _— Offfice.38 The firm and unequivocal rejection of means and above and beyond all other objectives. the Romanian proposal was relayed to WeizWhen it reached London, Weizmann’s mes- mann and Sharett, who in the meantime had arsage triggered the usual round of consultations ___ rived in the United States. It contained several

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Rescue Plans

far-reaching points, the most severe of which case, this attempt on the part of the Kook group touched on the future. The British Foreign Office | accomplished nothing in terms of rescuing the alleged that because the Nazis created the Jewish —_ Jews of Transnistria."

problem, it could only be resolved by an Allied Throughout 1943 attempts were made to exvictory. This was also the line taken at the _ tend aid to the deportees in Transnistria and to Bermuda Conference, which was held several help transfer them back to Romania, but there

weeks later. was no return to the original proposal to evacuNot only did the Allies’ discussions on the _ate the seventy thousand surviving Jews. After the Transnistria Plan end all hope of reviving the _ press items, it was clear to everyone that without plan (after the Germans had actually done Allied cooperation and assistance it would be imthe same), but Britain and the Allies came out of possible to rescue them. Efforts at emigration (as those discussions with commonly formulated — opposed to aid sent to Romania in order to imprinciples that would prevent the success of sim- _ prove the Jews’ ability to survive) now focused on ilar plans in the future.*? Ben-Gurion and hiscol- —_ attempts to transfer children from Transnistria to

leagues were not surprised by the negative re- Romania proper and then evacuate them. Later, sponse of Britain and the United States. He had —_ when there were again signs that Romania was foreseen it as soon as the proposal wasbroughtto willing to release Jews, it was no longer a question him. The grimmest assessment had becomeare- —_ of ransom money. This operation was handled by ality, and there seemed no way out of the trap. Mossad Le Aliyah Bet activists in Turkey, which Nevertheless, the Yishuv and Jewish organi- — included Schind and Yehieli, Kollek and Avriel zations outside Palestine were slow to reconcile | and Pomeranz, Barlas, Bader, and others. It was themselves to so stinging a failure and tried to _— not until early 1944 that they managed to obtain breathe some life into the Transnistria Plan. They | some ships. In June 1943 they tried another tactic:

published a denial, alleging that the Romanian Smuts, the South African prime minister, was proposal had never existed. It was a blend of asked to lend his patronage to a plan for the esnaiveté and deep desperation. What possible — tablishment of refugee camps in Turkey for the benefit could there have been in this pretence in _—‘ Transnistria refugees, to be financed by Jewish the face of the murderous Nazis and the public and international money. This idea, too, did not shrugging of shoulders of Britain andthe United —= materialize. In August 1943 Smuts was unwilling States? Yet this was what they did. These were not — to admit Jewish children into his country.*!

wet-behind-the-ears diplomats but seasoned The proposal for rescuing children gained campaigners like Stephen Wise in New York, | momentum in March 1943, when Kaplan visited working on behalf of the World Jewish Congress —_ Turkey. At the same time, Konstantin Bursan ar-

and the London branch of the Jewish Agency. rived in Turkey on a mission for Fildermann The denial also came asaresponsetothefull- | involving the orphan issue. The plan received page advertisements Hillel Kook, Samuel Merlin, | added momentum in the summer of 1943, when and Ben Hecht—all members of the Emergency _—_Sharett visited Turkey. Mihai Antonescu, the RoCommittee to Rescue the Jewish People of Eu- manian deputy prime minister, signed a written rope—placed in the New York press, which read: agreement that Jewish children would be allowed “For Sale, 70,000 Jews, Price $50 a head, guaran- to leave Romania on condition that the Jewish teed human beings.” The advertisements andthe = Agency or the Red Cross obtain the approval of denial reflected a disagreement over how best _ the superpowers and arrange a suitable means of

to put pressure on the superpowers, whether transport. The letter of commitment was sent to through public means or quiet diplomacy.Inany __ the offices of the International Red Cross in Is-

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Dealing with the Devil

tanbul during the final third of May, but no pos- —_—s matter was probably a ruse and, most decisive of

itive results were forthcoming for the usual rea- _all, was political: “the Foreign Office views with sons: British heel dragging; transport problems — concern the hardships involved in dealing with across Turkey; and relentless Nazi pressureonthe — sucha large number of Jews... it will be almost Romanians not to moderate their policiestoward —_ impossible to deal with 70 thousand refugees.” “If the Jews and not to let them out of Romania.*- we open the door to adult Jewish men to leave enThe inability to rescue five thousand children — emy territory, this will bring about an uncontrolfrom Transnistria proves that therewasnochance _lable flood.” “For this reason we tend not to agree of rescuing seventy thousand adults. Asaresultof to any public confirmation, even for the prelimithis failure, a year later no change had taken place _ nary financial arrangements.”“4

in the negative attitudes of the Germans or of This response had been prepared in the Britain and the United States. Even if the Roma- —_ course of debates in the British Foreign Office.

nians had been sincere in their commitment, The participants worried about the American there would have been no chance of successinthe plan: “As far as can be foreseen, it will cause us face of such opposition. Despite all the efforts to | many complications.’4 However, this time there rescue the Jews of Transnistria, only twelve hun- __ was dissent within British governmental circles. dred refugees were saved, some of whom arrived The British embassy in the United States recom-

in Palestine in March and April 1944.” mended that the Foreign Office not object to the A POST-FINAL ATTEMPT BY WISE establishment of the fund, since this step had re-

AND MORGENTHAU ceived the blessing of the US. administration. It

warned that if Britain remained adamant in its The Transnistria Plan was one of several issues objection, it would become the object of fierce that led Jews in the United States to put pressure —_ public criticism issuing from a broad spectrum on their elected officials in late 1943. Treasury Sec- and would be accused of thwarting plans and inretary Henry Morgenthau Jr. and Rabbi Stephen human behavior. Fearing just such a developWise, president of the World Jewish Congressand = ment, Stanley recommended rhetorical moderachairman of the Zionist Emergency Committee, _ tion. Still, the Foreign Office did not wish to relax were given permission by President Roosevelt __ its position. to establish a closed fund in Switzerland whose On 20 December the matter was no longer in money would serve as backup to monies being _ Britain’s hands. Morgenthau protested sharply to withdrawn in Romania to finance the emigration Secretary of State Cordell Hull over the delay

of some seventy thousand Jews. caused by “the British, who are willing to reconThe planned cost of this program was _ cile themselves to the possible death of thousands around $170,000, a relatively smallfigureincom- _—_ of Jews... because of the difficulty of coping with

parison to the sums mentioned at first. It was large numbers of Jews [even if saving them were therefore possible to claim that the fund was in _ possible].”4° Hull gave instructions to approve no way intended for the payment of ransom the transfer of funds and the British were faced money but merely to cover the cost of emigra- — with a fait accompli. They realized that if they tion. Morgenthau instructed the American am- _ prolonged their objections they might find thembassador in Berne to set up the fund, but this led selves in an embarrassing situation. Thus, Sir to the usual political complications. Britain was | Anthony Eden, Britain’s foreign secretary, anfirmly opposed and voiced the standard reasons: nounced that his country was reconciled to the the proposed arrangement was “liableto resultin — establishment of the fund in Switzerland and the leaking of funds to the enemy”; the whole _asked only that cautionary procedures be taken

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Rescue Plans

in order to prevent Palestine from being flooded § dependent and semi-independent alternatives, by refugees. Setting aside the question of the — evenif there seemed to be no chance of succeedfund, the rescue plan itself was never carried out. ing. This pattern was repeated in terms of the The Romanian government knuckled under to _‘Yishuv’s reaction to other ransom schemes.

German pressure and did not allow the exodus of In Jerusalem, London, and Washington, thousands of Jewish refugees.” Here was yet an- efforts were made to obtain the consent of the other instance where Germany succeededinfrus- British and American governments to carry out

trating all rescue efforts. the plan. As part of this effort, Kaplan, Epstein, More successful was the supply ofaid parcels = and Kollek—who were all involved in secret op-

to Transnistria and the transfer ofsomeofthede- — erations—were sent to Istanbul. Sharett also portees to Romania. Money, food, medicine,and —_ went. This pattern would also be repeated. The clothes were sent to Transnistria through the Yishuv cooperated with the JDC, the World JewJewish community in Bucharest, which collected ish Congress, and with Jews who held senior

donations from its wealthier members. The _ posts in the U.S. administration. Such joint Yishuv also funneled aid through its emissaries in efforts to rescue Jews knew no boundaries. The Istanbul—fifty thousand Palestinian pounds ac- _ leadership was unable to cope with the public’s

cording to one source and three hundred thou- demand for information on behind-the-scenes sand according to another. Ben-Gurion was activity regarding the rescue of Jews. The inforinstrumental in raising funds for this aid mation it provided to some sectors of the public program.*® The JDC supplied most of the aid led to the spread of rumors. It would learn its lesby means of the International Red Cross and — son and maintain secrecy in the future. financed the transfer of forty tons of food and The Transnistria Plan was the first such ranclothing. There was also a modest degree of suc- —_ som plan to be placed on the agenda of Britain

cess in smuggling Jews from Transnistria to | and the United States during the war. As far as Bucharest.” In the end, the Romanian govern- __ they were concerned, it was a comfortable platment agreed to take back the Jews exiled to form from which to determine political positions Transnistria. The Yishuv also participated in and formulate responses. These plans overrode

financing this transfer.°° fundamental bans adopted by the Allies: no negotiations with the Nazis; no money to be trans-

The Transnistria Plan, which was first discussed ferred to occupied territories; no divergence in late 1942, was not implemented primarily asa | from White Paper restrictions on immigration result of Germany’s opposition to the release of | and no increase in emigration certificates to Jews but also because Britain and the United Western countries. Britain and the United States States objected to admitting tens of thousands of | maintained a unified position throughout the Jews into their countries or into Palestine. The — war and rejected any proposal to rescue Jews that plan in its various stages illustrated the complex = involved ransom money.

connections between the Nazi authorities and THE SLOVAKIA AND

their satellite countries. | EUROPA PLANS The Yishuv began evaluating the proposal as

soon as it was placed on the agenda. Ben-Gurion The Europa Plan, also involving ransom, was and Gruenbaum were the first to be privy tothe —_ presented simultaneously with efforts to rescue secret and Ben-Gurion determined its direction, | twenty-nine thousand children and virtually at namely, to do everything possible froma political the same time as the Transnistria Plan was being

and operational point of view, including in- presented. The Europa Plan was placed on the

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Dealing with the Devil

Yishuv’s agenda at the end of 1942 and was dis- leaders in return for a cancellation of deportacussed until roughly the end of 1943. Among sev- _ tions. One of their main targets among the Nazis eral points of similarity between both plans were: — was Dieter Wisliceny, appointed by Himmler to their proximity in time; the fear that rescue inre- —_— the post of adviser on Jewish affairs at the Gerturn for ransom was a fraud; the fact that the |= manembassy in Bratislava, the Slovakian capital. sums of money mentioned were far beyond the | Among the Slovaks, attempts were made to bribe Yishuv’s ability to pay (although the “tariff men- —_ those in middle-level posts—junior ministers, tioned the first time was much higher); doubts senior officials and office heads—since it was felt

regarding the true motives of the parties in- that it would not be possible to reach highervolved; and, finally, the utter failure of both ranking individuals.

plans. At the beginning of July, the Working Group The Europa Plan was hatched in Slovakia,a began bribing various Slovakian officials, includCatholic country with a long tradition of anti- ing: Dr. Anton Vasek, “king of the Jews,” who Semitism, which at the time was under the polit- | headed department 14, which was responsible for ical auspices of Germany. The Ustredna Zidov __ Jewish affairs, including rounding up Jews and (UZ), or “Jewish Center,” was the main Jewish deporting them to the east; Isidor Koso, head organization in Slovakia during the Nazioccupa- — of the prime minister’s office; Gisi Medricky, tion. It felt it had succeeded in postponing thede- —_ finance minister; Alois Pecuch, responsible for portation of some of the local Jews by paying off — labor camps; and Zabrecky, one of the commisa Nazi official plus several Slovakian officials and _sars in charge of deportations.

ministers.>! It was no easy task reaching the high-ranking The use of ransom as a technique developed — Wisliceny. A key person was Karel Hochberg, an gradually. During the latter half of June 1942, — engineer and Jewish Gestapo agent who became Rabbi Michael Ber Weissmandel (son-in-law of | Wisliceny’s aide. Hochberg, in charge of special Rabbi Shmuel David Ungar of Nitra, leaderofthe tasks in Wisliceny’s vicinity,*? had gained a repu-

Jewish Orthodox community in Slovakia), pro- — tation for being dangerous and uninhibited. posed trying to stop the deportations from Slo- | Weissmandel managed to meet Hochberg during vakia by bribing Slovakian and high-ranking __ the second half of July and to persuade him to German officials. Weissmandel raised his idea __ offer Wisliceny a bribe on his behalf.

with the Working Group (a euphemism for Res- The members of the Working Group thought cue Committee)—known variously as the “se- their proposals would be more believable if cret committee,” the “committee in hiding,’ and ‘they had the support of the Jewish Agency the “shadow government”—consisting of about and international Jewish aid associations, but ten Jewish activists who formed a cell within the time was short and they could not wait to obtain Jewish Center and constituted the true Jewish — the consent of these bodies. The solution they hit

leadership in Slovakia. upon was to create a fictitious person named The goal uniting the members of this group —_ Ferdinand Roth, who purportedly represented was a determined search for clandestine or other — international Jewish organizations located in ways of saving Jews. Gizi Fleischmann, chair- —_ Switzerland. A letter “written” by Roth—actually woman of the Zionist Organization and WIZO — composed by Weissmandel in Slovakia—promand JDC representative, was a key figure in the _ised international Jewish support for the deal.*4 working group.” Convinced that Weissmandel’s While Weissmandel and his colleagues were proposal was worth investigating, the group at- = awaiting Wisliceny’s reply, which Hochberg was tempted to bribe influential Slovak and Nazi to personally deliver following his meeting, and

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Rescue Plans

the results of the bribes to the Slovaks, there was Rabbi Weissmandel and his colleagues in the sudden hiatus in the deportations (from1 August | Working Group were not aware of the strange coto 28 September 1942). It was quite naturaltobe- —_ incidences that caused Wisliceny to reduce the lieve the bribes were the reason. The hiatus was _ pressure for a while. They tended to believe that probably the result of several coincidental factors _ their proposal to Wisliceny and the bribes paid to

unknown to the Working Group.*® the local hierarchy were what prevented the conWisliceny, however, knew the truthandtook tinued deportations. Based on this assumption, full advantage of the group’s ignorance. For ex- | Weissmandel hatched the idea of expanding the ample, they did not know about certain activities | “small plan”—aimed only at saving the lives of carried out by the Slovakian prime minister.Even —_ Slovakia’s Jews—to halt deportations all over Eubefore speaking with Hochberg, Wisliceny was __ rope by offering bribes and promising legal aid at summoned to a meeting with Vojtech Tuka, Slo- _ the end of the war. This was variously known as vakia’s pro-Nazi prime minister, who told him _ the Europa Plan, the Rabbi’s Plan, or the Stopthat he had heard rumors concerning events in — Action Plan.

Poland and want to send emissaries to investi- HALTING DEPORTATIONS AT A COST gate. It was a hint that opposition to the deporta- OF THREE MILLION DOLLARS tions of Jews was mounting in Slovakia. Wisli-

ceny required permission from his superior, Wisliceny presented the proposal to Eichmann in Adolf Eichmann, for such an investigation and _ Berlin. The latter promised to relay it to Himmwent to Berlin, where he discussed the sig- ler. In November 1942 Wisliceny informed the nificance of Tuka’s request. Upon his return, he |= Working Group that Himmler had agreed to the presented a false picture to the Jewish members __ proposal and that he had been entrusted with of the Working Group. He agreed tothe termsof the task of negotiating with representatives of Slothe proposal as presented to him by Hochberg _ vakian Jewry. He named his price: three million and told his Jewish counterparts that the depor- dollars in return for halting deportations from tations had ceased thanks to his intervention — western, southern, and southeastern Europe to in Berlin. Wisliceny took personal credit for the | extermination camps in Poland.°’ hiatus and made no mention of Tuka’s request, In November 1942 the Working Group’s leadwhich was the real reason for the hiatus. ers began fund-raising activities. First on their list Wisliceny received a bribe, although the ex- —_—_ was Saly Mayer, the JDC representative in Geneva.

act sum and when it was given remains un- _—Mayer’s reply did not please Weissmandel, who known. One version has it that he received — described him as “a little man who knows nothing twenty-five thousand dollars in the middle of — except to refuse and to turn down and to ask quesAugust and an additional twenty thousand to- __ tions.” At the beginning of December Gizi Fleisward the end of September (on the Jewish Dayof = chmann and Rabbi Armin Frieder (chief rabbi Atonement). As regards his reply, he suggested — of the Slovakian Neologues*® wrote to Abraham the group apply to the Slovaks as wellinorderto — Silberschein, representative of the World Jewish put a halt to the deportations. Wisliceny thus as- | Congress in Geneva, Nathan Schwalb, representasured himself the best of both worlds: he re- __ tive of the local Hehalutz, and to the Yishuv emisceived the Jews’ money and did not bear the __ saries in Istanbul asking for the appointment of a burden of responsibility for the deportations special representative who would conduct negotiwhen they resumed. Indeed, the Jews did not _—_ ations with Wisliceny. They stressed the imporconsider him responsible for the September and _ tance of secrecy, as it had been required in discus-

October deportations. sions of the Transnistria Plan.*’ 214

Dealing with the Devil

By 4 December Schwalb had written the fol- _—_— results of the examination. In their discussions, lowing letter to Palestine, by way of Istanbul, de- | however, they referred only to the “small plan.” It tailing the main points of the proposal as ithad took the JAE time to realize that this was a much

reached him: larger plan, and only then did they adopt the pat-

, , tern used in the Transnistria Plan and the Slova-

In Slovakia there is cause to bypass the kia Plan

punishment of deportation and letter the 4, . According to Schwalb’s of 4 ,December matchmaker for this is the well-known ; oe Loit , 4. 1942 and the discussion over it in Palestine,

adviser [Wisliceny] who has already ;

; qe his would appear that Schwalb and[Slovahis colleagues in proven powers in his home . _ , . Geneva the Yishuv leadership in ,unkia]. They, preempted [the Working Group] have in, derstanding the broader scope of the plan that is-

formed us that he is about to be pro, ; , ; ; sued from Slovakia. Because Schwalb’s letter did moted in rank and will be the not head clerk . ear sufficiently distinguish between the smaller for southeastern Europe [Greece 4 , Slovakia Plan and the larger Europaand Plan, it, did Hungary]; thus heofhas hisinprom; , It , . little to open thefar eyes its kept readers Palestine. ises entirely to the letter. ...is possible We that must give , ; _. er the Palestinian leadership did not

our reply to our people. , .

interpret the proposal the same way it had been It can therefore be determined that at the begin- understood in Slovakia or even in Geneva. At the

ning of December 1942 information on the Eu- time the Yishuv leadership was involved with ropa Plan had reached Geneva and the large Jew- _‘ the Transnistria Plan—especially the rescue of the

ish organizations, and from there it took some children, which was being coordinated both in time to reach the Yishuv delegation in Istanbul Jerusalem and Sweden. These plans appeared and the JAE in Jerusalem. How did the various more concrete and the rescue of children was

organizations react? considered more urgent and, to a certain extent, According to Weissmandel, Mayer, the JDC = more of a moral commitment.”

representative in Geneva, received the proposal As soon as details of the plan devised by the with disbelief and was unwilling to respond fa- § community in Slovakia reached the Yishuv, the vorably. (This reaction is not documented else- — same pattern of spreading the secret from one where, and Weissmandel himself declared that group to another was repeated, this despite reMayer’s reply had been lost.) The truth of the — quests to the contrary. Within a short time memmatter is that Mayer offered several proposals, bers of the National Council leadership, the Zioneventually moving from adopting portionsofthe — ist Actions Committee, the Histadrut Actions

group's proposal to complete acceptance.®! Committee Secretariat, and members of various Documentation proved that in Jerusalem parties all demanded that the JAE immediately rethe ransom plan does exist. Information reached —_ spond positively to the Slovakian proposal.

Palestine during the latter half of January and Discussions of this issue were either not docthroughout February 1943. At first the JAE was umented or have not come to light. Nevertheless, not aware that the proposal was divided intotwo __ these discussions took place during the second parts, the “small plan,’ whose aim was tosavethe half of January, and at their conclusion Gruenremaining Jews in Slovakia, and the broader, baum cabled Silberschein (representative of the

more grandiose Europa Plan. They reacted to it | World Jewish Congress in Geneva) that the in the same way they had reacted tothe Transnis- —_ Yishuv “takes a favorable view of the proposal put tria Plan: first examine the chances ofsuccessand forward by the Slovakian rabbis.” He asked that a then determine financing in accordance withthe _ further evaluation be made to determine “if it is

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practical and what assistance is required” andto the special committee established for this purinform the Working Group in Slovakia of the pose and was deeply involved in the problem of Yishuv's decision.™ At this point the Yishuv was _ integrating children and raising funds. Morestill convinced that the proposal referred only to — over, Ben-Gurion and Gruenbaum were the first the rescue of those Jews remaining in Slovakia. to receive information on the Transnistria Plan, On behalf of the JAE, Dobkin informed at which point Ben-Gurion defined his position Melekh Neustadt, chairman of the Mapai World — immediately. Could he have been the only one Union, and other public representatives that “our not to know about the new plan from Slovakia? approval in principal to the proposal” had been = What is the meaning of Ben-Gurion’s and the cabled to Silberschein, who was asked to “exam- JAE’s silence on this matter? ine the feasibility of the proposal and the sum It will soon become apparent that this silence required of us for the purpose.”® Dobkin’s an- __ reflects a lack of documentation rather than an nouncement was intended to appease public absence of real activity on the part of the Yishuv pressure and to prove that the JAE was indeed _ following the arrival of early news from Slovakia. looking seriously into the matter. The first re- | Ben-Gurion was familiar with all aspects the Slosponse to the Slovakia proposal was similartothe — vakia Plan in its very early stages. First of all, the Yishuv’s reaction to the Transnistria Plan:adeci- | Yishuv began discussing the Slovakia Plan as soon sion to make a positive evaluation of the proposal _as information arrived in January. It is possible (although its full significance was not yet under- _ that these discussions took place in quarters stood) and to inform the Working Group in Slo- — where resources for documentation were not

vakia of this.% readily available, or perhaps documentation does According to available documentation, Ben- _ exist but has not yet been discovered by reGurion’s first reference to the Slovakia plan oc- _ searchers. In any case, based on Gruenbaum’s let-

curred in February 1943 in connection with ter to Silberschein one may safely conclude that warding off criticism against himself and his col- —_ the Slovakia Plan was discussed in the Yishuv as leagues regarding their position on rescue issues. soon as details became available, and that it was The fact that there is no further documentationis |= mistakenly assumed that it only referred to the questionable. Moreover, why did a month and _ rescue of Slovakia’s Jews.

half pass between Schwalb’s cable (4 December In addition, there are clear—although not 1942) and preliminary discussions, which took unequivocal—hints in Ben-Gurion’s speech at place (to the best of my knowledge) during the the Mapai Center on 24 February 1943 of the exfirst half of January 1943? Why did the JAE itself istence of a meeting, upon whose conclusions not discuss the Slovakia Plan (as opposed to the = Gruenbaum based his letter to Silberschein. One Europa Plan) until the return of Kaplan from Is- —= must therefore assume that undocumented distanbul at the end of March? It is clear that the — cussions did take place that proved crucial. In plan was discussed in other quartersaround mid- __ that case, why did the discussions not take place January 1943, since Gruenbaum could otherwise in the JAE? Although one cannot be certain, the not have been able to send his reply to Geneva. JAE might have been excluded from sharing the Unlike the Slovakia proposal, the moment the — information for fear that it was too transparent Transnistria proposal arrived, the JAE convened to British or American intelligence agents and

a special session. might lead to leaks. It is also possible that the JAE Ben-Gurion was preoccupied with estab- — did discuss the information from Slovakia but lishing the Rescue Committee and promoting __ that these discussions were not documented beplans for rescuing children. He wasa member of _ cause they were classified.

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Dealing with the Devil

A partial explanation for the apparent si- that the latter were broad-based rescue efforts lence could be due to the fact that the Yishuv did —_ with good chances of success, so it focused all its

not identify the “large plan,” which was encapsu- _attention on them, leaving the Slovakia Plan on lated within the “small plan.” However, inthefol- —_— hold.®

lowing letter Venja Pomeranz sent to Palestine on The documentation we do possess shows 13 December 1942 a connection is made between that Ben-Gurion dealt with this issue for the first the chance to rescue Jews from Transnistria by —_ time in early February at a meeting of Mapai Secpaying ransom moneyand the opportunitytodo ___retariat. It would appear that he and other speakthe same in Slovakia, and there are even hints of ers did indeed refer only to the “small plan” to

something larger in scale: rescue the Jews of Slovakia. This conclusion is

; someone supported by the sums of money discussed. Here,, There for example, writes from PP y 7 ” after had been no cognitive change even

Romania that in the Regat region, thefrom . Istanbul, , - Menahem Bader, newly arrived Jews managedhistolatest bribeimpressions. the authorities ,; ;not , en, ae areported He, .,did with quarter of a billion lei to postpone . i. oo. lighten hisspring. audience on the significance of the deportations until .. . Something ; ,; - ay ,; Slovakia Plan. At that meeting Ben-Gurion similar is mentioned by took Nathan Schwalb ; a firm stand and spoke out against the payfrom Geneva thatLoaccording to a letter ae ment of ransom money, insisting that the JAE he, received from on the community in .support ; oa. should focus financial to Bratislava from famoussupplying rabbis (this letter, an enterprise for rescuing children and not to too, is brought, financing here) ... by means suchplans. as ; ransom

In January February these, it was possible 1943 tothedelay the and expul, rescue of children was still the focal point sion of twenty thousand Jews... . They ; ae , , eythat _ of the Yishuv’s activities.” think inweeks Zivia’s placein[Zivia Lu- ; i , Two later, late February, betkin, i.e., Poland] something can beBen.,;

saved by these means.” , era: .

Gurion again referred to ransom plans at a Mapai meeting. Zvi Yehieli, a member of the illegal imIn that case, Pomeranz was suggesting that the §_ migration operation, gave a lengthy report on his

community in Slovakia was convinced that stayin Istanbul and also reviewed the situation in bribes could be used in order to rescue Jews in _—_ Slovakia. Yehieli also failed to clarify for his listenPoland, but he, like Schwalb, did not make clear __ ers the fact that a large plan to rescue all the Jews

in his letter that the Working Group in Slovakia — of Europe through negotiations with the Nazis was proposing the rescue ofall the Jewsin Europe —__ was encapsulated within the plan to delay the de-

by means of paying ransom money and that it portation of Slovakia’s Jews to extermination was basing this proposition on its talks with a | camps. His report was followed by much debate.

high-ranking Nazi official. Ben-Gurion presented a long list of rescue The Yishuv mistakenly assumed that this plans under consideration by the Yishuv. He raised was basically an attempt to postpone the depor- _ the possibility of postponing deportations to the tation of twenty thousand Slovakian Jews (so extermination camps in return for ransom, claimthey thought, although the number was in fact —_ing that “there are places where rescue can take twenty-four thousand), a relatively small com- _ place, but large sums of money are needed... . munity. The timing might also have beenaspur: = There are countries where the gentiles are prepared the Slovakian Working Group’s proposal arrived __ tohelp... itis simply necessary to bribe officials in when the Yishuv was busy examining two other — order to avoid butchering, slaughter, deportarescue plans. The Yishuv’s first impression was _ tions.” However, he did not refer specifically to the

217

Rescue Plans

Europa Plan, his words being more compatible KAPLAN CLARIFIES THE PICTURE with the “small plan” and the real activity of the Both parts of the plan became quite clear during

Slovakian Working Group than the more ambi- March 1943. Kaplan returned from a visit to tious Europa Plan. He went on to announce that Turkey and clarified the situation in his reports to the JAE had also decided to participate in funding § Ben-Gurion and others. Ben-Gurion had great

ransom plans, but it is difficult to determine faith in Kaplan’s judgment. Kaplan’s suitability whether it was the Slovakia or the Europa Planhe —_ for sucha mission is reflected in things he himself

was referring to. He also expanded on the need for said at a fund-raising rally: “On my visit to secrecy. Could his insistence on silence explainthe — Turkey, I glimpsed a possibility to rescue the Jews fact that he barely broached the subject of the new — and was captivated. I became aware of the fact

plan that had just been put on theagenda?Orcould that many [Jews], albeit not all, can be helped. I it have been that at that stage he still did not fully §= amknownasaman whois cool and cautious congrasp the scope of the proposal containedinthelet- | cerning money and this is probably why I was sent

ters from Slovakia?7! out there.’”? These words contained a hidden

Another point in Ben-Gurion’s speechtothe |= message, a word of encouragement, to the Mapai Center is worth mentioning. He told his —_ donors: if I, who am so careful concerning money

listeners that at some prior time individuals in- matters, say so, then it would be quite proper for volved in the rescue issue had met and reached — you to open your wallets. They may also have consome decisions. He said that decisions on rescue _ tained a reliable description of his impressions of had been reached in previous meetings as well. __ the real potential of the plan as well as an awareThis, then, may well be the key to solving the rid-_ _ ness of his own personal task in the operation.

dle of where the decision was made to examine In his talks with the various emissaries in Isthe feasibility of the Slovakia Plan andtoinform __ tanbul, Kaplan also checked out what they knew

Silberschein in Geneva. about the situation in Slovakia, including the Ben-Gurion also informed his colleagues “large plan” and its chances of success. He inthat efforts were being made to raise 125,000 structed Barlas to cable Richard Lichtheim, the Palestinian pounds to be put “at the disposal § Jewish Agency representative in Geneva, and Silof our friends in Istanbul and Switzerland.” At —_ berschein, the World Jewish Congress representhe same session Kaplan also mentioned afund- _ tative, for their latest opinion of the rabbis’ plan. raising drive. Based on the spirit of the timesand Their hesitant replies arrived in Istanbul while he the type of action adopted, it is quite possible that —__ was still there.

these were also hints of plans for the transfer of Kaplan met Monsignor Josephe Angelo ransom money in order to postpone thedeporta- — Roncalli, the Vatican’s apostolic nuncio and rep-

tion of Slovakia’s Jews. resentative of the Holy See in Istanbul, whose vast Ben-Gurion emphasized the Yishuv’s fight experience in politics and communications led against time. This could have referred both tothe — him to refer to himself as “letter bearer of the precarious fate of Slovakia’s Jews as well as to the = Middle East.” Kaplan entrusted Roncalli with a fact that Himmler had ordered the total annihila- |§ message for the pope, in which he asked the tion of the Jews of Europe and insisted that depor- Catholic leader to exercise his influence with the tations to the extermination camps continue.” Itis | Slovakian leaders to convince them to thwart hard to determine from Ben-Gurion’s speechifto- the planned deportation from that country. Kaplan ward the end of February the Yishuv had finally re- also examined with Roncalli the possibility of alized that the plan formulated in Slovakiaentailed transferring Jews from Slovakia to Hungary (the

the rescue of Europe’s entire Jewish population. latter’s Jews were in a better situation at that

218

Dealing with the Devil

time) and saw Roncalli cable this request to the —_ volving the transfer of Jews from one country to pope. Kaplan also investigated the possibility of | another or from one region to another; helping sending parcels to Slovakia and obtaining the —_ Jews avoid deportation by means of forged docusupport of the Red Cross for various kinds of aid — ments and other life-saving efforts. Kaplan be-

activity.”4 lieved these were the types of activities one ought Kaplan’s report following his return to Pales- to pursue and instructed the emissaries to act in

tine eliminated the mystery surrounding the __ this spirit. affair. It was now clear that there was a difference It would appear that, notwithstanding the between the bribe aimed at preventing the re- | stormy correspondence with Bratislava, the denewal of deportations from Slovakiaandtheplan __ tailed plan, and the earnest appeals, Kaplan was to rescue the entire remaining Jewish population —_ not convinced that there was much of a chance of Europe. Kaplan remained skeptical and saw __ of carrying out the large plan. His evaluation little chance of carrying out two large-scale plans. | was devastating. He doubted the Nazis actually He believed that no foundation existed for “ex- | meant to carry out the large ransom plans. There traordinary operations” in Romania, Slovakia, or was no chance that Britain and the United States anywhere else in occupied Europe. Kaplan reck- = would permit the movement of so many individoned it would be impossible to save entire popu- _ uals, and without their help such a transfer was lations of Jews and that rescue operations would —_ impossible. Their stand became clear to Kaplan not become a “public spectacle involving thou- _— after the Transnistria Plan was leaked to the

sands of people.” Western press and the Yishuv was warned to sever He explained that the “rabbis planfrom Slo- _any ties with the Axis powers.’

vakia ... comprised several levels, a small plan, a All this time letters reached Istanbul and larger plan,” and that the chances ofachievingthe | London from the Working Group. Rabbi Weisslatter were slim. Still, he presented his listeners | mandel and Gizi Fleischmann added heretofore with the broad spectrum of opinions he had —_ unknown details concerning the plans and in-

heard in Istanbul, ranging from those who sisted that they were feasible. They demanded thought the plan was “deceptive, an attempt that everything be done to raise the two or three to extract money,” and those who “had hopes _ million dollars necessary for the plan to be put for this plan.” The latter pointed out that in into effect and, even more urgent, to come up Bratislava (Slovakia) and Chernowitz (Bukov- with a deposit amounting to two hundred thouina), deportations had been postponed in return sand dollars. Weissmandel and Fleischmann for payment of a “deportation tax” anda “sitting | were convinced that Wisliceny would keep his tax.” It was, of course, possible that the plan | word and that even the most extreme Nazis could reflected “extortion or delay” tactics, but there be bribed. They believed that the currency laws was still a chance that it contained a “core that forbidding the transfer of money to occupied terwas healthier,” which was worth pursuing aslong _ritories would not be enforced in the case of per-

as negotiations with Wisliceny were still occur- | sonal ransom payments, or that they could be ring and he was referring various proposalsto his | circumvented because the money was not in-

superiors in Berlin.” tended for war needs. As the late March-early Notwithstanding his reserve regarding the April 1943 deadline for payment drew closer, “large plan,’ Kaplan believed there was a good _ their letters grew more urgent and blunt—espechance of success for the “small plan,’ which in- _ cially those of Rabbi Weissmandel.”

volved all of the following: bribing minor of- Schwalb passed the letters on to Istanbul, ficials; postponing deportations; excursions in- and on 10 March 1943 he added a letter of his own

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Rescue Plans

to Kaplan. He again stressed his support for the The Bermuda Conference was convened in plan in its entirety, this time presenting his rea- — April 1943. The mood, which at first reflected sons in great detail. Among other things, Schwalb —_— high hopes generated by the conference, now wrote that if the Yishuv had responded to the __ turned to one of disappointment as the summer cries from Slovakia back in December and had _ began, spurring more independent attempts to begun raising the necessary ransom money, “we — make some headway in the rescue of Jews. As we might have been able to reduce the extent of the _ have seen, the illegal immigration operation was calamity that occurred in several countries, espe- _—_ involved with rescuing children and supplying cially in Zivia [i.e. Poland].” It was now impera- aid to the Jews of Transnistria (and even evacuattive to “focus on the big issue,” to raise the neces- —_ ing some of them). At that point in time, rescue sary funds from the Yishuv and from the Jews of | emissaries in Istanbul had established a more orthe United States and not miss another opportu- _—_— ganized system of operational links to British and

nity. The deteriorating situation of the Jews of | American intelligence and sabotage organizaGreece and Bulgaria now made itevenmoreim- __ tions.

portant to carry out the plan.” Work on the Slovakia and Europa Plans esSchwalb’s letters to Kaplan and the latter's —_calated gradually, but the plans still had to be deown impressions during March did nothing to __ bated by the JAE plenum. It is possible that the change the Jewish Agency treasurer’s opinion re- plenum did not convene because no new decigarding the “large plan.” Thus, even when com- sions were required at the time or out of a fear

municating with the occupied territories, he of information leaks. Ben-Gurion and his colmaintained a degree of restraint and refrained leagues may have known that the British and from making promises with regard to the Slova- | American intelligence services in the region reg-

kian Working Group’s plan: ularly tapped into the JAE’s debates and kept tabs

; on itsshocking activity. Available documentation simpl [have read the letters of the rabY py . ; , does not reflect what actually took place at the

, meetings.

bis, who are pleading and howling for ;

help. To our great distress, we are unable No documentation exists between March to undertake the taskto establish on ourBen-Gurion’s own. , Lye ; already and theentire end of May inBut as I have said, we do not con, — , , creased involvement in implementing the Eu-

sider ourselves freeIn of this concern and we 4: ok ropa Plan. aour speech to the We Mahanot Ha’olim shall do everything in power. have oye , youth movement (Beit Hashita) in early April;

passed on this demand to1943 the other parts , he pointed out that Slovakia was one of the of the Jewish nation. For the time being, , ,

; countries fromdisposal which Jews could be rescued. we shall place at your a sum [of ; .in; a ; , ; Plans prepared in Slovakia were mentioned

money] for immediate action and we i ; 1943, ; hall trvttry dthe to aid tiexpand memo distributed by Hartglas in late April shall the aid operation. , ; y P P which was also forwarded to Ben-Gurion. Hart-

The emissaries transferred four thousand Pales- __ glas wrote that the Slovakia Plan “conceals a dantinian pounds, representing virtually everything — ger of ordinary extortion” and “through empty

they had accumulated, and the JDC sent an addi- promises and threats the Gestapo circles obvitional five thousand—totaling roughly thirty-six ously intend to extort vast sums of money from thousand dollars. Kaplan added that they were — world Jewry....So long as negotiations continue, hoping to obtain the remainder of the deposit — only small deposits were being paid to delay defrom the Jews of South Africa, Egypt, and other __ portations. But it is hard to know if after the

communities.” negotiations the Gestapo will not extort a sig220

Dealing with the Devil

nificant sum of money, stop the blackmail, and —_‘Yishuv’s duty to help finance it even if the money

exterminate all the Jews of Slovakia.”® “goes up in smoke.” He said the Yishuv could not According to available documentation, Ben- __ to refuse to participate in the rescue either for Gurion’s silence is explained by the fact that atthat | “political reasons” or strategic ones. Bader invery moment he was involved in other rescue mat- _ sisted that “the mood had to be altered . . . that ters. Moreover, based on surviving documents, __ there is no way to help.’*4

he took no part in the ample correspondence Others also insisted on taking advantage of between Palestine and Turkey, Switzerland, and the new opportunities. For example, Anshel Slovakia. The correspondence reveals the funda- _ Reiss, one of the leaders of the expatriate Polish

mental differences between Schwalb, who had community in Palestine and a member of the supported the Europa Plan from the beginning, = Zionist Actions Committee, proposed allocating and Lichtheim, the Jewish Agency representative a large sum of money to serve as backup for any in Geneva, who had reservations both about eventuality, say, if “a telegram arrives from Slova-

Schwalb and the plan. The correspondence also —kia with a demand for many thousands of reflects the growing support for Schwalb’s line of | pounds” and it becomes impossible to comply thought, namely, to promote every possible way of because of lack of cash.®

carrying out the plan. More important, it also re- Letters from Fleischmann and other memveals that despite all these obstacles, both in the bers of the Working Group, including letters Yishuv and in Geneva money was being allocated from several emissaries upon Bader’s arrival—

for financing the Europa Plan. were all aimed at persuading the Yishuv leaders GROWING HOPES FOR a a positive change involving the Europa Plan.

THE EUROPA PLAN ‘hey pointed to a temporary halt in deporta-

tions from Slovakia, which had not resumed in By mid-April, Schwalb reported to Istanbul that April, as planned. It was reported that Fleishe had persuaded the JDC in Geneva to allocatea =chmann had met with Wisliceny, who told her hundred thousand Swiss francs to enable Gizi that he was responsible for detailed negotiations Fleischmann to begin negotiations.*! Barlas was — on the Europa Plan. He informed her that his quick to ask Lichtheim about the extent of JDC — superiors were prepared to cease deportations participation and cabled Kaplan withthenewde- —_ throughout Europe, except for Poland, on contails. He also wrote about Schwalb’s report ina — dition that a payment of two to three million letter he sent to the JAE in Palestine, and, in order dollars or an equal sum in Swiss francs was to add weight to the issue, Bader and Pomeranz = forthcoming, with a deposit of two hundred also wrote home and emphasized the importance thousand dollars by the 10 June 1943 and the balof Yishuv support for the plan.®? Two days later it | ance in weekly installments.

was announced that twenty-five hundred Pales- This meeting, together with letters from tinian pounds had been transferred from Istan- Schwalb and other emissaries, boosted the spirits bul to Slovakia to be used for bribery and ran- __ of those who believed that risks should be taken som payment. Wishing to reassure Fleischmann, __ even if this involved illegal activity—and kept the Bader wrote her that various steps were being _ hope alive that there was a chance of carrying off taken to advance the plan and that he was return- _ the plan and saving Europe’s Jews by means of

ing to Palestine for this purpose.® bribes within the Nazi establishment. The disapUpon his return, Bader emphasized in vari- _— pointing results of the Bermuda Conference ous forums that there was some chance ofthe Eu- _— probably encouraged the tendency to act inde-

ropa Plan succeeding, and that it wasthereforethe pendently of the Allies. This attitude was the

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Rescue Plans

background to the Istanbul emissaries’ willing- sion, would require separate, much larger alloca-

ness to put real money on the line.*® tions if it proved feasible.* Despite the change in attitude toward the The emissaries also wrote that it was now plan, it was still not discussed by the JAE plenum. possible to send aid to Poland thanks to a draOne possible explanation for this and Ben- — matic new development. It began with the return Gurion’s lack of response before the end of May — of acourier who had delivered money and letters might be the result of a decision dating from late —_ to Poland, one of several experimental dispatches February: given the lack of choice, even bribes __ to check out the possibilities for direct aid to the had to be paid, and the JAE would guarantee —= Jews of Poland, who were most in need of assismoney for such operations. Thus, this position tance. It is worth noting that, at the time of the may have facilitated the gradual decision to par-_ _—scourier’s return, only about six months had ticipate in financing the Europa Plan withoutun- _ passed since the Yishuv had finally accepted the

necessary debate in the plenum.*’ fact that mass murder was being perpetrated in The documentation available for May 1943 | Europe—especially in Poland. Those six months scatters a great deal the clouds around Ben- _ saw large-scale rescue activity and the expansion Gurion’s involvement in all aspects of the Slova- —_ of the Palestine Office in Istanbul, which now kia affair. Venja Pomeranz and Ze’ev Schind ap- — maintained an organized system of secret collabplied directly to Ben-Gurion with a request for oration with British intelligence services.

his intervention in raising funds for the rescue During those six months the emissaries were operation. They explained their request by de- —_ engaged in activity relating to the “small rescue,” scribing the new options. From the letter’s open- _— consisting of money, food, clothing, medicine, ing words it is quite clear that Ben-Gurion was _ and so forth. Since it was imperative to establish privy to everything that had taken place: “We — whether this aid was actually reaching its destina-

have decided to apply to you directly ona matter tion and not falling into the hands of Nazis or that you are familiar with.” They reviewedthein- —_ Nazi collaborators, special aid networks were set formation they had received from the Working — up and their efficacy was examined. The couriers Group and passed along to Ben-Gurion copies of were an essential link in this chain. By early 1943 recent letters. Some of the letters described meet- they had been sent into the occupied territories ings with Wisliceny on 7 and 10 May. Pomeranz _and their return was eagerly awaited. The first of

and Schind demanded that Ben-Gurion help — them arrived in May and confirmed that the them prepare for the “amazing” possibility of | money had been delivered. The courier also “helping Poland and, in part, also Slovakia.” transmitted letters from leaders of the underThey emphasized that their present request — ground Jewish cells in various parts of Poland.

to increase the monthly budget from ten to The return of that courier was seen as a suctwenty-five thousand Palestinian pounds was cessful first step in the establishment of aid netaimed mainly at financing the “small rescue” in —_ works. There was always the fear that the opera-

Poland, consisting of food, medicine, clothing, tion might fail if those couriers disappeared with and so forth. The allocation was not actually for | the money within the occupied territories or the Jews of Slovakia, “who were still using money —_ handed the aid over to the Nazis. It is worth not-

to defend themselves against deportation,” nor ing that some of the couriers were criminals who for funding the “business of the intercessor [Wis- had engaged in smuggling and illegal operations liceny] (the rabbis’ proposal, etc.).” They needed __ before the war. On more than one occasion the to stress this in their letter, since it was clear that recipients of the aid feared that the courier was a the Europa Plan, which was still under discus- §_ Naziagent trying to entrap them. The handlers in

222

Dealing with the Devil

Istanbul had their own fears: even when the lov- Avriel provides a more detailed description. alty of the courier was assured, the more the lat- Vienna-born Scholz was an exceptionally handter knew about his handlers and the people to — some, elegantly dressed man, a kind of “movie whom he was delivering aid, the greater the dan- _ star James Bond type” and an accomplished safe-

ger to the aid network as a whole. cracker. The police pursued him in 1936, but he Not all the couriers were criminals. Some = managed to slip away to Paris, where he disapwere anti-Nazi activists with various ideologies — peared among his fellow thieves. According to of their own. Missions such as these were their — Avriel, Sholz’s life in France was more or less form of protest. Some Yishuv couriers were also — quiet; he studied French and observed the local engaged in other missions as emissaries for the culture. intelligence services. Such jobs were considered Things changed when France was occupied “overtime” and earned them additional income. __ by the Reich. As a German subject, albeit in ocMany acted on the assumption thataGermande- — cupied France, he was subject to being drafted feat was a real possibility and wanted to assure — into the German army. He was sent to Stuttgart

their future in a free Europe. and attached to a Gestapo unit in charge of dealThe Yishuv emissaries in Istanbulemployed — ing with resistance movements. Because of his about ten couriers. Some of them were occupied _ fluency in French and ties to the criminal world, throughout the war years andafewoperatedun- _—ihe was sent to work in Paris. His assignment was der false names. Josef Winninger, Dr. Sedelchak, to prevent the French underground from getting Eric Popescu, Bandi Grosz and RudiScholz were _hold of gold, thus curbing its freedom of action. couriers. Some were also members of other espi- —- His superiors supplied him with the means to

onage webs, including the American “Dog- purchase illegal gold, which he would bring to wood.” Several of the couriers were freelancers, — the Gestapo cellars. Scholz was a talented speaker

or semi-independent agents, in the field and and made the most of this asset. He was courathere were also double and triple agents.* geous and used his travels throughout Europe on A CRIMINAL AND A GESTAPO AGENT behalf of the Gestapo as a cover while secretly

IN THE EMPLOY OF THE YISHUV working for the Yishuy.

How did the connection between Scholz and

Who, then, was the courier who first brought — the Yishuv arise? According to Pomeranz and news of events inside Poland and caused Bader, Avriel, it was Shmuel (Samo) Springman, a ResPomeranz, and Kollek so much agitation? A cer- cue Committee member, who was responsible. tain Rudi Scholz has been described by both The Rescue Committee of Hungarian Jews mainPomeranz (who changed his name to Ze’ev _ tained direct contact not only with Palestine but Hadari) and Ehud Avriel. Pomeranz was present —_ also with the group of emissaries organizing itself at the first meeting with Scholz, while Avriel got —_in Istanbul. Budapest, an important city that was to know him either during the summer of 1943 _ centrally situated, became a hub of aid and rescue (after arriving in Istanbul to strengthen opera- _activity, enjoying relative peace until being occutions there) or in the spring of 1944 (as he states pied by the Nazis in March 1944. These circumin his book). According to Pomeranz, Scholz was _ stances led many organizations to establish their an adventurer and a shady character, a Gestapo —_— networks in Budapest, including those belonging

agent (he worked for the Abwehr) who volun- _ to the Nazis. teered to work with the emissaries of the Yishuv According to Avriel, the Yishuv had already and even delivered their money into the “bunkers dealt with Scholz before he met him. Scholz’s girl-

of our people in Poland.” friend in Budapest, a young Jewish stenographer 223

Rescue Plans

working in the offices of the Rescue Committee, stood at the head of secret operations. It reflected fell in love with a man she believed to be an Aus- _ their desire to include Ben-Gurion in the good trian businessman who traveled widely all over —_ news and thereby to obtain his permission and the world. She knew about Springman’s secret ac- support for the budgetary and other preparativity and told Scholz about it. She also told him _ tions necessary for action behind enemy lines.

about the need for couriers to deliver money to THE MEANING OF THE “BLACK HOLE” Poland. Scholz offered his services gratis, and his

ties with Poland were established.?! IN DOCUMENTATION Both Pomeranz and Avriel state in their — The letter sent by Pomeranz and Schind—which memoirs that Scholz was no ordinary mercenary dealt in great detail with transferring aid, fundcourier: in addition to being an adventurer and __ raising, ways of overcoming restrictive laws, and Gestapo agent, he was also a romantic and an _ sp. on—also teaches us something else. In hindanti-Nazi.” He was deeply affected by his meet- _ sight, it proves that the “black hole” surrounding ing with the brave Jews in Poland. According to —_ Ben-Gurion’s involvement in the Slovakia affair Pomeranz, “upon his return from Poland, after —_ only concerned documentation and not the realmaking contact with our people there, itwasasif —_ ity of the events.

a new soul had been born in his body. Tears filled The truth is that Ben-Gurion was aware of his eyes as he handed over Frumka’s letter.” He —_ the matter from the start. The need to evaluate at said that Frumka and several others refused to _ first hand the information arriving from Slovakia leave the ghetto and follow him toa safe haven, —_ was one of the reasons for dispatching Epstein

insisting: “We choose to die with the rest ofour and Kaplan to Istanbul in early March 1943. brothers, and our fate will be that of Israel."** — Based on intelligence reports, by the end of FebAvriel has also described another dramatic meet- ruary 1943 Ben-Gurion had already decided,

ing where a courier named Winninger arrived in consultation with Kaplan, to make policy with Scholz and brought a letter from Springman _ changes and to begin allocating funds for bribes. testifying to the great courage and devotion ex- _—- From that point he was in the know on the Slovahibited by Scholz during his last trip to Poland.” _ kia issue.

Whether this was true or not, Scholz’s return The letter also supplies answers to questions was a significant and dramatic event. He wasthe —_ regarding Ben-Gurion’s involvement in the vari-

first courier not to have disappeared, to have _ ous twists and turns of the Europa Plan. Both the been sent to Poland and returned to Istanbul — dispatch of the courier Scholz and the early prowith unambiguous evidence that he had indeed _posals from Slovakia took place in an atmosphere made it to his destination and delivered the —_ of utmost secrecy. It was only natural that records goods. The emissaries’ excitement was under- _ of events during this period would be fragmenstandable given the danger involved in forging _ tary at best. The “black hole” in documentation ties with such people and the fierce desire to es- _is proof not of inactivity but a result of secrecy. tablish networks to provide aid for the Jews in oc- The letter further proves that the emissaries cupied Europe. It now appeared that they could —_— regarded Ben-Gurion as the man to turn to on all

increase the level of aid and establishamoreelab- = matters connected with the rescue operation.

orate operation. They did not hesitate to apply to him directly, This, then, was the background to Schind’s___ since their issues fell within the sphere of his inand Pomeranz’s request for increased aid to __ terests and responsibility and he was considered Poland as expressed in their letter to Ben-Gurion, the final authority.%° Wishing to go to Istan-

which appealed to the Yishuv and the man who bul and fearing that his membership in the

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Dealing with the Devil

Hashomer Hatza’ir movement stood in his wav, | would be allocated to the “small rescue” in Menahem Bader did precisely this, andit wasalso Poland and they were waiting with bated breath typical of Ben-Gurion’s future relations with the _ for a further allocation that would allow them to emissaries. The letter also reveals that a group = embark on the large ransom plan devised by the consisting of Eliezer Kaplan, David Remez, and — Working Group in Slovakia. The three reiterated Golda Meyerson (of the Histadrut) and Melekh __ the lack of time and pointed out that they had alNeustadt (of the Mapai World Union) was privy _ readystretched the entire budget at their disposal

to information concerning secret activity. until 20 July, including ten thousand Palestinian A letter sent some days later sheds further — pounds in Switzerland.*”

light on the level of Ben-Gurion’s involvement in In their letter the three pointed to the the Slovakia affair and other clandestine rescueis- | church’s intervention in Slovakia and stressed sues. Barlas, Pomeranz, and Schind wrote to the that the Working Group believed that this interJAE and the Rescue Committee, stressing that | vention was one of the reasons for the halt in de“this letter comes in the wake of, and in addition —_ portations. In March Kaplan had asked Roncalli, to, our letter and notes sent five daysagoto David _ the apostolic nuncio, to instruct the church in Ben-Gurion. Its main message was the urgency — Slovakia to dissuade their government and the

and the possibilities . . . to help the Jews of | Catholic believers from continuing the deportaPoland.” The three rescue emissaries pointed out —_ tions. The monsignor promised to pass along the

that they were asking Ben-Gurion to raise the — request to the Vatican and did indeed do so. By monthly budget for aid to Poland to twenty-five April results were evident.

thousand Palestinian pounds. They were now Today we know that the efforts of the asking for an update and increase of the sums Catholic church in Slovakia to separate the con-

needed in Istanbul. verted Jews from the general body of deportees They justified their request by referring to —_ destined for extermination were extended during new information they had received: deportations §_ April to pressure certain Slovakian government in Slovakia had been deferred thanks tothe inter- —s ministers to cease deportations altogether. At the vention of the church but also because of the — beginning of May the Vatican itself made an offlargest amount of bribe money the Yishuv was __ cial appeal to the Slovakian government, which supplying. Nonetheless, they had information of | responded the same month the request would rean imminent date for the resumption of deporta- ceive serious consideration.”

tions from Slovakia, and they would be renewed The appeal to Ben-Gurion, the JAE, and the if ransom money was not transferred by then. | Rescue Committee in Palestine was discussed by This was the reason for their urgency. The three the Yishuv leadership and the reply was placed in wrote that they did not have the “moral and Bader’s hands, who was on a brief visit in the financial... authority to decide for or againston country and was about to return to Istanbul. the matter of the large plan in Slovakia. A ‘yes’ re- | However, Bader’s documents had expired and he quires sums that we are unable to raise, and‘no’ ___ was arrested on the Turkish border and did not

is worse still.” They referred their readers to the reach Istanbul as planned. He was returned to letter from Oskar Newmann, a member of the _ Syria, where he posted desperate letters to his colWorking Group and chairman of the Zionist leagues in Istanbul, detailing as best he could the Federation in Slovakia, attached to Schind’s and replies he bore with him from Palestine.

Pomeranz’s letter to Ben-Gurion. Bader asked Barlas to join him in Syria to Barlas, Pomeranz, and Schind were certain _ pick up what he had brought with him. Why was that twenty-five thousand Palestinian pounds _it essential that they actually link up? What did he

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want to hand over? After all, the verbal reply of | The question was raised with Ben-Gurion and the Yishuv leadership could have been postedone — Sharett, who replied: “Make a deal with the way or another. It appears that Bader wanted to devil.” This proves that Ben-Gurion and his sengive Barlas something very valuable—money or __ ior colleagues—in this case Sharett—were most diamonds—that he was carrying with him. certainly confronted with such issues. As we shall

A “DEPOSIT” FROM THE YISHUV see, the decision to pay bribes was most practical and touched on details of the operations.!” Smuggling diamonds purchased in Palestine was It can be concluded that by the end of May or one way of getting moneyinto Turkey. Diamonds __ the beginning of June, a change had taken place were the perfect commodity for this purpose, be- in preparations for the plan. It was no longer being small and very valuable. They were eithersold = ing characterized as “sensational” and people in Turkey on the black market or smuggled into —_ were no longer saying—as did Kaplan at the end the occupied territories. This fact was known by — of March—that it had no chance of succeeding. the various intelligence agencies, who carefully | Although there was still no sure sign of a reliable tracked the purchase of diamonds in the region __ source for the money, it was decided to allocate

and their passage from hand to hand.” twenty-five thousand Palestinian pounds, which What Bader took with him, first and fore- represented half of the deposit.!%

most, was a significant reply. Twenty thousand This decision was not recorded in the minPalestinian pounds had been approved for the utes of the JAE. It would appear that the decision funding of the “small rescue” in Poland and — was made by Ben-Gurion, Kaplan, Sharett, and Palestine, with twenty-five thousand pounds _ possibly also Gruenbaum, and that Bader took it (one hundred thousand dollars) “for the rabbis” — with him to Turkey. Notwithstanding that deci-

plan only if it turns out to be feasible.” The sion, the public debate on the issue continued Yishuv had decided to allocate half the sum de- _— unabated, as did the criticism of the leadership, manded by Wisliceny. Bader also provided in- — which was unable to offer a suitable defense beformation on fund-raising activities among the __ cause of the secret nature of some of its activity.!™

Jewish communities of Egypt and South Africa, In late June the Zionist Actions Committee rescue activity and ransom, and appeals to the —_—iheld a lengthy debate during which fund-raising

JDC for the same purpose. His description re- efforts for rescue activity were criticized. Critics

veals a system of intermediate funding and warned that the leadership was liable to miss a “roundabout” funding: the Yishuv transferred real chance at rescue, since the deadline for Wismoney to the occupied countries andinso doing _liceny’s offer was drawing near (it had been postviolated the Allies’ currency laws, whereas contri- —_— poned to early July). The JAE rejected the critibutions from Jewish communities were trans- _—_ cism. Gruenbaum gave a lengthy report detailing

ferred to Palestine. It thus managed to avoid get- efforts to obtain funding, including appeals to ting the Jewish communities in trouble for illegal the Mobilization and Rescue Fund, the JDC, and

transfer of funds.!®! Jewish communities in the free world. Although Bader also shed light on the Yishuv’sdecision- _ there had been no great fund-raising success stomaking processes concerning clandestine rescue _ries, at the risk of losing essential funding it was matters. He did not tie this directly to the Slova- _—_ agreed to allocate funds to try and save Jews by kia issue but rather to discussions of the proposal —_ paying ransom money.

to obtain ships by means of bribes. Such issues Both Dobkin and Kaplan referred at length were discussed at the exact same time as efforts to the criticism and to the proposals raised. to rescue children and the Transnistria Plan. | Dobkin called on the Zionist Actions Committee

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Dealing with the Devil

to institutionalize the fund-raising operation | and Gruenbaum’s statement that their efforts and to expand the circle of people bearing the — had thus far been unsuccessful. It was also deburden. He emphasized that the problem was not cided to send Gruenbaum on a fund-raising tour one of ill will on the part of the JAE to help the involving the Jews of South Africa. Jews of Europe but rather of difficulties in raising Moreover, the Yishuv’s main decision on the required money. Despite the hardships in- — funding had already been made. Contrary to the volved, Dobkin insisted that “there has never yet — sharp criticism and to Dobkin’s own statement been a demand for money that we have not _ that the Slovakia Plan “was still under discusfulfilled,” with the exception of the “Slovakia sion” and that a budgetary commitment had not matter, which is still under discussion.” He pro- _ yet been passed, it was then that the decision was posed a suitable way for raising the necessary made to transfer a hundred thousand dollars,

money. which represented the Yishuv’s share in the Kaplan was most adamant. He rejected the = agreed-upon deposit of two hundred thousand. criticism out of hand and did so at great length. | Atthesame time confirmation of this reached the He, too, stressed that the problem of fund alloca- rescue emissaries in Istanbul, who had already tion did not reflect ill will on the part ofthelead- —_ sent the information from Istanbul to Slovakia,

ership but rather the real difficulty in raising together with eight thousand dollars they had money. Ben-Gurion also attended the meeting _ previously been given from the approved sum. but refrained from speaking except for a request It can therefore be determined that the JAE’s not to attack Gruenbaum, who was absent for — decision—or at least that of the small “cabinet” part of the meeting. He probably had nothing to — within the JAE—had been reached prior to this add to his colleagues’ comprehensive and firm — wave of criticism. The latest information brought

comments. Upon his return, Gruenbaum ex- __ by Bader and letters sent to Ben-Gurion (late pressed the opinion that Ben-Gurion’s silence May) and the JAE (early June) were what motiwas probably due to the fact thathe was unableto — vated the decision makers. In June certain say anything about what was being done to ad- _ processes had been set in motion and the element

vance the Europa Plan.!” of time became even more pressing.!0” The JAE’s words were not evasive. At that Thus, information on the JAE’s willingness very moment great effort was being expended to __ to fund the operation was immediately passed on raise the necessary sums.!% In April, following — by Turkey to Slovakia. Information on the JDC’s Kaplan’s return, frequent meetings were held be- _ willingness to participate under the cover of its

tween the JAE and the JDC. A series of prelimi- regular support for the community and maintenary talks finally led to an official meeting on _ nance of labor camps was also passed on. At first 11 May 1943 between JAE representatives andthe they agreed to finance Wisliceny’s deposit of two JDC branch in Jerusalem, during which the ques- hundred thousand dollars. There were also hints tion was raised concerning the JDC’s participa- —_ in the information sent to Turkey of the Yishuv’s

tion in funding the ransom plans. fear that although the JDC had agreed to particiIt must remembered that this was an illegal _ pate, in the end the entire burden might fall on operation. Indeed, Dr. Judah Leib Magnes, head __ the JAE’s shoulders—even if only because of the of the Palestine branch of the JDC, did not wish __ illegality of the operation, which would prevent to make a decision on the issue and asked for di- — the JDC from fulfilling its financial commitment.

rections from New York. In the meantime, the Notwithstanding these fears, the JAE met its JDC branch in Jerusalem tended to reject the —_ financial commitments. It did not have a choice, JAE’s proposal. This was the reason for Kaplan __in the end, but to take a path that was twisted and

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Rescue Plans

dangerous—to stretch the matter to the limit | Working Group’s disappointment was expressed and, after this point, to announce their financial —_ in Fleischmann’s letter. Still, Wisliceny did not commitment. In a letter to the Working Group, _ arrive in Slovakia during July and even agreed to Pomeranz and Schind formulated most convinc- _ further postponements of the deadline for pay-

, dt lain that th d t

ingly the JAE’s scope of activity: ment of the deposit. The Working Group manIf there really is a miracle, and the deposit aoe eee Ne Paposes: Ganenipeinsn to Willi [Wisliceny] postpones the exter- was not satisfactory. Additional time was found

Co. YI postp ae when, at the end of July, Barlas informed Fleischmination various places—it will a decided ce ; , in mann that in Istanbul, too, “it hadbe been

great source of pride for you that you . . oy , tyrant. If it turns out atobtain the last moment , money . arhis would interim funding Co, until ,the that Saly [Mayer] and organization . arrived from other sources. [the, JDC] do not supply their deposit— , By mid-August the Yishuv had transferred to

to alleviate the suffering.”!!° This was seen as furhave ;found a way to the heart , ; oo, ther evidence that thecruel Yishuv andofitsthe emissaries

you, .will not be deserted by the [Yishuv]. , Slovakia only part of its half of the deposit. It arThe Yishuv will hurry to muster its re- , .; , rived piecemeal and less at than fifty thoumaining strength to totaled save the last ;; ; . sand dollars. It mustyou have been difficult to raise moment from the devastation that awaits so much monev in asinele attempt to supply the

you. The Yishuv will not allow that “for , oe aeTprn) SUPBY

your red blood.!% ;

, a. needs of all thewill rescue operations, which were bethe sake of golden monies you give , ing carried out simultaneously.

In August, Sharett was supposed to arrive Thus Bader wrote to Slovakia as well, his words —_in Istanbul. He went in order to examine the based on the unequivocal stance taken bythe JAE __ possibility of rescuing the first thousand Jews

during his visit to Palestine and on what he from Bulgaria. His visit raised the hope that the brought with him upon his return from Palestine —_— political powers in Istanbul might be able to

to Istanbul. bring about a breakthrough. News of the visit Following an exchange of correspondence _ was passed along to Slovakia in order to provide on Mayer’s reliability in allocating two hundred = encouragement to the Working Group. The thousand dollars, it transpired in early July that —_ deadline for Wisliceny’s payoff was again drawthe money had been allocated. A courier sent to _—ing near.!!!

Gizi Fleischmann informed her that the money The emissaries waited with bated breath for had been deposited in a closed Swiss bank ac- Sharett’s arrival and made preparations for his count until the end of the war, and that it could visit. Announcing that the arrangement in Gebe used for the withdrawal of local currency to _— neva was unsatisfactory, they demanded a letter

pay the deposit. Barlas reported this to the (with a copy to Ben-Gurion) saying that the Yishuv. It was an accepted practice at the time §—_ Yishuv would increase it allocation to the Europa and was known as the “notes” method (“aprés,’ —_—_- Plan, since less than a third of the deposit had

or “after,” in French), whereby the money would been covered so far. They emphasized that the be cashed after the war against a “note” presented —_- Yishuv leadership had to decide immediately on

by the bearer. 10 the direction of the operation so that Sharett Gizi Fleischmann and her colleagues were —_ would arrive prepared and be able to join them in

not satisfied with the arrangement, since they promoting the plan.!!2 were in need of dollars that could be transferred This request by the emissaries was a typical immediately to Wisliceny and his cohorts. The _ pattern of the time, characterized by a tendency

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to digress and hold superfluous debates on sub- _age to obtain such a sum and send it off? He apjects that had already been discussed and deter- parently modified certain criteria and gave inmined; since it had already been decided in June _ structions to have the money sent at the expense that the Yishuv would participate in funding the — of something else, which would later be funded ransom, information to this effect had already | by money obtained elsewhere. Indeed, Sharett

been passed on to Istanbul, the problem no _ sent an urgent request for money to cover the longer being one of decision-making but of deficit. Shortly thereafter Saly Mayer also allofund-raising. This was also evident in letters cated seventy thousand Swiss francs, which were from the emissaries. They wrote to Slovakia of sent to Slovakia. It was later discovered that this Sharett’s imminent visit and mentioned “Saly — sum was not followed by the remaining money and our absolutely clear promises.” The hardship — Sharett had requested.'!®

is also evident in the emissaries’ letter to the Beginning in mid-August, money sent by the Working Group, informing it that they were _Yishuv for the Europa Plan started flowing in with soon sending twenty-three thousand dollars by greater frequency and in larger sums. As Sharett courier, of which fourteen thousand was for promised, the Yishuv send a total of a hundred Poland (perhaps out of the new allocation fol- | thousand dollars toward Wisliceny’s deposit. By lowing their appeal to Ben-Gurion) and five the end of September 1943, a total of two hundred thousand toward financing labor campsinSlova- thousand had been sent to Slovakia (including kia—but not a single dollar toward the deposit |= money sent from Geneva), representing half of all

demanded by Wisliceny.!"3 the money sent to Slovakia during 1943-44. (According to current data, the Yishuv sent a total

SHARETT WORKS OUT OF ISTANBUL of four hundred thousand dollars to Slovakia.) When Sharett left for Turkey at the end of July | Money not used for ransom payments was used 1943, he was convinced that the chances of the to bribe Slovakian officials, to finance aid to the Europa Plan succeeding were good, and once camps, to support the deportees to Poland, and to there his impressions only reinforced his opin- _ finance border-crossing operations.!!? Through ion. Like Kaplan during his March visit, Sharett | contacts with Jewish communities in the free made good use of his authority and took action — world, especially South Africa and the Yishuv itto advance the plan.!!4 He immediately sent two self, the Yishuv and the JDC managed to break cables to Geneva, one to Lichtheim, the Jewish — through the financial bottleneck. These efforts

Agency representative, and the other to Saly had begun long before Sharett left for Turkey and Mayer, the JDC representative. Sharett stressed continued during his stay there.!!8 that he had studied the proposals from Slovakia Communications with the JDC were conand believed that the money should be trans- = ducted through various channels. During the ferred to the Working Group even ifonly to buy _first months of 1943, discussions were held with time. “Gisi’s proposal” was for him “the main is- | Saly Mayer in Geneva. For several months nego-

sue under the current circumstances.” He in- tiations had been conducted in Jerusalem with formed Mayer that, despite other commitments, the JDC’s Jerusalem branch, and these had in- , he was allocating $50,000 and asked himto send creased lately. Lastly, negotiations were conGizi Fleischmann $150,000 in cash and not asa ducted with Joe Schwartz, the JDC head in Eu-

bank deposit in Switzerland. rope, whose arrival in Palestine was expected in Sharett did not wait for a positive reply from §_ August.

Mayer and the JDC. He immediately sent fifty Schwartz arrived in Palestine in early August thousand dollars to Slovakia.!!5 How did he man- 1943. After two rounds of talks with Dobkin, who

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represented the JAE, and separate talks with false situation in meetings that were docuSharett in late August, an agreement was signed mented. between the JAE and the JDC that included the Available documentation reveals no meeting transfer of funds for the “small rescue” in the = between Ben-Gurion and Schwartz. Could occupied territories and ransom payments. Dobkin have engineered such a step on his own? Although Schwartz insisted that the agreement —__It can be assumed with considerable certainty mention the ban on money transfers to occupied — that Ben-Gurion and Kaplan were involved in all territories, he agreed with Dobkin and Sharett— _ stages of the discussion, formulated the agree-

again repeating a pattern involvingamemberof ment with Dobkin—and certainly with the leadership triumvirate at a decisive juncture | Sharett—and approved it. Shortly after the arin the rescue operation—on the actual collabo- rival of news of the annihilation, a framework ration over the Slovakia issue and on ways to cir- —_-was devised for cooperation with the JDC, con-

cumvent the ban. sidered a non-Zionist philanthropic organiza-

The Schwartz-Dobkin agreement outlined a tion. As we have seen, it was Ben-Gurion himself roundabout way of transferring funds: “The JDC — who designed this framework, although he was was prepared to place at the disposal of individu- _ not entirely reconciled to it.

als who deposit financing for aid to occupied The Schwartz-Dobkin agreement was not countries reimbursement to be paid in America __ discussed at the JAE the day after its signing on after the war.” A sum was mentioned—twentyto 8 August, nor did the agreement signed with twenty-five thousand Palestinian pounds per — Sharett two days later require JAE authorization.

month (equal to from eighty to one hundred These facts reinforce the impression that these thousand dollars)—as were names of JDC — agreements were top secret. They also indicate trustees—Joseph Blum in Hungary, Gizi Fleisch- —_ that the JAE plenum was not party to such secret mann in Slovakia, and others—who had the au- _— matters or that documentation does not reflect thority to oversee deposits. This would be done __ the full proceedings at the meeting.!”! I believe

“in collaboration with the Jewish Agency.”!!9 these conclusions to be generally correct, having

Schwartz met with several individuals in supplied documentation underlying this asvarious organizations and heard criticism from — sumption, although in the case at hand it is hard some of them regarding the position taken by __ to determine if the JAE plenum was privy to the

the JDC. In his response he repeated the JDC’s secret. The assumption that Ben-Gurion, Kawell-known position, although in practice he plan, and Sharett were not involved in drawing had backed off somewhat from it by signing the —_ up the agreement and did not advise Dobkin in

agreement with the JAE. Despite the criticism, his negotiations is an extremely unlikely scehe refrained from revealing the existence of the _nario.

agreement for the simple reason that it was sen- In Palestine it was assumed that Schwartz sitive (most of it being based on illegal activity) | was acting independently, since the JDC in New and secret. Schwartz’s desire to respond to his _—_—-York did not have the courage or the freedom to

critics did not overcome his forced silence.!2° _ act. Efforts were made to help overcome the reThis again demonstrates that the recording of serve of the senior JDC staff in New York. Sharett

something said by a particular participant ina | instructed Nahum Goldmann of the Jewish meeting did not always reflect the real situation. | Agency’s U.S. branch to clarify to the JDC in New

The need for discretion often prevented indi- York that there were British and American offividuals from revealing a specific operation— _ cialsin Istanbul who knew all about the illegal acsometimes even motivating them to present a _ tivity in Geneva yet were doing nothing to pre-

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vent it. Shortly afterward Sharett also promised him for twenty-five thousand dollars toward this kind of aid to Mayer, the JDC representative | Wisliceny’s deposit, he did not have the money.

in Geneva.!” The tight financial situation reached a crisis THE JDC’S DIFFICULTIES AND point in the summer of 1943. It became obvious

that the Yishuv could supply only interim fund-

INTERIM FUNDING BY THE YISHUV ing, and what had been concluded with Schwartz Notwithstanding its willingness, the JDC had _at that very time would not meet the urgent need trouble meeting its commitments. Despite for cash to pay the ransom in Slovakia. Moreover, Mayer’s promises and Schwartz’s agreements, it | couriers had been sent to Poland several times transpired that in August and September Mayer since Scholz’s return in May, apparently estabsent only $53,000 to Slovakia. The rescue emis- lishing an efficient channel of communication. saries in Istanbul were right for being more skep- _— They reported that, as the situation in Germany

tical than Schwalb concerning Mayer’s abilities. | deteriorated, “big and small henchmen of the Up to June 1943 Mayer had sent about 180,000 _ tyrant” in Poland were increasingly susceptible to Swiss francs ($42,000), and in August-September bribes; camp heads and ghetto chiefs dropped he had sent the $53,000 simply because untilthen hints that they would consider making conceshe did not have enough cash. He repeated his __ sions in return for cash.!*4 These developments, promise of paying the balance “aprés.” No addi- —_ of course, created a new need for money. Lastly, tional cash arrived both because the Swiss gov- _‘ time was running out for the 20 August payment ernment objected and because the JDC in New __ to Wisliceny.

York was still not convinced that the Europa Plan Under these circumstances, and with des-

was an extraordinary occurrence. perate pleas from Slovakia and Istanbul, BenThe JDC only started fulfilling its part ofthe | Gurion cabled the following urgent message to bargain in October: the transfer of twenty thou- | Gruenbaum: “We have received sad news from sand Palestinian pounds (eighty thousand dol- —_Gisi, who is demanding means for the complete lars) per month, some of which would be sent in rabbis’ larger plan. Cooperation of South African a roundabout way through the occupied areas. It Jews indispensible.”!”

was essential even if it arrived in installments. In South Africa Gruenbaum was doing his That amount constituted around half of the best to raise funds and the community did inYishuv’s entire monthly budget for rescue activ- | deed come through, but this did not exonerate ity,!23 but its payment helped jumpstart the “in- | the JAE from having to find interim funding in

terim funding” system. the hope that the promised money transfers Mayer had a problem he was unable to dis- | would eventually be forthcoming. The JAE did cuss with the Slovakians. Since April 1942 the not wait for the promises to be fulfilled and transSwiss had blocked the transfer of dollars out of — ferred the money it had agreed to pay. Only after Switzerland for use in aid projects. In fact, be- that did the JDC, the South African community, tween April 1942 and the summer of 1943 Mayer = and others send money to the Yishuv. It later had received no money from the United States. | turned out that the Yishuv sent much larger sums He was only able to use money donated by the __ than the JDC.!6

Jewish community in Switzerland, although Upon his return to Palestine, Sharett remost of this was used to support Jewish refugees ported to the JAE. The part concerning Slovakia who had managed to make it to Switzerland. All was laconic. He believed that Slovakia was one of he was able to offer was payment in the form of only four areas where the aid being sent was ac“aprés.” Thus, when the Working Group asked _ tually effective and successful. In Slovakia “the

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Rescue Plans

financial aid prevents or postpones deportation; — to take place some days hence to examine “the exit is not a question of food, the main thing being _ tent to which material and moral support can be to prevent restrictions, and the financialaid does __ increased to those out there.”

put them off?” Sharett’s reports on the Slovakia affair were In his speech to the JAE, he made no men- highly concise. It is likely, therefore, that the body tion of his instructions to immediately send fifty | to which Sharett reported, according to Benthousand dollars to Slovakia, nor of his appeal to Gurion’s description—the same body (BenMayer regarding the missing sum required to _— Gurion referred to it is as “secretariat,” but it was make up the deposit. In his report to the Mapai —_ not the Mapai Secretariat) that was supposed to Center Sharett spoke in very general terms and = convene soon—was the very same small cabinet, gave no details. It would appear that hetriedvery __ the circle of senior officials around Ben-Gurion, hard to keep secret all efforts to carry out the Eu- _ that directed the various operations and whose

ropa Plan.!?7 consultations led to the most important decisions.

All this goes unmentioned in the minutes of On the matter of funding for rescue activity, meetings held during August and September. _ including that for the Europa Plan, Ben-Gurion’s Here, too, the question arises as to when deci- sentiments recalled his position in early Februsions were made, since large sums of money ary. He firmly rejected calls to the JAE for inchanged hands. There isno doubt thatthe Yishuv creased funding. (It is important to recall that leaders were the ones to decide. One of two pos- __ this occurred after Sharett had transferred sigsible assumptions is correct: either the recorded __ nificant sums of money to Slovakia, and that minutes of the JAE meetings were incomplete or — this was done in accordance with Ben-Gurion’s these issues were determined in the three- or — and Kaplan’s wishes.) Ben-Gurion claimed that it four-man cabinet—in consultation with Ben- — was impossible to expect the JAE to finance the Gurion, Kaplan, and Sharett (and perhaps also __ entire rescue operation from it own budget. In

Gruenbaum)—and not the JAE plenum. order to share the burden, the JAE was trying to Upon his arrival in Palestine, Venja Pomer- _—sraise money by appealing to wealthy Jews in the anz also raised the subject of the Jews of Slovakia. | Yishuv and abroad.

Ata special meeting of the Rescue Committee in PUBLIC STATEMENTS VERSUS

the Jewish Agency offices, Pomeranz pointed out CLANDESTINE ACTS that fifty-two thousand dollars had been transferred to date. He also emphasized the impor- —_ Ben-Gurion’s words reflected the internal contance of bribery as a means of rescuing people. _ tradictions in the JAE’s funding policies. Money “Credit! And immediately!” he demanded.!22 He — would be found in the JAE’s budget to finance all also reported to the Mapai Center on the rescue —_ programs involved in the immigration of Jews. operation and repeated the routine criticism of | Other rescue efforts, including ransom plans or

the position taken by the leadership. “small rescues” of various sorts, were not the Ben-Gurion’s response may shed light on —_JAE’s job, but it would finance them by raising the question of how involved he was in the Slova- funds from outside sources in the Yishuv and kia matter and where decisions were made. He — abroad. What Ben-Gurion was actually saying began by stressing the moral value of the work __ was that the JAE was committed to funding ranbeing done by the emissaries and the Yishuv — somor “small rescue” plans—even those beyond in general. Next he turned to the practical issue its means—based on the conviction that these concerning the rescue of Jews. He mentioned __ outside sources would, in the end, balance out its Sharett’s report and a meeting that was supposed — overextended commitments.

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It would appear that Ben-Gurion and his Years later, Ehud Avriel presented a similar colleagues were distressed by the fact that while picture of Ben-Gurion’s involvement in the resthe JAE was required to bear the financial burden _ cue activity, including the Slovakia affair. Avriel, for broad-scale operations, such as the ransom =a member of the JAE’s Political Department, was payments in Slovakia, it was still the object ofex- a key activist in the rescue activity and in the se-

tremely sharp criticism. Moreover, this alloca- _cret collaboration. He replaced Teddy Kollek in tion of funds meant that other vital activityinthe — Istanbul in 1943, a time when the hope of impleYishuv suffered. Still, Ben-Gurion and his col- — menting the Europa Plan was at its peak and the leagues refrained from pointing to their heavy _— decision to supply Wisliceny with the deposit financial commitments to deflect the sharp criti- | money had been reached. Although he was not cism to which they were subject. They preferred questioned specifically on Slovakia, Avriel chose to refute it with counterclaims rather than to re- —_ to stress Ben-Gurion’s involvement in the rescue

veal the secret rescue activity. plans: Ben-Gurion’s words at that meeting expressed

his involvement in all the discussions and decisions As a Haganah emissary in Istanbul from on the Slovakia proposal, as well as his determina- the summer of 1943 until the end of the tion to maintain secrecy even at the cost of person- war, I had many occasions to meet Benally becoming the target of criticism. The voluntary Gurion. Every time I returned to Palescharacter of the Jewish community in Palestine tine to report to our superiors, I was sum-

made it possible for many people to shirk their moned by Ben-Gurion, who wanted to financial burden and hide from the Jewish Agency, receive a detailed report on our activity. whose coffers were dangerously depleted. Despite The operational details were handled the fact that the Jewish communities and organiza- mostly by Haganah representatives tions abroad were not subject to any kind of volun- Eliyahu Golomb and Shaul Avigur, as tary Yishuv authority, Ben-Gurion had no inten- well as the Jewish Agency Political Detion of “exempting” them from responsibility. He partment’s Moshe Sharett and Reuven

and his colleagues wished to rent the mantle of Shiloah. Gruenbaum, on behalf of the hypocrisy they wrapped themselves in—everyone JAE, was responsible for the rescue file. was making accusations yet few were stepping for- He was actually formally in charge of the

ward to help—although the Yishuv’s financial mission in Istanbul. Ben-Gurion, who means were ridiculously meager compared with was chairman of the Jewish Agency, did

the enormous needs. not ask for the names of couriers or about

Ben-Gurion’s and his colleagues’ stoicism in concrete sums of money that had been the face of criticism is impressive. They were transferred that month from one place to never tempted to exonerate themselves by re- another. But he took an interest in the vealing secrets, even under the heaviest public smallest details of our work, and of the pressure. Kaplan, of course, was one of the first specifics of the intelligence we had accuto come under fire, yet he never revealed any mulated on the conditions in countries thing, merely hinting at the effort being ex- under Nazi occupation. Looking back, I pended: “I only wish to state that if things are would say that in the seven or eight meethappening in Istanbul and in Geneva, it is due to ings I had with Ben-Gurion during the the efforts of those people who are accepting re- war, he knew the information I was about sponsibility and who are unable to discuss what to report to him even before my arrival. I

they are doing.” mean, he knew the background and the 233

Rescue Plans

main facts. He was always asking me to plan. Moreover, he was given ten thousand dolsharpen the picture, to supply him with lars in cash as a deposit. It turned out shortly more exact details on the situation in Slo- thereafter that it was a false hope. By the end of vakia, on the negotiations being held October it was clear that the proposal had actuby the Jews of Slovakia with the local au- ally been removed from the agenda. In Slovakia it thorities, or with the Gestapo, for the res- was believed that the money from the Yishuv and cue of Slovakian Jews. ... He knew about from Mayer had been transferred too late. Gisi’s and asked for a sharpened picture. He es- letters turned bitter, grim, and increasingly worpecially investigated ... and knew about risome. They basically said that communications

... the activity we were involved in.!%° with Wisliceny had been severed, and that there was no doubt that talks with him would have Coupled with its efforts within the South African —_— produced positive results had the deposit been Jewish community, the Yishuv also tried to raise placed on his desk earlier.!%2

money from its own local wealthy community. From September until early October 1943, Ben-Gurion joined in a direct plea to these indi-_ _— the emissaries in Istanbul believed that the plan viduals as part of “Solidarity with the Diaspora” __ still had a chance and awaited Wisliceny’s reply.

month. He informed them of the race against — Barlas arrived in Palestine in October, still detime, the ransom program, and the financial bur- scribing events in Istanbul in optimistic terms: den being borne by the Yishuv. They werealsoin- “There is also significant relief in Slovakia. Corformed by Dr. Emil Schmorak of the JAE—oneof —__ respondence shows that the fear of deportation

the Rescue Committee leaders and the civilright- | that was hanging over their heads in recent wing party leaders, who had just returned from §_ months had been removed and there is no longer Turkey—about the enormous sums of money _ anything to fear. Payments are coming in piecethat the Yishuv was offering in order to prevent —__ meal, so that it hasn’t been canceled but neither

the deportation of Slovakian Jews to death has it been implemented. To date they have paid camps. He was referring to sums transferred dur- | some 200 thousand dollars.”!

ing August and September totaling some two Doubts gradually increased during October hundred thousand dollars. At that fund-raising 1943, but there were still people who had hope. In

meeting a substantial sum was raised from a letter to the Working Group dated 3 October, among the wealthy people in the Yishuv.!?! the emissaries asked if there was a chance that At the end of August Wisliceny traveledfrom § Wisliceny would use his influence in Greece: Greece to Slovakia and announced that the situa- | “Maybe some quick act on his part is possible, or tion had changed and that he had to consult with — on the part of his colleagues in the capital... . his superiors. A few days later he informed the | Howdid the negotiations with him end, anyway? Working Group that the May decision had been _ In the meantime, our brothers are being lost to us rescinded and that a decision had been made to __ all over the place.” 4 resume deportations of Jews from Slovakia to ex- Just a few days later, grim reports started artermination camps. The Working Group wasim- _riving in Istanbul and from there to Jerusalem: pressed that the delay in payment had causedthe “There's no real assurance that Willi | Wisliceny] Germans to believe that “Ferdinand Roth” was _ will produce success on a scale we had hoped

not a reliable partner for negotiations. for)... that the negotiations with Willi proStill, Wisliceny left a glimmer of hope when duced no positive results.” The emissaries wrote he told the group that his superiors would recon- — home that “Naomi [Gizi Fleischmann] was prob-

sider their position and return to the ransom _ ably right in her assessment that two months ago

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the affair could have ended differently,’ and that | andthe Germans in this affair. It is doubtful that “if it all depended on the Jewish Yishuv in Pales- even today it might be possible to supply untine, it would have been very different.” From —_ equivocal answers to questions that have arisen mid-October there was no longer any hope of — concerning that plan.

carrying out the Europa Plan, and in December All ransom plans pose similar problems for Schind declared that “the matter of the interces- _ the researcher. It is difficult to determine the real sor from Slovakia is no longer on the agenda.” !*” position of the German “side” (the word is clearly

As concerns the main participants in the inadequate to describe the Nazi government's affair, Fleischmann perished in Auschwitz. | complex web of authority) or what the real posiRabbi Weissmandel jumped out of atrain carry- _ tion was of the satellite countries, which were the ing him and his family to Auschwitz; his wifeand = main arenas of the ransom and bribe operations.

children remained in the carriage and perished |= The Germans proved that they were capable in the death camp. After the warhemadehisway — of anything: conducting negotiations to extort to the United States, where he became an ardent money from the victims while continuing to exanti-Zionist until his death in 1957, leaving be- — terminate them. Their ultimate objective rehind a bitter and angry book entitled From the — mains unclear, since they pursued several differDepths, which described the affair as he saw it. — ent courses simultaneously.

reat preparations for the Nuremberg trials, WAS THE EUROPA PLAN PART OF isliceny was interrogated concerning his part THE FINAL SOLUTION? in the Holocaust. His trial was moved to Bratislava, where he was sentenced to death and _—‘ There are those who claim that there are indica-

hanged in 1948. tions that deportation from Slovakia ceased because of internal Slovakian circumstances and In any retrospective examination of the affair, the | that the Europa Plan was an attempt at fraud on central question remains what would have hap- _ the part of the Germans—part of the “final solupened had the ransom money been paid on the __ tion” and not a departure from it. date determined by Wisliceny. Under those cir- The extent of deportations from Slovakia had cumstances, would the Europa Plan have come been determined before the affair commenced. into being or would it have been proveda fraud, __ Fifty-eight thousand Slovakian Jews—among the with money dropped into Nazi pockets and. _ first being the youngest and strongest—had been nothing done to help the Jews? On the ransom __ sent to the death camps before deportations plans in general, did Ben-Gurion believe there ceased. According to Slovakian documentation, in was reason to consider this course of action? If so, March 1942 the Slovaks reached an agreement what was the Yishuv’s role in financing the ran- — with the Germans to deport sixty thousand Slova-

som plans? kian Jews as part of the first stage. This program

Given the research already devoted to an- —_- was carried out. It is also worth noting that in May swering this question—the latest being Yehuda __ the Slovakian government issued its definition of Bauer’s Jews for Sale?—I have little to add to this “Slovak Jew” and that most of the remaining Jews data except to note that most of the documenta- —_— were saved from deportation based on that definition at the researchers’ disposal was not available _ tion. Research has uncovered the fact that, accordto the decision makers and players during 1942 _ ing to Slovakian documentation from February to

and 1943 in Slovakia, Turkey, and Palestine. March, there was a plan to send them all to their Notwithstanding this advantage, there is stillun- | deaths. In practical terms, this referred to sixty certainty concerning the motives of the Slovaks — thousand people in the first stage, since the others

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were protected by the aforementioned law orhad __ for a million lives. In terms of “tariffs” at that escaped. In any case, from Wisliceny’s point of time, it was very low, especially when one recalls view it did not change the fact that Jews remained _ the Nazis’ tendency to exaggerate the financial in Slovakia and that there was money to be weight and organizational capabilities of the Jews

made. !38 of the free world. The Transnistria Plan required

It is also worth recalling the impact of other — four hundred dollars per rescued Jew; as things internal and external forces: activity on the part — turned out, Eichmann demanded a similar sum of the Slovak Church and the Vatican; the efforts in his talks with Joel Brand. of moderate circles in Slovakia to end the depor- If it was merely a case of personal bribes, the tations; the role of Jews themselves in terms of question would have arisen as to how it was posbribes paid to Slovak clerks and functionaries. sible to hope that an unrecorded sum of money These motivated the Germans to put a halt— — dropped into the pocket of a private individual albeit a temporary one—to the deportations.!39 could have the kind of influence that would halt The halt in deportations during 1943 may also _—_—a sophisticated murder apparatus. And if it was have been the result of delays in the German ex- _ not into Wisliceny’s pocket into which the money termination apparatus in the death camps and __ was being dropped but Himmler’s, who was head

access to it.!40 of the operation, then there were plenty of more Thus, at that stage the German halt intrans- __ efficient ways for him to grow rich.

port to the camps was not motivated by bribe On the other hand, if one assumes that it was money. Up to that point the Nazishadcarriedout not a personal bribe but rather payment for a their anti-Jewish policies to the best of their abil- |= much broader program aimed at stopping the exities, but the activity of several senior Slovak offi- _ termination in several countries, it would have

cials disturbed them, so they temporarily turned been difficult to conceal such a program and

to exterminating other groups of Jews.!*! would certainly have angered fanatics. HimmThere is adequate reason to reject the as- _ler’s enemies would most likely have exploited it sumption that the Europa Plan evolved asa result — to denigrate him in the eyes of Hitler. Even so, if of the desire of several senior SS personnel to cre- Himmler were to attempt to justify such a plan— ate for themselves the image of rescuers of Jewsor which totally contradicted Nazi ideology—to his to seek a path to the West through negotiations —_ leader and his subordinates, he would have had

with Jewish organizations in the free world. This | to make it appear extremely lucrative to the assumption is incompatible with actual events. If | Reich. Consequently he would have had to deHimmler had indeed agreed to the Europa Plannin mand huge sums of money in return for a halt— November 1942, this would have been before Ger- —_ even a partial one—in the extermination, but many’s worsening state on the Russian front and = Wisliceny demanded a relatively small sum in his in northern Africa had become clear. What reason __ talks with the Working Group. is there to assume that at that specific time Himm- This plan also has to be examined in light of ler and his henchmen were in need of “world _ thetwo other plans on the agenda at the same time. Jewry’? Moreover, why did Himmler cease nego- _ It isanestablished fact that the Nazis thwarted both tiations with the Working Group after things the plan for rescuing children and that for rescuing started going badly for Germany during the sec- _ the Jews of Transnistria. In that case, why should ond half of 1943? In his book Jews for Sale? Yehuda one trust their dealings with the Jews of Slovakia so Bauer replies to these questions in great detail. soon after thwarting the other two plans?

The sum named by Wisliceny makes one Wisliceny’s motives were decidedly suspect. suspicious: two or three million dollarsin return | He might have been attempting to distract the

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Slovak leadership with a false planthat wouldoc- = “cheapest” plan on the agenda, promising an end cupy the Jewish leadership in the free world and __ to the deportations of the entire Jewish commuthe Jews remaining in the occupied territories _ nity of Europe in return for two or three million

and thereby divert their attention from other dollars. Obviously, if anyone had taken the sum matters. Whether or not he was aware of the task _ seriously, it would have involved some accountto which he had been appointed, Wisliceny ex- —_ ing. Although Ben-Gurion agreed to go for the hibited great cunning. He placed large sums of | “expensive” Transnistria Plan, he would certainly money in his pockets and did not missan oppor- _ not have rejected so “worthwhile” a proposal as tunity to exploit the Jews insecurity andtheirde- — Wisliceny’s.

sire to grasp at even a slim chance of rescue.!” We have seen how in late February BenIf indeed the Europa Plan had never beena —_ Gurion adopted in principle that the JAE would serious plan but rather a fraudulent trick devised _—_ also participate in funding the ransom and bribe by Wisliceny, it is possible to detect arepetitionof | payments. But he and his colleagues knew that the debate pattern in the Transnistria Plan: both — the Yishuv would be unable to raise such sums plans were discussed in Jerusalem and fired the — based on their own resources and that they would imagination of the Yishuv’s leadership, yet ulti- have to collect money from other areas. Thus, the

mately both proved false and unfounded. adoption of this position was based on the finanBen-Gurion’s position on ransom plans was __ cial participation of the Yishuv together with formulated immediately after being informed of — other Jewish sectors and interim funding based the Transnistria Plan: press forward with negoti- | on donations from abroad.

ations and examine the plan, notwithstanding These policies crystallized when another doubts as to its feasibility. There isno documen- __ channel of activity began materializing in the tation regarding Ben-Gurion’s reactiontoaplan — spring and summer of 1943, namely, the “small similar to the Slovakia affair, but itis unlikelyhe — rescue” involving aid for survival to the Jews of would have taken a different stand. Itis also clear | Poland. Thisnew channel required much money. that Ben-Gurion was informed of all the details It should be remembered that at this precise mo-

of the affair. ment the Yishuv was involved in the plan for

From Ben-Gurion’s point of viewasthe po- transferring children to Sweden or Turkey. All litical and operational leader ofthe Yishuvatthe — this forced the JAE to manage its finances extime, the two plans discussed at the end of 1942 tremely carefully and to allocate the little at its and the beginning of 1943 were in principle a _ disposal to rescue efforts whose chances of sucsingle unit. They were both highly dangerous, — cess were greatest. Ben-Gurion was personally but he believed that they also held out the pos- _involved in all fund-raising efforts. His dramatic sibility of saving the lives of many Jews. He feltit | appeal to Gruenbaum in South Africa is a clear worthwhile to get the most out of the negotia- | example of this.

tions, if only to buy time, and if it turned out Despite reservations regarding the plan, that there was a real chance of saving Jews, the —_ large sums of money were sent to Slovakia; only

entire Yishuv would be mobilized to promote | Romania, Hungary, and Poland received more, the plan and to participate in funding it. The but the Jewish community in Slovakia was relahandling of the Slovakia affair was therefore tively small. Such large sums of money would based on a pattern determined by the handling _ never have been sent without Ben-Gurion’s ap-

of the Transnistria affair. proval. The transfer of money proves, in fact if It is important to remember that from the not verbally, that Ben-Gurion’s words in early Yishuv’s point of view, the Europa Plan was the February and, to some extent, also in August 1943

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Rescue Plans

were aimed at carrying out the complex and —__ Ben-Gurion was the first in the JAE leadership to thankless job of coaxing as many people as pos- _ deal with it. The decision at the time was to exsible into participating in the funding, and not —_amine the feasibility of the two plans and not to merely to talk about the importance of rescuing __ reject them out of hand.

Jews from Europe. The man who spoke out Por several weeks—until February 1943— against paying ransom was the selfsame man Ben-Gurion and others in the JAE wavered bewho approved the budget for it. His intention tween a willingness to carry out the plans and was to propel the whole affair as far as possible, | an unwillingness to participate in funding. In to the ultimate moment of truth, andifno other |= March1943 Eliezer Kaplan analyzed the two plans solution was found, the Yishuv would bear the —_ and was concerned by their insubstantiality, yet

financial burden for the operation. It would still funds “dribbled” into Slovakia. appear that in the end most of the emissaries Late May and early June marked a turning felt similarly. During the various stages of the —_ point in the JAE’s attitude toward the Europa Europa Plan they even said that intime of need, _—_ Plan, and it was finally decided that the Yishuv

if there were no other options, the Yishuv would participate in funding it. There is no would assume responsibility.'43 This attitude con- doubt that at this stage Ben-Gurion was involved formed to Ben-Gurion’s general outlook regard- _—in all the debates and discussions involved in this ing the Yishuv’s task at the time of the Second _—_ decision. August appeared as the moment of World War, namely, to be the vanguard of the __ truth, with the entire sum in cash still not avail-

Jewish people. able. At that time more money was needed for the Clearly, Ben-Gurion and his colleagues were survival of Jews in Poland. Ben-Gurion cabled aware of the possibility that the Europa Planwas = Gruenbaum in South Africa to urge the Jewish a fraud. But they gave instructions to contact the |§ community there into making generous contri“devil” to determine his motives. In their discus- butions to the rescue efforts. Notwithstanding

sions on this and other ransom plans, Ben- the goodwill and serious attempts at operating Gurion and his colleagues considered this very — the Europa Plan by means of interim payments, real possibility. Nonetheless, he did not reject — the JAE was simply unable to bear the financial these plans out of hand. Thus, in late 1942 and _— burden of so many essential needs at the same early 1943 the Yishuv received proposals fortwo _ time. All the plans depended on the tragic conransom plans. My documentation clearly shows _ nection between “gold” and “blood,” and the JAE that at least in the case of the Transnistria Plan, — was obliged to maneuver between them.!“4

238

6

Between the Hammer and the Anvil in 1944 Continuing Efforts to Rescue Children and the Struggle for Immigration to Palestine

Te end of the war appeared on the horizon fourth (and final) term in office, and the War throughout 1944. Several Russian victories Refugee Board had been established. Essential for were noted at the end of 1943. In early 1944 the rescue activity at the time—especially since it inUSSR’s Red Army had settled roughly along the —_ cluded senior government officials—it was given Leningrad-Odessa line. By the spring the Russians wide-ranging authority to act in Turkey, Switzeralso controlled the outskirts of Lvovtotheeastand — land, and Sweden. Miriam Taub, Ben-Gurion’s the Crimean Peninsula to the south. At the begin- _— secretary during his stay in the United States and ning of 1943, the Allied forces were positioned a close associate, later wrote: “The President's north of the Vasto-Minturno line north of Naples = War Refugee Board is doing a wonderful job. I and Bari in Italy. By 4 June 1944 all of Rome had don’t really know what they can achieve, but they been conquered, precipitating the downfall of — are doing their best and their orientation is not to Italy. On 6 June Operation Overlord commenced, leave a stone unturned.”

during which the Allied forces landed in Nor- It took time for everyone to understand that mandy and opened the western front. In the satel- _—_ the establishment of this body did not signal a lite countries morale was plummeting. The sub- _ change in policy in the West. No changes were

marine system overseen by Germany in the made in the three main principles relating to the Atlantic Ocean failed to achieve its objectivesand |= management of the war, which had a direct effect collapsed, although this fact was not common __ on the chances for rescue, and they were mostly

knowledge.! Throughout this period American __ not carried out: the policy of focusing on the and British secret intelligence services were active | main effort; the demand that Germany surrenbehind enemy lines in the satellite countries. der unconditionally; and the ban on transferring In March Germany invaded Hungary, until © money to occupied areas. Nor was there any then a relatively safe haven for Jews. Theinvasion _ significant change in the policy of not allowing of Hungary and the Allied landingsin Normandy —_Jews into Western states or, in the case of coun-

increased the fear that in its death throes the __ tries under British Mandate, restricting their enThird Reich would finish off the remainder of _ try into Palestine. Even during the fifth year of Europe’s surviving Jews. Although the Axis pow- _ the war, the gates of the world’s two major places ers steadily lost ground during the first half of | of refuge for Jewish Holocaust survivors—Pales1944, the Yishuv still feared policy changesinthe — tine and the Western states—were closed to Jewneutral states, especially Turkey. It worried that —_ ish immigration.

Turkey might join the war on the Axis side or Rescue efforts were focused on three main shift from sympathetic neutrality to hostile neu- objectives during that year. First, efforts contintrality. It was clear that such developments could —_— ued to rescue children. Second, immediately after

result in the slowing or total shutdown of the the invasion of Hungary, efforts were made to

most important rescue channel. rescue the Jews trapped there, initially by ordiIn the United States 1944 was an election nary means and later through the ransom plan year. President Roosevelt was running for his _ presented by Joel Brand. Third, the Parachutists’

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Rescue Plans

Scheme and the Self-Defense Plan (which rosein rescue of children a top priority. Ben-Gurion led January 1944, with a main objective of organizing the meandering attempts to rescue the Jews of the Jewish communities in the Balkans to resist | Hungary, was involved in laying down the founthe Nazis) were put into operation as part ofthe dations for the secret collaboration with Amerisecret collaboration with American and British — can and British intelligence services, and was inintelligence services, both of which reached their — strumental in sending aid to the survivors in the peak in 1944. With the Allied advance in Europe, areas being liberated, bringing them to Palestine, the Yishuv began extending various kinds of aid = and mobilizing them for the political struggle to remaining Jews in occupied territories. awaiting the Yishuv in the aftermath of war. BenThe Yishuv’s growing presence in Istanbul |= Gurion’s emotional visit to Bulgaria marked the was also an expression of its involvement in sev- _ height of this activity. eral locally based rescue operations. This led to It was a difficult year for Ben-Gurion both as conflicts between emissaries and the various or- | amanandasa leader. At first he resigned his post ganizations they represented. JAE members were = and took no part in JAE sessions, thereby exsent to Istanbul in an effort to arbitrate and settle pressing his political, personal, and ideological disputes. One emissary, Dr. Mordechai Eliash, — differences with Chaim Weizmann, the president also tried to calm things down. To this end, a of the Zionist Federation. In the spring the split council was established and various committees —_ in the Mapai party was common knowledge, and and recording and coordination procedures were —_ in autumn the established Yishuv and the rightobserved. It was a development similar to the —_ wing circles reached their lowest point. The first process of sterilization undergone by the Rescue “Season” had started. In August Ben-Gurion lost

Committee in Palestine. Berl Katznelson, the man he considered his best Other Jewish groups started appearing inIs- _ friend and his most important political and idetanbul. One of these was the Orthodox Rescue __ ological ally, who had jointly led Mapai and, in Committee and representatives of the Peter Berg- —_ truth, the entire Zionist labor movement. He son (Hillel Kook) group, which included Eri took the death of Katznelson very badly, expressJabotinsky and Leon Danenberg. The Bergson __ ing anger, frustration, and perhaps even desperagroup set off on an independent course worthy of tion following the failure of the Joel Brand plan.

a separate analysis.’ In Istanbul the atmosphere BRITAIN AND THE was tense among the emissaries of the organiza- PENDULUM POLICY tions representing the Yishuv and those of minor-

ity movements within the Yishuv, a reflection of | At the end of a hostile meeting between Benthe same tension in Palestine. Conversely, ties be- = Gurion and MacMichael, the British high comtween the non-Zionist JDC and the Yishuv heads missioner, in April 1944, Ben-Gurion wrote in his

and their emissaries were strengthened, with diary: “It requires... much wisdom and much most of the aid operations devised andhandledin = sympathy to comprehend our affairs, and to unJerusalem, London, Sweden, the Iberian penin- — derstand them, too.” Here he sums up his feelings sula, and the United States being carried outina toward the British during the final two long and

coordinated manner. frustrating years of the war, including their posiFrom Ben-Gurion’s point of view, 1944 tion on the rescue of Jews and the policies they signaled a heightened involvement in rescue adopted at end of the war.

attempts and their outcome. He established a This bitter tone also characterized the method in dealing with Britain’s confusing poli- —-_ Yishuv’s attempts to rescue children from Europe

cies and played an important role in making the in 1944, this time not as part of the plan involving

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Between the Hammer and the Anvil in 1944

twenty-nine thousand children, which did not used at the time, when the JAE asked for an allosucceed. At the beginning of the year efforts were —_ cation of certificates for Jews from specific coun-

focused on modest plans to rescue children from __ tries the same number of certificates were rethe Balkans. Once the Nazis had invaded Hun- __ served from those specific Jews and actually were gary, another special plan was added for rescuing —_ cut off from among the remaining certificates alchildren from there. As more and more places _ located by the White Paper.

were liberated toward the end of the year, plans The immigration of someone in possession were made to locate Jewish children who had of an immigration certificate was riddled with been dispersed throughout Europe—now mostly objective as well subjective obstacles, some of orphans—and to bring them to Palestine and re- which were bureaucratic hurdles devised by the

turn them to the Jewish fold. British themselves. Some certificate holders were During preparation for these plans, several § made fearful of the journey to Palestine, others phenomena were in evidence: a growing aware- _- were delayed as a result of the chaotic aftermath

ness among JAE senior members of Britain’s of war, and still others were murdered. All these long-standing tendency to “swap” adult for so- _—_— circumstances caused serious holdups in utilizcalled child immigration; Britain’s misleading, __ ing the allocated certificates, and for a long time

zigzagging policies, which blurred their intent; it was impossible to use them for bringing in and improved transport facilities from mid-year other Jews because annulling an unused ceronward. There was also a continuing debate over _ tificate was a drawn-out process made even more “who to rescue,’ and whether it was “worth- —_ complicated by British bureaucracy.

while” rescuing children. The JAE wavered be- For the Jews the danger was twofold. First, tween efforts to rescue adults and children from once the five-year period of the 1939 White Paper Europe and attempts to save children and adults expired in late March 1944, there was a chance from elsewhere, between those who were practi- —_—‘ that no use might be made of several thousand cally impossible to rescue and those who were __ remaining certificates. Second, a lack of unallonot in immediate danger of death but could be cated certificates would prevent the emigration

rescued. of Jews from places where exit was easier. Thus, a

Ways of bypassing the obstacles the British choice had to be made between two risky possiplaced on the use of the remaining certificates _ bilities. Ben-Gurion demanded an allocation of from the White Paper quota took pride of place _ certificates for every Jew who had a real chance of in JAE discussions during 1944. Ben-Gurion’s being evacuated, whether from Europe or one line of thought was adopted: to demand that — of the Muslim countries, so long as no unused immigration certificates be allocated to all Jews certificates remained. Time was running out. wherever there existed a chance of bringing them This was the principle that guided Sharett in to Palestine, whether from occupied Europe or _his talks with Eric Mills, head of the Mandatory

from one of the Muslim countries. Government's Emigration Department, and It was a difficult decision for Ben-Gurion.In other British officials. Sharett learned from his order to understand the debate over the question | counterparts that Ben-Gurion’s fears were not of “who should be rescued,” it is necessary tore- | unfounded. The British did indeed count all the view the meandering method of calculating the __ certificates that had been issued, including those certificates. At the beginning of 1944, the JAEcal- —_— that had not been used. These totaled eighty-nine

culated that roughly twenty thousand certificates | thousand, which was fourteen thousand above remained of the seventy-five thousand allocated — the White Paper quota for the period that was by the 1939 White Paper. According to the system = about to end in March 1944. The significance of

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these calculations was obvious: ina short time it _ tion certificates. Although the recommendation would no longer be possible to bring Jews into _ had not been approved at the beginning of 1944,

Palestine legally. it still permitted one to hope. Following holdups At the same time, there were several hundred that lasted years, the British allowed Italian Jewthousand Jews in Europe, and the Yishuv hoped __ ish refugees from Piedmont to immigrate to to rescue them. A significant number of Jews in _—Palestine.>

Muslim countries were also waiting for certifi- Stanley, one of the leading proponents of a cates. It was still possible to cling to Britain’s __ relaxation of British immigration policies, probpromise, made in the summer of 1943, that any _ ably feared that, if the British were to announce Jew from occupied Europe who succeeded in the annulment of all certificates not used by 30

reaching Turkey would be allowedtocontinueon March, then a revolt would break out in the from there to Palestine, but past experience left | Yishuv and Western public opinion would turn little room for hope. The British tended not to — against Britain.6 The British could have accu-

honor promises of this kind. rately assessed the atmosphere in Palestine from Sharett said that his British counterparts ad- information supplied by their intelligence servmitted there was no guarantee that the unused _ices. His fears were justified by the fury and fruscertificates would remain valid; some of their __ tration boiling over in the Yishuv. The feeble reowners were probably no longer aliveorwereun- __ sults of the Bermuda Conference, the thwarted able to leave at that time orin the near future.The ransom plans, and the foiled attempts at rescuing British refused to budge from their position. — Jewish children could easily have ignited a riot.

They did not wish to expose themselves to the The JAE was not content with Britain’s gespossibility of valid certificate holders turning up _ tures of flexibility. Following Ben-Gurion’s adand demanding the honoring of acommitment __ vice, they decided to reject Eric Mills’s calcula-

that had been given to others. They secured tions and to demand that at least a third of the themselves against this danger by means of a _— remaining quota of certificates—according to slowdown in the issuance of unused certificates the JAE’s estimate—be allocated to people from or by not issuing them at all. Theyalsomadesure outside the occupied territories.’ It was also deto drop from the promised quota any infiltrator — cided to continue placing political and moral that they discovered. For example, they received pressure on Britain in Palestine and London. information from the military authorities under = Ben-Gurion took part in all important meetings Anders (in Palestine at the time) concerning sev- —_ with British representatives. He also met with a eral Jews who had deserted his army; the quota __ senior British military intelligence officer and

was reduced by this number. criticized Britain’s wishy-washy policy of “helpThe British repeatedly misled the Jews, but _ ing, not helping.”

there were also occasional positive gestures. On 3 April 1944 Ben-Gurion met with the Oliver Stanley, the colonial secretary, decided to high commissioner, a meeting to which he decancel the time limit demanded by the White Pa- —_—- voted fourteen pages in his diary. The high com-

per and declared that the final date for the is- |= missioner “blushed,” was “at the boiling point,’ suance of legal permits to enter Palestine would and was “as furious as a drunk” in the face of critexpire when the full quota of seventy-five thou- —_icism Ben-Gurion hurled at him as the represensand certificates had been reached. This flexibil- —_ tative of the British government. Ben-Gurion ity averted the danger of the unused certificates | also reminded the high commissioner of Stanbeing forfeited. Mills urged his superiorsinLon- ___ley’s dramatic statement following the official don to simplify the process of issuing immigra- |§ announcement in Parliament of the slaughter of

242

Between the Hammer and the Anvil in 1944

Jews in Europe, and the emotional impression it —_ to utilize the certificates and renewed the risk that made. Stanley’s pledge to allocate thirty thou- —_ the Jews might emerge empty-handed. The JAE sand certificates to children was an “important — shared Ben-Gurion’s mood. As far as Dobkin was

gesture [that] made an impression on the whole concerned, the new British instructions were world...and onus,” but it was devoid ofanyreal aimed at “stopping immigration.” Joseph was content since “you did not let them in.” more aggressive, arguing that the Yishuv would One can add to this serious accusation an- _ be obliged to “declare a war on the immigration other one mentioned earlier. Since the allocation _ policy.” Ben-Gurion rephrased the JAE’s decision promised by Stanley was based on the White to increase pressure on London as follows: “We Paper quota, there was nothing remarkable about _ shall insist on having certificates issued to Jews it. When they were uttered, these words consti- from other countries as well.”!!

tuted a verbal prevarication. In the real situation, In keeping with the decisions of the JAE in Britain used deceptive means to prevent the chil- —_ Jerusalem, Sharett sent a sharply worded letter dren’s immigration, thus avoiding early utiliza- (signed by Linton, secretary of the JAE London tion of the White Paper quota, the unpleasant- _— branch) to the undersecretary for colonial affairs. ness of having to face other Jewish refugees, and = Sharett thanked Britain for simplifying the pro-

a threat to their relations with the Arab world. cess of issuing certificates, demanding that the The high commissioner furiously rejected Turks assist in obtaining transportation facilities, Ben-Gurion’s allegations, replying that the Jews and for its July 1943 decision to allow all Jews of Palestine were “a strange nation” and their —_ reaching Turkey to depart for Palestine. Howleaders “evil psychologists.” The Yishuv and its __ ever, the restrictions imposed and the convoluted leaders were unable to appreciate the British and = way of calculating the remaining certificates

their efforts on behalf of the ungrateful Jews. | meant that these positive developments were Ben-Gurion replied that these good deeds were — completely impractical.

infrequent. Sharett provided a lengthy analysis of the Ben-Gurion did not expect any practical re- various rules. He did nothing to hide the sults to emerge from this meeting. The high __Yishuv’s feeling that Britain did not intend to act commissioner’s authority on these issues was __ on behalf of the Jews in the occupied territories. limited. He did not determine his country’sem- _—‘The reserving of certificates for them was no igration policies but merely implemented them. more than a ruse to prevent the immigration of Ben-Gurion reckoned that the high commis- _Jews from elsewhere. It did nothing to open the sioner himself did not fully understand his gov- _— gates and permit the entry of Jews from Hungary

ernment’s policies and that his limited abilities | or other places where the Gestapo was about to prevented him from getting to the root of the | pounce. For example, the British were closing

problem.’ the gates of Palestine to Jews from Aden and A NEW RESTRICTION North Africa, who were enduring harsh treat-

ment, and to Jews who had suffered the hardBen-Gurion’s conversations with the British in- ships of war to reach southern Italy, Spain, telligence official and the high commissioner Portugal, and Mauritius. occurred against a backdrop of new information Sharett listed the requests to the British govfrom London" involving instructions from the — ernment to rescue adults and children since colonial minister that immigration certificates 1940, all of which had been rejected under variwould be reserved only for Jews trapped in en- ous pretexts. He mentioned the request to rescue emy countries. This news threatened the ability | children deported to Poland and Transnistria

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Rescue Plans

and the sinking of the Struma. He referredtothe calm things down. He urged his colleagues to tragic fact that 19,500 certificates allocated bythe | adopt a more cautious policy: to continue supWhite Paper had gone unused for fourandahalf _ plying the lists for tactical reasons and not as a

years later, while Jews were trapped in Europe principled declaration of who should be resand were being slaughtered in the thousands. cued.!4 In any event, this debate clearly demonThe letter ended with the following JAE de- _ strates that the JAE was in no way a “rubber mands: to cancel the ruling limiting the issue of | stamp” for Britain’s policies regarding the rescue certificates to refugees from enemy countries; to —_ of Jews. It constituted the “other side” of the coin, issue the entire remaining quota and to stop us- —_ confronting the British with their arms and legs

ing unfulfilled commitments as anexcusefornot tied to a great extent.

issuing certificates to other refugees; and to im- The spring and summer of 1944 were mediately allocate six thousand certificates to | marked by efforts to rescue the Jews of Hungary Jews from “safe countries” as part of the regular _—_ either by regular means or through ransom pay-

schedules for April-June 1944.7 ments. By the end of 1944, plans for rescuing chilAt a JAE debate held several days later,apro- | dren had been shelved, although here and there posal was made that Ben-Gurion or Joseph ex- efforts were made to rescue children from Bulplain to Mills, head of the Emigration Depart- __ garia, Romania, and other occupied territories ment, the real objective of the lists of immigrant in the hope that, since the issue was children, it certificates sent to occupied Europe, namely, to —_ would receive special treatment. A new plan for

rescue those listed from deportation to death the rescue of children from Hungary, not initicamps. Ben-Gurion or Joseph would demand ated by the Yishuv, was put forth, but once that Britain continue to issue certificates beyond __ the plan was on the agenda the Yishuv tried to ad-

the White Paper Quota, in return for which the vance it. JAE promised not to demand the fulfillment of In Palestine continuing pressure was exerted this commitment to the Jews in the occupied on Britain to relax its policies. Weizmann worked countries, nor to demand entry into Palestine _to this end in London and succeeded in meeting for these certificate holders. Shapira, head ofthe — Stanley, the colonial secretary. Here and there

Immigration Department, pointed out that signs of a loosening of its position could be deMills had agreed to such an arrangement inthe __ tected asa result of these meetings. For example, past and had only recently changed his ap- __ the British were willing to review requests by Jews proach. The discussion ended with a decision to — in “safe countries” who were applying directly for entrust Ben-Gurion and Joseph with the matter, |§ immigration certificates. They were also willing

together with the Political and Immigration to rescind their decision to invalidate certificates

Departments.!? issued to but not utilized by Jews from Yemen,

The discussion was stormy. Some partici- Turkey, and Iran and which would probably not pants demanded a public campaign against be used before they expired in June 1944. Britain and the United States. Sharett proposed These signs of greater flexibility, however, “making something big out of it,’ explainingthat were not truly significant, as Sharett pointed out:

the British had once again managed to win pub- “Three or four years they [the British] have lic approval by presenting themselvesashumane, closed the doors to Palestine to people from enwhereas in truth their policies were twisted and = emy countries, and this was at a time when the cruel. Ben-Gurion was as aware as his colleagues — exit doors to the enemy countries were open. of the traps repeatedly being laid for them bythe |= Now they are opening the entrance doors, while British, but he tried to reassure the membersand _ the exit doors are about to be locked.”

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Between the Hammer and the Anvil in 1944

TWO ADDITIONAL PLANS FOR the Hungarian government permit the exit of all RESCUING CHILDREN Jewish children under the age of ten. Great hopes Two more plans for rescuing children were pro- _ were raised by this plan. Judging from early reacposed in early summer 1944, both of which be- tions on the part of the Hungarian government, came evident during another of Kaplan’s visits to | some of which found their way to Switzerland Turkey. One was an old plan that resurfaced from and were published by the Associated Press news time to time and involved the rescue of orphaned —_ agency on 19 July in London, Hungary tended to children from Romania, many of them survivors acquiesce.

of Transnistria. After the plan to rescue adults On 9 July Miklés Horthy, the Hungarian had failed, it was decided to give priority to chil- _—ruler, ordered a halt in the deportations from Bu-

dren from this distressed region. The ship Tary dapest to allow help to be extended to prisoners was to be used in this operation. In the spring of | in Hungarian prison camps and to permit “cer1944, food supplies as well as life preservers and __ tain types” of Jews, including children under ten, “safe conduct” permits from the Russians were — to leave Hungary unconditionally. News of this readied for the journey.!° The second plan wasto reached Istanbul, where Kaplan cabled Sharett in

rescue Jewish children from occupied Hungary. London to begin setting the matter in motion. Preparations for the first plan revealed a §_ The emissaries also reported home on these delong-standing animosity within the Romanian —_ velopments, which seemed hopeful.!®

Jewish leadership between A. L. Zissu, a key These plans also required necessary prepafigure in the Romanian Zionist movement, and rations with respect to immigrant certificates. Wilhelm Fildermann, aleading personalityinthe | The assessment was that there were large numnon-Zionist community. Ben-Gurion, called bers of children involved and that at least some upon to settle matters, asked Zissu to make peace | of them would arrive in Palestine. Thus, a certain with Fildermann in order to avoid jeopardizing | exception would be needed from the remaining

the rescue attempts. Later, when Ben-Gurion quota of certificates (now totaling roughly ten learned that the dispute had deepened, he asked _ to fifteen thousand). It was clear that the British if it was possible for one of the parties to depart | would again refuse to allocate a special quota Romania and leave the balance of the workinthe | and would remove the number of survivors from hands of those who could cooperate. However, the existing quota. This meant that it would be neither was prepared to leave his community __ possible to rescue only about ten to fifteen thou-

behind. sand children. Moreover, if this entire quota So acute was the degree of animosity that —_ were allocated to children, no additional adults

the Romanian branch of the Red Cross was would be admitted into Palestine, and without called upon to sort the children and determine — this promise it would be impossible to rescue the exit order. Even this did not help, since the | them from Europe. It is worth recalling that in Red Cross headquarters in Geneva forbade its | the summer of 1944 large areas were about to be branches to interfere in the conflict. Another ob- _ liberated in Europe and that European Jews were stacle blocking the rescue of children involved — expecting to be evacuated and rescued. Toward the sinking of the Mefkure on 5 August. This — the end of the discussion, Ben-Gurion pointed again raised the issue of sea travel without “safe | out that although in some cases it made sense to

conduct” permits.!” be patient, the Yishuv could not allow “even one The second plan for rescuing children was day to pass without immigration ... and would raised simultaneously by Ira Hirschmann and _ even... protect [immigration] by force if this the War Refugee Board, which demanded that —_ proved necessary.”

2.45

Rescue Plans

The danger of immigration coming to a _ each of the large rescue plans. In the summer of complete halt motivated Yitzhak Gruenbaum, 1944, the British were among the leading players chairman of the Rescue Committee, to ask that in the war against the Nazis, a fact that deterred Ben-Gurion and his colleagues in the Political the Yishuv from waging a frontal attack against Department “start thinking” about what they — them. would do when the Yishuv reached the end of the Nevertheless, the Yishuv merely postponed quota of immigration certificates. “Itisnolonger any direct confrontation with the British until it a case of theory; it has now become a practical _—_ could be assured of positive results. Turning to matter.” Gruenbaum suggested sharing as little | the United States, it harnessed American Jewish information as possible with the British, espe- —_ public opinion, strengthened its economic infra-

cially any doubts concerning the rescue plans. structure, prepared for the social integration of Gruenbaum believed that, since the British masses of immigrants, and established a defense would foil any rescue plans, they should be pre- — force—all part of a quiet deployment for the vented from obtaining any information that future confrontation with the British the Yishuv would help them do so. He maintained this posi- _ leadership felt was inevitable.

tion when Joel Brand’s rescue mission was dis- ONCE AGAIN, WHO SHALL

cussed, where the plan was to obtain ten thou- WE RESCUE?

sand trucks without the British getting wind of it. : This was a complicated matter involving The possibility of saving children by using up all mainly strategic issues. When the debate reacheda the remaining certificates reopened the fierce dedead end, it was decided to move it toasubcom- _ bate surrounding the question “who shall we resmittee consisting of Ben-Gurion, Gruenbaum, cue?”2! In the summer of 1944 there was a definite Kaplan, and Fishman—a team that reflected its _ feeling within the Yishuv that the war was comimportance. Kaplan, just returned from Istanbul, _ing to an end. But no one could actually tell how

brought with him new information, impressions, long it would take, and there was no way of and a few ideas about the rescue issue. It proved = knowing who would be murdered or die by one easier to discuss and decide on proposals in the of several methods that the Nazis and the Axis smaller forum, and this pattern was to berepeated —_ powers had prepared for the Jews if they were not

many times throughout the war. offered a way out before the end of the war. As Only a few days had passed when it was de- _long as the threat of death was imminent, the termined that the British had reneged ontheirre- question of preference was pushed aside. Howcent commitments. Sharett reported thisto Ben- _ ever, once the Yishuv leaders felt the danger had

Gurion and balked when the latter instructed diminished, they went back to examining the him to make one more attempt at lobbying the —_ candidates for immigration based on their useBritish government in London before the Zionist —_ fulness to the Zionist enterprise.

movement made public the cynical and incon- The painful question again surfaced that by sistent attitude of the British toward the “sad focusing all efforts—especially the allotment of business of negotiating immigration.” It proved _certificates—on the rescue of children, was the a waste of time. Sharett tried his best, but the = Yishuv not in effect giving up on the possibility

British continued their policy of deceit.” of rescuing adults? Again the leadership realized Again the JAE did not rush to announce that Britain’s willingness to devote the remainopen warfare against the British. This can be ex- _ing certificates to immigrant children concealed

plained by the Yishuv’s weakness at the time, its a not-so-secret agenda to block the entry of general dependence on Britain and the West in _ adults.

246

Between the Hammer and the Anvil in 1944

In a debate on this issue held on 23 July 1944, repatriation to their countries of origin and a reBen-Gurion called on the JAE to avoid being vival of Jewish emancipation there. If the Yishuv overly optimistic and to determine if there was _ leadership was faced with such a difficult choice, anything significant in the recently proposed res- it would also have to consider this possibility and cue options. Only four days later it became ap- first rescue people whose support for Zionism parent that Joel Brand’s rescue mission had also —_—wass proven. Even after the highly charged debate

been leaked to the press and removed from the that developed in the JAE, Ben-Gurion remained agenda. It also became clear that the leadership’s _ firm in his position: “The danger of death hovers request of the major players to at least pretend = above them all, and we can take an X number, to give the matter serious considerationinorderto __ so that I say: we shall take the kind of X that can buy time and delay extermination had been re- _ remain in Palestine.” jected. Ben-Gurion’s words, therefore, were based Ben-Gurion gave two reasons for preferring

on recent and bitter experience. children. First, it was a humane duty to save chilIn the event that a real opportunity did — dren. It is worth remembering his incisive and present itself for saving large numbers of Jews, | emotional sentiments throughout the war on the the question of priorities would raise its ugly | subject of children and their bitter fate. Even head again. Ben-Gurion proposed a sharp, clear- | when presenting the logic behind the second reacut formula for rescue immigration: prefer chil- | son—the advantage of rescuing children—he dren over adults and Zionists over other adults. did not hide his opinion that the rescue of chilWhere the Yishuv’s decision counted, in cases dren was a secure bet from the Zionist point of involving imminent death all Jews would be view. They would receive a Zionist education and rescued who could be rescued. If the time came the chances were that most of them would rewhen the British allocated a restricted quota, § main in Palestine and take part in the Zionist where not everyone could be rescued and the __ enterprise, whereas adults, whose personalities need arose to choose from among the many, the —_ were already formed, were more likely to emirescue quota would first be filled by Zionists; _ grate. only after the quota had been filled would other Nor did he accept the view that the social in-

Jews be admitted. tegration of children was more expensive and Ben-Gurion claimed that the Yishuv had a more complex, and that the “Zionist calcularight to make these choices, especially in light of | tion” consequently required the selection of

the trials awaiting the Yishuv in the near future. —_ adults. On the contrary, living accommodations He was here referring to the political struggle an- | for children were much simpler, and there was ticipated by the Yishuv and the Zionist move- no immediate necessity to find employment. Rement at the end of the war. Such a choice, which turning to an idea that surfaced in late 1942, Benwould be made only if it was not possible to save Gurion claimed it was easier to obtain Jewish or

everyone at risk, would protect the Yishuv international external funding for the rescue and against the possibility of a mass exodus from __ rehabilitation of children. From a moral and

Palestine immediately following the war. practical angle, it was fitting that the Yishuv This would be a “political calamity” for | make children its top priority and evacuate them Zionism, according to Ben-Gurion, playing first from Romania, Bulgaria, and other areas. straight into the hands of Britain and those ofits | Ben-Gurion stressed that all this would be necsupporters who alleged that the Jews themselves __ essary only if the need to choose arose. The JAE’s

were not interested in having a state of their own, rescue emissaries had been instructed to act in and that the best solution for them would be __ this spirit.”

247

Rescue Plans

This selection of candidates from among main developments. Several negative events octhose wishing to immigrate to Palestine had a _—_ curred to dampen Horthy’s July declaration and precedent a decade earlier, during the thirties. | the hope that the Germans would accept the deThen, too, the Zionist movement had reserved _ parture of Jewish children and adults from Hunthe right to decide who would receive immigrant gary. Horthy was pressured by the Germans to go certificates designated for those who were not back on his promises, preparations for the de“people of wealth.” Zionist emissaries and the _ portation of Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz escaPalestine offices in Europe were instructed tore- —_ lated, and in mid-October Horthy was overject people who were infirm, handicapped, eld- —_ thrown and replaced by a puppet government. erly, or “welfare cases.” In 1936 several “welfare | Shortly thereafter thousands of Hungarian Jews cases” were returned to Europe after the Yishuv __ were sent to forced labor camps, with thousands

, decided it could not support them indefinitely. | of other men, women, and children forced to As in the period under discussion, two trends _ leave their homes in the middle of winter to join were evident: to encourage mass, nonselective —_a “death march” to the Austrian border.”

immigration not to allocate the limited resources THE STRUGGLE FOR THE available (sporadically issued immigration cer- HOLOCAUST SURVIVORS tificates and inadequate budgets for social integra-

tion) to those who were unable to participate | These changes upset plans once again. It could no

in the pioneer enterprise.” longer be expected that many Jews would leave The polemical debate surrounding the ques- | Hungary or that certificates should be reserved tion of who to choose was tied to the question of for them. It was now necessary to reallocate cerwhat should be done with Jews whose immigra- tificates for Jews who could be rescued.”° Great tion to Palestine was hampered by politicalandlo- —_ effort was needed at this stage of the war both to gistical problems. JAE representatives in Geneva, remove Jews from the liberated areas and to preIstanbul, and the Iberian peninsula, and non- _pare for a struggle of another kind, namely, to se-

Zionist organizations responded unequivocally: cure the future of the survivors who were no first evacuate the Jews to Palestine or elsewhere; —_— longer in danger of extermination. To discover so-

after the war, solutions would be found within _ lutions for Holocaust survivors was surely an imthe framework of peace accords andarrangements migration issue being waged ona scale vastly difffor resettling war refugees. Thus, Dobkin tried to — erent from that of the White Paper. In this case obtain three thousand Spanish entry permits for children were viewed as the vanguard; their social children. Sharett appealed to Switzerland and _ integration would demonstrate the Zionist moveSweden to admit children and received a positive = ment’s ability to resettle large numbers of Jews in response. JAE representative Adler-Rudel, based _Palestine.?’ in Sweden, worked toward the same objective. The The focus now shifted from failed attempts World Jewish Congress and the JDC were also at rescuing children from the jaws of the Nazi exworking to evacuate Jews to any country offering | termination machine to the question of resettling refuge. For instance, Rescue Committee chairman ~ those children who remained in the liberated Yitzhak Gruenbaum repeated his appeal to the —_ countries of Europe. The gravity of the “choice” Jews of South Africa and now asked Australia’s | question dissipated as all of Europe was gradually Jews to urge their government to grant temporary liberated. Since it was no longer a life-or-death

asylum to Jewish refugees.”4 issue, Ben-Gurion grew firmer in his resolve that During the final months of 1944, reality con- Zionists should be preferred over other adults for tinued to confound those trying to anticipate the |§ immigration to Palestine. He still maintained

248

Between the Hammer and the Anvil in 1944

that rescuing children was a top priority. He was — persons (DP) camps in postwar Germany. He now motivated not by the necessity of saving was directly involved in the coordination of this them from death but rather from Christianity, to —_— activity in Europe.”

prevent them from being lost to Judaism or from In October 1944, when Ben-Gurion’s visit to settling in a Diaspora country instead of the Jew- Romania (which was changed to Bulgaria) was ish state. The loss of children to Judaism was, of being considered, he asked the Immigration Decourse, graver than their loss to the Jewish state, | partment to supply him with a report on the but after the Holocaust both these possibilities | preparations being made for the integration of

were, to Ben-Gurion, insufferable. large numbers of immigrants, including chilAccording to JAE data, Jewish orphans were _—_ dren.*0 Ata JAE meeting he publicly read Britain’s

scattered throughout Europe at that time, with declaration on the release of the remaining most in Poland. The Yishuv had tried for several certificates (10,300) from the original quota and months to evacuate the Transnistria orphans. It the increased number of certificates for children. was believed that there were between 20,000 and __— He said that he had asked “our friends in the 30,000 Jewish children in France (in fact, there U.S.A.” for help in organizing transportation. were only 7,000) who were housed in churches, There were also reports on attempts to purchase monasteries, and farms. It was feared that many __ vessels from Spain or Latin America.”!

would either be unwilling or unable to return to The British continued to insist on the main | their long-hidden Jewish roots. (Saul Friedlan- —_ points of their policies: immigration would be der’s book When Memory Comes movingly re- _ permitted only within the guidelines of the White

counts this tragic problem.) When cities in Eng- Paper (at that time 10,300); the number of land were evacuated, some 2,000 Jewish orphans _ certificates for children would be increased at the were billeted with non-Jewish families, and it was expense of certificates for adults. It came as no feared that these families might refuse to return — surprise. The JAE was well versed in the British the children. According to JAE records, the Ar- — government’s habit of recycling false concessions. mée Juive (AJ), a Jewish underground organiza- Its members were wary of Britain’s tendency to tion founded in Toulouse after the fall of France —_ prevent the immigration of adults (as opposed to in 1940, transferred some 4,000 children from that of children).32 The participants in the debate France to Switzerland. It was estimated that an _ stressed that the ongoing liberation of Europe equal number of Jewish orphans were located in —_was creating a new situation. Dobkin put it sucBelgium and even more in Holland, but there __ cinctly: “It is the first time in several years that we were no exact figures. There were alsolargenum- —_are again faced with the question of immigration bers of orphans in Poland. Lacking hard evi- __ rather than of rescue.”

dence, the JAE estimated that between 150,000 The British restricted the release of and 200,000 Jews had survived, of which100,000 __ certificates to fifteen hundred a month. At the were children (in fact, the number was much end of 1944, they were more concerned than ever

lower).”8 at the prospect of large waves of immigrants, esBen-Gurion was undecided as tothe proper _ pecially when news arrived of thousands of Jews course of action concerning the fate of the Holo- _ signing on for immigration in Bulgaria and tens caust survivors, especially that ofthe children. He — of thousands in Romania. It may safely be aspersonally oversaw efforts to bring them to Pales- |= sumed that the immediate reason underlying this tine and made three visits to the centers of activ- _— ruling was the anticipated reaction of the Arabs, ity in the liberated areas: one to Bulgariaimme- —_ who were convening in Cairo for the first meetdiately following liberation and two to displaced — ing of the Arab League. The JAE, for its part,

249

Rescue Plans

refused to reconcile itself to the rate ofimmigra- _ ately to Palestine.” It was imperative that Amertion dictated by the British. Once again Ben- _ica’s Jews make every effort to obtain boats. He Gurion pointed out that as far as the Yishuv was _ also suggested they ask American military auconcerned, only one factor could determine the _ thorities for vessels to evacuate children from the rate of immigration, namely, the Yishuv’s ability | French coast.

to carry out the enterprise and mobilize the nec- Thus, Ben-Gurion took action before-

essary support. hand—which was typical of his working methThe JAE decided to reactivate the Commit- ods during the war. He acted independently tee for Child Immigration, which had been — whenever he felt it was better not to wait. Several founded, at Ben-Gurion’s instigation, in Decem- _ days later Ben-Gurion cabled Lourie an addition ber 1942 immediately following the news of mass _ to his letter dated 10 October, this time asking murders. By 1944 the committee had expanded him to examine the possibility of mobilizing any

and undergone several changes. Its activity was available ship to sail from Romania.** Bendisrupted due to pressure by political partiesand § Gurion was here attempting to circumvent the movements, religious groups, and kibbutzim __ restrictions on the monthly rate of immigration within the Yishuv, who demanded representa- —_ imposed by Britain and to speed up the rescue of tion on the committee. They all wanted to make Jews before the borders were sealed off.

sure that the children—who unfortunately never The British announcement that arrived arrived—would be sent tothem. The committee from London at the beginning of the month was became yet another bloated and inefficient body, _ typically accompanied by a stern rebuke from like the Rescue Committee and the emissary del- = Mills. He repeated the well-worn stipulation re-

egation in Istanbul. garding past commitments and informed Sharett The committee also grew to “parliamentary” that these would be subtracted from the remainproportions as a result of the national debate over _ing certificates (10,300). Again the Yishuv was education for the orphaned children, including —_ obliged to quibble with Britain over the distincboth the “Tehran children” and those whose ar- _ tion between a commitment given as a means of

rival was anticipated but who did not come. saving Jews from deportation and a regular Adding representatives to the decision-making __ certificate to be used as soon as transport could body was one way of extinguishing the polemic, __ be arranged.

but it was an uncontrollable process. Ben-Gurion, In numerical terms, the dispute involved aware of the powerful emotions on all sides, | two thousand certificates—whether five or seven stressed that proportional representation would — thousand remained. Considering the desperate be maintained in the revamped committee.*4 straits of the Jews of Europe, this dispute was abIt is worth dwelling on Ben-Gurion’s appeal _—_ surd. The JAE rejected the new restrictions since to “our friends in the U.S.,” at the JAE meeting, — the promised certificates were far from adequate

which reveals a recurring pattern in his activity. | to meet the level of immigration anticipated. He was referring to two letters he had sent three = (The JAE was arranging for the immigration of a days earlier to Judith Epstein, a key Hadassah ac- — hundred thousand children.) The question retivist, and Arthur Lourie, secretary of the JAE’s |= mained as to when the conditions would be right U.S. branch. Ben-Gurion mentioned the possi- for the struggle to begin.>’

bility of transporting thirty-two hundred chil- SHARETT’S “EXTREMISM”

dren from France, Belgium, and Switzerland. Most of these children were in Christian homes, The JAE hoped that the British would refrain and “it is imperative to transfer them immedi- _—_ from including the certificates for children

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within the general quota of certificates, but they — from Linton, secretary of the London branch, refused to do so. Tension on both sides led the —_— saying that Sharett was to discuss the immigraJAE to feel that the British had maneuvered them tion of children from France with the Palestine into a trap as far back as 1942. This served as the government. An official notice to this effect arbackground to Sharett’s feeling that he had man- ___ rived later.*®

aged to avoid this at the last moment. I have focused on this issue in order to illusIn effect, he wanted to persuade the Colonial _ trate the ambivalent relationship of the JAE with

Office in London to “thaw out” the remaining the British over the immigration of Holocaust certificates by describing the plight of the Jewsin — survivors and to study the attitudinal patterns of

Europe. As an admittedly grim “illustration,” he the British, on the one hand, and the Yishuv, stressed the urgency of bringing to Palestine — on the other. The purpose of Sharett’s proposal those orphaned children whose mothers had _ was to alter Ben-Gurion’s instructions to rescue committed suicide in France in order to save _ the orphans first. He apparently did this both bethem from deportation. It proved a bad choice, — cause he wanted to extricate himself from the since it enabled the Colonial Office to interpret British trap and out of a sincere belief that public this request literally and allocated the remaining = opinion would eventually work on behalf of the certificates to children from France and Belgium. — orphans and permit them to be rescued from EuSharett had originally argued against allo- | rope even after the quota of certificates had been cating all the certificates to children based onthe used up. Sharett’s actions reflected his unwaverhigh cost. Although he had fallen into Britain’s —_ing, extreme position on the issue of children.

trap, he recovered quickly. Recalling the written A flow of information on the number and allocation of five thousand certificates for chil- | condition of Jewish children dispersed across dren from the Balkans in late 1942 and early 1943, Europe motivated the JAE to devote two debates he responded: “First of all, there’s a mistake here; to the subject in December 1944. Ben-Gurion was we did not demand certificates only for children. __ visiting Bulgaria. He was horrified by the sufferT used the condition of the children solelyasanil- | ing he encountered, although Bulgarian Jews

lustration.” The officials were in no hurry to were better off than others in Europe. Still, it was accept Sharett’s explanation and passed the issue enough to deeply shock a generally cool-headed

on to the colonial minister. Ben-Gurion. This was a time of taking stock and During his last evening in London, Sharett planning. The JAE was preparing for a large Ziondined with Weizmann and encountered Stanley __ ist conference with participants from abroad, inin the hotel lobby where they were both staying. | cluding Weizmann. Against this background, the Stanley recalled Sharett’s anger athaving most of issue was again carefully examined, including the the certificates allocated to children. Sharett | question of who should be saved. The Yishuv was planned to fool the British by means of another —_ determined to take in adults as well as children solution. Instead of allocating all two thousand _and not to sacrifice one group for the sake of the

certificates to Jewish children rescued from other. France, why not allocate one thousand to chil- The first debate (3 December) took place dren and another thousand to adults? Since not —_ while Ben-Gurion was still away, but he took part

all the certificates would be issued to orphans, in the second debate at the end of the month (31 whole families could immigrate with their chil- | December) and was adamant in his belief that dren. Encouraged by his conversation with Stan- —_ the immigration of children must play a central ley, Sharett appeared to have succeeded in his _ role in the Yishuv’s enterprise. At its first meeting ploy. A few days later a cable arrivedinthe Yishuv the JAE had tried to determine the nature of its

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activity and that of its offices in rescuing chil- _ financial ability to integrate them? At the earlier

dren. There was general disappointment in the JAE discussion it had been decided to rescue functioning of the Committee for Child Immi- _ twenty thousand children during the first stage, gration.” It was stressed that the mostimportant but now Ben-Gurion rejected Kaplan’s approach, thing was to rescue the “orphaned children,” but — which he felt was too calculating. Believing that a

that care must be taken not to give the impres- __ political program should not be restricted by sion that “we care only for the orphans” or for __ financial and managerial considerations, he re-

children. turned to the basic framework of the original plan

The question of funding was also discussed _ for the rescue of children: the Yishuv would bring again. Kaplan believed that the costofsupporting — in large numbers of children and American Jewry twenty thousand children in the first stage would — would share, whether willingly or not, in the cost be fourteen million dollars, to be followed by ten _ of their social integration.“

million annually until they were self-supporting. Weizmann and other Yishuv leaders This was way beyond the Yishuv’s resources and _— adopted a similar stand at that time. The idea would necessitate the help of the Jewish nation, |= was to announce a comprehensive enterprise for the superpowers, and international organiza- — the immigration of children dispersed throughtions.*! It was decided that during the first stage | out Europe. Experts believed it would be easy to the JAE would be responsible for the immigra- find 100,000 candidates. Top-level diplomatic tion of twenty thousand children and the Immi- moves were also instituted. Weizmann met with gration Department would prepare for their so- | Churchill to discuss the 100,000 to 150,000 or-

cial integreation.” phans, and the latter agreed that help would be THE NEED TO RESCUE THE regu’ ree me wor nations. lentjohn also met the new high commissioner, Lord John CHILDREN IMMEDIATELY Gort, whom he raised the issue of the children.*

At the second meeting Ben-Gurionrecountedhis __ As for the planning and execution of the rescue grim impressions of his visit to Bulgaria. He out- __ effort, it was again proposed that the Planning lined the political program upon which activity | Committee, headed by Ben-Gurion, would ason behalf of the children of Europe would be — sume responsibility.* based. The Zionist plan now sported two “cos- In many ways the JAE’s second discussion in tumes,’ the political demand for a Jewish state late December 1944 retraced its steps to its startand the practical immigration of a million Jews —_ing point. Ben-Gurion had originally devised a to Palestine. Without the practical “costume” the — plan for the immigration of large numbers of

political one would be no more than empty children that everyone agreed was too ambitious words. The children would account for the first for the Yishuv’s resources. Like the earlier plan, million since their rescue could not be post- his “scheme” was transparent: first establish an poned. Ben-Gurion was opposed even to specify- energetic pace and then force world Jewry to ing the number of children to be rescued. The __ participate in the funding. Again Ben-Gurion Yishuv had to fight for the right to bring in Jews _ assigned a central role to the Jewish Yishuv in according to its abilities and not to focus ona _ Palestine and set his sights on both the humanispecific number, whether twenty or a hundred _ tarian and national-political outcome of the

thousand children.* mission. However, in one important respect Ben-Gurion here touched on an issue that there was no similarity to the 1942 plan: by late

was troubling the Yishu: namely, shouldthenum- —_—-1944 more than a million Jewish children had alber of immigrants be compatible with the Yishuv’s —_ ready been murdered.

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Between the Hammer and the Anvil in 1944

THE QUESTION OF to send him was prompted by dissatisfaction with REPRESENTATION IN ISTANBUL Chaim Barlas. Although he was highly praised, Another issue that was discussed throughout all agreed that his duties prevented him from 1944 and was brought to Ben-Gurion’s attention functioning optimally both in Istanbul and Anwas the question of the Yishuv’s representationin kara. Another task entrusted to Eliash was to Turkey. As Istanbul’s importance as a gateway to make peace among the various emissaries in IsEurope and the starting point for all rescue activ- | tanbul and to formulate a proposal for improving ity became clear, pressure grew in the Yishuv to _ work efficiency.” increase the number of its emissaries, to replace Chief Rabbi Yitzhak Herzog Halevy left for some by “more talented” personnel, andtobetter § Turkey at the same time, which led to dissatisfac-

organize their activity.” tion mainly because reports of his mission and Menahem Bader’s mission to Istanbul illus- ‘that of Eliash had been disclosed simultaneously.

trates the intramovement and intraorganiza- | The Al-Domi group, under the leadership of tional tensions involved in constituting the dele- | Rabbi Binyamin, was among those calling for gation. Bader asked to be sent and was convinced —_ Herzog’s visit to Turkey. Although this group had

that the obstacles he had to overcome werethere- | exerted much public pressure on the JAE to insult of his being a member of Hashomer Hatzair. _ crease its rescue activity on behalf of children, it He discussed the matter with Ben-Gurion and it was clearly unaware of the myriad rescue plans was arranged. Ben-Gurion was also involved in —_ and could not be included in all of them.

discussions regarding the delegation and its ac- Rabbi Herzog met Ben-Gurion prior to his tivity and was exposed to the indecision andten- . departure. He asked for his blessing and perhaps sions. The inclusion of representatives of ethnic also for some political guidance. The two may or national groups in the Istanbul delegation re- = have discussed the rabbi’s efforts to motivate

quired his confirmation. church leaders to pressure the Nazis, and in parBen-Gurion also considered the possibility ticular to influence Catholic communities in the of sending either Dr. Bernard Joseph, secretary of satellite countries. Upon his return, the rabbi

the Political Department, or Dr. Mordechai filed reports stressing the fact that Ben-Gurion Eliash, the well-known lawyer based in Jerusalem. had encouraged him to go.°°

The recommendation to send Eliash was pre- It soon became apparent that Eliash’s and sented by the Political Department in consulta- | Herzog’s visits caused new tensions among the tion with Sharett and Gruenbaum. Ben-Gurion _Yishuv’s emissaries in Istanbul. Barlas believed was asked to persuade Eliash to take time off from that there was no point in sending short-term his personal and public affairs in order to under- emissaries. The complexity of the issues and the take this special mission. He also instructed him __ secret relationships required careful study and on the finer points concerning the relations sensitivity. He probably felt that the “reinforceamong the emissaries in Istanbul—the delega- | ment” reflected dissatisfaction with his own tion contained different ranks—and the various = functioning and diminished his authority. His

offices in the Yishuv.* bitterness soon became apparent in letters, caEliash left for Istanbul in early February bles, and verbal messages to the Yishuv leader1944. One of his tasks was to help Chaim Barlas, _ ship.

the JAE’s senior representative in Turkey, moni- Some JAE members felt that the difficulties tor relations with representatives of governments § encountered by Eliash and Herzog would conand organizations involved in rescuing Jews from vince the majority of the public that the Yishuv Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. The decision was facing major obstacles in trying to activate

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Rescue Plans

=OO

to. ©«_. - ieee ......~— ss

a +. i gz, = hermes Chaim Barlas, director of the Eretz-Israeli office in Turkey (Haganah Archive)

the delegation in Istanbul. They hoped that The reports also stressed that fewer people Eliash, Herzog, and especially the public groups —__ were leaving Bulgaria. Bombing of the capital of that initiated the visit would realize that the lack | Sofia completely immobilized the administration

of success was the result of objective obstacles and destroyed the Swiss and Turkish consulates, within the delegation and not necessarily the re- | which had been important links in issuing per— sult of mismanagement or lack of interest on the — mits. Jews, together with their leaders, were dis-

part of the Yishuv leadership in Palestine.>! persed throughout Bulgaria. Reports of the arrest Eliash and Herzog reenergized attempts to — of more than twenty heads of the Zionist moverescue Jews. from the Balkan states. Ira Hirsch- |= ment in Romania halted the border smuggling mann, representative of the American War Ref- operation between Hungary and Romania and ugee Board, arrived in Turkey at about the same _ blocked an escape route from Hungary.”

time, and the competition that developed be- The relationship that existed at the time between him and Laurence Steinhardt, the U.S. _ tween the Allies and Turkey impacted the delegaambassador, also escalated the rescue activity. In- _tion’s activity in Istanbul. Shortly before the arrival formation received by Ben-Gurion and the JAE __ of Herzog and Eliash, attempts to alter Turkey’s (including reports from Shaul Avigur, who re- _ neutral status by including it in the Allied camp turned from Istanbul in mid-February, and cables _ had failed. The resulting tension, coupled with and letters from Barlas, Eliash, and Herzog) gave —_Turkey’s sensitivity to the European states’ medthe impression that Turkey was maintaining its dling in its affairs, complicated maneuvers beneutral position and was in no hurry to join the — tween the various departments of the Turkish war. The base for rescue activity would therefore government and the British embassies, on the one remain in Turkey and might even be expanded. hand, and the United States, on the other.*? Eliash

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and Herzog were expected to be familiar withthe — plan was thwarted because, among other reasons,

structure of the Turkish Foreign Office and its the “safe conduct” permit arrived late from working methods, including the idiosyncrasies | Moscow; following the Struma incident and the of its senior officials, in addition to the newrules _—_ sinking of other ships, shipowners and their capand restrictions that occasionally disturbed the _ tains were wary of setting out to sea without this smooth functioning of rescue plans. Forexample, —_ permit.

one such rule prohibited a stay of more than Several other possibilities were also examtwenty-four hours in Istanbul. The Turks even ined: buying confiscated ships from a Jewish alleged that some Jews made up stories about —_ shipowner in Turkey, using them under his name,

Turkey after having stayed there.** and returning them; purchasing a thousandThe Yishuv’s arena of activityinIstanbulwas berth ship from the Turkish government, transcomplex. Barlas, Eliash, Herzog, and the other _ferring five thousand people, and “donating” it to emissaries tried to act in legal, semilegal, andille- | the Turkish Red Crescent. These ideas were progal ways. They maintained contact with Turks, posed to various officials in the Turkish governAllied ambassadors, diplomats of satellite coun- —s ment, but no reply was received by the time Eliash tries, and secret service personnel. Among other — and Herzog left for Palestine. In any case, it was things, the Turks refused to establishatemporary clear that even if they had been approved, it would

transit station in Turkey, claiming that it was in have taken several months for the ships to be the midst of a food shortage. Herzog spoke with = made seaworthy and for the “safe conduct” perChristian leaders and persuaded them toencour- —_—smits to arrive.>°

age their counterparts in the occupied territories This effort to obtain ships resulted in an arto save Jews by protesting their murder.* gument between Herzog, Barlas, and Steinhardt, Transport continued to be a major obstacle. |= onthe one hand, and Eliash and Hirschmann, on The various emissaries were convinced that — the other. Both sides claimed responsibility for efforts had to focus on obtaining the means nec- __ the cable sent to the U.S. president demanding essary for sea transport. The arrival of Eliash, — that his country commit itself to compensating Herzog, and Hirschmann in Istanbul intensified | Turkey for the loss of ships placed at the disposal efforts to secure seaworthy vessels. Two options of rescue operations involving children. The presented themselves: boats could either be pur- — United States agreed to this demand, which led to chased or rented in the country of origin(Roma- _—_a heated argument over who should take credit nia or Bulgaria) or rented in neutral countries _—_ for this achievement.*’

(mainly Sweden and Portugal), where cargoes Such arguments are common within an at-

consisted mainly of food. mosphere of little achievement and deep frustraRabbi Herzog had to tap his earlier connec- __ tion. The American commitment was, of course,

tion as chief rabbi of the Jewish community in more important than the petty quarrel that surIreland. He asked Eamon De Valera, the Irish — rounded it. But it does point up the volatile mixprime minister, to help in obtaining Irish vessels, ture of personalities that had to be placated: but his request was denied. Another possibility Barlas’s tendency to prefer Steinhardt, Eliash’s was to seek a Turkish, British, or American boat tendency to cooperate with Hirschmann, and the that was seaworthy. The plan to purchaseasmall — unrelieved tension between Hirschmann and boat through immigration activists in Romania _—_Steinhardt.*°

almost succeeded. The hope was to transfer 130 What was Ben-Gurion’s involvement in all children and 20 adults in this way. (The Turks — these machinations? Hirschmann, Eliash, and permitted a weekly transfer of 150 children.) The |= Herzog had met him before leaving for Turkey.

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Hirschmann set off armed with a presidential According to Herzog, Steinhardt told him power of attorney to act on behalf of Jews requir- about this condition, as well as his warning to ing rescue. Ben-Gurion gave him his blessing and __ the Turks that they would be blacklisted in the made a number of suggestions and requests, in- | Western press if they did not change their posicluding a request that he work in unison with Bar-_ _— tion and start helping to rescue Jews. Steinhardt las, head of the Palestine Office in Turkey.°? Some —_ was temporarily holding in check those people

emissaries reported from Turkey that Hirsch- — who were eager to publicize Turkey’s deeds in mann was doing all he could to rescue Jews. the Western press and to jeopardize its chances When reports of the arrest of immigration of receiving American aid. Resolute American activists in Romania arrived in January 1944, intervention was also evident with respect to the Ben-Gurion cabled Hirschmann to do every- = Milca, which the Red Cross declared not sea-

thing to get them released. Hirschmann prom- worthy. This ship sailed from the Romanian ised to help and added that he was working with __ port of Constanta with 203 Jews on board, lack-

Steinhardt to rescue Jewish refugees from the ing Turkish transit permits and immigration Balkans. In the margins of his official letter certificates to Palestine. It arrived in Istanbul on Hirschmann wrote “I was deeply touched byour 1 April and the Turks, fearing a precedent, remeeting, adding, “Ambassador Steinhardt and _fused to allow the passengers to disembark. If myself have made progress in our program for — what Herzog passed along to Ben-Gurion from

transportation for the refugees” (emphasis in Steinhardt is true, American pressure may have

original).°! caused the Turks to deviate from their general WAS THERE AMERICAN policy by permitting the refugees to disembark PRESSURE ON TURKEY? and even arranging seats for them on a Syriabound train.©

Upon his return from Turkey, Herzog gave Ben- U.S. intervention in obtaining the Tari and Gurion copies of two letters, one from Hirsch- the Milca was the source of additional tension bemann and the other from Lowell C. Pinkerton, the | tween Hirschmann and Steinhardt, and their disU.S. consul in Jerusalem. Hirschmann reviewed — pute over who deserved credit was reflected in the activity in Turkey and replied to questions __ Barlas’s reports to the Yishuv. Barlas was totally posed to him verbally by Herzog. Pinkerton’s let- | on Steinhardt’s side.“* The question of who was ter included the response of John W. Pehle, chair- —_ responsible for the change in Turkey’s position is man of the United States’s War Refugee Board, to —_ irrelevant, but Ben-Gurion’s and his colleagues’ a cable by Herzog from Turkey. A few days later reaction to Barlas’s report indicate the type of acHerzog reported to the JAE on his visit and also _ tivity they desired. They instructed Barlas to maprovided Ben-Gurion with additional detailsina | neuver between the two Americans and to adopt

letter he sent the same day. a practical attitude. Ben-Gurion called on Barlas The most important detail contained in toachievea “firmer understanding” with HirschHerzog’s letter to Ben-Gurion cannot be con- —s mann, even though the latter’s adviser was “antifirmed elsewhere. The Americans had made the —_ Zionist press reporter Joe Levy of the New York renewal of the lend-lease contract, which was Times in Istanbul, who tried to turn Jews toward

about to expire, conditional upon Turkey’s — other countries rather than Palestine.” Although promise to relax its attitude toward rescuing Hirschmann himself was close to Hillel Kook’s Jews. The United States’s main condition was that circles, Ben-Gurion did not believe he had to be the Turks place one of its ships, the Tari, atthe | shunned. He proposed speeding up the dispatch

disposal of the rescue operations. of Eliash on a second trip to Istanbul and worked

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Between the Hammer and the Anvil in1944

out an arrangement that would not harm Eliash’s | — complaints that recurred in his letters. He may

own business affairs. have felt that a parallel emissary system was being The JAE accepted Ben-Gurion’s position — established in Turkey behind his back. If Benand Joseph cabled Barlas, informing him of the Gurion and his colleagues were not satisfied with JAE’s concern over his deteriorating relations his work, wrote Barlas, they should recall him to with Hirschmann and its wish that he do every- Palestine. He wanted to know why Ben-Gurion thing possible to patch things up and settle the —_ was personally involved in the Eliash matter and dispute. They did not accept his position on _ explained that a long line of British and AmeriEliash—whose visit, though brief, was of vital | can emissaries were waiting outside Turkey for importance—and asked Barlas to make certain —_ entry permits. He insisted that his fellow emisthat Eliash would be issued an entry permit. saries in the Yishuv delegation were as reserved as Thus, Ben-Gurion and his colleagues were he was about the dispatch of short-term emisabout to force Barlas to accept a second visit by __saries to Turkey. Eliash. Barlas rejected the JAE’s decision to send A large portion of Barlas’s letter was devoted emissaries representing immigrant groups,ade- —_ to a description of the cognitive differences becision whose motives appeared to him political | tween Jerusalem and Istanbul. He wondered if rather than professional. The various cables to _ the information flowing in from Turkey was even Barlas all received the same reply: he was awareof reaching Ben-Gurion and other senior officials, the Yishuv’s “excitement” and the extenuating or if the latter were being handed scraps of inforpolitical circumstances. Although he opposed = mation by other people who were not well versed. these visits, he promised to do his best to obtain This might have explained why he was receiving

entry permits.® instructions that forced him to choose between Barlas tried to defend his image as a loyal “doing the bad thing according to the matter and civil servant. Cooperation between Barlas and __ the situation or not to fulfill the instructions that Hirschmann broke down when the latter de- — were given without knowledge of the circummanded an action that Barlas felt lacked opera- _ stances.” Barlas declared that he would not carry

tional logic, namely, to concentrate tenthousand out instructions that seemed illogical. Benchildren in Constanta in order to evacuate them Gurion, it will be recalled, was responsible for orat the rate of a thousand to fifteen hundred every —— ganizational discipline, so this letter constituted a two weeks. Barlas rejected this plan because it —_ stinging personal reproach.

would have taken too long to obtain “safe con- As an example, Barlas referred to the JAE’s duct” permits for the ship promised bythe Turks. instructions to bring to its notice all disagreeIndeed, after a month it proved impossible to —_ ments arising in the “council” (a recently estabhold so many Jews—especially children—in a _ lished body comprised of all the organizations accamp in Constanta, which was still under Nazi __ tive in Istanbul, including the Revisionists and control.® Barlas also rejected the accusation that | Agudat Israel). The practical significance of this he was not maneuvering sophisticatedly between | demand was that any act with which anyone Steinhardt and Hirschmann; onthecontrary,the | disagreed would be nipped in the bud. Barlas inconflict between the two encouraged Steinhardt __ sisted that without final authority he could not

to help Barlas.° assume responsibility, nor would he do so if When Ben-Gurion continued to press Barlas temporary emissaries such as Eliash nibbled away

for an entry permit for Eliash, the latterranoutof at his authority. He resolved that now was the patience. He sent Ben-Gurion a long and bitter __ time to focus on rescuing the Jews of Hungary, letter, venting his fury by itemizing the various _—_— according to the Brand plan, and concluded his

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Rescue Plans

letter with a direct jab at Ben-Gurion: “From you, importance of the special-tasks emissaries— comrade Ben-Gurion, I have learned...torelin- — Avriel, Kollek, and Zaslani (Shiloah), together quish responsibility when there is no possibilityof | with Bader, Schind, and Pomeranz—all of whom doing so because of the opposition of others and __ had a direct link to Ben-Gurion. Barlas had no when there is no way of agreeing with them, and _idea of the intensity of their relationship to Benin this I would like to be your faithful student.””° Gurion, although he probably sensed its existence. The rift between Jerusalem and Istanbul was On the one hand, this group constituted an imbased on mutual misunderstanding. According _ portant source of information and opinion upon to Barlas, whereas the JAE was not versed in op-_ —_~which Ben-Gurion based his decisions. On the

erational constraints, the JAE’s senior official in other hand, they regarded Ben-Gurion as their Turkey was blind to the pressures under which — main authority. Together with Kaplan and Sharett, the Yishuv had to operate. Barlas, the pedantic —_ and after consultations with his closest emissaries, and loyal clerk, found it hard to understand why — Ben-Gurion decided on his rescue strategy.

the political establishment for whom he worked Barlas probably knew that Ben-Gurion, Kahad to capitulate to the pressure of organizations plan, and Sharett had an established a system to founded by ex-immigrants for this or that coun- monitor information and activity in Istanbul, try and to the demands of various other groupsin —_ which he seems not to have given its due weight, the Yishuv. Why couldn't Ben-Gurion, Gruen- as is evident from his repeated complaints about baum, Kaplan, and others simply reject requests the JAE’s remoteness from events in the “field.” from Rabbi Herzog and the people he repre- _—As will be demonstrated, Barlas was not a key sented, or from Mapai, the Histadrut, and other _ figure in the secret rescue operations. Together

Yishuv groups? with the emissaries’ council, he was just so much Barlas was probably too obtuse to grasp the —_ public baggage and was obliged to fend off critiextenuating circumstances resulting from the fact | cism meted out in Palestine regarding the activity that the Yishuv was a voluntary society atthe time. of the emissaries. He was simply sidestepped by Of course, all politicians work under pressure, but — the organization headed by Ben-Gurion, Kaplan, Ben-Gurion was obliged to function under partic- | and Sharett. There was an obvious affinity beularly difficult conditions. He bore constitutional tween Eliash and this organization,’! and from responsibility for a nation uniquely persecuted — Barlas’s perspective his opposition to Eliash’s but lacking all sovereign power oflawenforcement mission was justified.” or supervision. These conditions created extraor- Eliash left for Istanbul in August 1944 despite dinary hardship for him in his capacity as leader. _ Barlas’s threat that he would resign. As far as BarHe was obliged to operate according to various _las was concerned, Eliash’s arrival was a clear sign channels and methods and to make every effortto of lack of confidence in him. Eliash was sent to appease the volatile and frustrated public. Herzog, strengthen the activity of the Palestine Office in Magnes, and others were needed in Istanbul, but = Turkey and to help Barlas in his work. Overburnot to command any specific operation. Theirtask | dened, Barlas was too preoccupied with his own was mostly one of building morale and raising the | image as someone difficult to work with, inflexispirits of the Jews in the occupied territories aswell ble, and lacking in sufficient self-discipline to

as those in Palestine. carry out policies that were constantly changing It appears that the misunderstanding be- and often ill-defined. tween Barlas and Ben-Gurion was due to Barlas’s Eliash’s mission also ruffled some feathers in underestimation of Ben-Gurion’s involvement in _ Palestine. Yitzhak Gruenbaum, chairman of the the secret rescue issue. Barlas was unaware of the = Rescue Committee and a man with a tendency to

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Between the Hammer and the Anvil in 1944

feel slighted, alleged that he had not been con- _—_—simmigrated and been socially integrated (up to

sulted on the visit. Eliash returned home sooner 30.9.44). By the outbreak of war, 4,886 immithan expected. Ben-Gurion did not hide his dis- grated. From then and until 30 September 1944, appointment. It was not for a quickie visit thathe an additional 7,246 young people immigrated had taken so much trouble and even forced Bar- _—and were integrated.””° These data included chil-

las to arrange for an entry permit. dren from regions not under Nazi occupation. Eliash quickly realized that it was necessary — Thisstill did not account for the 29,000 promised to reduce the scope of activity. Now that Roma- __ by Stanley in his dramatic announcement in Parnia had been liberated and other countries were —_ liament. Why were they unable to rescue even

about to be, it was imperative to shift the focusof that small amount?

activity to the center of the Jewish population Ben-Gurion put the rescue of children at the and to conduct activities from within, including top of his agenda. Even those colleagues who inithe desire of Jews to emigrate to Palestine.” tially disagreed with him were finally swayed in the This conclusion reinforced the tendency of | end. The leadership announced that the Yishuv the JAE’s senior members to visit the site of activ- | would assume financial responsibility for bringing ity themselves. Gruenbaum and Ben-Gurion an- __ children to Palestine even though such an enternounced their desire to go to Romania, wherethey _ prise was clearly beyond the Yishuv’s means. In all hoped to influence the fate of the Holocaust sur- _his major speeches during this period Ben-Gurion vivors. They attached great importance to the “at- —_ angrily reiterated the fate of the children. Weiz-

titude of liberated Judaism in the Diaspora... to mann, Ben-Gurion, Kaplan, Sharett, and others our political campaign.” Ben-Gurion and his col- ~~ were personally involved in applying political leagues wanted to arrange “Zionist trainingforthe — pressure in Jerusalem, London, and the United Jews of Romania and Bulgaria” and to speed up States in order to achieve international recognipreparations for their emigration to Palestine.” tion of the importance of this humanitarian enterAccording to Eliash’s report, the Russian in- _ prise. International organizations were mobilized vasion of Romania in late August again confused _ to help, as were key world figures.

the situation. The dispute within the Romanian Moreover, the JAE saw through yet accepted Jewish leadership between Filderman and Zissu_ the cynical British “trick” involving the immigrahindered the activities of the emissaries. Eliashre- _ tion of children instead of adults so long as chilported on attempts to evacuate non-Romanian- —_ dren would ultimately be saved. The JAE thus speaking Jewish refugees from Romania—espe- __ placed the humanitarian motive above the more cially the Transnistria children—and passed on = narrow—or at least short-term—dZionist inter-

official news from Hungary stating that in July ests, despite the supreme importance of adding Horthy had promised that Jews would no longer _ adult Jews to the Yishuv in light of the approach-

be persecuted. This easing of restrictions in- ing bloody struggle for immigration and sovercluded a lifting of the ban on the sailing of the _—_ eignty. The JAE and emissaries assigned to rescue Milca, Vita, and Porinand renewed efforts to ob- _activity repeatedly attempted to overcome a vari-

tain additional ships to transfer the Jewish etyoflogistical problems—securing exit and tran-

refugees from newly liberated areas.” sit permits, finding means of transport, convincing countries to provide temporary asylum—but

In early March 1945 Ben-Gurion wrote the fol- most of these attempts came to nothing. lowing in his diary: “Youth Aliyah began in Feb- What stood between the children and rescue? ruary 1934, with the arrival ofthe young peoplein §_The Nazis and their satellite states, coupled with Ein Harod. Since then 12,132 young people had __logistical problems encountered in all such global

259

Rescue Plans

wars. Even if these two factors had not thwarted _later. The allocation of certificates was merely a rescue efforts, it is a virtual certainty that Britain’s | “shock absorber,” to quote MacMichael’s memopolicies and the manner in which they were en- __ rable phrase. Its aim was to soften the Yishuv’s forced would have done so. The British deliber- _ pressure tactics by releasing them in dribs and ately stymied all actions they feared might jeop- — drabs, which was done whenever the British gov-

ardize the White Paper restrictions. ernment felt threatened by public opinion or The refusal of the Western states—especially | other outside pressure. According to Zweig, this Britain and the United States—to change immi- — approach reflected Britain’s stand on this issue gration quotas and to open their doors to Jewish — throughout the war.”” Bernard Wasserstein children contributed to the failure of most rescue | summed up his study as follows:

plans. as theybe were concerned, that , ten record eg TerAs ie far It may objected thattheiffact Britain’s

, . ontothe Jewish question during the; 4war subject a stream of refugee children or adults 3; we Lae was unimpressive, that of other countries

by lifting immigration restrictions they would be he J} °) h fon during th

, ; ee was O r worse. There is some tru

was secondary. The British were primarily inter- as often fa se. There j truth

, . in this. But it was no standards o

ested in stalling Jewish immigration from Europe .n this. But it was not by the standards of

; oo. others a lone and justifia rou ; , al e without allies in this

to the Allied states or Palestine. They did not hes- thers that a lone 4 tifabl d itate to suspend immigration under the pretext Britain chose to ficht tn t lies th;

ac ;

that children should be rescued first—without « *® ,

tually rescuing them .her “finest and hour.” The Jews in looked their most desperate dependent hour in There were a few worthy souls in that mostly lar to B i f f . , , articular to Britain for some gesture o€

antagonistic establishment. Arthur Whittall, a P 5 a token of her adh S to th

ae concern as a token of her adhesion to the member ofeaBritish intelligence in Turkey, and og , values for which she waged war. The reSamuel Hoare, Britain’s4.ambassador inhas Madrid, hasdescribed been described in this book. sponse been this tried to untangle -the labyrinthine policiesinthat Pbook ,,

, a. Therescue. men chiefly responsible for sending hindered But to others within the same es- . to ; ; , , the Struma her doom; for refusing tablishment did their best to create impassable oo, , ee admit significant numbers of Jewish

. , , ; C e ar

obstacles, justify the abandonmentrefugees of the Jews, _ to Britain, Palestine, or the Em-

and strengthen the tendency of Allied govern- ‘re: for blocking the bombardment of ments and world ,public opinion shrug their decisions P,©Auschwitz; andtofor the other

shoulders these horrors. wasdiscussed the selfsame were ,. oe ,atwhich haveThis been

the sort ,; who would probably that, time even the moral ethos have of theplayed United the ne i,part States was stricken with varalvsis of the Good Samaritan if their neighbors . eeconclusion had fallenisamong thieves. But the agony This supported by impeccable ; Great Britain that had once acted so valiantly. At

. . of Zweig European Jewry was the enacted in a separesearch. ae Ronald has examined posi. 4: rate moral arena, a grim twilight tion by, ;Britain regard to saving Jews inworld ; ;did ;; . ,taken ; ; where theirwith conventional ethical code

the light of available data, which speaks for itself. « not apply. And so they “came and looked,

Forree example, 1939 quota of the seventy-five thou- a ,; andthe passed by on other side.””8

sand immigration certificates was only used up in December 1945. On 31 March 1944, the expiration In July 1944, in one of the most important speeches

date for the five-year White Paper, twenty thou- _he delivered during this period,” Ben-Gurion resand certificates remained unassigned despitethe ferred to the deplorable phenomenon described by fact that there were thousands waiting to be res- | Wasserstein. It amounted to a pitiless distinction cued; that quota was only met a year anda half between one kind of blood and another.

260

/ The Secret Partnership

Te Parachutists’ Scheme, whose purpose was —_ within Jewish communities and the preparation to aid the Jews of Europe, was another in- _ of operational systems pending invasion of the stance of the secret collaboration between the § Middle East by Axis countries; aiding Allied piJewish Agency and the British, Americans, and _lots, air crews, and prisoners and assisting in their other powers in the Middle East and Europe. It —_ escape from enemy territory. began in the twenties and thirties and continued From the beginning of the war but mainly toduring and after the war, ultimately resultingina | ward the end of 1942, when the picture of the exspecial relationship during the fifties betweenthe — termination of Jews became clear, the primary Mossad, Israel’s espionage agency, and the CIA, _ objective of the Yishuv in this secret partnership America’s equivalent. Most of the people in- was to provide assistance both in the “Big Rescue” volved in the secret collaboration between the — and the “Small Rescue.” Agents from the Yishuv Americans and the Yishuv (the pre-state Jewish penetrated occupied Europe or sent couriers to Settlement in Palestine) were active well into the study the situation of the Jews, provide them with early decades following the establishment of the — forged papers and money, and organize resistance

State of Israel. cells. They smuggled Jews out of occupied territoThe partnership was influenced both by the _ries into areas where their chance of survival was quality of the relations prevailing between the _ better (termed organizing “excursions” ). Yishuv and the major powers as well as by politi- Toward the end of the war, the morale issue cal and military developments in the Middle East | became more prominent and activities were and Europe. Established on the basisofcommon __ geared to renewing survivors’ contact with the

interests, its development oscillated between Jewish world—especially the Yishuv and the those that were temporary, limited, and precari- | Zionist movement—beyond the occupied terrious and those that were deep-rooted and perma- __ tories. The emissaries filled the void left when nent. This polarity was naturally influenced by _ local leadership was either annihilated or aban-

key figures in the field. doned. They presented a Zionist alternative to The secret partnership led toa wide rangeof | the Communist doctrine borne aloft by the liberactivity within this twilight world of intelligence, | ating Red Army. At war’s end two goals were

espionage, propaganda, sabotage, aid, and res- added to the secret partnership between the cue: the establishment of three bureaus for the = Yishuv and the espionage organizations of the interrogation of refugees and prisoners; the dis- | Western powers: cooperation in locating and patch of agents from the Yishuv for onetime punishing war criminals and the deployment of information-gathering missions as wellasthees- _ intelligence to combat the cold war. It was already tablishment of permanent espionage, propa- possible to sense the first chill winds heralding ganda, and subversion networks; the creation of the arrival of the latter.

radio networks in occupied territories or those Cooperation was spread across a vast geoabout to be; the dispatch of Jewish commandos _ graphical area. Together with the Yishuv, the from the Yishuv for sabotage operations in vari- _— British and the Americans conducted secret operous Middle Eastern and European countries; the ations on a massive scale: throughout the Middle establishment of intelligence and sabotage cells | East, both in the countries bordering Mandatory

261

Rescue Plans

Palestine as well as in more distant countries like terested in becoming directly involved in the Iran, Yemen, and even Russia and Afghanistan; refugee problem; they did not want to sabotage throughout the Mediterranean basin, from North their relations with the Arab world; and they had Africa to the Balkans; and in Central Europe, a clear interest in preventing the Yishuv from acHungary, Romania, Slovakia, and Austria. There —_ quiring military and intelligence experience that was an attempt made to work together in Ger- _— might later be turned against them. The Amerimany and even in Poland, ground zero ofthe an- _—_—cans regarded the “red” nature of the Yishuv with

nihilation. disdain. The predominance of the Socialist outThe secret partnership was based onthe single look and mode of operation within the Yishuv most important resource the Yishuv was able to —_ was considered suspect by both the Americans offer, namely, the people who had left the many —_and the British.

countries of the Middle East and Europe. They The Parachutists’ Scheme of 1944 marked spoke the native language, were familiar with the __ the peak of joint secret activity. Dropping paralocal customs of the population, and enjoyedacer- _chutists into occupied zones was of major practitain freedom of movement because they knew the — cal and symbolic significance. Nevertheless, it terrain. The Yishuv was also able to offera com- = must be mentioned that the Yishuv wanted to plete system of local cells: Palestine officesthathad = involve many more parachutists but received no operated openly in different places, as wellasthose help. Furthermore, the parachuting operation that had gone underground after the occupation; — was but one action—perhaps not even the most branches of Jewish youth movements and their § important—suggested to the British and Ameristaffs; various elements in the Jewish community cans by the Yishuv and weighed by the partners. able to extend temporary assistance and “safe | Among the more extreme plans was the destabihouses” to fugitives, undercover agents, and oth- _ lization of Hitler’s reich and the mass rescue of ers. Lastly, the Yishuv brought something even _ Jews from occupied Europe.

more precious to this partnership: a strong moti- The roots of cooperation between British esvation to reach occupied European countries and —pionage services and various elements in the provide assistance to Jews as well as the steel-willed = Yishuv can be traced back to the twenties. In the

determination to eradicate the common enemy. thirties the Haganah conducted relations with The Jews were not the only factor in this __ the British on behalf of the Yishuv. Cooperation partnership. Non-Jews—Yugoslavs, Romanians, increased during the Arab rebellion (1936-1939) Czechs, Greeks, Italians, and Hungarians—also —_ but decreased toward the end when the White Paoffered similar services to the British and Ameri- _ per policy took shape. The Yishuv leadership as-

cans. Indeed, there was a price involved—oftena | sumed that the outbreak of a new world war political price—but this was not as problemati- | would strengthen cooperation. Indeed, at the becal for the British and Americans as the flooding — ginning of the war British and Yishuv representaof Palestine or the Western countries withtensor __ tives were already discussing proposals for diverhundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees who _ sifying the spheres of cooperation between the might be rescued as a result of the secret partner- _ parties.

ship with the Yishuv. Some proposals reflected an attempt to reThe Yishuv's offers of assistance seemed less __ vive the patterns formulated during the First appealing and cooperation was increasingly lim- | World War. New proposals revolved around ited when it became clear to the British and the —_‘Yishuv assistance in sabotage, espionage, and

Americans that the rescue of European Jews was counterespionage activities in the occupied the Yishuv's main goal. The British were not in- zones. Research by Yehuda Bauer, Shlomo Aron-

262

The Secret Partnership

son, and Yoav Gelber has shed much-needed __alsoacentral factor in the Yishuv’s secret contacts light on these proposals and on the activities that — with the British. The Intelligence Service of the

resulted.! Haganah (Shai), the illegal immigration organi-

The British and American end of this coop- —_ zation (Mossad Le Aliyah Bet), and the comeration agreement consisted of a series of mili- | mando unit of the Haganah (Palmah) were all tary and civilian bodies. Some of them arose or — underground bodies more or less hidden from expanded when the war broke out and reserve __ the authorities. Sometimes they clashed with the forces were mobilized. The division of authority authorities, even before the Yishuv’s relationship was not clearly defined, resulting in frequent — with the British had deteriorated to the point of

quarrels and even competition. The characteris- armed conflict. Nevertheless, it was through tic compartmentalization and overlapping of ac- _ these bodies that the Yishuv conducted its secret tivities of intelligence bodies, as well as the need partnership with the British. The latter, for their for mutual supervision, created an understand- _part, also maintained parallel contacts with the

able tension among the various organizations. National Military Organization (Irgun Tsva’i Disagreements emerged involving people in the — Leumi, or IZL).

mobilized reserves; their sense of independence This peculiar partnership between the from the system, coupled with their naive ama- _ British and an illegal underground organization teurishness and lack of discipline, infuriated — like the Haganah was strengthened in 1943 and many in the established intelligence apparatus. 1944. This happened precisely when the “narThe natural tendency to blur the definition of | row” Yishuv context itself—immigration, settlespheres in intelligence systems, combined witha = ment, land, weapons—was leading to a harsh typical crossing of lines, led to friction between — confrontation between the two sides. To underthe regulars and the “mobilized” civilians. Even __ stand the nature of their collaboration, one must when the lines of authority and responsibility recall that at the time the Yishuv gave priority to were clearly defined, they were not always re- _ the war against Hitler and to aiding and rescuing spected. Reality also made a contribution. The __ the Jews of Europe, and that it worth rememberchaos of war does not lend itselfto the creationof ing, when considering the issue, to what extent

discrete “subjects.” the Yishuv dealt with its Palestinocentric goals at It should come as no surprise that repre- __ that time. sentatives from the Yishuv did not always know Among those centrally involved in handling with which British or American bodies they _ secret activities during this period were Reuven were negotiating, a problem that resurfaced in = Zaslani (Shiloah), Eliyahu Golomb, Shaul Meirov their dealings with Nazi espionage groups. The —_ (Avigur), David Hacohen, Eliahu Epstein (Ealth), Yishuv soon learned that it was possible to ex- Teddy Kollek, Ehud Avriel (Auberel), Zvi Schechploit this confusion and maneuver between the ter (Yehieli), Ze’ ev Schind, Menahem Bader, and

different organizations. When contact with one Ze ev (Venja) Pomeranz (Hadari), all of whose group failed, the Yishuv turned to another, but —_ contributions will be discussed. it was not always clear with whom it was worth Activities were conducted under the public

dealing. direction of Chaim Weizmann (occasionally),

The Jewish Agency’s Political Department Berl Katzenelson, and Yitzhak Tabenkin, but handled secret dealings on behalf of the Yishuv, David Ben-Gurion was the mainstay for the enprimarily within the sphere of what I have __ tire period. He headed most of the institutions in termed the “section for special operations.” The __ the Yishuv and was its acknowledged leader. His various arms of the Haganah organization were character suited him for this role, as did his work

263

Rescue Plans

habits and the sense of trust and mutual respect __ ter the start of the war. They all reported to he fostered among those involvedinthesecretac- _ Britain’s military commander in the Middle East, tivities. Moshe Sharett and Eliezer Kaplan were — whose headquarters was in Cairo. The Middle always at his side in directing these activities. East Intelligence Centre (MEIC), an informationIn general, during the Second World Warthe __ gathering body, was headed by Sir Iltyd Clayton. British espionage and special missions services _ At the beginning of 1943 Clayton was appointed were divided into civilian and military bodies. __ political adviser in the Cairo offices of the resiThe two main civilian sections were MI5 and _ dent minister. Security Intelligence Middle East MI6, whose various constituents reported to the | (SIME) was involved in counterespionage, while combined espionage committee in London and Political Intelligence Middle East (PICME) hanto the appointed ministers. Ultrasensitive intelli- dled political intelligence and advice. These bodgence was passed directly to the prime minister _ ies all reported to the head of military intelligence

and the secretary of defense. (DMI) in London, as well as to representatives of MIs5 was in charge of internal security and _ civilian intelligence services in the area and to the

counterespionage in the British Isles and the resident minister, who headed the Middle East British Empire. It was organized into local De- = War Council, which consisted of British senior fense Security Offices (DSOs). Alongside these diplomats and commissioners in the area.? were separate internal security offices such as the On the American side, the Yishuv mainly Criminal Investigations Department (CID) and __ tried to interest the Office of Strategic Services the British secret police in Palestine, which was (OSS), a military body reporting to the heads of attached to the Mandate government but re- —_ the American headquarters. Secret contacts with

ported to other security factors as well. the OSS began in the United States as soon as it was MI6, the British espionage service, was also —s organized and intensified after it had established known as the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). It | command posts and offices in London, Bern, Alhad branches in various parts of the British Em- _geria, and especially in Cairo and Istanbul.

pire, including Palestine. Colonels John Teague Some of the same individuals who were and Harold L. Gibson were senior officers in this establishing contact with the various British inbody. The Inter-Service Liaison Department __ telligence services were leaders in the Zionist (ISLD) served as the headquarters of MI6 inthe | movement, namely, Chaim Weizmann, Berl Middle East and had representatives from other = Katzenelson, and David Ben-Gurion. Weizmann intelligence bodies, such as MI5. The MI6 unitre- = hoped that the intelligence services the Zionist sponsible for sabotage on the enemy front was |§ movement promised to supply to Britain would the Special Operations Executive (SOE) known revitalize their pact and restore their relationship as Military Operation 4 (MO4). British and to that which had existed in the First World War. Yishuv secret activities were conducted through = There was an important intelligence and military these different units. The rescue of prisoners of — aspect to this connection. At the beginning of the war and fugitives was carried out with the aidof | war, Weizmann had offered his services to the MI9. The A Force, another SOE unit charged __ British, including his personal contacts all over with the rescue of prisoners of war as well as — Europe, but they showed no particular interest. strategic deception, was commanded by An- —_ He also told them of a German army plot against thony (Tony) Simmonds, who was to playacen- —__ Hitler. This information also failed to elicit any

tral role. enthusiasm. However, they were interested in In general, Britain’s military intelligence | Weizmann’s contacts with Jewish scientists who units in the Middle East were established right af- | had emigrated from Germany, who might be a

264

The Secret Partnership

valuable source of scientific and technical infor- —s mandéer of the school for sabotage and light warmation, especially in the sphere of weapons pro- _ fare established by the SOE and based on Mount

duction. A committee of experts, including | Carmel. Simmonds remained a true friend of the Chaim Weizmann and Simon Marks (partowner _—_—-Yishuv throughout the war, particularly when he of the Marks & Spencer chain), was establishedto |= commanded the A Force.®

examine this source of information.* Equally important was Colonel John Teague, These contacts brought the Yishuvleadersto one of the heads of the SIS, whom the Yishuv the attention of Admiral John Godfrey, head of | nicknamed “the plasterer.” He helped establish intelligence for the British navy. Weizmann also —an arrangement for gathering information from offered him the services of the Zionist move- _ prisoners of war and Jewish refugees coming to ment. At the end of 1944, David Hacohen, a cen- the Middle East. In addition to the interrogation tral figure in the secret activities, recorded (offi- _ offices in Aleppo, Istanbul, and Haifa, the Yishuv cially as well as in his memoirs) that it was Berl ___ staff also assisted in the interrogation of prison-

Katzenelson who introduced him to Godfrey. ers of war and refugees in Cairo and the surBen-Gurion was also to meet with the heads of rounding prisoner of war camps. Teague and his British navy intelligence in London at this time.* —_ team also discussed with the Yishuv the possibilGodfrey referred Weizmann and the agency __ ity of deploying intelligence networks from the representatives in London to section D in the SOE, Caucasus to Russia.

specifically to George Taylor, whom the Yishuv Patrick Domville, a veteran British officer in nicknamed “the tailor’? A key figure in the early __ the field, also played a crucial role. When Istanbul stages of the partnership, he headed the Balkan —_ became the locus of secret activities, three more branch of the SOE and wished to avail himself of SIS officers joined the inner circle of cooperation: the services of the Jewish Agency in the Balkans.6 = Arthur Whittall, Sonders Walfson, and Harold L. In May 1940 the Balkan team was relocated closer Gibson. Colonel Gibson, SIS commander in Isto the front in Cairo. Subsequently Taylor was __ tanbul, was involved in ransom activities and betransferred to London, where he became head of _friended Kaplan and Epstein during their visit to

the operational headquarters of the SOE. Turkey. Commander Walfson was an SIS officer A limited form of cooperation also existed stationed in Turkey when they first made contact between the Yishuv and the CID, which onseveral —_ with him. As a result of his loyalty and assistance

occasions asked colleagues in the Haganah and _to the emissaries, they referred to him as one of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency for the “Thirty-Six Just Men” mentioned in Jewish information on residents or suspicious recent ar- mysticism. rivals in the country, specifically Germans, Ital- The British, aware that the Yishuv was not a ians, and their partners, who had operated for unified society, maneuvered among the various many years in the Middle East—especially in _—_ constituents, each possessing different modes of Palestine. A special counterespionage unit (De- —_ operation. They did not always wait for suggespartment 5) was subsequently established, which __ tions to come from the Yishuv leadership. Just as

later merged with the Haganah’s Shai.’ the Yishuv exploited the multiplicity of regulaAnother central figure on the British side was _ tions governing British units, the latter attempted Colonel Anthony Simmonds. In the early thirties _ to enlist different elements in the Yishuv, such as he served as a political officer in Galilee. During the IZL, as well as individual civilians or Jewish the Arab rebellion he had been Orde Wingate’s _ soldiers in the British army.°

second in command. When contact with the SOE Though the direct approach enlarged the was renewed, Simmonds became the first com- _ circle of cooperation, it hampered the ability of

265

Rescue Plans

the Yishuv leadership to serve Jewish goals. Ben- | development. Solel Boneh was one of the main Gurion was involved in most of these activities economic arms of the Histadrut (General Labor both on the tactical and strategic levels. Although — Federation), served as a conduit for transferring he oversaw cooperation in local and district mat- funds required for protection and rescue work, ters, his primary goal was to place the Yishuv _and provided a cover for the deployment of inwithin the family of free nations and establish it | formation networks and for smuggling weapons as one of the allies. This desire was openly ex- — and equipment. Hacohen also carried out mispressed, for example, in the determination to sions on behalf of the Haganah and the Political establish a “Hebrew” army, but it was also clan- Department of the Jewish Agency.

destinely expressed in the attempt to create an Hacohen set out for London but fell ill, so his

intelligence pact. meeting with Taylor had to be postponed. It Ben-Gurion’s efforts and those of his staff finally took place some time later in Bucharest. were mainly confined to the British circle of co- | Hacohen showed Taylor the diverse, multiple opoperation until the middle of 1941. After Britain’s erations of the Zionist movement in Europe. cool reaction to the Yishuv leadership’s propos-_ —_ They left Bucharest for London, where further als, Ben-Gurion led a strategic effort to create a meetings included Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, and secret pact with the United States. The impor- — Sharett. The outlines of the operations were tance of this change in direction should not be _ sketched and it was decided that Hacohen would underestimated. Ben-Gurion adhered to his ba- _ be the contact between the Jewish Agency and sic view that the Jewish people must strive for | Taylor’s SOE organization.!?

partnership in the family of nations as a sover- Ben-Gurion remained in London while teneign ally. In his eyes this was true emancipation: _ tative relations developed and took shape. There equal rights not only for the individual Jew but _he received reports on various contacts with the

for Jews as a group. British as well as requests to authorize operations THE PERIOD PRECEDING THE or assess proposals. Ben-Gurion had left for LonANNOUNCEMENT OF THE don following Churchill’s election (10 May 1940). ANNIHILATION OF JEWS Since the latter was a confirmed pro-Zionist, this change in leadership raised Zionist hopes. The Zionist leaders had presented Britain with Among other things, Weizmann and Bencomprehensive proposals for cooperation at the | Gurion tried to persuade the new government to beginning of the war, but the first significant establish a Jewish army unit, which was naturally efforts only began in 1940, after the invasion of intended to increase the level of clandestine cothe Netherlands by the Nazis, the fall of France, —_ operation.

and the entrance of Italy into the war as an Axis In May 1940 Weizmann and Ben-Gurion

power. discussed the issue of secret cooperation with Immediately after the Yishuv established ini- various officials in the British government. Dov

tial contact with Taylor in London, the latter | Hos, a Haganah leader with contacts in British wished to assist the Yishuv in setting upanetwork Labour party circles, added his professional in the Balkans, starting with Romania. David Ha- — touch to these discussions. On 23 May Bencohen was sent to London for this purpose. Offi- Gurion, Weizmann, and Hos submitted a memo cially director of the industrial and construction —_ detailing the various proposals for cooperation company Solel Boneh. Hacohen and the com- _ between the Yishuv and Britain. These included: pany he headed performed both publicandsecret | “(B) Economic warfare: enlistment of Jews in tasks unrelated to construction and economic _ neutral countries in support of the economic war

266

The Secret Partnership

against the Nazis; (C) Military aid: enlistment of | covered the network. The new regime in Romasome divisions in the Yishuv, creation of a pilot _ nia was not pro-British and was therefore not a unit, and assistance for the intelligence service; | candidate for partnership in such plans."

(D) Propaganda in neutral countries.” They rec- Taylor’s next idea was to blow up a vessel ommended that a special joint committee be es- —_ loaded with scrap metal in the “Iron Gate,” one of

tablished to discuss “the implementation ofthese — the most vital passages of the Danube, thus

activities.”!! blocking the petroleum lane. Such a British ship Sharett informed Ben-Gurion about practi- —_ was indeed sent, but it was discovered before the cal developments regarding the secret coopera- __ plan could be carried out, forcing the British to

tion with Britain on the home front. This infor- select another method. The mission was handed mation was frequently relayed againstabackdrop __ to the Yishuv, where several senior officials in the

of fear of the advancing Axis forces and the Haganah—Hacohen, Yehuda Arazi, Yitzhak Arabs, who were considered pro-German. At the Hacker, and David Arnon—traveled to Romania

time Ben-Gurion and Sharett shared a good to establish an intelligence and sabotage networking relationship, particularly on matters in- | work. In the autumn of 1940, Arazi, Hacker, and

volving security and intelligence. Ben-Gurion Arnon were forced to leave Romania after the applied Sharett’s information in the efforts he failure of a plan to send another vessel to the had done with Weizmann in this fieldinLondon. — Danube, plus other aborted attempts.

FAILURES IN ROMANIA AND | A most daring plan being formulated at the CONTACTS WITH “THE TAILOR” time was a mid-ocean exchange between a group of illegal immigrants sailing in a rickety boat and In mid-1940 the British were planning to sabo- _—a unit of Haganah commandos. The illegal imtage targets in Romania. They wanted to disable |= migrants would be put aboard the Haganah ves-

installations that served the German war ma- sel and would sail to the Yishuv, whereas the chine even though Romania was still officially | commandos, now disguised, would return to the neutral. The petroleum plant in Ploiesti was one |§ Romanian point of departure on the pretext that of these targets. The British wanted to destroythe — the boat was not seaworthy. They would wait unoil fields or at least block access to them by wayof __ til the Nazis occupied Romania and sabotage the the Danube, which was a major transport artery. port, blending in with the local Jews to organize The idea of sabotaging the Tripoli refineries in __ cells of resistance against the Nazis in Romania.

Lebanon later arose against a similar back- | At Haganah headquarters Golomb made this ground; a band of Yishuv fighters known as the __ plan part of a larger effort to infiltrate fighters Twenty-three Yordei Hasira (boatmen) sailed to into Poland and reinforce the Jewish resistance

attack these refineries. movement there. This approach laid the foundaVarious British intelligence authorities were tions for the Parachutists’ Scheme.

involved in planning the sabotage operation in This bold plan was raised before news of the Ploiesti. Britain’s military attaché in Bucharest — systematic murder of the Jews of Europe became received orders to establish and train a sabotage |= known. David Hacohen traveled to London to network, aided by British officers specially sentto | present the plan to the British authorities, but Romania for this purpose, composed of British they refused to authorize it since it incorporated

civilians then living in Romania and Romanians aid to Jewish immigration.’ Sharett, Golomb, working in the oil fields. The Romanian govern- —_ and Hacohen himself reported on these plans to ment, aware of its existence, was forced to banish = Ben-Gurion. They sought his opinion and perits members from Ploiesti once the Germans un- _ haps his authorization. Golomb reported that

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“Hacohen’s contact with ‘the tailor’ [Taylor] was Americans during the course of the war, and getting closer, and his assistance was increasing, | Ben-Gurion and others raised it in London. despite the hopelessness of the operation in Ro- _ Sharett reported that the proposal to establish a mania.’ Ben-Gurion replied, through Sharett, Yishuv flight wing had been rejected on this oc“to the cable of the 27th [May] ... to the letter casion, but that the British were willing to confrom brother-in-law [Golomb] of the same date, sider drafting Yishuv pilots into existing RAF share his opinion.”!4 Eventually Hacohen would __ crews.!¢

testify that, in consultation with Ben-Gurion in Ben-Gurion adopted the recommendations London and later with Weizmann, it was decided of Sharett and his assistants in the Jewish “without further hesitation ... to collaborate | Agency’s Political Department and of key perwith Britain through every means at our dis- _sonalities in the Haganah. He also thought that posal” despite operational uncertainties. They — Taylor’s proposal should be accepted. He urged hoped to combine intelligence and sabotage ac- _— Sharett not to flippantly refuse the money offered tivities with assistance to the different Jewish by Taylor. He cabled Sharett following receipt of communities, to maintain contact between the __his letter and said that he must not incur addiYishuv and the Diaspora, to gain combat experi- —_ tional expenses before it was clear whether atence, and to establish connections with British tempts to raise money in Britain and the United

military and political leaders.! States had been successful.!? An additional mesIn May 1940 Taylor's headquarters was sage was apparently sent to Sharett with Benmoved to Cairo, close to the arena ofplannedop- — Gurion’s cable. Sharett never fully understood erations in the Balkans. At the beginning of June —_ Ben-Gurion’s response, although he grasped the he again approached the Jewish Agency, wishing spirit of it. In another cable to Ben-Gurion, to act in accordance with the plan worked out — Sharett assumed Ben-Gurion was not opposed to with Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, Sharett, and Ha- _ receiving money offered by Taylor and would act cohen in London. Taylor offered to bankroll the —_ accordingly.'8 Jewish Agency’s expanded secret operations with The question of financing naturally arose in funds from his own department. Taylor’s offer _ all Yishuv operations. The agency worked within was passed on to Sharett for authorization, who _a set budget and had to find the funds for any discussed it (using the pseudonym “November” ) “spontaneous” activity. It was raised here owing in a letter he sent to “the father of Amos” (Ben- ___ to the heavy expenses required by intelligence Gurion) in London. Sharett asked Ben-Gurion if operations. Taylor’s suggested expansion necessihe thought they should accept money from Tay- _ tated payments to informers and bribes, as well as lor or provide the “entire service as a contribu- _ travel and accommodation expenses for emistion to the war.” Sharett himself felt they should —_—_ saries. The question also arose because the SOE

only agree to British financing if the operation | was funding Haganah training exercises at the Tel went beyond the Jewish Agency’s financial capa- — Aviv exhibition grounds and in the SOE school bility. In any case, Taylor’s offer should not bere- —_ for sabotage and light warfare on the Carmel.!?

jected. This was also the opinion of the Yishuv’s Ben-Gurion also passed along to Kaplan in-

experts on secret operations. formation contained in reports by the Yishuv and In this letter Sharett suggested the establish- from feelers put out in London. As treasurer of ment of a crew of young flyers from the Yishuv, — the Jewish Agency, Kaplan raised funds in the an idea that was discussed with British army au- —_~ United States—in addition to performing politithorities and the British civil serviceinthe Yishuv cal and security tasks. Ben-Gurion’s letter to Kaand Cairo. It was raised several times intalks with — plan, stamped “Secret—Personal” and “Not for

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Distribution,’ contained all the information that On the eve of the fall of France, we could safely be conveyed through such channels were about to set up an intelligence netwithout allowing secrets to fall into the wrong work in Syria with his help. We planned

hands. Ben-Gurion asked Kaplan if he had to send special agents to reside permaworked in the United States to promote “aero- nently in Damascus and Beirut. The denautical, naval, and general army training,” feat [the fall of France and the evacuation adding that in his estimation Lloyd, Britain’s new of the British army at Dunkirk] and the colonial minister, was not inclined to cooperate separation of the Allies [Britain and with the Zionist movement and the Yishuv.”° France] led to cancellation of the plan. In 1940 signs of activity could be discerned The Plasterer then informed us that his

within the executive trio surrounding Ben- sources [mainly in Syria] had dried up Gurion: Sharett reported from the Yishuv and and that without us they had no pipeline

consulted Ben-Gurion, who was in London, to Syria. He wants us to increase our seeking his authorization. From London Ben- efforts.” Gurion reported to Kaplan in the United States and directed his activities. Ben-Gurion’s two — Sharett described several information-gathering

senior colleagues in the agency leadership methods. Jews of Syrian or Lebanese origin were clearly had a hand in directing secret rescue ac- —_ sent in with questionnaires filled by “our friends

tivities. and agents.” Jewish merchants used their travels EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND in the area to gather information. Syrian and EVALUATION OF THE ARAB WORLD Druze friends were invited to the Yishuy, where their conversations revealed information on An examination of Yishuv documentation dur- __ events in their country. Interesting information ing July-August 1940 reveals deep cooperation — was contained in letters from Yemen written by with the SIS in the Middle East, which was Jews with access to the palace. Experts and officheaded by Colonel John Teague. Thesurrenderof ers from among expatriate Italians—mainly France and Italy’s entry into the war on the side | Umberto Nahon of the Jewish National Fund of Germany increased fears that Syria and Iraq (JNF) and Enzo Sereni (one of several parawould cooperate with the Nazi—Fascist camp. — chutists who failed to return from their mission Hence the mutual interest of the British and the — in Europe)—compiled seven detailed reports on

Yishuv in closely monitoring activities among _Italy’s military capability and economic infrathe Arabs in Palestine and the Middle East asa _ structure. whole, as well as creating new intelligence net- Sharett also told Ben-Gurion that arrangeworks and strengthening existing ones.*! During = ments were being made to reschedule the visits late spring and summer 1940 Sharett resumed his of “Reuven [Zaslani-Shiloah] and Elias [Eliyahu reports to Ben-Gurion concerning collaboration Sassoon] to Syria with the aid of anonymous gifts

with the SIS: [bribes].” It was also suggested to the British that they send an engineer of Italian origin to Egypt to

Our partnership with the Plasterer “make use of his aeronautical expertise [airfields] [Teague] is strong and developing. We and fortifications in Lybia and Abyssinia.” Insubmitted a lot of material on Arab activ- deed, “the man was invited and was working ities, and in accordance with our sugges- there.” Sharett summarized the result of all these tions the Plasterer set a number of police activities as follows: “A wealth of important

actions in motion. material, including on Iraq, that the Plasterer and 269

Rescue Plans

his friends appreciated very much and passedon _ British intelligence factors: “At the request of the

to London ... from whence came appreciation Plasterer [Teague] we have organized a special and the request for responses to certain ques- service for extracting all relevant information

tions, which were partially answered.” from wartime immigrants from enemy counInhis letter Sharett hintedatanotherformof tries. We have kept suspect Jews under surveilcooperation between the Political Department lance and have turned some in. All our help cenand the SIS. In July 1940 Eliyahu Epstein was dis- _ ters on the Plasterer and we respond to the CID patched to Turkey in order to establish contacts | and military intelligence when asked.’ Sharett and learn which way it was inclining inthe war. —_ also told Ben-Gurion that plans for operations in He eventually established the Political Depart- | Romania were continuing and that he was about ment as an important presence there forthe du- _ to leave for Egypt with Reuven Zaslani to check ration of the war. One of its aims was to deter- | on them (these plans were canceled at the end of

mine the practicality of a planned strategy, the year).’6 termed the “peripheral pact,” between the Yishuv Upon arriving in Egypt, Sharett discovered (later the State of Israel) andthe non-Arabcoun- _ that institutional and personal disagreements betries in the Middle East and surrounding areas, — tween the British Middle East army command

such as Turkey, Iran, and Ethiopia. and the SOE (the civilian element under the SIS) Reports filed by Epstein from Turkeyheldno threatened the fragile relationship between the deep secrets but were very instructive. He con- _—‘Yishuv and British intelligence. His operational veyed much information on the domestic situa- | independence allowed him to diverge from the

tion, on Nazi and pro-Nazi activities,on Turkeys policies of the command in Cairo and the military strength, and on various national mi- |§ Mandatory government in Palestine. General norities. He also met with the local commander Archibald Wavell, commander in chief of of the SIS, who indicated that Britain valued his Britain’s forces in the Middle East, tried to incorinformation. Rescue agents later tapped the con- —_— porate the SOE under his command. Taylor was

tacts established by Epstein in Turkey and he called back to London and his replacement, Paul himself assisted Kaplan during their joint visit | Godville, was similarly replaced by James Pol-

there.*4 lock, nicknamed “the Pole” by the Yishuv. To the

THE HAIFA INTERROGATIONS BUREAU regret of the civil service and army officers in the Middle East, the SOE’s autonomy was now reAnother joint activity with the SIS was the estab- _ stricted, as was the freedom that had allowed it to lishment of the Interrogations Bureau (which _ establish close contacts with the Jewish Agency.

also operated under the cover name Jewish Upon his return, Sharett cabled his main impresAgency Department of Statistics) in Haifa on sions to Ben-Gurion: “I went to Egypt to clarify 15 July 1940, which was promptly reportedto Ben- = matters regarding David [Hacohen]. Following Gurion. This office had the task of gleaning as__ the breakdown of his relations with the Middle

much information as possible from refugees or | East Command, the operational heads were soldiers recently returned from occupied zones. — changed. Wavell demanded that the project be Colonel Teague repeatedly attempted to broaden _ placed under his command. The previous direcand professionalize it. The variety of work car- __ tor, who had insisted on his independence, was ried out in the office was highly valuedanditcon- _fired and the new one [Pollock] accepted the vertinued to operate until November 1944. This is __ dict. It seems that there was also a fuss about their how Sharett reported the establishment of the cooperation with us.” Sharett also reported that office and its assistance to the CID and other he had met with the new commander, accompa-

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The Secret Partnership

nied by Zaslani and Hacohen. Pollock also ex- _—s received reports and authorization requests pressed interest in cooperative arrangements, but from Sharett, Golomb, and others.°*? After the only within the new boundaries set by Wavell. | bombing of Tel Aviv in early September 1940, Sharett could only promise “our continued help — Ben-Gurion demanded a daily update on events

within the limited framework.” in the Yishuv.?!

| Sharett also met General Wavell, who asked AIDING DE GAULLE’S

him if the Yishuv was willing to conduct pro-

Britishpropaganda propaganda inIn Syria. ThisPwas important FREE FRANCE GROUP oy Sw given Syria's sympathy for Nazi Germany and Documents reveal Ben-Gurion’s involvement in Fascist Italy. Wavell’s question aroused the hopes _ the issue of secret cooperation with Charles de of both Sharett and Pollock. In the end, the — Gaulle’s Free France group in the Middle East. De British contributed several thousand Palestinian Gaulle’s representatives in London asked Weizpounds to finance the propaganda operation. mann and the executive branch for propaganda Sharett and his colleagues suggested a more ex- _ assistance by the Yishuv against Vichy France in tensive operation in Syria, but this was not ac- — Syria and Lebanon. Both Ben-Gurion and Weizcepted because there was “no clear line on the —s mann instructed Sharett to treat the request sympart of the command.””’ Sharett reported all this _ pathetically and suggested giving the French

to Ben-Gurion. information on Syria gathered by the Jewish The Jewish Agency’s Political Department Agency, publishing statements by de Gaulle and

divided up the money from the British among his group in both English and Arabic in the sheiks in Transjordan, Druze leadersinSyriaand —__Yishuv press, and disseminating French propathe Lebanese Republic, local leaders in various _ ganda in Syria.

places, and newspaper editors in Damascus and Sharett, Zaslani, and Hacohen had actually Beirut. These formed an important channel in _ established contacts before instructions arrived the propaganda war, whose principal task wasto — from ~London. Sharett checked with Colonel generate favorable public opinion and a pro- _— Teague and cabled Ben-Gurion: “In answer to British atmosphere in the event ofa British inva- _ your cable regarding assistance to de Gaulle via

sion of Syria.” the Plasterer. From the earlier [cable] you will see Sharett’s report was incomplete, as were _ that plans made here exceed your suggestions.” other reports he sent to Ben-Gurion in London —_On 16 August 1940 propaganda broadcasts from and the United States. Rules of secrecy appar- —- Radio Free France were already being transmitently prevented him from reporting all develop- _ ted from a station in David Hacohen’s home on ments in written form. Sharett was consequently |= Mount Carmel. At first they were broadcast in unable to tell Ben-Gurion that Brigadier Clay- — Arabic and French and later in Bulgarian and ton, head of military intelligence in the Middle Hungarian. These broadcasts continued after the East, had adopted the Yishuv proposal to send _ British conquered Syria.

several Arabic-speaking agents to Syria and In the autumn of 1940, Tuvia Arazi, a memLebanon. Apparently he was also unable to re- _ ber of the Jewish Agency’s Political Department, port that Yohanan Rattner, one of the Haganah — and Joseph Fine, a Haganah member and a commanders, was put in charge of plans to sab- —_— founder of Kibbutz Hanita, were in charge of a otage vital crossings and vulnerable points on _ network of Arab agents who spread de Gaulle’s possible German invasion routes southward and _ propaganda in Syria and Lebanon, gathered inforeastward from Turkey.”? However, Ben-Gurion —_ mation, and engaged in sabotage and political inwas kept up to date on other security issues and _citement. In early 1941 this network participated

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Rescue Plans

in the successful rescue of Gaullist officersimpris- | most of the time, were both kept fully informed oned in Beirut. The network had been established about secret operations. As far as possible, they rather hastily and encountered many difficulties. received reports and authorization requests even Several of its agents were imprisoned. Arazi was _ though the nature of these activities dictated minwounded and captured, but was finallyrescuedon = imum correspondence.** Gradually, as the secret the eve of the British invasion of Syria. Intheend operations grew more complex and the differthe “Arab Department” was established in the Ha- — ences between Weizmann and Ben-Gurion on ganah, with its members assuming Arabidentities | general principles as well as practical matters

and infiltrating Syria on information-gathering | became more acute, the importance of the

and sabotage missions.*4 Sharett /Ben-Gurion/Kaplan leadership triangle Cooperation between the British and Ben- —_ became evident.

Gurion and his colleagues continued throughout COOPERATION IN 194] 1940 despite political tension with regard to the

1939 White Paper policy. The contradiction in Until 1941 the war seemed distant, but in the Ben-Gurion’s famous statement that the Yishuv _ spring of that year there was mounting fear that it must “war against the Nazis as if there were no —_—would reach the Middle East. The same familiar

White Paper; war against the White Paper as if refrain was heard that pro-Nazi and pro-Fascist there were no war against the Nazis” wasgrounded Arab circles might side with the German invader.

in reality. Such groups, under the leadership of Rashid Ali

The actual relationship between the Yishuv _al-Kailani, had managed to rise to power. The fear and Britain was riddled with contradictions. Se- _—- was that this trend would spread to Syria and percret cooperation with the British fellintolineun- —_ haps even other countries.

der Ben-Gurion’s long-term direction. He as- During the first half of the year Sharett pired to make the Yishuv’s underground and __ redoubled his efforts to allay the suspicions paramilitary units the foundation for a profes- —_ of British policymakers in the Middle East and

sional army. No better framework could be to intensify and accelerate cooperation. Even found for this than the British army and its vari- | though his and Weizmann’s efforts in London ous branches. This direction was greatly rein- proved useless,?” from 1940 to mid-1941 the level forced in the period that elapsed from Churchill’s _ of secret cooperation did not drop and its sphere rise to power until it became clear thatevennow — was not restricted.® Among other activities, the British were not going to abandon the spirit _— fighters from the Yishuv participated in comof the White Paper. The memorandum (23 May mando operations in the Aegean Islands area and 1940) that Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, and Hos sub- in Greece itself. Although Taylor was reassigned mitted expressed this view and the writers strong to run the agents’ training school in London, he

desire to assist in the defeat of Hitler.*° visited Turkey and Egypt from time to time and Documentation—admittedly abbreviated initiated such operations together with Pollock, due to the secret nature of the operations— __his replacement in Cairo. Other operations in shows that the key individuals involvedtookcare this region included the invasion of the Greek isto report to Ben-Gurion on major issues. It also = land of Rhodes, actions to secure the port at reveals the early presence of the leadership tri- | Crete, and participation in the withdrawal from angle—Sharett/Ben-Gurion/Kaplan—in direct- | Greece to Crete immediately after the German ing secret activities during the Second World __ invasion of Greece. At the time a proposal was be-

War. Ben-Gurion, who was often out of the = ing considered to establish a naval unit comcountry, and Weizmann, who was also abroad _ prised of Greek immigrants who apparently were

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The Secret Partnership

to perform undercover operations inthe Aegean =mander of the Middle Eastern front. Ben-Gurion

zone.°? dwelt at length on the increased threat to the During most of this period Ben-Gurion fo- —_- Yishuv and surrounding countries as a result of cused on attempts to persuade the new British — the British retreat in Libya and Rashid Ali algovernment to repeal the policies outlined inthe —_ Kailani’s revolution in Iraq.*

White Paper and authorize the establishment of a Significant British preparations became eviJewish army unit. This activity largely confined dent in light of the new situation. In the spring of him to Britain and the United States. After 1941 there were signs of an intensification of sespending the summer and fall ofi940in London, —_cret cooperation between the Yishuv and the he left for the United States at the end of1940.He British, a development directly related to the left the United States in mid-January 1941 and ar- worsening situation in the Middle East. Gerrived in Palestine on 13 February. He spoke sadly = many’s sudden invasion of countries in Eastern of the “terrible war, the likes of which have never — Europe had not been forgotten by the SOE, and been seen.”“° At the end of July 1941, he again nowit was allowing adequate time to prepare for went to London and from there to the United __ the possibility of the Middle East falling into Axis States. Thus, during 1941 Ben-Gurion spent only hands. In May 1941 a branch of the SOE was es-

about five months in the Yishuv. tablished in Jerusalem. The Cairo center assigned In the early months of 1941 news continued _it the task of creating, together with the Yishuv, to arrive about the worsening military situation cells for information gathering and subversive and the precarious condition of Europe’s Jews, —_ activity in Arab countries. This program of operwhere it was discussed at JAE meetings.*! Onlyin —_ ations echoed the spirit of proposals Sharett had April 1941 did the Yishuv realize that the remote- presented to Major General John G. W. Clark, ness of the Middle East front was temporary. | commander of British forces in Palestine, involvBen-Gurion repeatedly stressed the danger lurk- _ ing the establishment of a parachute unit and a ing at the gates and reaffirmed the seriousness of “fifth column” that would operate in Palestine the military situation in the Middle Eastand Eu- _ following the Nazi occupation.“

rope: Germany’s invasion of Greece and the lat- “93 YORDEI HASIRAH,”

up omission Mgos ; rene i" THE PALESTINE SCHEME, AND cupation of Bulgaria a ayka; and the Rommel’s

advance in North Africa. The fear of “a Nazi in- BUDDING COOPERATION IN TURKEY

vasion of the country” was renewed.” Two notable affairs that occurred in the spring of Ben-Gurion warned his Jewish Agency col- 1941 were “23 Yordei Hasirah” and the Palestine

leagues not to cling to the soothing words by Scheme, which was also known as “Moshe General Wavell that Sharett had heard him utter |= Dayan’s Private Network.” Sharett met with Polin Cairo: “He was expressing his opinion—and __lock, head of the SOE in Cairo, to discuss the esIm not telling you this just to calm the public, — tablishment of Dayan’s network for commando because it doesn’t make me calm—that there’s _ operations in Syria and Lebanon.* They agreed

no danger of Nazi forces encroaching on our _ that it was necessary “to begin sabotage actions country and that if they do, we will stand up to immediately against transport, etc., in Syria and them.” Ben-Gurion said that the British com- Lebanon on the assumption that the Germans mander’s words “were not oracular.” Anyone were certainly about to arrive and everything had reading Churchill’s speech would find a subtle —_ to be done to disturb them and make their arrival hint that the head ofthe British governmenthim- __ difficult.” They also decided that the Yishuv self did not share the confidence of the com- —_ would allocate people for commando action in

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Tripoli (Lebanon) who would operate under a _Jews living in the Caucasus on Turkey’s eastern “de Gaullist cover.” The fighters assigned to this —_ border, and occupants of the southern zones of mission came to be known as the “23 Yordei Russia should be enlisted in the British intelli-

Hasirah.” gence network to gather political and military inSharett also put out feelers concerning the — formation in their respective areas, primarily possibility of extending the northern border of — inside Russia and the Black Sea ports. The SIS Palestine up to the Litani River, which was the _ adopted his suggestion and passed it on to Cairo. “most suitable line of defense against enemy in- They suggested that the agents should be enlisted vasion from the north.” Pollock replied that the — through Sharett and should be trained in Turkey British were considering that possibility. Based before they left for the Caucasus zone.

upon a document that had fallen into British Epstein also agreed to the British request hands, he said the French Vichy army hadalready __ that he spend several weeks in Iran. They greatly decided that the Litani River would become its _ facilitated his journey to Iran during the summer southern line of defense. Wishing to strengthen — of 1941 and he coordinated his activities to suit

the Yishuv against the possibility that Allied — them. In the course of his visit, he developed a forces would withdraw from Palestine, Sharett firm relationship with Walfson (known in the said that “Britain would not be able, under any Yishuv as “Ben Zeev,’ or the Apostate, having circumstances, to justify itself to the civilized converted to Christianity), who was then one of world and the courts of history” if the Jewish — the heads of the SIS in Turkey.” In the summer of settlement in Palestine were simply abandoned 1941 the operations being directed by Joseph Fine to Nazi conquest without any means of defense —_ in Syria and Lebanon were also in full swing: sab-

and without British support. otaging railway stations; attacking fuel dumps; Pollock promised to raise this point with — gathering information and spreading propaWavell. He added that if the operation in Tripoli § ganda.°° At the same time, wireless operators succeeded, “many possibilities would open for continued to be enlisted and trained for Colonel us.” He also supplied Sharett with information § Teague’s intelligence networks.>!

concerning the situation in Iraq following al- From April to May 1941 cooperation beKailani’s takeover as well as Germany’s plans to _ tween the Yishuv and various British authorities

cut off Egypt and Palestine by penetrating into increased, although for the five months BenSyria and Iraq up to the southern city of Basra.In | Gurion was in the Yishuv there is less documenthis way they would isolate Turkey andthencon- _ tation of his involvement in these matters. Thus, quer Egypt and Palestine. Pollock said that the —_ aside from general reports on secret cooperation British were preparing for such a possibility by that he heard at Jewish Agency meetings, there is

reinforcing troops in Iraq.*° no hard evidence of his involvement in authorizDayan’s network had begun operations, ing the establishment of the Dayan network or having participated in the conquest of Isk- the operations of the 23 Yordei Hasirah, which enderun*’ on the Mediterranean coast of Tur- reflected a new phase of cooperation. Sharett rekey’s southern border. At the same time Eli- mained the central figure in directing these oper-

yahu Epstein’s operation in Turkey—mainly ations. involved in expanding intelligence and sabotage Sharett reported even the less dramatic networks in the zone under German controlorin — items to Ben-Gurion and asked for his assessareas designated for occupation—was also con- _—s ment and authorization, but in this instance the tinuing. While visiting Turkey in April 1941, Ep- © documents do not record such reports. Benstein proposed to the SIS there that the Yishuv, | Gurion’s name was not mentioned in the ex-

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change of accusations that sprang up aroundthe _ation of the White paper policies and the cancelactivities of 23 Yordei Hasirah after the war. He _lation of the plan to form a Jewish brigade. The was not even mentioned in the bitter debatessur- fear of a Nazi invasion of Palestine led him to

rounding Hacohen’s book, which condemned concentrate on the establishment of a brigade, the decision-making process preceding the oper- —_ which proved frustrating.

ation. Ben-Gurion’s name surfaced only in dis- Ben-Gurion clearly understood the reasons cussions about compensation for the families of | behind the British authorities’ expansion of secret

those who perished.*? cooperation, but he was not overly enthusiastic Nevertheless, it is possible that during Ben- — about it. Senior British officials in the Middle East Gurion’s stay in the country Sharett gave himthe — were careful to maintain a very controlled form gist of things verbally. Their offices in the Jewish — of cooperation. Almost a year had passed since Agency in Jerusalem were near each other and,as — the Churchill government’s election, and Benwe have seen, they jointly ran the Jewish Agency’s — Gurion rightly concluded that it had no intention

Political Department. It is therefore reasonable — of revising the White Paper policy. Britain reto conclude that Ben-Gurion was aware of the 23 mained firm in its overestimation of the clout the Yordei Hasirah mission and the establishment of | Arab world could muster and did not regard the

the Dayan network. Jewish settlement in Palestine as a true partner Ben-Gurion left the country attheendofJuly — whose vital interests needed to be taken into acand returned to Britain only after several weeks of — count.%4

exhausting travel.*? He gradually lost hope that Apparently such considerations led Benthe Churchill government would change the — Gurion, in early spring 1941, not to take too seriWhite Paper policies and on 11 Novemberi941he — ously the expansion of secret cooperation with sailed for the United States. Available documents the British, which he viewed as a local, limited, do not show that Ben-Gurion was involvedinthe | and opportunistic matter. Recognizing that it secret cooperation with the British during his stay | was impossible to deter Britain from its strategic in London or at the beginning of his stay in the —_ decision not to support the realization of Zionist United States. It is reasonable to wonder why. Af- _—_— aims in Palestine, he laid the groundwork for a

ter all, his colleagues in the operational ex- strategic alternative by shifting his orientation ecutive—Sharett, Meirov (Avigur), Zaslani (Shi- toward the United States.

loah), Golomb, and other personalities in the It seems that it was Reuven Zaslani (Shiloah) Jewish Agency’s Political Department—were — who provided Ben-Gurion with the operational deeply involved in this phase of cooperation and data for a proper assessment. Zaslani was thormost of them were members of Ben-Gurion’s — oughly informed about the progress of the secret close circle. Could it be that this time they neither cooperation, and he was also very disappointed.

reported to nor consulted with him? He found signs that the British intended to orAlthough there can be no definitive answer, — ganize themselves independently in the field, it may be assumed that Ben-Gurion did not have __ without relying on the Yishuv. This was especially anything new to offer once the guidelines had __ true concerning the establishment of a branch of been set at the beginning of the war and againin —_ the SOE in Jerusalem, which seemed to herald London in May 1940. He was essentially disap- _—_— the expansion of cooperation. He saw the inter-

pointed in the British government for its slow- _ nal disagreements in the SOE and arguments ness in developing secret cooperation activities, | with those in charge as clear indications that the which did not meet his expectations even when ___ British upper echelon did not place much value they were formulated, but mainly inthe continu- —_ on secret cooperation with the Yishuv and, in any

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case, preferred to limit itas much as possible. Za- | William Donovan, head of the Office of the Coslani specifically pointed to the “clear intentions — ordinator of Information (OCI). Within a few [of the British high command] to avoid depend- months the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)

ency on us as far as possible.” would supplant this organization. In turn, in 1945 There seems to have been disagreement the OSS would itself be replaced by the Central among those at the top of the Jewish Agency’s Po- _ Intelligence Agency (CIA).

litical Department. There were clear differences in The COI was already working with army and the evaluations presented by Zaslani and Sharett. _ naval intelligence at the time. It was energetically Ben-Gurion was inclined to adopt Zaslani’s oper-_ _—_— seeking its niche in the new wartime reality and

ational evaluations. They confirmed his political | had won the enthusiastic support of President feeling that even Damocles’ sword suspended — Roosevelt, Donovan’s personal friend and proabove the Middle East would not bring Britain to _ tector. In the end the COI won a central position change its basic attitude toward the Yishuv. Ben- _for itself, ultimately employing thousands of Gurion thought that itwasimportanttocontinue — people worldwide.*’

secret cooperation with Britain, but certainly not During his meeting with Donovan—who

to the exclusion of all else. was preoccupied with creating his fiefdom and He therefore left the country convinced that _ possibly also seeking agents, partners, and strateefforts must be directed toward developing coop- _— gic_ contacts—-Ben-Gurion suggested that he erative ties with the United States. Ben-Gurion make use of the Jewish-Zionist global network. had apparently gone to London feeling that only | Donovan asked Ben-Gurion to present the proa miracle could change British policy. This new _ posal in a memo, which Ben-Gurion did within direction was already perceptible inthe meetings _five days. Hinting at the likely channels of coopon security matters he attended in London, espe- _ eration and the possibility of gleaning informacially in his meeting with Winant, the American __ tion from Jews of European origin, he refrained ambassador to London. Ben-Gurion requested = from providing specific details—apparently to his aid in connection with his visit to Washing- —_ avoid having information circulating in the corton. He had pinned his hopes on the United __ ridors of the government and Congress.*®

States, a fact that was reiterated in his letters and Pursuant to his meeting with Donovan, Benspeeches. The 1942 Biltmore Program was the — Gurion activated the U.S. branch of the Jewish clearest political expression of this hope.°® Agency and staffed it with a number of Jews who This change in direction was not merely po- _—sihad worked in the area of American espionage. litical. Ben-Gurion began by promulgating the _In this effort he was aided by several individuals: secret aspect of this new orientation. He made __ Robert Szold, a member of the Emergency Comthe same proposals to the Americans that Weiz- mittee for Zionist Affairs of the American Zionist

mann and he had made to the British in May | Movement; Emanuel Neumann, the Emergency 1940. This was the first step in a struggle that | Committee secretary; Judge Harry M. Fisher; and lasted for ten years. Only after repeated efforts | Arthur Goldberg, a lawyer who was then working did the American leadership and the CIA finally — with the COI and would later work with the OSS.

agree to establish close cooperation withthe State It is possible that Fisher was asked to make a

of Israel and the Mossad. match between Goldberg—his fellow Chicagoan BEN-GURION AND THE OSS and possibly a prewar colleague—and the Jewish Agency in New York.

A week after arriving in the United States (1 De- Arthur Goldberg was asked by the OSS to escember 1941) Ben-Gurion met with General tablish contacts with Socialist organizations in

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Reuven Zaslani (Shiloach), head of the Yishuv intelligence (Ministry of Defense Archive).

Europe and to enlist the aid of espionage, sabo- In an ongoing effort to consolidate the protage, and propaganda agents from among these _cess that had begun with Donovan, Ben-Gurion groups. It will be recalled that Ben-Gurion and = and members of the Jewish Agency’s American his colleagues in the Haganah kept in touch with —_ branch concentrated on Goldberg and, through their European colleagues in the Socialist Inter- him, on Dulles. At Szold’s suggestion Neumann national and made use of them for similar pur- wrote Goldberg on 21 May 1942 to suggest a meetposes. Goldberg was subsequently assigned toa —_ ing with him, the groundwork for which was appost in London and served as one of Allan __ parently laid by Judge Fisher.”

Dulles’s senior partners in establishing the OSS Goldberg and Neumann met a few days ,

in Bern in November 1942. later. This was followed by two meetings in New Dulles, a Princeton graduate anda partner York attended by Dulles, Goldberg, and Neuin an important Wall Street legal firm, was a close mann, at which Neumann detailed the plan for associate of Donovan’s. At the time of Ben- — cooperation between the Jewish Agency and the Gurion’s visit, he was director of the COI officein COI. He mentioned the Zionist movement’s New York. The station he later established in offices in Switzerland, Sweden, Turkey, and other Switzerland became the most important Ameri- _ neutral countries, also disclosing contacts with can espionage location along the German border. _ affiliated organizations (such as the Hechalutz He established working relations there with | movement, the youth movements, and the party members of the Zionist movement and also with cells) in various areas under Nazi occupation.

Eduard Schulte, who was not a member of the Neumann also mentioned secret contacts with movement, but who relayed vitalinformationon British espionage services. He told them that _ the Nazi extermination machine. Among other — Weizmann and Ben-Gurion, who jointly headed things, Dulles was responsible for obtaining im- —_ the Zionist movement, were in New York and portant information on the development plans _ that Ben-Gurion, who was in charge of the exec-

for the V-1 and V-2 missiles.®! utive body, would be leaving the United States

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within a few weeks. Neumann pointed out that _plicitly stated that the establishment of a Jewish Ben-Gurion could order the implementation of — State in the near future was the aim of the Zionist any plan for cooperation and recommended a movement. Second, the Yishuv and the Zionist meeting with him. He handed them amemohe movement had begun to move toward secret co-

had prepared on the subject. operation with the United States, the rising world Dulles’s attitude seemed positive.On 8 June power, in the hope that it would develop into a he wrote to his Washington colleagues saying __ close political and operational partnership.®

that he estimated that contact with the Zionist In October 1942 Ben-Gurion returned from movement would be a “most valuable source of the United States to find a familiar duality charinformation” and recommended examining the _acterizing secret cooperation with Britain. On ~ proposal. Wishing to examine the situation from the one hand, in mid-1942 cooperation in the every angle, he asked for more information on running of the investigation office and the enlistthe Zionist movement and its activities in the —_ ing of wireless operators® was continuing, and United States. Indeed, Dulles was warned about __ there was much progress in setting up the Dayan the possible consequences of cooperating with network. On the other hand, in May 1942 (before the Zionists in terms of the reaction of the Arab Ben-Gurion’s return from the United States) reworld. Dulles was not alarmed. Herepliedthathe —_lations had grown very cool when it was discovwas aware of Arab hostility, but that he and his ered that Palmah training in the Ben Shemen people nevertheless thought that it was possible —_ forests had deviated considerably from what had to obtain important information from the Jewish — been agreed upon with the SOE.” The British, as-

Agency without being identified with its aims. suming a self-righteous manner, had “discovAround May-June 1942 Ben-Gurion met ered” that the Yishuv was working toward its own with senior officials in the U.S. Department of goals. Those in the British camp who had been Defense. (One cannot entirely rule out the possi- = opposed to this cooperation warned even more bility of aconnection between these meetingsand —= emphatically of the high cost involved.

the proposals made by Ben-Gurion and Neu- However, all this was overshadowed by the mann to Donovan and Dulles.) In his talks with fact that Jews in Europe were being systematically these officials Ben-Gurion tried to convincethem __ slaughtered by the Nazis. This realization totally that the Yishuv would prove a loyal ally to the —_ altered the context for evaluating everything, inUnited States in the Middle East, and that the —_ cluding secret cooperation. Of what use were all branches of the Zionist movement would assistits the joint communications and intelligence netwar effort. At this very moment other branchesof —_ works? All, without exception, were powerless to the government were questioning whether Ben- _—_ stop what was really going on in Europe. From

Gurion’s activities in the United States would _ the point of view of information gathering and

prove harmful to American interests. processing, this was an intelligence crisis of enorAfter the disappointment encountered with = mous proportions. The dire limitations of these Churchill and his government, a new strategic intelligence systems were fully revealed when process was taking shape in1942.Itwouldappear — they had to contend with events that had no that Ben-Gurion had decided on this strategy by —_ precedent in human history.

the muddle of 1941, which crystallized as a result UPDATING COOPERATION of his fruitless stay in London at the end of that

year. There were two main revelationsinthenew On his way back from the United States, Benapproach. First, in the Biltmore Program (which Gurion acquainted himself with recent developwould become the Jerusalem Program) it wasex- — ments in the sphere of secret cooperation. When

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he reached Cairo, he met Reuven Zaslani (Shi- _ tionship lasted for many years. In 1934 Hos had

loah) and also tried to locate “Dr. Frederick characterized Domville as the country’s “best Simons,” the alias of Enzo Sereni, who was serv- Zionist informer on the English.”7!

ing in the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) in For Zaslani and his colleagues Domville reCairo, but Sereni had already returned to the —s mained an important source of information and

Yishuv.® served as a sounding board for gauging British Ben-Gurion’s meeting with Zaslaniin Cairo _ reactions to new Jewish Agency requests or ideas.

was important in terms of bringing him up to Domville helped the agency prepare the grounddate. Zaslani remained a central figure in secret work for new initiatives, but he expected somecooperation activities between the Yishuv and thing in return for his services. He gathered the British. He arrived in Cairo inthe autumn of information and evaluations from the Yishuv 1942 in order to explore the possibility of incor- _—_ leaders. His superiors in the British army and porating the Palmah in the intelligence and sab- _ civilian government also used him to gauge the otage network the SOE intended to establish in _ reactions of the Yishuv leaders to ideas raised by the Fertile Crescent® and reinstating the broad __ the British camp.”? Through Domville Zaslani plan of cooperation with the SOE following the | became known to other British intelligence offic-

May crisis. This plan included the training of — ers at army headquarters in Jerusalem. One of three special Palmah units that had been estab- them was John James Lawson, a member of the lished in the interim: the Arab section, which = RAF, who was one of Zaslani’s British partners in would be the (Arabized) infiltration unit, the activating the Parachutists’ Scheme in 1943. German section, and the Balkan section. These At the beginning of 1938, Domville was transcommando units were trained to work behind __ ferred to another post in Iraq, but his contacts enemy lines according to their geographic desig- | with Zaslani, Epstein, and others were mainnation.”? Ben-Gurion laconically wrote in his di- —_ tained. Epstein supplied him with information ary that he had “been busy all day [with Zaslani].” and evaluations of the Pan-Arabic movement. Most likely he had updated Ben-Gurion on de- — Domville asked for their help in enlisting German velopments during the past eighteen months, in _and Italian agents and local inhabitants to serve addition to the plans discussed during his cur- _ British intelligence interests in the Middle East.”

rent visit. Following rioting against Jews in Baghdad, ZaThe next day Ben-Gurion met with Patrick — slani asked Domville to help him plan a secret Domville—a central figure in the secret dealings visit. Their correspondence was often personal in Zaslani conducted with the British—and Tony _ nature; for example, Zaslani and his wife congratSimmonds of British intelligence. As usual in —_ ulated Domville on having survived the uprisings such circumstances, he was under a self-imposed __ in Iraq at the time.”4

vow of secrecy (which extended to his diary, a Before the meeting between Domville and much-sought-after source of information) and —_ Ben-Gurion, Zaslani and Domville discussed a did not provide any details of what had tran- _ proposal to expand the framework of secret co-

spired. operation. Domville warned Zaslani that such a Domville’s acquaintance with Zaslani, Hos, —_ request would raise suspicions among those op-

Epstein, and others in the Yishuv’s intelligence | posed to such cooperation with the Yishuv and and security network went back to the early thir- might cause them to demand an end to it.”> Apties. He was then a political officer at British = parently Ben-Gurion wanted to hear Domville’s Army headquarters in Jerusalem, and Zaslani = opinion with his own ears. Three months later, was Domville’s interpreter. Their special rela- | when the agency leadership was discussing the

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plan to send parachutists to Europe in the guise __ both officers in the SOE. He wrote in his diary of “commando units,” Ben-Gurion vented his _ that their talk had revolved around the “relationfrustration by claiming the idea was “a mockery __ ship between the English and the Jewish soldier,” of the poor.” Perhaps this echoed Domville’s ad- but most probably they spoke about intelligence

vice “not to exaggerate.” matters as well. Eban was the liaison officer The same day Zaslani and Ben-Gurion met between SOE headquarters in Jerusalem and the with Colonel Tony Simmonds. In mid-September Jewish Agency’s Political Department and the 1941 Simmonds concluded his duties and said a Haganah. In his memoirs Eban describes his imfond farewell to his Yishuv partners. Simmonds __ pressions following the first meeting with Benwrote to “Moshe” (Sharett) that he had been ap- — Gurion, which was part of a round of introducpointed to a new post and that before he left he — tions Reuven Zaslani had arranged for him wanted to thank Sharett and his staff for their | immediately upon arrival:

help, which had been offered in the honest and ,

warmhearted spirit of participation in the general Foe He ae nome oi war effort against the Nazis. He also asked him to den t by looking even smaller than

convey his special thanks to Reuven Zaslani and how