Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, 2007 9781695953648

Table of contents :
Contents
Foreword
Preface
Mission Acronyms
Map of Peace Operations, 2006
Strategic Summary 2006
1 Consolidating Peace: Priorities and Deliberative Processes
2 Sudan: Faltering Protection and Fragile Peace
3 Mission Reviews
4 Mission Notes
5 Global Statistics on UN Missions
6 Global Statistics on Non-UN Missions
7 UN Mission-by-Mission Statistics
8 Statistics on the African Union Mission in Sudan
9 Statistics on Selected Non-UN Missions
Index
About the Book

Citation preview

A N N U A L R E V I E W OF

lobal Peace Operations

2007

This volume is a project of the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) International Security Institutions program. The CIC is an independent institution housed at New York University. Project Team VOLUME EDITOR A N D LEAD SCHOLAR

Ian Johnstone SERIES EDITOR

Bruce D. Jones SERIES COORDINATOR

Alhaji M. S. Bah PROGRAM COORDINATOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

Richard Gowan RESEARCH OFFICER

Tania Belisle-Leclerc RESEARCH OFFICER

Benjamin C. Tortolani CONTRIBUTORS

Catherine Bellamy, Rahul Chandran, Gillian Cull, Jennifer Hazen, Kristina Jeffers, Asif Khan, Anne Le More, Gordon Peake, Rachel Schiller The project's advisory board is composed of Lakhdar Brahimi, Jayantha Dhanapala, Rosario Green, Funmi Olonisakin, John Ruggie, Sir Rupert Smith, and Stephen J. Stedman. The CIC is grateful for their advice and support. CIC is solely responsible for the content of this publication. Any errors of fact or analysis, and any and all judgments and interpretations about missions and operations discussed herein, are those of CIC alone.

^f^Pj^ ^ ^

PEACEKEEPING BEST PRACTICES

This project was undertaken at the request of and with the support of the Best Practices Section of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

s s

Additional support for the project was provided by the International Peace Academy.

ANNUAL

REVIEW

OF

lobal Peace Operations A PROJECT OF THE

Center on International Cooperation

LYN N E RIENNER PUBLISHERS

B O U L D E R L O N D O N

Published in the United States of America in 2007 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2007 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A Cataloging-in-Publication record for this book is available from the US Library of Congress. British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: 978-1-58826-509-8 ISSN: 1932-5819 Printed and bound in Canada @

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5

4

3

2

1

Contents Foreword, Said Djinnit Preface, Bruce D. Jones List of Mission Acronyms Map of Peace Operations, 2006

vii ix xi xii

Strategic Summary 2006

1

1 Consolidating Peace: Priorities and Deliberative Processes, Ian Johnstone

13

2 Sudan: Faltering Protection and Fragile Peace, Alhaji M. S. Bah and Ian Johnstone

29

3 Mission Reviews

45

Alphabetical order by location 3.1 Aceh(AMM) 3.2 Afghanistan (ISAF, UNAMA) 3.3 Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC, EUFOR RD Congo, EUSEC DR Congo) 3.4 Haiti (MINUSTAH, OAS) 3.5 Liberia (UNMIL) 3.6 Middle East (UNIFIL, TIPH, UNTSO, UNDOF, MFO Sinai, EUBAM Rafah, EUPOL COPPS) 3.7 Timor-Leste (Operation Astute, UNMIT)

4 Mission Notes

46 52 58 66 74 82 90

97

Alphabetical order by location 4.1 Abkhazia-Georgia (UNOMIG, CIS) 4.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina (NATO HQ Sarajevo, OSCE, EUPM, EUFOR Althea) 4.3 Burundi (ONUB) 4.4 Central African Republic (FOMUC, BONUCA) 4.5 Comoros (AMISEC) 4.6 Cote d'lvoire (UNOCI, Operation Licorne) 4.7 Cyprus (UNFICYP) 4.8 Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) 4.9 India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) v

98 100 103 106 109 111 114 116 119

vi • CONTENTS

4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14 4.15 4.16 4.17 4.18 4.19

Iraq (MNF-I, NTM-I, UNAMI) Kosovo (UNMIK, KFOR) Mindanao, Philippines (IMT) Moldova-Transdniestra (CIS) Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) Solomon Islands (RAMSI) South Ossetia-Georgia (CIS, OSCE) Sri Lanka (SLMM) Tajikistan (UNTOP, OSCE) Western Sahara (MINURSO)

121 124 128 130 132 134 136 138 140 142

5 Global Statistics on UN Missions

145

6 Global Statistics on Non-UN Missions

175

7 UN Mission-by-Mission Statistics

201

Alphabetical 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9 7.10 7.11 7.12 7.13 7.14 7.15 7.16 7.17 7.18 7.19

order by mission

acronym

MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara) MINUSTAH (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti) MONUC (UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) ONUB (UN Operation in Burundi) UNAMA (UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission for Iraq) UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force) UNFICYP (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon) UNIOSIL (UN Integrated Office for Sierra Leone) UNMEE (UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea) UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia) UNMIS (UN Mission in the Sudan) UNMIT (UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste) UNMOGIP (UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan) UNOCI (UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire) UNOMIG (UN Observer Mission in Georgia) UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization)

206 213 222 233 243 250 257 266 275 286 296 305 314 323 333 342 347 356 363

8 Statistics on the African Union Mission in Sudan

369

9 Statistics on Selected Non-UN Missions

377

9.1 9.2 9.3

EUFOR RD Congo (EU Force in the Democratic Republic of Congo) ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) Operation Astute

Index About the Book

379 381 384

387 391

Foreword Peace support operations remained high on the international agenda over the past year, and we have been reminded of their importance in promoting human security in Africa and globally. While the United Nations remained the lead player, 2006 witnessed the continued involvement of the African Union, the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in peace operations that were characterized by varying degrees of cooperation. Since its inception in 2002, the AU has played and continues to play a crucial role in the search for solutions to some of Africa's most intractable conflicts. In Burundi, Cote d'lvoire, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia, the AU has been involved in the quest for peace with varying degrees of success. However, it is the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) that has propelled it into the peace operation sphere. The AU-led peace operation in Darfur registered the highest level of institutional cooperation involving several peacekeeping platforms; as the UN, the EU, and NATO provided various forms of support—making it a unique case of partnership, but not without its challenges. Nonetheless, AMIS, more than anything else, demonstrated the crucial need for stronger institutional cooperation and complementarity with a specific focus on the evolving relationship between the AU and UN. While the UN remains the primary institution to undertake global peace operations, the exponential growth in peace operations demonstrates the compelling need for cooperation based on comparative advantage.

The deployment of AMIS was a clear illustration of the determination of the African Union to fully assume its responsibilities. This deployment also brought to light the current limitations of the AU in terms of managerial capacity, finance, and logistics, which need to be addressed within the framework of the operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF). In 2006, the various peace operation platforms were engaged in several theaters. The AU launched a successful mission in support of elections in Comoros, and continued to support plans for a peace operation in Somalia. The UN missions in Cote d'lvoire, Liberia, Haiti, Ethiopia-Eritrea, and Burundi were actively involved in the peace processes in those countries with varying degrees of success. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the UN oversaw that country's first-ever presidential and parliamentary elections involving over 25 million registered voters in a vast territory with limited infrastructure. The European Union sent its second peace support mission to the DRC; the first being Operation Artemis deployed in 2003. Elsewhere, the UN mission in Lebanon was expanded to deal with the new tasks that resulted from the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. In Afghanistan, NATO continued to support the government in consolidating peace and had to contend with the resurgence of insurgent activities. The return of international troops to Timor-Leste was a demonstration of the challenges of consolidating peace. Timor-Leste's relapse into violence served as a vii

viii • FOREWORD

stark reminder of the need for sustained international engagement in postconflict societies such as Sierra Leone and Burundi—the first two cases under the purview of the newly established Peace-building Commission. I am convinced that this second volume of the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations and subsequent volumes will continue to inform and shape the policy discourse and

deepen our understanding of this crucial aspect of international security. Through its in-depth analysis and data on UN and nonUN peace operations, the Annual Review enhances our understanding of the crucial need for cooperation and complementarity, and will no doubt remain an invaluable reference tool for all involved in the often-elusive search for peace.

Said Djinnit Commissioner for Peace and Security, African Union

Preface This volume of the, Annual

Last year's Review was met with much acclaim, but we were acutely aware of one major weakness: its data sections concentrated heavily on the United Nations. As we had contemplated when launching the series, this year's volume begins the process of expanding our data collection with new figures on EU, AU, NATO, and other operations, thanks to continued collaboration with SIPRI, a new collaboration with IISS, and most importantly new collaboration with the AU's Commission for Peace and Security. Along with more extensive field research, these new sources of data provide a richer picture of the evolving international architecture for peace operations, within and beyond the UN. A publication like this is made possible first and last by the editorial team. That team was led again in 2006 by Ian Johnstone, whose skilled guidance has helped to establish the Review with policy, practitioner, and academic audiences alike, and whose thematic essay in this year's volume fuses academic insight and policy relevance with rare acuity. The new series coordinator, Alhaji M. S. Bah, brought with him to CIC his expertise on the AU and his organizational skill, shepherding the process to conclusion even while becoming a new father. Richard Gowan, in a new role as program coordinator for CIC's overall work on international security institutions, helped to draw strategic insight from a mountain of collected data and analysis. Ben Tortolani filled in numerous research gaps and orchestrated the revision process. Tania Belisle-Leclerc generated much of the data in the first place

Review of Global Peace Operations is the second in a series from the Center on International Cooperation at New York University. It has been developed in cooperation with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Best Practices Section and with support from the African Union's Peace and Security Department. I am grateful to both organizations for their cooperation, encouragement, and most of all their willingness to foster transparency through collaboration with an editorially independent publication like this one. United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guehenno and African Union (AU) Commissioner for Peace and Security Said Djinnit deserve particular thanks in this regard. The Annual Review has quickly established itself as an important reference tool in peacekeeping. Demand for the publication among the UN's peacekeeping staff and among member states' military advisers and political officers highlights the need the project meets; there is growing recognition of the Review in academic circles as well, and frequent references to it by leading newspapers and magazines seeking to provide more nuanced accounts of the story of peacekeeping. All of this was made possible by financial and substantive support from a number of governments: thanks are due to the UK Global Conflict Prevention Pool, the government of Canada, the government of Germany, the government of Norway, and the government of Sweden.

ix

with unflappable good humor, and Catherine Bellamy edited the entire text and saved us from several mistakes. My very sincere thanks to them all. We are also indebted to CIC staff members Sara Batmanglich, Alex Evans, Victoria DiDomenico, Melissa Lucas, Rahul Chandran, Katherine Haver, Saloni Meghani, Adele Harmer, and Abby Stoddard for their invaluable support. We are particularly grateful to Barnett Rubin and Shepard Forman for their unflinching support and guidance.

Geofrey Mugumya, Monique Mukaruliza, ElGhassim Wane, Bereng Mtimkulu, MajorGeneral Ishaya Isah Hassan, General Henry Anyidoho, Ambassador Hasan Djibril, Ambassador Sam Ibok, Ambassador Ki-Doulaye Corentin, Solomon Gomez, Tamba E. Juana, Ahmed Rufai Abubakar, Colonel Mayell Mbaye, Colonel Ebrahima Bah, Blance Munah Hyde, Elizabeth Mgaya, Abdourahman A. Ibrahim, Oscar Munanura, Memekiaw Bewketu, Michael Munyoki, Abdel Haireche, Salvatore Nkeshimuna, Kwesi Anning, and Biscut Tessema.

Several people in the UN and its peace operations provided help along the way. We thank in particular: David Harland, Fatemeh Ziai, David Haeri, Salman Ahmed, Lieutenant-General Randir Kumar Mehta, Roxaneh Bazergan, Jolanda Profos, Paul Keating, Anna Shotton, Ugo Solinas, Kelly Fleck, Renata Dwan, Rafael Peralta, Ermina Van Hoye, Ayaka Suzuki, Lisbeth Cultey, Vudithe Moise, Luis Sergio Mendes, Michael Gaouette, Huria Ogbamichael, Karen Smith, Said Conde, and Nishkala Suntharalingam. Gratitude also goes to the many UN desk officers who read drafts of the mission reviews and notes. We are also thankful for the cooperation of members of DPKO's Military Division, Police Division, Office of Operations, and Office of Mission Support, including the Cartographic Section and especially Roy Doyon. We remain grateful to staff within the Office of Programme Planning, Budget, and Accounts for their continued support.

The International Peace Academy remains an invaluable partner on this project, and we are particularly indebted to Elizabeth Cousens, Ernst Felberbauer, Jennifer Gregoire, Adam Lupel, Amy Scott, Beatrice Agyarkoh, and Marvin Elisa Trujillo. We are grateful to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute for their continued cooperation on this project and in particular Sharon Wiharta and Kirsten Soder. We are also indebted to Christopher Langton, Nigel Adderley, Jean-Yves Haine, and Roderick Feltzer at the International Institute for Strategic Studies for their invaluable support.

We benefited from the support of a number of officials from the AU, AMIS, the Darfur Integrated Task Force, and the UN Assistance Cell to the AU. We are particularly grateful to

Gratitude also goes to Evliana Berani, Veronica Lie, Andrew Sherriff, Alexander Ramsbotham, Anja Kaspersen, Jonathan Rich, Timothy Heath, Victoria Holt, Alistair Edgar, Matthew Ripley, Heidi Hulan, Robert Blackhurst, Roland Zinzius, Thomas de Waal, Fred Wooldridge, and Justin Haccius. We are particularly grateful to Daniel Keohane for his advice on European issues. Finally, we remain grateful to the staff at Lynne Rienner Publishers, especially Steve Barr, for assistance, support, and patience. Bruce D. Jones Codirector, Center on International Cooperation

Mission Acronyms AMIS AMISEC AMM BONUCA CISPKF EUBAM Rafah EUFOR Althea EUFOR RD Congo EUPAT EUPM EUPOL COPPS EUPOL Kinshasa EUSEC DR Congo FOMUC IMT ISAF JPKF KFOR MAPP MFO Sinai MINURSO MINUSTAH MNF-I MONUC NTM-I ONUB RAMSI SLMM TIPH UNAMA UN AMI UNDOF UNFICYP UNIFIL UNIOSIL UNMEE UNMIK UNMIL UNMIS UNMIT UNMOGIP UNOCI UNOMIG UNTOP UNTSO

AU Mission in Sudan AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros Aceh Monitoring Mission UN Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic CIS Peacekeeping Force in Georgia EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina EU Force Democratic Republic of Congo EU Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories EU Police Mission in Kinshasa EU Security Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo Force Multinationale de la Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale International Monitoring Team International Security Assistance Force CIS-South Ossetia Joint Force NATO Kosovo Force Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti Multinational Force in Iraq UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo NATO Training Mission in Iraq UN Operation in Burundi Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission Temporary International Presence in the Hebron UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UN Assistance Mission in Iraq UN Disengagement Observer Force UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus UN Interim Force in Lebanon UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo UN Mission in Liberia UN Mission in Sudan UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire UN Observer Mission in Georgia UN Tajikistan Office of Peace-building UN Truce Supervision Organization xi

PEACE OPERATIONS 2006

SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

UNIFIL

03/1978L

OSCE - BiH 12/1995 EUPM 01/2003 EUFOR ALTHEA 12/2004 NATO HQ Sarajevo 12/2004

i

UNDOF

r

I

MFO 04/1982

ïssp

WEST B A N K — A GAZA a j -, - i * EU BAM Rafah 11/2005 P\ \j \ \ A-

05/1974

F.UPOL COPPS 01/2006 UNTSO

05/1948 TIPH 2

W:

01/1997

f %

! M1NUSTAH 06/2004 OAS Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy MINURSO in Haiti 04/1991 I 06/2004

MAPP 02/2004

UNIOSIL

mm

01/2006

'

jflk

I

^VV

UNMIL 09/2003 I

H" ?

mm

I'NOCI 04/2004 Operation Licorne 02/2003 BONUCA

2/2000

FOMUC

12/2002

MONUC 11/1999 EUPOL Kinshasa 04/2005 EUSEC DR Congo 06/2005 EUFOR RD Congo 06/2006 !

Non-UN Missions, Location of I AMIS: African Union Mission in Sudan, Khartoum - AU AMISEC: African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros AMM: Aceh Monitoring Mission, Banda Aceh - EU and ASEAN countries CIS Peacekeeping Forces in Georgia, Sukhumi EU BAM Rafah: EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah, Rafah EUFOR ALTHEA: European Union Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo EUFOR RD Congo: Operation EUFOR RD Congo, Kinshasa EUPAT: EU Police Advisory Team in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia EUPM: European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo EUPOL COPPS: EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories, Ramallah EUPOL Kinshasa: European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa, Kinshasa EUSEC DR Congo: EU Security Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo FOMUC: CEMAC (Central African Monetary and Economic Community) Multinational Force in the Central African Republic, Bangui IMT: International Monitoring Team, Cotabato City ISAF: International Security Assistance Force, Kabul - NATO Map No. 4255.1 Rev.1 UNITED NATIONS September 2006

Dates following the abbreviated mission names represent dates of effect (for UN missions), and start dates (for non-UN missions).

jlJNMIK 06/1999 KFOR 106/1999

J o i n t C o n t r o l C o m m i s s i o n P e a c e k e e p i n g Force 107/1992 UNOMIG 08/1993

E U PAT 12/2005

UNFICYP 03/1964

S o u t h Ossetia J o i n t F o r c e 07/1992 C I S P e a c e k e e p i n g Forces in G e o r g i a 06/1994

UNAMA 03/2002 ISAF 12/2001

UNTOP 05/2000 UNMOGIP* 01/1949 UNAMI 08/2003 MNF-I 10/2003 NTM-I 08/2004 UNMEE 07/2000 UNMIS 03/2005 AMIS 06/2004

AMISEC (13/2006

IMT 11/2004

SLMM 02/2002

RAMSI 07/2003

AMM 09/2005

UNMIT 08/2006 Operation ASTUTE 05/2006

ONU! 06/2004 1000 I

2000 I 1000

3000 I 2000

4000

5000 km 3000 mi

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do noi imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

*Dotted line represents approximately the Une of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir lias not yet been agreed upon by the parlies.

Department of Peacekeeping Operations Cartographic Section

Strategic Summary 2006

1

The year 2006 saw profound changes in the political and strategic environment for peace operations, many of which could not have been predicted at the start of the year.1 There have been significant successes, such as the UN's oversight of elections in Haiti and, most strikingly, the Democratic Republic of Congo. But these have been balanced—and frequently eclipsed—by severe challenges. The latter included the return of international troops and police to Timor-Leste after its reversion to violence; the intense opposition faced by NATO forces in Afghanistan; and the need to sustain the African Union's troops in Darfur while the Sudanese government blocked the deployment of a UN force to the region. And there were surprises, notably the deployment of a large European-led UN force to Lebanon.

reversed. In the twelve months up to 30 September 2006, the number of troops deployed by NATO, the African Union, the European Union, and other regional organizations jumped from 52,700 to 68,000—a rise of 28 percent, largely driven by increases in NATO's mission in Afghanistan. Alongside this increase in military activity, 2006 also witnessed new dilemmas for the policing and peacebuilding elements of peace operations. The importance of these had been recognized in the 2005 World Summit's decision to establish the Peacebuilding Commission, Peacebuilding Support Office, and Standing Police Capacity within the UN—both the Group of Eight (G8) and the EU also pursued policing initiatives. But Timor-Leste's relapse into violence raised hard questions about failings in earlier international peacebuilding efforts there, and also led to a new mandate to deploy 1,608 police— the Security Council also envisaged sending 3,300 police officers to Darfur. While the Peacebuilding Commission took up the cases of Burundi and Sierra Leone, the international community struggled to identify ways to reconstruct the Lebanese state without provoking a confrontation with Hezbollah. (For trends in civilian and police deployments, see the information box on p. 9.)

The year's challenges resulted in a major new expansion of both UN and non-UN peacekeeping deployments. From January 2000 to September 2005, the number of UN military and police personnel on duty worldwide grew from 18,600 to 68,500, while those deployed by regional organizations fell from 108,300 to 48,000. The previous edition of this Review warned that these trends were "already straining the capacity" of the UN. But in the twelve months from 1 October 2005 to 31 October 2006, the number of UN troops, military observers, and police personnel rose to 81,000— and if all current mandates were fulfilled, and civilian staff added in, the UN would eventually have 140,000 peacekeeping personnel in the field. This would almost double the UN's previous peak of 77,000 during the Bosnian war in the 1990s. Meanwhile, the decline in deployments by regional organizations has been

Given the diversity of peace operations and the rapidity of their evolution, it is risky to generalize about the state of peacekeeping. But it is clear that the rate of growth raises a basic question: Is the present level of activity sustainable? This is a matter of global strategic concern—peace operations increasingly involve the flow of personnel between as 2

STRATEGIC SUMMARY 2006 • 3

Top Twenty Largest Peace Operations: 31 October 2006

Non-UN

well as within regions, be they Bangladeshi troops in Africa, Europeans in Afghanistan, or Chinese in Lebanon. The scale of deployments challenges our preconceptions about the resources required. In 2004, US scholars Michael O ' H a n l o n and Peter Singer estimated the need for a "total pool of 200,000 international peacekeepers," including at least 20,000 police. 2 As of September 2006, there were over 140,000 UN and non-UN troops and police deployed worldwide in addition to 162,000 troops in Iraq. UN mandates called for about 35,000 more. Both the demand for and the supply of personnel is challenging previous predictions—as well as the resources of the international community.

The overall growth in peace operations has been driven by the geographical diversification of the military deployments of the UN, NATO, and the EU. For the UN and NATO, this has involved increased engagement in the broader Middle East. As of September 2005, the UN maintained 51,400 (82 percent) of its troops and military observers in Africa, and only 3,200 (5 percent) in the Middle East. The Lebanese crisis transformed its presence in the latter: by September 2006 it had 6,400 soldiers in the region, and the UN force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was mandated to reach 15,000.

In this context, it is necessary to analyze the trends that may affect the deployment and effectiveness of peacekeepers, including the distribution of peace operations worldwide and the sources of troops for those missions. It is also necessary to highlight the extent to which current circumstances have caused international institutions and states to approve innovative hybrid peace operations—but also to blur the line between peace enforcement and counterinsurgency, making new deployments harder.

However, the increased importance of the UN's operations in the Middle East was offset by its continued role in Africa. In the year ending at September 2006, the UN military presence on the continent grew from 51,400 to 54,500, increasingly concentrated in its four large-scale missions in DRC, Sudan, Cote d'lvoire, and Liberia. Although the UN reduced its role elsewhere in Africa, withdrawing troops from Sierra Leone in December 2005 and drawing down its mission in Burundi through 2006, Africa still represented 75 percent of its global

Diversifying Deployments

4 • ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

Troop Deployment by Organization: 1996-2006

80,000

70,000 60,000 UN

S. 50,000 o 0

NATO —

H

'S 40,000

CEMAC CIS

u

-Q

1 30,000

—

ECOWAS

—

EU

—— Other (MNFs and ad hoc) 20,000 10,000

The E U ' s diversification was smaller in

deployments at the end of October, relative to

scale, and focused on Africa. In the third

14 percent in the Middle East. Council

quarter o f 2 0 0 5 it fielded 6 , 7 0 0 troops in

mandated an expansion of the Sudan mission

Bosnia and Herzegovina, but none outside

( U N M I S ) for Darfur by 17,300 military per-

Europe, although it had civilian missions in

sonnel, 3 , 3 0 0 civilian police, including up to

Africa and Asia and had intervened in the

16 formed police units, and 3,000 civilians, al-

D R C in 2 0 0 3 . In September 2 0 0 6 its presence

though it had not won Khartoum's consent for

in Bosnia had fallen to below 6 , 0 0 0 , while it

this mission by the end of November. Even if

had committed 2 , 4 0 0 troops to reinforcing

UNIFIL

In August 2 0 0 6 , the Security

authorized

the UN in Kinshasa—although most of the

strength, African missions would still account

latter were being held in reserve in Gabon

for three-quarters of the UN's military com-

and Europe.

was to reach

its full

mitment in terms of personnel. I f UN peace-

While NATO and the E U have signifi-

keeping thus faced major political challenges

cantly altered their global military profiles,

in the Middle East, this has not been balanced

the

by

peacekeeping, the AU, has remained more

a reduction

of

its

obligations

across

Africa—exacerbating the strain it faces. NATO experienced a far clearer shift in

third

major

regional

organization

in

static. In March 2 0 0 6 it launched a short-term and successful combined military and police

its deployment patterns. In September 2 0 0 5 ,

mission

NATO oversaw missions of 1 7 , 2 0 0 troops in

Comoros, but it primarily remained focused

of

1,226 to support elections

in

Kosovo and 1 2 , 4 0 0 in Afghanistan—a year

on its operation in Darfur.

later, the former force had shrunk slightly,

While the AU has supported a transfer to

while the latter had grown to 2 0 , 0 0 0 . In Octo-

a UN mission in Darfur, it has aimed to go

ber 2 0 0 6 NATO took command of 12,600 US

elsewhere. In 2 0 0 5 the A U ' s Peace and Secu-

troops in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, it still

rity Council

faces constraints in the broader Middle East,

deployment alongside the UN in the D R C . In

demonstrated by the rejection of proposals

2 0 0 6 it authorized an East African subre-

that it should deploy to Lebanon.

gional organization, the Inter-Governmental

had explored

options

for

a

STRATEGIC SUMMARY 2006 • 5

UN Military Deployments to Regions: 31 October 2006 60,000 54,587

o

o

50,000

40,000

O

30,000

I

10,147

10,000

Africa

Middle East

6,652 1,017

Central and South America

Authority on Development (IGAD), to deploy up to 8,000 peacekeepers to Somalia in expectation of an AU follow-on force. Although Uganda had pledged 3,000 troops to IGAD and despite the UN Security Council's authorization of the mission in December, the deployment was blocked by financial, logistical, and political obstacles. Elsewhere, ad hoc coalitions continued to make equally important contributions to peacekeeping, as in the deployment of an Australian-led multinational force to TimorLeste in May 2006. And despite their rapid growth, the combined military deployments of the UN, NATO, the EU, and the AU in September 2006 still only represented 70 percent of the US-led and UN-mandated multinational force in Iraq.

Diversifying Troop Contributions A second major shift in peace operations in 2006 concerned the supply of troops. The reinforcement of UNIFIL brought the first large-scale increase in European contributions to the UN since the Bosnian war. This should be seen in the context of further increases in European deployments through

Europe

54

Central and South Asia

East Asia and the Pacific

the EU and NATO, as well as significant increases in East Asian contributions to the UN. Nonetheless, the majority of UN peacekeepers continued to come from South Asia and Africa. In September 2005, 46 percent of UN military personnel were from Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Nepal—a year later, the four countries still accounted for 45 percent of forces. Although UN deployments in Africa grew in 2006—and would grow far more in the case of a Darfur deployment—the number of African UN peacekeepers actually fell slightly, from 19,100 to 18,600, between September 2005 and September 2006. Nevertheless, Africa remained the second largest regional contributor to UN operations, providing 27 percent of forces, a 4 percent drop from 2005. In the same period, the AU force in Darfur remained level at 7,000, despite plans to expand it by an additional 4,000. This may reflect the fact that, in quantitative terms, African forces come from a relatively small number of states—and as the table below shows, fewer than ten provide the bulk of both UN and AU forces. While the importance of smaller contributors with considerable peacekeeping experience (such as Ghana, Kenya,

6 • ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE

OPERATIONS

Military Contributions to UN Missions by Region: 2000-2006

o

30,000

ra

25,000 —

Africa

—

Central and South Asia Central and South America East Asia and the Pacific

—

Europe Middle East • North America

and Tunisia) and untapped sources should not be underestimated, the difficulties in increasing the total of A U - l e d d e p l o y m e n t s r e f l e c t strains on a core group of militaries needed to sustain them. If S o u t h Asia and A f r i c a c o n t i n u e d to supply the bulk of U N forces w o r l d w i d e , two other regions appeared important to the U N ' s o n g o i n g o p e r a t i o n a l e x p a n s i o n . T h e first of these was East Asia and the Pacific. By Sept e m b e r 2 0 0 6 , this region supplied 3 , 5 0 0 U N p e a c e k e e p e r s . If this c o n t r i b u t i o n w a s still only a tenth of South A s i a ' s , it was nonetheless t w i c e the f i g u r e of a year b e f o r e . It w a s also set to grow further, as C h i n a and Indonesia had p l e d g e d up to 1,000 t r o o p s e a c h to U N I F I L . 3 E v e n b e f o r e the L e b a n o n d e p l o y ment, C h i n a had m o r e than d o u b l e d its U N c o m m i t m e n t s , f r o m 7 0 0 troops and military observers in September 2005 to 1,500 by June 2006. In that C h i n a ' s active a r m y of 1,600,000 is nearly half as large again as I n d i a ' s , there has been speculation as to whether it may develop a p e a c e k e e p i n g role c o m p a r a b l e to that of the South Asian states. To date, C h i n a has c o n c e n t r a t e d on o f f e r i n g e n a b l e r s , such as medical units and engineers. It remains to be

Selected African Military and Police Contributions to Peace Operations: 31 August 2006 AU 2,240 Nigeria 1,840 Rwanda 769 South Africa 624 Senegal 563 Ghana 121 Kenya Ethiopia Morocco Benin Namibia Niger 6,157 Subtotal Other African Country 770 Contributions 6,927 Total

UN

Total

2,411 324 2,089 1,892 2,674 1,358 2,574 1,548 1,268 643 547 17,328

4,651 2,164 2,858 2,156 3,237 1,479 2,574 1,548 1,268 643 547 23,485

2,393 19,721

3,163 26,648

seen w h e t h e r C h i n a will m o v e t o w a r d dep l o y i n g a f u l l e r r a n g e of f o r c e s . But it m a y p r o v e particularly i m p o r t a n t to the U N , the only organization through which C h i n a has as yet deployed. T h e reverse is true for Europe, the second region contributing to the expansion of peace-

STRATEGIC SUMMARY 2006 • 7

Top Twenty Military Contributors to UN and Non-UN Peace Operations: October 2006

keeping. Here, NATO, the EU, and the UN all offer institutional frameworks for deployments. We have seen that the NATO role in Afghanistan drew a considerable number of European peacekeepers into the broader Middle East. The expansion of UNIFIL had a similar effect. European forces were already better represented in the UN's Middle Eastern missions (UNIFIL, UNDOF, and UNTSO) than in the UN's African operations before the Lebanese crisis. UNIFIL's growth meant that by the end of September 2006, Europeans made up 70 percent of the expanding force. But as in Africa, European deployments have been driven in quantitative terms by a core group of states using the variety of institutions available (as well as single-nation deployments such as France's Operation Licorne in Cote d'lvoire, and ad hoc multinational frameworks, such as in Iraq), as shown in the table below, which compares UNIFIL with the main deployments of the EU and NATO. Six European nations (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom) supplied half or more of the forces in each case. The percentages are higher for operations outside Europe—although the addition of US forces to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in October 2006 affected the ratio there considerably. Therefore,

the relative expansion of European peacekeeping across all institutions relies heavily on the capacities of these countries. Just as the UN has overseen a major influx of South Asian troops into African missions since 1999, it is now an institutional channel for Europeans to deploy into the broader Middle East; NATO offers another. This reflects significant political obstacles to expanding the region's own peacekeeping capacities. As of September 2006, the Middle East provided 3,000 peacekeepers to the UN, an increase of 600 compared to the year before—all but 31 of these were from Jordan. While Qatar promised a contingent of 300 troops to UNIFIL, the politics of the region's conflicts and the lack of a regional institutional framework both militate against a major increase in Middle Eastern peacekeeping capacity. While NATO has provided a mechanism for new European deployments, the US decision to transfer 12,600 troops to ISAF in October 2006, represented a significant shift, as US practice since 2001 had been to reduce the number of troops in NATO missions. It remains to be seen whether Afghanistan will act as a precedent for further US deployments through NATO and other formal multilateral structures. Meanwhile, Central and Latin American states provided 10 percent of UN

8 • ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

Military Contributions by Selected EU Countries: 30 September 2006

Mission Size Selected EU Contributors Italy Germany France Netherlands Spain United Kingdom Combined Contribution from Selected EU Countries

EUFOR RD Congo

EUFOR ALTHEA

ISAF

KFOR

UNIFIL

TOTAL

2,370

5,935

32,600

16,160

5,147

62,212

50 730 1,090 40 130 *

888 861 477 301 350 573

1,600 2,750 1,000 2,000 600 5,000

2,200 2,900 2,100 * 750 400

1,074 0 1,531 0 614 0

5,812 7,241 6,198 2,341 2,444 5,973

2,040

3,450

12,950

8,350

3,219

30,009

Notes: These figures represent the number of personnel deployed in large-scale units and may exclude some personnel deployed individually or in small-scale units. * Denotes small deployments.

forces, concentrated in the Haiti mission (MINUSTAH), the only military peace operation in the region.

Overstretch: Symptoms and Solutions As military deployment patterns altered through 2006, two trends emerged across global peace operations. The first was an increasing reliance on "hybrid" operations—those that mixed and matched the capacities from different organizations into common responses—to respond to the risk of overstretch. The second was an increase in the political problems in winning consent for operations—problems associated with the increasing use of force by and against missions.

Hybrid Operations Hybrid peace operations are not new. 4 Since the 1990s, there has been a complex interaction of organizations in the Balkans and West Africa, and the UN has entered into hybrid arrangements with multinational forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Striking examples of hybridity in 2006 were the DRC, Sudan, Timor-Leste, and Lebanon, although in each it took a different form. In the DRC, the UN and the EU deployed troops separately, but in coordination. The EU's force was deployed at the UN's re-

quest, for UN purposes, and carried out joint operations with M O N U C in Kinshasa. Similarly, a balance has been found between the new UN police and Australian-led forces in Timor-Leste. In Sudan, where the UN, NATO, the AU, and the EU have joined forces to develop a complex peacekeeping framework, the UN deployed UNMIS, a multidimensional operation, to oversee the north-south peace agreement. In Darfur, the AU deployed AMIS and received strategic lift support through NATO, while the EU provided additional lift, police and military advice, and (most crucially) funding. 5 EU personnel worked in a cell within the AU command and control structure, while the UN provided planning resources for the AU (since 2004) through its assistance cell, and expanded its support to include a package of police, military, political advisers, and hardware. Coordinating this level of complexity proved challenging. The establishment of a partner technical support group and a liaison group in Addis Ababa improved coordination among those involved, but the focus was on operational issues instead of strategy. The African Peace Facility, an EU financial instrument, proved to be a useful financing mechanism for AMIS, but the need to replenish this brought to the fore significant challenges for

STRATEGIC

SUMMARY

2006

• 9

Police a n d C i v i l i a n D e p l o y m e n t s If military peace operations remained level in A f r i c a and grew in the Middle East, police missions have f o l l o w e d another pattern. The n u m b e r of UN police grew by 29 percent, from 6.200 to 7.900. in the year ending 30 September 2 0 0 6 ; the Security Council resolutions for Timor-Leste and Darfur meant that there was a theoretical requirement for 12.000 personnel. The majority of those police actually deployed were in three non-African missions: Timor-Leste, Kosovo, and Haiti combined accounted for 54 percent of the total. But there has been a significant growth in the use of police in African missions, for which the total rose f r o m 2 , 3 0 0 to 3 , 8 0 0 in the period under review. These were largely concentrated with the major UN military formations in Cote d'lvoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and Sudan. Conversely, there were no UN police in the broader Middle East, except for eleven in Afghanistan, although the EU had a police training mission in the Palestinian territories. While the f o c u s of UN policing is thus moving to Africa, the sources of personnel are more diverse than in the case of the military, with Africa, Europe,

and Central and South Asia providing roughly a quarter each. However, when n o n - U N police missions are taken into account, the shift toward Africa in terms of deployments and contributions b e c o m e s clearer still. While the EU reduced its residual police presence in the Balkans to f e w e r than 200, the AU expanded its police presence in D a r f u r to 1.425 (including 234 female officers) and deployed 30 officers to the Comoros in 2006. This increase in the use of international policing has received external support—the EU and UN assisted the AU police in Darfur. The A l l ' s deployment of a significant number of female police officers is also an important development. The distribution of civilian political, peacebuilding, and monitoring missions is even more complex. The UN was responsible for f o u r such missions at the start of 2006—in A f g h a n i s t a n . Iraq, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste. A f i f t h , in Burundi, is under preparation, and long-term UN peacebuilding missions are likely to b e c o m e the norm as larger African operations draw down. A m o n g other international organizations. the E U ' s civilian missions are the

most varied, with legal advisory teams for Georgia and Iraq, border monitors for Moldova and the Palestinian territories, and demobilization monitors in Aceh. Indonesia. The Aceh Monitoring Mission ( A M M ) was negotiated in part at an Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( A S E A N ) forum, and staffed by observers f r o m A S E A N nations alongside EU personnel. A M M . though not a formal A S E A N operation, as command and management of the mission remained with the EU, is indicative of the particular complexity of civilian missions in Asia, where the UN presence is slight relative to Africa and the Middle East. The result is a variety of small-scale institutional and ad hoc initiatives, including monitors f r o m the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) on the Philippine island of M i n d a n a o , and f r o m the Nordic Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission ( S L M M ) . The fragility of such arrangements was highlighted in 2006 when the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) demanded that all EU citizens be removed from the S L M M , in response to it being declared a terrorist organization by the EU.

the A U and EU. By November, there was grow-

York ran through a special cell d e s i g n e d to

ing r e c o g n i t i o n of the n e e d f o r b e t t e r - d e v e l o p e d

supplement

interinstitutional arrangements. The U N was

phase, the u p g r a d e d U N I F I L l o o k e d like an

a d v o c a t i n g a n d the A U a p p r o v e d a t h r e e - p h a s e

EU-led multinational force operating under a

process leading to a hybrid force, the leader-

U N l o g o — t h i s b e g a n to c h a n g e as C h i n a and

s h i p of w h i c h w o u l d b e j o i n t l y a p p o i n t e d b y

S o u t h A s i a n f o r c e s d e p l o y e d to the m i s s i o n

the U N and A U .

through standard U N structures.

U N p r o c e d u r e s . In its

earliest

In t h e c a s e of L e b a n o n , n o f o r m a l h y b r i d

That Europe skirted the U N ' s m e c h a n i s m s

structures were involved. But the rapid mobi-

irritated many, raising concerns about "privi-

l i z a t i o n of t h e f i r s t w a v e of E u r o p e a n t r o o p s

l e g e d " m i s s i o n s . Yet m a n y U N o f f i c i a l s w e r e

for U N I F I L was negotiated through the Euro-

simultaneously

p e a n C o u n c i l in B r u s s e l s , a n d t h o s e d e p l o y e d

overstretched capacity. Nonetheless, the U N

relied on their o w n logistical

arrangements

h a s f o u n d itself at t h e n e x u s of n e w i n s t i t u -

r a t h e r t h a n o n t h o s e of t h e U N . T h e i r l i n e s of

tional a r r a n g e m e n t s with both the A U and the

c o m m u n i c a t i o n between the field and

E U , s u g g e s t i n g t h a t it m a y b e m o r e a d a p t a b l e

New

concerned

about

their

own

10 . ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

Global Polke Deployments to Regions: 31 October 2006 Central and South Asia 3 \

Central and South America 1,682

East Asia and the Pacific 1,228

" Middle East

Contributions of UN Police by Region: 31 October 2006

2,500

2,121 1,883

Central and South Asia

Africa

Europe

than its critics generally maintain. Coordination questions were not confined to the AU, EU, and UN. NATO was confronted with logistical challenges and slow force generation in its engagement in Afghanistan. As NATO took on more responsibilities through 2006, debate regarding command structures,

East Asia

and the Pacific

Middle East

North Central and South America America

policy harmonization, national caveats, and simple manpower and equipment availability dominated discussions among NATO officials. Some complained about a lack of "rapid response" capacities, a function in large part of excess demands on NATO's limited supply of helicopters—others put these problems

STRATEGIC SUMMARY 2006 • 11

down to an inequitable distribution of the burden a m o n g contributors. In September 2006, calls from NATO's Supreme C o m m a n d for 2,000 reinforcement troops nearly went unmet, until Poland volunteered 1,000.

The Challenge of Consent But in Afghanistan—as in Lebanon, the DRC, and D a r f u r — t h e biggest obstacles to operational efficiency were often political. ISAF's capacity problems reflected troop contributors' domestic political sensitivities over its mandate to confront the Taliban alongside US-led Operation Enduring Freedom. Similarly, when Secretary-General Annan requested rapid deployment of an EU standby force for the DRC, debates among potential contributors ran on for three months. But when large numbers of peacekeepers were required for Lebanon, they were available to deploy rapidly. Yet the likelihood that Hezbollah might oppose the deployment of peacekeepers generated a tough debate over UNIFIL's rules of engagement. Politicians and the media weighed the risks of an international and domestic backlash from either inflicting Muslim casualties or stumbling into a confrontation with Israeli forces. Generating domestic support for long-range operations remains a challenge for troop contributors. Thus, while I S A F fought the Taliban, U N I F I L aimed to avoid conflict with Hezbollah and Israel. But the challenge of consent was not confined to these missions. From Timor-Leste to Haiti and the D R C , peacekeepers also c o n f r o n t e d the challenge of political, military, and other groups who were dissatisfied with the results of transitional political processes or elections. In the D R C , this meant deploying additional combat capacity to provide security during elections and their aftermath, and also mounting robust operations to protect civilians—operations that resulted in substantial casualties on both sides. In such environments, peacekeeping can seem to blur into war-fighting, affecting public opinion both where troops are deployed and in their home countries. 6 The most acute challenge of consent in

2006 came not f r o m a nonstate actor, but a state: the Sudanese g o v e r n m e n t ' s protracted rejection of the transfer f r o m the A U to the UN in Darfur. U N Security Council Resolution 1706 expanded the mandate of the UN mission in Sudan to include Darfur, and was adopted under Chapter VII, but required K h a r t o u m ' s consent b e f o r e any deployment. K h a r t o u m ' s refusal to acquiesce was a serious political challenge to the U N , especially in light of the 2005 World Summit's commitment to "a responsibility to protect populations f r o m genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity." The U N ' s inability to deploy to D a r f u r was seen as damaging both to the norm and the institution. In spite of the shift of emphasis toward deploying an A U - U N hybrid in late 2006, questions remained over whether the Sudanese government would give its consent to command structures that vested decisionmaking power in the U N — t h e precise structure of a mission can prove open to negotiation as well as its basic deployment. S u d a n ' s stance was also a challenge to the AU, which was in the early stages of developing its security architecture to tackle conflicts involving gross violations of human rights, war crimes, and crimes against humanity by its own members. The fact that the A U ' s Peace and Security Council continued to seek S u d a n ' s consent for the transition to the U N , highlighted the gap between the interventionist provisions of the A U ' s Constitutive Act and the political complexities of implementing them. Similarly, it was not clear how the A U planned to deal with the d e m a n d for rapid deployment of a peace operation to Somalia after the transitional government, backed by Ethiopian troops and aircraft, ousted the Union of Islamic Courts from Mogadishu and other areas it controlled. As peace operations expanded through 2006, so did the level of resistance to them.

Conclusion Problems over hybrid operations, reports of violence f r o m the D R C to Afghanistan, the

12 • ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

breakdown in Timor-Leste, and the failure to get the UN fully into Darfur all cast long shadows over peace operations in 2006. But any analysis of the performance of peace operations in this period must take one fact into account: there was no general collapse. The previous edition of this Review noted that the UN seemed to be facing chronic problems in deploying its forces. UNMIS was far behind schedule in deploying to southern Sudan, and MONUC had been denied requests for extra troops for the DRC by the Security Council. In early 2006, it appeared possible that the EU would not accede to the UN's request for help in the DRC, that some NATO countries would not go to Afghanistan at all, and that AMIS would withdraw from Darfur. The reality may have been grim, but it was not as bad as it could have been. MONUC managed to run the DRC polls against huge odds, the UN found a way to deploy rapidly to Lebanon, and EU and NATO members

accepted responsibilities beyond Europe. Australia mounted an effective response in Timor-Leste. The AU struggled in Darfur, but held on. By the end of the year, deployments to peace operations, including operations in Iraq, had surpassed recent predictions of need, and new troop and police contributors had emerged in Asia. If hybrid operations were developing through trials and (sometimes tragic) errors, new modes of cooperation resulted. Peacekeeping has thus managed to adapt to high-profile crises over the past year. But if peace operations are to be sustained at their current level, crisis-response mechanisms alone will not be enough. The international community also needs to deepen its shared understanding of how to consolidate hardwon peace agreements and translate them into lasting stability. This is a precondition for balancing global demand for peace operations with resources, and the subject of Ian Johnstone's thematic chapter in this Review.

Notes The information provided in the graphs and tables in this section, where not cited otherwise, has been aggregated from the data presented in Chapters 5 through 9 of this volume. For scaling purposes, the tables and graphs in this section do not take into account personnel deployed in the Multinational Force-Iraq. 1. This summary focuses on global trends in peace operations in 2006. For an excellent and incisive recent analysis of longer-term trends, see William J. Durch and Tobias C. Berkman, Who Should Keep the Peace? Providing Security for Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations (Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006). 2. Michael O'Hanlon and Peter Warren Singer, "The Humanitarian Transformation: Expanding Global Intervention Capacity," Survival 46, no. 1 (2004): 82. 3. In the event, operational requirements meant that these pledges did not need to be fulfilled in their entirety. For more on this issue, see p. 82 of this volume. 4. For an earlier discussion of hybrid operations, see Bruce Jones with Feryal Cherif, "Evolving Models of Peacekeeping" (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Best Practices Unit, 2005). 5. Additional direct financial, logistical, and planning support was provided by Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, Netherlands, and Norway. 6. For a detailed analysis of questions surrounding the use of force in peace operations, see Ian Johnstone, "Dilemmas of Robust Peace Operations," Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2006 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006).

Consolidating Peace: Priorities and Deliberative Processes Ian Johnstone

13

While efforts to

each area, ranging f r o m active patron, inf o r m e d by international standards of legitimacy, to passive observer, deferring at every step to local ownership and local conceptions of legitimacy. The central argument of this chapter is that the best way to determine where on that spectrum an intervention should fall, and how to move from one point to another, is through genuine deliberation among internal and external actors. By guiding the engagement of the relevant actors, deliberative principles can help to set priorities and allow for midcourse corrections, while cultivating the sort of conflict resolution and participatory governance that sustainable peace requires.

suppress violence in Afghanistan, Darfur, and Lebanon dominated the peace operation headlines in 2006, most of the world's peacekeepers were doing something different. From Haiti to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to Aceh, soldiers and civilians were engaged in the less attention-grabbing but equally important work of helping to consolidate peace.

"Peace consolidation" is not a term of art, and in this chapter it is not meant to describe a specific phase or set of activities in a peace process. The expression is used here as a way of discussing the particular role peace operations can play in planting the seeds of selfsustaining peace, without drawing a sharp line between "peacekeeping" and "peacebuilding." It assumes that, because there is always pressure to end an operation quickly—or at least to move from one phase of a peace process to the next—the period when an integrated military, police, and civilian presence is on the ground presents a relatively limited window of opportunity. Peace operations cannot themselves complete the long-term enterprise of consolidating peace, but they can begin the process—they can lay the foundations for effective peace consolidation.

Peace Consolidation: Priorities and Recent Practice The spectrum of peace operations extends f r o m pure observer missions to transitional administrations with full governing powers. 2 Most operations fall between those extremes. Indeed, there has been an evolution: in the early 1990s, multidimensional missions like those in El Salvador and M o z a m b i q u e were formally mandated only to monitor and assist; in the mid-1990s, missions in Eastern Slavonia and Bosnia had a degree of executive authority; in the late 1990s, the United Nations was given governing powers in Kosovo and East Timor. The United States had similar authority in Iraq in the early days of the occupation, but most peace operations since then have employed more of a "light footprint," the strategy used in Afghanistan. Yet even assistance missions, like those in Haiti and Liberia today, sometimes b e c o m e

The starting point in understanding how to lay those foundations is to acknowledge that peace consolidation is an inherently political exercise, whose central goal is to channel conflict f r o m violent into peaceful f o r m s of settlement. 1 Recent experience has highlighted the importance of making an early start in three a r e a s — g o v e r n a n c e (including economic governance), security, and justice. Peace operations play a variety of roles in 14

CONSOLIDATING

without

f o o t p r i n t " w a s the right w a y to s u p p o r t A f -

formally assuming executive powers. Thus

involved

in g o v e r n a n c e

functions

g h a n i s t a n ' s nascent g o v e r n a n c e institutions, it

the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n patron and p a s s i v e

w a s not the w a y to p r o v i d e s e c u r i t y b e y o n d

o b s e r v e r , the weight o f the footprint, the line

Kabul.

b e t w e e n c o n s e n t and c o e r c i o n , and e v e n the

H o w then to strike the b a l a n c e is a c o r e

" g r a d a t i o n s o f s o v e r e i g n t y " in p o s t c o n f l i c t

challenge for peace consolidation. B e c a u s e nei-

societies

tend to c o m e in s h a d e s o f

rather than either/or dichotomies.-

gray

ther internal nor external actors have privileged insight into that question, and b e c a u s e it may

1

operations

vary b a s e d on the function (security v e r s u s

f a c e a b a s i c d i l e m m a : on the o n e h a n d , the

g o v e r n a n c e , f o r e x a m p l e ) , the p r o c e s s m u s t

m o r e p r o a c t i v e the external role, the harder it

be interactive. It requires genuine deliberation

is for local state structures to gain l e g i t i m a c y

a m o n g local actors, and between local and

and e f f e c t i v e n e s s ; on the other h a n d , r i g i d

external actors. Deliberation m e a n s more than

a d h e r e n c e to " l o c a l o w n e r s h i p " can

mean

consultation and d i a l o g u e ; it is one o f three

d e f e r r i n g to local p o w e r b r o k e r s that m a y

principal m o d e s of public policy d e c i s i o n m a k -

lack the l e g i t i m a c y and c a p a c i t y to d e l i v e r

ing in democratic societies, along with bargain-

s u s t a i n a b l e p e a c e . W h e r e the b a l a n c e s h o u l d

ing and voting. It is a i m e d at building consen-

lie is rarely s e l f - e v i d e n t f r o m the start o f an

s u s through r e a s o n e d e x c h a n g e

o p e r a t i o n , and is n e v e r static. If the U N w a s

a g r e e m e n t is not p o s s i b l e , m a k e s it easier to

too h e a v y - h a n d e d in the early d a y s of its mis-

live with d i s a g r e e m e n t in a pluralistic society.

T h e result is that all p e a c e

s i o n in E a s t T i m o r , its a p p r o a c h in Haiti in 2 0 0 5 w a s p r o b a b l y too p a s s i v e . If a " l i g h t

and,

when

T h e a r g u m e n t that d e l i b e r a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s can u s e f u l l y g u i d e the e n g a g e m e n t

José Ramos-Horta, then f o r e i g n minister of Timor-Leste, speaks at a UN Security Council meeting, 5 May 2006.

o f all

PEACE

• 15

16 • ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

actors in a peace process is developed further at the end of this chapter. 4 First, however, a review of recent practice in three areas—transitional governance, transitional security, and transitional justice—illustrates the value of deliberation to peace consolidation. These are not priorities per se, but rather frameworks within which specific peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities occur, from police training to elections to economic reconstruction. The central point is that the process by which all of these activities are undertaken is as important as the outcome. And while many of them are long-term endeavors, not all good things can be done at once and most peace operations face constant time pressure, from the UN Security Council (or other mandating organization), donors and local leaders. The creation of the Peacebuilding Commission may help to extend time horizons, but it is nevertheless important that an early start be made in each of these areas, as soon as the worst of the fighting is over. Deferring action may mean failure to seize the moment when international commitment is greatest. Even more serious, noninclusive politics and institutions may become entrenched, making it hard to reverse course once the failings are perceived.

not necessarily evolve into more robust forms of democratic governance. Interim institutions, moreover, do real work: they prepare for elections, write constitutions, manage the budget, and appoint people to the ministries that administer the transition, such as Defense, Interior, and Justice. Terrence Lyons favorably compares the transitional arrangements leading to elections in El Salvador, and Mozambique, with those in Angola, Bosnia, and elsewhere. 7 The former helped to demilitarize politics in their respective societies, while the latter did little to cement peace, let alone democracy. Lyons highlights the importance of creating political parties and independent electoral commissions, but also makes the broader point that interim institutions can be used to foster peaceful political competition. Liberia recently completed a two-year period of transitional government, setting the stage for peaceful elections, the relatively smooth assumption of power by Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, and a productive first year in office. It is too soon to judge the three-year power-sharing arrangement that preceded recent elections in the DRC, but from the perspective of today, it looks more successful than anyone would have dared hope a few years ago.

Transitional Governance

Similarly, the process of writing and adopting a constitution can be as important for sustainable peace as the principles and structures it enshrines. An inclusive, deliberative process is especially important in postconflict societies, because the future governance of the country cannot be left entirely in the hands of those who fought the war. 8 The making of Afghanistan's constitution is illustrative. The "interim authority" that was selected to govern Afghanistan at the 2001 Bonn meeting handed over to the more inclusive transitional government that came out of the Emergency Loya Jirga held in 2002. This gathering of 1,051 elected and 500 appointed delegates, though not perfectly representative, debated some of the most difficult and controversial issues facing the country. 9 That

Cultivating legitimate and effective governance cannot be engineered through a series of predetermined steps. However, the nature of governance arrangements between the end of the worst fighting and the establishment of permanent institutions can have a profound effect on the prospects for sustainable peace. Not mere placeholders until legitimate government can be established, transitional arrangements shape the political landscape for competing groups in a postconflict society. If well designed, they can foster the sort of nonviolent contestation, conciliatory politics, and consensus building that are at the foundation of sustainable peace. 5 They hold the promise of what Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis call "participatory peace," 6 which may but will

CONSOLIDATING

set the stage for the drafting of a constitution by a 35-member commission, following extensive public consultations with an estimated 178,000 people. The constitution was formally adopted in a 502-representative Constitutional Loya Jirga in 2004, paving the way to elections in 2004-2005. While this transitional exercise involved back-room deals and pressure tactics, as well as traditional forms of consultative governance, it did produce a government that enjoyed substantial respect among the Afghan population—at least until the lack of progress in improving security became apparent. 1 0 By way of comparison, the rushed and improvised constitutional process in Iraq was far less successful in animating an inclusive debate about the future of that country. 11 This is not to say that long-term powersharing is easy, as the case of Sudan illustrates. The north-south conflict ended in a comprehensive agreement that embodies a partnership between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the ruling National Congress Party (NCP). By mid-2006 the partnership was under serious strain, and the two parties had all but stopped engaging each other politically. Thus when President Omar al-Bashir (of the NCP) rejected the decision of a boundary commission regarding the oil-rich region of Abyei, Vice President Salva Kiir (of the SPLM) figuratively threw up his hands rather than demand that Bashir justify his position before the world and the Sudanese people. The Darfur peace agreement (DPA) is even less promising as a vehicle for sustainable power-sharing. Negotiated in Abuja over a period of two years and then rushed to conclusion in May 2006, the agreement became increasingly disconnected from realities on the ground. Opposition to the DPA, which was signed by the government of Sudan and only one rebel faction, mobilized almost immediately, to the point where much of the population of Darfur became contemptuous of both the rebel faction who had signed the agreement

and the African Union peacekeepers who were overseeing its implementation. It quickly became clear that the political process would only be salvaged by addressing the concerns of the other rebel groups through direct negotiations, and by convening a more inclusive Darfur-Darfur dialogue involving hundreds, loosely modeled on Afghanistan's Loya Jirga. The Darfur situation also illustrates the importance of interaction between local and external actors. The disconnect between the AU mediators and Sudanese parties in Abuja, on the one hand, and the people of Darfur, on the other, led to an agreement that was not implementable. Similarly, the distance between the NCP leadership in the government of Sudan, and external actors pushing for the UN to take over from the AU in Darfur, led to a serious impasse over the proposed transition. Given that there is neither the will nor the capacity to impose a solution in Darfur, both the DPA and the transition require that local dynamics be reconciled with international expectations and human rights norms. Interim institutions can also be useful in getting a start on good economic governance. This is increasingly seen as important to a peace process because many conflicts are fueled in part by competition over resources, and because the ability to deliver basic services is a measure of a state's authority. The Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP) in Liberia had a rocky start because the initial plan, designed by the United States, World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and EU, was too intrusive and therefore was rejected by the UN Security Council. A protracted consultative process with the Liberian transitional government, the UN, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) resulted in a compromise that included cosigning authority for international experts, but also considerable emphasis on local capacity building. Moreover, the details of implementation were not spelled out in the initial plan, leaving room for deliberation among the members of

PEACE

• 17

18 • ANNUAL

REVIEW

OF GLOBAL

PEACE

OPERATIONS

B o x 1.1 T h e E f f e c t i v e n e s s o f P e a c e b u i l d i n g : E m p i r i c a l S t u d i e s

T h e y e a r 2 0 0 6 s a w the p u b l i c a t i o n of

the greater the need for

t w o i m p o r t a n t s t u d i e s on the e f f e c t i v e -

a s s i s t a n c e to e s t a b l i s h a l a s t i n g p e a c e .

interim strategy f o r risk c o n t a i n m e n t .

ness of p e a c e b u i l d i n g strategies. M i c h a e l

T h i s , c o m b i n e d with q u a l i t a t i v e analysis

• U n i t e d N a t i o n s p e a c e o p e r a t i o n s bring

D o y l e and N i c h o l a s S a m b a n i s p u b l i s h e d

of a n u m b e r of c a s e s , l e a d s D o y l e and

the risks d o w n . M o r e o v e r , in a typical

Making

S a m b a n i s to a s e v e n - s t e p plan f o r e f f e c -

country, doubling expenditure on peace-

p r e h e n s i v e a n a l y s i s of all U N and n o n -

tive

internal

k e e p i n g w o u l d r e d u c e the risk over the

U N p e a c e o p e r a t i o n s b e t w e e n 1945 and

security, s e e k t h e c o o p e r a t i o n of n e i g h -

c o u r s e of the d e c a d e f r o m 4 0 p e r c e n t

1999. T h e y identify three key factors that

b o r s , i d e n t i f y s o m e " q u i c k w i n s " in d e -

to 31 percent.

i m p a c t the p r o s p e c t s f o r s u c c e s s of a

livering basic s e r v i c e s , build the r u l e of

War and Building

Peace,

a com-

peacebuilding:

international

establish

d e c a d e , and so t h e r e is a n e e d f o r an

p e a c e o p e r a t i o n , in w h a t they call t h e

law and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n s e n t , g u a r a n -

B a s e d on their results, C o l l i e r and col-

" p e a c e b u i l d i n g triangle":

tee property

leagues p r o p o s e a " p o l i t i c s + " strategy, in

• T h e level of hostility b e t w e e n the f a c -

rights,

foster democratic

participation, and p r o m o t e g e n u i n e moral

w h i c h t h e plus w o u l d b e l o n g - t e r m e c o -

and p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e c o n c i l i a t i o n .

n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t t h r o u g h substantial

tions, measured by the amount of deaths

In an A u g u s t 2 0 0 6 study of seventy-

aid and rapid r e f o r m , c o m b i n e d with a

and displacement, as well as the type of

f o u r c a s e s , Paul C o l l i e r and his associ-

c o m m i t m e n t to the p r o v i s i o n of security

war and n u m b e r of warring parties.

ates c o m p a r e the political, e c o n o m i c , and

by external p e a c e k e e p e r s t h r o u g h o u t the

military a s p e c t s of p o s t c o n f l i c t

first p o s t c o n f l i c t

• T h e local c a p a c i t i e s r e m a i n i n g a f t e r

situa-

decade.

Finally,

the

tions. T h e y c o m e u p with three interest-

l o w e r the p e r c a p i t a i n c o m e , the h i g h e r

d o m e s t i c p r o d u c t or e n e r g y c o n s u m p -

ing f i n d i n g s on the risk of a relapse into

the postconflict risks, at the outset of the

tion, and p a s t e x p e r i e n c e w i t h d e m o -

conflict:

peace. A c c o r d i n g to the authors, this pro-

• T h e level of international a s s i s t a n c e —

• A n e l e c t i o n r e d u c e s the risk s u b s t a n -

ple f o r r e s o u r c e allocation a m o n g post-

as m e a s u r e d by t y p e of m a n d a t e and

tially in the year of the election itself,

c o n f l i c t countries: r e s o u r c e s p e r c a p i t a

n u m b e r of t r o o p s c o m m i t t e d .

but i n c r e a s e s it e v e n m o r e

the war, m e a s u r e d by p e r c a p i t a g r o s s

vides a clear and u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l princi-

cratic g o v e r n a n c e .

substan-

tially in the f o l l o w i n g year. T h e i r c o r e f i n d i n g is that the d e e p e r the

• Economic development

hostility and the less the local capacity,

should b e a p p r o x i m a t e l y i n v e r s e l y prop o r t i o n a l to the level of i n c o m e in the

substantially

postconflict country.

r e d u c e s risks, b u t it t y p i c a l l y t a k e s a

Sources: Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis. Making War and Building Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Mans Soderbom. "Post-Conflict Risks," Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford. CSAE WPS/ 2006 12, 17 August 2006.

the tripartite steering c o m m i t t e e , c o m p o s e d of

k e e p e r s cannot be e x p e c t e d to k e e p the peace

government actors, international actors, and

f o r e v e r ; at a c e r t a i n p o i n t t h e y m u s t h a n d o v e r

civil society r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . Early signs of

to local forces. P e a c e o p e r a t i o n s

G E M A P ' s impact are positive, as g o v e r n m e n t

become

r e v e n u e is r i s i n g .

though

involved the

lead

in

that

actors

in

necessarily

transition, security

even sector

r e f o r m ( S S R ) t e n d to b e bilateral p a r t n e r s .

Transitional Security

As Barnett Rubin argues, the security tran-

In the early d a y s of a p e a c e p r o c e s s , security

sition and the political transition are mutually

is n o t u p f o r d i s c u s s i o n : e i t h e r o u t s i d e r s i m -

reinforcing; control over security institutions

p o s e it, o r a p e a c e a g r e e m e n t o b l i g e s it. T h e

is c e n t r a l t o b u i l d i n g a l e g i t i m a t e s t a t e , w h i l e

p r i m a r y f u n c t i o n o f m o s t p e a c e o p e r a t i o n s is

building effective security institutions requires

to h e l p

credible political leadership.12 A n d

provide

security,

and

increasingly

because

they are being given robust m a n d a t e s — i f not

S S R is n o t o n l y a b o u t e q u i p p i n g a n d t r a i n i n g ,

a l w a y s the c a p a c i t y — t o do so. But

but also about g o v e r n a n c e — a b o u t w h o over-

peace-

CONSOLIDATING PEACE • 19

sees the security sector and whose interests it protects—the parties to the conflict and security establishments cannot deliberate in secret, alone. Representative assemblies, local governments, and the broader population must be engaged. This lesson was well-learned in Sierra Leone, where the Office of National Security has taken the lead in facilitating inclusive decisionmaking processes, including consulting local communities. 1 3 The talks on SSR in Afghanistan, on the other hand, lacked transparency. 14 In contrast to the constitution-making process described above, the security arrangements in Afghanistan were driven more by a desire to enlist allies in the war against AlQaida and the Taliban, than by a genuine effort to build national security institutions dedicated to supporting the central government. T h e connection to governance is also borne out by Salman A h m e d ' s c o m m e n t that the most difficult part of SSR is agreeing on the ethnic and regional composition of national forces, and reducing their size to fiscally sustainable levels. 1 5 The outbreak of violence in Timor-Leste in early 2006 was as much a problem of the neglect of the new defense force, mishandling of the new police, and inattentiveness to governance issues, as it was a matter of not staying long enough to support the new security institutions. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, M O N U C and other international actors have been struggling to create an effective Congolese army, in part through joint operations. This has proven to be controversial, because the "integrated" Congolese brigades, composed of former militias of different ethnic groups, have become a source of human rights abuses. In Iraq, the building of broadly representative security institutions has proven to be enormously difficult and, in the view of one observer, may be making matters worse by exacerbating communal tensions. 1 6 Policing and police reform constitute a further illustration of the deeply political nature of security sector reform. In Haiti, beginning in early 2005, the main security threat came not from a single organized opposition to the transitional government, but rather from disparate

MINUSTAH peacekeepers from Uruguay guard the transport of ballots north of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 6 February 2006.

armed gangs engaged in low-level politically motivated or criminal violence. The threat could have been dealt with through low-intensity military operations, high-intensity police operations, or some combination. The choice had implications beyond the immediate challenge of providing security, because ultimately the consolidation of peace entails reducing the role of the military in internal security. Thus the process of transitioning from security provided by external military forces, to external police forces (typically formed police units), to local police forces, is at its core a process of forging a social contract between the local police and population. This social contract is not going to emerge simply from the successful imposition of law and order; it is an interactive, evolutionary process. And external actors have an important role to play, because many postconflict societies see domestic popular demand for an "iron hand" in dealing with rising violence and crime. 1 7 This can be coun-

2 0 • ANNUAL

REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE

OPERATIONS

tered by imparting the ethos of community policing, which has become a major strategy in peace operations. Multinational institutions, including the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), EU, and UN, have begun to develop principles for security sector reform, all of which place a premium on "local ownership" in addition to stressing the importance of good governance. 18 Good security sector governance is widely understood to mean limiting the role of the military in internal security, ensuring that all security forces are under civilian control, meeting basic standards of accountability and transparency, and insisting on respect for basic human rights. These standards cannot be imposed by outsiders, nor can they be adopted wholesale by national security forces in the early stages of a peace process. But they can be the starting point for an inclusive dialogue about the security requirements of a given society. While a peace agreement may set the path, midcourse adjustments must often be worked out along the way, as the political transition unfolds and legitimate local authorities emerge to lead or partner in the process. External actors have a role to play not only in equipping and training, but also in giving advice on security sector governance, through a process that ideally engages all national and international "stakeholders," as the new UN mission is doing in Timor-Leste. 19 Transitional Justice There is a tendency in peace operations to defer action on justice, given the more pressing security and governance demands in the immediate postconflict period. This is misguided, for two reasons. First, failure to address justice issues at an early stage can undermine both security and transitional governance: a "rule of law vacuum" can be seized on by spoilers and criminal groups; 20 and local leaders may appear to be benefiting from a culture of impunity, undermining the confidence of the broader population in the peace process. Second, the assumption that a

tradeoff must be made between peace and justice is based on too narrow a reading of both concepts. Broadly speaking, there are three goals of transitional justice: accountability, truth and reconciliation, and restoration (both individual and societal). These goals may be given different priorities in different societies, or in the context of particular conflicts. None can be achieved quickly, and often the question is whether they should be pursued simultaneously or sequentially. It is important for a society to begin a discussion about what sort of justice is appropriate soon after the fighting ends. External actors have a role in encouraging that discussion. There are international standards that ought to be promoted, and normative red-lines that ought not to be crossed, such as amnesty for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 21 The exercise of agreeing on transitional justice mechanisms should be a collaborative one, with domestic and foreign actors working together to map the range of options and to catalyze policy and public deliberations on which to pursue. A closer look at each of the three goals illustrates the complexity of the relationship between local and external actors. Whether based on a theory of retribution or deterrence, accountability reaffirms the shared norms of a society by expressing condemnation of those who committed the crimes, and condemnation of the crimes themselves. But rushing to punishment can undermine a peace process. Fear of being arrested by peacekeepers and handed over to the International Criminal Court (ICC) is one reason why the Sudanese government opposed a transition to a UN mission in Darfur. The Lord's Resistance Army only entered into peace talks with the government of Uganda when its leaders were given assurances by the mediators that they would not be handed over to the ICC (though the ICC indictments stand). Without Nigeria's offer of asylum to Charles Taylor, there likely never would have been a peace agreement in Liberia. This does not mean that deferring or ignoring criminal justice is always wise—the indictment of Taylor by

CONSOLIDATING PEACE • 21

the S p e c i a l C o u r t f o r Sierra L e o n e r e m o v e d him f r o m the political process in L i b e r i a — b u t it d o e s suggest that instant accountability is not a l w a y s possible. On the other hand, the prospect of prosecution, w h e t h e r by the ICC, hybrid tribunals like in Sierra L e o n e (and prop o s e d f o r B u r u n d i ) , or national courts, now a f f e c t s the d y n a m i c s of a l m o s t all p e a c e processes. It raises questions about w h o m one e n g a g e s with: S h o u l d indicted w a r c r i m i n a l s be treated as legitimate participants in the political process? To what extent should their "stake" in the o u t c o m e be a consideration? T h e second broad p u r p o s e of transitional j u s t i c e — t r u t h and r e c o n c i l i a t i o n — i s i m p o r tant w h e n the f a c t s a b o u t the past are in d o u b t , or in order to "lift the veil of d e n i a l " a b o u t w i d e l y k n o w n or u n s p o k e n truths. 2 2 U n l i k e trials that d e p e n d on m a k i n g a choice b e t w e e n individual guilt and innocence, truth c o m m i s s i o n s can h e a r d i f f e r e n t points of v i e w a b o u t the pattern of a b u s e s and the political, social, and e c o n o m i c conditions that m a y h a v e led to t h e m . If truth c o m m i s s i o n s p r o m o t e reconciliation, as a d v o c a t e s claim, it is not b e c a u s e they lead to f o r g i v e n e s s about the past, but b e c a u s e they are e x e r c i s e s in deliberative politics—a way to stimulate public d e b a t e about h o w to address the past and carry on. 2 3 The Truth and Reconciliation C o m mission ( T R C ) in Sierra L e o n e served this purpose to an extent, and the recently launched T R C in Liberia has been designed to do the same. Belated efforts are now under way to set up a truth c o m m i s s i o n in Burundi. T h e U N is consulting not only g o v e r n m e n t officials, but also religious leaders, political parties, and n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l organizations on the f o r m that truth commission should take. 2 4 R e s t o r a t i o n , a third goal of transitional justice, relates directly to rule-of-law r e f o r m . Societal restoration is a b o u t r e c o n s t r u c t i n g the social, political, and legal s y s t e m s destroyed by violence. 2 5 P e a c e operations have an o b v i o u s role to play, although r u l e - o f - l a w m a n d a t e s tend to be vague. Scott Carlson, in a U N l e s s o n s - l e a r n e d study, m a k e s a c o m pelling case for a m o r e " r o b u s t " a p p r o a c h to

c o u n t e r the f a c t that transitional or n e w l y elected governments often lack the legitimacy and capacity to take the lead in rule-of-law reform. 2 6 In Haiti, M I N U S T A H shifted toward a more proactive approach to justice reform in late 2005, w h e n it b e c a m e apparent that sustained progress would require greater involvement of international personnel throughout the entire system. This meant more hands-on mentoring of magistrates, prosecutors, and other justice officials, and it had the effect of opening the system to closer scrutiny. Restoration, it should be stressed, may involve resurrecting traditional a p p r o a c h e s to justice rather than importing m o d e l s f r o m elsewhere. In Liberia and southern Sudan, m a n y c i t i z e n s — e s p e cially in rural a r e a s — a r e inclined to look to c u s t o m a r y law and " c o m m u n i t y - b a s e d " systems for justice, rather than formal courts and processes. 2 7 Yet the leadership in each place has c o n c e r n s about resurrecting traditional systems, in part because they are hard to reconcile with international h u m a n rights norms. This suggests that the planning and implementation of r e f o r m p r o g r a m s requires not only internal deliberation, but also e n g a g e m e n t by external actors to ensure that international standards are respected while nascent institutions are built. Timor-Leste is an instructive case for all three goals. T h e U N Secretary-General established a commission of inquiry to gather information on possible violations of h u m a n rights committed in the period leading to and immediately after the vote on independence in Sept e m b e r 1999. That report put in motion a process that led to the e s t a b l i s h m e n t by the U N Transitional Administration in East Timor ( U N T A E T ) of a hybrid special panel on serious crimes and a truth c o m m i s s i o n , w h o s e 2 , 0 0 0 - p a g e report was issued in m i d - 2 0 0 5 ; national trials in Timor-Leste; the creation of an ad hoc court by Indonesia; the creation of a "truth and friendship c o m m i s s i o n " by the gove r n m e n t s of T i m o r - L e s t e and Indonesia; and finally a "commission of experts" to review all those e f f o r t s and m a k e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s on what more could be done. T h e most interesting

22 • ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

Box 1.2 Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: Burundi—A Minor Success with Major Consequences Carolyn McAskie ethnic

p u s h e d for the A f r i c a n U n i o n ' s first ever

institutions that e m b o d i e d an evolution

conflict f o r m a n y years, hut unlike other

p e a c e k e e p i n g m i s s i o n in 2 0 0 3 a n d t h e n

away f r o m ethnic bias and toward ethnic

p e a c e k e e p i n g " c l i e n t s . " it w a s n e v e r a

for the U N

By

b a l a n c e . In y e a r s of d i a l o g u e , t h e p a r t i e s

failed state. T h r o u g h o u t the darkest d a y s

the time the U N O p e r a t i o n in B u r u n d i

discovered that their d e m o n s diminished

of c o n f l i c t , it h a d a f u n c t i o n i n g g o v e r n -

( O N U B ) arrived on the g r o u n d , the par-

a s t h e y s p o k e t o e a c h o t h e r . In c o n s o l i -

m e n t a n d an a r m y t h a t , d e s p i t e its f a u l t s ,

ties had been e n g a g e d on one level or

dating peace. Burundi's external partners

h a d c o n t r o l of t h e territory. W h a t it l a c k e d

another for years, and formally for the

must deal equally boldly with social and

w a s capacity, due to extreme

six y e a r s since 1998.

e c o n o m i c needs, to e n s u r e that f r u s t r a -

Burundi

suffered f r o m terrible

poverty,

ensure

tion and e x c l u s i o n do not d r a w B u r u n d i

c o m p l e t i o n of t h e A r u s h a p e a c e p r o c e s s

into conflict again. O v e r the past decade,

in

b e f o r e t h e e n d of t h e t r a n s i t i o n a l p e r i o d

the w o r l d has c o m e to better u n d e r s t a n d

1993 with political help f r o m the U N .

a n d t h e b e g i n n i n g of e l e c t i o n s . It u n d e r -

t h e l i n k b e t w e e n l a c k of

a n d g a i n e d s t e a m in 1 9 9 5 w h e n f o r m e r

t o o k a c o m p l e x set of t a s k s t o e n s u r e

a n d c o n f l i c t . H e l p i n g t o set s o c i e t i e s o n

Tanzanian

security,

a sound

y e a r s of w a r . a n d t h e f l i g h t of p e o p l e a n d resources. T h e Burundi peace talks began

president

Mwalimu

Julius

ONUB's

mandate

was

encourage

the

to

legislative

N y e r e r e l a u n c h e d t h e r o u n d of c o n s u l t a -

process, and improve the h u m a n

t i o n s that led to t h e A r u s h a p e a c e p r o c e s s .

situation,

In A r u s h a , the B u r u n d i a n p a r t i e s s l o w l y

w o m e n . Support for elections b e c a m e the

r e a l i z e d they c o u l d talk to e a c h

m o s t v i s i b l e e l e m e n t of O N U B ' s

other,

including

the

rights

position

of

work,

social

and

development,

economic

footing

must receive the same high-level intern a t i o n a l a t t e n t i o n as d o e s t h e t r a d i t i o n a l peace and security agenda. Hope

is b e i n g p l a c e d

in t h e

UN

b u t it w o u l d t a k e e i g h t e e n m o n t h s a f t e r

b u t o n l y part of it. T h e s u c c e s s of t h e m i s -

Peacebuilding Commission, created

t h e s i g n i n g of t h e A r u s h a A g r e e m e n t a n d

sion w a s d u e to the f a c t that e x t e r n a l p l a y -

D e c e m b e r 2005. Burundi has been iden-

intense pressure from Nelson

ers—political, peacekeeping, and human-

t i f i e d a s o n e of t h e c o m m i s s i o n ' s f i r s t

( w h o had r e p l a c e d N y e r e r e as m e d i a t o r

itarian—worked

c l i e n t s , m a k i n g it t h e b e n e f i c i a r y of a

f o l l o w i n g h i s d e a t h ) , to p u s h t h e m i n t o a

way, particularly with B u r u n d i ' s

transitional government.

bors. An important challenge for the post-

Burundians

Mandela

of

the

strategic p r o c e s s to b r i n g d o n o r s

and

international institutions together

with

B u r u n d i a n s to c o n s o l i d a t e p e a c e . A c o n -

peacekeeping

to c o n t i n u e to w o r k t o g e t h e r c o h e r e n t l y to

certed

s u p p o r t t h e c o n s o l i d a t i o n of p e a c e .

m e e t t h e e x p e c t a t i o n s of t h e p o p u l a t i o n

persuade the Security Council or the senranks

neigh-

c o n f l i c t p e r i o d will b e f o r t h e s e e l e m e n t s

f o r c e at s o m e t i m e , but it w a s d i f f i c u l t t o ior

t o g e t h e r in a c o h e r e n t

in

there

always assumed

w o u l d h a v e to be a U N

Secretariat

that

this

w o u l d be realistic. South A f r i c a therefore

I

t o t a k e o v e r in 2 0 0 4 .

In t h e p r o c e s s of n e g o t i a t i n g p e a c e , Burundians

dealt

courageously

with

i s s u e s of p o w e r a n d e t h n i c i t y , b u i l d i n g

e f f o r t to h e l p

the

government

w o u l d be a strong signal to B u r u n d i and o t h e r c o u n t r i e s in c o n f l i c t t h a t t h e r e a r e gains to be m a d e f r o m peace.

Note: Carolyn McAskie is UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, and former Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral for Burundi. Original article published in Internationa/ Insights (Canadian Institute of International Affairs) 6, no. I (September 2006).

111

finding is that both governments, Timor-Leste and Indonesia, place more emphasis on "restorative" than "punitive" justice, and seem to be more willing to accept what has been accomplished than are the international experts who have investigated and the victims and families who were consulted. 28 (The position of the Timorese government is driven in part by a desire not to jeopardize improving relations with Indonesia.) The UN recom-

mended a multidimensional approach for the new mission in Timor-Leste, which includes ongoing monitoring, institutional capacity building, support for "accountability" measures, and compensation to victims. 29 Complemented by the mission's governance and security functions, the approach embraces a broad conception of justice that ultimately is designed to build an inclusive political community in Timor. 30

CONSOLIDATING PEACE • 23

A s S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l A n n a n put it, "ree s t a b l i s h i n g j u s t i c e s y s t e m s , p l a n n i n g rule of law r e f o r m s and a g r e e i n g on transitional justice processes are . . . necessary subjects of serious public consultation and debate." 3 1 International actors have a role to play in these debates, both as mediators to help decide what kind of justice and for w h o m , and as advocates for international standards. T h e y also have a critical role to play in helping to build a f u n c tioning legal system, not least because it can create the conditions for peaceful political contestation. While it may not be possible to guarantee rights of political participation, assembly, and expression in an i m m e d i a t e postconflict environment, some belief that basic rights will be guaranteed in the f u t u r e are necessary to create political space for deliberation.

Deliberative Principles and Methods T h u s there is a substantial b o d y of recent practice to suggest that the transitional period in a p e a c e process be used to foster deliberation a m o n g and b e t w e e n local and e x t e r n a l actors. G e n u i n e deliberation m e a n s more than dialogue; it is a fundamental democratic value, the m o s t i m p o r t a n t characteristic of w h i c h is r e a s o n e d e x c h a n g e . Its g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e is r e c i p r o c i t y — t h e notion that d e c i s i o n s m u s t be j u s t i f i e d in terms that all w h o are b o u n d or seriously a f f e c t e d can a c c e p t , e v e n if they d i s a g r e e with the d e c i s i o n itself: " y o u m a k e y o u r c l a i m s on t e r m s that I can a c c e p t in principle . . . I m a k e my claims on terms that you can accept in principle." 3 2 Deliberation is v a l u e d b o t h b e c a u s e it leads to better outc o m e s w h e n t h e r e are d i s p u t e s a b o u t p u b l i c policy, and b e c a u s e it signals mutual respect. It m a k e s both r e a c h i n g a g r e e m e n t and living r e s p e c t f u l l y with d i s a g r e e m e n t easier. Deliberative democracy is not incompatible with liberal democracy, but the differences are important in light of recent critiques of the socalled peacebuilding consensus, with its emphasis on the establishment of electoral democracies and market-oriented economies. 3 3 Rather than assuming there is some predetermined

end-state toward which all postconflict societies must be pushed, deliberative principles are aimed at i n f o r m i n g the process that determines what the end-state should be and how to get there. 3 4 Moreover, in a peace operation, outsiders m a k e decisions that have a prof o u n d — s o m e t i m e s even b i n d i n g — e f f e c t on local citizens. In the spirit of accountability, deliberative principles should guide the engagement of outside actors as well as local systems and institutions. T h e ideal of d e l i b e r a t i o n — t h a t participants have equal standing and voice, and that the debates occur u n a f f e c t e d by relationships of p o w e r and c o e r c i o n 3 5 — i s not met in any society, let alone o n e c o m i n g out of conflict. But two of its underlying principles—participation and p u b l i c i t y — c a n usefully i n f o r m the r e l a t i o n s h i p s a m o n g the relevant actors. T h e process of formulating, implementing, and revising a p e a c e c o n s o l i d a t i o n strategy should b e as p a r t i c i p a t o r y as c i r c u m s t a n c e s p e r m i t . Typically this will be limited to the parties to the c o n f l i c t and the most p o w e r f u l o u t s i d e actors in the early stages, but can b e c o m e m o r e i n c l u s i v e as the p o s t c o n f l i c t situation stabilizes. Inclusiveness is important b e c a u s e those w h o wield the greatest d e c i s i o n m a k i n g i n f l u e n c e in a p o s t c o n f l i c t society are not always seen as legitimate by the local population or p o w e r f u l outside actors. While it is never possible to consult all who are affected by every decision (just as it is never possible for all citizens to participate directly in democratic decisionmaking), another basic deliberative p r i n c i p l e — p u b l i c i t y — i s an indirect way of engaging a broader range of stakeholders. T h e publicity principle holds that the reasons for decisions should be accessible and u n d e r s t a n d a b l e , and the debates that lead to them should be as transparent as possible. T h e notion that positions must be stated publicly in terms that all can accept is a device for engaging parliamentarians, opposition groups, and civil society, turning them into an audience at whom the justifications must be directed. Direct participation is not necessary for deliberative principles to have an impact: the audience effect

24 • ANNUAL

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impels the speaker to account for the concerns of all who have a stake in the outcome of the deliberations. 3 6 None of this is easy, of course, and deliberation is no panacea. Nobody imagines that it can supplant the influence of power; the ambition is more modest. To the extent that political struggles take place through deliberation (as opposed to bargaining, and pressure), it levels the playing field by reducing the impact of power. Moreover, an immediate postconflict environment is too fraught to expect peaceful, broadly inclusive political competition. If anything, fostering such competition can be divisive—an obstacle to the sort of consensusbuilding and conciliatory politics that is required. Thus the deliberative processes themselves may have to evolve, from confidential exchanges among the most powerful actors, to public exercises of justification and reason-giving, to a more stable process in which decisions are made in institutions that lend themselves to inclusive, open—perhaps confrontational but nonviolent—political contestation. It is not possible to come up with a checklist of operational devices to incorporate more and better deliberation in any peace process— they are too context-specific. Nevertheless, the above review of recent practice, as well as the case studies in this volume, offer some illustrative suggestions: • One of the principal functions of the political head of any mission is to foster deliberation. S o m e are much better at this than others; f o r m e r UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi is reputed to be one of the best. • Use the transitional period to engage actors other than the parties to the conflict, and provide platforms for them to participate in decisions, like the Loya Jirgas in A f g h a n istan and the proposed D a r f u r - D a r f u r dialogue in Sudan. • Encourage transparency in decisionmaking on important matters of public policy, in order to take advantage of the audience effect, indirectly holding decisionmakers

accountable. T h e publication of decisions by the steering committee that oversees Liberia's G E M A P program is an example. • In exercising good offices, draw on expert opinion and empirical data, in order to pressure the parties to deliberate on the basis of assessable evidence rather than self-serving claims. Resolution of the north-south boundary disputes in Sudan, for example, could benefit from expert opinion on the historical boundary and the location of oil reserves. • Start with interim constitutions and even legislation, because they automatically come up for reconsideration at times and in institutions that are likely to be more conducive to genuine deliberation compared to an immediate postconflict period. • Encourage truth commissions as a first step in seeking transitional justice, because they are themselves devices for public deliberation about what happened and why, and how to move forward. The commissions in Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste serve as examples. The broad-based consultations on setting up a truth commission for Burundi illustrate the value of inclusiveness even in designing the institution. • Include the leadership of peace operations in committees set up to oversee implementation of a peace agreement. The presence of impartial third parties can generate deliberation on issues the parties would rather avoid, and can ensure that all perspectives get a fair hearing. The cease-fire commission for the north-south peace process in Sudan is a positive example; removal of the nonsignatories to the D a r f u r peace agreement from the cease-fire commission there serves as a negative example. • Use these joint bodies to engage with civil society and local communities, as the commissions on security arrangements did in Aceh. Engaging civil society directly in the implementation of a peace agreement can have the incidental benefit of creating new cadres of political actors while opening political space for dealing with matters that do not relate directly to the peace process. • Seek to revive or cultivate traditional de-

CONSOLIDATING PEACE •

liberative mechanisms. Local reconciliation initiatives in Liberia and Sudan are examples, as are the transitional justice approaches adopted in Mozambique in the early 1990s. Sometimes this requires local community empowerment, as the World Bank has attempted in Timor-Leste and Afghanistan with respect to the allocation of development funds. • Some UN Security Council visits to mission areas can be seen as deliberative exercises, where engagement is direct and on the basis of reciprocity, rather than "megaphone diplomacy." Security Council missions to Haiti in 2005 and the DRC in 2006 are examples. • Finally, it is possible to imagine the UN Peacebuilding Commission as a venue for not only coordination, but also deliberation: a forum for reasoned exchange between members of the commission and national counterparts. In fact, when Burundi and Sierra Leone, the first two "clients" of the commission, presented their strategies, they were encouraged to attend each other's sessions—a nod to deliberative principles.

Conclusion The debate between those who would place democratization at the center of peacebuilding

and those who see it as a "pipedream" has not been resolved. 3 7 While the built-in conflictmanagement potential of representative democratic institutions is widely acknowledged, there is ample evidence that rushing to elections can be destabilizing. This chapter has focused on a different element of democracy. I have argued that laying the foundations for sustainable peace depends as much on deliberative mechanisms as it does on representative ones. Clearly there are limits on the scope and impact of deliberation in a postconflict society. Most decisions will be made on the basis of bargaining, voting, arm-twisting, and less subtle forms of coercion, though hopefully not violence. In the early days of a peace process, deliberation may begin at a low level, with few participants and not much publicity, but it can build over time as deliberative habits and institutions take hold. Moreover, deliberation between local and external actors is a way for the latter to practice what they preach, enhancing the legitimacy of their intervention while cultivating the sort of democratic practices that self-sustaining peace requires. In sum, deliberative principles and methods are a way of holding the parties in a peace process accountable to the larger population, and may be the only way of holding outsiders accountable to the people on whose behalf they purport to be acting.

Notes I am very grateful to the following people for their thoughtful comments on drafts of this chapter: Salman Ahmed, Sarjoh Bah, Rahul Chandran, Gillian Cull, Richard Gowan, David Haeri, Bruce Jones, and Richard Ponzio. Any errors of fact or judgment are my own. 1. See United Nations, "Secretary-General's Address to Opening Session of Peacebuilding Commission," 23 June 2006; Elizabeth Cousens and Chetan Kumar, Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000). 2. Richard Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005); Simon Chesterman, You the Peoples: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004). 3. On gradations of sovereignty, see Robert Keohane, "Political Authority After Intervention: Gradations of Sovereignty," in J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert Keohane, eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Stephen Krasner, "Shared Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States," International Security 29, no. 2 (2004): 85-120. 4. For a similar argument that focuses primarily on internal deliberations rather than deliberation between local and external actors, see Michael Barnett, "Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States After War," International Security 30, no. 4 (2006): 87-112.

26 • ANNUAL

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5. Terrence Lyons, "Transforming the Institutions of War: Post-Conflict Elections and the Reconstruction of Failed States," in Robert Rotberg, ed., When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). 6. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 18-19. 7. Lyons, " T r a n s f o r m i n g the Institutions of War." On interim consultative institutions, see also Michael Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert Orr, Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador (Cambridge, U K : C a m b r i d g e University Press, 1997). 8. Vivien Hart, "Constitution-Making and the Transformation of Conflict," Peace and Change 26, no. 2 (April 2001): 153-176. 9. Briefing to the U N Security Council by the S R S G for Afghanistan, New York, 19 July 2002. 10. See Barnett, " B u i l d i n g a R e p u b l i c a n P e a c e , " pp. 1 0 2 - 1 0 3 ; Richard Ponzio, " T r a n s f o r m i n g Political Authority: U N Democratic Peacebuilding in Afghanistan ( 2 0 0 1 - 2 0 0 5 ) , " paper presented at the nineteenth annual meeting of the Academic Council of the United Nations System, 8 - 1 0 June 2006. 11. For critiques of the constitutional process in Iraq, see Hamid Barrada and Philippe Gaillard, " L e Grand Interview: L a k h d a r B r a h i m i , " Jeune Afrique no. 2375, 1 6 - 2 2 July 2006; International Crisis Group, "Unmaking Iraq: A Constitutional Process Gone Awry," Middle East Briefing no. 19, 26 September 2005; US Institute for Peace, "Iraq's Constitutional Process: An Opportunity Lost," Special Report no. 155, D e c e m b e r 2005. 12. Barnett Rubin, " T h e Politics of Security in Post-Conflict Internationalized State Building," in Charles Call and Vanessa Wyeth, eds., Building States to Build Peace ( f o r t h c o m i n g ) , p. 31; Barnett Rubin, "Peace Building and State-Building in Afghanistan: Constructing Sovereignty for W h o s e Security?" Third World Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2006): 180. 13. See Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, "Workshop on Peace Consolidation in Sierra Leone," Freetown, Sierra Leone, 30 J u n e - 1 July 2006. 14. Rubin, "Politics of Security," p. 24. 15. Salman A h m e d , " N o Size Fits All: Lessons in M a k i n g Peace and Rebuilding States," Foreign Affairs 84, no. 1 (2005): 165. 16. Stephen Biddle, "Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon," Foreign Affairs, no. 2 (2006). See also, James Baker III and Lee Hamilton, Report of the Iraq Study Group, D e c e m b e r 10, 2006. 17. Eric S c h e y e and G o r d o n Peake, "To Arrest Insecurity: T i m e f o r a Revised Security R e f o r m A g e n d a , " Conflict, Security, and Development 5, no. 3 (2005): 303. 18. O E C D , Security System Reform and Governance, D A C G u i d e l i n e s and R e f e r e n c e Series (2005); EU, Concept for ESDP Support to Security Reform (2005); United Nations, DPKO Policy Directive on Law Enforcement Agencies (2006); UNDP, Strategic Approaches to Justice and Security Sector Reform (2002). T h e UN Special C o m m i t t e e on P e a c e k e e p i n g O p e r a t i o n s requested the Secretariat to conduct "a process of joint policy-making on security sector reform best practices," which the U N D P and D P K O are leading in collaboration with other U N entities. U N doc. A/60/19. 19. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on Timor-Leste Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1690 (2006), 8 August 2006, para. 114; S/RES/1704, 25 August 2006. 20. Scott Carlson, Legal and Judicial Rule of Law Work in Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, UN Lessons Learned study (2006), p. 4. 21. T h e U N registered a reservation to the L o m é A g r e e m e n t in Sierra L e o n e b e c a u s e it granted amnesty for those categories of crimes. 22. Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of the Truth Commissions (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 25. 23. A m y G u t m a n n and Dennis T h o m p s o n , Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 185. 24. United Nations, Seventh Report of the SG on the UN Operation in Burundi, S / 2 0 0 6 / 4 2 9 , 21 June 2006, para. 8. T h e UN has also been engaged in consultations about a "special c h a m b e r " for war crimes, which will likely take the f o r m of a hybrid tribunal. 25. Martha Minnow, " T h e H o p e f o r Healing: W h a t Can Truth C o m m i s s i o n s D o ? " in Robert Rotberg, ed., Truth v. Justice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 253. 26. Carlson, Legal and Judicial Rule of Law Work. 27. On Liberia, see International Crisis Group, "Liberia: Resurrecting the Justice S y s t e m , " 6 April 2006, p. 1. My conclusion on southern Sudan is based on interviews in Juba, September 2006. 28. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on Justice and Reconciliation for Timor-Leste, S/2006/580, 26 July 2006, para. 19. 29. S/2006/628, 8 August 2006, paras. 7 3 - 9 0 , 125-126.

CONSOLIDATING

30. See R a m a Mani, "Rebuilding an Inclusive Political C o m m u n i t y , " Security Dialogue 36, no. 4 (2005): 5 1 1 - 5 2 6 . 31. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, S/2004/616, 23 August 2004, para. 19. 32. G u t m a n n and T h o m p s o n Why Deliberative Democracy? See also A m y G u t m a n n and Dennis T h o m p s o n , Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, M A : Harvard University Press, 1996); Stephen Macedo, ed., Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999). For a fuller analysis of the relevance of deliberative democracy theory to international affairs, see Ian Johnstone, "Deliberation and Legal Argumentation in International Decision-Making," in Hilary C h a r l e s w o r t h and J e a n - M a r c C o i c a u d , eds., The Faultlines of Legitimacy (New York: United Nations University Press, f o r t h c o m i n g 2007). 33. Barnett, "Building a Republican Peace," pp. 8 8 - 8 9 ; Roland Paris, At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge, UK: C a m b r i d g e University Press, 2004); Oliver Richmond, " U N Peace Operations and the D i l e m m a s of the Peacebuilding C o n s e n s u s , " International Peacekeeping 11, no. 1 (2004): 8 3 - 1 0 1 ; Alex Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping (Cambridge, M A : Polity Press, 2004). 34. Barnett, "Building a Republican Peace," p. 90. 35. Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, M A : M I T Press, 1996). 36. Even if the public reason-giving is insincere, paying lip service to shared interests can moderate behavior, because the speaker feels impelled to m a k e s o m e e f f o r t to match words with deeds. Jon Elster calls this the "civilizing force of hypocrisy"; Jon Elster, ed., Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge, U K : C a m b r i d g e University Press, 1998). 37. For a summary of the debate, see Ponzio, " T r a n s f o r m i n g Political Authority."

PEACE

• 27

Sudan: Faltering Protection and Fragile Peace Alhaji M. 5. Bah and Ian Johnstone

29

Sudan presented the most complex, com-

(SPLM) in January 2005, the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) has as its centerpiece a referendum on self-determination for southern Sudan after six years. In the interim period, the south is granted significant autonomy, while the N C P retains its authority in the north—including the continuation of Islamic law (sharia) (at least until elections are held in 2009). The two parties are to share power and wealth, while carrying out agreed security-related measures and resolving disputes over areas in southern Kordofan, the Blue Nile States, and Abyei.

bined peacekeeping challenges to the international community in 2006. It hosted two operations, one run by the United Nations to oversee the north-south peace process, and the other by the African Union to manage the Darfur crisis. Faced with a frequently hostile government in the north and a largely indifferent one in the south, the UN mission in Sudan (UNMIS) struggled to hold the parties to the terms of a comprehensive peace agreement they signed in early 2005. The African Union mission (AMIS) faced even greater obstacles. Despite (or perhaps because of) the peace agreement signed by the government of Sudan and one rebel faction in May 2006, security and humanitarian conditions in Darfur worsened. The longplanned exit strategy for AMIS—a handover to the UN—was blocked by the unyielding opposition of the government, whose good faith was further cast into doubt by a major military offensive in the fall. While debate and planning for such a transition occupied much of the year, it was not until the end of 2006 that key outside actors began to forge a common position. In November, the UN increased its support for the AU and agreement was reached in principle on a hybrid UN-AU mission, but it took another month of diplomatic pressure to get the Sudanese government to agree to the concept. As 2007 approached, the north-south peace process was faltering and questions remained about the will and ability of the international community to make good on its commitment to protect civilians in Darfur.

Darfur has been in crisis since February 2003. The Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M)—later joined by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)—took up arms against the government to protest years of political and economic marginalization. The government of Sudan reacted by mobilizing the Arab militia, known as Janjaweed. Negotiations in 2004 produced a humanitarian cease-fire agreement between the government and two rebel groups. The AU then launched peace talks in Abuja, which progressed unevenly. This was due in part to a split in the SLA between a faction led by Minni Minawi, with support from the Zaghawa ethnic group, and a faction led by Abdoul Wahid al-Nour, with significant support from the Fur, the largest ethnic group in the region. High-level engagement and intense pressure from the United States during the final round of negotiations produced the Darfur peace agreement (DPA), signed by the government of Sudan and the SLA faction led by Minni Minawi, on 6 May 2006.

Background

Meanwhile, in January 2005, an international commission of inquiry established by the UN Security Council found that crimes

Signed by the National Congress Party (NCP) and Sudan People's Liberation Movement 30

SUDAN: FALTERING

against humanity and war crimes were probably c o m m i t t e d in Darfur and that, while the government

had not pursued a policy

of

g e n o c i d e , s o m e individuals may have c o m mitted acts with genocidal intent.' In March

200 ml

UNMIS area of operation Administrative boundary

AMIS area of operation

V/

Wadi Haifa I

2 0 0 5 the Security Council referred the case to

NORTHERN

t.

I

i

the International Criminal Court ( I C C ) . T h e

Haiya

individuals identified by the commission. T h e

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CHAD

Omdurman

peace process or c o m m i t atrocities.

a strong central government and a nascent southern government, neither o f which wants the UN to play a proactive role in managing

Geneina

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)

SUDAN

vides good o f f i c e s , monitors the c e a s e - f i r e

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UNITED N A T I O N S

imposed restrictions on freedom o f movement, as well as other obstructions like customs delays. At times during 2 0 0 6 , security

At the start o f 2 0 0 6 , U N M I S had only

conditions rendered certain places o f f limits

reached 4 0 percent o f its authorized military

or only accessible with force protection. How-

strength, which rose to 7 8 percent by early

ever, some o f the U N ' s difficulties in Sudan

March and c l o s e to full strength by the mid-

were self-inflicted. Procurement and recruit-

dle o f the year. Police deployment followed a

ment faced major delays. B y September 2 0 0 6 ,

similar pattern, while civilian

recruitment

resignations and contract nonrenewals had

was further behind schedule, with a vacancy

reached a rate o f one person per day, outstrip-

rate o f 3 6 . 5 percent at the end o f September.

ping the pace o f hiring. Though nominally

U N M I S operates in difficult conditions. In

" u n i f i e d , " the mission suffered from inordi-

addition to a massive area to be covered, roads

nately poor coordination. T h e expulsion o f J a n Pronk in October,

/

UGANDA

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance .. by the United Nations.

placed persons, and prepare for elections and o f the UN Charter, though it does have Chap-

"jr

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the rule o f law, facilitate the return o f disreferenda. U N M I S operates under Chapter V I

.

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between north and south, oversees the redereintegration

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mament, demobilization,


Budget

$208.4 million (April-December 2006)

port p a c k a g e " of some 3,000 personnel.

> Strength as of 30 September 2006

Troops: 4,980

Force commander

• Police commissioner

Military observers: 773 Civilian police: 1,346

For detailed mission information see p. 369.

p r o v i d e d logistics and f i n a n c i a l support, N A T O p r o v i d e d strategic airlift, and the United States, United K i n g d o m , C a n a d a , the Netherlands, and others provided additional bilateral assistance—an indication of an emerging division of labor of sorts. F r o m late 2 0 0 4 to m i d - 2 0 0 5 , A M I S was quite e f f e c t i v e , due in large m e a s u r e to good cooperation f r o m the rebel groups in Darfur. T h e J a n j a w e e d were less cooperative, but tended to operate at night and so there were f e w opportunities for direct confrontation with A M I S . As the security situation deteriorated in late 2005 and pressure for a peace a g r e e m e n t grew in early 2006, there was public discussion for the first time about h a n d i n g over p e a c e k e e p i n g responsibilities to the U N . T h e rationale for the transition, which had been the A U exit strategy f r o m the start, was the U N ' s greater capacity for the sort of multidimensional operation that would be required to oversee a comprehensive peace agreement. With the s i g n i n g of the D a r f u r p e a c e a g r e e m e n t , and the g o v e r n m e n t of S u d a n ' s c o n t i n u e d r e s i s t a n c e to a transition to a U N o p e r a t i o n in D a r f u r , A M I S a d o p t e d a n e w c o n c e p t of o p e r a t i o n s in m i d - 2 0 0 6 . S u b s e quently, the A U proposed an expansion of the f o r c e by 4 , 0 0 0 troops, b r i n g i n g the total to a p p r o x i m a t e l y 11,000. But it w a s not clear

The Darfur Peace Agreement and Its Implementation T h e year 2 0 0 6 b e g a n with a d e t e r i o r a t i n g security situation in D a r f u r , d o u b t s a b o u t A M I S ' s ability to sustain a robust operation, and determination to reach a peace a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n the g o v e r n m e n t and rebel g r o u p s . U n d e r p r e s s u r e f r o m the U n i t e d States to c o m p l e t e the A U - l e d A b u j a talks, the D a r f u r p e a c e a g r e e m e n t w a s s i g n e d in early J u n e . M o d e l e d on the n o r t h - s o u t h c o m p r e h e n s i v e peace agreement, it addresses the contentious issues of security, power, and wealth sharing. It calls for d i s a r m a m e n t of J a n j a w e e d militia. M i n n i M i n a w i w a s a p p o i n t e d special assistant to the president, the f o u r t h highest position in the G N U , as well as chair of the Transitional D a r f u r Regional Authority. T h e DPA calls f o r a r e f e r e n d u m , by July 2 0 1 0 , to d e c i d e w h e t h e r D a r f u r s h o u l d be a region with a single local g o v e r n m e n t , or a collection of three states. T h e DPA parties h a v e agreed to establish a r e c o n s t r u c t i o n and d e v e l o p m e n t f u n d , to w h i c h the G N U is to contribute $ 7 0 0 million over three years. The appointment of Minni Minawi widened the rift with the S L A - W a h i d and J E M , w h o had rejected the DPA, as it failed to address some of their key demands, such as individual (as o p p o s e d to group) c o m p e n s a t i o n , the immediate disarmament of the Janjaweed, a vicepresidential position reserved for Darfur, and j u s t i c e for those w h o experienced atrocities. Efforts by the A U and others, including threats of sanctions against the leaders of the two groups, failed to bring them on board. However,

SUDAN: FALTERING PROTECTION

Sudanese women demonstrate in Khartoum against the possible transfer of peacekeeping in Darfur from the African Union to the UN, 8 March 2006.

some individuals within the two nonsignatory groups signed a Declaration of Commitment (DoC) in support of the DPA. The post-DPA period witnessed an increased splintering and realigning of the rebel groups, with conflicting and competing demands. The National Redemption Front (NRF) and G19 were the most notable groups to emerge during this period. Meanwhile, the government of Sudan and SLA-Minni used the DPA to mount attacks on the nonsignatories. Starting in August 2006, the government amassed thousands of troops and weaponry in the region, and attacked several towns and villages. While hostilities between the DPA signatories decreased, fighting between them and the nonsignatories increased. In addition, A M I S itself increasingly became the target of attacks by the latter. Compounding these growing security problems, the humanitarian and human rights situation deteriorated significantly in the post-DPA period. With approximately 14,000 aid workers and about 85 nongovernmental organizations

(NGOs), Darfur hosted the biggest humanitarian operation in the world. Fighting between the various rebel groups, the government of Sudan, and the Janjaweed militia created more internally displaced persons (IDPs) and forced humanitarian agencies to withdraw f r o m affected areas. By August 2006, humanitarian access had dropped to its lowest level since 2004. Attacks against civilians and UN and N G O staff increased during the year, with violent deaths in the first half of 2006 up nearly 400 percent over the same period in 2005. 2 In late November, as the government placed new obstacles in the way of humanitarian action, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs told the Security Council that the crisis in Darfur was "closer to the abyss" than at any time since 2004. To carry out the new tasks emanating from the DPA, such as monitoring buffer zones and grazing routes, as well as the protection of civilians, A M I S developed a new concept of operations in June 2006. By then, its ability to carry out even its monitoring mandate had

• 37

38 . ANNUAL

REVIEW OF GLOBAL

PEACE

OPERATIONS

Box 2.2 S h a r i n g the Front Lines: A i d W o r k e r s Under the G u n Between 1997 and 2005, nearly as many humanitarian aid workers lost their lives to violence as did uniformed peacekeepers. All told, 947 civilian aid workers were killed, kidnapped, or seriously injured by armed attacks during the nine-year period. These are among the findings of a joint study by the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) and the Humanitarian Policy Group/Overseas Development Institute (ODI): Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and Operations (see http://www.cic.nyu.edu or http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg). Drawing on the most comprehensive global dataset to date of reported major incidents of violence against aid workers, the study found that the absolute number of attacks on aid workers each year has nearly doubled since 1997. The proliferating numbers of violent incidents have contributed to the widespread perception that aid workers are

increasingly targeted, and that the risk of violence against them is higher today than ever before. The study's statistical analysis, however, reveals that the situation is not as dire as it appears. By calculating yearly estimates of the population of aid workers in the field (a population that increased roughly 77 percent from 1997 to 2005), the study demonstrates that the global incidence of violence against aid workers rose only slightly over 1997-2005. The analysis also shows that, with the exception of Iraq in 2 0 0 3 - 2 0 0 4 , Somalia was the most dangerous environment for aid workers, followed by Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq, North Caucasus, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Sudan in particular has had an upswing in violence recently, as aid workers increasingly fall victim to violence in Darfur. From the start of 2005 to the third quarter of 2006, Sudan led

the field, with the highest number of attacks committed against aid workers (thirty-seven incidents involving ninetyfour victims). In these contexts, however, local aid workers, relative to their numbers in the field, are suffering increasing casualties, while their international colleagues are becoming relatively less at-risk. Perceptions of increased risk have led to greater reliance on local actors and national staff to deliver aid. Socalled remote management programming allows operations to continue, but often results in less effective and less strategic programming. The study argues that humanitarian organizations have failed to fully consider the impact and ethics of remote management. Recommendations are offered for strengthening operational security and aid management in insecure environments, including through development of local capacity.

Violent Incidents A g a i n s t A i d W o r k e r s by Year

Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Totals

Total Incidents

Total Aid Worker Victims

UN

ICRC

IFRC

NGO

Donor/Other

34 26 31 41 29 47 62 66 72 408

77 69 66 94 94 88 145 140 174 947*

26 24 16 31 28 17 31 18 24 215

9 26 8 10 11 7 8 0 4 83

10 5 4 0 3 5 20 11 5 63

31 14 38 51 52 58 86 107 139 576

1 0 0 2 0 1 0 4 2 10

Killed Wounded Kidnapped Nat'l Int'l 39 36 29 58 27 38 86 60 61 434

8 15 15 25 20 23 49 55 95 305

32 18 20 11 47 25 8 24 17 202

43 54 41 74 66 73 118 109 159 737

34 15 25 20 28 15 27 31 15 210

*The figure of 947 includes those killed in the bombing of the UN's Baghdad headquarters in August 2003, but not the estimated 150 people injured in that incident. Records are insufficient to determine the number and affiliation of the injured.

SUDAN: FALTERING PROTECTION

diminished, for a variety of reasons. It had limited access to areas controlled by groups opposed to the DPA, and could not maintain a twenty-four-hour presence in some IDP camps. The politicized environment and the insecurity meant that AMIS could not execute its strategy of protection by presence, a strategy that had worked well in the past. Despite the deployment of over 90 percent of the mission's authorized personnel, the financial and logistical challenges were acute. Financial shortfalls left mission personnel without salaries and allowances for months on end. Aiming to restructure and enhance the existing force, the AMIS force commander requested six additional battalions in September 2006. However, given the logistical and financial constraints (and hesitations on the part of donors), initial efforts centered on the possibility of two additional battalions. A new cease-fire commission and joint commission were inaugurated in June 2006 to monitor the cease-fire under the DPA and previous agreements. This forced AMIS to experiment with two cease-fire commissions, one for the N'djamena Agreement and the other for the DPA. This experiment was dogged by controversy, as the DPA parties objected to the participation of nonparties in the two new bodies. The government of Sudan declared the NRF a terrorist group, and claimed the government could not guarantee the security of nonsignatories on the CFC. AMIS suspended representatives of the nonsignatories on 16 August in an attempt to put an end to the paralysis of the two bodies. As a result, AMIS increasingly came to be seen as biased in favor of the DPA parties. The parties referred to the decision as an act of war—an implicit threat against AMIS personnel and property. 3 Moreover, the suspension severed the only link AMIS had with these groups, making it difficult for the mission to verify cease-fire violations and attacks on its personnel in areas controlled by the nonsignatories. However, a meeting of the DPA Joint C o m m i s s i o n in N o v e m b e r a p p r o v e d a proposal for the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a two-

chamber CFC: one for the DPA and DoC signatories and another for nonsignatories. A proposal for a third chamber involving all the parties was left to the discretion of the force commander. The AU established a DPA implementation team (DPAIT) to work closely with the chair of the proposed Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC), loosely modeled on Afghanistan's Loya Jirga. The DDDC was designed as a bottom-up approach to remedy the top-down approach of the Abuja talks, and to encourage dialogue among the people of Darfur for identifying problems, proffering solutions, and choosing their leaders (with external partners acting as facilitators). One of the DPA implementation strategies is to undertake quick-impact projects to rebuild schools and clinics, sink boreholes, and expedite the establishment of a compensation committee. Nonetheless, the vast majority of people rejected the DPA, making its implementation and the convening of the DDDC problematic. The chairperson of the DDDC's preparatory committee was finally appointed in September 2006, but little progress had been made by the end of October. The Politics of Transition The increased insecurity in the post-DPA period—and the need to implement the agreement—increased the motivation for transition to a UN force. While AMIS had done a laudable job since its initial deployment, the mission could not address the intractable political and security problems given its human resource, financial, and logistics constraints. On 10 January 2006, the PSC decided in principle to hand over the operation to the UN. The UN Security Council welcomed the decision and requested the Secretary-General to embark on contingency planning in consultation with the AU, the GNU, and other stakeholders. The PSC reiterated its position in March and extended the mandate of AMIS until 30 September 2006, while stressing that the transition would require the consent of

• 39

4 0 • ANNUAL

REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE

OPERATIONS

the government o f Sudan and the continued

formed police units ( o f 125 e a c h ) and 3 , 0 0 0

African character o f the mission.

civilians. T h e resolution also called for the

A UN Security Council mission visited

U N to support A M I S , pending the transition

Sudan and Chad in June to boost efforts to

to a UN force. Twelve members o f the Coun-

implement the DPA, and to pave the way for

cil voted in favor o f the resolution, while

the transition. The Council's visit was followed

China, Russia, and Qatar abstained.

by a joint A U - U N technical assessment team, led by U N

Under-Secretary-General

Although the resolution was adopted under

Jean-

Chapter V I I , the Security Council invited the

Marie Guehenno o f the UN and A U Commis-

G N U to consent to the UN deployment. T h e

sioner Said Djinnit. The Security Council and

government o f Sudan forcefully rejected the

the assessment mission concluded that A M I S

deployment, reiterated its threats to wage a

should hand over to a larger, more robust, mul-

j i h a d (holy war) on any U N troops deployed

tidimensional UN operation, and that A M I S

to Darfur, and demanded that the A U leave

should be strengthened in the interim. President

Darfur at the expiration o f its mandate, on 3 0

Omar al-Bashir rejected the proposed transi-

September 2 0 0 6 , unless it accepted financial

tion, arguing that the A U had no right to hand

assistance from the L e a g u e o f Arab States

over its mission, especially since the DPA de-

and the G N U , though the government of Sudan

liberately left out such a reference.

later retracted this ultimatum. T h e govern-

Claiming that the government o f Sudan was capable o f restoring security and protecting the civilian population in Darfur, President B a s h i r presented the U N Secretary-General with a plan to deploy 2 7 , 5 5 0 government troops and police, along with 4 , 0 0 0 Sudan Liberation Movement (i.e., S L A - M i n n i ) fighters to the region, signaling the government's intent to pursue a military option. T h e G N U was not united in its rejection o f the proposed transition. W h i l e members o f

ment claimed that the U N would not

be

impartial, as the international community had not condemned the DPA nonsignatories for their violent acts. An unstated worry o f the government o f Sudan was that the "international c o m m u n i t y " was pushing for r e g i m e change, and that a UN force would arrest senior government officials indicted by the International Criminal Court. Perhaps even more worrying to the N C P was the fear o f Darfur gaining independence.

N C P vehemently opposed the transition, S P L M

In October, U N Special Representative o f

leader S a l v a K i i r openly voiced his support,

the

as did Minni M i n a w i , the DPA nonsignato-

reported on his personal blog that the S A F

ries, and the vast majority o f Darfur's popula-

had lost two m a j o r battles in Darfur in Sep-

tion. T h e A U as an organization has been

tember 2 0 0 6 , with hundreds o f casualties,

steadfast in its public support for a transition,

many prisoners

but in private dealings with the government

refusing to fight. T h e report prompted first

o f Sudan, some North African countries have

the Sudanese military and then the govern-

been equivocal.

Secretary-General

(SRSG)

Jan

taken, and some

Pronk

soldiers

ment (without consulting the S P L M ) to de-

B a s e d on recommendations presented by

clare Mr. Pronk persona non grata on

20

the U N Secretary-General, on 31 August the

October. He left three days later for "consul-

Security Council adopted Resolution

tations with the S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l " in New

1706,

expanding the mandate o f U N M I S to include

York. It was there decided that Mr. Pronk

support for implementation o f the DPA and

would continue as S R S G until the end o f the

the N ' d j a m e n a Agreement, and to use all nec-

year, based outside o f Sudan. His deputy, Taye-

essary means to protect civilians.

UNMIS

B r o o k Zerihoun, would assume day-to-day

would be strengthened by up to 17,300 military

responsibilities pending the appointment o f a

personnel, 3 , 3 0 0 civilian police, including 16

new S R S G .

SUDAN: FALTERING PROTECTION • 41

In mid-November, a meeting convened by the UN Secretary-General in Addis Ababa led to an agreement "in principle" on a hybrid UN-AU force. This was confirmed at an AU PSC meeting in December, as part of a threephase process: UN light support to AMIS, followed by a larger support package and eventual transition to a hybrid force. With January 1 approaching—a critical date because it marked the end of the AMIS mandate as well as the term of Kofi Annan—pressure grew for the deployment of an expanded force and a re-energized political process in Darfur. At the end of December, the government finally agreed to the hybrid force. But with continuing reservations about the size, as well as command and control arrangements, it was clear that it would take some time to get a major UN presence on the ground. Meanwhile, violence that had been spilling over into Chad and the Central African Republic for much of the year prompted the dispatch of a UN technical assessment mission

to consider the possible deployment of a multidimensional presence to both countries. On 22 December, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that the conditions for a UN peacekeeping operation did not exist, mainly because the rebel groups would oppose it. He went on to state that, if the Council decided to deploy a mission, it should be a robust force with a mandate to monitor the borders and protect civilians.

Conclusion In late 2006, international attention was focused on Darfur, while the north-south peace process was faltering. The outline of a unified international strategy was starting to emerge for both conflicts, but it was not clear whether either would come to fruition or succeed. The strategy on Darfur had three elements: broadening support for the DPA, enhancing the capacity of AMIS, and convincing the NCP to accept a transition to a UN mission. On the

An AU peacekeeper guards a water station in Darfur, 6 September 2006

42 • ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

first, it was clear the government of Sudan would not agree to renegotiate the DPA, but some aspects of it could be "revisited," such as individual compensation, the immediate disarmament of the Janjaweed, and more equitable power-sharing. It was hoped that this, plus other inducements, would bring the nonsignatories on board and would win the support of the broader population. By the end of October, progress had already been made on enhancing AMIS in the form of a new concept of operations, changes in the mission leadership, and the U N lightsupport package. However, there was a disconnect between the Security Council's approval in August of a much larger, more robust UN operation, and the minimal enhancements of A M I S described above. If 20,000 uniformed personnel were seen as necessary to bring a measure of security to Darfur, then the latter hardly seemed like an alternative, even as a stop-gap measure. Moreover, with the government of Sudan having successfully resisted pressure for a speedy transition to the UN, it was better placed than ever to dictate terms on what happened in Darfur. Whatever new capacity AMIS may acquire, its political weaknesses vis-a-vis an emboldened government raised troubling questions about whether it would be able to turn the tide on its declining effectiveness. As for the prospects of a transition, with nobody volunteering troops to intervene coercively, the consent of the government was essential. Better diplomacy, including among major outside players like the United States and China, might well have prevented matters reaching stalemate in September. The N C P ' s genuine worries about losing Darfur (seeing a parallel with the south), and about ICC prosecutions, could have been addressed, at least to the extent that a UN presence in the region would not have a decisive impact one way or the other. Moreover, formal consent of the government without any intention to cooperate would not be a sound basis for deploying a UN force, of any size. The N C P needed incentives to give up the military option. In those

circumstances, only so much could be achieved by "megaphone diplomacy" (as the UN Deputy Secretary-General put it). A consensus seemed to be emerging at the end of the year that a more nuanced approach was required, combining carrots and sticks, with China and Arab and African countries delivering reassuring messages to complement the tougher messages coming from the United States and United Kingdom. In October 2006 the United States raised the level of its political engagement by appointing a senior envoy to Sudan, Andrew Natsios. Meanwhile, the five Security Council permanent m e m b e r s were working to forge a c o m m o n message in their dealings with the Sudanese government. Similarly, Secretary-General Annan put together a set of " c o m m o n principles" to guide the efforts of the UN, AU, and League of Arab States behind the scenes. The N o v e m b e r meeting in Addis Ababa saw a convergence a m o n g the outside actors, with the UN and AU leading the process and the P5, EU, and L A S committing to support it. This seemed to bear fruit in the form of the g o v e r n m e n t ' s agreement on a hybrid mission. Overlaying the three elements of a strategy on D a r f u r was how to ensure it did not detract from the north-south peace process. While there is logic in delinking the two, given that the international focus on the former seemed to be to the detriment of the latter, the government of Sudan had an incentive to keep them linked. The N C P may ultimately be able to live with losing the south if it can be assured of enough access to oil; it could not tolerate the loss of Darfur. It might therefore be tempted to give ground on northsouth issues in order to gain S P L M support on Darfur. There is an even more fundamental linkage between the two issues. Whether the north-south process leads to unity or secession (both sides seem to be working on the assumption that it will be the latter), the top priority for U N M I S and other international actors is to ensure that the end result occurs

SUDAN: FALTERING PROTECTION

p e a c e f u l l y and is sustainable. For that to happen, not only must the parties to the c o n f l i c t settle the core issues that divide them, but the g o v e r n m e n t s they lead (in the north and south) m u s t also meet m i n i m a l s t a n d a r d s of participatory g o v e r n a n c e . W h i l e all e y e s are f o c u s e d on the crisis in Darfur, the 2 0 0 9 elections also warrant attention now because they h a v e the potential to t r a n s f o r m the political l a n d s c a p e . If c o n v e r t i n g the S P L M into an inclusive g o v e r n m e n t is likely to be difficult,

the challenge in the north is m u c h greater. T h e N C P has little incentive to transform its style of governing, especially if it has given up on ever " m a k i n g unity attractive" to the south. But p e a c e will not be sustainable unless all groups feel they have a stake in the f u t u r e of the country. T h e conflict in D a r f u r stems f r o m a long and brutal history of marginalization. U n l e s s that is rectified by b u i l d i n g a m o r e inclusive political c o m m u n i t y in the north, any peace is likely to be short-lived.

Notes 1. United Nations, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, 5 January 2005, para. 641. 2. United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Summary of Insecurity Incidents February-July 2006 Versus February-July 2005," 1 August 2006. 3. Personal interviews with AMIS personnel, Khartoum and El-Fasher, Sudan, 13-20 August 2006.

•

Mission Reviews

3.1 Aceh

More than a year

after the signing of the

Bambang Yudhoyono won Indonesia's first

memorandum of understanding between the

national democratic election. Despite cam-

government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh

paign promises to end the war in Aceh, Yud-

Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka [GAM]),

hoyono extended martial law. Then, on 2 6

conditions appear promising in Aceh. The Aceh

December 2 0 0 4 , the Indian Ocean tsunami

Monitoring Mission (AMM), a joint effort of

struck the northern and western coasts o f

the European Union, Norway, Switzerland, and

Aceh, killing some 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 people and dis-

five countries of the Association of Southeast

placing over half a million. As humanitarian

Asian Nations (ASEAN), successfully moni-

agencies arrived in Aceh, G A M and the gov-

tored the decommissioning and demobilization

ernment held five rounds of

of G A M troops and relocation of Indonesia's

facilitated by the Crisis Management Intitia-

military and police forces. Peaceful elections

tive ( C M I ) in Helsinki, which led to the sign-

were held on 10 December 2006, a remarkable

ing o f the memorandum of understanding

achievement given Aceh's troubled history.

eight months later.

negotiations

However, challenges remained in implementing some elements of the memorandum. New legislation on the governing of Aceh had been prom-

AMM: Mandate and Functions

ulgated, but there was opposition to provisions

The memorandum of understanding mandated

perceived as inconsistent with the memoran-

the A M M to monitor implementation of vari-

dum of understanding. A human rights court and

ous aspects of the peace agreement. In Septem-

a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC)

ber 2005, A M M was deployed by the European

have not been established, and economic recov-

Union, Norway, Switzerland, and five A S E A N

ery and reintegration were uneven. A M M was

countries (Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Sin-

scheduled to withdraw on 15 December 2006,

gapore, and Thailand). A M M ' s tasks include

with a sense of accomplishment, but a number

monitoring the demobilization of G A M and the

of political, economic, and justice questions re-

decommissioning of its armaments, relocating

mained unsettled.

nonorganic military and police troops, 1 and reintegrating active G A M members. It also has responsibilities

Background

for

monitoring

the

human

rights situation and legislative reform, ruling

On 15 August 2005 the government of Indone-

on amnesty cases, and managing alleged viola-

sia and G A M signed a memorandum of under-

tions of the memorandum of understanding.

standing that ended thirty years of secessionist

A M M is a civilian mission within the

violence in Aceh. The memorandum followed

framework of the European Security and De-

the breakdown of the 2 0 0 2 Cessation of Hos-

fense Policy (ESDP). The E U ' s Political and

tilities Agreement (COHA), which led to the

Security Committee (PSC) exercises political

declaration of martial law in Aceh in Decem-

control and strategic guidance of A M M under

ber 2 0 0 3 . In October 2 0 0 4 , President Susilo

the responsibility of the European Council.

46

ACEH • 47

The costs of the mission are financed f r o m the EU budget and by contributions of EU m e m b e r states and participating countries. The legal basis for A M M is found in two key documents: the August 2005 memorandum of understanding and the European Council's Joint Action of 9 September 2005. On 15 August 2005, an initial monitoring presence (IMP) was established; twelve days later was it deployed to prevent a potential vacuum after the signing of the memorandum of understanding. It consisted of eighty monitors from EU and A S E A N countries deployed across five locations for the period between the signing of the memorandum and the full deployment of A M M . The timely presence of the IMP provided an early demonstration of the EU and ASEAN countries' commitment to the peace process, while contributing to confidence building among the population of Aceh. A M M became operational on 15 September 2005, the date on which the decommissioning of G A M armaments and the relocation of military and police forces began. With an initial mandate of six months, A M M was extended three times, for three-month periods, at the request of the parties, through to 15 December 2006. During the decommissioning phase, A M M numbered approximately 220 international u n a r m e d personnel. The decision to field a civilian rather than military mission was made in view of Indonesia's sovereignty concerns. Upon completion of the security arrangements, A M M downsized to eighty-five people, of which almost two-thirds came from EU member states as well as Norway and Switzerland, and the rest f r o m the five participating A S E A N countries. The mission, whose headquarters is in Banda Aceh, established eleven district offices geographically distributed throughout Aceh. Monitors conduct their tasks by patrolling and c o m m u n i c a t i n g with both parties, and by carrying out inspections and investigations as required. The approach of A M M is to act as a facilitator and to build confidence between the parties. In its final phase, the mission numbered only thirty-six monitors, based in Banda Aceh.

f

Sabang

[mT

AMM 09/2005

-.Sigli

Aceh

Andaman Sea

Bireuen

o--

o -Calang

Strait of Malacca

Lhokseumawe Idi oPeureulak

Takengon

A c e h

Meulaboh

BìangkejereriQ

LangsaS Tebing Tinggi

o/ Medan

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

•

Tapakktuan0

«

Sumatera . Utara

Kisaran /yen

'0Parapat

Sinabang

INDIAN OCEAN

-.Porsea ' ,

gBarus Department of Peacekeeping Operalions Cartographic Section

Map No 4287 UNITED NATIONS September 2006

EU Aceh Monitoring Mission ( A M M )

• Authorization date • Start date • Head of mission • Budget • Strength as of 30 September 2006

9 September 2005 (Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP) August 2005 Pieter Feith (Netherlands) $19.7 million (October 2005September 2006) Civilian observers: 36

While the EU has previously carried out peace operations in the f o r m e r Yugoslavia, the Caucasus, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, Aceh represents the first E S D P mission in Asia. As such, A M M is breaking new ground and may serve as a model for the way the EU will conduct crisis operations in the future. For ASEAN, participation in A M M signals a move away f r o m past policies of "noninterference" in the activities of member states, and toward an emerging common security or defense mechanism. The nature of the

48 •

MISSIONREVIEWS

arrangement—with ASEAN countries participating but not A S E A N as an organization— reflects a tentative and significant step toward a peacekeeping role for the organization. The combination of EU and ASEAN monitors has provided increased legitimacy for AMM. ASEAN personnel contributed cultural awareness and regional knowledge, while the E U presence provided diplomatic and financial weight, as well as managerial coherence. Both the EU and A S E A N reiterated their full respect for the territorial integrity of Indonesia and the future of Aceh within it. The government of Indonesia welcomed the arrangement.

AMM: Key Developments and Challenges Security Decommissioning and relocation were carried out remarkably smoothly in four parallel processes between 15 September 2005 and 5 January 2006. In accordance with the memorandum of understanding, GAM handed over all of its 840 weapons to A M M , and on 27 December 2 0 0 5 it officially disbanded its military wing. The government of Indonesia fulfilled its commitments by relocating a total of 2 5 , 8 9 0 nonorganic military and 5,791 nonorganic police out of Aceh. The number of police and military forces remaining in Aceh, as verified by AMM, is within the maximum strength specified in the memorandum of understanding: 14,700 for the Indonesian military (the Tentara Nasional Indonesia [TNI]) and 9,100 for the police. Since the completion of the security arrangements, Aceh has been violence-free, with the exception of a few incidents, but these have not threatened to derail the peace process. Regular meetings of the Commission on Security Arrangements (COSA), which comprises government of Indonesia, GAM, and A M M representatives, were held throughout the decommissioning/relocation phase at the

provincial and district levels (D-COSAs) and continue to be held as forums for discussion and building trust between military, police, and GAM field commanders. The COSA and DCOSA meetings have been a crucial element in building confidence between the parties themselves, as well as between the parties and the local communities. A M M has also used the D - C O S A s as an opportunity to explain the memorandum of understanding to the parties at the field level and to civil society. Tim Sosialisasi Aceh Damai, commonly known as Timsos, or the Socialization Team, was formed as a mechanism through which G A M and the government of Indonesia would jointly design and disseminate to stakeholders information about the peace process, preventing the parties from spreading propaganda. The donors (the World Bank, the UN Development Programme [UNDP], the US Agency for International Development [USAID], the International Organization for Migration [IOM], and A M M ) have done most of the work to prepare a public information campaign, while G A M and the government of Indonesia have signed off. This facilitated the rapid dissemination of information about the memorandum of understanding to the district and village levels. It also provided a forum for donors to support the peace process, without the appearance of their logos on the material. The fact that both parties were prepared to carry out their security-related commitments in good faith is the most significant factor in the smooth implementation of the decommissioning, demobilization, and relocation of troops. Without a good faith effort by both parties, no amount of outside monitoring could have achieved the current results. However, A M M ' s role in reinforcing this good faith was significant. Its dissemination of information to the parties at all levels of implementation, as well as its creation of a forum for airing grievances, acted as confidence-building measures. It also built awareness and support for the peace process within

the wider civilian community. Additionally, A M M provided an international spotlight on the Aceh conflict, signaling the commitment of the international community to its resolution. Both parties understood that their international reputations were at stake, and that millions of dollars of aid money would leave the province should the violence continue. While A M M can be credited with successfully completing its mission with regard to security arrangements, it is the cooperative efforts of the two parties that allowed A M M to achieve this success. Political Process The memorandum of understanding specifies that new legislation, the Law on the Governing of Aceh (LOGA), be promulgated and enter into force no later than 31 March 2006. This deadline was not met by the government of Indonesia, as it took longer than expected to secure parliamentary approval. The LOGA was initially drafted in Aceh by the provincial legislature (the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah [DPRD]) after consultation with elite politicians and businessmen in the capital, Banda Aceh. The process, however, lacked input from Acehnese outside the capital city. The draft was then sent to the national parliament in Jakarta, where it was the subject of significant debate and editing, with little participation from GAM or civil society leaders in Aceh. The LOGA was finally approved by the national parliament (the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat [DPR]) on 11 July 2006, and then signed into law by the president on 1 August. Because of the lack of consultation and consensus building during the process, the law was received with widespread protests. GAM sent a letter to the government, A M M , and the CMI detailing the provisions of the law it viewed as not consistent with the memorandum of understanding. Sixty nongovernmental organizations in Aceh formed a coalition protesting the law, and organized public demonstrations. The government provided some

A Free Aceh Movement member surrenders his weapons to the Aceh Monitoring Mission in Banda Aceh, Indonesia, 15 September 2005.

clarification, but by the end of October had not yet indicated that it would revise the law. Peaceful elections were held on 10 December 2006, the first time Acehnese were able to elect the governor, vice governor, and 19 district heads in free and fair elections. This key test of Aceh's new autonomy resulted in a decisive victory for GAM gubernatorial candidate Irwandi Yusuf and running mate Muhammad Nazar. Interpreting its mandate narrowly, the A M M claimed its mission had been fulfilled by monitoring the process of legislation reform, as the LOGA had been promulgated and elections held. Justice While steps have been taken toward fulfilling the memorandum of understanding's provisions regarding justice and human rights, overall progress is slow. In accordance with the memorandum, 1,789 GAM prisoners were re-

50 •

MISSIONREVIEWS

leased immediately upon its signing. However, there are still s o m e s i x t y - f i v e u n r e s o l v e d cases that A M M is in the p r o c e s s of ruling on. T h e key issue for these cases is the uncertainty over w h e t h e r the charges are related to G A M activities or to criminal acts c o m m i t t e d by A c e h n e s e . T h e first of the three provisions in the m e m o r a n d u m of understanding regarding human rights requires the government of Indonesia to adhere to the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. On 30 September 2005 the Indonesian g o v e r n m e n t passed two bills formally ratifying the two covenants. However, there has been little m o v e m e n t to f u l f i l l the s e c o n d h u m a n rights p r o v i s i o n of the m e m o r a n d u m of understanding, which calls f o r a h u m a n rights c o u r t to be established. Similarly, the truth and reconciliation c o m m i s s i o n s p e c i f i e d in the m e m o r a n d u m has yet to m a t e r i a l i z e . Until the p r e s i d e n t appoints m e m b e r s of the national-level T R C , the c o m m i s s i o n in A c e h c a n n o t be established. Five civil society seminars have been held to d i s c u s s the f o r m the T R C will t a k e w h e n it is e s t a b l i s h e d . It a p p e a r s that A c e h will c h o o s e a m o d i f i e d S o u t h A f r i c a n - s t y l e m o d e l , in w h i c h p e r p e t r a t o r s w h o tell the truth will be granted amnesty. Informally, A M M staff claim that neither party has p u s h e d for the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of either a h u m a n rights court or a T R C , as there have been h u m a n rights violations c o m m i t t e d by both sides, and neither side is eager to be brought to justice. A M M maintains that it has b e e n restrained in e n c o u r a g i n g i m p l e m e n t a tion of the h u m a n rights p r o v i s i o n s of the m e m o r a n d u m of understanding, as its responsibility is to m o n i t o r the p r o g r e s s of the parties. T h e implication of this reasoning is that A M M should remain in A c e h until the parties fulfill their h u m a n rights obligations.

Economic

Recovery

E c o n o m i c recovery is c o m p l e x , as tsunami reconstruction is occurring in parallel to reintegration activities. Moreover, both have been slow. In February 2 0 0 6 the governor of A c e h

formed the Aceh Reintegration Agency (Badan Reintegrasi Damai Aceh [BRDA]), to m a n a g e reintegration assistance. T h e relationship between the B D R A and the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi [BRR]) is not well d e f i n e d . There is confusion about how to provide assistance to villages that are both tsunami- and c o n f l i c t - a f f e c t e d . M a n y A c e h n e s e are frustrated with the lack of transparency in both the reconstruction and the reintegration processes, and with the lack of progress since the tsunami and the signing of the m e m o r a n d u m of understanding. C o m b i n e d with u n e m p l o y m e n t , this frustration has the potential to b e c o m e an obstacle to the peace process.

Conclusion A M M w a s s c h e d u l e d to l e a v e A c e h on 15 D e c e m b e r 2006, five days after the elections. W h i l e it can be said that A M M has succeeded in monitoring the d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g , d e m o b i lization, and relocation of troops, other aspects of its m a n d a t e r e m a i n i n c o m p l e t e . For e x a m p l e , A M M is m e a n t to m o n i t o r the reintegration of G A M e x - c o m b a t a n t s , w h i c h remains unfinished. It is supposed to m o n i t o r the f u l f i l l m e n t of h u m a n rights c o m m i t m e n t s m a d e by the parties in the m e m o r a n d u m of u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; h o w e v e r , no m o v e m e n t has been m a d e on a h u m a n rights court, nor on a truth and r e c o n c i l i a t i o n c o m m i s s i o n . A n d A M M is s u p p o s e d to m o n i t o r the p r o c e s s of legislation c h a n g e . W h i l e the L O G A has been p r o m u l g a t e d , it has been met with widespread d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n . T h e D e c e m b e r elections m a r k e d a significant step t o w a r d stable p e a c e in A c e h , a r e m a r k a b l e a c h i e v e m e n t in v i e w of the t h i r t y - y e a r civil w a r that the p e a c e p r o c e s s b r o u g h t to an e n d . H o w e v e r , key e l e m e n t s of the m e m o r a n d u m of u n d e r s t a n d i n g r e m a i n to be i m p l e m e n t e d , w h i c h will r e q u i r e c l o s e c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n the new governor and Jakarta. A M M did not enter Aceh with a clear exit strategy, and as the year drew to a close, the EU in particular was seeking a rapid exit. If such a strategy had been formulated, based on

ACEH • 51

substantive benchmarks—rather than on improvised indicators related to speed—it is likely

the mission would have remained beyond the end of 2006 to ensure a sustained peace.

Note 1. " N o n o r g a n i c " refers to military and police forces not based in Aceh, but sent to Aceh to support the military offensive.

3.2 Afghanistan

O n 20 D e c e m b e r 2005, the first freely elected Afghan parliament in over three decades was sworn in, marking the end of the Bonn process. In the light of an election that had progressed relatively smoothly, there was cautious optimism about the future of Afghanistan. Nine months later the mood had changed. Civilian and military casualties had soared, suicide bombings were occurring regularly, and citizens and leaders publicly questioned the ability of the central government to exert control over the provinces. Against this backdrop, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), led by NATO, was in the process of taking command over the majority of coalition forces in Afghanistan, and the remaining provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). ISAF was engaged in combat in the south against an increasingly strong insurgency. Meanwhile, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) became co-chair of the board of a new five-year governance and development "compact," designed to help the government project authority throughout the country.

The Bonn agreement included a request for the Security Council to deploy a multinational force to assist with security. Security Council Resolution 1386, of 20 December 2001, authorized ISAF to operate in and around Kabul, under United Kingdom command. ISAF was originally deployed with a different command structure and mandate than the US-led coalition, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which continued to conduct military operations against Al-Qaida. On 28 March 2002, to lead international civilian activities, the Security Council, through Resolution 1401, authorized the creation of UNAMA under the leadership of Lakhdar Brahimi. UNAMA was mandated broadly to monitor the benchmarks of the Bonn process and to assist the Afghan government in reaching those objectives.

ISAF: Mandate and Functions The structure of ISAF evolved considerably between 2002 and 2005. At deployment in 2002, operating under the limited mandate for security in Kabul, the UK was in command of a 5,000-strong force for six months. This was followed by Turkey for a further six months, after which Germany and the Netherlands were scheduled to take over joint command in January 2003. Prior to assuming command, the Germans and the Dutch made a formal request to NATO for support in command and control, which was approved on 17 October 2002.

Background In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, a USled coalition launched a military campaign against Al-Qaida and drove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. This led to the Bonn process, which laid out a two-year roadmap for development of a constitution and national elections. The final benchmark was achieved on 18 September 2005 with the election of the Wolesi Jirga (lower House) and the provincial councils, who later selected members of the Meshrano Jirga (upper House).

In April 2003, a few months before the German/Dutch command was scheduled to hand over, Germany approached the NATO 52

AFGHANISTAN

M i l i t a r y C o u n c i l and r e q u e s t e d a feasibility study on w h e t h e r I S A F c o u l d o p e r a t e u n d e r N A T O control in o r d e r to a v o i d the d i s r u p tions of h a n d o v e r and s e a r c h e s f o r lead nations. On 16 April 2003, the North Atlantic C o u n c i l ( N A C ) a g r e e d to a s s u m e c o m p l e t e c o m m a n d and control, w h i c h o c c u r r e d f o r mally on 11 A u g u s t 2003. In S e p t e m b e r 2003, in response to n u m erous requests f r o m A f g h a n president H a m i d Karzai and U N A M A , I S A F concluded that it lacked critical military capacity for expansion. Despite these shortages, and internal resistance f r o m some alliance m e m b e r s , the Security Council passed Resolution 1510, on 13 October 2003, providing the m a n d a t e to expand. The process of expansion lurched forward unevenly; in early 2004, I S A F assumed c o m m a n d of the PRT in Qunduz, and laid out a plan for a gradual four-phase expansion, through the north and west (phases 1 and 2, scheduled for 2005), the south (phase 3, 2006), and partially in the east (phase 4, 2007). In October 2005 the N A C took the controversial decision to expand I S A F to the volatile south, and assumed c o m m a n d of the majority of forces in Afghanistan ahead of schedule in 2006. I S A F has g r o w n p r o g r e s s i v e l y o v e r the years, f r o m the original 5 , 0 0 0 d e p l o y e d in 2 0 0 2 to a f o r c e of m o r e than 3 2 , 0 0 0 today, i n c l u d i n g a p p r o x i m a t e l y 12,600 U S t r o o p s absorbed in September 2006. T h e operation is structured with distinct yet cooperative units. I S A F headquarters, in Kabul, p r o v i d e s direction and p l a n n i n g to all units and acts as the focal point for liaison with the UN, the A f g h a n g o v e r n m e n t , and other relevant parties. Five regional c o m m a n d s cover ISAF: north, west, south, east, and capital. Each regional c o m m a n d also has responsibility for its PRTs, which operate within a quasi-independent structure, c o m m a n d e d by a lead NATO nation. T h e r e are currently t w e n t y - f i v e PRTs, all of which are under NATO c o m m a n d . In addition, the Air Task Force plans and conducts I S A F air operations, and forward bases provide logistical, medical, and security support to PRTs in each region. Since January 2004, N A T O has

• 53

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