A Fishery for Modern Times: The State and the Industrialization of the Newfoundland Fishery, 1934-1968 9781442623644

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgements
1. Introduction
PART I. Industrialization in Depression and Wartime: The 1930s and 1940s
PART II. Planning for a New Fishery: the 1950s
PART III. Competition for the Resource and the Consolidation of Industrialization: the 1960s
Notes
Index

Citation preview

A Fishery for Modern Times

The State and the Industrialization of the Newfoundland Fishery, 1934-1968

In the early 1990s, the northern cod populations off the coast of Newfoundland had become so depleted that the federal government placed a moratorium on commercial fishing. The impact was devastating, both for Newfoundland's economy and for local fishing communities. Today, although this natural resource—exploited commercially for over 500 years—appears to be returning in diminished numbers, many fisheries scientists and fishers question whether the cod will ever return to its former abundance. In A Fishery for Modern Times, Miriam Wright argues that the recent troubles in the fishery can be more fully understood by examining the rise of the industrial fishery in the mid-twentieth century. The introduction of new harvesting technologies and the emergence of 'quick freezing', in the late 1930s, eventually supplanted household production by Newfoundland's fishing families. While the new technologies increased the amount of fish caught in the northwest Atlantic, Wright argues that the state played a critical role in fostering and financing the industrial frozen fish sector. Many bureaucrats and politicians, including Newfoundland's premier, Joseph Smallwood, believed that making the Newfoundland fishery 'modern', with centralization, technology, and expertise, would transform rural society, solving deep-seated economic and social problems. A Fishery for Modern Times examines the ways in which the state, ideologies of development, and political, economic, and social factors, along with political actors and fishing company owners, contributed to the expansion of the industrial fishery from the 1930s through the 1960s. While the promised prosperity never fully materialized, the continuing reliance on approaches favouring high-tech, big capital solutions put increasing pressure on cod populations in the years that followed. As Wright concludes, 'We can no longer afford to view the fisheries resources as "property" of the state and industry, to do with it as they choose. That path had led only to devastation of the resource, economic instability, and great social upheaval.' (The Canadian Social History Series) MIRIAM WRIGHT has published several journal articles and papers in other books. She is currently a SSHRC post-doctoral fellow at the University of British Columbia.

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A Fishery for Modern Times: The State and the Industrialization of the Newfoundland Fishery, 1934-1968

Miriam Wright

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS Toronto Buffalo London

Originally published by Oxford University Press Canada 2001 © University of Toronto Press 2014 Toronto Buffalo London www.utppublishing.com Reprinted in paperback 2014 ISBN 978-1-4426-5965-0 (paper)

Printed on acid-free, 100% post-consumer recycled paper with vegetable-based inks

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Wright, Miriam Carol, 1964A fishery for modern times: the state and the industrialization of the Newfoundland fishery, 1934-1968 / Miriam Carol Wright. (Canadian social history series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4426-5965-0 (pbk.) 1. Fishery policy - Newfoundland - History - 20th century. 2. Fishery management - Newfoundland - History - 20th century. 3. Fisheries Newfoundland - History - 20th century. I. Title. II. Series: Canadian social history series. HD3616.C32N47 2013

338.971009'041

C2013-903486-2

University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial assistance to its publishing program of the Canada Council for the Arts and the Ontario Arts Council. ONTARIO ARTS COUNCIL CONSEIL DES ARTS DE L'ONTARIO Canada Council

for the

Arts

Conseil des Arts du Canada

so Y E A R S OF ONTARIO GOVERNMENT SUPPORT OF THE A R T S 5 0 A N S DE SOUTIEN DL GOUVERNEMENT DE L'ONTARIOaAUX ARTSS

University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Canada Book Fund for its publishing activities.

Contents

Acknowledgements / vii 1 Introduction / 1 PART I

INDUSTRIALIZATION IN DEPRESSION AND WARTIME: THE 1930s AND 1940s

2 Beginnings in a Dying Colonial Regime /10 PART II PLANNING FOR A NEW FISHERY: THE 1950s 3 Visions of Development in the Canadian Context / 37 4 Federal-Provincial Conflict, Co-operation, and Compromise / 65 5 Smallwood and the Frozen-Fish Companies / 81 PART III COMPETITION FOR THE RESOURCE AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF INDUSTRIALIZATION: THE 1960s 6 Facing the 'City of Trawlers' in Newfoundland /104 7 Federal Response to a Changing Fishery /126 8 Conclusion/150 Notes /158 Index/189

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Acknowledgements

I would like to take this time to thank the many people who have helped me in one way or another in the researching and writing of this book. This project grew out of my graduate work in history, first at Queen's University where I did a Masters' degree and then at Memorial University of Newfoundland where I did a Ph.D. Ian McKay who supervised my Masters', got me interested in the question of the fishery and the state in Atlantic Canada. At Memorial, however, I was able to fully explore and develop this topic, guided by my supervisors Greg Kealey and Rosemary Ommer. Both have been unwavering sources of support and encouragement through all stages of this project. I have especially appreciated Greg's good judgement and insights, and Rosemary's enthusiasm for the study of the Newfoundland fishery. This manuscript owes much to their guidance. I would also like to thank others who also offered comments and criticisms of the material (or parts of it) on which this book is based at one stage or another: Linda Kealey, Jim Miller, Skip Fisher, Eric Sager, Dianne Newell, Danny Samson and the reviewers and editors for Oxford University Press. I have received assistance from the staff at various archives, including the Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador, Memorial University's Maritime History Archives and the Centre for Newfoundland Studies, and the National Archives of Canada. Financial assistance for this project came from the Institute of Social and Economic Research and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. I also received assistance from the Tri-Council Eco-Research Project, 'Sustainability in a Changing Cold-Ocean Coastal Environment', which took place at Memorial from 1995 to 1997. vii

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I would also like to thank my friends and family for help along the way. Robert Hong, friend and companion, shared his interest and enthusiasm for the history of this place. The researching and writing of this book would have been much more difficult without him. I'm grateful to my parents, Glen and Patricia Wright, and my sister and brother, Lisa and Steven. My parents, who were living in Newfoundland when I was born, fostered my early interest in this eastern province and gave me immeasurable support over the years. Finally, I would like to mention my late grandparents, whose quiet pride in me was always an inspiration. Different versions of parts of this book have previously appeared in published form. Material from parts of Chapter 2 was published in 'Background to Change in the Newfoundland Cod Fishery at the Time of Confederation', Newfoundland Studies 14, 2 (Fall 1998): 253-65. 'Fishing in the Cold War: Canada, Newfoundland and the International Politics of the Twelve-Mile Fishing Limit, 1958-1969', Journal of the Canadian Historical Association, New Series 8 (1997): 239-58, contains some of the material found in Chapter 7, while 'Frozen Fish Companies, the State and Fisheries Development in Newfoundland, 1940-1966', Business and Economic History 26, 2 (Winter 1997): 727-37, summarizes some material from Chapters 2 and 5.

1 Introduction

The collapse of the northern cod stocks off the coast of Newfoundland in the early 1990s was not only a major ecological disaster, but has also been devastating for the province's economy and society. In 1992, after several years of particularly poor landings, government fisheries scientists announced that the fish population was too small to withstand another season of fishing. In early July, the federal government declared a moratorium on commercial cod fishing on the east coast of Newfoundland, on the Grand Banks, and off the coast of Labrador. The following year it closed the cod fishery on the south and west coasts of Newfoundland as well. For the first time in over 500 years, there was no commercial fishery off the coast of Newfoundland. Overnight, over 30,000 fishers and plant workers in Newfoundland lost their jobs, as did thousands of others indirectly employed in the fishing industry. In a province where the fishery was still one of the largest employers, and where few other employment opportunities existed, the closure has caused great hardship. For seven years, the cod fishery of the east coast of Newfoundland remained closed. Some fishers began catching other species, such as crab and shrimp, but most had fewer options. By the late 1990s, the federal Department of Fisheries partially lifted the moratorium by allowing small quotas of cod to be taken off the south and east coasts of the island. The quotas, however, were just a fraction of the amount the fishers of Newfoundland had taken in earlier days. Fisheries scientists today warn that a full ecological recovery may take decades, if it happens at all. Today, as older fishing people spend long days staring out at the sea, and younger families pack their belongings into U-Haul trucks heading for Ontario and Alberta, the question

1

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A FISHERY FOR MODERN TIMES

haunting us all is: How could this happen? How could a resource that has fed so many for centuries disappear? In the years since the moratorium, many people have been struggling with that question. The short answer is that years of intensified fishing by both resident Newfoundlanders and (before the declaration of a 200-mile fishing limit in 1977) European fishers weakened the cod populations until they could no longer sustain commercial fishing. But how and why did this happen? Perhaps not surprisingly, many of the commentators on this crisis have been looking for someone or something to blame—uncaring politicians, deluded scientists, greedy fishing company owners, and destructive technologies. While finding a scapegoat for the collapse of the cod fishery may be comforting, focusing so narrowly on a couple of causes only obscures the larger historical processes that contributed to the crisis. Recently, Canadian fisheries scholars have tried to move away from the narrower perspectives of the past.1 Crises not only on the Atlantic coast but also in the Pacific and inland fisheries have made us all more aware of the precariousness and complexity of the fishing economy and fishing communities. People studying the fishery are realizing that understanding the fishery in the past and present requires an awareness of the many aspects of the fishery, including the biological, ecological, social, economic, political, and cultural dimensions. This book reflects this new direction in fisheries scholarship, and suggests that to understand the present crisis in the fishery we need to think more broadly about the events and processes that affected the historical development of the fishery. I would argue that to understand what happened to the Newfoundland fishery, we need to start looking critically at the rise of the industrial fishery in the midtwentieth century. Although there is evidence that cod populations have been under pressure from fishing since at least the nineteenth century, the scale of harvesting in the North Atlantic increased dramatically in the 1940s and 1950s.2 In this period, the emergence of new harvesting and processing technologies, particularly the rise of the offshore otter trawler (a vessel over 100 feet long that drags a bagshaped net held open by large flaps or doors) and the factory-freezer trawler (a trawler with freezing and processing facilities on board) and the invention of 'quick' freezing, which enabled fishing companies to preserve greater volumes of fish, fuelled the industrial expansion of North Atlantic fisheries. In Newfoundland, the primarily inshore fishery based on salted fish production was transformed with the emergence of a frozen-fish sector, characterized by large, privately owned processing plants supplied by offshore fishing trawlers.

INTRODUCTION

3

Over the years, the industrial sector of the Newfoundland fishery grew, and the technological escalation that accompanied it put increasing pressure on the resource. The fishery, however, did not make these changes unassisted. From its very inception, the industrial fishery in Newfoundland has been supported and largely financed by the state. The centrality of the state in the industrialization of the fishery raises many questions about the relationship between the government and the economy, and its impact on the direction of development. A Fishery for Modern Times will trace how and why the fishery evolved the way it did in this critical period, providing the context for the industrial expansion in the fishery and the processes that later contributed to the destruction of the resource. In particular, this book will focus on the role of the state in encouraging and supporting industrialization in the fishery from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s. Although used in the singular, the 'state' is actually multi-layered and complex. This book studies the involvement of the state in the fishery: the actions of politicians and bureaucrats, changing state structures, the dynamics of federal-provincial relations and how they affected policy and program directions within the fishery. Particular attention will be paid to the 'visions of development', the ideas and concepts held by politicians, bureaucrats, and others that helped shape policy direction. Fisheries policies and development programs were also affected by people, events, and entities outside the state. An important dimension of this analysis is the relationship that developed between the state and the fishing companies. Although people in fishing communities had a much weaker connection to the state, at times their demands and concerns also had an impact on policy direction. As well, this book considers the impact of larger economic and technological changes occurring in the North Atlantic fisheries in this period on both policy formulation and implementation. And finally, this book recognizes that the resource itself, Atlantic cod, is not merely a product, but also a wild animal, part of a complex environment. This analysis considers the way that changes in the cod population off the coast of Newfoundland affected the needs and demands of fishing people, as well as the way the state responded to problems. For a subject as crucial to the understanding of twentieth-century Newfoundland economy and society, however, the fishery from 1940 to 1970 has received relatively little attention from scholars. Most research has taken the form of community studies of the impact of industrialization in the fishery. In the 1960s, rural Newfoundland and its supposed transition from 'traditional' to 'modern' society caught

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the attention of social scientists, mainly from the United States and Europe.3 This work, however, derived from field notes created by researchers who spent short periods of time living in these communities, had a limited understanding of historical change. In the 1980s, several more thorough studies of the impact of industrial change on fishing outports appeared. Bonnie McCay examined the introduction of longliners (decked fishing vessels typically between 45 and 60 feet in length) in a community on the northeast coast of Newfoundland, while Peter Sinclair analysed new technologies and class relations in a Great Northern Peninsula outport.4 Apart from the community-based studies, there have been a few larger overviews of fisheries development and state policy in the twentieth century. Rosemary Ommer looked at the successive failure of the state to deal adequately with the problems in the Newfoundland fishery, from the late nineteenth century to the present.5 Peter Sinclair published a collection of essays highlighting the general trends in state involvement in the fishery since the 1930s. Raymond Blake's study of the integration of Newfoundland into the Canadian federation devotes a chapter to some aspects of fisheries development in the early 1950s, but focuses on the political level, rather than the larger social and economic context of fisheries policies.6 The only major historical study of this period is David Alexander's The Decay of Trade: An Economic History of the Newfoundland Saltfish Trade 1935-1965.1 Throughout his academic career, Alexander kept searching for the reasons for Newfoundland's seemingly chronic state of underdevelopment and poverty. In The Decay of Trade, he argued that in the post-Confederation years Newfoundland missed opportunities to develop new markets and products for the saltfish industry. These errors of omission, he claimed, were committed by both the saltfish merchants, who apparently lost interest in the business, and the federal Department of Fisheries, which preferred to see the development of the frozen-fish industry in Newfoundland. He argued that this legacy of failure and neglect has handicapped the province in its ability to find economic self-sufficiency. The Decay of Trade was an important book, as it opened up a whole realm of inquiry into Newfoundland's economic condition. The decline of the saltfish trade, however, only covers part of the rather complex events and processes that were taking place in this critical period. By his own admission, Alexander paid little attention to the frozen-fish sector and the reasons for its growth after World War II. As well, Alexander failed to look more critically at the larger relationship between the state and the economy.

INTRODUCTION

5

Besides providing an analysis of the history of fisheries development policies in Newfoundland, this study offers an opportunity to explore some of the larger questions about the connections between the state, the economy, and society. This book employs a theory of the state based on the work of Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci and of Gramscian-influenced scholars Esteve Morera and Stuart Hall. This approach offers a way of understanding the concrete connections between the government and the fishing industry, as well as the more subtle, ideological connections between the state, the economy, and society.8 Gramsci was a historical materialist, and saw connections between the economic structures of society ('structure') and the world of human activity—politics and the state, and civil society ('superstructures'). Unlike some Marxist theorists who viewed the state in simplistic or reductionist terms, Gramsci was more sensitive to the complexity of that relationship and, indeed, of the complexity of the modern state. He believed that the rise of the interventionist state in the twentieth century was in part a response to the series of crises that were afflicting industrial capitalism in the late nineteenth century. The state, however, was no mere instrument of the dominant economic class, catering exclusively to the needs of capitalism. Civil society is affected by other aspects or interests that are not directly related to the economy, such as gender, ethnicity, culture, and religion. The state, then, has a larger role—to appease and control conflicts within civil society while still creating the best environment for the economic structures. Gramsci believed that the dominant economic group (or sections of it) maintain and secure control of the state through a combination of physical force and what he called 'hegemony'. For Gramsci, hegemony is achieved when the ideas or concepts that generally support the dominant economic system become universal and are accepted by the wider population as 'true' or 'common sense'. Although clearly rooted in the economic system, hegemony is only realized when the ideas transcend the economic and begin to operate on a broader, cultural level. Far from being an inherent truth, however, hegemony is historically constructed. The making and remaking of hegemonic power is a continuous process and it survives by responding to challenges from alternative social groups. This theory is useful, partly because it helps contextualize the relationship between the state and private enterprise in the fishery, and partly because it helps us connect events in Newfoundland with larger historical processes. In particular, the policy-makers' and politicians' 'visions of development', which helped shape fisheries policies, can be seen as ideological. In this book, 'ideology' refers to a 'world

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A FISHERY FOR MODERN TIMES

view', a way of perceiving and interpreting the world and of representing it in speeches and images.9 Ideologies are rooted in material and social interests, but are never entirely homogeneous or internally consistent. Other interests not directly connected to the economic, such as gender, ethnicity, and religion, as well as remnants of older ideologies, are often embedded within them. When we are looking at ideologies within society that are dominant (as Gramsci would say, they are hegemonic or becoming hegemonic), we can gain some insights into the way that social and economic power works. My argument is that many of the fisheries planners and politicians held a particular ideology or vision of development. This ideology assumed that industrialization was the true path to prosperity. It placed great faith in the ability of private capital, technology, and rational state planning to create a better world. It also assumed that industrial organization in society was necessary for greater social and cultural 'progress'. The industrial vision was an inherently historical entity. Emerging at a particular time in the history of the Newfoundland fishery, its practices also changed over time, as the needs and demands of the fishing industry, politicians, and the resource itself changed. Although most of the fisheries planners and politicians dealing with Newfoundland shared this industrial vision of development, others perceived the fishery and the future development of society differently. Some questioned the ability of large-scale industrial development and private enterprise to solve the problems of the fishery. Indeed, they attacked some of the foundational assumptions of the industrial vision of development. These alternative visions for the fishery had little support within the state, however, and the degree to which they reflected the ideas of those directly involved in the fishery is uncertain. Their presence, however, suggests that the industrial path for the fishery was not a 'natural', or inevitable development in the history of the Newfoundland fishery. Far from being unique to Newfoundland, the industrial vision of development was connected to larger currents in Western thinking about social and economic change that had emerged in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.10 These ideas were connected to the social, economic, political, and cultural experiences of Western Europe, particularly the Enlightenment and the rise of industrial capitalism. In the nineteenth century, a number of related theories circulated, including notions of social and economic 'progress', evolutionary theories, and classical and neoclassical theories of economic growth. In the early twentieth century, social scientists

INTRODUCTION

7

built on some of these ideas, articulating theories about how societies make the transition from 'pre-modern' to 'modern' industrial organization. These theories came to be known as 'modernization theory'. According to this approach, the world consisted of 'traditional' and 'modern' societies. Traditional societies had 'simple' forms of economic, social, and political organization. The economies tended to be labour-intensive, with low levels of capital and technology. The people, primarily occupational pluralists, were backward-looking, resistant to change, and lacking innovative spirit. Conversely, modern societies had more complex forms of organization, requiring a population capable of filling specific roles. Modern societies tended to be industrial and centralized, with high levels of capital and technology. Modern people were forward-looking, innovative, and educated. Modernization theory assumed that by infusing traditional societies with capital, technology, entrepreneurship, and modern attitudes, they, too, could become modern. Modernization theory reached its height in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, when it became the basis of an international movement to develop 'underdeveloped' economies.11 These ideas infused international institutions such as the World Bank and the United Nations. The Western world's obsession with 'modernizing' impoverished nations after World War II was sparked by a number of factors, including fears of political instability in 'Third World' nations and the need to secure economic resources.12 What made modernization particularly attractive was the fact that, like the Keynesian model also popular among state planners, the modernization approach upheld the capitalist economic system. One of the best-known proponents of the modernization approach in the 1960s was United States presidential adviser W.W. Rostow, author of The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto.13 The subtitle of Rostow's book suggests that finding an alternative to socialism in impoverished countries was a concern of this movement. The political, economic, and cultural ideologies embedded in the modernization approach led some scholars and activists to attack it in the 1960s and 1970s.14 They argued that the modernization approach, modelled on the Western European experience, had failed to bring peace and prosperity to impoverished peoples of the world. Some Marxist-inspired writers known as dependency theorists criticized it for focusing on internal factors such as technology and entrepreneurship, but dismissing external influences such as colonial relationships or the dynamics of the international economy. As well, they accused its proponents of ignoring the impact of class and race relationships

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on economic and social development. Feminists argued that modernization theory contained a gender ideology consistent with the white, middle-class ideas of women's 'proper' place in society. They criticized the modernization project for negating women's roles as producers in non-Western economies. Indeed, for many, modernization did not bring the prosperity and stability promised by postwar planners, politicians, and industrialists. Marshall Berman suggests that being 'modern' has meant living in a world subject to both creative and destructive forces at the same time.15 Berman argues that in the nineteenth century the great thinkers consumed with issues of modernity—Marx, Nietzsche, Dostoevsky, and others—were aware of the dual nature of modern life. By the early twentieth century, however, thinking about modernity had become polarized; thinkers tended either to embrace and celebrate the creative aspects of modernity while ignoring its more destructive characteristics or to reject it entirely. Berman argued that modernization theory emerged out of the 'positive' modernist strain. He claims that the 'tragedy of development' in the modern era has been the pursuance of industrial and technological progress without an awareness of its more destructive consequences. As we shall see, the 'modernization' of the Newfoundland fishery in the mid-twentieth century had potentially liberating and more ominous implications for fishing people and for the resource itself.

Overview of the Book Chapter 2 looks at fisheries development during the Commission of Government period, 1934 to 1949, when financial difficulties led the British government to rescind responsible government in Newfoundland and replace it with a body of appointed civil servants. The chapter looks at the first years of fisheries development during the Commission and the economic and policy impact of World War II. As well, it provides the international, technological, and economic context of the rise of the frozen-fish industry in Newfoundland and the history of local frozen-fish firms and their turn to state support in the 1940s. Chapters 3-5 focus on fisheries development in the first decade after Confederation. Chapter 3 outlines the ideological terrain of fisheries development in the late 1940s and 1950s. It considers the critical and conflicting ideas about the future of the fishery held by key figures, such as the economic policy adviser and federal Deputy Minister of Fisheries, Stewart Bates; Newfoundland's first and longstanding Premier, Joseph Smallwood; and Newfoundland's first

INTRODUCTION

9

Minister of Fisheries and Co-operatives, WJ. Keough, and his Deputy Minister of Co-operatives, Fred Scott. It examines the connections between the rise of the so-called 'industrial vision of development' and the expansion of state fisheries management in the 1950s. It also looks at the growing importance of economic theories to federal fisheries management in the postwar years. Chapter 4 examines conflicts and compromises at the level of federal and provincial governments as they struggled to formulate the role of the state in the Newfoundland fishery. Chapter 5 looks at the relationship that developed between the provincial government and the Newfoundland frozen fish companies. By the 1960s, the Newfoundland fishery was changing rapidly, partly owing to the expansion of the European distant-water fleets and their arrival off the coast of Newfoundland. Chapter 6 explores the impact of the intensified offshore fishing on the resource itself and on the demands and needs of fishers and fishing company owners. Smallwood responded with a renewed public relations campaign, once again telling the people of Newfoundland that technology and scientific methods would save the fishery. Chapter 7 looks at the way the federal government responded to the changing conditions in the fishery and the new demands for help. At the international level, it attempted to secure a 12-mile fishing limit to curtail European offshore fishing. At the domestic level, it began to take a more direct role in financing the expansion of the industrial fishery. Chapter 8 reflects on the long-term connections among the economy, society, and the state and the path of fisheries development in Newfoundland within the Gramscian framework. As well, it considers the long-term repercussions of the industrial path for the fish and fishery of Newfoundland in the present and future. But above all, this book suggests that the collapse of one of the world's richest fisheries resources was not simply a matter of misguided scientists, uncaring politicians, or 'too many fishermen catching too few fish'. Understanding the complex relationships between humans and the natural environment means having to look at the broader historic, social, economic, political, and environmental processes. To begin, however, we might try to think about a time when becoming 'modern' looked like the only solution to decades of hardship in the Newfoundland fishery.

PARTI

Industrialization in Depression and Wartime: The 1930s and 1940s 2

Beginnings in a Dying Colonial Regime In Newfoundland, the 1930s and 1940s were a period of significant political, economic, and social change—change that occurred on several levels. Economically, the 1930s began with a crisis in the saltfish trade, caused largely by the Great Depression and the downward spiral of prices for food commodities on the world markets. During World War II, however, the emergence of new technologies and market opportunities helped encourage the rise of a new, frozen-fish sector. Unlike the saltfish trade, the new sector had an industrial organization, with its offshore fishing trawlers and centralized processing plants. These structural changes had implications for the organization of the entire fishing economy. Political events in Newfoundland were no less tumultuous. Threatened with bankruptcy and civil strife, the small British Dominion, which had been self-governing since 1855, voluntarily suspended its democratic political institutions in favour of a British-appointed Commission of Government. From 1934 to 1949, a team of six appointed administrators managed all aspects of Newfoundland's civil and political life, from health and education to justice and economic development. Apart from these more dramatic events, other, more subtle changes were occurring in the relationship between the state and the economy. Although the Newfoundland government had made several attempts to assist the fishery from the late nineteenth century onward, 10

BEGINNINGS IN A DYING COLONIAL REGIME

11

Three men in an inshore fishing boat (trap skiff) at Flowers Island, Bonavista Bay, c. 1940. They are hauling a cod trap, a box-shaped net popular in many inshore fishing areas of Newfoundland from the late nineteenth century to the time of the cod moratorium in 1992. (Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador, VA 14-199.)

it was not until the arrival of the Commission of Government in 1934 that state involvement in the fishery began in earnest. The British civil servants and former colonial administrators who were responsible for fisheries in Newfoundland in this period tried to bring principles of efficiency and centralization to the fishing economy. Although these administrators were working before the height of the 'modernization' paradigm, they clearly held ideas about the future of the economy and the role of the state in fostering economic and social change consistent with this model. In the early years of the Commission of Government, state intervention involved creating a central bureaucracy to oversee fisheries matters and directing co-operative initiatives aimed at revitalizing the rural economy devastated by the Great Depression. By the early 1940s, however, the Commission of Government shifted its support away from co-operatives and towards the frozen-fish sector, which many believed was capable of transforming rural Newfoundland into a centralized and 'modern' society much more quickly and easily. In the process of supporting this emerging sector, the Commission of Government forged a direct relationship with a small group of frozen-fish companies in Newfoundland. These firms would come to dominate the fishing industry in Newfoundland in years to

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come. And their reliance on state support, begun during the 1940s, would also continue in the decades that followed. Although the Great Depression may have instigated the suspension of responsible government in Newfoundland, the problems of the country's fishing economy began decades earlier. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Newfoundland fishery had been a family-based enterprise supported by a system of merchant credit.1 Men using small, inshore craft harvested the fish, while women and children salted and cured it by drying it in the sun. The credit or 'truck' system, an adaptation of a capital-scarce economy, had evolved with the rise of the inshore resident fishery early in the nineteenth century. Like the inshore fishery itself, the credit system operated on a seasonal basis. In the spring, fish merchants gave credit to fishers to outfit themselves with supplies for the coming fishing season. In the fall, when the catch had been cured, the fisher returned to the merchant with the fish. The merchant then deducted what was owed for the spring supplies and put the remainder on the individual fisher's account in the firm's ledgers. Throughout the winter, the fisher received what was owed through household goods and food staples the merchant stocked at its store. Although the varied ways in which it worked and the cause of its persistence in Newfoundland into the mid-twentieth century are still not fully understood, the precariousness of the system during times of economic crisis was readily apparent. Several variations in the organization of the saltfish sector existed in different areas of Newfoundland. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, fishers from some areas of the island began outfitting schooners to take to the coast of Labrador for the summer fishing season. As well, in the same period, schooners based on the south coast of the island and the Avalon Peninsula also fished offshore on the Grand Banks. Both the Labrador schooner fishery and the Banks fishery, however, had declined by World War II. The products of all of these fisheries were exported to markets in southern Europe, the Caribbean, and South America. Newfoundland was once the world's largest exporter of salted fish but this position began to crumble in the late nineteenth century.2 Deteriorating quality of the cure and growing competition from countries such as Iceland and Norway, which were developing their own saltfish sectors, threatened Newfoundland's place in the international markets. Both Norway and Iceland produced salted cod and had the advantage of having access to their fishing grounds all year. In Newfoundland, the rich fishing grounds off the northeast coast of the island and Labrador were covered in ice for half the year. In the

BEGINNINGS IN A DYING COLONIAL REGIME

13

Making saltfish at the Outer Battery, St John's, Newfoundland, c. 1880. These people are standing on the fish flakes, or wooden racks used for drying the fish. The women are gathering the dried cod and stacking them in round piles. Women often brought their children with them to the fish flakes, getting the older children to help. (Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador, A17-196.)

first two decades of the twentieth century, Newfoundland governments made several attempts to introduce new technologies such as cold storage facilities, which some believed would improve fish quality and allow the fishery to move into North American markets with the sale of fresh fish.3 Lack of financial backing, along with concerns about the expense and viability of the new technologies, however, prevented them from being adopted to any great extent in that period. Subsequent attempts by both the Fishermen's Protective Union (an organization of fishing people founded by William F. Coaker in 1909) and the Newfoundland Board of Trade to get the government to introduce marketing and technological changes also failed. The Dominion's administration was small and lacked the mandate and the revenue to embark on any major fisheries development programs. Compounding the problems was the fact that in the 1930s Newfoundland's economy remained almost entirely dependent on the fishery. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, Newfoundland governments had tried to foster land-based industrialization by building a railway and encouraging mining and pulp and paper development. Although two pulp and paper plants and several mining projects eventually resulted, together they employed only a few thousand

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people. Newfoundland's only city, St John's, hosted a small manufacturing sector, providing clothing and household goods for the domestic market and some items for the fishing industry. The vast majority of the people living in Newfoundland, however, remained attached to the fishery. The high prices and great demand for salted fish during World War I offered a reprieve for the saltfish economy in Newfoundland. With the onset of the post-World War I recession, however, the Newfoundland fishery once again faced its old problems. At the height of the Great Depression in the early 1930s, prices for foodstuffs such as wheat and fish plummeted. The merchant credit system, which had been the glue that kept the saltfish economy functioning, began to collapse. With prices so low, fishers could not catch enough fish to cover the cost of their supplies. Many merchants carried heavy debt loads, and some could not continue providing credit to fishers. Many fishing families were forced to apply for 'the Dole', the meagre few dollars a month then offered by the Newfoundland government. With declines in trade and general economic activity in the capital, the St John's manufacturing sector also suffered, causing widespread unemployment among urban residents. And unlike their rural counterparts, who could subsist on fishing, hunting, and growing vegetables to eat, the urban poor faced some long, hungry winters. Newfoundland politics proved unable to survive the crisis in the saltfish economy in the early 1930s.4 Already weakened by crippling debt payments from World War I (Newfoundland was the only country that actually paid back its war debts), the Newfoundland government teetered on the edge of bankruptcy. In 1930, fearful of defaulting on its loan payments, the Liberal government of Richard Squires borrowed more money, mainly from Canadian banks. The following year, however, lenders had become increasingly reluctant to back Newfoundland's loan requests. As well, growing accusations of corruption and financial wrongdoing against the Prime Minister and several of his cabinet ministers fed popular discontent with the government. The unrest spilled into the streets, leading to several confrontations between crowds of unemployed people and police. In April 1932 a demonstration outside the Colonial Building, where the House of Assembly was located, grew particularly violent. The crowd of 10,000 people started throwing rocks at the windows and then stormed the building. The Prime Minister fled through a side door. Within days, Squires called an election for 11 June. Squires lost the election to Frederick Alderdice, a St John's merchant and leader of the newly formed United Newfoundland Party.

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Women making saltfish in Grand Bank, c. 1940. From the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century, Grand Bank was a centre for the bank fishery, where merchants owned schooners that fished offshore. In these communities, the merchants hired local women to cure the fish. Here, fish was dried directly on the beach stones, rather than on wooden fish flakes. (Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador, Al 8-173.)

During the election, Alderdice had promised to appoint a committee to consider installing a commission government for a few years until the economic and political problems had been resolved. After Alderdice made several unsuccessful attempts to raise money to make the debt payments (including an undertaking to sell Labrador to Canada), a deal was brokered among Great Britain, Canada, and Newfoundland. Canada and Great Britain agreed to pay two-thirds of the interest on Newfoundland's war debts if Newfoundland was willing to accept a Royal Commission to examine its political and economic problems. In 1933, the Royal Commission, chaired by Scottish barrister and Labour peer, William Warrender Mackenzie, Baron Amulree, recommended the suspension of representative government in Newfoundland.5 According to Amulree, the small country had failed to develop into a modern society. The political system was corrupt and extreme sectarianism hampered the development of modern civil administration in the country. The fishing economy was archaic and could not fuel innovation or diversification. The people themselves, according

16

A FISHERY FOR MODERN TIMES

to Amulree, lacked the spirit and initiative to start reforms on their own. They needed a 'rest' from politics, and a team of skilled technocrats could help Newfoundland onto the path to economic, social, and political progress. Although no one would deny that the Newfoundland economy had many problems in the 1930s, Amulree's analysis of those problems reveals more about currents in social and economic thinking of the time than it does about Newfoundland itself. Amulree was writing before modernization theory reached its peak, but his analysis of the Newfoundland fishery displays many features of that approach: his use of the 'traditional/modern' model to explain the way the society had developed, his emphasis on internal factors such as the 'greedy' merchants and the lack of 'entrepreneurial spirit' among fishing people. He attacked the credit system, which he viewed as a cause, not a symptom, of larger problems in the fishery. It stifled the independent, entrepreneurial spirit of the fishing people, he asserted, by making them unwilling to invest their own money in ventures when merchant credit was readily available. Amulree believed the undesirable tendencies caused by the credit system were 'sapping the energy, initiative and moral sense of the people, and instead of building them up into an independent and self-reliant race, is reducing them to a state bordering on servitude.'6 His descriptions of the credit system comparing merchant credit to feudalism suggest he had a poor understanding of the fishing economy. Although the Newfoundland economy was largely rural and had few vestiges of industrialization, it was hardly medieval. Despite his strong feelings about the credit system in the fishery, Amulree had few concrete suggestions on how to abolish it. Instead, he argued that the fishery needed greater intervention by the state, and offered ideas on how a fisheries bureaucracy could be established. In the 1920s and 1930s government bureaucracies in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada were expanding. Principles of scientific management and efficiency, such as Taylorism, which had appeared in industry and business practices in the period, were applied to state management of civil affairs. Amulree criticized Newfoundland, however, for failing to develop the institutions he believed were the mark of modern society. He hoped that with the Commission of Government, a modern administrative structure could be devised to manage the Newfoundland fishery. In early 1934, with little fanfare, six men, three from Great Britain and three from Newfoundland, along with a governor, took control of civil affairs in the former Dominion. The Commission of Government

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had six departments, with a single commissioner overseeing each one: Finance, Natural Resources, Public Utilities, Home Affairs and Education, Justice, and Public Health and Welfare. The large Natural Resources department included fisheries, forestry, mining, and agriculture. Between 1934 and 1949, five men served as Commissioner for Natural Resources: Sir John Hope Simpson (1934-6), Sir Robert Benson Ewbank (1936-9), John Henry Gorvin (1939-41), Peter Douglas Hay Dunn (1941-5), and Major William Henry Flinn (1945-9). All were from the British Isles, and all had had long careers in public service. Hope Simpson and Ewbank each had spent over 25 years in the Indian civil administration. Hope Simpson also had directed relief efforts in Greece and China before coming to Newfoundland. Gorvin and Dunn were British civil servants. Gorvin had worked for many years with the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. Flinn, born in Ireland, had served with the Royal Irish Regiment. He had overseas colonial experience also, working as Colonial Secretary to Barbados and Jamaica before arriving in Newfoundland. One of the common threads among these administrators was a belief in the ability of the state to manage the economy. Indeed, a major emphasis in the early years of the Commission of Government was the creation of a bureaucratic structure to oversee and organize the fishery, making it more efficient and 'modern'. Another characteristic the Commissioners for Natural Resources had in common was a background in Britain's colonial administrations overseas, and many of the commissioners carried with them ideas and attitudes about 'backward' societies prevalent within the colonial project. Indeed, as scholars of colonial and post-colonial societies have suggested, colonial regimes contained ideologies that combined Western ideas about 'modern' economic and social development with ideas about race, class, and gender.7 These ideologies were a fundamental part of Europeans' political, economic, and military control over Asia, Africa, and the Americas in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. Although the people of Newfoundland were largely of British heritage—English and Irish—Hope Simpson and others associated with the Commission of Government tended to view them in similar ways to their other colonial charges—lacking in moral fortitude, technological prowess, and organizational abilities.8 Hope Simpson, for example, saw Newfoundland as a 'foreign' country in need of instruction on modern methods of efficiency. In tours of the outports, he and his wife often marvelled at the strangeness of the people. At one point, his wife, 'Quita', commented: 'It always comes as a surprise to me when these children talk

18

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English—they seem such little foreigners—so wild and furtive.'9 When Hope Simpson was trying to introduce reforms in the fishery, he argued that Newfoundlanders, like the Greeks and Chinese, had an inherent 'instability'. He said, however, that the people of Newfoundland lacked 'the unremitting application of the Chinese'.10 He often complained that the people of Newfoundland, from the Water Street merchants to the outport fishers, resisted greater state control. Nonetheless, he was convinced that the efforts of the Commission were pushing Newfoundland towards a higher level of political and administrative organization. Although, like Amulree, Hope Simpson had few ideas on how to address some of the larger problems in the saltfish economy, he believed the administration of fisheries policies needed to be more organized. A Department of Marine and Fisheries had existed in Newfoundland since the late nineteenth century, but it was small, with most of its staff occupied with steamship inspection duties. In 1936 Hope Simpson established the Newfoundland Fisheries Board, a small bureaucracy that set the framework for future government intervention in the economy. Hope Simpson was pleased with his efforts, saying the new body had 'dictatorial powers' designed to reorganize saltfish marketing, regulate and enforce fisheries laws, and oversee scientific research.11 In the early years, the Board directed much of its efforts to reforming the saltfish marketing system. It required all saltfish exporters to obtain a licence, and it set regulations on standards and culling. A more centralized marketing system did not emerge until much later, however, with the creation of the Newfoundland Association of Fish Exporters Limited (NAFEL) in 1947. Besides organizing marketing, the Newfoundland Fisheries Board also supported scientific fisheries research, which, by the 1930s, was a growing international field. The Newfoundland government had established the first fisheries research station in Bay Bulls in 1931.12 When the Bay Bulls station burned down, the Commission of Government built a new research centre in St John's in 1940. Probably of greatest impact for the inshore fisheries, however, was the Board's development of a bait service, providing frozen bait to the hook-andline fishery. A motorized vessel, Malakoff, had a freezer on board and delivered bait to inshore communities. As well, the Board established a small number of permanent bait freezing plants around the island. Despite these efforts, the Commission made little impact on continuing poverty in rural Newfoundland. As a means of addressing this problem, and to alleviate dependence on government relief, the Commission of Government tried to encourage a co-operative movement

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in the outports. The British Colonial Office had supported these methods in Africa and Asia. In fact, both Hope Simpson and Ewbank had worked with agricultural co-operatives in India. In a radio address in 1937, Ewbank claimed that the Indian co-operatives could provide a model for Newfoundland.13 The commissioners promoted co-operatives not as an alternative to private enterprise but as a form of 'selfhelp' for those on the economic margins of society. Largely organized by Commission of Government employees, the co-operative movement met with limited success.14 Later, the Commission received help from the Antigonish Co-operative Movement based in Nova Scotia. Founded in 1928 by Father Moses Coady, a Roman Catholic priest, the Antigonish Movement was based in the Extension Department of St Francis Xavier University.15 The Extension Department offered adult education to the mainly rural people of Nova Scotia and promoted the development of co-operative enterprises. In the late 1930s, Extension Department workers from St Francis Xavier came to work in the co-operative movement in Newfoundland. When the co-operatives failed to produce results quickly, the Commission began looking for a more comprehensive rural development plan. It engaged John Henry Gorvin to use his years of experience dealing with agricultural problems to devise a solution for Newfoundland. Unlike the other commissioners, Gorvin came from a politically left position. He envisioned a more far-reaching cooperative economic organization in rural Newfoundland. Like Amulree, Gorvin had concluded that the merchant credit system was the root cause of Newfoundland's economic woes.16 Gorvin planned to replace the need for merchant credit by installing regional economic development councils. These councils would offer loans to fishers to buy supplies and equipment as well as oversee the creation of local enterprises. In 1939, Gorvin became Commissioner for Natural Resources and began drafting the legislation for his rural reconstruction plan, the Special Areas Bill.17 This legislation, if enacted, would have placed the state more directly into the fishing economy than anything else the Commission of Government had done. Gorvin's plan gave the government sole responsibility for appointing people to all local and regional administrative positions within the new enterprises. Just as Gorvin was drawing up the bill, however, Great Britain's declaration of war on Germany put a sudden halt to his plans. Arguing that mobilizing Newfoundland for war demanded all of their attention, the Commission of Government postponed all rural development projects.18 The war, however, gave the Commission an excuse to abandon

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the proposal that had been controversial among some members of the business community, specifically the Newfoundland Board of Trade, which feared that the Special Areas Bill would interfere with private enterprise in the fishery.19 Although the commission had no direct ties to the local business elite, the commission's limited legitimacy made them reluctant to embark on major initiatives strongly opposed by local leaders. Just as the Special Areas Bill was dying, the Commission of Government became aware of a new possibility for developing the Newfoundland fishery. In the United States, the food industry was undergoing a major transformation at all levels—production, packaging, marketing, and consumption. Food production and consumption were changing from a local enterprise, with local farmers producing for nearby markets, to a pan-North American industry. Large food-processing and packaging firms such as General Foods were emerging, shipping their goods across the continent to large grocery store chains. As North America became increasingly urban, electrified, and affluent, and bought more refrigerators, the potential market for packaged foods grew. With its centralized production and new technologies, the North American food sector was beginning to embody the characteristics of a 'modern' industry. Indeed, to many North Americans, the transformation in the way they bought and consumed food was also a tangible sign of the 'modernity' of the twentieth century. These larger changes had direct bearing on the fishing industry. One of the difficulties faced by the North American fishing industry in the early twentieth century was that few in North America ate salted fish. For the Atlantic fisheries to break into North American markets, firms had to find a way to preserve fish as close to its fresh state as possible. Although the cold storage plants could preserve fresh fish for a few days, technicians had been searching for a way to freeze the fish to increase its shelf life from days to weeks or even months. In the 1920s and 1930s, various methods of freezing fish had been invented, most involving dipping the fish into vats of cold salt water. The process was slow, however, and it left the fish looking and tasting less than desirable. In the late 1930s, Clarence Birdseye, an eccentric American inventor and entrepreneur who lived for a number of years in Labrador, had developed a method of 'quick freezing' packages of fish fillets. Quick freezing, which froze the fish between cooled metal plates, arrested the decay process without turning the flesh into a pulpy mass after it was thawed. Consumers preferred this new product, and the North American market for frozen fish began to grow.

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Indeed, between the two world wars a number of developments in the American food industry made frozen fish, and frozen foods in general, more accessible to North Americans. Shipping fish across the continent became cheaper and faster with the growth of road networks in the United States and many areas of Canada. The fish processing companies also realized that by filleting and packaging their product, they could reduce the weight, thereby cutting down on shipping costs. A study of the New England fishing industry found that shipping costs fell by 90 per cent from 1911 to 1941.20 As well, technological innovations and mass production and marketing techniques of such firms as Fridgidaire, Kelvinator, and Sears in the 1920s and 1930s made home refrigerators both more reliable and affordable. By the late 1930s, manufacturers introduced designs featuring separate freezing and storage compartments, giving more room for frozen items.21 Refrigeration, once a luxury only for the wealthy, was quickly becoming standard in American homes. Packaged and processed frozen foods seemed poised to transform the North American food industry. To those of us who have no memory of the time before refrigerators and grocery store chains with frozen-food cases, these developments would not seem particularly remarkable. However, we sometimes forget how innovative and full of possibilities frozen food appeared to people in the 1940s. For the first time, packaged frozen fish from Newfoundland could be shipped to Boston, where it would then be transferred to waiting transport trucks and travel across the country to supermarkets thousands of miles away. Buying and consuming fish suddenly became much easier for the large part of the population unfamiliar with cleaning and filleting fish. Shoppers merely had to pick up one of the brightly coloured packages of frozen fish fillets with cooking instructions on the back. They could store frozen fish, along with their cans of concentrated orange juice and bags of frozen peas, in their home refrigerators. Reaching those kinds of markets, on that scale, was never possible before these technological, organizational, and, indeed, cultural changes in the North American food industry. By the late 1930s only a couple of Newfoundland saltfish companies had invested in freezing facilities. Commissioner Robert Ewbank had tried to interest the American firm General Seafoods in building a plant on the south coast of the island, but protests from New England fishers fearing competition from the north, squashed the deal.22 The outbreak of World War II, however, encouraged several more local saltfish merchants to move into frozen-fish production. During the war, Great Britain relied heavily on North America for food, for its

22

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own population and for its soldiers fighting overseas.23 Shortly after the war began, British importers came to Newfoundland looking for supplies of frozen-fish fillets.24 They signed a contract with three St John's-based firms to provide them with 10 million pounds. That provided the initial impetus for the local frozen fish sector. Within a few years the number of firms producing the new product, as well as exports to both the United Kingdom and the United States soared. Newfoundland exports jumped from approximately 1.5 million pounds of frozen groundfish in 1938 and 1939, to 10.5 million pounds in 1940 and 1941.25 The Commission of Government saw in the frozen-fish enterprise the possibility to bring Newfoundland out of the mercantile world of saltfish into the industrial North American economy and culture. Indeed, the new sector seemed to embody the characteristics of a modern, 'progressive' economy. With centralized processing plants, the frozen-fish sector offered cash employment to rural workers. The frozen-fish companies also provided employment on their offshore fishing trawlers. In addition, the new industry promised to eradicate the credit system because the frozen-fish firms in Newfoundland tended to pay inshore fishers cash for their fish rather than giving them credit. The fact that frozen fish was sold primarily in North America made it doubly attractive to the commissioners. For many years, Newfoundland exporters had experienced currency exchange problems when selling fish. Newfoundland used the Canadian dollar as a medium of exchange, but most of its saltfish customers used other currencies. By selling more fish to the United States, exporters would receive American dollars, thus bypassing the currency problems. The Commission of Government received encouragement from the local fish trade to assist the nascent industry. In 1940, Hazen Russell, a director of Job Brothers, a prominent fishing firm, approached the Commission of Government, emphasizing the economic advantages of supporting the frozen fish sector.26 Russell's central argument was that frozen fish, a processed and packaged commodity, offered many more opportunities for economic expansion than did saltfish production. Frozen fish, a higher value-added product because of its processing, also had the potential to create paid employment in several areas, thus helping to alleviate the unemployment problem in Newfoundland. The frozen-fish industry could also support crews for deep-sea vessels that would be catching fish, and workers on land, including men, women, and boys at the processing plants. Even longshoremen could be assured of more work, although Russell hoped

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they could be persuaded to lower their wage demands for loading frozen fish as he claimed their colleagues at Nova Scotian ports had done. He proposed that the government get involved in this new industry by building cold storage facilities, harbours, wharves, and fish-meal plants. While the Commission of Government resisted erecting its own cold storage plants, the commissioners felt they had enough reasons to move ahead with a new development plan. P.D.H. Dunn, Gorvin's successor as Commissioner for Natural Resources in 1941, began to devise a plan to develop the frozen-fish industry.27 Dunn was convinced that capital, technology, entrepreneurship, efficiency, and centralization would lead the Newfoundland fishery into a more prosperous future. The frozen-fish industry, with its use of cash, would eradicate the credit system without challenging the position of private enterprise in the fishery. In some ways, this proposal resembled Gorvin's earlier plan, with its emphasis on centralized economic planning. The difference, however, was that Dunn's plan ultimately left the development of the economy to private enterprise. The government could guide and influence economic development by providing loans to private companies willing to invest in frozen fish.28 By putting restrictions on what the loans could be used for, the government would have some say in the nature and location of development projects, yet would still maintain an arm's-length relationship with the industry. The state, Dunn suggested, would need to broaden its supervision over the frozen-fish industry by licensing and inspecting processing plants. The government began offering low-interest (3.5 per cent) loans to companies for the construction and operation of frozen-fish plants and for the purchase of deep-sea trawlers. The goal was to encourage development at 15 communities around the island. Each of these centres would have a plant to process the fish, either by freezing, smoking, or salting. The firms would pay cash to fishers for their fish and would also provide jobs in the plants and on their trawlers. Dunn maintained that these fishing centres would 'in the course of time, have the effect of freezing the credit system, the harmful effects of which have been commented upon by every committee which has examined the fishing industry in Newfoundland.'29 Dunn claimed the lack of trawler ports on the northeast coast and the ice conditions that prevented year-round fishing would make large plants there uneconomical. Companies in the frozen-fish business would therefore require operations on both the south and the northeast coasts, so that

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they could ship extra fish from their south coast trawlers to the northern plants during the winter. He rejected any plans to install large-scale co-operative enterprises along the lines of the Special Areas Bill, citing opposition from existing firms and the dearth of business management skills in the local population.30 Dunn also gathered information on the economic trends in North American food markets. The Commission hired New York marketing consultants George S. Armstrong, Inc. to investigate the possibilities for the postwar American markets. In 1944, the firm reported its findings to the Commission.31 The report highlighted the transformation occurring in the processing, marketing, retailing, and consumption of food in North America, and offered compelling evidence that frozen food was a growing industry. Frozen-food consumption in the United States jumped from 170 million pounds annually in 1936 to 800 million pounds in 1943. Frozen-fish production more than doubled in the same period. Grocery stores with frozen-food display cases, practically non-existent in 1930, became a defining feature of the suburban landscape. And perhaps most promising of all, mass production of domestic appliances, combined with rising incomes, meant that most American families could afford refrigerators for their homes. The Armstrong Report claimed that 27 million of the 27.6 million American households with electricity (7.2 million American households were still without electricity) had refrigerators in 1940. While this number seems high, the report clearly gave the impression that frozen foods would soon become an integral part of American eating habits.32 The only drawback to directing fish production to the United States, however, was the fact that Americans overwhelming preferred beef and pork to fish. Acknowledging that the 13 pounds of fish consumed by the average American each year fell far below the 35 pounds eaten by the British on average and the 55 pounds eaten by the average Japanese, the Armstrong Report suggested that the sheer size of the United States made it a lucrative market. Although Britain had been the major importer of frozen fish during the war, the report warned that the relative lack of refrigeration in Britain made investing in that market risky. The consultants cautioned, however, that competition could come from both Canadian and American producers. Before substantial amounts were invested, therefore, Newfoundland processors should proceed slowly, building moderately sized plants (less than 25,000 Ibs/day production capacity), until they could be sure how much product the market would bear. A favourable trade agreement with the United States should also be a priority, they said.

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The Commissioner for Natural Resources had a much larger task than simply announcing that loans would be made available. Indeed, he was faced with having to 'sell' the idea of the industrial alternative to local entrepreneurs. Dunn expressed frustration that so few companies had made the step into the industry: Some of the firms engaged in the fish trade are unfortunately not progressive, and they do not wish to change their methods so long as profit can be made. Their attitude appears to be that someone else should take the initial risk and not until it is proved that profits can be made will they consider coming into the business.33 Securing co-operation from the business community in developing a frozen fish trade was vital to the success of the reconstruction plans. In a letter to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Dunn suggested that the Armstrong Report could help him in convincing the people of Newfoundland that frozen fish was the best alternative for the future.34 He complained that some involved in the fishery still resisted the changes. He was also concerned that organized labour in Newfoundland would increase wage demands, forcing up costs in the new industry. Dunn told the Secretary of State that he had organized a committee consisting of merchants and labourers to look into improving efficiency and cutting costs in the fishing industry. Dunn continued his campaign to gather support for the frozen-fish industry in a radio address in 1944, in which he described the benefits of a modern, industrialized, centralized fishery catering to the needs of North American consumers.35 Taking cues from the Armstrong Report, he talked about home refrigerators, new technology, and an economy proceeding under the guidance of a central authority. For too long, he warned, Newfoundland had been dependent solely on the inshore fishery and crippled by the credit system. Now, with the development of a frozen-fish industry equipped with processing plants and offshore fishing vessels, Newfoundland could be on the path to a stronger economy and a higher standard of living for its people. He also talked about the new relationship developing between the fishing economy and the state. Dunn acknowledged that the government had become more directly involved with the fishing industry since the arrival of Commission of Government, and most recently during World War II. He told the listeners that they had experimented with co-operative organizations and had even considered state-run frozen-fish enterprises. He assured the public, however, that the time for the state to take direct control of the industry had not arrived. The fishery, he asserted, would remain in the hands of private enterprise.

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After finding a way to develop the frozen-fish sector, the other major issue for government and private enterprise alike was to secure favourable trade terms with the United States. Before the war, high tariffs had made the American market inaccessible, but on 1 January 1939 a new trade agreement had come into effect between the United States, Canada, and Great Britain that favourably affected the export of Newfoundland frozen fish to the United States. It reduced the import tariff from 2.5 cents per pound for cod and haddock fillets to 1.8 cents per pound, making the US market more accessible to Newfoundland producers.36 The Commission of Government considered initiating negotiations with the United States during the war, but the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs advised against it.37 Since the United States would emerge from the war as 'the great creditor nation' and would therefore be expected to carry out liberal trade practices, the Secretary of State intimated that a better deal could be reached after hostilities ceased. Perhaps foreshadowing the Confederation issue to come, he warned that the United States was not likely to give favourable trade terms to one British Commonwealth (namely Newfoundland) without giving the same terms to another (namely Canada). In the early 1940s the Commission of Government forged links with a small group of former saltfish merchants who were willing to make the transition to frozen fish. Without a full understanding of the nature of the fishing industry in this period, it is difficult to identify the reasons that some firms successfully made the transition and some (in fact, the majority) did not. We do know that with the exception of Job Brothers, frozen-fish operators were not among the largest fishing enterprises in St John's. Companies such as Bowering Brothers, with offices in St John's, Liverpool, and New York, had already begun to diversify out of the fishery and into retail, insurance, and shipping. The firms that opted for frozen fish tended to be relatively small, family-owned, and family-financed. A common feature among the owners and managers of these companies, however, was their shared belief that frozen fish and the American market promised the best path for the fishery. Indeed, all of the owners of the frozen-fish firms showed a remarkable resilience and willingness to find the means to persist in an unproven industry. By war's end, six Newfoundland companies with a total of 18 plants were exporting 34 million pounds of frozen fish and were poised for further expansion into the American market.38 One of the first firms to produce frozen fish in Newfoundland was Job Brothers and Co. Ltd. The Job family had operated businesses in

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St John's since the late eighteenth century. By the late 1930s, Job Brothers was a diversified company with offices in St John's and Liverpool, and interests in saltfish drying, retail stores, and shipping as well as frozen fish.39 The Hon. R.B. Job, former member of the Newfoundland legislature, was president of the company when it established its first groundfish filleting plant on the south side of the St John's harbour at the beginning of World War II and a second plant in Port aux Basques, on the southwest corner of the island. The key figure in overseeing the frozen-fish branch of this company was not R.B. Job himself but Hazen Russell.40 Russell, born and raised in New Brunswick, first came to Newfoundland as manager of the Catalina branch of the Bank of Nova Scotia in 1916. He entered the fishing business two years later when William F. Coaker, founder of the Fishermen's Protective Union, hired him to manage his operation at Port Union, the Fishermen's Union Trading Company (FUTC). Since he had no previous experience in the fishery, Russell arose early every morning and headed down to the wharf to 'learn the fishing business'.41 While there, he first encountered freezing technology, experimenting with a freezer that Coaker used for salmon and bait. In 1927, Russell left Port Union to join the Board of Directors of Job Brothers. According to his son, Russell tried to keep abreast of the latest methods, periodically visiting freezing technicians and researchers in Britain. At Job Brothers, Russell oversaw the outfitting of the 6,000-ton Blue Peter, a refrigerated vessel formerly used in the Argentine meat trade, with brine freezers for salmon. Beginning in 1929, the Blue Peter, with its crew and a group of young men and women to process the salmon, took a yearly run up the coast of Newfoundland as far as Cartwright, Labrador. Once sufficient salmon had been collected and frozen, the workers were sent back to St John's on a coastal vessel, while the Blue Peter took its cargo to England to sell. Although these operations were small by later standards, the Blue Peter was the first floating, frozen-fish processing outfit in Newfoundland. Job Brothers finally sold the vessel, considered rather large for the salmon operation, in the late 1930s. In 1939, Russell saw an opportunity to expand the firm's frozenfish operations. Job Brothers came into the possession of an abandoned facility in Bonavista, property of a local merchant who had gone out of business while still owing them money. Not interested in using the building himself, R.B. Job let Russell buy it. Russell then incorporated a new company, Bonavista Cold Storage, with authorized capital of $20,000.42 The first directors and shareholders included Russell, his wife Ora, his son Paul, and local merchant

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J.T. Swyers. Within a few years, the new company added a few more local investors, including Ches Pippy, owner of Newfoundland Tractor and Equipment, and Gordon Bradley, who became a senator after Confederation. The company renovated the older premises, added another building, and was soon processing five-pound frozen fillet packs for the British during the war. Meanwhile, Russell continued to work for both Bonavista Cold Storage and Job Brothers. According to Russell's son, in 1943 R.B. Job told Russell that he could not continue to 'serve two masters', and suggested that Job Brothers purchase a controlling interest in Bonavista Cold Storage. Russell agreed, but did not remain under the influence of Job for long. Shortly thereafter, Russell secured a loan from the Bank of Montreal and bought controlling interest in Job Brothers.43 In a business coup d'etat, he replaced R.B. Job as president of Job Brothers and Co. Ltd. R.B. Job, however, remained on the Board of Directors. Then, Russell formed a holding company called Northlantic Fisheries in 1945.44 Northlantic Fisheries consisted of Job Brothers, Bonavista Cold Storage, Northlantic Sealers, Blue Peter Steamships, Canada Bay Cold Storage,45 St Anthony Cold Storage, and Bonavista Mutual Traders.46 By 1947, Northlantic, with $2,344,200 subscribed capital, seemed poised to play a major role in the frozen-fish industry. That year, Russell applied for a loan to purchase three trawlers.47 He argued that they needed deep-sea fishing vessels to obtain a greater diversity of species, such as haddock, redfish, and flounder, for the American market. He also explained that the 200 workers employed at the St John's plant depended on a steady supply of fish. The next year the company received a loan of $400,000 from the Commission of Government to purchase three trawlers.48 The alliance between Russell and the Job family, however, did not last. In 1953, Russell resigned as president of Job Brothers and Northlantic.49 He then bought back interest in the company he founded, Bonavista Cold Storage, from Job Brothers. Russell was to spend the rest of his career at the helm of Bonavista Cold Storage. After Russell left, Job Brothers gradually divested itself of its frozen-fish investments, except for its plant in St John's, which it retained until the 1960s.50 By the end of the war, a company called Fishery Products Limited had emerged as the largest producer of frozen fish, with a production in 1947 of over 7.7 million Ibs.51 Although the company was only incorporated in 1941, the owners, the Monroe family of St John's, had been involved in the fishing business since the early twentieth century. Walter S. Monroe was born in Dublin, Ireland, in 1871 and educated

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in Edinburgh and Oxford before emigrating to Newfoundland to assist his uncle, Moses Monroe, in his family enterprises (Colonial Cordage, Newfoundland Boot and Shoe Company, St John's Electrical Light Company). In 1909, W.S. Monroe founded the Monroe Export Company, a saltfish firm, which he operated until he entered Newfoundland politics in the 1920s. Monroe became Prime Minister in 1924, holding that post until 1928.52 Preoccupied with the tumultuous world of Newfoundland politics, W.S. Monroe left much of the management of the family business to his son, Arthur. Born in St John's and educated in St John's and England, Arthur Monroe led the family into the frozen-fish business at the beginning of World War II. Known to his contemporaries as a bright, clever, if somewhat impetuous business person, Arthur Monroe built a large fishing enterprise in a relatively short period of time. From its inception, it was a family-owned and family-financed enterprise.53 In its first few years, the company underwent significant growth. The largest investor was the family-owned Monroe Export Company, with 1,424 shares at $100 each. Over the next few years, this company was the main source of investment, owing to the fact that it was able to secure a $70,000 bank loan for the new family endeavour.54 The immediate family members—W.S. Monroe, Arthur and Helen Monroe—increased their shares in the company as well. Besides increasing investment through the Monroe Export Company, Fishery Products Limited (FPL) raised its level of nominal capitalization from $50,000 in 1941 to $2,400,000 by 1946. Although not all of this was subscribed, by 1947 the company had issued $1,255,200 worth of shares.55 The firm's first freezing plants were at St John's and Holyrood, located just outside the capital. During the war, Arthur Monroe established plants at Isle aux Morts, Burnt Islands, and Burin on the south coast of Newfoundland, and on the northeast coast, at La Scie and Joe Batt's Arm.56 By the end of the war the company owned four trawlers, various smaller motor vessels, and two refrigerated ships.57 In 1946 FPL bought the assets of the Monroe Export Company and took over its saltfish operations.58 The company was among the largest exporters of saltfish, by volume, between 1947 and 1959.59 Despite being the largest frozen-fish operator in Newfoundland, FPL did not receive any government loans until 1947, four years after the inception of the loan program.60 Although Monroe first applied for a loan of $100,000 in 1945, several members of the Commission of Government were concerned about the rapid expansion of the company and were afraid it was a poor risk. Dunn refused to send the loan application to the Commission, arguing that it was too difficult to

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Frozen-fish plants operating in 1946 and 1964.

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control Monroe's penchant for overexpansion. He noted that the owner of FPL had 'adopted a policy of expansion which is unlikely to be justified by results'.61 Dunn reiterated his reservations about the company to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. Admitting that FPL did have a few very good plants with high productive capacity, he explained he was reluctant to recommend loans 'because of the difficulty of controlling Mr. Arthur Monroe'. Dunn remarked that FPL'S latest growth had occurred against the advice of both himself and Monroe's bank. He conceded, however, that 'if a satisfactory means of controlling his passion for expansion can be found, then I shall bring a proposal to the Commission.'62 In 1947, Monroe again applied for a loan, this time for $225,000 to buy a refrigerated freighter and a dragger.63 The Secretary for Natural Resources, Kenneth Carter, remarked that the proposal was sound, but his support was given reluctantly. The company had recently cut prices paid to fishers for fish, and he suggested that the company was profiting at their expense: Our purpose in making funds available to operators in the frozen fish industry is to encourage it so that the country generally and the fishermen particularly should benefit therefrom. Indications are, however, that the fishermen are not getting as much for their fish as they should while the companies are piling up huge profits.64 Although the Commission of Government had no direct evidence that the company was making exorbitant profits at the expense of the fishers, it hesitated to finance the operation. The Commissioner for Finance, noting earlier concerns about the company, recommended caution in giving capital to FPL.65 In June 1947 the Commission of Government finally granted FPL $225,000 for the purchase of three vessels.66 The loan invoked an outburst from the Treasury in London. In a letter to St John Chadwick of the Commonwealth Relations Office, W. Russell Edmunds of the Treasury Chambers chastised the Commission of Government for providing the loan to FPL, and in particular, for accepting mortgages on the vessels themselves as security.67 The central issue that Edmunds was addressing, however, was whether or not government should be assisting private enterprise at all. He believed the industry, not government, should provide the initiative and the capital, no matter how needy the Newfoundland economy. The views from the British Treasury, however, were not universally accepted, even within the metropolitan government. Chadwick passed the letter to W.H. Flinn, Dunn's successor in Natural Resources, remarking

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wryly that it was 'a long harangue from our friends in the Treasury'.68 Flinn, in reply, defended the Commission of Government's decision to fund companies such as Fishery Products Limited. He argued: Anything in reason should be encouraged that will help to divert sales from the salt-codfish, non-convertible sterling markets in Europe and, generally, that will accelerate or develop the modernization of methods of production whether of frozen or dried salt codfish. I think that Government has taken a very fair risk and is indeed to be commended for its bold and imaginative policy at a time when some lead of the sort is desirable.69 Despite concerns about extending loans to private companies, and Fishery Products Limited in particular, the commissioners were finally willing to take those risks to make changes to the Newfoundland fishery. During the war several smaller frozen-fish enterprises also emerged—companies that would prove to be among the major frozen fish producers after 1945. John Penny and Sons of Ramea, on the south coast of Newfoundland, was an old bank fishery firm that had been operating since the 1850s.70 The Newfoundland bank fishery, which used wooden schooners to fish the rich offshore fishing grounds, developed in the nineteenth century.71 It was based primarily on the south coast of the island and the Avalon Peninsula. Merchants outfitted schooners with dories. The crews fished using handlines from the small wooden craft, which they lowered over the side of the ship each day. The fish was salted and packed into barrels, where it was later dried on the beach by women employed by the merchant.72 By World War II, however, this fishery had declined, and former banking firms such as John Penny and Sons were looking for new areas of enterprise. George Penny, later appointed a senator for Newfoundland after Confederation,73 was the fourth generation of the Penny family to ply the trade. His company managed to survive the Depression of the 1930s and in 1942 made the transition to frozen fish. Like most of the other frozen-fish companies, John Penny and Sons was a family-owned and family-controlled enterprise.74 Besides family members, its early directors also included John Cheeseman, who would become provincial Minister of Fisheries in 1956. In 1946, John Penny and Sons applied for and received a $40,000 loan from the Commission of Government to buy a trawler.75 By that point, the company had already financed one trawler of its own.76 It also owned several schooners, as well as a number of smaller motor dories used in the collection of fish from fishers along the coast. Its

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plant had been installed with the quick-freezing technology in 1946. Employing an average of 95 men and 15 women, this processing plant had a production capacity of 40,000 pounds of packaged fish fillets per day.77 When George Penny died in 1949, the ownership and operation of the business fell to his wife, Marie, and daughter, Margaret. Silas Moores of Carbonear, connected to the saltfish exporting firm of W. & J. Moores, also made the transition to frozen fish during the war. Incorporated in March 1944, the directors and majority shareholders of North Eastern Fish Industries Limited included Silas Moores, his wife Dorothy, and his daughter Megan.78 Later the family firm was joined by son Frank, who became Premier of Newfoundland in the 1970s. The company established its first frozen-fish processing plant in Harbour Grace. After barely a few weeks' operation, however, the plant burned down, and the Commission of Government provided a loan of $100,000 to rebuild.79 By the end of the war, the Commission of Government's program for developing the fishery was firmly in place. Indeed, when Newfoundland turned to constitutional questions in the late 1940s, the future direction of the fishing economy was part of the agenda. The National Convention, which met from September 1946 to January 1948, was a group of citizens elected to debate the political future of the country.80 Besides voting on the contents of the ballots for the two referenda, the Convention also investigated various aspects of Newfoundland's economy and society. The Fisheries Committee, chaired by R.B. Job of Job Brothers, presented its report in March 1947. With one of the acknowledged 'pioneers' of frozen fish at its head, the Committee argued that frozen fish would play a major part in Newfoundland's future. Citing Dunn's reports on postwar reconstruction as well as the Armstrong Report, the Committee proclaimed that the frozen-fish sector was 'in the class of a manufacturing industry', and had the most to offer the economy of Newfoundland.81 So confident were they in the future of frozen fish that the Subcommittee Report on Saltfish focused more on frozen fish than saltfish. Citing the belief that the world supply of saltfish would soon outstrip demand as saltfish-producing countries expanded their own production, the report suggested Newfoundland should divert as much production as possible into the frozen-fish sector. Access to the American frozen-fish market remained a major preoccupation of the Fisheries Committee. It acknowledged that the large exports of frozen fish to the United Kingdom were a wartime aberration and that demands for the product would soon decline. In

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fact, the Committee, citing the Armstrong Report, agreed that only when the United Kingdom had developed refrigeration and cold-storage facilities on the same scale as the United States could substantial overseas sales be expected. In the meantime, however, securing favourable trade terms with the United States to ensure access to that market was critical, otherwise Newfoundland plants would sit idle and hundreds would be unemployed. The uncertainty of the US market also hindered expansion in the industry, as it made further investment in frozen-fish plants risky. Other matters addressed by the Fisheries Committee highlight both a concern with fostering the frozen-fish industry and the assumption that the state would henceforth take a more interventionist role in fisheries matters. Suggestions concerning the government's assistance to the frozen-fish industry, encouragement of the use of more efficient gear in the inshore fishery, capital investment schemes, and social security to widows of fishers reveal this new attitude to fisheries management. As well, the Committee debated the viability of co-operatives in the fishery, tentatively suggesting that they might offer the best returns for the producer, particularly in the live lobster fishery. Perhaps foreshadowing things to come, the Committee concluded by expressing concern about the possibility of the Grand Banks becoming depleted with the expanded use of more efficient harvesting technologies. One of the people sitting in the National Assembly chambers taking great interest in the Fisheries Report was the member from Bonavista Centre and future Premier of Newfoundland, Joseph R. Smallwood. He was especially intrigued by the possibilities offered by the industrial frozen-fish industry and praised R.B. Job for producing a fine report. Smallwood recognized, however, that industrializing the fishery had far greater implications than merely shifting to a new product. In fact, he seemed ambiguous about what he called the 'social or sociological' dimension of the new way of fishing. He said, 'My head tells me we must change; we must become industrialized; we must go ahead or go under', yet he had reservations about the transformation from 'petty capitalist' production to a 'fishery proletariat'.82 Smallwood argued that national 'traits' he associated with independent fishing, such as individualism and adventurousness, would be lost. Smallwood acknowledged, however, that the social benefits of the industrial fishery might outweigh the losses. He noted the case of Bonavista, where he had spent some years at the height of the Great Depression, which had been partially industrialized through the frozen-fish plant. He explained:

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a social revolution has occurred there in living conditions and standards since the fresh fish freezing plant has been established. So I have a great deal of sympathy for and a great deal of appreciation of the importance of this new development and also a great deal of concern.83 Smallwood seems to have recognized the double-edged sword of modernization; he saw both the promise and the threat inherent in fisheries industrialization and realized it could involve fundamental social as well as economic change for Newfoundland. Moreover, these comments suggest that, in March 1947, Smallwood was not entirely convinced that industrialization was the best path for the future. The 'industrial vision of development' was by no means universal. That, and Mr. Smallwood's conversion, would come later. At one level, the events that occurred in Newfoundland in the 1930s and 1940s were unique: the rescinding of responsible government and its replacement with a Commission of Government was unprecedented. As well, Newfoundland's extreme dependence on saltfish production made it particularly vulnerable to changes in world food commodity prices caused by the Great Depression. At another level, however, the Commission of Government represented a much larger phenomenon: the self-conscious attempt by the state to 'modernize' the economy, making it more orderly and efficient, a process that was occurring in other parts of the world. It was also a fundamental part of the European colonial project in Asia, Africa, and the Americas. In Newfoundland, the Commission of Government greatly expanded the state's role in the fishery by creating the Newfoundland Fisheries Board and organizing saltfish marketing and cooperatives. There were limits to the Commission's willingness to intervene in rural Newfoundland, however, as it rejected Gorvin's proposed Special Areas Bill, which would have given the Commission responsibility for directing the fishing economy. With the arrival of quick-freezing technology and the instant demand created for frozen fish during World War II, we can see the growth of the 'industrial' vision of development. Amid the pronouncements by Commissioner Dunn about the 'revolution' in the frozen-food industry and the mass marketing of home refrigerators in the United States, government and industry, from their different perspectives, both began thinking about the fishery and its potential for developing the economy. Pursuing the frozen-fish option was both an ideological and practical decision. At an ideological level, frozen fish offered the path to the creation of a modern, industrial society in

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Newfoundland. At the practical level, providing loans to the frozenfish companies, which offered employment and cash to fishers for fish, seemed an easier way to develop the economy and reduce dependence on merchant credit. In the process, a new partnership arose between the government and a small number of companies willing to enter the new frozen-fish sector. This alliance laid the foundation for a long-term relationship between private enterprise and the state in fisheries development in Newfoundland. Indeed, it became an enduring characteristic of postwar fisheries policy. As well as providing the basis for industrial fisheries development in Newfoundland, the Commission of Government period saw the initiation of several debates about the means and goals of fisheries development. One issue that arose was the role of the state and the possible methods of government assistance to the fishery. To what degree should the state be involved, and what were its obligations towards the fishery and the people who made their living by it? How should the state help private enterprise? Was there a role for cooperative fishing operations? These questions arose initially during the Commission of Government era, and they would resurface in the decades to come.

PART II

Planning for a New Fishery: the 1950s

3

Visions of Development in the Canadian Context After the clock struck midnight on 31 March 1949, Newfoundland quietly slipped into Confederation, an anti-climactic event after the tumult and rancour of the political debates that preceded it. As part of the Terms of Union, responsibility for Newfoundland's sea fisheries moved to Ottawa from St John's. Under the British North America Act, the federal government had jurisdiction for regulating and conserving Canada's ocean fisheries. This role was administrative only; the state did not claim public ownership of the resource the way it had with minerals. The provinces retained control over processing and labour in the fishery. The events of Confederation, however, have obscured the more fundamental changes occurring in the state's relationship to the economy in general, and the fishery in particular. Like the Commission of Government during the 1930s and 1940s, the federal and provincial Departments of Fisheries redefined their roles in the fishery after 1949 and developed new institutions to accommodate these changes. And all the while, the industrial vision of development, which grew during the 1940s with the arrival of the frozen-fish sector, gained strength. Both federal fisheries officials and the new Premier of Newfoundland, Joseph R. Smallwood, put their faith in the abilities of private capital, technology, and the state to build a modern fishery. 37

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Not everyone involved in developing the fisheries, however, agreed that the industrial vision offered the best hope for the future of the Newfoundland fishery. Indeed, several people within the provincial government, including the first Minister of Fisheries, WJ. Keough, were sceptical of the ability of industrial development to bring prosperity. Although these ideas were never dominant within fisheries planning, their very existence suggests that we cannot assume that the industrial vision of development prevailed because it was the only 'logical' or natural choice for the Newfoundland fishery. As Morera argued: Gramsci's insistence on the historicity of hegemony and on the historical, rather than intellectual, reasons for the triumph of one hegemonic system over another are of the utmost importance for a clear understanding of this crucial concept.1 The ideology of planning—specifically, the industrial vision of development, where it appeared, and how—is the subject of this chapter. The immediate post-World War II years were filled with optimism about the potential for Canada's economic growth. During the war the Canadian economy had expanded, particularly in the 'high-tech' sectors such as electronics, automotive production, and chemical engineering. These same technologies had helped the Allied forces win the war, and many believed that scientific applications could transform the peacetime economy and society as well. Indeed, the confidence in the powers of technology, economic analysis, and rational state planning breathed life into the post-World War II international economic development or 'modernization' movement.2 Increasingly, the state was adopting a dual function—as both an enforcer of regulations and a supporter, offering scientific expertise, economic analysis, and information to the industry. As Morera explains, this dual role is the fundamental characteristic of the modern, interventionist state. He argues, however, that the state does not intervene out of purely ethical reasons, but as a way of controlling conflict and adapting 'civil society to the economic structures'.3 The state was not simply helping the economy, but helping to develop a particular type of economy. Although the Canadian state had long been involved in economic development, the degree and nature of state involvement in the Canadian economy began to change in the 1930s and 1940s. As well, the state's bureaucratic structures expanded to accommodate its new role. During the Great Depression, the federal government began to respond to public demands to alleviate the suffering caused by massive unemployment. During World War II, federal cabinet minister

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The federal Department of Fisheries created a series of 'advertisements', which appeared on the back cover of the departmental information magazine, Trade News. This ad, promoting the use of electronic fish finders, deliberately plays upon the readers'knowledge of the famous phrase from Moby Dick to show how new technology will replace 'traditional'methods. Many of these ads tried to emphasize the modernity and efficiency of the fishing industry. (Trade News 7, 1, July 1954.)

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C.D. Howe, arguably one of the most powerful economic policymakers in the 1940s and 1950s, orchestrated production for the war effort from Ottawa.4 Although he dismantled many of the Crown corporations and regulations systems he set up during the conflict, the state never returned to the pre-war level of involvement in the economy. The federal government's official adoption of Keynesianinspired economic policies and the expansion of a social welfare system signalled that the state was indeed broadening its involvement in Canadian civil society. The federal government continued to provide support to Canadian business through tax incentives, infrastructure programs, and research and development. Industries considered vital to postwar industrial development, such as energy and mining, continued to be heavily regulated.5 Although Canada's fisheries never received the federal government's attention the way petroleum or other sectors considered central to Canada's postwar development did, the bureaucracy did undergo a transformation. A Canadian fisheries department had existed since 1868, but it was a relatively small operation, primarily responsible for enforcing fisheries regulations regarding length of seasons, type of gear used, and pollution control. In 1949, the Department of Fisheries announced a bureaucratic 'modernization' to reflect its new role in encouraging industrial development in the fishery.6 The federal Minister of Fisheries at the time, R.W. Mayhew, also admitted that Newfoundland's entry into Confederation, and the responsibilities it brought, hastened the bureaucratic expansion and reorganization. The major structural change in the Department of Fisheries was a centralization of functions and services in Ottawa. Before 1949, the Department of Fisheries had been organized in geographical divisions, with local offices overseeing the Atlantic, Pacific, and Inland districts. After 1949, however, the geographic organization gave way to 'functional' divisions based in Ottawa, with local offices retained to help administer programs and regulations. These new divisions oversaw a greater variety of responsibilities, including technological development, economic and market analysis, conservation, and education and consumer information. Industrial development, however, became a major priority, and many of these divisions were oriented towards helping Canada's fisheries become more competitive and efficient. Aside from the Department of Fisheries itself, the federal fisheries bureaucracy included the Fisheries Research Board, the government's scientific research organization that had been operating, in various forms, since 1898. In the 1920s and 1930s it had become more industry-oriented, providing research in processing and harvesting-

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This ad plays upon the stereotypes of fishers as individualistic, hardy men. By focusing on the variability offish harvests, it negates other factors that affect fishers' ability to catch fish, including access to technology or loans for fishing equipment, capital structures within the industry, and labour issues. (Trade News 10, 9, March 1958.)

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technologies. The Fisheries Prices Support Board was another federal agency, created to offer assistance to fishers in the event of low prices. All three divisions reported to the Minister of Fisheries. Besides encouraging industrial development, the Department of Fisheries played a greater role in promotion. At a general level, the revitalized department announced it would 'develop a greater understanding of the importance of the resource and the industry in the social and economic life of the country.'7 Promotion was also considered necessary to create general consent for increased state involvement in the fishery and to persuade people in the industry to accept new approaches and methods. The Department of Fisheries Annual Report for 1951-2 explained the necessity of promotion: Until recently there was a general lack of public understanding not only of the fisheries and their economic importance but of the Department's constitutional responsibilities and its numerous services. Lack of understanding on the part of the public and the industry makes the work of the Department that much more difficult, particularly as it relates to curbing illegal fishing. The regulations can only be enforced effectively with the co-operation of fishermen and the public.8 As Gramsci would argue, creating consent for state involvement in civil society was the foundation of the hegemonic process. The above passage certainly indicates that the Department of Fisheries believed achieving 'co-operation' from both the people in the fishery and the general public was essential to its legitimacy. At the same time, the department believed communication to the industry was important for encouraging the 'modernization' of the fishery. Promotion, mainly the responsibility of the department's Information and Education Service, took a variety of forms. The department frequently issued press releases on its activities and the fisheries development programs. It supported the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's 'Fishermen's Broadcasts', aired throughout Atlantic Canada and Newfoundland, often supplying the stations with interviews from Fisheries Research Board scientists. The department reached people through print with a magazine-style journal called Trade News. This publication contained general articles on the fisheries, information on regulations, profiles of department officials, reports on scientific and technological research, and articles about the various policies and programs. The information was presented in a visually appealing way, complete with numerous photographs and a

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series of promotional posters on the Canadian fisheries, which the Department also placed in Canadian commercial magazines and used in various public exhibitions and trade shows. The department sent Trade News to people involved in the fishery, such as fishers, plant managers, and provincial fishery officials. The Department of Fisheries also distributed information on the fisheries through other publications, pamphlets, films, and filmstrips. Perhaps the most significant changes in the Department of Fisheries in the immediate postwar years was the introduction of economic analysis to fisheries management. Earlier, biological concerns had dominated the approach to managing Canada's fisheries. According to historian Doug Owram, economists achieved a new prominence in the postwar bureaucracy, as they were believed to have the ability to predict and rationalize the chaotic world of capitalism.9 In the 1940s, university-trained economists were appointed to key positions in the fisheries bureaucracy, signalling the importance of this perspective to fisheries management. In the early 1950s, H. Scott Gordon, an economist who also spent some time working for the federal Department of Fisheries, wrote the influential journal article, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery'.10 Gordon brought both biological and economic issues together in his theory, arguing that it was possible to calculate the amount of fish that could be taken to give the greatest economic returns to the individual fishing enterprise. He argued, however, that when a resource was common property, getting the maximum economic benefit was almost impossible. With unlimited access, greater numbers of people would enter the industry, thus causing profits for everyone to fall. According to the theory, limiting access to common property resources through restrictive licensing was the only way to ensure adequate economic returns. Although the federal government never introduced limited-entry licensing to the Newfoundland fishery, other elements of the theory, specifically its attention to increasing economic efficiency, permeated fisheries policies in this period.11 The man credited with raising the profile of economics in the department was Stewart Bates, Deputy Minister of Fisheries from 1947 to 1954. Among his colleagues, he was known as a brilliant thinker who kept abreast of economic theories of development.12 Born in Scotland, Bates was educated at the University of Glasgow and Harvard University. He began his career as an economic policy adviser in Canada when he was invited to work for the Nova Scotia Economic Council in the 1930s. In 1937, the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (the Rowell-Sirois Commission)

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engaged him to write The Financial History of Canadian Governments.13 After his work with the Commission, he taught briefly at Dalhousie University in Halifax before becoming Assistant Deputy Minister of the Department of Fisheries in Ottawa in 1942. Although Bates's background in fisheries was limited (while at Dalhousie, he served on the Nova Scotia Salt Fish Board), he nevertheless researched and wrote the Report on the Canadian Atlantic SeaFishery as part of the Nova Scotia Royal Commission on Reconstruction and Rehabilitation in 1944.14 Bates left the federal Department of Fisheries for a short time after the war when C.D. Howe appointed him Director General of Economic Research. In 1947, Bates returned to the Department of Fisheries as Deputy Minister. He left the department in 1954 when he became president of the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, a position he retained until his death in 1964. Although Bates was writing before the modernization paradigm reached its height and before such economic planners as Rostow popularized the theory, his analysis of the problems in the Atlantic fishery were consistent with the modernization view. As with many modernization theorists, he pointed to internal factors, such as the attitudes of the population and lack of capital or technology, as the reasons for the problems in the fishery. For Bates, modernization meant far more than building larger fishing boats; it implied adopting new attitudes, accepting new values, and turning away from the world of the transatlantic mercantile trade, with which saltfish had been associated, towards a North American, industrial consumer culture. Bates considered the Atlantic Canadian saltfish industry a 'traditional' enterprise that had failed to evolve into an industrial form. He found the Atlantic saltfish firms weak because of their relatively smaller size, their lack of centralization and consolidation, and the absence of organizations among either the fishers or the exporters. He acknowledged that there were historical reasons for this, mainly that saltfish was originally produced by the fishers themselves at scattered points along the coast. Although the Nova Scotia saltfish industry had moved into mechanical processing in the form of artificial dryers, he claimed that the industry never fully modernized. Bates held up the British Columbia salmon fishery, which had undergone consolidation and geographic centralization and was more capital-intensive, as a model for the Atlantic fisheries.15 Not only did Bates believe that the saltfish sector was at an arrested stage of development, he accused it of stifling the spirit of innovation in the industry as a whole. He complained:

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the tardiness of development has allowed interests that were vested in the older forms of the fish trade (particularly salt fish) to maintain their influences, their outlook and vision over most of the fishing industry and its associated institutions. Even the technique of production in fresh fishing has tended to be confined within the horizons of those interested primarily in the older branch of the trade.16 The 'outlook and vision' of the saltfish industry, in Bates's mind, were not those of a forward-looking, modern, industrial, North American fishery, but of a stagnating fishery that looked to the past. Elsewhere in the report, Bates remarked that the fresh-frozen industry entered the war 'under the compulsion of methods' of the saltfish trade; without the restraining influence of the latter, the former would be able to develop more easily.17 Clearly, Bates believed that the saltfish industry had a negative influence on the development of a modern, industrial fishery in Atlantic Canada, and it could not be allowed to maintain its dominance. Bates's attitudes towards the saltfish trade extended to the people who worked in the industry—both company owners and fishers. In characterizing the fishers, Bates drew on stereotypes of the seafaring man and of the nature of rural peoples.18 He romanticized the inshore fishers, yet insisted that these very romantic qualities of the fishers were the source of their backwardness. Fishers were ruggedly individualistic and independent, but at the same time they were stubborn, ignorant of modern ways, and in need of guidance. 'Fishermen', he remarked, 'often value highly freedom and the romantic and heroic attributes of the sea; sometimes, like older European seafarers, they act as if "seafaring is necessary, living is not necessary.'"19 Independence posed a problem, according to Bates, because fishers valued it more than economic gain. He wondered at those who were 'apparently willing to stand much economic stress so long as this freedom is unimpaired.'20 In contrast, Bates noted, the British Columbia fishers had entered the work culture of postwar North America, and they had achieved 'near the position of wage-earners' as organized labour.21 Bates thought a more industrialized work culture would stabilize the industry, encouraging fishers to work more efficiently and productively. Bates applauded the frozen-fish industry. He clearly believed that its centralized organization, its use of new technologies, and its predominantly North American markets made it a suitable foundation for an industrial fishery. Like P.D.H. Dunn, Bates was excited about the 'revolution' in North American food processing that occurred because

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of the mechanization and consolidation of agriculture and the food distribution industry. Tor the housewife', he argued, 'this transformation filled her shelves with canned fruits, vegetables, meats, soups, and a great variety of packaged and graded foods that her grandmother never knew.'22 For Bates, technology was important, not only for developing new products but also for rationalizing production. If firms consolidated harvesting and processing operations, they could reduce costs, increase production, and maintain greater control over quality. He envisioned the Nova Scotia fishery centralized into a few ports with processing plants, each with its own fleet of trawlers. Bates insisted that modernization could not take place without an accompanying change in attitudes among the people in the industry. He claimed the saltfish industry was lacking in sufficient vision, arguing that 'the social milieu in the industry was not the kind that encourages the search for modernization.'23 Education needed to take place at all levels, from the fishers and plant workers to the company managers, to nurture 'the imagination and intelligence on which economic progress depends'.24 Industrial schools would provide technical skills, but he suggested that education must strive beyond mere technical proficiency: Industrial education may not be sufficient to create the desired habits of mind in the industry, but the attitude to adopt is not to regard such education as having only a remote chance of creating the desired habits of mind; it is rather the only chance.25 Until the people of the Atlantic fishery accepted the social and economic values of the larger North American society, they would be doomed to a life of poverty. Bates admired the Commission of Government's work in encouraging the frozen-fish industry in Newfoundland and suggested that it could provide a model for Nova Scotia. He proposed that the state invest directly in fishing enterprises, either private firms or cooperative ventures, by providing equity capital and subsidies for fishing vessels. Once the company was financially secure, its shareholders could buy back the government shares. Bates also recommended that the government finance and build cold-storage and refrigeration facilities, something that Newfoundland's Commission of Government had decided against. Although Bates was reluctant to endorse the escalation of state administration in private enterprise, he admitted that government involvement in the fishery was inevitable with any kind of assistance program. This arrangement, at least, gave the government, through its shares, some control over the use of the funds. It

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also allowed the fishery to remain, structurally, in the hands of private enterprise. And lest people assume the government was handing out money freely, he argued: 'It is not a Santa Claus State, since management has to find an equal share.'26 Clearly, Bates had adopted the prevailing hegemonic model of development and was trying to encourage its application to the Atlantic fishery. His words are important, not only because of the influence his work had on the formulation of federal policy but also because of the insights they give to the ideological dimension of fisheries development. Federal fisheries planners were not merely unbiased technocrats looking to solve problems of the fishery; they represented a particular ideological position. Their concepts of the way economies and societies work and evolve had a tremendous impact on the direction of fisheries development. Others overseeing this transformation in fisheries management in the federal government were R.W. Mayhew, Minister of Fisheries from 1948 to 1952, and James Sinclair, who held the Fisheries portfolio from 1952 to 1957.27 Mayhew was a native of Ontario who moved to British Columbia as a young man, establishing himself in a career in manufacturing before taking public office in 1937. Mayhew's main contribution was overseeing the restructuring of the Department of Fisheries, a process that Bates initiated. A British Columbian, James Sinclair replaced Mayhew.28 A Rhodes Scholar and trained engineer, Sinclair entered politics briefly in 1940, when he was elected to the House of Commons. He joined the Royal Canadian Air Force during the war, then regained his seat in the House of Commons after his return from overseas in 1945. Known as a renegade in the Liberal caucus in his first few years in office, 'Jimmy' Sinclair distinguished himself as one of the brightest parliamentary assistants of the House of Commons before he received his cabinet post.29 Jack Pickersgill, a top adviser to Louis St Laurent and later a member of Parliament from Newfoundland, depicted Sinclair as a 'brilliant debater', independent, and outspoken.30 Although two former directors of the Fisheries Research Board described Sinclair as one of the strongest and ablest fisheries ministers of the first 20 years after the war, they also accused him of taking a greater interest in the Pacific fisheries than the Atlantic.31 Sinclair's diaries indicate a strong interest in the fisheries of his home province. In his account of a trip he made to the Soviet Union in 1955 as a representative to an international meeting on whaling, he noted that he frequently discussed issues of importance to the British Columbia salmon fishery with Soviet officials. Besides the personal interest he had in the

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Pacific fishery, the fact that the total value of fishery products from British Columbia was usually roughly double that of Newfoundland may have contributed to his greater interest in Canada's west coast.32 In Newfoundland, the political landscape was dominated by Joseph Smallwood, probably one of the most controversial, yet enigmatic, figures in Newfoundland's political history.33 One of the mythologies that has survived in Newfoundland is that he deliberately turned his back on the fishery in favour of land-based industrial development. On the contrary, however, the man who wrapped himself in the banner of Confederation, led Newfoundland into Canada, and then reigned as Premier for over two decades made a profound impact on the fishery. Born in rural Newfoundland in 1900, his family moved to St John's while he was still an infant. The oldest of 13 children, Smallwood had an impoverished childhood, despite being the grandson of a St John's boot and shoe manufacturer. Through the help of a welloff uncle, young Joseph attended one of the city's most prestigious academies, Bishop Feild School. Never a strong student, Smallwood left school before he reached 15 years of age. Despite his lack of academic success, the young man took an interest in social and political issues and began to think of himself as a socialist. He became an enthusiastic member of a debating society, the Methodist College Literary Institute, which had nurtured and polished many of Newfoundland's political elite over the years. Smallwood began his first career, journalism, while still a teenager. After several years with St John's newspapers he moved to New York, where he found casual work with the socialist publication, The Call. Although Smallwood's understanding of the subtleties of socialist theory was questionable, he ardently promoted the workers' cause. Smallwood threw himself into the labour movement of New York. He soon spoke regularly at labour, human rights, and even Jewish rights rallies. In 1925, as the American socialist movement was crumbling, Smallwood returned to Newfoundland. He married, started a family, but never quite 'settled down'. Over the next 25 years he tried several careers, including union and co-operative organizing, newspaper editing, book publishing, and farming. All the while, he still harboured political ambitions, and worked as a backroom organizer for the Newfoundland Liberal Party and Richard Squires. He ran unsuccessfully for a seat in Bonavista as a Liberal in 1932. He also began amassing facts and knowledge about his country, information he used to write several books, including a biography of Sir William Coaker and his first encyclopedia, Book of Newfoundland (after his retirement from

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politics he started work on the Encyclopedia of Newfoundland and Labrador, finally completed in the mid-1990s). He became known to the Newfoundland public in the 1930s as the voice of The Barrelman, a popular radio show. Declaring he was 'making Newfoundland better known to Newfoundlanders', Small wood promoted his own brand of Newfoundland nationalism to a growing base of fans. His leap from radio host to politician happened in 1946, when he was elected to the National Convention. He became the self-appointed champion of Confederation with Canada, both during the Convention debates and in the two referendums held to decide Newfoundland's political fate. When the Confederation option won the majority of votes in the second referendum, Small wood led the Newfoundland team in negotiations with Ottawa. Shortly after Newfoundland became the tenth Canadian province, the people of Newfoundland voted him into the Premier's chair. Smallwood was a complicated character: he defies any attempts to make definitive statements about his philosophies or creeds. Contradictions in political ideology never seemed to bother him, as he jumped from hustling socialism on the streets of New York to supporting the backroom antics of the corrupt government of Richard Squires without any apparent qualms. Nevertheless, an awareness of two dimensions to his character can help us understand how he affected the Newfoundland fishery after he became Premier. First, he was a dedicated believer in his own vision and excelled at making others believe it, too. His convictions changed over the years, but the lack of consistency does not negate the strength with which he held on to his views. With the speaking skills honed in the union halls of New York City, he applied his powers of persuasion to his political career. Second, Smallwood had little financial sense and weak management skills, which frequently hindered his ability to bring his visions to reality. Throughout his life, in both his personal and public affairs, Smallwood embarked on a series of grand plans that failed, largely because of his lack of judgement and inability to control the financial aspect. Before he was 40, he had a litany of well-intentioned 'flops' to his credit, including a failed film project, defunct newspapers he had edited, and several misadventures in farming. After Confederation, Smallwood promoted a number of development projects, from glove factories to a linerboard mill in Stephenville, that suffered from imprudent planning and management. Smallwood also had a tendency to fall under the charms of industrial promoters who were little more than 'carpetbaggers', such as Alfred Valdmanis and John C. Doyle.34 Not everything Smallwood did was a failure; a man who won

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six provincial elections could hardly be called a loser. The point, however, is that Smallwood frequently got into trouble for jumping into enterprises and projects without adequate planning or understanding of the financial considerations. By the time he became Premier, Smallwood had come to believe that industrialization, not socialism, would bring the North American dream to Newfoundland. Perhaps after years of trying to get the working and fishing people to organize, with only sporadic success, he wanted a quicker path to social change. Or, he might have seen the transformations to the Newfoundland economy during World War II, when both Canada and the United States built military bases around the island and in Labrador. For the first time in their lives, many people in rural Newfoundland earned steady cash wages for the work they did in building and servicing the bases. And finally, Smallwood may have picked up on the postwar optimism and the predominant belief that science, technology, and private enterprise would solve all the problems of the world. While Smallwood was not a modernization theorist, his ideas about developing both the fishing and non-fishing economy clearly bear the imprint of the industrial vision of development. In the first 10 years after Confederation, Smallwood's main economic strategy consisted of assisting private enterprise, primarily at government expense, in developing the province's resources. He regaled the people of Newfoundland with his famous 'develop or perish' speeches, telling them that industrialization would make Newfoundland the 'bright star' in the Canadian crown.35 Some of the mostly highly publicized projects included a collection of investors he organized to develop hydroelectricity in Labrador, British Newfoundland Corporation (BRINCO), and a Crown corporation called Newfoundland and Labrador Corporation (NALCO) created to develop other natural resources. Smallwood, with the help of his 'Director of Economic Development', Alfred Valdmanis, also convinced over a dozen European manufacturers to accept loans to come to Newfoundland. Most of these ventures eventually failed, victims of poor management, naive business plans, and, at times, deliberate criminal activity on the part of the entrepreneurs. Smallwood's approach to developing the fishery closely resembled his methods for developing other resources in this period. In fact, in speeches he made to the House of Assembly in the early 1950s, Smallwood often argued that the island's inshore fishery needed to adopt the methods and organization of the mining and pulp and paper industries. Like Bates before him, Smallwood criticized the

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Premier Joseph R. Smallwood (right) and two members of the fish business, Edward Russell and Cam Eaton, examine frozen-fish packaging at the 'Buy Newfoundland Products Campaign', 1950. (Centre for Newfoundland Studies Archives, Memorial University of Newfoundland, Collection 75, 5.04.652.)

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saltfish sector for its 'traditionalism', its 'handicraft' production methods and outdated technology. Indeed, Smallwood claimed the saltfish sector was lacking 'the scientific touch of modern capitalism'.36 For Smallwood, this 'scientific touch' had an almost magical quality, as it promised to bring the prosperity that had so long eluded Newfoundland's fishery. With frozen-fish plants, trawlers, and new fishing gear, the Premier believed he had the answer. Smallwood was also a 'past-master of a showman', as someone called him years later, and he played a major role in promoting the work and policies of his government.37 Although the provincial government lacked the resources of its federal counterpart, Smallwood made the most of his promotional skills. Radio was his most comfortable medium, but he also made use of newspapers and television to make contact with the public. Not merely giving information on government actions, however, Smallwood brought a dramatic flair to his promotions. One example was a series of films he had made on the economy and life of post-Confederation Newfoundland. One of the foreign companies Smallwood enticed to Newfoundland in the 1950s was a film production firm from Latvia that had made 'progress' films for the Soviet Union. Smallwood hired the company, Atlantic Films and Electronics Limited, to make a series of films depicting the economic and social 'progress' in post-Confederation Newfoundland. Smallwood himself was involved in drafting a script for a film about a fish plant being built in La Scie, a fishing community in northeastern Newfoundland.38 According to the script, the film on La Scie would portray the transformation of a small, inshore fishing community through the introduction of a fish processing plant. The script began by describing La Scie 'before modernization', both its 'tranquil charm' and the hardship endured by the residents in such an isolated area. The script then focused on the role of the government in planting the seeds of change in La Scie: Then one day to the harbour of La Scie came the survey boat 'Cygnus,' [carrying] to the community representatives of the Government of Canada and the Government of Newfoundland, who brought a message that was to change the life of La Scie and many other small villages along the coast. The message they brought that day in 1953 was—centralization. The Government of Newfoundland had decided to spend a large sum of money, and with the cooperation of the Government of Canada, turn La Scie into a modern town And to ensure the success of centralization, there was to be

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a central industry, a fish plant, as modern as any in North America. ... When the Cygnus departed, the people knew that La Scie was to become the subject of experiment and the object of observation.39 This passage, describing how a ship of government people would come to an isolated town to spread the gospel of centralization and modernization, reveals the promotional, educative role that Smallwood saw for the state. It also reveals the faith that Smallwood had for industrialization in rural Newfoundland and the almost magical excitement attached to it. Although Smallwood dominated Newfoundland politics, others in the provincial fisheries administration had their own views about the future of the fishery. In 1949, the new provincial Department of Fisheries and Co-operatives had the dual responsibility of looking after the land-based aspects of fisheries management, specifically licensing processing plants, and overseeing the co-operative program introduced by the Commission of Government. To accommodate this dual role, the Minister of Fisheries had two deputy ministers reporting to him, the Deputy Minister of Fisheries, and the Deputy Minister of Co-operatives. Supporting Smallwood's vision was British Columbia-born Clive Planta, Deputy Minister of Fisheries for Newfoundland. Planta's early career included business, organizing agricultural co-operatives, and a brief stint as an independent member of the British Columbia legislature representing the Peace River district.40 In 1945, Planta became manager of the Fisheries Council of Canada. Shortly after Confederation, Planta met Smallwood, who was immediately impressed with his abilities and offered to make him Deputy Minister of Fisheries. He accepted, and became an enthusiastic promoter of development. He was not well received by some of his federal counterparts, however, who thought he was trying to proceed too quickly with the fisheries development program.41 Planta's career with the Newfoundland Department of Fisheries turned out to be brief, as personal financial troubles led him to resign in 1954.42 Not everyone in Smallwood's government automatically agreed with all of his views and approaches to developing the fishery, however. The first Minister of Fisheries and Co-operatives, William J. Keough, brought some different ideas to the post. A native of St John's, Keough spent many hours in his youth with his fisherman grandfather.43 Like many young people who grew up during the Great Depression, Keough had difficulty finding work upon graduating from high school. To occupy himself, he became interested in world affairs and began reading and writing articles for local and international journals.

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He founded and edited the Labour Herald, a short-lived labour newspaper. Eventually, he got a job with the Commission of Government, first as a land settlement accountant, and then as co-operative fieldworker in the St George's district on the west coast of Newfoundland. While in St George's, Keough, a Roman Catholic, encountered the social activism of a Roman Catholic priest, Father Michael O'Reilly, who had spearheaded the co-operative movement in the area.44 In 1934, troubled by the poverty of the people in his parish, O'Reilly had enlisted the support of both Sir John Hope Simpson and Father Moses Coady of St Francis Xavier University to establish cooperative societies. Coady, who had founded the Antigonish Movement in Nova Scotia, asserted that co-operative ownership was the path to a better way of life, both materially and spiritually.45 He argued that the capitalist system, with its unequal distribution of wealth, was impoverishing the majority of people and destroying the creative and spiritual side of most of humanity. Coady argued that a small group of entrepreneurs had taken control of the world's resources and property, causing severe hardship for many. Unlike other critics of the capitalist system in the 1920s and 1930s, however, Coady did not turn to socialism. Instead, his vision was rooted in the craft-based co-operative movements of the nineteenth century, such as the Rochdale weavers of Great Britain. He said, 'Give the people of Canada ownership, and all other things will be added unto them.'46 Becoming part of this group of people connected to the cooperative movement in St George's had an important impact on Keough's thinking. In a newspaper article in 1954, Keough fondly recalled the gatherings held among the other co-operative and education workers during his days in St George's.47 Sometimes talking late into the night, they would discuss ideas for building a brighter future for Newfoundland. Eventually, Keough came to believe that Confederation would help bring that brighter future. In 1946, Keough resigned from the Co-operatives division and got elected to the National Convention for St George's. He had great sympathy for the fishing people, and many of his speeches focused on their plight. His entreaties to think of 'the last forgotten fisherman on the Bill of Cape St George' resonated in the minds of his fellow Convention members.48 On one occasion, he asserted: Time and time again I have undertaken to remind this Convention of that symbolic forgotten fisherman whose shadow is across all our history. I have spoken of the grim Gethsemane he has endured, of how great has been his historic difficulty in making ends meet,

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of how it has not been easy for him to bring up his children in the fear and love of God, and with their bellies empty.49 When Newfoundland became a province, Keough seemed a natural choice for Minister of Fisheries. The newly elected member from St George's-Port au Port had been one of Smallwood's loyal Confederation campaigners. As a Roman Catholic, he added a necessary denominational balance to the cabinet table in a society still affected by sectarian divisions. Despite Keough's close association with Smallwood during the Confederation campaign, his ideas regarding the manner of development differed sharply from the Premier's. Keough himself acknowledged the impact of the Antigonish Movement on his thinking, arguing that he knew of no other system that could achieve 'the kind of society that will satisfy the minds and hearts of men'.50 He was particularly wary of the twin paternalisms of big business and a highly interventionist state. In a speech to the Consumer's Co-operative Society in St John's, he warned: The Capitalist system has not given us that brave new world that men looked forward to so expectantly when the first spinning jenny and the first steam engine began to move. There came in its place greater concentration of power through the wealth in a few hands than the ancient despots ever enjoyed or hope to enjoy.51 Only if people turned to co-operative principles did they have a chance at freedom. At the same time, however, he expressed scepticism about the ability of the state to force new forms of ownership on the population. He had been critical of the Commission of Government's 'top-down' approach to co-operative development, and continued to assert that education, not government interference, was the key to a new society. Like his contemporaries Smallwood and Stewart Bates, Keough supported the introduction of new harvesting methods and processing plants to the fishery. Unlike Bates, however, he argued that the technological developments would have little impact if not accompanied by greater ownership by the fishing people in the new fishery.52 Besides co-operative ownership of plants and vessels, Keough suggested that a producers' marketing board for saltfish would also lead to equality for fishing people. In a 1951 radio speech, he declared he did not wish: to preside over the emergence of a new fishery structure in which the fishermen would be excluded from ownership. The fishermen

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WJ. Keough, provincial Minister of Fisheries and Co-operatives from 1949 to 1956, speaking at the National Convention, 1946. (Centre for Newfoundland Studies Archives, Memorial University of Newfoundland, Collection 75, 5.05.278.)

of Newfoundland will be ill-served if all that came of the modernization of the fisheries would be the substitution of new commercial fish monarchies in place of the fish kingdoms in each bay founded on saltfish.53 Clearly, Keough, Bates, and Smallwood had rather different world views and ideas about the future of the fishery. Bates, as well as Commissioner Dunn before him, seemed confident in the power of the new industrial order to bring prosperity to the fishery. Keough, too, believed the fishery should be made more efficient with new technology, but he raised the issue of who would control that technology. In Bates's schema, ownership was not the issue; he argued that simply centralizing and adding new technology would in itself raise the standard of living for everyone. If fishing people wanted to secure for themselves greater leverage, he advised them to form industrial trade unions. Keough's Deputy Minister of Co-operatives, Fred Scott, shared many of Keough's ideas about the future direction of the fishery. Born in the Eastern Townships of Quebec in 1901, Scott was raised in the state of Washington, where his family had moved.54 As a young man

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Scott returned to Quebec, obtaining a degree in Classics from McGill University. He remained in Quebec after graduation, teaching at a private school in the Eastern Townships. Far from being intellectually isolated in rural Quebec, however, Scott became interested in the broader debates about society and social reconstruction taking place around the world in the 1920s and 1930s. Scott received the chance to put some of his ideas into practice when he moved to Newfoundland in the 1930s. He found work as a school inspector in the Protestant system, but after a conversion to Roman Catholicism he began teaching in a Catholic school on the west coast of Newfoundland. In 1944 the Commission of Government appointed him magistrate for St George's, a position he held until 1949. Like Keough, Scott was impressed by the work of Father Moses Coady and the Antigonish Movement. Scott, too, joined the small group of enthusiastic people connected with the co-operative movement on the west coast of Newfoundland. A firm supporter of Confederation, Scott participated in these discussions about co-operative principles, social reconstruction, and the regeneration of the Newfoundland economy. Scott maintained ties with Coady after becoming Deputy Minister of Co-operatives, and the two met to discuss expanding the co-operative movement with Coady's assistance. The federal government rejected their requests for funding, however, on the grounds that the federal Department of Fisheries had decided to operate its own fisheries education programs.55 Another person within the Newfoundland Department of Fisheries and Co-operatives, Colin Story, believed new technologies and methods needed to be introduced to the inshore fishery, but tried to offer different models of development. A native of St John's, Story had been educated in the United States and served with the Forestry Unit and the Royal Navy during the war. He also had studied fish-processing technology, and in 1949 was hired as a fisheries technology specialist for the new provincial fisheries administration.56 Story believed that one model for fisheries development would not address all of the problems in the Newfoundland fishery. One feature of the industrial model, as described by Bates and Dunn, was its inherent uniformity. Like the Fordist method of production, it worked better when all products were made the same way, in identical factories. The Newfoundland fishery, however, was never uniform. Some areas, such as the northeast coast, were seasonal fisheries, while the south coast was a year-round fishery. Some communities had rich fishing grounds within a few miles of shore, while in others the fishers had to travel further or even to offshore fishing grounds. Indeed, some communities on the island of

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Newfoundland had historically relied on travelling to fishing stations on the Labrador coast because their own local resources could not sustain the population. Those promoting the industrial model for fisheries development, however, failed to consider the difficulties in attempting to install a Fordist model in an essentially non-uniform economy. Not all areas could sustain centralized frozen-fish operations, so Story began looking for other models of development. In 1950, he went on a tour of the major fishing countries of northern Europe, including Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and the United Kingdom, to investigate fisheries development programs, the various technologies for processing and harvesting, and their methods of financing.57 He returned filled with enthusiasm for the possibilities for Newfoundland. Story was impressed by the variety of operations in these countries, which managed to incorporate frozen fish and saltfish, and inshore and offshore fisheries, into their long-term development goals. He also remarked on the high degree of state assistance in developing the fisheries and on the strength and influence of fishers' and trade organizations. He acknowledged that new technologies would not necessarily provide a panacea for the Newfoundland fishery. Developing the fishery in these European nations had been difficult and took considerable commitment from governments and the trade and fishing people. Nevertheless, Story thought that the Newfoundland fishery had a chance. Story questioned the benefits of financing offshore trawlers.58 He admitted that the processing plants needed a steadier supply of fish, but investing in trawlers, especially the larger class of vessels in the 100-120' range, made little economic or social sense. First, processing companies that owned trawlers tended to pay very low prices for the trawler-caught fish. Before the mid-1970s, trawler crews earned a share of the catch instead of receiving salaries. Processing companies would keep the prices for fish low, operate their trawlers at a loss, and make up the money on the processing. Second, for the amount of fish caught, trawlers required a relatively small crew. If most fish were caught this way, very few people would have access to the resource, limiting the benefits of the fishery to a small number. Third, as depletion of the fish stocks occurred, the larger vessels became less economical to operate. Story claimed that declining stocks were already becoming an issue in Newfoundland. He noted that in just four or five years, the larger offshore trawlers operating on the Grand Banks had seen their annual landings fall from eight to eight and a half million pounds to four to five million pounds. Although funding trawlers might have been necessary initially, Story argued that the government

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needed to develop more efficient, smaller vessels for the Newfoundland fishery. The greatest challenge for the provincial fisheries officials, however, was getting the federal government interested in supporting development of any kind. In the spring of 1950, Fred Scott attended a meeting with federal Department of Fisheries and provincial officials, ostensibly called to inform the provinces of federal assistance. Scott, however, remained unimpressed, complaining that the federal representatives were vague about fisheries development.59 He even claimed that the Department of Fisheries officials had little interest or concern for the small-boat fishery and the saltfish sector. The only sign of hope Scott found at the meeting was Stewart Bates's offer to fund a joint federal-provincial study to investigate the possibilities for future fisheries development. Even then, the offer was qualified by Bates's warning that the federal government still believed that fisheries development was the responsibility of private enterprise, not the state. The federal government would provide assistance through scientific research, surveys of fishing regions, and general help in analysing the problems in the fishery. Despite the federal government's claims that it would take a minimal role in fisheries development, the Newfoundland Department of Fisheries recommended that Smallwood take the federal government up on the offer. Smallwood, anxious to let the public know he was serious about assisting the fisheries, took advantage of the chance to make a public show of the creation of the Newfoundland Fisheries Development Committee (NFDC in January 1951. In a combined press release, Smallwood and federal Fisheries Minister R.W. Mayhew announced the creation of the Newfoundland Fisheries Development Committee and its mandate: to formulate a development program, with particular focus on utilizing resources and improving the efficiency of harvesting and processing methods.60 A notable absence was the issue of marketing fishery products, which, being now a federal responsibility, was specifically excluded from the project. Chief Justice of Newfoundland Sir Albert Walsh, a member of the delegation that negotiated the Terms of Union between Canada and Newfoundland, led the committee. The federal representative was W.C. MacKenzie, who worked in the Economics Service of the federal Department of Fisheries.61 Born in Cape Breton, MacKenzie received a Master's degree in Economics from Dalhousie University in 1938. He had worked with Stewart Bates on the Report on the Canadian Atlantic Sea-Fishery. In the early 1950s, the federal government sent MacKenzie to Newfoundland to organize a fisheries

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statistics-gathering system. He provided the statistics for the Walsh Report and wrote most of it. Representing the provincial government was Clive Planta, Deputy Minister of Fisheries for Newfoundland. Other members included Hazen Russell of Bonavista Cold Storage and George Dawe, president of the Fishermen's Union Trading Company of Port Union. Representing Newfoundland fishers was George Groves, who was involved with an experimental longliner program the federal government financed at Bonavista from 1951 to 1953.62 The other fishing representative was Clarence Williams, a bank 59 fishery captain. In April 1953 the committee presented its report to the federal and provincial governments.63 Like the earlier reports of Dunn and Bates, the Walsh Report, as it became known, recommended industrialization for the Newfoundland fishery. It suggested that the government provide loans to private firms to build freezing and mechanized saltfish-processing plants on the northeast coast of the island. The report did recommend the government encourage some co-operatively owned fishing operations in the province, but only in remote areas where private firms would have difficulty making profits. Private enterprise would develop the fisheries in the most potentially lucrative districts. The Walsh Report envisioned a streamlined fishery, with a smaller but more technologically equipped workforce. The Walsh Report bore many resemblances to the report written by Stewart Bates nearly a decade earlier, particularly in its analysis of the problems of the Newfoundland fishing economy and society. The report frequently referred to the Newfoundland inshore fishery as 'primitive', embodying the characteristics of the archetypal traditional society—occupational pluralism, high use of labour relative to capital, low levels of technology and education, and scattered populations. The report was particularly critical of the persistence of occupational pluralism, or the tendency of fishing people to take part in a variety of activities besides catching fish. Historically, the short fishing season on the northeast coast of the island meant that people could not rely on fishing alone for survival. In the outport economy, people pursued various seasonal activities to make a living—sealing in early spring, fishing and growing vegetable gardens in summer, berry picking and hunting in fall, cutting firewood and attending to boat and net repairs in winter. The report noted that as few as 3 per cent of fishing families obtained 90 per cent of their incomes from fishing. In another document written in this period, NFDC member Clive Planta argued:

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It is a fallacy to assume that to be a success, a fisherman must have one leg in a potato patch or hay meadow and the other in a boat, or that a successful fishing community must be one with an immediate agricultural hinterland.64 Although these diversified activities had ensured economic survival for fishing families in the past, the fisheries planners considered them antithetical to a modern fishery. A modern fishery, like the archetypal modern society, needed specialized workers, not 'jacks of all trades'. Comments about the need for 'new attitudes' in rural Newfoundland were another indication of the social dimensions inherent in this vision of development. The Walsh Report blamed the physical isolation of outport and the attachments people had to their homes for instilling 'inertia' in the fishing population. Without those ties, many people would have found other types of work in more amenable physical surroundings. In the future, those who remained in the fishery— plant workers and fishers—would have to adopt new outlooks. The report warned: It is necessary that the people, fishermen and plant workers, acquire a spirit of responsibility for their community and the industry upon which it is based. Educational programmes are valuable means to this end but they will fail if they are not supported by an environment that inspires an enthusiastic citizenship.65 Plant workers not only would have to adopt new attitudes, but also would have to learn industrial work habits: A specialized labour force for the fish processing industry in this province is still in the early stages of development, and most plant workers are drawn from the ranks of fishermen and their families who are unused to industrial discipline.66 The report maintained that fishers were accustomed to working sporadically and they carried these 'bad' habits over to wage labour positions. Instead of remaining on the job, people tended to quit after they had accumulated some money. Part of the problem, according to the report, was that in rural Newfoundland there were few opportunities to spend money, so there were few incentives for people to increase their cash earnings. The Report's comments about the role of women in the fishery reveal the importance it placed on introducing outport Newfoundland to North American culture.67 These comments about women's and

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men's place in the fishery reflected the prevalent attitude towards gender in Western society, specifically the concept of 'separate spheres'.68 Associated historically with the transition from household production to an industrial economy, this gender ideology assumed that man's primary role was as the family breadwinner and woman's was as a caregiver in the home, not as a direct contributor to family income. Although this belief never entirely reflected the reality of many men's and women's experience historically, the ideology had persisted through the twentieth century. Although it had emerged (at least partly) from the social relations of society, it had become embedded in state policy, not only in Western countries, but also in the 'development' programs administered by Western countries in more impoverished areas of the world. The Committee was clearly uncomfortable with the fact that women had long been an integral part of saltfish production.69 On the northeast coast of Newfoundland the majority of fish were caught in a two-month period, when the cod followed the capelin, their main food source, to the inshore waters. Many inshore fishers caught fish in a box-like net known as the cod trap. It enabled fishers to catch a large amount of fish in a relatively short period. As the men and older boys spent most of their days during this season on the water, the women and children of the communities were left with the task of cleaning, salting, and drying the fish. The 'shore crews' had to keep a close watch on the progress of the curing, taking the fish out daily to dry in the sun and quickly bringing it inside if the skies showed signs of rain. In the days before refrigeration, this process, which took the better part of the summer months, was vital to the success of the inshore saltfish industry. Although this division of tasks between men and women had arisen partly because of the particular labour needs of the inshore fishery, the committee felt it was regressive. The committee assumed that in a highly developed, modern economy, men would take on greater responsibility for looking after their families. In the final chapter, the report claimed that women would play no direct role in the industrial fishing economy, with the exception of some young women who might work in fish plants. Indeed, the Report argued that the withdrawal of women from the fishery was a step towards a modern society: The general social improvement which has been taking place in the Province for some years is resulting in the liberation of women from the hard and unsuitable work of fish-making and allowing them to devote their time to their household duties and to live in an atmosphere of human dignity as wives and mothers.70

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The underlying assumption was that women's proper place was in the home, not curing fish on the beach. Through the Walsh Report we get a glimpse of the industrial vision of development—what fisheries planners believed were the requirements to turn rural Newfoundland into a 'modern' society. There is no denying that there were major problems in rural Newfoundland. Fishing communities were badly in need of basic services such as schools, electricity, and running water. The problem, however, was that the modernization analysis used by Bates and the Walsh Report, held up industrialization as the only path to a better standard of living for fishing communities. It never considered the issue of ownership of fishing enterprises and access to new technologies. Keough had been concerned that unless fishing people had some stake in the ownership of the new fishery, they would fail to benefit from modernization. The Walsh Report, on the other hand, assumed that a fishery controlled by private enterprise would automatically create a higher standard of living in fishing communities. Indeed, many believed the Newfoundland fishery was on the verge of the greatest transformation in its history. In many ways, they were right, but the thriving, prosperous society the industrial vision promised never entirely materialized. What did fishing people themselves think? Were they more likely to support the ideas of the Walsh Report and Joseph Smallwood or the alternative approach of people such as Keough? Certainly, Smallwood made industrialization through centralized fishing centres sound attractive. He also made it sound like a relatively easy process—simply build fish plants and trawlers, and prosperity will follow. Keough's ideas, which would have had fishing people directly involved in the management and ownership of these enterprises, would have meant much more work for fishing communities. The cooperative movement had never been strong in Newfoundland, and much of the initial push for founding these enterprises came from people like Father Michael O'Reilly and Father Moses Coady. Also, we have to remember that although industrialization was new to the Newfoundland fishery, capitalist organization was not. In many ways, the ideas of Smallwood and others about an industrial fishery represented less of a change than did Keough's ideas about fishers controlling the ownership of production. Without a more detailed study of fishing people in this period, however, we will not have a complete understanding of the views in rural Newfoundland. Indeed, we know very little about the nature of class relations in Newfoundland in this and earlier periods.71 Nevertheless, there was never a wholesale rejection of industrial plans for the fishery in rural Newfoundland. In fact,

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many communities wanted frozen-fish plants and new technologies. Nevertheless, fishing people may have found some aspects of the modernization model disturbing or impractical. For example, many may have resented the implications of comments in the Walsh Report about the need to discourage people from hunting or farming in favour of getting them to spend more time catching fish. And as we will see, people did protest or reject some attempts to force modernization on outport Newfoundland. If we look carefully at the broader issue of state fisheries management in the 1950s, we can see the influence of the industrial vision of development. We see it in the new structures of the federal Department of Fisheries, with its emphasis on the application of scientific knowledge and economic principles to modernize and industrialize the fishery. We see it in the ideas of Stewart Bates, who was intent on making the fishery more economically efficient and technologically advanced. And the breadth of the industrial vision is found in the fact that Bates saw fisheries modernization as a way of advancing society, dropping 'traditional' attitudes and adopting the mindset of a forward-looking people. We see the industrial vision of development in the speeches and actions of Smallwood, who, despite earlier misgivings, called out to the people of Newfoundland to 'develop or perish'. Although the state, over the long term, supported the economic structures of industrial society, it was not a monolithic entity, merely doing the bidding of the economic elite. Indeed, as Stuart Hall argues, the state 'is also the site of contradictions—both within its own structures, and in relation to external social forces.'72 One of the reasons that the state is contradictory is that it is made up not just of institutions, but also of people. People may have many reasons for getting involved in the government, so not all will necessarily subscribe to the dominant hegemony within the state. Keough's and Scott's insistence that ownership of fishing enterprises, not merely new technologies and centralization, was the key to a more prosperous and equitable fishing society was not the dominant view of the federal Department of Fisheries. How successful these alternative visions were in affecting policy, however, is another matter.

4

Federal-Provincial Conflict, Co-operation, and Compromise

The industrial vision of development that first emerged in the 1940s dominated fisheries planning at both federal and provincial levels in the 1950s. Alternative visions espoused by WJ. Keough and others received little attention from Premier Smallwood and federal officials. Despite the hegemony of the industrial vision, however, the path from ideology to state practice was not straightforward. As Stuart Hall observed about the way various Western states have evolved to support the economic system: 'the process happens, in different social formations, at a different pace: by significantly different routes: with more or less degrees of completeness: and with strikingly different results.'1 While federal fisheries officials and Premier Smallwood supported the industrial vision of development, they differed on how to implement it. These differences became apparent when Smallwood tried to enlist federal support for the development plan in the Walsh Report. Far from being merely personal differences in opinion, the conflicts that arose over fisheries development in the 1950s were rooted in the diverging mandates and agendas of the federal and provincial governments. Although the Canadian government was becoming more involved in the economy in the postwar years, the 1953 Walsh Report proposed a much greater degree of intervention than Ottawa was prepared to undertake. Although the state was becoming more involved in the economy, remnants of the older, liberal, laissez-faire ideology remained in the circles of power in the federal government in the 1950s. The Canadian state of the 1950s was not as interventionist as it would become in the 1960s and 1970s. The fisheries development program would have had the government taking a leading role in 65

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directing, planning, and financing the economy in a region. This differed sharply from the economic strategies of the Liberal government of Louis St Laurent in the 1950s, which preferred a more indirect role through infrastructure programs such as building gas and oil pipelines and transportation networks. Even in the other resource industries, including energy and mining, where the state was heavily involved in regulation and administration, private enterprise still held the leading role in developing the sector. Besides the greater degree of intervention, the Walsh Report implied that the state had an obligation to support the economy of an 'underdeveloped region'. The concept of regional development would not become part of federal thinking for another decade.2 While the federal government clearly was interested in supporting fisheries development through its various services in the Department of Fisheries, it certainly preferred an indirect role. Even before the release of the Walsh Report, James Sinclair warned the fishing industry in Newfoundland not to expect direct capital assistance. At a federal-provincial meeting on the fisheries, he said: It is not our job as a government to initiate enterprise. That is up to you, to your management, to your rugged individualists, to your Fish Trades Association, to the members of your industry. Without that individual enterprise there is little that we as a Federal Government can really do—for we have no interest in going into the fish business.3 The federal government's reaction to the Walsh Report and its request for a major federal-provincial development program reflected the general reluctance of Ottawa to intervene in 'regional' problems. Although a special Interdepartmental Committee, which examined the Walsh Report, agreed with its analysis of the Newfoundland fishery and its vision for an industrialized, centralized economy, it rejected its principal recommendations for development.4 The committee, which included Stewart Bates and R.B. Bryce of the Department of Finance, explained that they simply could not offer a special development program to Newfoundland without offering the same to other fishing provinces. Furthermore, the committee balked at the state's providing financing to fishing companies. The federal Department of Fisheries would and should provide its regular services, such as research and development, but nothing more. Several factors—political, ideological, and personal—affected the federal government's reaction to the Walsh Report proposals. First, the Walsh Report recommendations were much more interventionist

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in their scope than were any other federal programs for the fishery or for 'regional' economies in the 1950s. Having the state direct fisheries development by deciding where plants should go, and then funding private firms to build them, was beyond the thinking of federal planners in that period. Although Newfoundland's Department of Natural Resources approached that level of involvement in the 1940s, its mandate, and its power, was different from that of the Canadian federal government. Second, federal officials feared protests and demands for similar programs from other provinces with sea fisheries. In particular, they would have expected Nova Scotia to make similar requests. The federal government had no wish, apparently, to embark on major fisheries programs for all of Atlantic Canada. There was also a reluctance, for ideological reasons, to enter into such direct relationships with private firms in the fishery. Federal officials were wary of 'interfering' with free enterprise and competition in the industry. They were concerned about the reactions by the United States to trade issues should the Americans believe the fishing industry in Newfoundland to have been subsidized. And finally, the attitudes of many federal officials towards Premier Smallwood personally may have had an impact. In Ottawa, leading Liberal members viewed Smallwood as a 'loose cannon'. As a relative newcomer to the Liberal Party, he was considered by many to be not yet trustworthy. Indeed, such prominent Newfoundlanders as Gordon Bradley, of Bonavista, Liberal member of Parliament and cabinet minister, and Raymond Gushue warned federal officials that Smallwood's plans were likely to be hastily conceived and short-sighted.5 Federal officials revealed their uneasiness with direct connections to private enterprise during negotiations with the province to transfer a bait service program to Newfoundland.6 Under the Terms of Union the federal government assumed responsibility for the public bait depots that the Commission of Government had built in the 1930s. The federal government, however, was never comfortable about providing this service (it offered the service to no other Canadian provinces), and had indicated it would be willing to give it back to Newfoundland. As the Walsh Report was being released, Smallwood asked if the federal government would give the bait depots to the province, along with a lump sum of $1,250,000 to cover operations costs. Initially, Sinclair recommended cabinet approve the deal.7 Federal opinion quickly changed, however, when Smallwood announced that Arthur Monroe's company, Fishery Products Limited, would take over the bait depots, equip them with fish-freezing equipment, and turn them into combination frozen-fish processing plants and bait

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depots.8 The company would have the exclusive right to lease the bait depots for a period of 20 years. In return, the provincial government would invest $1,250,000 equity capital in the company to equip the new plants. At the instigation of Monroe, Smallwood decided to turn Fishery Products into a Crown corporation.9 The agreement, however, allowed Monroe to retain sole control over the management and operation of the new company. The arrangement had benefits for both Smallwood and Monroe. Monroe would receive capital to develop frozen-fish operations, yet he would not have to pay back any loans. As a Crown corporation his company would be free from paying taxes, yet Monroe could continue to run his firm as if it were still privately owned. And of course, his organization, already the largest frozen-fish producer in the province, would have its predominance in the industry assured. For Smallwood, this was a way of getting federal money through the back door for building freezing plants. Smallwood would simply take the money the federal government had intended for the bait depots and give it to Monroe for building fish plants. Federal officials, however, had many reservations about the plan, and particularly feared reactions by the American fishing industry. Trade relations with the United States were a particularly sensitive issue in 1953 because the Americans were reviewing their terms of trade regarding Canadian fish imports. Since almost all of Newfoundland's frozen fish went to the United States, any increase in tariffs would affect exports. Members of the federal Department of Fisheries believed the Americans would not approve of Canadian government direct assistance to fishing firms. One federal official argued that, 'whatever the ultimate scope of that company [Fishery Products], the federal government will be accused of having aided the nationalization of the Newfoundland fishing industry.'10 Moreover, he added, the Americans might view this as unfair subsidization of the fishing industry. The New England fishing industry had a particularly strong lobby group and would undoubtedly protest vigorously. As well, the federal Department of Fisheries was uncomfortable with the message that the deal would give to the fishing industry in Newfoundland.11 Time and again the federal officials had tried to define the state's role as a supporter of entrepreneur ship through research, infrastructure, and education, but not as a provider of direct financial aid. Yet, if the Canadian government gave the Smallwood government $1.25 million for bait depots, and then Smallwood promptly handed that money to Arthur Monroe, the public might perceive that the Department of Fisheries was financing private enterprise. Although its involvement was indirect, the federal government

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would be assisting in the expansion and growth of a single company at the expense of others, allowing Fishery Products to maintain a monopoly in the industry. With that kind of control, Fishery Products could presumably open and close those plants at will. The deal would not have been popular with other private firms in Newfoundland, nor with the other fishing provinces. In fact, the federal government received an angry protest from the Newfoundland Fish Trades Association, which complained that the Smallwood government was allowing Fishery Products to take control of the fisheries development program.12 Smallwood's opposition in the House of Assembly, the Progressive Conservatives led by Malcolm Hollett, also criticized the proposed deal with Fishery Products. Hollett feared increasing government involvement in the fishery, portraying the proposal as a step towards the 'nationalization' of the fishery. He asked for assurances from Smallwood that the government had no intention of 'either nationalization of the industry or of the granting of anything that smacks of monopoly to either the Fishery Products Limited or anybody else'.13 Like the federal officials, Hollett also had ideological difficulties accepting such a direct connection between private enterprise and the state. Smallwood, on the other hand, defended the plan, and gave utilitarian arguments for giving private firms a central role in fisheries development. While he rejected the charges that his government planned to 'nationalize' the fishery, he claimed that a partnership with private firms was essential for modernizing the industry: We would like to avail ourselves of the skill, experience, managerial efficiency and energy of the best elements of the fish trade, inviting them to come in with us and with the Government of Canada on a great programme of reorganization and modernize our great Newfoundland fisheries, so that it will cease to be a slum industry and become as modern as the great paper mill in Corner Brook.14 Despite Smallwood's optimism about Ottawa's willingness to form a partnership with private enterprise, federal officials were far less certain. The Fishery Products Limited proposal brought to the forefront a number of issues: interference with free competition of private enterprise, complaints from other fishing provinces, and trade issues with the United States. If nothing else, it forced the federal government to decide unequivocally where it stood on these matters. Within a few weeks of hearing about the deal, Minister of Fisheries James Sinclair told Smallwood the federal government found the

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proposed bait service deal unacceptable.15 Citing concerns about the reactions by the United States government, which was reviewing its tariff policies, Sinclair told Smallwood that the Newfoundland government could not turn Fishery Products Limited into a Crown corporation for the purposes of furthering fisheries development. The province could provide loans to private companies, but it could not get directly into the fishing business and it certainly could not give a monopoly to one firm. Sinclair also told him the Canadian government would not transfer the bait depots to the province, but would continue to operate the service as before. Having dealt with the bait service, the federal government once again turned its attention to the Walsh Report itself. A group of seven officials, including Stewart Bates, took a trip to Newfoundland in the summer of 1953 to re-evaluate the report's recommendations.16 They reaffirmed their belief that government should not appear to be supporting private enterprise. The northeast coast, however, needed some special assistance, which they felt the federal government should provide. They warned that federal involvement should be limited, lest the fishing people become too dependent on government handouts and fail to develop an attitude of * self-help'. In October 1953 the federal and provincial Departments of Fisheries issued a joint press release in which the federal officials drew the boundary for federal participation in Newfoundland fisheries development.17 Assisting private companies directly was outside the federal government's realm, they insisted, so the province would have to look elsewhere to fund its frozen-fish plants. The federal government would, however, participate in small-scale projects deemed 'experimental'. One of these projects was a federal saltfish drying facility at Valleyfield. The other was two centralized curing stations slated for communities considered too small to interest private firms. They also agreed to construct harbour facilities at La Scie, where the province was planning to build a combined salting and freezing plant. As usual, the federal government would continue with its general research and experimental programs for the Atlantic fisheries, including exploratory fishing and technological development. In short, except for the 'experimental' saltfish projects, the federal government offered nothing more than the services it provided for other fishing provinces: no capital for development projects, and no joint federal-provincial committee to oversee the fisheries program in Newfoundland. One of the issues left hanging after this announcement was the future of Newfoundland Association of Fish Exporters Limited, Newfoundland's fish exporting organization. Since 1947, saltfish

CONFLICT, CO-OPERATION, AND COMPROMISE 71

merchants had pooled their fish through NAFEL, which negotiated prices and size of shipments to markets in Europe and South America. As international trade was within federal, not provincial, jurisdiction, the future of NAFEL remained uncertain. Under the Terms of Union with Canada, NAFEL had received the right to continue controlling saltfish marketing for a five-year period. In 1953, the federal government extended NAFEL'S term for another three years. The federal government was never enthusiastic about NAFEL, and had actually suggested that a producer's co-operative, rather than a saltfish exporter's organization, would better serve the needs of the industry. The Department of Fisheries, however, seemed reluctant to take any direct action to foster the saltfish trade, an industry they considered 'old-fashioned'. Even after saltfish marketing was transferred to the Department of Trade and Commerce the following year, the federal government declined to address the matter.18 That year, however, the federal government removed saltbulk, a form of saltfish that was 'green'—packed directly into barrels of salt upon catching, instead of let dry naturally—from NAFEL'S purview. This allowed saltfish interests from Nova Scotia, where a mechanical drying industry was well developed, to come to Newfoundland to buy saltbulk for their plants directly from local fishers. NAFEL'S mandate would be extended one more time until 1959, when it was finally disbanded. Although the federal government rejected the Walsh Report recommendations, Smallwood was determined to carry on with the development plan alone. Like many other of his development plans, Smallwood had highly publicized the Walsh Report by appointing high-profile Newfoundlanders to the committee and by issuing frequent (and usually premature) press releases on assistance the fishery could expect from the government. After all that, Smallwood could not turn around and tell the fishing people of Newfoundland that their hopes for a better life would have to wait. So, Smallwood began looking for ways to implement the Walsh Report recommendations. He decided to go ahead with the frozen-fish plant-building program by offering provincial government loans to Fishery Products to build and operate plants at five communities: Bay de Verde, Catalina, Joe Batt's Arm, Change Islands, and Twillingate. Smallwood's plant-building program expanded over the next few years, and remained the province's main initiative in fisheries development (more on the relationship between the Smallwood government and the frozen-fish companies in the next chapter). Smallwood also created a Crown corporation, the Newfoundland Fisheries Development Authority (NFDA), to oversee the province's

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fisheries development program. In 1954, Small wood, with much fanfare, announced the hiring of three men (at what was then considered an exorbitant annual salary of $25,000 each). Harry Dustan, chair of the new organization, was a former bank manager and had worked for Northlantic Fisheries.19 Ross Young also came from the business community, having worked in the head office of the St John's fishing firm, Crosbie and Company Ltd. Harry Winsor, a native of Twillingate, had a background in government fisheries administration, first with the Newfoundland Fisheries Board and then with the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in Rome. The NFDA was responsible for managing the only major joint federal provincial project arising from the Walsh Report, the experimental centralized curing stations. Originally, the federal and provincial governments were to work together at the stations built at Seldomcome-by on Fogo Island and Quirpon on the Great Northern Peninsula. The plants were to increase productivity by relieving the fishers from drying the fish themselves. They could sell their fish directly to the curing stations, which were to consist of centralized flakes, as well as cool storage, pickling vats, and salt and bait stores. The federal government was to contribute 50 per cent of the capital cost of the station, as well as the cost of the marine works. The provincial government was to contribute the other 50 per cent for the construction of the plants, as well as any working funds, and was also to absorb losses for the operation for the first three years. If the experiment worked, there were plans to enact legislation along the line of the Cheese and Cheese Factory Act to encourage producers' cooperatives.20 The NFDA was to oversee the operations of these projects, but was to consult with the federal representatives. Although intended as the cornerstone for future development, these projects led to further strains in federal-provincial relations. Early on, things started to go awry. One of the biggest problems was the question of the form of ownership of the plants. Originally, the plants were supposed to be co-operatively owned. Neither the federal government nor the NFDA, however, was a strong supporter of cooperative movements on principle. The federal government saw the co-operative solution as an alternative to government handouts, rather than as a way to create a more equitable position for fishing people generally.21 Unlike Keough, who had talked about the importance of co-operatives to prevent the consolidation of economic power in the hands of a few, the federal officials saw them as useful only in areas where private capital considered the venture too risky. Similarly, the NFDA had suggested co-operative ownership only because no private

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company was willing to invest in the saltfish curing plants on rather remote areas of the island. Indeed, Winsor had expressed reservations about establishing a co-operative enterprise because of 'the possible inefficiencies of a group of "amateurs" and the absence of profit motive on the part of management, the dampening effect it might have on any plans which private industry might have'.22 Ironically, few within the provincial Department of Fisheries and Co-operatives could have assisted in developing co-operative enterprises in Seldom and Quirpon. By the time the centralized curing stations were under way, the Newfoundland government was dismantling its co-operatives program begun by the Commission of Government in the 1930s. Both Smallwood and Keough had criticized state involvement in co-operatives, arguing that a 'top-down' approach to co-operative organizing defeated the purpose of the movement. In the House of Assembly in 1954, Smallwood expounded on his views on the role of co-operatives and the state in economic development. He began by telling about his encounter with J.H. Gorvin and his plan to create regional development councils in the 1930s. According to Smallwood, Gorvin had asked for his opinion on the proposed Special Areas Bill. Smallwood claimed he replied that he supported the idea in principle, but rejected its method of implementation. Smallwood reportedly told Gorvin that if he used civil servants to carry out the plan, he would be 'making the greatest mistake of [his] life' ,23 Rather, the Premier argued that either the co-operative movement 'grows out of the very soil, springs up out of the very sea or it does not grow.'24 Although the provincial Department of Fisheries and Cooperatives retained its name until 1956, the Co-operatives division of the department lost much of its staff in 1953. The Deputy Minister of Co-operatives, Fred Scott, was dismissed and the position was abolished.25 The government handed responsibility for adult education and co-operative assistance to the new Extension Service of Memorial University of Newfoundland. The new service offered support primarily to rural Newfoundland, but it was not directly co-ordinated with the policies of the Department of Fisheries. The Cold War climate may also have had an impact on the degree of support for cooperative organizations in the early 1950s. In several of his speeches, Keough defended the movement against the charge that it was the 'thin edge of the wedge of socialism'.26 The fact that he would be so defensive suggests that co-operative movements may have been viewed with suspicion. With the removal of responsibility for cooperative development from the department and the firing of Fred Scott earlier, there was no one in the department with expertise to

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handle such an undertaking. In a speech Harry Winsor was asked to deliver on co-operatives in fishery development years later, he acknowledged that he knew very little about the subject.27 With that weak commitment to co-operative organizations, it is hardly surprising that the NFDA never established co-operative enterprises at Quirpon and Seldom. Instead, the NFDA set up limited liability companies, where the fishers bought shares in the operations. The federal government was hardly a strong supporter of co-operative ownership, but department members were perturbed nevertheless by the change in plans. In discussing the Quirpon project, H.R. Bradley, representative of the federal Department of Fisheries in Newfoundland, accused the NFDA of straying from the original goal of community co-operation.28 Acknowledging that the dearth of successful co-operatives in Newfoundland may have contributed to the NFDA'S decision, he argued that the NFDA had inadvertently fostered an attitude of government dependency in that community. Instead of looking after their own affairs, he complained, the people of the community 'may look to the government for everything.'29 Federal Deputy Minister George Clark, a former fish company director from British Columbia who replaced Bates in 1954, complained that from the beginning the provincial government had taken control of the projects, even though the federal government was 'never too happy with, and did not have much faith in, this overall approach' .30 Clark added that he had expressed his displeasure to the NFDA, but they did not respond to his concerns. The federal government also claimed the NFDA'S community relations in the areas where the plants were going to be built were poor. He charged they had not worked hard enough to educate the community about the project and obtain its full support. In its defence, the NFDA claimed that the fishers, through no fault of their own, simply were not capable of operating the stations themselves.31 In fact, Dustan admitted that at the Quirpon station, there was 'no real evidence of co-operation and little possibility of any pride of ownership of the facilities developing'.32 Harry Winsor's comments in 1955 regarding the operation of the plants suggest, however, that the NFDA had never had much faith in developing co-operative enterprises, so their failure to organize the fishers is hardly surprising.33 Other sources of conflict between the federal and provincial governments over the centralized curing stations were financial in nature, for example, the NFDA'S addition of a mechanical dryer to the Seldom plant, which increased costs.

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Making matters worse, members of the Nova Scotia saltfish industry publicly campaigned against federal involvement in the Newfoundland saltfish industry. Since 1954, Nova Scotian saltfish companies had taken advantage of the release of saltbulk from NAFEL'S control. Prices for fish in Newfoundland were lower than they were in Nova Scotia, and the Nova Scotia buyers became increasingly dependent on Newfoundland to supply their mechanical fish-drying plants. Saltfish interests in Nova Scotia considered the development of a saltfish processing industry in Newfoundland a direct threat. In 1954, the Canadian Atlantic Salt Fish Exporters Association sent a brief to the federal government, attacking the assistance suggested for the Newfoundland saltfish industry through the Walsh Report.34 Asserting that Newfoundland fish competed directly with Nova Scotia saltfish in the world's markets, they claimed the federal government had no right to offer assistance to the Newfoundland industry. After all, they pointed out, in Nova Scotia, private enterprise had had to develop the fishery on its own and had never been the recipient of government monies such as were now being considered for the Newfoundland fishery. In 1955, a prominent member of the Nova Scotia saltfish industry, Fletcher Smith, of A.M. Smith & Co. Ltd., issued an open letter to Sinclair and Minister of Trade C.D. Howe directly challenging federal assistance for the Quirpon and Seldom plants.35 Smith began his eightpage letter with the headline 'Questionable Policy: Federal-Provincial Government Built, Tax Exempt, Salt Fish Plants in Newfoundland to Compete with Privately Owned Plants'. Fletcher accused the government of deceiving the public by indicating that the projects were of an 'experimental' nature. Since they were much larger and more costly than the original plans, they could not be seen as being experimental stations. They were full-scale commercial enterprises subsidized by the federal government, he declared. Newfoundland did not need saltfish curing stations, he argued, when the fishers could sell saltbulk to Nova Scotia plants. Furthermore, it was more economical for Newfoundland fishers to sell their saltbulk to Nova Scotia plants for processing than to build a saltfish processing industry themselves. Smith accused the federal government of discrimination, claiming the policy endangered private enterprise in Nova Scotia. Smith's public attack would hardly have been welcome to the federal government. The letter pointed to the very issues—'nationalization' of private enterprise and competition with other provinces—that the federal officials had tried to avoid with the release of the Walsh

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Report. As damage control, Sinclair issued a public reply, defending the program.36 Far from giving an unfair advantage to the Newfoundland industry, Sinclair claimed the federal government was only trying to help the newest province 'catch up' with more developed areas. For years, he said, the federal government had helped the Nova Scotia fishing industry; Newfoundland was only getting its due. Competing with private enterprise was not their intention: the tiny plants at Quirpon and Seldom could never threaten the 'long-established, wellfinanced, ably-managed, privately-owned' companies in Nova Scotia.37 Sinclair also took exception to Smith's claim that Newfoundland fishers should be exclusive suppliers to Nova Scotia plants, arguing that the people of Newfoundland naturally wanted the security and benefits of having a local processing industry. He reaffirmed the government's contentions that the projects were indeed 'experimental' and that the degree of federal involvement was minimal. Despite Sinclair's public defence of the Quirpon and Seldom projects, federal officials, privately, remained unhappy with the course things were taking and federal representatives continued to balk at the extra expenses of building and equipping the plants.38 Finally, in 1957 and 1958, the federal government withdrew from actively assisting in the management of the plants.39 What had been seen as an experiment in community ownership, a chance for the fishing people in remote areas to get better returns for their product and a greater control over their lives, ended without ever achieving those goals. In assessing the Quirpon and Seldom projects, Harry Dustan pointed to the lack of community interest, the continuing losses on the operation, and the minimal increase in productivity for the fishers as contributing to the lack of success.40 Indeed, over the next decade, the plants did not produce the volume of fish originally anticipated, as many fishers continued to salt at least part of their catch on their own. Not long after the failed Quirpon and Seldom ventures, the federal government initiated its own program for 'community stages' in the Newfoundland fishery. 'Community stages' usually consisted of a shed with facilities for cleaning and washing fish. Inshore fishers used them instead of their own premises for preparing their fish. The advantage of community stages was that they often had running water, unlike most private premises. Community stages, by bringing fishers together in preparing their fish, also offered the possibility of collective selling. The federal government introduced the community stage program in 1958 after a particularly poor fishing season. A series of summer storms kept many fishers off the water, and landings

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were down an average of 25 per cent from the previous year.41 Rather than giving price support, or individual compensation, to the fishers, the federal government decided to offer community stages to affected areas. Seeing this initiative as essentially a 'make-work' project, the federal government paid the fishing people to build these stations and, over the 1958-9 season, 20 community stages were built. The federal and provincial Departments of Fisheries co-operated by offering follow-up courses for people in community leadership skills, ostensibly to encourage fishers to form sellers' organizations.42 A later assessment of the training programs, held at the federal government's Valley field experimental plant, found that most of the participants were young men, not the more experienced fishers who would have had the greatest influence in forming community organizations. Ironically, this one-time federal program interfered with a similar program the provincial Department of Fisheries had introduced that same year.43 The provincial program, however, was not as lucrative for the fishers, as the government only provided the construction supplies for the community stage; the fishers themselves had to supply the labour. As a result, only three community stages were built under the provincial program. Although the federal government had backed away from direct involvement in financing the frozen-fish companies, the Department of Fisheries supported private interests in the fishing industry in other ways. Indeed, the federal government had a long history of assisting fishing enterprises through the research and development facilities and programs of the federal Department of Fisheries. The expanded services of the Department of Fisheries, begun in 1949, aimed at helping the fishery 'modernize', were of direct benefit to the industrial commercial fisheries of both Atlantic and Pacific coasts. The Industrial Development Service (IDS) branch of the federal Department of Fisheries was created in 1954 to experiment with new fishing and processing methods. The Department of Fisheries Annual Report of 1956-7 described the new service as encouraging 'private industry to carry out industrial and scientific development work consistent with the most urgent needs of the fishing industry in its progress towards modernization'.44 Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the Industrial Development Service was involved in a variety of projects in conjunction with private enterprises, including experiments with various types of harvesting gear, including the mid-water trawl, Danish seining, metal lobster traps, longlining, and gill nets. The IDS did some research in improving transportation of fish, and developing sea-water holding tanks for freshly harvested fish. Processing, particularly

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experimentation with new fish products and by-products, also occupied IDS researchers. Work in artificial drying of fish was carried out at an experimental drying plant at Valleyfield, Newfoundland. The Fisheries Research Board (FRB), an independent scientific organization of the Canadian government, also provided some assistance to the development of the industrial fishery through several of its divisions.45 FRB research was divided into two main areas—biological and technological. The biological components were involved with primary scientific studies of fish populations with stations located in British Columbia, New Brunswick, and St John's, Newfoundland. The St John's station, headed by Dr Wilfred Templeman, also engaged in exploratory fishing, looking for commercially useful species that could be accessed by an offshore fleet. Exploratory fishing was specifically oriented to assisting the offshore, frozen-fish industry, as the new frozen-fish markets required a variety of groundfish species, such as redfish, haddock, and halibut. Historically, the primary species fished in Newfoundland had been cod, and the frozen-fish company owners were able to assimilate new information to diversify their landings for the American market. The FRB'S east coast technological station, located in Halifax, was directly involved in experiments to benefit the fish processing industry.46 The fishing industry had relied on government scientists for assistance in research and development since the 1920s, when early experiments in freezing methods were carried out. The Halifax station focused on improving the quality of fish products, developing new commercial items, and improving processing and handling methods. Scientists from the Nova Scotia station would make visits periodically to private plants in Newfoundland, offering advice on plant layout and efficiency. As well, studies were done on Newfoundland trawlers to improve the condition of fish. Examining the nutritive value of fish and the impact of processing was also among the projects of the FRB technological stations in the 1950s and 1960s. Aside from research and development, the federal government offered some financial assistance to the province for establishing educational programs for fishers, beginning in 1953.47 Having no permanent educational facilities for fishing people, the provincial government created a travelling workshop program, offering short courses in marine engine repair, navigation, and gear and fishing methods.48 The scale of the program remained modest; between 1953 and the 1959-60 season, a total of only 1,812 fishers attended.49 Despite all the rhetoric about the importance of education and its centrality to fisheries development, little money was spent in this area.

CONFLICT, CO-OPERATION, AND COMPROMISE 79

Not until the creation of the Newfoundland College of Fisheries in 1964 were any permanent facilities established to accommodate larger numbers of students. Despite these federal programs, people in the provincial Department of Fisheries began feeling impatient with the slow pace of change in the inshore fishery. In 1957, the new provincial Minister of Fisheries, John Cheeseman, appealed to James Sinclair for a joint federal-provincial review of fisheries development since the Walsh Report. Although he became Minister of Fisheries only after the 1956 provincial election, Cheeseman had long been involved both in the fishing industry and in fisheries administration. Born in Port au Bras in 1892, and educated there and at Bishop Feild in St John's, he joined his father's Burin-area fisheries business in 1909. He was first elected to the House of Assembly in 1919. After losing his seat in 1923, he joined the firm of Burin Import and Export Company. In 1930, he formed his own firm, Cheeseman and Co. During the Commission of Government era, Cheeseman worked as the Chief Inspector for Fisheries and then as the Chief Fisheries Officer. He began a long association with John Penny and Sons of Ramea when he joined its Board of Directors in the 1940s. He remained a director throughout the 1950s, occasionally writing to the provincial government on the company's behalf before his election to the House of Assembly.50 Even after his appointment as Minister of Fisheries, he retained his seat on the Board, although he relinquished his voting privileges. Sinclair agreed to Cheeseman's request, so long as the committee remained a temporary, rather than permanent, body.51 The 'Working Party on Fisheries Development' included federal officials I.S. McArthur, representing the federal Fisheries Prices Support Board, and L.S. Bradbury of the Industrial Development Service of the Department of Fisheries. Attending from the province were Harry Winsor of the NFDA and Deputy Minister of Fisheries Eric Gosse, who replaced Clive Planta in 1954. Born in Spaniards Bay in 1912, Gosse was manager of the Labrador-based firm, G and M Gosse, from 1931 to 1936, when he left to join the Newfoundland Fisheries Board.52 After World War II, during which he had served with the Royal Air Force, Gosse went to Jamaica to work in the saltfish trade. He was a trade representative with the Newfoundland Fisheries Board, then became Trade Commissioner for the Canadian Department of Trade and Commerce; he also served as Trade Commissioner for the Dominican Republic. He returned to Newfoundland in 1956. The Working Party presented its own report in January 1958.53 They concluded that the main problem of the fishery as indicated by

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the Walsh Report, low individual productivity, still plagued the Newfoundland fishery. Indeed, the Working Party concluded that 90 per cent of the fishing people had been untouched by fisheries programs and were still using the same methods and were catching the same amount of fish that they had for years. Although fishing people's average incomes had increased, they were still far behind those of Nova Scotia. The Working Party, like the Walsh Committee before it, believed that getting the fishers to catch more fish was still the answer to the problems of the Newfoundland fishery. Introducing new harvesting technologies was only part of the solution, however. Although the Walsh Report had argued that some fishers would have to leave the industry, the Working Party warned that the Newfoundland fishery would have to undergo a major depopulation. For every fisher who hoped to remain in the fishery and make a decent living, four others would have to leave. The committee was clearly influenced by Scott Gordon's work, which recommended limited access to the resource to ensure maximum economic benefits. The Working Party realized, however, that the solution was drastic, and the province lacked the social and economic infrastructure to handle such a project. At that time, the Working Party was not suggesting that either the federal or provincial government consider embarking on a massive resettlement. The mere hint from the Working Party that only 20 per cent of Newfoundland fishers should remain indicates how thoroughly it believed that technology and centralization would create a modern fishery. The industrial vision was there, even though the federal government was, for other reasons, unwilling to commit itself to programs that would have made it happen more quickly. The federal government was in the midst of a transition in its relationship to the economy and to society in the postwar years. Heightened levels of government involvement were accepted, even expected by many in the 1950s. The Canadian government was beginning to assist major industries considered vital to postwar economic development such as mining, energy, and transportation. The state, however, had not yet evolved into the more highly interventionist entity it would become in the 1960s. The time for greater involvement in the Newfoundland fishery had not yet arrived.

5

Smallwood and the Frozen-Fish Companies

Unlike the federal civil servants and politicians, Premier Smallwood had no reservations about establishing a direct connection between private enterprise and the state. Indeed, the Commission of Government had already set a precedent, having extended the first loans to fishing companies in the 1940s. As well, Smallwood, new to institutional politics, had no investment in the 'small-L' liberal ideal of the separation between the economy and the state. In the absence of support from the federal Department of Fisheries, Smallwood turned to private enterprise to fulfil his promises of a new industrial economy for Newfoundland. Between 1949 and 1 December 1967, the Newfoundland government spent over $53.5 million on assistance to the fishery.1 Nearly two-thirds of that total, $33 million, went to private companies in the form of loans and loan guarantees. It was not always an easy relationship, as the needs of a government and the needs of a corporation often diverged. Nevertheless, the relationship that formed between the Smallwood government and the small group of frozenfish companies would become one of the defining features of postConfederation fisheries development in Newfoundland. Although Newfoundland had become part of Canada, few in the frozen-fish sector had any illusions about directing their production to the Canadian domestic markets. Markets on the Canadian mainland were small relative to the United States. Besides, the frozen-fish firms of Nova Scotia, such as National Sea Products, already dominated Canadian domestic sales.2 Instead, as the Newfoundland frozen-fish sector expanded, it became more tightly integrated into the New England fishing industry. New England was the centre of North American fresh- and frozen-fish production and distribution 81

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and nearly all of Newfoundland's frozen fish went to the markets of Boston and Gloucester, Massachusetts. In the early 1950s, the American frozen-fish market looked promising. Clarence Birdseye's company, General Seafoods (a division of General Foods), began selling 'fish sticks', a new product made by sawing up blocks of frozen cod, haddock, or redfish, dipping the sticks in batter, and deep frying them. Consumers merely had to take the frozen, breaded fish sticks out of the box and re-heat them in the oven. Thinking that this product would entice Americans to buy more fish, many firms moved into the fish-processing business. Within a few years the number of fishstick processors quadrupled, and production jumped from 7.5 million pounds in 1953 to 63 million pounds in 1955.3 As production of pre-packaged frozen fish grew in the United States, so, too, did American fishing firms' dependence on imported groundfish.4 The post-World War II years were difficult for the New England fish-harvesting sector. The favoured species, haddock and redfish, had became scarce and landings at the major offshore fishing ports of Boston and Gloucester declined throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Fishing companies began selling their trawlers, finding it cheaper to buy imported groundfish than to try to operate offshore harvesting divisions profitably. Between 1947 and 1965, the number of offshore vessels of 150 gross tonnes and over fishing out of Boston fell from 60 to 26.5 Indeed, the largest firms, such as Boston's General Seafoods, were in the process of reinventing themselves as they turned away from processing/harvesting operations to focus more exclusively on processing/distributing. By the end of the 1950s, imports comprised 62 per cent of groundfish fillets sold in the United States.6 Most of the imports came from Canada, although Iceland and Norway also supplied the American markets in this period. Newfoundland's frozen-fish production accounted for a large proportion of the Canadian imports. Indeed, on its own, Newfoundland was the single largest supplier of frozen groundfish to the American market. Between 1956 and 1965, Newfoundland groundfish accounted for 31.8 per cent of total imports to the United States.7 Over the years, the supply end of the American frozen-fish industry became increasingly competitive. In the 1950s, Iceland divided its exports between the United States and the Soviet Union. According to a Canadian government report, Iceland sold 61 million pounds of frozen fish to the USSR and Eastern Europe in 1956.8 When the Soviet Union expanded its own distant-water fishing fleets in the late 1950s, Iceland began diverting more of its production to the United States. By the early 1960s, not only had Iceland

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increased its sales to the United States, but countries such as Denmark and newcomers Japan, Poland, and Argentina were also selling fish in this market. Although Newfoundland exported millions of pounds of frozen groundfish fillets and blocks (fish fillets or pieces frozen into 10pound blocks), it sent very few fish sticks to the United States. Indeed, only Fishery Products Limited operated a fish stick-making line in Newfoundland. Reasons for the Newfoundland trade's failure to move into this 'value-added' line of production had more to do with the American tariff structures, however, than lack of initiative. Since the end of World War II, the New England fish harvesters had been pressuring the United States Tariff Commission to raise duties on frozen fish.9 The fish-processing companies, which depended on imported groundfish to supply their plants, wanted tariffs kept relatively low. In 1954, the United States government compromised by imposing a duty of 20 per cent for frozen fillets and blocks, and 30 per cent for breaded and cooked fish (fish sticks).10 The higher rate for fish sticks made it less economical for Newfoundland companies to add fish stick-making lines to their plants. Thus, the Newfoundland fish-processing industry was limited to producing raw materials for the New England companies. Contrary to expectations, however, per capita fish consumption in the United States failed to rise. Although incomes rose in this period, most Americans preferred to spend their new-found wealth on other protein foods, such as meat and chicken. Between 1950 and 1959, the average yearly consumption of meat per person rose from 145 pounds to 159 pounds, while fish consumption hovered between 10 and 12 pounds per year.11 According to a study of the American fishing industry in the early 1960s, 'Fish has not managed to achieve a breakthrough in the minds of the U.S. consumer.'12 The failure of Americans to live up to the expectations of the fish-stick processors led to problems in the industry in the mid-1950s as supply exceeded demand. The post-Korean War recession in the mid-1950s may also have contributed to the problems in the market. Many of the smaller companies that had moved into fish-stick production went out of business, but the largest companies, such as Gorton-Pew of Gloucester, Booth Fisheries, and General Seafoods, continued to dominate the industry. Glutted domestic markets and growing competition among the groundfish exporters enabled the New England processors to keep prices paid for frozen fish stable throughout the 1950s, despite rising costs incurred for producing it. In Newfoundland, prices were generally lower than in Nova Scotia and New England. Between 1953 and

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1963, the average (July) price per pound of gutted, head-on cod paid to Newfoundland fishers only increased from 2 cents to 3 cents.13 Geography and accessibility to fresh-fish markets contributed to the lower fish prices paid in Newfoundland. Traditionally, a premium was paid in New England for fresh over frozen fish.14 In areas where fishers had the opportunity of selling fish to the fresh market, such as New England and Nova Scotia, the fishers generally received more money. In Newfoundland, however, very little fish was ever sold fresh, and no such competition between the fresh and frozen sectors existed, which in turn exacerbated already lower prices. Finally, the absence of a union of primary producers in the Newfoundland fishery (lacking in Nova Scotia and New England, for that matter) meant that fishers had little input in negotiating prices. Although the American fishing companies had earlier invested in operations in Canada, most showed little interest in getting directly involved in the Newfoundland fishing industry. In fact, the Newfoundland Fisheries Development Authority tried desperately to convince the president of Booth Fisheries, one of the largest American firms, to buy or build a plant in Newfoundland.15 Booth Fisheries, founded in Chicago in 1848, quickly expanded into all major North American fisheries.16 By the mid-1950s the company had absorbed 34 smaller corporations and had operations on the Great Lakes, Lake Winnipeg, the Pacific coast, Alaska, New England, the southeastern United States, and the Gulf of Mexico. The company also had processing plants in Nova Scotia. After several years of intense lobbying, Booth finally agreed to buy a freezing plant and a trawler at Fortune, on the Burin Peninsula on Newfoundland's south coast in 1959. The operations had belonged to a firm that had gone bankrupt. In return for the plant (Booth Fisheries obtained the property for less than market value) the American firm agreed to employ a certain number of people and operate a set number of days a year. For the most part, however, the Newfoundland frozen-fish industry was a local enterprise. Of the $33 million of government money spent on loans to private fishing companies between 1950 and 1967, $30 million went to firms for building plants, trawlers, and for working capital. Just under half of the money extended to firms for frozen-fish-related ventures went to four companies—Arthur Monroe's Fishery Products Limited ($5.5 million),17 Hazen Russell's Bonavista Cold Storage ($4.6 million),18 the operations owned by the Lake family of Fortune: Gaultois Fisheries Limited ($1 million), Burgeo Fish Industries Limited ($1.5 million), and John Penny and Sons ($815,000).19 The government extended most of these loans during the 1950s, particularly

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between 1953 and 1960. Although these amounts may not seem exorbitant, we have to remember that both incomes and the degree of capitalization in the fishery were relatively low in comparison. The 1953 Walsh Report noted that the average family income from fishing and other sources was approximately $1,300 per year.20 As well, in 1955 the total value of all fishing vessels, gear, and shore installations (excluding processing plants) in Newfoundland was just over $15.6 million.21 Divided by the estimated number of fishers (14,956) that comes to just over $ 1,000 of capital equipment per person.22 With the assistance of the provincial government, the frozen-fish industry grew rapidly. Between 1950 and 1964, the number of frozenfish plants doubled and the number of fish-plant workers increased from 1,170 to 7,427.23 Frozen-fish production rose from 34.5 million pounds in 1950 to 57.8 million in 1960 and to 106.9 million pounds in 1965. By 1957, three firms—Fishery Products Limited, Bonavista Cold Storage, and Gaultois Fisheries Limited—accounted for 60 per cent of Newfoundland's frozen-fish exports, with Fishery Products Limited producing slightly over half of that total. Data on frozen-fish production, saltfish production, and freezing plants and trawlers are presented in Figures 1-3. Smallwood, not Newfoundland Minister of Fisheries W.J. Keough, took the lead in initiating the policy of financing the frozen-fish plants. Smallwood was not known as a 'team player' during his two decades as Premier and he habitually initiated policy on his own without consulting his cabinet ministers. Indeed, his refusal to take the advice of his cabinet was one of the reasons that a number of highprofile cabinet ministers resigned during his first few years in office. From what we know of Keough's ideas on fisheries development, he would not likely have supported investing so much government money into a few frozen-fish enterprises. In fact, Keough had warned about the consequences of allowing 'new commercial fish monarchies' to control the industrial fishery. Smallwood had no qualms, apparently, about handing fisheries development to a few fishing firms. Although it is uncertain if Keough ever directly challenged Smallwood's plans, the Minister of Fisheries had little direct contact with the companies themselves. The fishing company owners primarily corresponded directly with either Smallwood or members of the Newfoundland Fisheries Development Authority. During the negotiations over the ill-fated Bait Service deal with Fishery Products Limited in the spring of 1953, Keough was not even present.24 While Smallwood had much to gain by supporting the expansion of the frozen-fish industry in Newfoundland, the company owners

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Figure 1 Numbers of Freezing Plants and Trawlers, 1949-1965

SOURCE: Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador, GN 34/2, NFDA, file 'Smallwood, Hon, J.R., Statistics 1967'.

also benefited. Despite the mythology that the Water Street merchants of St John's were making great profits at the expense of the fishing people, the fishing trade in Newfoundland had long been capitalpoor. The companies that had made the transition to frozen fish were relatively small and lacked the resources to make the heavy investments needed for the industrial fishery. Local chartered banks were willing to offer loans to these enterprises, but demanded the loans be repaid in five years, something the fishing company owners claimed would be difficult to do. These firms felt under pressure to acquire these technologies quickly, for Newfoundland's main competitors in the frozen-fish markets—Nova Scotia and Iceland—had industrialized much earlier. Although Newfoundland had an advantage being closest to one of the richest sources of groundfish in the world, it lagged far behind in capital development. In the wake of the federal government's rejection of the Walsh Report, Arthur Monroe's Fishery Products Limited became Smallwood's unofficial 'instrument' of fisheries development. The company

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Figure 2 Newfoundland Frozen-Fish Production, 1949-1968

SOURCE: Fisheries Statistics of Canada—Newfoundland. Ottawa: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, various years.

took this role partly because of Monroe's persuasive powers, and partly because Smallwood was looking for the fastest possible route to industrialization. Monroe was also among a small group of high-profile community political and economic leaders who played an instrumental role in the Confederation campaign. To his contemporaries, Monroe was a quick, intelligent, yet highly individualistic and stubborn man. He saw himself as a pioneer in the industry, and was not shy in conveying that to Smallwood. In a 1950 letter in which he asked Smallwood for loans for trawlers, Monroe argued that only large companies such as his would be able to compete in the American market.25 Countries like Iceland and Norway were quickly increasing their production, making it more difficult for Newfoundland firms. Monroe offered to expand his operations, saying, 'We are capable of it and in a national emergency, I feel that we are bound to it if so requested by the government.'26 Although a decade earlier, members of the Commission of Government were dubious of Monroe's management abilities, Smallwood

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Figure 3 Newfoundland Saltfish Production, 1955-1968

SOURCE: Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, Statistical Bulletin Supplementary Issue, Fisheries Statistics for 1960-90. Dartmouth, NS, 1995.

and Deputy Minister of Fisheries Clive Planta revealed no such reservations. Planta claimed that Monroe, along with Bonavista Cold Storage owner Hazen Russell, had led the way in Newfoundland in 'modern business thinking and practical efficient administration in the fisheries'.27 Planta was impressed also with the marketing organization, the Cleveland, Ohio-based Fishery Products Incorporated, that Monroe had organized to sell his products in the United States.28 Smallwood, too, was impressed by the size and breadth of Monroe's operations. In a speech he made regarding the Bait Service deal, he argued that Fishery Products merited such a central role in the fisheries development program because it had the experience and management skills to implement a large-scale project.29 He talked about the advantages of having the services of a company which is fully equipped with the processing and marketing facilities, the skilled technicians and the management to

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carry out such part or parts of the development programme, as we and the Federal Government may decide to place in their hands. Thus, as soon as the development program is decided upon, which I sincerely hope will be in the near future, we will have an instrument that will enable us to work instantly. I believe we can expect impressive results this summer.30 Within a few weeks of the federal government's rejection of the Walsh Report recommendations, Smallwood and Monroe reached an agreement to begin building frozen-fish plants on the northeast coast. They hoped the five communities chosen would become focal points for future development, drawing in people from surrounding areas. This area was targeted mainly because at that point very few processing plants, for either saltfish or frozen fish, had been built north of Bonavista. Historically, the northeast coast had supported the majority of Newfoundland's inshore fishers and produced the most fish, but the oldest and largest frozen-fish plants were located in St John's and on the south coast of the island. The south coast was ice-free in winter and was ideal for a year-round, trawler-based fishery. The northeast coast fishery, however, was seasonal, operating when harbours were free of ice in the late spring, summer, and early fall. Although frozen-fish plants on the northeast coast could process great amounts of fish during the summer trap season, they could not operate at full capacity during the rest of the year. The Walsh Report had recognized this problem, suggesting that any plants north of Bonavista should have both freezing and salting facilities. Since artificial saltfish drying plants relied on saltbulk, which did not have to be processed immediately, unlike frozen fish, the plants would be able to operate longer. Despite these warnings, Arthur Monroe, buoyed by expectations of growth in American demands for frozen fish, decided to make the northeast coast plants freezing plants only. Monroe's new plants were slated for the communities of Twillingate, Catalina, and Bay de Verde. Twillingate, located on two small islands on the west side of Notre Dame Bay, had been a prosperous mercantile and supply centre for the fishery in the northern areas of the island in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Although its economy had declined during the twentieth century, it still remained a rich inshore fishing area. Catalina, on the eastern side of the Bonavista Peninsula, had attracted permanent settlers who fished its waters as early as the sixteenth century. Besides the frozen-fish plant, it was also home to one of the largest artificial saltfish-drying operations in the province, owned by the Mifflin family. Monroe was also supposed

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Women packing fish in a freezing plant, c. early 1940s. The plants later became more mechanized, with women working along conveyor belts, rather than the simple wooden tables seen in the picture. (Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador, A 31-74.)

to build a plant at Bay de Verde, another centuries-old fishing settlement located on the north side of Conception Bay, near Baccalieu Island. In addition to these three plants, Monroe was to reactivate two dormant fish plants. During World War II, Monroe had built a small frozen-fish plant at Joe Batt's Arm, a small community on Fogo Island, situated east of Twillingate. As part of the loan agreement, Monroe was to expand the Joe Batt's Arm property and get the plant, closed since 1946, running again. Monroe also agreed to operate a frozen-fish plant on Change Islands, a small group of islands between Twillingate and Fogo. He was to take over a building from the defunct Northeastern Co-operative Society and convert it to frozenfish facilities. Under the agreement, Fishery Products would receive 20-year loans at 3.5 per cent for construction costs and working capital, and in return the government took the first mortgage on all buildings and vessels.31 Monroe received his first instalment of $1,687,000 for the plantbuilding project later in 1953.32 This loan was not for the five new plants, however, but to support Monroe's other plants at Burin, a trawler-based operation located on the Burin Peninsula, a historic base for the bank fishery; Trepassey, another trawler-based plant

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Men working in Fishery Products Limited plant in Burin. While women in fish plants primarily packed the fish into containers, men typically operated the fish butchering machines. (Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador, B 9-7.)

located on the southern Avalon Peninsula; Greenspond, an inshore plant on the west side of Bonavista Bay; Long Harbour, in Placentia Bay; Rose Blanche, on the southwest coast; and his plant at Joe Batt's Arm. He also received money for several collector vessels. In 1954 he received $1.5 million in loans at 3 per cent interest for the five plants that were part of the original agreement—Twillingate, Catalina, Joe Batt's Arm, Change Islands, Bay de Verde—along with extra funding for the Trepassey plant, which he was outfitting to manufacture fish sticks (the fish-stick line was later moved to Burin). Construction on the new plants was slow, however, and neither the government nor Monroe revealed many details about the schedule for opening the plants to the public. In the fall of 1954 one delay arose when Monroe informed the NFDA that he wanted to change his plans for the Twillingate plant, turning it from an inshore fishery-supplied operation to a combined inshore and longliner plant.33 He requested an extra $500,000 in loans to enable the Twillingate plant to accommodate longliners, which were larger and could catch more fish than

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inshore craft. Monroe argued longliners could better help his plant handle the increase in demand for frozen-fish products. H.G. Dustan, chair of the Newfoundland Fisheries Development Authority, was reluctant to allow the change, and recommended to Minister of Fisheries Keough that the request be denied. In two letters, which Keough passed on to cabinet, Dustan outlined his reservations.34 Longliners undoubtedly caught more fish, but they were expensive vessels, costing approximately $25,000 each. Even with federal and provincial subsidies, a prospective owner would have to supply $8,000-$9,000 of his own money for the vessel, a sum few could afford. Turning the Twillingate plant into a longliner-based plant would defeat the original purpose of helping the inshore fishery in the area. Besides, the ability of the markets to sustain increased production was unknown. Dustan also expressed some concern about the operations of Fishery Products and the wisdom of giving it more responsibility. The expansions had already overextended the company's resources, particularly at the management level. Dustan argued further that letting a single company continue to dominate the northeast coast fishery would impede competition and might prevent fishing people from getting the fairest prices possible for their fish. The people of Twillingate began hearing rumours about Monroe's proposal to change the plant into a longliner operation. Learning of the anxiety growing in the community, Monroe, in a letter to a St John's newspaper, tried to defend his plans and dispel the rumours that he would not accept inshore fish.35 He admitted, however, that he had enlarged the plans for the Twillingate plant and hoped to accommodate fish from both inshore fishers and longliners. 'If the government could not depend on me and others to come to them with suggestions,' he argued, 'it would be a very sorry state of affairs.'36 These events raised the larger issue of the lack of information about the details of these development projects. Indeed, some began suspecting that Smallwood had announced the construction of the plants to coincide with his attempts to get Jack Pickersgill, a former federal civil servant, elected as a member of Parliament for Bonavista-Twillingate.37 Smallwood, looking for a strong candidate to represent Newfoundland's interests in the federal cabinet, had recruited Pickersgill to run for the Liberals in Newfoundland in 1953. Coincidentally or not, three of the planned development projects—Twillingate, Change Islands, and Joe Batt's Arm—were located in Pickersgill's riding. Residents of those areas complained that nothing had happened since Pickersgill got elected. Despite the concerns of Dustan, Monroe eventually received an extra $500,000 to expand the Twillingate plant.38 The timing, however, proved to be unfortunate for Monroe. By late 1955, Monroe's company

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was beginning to feel the pressures of the glutted American frozen-fish market. In the middle of his frozen-fish plant expansion project, Monroe began to have second thoughts about the market's abilities to sustain increased production. In a speech given to the Newfoundland Board of Trade several years later, he reflected on the timing of his expansion program: It was perhaps an unfortunate coincidence that just about that time the fish stick boom was really taking shape the Premier announced his Fisheries Development Program—almost a case of 'come and get it.' The mixture—almost intoxicating. And then you have the background for the expansion that has taken place—fully justified and soundly planned in the light of that day.39 Monroe quickly tried to scale back his expansion plans and reduce the freezing capacity in the company's plants.40 He had changed his mind about the viability of large freezing operations in the more northerly regions and proposed to change Twillingate into a combined freezing and salting operation and make Catalina a mechanical saltfish-drying plant. Moreover, Monroe wanted to sell his financially troubled Joe Batt's Arm and Change Islands operations. Those facilities were older, located in smaller communities, and he was having trouble getting enough fish from the inshore fishery to keep the plants running. Monroe also asked to be released from any commitment to build a plant at Bay de Verde, saying the area could not support a frozen-fish industry. Monroe also defended himself and his company against accusations that he lacked good business judgement and that his company was being allowed to dominate the fishing industry. He accepted some of the blame, admitting that the frozen-fish expansion program had been hastily conceived. He claimed, however, that he made those decisions based on the economic forecasts of the time and no one predicted the glut in frozen-fish products on the American market. Monroe justified the role his company had played in fisheries development, saying he was filling a void in the province's economy: To an impartial observer, it will be apparent that Fishery Products have been the principal instrument in the development program to date—that they appointed themselves as 'the instrument' but that there were some grounds for their believing that the Government expected them to take the lead.41 His leadership in fisheries development, he asserted, had kept people in the fishery and prevented the fishing communities from being abandoned.

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Within a few weeks of proposing a new development plan, Monroe sent another, more urgent message to Smallwood saying his company needed immediate financial aid.42 Fishery Products Limited had taken risks to accommodate the province's development plans, and Monroe argued the government was obligated to help. He asked for $500,000 to operate the Twillingate and Catalina plants, which were still under construction but would open soon. A manager with the Bank of Nova Scotia, which handled Fishery Products' loans, warned that the extra money was necessary to keep the company afloat.43 Monroe also appealed for help in reducing his excess freezing capacity. He asked Smallwood if the government could buy his plants at Joe Batt's Arm, Change Islands, and Long Harbour and his saltfish operations at Bay Roberts for $740,000. The proceeds of the sale, he reasoned, could go towards the Twillingate and Catalina plants. Referring to the protests by the Nova Scotia saltfish industry regarding assistance to Newfoundland, Monroe argued that establishing modern saltfish plants in Newfoundland was vital for the protection of the local industry. The letters to Smallwood also suggest growing conflicts between Monroe and the Newfoundland Fisheries Development Authority. The NFDA was directly responsible for managing the loans and overseeing the construction of the fish-processing plants. Monroe, however, accused the NFDA of telling the Newfoundland government that his company was incapable of carrying out the development program. Monroe charged the NFDA with incompetence, claiming the members failed to understand the complexity of the international frozen-fish industry. He defended his credibility, and argued that if his company were to collapse, the whole fisheries development program would be jeopardized. If the government were to withdraw support, it would cause 'a great deal of disruption and consequent loss... as confidence would be destroyed and both sales outlets and parts of an organization which have taken years to build up would evaporate.'44Despite problems, Monroe argued that no other company in the province could undertake such an ambitious plan. Harry Dustan, of the NFDA, responded to Monroe's 16 January letter by saying it 'confirms the existence of a situation which we feared and anticipated might develop.'45 He claimed he had been concerned about the financial position of the company for some time. Dustan advised Smallwood not to let Monroe sell his economically weak plants at Long Harbour, Change Islands, and Joe Batt's Arm, while keeping the more profitable operations. Furthermore, Dustan asserted that the government should curb expansion and force the company to honour its commitments. He recommended that they draw up a new

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agreement with the company, creating a new schedule for repayments to alleviate the shortage of cash for its daily operations. In the future, however, the state should take greater control over Fishery Products' operations, particularly its financial affairs. Despite the many problems, the Smallwood government had too much invested in Fishery Products, both politically and financially, to allow it to collapse. After negotiating for several months, Smallwood and Monroe finally reached a new agreement in April 1956.46 Monroe got a new repayment schedule for the loans with the final balance owing in 1978, instead of 1973. He did not have to pay interest from 1955 to 1957. He also received additional loans of $500,000 for operational expenses and $270,000 for the Catalina plant. In return, Monroe had to complete the Twillingate and Catalina plants, but he did not have to build at Bay de Verde. Monroe also had to accept greater government involvement in Fishery Products' financial affairs and would have to consult with the NFDA before buying and selling property. Although Monroe eventually completed the Twillingate (1960) and Catalina (1957) plants, he continued to chafe at the NFDA'S attempts to oversee his financial affairs. Under the terms of the 1956 agreement, a government representative was to attend all meetings of Fishery Products' Board of Directors, and a special committee was created to oversee the company's finances. Members of the NFDA, however, complained that Monroe avoided inviting them to his board meetings. Indeed, they claimed Monroe very rarely called board meetings, preferring to manage the company on his own. A highly individualistic man, Monroe resented taking advice from others, particularly government bureaucrats. One source of conflict arose when the NFDA discovered that Monroe had made a number of alterations to his construction plans for the Twillingate plant without informing the government. After a routine visit to the area by a provincial Department of Fisheries employee, the NFDA learned that Monroe had reduced the size of the Twillingate plant.47 Moreover, people working on the site claimed Monroe had shipped the extra construction materials and other equipment from Twillingate to his other properties. The NFDA penalized him, and told him he could not transfer any more equipment without government permission.48 The NFDA relented, however, to Monroe's requests to close his plants at Joe Batt's Arm and Change Islands in I960.49 Monroe also made repeated attempts to give the government shares in his company in lieu of repaying the loans. Monroe had made similar proposals in the past,50 although none had been successful. He made separate appeals to the government in 1957, 1960, and

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1961.51 On these occasions, Harry Dustan argued that the deal left the government with little security or guarantee for recovering its money.52 The shareholders and the company would benefit, leaving the government to shoulder all the risks. Despite these ongoing tensions between Monroe and the NFDA, Smallwood and Minister of Fisheries John Cheeseman continued to support the company. In a memo to cabinet, Cheeseman defended Fishery Products, saying: From the day in the year 1950 when this company received its first loan from the government it started to weaken and as the loans increased the patient became weaker until finally when no further loans were available the patient almost passed out. Indeed, the crisis has not yet completely passed and, as I shall endeavour to show in this memo further blood transfusions will be necessary.53 Rapid expansion, without sufficient financial control by either Monroe himself or the government, was the main result of the loans. Cheeseman argued that the financial situation of the company was of vital importance to the economy of Newfoundland, and particularly to the thousands of people living within its areas of operation. Indeed,' he claimed, 'the failure of this company would be a major disaster to Newfoundland. It has been my constant endeavour since assuming office to try and avert this.'54 Cheeseman asserted he had worked hard at getting the company's finances under control and gaining the trust of Arthur Monroe. He was pleased to report that despite adversities, such as criticisms in the press and the individualistic tendencies of Monroe's personality, he had accomplished this task. Finances were under tighter control and the company showed signs of pulling out of its difficulties. Cheeseman concluded by saying there would be no benefit to either company or government by withholding further assistance. With a couple of profitable seasons and a spirit of cooperation between management and government, the company would be on firmer ground financially. 'Its importance to the economic and social health of Newfoundland demands the effort.'55 That Newfoundland's Minister of Fisheries placed the highest importance on supporting the financial health of this one company suggests how the path of fisheries development had come to focus on Fishery Products. After millions of dollars having been directed to Arthur Monroe's company, the fate of Fishery Products and of the government fisheries development program was virtually identical. Indeed, the company continued to depend financially on government

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assistance throughout the next two decades. As of 31 December 1977 Fishery Products' long-term debt amounted to $17,749,000, including $7,431,000 owing to the Newfoundland government and $5,086,000 in other loans guaranteed by the province.56 Another of the original frozen-fish companies in Newfoundland, Hazen Russell's Bonavista Cold Storage, also received some government assistance. He and his family continued to operate the Bonavista plant. He also took over a trawler-based plant at Grand Bank, on the Burin Peninsula, that Northlantic Fisheries had planned to build.57 Northlantic had already received a loan from the provincial government for Grand Bank and had purchased three trawlers, using assistance from the Commission of Government in the late 1940s. After Russell left Northlantic in 1953, Northlantic decided not to proceed with the Grand Bank project. Smallwood then turned to Russell, asking him to rescue the plan. Russell agreed, and in 1953 Bonavista Cold Storage received a loan of $1,050,000 to build a frozen-fish plant at Grand Bank, as well as to expand the Bonavista premises.58 Russell also acquired the trawlers and the loan originally issued by the Commission of Government to Northlantic.59 Over the next 14 years, Bonavista Cold Storage received loans for working capital and various vessels totalling $4.6 million. Russell's relationship with the provincial government, however, was less tumultuous than Arthur Monroe's. Russell was less inclined to embark on large-scale plans for his company than was Monroe. Russell was more wary of creating too close a relationship between private enterprise and the state. Although he admitted that he had needed government loans, he argued that economic development should be left to the private sector. At a Newfoundland Board of Trade dinner he suggested that there was a danger to private enterprise with too much government involvement.60 He criticized the government, however, for its lack of a co-ordinated fisheries development policy and for failing to pay attention to marketing issues in the fishing industry. He said he looked forward to the day when private capital and an 'understanding government with sound long-term trade policies' would work together in fisheries development. Although Bonavista Cold Storage experienced a number of difficulties over the years, including labour disputes and problems getting enough fish to supply their Grand Bank plant, the company avoided the severe financial crises of Fishery Products Limited. Throughout most of the 1950s and 1960s, Bonavista Cold Storage was the second-largest producer of frozen fish in Newfoundland. The only other major addition Russell made to the company was the purchase of a

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plant at Fermeuse, on the southern shore of the Avalon Peninsula, which had been owned by North Eastern Fish Industries.61 While remaining a smaller company than Fishery Products, Bonavista Cold Storage also had fewer problems making its loan payments. By the late 1970s, the company had repaid most of its government loans.62 In the early 1970s, the Russell family sold its interests in the firm to the Lake Group of companies. Two other companies were among the largest frozen-fish producers in Newfoundland and received substantial provincial government loans: John Penny and Sons of Ramea and the group of companies owned by the Lake family of Fortune. When Senator George Penny, the president of John Penny and Sons, died in December 1949, his widow Marie took over. The former Marie Smart of Port aux Basques was assisted by her daughter, Margaret, who graduated in 1950 from the Mount Saint Vincent School of Commerce in Halifax.63 Although Marie Penny took the helm of the family business rather late in life, she was widely respected among her colleagues as well as by government representatives as an able manager. In 1967, she became the first woman to be elected president of the Fisheries Council of Canada, a national organization of fishing companies. The firm itself did not undergo any major expansions during this period. Apart from acquiring a couple of loans for trawlers, the Ramea operations remained much as they were before Confederation.64 Like the Pennys, the Lakes had roots in the bank fishery. H.B. Clyde Lake was born in Fortune in 1884 and became a captain of a banking schooner at the age of 22.65 Shortly thereafter he formed a business known as Lake and Lake, with other family members. In 1924, he was elected to the House of Assembly for Burin, serving two terms, including a period as the Minister of Fisheries in the Richard Squires government. After his defeat, he founded H.B. Clyde Lake Limited, a saltfish export and mercantile goods import company based in St John's. By the late 1940s, H.B. Clyde Lake Ltd was one of the largest exporters of saltfish in Newfoundland. Lake had two sons who followed him into the fishing business, Spencer and Harold, both born in Fortune, but educated in St John's.66 These young men eventually joined their father's business in St John's. The Lakes moved into the frozen-fish business in 1951 when they formed Gaultois Fisheries Limited. The major shareholders included H.B. Clyde Lake Limited and Fulham Brothers, a New England fishprocessing company.67 They received a loan of $425,000 from the provincial government for their new frozen-fish plant at Gaultois, with the provision that they collect fish from inshore fishers in communities in the surrounding area as well as from Gaultois.68 The

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Gaultois plant, however, was a problematic operation, and the Lakes had problems making payments on their government loans. The provincial government postponed payment dates on numerous occasions, so that by 1971, the Lakes still had not made any interest or other payments on the Gaultois loan.69 The Penny family joined forces with the Lakes of Fortune in 1954, when Marie and Margaret, along with members of the Lake family, formed a company and bought the former Fishery Products plant at Burgeo.70 Together, they received a loan of $650,000 to refurbish the Burgeo plant and buy trawlers.71 The 1956 marriage of Spencer Lake and Margaret Penny contributed to a change in the business partnership between the families.72 Marie Penny, having initial reservations about the union, resigned as co-manager of this company and sold her own shares, and the shares belonging to John Penny and Sons Ltd, to her daughter, Margaret.73 Whatever their personal feelings in the matter, however, the two families maintained their business partnerships over the years.74 Throughout this period, the Lake family diversified into other areas of the fishing industry. In the mid-1960s, members of the Lake family had interests in shipping firms, marine equipment enterprises, and trading offices as well as the frozen-fish operations.75 By the early 1970s, after the purchase of Bonavista Cold Storage, the Lake group of companies had become the second-largest producer of frozen fish, behind Fishery Products. After Marie Penny's death in 1971, Spencer Lake bought his mother-in-law's shares, and John Penny and Sons became affiliated with the Lake group of companies.76 Besides helping these firms, the Newfoundland government also built a number of plants and leased them to private operators. The most ambitious project was a large freezing plant built at La Scie on the Baie Verte Peninsula in northern Newfoundland. Smallwood thought that the La Scie plant would provide a model for centralization for the rest of the province, and for that reason he had commissioned the Atlantic Film and Electronics Company to document the process. The federal government also contributed by improving the harbour and building a wharf. Water, sewage, and electrical services were also provided for the community. When the building of the plant took longer than expected and the NFDA had problems finding a firm interested in buying it, many argued that it would be difficult to run the large plant profitably since weather conditions limited the length of the fishing season to five or six months. In 1960, when the plant was completed, the NFDA leased it to Job Bros.77 The company received operating grants for several years from the provincial government to make up the yearly losses incurred in running it.

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The NFDA also became involved on the south coast of the island in building plants, which it later leased or sold to private firms. After the bank fishery declined in the 1930s and 1940s, many of the south coast communities that had participated in this enterprise suffered. The Newfoundland government established the South Coast Commission, which submitted a report on the troubled area in 1957.78 As a result of the report, the NFDA built freezing plants at Rose Blanche and Harbour Breton. It leased the Rose Blanche operation to a private firm, TJ. Hardy and Company Ltd, and sold the Harbour Breton plant to one of the giants of the British Columbia salmon canning industry, British Columbia Packers. As well, the NFDA built and operated a shipyard at Marystown, on the Burin Peninsula, to service the trawlers owned by the Newfoundland processing companies. The Smallwood government played an important role in supporting the firms of Arthur Monroe, Hazen Russell, Marie Penny, and the Lake family not only during the initial expansions in the early 1950s, but during the market recessions of the later 1950s. Expansions had come too quickly, before the extent of the American demand for frozen fish was known. Very few of the frozen-fish plants built in this period operated at full capacity. Most had trouble securing enough fish to run profitably, whether they were dependent on inshore fishing or trawler operations. The Smallwood government, however, had too much invested in frozen-fish development to sever its financial support. And the company owners themselves believed that the government, having initiated this development plan, had obligations to search for solutions. Monroe, talking about the depressed state of the market, the shortage of working capital in the industry, the lack of interest of the financial community in supporting frozen fish, said: 'Something has to be done. The trade alone cannot do it.'79 In 1957, in response to these problems with the fisheries development plans, the Newfoundland government hired a business consultant, Arthur D. Little, Inc., of Boston, to examine the largest frozen-fish producers in Newfoundland (and the recipients of the largest government loans)—Fishery Products Limited, Bonavista Cold Storage, Gaultois Fisheries Limited, and Burgeo Fish Industries.80 Little's mandate was to provide an analysis of the US market situation, as well as to study in detail the individual plants' finances and operations, and then to make suggestions for improving efficiency and increasing production. Arthur D. Little Inc. submitted the Little Report, as it was known, to the Newfoundland government in May 1958.81 The report concluded that the Newfoundland frozen-fish industry was a victim of depressed conditions in the US market and of a development program

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that had allowed the firms to expand too quickly, creating more fish plants than were needed. The American frozen-fish industry was still reeling from the 'fish stick' expansion and a glutted supply. By the mid-1950s, it was apparent that the modest increases in fish consumption were a result of a growing population, not of Americans' sudden desire to eat more fish. The Little Report argued that the Newfoundland exporters could not count on American demand for fish increasing and would have to fight for a larger share of the American market. In the past, the New England buyers had taken their superior knowledge of the market conditions and used to it take advantage of Newfoundland firms. The report cited instances where New England processors had played one Newfoundland firm against another to push prices down. Newfoundland companies had to realize that their true rivals in the fishing business were not their fellow frozen-fish producers, but the New England processors who controlled the industry. The report suggested that the fishing companies co-ordinate their marketing strategies, collect information about market conditions, and perhaps produce a common 'Newfoundland' brand. The Little Report also criticized the government's handling of the development program. It claimed expansions proceeded without any consideration of the long-term market needs or of the economic viability of the plants themselves. Generally, the plants lacked control of their costs of production; indeed, most had no satisfactory means of calculating their costs and productivity. The report made some suggestions for reducing costs, mainly through better maintenance and repair of trawlers and by increasing labour productivity. It recommended that the government stop providing loans for more fish plants. The report also suggested that the government keep a closer watch on the financially troubled companies, particularly the ones not able to make their loan payments. In addition, a uniform accounting system for all plants would make it easier for the NFDA to take a direct role in managing the industry. The Little Report also did individual financial studies of each of the four companies, examining records, visiting the plants, and making suggestions for improving their operations. In some cases, the consultants suggested that some companies get further loans for acquiring more trawlers to improve efficiency. Not everyone was happy with the analysis of the Little Report. Both Hazen Russell and Arthur Monroe submitted lengthy critiques of the document, explaining why they thought the consultants had misinterpreted their operations. Harry Dustan of the NFDA thought the industry had much deeper problems than could be solved simply by adjusting efficiency levels and improving marketing.82 He thought

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the inability of the firms to carry such heavy debt loads hindered their performance. The high costs of operating trawlers in a province that lacked repair facilities and easy access to parts also handicapped the industry. Dustan liked the idea of co-operative marketing efforts, however. The people who worked in the plants protested because they and their concerns were ignored completely. Lester Farewell, representing the Burin Workers Union at the Fishery Products Burin plant, appealed to the government to include plant wages and prices paid to fishers in the study.83 Farewell wondered why Nova Scotia plants paid higher wages to their workers and offered higher prices for fish than the Newfoundland companies. Although Monroe supported the union's request, the provincial government refused. The Smallwood government was also reluctant to make the findings of the Little Report public.84 Farewell made repeated requests to see a copy of the report, but was always turned down.85 Despite the money and effort put into the Little Report, the provincial government did not act (or was not able to act) on most of the consultant's recommendations. The companies themselves received some free advice on making their firms more efficient. The report's advice on the NFDA taking a more directive role in the development program, however, made little impact. The NFDA simply did not have the resources to oversee the activities of each firm more closely. Although both the NFDA and the company owners agreed that more attention needed to be paid to marketing, they did not have the authority to do anything about it. International trade was a federal jurisdiction, not a provincial one. As well, none of the firms expressed any interest in marketing a single Newfoundland brand. Several of the firms, including Fishery Products, John Penny and Sons, and the Lake companies, already marketed brands of their own, while Bonavista Cold Storage produced the house brand for several American grocery store chains. A large proportion of Newfoundland's production was sold as unbranded cod blocks, which received further processing by the American food companies. Unless the tariff structures that prevented Newfoundland firms from doing the secondary processing themselves were changed, a common Newfoundland brand would have had little effect. As the Little Report itself acknowledged, many of the Newfoundland frozen-fish industry's problems lay outside of its control, in the economic heartland of the Northeast United States. This study of the emerging relationship between the Smallwood government and a small group of frozen-fish company owners offers

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us a chance to look at the way the interests of capital and the state came together in a concrete way. In the heady days after World War II, it seemed technology and the industrial way would solve the world's problems. Without much assistance from the federal government, Smallwood turned to the frozen-fish enterprises to bring a modern society to Newfoundland. The capital-poor frozen-fish companies, seeing opportunities for their firms in supplying the New England fish-processing industry, found help in the state. This was not the only way that development could have occurred. Keough had different ideas, as did Colin Story, for building the fishery. Indeed, giving twothirds of monies spent on fisheries development between 1950 and 1967 for the funding of fish companies was not the only method by which private enterprise might have been assisted. The combination of the presence of the hegemonic ideology of modernization, plus Smallwood with his emphasis on developing Newfoundland as quickly as possible, plus the wishes of the frozen-fish companies to supply the US market, all contributed to setting Newfoundland fisheries development on this path. Other factors, such as the changes occurring in the New England fishery, the tariff on fish sticks, and Americans' reluctance to eat more fish, also affected the way that development occurred. And of course, the Commission of Government had already started the Newfoundland fishery in this direction; Smallwood simply expanded the scale and scope of the program. Developing the frozen-fish industry in this way had a number of consequences for Newfoundland—consequences that most did not foresee. First, the Smallwood government poured so much energy and money into frozen-fish plants that there was little left for anything else. Second, the state supported the expansion of one company in particular, Fishery Products. Already the largest producer of frozen fish before Confederation, the company maintained this position with the help of the Smallwood loans. Third, the doubling of the number of frozen-fish plants in the province in the 1950s contributed to a cycle of technological escalation in Newfoundland. The logic of fisheries development is that the more money you spend on capital development, the more fish you have to catch and process to pay for it. In the 1950s, however, there was too much processing capacity, and the pressure to find greater sources of fish mounted. Finally, a cycle of dependency between capital and the state emerged, a cycle that continued through the 1970s and 1980s, and that played out against increasing pressure from offshore international fisheries.

PART III

Competition for the Resource and the Consolidation of Industrialization: the 1960s 6

Facing the 'City of Trawlers' in Newfoundland The people of Newfoundland were used to sharing the rich cod resources off the coast with fishers from across the Atlantic Ocean. For centuries, fishers from Spain, Portugal, and France had been fishing off the Newfoundland coast. In the 1950s, however, they began replacing their wooden ships with steel-hulled otter trawlers and factory-freezer trawlers, which allowed crews to process fish on board. Every year brought more trawlers from an ever-increasing number of countries. Soon, the vessels regularly catching fish off the coast of Newfoundland, Labrador, and in the Gulf of St Lawrence numbered in the hundreds. In the days of the three-mile territorial limit, the European vessels could fish within sight of the inshore grounds and side-by-side with Newfoundland's offshore fleet. Sometimes, fishing people reported they could see so many ships that they looked like 'floating cities' at night. These floating 'cities of trawlers' had a powerful impact on the Newfoundland fishery. Never in the nearly 500-year commercial fishery in the northwest Atlantic had anyone had the ability to catch fish with such efficiency and speed as the new European fleets. Catches rose to extraordinary levels throughout the 1960s. The resource, and the people in Newfoundland dependent on it, would never be the same again. By the late 1950s, complaints about offshore competition and other related and unrelated problems began emerging from fisheries 104

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research stations, fishing company boardrooms, the production lines in the processing plants, and the wharves of inshore fishing communities. With European fishing showing no signs of abating, both fishing people and fishing company owners made appeals to the government for help. Newfoundland fishing company owners belonged to several industry associations and used them to lobby the federal and provincial governments. Fishing people lacked the degree of organization of the business community, but some raised their complaints through the Newfoundland Federation of Fishermen, created in the early 1950s, and a Fisheries Convention organized by the provincial government in 1962. Smallwood, the consummate politician, refused to allow these grievances to upset either the general peace in Newfoundland or his own hold on power. Instead, in the weeks before the provincial election of 1962, he embraced them, repackaged them, and used them to launch a new campaign to modernize and 'streamline' the Newfoundland fishery. Once again, Smallwood presented himself as the saviour of Newfoundland, the only leader willing to go back to Ottawa to fight for more assistance for the fishery. Esteve Morera has suggested that the state takes a 'direct interest in civil society in order to control it and to steer its possible conflict along permissible channels'.1 Smallwood's public campaign to convince the people of Newfoundland that modernization would solve their problems reveals, on a small scale, how the state attempts to shape and control expressions of unrest. The fisheries planners of the 1940s and early 1950s never imagined they would have to contend with a problem of the magnitude of the expansion of the European distant-water fleets. After World War II, many European countries began rebuilding their economies. For countries such as Spain and Portugal, where Newfoundland fish had long been a part of the diet, investing in otter trawlers to make the long journey across the Atlantic seemed a perfect solution. The Soviet Union, anxious to become self-sufficient in food after the devastations of war, built a fleet of factory-freezer trawlers that fished for cod and redfish off the coasts of Newfoundland, Labrador, and the northeastern United States. When the newly formed International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fishery (ICNAF) began collecting data on fishing activity in the northwest Atlantic in 1953, 540 otter trawlers over 50 gross registered tons (CRT) fished in the ICNAF management area; by 1962, the number had risen to 975.2 The total gross tonnage of these vessels also increased dramatically, indicating that the trawlers were getting larger, with expanded catching capacities. In 1962 the countries with the largest fleets included the Soviet Union

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(344 vessels: 198,196 GRT), Portugal (72 vessels: 72,958 GRT), East Germany (84 vessels: 66,110 GRT), and Spain (132 vessels: 62,986 GRT). Although Canada's offshore fleet numbered 272, these vessels were relatively small, totalling only 34,525 GRT. Newfoundland had 33 offshore vessels, totalling less than 7,000 GRT. This new technology changed not only the amount of fish caught off the coast of Newfoundland, but when it was caught and by whom.3 Before the arrival of the distant-water fleets in the 1950s, annual landings from the resident fishery in Newfoundland ranged from 100,000 to 300,000 tonnes. The small-boat fishery of Newfoundland was primarily a summer affair as ice-bound harbours along the northeast coast limited winter fishing. Only the Newfoundland trawler fishery based on the south coast of the island caught fish in the winter. Between the mid-1950s and the late 1960s total landings of cod tripled in ICNAF areas 2J3KL, which include the southern half of coastal Labrador and the east coast of Newfoundland, reaching a historic high of 810,000 tonnes in 1968. The international fleets recorded most of these increased catches. The European otter trawlers fished all around the island of Newfoundland, off the coast of Labrador, and in the Gulf of St Lawrence in all seasons. This meant that the cod populations off the coast of Newfoundland were subject to a more intensive and never-ending fishing season. Without fishing quotas of any kind until the early 1970s, the European vessels were legally entitled to catch as much fish as they wished (see Figure 4). Fisheries scientists working in the Newfoundland area began to notice changes in the fishery by the early 1960s. Dr Wilfred Templeman, director of the Canadian government's fisheries research station in Newfoundland from 1944 to 1972, began talking publicly about the impact of offshore fishing as early as 1962.4 At the 1962 Fisheries Conference, Templeman told the audience of fishers and government officials that international vessels were competing intensely for all of the major commercial groundfish species, including cod, haddock, redfish, and flounder. He told the audience to expect the catch per person and the size of the fish to decline. Although he was reluctant to predict how long it would take before the Newfoundland fishery became exhausted (he claimed it was like 'witch doctoring into the future'), he had a rather bleak view of the ability of ICNAF to regulate fishing. He noted that the ICNAF countries were primarily interested in ensuring their own fleets had access to the resource and cared little for the impact on the adjacent states. In 1966 Templeman published a major report on marine resources in Newfoundland in which he talked more specifically about the impact of offshore fishing on cod populations.5 Although he noted

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Figure 4 Cod Landings, ICNAF/NAFO Subareas 2J3KL,1960-1990

SOURCE: Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, Statistical Bulletin Supplementary Issue, Fisheries Statistics for 1960-90. Dartmouth, NS, 1995.

that Newfoundland's small offshore fleet was slowly increasing its catches over time, other signs indicated that the size of the cod populations was diminishing. The fish landed in both inshore and offshore fisheries were getting progressively smaller, suggesting that the older, larger animals were getting fished out. Also, the 'catch per unit of effort' was falling, meaning that it was taking more time, money, and effort to catch fish. Templeman warned that the cod and other groundfish populations would continue to decline, as all ICNAF countries planned to increase their fishing activities in the coming years. Templeman realized that the inshore fishery was the most vulnerable to intensified offshore fishing. Much of the small-boat fishery depended primarily upon fish that spawned on the offshore banks and migrated inshore during the summer. With the European vessels fishing on the offshore banks throughout the year, fewer fish survived to make the annual migration to inshore waters. As well, the majority of inshore fishing people used vessels under 35 feet, making it harder

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for them to move to new fishing grounds when local populations declined. The research of Templeman and other fisheries scientists based in Newfoundland revealed dramatic changes in catch rates for the inshore fishery from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s. Templeman made the startling observation that between 1956 and 1964, despite increases in the number of inshore fishers (53 per cent), vessels (57 per cent), and gear (traps, 69 per cent; gill nets, 1819 per cent), total inshore landings had remained relatively stable.6 Allister Fleming, another federal fisheries scientist based in Newfoundland, documented the fall in yields per fisher in the ICNAF subareas 2 (Labrador) and 3 (Newfoundland east and south coasts).7 Despite an increase in landings in subarea 2, after 1959 yields per fisher had fallen by 25 per cent from the 1954-7 average. In subarea 3K (the northern half of the east coast of Newfoundland), the number of fishers had remained the same, but landings and yields per fisher fell 40 per cent below the 1954-5 level. Likewise, in subarea 3L (the southern half of the east coast of Newfoundland), the number of fishers rose by 30 per cent while landings fell 20 per cent. The heavy fishing done by the Soviet Union off the coast of Labrador in the 1960s caused particular concern. Templeman noted: With this great development of the European offshore deep-water fishery, Newfoundland landings from the coastal fishery off Labrador (Subarea 2) declined from about 100% of the total in 1950 to 32% in 1955-58 and to 9% in 1961-64. The new offshore fishery affects the inshore fisheries of Labrador and northern Newfoundland by reducing both quantities and sizes of cod.8 Both Templeman and Fleming argued that, with continued offshore fishing, the only chance for the survival of the inshore fishery was to equip it with more efficient gear and vessels to catch the increasingly scarce groundfish. Fisheries scientists also documented some local depletions occurring in the inshore fishery. One area affected in the 1950s was Bonavista, where the federal government had established the experimental longliner project. At first, from 1952 through 1956, the experimental longliners had produced large quantities of cod, with average landings of 100 pounds of fish per 50-fathom line (with 50 hooks per line). The Fisheries Research Board published the results, as it did with all of its scientific findings. Word of the rich fishing grounds spread, not just in Newfoundland, but in other fishing areas throughout the North Atlantic. Within a year, fleets of longliners from Norway and the Faroe Islands, as well as a number of European trawlers, had joined the Bonavista vessels.9 Landings for the Bonavista long-

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liners began to fall. By the early 1960s, the average catch per line had fallen by 60 per cent and the average size of the fish had declined by two inches. The fishery had declined to the point where it was no longer economical to fish and many of the Bonavista longliners left the area. Many fishers also complained that the trawlers tore gear of the smaller vessels. One longliner captain who declared he was selling his boat remarked: Often we have lost hundreds of dollars worth of gear, and had to give up and come back to port again Because of this, it has not been profitable, especially during the past couple of summers when the number of fish was scarce on the offshore grounds.10 Longliners operating in other areas of the province also reported similar problems.11 The sudden arrival of European fleets at Bonavista and other points around Newfoundland provoked public debate about the minimal protection the existing three-mile fishing limit gave to the resource. Both the frozen-fish company owners and inshore fishing people began appealing to the government to extend the fishing limit from three to 12 miles (see Chapter 7 for a discussion on the international negotiations over the 12-mile fishing limit).12 They also demanded that the federal government stop international vessels from entering Newfoundland bays, the traditional fishing grounds of inshore fishers, by declaring that the three-mile limit began at an imaginary line drawn from straight baselines, or headland-to-headland. When Newfoundland joined Confederation in 1949, members of the Newfoundland delegation assumed that the headland-to-headland principle applied to the waters off the coast of the island, based on an agreement made between Great Britain and the United States in 1912.13 In the 1950s, however, the Canadian government argued that the Canadian threemile territorial limit was measured following the sinuosities of the coast, not using straight baselines.14 For Newfoundland (indeed, for all of Canada), with its jagged coastline, numerous long, deep bays, and many fishing communities located on offshore islands, a measurement of the territorial limit from headland-to-headland would have greatly increased the size of protected fishing areas. For the frozen-fish sector, heightened offshore fishing threatened its supply from both the inshore fishery and its trawlers. Securing adequate supplies of fish had long been a problem for the frozen-fish industry, a dilemma exacerbated by the overcapacity in processing facilities on the island. Increased competition for the resource led to rising costs, as both trawler owners and inshore fishers had to extend more effort to catch fish. With little upward movement in prices for

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frozen fish in Boston, company owners feared the cost of catching fish would outstrip the returns. At the Fisheries Convention in 1962, Arthur Monroe claimed that his trawlers had had to extend more effort to catch a pound of fish, but the average yields per vessel had declined.15 To make up for the growing scarcity, his trawlers were having to stay on the fishing grounds longer. A few extra days sitting in the hold caused the fish to deteriorate, resulting in a lower-value product. Unless the government acted on foreign offshore fishing, he argued, the Newfoundland trawler fishery would disappear. Frank Spencer of Booth Fisheries shared Monroe's concerns: I feel certain that in the years ahead, you are going to find a gradual depletion of those fisheries, the concentrated fishing effort now being extended toward them, will I am sure result in our having to put forward a greater unit of effort per pound of fish landed, by that I mean we will need more trawlers to keep our plants operating.16 Hazen Russell also talked about the threat to the Newfoundland companies posed by the foreign vessels. He warned that: nothing short of a miracle is going to prevent the depletion of the fishing areas in Newfoundland and on the Grand Banks to a point where private enterprise will not be able to operate and everyone will have to be subsidized or get out of business.17 In an interview with a local newspaper earlier that year, Russell had blamed the foreign vessels fishing 'within a stone's throw of our shores' for the declining per capita production offish and several catch failures that had occurred since the mid-1950s.18 Indeed, he predicted the Newfoundland fishery was likely to become as greatly depleted as the fishing grounds on the eastern side of the Atlantic. The inshore fishery would be destroyed and reduced quantities of fish would make catching fish more expensive. Russell argued, 'unless the processors can obtain correspondingly higher sales prices, the fishing industry as we know it is bound to become less valuable to the country.'19 The fears of frozen-fish company owners that decreasing stocks would make it harder for them to recover costs made them particularly resentful of the Soviet Union's factory-freezer trawlers. These vessels, some of which were 8,000 CRT and the size of two or more football fields, had no parallel in Newfoundland, where most of the trawlers ranged from 151-500 CRT and were just over 100 feet long. Many expressed concerns that the Soviet vessels, being state-owned, did not have to make a profit and could continue fishing long after diminishing returns forced the Newfoundland trawlers ashore. High

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costs and the unlikelihood of getting a return on the investment prevented Canadian companies from competing with factory-freezer trawlers of their own. The Newfoundland trade used its industry associations, the Newfoundland Fish Trades Association (NFTA) and one of its suborganizations, the Frozen Fish Trades Association (FFTA), to lobby the federal government for a 12-mile limit.20 Both of these groups belonged to a national organization, the Fisheries Council of Canada (FCC), to which they also appealed for help. The Newfoundland groups, along with organizations in British Columbia and Nova Scotia, failed to convince the national organization to take a strong stand on the fishing limit on their behalf. The Ottawa-based FCC closely guarded the relationship it had cultivated with federal officials, and refused to ask the government to make a unilateral declaration of a 12-mile limit. Instead, the FCC preferred a moderate course, suggesting that Canada extend its fishing jurisdiction only after formal negotiations with the other countries involved.21 Members of both the Newfoundland and British Columbia fishing industries were dismayed with the FCC'S cautious approach. A Newfoundland member of the saltfish trade, J.C. Grieve of Bowering's Limited, criticized the FCC'S timid stance, saying Canada should 'proclaim [its] baselines and national waters and argue afterwards.'22 In response to complaints from the industry in British Columbia about the FCC'S reluctance to take a stronger stand on the territorial waters issue, Gordon O'Brien, manager of the FCC, explained that he did not believe the FCC should become too 'political' in its demands.23 Particularly since it was an election year, the FCC needed to keep its neutral stance on the issue. Rather than asking for an immediate 12-mile limit, headland to headland, the FCC preferred to express disappointment at the slowness of negotiations. Although not as well organized at the local and national levels as the fishing company owners, the people of the inshore fishery also demanded that the government implement a 12-mile fishing limit. In the mid-1950s, inshore fishing people began complaining about the presence of trawlers, both foreign and domestic, in the bays and headlands of Newfoundland.24 Indeed, newspaper headlines of the period, while dramatic, suggest that people were becoming concerned: 'Foreign boats hurt longliner fishery'; 'Growing piracy by foreigners dooms fishery'; 'Fishermen will fight warns south coast man'. A St John's Evening Telegram editorial cartoon depicted half-a-dozen foreign trawlers lined up on one side of the fishing limit and a lone man sitting in a dory holding a handline on the other.25 Some of the earliest complaints were about foreign trawlers interfering with inshore gear,

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cutting lines to nets that inshore fishing people had placed in the water. Many also accused them of tearing up the spawning grounds with their bottom-dragging trawl nets. And, of course, inshore fishing people blamed the trawlers for contributing to the growing scarcity of fish. Fishing people attending the 1962 Fisheries Convention in St John's talked about the problems that trawlers caused for the inshore fishery and their impact on the resource.26 In fact, Smallwood remarked on how often people talked about the problem: 'If they [people at the convention] were talking about anything at all they'd drag in the 12-mile limit. Shows you how much it is on men's minds.'27 Most suggested a 12-mile fishing limit would help solve the problem, although one man suggested that a 200-mile limit was the answer.28 At that point, Peru had unilaterally declared a 200-mile limit along its coastline. He argued: We know quite well what is happening on the Grand Banks with the increase in the number of trawlers which the Russians have I rather think that in the light of what is happening on Georges Bank off Boston that the Grand Banks will be certainly depleted in a very few years unless pressure and representation is made to Ottawa in a much stiffer vein than has been made heretofore.29 He was referring to the increase in Soviet Union fishing activity on Georges Bank just off the northern New England coast. According to Margaret Dewar, the New England fishing people, like their Newfoundland counterparts, complained the vessels looked like 'floating cities', or more specifically, 'New York City'.30 The foreign vessels were not always the villains. Many complained about domestic trawlers fishing inside the three-mile limit at night. One man claimed he had seen local trawlers in Trepassey Bay, located on the southern half of the Avalon Peninsula, fishing within a mile of shore.31 He argued that the trawlers in Trepassey Bay affected not only the local inshore fishery, but the inshore fisheries of other parts of the island. This man observed that the fish from Trepassey Bay regularly migrated around the Avalon Peninsula to the Southern Shore, an area just south of St John's. He implied that the full impact of intensive fishing in one small area was felt in other places. These comments highlight the complexity of cod populations around the island and the potential for widespread affects of offshore fishing. The Newfoundland Federation of Fishermen (NFF) also made pleas on behalf of the inshore fishing people. Founded at the instigation of Smallwood in 1951 and financed annually by the Newfoundland government, the NFF was hardly a 'grassroots' organization. Its general

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secretary, appointed by Smallwood himself, was Max Lane, a former teacher and magistrate from Salvage, Bonavista Bay. Neither a union with power to negotiate fish prices nor a broader fisheries association, the NFF lacked a clear mandate. Its credibility was further damaged in 1959, when Smallwood decertified the striking International Woodworkers of America during a labour dispute and tried to replace it with the NFF, with Max Lane (who was at this point also an MHA for White Bay North) at the helm. The striking IWA members derided the plan, calling it the 'Fish and Chips' union. Nevertheless, the organization had local units around the island, and members could submit proposals or petitions on various issues to the NFF office in St John's. Once a year, the NFF met and voted on the resolutions and passed them on to the provincial government for consideration. Almost every year, the batch of resolutions included a call for a 12-mile fishing limit.32 Members of the provincial Department of Fisheries also tried to alert the federal government to the problems being caused by the intensified offshore fishing.33 In 1959, Colin Story warned of the potential harm that intensive offshore fishing might have on the inshore fishery. Story drew a link between the fishing activity offshore and problems experienced by both the longliner and inshore fisheries at Bonavista. He cited the fall in the catches for the longliner fishery and the reduction in the average size of the fish since the beginning of the commercial longliner fishery. Cod migration patterns also explained what was happening to the inshore fishery. Dr Templeman's tagging studies suggested that, in the summer, fish migrated from offshore to the Bonavista inshore grounds, but rarely moved in a northerly or southerly direction. In areas just south and north of Bonavista, where there was no heavy fishing directly offshore, the inshore fishery had been relatively good. The fact that Bonavista's inshore fishery had been poor, while the nearby districts had had better landings, suggested that depletion in Bonavista's offshore grounds was a factor. Story also argued that ICNAF'S method of collecting data made it difficult to track declines in local fish populations. He claimed the ICNAF statistical subareas—2J, 3K, and the like—were too large to determine how much fishing was taking place in any particular region. Story maintained that ICNAF statistical area 3L, where Bonavista was located, included at least two different populations of fish (one on the northern Grand Banks, the other at Bonavista) and there was no way to tell how much fish was being taken from each group.34 Story pleaded with the Deputy Minister to ask the federal government to demand that ICNAF change its method of collecting data. He suggested

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that if the divisions were smaller, then they could determine how much fish was actually being caught in the Bonavista area. Certainly, Story lacked 'hard' statistical proof that the Bonavista fishery was in danger, but he believed they had enough data to insist that government act. The evidence is sufficient,' he claimed, 'or at least would be sufficient in other fishing countries who have experienced how rapidly depletion can take place.'35 Warning that foreign fishing was only going to become more intense and efficient as new technology was being developed to enable vessels to fish on rougher grounds, he recommended that the government immediately undertake a study 'with a view to directing every effort towards the prevention of over-fishing' ,36 The inshore fishing people of Newfoundland had other problems, both related and unrelated to the intensified offshore fishing in this period. Although fishing families earned, on average, more than they had before Confederation, they still made only half what fishing people in Nova Scotia made.37 The need for new technologies was greater because of the increased offshore competition, but investments in vessels, gear, and shore installations (flakes, piers, smokehouses) remained low. In 1960 in Newfoundland, the average value of boats per person was $304.68, gear, $329.16, and shore installations, $123.14.38 Inshore fishing people had received little assistance to acquire new technology in the 1950s. Between 1950 and 1961, the provincial Fisheries Loan Board issued 442 loans, totalling $1,274,000 (compared to the over $13 million the provincial government gave to the frozen-fish plants in the same period).39 Of these loans, over half were for new marine engines. The average loan was $2,900, with the average for marine engines being $1,100. Considering that 17,529 inshore fishers worked in the fishery in 1960, only a small percentage benefited from the provincial loan program. As well, considerable regional differences in the acquisition of these technologies existed, as the majority of new investment in the inshore fishery occurred in the areas south of Cape Freels.40 The only major assistance project was the introduction of the longliner. Its size enabled the fisher to venture farther from shore than with inshore vessels. The Walsh Report and various fisheries officials heralded longliners as the most efficient means of supplying fish plants, apart from trawlers. The provincial government assisted in the longliner project by hiring a naval architect to design a series of longliners.41 From 1954 to 1961, the naval architect, a British employee of Lloyd's Surveyors, who was contracted to the provincial government, designed longliners, combination trap boat/longliners

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(vessels adaptable for both tending cod traps inshore and longlining), and one 60' dragger (vessels often using trawl technology ranging from 60' to 100'). The provincial Fisheries Loan Board offered small bounties and loans for fishers to acquire (or build) these vessels. In addition, the federal government gave a bounty of $160 per ton for vessels between 55' and 60'. As of March 1961, the Fisheries Loan Board had provided loans for 47 longliners, 10 new draggers, and 30 combination trap skiff/longliner vessels.42 Despite this support for the longliner, economic and environmental problems severely limited the appeal of this vessel. John Proskie, an employee of the federal Department of Fisheries, studied the economics of longliners in the early 1960s and found that the muchtouted vessels were too expensive for the returns received by the fishers.43 Proskie argued that while costs of building and operating longliners had increased since 1952, the price of fish had remained relatively stable. In fact, he questioned introducing larger, more costly boats to the inshore, considering the poor cost-price relationship. Of the Newfoundland vessels he studied, the one that showed the best returns was the relatively small (36'-38'), inexpensive combination trap skiff/longliner introduced in the mid-1950s. One government policy applauded by fishing people and frozenfish company owners alike was the introduction of Unemployment Insurance benefits for self-employed fishers in 1957.44 For years, federal Department of Fisheries officials had resisted it, fearing it would encourage large numbers of fishers to remain in the industry. Newfoundland cabinet minister Jack Pickersgill, hoping the plan would help stabilize the incomes of his constituents, finally prevailed upon the federal cabinet to accept the plan. The policy, however, had some unintended consequences for the fishing industry in Newfoundland. The methods of calculating the insurable weeks or 'stamps' made it easier for fishing people to qualify if they salted their own fish rather than sold fresh fish to a processing plant. Someone selling fresh fish would have to make regular deliveries to a plant for a certain number of consecutive weeks to get enough stamps. On the northeast coast, where fishing seasons were short and often interrupted by stormy weather or ice, it was sometimes difficult to sell fish regularly. People selling cured saltfish, however, did not necessarily make weekly deliveries to the buyer. Because of the time it took to cure the fish, they would make several larger deliveries later in the season. To calculate the insurable weeks, they used a 'divisor' system, meaning that the total amount of fish sold to the dealer in a season was tallied and divided by a set amount, and stamps were given retroactively. As it

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turned out, someone could obtain more stamps if they salted their fish than if they sold it fresh. As Harry Winsor explained, if someone caught 5,000 pounds of fish in a week, he could either sell it fresh and receive one stamp worth $1.88, or salt it and receive four stamps worth $0.92 (for shore cure) or $0.76 (saltbulk) each.45 Ironically, both the Bates Report and the Walsh Report had envisioned a day when the fishing people would become specialized harvesters, spending less time curing their own fish. Yet the Unemployment Insurance regulations had the opposite effect, with many fishers claiming they had no choice but to continue salting their own fish. As one fisher at the 1962 Fisheries Convention explained, it would be foolish to do otherwise: Now any man with a grain of sense is going to put his fish under salt. Now ... whatever kind of market you [referring to frozen-fish plant owners] had for fresh fillets, the plant must go idle until I get my stamps, and then I will give you some.46 We have to assume that fishing people were making strategic choices to ensure they obtained the most returns from their catch. Salting some of their fish as 'insurance' for insurance, even when they could have sold it to a plant, was one of those strategies. The frozen-fish company owners, who generally supported the Unemployment Insurance program, resented the advantage it gave to saltfish. Individually, and through the NFTA, they made a number of complaints to the federal government about the program. Having increased their processing capacity in the 1950s, they felt they could ill afford to lose a potential supply. Arthur Monroe cited the Unemployment Insurance regulations as one of the reasons he had to close his Joe Batt's Arm plant.47 He argued the fishing season simply did not last 15 weeks and the fishers could not deliver all their landings to the plant and still qualify for benefits. Alec Moores, of North Eastern Fish Industries, complained that the Unemployment Insurance Commission had made it impossible for frozen-fish firms to compete with the saltfish buyers.48 H.J. Reid, manager of John Penny and Sons, noted a particular problem for the southwest coast fishery, saying that the benefit period (winter) interfered with the winter fishing season in that area.49 Even Jack Pickersgill conceded the method of calculating stamps needed to be changed.50 Claiming two fish plants in his riding had to be closed, Pickersgill argued that the regulations were interfering with the 'economic distribution' of fish between frozen-fish plants and saltfish-making. In the early 1960s, the managers of the Unemployment Insurance Commission had larger complaints about the program.51 They argued

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that extending benefits to self-employed fishers took more from the system than it could manage. Indeed, they asserted that the system was actually a form of income supplement for fishing people, not 'insurance'. In response, in 1961, the federal government appointed a Committee of Inquiry to look into Unemployment Insurance for seasonal workers (the Gill Committee). One of the issues the committee examined was the method of determining stamps for fresh and salted fish. The NFTA and the NFF, both of which submitted statements to the committee, supported the program generally, but argued for changes to the divisor system. The Gill Committee eventually recommended that the government create a separate insurance program for fishers to address the special problems of the industry. The Department of Fisheries suggested that a new program could combine 'insurance' with an income supplement for low-income fishing people. Despite these recommendations, the federal government failed to make any changes. According to William Schrank, the government simply found it too politically difficult to replace the 'insurance' nature of the program with a 'welfare'-style program.52 Federal officials also feared it would set a precedent for other workers. They were concerned, furthermore, that United States trade officials might consider the program 'subsidization', thus jeopardizing Canadian fish exports to that country. With the rejection of the Gill Committee report, any plans for reforming the divisor system died as well. By the early 1960s, Smallwood desperately needed to deflect criticism from his administration and at the same time find a way to convince the federal government to offer more support to the province. His plans to replace saltfish production with frozen fish along the northeast coast had not managed to transform the industry as quickly as he had hoped. As well, Smallwood's popularity had been tarnished by scandal and controversy: the failures of many of his economic development plans, the alienation of several key cabinet ministers, the bitter dispute with the province's woods workers in 1959, among others. Smallwood seized upon the growing discontent in the fishery and began channelling it towards a new fisheries development 'movement'. He launched it at the Fisheries Convention held in St John's in September 1962. The gathering, organized by the Newfoundland government, featured invited guests and panellists, including federal and provincial officials, company owners, fisheries scientists, and fishing people. Smallwood himself presided over much of the proceedings, giving speeches, querying panellists, bantering with fishers, and, in the process, displaying his renewed attention to the fishery. Besides giving Smallwood a platform, the convention also gave inshore fishing people the chance to line up at the microphone and

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talk about the problems they faced. Judging from the comments, many inshore fishing people had become caught in a spiral of low prices, lack of technology, and declining landings. Fishing people complained that prices for both salted and fresh fish were so low they could not hope to invest in the new vessels, gear, and other equipment to make their operations viable. A man from the southern shore of the Avalon Peninsula defended inshore fishing people against the claim that they were too stubborn or resistant to change to buy new engines for their boats or other equipment: I'd say the majority of the fishermen, if they got a better price for their fish, a price where they could make a decent living, they would get the new type gear. . . . But you turn around and see a price of 2 cents a pound for fish, that's poor enticement to a man to go and pay $1400 or $1500 for an engine or probably pay $3000 for a nylon trap.53 People also commented about some of the larger problems in the saltfish sector. While a few centralized saltfish plants had been built during the 1950s, the majority of salted fish was still produced by individual fishing families. In 1960, 56 per cent of inshore fishing people still produced saltfish exclusively, with the remaining 44 per cent selling fresh fish or a combination of salted and fresh fish.54 Although the numbers of fishers selling saltfish remained high, the sector itself had changed rapidly in the 1950s. Saltbulk replaced shore cure as the predominant salted product exported from Newfoundland. Shore cure brought higher prices, but it took more time and effort to produce. Labour was a particular problem that the men at the conferences discussed. With the expansion of the school system after Confederation and the introduction of new social programs, women and children had fewer incentives to make saltfish. More children were in school than a decade earlier, and other benefits, such as family allowance, alleviated some of the financial pressures on the fishing families. Besides, some women had the opportunity to work for wages in frozen-fish plants. Some of the men at the conference claimed they would like to produce shore cure, but felt reluctant to ask their wives to do it without being paid. What was once accepted without question now seemed problematic in an environment where some women now worked for wages. These men pointed to the fact that women working in frozenfish plants earned salaries and collected Unemployment Insurance, while women working on the flakes earned nothing (women shorecrew workers married to fishers were ineligible for Unemployment

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Insurance benefits). One man said that he made a decent living by selling shore cure and receiving Unemployment Insurance benefits, but admitted, 'Sorry to say, though, my wife worked harder [than he did] but she never got no unemployment.'55 Some people suggested centralized curing plants, which could pay women to cure fish, might solve these problems.56 While Smallwood encouraged fishing people to comment on specific issues during the convention, no one made a direct attack on the nature or general direction of fisheries policies. No one raised the kinds of concerns that former Minister of Fisheries W.J. Keough had expressed a decade earlier about ownership and control of technology and processing facilities. Did this mean that fishing people did not have these concerns themselves, that they had completely accepted the industrial model of development without question, or did it mean that those views never had the opportunity of being expressed at this venue? As Gramsci argued, hegemony occurs when all people come to accept the values and interests of a dominant social group as their own, as a 'universal' truth. Unfortunately, until a larger study is done on fishing people in this period, we can only speculate on the full extent of dissent and resistance in the fishing communities of Newfoundland. Fishing company owners also took the opportunity to complain about the government's lack of attention to problems in the fishery. At another function held that same year, Harold Lake described their frustrations: We end up continuously lobbying and knocking on the door like an aggressive salesman, outlining the policy and plans to develop the fishery. We in the fish trades have set down briefs on numerous items affecting our fishery, both salt and fresh, and in most cases, [no action] has been taken on these points, all of which in our opinion has retarded the development of the Newfoundland fishery.57 Lake's image of the fishing entrepreneur rapping on government's door with a suitcase full of advice and demands illustrates the growing relationship between private enterprise and the state. They saw it as their duty and right to tell government officials how they were failing the Newfoundland fishery. At the convention, many complained about the growing difficulties of operating frozen-fish enterprises. Hazen Russell contended that the outlook for the frozen-fish sector was poor. Profits had been meagre, while expenses had been high. As a group, they had failed to attract outside investors and had to rely primarily on the government for financing.58

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Others also had pessimistic feelings about the future. They accused the federal government of neglecting the Canadian offshore fishery, refusing to offer subsidies for trawler purchases or assistance in establishing dry docks or vessel repair facilities.59 They complained the government had no understanding of the economic problems facing the industry and would not help them adapt to the more competitive international environment. At the end of the convention, Smallwood gave his thoughts on the future of the fishery. In many ways, his views had not altered during his dozen years as Premier. He still believed that technology was the key to a prosperous fishery. In fact, he stressed that new technology for the fishery was vital, not only to improving production and returns, but also in keeping young men interested in fishing. He claimed that the 'miracle' of television and radio and roads meant that the young men of the outports were being influenced by outside forces and were no longer content with the ways of the past. Referring to the gospel classic, 'Give me that old-time religion', Smallwood exclaimed: . . . it was good enough for our father, it's good enough for me. That may be true about some things but it is not true about the fishery If they're going back into the fishery, that fishery has to be a far more up-to-date thing, a far more modern thing, a far more streamlined thing.60 Smallwood then announced he would spend the rest of his political career fighting for a 'modern', 'streamlined' fishery. He wrapped the modernization project into the cloak of Newfoundland nationalism, declaring 'if there is a spark of love of Newfoundland, we have got to make the greatest effort of our lives' to rebuild the fishery for those young men.61 As a first step, Smallwood appointed a Fisheries Commission to make recommendations for a development program. The 27-member group included fishing company owners such as Arthur Monroe and Frank Moores of North Eastern Fish Industries, and representatives from the provincial government and the NFF. Apart from his enthusiasm about the streamlined, technological fishery, Smallwood also revealed a new strategy to help the inshore, saltfish sector. A decade earlier, Smallwood had shown little interest in revitalizing saltfish. Both WJ. Keough and Colin Story had proposed a saltfish producers' marketing agency without success,62 but by the early 1960s Smallwood had become more receptive to these ideas. Although saltfish production had been declining relative to frozen fish, it still comprised a significant amount of the province's

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total. At the same time, Smallwood became aware of a new federal regional development program created by the Diefenbaker government. The 1961 Agricultural and Rural Development Act (ARDA) assisted farmers by providing price stability, market development, and other supports. Smallwood invited an agricultural economist from Manitoba, Baldur Kristijanson, to the convention to talk about ARDA and its possible applicability to fisheries. Seeing an opportunity to get federal money for small-scale economic development, Smallwood told the assembly that they might try to get ARDA funding for Newfoundland fisheries. A few weeks later, Smallwood called an election, the fifth since he became Premier in 1949. Although only three years into the term, Smallwood claimed he needed to get a mandate from the people to launch a $50 million fishery development program spread over four or five years. 'We are determined', he said, 'to embark upon the biggest fisheries development that Newfoundland has ever known.' Using his repetitive, rallying speaking style, Smallwood again raised technology as the saviour of the Newfoundland fishery. He would invigorate the fishery with hundreds of new boats and engines. They would build more fishing plants and spend money on research to develop new methods for processing and handling fish. Smallwood directed his message not only to the fishing people of the province, but also to the non-fishing people. Acknowledging that all taxpayers would have to help pay for the program, he explained that the fishery was the foundation of the economy and that a healthy fishery meant a secure living for forest industry workers, miners, and professionals. Less than two weeks before the election, the Fisheries Commission drafted an interim report. Smallwood presented the findings himself during a radio and television broadcast.63 As always, he enthused about the 'revolution' about to happen for the fishery, a revolution that only he could lead. He used the report as a basis for his 11-point election platform on fisheries development. The proposals included increased bounties for boat-building, drydock and harbour facilities, exploratory fishing, and programs to establish communityowned fish plants and community stages. The report also demanded that the government of Canada unilaterally declare a 12-mile fishing limit and claim the Gulf of St Lawrence and the Strait of Belle Isle as Canadian waters. Whether Smallwood's fisheries modernization campaign actually contributed to Liberal support or whether people would have voted for him regardless is not entirely clear, but on 19 November Smallwood won his fifth majority. As promised, he continued with his

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plans for the development program, which, by the end of the election campaign, had swelled to $80 million. One of his first tasks was to secure funding from the federal government. Although during the election he had claimed that the federal government would be responsible for nearly half of the $80 million, Ottawa had not made any concrete commitments. In the meantime, Smallwood worked on finalizing a proposal to take to the federal government. A few months after the election the Fisheries Commission submitted its final report to the provincial cabinet.64 Besides expanding on the 11-point program, the report described at length the problems caused by the increase in European offshore fishing and the impact this was having on both inshore and trawler fishing in Newfoundland. The report suggested the government try to revive the flagging saltfish sector with marketing assistance and price supports, and by offering educational programs for inshore fishing people. Meanwhile, Smallwood had also appointed a group to draft a proposal for fisheries development using ARDA as a model. Smallwood appointed Colin Story and Pat Murray, Newfoundland's Deputy Minister of Agriculture, to work with several men who had been involved with the Diefenbaker government's regional development programs—Baldur Kristjanson, D.W. Carr, and M.W. Menzies—drafting a final proposal. In 1963, the group produced National Fisheries Development: A Presentation to the Government of Canada by the Government of Newfoundland?5 Instead of making a case for assisting the Newfoundland fishery alone, the authors of the report suggested that the government create a national program for community-based fisheries, parallel to ARDA. Like the ARDA legislation, the National Fisheries Development proposal advocated producers' marketing boards, price supports, increased credit for producers, and infrastructure such as road and harbour developments. Unlike the Fisheries Commission reports, this program focused primarily on helping the inshore, saltfish sector. The federal government, however, rejected this approach to solving problems in the inshore fishery. Although the loss of Diefenbaker to Liberal Lester B. Pearson in the April 1963 election may have been a factor, opposition to the plan from the federal Department of Fisheries may have played a larger role. Department of Fisheries officials thought the proposal undermined the larger goals of centralizing the fishery and reducing numbers.66 With echoes of Stewart Bates's Report on the Canadian Atlantic Sea-Fishery, the federal officials attacked the plan for focusing on the inshore, saltfish sector. This 'cottage industry', as they called it, comprised only one-third of the

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value of Newfoundland's entire fisheries production. Indeed, they said, an industry where the average yearly production per person was less than 4,000 pounds, valued at $500, was barely worth encouraging. In fact, the federal officials feared that any added incentives for saltfish production would draw more people into the sector. The federal government did appoint a Royal Commission to consider a producers' marketing board for saltfish in Atlantic Canada. The head of the Royal Commission, former Deputy Minister of Fisheries D.B. Finn, travelled throughout Atlantic Canada, holding hearings on the subject and taking submissions from fishers' and trade organizations.67 He eventually recommended against the proposal.68 He noted that the problems in the saltfish sector were only acute in areas where salted fish was produced by individual fishers and their families rather than in centralized curing plants or mechanical dryers. This essentially reduced the problem to Newfoundland and the north shore of Quebec, the only two areas where the majority of salted fish was produced by fishing families. Although he agreed that attention to marketing would likely have benefited the saltfish sector, he thought that the production problems in the industry—specifically the lack of uniform production methods and quality control—needed to be dealt with first.69 Finn also remarked that long-term trends in production and consumption of fish products worldwide suggested that saltfish was a dying industry. The government should not, he asserted, invest heavily in a precarious industry and encourage people to remain attached to it. Finn feared that incentives to remain in the saltfish sector would hurt the growth of the frozen-fish sector, an industry that he argued should be encouraged. Apart from these objections, Finn noted that there was no consensus within the industry itself on the need for a producers' marketing board. Although it had the backing of the Newfoundland Federation of Fishermen, the proposal had little support from the saltfish trade in Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Quebec.70 While members of the frozen-fish trade in Newfoundland did not object to a producers' marketing board in principle, they feared any policy that would have increased the competition between the saltfish and frozen-fish sectors. Frank Moores of North Eastern Fish Industries feared that politicians would set prices for saltfish high to gain political favour.71 Arthur Monroe's son, Denis, argued that competition between the saltfish and frozen-fish sectors would not be a problem if supplies were unlimited.72 With fisheries biologists predicting increasing scarcity, competition between the saltfish and frozen-fish sectors for supplies would be intense.

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In his analysis of the saltfish trade, David Alexander has decried Ottawa's rejection of a marketing board for saltfish.73 Alexander believed that if the government had paid more attention to marketing matters, such as creating a marketing board and searching for new markets, the Newfoundland fishery would have prospered. After all, the federal government had been willing to introduce a producers' marketing board for wheat. He asserted: If market development had been more satisfactory, there would have been an expansion of productive investment from private rather than public sources, generating higher labour and capital productivity and higher incomes, without any real or disguised reduction in the size of the fishing labour force.74 While paying attention to marketing may well have benefited the fishing industry in Newfoundland, we have to be careful about assuming that it would have solved all the major problems of the fishery. Alexander's statement about what would have happened if market development had been greater is counterfactual; he had no way of knowing if private industry would have been inclined to invest in saltfish if marketing conditions were improved. While prices for saltfish in the international markets rose during the 1960s, larger uncertainties about the future demand for the product limited its appeal as an investment opportunity. The countries that had been the largest consumers of Newfoundland's salted fish—Portugal, Spain, Italy—were in the process of building their own offshore fleets. It would be naive to have expected these countries to abandon their distant-water fleets to buy Newfoundland fish. Besides, there is no evidence that private enterprise had any money to invest in saltfish plants. We have already seen that the Newfoundland frozen-fish industry was financed primarily by the provincial government. How would saltfish investment have been any different? While the federal government made clear its reasons for not wanting to support the saltfish sector, other factors made it reluctant to introduce marketing solutions for either the saltfish or frozen-fish industry. The government had been willing to make the effort for the Canadian Wheat Board in the 1940s, but many differences existed between wheat and salted fish. Wheat is easier to produce uniformly than salted fish; shore-cured fish is affected by many variables, including weather, the amount and quality of salt used, the size and condition of the fish, and the particular curing methods used by the producer. As well, the varieties and grades of salted fish were numerous. Creating a producers' marketing board would have meant restruc-

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turing the entire saltfish sector to ensure uniformity in grade and cure, not just arranging for 'pool' buying from producers. Indeed, the Newfoundland government's original proposal for a marketing board included a large-scale restructuring plan—centralized curing stations, mechanical processing plants, and boards to implement uniform standards. The marketing solution would have meant a much higher degree of state intervention in the economy than the government was prepared to undertake. Besides, wheat had greater value, both economically (in 1963, the total export value of wheat and flour was approximately $850 million; the export value of all Canadian fishery products was $174 million) and politically, for the Canadian government, giving it greater incentives to stabilize wheat production. The 1960s were a challenging period for the Newfoundland fishery. Both inshore fishing people and the frozen-fish company owners had difficulties facing the 'cities of trawlers' that arrived off the Newfoundland coast in the late 1950s. Inshore fishing people, using small, wooden boats, hooks and line, and cod traps, had trouble competing with hundreds of European trawlers fishing the same populations. Neither federal nor provincial fisheries policies had extended much assistance to the inshore sector. Although the frozen-fish companies had received the majority of provincial government funding for fisheries development, they encountered rising costs of catching fish and continued low prices in Boston. Smallwood's responses to the growing discontent offer some insights into the ways in which politicians can manipulate and control protest. Instead of letting the complaints from the fishing industry destroy his administration, Smallwood embraced them, and declared he would take their problems to the federal government, demanding more help. Although Smallwood continued to promote his vision of a centralized, industrialized fishery, he was also willing to try an alternative method to secure federal funding for the inshore, saltfish sector. The Newfoundland government's plan to revive the saltfish economy failed when the federal Department of Fisheries attacked it for undermining the larger goal of 'rationalizing' the Newfoundland fishery. While the federal government balked at restructuring the saltfish sector, as we shall see, it was preparing to deal with growing problems in the Atlantic fishery.

7

Federal Response to a Changing Fishery

In the 1960s, the federal government responded in two ways to the growing problems in the Newfoundland fishery: by searching for an international solution to the intensification of European offshore fishing, specifically a 12-mile fishing limit; and by providing direct funding for new technologies, education, and community centralization. In particular, the federal government committed itself to providing loans to private firms to build more fish plants and acquire offshore fleets. Indeed, the federal government finally seemed willing to take a more direct role in implementing the industrial vision of development. Why, after a decade of telling Newfoundland that Ottawa should have a limited place in development, did the federal government change its tactics for dealing with the Newfoundland fishery in the 1960s? At one level, the federal government was responding to changes occurring in the fishery, specifically the rise of the European offshore fleets. If controlling the conflicts that arise in civil society is an important state activity, the government certainly had an interest in appeasing the angry voices coming from both British Columbia and Atlantic Canada. Intensified offshore fishing threatened to destroy the economic foundation of Canada's fishing industries. As well, growing English-Canadian nationalism in this period may have pushed the federal government to curtail foreign fishing so visible off Canada's coast. When these negotiations took longer than anticipated, the Pearson government adopted an 'if you can't beat'em, join'em' approach to fisheries development and expanded Canada's own offshore sector. This renewed commitment to industrializing the fishery was more than just a direct response to European trawlers. It also reflected the changing relationship of the state to the economy and society in the 126

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1960s. As Gramsci would have predicted, Western (indeed, even the Communist-led) governments were becoming more interventionist, a response to a number of factors including demographic pressures of growing populations, rapid industrialization, and social unrest. Although the degree of public discontent was relatively low in Canada, the Canadian government did respond with increased social programs, including medical insurance plans and pensions for the elderly. Apart from the social welfare initiatives, the federal government also began looking at the problem of regional disparity in the 1960s. While central Canada had clearly benefited from the postwar economic development boom, Atlantic Canada remained far behind in terms of incomes, productivity, and employment rates. The 1957 Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects chaired by Walter Gordon was the first major report since the Rowell-Sirois Commission of the 1940s to advocate special attention for the 'havenot' areas. The Diefenbaker Conservatives introduced the first regional development programs, including the Agriculture and Rural Development Act (1961) and the Atlantic Development Board (1962). These were followed by the Fund for Rural Economic Development (1966) and the Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE) in 1969.1 These regional development programs were strongly influenced by the international modernization movement that was reaching its height of popularity in the 1960s. The focus of the Canadian programs was the creation of an optimum environment—economic and social—for investment. The programs tried to encourage capital accumulation, create industrial infrastructures such as roads, bridges and utilities, and provide technological assistance. They also emphasized educating the labour force and providing services to communities. Another key concept behind the Canadian approach to regional development in the 1960s was the 'growth pole', based roughly on the theories of French economist Fra^ois Perroux.2 Perroux saw innovation, the exercise of entrepreneurship, as the mainspring of social and economic progress. He argued that innovative enterprises, or 'propulsive enterprises', tended to be concentrated in particular places, leading to the polarization of the economy. He called these centres of innovation 'growth poles'. In Perroux's theory, however, there were no rules about where the spread effects of innovation would be felt. Although Perroux himself did not believe his theory could be the basis of regional development programs, his ideas were applied to state policy nevertheless. In many ways, the federal

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government's interest in assisting the Newfoundland fishery reflected these trends in the evolution of the state in the postwar years. Although securing a 12-mile fishing limit was never a major priority of either the Diefenbaker or Pearson governments, both responded to mounting pressure from Canada's Atlantic and Pacific coasts.3 The Canadian attempts to secure a 12-mile fishing limit occurred during a period of intense international debate on control and use of the world's oceans and the resources within them.4 Ideologies of the ocean—ways of thinking about the relationship between coastal states and the sea—change over time, a result of many factors including economic and political need, military might, and development in seafaring technologies. By the nineteenth century, the concept of 'freedom of the sea' predominated in Western countries. This ideology assumed that land-based property laws did not apply to the world's oceans because the sea and its resources were 'inappropriable' and 'inexhaustible' (or so they thought). Freedom of the sea allowed coastal states to claim a narrow band of ocean along their shores, or 'territorial sea', for military, trade, or other purposes. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most European and North American states claimed a three-mile territorial sea, although Scandinavian countries claimed four miles and Russia claimed 12. After World War II, new seafaring technologies, a changing world economy, and discoveries of seabed mineral resources raised new questions about maritime law. In 1945, US President Harry S. Truman, interested in gaining control over offshore oil, claimed his country owned the resources in the seabed on the continental shelf. Although his comments were, to quote maritime researchers Anthony Scott and Francis Christy, 'unexpected and widely misinterpreted', the so-called 'Truman Proclamation' fuelled international debate on maritime law.5 Many of the discussions took place in the newly created United Nations and its Food and Agriculture Organization. In 1949, the UN asked the International Law Commission to codify a Law of the Sea. The ILC compiled information on a range of topics, including navigation, the territorial seas, claims for resources on the continental shelves, and high-seas fishing and conservation. After the investigation, the ILC recommended that the United Nations sponsor a conference to develop an international agreement on ocean issues. Unfortunately for those hoping to see a speedy resolution of these problems, the movement to establish a new system of maritime law became entangled in Cold War politics.6 Clearly, the territorial sea issue had defence implications, which added to the growing conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union over military supremacy in the post-World War II period. In addition, the United

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Nations failed to offer a neutral ground for these discussions. According to Cold War historian Lynn Miller, the ideological contests between the United States and the Soviet Union impinged on the supposedly non-political, non-military activities of the United Nations, such as education and health programs.7 In fact, he suggested that the East-West conflict interfered with the United Nations' ability to deal with world problems effectively. At the first UN-sponsored Law of the Sea Conference in Geneva in 1958, defence, conservation, Cold War paranoia, and economic interests intermingled.8 The width of the territorial sea caused the greatest controversy. Early in the proceedings, several different positions emerged. The 'extreme 12-milers', as the Soviet Union, East bloc countries, and Iceland were known, wanted a 12-mile territorial and fishing limit. European countries, including France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, which had large distant-water fleets but with relatively small fisheries resources off their own coasts, preferred the three-mile territorial limit and fishing zone. The United States and the United Kingdom came to the conference supporting the status quo and the 'freedom of the sea' ideology. The Canadian delegation, led by George Drew, Canada's High Commissioner to Britain, tried to find a middle ground. The Canadians proposed to keep the three-mile territorial limit intact, but asked for an exclusive fishing zone a further nine miles offshore. In a surprising move, the United States and United Kingdom put forward a joint proposal, upstaging the Canadian plan. They suggested a new six-mile territorial sea, plus an extra six-mile fishing zone (the 'sixplus-six' formula). The Canadian delegation disapproved, because it allowed nations with a 'tradition' of fishing in a particular area the right to fish in those grounds in perpetuity. In Canada's case, the USUK proposal would have allowed fishing vessels from Spain, Portugal, Great Britain, and France, to name a few, to continue to fish in the area between six and 12 miles from shore. This proposal also failed, with Canada and Iceland, among others, voting against it. Canada returned with another plan, backed by India and Mexico, which provided for a six-mile territorial sea, with an exclusive fishing zone extending a further six miles. It, too, failed to garner sufficient support. Although the first Law of the Sea Conference ended without an agreement on the fishing zone issue, the delegates made progress on a number of related marine issues. The conference adopted four conventions covering (1) the right of coastal states to exploit the resources under the continental shelf; (2) conservation of resources on the high seas; (3) international navigation on the high seas; and (4) territorial seas and contiguous zones (i.e., the area immediately

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outside the territorial sea). The latter consisted of a number of related issues, including the right to draw new territorial limits using straight baselines (in 1951, the International Court at the Hague recognized this principle for Norway), a guarantee of 'innocent passage' for ships through claimed waters in peacetime, and jurisdiction for coastal states in matters such as customs and sanitation in the contiguous zone. It was left to the individual states to ratify these conventions on their own. Besides the adoption of the conventions, the delegates agreed to hold another Law of the Sea Conference in 1960. Although the United States had shown some willingness to compromise during the conference, remarks made by Arthur H. Dean, chair of the American delegation, suggest that defence, not fisheries conservation, was his priority.9 Dean, an attorney and former law partner of President Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had also worked as a diplomat.10 Dean served as special ambassador to Korea in 1953-4 and was a negotiator after the armistice. Later, he worked with the Kennedy administration as a test-ban treaty negotiator for the State Department. According to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Dean was also one of a small group of 'elder statesmen' President Johnson assembled to advise him on the Vietnam war.11 Dean was highly suspicious of the Soviet Union's motivations for requesting a 12-mile territorial and fishing limit at the 1958 conference. He accused the Russians of using the Law of the Sea to further their naval interests. Dean argued the Soviets could hide their submarine fleets within the 12-mile zones of neutral countries, threatening world peace. Indeed, Dean saw the failure of the Law of the Sea Conference to reach an agreement on the territorial seas issue as a moral victory for the United States, a sign that the Soviet Union had been thwarted in its attempt to control international waters. Dean maintained: At a time when there are many doubts about whether we have any friends and whether our policies and concepts are surviving, it is refreshing to examine the extent of the achievements of the United States and the free world at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea held in Geneva.12 Although most of his comments focused on military rather than fisheries matters, Dean acknowledged a 12-mile fishing limit could jeopardize American fishing interests off the coasts of Canada and Mexico. With such rhetoric circulating, Canadian officials knew that they would have to proceed cautiously with further negotiations. In the 1950s, a number of countries, including Iceland, Peru, Chile, the Soviet Union, South Korea, and Indonesia, had made unilateral

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declarations on territorial waters and fishing limits. Canada refrained from such a bold move, primarily because of an unwillingness to offend the United States and Great Britain. Angering the Americans was particularly risky for Canada at a time when its economy was increasingly being drawn into a continental network. Norman Robertson, long-time Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, claimed Canada could not afford to alienate the United States over the territorial sea.13 He warned that the American government could retaliate with trade sanctions. Even worse, Canadian-American relations in general could be damaged. Although fearful about American retaliation Robertson argued that neglecting to pursue the extended fisheries jurisdiction could lead to political problems at home. Robertson urged the government to secure a 12-mile limit and adopt the four conventions passed at the Law of the Sea Conference. He particularly encouraged the government to declare a new territorial limit drawn from straight baselines. He also pointed out that Canada needed to develop a new strategy before the 1960 Law of the Sea Conference. Canada could not accept the proposal made by the United States and Great Britain at the last conference because it allowed nations with a 'tradition' of fishing off the coast the right to fish in the six-to-twelve-mile zone. He claimed that the Canadian and American proposals, as they were made at the last conference, were so similar that they would split the vote. In that case, Canada would have no alternative but to vote with the Soviets on a 12-mile territorial sea to secure protection for coastal fisheries. If that happened, Robertson warned: Canada would be standing entirely opposed to the position of its NATO allies on a military question and would be likely to face the strongest US resentment for having contributed to a rule of law which is regarded as favourable to Soviet interests and detrimental to Western defence interests.14 To prevent this scenario, Robertson suggested Canadian officials approach American representatives about making a joint proposal at the next Law of the Sea Conference. Later that year, Canadian officials met with representatives from the US State Department to discuss the upcoming Law of the Sea Conference.15 One of the lead American negotiators was William Herrington, Special Assistant for Fisheries to the Undersecretary of the Department of State. Unlike Arthur Dean, however, Herrington had a greater understanding of fisheries issues and had written a number of articles on fisheries management and conservation in the 1950s.16 In a speech delivered to the National Fisheries Institute

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Convention earlier in the 1950s, Herrington argued that new harvesting technologies had the ability to decimate coastal fish populations.17 He displayed a strong attachment to the 'freedom of the sea' ideology and claimed it had been of great economic benefit to the United States, encouraging 'development of commerce and of high-seas fishing'.18 Nevertheless, he acknowledged that unregulated offshore fishing threatened established fisheries and that a new international solution must be found. Herrington and the other American negotiators agreed to support a joint Canada-US proposal for the 1960 Law of the Sea Conference.19 They agreed to use the plan that the Canadian delegation had used at the end of the 1958 Conference. Using a 'six-plus-six' formula, the proposal contained a provision for the coastal country to negotiate phasing-out periods with those states that could demonstrate a history of fishing in the area. The State Department officials suggested that Canada should be the principal promoter of the proposal, in the hopes of attracting more of the neutral countries. Despite the co-operation between the two countries, the joint Canadian-American proposal fell one vote short of obtaining the required two-thirds majority at the 1960 Law of the Sea Conference. As before, the 'extreme 12-milers'—the Soviet Union, the East bloc countries, and Iceland—voted against the deal. A UN-sanctioned Law of the Sea remained elusive. The delegates left Geneva without plans for further talks. Shortly after the second failed conference, the Interdepartmental Committee on Territorial Waters, which had been formed to deal with the issue, considered alternatives.20 One official told cabinet they could not simply drop the matter, because Canadian national interests were at stake. Yet, if Canada were to make a unilateral declaration of extended fisheries jurisdiction, it could face court challenges from the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Portugal. The adviser reminded cabinet of the strong American fisheries lobbies, which could also launch lawsuits against Canada for interfering with their interests in the salmon fishery off the coast of British Columbia. This official also warned of trade retaliations and a loss of goodwill in international relations. A unilateral action by Canada could also set a precedent, allowing other countries to declare even larger territorial limits, thus causing problems for the NATO alliance. He encouraged the government to organize a multilateral agreement on fishing rights and territorial waters, based on the joint Canada-US proposal from the 1960 Law of the Sea Conference. American support was critical for its success, but State Department officials, it was said, had privately

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seemed amenable to the idea. The official suggested that the Interdepartmental Committee on Territorial Waters quietly survey potential signers to get a sense of support for the deal. In October 1960, cabinet agreed to the proposal and enlisted the assistance of Great Britain to organize the surveys. As Canadian officials began searching for support for a new multilateral agreement on maritime law, they also considered adopting the conventions made at the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference and drawing a new territorial sea using straight baselines. Support for declaring the Gulf of St Lawrence, the bays of Newfoundland, Hudson Bay, and passageways around the Pacific coast islands Canadian territory was growing within the Canadian government. In early 1961, however, a legal adviser with External Affairs told cabinet not to make such a declaration while they were negotiating with the Americans on the proposed multilateral agreement.21 The adviser feared that presenting the Americans with 'too many difficult decisions at one time might invite rebuffs.' Although acknowledging the importance of new baselines for the Canadian fishing industry, the External Affairs employee recommended that cabinet delay dealing with this sensitive issue until after the Americans had agreed to support the multilateral agreement. American support for a multilateral agreement proved elusive. Between February and the end of April 1961, Canadian and British officials questioned other countries about their willingness to support a new agreement based on the 'six-plus-six' formula.22 They hoped that if a sufficient number of other countries supported the plan, they could all convince the United States to participate. After receiving a number of positive replies from other countries, both Canada and the United Kingdom made formal requests for support from the United States. After eight weeks without a response, Canadian officials realized that the Americans would likely refuse the request. In September 1961, Undersecretary of State Norman Robertson and other members of the Interdepartmental Committee on Territorial Waters travelled to Washington hoping to persuade the Americans to participate in the multilateral agreement.23 Suspecting that within the American government several divisions existed on the territorial waters issue, Robertson arranged to meet with State Department, Interior Department (Fisheries and Wildlife Division), and Defense Department officials separately. Several meetings with the Americans confirmed Robertson's suspicions about the divisions within the American government. Although they had assumed that the State Department favoured the proposal, Robertson noticed that its representatives were somewhat vague, talking about the likelihood of the

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proposal's success, rather than whether they actually agreed with it. The Departments of the Interior (Fisheries and Wildlife) and Defense had strong reservations about both the 'six-plus-six' formula and the plan to implement it through a multilateral convention. Fisheries and Wildlife representatives feared the impact on the northwest Pacific fishing industry if Americans were denied access to the waters off the coast of British Columbia. The salmon populations of the Columbia River in Washington had been decimated by years of intense fishing and hydroelectric development, and many Americans fished north of the border. Not surprisingly, Defense Department officials feared the implications for national security posed by the proposed agreement. A Canadian Department of National Defence representative, Lt-Commander H.D.W. Bridgemen, met with Defense Department officials and several members of the United States Navy to discuss the matter.24 The Americans suggested that changes in the territorial sea could increase the amount of neutral territory in which hostile submarines could hide. Such changes could also interfere with free navigation through channels and straits. In addition, they argued that navies would lose their powers of intimidation if their warships were forced to stay beyond the horizon. During the meeting, Bridgemen detected disagreements among the Legal and Operations divisions of the US Navy. While members of the Legal division offered qualified support for the six-plus-six formula if it became international law, a captain from Naval Operations broke into the legalistic discussions, expounding on the dangers of ' "bargaining away" the freedom of the seas'. Bridgemen remarked that the position of the more powerful Operations division would likely dominate. All the American representatives feared that any action taken by Canada to increase the territorial sea without the sanction of the United Nations could provide a precedent for other countries to make even larger declarations of their own. In his conclusions, Bridgeman noted that The multilateral convention is being considered in the light of the Cold War.'25 Indeed, the Cold War was a major preoccupation with the American government that summer. Just as the Canadian government was trying to secure a multilateral agreement in the spring and summer of 1961, a series of crises brought a new tension to American-Soviet relations.26 In April 1961, the newly elected President, John F. Kennedy, approved a CIA-led expedition to invade Cuba and topple the socialist government of Fidel Castro. Although unsuccessful, the so-called Bay of Pigs incident soured relations not only with Cuba but also with Soviet Union President Nikita Khrushchev. Kennedy

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and Khrushchev had another tense encounter in the summer of 1961 over developments in Berlin. Unable to resolve issues surrounding the control of Berlin and Eastern Europe that had been festering since the end of World War II, Khrushchev threatened to sign a treaty with East Germany without the involvement of the United States. In August he ordered work begun on the Berlin Wall. Kennedy responded by sending 1,500 American troops to the area. Although Kennedy soon withdrew in favour of a new round of treaty negotiations in September, the incident contributed to the souring relations with Khrushchev. Several other events occurring during the Kennedy presidency ensured ongoing attention to defence matters by the American administration. The arms race continued, as the United States and Soviet Union stockpiled their supplies of both nuclear and conventional weapons. As well, the growing political problems in Southeast Asia in the aftermath of colonial rule concerned the Kennedy administration. In 1961, Kennedy decided to send 16,000 American military 'advisers' to help the South Vietnamese army fight the Viet Cong. Although historians disagree about the role Kennedy played in exacerbating these Cold War tensions through his actions and rhetoric,27 the events of the early 1960s undoubtedly heightened sensitivity to security issues. Whatever the final reasons, the American government refused to support the multilateral agreement. Without American backing, the proposal died. Canada took no further action until 1963, when the newly elected Liberal government of Lester B. Pearson made a unilateral declaration on fishing rights. Instead of using the 'six-plus-six' formula, Pearson decided on the less contentious 'three-plus-nine' formula, with a three-mile territorial limit and a nine-mile exclusive fishing zone. According to the plan, Canada would offer phasing out periods for countries with a tradition of fishing off the Canadian coastline. At the same time, the Canadian government decided to draw a new territorial limit, using the straight baseline system, and to enclose certain bodies of waters along its coasts, including the Newfoundland bays, the Bay of Fundy, and the Gulf of St Lawrence in eastern Canada, the Arctic Archipelago, Hudson Bay, and Hudson Strait in north-central regions, as well as Hecate Strait and the Dixon Entrance on the Pacific coast. Realizing that the United States government would likely object to these actions, Pearson informed Kennedy before he told the Canadian public. Within days, Alexis Johnson, American Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, along with Raymond Yingling and

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William Herrington, summoned Canadian ambassador Charles Ritchie to a meeting.28 Johnson asked Ritchie if the Canadian government would reconsider its position on fishing rights and territorial waters. He said the action would 'not be helpful' to CanadianAmerican relations. Johnson was particularly upset about Canada's intention to draw a new territorial limit using straight baselines. He said the action would set a precedent for archipelago countries, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, which had already announced their intentions to declare the waters between their islands as internal territory. As well, Ritchie noted Johnson's fears that the 'USA would be ... in an extremely poor position to protest Soviet expansionism of this kind if the USA were to acquiesce in the action contemplated by Canada as a neighbour, friend and ally.'29 Ritchie acknowledged that the American officials were not threatening, but they clearly 'made no effort to hide their agitation.'30 A few months later, during a meeting with Pearson at Hyannisport, Kennedy revealed his opposition to the decision to draw a new territorial limit.31 Kennedy asked if Canadian officials would agree to come to Washington for more talks on the matter. Pearson agreed. Although Pearson announced that Canada would declare a 12mile fishing limit effective May 1964, he delayed implementing the new territorial limit until after talks with the Americans. A first round of meetings took place in Ottawa in August 1963, followed by a second round in early December in Washington.32 Paul Martin, Sr, Secretary of State for External Affairs, attended the meetings, along with fellow department member Marcel Cadieux, Department of Fisheries representatives Hedard J. Robichaud and S.V. Ozere, assistant deputy minister and legal adviser, as well as members of the Canadian Department of National Defence. The American delegation consisted of Alexis Johnson, William Herrington, and Raymond Yingling of the State Department, along with representatives from Fisheries and Wildlife of the Department of the Interior and the Department of Defense.33 According to Martin, the Americans objected to the extension of the fishing zone on grounds that it restricted the fishing activities of Americans.34 The US also opposed the drawing of straight baselines for security and strategic reasons, particularly contesting Canada's wish to enclose the Gulf of St Lawrence. These issues proved insurmountable. Canada and the United States failed to come to an agreement during those first two rounds of talks. In other meetings with the Americans the following year, Secretary of State Dean Rusk told Paul Martin that Canada's intentions to take unilateral action violated international law.35

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In September 1964, Marcel Cadieux informed Paul Martin that the Department of the Interior (Fisheries and Wildlife Division) no longer opposed Canada's 12-mile fishing limit.36 Apparently, William Herrington told Canadian External Affairs officials during a social function in Washington that only the Defense Department—specifically the US Navy—opposed Canada's proposal. Explained Cadieux: While I think we have guessed that the strong stand being taken by the US is primarily on security grounds, this is the first time that we have had it confirmed, albeit privately, that our proposals on fishing are generally acceptable to the US.37 Indeed, by September of 1964 the US government's concerns about security had become particularly acute. In early August, North Vietnamese aircraft allegedly attacked American warships in the Gulf of Tonkin.38 Within days, President Johnson introduced a resolution in the Senate and House of Representatives granting him the right to take further military action against North Vietnam. Cadieux speculated the Gulf of Tonkin incident 'will have strengthened, if anything, the US Navy's resolve' to oppose the use of straight baselines to define the territorial sea.39 By the middle of 1965, Canada and the US had reached a stalemate.40 Cadieux noted that American government representatives 'continue to oppose strongly our baselines and have served their notice of their intention to make their views known to other countries.'41 The breakdown in talks happened during a period of increased tension in Canadian-American relations. Since the early 1960s, both Diefenbaker and Pearson had encountered conflicts with the Americans over trade and economic policies such as restrictions on Canadian advertising in American magazines and bank legislations that limited foreign involvement in the Canadian banking system.42 As well, Canadian foreign policy caused some rifts, particularly over Canada's relations with China and Cuba. As the American government deepened its involvement in Vietnam, Canadian officials found it harder to conceal their unease and even disagreement. Relations deteriorated further in 1965 when Pearson told the graduation class at Philadelphia's Temple University that the President should stop his bombing campaign in North Vietnam. Pearson later claimed President Johnson lectured him for an hour after the incident, attacking him for publicly criticizing American foreign policy.43 By 1965, the territorial limit issue was just one of many sources of tension between Canada and the United States. Not all Americans supported their government's hardline position on territorial waters and fishing rights. Fishing industry groups in

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New England, the Pacific Northwest, and Alaska all campaigned for a 12-mile fishing limit in the early 1960s.44 Senator E.L. Bartlett (Democrat—Alaska) demanded that the US follow Canada's example and declare a 12-mile fishing limit to restrict entry by Soviet and Japanese vessels in the fishing areas off Alaska.45 As well, a Seattle lawyer and American representative on the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, Edward Allen, accused the United States government of conflating defence and conservation issues.46 Through an American Bar Association committee on territorial waters, Allen and others drafted a list of resolutions asking the US government to handle naval and defence matters separately from fisheries conservation. This lobbying had some impact; the US government finally declared a 12-mile fishing zone in 1966.47 The territorial limit, however, remained unchanged. The Canadian government also had to appease the countries with a history of fishing in the waters off the Canadian coast. Indeed, Canada was obliged to negotiate with France, which held legal fishing rights off the coast of Newfoundland through the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht and several subsequent agreements.48 These negotiations with the United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark, Spain, Italy, and Portugal lacked the same urgency as those with the United States. Except for the United Kingdom, none of these countries were major trading partners or significant political allies. The Canadian government, nonetheless, duly began negotiating with each country in turn after notifying them of the plans for the 12-mile fishing limit. Before negotiations began, the cabinet decided to offer these countries a five-year phasing-out period for the Gulf of St Lawrence and 10 years for the 6-12 mile line elsewhere.49 Several, including the United Kingdom, Norway, and Denmark, had no problem with the terms and accepted Canada's position: by this time, these countries were in the process of declaring 12-mile limits of their own. Until deals had been reached with the other fishing nations, however, Canada had to wait before signing with the more amenable countries.50 Some states, particularly those with significant investments in their offshore fisheries, such as Spain, Portugal, and Italy, proved more troublesome for Canada. Spain and Italy protested Canada's declaration and, as Cadieux noted, they 'barely went through the motions of negotiating'.51 Indeed, the Canadian representatives feared they might challenge Canada's actions in the international courts.52 The Spanish argued that the 1922 Anglo-Spanish treaty, which was later extended to include Canada, gave them 'most favoured nation' status entitling them to fish in Canadian waters.53 Some Canadian officials suspected that the United States, still unhappy with Canada's

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position on declaring straight baselines, was encouraging these protests by Spain.54 The Canadian ambassador to Spain, Benjamin Rogers, reported that the head of Canadian and American Affairs for Spain, Senor Sagas, indicated that the Spanish had been discussing the matter with the US.55 Unlike Spain, the Portuguese government showed a willingness to negotiate. During the second round of talks, the Portuguese delegation argued that their 400-year history of fishing off the Canadian coast gave them the same rights to fish as if they had an actual treaty.56 Calvet de Magalhaes, head of the Economic Division, Ministry of External Affairs, explained that Canada's actions would hurt Portugal's extensive investment in the overseas cod fishery. His country was trying to improve its economy and standard of living, and a 12mile fishing limit would put a considerable dent in its offshore landings. A prosperous country such as Canada, he reasoned, should not hinder the development of a struggling country like Portugal. Despite this rhetoric, the Portuguese eventually accepted Canada's declaration. Progress on negotiations with each individual country continued slowly over the next few years.57 Many have criticized the Canadian government for appearing to do little to prevent the onslaught of foreign fishing in the 1960s. At a time when the much smaller Iceland was chasing British fishing vessels away from its shores, historian David Alexander argues that 'Canada was not even a "paper tiger"' on the fishing limit issue.58 The intertwining of the territorial waters issue with Cold War concerns helps to explain why the Canadian government failed to take a stronger stance. In balancing the interests of the Canadian ocean fisheries against the continued economic and political favour of the United States, the federal government leaned towards the latter. Fisheries apparently were never worth risking the wrath of the most powerful country in the world (and Canada's biggest trading partner). Only after a series of ecological crises in the northwest Atlantic fishery in the late 1960s and early 1970s did Canada and the international fishing community begin to take conservation more seriously. In 1969, Canadian Fisheries Minister Jack Davis finally declared a new 12-mile fishing zone, with a new three-mile territorial limit drawn from straight baselines.59 He cited the effects of foreign fishing on Newfoundland landings in particular as the reason for this move. A third Law of the Sea Conference convened in 1973, which eventually led to Canada's declaration of a 200-mile fishing limit in 1977. Although the Canadian government lost faith in diplomacy, it never lost faith in technology to solve the problems of the fishery. Indeed, there is evidence that the rise of the European fleets led federal officials

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to put an even greater emphasis on technological solutions. Colin Story, attending a federal-provincial meeting in 1960, claimed that the threat of offshore fishing was spurring the federal government to offer more assistance.60 It is most likely not a coincidence that the Canadian government's commitment to building the Atlantic trawler fleet intensified in the mid-1960s, when negotiations on the 12-mile limit had stalled. The Minister of Fisheries, Hedard Robichaud, began speaking openly about the need to build a more capital-intensive, technologically advanced fishery to compete with the Europeans.61 At a vessellaunching ceremony in Port Union, Newfoundland, in 1965, Robichaud spoke of the federal government's commitment to building Canada's offshore fleet.62 With a nationalistic fervour characteristic of the mid-1960s, he declared that Canada could not simply sit idly by while foreign vessels took most of the fish: to compete with them, indeed to outfish them, we must modernize both our inshore and our offshore fishing fleets so that we may exploit the resources of the Northwest Atlantic more effectively than any other nation, and so provide greatly increased earnings for our fishermen.63 Aside from the emphasis on technology, the federal fisheries programs of the 1960s, like the other regional development projects inspired by modernization theory, also attempted to adapt the labour force to the new economy and create infrastructure, such as wharves and harbour facilities. At its most ambitious, the government attempted physically to move the fishing population to foster the centralization of communities. Despite these changes, these programs offered a piecemeal approach to development. Although these strategies offered greater support than previously offered by the federal government, they lacked the larger, community-focused development envisioned in the Smallwood government's 1963 National Fisheries Development plan. For example, they introduced new technologies, but did not raise the issue of who would have access to these technologies and where. Programs were aimed at supporting the existing economic structures and did not make significant changes in the way wealth was distributed. One of the limitations of the modernization approach is that it focuses on a small number of internal factors in the economy, such as capital and labour, but fails to consider other reasons for poverty and the unequal distribution of wealth. The results of these programs, as we shall see, were never as complete as the modernization theories promised.

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One of the first federal programs reflecting the new interest in developing the fisheries in the Atlantic region was the FederalProvincial Atlantic Fisheries Committee (FPAFC), created in 1958. Deputy Minister of Fisheries George Clark, who replaced Stewart Bates in 1954, organized this group and fostered much of this new cooperation between the levels of government and the fishing industry.64 Although not an economist like many of his colleagues in the federal Department of Fisheries, Clark's background in management and industrial relations in the British Columbia fishing industry proved useful in hammering out agreements between divergent interest groups in the fishery. According to one member of the fishing industry in Newfoundland, he was not easily bullied by individual company owners who tried to make demands the government was not willing to meet. He also played a major role in the direction of the fledgling international fisheries organizations, the International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) and the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission (INPFC). Unfortunately, he did not live to see the completion of many of the projects he started. He died in Tokyo while attending an INPFC meeting in 1963. He was replaced by the former director of the FRB research stations in Nanaimo and St Andrews, New Brunswick, Alfred Needier. Clark created the FPAFC to assist the 'orderly and progressive development' of the fishing industry.65 Consisting of representatives from the federal government and the five Atlantic provinces (including Quebec), as well as fishing industry members, the FPAFC was to foster co-operation and co-ordination on fisheries matters between the federal government and the provinces. More specifically, the FPAFC made recommendations for programs for assistance in technological development, especially for gear, vessels, equipment, and processing facilities. In 1960, the federal government initiated a cost-shared scheme in which provinces could propose specific projects for funding.66 Administered by the Industrial Development Service of the federal Department of Fisheries, the program provided between 50 and 75 per cent of the cost of the project, with the provincial government paying the remainder. In Newfoundland, between 1960 and 1963, the federal and provincial governments spent a total of $291,481 on cost-sharing projects, including community stages, demonstrations for experimental harvesting equipment, and vessels.67 Over the 1965-6 fiscal year, total expenditures were $460,000 for various projects.68 The federal government also expanded its vessel bounty program. In 1961, the Department of Fisheries extended the bounty for

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wooden vessels in the 55-60-foot class to include all vessels of 45-60 feet. Ironically, this program may have led to fishers building vessels larger than what they needed simply to qualify for the federal subsidy. A provincial Department of Fisheries report claimed that many fishers requested loans to build the standard 46-foot longliner to qualify for the federal subsidy, when the 36-, 38-, and 40-foot vessels would have been more suitable.69 The official argued that the federal subsidy, when combined with the provincial bounty, 'enables them to get a better boat with a loan that is only some seven or eight hundred dollars more than the loan required to get one of the smaller boats which are not eligible for the federal subsidy.'70 By 1965, the federal government altered its bounty program again to include vessels of 35-60 feet. The technology having the greatest impact on the inshore fishery was the gill net, a rectangular net usually 50 fathoms long, which hung in a straight line in the water. As the fish swam through the net they were caught by their gills on the mesh. Few fishing people had used the gill net before the late 1950s, the majority using either hook and line or the cod trap. Unlike the cod trap, which remained stationed in one spot throughout the season, the gill net could easily be moved to take advantage of the changing migration patterns of cod. The new technology greatly increased the harvesting capacity of the inshore fishery, but it was also a more destructive method of catching fish. While the cod trap was far from benign, the gill net had a greater potential to waste a portion of the catch. If stormy weather prevented the fisher from making daily collection trips to the nets, some of the fish would spoil. If these gill nets got lost or broke away from their moorings, they could continue 'ghost fishing', as fish got caught and rotted in the mesh. Despite their drawbacks, the gill nets undoubtedly increased fishing people's productivity in these years. In 1959, the Industrial Development Service, with the assistance of the Fisheries Research Board, began offering instruction to fishers wishing to learn the new technique. In 1961 and 1962, the federal government gave bounties to fishers wishing to acquire nylon gill nets. Beginning in 1962, the provincial government began offering gill-net bounties. By 1964, the Newfoundland Deputy Minister of Fisheries estimated that there were 18,000 50-fathom gill nets in the hands of Newfoundland fishers, and that this gear had been responsible for catching 150 million pounds of cod.71 Indeed, the gill nets probably helped alleviate the problem of declining landings in this period, at least for those able to acquire

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Men working on a longliner (a decked vessel between 35' and 60' long), on the west coast of the Great Northern Peninsula, c. 1970. Like many longliners in Newfoundland, this boat was not using 'longlines' (lines to which baited hooks were attached), but a net, which can be seen wrapped around a drum to the right of the picture. (Centre for Newfoundland Studies Archives, Memorial University of Newfoundland, Collection 154, E151-E200.)

them. Fisheries scientists Hutchings and Myers have suggested that the rapid introduction of the gill net may have 'masked' the full impact of offshore fishing on the inshore sector in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Without the gill net, the decline in inshore landings might have been more dramatic.72 Despite these programs to introduce new technologies, the level of support for the inshore sector fell far behind that of the offshore, industrial fishery. Although the inshore fishery continued to be supported through Unemployment Insurance, that program can also be seen as a benefit to the fishing companies, as it allowed some fishers who might have left otherwise to remain in fishing communities. Statistics on vessel acquisition suggest that the number of longliners and other capital-intensive vessels and gear remained limited.73 As well, the distribution of these technologies was uneven throughout Newfoundland, with more southern areas, such as the Avalon Peninsula, acquiring longliners and gill nets at a faster rate, and in greater

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numbers, than in northerly districts such as Labrador and Notre Dame Bay. Although the reasons for these differences are complex and deserving of further study, these early results suggest that not everyone benefited equally from government programs. Probably the most significant program introduced in this period was the Fisheries Development Act of 1966, which allowed the federal government to provide loans to fishing companies for trawlers and fish plants.74 As well, the Act formalized the federal-provincial cost-sharing programs on exploratory fishing and on experiments with new gear, equipment, and vessels. It allowed the Minister of Fisheries, either alone or in conjunction with provinces, to undertake projects 'for the more efficient exploitation of fisheries resources and for the exploration and development of new resources', as well as for the introduction and demonstration of new types of fishing vessels, equipment, and techniques.75 This Act reveals the beginning of a new relationship between the federal government and the fishing industry, and suggests that Ottawa no longer had the same concerns about direct funding of private enterprise as it did in the 1950s. Clearly, the heightened levels of state intervention generally, the threat of European offshore fishing, and the demands from the Newfoundland government and the fishing industry contributed to the changed federal position. Furthermore, as tariff walls between Canada and the United States on fishery products eased somewhat in the mid-1960s, federal Department of Fisheries officials no longer feared American trade retaliation as they once had. Although the federal government had intended to help the industrial fishery through these programs, the fishing company owners of Newfoundland feared the impact of a greatly expanded Canadian offshore fleet on the American groundfish markets. They particularly resented the Atlantic Development Board recommendation that the Newfoundland fleet be increased from 55 to 150 trawlers by 1975. The Newfoundland Fish Trades Association hired an American fisheries consultant, Robert Gruber, to look into the potential consequences of substantial production increases in Newfoundland.76 Gruber, former president of Fishery Products Incorporated, a subsidiary of Fishery Products Limited based in Cleveland, confirmed the processors' fears that the American market could not absorb an increased Canadian production. Tripling the size of the trawler fleets would only cause a glut in the market and drive prices down. The only hope the Newfoundland industry had for selling greater quantities of fish, he suggested, was to launch an aggressive marketing campaign

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to take some of the business away from their main competitors, Iceland and Norway. Members of the Newfoundland fish trade met with federal officials at a private hearing of the Royal Commission for Newfoundland's Economic Prospects in October 1966 to ask the federal government to reconsider.77 They argued that the resource, the markets, and the labour force could not withstand an expansion of offshore vessels to 150. They referred to the Gruber Report, remarking that although they were pessimistic in the short term, they felt that improvements in expanding their share of the American market could be made if both governments co-operated in developing marketing arrangements and economic planning. Despite the advice, government failed to embark on a major marketing program for the Newfoundland fish trade. This incident suggests that the federal government introduced its plans to increase productivity and expand harvesting capacity in the mid1960s without understanding the marketing implications. It also reveals the often contradictory nature of state economic planning. What may on the surface look like a program beneficial to private enterprise may actually cause more problems for those the program was designed to help. Education had always been considered a key area for the modernization program, not only for the technological skills imparted to the workforce, but also for the modern 'attitudes' it supposedly gave the fishing people.78 By the mid-1960s both federal and provincial governments were willing to invest more money in educational facilities. In 1964 the College of Fisheries, Marine, Navigation and Engineering, jointly funded by the province and the federal government, opened in St John's. Premier Smallwood organized a public opening, inviting dignitaries and the media, and telling the crowd that the young men attending the college represented the future of the modernized Newfoundland fishery.79 Articles later appeared in the federal government's fisheries magazine, Fisheries of Canada (formerly Trade News), enthusing about the role that technology and these young men attending the college would have in transforming the fishery.80 The increased interest in funding education also coincided with a heightened demand for labour on trawlers. The fishing company owners had long been complaining about the difficulties they had finding adequate crews for their trawlers. With plans to expand the offshore fleet, securing a steadier source of labour became more important. Newfoundland's new College of Fisheries was largely aimed at training young men for work on offshore trawlers or sea-going vessels,

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although it offered general fisheries courses as well as training in fish processing. In 1966, when enrolment was not proceeding quickly enough, the provincial government organized some 'crash courses' for trawler crews at the College of Fisheries. Although Smallwood and other state planners tried to make life on the Newfoundland trawlers sound exciting and lucrative, the young men themselves were not so easily convinced. Very few of the men who went through the College of Fisheries in the first few years of operation ended up working on local trawlers. The destination of choice for many of them was the Great Lakes freighters, where wages and working conditions were considerably better than on Newfoundland offshore fishing vessels. In Newfoundland, trawler owners paid their crews a share of the catch instead of salaries. Earnings were notoriously unstable, as poor weather or an inexperienced captain could greatly impinge on the ability of the crew to make good landings. Turnover rates for trawler crews were high throughout this period. Not until trawler crews unionized and went on strike in the early 1970s did they finally earn regular wages, making life on the trawlers more attractive. The gender ideology underlying modernization was apparent in that the educational programs were aimed specifically at men, not women. One of the goals of modernization was to give male breadwinners the opportunity to learn skills to support their families. Evidence suggests, however, that women in Newfoundland's industrializing fishery contributed to family income. Women began working in the fish plants in the early years of the industrial fishery, and continued to comprise a significant portion of the processing labour force. Though most worked in the lower-paying jobs, the tasks considered 'unskilled', fisheries planners never saw women's low wages and lack of skills training as a 'problem'.81 Besides formal education for fishers, the federal government decided to tackle the centralization and reduction of the fishing population. Since the 1950s federal officials had been saying that they thought the number of fishing people in Newfoundland needed to be reduced. During the discussions with the Newfoundland officials after the failure of the National Fisheries Development proposal, the issue was raised again.82 For generations fishing families and even some communities had been voluntarily 'resettling' to other, more prosperous areas. Since Confederation, the Newfoundland government had offered financial assistance for communities wanting to move. But the provincial programs were aimed primarily at finding a way to provide services such as schools and public utilities to people

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living in more isolated areas. By the mid-1960s, however, the discussions focused on finding a more comprehensive program that would help concentrate the fishing industry and channel excess labour into other sectors. The result of those discussions was the joint federal-provincial Household Resettlement Program of 1965.83 Using growth pole theory as a guide, the program encouraged people to move from smaller communities to government-designated 'growth centres'. Fearing a public backlash, federal officials decided to release only a minimal amount of information on the program.84 Government officials quietly compiled lists of communities they believed needed to be resettled and lists of communities that were potential growth centres. Then, provincial government representatives went into the communities earmarked for resettlement and encouraged them to take part in the program. Votes were held, and if 80 per cent or more of the community members indicated they were willing to move, the government gave everyone money to help them relocate. They received the money only if they agreed to go to one of the designated growth centres. Although many communities did resettle, the program proved a political nightmare that left deep scars in the population. Fishing people, confused and upset by the secrecy of the state's methods, complained they had not been consulted. People from communities slated for resettlement wrote angry letters to the federal government, not realizing that Ottawa also was behind the plan. One such letter written from Deer Harbour, Newfoundland angrily declared: To leave our homes in Deer Harbour, after 140 years and leave our earnings behind, we think, sir, that the Newfoundland government is very unjust.'85 Another letter accused the government of withholding electricity from the community because it was marked for resettlement. The author complained of the lack of communication between the government and the people of the region: I think the people who make these policies in the Department should have come to Westport and talked to individuals and find out just what the people are thinking. . . . I am perfectly sure the majority would stay in Westport if given an opportunity to do so. The residents too would be the right people to give advice as to what might be done in setting up industry in the area. To my knowledge no one from your Department has ever visited Westport, except your field worker from Lascie. Maybe its [sic] his decision to have Westport listed as one of the communities which should be resettled.86

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Stern trawler, Grand Baron, owned by Bonavista Cold Storage, 1967. Before the mid-1960s, most of the trawlers used in Newfoundland were smaller 'side trawlers', where the net was hauled over the side of the boat, rather than the stern. The side trawlers were less stable than the stern trawlers, and tended to ice up in winter. (Centre for Newfoundland Studies Archives, Memorial University of Newfoundland, Collection 75,5.04.032.)

The government tried to appease these people, sending them letters telling them no one was forcing them to move, but not to dismiss the idea. As the program progressed, both federal and provincial governments had trouble dealing with the adverse publicity. The federal government had hired two university-based researchers to study the resettlement program.87 The report of Noel Iverson and Ralph Matthews painted an unflattering picture of the government's attempts at centralization. They claimed that the program failed to offer enough support for people making the transition to the new communities. After moving, people had trouble finding adequate housing or employment, and as a result many continued to fish in their old fishing grounds. In addition, people were unable to keep livestock or do vegetable gardening in their new communities, making it harder for them to manage financially. Not surprisingly, the federal government resented the findings of Iverson and Matthews. At a meeting of the various federal departments

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involved with resettlement, one official argued that the study was 'published prematurely and used to beat the program over the head'.88 He hoped that future studies would be reviewed more carefully and that other studies emphasizing the economic returns of the program would 'put things back in their proper perspective'. Despite attempts to convince the people of Newfoundland that resettlement was beneficial to the province, neither the federal nor the provincial government was able to surmount the bitter feelings the program created. The 1965 Household Resettlement Program reveals both the extent of and the limits to state intervention in the fishery, and illustrates the attempts to convey the 'industrial vision' of development to the people of Newfoundland. Armed with the latest theories on 'growth poles' and 'propulsive enterprises', the federal and provincial governments attempted to force economic and social development in Newfoundland. They carefully monitored the output of information and tried to make the people of Newfoundland believe that resettlement would benefit everyone. Although many inshore fishers wanted some aspects of the industrial vision, including fish plants and longliners, they balked at the intrusiveness of the Household Resettlement Program. Getting loans to buy a new marine engine was one thing; having the government tell them where they could live was another matter entirely. In trying to solve the economic and social problems of the Newfoundland fishery, the state crossed a barrier that many fishing people were not willing to accept. Despite the backlash caused by the resettlement program, the 1960s were generally a period of consolidation of the hegemonic industrial vision of development. By the 1960s, increased European offshore fishing, growing political pressures to address regional inequalities, and the maturing of the interventionist state made the federal government more willing to invest directly in modernizing the fishery. In the process, a new relationship between the federal government and the frozen-fish companies in Newfoundland developed. Ironically, in giving loans directly to fishing companies, the Canadian government was adopting the same methods that Smallwood had promoted a decade earlier. These interventions did not alter the existing economic structures or fundamentally change the distribution of wealth within the Newfoundland fishery. The industrial sector, dominated by a small number of firms, remained the greatest recipient of government funding. In the years that followed, the Newfoundland fishery continued on the path to increased industrial development—a path that eventually led to the devastation of the resource.

8

Conclusion

We might imagine how John Hope Simpson, P.D.H. Dunn, and Stewart Bates would have viewed the result of 25 years of industrial development in the Newfoundland fishery.1 By the late 1960s, the fishery was still changing, partially transformed into the modern economy and society they had envisioned decades earlier. Frozen fish, not salted fish, generated the most revenues. Newfoundland fish was more likely to be found in the frozen-food section of a shopping mall grocery store in Utah than stacked in wooden barrels in the open-air markets of Lisbon or Barcelona. Although most fishing people continued to fish from small, wooden, inshore boats, they had more nets and gear than they had had a generation earlier. While some still salted their fish, many other fishing people now sold their catches for cash to the 60 or so frozen-fish plants around the island. Women had left their places at the fish flakes for jobs on the processing lines. On the south coast and Avalon Peninsula, trawler-based plants provided employment to communities formerly dependent on the bank fishery. Hope Simpson, Dunn, and Bates would have seen that the state involvement in the fishing economy had grown, a process they had helped to initiate. Although they would not necessarily have recognized it as a hegemonic ideology, our fisheries planners would have seen the ideas about economic and social development that they expressed in the 1930s and 1940s still held by fisheries planners in the late 1960s. Their counterparts in the 1960s, however, may have been more comfortable with the degree to which the state was willing to become involved in the fishing industry and the lives of fishing people. As well, Hope Simpson, Dunn, and Bates probably never imagined that the firms getting loans in the 1940s would still depend 150

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on government support in the late 1960s. They had seen government aid to industry as a short-term strategy to boost industrial development, not a long-term solution. While Hope Simpson, Dunn, and Bates realized that trying to develop a fishery created all kinds of conflict, they may have been surprised at the source of some of those problems. In the 1940s, these men assumed that they could provide a blueprint for a new fishery and it was simply a matter of getting the people in the industry to accept the new values and methods of a modern fishery. They may not have imagined the degree of conflict within the state itself that affected the course of development. A hegemonic vision of development within the state and even society is no guarantee that everyone will agree on how to implement it. Clashes between the federal and provincial governments, politicians and bureaucrats, fishing company owners and the state, and fishing people and their elected representatives were a feature of the modernization process. The fisheries planners of the 1940s might have been surprised at the way that new fisheries technologies and economic developments outside Canada's borders became a double-edged sword for the Newfoundland fishery in the 1960s. In the 1940s, they believed in the powers of trawlers and quick-freezing and refrigerators to transform the Newfoundland fishing economy. They probably did not anticipate that those same technologies, in the hands of European fishing countries, would also undermine the state's attempts to modernize the fishery in rural Newfoundland. Nor, perhaps, did they realize attempts to find an international solution would become entangled in the political, military, and ideological conflict gripping the world during the Cold War. Although the fisheries planners would have been pleased to see the bulk of Newfoundland's fish exports going to the United States, they might have been concerned about the degree to which the fortunes of the fishing industry lay in the hands of a few, very large American firms. The prosperity that the fisheries planners of the 1930s and 1940s imagined for rural Newfoundland never quite materialized. Indeed, incomes had risen, but so had expenses, as fish was getting increasingly hard to catch. The Newfoundland fishery had never been an egalitarian enterprise, giving everyone equal access to the resource and the wealth it produced. Survival in the fishery of the 1960s and onward depended even more than in the past on having access to new technologies, such as gill nets and more powerful engines. The divisions between the inshore and offshore sectors were intensifying, as the province's trawlers now supplied two-thirds of the fish processed

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in the frozen-fish plants. While some prospered in these years, many others did not. In the years that followed, many of the ideas and approaches to fisheries development initiated in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s continued to shape the Newfoundland fishery. The industrial vision of development, the close relationship between the state and private capital in the fishery, and the favouring of capital-intensive approaches were primary features of the path of fisheries development in the 1970s and 1980s. The small group of firms that first received government funding in the 1940s and 1950s still dominated the processing and offshore harvesting sectors, owning the largest plants and all of the trawlers. The majority of fishing people—approximately 80 per cent—remained in the inshore fishery. Although the processing companies wielded considerable power, a new organization emerged in 1969, the Newfoundland Fisheries and Food Allied Workers Union (NFFAWU), which tried to give fisheries workers some control in the process.2 The NFFAWU, which included inshore fishers, trawler crews, and plant workers, fought throughout the 1970s for the right to negotiate wages and fish prices. Throughout this period, the technological buildup intensified, as the numbers of vessels, both inshore and offshore, the size and efficiency of these vessels, the amount of gear, and the numbers of fishing people multiplied.3 As well, the spatial scale of fishing changed, as inshore fishers continually moved further afield in search of the increasingly scarce fish.4 The biggest increases in technological acquisition occurred after 1977, when Canada declared a 200-mile fishing limit. Without European trawlers dragging the ocean floor along the coast, many in the industry believed that prosperity would at last come to the Newfoundland fishery. The provincial government offered generous subsidies for people wanting to build larger vessels. Newfoundland's midshore fleets—longliners and Danish seiners from 35 to 65 feet long—swelled from 400 in 1968 to 1,200 in 1981. As well, a fleet of small draggers—vessels between 55 and 65 feet that use a variety of gears, including trawl nets like the offshore trawlers—appeared in this period. The processing sector also expanded after 1977 with government help. The number of licensed groundfish plants jumped from 89 in 1975 to 138 in 1980.5 Like Smallwood's attempted expansion in the 1950s with Fishery Products Limited, however, the strategy of building more plants caused as many problems as it solved. Although thousands of people found work in the plants, the expansion brought the province's largest firms—Fishery Products Limited, the Lake

CONCLUSION

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Group (which included the plants operated by the Lake family, as well as the assets of the former Bonavista Cold Storage and North Eastern Fish Industries Limited), and John Penny and Sons—close to bankruptcy. The high interest rates and the recession of the early 1980s made the already heavy debt loads of these firms difficult to handle. The province's overcapacity in processing facilities, a problem since the 1950s, continued to affect the viability of the industry. As before, the state had too much invested financially, politically, and ideologically in the industrial fishery to allow it to collapse. In 1982, the federal government appointed civil servant (now Liberal Senator) Michael Kirby to head a task force on the Atlantic fishery. Echoing all the major government analyses on the fishing industry from Dunn and Bates in the 1940s, the Walsh Report in the 1950s, to Robichaud in the 1960s, Kirby argued that the fishery must operate on principles of efficiency, consolidation, and centralization.6 As a result of Kirby's recommendations, the government rescued the Newfoundland processing sector. In 1983, the federal and provincial governments paid $233.5 million to buy the ailing companies and repay their debts.7 The state amalgamated Fishery Products Limited, the Lake Group, and John Penny and Sons, and created a Crown corporation, Fishery Products International (FPI). The government reprivatized FPI in 1987 for $152.7 million. Fishery Products International was the largest offshore harvester/processor in the province. Together with National Sea Products, a Nova Scotia-based firm, the two dominated the groundfish industry in Atlantic Canada throughout the 1980s. While these plans were being made to expand the Canadian fishery in the northwest Atlantic, many believed that the problems of overfishing had been solved. Beginning in 1973, ICNAF had imposed quotas or total allowable catches (TAGS) on cod fishing in the northwest Atlantic based on the maximum sustained yield, the most fish that could be taken without causing the size of the population to decline. In 1977, however, ICNAF (soon to become the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, NAFO) introduced a more conservative method of determining the quota, based on 18 per cent of the biomass (the total amount of fish in the population). Indeed, Canadian landings did increase significantly in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Federal fisheries scientists were confident in their ability to control fishing and protect the resource. In fact, they predicted that the cod populations would continue to grow. Despite the optimism, new studies suggest that the cod populations had been more severely damaged by the intensive fishing of 1960s and 1970s than people realized.8 Hutchings and Myers looked

154

A FISHERY FOR MODERN TIMES

at changes not only in the size of the cod populations in this period, but also the age structure. The numbers of fish of a certain age within fish populations can indicate the relative health of the group, as well as its potential growth. Atlantic cod typically reach sexual maturity at the age of six or seven years, but they are large enough by the age of four or five to be caught in large numbers by the commercial fishery. If not enough fish are allowed to survive long enough to spawn, the ability of the population to sustain itself over time is compromised. Hutchings and Myers discovered that between 1962 and 1977, the numbers of 'harvestable' fish fell by 82 per cent, and even more ominously, the numbers of fish of spawning age declined by 94 per cent. In that period, the chance of a fish surviving long enough to reach sexual maturity dropped from 60 per cent in 1962 to 30 per cent in 1977. In fact, they state that by 1977, 'Northern cod were on the verge of commercial extinction.'9 Already weakened by two decades of heavy offshore fishing, the cod populations could not withstand the renewed harvesting efforts of the Newfoundland and other Atlantic Canadian fleets in the 1980s. Although total landings of cod remained stable throughout the 1980s, other evidence suggests that populations again showed signs of decline after 1985. Increasing or stable catches can reflect increased fishing effort rather than a growing fish population. Hutchings and Myers point to several signs of a population under pressure, particularly changes in harvesting and catch rates.10 For example, the Canadian trawlers increased the amount of time they spent dragging their nets through the water in the 1980s, but their catch rates declined by half. As well, they noted changes in the catch rates and harvesting activities in both the inshore and mid-shore sectors. People who used gill nets moved farther offshore over time, and catch rates among many gear types in the inshore fisheries dropped rapidly after 1985. By the early 1990s the cod populations were no longer able to adapt to the ever-increasing fishing effort. Although some government fisheries scientists argued that environmental conditions, specifically colder water temperatures off the coast of Newfoundland and Labrador in the early 1990s, precipitated the collapse of the cod populations,11 years of heavy fishing by humans remains the most persuasive explanation. Many uncertainties face the fishery of today. Some of the cod populations show modest signs of improvement, particularly on the south coast of the island (which opened to commercial fishing in 1997) and in some inshore areas of the northeast coast of the island of Newfoundland. The populations based on the large, offshore shoals of the

CONCLUSION

155

east coast of Newfoundland and Labrador, which traditionally supplied much of the inshore fishery, however, remain sparse. Fisheries scientists do not know when, if, or to what degree they will ever recover. In the meantime, some fishers have moved to other highervalue species such as crab and shrimp. Access to these fisheries is highly restrictive, however, in terms of both getting the required licences and being able to afford the equipment needed to participate in them. Many questions remain about the structure of the future fishery. Thus far, the offshore trawlers have not participated in the small commercial cod fisheries in Newfoundland since the lifting of the moratorium. Some inshore fishers have expressed fears that an offshore fishery may return, threatening their position. Not surprisingly, the state has refrained from engaging in the more difficult questions about people's relationship to the resource in the future. Will company-owned trawlers once again drag the spawning grounds of the continental shelf? Will a few companies come to dominate the industry again? Will the state consider the fisheries resources, like offshore petroleum, its own 'property' to allocate as it chooses? Before we start to repeat the mistakes of the past, I would suggest that we think more critically about the path of fisheries development over the past 50 years and become aware of the processes that have led us to the present problems. The research presented here can offer some insights into the past and present, for it demonstrates that the emergence of a centralized, capital-intensive fishery dominated by a few firms was not a 'natural' or inevitable development but a complex historical process. At one level, the particular historical context in Newfoundland in the mid-twentieth century—the economic background, new technologies and markets, domestic and international politics, the personalities of the people involved, and ecological change—explains how the fishery industrialized. At another level, however, the larger connections between the state, the economy, and society played a part in how the fishery developed. Clearly, there was a relationship between capital and the state. Although the relationship varied over time and was made manifest differently at various levels of the state, it was still a critical dimension of the industrialization of the fishery. And it is important that we continue to be aware of these larger connections between the state, the economy, and society. Although the state itself has changed considerably in the past few decades and governments have sought to dismantle many aspects of the welfare state, we should not assume that those historic connections have necessarily disappeared.

156

A FISHERY FOR MODERN TIMES

This book has also demonstrated the importance of understanding the ideologies of state planning and how they help to shape the possibilities for economic and social change in a region. Far from being unique to Newfoundland, these ideologies had long been part of Western capitalist society, and were being widely applied in other parts of the world considered 'underdeveloped' or 'traditional'. In Newfoundland, the industrial vision of development shaped the way people thought about the problems of the fishery and limited the range of solutions. This hegemonic ideology was so strong that the model itself was rarely questioned by those in power, not even when the promised prosperity failed to materialize. And finally, this study also suggests that the Newfoundland fishery is truly part of an international fishing economy and that, consequently, problems must be addressed at an international level, not just at the local level. This is particularly important now, not only because almost all of Newfoundland's fish still is sold in the highly competitive international markets, but because many fishing operations are becoming global corporations. Fishery Products International, for example, has operations all over the world. Far from collapsing along with the northern cod, FPI has survived by getting rid of many of its assets in Newfoundland and relying on other fisheries. It has also shipped fish from Alaska and other areas to be processed in Newfoundland. While this strategy may benefit FPI shareholders, it may hurt the long-term survivability of the world's fishing resources. Companies may exploit fish in a particular area, and when it becomes depleted, simply shift their operations elsewhere. If the world's fisheries are going to survive in ways that still provide benefits to other people besides the shareholders of the fishing corporations, we need to be part of international solutions, not just regional or national solutions. We can no longer afford to view the fisheries resources as 'property' of the state and industry, to do with it as they choose. That path has led only to devastation of the resource, economic instability, and great social upheaval. Instead, we need to find a way to use and look after the fishery that provides economic and social benefits, and allows more equitable access to the resource without destroying it or the delicate ecosystem of which it is a part.12 Of course, that is easy enough to say, but difficult to do. In many ways, the fishing industry has been shaped by the interconnected relationship of state, economy, and society. Such factors as international capitalism, hegemonic ideologies, politics, technologies, and environmental change all played a role in the development of the fishery in Newfoundland. Becoming aware of how those processes affected the fishery is only a first step.

CONCLUSION

157

If we are to find a solution, it will mean having to question old assumptions about the way a successful economy and society should evolve, and that will not be easy to change. These processes are not only rooted in the way we think about the economy and society, but are entrenched in their very organization. Nevertheless, the survival of the world's fish populations, and the people who make their living from them, may well depend on our willingness to make difficult and even radical choices.

Notes

Chapter 1 1. Dianne Newell and Rosemary Ommer, Fishing Places, Fishing People: Traditions and Issues in Canadian Small-Scale Fisheries (Toronto, 1999); also see Rosemary E. Ommer, principal investigator, Final Report of the Eco-Research Project (t Sustainability in a Changing Cold-Ocean Coastal Environment" (St John's, Aug. 1998); Harold Coward, Rosemary Ommer, and Tony Pitcher, eds, Just Fish: Ethics and Canadian Marine Fisheries (St John's, 2000). 2. Sean Cadigan, Tailed Proposals for Fisheries Management and Conservation in Newfoundland, 1885-1880', in Newell and Ommer, eds, Fishing Places, Fishing Peoples. Sean Cadigan and Jeffrey A. Hutchings, 'The Ecology of Expansion: The Case of the Labrador Fishery', paper presented at the Canadian Historical Association annual meeting, St John's, June 1997; Jeffrey A. Hutchings and Ransom A. Myers, 'The Biological Collapse of Atlantic Cod off Newfoundland and Labrador: An Exploration of Historical Changes in Exploitation, Harvesting and Management', in Ragner Arnason and Lawrence Felt, eds, The North Atlantic Fishery: Successes, Failures and Challenges (Charlottetown, 1995). 3. Examples of these community studies include Tom Philbrook, Fisherman, Logger, Merchant, Miner: Social Change and Industrialism in Three Newfoundland Communities (St John's, 1966); John Szwed, Private Cultures and Public Imagery: Interpersonal Relations in a Newfoundland Peasant Society (St John's, 1966); Jim Paris, Cat Harbour: A Newfoundland Fishing Settlement (St John's, 1972); Samuel Ben-Dor, Makkovik: Eskimos and Settlers in a Labrador Community (St John's, 1966); Melvin Firestone, Brothers and Rivals: Patrilocality in Savage Cove (St John's, 1967); Louis Chiaramonte, Craftsman-Client Contracts: Interpersonal Relations in a Newfoundland Fishing Community (St John's, 1970).

158

NOTES

159

4. Peter Sinclair, From Traps to Draggers: Domestic Commodity Production in Northwest Newfoundland, 1850-1982 (St John's, 1985); Bonnie McCay, 'Appropriate Technology and Coastal Fishermen of Newfoundland', Ph.D. thesis (Columbia University, 1988). 5. Rosemary Ommer, 'What's Wrong With Canadian Fish?', in Peter Sinclair, ed., A Question of Survival: The Fisheries and Newfoundland Society (St John's, 1988); Ommer, 'One Hundred Years of Fishery Crises in Newfoundland', Acadiensis 23, 2 (Spring 1994): 5-20. 6. Raymond Blake, Canadians At Last: Canada Integrates Newfoundland as a Province (Toronto, 1994). 7. David Alexander, The Decay of Trade: An Economic History of the Newfoundland Saltfish Trade, 1935-1965 (St John's, 1977). 8. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, trans, and ed. (New York, 1971); Esteve Morera, Gramsci's Historicism: A Realist Interpretation (London, 1990); Stuart Hall, 'The Rise of the Representative/Interventionist State 1880s-1920s', in Gregor McLennan, David Held, and Stuart Hall, eds, State and Society in Contemporary Britain (Cambridge, 1984); Stuart Hall, 'The Toad in the Garden: Thatcher Among the Theorists', in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, eds, Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (Urbana, 111., 1988); Stuart Hall, 'The Problem of Ideology: Marxism without Guarantees', in David Morley, Kuan-Hsing Chen, and Hall, eds, Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies (London, 1996). 9. For a critical analysis of the term 'ideology', see Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London, 1991). 10. Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton, NJ, 1995); David Harrison, The Sociology of Modernization and Development, (London, 1988); M.P. Cowen and R.W. Shenton, Doctrines of Development (New York, 1996). 11. The literature on development ideologies and their impact on social and economic policies in non-Western countries is large. For examples, see Cowen and Shenton, Doctrines of Development; Frederic Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: The Labour Question in French and British Africa (Cambridge, 1996); James Ferguson, The Anti-Political Machine: 'Development', Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (Cambridge, 1990). 12. Escobar, Encountering Development, 21-39. 13. WW. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge, 1960). 14. Andre Gunder Frank, Sociology of Underdevelopment and the Underdevelopment of Sociology (London, 1972); Paul Baran and E.J. Hobsbawm, 'A Non-Communist Manifesto', in Paul Baran, ed., The Longer View

160

NOTES

(New York, 1969) 52-67; Ester Boserup, Woman's Role in Economic Development (London, 1970); Barbara Rogers, The Domestication of Women: Discrimination in Developing Countries (New York, 1980); Lourdes Beneria and Gita Sen, 'Class and Gender Inequalities and Women's Role in Economic Development—Theoretical and Practical Implications', Feminist Studies 8, 1 (Spring 1982): 157-75. 15. Marshall Berman, All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity (New York, 1982).

Chapter 2 1. See Sean Cadigan, Hope and Deception in Conception Bay: MerchantSettler Relations in Newfoundland, 1785-1855 (Toronto, 1995); Patricia Thornton, 'A Dynamic Equilibrium: Settlement, Population and Ecology in the Straith of Belle Isle, Newfoundland, 1840-1940', Ph.D. thesis (University of Aberdeen, 1979); James K. Killer, 'The Newfoundland Credit System: An Interpretation', in Rosemary Ommer, ed., Merchant Credit and Labour Strategies in Historical Perspective (Fredericton, NB, 1990). 2. Shannon Ryan, Fish out of Water: The Newfoundland Saltfish Trade, 1814-1914 (St John's, 1986). 3. William Reeves, 'Alexander's Conundrum Reconsidered: The American Dimension in Newfoundland Resource Development, 1898-1910', Newfoundland Studies 5, 1 (Spring 1989): 1-37. Reeves uncovered early attempts by the state to introduce new technologies such as cold storage aimed at developing an industrial fishery parallel to that in New England. Robert Hong, ' "An Agency for the Common Weal": The Newfoundland Board of Trade, 1909-1915', MA thesis (Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1998). Hong found that the Board proposed government action in such areas as improving the cure, market development, and financing technological research. 4. S.J.R. Noel, Politics in Newfoundland (Toronto, 1971), 186-220; Peter Neary, Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World, 1929-1949 (Montreal and Kingston, 1988); Gene Long, Suspended State (St John's, 1999). 5. Great Britain, Newfoundland Royal Commission Report (London, 1933). 6. Ibid., 106. 7. For an analysis of the cultural implications of colonialism, see Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York, 1993). 8. Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology and Ideologies of Western Dominance (Ithaca, NY, 1989). Adas notes that in nineteenth-century Europe, writers often made similar comparisons between the rural and working classes of Europe and people of non-Western colonial societies.

NOTES

161

9. Peter Neary, ed., White Tie and Decorations: Sir John and Lady Hope Simpson in Newfoundland, 1934-1936 (Toronto, 1996), 160. 10. Ibid., 281. 11. Ibid., 284. 12. Melvin Baker and Shannon Ryan, 'The Newfoundland Fishery Research Commission, 1930-1934', in James E. Candow and Carol Corbin, eds, How Deep Is the Ocean? Historical Essays on Canada's Atlantic Fishery (Sydney, NS, 1997). 13. Centre for Newfoundland Studies, Memorial University of Newfoundland (CNS), 'Co-operation in India', radio address by Robert Ewbank, 1 Apr. 1937. 14. Roger Carter, 'Co-operatives in Rural Newfoundland and Labrador: An Alternative?', in Peter Sinclair, ed., A Question of Survival: The Fisheries and Newfoundland Society (St John's, 1988). 15. Moses M. Coady, The Antigonish Way (Antigonish, NS, 1943). 16. Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador (PANL), GN 38, S2-1-17, file 26, Special Areas Bill, 103^. 17. Ibid. 18. Neary, Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World, 121-3. 19. PANL, GN 38, box S2-1-19, file 1, Newfoundland Board of Trade to W.J. Carew, Secretary of Commission of Government, 21 Sept. 1940. 20. Edward Ackerman, New England's Fishing Industry, (Chicago, 1941), 228. 21. Richard S. Tedlow, New and Improved: The Story of Mass Marketing in America (New York, 1990), 305-28; Oscar Anderson, Jr, Refrigeration in America: A History of A New Technology and Its Impact (Princeton, NJ, 1953), 198-9. 22. Robert Ewbank, Public Affairs in Newfoundland (Cardiff, 1939). 23. For background on the impact of British Ministry of Food requests for canned salmon in British Columbia, see Dianne Newell, 'The Politics of Food in World War II: Great Britain's Grip on Canada's Pacific Fishery', Canadian Historical Association Historical Papers (1987): 179-97. 24. PANL, GN 38, box S2-1-5, file 8, P.D.H. Dunn to Commission of Go^rn* ment, NR 56(b)-'41, 16 Oct. 1941. 25. PANL, GN 34/2, file 25/79, 'Report of the Fisheries Committee to the National Convention', 13. 26. PANL, GN 38, box S2-1-3, file 5, 'Appendix "A" to NR 116-'40, Codfillet Production in Newfoundland', 1 Oct. 1940. 27. Ibid., box S2-2-2, file 7, 'Draft Despatch to Secretary of State', NR l(a)-'43,7Jan. 1943. 28. Ibid., S2-1-5, file 1, 'Fishery Development—Conditions Under Which Loans will be Made'.

162

NOTES

29. Ibid., box S2-2-2, file 7, 'Draft Despatch to Secretary of State', NR l(a)-'43, 7 Jan. 1943. 30. Ibid., 'Memo—Reorganization of Fisheries', NR l-'43,4 Jan. 1943. 31. Ibid., box S2-1-5, file 2, 'Report by George S. Armstrong Inc. on Cod Fillet Production and Distribution, 1944'. 32. Tedlow, New and Improved, 326, cites a different source indicating that, in 1940, 62.8 per cent of American households with electricity also had refrigerators. The Armstrong Report's figures may include both electric and the older ice-cooled refrigerators. Sales by major manufacturing companies totalled approximately 18 million units between 1934 and 1941. Americans bought refrigerators at a faster rate than did Canadians in the 1940s and early 1950s. For a discussion of refrigerators in the Canadian context, see Joy Parr, Domestic Goods: The Material, the Moral and the Economic in the Postwar Years (Toronto, 2000), 247-54. 33. PANL, 'Memo—Reorganization of Fisheries', 4 Jan. 1943. 34. PANL, GN 38, box S2-1-5, file 2, 'P.D.H. Dunn to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs', 15 Feb. 1945. 35. CNS, 'Fisheries Re-organization in Newfoundland', radio address by Hon. P.D.H. Dunn, QBE, Commissioner for Natural Resources, 21 Jan. 1944. 36. PANL, 'Report by George Armstrong Inc.' The trade terms stipulated that Newfoundland and Canada had a combined export quota to the US of 18 million pounds. The lower tariff only applied to the first 18 million pounds. Any exports over that combined amount would be charged the higher rate of 2.5 cents per pound. 37. Ibid., box S2-1-5, file 1, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland, 20 Feb. 1945. 38. National Archives of Canada (NAC), RG 23, vol. 1748, file 794-17-1 [1], 'Newfoundland Freezing Plants', Department of Fisheries, 19 May 1951. 39. Newfoundland and Labrador Registry of Companies and Deeds, file 1227, Job Brothers and Co. Ltd. The company was incorporated in 1933. Although members of the Job family, as well as other local business people, were among the shareholders, the majority of shares were actually held by Hudson's Bay Company. 40. Interview with Paul Russell, Hazen Russell's son, Mar. 1994. 41. Ibid. 42. Newfoundland and Labrador Registry of Companies and Deeds, file 1648, Bonavista Cold Storage. 43. Newfoundland and Labrador Registry of Companies and Deeds, file 1227, Job Brothers and Co. Ltd; file 1648, Bonavista Cold Storage. Russell bought the shares that had been held by Hudson's Bay Company. 44. Newfoundland and Labrador Registry of Companies and Deeds, file 1842, Northlantic Fisheries. The directors were Hazen Russell, Ches

NOTES

45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

50.

51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59.

163

Pippy, W.F. Hutchinson, Lewis Ayre, Gerald S. Doyle, Charles Hunt, Campbell Macpherson, and Gordon A. Winter. Canada Bay Cold Storage was founded by Russell and a local merchant in Englee, where the plant was located. It was mainly a salmon freezing plant, as was St Anthony Cold Storage. PANL, GN 34/2, file 83/3, 'Northlantic Fisheries Limited, 4 June 1947, List of Authorized Capital and Issued and Fully Paid Capital'. Ibid., H.A. Russell to Commissioner for Natural Resources, 26 July 1947. Ibid., copy of loan agreement between the Newfoundland government and Northlantic Trawling Co., 16 Mar. 1948. Newfoundland and Labrador Registry of Companies and Deeds, file 1227, Job Brothers and Co. Ltd; file 1842, Northlantic Fisheries. Although Russell resigned as president and from the boards of directors of these firms, he kept his shares until 1965, when he sold them to Ayre and Sons Ltd. Earlier, Job Brothers had sold its processing plant at Port aux Basques. Canada Bay Cold Storage was sold to the Lake family, and Arthur Monroe of Fishery Products Limited bought St Anthony Cold Storage. Hazen Russell bought the three vessels obtained by Northlantic in 1948. After Russell's departure, Northlantic continued to operate with the remaining investors and Board of Directors. PANL, GN 38, box S2-1-5, file 11, 'Fishery Products Limited: Production of Individual Operators for the year 1941 \ Monroe was a cousin of another Newfoundland Prime Minister, Frederick Alderdice. Newfoundland and Labrador, Registry of Companies and Deeds, file 1689, Fishery Products Limited. PANL, GN 38, box S2-1-5, file 1, NR 15-'45, Draft Despatch to the Secretary of State concerning loans to companies for fishery development, 15 Feb. 1945. PANL, GN 34/2, file 83/2, vol. 1, 'Fishery Products Limited Balance Sheet as at 31st December, 1942'. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1748, file 797-17-1 [1], 'Newfoundland Freezing Plants'. PANL, GN 34/2, file 83/2, vol. 1, 'Fishery Products Limited, Fixed Assets—Vessels as at 31st December 1947'. PANL, MG 523, W.S. Monroe Export Company Limited, file 50, 'Monroe Export Co. Ltd. sale to Fishery Products Ltd. April 1, 1946'. Maritime History Archives, Memorial University of Newfoundland (MHA), Newfoundland Association of Fish Exporters Limited Records, Shipment Ledgers, 1947-59. Between 1947 and 1949, FPL was amo the top 10 exporters of saltfish by volume; between 1949 and 1959, the

164

60.

61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66.

67. 68. 69. 70. 71.

72.

73. 74. 75.

NOTES company was among the top five exporters of saltfish. The company withdrew from the saltfish business after 1959. PANL, GN 38, file 83/2, vol. 1, 'Loans Advanced to Corporations or Individuals for the Purpose of Assisting them in Development of the Fisheries', 22 Jan. 1947. FPL received one loan before the official loan program was set up. In March 1942, the company received $25,000 for the plant at Isle aux Morts, but the loan was repaid the following year when the plant burned down. Ibid., box S2-1-5, file 2, NR 15(a)-'45, P.D.H. Dunn to Commission of Government, 14 May 1945. Ibid., NR 15-'45, Draft Despatch to the Secretary of State concerning loans to companies for fishery development, 15 Feb. 1945. PANL, GN 34/2, file 83/2, vol. 1, FPL to Commission of Government, 18 Jan. 1947. Ibid., Arthur Monroe to Commission of Government, 27 July 1947. Carter's comments were written on the back of the above document. Ibid., Commissioner for Finance to Commissioner for Natural Resources, 28 May 1947. Ibid., Certified Copy of Minutes, 20 June 1947 re: meeting 14 June 1947. Earlier, the Commission of Government had approved a loan for $168,000 for FPL to purchase one trawler and one refrigerated vessel. This amount was increased to $225,000 when Arthur Monroe asked that they be allowed to purchase three vessels instead of two. Ibid., file 82/3, vol. 1, W. Russell Edmunds, Treasury Chambers, to St John Chadwick, Commonwealth Relations Officer, 4 Nov. 1947. Ibid. Ibid., file 83/2, vol. 1, W.H. Flinn to St John Chadwick, 12 Feb. 1948. Ibid., NFDA, file John Penny and Sons, pamphlet, 'The Penny Story, 1856-1956'. Fred Winsor, 'The Newfoundland Bank Fishery: Government Policies and the Struggle to Improve Bank Fishing Crews' Working, Health and Safety Conditions, 1876-1920', Ph.D. thesis (Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1997). Cynthia Boyd, ' "Come on all the crowd, on the beach!": The Working Lives of Beachwomen in Grand Bank, Newfoundland, 1900-1940', in James E. Candow and Carol Corbin, eds, How Deep is the Ocean?: Historical Essays on Canada's Atlantic Fishery (Sydney, NS, 1997). Penny did not serve long in the Senate; he died in December 1949. Newfoundland and Labrador Registry of Companies and Deeds, file 749, John Penny and Sons. PANL, GN 34/2, file 83/2, vol. 1, 'Department of Natural Resources, Loans Advanced to Corporations or Individuals for the Purpose of Assisting Them in Development of the Fisheries'.

NOTES

165

76. Ibid., file 83/5, 'John Penny and Sons, Balance Sheet as at April 30th, 1946'. 77. Ibid., 'John Penny and Sons, Limited, Outline of Fresh Fish Operations, Ramea'. 78. Newfoundland and Labrador Registry of Companies and Deeds, file 1768, North Eastern Fish Industries Ltd. 79. PANL, GN 38, S2-1-5, file 2, NR 15-'45, Draft Despatch to the Secretary of State concerning loans to companies for fishery development. 80. J.K. Killer and M.F. Harrington, eds, The Newfoundland National Convention 1946-1948, vol. 2 (Montreal and Kingston, 1995). See 'Report of the Fisheries Committee of the National Convention, March 24,1947", 181-250; 'Report of the Sub-Committee on the Cold Storage Industry', 183-7; 'Report of the Sub-Committee on the Salt Codfish Industry', 187-9. For the transcripts of the debate surrounding the introduction of the Report, see J.K. Killer and M.F. Harrington, eds, The Newfoundland National Convention 1946-1948, vol. 1 (Montreal and Kingston, 1995), 371-133. 81. Ibid., vol. 2, 213. 82. Ibid., vol. 1,82. 83. Ibid.

Chapter 3 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Morera, Gramsci's Historicism, 167. Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men, 402-18. Morera, Gramsci's Historicism, 178. Robert Bothwell and William Kilbourn, C.D. Howe: A Biography (Toronto, 1979). David Wolfe, 'The Rise and Demise of the Keynesian Era in Canada: Economic Policy, 1930-1982', in Michael S. Cross and Gregory S. Kealey, eds, Modern Canada: 1930-1980s (Toronto, 1984); James Struthers, The Limits of Affluence: Welfare in Ontario, 1920-1970 (Toronto, 1994); Melissa Clark-Jones, A Staple State: Canadian Industrial Resources in Cold War (Toronto, 1987). Canada, Department of Fisheries, Twentieth Annual Report 1949-50 (Ottawa, 1950), 9. Ibid. Canada, Department of Fisheries, Twenty-second Annual Report, 1951-1952 (Ottawa, 1952), 12. Doug Owram, The Government Generation: Canadian Intellectuals and the State 1900-1945 (Toronto, 1986). H. Scott Gordon, 'The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery', Journal of Political Economy 62 (1954): 124-42.

166

NOTES

11. See Dianne Newell, Tangled Webs of History: Indians and the Law in Canada's Pacific Coast Fisheries (Toronto, 1993), 122-47, for a discussion on the impact of the 'economic' approach on policy affecting Native fishers in this period. 12. NAC, RG 23, vol. 430, file 'A.W.H. Needier', 21. 13. Stewart Bates, The Financial History of Canadian Governments (Ottawa, 1939). 14. Stewart Bates, The Report on the Canadian Atlantic Sea-Fishery', in Nova Scotia Royal Commission on Reconstruction and Rehabilitation (Halifax, 1944) (hereafter Bates Report). 15. See Newell, Tangled Webs, 122-9. 16. NAC, RG 23, Bates Papers, vol. 505, box 3, file 'Wartime Conditions and the Atlantic Fishery'. 17. Bates Report, 33. 18. See Ian McKay, The Quest of the Folk: Antimodernism and Cultural Selection in Twentieth-Century Nova Scotia (Montreal and Kingston, 1994) for an analysis of the construction of the 'Folk', the portrayal of rural Nova Scotians as hardy, innocent, unchanging, pre-modern people by amateur folklorists such as Helen Creighton from the late 1920s to the early 1970s. 19. Bates Report, 107. 20. Ibid., 82n. 21. Ibid., 26. 22. Ibid., 108. 23. Ibid., 61. 24. Ibid., 11. 25. Ibid., 22. 26. Ibid., 131. 27. R.N. Wadden, Department of Fisheries of Canada 1867-1967 (Ottawa, 1967). 28. Sinclair was born in Scotland, but moved to Canada while young. 29. PANL, GN 34/2, file 11/4, vol. 2, newspaper clipping, n.d., 'An Impatient Liberal "Rebel" Makes Cabinet the Hard Way'. 30. J.W. Pickersgill, My Years With Louis St. Laurent: A Political Memoir (Toronto, 1975), 69. 31. NAC, RG 23, vol. 430, file J.L. Kask, 9, 36; file F.R. Hayes. 32. University of British Columbia Library, Special Collections, James Sinclair Diaries, Box 1, Diary—1955, Trip to Russia for International Whaling Commission, 18-23 July 1955; Dominion Bureau of Statistics, British Columbia Fishery Statistics, various years. 33. Two biographies of Smallwood cover similar ground: Richard Gwyn, Smallwood: The Unlikely Revolutionary, rev. edn (Toronto, 1972);

NOTES

167

Harold Horwood, Joey: The Life and Political Times of Joey Smallwood (Toronto, 1989). 34. Alfred Valdmanis, a native of Latvia, was Smallwood's economic adviser from 1950 to 1954. He was later prosecuted and convicted for takin kickbacks from several German firms. See Gerhard P. Bassler, Alfred Valdmanis and the Politics of Survival (Toronto, 2000). John C. Doyle was an American business promoter who became involved in several illfated resource development projects in Newfoundland. In 1973 he wa arrested for fraud relating to a linerboard mill he built in Stephenville, Newfoundland. He was also wanted by the American authorities for illegal activities related to his other business ventures. He escaped to Panama to avoid the charges and later moved to Cuba. 35. Joseph R. Smallwood, / Chose Canada (Toronto, 1975), 24. 36. Proceedings of the House of Assembly of Newfoundland, 1953 (supple ment), 7. 37. NAC, RG 23, Accession 90-1/230, box 10, file 711-29-7 [1], 'Impressions of the Newfoundland School of Fisheries' by C.H. Castell, 4 Mar. 1964 38. PANL, GN 34/2, file 13/64, vol. 2, 'Development of La Scie—Narration 39. Ibid., 5-6. 40. 'dive Planta: Newfoundland Deputy Minister of Fisheries', Newfoundland Journal of Commerce 17, 12 (Dec. 1950): 16-17. 41. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1751, file 794-17-7 [1], R. Hart, Industrial Developmen Branch to Stewart Bates, 25 June 1954. 42. Gwyn, Smallwood, 172. 43. PANL, GN 34/2, file 3/32/2, vol. 1, newspaper clipping, Western Star, 12 Feb. 1954, 'He's at the Wheel Now In Our Fisheries Post'. 44. Hans Rolleman, The Socialist Bishop of St George's', Evening Telegram, 23 May 1999. Rolleman later sent a disclaimer to the newspaper, saying that the title given the piece misrepresented the article, as Bishop Michael O'Reilly was a social activist, not a socialist. The title Rolleman had chosen was 'Bishop Michael O'Reilly, Social Activist on Newfoundland's West Coast'. 45. Coady, The Antigonish Way. 46. Ibid., 15. 47. PANL, GN 34/2, file 3/32/2, vol. 1, newspaper clipping, Western Star, 12 Feb. 1954, 'He's at the Wheel Now In Our Fisheries Post'. 48. Killer and Harrington, Newfoundland National Convention, vol. 1, 1424 49. Ibid. 50. PANL, GN 34/2, file 3/32/2, vol. 1, Daily News 1 Aug. 1953, 'Ancient Forces Must Build the New Social Structure', extract from address given by W.J. Keough at the celebration of the Silver Jubilee of St Francis Xavier University Extension Department.

168

NOTES

51. Ibid., 'Address delivered by the Hon. WJ. Keough, Minister of Fisheries and Co-operatives, at the Annual Meeting of the St John's Consumers Co-operation Society, Ltd., in Victoria Hall on Jan. 26, 1951'. 52. Ibid., Evening Telegram, 18 Mar. 1950, 'W.J. Keough Envisages Centralized Structures in Future'. 53. Ibid., Speeches and Press Messages, radio address by W.J. Keough, n.d. (Probably 1951, as he refers to the Newfoundland Fisheries Development Committee, which was set up in 1951. He also talks about proposed expenditures for 1952, so it was not any later than that.) 54. Interview with John Scott, Nov. 1995 at Memorial University of Newfoundland, St John's. Dr Scott is Fred Scott's son. 55. PANL, GN 34/2, file 11/4/2, Moses Coady to Stewart Bates, 31 Dec. 1949; Stewart Bates to Fred Scott, 23 Dec. 1949. 56. Cyril Poole, ed., Encyclopedia of Newfoundland and Labrador, vol. 5 (St John's, 1994), 313. 57. PANL, Miscellaneous Files, 'Summary Report by Colin Story, Fisheries Technologist', 9 Apr. 1951. 58. PANL, GN 34/2, Newfoundland Fisheries Development Authority Papers (hereafter, NFDA), NFDA Policy Re: most suitable fishing vessels for Newfoundland, memo to Deputy Minister, n.d. [c. 1954-5]. 59. Ibid., file 27/1, Fred Scott to W.J. Keough, 10 July 1950. 60. Ibid., file 25/31, vol. 1, 'Joint Federal-Provincial News Release, Jan. 27, 1951'. 61. MacKenzie replaced Raymond Gushue, former chair of the Newfoundland Fisheries Board, in 1952. 62. Wilfred Templeman and A.M. Fleming, The Bonavista Longlining Experiment, 1950-1953', Fisheries Research Board of Canada Bulletin, No. 109 (1956). 63. Canada and Newfoundland, Newfoundland Fisheries Development Committee Report (St John's, 1953) (hereafter, Walsh Report). 64. PANL, GN 34/2, file 25/33/10, Clive Planta to Minister of Fisheries, 15 Jan. 1953. 65. Walsh Report, 72. 66. Ibid. 67. For background on gender, the state, and the Newfoundland fishery, see Miriam Wright, 'Women, Men and the Modern Fishery: Images of Gender in Modernization Plans for the Canadian Atlantic Fishery', in Carmelita McGrath, Barbara Neis, and Marilyn Porter, eds, Their Lives and Times: Women in Newfoundland and Labrador (St John's, 1995); Miriam Wright, 'Young Men and Technology: Government Attempts to Create a "Modern" Fisheries Workforce in Newfoundland, 1949-1970',

NOTES

68.

69. 70. 71.

72.

169

Labour/Le Travail 42 (Fall 1998): 143-59; Barbara Neis, 'From "Shipped Girls" to "Brides of the State": The Transition from Familial to Social Patriarchy in the Newfoundland Fishing Industry', Canadian Journal of Regional Science 16, 2 (1993): 185-211. For background on the development of the 'male breadwinner/female homemaker' ideology, see Keith McClelland, 'Masculinity and the "Representative Artisan" in Britain 1850-1880', in Michael Roper and John Tosh, eds, Manful Assertions: Masculinities in Britain since 1800 (London, 1991); Mary Poovey, Uneven Developments: The Ideological Work of Gender in Mid-Victorian England (Chicago, 1988). Walsh Report, 13, 101-2. Ibid., 102. Some of the works dealing with these questions include Sean Cadigan, Hope and Deception in Conception Bay: Merchant-Settler Relations in Newfoundland 1785-1855 (Toronto, 1995); Linda Little, 'Collective Action in Outport Newfoundland: A Case Study from the 1830s', Labour/Le Travail 26 (Fall 1990): 7-35; Jerry Bannister, ' "A Species of Vassalage": The Issue of Class in the Writing of Newfoundland History', Acadiensis 24, 1 (Autumn 1994): 134-44. Hall, 'The Rise of the Representative/Interventionist State', 47.

Chapter 4 1. Hall, 'The Rise of the Representative/Interventionist State', 45. 2. Margaret Conrad, The 1950s: The Decade of Development', in E.R. Forbes and D.A. Muise, eds, The Atlantic Provinces in Confederation (Toronto, 1993). In the 1950s the other Atlantic provinces also faced difficulties getting support for economic development from the federal government. 3. PANL, GN 34/2, file 27/1, Fisheries Council of Canada Bulletin, 6 Feb. 1953, excerpt from speech by James Sinclair. 4. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1749, file 794-17-1 [6], memo to cabinet re: Report Newfoundland Fisheries Development Committee, 15 May 1953; memo to cabinet re: Walsh Report on Newfoundland Development, 9 May 1953. 5. Blake, Canadians at Last, 165-8. 6. PANL, GN 34/2, file 104/4, Certified Copy of Minutes of the Honourable Executive Council of the Province of Newfoundland re: the meeting held on 22 Apr. 1953. 7. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1260, file 727-201-1 [2], James Sinclair to Cabinet, 'Newfoundland Bait Depots', 16 Apr. 1953. 8. Ibid., George Clark to Stewart Bates, 25 Apr. 1953.

170

NOTES

9. CNS Archives, J.R. Smallwood Papers, file 3.12.040, Arthur Monroe t Joseph Smallwood, 9 Mar. 1953. 10. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1260, file 727-201-1 [2], Memorandum to the Ministe 'Some Considerations in Transferring Bait Depots to Newfoundland Government', 6 May 1953. 11. Ibid., Memorandum to Minister, 'Transfer of Bait Depots to Newfoundland', 4 June 1953. 12. Ibid., E.A. Harvey, Newfoundland Fish Trades Association, to James Sinclair, 12 May 1953. 13. Newfoundland Proceedings of the House of Assembly (supplement), 1953, 6. 14. Ibid., 7. 15. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1260, file 727-201-1 [2], James Sinclair to Josep Smallwood, 13 May 1953. 16. Ibid., vol. 1750, file 794-17-1 [8], Memorandum to Cabinet, 'Newfoundland Fisheries Development', 8 Sept. 1953. 17. Ibid., file 794-17-1 [7], Department of Fisheries, Information Service Press Release, 1 Oct. 1953. 18. Pickersgill, My Years with Louis St. Laurent, 223-4. According to Jack Pickersgill, Smallwood himself requested the transfer, arguing that C.D. Howe, the powerful Minister of Trade and Commerce, would be more adept at handling the fisheries marketing issue. The plan backfired, however, as fisheries marketing was never a big priority in the Department of Trade and Commerce in the 1950s. 19. CNS Archives, Smallwood Papers, file 3.12.012, 'Introducing the Fish eries Development Authority' by Clive Planta, 31 Mar. 1954. 20. Legislation designed to assist producers' organizations to develop their own processing facilities. The Cheese and Cheese Factory Act provided for assistance to dairy producers wishing to set up their own cheese factories. 21. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1751, file 794-17-7 [1], R. Hart to Deputy Minister, 18 Apr. 1955; R. Hart to Deputy Minister, 22 Apr. 1955. 22. PANL, GN 34/2, NFDA, file 'Centralized Curing Stations', Harry Winsor to Harry Dustan and Ross Young, 30 Sept. 1955. 23. Newfoundland Proceedings of the House of Assembly, 1954, 773. 24. Ibid., 772. 25. PANL, GN 34/2, file 611/8/73, W.J. Keough to Executive Council, 14 Jan 1953. 26. Ibid., file 3/32/2 vol. 1, 'Address delivered by the Hon. W.J. Keough, Minister of Fisheries and Co-operatives, at the Annual Meeting of the St John's Consumers Co-operation Society, Ltd., in Victoria Hall on Ja 26, 1951'.

NOTES

171

27. Ibid., NFDA, file H.C. Winsor Personal, vol. 2, Speech—Co-ops in Fish ery Development, n.d. [c. 1959]. 28. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1438, file 746-212-1 [1], H.R. Bradley to Deputy Min ister, 29 Feb. 1956. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid., George Clark to H.R. Bradley, 2 May 1956. 31. PANL, GN 34/2, NFDA, file Seldom Fishery Development, H.G. Dustan t J.T. Cheeseman, 29 Mar. 1957. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid., file Centralized Curing Stations, Harry Winsor to Harry Dustan and Ross Young, 30 Sept. 1955. 34. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1750, file 794-17-1 [8], 'Nova Scotia Salt Fish Industr in Relation to that of Newfoundland and Quebec', by Canadian Atlantic Salt Fish Exporters Association, 8 July 1954. 35. MHA, NAFEL Papers, file R63-13-2-56, Fletcher Smith to C.D. Howe and James Sinclair, 2 Dec. 1955. In a subsequent letter (NAC, RG 23, vol. 1750, file 794-17-1 [10], Fletcher Smith to James Sinclair, 6 Jan. 1956), Smith claims to have sent copies of the 2 December letter to the press, members of Parliament, senators representing Nova Scotia, members of the Nova Scotia Assembly, the Canadian Atlantic Salt Fish Exporters Association, and key staff in the Department of Trade and Commerce and the Department of Fisheries. 36. MHA, NAFEL Papers, file R63-B-2-56, James Sinclair to Fletcher Smith, 30 Dec. 1955. 37. Ibid. 38. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1436, file 746-207-1 [1], H.R. Bradley to Deputy Minister, 12 Mar. 1958. 39. Ibid., vol. 1260, file 727-201-1 [1], I.S. McArthur and L.S. Bradbury to Deputy Minister, 16 Apr. 1957; PANL, NFDA, Seldom Fishery Development, H.G. Dustan to J.T. Cheeseman, 3 Mar. 1957. In 1957 the provincial go ernment decided to lease the Seldom plant to the Fisherman's Union Trading Company, a saltfish firm established many years before by William Coaker, founder of the Fisherman's Protective Union. They claimed that the Seldom operation was too complex to be run co-operatively, and the fishers simply lacked the basic education to manage such an enterprise. Ibid., George Clark to W. Sellars, Auditor General, 4 Feb. 1958. In 1958, Deputy Minister George Clark said that the federal Department of Fisheries would no longer assist in the management of the Quirpon plant, which remained under the control of the NFDA and—citing the change in the original conception of the plant and the subsequent creation of a limited liability company in Quirpon—noted it was advisable that the federal government discontinue its relationship with the project.

172

NOTES

40. PANL, GN 34/2, NFDA, file Seldom Fishery Development, H.G. Dustan to J.T. Cheeseman, 29 Mar. 1957. 41. Canada, Fisheries Research Board of Canada Annual Report, 1958-59 (Ottawa, 1959). 42. PANL, GN 34/1, file 2/4/15, vol. 1, B. Thorns to Director, Co-operatives Extension, n.d., although the document provides an overview of the community stage training program offered 23 Nov. to 3 Dec. 1959. 43. MHA, NAFEL Papers, file R63-B-1-7, 'Review of Fisheries 1959 by J.T. Cheeseman'. 44. Canada, Department of Fisheries Annual Report 1956-57 (Ottawa, 1957), 36. 45. Canada, Department of Fisheries Annual Report, various years; Kenneth Johnstone, The Aquatic Explorers: A History of the Fisheries Research Board of Canada (Toronto, 1977). 46. Canada, Department of Fisheries Annual Report, various years. 47. Wright, 'Young Men and Technology'. 48. J.J. Quigley, 'Fishermen's Training Program', Trade News 14, 7 (Jan. 1962): 12-13. 49. CNS, J.R. Smallwood Papers, file 3.12.019, 'Annual Report of the Newfoundland Fisheries Development Authority for the Year Ending March 31, 1962'. Some fishers may have taken the courses more than once, or may have taken different courses in different years, so it is possible that less than 1,812 individual fishers took courses. 50. PANL, 34/2, NFDA, file John Penny and Sons, J.T. Cheeseman to H.G. Dustan, 26 June 1954; letter to Dustan from Cheeseman, 12 Nov. 1954. 51. Ibid., file 11/76, J.T. Cheeseman to James Sinclair, 29 Oct. 1956; Sinclair to Cheeseman, 5 Feb. 1957. 52. Ibid., file 11/80/7, vol. 1, Eric Gosse to D.W. Thompson, Information Officer, Resources for Tomorrow Conference, 23 Aug. 1960. 53. Ibid., file 11/76, 'Report of the Working Party on Fisheries Development', 7 Jan. 1958.

Chapter 5 1. Centre for Newfoundland Studies, Government of Newfoundland, Statistics of Government Assistance to the Fisheries from Confederation to 31st, December, 1967 (St John's, 1968). 2. Fishery Products Limited actually attempted to move into the Canadian market in the 1950s, and even opened a distribution office in Montreal. Competition was fierce, however, and the company eventually abandoned the venture. 3. Margaret Dewar, Industry in Trouble: The Federal Government and the New England Fisheries (Philadelphia, 1983), 49.

NOTES

173

4. Ibid., 30-41. 5. Ibid., 33. 6. Georg Borgstrom, 'U.S. Atlantic Fisheries and Current Trends in Supply and Use', in Georg Borgstrom and Arthur J. Heighway, eds, Atlantic Ocean Fisheries (London, 1961), 237. 7. Maritime History Archives, Harold Lake Papers, box 45, Market Study— The Frozen Fish Trades Association Ltd., St. John's, Newfoundland by Robert J. Gruber, International Fisheries Consultant, Cleveland, Ohio. 8. PANL, GN 34/2, NFDA, file Joint Standing Committee on Fisheries Development, 'The Market for Groundfish Products', prepared by the Markets and Economic Service of the federal Department of Fisheries, 1957. 9. Dewar, Industry in Trouble, 46-54. 10. Ibid., 52. Dewar argued that President Eisenhower rejected attempts to further increase duties on fish, saying the 'other nations concerned are not only our close friends, but their economic strength is of strategic importance to us in the continuing struggle against world communism.' 11. Borgstrom, 'U.S. Atlantic Fisheries', 250. 12. Ibid. 13. PANL, GN 34/2, file 8/45/9, 'Prices Received by Fishermen—Cod'. Prices paid to fishers for head-on, gutted cod varied both by the time of the year and by region. Prices in the winter months, for example, were usually a fraction of a cent higher. Fish buyers on the southwest coast of Newfoundland, specifically Ramea and Port aux Basques, often paid fishers more than in St John's or on the northeast coast. For an indication of these regional and seasonal differences in price, see PANL, GN 34/2, NFDA, file Fish Prices, and PANL, GN 34/2, file 12/7/7. 14. Ibid., NFDA, file Joint Standing Committee on Fisheries Development, 'The Market for Groundfish Products', prepared by the Markets and Economic Service of the federal Department of Fisheries, 1957, 'Attachment 4—Average Export Values of Specified Codfish Products'. The chart shows prices paid for both fresh and frozen fillets in the United States from 1949 to 1956. Prices for the fresh product were always higher. Th difference ranged from 40 cents per 100 pounds, to just under $3.00 per 100 pounds. 15. Ibid., file Booth Fisheries. The file contains correspondence between the NFDA and R.P. Fletcher, Jr, president of Booth Fisheries, dating from 1954 through the 1960s. 16. Ibid., 'Booth Fisheries Corporation', Southern Fisherman (Jan. 1955): 24-5. 17. This includes a $110,000 loan given, and paid back, in 1950. 18. This includes $1,025,000 that was repaid before the bulk of the loans came due. 19. This includes $315,000 that was paid back in 1952.

174

NOTES

20. Walsh Report, 20-1. This amount included income from government sources, such as pensions and family allowances. 21. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Fisheries Statistics of Canada, Newfoundland Section, 1956. This amount included the province's offshore trawlers, which totalled nearly $5 million. 22. If we look merely at the total capitalization of inshore vessels and gear and the number of inshore fishers, the average is closer to $700 per person. 23. PANL, GN 34/2, NFDA, file Ross Young, report written by Young on the activities of the NFDA. The document includes chart, 'Frozen Ground Fish Industry', with statistics of the frozen fish industry from 1949 to 1966. 24. Ibid., file 82/3, vol. 2, document, no title, beginning 'The sequence of events in connection with the arrangement between the Government of Newfoundland and Fishery Products Limited. . . '. Keough's name appears nowhere in this account, although Smallwood's does. 25. CNS Archives, Smallwood Papers, file 3.12.040, Arthur Monroe to Joseph Smallwood, 29 May 1950. 26. Ibid. 27. PANL, GN 34/2, file 82/3, vol. 2, Memorandum from Clive Planta, 'Bait Depot Project', 11 May 1953. 28. Fishery Products Inc. had a processing plant where it took the fish from Monroe's operations in Newfoundland and made them into fish sticks. Contrary to the understanding of the Newfoundland government, however, Monroe did not own majority interest in the company. 29. CNS Archives, Smallwood Papers, file 3.12.040, speech, n.d. This woul have been written in the spring of 1953, after an agreement was reached with Monroe but before Smallwood found out that the federal government would not fund private companies in Newfoundland. 30. Ibid. 31. PANL, GN 34/2, file 82/3, vol. 1, Certified Copy of Minutes of the Executive Council of Newfoundland re: the meeting held 26 Apr. 1956. This was the amended agreement, first made in 1953, then amended in 1954, 1955, and 1956. 32. Ibid., file 2/37 (1953), Certified Copy of Minutes, Fisheries and Co-operatives 466-'53, 29b-'53. 33. CNS Archives, Smallwood Papers, file 2.11.006, Arthur Monroe to H.G Dustan, 5 Oct. 1954. 34. Ibid., W.J. Keough to Executive Council, 25 Oct. 1954; H.G. Dustan to Keough, 25 Oct. 1954; Keough to Executive Council, 1 Nov. 195 Dustan to Keough, 1 Nov. 1954. 35. PANL, GN 34/2, file 8/133, vol. 1, letter to the editor from Arthur Monroe Daily News, 3 Nov. 1954.

NOTES

175

36. Ibid. 37. Ibid., newsclipping, 'Political Notebook', by Harold Horwood, Evening Telegram, 4 Nov. 1954. 38. Ibid., file 2/37 (1955), Certified Copy of Minutes, Fisheries and Co-operatives 404-'55. 39. Ibid., file 25/53, newsclipping, 'A Solution for Fresh Fish Over-Production', speech by Arthur Monroe given to the Newfoundland Board of Trade, Evening Telegram, 9 Feb. 1957. 40. CNS Archives, Smallwood Papers, file 3.12.040, 'Fishery Products Lim ited, An Appraisal of our Policy, Plans and Prospects', 20 Dec. 1955. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid., Arthur Monroe to Smallwood, 16 Jan. 1956. 43. Ibid., C.R. Handrigan, Bank of Nova Scotia, to Arthur Monroe, 27 De 1955. Monroe had given a copy of the letter to Smallwood. 44. Ibid., Arthur Monroe to Smallwood, 16 Jan. 1956. 45. Ibid., Memorandum from H.G. Dustan, 30 Jan. 1956—'16 January 1956 letter from Arthur Monroe'. 46. Ibid., Smallwood to Arthur Monroe, 1 Feb. 1956; Monroe to Smallwood, 7 Feb. 1956; Smallwood to Monroe, 23 Feb. 1956; Monroe to Smallwood, 23 Feb. 1956; Monroe to Smallwood, 25 Feb. 1956; PANL, GN 34/2, file 82/3, vol. 1, Certified Copy of Minutes, 390-'56, Fisheries and Cooperatives 18-'56. 47. PANL, GN 34/2, file 82/3, vol. 5, L.J.M., NFDA, to Ross Young, 7 Mar. 1958. 48. Ibid., file 2/37 (1959-60), Certified Copy of Minutes, 121-'60, Fisheries 2b-59. Originally, the provincial government ordered that FPL pay the depreciation costs of a fish meal machine that was intended for Twillingate, but Monroe moved to Trepassey. In this piece of legislation, however, the order was rescinded, provided the company not transfer any more equipment without government permission. 49. Ibid., Arthur Monroe to J.T. Cheeseman, 4 Mar. 1960. Monroe blamed the closure of his Joe Batt's Arm plant on the fact that most fishers there preferred to salt their own fish rather than sell to his plant. 50. Ibid., file 83/2, vol. 1, Memorandum—'Proposed government assistance, FPL', 3 May 1947. 51. Ibid., NFDA, file Fishery Products Limited 1957-58, 'Financial Reorganization plan of Fishery Products Limited and New Company'; CN Archives, Smallwood Papers, file 2.11.012 (1960), J.T. Cheeseman to Executive Council, 28 Mar. 1960; file 2.11.013, Memorandum to Executive Council—'FPL', 19 Dec. 1961. 52. Ibid., file 82/3, vol. 4, H.G. Dustan to J.T. Cheeseman, 30 Dec. 1957; v 5, Dustan to Cheeseman, 28 Dec. 1961.

176

NOTES

53. CNS Archives, Smallwood Papers, file 2.11.011 (1959), Memorandu from J.T. Cheeseman—'Fishery Products Limited', 30 Dec. 1958. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid. 56. Miriam Wright, personal files, 'Fishery Products Limited—Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements, December 31, 1977' (obtained from W. Schrank). 57. For an outline of the earlier Northlantic deal and how the project was transferred over to BCS, see PANL, GN 34/2, NFDA, file Bonavista Cold Storage, W.J. Keough to cabinet, 15 Nov. 1954. Also, a number of documents in PANL, GN 34/2, file 82/14, vol. 2, deal with the pullout by Northlantic on the Grand Bank deal and the subsequent takeover by BCS. 58. PANL, GN 34/2, file 2/7 (1953), Certified Copy of Minutes 832-'53, Fisheries and Co-operatives. 59. Ibid., file 2/37 (1953), Certified Copy of Minutes 901-'53, Fisheries and Co-operatives. 60. Ibid., NFDA, file Board of Trade, 'Newfoundland Fisheries', by H. Russell, Board of Trade dinner, 8 Feb. 1955. 61. After Silas Moores died in the early 1960s, the British division of Unilever bought North Eastern Fish Industries. It operated the Harbour Grace and Fermeuse plants for a couple of years before abandoning the project. At that point, the Newfoundland government, which held the mortgages on the North Eastern Fish Industries properties, sold the assets to other operators. 62. According to a document in the personal files of Paul Russell, 'Long Term Loans and Interest', the company had received a total of $7,586,950 from both federal and provincial governments between 1953 and 1975. As of 31 Dec. 1977, all but $865,000 had been repaid (the remaining loans came due in 1979) (copy of this document available in personal files of Miriam Wright). 63. PANL, GN 34/2, NFDA, file John Penny and Sons, pamphlet entitled 'The Penny Story'. 64. Ibid., file 2/37 (1952), Certified Copy of Minutes, 396-'52, Fisheries and Co-operatives—loan for $95,000; file 2/37 (1959-60), Certified Copy of Minutes 314-'59, Fisheries and Co-operatives 33-'59—loan for $100,000. 65. Poole, ed., Encyclopedia of Newfoundland and Labrador, vol. 3 (St John's, 1991), 234-5. 66. Ibid., 235 (Harold Lake), 236 (Spencer Lake). 67. Newfoundland and Labrador Registry of Companies and Deeds, file 2299, Gaultois Fisheries Limited. The company severed its relationship with Fulham brothers in 1957.

NOTES

177

68. PANL, GN 34/2, file 2/37 (1952), Certified Copy of Minutes, 202-52, Fisheries and Co-operatives 13-'52. 69. MHA, Harold Lake Papers, list found among newspaper clippings in file list folder, Taken from Public Accounts of Province of Newfoundland for Year Ended—Gaultois Fisheries Ltd.' In a newspaper clipping found in the same file, 'Cod Crisis/Deja vu for retired processor', The Express, 22 July 1982, Harold Lake claimed that by 1982 the Lake Group of Companies owed $18 million. 70. PANL, GN 34/2, NFDA, file Burgeo Fish Industries Ltd., Harry Dustan to Ross Young and Harry Winsor, 5 Nov. 1954. The memo indicates that of this company, H.B. Clyde Lake and John Penny and Sons each held 2,500 shares. Marie Penny held 1,499 shares, as did Spencer Lake. Margaret Penny held 1,999. 71. Ibid., file 2/37 (1954), Certified Copy of Minutes 801-'54, Fisheries and Co-operatives. 72. Ibid., NFDA, file 'John Penny and Sons', Marie Penny to H.G. Dustan 7 Aug. 1956. 73. Ibid., Marie Penny to H.G. Dustan, 29 Sept. 1956; Newfoundland and Labrador Registry of Companies and Deeds, file 2566, Burgeo Fishing Industries Ltd. 74. Newfoundland and Labrador Registry of Companies and Deeds, file 2756, Caribou Fisheries Inc. This company, formed in May 1956, was US selling agent for the Penny and Lake companies, marketing the 'Caribou' brand of frozen fish. Marie Penny kept her shares in this company after the marriage of her daughter. Her daughter, likewise, remained on the board of directors of John Penny and Sons. In 1963 the two families formed another company, Caribou Reefers. The directors included Marie Penny, Harold Lake, Spencer Lake, Margaret Lake, and lawyer Doug Hunt. MHA, Harold Lake Papers, box 44, black binder—'Caribou Reefers'. 75. MHA, Harold Lake Papers, box 44, black binder—list of Lake family companies. 76. Newfoundland and Labrador Registry of Companies and Deeds, file 749, John Penny and Sons. 77. PANL, GN 34/2, NFDA, file La Scie Fishery Development, vol. 6, H.G. Dus tan to cabinet, 'La Scie Operations', 12 Feb. 1964. 78. South Coast Commission, Report (St John's, 1957). 79. MHA, Harold Lake Papers, box 44, document written by Arthur Monroe, 19 Feb. 1957. 80. PANL, GN 34/2, file 8/3/2, John H. Adams, Arthur D. Little Inc., to J.T. Cheeseman, 22 Apr. 1957. Arthur D. Little Inc. also examined the 15 or so other enterprises—rubber factories, cement plants, etc.—that Smallwood

178

81. 82. 83. 84. 85.

NOTES

launched after Confederation. See Doug Letto, Chocolate Bars and Rubber Boots (Paradise, Nfld, 1998), 65-74. Ibid., NFDA, file Arthur D. Little, Inc., 'Analysis of the Newfoundland Frozen Fish Industry—Report to Department of Fisheries, Province of Newfoundland' by Arthur D. Little, Inc., 16 May 1958. Ibid., file 8/3/2, Harry Dustan to John Cheeseman, 24 Apr. 1958. Ibid., file 8/323, Lester Farewell to J.T. Cheeseman, 10 May 1957. Letto, Chocolate Bars, 65. According to Letto, Smallwood tightly controlled the release of information about the reports the Arthur D. Little company did on the other industries in Newfoundland that year. PANL, GN 34/2, file 8/323, Lester Farewell to J.T. Cheeseman, 9 Jan. 1958; Cheeseman to Farewell, 3 Feb. 1958; Cheeseman to Farewell, 10 Nov 1959.

Chapter 6 1. Morera, Gramsci's Historicism, 111. 2. ICNAF/NAFO, List of Vessels Over 50 Tons ..., various years. 3. Jeffrey A. Hutchings, 'Spatial and temporal variation in the exploitation of northern cod, Gadus morhua: a historical perspective from 1500 to the present', in Daniel Vickers, ed., Marine Resources and Human Societies in the North Atlantic Since 1500 (St John's, 1997). 4. PANL, MG 644, file 287, 'Fisheries Convention, September 24, 1962', 1-40. 5. Wilfred Templeman, Marine Resources of Newfoundland, Fisheries Research Board of Canada Bulletin No. 154 (Ottawa, 1966). 6. Ibid., 2. 7. PANL, GN 34/2, file 11/80/6, vol. 3, 'The Inshore Cod Fishery of Newfoundland and Labrador', by Allister Fleming, in Summary of Proceedings of Industrial Development Section, June 22-23, 1964. 8. Templeman, Marine Resources of Newfoundland, 29. 9. For background on the problems of the Bonavista longliner fishery, see Miriam Wright, 'Fishers, Scientists, the State, and their Responses to Declines in the Bonavista Fishery, 1950-1964', in Vickers, ed., Marine Resources and Human Societies. Templeman, Marine Resources of Newfoundland, 42-5. 10. 'Foreign boats hurt longliner fishery', Evening Telegram, 28 Apr. 1960. 11. 'Fishermen will fight warns south coast man', Evening Telegram, 2 Mar. 1961. 12. Although the fisheries scientists at the time argued that 12 miles would not make much of a difference, most people in the fishery focused on the 12-mile proposal.

NOTES

179

13. Raymond Gushue, Territorial Waters of Newfoundland', Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 15, 3 (Aug. 1949): 344-52. 14. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1983, file 721-87-1 [13], 'Interdepartmental Committee on Territorial Waters' by S. V. Ozere, 9 Sept. 1953. 15. PANL, MG 644, file 287, 'Fisheries Convention, September 24, 1962'. 16. Ibid., 41. 17. MHA, Harold Lake Papers, box 1, file H. Lake, Halifax talk—Moncton Board of Trade, 'Fisheries—offshore and inshore, and particularly the Newfoundland Fisheries', by H.A. Russell, Feb. 1961. 18. 'Foreign pressures deplete fish stocks', Evening Telegram, 29 June 1962. 19. Ibid. 20. Both France and the United States had separate treaties with Great Britain that gave them the right to fish in certain areas off the Newfoundland coast. See Peter Neary, 'The French and American Shore Questions as Factors in Newfoundland History', in Neary and J.K. Hiller, eds, Newfoundland in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Toronto, 1980). 21. MHA, Harold Lake Papers, box 3, file Canadian National and Territorial Waters, 'A Brief Concerning Canada's National and Territorial Waters submitted to the Government of Canada' by the FCC, 28 Jan. 1963. 22. Ibid., 'General comments on Brief by J.C. Grieve re: Territorial Waters'. 23. Ibid., letter from Gordon O'Brien, 5 Nov. 1965. 24. PANL, GN 34/2, file 25/2/1, vol. 1. This file contains dozens of newspaper clippings from local papers relating to the foreign fishing issue. These include: 'Foreign boats hurt longliner fishery', Evening Telegram, 28 Apr. 1960; 'Foreigners, stay out', Evening Telegram, 27 Apr. 1960; 'Foreign trawlers again hamper local fishermen', Evening Telegram, 12 June 1959; 'Foreign trawlers still interfering', Daily News, 25 Apr. 1959; 'Draggers damaging gear, Bonavista residents say', Evening Telegram, 27 July 1958; 'Foreign trawlers hamper fishing', Evening Telegram, 17 July 1957; file 25/2/1, vol. 2, Trawlers in, reports vary', Evening Telegram, 15 Nov. 1962; 'Growing piracy by foreigners dooms fishery', Evening Telegram, 26 Apr. 1962; 'Resent Foreign Draggers', Daily News, 28 Feb. 1962; 'Complain of large Spanish trawlers', Daily News, 21 Apr. 1961; 'Fishermen will fight warns south coast man', Evening Telegram, 2 Mar. 1961. 25. 'Looking in and Looking Out', editorial cartoon, Evening Telegram, 5 Feb. 1963. 26. PANL, MG 644, file 287, 'Fisheries Convention, 26 Sept. 1962', 72, 85. 27. Ibid., 27 Sept. 1962,4. 28. Ibid., 5. 29. Ibid. 30. Dewar, Industry in Trouble, 108-11.

180

NOTES

31. PANL, MG 644, file 287, 'Fisheries Convention, September 26, 1962', 63. 32. Ibid., file 125/1, Max Lane to Angus MacLean, 11 Apr. 1961; file 125/12, NFF Annual Convention Report, 1964, Resolution #4; file 125/3, NFF Annual Convention Report, 1965, Resolution #1. 33. Ibid., file 11/80 vol. 2, Colin Story to Deputy Minister, 19 Nov. 1959. 34. One of the difficulties in cod management is that scientists still do not know how many distinct cod populations exist in this area. Although 'Northern cod', refers to the fish living in areas 2J3KL, there may be many subgroups, i.e., genetically distinct populations within this larger group. 35. PANL, GN 34/2, file 11/80, vol. 2, Colin Story to Deputy Minister, 19 Nov. 1959. 36. Ibid. 37. In Nova Scotia, prices were higher and a greater percentage of landings were for higher valued species such as lobster and shrimp. 38. PANL, GN 34/2, NFDA, file Statistics vol. 5, 'Men, Boat and Gear Statistics, Newfoundland Area—1960', Department of Fisheries Economic Service. 39. Ibid., file 12/28/2.1, 'Annual Report of the Fisheries Loan Board for the year ending March 31, 1961'. 40. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Fisheries Statistics of Canada, Newfoundland Section, 1961. 41. PANL, GN 34/2, NFDA, file Naval Architect and Ship's Surveyor. 42. Ibid., file 12/28/2.1, 'Annual Report of the Fisheries Loan Board for the year ending March 31, 1961'. 43. Ibid., file 11/41/10E, 'Operation of Longliners and Draggers Atlantic Sea Board 1952-1958', by John Proskie, Economic Service, Department of Fisheries, 1960. 44. For background on the creation of Unemployment Insurance benefits for seasonal workers, see Richard Lund, 'Unemployment Insurance and Seasonal Workers in Canada, 1940-63', MA thesis (University of Western Ontario, 1991); William E. Schrank, 'Benefitting Fishermen: Origins of Fishermen's Unemployment Insurance in Canada, 1935-1957', Journal of Canadian Studies 33, 1 (Spring 1998): 61-87. 45. PANL, GN 34/2, NFDA, file Unemployment Insurance, vol. 1, 'Fisherman's Unemployment Insurance', by H.C. Winsor, 11 May 1960. 46. PANL, MG 644, file 287, 'Fisheries Convention, 26 Sept. 1962', 85. 47. PANL, GN 34/2, NFDA, file Fishery Products—Joe Batt's Arm, 'Fishery Products Limited', by H.C. Winsor, 1 Feb. 1960. Monroe also blamed the Joe Batt's Arm Fishers for being too 'salt-fish minded'. 48. Ibid., file Unemployment Insurance, vol. 1, A.D. Moores, North Eastern Fish Industries, to the Frozen Fish Trades Association, 20 Feb. 1960. 49. Ibid., file Unemployment Insurance, vol. 1, HJ. Reid, Manager, John Penny and Sons, to Eric Harvey, Frozen Fish Trades Association, 19 Feb. 1960.

NOTES

181

50. Ibid., file 11/4/9, House of Commons Debates, 3 June 1961. 51. William E. Schrank, The Failure of Canadian Seasonal Fishermen's Unemployment Insurance Reform during the 1960s and 1970s', Marine Policy 22, 1(1998): 67-81. 52. Ibid. 53. PANL, MG 644, file 287, 'Fisheries Convention, 25 Sept. 1962', 19. 54. PANL, GN 34/2, NFDA, file Statistics, vol. 5, 'Men, Boats and Gear Statistics Newfoundland Area, I960', Department of Fisheries Economic Service. 55. PANL, MG 644, file 287, 'Fisheries Convention, 26 Sept. 1962', 28. 56. Various attempts to produce an artificially dried 'shore cure' product throughout the 1950s had failed. Although federal plants established in Bonavista and Catalina had produced a quality product, costs were too high to justify producing it commercially. 57. MHA, Harold Lake Papers, box 1, file Debate on Fisheries. 58. The shareholders' lists for these companies indicate that they had few investors outside immediate family members. 59. Although the federal government offered rebates to companies buying Canadian-built trawlers, the subsidy was intended to bolster the shipbuilding industry, not the fishery. Canadian-built ships were more expensive than European vessels, and the rebate made up the difference between the cost of the Canadian ship and what the company would have spent on a European trawler. 60. PANL, MG 644, file 287, 'Fisheries Convention, 27 Sept. 1962', 5. 61. Ibid. 62. PANL, GN 34/2, NFDA, file Centralized Curing Stations, document written by W.J. Keough on centralized curing stations, n.d., but sent to the NFDA on 6 Sept. 1955; PANL, GN 34/2, file 11/76, H.C. Winsor to J.T. Cheeseman, 13 Dec. 1956. Winsor sent a copy of Story's proposal to Cheeseman. 63. 'Government Approves Fishery "Revolution"', Evening Telegram, 8 Nov. 1962. 64. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1748, file 794-17-1 [1], 'Report and Recommendations of the Newfoundland Fisheries Commission to the Government of Newfoundland—Final Report'. 65. Newfoundland, National Fisheries Development: A Presentation to the Government of Canada by the Government of Newfoundland (St John's, 1963). 66. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1751, file 794-17-1 [13], 'A Response to National Fisheries Development: A Presentation to the Government of Canada by the Government of Newfoundland, January, 1963\ There is no date or author on this document, but most likely it was written by someone in the Department of Fisheries Economic Service. This volume (1751) is a file of that division.

182

NOTES

67. Commission of Enquiry into the Atlantic Salt Fish Industry, Verbatim Reports of the Public Hearings Held in Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Quebec from February 1 to February 15, 1965, Public Hearing Held at Building No. 302, Fort Pepperrell, St John's, 1 Feb. 196 68. Commission of Enquiry into the Atlantic Salt Fish Industry, Report (Ottawa, 1968). 69. Robert Hong, 'Pandora's Box and the Thin Edge of the Cultural Wedge: Technological Adaptation and Accommodation in the Newfoundland Cod Fishery, 1870-1920', paper presented at Atlantic Canada Studies Conference, Halifax, 4-7 May 2000. Hong argues that many of these production problems existed from the late nineteenth century. 70. Commission of Enquiry into the Atlantic Salt Fish Industry, Public Hearings. Copies of the official submissions to the Commission by the NFTA, as well as several Nova Scotia organizations, the Nova Scotia Fish Packing Association (frozen fish), and the Canadian Atlantic Salt Fish Exporters Association, can be found at: MHA, Harold Lake Papers, box 1, file Dr D.B. Finn, Commission of Inquiry into Salt Fish Marketing. 71. MHA, Harold Lake Papers, box 2, Salt Fish Marketing Board, essay written by Frank Moores, 11 May 1964. 72. Ibid., essay written by Denis Monroe, 11 May 1964. 73. Alexander, The Decay of Trade. 74. Ibid., 16.

Chapter 7 1. These programs, however, were heavily criticized as tools of political patronage and ineffective at generating economic growth. Although the government disbanded many of these ventures in the 1970s and 1980s, new government organizations such as Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency took their place. 2. Benjamin Higgins, 'Francois Perroux', in Donald Savoie and Higgins, eds, Regional Economic Development: Essays in Honour of Francois Perroux (London, 1988), 3-47. 3. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1986, file 721-87-1 [22], Homer Stevens, United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union, to J. Angus McLean, Minister of Fisheries, 3 June 1960; NAC, RG 23, vol. 1987, file 721-87-1 [31] 'Submission by the General Executive Board and Standing Committee on Fisheries of the United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union', 21 June 1963. 4. Francis T. Christy, Jr and Anthony Scott, The Common Wealth in Ocean Fisheries (Baltimore, 1965), 153-74. 5. Ibid., 161.

NOTES

183

6. For historiographical discussions on the Cold War, see Melvin Leffler, The Cold War: What Do We Now Know?', American Historical Review 104, 2 (Apr. 1999): 501-24; Ronald E. Powaski, The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union 1917-1991 (New York, 1998), 92-6. 7. Lynn H. Miller, 'The United States, the United Nations, and the Cold War', in Miller and Ronald W. Pruessen, eds, Reflections on the Cold War (Philadelphia, 1974). 8. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1985, file 721-87-1 [14], 'Law of the Sea Background Reference Paper for the Prime Minister's World Tour'. 9. Ibid., file 721-87-1 [13], 'Foreign Policy Report: The Law of the Sea', by Arthur H. Dean. 10. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston, 1965), 439. 11. Robert McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York, 1995), 196-7. 12. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1985, file 721-87-1 [13], 'Foreign Policy Report: The Law of the Sea', by Arthur H. Dean. 13. Ibid., file 721-87-1 [15], N.A. Robertson to Minister of External Affairs, 21 Sept. 1959. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid., file 721-87-1 [20], 'Summary of Discussions of the Law of the Sea, Friday, Oct. 23, 1959', 27 Oct. 1959. 16. William Herrington and J.L. Kask, 'International Conservation Problems and Solutions in Existing Conventions', Papers Presented at the International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea, Rome, 1955. United Nations Doc. No. A/conf. 10/7, 344-439. Ironically, Kask was, at the time, director of the Fisheries Research Board of Canada. Before his appointment, however, Kask had spent some time working in the United States Fisheries and Wildlife Division. 17. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1983, file 721-87-1 [1], 'United States Policy on Fisheries and Territorial Waters', by William Herrington, Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife for the Under Secretary of the Department of State—speech made to the National Fisheries Institute Convention, Los Angeles. 18. Ibid. 19. PANL, GN 34/2, NFDA, file Territorial Waters, 'The Law of the Sea: A Canadian Proposal'. 20. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1985, file 721-87-1 [21], Memorandum to Cabinet: 'Law of the Sea—Possible Courses of Action', 13 May 1960. 21. Ibid., vol. 1986, file 721-87-1 [23], Draft Memorandum to Cabinet, 'Problems connected with implementation of the straight baseline system', 9 Jan. 1961.

184

NOTES

22. Ibid., vol. 1986, file 721-87-1 [27], Draft Memorandum to Cabinet, 'Law of the Sea: Possible Courses of Action', 11 July 1961. 23. Ibid., Norman Robertson to the Minister, 'Law of the Sea: Discussions i Washington', 12 Sept. 1961. 24. Ibid., H.D.W. Bridgeman, Lt-Commander, RCR, DND Representative, Interdepartmental Committee on Territorial Waters, to Marcel Cadieux, External Affairs, 'Law of the Sea—Report of Discussions with USA Department of Defense, Sept. 8, 1961', 13 Sept. 1961. 25. Ibid. 26. Powaski, The Cold War, 135-66. 27. For example, former Kennedy aide Arthur Schlesinger, Jr, in A Thousand Days, blamed the Soviet Union for the crisis, while Thomas Patterson, Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan (Oxford, 1988), thought Kennedy's own aggressive anti-Communist policies created much of the conflict. The 'post-revisionist' Powaski, The Cold War, 166, believes heightened tensions in the early 1960s were caused by 'the inability of the two sides to resolve the Berlin problem and to Khrushchev's attempt to challenge growing U.S. nuclear superiority, and preclude a U.S. invasion of Cuba'. As well, he claims personality conflicts between Kennedy and Khrushchev 'exacerbated' the problems. 28. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1986, file 721-87-1 [28], C.S.A. Ritchie to Externa Affairs, 1 Mar. 1963. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid., vol. 1987, file 721-87-1 [32], Paul Martin to cabinet, 'Law of the Sea Negotiations with the United States', 19 Dec. 1963. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid., 'Draft Minutes of Second Round of Law of the Sea Discussions in Washington', 4 Dec. 1963. This document lists those who attended the meetings. The contents of this document, however, were restricted. 34. Ibid., Paul Martin to cabinet, 'Law of the Sea Negotiations with the US', 19 Dec. 1963. Martin's report summarizes the 4 Dec. meeting. 35. Paul Martin, A Very Public Life: So Many Worlds, vol. 2 (Toronto, 1985), 393^. 36. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1988, file 721-87-1 [30], M. Cadieux to the Ministe 21 Sept. 1964. 37. Ibid. 38. For background on the Gulf of Tonkin incident, see Michael Maclear, The Ten Thousand Day War, Vietnam: 1945-1975 (London, 1981), 112-13; McNamara, In Retrospect, 127^3. 39. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1988, file 721-87-1 [30], M. Cadieux to the Minister 21 Sept. 1964.

NOTES

185

40. Ibid., file 721-87-1 [35], M. Cadieux to the Secretary of State for External Affairs and Minister of Fisheries, 18 Dec. 1964; file 721-87-1 [40] 'Draft Statement for Use by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the External Affairs Committee', 18 June 1965. 41. Ibid., file 721-87-1 [35], M. Cadieux to Secretary of State for External Affairs and Minister of Fisheries, 18 Dec. 1964. 42. Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English, Canada Since 1945: Power, Politics and Provincialism, rev. edn (Toronto, 1989), 192-7; 257-65; Alvin Finkel, Our Lives: Canada After 1945 (Toronto, 1997), 157-71. 43. Lester B. Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson, vol. 3 (Toronto, 1975), 138-41. 44. Dewar, Industry in Trouble, 132—4. 45. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1986, file 721-87-1 [30], copy of Congressional Recor 15 May 1961, 'Extension of Territorial Waters to Protect Fishery Resources'; telegram to External Affairs, Ottawa, 25 June 1963, text of statement made by Senator Bartlett urging straight baselines and fishing zones for the US. 46. Ibid., vol. 1988, file 721-87-1 [42], Edward Allen to members of the Seattle Council of the Navy League, 17 Aug. 1964; Canadian Consulate General to Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, 19 June 1965 (attached is a copy of an article, 'Freedom of the Sea', written by Allen and published in the American Journal of International Law 58). 47. Dewar, Industry in Trouble, 133. 48. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1988, file 721-87-1 [35], S.V. to Minister of Fisheries, 'Law of the Sea, Arrangements with France', 16 Nov. 1964. The Can dian government, because of the complications involved with France's claims, decided to postpone negotiations with that country until after deals with the US and others had been settled. For background on the historic relationship between Newfoundland and France, see Rosemary Ommer and J.K. Killer, 'Historical Background on the Canada-Franc Maritime Boundary Arbitration', Government of Canada, Departments of Justice and External Affairs, 1990. 49. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1988, file 721-87-1 [35], Marcel Cadieux to Secretar of State for External Affairs and Minister of Fisheries, 18 Dec. 1964. 50. Ibid. Cadieux noted that although these three countries accepted the fiveyear plan for fishing in the Gulf of St Lawrence and the 10-year plan for other areas, Canada had to wait until they had finalized deals with Spain, Portugal, and Italy. He said the UK, Denmark, and Norway would want the same deal as the other fishing countries. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid., Marcel Cadieux to Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of Fisheries, 6 Oct. 1964.

186

NOTES

53. Ibid., file 721-87-1 [30], Under Secretary of State for External Affairs to Canadian High Commission, London, 17 Aug. 1964. The treaty was the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1922. 54. Ibid., file 721-87-1 [35], Marcel Cadieux to Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of Fisheries, 6 Oct. 1964. 55. Ibid., Benjamin Rogers, Canadian ambassador to Spain to Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, 4 Dec. 1964. Rogers said that the Spanish official claimed that the US feared that if Canada enclosed the Gulf of St Lawrence, the North Vietnamese would follow suit and enclose the Gulf of Tonkin. Rogers was sceptical that the Americans would make such a comparison, but thought that Sagas's comments indicated that the two countries had been discussing Canada's position. 56. Ibid., 'Law of the Sea, Second Round of Talks Between Portugal and Canada, Oct. 20-21, 1964'. 57. Ibid., file 721-87-1 [40], 'Draft Statement for Use by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the External Affairs Committee', 18 June 1965. By June 1965, none of the final agreements had been signed. 58. Alexander, The Decay of Trade, 164. 59. William E. Schrank, 'Extended fisheries jurisdiction: Origins of the current crisis in Atlantic Canada's fisheries', Marine Policy 19, 4 (1995): 285-99. 60. PANL, GN 34/2, file 11/80/5, Colin Story to Deputy Minister, 'Report on Meetings between Representatives of the Five Atlantic Provinces and the Federal Department of Fisheries held at Ottawa, January 6 to 8, I960', 22 Jan. 1960. 61. Ibid., file 27/17 vol. 1, Hedard J. Robichaud to Max Lane, 29 Apr. 1964. 62. Ibid., file 11/4/17, speech by H.J. Robichaud at Port Union, Nfld, 12 Oct. 1965. 63. Ibid. Emphasis in original. 64. R.N. Wadden, Department of Fisheries of Canada 1867-1967 (Ottawa, 1967). 65. PANL, GN 34/2, file 11/80 vol. 1, 'Federal-Provincial Atlantic Fisheries Committee—Terms of Reference', 20 June 1958. 66. Ibid., file 11/80/5, Colin Story to Deputy Minister, 22 Jan. 1960. 67. Ibid., file 11/76/1, vol. 2, Deputy Minister of Fisheries (Newfoundland) to Deputy Minister for ARDA, 21 Oct. 1963. 68. Ibid., file 11/75/1, vol. 3, 'Department of Fisheries, Ottawa—Fisheries Development Projects in Co-operation with Newfoundland 1965/66'. 69. Ibid., file 34/2, 'Costs, less specialized equipment and fishing gear, to have boats designed in the Division of Vessel Construction and Inspection built by boatyards', n.d. 70. Ibid., 'Costs, less specialized equipment and fishing gear, to have boats designed in the Division of Vessel Construction and Inspection built by boatyards', n.d.

NOTES

187

71. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1782. File 796-17-1 [3], E.M. Gosse to A.W.H. Needier, Deputy Minister of Fisheries, Ottawa, 24 Mar. 1964. 72. Hutchings and Myers, The Biological Collapse of Atlantic Cod', 72-5. 73. Miriam Wright, 'Industrialization, Environmental Change, and the Newfoundland Inshore Fishery, 1955-1968', paper presented to the Canadian Economic History meeting, Kananaskis, Alta, 23-5 Apr. 1999. 74. PANL, GN 34/2, file 24/63, 'An Act to provide for the development of the commercial fisheries of Canada', 12 May 1966. 75. Ibid. 76. MHA, Harold Lake Papers, box 45, 'Market Study—The Frozen Fish Trades Association Ltd., St John's, Newfoundland by Robert J. Gruber, International Fisheries Consultant, Cleveland, Ohio'. 77. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1751, file 794-17-1 [15], C.R. Molson, Economic Service, Department of Fisheries to Deputy Minister, 'Private Hearings, Royal Commission on Newfoundland's Economic Prospects', 27 Oct. 1966. 78. Wright, 'Young Men and Technology'. 79. NAC, RG 23, accession 90-1/230, box 10, file 711-29-7 [1], 'Impressions of the Newfoundland School of Fisheries' by C.H. Castell, 4 Mar. 1964. 80. Fisheries of Canada 19, 9 (Mar. 1967): 4. 81. Neis, 'From "Shipped Girls" to "Brides of the State"'. 82. PANL, GN 34/2, file 27/17, vol. 1, Newfoundland Minister of Fisheries Max Lane to federal Minister of Fisheries Hedard J. Robichaud, 11 Feb 1964; 'Summary of Discussions on the Development of the Newfoundland Fisheries Between Federal and Provincial Fisheries Representatives, Ottawa, December 18, 1964'; 'Federal Conference on Fisheries Development, Ottawa, January 24, 1964'. 83. For two rather different interpretations of the 1965 Household Resettle ment Program, see N. Iverson and Ralph Matthews, Communities in Decline: An Examination of Household Resettlement in Newfoundland (St John's, 1968); Parzival Copes, The Resettlement of Fishing Communities in Newfoundland (Ottawa, 1972). 84. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1793, file 796-44-1 [6], Mark Ronayne, Assistant Dire tor of the Information and Consumer Branch, to Jean Bruce, Task Force on Government Information Services, 2 Nov. 1968. 85. Ibid., vol. 1792, file 796-44-1 part 4, Esau Penny to Minister of Fisheries, 13 May 1967. 86. Ibid., vol. 1793, file 796-44-1 [6], Sefton Jacobs to Department of Community and Social Development, 19 July 1968. 87. Iverson and Matthews, Communities in Decline. 88. NAC, RG 23, vol. 1793, file 796-44-1 [6], minutes—'Ninth Meeting of the Federal Interdepartmental Committee on Centralization of Newfoundland Communities, Nov. 22, 1968'.

188

NOTES

Chapter 8 1. Sir John Hope Simpson died in 1961, P.D.H. Dunn died in 1965, both in Britain, and Stewart Bates died in 1964. 2. Gordon Inglis, More Than Just a Union: The Story of the NFFAWU (St John's, 1985). 3. Lawrence Felt and Wade Locke, ' "It were well to live mainly off fish": The Collapse of Newfoundland's Fisheries and Beyond', in Arnason and Felt, eds, The North Atlantic Fisheries: Successes, Failure and Challenges', Barbara Neis, Lawrence Felt, Richard L. Haedrich, and David C. Schneider, 'An Interdisciplinary Method for Collecting and Integrating Fishers' Ecological Knowledge into Resource Management', in Newell and Ommer, eds, Fishing Places. 4. Neis et al., 'An Interdisciplinary Method', 229. Figure 11.2 shows a map indicating the increases in vessels and gear, as well as the spatial shifts in fishing effort after 1970. 5. R.G. Kingsley, 'Overview of the Processing Capacity of the Newfoundland and Labrador Groundfish Industry', in Keith Storey, ed., The Newfoundland Groundflsh Fisheries: Defining the Reality, Conference Proceedings (St. John's, 1993), 127. 6. Task Force on the Atlantic Fisheries, Navigating Troubled Waters: New Policies for the Atlantic Fisheries (Ottawa, 1982). 7. William E. Schrank, Blanca Skoda, Paul Parsons, and Noel Roy, 'The Cost to Government of Maintaining a Commercially Unviable Fishery: The Case of Newfoundland 1981/82 to 1990/91', Ocean Development and International Law 26 (1995): 357-90. 8. Hutchings and Myers, 'The Biological Collapse of Atlantic Cod', Marimar G. Villagarcfa, Richard L. Haedrich, and Johanne Fischer, 'Groundfish Assemblages of Eastern Canada Examined Over Two Decades', in Newell and Ommer, eds, Fishing Places. 9. Hutchings and Myers, 'The Biological Collapse of Atlantic Cod', 78. 10. Ibid., 78-81. 11. W.H. Lear and L.S. Parsons, 'History and Management of the Fishery for Northern Cod in NAFO Divisions 2J3K and L', in Parsons and Lear, eds, Perspectives on Canadian Marine Fisheries Management (Ottawa, 1993). 12. See Newell and Ommer, 'Conclusion: Lessons Learned', in Newell and Ommer, eds, Fishing Places, for a discussion on the issues that the state might consider in developing a more comprehensive and socially, economically, and ecologically sensitive management structure.

Index

Agricultural and Rural Development Act(ARDA), 121, 122

Alderdice, Frederick, 14-5 Alexander, David, 4, 124, 139 Allen, Edward, 138 Amulree, Baron, 15-6 Antigonish Co-operative Movement, 19, 54, 55 Armstrong Report, 24-5 Atlantic Development Board, 144 bait service deal, 67-70, 85, 88 bank fishery, 32 Bartlett, Senator E.L., 138 baselines for territorial and fishing limits, 130, 131, 133, 135, 136, 137, 139 Bates, Stewart, 43-7, 56, 59, 63, 64, 66, 70, 116, 122, 150-1 Bay de Verde, 90, 93, 95 Bay of Pigs incident, 134 Benson Ewbank, Sir Robert, 17 Berman, Marshall, 8 biomass, used for estimation of quotas, 153 Birdseye, Clarence, 20, 82 Blake, Raymond, 4 Bonavista Cold Storage, 27-8, 84, 85, 97-8, 99 Bonavista fishing area, 108-9, 113-14

Booth Fisheries, 84 Bradley, H.R., 74 Bridgemen, H.D.W., 134 Burgeo Fish Industries Ltd., 84 Burin, 90 Cadieux, Marcel, 137, 138 Canadian Atlantic Salt Fish Exporters Association, 75 Canadian- American tensions over territorial limits, 130-8 Catalina, 89, 93, 94, 95 catch rates, declining, 107, 108-9, 113-14 'centralizing' as federal goal, 122, 126, 140; resettlement, 140, 146-9 Change Islands, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95 Cheeseman, John, 32, 79, 96 Clark, George, 74, 141 Clyde Lake Ltd, H.B., 98 Coady, Father Moses, 19, 54, 57, 63 cod moratorium: declared (1992), 1; lifted, 155 cod populations, declining, 153-5. See also depletion of resources cod trap, 11, 62, 142 Cold War, 134-5, 137, 139, 151 College of Fisheries, Marine, Navigation and Engineering, 145-6

189

190 INDEX Commission of Enquiry into the Atlantic Saltfish Industry, 123 Commission of Government (1934-49), 10, 11, 35, 103; and frozen-fish firms, 20, 22-6, 29, 31-3, 35-6; and modernization theory, 11, 17; organization, 16-17 community stages, 76-7 Confederation (Newfoundland with Canada), 37 co-operative movement, 54, 55, 57, 63 co-operatives in fishery development, 11, 18-19, 24, 34, 55, 63, 74; federal government attitudes, 72; provincial government attitudes, 72-4 credit system, 12, 14, 19, 22; seen by Amulree as cause of problems, 16 damaging of gear, 109, 111-12 Davis, Jack, 139 Dean, Arthur H., 130 Department of Fisheries and Cooperatives, Newfoundland, 53, 73 Department of Fisheries (Newfoundland), 79; complaints to federal government about offshore fishing, 113-14 Department of Natural Resources, Newfoundland, 67 dependency theorists, 7-8 depletion of resources, 104, 106-9, 123, 146, 149, 153-4, 156; changes noticed by early 1960s, 106; early concerns, 34, 58; foreign vessels blamed, 104, 106, 107-8,109, 110 draggers, 152 Dunn, P.D.H., 17, 23-4, 25, 29, 31, 35, 150-1

Dustan, H.G., 72, 74, 76, 92, 94-5, 96, 101-2 East Germany, 106 economic analysis and fisheries, 43-7 Edmunds, W.Russell, 31 education programs, 77, 78-9, 142, 145-6; importance seen by Bates, 46 European fishers, 104-11, 125, 126, 151 Ewbank, Robert, 21 exploratory fishing, 78 factory-freezer trawlers, 2, 104, 105, 110-11 Farewell, Lester, 102 Federal Department of Fisheries: Bates' analysis of fisheries, 43-7, 56, 59, 63, 64, 122; centralization of fishery, 122, 126, 140, 146; experimental projects, 70, 72-4; indirect role preferred in 1950s, 66-71; Industrial Development Services (IDS), 77-8; limited support for saltfish, 71, 122-5, 143-4; promotional efforts, 39, 41, 42-3; 'rationalizing' (reducing numbers), 80, 122, 125, 146; reorganization, 40; research, 40, 42, 59, 106-8, 113 federal government and fishery, late 1950s-60s, 126-49: commitment to direct funding, 126; education, 142, 145-6; regional development programs, 127-8; resettlement, 140, 146-9; search for 12-mile fishing limit, 128-39; support for technology, 139-44; Unemployment Insurance for self-employed fishers, 115-17, 118-19

INDEX federal government undertakes direct funding in 1960s, 144 Federal-Provincial Atlantic Fisheries Committee (FPAFC), 141 financial problems of Newfoundland in early 1930s, 14, 15 Finn, D.B., 123 Fisheries Commission, 120, 121, 122 Fisheries Committee, 1947 report for National Convention, 33-4 Fisheries Convention (1962), 110, 112, 117-21 Fisheries Council of Canada, 98 Fisheries Development Act of 1966, 144 Fisheries Loan Board (Newfoundland), 114, 115 Fisheries Prices Support Board, 42 Fisheries Research Board, 40, 42, 78, 106-8, 113 Fishermen's Protective Union, 13 Fishery Products International (FPI), 153, 156 Fishery Products Ltd, 67-9, 70, 71, 83, 84, 85, 152-3; conflicts with NFDA, 94-6; development plans, 86-93; instrument of fisheries development, 86-9, 93; support from Smallwood government, 86-9, 95-7, 103 fishing limits: 3-mile, 112; 12-mile, 111-13, 121, 126, 128-39; 200-mile, 112, 139, 152 fish populations, scientific studies of, 78 fish sticks, 82, 83 Fleming, Allister, 108 Flinn, Major William Henry, 17, 31-2 'freedom of the sea', 128 Frozen Fish Trades Association, 111

191

frozen-fish sector, 2, 10, 11-12; approved by Bates, 45-6; and Commission of Government, 20, 22-6, 29, 31-3, 35-6; government loans, 70, 84-5, 89, 95-7; growth 1950-64, 85; overexpansion, 100-1; relationship with federal government, 149; relationship with Newfoundland government, 81, 84-5, 86-100, 102-3; revenue greater than from saltfish sector, 150; sales to US, 81-2, 83; statistics, 86, 87; supply problem, 123; trade relations with US, 68 Gaultois Fisheries Ltd., 84, 85, 98-9 gender ideology, 62, 146 Gill Committee, 117 gill net, 142-3 globalization, 156 Gordon, H. Scott, 43, 80 Gorvin, John Henry, 17, 19, 73 Gosse, Eric, 79 government support. See state involvement in Newfoundland fishery Gramsci, Antonio, 5, 42, 119, 127 Grand Banks, 15, 34 Great Depression, 10, 11, 12, 14, 35 Grieve, J.C., 111 Groves, George, 60 growth pole theory, 127, 147 Gruber, Robert, 144-5 Hall, Stuart, 5, 64, 65 headland-to-headland principle, 109 hegemony (Gramsci), 5, 42, 65, 119, 151, 156 Herrington, William, 131-2, 136, 137 Hollett, Malcolm, 69

192 INDEX Hope Simpson, Sir John, 17-18, 19, 150-1 Household Resettlement Program (1965), 147-9 Howe, C.D., 40 Hutchings, Jeffrey A., 143, 153-4 ice conditions and winter fishing off northeast coast, 12, 23, 89, 106 Iceland, 12, 82 ICNAF. See International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fishery ideologies of state planning. See hegemony (Gramsci); industrial vision of development income from fishing, 85 indirect role preferred by federal government in 1950s, 66-71 Industrial Development Services (IDS), 77-8, 142 industrial vision of development: Bates, 43-7, 56, 64; Commission of Government, 35-6; connection with modernization theory, 6-7; continuance in 1970s and 1980s, 152; in federal Department of Fisheries, 40, 42, 64; implementation by federal government in 1960s, 126-8, 149, 150-1; ownership issue (Keough and Scott), 38, 53-7, 63, 64, 65, 72; and postwar economic development, 38; practical obstacles in 1950s, 65-70; Smallwood's early doubts, 34-5; Smallwood's later faith, 37, 50, 53, 63, 64, 87, 117, 121 ; strength of dominant ideology limiting range of solutions, 156; variety of Newfoundland fishery ignored, 57-8; views of fishing people, 63-4,

119; Walsh Report, 60, 61, 63; Working Party on Fisheries Development, 79-80 inshore fishery. See saltfish sector (inshore fishery) Interdepartmental Committee on Territorial Waters, 132-3 International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fishery (ICNAF), 141; quotas on cod fishing, 153; statistics on fishing activity, 105, 106, 108, 113-14 International Law Commission (ILC), 128 International Woodworkers of America, 113 intervention by state. See state involvement in Newfoundland fishery Iverson, Noel, 148

Job, R.B., 27, 28, 33 Job Brothers and Co. Ltd., 26-8, 99 Joe Batt's Arm, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95 Johnson, Alexis, 135-6 Kennedy, John F., 134-5, 136 Keough, William J., 38, 53, 65, 85, 92, 103, 120; stresses cooperative ownership by fishing people, 54-6, 63, 64, 72, 73, 119 Khrushchev, Nikita, 134, 135 Kirby, Michael, 153 Kristjanson, Baldur, 121, 122 Lake, Harold, 119 Lake, Spencer, 98, 99 Lake family ventures, 84, 85, 98-9, 152-3 land-based industrialization, 13-14 Lane, Max, 113

INDEX La Scie freezing plant, 52-3, 99 Law of the Sea Conferences: (1958), 129-30; (1960), 131-2; (1973), 139 licensing, 43 Little Report (1958), 100-2 loans from government. See State involvement in Newfoundland fishery loggers' dispute, 113 Long Harbour, 91,94 longliners, 4, 91-2, 143; decline in landings, 108-9; provincial support for, 114-15 McCay, Bonnie, 4 MacKenzie, W.C., 59-60 manufacturing sector, 14 maritime law: International Law Commission, 128. See also Law of the Sea Conferences marketing board for saltfish, 123-5 marketing program recommended by Gruber, 144-5 Martin, Paul, Sr., 136 Matthews, Ralph, 148 Mayhew, R.W., 40, 47, 59 Memorial University of Newfoundland, 73 merchant credit. See credit system modernization theory: Amulrec's analysis (1933), 15-16; attractions to capitalist economic nations, 7; Bates, 44-6, 47, 63, 64; and Commission of Government, 11, 17; conflicts affecting implementation, 151; creative and destructive force, 8; criticisms of, 7-8; gender ideology, 62, 146; limited by focus on a few factors, 140; popularity in 1960s, 127; Smallwood and, 34-5, 120; Walsh

193

Report, 60-3. See also industrial vision of development Monroe, Arthur, 29, 31, 68, 100, 101, 110, 116, 120. See also Fishery Products Ltd. Monroe, Denis, 123 Monroe, Walter S., 28-9 Moores, Alec, 116 Moores, Frank, 33, 120, 123 moratorium on commercial cod fishing, 1, 155 Morera, Esteve, 5, 38, 105 Myers, Ransom A., 143, 153-4 National Convention on Newfoundland's political future (1946-48), 33 National Fisheries Development plan (1963), 122, 140; rejected by federal government, 122-3 National Sea Products, 81 New England fishing industry, and Newfoundland, 81-2 Newfoundland Association of Fish Exporters Limited (NAFEL), 70-1 Newfoundland Board of Trade, 13, 20 Newfoundland College of Fisheries, 79 Newfoundland Federation of Fishermen, 105, 112-13 Newfoundland Fisheries Association of Fish Exporters Limited (NAFEL), 18 Newfoundland Fisheries Board, 18,35 Newfoundland Fisheries Development Authority (NFDA), 71-3, 74, 85, 99, 100, 102; conflicts with Monroe, 94-6 Newfoundland Fisheries Development Committee (NFDC), 59

194 INDEX Newfoundland Fisheries and Food Allied Workers Union (NFFAWU), 152 Newfoundland Fish Trades Association, 69, 111, 144 North Eastern Fish Industries Limited, 33 Northlantic Fisheries, 28 Norway, 12 Nova Scotia, attack on federal assistance to Newfoundland fishery, 75-6 O'Brien, Gordon, 111 occupational pluralism, 60 Ommer, Rosemary, 4 O'Reilly, Father Michael, 54, 63 otter trawlers, 2, 104, 105 overfishing. See depletion of resources ownership, 54, 55-6, 63, 64, 72-3, 119. See also co-operatives in fishery development Owram, Doug, 43 packaged foods, 20, 21 Pearson, Lester B., 135, 136, 137 Penny, Margaret, 98, 99 Penny, Marie, 98, 99 Penny, John, and Sons, 32-3, 84, 98, 99, 153 Perroux, Francois, 127 Pickersgill, Jack, 47, 92, 115, 116 Planta, Clive, 53, 60-1, 88 Portugal, fishing fleets, 105, 106 prices for fish, 83-4, 115, 118, 124, 125 processing, overexpansion after 1977, 152-3 Proskie, John, 115 quick freezing, 2, 20 quotas on cod fishing, 153

'rationalizing' (reducing numbers), 80, 122, 125, 146 refrigeration, 21, 24 regional development programs, 66, 127, 140 Reid, H.J., 116 research. See Fisheries Research Board resettlement, 140, 146-9 'revolution' in food processing and distribution, 45-6 Ritchie, Charles, 136 Robertson, Norman, 131, 133-4 Robichaud, Hedard, 140 Rostow, W.W., 7 Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects (1957), 127 Royal Commission on Newfoundland (1933), 15 Russell, Hazen, 22-3, 27, 28, 88, 101, 110, 119. See also Bonavista Cold Storage St Francis Xavier University, 19 saltbulk,71,75, 89, 118 saltfish sector (inshore fishery); centralization, 122, 126, 140; drying saltfish (photograph), 13; experimental curing stations, 72-4; federal goal of 'rationalizing', 80, 122, 125; federal support limited, 71, 122-5, 143-4; marketing board considered, 120, 122, 123-5; NAFEL (exporting organization), 70-1; prices, 14, 124; problems, 114, 117-19, 124; Smallwood's development proposals, 120-2; statistics, 88; supply problem, 123; traditionalism criticized, 44-5, 46, 50, 52, 71; vulnerability to offshore fishing, 107-8

INDEX Schrank, William, 117 Scott, Fred, 56-7, 59, 64, 73 shore cure replaced by saltbulk, 118 Sinclair, James, 47-8, 66, 67, 69-70, 76, 79 Sinclair, Peter, 4 size of fish caught, reduction in, 107, 113 Smallwood, Joseph R., 48-53, 59; assistance to frozen-fish companies, 81, 84-5, 89; belief in industrialization, 37, 50, 53, 63, 64, 120; campaign (1962) for modernization of fishery, 105; character, 49-50; criticism of saltfish sector, 50, 52; development plans, 71-4; early ambiguity about modernization, 34-5; federal government attitudes to, 67; Fisheries Convention (1962), 110, 112, 117-21; photograph, 51; promotion skills, 49, 52-3; relationship with Arthur Monroe, 86-9, 95, 96; scandal and controversy, 117; views on cooperatives, 73 Smallwood government: agreements with Arthur Monroe, 86-93, 96-7; companies' increased expectations, 119-20; conflicts between Monroe and NFDA, 94-6; direct support for frozen-fish companies, 81, 84-5, 97-100, 102-3; federal action against foreign fishers requested, 113-14; Fisheries Commission, 120, 121, 122; fishery development program, 117, 121-2; limited support for inshore fishing, 114; loans and bounties for longliners, 114-15; National Fisheries Development proposal rejected by

195

federal government, 122-3; Newfoundland Fisheries Development Authority (NFDA), 71-2, 74, 84, 102; Newfoundland Fisheries Development Committee (NFDC), 59, 65-6; overexpansion in development program, 92-3, 96, 100-1 ;Smallwood's 1962 modernization campaign, 105 Smith, Fletcher, 75 South Coast Commission, 100 Soviet Union fishing activity, 82, 105-6, 108, 110-11, 112 Spain, fishing fleets, 105, 106 Special Areas Bill, 19-20, 24, 35, 73 Spencer, Frank, 110 Squires, Richard, 14 state, economy, and society, 155-6 state involvement in the fishery, 150 state involvement in Newfoundland fishery: bait service deal ruled unacceptable, 67-70; 'bottom-up' co-operatives stressed by Keough and Scott, 54-7, 63, 64, 72, 73; Canada's economy in 1930s and 1940s, 38, 40; changes with Confederation, 37; Commission of Government and frozen-fish firms, 20, 22-6, 29, 31-3, 35-6; and dominant vision or 'hegemony', 5, 42, 65, 119, 151, 156; federal-provincial conflicts, 72, 74-6; Fisheries Committee Report (1947), 33-4; Fisheries Development Act of 1966 (federal), 144; Fisheries Research Board, 40, 42, 78, 106-8, 113; growth in 1960s, 150-1; Little Report (1958), 100-2; resettlement, 146-9; visions of development. See Industrial vision of development, Modernization

196 INDEX theory. See also Federal Department of Fisheries; federal government and fishing; Smallwood government; Walsh Report state planning, ideologies of. See hegemony (Gramsci); industrial vision of development stern trawlers, 148 Story, Colin, 57-9, 103, 113-14, 120, 122, 140 tariffs, US, 83, 144 technology, 80, 142, 151, 152; federal confidence in, 139-40 Templeman, Dr Wilfred, 78, 106-8, 113 three-mile fishing limit, 104, 109 Trade News (journal), 42-3 trade relations with US, 68 training programs. See education programs transportation and food distribution, 21 trawlers, 23, 28, 58-9, 104, 111, 112, 125, 145, 151-2, 155. See also factory-freezer trawlers; otter trawlers; stern trawlers Trepassey, 90-1 Trepassey Bay, trawlers in, 112 Truman Proclamation' on seabed resource, 128 twelve-mile fishing limit. See fishing limits Twillingate, 89, 91, 92-3, 94, 95

Unemployment Insurance for selfemployed fishers, 115-17, 118-19 United Nations, 128; See also Law of the Sea conferences Valdmanis, Alfred, 49, 50 variety in Newfoundland fishery, 57 vessel bounty program, 141-2 Vietnam War, 135, 137 Walsh Report, 59-60, 61, 64, 71-4, 80, 85, 89, 116; federal government reaction, 66-7, 70, 71; industrial vision of development, 60, 61, 63; interventionist view, 65, 66-7; regional development concept, 66; women in the fishery, 61-3 Winsor, Harry, 72, 73, 74, 116 women in the fishing industry, 61-3, 118-9, 146 Working Party on Fisheries Development, 79-80 World War II, 19-20,21-2; expansion of Canada's economy, 38 state intervention, 38, 40 Young, Ross, 72

THE CANADIAN SOCIAL HISTORY SERIES Terry Copp, The Anatomy of Poverty: The Condition of the Working Class in Montreal, 1897-1929, 1974. ISBN 0-7710-2252-2 Alison Prentice, The School Promoters: Education and Social Class in Mid-Nineteenth Century Upper Canada, 1977. ISBN 0-7710-7181-7

Marta Danylewycz, Taking the Veil: An Alternative to Marriage, Motherhood, and Spinsterhood in Quebec, 1840-1920, 1987. ISBN 0-19-541472-1 Craig Heron, Working in Steel: The Early Years in Canada, 1883-1935, 1988. ISBN 0-7710-4086-5

John Herd Thompson, The Harvests of War: The Prairie West, 1914-1918, 1978. ISBN 0-19-541402-0

Wendy Mitchinson and Janice Dickin McGinnis, Editors, Essays in the History of Canadian Medicine, 1988. ISBN 0-7710-6063-7

Joy Parr, Editor, Childhood and Family in Canadian History, 1982. ISBN 0-7710-6938-3

Joan Sangster, Dreams of Equality: Women on the Canadian Left, 1920-1950, 1989. ISBNO-7710-7946-X

Alison Prentice and Susan Mann Trofimenkoff, Editors, The Neglected Majority: Essays in Canadian Women 's History, Volume 2, 1985. ISBN 0-77 10-8583-4

Angus McLaren, Our Own Master Race: Eugenics in Canada, 1885-1945, 1990. ISBN 0-19-541365-2

Ruth Roach Pierson, 'They're Still Women After All': The Second World War and Canadian Womanhood, 1986. ISBN 0-7710-6958-8

Bruno Ramirez, On the Move: French- Canadian and Italian Migrants in the North Atlantic Economy, 1860-1914, 1991. ISBN 0-19-541419-5

Bryan D. Palmer, The Character of Class Struggle: Essays in Canadian Working-Class History, 1850-1985, 1986. ISBN 0-7710-6946-4

Mariana Valverde, The Age of Light, Soap, and Water: Moral Reform in English Canada, 1885-1925, 1991. ISBNO-7710-8689-X

Alan Metcalfe, Canada Learns to Play: The Emergence of Organized Sport, 1807-1914, 1987. ISBN 0-19-541304-0

Bettina Bradbury, Working Families: Age, Gender, and Daily Survival in Industrializing Montreal, 1993. ISBN 0-19-54121 1-7

Andree Levesque, Making and Breaking the Rules: Women in Quebec, 1919-1939, 1994. ISBN 0-77 10-5283-9 Cecilia Danysk, Hired Hands: Labour and the Development of Prairie Agriculture, 1880-1930, 1995. ISBN 0-77 10-2552-1 Kathryn McPherson, Bedside Matters: The Transformation of Canadian Nursing, 1900-1990, 1996. ISBN 0-19-541219-2 Edith Burley, Servants of the Honourable Company: Work, Discipline, and Conflict in the Hudson's Bay Company, 1770-1870, 1997. ISBN 0-19-541296-6 Mercedes Steedman, Angels of the Workplace: Women and the Construction of Gender Relations in the Canadian Clothing Industry, 1890-1940, 1997. ISBN 0-19-541308-3 Angus McLaren and Arlene Tigar McLaren, The Bedroom and the State: The Changing Practices and Politics of Contraception and Abortion in Canada, 1880-1997, 1997. ISBN 0-19-541318-0

Kathryn McPhersqn, Cecilia Morgan, and Nancy M. Forestell, Editors, Gendered Pasts: Historical Essays in Femininity and Masculinity in Canada, 1999. ISBN 0-19-541449-7 Gillian Creese, Contracting Masculinity: Gender, Class, and Race in a White-Collar Union, 1944-1994, 1999. ISBN 0-19-541454-3 Geoffrey Reaume, Remembrance of Patients Past: Patient Life at the Toronto Hospital for the Insane, 1870-1940, 2000. ISBN 0-19-541538-8 Miriam Wright, A Fishery for Modern Times: The State and the Industrialization of the Newfoundland Fishery, 1934-1968, 2001. ISBN 0-19-541620-1