A good deed is never forgotten: Crédit and mutual exchange in seventeenth-century France

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A good deed is never forgotten: Crédit and mutual exchange in seventeenth-century France

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A G o o d D eed is N ever Forgotten: C redit and M utual Exchange in Seventeenth-Century France

V olum e O n e o f Tw o

A D issertation subm itted to the Faculty o f the G raduate School o f A rts and Sciences o f G eorgetow n University in partial fulfillment o f the requirem ents for the degree o f D o c to r o f Philosophy in H istory

By

Valerie J. Shearer, M.A. W ashington, D.C. A ugust 22, 2005

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UMI Number: 3230998

Copyright 2006 by Shearer, Valerie J.

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Valerie J. Shearer, M.A. Thesis Advisor: Jam es B. Collins, Ph.D . A bstract

H istorians have argued that early m o d em "patron-client" relations revolved around fidelity, a value m any o f them contrast to personal interest. M y dissertation rejects the self-interest paradigm as an anachronistic interpolation. M ore broadly, m y thesis rejects the application to early m o d em societies o f paradigm s, such as rational choice theory, draw n from analyses o f contem porary W estern societies. Relying instead o n Pierre B ourdieu’s theory o f social capital, w hich suggests that individuals accum ulate the m aterial and social capital necessary in different fields o f pow er, one can broaden the definition o f pro fit and analyze a logic o f practice that escapes the “rationality” o f capitalism. Focusing o n France in the decades leading up to the E states G eneral o f 1614, m y dissertation exam ines issues o f reciprocity w ithin a range o f fields o f pow er, using archival and published sources: letters, financial docum ents, political pam phlets, m em oirs, courtesy books, literature, political philosophy, m oral and religious treatises, and m aterial evidence such as architecture and art. T h e dissertation focuses, in part, on the Brulart de Sillery family, the only one o f the great m inisterial families o f the early seventeenth century to have been ignored by historians. T h e Sillery family provides a particular case o f the shift away from the traditional belief th at posited a unity betw een private interest and com m on interest in civil life. F ro m the early seventeenth century, this

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ideal was contested in relations o f pow er w herein the duty and obligation shifted from the bienpublique to interests either m ore particular o r m ore state-centered. T he m utual exchange o f benefits operated as a m oral econom y in w hich individuals accrued social capital (credit) in civil society, as circles o f "citoyens" b o u n d by m utual benefits and obligations. T he expectation o f rew ard for a “bienfait” did n o t obviate the m oral rectitude o f the gift, reciprocity structured th e political system, social relationships, and religious life w ithin the fram ew ork o f the existing Judea-C hristian and Classical ethical traditions.

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GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This is to certify that we have examined the doctoral dissertation of Valerie Shearer entitled A Good Deed is Never Forgotten: The Culture o f Giving in 17th Century France and Quebec submitted to the faculty of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor o f Philosophy. This dissertation is complete and satisfactory in all respects, and any and all revisions required by the final examining committee have been made.

James B. Collins Thesis Advisor

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Jo Ann Moran Cruz Committee Member

Signature

Date

S ig n a tu re ^

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Kristen Neuschel Associate Professor Duke University

John R. McNeill

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D irector o f Graduate Studies

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This dissertation has been accepted by the Graduate School o f Arts and Sciences.

Y // 2 /# £ Date

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J

In M em oriam R aym ond B. Shearer 1947-1999

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PREFACE W o r d s s t r a i n , C r a c k a n d s o m e t i m e s brea k, u n d e r the burden.

T .S. Eliot

I am thankful for the support and faith o f the com m unity o f G eorgetow n University. F o r th e circulation o f books and ideas, I will forever thank A nnette T albert and Kim berly B rooks and certainly M adam e Beaucham p. B ob Schnucker counseled a long tim e ago that m y children w ould learn m any things from m y studies —they learned their way around libraries and discovered the weight o f books; fo r this, I thank all o f them b u t will nam e only Ezra. I have enjoyed the great fortune o f the Internet; do I thank technology? Truly, it is im possible to thank teachers. I can only say there are som e th at live always present (asfootfalls echo) like Jam es H eard at H arold W ashington College; Bruce Steiner, Steve M iner, K atherine Jellison at O hio University; J e ff H e rf at the University o f M aryland; Joanne R appaport and Jo A nne H o e p p n e r M oran Cruz at G eorgetow n University. Natalie Davis gave encouragem ent at exacdy the right m om ent. K risten N euschel was present long before w e m et. B ob Schnucker has been ever-present w ith kindness since that sem inar w hen I first learned the m eaning o f grace. D o u g Baxter is unflinching w ith generosity, constant w ith su p p o rt and guidance. I have been through the w orst and best o f tim es w ith Jim Collins and his patience is w ritten throughout. I will pass it on. F o r the com fort and affection o f family and friends w h o had faith w hen I did not, Gratia.

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TABLE OF C O N T E N T S

P R E F A C E .............................................................................................................................................................. V T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S ................................................................................................................................ VI T A B L E O F F I G U R E S .................................................................................................................................. VIII IN T R O D U C T IO N ................................................................................................................................................1

PA RT O NE

THE PARADOX O F BENEFITS _________________________________________ 18

I

T h e O b l ig a t io n s o f B e n e f i t s : D e b a t e s S in c e M a u s s .........................................................2 9

II

S o c ia l C a p it a l a n d t h e E c o n o m ic s o f B e n e f i t s ................................................................. 40

III

S o c ia l C a p it a l in E a r l y M o d e r n F r a n c e ............................................................................. 57

PA RT TW O

OBLIGATIONS AND BENEFITS IN FRIENDSHIP ___________________ 78

IV

P r o v e r b ia l W i s d o m ........................................................................................................................... 84

V

T h e S c ie n c e o f M o r a l s .................................................................................................................... 117 THE T ra ic te d e la c o v r BY EUSTACHE DE REFUGE.........................................................................1 27 H a b itu d e ........................................................................................................................................................ 135 T h e M o ra l P h ilo so p h y o f G u a z z o , P a lm ie r a n d la P rim a u d a y e ...............................................1 4 0

PA RT T H R E E

THE POLITICS O F BENEFITS _____________________________________ 176

VI

P o l it ic a l T h e o r y : B e n e f it s a n d H a r m o n y in O r d e r ................................................... 184

V II

T h e P u b l ic D e b a t e : B e n e f it s a n d V e n a l i t y ....................................................................2 1 4

V III

P r e a c h in g H a r m o n y a n d O r d e r .......................................................................................... 2 7 6

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PART FOUR

LA MAISON BRULARTDE SILLERY...................................................... 308

IX

H o n o r a n d C r e d i t .......................................................................................................................... 3 1 7

X

T h e C o n c o r d o f t h e F a m il y A l l i a n c e ..................................................................................3 35

XI

T h e D i s g r a c e o f t h e B r u l a r t d e S i l l e r y ...........................................................................3 6 6

The Fdcheuse Affair o f the Valtelline......................................................................................394

PART FIVE

THE DEVOUT L IF E .......................................................................................421

X II

R e t r e a t f r o m t h e W o r l d ......................................................................................................... 431

X III

T h e S c i e n c e o f C h a r i t y ............................................................................................................. 461

X IV

T h e S w e e t n e s s O f C h a r i t y .....................................................................................................4 8 5

C o n c l u s i o n ..................................................................................................................................................... 528 G e n e a l o g y ...................................................................................................................................................... 535 G l o s s a r y .......................................................................................................................................................... 539 B i b l io g r a p h y ..................................................................................................................................................542

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TABLE OF FIGURES

F i g u r e 1. “ A m itie D u r a n t e , V o i r e A p r e s M o r t ” f r o m B a r t h e l e m y A n e a u , E m b l e m e s d 'A l o ia t (1 5 4 9 )....................................................................................................................................................................................2 F i g u r e 2 . T h e T h r e e G r a c e s , R a p h a e l (1 5 0 4 ). M u s e e C o n d e ......................................................................... 35 F i g u r e 3 . “ L ’u n e m a in l a v e l ’a u l t r e ” f r o m P r o v e r b e s e n r i m e s ( c a . 1 4 7 5 )...........................................93 F i g u r e 4 . “ M u t u e l a y d e ” f r o m B a r t h e l e m y A n e a u , E m b l e m e s d 'A l o i a t (1 5 4 9 )................................. 98 F i g u r e 5 . “ G r a t l e ” f r o m C l a u d e M i g n a u l t , O m n ia A n d r e a e A l c /a n ( c a . 1 5 7 7 ).............................. 105 F i g u r e 6 . P o u r u n A m i e t S e r v it e u r F id e l e , (1 5 5 9 ). G a b r i e l S y m e o n ....................................................... 148 F i g u r e 7 . “ C o n c o r d e ” f r o m B a r t h e l e m y A n e a u , E m b l e m e s d 'A l o i a t (1 5 4 9 )......................................2 6 4 F i g u r e 8. “ C o n c o r d e I n s u p e r a b l e ” f r o m B a r t h e l e m y A n e a u , E m b l e m e s d 'A l o i a t (1 5 4 9 )......... 2 6 5 F i g u r e 9 . “ S a l u t P u b l i c q u e ” f r o m B a r t h e l e m y A n e a u , L e s E m b l e m e s (155% )................................ 2 6 7 F i g u r e 10. “E s p e r a n c e ” f r o m B a r t h e l e m y A n e a u , E m b l e m e s d 'A l o i a t ( 1 5 4 9 )................................. 2 7 0 F i g u r e 11. “ G e n e r o s i t y ” f r o m N i c o l a s O r e s m e , A v i s a u R o y (1 4 3 5 ) ....................................................... 2 7 2 F i g u r e 12. “ A m itie p o u r p r o f f i t ” f r o m N i c o l a s O r e s m e , E t h iq u e s ( c a . 1 4 5 0 )................................... 301 F ig u r e 13. “A m is t e e n t r e P r in c e e t s u ie z , e n t r e p a r e n s , m a r ie z ” f r o m N ic o l a s O r e s m e , E t h iq u e s ( c a . 1 4 5 0 )................................................................................................................................................... 301 F i g u r e 14. “ M e r c i J e t e d e l i v r a i . . . M e r c i P e r e ” f r o m N i c o l a s O r e s m e , E t h iq u e s ( c a .\4 5 Q ). 333 F i g u r e 15. J a c q u e s B l a n c h a r d , Ve n u s a n d t h e T h r e e G r a c e s S u r p r is e d b y a M o r t a l (1 6 3 1 ).... 4 5 3 F i g u r e 16. M e d a i l l e . N o e l B r u l a r t d e S i l l e r i (1 6 3 2 ). M u s e e n a t i o n a l d e l a R e n a i s s a n c e . .. 4 6 0 F i g u r e 17. T h e I n t e r i o r D o m e o f N o t r e - D a m e s - d e s - A n g e s in B a b e l o n , F r a n q o is M a n s a r t .... 4 9 7 F i g u r e 18. A n t o i n e P i e r r e t z , L e F a m e u x F r o n t s p i e c e d u T e m p l e d e S a in t e -M a r i e , ( c a . 1650). 501 F i g u r e 19. N o e l B r u l a r t d e S i l l e r y , A n o n y m o u s . T r o y e s C a t h e d r a l ...................................................525

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IN T R O D U C T I O N L e d B i e n - f a i c t d d o n t le c y m e n t de La d o c i e t £ h u m a i n d , e3 Led cepd ed m a n o t t t d ( d i d o l t un a n c i e n ) a v e c LedqueLd on p e u t Lier ed c a p t i v e r a u t r u y : m e d m e m e n t en La C o u r t , ou L ' i nt e r e d t e d t Le deuL l i e n . Eudtache du Refuge

O u t o f the m any guides to the royal court, the Traicte de la covr, ou, Instruction des covrtisans, was o n e o f the m o st popular for m any reasons.1 In the first place, this was a contem porary w ork by a French author, E ustache de Refuge. H e had vast experience in local governm ent, foreign embassies and the royal court. Betw een the lines, his b o o k tells the story about the tensions o f the court in the tortured years o f the regency governm ent. Refuge did n o t attem pt m oral philosophy; his prim ary goal was to describe things as they were, n o t as they should be. O n e example o f his pragm atism is his reading o f a lynchpin o f stoic philosophy, “B enefits are the cem ent o f hum an society, b o th th e vines and the manacles, said an ancient, w ith w hich one can b ind and captivate another; above all at the Court, w here interest is the only b o n d .” W ith the spareness o f w ords necessary for a practical guide, Refuge distilled the im portance o f benefits in hum an society in one sentence: th e m utual exchange o f bienfaits binds m en o f goodwill to each other in civil society. W ith these carefully chosen w ords, he called his reader’s attention to m utual benefits and reciprocal obligations w ith tw o com m on analogies —

1 A lso see section “Eustache de Refuge.” Eustache de Refuge, Traicte de la covr, ov, Instruction des covrtisans (Paris: Abraham Saugrain, 1617; reprint, galhca.bnf.fr), 11. 2

Lucius Annaeus Seneca, ed., On Favours, Moral and Political Essays (N ew York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 200.

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benefits and reciprocal obligations w ith tw o com m on analogies —bonds {Her), chains (manottes) and vine stock {ceps), captivate {captiver) —that carried the nuance and gesture o f symbolic language. Refuge drew a sharp contrast betw een these obligations in his talk o f benefits; the golden b o n d o f friendship as the stock o f the vine and the ro o t o f all good things and the iron chain o f servitude as the bondage o f captivation. This golden b o n d o f friendship prom ised the harm ony and order o f civil society. O nly beasts lived outside the b o n d o f friendship as A ristotle argued. This im portant axiom was realized as an em blem (Figure 1).

Figure 1. “Am itie Durante, V oire A pres M ort” from Barthelemy A neau, Emblemes d'Aloiat (1549).

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“E stre uniz et conjoincte par amitie inseperable, s’entre-aim er indissolublem ent,”

Robert Estienne, Dictionarium latinogallicum, ARTFL ed. (1552). T he golden bond, or the virtuous bond o f friendship, was marked by affection, utility and respect. T he bondage o f iron was formed only by utility and interest. Stefano G uazzo, I m Civile Conversation, trans. Gabriel Chappuys (Lyon: Jean Beraud, 1580; reprint, gallica.bnf.fr), 418. “Qui premier, diet quelqu' un a invente les bienfaicts, a forge des ceps et m enottes pour lier et captiver autruy. D o n t plusieurs ont refuse de prendre, pour ne blesser leur liberte, specialement de ceux qu' ils ne vouloient aymer ny recognoistre, com m e porte le conseil des sages, ne prendre du meschant, pour ne luy estre tenu,” Pierre Charron, De la sagesse, ed. Amaury D uval (Paris: Rafilly, 1827; reprint, gallica.bnf.fr), 496499.

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In the picture Barthelem y A neau illustrated the “law o f m utual office” as the b o n d that benefits the b o th the ancient elm and the young vines. T h e em blem was a sym bol o f the civil friendship b o m o f “spirit n o t body” that endured in civil society beyond the death o f one individual.4 T he m utual exchange o f benefits and services enlivened the spirit the civil and civic com m unity. E ven after death this law o f m utual benefits w ould n o t be forgotten —obligations and benefits endured from one generation to the next. I f we read the w ords “obligation” and “b o n d ” w ith a m o d em sensibility, we m ight oppose them to liberty. B ut they believed that if m otivated by goodwill, the obligations and bon d s that followed m utual benefits provided the liberty that each citizen enjoyed. Refuge recognized, absent goodwill and the law o f m utuality, m en served only their ow n interests; he argued the court was ruled by desire and fear, w hich he understood as a loss o f liberty o r quite simple servitude as represented by the m anacle as an iron bond.5 Eustache de Refuge reckoned all o f these obligations b o th good and bad in his succinct statem ent. In his m anual, he lam ented that the royal court was n o t a place ion gens de bien o r those w ho valued their liberty o f speech and action. A t th e sam e tim e, he understood, as we m ight, th at m utual benefits and reciprocal obligations w ere the cem ent o f civil

4 “Une Olm e seiche, & sans fueille, embrassa le belle vigne, & sa verdeur dressa. Recognoissant naturel benefice, rendit le droict de mutuel office, D onnant exem ple, amys tel£ comparer, Que mort aussi nepuisse separer.” Gloss: “La vraye amitie est de l’esperit, non du corps, l’esperit est immortel: parquoy elle est immortelle, faisant faire debvoir d ’amy, non seullement en la vie: mais aussi apres la mort.” Barthelemy Aneau, Emblemes d'A.loiat de nouveau Translate£ en Francois verspour versjouxte les Eatins, gallica ed. (Lyon: Roville, 1549), 194. 5 Liberty (libere): “Sans subjection aucune, Sans crainte,” Estienne, Dictionarium latinogallicum.

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society. F ro m this perspective, the n o tion that benefits do n o t entail obligations is at best a m o d ern conceit. L o n g before Eustache de Refuge w rote his guide, there were calls for the reform o f the rules surrounding bienfaits. Certainly, m any decried the excess o f pensions and heavy taxes, how ever, th e focus o f reform centered on the m o d em “corruption” o f venality. If we look through a contem porary lens, we m ight conclude along w ith an earlier generation o f historians that venality flourished am ong self-serving bureaucrats in a system o f patronage in an era plagued by w idespread corruption.6 O th e r historians challenged the assum ptions that supported this line o f argum ent and asked different questions. A s a result, they observed dedicated jurists upholding law and a system o f justice that flourished am idst the venal system o f office holding. T h e earlier logic th at assum ed that venality sm acked o f the corruption o f patronage was discarded on the trash heap o f anachronism standing as a m oral tale for those w ho ask questions about the past. B ut yet, in the early seventeenth-century reasonable people disagreed about the issue o f venality, so we m ust ask why. In their debate, w e find the com m on ground as distilled in the statem ent o f E ustache de Refuge. T he opposing sides agreed that the m utual exchange o f benefits am ong m en o f goodwill was a pow erful b o n d in the order o f politics if n o t the very source o f pow er, authority and honor. In an era o f startling change, the collective recognition o f the strength o f this b o n d could only lead to a pitched battle for the title o f

6 K. W. Swart, Sale of Offices in the Seventeenth Century (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1949). 4

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“m aitre et bienfaicteur.” Thus, th e debate over venality was at its heart a struggle waged for control o f the distribution o f benefits as the source o f pow er o r w hat they referred to as credit. F or us, their debate dem onstrates the p rofound im portance o f reciprocity and mutuality in civil society. W ith this work, I suggest that examining the beliefs and values surrounding the m utual exchange o f benefits is tim e well spent. I argue that the social and political order was built o n the m utual exchange o f benefits that provided liberties and m andated obligations. In this effort, I explore the early m o d em understanding o f m utual exchange as represented in the em blem and w ith the old proverb, Un bienfait n’estjamais perdu. B ut this discussion about benefits quickly leads to the discom fort o f ambiguity. In ou r age o f scientific truth, m o st often, w e are far m ore at ease w ith typology and resist the exclusivity o f the double-entendre. B ut this was n o t always so —early m o d em people delighted in paradox as w itnessed by the astounding popularity o f collections o f epigrams.

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See Refuge for the praise and obligation due to the “bien-faicteur,” Ibid., 15-17. The tide given to Louis XI by Commynes in his preface. Philippe de Commynes, Memoires, ed. Joel Blanchard and Michel Quereuil (Paris: Librairie generate franfaise, 2001). Russell quotes a seventeenth-century artists’ explanation, “D ecouvrir des analogies cachees entre des objets apparamment sans rapport entre eux,” D aniel Russell, Emblematic Structures in Renaissance French Culture (Toronto: University o f Toronto, 1995). Indeed, Jean Pussot, a carpenter by trade, includes an anagram in his journal, Jean Pussot, Joumalier ou Memoires de Jean Pussot, Maitre charpentier en la Couture de Reims, ed. E. Henry and C. Loriquet, gallica.bnf.fr ed., I d Academic Impe'riale de Reims (Reims: P. Regnier, 1857). 5

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T h e em blem books contained keys to help unravel the m ystery contained in the paradoxical. A s a p o in t o f beginning, the editors glossed the epigrams to rem ind their readers o f the m eaning o f w ords, for example, the w ord “m utuel” (mutuus). W e easily recognize the w ord “m utual” w hich has retained m uch o f its m eaning if n o t its im portance in m o d em society. B ut the w ord office (munus) n o longer carries its earlier sense o f b o th service and reward. A dding to the perplexity for the m o d em reader, there were m any o th er auto-antonym s such as grace and hote defined as b o th giving/receiving. Som e w ords like bienfait lack any real specificity; in the case o f bienfait the m eaning truly floats. N ico t defined bienfait simply as the happiness th at is given to another.9 As he well knew, a bienfait b ro u g h t pleasure so clearly th e bounds w ere indescribable. O ne first w ould ask, w hat w ould bring this particular person happiness and th en give som ething to delight the other —services, offices, a cask o f good wine or the favor o f an introduction to a person o f im portance. M any o f us struggle w ith th e translation o f this w ord, I have settled o n the w ord “benefit” because its ambiguity captures the understanding that a benefit was relative to those involved —even the m eaning o f its obligation. Looking back, we also find other perplexities such as the hom ographs honneur and layer th at have lost m uch o f their multiplicity o f m eaning —honneur was u n d ersto o d as b o th the intangible and tangible rew ards for virtuous behavior; loyer derived from the Latin w ords pretium

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Bienfait: “Est faire et rendre heure ou heureux aucun.”

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(reward) and meritum (merit).10 It should com e as n o surprise that in the political order, interests public and particular w ere m utual and reciprocal. T hrough the m o d em lens, the w ords publique and particulier standing alone represent an alm ost incom prehensible dichotom y b u t at the same time, one m u st understand this paradox to analyze m utual exchange in early m o d em France.11 Early m o d em French theorists held the two spheres to be so close that a clear difference was alm ost unintelligible. T o serve the bienpublique benefited the individual; to strengthen the particulier fortified the bienpublique.

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examples o f their understanding, we can tu rn to H enri E stienne w ho defined res as “L 'estat et condition d'un chascun: Res publica.”

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Tellingly, E stienne avoided a verb

relying o n the colon alm ost as an equation o f equivalence. Follow ing this reasoning, Jean N ico t w rote th at “L e salut de la cite est conjoint au salut de m oy seul.” T h e prosperity and health (salut) o f each citoyen was united w ith th at the “respublica.” 14 N icot reverted to the older w ord salut (health), again yet another w ord that begs attention since it defies a simple one-w ord translation unless w e understand that health is the m aterial good,

10 For definitions, please refer to the Glossary. 11 The word particulier bedevils m odern com m entators (and translators), w ho invariably wish to use the term “private” as a synonym for “particulier.” Private implies outside civil life, as w e see with the definition o f N icot. Private (prive): signifie familier, et com m e domestique. Jean N icot, Thresor de la languefranfoyse, tant ancienne que modeme, ARTFL ed. (Paris: David Douceur, 1606). 12

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"Par reciproque benevolence," B N Mss. Ft. 15494, fol. 62 v. Estienne, Dictionarium latinogallicum.

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“Ciuitatis salus cum vnius mei salute coniuncta est.” Conversely, the expenses o f the respublica were both “Le com m un et les particuliers” as in “Publice et priuatim oneri esse,” in N icot, Thresor de la languefranfoyse. 7

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spiritual peace and happiness o f the body politic. In this sense, once again we see the close proxim ity betw een the particulier and the publique that is at odds w ith a m odern sensibility. In an effort to m aintain the distinction o f these w ords w ith m odern usage, I m aintain the French spelling in this discussion. In the case o f publique, I use the older spelling to avoid any confusion w ith the w ord “public.” W ith these examples, we see why early m o d em F rench political theorists, as a consequence o f their understanding o f these m eanings, rejected the separation o f the econom ic and the political as nonsensical. F or them , the paradox o f civil society rested o n the m utual exchange o f benefits and reciprocal obligations that served interests b o th publique and particulier. T he harm ony and unity o f the body politic was the equity o f interests that b rought happiness, peace, liberty and prosperity to citizens. In this w orld, the paradigm o f self-interest as a residue o f m o d em capitalist econom ic theory is an anachronism . T h a t language evolves is a certainty, th at rhetoric has the pow er to bew itch the listener w ith the pow er o f magic is an abandoned logic b u t yet as readers, w e m u st avoid o ur bew itchm ents.15 T hus, the search to understand their beliefs about th e m utuality o f benefits dem ands that we stand guard testing ou r suppositions and assum ptions.16 T he

15 William A. Covino, Magic, rhetoric, and literary: an eccentric history of the composing imagination (Albany: State University o f N ew York Press, 1994); Lucien Febvre, "Civilization: evolution o f a word and a group o f ideas," in A new kind of history: and other essays, ed. Peter Burke (N ew York: Harper & Row, 1973). 16 The C om aroffs warn, “Contrary to som e scholarly opnion, it is not so easy to alienate ourselves from our ow n meanigful context.” In this vein, the early modern dictionaries are a good place to start. On the importance o f self-reflexivity see for example, Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J.

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use o f theory is a vital p art o f the journey o f questioning, understanding and describing other worlds. As w ith any good m ap, theoretical w ork describes paths to take and pitfalls to avoid. A com parative view enriches our perspective. In the theory o f m utual exchange, M arcel M auss blazed m uch o f the trail th at we now tread. His elegant work, The Gift, fram ed m any o f the questions th at we ask. H ow ever great our debt to the underlying structures th at anthropology describes, as historians we are concerned w ith historical tim e w hich brings a rhythm o f change; as hum ans, we sense that individuals act if n o t independently then at least w ithout suffocating restraint. W e intuitively understand that the m ore things change the m ore they stay the same. B ut h ow do we explain this? Pierre Bourdieu helps us bridge the gap betw een the fixed m om ent and the unfolding o f historical time. In his theory o f practice, for example, he suggests th at individuals act within a habitus m arked by social and individual constraints, and at the sam e time, individuals act upon the habitus creating individual histories w rapped and folded within a collective history that acts as a repository o f beliefs and values, rules and expectations that guide practice for future generations A s a parlementaire expressed this, un veritable regisitoire ou le tableau des moeurs de chaque generation est trace.

17

D . Wacquant, A n Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1992); John & Jean Comaroff, Ethnography and the Historical Imagination (Boulder: W estview Press, 1992), 7; Greg Dening, History's anthropology: the death of William Gooch (Lanham, MD: University Press o f America, 1988); Greg D ening, Performances (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1996); Lucien Paul Victor Febvre, A New Kind of History: from the writings ofFebvre, trans. Peter Burke (N ew York: Harper & Row, 1973). 17 '

Edouard Maugis, Histoire du Parlement de Paris (Paris: Burt Franklin, 1914), Vol. 1: 273. 9

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I also suggest th at his theory o f social capital is consonant w ith the early m odem n otion o f credit —the m elange o f honneur, pow er and reputation that was central to the ability o f an individual to act w ith a m easure o f authority in society. T he credit that an individual possessed was relative to a netw ork o f friends b o u n d by com m on interests in a field o f practice. I f we look to his concept o f fields o f practice, we understand that the pow er o f an absolutist royal court could only be a pretension —a conclusion that is docum ented by recent research. Certainly, these are b ro ad issues w ith a vast historical literature m arked by an interesting debate. In order to adequately address the dilemmas posed by the notions o f credit and m utual exchange, it is im perative to discuss b o th the theoretical fram ew ork offered by M auss and B ourdieu and som e o f the implications w ithin the historical debate. T herefore, the first chapter is devoted to an exam ination o f the relevant sociological, anthropological and historical work. T h e discussion then turns to proverbs, serm ons and w ritten m anuals as representative o f th e ways in w hich early m o d e m people instilled beliefs and values regarding the m utual exchange o f benefits. Fortunately for historians, at this very tim e hum anist scholars w ere in the m idst o f standardizing language. They searched through w ritten histories and texts to discover etymologies as a com parison for current usage before publishing their work. H enri E stienne to o k to the streets carefully recording the way in w hich the “rustics” repeated proverbs, recording their p attern o f speech (parole) in an effort to stabilize referents and language. W e can gage th e success o f their w ork in

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the m em oir left by Jean Pussot, a m aster carpenter in Reims, w ho recorded som e o f the new standards for pronunciation in his journal. B ut m ore than this, H enri E stienne also corrected the errors o f the pagans in view o f Christian beliefs. H e turned to old proverbs such as “U n bienfait n ’est jamais perdu.” T he proverb prom ised that the good deed was n o t lost. B ut E stienne argued that the good deed was never lost because a just and benevolent G o d did n o t forget. T h e old proverb was energized w ith a prom ise, sooner or later, in this life o r the next. Yet, while the source o f ancient truth was corrected, the m oral tru th survived intact. T he good deed given in the spirit o f goodwill and m utual helpfulness was necessarily a b o o n for the giver. This m oral injunction served as the fram ew ork for the logic o f practice as taught w ith the earliest lessons in childhood. B ut in life, the ungrateful forgot. T he m oral person was necessarily just; cast in this light, the ingrate and the avaricious w ere unjust. In this m oral econom y, law m aintained justice th at rendered each his due. T he harm ony o f the society o f orders was the sweet voice o f the equity o f justice th at balanced the natural inequality o f the m em bers o f the body politic. All agreed that the source o f justice was divine and all agreed that justice was central to reform . T w o preachers w ith very different tem peram ents addressed the assembly o f the Estates G eneral ab o u t these m atters w ith rem arkably different views about the obligations o f justice. Jean-Pierre Cam us argued th at justice rem ained absolute w ith the authority o f the m onarch; royal justice was rendered w ithout m erit. Jacques Davy du P erro n argued that justice was a divine grace given to the m onarch w ith obligations;

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justice was rendered because it was m erited. O nly the view o f B ishop Cam us coincided w ith the new logic o f state. As historians have long understood, the structure o f society in the early m odem w orld was built as a hierarchy. A procession o f theorists from Christine de Pizan argued that the m ost natural order o f the political hierarchy m irrored the order o f the family. T he obligation to family and friends was a b o n d o f m utual assistance and affection th at was extended even further by marriage alliances in a deliberate strategy to pro tect the present and future generations. Necessarily, m utual affection and obligation included aiding family and friends in their efforts to attain charges and offices. T hese obligations were ordered relative to the patriarchal m odel; the individual first aided family, friends and neighbors.

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Inevitably, m en and w om en faced conflicts in the everyday o f life. T he

resolution o f conflict was indeed a calculus o f interests based o n obligations to family, friends and com m unity as reckoned by individual conscience w eighed in the balance o f th e bien publique and bien particulier.:19 T h e durability o f relationships term ed friendships, including the maitre I serviteur relationship, was subject to time, place and opportunity w hen in conflict w ith the hierarchy o f duty and obligation. Certainly, these com m on realities led

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As D u Vair wrote in the Traite de la Constance, “II a premierement a consoler ses parens, ses amis, ses voisins, et, selon que les degrez d’affection le conjoignent de plus pres a chacun d ’eux.” See discussion above, p. 304. 19

Community defined particular to on e’s civil role. For example, N o e l Sillery’s role as ambassador framed the boundaries o f the bien publique differently than Jean Pussot, a master carpenter in Reims. Conceptually, the bien publique was central to both while at the same time it was bounded differendy. Put in the language o f seventeenth century France, the habitude o f N o el Sillery was very different than that o f Jean Pussot. See discussion, pp. 410-417.

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to difficult choices and disappointm ents in the balance betw een com peting loyalties.

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This line o f argum ent implicidy suggests, given the constraint o f the patriarchal m odel and its attendant sense o f duty, that they were n o t solely self-interested, even w hen switching maitres or serviteurs. In practice, individuals responded to the strains and tensions o f the everyday w ith the ambivalence com m on to life. A ristotle b roached this reality concluding th at these choices w ere left to the best judgm ent o f the m orally upright individual. His conclusion did n o t contain m oral ambiguity; the very perplexity o f life dem anded a firm base in ethics.

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T hen as now , the everyday o f life resisted hard and fast

rules, so we m ust tu rn to the context o f cultural beliefs and values, as Q uentin Skinner proposed, to understand the choices o f others.

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W e quickly understand th at fidelity and

loyalty were subject to a hierarchy o f obligations defined by each individual. They term ed this a science, as I will discuss. F o r the reader, the ambiguity o f the descriptive w ords for relationships is quite o ften m addening. T he w ords “friend” and “serviteur” w ere used to describe a variety o f relationships according to standard usage. W hen M arechal D ’E strees w rote that M. de Longueville arrived in Paris w ith “grand n om bre de ses amis” it was understood th at ses

20

For “giving faith” and nuance o f the word “prom ise,” Pierre Charron, De la sagesse, 496-499.

21

For example, Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics," in Basic Works, ed. Richard M cK eon (New York: Random H ouse, 1941), B ook 9; Cicero, Des Offices (Paris: A La Haye, 1692), Book 3. 22

Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, vol. 1: Regarding M ethod (N ew York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 30-33.

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amis included family, serviteurs and friends.

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Som etim es, there was an attem pt at clarity. As

w hen Bassom pierre testified that he was a serviteuroi the particuliers b u t n o t the “ cabale en gross.”24 As we find them struggling to convey their m eaning, we understand that the A ristotelian categories o f friendship th at structured the language did n o t always reflect the realities o f life m uch less the nuance. They captured these distinctions w ith gestures and daily rituals certainly. In the late sixteenth century, scholars studied language, m ade corrections, developed refin em ents in speech and form al courtesies all o f w hich were favored by elites. Still the ancient categories fram ed the descriptions o f friendships. T he language o f courtesy was a representation o f the ideal o f social b onds th at united individuals as one com m unity reflecting a long history b o u n d w ith a tangle o f rules. Individuals appropriated language and rituals as a science o f m orals b o th to act in the existing social order and to change the order o f things. By the early seventeenth century, w riters and reform ers sorted this o u t in guides to practice, the art o f politics and m oral manuals. In looking at the discourse o f political theory, we find order described as a political-econom y. Early m odern theorists like Jean B odin and A ntoine de M ontchrestien, following the lead o f Nicolas O resm e, p o in t to th e error o f A ristode in dividing the

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Francois Annibal d' Estrees, Memoires du marechal d'Estrees sur la regence de Marie de Medicis, ed. P aulB onnefon (Paris: Renouard, 1910), 111.

24 Francois de Bassompierre, Journal de ma Vie: memoires du marechal de Bassompierre, ed. M. de Chanterac (Paris: Renouard, 1870), 321. 14

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econom ic and political. Early m o d em theorists did n o t divorce the econom ic from the political because it was simply illogical. T h e existing social order testified to A ristotle’s m istake; the body politic and the family w ere m irror images o f each other. Their argum ent was simple; the econom ic is the political, a m ode o f understanding described better as a political-econom y by w hich political organization is fundam entally tied to the econom ic structure o f the household. F ro m the vantage p o in t o f early m o d em people, social organization rested o n the econom y o f the circulation o f all things useful described as bien o r utilite. These w ords, as w ith their theory o f political-econom y, bring to m ind m ore than the m aterial necessities o f life. D efined within a discourse infused w ith Aristotelianism , bien o r utilite captured the m aterial and im m aterial necessities o f the good life including happiness, peace, harm ony and a good nam e. E veryone believed these goals to be essential for the well being o f the household and o f the body politic.

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In turn, this

political-econom y was dictated by custom that guaranteed the liberty o f each citojen protected by g ood governm ent.

26

W e see evidence o f change in the language o f Franqois de Sales. H e freely borrow ed the language o f courtesy b u t w ith a different logic. In turn, a new er generation

25

Pierre Bourdieu, "The Forms o f Social Capital," in Handbook of Theory and Researchfor the Sociology of Education, ed. John G. Richardson (N ew York: G reenw ood Press, 1986), 242.

James B. Collins, "French Republicanism," Aristocracies and Urban Elites in Early Modem Trance: A Tribute to Ellery Schalk 27, no. 2 (2001): 227. “Les Francois ont eu plus agreable le nom de Coustume que de Loy; car l’un tesm oigne la liberte & une volontaire subjection,” Jean Tournet, Coutumes de prevote et vicomte de Paris (Paris: 1608). 15

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o f writers and artists testifies to this change as witnessed in language. F o r example, Nicolas Faret advocated that the Honneste homme could profiter a soy mesme\ Jacques Blanchard painted The Three Graces w ith their backs turned; A rm and-Jean du Plessis de Richelieu argued a new political logic centered on “reason o f state.”

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T here were an

astounding n um ber o f new religious organizations. These changes signify a radical transform ation. T he old m odel o f civil society in w hich m en o f goodwill looked to each other was challenged w ith the m o d em assertion that privileged the K ing as the “m aitre and bienfaicteur.” T h e new m odel o f political order centered the king and destabilized the bienpublique w ith an im personal n o tio n o f state, a w ord that could never reflect the affective b o n d o f friendship n o r its utility. Lastly, to test this conceptual fram ework, I exam ine th e logic o f practice in the life o f N oel B rulart de Sillery. C onsistent w ith the value o f patriarchy in m oral and political philosophy, N o e l lived in relationship to his family and friends —the maison Sillery. T he m arriage alliances o f this family form ed an intricate w eb o f m utual affection and obligation. I often im agined N oel, the unm arried commandeur as a “D addy W arbucks” w ho helped his family over the course o f his lifetime. M uch o f his financial assistance to others was m ade possible by his investm ent in rentes. H e also, o f course, enjoyed pensions as a result o f his office and incom e from the commanderie in Troyes. Certainly, this was a

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Nicolas Faret, Uhonneste homme; ou U a rt deplaire d la court, ed. M. Magendie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1925), Maurice Magendie's introduction, XLVI. 16

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com m on strategy am ong early m o d em families leading to significant fortunes as a benefit o f service.

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In turning to the life o f individuals, it is clear th at life never stands still. In his early career, N o e l operated within a particular m atrix o f practice —the theater o f court politics. H e h ad a n u m b er o f possible courses o f action dictated in part by his habitude and moeurs as a m an o f court and in the broader context, as a m an o f state. H ow ever, his choices were also self-limited by a constellation o f dynamics including his particular m oral beliefs, expectations and obligations that in turn were tem pered and prodded at any given tim e by political exigencies and family m atters. N o el B rulart de Sillery m aintained his h o n o r and credit after his political disgrace in a field o f practice that we m ight call the new devotion. H e drew from his habitude as a virtuous noble dem onstrating generosity, affection and loyalty. This new field o f practice, as a case in point, dem onstrates that the beliefs and values surrounding m utual exchange w ere n o t b o und, indeed could n o t be b o und, in specific realm s called politics, religion o r econom ics. Little w onder that their religious and theological convictions were politicized further by reform ers w ho focused on divine grace as a gift to hum ankind.

28

Joseph Bergin, The Making of the French Episcopate, 1589-1661 (N ew Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); James B. Collins, Classes, Estates, and Order in Early Modern Brittany (N ew York: Cambridge, 1994), 83.

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Part O n e

T h e P a r a d o x of B e n e f i t s

Q u a n d on t a c h e de v e n i r en c r e d i t , e t d ' a v o i r l a b o n n e g r a c e de c h a s c u n .

Jean N icot

In Les reveries dupromeneur solitaire, Jean-Jacques R ousseau (1712-1778) described the joy o f those to w hom he gave as the only rew ard he needed writing that, “A bienfait freely given is certainly a w ork I like to do.” 1 R ousseau understood that a bienfait implied reciprocity, although he lacked a w ord th at described giving w ithout an expectation or obligation to reciprocate. This task was left to Charles Irenee Castel de Saint-Pierre (1658-1743) w ho coined the term bienfaisance that described an act that ameliorates hum an suffering without an obligation for reciprocity.2 T heir distinction o f disinterestedness as an ideal becam e the hallm ark o f bienfaisance set apart from th e selfinterest o f a bienfait. A s articulated by E nlightenm ent philosophers, this dichotom y inform ed the logic o f subsequent political and econom ic theory as a paradigm o f self-

1 “U n bienfait purement gratuit est certainement une oeuvre que j’aime faire.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Les reveries du promeneur solitaire (Paris: Gallimard, 1972), 9th promenade, 151-160. For Rousseau’s argument for the proper role o f giving and charity in society, see Jean Starobinski, "Don fastueux et don pervers: Commentaire Historique D'une Reverie de Rousseau," Annales E.S.C., no. 41 (1986): 7-27. Judith Still argues that charity reflected difference based on class and had a negative connotation for Rousseau. Judith Still, Justice and Difference in the Works of Rousseau: Bienfaisance and Pudeur (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 16-36. “J’ai cherche un terme qui nous rappelat precisem ent Fidee de faire du bien aux autres, et je n ’en ai pas trouve de plus propre pour m e faire entendre que le terme de bienfaisance,” Oscar Bloch, Dictionnaire Etymologique (Paris: Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1932).

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3

interest. Capitalist econom ic theory tied to equations o f profit and loss only furthered the rigidity o f the binary paradigm since gifts resist a tidy arithm etic.4 T h e paradigm o f self-interest dichotom izes in such a way that ambiguities are lost to rigid boundaries. For historians, one o f the consequences o f this paradigm is the im position o f an anachronistic set o f values relative to the political-econom y o f the early m odern world. T hese tensions have n o t b een lost o n researchers w ho now contest the validity o f the self-interest paradigm , particularly as a m odel for theories o f social capital. Social scientists, above all anthropologists, have led the contem porary analysis o f gifts and m utual exchange in hum an societies. This research is, in part, a testam ent to the w ork o f M arcel M auss, w ho posed challenging questions ab o u t the significance o f the obligations and benefits o f m utual exchange. Yet, since historical study is concerned with the dynamics o f tim e, a useful m ethodology m ust help us clarify the m echanism s o f change. T he theory o f social capital relative to fields o f practice as outlined by Pierre B ourdieu provides such a conceptual fram ework. Im portantly, this perspective n o t only allows an escape from the self-interest paradigm b u t also adm its individuals w ho act w ith a logic o f practice inform ed by the beliefs and values o f their culture.

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For an examination o f Adam Smith and Rousseau on this point see Force. From a more modern perspective, a critique o f the paradigm o f self-interest is in M onroe. Pierre Force, Selfinterest bfore A dam Smith: a Genealogy of Economic Science, Ideas in context; 68. (Cambridge; N ew York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Kristen R. M onroe, The Heart of Altruism: Perceptions of a Common Humanity, 1st pbk. ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998). 4 Carlo M. Cipolla, Before the Industrial Revolution: European Society and Economy, 1000-1700, 3rd ed. (New York: N orton, 1993).

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Pierre Bourdieu, first educated in philosophy and then as a social researcher w ho carried out his w ork in Algeria, developed a “theory o f practice” to bridge the gap betw een the inherent determ inism o f structuralism and o ther objectivist approaches and the n otion o f absolute freedom o f individual action in subjectivist theories.5 O ne hazard o f the structuralist approach, according to Bourdieu, is the collapse o f tim e by an observer, by w hich discrete events lose the uncertainty experienced by individuals. In the schem a o f Bourdieu, hum an agency is param ount in the everyday practice o f giving, receiving and returning.6 In this example, the logic o f the gift is dependent on the strategy o f an individual in a particular situation w ithin a “field o f practice.” There is no certainty that a gift will b e returned —it falls to the individual w ho receives a gift to accept o r reject the obligations represented by the gift. H ow ever, the honorable person will dem onstrate gratefulness for a gift in conform ity w ith convention as a m atter o f

5 For critique o f Bourdieu: T om Schuller, Stephen Baron, and John Field, "Social Capital: A Review and Critique," in Social Capital: Critical Perspectives, ed. T om Schuller, Stephen Baron, and John Field (N ew York: O xford University Press, 2000); Richard Schusterman, ed., Bourdieu: A Critical Reader (N ew York: Blackwell Publishers, 1999); Martti Siisiainen, "Two Concepts o f Social Capital" (paper presented at the ISTR Fourth International Conference, Trinity College Dublin, Ireland, 2000); Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J. D . Wacquant, A n Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: University o f Chicago, 1992). 6 Gift exchange is not guided by “mechanical interlockings o f obligatory practices since individuals” are not merely “epiphenom enon o f structure,” Pierre Bourdieu, The Togic of Practice, trans. Richard N ice (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1990), 98. A s he explains, “cycles o f reciprocity” exist only for the objective observer who “retrospectively projects the counter-gift into the project o f the g i f t . . . In reality the gift may remain unreciprocated, w hen one obliges an ungrateful person; it may be rejected as an insult, inasmuch as it asserts or demands the possibility o f reciprocity, and therefore o f recognition.” Ibid., 98.

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courtesy o r a m atter o f practice. K risten N euschel makes precisely this point about sixteenth century French nobles arguing that, “All professions o f loyalty and friendship, all solicitations and grants o f largess w ere encom passed by this habit o f exchange revealed in their letters —a habit structured by the dem ands o f ho n o r.”9 Such habits are nu rtu red from an early age conform ing to the particular standards o f a cultural milieu. As observers we recognize patterns o f behavior, how ever, individuals understand their action as logical o r com m onsensical relative to a given situation. In turn, this individual logic is reinforced w hen understood by others in the social group.10 T he logic o f practice is inherendy experiential and useful —and singular to an individual. I t is strategization —procedures tofollow, paths to take —inform ed by experience and structured by dispositions relative to a particular field o f practice and tim e.11 Faced w ith a choice, in order to achieve a certain goal, the individual proceeds w ith a logic based on her history o f practice fram ed by her particular dispositions w ithin a habitus. T he habitus, as a cultural space o r a relationship, form s a system o f social constraints or structures that inform action understood as appropriate in given situations. Early

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Indeed, as Bourdieu explains, “The m otor o f the w hole dialectic o f gift and counter-gift is . . . the sense o f honor, a disposition inculcated by all early education and constantly demanded and reinforced by the group,” Bourdieu, The Togic ofPractice, 105. Kristen B. N euschel, Word of Honor Interpreting Noble Culture in Sixteenth-Century Prance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 76-77. 10 Siisiainen, "Two Concepts o f Social Capital". 11 D ispositions are the unconscious and conscious structures o f practice that are “constructed not passively recorded” by the individual and the collective. Bourdieu, The Hogic of Practice, 54. D ispositions are n ot rules or norms: Bourdieu adamantly rejects both words since they imply a rigidity that is not found among individuals and their relationships with others. Bourdieu, The

Togic of Practice, 52. 21

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m o d em French people used the term habitude —a constellation o f social dynamics that included moeurs garnered through conversation, birth, and learning —to delineate a similar concept.

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In their guides for the perplexed, m oral philosophers outlined the habitude and

m anners necessary for life at court. A n am bitious roturier m ight read these m anuals and learn m anners and courtesies, b u t w ithout the habitude o f a noble the roturier could only ape m anners. W e can view B ourdieu’s definition o f habitus in m uch this same way. T he habitus results from the socialization o f collective beliefs, perceptions and custom s that are nonetheless distinct relative to individual lived experience and practice; the habitus is n o t m erely the result o f form al or inform al learning n o r is it conditioning. T he habitus is, in this sense, the relationship betw een the individual and th e collectivity, operating as a dialectic by w hich dispositions are em bodied b o th in the individual and in the collective. T he habitus is a m ediating position (and a m ediated position) betw een the individual and the surrounding w orld; therefore the habitus is constantly produced and reproduced in the practice(s) o f everyday life. As a m ediating position, we see collective beliefs, perceptions, and custom s u n d ersto o d by individuals. W e also see individuals w ho strategize and practice in the everyday; they m ediate the habitus in a way unique and particular. T he habitus is n o t an iro n cage produced by conditioning; it is n o t static b u t

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See secdon “Habitude” and Glossary.

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rather dynamic over time. W hat we see, as observers, are actions th at produce m ore history, both particular and collective.

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All those w ho have a stake in society contribute to the reproduction o f the social order w ith the caveat th at those w ho possess large am ounts o f social capital dom inate production. Still, individuals constantly produce and reproduce habitrn through form al and inform al m odes. T he spoken proverb, the hom ily and the rules o f courtesy, for example, served to reinforce a given set o f dispositions and practice in early m odem F rench society. Processions, speeches and pam phlets read aloud o n the street com er or the friendly debate in a tavern served a similar purpose. T he spoken w ord carries collective beliefs and values as th e w isdom o f generations pregnant “one m ight say, w ith all the history through w hich they have passed.” 14 This history does n o t stand still. Family stories, tall tales and proverbs im part the w isdom o f lived experience to the next generation. T he French proverb, Un bienfait n’estjamais perdu: Une bonne action a son recompense tot ou tard, served to inculcate a set o f social dispositions or custom s: in this case, that a gift, a benefit o r a kindness will n o t be lost o r forgotten —it will be retu rn ed .15 T he assertion is unequivocal; the proverb does n o t state that a bienfait should b e returned but

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“The habitus, a product o f history, produces individual and collective practices —more history —in accordance with the schem es generated by history. It ensures the active presence o f past experiences, which, deposited in each organism in the form o f schem es o f perception, thought and action, tend to guarantee the ‘correctness’ o f practices and their constancy over time, more reliably than all formal rules and explicit norm s,” Bourdieu, The Togic of Practice. 14 Febvre, "Civilization: evolution o f a word and a group o f ideas," 217. 15 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. Richard N ice (N ew York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 17.

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th at ipsofacto, it will be rewarded, “sooner or later.” It was accepted as a dictum, as com m on sense, as logical and as a natural law. T h e m isers and avaricious w ho did n o t retu rn favors and kindnesses were transgressors o f this m oral law. They were vilified by their neighbors, punished by form al law, and shunned by early m o d em writers, like H enri E stienne. H e disputed the origin o f the proverb, b u t n o t its tru th rather he im puted the extra-m oral tone o f Biblical injunction.16 T h e old proverb m irrored the spiritual law o f scripture as in the gospel o f Luke 6:38, Donne%,