Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2013 9781626372238

Citation preview

2012_CIC_FM_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:47 PM Page i

Global Peace Operations ANNUAL REVIEW OF

2013

2012_CIC_FM_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/12/13 11:45 AM Page ii

This volume is a product of the Center on International Cooperation’s (CIC) Global Peace Operations program. CIC is an independent institution housed at New York University. Project Team VOLUME EDITORS AND LEAD RESEARCHERS

Megan Gleason-Roberts and Alischa Kugel SERIES EDITOR

Bruce D. Jones CONTRIBUTING EDITOR

Richard Gowan PROGRAM OFFICER

Morgan A. Hughes CONTRIBUTORS

Tatiana Carayannis, Elodie Convergne, Tristan Dreisbach, Megan Gleason-Roberts, Richard Gowan, Steven Hui, Marc Jacquand, Alischa Kugel, Yannik Lewis, Laurie Mincieli, Urs Schrade, Sofia Sebastian, Keith Stanski, and Erin Weir The Center on International Cooperation is solely responsible for the content of this publication. Any errors of fact or analysis, and any and all judgments and interpretations about missions and operations discussed herein, are those of CIC alone. This project was undertaken with the support of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN Department of Political Affairs and UN Department of Field Support, the African Union Peace and Security Department, the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Secretariat, the Organization of American States Department of Democratic Sustainability and Special Missions, and NATO’s Civilian Liaison Office to the UN.

2012_CIC_FM_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:47 PM Page iii

Global Peace ANNUAL REVIEW OF

Operations 2013

A PROJECT OF THE

Center on International Cooperation

2012_CIC_FM_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:47 PM Page iv

Published in the United States of America in 2013 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2013 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved ISBN: 978-1-58826-926-3 (hc) ISBN: 978-1-58826-902-7 (pb) ISSN: 1932-5819 Printed and bound in the United States of America. The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5

4

3

2

1

2012_CIC_FM_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:47 PM Page v

Contents

List of Boxes Foreword, Jeffrey Feltman, Ameerah Haq, and Hervé Ladsous Preface, Richard Gowan List of Mission Acronyms Map of Global Peace Operations, 2012 Strategic Summary 2012 Megan Gleason-Roberts and Alischa Kugel

viii ix xi xv xviii 1

1 The Changing Face of Peace Operations: New Mandates and Risks for Peacekeeping and Political Missions Richard Gowan

13

2 Leadership and the Use of Force in Peace Operations: Principles for Peacekeeping and Political Missions Bruce D. Jones and Richard Gowan

23

3 Mission Reviews

31

Alphabetical order by location 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4

Afghanistan Somalia Sudan and South Sudan Syria

32 39 47 58

4 Mission Notes

65

Alphabetical order by location 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9

Asia and the Pacific Caucasus and Moldova Central Africa Central Asia Democratic Republic of Congo Haiti Libya Middle East Sahel

66 72 77 85 91 97 103 109 122 v

2012_CIC_FM_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:47 PM Page vi

vi

•

CONTENTS

4.10 4.11 4.12

Timor-Leste West Africa Western Balkans

129 134 144

5 Global Statistics on UN-Commanded Missions

153

6 Global Statistics on Non-UN-Commanded Missions

183

7 UN Mission-by-Mission Statistics

233

Alphabetical order by mission 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9 7.10 7.11 7.12 7.13 7.14 7.15 7.16 7.17 7.18 7.19 7.20 7.21 7.22 7.23 7.24 7.25 7.26 7.27 7.28 7.29 7.30 7.31 7.32 7.33

BINUCA (UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic) BNUB (UN Office in Burundi) CNMC (Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission) Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator for Darfur MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara) MINUSTAH (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti) MONUSCO (UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) Personal Envoy for Western Sahara Personal Representative on the Border Controversy Between Guyana and Venezuela Special Adviser for Cyprus Special Adviser for Myanmar Special Envoy for the Implementation of Resolution 1559 Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan UN and Arab League Envoy to Syria UN Office in Yemen UNAMA (UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission for Iraq) UNAMID (AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur) UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force) UNFICYP (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon) UNIOGBIS (UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau) UNIPSIL (UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone) UNISFA (UN Interim Security Force for Abyei) UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia) UNMISS (UN Mission in South Sudan) UNMIT (UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste) UNMOGIP (UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan) UNOCA (UN Office for Central Africa) UNOCI (UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire) UNOWA (UN Office for West Africa) UNPOS (UN Political Office for Somalia)

238 243 247 251 252 261 270 280 282 283 287 289 291 294 295 297 305 313 322 330 338 349 355 361 369 376 385 393 401 408 412 421 426

2012_CIC_FM_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:47 PM Page vii

CONTENTS • vii

7.34 7.35 7.36 7.37 7.38 7.39

UNRCCA (UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia) UNSCO (Office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process) UNSCOL (Office of the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon) UNSMIL (UN Support Mission in Libya) UNSMIS (UN Supervision Mission in Syria) UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization)

Index About the Book

430 434 438 442 446 450 457 475

2012_CIC_FM_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:47 PM Page viii

Boxes

India-Pakistan The African Union’s Panel of Eminent African Personalities Piracy off the Coast of Somalia Security Implications of Climate Change Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide The African Union’s Efforts Against the Lord’s Resistance Army HIV/AIDS and UN Peace Operations Organization of American States Safety and Security in UN Peace Operations Cyprus Yemen Western Sahara Women, Peace, and Security: Equal Access to Justice Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission

viii

37 42 44 52 63 83 94 100 105 112 115 124 132 139

2012_CIC_FM_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:47 PM Page ix

Foreword tries and parties create conditions necessary for societies to transition from violent conflict to sustainable peace. The leadership in many of these missions embodies the good offices role of the Secretary-General on the ground, and they increasingly draw from common pools of civilian experts and field support platforms. These linkages are also reflected at UN headquarters, where our Departments of Peacekeeping Operations, Political Affairs, and Field Support are working closely together in support of our field operations. The Review also demonstrates the diversity and complementarity of our missions and covers the whole spectrum of mandates: from military observer groups monitoring ceasefires to multidimensional peacekeeping operations that combine logistical and security capabilities with civilian expertise; from Special Envoys and regional offices focusing on conflict prevention and mediation to multifaceted political missions that accompany complex peace consolidation processes. Finally, the Review provides qualitative analysis—noting the successes in fostering peace, while also highlighting instances where more can be done. The two thematic chapters in this year’s review set out some of the major challenges confronting the UN and other peace and security actors. Chapter 1 on the changing face of peace operations recognizes the increasingly difficult environments in which the United Nations is operating. It highlights the challenges of deploying missions in rapidly evolving contexts and reviews how these issues were addressed in the recent cases of the DRC, Mali, and Somalia. Chapter 2

We jointly welcome the 2013 Annual Review of Global Peace Operations. This year marks the first time that the Center on International Cooperation reviews the work of field-based political missions and peacekeeping operations in a single volume. This offers an opportunity to foster learning within and between different types of field missions and to build on the complementary nature of our international conflict management tools. With recent deployments to address new and intensified threats to peace and security, the need to identify complementarities is particularly relevant today. The Review illustrates the challenging environment in which peace operations are deploying and the increasing prevalence of multiple mission deployments in a single country or region. In some countries where the UN is expanding its engagement, such as Mali and Somalia, this means that peacekeeping and special political missions are operating in parallel with enforcement operations led by non-UN actors. Exceptionally, the UN peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been mandated to undertake targeted offensive operations. This effort is in support of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s broader efforts to achieve peace in the Great Lakes region, through the adoption of the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework by eleven states in the region. The Review rightly highlights the need for strong and effective coordination in all such cases. There are commonalities between peacekeeping operations and field-based political missions. Both are, in most cases, essentially political instruments mandated to help counix

2012_CIC_FM_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:47 PM Page x

x

•

FOREWORD

focuses on the particular challenges for mission leadership of increasingly complex and divisive conflicts that require the engagement of a broad range of actors, some of which may have enforcement or counterterrorism roles and are operating alongside peace operations. It rightly notes the urgency of ensuring that, in all such cases, the political track of international engagement does not lag behind the security track. This is a point that the Secretary-General has highlighted repeatedly in his reports on the DRC, Mali, Syria, and Somalia. The chapter reminds us of the urgency of ensuring that Special Envoys and Special Representatives of the Secretary-General are adequately empowered and supported in the political roles mandated to them. In all cases, field missions must

Jeffrey Feltman Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs

have resources and capabilities commensurate with their mandated tasks. As we tackle today’s challenges to international peace and security, while also preparing for those of tomorrow, an independent analysis of how peace operations have developed on a global scale and an outside assessment of key issues that warrant further debate are needed more than ever. The Annual Reviews are an insightful contribution to both. With this in mind, we would like to thank New York University’s Center on International Cooperation, which helps to foster a wider understanding of global peace operations and their important contributions to peace and security around the globe.

Ameerah Haq Under-Secretary-General for Field Support

Hervé Ladsous Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations

2012_CIC_FM_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/12/13 11:46 AM Page xi

Preface

This is the eighth edition of the Center on International Cooperation’s Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, but it covers a far wider range of missions than its predecessors. For the first time, the volume includes civilian political missions, meaning that it gives a fuller and more detailed overview of international crisis management today. Furthermore, while the volume covers events in 2012, Chapters 1 and 2 address important developments in the early months of 2013, when the United Nations Security Council took a series of heavily debated decisions on missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, and Somalia. As Chapter 1 notes, these decisions may signal major changes in military and civilian crisis management, and this volume puts them in context and explains their significance.

But we have also been challenged to explain why the Annual Review has concentrated on missions involving uniformed personnel (including soldiers and police officers) rather than purely civilian operations. Earlier editions of the Review never completely excluded this type of multilateral activity because they covered important missions such as the UN assistance missions in Iraq and Afghanistan and some of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) main operations in the Balkans. However, we did not include many other noteworthy examples in the Annual Review, so in 2010 we launched the separate Review of Political Missions to fill the gap. The Review of Political Missions helped to inform an extensive policy debate at the United Nations about these operations’ contributions to peace and security. Yet, we have been conscious that dividing “peace operations” and “political missions” into parallel volumes was potentially counterproductive. Many political missions work alongside military or police operations, or take over when peacekeepers depart. Trying to tell their stories or analyze their strengths and weaknesses separately is misleading. In the introductory chapter for the first edition of the Review of Political Missions, Ian Martin argued that “all peace operations are political,” but there were also conceptual reasons to merge the two volumes.1 Three years later we followed through on this logic. This edition of the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations covers all the missions that were previously covered in the two separate volumes. We believe that by merging the two

What Are Peace Operations?

Since we launched the Annual Review in 2006, we have always used a broad definition of “peace operations.” We have avoided getting caught up in debates over the boundaries between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Some of the missions that we have tracked yearly—such as the NATO operation in Afghanistan and the African Union force in Somalia—have effectively shifted into warfighting missions. We have occasionally been challenged to justify their inclusion alongside more straightforward peacekeeping efforts. We have argued, however, that it is necessary to offer readers a picture of the full spectrum of peace operations. Excluding missions that have used an increasing level of force would prevent this. xi

2012_CIC_FM_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:47 PM Page xii

xii

•

PREFACE

Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2013

The Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2013 covers more than one hundred multilateral peace operations active in 2012 fielded by the UN, AU, EU, ECOWAS, OSCE, OAS, and coalitions. The Annual Review uses a broad definition of peace operations that includes multilateral and ad hoc military and police missions, as well as civilianled political missions. Neither type of mission has a simple definition. Alongside more straightforward peacekeeping

missions, the Annual Review has, for example, included peace enforcement operations that employ the use of force and engage in active combat. Under political missions, we include multilateral civilian-led missions that have political engagement in the form of launching and supporting political processes at their very core. This includes, for example, the European Union’s Special Representatives and the African Union Liaison Offices that support the imple-

volumes we are able to give a much fuller overview of multilateral operations and a greater sense of how different types of missions reinforce (or potentially duplicate) each other. Previous editions of the Annual Review have emphasized the growing trend toward hybrid peace operations mandated and managed by multiple organizations, and this edition underlines how common this has become.2 We hope that it will prompt readers to reflect on the strategic choices, compromises, and conflicts that have led to the creation of complex institutional arrangements in cases such as Somalia. The title of the present volume, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, reflects the fact that every mission covered in it contributes to peace and security in some way, whether it is through conflict prevention, managing ongoing crises, or postwar reconstruction. The sheer variety of types of missions involved should not distract from this common purpose. As in previous volumes, we continue to focus on missions that are mandated by multilateral organizations. In most cases, these operations are also commanded or managed multilaterally, although there are exceptions to this rule. Many missions are now covered in regional chapters (for example, the Balkans, Middle East, West Africa). This is partially

mentation of peace agreements and accompany political processes. We have excluded missions, such as EU delegations and other liaison offices that may engage in political activities, but as their core function serve as more regular diplomatic or development presences. Along the same reasoning, we have also excluded election observer and human rights monitoring missions.

for ease of reference, but also reflects the fact that in many regions there are peace operations in neighboring countries that affect one another. This has, for example, been a notable phenomenon over the past year in West Africa, where peace operations in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire work alongside each other in the volatile border area, and in the Middle East during the escalating Syrian war.

Events in 2013

While merging our research on peace operations and political missions required considerable planning, we have also been conscious of the need to respond to a flurry of important decisions on UN operations taken in early 2013. In the first quarter of this year, as Chapter 1 describes, the Security Council made hard choices on peace enforcement in the eastern Congo, stabilization in Mali, and statebuilding in Somalia—posing new challenges for both peacekeeping and civilian crisis management. Typically, each Review covers a single calendar year, but we decided that we should include some initial analysis on the recent UN decisions, meaning that this volume addresses events through early 2013. Hopefully, by extending our narrative into 2013 we help readers evaluate developments in 2012 more effectively. Adding this analysis delayed publication somewhat, but we believe it is worthwhile.

2012_CIC_FM_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/12/13 11:46 AM Page xiii

PREFACE • xiii

Acknowledgments

The process of merging the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations and the Review of Political Missions has been helped by our institutional partners at the UN and other organizations. Many individuals have contributed to this process and they are acknowledged below. However, we are particularly grateful to the three Under-Secretaries-General at the United Nations whose support has been essential to this transition: Jeffrey Feltman, Ameerah Haq, and Hervé Ladsous. As the leaders of the Departments of Political Affairs, Field Support, and Peacekeeping Operations, respectively, they know more about the need for cooperation across missions and institutions than anyone else, as their jointly written Foreword shows. Even if we had not decided to expand the volume this year, it would have taken a lot of energy to keep up with the developments in peace operations in cases such as Syria, Libya, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. As we go to press, the UN, African Union, European Union, and ECOWAS are debating the future of Mali after French forces intervened there on 11 January 2013. The year ahead is likely to be an exceptionally challenging one for peace operations of all types. We hope that this volume will help policymakers and experts navigate the tests that lie ahead. Producing a book of this type is hard work. Merging two books of this type into one is harder. Three staff members of the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) have shouldered these burdens both thoughtfully and cheerfully over the past year. Megan Gleason-Roberts and Alischa Kugel, having worked on previous editions of the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations and Review of Political Missions, respectively, made the merger remarkably easy and ensured that this book is up to the highest standards. Morgan Hughes, having overseen the collection, sorting, and presentation of data for both volumes, did an excellent job of managing the increased number of figures we needed for this volume.

Bruce D. Jones, director of CIC, provided strategic guidance for the merger as well as for Chapter 1. Former deputy director Jake Sherman played an important role in the early phase of planning for the merger. Yanikk Lewis and Laurie Mincieli offered invaluable support to the production of this book. Tatiana Carayannis, Elodie Convergne, Tristan Dreisbach, Steven Hui, Marc Jacquand, Urs Schrade, Sofia Sebastian, Keith Stanski, and Erin Weir provided valuable contributions to the volume. The Global Peace Operations team is grateful for the considerable support of CIC staff members Yvonne Alonzo, Lynn Denesopolis, Molly Elgin-Cossart, Jane Esberg, Antonie Evans, Noah Gall, Tom Gregg, Emily O’Brien, Barnett Rubin, W. P. S. Sidhu, Benjamin Tortolani, Teresa Whitfield, and Vanessa Wyeth. This project would not be possible without the generous financial support of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the German Foreign Office, and the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Their assistance funds the production of the Annual Review, as well as the outreach that ensures that the volume’s analysis and data inform policy discussions on global peace operations. The Annual Review is the product of a close partnership with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Department of Political Affairs (DPA), and Department of Field Support (DFS), as well as the Peace and Security Department of the African Union (AU), the Secretariat of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of American States (OAS) Department of Democratic Sustainability and Special Missions, and NATO’s Civilian Liaison Office to the UN. In addition to the three Under-SecretariesGeneral at the UN thanked above, CIC would also like to express its gratitude to Ramtane Lamamra, AU commissioner for Peace and Security; Lamberto Zannier, OSCE secretary-general; Christopher Hernández-Roy, director of the OAS Department of Democratic Sustainability and Spe-

2012_CIC_FM_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:47 PM Page xiv

xiv

•

PREFACE

cial Missions; and Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO secretary-general. There is not sufficient space to thank the many officials who assisted us throughout the process, but David Haeri of the DPKO’s Best Practices Section and Lee O’Brien of the DPA’s Policy and Mediation Division deserve special mention. Elsewhere at the UN, we are also grateful to Lin Bai, Joanne Barrett, Levent Bilman, Alessandra Cabras, Sebastian von Einsiedel, Akylbai Eleusizov, Raphaëlle Guillon, Megh Gurung, Wifag Hadra, Craig Hanoch, Patrick Hein, Aftab Hossain, Hibo Hussein, Naoki Ishikawa, Rebecca Jovin, Sajid Khan, Jared Kotler, Charlotte Larbuisson, Jonathan Lincoln, Andriani Mortoglou, Gloria Ntegeye, Marlène S. Nzengou, Madalene O’Donnell, Vincent Pasquini, Kristina Segulja, Andrei Shkourko, Leanne Smith, Alok Tandon, Oliver Ulich, and Axel Wennmann, as well as the many desk officers who reviewed drafts and provided data. Deep thanks are owed to Ayako Kagawa, Terje Trasberg,

and Geraldine Velandria of the UN’s Cartographic Section, who prepared the many detailed maps in this volume. We are also indebted to Claus Neukirch and Skaidrile Grigaite at the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre; El-Ghassim Wane and Elizabeth Choge-Nyangoro at the AU’s Department of Peace and Security; Eirini LemosManiati, NATO civilian liaison officer to the United Nations; and Katalina Montaña, OAS Department of Democratic Sustainability and Special Missions. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) once again provided much of the non-UN data for the volume. We are particularly grateful to Xenia Avezov, Jane Dundon, and Neil Melvin. We owe tremendous thanks to Lynne Rienner Publishers. We are especially grateful to Steve Barr and Lesli Brooks Athanasoulis for their unstinting support and attention to detail. — Richard Gowan

Notes 1. Ian Martin, “All Peace Operations Are Political: A Case for Designer Missions and the Next UN Reform,” in Review of Political Missions 2010 (New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2010), pp. 8–14. 2. Alhaji M. S. Bah and Ian Johnstone, “Sudan: Faltering Protection and Fragile Peace,” in Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), pp. 29–44.

2012_CIC_FM_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:47 PM Page xv

Mission Acronyms

AFISMA AMISOM AULO BINUB BINUCA BNUB CNMC CSI ECOMIB EUAVSEC South Sudan EUBAM EUBAM Rafah EUCAP Nestor EUCAP SAHEL Niger EUFOR Althea EUFOR Libya EUJUST LEX Iraq EULEX Kosovo EUMM EU NAVFOR Somalia EUPM EUPOL Afghanistan EUPOL COPPS EUPOL RD Congo EUSEC RD Congo EUSRA EUTM Somalia IMT ISAF ISF JCC KFOR

African-led International Support Mission to Mali AU Mission in Somalia AU Liaison Office UN Integrated Office in Burundi UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic UN Office in Burundi Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission Community Security Initiative ECOWAS Mission to Guinea-Bissau EU Aviation Security Mission in South Sudan EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point Regional Maritime Capacity Building for the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean EU CSDP Mission in Niger EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina EU Military Operation in Support of Humanitarian Assistance Operations in Response to the Crisis Situation in Libya EU Rule of Law Mission in Iraq EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia EU Naval Force Against Piracy EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina EU Police Mission in Afghanistan EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo EU Special Representative for Afghanistan EU Training Mission in Somalia International Monitoring Team International Security Assistance Force International Stabilization Forces Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force NATO Kosovo Force xv

2012_CIC_FM_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:47 PM Page xvi

xvi

•

MISSION ACRONYMS

KNDR MAPP/OEA MFO MFO Sinai MICOPAX MINURSO MINUSTAH MISSANG MONUC MONUSCO OAE OAS/AZ OHR OMIK OOS OSCE BiH RAMSI SADC TIPH 2 UNAMA UNAMI UNAMID UNDOF UNFICYP UNIFIL UNIOGBIS UNIPSIL UNISFA UNMIK UNMIL UNMIS UNMISS UNMIT UNMOGIP UNOCA UNOCI UNOWA UNPOS UNRCCA UNSCO UNSCOL UNSMIL UNSMIS UNTSO

Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Columbia Multinational Force and Observers Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti Angolan Technical Military and Security Mission in Guinea-Bissau UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo Operation Active Endeavor OAS Office in the Adjacency Zone Between Belize and Guatemala Office of the High Representative OSCE Mission in Kosovo Operation Ocean Shield OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands Southern African Development Community Temporary International Presence in Hebron (Phase 2) UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UN Assistance Mission for Iraq AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur UN Disengagement Observer Force UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus UN Interim Force in Lebanon UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone UN Interim Security Force for Abyei UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo UN Mission in Liberia UN Mission in Sudan UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan UN Regional Office for Central Africa UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire UN Office for West Africa UN Political Office for Somalia UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia UN Special Coordinator Office for the Middle East Peace Process Office of the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon UN Support Mission in Libya UN Supervision Mission in Syria UN Truce Supervision Organization

2012_CIC_FM_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:47 PM Page xvii

Global Peace Operations ANNUAL REVIEW OF

2013

2012_CIC_FM_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:47 PM Page xviii

OSCE - BiH 12/1995 OHR 06/2002 EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina 06/2002 EUPM 01/2003 - 06/2012 EUFOR ALTHEA 12/2004

MINUSTAH 04/2004 OAS Office in the Adjacency Zone between Belize and Guatemala 07/2003 Personal Representative of the Secretary General on the border controversy between Guyana and Venezuela 02/1990 OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia 02/2004

UNSMIL 09/2011 AU Liaison Office in Libya 10/2011 Personal Envoy, Western Sahara 03/1997 MINURSO 04/1991 AU Liaison Office in Western Sahara Special Envoy, Sahel 08/1994 09/2012 AFISMA EUCAP SAHEL Niger 12/2012 EUTM Mali 08/2012 12/2012 UNIOGBIS 06/2009 AU Liasion Office in Guinea-Bissau UNOWA 03/2010 11/2001 ECOMIB 05/2012 UNIPSIL 08/2008 UNMIL 09/2003 AU Liasion Office in Liberia 04/2004 UNOCI AU Liasion Office in Chad 04/2004 04/2005 AU Liaison Office in Cote d’Ivoire 01/2005 CNMC* Operation Licorne UNOCA 03/2004 02/2003 08/2010

MONUSCO 05/2010 EUPOL RD Congo 07/2007 EUSEC RD Congo 06/2005 AU Liaison Office in the DRC UNAMID 10/1999 07/2007 Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator for Darfur 08/2008

E 0

2012_CIC_FM_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:47 PM Page xix

EUBAM * 11/2005 JCC 07/1992 OSCE Mission to Moldova 04/1993

CiO Representative on the Minsk Conference 01/1997 EUSR for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia* 07/2003 EUMM 10/2008

UNRCCA 05/2007 OSCE Centre in Ashgabat 01/1999

OSCE Office in Baku 07/2000

UNFICYP 03/1964 Special Advisor, Cyprus 04/1997

OSCE Office in Yerevan 02/2000

OSCE Centre in Astana 07/1998

OSCE Centre in Bishek 01/1999 CSI 11/2010 OSCE Office in Tajikistan 06/2008

UNMOGIP* 04/1948

AU Liaison Office in the Sudan 08/2007 UN Office in Yemen 06/2012 EUCAP NESTOR 07/2012

Special Advisor, Myanmar 12/1994 UNAMI 08/2003 EUJUST LEX Iraq 03/2005

UNISFA 06/2011 AU Regional Task Force on the LRA 11/2011 UNPOS 04/1995 Operation Ocean Shield* 08/2009 EU NAVFOR Somalia - Operation Atalanta 12/2008 AMISOM 03/2007 AU Liaison Office in Somalia 09/2005

UNMISS 07/2011 Special Envoy, Sudan and South Sudan 07/2011 EUAVSEC South Sudan 06/2012 AU Liaison Office in South Sudan 08/2007 EUSR for Sudan and South Sudan 09/2010

AU Liaison Office in the Comoros 10/1997 AU/SADC Liaison Office in Madagascar BNUB 07/2011 12/2010 AU Liaison Office in Burundi 03/2004 EUSR the Horn of Africa* 12/2011 KNDR 01/2008 EUTM Somalia 04/2010

IMT 10/2004

RAMSI 07/2003

2012_CIC_FM_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 4:11 PM Page xx

2012_CIC_SS_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:39 PM Page 1

Strategic Summary 2012 Megan Gleason-Roberts and Alischa Kugel

2012_CIC_SS_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:39 PM Page 2

As 2012 came to a close, violence in Syria continued unabated despite efforts by joint UNAU Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi to mediate between the conflict parties and to reconcile differences between member states over the approach to the crisis. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, national forces cautiously returned to Goma after M23 rebels withdrew, but the situation remained volatile. In Mali, amid preparations for an African-led international intervention force to expel Islamist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda, insurgents advanced farther toward government-held territory. The growing threat prompted the launch of a French military operation in early January 2013, at the transitional government’s request, to halt the Islamists and accelerate the deployment of African troops. Events in 2012 demonstrated the critical role that peace operations can play as a tool for crisis management, but also brought their limits into sharp relief. Political and security advances in a number of countries allowed for reductions in deployments. However, across the Middle East and much of Africa, peace operations came under severe strain as they struggled to respond to deteriorating security conditions, as in eastern Congo, and to unraveling political agreements, as in Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic. The confluence of the two in Syria resulted in the resignation of Kofi Annan from his post as Special Envoy and the withdrawal of the short-lived observer mission. The international community continues to struggle to develop a roadmap for the way forward, with divisions in the Security Council hampering progress in finding a resolution to the crisis.

In addition to the authorizations in Syria, in 2012 the Security Council upgraded the UN’s political presence in Yemen to assist with the transition process and established the post of Special Envoy for the Sahel. In December the Council authorized an African-led military force in Mali and asked the SecretaryGeneral to submit detailed proposals for a multidisciplinary UN presence in Mali to support the political and security process. These events took place against an evolving debate on the financing and support of both peacekeeping and political missions at the UN. At UN headquarters, the divide between troop- and financial-contributing member states continued, but the senior advisory group on troop costs presented a series of recommendations to be deliberated by member states in 2013 that have the potential to break the stalemate on this issue. Proposals to strengthen the funding and backstopping arrangements for political missions failed to move forward. However, there are some promising signs that agreements may be reached on some aspects of financing in 2013. While political missions still lack a dedicated forum at the UN, where all member states can express their views on these operations, a request by member states for the Secretary-General to provide a comprehensive report on the UN’s political missions in mid-2013 may provide a venue for further discussion. Commitments by the Security Council and General Assembly to strengthen the UN’s conflict prevention and mediation capacities may be a harbinger of new momentum. Regional organizations played a prominent role in addressing political and security

2

2012_CIC_SS_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:39 PM Page 3

STRATEGIC SUMMARY 2012 • 3

Top Ten Nationalities of International Civilian Staff in UN Peacekeeping and Political Missions: 31 October 2012 7,031 international civilian staff in UN missions represent 166 member states, of which the top 10 comprise 34%

US 6%

Kenya 5%

Philippines 4% Canada 3% Ghana 3% India 3% Sierra Leone 3% UK 3%

All Others 66%

crises in 2012, most notably in Africa. In Somalia, the AU mission’s advances in stabilizing Mogadishu and extending its reach beyond the capital enabled progress in the country’s political transition. In West Africa, ECOWAS took the notable lead in addressing the coups in Guinea-Bissau, where it appointed a mediator for the crisis and deployed a military mission, and in Mali, where it led mediation efforts. In northern Mali, ECOWAS and the AU jointly prepared for an African-led military intervention drawn from ECOWAS forces, some of which deployed in early January 2013. The EU also increased its presence in the region, authorizing missions in Niger and Mali. While in 2012 nearly 85 percent of all multilateral peace operations were operating in parallel with another multilateral mission,1 coordination and cooperation between UN and regional organizations yielded mixed results both on the ground and in terms of institutional

Nigeria Serbia 2% 2%

partnerships. The security gains in Somalia were achieved within a new strategic concept for AMISOM and greater UN support for the mission, demonstrating new high points in the UN-AU relationship. UN military planners also assisted the latest joint AU and ECOWAS planning efforts for the African-led force in Mali. Despite these joint efforts, however, the Secretary-General only guardedly recommended the approval of an intervention force. Continued questions on the funding of the mission and the lack of a strong endorsement for the intervention force from the SecretaryGeneral represented a major setback to the relationship between the institutions. Events in 2012 underscore the fundamental link between politics and security in crisis management. The work of both types of peace operations—political and peacekeeping—in moving processes in these areas forward has provided the foundational logic for combining the coverage of the Annual Review of Global

2012_CIC_SS_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:39 PM Page 4

•

ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

Civilian Staff in OSCE Missions,1 UN Political Missions,2 and UN Peacekeeping Operations: 2008–2012

25,000

Total Number of Civilian Staff

4

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

0 2008

2009 OSCE

2010

2011

UN SPMs

UN PKOs

2012

Notes: 1. OSCE figures in 2008 and 2009 reflect budgeted staff. Staff strength in 2010 is as of 1 August 2010, and for 2011 is as of 30 April 2011. 2. International and national civilian staff in UN SPMs for 2008 are as of 30 September.

Peace Operations with the Center on International Cooperation’s Review of Political Missions.

Trends in Global Peace Operations

Deployments to all military and civilian-led global peace operations shrank by nearly 11 percent in 2012, with 254,982 troops, police, and civilians in field-based missions this year as compared to 286,325 in 2011.2 This represents the first contraction of global peace operations in nearly a decade.3 The number of civilians supporting UN field missions, both peacekeeping and political, saw a slight decrease of 2 percent, to 23,987, in 2012. With a decrease in civilian staff from 20,662 in 2011 to 20,132 in 2012, peacekeeping operations saw a bigger reduction than did political missions, which experienced only a

small contraction of about 1 percent in the same period. The United States, Kenya, and the Philippines are the top three nationalities of international civilian staff in UN peacekeeping and political missions.4 The vast majority of multilateral peace operations in the field operate alongside another mission, with approximately half of all political missions operating in parallel with military deployments. Africa hosts sixteen UN missions—the highest regional concentration of peace operations—with seven peacekeeping operations and nine civilian-led political missions, including two regional offices.5 Of these missions, 81 percent are deployed in the same region or subregion. Of the seven fieldbased missions that the UN operates in the Middle East, four are peacekeeping operations and three are political missions.6 In the Middle East, only UNAMI operates without another

2012_CIC_SS_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:39 PM Page 5

STRATEGIC SUMMARY 2012 • 5

UN peace operation alongside it within the same subregion. There is also a growing trend of military and civilian-led missions of different institutions deploying alongside each other. In the Western Balkans in 2012, the EU, the OSCE, and NATO had three military and police operations and ten civilian-led missions deployed that worked in close cooperation with each other.7 Over 90 percent of all non-UN peace operations in Africa operate in cooperation with a UN mission in the same country or subregion. The EU, which fields four military and police operations and five civilian-led operations in Africa, runs eight of its nine missions alongside UN presences.8 Peacekeeping Operations

UN military and police deployments to peacekeeping missions continued to contract, from 98,972 uniformed personnel in 2011 to 96,934 in 2012,9 a decrease of 2 percent. The reduction occurred across troop and police deployments and follows a contraction seen over the 2010–2011 period.10 In Sudan and South Sudan, deployments to UNMISS and UNISFA, missions that were both authorized in 2011, increased as the missions neared their full strength, while deployments to UNAMID declined. Sudan and South Sudan continue to host over one-third of the UN’s total peacekeepers. In West Africa, UNMIL’s planned force reduction continued, amid an authorized increase in its formed police units, while UNOCI’s forces stayed level. The precarious security situation in Côte d’Ivoire delayed planned reductions in the latter’s strength. In Haiti, after a surge in troop and police deployments in response to the 2010 earthquake, both troop and police levels continued to decline, approaching pre-earthquake levels. Deployments to UNMIT also gradually decreased throughout 2012, leading up to its closure on 31 December. Non-UN deployments shrank by nearly 20 percent overall, with large reductions in NATO’s ISAF troops in Afghanistan accounting for much of the decrease. Bolstered by a near

doubling of AMISOM’s authorized strength, and rapid additional contributions including the rehatting of Kenyan troops, AU deployments to the organization’s sole peacekeeping mission grew over 80 percent in 2012, reaching nearly 20,000 personnel. Overall police deployments to non-UN missions decreased nearly 13 percent. Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India were once again the top three military contributors to UN missions. Brazil, though its contributions did not significantly change from 2011 (and indeed dropped slightly), was a top ten contributor in 2012. South Africa and China were respectively the twelfth and thirteenth largest contributors in 2012. India and Nigeria are top ten contributors across military, police, and civilian personnel to UN peacekeeping missions. In the AU, Uganda, Burundi, and Kenya were the top troop contributors. Political Missions

With the creation of the posts of Joint UN-AU Special Envoy to Syria and Special Envoy to the Sahel, the UN authorized two new political missions in 2012 and strengthened the country presence of the Special Adviser on Yemen. Following the peaceful conduct of the elections in Sierra Leone in November 2012, the UN is laying out plans for UNIPSIL’s exit strategy, while a transition from BNUB to a regular Country Team presence will also be discussed. Overall, civilian personnel in UN fieldbased political missions experienced a slight decrease, from 3,912 in 2011 to 3,855 in 2012. With total staff strengths of 2,085 and 1,205 respectively, UNAMA and UNAMI remained the largest UN field-based political missions in 2012, accounting for 77 percent of all staff in UN field-based political missions. Uniformed personnel deployed in political missions increased by 47 percent, from 284 total staff in 2011 to 416 in 2012.11 This change was largely due to the increase in contingent troops deployed to UNAMI—the only UN political mission with a troop presence—from 221 to 352 between April 2011 and October 2012, amid a deterioration of the security situation in Iraq.

2012_CIC_SS_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:39 PM Page 6

•

ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

Total Number of Missions by Organization: 2010–2012

45 40

40 40 38

35

Number of Missions

6

30 25

25

23 21

20 17 14

15

15

15 15 15

9 9

10 7

5

5 0

UN

EU

AU

OSCE

6 4

Coalition/Ad Hoc NATO

2010

2011

3

4

0 0 ECOWAS

3

OAS

2

1 1

1

ECCAS

0

1 1

Arab League

2012

Note: Includes both military and civilian-led missions that were operational for any period between January and December of each year. The UN Special Envoy for the Sahel, EUAVSEC South Sudan, ECOMIB, the ECOWAS Envoy to Mali, and the ECOWAS Envoy to Guinea-Bissau are counted in the graph, but are not presented in the data sections of this Annual Review.

Top Ten Military and Police Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations: 31 October 2012

Military

Police

Pakistan Bangladesh India Ethiopia Nigeria Rwanda Nepal Egypt Ghana Brazil

Bangladesh Jordan India Senegal Nepal Pakistan Nigeria Rwanda Egypt Tanzania

The United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada represent the top three nationalities among international staff in UN political missions. Kenya, the Philippines, and India follow closely in fourth and fifth place.12 India is the only emerging power represented among

the top ten nationalities of international staff in political missions. While the number of political missions deployed by the UN, EU, OSCE, and OAS largely remained the same in 2012, the AU and ECOWAS both increased their field presence.

2012_CIC_SS_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:39 PM Page 7

STRATEGIC SUMMARY 2012 • 7

Parallel Peace Operation Deployments: 31 October 2012

10 9

Number of Missions

8

3

1

7 6 1

3

5 3

4 3

1

3 3

2

4

2

3 2

1

1

1

0 Sudan/ South Sudan

Somalia Military Missions

1

2

Kosovo

Civilian-led Missions

Afghanistan

DRC

Special Envoys

Notes: 1. Missions deployed to the broader Horn of Africa region are counted as part of Somalia. 2. The mandate of the International Civilian Office in Kosovo (ICO) ended 10 September 2012, but this operation is counted in the graph.

ECOWAS, which had zero political missions in 2011, deployed two in 2012,13 while the AU now operates fourteen liaison offices across Africa—an increase of 17 percent over 2011.

Peace Operations in 2012

Changing political dynamics as a result of the Arab Spring remain uncertain and are still unfolding, within varied national and regional environments. In Libya, UNSMIL assisted in the holding of the first elections in over forty years in July, whereas conflict continued unabated in Syria throughout the year. By the end of 2012, it was estimated that nearly 60,000 people had perished since the start of the Syrian conflict in March 2011. In February 2012, Kofi Annan was appointed as the joint United Nations–Arab League Special Envoy for Syria. Amid Annan’s intense mediation efforts, in April the UN deployed the UN

Supervision Mission in Syria, a peacekeeping mission with a limited observation mandate. However, the violence on the ground worsened, as did the divisions in the Security Council. After vetoing a Security Council resolution in February demanding the Syrian government to end the violence, Russia and China vetoed another resolution in July that threatened Bashar al-Assad’s regime with sanctions for failing to comply with Annan’s peace plan. In August, UNSMIS was discontinued and Annan resigned as Special Envoy. The failure of Annan’s successor, Lakhdar Brahimi, to secure a cease-fire during Eid al-Adha or since then has demonstrated the persistent limits of political engagement in the absence of a unified Security Council. The effects of the conflict have destabilized the region and coincided with the outbreak of overt hostilities between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory of Gaza.

2012_CIC_SS_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:39 PM Page 8

•

ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

Total Military Contributions to UN Peacekeeping and Non-UN Military Operations: 2002–2012 160,000 140,000

Number of Military Personnel

8

120,000 100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 0 2002

2003

2004 UN

2005

2006 NATO

While 2012 was largely expected to be a year of drawdown of the presence of international peace operations in West Africa, the overall security environment, coupled with multiple military coups, limited more rapid reduction of peacekeepers in the region. Instead, the precarious security situation brought about the deployment of two new peace operation presences, the ECOWAS Mission in GuineaBissau (ECOMIB) and the EU capacity-building mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger). In December, two additional missions, the Africanled International Support Mission for Mali (AFISMA) and the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali), were authorized. Ongoing force reductions for UNMIL continued, largely driven by pressure from the international community following successful elections in 2011 and amid larger budgetary constraints. The reductions occurred despite the SecretaryGeneral’s assessment that national forces are still unable to maintain stability. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, over twelve years of peacekeeping in the country suffered a major setback when the M23 rebel movement took control of Goma

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Regional and Ad Hoc Deployments

as national forces fled. UN peacekeepers were criticized for their inability to halt the M23 advance despite deploying attack helicopters. MONUSCO troops engaged in limited activities to protect civilians in and around Goma and supervised the rebels’ withdrawal two weeks after the siege. The UN Group of Experts on the DRC has repeatedly stated that Rwanda and Uganda, despite their assertions otherwise, have provided critical support to the M23 movement, complicating the mediation role they have assumed between the government and the rebels. Peace operations also faced rapid deterioration in the Central African Republic, where the emergence of an armed rebel coalition in December threatened political progress and peace consolidation efforts. As the armed groups advanced, eventually gaining control of approximately one-third of the country, the governments of Chad and South Africa agreed to send 2,000 and 400 troops respectively to halt the rebel coalition. The Economic Community of Central African States bolstered its peacekeeping operation

2012_CIC_SS_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:39 PM Page 9

STRATEGIC SUMMARY 2012 • 9

Total Military Contributions to UN Peacekeeping and Non-UN Military Operations, Excluding ISAF: 2002–2012

90,000

Number of Military Personnel

80,000 70,000 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 0 2002

2003

2004 UN

2005

2006 NATO

in the Central African Republic, MICOPAX, while the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) engaged with the government and rebels to establish a dialogue and cease-fire. Both the Security Council and the SecretaryGeneral condemned the violence, which resulted in the temporary evacuation of nonessential UN staff. Peace negotiations in early January 2013 yielded a cease-fire and an agreement on forming a coalition government, but the security environment in the Central African Republic remained precarious. The considerable security advances by a reinforced AMISOM and Somali forces in 2012 paved the way for the relocation of the UN Political Office for Somalia to Mogadishu for the first time in seventeen years. These gains were matched on the political front, where the creation of a new government and parliament formally ended the transitional period. However, delayed political reforms and continued asymmetric attacks underscore that there is a limited window for securing the unprecedented achievements of 2012.

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Regional and Ad Hoc Deployments

Sudan and South Sudan, which together host a total of nine multilateral political and peacekeeping missions, made only halting progress in resolving outstanding issues around the administration of Abyei and border demarcation in 2012, but did at least manage to register an agreement on revenue-sharing with the assistance of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel. However, progress in negotiations was overshadowed at the close of 2012 by rising violence in the South Sudan state of Western Bahr el-Ghazal, where in December UNMISS sheltered 5,000 people at its regional base. At the same time, in Jonglei state, one of UNMISS’s helicopters was shot down by South Sudanese armed forces. A humanitarian crisis enveloped South Kordofan and Blue Nile states as fighting between rebels and Sudanese armed forces continued. In Darfur, the security situation remained unstable, posing continued threats to civilians and peacekeepers alike. In Afghanistan, significant planning is under way for what will be the largest peace operation transition in the near future—the drawdown and withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) by the end

2012_CIC_SS_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:39 PM Page 10

•

ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

Number of UN Field-Based Political Missions by Region: 31 October 2012

10 9

9

Number of Missions

10

8 7 6 5 4 3

3 2

2 1 0

Africa

Middle East

of 2014. A key component of the withdrawal, the handover of security responsibilities to national authorities, has largely adhered to planned timelines, though the process has been beset by a surge in green-on-blue attacks. With ISAF’s departure and pending plans for an ISAF follow-on presence, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan will likely become the primary international presence in Afghanistan, at a time when the mission is also facing considerable cuts to its budget. In many of these missions, security issues presented continued and in some cases growing challenges for operations on the ground in 2012. In Libya, the convoy of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General was attacked in April, and in December another attack on a UN convoy took place, while freedom of movement was restricted for mission staff in Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, negatively affecting their ability to implement their mandates. Both thematic chapters in this volume analyze the changing strategic context for peace operations, particularly in increasingly dangerous settings, and the implications for mission leadership and new missions.

Central and South Asia

Conclusion and Looking Ahead

The year 2012 presented a new terrain for multilateral peace operations. Overall deployments to missions fielded by the UN and other organizations decreased. Yet at the same time, several new missions were authorized in 2012, and new operations have been proposed for 2013, including a possible additional regional force in eastern Congo. While the direction of the volatile situation in Syria is difficult to predict, developments on the ground may necessitate a new peacekeeping or political field mission. The overall debate around peace operations at UN headquarters and national capitals has continued to focus on reductions pushed by financial necessities, but realities on the ground point to the continuing role for both political and peacekeeping missions in crisis management. There is growing interest in strengthening conflict prevention measures and in the deployment of lighter-weight missions—both civilian-led and more specialized military missions involving specific thematic expertise and specialized assets. As this year’s volume of the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations

2012_CIC_SS_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:39 PM Page 11

STRATEGIC SUMMARY 2012 • 11

demonstrates, various types of peace operations deployed by international organizations already commonly work alongside each other. There is also an increasing interest in stronger cooperation across organizations, though events in 2012 demonstrate that there is still some way to go before a division of labor based on comparative advantage is achieved. Overarching these changes is the question of whether and how Western nations will reengage with UN peace operations as they withdraw their troops and specialized assets from Afghanistan over the next two years. Events in 2012 also demonstrated the limits and capacities of peace operations to stabilize environments and support political processes, heightened by the degree of political support from member states. While the stalemate in

resolving the conflict in Syria in 2012 and its associated high human costs illustrated the limits of peace operations, especially in the context of a divided Security Council, the crucial security advances in Somalia that created the political space necessary for progress are in large part due to UN, AU, and EU consensus on increasing support to AMISOM. Looking forward, peace operation deployments will encounter volatile and in some cases deteriorating security situations and challenging political realities, amid expectations from the international community to do more with fewer resources. But if lessons from the past year are to be a guide, the international institutions fielding these missions must be equipped with sufficient operational capacities and political backing to enable progress on the ground.

Notes 1. This figure includes peacekeeping and political missions, including regional offices with a mandate covering several countries. 2. These figures exclude civilian deployments to non-UN missions. Figures for UN deployments are as of 31 October 2012, while figures for non-UN deployments are as of 30 September 2012. 3. The last reduction of UN and non-UN combined deployments was in 2003. In 2011 there was a reduction of UN deployments and an increase in non-UN deployments that more than offset UN reductions, with overall growth in global peace operations. 4. This includes all field-based political missions and peacekeeping operations, as well as the Special Adviser for Cyprus, UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU), UN Representative to the Geneva International Discussions (UNRGID), Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, and UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA). 5. The peacekeeping operations are MINURSO, MONUSCO, UNAMID, UNISFA, UNMIL, UNMISS, and UNOCI. The political missions are BINUCA, BNUB, CNMC, UNIOGBIS, UNIPSIL, UNOCA, UNOWA, UNPOS, and UNSMIL. 6. The peacekeeping operations are UNDOF, UNIFIL, UNSMIS, and UNTSO. The political missions are UNAMI, UNSCO, and UNSCOL. 7. The military missions are EUFOR Althea and KFOR. The civilian missions are EULEX Kosovo, EUPM BiH, EUSR in BiH, EUSR in Kosovo, ICO, OMIK, OSCE Mission to BiH, OSCE Mission to Montenegro, OSCE Mission to Serbia, OSCE Mission to Skopje, and OSCE Presence in Albania. 8. The exception is EUCAP Sahel Niger. 9. Uniformed personnel include troops, military observers, and civilian police in UN peacekeeping missions. Year-to-year comparisons are made on actual deployments between September 2011 and September 2012 for non–UN-commanded missions, and between October 2011 and October 2012 for UN-commanded missions. 10. In 2012, UN military deployments decreased from 84,735 personnel in 2011 to 83,300 in 2011, a reduction of over 1.5 percent. UN civilian police deployments decreased from 14,237 personnel in 2011 to 13,637 in 2012, a reduction of over 4 percent. 11. Uniformed personnel in field-based UN political missions include troops, military experts on mission, and police. The 2011 figures of uniformed personnel are as of 30 April, as compared to 2012 figures as of 31 October. 12. Kenya and the Philippines have equal representation of staff. 13. This includes the mediators deployed by ECOWAS to Guinea-Bissau and Mali.

2012_CIC_SS_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 4:20 PM Page 12

2012_CIC_1_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:39 PM Page 13

1

The Changing Face of Peace Operations: New Mandates and Risks for Peacekeeping and Political Missions Richard Gowan

13

2012_CIC_1_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:39 PM Page 14

In the first four months of 2013, the United Nations Security Council took a series of major decisions on peace operations and political missions that potentially mark a turning point in the history of multilateral crisis management. The Council approved an “intervention brigade” to fight militias in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and, after a period of six years in which it has avoided launching new large-scale missions, authorized a force of over 12,000 troops and police to deploy to Mali after France intervened to halt rebel advances in January. It also called for the creation of a new political mission in Somalia with an expansive mandate to support the government and African Union peacekeepers in building up a functioning federal state. Crucially, this new mission is to have “an expanded physical presence,” deploying personnel across Somalia, much of which remains very fragile. Coming in quick succession, these decisions add up to a significant expansion of the UN’s commitments in Africa. Since the international financial crisis broke, there has been an emphasis on the “consolidation” of peace operations—implying a gradual reduction in total deployments—although there has been a gradual expansion of political missions.1 Consolidation will continue in some cases, such as Haiti and Liberia, but the Security Council now appears ready to countenance new deployments, and the UN peacekeeping budget may rise considerably in 2013. The Council is also continuing to explore new ways of using political missions. The UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) will receive logistical support from the separate, more costly UN support mission that has

backed up the African Union logistically and administratively since 2009. The Council also approved a relatively large political office in Mali in December 2012—creating a platform for talks on peacekeeping. In addition to the UN’s efforts, the crisis in Mali in particular has stimulated other organizations to take on new deployments. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) launched a security force (the African-led International Support Mission to Mali [AFISMA]) to support the French intervention, paving the way for the UN. The EU has sent trainers to assist the Malian army and begun to implement preexisting plans for a smaller rule-of-law mission in the Sahel. As this chapter will emphasize, the AU and other African organizations have played an instrumental role in reshaping the UN presence in the DRC, often in tense debates. The decisions on the DRC, Mali, and Somalia are also significant because they are symptomatic of broader dilemmas relating to the capacity of peace operations and political missions to operate in dangerous environments. The intervention brigade in the DRC is designed to use offensive force to help stabilize the perennially chaotic east of the country, and may sustain as well as inflict casualties. The missions in Mali and Somalia both face the possibility of attacks from radical Islamist groups. Both before and after the French intervention in Mali, UN SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon raised concerns that UN humanitarian workers could become targets if they were too closely associated with international military operations. Similar fears played an important part in planning for Somalia. 14

2012_CIC_1_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:39 PM Page 15

THE CHANGING FACE OF PEACE OPERATIONS • 15

The discussions over the risks involved in these cases echo arguments over the dangers of deploying the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) in the second quarter of 2012. Although a small mission, UNSMIS was required to navigate a potentially hostile environment and eventually had to curtail its operations because of safety concerns (see p. 58). More recently, the UN has had to contend with the kidnapping of peacekeepers on the Golan Heights as the Syrian war has fomented regional instability, and there have been fatal attacks on peacekeepers in both Darfur and South Sudan. Peace operations and political missions have always run significant risks, as Afghanistan and Iraq have amply and tragically demonstrated. Nonetheless, it is clear that the UN faces an evolving—and deteriorating— threat environment in many new and existing missions. Other organizations face comparable dilemmas: the AU has already sustained significant casualties in Somalia as well as Darfur, and has accused the UN of an excessively cautious approach to operations. As Bruce D. Jones and I argue in the next chapter, the security challenges and political pressures facing UN and non-UN peace operations and political missions place major demands on national and international policymakers. While we will go on to look at how this demand can be met—and especially the leadership questions involved—this chapter looks at the origins of the Security Council’s decisions on the DRC, Mali, and Somalia and the often convoluted policy processes that shaped them.

The Legacy of 2012

The fact that the Security Council seized on new operational concepts for the DRC, Mali, and Somalia in early 2013 created the impression that the UN was undergoing decisive shifts in its approach to crisis management. Some long-standing troop contributors to UN missions were particularly concerned by the implications of the intervention brigade in the

DRC, and the Security Council attempted to reassure them by stating that this intervention is “exceptional.”2 Nonetheless, it is also important to recognize that the Security Council settled on its policies toward these three cases only after extended consideration of the options and threats involved. Narrating the events of 2012, this edition of the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations provides a unique overview of how policy debates developed slowly and tentatively prior to the ultimate decisions in 2013. Some of the assumptions that informed these debates, most notably over the type of intervention required in Mali, have since been found wanting. But it is still necessary to go back to these earlier discussions to answer two questions: Which players (in the UN and elsewhere) have acted as the “policy entrepreneurs” in defining the options for peace operations and political missions in each case? Have the UN and its partners debated their strategic options in an efficient or timely fashion, or have they tended to react to events in an ad hoc manner? Understanding the dynamics that led to the Council’s decisions can also help us predict how the UN and regional organizations will respond to future demands for new missions and reinforce existing operations. The conceptual and strategic debates sparked over the DRC, Mali, and Somalia—especially concerning threat management, the use of force, and the role of political missions in navigating active conflicts—have not been resolved, or even properly explored. This chapter is an account of brief skirmishes in a much bigger argument over the state of crisis management. It looks first at arguments over military options in the DRC and Mali, including their political dimensions, and then at the new mission in Somalia.

The DRC: Stumbling Toward Peace Enforcement

While the UN has overseen a number of successful operations in Africa over the past decade, these long-running blue helmet missions

2012_CIC_1_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:39 PM Page 16

16

•

ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

have been the target of growing criticism from both inside and outside the organization. One basic critique is that some have simply gone on too long, potentially creating “dependency” on peacekeeping for stability. The second is that the UN has tended to rely on large numbers of static and sometimes underequipped infantry, often because no alternative military resources are available. The third, articulated by African governments and the AU, is that these missions are too slow to use decisive force against spoilers—especially in contrast to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which has undertaken costly but increasingly successful operations to seize back territory from Islamist forces. UN officials have recently attempted to address some of these criticisms head-on. Tasked with planning a new mission in South Sudan in 2011, they proposed a relatively light, mobile force—although these plans have been undermined by a lack of high-end military assets.3 The UN has also advocated the use of surveillance drones to assist peacekeepers in the eastern DRC and on the border between Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. But African governments have experimented with proposals for regional and subregional operations that would (at least on paper) be more aggressive than UN forces. These include the development of an AU Regional Intervention Force in Central Africa aimed at combating the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The force, which was still coming together in 2012, could potentially conduct aggressive military operations not only in parts of the DRC patrolled by UN troops, but also in South Sudan and the Central African Republic. But as we note on p. 83 of this volume, this force has been hampered by funding gaps and deployed slowly. Nonetheless, the deteriorating security situation in the eastern DRC prompted proposals for another regional peace enforcement mission. In the second quarter of 2012, the Tutsi March 23 (M23) militia put increasing pressure on Congolese forces and the UN (which responded with significant force on some occasions) in the east of the country. A

group of southern African countries, including South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, offered troops or assets for a new mission to take on M23, and this proposal was endorsed by both the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the African Union in mid-2012. However, this mission also faced financial and logistical obstacles, and the idea for it did not gain additional traction until November 2012, when M23 temporarily seized the regional hub of Goma. UN forces in Goma protected civilians and kept up patrols, but their failure to deter or reverse M23’s advances sparked heavy public criticism. At this point, the permanent members of the Security Council began to look at the peace enforcement option more closely. Versions of the original plan included (1) an independent African force that would rely on UN logistical support and (2) a brigade under full UN command. The latter option gained prominence as UN officials and other skeptics asked hard questions about how two separately commanded operations would work together. Ultimately, the intervention brigade became part of a larger peace package for the DRC, worked out under the auspices of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. In February, the governments of the region signed a “peace, security, and cooperation framework” that endorsed the new brigade. Ban also proposed that a new special envoy, former Irish president Mary Robinson, lead diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis. There were lingering doubts about the intervention brigade: in the run-up to the final agreement on the framework, some African governments worried that the UN would not use the brigade in an assertive manner. Conversely, some governments with troops inside the existing UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, including India, warned of potential threats to their personnel. The Security Council ultimately mandated the mission in Resolution 2098 on 28 March 2013, although the text is loaded with

2012_CIC_1_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:39 PM Page 17

THE CHANGING FACE OF PEACE OPERATIONS • 17

caveats about the force to satisfy the remaining skeptics. The Council also stipulated that it would review the intervention brigade after a year, apparently to push the Congolese government toward finding political solutions to the problems of the eastern DRC. The brigade is set to become operational in July 2013. This brief history of how the brigade came into being highlights three main points. First, the initial impetus for the mission came from African states—the “policy entrepreneurs” in this case. Second, the gap between these powers’ ambitions and capabilities meant that the UN was almost inevitably involved in implementing the mission. Third, it took an urgent crisis (the fall of Goma) to move the proposal forward. Similar dynamics affected UN diplomacy over Mali.

Mali: Prolonged Planning, Sudden Crisis

Policy debates over peacekeeping in Mali were even more drawn out than those over the eastern DRC, and for a time it appeared that the UN would have only a supporting role. The initial international reaction to the seizure of northern Mali by a mixture of secessionists and Islamists in March 2012 was confused (the fact that the army had launched a coup on 22 March and opposed outside intervention did not help matters). At first, regional and Western powers staked their hopes on a political response to the crisis. An ECOWAS envoy, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, mediated a return to civilian rule in southern Mali with support from the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA). However, the army maintained a strong political role, and it proved difficult to make progress in negotiations with the main northern factions. Options for a military intervention slowly came into focus in the middle of 2012. ECOWAS initially tabled proposals for an operation, aimed at stabilizing southern Mali and potentially assisting the army in recapturing the north, in talks with France and the AU in June and July. The potential number of

troops fluctuated from just over 3,000 to 11,000. At France’s instigation, ECOWAS presented its proposal to the Security Council, but the Council twice refused to authorize military action in both cases because of a lack of detailed operational plans. In October 2012, after receiving a more detailed but still incomplete proposal from ECOWAS and the direct request for an intervention from Mali’s interim president, the Security Council attempted to accelerate the planning process by directing the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to assist ECOWAS and the AU in preparing final options for a military intervention in support of the Malian army. This created both significant moral hazards and operational dilemmas for UN officials, as they were required to help put together a plan for a military operation over which they would have no direct control. Meanwhile the distribution of responsibilities for dealing with the crisis within the UN became confused. While the head of UNOWA, Said Djinnit, had contacts with some rebel leaders, Ban Ki-moon appointed former Italian premier Romano Prodi as envoy for the Sahel region as a whole. Prodi’s office ultimately only had a marginal role in operational decisions on Mali, however. Meanwhile, officials dealing with peacekeeping and political affairs at UN headquarters engaged in intense and sometimes testy debates over Mali. In December, the Security Council authorized the deployment of 3,300 African troops to support the Malian army. The UN was also directed to set up a political office in Mali’s capital, Bamako (which in March 2013 had forty-seven staff members). The EU offered to train the Malian army to prepare for an operation to retake the north, although this was not expected to take place before September 2013. This plan was sidelined after France intervened on 7 January 2013 to stop rebels from capturing parts of southern Mali, potentially including Bamako. West African and Chadian forces hastily deployed to reinforce the French.

2012_CIC_1_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:39 PM Page 18

18

•

ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

Once these initial African forces were deployed, it soon became clear that they would struggle to sustain themselves logistically. The United States raised the possibility of a UN peacekeeping operation early on, and France soon also advocated this option. In the months that followed, a wide variety of options were floated in New York, ranging from maintaining a regional operation with UN logistical support, to a UN-led mission with a peace enforcement mandate. From an early stage, Ban Ki-moon raised concerns about the risks of involving the UN—even only in a support capacity—in offensive operations against rebels or Islamist groups. Meanwhile, the Malian government appeared concerned that a UN operation might not serve its interests, and considerable cajoling was required to secure Bamako’s consent. Conscious of the need to take pressure off France and its African allies, the Security Council converged on the operational model eventually set out in Resolution 2100: the deployment of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), partially based on the existing African force, scheduled for July 2013. A separate French force will continue to conduct operations against rebels and Islamist groups. While MINUSMA does not have a peace enforcement component similar to that approved for the DRC, the mission is still liable to be a target for insurgents.

The New Politics of Military Peace Operations

While the French intervention upset many earlier assumptions about Mali, there are striking similarities between this narrative and the story of the intervention brigade in the DRC. Again, much of the impetus for an international deployment came from African governments, but there was also a gap between their ambitions and capabilities. The UN became increasingly directly involved in planning the mission to address these gaps, although the plans articulated for Mali in December 2012 arguably had flaws. The intensification of the

crisis in January 2013—and the ensuing need to consolidate the gains made by France and its African allies—shook up policy debates and effectively made a UN operation inevitable. Set side-by-side, these narratives underline two essential points about the politics around military peace operations today. The first is that, while the Security Council may have looked bold in its decisions on both the DRC and Mali in early 2013, it was actually highly cautious on both cases through 2012. While the Security Council recognized the seriousness of the problems involved early on in 2012, it continued to debate its options at length until major crises increased the need for a decisive response. Even after the fall of Goma, the Council took more than three months to mandate an intervention brigade for the DRC, and it moved rather more slowly on Mali than some of its members had initially hoped. This slow approach had virtues: UN officials argue that it gave time to assess strategic options, build trust, and modify plans that needed considerable revisions. Equally, the Council arguably lost the strategic initiative at times, waiting on events rather than sending out clear political signals and threats. Second, it is important to contrast the caution of the Council with the more assertive approaches advocated by African powers in both cases. The Congolese and Malian cases have arguably highlighted and heightened African criticisms of the UN’s wary approach to risk in peace operations. These cases have also deepened concerns held by some members of the Security Council about the capacity of African powers to mount the high-intensity operations they advocate. These criticisms and concerns are likely to be repeated in future debates over peace operations in Africa. In the Mali case in particular, multiple UN officials were engaged in diplomatic efforts alongside their counterparts from ECOWAS and the African Union in 2012, while the quest for a viable military plan arguably distracted from (perhaps remote) political solutions. Although the Security

2012_CIC_1_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:39 PM Page 19

THE CHANGING FACE OF PEACE OPERATIONS • 19

Somalia: A Decisive Political Test?

Although inevitably associated with peacekeeping failures in the 1990s, Somalia has recently been praised as a success story for international crisis management. In 2011 in particular, the AU force (AMISOM) succeeded in pushing back the Islamist forces that had previously controlled much of the country. Meanwhile, UN-led political talks outside the country made gradual progress toward a political settlement. By the beginning of 2012, there appeared to be a chance to consolidate these successes. In December 2011, Ban Ki-moon visited Mogadishu and declared that the UN Political Office for Somalia (based in Kenya since 1995) should base at least some of its personnel in the capital for the first time. This was a noteworthy signal of confidence in the country’s evolution and, despite an early attack on the new UN office, this move gave UNPOS improved day-to-day access to Somali leaders. Meanwhile, AMISOM benefited from a revised operational concept and significant reinforcements, enabling the mission to make further major advances. In the second half of 2012, UN and AU officials turned their attention to a more radical overhaul of their missions in Somalia (see p. 39). One sensitive priority was how to increase the international civilian presence outside Mogadishu. If the restoration of Somali state authority was to succeed, officials agreed,

governance advisers and other experts would need to work beyond the capital. But it was not clear whether this should mean an expanded UN presence or adding civilian advisers to the AU force. As Megan GleasonRoberts and Alischa Kugel have noted, some UN officials were “skeptical of the AU’s eagerness to develop its multidimensional civilian capacities, particularly in areas where the UN sees itself as having established expertise and a comparative advantage.”4 Questions arose over how increased UN political engagement would affect perceptions of—and potential threats to—explicitly apolitical UN humanitarian officials. It was also necessary to decide how this mission would relate to the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), with its mandate to sustain the AU force logistically and administratively. An assessment mission at the end of 2012 laid out options ranging from fully integrating the UN presence in Somalia (including UNSOA and humanitarian agencies), to keeping the various elements of the UN entirely separate.

UN Photo/Stuart Price

Council, UN officials, and their regional counterparts attempted to align political and military strategies, there was a strong impression of uncertainty over how precisely to handle both the DRC and Mali. Questions about the balance between politics and force, as well as the division of responsibilities between the UN and the AU, are also a familiar part of policy debates over Somalia, where the AU first deployed peacekeepers in 2007. The chapter now turns to the process leading up to the authorization of the new UN political mission in Somalia (UNSOM), which still involves many risks.

A woman looks on as a Ugandan police officer serving with AMISOM walks past during his patrol in the Kaa’ran district of the Somali capital, Mogadishu, in November 2012. AMISOM’s police units are working with their counterparts in the Somali national police to help provide security to Mogadishu, in addition to training and mentoring national police officers on policing techniques and practices.

2012_CIC_1_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:39 PM Page 20

20

•

ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

The Council eventually settled on establishing a new political mission in Somalia (UNSOM) that is structurally integrated with the UN Country Team and receives logistical support from UNSOA. In addition to political affairs and support issues, the mission is mandated to advise AMISOM on peacebuilding and statebuilding matters—no mean task given that AU forces are still in combat— while also monitoring and reporting on human rights abuses to the Council and helping prepare a new constitution. UNSOM is also charged with building the capacity of the Somali authorities, especially on disarmament, security sector reform (SSR), and counterpiracy. While political missions have taken on an increasing range of tasks over the past decade (with a particular emphasis on security-related affairs including disarmament and SSR), this is a very broad mandate to carry out in a still volatile environment. UN officials warned that the security situation will still make it difficult for UNSOM personnel to venture beyond major cities in many areas. Coming less than two years after the deployment of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)—another complex political mission that has undertaken a wide range of duties—the mandate for UNSOM indicates that the Security Council is increasingly willing to invest a great deal of trust in political missions. Some officials and analysts assume that UNSOM and AMISOM will eventually be merged into a single blue helmet operation. In the meantime, UNSOM’s ability to expand across Somalia and contribute to the consolidation of the Somali state will shape views of the capabilities of political missions more broadly.

Conclusion

The process leading up to the launch of UNSOM was in some ways more straightforward than the processes regarding the DRC and Mali. The Council and UN planners had time to consider a range of strategic choices, and no overwhelming crisis interrupted their

deliberations. Nonetheless, there were parallels with the other processes too. All involved considerable reflection on how to operate in an unstable environment, including how to balance relations with a regional partner with a high tolerance for risk. This is an important reminder that political missions often have to adapt their structures and strategies as radically as do military operations in order to navigate complex threat environments. The prolonged deliberations over the cases outlined here underline that there is no consensus on how the UN and other organizations can adapt to these challenges. A wide array of actors, running from troop contributors to humanitarian officials, have reason to be concerned about the problems involved. These specific debates may also have a lasting impact on how the UN deals with other crises. The planners dealing with Mali and the DRC in 2012 were aware that options were also being prepared for a possible postwar mission in Syria. There were fears that if the UN took on peace enforcement in Africa, the Security Council might soon direct it to do the same in Damascus or Aleppo. Meanwhile, there were broader questions over the implications of more aggressive policies for the protection of civilians, an operational and ethical priority for the UN. If future peace operations are likely to spark similar debates and fears (and as Bruce D. Jones and I argue in the next chapter, they probably will), some sort of structured strategic debate will be required within the UN and among its partners about how to manage the risks ahead. A purely case-by-case approach to these problems may sometimes be a matter of necessity, but this can wear down states’ trust in peace operations and block the development of effective doctrines to guide new missions. At times like this, it is common for analysts to call for the creation of some sort of high-level panel—typically compared to that which produced the 2000 Brahimi Report—to assess the challenges and choices ahead. The quality and impact of such panels have been

2012_CIC_1_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:39 PM Page 21

THE CHANGING FACE OF PEACE OPERATIONS • 21

mixed over the years. Nonetheless, there is a case to be made for involving some new sort of high-level review of the shifting strategic context for both peace operations and political missions, to enable more effective mission planning in the future. In time, policymakers may see the deliberations over the DRC, Mali, and Somalia in 2013 not as the culmination of a difficult policy process but as prologues to a more

general overhaul of multilateral crisis management. But this chapter has, at a minimum, shown how difficult it has been for the Security Council and other actors to come even this far. This has mostly been a history of reactive decisions and uneasy compromises. In a period of widespread strategic change and new threats, it is time for those who care about shaping effective international crisis management missions to regain the initiative.

Notes I thank Megan Gleason-Roberts and Alischa Kugel for comments on a series of drafts of this chapter, and a number of UN officials for advice on an earlier version. The views expressed here are my own. 1. For a guide to policy issues in this period see Ian Johnstone, “Peacekeeping’s Transitional Moment,” in Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2011 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2011). 2. See UN Security Council Resolution 2098 (28 March 2013), paragraph 9. 3. See Megan Gleason, ed., “Sudan and South Sudan,” in Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2012 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2012), p. 74. 4. Megan Gleason-Roberts and Alischa Kugel, “Diplomatic Fallout: The Next Phase of UN Engagement in Somalia,” World Politics Review (20 May 2013). Available at http://www.worldpolitics review.com/articles/12960/diplomatic-fallout-the-next-phase-of-u-n-engagement-in-somalia.

2012_CIC_1_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 4:22 PM Page 22

2012_CIC_2_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:37 PM Page 23

2

Leadership and the Use of Force in Peace Operations: Principles for Peacekeeping and Political Missions Bruce D. Jones and Richard Gowan

23

2012_CIC_2_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:37 PM Page 24

As crisis management grows more complex, it is ever more important that states, organizations, and individual international officials offer strong leadership to manage the challenges ahead. As co-author Richard Gowan notes in Chapter 1, the year 2012 and the first half of 2013 have been a dramatic period for multilateral peace operations and political missions, marked by crises from Mali to the Middle East. The Security Council and major powers in regional organizations have placed increasing expectations on uniformed peacekeepers and civilian crisis managers alike, ordering them to take on tasks ranging from supervising a deteriorating conflict in Syria to seizing territory—and improving governance—in Somalia. There seems to be a growing demand for peacekeepers to shift toward peace enforcement, captured in the May 2013 mandate for a new intervention brigade in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. And in cases including Somalia, multilateral political missions have been asked to play a greater role in support of aggressive international military operations. These tasks presage potentially even greater challenges ahead. The strategic environment for peace operations and political missions is changing, and this is not merely a short-term phenomenon. The overall number of major civil wars has declined significantly and steadily, though there’s been a slight uptick—concentrated in the Arab world— since 2006. The decline is partially attributable to the international investment in peace operations and mediation over this period. Yet those civil wars that remain appear especially difficult to resolve, involving major political tensions (as in Syria), harsh operating

environments (Darfur), and all too often radical Islamist forces (Mali and Somalia). Some veteran international officials argue that these obstacles are insurmountable, and that the UN and its partners should not venture where “there is no peace to keep.” Yet recent crises have shown that governments are fundamentally divided over the relevance of these concerns and principles. There are no hard and fast rules in multilateral crisis management. There is a reasonable probability that the Security Council and other intergovernmental bodies will continue to give peace operations and political missions increasingly ambitious—and in some cases unachievable—mandates. It will fall to the leaders of individual missions to translate these expectations into workable operations. In many cases, international officials have considerable leeway to interpret their mandates, but they face a high political price if they fail. This chapter highlights the need for the individuals put in charge of UN and non-UN missions to show especially high levels of judgment in three areas: (1) grasping the dynamics of violence; (2) shaping the political frameworks for the use of force; and (3) balancing forceful interventions with peacebuilding.

The Need for Leadership

How realistic is it to ask international officials to guide complicated and sometimes dangerous peace operations, especially in cases where they are authorized to direct the use of force? The UN secretariat has invested heavily in senior leadership training in recent years. But UN officials and their counterparts in regional organizations admit that mission

24

2012_CIC_2_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:37 PM Page 25

LEADERSHIP AND THE USE OF FORCE IN PEACE OPERATIONS • 25

leaders are still often chosen for political rather than meritocratic reasons. The best often rely on personal skills and experiences, not standardized training. In a recent study of leadership at the UN, Fabrizio Hochschild emphasizes the need for “entrepreneurial” senior officials to have personal knowledge, political awareness and insight—as well as a good sense of timing—to master complex challenges. “The exercise of leadership consists of gaining awareness of the limitations, the contradictions and the unknowns, and then setting out to carry the organization beyond them,” Hochschild argues. “UN leaders should be aware of but not resigned to the constraints but find a means of creating space for independent action.”1 Peace operations and political missions in unstable countries are certainly not naturally “conducive” environments for steady institutional progress. Even after numerous efforts to systematize international crisis management, individual judgment is a hugely important factor to making a mission succeed. When the Security Council trusts a UN envoy’s insights, for example, it will often give him or her considerable room for maneuver. Over the past two years, the Council has placed a notably great deal of trust in Jamal Benomar, the UN special representative of the SecretaryGeneral in Yemen. Conversely, the Syrian crisis has underlined how hard it is for international officials to respond strategically to conflicts in the absence of top-level political support. During the first two years of the war, the Security Council’s divisions prevented it from defining a credible route out of the crisis. In February 2012, it turned to former SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan to mastermind mediation efforts, but his work was undercut by persistent international divisions. In such conditions, even a tried-and-tested global figure will struggle to play a decisive leadership role. (Some argued that he tried too long, and in so doing blocked more decisive international action; but in retrospect it is clear that any such action was unlikely anyway.) Annan’s

replacement, the widely respected Lakhdar Brahimi, encountered very similar difficulties. Yet even senior international officials with much greater top-level political support typically face huge obstacles to exercising leadership, ranging from bureaucratic impediments to the difficulty of gaining leverage over political actors in fragile states. Many of these obstacles are common across many or all multilateral missions. However, this chapter focuses on a particular set of obstacles to leadership, and opportunities for it, that relate to high-risk environments such as Somalia, Mali, and the DRC. As Gowan argues, these countries are becoming test cases for multilateral crisis management in dangerous theaters. The leaders of both peace operations and political missions must decide how to balance political engagement with the use of force in each of these cases: getting this balance right will be essential to creating lasting stability in every one of them.

Old and New Problems

The importance of leadership to multilateral crisis management is not a new theme. In the 1990s, after the UN’s failures in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia, international officials and experts gave considerable attention to the problems of “command from the saddle” in conflict zones.2 Bruce Jones contributed to these debates, highlighting the importance of strategic coordination among peacekeepers, humanitarian actors, and development agencies to stabilization and peacebuilding operations. Jones argued at that time that two factors could undermine efforts to coordinate international action: “the growing proliferation of international, state, and non-governmental actors” and “the possibility of a continued move from traditional, ‘consensual’ peacekeeping operations to increasingly coercive strategies.”3 Since then, the UN has invested immense time and effort into developing integrated mission structures that should (in theory) empower mission leaders to manage the proliferation of actors on the ground. UN officials

2012_CIC_2_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:37 PM Page 26

26

•

ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

have also devoted a great deal of time to building partnerships with entities such as the African Union and the European Union, and day-to-day interactions have improved significantly over time. Nonetheless, international efforts often remain fragmented in postconflict states, and some analysts are pessimistic about what mission leaders can achieve. A recent study by Cedric de Coning argues that Special Representatives of the SecretaryGeneral (SRSGs) have been reduced to “process facilitators,” mediating between different parts of the UN system.4 This may be pessimistic, but it points to an important distraction in the time and effort of SRSGs. The role of coercive strategies in peacemaking and peacebuilding has been even less satisfyingly resolved. Over the last decade and a half, UN and non-UN peace operations alike have been willing to experiment with the use of force. In some cases, such as Haiti and the DRC, UN forces have made extensive use of force to deal with spoilers and protect civilians; and UN-mandated multinational force operations have at times deployed and used considerable force. In southern Lebanon, the UN mission was revitalized in 2006 after the summer war between Israel and Hezbollah and given an explicit mandate to use its military capabilities to extend state authority, though changing political conditions on the ground mean that this mandate has not been genuinely tested. Nonetheless, the evolution of “robust” peacekeeping has been piecemeal. Many troop contributors to UN missions have expressed concern about the risks to their personnel and the blurring of the boundary between peacekeeping and tougher stabilization operations. Even large missions have frequently lacked the military assets to concentrate significant force in multiple areas simultaneously, limiting their options. Some spoilers—such as militia forces in the DRC and Darfur—have proved increasingly adept at identifying and exploiting mission weak spots. Meanwhile, the relationship between international military forces and political missions

has proved complex and sometimes dangerous. In Afghanistan and Iraq, UN officials have attempted to develop viable political processes alongside forceful operations by well-equipped Western forces. In both cases, they have tragically lost lives as they have attempted to engage. In Somalia, the UN deployed political staff to Mogadishu in early 2012 under the protection of the AU, but the UN and AU have often differed over the effects of the latter’s offensive operations. Furthermore, as Megan Gleason-Roberts and Alischa Kugel demonstrate in this volume’s Strategic Summary, in 2012 approximately half of all UN political missions were fielded in parallel with military deployments. Increasingly, this also includes parallel civilianmilitary deployments of different institutions, adding a new dimension to the delicate balance between political engagement and military actions and risking a further diffusion of responsibility when crises erupt. While the use of force by multilateral missions is always likely to be problematic, experience also shows that some mission leaders are better equipped to manage the consequences than others. In some cases, military and police commanders play a decisive role. In Bosnia in the mid-1990s, General Rupert Smith played a decisive part in toughening the mission’s response to the Bosnian Serbs, although this put personnel at risk (and, as he has since admitted, eventually involved acting with virtually no reference to the Security Council at all in 1995).5 More recently, the success of UN operations against gangs in the Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince, in 2007 was often put down to the skills of the Brazilian two-star general in charge. But the civilian political leadership of a peace operation also plays an essential role in decisions on the use of force and especially in justifying the political framework for coercive action. Over the years, a small number of UN mission leaders have demonstrated an especially strong interest in the use of force. Jacques Paul Klein, a former US Air Force

2012_CIC_2_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:37 PM Page 27

LEADERSHIP AND THE USE OF FORCE IN PEACE OPERATIONS • 27

officer who led UN missions in eastern Slavonia and Liberia, authorized military operations in both cases to subdue spoilers and assert the UN’s capabilities. A more recent leader of the UN’s mission in Liberia (UNMIL) gained the affectionate nickname “Field Marshal” after taking a close interest in military matters. However, many civilian UN mission leaders are more ambivalent toward, and in some cases uninterested in, the military dimensions of their jobs. This is unsurprising: most come from diplomatic or development careers, not the armed forces. Some leaders have seen their tenures cut short due to military miscalculations. In 2008, the head and deputy head of the UN’s mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) had to resign after a badly prepared police raid against Kosovar Serbs in Mitrovica resulted in the death of a UN police officer and numerous NATO casualties. Leaders of political missions sometimes maintain a studied distance from the use of force. In Libya in 2011, the leader of the UN’s support mission (UNSMIL), Ian Martin, deliberately employed a consensus-building approach that set the UN apart from NATO and the latter’s coercive strategy. But it is hard to keep this level of distance in cases where violence is ongoing or escalating, as the tragic bombing of the UN office in Baghdad a decade ago demonstrated. The leader of the mission, Sergio Vieira de Mello, had bravely decided to emphasize openness to Iraqi society as the keynote of his mission, which included setting up office outside the heavily defended green zone. But this openness left the UN offices vulnerable to attack. A degree of ambivalence about coercion is advisable—and even useful—in cases where a peace operation is overseeing a generally stable situation. In periods of intense violence, a clearer position is necessary. When postelectoral violence swept Côte d’Ivoire in 2010 and 2011, for example, the leaders of the UN peacekeeping operation in the country (UNOCI) took a strong political line in favor of election winner Alassane Ouattara. But the

mission was thrown off balance by attacks from forces loyal to former president Laurent Gbagbo, and showed signs of crumbling. Only determined action from UN officials in New York, after delays from the Security Council, directed the mission to employ force to protect civilians in concert with French forces. In the Ivorian case, the mission leadership was surprised by political developments and constrained by weaknesses in the forces it had at hand. Yet when an element of an operation is tasked with intervening forcefully to create stability, as is now the case in the DRC, uncertainty should not be an option. Nor is it possible in a case such as Somalia, where the new UN assistance mission (UNSOM) is charged with advising AU commanders on peacebuilding and statebuilding. The AU mission (AMISOM) has developed a reputation for vigorously using force even after taking casualties, and thus a critical element of any advice from the UN will have to involve how to employ force to consolidate, rather than set back, peacebuilding. Complex questions around the use of force also face the UN in Mali, where the new UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) will deploy alongside French troops who are still pursuing Islamist forces. In theory, France and the UN are following separate mandates, and MINUSMA is not meant to launch offensive operations. But the mission’s mandate foresees the possibility that UN forces, potentially reinforced by the French, will become involved in fighting with antigovernment forces. How to conduct that fighting, and how to manage the local and national political consequences, will test the mission’s leaders, who are also tasked with supporting Mali’s peace process.

Leadership and Force

In this context, what steps can international officials take to exercise effective leadership in current and future cases where the UN or its partners are frequently engaged in the use

2012_CIC_2_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:37 PM Page 28

28

•

ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

of force? Three principles (all applicable, if in different ways, to both military peace operations and political missions) stand out. The first and simplest is to grasp the dynamics of violence. In some relatively calm operational environments, it may be possible for mission leaders to downplay or ignore military options. But it is obviously essential for leaders who operate in more volatile environments to have a strong grasp of the likely military consequences of enforcement actions, the capacity of spoilers to resist, and contingency plans for both positive and negative outcomes. This may appear to be common sense, but prior experience shows that this is not always put into practice. Leaders of peace operations require clear guidance from military staff officers on these issues, but so do leaders of political missions operating alongside military operations such as UNSOM. Indeed, the leader of a political mission in this situation arguably needs the extra leverage provided by especially good advice. The quality of military staff officers and advice in multilateral peace operations is currently mixed, and this must be improved. A second principle is that civilian leaders must shape the political framework for forceful acts. Military officers on peace operations always insist that their civilian counterparts must shape the political strategies that frame the use of force. But these strategies are often deficient or contested. The conditions under which the UN would use force in Côte d’Ivoire in 2010 and 2011 were, for example, confused by initial political differences between the AU, ECOWAS, and the UN about how to handle the crisis. In the DRC, the Congolese government and army have frequently dragooned the UN into supporting ill-fated offensive operations against militia forces, despite the doubts of international officials. The UN has often been left to manage the military, humanitarian, and political consequences when the offensives fail. To avoid such dilemmas, mission leaders, especially when mandated to use offensive force, must ensure that they frame their actions

politically. They must develop robust overt or covert mechanisms for political dialogue with violent groups of spoilers. In some cases, a political mission operating alongside a separate military force can act as a conduit for such dialogue. But it is important that leaders with direct decisionmaking power over the use of force endorse any talks, and that political missions and military operations working in the same space share information effectively. It is also essential that national authorities do not free-ride on coercive actions by international forces. Where the UN or another organization uses force to extend the authority of a government, it has significant de facto leverage over that government, and should use it. The mandate for the intervention brigade in the DRC, for example, includes important injunctions about the need to improve governance in the eastern Congo. A key test of the brigade’s impact will be whether these injunctions are followed or dismissed. Similarly, the Malian authorities must recognize that the presence of an international peace operation on their territory (like the preceding French-led intervention) offers a framework for national reconciliation and peacebuilding, rather than simply bringing rebel provinces under their control. In cases such as Mali and the DRC, it is also crucial that international officials promote a clear public understanding of the political terms for the use of force, and are transparent about the conduct and outcomes of campaigns. The third principle for mission leaders relates to this public political issue: leaders must balance robust action with material incentives for peacebuilding. Wherever an international force is engaged in fighting, it is necessary to ensure preparations for the early recovery of the region. This involves humanitarian action but also a strong economic dimension: funds need to be ready to rebuild and restart economic life after fighting. Perhaps the best example of this to date comes from Haiti, where the Brazilian-led UN force (MINUSTAH) skillfully blended the use of deliberate force

2012_CIC_2_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:37 PM Page 29

with rapidly deployed economic assets—a modern variation on classic approaches of blending sticks and carrots into effective persuasion. In the DRC, the UN has made a good start by appointing General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz as force commander for MONUSCO; he served as force commander in Haiti during the critical phase of operations there, and has done cutting-edge work on blending coercion with economic incentives for peace (putting into practice the much debated links between security and development).6 Eastern Congo and Mali will also be important test-cases for the development community, who have learned a great deal about rapid consolidation of peace but have applied that learning inconsistently. Somalia is tougher, as the remit of the government is more constrained and the political situation even more fragile, but even there the right investments in the private sector and the NGO community can reap rewards in terms of sustaining support for the current, tenuous political settlement. It remains to be seen whether the structural integration of UNSOM will be beneficial in coordinating international development activities.

Conclusion

It is critical that a fuller debate be held on the new directions in the use of force in peacekeeping and peacebuilding if the UN and its partners are to fulfill some of their recent mandates—and be ready for the mandates that they may have to fulfill in the future to address increasingly difficult conflicts. As the UN implements its new mandates in the eastern Congo, Mali, and Somalia—and starts to anticipate the possibility of new mandates and changing circumstances in Afghanistan—the limitations to debate around the issue of coercion is striking. Some Security Council and Secretariat officials, in their response to the decision to establish the intervention brigade, seemed unaware that the UN had undertaken operations to extend state authority before, including use of coercive force; the mission

UN Photo/Sylvain Liechti

LEADERSHIP AND THE USE OF FORCE IN PEACE OPERATIONS • 29

Peacekeepers of MONUSCO are shown on patrol in Bunagana, a town in the DRC’s North Kivu province in May 2012, during efforts with government forces to secure the area against rebel attacks.

structure is an important evolution, but hardly a revolution in UN practice.7 The debate over Mali was more persuasive, but revealed important fissures in the UN between those who view terrorism as a threat that warrants a decisive response, and those who view terrorism as an issue better left to member states to handle directly. There is also still a need to solidify the diplomatic and security strategies employed by political missions in unsafe countries, a point that we have previously highlighted and that was underlined by threats to the UN mission in the Central African Republic in early 2013.8 These risks go beyond immediate threats to specific missions, involving broader challenges to the credibility of the UN and multilateral crisis management in general, because a single major failure could influence perceptions of the entire enterprise. A final challenge for international officials is to communicate the rationales and risks involved in adopting risky strategies to their political masters and global public opinion. Leaders in the field and at the headquarters level need to forge a common narrative over when and why force is necessary, one

2012_CIC_2_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/6/13 12:37 PM Page 30

30

•

ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

that frames their decisions about specific missions. This may sound like an abstract distraction, but developing such a political narrative is essential to legitimizing high-risk operations and managing expectations. The officials tasked with directing operations in the DRC, Mali, and Somalia bear a particular responsibility for shaping assumptions over the future of peace operations and political missions. So too does Ban Ki-moon, who has seen his tenure as Secretary-General defined by these boundary-pushing management missions,

a situation he may not have foreseen upon taking office.9 In this context, effective leadership of peace operations and political missions demands not only fine judgment in the field over how to use, frame, and justify the use of force, but also a broader willingness to stir up political debate about these choices. The baseline principles offered here hopefully provide a starting point for a fuller debate about how international officials handle new challenges to multilateral missions.

Notes 1. Fabrizio Hochschild, “In and Above Conflict: A Study on Leadership in the United Nations,” Geneva, July 2010. Available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/B6B35487059500 D0852577850059ED87-HDCentre-UNLeadership-jul2010.pdf, p. 80. 2. See, for example, “Command from the Saddle: Managing United Nations Peacebuilding Missions” (Oslo: FAFO Institute for Applied Social Science, 1999). 3. Bruce D. Jones, “The Challenges of Strategic Coordination: Containing Opposition and Sustaining Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars,” Policy Paper Series on Peace Implementation (New York: International Peace Academy, June 2001), p. 2. 4. Rupert Smith, “The Security Council and the Bosnian Conflict,” in Vaughan Lowe et al., ed., The UN Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice Since 1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 442–452. 5. Cedric de Coning, “Mediation and Peacebuilding: SRSGs and DSRSGs in Integrated Missions,” Global Governance 16, no. 2 (2010), p. 282. 6. See Jake Sherman, “Peacekeeping and Support for State Sovereignty,” in Megan GleasonRoberts, ed., Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2012 (New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2010), pp. 11–25. 7. Richard Gowan and Tristan Dreisbach, “Taking Risks: Sustaining Political Missions in Unstable Environments,” in Political Missions 2012 (New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2012), pp. 12–16. 8. Carlos Alberto Dos Santos Cruz, “Building Early Confidence in Haiti—Challenges and Reflections,” in World Development Report 2011 (Washington, DC: World Bank 2011), p. 129. 9. See Richard Gowan, “Less Bound to the Desk: Ban Ki-moon, the UN, and Preventive Diplomacy,” Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 18, no. 4 (October–December 2012): 387–404; Richard Gowan, “Floating Down the River of History: Ban Kimoon and Peacekeeping, 2007–2011,” Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 17, no. 4 (October–December 2011): 399–416.

2012_CIC_3_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:26 PM Page 31

3

Mission Reviews

2012_CIC_3_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:41 PM Page 32

3.1 Afghanistan

Over the past year, considerable planning has taken place in anticipation of the end of the current UN-mandated and NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. A series of international conferences have focused on managing not only the security dimensions of this transition process, but also its potential economic and institutional implications. The International Conference on Afghanistan in Bonn in December 2011 reaffirmed the timetable for the handover of security responsibilities from ISAF to Afghan forces by the end of 2014. In May 2012 the NATO summit in Chicago reconfirmed international security and economic commitments with a pledge for an annual aid

$)*+$1,67$1

Qurghonteppa (Kurgan-Tyube)

Kerki

Termez Feyz Mazar-e .81'8= Taluqan Sharif %$'$.+6+$ %$'$.+6+$ Kunduz

-2:=-$1

%$/.+

Baghlan

6$0$1*$1 

6$5, 38/ 6$5,38/

Qala-I-Naw

Bamyan

*+25

Shindand

)$5$ + )$5$+

'$< .81',

185,67$1

3$5:$1

Ghazni

Kandahar +,/0$1'

Spin Buldak

=$%8/

3$.7,.$

Zhob Chaman

Tank The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Qalat

Quetta

Map No. 4497.1 UNITED NATIONS December 2012

Rawalpindi

3$.7