Arrows in the dark: David Ben-Gurion, the Yishuv leadership, and rescue attempts during the Holocaust, Vol. 2 9780299175535, 9780299175504

Table of contents :
Frontmatter
8. "A One-in-a-Million Chance": Attempts to Rescue Hungarian Jewry and Negotiations toward the End of the War (page 3)
9. Bombing to Deter and Stultify (page 71)
Part III. Financing of Rescue Attempts and Assistance
10. At the Edge of the Abyss: Financial Maneuvers by Ben-Gurion and Kaplan, 1942-1943 (page 89)
11. Financing Aid and Rescue Activity in Liberated Europe (page 117)
12. The Jewish Agency Budget and Fund-raising Appeals in Palestine (page 129)
13. Fund-raising Campaigns Abroad (page 151)
14. Money Transfers (page 173)
15. Funding Aid and Rescue Operations: A Summary (page 189)
Conclusion (page 195)
Notes (page 221)
Bibliography (page 241)
Names Index (page 257)
Subject Index (page 273)

Citation preview

ARROWS IN THE DARK

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David Ben-Gurion, the Yishuv Leadership, and Rescue Attempts during the Holocaust

VOLUME 2

Tuvia Friling Translated by Ora Cummings

THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN PRESS

This book was published with the support of Ben Gurion University of the Negev and the Shalem Center in Jerusalem. The University of Wisconsin Press 1930 Monroe Street Madison, Wisconsin 53711

www.wisc.edu/wisconsinpress/ 3 Henrietta Street London WC2E 8LU, England Copyright © 2005 The Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System All rights reserved

54321

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Friling, Tuvia. [Hets ba-arafel. English] Arrows in the dark: David Ben-Gurion, the Yishuv leadership, and rescue attempts during the Holocaust / Tuvia Friling [translated by Ora Cummings]. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-299-17550-2 (hc) 1. World War, 1939-1945—Jews—Rescue. 2. Holocaust, Jewish (1939-1945) 3. Jews—Palestine—Politics and government—20th century. 4. Ben-Gurion, David, 1886-1973. I. Title. D804.6 .F7513 2003 940.53 1835—dc21

2003008907

In memory of my father, Haron Ben-Avra’am, and my mother, Ida-Yehudit May they rest in peace

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Contents

8. “A One-in-a-Million Chance”: Attempts to Rescue Hungarian Jewry

and Negotiations toward the End of the War 3 9. Bombing to Deter and Stultify 71

Part III. Financing of Rescue Attempts and Assistance 10. At the Edge of the Abyss: Financial Maneuvers by Ben-Gurion and

Kaplan, 1942-1943 89 11. Financing Aid and Rescue Activity in Liberated Europe 117 12. The Jewish Agency Budget and Fund-raising Appeals in Palestine 129

13. Fund-raising Campaigns Abroad 151

14.Money Transfers 173 15. Funding Aid and Rescue Operations: ASummary 189

Conclusion 195

Notes 221 Bibliography 241 Names Index 257 Subject Index 273

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ARROWS IN THE DARK

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8

“A One-in-a-Million Chance” Attempts to Rescue Hungarian Jewry and Negotiations at War's End

() 19 Istanbul. May 1944 a German plane landed in decision making, initiation and direction of the Two men disembarked. The first | operation, devising general policies, and graspwas a small-time industrialist named Joel Brand, —_ ing the minutest details.

a daredevil rescue activist and member of the Aid The various problems involved in efforts to and Rescue Committee in Budapest, founded by __ rescue Jews seemed to have been reached a peak a group of Hungary’s Jews. The second was our __ during the weeks following Brand’s arrival from rather dubious friend Bandi Grosz, a Jewish con- |= Hungary. Since Brand’s ransom plan was the

vert to Catholicism, a thief and smuggler of _ third of its kind, the JAE behaved and reacted in goods and foreign currency, anda partnerinvar- —_ accordance with previously created patterns.

ious straw companies. He worked for both the Among the active groups, the American JDC Abwehr and the Hungarian military intelligence | and the War Refugee Board played a prominent services, was one of the agents handled by Kollek —_ role. The JDC, a non-Zionist philanthropic sociand Avriel, and was an agent in the Dogwood _ ety, was willing to participate secretly in activities web. Without a doubt, he was a multifaceted — that violated American law. The War Refugee

character.! Board, on the other hand, entered the campaign

Brand and Grosz each bore messages from — with a display of courage, but its involvement the Germans. Brand had known Grosz in Hun- __ ended within a relatively short time with a show gary, but he was only to learn the purpose of his — of weakness.

present journey sometime later.” The arrival of For about a year prior to Brand’s arrival in Brand and Grosz opened a second actinapainful Istanbul in May 1944, the Yishuv emissaries had

and multifaceted drama lasting exactly two been experiencing unfortunate results while opmonths (until 19 July 1944), ending in a bitter erating a dubious courier network in collaborafashion when Brand’s ransom proposal? was tion with the Americans and the British in Istanleaked to the Western press. The drama had its bul. By late 1943 Avriel was called for a review good and bad guys, high andlowspots,moments following the discovery that Germans had of hope and despair, trust and suspicion, anda __ infiltrated the web. Structural faults in the secret dramatic plot that stretched across four conti- —_— collaboration with the Allies were also apparent nents. In the final analysis, the Brand plan did __ by the time Brand’s proposal was discussed.

not materialize. The Jews of Hungary, the largest A mysterious invitation sent to Menahem group still remaining in Europe, were led at Bader to visit Berlin was another important sign breakneck speed to Auschwitz, where some __ of this tortuous affair, which was linked to simi437,000 were slaughtered by the end ofthe occu- _ lar contacts made in the Iberian peninsula and pation. Some of those who remained died during = Sweden. In studying this labyrinth of events, I the infamous “death march” of November 1944. shall examine the JAE’s policies in order to deterNotwithstanding all the research into this = mine ifit did indeed shoot “an arrow in the dark,” subject, there is still no clear answer to the ques- as Kaplan put it, so long as there was even a one tion of how substantial Brand’s proposal really in a million chance of rescuing Jews.

was. However, documentation of the affair Much has been written about this ransom clearly shows Ben-Gurion’s deep involvement in _ plan, in the form of newspaper articles, memoirs

3

Rescue Plans

and eyewitness testimonies,adocumentary-style | with attempts to rescue Hungary’s Jews—none book, and stage plays.‘ Many unsolved riddles — of which succeeded.

remain despite state-of-the art research, which An outstanding proposal was variously only adds to the enigma. In this respect,onemust known as “goods for blood” (German “Blut gecarefully distinguish between what we know to- — gen Waren” or “Waren fiir Blut”) or the Brand day in hindsight and what the heroes and deci- _— plan, named after the emissary who brought it sion makers knew at the time about the situation to the notice of the Yishuv leadership. Its main

in Hungary and the motives and plans of the points were first disclosed to the rescue emis-

Nazis. saries in Istanbul on 19 May 1944. It is more than This methodological distinction is also valid _ likely that it was proposed by Heinrich Himmler

with regard to shorter time periods, including himself. weeks or even days. One should be guided by this It was the third ransom plan to be received fact when analyzing the various stages of what __ by the Yishuv. Joel Brand, a key member of the was known to the story’s participants. Thus, the | Aid and Rescue Committee in Budapest,° arrived information at Brand’s disposal upon his arrival — in Istanbul on 19 May 1944 and presented the in Istanbul differed from that at his departure for | main points of the plan to the local Yishuv emisSyria. What he knew in Aleppo (Syria) was diff- _ saries. They decided to send Venja Pomeranz erent from what he knew when he submitted var- home immediately, and five days later he arrived

ious versions of later testimony. with his report on the proposal. From then until The ransom proposal presented by Brand _it was given to the press and removed from the and the developments it led to departed in agenda (19 July 1944), it was examined from all significant ways from the original defined angles and every effort was made by senior memboundaries. The repercussions of earlier ransom __ bers in the Yishuv to put it into action. Benplans were more moderate. The offshoots of the | Gurion was deeply involved, as were Kaplan, affair and the chain reaction it caused seriously Sharett, Gruenbaum, and the rest of the JAE affected the lives of those who were involved init | members. All the senior emissaries were inand even altered the history of the State of Israel. | volved, together with the head of the Yishuv’s In addition, the affair was of greatimportance as __ secret apparatus.

a dramatic and concentrated symbol of the tragic IN THE SHADOW OF THE GERMAN absurdity facing the Yishuv in its effort to rescue the Jews of Europe. It reveals the inherent reasons

. OCCUPATION OF HUNGARY

for failure and illustrates the way in which the The fate of Hungarian Jewry under German ocYishuv and its leaders faced insurmountable ob- cupation was discussed in two JAE meetings held stacles whenever they attempted to halt the Nazi on 26 March and 2 April 1944. The March debate

|4

murder machine. took place one week after the invasion, which THE BRAND AND GROSZ AFFAIR Ben-Gurion defined as a “sign of new calamity.” He felt that pressure must be leveled against

On 19 March 1944, exactly two months before _ Britain to increase the quota of certificates for the

Brand and Grosz arrived in Istanbul, German rescue of Zionists from Hungary and Jews from armies invaded Hungary (Operation Margarete). the Balkans. To this end, the Yishuv delegation The process began of turning Hungary from a__had to be reinforced with a special emissary, Dr.

“paradise” for its Jews® into a land in which the — Mordechai Eliash, and ex-Romanian or Hungar“final solution” was put into action. The four or — ian Jews. Ben-Gurion also proposed increasing five months preceding the summer were filled _ the rescue budget. Shortly afterward the JAE de-

“A One-in-a- Million Chance”

cided to allocate an intermediate sum equal to _ pope. In Ben-Gurion’s speech to the JAE on 26

100,000 Palestinian pounds. March 1944, therefore, he combined past activity Ben-Gurion may have referred to the Zion- _ with future plans. The more secret issues, such as ists in Hungary (as opposed to the Jews of the _ self-defense, were mentioned very generally and Balkans), under the assumption that, notwith- _ only briefly.’

standing the death sentence hanging over Hun- The Palestine office in Hungary was also a garian Jews in general, the assimilated among _ focal point for pressure and criticism. Thus, them were not yet fully aware of the need to es- | Hungarian Po’alei Zion members demanded of

cape. In addition, there was a preference for Ben-Gurion, Kaplan, and Dobkin, representaZionist activists. When the line to leave got __ tives of their sister party in the JAE, that staff longer, this became the way out for everyone in — changes be made in the Budapest office. Their

the Jewish nation.’ letter reflected political tensions among the This debate and several more in the JAE and Zionists, who comprised no more than 5 percent other Yishuv bodies took place under the grow- _ of the entire Hungarian Jewish population!!°

ing pressure of ex-Hungarian Jews in Palestine. Throughout this period reports kept flowing Ben-Gurion met with one of them four days after | into Ben-Gurion’s office from various sources the invasion, when he was asked to increase the = concerning Germany’s decision to treat Hunimmigration certificates allocated to Hungarian _— gary’s Jews “the way [they did the Jews] in Jews, to increase financial aid sent by the Yishuv, — Poland.” First steps in this direction had already and to urge the pope to exert diplomatic pressure been taken: Jews were either concentrated in against Hungary (“since the Hungarian nationis _—_ ghettoes or transferred to areas under fire; their very orthodox”). He was informed of the need property was confiscated; and veteran Zionists for self-defense and the fact that Tito andhispeo- —_— were arrested.!! Public protests and fund-raising

ple could help. in the wake of this news have already been disVarious types of cooperation were discussed —_ cussed.!*

with Tito both before and after the German inva- GRUENBAUM SUGGESTS MAKING sion. One of the more important discussions—

Weizmann’s talks with Churchill on the aid CONTACT WITH THE DEVIL

requested by Tito for Hungarian Jewish refugees— — Brand’s proposal was not the first to suggest the began as a proposal sent by Joseph to Sharetton22 _ possibility that the rescue of the Jews of Hungary March 1944, a day after Ben-Gurion’s meeting with = might be accomplished through negotiations the representatives of ex-Hungarian Jewry. Joseph with the Germans. At a JAE meeting held on 2 also suggested that the JAE in London ask the Allies April 1944 Yitzhak Gruenbaum, chairman of the to warn the Hungarian government that it would = Rescue Committee and one of the General Zionbe punished for aiding in the persecution of Jews.® ists’ leaders, proposed that the JAE contact the Acquiescing to some of the requests, three © German representative in Istanbul to determine

days later Ben-Gurion proposed increasing the the cost of “halting the extermination of all the number of certificates and the budget, since “the —_ remaining Jews in Europe.” The German invaentire nation is not poisoned and something can sion of Hungary was, of course, the immediate

sometimes be done with the money.” He also backdrop to this proposal. supported the proposal to involve the West and The Gruenbaum proposal constituted the the pope in preventing the murders. In March dying embers of the Europa Plan, which had been 1943 Kaplan had asked Vatican staffmember An- _ removed from the agenda several months earlier gelo Roncalli to pass along a similar request to the and had also referred to all the surviving Jews in

5

Rescue Plans

Europe. Gruenbaum assumed that persons could Moshe Shapira and David Ben-Gurion took be found in the shaky Third Reich who cared —_a moderate stand. Shapira, who belonged to the about their own personal future and that oftheir © Hamizrahi party, did not reject outright the idea country. This assessment was based on earlier — of contact with the Nazis, suggesting it be done feedback from political and intelligence sources through Ira Hirschmann, the representative of and upon contacts with people within the Nazi the War Refugee Board (WRB) in Istanbul. Benhierarchy itself. Ben-Gurion, Sharett,and Kaplan Gurion opposed Gruenbaum’s proposal. The even gave strict instructions to Bader to “make — superpowers’ policies, which demanded the un-

contact with the devil” if necessary." conditional surrender of Germany, negated any Gruenbaum proposed that Jewish Agency — chance of their supporting such a proposal. people in the United States urge the Rooseveltad- | Moreover, they would blame us, claiming that ministration to suggest to Germany that it “re- “for the sake a few Jews we were willing to forgive frain from deporting to Poland the Jews of the — the Germans for everything.”

Balkans that are now falling into their hands,” Ben-Gurion supervised the activity of Zaconcentrate them in special camps, and give _ slani, Kollek, and Avriel. One can therefore safely them the “status of ‘enemies’ imprisoned during assume that his words here were a pretext for getthe war period.” The Yishuv would finance their —_‘ ting out of this debate. Furthermore, Gruen-

upkeep. Such an idea had been raised in 1943 baum’s proposal was adopted to a significant and was again discussed several times thereafter. It extent. The JAE decided to seek indirect channels

can be assumed that Gruenbaum hoped that to the Germans through Hirschmann, who had such pressure would prove fruitfulin the United to “find ways of presenting things to the enemy’s States, where President Roosevelt hopedtobere- —_—s representatives in Ankara.” It was decided to inelected for a fourth term. A War Refugee Board __ struct the Palestine office in Istanbul to “ask the

had been established only four months previ- German government not to deport Jews from ously in response to domestic political pressure the Balkans to Poland, but rather to concentrate and it was believed at the time that itwould bean — them in special camps under the supervision of

effective body. the Red Cross.” Gruenbaum’s proposal to apply

The JAE’s reactions were mixed. Some mem- to the Americans was not adopted. It is not imbers objected for emotional reasons. Dobkin felt possible that the version of the conclusions conthat Gruenbaum’s proposal to negotiate directly sulted is incomplete, and it is quite possible that with the Nazis was “simply shameful.” He asked —__ decisions were reached that were not recorded in rhetorically, “Could we be offering pitytotheGer- —_ the minutes or were not mentioned at the meet-

mans?” Dr. Werner Senator rejected in principle __ ing itself. These were the sorts of subjects that the possibility that “a Jew should appear before |= were meant to be hidden from the eagle-eyed

von Papen,’ Germany’s ambassador to Turkey. British.

There was a great distance between the Pomeranz arrived in Palestine on 24 May worlds of Zaslani, Kollek, and their colleagues, 1944. The information he presented concerning a who acted on instructions issued by Ben-Gurion, | newransom plan completely altered preparations Kaplan, and Sharett, and that reflected the senti- for coping with the threat to Hungarian Jewry.'® ments of Dobkin and Senator. Within three = There was an air of urgency in Istanbul. As soon as months history would make them allalaughing- — the emissaries had decided to send Pomeranz stock by placing Dobkin himself face to face with = home, they attempted to inform the Yishuv that a similar proposal for direct negotiations with he was on his way and to report back on the new

the Nazis in Lisbon. proposal. Chaim Barlas asked Steinhardt, the 6

“A One-in-a-Million Chance”

U.S. ambassador to Turkey, to help in dispatching __ in their British and American colleagues. As we , the information, and Avriel and Schind asked the __ shall see, their suspicion was not misplaced.

same of their friends Whittall and Gibson.!” Pomeranz arrived in Palestine, visited briefly

, with his family in Kibbutz Ramat Rachel, and was

A NOTE HIDDEN IN A TUBE amediatel y ad by TeddyeKellek immediately accompanie OueK to a

OF SHAVING CREAM AND | y ae yey ; night meeting with Ben-Gurion and Sharett. He

POMERANZ’S REPORT , ,

handed them a note, hidden in a tube of shaving Without the help of the Americans or the British, | cream, in which the emissaries outlined the reathere was no quick way to reach Palestine or pass _—_ sons for his sudden appearance in Palestine: along a message. The information was conveyed

through several channels, one of which was The emissary’s journey is suddenly urPinkerton, the American consul in Jerusalem, gent, with regard to the arrival of [Comwho phoned the JAE on 24 May with a message rade] Brand, who has brought the most for Sharett: “Be waiting at Lod for a special mis- distressing news of the situation of the sion regarding Hungary. Prepare an urgent meet- Jews in Hungary. That which we have ing of the JAE on Wednesday evening. Prepare for dreaded has befallen us in a way that we

a sudden trip to Kushta [Istanbul].”!8 . could not have imagined. Indeed, the The British proposed that Pomeranz fly to plan, which is aimed at alleviation and Cairo and make his way from there to Palestine. rescue, is presented to us in the form of a Pomeranz hesitated, consulted with Avriel, and satanic plan that we were unable to disfinally decided to reject the offer for fear of being cuss without first showing it to you. The held up in Cairo. He preferred to travel by way of [comrade] emissary will give you all the

Beirut and then on to Palestine.!? This clearly re- details, which speak and cry out for veals that Pomeranz and his friends had no faith themselves, and you must consider the

a ey

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3 e e eaeeee3.ee

revealed that Brand’s mission was in trouble. _ several days before Ben-Gurion decided to report Feri” said his proposal had come from SS officer _ to the JAE."8 From this point on the affair underHermann Krumey, the “head of the anti-Jewish went endless ramifications, and to this day there activity in Hungary,’ who was “a ‘fair’ man in his is much that is still unknown.

os » : ° « * >> ° . : eo e ca » cc € . > e eo ° e LJ 3

opinion. Krumey asked why a Yishuv emissary Feri,’ about whom the Yishuv emissaries shouldn't come to Hungary to conduct direct reported to Ben-Gurion, was none other than

e e ° 4 e °° e

negotiations. He stressed that such an emissary Ferenc Bagyoni, emissary and aide to the Hun-

° e ( . e. .eoee°s ee>ee e

°e°

would be assured safe conduct home. garian military attaché in Bulgaria, Lieutenant

Ben-Gurion went on to report that Bader — Colonel Otto Hatz, the Abwehr agent known as did receive a telegram from Budapest on 23 June Jasmine” who had managed to infiltrate the in which he was invited to conduct direct negoti- | Dogwood network. Hatz’s close relations with _ ations. The telegram closed with a promise that the Germans became clear toward the end of further details would arrive soon. Zaslani in Is- summer 1944, which signaled one of the main tanbul sent out all this information on 28 June, _ nails in the web’s coffin. Bagyoni was also at-

“A One-in-a-Million Chance”

tached to the Dogwood network, where he was _ distinctions between one type of loyalty and angiven the name “Pink.” As we shall see, Bagyoni’s other that had been sold elsewhere. If one wishes name was also linked to an attempt to open an- —_— to name the independent sources of intelligence other channel for the rescue of Jews from Sweden used by Britain and the United States, one should

at the end of 1944. place Hatz alongside Grosz in this respect. Hatz The third member of the group of Hungar- _ belonged to a group of ex-Abwehr agents (the ian agents was Lothar Kévess,!2° who introduced — others were Laufer, Bagyoni, and Kévess) who himself to Kollek and Avriel during 1943. After | were now in the employ of the SS in Budapest.

Hatz was discovered, Kévess replaced him in the The Nazi counterparts to this group also Dogwood network and was assigned the name _ included the shadowy “Consul Stiller,” a mystery “Jacaranda.” Kévess, who belonged to a politi- © man who had attached himself to the German cally prominent Hungarian family, was a British — consulate in Istanbul. As we shall see, Stiller also agent and had excellent connections among the — approached Bader witha similar proposal to hold Nazi agents. He worked for the Socony Vacuum _ direct negotiations between the Yishuv and auOil Company in Istanbul, whose general man- ___ thorized Nazi officials. Stiller invited Bader to

ager was Archibald Walker, a member of the Berlin rather than Budapest.

American OSS.!2! A review of the German camp in Istanbul, Following the German occupation of Hun- |= Hungary, Germany, and other countries reveals gary, the SS played a central role in the new ad- _—a very motley bunch of senior Nazi officers and

ministration and took control of organizations officials. One of them was Bruno Peter Kleist, formerly managed by the local Abwehr. In April | who had been sent to Stockholm by Joachim von 1944, shortly after the invasion, theSSsummoned Ribbentrop, Germany’s foreign minister, and Hatz, Bagyoni, and Kévess to Budapest. The three = was apparently also in the service of Heinrich were arrested on 3 May and released on 26 May. Himmler. He was letting it be known, to a Among other things, the SS was interested inlo- _ greater or lesser degree, that certain circles in the cating pro-West cells in Hungary in order to de- —‘ Nazi hierarchy were interested in developing a stroy or utilize them for their own ends.!” dialogue with the West through discussions with After their release, the three probably be- the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine or other Jewish came agents on behalf of the Budapest SS group. — organizations.!*

This is important for a proper understanding of THE FIRST PROPOSAL RECEIVED BY

the future stages of the affair and, in particular, for deciphering the meaning of Bagyoni’s (Feri’s) BADER ARRIVES IN JERUSALEM messages. Who handed them over to the SS and To return to Ben-Gurion’s report to the JAE rewho helped set them free? Probably “Direktor garding Bader’s invitation to enter into direct ne-

Schréder” (Laufer), who had made great inroads gotiations in Budapest, about which he had in the new Hungarian administration. Beginning learned a few days earlier from Zaslani in Istanas a double agent handled by the Abwehr in the bul,!*4 Ben-Gurion pointed out that this developBritish, American, and Yishuv espionage net- _—sment had to be reported to the regional intelliworks in Istanbul, Laufer had risen to a position gence unit and from there to the command in

of importance in the Budapest SS group. Cairo. Ben-Gurion chose not to disclose to his Laufer knew everyone within the German, colleagues that Tony Simmonds, who sympaHungarian, and Jewish Yishuv systems. He was _ thized with the Jewish and Zionist issue, was the

intimately familiar with their agents and couri- one to forward Zaslani’s letter. The practical ers, their operational norms, and knewthe subtle _ significance of such a service was quite clear at

35

Rescue Plans

this stage of the war and the rescue attempts: at — very idea of making demands: “Mr. Gruenbaum least some of the British secret service personnel —_ appears to have forgotten that we are dealing with were aware of the letter’s contents even before — wild animals here. Our men can only point out carrying out Zaslani’s request to pass it along to —_ that continued deportations might complicate ne-

the regional intelligence unit. gotiations.”!*5 Kaplan was similarly opposed to After pointing out Zaslani’s request, Ben- _ Bader’s trip to Hungary. The JAE decided to turn Gurion made two comments that are crucialtoa —_ over the new information to the Mandatory govproper understanding of future developments. | ernment in Jerusalem and to Sharett in London, to The first revealed that “our people in Kushta [Is- _ instruct Bader to await Kaplan’s arrival in Turkey, tanbul] were not sufficiently tight-lipped, and = and to ban him from going to Hungary for the this might place us in an uncomfortable situa- _ time being.!”°

tion. The second, an aside, noted that “Mr. Shaul A BAN OR A CONTINGENT BAN? Meirov is leaving for Kushta today and he can take our reply with him,” and added that Kaplan That same day Ben-Gurion cabled Sharett in

was scheduled to leave three days later. London regarding new developments in IstanBen-Gurion raised Bader’s question of bul, but from this document and from the little whether to accept the invitation to Hungary. After that was said at the JAE meeting it is to be asregistering his own opposition, he gave his col- sumed that more decisions were almost certainly leagues a chance to have their say, sinceSharett was reached, as were other conclusions that were not still trying to persuade Britain and the United recorded or discussed in official forums in the States to negotiate with the Nazis. (That very presence of more than a few people. morning news had arrived from London that the This can be gleaned from several clues. First proposal was being given serious consideration.) among these are the obvious hints at the difficulBen-Gurion also said that the Foreign Office _ ties involved in concealing Bagyoni’s offer to might allow Brand and Grosz to return to Hun- ___ Bader. Recall that Ben-Gurion pointed out the gary, and the British had not ruled out a meeting ___ difficulty involved in keeping the new developwith the enemy. He was also convinced thataslong = ment secret and expressed considerable dissatis-

as the superpowers had not totally rejected the _ faction at the transparency of the Istanbul operpossibility of Brand returning withareplyofsome — ation. He probably already knew quite a bit sort, the JAEshould not contemplate enteringinto | about that crowded city. Zaslani himself had

independent negotiations with the enemy. given orders to forward this classified informaGruenbaum was also opposed to Bader’s _ tion to the British and even used them himself to journey and had not changed his position since __ pass along “information.” As in earlier cases, he the beginning of the affair: no negotiation withthe — had no choice and Ben-Gurion knew this. It is Nazis as long as the deportations continue. Ac- — even possible that Zaslani had discovered that cording to recent information, said Gruenbaum, __ the British already knew about Bader’s invitation thirty-five thousand Jews remained stranded in from its own sources. Zaslani did not “volunteer Hungary at that time. If his demand was not met, —_— information.” He passed on only what he con-

he feared that it would be a short while before sidered was already known or would soon be there would be no one left to negotiate over. Ben- known from other sources. Under the circumGurion, who also objected to Bader’s journey as__ stances, this was not an unfounded assumption,

long as there was a chance of agreement with the nor was it easy to keep such information Americans and the British, rejected both the claim ___ classified either. Britain and the United States on which Gruenbaum based his objectionandthe — were “on the tail” of the Yishuv leaders in Tel

36

“A One-in-a-Million Chance”

Aviv and Jerusalem, especially with regard to __ ban against his trip to Budapest).!”8 Juggling of

these subjects. !?7 this sort could only succeed only if the British It is obvious that Ben-Gurion was extremely | and American friends of the Yishuv emissaries

uncomfortable conducting a debate on so hadno inkling of its classified aspect, which concharged an issue where the opening steps were __ tradicted its obvious one. This would explain exposed to the British. There can be no doubt — Ben-Gurion’s heightened insistence on secrecy at that he was reluctant to conduct itinsuchapub- __ this stage. lic arena as the JAE. A possible conclusion here There was nothing really new in all this. The is that Ben-Gurion was obliged to present the —_-Yishuv leaders had behaved similarly on other isappearance of being openly opposed. The emis- sues, such as concealing weapons, military trainsaries activity was transparent to the British be- _—ing of the Palmah, the illegal-immigration opera-

cause they depended on the latter’s services. tion, land purchase, and long-term economic Moreover, it is almost certain that Britainandthe _ planning. Although the Jewish Agency proclaimed United States knew of Bagyoni’s offer to Bader __ that it was not involved in illegal activity, it most

from their own sources. Thus, it was important certainly was. Here, too, it presented itself as a not to appear irresponsible, not to act likesome- _ partner with “clean hands,” but in reality it was seone capable of helping the enemy “in hisnarrow __ cretly making plans for semiautonomous action. objectives” and by doing soto playintothehands —_ A typical example of this is the case of the emissary of hostile groups within the American and — who was captured on his way to Greece.

British administrations at a time when no deci- A second clue was Meirov’s and Kaplan’s sion had yet been reached in London and Wash- _— mission to Istanbul. Although this had been

ington. planned beforehand—several days after ShaOn the other hand, past experience had __rett’s report on the meetings in Aleppo they were proven that no faith should be placed in the —_ already making plans for a higher-level political United States and Britain on the issue of rescuing = and operational headquarters in Istanbul—it is Jews. Thus, Ben-Gurion was obliged toengagein not farfetched to assume that the news of Baga subtle juggling act: to give Britain and the —_yoni’s proposal to Bader speeded up these prepaUnited States the information—it might already rations. A top-ranking team was again being asbe in their possession and not sharing it could — sembled in the Turkish city: Kaplan and Meirov complicate the Yishuv’s relations with the West, — were about to set off; Zaslani had preceded them; whose help was essential in all stagesoftherescue —_ Avriel (leader of the courier web, who accompaoperation—while at the same time examining a __ nied Brand to Aleppo and then came to Palessemiautonomous plan, based on developments __ tine) and Pomeranz were preparing to return to

involving Bader, in the hope of supplying the —‘ Istanbul. Having learned of the Bagyoni procontumelious superpowers with a “pre-cooked __ posal, Sharett, Zaslani, Kollek, Schind, and othdish” they would be hard-pressed to reject (thus ers attempted to convince their counterparts in the term “semiautonomous,” since without their the American and British espionage services in

help no possibility existed of rescuing Jews). Palestine, Cairo, and Istanbul to arrange urThus, parallel to the “naive” presentation of | gently needed entry and transit permits to the material to the West, a step was taken that was —_ Turkey. !”9

not documented but appears to be broadly This speeded up deployment of top-ranking hinted at in Bader’s subsequent communications —_ individuals would not have been necessary unless to Ben-Gurion. (As we will see, Bader wrote that — those involved were planning a far-reaching

Kaplan had explained to him the reasons forthe — operation. This is proof that the Yishuv was

37

Rescue Plans

determined to salvage something from the affair. According to my assessment, Ben-Gurion’s It was thus necessary to bring together top-level objection to Bader’s trip to Hungary was limited decision makers at a location close to the hub of to a certain circumstances. Once the British got activity. But how can one ascertain whether this — wind of Bagyoni’s conversation with Bader, there speeded-up deployment was also intended to —_ was no reason to deny or conceal it. He was conleave open the possibility that semiautonomous __ stantly wary of appearing irresponsible. At a time

action might be necessary if the superpowers — charged with anticipation over the reply of the ducked out of the other option? This can be de- —_ superpowers, he chose a path of controlled distermined from Bader’s correspondence with — closure. The withholding of such sensitive inforBen-Gurion after his conversation with Kaplan = mation could have upset the delicate relationship in Istanbul. Bader’s eyes were opened to Ben- _ with Britain and thereby further reduced the alGurion’s and his colleagues’ realintentions when ready small chances of rescue. Nevertheless, parhe heard from Kaplan about the secret plan to _ allel to his efforts to present the Jewish Agency as take semiautonomous steps. This conclusion is cooperating with the British and Americans, based on a large body of testimony and highly — Ben-Gurion was giving orders to prepare secretly

significant indication. for a semiautonomous act. It would appear that A third clue can be found in Ben-Gurion’s __ the fear of an information leak meant that even telegram to Sharett. Ben-Gurion had instructed — the majority of the JAE were unaware of this diSharett to cable him from Londonanynewinfor- _rective.!! mation or changes in the situation with respect to Ben-Gurion was well aware that he himself the JAE and to cable directly to Kaplan in Istan- and the major Yishuv units were under constant bul, who was authorized to decide on the spot. _—_ surveillance, although even he could not have Information from London would help Kaplan —_ know to what extent. Just a few days after Agrondecide if the Yishuv would keep its activity secret | sky’s meeting with Ben-Gurion, during which from Britain and the United States and perhaps |= Weizmann’s and Sharett’s activity was discussed, even whether to pretend to be negotiating onbe- —_ the information was reported in detail to Ameri-

half of both. can intelligence services. It was clear to BenIn other words, based on factual and cir- | Gurion that, because this operation involved the cumstantial testimony, I am assuming that Ben- _ rescue of so many Jews, British and American inGurion was acting both on overt and covert lev- _ telligence services would make every effort to disels. Superficially—things he said to the JAE; the — cover what the JAE was up to.!°?

contents of his cables to Sharett and Bader—he BADER’S SECOND INVITATION, was opposed to Bader’s desire to bargain directly INTERIM AGREEMENT B, AND THE with the Nazis. On the other hand, he appears to KLARMAN-GRIPPEL PROPOSAL have instructed Kaplan and Meirov to clarify for Bader verbally what he himself was prevented = While the emissaries in Istanbul were still awaitfrom writing (for fear of disclosure),andauthor- _ing the JAE’s response to Bagyoni's invitation to ized Kaplan to decide from Istanbul whether to _ Bader, another call came from Budapest asking if

pursue further contact with the Nazis. The secret | Bader intended to come. This reinforced the summary instructions were meant to be carried —_ emissaries’ impression that the proposal was seout when it became obvious that the British were rious. Fearing that an important opportunity to once again leading the Yishuv down the garden _ save Jewish lives might be missed because of a depath and were about to jeopardize new possibili- —_ lay in responding, they decided to take independ-

ties of rescuing Jews.!3° ent action. Their plan was intertwined with a step 38

“A One-in-a-Million Chance”

that was being devised in Cairo by Hirschmann, _hering to the position he adopted in his talks with Schwartz, and Sharett—and, in my opinion, —Sharett and Hirschmann in Cairo. It was decided was probably also linked to Ben-Gurion’s secret — that Hirschmann would not report on this new

deployment. move to Steinhardt and that attempts would later

At this stage of the affair, Hirschmann and __ be made to involve him in the process and perSchwartz had just arrived in Istanbul and joined —_ hapseven to try to mobilize the more senior playthe rescue activists on the spot. Magnes came __ ers in Washington.!*4 with Schwartz. After some indecision, the emis- The entire process was shrouded in secrecy. saries decided to tell Hirschmann about Bader’s —_‘ The people in Istanbul did not wish to jeopardize invitation to visit Budapest. The meeting took |= Weizmann’s and Sharett’s efforts in London. It place in a hotel room. Hirschmann was sick and __ was clear that Britain was not willing to cooperin a foul mood. Upon his return to Istanbul, = ate with the Zionist movement in implementing Steinhardt informed him that Washington had __ the Brand plan, but the emissaries were not aware instructed him not “to having anything more to _ of this yet. While awaiting Kaplan’s arrival in Is-

do with the Brand affair.” tanbul, they were told that Gruenbaum’s arrival The apparent change in American policy — was also imminent and that Barlas had arranged was the result of Lord Halifax’s influence on the entry permits for both of them.!*»

American Foreign Office. It was a blow to In the meantime, another daring proposal Hirschmann, who had arrived in Istanbul ina —_—was raised by two “oppositional” members of the “Bergson” -style fighting spirit. Obliged to con- — council of rescue emissaries in Istanbul: Yaakov

tend with denials from Washington, little re- | Grippel of Agudat Israel and Joseph Klarman of mained of the self-image he had affected for him- the Revisionists.!3° They proposed sending two self in Cairo, where he reprimanded Schwartzfor | Yishuv emissaries from Istanbul to Hungary in being too moderate and for fearing accusations the interim until permits were obtained for of “dual loyalty.” Hirschmann, who had said in —_‘ Brand and Grosz, the earlier couriers. These Cairo that he felt himself humbled in the pres- — emissaries would serve as living proof that serience of those courageous emissaries, was obliged = ous attempts were being made to examine the to repeat that he would do all he could to help = ransom plan. Following discussion, the matter even though his “hands were now tied.” !°3 was dismissed, but it was decided to raise it again Another interim agreement was proposed once the second interim agreement had achieved during the meeting with Hirschmann, under the _its objective.!*”

assumption that the previous agreement had All these clarifications and discussions took been received in Hungary and had achieved its place between 25 and 30 June. On 29 June objective, namely, to keep the proposal simmer- — Schwartz’s proposal was adopted and on 30 June ing while it was being discussed in London and ___ telegrams were sent to Vienna and Budapest anWashington. They wished to reiterate an “agreed = nouncing that the Yishuv was ready to enter neupon’ reply on behalf of the “homeland”—to re- _ gotiations on a financial basis.!38 This was the seciterate that the Yishuv was willing to take inde- — ond interim agreement, representing a further

pendent action and to transfer money in return attempt at bypassing the obstacles and buying for Jewish lives, and that, if the Nazis were agree- time. On this occasion it was the result of cooper-

able, Bader would go to Budapest to finalize the ation between the emissaries and the JDC. negotiations. Magnes and Schwartz, the JDC rep- Hirschmann was let in on the secret, but he acted resentatives, promised that this time there really | behind the scenes. The second agreement reached would be money available. Schwartz wasthusad- —_ Budapest, was eagerly accepted, and probably set

39

Rescue Plans

the stage for the next step—which arrived from Cairo by Schwartz, Hirschmann, and Sharett)

Berlin. and Bader’s departure to negotiate with Kaplan’s

To return briefly to the explanation Bader — approval. Indeed, Kaplan arrived with instrucheard directly from Kaplan concerning instruc- __ tions and briefed Bader on the logic behind the tions from Jerusalem, a few days after their talks plans and the parts that were classified. How else in Istanbul, Bader wrote to Ben-Gurion. Right is one to understand Bader’s statement to Benat the outset of the letter, the “verbal doctrine” | Gurion that “Thad no intention of acting without instructions were obvious, lurking behind Ben- _—y your consideration and decision” and, in the selfGurion’s open refusal, together with that of the — same letter, informing Ben-Gurion about his so-

entire JAE, to acquiesce to the new proposal: called forbidden connections? I have received your telegram demanding THE THIRD ROUND: BADER-STILLER

agshalt toaafurther activity thewas in-dis-, ry TES ; Several days after theregarding second agreement

vitation Budapest and to await Eliezer’s ,,; ; ; ;toarrival. patched to Kaplan’s arrival [Kaplan] InVienna—following the meantime, Eliezer . ,; ; the in Istanbul and talks with Bader, and while also and reported on the reasons for ,awe ; ; ; came i emissaries were awaiting letter .from this cable. Pityand thatKaplan the friends [the British . London or Jerusalem containing the decision of intelligence people who passed along the ,a new proaay the superpowers—Bader received message] once again didn't keep their ,; : ; posal. Ben-Gurion was once again the, first per-

promise to, son Ze'ev [Schind] to pass along i, ;Bader , to receive information on it. As related the to HQto[in Jerusalem] toon prevent . i, cable the event Ben-Gurion, 8 July (a Saturday

department.!*? , ,

it from falling into the hands morning) of another , he received a call from the German

consulate in Istanbul asking him to attend a The discomfort at being so transparent to the meeting. The speaker introduced himself as British is obvious. The cable’s sentence order “Consul Stiller” and told Bader that he had been leads to the conclusion that this transparency is __ trying to locate him for two days. Bader talked to the basis of the “reasons for this cable,’ in other | Kaplan and other emissaries and it was decided words, the reasons that motivated Ben-Gurionto to agree to a meeting.!“0

pretend that he was totally opposed to Bader con- “Consul Stiller” invited Bader to attend neducting negotiations without the knowledge of —— gotiations in Berlin. A special plane would be

Britain and the United States. sent that would wait for him for three days. Since the cable’s contents had immediately | Bader explained that he was unable to leave been leaked to the British—both to the political | Turkey without the proper exit permits issued units and to the intelligence services—and since — by the Turkish and British authorities. He asked the intelligence services maintained an ambiva- _ for an extension in order to weigh his options. lent attitude toward the Yishuv—specifically | Bader was trying to buy time in order to check cooperation with the Yishuv, for there were those — the credentials of the mysterious emissary and who opposed this—Ben-Gurion was unable to _ the legitimacy of his proposal. He wished to openly support this step. He left itto Sharettand — consult with his colleagues and obtain their ap-

Weizmann to do their persuading in London, _ proval to conduct direct negotiations with while simultaneously laying the groundwork for —_ Berlin. Nonetheless, he did not wish to miss an

a semiautonomous action if the superpowers de- opportunity that might not be repeated, and cided to drop out. The two important steps were __ stressed that he could probably go if suitable financial preparation (which was discussed in —_ permits were forthcoming.

40

“A One-in-a-Million Chance”

Kaplan’s explanations provided Bader with — and the JAE were asked to reach an immediate enough confidence to inform Stiller that his trip —_—_ decision for or against.!”

to Berlin was not out of the question. This ap- In Jerusalem the picture became clearer proach was adopted by Bader and his colleagues —_‘ thanks to another report, written on 8 July, whose throughout the interim period, namely, to create —_ arrival was delayed. The telephone call Bader had

the impression that “the door was open to nego- _ received inviting him to the consulate came ditiations.” Bader also used this logic in the previ- _ rectly from the German consulate in Istanbul. Af-

ously mentioned letter to Ben-Gurion. ter Bader refused, the speaker suggested a meet“Consul Stiller” suggested that Bader obtain _— ing at a private house, and once again Bader a passport from a neutral stateand promisedthat refused the invitation. In the end they agreed to he, too, would search for ways of overcoming meet that same morning at 11 a.m. at a Germantechnical difficulties. They arranged for another |= owned bookstore. The man told Bader that a spemeeting in three days’ time, which was the cial plane had been waiting for him at the airport, longest delay Bader was able to obtain. The con- _ but, since he could not be located, the plane resultations in Istanbul were attended by Kaplan, turned to Berlin. He added that it would return in Meirov, Schind, and Barlas. Some of the meet- exactly one week’s time for the same purpose. ings were also attended by JDC representatives | Bader reminded the man that he was a Jew and Schwartz and Magnes, as well as by Hirschmann, _ was therefore unable to fly to Berlin. The man who represented the War Refugee BoardinIstan- — told him he did not know this. He had thought bul. All were party to the financial accords dis- that Berlin was requesting a citizen of a neutral cussed in Cairo and to what has been defined state. They agreed to meet again within a couple

here as Interim Agreement B. of days.

In a report to Jerusalem, Bader recalled that The emissaries wondered about transferring after each consultation it was decided to pass information on these new developments to along new information—as well as doubts—to _ Palestine and to Sharett in London. Kaplan asked Ben-Gurion in Jerusalem and Sharettin London, — why they should not try to do so through the and to leave all final decisions tothem. Badereven _ British embassy in Ankara. Schind explained that stressed that he had no pretensions regarding his _— experience had taught them that the British folauthority to make decisions, but that it was his | lowed two paths: doing everything in their power duty to add that “this [is] now a very serious _ to save the lives of Jews and doing everything in stage, which shows is revealed by the factthatthey their power to thwart any attempts at rescuing [the Nazis] had moved the discussion of the issue Jews. Based on our knowledge of attempts to to a central location—Berlin rather than Bu- _ transfer information about the “Feri” proposal, dapest or Vienna.” He was prepared to leaveeven = we nowknow that Schind was right. In the end it

though the proposal might turn out to be a _ was decided to try to enlist Hirschmann’s help

trap.'4! despite the fact that Washington had imposed a Two days later (10 July) more information ban on his activity.

was sent to the Yishuv. Jewish underground cir- Hirschmann reiterated to Kaplan that he cles in Budapest had been informed of Bader’s |= and the American embassy in Ankara were forinvitation, and they were awaiting his arrival.On — bidden to get involved in the matter. Kaplan 11 July a further meeting was planned between _—_ asked him to at least “forget the whole thing.” Af-

Bader and a member of the German consulate. It ter a fruitless meeting with Hirschmann, Kaplan was decided that Bader would buy time by saying _ said that he would issue instructions within a few

that he was awaiting instructions. Ben-Gurion hours. Four hours later he announced that he

41

Rescue Plans

had decided to cable Ben-Gurion through the _ the two interim agreements sent by the emisfriends of the Yishuv in the British or American saries. Paul L. Rose, one of two researchers (the secret services. He hoped that the cable would ar- — other being Yehuda Bauer) who have examined rive within a couple of days—and that only Ben- _ this matter in detail, discusses only the first in-

Gurion would receive it.!#3 terim agreement. According to his findings, this MYSTERY AND DECODING agreement reached Budapest at the end of the first week in July. Only then did it begin to arouse

There is a great mystery surrounding the double _interest in Budapest and subsequently in Berlin. attempt to approach Bader, involving Lieut. Col. | Both Rose and Bauer have determined that reOtto Hatz, the Hungarian military attaché, and _ sponses to that interim agreement ultimately led his aide Ferenc Bagyoni (Feri), accompanied by to, among other things, the opening of additional Lothar Kovess and Bandi Grosz—all double or _ channels for direct negotiations between Jewish triple agents who at that stage were alreadyrepre- | groups and the Nazis in Istanbul, Switzerland, senting the SS in Budapest. These men were __ the Iberian Peninsula, and Scandinavia.!*

taking orders from the SS in Berlin and would I share Rose’s and Bauer’s estimation of the almost certainly have been connected to the SS__—s importance of that first interim agreement, but branch in Vienna. As we have seen, shortly after | I am convinced of the existence of two interim the occupation, the Abwehr agents underwent a agreements. Each of the agreements had a single retraining program atthe SD (theSSsecurityand — central objective. The fact that the Yishuv sent

espionage service) facilities in Budapest.!4 out two separate agreements explains why Bader In early summer 1944 the British and Ameri- received two invitations. Both the available doccan secret services and the Yishuv rescue emis- | umentation and the timetable and developments saries were still unaware of the complex conflict- of the period lend support to my theory.

ing loyalties of these people, but what they did To briefly review the events: On the night of know was already leading them to ask questions. | 29 May Bader and Brand formulated the first inWho, in fact, was Bagyoni representing in the __ terim agreement, which was sent by courier the Nazi jungle in Budapest? Was he perhaps repre- following night to Dr. Israel Kasztner in Busenting elements in the Hungarian intelligence — dapest.!4° Interim Agreement A was intended to services? Who was the mysterious “Consul Stiller” | save Brand and his mission and to cover the fact and whom did he represent? Bagyoni said he was _ that no significant developments had taken place bearing a message from Herman Krumey, an SS__ that could have permitted Brand to return. It was officer in Budapest. Stiller said that he had been _an initiative devoid of any financial, logistical, or sent by people in the German Foreign Office in _ political foundations. Bader and Brand took a Berlin. What, then, could have been behind the — chance, hoping that the Yishuv and the superproposal to rescue Jews in return for money? Was — powers would ultimately supply the necessary this yet another attempt to open an additional cover for the false offer presented in Agreement A. channel of communication with the West, follow- This agreement arrived in Budapest after Dr. ing the difficulties in the Brand-Grosz mission? It Kasztner and Hansi Brand (Joel Brand’s wife) may well have been. But then what isthe connec- _ had been released from prison, having been artion between the invitation to Bader by Bagyoni __ rested by those unfamiliar with the current state to travel to Budapest and “Consul Stiller’s” invita- | of communications between the various Nazi au-

tion to Bader to go to Berlin? thorities and the Jewish Aid and Rescue ComIn order to answer these questions, onemust mittee in Hungary.'4”7 Upon its arrival in Hunreturn to Budapest and examine the responses to gary, the agreement was passed on to Kasztner’s

42

“A One-in-a-Million Chance”

Nazi contacts. Although they had reservations | once again—but rather the establishment of a about the Istanbul “partners,” they nevertheless secret basis for direct negotiations between the decided to signal that their “business” intentions | _Yishuv and the Nazis. Something along these were sound and sent Bagyoni to invite Bader to _ lines was whispered in Bader’s ear by Kaplan and

Budapest on behalf of SS officer Hermann Meirov. In Istanbul they supplied Bader with

Krumey. top-level political and military support. In this Bagyoni delivered the invitationto Baderon respect Agreement B also differed from Agree10 June, only a few days after the arrival of the |§ ment A. The main points of Agreement B were agreement in Budapest. On 23 June Bader re- — cabled to Vienna and Budapest on 30 June. It was ceived confirmation of the invitation ina cable | emphasized that the Yishuv was prepared to enfrom Budapest, which informed him that he was ter into direct negotiations to rescue Jews in exindeed invited to conduct direct negotiationsand change for money. The dispatch of the cable to that additional details would follow. All this in- Vienna is noteworthy.!“”

formation was sent to the Yishuv on 28 June by The actual document containing Interim

Zaslani.'48 Agreement B was only sent by courier on 5 July (it If one rules out the possibility that Bader was —_ appears that no reliable courier was available beinvited to Budapest in response to Interim Agree- _— fore that date) and reached Kasztner in Budapest ment A, it becomes hard to explain why he, ofall —_ two days later.!5° The Interim Agreement B docupeople, received the invitation and why the latter © ment and the cables to Vienna and Budapest that

specifically arrived in early June. Bader was a __ preceded it probably precipitated the next step coauthor of Agreement A. Thus, the agreement taken by the Nazis from Berlin, namely, Stiller's achieved its objective: the Nazis accepted it, | overtures to Bader.

offered a counterproposal, Brand’s family was GANGS AND CONSPIRACIES UNDER not liquidated, and his mission was extended. To-

day a more complete y itOis easier gainato gain e complete p picture of TOTALITARIAN CAMOUFLAGE the background leading up to all this: certain _—In order to sort out the various elements in this Nazi circles were looking for contacts in the West = merry-go-round, one must elaborate somewhat

and were in no hurry to burn their bridges. on the relations between the SS and the Abwehr, Interim Agreement B was devised in Istan- _ specifically the absorption by the SS of the Abbul during the five days between 25 and 30 June. _—_ wehr station in Budapest and the Abwehr’s inBrand was already imprisoned in Cairo at that —_ ability to comprehend that the SS had taken it time, while the emissaries in Istanbul were still —_ over. waiting for final permits that would enable Bader The roots of the conflict can be traced to the to set off for Budapest. This proposal was much early days of the Third Reich. In 1935 the Abwehr, more serious because it was based onthe guaran- _ the military intelligence unit, was headed by the teed financial backing of the JDC and Lord nationalistic Admiral Wilhelm Canaris. From the Moyne and the Americans gave it their silentap- _— very beginning a bitter feud was waged between

proval—or so it seemed at the time. Canaris and Reichsfuhrer Heinrich Himmler, the The objective of Agreement B was com- commander in chief of the SS. pletely different, the issue no longer being the fate The feud was conducted between the army of Brand or his family—although the Yishuvstill and the Nazi party, between the military intellihoped that Brand would be released and allowed gence and its commander, Canaris, and the party’s to return home, there was already a growing sus- _ security units (the SS, SD, and the Gestapo), which picion that the superpowers would prevent this —_ were subject to Himmler’s authority. The personal

43

Rescue Plans

issue was the decisive one here. The leaders of var- undermining his authority and decided to subjuious organizations fought for power and status. gate them to more loyal units. In February 1944 Conflicts also developed over the characterofGer- | Canaris was fired and Himmler succeeded in many under Nazi party rule. There was friction abolishing the Abwehr’s autonomous existence between the traditional elite and the new elite, _ by linking it to the SD, the SS security and espiwhich had been elevated by the party from the __ onage services.!°! masses, as well as disagreement over definitions of When the SD people arrived in Hungary fol-

the central foe and ways of conducting the war. lowing the occupation, they therefore came as Conflict even surrounded the political issue with bosses, as commanders, not as junior partners. respect to the Jews and various ways of carrying This fact did not immediately register at all levels

out the “final solution.” of the Abwehr in Hungary and elsewhere. It took There were similar underground organiza- __ time for the various cells and stations to undertions supporting Germany’s former prime min- stand that their bosses had been replaced within ister, von Papen (now German ambassador to __ that centrist feudal establishment.

Turkey), against the Hitler government. One of Gerhard Clages, who was mentioned by the few outward expressions of this oppositional Brand in his reports, was the SD commander activity was the conspiracy to murder Hitler.The = who “swallowed up” the Abwehr in Budapest, toCanaris-von Papen-von Ribbentrop circles and _ gether with all the attendant officers and agents,

the group of conspirators who wished to kill even if this fact was not yet common knowledge. Hitler were among the right-wing elements that | Schréder-Laufer was then his aide. The Nazi Hitler inherited from the previous regime. His |= murder machine was also active in Budapest— rise to power was based, among other things, the Sondereinsatzkommandounder the leaderon a confederacy with some of them, which ex- ship of Adolf Eichmann of the Gestapo, which plains the relative influence they maintained in —_ was an authority within the Reich Main Security

Germany. Office (RSHA) within the SS.

Besides Himmler, the bitter struggle was Edmund Veesenmayer was also active in that waged by other young stars, including SS Ober- system. He was German minister plenipotentiary

sruppenfiihrer Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Walter of the Reich, and after the occupation he became Schellenberg, and Obergruppenftihrer Heinrich __ the de facto governor of Hungary. Veesenmayer Miller of the Gestapo. They all strove totakeover simultaneously belonged to two opposing groups

the Abwehr—including its connections, webs, in the disintegrating Reich: he was an ambasand resources—and to subordinate it tothe Nazi — sador on the Foreign Office staff and was thus party’s security units. This struggle continued — subject to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, one throughout the war in all the countries under | of Himmler’s enemies; but he also held a position Nazi occupation, including its satellites. SS per- = in the SS, Himmler’s organization. Before Veesonnel also strove to take control of Abwehr — senmayer was sent to Budapest, Hitler met with agencies in neutral states such as Spain, Portugal, his two superiors, von Ribbentrop and Himmler,

Sweden, and Turkey. and tried to coordinate their activity in Hungary. Toward the end of 1943 and during 1944, a —_ Hitler was in no hurry to place all the power in

certain advantage was accorded the SS. The Ab- | Himmler’s hands even when faced with von wehr’s status was reduced primarily because ofits | Ribbentrop (which partially explains why he defailure to obtain and analyze intelligence, but it | fended Canaris for such a long time). Some his-

was Hitler who decided against the organization. torians are convinced that Himmler opposed He was convinced that Canaris andhismenwere — Veesenmayer’s appointment to Hungary and that

44

“A One-in-a-Million Chance”

Hitler forced him to accept it. Whenever there tion on Interim Agreement B to Himmler (acwas even a hint of dissent between Veesenmayer cording to Kasztner).'54 Once the information and the SS, he would claim that he had in his reached Berlin, Stiller was dispatched on his mispocket a kind of insurance policy, a personal let- _ sion. It is almost certain that the two invitations ter from Hitler appointing him to the post.!*? received by Bader from Bagyoni and Stiller were All these elements within the Naziestablish- _ linked to the interim agreements.

ment, together with the Hungarian civilian and It can be assumed that information on Inmilitary intelligence services, were struggling terim Agreement B reached Berlin through two with the question of how to maneuver through __ possible channels, but definitely by way of Vi-

the political and military minefield that was | enna. When the document arrived in Vienna, evolving in Europe at that time, asreflectedinthe | preparations were set in motion that led to dispatch by Brand, the invitations to Bader, and _Stiller’s invitation to Bader. The arrival of the in-

the activities of such agents as Laufer and formation from Becher—by way of Budapest—

Grosz.!°? resulted in a growing tendency to enter into neMORE ON THE STILLER AFFAIR gotiations with the Yishuv emissaries in Istanbul.

My hypothesis also relies on Stiller’s remark that Concerning the new invitation issued to Baderin _he had been searching for Bader!>? since 6 July, in Istanbul by “Consul Stiller,’ the question arisesas | other words, before the full content of Interim

to why Bader was invited. Bader wasagainchosen Agreement B had reached Kasztner and, of because the Nazis considered him instrumental course, before his meeting with Becher.

in formulating the first and second interim To summarize, after Brand left for Istanbul, agreements. Their agents were present in Istan- _ his Nazi handlers waited for replies. When Brand

bul and heard about the Yishuv rescue emis- failed to return, they put pressure on Kastner and

saries, Bader included among them. Hansi Brand and their friends. They urged IstanInformation on Interim Agreement B, — bul to supply an immediate response to Eichwhich was sent by the emissaries from Istanbul, | mann’s proposal. On the night of 29 May Brand could have reached Berlin through one of two and Bader wrote a false response, in the form of

channels: directly by way of Vienna (with no Interim Agreement A, in order to save Brand's Jewish intervention) or through Kasztner in Bu- —s mission. The agreement was dispatched on 30 dapest. Kasztner related that as soon as he re- = May and arrived in Budapest several days later. ceived the cable he met with Eichmann and Kurt §Krumey and his cronies in Hungary took the A. Becher, Himmler’s special representative. A agreement seriously since they had nothing to document of this kind was instrumental to the _ lose by accepting it. They then sent Ferenc BagyAid and Rescue Committee in obtaining a delay —_ oni, one of the agents they had inherited from the in the deportation to death camps of Hungary’s |= Abwehr, to Istanbul and issued an invitation to Jews. It was equally important to Kasztner’s Ger- _ Bader to visit Budapest. Bagyoni handed the inman counterparts and to senior members of the __ vitation to Bader on 10 June.

Nazi establishment, who could have interpreted In the meantime Brand was taken to Cairo. it as a position signal to the supporters of a“sep- | The Zionists were unable to persuade the British

arate peace” with the West. to permit his return to Budapest with a response By this time Himmler believed that Ger- that would provide a platform for negotiations many could suffer a defeat ifit continued the war —_ with the Nazis. Financial discussions were simulon two fronts. It is clear, therefore, why Becher _ taneously held in Cairo in preparation for a semihastily departed Hungary to present theinforma- | autonomous Jewish rescue operation. Schwartz

45

Rescue Plans

and Hirschmann, Sharett’s partners in that dis- and loyalties within the Nazi hierarchy. Bencussion, arrived in Istanbul and, together with = Gurion and the Yishuv did realize that the double the Yishuv emissaries, took part in composing invitation issued to Bader reflected Nazi authoriInterim Agreement B. The main points of the ties engaged in some sort of power struggle. First, agreement were cabled to Vienna and Budapest __ they assumed that some of the signals regarding a on 30 June. A reply followed swiftly. On 8 July __ willingness to negotiate had come from Himmler, Stiller invited Bader to Berlin. We do not know who was very close to Hitler in the Nazi hierarchy,

who he was to meet. and that others had come from the Foreign Office. Although Bader reported that the invitation | Second, they assumed that this willingness to originated in the German Foreign Office, or circles negotiate reflected the realization within certain close to von Ribbentrop—one might easily as- _—_ Nazi circles that Hitler was leading Germany to sume that Veesenmayer or someone else tipped ___ disaster and that they had to be rid of him and to von Ribbentrop off with regard to Interim Agree- _ strive for a “separate peace” with the West. Third, ment B—it is my opinion that after learning of | they assumed that they could make use of the sitInterim Agreement B from his people in Vienna _ uation to rescue Jews. They tried to pass their conand Budapest (Becher), it was probably Himmler _ clusions along to the Allies, since without such cowho was behind the invitation to Bader to negoti- = operation it would have been impossible to take

ate in Berlin. advantage of these new developments within the Lacking sufficient information and not al- — Nazi camp to rescue Jews.

ways knowing what to expect, the Yishuv leaders HIDE-AND-SEEK IN LISBON:

still nee to ma important oecisions maven DOBKIN AND SCHWARTZ RECEIVE data and sufficient hindsight have been unable INVITATIONS TO BERLIN current researchers equipped with a wealth o

to decipher the entire story. How much did the —_ Bader was not the only one to be invited to Berlin. emissaries know about “Consul Stiller”? A friend |§ Around the same time (early July) invitations

in American intelligence informed them that were also extended to JAE member Eliyahu Stiller was indeed Germany’s consul in Istanbul, | Dobkin and JDC European chief Joe Schwartz. but my own examination of the list of German —- Dobkin was in Lisbon at the time, dealing with functionaries in Istanbul does not confirm this. rescue issues. The JAE had recently decided that Was there a connection between that “consul” —_he would set off for the United States, where he and von Papen, the former German chancellor, — would try to gain support for negotiations with who was involved in anti-Hitler activity at the | the Nazis concerning the Eichmann proposal. time? Could Stiller have been sent by Clages,SD —_ Kasztner cabled Dobkin several times that the commander in Budapest, who handled former |= Germans were hoping to meet with him and with Abwehr agents in various German consulates?! = Schwartz. The SS was prepared to send four deleWas the invitation to Germany a test to deter- _ gates for this purpose to any location chosen by mine the Yishuv’s and the West’s response or was_ — Dobkin and Schwartz.

it merely a form of provocation aimed at expos- The two men were not unknown to each

ing traitors and collaborators? other. Dobkin had helped lead negotiations with Neither Ben-Gurion and his JAE colleagues Schwartz in August 1943. The two men had for-

nor the Yishuv’s secret service personnel and mulated a secret agreement between the JDC emissaries in Istanbul—not even Brand, whohad _—_ and the JAE. The JDC agreed to participate in the

arrived in May 1944 with information—could funding of a ransom plan on condition that the make heads or tails of the complex relationships _— fact be kept secret that an American-Jewish

46

“A One-in-a-Million Chance”

organization was violating the laws of its own Jews. Kasztner reported this to Istanbul and to

country. Dobkin and asked the latter to prepare for the Dobkin was quick to report to Sharett in _ arrival of refugees.!© Just a few years later, the seLondon and the JAE in Jerusalem. He saw this in- lection of those fortunate enough to board that vitation to Berlin as an important development, — train would become one of the focal points of a perhaps reflecting an attempt to simplify thecon- wretched court trial known as the “Kasztner ditions of the deal by accepting money instead of _— Affair.”

trucks.57 Dobkin asked Sharett to determine if In London Weizmann and Sharett were London was willing to discuss the money option, awaiting Britain’s final official decision on or goods that had no military value, with the Ger- Brand’s return and on the response to the Nazis. mans. Sharett was making plans to come to Lis- _ All this time new information and data had been bon to oversee rescue preparations, and now streaming in from the Yishuv, Portugal, and the Dobkin suggested that he move his visit up and —_— United States indicating that the deportation of personally conduct negotiations with SS agents |§ Hungarian Jews to death camps was continuing,

in Lisbon. as well as news of the invitations extended to

Dobkin was unhappy about meeting withSS — Bader, Dobkin, and Schwartz to visit Berlin.'® agents without Sharett’s prior approval. Itshould | Weizmann and Sharett were convinced that the be noted that he had been very reserved aboutin- Nazis were serious about conducting negotiadependent negotiations with the Nazis when the __ tions, and that it might still be possible to save issue was discussed in the JAE immediately after some Jews. They demanded a meeting with Forthe occupation of Hungary.!°® He had undergone __ eign Secretary Eden.!” a significant change in attitude, his fear having This meeting took place on 6 July 1944. Weiznothing to do with principles. Dobkin had no —s mann and Sharett discussed the gravity of the sitdesire to interfere with the efforts of the Yishuv’s —_ uation in Hungary: four hundred thousand Jews

rescue emissaries and the Zionist movement in had already been deported to extermination London, Istanbul, and Jerusalem, who would camps (mostly to Birkenau) and an additional have found it hard to persuade the Allies of the — three hundred thousand were about to be sent necessity of negotiating with the Nazis over Eich- _in their wake. They recognized the fact that “the mann’s proposal were it to become known that —_Gestapo’s proposals were not devoid of foul inthe Yishuv was conducting independent negotia- _tentions,” but they understood that there would

tions with the Nazis in Lisbon. be no choice but to pay the ransom. Although the Dobkin tried to evade Nazi observation and _‘Yishuv leadership’s proposals were “neither conto stall the meeting until he had more officialdata__servative nor routine,’ they had to be adopted in on developments. His attempts proved useless: the face of the “terrible calamity.” Weizmann and Gestapo agents managed to locate him and in- _—_Sharett told Eden about the two invitations to formed him that their superiors were preparedto Berlin and Budapest and hinted that they might meet him in Switzerland and wouldsenda plane __ signal that the Nazis were indeed prepared to dis-

to take him there.!°? cuss the release of Jews. They went on to ask the At the same time, Eichmann informed Kasz- Allies to supply the Europe’s Jews with safetner and his colleagues in Hungarythathe would — conduct permits, to warn the Hungarians against permit fifteen hundred Jews to leave Hungary by involvement in the murders, and to bomb train for Switzerland. Through this offer he may | Auschwitz and the railway lines leading to it.!©

have been hinting that the hosts in Berlin were Weizmann and Sharett felt that Eden was actually planning to bargain over the release of | sympathetic to their cause. They sensed no evasion

47

Rescue Plans

when he expressed the view that “the enemy was _ proposal to fly to Berlin was proof that “the matobviously playing a devilish game” and that one __ ter is still valid because the Germans have someneeded to proceed with care, coordinating every- _ thing to offer and because they are prepared to thing with the Americans and the Russians. Eden _ discuss the proposals.” !®7

told them that the Bader invitation had to be dis- It was a desperate and futile attempt. Sharett cussed by the British War Cabinet. Sharettreported already knew by then what Britain’s position was on the meeting to Ben-Gurion that same day.!* on the issue, and he was not optimistic about his Eden’s comments were couched in the kind _ appeal. That same day he cabled some bad news of understatement that Weizmann and Sharett —_ to Ben-Gurion: “The Foreign Office has vetoed did not manage to comprehend. They did notyet — Brand’s return... Menahem’s proposal . . . negrealize that Britain and the United States had al- ative.” Sharett also pointed out that, as agreed, he ready “buried” the ransom plan. By the time the _ had cabled this information directly to Kaplan in matter was fully understood, several more devel- _—stanbul.!

opments had taken place and the invitation re- Sharett based his information on Randall and ceived by Bader underwent a few more transfor- —_ Jan Henderson, both senior officials in the British mations. From Jerusalem Ben-Gurion, together —_ Foreign Office. They met with him on 12 July 1944 with the emissaries in Istanbul, tried to move (the day before Ben-Gurion sent his cable) and told the plan forward. Nonetheless, Ben-Gurion’s re- —_ him that Bader would not be permitted to fly to marks during those days (mid-July) showed that _ Berlin, that there was no point in Brand returning he no longer hoped for help from Britainandthe — to Budapest, that the idea of supplying Jews in

United States in rescuing Jews.!© Nazi-occupied areas with documents that would Magnes, the JDC representative, returned grant them Allied support was ridiculous, and that from Istanbul with firsthand information and _ arranging a safe haven for several thousand people personal impressions regarding the invitation re- | was impossible and impractical. Eden’s pleasceived by Bader. He handed this information — antries had masked an attitude of cold indifference.

over to Ben-Gurion and Gruenbaum. Magnes On 15 July Randall officially informed pointed out that the second invitation had been _—_—Sharett that this was indeed the firm position of issued by Nazi circles within Berlin itself. Addi- | His Majesty’s government.!® His reasons for this

tional details were known to Ben-Gurion from — decision were based on information received other sources. Magnes stressed that the invitation | from Grosz and the fact that Churchill had deterwas still valid, so Ben-Gurion hurriedly cabled = mined that the ransom plan was not to be taken Sharett (13 July 1944) that the invitation stood seriously, since it was a “plan that had come and pressed him to demand that the British au- —‘ through the most dubious of channels ... and thorities allow him to leave for Berlin. He also _—-was itself of the most dubious character.”!”

sent Sharett a long and detailed memo that Sharett tried to return to the proposal that Magnes had given him concerning recent devel- —_ had been raised at the beginning of the affair,

opments in the affair.!® namely, that Britain and the United States send ACLEARREFUSAL OW THiepaRT Noemi of tom, oa fil om

OF THE BRITISH ate in order to buy time and, at the very least, delay Sharett received the cable the following day and _ the murders. He cabled Ben-Gurion and Kaplan passed it on immediately to Alec Randall, headof — with details of the new proposal: Gustav Kullman,

the Refugees’ Department in the Foreign Office. a Swiss citizen and deputy chairman, under Sir By way of explanation, Sharett stressed that the | Herbert Emerson, of the Inter-Governmental

48

“A One-in-a-Million Chance”

Committee on Refugees would be sent to Bu- _ that it was time to investigate other rescue opdapest to investigate the possibility of negotiating —_tions.!76

the fate of the Jews. The proposal was presented to Responses were grim. Gruenbaum defined the United States and the USSR; as Sharett re- the leak as an “indescribable provocation. The ported, he himself had presented it to Randalland Gestapo offers a secret proposal, this proposal is

it was currently under review.!”! rejected, and then publication is made of what On 16 July Ben-Gurion recounted the latest — the Gestapo offered us ... an unprecedented developments to his colleagues in the JAE. He _ injustice, in which the blood of our brothers is detailed the course of the invitations received by __ given no consideration... .” Schind characterBader and said that Magnes had clarified the pic- —_ ized Brand’s mission as “the miserable plan” and ture upon his arrival in Jerusalem. He pointedto —_ lashed out in all directions—including at himthe connections with the German Foreign Office, self—for the fact that tens of thousands of Jews as expressed in “Consul Stiller’s” involvement — could have been saved if only the British had not and the fact that Bader was actually invited to —_ been approached and if negotiations had begun Berlin, which he believed made the matter allthe = immediately following Brand’s arrival in Istanbul more suspect as a “Nazi trick,” by which he may _ not two months later. All this second-guessing have meant that one of the parties backbiting in | was unfounded, although it was voiced by a man Berlin had used the invitation to set upatrap for | experienced in undercover activity. I have already

its adversaries. !”2 demonstrated that Britain and the United States

Ben-Gurion also singled out the change from —_ had known of the plan from their own sources enthusiasm to reserve experienced by Ira Hirsch- _—and kept its progress under close surveillance. mann, of the American War Refugee Board, asare- —_ Sharett said that the British did all they could to sult of instructions “not to have further dealings thwart the rescue plan, fearing “a flood of Jews in with the Brand affair.”!”3 Sharett cabled Ben- _ the event that anything came of it.”!7”

Gurion twice on the decision against the ransom Ben-Gurion did not respond directly to the plan, but the two cables only reached their destina- —_ leak. Nine days before the leak, he expressed his

tion after the JAE meeting (one that same day and sentiments in an extremely outspoken public the other the following day). Thus, at the meeting — statement.!”8 By contrast, his words in the tensionBen-Gurion could relate only to Hirschmann’s be- _filled debate that followed the leak were devoted to

havior and signs of heel-dragging.!”4 refuting self-blame and were mainly aimed at

THE LEAK Gruenbaum, who accused the JAE of being partly responsible for the plan's failure because of its de-

From this point things started moving quickly. __ cision to share information with Britain and the Within three days it became clear that the worst United States.

possible thing had happened. The plan had been Gruenbaum’s speech followed Kaplan’s reremoved from the Allies’ agenda (asthe Transnis- _ port of his journey to Turkey. It is worth dwelling

tria Plan had earlier) through leaks to the press. on the speech within the context of his complex On 19 July the matter was published in the New relationship with Ben-Gurion.!”? In the third York Herald Tribune and the following day it was _ chapter I touched on this relationship in the concommon knowledge throughout the free world _ text of Gruenbaum’s complex and thankless poand Palestine.!”> Within a few days it became __ sition as head of the Rescue Committee. Gruenclear both in Palestine and among the emissaries | baum’s ire was now aroused by the way in which in Istanbul that the ransom plan that Brand had _— Kaplan went straight from reporting on the brought with him from Hungary was dead and _ Brand plan to demanding that Britain ensure the

49

Rescue Plans

entry into Palestine of any Jew who managed to __ tacked for inaction. When he spoke out, insisting make it to Turkey. According to Kaplan, prepara- __ that there was little chance of rescuing Jews, he tions had to be made for the immigration of — was viewed “even by this desk” as not wishing to thousands of Jews, and Britain had to allow them save Jews. !80

to enter. Ben-Gurion called on Gruenbaum not to Gruenbaum was furious. Hadn't the JAE launch accusations: “We are all men of conlearned from the Brand affair that Britain was not science here,’ and it would be best to avoid hint-

to be involved in rescue issues? Gruenbaum ing at misdemeanors on the part of the JAE on rightly pointed to the British government’s an- _ the Brand issue. Even if errors had been made— nouncement in the summer of 1943 that any Jews insofar as “members of the JAE were mistaken” in who managed to reach Turkey would be allowed — the same way that Gruenbaum had made mis-

to immigrate to Palestine, and he insisted that | takes—there had been no bad intentions but there was no need for debate, since the British | simply a desire to help born of deep personal were “using all kinds of tricks and intrigues to —_— concern.

hold up the arrival of Jews in Palestine.” “No fur- Kaplan, too, rejected Gruenbaum’s accusather questions must be asked” that might lead to __ tions and called on him “not to complicate the the British “placing obstacles in our way and — debate with other things—important or not.” ' making it impossible for us to rescue those that it | Following a detailed and comprehensive investiis still possible to rescue.” It was obvious, asithad gation of the matter, he could declare that in the been in the Brand affair, that nothing would Brand affair the JAE had acted “correctly, out of

come of it. political conscience, according to the best interIn linking the two issues Kaplan was mistaken __ ests of the Hungarian Jews and those of the Jew-

both in terms of substance and strategy. First, the ish people... .” Kaplan knew whereof he spoke, question of Jews arriving in Turkey being givenau- _ having been intimately involved in the secret coltomatic permission to immigrate to Palestine was _ laboration, the plan for rescuing children, the very different from the Allies’ attitude toward a —_ ransom plans, and having just returned from Is-

complex process like the ransom plan, which _ tanbul. could impact the management of the war and In summing up his sentiments at the end of influence relationships among them. Second, — the debate, Gruenbaum may have realized that from a tactical and rhetorical point of view, it was he had overstepped the mark in his unfounded a mistake to even mention the words “permission accusations. “On the matter of conscience, I of from the British” in the current atmosphere of — course had no desire to offend [anyone]. I reanger and frustration following Britain’s thwart- _ ferred only to my own conscience. I said that my ing of the plan to ransom the lives of Hungary's | own conscience was not appeased.”!8!

Jews. Third, there was no point in permitting HORTHY’S ANNOUNCEMENT Britain to “resell” a commitment to the Jews that

they had already taken upon themselves. On 20 July 1944, one day after the Brand affair “Have we committed a crime?” Ben-Gurion — was made public, the world press published an demanded in the midst of Gruenbaum’s polemic. | announcement by Hungarian dictator Admiral “We did what we had to do.” Gruenbaum contin- | Miklés Horthy that Hungary was prepared to ued to complain bitterly that his conscience was __halt the deportation of Jews to Poland and to alnot at rest, linking other allegations to this issue. | low them to escape across its borders.

He insisted that the JAE did not protect him It is worth noting that at the time of this anwhen he and the Rescue Committee were at- | nouncement Hungary had already been under

50

“A One-in-a-Million Chance”

Nazi occupation for four months. It wouldappear —_ also reported that Kasztner had told Dobkin of

that Horthy’s change of heart grew out ofafeeling | the Germans’ willingness to meet him and that the Reich’s days were numbered and that it = Schwartz in Lisbon.!®

was a shadow of its former self. This was plain to The emissaries in Istanbul also tried to everyone, and it now seemed that this was the last breathe new life into the plan by suggesting chance to side with the victors. Horthy fearedthat | sending Bader to Hungary or Germany or the local gendarmerie, energetically rounding up = arranging a meeting between Dobkin and Jews for deportation, might topple him from Schwartz with representatives of the SS. Once power. The Hungarians were especially fearful § again they informed the JAE of the Germans’ that reprisal would take the form of an air attack. _—_ willingness to meet in Spain and demanded a reThe world press was filled with news of Auschwitz _ ply within ten days concerning the possible loca-

and the annihilation of Hungary’s Jews, President tion. The emissaries reiterated that “Menahem’s

Roosevelt’s warning to Horthy, and the bombing journey was imperative” and added _ that of the railway station in Budapest—all of which = Schwartz had left Turkey en route to Jerusalem increased Hungary’s fears. The pope andthe neu- = and would be held up there for a while on his way tral states also influenced the situation, as didthe — to Spain, probably to synchronize positions. willingness of various countries and organiza- = They asked for this information to be passed tions—such as the International Red Cross and _along to Sharett in London. !*4

the American War Refugee Board—to aid in the In late July (ten days after the leak) Pomer-

rescue of Jews. !82 anz and Bader reported to the JAE from Istanbul News of the Brand affair and Horthy’s an- — concerning a cable Kasztner had sent them on 28 nouncement created a new situation. It washard —_ July. Kasztner wrote that the Germans proposed to conduct such complex negotiations when all _ holding a meeting with the “black” (Schwartz) at the details had been made public. Horthy’s an- — the French-Spanish border and they wanted to nouncement also aroused certain hopes—for a _ set the date. About twelve hundred of the seven-

few weeks at least—that a large-scale, above- teen hundred people Eichmann had permitted to board rescue operation would obviate the need —_ leave were now at Bergen-Belsen and five hunfor secret negotiations. Despite this hope, rescue —_ dred were leaving soon for Spain. A man called activists were still concerning themselves with “Schrdéder” was among the German representa-

the invitation issued to Bader and proposals by _ tives who would be coming to the FrenchGerman agents that Dobkin meet with SS people Spanish border. We do not know if he was the in Spain or Portugal, and another that Gustav = same Frantisek Laufer involved in earlier inciKullman of the Inter-Governmental Committee — dents.!8 In the end Dobkin failed completely in on Refugees negotiate with the Germans overthe _his efforts to obtain permission from the British

fate of the Jews. and Americans for him and Schwartz to meet Sharett wrote to the JAE that he was about to with the Germans. They were told that there meet with someone in the British Foreign Office | would be no negotiations, neither involving in order to discuss Kullman’s mission. When goods nor money.!*

Britain expressed displeasure about the latter Horthy’s announcement raised hopes beproposal, Sharett suggested the International cause it was public, the result of pressure on HunRed Cross as an alternative. He planned to put __ gary, and because it was preceded by a remission pressure on Britain through the Americans and __ in deportations to the death camps. The hope asked the JAE to instruct Nahum Goldmann to _ was tangible in Sharett’s cable from London to be active once again in the United States. Sharett Jerusalem:

51

Rescue Plans

In light of Horthy’s announcement, we wrote that “Feri” had served the rescue emisrecommend (1) the immediate renewal of saries in Istanbul and that he could be relied the Swiss and Swedish proposals for [res- upon to help in the matter of “Ezra hagar,” the cuing] children; (2) increasing the num- code name for the rescue of Hungary’s Jews.

ber of immigration certificates to Pales- Adler-Rudel asked for confirmation from tine; (3) [supplying] Adler-Rudel with the JAE that connections with Feri were confinancial resources for the Swedish proj- ducted with its authority and asked if Barlas was ect; (4) further review of the Kullman idea, also familiar with Feri and supported Bader’s rec-

based on the evacuation of Hungarian ommendation. After meeting with Bagyoni,

Jews. !8? Adler-Rudel wrote Bader that he had not supplied him with any special proposal or new deWhat was Sweden’s role in all this? Earlier in this __ tails. Bader’s reply, in the form of three cables, study I described the attempt to rescue Jewish — assured Adler-Rudel that Bagyoni aided Kasztner

children by transferring them to neutral Sweden. in his efforts to rescue Hungary’s Jews and The plan was examined at the beginning of 1943, —_ stressed that for over a year and a half he and his shortly after the official news of the annihila- — colleagues had worked with Bagyoni and that he

tion.!8§ Now, nine months later, the possibility could be trusted.!9! existed that the plan might be realized. In fact, on Bader’s report to the JAE in Jerusalem on 1 July (just under three weeks before Horthy’s — the “match” Bader made between Adler-Rudel public announcement) Sweden had contacted and Feri dispels some confusion. There was a the JAE in Jerusalem with the promise that Jew- prevailing fear that the Nazis’ death throes ish refugees from Hungary would be permitted = would reflect on the Jews—especially those reto enter Sweden.'® Sweden therefore was des- = maining in Poland—in the form of “blitzkrieg tined to be the country of refuge for those Jews —_ attacks that would leave no trace,” and Bader leaving Hungary following Horthy’s announce- _ hoped for Feri’s help in thwarting them. Bader ment. Schlomo Adler-Rudel, the Jewish Agency further reported that Adler-Rudel had told him emissary, was again sent to Sweden to lay the __ that he was awaiting “the arrival of an Ashkenazi groundwork for the operation.!*? This course of | [German] with whom to negotiate. ..and it was action offered more promise than sending Bader _ possible that negotiations similar to those of Sali

to Berlin to spite the Allies. [Mayer] were being conducted on other fronts.” BAGYONT AND KLEIST IN STOCKHOLM The Ashkenazi mentioned was Dr. Bruno Peter Kleist, whose negotiations and those conducted From this point on Sweden became the focal by Sali Mayer in Switzerland are discussed elsepoint of rescue attempts for the Jews of Hungary. — where.!%”

Even in this northern geographical shift of activ- Bagyoni’s arrival in Stockholm and the ties ity there is more hidden than aboveboard. At between him and Adler-Rudel were known to least two of the earlier leading players (Baderand — the Americans, who were aware of all developBagyoni [Feri] were involved in events concern- —— ments, including Bader’s cables to Adler-Rudel ing Sweden. Bagyoni arrived in Sweden in Sep- _—_and Ehrenpreis’s and Adler-Rudel’s meetings in

tember, shortly after Adler-Rudel. The object of | Stockholm. They read the cables sent by the his visit was not at all clear, but he brought with —_- Yishuv’s rescue emissaries in Istanbul and already

him a recommendation written by Bader plus saw in Bagyoni and his colleagues intelligence letters to Adler-Rudel and Dr. Marcus Ehren- objectives. A further source of information was preis, the chief rabbi of Sweden’s Jews. Bader _ the report Adler-Rudel himself sent to the British

52

“A One-in-a-Million Chance”

ambassador and to Count Folke Bernadotte, then |= Germany be allowed to buy supplies—especially

deputy chairman of the Swedish Red Cross. medicine—in Sweden. It is hard to ignore the What worried the Americans? First of all, similarity between this idea and the earlier overthey were unable to understand what Bagyoni _ tures to Hungary.!"° was doing in Stockholm. They recalled that Bagy- As Kleist testified after the war, at the beginoni had worked for Otto Hatz, Hungary’s mili- ning of 1944 he met Hillel Storch, chairman of the tary attaché in Bulgaria and an agent inthe Dog- — Swedish branch of the World Jewish Congress. At wood network, which was already known to be ___ this meeting they discussed the possibility of resserving many masters. They also knew that Bagy- — cuing thousands of Estonian Jews as well as the fate oni worked with Lothar Kévess, a member of the of other Jews imprisoned in German concentracolorful Hungarian enclave in Istanbul, who was __ tion camps. During these visits in Stockholm—

a double agent subject to the close scrutiny ofthe | some of which took place around the time of Americans.!%3 Of course, the Americans also had _—__ Brand’s and Grosz’s departure for Istanbul—he

an ongoing interest in keeping tabs on Zionist also met with Adler-Rudel, the Jewish Agency’s

plans for mass immigration. representative in Sweden, and an anonymous JewAnother mystery surrounded Peter Kleist’s —_ ish businessman (probably Eric Warburg, a Jewish mission in Stockholm. A businessman in his late banker from Stockholm). thirties, he was the emissary of German Foreign Most researchers are convinced that the moMinister von Ribbentrop, but he also acted on _ tive behind Kleist’s proposal was similar to that of behalf of the SS and even servedthe Abwehrinhis — the other proposals, namely, a desire to open a spare time. There were connections, intentional | separate communications channel with the West or otherwise, between his assignment and those ___ through discussions concerning the fate of the of Brand and Grosz. For example, Bader and Jews. Particularly on the eve of defeat, the Jews

Bagyoni were implicated in both missions. were practically the only “goods” the Germans Kleist visited Stockholm several times during — were able to offer the West. They discovered that the summer and autumn of1944. Iver Olsen—the the West was not about to go out of its way to pur-

financial attaché at the American embassy in chase these “goods.” It can be ascertained that Stockholm and a representative of the American __ Kleist’s mission, like other steps taken by GerWar Refugee Board who was also attached to the = many at the time, originated within Himmler’s

OSS in Stockholm—enlisted his services. Kleist circle—or at least was based on the latter’s bore a double message: a proposal for separate | knowledge and tacit approval.!””

negotiations with the West and a willingness to Adler-Rudel arrived in Stockholm equipped release Jews from the Nazi murder machine.!™ with a list of Hungarian Jews, supplied by the JAE

Kleist had already begun conducting prelim- in Jerusalem, for whom he was to arrange inary talks and had sent messages between von Swedish “safe conduct” certificates—the selfRibbentrop and representatives of the West from | same idea that Randall and Henderson of the 1942 to 1943. During these visits he also met with British Foreign Office had told Weizmann was Count Folke Bernadotte.!® At that time he was ridiculous (12 July 1944). The Jewish Agency’s already offering to release Jews (two thousand —= modus operandi was obvious: when one channel Latvian Jews in return for two million dollars) to | appeared blocked, it approached the matter from

improve relations between Germany and the another direction. The emerging picture, thereWest. He later lowered the price to the equivalent fore, does not confirm the subsequent negative of two million Swedish crowns (half a million image of the Jewish Agency as inactive regarding dollars) in foreign currency onthe conditionthat __ the rescue of Jews.

53

Rescue Plans

Immediately following his arrival in Stock- __ time in Istanbul, Spain, Portugal, and Switzer-

holm, Adler-Rudel heard from Storch about land? How significant is it that in all these locaKleist’s activity. Storch had already met Kleiston __ tions one finds representatives from the Yishuv, several occasions and had proposed that the Nazis American Jews, members of the JDC or the WJC,

release several thousand Jews being held in representatives of the WRB (in Switzerland, this Bergen-Belsen and supply them with South — was Rosewell McLelland), as well as various American passports. Included in this group were —_ emissaries from the Nazi side?20!

thirteen hundred Jews from the famous “Kasztner What is clear from this set of complex cointrain,’ who had left Hungary and were beingheld _cidences is that the JAE had been trying to put temporarily in Bergen-Belsen. Another three to —_—into action an initiative—part of the plan to resfour thousand Jews from the Balkans were being cue children—since early 1943. Also obvious are held in German forced labor camps, and anaddi- __ the threads connecting the Yishuv leadership and tional three hundred Jewish women were impris- — the Zionist movement in Jerusalem and London

oned in a camp near Tallinn in Estonia.!% with their operative arms in Jerusalem, Istanbul, As with negotiations concerning Latvian Lisbon, and Stockholm. Also apparent is the inJews, Kleist at first demanded a million dollars volvement of the JDC (both with and without the but later agreed to accept a million Swedish — Jewish Agency) at that time. Equally well known crowns, with which the Nazis would buy medi- is Adler-Rudel’s mission in Sweden, namely, to cine from Sweden. Adler-Rudel was thus in- _ transform the Swedish government’s promises volved in activity that had begun before his ar- | and Horthy’s declaration into a workable system rival. He apparently made a point of reportingto for rescuing Jews.

the British embassy and to Count Bernadotte to On the other hand, it is not at all clear how prevent this activity from interfering with his = Bagyoni, arriving in Stockholm on a German main objective in Sweden, namely, the rescue of transit permit, figured in these activities. Was Jewish children. Of course, he also reported to —_ there any connection between Horthy’s declarathe London branch of the Jewish Agency andto _ tion and Bagyoni’s mission? Was Bagyoni enlisted the rescue emissaries in Istanbul, where hisinfor- _ to escalate the release of Hungary’s remaining

mation was transferred to Jerusalem.!” Jews thanks to his connections within Hungary? It is not entirely clear which Nazi figure was Were certain persons interested in sending a loud

behind the proposals discussed in Stockholm. and clear message that Horthy’s proposal was Here, too, there were many players. The emis- _ practical and that the Hungarian establishment saries sent by the Germans secured theirownin- was indeed looking for a way of breaking free of terests amid the tenuous reality that surrounded — the German stranglehold? If so, how was it pos-

the chaotic German government. They reported sible that American intelligence services knew to whichever side seemed sufficiently important nothing of a plan in which the United States was and strong enough to protect them. Kleist, who _ purported to bea central player, forcing it to make was sent by von Ribbentrop, secretly reported to —_ inquiries worldwide about Bagyoni’s journey to

Ernst Kaltenbrunner, then head of the Reich Stockholm? Main Security Office (RSHA). Apparently he also Moreover, it is unclear whether there was a reported to Himmler, Kaltenbrunner’s patron connection between Kleist’s mission and the two

and von Ribbentrop’s enemy.2“ invitations received by Bader to Budapest and Was there any connection between these _ Berlin. Bagyoni was indeed involved in Bader’s feelers being put out in Stockholm and other ini- invitation to Budapest, which was almost certiatives being bandied about around the same __ tainly sent by the SS, but it would appear that this

54

“A One-in-a-Million Chance”

time he had come to Stockholm at another’s bid- —_—-Yishuv activists and representatives of the JDC, ding. Perhaps he did so with the intention of cre- — the World Jewish Congress, the American War ating a convenient alibi for a time when the West — Refugee Board, as well as others representing the had won the war. It is also possible that he was —_ United States and Britain.

sent by his superiors in the Hungarian intelli- In both Switzerland and Sweden Jewish forces gence services. Then again, he may simply have __ tried to jump-start negotiations, if only to halt the

escaped to Stockholm to distance himself from extermination process and save as many Jews as his betrayed handlers in the multilateral espi- possible before the Nazis were defeated. Allied onage operations he and Otto Hatz were mixed _ forces were constantly advancing on all fronts into up in. It is also possible that he was sent by Ger- _ the heart of Europe, and negotiations for the resman intelligence to ferret out anti-Nazi activity | cue of Jews through Sweden actually took place in Stockholm and to close ranks against the im- _after the Allies had already liberated several con-

pending disintegration of the Nazi camp.” centration camps inside Germany itself. Why did Bader recommend that Adler- While the Germans were sending out feelers Rudel cooperate with Bagyoni? One cannot be __ to the West, they continued to murder Jews. Becertain since everything was linked toeverything = ginning on 8 November 1944, the Nazis’ arsenal else: intelligence, rescue, and smuggling. In any — of destruction was expanded to include the event, it is clear that after the rejection of Brand’s_ _ horrific “death march.” Thirty to fifty thousand ransom plan, attention shifted to Horthy’s an- —_ of Budapest’s Jews marched along the Budapestnouncement, and it was hoped that large-scale, | Vienna highway some 180 kilometers toward the aboveboard, government-initiated rescue opera- = Austrian border, while the Nazis picked out the tions would now go into effect. Thus, the possi- | weaker ones on the way and shot them to death. bility of Bader conducting independent negotia- |= The extermination, therefore, continued virtu-

tions with the Germans was shoved to the allyup tothe final moments before the collapse of sidelines.*3 Furthermore, the open and clandes- __ the Nazi government.

tine negotiations conducted by various represen- Negotiations over the rescue of Jews through tatives of the Nazi camp with Adler-Rudel and = Sweden were conducted at a time when the Third Storch and with Mayer and Kasztner would have __ Reich was breathing its last. This might explain made Bader’s journey to Berlin superfluous. why in April 1945, only days before the final col-

NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN MAYER AND _2PS¢ @ meeting took place in Berlin between Reichsfiithrer SS Himmler and the Jewish repre-

KASZTNER AND BECHER AND KRUMEY sentative of the World Zionist Congress. This

During the summer and early autumn of 1944, meeting played a very minor role in Benthe two arenas in which the fate of Europe’s Jews | Gurion’s agenda and that of the Yishuv’s intelliwas discussed were Sweden and Switzerland. In gence establishment, the reasons for this being Switzerland negotiations focused ontransferring twofold. First, from the Yishuv’s point of view neJews through Switzerland to the Iberian Penin- = gotiations with the Nazi camp thus far had sula. In many ways these talks resembled those —_ proved that they were no more than wishful methat had preceded them: they expressed the de- —_ anderings and that Britain and the United States sire of elite Nazi groups to sell Jews in return for | would prevent any real results from emerging. money and the opening up of channels to the | Second, toward the end of the war Ben-Gurion West; representatives of the Nazicamp were usu- _and his colleagues focused their efforts on atally the same people and allhad tiesto Himmler’s —_ tempting to reach those Jews who had survived

camp; and they faced a motley collection of — the Nazi withdrawal.

55

Rescue Plans

Ben-Gurion and his colleagues in the JAE _—_agreed that he could create the illusion he was nestrove to collect the Jews in the liberated zones, —_ gotiating in order to buy time and to hold up the

care for them, and prepare them for immigration extermination process, but they forbade him to Palestine or for the anticipated political struggle | from negotiating over a plan that was similar to following the war. These tasks seemed tobe more _ the one Brand had brought from Hungary. He practical to the Yishuv, although they, too, in- | wasalso expressly forbidden to turn up at a meet-

volved political and economic problems. Senior ing as the official representative of the United members of the operational hierarchy were re- States and to offer the Nazis money or goods. sponsible for carrying them out, and the Yishuv’s These bans were issued from Washington by leaders devoted most of their attention to them.” = Rosewell McClelland, the representative of the It is for this reason that Gruenbaum and the Res- — War Refugee Board in Switzerland. The JDC cencue Committee were involved in the later ransom _ ter in New York also placed severe restrictions on plans on behalf of the Yishuv. Most probably the = Mayer’s negotiations with the Becher-Krumey Political Department and the illegal immigration = group. When Schwarz arrived in Switzerland, he, operation had little faith that any positive results too, was forbidden to conduct negotiations.?””

would emerge from negotiations in Sweden and Mayer ignored the ban and entered into ne-

Switzerland.2 gotiations. The first meeting took place in August

Before briefly describing the main points of | on the aforementioned bridge that connected these negotiations, I wish to draw the reader’s at- | Switzerland to Austria—and for a very prosaic tention to the connection between the possibility — reason: The Swiss government was reluctant to of acting semiautonomously (discussed by Sharett, permit the entry of Nazi officers into its neutral Hirschmann, and Schwartz) and Sali Mayer’s plan _ territory. The Nazis proposed that the Jews in Switzerland. The former discussions, held in supply ten thousand trucks to be used for agriCairo in June 1944, focused on establishing alarge cultural purposes, and in return Jews would be monetary fund and conducting direct negotia- _ released to the United States.*°° As the negotiations—which was precisely Mayer’s objective in _ tions dragged on into September, October, and

Switzerland. early 1945, the Nazis asked for goods. Mayer tried

On 21 August 1944 five people met on the to offer money, but even the sums he talked about bridge spanning the Rhine canal between Saint —_ were not at his disposal. He had no more than Margareten in Switzerland and Hochst in Aus- — what he had actually managed to collect in tria. These included Sali Mayer of the JDC, Dr. Switzerland.

Israel Kasztner of Hungary, and three SS offic- In October and November these negotiaers—Kurt Becher, Hermann Krumey, and an __ tions were joined by local Jewish initiatives in unidentified officer. Most of them had been in- —_ Hungary and Switzerland. Until then Mayer had volved in previous ransom plans. The meeting __ successfully transferred both money and tracwas aimed at examining anotherransom planin- __ tors, and at one point he even obtained permisvolving those European Jews who had survived __ sion from Stettinius, the U.S. secretary of state, to

the Nazis. There was nothing newintermsofthe — transfer twenty million Swiss francs from the

concept, the method, or the participants.*” JDC center in New York to their account in Mayer gambled. Like the Yishuv emissaries | Switzerland, but Stettinius forbade him to hand who forged two “agreements” and were not in __ the money over to the Nazis. The deposit, meant possession of the money the sellers of Jews were __ to serve as a signal that the negotiations were sedemanding of them, Mayer was forcedto manip- _ rious, gave Mayer a chance to buy precious ulate and maneuver. The American authorities —_ time.?°

56

“A One-in-a-Million Chance”

The last meeting between Mayer and the __ this matter in Switzerland. Any other plan, as well Nazis took place in February 1945. Mayer showed __as the carrying out of Horthy’s declaration on

them the bank slip confirming the transfer of | immigration to Palestine, depends on this meettwenty million francs from the JDC in New York. ing. Some 2,000 [people on Kasztner’s train] He tried to bring the Jews under the auspicesofthe have been taken to Bergen-Belsen—probably for International Red Cross. The Jewish negotiatorsin | exchange or release when the meeting takes Sweden had also tried a similar maneuver.!° place.”2!4 Two days later Jerusalem sent this mesWhat were the results of Mayer’s negotia- | sage to Sharett in London and asked for his intertions? He appears to have brought about a soften- vention.2!5 In October 1944 Ben-Gurion met with ing of Nazi policy toward the Jews. It is possible | Brand and mentioned negotiations in Switzerthat the holdup in deportations of Budapest’s Jews —_ land. Brand had just been released from custody during August 1944 resulted from these negotia- —_ in Cairo. Ben-Gurion told him of the efforts to tions. He may also have effected a positive change __ rescue the remaining Jews of Hungary and exin attitude toward the Jews being held in several _—_ pressed his hope for positive results from Mayer's camps, and may even have paved the way fora —_ and Kasztner’s negotiations in Switzerland.?!

“smooth: transfer of the camps to the Allies.?!! A JEW CONFRONTING THE It is worth mentioning that Walter Schellen- MURDERER OF HIS PEOPLE

berg, Himmler’s close associate and one of the SS heads, was also active on the Nazi side, as was _— Similar negotiations were being held in Sweden. Clages, SD commander in Budapest, who tooka — This time they were centered around Felix Ker-

leading role in the Brand affair. Clages had been __ sten, personal masseur to Himmler, who was

party to dealings with Mayer since September. conducting negotiations with members of the Schellenberg’s involvement was another sign of | Swedish branch of the World Jewish Congress. Himmler’s presence behind the Nazi negotiating Kersten, a German of Baltic origin with a Finnish

team.?!? passport, had managed to assuage certain of To return to Palestine and Ben-Gurion, | Himmler’s physical pains and thereby gain his when Kaplan returned from Turkey, he brought _ trust, eventually becoming his confidant.?!”

preliminary information on negotiation at- Kersten arrived in Sweden in 1943. From the tempts in Switzerland. At a JAE meeting Kaplan _ beginning he tried to mediate between Himmler told those present: “We are at the beginning ofa = and the West. In Himmler’s name (or so he almomentous event that could be very large.” He _leged) Kersten proposed that the American OSS also informed them that Schwartz, the JDC chief — representative in Stockholm fly to Berlin for a in Europe, had left Istanbul for Lisbon “in order meeting with Himmler.?!8 During 1944 and 1945 to make attempts from the other end,” and that _—‘ Kersten established connections between HimmAdler-Rudel had been sent to Stockholm. Kaplan _ler and Hillel Storch as well as other representa-

also reported that he had taken certain steps in tives of the World Jewish Congress. Sweden’s order to ensure the availability of money forthe — steadfast involvement in attempts to rescue evacuation of Jewish children to the Iberian Jews—especially from Hungary—served as a Peninsula.?!3 More detailed information had al- _ backdrop to these activities. ready reached Ben-Gurion’s desk on 22 August Like Bader, Dobkin, and Schwartz, Storch 1944, a day after the meeting in Saint Margareten. was also invited to Berlin, this time for a meeting Ehud Avriel reported from Istanbul on addi- — with Himmler himself. In early March 1945 Ker-

tional Nazi signals in the direction of Switzer- sten delivered the invitation directly from’ land: “The Germans want another meeting on Himmler. At the same time, Himmler promised

5/

Rescue Plans

to release ten thousand Jews to Sweden or _ all the survivors to remain where they were or to Switzerland. Storch consulted with the Swedish — leave Germany with the help of the International Foreign Office, which told him that his journey — Red Cross. Moreover, he demanded that Himmwas imperative, an opinion shared by Count __ler order all camp commanders to treat the Jews Folke Bernadotte—affiliated with the Swedish = humanelyand, over time, to hand over the camps Red Cross at the time —who was about to set off to the advancing Allied forces. Masur also supfor Berlin on rescue missions. Another playeron __ plied Himmler with a list of Jews whose immedi-

the Nazi side was Schellenberg, who had estab- ate release was being demanded by the World lished contact with Mayer and other Jews in Jewish Congress.

Switzerland. Himmler said that the Nazis had recently Storch made sure to report his own activity —_ been responsible for the release of large numbers

and developments in the negotiations to several of prisoners from several camps. The Allied people. Gruenbaum received these reports,asdid forces had released prisoners from other camps, Adler-Rudel (who had returned to Londoninthe including Bergen-Belsen and Dachau. Himmler meantime) and Josef Linton, the experienced complained that the Allies had made public the secretary of the London branch of the Jewish _ sights they encountered upon entering the liber-

Agency. He also reported to Stephen Wise, ated camps in Germany. This was propaganda, Nahum Goldmann, and Arieh Tartakover, all remonstrated Himmler.?22 members of the World Jewish Congress in the Masur reckoned that this group included United States. Wise and Goldmann were also several dozen Norwegian Jews from the list he members of the Jewish Agency’s American had given Himmler; Swedish Jews from another branch, and both organizations worked in close _list; a thousand Jewish women who had been cooperation. Storch, who asked that his journey transferred to Sweden from the Ravensbriick be kept a secret, wrote that Himmler had stressed camp; and several Jews from Theresienstadt. He that any leak of such a program would point up _also expected Himmler to place an unequivocal Germany’s weakness and force him to renegeon —_ ban on murdering Jews in the camps and allow his promises.”!? Four days later (31 March) Storch the Red Cross to provide food and medicine. informed those same colleagues that he had also Himmler’s single condition was that the enconsulted with Rabbi Ehrenpreis and that they __ tire transaction be kept secret, that no details were both convinced that time could be bought — would be reported on the reasons behind the reby holding negotiations with Himmler. Storch _leases, and that the latter would not be linked to

therefore decided to set off for Berlin.2° Himmler or his people. According to Masur, one Kersten sent out feelers throughout April.In of the participants at the meeting told him that early spring 1945 the Jewish side in the negotia- _ Hitler was still firmly opposed to any concessions tions decided that Norbert Masur would go to __ to the Jews, and that if he were to get wind of the Berlin. Masur was the chairman of the Stock- —_ decisions reached at that meeting he would probholm Zionist society and was alsotreasurer ofthe — ably thwart them. The man told Masur that even local chapter of the World Jewish Congress.”7!On just three weeks before the end of the war, Saturday, 20 April 1945, ten days before Hitler’s | Himmler was not about to defy Hitler even if he suicide in a Berlin bunker, Masur met Himmler _had the ability to do so.

at Kersten’s estate near Berlin. In the course of the meeting, Himmler tried The meeting lasted more thantwoandahalf — tospread lies, but Masur did not place much faith

hours. Masur demanded that Himmler stop de- —in his commitments. Nonetheless, Himmler porting Jews to extermination camps and allow __ definitely appeared to be trying to salvage some-

58

“A One-in-a-Million Chance”

thing at the last moment. Masur believed that negotiations with the Nazis over the release of Himmler might exterminate the few Jews who Jews. Nonetheless, his expectations for the sucremained, but that there was a chance that he _ cess of such negotiations were none too high bewould fulfill some of his commitments. All this cause the Allies were unwavering in their demand information was sent to the JAE in Jerusalem and for an unconditional German surrender. When to Adler-Rudel and Linton atthe Londonbranch. the Brand plan was placed on the JAE’s desk, he After the war, Adler-Rudel reckoned that twelve — declared that it was “quite implausible” and that hundred Jewish women were indeed released — the Germans clearly had “one objective—to exfrom Ravensbriick on Himmler’s orders.?”3 terminate the Jews.” He did not seek the easy way It can be established that Ben-Gurion and __ out of this pessimistic evaluation and determined

his colleagues in the JAE and the London and that “if there’s a one-in-a-million chance—we U.S. branches were aware of the discussions be- must grab it.’225 As the affair moved forward, ing held in Switzerland and Sweden.2% Although = Ben-Gurion emphasized that as far as the Jews they were supplied with reports on the main de- — were concerned, the main objective was to hold velopments, they were not asinvolvedastheyhad — up the extermination by entering into negotiabeen in the Brand mission and its ramifications. _ tions even if this proved futile. He skillfully used As far as they were concerned, the talks in Switz- _ artifice to convince the Nazis that their proposals erland and Sweden were a continuation of previ- were being given serious consideration and to ous efforts that had produced virtually no results. | motivate them to put off the murders.”

The negotiations and communications had The Brand affair illustrates the way in which thus reached a peak with the meeting betweena — Ben-Gurion was forced to maneuver in order to Jew and an archmurderer, Reichsfuhrer SS Hei- maintain the necessary operational freedom of drich Himmler, second in command in an ad- movement in the face of the reality of the Yishuv in ministration whose objective was todehumanize __ Palestine: subservient to a foreign power that kept and exterminate “the Jew.” Himmler met with a _close tabs on every move made by the local leaderrepresentative of the World Jewish Congress and _ ship; confronting a world war and the exterminathe Zionist movement. It was a dramatic and __ tion of the Jews of Europe. This necessitated the even pathetic and absurd finale to a horrific |§ emergency procedures adopted by Ben-Gurion, event. It was under such circumstances that the — suchas not recording debates, conclusions, or incurtain fell on the final act, which was marked by ___ structions attached to certain decisions that were an array of attempts to rescue Jews during the __ relayed by “word of mouth,” and even bypassing Second World War, all of which were complex the JAE, which unwittingly found itself approving

and daring but none of which had a strong _— decisions made by Ben-Gurion and his con-

enough grasp of reality. fidantes.22/

As we have seen, this need to maneuver beBen-Gurion was deeply involved in the Brand __ tween extreme extenuating circumstances forced affair, which constituted the main effortto rescue | Ben-Gurion to establish a “parallel system” of dethe Jews of Hungary and the surviving Jews in _bating, planning, and decision making alongside other European countries, a rescue plan riddled __ the leadership’s “formal” bodies. The fingerprints with all the problems characteristic of previous _ of this system are apparent throughout the Brand efforts. He played a central role in determining _ affair, at the center of which was the leadership general policies and tactical strategies. Inthe JAE — triumvirate—Ben-Gurion, Sharett, and Kaplan. debate held on 2 April 1944, two weeks after the | These men proved outstanding. These men motiNazi invasion of Hungary, he did not reject direct vated a group of young, courageous, and devoted

59

Rescue Plans

helpers who admittedly lacked operational expe- = ments from London and Istanbul even if it was rience and professional training. This group was _—_—_ addressed to Cohen or Kaplan. This is also obviheaded by Meirov and Zaslani. Others included: —_ ous from information contained in Ben-Gurion’s

Epstein, Kollek, and Avriel; Schind, Bader, and reports to the JAE.

Pomeranz. The members of this secret group usually Even this parallel system was not always as_ _—_ deferred to Ben-Gurion’s authority. He was the coordinated as it should have been. It was often _ senior political leader, chairman of the JAE, and disorganized and riddled by conflicting loyalties. | head of the Zionist Labor movement’s major poIt grew out of a pluralistic, involved public com- _litical party (all members of the group belonged

posed of diverse bodies, movements, and politi- to the labor movement). Since Ben-Gurion, cal parties, immigrant organizations, and trade = Sharett, and Kaplan were more attentive than unions. Thus, the modus operandi of this parallel _—_ their colleagues to special wartime needs, Ben-

system involved improvisation and even operat- Gurion established a special relationship, based

ing within “gray areas.”2?8 on mutual respect, with the people involved in Most of the members of this secret group __ the Yishuv’s secret activities. were aware of events before they became known Ben-Gurion’s tendency was to uphold, as far to the JAE. Sometimes they were even aware ofac- —_as_ possible, the rules of democratic leadership tivity carried out without JAE approval or that even during a state of emergency, and he strove to contradicted its (recorded) policies. As we have involve the JAE in all strategic decisions. After seen, the JAE records make no mention of two _ Brand’s arrival from Hungary, he convened the major funding agreements between the Jewish _JAE for three extraordinary sessions. On 25 May Agency and the JDC or ofa report of debates, held —_ he called his colleagues together for a hearing on

by representatives from the two organizations, | Pomeranz’s report; on 14 June they met at his concerning JDC aide to Jewish plans involving home in Tel Aviv, following Sharett’s return and semiautonomous activity against the Nazis.” his report on the Aleppo meeting; on 24 June The Brand affair also illustrates the way in _ they met to discuss Sharett’s Cairo meetings with

which the Yishuv’s intelligence channels oper- Hirschmann, Schwartz, and Moyne prior to ated. The latest information first landed on Ben- Sharett’s departure for London. The JAE also Gurion’s desk and that of the parallel system § continued to hold regular Sunday meetings, surrounding him. Venya Pomeranz arrived in — which were devoted, in part, to discussions on Palestine on 24 May 1944 and immediately re- the Brand affair and its ramifications. On one of ported to Ben-Gurion and Sharett. According to — these occasions Ben-Gurion demanded that his one source, upon his return from Aleppo Sharett — colleagues confront these complex dilemmas, reported first to Ben-Gurion. Agronsky returned _and for the first time since the ransom issue was from London and reported first to Ben-Gurion placed on the agenda they were all required to only on Weizmann’s and Sharett’s activity re- _—air their views. From the very beginning, he had

garding the Brand issue and the “self-defense also activated the JAE’s branches in London plan.” This was also the pattern followed by Ju- = and Washington, represented by Goldmann and dah Magnes and Harry Vitals of the JDC and Ka- = Weizmann, whom he instructed to win the supplan and Eliash upon their return from Turkey. port of the two superpowers.”*!

News of the Nazis’ invitation to Bader first Ben-Gurion also acted on a tactical level. For reached Ben-Gurion and only later was shared = example, as soon as the Brand affair became with his colleagues.*3° Ben-Gurion was the firstto | known to him, he insisted on sending Sharett to

receive information about unfolding develop- Istanbul (even without the necessary entry per-

60

"A One-in-a-Million Chance”

mit) and from there to London. It was Ben- _ behalf of the Jewish Agency and the World Jewish

Gurion who insisted on including the United Congress. States and Britain in the secret plan, and he was Unlike the two previous ransom plans, no also the person who passed along all new infor- —_— information was leaked to the public concerning mation to Sharett in London.2*2 As we have seen, the JAE’s secret discussions of the Eichmann pro-

Ben-Gurion was the one who oversaw the __ posal and its repercussions—a clear sign of maYishuv’s and the Zionist movement’s tactics — turity. Despite tactical differences among mem-

throughout the Brand affair. bers of the JAE and notwithstanding heavy Important operational partnerships devel- = pressure placed on them by the Yishuv’s exoped in the course of the Brand affair. Political | Hungarian population, the issues discussed by and ideological differences among the large Jew- _ the JAE were not sensationalized.

ish organizations were pushed aside. Dr. Magnes The Brand affair raises a painful question: of the “Brit Shalom” and the JDC, who visited Did Ben-Gurion and the Yishuv leadership make Turkey on an aid-and-rescue mission, brought __ their participation in plans to rescue the Jews of

back with him up-to-date information on — Europe contingent on the refugees coming only Bader’s invitations, which he handed over to _ to Palestine? In other words, did they refrain Ben-Gurion. The JDC cooperated with the Zion- — from taking part in rescue plans that provided ist leadership and even considered the possibility refuge outside of Palestine? There clearly was no of the Jewish side secretly allocating money for such stipulation, since the proposal to rescue

independent negotiations with the Nazis. Hungary's Jews was based on a ban against sendThese secret discussions express a certain ing them to Palestine. (Eichmann himself promeasure of independence. Evenifplansthat were vided five reasons for the ban.) All the plans disdebated did not materialize, it was not the conse- _ cussed in the wake of Brand’s mission and even

quence of a non-creative thought process but afterward never suggested that refuge be rerather because the rescue of Jews—supposingthe __ stricted to Palestine.

Nazis were to agree to release them—was wholly It could, of course, be claimed that Bendependent on the West. The Yishuv leaders wel- | Gurion was conducting himself like a savvy politi-

comed the intervention of Hirschmann, who cian who, though realizing he had to come to represented an American government-—affiliated terms withthe ban, also knew that most of the Jews

body and was an enthusiastic supporter of the sent to Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland Bergson (Kook) group, although instructions would ultimately end up in Palestine because at from Washington forced Hirschmann to with- that time there weren't many “takers” for Jewish draw his offer to lend a hand in unconventional _refugees.?33 Even if one were to accept the dubious rescue procedures. Unlike Hirschmann, who had __logic behind this allegation, there is no denying the

to follow the orders of those who were indifferent fact that Ben-Gurion made no conditions and to the fate of the Jews, one can contrast the rela- acted to the best of his ability to rescue the Jews tive independence of certain Jewish people who of Hungary. His involvement in the Brand affair acted on behalf of the Zionist movement and __ was so great that Gruenbaum complained that such organizations as the JDC and the World Ben-Gurion was undermining Gruenbaum’s own Jewish Congress. Both organizations also coop- _efforts.?54

erated with the JAE in negotiations held in The Brand affair also revealed Ben-Gurion’s Switzerland and Sweden, which was reflected in _ susceptibility to pressure from immigrant organthe fact that Zionists such as Stephen Wise and _izations, typically those that had not been con-

Nahum Goldmann carried outajoint missionon tained by the Rescue Committee, his “lightning

61

Rescue Plans

rod.” On 23 March 1944 he met with animpor- _it managed to spread confusion among the Allies, tant delegation of ex-Hungariansanddidhisbest leading to open conflict, with Russia leaving the to fulfill most of their requests. He also met with _ pact. leaders of the Jerusalem Sephardic community, Simply leaking information on these negotidiscussed the possibility of rescuing the Jews of | ations would have been sufficient for the RusGreece, and hinted at “negotiations with the — sians—who were by nature suspicious—to bedevil,’ who did not distinguish between Ashke- = come quite agitated. Whoever designed the nazic and Sephardic blood. Ben-Gurion asked —_ ransom plan may have intended to cast a shadow his counterparts to pull together and calm things —_ over the superpowers by suggesting a “separate down in their respective communities. This peace” with the West and continued war against meeting took place in the wake of the polemic the USSR, or did they intend to use to such a revGruenbaum was involved in at the time.”°° olutionary process to counter the old/new threat A review of the Brand affair clearlyshowsthe against the world, namely, communism? The obstacles the Yishuv’s leadership faced in deci- | Germans probably intended to sow dissent phering the enormous complexity of the various |= among their enemies by manipulating the “omprocedures involved. On the onehandtherewere _nipotent” Jews into pressuring the superpowers, the Nazis with their labyrinthine chain of com- — to embarrass them with an apparently farmand, their conflicting intentions, and the gap _— reaching proposal to rescue Jews, to maneuver between what they said and what was actually — them into refusing and then claiming that they happening. On the other hand there was Ben- _ put the Jews at their disposal but they didn’t want Gurion and his colleagues, taking a stand against — them. Perhaps the Nazis hoped that such a process Britain and the United States, who were offering |= would improve their position in the peace talks the Yishuv sympathy and promising tactical co- —_— following the war.

operation while doing their utmost to thwart any But if this was a blatant act of propaganda, attempt at a mass rescue of Jews. One shouldalso —_- why did it take place in secret? Why, for example,

not forget the Russians as a primary player. They | was the proposal not broadcast over Radio were terrified of a German conspiracy with the Berlin? After all, the pressure on Britain and the West, which as early as 1943 had been an option United States would have been so much greater, among certain circles in the Nazi establishment. the confusion would have increased, and it would Moreover, the Russians were not overly enthusi- have been harder for anyone to wriggle out.

astic about rescuing Jews. These feelers may have been aimed at overturnPERPLEXING QUESTIONS ing the economic embargo to which Germany

was subject. Those behind the proposal probably Ben-Gurion was required to ask the right ques- assumed that by sending out ships bearing coffee,

tions in real time, based on fragmentary infor- cocoa, and other goods, the Western powers mation that was often misleading and riddled —_ would be indicating to other countries wanting with contradictions, without having at his dis- | to do business with Germany that the embargo posal any retrospective knowledge. Thus, he and _had been lifted.

his colleagues were unsure whether Germany It is also possible that the objective of the really intended to carry out its promise to “sell” a © ransom proposal was to frustrate the Allies’ plans million Jews. The Nazis may have intended to re- _—_—‘ to open a new battlefront against Germany from lease small groups at a high political or personal _—_ the west. An imminent invasion from the west,

price. Perhaps Ben-Gurion and his colleagues as- coupled with a million Jews on their way west sumed that Nazi Germany could hold on only if and southwest to Spain and Portugal, would have

62

“A One-in-a-Million Chance”

blocked the main highways, bridges, and all ma- —_ choice of such an emissary prove that the plan itjor access roads, possibly halting the invasion al- self was dubious, or was Grosz selected because of

together. the complex nature of his mission?

It is possible that the Nazis simply hoped to An American secret service agent in Turkey achieve some quiet in Hungary and to extort voiced these concerns in a cable he sent his commoney from the Jews there—to instill in them = manding officers: “If the idea of a separate peace the false hope that a solution was close athandin _is to be taken seriously, are a minor industrialist order to prevent them from rebelling or prepar- from Hungary [Joel Brand] and a well-known ing their self-defense, as they had done in War- _ double agent the most suitable emissaries to pass saw, and leaving the arena clear for annihilating | on the message even in its earliest stages?” In that

them in peace. Such trickery had its horrific case, what was a leader to do when faced with a precedents, with names such as “resettlement,” situation that was as obscure, multifaceted, and “transferring to the east” and other euphemisms. poorly understood as this one? Even today reIt was hard to understand the discrepancy searchers remain divided.” between Eichmann’s proposal and the continued It was also possible, from the Yishuv’s standdeportation of Jews from Hungary to Auschwitz. —_ point, to raise such questions with regard to Nor did they stop after June, when Bader wasin- __ other incidents, such as the invitations extended vited to Budapest. Another long list of questions — to Bader, the negotiations conducted by Mayer, could be posed regarding the intentions of the —_ and the activity of Kleist and Kersten. If HimmHungarians and the Nazis and the origin of the __ler’s people in the SS—Schellenberg, Krumey,

Eichmann’s ransom proposal. No simple re- Becher, Clages, among others—intended to sell sponse suffices, since it would have been hard to —_— Jews and to gravitate toward a deal with the West,

assume that anyone on the German side could — why did they send out contradictory signals? have supposed that Britain or the United States | Why did Himmler stand by Hitler almost to the would have agreed to send the Germans ten very last moment and refrain from freeing him-

thousand trucks at that stage in the war. self both publicly and practically? If they were reEven today there is still no consensusamong _ally prepared to carry out a deal, why did the historians on a number of major issues. For ex- — meeting between the Reichsfiihrer and the Jewish

ample, was Eichmann serious about his pro- __ representative take place only when the Allied posal? Was he acting under instructions from _ forces were virtually at the entrance to Hitler's Himmler or had he misinterpreted Himmler’s —_ Berlin bunker? Why didn’t the Nazis conduct any

intentions? Was he acting out of a desire to _ serious negotiations in Istanbul? These questions thwart, once and for all, Himmler’s tendency and were posed by the Yishuv leaders at the time, but complete the “final solution” at any cost? How _like researchers today they were unable to supply can one conclude that the West would agree to —_any real answers.

pay the Germans in trucks (for use on the eastern VIEWING THE SITUATION

front), food supplies, or a substantial sum of ;

money in return for Jewish lives? What are we to THROUGH BEN-GURION 5 EYES make of Wisliceny, who came armed with recom- — How did Ben-Gurion interpret all this? He unmendations and an unauthorized promise that — derstood that the source of the Nazis’ proposal

there would be no ghettoes, deportations, and lay in Germany’s deteriorating situation and asmurders. How were the leaders to interpret the sumed that the supplicants were seeking a way choice of Grosz, who served all parties, with his out for themselves or for Nazi Germany. He bedevious and unsavory personality? Did the lieved, in other words, that the proposal should

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Rescue Plans

be accepted. He also realized that the proposal re- nection between the goodwill invested in the vealed a lack of consensus among the various Nazi __— plans and whether they would bear fruit. In time authorities and actually indicated that the chaotic —_ an increasing sense of guilt within certain segsituation that existed in the Nazi camp was what —_ ments of Israeli society would result from this made the proposal possible. This assumption was —_ discrepancy—as well as accusations in the wake

reflected in his opinion concerning the invita- — of the Kasztner affair.

tions received by Bader. After the meeting in The Griinwald-Kasztner trial provided strong Aleppo, it was clear to Ben-Gurion that the cen- _ support for the allegation that Kasztner had coltral issue was the proposal for a “separate peace” _—_—laborated with the Nazis, an allegation that was

that Grosz had brought with him. He gathered _first heard among that part of the Jewish commufrom this that there was no chance ofthe plansuc- _ nity that had been involved in the attempts to resceeding, since Britain and the United States would cue the Jews of Hungary, and would later spread reject it out of hand. He therefore proposed that —_ throughout the young state of Israel. The first part

negotiations be undertaken—even if these ofthe trialand the controversy surrounding it also proved futile—in order to raiseGermany’s hopes __ resulted in an unprecedented hypothetical com-

and cause it to delay exterminations. parison: Kasztner collaborated with the Nazis just Ben-Gurion believed that the superpowers _as the Jewish Agency and Mapai, under the leaderwere not enthusiastic and that the slight chance __ ship of Ben-Gurion, collaborated with the British. of enlisting them in the “buying time” strategy | European Jewry in general, and the Jews of Hundepended on their goodwill, so it became essen- _ gary in particular, were left to fend for themselves, tial for the Yishuv not to be caught conducting —_according to the accusers, in order to achieve perindependent activity behind their backs. In any __ sonal or Zionist objectives. This allegation, based

case, the bitter experience leading up to the on material discussed in the Kasztner affair, conBrand affair and the logistical hardshipsinvolved _ tributed most forcefully to the negative stereotype in the mass rescue of Jews placed the plansinthe — surrounding Ben-Gurion and the Holocaust.”3”

realm of fantasy. In fact, it was the Nazis who murdered, the Ben-Gurion veered from these assumptions |§ Hungarians who collaborated, and the superwhen he considered sending Bader to conduct —_ powers who did their best to evade and mislead negotiations and questioned the Yishuv’s finan- the Yishuv leadership. Ben-Gurion and his colcial ability and the JDC’s willingness to partici- leagues were aware of the limits of their offer of pate in semiautonomous activity. He prepared cooperation. If the Yishuv leaders did not overthe groundwork for a last-minute procedure if it step these limits—the extent to which they returned out that Britain and the United States re- |= mained within those limits is not at all clear—it sponded negatively. The Yishuv had nothing to __ was because they had no alternatives for rescuing lose under such circumstances and couldattempt | European Jews. In the face of British and Amerito fool the Nazis without the support of the — can opposition, no rescue plan was achievable. superpowers—and might even manage torescue The meager results proved that Ben-Gurion and

a few Jews as a result of the negotiations. his colleagues in the JAE were fighting insurIn fact, Ben-Gurion had no choice and was mountable obstacles. quite desperate. His wavering activity reflected Ben-Gurion left no clear-cut response to the his unresolved position. His hands as well as _ failure of the plan to rescue the Jews of Hungary. those of his close associates were tiedandtheydid _ Still, in his rejection of Gruenbaum’s self-blame their best to get something for nothing, which __ it is possible to see the way in which he coped was clearly impossible because there wasnocon- with it. He devoted little time to discussions of

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“A One-in-a-Million Chance”

the degree of wisdom and initiative displayed newed negotiations and everything will be all

after Brand’s arrival. In late 1944 Ben-Gurion right. devoted most of his efforts to rescuing the sur- m& Who are the negotiators? viving Jews in the liberated areas¥* and to the =m Sali Mayer, representative of the JDC in political activity he anticipated after the war. The Switzerland, a man of much experience. I was death of Berl Katznelson in August 1944, which filled with fury. And you, Comrade Bencame as a harsh blow, also caused him to with- Gurion, say it with complete calm? Are you draw and avoid being caught up in any contro- aware of the kind of person Sali Mayer is? He versy. Ben-Gurion personally tried to explain to is old and untalented. He is unequipped to Joel Brand, following his release from British conduct negotiations of this kind. Sali Mayer custody on 7 October 1944, that the Yishuv lead- is a disaster for us all. ership was not to be blamed for the failure of his

mission. He wanted Brand to be includedinaid — Brand later wrote that he had been impolite to and rescue activity and even to be given secret | Ben-Gurion. Ben-Gurion replied: “There are mis-

missions. sions to which an old man is more suited than BRAND’S TEMPESTUOUS REACTION three youngsters.’ Ben-Gurion did not share

Brand’s negative opinion of Mayer. Brand asked Brand was convinced that the Yishuv leadership = about events in Hungary, to which Ben-Gurion had worked with the British to thwart his mis- _ replied: “The situation is better than you think. We sion. Upon his release, he lashed out in all direc- = have had many achievements. Hundreds of thoutions—even targeting Ben-Gurion—verbally sands will be saved.” This was an expression of the

and in print. After being released, Brand washeld hope that the Yishuv’s various activities, comin a British intelligence camp near Cairo under bined with those of the JDC, the International Red

the guise of a British officer. He bitterly an- Cross, Sweden, and others, would soon prove nounced to the JAE that he had exposed its con- fruitful. Brand asked for permission to leave for spiracy against him. Brand declared that he was § Hungary and Ben-Gurion replied that Kollek lifting the yoke of obedience placed on his shoul- — would take care of him and “see to everything.”2“°

ders by Sharett in Aleppo and threatened to start Ben-Gurion ordered that information be acting independently. Responsibility for the re- —_ placed at Brand’s disposal on all the procedures

sults of his activity would fall on the JAE.” relating to his case from the moment it became As soon as Brand arrived in Palestine, Kollek © known. He probably wanted to supply Brand brought him to Ben-Gurion. Here is how Brand ~ with data that would substantiate the complex

summarized this meeting: picture he himself had of the affair. This order clearly reflects Ben-Gurion’s opinion that neither

m At long last I found myself in the presence of he nor his colleagues had anything to hide rethe JAE Chairman. I vented my bitterness, garding the Brand affair. Ben-Gurion also inwhich had accumulated for several months structed Kollek to ask the Rescue Committee

while I was incarcerated in prison. to supply Brand with copies of all cables relating m What have you done, Comrade Ben- to Hungarian Jewry and that of other European Gurion? ... How could you have permitted countries. He wanted to involve Brand in activity me to sit for five months in a Cairo jail while | on behalf of European Jewry in order to help him our brothers in Hungary were being extermi- overcome his powerful sense of guilt.”#!

nated? Who else is still alive?—For the time After a while, Brand was invited to particibeing, everything is in order. We have re- _ pate in the activities of the Political Department

65

Rescue Plans

and the Yishuv’s intelligence circles, especially | Schechter—all of whom checked on his condipreliminary activity in rooting out war criminals tion and sawto his needs. They talked to him and and bringing them to trial. In March 1945 Kollek | encouraged him by stressing the importance of introduced Brand to Lieutenant Colonel Hun- _his mission and achievements, attempting to disloke, a senior British intelligence officer (MI5)in pel his deep sense of guilt. They also promised to the Middle East. Brand told him that he knew _shelp his family, saying that his children would be many war criminals, their organizations, and among the first to be evacuated from Hungary, their modus operandi, and that he was prepared _—_and they did indeed try to fulfill this promise. to leave for Europe if he was permitted to meet = They attempted to rescue his mother, wife, and

his family in Hungary.?” other members of his family by way of SwitzerBrand summed up his evaluation ina letter land. According to the instructions that accomaddressed to the JAE and Ben-Gurion. He de- _ panied this effort, “All expenses involved in this scribed his movements from the moment he left —_ will be reimbursed,’ While he was still in prison,

Budapest and offered his opinion of the JAE. — they even examined various ways of involving Concerning his prison experience he wrote: “Ias- —_ him in operations following his release, includsume that during my absence the Jewish Agency __ ing the possibility of his returning to Hungary did everything possible to help the Jews of Eu- _after all. rope.” The blame for not being able to return to It is unlikely that the JAE’s behavior reflected Hungary was placed squarely on the shoulders of a fear of what Brand would find out. On the con“some of the British authorities,’ but also, to trary, even after details of the plan were leaked, some degree, on the JAE’s decision, which was _—Zaslani and Kollek consulted first with the Istanbased on information from Hungary. He signed __ bul rescue emissaries and then with the Jewish off with a series of suggestions for possible activ- _ leadership in Hungary on the possibility of Joel

ity, some of which had already been adopted. Brand returning to Hungary.“ Another option Brand was thus not convinced that the JAE was to send Brand to the United States and South and Ben-Gurion had done their utmost torescue — Africa on a fund-raising drive.**4 Had there been the Jews of Hungary. He made do withareserved __ the slightest fear of Brand and what he knew, the “I assume” to describe his feelings regarding the | JAE would probably have behaved differently toJAE’s activity during his imprisonment. He in- — ward him and refrained from sharing informasisted that the JAE was opposed to his return— tion on their activity in the wake of the proposal which it was not. On the contrary, Ben-Gurion he had brought from Eichmann.

led the JAE to adopt a position that left Brand to On the question of a possible conspiracy, a make up his own mind as to whether toreturnto —_— report sent on 8 June by what I choose to define Hungary. When Brand was arrested, the JAE _as the “Special Tasks Section,’ headed by Zaslani, acted to obtain his release and demanded repeat- |= mentionsa journey to Aleppo by Sharett, Meirov,

edly that he be permitted to return to Hungaryif | Zaslani, and Schechter whose objective was to he so chose. People worked on his behalf in meet with Avriel and Brand: “We expect their reJerusalem, Cairo, and London, and onseveraloc- __ turn from Aleppo either tomorrow or the day afcasions Sharett appealed to various individualsin ter. We do not know, for the time being, if Avriel

Palestine, London, and Cairo. None of this — will return with the Yishuv people to Palestine proved effective because of Britain’s objections. from Aleppo, or if he will accompany Brand back During his imprisonment Brand was visited — to Istanbul. One way or the other, you cannot by members of the Jewish Agency’s Political De- —_ imagine how eager we are to receive the informa-

partment’s secret services, by Kollek, Zaslani,and tion they are bringing with them....’ Thus,

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“A One-in-a-Million Chance”

when the delegation set out for Aleppo, its mem- _ but he appears to have avoided controversy bebers had no idea how things would develop, and —_ cause he saw no reason for it at a time when the the most obvious thing would have been for — wounds were still fresh.

Brand to return to Istanbul and from there to In time Israel Kasztner met with BenHungary.”* If there had been a conspiracy be- —_ Gurion. His legal problems were at their worst tween the Yishuv leaders and the British to arrest | and he came to Ben-Gurion’s Negev home in

Brand and, in doing so, destroy his mission, it Sede Boger. After the visit, Kasztner told his must have been so secret thatthe JAEitselfhadno brother, Yehoshua, that Ben-Gurion had a pro-

idea of its existence. found understanding of the matter and “the day Brand’s position kept changing. This sprang —_ will come that the prime minister of Israel will not solely from an impartial analysis oftestimony stand in the Knesset and supply the correct evaland documentation but from the deep sense of uation of all my and my colleagues’ actions and pain and frustration that plagued him and the _ declare the whole truth before the entire nation.” many good people involved in the rescue opera-__In early 1958, after Kasztner was murdered and

tions, who shared Brand’s sense of guilt.246 the High Court of Justice had found Kasztner’s The weight of responsibility may also have _accusers guilty of defamation, Yehoshua Kasztaffected Brand’s judgment, which oscillated be- | nerasked Ben-Gurion to fulfill his brother’s wish. tween overestimating his own power toinfluence | Ben-Gurion replied: “I am in receipt of your letthe fate of Hungary’s Jews and sinking into a __ ter and I respect your concern for the honor of morass of self-blame. He may also have adopted —_—your brother, who was murdered by base crimi-

the stereotype of “the Jews who govern the nals and whose honor was trampled upon in his world.” After all, the Nazis believed this and re- _ lifetime and at his death by villains, who have peated it constantly in their conversations with adopted the guise of guardians of decency.” But Brand. Even Kasztner nurtured it as a kind of the time had not come to clear Kasztner’s name. wishful thinking (“the Jewish Agency will finda | Ben-Gurion went on:

”), on th hand, and f tricking th , , Nazis, on the other. Brand did not delve deeply oo. ,; to convene a public tribunal to look into into the complex relationship between the Al, the events of the Holocaust. I do lies andterrible found it hard to comprehend the real— ,

wey ), on the one hand, an pat anes ane Nor do I agree with the judges’ proposal

|||.

,; - , not believe that it isYishuv, possiblethenowadays to. miserable—position of the Jews of , , a establish a tribunal whose only objective

Europe, and thebe Jews of the world within the . , ; ; i would to unearth the truth. Partisan multiple considerations that guided the Allies in . ,; political interests are exploiting the

the war. To repeat, he was not the only one not

to have

, Holocaust—they would no doubt thoroughly grasped it.?4” , 8, leave their traces on any public tribunal deal-

BEN-GURION’S LETTER TO ing with this tragic affair—and only hisYEHOSHUA KASZTNER torians, responsible for their consciences,

oy future.

The documentation I have examined does not would be able to clarify the matter in the express Ben-Gurion’s fierce attempts at deflecting criticism. Even on previous occasionshe had —_ Ben-Gurion thus exhibited great practicality by

not invested too much effort in this area, al- _ rejecting attempts at explaining something that though he was often not averse to firmly and was inexplicable, given the circumstances surpublicly siding with positions that were hard to _— rounding the generation that had experienced support. He may even have left the job to others, the Holocaust.248

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Rescue Plans

Ben-Gurion may also not have tried to fend § government: “First, to hint to the other side, off criticism because he was aware of the enor- _ through suitable channels, . . . of the willingness mous conceptual discrepancy between thosewho to appoint a delegate who would discuss the resgrasped the total picture and those who glimpsed — cue and transfer of as many Jews as possible.” Sec-

only part of it. Even the most experienced Istan- _ ond, to hint to the Nazis that a “prior condition” bul emissaries, who were geographically and op-__ to any debate would be an “immediate halt” to erationally closest to the rescue efforts, found it —_ the deportation of Jews to their death.25

hard to believe that there had been no neglect on A second cable, sent from Jerusalem the the part of the JAE. The complexity of the plan —_ same day, asked Roosevelt to permit representaand its feeble chances of success resulted in skep- _ tives of the War Refugee Board to meet people tical responses. Even members ofthe AidandRes- = “from the Budapest group” in Istanbul in order cue Committee in Budapest were reserved when __ to take action to permit Brand to return immediBrand first told them of Eichmann’s proposal. It _—_ ately to Hungary and to entrust him with the was only a short distance to believe doubts tolead —_ news that the Allies were prepared to negotiate to neglect. Even some of the Yishuv’s rescue emis- _—_ over proposals to release Jews and stop the mursaries were caught up in these doubts, which were __ ders. Alternatively, Roosevelt was asked to motilogical but had no basis in reality.24 Ben-Gurion __ vate the British into allowing Brand to return im-

understood that it would have been impossible mediately and to entrust him with the to explain away the depth of the tragedy and its | announcement that the proposal he had brought absurdity. He realized that no explanation could —_ was being “discussed in the most senior circles dispel the strong tendency to gravitate toward —_ and that action could be expected soon.”?5!

self-blame or to accuse the leadership. I have been unable to uncover any response In order to grasp Ben-Gurion’s position re- from Roosevelt in the available documentation. garding the Brand affair and to understand his = This should come as no surprise. Who was Benfeelings, itis worthwhile to examine his directap- Gurion, after all, and what was his power at that peal to Roosevelt eight days before the Eichmann __ time? He was ignored. Although one has no way proposal was leaked to the press. On 11 July1944 ~~ of knowing how the U.S. administration viewed Ben-Gurion sent Roosevelt an eleventh-hour him, one thing is certain: it rightly reckoned that plea to intervene and save the ransom plan.Ina __ the Jewish side it was facing was helpless.

long cable Ben-Gurion outlined the main points Both of Ben-Gurion’s cables to Roosevelt, of the affair. He told Roosevelt that the Nazishad the symbol of power in the free world, were sent agreed to release a million Hungarian and Ro- _after all the information on Bader’s invitation to manian Jews “according to certain conditions — Berlin was already at Ben-Gurion’s disposal. This known to the American State Department” and —_ information increased the hope that it was still stressed that the JAE had suggested conducting _ possible to delay exterminations through negotinegotiations with those making the proposal. He _ ations. At the same time, frustration increased as did not sweep aside “certain doubts” thataccom- __ time was slowly running out while Britain and panied the proposal “in its current state,’ never- the United States prevaricated, isolating themtheless insisting that haste must be taken in en- _ selves, and remained so obtuse as to refuse to help

tering into negotiations “with representatives of | in coaxing the Nazis into false negotiations

the enemy circles that initiated it.” whose sole objective was to hold up the extermiBen-Gurion also pointed out Brand’s im- _ nation of Jews. The cables also prove that Benprisonment in Cairo and called upon the presi- = Gurion and the entire JAE membership shared dent to adopt the JAE’s proposals to the British | Gruenbaum’s position and that now any negoti-

68

“A One-in-a-Million Chance”

ations with the Nazis were contingent onahaltin ful not to reveal details of the recently received

deportations to death camps. This possibly proposal from Hungary or to recall the frustrattestifies to their feeling that the finalmomenthad __ ing appeals to Britain and the United States. The arrived and that they no longer had anything to _ public was able to comprehend the full meaning

lose: if the annihilation did not stop now, it of Ben-Gurion’s words when, only a few days would not stop until the fall of Germany. later, the affair was leaked to the press. Only now On io July, one day before cabling Roosevelt, was it possible to understand that by then BenBen-Gurion delivered an impassioned speech Gurion was already mourning the demise of the and hurled accusations at the Allies. He wascare- —_ ransom plan.

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BLANK PAGE

9

Bombing to Deter and Stultify

Ars to various forms of pressure in order As soon as the Jews in Palestine, the United undermine confidence in the enemy’s _ States, and the rest of the free world were aware of home front, shaking its morale, destroying its the situation in Europe, the question became economic infrastructure to punish or deter— howto put an end to the extermination through such tactics resembled those applied duringthe — sabotage. One suggestion was to bomb the camps

war itself. The warring sides in the Second _ or the roads leading to them. This could have World War merely perfected most of these — taken the form of straightforward bombing of methods but did not invent them. These specific targets, or the camps could have been inincluded: destruction of the economic infra- cluded in larger bombing operations involving structure and blockades; striking at industrial § important military objectives. Such an operation complexes, transport facilities, and civilian could have been included in the “small rescue,” populations; threatening prisoners and hos- — which involved operations aimed at improving tages with bodily harm; and announcing trials — the Jews’ chances of surviving Nazi persecution, and severe punishment once the war was over. —_as opposed to the “large rescue,” whose objective The Nazis had no compunction about using any — was to free them from Hitler’s clutches.

or all of these methods both before and during SHOULD WE DEMAND BOMBING?

the war. An outstanding example was the blitz- LATE 1942-LATE 1943

krieg against Britain; even Tel Aviv was under threat of bombing by the Axis powers. The = After they razed the Bohemian village of Lidice, Nazis’ considered their (ultimately unsuccess- the Nazis were warned by Roosevelt (June 1942). ful) attempt to develop V-2 missiles andlaunch — Roosevelt and Churchill jointly issued a further them against civilian populations in Britain an = warning after the Nazis murdered hostages in

important strategic move. France, with Churchill threatening revenge for Aerial bombing, especially of civilian popu- __ the Nazis’ use of poison gas. These warnings had lations, was one method used by the Alliestoun- —_— nothing to do with the plight of the Jews, notdermine the ability and will of their adversariesto | withstanding the fact that it had been common

fight, as well asa means of punishment anddeter- | knowledge since the summer of 1942 that the rence. Outstanding examples include the bomb- _—s Jews _ were victims of a particularly gruesome ing of Dresden and the destruction of the Japan- _—_— form of persecution.

ese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atomic Even before the Yishuv officially announced bombs. Among the central issues in the present that Europe’s Jews were being systematically annidiscussion is the fact that the Allies could have an- hilated, Richard Lichtheim of the Jewish Agency nounced that the bombing of enemy cities also —_—sin Switzerland asked for warnings to be issued to constituted punishment for the treatment of the |= the Nazis—or at least to their satellites—that

Jews and could have threatened to keep up the ‘they would be punished for persecuting Jews. bombing until the annihilation ceased. Another —_ Lichtheim appended this appeal to his first revelaissue is that the Allies could have stopped the an- _ tions from Geneva regarding the murders. In Sepnihilation by bombing and destroying the en- —_ tember 1942 the London branch of the World Jewemy’s death camps and the roads, bridges, and _ish Congress also appealed to the rest of the world

railway tracks leading to them. to warn the Nazis.! 71

Rescue Plans

In the summer of 1942 a number of direct | Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs and warnings were issued to the satellite countries by — the Jewish Agency’s London branch to request General Wladyslaw Sikorski, former prime min- _ that they press Roosevelt and Churchill into issuister and head of the Polish government-in-exile; | ing warnings to Germany and the satellite states. Shmuel Zygelboym, Bund representative on the — The Yishuv’s chief rabbi was asked to meet with Polish National Council, a parliament in-exile; — the envoy of the Catholic church in Jerusalem to

and Cardinal Arthur Hinsley, archbishop of | demand that the church publicly condemn the Westminster, against persecuting Jews or collab- extermination of Jews and warn that all those asorating with others who persecuted Jews. Car- _ sisting in the murders would be punished.°

dinal Hinsley broadcast a speech, specifically At a JAE meeting held a week after the anaimed at Roman Catholics, denouncing the per- nouncement (29 November 1942) the particisecution of Jews. In another radio broadcast Pro- pants discussed the kinds of pressure that could fessor Pieter Sjoerds Gerbrandy, prime minister — be exerted on Germany and the Axis powers. of the Dutch government-in-exile, also con- | Ben-Gurion supported the proposal to “demand demned the expulsion of Jews from Holland. that the Allies warn the Nazis that they would More specific, practical suggestions were face collective punishment for murdering Jews.” also proposed. In June 1942 General Sikorski de- He offered no details of the kind of collective manded that Churchill order the confiscation of | punishment he envisioned, but he considered German property and intensive bombing raids — this demand among the few available practical on nonmilitary targets inside Germany to “pay — options.® He was also in favor of establishing a back for German cruelty.” Vyacheslav Molotov, — Jewish air squadron: “I am sure the American the Soviet foreign minister, declared that his | government will agree at once to the establishcountry would try all Nazileaders for war crimes, ment of special units of Jewish pilots, as it agreed and the Soviet Union established a special inter- _ to special units of Norwegians, with the clear in-

national court for this purpose.’ tention that these would be the first to invade The necessity for pressure to be applied to Norway.’ Germany and its allies was discussed repeatedly in Ben-Gurion repeated the call to action in a the JAE, the National Council, Mapai, and other = dramatic speech at a special meeting (30 NovemYishuv political bodies as soon as news emerged __ ber 1942) of the Elected Assembly, arguing that from Europe. Suggestions put forward included: | Germany’s military leaders and the German peo-

Allied governments broadcast by radio or any ple must be warned “that they will be held reother means a clear and uncompromising message — sponsible for the bloodshed.”® This sentiment to Germany that it could expect “retribution and —_was echoed at a JAE session held on 6 December revenge for its crimes, including financial repara- 1942, where he stressed the distinction between tions”; execute Nazi leader Rudolf Hess, who was _ the German people and their leaders and went imprisoned in England; execute German citizens into alengthy and detailed description of his own residing in the United States; round up German __ views on the efficacy of the warnings. In his earnationals residing in Palestine and announce that _lier speech to the Elected Assembly he presented they would be executed if the Nazis did not stop —_a lengthy analysis of Hitler’s murderous nature annihilating Jews; establish a Jewish air squadron —and convinced his colleagues that “warnings to as part of the U.S. forces, with the express purpose — Hitler alone are worthless,’ but that warnings of bombing civilian populations in Germany.* aimed at the German army might prove effective. Immediately after the announcement of the | Ben-Gurion pointed out that his modest request annihilation, Dov Joseph cabled the American — expressed the Yishuv’s and the Jewish nation’s

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Bombing to Deter and Stultify

impotence and helplessness, in so “sorry a state as with the request that it issue a warning to

to have to appeal to Roosevelt to carry out our the German military leaders. missions, and there is no knowing if he will do so

or not? Ben-Gurion even went so far as to suggested how

At that session the JAE adopted a number of contact could be made with people in the counresolutions concerning rescue operations, which tries that had received these warnings:

Ben-Gurion then translated into operational di- We suggest you ask the [British] governrectives in letters to JAE branches and activists in ment to allow us to [fly over Poland in Britain and the United States. In these letters he special aircraft to drop leaflets to the Jews elaborated on his views of the various forces to show that we] stand with them in this

involved in exterminating the Jews: calamity, to rescue whoever can be res[I] doubt if Hitler himself can be in- cued, and to tell them that the Jewish fluenced to any great degree, but reports people in Palestine, England, America, indicate that the actual massacres are not and other countries are doing their utbeing carried out by the army but by the most to rescue them. We also suggest that Gestapo and special storm trooper divi- the British government distribute leaflets sions of the Nazi party, which makes it in Germany to the German people, telling conceivable that firm warnings on the them about the murders and the atrocipart of President [Roosevelt] to the Ger- ties, that the entire civilized world is apman military commanders that they will palled and calling upon them, the Gerbe held personally responsible for the mans, to stop the murderers. There is a

atrocities may have some effect. special need to apply to the governments of Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, He also mentioned the possibility of influencing which, although Hitler’s allies, must be the satellite states: “Special action must be taken held responsible if they lend a hand in the to rescue the Jews in the Balkan states, Hungary, massacre perpetrated by the Nazis against Romania, and western Europe, where there is no the Jews of Poland”! direct Nazi rule, or where the Nazis are still not as

cruel as in eastern Europe. An American warning At a Mapai meeting Ben-Gurion claimed that to the governments of Hungary, Romania, and _leaflets might help disperse the smokescreen the Bulgaria might have some effect even though German government was using to conceal its they share a pact with Hitler.”!° Ina letter to Berl activity. The German people and the soldiers Locker, stationed in the London branch, Ben- — would become aware of the atrocities, as would

Gurion reiterated this point: the people of Poland, who would be asked to stop the murderers and be warned against col-

As far as we know, the butchering is being laborating in them.! carried out without military participation On this issue Ben-Gurion was approached by the Nazi special police, and although it by people who suggested specific action, and he

is doubtful if any warning would in- was obviously affected by the public’s sentifluence Hitler, we are sure that warnings ments. Here is one typical example from a Telto army commanders that they will be Aviv resident: “The German people and their held personally responsible for the mur- allies, especially the German women, have little ders probably will prove effective. We sug- idea of the vile atrocities being perpetrated by gest applying to the British government the Gestapo and Hitler’s henchmen.” Here is

73

Rescue Plans

another: “Publicity must make the issue known, We now know that the declaration was via radio broadcasts to the German people and —_ completely ineffective. Nor should it be suptheir allies, and one must protest the atrocities | posed that many of the Yishuv leaders actually being committed in their countries by sadistic believed that any practical results would emerge

lunatics, who are worse than wild animals in from verbal threats unless some were impletheir cruelty, by issuing warnings against com- mented. In any event, the declaration was plying with unforgivable crimes.”!? Another let- | widely publicized in the press and on the radio ter contained a suggestion that Ben-Gurion draft | and was followed by other declarations. Poa petition—to be signed by all the Jewish male —_land’s ambassador to London, the Czech foreign and female soldiers serving in the British armed —= minister, and Radio Free Belgium all declared forces, as well as all the Jewish men and women their support. To some extent, it was a moral working in industrial plants directly connected = achievement for the Jews.'®

with the war effort—asking Churchill, Smuts The Allies’ declaration also roused Britain’s (the South African leader), and Roosevelt to is- | Jewish community to action. The Jewish Chronsue an unequivocal warning to Germany that it icle, for example, repeated the Yishuv’s demand could expect severe punishment if the extermi- for warnings to be issued to the Germans over

nation did not cease immediately. 4 the radio or through leaflets dropped over GerThe Near East division of the Polish repub- many. Prof. Selig Brodetsky of the JAE’s London lic’s press association also wrote to Ben-Gurion — branch made the same demand at a late Decemexpressing sympathy for the Yishuv’s pain and __ ber meeting with Richard Law, the parliamenfull solidarity with the Jewish people’s demand __ tary undersecretary of state for foreign affairs.! that the Allied governments take immediate ac- —_ The Allies threatened to punish perpetrators of tion against the unprecedented annihilation of — crimes against the Jews but offered no refuge to the Jewish nation. The Polish press shared the — the persecuted Jews, nor did they promise any Yishuv’s view that “acts of retaliation were neces- —_ tangible aid. The impression was that the Allies’

sary as the only means of halting the barbaric | concern was not entirely sincere, which made cruelty of the Germans in Poland and other oc- __ their threats somewhat unconvincing. The dec-

cupied countries.” laration did not induce the Germans to soften On 17 December 1942 the Allies condemned their attitude toward the Jews, nor did it reassure the Nazis’ “bestial” policies and “cold-blooded — those in the West who sympathized with the annihilation.” Such actions, they said, only rein- _ plight of the Jews. Indeed, beginning only a few

forced the determination of all freedom-loving days after the declaration and continuing nations to crush Hitler’s barbaric tyranny. They — throughout 1943, there were repeated calls for warned the Germans that the “perpetrators of | more severe condemnations and a more sophisthese crimes will not go unpunished.” The JAE __ ticated means of placing pressure on the Nazis had mixed feelings about the declaration. Some — and their accomplices.”°

members felt it may have been insufficient and During January 1943 the JAE twice discussed that a more aggressive warning should have been —_ asking the Allies to bomb civilian population issued.!6 The majority, however, tended to ap- _—_ centers in Germany and to announce that these prove of the declaration. “It is the first time our — were acts of reprisal for Germany's behavior toappeal to other governments has received atten- —_ ward the Jews. Gruenbaum reported that the Poltion,” said Ben-Gurion, adding, “There is moral ish government-in-exile had suggested to the JAE satisfaction in that Israel’s cry of agony has been _ that they join forces in demanding that the Allies

heard.”!” “bomb German cities, not only for strategic rea74

Bombing to Deter and Stultify

sons’ but specifically as retaliation for their per- = was on a visit to Palestine at the time. Kot re-

secution of the Jews. peated the Polish proposal for joint YishuvBy June 1942 Sikorski had been making such _ Polish appeals to the British to allow Polish pilots

demands of the British and continued to repeat to conduct bombing raids over Germany in them because the Poles obviously believed that __ reprisal for Nazi atrocities. His proposal was not the chances of having their proposals adopted _—_ discussed.”

had improved. They were encouraged by the In January Ben-Gurion again called on the public outcry and the Allies’ December declara- _— Allies to issue warnings to the German army and tion to Germany. They must have believed that — general public. He called for a propaganda drive

the warnings were an expression of the Jews’ —_in which leaflets would be dropped over Gergreat influence over the West. It turned out tobe = many and Poland, explaining that such leaflets illusory, but even delusions can sometimes prove — could stress the positive examples of other na-

effective. tions, such as the Belgians and the Dutch, who

Ben-Gurion’s reaction was discouraging: “If | “help [the Jews], often at the risk of their own Britain can bomb German cities, it willdoso,and _ lives.” We now know that Ben-Gurion’s view of our demands will make no difference.” This view the Belgians and the Dutch was based on partial was shared by others in the JAE. Was Ben-Gurion and inaccurate information.

reserved because of a belief that Britain would in- In his public announcements Ben-Gurion deed use all its might to bomb Germany? Washe _hinted at the reasons behind his reluctance to ask afraid of making too many demands, choosingto __ the Allies to declare that their bombing of Gerfocus on demands that appeared to be more _— man cities was in retaliation for atrocities comimportant, such as those pertaining to the mass _— mitted against the Jews. He pointed out that even

rescue of Jews, the Transnistria Plan, and the in their December declaration the Allies ignored

Parachutists’ scheme? the fact that the Nazis had singled out the Jewish Perhaps Ben-Gurion assumed that Britain = people and did not mention rescue operations, would bomb Germany anyway, as part of its war | which such treatment made necessary.” effort, but would refuse to declare that the bomb- Ben-Gurion’s reservations were fully conings were reprisal for the annihilation of Jews. He _ firmed. The Polish government-in-exile, undemay have assumed that Britain would avoid link- _ terred by the JAE’s reluctance to cooperate, again ing the bombings with Jews for fear of being ac- —_ appealed to the Allies to carry out bombing raids cused of waging a “Jewish war,” and that Britain § over Germany. The demand was presented to might be willing to make do with anything less = Churchill and was reviewed by the Foreign Office than unconditional surrender. Too great aninsis- and Air Ministry, both of which rejected it.

tence that the Nazis stop the mass murder of Jews Several fears were aired: Allied bombings might be construed as a readiness on Britain's — defined as reprisals for Nazi atrocities against the part to accept a “separate peace” with Germany — Jews would exacerbate Nazi cruelty; by complywithout unconditional surrender. Documenta- _ing and halting the murders, the Nazis would be tion sheds no light on the reasons for Ben- _ forcing the Allies to cease bombing civilian GerGurion’s and his colleagues’ opposition to this —sman targets; other parties might make demands

opinion in the JAE.?! for Allied reprisals for their own “partisan probThe suggestion was again discussed in the lems”; the Allies might be accused of competing JAE following Gruenbaum’s report, at the endof | with Germany in terms of acts of cruelty.

January 1943, regarding his meetings with Stanis- In addition, operational arguments were law Kot of the Polish government-in-exile, who _ brought to bear against reciprocal bombing raids.

/5

Rescue Plans

In retrospect, it is hard to reconcile this with the the Jews, said Gruenbaum, was clearly of no confact that since early 1943 British and American — sequence, and as far as the Allies were concerned,

bombers had been flying missions out of Britain the Nazis could abuse and murder them all. to sow destruction in major German cities and Again Smuts was evasive and asked Gruenbaum industrial sites. The justifiable apprehension re- = for a memo on the subject.”

mained that retaliatory bombing would give cur- I have uncovered no documentation on a rency to Nazi propaganda claiming that the Allies |= JAE discussion prior to Gruenbaum’s request were fighting the war on behalf of “world Jewry.” — that Smuts threaten the Nazis with reprisal. It is These misgivings were common to the Ameri- known that Gruenbaum met with Ben-Gurion cans, the British, and even the Jews, including before departing for South Africa, but the conthose in Palestine. Ben-Gurion shared this con- _ tent of their conversation is not recorded. Gruencern and did not wish to undermine the fighting | baum was most consistent in his tendency to spirit of the nations battling Hitler—for anti- | make such demands and to urge the JAE to be-

Semitism was rife among them, too.”4 have likewise. He may have cleared his appeal to At JAE meetings held early in 1943 sugges- | Smuts in advance, but it is equally likely that he tions were often made for exerting pressure on =made it on his own initiative.

Germany and its satellites. Usually demanding It is also conceivable that Ben-Gurion gave that the Allies take unspecified “special steps,” his silent approval to Gruenbaum to float a “trial they generally did not produce results. A sugges- _ balloon” in the form of an appeal to Smuts. If the tion was also put forth to appeal directly to Hitler |= former had adopted Gruenbaum’s initiative, he to release the Jews. Proposals were made to warn —_ would have suggested to his counterparts on the satellite nations, since the war was beginning to — Allied committee to threaten Hitler with reprisal; look bad for the Axis forces. It would appear that — even if he did not, the Yishuv would not be faced

expectations raised by the Bermuda Conference — with a direct refusal from Allied leaders. The were responsible for postponing the debate on _‘Yishuv did not have a “direct line” to Allied leadthese issues.*> By May and June 1943, it was quite —_ ers and every appeal, to some extent, was made at

clear that the conference was not yielding any the expense of another issue.

positive results. Gruenbaum’s conversation produced no The call to threaten the Nazis with severe change in Allied bombing policy. In late October retaliation was again raised in August 1943. This 1943 the foreign representatives of Britain, the time it was addressed to Jan Smuts, South Africa’s United States, and the USSR met in Moscow to prime minister. Ata meeting with Smuts,Gruen- __ discuss another declaration by the superpowers. baum suggested that the former issueadirectde- _ Britain preferred not to refer to the gas chambers. mand to Hitler to put a stop to the murders and _ __In the end, the declaration signed by Stalin, Rooto accompany this with a stern warning. Smuts sevelt, and Churchill on 1 November 1943 made was evasive, only agreeing to make an announce- no mention of Jews.?’ ment that the Allies had detailed lists of the per- The efficacy of the warnings was the subject petrators, who would be forced “to pay forevery- of much professional debate. Not making them thing.” Gruenbaum tried to pressure him by __ did not necessarily reflect a lack of concern for recalling Roosevelt and Churchill’s recent joint the plight of the Jews. Several propaganda and written statement warning the murderers of the —_ psychological warfare departments of the WestPolish farmers on the banks of the Bug River, —_ ern espionage agencies expressed doubt as to the pointing out that the warning did not containa __ efficacy of repeated warnings in the form of radio single word about the murdered Jews. The fate of broadcasts or leaflets dropped from the air. Their

76

Bombing to Deter and Stultify

value might be diminished and there was even a Immediately following news of the invasion danger that repeated warnings would achieve the of Hungary in March 1944, support for a demand opposite effect: if the Allies appeared to be sensi- __ that the Allies threaten retaliation began to grow. tive to the Jewish issue, the Nazis might consider |= On 22 March the Political Department suggested it best to put pressure on them precisely by step- _ that Sharett, who was in London, issue a demand

ping up the persecutions. that the Allies warn the new regime in Hungary. Everything was subordinated to the mainis- —=_ In view of the new situation in Hungary, the sugsue, namely, to win the war, and it appeared that — gestion was cabled to Sharett two days before the focusing on the Jewish problem was not compat- —‘«JAE actually discussed what action should be ible with this objective. Law said that Britain was taken. Based on the JAE’s past pattern of activity, not able, at that stage of the war, toassignenough _it is safe to assume that this initiative was first ex-

importance to the matter as to outweigh other is- amined by Ben-Gurion or another senior JAE sues of interest to their propaganda machine.”8 leader. In any case, no mention was made of it at By the end of 1943 it was clear even to Jews the JAE meeting, most likely because it was subject to Nazi rule that Allied bombings of Ger- — known that President Roosevelt had issued such man targets would only worsen their plight.Some a warning three days earlier.*! even demanded that pressure be put on the Allies Britain was even more firmly opposed to isto refrain from such bombing. There were senior — suing warnings than was the United States. The Jewish leaders in the free world who were appre- _—s reasons remained the same, with only a slight ad-

hensive as to the possible repercussions of these dition: the Allies must not adopt Germany’s savbombings. Moreover, since May the Allies had —_ age behavior. Britain’s indifference on this issue been involved in large-scale bombing (known as __ grew stronger. The U.S. government decided to

the “Point-blank Campaign”) of Germanys warn Hungary, whereas Britain maintained that strategic military positions. The large number of _ the Allies’ previous warning (December 1942) aircraft involved in these missions meant that had little or no impact whatsoever and the plight no additional missions, such as retaliatory forays | of the Jews had actually worsened. There was over population centers or extermination camps, therefore no reason to believe that further warn-

were possible.?? ings would offer better results. Still, public presFROM OPPOSITION TO PASSIVE sure on Eden, Britain's foreign secretary, in late March 1944 forced him to issue a warning to the

SUPPORT: 1944 murderers and their collaborators.”

A change in attitude within the Yishuv leadership By April 1944 Gruenbaum remained the was discernible by mid-1944, especially with re- only Yishuv leader who refused to make do with gard to efforts to rescue the Jews of Hungary. Since verbal warnings and demanded harsh retaliatory the several demands to warn Germany had re- — bombing attacks against Germany, believing that ceived no verbal support from the JAE. In 1944, these would deter the Germans from proceeding too, it was Gruenbaum who was the chief spokes- | with mass extermination. He publicly attacked person favoring such demands: “Does an alterna- the Allies’ arguments against retaliatory bombtive exist to Hitler being forced by his own people _—ing raids. Notwithstanding Britain’s reluctance to

to stop the murders, since he is bringing disaster | issue ultimatums, several such warnings were down upon them? Is anything more suitable to —_ broadcast to the Hungary’s government, among this end than Allied bombing of German cities— others, following the spring of 1944. The Hungarand not merely when strategic considerations are ian people were asked to follow Denmark’s ex-

involved?”3° ample by aiding their Jewish fellow countrymen //

Rescue Plans

by preventing their deportation to death camps. installations, and it would be difficult to replace Nevertheless, Britain remained firm in its refusal | death camp staff killed in bombing raids. Also,

to conduct retaliatory bombing raids. some Jews might be able to escape the camps in In May 1944 concern mounted in the Yishuv the ensuing confusion. Pinkerton, however, following indications from Hungary that Jews— _firmly refused to pass on this request to his govespecially those in provincial towns—were being — ernment and insisted on receiving it in writing. sent to death camps. Nevertheless, shortly before Fully conversant with the Yishuv leadership’s

his return from London, Sharett remained re- inner workings, Pinkerton suspected that Gruenserved in his replies to journalists and politicians |= baum’s demand had not been cleared with his regarding the JAE’s position on bombing con- _—JAE colleagues.*°

centration camps and roads leading to them. He A few days after this meeting, Gruenbaum insisted that the JAE still rejected this option.** circulated a summary of his request among JAE The third week of May 1944 saw the arrival in members. The memo was discussed at the JAE Istanbul of Joel Brand. Upon receipt of Pomeranz’s meeting on 11 June 1944, when Gruenbaum reitinformation on the ransom proposal, Gruenbaum _ erated his conversation with Pinkerton and sent a series of cables to Allied leaders demanding stressed that Jews were being deported from the bombing of railroad stations and tracks from § Hungary at the rate of twelve thousand a day (as Hungary to Poland. The JAE did not discuss these ___ was stated in chapter 8, this data was inaccurate).

cables, which were obviously sent on Gruenbaum’s In general, the JAE was firmly opposed to initiative in his capacity as Rescue Committee | bombing Poland. Not knowing the state of affairs chairman. He was probably leaning on public in Poland, Ben-Gurion said that the JAE was not opinion and the support of David Remez, secretary ina position to “make proposals on the matter.”

of the Histadrut.* Senator Joseph and Schmorak agreed that “we Gruenbaum was acting independently — cannot take responsibility for any bombing that when, at a meeting on 2 June 1944 with Lowell C. — could result in the death of even a single Jew.” Pinkerton, the U.S. consul in Palestine, he urged = Gruenbaum was rebuked for applying to the Pinkerton to press Washington into issuing ase- |§ American consul in the first place without first vere warning to Hungary, a request the consul = agreeing ona united position with the JAE heads. did indeed fulfill. Gruenbaum also asked for the — He was criticized even more for raising so conU.S. air force to bomb the death campsin Poland __ troversial a demand with the representative of a and roads and railway lines leading tothem from = major power. As Ben-Gurion concluded, “The Budapest, this time not merely as a warning or — JAE holds that no proposals must be made to the

act of reprisal but to thwart the extermination Allies regarding the bombing of places in which

process. there are Jews. >” Pinkerton agreed to pass on the request to It is important to note that the JAE only con-

his government but expressed concern that such demned that part of Gruenbaum’s proposal relatbombing would result in the death of many Jews —_— ing to bombing the camps. It did not touch on and that German propaganda would be quick to — the demand to bomb the roads and tracks leading announce that Americans were killing Jews. In —_‘ to them (which Pinkerton agreed to pass on to

reply, Gruenbaum said that under the circum- Washington). Here, too, documentation is unstances the Jews had nothing to lose and might _ helpful because one cannot be sure that the mineven gain from the delay that would result from —_utes include everything that took place at the the destruction of death installations. The Ger- _— meeting. It would be surprising if the proposal to

mans would probably be unable to build new bomb the roads and tracks was not discussed,

78

Bombing to Deter and Stultify

since such action would not have endangered Then there is the question of how much the Jews, making Ben-Gurion’s arguments inappli- —_—‘ JAE actually knew about the situation. The dis-

cable. cussion may well have been influenced by a genFirst, it is possible that, given this heated dis- eral lack of knowledge of the true situation. cussion, the questions of whether to demand the Someone said, “There are Jews” in Auschwitz, bombing of the camps or of the roads leading to —_ while someone else said, “There is a large labor them became intertwined. Second, the American camp in Auschwitz.” There was no one present to consul had agreed to pass along this demand __ correct these statements. It is worth noting that without delay. Moreover, Gruenbaum had al- __ there was a series of camps at Auschwitz, some of ready sent a cable in a similar vein to the United = which were labor camps. Another part, Birkenau,

States and Britain and had encounterednooppo- contained installations in which Jews from all

sition on the part of the JAE.*® over Europe were brought to be slaughtered. Clearly, the general tension surrounding the — These installations were expanded to accommo-

Brand affair, as well as the tense period while date the Jews of Hungary. waiting for replies from Britain and the United The JAE may thus have been under the false States, probably led to the rejection of Gruen- = impression that Auschwitz was but one labor baum’s initiatives. His opponents most likely | camp among many, not associating it with deporfeared that additional appeals to the Allies would tations from Hungary or elsewhere, and conseinfluence their willingness to help the Jews. Ben- — quently had no real idea of the destination of the Gurion and his colleagues may have felt that ne- —_ deportees or the type of installation that required gotiations based on the Brand plan were a surer bombing.*? Thus, notwithstanding the wealth of

way of postponing deportations than Gruen- information arriving in Palestine, it appears that baum’s bombing raids. They may have feared — bothin the Yishuvand in occupied Europe no one that Gruenbaum’s demands would have a nega- __ really knew for sure the location of the major extive effect and reduce the already slender chance _ termination center or what Auschwitz really was. that the Allies would help the Jews take advantage = Auschwitz was not always described as an exter-

of Eichmann’s offer. mination center, unlike Belzec and Treblinka,

The debate over the bombing issue sealed — which were considered the main death camps. the chapter on the JAE’s opposition to Gruen- — Not only the Jews in occupied Europe and in baum’s sustained and unrelenting efforts. After | Palestine but also in countries in the free world this, the JAE did an about-face in terms of its | and the governments-in-exile in London (with position. Although Gruenbaum insisted that the exception of Poland), thousands of whose citthe matter was of supreme urgency, he permit- —_—izens were imprisoned in Auschwitz, had no idea

ted several days to elapse between taking the _at the time of what was happening there.” steps he took listening to Pomeranz’s report and How ironic, therefore, that a sudden change raising the issue in the JAE. He probably had to __ took place only a few days later, prompted by the wait several days for an audience with the con- __ escape of two prisoners from Auschwitz, Rudolf sul, but it still took him several more days to —_ Vrba (alias Walter Rosenberg) and Alfred Wetdraft the memorandum summing up the meet- _zler, whose stories reached the governments of ing and a few more days to bring the materialto —__ Britain and the United States, as well as Jewish or-

the JAE’s attention. After all, it was he himself ganizations in Palestine and the rest of the free who had claimed that twelve thousand Jews — world. were being led to their deaths daily. Why did he Consequently, when Gruenbaum placed the

procrastinate? issue on the JAE agenda, there was substance to 79

Rescue Plans

Ben-Gurion’s statement that the Yishuv did not _ arrived from Hungary. He knew that there was no

know the real situation in Poland. Also, when chance of the Allies swallowing the bait. With a Gruenbaum discussed bombing the death camps ransom plan that had only the slimmest chance of with Pinkerton, he was, in fact, thinking about _ success, it is easy enough to understand why Bencamps that no longer existed, such as Chelmno, — Gurion tended to favor the Yishuv’s demand that Treblinka, and Belzec. Gruenbaum emphasized __ the Allies bomb the death camps and put them out Auschwitz as being the main target for bombing, of action. By then there was virtually nothing to apparently unaware of its deeper significance.*! lose in presenting such a demand.*

Meanwhile, there were clear signs of in- Gruenbaum’s refused to accept the JAE’s creased public pressure. On the day of the JAE judgment regarding his proposal and commeeting (11 June 1944) Rabbi Binyamin (Yeho- plained bitterly at two Rescue Committee sesshua Radler-Feldman, a member of the Al-domy _ sions as well as in a letter to Barlas in Istanbul.“ group), heading a committee of seven public But his tactics failed to sway the JAE to adopt his figures, demanded in writing an urgent meeting — way of thinking. The change was apparently due with Ben-Gurion “re: the rescue of the Jews of | tonewinformation. Vrba and Wetzler succeeded Hungary and rescue activity in general.” The — in escaping from Auschwitz in April 1944, bringletter specified nothing more, but it may be sur- —— ing with them reliable firsthand information mised that the rabbi wished to review the request | about what was going on there. They had been to bomb the camps, since this was a subject he — working in the camp’s registration office and had discussed with Gruenbaum on 25 May 1944. were thus able to supply detailed descriptions of Ben-Gurion’s meeting with the rabbi took place — the camp’s layout, the names of its officers, and the following day (12 June 1944). All this pressure procedures—especially the extermination promay have contributed to the JAE’s change in atti- cess. This information was reinforced by addi-

tude regarding the bombings.” tional testimony from two other inmates who At the 15 June 1944 meeting between Ben- _had escaped at the end of May.

Gurion and Sharett and Harold MacMichael, the All the evidence reached Slovakia and was British high commissioner, Ben-Gurion said, “If forwarded to Geneva. Local representatives of anything possible can be done that will not the Yishuv, the Zionist movement, and the other supply the enemy with an advantage or adversely = Jewish organizations published the information affect the war effort, he [Ben-Gurion himself] in the press and elsewhere. The testimonies were begs that it be done.” Ben-Gurion didnotexplain _also relayed to representatives of Orthodox Jew-

what he meant by “anything possible.” ish organizations in Switzerland, who in turn inThese words, uttered only four days after his | formed their counterparts in the United States.

vehement rejection of the proposal to bomb The information reached Hungarian Jewish Auschwitz, may have signaled a change in attitude —_ leaders; Anthony Eden (the British foreign secreon his part. He was also influenced by publicopin- —__ tary); and the U.S. State Department (through ion. However, itis not impossible that hischangein | Roswell McClelland, of the War Refugee Board, attitude derived principally from a marked dim- —_ and Wise and Goldmann, who were in the United

inution of his hopes (qualified to begin with) to States). The Yishuv leadership received the infor-

80 |

save the Jews of Hungary by means of the proposal _—s mation on 18 June 1944 by way of Istanbul, as in-

brought by Brand. It happened following Sharett’s dicated in the minutes of the Rescue Committee return from Aleppo, when Ben-Gurion realized _ presidency for that date.

that a “separate peace” was the main trend among In their testimony the escapees pleaded that the proponents of the ransom proposals thathad = Germany and Hungary be threatened with retal-

Bombing to Deter and Stultify

iatory action by the Allies that the Vatican be = 0n 30 June. Ben-Gurion also learned that the two asked to issue a severe public condemnation— _had raised the proposal at a meeting with Eden and, above all, that the gas chambers andcrema- _—on 6 July and that the latter had informed them toria in Birkenau and the railway tracks leading __ that he had discussed with the Air Ministry the

from Slovakia and Hungary to Poland be possibility of bombing the camps, and also that bombed. A dramatic appealto “blowup fromthe — he would discuss the suggestion that the railway air the centers of annihilation” in Auschwitz and _ tracks leading to them be bombed.

the railway lines, bridges, and stations leading to Sharett sent Eden a memo summarizing the it was made by Rabbi Michael Dov Ber Weiss- __ testimony of the escapees. He vouched for their mandel of the Slovakia Working Group.* Allthis __ reliability and reiterated his conviction that information reached Palestine toward the latter | bombing was essential in order to hold up the exhalf of June. Everything pointed to the fact that | termination process and the deportation of many Auschwitz was the final destination of those de- —_ thousands still in Hungary “at least until the ported from Hungary and that things were mov- __ roads and railway tracks could be repaired and

ing at a rapid pace. the installations for murder could be rehabiliGruenbaum intensified his efforts to get his _ tated.” Sharett pointed to the long-term benefits proposal accepted. He sent cables to Sharett, | of bombing: it would signal that the Allies were Wise, and Goldmann. Similar cables were sent by declaring direct war on the annihilation; it would immigrant organizations and others in Palestine, expose the German propaganda lie that the Allies all demanding that the Allies bomb Auschwitz — were actually satisfied the Jews were being exterimmediately.*° Gruenbaum’s persistence was not minated (which did not prevent the Nazi pronew, but this time he managed to get Weizmann _ pagandists from insisting that the Allies were and Sharett to contact the Allies in London and __ mercenaries of “international Jewry”); it would to convince them to bomb Auschwitz and the __ dispel doubts prevalent among several of the Alroads leading to it. The question, however, was _ lied countries that the reports of genocide were not brought before the JAE plenum until early exaggerated; and substance would be given to July. When did the change take place? Who in- _ threats of retaliation for murdering Jews. Sharett structed Sharett to reverse the JAE’s decision of11_ ~— even voiced the hope that such bombing would

June 1944? create pressure inside Germany against the conSharett was in London at the time, supervis- _ tinuation of the annihilation. Sharett simultane-

ing activity on behalf of Hungarian Jewry. He ously stressed that the JAE was aware of the made a point of supplying Ben-Gurion with downside of such acts: the bombing of Auschwitz most of the details of his activity, either by cable |= would harm Jews already there; it was doubtful if

or by word of mouth through trusted couriers. this would lead to large-scale rescue. The memoThus, if the JAE’s records do indeed reflect the es- randum was also transmitted to Ben-Gurion, but sentials of the discussions, it would seem that at —_ he delayed informing the JAE about it.*”

least during the first half of July Ben-Gurion was At a JAE meeting held in early July—two not divulging to the JAE alltheinformationinhis days after Weizmann’s and Sharett’s meeting with possession. This might have been due to the sen- Hall—Gruenbaum asked to be allowed to hold a

sitivity of the Brand affair. press conference for the foreign press, in which Sharett reported—among other things— he would update them on events in Auschwitz, that he and Weizmann had deliveredthe contents the deportations in Hungary, and would demand

of Gruenbaum’s cables to George Hall, the a halt to such deportations “at all costs.” The British undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, | JAE’s and Ben-Gurion’s reservations were still

81

Rescue Plans

evident in the discussion. Brand’s ransom plan _a negative reply before allowing them to consider claimed most of their attention, and they were __ the request, although they would most probably unwilling to jeopardize it. Schmorak, Senator, __ reject it too.

and Ben-Gurion were not in favor of a press con- Eden was angry at this response and wrote ference on the grounds that such publicity would the following alongside Sinclair’s doubts as to the be useless and would not put anendtotheexter- —_ benefit to the victims: “He was not asked for his mination. “There is no call fora press conference opinion ... he was asked to act.” The same day with foreign newsmen, said Ben-Gurion. “West- Alec Randall, head of the Refugee Department in ern European reporters have a different mental- —_ the Foreign Ministry, told Sharett that the matter ity, and such a conference will be of no benefit of the bombing was “being examined by the apwhatsoever to us.’48 He probably did not wish to _— propriate authorities,’ even though the answer acquaint the entire JAE with all the information | would most probably be negative.*

he had received on the activity of Weizmann and Passing on responsibility to the Americans Sharett in London. It should be remembered that — was typical. Washington had already discussed

other options—concerning the invitation re- the request relayed by Pinkerton and similar apceived by Bader—were being examined at the _ peals by the World Jewish Congress and had even same time in Istanbul and Cairo, and these, asfar | managed to reach a negative decision. By 4 July, as we know, were also not discussed at the JAE’s the Assistant Secretary for War, John McCloy,

meetings. had determined that the war department considEden’s reply to the suggestion madeon6July ered the bombing plan to be impractical, since it was that the possibility of bombing had already _ necessitated considerable air support that was rebeen discussed and rejected, but he added that = quired elsewhere. Moreover, even if it were pracunder the circumstances the matter would be re- _ tical, it would likely result in “retaliatory acts by viewed. In a letter to Churchill the same day, he — the Germans.”*? mentioned Weizmann’s request and suggested At a JAE meeting on 9 July 1944, Ben-Gurion

that it be discussed in the cabinet. Churchill reported on the information from Sharett and favored the proposal and suggested contacting | Agronsky, who had returned to Palestine from the air minister before bringing the matter to |= London. He talked about the Weizmann/Sharett the cabinet. The following day (7 July) Edencon- —s meetings with Hall and Eden and read Sharett’s

tacted Sir Archibald Sinclair, the air minister, to telegram on the meeting with Hall, but he made inform him of Weizmann’s suggestion and of his | no mention of the bombing-and-warnings issue. own commitment to reassess it, pointing outthat = The discussion focused on efforts to proceed Churchill favored it. Eden hoped that “some- —_ with the ransom proposal.

thing could be done.” The bombing-and-warnings issue was The explicit backing of the prime minister __ raised at the JAE only a week later. The reason beand the foreign secretary was of no avail.On1i5 _ hind this is clear: the feeling that nothing positive

July Sinclair wrote to Eden that three topics had = would come of the Brand affair was growing been examined: the disruption of the railways, more acute and, in view of the deteriorating situthe destruction of the extermination installa- | ation in Hungary, Gruenbaum’s proposal had to tions; and other strikes in the camp. The results be implemented. Gruenbaum reported that rewere negative: the distance was too great, the op- _—_ cent Allied bombing raids over Hungary had also eration dangerous and costly, and it was doubtful _ been directed at railway stations and did not rule if it would help the prisoners. He suggested con- _— out the influence of the Yishuv’s demands on the

tacting the Americans and not giving Weizmann selection of targets.

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Bombing to Deter and Stultify

July 1944 marked the first time that Ben- does not indicate what led to this about-face. Did Gurion did not circumvent the issueofbombings it happen in Jerusalem, in the wake of the meetat a JAE session, although his remarks were very — ing with MacMichael, or in London? Was Sharett

brief. He noted that Sharett had indeed “in- __ instructed in the spirit of the new policy before formed us that London had agreed tobomb rail- = departing for London, after hearing Benway stations between Hungary and Poland.” He —_ Gurion’s remarks to MacMichael that everything

said nothing about bombing the actual camps. possible should be done so as not to give the GerThat meeting ended with no resolution to mans an advantage? More likely, the demand for demand that the Allies issue threats if the Nazi the bombing was initiated by Zionist movement annihilations were not halted. At the same time, leader Weizmann and the JAE London branch, it appears that things were taking place outside | with Gruenbaum’s vigorous support. It would the plenum. A few days later Lauterbach, the appear that Sharett backed Weizmann and his head of the Jewish Agency’s Organization De- _ colleagues in London to insert the demand into partment, sent a proposal to Joseph Linton, the their conversation with Hall and Eden. In any London branch secretary, calling for the Alliesto | event, Ben-Gurion was the most informed label the crimes against the Jews, including de- = among his colleagues on the JAE concerning the

portations to Poland, as war crimes.*! essentials of Sharett’s activities in London and he At that mid-July meeting Ben-Gurion did was in no hurry to share his information with not mention—perhaps because he did not _ them. Hedid not go out of his way to support the know—that on 11 July the London branch had _s new position, nor did he mitigate against it.

decided to send a firm, lengthy, and detailed de- Efforts to prompt the Allies to bomb from mand to the British government to bomb the __ the air in order to disrupt the extermination prodeath camps and the roads leading to them. (Itis cess continued offand on until the end of the year. possible that he had no knowledge of this deci- —_—s In the final analysis, they produced no tangible re-

sion at the time.) Although the London branch _ sults. Yishuv leaders believed—falsely, at times— acknowledged in a memo that any bombing of __ that certain bombing forays amounted to complithe camps “had little chance of rescuing the vic- = ance with their requests. When, as a result of a tims,” it insisted that the death factory “could be — deviation in the trajectory of one bombing raid destroyed and its personnel killed...anditcould — fromits target, some bombs mistakenly fell on the deal a blow to the apparatus of massmurder” and __ Birkenau extermination camp instead of the adjadelay the slaughter of the remaining three hun- — cent Monowitz rubber and synthetic petroleum dred thousand Jews trapped in Hungary. It also _— factories, Sharett was quick to cable Gruenbaum stressed the moral weight of the bombings. In __ that Britain was acting on his demands.

order to invest the proposal with greater sig- It was quite natural for Gruenbaum to renificance, it pointed out that “the Oswiecim ceive this information, as well the amendment to camp contains workshops belonging tothe Ger- _it that Sharett sent a few weeks later. Even now it man arms corporations Siemens and Krupp,” — was he who stood out in his demands to bomb the

which were bombing targets.*? camps and the roads and tracks leading to them. It is obvious that from mid-June to late July © Again Gruenbaum sent a series of cables to Wise 1944 Ben-Gurion experienced a change in posi- and Goldmann in the United States, Brodetsky tion from firm opposition to the Yishuv even _and Sharett at the London branch, Lichtheim and suggesting the bombing of extermination camps = Mayer in Switzerland, Ehrenpreis in Sweden, and (not to mention the roads leading to them) to _ Barlas in Istanbul, demanding that they press yet

tacitly approving such action. Documentation again for the bombing of installations and road

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Rescue Plans

and rail tracks leading to them. He also raised Speaking on behalf of Eden, Law gave Weizthese demands in his various speeches. mann the negative reply in early September 1944. Gruenbaum did have some support in his The matter had thus been under discussion for

tireless campaign. On his visit to Turkey, | about two months before being rejected as Mordechai Eliash sent cables to Sweden (on the =‘ “impractical” and “unwarranted.” The system in-

recommendation of Steinhardt and Hirsch- volved dragging out appeals or unpopular remann), the U.S. and the International Red Cross. —_ quests by passing them from one unit to another Sharett instructed Linton at the London branch __ until they were no longer valid or those who orig-

to continue demanding the destruction of the _inally proposed them gave up in despair.°* In death camps, since in their current position October 1944 efforts were made to revoke the deci(summer 1944) the Germans would be unable to sion. Gruenbaum, Goldmann, representative of rebuild new camps. After Britain claimed they __ Britain’s Jewish communities, and others continwere unobtainable, Linton appended plans and __ ued to demand bombing, mainly because it was further descriptions of Auschwitz received from — known that targets very near the camps were be-

the Polish government-in-exile.* ing bombed at the time. Britain and the United States were opposed to Another option was to win the agreement of bombing the camps and the roads andtrackslead- — the Soviets. Eliyahu Epstein of the Political Deing to them. Most modern researchers agree that | partment, who had broad global connections, rethere was no factual, practical basis to the various —_ vived an idea suggested in July and contacted a arguments they used as excuses. Their negative at- | Soviet embassy adviser in Cairo, requesting that

titude is obvious. For example, the maps of | the USSR bomb Auschwitz and the roads leading Auschwitz supplied by Linton were not handed to it, since Soviet airfields were closer to the tarover to the Air Ministry but rather hiddenawayin __ get than those of Britain and the United States. Foreign Office files. The British government did — The reply was negative, such a proposal being

not seriously examine additional information “out of place from a political standpoint.” What offered by the Polish government-in-exile. The — the adviser apparently meant was that Moscow RAF general staff “examined” the proposal only was not about to worsen relations with London because it was instructed by Churchilltodosoand = and Washington by adopting an idea rejected by could not be rejected without some explanation. — the western superpowers. In London representaPhrases such as “technical difficulties” or “the mat- tives of the Jewish communities asked the Forter was discussed and examined from all angles” —_ eign Office to examine the possibility of bombing

were used as an excuse for not bombing. the camps in conjunction with the USSR. This These maneuvers by British officials suc- request was also turned down.°*” ceeded because Churchill was out of the country A greater measure of success, though limited from the end of August, and it would appear that —_ in scale, was achieved by those asking that collabhe was kept uninformed of the tendency to fore-. _— orators and war criminals be warned about the stall such operations. Eden, the foreign secretary, | punishment they could expect after the war. In did not deal with the matter; he was preoccupied = October 1944 British radio broadcast to Germany with the crisis in relations with the USSR overthe —_a list of Auschwitz murderers who would be punlatter’s refusal to allow British and American __ ished after the war. The Polish underground sent supply aircraft to land during the revolt of the __ the list to its government-in-exile in London and

Polish (non-Jewish) underground in Warsaw. it was also broadcast in Polish, together with an The issue was consequently entrusted to Richard __ explicit threat of punishment. This approach con-

Law, the parliamentary undersecretary of state. formed to Churchill’s attitude. He wrote to Eden

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Bombing to Deter and Stultify

in October 1944 that he favored the issuance of | would soon find another way of carrying it out, such warnings because they offered a chance to _and that the Allies were reluctant to play into save the masses affected by Nazi oppression. Still, | the hands of Nazi propaganda and be accused of there was no significant change in British propa-_ _—sfighting on behalf of the Jews. An examination ganda, which was ultimately found lacking as far __ of flight routes, number of sorties, and scope of

as the murder of Jews was concerned. bombing over air space close to Auschwitz all The last attempt to motivate the Allies into —_ lead to the conviction that the oft-repeated redisrupting the extermination process occurredin — fusal to bomb the death camps reflected utter April 1945, with a typical reply: a cure-all prom- _ indifference to the fate of the Jews being slaughise to make up for all the suffering in the form of tered in Auschwitz and elsewhere. an imminent victory over Germany. On 1 Febru- Ben-Gurion’s and the JAE’s position may be ary 1945 Gruenbaum cabled a desperate message § summed up by recalling that there was a broad to Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill, beggingthem — consensus regarding the need to demand that the

to “raze the death factory in Oswiecim” while Allies issue verbal and written warnings to Gertheir aircraft are “destroying the petroleum, |= many. Ben-Gurion himself made this demand on arms, and ammunition plants.” He also asked for | numerous occasions in his public speeches and in

severe warnings to be issued to the Nazis and _his directives and remarks in internal discustheir collaborators against any attempts to harm sions. He also included a call for warnings in his the remaining Jews during the death throesofthe | many protest speeches.

Third Reich. Until mid-June 1944, Ben-Gurion disassociOn 10 April a polite letter arrived from _—_ated himself from the proposal to demand Allied Pinkerton, the U.S. consul, acknowledging receipt | bombing of the camps and roads and rails leading of the cable on behalf of his president. Although — to them. Even when he altered his position, his encouraging, Pinkerton stressed thata satisfactory | support was only moderate. He may have believed solution to the Jewish problem would come only __ that efforts should not be divided and that one with the liberation of Europe, when the forces of | should concentrate on promoting Brand’s plan. darkness and death would be crushed. No replies | He may also have concluded that the Allies would from Churchill or Stalin to Gruenbaum’s finalap- _—_ disregard the demand in the end and that it would

peal have been uncovered to date.* only harm any chance of obtaining Allied consent on other important issues. He may have feared Most researchers agree that the Allies’ reasonsfor that insufficient intelligence information meant refusing to bomb the death camps andthe roads __ that more Jews would be hurt in Allied bombings and rails leading to them range from utter insin- than would be saved.°! It is clear that until June cerity to downright lying. Among the opera- —1944 Ben-Gurion did not fully comprehend the tional arguments given were: complexity of mis- _ true nature of Auschwitz, perhaps a result of the sion; lack of available intelligence data; distance highly sophisticated system of misinformation of targets from airfields; risk to pilots; difficulty | and camouflage developed by the Germans. In of ensuring accurate hits; and expense. Halting = any event, Ben-Gurion did not ally himself unthe deportations from Hungary (although there — equivocally with those few individuals who conwas always the fear that they would be resumed) sidered the bombings something symbolic and was also given as a reason for removing the pro- _ significant in an effort to shatter the “other posal from the agenda. Other reasons involved _ planet.” He left it to Gruenbaum and the London the fact that annihilation of the Jews wasacentral branch to determine the pace and was content to issue in Nazi ideology, which meant the Nazis _ give his quiet assent to their activity.

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PART 3 FINANCING OF RESCUE ATTEMPTS AND ASSISTANCE

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10

At the Edge of the Abyss Financial Maneuvers by Ben-Gurion and Kaplan, 1942-1943

esearch has not yet provided a complete = mentation concerning the financing of the rescue RES. to the question ofhow much money __ operation is not surprising, and it is clear why it is was allocated by the Yishuv to the rescue of Jews __ so hard to assess the scope of the funding and its

during the Second World War, especially when _ routes.

the true significance of what was happening In part 3 of this book I shall examine how in Europe became common knowledge. This isa | Ben-Gurion and his closest colleagues (particuformidable task since the rescue activities were larly Kaplan) raised and allocated funds for the

extremely complex and mostly secret. rescue of and assistance to the Jews of Europe. I Determining the financing of the rescue op- _—-will attempt to determine if they had a clear eration also raises special difficulties. Those allo- financing policy, how much money was raised, cating the funds and their recipients took care to | and from what sources. In the absence of complete carefully cover their tracks. Varied methods were documentation on the allocations, one can learn utilized to “launder” some of the money and to —_ about funding by tracing the movement of monies conceal its movement—for example, bymeansof in occupied Europe and determining the extent of “straw companies”—because transferring funds __ the activity. It is also important to understand how from the free countries into occupied Europe re- — the funds were transferred, which intelligence quired violating the laws and currency regu- _ agencies followed the transfers and knew of them, lations of the Western countries. Some of these | and whether there was a reaction to these financial activities required the payment of bribes. The _activities by the Yishuv in Palestine.

conversion of money or diamonds (which were These are central questions, the financing of easier to smuggle) into currencies usable in occu- _ rescue activities being one of the main criteria for

pied Europe was an intricate process that took determining the sincerity of a statesman’s proplace on the black market through couriers or |= nouncements regarding his intention to adopt a shady moneychangers who made their brokerage __ given policy. On the other hand, the funding of conditional on the highest degree of discretion. | suchactivities can also indicate the presence of an They did not issue receipts or bills of lading for | unpublicized policy—perhaps even a practical what was transferred through them or for what __ policy that contradicts official declarations—as they retained for themselves. The principle ofact- _ well as secret processes for which funds are alloing in secrecy was also applicable in the case of — cated, and real criteria, as distinct from those those banks involved in the depositing and the __ reflected in public discourse.

transfer of monies. At times Western spy services Moreover, it involved violations of the law, helped with the movement of funds, and very of- —_ and there was even a real danger that allocations

ten their involvement also had to be kept secret. | of money would be irretrievably lost, would All of these were matters that people are reluctant | hamper the political activity of the JAE, or would to discuss freely even in normal times, let alone | comeatthe expense of settlement activity and the

during a world war. Nations and intelligence — establishment of an infrastructure for mass imagencies today still practice some of these meth- = migration. Nevertheless, establishing that funds ods and consequently are reluctant to reveal their | were allocated and to what extent provide past activities. As a result, the paucity of docu- _ significant testimony to the level of concern or

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Financing of Rescue Attempts and Assistance

indifference of the Yishuv’s leadership regarding The significance of the battle of El-Alamein

the fate of Europe’s Jews. in pushing back the Germans from North Africa To briefly sketch the background, the alloca- | was not known at the time the events occurred. tion of funds from resources of the Yishuv itself | Even after El Alamein, and following news of the was obviously also a function of its economic —_ mass slaughter of European Jewry, the fears of the capability. During the war years, the population —_-Yishuv Jews with regard to their own safety were of the Yishuv comprised between 450,000 and _ not dispelled. Consequently, they assumed that

475,000 Jews, the majority recently arrived the Yishuv budget would continue to finance younger immigrants. A small minority belonged = mobilization, fortification, and other defense to the moneyed stratum or to the well-offveteran _activities, perhaps to make certain that what hapYishuv. The period was characterized by various __ pened to the Jews “there” would not recur with political upheavals, including the Arab revolt such ease a few months later “here” in Palestine. (1936-1939) and the Second World War (from Here one should stress the signal importance of 1939 onward), and a general sense of political and the fact that the Yishuv was based on a voluneconomic instability that existed throughout the _teerism structure. Most of its political machinery

world as well. functioned thanks to volunteers. Consequently, Beginning in mid-1941 an economic revival __ the ability of the Yishuv leadership to enforce— was discernible in the economy as a whole as well as for instance, to collect taxes and levies—was limin the life of the individual in Palestine. The stan- _ited to various forms of social and organizational dard of living of the workers improved, but it was __ pressure. The willingness or indifference of the the capitalists and industrialists who mainly en- _ various volunteer elements carried greater weight joyed the fruits of the recovery.! Only in hindsight — than the relatively weak enforcement measures

can one know for certain if a particular im- _ available to the leadership. From this standpoint, provement was the first stageinaprocessofgeneral __ the significance of the money raised was greater and sustained recovery or simply a momentary __ than that of an equal sum raised and allocated in

caprice on the part of the “minister of history” a sovereign society. or the “finance minister.” Other pictures raced The JAE budget at the time was based on inthrough the minds of the heroes of that period— — come from three main sources: the fund of the the capitalists and wage earners—as they read the Palestine Foundation Fund (PFF); the Jewish Nanewspaper headlines: the difficult situation of the tional Fund (JNF); and the Mobilization Fund. United States, “the land of unlimited opportunity,’ = Every year they collected donations from indiwhich was only then just beginningtorecoverfrom viduals and organizations through special appeal the great economic crisis that had gripped it since | campaigns, issued compulsory loans and bonds, 1929; the memory of the severe economic and and collected direct and indirect taxes and levies.?

political crises which completely overturned the The official and unofficial exchange rates are

established order of things in Europe. an essential element in the present discussion. It The demands made on the capitalists and _is clear that the budgets of the Jewish Agency and wage earners to contribute more money to aid __ the allocations of the various funds were calcuand rescue the Jews of Europe therefore came _lated according to the official rate of exchange. during a time of economic improvement in the | However, the value of the sums exchanged on the Yishuv but also a feeling of uncertainty. Evenin black market or transferred to occupied Europe less stormy times, expectations, illusions, feelings | was generally lower. Every exchange or transfer of uncertainty—all of these exert a notinconsid- _ transaction required different kinds of “commis-

erable influence on economic systems. sions.” Thus, the official exchange rate for one

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At the Edge of the Abyss

Palestinian pound was four U.S. dollars, but at | one determines these dimensions on the basis of times it was exchanged for three dollars. Simi- _a professional economic analysis. larly, in Switzerland the official exchange rate for It is therefore apposite to know that the regone dollar was four francs thirty centimes, but on ular budget of the Jewish Agency in the years relthe Swiss black market the dollar was only worth evant to this discussion was as follows: 1943 = 1.15 two francs seventy centimes. The decline in the million Palestinian pounds; 1944 = 1.1 million value of money as a result of wartime inflation Palestinian pounds (the regular budget) plus 2.1

must also be taken into consideration, although million Palestinian pounds (the “irregular” the inflation rate in Palestine during the Second _ budget, ie., the addition dependent on future

World War was very slight. income).

Another aspect that should be considered is In order to obtain a more accurate picture of the degree of flexibility of the budget. Discus- __ the degree of elasticity in the budget, it is necessions regarding the financial dimensions of aid sary to examine the relationship between stanand rescue activity began toward the end of 1942, | dard expenses—a component that is very diffi-

immediately after reports of the extermination cult to alter, especially in periods of crisis— were received and made public. At that time the = and variable expenses. The true significance of Jewish Agency budget had already been “up and __ changes in the budget, in particular allocations running” for several months. Anyone who has _for aid and rescue, can only be properly assessed

ever managed a budget—even that of a PTA _ if one takes into account the relationship becommittee—is aware of the difficulty of coping tween the agency’s regular expenses and its variwith a significant and unplanned expense after —_ able expenses.

a part of the budget has already been used up. A According to Dina Porat, between 1 Februnew allocation requires that the planned budget- ary 1943 and 1 June 1945 the Yishuv transferred for ary framework of any organization be increased __ rescue 1.329 million Palestinian pounds. The and may involve the utilization of “reserves” or sources for this sum are as follows: Mobilization

changes in the apportioning of the budget. How- and Rescue Fund = 647,000; JDC = 512,000; ever, every allocation reflects the needs and the _—_—- various other communities in the free world = constant pressure of influential groups on the —_170,000.4 Based on the value of the U.S. dollar at

work program of the organization, making it that time (4 U.S. dollars for 1 Palestinian pound), very hard to alter an approved budget. Toward _ the Yishuv allocated for rescue 2.588 million U.S.

the end of 1942, the JAE was quite limited in its dollars of the funds that were collected by the ability to change the Jewish Agency’s current Mobilization and Rescue Fund (these were not budget.? Only beginning with the budget for1943. —_— the only funds the Yishuv allocated for rescue). did the JAE enjoy relative freedom to adapt the = This sum alone was greater than that allocated by

budget to the new situation. other Jewish communities, with the exception of The Jewish Agency’s budget—especially its the Jews of the United States. This was a relatively size—is obviously an indicator of the economic — major allocation when one takes into considerastate of the Yishuv at that time. Based on this, one tion the size of the Yishuv, its demographic struccan attempt to estimate the dimensions of what _ ture, and the fact that it was a society still in its researchers refer to as “the Yishuv’s capacity” to formative stage of development.’ Porat also deundertake additional tasks. Discussing what the termined that rescue activity was one of the JAE’s Yishuv was able to allocate might be less emo- —_— four main expenditure items.°®

tional and less demagogic—and definitely more According to Akiva Nir’s analysis of the productive from a researcher’s standpoint—if | Yishuv delegation in Istanbul, the latter spent

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Financing of Rescue Attempts and Assistance

188,000 Palestinian pounds in 1943, 247,854 in and the Dardanelles), one arrives at the conclu1944, and 285,403 in 1945, for a total of 721,257 sion that “close to 700,000 [Palestinian] pounds Palestinian pounds. Based on these figures, itis | were allocated for purposes which can collecclear that the money collected in the Yishuv or _ tively be called aid and rescue.” This is similar to

transferred through the Yishuv, reached the the sum estimated by Nir, minus the payments emissaries in Istanbul and was used for aid and _for the ships. According to Bader, the sum avail-

rescue activities. able to the emissaries at the start of their term in Nir also supplied data gleaned from the off- | Turkey was only 5,000 Palestinian pounds, and

cial statistical information sheet of the JAE. the increase in the budget allocated to them was According to this information, the Mobilization “gigantic and legendary.”

and Rescue Fund raised 827,000 Palestinian Summing up his activities and those of his pounds in the five years between 1940/41 and __ colleagues in Istanbul, after the war Bader wrote 1944/45, but of this amount only 234,000 Pales- that up to that point approximately 1.3 million tinian pounds were spent on rescue. Theremain- —_ Palestinian pounds had been spent on all the

ing 593,000 Palestinian pounds were spent items relating to aid and rescue. He detailed mainly on funding mobilization and the families | the components of the expenditure as follows: of the mobilized troops, with the smallest the rescue of Jews from Greece and children from amount (106,000 Palestinian pounds) trans- | Yugoslavia; support for the Jews of Bulgaria and ferred to the Kofer HaYishuv fund-raising agency — the Jews who suffered from hunger and cold in

to finance the activities of the Haganah. Transnistria and Tchernowitz in Bukovina; those If these figures are accurate, andif Niriscor- | “who wandered over the snow-covered mounrect in stating that a little over 721,000 Palestinian __ tains of Italy and Savoy and the Pyrenees until pounds reached Istanbul, and if only 234,000 of they found haven and refuge”; and thousands of them came from the Mobilization and Rescue — orphans who were smuggled out of France, Fund, then the remainder (487,000 Palestinian Belgium, and Holland. Money was also spent to pounds) came from other sources—either di- _ fund the “Tiyulim,” the “trips” Jews made “bravrectly from the JAE budget or from other bodies _ing the fire of a thousand dangers from Poland to that allocated money to the Yishuv for rescue, — Slovakia, from Slovakia to Hungary, and from which the JAE then transferred to Turkey.’ Hungary to Romania,” from a dangerous area to Menahem Bader, who, among his many du- —a more peaceful, less dangerous area.

ties, served as treasurer of the Istanbul delega- Additional monies, Bader continued, were tion, apparently knew quite a bit about what the _— allocated for the acquisition of “forged docudelegation transferred to occupied Europe. In —_— ments and certificates, bread coupons, and the summarizing his mission, he wrote that in the — doors which were opened in prison,” as well as years 1943 and 1944 over 1.1 million Palestinian “for bribes [?] to delay deportations and to prepounds were spent on aid and rescue—much _ vent the liquidation of work camps in Novaki, more than was estimated by Nir. (In another Srat, and Krakow.” In addition, money was also summary Bader wrote that the Yishuv trans- _ allocated following “the diabolical offer of the ferred 1.3 million Palestinian pounds for the same chief murderer, the man from Sharona,” the purpose.) Bader reckoned that if from that same ransom offer made by Eichmann, who visited the sum of 1.1 million Palestinian pounds one de- Templar settlement of Sharona, near Tel Aviv. ducted payments for the purchase or leasing of Possibly Bader was referring to funds that were ships (it may be assumed that they were not in- __ transferred into Hungary as advance payment of tended for pleasure cruises between the Bosporus one kind or another, perhaps advance payment

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At the Edge of the Abyss

in support of the first “interim agreement.” Bader tee totaled 1,756,734 Palestinian pounds. This also mentioned the money allocated for the res- sum includes all the expenses and income of the cue of seventeen hundred inmates at Bergen- committee, but it does not include the additional Belsen, the people on the “Kasztner Train,” and _ funds that were transferred for aid and rescue by the twelve hundred rescued from Theresienstadt other groups or without the committee’s knowltoward the end of the war. Inhis summary Bader __ edge. Even so, the budget of the Rescue Commitincluded allocations for the purchase and leasing _ tee indicates a considerable level of activity."

of ships for the thousands of survivors who There are those who expand the definition of reached Palestine by being “transported in rick- _ funds allocated for rescue by including funds al-

ety crates from Constanta and the shores of located foracomprehensive solution to the probGreece—across stormy seas and past enemy lem of the Jewish people, specifically for the eswatches and the suffocating noose of the White —_ tablishment of an infrastructure to create a state.

Paper.”? This, it will be recalled, was the overall concept of In this document Bader indicated a still | Ben-Gurion and Kaplan. Since they felt strongly greater funding role performed by the Yishuv: that the establishment of a state would provide a close to two thirds of the 1.3 million Palestinian | comprehensive solution to the problem, the allopounds (totaling a little over 850,00 pounds), or —_ cation for an infrastructure was, in their view, a some 150,000 pounds more than his estimate in — direct and essential contribution to the rescue another summary. According to him, the funds effort. According to this broader view, the Yishuv

were transferred to occupied Europe allocated a far greater sum for rescue. Kaplan ar-

, , ticulated this point with directness and suggested as a ransom for lives saved—into the < > the , , saving every penny” for the days following

darkness theythewere flung atoftimes, intoimmigrants , ; Lo, , warinto for integration the many the; fog, the unknown—to serve as a a » , one who “will need housing and work,” to which delaying barrier and wall,must and barricade ; also add the basic requirements of health

for arms, for the fire of revenge, and a ae and so ; and rehabilitation, settlement, education,

burning flag and for bread, simply for , , ; forth. According to figures supplied by Shabtai bread to break the hunger, andTeveth, a warm a major part of the budgets of the JNF and

blanket and bunker, and rescue boats! — i,budget the PFF and hundred the entire immigration one_a:million three thousand . ;were allo- (1,210,360 Palestinian pounds in 1943)

Palestinian divided into 800 ae « nq: , catedpounds, to activities that could be called “long-term days of killing and suffocation and blaz- rescue”

ing extermination furnaces, and you see ; ; ; stormy sea blood and tears into 112.9 which - ~e U.S. va of Palestinian pounds (roughly million

, According toathis argument, during the five what they amounted to,years drop ina raging nae of the Second World War about 3.39 million

five and a half million of our brethren , dollars at today’s rate of exchange) were allocated

dove and drowned.!°

for rescue (in the broadest sense of the word).

Bader’s estimate of 1.3 million Palestinian pounds —_Teveth further shows that at that time only 1.149 is very close to that of Porat, who estimated that —= million Palestinian pounds were allocated for the

the Yishuv allocated 1.329 million Palestinian purchase of land by the JNF (about 38.3 million

pounds to the rescue mission. USS. dollars). According to a report by the Rescue Com- To refute a widespread misconception, conmittee to the Twenty-third Zionist Congress ata trary to the image which Ben-Gurion himself meeting in Jerusalem, the budget of the commit- _ cultivated, there is no basis for the assertion that

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Financing of Rescue Attempts and Assistance

he understood little or nothing about economic —_ adopted in this part of the book, and I feel oblimatters. The establishment of extensive econo- _ gated to justify it.!4 It would appear that Kaplan mic systems, management of finances, the crea- _—_ was a kind of “punching bag.” The anger and

tion and management of a budget, raising funds _ frustration that characterized discussions of in Palestine and abroad—all these were not for- _ financing the rescue operation were generally di-

eign to Ben-Gurion. As general secretary of the — rected at him. What Kaplan absorbed BenGeneral Federation of Labor (Histadrut) and Gurion was spared, but this does not mean that (later) chairman of the JAE, he was involved in Ben-Gurion did not concern himself with the the establishment of very large economic and _ funding of rescue activity. financial institutions by Yishuv standards. Ben- When Kaplan returned from his first visit to Gurion was deeply involved in the activities of | Istanbul, he likened the action required to the the Economic Research Institute and the Plan- _ shooting of an arrow in the dark. The financing ning Committee and its subcommittees (all | of the rescue operation was the immediate conchaired by experts); he raised funds for the Ha- _ text of his statement, and there was no one betganah in Europe and the United States; and be- _ ter suited than Kaplan to express the policy of fore, during, and after the war he managed secret the JAE: money would be collected and trans-

funds that provided him with a degree of opera- ferred—this despite the fear that it would be tional flexibility.’ Right from the start ofhispub- — equivalent to throwing it away—because it was lic career, Ben-Gurion realized only too well the — forbidden to overlook any opportunity to res-

power of money to translate dreams into action. cue Jews. Basic economic concepts were clear to him, or At the end of 1942 the Yishuv leadership was else he could learn them with ease because he confronted with the necessity to speedily draw was an autodidact par excellence. Consequently, | up an orderly plan of action. The pressure was although the treasury and management of the = immense. It would not be an exaggeration to say budget were not specifically included in his area _— that the reports shocked the leadership and of involvement, it is quite clear that he knew __ threatened to paralyze it. It did not dictate develeverything necessary about the funding of rescue = opments, which demanded a response from it,

operations. and frequently had only a very limited degree of In economic matters he was assisted by — control over what was happening in the Yishuv

people like David Horowitz as well as other eco- _ itself. The balance of this chapter will be devoted

nomic experts, particularly by his colleague to an examination of whether the leadership— Eliezer Kaplan, the treasurer of the JAE anda _ _—_and, above all, Ben-Gurion and Kaplan—sucmember of the ruling triumvirate (the third be- _—_— ceeded in formulating a financing policy and acting Sharett). He was an efficient treasurer, one —_—ing in accordance with it.

of the leaders of Mapai and the JAE, and a Questions regarding financing—what to confidant of Ben-Gurion. Kaplan, together with — finance, how much to spend, and where to find Ben-Gurion and Sharett, headed Mapai, the sources of income—appeared straightaway. Pre-

JAE, and the Yishuv. cisely at that time the JAE was in the final stages Ben-Gurion received the bulk of informa- —_ of approving the Jewish Agency budget for the

, tion passed along to Kaplan concerning the upcoming financial year (1942-1943).!° The financing of aid and rescue, and was also a part- — funding of the rescue operation became a pressner in the main funding decisions made by Ka- _ ing question, particularly when three costly res-

plan, although he permitted him freedom of cue plans were presented in succession: the plan action. This last point is one of the premises to rescue children and two ransom plans.

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At the Edge of the Abyss

FINANCING THE PLAN The fact that discussions were detailed, with the TO RESCUE CHILDREN process of integration stripped down to its comThis plan—rescuing twenty-nine thousand chil- _ ponent parts based on cost, proves that there was dren from Europe and bringing them to Palestine —_a real expectation of the arrival of thousands of

by utilizing the remaining immigration permits children. from the White Paper of 1939—-demanded ex- As was described earlier (see chapter 4) the haustive team effort and important decisions re- sense of urgency prompted Ben-Gurion to progarding the extent and manner of funding. It _—_ pose that the integration of the children not rearoused greater hope than any other plan—even = main the exclusive responsibility of the Youth Ben-Gurion was optimistic—and it seemed at Aliyah (Immigration) office headed by Henrietta the time that the British were prepared tohelpin —_ Szold. He did not flinch from his proposal even its realization.!° The two ransom plans presented — though Szold was one of the leaders of Hadassah. were the Transnistria Plan—based ona proposal A blow to Szold was also likely to put at risk to release seventy thousand Jews from Transnis- | Hadassah’s financial support of the Yishuv, and it tria in exchange for a ransom—and the Slovakia _—_ also had harmful repercussions for Ben-Gurion Plan, from which emerged the broader Europe = and Mapai. Another sensitive area concerned the Plan, or Rabbis’ Plan. It should be apparent that children of those mobilized from the Yishuv. a serious organization had to carefully weighhow There was a feeling among the families that the best to organize itself for operations which were —_ Yishuv leadership did not support them adeunforeseen and very costly—perhaps even ex- | quately—and nowit would make a great effort to

ceeding its financial capability. assist refugee children arriving in Palestine on Discussions about funding the rescue began _ behalf of the mobilized soldiers.

immediately following official reports on the Ben-Gurion decided that if the need arose extermination. In time it became clear that the the Yishuv would bear the sole financial burden rescue of masses of Jewish children was nothing of integrating the first five thousand children. more than wishful thinking, but at the beginning —_ He used their arrival to raise money from world of December 1942 Mapai and the Histadrut, as Jewry and viewed the integration of children as well as other organizations, had discussed the a promising event that would give birth to a big children’s integration. The main question was __ settlement enterprise: “We shall have to go to how the children were to be divided up among __ the Jews of America and say to them: we require the various Yishuv groups. In the backgrounda _ for these children land, equipment, houses, a

heated controversy was already developing. new settlement. ... [T]he calculation has to be At one of these discussions (9 December — based on settlement, not merely temporary 1942) the members of the Mapaisecretariat asked refuge.” The Mapai secretariat adopted his proabout the role of Mapai, the Histadrut, and the —_ posal that a special committee draw up the pro-

kibbutz settlements in integrating the children. gram." Who would provide financing and what system Ben-Gurion placed the rescue of children would be followed—private absorption, absorp- _—- within a very broad context. The cost of the ention on agricultural settlements, or absorptionby __ terprise, according to his expanded conception,

private individuals in various cities? Would would far exceed the financial capabilities of the world Jewry, through organizations like Hadas- _Yishuv, especially when one took into account its sah or the Polish government-in-exile, continue —_ participation in the funding of other aid and res-

to participate in the financing and, if so, what | cue campaigns and the defense expenditure. would be the extent of their financial assistance? | His expanded approach reflected a considerable

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Financing of Rescue Attempts and Assistance

degree of optimism, which in the end was _ with regard to the possibility of rescuing tens of groundless. His desire to present the enterpriseas | thousands of children. It was decided to initiate a first stage in the evacuation of Jewish children _—_ contacts with representatives of the JDC and to

from occupied Europe was based on the hope _ dispatch Yitzhak Gruenbaum to the United that the broad context would contribute to the —_ States in order to try to get American Jewry to acceleration of the rescue plan and improve the _ finance the projected aid and rescue efforts. As

chances of securing funding for it. will be recalled, Ben-Gurion opposed sending a In remarks to colleagues in the Mapaisecre- _—Yishuv delegation to the United States, but he es-

tariat, Ben-Gurion began by outlining the ele- = poused the suggestion that Gruenbaum should ments of the policy plan that had been discussed __ travel alone on a mission of propaganda and by the JAE on 13 December 1942 and atasession _—_fund-raising.'9

of the special Committee for Child Immigration, Specific sums were already referred to in a which met the following day. At the meetings of — discussion held at the Mapai secretariat toward the JAE and the special committee (Ben-Gurion the end of December. In the plan presented there, was one of its five members) it was decidedtoan- —_ those present discussed the rescue of a minimum

nounce to the British government that the JAE of ten thousand children. The estimated cost of would fund the integration of the twenty-nine _ transport and their integration—including “setthousand refugee children and was also drawing _tling them during their adolescence” in the spirit

up “broader plans” in accordance with Ben- of the broad conception presented by BenGurion’s wishes. The JAE consequently adopted Gurion at the previous session—was about five the policy he outlined in the party arena: the — million Palestinian pounds (twenty million U.S. Yishuv would bear the financial burden of this dollars at the then current rate of exchange). Allarge-scale enterprise and the JAE would under- _—‘ though it was understood that the funds for this

take to finance it and subsequently act to obtain = operation would not be required simultane-

the money.!® ously,” all realized that such an enterprise would Ben-Gurion and Kaplan pointedto the poten- — exceed the Yishuv’s financial capability.

tial partners in financing “the rescue of these chil- Ben-Gurion described to his party coldren and their integration in Palestine”: the JDC, —_ leagues the stand adopted by the JAE in their dis-

the aid organization of American Jewry, which, cussions with the Mandate government and the with certain qualifications, would be included in _ British government in London: “We want to save

the financing; and “the Jewish and non-Jewish 25 thousand children. They asked us: money; world.” Kaplan explained that the decision to raise = plans. We said: ‘We take responsibility for the money from outside sources did not contradictthe funding.’ They were not satisfied with this; we JAE’s decision to assume financial responsibility gave an official letter. We thought: afterward we

“for every child that can be rescued... meaning can continue with the discussion.” He again tens of thousands.” The significance of this under- _ stressed that the JAE had assumed total financial taking was that the JAE would guarantee the finan- — responsibility—since bringing the children over

cial side of the immigration and integration and their integration were “the most important processes through interim funding until money consideration of Zionism”—and it intended to was obtained from other sources; in the worst-case obtain the “assistance of all the Jewish people” to scenario it would finance them from its budgetary _ finance the enterprise.*! It is worth recalling that

reserves or through an increase of its debts. the Yishuv’s “capacity for economic integration” The JAE thus succeeded in recovering from = was an important element in the restrictions imthe initial shock and in formulating a clear policy | posed by the British on immigration at the end of

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At the Edge of the Abyss

the thirties. Now they were raising this subjectin implemented, since the Allied governments the context of the rescue of children; ini942 and = would most likely not permit funds to be transthe beginning of 1943 the British were well aware ferred to enemy countries.” The amount of ranof the fate awaiting the Jewish childrenremaining | som demanded was between three and four mil-

in Europe if they were not rescued. lion Palestinian pounds (equivalent to roughly The financial responsibility of the JAE for — twelve to sixteen million U.S. dollars) in exthe transport and integration of the children ne- —_— change for seventy thousand Jews from Transnis-

cessitated that it look to outside funding. The JAE tria. According to another version, the ransom had assumed a risk, having no other choice,and §=money demanded was more than twice this had taken responsibility for an undertaking with- amount.” out any real long-term coverage apart from the Nonetheless, Ben-Gurion stressed that neability to provide interim funding. This fact is _ gotiations should continue in order to assess the not in keeping with the accusations subsequently possibility of implementing the plan, for if it hurled in JAE meetings. A hesitant leadership, | became clear that taking out and transferring the one shackled by routine, would not have daredto |= money was the only obstacle, perhaps a way take such a risk. The general principle laid down — would also be found to overcome this.* Kaplan by Ben-Gurion and Kaplan with regard to the _ next described the size of the financial burden infinancing of the JAE was hardly conservative, to —_- volved in this proposal and voiced the fear that

say the least: at every occasion that offered a the whole affair might be nothing more than a chance of rescue, the JAE would assume financial form of “financial blackmail.” Nevertheless he responsibility for the enterprise and only after- | was determined to pursue the matter to the end ward would it try to find funding. Lackofmoney _ even at the risk of losing great sums of money.

would not thwart rescue efforts. As was mentioned in chapter 5, the JAE FUNDING THE members discussed the proposal to divide the TRANSNISTRIA PLAN ransom plan into two parts. It was suggested that one begin with the cheaper operation, namely, The JAE was virtually called upon to finance evacuating Jews from Transnistria and returning three rescue projects simultaneously. The second — them to Romania, later extricating them from was placed on the agenda in Palestine at the end = Europe. Eliyahu Dobkin also suggested raising of December, immediately after the first reports | some of the funds from the wealthy Jews of Roabout it reached Jerusalem from Istanbul. As was mania. The Yishuv was then unable to raise such

stated earlier (see chapter 5), the information sums from its own resources, and certainly not about this development was first given to Ben- from the 1942-1943 budget, which was due to be Gurion and Gruenbaum. It was subsequently approved at the time. Raising money in Romania presented to the JAE at a special session held on _itself to rescue Jews in Bessarabia and Bukovina

23 December 1942. who had been deported to Transnistria would also Gruenbaum chaired that meeting inthe ab- _avoid the necessity of having to violate the prohisence of Ben-Gurion. He gave the JAE informa- __ bition against transferring money to the Axis tion concerning the ransom offer and summa- _ countries. The JAE therefore approved the prorized Ben-Gurion’s position as expressed during __ posal to continue negotiations, adding to Gruentheir meeting before the session: Ben Gurion felt | _baum’s agenda the task of soliciting contributions that one should consider the proposal and weigh _for the ransom during his U.S. visit.” its chances of success, strive for continued nego- While the JAE was discussing the funding of tiations, although he doubted the plan could be __ the two rescue plans, a third rescue plan was also

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presented. Each of them required great sums far _— actually incapable of obtaining the funding. in excess of the Yishuv’s financial capability. The | There were those who maintained that the JAE cost of rescuing twenty-nine thousand children — did not understand what was required, whereas and bringing them to Palestine was 4.8 million others were of the opinion that it simply did not U.S. dollars—which did not include the cost of | wish to participate in the rescue operations.

integrating and settling them. The financial cost Criticism mounted—and not without reaof the Transnistria Plan was at least12-16 million — son. The sums allocated by the JAE seemed very dollars. Compared to those 16.8 to 20.8 million = small—even__ridiculous—totaling twenty-five

dollars, the budget of the Jewish Agency in1942 thousand Palestinian pounds for the year was 1.15 million Palestinian pounds including = 1942-1943.*’ Criticism came from different quarfixed expenses, and the projected budget fori943, _ ters: the Budget Committee of the Zionist Actions which was 1.1 million Palestinian pounds, wasin- | Committee, the Zionist Actions Committee itself, creased by 1 million Palestinian pounds in the — the Rescue Committee, the Histadrut, Mapai, to nonregular section of the budget, totaling2.1mil- | name just a few. Critics suggested other ways to

lion Palestinian pounds. obtain the required money, their comments The sum required for the transport of the reflecting great confusion. The JAE was criticized children alone amounted to the entire budget of —— on all sides for a lack of understanding, impothe JAE for 1942 plus another two hundredthou- _ tence, opposition to finance rescue plans that had sand U.S. dollars; according to the lower cost es- _— only a faint chance of success, and allocating intimate of the Transnistria Plan, it was two or _ sufficient funds in general. The JAE was also acmore times greater than the said budget. It would — cused of the historic blunder of distinguishing behave been difficult to find organizations able to —_ tween “Zionism” and “rescue,” which, according stretch their economic resources to such an ex- __ to the critics, must never be distinguished from

tent. Yishuv funding of the rescue plans was _ one another. They maintained that the JAE had nothing more than a pipe dream. Nevertheless, | made sucha distinction even though, as has been Ben-Gurion and the majority of JAE members demonstrated, the attitude of the leadership was decisively favored doing everything possible to __ the reverse.

implement the plans.”6 A large part of the criticism was directed at Ben-Gurion paid close attention to the de- _ the JAE’s leaders: Ben-Gurion, the chairman; Katails concerning the funding of the planto rescue _ plan, the treasurer, who was not prepared to allochildren, which seemed practical, but contented — cate “even a penny”; and Gruenbaum, chairman himself with general remarks about funding the — of the Rescue Committee. It was not enough,

Transnistria Plan, which in his view was quite |= many of the critics argued, to decide upon an illusory. At the same time, the overall policy of overall policy, to extend financial coverage for Ben-Gurion and Kaplan also devolved upon the __ rescuing children, or to be prepared to assist vetTransnistria Plan, and the JAE decided that lack eran Zionists. They called for the allocation of at of funding should not present an obstacle to its —_ least ten times the amount proposed by the JAE,

implementation. at least 250,000 Palestinian pounds.”® It is worth noting that such an expanded allocation was

A NONCOMPLIANT JAE nowhere near the immense sums under discus-

A short time after the rescue policy had been de- _ sion at the time. cided, it became clear that the JAE was incapable The criticism leveled at the JAE sheds light

of obtaining funding to cover the obligations it on its policy at the time. Since Kaplan, Benhad undertaken. Many did not believe that it was | Gurion, and Gruenbaum were forced to defend

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At the Edge of the Abyss

themselves, the criticism elicited explanations problem was conceptual, a mistaken view that concerning their financing policy and forced __ took root in JAE circles, and not simply one of them to be more specific. At the beginning of | empty coffers pure and simple. Only the atmos1943, a month or two after the reports of the ex- phere of those hectic and troubled days can extermination, horrifying reports became increas- _ plain howa practical man like Haft, well aware of ingly frequent, and it was very difficult to admit the difference between wishful thinking and hav-

that the JAE did not have sufficient money for ing the required financial capability, could exrescue. The rate of extermination increased and __ press these sorts of views.

there were reports of deportations of Jews from Others called for a halt to “this silence” and the Balkans, Holland, Belgium, Germany, and __ urged a constant state of alarm that would open Norway. It became known that Hitlerintendedto _ hearts and wallets. Here it is worth recalling the

systematically murder five million Jews, and connection between the public’s alarm and the Himmler gave orders to annihilate all of Polish raising of contributions based on it. It was furJewry by the beginning of 1943. The impassioned _ ther stated at that same meeting of the Mapai seccalls of the Yishuv emissaries in Istanbul, and the retariat that the allocation of monies should not words of reproach from those returning from —_ be made contingent on the guaranteed success of

there, fanned the flames. the plans, for “when a person is lying dangerously A characteristic discussion took place at the __ ill, no man will dare say: “No medicine will help

Mapai secretariat on 10 February 1943. It oc- anymore; it is a pity to spend money ona medical | curred following a report given by Bader during _specialist.’”2° As we have seen, this was indeed the his visit to Palestine, plus other reports that were JAE’s policy.

circulating. Sharp attacks were made against the The JAE was asked in an accusatory tone JAE, against members of Mapai in the JAE, and what it had done to collect money abroad and in particularly against Ben-Gurion. David Remez, the United States. There were calls to at least save the general secretary of the Histadrut, succinctly — the Yishuv’s “Zionist conscience.” Golda Meir

expressed the criticism welling up in the His- called on the JAE to concentrate on rescue betadrut leadership and Mapai when he described _ cause “there is now no other Zionism.” She de-

the situation where there is apparently “money = manded that unnecessary confrontations be for every necessity” and, on the other hand, avoided but nevertheless asked how Kaplan “when it is necessary to give baksheesh of afew could talk about the allocation of a lot of money

thousand lira, we have no money.’”’ for rescue and then argue with the Mobilization Avraham Haft, who was involved with — Fund over sums on the order of twenty thousand

financial matters in the kibbutz and moshav Palestinian pounds.?! movements and active in the Kofer HaYishuv, From the long list of critics and those offerstated that Ben-Gurion “does not display the ing suggestions, it is worth examining the remaximum concern in this matter” and expressed —= marks of Eliyahu Golomb, the unofficial comthe view that the JAE did not allocate sufficient |= mander of the Haganah organization. Golomb money for rescue because it erred in making a — enumerated a long list of difficulties and possible

distinction between “the catastrophe” and courses of action, described logistical and vari“Zionism.” Haft rejected the tight-fisted ap- | ous other problems, and stressed that, notwithproach, which he ascribed without any proof to — standing the difficulties, everything possible Gruenbaum, favoring the allocation of “hun- — should be done because “there might be some dreds of thousands of Palestinian pounds.” His _ substance to these propositions.” He stressed the remarks created the impression that the main _—importance of waging a relentless battle against

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Financing of Rescue Attempts and Assistance

the clock and attempted to quantify the dimen- _ of those involved were convinced that they were sions of the operation: 1.2 million Palestinian doing the right thing on behalf of the Jews of Eupounds (4.8 million U.S. dollars) would have to _— rope. One of the speakers expressed the nature of be raised in order to rescue thirty thousand peo- _ the argument as follows: “The most difficult arple from Europe, based on an estimated 40 Pales- = gument is with friends whom you feel share the tinian pounds to transport each person aboard _ same attitude toward the issue as you yourself.”

Turkish ships. Even if the JAE managed to raise KAPLAN DEFENDS HIMSELF such a sum from contributions by America’s

Jews, it would be difficult to transfer the fundson |= Members of Kaplan’s and Ben-Gurion’s party acaccount of the ban on the transfer of monies to _ tually denounced them, claiming it was they who occupied Europe. Would America’s Jews donate —_— were preventing the allocation from the agency such a sum? Golomb answered in the affirmative, funds for rescue. Kaplan vigorously rejected the

as did Ben-Gurion, who interjected his com- _ criticism. He absolutely denied any “division of

ments in the same positive spirit. duties” between “plaintiff and defendants” and According to Golomb, the need to raise rejected the claim that “someone interfered.” He money from the Yishuv made it essentialto create himself attempted to manage the JAE’s two a sense of obligation among the public, to stress = means for collecting money—the PFF and, to a the opportunity of rescue, and to remove the un- certain extent, the Mobilization Fund—but the necessary cloak of secrecy. It was permissible and __ experts rejected his suggestions for professional imperative to print “daily on every page of the __reasons.*?

newspaper: a possibility exists to save Jews. Kaplan explained why the JAE could not Money is needed for this purpose—it willhavean fund the rescue plans from its own resources, effect.” Every possible avenue for the transfer of stressing that this did not mean the JAE was funds was to be explored, in order to prevent the washing its hands of the necessity to produce inpossibility of rescue plans being thwarted by ofa _ terim funding or guarantees for the financing of

temporary lack of cash.” rescue plans until the required amount was colAmong Mapai members there was a com- _lected. Inhis own words, he acted thus “yesterday mon assumption that the leadership refused to —_—and today,” and when he heard from Bader about risk large amounts of money for plans that were __ the possibility of rescuing five thousand children destined to fail. This was erroneous. The consis- —_ and bringing them to Palestine, he gave instruc-

tent attitude of the JAE and the practical policyit tions to allocate forty thousand Palestinian adopted at the end of 1942 were expressedin Ben- —_ pounds for the operation “without much arguGurion’s apt formulation in connection with —= ment and without embittering the life of each of

Eichmann’s proposal: “If there is a one-in-a- us.” It now “only” remained to find the financial million chance, we should grab it.” The leader- _—_— backing for this measure. Tens of thousands of ship was involved in a series of complex activities. Palestinian pounds were allocated for the purIn general, it was not possible to discuss them in __ chase of ships for the illegal immigration opera-

public forums without running theriskofdoom- tion. The JAE’s participation was approved to

ing them to failure. create a monetary reserve to be made available to The embattled members of the JAE were be- __ the Yishuv’s emissaries in Geneva, contingent on

set by a furious wave of criticism atatime when _partners being found. they had to prepare the relatively inexperienced Kaplan also made an apparent reference to branches of the agency for operations of extraor- —_‘ the Transnistria and Slovakia plans when he said

dinary complexity. It was a painful polemic. All that he had given instructions not to jeopardize

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At the Edge of the Abyss

the possibility of rescuing Jews because of finan- _ rescuing the forty-five hundred children and five cial constraints. Consequently, talk of opposition | hundred adult escorts would require the purand an inappropriate rate of progress were dem- chase of ships at a cost of fifty thousand Palestin-

agoguery, Kaplan declared, and in response to __ian pounds. They already had thirty thousand demagogic remarks one did not alter one’s rate Palestinian pounds, said Ben-Gurion, and the of progress. The gist of his position was that no completion of the sum was a “burning issue” rescue operation would be thwarted by lack of being handled by “three people—one of whom money, and that the JAE would obligate itself | represents the treasury of the Jewish Agency, anfinancially and seek funding afterward. From other the treasury of the Executive Committee Kaplan’s remarks it emerged that he had already __ [of the Histadrut], and a third the Mobilization allocated forty thousand Palestinian pounds and _levy or the National Council—all of whom are an extra ten thousand. It seems that at that stage here.” From Ben-Gurion’s remarks it is clear that he had even allocated larger sums than those his — the JAE had already transferred more money

critics demanded of him. than the critics knew about and that Ben-Gurion Ben-Gurion spoke up a number of times at —_—- was not in need of the “exoneration” that Kaplan

that session, but he totally ignored the criticism — had bestowed on him. directed at him and his colleagues. He contented In all of his remarks Ben-Gurion referred to himself with the “exoneration” Kaplan bestowed the rescue of Jews from Europe. On the other on him: “Who interfered? [They] accuse the Jew- hand, he adopted a different attitude toward ish Agency. Ben-Gurion is not to be blamed in —_— what was termed “the small rescue” concerning this instance. He did not deal with it. So then Ka- the question of aid to the remaining Jews in Euplan should be blamed.” Ben-Gurion supposedly rope: “I don’t know anything about money for left it to Kaplan to deal with such mattersanddid __ this. I think that this question is not apposite at

not involve himself in them. this moment.” The astonishment elicited by this This description was quite chivalrous but statement has already been discussed (see chapnot at all accurate. Ben-Gurion was most decid- ter 5). Had Ben-Gurion not some time earlier edly involved in determining the funding policy | urged the JAE to implement the Transnistria of the rescue operations and inthe decisionscon- _ Plan, one of whose main points was the transfer cerning its offshoots. As we have seen, he partici- of Jews trapped inside Romania from the horrors pated in the activities of the central bodies deal- —_— of Transnistria to Romania proper? Was it his in-

ing with the rescue of children and its funding. tention to circumscribe the functions of the JAE, Up to this point, he had taken part in one gather- _ to clarify what it would not deal with and what ing of the Mobilization Fund for the purpose of the area of responsibility of the other Jewish bodcollecting money and received regular updates —_ies was? Was he perhaps inferring that at this on various fund-raising activities or on activities stage the Transnistria Plan was not practical, and that required the allocation of funds.*4 It should — that consequently there was no point in distherefore not be assumed that Ben-Gurion relied —_ cussing its funding?

on such a factually dubious “exoneration.” Fur- According to Ben-Gurion’s and Kaplan’s thermore, it is hard to imagine that a man like = subsequent actions, it appears that now, too, him, aware of his responsibility as leader, would = Ben-Gurion tried to prevent other bodies in the

take cover behind such a smokescreen. Yishuv and the Jewish people from hiding behind Nevertheless, Ben-Gurion paid no attention — the limited financial resources of the Zionist to criticism leveled against him and adopted a §movement and the Yishuv institutions in Palesbusinesslike approach. He told the gathering that — tine. Apparently he wished to force them into

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participating in funding the rescue effort to the WORD VERSUS DEED largest extent possible, stressing that the financial | Ben-Gurion hinted at another difficulty: the sponsorship coverage extended by the JAEtothe _ need to look after the Jews in Palestine. The backvarious rescue initiatives did not “exempt” them ground to his comments included, among other from the general financial burden. This was nota things, public pressure exerted on the leadership question of shrewd diplomacy or pure bargain- __ to also deal with the families of the mobilized ing: public pressure and the natural inclination men. This was a trenchant statement, not polto want to help led the JAE to exceeditsmeans,to ished froma political or public relations point of a large extent, making the maneuvers of Kaplan view. In due course such statements would be and Ben-Gurion to attract contributors essential | used to prove that Ben-Gurion turned a cold

from their point of view. shoulder to the fate of Europe’s Jews during the In the course of the meeting, Ben-Gurion holocaust. The truth of the matter is that the JAE elaborated on his comments concerning limitsto simply was unable to meet its financial obligathe activity of the JAE in the rescue effort. With tions. Despite this powerlessness—and this verregard to “rescue [meaning] the bringing out of bal dissociation—the JAE did transfer a great Jews and their transfer to Palestine,” there can be deal of money to Europe and allocated bribe no argument “that the Jewish Agency takes upon money to prevent killings. itself the transportation costs of the children.” By Every statement that was interpreted then— contrast, Ben-Gurion distinguished betweentwo _ or is interpreted today—as comparing two types types of “assistance to Jews in the place of their of concerns and “obligations” was an incorrect residence”: the JAE would support veteran Zion- —_ and even unreasonable interpretation. These two

ists and would send them passports, but “for concerns existed on two very different planes, bribes to prevent decrees”—meaning the Trans- |= and Ben-Gurion was not alone in realizing this. nistria Plan and apparently the Slovakia Plan, § There was no practical significance to this com-

too—“the JA cannot give money.” parison made by Ben-Gurion. It was simply anAt the start of the meeting Ben-Gurion had _ other example of his not inconsiderable talent for stated that there was no actual plan of this kind, __ slipping up from time to time, allowing stinging whereas afterward he simply stated that the JAE —_ and cruel utterances to distort the true meaning was unable to meet the cost of bribe paymentsto of his own actions.*

prevent killing. The JAE was dealing with the res- In early February 1943 Ben-Gurion had cue of the first five thousand children, which = maintained that it would be preferable for the “will require large investments and great efforts | JAE to concentrate on financing the rescue of from the Yishuv, from the Jewish people, and children and aid to veteran Zionists and several the Zionist movement”—according to Golomb _ other operations of the “small rescue” type rather 4.8 million U.S. dollars fortwenty-ninethousand than to allocate sums for ransom. Ben-Gurion’s children. Ben-Gurion acknowledged the diff- reason was the JAE’s inability to meet the huge culty of raising such a large sum of money ina —_ payments required. His intention was apparently such a short space of time, but he again exuded __ to force every Yishuv or non-Yishuv group to the same optimism he had expressed in hisinter- _ participate in financing ransom demands. jection to Golomb, repeating that he believed it It took all of February for the JAE to establish was possible to do so. This, therefore, was the _ its financing policy for the rescue projects, and it JAE’s narrow space for maneuvering and Ben- _ was subjected to severe criticism. It was one of the Gurion staunchly stood by it. The bag was rid- _ topics that preoccupied the Mapai Center in a de-

dled with holes. bate on 24 February 1943 after hearing a report by 102

At the Edge of the Abyss

Zvi Schechter (Yehieli), who had returned from who dealt with Aliyah Bet), as had members of Istanbul. A few days earlier the JAE had decided __ the Agricultural Workers’ Federation (who, like that Kaplan would leave for Istanbul and, while — Schechter, did not deal solely with agriculture), there, would examine the financial requirements |= and members of the Histadrut’s Executive Comof the rescue, among other things.** Schechter, = mittee. Two central issues were discussed: aid to one of the leaders of the illegal immigration op- —_ Jews in Nazi-occupied lands and emigration eration and the Agricultural Workers’ Federa- —_ from those countries. For the benefit of his coltion, was an important member of the Yishuv’s _ leagues, Ben-Gurion reviewed the various probsecret service team. From the middle of 1943 he lems involved and examined what had already liaised with the British on the Parachutists’ | been implemented based on the decisions of that

Scheme. meeting of activists.

After analyzing the financial significance of In a detailed survey, one that reflected conthe Transnistria Plan, Schechter tried to mini- _ siderable knowledge of the various aspects of the mize the audience’s concerns and concluded that — rescue, Ben-Gurion described the difficulties, “the matter of the ransom is incorrect,’ since __ the possible courses of action, and what was rewhat was involved was “a huge migration tax,’ | quired from the Yishuv for their implementacommon in Germany and Romania before the tion. Hunger was a common concern, but he eswar. The Yishuv should not act like “the JDC, timated that it was more essential to save Jews by afraid to deal with any matter involving a prohi- _ transferring them from dangerous countries to a bition,’ but it should be wary of becoming en- —_—_— country like Hungary, in which there was less of

meshed in unnecessary complications.*” Most of | a danger. Ben-Gurion also described the necesthe other topics Schechter mentioned touched _ sity of bringing the Jews close to the borders of on matters of financing, including the high cost —_ neutral countries, which, of course, was a refer-

of purchasing ships and the ban on transferring ence to the “Tiyulim” (walkabout) system, funds to enemy territories. He stressed the im- | whereby Jews were smuggled out of occupied portance of bribes as a means of rescuing Jews _ territory or into areas where they had a better and improving their ability to survive in Europe. chance of survival. He described how to transfer monies to the Axis “There are places where rescue is possible,” countries through various couriers and raised said Ben-Gurion, “ but money is required; there the possibility of expanding the scope of this ac- —_ are countries where gentiles are willing to help,

tivity if funding were increased. and there are places where this is possible only This meeting is important not only in un- — with _money.... Simply put, officials must be derstanding the needs and difficulties involved in bribed in order to prevent massacres, slaughters, funds allocation but also in understanding the — deportations.” Aid and rescue operations of this development of Ben-Gurion’s attitudes toward kind were also possible because of communicafinancing rescue operations. At the end of _ tionsavailable to the emissaries in Geneva and IsSchechter’s remarks, Ben-Gurion dealt at length — tanbul. Contact had been established with almost

with all aspects of the rescue issue, both the _ all the occupied countries, with the exception of “small rescue” and the “big rescue.” He recalleda Poland, through regular post or special couriers. meeting held “ten to fourteen days ago” that in- | Some of the couriers—particularly priests—did cluded Mapai members of the JAE, but he men- _ their work “for the sake of heaven,” while others tioned no names. “Members dealing with immi- | demanded payment. This enabled emissaries to

gration” had also participated (apparently a § know “more or less what is going on in those reference to Golomb, Meirov-Avigur, and others countries.” There are unmistakable echoes here

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Financing of Rescue Attempts and Assistance

of briefings Ben-Gurion received from Zaslani- and things you didn’t hear, and it is perhaps Shiloah, Epstein-Ealth, and others regarding the advisable that you should not hear,” said Beninitial system, established and operated from Gurion, thereby clearly hinting at a series of acIstanbul and Geneva. Beginning in mid-1943 this tions conducted far from the public eye and even system was expanded and during the summer of __ from the eyes of his representatives in most of the 1944 the intelligence failure associated with it decision-making bodies. The reasons for the se-

subsequently became clear. crecy are also clear: the ban on the transfer of Ben-Gurion stated that the Yishuv leader- monies and the fear of having information ship and its emissaries were also involved inim- —_ leaked, which would harm rescue efforts. Ben-

migration. They were striving to bring over Gurion reiterated that the JAE would be responforty-five hundred children and five hundred sible for financing the rescue of children, claimadults and had plans to use up the entire quotaof ing that funds had been allocated for this permits. “The difficulties are enormous,” he purpose: forty thousand Palestinian pounds for noted, with the stupid and cruel Turks placing _ the first thousand children (according to Kaplan obstacles in the children’s way. “Ships are at a spe- in the Mapai secretariat). He reported on atcial premium, now that they are being usedinthe tempts to find ships to transport the children and war effort,’ so “we shall need our own vessels. No —_— explained that Kaplan had been sent to Istanbul

easy task even in ordinary times.” to decide on “spending larger sums.” Ben-Gurion All of this was, in one way or another, con- — summed up his remarks by stating that the chalnected with money—a great dealofmoney. Ben- _ lenge of the rescue required the Yishuv to prepare Gurion told the members of the Agricultural _ itself logistically and mentally for “urgent, large-

Workers’ Federation that the cost of bringing scale aid. One cannot know how much time reover a child in a foreign ship was about forty mains and how long people will need help.” Palestinian pounds, and the purchase of ships, Ben-Gurion had come a long way since utwhich necessitated large sums even in peacetime, tering his remarks at the Mapai secretariat on 10 was even more expensive in wartime.*® An addi- February 1943 that it wasn’t the JAE’s job to pay tional big expenditure was bribery, which was _ for bribery; now, only two weeks later, he was

indispensable. agreeing that money had to be allocated for

Ben-Gurion described the funding decisions __ bribes. The difference reflects a maturation prothus far approved. He included all that had been _—_ cess anda change of attitude. It appears that Ben-

decided until then in the Mapai secretariat and = Gurion was influenced by the cumulative effect the JAE—including the period of his resignation — of the reports of the various emissaries, which from the JAE—in coordination with the Rescue _also led to the decision to send Kaplan to IstanCommittee, the Mobilization Fund, the National bul. lam unaware of any significant change in the Council, and the Histadrut. Ben-Gurion also JAE’s finances that occurred in the interim. Nevmentioned the decision to hold a secret fund- ertheless, Ben-Gurion was now prepared to inraising Campaign among the wealthy people in __ crease the financial stakes and even to risk paying the Yishuv, the first function having beenheldthe __ bribes. day before with his participation. The plan was to Although the extent of the risk had changed, make a concentrated effort to raise atleast125,000 — _Ben-Gurion’s basic premise had not: the JAE Palestinian pounds to be placed “at the disposalof | would continue to demand that every possible

our friends in Istanbul and Switzerland.” source of revenue be tapped in funding rescue It was decided to hold a secret fund-raising | operations and would increase the scope of its incampaign on account of things “that you heard __ terim funding. At the same time, the JAE would

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At the Edge of the Abyss

strive to reduce, as far as possible, theharmtothe — ous Yishuv allocations in the possession of the Yishuv’s security and establish an infrastructure | emissaries in Istanbul and Geneva prior to his arfor mass immigration. The financing policy was _ rival; JDC monies, which served to pay “deporta-

based on borrowed time: providing interim tion tax” or “sitting tax” in Slovakia; and funds funding from Yishuv sources and extending obtained by the local communities in the Axis financial coverage by the JAE until external countries. According to Kaplan’s calculations, sources could be located. The problem, ofcourse, —_ in addition to the 75,000 Palestinian pounds he

was that even borrowed time lapses in the end, had allocated in Istanbul, another 75,000 to and that the JAEF’s ability to extend interim fund- —_—_100,000 Palestinian pounds to finance the trans-

ing was finite. port of five thousand children from Transnistria Against this background, one can discerna to Romania were required immediately. Kaplan number of actions: Ben-Gurion’s plantoembark _ said he had already instructed the emissaries to on a fund-raising campaign in South Africadur- —_ undertake any action necessary and had commiting March, which never materialized;* the ap- ted the JAE to obtain the required sum. He told peal to the governments of the United Statesand = Mapaiit was “imperative to continue” this action Britain for assistance in securing a ship;*! and and commented, with regard to its scope, “life Kaplan’s trip to Istanbul. Kaplan’s journey wasal- _—will tell.”

together “a commander’s visit” to the front, in- Reports on Kaplan’s journey reveal that the volving study, encouragement, organizing the overall policy delineated within Mapai by Benoperation, making decisions, and so forth. This | Gurion at the end of February was indeed imple-

journey also contributed to a change in Ben- mented. The interim funding proved insuffGurion and Kaplan, which began crystallizing cient, especially as the rescue activities grew in during February, since Kaplan was now per- scope. As a result, some operations were frozen, suaded that something could be done, that there —_ resulting in loud complaints by the emissaries. was a point in firing an arrow in the dark, leading § There simply wasn’t enough money.

him to approve the allocation of seventy-five THE EMERGENCE OF thousand Palestinian pounds in Istanbul and

Geneva for special projects. This sum, which was NEW POSSIBILITIES put at his disposal before he left for Turkey, came = The period between spring and early summer from three sources: the JAE, the Histadrut, and —_1943, was characterized by expectations that acthe Mobilization Fund. Thisamount wasinaddi- — companied the convening of the Bermuda Contion to the ten thousand Palestinian pounds that —_ ference. Attempts to carry out the other rescue reached the emissaries each month for funding plans—the rescue of children,* the ransom plan,

their ongoing activities.” and the secret cooperation plans—continued Upon his return, Kaplan presented reports _ but resulted in no significant change in the dito the JAE, the Rescue Committee, and his Mapai _ —_—s mensions of the rescue.*®

party. Ben-Gurion heard two reports and was The paucity of results aroused contrasting able to read the minutes of the third. Further- reactions: criticism of the behavior of the Yishuv more, it is also known that he and Kaplan hada __leadership,*” on the one hand, and harsh resignalong conversation in which the latter summed up tion at the hopelessness of the rescue attempts,

his mission to Istanbul. the feeling that the money was being thrown Kaplan expanded on the three sources of —_ away for nothing, on the other. The most striking funding for rescue operations and on aid to Eu- _—_— example of this type of resignation is found in the rope’s Jews, which included the following: previ- previously cited memorandum by Apollinary

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Financing of Rescue Attempts and Assistance

Hartglas, where he states that “despite the vast | vakia demanding many thousands of ‘Pfunds’” sums required for this operation, its resultt—at | and one cannot comply because of insufficient

best—would be extremely limited.” cash.) At that time discussions of the financing pol- Yitzhak Gruenbaum rejected the criticism icy were influenced by the agreement signed be- — and _ explained the emissaries’ pressure not as tween the Rescue Committee and the Mobiliza- _ reflecting failings by the JAE but rather as the re-

tion Fund, which stated that the Mobilization sult ofa feeling that opportunities for rescue had Fund would also be responsible for raising funds _ increased, that “there is .. . a certain collapse in for rescue activity.*? Efforts to raise contributions — the Nazicamp. ...Cracks have opened that were from abroad were redoubled, while the internal —_ previously not visible or nonexistent.” He excriticism of the JAE’s handling of the financing _ plained that the JAE and the Rescue Committee

was renewed. were increasing the funds allocated for rescue.** The Zionist Actions Committee meeting held — Bader and other emissaries did indeed feel that on 18 May 1943 was the scene of sharp criticism. — the network of couriers they established now Bader, in Palestine to alert the leadership and to — made it possible to penetrate almost anywhere in mobilize the support of various institutions, de- _ the occupied areas, and that one should capitalscribed the rescue activities and their chances of __ ize on this.

success, thereby fanning the flames of criticism The criticism and appeals for help were and calling on the JAE to adopt a different way of | aimed directly at Ben-Gurion. (In chapter 5 I thinking in order “to break the mood...thatitis discussed at length the appeal of Schind and Poimpossible to act, that it is impossible to help.”°° meranz to Ben-Gurion on 25 May 1943.°) The The gap was thus revealed yet again between the — emissaries asked him to demand an increase in Yishuv leadership's feeling that everything was be- — the monthly allocations for rescue in view of the ing done to achieve a breakthrough andthe opin- —s newly expanded operational opportunities, the

ion of the Zionist Actions Committee or the __ latter referring primarily to the Europa Plan and Yishuv’s delegation in Istanbul that this was not the establishment of contact with the Jews in Pol-

enough. ish ghettoes through Rudi Scholz. Scholz’s return

David Remez called on the JAE “toappointa — had made them extremely happy (they were unMinister for Rescue Affairs.” Yaakov Zerubavel,a aware that he was a leading Nazi agent). They member of the Po’alei Zion Left, praisedaspeech — asked that the monthly allocations be increased by Ben-Gurion entitled “Reply to the Ruler” (ap- = from ten to twenty-five thousand Palestinian parently delivered at a gathering of the Elected = pounds for each of the next two months. This Assembly on 24 March 1943) that expressed the — increase was intended to support activity in feeling of the people, but he maintained that it | Poland. The Europa Plan would require separate was not followed by action and called for the es- _—_and far greater allocations.

tablishment of a twenty-five million Palestinian Pomeranz and Schind called on BenPound fund. Anshel Reiss, a member of Mapai = Gurion to mobilize “the Diaspora in the free and one of the heads of the Polish communityin —_ countries, starting with the U.S.,” the political Palestine, while sensitive to the JAE’s difficulties _ difficulty involved in transferring funds to the in maneuvering between conflicting needs— — occupied countries notwithstanding. They were mobilization as well as settlement—both of experts in illegal action and knew it was possible which were important, called for more fund- to circumvent prohibitions. They also recomraising activity by world Jewry in order to avoid §= mended that Golda Meir go on a U.S. fundthe situation where “a telegram arrives from Slo- _ raising mission. In the meantime all was ready

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At the Edge of the Abyss

for an operation—only funds were lacking— ready been transferred to Poland and Thereand they asked for these to be made available sienstadt. In the end, the money was not sent from the Yishuv’s resources. Pomeranz and __ because Popescu was late in arriving, and treasSchind were therefore requesting a big increase —_ urer Bader “adapted” the reports and accounts

in the interim funding. in his hands to the situation prevailing there. The important letter from Pomeranz and This minor affair also testifies to the high deSchind reached Palestine in late May or early — gree of freedom of action and flexibility the June. Ben-Gurion was out of the office due toill- | emissaries permitted themselves even toward ness.°> The main response to their appeal was _ their superiors. It also reveals that the emismade by Bader on his way back from Palestine to _saries at times tended to be inexact in their reIstanbul. He had been arrested on the border ports on account of what seemed to them to be between Syria and Turkey for havinginvaliddoc- —_ operational constraints.”*

uments. His letters provide a comprehensive pic- Fourth, according to Bader’s reports, it apture of his contacts in Palestine, his authoriza- _ pears that the Histadrut also had no clear undertions and instructions, working methods in _ standing regarding its participation in the fundPalestine and Istanbul, and something of the re- ing of operations. Some of the JAE’s sharpest sources he brought with him. Here I shall focus _ critics came from that quarter, including David

on funding. Remez, Golda Meir, and Meir Ya’ari. NonetheFirst, Bader carried with him explicit au- _ less, the Histadrut also was beset by internal fricthorizations from Kaplan, Sharett, and Ben- tion that disrupted the allocation of funds.*?

Gurion to use bribes. Other partners in the Fifth, Bader discovered that the convoluted Yishuv’s rescue operations also gave their ap- _ nature of financial sources, the differing ways of proval, including Rescue Committee chairman transferring funds, and their allocation among Gruenbaum and Histadrut leaders: “The idea various initiatives and enterprises resulted in the was that if they want a bribe—pay it,’ wrote __ treasurers losing the ability to keep track of the Bader. He also carried with him a similarly ex- movement of funds. Six months after operations

plicit authorization concerning the Slovakia began in full swing, there were already two acPlan: “Aside from this, 25,000 Palestinian pounds = counting “versions.” According to the first, were approved for the rabbis’ offer, if only it 84,000 Palestinian pounds remained from what

would be relevant.”»” the Yishuv had allocated for rescue until the end

Second, Bader carried not only money but __ of the fiscal year. According to the second, only

apparently also diamonds. | 59,000 Palestinian pounds remained. This disThird, from documents containing calcu- crepancy made Kaplan unwilling to increase lations sent by Bader to Istanbul, itappearsthat |= monthly allocations.

Schind saved some of the money sent to the Sixth, among the operations for which funds emissaries there in order to deposit it in the had been allocated, there were bribe payments hands of the courier Popescu, who was due to __ destined to advance the Slovakia Plan, money for return from a mission in Poland and There- __ various expenditures by the operation centers in sienstadt and to embark on a new mission. The Istanbul and Geneva, the dispatch of food parcels

emissaries reported with great excitement to the occupied areas and Russia, and the purabout these developments and anticipated chase of ships for transporting immigrants. Popescu’s imminent arrival. Not wishing this | What clearly emerges from all this is that in June sum to be used to fund other operations, they 1943 the JAE allocated funds both for the “big” decided to tell Palestine that the money had al- and “small” rescues.”

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RITUALS OF BLAME Despite the difficulty of finding new ways of Despite the commitment Bader carried with responding to criticism, Gruenbaum and others him, there was insufficient coverage even forthe tried to confront it. For example, Gruenbaum, required interim funding. Nor did Kaplan see — who had arrived late at the meeting, claimed that any reason to retreat from the usual policyofnot despite the real fear of losing money allocated for “exempting” potential partners from their re- — the Europa Plan, he had nevertheless decided to sponsibility to fund rescue operations. Conse- _ take the risk and try to save Jews. The problem quently, in the face of every conceivable financial —_ was not a reluctance to take risks by allocating

demand, his initial response was always: “I funds for a dubious plan but rather the simple haven't any.” This continued to arouse anger and _fact that there wasn’t sufficient money. Gruenamazement among several of the second- and —_ baum explained that efforts to obtain additional third-rank members in the Yishuvleadershipand —= monies by expanding the circle of those bearing

often among the emissaries as well. the financial burden was no simple matter. AtIn a tense session of the Zionist Actions tempts at roping in the JDC “were faltering a Committee held on 24 June 1943, the pattern of at- little,’ and it appeared that at best the JDC would tack and defense recurred. Ben-Gurion listened be prepared to contribute one Palestinian pound without comment, apart froma pleanottoattack for every pound put up by the Zionist movement Gruenbaum in his absence. Again Anshel Reiss —_ and the Yishuv.® Nor were efforts by the JAE to

led the attack. He complained that the emissaries raise contributions from among Egyptian Jews had been sent away empty-handed and pointedto — and those of South Africa meeting with success.® the leadership’s failure to respond to Bader’s re- _— Difficulties also arose regarding fund-raising in quests on his last visit, as well as tolettersby other —— Palestine.St Notwithstanding these setbacks, the

emissaries. He described lost opportunities re- | JAE transferred limited funds to Istanbul but garding the “large” and “small” rescue plans! and —_ could not transfer more because “we have none.” referred to the repeated rejection of an advance _—It was suggested that Reiss and Neustadt remem-

payment on account of the ransom demanded by __ ber that they were not alone in their pain, that Wisliceny. It is doubtful whether Reiss had any “others also feel the same pain and remember... knowledge of the replies received by Bader or _ the same things and do all in their power”® to

knew about the resources at his disposal. help the Jews of Europe. In time this criticism became a kind of Dobkin and Kaplan were also roped in to repurification rite needed by the critics, whereas _ buff the criticism. Dobkin called on the Zionist those who were criticized learned to live with it. | Actions Committee to institutionalize fundEven Reiss, who at that time had already gained __ raising and avoid ineffectual discussions, since the standing of “professional critic,” testified that | nobody denied that they had a duty to assist the he knew “that money is not only a question of — Jews of Europe. To gain the ear of the critics, he goodwill. I know that fund-raising is no easy _ surveyed the allocation of funds up to that point. thing... and does not depend solely on the feel- The first decision in early 1943 was to raise ings ... of public officials.” The critics’ sugges- 250,000 Palestinian pounds. Five months later tions that the Yishuv increase its efforts “to ap- —_—-.113,000 Palestinian pounds had already been ex-

peal to those sections of Jewry that are still | pended on aid and rescue. The income until that untapped, who can do something, to the Jews of | stage amounted to 45,000 Palestinian pounds America, of England, of South Africa ... that from the Mobilization Fund and 25,000 Palestinfunds should come from there” sounded increas- _ian pounds from a special allocation by the His-

ingly like hollow statements. tadrut. The Jewish Agency had spent 43,000 108

At the Edge of the Abyss

Palestinian pounds, representing the remainder _ fact that Kaplan, Dobkin, and Gruenbaum fielded of the money from its fund. Now another 45,000 _ the criticism extremely creditably. Kaplan wanted Palestinian pounds had been allocated, and of _ to prevent a limited budgetary debate in a wide this sum 25,000 Palestinian pounds was an ad- _ but binding arena like the Zionist Actions Comvance that apparently would not be returned to _— mittee. He asked the presidium at the meeting to the JAE’s kitty. An additional 25,000 Palestinian “erase from the protocol all the numbers. . . they pounds had been earmarked for Julyand August. — should not be entered in the internal protocol of Dobkin also stressed that “there has not yet —_ the Zionist Actions Committee, but I would point been a financial request with which we have not _ out that we are talking about very important mat-

complied,’ apart from “the Slovakia matter, — ters. And Dobkin threw out a figure of 50,000 which is pending,” and that “there was moneyin _ Palestinian pounds, the other 40,000 not remainIstanbul and Geneva that they were unable tore- —sing in any coffer.”

trieve.” The situation had now changed. New op- Kaplan suggested that the Zionist Actions portunities had arisen that surprised even those | Committee content itself with a general public with guarded expectations. Consequently special |§ announcement that lack of funding would not resources had to be raised. It was agreed that it affect rescue operations and another to the emiswas essential to raise this money, but “itwould be __ saries that they could continue “with fairly wideone of the easiest things to decide that the Jewish — range activity.” Changes in the fund-raising Agency must provide the money”—a statement arrangements and fund activities would be disechoing Kaplan’s and Ben-Gurion’s resolve to —_ cussed ina reduced committee of the Zionist Acprevent various parties from evading responsi- —_ tions Committee “together with the appropriate

bility.° institutions” far removed from the public eye. KAPLAN’S FATIGUE (One can surmise that he was also referring to British as well as other “eyes.”) The Zionist Ac-

Kaplan was exhausted by futile discussion, pre- tions Committee adopted Kaplan’s proposal to dictable criticism, and endless debate. He reiter- transfer the discussion to a reduced committee.” ated that the problem was not one of lack of will | From the critics’ standpoint, too, this round of or even of action: “[W]e knock on every door... talks occurring at the end of June 1943 ended with but this does not depend on us.’ Kaplan a feeble outcry, followed by adoption of the JAE’s proffered what was apparently an administrative position. The most scathing attacks against the reason. The approval of the Jewish Agency’s JAE achieved nothing because the main problem budget and changes in its goals, among other __ was that there wasn’t enough money, period.”! things, begin in the Zionist Actions Committee’s

budget a not in its plenum. Conse- “SOME TRAGIC

; — ; ; , MISUNDERSTANDING”

quently if the Zionist Actions Committee did indeed desire a new appraisal of the budget struc- | There were not many supporters in the Yishuv ture, it had to go to the Budget Committee. _ for the JAE’s declared funding policy. Public critKaplan thus tossed the ball back in the Zionist —_icism continued unabated throughout the sumActions Committee's court and expressed a pref- —s mer of 1943 up to the end of the year. Golda Meir

erence for a “businesslike” discussion with a was one of the leading critics on behalf of Mapai committee that was practical in its approach.® and the Histadrut. At a discussion in the HisIt could be that a sense of weariness resulting — tadrut secretariat she claimed the JAE suffered from the purposeless debates explained Ben- _ from “some tragic misunderstanding” that man-

Gurion’s silence at that meeting, apart from the _ifested itself in an unwillingness to allocate

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monies in the requisite amount for rescue. Her — of 250,000 Palestinian pounds, but their deremarks were certainly aimed at Ben-Gurion, |= mands had been rejected. The emissaries from IsKaplan, and Sharett. Others at that discussion — tanbul had reported that it was possible to rescue, went still further and maintained that the JAE _and it was therefore up to the Yishuv leadership

was exploiting money earmarked for rescue to “to approach this problem with somewhat

advance other objectives. greater largesse than it had done heretofore.” Besides internal criticism, there was also In Suprasky’s evaluation of the previous four general recognition that the JAE members were __ years, there was a great deal of wise hindsight, for pained by the killing of Jews in Europe, and man- until the end of November 1942 he, like his colifest care was taken not to undermine the Jewish _ leagues, did not know for certain what was taking Agency’s standing as the central authority forthe — place in Europe. Furthermore, even when SuJewish people. Even the severest critics under- — prasky was making his remarks, he already knew

stood that the JAE needed help to bear such an that until the summer of 1941 mass exterminaimmense financial burden. In the background __ tion had not taken place. Suprasky was surely unthere lurked the fear that too severe acriticism or aware of the scope of the covert and overt action flagrant an action against the JAE would erode its taken until September 1943, but he knew enough standing in the Yishuv and in the eyes of the out- _to rid himself of the sarcastic tone that pervaded side world. The critics did not wish to weaken the his remarks, for he himself was a member of the JAE’s position with respect to the British, nor did | Rescue Committee, whose development into a they wish to play into the hands of the Revision- —_ body lacking operational ability was, in large

ists or the ultra-Orthodox factions.” measure, due to the functioning and the nature The Zionist Actions Committee continued of the considerations of his fellow members and to be an arena for the expression of sharp criti- | of the social systems they represented. These cism. Yehoshua Suprasky, a right-wing member — words of criticism were not devoid of political of the General Zionists anda member ofthe pre- —_— tendencies and appeals, nor of the constant frussidium of the Rescue Committee, was particu- __ tration that cast its shadow over rescue activities.

larly sarcastic, choosing “Polish Jewry Day” to The emissaries also leveled criticism. Alattack. The Zionist Actions Committee convened — though they represented organizations, parties, to mark the event on 1 September 1943. After | and movements that were part of the mainstream Sharett’s report on his journey to Istanbul and _—Yishuv establishment, they were nevertheless unCairo, Suprasky commented: “I am very pleased _— able to overcome their frustration. Pomeranz,

that after almost four years our friend Shertok Bader, and Schind warned against lost opportu[Sharett] traveled to Istanbul, and that a few nities to save Jews and described the despairing months before that Kaplan traveled to Istanbul, —_ cries emanating from Gizi Fleischmann and the

and they began to take a serious interest in the | working group in Slovakia and elsewhere. The matter, to look for ways to save the Jews of Eu- emissaries announced that what had been transrope.” As a member of the presidium of the Res- _ ferred to them covered only about a third of the cue Committee he knew that the JAEhaddonea advance payment Fleischmann had agreed to little “in matters of rescue,” but on the whole all —_— hand over. They requested “a limited, telegraphic

the “meager” means that had been devoted to —_ power of attorney to act with Moshe [Sharett, rescue was equivalent to “nothing” compared to —_ who was visiting Istanbul] on everything we conthe monies required. In early springhe andother __ sider right."”4

members of the Zionist Actions Committee’s When it became clear what had, in fact, been budget committee had demanded an allocation known from the outset, namely, that the Yishuv

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could not cover the ransom sums on its own, __ ters written by Shaul Meirov-Avigur from IstanBen-Gurion and Kaplan turned to the Jewish bul in May 1943: “I cannot detail here the procecommunity in South Africa. Sharett had also —_ dural _techniques—arrangements, guarantees,

been authorized to make decisions on the spot, etc.—but in spite of all the arrangements that and he did intervene, issuing directives on allthe | can be made and that I made, they are obviously

problematic items on the agenda. However, tied to the losses that could be incurred. Here Sharett’s presence in Turkey could not alter the there is no wise counsel.” They did not know to fact that the requirements outweighed the JAE’s —_ what extent the Jewish Agency’s financial risk in

funding capabilities. Europe had been increased. At the same time, it BEN-GURION FACES HIS CRITICS is possible that most activists in groups like the Mapai Center were already aware of the kinds of Ben-Gurion broke his relative silence and boldly —_ action undertaken there, and that the policy was

confronted the criticism at the Mapai Centeron to examine every possibility of rescue. They ap24 August 1943. He vigorously rejected the claim parently did not know that Ben-Gurion and Kathat the JAE was not doing its job with respect —_ plan had allowed the emissaries to invest money to the rescue issue. Once again his tendency was _ _ in rather overambitious attempts.”

not to allow other groups in the Yishuv and the At that discussion the same sharp criticism Jewish people to evade their responsibility and _—_ of the JAE’s financing policy was again voiced. to salve their consciences by pointing anaccusing — Haft and Reiss were once more among the chief

finger at the JAE, which, without their help, critics. This time Ben-Gurion confronted them would not have been capable of even beginning — with trenchant remarks, as did Kaplan. Bento confront the horror of the extermination. Ben- Gurion distinguished between the overall reGurion reiterated that responsibility for the res- sponsibility of the Jews in the free world for the cue of the Jews of Europe lay with all the Jewish = Jews of Europe and what was, in his eyes, the dual

people in the free world. responsibility of the Yishuv: responsibility for the Earlier Venja Pomeranz had presented to _fate of the Jews of Europe and responsibility for Mapai a report detailing the activity of the emis- — the consolidation and establishment of what saries in Istanbul, including the possibilities for | would ensure that such an anomalous situation rescue and their needs, as wellas the expectations | would not recur. The nonpopulist essence of his of Europe’s Jews for help from the Yishuv and remarks was to define the room for compromise world Jewry. Pomeranz reported on successful _— that existed between these two functions. It attempts to infiltrate into Poland and to send __ should be stressed that, according to his concepmoney and parcels. According to him, the Jewish __ tion, they were liable to come at the expense of community in Slovakia was the focus of assis- — each other in the short term. In the long term tance to Poland, but Slovakia itself stood at the they were two sides of the same historic endeavor. edge of the abyss and was only saved by “golden Some of Ben-Gurion’s forceful remarks were blood” preventing the spilling of “red blood.” _ reminiscent of the earlier discussion held in FebPomeranz stressed the importance of bribes asa —_ ruary 1943. Here, too, the principle that reality means of saving Jews and reiterated his demand __ was stronger than any declared policy was manito increase the interim funding from the Yishuv’s_ _ fest, and the declaration would have to be judged

finances. in the light of events. Here is how Ben-Gurion It is quite feasible that most of his listeners at defined his policy in the summer of 1943: the JAE that Mapai meeting had not been exposed toin- —_—- would participate in the funding of any plan havformation of the sort included in one of the let- —_— ing to do with the immigration of Jews; monies

1

Financing of Rescue Attempts and Assistance

for this would be found in the JAE budget. Other — from a simple calculation of the cost of the two

rescue operations, ransom plans, or “small res- | ransom plans and the plan to rescue children. cue” and its spin-offs were not included in the —_ There was practical logic behind the demand that

JAE’s direct sphere of responsibility. Conse- the JAE direct its efforts to raising money from quently the JAE would try to raise money for _Jews in other countries, or from rich Jews in the their funding from extrabudgetarysourcesinside | Yishuv. Ben-Gurion maintained that the JAE

and outside the Yishuv. was, in fact, doing this even though it did not Ben-Gurion emphasized that it was morally have “overall Israeli authority over the Israeli incumbent on the Yishuv to inspire the Jews in wallet, or over all Jewish affairs.” Organizations Europe and to give them hope. He said that the — suchas the World Jewish Congress, the American Yishuv emissaries were giving tangible expres- | Jewish Congress, the JDC, and other organizasion to the saying “AllIsraelis provide foronean- —_ tions were not subject to JAE control. Benother.” Moreover, their moral mission had a dual Gurion and his colleagues were, in fact, soon import: it was their duty both to encourage the |= compelled to abandon the expectation of being Jews in Europe and to rouse the Yishuv public _able to dictate their policy to these organizations. from its indifference. There was additional moral It is worth quoting the penetrating remarks value in the very fact of “being a fighting Jew,’ an | Ben-Gurion chose during such a tense period. important symbol both to the Jews of the Yishuv — The Jewish Agency was “the all-Jewish organizaand those in Europe, which “redeemsthesenseof tion for the building up of Eretz Israel.” The min-

insignificance” and “incompetence.” Ontheprac- _ gling of concepts and functions would not be tical side, the Yishuv had to increase the mobili- —_ effective in terms of the activities to which it was zation of soldiers to the British army as wellasits | assigned, according to its definition, nor for rescontribution to the general struggle against the — cue: “I do not wish to say what is more imporNazis, which meant bringing victory and rescue _ tant, to build Eretz Israel or to rescue a single Jew

closer. from Zagreb. And it may be that at times it is

The Yishuv had taken and was taking addi- —§ more important to save one child from Zagreb, tional measures. The day before there had been _ but they are two different things, and this jum“a meeting of the secretariat where they discussed __ bling. . .to whom is this beneficial [and] why this with greater practicality the questions on the — confusion of concepts?” The JA must do “all that agenda in light of the report of Moshe [Sharett, _is required to rescue Jews through immigration

who had returned from Istanbul].” Within a to Palestine.” This is what it must be concerned week an additional meeting would be held with with; this is its function and this is what it is dothe aim of “examining aid and counseling we are _— ing. .. . |[T]o save one more Jew, to do something able to give.” The Yishuv leadership must “con- __ to prevent deportation, this is very important—

sider this agenda a second and third time, clarify | perhaps even more important than running a to what extent we may intensify—and we can un- school in Palestine or other things that are doubtedly intensify—the material and moralaid | done—but... for this there must be other orto those who are there.” The Yishuv anditslead- —_ ganizations and other funds.”

ership have to “wake up” and “examine anew the Is Ben-Gurion speaking here in all innoefforts of aid and rescue,” how to increase “popu- _ cence? Are we to understand his words according lar participation” and awaken “humane Jewish _ to their plain meaning? It seems to me that Ben-

solidarity.” Gurion was trying to break the vicious circle of The demand that the JAE allocate all the accusations and self-recrimination of Haft and monies from its budget was futile. Thisisobvious _ Reiss through the use of provocation, whose ob-

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At the Edge of the Abyss

jective was to force other organizations into It appears that what guided Ben-Gurion and financing rescue operations, for only by this Kaplan and fed their readiness to stand firm means would it have been possible to allocate against inimical public opinion was the desire—

large sums to these operations. the necessity—to do everything possible to harIn the summer of 1943 Ben-Gurion was well ness all available resources for immediate rescue aware that the decisive issues were the possibility | operations, on the one hand, and to build the inof rescue and the availability of funding, not de- frastructure for the rehabilitation of the Jewish bates about what kind of rescue operation would __ people after the holocaust, on the other. Benwin funding or who and where the money would — Gurion and his colleagues believed that the two come from. Even when announcing, duringthat — goals were inextricably intertwined. The hands of tense meeting, what the JAE would not fund, the Yishuv leadership were, to a large extent, tied, Ben-Gurion abandoned his reservations and al- — with no power to enforce. Consequently the most in the same breath said that “material aid” |= main weapon ofa leader like Ben-Gurion was the to Europe’s Jews had to be increased. Ben-Gurion creation of an artificial vacuum in the funding knew very well that the emissaries, the next link | anda firm announcement that the only way to fill in the Yishuv’s chain of action, did not distin- that vacuum was through external funding and guish between different forms of rescue and did _ not from Jewish Agency resources. It might thus not prefer one kind over another. When the op- _ be possible to exert pressure on Jewish circles in-

portunity presented itself, they unhesitatingly side and outside of Palestine, who preferred to

provided assistance. evade personal responsibility by laying the latter Moreover, the entire system did not function _at the feet of the Zionist movement and various solely in accordance with resolutions adopted by _‘Yishuv institutions, which did not have the abilthe JAE, Mapai, or any other body. It was a very __ ity to supply the required amounts of money. complex system that reacted to a myriad of smaller If one takes into account the sums involved, units and responded to deeper motivations, not one could say that Ben-Gurion and Kaplan were always being guided by declarations or decisions. indeed tight-fisted, but only in order to exert Neither Kaplan nor Sharett observed these restric- public pressure on the wealthy Jews with private tions when they reached Istanbul.” At the end of capital and on other Jewish organizations. Their 1944, when Ben-Gurion made a dramatic visit to “stinginess” was therefore carefully considered Bulgaria, he ignored all the restrictions he had so —_and required great spiritual strength. One tends

heatedly advocated at that meeting. to scrutinize self-justifying utterances of leaders Latter-day researchers tended to interpret by pointing out discrepancies between these and these remarks in two different ways.Somesawin _ their actions, yet here we have the cruel statethem an expression of introversion, alienation,a | ments of a leader that do not correspond to his sign of Ben-Gurion’s opaqueness and that of — actions, which were not at all cruel. And what those who shared his outlook, which in the re- _ does this discrepancy reveal? It appears that this searchers’ opinion narrowly focusedontheneeds __ leadership took a moral stand, namely, absolute of Palestine and the Zionist movement. Others concentration on the ultimate goal rescuing Jews

were impressed by Ben-Gurion’s, Kaplan’s,andat regardless of how that leadership might be times even Gruenbaum’s capacity forendurance viewed.’ in the face of criticism and pressure, the con- Thus, a number of actions were undertaken scious and unconscious demands “to beexempt” — overseas and especially at home. These peaked from responsibility by pointing an accusing — in “the month of solidarity with the Diaspora”

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Financing of Rescue Attempts and Assistance

during which the intention was to collect ary or February allocations will probably dry up 250,000 Palestinian pounds. After considerable — completely.” Bader, the emissaries’ treasurer in organizational effort, the goal was not attained _Istanbul, was again sent to Palestine “to prevent and it was necessary to continue to apply pres- _— disaster and disgrace.” He requested that the sure until the sum was obtained. Among these _ budget for rescue operations be institutionalized efforts was Gruenbaum’s trip to South Africa —_ and wished to partake in the fund-raising activ-

and Ben-Gurion’s appeal for aid from South __ities.6 He organized at-home fund-raising Africa’s Jews, in which he asked them to con- drives, with Ben-Gurion present at the most imtribute their share in funding the ransom that __ portant of these,®° but this campaign did not

Wisliceny was extorting in Slovakia.” bring about a tangible change in the scope of the At the end of October Ben-Gurion resigned —_ funding. from his post on the JAE, precipitating a crisis that continued until the beginning of 1944.°° Re- At the end of 1943, earlier tendencies resurfaced. lations with the British had become strained, the _ First, the argument over fund-raising methods was result of searches for weapons and the confronta- renewed: Should there be a separate fund for rescue tion at Ramat Hakovesh.*! The emissaries hope or a continuation of the joint fund? The controthat a concerted effort would result in a large __versy intensified after experts of the fund estimated fund to finance rescue operations, thereby spar- _ that its monthly income during 1944 would not exing them the necessity of constantly pointing to _ceed fifty thousand Palestinian pounds.*

wasted opportunities, were dashed. They were Second, the question of the desired format again compelled to call for increased allocations, for distributing funds between the JDC and the and in October 1943 Barlas came to Palestine and JAE was again debated. In the end the immediate demanded “at least” forty thousand Palestinian needs proved decisive. Ben-Gurion tried but

pounds per month.*? failed to establish guidelines for the delegation of Before absenting himself from the JAE ses- tasks between the two organizations. He himself sions, Ben-Gurion participated in a debate on — adopted a more flexible pattern of action. For exBarlas’s demand. The extent of the Yishuv’s aid ample, toward the end of 1943 the issue of aid to was discussed, together with a description of the — Jewish refugees in Italy surfaced. Several mem“interim funding” system, whereby advance pay- _ bers of the JAE suggested leaving the care of the ments were made that would probably never be __ refugees to the JDC “because our financial rereimbursed to the JAE. There were differences of sources are limited,” but Ben-Gurion maintained opinion over the extent to which aid could bein- that “Jews are suffering and we must extend aid creased. Ben-Gurion suggested that Kaplan and immediately. Obviously we shall approach the Gruenbaum work out an agreed-upon proposal JDC, but until they respond we must supply help and bring it before the JAE for approval. Barlas’s of some kind.”®”

pressure resulted in an increase in the monthly Third, it is patently clear that the JAE supallocation by the Mobilization Fund of from ten _ ported all types of rescue according to its ability

to fifteen thousand Palestinian pounds for a and available opportunities. Its decision to fund

three-month period.® only rescue operations whose ultimate purpose This was a third of what Barlashadhopedto — was immigration to Palestine remained so only obtain, particularly at a time when a feverish — on paper. The only practical purpose was to atfund-raising campaign was taking place in the __ tract donors from different circles and organizaYishuv. His failure filled Barlas with doubts and _ tions, and to motivate them to contribute to the led him to make a gloomy prediction: “In Janu- _ types of rescue the JAE had announced it would

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At the Edge of the Abyss

not support. Final proof of this may be found in —smanded an explanation as to why they were not the reports of the emissaries issued toward the — following JAE guidelines. Ben-Gurion’s only end of 1943. Barlas and Bader reported on a series question concerned not the actual violation of of far-reaching activities, and no one within the —_JAE decisions but whether the recipients of the JAE, including Ben-Gurion, blocked them or de- _aid knew that it came from Palestine.*

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11

Financing Aid and Rescue Activity in Liberated Europe B’ 1944 Ben-Gurion, Kaplan, Gruenbaum, __ tional 50,000 for special occasions), nor were

and, to a lesser extent, othersinthe JAE were — they appeased by Kaplan’s commitment that the highly experienced. They had long faced an al- = JAE would find interim funding when the need most constant barrage of criticism over thefund- —_ arose. Public pressure in Palestine continued and ing of aid and rescue missions for Europe’s Jews. | was even fanned by testimonies from refugees. In response to public pressure, they adopted a _Crriticism also raged following the occupation of position designed to meet two pressing needs si- | Hungary and the raising of the slaughterer’s knife multaneously: (1) to ensure that rescue and aid _— over a big Jewish community that until then had opportunities should not be missed throughlack been spared the fate of Jewish communities in of funding, and (2) to frustrate the tendency of —_ neighboring countries.

Jews in Palestine to sidestep their obligations by Nor did the solutions suggested reflect saddling the Jewish Agency with full responsibil- —_ significant innovations. It was proposed to in-

ity for funding. crease the monthly allocation of the Mobilization This maneuver drew fire and was frequently = Fund, or to hold a onetime fund-raising caminterpreted as reluctance onthe partoftheJAEto _ paign to raise large sums placed at the disposal of provide funding. Both Ben-Gurion and Kaplan __ rescue activists.! Tense debates, crises, and even did not hesitate to perform a thankless task and __ the resignation of Gruenbaum (not solely beadhered—at least verbally—to the principlethat cause of the funding issue) resulted in an addiJAE funds would only be used for interim fund- _ tional project to raise funds for rescue.’ ing would be allocated only after all other sources While the Yishuv was still preparing the new had been tapped unsuccessfully. Not only did project, which was named “Yishuv to the Rescue,” Ben-Gurion maneuver between the two poles,he — the German army invaded Hungary (19 March also actively sought to enlarge the circle of part- 1944). It was now necessary to start thinking of ners in financing rescue activity and attempted, —_ rescuing Jews from “the great center of Jewry,” both overtly and covertly, to mobilize partnersin which is how Ben-Gurion described Hungary a

Palestine and abroad. few days after the invasion, as well as from the “INSTRUCTIONS ARE CLEAR: Ballaan states.” _. DO NOT HESITATE” How did the new situation atfect Ben-

Gurion and Kaplan’s financing policy? BenBen-Gurion was absent from the JAE for two of | Gurion saw in the Nazi invasion of Hungary the the first three months of 1944, when the progress —_ portent of a new disaster, and asserted that action discerned in 1943 continued. The 1944 budget would have to be taken on three planes: political, followed the regular pattern of proposal, debate, — organizational,° and financial. He did not enter

criticism, and approval, and once again the res- into detail as to what needed to be done to cue was not funded from the current budget. The _ finance the requisite operations, contenting him-

emissaries reiterated their demand that the JAE self with stating that “financial aid must be inshould increase the allocations for aid and res- _creased.”6 cue. They were not satisfied with the sum allo- What he said very briefly at the JAE meeting cated (100,000 Palestinian pounds and an addi- _he had expanded upon several days earlier at a

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Financing of Rescue Attempts and Assistance

meeting with representatives of Hungarian payments,” which, for all intents and purposes, Jewry: more money had to be sent to Hungary _ were allocations and not interim funding. Thus, “because the nation is not totally poisoned, and __ the JAE allocated 200,000 Palestinian pounds by sometimes things can be done with money.” This __ the end of June, knowing that 70,000 would not expressed Ben-Gurion’s own departure from his —_ be reimbursed from any source.!°

and Kaplan’s “rules,” one of which stated that The centralized fund-raising effort in the there would be no funding for bribes. He had _ spring and summer of 1944 did not substantially reaffirmed those “rules” in August 1943 at the ease the financial burden, which still weighed Mapai Center,’ which illustrates how Ben- — unbearably on the JAE. Nevertheless, the policy Gurion and Kaplan sidestepped their own “pro- —_ remained the same: interim funding with the hibitions” and “permissions” and applied them _ proviso that only a portion would be returned. whenever it suited their current operational § The Palestinian emissaries knew that the JAE

needs. would do all in its power to ensure that rescue

Two weeks later the JAE held a debate in _ projects were not foiled by funding constraints. which Ben-Gurion issued a vague directive on Some of them could not take the public pressure the need to increase allocations foraidandrescue and even “leaked” this directive, which was typdue the deteriorating situation in central Europe. __ ical of those emanating from Jerusalem. For exThe participants were undecided asto whetherto = ample, in April 1944 the normally very discreet wait for donations to be collected from the spe- = Shaul Meirov-Avigur told members of the Hiscial “Yishuv to the Rescue” fund-raising drive or — tadrut Executive Committee: “Instructions are to once again allocate interim funding from the __ clear: do not hesitate. This is not official . . . but JAE budget pending the arrival of pledged cash. —- you are not to hesitate to undertake financial Gruenbaum and others wanted to proceed and §commitments where there exists a chance for proposed authorizing Kaplan to allocate an ad- rescue. I hope they are encouraged by successful vance of 100,000 Palestinian pounds for rescue — attempts. . .. We may be facing a large financial

operations, in particular for the purchase or leas- commitment.”!! To remove any lingering ing of ships. People from the Mobilization Fund —_ doubts, Meirov emphasized that “our friends in anticipated receiving large sums ofmoney, which Istanbul must know that the Yishuv stands bewould cover the new advance as well as the previ- hind them, as does the Mobilization and Rescue

ous ones. The JAE adopted Gruenbaum’s pro- _- Fund, and that there should be no hesitation posal in the spirit of Ben-Gurion’s stance two __ over fresh commitments, where there are real

weeks earlier.® chances at rescue. Clearly, considerations are The fund-raisers’ hopes were dashed. Once __ difficult, and there are reasonable chances of losagain it became apparent that even comprehen- _inga great deal of money, but as we have learned, sive and concentrated fund-raising did not meet — wecan hope for reward.'”

the massive requirements, and interim funding If the Yishuv possessed “reliable couriers from the JAE budget was turned into “bad debts.” abroad” —here Meirov hinted at the untrustworThe fund-raisers had hoped to raise 250,000 to __ thiness of the couriers the Palestinians were com300,000 Palestinian pounds, but by late May the _ pelled to use—“our results could have been more “Yishuv to the Rescue” coffers contained only __ significant.” Meirov also revealed that the Yishuv 130,000. After extending the fund-raising drive | was unreserved in offering money for the pur-

into the summer months, the sum approached chase of ships, “which seemed to others to be the 200,000 mark.’ Donations did not cover all — outrageous.”!3 All the while Ben-Gurion and Kaneeds and the JAE continued to make “advance _ plan maintained a facade of tightfistedness.

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CHANGES RESULTING FROM wagonload of goods in return for every wag-

BRAND’S ARRIVAL onload of medicine, clothing, and food sent to Eichmann’s ransom offer brought about acom- _ the ghettos and camps.!®

plete change in the budgetary debates on deploy- The agreement was dispatched mainly to ment for the rescue of Hungary’s Jews. !4It was —_ prevent a break in communications with Eichclear that the rescue of hundreds of thousands of |= mann as a result of tardiness in replying to his

people also entailed money for food, transport, | proposal. Nevertheless, the emissaries tried to

escorts, travel passes, and so forth. confine themselves to commitments within their The first JAE debate on the proposal brought reach. For example, they did not promise trucks by Brand from Eichmann made no mention of —_ and gave sums in Swiss francs, the currency most where the ransom money would come from. The — convenient for them at the time. It is almost cerfunding question was clearly not the first obsta- _—_—‘ tain that they took into consideration the poscle to be overcome. It was also common knowl- __ sibility that the draft of the agreement would deedge that the Yishuv would be unable to bear __ viate from its intended purpose—to prevent a such a burden, either in goods orincash. Norwas _ break in communications—and would form the mention made ofthe role assigned bythe Nazisto basis for practical discussions. They apparently

the Yishuv, namely, mobilizing the financial | assumed that interim funding from Palestine forces of the entire Jewish nation to produce ran- = would enable them to meet their financial com-

som payments. Only Sharett made an indirect §mitments. reference to the issue of funding when he raised At the June 1944 session, Gruenbaum menthe question the superpowers would surely ask: — tioned for the first time the sum Barlas was What was to be done with so many Jewsandhow __ requesting for the rescue of Hungary’s Jews, were they to be fed?!5 Nor did the issue of fund- —_ namely, halfa million Palestinian pounds (about ing arise during the JAE’s discussion after Ben- — two million dollars). This indicates that the emis-

Gurion’s and Sharett’s meeting with the high saries did, in fact, ask Jerusalem for financial commissioner!*—ostensibly for the same rea- _ backing for their commitments. The sum Gruen-

son.!” baum mentioned could not have been considEvidence of discussions about budgeting the — ered adequate to cover the huge ransom payrescue in Hungary emerge from Gruenbaum’sre- —= ments demanded by Eichmann, and it is possible

marks at a meeting of the JAE on 4 June 1944. It that Barlas was requesting funding in the event

may be that the dispatch of the first interim that the Nazis approved the first interim agreeagreement was what impelled Gruenbaum to — ment, in which case there would be an immediaddress the issue of funding. The agreement sent ate need for money for initial operations.

by the Yishuv emissaries in Turkey explicitly The JAE listened to Gruenbaum’s remarks mentioned “tariffs.” It was agreed that the Nazis __ but did not discuss them. The discussion quickly would receive four hundred dollars (theyhadde- —_ shifted to another subject, one connected to fund-

manded five hundred) for every Jew permittedto raising: the confrontation with the Revisionists, immigrate to Palestine, or one hundred dollars — which resulted in reduced contributions to the for every Jew permitted to immigrate toaneutral | Mobilization Fund. There are no indications in country. In return for immediate cessation ofde- the meeting’s protocol that the JAE addressed portations, the Nazis would receive one million _ Barlas’s request. It seems abundantly clear that his Swiss francs and an additional million every request was far in excess of the JAE’s limited budmonth for not renewing deportations. Another _ getary capacity. It may also be the case that such item in the draft agreement promised the Nazisa _ issues were not discussed in the JAE plenum.’

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Financing of Rescue Attempts and Assistance

In the minutes of JAE meetings prior to the AID POLICY IN THE end of the Brand affair, no mention is made of LIBERATED AREAS any discussion devoted to funding the ransom Things changed toward the end of 1944 and the demanded by Eichmann. Nor is there any trace —_war’s end. As Europe was gradually being liberof summations by Moshe Sharett, Joe Schwartz — ated and it became possible to reach these areas

(the JDC representative), and Ira Hirschmann with relative ease, the immediate danger to the (the War Refugee Board representative) on set- _ lives of the surviving Jews seemed to dissipate ting upalargefundto payransom moneytothe | somewhat. Consequently, the question arose as Nazis. Eichmann’s proposal was presented to to whether it would not be more appropriate for Kaplan in Palestine and subsequently discussed — the Zionist movement to concentrate solely on in Istanbul, but itis completely absent from the funding immigration. In the final analysis, this protocol entries of JAE meetings in Jerusalem.2° — danger, which perhaps was lessening to some The proposal Brand brought did not lead —_ degree, is what had dissuaded Ben-Gurion and to a comprehensive rescue operation for Hun- _shis colleagues from implementing their declared gary s Jews or other Jews surviving in Europe. policy and had caused them to allocate “Zionist”

It is possible that the vast monetary expense, monies for “non-Zionist” goals (although it coupled with the ransom plan itself and its var- _—_ should be stressed that almost from its inception

ious offshoots, would have doomed the effort — the Zionist movement had been involved in the to failure. The matter was not looked into at all lives of Jewish communities, which was then because political, military, and logistical obsta- termed “present work”). cles took precedence over the financial hurdle Nevertheless, the Zionist movement and the and prevented any real discussion of it. It was = Yishuv could not restrict themselves solely to acnot the problem of funding that put an end to __ tivities on behalf of immigration for various reathe suggestion to absorb the Jews of Hungary sons. First, following liberation the distress of in camps under the protection of the Interna- Europe’s Jews was great. Certainly there were no tional Red Cross or the Swiss government by __ longer any forced labor camps, systematic extermeans of international funding or funding mination, and death marches, but the scars of the from American Jewry. The efforts of the Yishuv, | war were very marked among the few survivors, the Zionist movement, and the other Jewish —_and the danger of death from cold, hunger, and bodies in the free world were focused on first —— disease had still not passed. After the Kielce poovercoming political and logistical difficulties. | groms and similar incidents in other parts of Eu-

This fact is clearly reflected in Yishuv docu- rope,” it became clear that even the danger of

mentation.?! murder had not entirely disappeared. The Jewish Thus, until the summer of 1944 the policyof | Agency and the Zionist movement could not reBen-Gurion and Kaplan for funding rescue activ- = main indifferent to these phenomena or assign ity remained unchanged: the Yishuv would allo- responsibility to local authorities or non-Zionist cate money to the best of its ability, would try to —_ Jewish organizations.

find other contributors among the Jewish people, Second, the situation became confused beand would conserve the meager budget of the — cause of competition among the various organiJewish Agency as the last “iron ration” to finance —_zations over the few survivors. Everyone realized the discrepancy between monies raised and pro- _ that this struggle would decide the future image

tection against possible harm resulting from of Yishuv society—including the leaders of that

these shortfalls. society—when refugees from Europe were inte-

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grated, as many hoped they would be. It wasavi- —_ This necessity was eventually translated into allotal struggle for political supremacy. The general _—_ cations of money.

assumption was that an immigration certificate, Many Jews clung to the idea of emancipation a food parcel, shoes, or medicine were items of even after the holocaust, wishing to perpetuate great “ideological significance” in view of the — Jewish life among the gentiles. Support for the

miserable state of the survivors. idea of rehabilitating Jewish life in Europe was It was clear that if the Jewish Agency didnot — widespread among Jews as well as non-Jews.

assume responsibility in Europe as the largest | Members of the various underground moveofficial, centralized organization of the national |§ ments—and even ministers in exiled governJewish movement, non-Zionist organizations ments— wanted Jews to return to their homes, and movements that had other plans for the sur- = which would project a more humane image of vivors would fill the power vacuum. There was __ their society’s actions. Several European statesalso another discouraging scenariointheformof = men and economists were interested in the spe-

Zionist splinter groups that functioned inde- cial contributions of Jews to economic activity pendently of the national umbrella organization. | during postwar reconstruction.

The precedent of a splintered Jewish representa- The fourth, very important reason that tion at the Evian Conference (July 1938), experi- | prompted the Jewish Agency to organize Euences from the previous three years with the Res- —_— rope’s surviving Jews and to place itself at their

cue Committee, tension surrounding relationsin head was what Ben-Gurion termed the “Red Pathe Palestine office in Istanbul—all these sig- per,’ namely, the danger of Jews being imprisnaled the pressing need for the Jewish Agency to = oned in Europe under Communist rule. This fear establish a strong central presence in Europe. of the Communist version of western emancipaBen-Gurion’s visits to the survivors after the — tion prompted a race against time that impelled war; Bulgaria (November—December 1944); the the Zionist leadership to organize the Jews to flee DP camps and Germany (October 1945, January— ——_~while it was still possible, before the fate of the

February 1946); his attempts to unify the youth =§Jews in countries that Stalin was about to swallow

groups within the framework of Nocham — up would become that of the Jews of Russia: iso(United Pioneering Youth)—all expressed his __ lation, the uprooting of all Jewish life, and the fear of fragmentation and his desire to meld the —_ constant shadow of official anti-Semitism.

conflicting forces into one central source of The liberation of many Jews from the horstrength under his leadership and undertheum- rors of nazism did not reduce the heavy financial

brella organization of Mapai. burden of the JAE. It is possible to assert that even Third, active concern about the concept of | now there was a discernible gap between the repatriation became rife toward the end of 1944. — JAE’s declared funding policy and the policy ac-

This involved a tendency to distinguish between tually implemented. Decisions did not always a humanitarian solution to the Jewish refugee stand the test of reality, and reality repeatedly problem and the Zionist movement’s struggle to raised problems that had not been discussed. establish a Jewish state in Palestine. It was clear | Ben-Gurion reserved a degree of operational that Britain would encourage such a distinction. | freedom for himself and used political and huIt did not require a particularly keen political | manitarian reasons, either consciously or unconsense in order to notice this and to understand _sciously, to explain his divergence from the fundthat the Zionist movement had to increase the ing rules he and his chief colleagues had laid presence of its emissaries in the liberated areas. | down.

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ROMANIA and Smyrna arriving shortly thereafter, and perThroughout 1943 attempts were made to rescue _ haps within a few days they would set out with Jews from Transnistria and to bring them backto immigrants. Among other things, they stressed safer places in Romania proper. The Yishuvemis- _ that “the lack of money was beginning to make itsaries also worked to bring to Palestine those Jews _ self felt” and noted that they urgently required who were already in Romania proper, particu- _ five hundred thousand Swiss francs.” larly after the Transnistria Plan had been leaked Venja Pomeranz, who was visiting Palestine to the press. The Romanian government had to _at that time, and Shaul Meirov-Avigur savagely agree to such a plan and the Nazis hadtoturna attacked the JAE. They described the numerous blind eye; also, “safe conduct” had to be guaran- _ possibilities of immigration, noting that four teed by the Soviets before the very prosaic mat- | thousand Jews who were waiting in Romania

ters of ships, transport within Turkey, transit | could be brought over if money were found. permits, and money could even be considered. | Pomeranz and Meirov talked about wasting The financial burden this operation placed on “Zionist credit” and ignoring “the shining Zionthe Yishuv was heavy, especially the cost of trans- ist role,’ which would “diminish the Jewish port, and here, too, the pattern was repeated: the = Agency’s Zionist role in this world and the next,” JAE sent to its people advance payment in the = among other topics.

hope of retrieving a small part of it. This was af- Intense debates were held in various ter it had forced every other possible body to par-_ _—_— branches of the Histadrut. Some of the speakers

ticipate in funding. Natural partners in this en- threatened the JAE by announcing their intenterprise were the political parties, movements, — tion to circumvent it. In the end it was decided and organizations in Palestine; Jews in various __ that the Histadrut would help the Mobilization communities throughout the free world; andes- —- Fund finish its fund-raising drive from the previ-

pecially the JDC. ous spring and would use its contacts to involve The JAE took charge of this operation and _Jews abroad.*4 A Histadrut delegation conferred was required to allocate money from the Yishuv with Kaplan and categorically demanded that he budget, and not when “it arrived” or when “we — immediately allocate 250,000 Palestinian pounds have it” but forthwith. Simultaneously, through- _to transport four thousand people and a similar out 1944 it continued to fend off criticism that it sum for another four thousand.* The Histadrut was working too slowly and inefficiently and for = was an important factor in the rescue debate, the impression it gave of being averse to funding —_ both on account of its great ideological commitvital rescue operations not of direct concern to ment to the fate of the Jews and because of its

Palestine—thereby forcing others to supply — conspicuous readiness to allocate monies for

funds in its stead. funding the rescue.

As more and more countries were liberated, The Rescue Committee, with Gruenbaum at the number of Jews who could be reached, taken its head, also veered between criticism and adcare of, and possibly brought to Palestine grew. |§ mission that the JAE was playing its part. Its Thus, in early summer 1944 the Palestine office in members knew that the JAE had recently alloIstanbul wrote to the JAE, the Rescue Committee, cated 180,000 Palestinian pounds, and a week and heads of the illegal immigration operation. later they even acknowledged that the Rescue While describing confusion surrounding the | Committee already owed the JAE about 300,000 Brand affair, it also pointed to some success re- _— Palestinian pounds. Still, members of the Rescue

garding Jewish immigration from Romania: The | Committee continued to level criticism at the Kazbek had arrived in Constanta, with the Bulbul | JAE and even threatened to borrow money from

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the Anglo-Palestine Bank (APB). And because __ the funds apparently not having been utilized be-

the committee depended on the JAE, it would cause of routine upheavals in the aid and rescue

thereby increase the latter’s debts.”® processes. Among those leveling criticism now was At the conclusion of the meeting it was deShaul Meirov-Avigur. Having only afew months _ cided that the JAE would make its usual anearlier explained to the members of the secre- | nouncement, namely, that in the interim it would tariat at the Histadrut Executive Committee the | assume responsibility for funding the first part rationale behind the Jewish Agency’s behavior, involving the transport of four thousand people. he now joined the fray. His earlier remarks about = The difference between Ben-Gurion and Kaplan not letting lack of funds prevent them from car- became evident at the decision stage. Benrying out rescue operations, to which the Jewish Gurion said that “we must cable our friends in Agency gave its full backing, nowhauntedhimas Istanbul that we are underwriting the necessary

he, too, succumbed to despair. funds, up to a ceiling of 250,000 Palestinian Ben-Gurion and Kaplan were united in fac- = pounds for bringing 4,000 people.” Kaplan intering the onslaught of criticism, both adopting the = rupted Ben-Gurion to propose a more cautious same stance: to give as good as they got; to hurl formulation that did not mention sums. “The blame back at those who were not doing their fair JAE authorizes Gruenbaum and Kaplan to comshare. Only after realizing that its provocative po- —s mit to the sums required for the immigration of sition had run its course and was no longer effec- = 4,000 people.” Ben-Gurion agreed to Kaplan’s tive in raising money was the JAE prepared toal- = wording with one proviso: “If this is not suffi-

locate money from its budget. cient, we shall hold an emergency session to reNevertheless, by the middle of June 1944 cer- discuss the matter.”2”

tain differences between Ben-Gurion and Kaplan The JAE decisions guided Kaplan during his became apparent, perhaps for the first time. Ata visit to Istanbul, and he conferred with people in JAE session Kaplan described the varioustypesof the Palestine office and local JDC representatives

pressure applied by the Histadrut, the Rescue — to determine the extent of funding. He also Committee, and the emissaries. These demands —_ worked out a basic agreement with the JDC, retotaled 500,000 Palestinian pounds intwo equal = quiring approval from Jerusalem and New York.

amounts, designed to finance the immigrationof It mainly centered upon funding for the first eight thousand people. Kaplan said that the JAE — wave of immigrants in the plan to transport Rohad allocated an advance of over 200,000 Pales- mania’s Jews (about three thousand people). The

tinian pounds over the past three months and, JDC agreed to bear the brunt of the burden. One according to accounts, about half that amount — ofthe paragraphs in the agreement saved the JAE had not been used. Schind had reported on the —_a lot of money: the JDC would transfer its part in allocation of funds that had, in fact, not been — Swiss francs (from the United States or directly used, fearing that the treasury was not transfer- —_— from Switzerland), whereas the JAE would pay its ring to him other allocated funds and mistakenly share in Palestinian pounds according to the relbelieving that the postponed use ofthe funds was _atively low rate of exchange instead of the black only temporary. In June 1943 Bader corrected his —s market rate.

accounts and supplied Schind with a defense. Kaplan maintained that the agreement The correction prompted Kaplan and his people —— proved that the JAE’s funding policy was to examine more closely the utilization of the —_ justified. Despite all the criticism, “the immigrabudget. They discovered that the nonutilization tion of even a single person had not been delayed of allocated funds was a recurring phenomenon, __ through lack or absence of money when it was

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needed.”’8 Until Kaplan managed to obtain JDC the aid immediately and must appeal to backing, the JAE supplied its usual “safety net” = whichever side can help us right now.... We for the various aid and rescue operations by as- — must appeal directly to the Russian government suring their funding. While still in Istanbul Ka- —_and the Polish [National] Liberation Committee, plan announced that there was an allocation of at — which today controls . . . the liberated areas,” to least 35,000 Palestinian pounds for July to safe- | permit a JAE emissary entry into Poland to help

guard rescue operations until outside funding the surviving Jews. Ben-Gurion also sought was obtained. This was the usual pattern.?° material aid from the United States and Britain Immediately upon his return, Kaplan first for Poland’s Jews, who were to be transferred reported to Ben-Gurion and Gruenbaum on his _along routes to be opened by the JAE as a result of activity in Istanbul, and then to the JAE andthe _its contacts with the Soviet government. He sugRescue Committee. The wealth of details and gested asking the Soviet representatives in Cairo their complexity necessitated an in-depth discus- | and London to support the agency’s appeal. The sion, as did the complicated relations between JAE adopted Ben-Gurion’s plan.

the Jewish Agency and the JDC. The JAE con- In August and September 1944 the Jewish sequently appointed a four members subcom- _— Agency followed Ben-Gurion’s lead. Dr. Emil mittee consisting of Ben-Gurion, Gruenbaum, Sommerstein, a member of the Polish National Shapira, and Kaplan, and entrusted it with the —_ Liberation Committee, contacted the JAE and task of examining Kaplan’s decisions in Istanbul = asked for emergency aid in the form of food,

one by one.*? clothing, medicine, and welfare workers. He rePOLAND ceived a prompt reply from the JAE, which re-

quested details of the aid required. Kaplan

The aid provided to the Jews of Poland in the __ stressed that “everything must be done to prosummer months of 1944 even more strikingly il- vide assistance as soon as possible.” Sommerstein lustrates Ben-Gurion’s tendency to depart from __ cabled Palestine the kinds of aid needed for tens his and Kaplan’s funding policy. The Polish Na- of thousands of refugees (in actual fact there

tional Liberation Committee called on the weren't that many refugees). The JAE adopted Yishuv for help, and Ben-Gurion and his col- — Ben-Gurion’s proposal of putting Kaplan and leagues understood the humanitarian and politi- © Gruenbaum in charge of organizing an aid cal repercussions implicit in this appeal: estab- = program..!

lishing contact with an organization subject to BULGARIA Soviet control and, through it, with the Soviet

authorities themselves; dispatching emissariesto | Ben-Gurion’svisit to Bulgaria provides an excellent areas that heretofore had been impossible toen- — example of his and Kaplan’s flexible funding politer on account of the Nazi presenceand werenow ___ cies as the war was drawing to a close. Ben-Gurion

off limits because of a Soviet prohibition. visited Bulgaria during late November and early In one particular JAE debate, Ben-Gurion |= December 1944. He had hoped to make it to Rodeviated from many of his own constraints re- mania, where the greatest number of Jewish surgarding aid to refugees and rejected every pro- —_—vivors were concentrated, but Britain influenced posal whose ultimate effect was to procrastinate, the Russians to forbid such a visit and he had to be make conditions, or jeopardize opportunities for | content with a weeklong visit to Bulgaria.”

rescuing Jews. He rejected suggestions to wait for Ben-Gurion arrived in Bulgaria during a a more favorable atmosphere to contact the Rus- _ transition between a monarchical and a Comsians: “We don’t have the time, we must extend =§munist regime, which was just beginning to es-

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tablish itself. He saw the sorry state of the local the same picture, children about to die, a Jews and sensed their tremendous thirst for con- terrible thing. I tried to speak to them, tact with other Jews in the free world, the Yishuv, but I was ashamed. Those who were with and the Zionist movement, with Ben-Gurion me spoke Bulgarian. We were all dressed. himself regarded as “the king of the Jews.” Ben- I saw they were insulted—why have you Gurion became aware of the ideological vacuum come to see us’—people on the verge of and the desperate need for leadership. He also total despair, such a terrible thing.*°

noticed how the Jewish Communists dominated _—

the community, its institutions, and migration Ben-Gurion summed up his description with the trends. Although there was much suffering in ev- words “atrocity, shame, abyss. . horror. "In the idence, Ben-Gurion knew that the Bulgarian Jews restrained emotional world surrounding Benwere actually much better off than other Jews in Gurion, such SAP ressions testify to a profound Europe. He therefore regarded the suffering of shock. The visits to Yotch-Bonar and other places Jews in other parts of Europe proportionately. gave Ben-Gurion a concentrated overview of the Emotionally it was an extremely intense situation of the surviving Jews in Europe. The visit. One of the most memorable incidents was need for aid from Palestine was brought home to Ben-Gurion’s visit to the slum district of Yotch- im directly and sharp ly. Upon his return, he Bonar in Sofia. His diary entries and his reports told the JAE:

upon returning home were especially powerful: What I witnessed in Bulgaria applies equally to all the Jews of Europe, but I

I was in four rooms. In the first I found shall confine my remarks to those 45 only one family; the father was in the thousand. We must extend immediate army, the wife receives 500 leva per aid, particularly to the children. I am month, from which rent is deducted—in sure that the great majority of the chilour money that is less than 20 grush— dren will die from cold, disease, lack two naked, barefoot children, she also of food, and medicine. There is no medbarefoot, she cannot go outside, the chil- icine in Bulgaria; we have to provide dren cannot go to school. I entered the assistance. There is tremendous danger second room: two families, a healthy in the matter of aid. There are the Jewwoman, her husband is a butcher, she ish Communist authorities, who can also apparently from a butcher's stock; a cause us to lose those Jews who survived

second woman, pale, suckling a child, physically.35 pregnant, with two more pale children,

terrible to look at, thin. J am sure those Ben-Gurion wasted no time. He demanded imchildren will not survive more than a mediate aid and made sure it was supplied. The month, six weeks, barefoot, all of them best type of assistance, in Ben-Gurion’s view, was barefoot, dressed in rags, nothing in the to organize the Jews of Bulgaria for immediate room besides two beds, and two families immigration to Palestine. Yet he knew that mass live in it. In the third room: four families, immigration was not practical; not all Jews lots of children, all of them pale, the mark wished to immigrate and, in any case, even if all

of death on their foreheads; two men the permits were obtained, there were only some among them, one old and paralyzed and ten thousand immigration certificates on record a young crazy one, all in the same room. and the number of valid certificates was even In the fourth room: three or four families, smaller.

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These obstacles prompted Ben-Gurion to cause of restrictions imposed by the Bulgarian differentiate between short-term andlong-term authorities plus transportation problems. Of aid. While still in Bulgaria, he had set about ar- _ the total permits allocated, 200 were designated ranging for emergency aid and continued this _ for children from poor neighborhoods, 150 for effort upon his return to Palestine. Immediately children already on the waiting list whose after the visit to Yotch-Bonar, theJDC complied certificates had arrived, and 100 for children with Ben-Gurion’s request and supplied cloth- from provincial towns. In instructions to meming and footwear.** He instructed the Zionist bers of the Bulgarian Zionist Federation he reitleaders in Bulgaria and the local Yishuv emis- __ erated the urgency of caring for the children:

saries to obtain the appropriate permits in orderwill i, , Pree P nae The Zionist and Hechalutz centers to receive assistance from the Yishuv. Whiletostill , ,poverty, ; ; ; pay very special attention the on his way home, Ben-Gurion received news in ,

, strickentrade children of Sofiaminisand elsewhere, Istanbul thatsy Bulgaria’s and finance ,, will take care of them, will look after

ters. had agreed to permit the entry of shipments , i, , , their health, their affinity with the Jewish containing clothes, shoes, and medicine for the ; , people, their Hebrew education, and, Jews of Bulgaria. In response, Ben-Gurion made re , « above all, their immigration to Palestine, the we following note to himself: “To announce — from . . ysand ; because bringing over Jewish youth quantities expedite delivery.’3”? Upon his , to ; . ; ; infancy to army age as soon as possible arrival in Palestine, he gave instructions to oi, . , , Palestine is the vital and urgent duty arrange for the shipment of five thousand pairs - J,of

. ; _ Bulgaria's Jews and the world Zionist . , movement.°?

of children’s shoes, medicine, and soap. A few days later he requested confirmation that this

had been done, and in a letter to Ehud Avriel, | Upon his return, Ben-Gurion tried to impress one of his escorts in Bulgaria, he asked ifhisin- upon his colleagues the enormity of the distress. structions had been carried out andif the ship- _ His instructions touched not only upon the allement of shoes had arrived. More aid was sent __ viation of physical suffering but also on reinforc-

later.38 ing Jewish and Hebrew education in Bulgaria. On From Ben-Gurion’s point of view, acceler-_ _— his way back, he instructed Israel Goldin, a mem-

ated immigration to Palestine, especially of chil- ber of the Palestine Office in Istanbul, to send out

dren, was included in the emergency aid. In a school textbooks.”

meeting summing up his visit to the Yotch- Once back home, Ben-Gurion issued inBonar neighborhood, Ben-Gurion instructed structions to allocate a certain sum for the exemissaries Avriel and Pomeranz to “organize pansion of the Hebrew education system and for groups of youngsters for immigration, include _aid to teachers of Hebrew and Jewish subjects.*! in the groups large numbers of the poor chil- —_—_ He repeated instructions to send textbooks, Hedren—organize a study of the children, includ- — brew journals, and newspapers “to generate ening photographs, descriptions of their condi- _—_ ergy and resources for teaching Hebrew to Jewish

tion—so they can be brought to Palestine ex youngsters, and to fend off schemes of assimilagratia.” Three days later, in Bulgaria, Ben- tion that were being forced upon Bulgaria's Jews, Gurion decided to allocate to children 450 ofthe —_ particularly on the younger generation.””

1,000 remaining immigration certificates from The funding requirements dictated by realprevious allocations and place them at the dis- _ ity were insurmountable. The Jewish Agency posal of Bulgaria’s Zionist Federation. The per- —_— was not content with funding the rescue of Jews

mits had not yet been taken advantage of be- from Europe and did not leave the funding of

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other essential activities to Jewish and interna- _ tions as long as its leaders were convinced of the tional charity organizations. Ben-Gurion him- _ impossibility of awaiting funding from another self was one of the first to override the rules he — source. There was a combination here of huhimself had been primarily responsible for lay- = manitarian concern coupled with external poing down. In Bulgaria, asin Poland, Greece, and _litical considerations and internal governmenother places, the JAE financed essential opera- _ tal considerations.

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12

The Jewish Agency Budget and Fund-raising Appeals in Palestine THE JEWISH AGENCY BUDGET THE 1943 BUDGET Three budgets (1943, 1944, and 1945) were de- The need to finance wide-ranging rescue operabated and approved in the JAE and the Zionist —_ tions descended on the leadership when the budActions Committee between news of the exter- — get proposal for 1943 was already prepared. Like mination in Europe and the end of the war. Ben- —_— every budget proposal, it was the result of presGurion and Kaplan did their best to ensure that —_ sure exerted by various interest groups within the

aid and rescue operations of all kinds were —_Yishuv, which naturally represented specific ecofunded by the JAE only when no other alternative nomic and social strata, as well as political and was available; they approved direct monetary al- —_ ideological concepts.

locations from the agency budget only when it How did the public outcry and emotional became clear that all the other possibilities had upheaval affect the budget? How was the latter been exhausted, and that there wasareal danger _—_ shaped by the political input of pressure groups,

that rescue or aid would be thwarted through _interested parties, and sealed commitments? Was lack of funds. This policy exposed them to criti- — the budget framework altered? At the time it was

cism from various quarters. a question of immense sums in comparison to The JAE was a coalition organization that the size of the Jewish Agency budget. Did the critreflected the delicate and complex socialand po- _ics suggest reducing or abolishing ministries or litical composition of the Zionist movement and _activities in their own backyards? To what extent the Yishuv. Its activity was voluntary. Conse- did Ben-Gurion and Kaplan manage to control quently, Ben-Gurion and Kaplan wereextremely the Jewish Agency budgetary discussions? Let me vulnerable to criticism, andit might be assumed __ state categorically that the harsh criticism barely that the result would have beena changein pol- _ affected the order of priorities. The critics did not icy, a change in the order of the JAE’s priorities. | volunteer to trim their own domains. The de facto split in Mapai in 1942 severely un- On 13 December 1942, following news of the dermined Ben-Gurion’s political base, and in the extermination, the first JAE discussion on the spring of 1944 it even ended with the official 1943 budget was held. There was no manifest tensplitting up of the party. Ben-Gurion was there- —_ dency to introduce a basic change in the profore very vulnerable from a political standpoint — posed budget, which had already been drawn up. and, as a result, ostensibly open to compromises.._ For example, at the time the JAE members were Under the circumstances, one might have as- ___ deliberating how to fund the rescue of children, sumed that he would not have adhered to a __ but this did not affect the budgetary discussions “tough” policy, nor try to draw fire upon him- __ themselves. Ben-Gurion felt it was necessary to

self, and would also have “retreated” on the allocate money to the Planning Committee in funding policy. On examining the political situ- charge of coordinating Zionist activities after the ation of the JAE under Ben-Gurion and Mapai, — war. Others raised routine requirements of one one might have expected those who leveled crit- sort or another. Only Dobkin remarked that it icism at the funding policy to have succeeded in was necessary to add twenty thousand Palestin-

changing it. ian pounds for immigration; he may have been

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Financing of Rescue Attempts and Assistance

hinting at the budgetary repercussions following |= summary of the meeting of the amount of rethe sad tidings from Europe, althoughthesumhe ___ serves to be devoted to aid and rescue, the budgmentioned was far from what was required. Ben- _ etary priority of rescuing children was stressed.”

Gurion proposed that any reservations about the From Ben-Gurion’s and Kaplan’s point of budgetary structure should be addressed to the __- view, pressure from the Budget Committee was Budget Committee of the Zionist Actions Com- _ desirable. If the current budget had to be used,

mittee.! they preferred that the request be made by a “parThe Budget Committee was a controlling = liamentary” committee of the Zionist Actions and supervisory body. It examined and approved |= Committee, consisting of representatives of all Kaplan’s budget proposal. It also noted having __ the parties, rather than a directive from the two “heard the [Jewish] Agency treasurer’sannounce- _ leaders. They would thereby not be a party to po-

ment concerning its willingness to financetheim- tential budgetary conflicts, or would at least be migration of children from the Diaspora and to — supported by the Budget Committee in forcing fund this activity with necessary resources, inad- ___ the JAE to relinquish some of its own budget. dition to sums raised from other sources.” The | Ben-Gurion or Kaplan many also have been Budget Committee demanded a change in the __ called in to mediate between the critics’ demands, budget’s structure to underscore this commit- — the committee’s guidelines, and the JAE’s stipula-

ment. tions on behalf of its departments.

There were two possibilities: set aside 250,000 The JAE did not vote on the Budget ComPalestinian pounds for immigrant youngsters in = mittee’s proposals. In the end, both bodies anthe 1943 budget, or leave a fifth of the budget in nounced that the JAE would assume financial rereserve for this goal, inasmuch as it was needed. _ sponsibility for rescuing children from Europe. The proposal to set aside a quarter of a million The budget itself, which did not reflect this comPalestinian pounds was retracted after Kaplan mitment, was a compromise based on the fact explained that the numbers of children and ac- _ that the plan was not yet in operation (for the tual costs of the rescue were still unknown.It was = most part it remained on paper for some time therefore decided to assign 20 percent of the — afterward); it acknowledged the JAE’s commitbudget to the rescue of children, which was to ment without mentioning specific sums, until serve as a reserve for interim funding, to be such time that it became clear whether the plan drawn from various Jewish Agency departments —_ was practicable.’

as the need arose. There was a danger of outside The Budget Committee held further disfunding not being available and the allocation cussions when the budget was being shaped, not returning to the agency coffers. Reluctant to —_ and here again the criticism proved sterile. Sevhave its freedom of action restricted, the JAE was eral committee members wished to examine the consequently unwilling to assign a fifth of itsde- —_ possibility of tailoring the structure of the partmental budgets to another cause. Kaplanwas budget to the new situation. They suggested asquick to explain that this would involve only “a _ _ signing special clauses to rescue, or at least re-

number of departments.” ducing expenditure in other areas and increasBen-Gurion was well informed regarding ing aid to the Diaspora. In addition, some the proposal to designate a fifth ofthe JAE budget |= members felt it was worth trying to implement as interim funding for aid and rescue, and it ap- _—srrescue plans even if “there is no assurance of pears that he and Kaplan had discussed it before = money reaching its destination.” However, it the meeting. He defended the decision against its was also acknowledged that the JAE could not critics. Although no mention was made in the __ shoulder the entire burden, and that other part-

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The Jewish Agency Budget and Fund-raising Appeals in Palestine

ners must be found. It was also claimed that it Kaplan’s original proposal for the “regular” would be difficult to reopen budgetary debates 1944 budget resembled the regular 1943 budget in at such a late stage because irreversible commit- _ scope, totaling 1 million Palestinian pounds. Folments were involved. The JAE insisted that it | lowing pressure to increase the allocation in a could allocate only twenty-five thousand Pales- | number of areas, the regular budget was slightly tinian pounds to aid and rescue activity fromits increased and stood at 1.1 million Palestinian

1943 budget.4 pounds. Together with the additional “special” Nor did the criticism leveled by the Zionist | budget, which depended upon future income,

Actions Committee on 18 January 1943 lead to __ the Jewish Agency’s budget for that year totaled any change in the budget. Apparently the com- — some 2.1 million Palestinian pounds. The budmittee realized that the JAE was not allocating _ get’s inner division also reflected continued sup-

large sums because it was still not certain that port for standard items like housing, settlement, lack of funding was the main obstacle to carrying defense, immigrant integration, and religious

out planned operations. The Zionist Actions affairs.’ Committee almost certainly understood that It took about five months to examine and funding the plans would greatly exceed the Jew- = approve the budget. As always, the JAE tried to ish Agency’s financial capacity. The criticism was = preserve—and perhaps even increase—the therefore only a manifestation of frustration and — budgets ofits own divisions. There were the usual pain rather than representing real pressure for | demands for settlement, industry and finance, change.° In the end, a budget of 1,150,000 Pales- agricultural and maritime enterprises, and the tinian pounds was approved, based on the previ- |= merchant fleet. Funding had to be found for sol-

ously determined framework.° diers as well as for various religious and educaTHE 1944 BUDGET tional organizations.’ Kaplan and Ben-Gurion

were evidently not the only ones who believed in The JAE’s debates concerning its1944 budget, be- _ the necessity of developing an economic and soginning in late 1943 and ending with the budget’s _ cial infrastructure for statehood.

approval in March 1944, were characterized by an Many of those demanding an increase in the almost unanimous agreement that the budget _aid and rescue allocation in the Jewish Agency's would follow the same pattern as its predecessor budget were inconsistent, veering between “the and would not allocate large sums to aidandres- —- Yishuv’s needs” and those of the “Diaspora.” For

cue. There was the usual struggle over depart- | example, Rabbi Leib Yehuda Fishman-Maimon, mental budgets and the interests of the various —_ head of the Department of Commerce, Industry, groups represented by the JAE. Here, too, there and Labor, claimed that the “JAE budget for 1944 was a noticeable disparity between remarksmade — could not feasibly exclude a rescue clause,” while in the JAE and other bodies at the beginning of —_ hastening to pin his hopes on the Budget Comthe year and what was said at the time ofthe bud- — mittee of the Zionist Actions Committee pressurget’s approval in March. Several ofthe budgetary __ ing the JAE into correcting the omission.?

clauses remained vague despite repeated requests Rescue Committee chairman and JAE memfor clarification. These could have constituted — ber Yitzhak Gruenbaum also tended to veer bea budgetary reserve held by Kaplan and Ben- __ tweenthetwo poles. After asserting that additional

Gurion for maneuvering between various re- _ aid and rescue funding had to come from the quirements, especially aid and rescue activityin budget itself,!° he later adopted Kaplan’s approach, Europe. In any event, Ben-Gurion did not partic- | welcomed his support, and accepted his promises

ipate in the 1944 budgetary discussions. that rescue operations would be unaffected even

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if no obvious funding was set aside for it in the — was also approved for miscellaneous items. All budget.!! Gruenbaum linked his January 1944 res- these were substantial additions from the standignation from the Rescue Committee to the issue —_ point of the JAE budget itself, but they fell far of funding. But the resignation did not influence — short of meeting rescue needs.!5 Melekh Neuthe distribution of funds and Gruenbaum did not stadt, Moshe Kolodny, and other critics of the repeat his demand to increase rescue fundingfrom § JAE not bound by positions in the Jewish Agency

the Jewish Agency’s budget.!2 also failed to enlist public pressure to alter the Eliyahu Dobkin, the most consistent of the | budgetary structure.!®

JAE’s faultfinders, was also unsuccessful. He Public criticism was thus not productive called to avoid making any differentiation be- —_ during 1943 either, once the public had been extween “the needs of Palestine and the Diaspora,” —_ posed, in one way or another, to information on because the rescue of Jews was a prime Zionist — the murders and the possibility of rescuing Jews. objective. He proposed adapting the budget “to —_ This could simply be explained by the fact that the immense change in immigration trends over __ the JAE’s budget was mostly earmarked for non-

previous months,” immigration that far ex- rescindable actions. Only minor alterations to ceeded expectations (only two thousand); deteri- — the budget were possible. Ben-Gurion and Kaoration in the employment and housing situa- _ plan sought to obtain the rest of the money from tion as a result of the need to integrate Jewish — extrabudgetary sources in Palestine and outside

deserters from General Wladyslaw Anders’s it. Far-reaching structural changes in the budget army; poverty of the immigrants from Europeor might lead to the cancellation of plans for settlethose coming from Teheran or Yemen. Dobkin _ ment, security, the economy and industry, social pointed out that “immigration offices are in- — welfare and education. Even if there was some volved in rescue” and demanded an increase of _ logic in taking sucha drastic step—highly doubtforty-five thousand Palestinian pounds for im- __ ful in view of the nonfinancial obstacles that migration.!3 He also demanded the establish- _— foiled aid and rescue—it would have necessitated

ment of a fund totaling one million Palestinian a comprehensive and systematic reorganization pounds for any potential rescue opportunities.'4 of the Yishuv’s fragile structure. This could not The Jewish Agency budget for 1943 totaled happen when the leadership lacked the power of 1,150,000 Palestinian pounds, and the proposed — enforcement. In any event, such a process would regular budget proposed for 1944 amounted to ___ clearly have taken considerable time in a volun1,100,000 Palestinian pounds. Anadditional mil- _ tary society that had committed itself to demolion Palestinian pounds budgeted for 1943 was cratic and representative forms of action. It also dependent on income. Dobkin’s request, there- —_ required a solid party base and all that this enfore, was for twice the already substantial in- tailed. The Yishuv leadership lacked the power of

crease, which in practical terms meant an in- enforcement and the political clout required for crease of about 200 percent in direct andindirect | sucha fundamental change.

public fund-raising within the Yishuv and, in Was there any logic in a radical structural part, from world Jewry. This demand was rather and budgetary move at this time? Was such a step unreasonable given the Yishuv’s size at the time. even possible? Not necessarily. Such a move Dobkin succeeded in increasing the Im- —_ could not significantly alter the Yishuv’s ability to migration Department’s budget by twenty-five save the Jews of Europe. Such a mission far exthousand Palestinian pounds. A further ten — ceededits financial capacity. Moreover, the major thousand (in addition to the fifteen thousand) problems involved in the rescue were not finanwas approved for housing, andasmallerincrease __ cial but logistical, military, and political.

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FUNDING AND DELIBERATE ment for obvious reasons.” He may have felt un-

OBSCURITY easy, for in principle Kaplan preferred that Several of the budgetary items were left intention- | checking budgets be done by a public represenally vague, and Kaplan presented them inthe most _ tative: “It must not be to assumed that one man general manner. Even after being questioned re- _—ihas control over large sums.” Yet he still made do peatedly, he did not divulge their full significance. | with mentioning incomes and specific “goals” For example, Kaplan allotted 120,000 Palestinian and “obvious” reasons.?!

pounds for “repaying debts,” and 160,000 Pales- It appears that the budget gave Kaplan and tinian pounds for “political activity.” Werner | Ben-Gurion some leeway to shift allocations to Senator, who questioned several of the compo- _ the Political Department for defense and paying nents in the budget proposal, estimated the alloca- off debts. Kaplan even remarked that “we receive

tion to the Political Department at 250,000 Pales- = monies for special purposes from various tinian pounds, assuming one included thebudgets sources, and as an example I entered an item of of the London and Washington offices. He also. —— 550 thousand Palestinian pounds for this in the voiced a general complaint that the JAEknewvery — expenditure of the nonregular budget”” It may little about the Political Department’s work and —_ be assumed that such patterns of action were not even less about defense matters; the latter’s budget —_—a Zionist invention, and even today they serve dif-

allocations already totaled 400,000 Palestinian ferent governments and organizations.

pounds.!§ At a budgetary meeting held a week A second category of funds supplied anlater, Senator pointed to irregularities, since “the | other means of maneuvering. These consisted of expenditures budget of 1943 includes 423,000 special funds at the disposal of Yishuv heads and Palestinian pounds for political matters,” and ex- _ leaders of the Zionist movement, enabling them pressed astonishment at the absence of detail. Dov —_ to undertake secret operations. Regulations and

Joseph, a member of the Political Department, | common practice allowed them to undertake tried to help but may have “spoiled things” in _ certain activities without reporting them to the clearing up the mystery: “I must reassure Senator official institutions of the Zionist movement. In and say that 60,000 Palestinian pounds is all that = the twenties Chaim Weizmann had a similar

is allocated to the department’s actual activity”! | fund at his disposal, thanks to which he fiIndeed, if only 60,000 Palestinian pounds had _nanced a secret tour of the Ha Shomer people in been designated for the department’s activity, | the Negev. The activities of the Intelligence what was the purpose of the remaining 393,000 ~—=Offfice, an early intelligence service used by

Palestinian pounds? Weizmann, were also funded secretly from this Kaplan’s explanations were very general. fund, as were intelligence operations, rescue, One “reply” consisted of the following counter- — the purchase of ships for illegal immigration, complaint: “The JAE does not find the time to —_and the acquisition of arms during the thirties listen to surveys on economic and financial mat- and forties.”

ters ... having more urgent things to attend The B funds and the obscure nature of some to.... When a discussion does get going, it is | budgetary items were what enabled the JAE to short-tempered, the members being occupied __ provide interim funding for the rescue operaelsewhere altogether.”2° He explained to Senator __ tions. The secret undercover operations of what that there was no deviation from the Political | was termed the “Special Tasks Section in the PoDepartment's original allocation, since, “apart _ litical Department,” which mostly related to res-

from this, we also had specific income for cue, were funded from some type of budget “basspecific goals.” It was only “an accountingarrange- __ ket.” It would appear that this funding originated

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Financing of Rescue Attempts and Assistance

in part in the B funds and in blocked budgetary Whether or not I am correct in assuming

items.”4 that Ben-Gurion participated in shaping the Only one budgetary clause was explicitly budget, it can be asserted that he adhered to the defined as a rescue expenditure: twenty-five policy adopted by himself and Kaplan during thousand Palestinian pounds were designated for 1943, namely, to raise money for funding rescue the immigration of children. A complete copy operations from extrabudgetary sources, and to of the Jewish Agency budget appears to have use funds from the budget only when there was fallen into the hands of the American and British _ no other alternative. Ben-Gurion participated in

intelligence services; a fact the Yishuv leaders the Zionist Actions Committee session that diswere apparently aware of. This is probably the cussed the budget at length and approved it. In reason why it was precisely the plan for rescuing — this debate Ben-Gurion covered a wide range of

children that was mentioned in the budget, political matters?® yet made no reference to the whereas other rescue plans were omitted; for it budget. If he had harbored any misgivings about was the only plan the British adopted and even __ the budget, he would hardly have missed such an discussed in Parliament. Allthe other plans obvi- —_ opportunity to modify it.

ously demanded caution and secrecy. FUND-RAISING WITHIN | Ben-Gurion was absent from JAE budget THE YISHUV

discussions because he was in a state of semiresignation at the time. This, however, doesnot The decision to greatly increase fund-raising signify that he was notinvolvedindrawingupthe ~ efforts both within and outside the Yishuv debudget and setting priorities. It would appear __ rived from Kaplan’s and Ben-Gurion’s stated as that he did assist in its preparation. First, prelim- —_—_-well as unstated policy of minimizing, as far as

inary discussions on such a subject were gener- __ possible, the use of Jewish Agency funds. They ally held far in advance, and he did take part in —_— were afraid that without contributions the Jewish the first discussion. Second, organizations and _Agency’s budget would totally collapse beneath parties generally reach the essential decisions on — the immense burden of funding aid and rescue in

budgetary matters after extensive preparatory Europe. work, most of which takes place beyond the reach The Jewish Agency held fund-raising drives of protocol writers’ pens. Third—and perhaps __ in Palestine and overseas. It utilized the regular most decisive for my argument—it must not be — appeals system, whose role was enlarged to inassumed that Ben-Gurion did not know that he __ clude fund-raising for rescue activity, and it eswould ultimately return to the JAE and have to __ tablished special rescue funds. The Mobilization

“live” with the approved budget. Fund was the main instrument operating in Furthermore, Ben-Gurion was consulted Palestine from July 1942. It was originally deduring his absence and received regular reports signed primarily to support the families of volof JAE meetings. This was established practice, — unteers to the British army, as well as to fund var-

and there is no reason to assume that budgetary ious defense expenditures and training of the matters, which were of decisive importance, were | Haganah. During 1943 its goals were enlarged excluded.*6 At the time Ben-Gurion was deeply — and its name was changed to Mobilization and involved in the activities of the Planning Com- ___ Rescue Fund. Additional funding operations exmittee, which had direct repercussions on the de- isted in the United States, South Africa, Britain, velopment of the budget, and he wrote aletterto | and Egypt. A portion of the monies was transthe JAE on behalf of the committee that was read ferred to Palestine, disguised either as contribu-

aloud during the budgetary debate.?’ tions to the development of Palestine or financial

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The Jewish Agency Budget and Fund-raising Appeals in Palestine

“investments.” Rescue operations were also Mandatory government's reaction. The JAE’s defunded, in part, through “straw companies” and ___ cision to assume responsibility for funding aid by means of money transfers from one company _and rescue operations included the words “when

to another. the time comes we shall announce this publicly,” THE MOBILIZATION FUND hinting at the complication associated with

transferring money into occupied Europe. The The first fund-raising debates wereheldwhenthe _ fear was twofold: first, such transfers were proplan to rescue children was initially broached. _ hibited in wartime; second, it was expected that Spontaneous contributions started flowing in, Britain would attempt to thwart the mass rescue and there was a fear within the Yishuv that one- of Jews to Palestine. A financial deployment that upmanship or unorganized, uncoordinated ac- ___ worried the British was liable to jeopardize contivity would ultimately diminish the size of con- _ tributions, as well as actual cooperation with the tributions. Discussions took place in the Budget _ British, which was essential for the success of the Committee of the Zionist Actions Committee rescue plans. This led to the idea of a secret fundand the JAE. According to Gruenbaum, various _ raising appeal among the wealthy in the Yishuv. fund-raisers had been hampered by the Mobi- —_ They would be invited to intimate secret soirees, lization Fund’s professional staff. He asked the ~— where the Yishuv heads would coax them into JAE to dictate fund-raising policy and to an- __ contributing money.°*°

nounce the creation of a “Child Rescue Fund.” The JAE and National Council promised the Ben-Gurion channeled the discussion to a = Mobilization Fund that this secret fund-raising special subcommittee and rejected Gruenbaum’s _—__ drive would not affect its activities, and that no repeated calls for a Jewish Agency debate onthe —_ proposal would be implemented without its apestablishment of a special child rescue fund. He proval. As reassurance, the JAE allocated an adwas afraid that hasty decisions might lead to —- vance payment of 15,000 Palestinian pounds, as uncontrolled competition among the various _— did the Histadrut. Similar sums were demanded

funds, which would adversely affect overallfund- by other bodies. The fund organizers hoped to raising both from the public sector and private raise between 100,000 and 120,000 Palestinian

organizations within the Yishuv, ultimately pounds.

harming the Mobilization Fund. Nevertheless, a month later the JAE reAnyone with even a superficial knowledge of tracted its support for the organizers of the secret

fund-raising matters inside and outside the appeal, who came from the Rescue Committee, Yishuv knew all about competition among the —_and, bowing under pressure from the Mobilizavarious organizations and the damage it caused. __ tion Fund, decided “to prohibit any kind of fund-

Thus, Gruenbaum understood Ben-Gurion’s raising activity until it became clear whether aversion to his proposal and reconsidered it. He — there was any chance of saving the Jews of the then suggested that he and Kaplan discuss and _ Diaspora.” If it emerged that there was a chance,

formulate a proposal with the Mobilization the function of the Mobilization Fund would be Fund, to be presented to the JAE. Others sup- — amplified to include fund-raising for rescue opported the need for coordination and centralized erations, contingent on there being a possibility fund-raising efforts. Ben-Gurion insisted on of increasing the sums contributed.®!

leaving the issue with the subcommittee, and the Two days after the Rescue Committee was

JAE decided to adopt his position.”? apprised of the JAE’s plans to relieve it of the Aside from his desire to protect the Mobi- secret fund, Kaplan proposed setting up a lization Fund, Ben-Gurion was also afraid of the |= new committee consisting of representatives of

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Financing of Rescue Attempts and Assistance

Mapai, the Histadrut, and the Mobilization it was prepared to exclude the rescue of children. Fund, which would be charged with establishing _It was finally decided to accept the PFF’s proposal the secret fund.*? Apparently the JAE changed its to organize—as part of its 1943 fund-raising—a mind because the Rescue Committee was gradu- _ special, separate fund to aid the Diaspora and the ally developing into a cumbersome body, and _ refugees.*?

was probably too pluralistic for the JAE and Ma- “MAYBE BEN-GURION WILL AGREE

pas “us aspired to be the primary factor in this TO DEVOTE A MONTH OR TWO” In late January the JAEheldacomprehensive | February 1943 was an intensive month for discussion on funding that includedadebateon wrestling with fund-raising issues since several the character of the Yishuv’s rescue fund. Ben- _— operations and rescue plans were up for discusGurion remained silent throughout the debate, — sion. Ben-Gurion was absent from most of the leaving Kaplan to raise the issue. He only chaired § JAE meetings in February. He and Kaplan had rethe debate and summed it up. Inthe course ofthe ceived harsh criticism from the Mapai secretariat debate, he rejected Gruenbaum’s complaint that = on 10 February, when Kaplan’s funding policy the JAE were not acting in accordance with the was attacked and Ben-Gurion’s nonintervention spirit of urgency that emerged from the Zionist in fund-raising activities also drew criticism.

Actions Committee on 18 January 1943. Ben- In rejecting hints that someone had interGurion kept to himself the fact that on 26 No- _ fered with fund-raising efforts, Kaplan apparvember 1942 he had instructed his secretary, Zvi ently also touched on the inconsistency ascribed Maimon, to receive from Dr. Aharon Bart, chair- to the JAE on the matter of the secret fund. Kaman of the Mobilization Fund, a financial state- —_ plan rejected the criticism out of hand, maintain-

ment detailing “total income, where it came __ ing that he had been working to institutionalize from, which people participated ... and distri- _all fund-raising drives and was trying to rope in bution of expenditures.” Presumably he asked for — the PFF and, toa certain extent, the Mobilization data at this early stage, having already begun to _—‘ Fund. He insisted that his suggestion that the PFF

examine the best ways of funding rescue activity. hold a special drive for funding rescue activity

The main thrust of the debate revolved had been ruled out. He had also suggested that around the question of who would manage the __ the Mobilization Fund do this, and this, too, was fund and what its function would be: Woulditbe __rejected.*4

part of the Palestinian Foundation Fund or Kaplan refused to allow the JAE to take would it be a new and special fund? Would it be charge of fund-raising, which would have been used solely for the rescue of children, for refugees | impossible both organizationally and adminisin general, only for Zionists, or for all types of __ tratively. Fund-raising is not a spontaneous, amJews? There was also the fear that AgudatIsraelor ateurish affair, confined to speeches at gatherother bodies might establish separate fundsifno ings, Kaplan declared. It needed experienced

solution proved acceptable to them. personnel, special people, solely devoted to the There was also the formal difficulty of | matter. The JAE’s “triumvirate,” Ben-Gurion, rerouting funds donated to the Jewish Agencyfor | Sharett and himself were not “unemployed.”

building the Yishuv, and legal repercussions in- Kaplan told his fellow party members about volved in proclaiming a fund for an illegal pur- _ his proposal to set up a limited committee—conpose, namely, transferring money to enemy _ sisting of Mapai, the Histadrut, and the Mobilizacountries. While pointing to the danger inherent — tion Fund—whose main job would be to raise in changing the fund’s goals, the PFF stressedthat funds for aid and rescue in Europe. He pointed to

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The Jewish Agency Budget and Fund-raising Appeals in Palestine

a difficulty raised by the Mobilization Fund, similar sums. The estimation was that these connamely, the need to provide positive results from tributions, together with those from wealthy rescue operations. So far there had been no real _— people in the Yishuv, would amount to a hundred achievements. In the meantime, Kaplan followed — thousand Palestinian pounds.*°

Ben-Gurion’s suggestion and asked the Mobiliza- After formulating its position, Mapai raised tion Fund for an undertaking to give—or atleast the subject for debate in the JAE (in Ben-Gurion’s lend—twenty thousand Palestinian pounds to —_ absence). Representatives of the National Councover the fifty thousand needed to purchase ships. cil, the Mobilization Fund, and the Histadrut The matter would require JAE approval, Kaplan ___ were also present. Relations between the fundsaid, since transferring money from the fund was __ raising bodies were clarified,*” and the difficulties

liable to cause it to violate the ban on sending — of the Mobilization Fund and its predictions

money to Axis countries. were presented. Competition remained fierce Various questions were raised regarding § among the various organizations. The monthly fund-raising: Which fund-raiser should be en- —_ sum of 40,000 Palestinian pounds could not be trusted with collecting money for rescue activity? raised, nor did this amount meet all the present Should the various funds be lumped together?3> _—s needs. A onetime secret project to raise between

What would Ben-Gurion’s role be? (Itwasagiven 100,000 and 150,000 Palestinian pounds or a that Ben-Gurion’s contribution to the effort was _ similar fund-raising appeal aimed at the Yishuv’s

crucial.) wealthy would destroy the Mobilization Fund. Ben-Gurion stressed the importance of an = Such contributions would come at the expense of immediate allocation of fifty thousand Palestin- —_ regular contributions. Only a month had elapsed ian pounds to purchase ships to transport chil- since the regular quotas imposed on the workers dren and other refugees, adding that the JAE, the and the employers had been adjusted, and it was Histadrut, and the Mobilization Fund would be __ impossible to increase them now.

responsible for fund-raising. He favored estab- Dr. Aharon Bart, chairman of the appeal’s lishing a single fund and suggested that the func- —_ presidium, was the main speaker on behalf of the

tions of the Mobilization Fund be enlarged. appeal at the meeting. He announced that, deBen-Gurion refused to join the committee of spite the difficulties, the appeal was prepared to three called for by Avraham Haft in addition to —_— put at the disposal of the rescue operations fifteen

the Mobilization Fund. Only Haft and Golda — thousand Palestinian pounds and to consider Meir were elected. Instead, Ben-Gurion agreed — what the JAE had already expended—eight thouto place himself at the disposal of the secret fund — sand and a further fifteen thousand—as a loan

as a “soldier,” intervening when necessary to = on account of the future fund-raising appeal. communicate with the Yishuv’s affluent Jews. | Moreover, if rescue operations were successful Notwithstanding the sharp criticism directed at and extra funding was required, the appeal could Ben-Gurion and Kaplan, in practice the Mapai —_ adopt them, either directly or indirectly.

Secretariat adopted their stand: the Mobilization Bart presented two further conditions: first, Fund would also be put in charge of fund-raising — the sums placed at the JAE’s disposal by the vari-

for rescue, and quotas imposed upon different | ous organizations would be considered loans. If sectors would be increased, as Eliyahu Golomb the fund-raising appeals succeeded and it was had suggested. The Mobilization Fund would _ possible to repay “loans” allocated to the various

immediately transfer twenty-five thousand institutions that had rallied to the cause, there Palestinian pounds for rescue operations, and = would be equality of “debtors” and the loans the Histadrut and Jewish Agency would transfer would be repaid to them all in equal portions.

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(This clearly hinted at the JAE’s wish to give pri- _ plan’s response sounded determined, with a hint ority to institutions close to it, especially the His- — of sarcasm: “And one last word to Gruenbaum. If tadrut.) Also, this proposal required the agree- _—- we reach this conclusion, I suggest you inform ment of the “defense committee” responsible for the Rescue Committee that this is the position of the matter, which the Mobilization Fund was de- __ the responsible institutions, responsible in deeds

signed to serve. and not in words: if they [the people from the

Gruenbaum rejected Bart’s proposals. He |= Rescue Committee] can add their money, let did not wish to precipitate in the Rescue Com- __ them, not merely being content with giving an mittee “an argument over what took precedence _ opinion.”>8 There is a clear hint in his words of the over what—the needs of the Yishuv or the needs _ state of mind that prompted the decision to reof the Diaspora.” One way or another, the Rescue _ store responsibility for managing the secret fund

Committee needed between 100,000 and _ tothe Mobilization Fund and of the influence of 120,000 Palestinian pounds to be spentasthene- = Mapai. cessity arose. The committee had to be able to act, It is worth lingering over the four days that knowing that it had such a sum at its disposal. elapsed between the meeting of the Mapai SecreThe Rescue Committee would not hold inde- _ tariat (Wednesday, 10 February) and that of the pendent fund-raising appeals, which harmedthe JAE (Sunday, 14 February). Kaplan remarked at operations of the Mobilization Fund, unless the the JAE meeting that instructions and a financial committee had 200,000 Palestinian pounds, — powerofattorney had been sent to Barlas the prewhich had to be raised throughout the Yishuv. | vious Thursday (the day after the Mapai SecreGruenbaum doubted the possibility of Agudat __ tariat debate). This is important in that it reflects Israel or the Revisionists contributing money. a set pattern of decision making in the Yishuv Kaplan insisted that fund-raising efforts leadership. A few days before the convening of must be increased, that it was important “to give — the JAE meeting, the operations that were slated those people who wanted action the opportunity for discussionhad already been carried out. If so, to act.” In order to avoid damage caused bynon- ——_ who approved them? The JAE had not convened

coordination, it was desirable to establish alim- | between Wednesday and Thursday. Did Kaplan ited committee of the appeal’s presidium withthe — decide on his own? Did Ben-Gurion and Kaplan addition of partners. The JAE and the fund’s ex- decide to act following pressure within Mapai, ecutive would announce their willingness to pro- —s and after consulting with Golomb and Meirovvide an advance payment at the appeal’s expense —_ Avigur? It would seem that the decision was made

and, like the Histadrut, would not lay down con- in a restricted circle outside the meetings of ditions for allocation. The JAE was uncertain as __ the JAE, following that same “parallel system” to the fate of the money being allocatedto rescue. — discussed in previous chapters. Although BenAlthough the JAE “was shouldering a very heavy Gurion had suspended himself from JAE disburden,” instructions had been sent to Barlas a cussions at that time, in doing so he did not surfew days earlier, together with a power of attor- _ render his real authority, and his central standing ney “to lease a ship, speed up the transport of — in that same “parallel system” proved this to be

children from Bulgaria, waste no time, evenifit the case.

costs 40 Palestinian pounds per child.” Kaplan was very determined. Apparently Kaplan suggested that the basis of participa- he was relying on the support of Ben-Gurion, tion should be twenty-five thousand Palestinian who was absent from the JAE meeting. He clung pounds from each party, the JAE and the Mobi- __ to his demand that all organizations participate lization Fund. As for the Rescue Committee, Ka- _in funding, insisting that the JAE was only a “go-

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The Jewish Agency Budget and Fund-raising Appeals in Palestine

between” where money from the PFF (one of the THE SECRET FUND JAE’s main sources of funding) was concerned. On 23 February 1943 several wealthy members of The PFF took good care of the money, but because — the Yishuv gathered in the home of Eliezer the latter did not belong to the JAE, it couldnotal- | Hoofien, manager of the Anglo-Palestine Bank. ter the money's designated destination. The JAE = Ben-Gurion was often called upon by Mapai to did not have permission to divert money to aid _ involve himself in such activities, and he was inand rescue operations in Europe. The Zionist Ac- | deed the main speaker at the first gathering, tions Committee had already discussed the budget — whose organizers wished to invest it with a very and had not found a way to allocate funds forsuch —— special character. Also invited was Menahem missions. Consequently, aid and rescue had tobe —__ Bader, who was visiting Palestine. Bader was a financed from sources outside the agency budget. _ key Yishuv rescue activist in Istanbul, and apparKaplan laid this obligation at the foot of his crit- ently he was to explain to the donors exactly what

ics—everyone was required to chip in. was being done with their contributions. The Mobilization Fund presidium under- Ben-Gurion and Bader gave lengthy descripstood that Kaplan was unyielding and that a tions of the Jewish situation in Europe, specimore accommodating proposal would not be _fically what could be done to help its Jews and forthcoming. It agreed to establish a coordinat- how much it would cost. They asked for contriing committee consisting of three tosixmembers __ butions from those present and for help in raising drawn from the Mobilization Fund, the Rescue = money from those unable to attend. The follow-

Committee, and the Histadrut. The committee ing day Ben-Gurion informed his colleagues of would try to map out new avenues of fund- __ the previous evening’s success: “Several made onraising that did not compete with the existing —_ the-spot contributions of a thousand Palestinian fund. The Mobilization Fund also agreed to allo- — pounds,” while others promised to raise similar cate twenty-five thousand Palestinian pounds to — sums from among their friends. He wasn’t sure

rescue operations. they could secure the 100,000 Palestinian pounds It was decided that the JAE, the Mobilization — they expected from this quarter, but he asserted Fund and the Histadrut would each contribute __ that “a large portion of it will be raised in the near twenty-five thousand Palestinian pounds, and _future if only those who took it upon themselves

that the total of seventy-five thousand would be — to work will do so. Six months later Benallocated immediately. It was defined as aloan, | Gurion repeated the same approach. and negotiations would subsequently be con- Ben-Gurion heard things in Hoofien’s home ducted concerning repayment terms. Further- that made him doubt the fund-raisers’ ability to more, the coordinating committee was charged ___ reach the financial target they had set themselves.

with determining a fund-raising format for ob- — People complained about their tax burden and taining money from of the Yishuv’s wealthy Jews. were worried that the authorities would raise the Kaplan asked for clarification as to “who income tax even higher. On 18 February 1943 the controlled the money and who was auditing.” — Palestine Post published a report on the MandaRescue Committee chairman Gruenbaum would __ tory government’s intentions to raise the income have signatory power, but the agency treasury tax and impose new taxes. would hold the money and the JAE would decide The day after the meeting Isaac Arditi exon each expenditure as it saw fit until the Rescue _ plained the concerns of the merchants and inCommittee had reached a decision. The agree- ___dustrialists in a letter to Ben-Gurion. The mesment was approved the same day both bythe Mo- _ sage was clear: regular, long-term commitments bilization Fund and the Rescue Committee.*° from this public would have to be part and parcel

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of the economic planning of their businesses. Toward the end of the third month, presEvery ill-considered decision of the Mandatory sure grew to change the agreement and obligate government or the Jewish Agency tocollectmore — the Mobilization Fund to increase its rate of almoney from them was liable to damage the fab- — location to rescue operations. Gruenbaum ric of their businesses, adversely affect their sta- | complained that the Rescue Committee was debility, and, in the final analysis, limit their ability | pendent on the Mobilization Fund. He also

to contribute.*! mentioned misunderstandings between his comWhether Arditi’s letter accurately reflected mittee, the Histadrut, and the fund. The Histhe true position of the Yishuv’s wealthy remains _ tadrut held a special fund-raising day at the beuncertain. In any event, it confirms the veryim- — ginning of May. Gruenbaum hoped the income portant fact that substantial and frequent dona- —- would be applied to the rescue cause. The fund

tions were generally contingent on the overall and the Histadrut thought otherwise, and in the planning of the businesses. Donors could not be — end Dr. Bart informed him that only between expected to abort operations or impede develop- fifty and fifty-five thousand Palestinian pounds ment for the sake of a donation to even the most — would be allocated instead of the promised worthy of causes. There was a certain logic in all — seventy-five thousand.

this: by strengthening the business, donations The incident left bad feelings between the would also increase. A contribution that causeda —__ Histadrut, the Rescue Committee, and the Mobibusiness to go under or damaged it extensively _ lization Fund.** The distress of the mobilized solmight perhaps be larger, but it would probably be _ diers’ families was marked, as was the pressure

a onetime and restricted affair. they placed upon the Yishuv offices. A letter sent Several weeks before the secret meeting in —_ to Ben-Gurion and his colleagues by a member of

Hoofien’s home, Ben-Gurion participated as a the Committee for the Care of Soldiers and “soldier” and fund-raising activist atamorepub- —_ Guards illustrates this. The committee’s finances lic event. He gave the main speech at a gathering —_ were dwindling, it had an accumulated deficit of

organized by the Mobilization Fund on 11 Janu- over four thousand Palestinian pounds, and it ary 1943 in the Ohel Shem Hall in Tel Aviv.” was unable to balance its budget. The need to give

AND RESCUE ; .

BETWEEN MOBILIZATION equal support to the families of soldiers and guards, to supply aid to the parents of mobilized

soldiers who had previously been the main

In spring 1943, following negotiations between — breadwinners, and the high cost of living and the JAE, the Rescue Committee, and the Mobi- mounting expenses—not to mention the suslization Fund, an agreement was reached for en- pension of the Mobilization Fund’s allocation— larging the appeal’s operations and entrusting it forced the committee to adopt three tough deci-

with raising funds for rescue operations. Its sions: “(1) To accept no new cases unless as a name was subsequently changed to Mobilization substitute for cases that were no longer receiving and Rescue Appeal. The agreement detailed the —_ aid. (2) To undertake no new operations or esdivision of the money among the various bodies tablish new institutions for children. (3) To avoid and how it would be collected. The hesitation ac- _—sraising any item on the expenditure budget excompanying the negotiations found expression __ cept for the cost-of-living increment, which, unin the agreement itself. In order to provide an es- fortunately, was not regulated by the committee cape hatch, it was decided that the agreement re- _ but rather in accordance with general policy in main in force for one year and, if necessary, un- __ the Yishuv.” This meant that “several thoroughly

dergo reevaluation in three months.* deserving cases” were deprived of “even the min-

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The Jewish Agency Budget and Fund-raising Appeals in Palestine

imum” degree of assistance. The committee pointed out the possibility of British objections, called for a special session of the JAE and the __ on the pretext that any money collected was desfund’s presidium to discuss the matter.** The Mo- __tined for the Axis countries. Relations between bilization and Rescue Appeal continued to exert the Yishuv and the British authorities were at a similar pressure throughout the period in which _low point and there was even a fear of the latter

it raised funds for the two charities. trying to harm the Haganah organization by CONFLICTING PRESSURES striking at an important source of funding.» ; AND LIMITED RESOURCES | The “Solidarity with the Diaspora Month drive also took place on account of the MobilizaEfforts to stretch resources in opposing direc- — tion Fund’s reduced income. The fund hoped to

tions came both from within and without the take advantage of the public outcry over the situJAE. Even Dobkin, of the Immigration Depart- ation in Europe to replenish its coffers. This tenment, called for changes inthe agreement during dency reawakened the controversy over keeping the first three months of its experimental phase. — fund-raising for rescue operations separate from He demanded an increase in money quotas for fund-raising for all other objectives, specifically rescue operations at the expense of quotastothe the fact that by answering the national call to help Haganah and to the families of mobilized sol- —_ Diaspora Jews, the Yishuv soldiers serving in the diers.*6 Dobkin pointed out that new rescue op- __ British army were part of rescue efforts and that tions in Poland meant that financial needs had __ therefore no separation should be made between multiplied; he was almost certainly alluding to _ the dual objectives of the Mobilization and Reswhat appeared to be a direct link with Poland — cue Fund.

through the couriers Schulz or Popescu. Dobkin The debate centered on the distribution of demanded parity between the sums allocated for | donations between the soldiers and their famiaid rescue and those allocated for the families of lies, on the one hand, and rescue operations, on soldiers. Although he preferred this, as an alter- — the other. The Mobilization Fund collected occanative he suggested separating the two objectives — sional donations and regular pledges from all

and establishing a separate rescue fund.*” sectors of the Yishuv economy. At that time Kaplan vigorously rejected suggestions to al- |= monthly income was about fifty thousand Palester the agreement with the Mobilization Fund, __ tinian pounds, forty thousand of which were alarguing that Dobkin did not understand the Jew- —_— located for “mobilization” and ten thousand for

ish Agency’s complex financial maneuvering. “rescue.” The question remained as to what The facts were plain: the fund failed to meet its | would be done with income from the “Solidarity fund-raising goals.48 Throughout this debate — with the Diaspora Month” drive.

Ben-Gurion remained silent, Kaplan appearing The two schools of thought went as follows: to express his own view and sparing him having __ (1) Every Palestinian pound above the regular to-

to participate in this argument. Ultimately the _ tal (fifty thousand Palestinian pounds), regard-

JAE did not adopt Dobkin’s suggestion.*” less of its source, should be allocated for rescue Two months later another major fund- operations. (2) All funds collected for rescue opraising appeal, to be known as “Solidarity withthe — erations should be used for this purpose; in addi-

Diaspora Month,” was proposed for the Yishuv. _ tion to the regular allocation of ten thousand Ben-Gurion supported the proposal and was in- Palestinian pounds, money collected as a result of volved in the details ofits planningand operation. —_ increased revenues from pledged income should The Mobilization Fund demanded active partici- —_ be used to fund the needs of mobilized soldiers.

pation by the JAE in organizing the newdriveand Obviously the hope was that pledged income

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Financing of Rescue Attempts and Assistance

would increase as a result of the planned public [Yishuv’s] charity foundations. The fact that the

fund-raising campaign. Jews of the Yishuv were heading the rescue effort Kaplan and Sharett favored the secondschool —_is an important Zionist asset, and any Zionist asof thought, while Dobkin preferred the first. No __ set is also an asset to the charity funds.”

agreement was reached in discussions between the This was a further indication of BenMobilization Fund, the National Council, and the Gurion’s basic belief that the Zionist enterprise JAE.>! Kaplan and Sharett were afraidthatthefam- — did not contradict rescue efforts and reinforced ilies representing the Committee for the Care of the hypothesis that when he did distinguish beSoldiers and Guards would carry out their threat = tween the two, it was mainly for tactical purto organize mass demonstrations on behalf ofthe — poses, namely, to force other to participate in recruits. An agreement was eventually reached fund-raising. This was really the main objective and Kaplan asked the JAE to approve it. The idea = of the “Solidarity with the Diaspora Month”

was to hold a month-long fund-raising drive, drive. The JAE did not have to pass judgment on whose objective would be to collect between one __ the needs of soldiers or rescue operations. The

and two hundred thousand Palestinian pounds question was most likely settled behind the and get all those who shouldand couldto paytheir — scenes before the JAE meeting.®> The “month”

fair share based on their ability. would include the Jewish New Year and its attenKaplan hinted that there were people and or- dant celebrations and holy days, and the JAE ganizations within the Yishuv who were evading —_ would participate in all scheduled events.

taxes; it will be recalled that the Yishuv lacked the MOBILIZING THE YISHUV’S power of enforcement. The choice of this partic- WEALTHY POPULACE: ROUND TWO

ular “month”—from September 15 until after the Day of Atonement—was no accident. As Bart ex- On 23 September 1943 Ben-Gurion again met sevplained to the fund, the JAE, and the National __ eral of the Yishuv’s capitalists in Jerusalem in or-

Council, the plan was for the drive to peakjustas der to induce them to donate money for rescue the population “was facing ‘judgment day, when operations. Also at the meeting were Kaplan, they would do their utmost to clear their con- —_ Rabbi Isaac Herzog, Mobilization Fund chairman

sciences.” Dr. Aharon Bart, and Dr. Emil Schmorak, who

The date was already “taken.” Other fund- _ represented the General Zionists in the JAE and raisers made a habit of holding their annual __ had recently returned from Istanbul. Schmorak drives at that time. Kaplan asked the PFF andthe was also a leader of the ex-Polish community in Jewish National Fund (JNF) to postpone their Palestine and was a member of the Committee of drives, but they refused. Undismayed, Kaplan Four and the Committee of Five, representing the asked for JAE intervention. Ben-Gurion said that nucleus of the Rescue Committee.

the JAE agreed with the designated date and The meeting was meticulously planned in promised all possible assistance. Also, although — close coordination with Ben-Gurion. The organhe agreed that the date might be awkward tothe _izers, who viewed it as a touchstone for the whole other fund-raisers, “the issue of rescuing the Jews “Solidarity with the Diaspora Month” drive, re-

of Europe was not only a financial but also a = quested that Ben-Gurion sign the invitations. moral one. It is now one of the central issues.” They also conferred with him about wording and There was another aspect to the Yishuvtakingthe format. Kaplan was asked to persuade one of the lead in the rescue venture. As Ben-Gurion said, — wealthy participants to be the first to announce “It is not only aid to the Jews of Europe—it also _his contribution and thereby to set the bar at an raises the prestige of the Yishuv and thus of the __ obligatory high level.»

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The Jewish Agency Budget and Fund-raising Appeals in Palestine

Ben-Gurion opened the meeting by voicing | He went on to say that they had to do “more than the widespread opinion that victory was near, al- = had been done so far. We wanted those people though there was no telling exactly when. He also — congregated here to give the signal to the whole of described the political state of the Zionist move- _ the Yishuv, to the Jewish communities overseas,

ment and the Yishuv, claiming that he detected _ that they also give more aid, do a little more than a note of “repentance” and possible regret in _ they have done up ’til now. Because the danger is Britain’s attitude. But he also warned against being _ great.”

overly optimistic. Hitler was still powerful, and Schmorak explained that the aim of the even though the Germans had been forced to re- = meeting was for “each of you to contribute ten treat, there was still one victim left upon whom to — times more than he had thought to contribute vent their hatred and revenge: the Jews. The dan- when he came here.” He described the rescue opger was not yet over, and the one thing that was at _ erations in vivid detail.°’ His visit to Istanbul had a premium was time. It had to be bought inorder — taught him the following simple truth: if more to defer the calamity for another “day or two,’and = money were available, more Jews could be saved. could spell the “difference between life and death Schmorak, who was head of the Trade and for many thousands [of Jews].” Ben-Gurion pro- _ Industry section within the Jewish Agency, tried vided up-to-date information on the situation in —_ to speak as one bourgeois to another. He reEurope supplied by “friends who had recently § minded his audience that their recent tax benefits spent time in the vicinity of the Holocaust,” refer- | were due to the intercession of the JAE, the ring mainly to Schmorak but also to reportsreach- _— British authorities having responded to pressure

ing Istanbul and sent on to Palestine.* and reduced the new tax brackets. One of the One of Ben-Gurion’s most important utter- JAE’s arguments had been that “the Jews pay a ances on the rescue issue was the following: “Ifin special tax . . . to take care of the Yishuv . . . and

some town, some region in Palestine, in some also to look out for the Jews of the Diaspora betiny way ... we can stand guard, if in some cause of their tragedy.” The British had seen the minute way we are able to stand guard...ifthe logic of the argument and it was now fitting to horror can be postponed for some time, the |= make good on the debt. significance of this could be rescue.” He went on Schmorak reminded his audience of the to stress the ongoing fight against time and the _fear-filled days before El Alamein and the threat

importance of funding: of invasion from Syria. Many had been willing at the time to donate large sums to avert the danger. Saving the lives of Jews waiting to be exe- Now was the time to regain that sense of urgency

cuted ... tells us one thing only: [We and to contribute generously. He made them must] do whatever is humanly possible think of their brethren, their families, and asked ... to extend material aid to those work- them to contribute even if this meant less wealth ing on rescue operations in order to save for themselves. When the time came, he wanted what can still be saved, to delay the them to answer the following question in all sincalamity as far as it can be delayed. [And cerity: What did you do to save us from death, we must] do it immediately, to the very slaughter, and deportation? best of our ability. I hesitate to say—since “We have no government, no police force, the matter is so serious—that we shall do and we cannot impose taxes,” said Schmorak. If our utmost; we are flesh and blood and no example is set by this meeting to the rest of the cannot do the maximum, but we shall do Yishuv, “our enterprise will fail and we shall lose

what we can. the option of saving those that are still alive.” 143

Financing of Rescue Attempts and Assistance

Following Schmorak, Dr. Bart said that solidarity _— referring to all the money collected during the month was designed to awaken the conscience of _ solidarity month.

the Yishuv, which perhaps tended to distance it- The organizers of the solidarity month may self from the horrors of Europe “as spiritual balm _also have wished to breathe new life into the Moagainst insanity.” Bart asked his listeners to do _bilization Fund. The decision to keep secret the their utmost so that in times of emotional stock- _— fact that funds collected during this month

taking “we can face our conscience.”*8 would also be used for mobilization and defense The words of Ben-Gurion, Schmorak, and __ could have reflected the leadership’s fear of a diBarratt did not fall on deaf ears. Erich Mohalier rect public polemic on this issue, which is quite turned to his colleagues (he may have been se- _— understandable. On the one hand, most people cretly asked by Kaplan to do so) and announced _in the Yishuv were relatively young at that time that he was pledging 5,000 Palestinian poundson and were mostly of European origin, having behalf of his company. Dr. Bart explained that all = more relatives in Europe than they had soldiers monies collected were earmarked for rescue ef- _ fighting on the British side. On the other hand, forts. Most of those who had been invited had the Yishuv leadership felt obliged to support turned up. Some sent their excuses, while others —_ families of soldiers who had answered the call to said they would consider making contributions. _ help the Allies crush Hitler and thus to save the Ben-Gurion summed up the results. “The total § Jews of Europe. Forsaking these families was not sum gathered at that meeting was 30,330 Pales- = a viable option in a voluntary community like the tinian pounds [U.S. $121,000]. The Yishuv can be Yishuv, which was based on the trust of those proud of this gathering. I hope each one here will |= who were sent as well as on those who did the do his utmost to foster the spirit of this meeting.” — sending. A leadership capable of betraying this Chief Rabbi Herzog mentioned the rule that —_ trust would have been of no use to anyone, least “if anyone who saves a single soul in Israel, itisas —_ of all to the Jews of Europe.

if he had saved the entire world,” stressing the re- « ligious significance of contributing money to the PAILORE OF THE SOLIDARITY WITH

i ; THE DIASPORA MONTH” CAMPAIGN

rescue effort. After explaining how the donations

would be transferred, Kaplan pointed out the |§ The campaign was preceded by intensive publicneed to keep the affair out of the press.°? Between ity, which took the form of meetings, advertisefifty and seventy thousand Palestinian pounds ments, and press releases. Its objectives were were collected, which was not bad given the tar- _—_—_ clear: to make the Yishuv aware of new rescue

get of a hundred thousand for the entire fund- _ possibilities and to help finance them.*! The tar-

raising drive. geted goal was 250,000 Palestinian pounds. It was

That meeting illustrated the fact that no dis- —_ reported that the Histadrut Executive Committinction existed between “Zionism” and “rescue” —_ tee was prepared to allocate 50,000 Palestinian or between the “big rescue” and the “small res- | pounds for rescue if other bodies in the Yishuv cue,” as Ben-Gurion had always insisted. Schmo- agreed to contribute a total of 200,000 Palesrak, Bart, and especially Ben-Gurion regarded __ tinian pounds. The JAE announced that it had rescue as a single unit. In the past the JAE had _—_ allocated considerable sums from its current been accused of diverting contributions origi- | budget.°* The private sector and the general pub-

nally meant to fund rescue operations for other lic were therefore called upon to contribute ends. Bart found himself having to emphasize —_ 200,000 Palestinian pounds.

that all donations from this meeting would be Progress reports on the fund-raising camused solely to fund rescue operations. He wasnot __ paign were published periodically in Davar and

144

The Jewish Agency Budget and Fund-raising Appeals in Palestine

other daily newspapers.® The points that were According to data, only 90,000 Palestinian given prominence in the press touched on the — pounds were collected. The Histadrut conheart of the problem. For example, Golda Meir tributed 50,000 Palestinian pounds conditionasked: “Are we going to say that we shall rescue _ally, but the latter was not fulfilled and it only such and such a number and no more because we contributed 20,000. After deducting the Mobihave no money?” In order to stress the impor- _ lization Fund’s share and the loans, only 32,000 tance of the “small rescue” and how important _ Palestinian pounds—a far cry from the hopedthe Yishuv’s contribution was, Sharett quoted a for sum—remained for rescue operations.® letter writer from the Diaspora: “For the Yishuv it Researchers have offered a number of explais a time of self-fulfillment. .. . Jews [in Europe] nations for this failure. First, the Yishuv was can be reached and helped through Istanbul. | weary from constant exposure to reports from Money is needed. Someone wrote: “There area the Diaspora. This wearing down could be exnumber of circles in hell; if we can bring one Jew _ plained in terms borrowed from social psycholfrom the ninth to the sixth, then we shall have _ ogy. Kaplan and the Histadrut leadership noted

done something great.” that the Yishuv was suffering a kind of dulling of Absolute salvation meant bringing JewstoPal- _ the senses.® This explanation appears rather farestine, and great effort is being expended to this _ fetched, since the Yishuv was tied to events in Euend, but “on no account must we see this as _—_— rope through familial, emotional, and personal

the only possibility. Even within this valley of | connections. death, flowing with blood, . . . there are islands of Second, the drive may have failed because relative safety, and we can bring people to these — too moderate a position was adopted, under the islands—even if only a few. We shall have to face — influence of Ben-Gurion and several of his colour consciences, if we don’t. We succeeded in _ leagues in the leadership, who were not in favor

bringing hundreds, and with intensified efforts of fueling an already charged atmosphere, pre-

we might even reach thousands.” venting more strident manifestations of protest Kaplan tried to explain the difficulty in ap- and outrage. It may be that less restrained and pealing to the public by saying: “Some people = more shocking propaganda would have created a are quite happy to translate their feelings into |§ more favorable atmosphere for fund-raising. Be money, but they don’t really like having their that as it may, it is clear that this explanation conpeace of mind disturbed, and by going to fund- _tradicts the first explanation, since any emphasis raising meetings, they arereminded oftheenor- _—_ on the terrible plight of Europe’s Jews would have mity of the disaster.” According to Kaplan, the —_ increased the sense of weariness and reluctance

Yishuv was willing to fund all kinds of rescue to make contributions to ensure their salvation.”

operations, making no distinction between Third, it may be possible to relate the failure “large” or “small,” or between immigration to to inappropriate preparation despite all the orPalestine or any other country willing to take ——_ ganizers’ efforts. The fund-raising campaign was

Jews. moved up to coincide with the “terrible days”

In the end, the fund-raising drive failed that form part of the religious period preceding to achieve its hoped-for objectives. Despite all the Jewish New Year. This created an impossible the publicity and the moral and social pressure, schedule and led to hasty preparations.”!

avoiding making contributions was a clear Fourth, the organizers may have erred in trend.® The targeted 250,000 Palestinian pounds _ their estimation of the public’s economic power. was not obtained even after the month was ex- _ Several special fund-raising campaigns had been

tended beyond the drive’s closing date. held since the end of 1942, in addition to regular

145

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SSeS Se aOR, |.ee SRR ENERENED.-.SRSERR SRS REESE. ORES BRR ee eeena RT oe reea nie Om eee 2SSS ee ee ROSSER ee RIES SSSR SSSR eagnCOO Sa BSR ce RO RRR”eS RSIS RRO OO SSR SRS OSC STR ORR OR RTS Ee gE aM SEE See SSE emg PSS See RUSSERT. - RRR RON RAR SRA E RRR EERE OS ORDERS. , -_” ORNS SSSR S RRR SERRE ENRON ENS RS NSN SE SC SR CE ROE A RRR ESR SRO CORRS SEES SE REE RO STON TIRE 7 RRR RRR

BORSA ERROR 3 0 ORS. . RORORRTRRER. RERERNENY SRRRMEERERERSSOR "RO ORR RES SS ESSER ERROR SRE RAS SAARC RRR RRR SRR RSS ON SSS RE SCS ROR RRND RN ONE ORS RK RAC RRS ROC ROE SSS ISO i

ES SSSR RSS 2 aS SRN SRS SaSR a etRRS PO Bee SR RRS.» Ee a eK. aS CaS igRR. os ee eee —rr—“‘(‘OCRNOCia i Sa a

Ba ee ess ca ER = ee ee ee Peoccanen a aaa eS nO ROR RRS IED. PRR Cre. ROR, | UR RRR SR SESS SSE ica SRR Se SI RES eo SRO SERN RICE ORO SUR REST RNS RET ERR SRS EO SSS SURO SORE SRE R RSENS or rs: Sa Bressiirestaere a SAE OOOO RR in RS. ROOD ORE SOR SERS OS ER RS ERS OTR ORE RR RU RR RRS. Sa SR

i ae hlhlhr——“‘aOsOOSC—i—iésDNSCisCsi‘iats=ONNSC RC RR (a i i .sti‘“OOOONOOSONOtssisiséssésese —i—=j

BSE ae RSENS SSSR SSSSSSRS a EE SS RR Se ea CoE

eeeeee ee ee eeeeES eeeee Se ee ee eeaeees ee ee eeee eee eee eee eeee enee Bese ee eR3RE, s,seee eRe RE aee =.2. eete eeer ee FSReSRaAR RSLS... SRS URNS OSS GRR: SORA SIS CRORE ROBO a ee ERS ee acc Roa SSNS MR SSS SADA E SOS RS SIS IS RES RONDA IOS AO ROE OSORNO NSE SRA SA RANA RR ORDER SES SONNE SOROS RA ERED RSE EER RSENS Ee llr i el — rll shmrr—

1: 344 379 (nn. 14, 16-18, 21-23, 25-27, 32, 36, 43, 52-53),

Schwartzbart, Ignacy (Yitzhak) 380 (nn. 68, 76), 381 (nn. 94, 110, 114, 133, 135), 382

1: 27, 31, 54-55» 357 (n. 17), 358 (mn. 37, 53), 359 (n. 69), (n. 140), 383 (nn. 218, 229), 384 (nn. 254-255, 258,

370 (n. 118) 266), 385 (nn. 268, 299), 386 (nn. 325, 335, 350), 387

2: 229 (n. 46), 230 (n. 59) (n. 374)

Schweiger, Moshe 2: 4-16, 18-20, 22—33, 36-41, 46-49, 51, 56-57, 59-61,

2: 23 _ 65-66, 77-78, 80-84, 94, 107, 110-113, 119-120, 136,

Seager, Cedric 142, 145, 156, 158, 164, 166, 168-169, 188, 199-200, 1: 309—316, 320, 325, 329, 331, 338, 353, 383 (nn. 199, 208, 204-208, 211, 221 (n. 19), 222 (nn. 26, 28, 30-32,

210), 384 (nn. 259-260, 318), 387 (n. 383) 41, 45, 52, 59), 223 (nn. 60, 70, 72-73, 80, 90-91, 2: 179-181, 183, 186, 238 (nn. 35, 65, 68) 94-95), 224 (nn. 96, 98, 100, 103, 108, 111-114, 116,

Sedelchak 127, 130), 225 (nn. 144, 156-157, 164, 166-169, 171,

1: 223 173, 175-177), 226 (nn. 183, 187, 193, 202), 227

Segal, Hermann (nn. 214-216, 223), 229 (nn. 31, 34—35, 46-47, 49, 53, 1: 131 55), 230 (nn. 57, 59, 14), 231 (nn. 46, 77, 81), 232 Segalovitz, Benjamin (nn. 88, 20, 39), 234 (nn. 52, 70, 2), 235 (nn. 19-20,

1:59 26, 41), 236 (nn. 60, 74, 83), 237 (n. 3), 239 (nn. 14,

Selborne, Lord Roundell Cecil Palmer 26), 240 (n. 31)

1:16 Shiloah, Reuven. See Zaslani, Reuven

Senator, David Werner Shimoni, Gideon

1: 46, 83, 92 1: 368 (n. 35)

2: 82, 133, 170, 228 (nn. 6, 9), 233 (n. 12), 237 (n. 94) 2: 163, 236 (nn. 55, 62)

Sereni, Enzo Shirach, Baldor Von. See Von Shirach, Baldor 1: 36, 269, 279-280, 297, 325-327, 350, 354, 381 (n. 137), Shragai, Shlomo Zalman

382 (nn. 142, 145), 384 (nn. 241, 256—258, 265, 267), 1: 131

(nn. 268, 270) Sikorski, Wladyslaw 2:385 175, 237 (n. 15) 1: 56, 88

Shaipra, Moshe 2: 72,75

1: 27, 37, 47, 66-68, 92, 126, 131, 143, 150, 193, 244, 361 Silberschien, Moshe

(n. 189), 362 (n. 8), 366 (nn. 5, 7), 367 (nn. 1, 3), 370 1: 372 (n. 17) (n. 114), 374 (n. 72), 377 (nn. 51, 57), 380 (n. 83) Silbershien, Alfred Abraham 2: 6, 25-26, 12.4, 159, 162, 191, 236 (n. 85), 239 (n. 3) 1: 52, 64, 214-216, 218

Shaltiel, Shabtai Silver, Abba Hillel

1: 343, 347 1: 41, 60, 108, 111

Shamir (Yezernitsky), Yitzhak Silverman, Samuel Sidney

1: 74 1: 59, 361 (n. 175), 370 (n. 118) Shaw, Sir John Simmonds, Anthony

1: 121, 385 (n. 304) 1: 160, 205, 264—265, 279-280, 289-291, 293, 297, 325,

2:14 327, 341-343, 345-347, 352, 372 (n. 25), 380 (n. 76),

Shazar, Zalman. See Rubashow, Zalman 381 (nn. 102, 106, 125), 382 (nn. 144, 149), 384

Shertok (Sharett), Moshe (nn. 256-257), 387 (n. 367)

1: 7, 10, 18-19, 25, 28—29, 39, 42—43, 50, 68, 85, 94, 96, 2: 35, 175-178, 184-185, 237 (n. 24) 98—99, 115, 119, 134, 145-146, 151-152, 156, 166-167, Simon, Julius

169-170, 173-175, 177-180, 182-184, 188-190, 2: 153, 162, 234 (n. 3)

269

Names Index

2: 82 2:8 Smith-Ross 2: 95

Sinclair, Archibald Szilagyi, Ernst (Erno)

Sirkin, Arye Leib Szold, Henrietta ; 1: 103, 191, 296 1: 82, 150-151, 185, 363 (nn. 17, 107), 370 (n. 124) 1: 292—293, 381 (n. 125) Szold, Robert

Smuts, Jan Christian 1: 276-277, 364 (n. 63) 1: 153-154, 180-182, 193, 210, 372 (n. 41) 2: 239 (n. 78) 2: 74, 76, 165, 167, 236 (n. 86)

Sneh, Moshe. See Kleinbaum, Moshe Tabenkin, Yitzhak

Sommerstein, Emil 1: 8, 25, 27, 64, 71, 263, 351, 354, 362 (Nn. 217)

2: 124, 230 (n. 59), 232 (n. 31) 2: 196-197 Spassof, Jordan Tamir, 1: 175-178 2:Shamuel 218

Springmann, Samuel (Samo) Tartakower, Arye

2:8 Taylor, Earl Sprinzak, Yosef 2:178

1: 223-224, 299, 301-304, 306—307, 310 2: 58, 227 (nn. 219-220)

1: 323, 363 (n. 18), 364 (n. 83) Taylor, George Francis

2: 155, 228 (n. 9) 1: 265-268, 270, 272, 294, 329, 334

Stalin, Joseph 2: 175, 237 (n. 12) 1: 119 Teague, John

2: 76, 85, 121, 230 (nn. 57, 59) 1: 264—265, 269-271, 274, 294, 379 (nn. 38, 51) Stanchik, Jan Tester, Arthur 2: 169 1: 199, 300, 303, 372 (n. 17)

Stanley, Oliver Fredrick George Tevet, Shabtai

1: 121, 152, 154-155, 157, 160-162, 164, 167, 171-174, 176, 1: 357 (nn. 2-3, 5, 27), 360 (n. 129), 361 (nn. 170, 173,

178, 180, 192, 198, 205, 208-209, 211, 242-244, 251, 182, 192), 362 (nn. 202, 224, 6), 363 (n. 27), 365

259, 324, 364 (n. 59) (nn. 98-102), 366 (n. 17), 367 (nn. 10—11, 13-14),

2: 16 379 (nn. 45, 56), 380 (n. 88)

Stawell, General 2: 93, 230 (nn. 12, 14), 239 (nn. 1-4), 240 (nn. 36, 39) 1: 328, 334 Thadden, Eberhard Von. See Von Thadden, Eberhard

1: 52, 333 1: 157

Stein, Leonard Jacques Thelin, George

Steinhardt, Laurence Thomas

1: 36-37, 49, 535 171, 254-257, 346, 376 (nn. 16, 21), 377 1: 344

(n. 64), 378 (nn. 66, 69) Tietz, Ludwig 224 (n. 98), 228 (n. 25) Tito, Josip Broz

2: 6, 8, 17-18, 30-31, 39, 84, 222 (n. 31), 223 (nn. 86, 90), 1: 184

Sternbuch, Yitzhak 1: 295, 328, 334, 338, 341

1: 52-53, 59-61, 63 2:5, 23

Stettinius, Edward, Jr. Toulmin, John

2: 17, 28, 56 1: 298, 330-333, 338, 346-347, 349, 385 (nn. 291— Stiller, Consol 292) 2: 35, 40-43, 45-46, 49 Trachtenberg (Dan), Shaike (Yeshayah)

Storch, Hillel 1: 297, 352-354, 387 (nn. 384-385, 387, 392)

1: 186 “Trillium.” See Grosz, Bandy :

Strauss, Nathan 1:Joseph 73 1: 53 Trumpeldor,

2: 53-555 57-58, 226 (n. 205), 227 (nn. 219-220) Trotsky, Leon Davidovich

Stupp, Avraham 1: 101, 364 (n. 85)

1: 88, 145—146 23199

Suprasky, Yehushua Tschernichwsky, Shaul

1: 131, 367 (nn. 26-27, 29) 1: 73 Szenes, Hanna 1: 144-145, 151, 153, 173, 188 2: 110, 231 (n. 73), 233 (n. 16), 236 (n. 68) Tuck, Somerville Pinkney

1: 297, 350, 354-355 2: 29, 158, 223 (n. 90), 224 (n. 98), 235 (n. 30) 270

Namies Index

Tuka, Vojtech Otto 1: 214 1:Wagner, 331-332

2: 176 1: 148

Tzika, Maria Wagner, Robert Ferdinand Walfson, Commander

1: 309 Fritz 381 (n. 114) Ulmann, 2: 177 1: 33-34 Walker, Archibald

Ujszaszy, Istvan 1: 265, 274, 289, 291, 297, 305, 312, 319 343, 347, 352-353,

1: 213 2: 35 1: 363 (nn. 18, 52) 1: 185

Unger, Rabbi Shmuel David Halevy 1: 310

Uziel, Rabbi Ben-Zion Meir Hai Wallenberg (family)

2: 168, 221 (n. 12) Wallenberg, Raoul

1: 185 | Valobra, Vittorio Waltman, Meir 2:154 1: 287, 381 (n. 98) Van Passen, Pier Warburg, Eric Vasek, Anton Wasserstein, Bernard

1: 112 2: 53

1: 213 1: 260, 360 (n. 152), 361 (n. 174), 363 (nn. 21-22, 41, 55), 2: 20, 44-46 (nn. 65, 69), 370 (n. 105), 372 (nn. 34-37), 373 Velebit, Vladimir (n. 44), 376 (n. 18), 377 (nn. 33, 37), 378 (n. 78),

Veesenmayer, Edmond 366 (n. 145), 367 (n. 2), 368 (nn. 36, 50, 58), 369

1: 341 384 (nn. 250, 254-255), 385 (nn. 271, 275, 277;

Vilensky, Emanuel. See Yelan Emanuel 301-302), 387 (nn. 377, 389)

Vilensky, Nahum 2: 221 (n. 4), 222 (nn. 46, 48, 50-52, 55), 223 (n. 80), 225

1: 29 (n. 175), 226 (n. 182), 228 (nn. 2, 16, 18, 24, 26-28),

Viteles, Harry 229 (nn. 32-33, 49-50, 55-56, 58-59), 230 (nn. 60—61) 2: 60, 153, 159, 208, 234 (n. 3), 235 (nn. 15, 22-23, 40) Wauchope, Arthur Grenfell

Von Hahn, Fritz Gebhardt 2: 197

1: 168, 369 (n. 77) Wavell, General Archibald John Arthur

Von Killinger, Manfred 1: 270-271, 273-274

1: 203 Webb, Anthony 2: 369 (n. 77), 372 (n. 18) 1: 280, 380 (n. 81)

Von Merkly, Anton Wedgewood, Josiah Clement 1: 303-304, 309 1: 103, 364 (n. 79) Von Papen, Franz Wehner, Erich. See Popescu Erich

1: 158, 316 Weisel, Ze’ev Wolfgang Von. See Von Weisel, Ze’ev Wolfgang

2: 6, 22, 44, 46 Weissburg, Hayim

vom Rath, Ernst 1: 74, 376 (n. 17), 378 (n. 72), 385 (n. 304)

1: 21 Weissmandel, Michael Dov Bar

Von Ribbentrop, Joachim 1: 213-215, 219, 235, 373 (nn. 54, 59, 61, 66), 374 (nn.

2: 35, 44, 46, 53-54 77-78, 86), 376 (n. 142)

Von Schirach, Baldor 2: 81, 229 (n. 45)

1: 20 Weitz, Yehiam

Von Thadden, Eberhard 1: 12, 358 (n. 31)

1: 168 Weizmann, Chaim

Von Weisel, Ze’ev Wolfgang 1: 7, 18, 21, 33, 37, 39, 42-43, 455 47, 51, 53) 60, 106-107,

2: 166 109—110, 115, 155, 167, 175, 182, 187-189, 191, 193, Vrba, Rudolf 196-197, 208-209, 240, 244, 251-252, 259, 263-268, 1: 5, 79-80 271-272, 276-277, 300, 320, 323, 327-328, 334, 340, 358 (n. 26), 359 (n. 78), 361 (n. 172), 365 (n. 110), 367

Wagman-Eshkoli, Hava (n. 2), 368 (n. 25), 369 (nn. 63, 66, 72, 94), 370

1: 12, 358 (n. 31), 363 (n. 9), 366 (n. 1), 371 (nn. 6, 11, 15, (nn. 99, 104-105), 371 (nn. 134, 2), 372 (nn. 33-37,

40) 39), 377 (n. 39), 378 (n. 76), 379 (mn. 22, 36), 380

2: 228 (nn. 1, 17) (n. 68), 384 (nn. 244, 266), 386 (n. 331) 271

Names Index

Weizmann, Chaim (continued) Yelan (Vilensky), Emanuel 2: 5, 10-12, 16-17, 23-25, 31-33, 38-40, 47—48, 53, 60, 1: 29, 293, 335-336, 358 (Nn. 48), 362 (n. 196), 385 (n. 306),

81-84, 133, 191, 196, 202, 221 (n. 4), 222 (n. 51), 224 386 (n. 322)

55), 230 (n. 56)2:1:217 75 Welles, Sumner

(nn. 107—110, 112), 225 (n. 161), 229 (nn. 47, 49, 51, Yelin-Mor, Nathan

2: 187 1: 346

1: 53, 60, 173, 182 Yezernitsky, Yitzhak. See Shamir, Yitzhak Welti, Hans Young, Rodney Wetzler, Alfred 2: 176, 178 1: 5, 79-80

White, Hayden Zaslani (Shiloah), Reuven

2: 209 1: 10, 20, 28, 134, 160, 205, 233, 258, 263, 269-271, Whittall, Arthur 275-277, 279-280, 282-283, 285, 287, 289-290, 1: 260, 265, 292-293, 305, 312, 315, 343-344, 369 (n. 75), 292-297, 306-307, 309-310, 312-317, 319-325, 376 (n. 4) 328-330, 332-339, 341-343, 345, 347-348, 351-352, 2: 7, 13-14, 179-183 360 (n. 143), 370 (n. 98), 377 (n. 60), 378 (nn. 71,

Wilhelm the second (Kaisar of Germany) 3-4, 10, 12), 379 (nn. 25, 27, 31-34, 36, 39), 380

1: 40 (nn. 65—66, 68—69, 71, 74, 81-82), 381 (nn. 95,

Willkie, Wendell 104, 112, 125-126, 133-134, 136), 382 (nn. 144—

1: 40-41 146, 148-149, 151, 161, 180-181, 183-184), 383

Wilson, General Henry Maitland (nn. 191-192, 194, 206, 208, 210, 215, 217-218, 220, 1: 296, 298, 324, 382 (n. 140) 223, 228, 230, 234, 237), 384 (nn. 240-243, 245-247,

Wilson, Woodrow 249-250, 256-258, 260, 266), 385 (nn. 273-277,

1: 41 284, 292, 296-300, 303-304, 306, 309), 386 (nn. 311,

Winant, John Gilbert 315-318, 322—323, 325, 332, 335) 350, 353-355), 387 1: 51, 188-189, 276, 361 (n. 162), 371 (n. 136) (nN. 359; 373-374» 379) 382)

Wingate, Charles Orde 2: 6, 15, 18, 23, 28, 34-37, 43, 60, 66, 104, 170, 175-180,

1: 103, 265 184, 188, 205, 208, 215, 222 (n. 58), 223 (n. 74), 224

Winninger, Joseph (nn. 118-119, 124), 237 (nn. 10, 12—13, 16, 18, 20—21, 1: 223-224, 300-304, 306-307, 317-318, 330, 341, 353 31), 238 (mn. 35, 50, 60-63), 239 (n. 29)

2: 165 Zavlodovsky (Amir), Rehavam

Wise, Stephan 1: 295, 322, 354, 380 (nn. 82, 90), 381 (nn. 92, 138), 382 1: 8, 41-44, 59-60, 65, 108, 110, 112, 187-188, 210-211, (n. 147), 384 (n. 263), 385 (n. 268), 386 (nn. 333, 294, 361 (nn. 176, 187), 363 (n. 17), 365 (nn. 94, 101, 337), 387 (nn. 376, 386)

107, 110, 112, 120), 373 (n. 47) 2: 175, 237 (nn. 8, 10, 21)

2: 58, 61, 80-81, 83 Zavrecky

Wise-Polier, Justine 1:Yaakov 213 1: 294 Zerubavel,

Wisliceny, Dieter 1: 363 (nn. 18, 54, 58), 364 (n. 83), 367 (n. 27) 1: 213-215, 219, 221-222, 226—229, 231, 233-237, 304, 2: 106, 231 (n. 51)

343 Zetnik, K. (Dinor, Yehiel)

2: 9, 19—20, 63, 108, 114 1: 72 Wright, Ernst Zigelbaum, Shmuel Arthur

1: 292 1255 Ya’ari, Meir Zissu, Avraham Leib 2:72

1: 70 Zweig, 1: 245, 259 2: 107 Ronald

Yehieli, Zvi. See Shechter, Zvi 1: 260, 378 (n. 77)

272

Subject Index

Abwehr (German Military Intelligence) Allies 1: 199—200, 223, 301—306, 308, 310, 316—318, 320, 331-332, 1: 28, 82, 87-89, 91, 101-102, 105, 119, 140-141, 143-144,

348 146, 152, 158, 195, 203, 208-210, 212, 221, 226, 254,

2: 3, 19-21, 34-35, 42—46, 53, 187, 225 (n. 152) 269, 291, 296, 300, 302, 304-305, 307, 309, 316, 320, Budapest station, 1: 302, 318; 2: 19, 43-44; Sofia station, 330-332, 336, 340, 343, 345, 347» 351-352, 365 (n. 95),

1: 331; Stuttgart station, 1: 303 376 (n. 18), 386 (nn. 326-327, 332, 334) See also German Intelligence Action Committee 2: 3, 5, 16-18, 21, 24-25, 31, 33, 46-47, 49-50, 52, 55, 57—

Aden 59, 62, 67—69, 71-72, 74-81, 83, 85, 144, 151, 166, 178, 2: 154, 156, 161 221 (nn. 4, 8, 18, 48), 222 (nn. 51, 53-57), 223 (nn. Adler-Rudel’s plan 83, 86), 225 (nn. 170, 175), 226 (n. 182), 228 (nn. 1: 143, 157, 166, 172—173, 183-189, 201—202, 205, 212, 237, 250—251, 24, 27, 29), 229 (nN. 30, 35-36, 40, 43, 45, 2.41, 315 48-50, 52), 230 (mn. 57-58, 60), 231 (n. 37), 239 (n. 11) 2: 52, 54, 199 Allies declaration (December 1942), 1: 87—88, 101, 152; 2: Aegean Islands 74-76; Assault on the Balkans, 1: 314, 1: 316; Europe, 1:

1: 272 179; 2: 55; Headquarters in Bari; 1: 321; Invasion from Aegean Sea the west; 2: 62; Invasion to Norway; 2: 72; Joint

1: 342-344, 346 forces; 1: 58; Middle East; 1: 179; 2: 32; North Africa; 1:

Afghanistan 144, 179; Prohibition to negotiate with the Nazis; 1: 91,

1: 262 95, 208, 212, 351; Prohibition to transfer money into 2:191 occupied territories; 1: 95, 212, 305, 347, 351; 2: 192,

Africa 194; Restriction on money transfer into enemy coun1: 51, 184 tries, 2: 178; Unconditional surrender, 1: 91; 2: 6, 59

1: 272 bombing

Agents’ training school in London See also Allies landing in Normandy; Retaliatory

Agriculture Allies landing in Normandy

1: 101, 131 1: 5,2:3 239 Agudate Israel

(nn. 11, 15) 1: 18

1: 6, 27, 59-60, 91, 93, 98, 126-131, 133, 170, 257, 366 Alsace

1:8 1: 60

2: 39, 136, 138 America. See United States

Ahdut Ha’avoda Movement American and Canadian Congress of Orthodox Rabbis

Al Hamishmar (newspaper) American Emergency Committee

1: 135 1: 42—43, 58-61, 107-108, 112, 129, 143, 148, 187, 210—211,

“Albatross” 276, 359 (nn. 95, 104), 360 (nn. 107, 117, 148, 153,

1: 73 157), 361 (nN. 159, 165, 181, 184), 363 (n. 17), 364

Al-Domi group (n. 93), 365 (nn. 94, 114, 116-117, 120), 367 (mn. 5,

1: 253148 115, 368(n. (n.5)39) 2: 80, 2: 18), 72, 228

Aleppo 1: 265,American 313, 327;Jewish 344 1: Archives 11

2: 4, 14-26, 30, 37, 60, 64-67, 80, 158, 187, 199, 223 American Jewish Committee

(nn. 60, 67, 70), 227 (n. 227) 1: 53, 365 (n. 99)

1: 20 1d

1: 165, 171 2: 112

Alexandretta (Turkey) American Jewish Congress

Alexandria American Jewish Historical Society Algeria AMPAL (American Palestine Trading Corporation)

1: 264, 298, 315 1: 54

Aliyah B, See Mossad Le Aliyah Bet 2: 173, 188, 191 273

Subject Index

Amsterdam Arab rebellion (1936—1939)

1215 1: 20,Operation 28, 36, 2:90 262, 265 “Amsterdam” 1: 349, 384 (n. 261), 385 (nn. 274, 297), 387 (n. 385) Arab states

Anatalia Bank (Turkish) 1: 18, 20—21, 23, 28, 36, 38, 42, 50, 143, 151, 158, 161, 168,

2: 173 174, 197-198, 209, 243, 249, 262, 267, 269, 273, 275, Anders’ army150, 278,242 314, 35121, 189, 197 ; 1: 145-146, 2:15,

Anglo Palestine Bank. See Anglo Palestine Company pro-Nazi Arab, 1: 272

(APC) Arab World. See Arab states

2! 123, 139, 185 Argentina Ankara 1:144

Anglo Palestine Company (APC) Arabized infiltration unit. See Palmah 1: 157-158, 165, 168, 171—172, 176, 179, 197, 201, 253, 292, Armenians (Genocide)

299, 325, 334, 372 (nn. 32-33), 376 (nn. 16, 21), 377 1: 58

(nn. 60—61), 378 (n. 66) Ashkenazi

2: 6, 8, 16, 25, 32, 41, 185, 222 (nn. 31, 34), 223 (nn. 80, 1: 8, 74, 77, 84

92), 225 (nn. 144, 156, 175) 2: 202

1: 294 1:Athens 245 Annihilation

Ankara Palace (Hotel) Associated Press (news agency) 1: 3-6, 11, 19-24, 30-31, 33, 39-40, 44-46, 48-50, 52-53, 1: 343-344 55, 58-62, 65-72, 75, 77-82, 86-87, 91, 95, 106-107, “Atlantic” (illegal immigration ship) 109, 112, 115-117, 120, 123, 125, 127, 140-141, 144-147, 1: 41-42, 80, 100, 107 154, 158, 161, 174, 195, 204, 208, 214, 217—218, 221, Atlantic Ocean

225, 228, 230, 234—236, 247-248, 261-262, 266, 277, 1: 239 281, 283, 285, 287, 290, 296, 324, 343-344, 354, 363 Atlit (detention camp)

(nn. 12, 21, 26), 373 (nN. 51-52, 54, 56-57), 375 1: 41, 71

(n. 139), 386 (n. 342), 387 (n. 357) Auschwitz 2: 5, 9, 16, 18, 20-22, 25, 28-29, 47, 51-52, 55-56, 58-59, 1: 5, 66, 72, 117, 235, 248, 260, 376 (n. 18), 386

63-65, 68-69, 71-75, 77-83, 85, 91, 93, 95, 99, (n. 326-327, 332, 334) 110—111, 120, 129, 152, 168, 199, 201, 203, 217, 219, 221 2: 3, 475 51, 63, 79-81, 84-85, 221 (nn. 8, 18), 222

(n. 4), 228 (n. 26), 229 (nn. 33, 45, 54) (n. 53-57), 223 (n. 83), 225 (n. 170), 226 (n. 182), 228

Anschluss. See Austria Anschluss (nn. 250-251, 24, 27, 29), 229 (nn. 32, 35-36, 38, “Anticlimax-Blue” Operation 40, 43, 45, 48-50, 52), 230 (nn. 57-58, 60), 239 (n. 11)

1: 349 Australia

1: 349 2:151

“Anticlimax-Doiner” Operation 1: 248, 376 (n. 24) “Anticlimax-Goulash” Operation Austria 1: 349 1: 17-18, 21—23, 31, 33, 35, 65, 86, 106, 115, 185, 224, 248, “Anticlimax-Lyon” Operation 262, 290, 299-302, 309, 321, 329, 336, 344, 349

1: 349 2: 55-56, 177, 188, 196, 210

“Anticlimax- Ravioli” Operation Anschluss, 1: 17, 21, 31

1: 349 Austro-Hungarian

1: 349 Axis states

“Anticlimax-Schnitzel” Operation 2: 183

Anti-Semitism 1: 20, 46, 122, 167, 195, 199, 201-202, 219, 239, 246, 261, 1: 16, 22—23, 31, 39-40, 48, 73-74, 87-88, 103, 107-108, 266-267, 273, 294, 309, 351 110, 120, 153, 179, 181, 195, 198-199, 201, 213, 342, 366 2: 71-72, 76, 97, 103, 105, 137, 141, 151-152, 163 (n. 143)

2: 76, 121, 155, 190, 202 B faction

Antwerp 8, 64, Yar” 135, 354 1: 1871:“Babi

Arab Federation 1: 49 1: 22 Bader Mission. See Interim Agreement B Arab League 1: 249 1. Baghdad 50, 279 274

Subject Index

Balfour Declaration Bergen Belsen

1: 173, 180, 182 1:115 2: 169, 198 2:15, 54, 57-58, 93, 211

Balkan states Bergson Group

1: 34, 56, 69, 148-152, 155, 157, 160—162, 171, 173, 179, 187, 1: 110-114, 240, 365 (n. 115), 372 (n. 40)

189, 200, 204, 240—241, 251, 254, 256, 262, 265-266, 2: 61 268, 279, 282, 285, 291-294, 296-297, 299, 313-314, See also Committee for a Jewish Army; IZL 316, 321-322, 32.4, 328, 332, 335, 380 (n. 90), 382 Berlin

(n. 147), 384 (n. 250) 1: 26, 44, 66, 183, 202—203, 214, 219 2: 237 (n. 21) 2: 3, 21-22, 33, 35: 40-43, 45-49, 525 54-55, 57-58, 62-63,

See also Jews in the Balkans 68, 227 (n. 222)

Baltic states OlympicConference games, 1: 22, 74 1: 49 Bermuda Bamishor (newspaper) 1: 5, 9O—97, 101-102, 108, 110, 159, 166, 172, 181, 187-190, 1: 84 210, 220—2.21, 242, 363 (n. 48)

Banks 2: 76, 105 2: 89, 173-174, 178, 180-184, 186 Bern

Allied countries, 2: 173; Britain, 2: 173; Britain, London, 1: 165, 167, 211 2: 179; Britain, Manchester, 2: 182; Enemy coun- Bessarabia tries, 2: 178; Germany, 2: 173; Holland, 2: 173, 181, 1: 34, 160, 196, 198 184—185; Neutral countries, 2: 173, 179; Switzerland, “Bessarabia” (illegal immigration ship) 2: 173, 179, 181, 184-185; Tel Aviv, 2: 179-181; Turkey, 1: 160, 172

2: 173, 179, 183, 185-186 Biltmore Convention Barclays Bank (Tel Aviv) 1: 53, 312, 360 (n. 157), 365 (n. 99)

2: 180-181 Biltmore Program

Bari (Italy) 1: 52, 63-64, 70, 108, 140, 154, 198, 276, 278, 320

2: 175-176 Birkenau Basra 2: 47, 79, 81, 83 1: 274 Black market Bay of Biscay 1: 226, 302 1: 239, 298, 321, 326-330, 333, 335» 337-338, 341, 349 2: 31, 152, 198

1: 184 2: Black 89-91, 123, 178-179, 181, 189 BBC Sea 1: 18, 26, 55, 58 1: 163-164, 179, 197, 199, 274

Bedzin (training camp) 2: 159 1: 31, 302 “Bloomingtdales” (New York)

Beiliss trial 2:Brith 29 1: 103, 296 B’nai

Beirut 1: 60, 111

1: 116, 269, 271-272, 292 Board of Deputies

American University in Beirut, 1: 330 1: 181

1: 220 1:Bosporus 17, 300 Beit-Oren 1: 297, 340 1: 148, 292

Beit Hashita, kibbutz Bohemia

Belgium 2:92 2: 74, 92, 99 Brand plan

1: 38, 66, 97, 184, 249-251 Brand mission. See Brand plan

Belzec 1: 4-5, 9, 29, 140, 175, 179, 195, 239-240, 246-247, 257,

2: 79-80 303, 308, 310, 316, 327, 331-334, 336, 345, 173 (n. 173)

Ben Shemen 2: 3-5, 8-9, 11-34, 36-37, 395 42, 45-51, 53, 55-575 59-62, 1: 278 64—68, 78—82, 85, 119—120, 122, 157-159, 167, 184, 199,

Ben-Gurion Heritage Institute’s Archive 206-207, 221 (nn. 1, 3-4, 6-7, 16), 222 (nn. 23, 26,

1: 10-11 30, 38, 41-42, 46, 51, 54-55), 223 (nn. 60-61, 64, 1: 18 149—150, 154), 226 (nn. 193, 203), 227 (nn. 227, 236),

Berchtesgaden 67-71, 73, 78, 85-86), 224 (n. 109), 225 (nn. 145-147,

2: 21-22 228 (nn. 247, 250-251), 240 (n. 40) 2/5

Subject Index . Brand plan (continued) 171, 176-177, 179, 184, 188-189, 196, 209-211, 310, Klarman-Griffel proposal, 2: 38-39; Leakage to news- 340-341; 2: 10, 15-17, 30—32, 48, 53, 75, 84; House of Paper, 2: 3, 49, 51, 62, 66, 68-69; Stiller proposal, Lords, 1: 87; Immigration policy, 1: 144, 195, 243,

2: 35, 40-43, 45-46, 49 260; 2: 16, 197, 218; Labor party, 1: 38; Liberal party, See also Interim Agreement A; Interim Agreement B 1: 38; London blitz, 1: 71; Marine Transport Office,

Bratislava 1: 160, 165, 175; Middle East War Council, 1: 264;

1: 213, 217, 219, 235, 375 (n. 115) Military attach in Romania, 1: 267; Navy, 1: 39, 191,

2: 229 (n. 36), 231 (n. 75) 352; Parliament, 1: 42, 87, 96, 103, 154, 166, 192, 205,

Bread coupons 242, 259; 2: 134; Resident Minister in Bari, 1: 328;

2:92 Resident Minister in Cairo, 1: 171, 264, 268, 289, 321, Bribe 323-324, 335, 341, 3493 2: 29-30, 158; Riots in Iraq, 1: 2: 89, 92, 102-104, 107, 111, 118, 154, 158, 170, 175, 186 50; Royal Air Force, 1: 38, 268, 279; 2: 84; War Cabi-

Bringing the Nazis to justice net, 1: 167; 2: 16—17, 33, 48; War declaration against

1: 320, 339 Germany, 1: 35; War Office, 1: 290; Yishuv pilots, Brit Shalom 1: 268 1: 357 (n. 4) See also Banks; British Intelligence; Germany, attacks

2: 61 on Britain; Jews in Britain; Public opinion; Sterling Britain zone; and specific newspapers 1: 5-7, 11, 17-21, 24, 28, 35-39, 41-46, 50—52, 55, 58, British Mandate in Eretz-Israel

60, 66, 68, 71, 78, 80-81, 83, 87-94, 96-97, 1: 5-7, 11, 18, 21-22, 26, 28-29, 36—39, 41—43, 46, 51-52, 100-109, 115—116, 118-119, 127, 141, 144-145, 65-66, 69, 79—80, 82, 88-89, 92, 97, 100-106, 114, 148-149, 152, 154-155, 157-167, 169-180, 182, 116, 119—121, 129—130, 140, 143-144, 148-149, 151-152, 184-189, 191-193, 195-198, 201, 204—205, 207— 154-155, 157, 159-168, 170-171, 173—174, 180, 182, 187,

212, 219, 240-244, 246-247, 249-251, 259-260, 191-192, 196-198, 202, 209, 212, 239—247, 249-251, 264, 266—276, 278-279, 285-287, 289-291, 293, 259-270, 272-275, 278-281, 283, 285—286, 289-291, 296-297, 305-306, 311, 320-325, 327-328, 334— 293-294, 296-298, 306, 312, 314, 320-322, 324-325, 335» 339-342) 344-345, 349, 352, 360 (Nn. 152), 361 328, 330, 335, 342, 345, 349, 351-353, 367 (Nn. 31), 370

(n. 174), 363 (nn. 21-22, 41, 55), 365 (nn. 114, 116), (n. 102), 376 (n. 23), 378 (nn. 77, 1) 366 (n. 145), 367 (n. 2), 368 (nn. 36, 50, 57), 369 2: 7, 10-11, 14-15, 18, 24—25, 27, 31-32, 36, 38, 42, 48,

(nn. 65, 69), 370 (n. 105), 372 (nn. 34-37), 373 65-67; 74, 80, 92, 96, 112, 114, 134-135, 139-144, (n. 44), 376 (n. 18), 377 (nn. 33, 37), 378 (nn. 77— 147-149, 158, 169, 174-177, 184, 190, 194, 197,

78), 384 (nn. 250, 254-255), 385 (nn. 271, 275, 277; 200-201, 211, 213, 218

301-302), 387 (nn. 377, 389) British Army, 1: 65, 103, 265, 268, 272, 279, 291, 296-297, 2: 4, 9, 14-18, 22-33, 35-41, 47-52, 54-55, 61-64, 66, 68-69, 306, 328, 335, 352; British police, 1: 79, 264; Censor71—79, 82—84, 105, 108, 112, 121, 124, 134-135, 141, 143, ship, 1: 26, 42, 80; 2: 211, 213; CID, 1: 264-265, 270; 148, 151, 158, 168—169, 173-174, 177, 179-180, 182, 194, 2: 27; Emigration Department, 1: 149, 151, 164, 241,

197, 199—2.00, 202, 210, 212—213, 218, 221 (n. 4), 222 244; Recruitment to the British Army, 1: 97, 102, (nn. 46, 48, 50-52, 55), 223 (n. 80), 225 (n. 175), 226 106, 140-141, 296-297, 328, 330, 3533 2: 92, 112, 144,

(n. 182), 227 (n. 227), 228 (nn. 2, 16, 18, 24, 26-28), 147-149, 194, 200; Searching for weapons slicks, 229 (nn. 32-33, 49-50, 55), 230 (nn. 56, 58-61) 1: 97, 100, 103, 191; Taxes, 2: 139, 142-143, 1473 Air Ministry, 2: 75; Army, 1: 36, 103, 105, 116, 160, 265, Weapons trails, 1: 296, 298 268-269, 272, 279, 287, 290—291, 296-297, 306, 324, British Public Records Office (PRO)

328, 335, 3525 2: 16, 112, 134, 141, 148, 194, 200; 2: 1:11 81-82, 84; British Empire, 1: 39, 58, 264; British Bucharest Forces headquarters in the Middle East (Cairo), 1: 1: 157, 165, 168, 191, 196, 199-203, 212, 266-267, 291, 315 166, 264, 270—271, 273, 275, 285—286, 289-290, 293, 2: 176, 186—187

296; British Ministry Committee on Refugees Buchenwald Affairs, 2: 16; Cabinet, 1: 154, 167, 193; 2: 82; Church, 1: 21 2: 72; Colonial Office, 1: 18, 21, 37, 42, 51-53, 149, Budapest 152, 154, 157, 164, 171, 176—177, 179, 196-198, 1: 34, 157, 165, 223, 245, 299-300, 302-304, 308-310, 242-244, 251; 2: 10, 16, 198; Colonies, 1: 11, 18; Con- 317-318, 331-332, 369 (n. 76) servative party, 1: 38; Consulate in Istanbul, 1: 201, 2! 3-5, 8-9, 12-13, 18—20, 23, 33-35, 37-495 51, 54-55, 63, 293, 311; Economic Office, 1: 160; 2: 16; Egypt, 1: 164, 66, 68, 78, 176, 222 (nn. 28, 38-39), 224 (nn. 118, 166, 170, 173-174, 177; Embassy in Algiers, 1: 3.41; 130, 141), 225 (nn. 146, 148-150, 155, 160) Embassy in Ankara, 1: 160, 164—165, 171, 176-179, Bug (river)

197, 201, 325; 2: 25, 41, 54; Embassy in Madrid, 1: 1: 198 184, 260; Embassy in Stockholm, 1: 184-185; 2: 52, 2: 76 54; Embassy in United States, 1: 42, 60, 167, 208, Bukovina 211; 2: 17, 39; Foreign Office, 1: 21, 51, 59, 154, 165, 1: 183, 196, 198, 219

276

Subject Index

2: 122, 184 2: 80 Bulgaria Chernovitz (Bukovina) “Bulbul” (illegal immigration ship) Chelmno

1: 46, 55, 62, 69, 89, 98, 120-121, 148-149, 151, 154, 158, 1: 219 163-164, 166—168, 174-180, 191, 193, 197, 220, 228, 2:92 240, 244, 247, 249, 251-255, 259, 271, 273, 282, 290, Chicago

293, 299, 301, 307; 309, 317-319, 321, 323, 331; 335; 1: 276, 298

349, 352, 354-355, 377 (Nn. 29) “Chicken” Operation 2: 14, 34, 53, 73, 92, 113, 121, 124—127, 138, 154, 160, 1: 349 162—163, 177, 211, 226 (n. 204), 232 (nn. 32-33, 36, Chief Rabbinate

39), 233 (n. 41), 239 (n. 1) 1: 82, 84, 97, 122, 146, 363 (n. 52) Communist regime, 1: 355; 2: 124; German occupation, 2: 72, 168, 212, 236 (n. 82)

1: 197, 273; Joining to the Axis nations, 1: 46; China Monarchical regime, 2: 124; Russian occupation, 1: 17-18

1: 3353 Lhrace occupation, 1: 46 2: 155

1: 197 1: 303 2:72 1: 29

Bulgaria-Turkey (railroad line) Chinion Company (straw company)

Bund Christian Science Monitor (newspaper) Bund report, 1: 52-53, 55-57, 59-61, 63 CIA Bund Archive 1: 261, 276, 298-299

1211 CIC (Counter-Intelligence Corps of the U.S. Army) 1: 330, 332-333 Cairo CID (Criminal Investigations Department). See British 1: 51, 57, 171-172, 179-180, 249, 264-265, 268, 270, Mandate in Eretz-Israel 272-274, 279-280, 286, 289-290, 292-293, Civil right. See Right wing circles in the Yishuv 296-298, 312—313, 316, 319-325, 329-334, 337-341, “Clearing” agreements

345-3475 349, 353, 376 (nn. 8, 10), 380 (nn. 68, 2: 178

373) 1: 341, 349

78), 384 (n. 251), 386 (nn. 330, 333), 387 (nn. 359, “Cobweb” Operation

2: 7, 18-19, 23-24, 26-32, 35, 37, 39-41, 43, 45, 56-57, 60, COI (Coordinator of Information) 65—66, 68, 82, 84, 110, 124, 158, 176-178, 184, 207, 223 1: 276-277

Canaanite 1: 261, 299, 351 2: 196-197 Cologne (n. 93), 237 (nn. 9, 14), 238 (n. 35), 239 (n. 27) Cold War

Canada 1:15 Capitalism 1: 264

1: 60, 144 Combined Espionage Committee (Britain)

1: 337 “Commandos.” See “Parachutists Scheme”

2: 196 Mountain Committee 1: for112, a Jewish Army Carmel 290 1: 265, 268, 271, 294, 296 See also Bergson Group

Carpatho-Russ Committee for Rescuing Children. See Committee of Five

1: for Rescuing Children 2:834 Committee for the Care of Children

Casablanca Conference 1:144 1: 91, 158 Committee for the Care of Soldiers and Guards Caucasus 2: 140, of142 1: 265, 274 Committee Five Central Europe 1: 81-82, 127, 130, 363 (n. 9) 1: 18, 31, 55, 262, 291, 298, 300, 306, 321, 330—331 23142

2: 178 See also Committee of Four; German Intelligence Ac-

Central Zionist Archives tion Committee; Rescue Committee

1:10 Committee of Five for Rescuing Children

Centrala Evreilor, “Jewish Center” (Romania) 1: 127, 150, 216, 250, 252, 283

1: 199-200 2: 96, 152, 202

“Challock” Operation Committee of Four

1: 342, 349 1: 27, 47, 70, 81, 126—127, 129—130, 132, 200, 323, 362

22175 (n. 8), 363 (n. 20), 365 (n. 106), 366 (n. 13) 277

Subject Index

2:142 1: 269, 271

Committee of Four (continued) Damascus

See also Committee of Five; German Intelligence Ac- Danube (river)

2: 137 1: 148 2:196 Davar (newspaper) tion Committee; Rescue Committee 1: 267, 303

Committee of Three beside the Mobilization Fund Dardenelles

“Commonwealth in Palestine” 2: 92

Communications Office 1: 29, 71, 333, 359 (Nn. 65), 362 (nn. 203, 213, 1-2), 363

2: 174 (nn. 12, 20, 38, 46, 50-52, 54), 364 (nn. 59-60, 71,

Communism 73, 76, 78-79, 84-85, 89, 91), 365 (nn. 128—130, 132), 1: 196, 261, 296, 299—300, 313, 321, 331, 3395 355s 357 366 (nn. 136, 138, 143), 367 (nN. 23, 29, 34, 12), 368

(n. 4), 377 (n. 28) (n. 36), 369 (n. 96), 372 (nn. 31, 34), 373 (Nn. 47), 376

2: 62, 121, 124-125 (n. 21), 381 (n. 100), 386 (n. 342)

Conspiracy to murder Hitler 2: 144, 160, 226 (n. 180), 228 (nn. 248-249, 23), 229

2: 44 (n. 31), 232 (nn. 1, 31), 233 (nn. 12, 34, 36), 234 1: 20, 256-257 (n. 54), 237 (n. 30), 240 (n. 48)

Constanza (nn. 61, 63, 65, 76-77), 235 (nn. 16, 40, 49, 52), 236

2: 20, 93, 122 Dayan’s network

Council of Synagogues 1: 274-275, 278, 283, 287

1: 60 Dead Sea 2:148 works Crimean peninsula 1: 49, 239 Death march

Croatia 1: 248 1: 309, 313, 319-320, 337 2: 3,55 2: 155 Declaration of the state

Cyprus 1:9 1: 46 Defense Committee Czarist Russia 2: 138 1: 40 Denmark Czech 1: 38, 186 1: 17-19, 31-33, 55, 60, 118, 183, 262, 291, 294, 299-301, 2:77

308-309, 321, 342, 386 (nn. 340-341) “Deportation tax”

2: 19, 209, 228 (n. 3) 2: 105, 153

Foreign Office, 2: 74; Government in exile, 1: 185; Mili- Deutsche Allgemeine Zeittung (newspaper)

tary delegation in Jerusalem, 1: 313 1: 29 Czechoslovakia Deutsche Bank 1: 17-19, 22—23, 27, 31-33, 35, 43, 79, 86, 141, 282, 308, 1: 173, 183 persons (DP) camps 2:329 11,Displaced 228 (n. 25) 1: 115

Anti-Semitism, 1: 342; Consulate in Jerusalem, 1: 342; 2: 121, 162 Defense agreement with France, 1: 18; Defense Austria, 1: 321; Bulgaria, 1: 249, 321; Germany, 1: 249, agreement with Soviet Union, 1: 18; German occu- 321; Romania, 1: 257

2:19 2: 206 Dachau 1: 264 1: 21 Dneister (river) 2: 58 1: 198 1: 26, 55, 365 (n. 99) 1: 37 pation, 1: 35, 79; Government in exile, 1: 141, 183, “Dissidents” 185, 342; Protectorate, 1: 31-32; Underground, 1: 342; 1: 8, 179

See also IZL; Lehi

DMI (Defense Military Intelligence)

Daily Telegraph (newspaper ) Doar Hayom (newspaper)

Dalia, kibbutz (dance festival) Dogwood network

2: 204 1: 223, 299-301, 304, 306-311, 313, 315-317, 323, Dalmatia 330-333 1: 341 2: 3, 17, 19, 34-35, 53, 179, 181, 186 278

Subject Index

22151 2: 206 1:144 Enlistment office, Tel Aviv

Dollar area End of Second World War Dominican Republic England. See Britain

Donovan Archive 1: 296 nu Entry and movement permits into Europe countries

“Dror” 341

Dresden 1: 147, 149, 151, 153-155, 157-159, 161-163, 167-168,

2:71 172-179, 183-185, 187-188, 191, 196, 243, 245, 248,

1. 27 2.10, 20, 39, 43) 47, 51-52, 54; 56, 95, 119 2: 176 Eretz-Israeli Arabs. See Palestinians

Druze Espionage 1: 264 348, 380 (n. 70) Dunkirk 2: 16, 26, 35, 37, 425 44, 55, 76, 173, 209, 237 (n. 24), 238 1: 38, 269 (n. 38) 1: 269, 271 1: 4, 11, 20, 28-29, 51, 63, 141, 199, 223, 261~—265, 276-277,

DSO (Defense Security Office) 298-299, 305-306, 310, 316, 328, 333, 335-338, 346—

Eastern Europe 1: 148 1: 139, 144, 158, 187, 273 Estonia

“Esther” (Cinema)

tine 1: 270 2: 95-96, 98 1: 82

2: 15, 196, 203 2: 53-54

Economic capacity of integrating immigrants into Pales- Ethiopia

1: 120, 196, 201—202, 250, 252, 259 Ethnic and national origins in the Yishuv

See also British Mandate in Eretz-Israel Euboea (island)

Economic Research Institute 1: 343

2:94 Europa Ransom plan. See Europa-Slovakia plan Egypt Europa-Slovakia plan

1: 21, 28—29, 58, 64, 164, 166, 170, 173-174, 177, 220, 226, 1: 4, 91, 140, 194-195, 212—216, 218, 220—222, 224,

269-270, 272, 274, 285, 287, 335, 379 (n. 43) 227-229, 231-233, 235-238, 304, 308, 343, 373 (nn. 51, 2: 29, 134, 151, 169—170, 176-178, 198, 237 (n. 92) 54, 57> 59, 62), 374 (n. 72), 375 (nn. 104, 108, 110, 115,

See also Jews, Egypt 121, 136)

Ein Gev, kibbutz 2: 4-5, 8-9, 23, 29, 50, 56, 61, 94—95, 100, 102, 105-108,

1: 292, 313 112, 114, 153-155, 164-165, 170, 207, 230 (n. 17), 231

Kibbutz bulletin, 1: 29 (n. 51), 239 (n. 28) Ein Harod, kibbutz European currency area

1: 259 2: 180

Einsatzgruppen Evian Conference 1: 49 1: 21, 74, 91, 94, 159, 181, 190, 365 (n. 95) Eisenhower Archive 2: 121, 239 (n. 3)

Pee Exchange group

1: 65,143, 294 64) 2: 90, 151(n. 2: 211

El] Alamain 1: 60, 65—67, 75, 81, 140, 144-145, 147, 166, 285-286, 369

Emancipation Exchange plan. See Exchange group

1: 247 Exchange rates 2: 121, 196, 201 2: 9O—91, 93, 96

1: 148 2: 209

Emergency Committee Ex-Soviet bloc

Emergency Committee to Rescue the Jewish People of Extermination camps

Europe 1: 4, 21, 24, 62, 64, 67, 140—141, 214, 217-218, 234-236,

1: 210 244, 322, 333, 343-344

1:5 219, 227 (n. 227)

Emergency laws 2: 8-9, 30, 45, 47, 51, 53, 55» 58, 69, 71, 77-85, 186, 207,

1: 159 cific camps

“Emniyet” (Turkish security services) See also Annihilation; Retaliatory bombing; and spe-

279

Subject Index

Famagusta Free World 1: 346, 387 (n. 367) 1: 195-197, 199, 226, 229, 236-237

Fascism 2: 49, 68, 71, 77; 79, 195, 199, 201-202, 212—213, 215, 217 1: 16, 19—21, 36, 40, 50, 116, 187-188 French Revolution Fertile crescent countries 1:70

Field security General Zionists 1: 330 1: 47, 68, 131, 360 (n. 128), 379 (n. 43) 1: 279

2: 197 Geneva

“Fighting Zionism” 2: 110, 142, 198, 239 (n. 8)

“Final Solution” 1! 4, 9, 26-27, 32-33, 37, 54, 59, 62, 65, 157, 193, 200, 1: 9, 23-24, 44, 49, 64, 73-74, 168, 195, 235, 318, 369 214—218, 221, 228-230, 233, 245, 248, 282, 304, 308,

(n. 77), 372 (n. 18) 344, 374 (n. 87)

2: 4, 44, 63, 221 (n. 4), 224 (n. 123), 226 (nn. 194, 2: 20, 26, 71, 80, 100, 103—105, 107, 109, 153, 155-156, 159,

196-197, 200-201), 227 (n. 216) 165, 177, 187-188 Financing rescue activities German Intelligence Action Committee 1: 4, 54, 89-90, 99, 110, 116, 125, 130, 132, 143, 148-151, 1: 126, 130—131, 366 (n. 15)

153, 177-178, 183, 185, 187, 190, 200—201, 204-207, 2: 228 (n. 20) 210—212, 215-220, 222, 224-235, 237-238, 247, 252, See also Committee of Five; Committee of Four;

259, 266, 268, 294, 305-308, 312, 317, 332, 344-347 Rescue Committee 2: 4, 13, 20, 22-23, 29-30, 32, 39-40, 43, 46, 48, 53, 55—57> German invasion to Middle East. See Middle East

59-61, 64, 66, 89-115, 117-127, 129-149, 151-171, German invasion to Palestine

173-188, 189-194, 200, 202, 217 1: 39, 46, 58, 64—65, 261, 273-275, 280, 287, 295-296 Bank transfers, 2: 178-185; Critics on financing rescue 2: 90, 143, 151, 198, 201 activities, 2: 98-102, 105-111, 130—132, 136-137, 189, German Jewish Aid Organization

191-192, 201-202, 206, 213-218; Diamonds, 2: 89, 1: 184 107, 173-174, 176, 178-179, 183, 186-187; Fund in Germany Switzerland, 1: 211-212; Funds-raising, 2: 90, 92, 96, 1: 4, 6, 9, 15-22, 30-33, 35) 37-40, 49-50, 52, 62, 69, 98-101, 104—106, 108—111, 113—114, 117-118, 120, 122, 72-74, 86, 91, 95, 106, 115, 123, 146-147, 157-159, 163,

134-145, 148-149, 151-152, 154, 157, 163-164, 166— 168-169, 173, 179, 183-185, 189, 191, 193, 195, 198-199, 167, 169—171, 173, 186, 192-195, 200; Gold, 1: 313, 203, 207, 209, 212—213, 231, 236, 239, 249, 262, 264, 346-3473 2: 173-174, 176, 178-179, 183, 186—187; In- 269, 271, 273-274, 287-288, 290, 298-300, 303, 309, terim funding system, 2: 173-174, 181-183, 192, 195; 316, 321, 336, 338, 351, 353, 357 (MN. 6), 370 (n. 117), 382

Money laundering, 2: 89 (nn. 152, 157)

First “Season” 2: 5-6, 9, 14-16, 21-24, 33, 35, 44, 45-46, 51, 53, 55) 58,

1: 240 62-64, 69, 72-77, 80—81, 84—85, 99, 103, 121, 156, 176,

Forced labor camps 188, 196-197, 211, 213, 218

2: 54, 120 Allies in the Middle East, 1: 203; Army, 1: 19, 35, 46, 48, 58,

Foreign currency supervision 68, 144, 195, 199, 223, 264, 302, 3363 2: 43, 72-73, 75,

2: 179, 181 151; Army and Navy, 1:17, 168; Army in North Africa, Forged documents Reich Security Office, 1: 168; Consulate in Istanbul,

Foreign Nationalities Branch. See OSS 1: 46, 58, 64, 273; Attack on Britain, 1: 38, 40; Central

1: 306, 312-313, 317 1: 316; 2: 35, 40—41, 46; Consulate in Jerusalem, 1: 20;

2: 92 Control over Romania, 1: 42; Czarist Germany, 1: 40; Foxsal (restaurant) Defeated, 1: 336; 2: 45, 53, 55) 69, 85, 106, 143, 187, 1: 334 213; Economic embargo, 1: 351; 2: 62; Embassy in France Bucharest, 1: 168, 202; Embassy in Budapest, 2: 44; 1: 17-19, 33, 38-39, 53, 58, 62, 65, 70, 97, 104, 144— Embassy in Slovakia, 1: 213; Embassy in Sofia, 1: 168, 145, 173, 184, 188, 223, 249-251, 266, 269, 271, 274, 331; Embassy in Turkey, 1: 158, 316; 2: 6, 22, 44; Forced

302 emigration, 1: 74; Foreign office, 1: 168, 203; 2: 42, 44,

2: 15, 21, 29, 51; 71, 92, 155 46, 49; Fiihrer’s headquarters, 1: 59; Invasion to

Church, 1: 146; Consulate in Jerusalem, 1: 97; Free Czechoslovakia, 1: 17; Invasion to France, 1: 38; InvaFrance, 1: 271; French underground, 1: 249; Ger- sion to Greece, 1: 46; Invasion to USSR, 1: 46—48, 51; man occupation, 1: 38-39, 104, 144-145, 223, 249, Luftwaffe (German air force), 1: 17, 38, 184; Nazi

266, 269; Hostages murder, 2: 71 party, 1: 20, 68; 2: 43-44; Negotiation with the West,

Frankfurt 2: 22—23, 26, 35, 42-43, 45—46, 53, 55, 62, 64, 75, 80;

1:15 Opposition forces, 1: 316, 332, 3363 2: 22, 44; Policy 280

Subject Index

in Arab world, 1: 168; Policy in Middle East, 1: Haganah 20-21; Propaganda, 2: 76, 78, 81, 85; War in North 1: 6, 19-20, 25, 28, 35, 38-39, 41, 43, 65, 85, 97, 100, 114,

Africa, 1: 90; West Germany, 2: 218 116, 126, 155, 179, 191, 233, 254, 262-263, 265-268, See also Abwehr; Annihilation; Austria, Anschluss; 271-272, 277, 280, 282-283, 285, 287, 290, 295-296, Axis states; Czechoslovakia, Protectorate; Einsatz- 318, 321, 337, 344, 348, 352, 357 (Nn. 4), 358 (Nn. 22), 359

sruppen; “Final Solution”; German invasion to (nn. 68, 71, 79, 101), 378 (n. 77), 380 (nn. 85, 90), Palestine; Gestapo; Immigration, Forced immigra- 381 (n. 137), 382 (nn. 142, 264), 387 (nn. 386, 389) tion; Intelligence, German; Kristallnacht; “Mein 2: 92, 94, 99, 134, 141, 149, 173, 183, 190—191, 202,

Kampf”; Munich Pact; Nazism; Nuremberg laws; 205-207 Occupied territories in Europe; Press, German; Arabized infiltration unit, 1: 279, 286; Department 1: 5, Radio, Berlin; Satellite countries; “Transfer agree- 265; Dismissal of the head of central command, ment”; and specific countries, German occupation 2: 191; Funds-raising, 2: 92; Haganah headquarters,

Germany-Italy-Japan pact 1: 267, 285; 2: 190; Ran (counterintelligence body),

12195 1: 28; Shai (Haganah’s intelligence department),

Gestapo 1: 20, 25, 28—29, 114, 263, 265; Weapon, 1: 5—6, 173, 296 1: 31, 33, 55, 68, 201, 213, 220, 223-224, 234, 243, 301, 304, See also Intelligence, Yishuv; Yishuv emissaries

316, 347-348 Haganah Archive

2: 8-9, 22—23, 43-44, 47, 49, 73, 186-187 1:11 Budapest, 1: 304; 2: 8; Romania, 2: 192 Hahalutz

“Ghetto-ization” 1: 27, 30, 186, 277, 282 1: 24, 31, 34, 46, 48, 74 2: 126

2: 5, 20 Geneva, 1: 54, 214; 2: 20; Poland, 1: 75, 374 (n. 93); War-

See also Nisko-Lublin Saw, 1: 54, 188

Ghettos Hahalutzi’im. See Hahalutz

1: 93, 95-96, 101, 103, 145, 224, 231, 286, 288, 291, 302, Haifa 32.4, 326, 355, 368 (n. 33), 371 (n. 6), 374 (n. 93) 1: 29, 41-44, 56, 66, 75, 145, 173, 265, 270, 286, 291-293,

Gibraltar 1:71 1: 185 Hameuhad, kibbutz 1: 36, 327 Hanita, 2: 191, 240 (n. 42) Glyn-Mills kibbutz 1: 180 1: 271 Gordonia 1: 7, 68, 143

2: 5, 13, 20, 63, 106, 119 313-314, 316, 335, 345, 347 See also specific ghettos Hamashkif (newspaper)

Giv’at Brenner, kibbutz 1: 8, 27, 156, 284-285, 365 (n. 129), 366 (n. 138), 380 (n. 85)

“Goods for Blood.” See Brand plan Hapo’el Hamizrahi

1: 27 Hapo’el1: Hatsa’ir Greece 8 1: 46, 97, 118, 131, 159, 179-180, 215, 220, 234, 272—273, 299, Hashomer Hatza ir

315, 321, 331, 342-347, 352, 364 (n. 69), 386 (n. 342) 1: 27, 70, 91, 135, 156, 225, 253, 357 (n. 4) 2: 37, 62, 92—93, 127, 170, 177, 181, 215, 237 (Nn. 30), 238 2: 191, 196, 240 (n. 33)

(n. 33) Haskala [education] movement

Consulate in Izmir, 1: 343; Eretz-Israeli commando 2: 216

operations, 1: 272; German occupation, 1: 273, 344; Hayent (newspaper)

Greek government in exile, 1: 346; Greek under- 1:19, 357 (n. 19) ground, 1: 342-344, 346-347; Italian-controlled Hazorea, kibbutz

1: 343 Group 1: 313 1: 9, 36, 169-170 area, 1: 344; Liberation, 1: 347 1: 297, 325

“Greek Jewry Week” “Hebrew Committee for National Liberation.” See Bergson G2 (unit in American Military Intelligence) Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Hadassah 1 Hellas

Haboker (newspaper) 1 343-345 1:71 Heritage Archive, Giv’at Haviva 1! 32, 41, 44, 82, 110, 151, 250, 365 (n. 99), 368 (n. 39) “Herzl Day” 2: 95 2: 212, 215, 225 (nn. 165, 178) 281

Subject Index

Herzliya 2: 3-11, 13-15, 18-36, 38-39, 42, 44-45, 47; 49-57; 59-69,

1: 117 735 77-83, 85, 92, 103, 117-120

High Commissioner’s Palace Army, 1: 309; Embassy in Bulgaria, 1: 309; 2: 53; Em-

1: 92 bassy in Turkey, 1: 331; German occupation, 1: 116, 1:71 21, 35) 42, 44, 47, 50-51, 54, 59, 77; Military attaché

Hiroshima 239, 303, 321-322, 328, 332, 335, 339, 3495 2: 4-5, 8, 19, Histadrut (General Labor Federation) in Bulgaria, 2: 34; Military attaché in Istanbul, 1: 11, 30, 44, 46—47, 54, 64, 67, 71, 81, 90, 95, 146, 149, 2: 33; Opposition forces, 1: 328, 332, 334, 339, 3493

157, 203, 215, 225, 258, 266, 282-285, 297, 326, 333, 2: 36; Punishment bombing, 2: 51; Puppet govern344, 348, 357 (n. 3), 363 (n. 24), 365 (n. 129), 366 ment, 1: 248; Supporting the Allies, 1: 331; Under-

(nn. 139, 148), 379 (n. 42) ground, 1: 141

2: 78, 94-95, 98-99, 101, 103-105, 107—109, 118, 122—123,

135-140, 144-145, 148, 155, 158, 164, 169, 173, 183, 188, Iberian peninsula

191, 198, 202, 207, 210, 230 (n. 29), 237 (n. 4), 238 1: 184, 240, 248

(n. 59), 239 (nn. 78, 8) 2: 3, 42, 55, 573 199

Agricultural Workers’ Federation, 1: 30, 157; 2: 103- ICA (Jewish Colonization Association) 104, 191, 212; Council, 1: 46—47, 360 (nn. 119, 125); 1: 184 2: 198, Election 1944, 1: 64; Executive Committee, Illegal immigration 1: 90, 215, 284, 344, 358 (n. 32), 361 (n. 179), 362 1: 6, 12, 37, 41, 43-44, 46, 63, 80, 100, 107, 111, 125, 141, 154, (nn. 215, 221), 363 (n. 47), 367 (n. 27), 368 (nn. 38, 156—157, 173, 176, 196—197, 206, 217, 220, 263, 267, 280,

61), 369 (n. 62), 370 (n. 104), 371 (nn. 141, 15), 372 282-283, 292, 295, 323, 344, 360 (n. 150), 378 (n. 13) (nn. 22-23, 26, 34), 373 (nn. 42, 49, 69), 374 (nn. 69, 2: 18, 37, 56, 100, 103, 122, 133, 160, 173, 187, 190, 205, 207 74, 82-84), 375 (nn. 104, 112—113, 136), 380 (nn. 85, See also White Paper, certificates; and specific immigra-

89), 382 (n. 142), 384 (n. 254), 387 (nn. 356, tion ships 357-358); 2: 101, 103, 118, 123, 144, 155, 191, 225 Immigrant organizations in Eretz-Israel

(nn. 176-177), 230 (n. 28), 231 (nN. 32, 37, 50, 72, 1: 8, 27, 74, 81, 97, 126, 131, 132, 139, 257-258 . 74), 232 (nn. 83-84, 2, 10-11, 24), 234 (nn. 69, 72, 2: 8, 202 75), 235 (nn. 10, 21, 24, 29), 236 (n. 81), 239 (n. 76); Bulgaria, 1: 27, 183; Czechoslovakia, 1: 27; Greece, 1: 131,

Funds-raising, 1: 44, 54; 2: 188; Political depart- 343; Hungary, 2: 8, 61-62; Poland, 1: 54, 82, 131, ment, 1: 90; Secretariat, 2: 158; Sixth Histadrut 145-146, 221, 284; 2: 106, 142, 188, 203; Romania, conference, 2: 210; Tel Aviv workers’ Council, 1: 27, 131, 203, 206; 2: 4; Yugoslavia, 1: 27, 131

2: 203; Trade unions, 1: 95; Treasury, 2: 101 Immigration

Hochst (Austria) 1: 6-7, 22-23, 25, 27, 31, 34-38, 41-42, 46, 48, 50-51, 66,

2: 56 79, 82, 90, 95, 98, 104, 106, 111, 120—121, 125, 139,

Holland 143-144, 148-154, 156—157, 159-162, 164-167,

1: 15, 38, 66, 184, 187, 249, 376 (n. 4) 169-171, 173, 176, 180, 182, 184, 187, 190, 192-193,

2: 72, 92, 99 196—198, 201—202, 204—205, 208—209, 212, 232, 239, Dutch representative in London, 1: 187; Government in 241-252, 255-260, 263, 267, 270, 272, 281, 284, 293,

exile, 1: 185, 187 301, 334) 339 344) 351, 354

Holocaust survivors 2: 5, 9, 12-13, 16, 20-21, 50, 52-53, 56-57, 89—90, 93, 1: 119-120, 140, 191, 239-240, 248-249, 251-252, 259, 261, 95-96, 103-105, 107, 111-112, 114, 119-123, 125-126,

288, 322-323, 325, 335) 344s 352s 354s 377 (n. 28) 129-132, 134, 141, 145, 152-154, 157-158, 160-162, 167, 2: 5, 56, 59, 61, 65, 114, 120—121, 124-125, 143, 148, 160, 169, 188, 190—191, 196—199, 206, 217-218

184, 211, 226 (n. 204), 232 (nn. 22, 32-33) Budget, 2: 93-94; Children, 1: 37, 43, 66, 69, 106, 143,

Horthy’s Announcement 149-151, 169, 187, 189, 192, 201—202, 208, 216, 241, 243, 2: 50-52, 54-55, 57 248—252; 2: 95-98, 100, 126—127, 130, 134, 152, 163,

Housing 168, 190; Education, 1: 250; 2: 168; Financing, 1: 111,

2: 131-132 150—152; 2: 120, 129; Mass immigration, 2: 196—197; Huldah, kibbutz Politicization, 2: 120-121; Quotas, 1: 6, 196; Selective,

1: 296 1: 247-248; 2: 5, 196; Transportation, 2: 126.

Hungary See also British Mandate in Eretz-Israel; Illegal immi1: 34, 43, 69, 116-120, 140-141, 151, 154, 168, 180, 182, gration; White Paper 185-186, 191, 193, 195, 215, 218, 230, 237, 239-241, Immigration Committee

243-245, 248, 253-254, 257, 259, 262, 282, 290, 293, 1: 37 299-300, 303-304, 307, 309—310, 312, 314-315, India 318-319, 321-323, 327-329, 331-332, 334-336, 339-340, 1: 6, 89, 181

345, 349, 353, 355» 372 (n. 18), 376 (nn. 24-25) Worker movement, 2: 188

282

Subject Index

Intelligence Iran

1: 3-4, 11-12, 20—21, 25, 28-30, 50, 52, 56-59, 61, 63, 89, 1: 262, 270, 274 114, 126, 159, 168, 179, 190, 199, 208, 223—224, 226, Iraq

233, 261-269, 277-282, 286—287, 289, 291-292, 1: 50-51, 64, 146, 150, 158, 162, 203, 269, 273-274,

297-298, 300, 303, 308, 312—315, 320—321, 328-331, 279-280, 287

333. 336, 347-349, 358 (n. 23), 380 (n. 70), 382 2: 183 (n. 173), 384 (nn. 244, 256), 385 (n. 310) Assyrian slaughtering, 1: 161 2: 6, 12, 15, 19-20, 27, 35-36, 40, 44, 52, 55, 60, 66, 85, 89, Ireland 104, 133, 173-174, 178, 183, 187-188, 197, 206, 209, 211, 1: 255 215, 221 (nn. 1, 4), 222 (nn. 26, 42), 223 (nn. 61, 64, “Tron Guard” (Romania)

69, 71, 78), 227 (n. 236), 237 (nn. 22-23) 1: 195 Allies, 1: 11, 300, 332; 2: 178; American, 1: 4—5, 11, 53, 573 “TIsidorus’ (illegal immigration boat)

116, 141, 172, 206, 208, 216, 220, 239-240, 276, 282, 1: 345-346 292, 298, 300, 303, 313-314, 317, 320, 323, 328-333, Iskenderun 349, 353, 380 (nN. 57, 59)5 2: 10, 17, 35, 38, 46, 54, 134, 1: 274 151, 158, 174-176, 179-180, 187, 195, 207, 226 (nn. 178, Island of Crete

189, 193, 202) (see also CIC; COI; DMI; OSS); 1: 272, 343 British, 1: 29, 37, 52, 116, 159-160, 170, 176, 201, ISLD (Inter Service Liaison Department)

204—208, 216, 220, 222, 239-240, 242-243, 260, 1: 264, 321 264-265, 267, 270-271, 274, 279-280, 291-293, Israel Labor Movement Archives

300, 317; 322-323, 328-330, 341, 347, 349, 353, 360 1:10 (n. 153), 378 (n. 3); 2: 10—11, 13-16, 29, 35, 38, 40, Israel Labor Party Archive

65-66, 134, 151, 174-177, 179183, 187, 195, 207 (see 1:10 also British Mandate in Eretz-Israel, CID; ISLD; Istanbul MEIC; MIs, MI6; MI9; SIME; SOE); Central 1: 4, 9, 26, 28-29, 36, 66, 92, 98, 116, 119, 133, 140, 151, Europe, 1: 291; Czech, 1: 300; German, 1: 20, 28, 155-157, 159-161, 164, 168-169, 172—179, 183, 190, 43, 158, 185, 199, 263, 274, 291, 302, 304—305, 310, 193, 197, 199—203, 206—208, 212, 214—215, 217-225, 316-318, 330-332, 336, 347-3493 2: 3, 17, 19, 35, 42-45, 227-231, 233-234, 240-246, 248, 250, 253-258, 53, 55, 106, 174 (see also Abwehr); Hungarian, 1: 303, 264-265, 281-282, 284, 289, 291-294, 297-301, 310, 318, 3325 2: 3, 42, 45, 53, 553 Israeli, 1: 28, 348, 380 303-321, 323-325, 329-334, 336, 338, 342-349, (n. 65); Italian, 1: 20-21, 28, 279; IZL, 1: 20; Naval, 1: 352-353, 362 (n. 217), 369 (nn. 73, 76-77, 86), 370 298; Neutral states, 2: 174; Satellite states, 2: 174; So- (n. 101), 372 (nn. 22, 32), 374 (nn. 74, 79, 83, 88), 375 viet, 1: 330; Turkish, 1: 330; Yishuv, 1: 4, 12, 20, 25, (nn. 110-113, 115, 117, 131, 134-136), 376 (nn. 4,

28-29, 50, 52, 141, 204, 208, 263, 265, 267, 270, 277, 16-17), 377 (n. 48), 378 (nn. 66-67, 69-70, 73), 381 279, 281-282, 291, 314, 321, 329—330, 333, 336, (nn. 102, 113, 115-118, 120, 128-129), 382 (nn. 156, 347-3493 2: 15, 27, 40, 55, 60, 66, 133, 173, 183, 188 158, 166, 169-170, 177, 189), 383 (nn. 193, 198, 210),

(see also Haganah, Shai; Secret cooperation be- 384 (n. 241), 385 (nn. 283, 287, 290, 295) tween the Yishuv and the Allies); Western states, 2: 3-11, 13-14, 16-19, 22, 26, 28-30, 33-43, 45-54, 57, 60,

1: 4, 11, 261, 2: 76 63, 66—68, 78, 80, 82—83, 91-92, 94, 97, 99, 103-114,

Intelligence Office 118, 120-124, 126, 139, 142-143, 145, 149, 153, 156-160,

2: 133 162, 165-166, 170, 173, 175—187, 208, 221 (nn. 1-2,

Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR) 12-13), 222 (nn. 28, 35, 53), 223 (nn. 62, 70-71, 77-78,

1: 91, 181, 183, 188, 190, 194, 324 86, 90), 229 (n. 109), 224 (nn. 118-120, 130, 142-144),

2: 23, 48, 51 225 (nn. 148, 153, 156, 176), 226 (nn. 185, 192-193,

Interim Agreement A 199), 227 (nn. 229, 241-243), 228 (nn. 245-246), 229 2: 12-13, 42-43, 45 (n. 55), 230 (mn. 5, 7), 231 (nN. 53, 75), 232 (n. 23), 234

Interim Agreement B (nn. 56, 58), 235 (n. 51), 237 (nn. 6, 17, 24, 27), 238

2: 13, 38-39, 41-43, 45-46, 225 (nn. 145, 147, 149-150, (nn. 35, 48, 50, 54-56, 61-63), 239 (n. 27), 240 (n. 33)

154), 227 (n. 227) See also Yishuv emissaries, Istanbul 1: 157 1: 15, 17, 19—21, 38, 62, 179-180, 195, 239, 243, 266, 271,

International Organization for Child Welfare Italy

Interrogation bureaus 282, 296-298, 313, 321, 326-328, 335, 341-342, 351,

1: 266 385 (n. 297), 386 (nn. 332, 335)

Aleppo, 1: 66, 265, 313; Haifa, 1: 29, 66, 265, 270, 286, 2: 92, 114, 154 291-293, 313-314, 316, 335, 347, 358 (n. 48), 378 British-American occupation, 1: 342; Entry into the (n. 4), 379 (n. 25), 380 (n. 58), 381 (n. 122); 2: 238 wal, 1: 39, 269; Policy in the Middle East, 1: 20-21;

(n. 59); Istanbul, 1: 66, 265, 291, 306, 318, 347 Surrender, 1: 269, 333

283

Subject Index

Ivan Karpic (restaurant in Ankara) 2: 6, 9, 13, 16-17, 20, 25-26, 29, 32, 37-38, 52-54, 58,

1: 294 60-61, 64, 66—67, 71—72, 83, 9O—91, 94, 98, 101-102,

IZL (Irgun Zvai Leum!) 108-113, 117, 120-124, 126, 129-137, 139-141, 143, 145, 1: 20, 111-114, 263, 265, 349, 351, 357 (n. 4) 147, 149, 152-154, 158-159, 169, 175-177, 179, 181—

2: 202 182, 185-186, 188—192, 199, 202, 212, 230 (Nn. 5), 233

Izmir (Smirna, as it is called in Greek) (nn. 7, 46) 1: 342-347 Jewish Agency Executive (JAE) 2: 170, 177 1: 7, 10, 27, 32-33, 45-49, 56, 66-67, 70, 77-79, 81-84,

87—99, 100-101, 106—110, 112, 114, 116, 118, 120—121,

Japan 125-135, 141, 143-167, 169—170, 172-175, 177-180, 1: 54, 194 182-184, 187-192, 194, 200-208, 215—218, 220—222,

JA’s Planning Committee. See Jewish Agency, Executive 225-228, 230-234, 237-238, 240-244, 246-254,

Planning Committee 256—259, 273, 283-290, 305, 323, 338-339, 343, 357

JDC UVoint Distribution Committee) (n. 17), 358 (nn. 21, 28, 32, 35, 44), 359 (nn. 59,

1: 8—9, 11, 31, 54, 144, 150-151, 159, 162, 177-179, 183-184, 60—61, 63, 66, 68, 70-71, 75, 88, 90, 93-94, 102— 194, 200, 212—215, 220—221, 226—231, 240, 248, 370 104), 360 (nn. 111-112, 115-116, 120-124, 127, 138, 141,

(n. 100), 375 (nn. 119, 121) 143, 147, 149, 153, 156), 361 (nn. 158-159, 161, 164, 2: 3, 9, 29-31, 39, 41, 43, 46, 48, 54-57, 60-61, 64-65, 91, 168-171, 173, 186, 189, 191), 362 (nn. 200, 203-204, 96, 103, 105, 108, 112, 114, 120, 122-124, 126, 151-163, 207, 221, 1, 7-8), 363 (mn. 14-15, 20, 23-25, 27, 29, 32, 165, 167, 174, 180, 182, 184-186, 192, 207, 227 (n. 229), 40, 43-44, 47-51, 53, 56-57), 364 (nn. 59-60, 63, 66,

234 (nn. 2-3), 235 (nn. 21-23, 28, 35, 46, 50, 53) 70-72, 75, 89-90), 365 (nn. 97, 103-105, 109—110, Dobkin-Schwartz agreement, 1: 229-230; Europe, 1: 144, 113, 115, 120, 123-126, 128, 131-132, 134-135), 366 229; 2: 153, 185; Geneva, 1: 9, 140, 214-215, 221, 229, (nn. 137, 3-6, 8-10, 12—13, 16—20), 367 (nn. 22, 231; 2: 52, 56, 65, 155, 159, 185; Istanbul, 1: 9; 2: 153, 26-27, 29, 1, 3-7, 10, 12-13, 15, 17-18, 20), 368 158—159; JDC cooperation with the JAE, 2: 151-163, (nn. 21, 24, 30, 31-34, 37, 39-41, 44-46, 49, 51, 53— 185, 207; Jerusalem, 1: 9, 227, 229; 2: 30, 151-153, 155, 55, 57-60), 369 (nn. 64, 67, 70-72, 74, 78, 82-85, 157-160; Lisbon, 1: 9; 2: 154, 159, 185; New York, 1: 9, 89, 91-92), 370 (nN. 99-101, 103, 105-108, 111, 144, 162, 227, 230-231, 368 (n. 57); 2: 30-31, 56-57; 113-114, 116, 127), 371 (n. 131, 138, 141, 143, 2, 12-16),

151, 153-154, 156, 159-160; Stockholm, 1: 9. 372 (nn. 18, 31, 38—39, 41-42), 373 (nn. 49, 56), 374 © See also Financing rescue activities, Funds-raising (nn. 76, 79, 82-83, 87, 97), 375 (nN. 104, 111-115,

JDC Archive 117-119, 121, 124-125, 127, 131, 133), 376 (nn. 3, 5-8,

iu 11-19, 21-22, 26), 377 (nn. 28, 30-34, 37-38, 40—45, Jericho 47-59, 61-62), 378 (nn. 65—68, 70, 72-75), 379 1: 65 (nn. 23, 41, 43-44, 52, 59), 380 (nn. 83, 86-87, 89), Jerusalem 381 (nn. 94, 99, 105, 109—110), 382 (n. 140), 384

1: 7, 9-11, 20-21, 28-29, 35-36, 50, 68, 78, 92, 96-98, (n. 254), 385 (n. 271), 386 (nn. 314, 325), 387 (n. 386) 107-110, 143, 146, 160, 166, 173, 175, 177, 179, 2: 3-15, 17, 19, 21, 23-28, 30—38, 40—41, 46—47, 49-54, 184-189, 193, 200—202, 212, 215, 227, 229, 234, 237, 56-57, 59-61, 64-68, 72—83, 85, 89—92, 94, 96-115, 240, 243, 253, 256-259, 273, 275, 279-280, 284, 288, 117-125, 127, 129-144, 148-149, 151-160, 162-171, 290, 292—294, 297, 305-307, 312-319, 330, 333-334, 177-180, 182, 185, 188-192, 199, 202—208, 221 (nn. 1, 3,

337-339» 342) 347; 349, 353 7> 9, 11-14), 222 (MN. 22, 25-30, 32-33, 35, 39) 43, 45; 2: 7-8, 10-11, 13-17, 27-28, 30, 35-37, 40-41, 47-49, 51-52, 57, 59), 223 (nn. 60, 65, 67, 70, 73, 77, 79, 84, 51-54, 57> 59, 62, 66, 68, 83, 93, 97, 118-120, 123, 142, 86-88, 90—93), 224 (nn. 100—101, 103, 113-114, 117-118, 149, 151-153, 155, 157-160, 163, 170, 175-178, 180-181, 125-126, 129, 138), 225 (nn. 148, 157-159, 164, 172-177),

184-186, 203—204 226 (nn. 180—181, 184-187, 190-193, 199, 201, 205), 227 Catholic church, 2: 72 (nN. 213, 216, 223, 225-226, 229—232, 234, 242, 250), Jerusalem Program. See Biltmore Program 228 (nn. 4-7, 8, 9, 17, 20-22, 25-26), 229 (nn. 31, 35,

Jewish Agency 37, 48, 51, 55), 230 (nn. 58, 5, 16-17, 19, 23, 25-27, 28), 1: 3-5, 7-10, 18, 20-22, 25-29, 32-35, 37-38, 42-43, 45-47, 231 (nn. 36, 40-46, 49, 53-55, 60, 63, 66, 71, 74, 77; 54, 58, 61-62, 64-68, 70-72, 75, 90, 143, 146, 149, 151, 79-82), 232 (nn. 83-84, 86—88, 2, 4-6, 8, 10, 15, 19-21, 157, 164, 166, 170, 172, 181, 183-190, 194, 200, 206, 210, 24-28, 30—31, 33-35, 38-39, 41-42), 233 (nn. 1-3, 8-9, 213, 218, 220—221, 229—230, 232—233, 261, 263, 265-266, 11—13, 15, 17-22, 25-27, 29, 33-34, 37-40, 43, 45), 234

268, 270—271, 273-280, 282—283, 285, 287, 292-297, (nn. 48-52, 56, 60, 62, 65-66, 70-72, 74-75, 78, 80, 5), 316-317, 320, 322-323, 326-327, 329-330, 332-333, 337> 235 (nn. 6-7, 13, 19, 21, 23-27, 31, 33-37, 39, 41-42, 339, 341-342, 345, 347, 352s 357 (n. 2), 361 (n. 185), 366 47-48, 53), 236 (nn. 56-57, 59, 60-66, 72-74, 76, (n. 145), 368 (n. 52), 371 (nn. 6, 10—12), 372 (nn. 16-18, 78-81, 83-88), 237 (nn. 90-92, 94, 2—4, 6, 20), 239

33-34, 37> 40, 50), 377 (n. 64), 386 (n. 314) (nn. 1, 3-4, 13-14, 24), 240 (nn. 29, 32, 35)

284

Subject Index

Arab Department, 1: 36; B funds, 2: 133-134, 191, 205; Jewish brigade. See Jewish army Budget, 2: 90-94, 98, 109, 112, 117-120, 122-123, Jewish Chronicle (newspaper) 129—134, 137, 139, 144, 149, 157, 177, 189, 191-192, 202; 1: 26, 55

Commerce and Industry Department, 1: 7; 2: 131, 2: 74 143; Committee for Child Immigration, 1: 150-151, Jewish communities in Britain

368 (n. 27), 369 (n. 65), 370 (n. 116); 2: 230 (n. 18), 2: 84 234 (nn. 5-6); Emergency Advisory Committee, 1: Jewish divisions

283-284, 313, 379 (n. 52), 380 (nn. 69, 84); Finance 1:34 Department, 1: 7; 2: 101, 123-124, 139, 166, 182; Jewish National Fund (JNF) Geneva branch, 1: 32-33, 54, 62, 65, 157, 218, 221, 229, 1: 7, 269

248, 282; 2: 80, 188; German Department, 1: 151; 2: 90, 93, 142, 169 Iberian peninsula branch, 1: 248; Immigration De- See also National Funds partment, 1: 7, 25, 27, 66, 125, 143, 150, 244, 249, 252; Jewish resistance 2: 132, 141, 154, 160, 191; Infiltration Advisory Com- 1: 88, 141, 240, 261, 267, 285-286, 322, 355 mittee, 1: 321, 325, 329, 334, 337-339» 342, 348, 384 Jewish scientists who had emigrated from Germany

(nn. 256, 258), 385 (nn. 277, 299), 386 (nn. 313, 315, 1: 264 333, 338), 387 (Nn. 373); 2: 190, 207; Istanbul branch, Jewish state 1: 248; 2: 54; Italian Desk, 1: 297; “Section for Special 1: 22, 41, 44, 53, 64, 108, 117, 123, 135, 140, 197-198, 249,

Operation,” 1: 10, 127, 134, 172, 282, 338-339, 346, 348; 252, 278, 283, 325, 339

2: 66, 133, 205; Labor Department, 1: 7; Lisbon 2: 121, 197-198, 200, 213, 218 branch, 2: 54; London branch, 1: 7, 21, 33, 42-43, 545 Jewish Telegraph Agency (JTA)

65, 68, 82, 84, 87, 89, 93, 109, 148-149, 160, 162, 164, 1: 26, 56 166, 170, 172, 175, 178-179, 183-189, 191, 193, 209, 243, Jews

251, 265, 271, 290, 339, 364 (n. 63), 368 (n. 51), 369 Communist states, 1: 121; Free World, 1: 23, 75, 79-80, (n. 63), 367 (n. 70), 370 (nn. 118-119), 371 (n. 2); 88, 104, 111, 143, 196, 199, 226, 229, 236-237, 2523 2: 5, 8-9, 27, 32, 47, 54, 58-60, 73-74, 83, 85, 133, 168, 2: 71, 77; 79, 91, 111, 120, 122, 125, 132, 160, 166; Li-

179-180, 182, 188, 212; Non-Zionists, 1: 83, 925 2: 31, berated areas, 2: 120-122; Muslim countries, 170; Organization Department, 1: 33, 61, 71, 362 1: 241-242; Satellite states, 1: 322; World Zionist or(nn. 197, 218); 2: 83, 230 (n. 28); Planning Commit- ganization Jews accused of collaborating the Nazis, tee, 1: 120, 150, 252, 366 (n. 143); 2: 94, 129, 134, 197; 1: 336 Political Department, 1: 7, 10, 18, 20, 25, 28-29, 81, See also B’nai B’rith; Centrala Evreilor; Rescue Com87-88, 93-94, 96, 125-127, 134, 143, 145, 149, 155, 164, mittee of Bulgarian Jewry; Rescue Committee of 166, 170, 172, 184, 189, 206, 208, 233, 246, 253, 263, Hungarian Jewry; South African Jewry’s Emer265—266, 268, 270-271, 275-276, 280, 282-283, 285, gency Committee; UZ (Ustredna Zidov), “Jewish 287, 292, 294-295, 321, 327; 329, 335-340, 344, 346, Center” (Slovakia); and Jews, specific parts of the

352—353, 370 (nn. 98, 101, 114, 122), 372 (n. 42), 379 world (n. 47), 380 (nn. 66, 72), 381 (n. 110), 382 (n. 148), Jews, Africa 383 (n. 203), 386 (nn. 314, 351), 387 (Nn. 374); 2:15, Egypt, 1: 220, 226; 2: 108, 154, 169-170, 177; North 17-18, 29, 33, 56, 65—66, 77, 84, 133, 166, 177, 183, Africa, 1: 89, 243, 317; South Africa, 1: 153-154, 181, 204—205, 207, 227 (n. 242), 237 (n. 16); Romania 220, 226—227, 229, 231, 234, 238, 248, 305, 368 branch, 1: 121; Statistic Department, 1: 5; Statistical (n. 35); 2: 76, 105, 108, 111, 114, 163-167, 170, 182, 236

information sheet, 2: 92; Stockholm branch, (nn. 55, 58, 62, 73, 79-80); South African Board of 2: 53-54; U.S. branch, 1: 7-8, 10, 58, 60, 68, 82, 84, Deputies, 1: 181; South African Pro-Soviet circles, 89, 93, 109, 144, 148-151, 160, 170, 186, 188, 230, 250, 2: 165 276-277; 2: 6, 11, 17, 32, 58-59, 73, 133, 159, 212 Jews, America See also Financing rescue activities; JDC cooperation 1:19, 40-42, 44, 51, 53-54, 57, 60, 73, 79, 83, 89, 107—-1H,

with the JAE; Yishuv emissaries 151, 160, 186, 197-198, 220, 246, 250, 252, 276, Jewish Agency Department of Statistics. See Interrogation 305-306, 361 (n. 178), 364 (n. 93), 365 (nn. 99, 114),

Bureaus, Haifa 368 (n. 33), 373 (nn. 54, 56), 375 (mn. 119, 121, 126), “Jewish air squadron” 378 (n. 1) 2:72 2: 29-30, 71, 73, 80, 91, 95-96, 100, 106, 108, 133, 151-152,

Jewish American Committee 157, 163, 198, 202, 224 (n. 98), 235 (mn. 17, 24, 40)s

1: 60 Non-Zionist, 1: 8, 41, 53, 108; 2: 3; Orthodox, 1: 8; 2: 80;

Jewish army Temporary emergency committee, 1: 60

1: 35, 39, 51, 58, 70, 111—112, 118, 141, 148, 266, 273, 290, See also American and Canadian Congress of Ortho-

380 (n. 85), 384 (n. 263) dox Rabbis; American Jewish Committee; Ameri-

2: 200 can Jewish Congress; B’nai B’rith 285

Subject Index

Jews, Asia 205-207, 210, 212; Romanian forced labor, 1: 196;

1:19 Romanian Jewish property, 1: 198; Sweden, 1: 185,

USSR, 1: 31, 33, 35, 49, 51, 1463 2: 174 1945 2: 35, 52-53, 55) 57-583 Switzerland, 1: 213, 231,

Jews, Australia 277, 3363 2: 55-56, 58; Switzerland, Orthodox, 2: 80; 1: 248 Transnistria, (see Transnistria plan); Turkey, 1: 156, Jews, Europe 160, 244, 342-343, 347; Western Europe, 1: 66, 69, Austria, 1: 22, 31, 33, 65, 86, 106; 2: 210; Balkan, 1: 56, 187, 193, 204; 2: 73; Yugoslavia, 2: 92 148-152, 157, 160-161, 171, 173, 187, 193, 204, Jews, Middle East 240-241, 251, 254, 256, 293, 322, 335; 2: 4-6, 22-23, 1: 165 54; 99, 117, 168, 184; Belgium, 1: 66, 1185 2: 99; Iran, 1: 244; Iraq, 1: 50, 105, 161-162, 279; Lebanon, Bessarabia, 2: 97; Britain, 1: 51, 160, 305-306, 376 1: 269; Syria, 1: 161, 269; Turkey, 1: 156, 160, 244, (n. 24); 2: 73-74, 84, 108, 133, 168-169, 180, 182, 229 342-343, 347; Yemen, 1: 105, 161, 244, 269; 2: 154, 1615

(n. 32); Bulgaria, 1: 27, 62, 69, 98, 120-121, 148-149, Aden, Yemen, 1: 2433 2: 161 151, 154, 158, 164, 166-167, 174-180, 182-183, 193, 220, Jews Council. See UZ (Ustredna Zidov), “Jewish Center”

228, 244, 247, 249, 251, 253-254, 259; 293, 352, 354; (Slovakia) 358 (n. 39), 367 (n. 32), 369 (n. 96); 2: 92, 121, Jews for trucks. See Brand plan 125-126, 154, 160, 162, 232 (nn. 36, 39), 233 (n. 41); Johnnies-come-lately (American)

Bukovina, Bulgaria, 2: 92, 97; Bulgarian Commu- 1: 299 nists, 2: 125; Central Europe, 1: 31, 55, 66, 204; Judenrat Czechoslovakia, 1: 19, 31-33, 43, 55, 86, 95, 118, 140, 1: 88 172, 175, 183-184, 195, 202, 213-218, 220-221, 225, Julius (illegal immigration ship) 229—230, 232, 234-236, 300, 305-306, 308, 340, 373 1: 186—187 (nn. 51-52, 54, 56-58), 374 (n. 98), 375 (n. 139), 376

(n. 141); 2: 11, 19, 110-111, 186, 223 (n. 65), 229 Kaldovo Sabac convoy (n. 45); Czech Neologues, 1: 214; Denmark, 1: 77, 1: 27, 358 (n. 39), 360 (n. 131) 186, 370 (n. 115); Eastern Europe, 1: 50, 52-53, 555 59, Kalia

144, 1873 2: 73, 174; Estonia, 1: 53; France, 1: 62, 65, 1: 33 118, 144-145, 173, 184, 188, 249-251, 362 (n. 197), 377 Kasztner’s murder

(n. 39); French Armée Juive, 1: 249; Germany, 1: 16, 2: 67 20-22, 33, 69, 73-74, 86, 106, 184, 370 (n. 121); 2: 99, See also Kasztner trial; Kasztner, Israel (name index) 197, 210; Greece, 1: 46, 159, 220, 342-347, 352, 386 Kasztner’s train

(nn. 342, 346-347), 387 (nn. 356-357); 2: 62, 92, 2: 47, 51, 54, 57, 64, 67, 93 170, 177, 181; Holland, 1: 66, 376 (n. 14); 2: 72, 993 See also Kasztner trial; Kasztner, Israel (name index) Hungary, 1: 43, 69, 116-120, 140, 151, 154, 168, 180, Kasztner’s trial

182, 184-186, 191, 193, 218, 223, 230, 237, 239-24], 2: 64, 204, 218 243-245, 253, 257; 293, 299, 321, 327-328, 334; 340, Katowice

345, 372 (n. 18), 376 (nn. 24-25); 2: 1-69, 73, 77-83, 1: 302 85, 92, 117-120, 154, 158-159, 184, 215, 221 (nn. 4, 6, “Kazbek” (illegal immigration ship)

11), 223 (n. 65), 229 (nn. 49-50, 55), 232 (nn. 4, 22, 2: 122, 184 38); Hungarian labor camps, 1: 248; Hungarian Kfar Giladi, kibbutz prison camps, 1: 248; Italy, 1: 62, 243; 2: 114; Latvia, 1: 344 2: 53; Norway, 2: 58, 99; Poland, 1: 16, 22, 24, 27, Kielce pogroms 30-33) 35-37 47> 495 54-57) 59> 66, 68, 725 75> 82, 84, 2.120 86, 88, 96, 99, 103, 105, 122, 131, 145-146, 149-150, Kiev

153, 165, 181, 183, 193, 204, 208, 217, 222, 224-225, 1: 49 237-238, 243, 249, 267, 283, 285, 299, 306, 360 Kishinev (n. 135), 362 (n. 208), 364 (nn. 69, 83), 377 (n. 28); 1: 50 2: 11, 50, 52, 73, 92, 99, 106, 110, 124, 162, 188, 190, Kleipete-Memel

197, 203-204, 211; Polish resistance movement, 1: 1:17 267; Romania, 1: 42, 50, 62, 96, 131, 140, 151, 154, 160, Knesset Israel

163, 168, 172, 177-181, 191, 193-201, 203-206, 208, 1: 6-7, 97-98, 129, 363 (Nn. 10), 377 (n. 44)

210—212, 217, 244-245, 247, 249, 253, 256, 259, 267, 2:170 293, 328, 340, 352, 354, 369 (n. 76), 370 (n. 101), 371 “Koffer HaYishuv” (redemption for the Yishuv)

(nn. 1, 8, 10-12, 15, 17-18), 373 (nn. 42, 49); 2: 4, 11, 1: 89 20, 68, 73, 92, 97, 101, 122-124, 176, 186—187, 215; Ro- 2: 92,99

mania, Organization of Jewish communities in, 1: Kolomyya

199; Romanian deportation, 1: 196, 198, 200-202, 1: 301

286

Subject Index

1:199 2:71

Konrad Star (shipping firm) Lidice (Czech)

Kovna 1: 30,Lilly 358 (illegal (n. 51) immigration 1: 176, 197 ship)

Krakow (ghetto) Lisbon 1: 93 1: 9, 54, 184, 200, 282, 316—317, 368 (n. 57), 376 (nn. 12, Kristallnacht 22), 383 (n. 210) 1: 21, 46, 106 2: 6, 31, 46-47, 51, 54, 57> 153-154, 157~160, 185-186, 224 2: 210 (n. 103), 226 (n. 186), 235 (nn. 15, 21, 26, 49) Krupp (firm) Litani (river) Kulke S.1.A.17, R. 30, Lithuania 1.199 33-34) 37 Kullman’s mission Lloyds (bank) 2: 48-49, 51-52 2: 173 Kushta. See Istanbul Lodz

2: 83 1: 274

Labor camps London 1: 336 1: 7, 11, 15, 17-18, 21, 27, 29, 31, 33 36-37, 39-40, 42-45, 1: 31, 67

Austria, 1: 336; Germany, 1: 336; Krakow, 2: 92; Novaski, 49, 51-52, 54-60, 65, 71, 82, 84, 87-89, 93, 98, 106, 2: 92; Slovakia, 1: 213, 227, 229; Srat, 2: 92; Yugo- 109, 114, 119, 143, 148, 151-152, 154, 157, 160, 162,

slavia, 1: 336 164-166, 170, 172-173, 175, 177-179, 181, 183-189, 191, Labor Movement 193, 208—210, 212, 219, 240, 242—246, 250-251, 259, 1: 25, 34, 46, 240, 323, 334, 351 264-273, 275-278, 284-288, 290-294, 297-298,

2: 60, 187, 205, 207, 237 (n. 4), 238 (n. 59), 239 (n. 6) 305-306, 311, 314, 320, 322-323, 327-330, 333-334,

Land purchase 337, 339-341, 349 1: 5-7 2: 5, 8-12, 15-16, 18, 23-25, 27-28, 30—33, 36—41, 47, 51,

2: 375 93 54, 57-61, 66, 71-74, 77-79, 81-85, 96, 124, 133, 168, Lands Law 176, 179-182, 185-186, 188, 198, 203, 208, 211, 213 1: 38, 42, 46, 101, 107 Lorenzo-Marques (South Africa) See also British Mandate in Eretz-Israel 1: 193

1: 342 1: 67, 239 1:17, 97 Madagascar Lebanon 1: 24, 74

“Leadburn” Operation Lvov League of Nations

1: 267, 269, 271, 273-274, 286, 292 Madison Square Gardens

Left wing circles in the Yishuv 1: 57359

1: 25, 77, 86, 337-338 Madrid

2: 196, 198, 202, 206 youth 1: 311movement Lehi Mahanot Ha’olim

2: 202 2: 212

1: 119, 349, 351, 357 (n. 4) 1: 220 See also “Dissidents” Major Powers

1: 256 190, 210, 252, 261

Lend and lease contract 1: 78-79, 88-90, 95, 98—99, 101, 103, 105, 111, 115-119, 168,

Leningrad 2: 11, 13, 27-28, 30, 36, 38, 64

1: 239 Declaration (December 1942), 1: 87—88, 101, 152, 166; Liberalism 2: 74-77 2: 196 Manchester Guardian (newspaper)

Liberated areas 1: 29, 52, 333

347 1: 297, 349

1: 120, 223, 240-241, 245, 248-249, 259, 298, 321, 339, “Mantilla” Operation

2: 56, 65, 117, 119—122, 124, 160, 162-163 Mapai (Jewish Labor Party) Liberated countries. See Liberated areas 1: 7-8, 10, 12, 16, 25, 27, 34, 45, 48-50, 64-65, 67, 70-71,

Libya 81, 84, 86, 89, 92, 98, 102, 106, 110, 120, 125, 127, 129, 1: 64, 273 131, 133, 135, 139, 149-150, 153, 157; 166, 183, 193, 200, 287

Subject Index

Mapai (continued) “Milos” (illegal immigration ship) 203, 206—207, 216—218, 225, 232, 240, 258, 284-285, 1: 41, 80 323, 334, 338, 351, 354 Minturno (Italy) 2: 64, 72-73, 94-95, 98-100, 102, 105-106, 109, 111, 1: 239 113, 118, 121, 129, 136-139, 188, 191, 196-198, 202, Mishmarot, kibbutz

204-205, 208, 212, 218, 231 (n. 78) 1: 319 Secretariat, 1: 49, 150, 156, 217, 232, 283; 2: 95-96, 99, Mizrahi

104, 136-138 1: 41, 84, 92, 131

“Margaretha” Operation. See Hungary, German occupa- 2:6

tion Mobilization and Rescue Fund

Maritza (illegal immigration ship) 1: 52, 226, 288

1: 175-176, 179 2: 9O—92, 99-101, 104—106, 108, 114, 117-119, 122,

1:104 2: 83 1: 148, 245 1: 148 1: Kampf” 264 Morocco 1:17 “Mein

2: 157, 184 134-142, 144—145, 148-149, 162, 200

Massada Monowiz (rubber and synthetic petroleum factories)

Mauritius “Month of solidarity with the Diaspora”

1: 41, 243 2: 113, 141-142, 144, 148, 200

“Mefkure’” (illegal immigration ship) Montreux Convention

MEIC (Middle East Intelligence Center) Moravia

1: 16, 18, 29, 65, 71, 74 1: 315

Merchants and industrialists in the Yishuv Moscow

1: 1: 36,2: 49,76, 53,84 255 2: 101 131-132

Mersin (Turkey) Mossad (Israeli espionage body)

1: 165, 171 1: 261, 276, 299, 352 Mexico 2: 174 1: 311 Mossad Le Aliyah Bet

MI5 1: 25, 38, 63, 125-126, 134, 156-157, 176, 206, 210, 263,

1: 264 280, 295, 368 (n. 52), 381 (n. 98)

MI6 (SIS) 2: 18, 56, 103, 122, 205, 207, 227 (n. 228)

2: 175, 180-182 Mozambique MIg9 1: 181 1: 264 Munich Convention Middle East 1: 17-18, 20, 21

1: 264-265, 269—270, 274, 289, 291, 300, 305, 328, 352 See also Illegal immigration; Yishuv emissaries

1: 5—6, 18, 20—21, 28, 36, 38-39, 46, 50—51, 53, 89, 97, 112, Munich Pact 145, 149, 166, 172, 179, 197-198, 203, 218, 261—262, 265, 1:17, 19, 221 269-273, 276, 278, 292, 295, 310, 312; 313, 324, 349

2: 15, 31, 173, 182 Nagasaki German invasion to Middle East, 1: 46, 261, 295; Infla- 2:71 tionary situation, 1: 313; War, 1: 28, 38, 46 Naples Migration. See Britain, Immigration policy; Rescue, Im- 1: 239 migration; United States, Immigration laws; National Archives in Washington USSR, Immigration policy; Western States, Im- 1:11

Milan 2: 179

migration National Bank of Switzerland

1:15 National Committee for Jewish Youth 1: 177, 179, 256 National Council

“Milca” (illegal immigration ship) 1: 184

2: 157, 184 1: 6-7, 27, 35, 78, 82—83, 87-88, 93-98, 109, 114, 116, 122,

Military Arm of the National Liberation Front (EAM). See 128—131, 133, 165, 203, 215, 358 (n. 26), 359 (nn. 66,

Hellas 69), 364 (n. 70), 368 (n. 61) Million National Funds191 2: 197plan 1: 152, 168-170,

Military Operation 4 (MO4). See MI6; SOE 2: 72, 101, 135, 137, 142, 148, 155, 169-170

288

Subject Index

National homeland Observer (newspaper)

2: 196 2: 200

1: 6, 7, 101, 106 1: 90

Nazis. See Germany Occupied territories in Europe Nazism 1: 26—28, 30, 32-35, 37-39; 49, 54-55, 59, 62, 65-66, 68, 1: 16-17, 21, 33, 36, 39—40, 46—48, 70, 74, 102, 169, 236, 88, 92, 95, 97, 100, 126, 140-141, 144, 146-148, 153,

300, 335 157, 161-162, 164—169, 173, 182, 184—187, 192, 205— 2: 21, 85, 169 206, 212-213, 219-220, 222—224, 226, 230~231, 233, Anti-Jewish legislation, 1: 62; Propaganda, 1: 60, 87, 237, 239-245, 255, 258-259, 261-262, 267, 270,

146, 185; 2:14 273-274, 277, 281-285, 288—289, 291—293, 296, 299,

Nea Vrissi (Turkey) 302, 304-305, 308, 312, 322, 327-328, 330-331, 1: 343-345, 347 334-336, 341-342, 344-345, 347-349, 352, 361

2: 178 (n. 185)

Negation of the Diaspora 2: 4, 29, 35, 42, 44, 47-48, 51, 74, 79, 89-90, 92-93, 96, 1: 86, 104, 117-118 100, 103, 106—107, 117, 135, 153-157, 159, 173-175, 2: 198, 201, 213, 216—217, 219 177-179, 181, 184, 186, 188, 192, 197, 201, 231 (Nn. 37)

Negev Food and supply consignment into occupied territo2: 133 ries, 1: 91, 141, 180, 219, 222, 237, 3423 2: 13, 107, 111, Netherlands 117, 156, 186 1: 266 : Odessa Neutral states 1: 36, 239 1: 4, 9, 36, 78, 83, 88, 91, 141, 143, 145-148, 151-153, 156, “Ohel Shem” (hall in Tel Aviv)

277, 287-288 Oil

165, 183-184, 189, 193-194, 239, 254-255, 266—267, 1: 140

1:79 2: 202 1: 26, 44, 55 1: 343

2:12, 44, 51, 103, 157, 173-174, 179, 187, 199 1: 267, 343

“New Deal” program Old immigrant organizations New Palestine (newspaper) “Ophir” (cinema in Tel Aviv)

New York Orthodox circles 1: 9, 59, 140, 162, 183, 193, 210, 227, 277, 292 1: 6, 8

2: 49 168

2: 29, 153-154 2: 168-169, 218

New York Herald Tribune (newspaper) Britain, 2: 168-169; United States, 2: 169; Yishuv, 2: 110,

New York Times (newspaper) Orthodox Rescue Committee

1: 26, 43-44, 208, 256, 294 1: 240

News agencies OSS (Office of Strategic Services)

1: 26, 42, 44, 66 1: 11, 53, 57 264, 276, 298-299, 308-310, 312-314,

1! 303 (n. 290)

Nikolaus Feker (straw company) 319-320, 325, 329, 331-333, 337-338, 345-347) 385

Nisko-Lublin (Poland) 2: 35, 174, 226 (n. 193)

1: 24, 31-32, 46, 74, 198 Algeria, 1: 264, 3173; Bari, 1: 329-331; Bern, 1: 264, 2773

Nitra (Slovakia) Cairo (Middle East headquarters), 1: 264, 298, 1: 213 312-313, 320, 329-333, 3395 346; 2: 176, 178; Greek Nocham (United Pioneering Youth) desk, 1: 346; Istanbul, 1: 264, 291-292, 298, 300, 305, 2:121 309-312, 331-332; Izmir, 1: 346; Jerusalem, 2: 28; New North Africa York, 1: 298; Sabotage in the Greek northeast rail1: 46, 58, 64, 89, 91, 144, 179, 185, 243, 273, 285, 315, 317, 320 way line, 1: 331; Stockholm, 2: 53, 57; Turkey, 1: 292, 2:21 316, 343, 346; Washington, 1: 320, 330—331, 333» 339

Norway “Overlord” 1: 38, 69 1: Operation 239

1: 20 1: 41, 80 1: 22, 73-74 1: 26, 44 2: 72

Nuremberg “Pacific” (illegal immigration ship) Nuremberg laws Palestine Correspondence (news agency)

Nuremberg trials Palestine Foundation Fund (PFF) 1: 235 2: 90, 93, 100, 136, 139, 142, 166, 168-169, 200 289

Subject Index

Palestine Office Philips 1: 26-27, 33, 248, 256, 258, 262, 344 1: 200

2: 122-123, 166 Phoenix petroleum and transport company (Romania)

Balkans, 2: 167; Bulgaria, 1: 157; Geneva, 1: 26, 344; 1: 193 Hungary, 2: 5; Istanbul, 1: 26, 178, 222, 281; 2: 6, “Phony War” 121-122, 126, 184; Portugal, 1: 26; Romania, 1: 199; 1: 38, 40, 65

Vienna, 1: 244 1: 242 Palestine Post (newspaper) Pinkney Tuck’s children. See Pinkney Tuck’s plan 1: 29 Pinkney Tuck’s plan 2: 33, 139 1: 144-145, 153, 173, 188 2: 176; Switzerland, 1: 336; Turkey, 1: 151, 256, 2583 Piedmont (Italy)

Palestinians 2: 29 2: 197-198, 214 1:19

1: 21, 28, 51, 93, 143, 161, 168, 197, 209, 215, 249, 313, 346, 351 Pinsk

Palestinocentrism Pioneer youth 1: 47, 86, 104-106, 119, 209, 263, 294 1:170

Palmah 1: 66 2: 37, 183 1: 158, 267, 343 2: 196, 199-201, 215 Pioterkov

1: 263, 278-279, 283, 285, 289, 294, 297, 324, 329, 337 Ploiesti (oil fields)

Arab section, 1: 279, 283; Balkan section, 1: 279, 283, Plonsk

285, 329; Funding, 1: 280; German section, 1: 279, 1: 134

283, 285,(firm) 329 Po1:15 river Paltours 2:191 Po’alei Agudat Israel Pan Arabic movement 1: 131 1: 279 Po’alei Zion “Parachutists’ Scheme” 1: 27, 41, 44, 47, 139, 183 1: 4, 30, 127, 141, 146, 240, 261-262, 267, 269, 279-280, Hungary, 2:5 282-283, 286, 290, 295-298, 306-307, 321, 324-329, Po’alei Zion Left

335-338, 340-342, 347-349, 353-355 1: 27, 44, 91

2: 18, 75, 103, 173-177, 183, 207 2: 106

1: 293 2: 120 1: 134, 193 2:77 Fourteen group, 1: 295; Simmonds-Schind agreement, Pogroms

“Parallel System” “Point-blank Campaign” 2: 59-60, 138, 203-208 Poland Paris 1: 16, 18, 22, 24, 27, 30-37, 47, 49, 54-59, 62, 66,

1: 21, 223, 334 68-69, 71-72, 75, 82, 84, 86, 88, 96, 99, 103, 105,

Partisans 118, 122, 131, 134, 141, 145-146, 149, 153, 165, 183, 1: 118, 336, 340-342, 355 187, 193, 204, 208, 214, 217, 220—226, 229, 231,

2: 178 237-238, 243, 249, 262, 267, 283-286, 288, 290, Greece, 1: 118, 343, 345 299, 301-302, 305-307, 309, 313, 325, 343» 367

Partition between Jews and Arabs in Palestine (n. 11), 374 (n. 93)

1: 23, 64 2: 5-6, 8, 10—11, 16, 20, 50, 52, 73-76, 78—81, 83-84, 92, 1: 41, 43, 100, 107 187-188, 190, 196-197, 203—204, 211

“Patria” (illegal immigration ship) 103, 106-107, 111, 124, 127, 141, 168-169, 173, 177,

Peace accords by the end of the war Annihilation committee, 1: 66; Church, 1: 146; Con-

1: 248 sulate in Budapest, 1: 299; Consulate in Palestine, 1: 108 London, 2: 74; Embassy in United States, 1: 60; 2:194 German occupation, 1: 30, 33-35, 49, 66, 88, 145;

Pearl Harbor 1: 145, 284; 2: 226 (n. 185), 236 (n. 86); Embassy in

Peel Commission 2: 124; Government in exile, 1: 27, 31, 49, 54-56, 1: 23, 320 60, 68, 71, 88, 145-147, 152-153, 181, 193, 284; 2: 72, 2: 197-198 74-75, 84, 95, 168-169, 203; Murder of Polish farm“Peripheral pact” ers, 2: 76; National Council, 1: 27, 54-55, 1463 2: 723

1: 270 Representation in Sweden, 1: 272; Russian occupa290

Subject Index

tion, 1: 30, 33, 36-37, 1453 2: 124; Underground, America, 1: 52, 83, 89, 107-110, 198; Bank holidays,

1: 27, 54, 284; 2: 84, 173 1: 115-116; Demonstrations, 1: 79, 81, 83, 110, 116—

“Polish Jewry Day” 117, 121, 281; Manifesto, 1: 82, 96, 108; Mourning,

2: 110 1: 81-83, 89, 122; Petitions, 1: 79, 96—97; Rallies,

Polish National Council 1: 77, 79, 82—83, 89, 96, 99-101, 108, 115-116, 120-121,

1: 27, 54-55, 146 166, 287; Strikes, 1: 79, 82-82, 96, 116, 122

2: 72, 162 Purchase of arm

2: 124 Pyrenees

Polish National Liberation Committee 2: 133, 176, 178, 186, 205

Polish Republic’s Press Association 2:92

1: 279 1: 184 2: 74

Political Warfare Executive (PWE) Quakers “Political Zionism”

2: 199, 201 Radio

1: 45, 117, 139 Rabbinate plan. See Europa-Slovakia plan

Pope. See Pius the XII (name index) 1: 26, 31, 52, 87, 261

“Porin” (illegal immigration ship) 2: 72, 74, 76

1: 259 American, 1: 26, 56; Berlin, 1: 26; 2: 62; British, 2: 84;

Portugal Free Belgium, 2: 74; Rome, 1: 26; Turkish, 1: 294 1: 3, 152-153, 183-184, 193, 243, 255, 315-316 Ramat Hakovesh, kibbutz

1: 337 Ramat Rachel, kibbutz Prague 2:7 2:19 Ravensbruck Press 2: 58 2: 9, 11, 15-16, 21, 31, 44, 47, 51, 54, 61-62 1: 191, 296

Post-War Peace Conference 2: 114

1: 31, 300, 308 Ransom plans. See specific plans 1: 17, 26, 28-29, 39, 42, 44, 47, 55, 66, 71, 90, 92, 115, 119, Reconstruction plan

333 1: 93, 101, 162 2:159, 50,172, 74, 203, 78, 80 Red Cross

Britain, 1: 29, 55, 178, 333; Free world, 2: 49; German, 1: 62; 1: 143, 151-153, 157, 163, 210, 212, 219, 256

Neutral countries, 1: 208; Press conferences, 1: 56, 83; 2: 6, 10, 24, 26, 32, 51, 53, 57-58, 65, 84, 120

2: 81-82; Right-wing, 1: 71; Romania, 2: 175; Sweden, Geneva, 1: 245 1: 186; Switzerland, 1: 208; United States, 1: 26, 43, 55, Refugee ships. See Rescue, ships 178, 208, 210, 333; West, 1: 19, 87, 168, 219; Western Eu- Regat region (Romania)

rope, 2: 82; Yiddish, 1: 26, 55; Yishuv, 1: 26, 28-29, 33, 1: 217 42, 71, 128, 168, 271, 333, 3493 2: 49, 144-145, 148 Religious circles in the Yishuv

See also News agencies; and specific newspapers 1: 8, 27

Pressure groups in the Yishuv 2: 191, 202, 206

2: 129 Reparations to the Jewish Nation Princeton 1: 277University 2: 156,1:120 218

Property Rescue

1: 22, 31, 35, 52, 63, 64, 306 Czechoslovakia way, 1: 342; Exchange plans, 1: 140,

Prussia 144-145, 147, 168, 172; Immigration, 1: 310; 2: 9, 11-14, 1: 51 16—18, 20—22, 24, 31, 47, 50—51, 55, 57-58; 62, 92, 103,

Public opinion 120, 145, 155, 159, 184, 199; Large rescue, 1: 140, 150, 1: 69, 77, 80, 84, 91—92, 109, 194, 242, 251, 260, 271 217-219, 261; 2: 71, 103, 108, 112, 144-145; Negotiation 2: 78, 80, 113 with the Nazis, 1: 4, 96, 115—117, 200—201, 203, 208, Britain, 1: 91; 2: 202; Sweden, 1: 185; Turkey, 1: 158; 212, 214, 217, 219—221, 234—237, 300, 304, 332-333, 336, United States, 1: 109-110, 2.46; 2: 155, 202; Western 339, 351; 2: 1-69, 79, 184, 207; Rescue of children, 1: 3,

opinion, 1: 242; World opinion, 1: 80, 83-84 82, 90, 101, 106, 127, 140-141, 143-194, 196-198,

Public protest of rescue operations 201-202, 204—205, 207-208, 210—212, 215-217, 220, 1: 11, 31, 77-88, 91—101, 105, 109—111, 115-120, 122, 133, 155, 226, 236-237, 239-253, 255, 259-260, 283, 305; 2: 29,

166, 194, 281, 343 50, 52, 54, 57, 94-98, 100-102, 104-105, 112, 129—130, 2: 5, 85, 195, 202 134-137, 152, 163, 165-166, 168-169, 198, 202, 210, 212,

291

Subject Index

Rescue (continued) Ringer telegram

217; Revisionists, 2: 166; Sailors training, 1: 280; 1: 52-53, 59-60, 62

Selective rescue, 1: 247-249, 251; 2: 136; Ships, 1: 148, Riots

150, 155-156, 159-160, 163, 165, 167-168, 171-173, 1: 21, 50-51, 116, 196, 279 175—180, 191, 193, 199-200, 205-207, 210, 226, 2.45, 2:15 250, 255-256, 259, 343; 2: 15, 20—21, 92-93, 100—101, Robert College (Istanbul)

103~104, 107, 118, 122, 133, 137-138, 154, 157, 160, 162, 1: 292 170, 179; Small rescue, 1: 140-141, 214-215, 217-219, Romania 225-226, 230, 232, 237, 261, 3173; 2: 71, 101-103, 1: 20, 22, 28, 34, 42—43, 50, 54, 62—63, 69, 89, 96, 141,

107-108, 112, 144; Transportation, 1: 159-160, 147, 151, 154, 160, 163, 168, 172, 177-178, 180-181, 163-164, 167, 171, 175-176, 178, 180, 191, 201-202, 210, 191, 195-208, 210—211, 217, 219, 237, 244-245,

243, 249, 255-256, 2593 2: 119, 122—123, 126, 153-155, 247, 249-250, 254-255, 259, 262, 266-267, 282,

157, 159-160, 162, 164-167, 170; Yugoslavia way, 290, 293, 297, 299, 323, 327, 339, 340, 347, 349,

1: 339-341, 344 352-354

See also Adler-Rudel’s plan; Brand plan; Europa- 2: 11, 20, 73, 92, 97, 101, 103, 105, 122, 124, 154-155, 160,

Slovakia plan; Exchange group; Financing rescue 175-177, 186-188, 192, 215 activities; JDC, cooperation with the JAE; “Para- Anti-Semitism, 1: 195, 198, 201; Fascism, 1: 195; German

chutists’ Scheme”; Pinkney Tuck’s plan; Secret occupation, 1: 195; Government, 1: 200; Oil fields, cooperation between the Yishuv and the Allies; 1: 158, 267, 343; Russian invasion, 1: 259, 335

emissaries 26 Rescue Committee 1:15, Rotterdam Self-Defense plan; Transnistria plan; Yishuv Rome

1: 3, 7, 10, 70, 81-82, 91-98, 112, 115—116, 125—135, 156, 170, 1: 15, 18

183, 213, 216, 223-225, 232, 234, 240, 246, 248, 250, Royal Institute for International Matters

258, 281, 283, 299, 302—303, 343 1: 184

2: 3-5, 8, 15, 19-21, 42, 45, 49-50, 56, 61, 65, 78, 80, 93, Rural settlements 98, 104—107, 110, 121—124, 131-132, 135-136, 138-140, 1: 8, 297, 349

142, 155, 159, 164-165, 170, 177, 195, 202, 205, 2: 95, 99, 168

207-208, 215 Russia. See USSR

1: 98 Sachsenhausen

Rescue Committee of Bulgarian Jewry

Rescue Committee of Hungarian Jewry 1: 21

1: 223, 299, 303 Safe sea passage (“safe conduct”) 2: 3-4, 8, 19-20, 42, 45, 49, 56, 61, 65, 68 1: 148, 199-200, 245, 255, 257

1: 320 2: 56-57

“Response to the Adversary” (Ben-Gurion speech) Saint Margretan (Switzerland)

1: 141 2: 184

Retaliatory bombing “Salah-a-din” (illegal immigration ship)

2: 75-78, 81-82 Salerno Civilians population, 2: 72, 75, 77; Extermination 22175 camps, 1: 140, 3333 2: 71, 77-81, 83-85, 207; Military Salonica

objectives, 2: 71, 77; Roads and Railways, 2: 51, 71, 1: 46, 343-344

78-79, 85, 207 “Salvador” (illegal immigration ship)

Reuters (news agency) 1: 43, 148

1: 26, 55 San Francisco Revisionists 1: 122

288, 290 1: 122

1: 6, 27, 91, 98, 112-114, 126, 128—131, 133, 170, 257, 285, San Francisco Peace Conference

2: 39, 110, 119, 138, 164, 166—167, 169, 191 Satellite countries

Rhodes 336 1: 272 2:17, 44, 71-73, Riga Savoy76, 156

Rhine (river) 1: 9, 34, 78, 131, 146-148, 157, 163, 168, 183, 189, 191,

1: 15, 56 193-195, 199, 209, 212, 235, 239; 253, 255, 259, 322,

1: 186 2: 92

Right wing circles in the Yishuv Scandinavia 1: 70-71, 128, 133, 249, 337, 349, 351 1: 185

2: 5, 196, 198, 202, 206 2: 42, 199 292

Subject Index

Schevenels Archive Socialist International

heel 1: 11, 30, 54-55, 277 “Season” 2: 173 1: 119, 133 Transfer of funds, 2: 187-188 2: 190, 218 Socony Vacuum (oil company)

Secret cooperation between the Yishuv and the Allies 1: 310 1: 4, 9, 28-29, 57, 66, 160, 172, 179, 204, 206—207, 220, 2: 35

222, 224, 233, 240, 253, 261-301, 321-353 SOE (Special Operation Executive) 2: 3, 5, 14, 26, 36-37, 40, 50, 174, 177, 181, 195, 206—207, 1: 264-266, 268, 270, 278-280, 287, 290

209, 215 A Force, 1: 264, 287; Balkans, 1: 265, 296; Bari, 1: 327; Cairo,

Gibson-Kaplan agreement, 1: 291-293, 306; Sabotage, 1: 273; Istanbul, 1: 294; Jerusalem, 1: 273, 275, 280; Lon1: 261-262, 267-268, 271-274, 276-278, 281, 287, don, 1: 328, 334; Raid on the SOE weapons storehouse

289, 293, 298-299 on mount Carmel, 1: 294, 296; School for sabotage

2: 135-139 Sofia 2: 67 Solel Boneh Self-Defense plan 1: 65, 266, 280

Secret Fund and light warfare, 1: 265, 268; Section D, 1: 265

Sede Boger 1: 254, 309-310, 331 1:10—11 2:3303, 125-126 1: 141, 320-321, 324-325, 327-329, 333-334» 336, 339» 341, 2: 183, 191

352, 354 “Sonborn Institute”

2: 5, 18, 28, 33, 60, 63, 149, 159, 201 2: 173

Sephardi Sondereinszkomando 1: 8, 77, 135 2:44

2: 62, 202 “Sontay” (illegal immigration ship) Settlement 1: 172, 176, 178 1: 7, 48, 82, 263, 274, 282 Sosnovietz

Shanghai South Africa 22155 1: 153-154, 180-181, 193, 220, 226—227, 229, 231, 237-238, 2: 89, 93, 95, 106, 131-132, 169, 189, 199, 215 1: 66

Sharona 248, 305

2:92 2: 76, 105, 108, 111, 114, 134, 151, 163~168, 170, 182, 199, “Shomer” 228 (n. 26) 2: 133 South African Jewry’s Emergency Committee

Siemens (company) 2: 164-167, 170

2: 83 South America Silesia 1: 193-194 1: 302 Soviet “Red Paper”

1: 264 2:121 2: 29 Spain “Sitting tax” 1: 91, 152-153, 193, 243, 249 SIME (Security Intelligence Middle East) 1: 321

2: 105, 153 2: 9, 11-12, 15-16, 21, 31, 44, 51, 54, 61-62, 154, 160 Slovakia Civil war, 1: 17-18 342 parties of Bulgarian origin

1: 202, 213-222, 225, 229—238, 262, 299, 309, 323, 340, Special rescue committee formed by members of various

Smuggling SS

2: 8, 12, 80-81, 92, 105, 114, 154-155, 175-177, 187, 215 1: 183

1: 288, 302—303, 342-346 1: 318, 336

2:177 2: 9; 19-22, 35, 43-475 51, 53-57) 59> 63

“Smyrna” (illegal immigration ship) Berlin, 2: 42; Budapest, 2: 19, 34-35, 42-43, 57; Lisbon,

1: 179 2: 47; RSHA, 2: 44, 54; SD, 1: 318, 332; 2: 22, 42-44,

1: 66 1: 106 1: 262 1: 108, 159

2: 122, 162, 170, 184 57; Vienna, 1: 42 Sobibor St. James’s Conference

Socialism “St. Louis” (refugees ship)

European socialism, 1: 351 2: 202 : 293

Subject Index

Stanley’s Statement “Tari” (illegal immigration ship)

1: 208, 242, 250, 259 1: 256

State of Israel Taurus Express (railway) 1: 29, 44, 105, 125, 195, 261, 270, 276, 292, 310, 326, 335 2:15

1: 112 2: 132 2: 4, 64, 203, 205, 213-214, 217-218 Teheran

“State Party” 1: 63, 145, 149-150, 173, 187, 193

Sterling area “Teheran Children” 2: 151, 180 1: 145-146, 149-150 Sternbuch telegram Tel Aviv 1: 52-53, 59-61, 63 1: 115, 157, 268, 271, 295—296, 326-327, 334

Stockholm 2: 60, 71, 73, 92, 140, 148, 179-181, 198, 203-204, 215

1: 4, 9, 184-188 “Tel Hai Day”

2: 26, 33, 35, 52-55, 57-58 1: 100

1: 68 2:92 2:73 Temporary asylum Straw companies 1:18 Stopaction plan. See Europa-Slovakia plan 2: 199-200

Storm troopers Templar

2: 3, 89, 173, 178, 181, 186 Theresienstadt

“Struma” (illegal immigration ship) 2: 58, 93, 107

Stuttgart 1: 46, 273 1: 223, 301, 303, 308 Times of London (newspaper) 1: 100, 163, 173, 176, 177; 179, 197, 244, 255, 260 Thrace (Greece)

Submarine 17, 162, 291 1: 197, 2391: Tobruk (Libya) Sudetenland 1: 58, 64 1: 17-20(crisis) Toulouse

Supporting the families of the mobilized troops 1: 249

2: 92, 102, 134, 140-141, 144, 147-149 “Transfer agreement” Svilengrad (Bulgaria) 1: 22,188 74 1: 168, 317 2: 178, Sweden Transit camps (safe haven) 1: 3, 97, 143, 152-153, 157, 172-173, 180-181, 183-189, 2: 6, 21, 32, 48, 120 193-194, 215, 237, 239-240, 248, 255, 277, 310, 315 Transjordan

2: 3, 35) 44, 52-59, 61, 65, 83-84, 151, 160, 199 1: 271 Anti Nazi circles, 2: 55; Consulate in Jerusalem, 1: 97; Transnistria Foreign Office, 1: 185; 2: 58; Maritime siege, 1: 140, 163, 177-178, 191, 196, 198—202, 204—207, 210—212, 1: 187-188; Migration policy, 1: 185-186; Neutrality, 217, 220, 236, 243, 245, 249, 259

1: 185 2:92

Switzerland See also Transnistria plan 1: 33, 59, 140, 152-154, 157, 165, 167, 173, 188, 193, 211, 213, Transnistria plan

308, 336 226, 236—238, 303

218, 221, 225, 229, 231, 239, 245, 248-250, 277, 302, 1: 178, 195, 199-201, 204—206, 208—212, 214-216, 219,

2: 9, 21, 29, 42, 47, 52, 54-59, 61, 65—66, 71, 80, 83, 91, 2: 8, 17, 23, 30, 49, 75, 95, 97-98, 100-103, 105, 122, 206,

104, 123, 155, 160—161, 179, 184-186 230 (n. 22), 231(n.37) Consulate in Bucharest, 1: 165; Consulate in Budapest, Transylvania

1: 165; Consulate in Eretz-Israel, 1: 151, 153; Con- 1: 34

sulate in Sofia, 1: 165, 254 2:8 Syria “Transylvania” (ship) 1: 29, 46, 64, 66, 158-159, 161, 225, 269, 271—274, 280, 1: 160, 172

286, 287, 292, 294, 327 Treaty of Versailles

2: 4, 14, 26, 107, 143, 187, 198 1: 16-17

Talin (Estonia) 1: 66 2: 54 2: 79-80 Treblinka

294

Subject Index

Tripoli 197-198, 201-202, 204, 207—212, 219-220, 230~231, 1: 267, 274 235, 239-240, 244, 246, 254-256, 259—261, 264, 266, Triumvirate 268—269, 271, 273, 275-278, 282, 294, 298-300, 1: 134, 164, 230 305-306, 311-312, 320-321, 324-325, 334-339, 346, 2: 59; 94, 136, 204-205, 239 (n. 28) 348-349, 351, 358 (n. 30), 362 (n. 210), 365 (nn. 95, Truman Archive 107, 114, 116), 367 (n. 17), 369 (n. 71), 371 (n. 128),

1:11 372 (nn. 37, 39)

Tunisia 2: 6, 9, 11, 15, 17-18, 22—2.4, 26-31, 33, 35-38, 40, 46—49,

1: 315 51, 54-56, 58, 61-64, 66, 68-69, 71-73, 76-77, 79-80, Turkey 83-84, 90-91, 94—96, 99, 105, 108, 123-124, 134, 1: 3, 28, 64, 148, 151-153, 155-156, 158-169, 162-168, 171, 151-152, 154-158, 162-163, 168-169, 174, 177, 179, 186, 173-178, 180-182, 187, 191, 193, 197, 200, 205-206, 188, 194, 197, 199, 202, 212, 214—215, 221 (n. 12), 227

210—211, 218, 221, 226—227, 229, 234-235, 237, 239, (n. 227), 239 (n. 3) 242-245, 253-258, 260, 265, 270—274, 277, 282, Air Force, 2: 78; American Trade Unions Federation, 291-294, 300-301, 304-306, 310, 315-318, 324-325, 1: 42; Anti-Semitism, 1: 40, 103, 107—108, 1103 2: 155,

331, 333, 342-347 202; Congress, 1: 110, 148, 276; 2: 194; Consulate in 2: 6-7, 9-17, 20-22, 26, 30, 36-37, 40, 44, 49-51, 57; Cairo, 1: 313; Consulate in Geneva, 1: 65; Consulate 60-61, 63, 84, 92, 105, 107, 111, 119, 122, 154, 157-159, in Istanbul, 1: 292—293, 299, 309, 311, 313, 325, 3463

161, 166—167, 170, 178, 180-187, 207 2: 178; Consulate in Jerusalem, 1: 11, 97, 143, 256, 313, Armenians murder, 1: 58; Army, 1: 270; Consulate in 3303 2: 7, 10, 17, 78-79, 85, 176, 189; Defense DepartBucharest, 1: 191; Consulate in Jerusalem, 1: 14; ment, 1: 53, 58, 278, 329; Economic crisis, 1: 79, 108; Consulate in Sofia, 1: 191, 254; National minorities, 2: 90; Election, 1: 40; Embassy in Ankara, 1: 292, 1: 270; Refugee camps, 1: 210; Transit camps, 1: 1673 299, 325, 346; 2: 7, 10, 17, 30, 32, 41; Embassy in

Varlik, 2: 183 Beirut, 1: 292; Embassy in France, 1: 53; Embassy Turkish Red Crescent in London, 1: 49, 51, 187-189, 276; Embassy in

1: 255 Moscow, 1: 36, 49, 53; Embassy in Stockholm,

“23 Yordei Hasira” (the 23 boatmen) 1: 185-188; Embassy in Switzerland, 1: 211; Embassy in

1: 267, 273-275, 283 Teheran, 2: 215; Entering the war, 1: 39, 43, 108-109,

29,000 children plan. See Adler-Rudel’s plan 298; Fascism, 1: 40; Immigration laws, 1: 144, 195, 211, 260, 351; 2: 199, 202; Isolationist policy, 1: 18, 39,

Ukraine 43, 108, 298; Jewish congressional members, 1: 1673 12.195 Military authorities, 1: 250, 264, 276, 298; Naval, Jews murder, 1: 55 1: 276; 1944 Election, 1: 239; 2: 6, 18; Republicans, Ukrainian Federation 1: 110; Secretary for war, 2: 82; Senators, 1: 111; State

1: 36 Department, 1: 60, 144, 188, 208, 211, 346; 2: 17, 39,

1: 332 1: 313, 322

“Ultra” (British code-breaking agency) 68, 80; Treasury Department, 2: 156; USAFIME, “Unconditional surrender policy.” See Allies, “unconditional See also American Intelligence; CIA; CIC; DMI; Ga;

surrender” policy OSS; Secret cooperation between the Yishuv and Underground movements in Europe the Allies; WZO 1: 284, 287, 289, 291, 296, 299, 300—302, 306, 308, 313, United War Appeal

321, 336, 341-342, 344, 346 2: 151, 163-167, 170

Union Holland Bank (Istanbul) USSR

2: 181, 184-185 1: 31, 33, 36, 47, 49-50, 54, 70, 105, 118, 145-146, 149, 158,

lutzi’im) 320-321, 323, 337 1: 30 2: 18, 32-33, 48-49, 62, 76, 84, 107, 121, 174, 209

Union of Pioneer Organizations (Brit Ha irgunim Haha- 193, 236, 239, 245, 250, 262, 265, 274, 282, 299-300,

Union Swiss Bank (Zurich) Air force, 1: 84; Anti-Semitism, 2: 121; Embassy in Cairo,

2: 181, 184 2: 84, 124; Embassy in London, 1: 49, 51, 323; Em2: 168 munist rule, 1: 300, 321; 2: 121, 163; Foreign Office, 2: United States 72; German invasion, 1: 47—48, 51, 196, 198; German “United Palestine Appeal for Aid to the Diaspora” bassy in Washington, 1: 49, 146; Europe under com-

1: 6-8, 11, 19, 24, 26, 28, 30-31, 38-45, 47, 51-62, 64, 66, occupied areas, 1: 49; Migration policy, 1: 321; Red 68—69, 71, 73, 78-83, 87—91, 93-94, 102—103, 105, Army, 1: 196, 198, 239, 261, 335-336, 342, 354; Spring 107-115, 118-119, 129, 141, 143-145, 148-150, 155, Attack, 2: 16; Submarine, 1: 179; Twentieth Congress

158-160, 166-167, 170-173, 182, 186-189, 193, 195, of the Communist party, 1: 299

295

Subject Index

UZ (Ustredna Zidov), “Jewish Center” (Slovakia) Currency regulations, 2: 89, 153-154, 168; Migration

1 212-213 policy, 1: 11, 212; United States, 2: 156

Working Group, 1: 211-222, 225, 228, 234, 236, 304-305; See also Germany, Negotiation with the West

2:19, 81, 110, 186 White Paper

1: 5-6, 11, 36—38, 41, 44, 46, 79-80, 88, 100-101, 105, 108,

Vasto 116, 121, 144, 149, 152, 154-155, 161-162, 166, 169-171, 1: 239 173-174, 177, 180, 192, 196-198, 202, 205, 208-209, Vatican 212, 241-244, 248-249, 260, 262, 272—273, 275, 321,

1: 91, 146, 200, 225, 236 353 2: 5, 81, 221 (n. 12), 225 (n. 152) 2: 20, 93, 95, 169, 184, 197

Vichy Certificates, 1: 31, 36-38, 41, 106, 121, 143-144, 154,

1: 104, 144, 271 161-167, 169—170, 173—174, 182~—184, 187, 192, 196—

Army, 2: 274 197, 205, 212, 241-246, 248-251, 256, 260, 344, 366

Vienna (n. 145); 2: 4-5, 9, 16, 20, 52, 92, 95, 104, 121, 125-126, 1: 32, 66, 223, 301-302, 308, 344 154, 1903; Quota, 1: 38, 106, 121, 144, 149, 153-155, 157,

2: 9, 39-43, 45-46, 55 160-162, 164-165, 169, 173-174, 187, 192, 196, 198,

Vilna 205, 241—247, 249, 251, 260; 2: 4, 16, 20, 104, 190

1: 30, 33, 36, 67 See also British Mandate in Eretz-Israel; Illegal immi-

Mass murder, 1: 55 gration; Immigration

2: 184 339 Hungary border) 1: 213

“Vita” (illegal immigration ship) Wireless 1: 259 1: 274, 278, 295, 309-310, 312, 314-315, 317, 3195 323, 331, Vojvodina (Jewish camp on the Yugoslavia-Romania- WIZO

1: 327, 329, 339, 341 “Work of the present” V2 missiles 2: 121, 201 1: 120 Workers movement. See Labor Movement

2:71 Working group. See UZ (Ustredna Zidov), “Jewish Center”

Development plans, 1: 277 (Slovakia)

World Jewish Congress

Wall Street 1: 8, 56, 59, 114, 183, 194, 199, 210-212, 218, 248

1: 277 2: 55, 57-59, 61, 71, 82, 112, 160, 186

War criminals Bucharest, 1: 199—200; Geneva, 1: 59, 214—215; London, 1: 261, 336, 339 1: 59; Sweden, 2: 53, 57; Switzerland, 1: 59; 2: 160;

2: 66, 84 United States, 1: 58; 2: 112

War of Independence World War I

1:9, 125 1: 5, 8, 17, 34, 73, 158, 185, 262, 264, 298-299 2: 190, 218-219 2:194 War Refugee Board World Zionist Organization (WZO)

1: 11, 239, 245, 256, 302, 346 1: 7, 26, 31, 41-42, 52, 54, 57, 64, 70, 86, 94, 103, 106, 2: 3, 6, 17, 24, 28, 33, 49, 51, 55, 68, 80, 120, 157-159, 166, 112-115, 119, 125, 129-130, 139—140, 143, 167, 190, 193,

177, 184, 187 198, 207—209, 245-248, 254, 261, 264—266, 269,

Istanbul, 2: 26, 41; Stockholm, 2: 53; Switzerland, 2: 56 276-278, 298-299, 312, 314, 320, 323, 328, 351, 362

Warsaw (n. 215), 368 (nn. 35, 52), 373 (nn. 64, 66, 74), 380

1: 54-55, 66-67, 96 (n. 59), 387 (n. 386)

2: 63, 84 2: 12-13, 17, 39, 47; 54; 59, 61, 80, 83, 101-102, 108, 113,

Ghetto, 1: 43, 55, 59, 95-96, 103 120—121, 125—126, 129, 133, 143, 147, 151-153, 156, 163,

Washington 167-168, 173-174, 184, 187—192, 194, 197-202, 1: 42, 49, 70, 75, 98, 108-109, 114, 146, 193, 276, 278, 288, 213—218, 236 (nn. 55, 62), 240 (nn. 40, 45)

292, 298, 310, 329-331, 333, 339, 346 Budget Committee, 2: 98, 109-110, 130-131, 135, 233 (n. 2: 15, 17, 28, 30—31, 37; 39, 41, 56, 60—61, 78, 82, 84, 159 4); Britain, 1: 7, 160, 164; Bulgaria, 2: 126; Czech, 1:

Western Europe 31, 225; 18th World Zionist Congress, 1: 7, 16; Hun2:15 gary, 2:5; Neutral Countries, 1: 277; Poland, 1: 33; Western states Romania, 1: 200, 245, 255-256; 2: 187; South Africa, 1: 17, 114, 116, 148, 212, 239, 260-262 1: 153-154, 181; 2: 165-167; Sweden, 1: 2773 2: 583 2: 5, 10, 14, 22, 37, 40, 42-43, 46, 52, 55, 61-62, 74-75, 84, Switzerland, 1: 277; Turkey, 1: 277; 21st World Zion-

89, 197, 219 ist Congress, 1: 35, 41; 23rd World Zionist Congress, 296

Subject Index

2: 93; United States, 1: 7, 41, 43-44, 54, 58, 107, 110, Youth Aliyah

112, 160, 198, 211, 249, 277, 2993 2: 58, 151-152 1: 151, 183 Enterprise, 1: 184

1 1: 125, 150-151, 368 (n. 39) Yagur 2: 95 1: 297 Yugoslavia 1: 122 339-341, 344, 349 Yassi 2:159 Yad Vashem Archives Youth Aliyah Office

Yalta Conference 1: 27, 46, 97, 141, 187, 190, 195, 199, 313, 321, 327-328, 336,

1: 50 Communists, 1: 339; German occupation, 1: 273; Rep1: 262, 269 Jerusalem, 1: 97; Underground, 1: 141, 313, 341

Yemen resentation in Cairo, 1: 340; Representation in 2: 132

Yeni-Czesme. See Nea Vrissi (Turkey) Zagreb

Yishuv commando units 2: 112 1: 263, 272-274, 279-283, 286-287, 290, 295-298, 313, Zionist Actions Committee

323, 326, 352-353 1: 7, 10, 22, 38, 47-48, 63, 93-94, 96, 115, 133, 215, 221,

Yishuv economy 226, 359 (n. 80), 360 (nn. 119, 130), 361 (n. 188), 362 2: 90-91, 189-191 (nn. 214-215), 363 (nn. 18, 23, 25, 47, 49, 54, 58), 364 Yishuv emissaries (nn. 59, 66, 79, 83, 89), 365 (nn. 106, 122, 127), 366 1: 28, 36, 140-141, 232, 312, 348, 354 (n. 143), 367 (nn. 23, 26-27, 29, 33), 369 (nn. 82, 89),

2: 26, 104, 208-209, 212 372 (nn. 18—20), 373 (n. 63), 374 (nn. 72, 85), 375 Balkans states, 1: 293; Geneva, 2: 100, 103; Istanbul, (nn. 105, 120), 382 (nn. 140, 142) 1: 95, 151, 156, 159, 163, 169, 172, 174~179, 190-191, 2: 31, 98, 106, 108-110, 129—131, 134-136, 139, 168, 203,

193, 200—201, 203-204, 206—207, 212, 214, 218-220, 207, 225 (nn. 176-177), 228 (nn. 248, 25—26), 230 222-225, 227—229, 231, 234, 238, 240, 245, 247, 253, (nn. 3, 28-29), 231 (nn. 46—47, 50-52, 61-62, 65-67, 255-259, 265, 268, 282, 284, 292-293, 299-308, 310, 69, 73) 77), 232 (n. 88), 233 (nn. 4—5, 8, 11, 13-14, 16, 312, 314-315, 317-318, 321-322, 331, 336, 342-343, 348, 21, 26, 28, 44, 47), 234 (nn. 49, 59), 235 (nn. 6, 11, 16, 3523 2: 3-4, 6-7, 10, 12-14, 16-17, 19, 26, 29, 33-34, 18), 236 (nn. 60, 62-63, 65—69, 80), 237 (nN. 92, 95,

37-43, 45-49, 51-52, 54, 56, 63, 66, 68, 92, 99, 1-2, 5, 7), 239 (nn. 78, 20, 25), 240 (nn. 31, 34) 104-115, 117—119, 122, 124, 126, 149, 154, 157-159, 163, Zionist Archives

165-166, 169—170, 173-174, 176-177, 180—187, 205; 1: 11 Occupied areas, 1: 141, 261, 283-284, 291; Poland, Zionist Movement. See World Zionist Organization

1: 146, 283-284; Romania, 1: 147 (WZO) Yishuv industry Zionist policy 1: 101 1: 106-107, 109—110, 113-115, 129-130, 139-140, 159-160, 2! 131-132 190-191, 275~-276, 282, 299, 311-312, 320-321, Yishuv institutions 337-338, 351 1: 81, 141, 226, 237, 282, 284, 295-296, 335, 343-344, 2: 196

348-349 Zionist Review (newspaper)

2: 101, 140, 174, 183, 189, 191, 194, 204—205 1: 26, 55

Taxes, 2: 142, 147 Zionist underground movements

“Yishuv to the Rescue” 1: 291, 293, 300-302, 307-308, 321, 324, 327

2: 117-118, 122 2: 23, 41

2: 196 1: 27 2: 125-126 2: 181, 221(n. 11) 1: 337 Zionist youth

Yishuv’s capitalists Greece, 1: 342; Hungary, 2: 23, 41; Slovakia, 1: 342 Yotch Bonar (neighborhood in Sofia) Zurich

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