5 (1) 2016 Horizon. Феноменологические исследования

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2016_5_1_115-132
2016_5_1_133-149
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2016_5_1_194-213
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ISSN 2311-6986 (Online) ISSN 2226-5260 (Print)

САНКТ-ПЕТЕРБУРГСКИЙ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ ИНСТИТУТ ФИЛОСОФИИ ST. PETERSBURG STATE UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

HORIZON ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY

5 (1) 2016 SPECIAL ISSUE

Traditions and Perspectives of the Phenomenological Movement in Central and Eastern Europe Традиции и перспективы феноменологического движения в Центральной и Восточной Европе

HORIZON ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ Том 5, № 1 2016 СПЕЦИАЛЬНЫЙ ВЫПУСК

Традиции и перспективы феноменологического движения в Центральной и Восточной Европе Журнал входит в международные базы данных, электронные библиотеки открытого доступа, каталоги периодических изданий: DOAJ | The Philosopher’s Index | CrossRef | ERIH plus | J-Gate | Ulrich | WorldCat | Google Scholar | CyberLeninka | RISC | MLA International Bibliography | OAJI Журнал зарегистрирован в качестве СМИ. Свидетельство ПИ№ ФС77–54878 от 26 июля 2013 г. Журнал издается при Институте философии Санкт-Петербургского государственного университета и при участии Центрального европейского института философии при Карловом университете и Институте философии Чешской академии наук

публикуемые материалы прошли процедуру рецензирования и экспертного отбора Главный редактор Наталья Артёменко (Россия) Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет

Выпускающие редакторы Витольд Плотка (Польша) Университет Гданьска Андрас Варга (Венгрия) Венгерская Академия Наук

Редакторская работа Петера Андраса Варги осуществляется при поддержке гранта OTKA PD105101 Венгерского Национального центра Исследования, Инноваций и Развития (NKFIH) Учёный секретарь Кира Майдаченко (Россия) Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет

Редакционная коллегия Ханс-Райнер Зепп (Германия, Чехия) Педагогический университет Фрайбурга и Карлов Университет в Праге; Карел Новотны (Чехия) Институт философии Чешской академии наук; Александр Шнелль (Франция) Университет Париж IV Сорбонна; Андрей Паткуль (Россия) Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет; Георгий Чернавин (Россия) Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики», Москва; Андрей Лаврухин (Россия) Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики», Санкт-Петербург; Фёдор Станжевский (Россия) Санкт-Петербургский государственный технологический институт (Технологический университет); Ирина Казакова (Россия, Литва) Европейский гуманитарный университет, Вильнюс; Анастасия Козырева (Германия) Университет Хайдельберга

Научный совет Дан Захави (Дания) Университет Копенгагена; Николя Фернандо де Варрен (Бельгия) Католический университет Лувена; Ханс-Хельмут Гандер (Германия) Фрайбургский университет им. Альберта-Людвига; Михаэль Габель (Германия) Университет Эрфурта; Жан Гронден (Канада) Университет Монреаля; Себастиан Луфт (США) Университет Маркетт; Виктор Молчанов (Россия) Российский Государственный гуманитарный университет; Неля Мотрошилова (Россия) Институт философии Российской Академии Наук; Алексей Савин (Россия) Институт философии Российской Академии Наук; Ярослав Слинин (Россия) Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет; Александр Хаардт (Германия) Рурский университет Бохума; Петер Травни (Германия) Бергский университет Вупперталя; Эндрю Хаас (Россия, США) Национальный исследовательский университет Высшая школа экономики (Москва); Михаил Хорьков (Россия) Институт философии Российской Академии Наук; Наталья  Бросова (Россия) Белгородский государственный национальный исследовательский университет; Данил Разеев  (Россия) Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет; Аннабель Дюфурк (Франция, Нидерланды) Университет Неймегена имени св. Радбода Утрехтского; Юлия  Орлова  †  (Россия) Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет; Роман  Громов  †  (Россия) Южный Федеральный университет; Ласло Тенгели † (Германия) Бергский университет Вупперталя Электронная почта гл. редактора: [email protected] Информация о журнале размещена на сайте: www.horizon.spb.ru

© Наталья Артёменко, 2016 © Авторы выпуска, 2016

HORIZON STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY Volume 5, Number 1 2016

SPECIAL ISSUE

Traditions and Perspectives of the Phenomenological Movement in Central and Eastern Europe The journal is indexed in: DOAJ | The Philosopher‘s Index | CrossRef | ERIH plus | J-Gate | Ulrich | WorldCat | Google Scholar | CyberLeninka | RISC | MLA International Bibliography | OAJI Mass media registration certificate ПИ № ФС 77–54878 issued on July 26, 2013 The journal is published under the auspices of the Institute of Philosophy of the St. Petersburg State University and the Central European Institute of Philosophy, affiliated with the Charles University and the Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Republic Academy of Sciences

all the submitted articles are subject to peer-review and selection by experts Editor-in-chief Natalia Artemenko (Russia) St. Petersburg State University

Guest Editors Witold Płotka (Poland) University of Gdańsk Peter Andras Varga (Hungary) Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Peter Andras Varga’s editorial work was funded by the grant OTKA PD105101 of the National Research, Innovation and Development Office (NKFIH) of Hungary Еditorial Assistant Kira Maidachenko (Russia) St. Petersburg State University

Editorial Board Hans Rainer Sepp (Germany) Pedagogical University of Freiburg and Charles University in Prague; Karel Novotný (Czech Republic) Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Alexander Schnell (France) University Sorbonne-Paris IV; Andrei Patkul (Russia) St. Petersburg State University; Georgy Chernavin (Russia) National Research University «Higher School of Economics», Moscow; Andrei Lavruchin (Russia) National Research University «Higher School of Economics», St. Petersburg; Fedor Stanzhevskiy (Russia) St. Petersburg Technical University (Technological Institute); Irina Kazakova (Russia, Lithuania) European Humanities University, Vilnus; Anastasia Kozyreva (Germany) University of Heidelberg

Advisory Board Dan Zahavi  (Denmark) University of Copenhagen; Nicolas Fernando de Warren  (Belgium) KU Leuven; Hans Helmuth Gander (Germany) Albert Ludwig University of Freiburg; Michael Gabel (Germany) University of Erfurt; Jean Grondin (Canada) University of Montreal; Sebastian Luft (USA) Marquette University; Victor Molchanov (Russia) Russian State University for the Humanities; Nelly Motroshilova (Russia) Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences; Alexei Savin (Russia) Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences; Jaroslav Slinin (Russia) St. Petersburg State University; Alexander Haardt (Germany) Ruhr University of Bochum; Peter Trawny (Germany) University of Wuppertal; Andrew Haas (Russia) National Research University «Higher School of economics», Moscow; Mikhail Khorkov (Russia) Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences; Natalia Brosova (Russia) Belgorod National Research University; Danil Razeev (Russia) St. Petersburg State University; Annabelle Dufourcq (Netherlands) Radboud University Nijmegen; Julia Orlova † (Russia) St. Petersburg State University; Roman Gromov † (Russia) Southern Federal University; László Tengelyi † (Germany) University of Wuppertal

Editor’s e-mail: [email protected] Official website of the journal: www.horizon.spb.ru

© Natalia Artemenko, 2016 © Authors of the issue, 2016

HORIZON ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ ТОМ 5, № 1 2016 СПЕЦИАЛЬНЫЙ ВЫПУСК ТРАДИЦИИ И ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКОГО ДВИЖЕНИЯ В ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЙ И ВОСТОЧНОЙ ЕВРОПЕ

СОДЕРЖАНИЕ WITOLD PŁOTKA

INTRODUCTION: TRADITIONS AND P ­ ERSPECTIVES OF THE ­­PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT IN ­C ENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

10

I. ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ 1.1 ЗА ПРЕДЕЛАМИ ПОЛИТИКИ GEORGE HEFFERNAN

HEIDEGGER’S CRITIQUE OF HUSSERL IN HIS BLACK NOTEBOOKS

16

MIHÁLY VAJDA

WIE ICH AUS DER MINDERJÄHRIGKEIT DES MARXISMUS MIT DER HILFE DER PHÄNOMENOLOGIE HERAUSWUCHS?

54

FRANCESCO TAVA

LIFEWORLD, CIVILISATION, SYSTEM: PATOČKA AND HABERMAS ON EUROPE AND ITS CRISIS

70

WING-KEUNG CHIK

TRUTH, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE POLITICAL. JAN PATOČKA’S VIEW ON LIVING IN TRUTH

90

1.2 ПАМЯТИ ЛАСЛО ТЕНГЕЛИ INGA RÖMER

FROM KANT TO THE PROBLEM OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL METAPHYSICS. IN MEMORY OF LÁSZLÓ TENGELYI

4

115

IRENE BREUER

FAKTIZITÄT, NOTWENDIGKEIT UND ZUFÄLLIGKEIT BEI ARISTOTELES UND HUSSERL 

133

BENCE PÉTER MAROSÁN

TRANSZENDENTALE ANTHROPOLOGIE. SINNBILDUNG, PERSÖNLICHES ICH UND SELBSTIDENTITÄT BEI EDMUND HUSSERL UND IHRE REZEPTION IN LÁSZLÓ TENGELYIS PHÄNOMENOLOGISCHER METAPHYSIK

150

1.3 ЭТИКА, АКСИОЛОГИЯ И ЛОГИКА PETR URBAN

FOREGROUNDING THE RELATIONAL DOMAIN — PHENOMENOLOGY, ENACTIVISM AND CARE ETHICS

171

MIKHAIL KHORKOV

PHÄNOMENOLOGIE AN DER GRENZE: ­Z UR ­G ESCHICHTE  DER REZEPTION UND VERMITTLUNG ­DER AXIOLOGIE MAX SCHELERS  IN DEN WERKEN VON TADEUSZ H. CZEŻOWSKI (1889–1981) ­U ND LARISSA A. CHUHINA (1913–2002). EINE FORSCHUNGSNOTIZ

183

VEDRAN GRAHOVAC

THE PERSISTENCE OF SELF-ENCLOSURE IN THE WHOLE-PART  RELATIONSHIP: THE CASE OF HUSSERL AND KRACAUER

194

1.4 ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЯ И ЭСТЕТИКА JAROSLAVA VYDROVÁ

THE INTERTWINING OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND CUBISM — IN THE ANALYSES AND WORKS OF ART OF CZECH ARTISTS AND THEORETICIANS

JAN JOSL

THE END OF ART AND PATOČKA’S PHILOSOPHY OF ART

214 232

II. ПЕРЕВОДЫ И КОММЕНТАРИИ ОЛЕСЯ БЕССМЕЛЬЦЕВА

ПРЕДИСЛОВИЕ К ПУБЛИКАЦИИ ­П ЕРЕВОДА ­­7­ ­П АРАГРАФА ­ ВТОРОЙ ЧАСТИ ­С ТАТЬИ МОРИЦА ГАЙГЕРА «К ­ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИИ ЭСТЕТИЧЕСКОГО НАСЛАЖДЕНИЯ»

МОРИЦ ГАЙГЕР

К ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИИ ЭСТЕТИЧЕСКОГО НАСЛАЖДЕНИЯ

247 258

5

РОМАН СОКОЛОВ

ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЙ ­Т РАНСЦЕНДЕНТАЛИЗМ И ­ПОЭТИЧЕСКОЕ ВИДЕНИЕ: КОНЦЕПЦИЯ ­ПОЭТИЧЕСКОГО ­ЭЛЕМЕНТА МАРКА ­РИШИРА. ПРЕДИСЛОВИЕ К ­П ЕРЕВОДУ СТАТЬИ МАРКА РИШИРА «ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЯ ПОЭТИЧЕСКОГО ЭЛЕМЕНТА» МАРК РИШИР

ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЯ ПОЭТИЧЕСКОГО ЭЛЕМЕНТА

272 281

III. ДИСКУССИИ WITOLD PŁOTKA

REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE «HORIZONS ­BEYOND BORDERS. TRADITIONS AND PERSPECTIVES OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE» (JUNE 17–19, 2015, BUDAPEST, HUNGARY) 299

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HORIZON STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY Volume 5, Number 1 2016 SPECIAL ISSUE TRADITIONS AND PERSPECTIVES OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

CONTENTS WITOLD PŁOTKA

INTRODUCTION: TRADITIONS AND P ­ ERSPECTIVES OF THE ­­PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT IN ­C ENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

10

I. RESEARCH 1.1 BEYOND POLITICS GEORGE HEFFERNAN

HEIDEGGER’S CRITIQUE OF HUSSERL IN HIS BLACK NOTEBOOKS

16

MIHÁLY VAJDA

MY EMERGENCE FROM THE IMMATURITY OF MARXISM IN VIRTUE OF PHENOMENOLOGY

54

FRANCESCO TAVA

LIFEWORLD, CIVILISATION, SYSTEM: PATOČKA AND HABERMAS ON EUROPE AND ITS CRISIS

70

WING-KEUNG CHIK

TRUTH, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE POLITICAL. JAN PATOČKA’S VIEW ON LIVING IN TRUTH

90

1.2 CONTRIBUTIONS ON LÁSZLÓ TENGELYI INGA RÖMER

FROM KANT TO THE PROBLEM OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL METAPHYSICS. IN MEMORY OF LÁSZLÓ TENGELYI

115

7

IRENE BREUER

FACTICITY, NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY AT ARISTOTLE AND HUSSERL

133

BENCE PÉTER MAROSÁN

TRANSCENDENTAL ANTHROPOLOGY. FORMATION OF SENSE, PERSONAL I, AND ­SELF-IDENTITY IN EDMUND HUSSERL  AND THEIR RECEPTION IN THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METAPHYSICS OF LÁSZLÓ TENGELYI

150

1.3 ETHICS, AXIOLOGY, AND LOGIC PETR URBAN

FOREGROUNDING THE RELATIONAL DOMAIN — PHENOMENOLOGY, ENACTIVISM AND CARE ETHICS

171

MIKHAIL KHORKOV

PHENOMENOLOGY AT THE BORDER: ON THE ­H ISTORY OF ­R ECEPTION  AND MEDIATION OF MAX SCHELER’S AXIOLOGY IN THE WORKS OF TADEUSZ H. CZEŻOWSKI (1889–1981) AND LARISSA A. CHUHINA (1913–2002). A RESEARCH NOTE

183

VEDRAN GRAHOVAC

THE PERSISTENCE OF SELF-ENCLOSURE IN THE WHOLE-PART  RELATIONSHIP: THE CASE OF HUSSERL AND KRACAUER

194

1.4 PHENOMENOLOGY AND AESTHETICS JAROSLAVA VYDROVÁ

THE INTERTWINING OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND CUBISM — IN THE ANALYSES AND WORKS OF ART OF CZECH ARTISTS AND THEORETICIANS

JAN JOSL

THE END OF ART AND PATOČKA’S PHILOSOPHY OF ART

214 232

II. TRANSLATIONS AND COMMENTARIES OLESYA BESSMEL’TSEVA

THE PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION OF THE 7TH PARAGRAPH OF SECOND PART OF THE ARTICLE «ON THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE AESTHETIC ENJOYMENT» BY MORITZ GEIGER

MORITZ GEIGER

ON THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE AESTHETIC ENJOYMENT

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248 258

ROMAN SOKOLOV

PHENOMENOLOGICAL TRANSCENDENTALISM AND POETIC VISION: MARC RICHIR’S CONCEPT OF THE POETIC ELEMENT. THE PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION OF MARC RICHIR’S ARTICLE «PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE POETIC ELEMENT»

MARC RIСHIR

PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE POETIC ELEMENT

273 281

III. DISCUSSIONS WITOLD PŁOTKA

REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE «HORIZONS ­BEYOND BORDERS. TRADITIONS AND PERSPECTIVES OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE» (JUNE 17–19, 2015, BUDAPEST, HUNGARY)

299

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HORIZON 5 (1) 2016 : Introduction : W. Płotka : 10–15 ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ • STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY • STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE • ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES

doi: 10.18199/2226-5260-2016-5-1-10-15

INTRODUCTION: TRADITIONS AND ­PERSPECTIVES OF THE ­­PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT IN ­C ENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE WITOLD PŁOTKA

The term «phenomenology» is equivocal, since it refers either to the philosophical tradition developed as the phenomenological movement that originates with cooperation of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) with the Munich Circle, or to a specific method of doing philosophy that consists in describing given phenomena in their essences. Herbert Spiegelberg (Spiegelberg, 1975, 20) calls the latter form «first-hand phenomenology», because it is about the phenomena, and he contrasts it with studying of texts as texts that are elements of the phenomenological movement; if one investigates texts, however, he or she does not do — as Spiegelberg (Spiegelberg, 1975, 20–21) states — «phenomenology proper» but rather phenomenology «in a sense of meta-phenomenology». The present issue of the «Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology» can be regarded as an attempt to bridge the gap between the two meanings with regard to the phenomenological movement in Central and Eastern Europe. For this reason, the main aims of the issue are twofold: first, it is to present the context, central figures, trends, and periods of phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe, and second, it is to show original contributions of philosophers from this part of Europe to contemporary debates in phenomenology. Why, however, this fragment of the phenomenological movement needs a special attention? We can initially assume that a need to explore the issue rises from a recognition of a lack of this topic in the main historical works on phenomenology. Even though Spiegelberg (Spiegelberg, 1999), and the authors of the Encyclopedia of Phenomenology

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Witold Płotka

(Embree, 1997) refer to Central and Eastern Europe, and they list a series of names and titles, it often seems to be reductive, selective, and schematic. In the «Part Four» of The Phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction dedicated to the «Geography of the Phenomenological Movement», Spiegelberg (Spiegelberg, 1999, 666–667) devotes to Central and Eastern Europe five paragraphs that present a sketch, rather than even a short introduction to this topic.1 In turn, the Encyclopedia of Phenomenology presents a richer perspective, but also in this book one finds more black holes than one can expect. There are, of course, entries on «Czechoslovakia», «Hungary», «Poland», «Russia», «Union of Soviet Socialist Republics», and on «Yugoslavia», but there is no separate entry, e.g., on «Czech Republic», «Slovakia», «Romania», «Lithuania», or — what is more important — on «Central and Eastern Europe». In result, as it seems, one cannot understand a specific character of the phenomenological movement from this part of the world. So, the need to deepen our knowledge of the phenomenological movement in Central and Eastern Europe follows from a remarkable absence of this area in studies on phenomenology. But, is it justified at all to explore this aspect of the phenomenological heritage? And, what follows, does phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe present any specific way of doing phenomenology? Before answering these fundamental questions, however, it is worth to make a more general comment. After over 11 decades after Husserl’s Logical Investigations, there is no common agreement on any criterion that enables a strict definition of what phenomenology is, namely, as a distinct and separate discipline or current in philosophy. Some researchers question any attempts to indicate such differentia specifica of phenomenology. Of course, such problems are not unique for phenomenology, but rather concern many, if not all, currents in philosophy. So, what is phenomenology? Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961) noticed in his Phenomenology of Perception that «It may seem strange that this question has still to be asked half a century after the first works of Husserl. The fact remains that it has by no means been answered.» (MerleauPonty, 2002, vii) As it is well known, to break the deadlock, Spiegelberg offered four

1

In the «Part Two» of his book, Spiegelberg refers also to Wilhelm Szilasi (1889–1966), Roman Ingarden (1893–1970), and Jan Patočka (1907–1977) as members of the Central and Eastern European movement, however, he indicates their involvement mainly in German philosophical tradition.

HORIZON 5 (1) 2016

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possible criteria to define a philosopher as a member of a given movement. So, there are: (1) the one-sided option of the self-declared members of such a movement; (2) the recognition by others, such as (a) the founder of the movement, (b) a representative group of insiders, and (c) a similar group of outsiders; (3) the historian’s decision based on certain objective criteria in the thought of the thinkers in question (a solution particularly easy to apply where the label is posthumous, as is the case with most «isms» before the 18th century); (4) any combination of the three preceding criteria. (Spiegelberg, 1999, 3)

For Spiegelberg phenomenology can be defined either «from the top down» or «from the bottom up». By the former, I understand an attempt to formulate a defined set of features or aspects that taken as a whole define phenomenology. Here, the criteria seem to be objective, however, they are exclusive of thinkers that cannot fit the definition. Therefore, the latter way of defining phenomenology that consists in including selfdeclared members, and members recognized by others seems to be more adequate. Such a definition formulated «from the bottom up» enables one to include different approaches to phenomenology. So, even though the presented criteria are problematic, the tools formulated by Spiegelberg seem to present a useful method to define what phenomenology is. Keeping this in mind, we can claim that phenomenology is irreducible to a defined set of features or aspects. Rather, phenomenology defines itself by a plurality of its members, descriptions, exchanges, discussions, polemics, and theories. In a word, the phenomenon of phenomenology is inseparable from the phenomenological movement. I think that this essential character of the phenomenological movement corresponds with Husserl’s description of historical character of sciences in general, and of phenomenology in particular. If so, also phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe is so-to-speak constituted by its history, and its horizon. Indeed, the phenomenological movement in Central and Eastern Europe was defined by its historical situation and, even more importantly, by political circumstances. I do not claim that historical and political situation determined phenomenology, but I think it is one of the essential factors that characterizes the phenomenological movement in Central and Eastern Europe as a unique, and distinct way of doing phenomenology. Going one step further then one can claim that history of the phenomenological movement in this part of Europe is divided into at least three periods: (1) early phenomenology before the World War II, (2) confrontation of phenomenology with Marxism and communism after the World War II, and (3) contemporary phenomenology

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after 1989–1990, so after the fall of communism. It is hard to present even a sketch of every period since they seemed to be different in each country. Let me indicate only few aspects. The phenomenological movement was established in Germany at the beginning of the XX century. Even though, early phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe was shaped by German tradition (many of Central and Eastern European phenomenologists studied by Husserl, and collaborated, e.g., with the Munich Circle), it was shaped in a dialog by referring to specific topics present in certain regions. In result of this collaboration, a difficult German phenomenological vocabulary was translated into various national languages from Central and Eastern Europe. After the first period of reception of new phenomenological ideas, thinkers, writers, and even artists from Central and Eastern Europe established their own understanding of what phenomenology is, and they developed it in new directions crossing the theoretical borders defined by Husserl. A development of phenomenology was discontinued by the World War II, and a new political order of Europe. The Iron Curtain made impossible an international exchange of scholars, and ideas. Starting from 1945–1946, national borders have divided the phenomenological movement into a mosaic of theories. Nonetheless, it was limited to the theory only. Insofar as phenomenology was regarded as opposed to Marxism, and as such as idealism, and as a bourgeois philosophy, phenomenologists were regarded as enemies of the proletariat. In result, many phenomenologists have fallen victims to repressions. At the same time, phenomenology founded a resistance against materialism. According to Michael Gubser (Gubser, 2014), phenomenology founded also a resistance against communist regimes. So, the meaning of phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe was shaped by political circumstances more — as it seems — than in other regions of the world. Here, following Milan Kundera, we can remark that Central and Eastern Europe seems to have something in common, namely, its culture. In his famous essay on The Tragedy of Central Europe, Kundera notices that Central European countries defined their identity as an expression of the resistance of the culture to communism (Kundera, 1986, April 26, 33). In the face of the centralized Soviet administration, Central European countries wanted to defend its plural culture. I think, that this diagnosis can be applied to phenomenology in particular. Doing phenomenology in the communist period was for

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many people and researchers an expression of the resistance of philosophy to materialism and Marxism. In addition, phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe was developed as a plural movement, without a clear centre, as Leuven in the West. Today phenomenology in this part of the world is vital, though unexplored. Of course, many phenomenologists from Central and Eastern Europe participate in global exchange of ideas, and take part in international discussions. Indeed, the process of globalization made the phenomenological movement more unified than ever. However, there was no opportunity to show a unique character, and an original contribution of Central and Eastern European phenomenology to contemporary debates. In this context, the issue of the «Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology» seems to be a significant contribution to our understanding what phenomenology in this part of the world was, is, and can be in the future. I believe that the issue enables a reader to see the plurality of the phenomenological heritage, as well as further perspectives of phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe. The present issue of the «Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology» gathers articles originally presented at the International Conference on «Horizons Beyond Borders. Traditions and Perspectives of the Phenomenological Movement in Central and Eastern Europe» that held on June 17–19, 2015 at the Institute of Philosophy of the Research Centre for the Humanities of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Budapest, Hungary. As such, the collection is a joint achievement of the participants of the event. I — also in the name of Peter Andras Varga — am grateful for their efforts to present a broader horizon on the phenomenological movement in Central and Eastern Europe. I believe that all presented contributions show a rich and complex structure — both in historical and systematical aspects — of the phenomenological movement in this part of Europe. At the end, I would like to express my thanks to Natalia Artemenko, Editor-In-Chief of the «Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology». Her generous support and help made possible a publication of this — as it seems — important collection of essays. R EFER ENCES Embree, L. (Ed.). (1997). Encyclopedia of Phenomenology. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Gubser, M. (2014). The Far Reaches. Phenomenology, Ethics, and Social Renewal in Central

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Europe. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Kundera, M. (1986, April 26). The tragedy of central Europe. The New York Review of Books, 33–38. Merleau-Ponty, M. (2002). Phenomenology of Perception. London – New York, NY: Routledge. Spiegelberg, H. (1975). Doing Phenomenology. Essays on and in Phenomenology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Spiegelberg, H. (1999). The Phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

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HORIZON 5 (1) 2016 : I. Research : G. Heffernan : 16–53 ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ • STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY • STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE • ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES

I. ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ 1.1 BEYOND POLITICS 1.1 ЗА ПРЕДЕЛАМИ ПОЛИТИКИ

doi: 10.18199/2226-5260-2016-5-1-16-53

HEIDEGGER’S CRITIQUE OF HUSSERL IN HIS BLACK NOTEBOOKS GEORGE HEFFERNAN Ph.D. in Philosophy, Professor of Philosophy, Philosophy Department, Merrimack College, N. Andover, Massachusetts, 01845 United States. E-mail: [email protected] In Heidegger und der Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung (2014), Peter Trawny claims that in his Black Notebooks (2014/15) Martin Heidegger is guilty of «ontological-historical anti-Semitism» (seinsgeschichtlicher Antisemitismus). There can be no doubt that Heidegger describes «the Jews» as «a kind of humanity» that lives by «the principle of race», displays «empty rationality and calculative capacity», and employs «the machinations of world Jewry» to propagate a «homeless» and «worldless» way of life accompanied by «ahistorical» and «atemporal» thinking — as «a people» that took advantage of «the metaphysics of the West», «especially in its modern development», to pursue «the uprooting of all being(s) from Being» as its «world-historical task». The question is whether in his narrative Heidegger assigns a relevant or pivotal role to his former mentor, colleague, and friend, Edmund Husserl, the founder of the phenomenological movement and a Jewish convert to Christianity, because he seems to suggest that there is a connection between Husserl’s Jewishness and his philosophy, as well as that his break with him was the result of the latter’s failure to deal with Being in terms of time or history. This paper investigates whether Heidegger’s remarks and Trawny’s reflections have any significant implications for an understanding of the philosophical relationship between Husserl and Heidegger. It finds that Trawny makes a strong case that a number of Heidegger’s statements in his Black Notebooks reveal him to be generally guilty of «ontological-historical

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anti-Semitism», but that he does not present a convincing case that in these texts Heidegger’s critique of Husserl specifically is motivated by «ontological-historical anti-Semitism». Key words: Heidegger, Husserl, Black Notebooks, Trawny, ontological-historical anti-Semitism, phenomenology, Being.

ХАЙДЕГГЕРОВСКАЯ КРИТИКА ГУССРЕЛЯ В «ЧЕРНЫХ ТЕТРАДЯХ» ГЕОРГ ХЕФФЕРНАН Ph.D. in Philosophy, профессор философии, кафедра философии, Мерримак Колледж, Андовер, Массачусетс, 01845 США. E-mail: [email protected] В своей работе «Хайдеггер и миф о всемирном еврейском заговоре» (2014) Питер Травни утверждает, что в «Черных тетрадях» (2014/2015) Мартин Хайдеггер виновен в «бытийноисторическом антисемитизме» (seinsgeschichtlicher Antisemitismus). Не может быть сомнений в том, что Хайдеггер описывает «еврейство» как «дитя человечества», которое живет по «расовому принципу», демонстрирует «пустую рациональность и калькулятивную способность», занято «происками мирового еврейства» для пропаганды «бездомного» и «безмирного» способа жизни, сопровождаемого «а-историческим» и «а-временным» мышлением; как «людей», которые используют «метафизику запада», «особенно в его современном развитом состоянии», реализуя стремление к «выкорчевыванию всего сущего из бытия» в качестве своей «мировой исторической задачи». Вопрос в том, приписывает ли в Хайдеггер в своих изложениях значимую или ключевую роль бывшему наставнику, коллеге и другу Эдмунду Гуссерлю, основателю феноменологического движения и еврею, обратившемуся в христианство? Поскольку он, как кажется, предполагает наличие связи между еврейством Гуссерля и его философией, так же как и свой разрыв с ним видит как результат более позднего несогласия в обсуждении вопроса бытия касательно времени или истории. Эта статья занимается исследованием вопроса, имеют ли хайдеггеровские заметки и размышления Травни какие-то какие-то существенные последствия для понимания философских отношений между Гуссерлем и Хайдеггером. Устанавливается, что хотя Травни приводит серьезные подтверждения тому, что число хайдеггеровских высказываний в его «Черных тетрадях» в целом обнаруживает его вину в «бытийно-историческом антисемитизме», он тем не мене не предоставляет убедительного довода тому, что критика Гуссерля в этих хайдеггеровских текстах особым образом мотивирована «бытийно-историческим антисемитизмом». Ключевые слова: Хайдеггер, Гуссерль, Черные тетради, Травни, бытийно-исторический антисемитизм, феноменология, бытие.

INTRODUCTION: HEIDEGGER, NATIONAL SOCIALISM, AND HUSSERL Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) was one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. He was the assistant of the founder of the phenomenological

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movement, Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), and his students included, among many others, Karl Löwith (1897–1973), Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979), Hans Jonas (1903–1993), and Hannah Arendt (1906–1975), as well as Leo Strauss (1899–1973), Jacob Klein (1899– 1978), and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002). Heidegger’s powerful influence on the existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) and the deconstructionism of Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) is also beyond doubt. Yet Heidegger presents one of the greatest paradoxes in the history of philosophy. On the one hand, he is famous for Being and Time (1927), a fundamental analysis of human being (Dasein) in terms of the existential structures of its relation to Being (Sein), first and foremost, temporality, and, by implication, historicity. Guided not only by Husserl, with his exhortation to go «to the things themselves» («zu den Sachen selbst»),1 but also by Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), with his emphasis on experience, life, and history, Heidegger applies phenomenology to life to sketch a hermeneutics of human existence in its entire historicity. The work develops the argument that finitude, authentically grasped and resolutely lived, leads not to nihilism but to a special kind of «carefulness» (Sorge as the Sein of Dasein),2 and articulates the position that a human life has no other meaning than that which the particular individual, «thrown» into the world and among others, «projects» on to it (Dasein as geworfener Entwurf).3 For all its talk of authentic existence, however, Being and Time does not provide any answer to the question: What should I do? Thus it leaves Dasein’s horizon wide open for its own determination of meaning. On the other hand, Heidegger is infamous for his involvement with National Socialism. He joined the N.S.D.A.P. on May 1, 1933, as party member #3125894, at a crucial juncture in German, European, and world history. He served as a very activist rector and even «Führer-Rektor» of the renowned University of Freiburg from 1933 to 1934,4 delivering his hortatory rector’s address, «The Self-Assertion of the German University» («Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität»),5 on May 27, 1933. One of

1

Cf. Husserl, Hua XIX/1, 10. References to the works of Husserl are henceforth by volume and page of his Gesammelte Werke or Husserliana (Hua). See the References at the end of the paper. 2 Cf. Heidegger, 1927/1977, §§ 39–44. 3 Cf. Heidegger, 1927/1977, § 58. 4 Cf. Sluga, 1993, 149, and Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe (henceforth: GA) 16, 79–274. 5 Cf. GA 16, 107–117.

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his best students later remarked that by the end of the speech «one did not know whether one should read the Pre-Socratics or march with the Storm Troopers».6 Bestowing early respectability on the fledgling regime of the new Chancellor Adolf Hitler (named by President Paul von Hindenburg on January 30, 1933), Heidegger declared to the students (October, 1933): «Let not doctrinal propositions and “ideas” be the rules of your Being. The Führer himself and alone is the present and future German reality and its law. […] Heil Hitler!»7 For various reasons, mainly and mostly political and professional, Heidegger resigned as rector of the university after a year in office.8 His later claims to the contrary notwithstanding,9 it is hard to maintain the thesis that he was active in the opposition to the regime of the Third Reich (1933–1945). Despite the fact that he had to submit to de-Nazification procedures by Allied, German, and academic authorities after the Second World War, which led first to his forced retirement without permission to teach and finally to his emeritus status with permission to teach (with a kind of nervous breakdown in between),10 the exact extent of Heidegger’s involvement with National Socialism did not emerge until long after his death. During his lifetime, he was able to sustain the self-serving story according to which he had been an innocent, naïve dreamer who had gotten romantically involved in politics way over his head, but not a convinced Nazi.11 In his signature «Letter on Humanism» (1947), Heidegger deftly, even aggressively, deflected an open invitation to face up to and to come to grips with the Third Reich and his association with it, stubbornly refusing to rethink within a humanistic horizon what it meant to be human after the Second World War and the mass murder of innumerable combatants and civilians by Germany and its allies.12 Cf. Löwith, 1986/2007, 35. GA 16, 184–185: «Nicht Lehrsätze und “Ideen” seien die Regeln Eures Seins. Der Führer selbst und allein ist die heutige und künftige deutsche Wirklichkeit und ihr Gesetz. […] Heil Hitler!» Unless otherwise noted, all translations in this paper are my own. 8 Heidegger was Rector from April 21, 1933, to April 27, 1934. Cf. Ott, 1988, 131–246, and Thomä, 2013, 552, 554. 9 Cf. GA 16, 372–394, 397–401, 409–415, etc. Cf. also Heidegger, Letter to Karl Jaspers, July 5, 1949, in Heidegger & Jaspers, 1990, 173. 10 Cf. GA 16, 367–448, and Thomä, 2013, 560. 11 Cf., e.g., Heidegger, Letter to Hannah Arendt, April 12, 1950, in Arendt & Heidegger, 1998/2002, 95: «Im Politischen bin ich weder bewandert noch begabt. Aber inzwischen lernte ich und künftig möchte ich noch mehr lernen, auch im Denken nichts auszulassen.» 12 Cf. GA 9, 313–364. The letter was composed in 1945, first published with «Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit» 6

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It did not help that Heidegger proposed an analogy between what Germans had done to their victims during the war and what some Allies did to some Germans after the war (1948),13 compared industrialized agriculture to the production of corpses in the gas chambers and extermination camps (1949),14 and suggested that the innumerable people who had «died» in the annihilation camps had not died (1949).15 In his Introduction to Metaphysics (1953 [lectures from 1935]), Heidegger even seemed to suggest that the tragedy of National Socialism was not that it had failed, but rather that it had never been tried, at least not by those who understood «the inner truth and greatness of this movement» («die innere Wahrheit und Größe dieser Bewegung»).16 In public Heidegger never expressed regret or remorse in regard to his involvement with National Socialism.17 In private he did so only very rarely, for example, in a few letters to his former colleague Karl Jaspers and his former lover Hannah Arendt.18 He was not only unapologetic, but he also tried to portray himself as an ardent but prudent critic of the regime, for example, in his revisionist, posthumously released, interview with the German news magazine Der Spiegel (1966).19 In his Black Notebooks, a kind of intellectual-philosophical diaries that he began before the Third Reich and continued after it, Heidegger occasionally but indirectly expresses his growing disappointment and mounting disillusionment with some of the realities of the regime. Yet he provides no criticism of the ideals of National Socialism as he wished to understand it.20 Also, nowhere in the Black Notebooks does Heidegger question the anti-Semitic theories or practices of National Socialism. After Heidegger’s death, scholars gradually uncovered more and more evidence («Plato’s Doctrine of Truth») in 1947, and then as a separate monograph in 1949. Cf. Heidegger, Letter to Herbert Marcuse, January 20, 1948, in GA 16, 431. 14 Cf. Heidegger, 1994, 26–27. 15 Cf. Heidegger, 1994, 53. 16 Cf. Heidegger, 1953/1987, 213: «[…] what is peddled about nowadays as the philosophy of National Socialism […] has not the least to do with the inner truth and greatness of this movement […].» See the explanation of the context of this quotation in the introduction by Fried and Polt, xv–xvii. 17 It is reported that Heidegger did once describe his rectorship and his related engagement for the regime as «the greatest stupidity of his life» («die größte Dummheit seines Lebens»). Cf. Petzet, 1983, 43. 18 Cf. Heidegger, Letter to Karl Jaspers, March 7, 1950, in Heidegger & Jaspers, 1990, 196–197, and Heidegger, Letter to Hannah Arendt, May 4, 1950, in Arendt & Heidegger, 1998/2002, 98–103. 19 Cf. Heidegger, 1976, Davidson, 1989, and Hachmeister, 2014, 7–60 and 283–310. 20 Cf., e.g., GA 95, 408–409. 13

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of the depth and extent of his involvement with National Socialism. In 1987, Victor Farías caused a sensation with the publication of Heidegger and National Socialism, a book that represented a major contribution to the topic and generated a great deal of controversy.21 In 1988, Hugo Ott revealed, among other things, Heidegger’s chronic careerism with his critical study Heidegger: On the Way to His Biography.22 In 2005, Emmanuel Faye went so far as to argue, in Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy,23 that Heidegger’s involvement with National Socialism was profound enough to discredit his philosophy entirely, a position that was, however, swiftly and strongly contradicted by a team of Heidegger scholars.24 Yet, in My Life in Germany Before and After 1933 (composed in 1940), Heidegger’s former student Karl Löwith had already pointed out that at their last encounter, in Rome in 1936, Heidegger agreed with him «without reservation» that «his taking the side of [National Socialism] lay in the essence of his philosophy».25 Heidegger’s turn to National Socialism also had a forceful impact on his relationship with Husserl. He had dedicated Being and Time to him «in reverence and friendship» (1927).26 For various personal and professional reasons, however, these thinkers gradually drifted very far apart as soon as Heidegger succeeded Husserl at Freiburg (1928).27 Yet, even after they had essentially ended their philosophical relationship, they still had occasional social contact. For example, Husserl invited Heidegger to his home for a «philosopher’s tea» on June 22, 1930, and for the fiftieth anniversary of his own doctorate on January 23, 1933 (one week before Hindenburg named Hitler chancellor), and Heidegger accepted both invitations.28 Toward the middle of 1933, however, not only philosophical differences but also political divisions had presented themselves, as Husserl witnessed Heidegger’s emerging National Socialism 21

Cf. Farías, 1987, 1989a, 1989b, and Altwegg, 1988. Cf. Ott, 1988. 23 Cf. Faye, 2005. 24 Cf. Fédier, 2007. 25 Cf. Löwith, 1986/2007, 58: «[…] weil ich der Meinung sei, dass seine Parteinahme für den N.S. im Wesen seiner Philosophie läge. H. stimmte mir ohne Vorbehalt bei […].» 26 Cf. Heidegger, 1927/1977, v. 27 Cf. Husserl, 1997, 1–32, and Thomä, 2013, 35–44. 28 Cf. Malvine Husserl, Letters to Elisabeth Rosenberg, June 22, 1930, and January 25, 1933, in Husserl, Briefwechsel (henceforth: BW), IX, 378 and 416, respectively. 22

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and increasing anti-Semitism.29 On April 6, 1933, Husserl, with all «non-Arian» civil servants of the state of Baden, was «vacated» («beurlaubt») from his university position by decree A7642 of the regional Reichskommissar; on April 14, he was notified that on the basis of the decree he had been «transferred» into the status of an «enforced leave of absence».30 Husserl called this decree and the Reich-wide measure of April 7, 1933, the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service (Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums), «the greatest personal injury of [his] life».31 Still, by decree A8500 the regional Ministry of Culture in Karlsruhe cancelled («with reservations») the earlier decree with respect to Husserl on April 28; by decree A18814 the cancellation was confirmed on July 20; and Heidegger, who had become Rector of the University of Freiburg on April 21 (and, as indicated above, had joined the N.S.D.A.P. on May 1), signed the cancellation on July 28.32 Yet, on January 15, 1936, Husserl was finally and irrevocably stripped of his permission to teach (Lehrbefugnis or venia legendi), effective retroactively to December 31, 1935.33 These and related developments, accompanied by Husserl’s bouts of self-doubts and Heidegger’s lack of solidarity,34 brought the final end to what Husserl would bitterly recall as «this supposed philosophical friendship between souls».35 There can be no doubt that Husserl saw a direct correlation between the rise of Heidegger’s commitment to National Socialism and anti-Semitism, on the one hand, and the decline and fall of his own relationship with him, on the other.36 After he 29

Cf. Husserl (with Malvine Husserl), Letter to Dietrich Mahnke, May 4/5, 1933, in BW III, 491–502. Cf. Schuhmann, 1977, 428. 31 Cf. Husserl, Letter to Gustav Albrecht, July 1, 1933, in BW IX, 92: «[…] daß ich das neue Beamtengesetz und dann die Beurlaubung als größte Kränkung meines Lebens empfunden habe.» 32 Cf. Schuhmann, 1977, 429, 433. Cf. also Sepp, 1988, 384. Cf. finally the subsequent interpretation of these events by Arendt and Jaspers in Arendt & Jaspers, 1985, 79, 84, 99, 732. 33 Cf. Schuhmann, 1977, 472, and Sepp, 1988, 385. 34 Even the frequently cited letter of Elfride Heidegger to Malvine Husserl of April 29, 1933, is a weak exception to the rule. Cf. Husserl, BW IV, 160–161. On the other hand, it is not true that Heidegger as Rector forbade Husserl entry to the University of Freiburg. Cf. Heidegger, «Letter to the Editor of Der Spiegel», February 22, 1966, in GA 16, 639. 35 Cf. Husserl, Letter to Dietrich Mahnke, May 4, 1933, in BW III, 493. 36 Cf. again Husserl, BW III, 493: «[Der schönste Abschluß dieser vermeintlichen philosophischen Seelenfreundschaft war der (ganz theatralisch) am 1. Mai öffentlich vollzogene Eintritt in die Nationalsozialistische Partei. Vorangegangen ist der von ihm [Heidegger] vollzogene Abbruch des Verkehrs mit mir (und schon bald nach seiner Berufung) und in den letzten Jahren sein immer stärker zum Ausdruck kommender Antisemitismus — auch gegenüber seiner Gruppe begeisterer jüdischer Schüler und in der Fakultät.] Das zu überwinden, war ein schweres Stück.» 30

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stepped down as Rector in 1934, Heidegger continued his membership in the N.S.D.A.P. and his association with National Socialist intellectuals, for example, by serving on the Committee for the Philosophy of Law (or Right) in the Academy for German Law (Ausschuß für Rechtsphilosophie der Akademie für Deutsches Recht), which played the role of an official consulting body for the composition of the Nuremberg Laws of 1935.37 At the end, pleading illness, Heidegger declined to attend Husserl’s funeral on April 29, 1938, a failure for which he later apologized to Husserl’s widow.38 In his recent book Heidegger and the Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy (2014),39 Peter Trawny claims that in his Black Notebooks (2014/15) Heidegger is guilty of «ontological-historical anti-Semitism» (seinsgeschichtlicher Antisemitismus),40 and that therefore one must raise the question whether and to what extent his philosophy is «tainted» or «contaminated» by this anti-Semitism. The dilemma, then, is this: Can one find a mean between (1) the extreme of dismissing the greatness of Heidegger’s philosophy because of the truth of his involvement with National Socialism, and (2) the extreme of discounting the truth of his involvement with National Socialism because of the greatness of his philosophy? In particular, how can Trawny’s thesis about Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism help answer this question? A tenable attempt at an answer to this question must include an inquiry into the connection between Heidegger’s brand of National Socialism and his peculiar kind of anti-Semitism, on the one hand, and his philosophical criticism of Husserl, on the other. 1. HEIDEGGER, TRAWNY, AND «THE MYTH OF THE JEWISH WORLD-CONSPIRACY» In the volumes of his Complete Edition (Gesamtausgabe) that he arranged to be held back until the end, namely, the Black Notebooks (Schwarze Hefte), Heidegger repeatedly 37

Hans Frank, Julius Streicher, Carl Schmitt, and Alfred Rosenberg also sat on the committee. Cf. Heidegger, Letter to Malvine Husserl, March 6, 1950, in GA 16, 443. Cf. also Ott, 1988, 167–168. 39 Cf. Trawny, 2014. 40 In the English translation of Trawny’s book, Andrew Mitchell renders this terminology as «Being-Historical Anti-Semitism». Yet this way of expressing the phenomenon at issue seems unnecessarily awkward. In any case, Trawny’s charge is that Heidegger is guilty of anti-Semitism with respect to the history of Being or that his interpretation of the history of Being is anti-Semitic. 38

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expresses anti-Semitic sentiments. The four volumes of the Black Notebooks that have been published thus far, in 2014–15 as volumes 94–97 of the edition,41 have reopened the heated debate about the philosophical value of Heidegger’s entire legacy.42 The observation that Heidegger’s anti-Semitic remarks make up only a small fraction of the content (c. 6 pages of approximately c. 1,500) of the Black Notebooks of volumes 94–97 of the Complete Edition is valid. The argument that therefore these remarks can be discounted, or that they are thus philosophically insignificant, is not sound. It is not about their relative quantity but about their absolute quality. Thus it is understandable, and in a sense even commendable, that the editor of the Black Notebooks, Peter Trawny, has followed up his work on them with a critical examination, Heidegger and the Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy (Heidegger und der Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung) (2014), in which he charges Heidegger with «ontological-historical anti-Semitism» (seinsgeschichtlicher Antisemitismus). In the introduction to his book, Trawny points out that, although it has been generally accepted that Heidegger was a thinker who associated himself with National Socialism and all that it involves, including anti-Semitism, it has not been generally accepted that Heidegger is guilty of anti-Semitism. He cites skeptics who claim: «Heidegger was engaged in National Socialism […] but he was not an anti-Semite.»43 Given that Heidegger made a number of anti-Semitic statements in places other than, as well as long before, the Black Notebooks, this may seem like an odd claim in any case. In his early correspondence with his future wife Elfride, for example, Heidegger already complains during the First World War: «The Jewification of our culture and universities is terrifying indeed, and I think that the German race should exert as much inner strength as possible to get to the top.»44 This remark was not a slip of the pen on Heidegger’s part, as a related remark, in another letter to Elfride, now his wife, shortly 41

The Complete Edition will ultimately encompass 102 volumes, so that further volumes of the Black Notebooks are planned. Thus this paper takes into account only the Black Notebooks that have been published in volumes 94–97 of the Complete Edition but not those that will appear in volumes 98 ff. 42 Cf. the list of items and events at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Notebooks. 43 Cf. Trawny, 2014, 11. 44 Cf. Heidegger, Letter to Elfride Petri, October 18, 1916, in Heidegger, 2005, 51: «Die Verjudung unserer Kultur u. Universitäten ist allerdings schreckerregend u. ich meine die deutsche Rasse sollte noch soviel innere Kraft aufbringen um in die Höhe zu kommen.» But he adds: «Allerdings das Kapital!» Thus he seems to imply that the Jews have «the capital» to get «to the top».

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after the war shows: «Manesse [?]–Hölderlin is so grotesque that one can only laugh — whether we ever again get out of this contamination and get to an original freshness and earthiness of life — sometimes one would really like to become a spiritual antiSemite.»45 Yet Heidegger’s early Judenangst is not restricted to the academy and culture, for he also writes to his wife again shortly after the war: «Here [in Meßkirch] one talks a lot about the fact that the Jews are buying up so much cattle from the villages that then there will not be any meat for sale in the winter. [… E]verything is flooded with Jews and pushers.»46 Also, having succeeded Husserl at Freiburg in 1928, Heidegger writes to Hannah Arendt in the winter of 1932/1933: «By the way, today I am just as much an antiSemite in university matters as I was 10 years ago and in Marburg […].»47 Moreover, in his last encounter with Karl Jaspers, in Heidelberg on June 6, 1933, Heidegger contradicts his colleague’s dismissal of «the nonsense of the [Protocols of the] Elders of Zion» and asserts: «There is indeed a dangerous international network of [the] Jews.»48 Finally, as Rector of the University of Freiburg in late 1933, Heidegger not only denounces his former student Eduard Baumgarten for having been «everything but a National Socialist» in Freiburg, but also defames him for having had «active contacts» in Göttingen with «the Jew [Eduard] Fraenkel», who had been fired from Freiburg under the National Socialist Civil Service Legislation.49 45

Cf. Heidegger, Letter to Elfride Heidegger, November 8, 1920, in Heidegger, 2005, 116: «Manesse [?]–Hölderlin ist so grotesk, daß man nur lachen kann — ob wir je nochmal aus dieser Verseuchung zu einer ursprünglichen Frische u. Bodenständigkeit des Lebens kommen — manchmal möchte man schon geistiger Antisemit werden.» 46 Cf. Heidegger, Letter to Elfride Heidegger, August 12, 1920, in Heidegger, 2005, 112: «Hier spricht man viel davon, daß jetzt so viel Vieh aus den Dörfern von den Juden fortgekauft wird u. daß es dann mit dem Fleischverkauf im Winter zu Ende sei. […] alles ist überschwemmt von Juden u. Schiebern.» 47 Cf. Heidegger, Letter to Hannah Arendt, Winter 1932/33, in Arendt & Heidegger, 1998/2002, 69: «Im übrigen bin ich heute in Universitätsfragen genau so Antisemit wie vor 10 Jahren und in Marburg […].» Heidegger taught at Marburg from 1923 to 1928. 48 Cf. Jaspers, 1977, 46 (quoting Heidegger): «Es gibt doch eine gefährliche internationale Verbindung der Juden.» 49 Despite disclaimers by his defenders (he did write a letter in defense of Fraenkel on July 12, 1933 [cf. GA 16, 140–141]), it is very highly likely that Heidegger’s denunciation of Baumgarten is genuine. Cf. Ott, 1988, 183–184, and Heidegger & Jaspers, 1990, 168–172, where Jaspers mentions the case (February 6, 1949) and Heidegger does not contradict him (June 22, 1949). Heidegger’s act played a key role in Jaspers’s Letter of Assessment (December 22, 1945) on Heidegger’s case to the Settlement Commission of the University of Freiburg. Cf. Ott, 1988, 315–317, especially 316. In his Letter of Assessment, Jaspers states that «in the 1920s, Heidegger was not an anti-Semite», suggests that he «became, at least in certain contexts, an anti-Semite in 1933», and points out the occasionalopportunistic character of his anti-Semitism. Given Heidegger’s earlier anti-Semitic utterances to others, and given that Heidegger and Jaspers became acquainted in the spring of 1920 (at Husserl’s house) and were close personally and philosophically until around 1933, it is more likely that Heidegger concealed his anti-Semitism

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For his part, Trawny aims to subject the thesis that Heidegger was not an antiSemite to a special kind of revision. For this purpose, he first distinguishes some of the characteristic features of anti-Semitism: Anti-Semitic was and is what is affectively and/or administratively directed against Jews on the basis of rumors, prejudices, and pseudo-scientific (race-theoretical or racist) sources, and leads to a) defamation, to b) a general picture of «the enemy», to c) isolation (by means of occupational prohibitions, ghettos, or camps), to d) expulsion or emigration, to e) destruction by means of pogroms, mass executions, or destruction camps. Today, in addition, what is supposed to characterize the Jews as «the Jews» is to be designated as anti-Semitic.50

Trawny first establishes that Heidegger makes anti-Semitic statements in his Black Notebooks. For example, describing «the end of the history of the great beginning of the Western human being» and the «transformation» of its «guardianship over Being» into «the claim of a re-presentation of being in its machination-like un-essence» as a «struggle» for «groundedness», Heidegger says this: And perhaps in this «struggle», in which aimlessness itself is struggled over and which therefore can only be the caricature of a «struggle», the greater groundlessness, which is bound to nothing, and which makes use of everything (Jewry), will «emerge victorious». But the real victory, the victory of history over that which lacks history, will be won only there where that which is groundless excludes itself because it does not risk Being but rather always only reckons with being and posits its calculations as what is actual.51

He adds for good measure this: One of the most hidden forms of the gigantic, and perhaps the oldest, is the tough skillfulness of calculating and pushing and mixing together in which the worldlessness of Jewry is grounded.52

from Jaspers, whose wife, Gertrud Mayer, was Jewish. See again Heidegger’s admission of his long-standing academic anti-Semitism in his Letter to Arendt of Winter 1932/1933. 50 Cf. Trawny, 2014, 11. 51 GA 95, 96–97: «Und vielleicht “siegt” in diesem “Kampf”, in dem um die Ziellosigkeit schlechthin gekämpft wird und der daher nur das Zerrbild des “Kampfes” sein kann, die größere Bodenlosigkeit, die an nichts gebunden, alles sich dienstbar macht (das Judentum). Aber der eigentliche Sieg, der Sieg der Geschichte über das Geschichtslose, wird nur dort errungen, wo das Bodenlose sich selbst ausschließt, weil es das Seyn nicht wagt, sondern immer nur mit dem Seienden rechnet und seine Berechnungen als das Wirkliche setzt.» 52 GA 95, 97: «Eine der verstecktesten Gestalten des Riesigen und vielleicht die älteste ist die zähe Geschicklichkeit des Rechnens und Schiebens und Durcheinandermischens, wodurch die Weltlosigkeit des Judentums gegründet wird.»

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And finally also this: World Jewry, incited by the emigrants who were allowed to leave Germany, is everywhere incomprehensible, and, with all its expansion of power, does not need to participate in acts of war, whereas we have no other alternative but to sacrifice the best blood of the best of our people.53

Thus Heidegger’s anti-Semitism in the Black Notebooks is beyond question.54 Having laid this foundation, Trawny then charges Heidegger not with vulgar National Socialist antiSemitism but with what he calls «ontological-historical anti-Semitism»:55 Our view of Heidegger obtains a new facet, unknown until now: Along a certain section of his path, the philosopher opened his thinking up to an anti-Semitism that can more exactly be designated as ontological-historical anti-Semitism. As will be seen, there seems to be no doubt about this. Everything depends, however, on clarifying what is to be understood by the concept of «ontological-historical anti-Semitism». The first intention of the following considerations is to develop a sensibility for this concept.56

Trawny explains what he means by ontological-historical anti-Semitism mainly and mostly in the chapter entitled «Types of ontological-historical anti-Semitism».57 There he connects generic anti-Semitism with specifically Heideggerian anti-Semitism: Anti-Semitism is the focal point of its different forms. With respect to Heidegger, there are found in the Black Notebooks three remarks that lead one to infer three different, inherently coherent, types of ontological-historical anti-Semitism. The concept of ontological-historical anti-Semitism should not at all suggest that we are dealing with an especially elaborate or refined anti-Semitism. Basically, Heidegger referred to definite, generally known forms. Yet he interpreted them philosophically, that is, ontologically-historically.58

Trawny claims that «the three types of this anti-Semitism», that is, Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism, emerge in the following three sets of remarks from 53

GA 96, 262: «Das Weltjudentum, aufgestachelt durch die aus Deutschland hinausgelassenen Emigranten, ist überall unfaßbar und braucht sich bei aller Machtentfaltung nirgends an kriegerischen Handlungen zu beteiligen, wogegen uns nur bleibt, das beste Blut der Besten des eigenen Volkes zu opfern.» 54 Cf. also GA 95, 161, 325, and GA 96, 133 («das internationale Judentum»). 55 This decision is consistent with the position that Heidegger does not embrace biological racism, though he seems to endorse «intellectual» or «spiritual racism» (GA 94, 142–143, 189, 191), analogously to his distinction between «vulgar National Socialism» and «intellectual» or «spiritual National Socialism» («der geistige Nationalsozialismus») (GA 94, 135). 56 Cf. Trawny, 2014, 11. 57 Cf. Trawny, 2014, 31–57. 58 Cf. Trawny, 2014, 31.

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the Black Notebooks (with enhanced context for better understanding): [1] For the same reason [a gross ignorance of the essence of Being and its being beyond power and impotence], however, every «pacifism» and every «liberalism» are also not in a position to penetrate into the area of essential decisions, because they only rise to the level of counter-play against genuine and artificial warriordom. The reason for the temporary increase in the power of Jewry, however, lies in the fact that the metaphysics of the West, especially in its modern development, provided the starting place for the spreading of an otherwise empty rationality and calculative capacity, which in this way lodged itself in the «spirit» without being able to grasp the hidden areas of decision on its own. The more original and initial the future decisions and questions become, the more inaccessible they remain to this «race». (Thus Husserl’s move to phenomenological observation, which involves distancing oneself against psychological explanation and historical accounting of opinions, is of lasting importance — and yet nowhere does it reach into the areas of essential decisions, but rather presupposes everywhere the historical tradition of philosophy; the necessary consequence shows itself at once in the change of course into Neo-Kantian transcendental philosophy, a change of course that in the end made unavoidable a progression into Hegelianism in the formal sense. My «attack» against Husserl is not directed against him alone and not at all essential — the attack goes against the omission of the question of Being, that is, against the essence of metaphysics as such, on the basis of which the machination of being is able to determine history. The attack grounds a historical moment of the highest decision between the priority of what is and the grounding of the truth of Being.)59 [2] The fact that in the age of machination race is elevated to the express and especially established «principle» of history (or only of Historie) is not the arbitrary invention of «doctrinaires», but rather a consequence of the power of machination, which must force what is, according to all its areas, into the planned calculation. By means of the thought of race, «life» is brought into the form of breedability that represents a kind of calculation. The Jews, with their emphatically calculating talent, have already been «living» for the

59

GA 96, 46–47: «Aus demselben Grunde aber ist auch jeder “Pazifismus” und jeder “Liberalismus” außerstande, in den Bezirk wesentlicher Entscheidungen vorzudringen, weil er es nur zum Gegenspiel gegen das echte und unechte Kriegertum bringt. Die zeitweilige Machtsteigerung des Judentums aber hat darin ihren Grund, daß die Metaphysik des Abendlandes, zumal in ihrer neuzeitlichen Entfaltung, die Ansatzstelle bot für das Sichbreitmachen einer sonst leeren Rationalität und Rechenfähigkeit, die sich auf solchem Wege eine Unterkunft im “Geist” verschaffte, ohne die verborgenen Entscheidungsbezirke von sich aus je fassen zu können. Je ursprünglicher und anfänglicher die künftigen Entscheidungen und Fragen werden, umso unzugänglicher bleiben sie dieser “Rasse”. (So ist Husserls Schritt zur phänomenologischen Betrachtung unter Absetzung gegen die psychologische Erklärung und historische Verrechnung von Meinungen von bleibender Wichtigkeit — und dennoch reicht sie nirgends in die Bezirke wesentlicher Entscheidungen, setzt vielmehr die historische Überlieferung der Philosophie überall voraus; die notwendige Folge zeigt sich alsbald im Einschwenken in die neukantische Transzendentalphilosophie, das schließlich einen Fortgang zum Hegelianismus im formalen Sinne unvermeidlich machte. Mein “Angriff” gegen Husserl ist nicht gegen ihn allein gerichtet und überhaupt unwesentlich — der Angriff geht gegen das Versäumnis der Seinsfrage, d.h. gegen das Wesen der Metaphysik als solcher, auf deren Grund die Machenschaft des Seienden die Geschichte zu bestimmen vermag. Der Angriff gründet einen geschichtlichen Augenblick der höchsten Entscheidung zwischen dem Vorrang des Seienden und der Gründung der Wahrheit des Seyns.)»

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longest time according to the principle of race, which is also why they most strongly resist the unrestricted application of the principle. The establishment of racial breeding does not stem from «life» itself, but rather from the overpowering of life by means of machination. What this machination pursues with such planning is a complete de-racing of peoples by means of the harnessing of them into the establishment of all that is, built the same and cut the same. Along with the de-racing goes an alienation of peoples from themselves — the loss of history — that is, the loss of the areas of decision next to Being. And thus are buried the only possibilities that peoples of their own primordial historical power bring themselves to unity in their counter-agility: for example, the concept that knows and the passion for sense-reflection with the depth and breadth of the uncanny […].60 [3] Why do we recognize so late that in truth England is and can be without a Western attitude? Because only in the future will we comprehend that England began to set up the modern world, but modernity, according to its essence, is directed toward the unleashing of the machination of the entire globe. The thought of an understanding with England in the sense of a distribution of the «rights» of the imperialisms also does not get at the essence of the historical process that England is now playing out within Americanism and Bolshevism, and that means, at the same time, within world Jewry too. The question about the role of world Jewry is not a racial one, but rather the metaphysical question about the kind of humanity that, without any restraints whatsoever, can take over the uprooting of all that is from Being as a world-historical «task».61

Clearly Heidegger’s remarks here are (1) anti-Semitic and (2) «philosophical» (lucus a non lucendo, as Husserl would say) in the sense that they are different in kind from the usual

60

GA 96, 56: «Daß im Zeitalter der Machenschaft die Rasse zum ausgesprochenen und eigens eingerichteten “Prinzip” der Geschichte (oder nur der Historie) erhoben wird, ist nicht die willkürliche Erfindung von “Doktrinären”, sondern eine Folge der Macht der Machenschaft, die das Seiende nach allen seinen Bereichen in die planhafte Berechnung niederzwingen muß. Durch den Rassegedanken wird “das Leben” in die Form der Züchtbarkeit gebracht, die eine Art der Berechnung darstellt. Die Juden “leben” bei ihrer betont rechnerischen Begabung am längsten schon nach dem Rasseprinzip, weshalb sie sich auch am heftigsten gegen die uneingeschränkte Anwendung zur Wehr setzen. Die Einrichtung der rassischen Aufzucht entstammt nicht dem “Leben” selbst, sondern der Übermächtigung des Lebens durch die Machenschaft. Was diese mit solcher Planung betreibt, ist eine vollständige Entrassung der Völker durch die Einspannung derselben in die gleichgebaute und gleichschnittige Einrichtung alles Seienden. Mit der Entrassung geht eine Selbstentfremdung der Völker in eins — der Verlust der Geschichte — d.h. der Entscheidungsbezirke zum Seyn. Und damit verschütten sich die einzigen Möglichkeiten, daß Völker ureigener Geschichtskraft in ihrer Gegenwendigkeit sich zur Einheit bringen: z.B. der wissende Begriff und die Leidenschaft der Besinnung mit der Innigkeit und Weite des Unheimlichen […].» 61 GA 96, 243: «Warum erkennen wir so spät, daß England in Wahrheit ohne abendländische Haltung ist und sein kann? Weil wir erst künftig begreifen werden, daß England die neuzeitliche Welt einzurichten begann, die Neuzeit aber ihrem Wesen nach auf die Entfesselung der Machenschaft des gesamten Erdkreises gerichtet ist. Auch der Gedanke einer Verständigung mit England im Sinne einer Verteilung der “Gerechtsamen” der Imperialismen trifft nicht ins Wesen des geschichtlichen Vorganges, den England jetzt innerhalb des Amerikanismus und des Bolschewismus und d.h. zugleich auch des Weltjudentums zu Ende spielt. Die Frage nach der Rolle des Weltjudentums ist keine rassische, sondern die metaphysische Frage nach der Art von Menschentümlichkeit, die schlechthin ungebunden die Entwurzelung alles Seienden aus dem Sein als weltgeschichtliche “Aufgabe” übernehmen kann.»

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biological, racial, vulgar anti-Semitism that one finds in National Socialism as conceived, preached, and practiced by Hitler, Rosenberg, Streicher, et al. Evidently, Heidegger did not share their primitive anti-Semitism.62 The special-specific character of Heidegger’s remarks is highlighted by the fact that he too does also make numerous other remarks that must be categorized as anti-Semitic but in a sense different from the ontologicallyhistorically anti-Semitic sense that Trawny describes.63 With respect to passages 1–3 above, however, one wonders whether it is more accurate to speak of «three types» (as Trawny does) or rather of three aspects of Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism. Here a quotation from a different chapter, «The ontological-historical concept of “race”»,64 clarifies what Trawny means by the ontological-historical anti-Semitism that he attributes to Heidegger: The ontological-historical anti-Semitism [Der seinsgeschichtliche Antisemitismus] consists in the fact that Heidegger believes this: The Jews, who live «according to the principle of race» [«nach dem Rasseprinzip»], make, in the «unconditionality» of «machination» [in der «Unbedingtheit» der «Machenschaft»], this «brutalitas of Being» [diese «brutalitas des Seins»], precisely the interpretation of themselves founded on this «principle of race» [Rasseprinzip], which gives them the task of pursuing, «without any restraints whatsoever» [«schlechthin ungebunden»], «the uprooting of being» [die «Entwurzelung des Seienden»] for the purpose and goal of the «expansion» of their «power» [ihre «Machtentfaltung»]. «World Jewry» [Das «Weltjudentum»] must have appeared to him as a people [ein Volk] or as the group of a people [die Gruppe eines Volkes], who or which, with the greatest self-concentration [in höchster Selbstkonzentration], pursued no other goal than the undermining of all other peoples [die Zersetzung aller anderen Völker]: a «race» [«Rasse»] that deliberately [bewusst] pursues «the de-racing of peoples» [die «Entrassung der Völker»].65

Thus Trawny argues, and, it seems, convincingly, that Heidegger’s remarks in the Black Notebooks are fraught not only with anti-Semitism generally but also with ontological-historical anti-Semitism specifically. The undeniable merits of Trawny’s book are that it clearly identifies the problem of ontological-historical anti-Semitism in Heidegger’s Black Notebooks and that it provides an accurate term for the phenomenon.

62

Cf., e.g., GA 16, 414. Cf. also Sluga, 1993, 101–124, and Thomä, «Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus», in Thomä, 2013,108–133, especially 113–125. 63 Cf. the representative sampling of such remarks in Thomä, 2013, 116–117. 64 Cf. Trawny, 2014, 59–69. 65 Cf. Trawny, 2014, 69.

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No reasonable person would think that Trawny’s case is weakened by the fact that Heidegger himself does not speak of «ontological-historical anti-Semitism». There is also no evidence that Heidegger thinks of himself as being anti-Semitic in any «unfair» sense. 2. TRAWNY ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER Trawny emphasizes Heidegger’s prominent mention of Husserl in the context of his own anti-Semitic statements. He also devotes an entire chapter, «Heidegger and Husserl»,66 to the relationship between these two philosophers. Thus he seems to suggest that there is a substantive connection between Heidegger’s special anti-Semitism and his material critique of Husserl. Therefore the natural question is whether and to what extent Trawny’s analysis of Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism casts any light on the philosophical relationship between him and Husserl. Just another way of posing the question is thus: Does Trawny show that Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism is relevant to his philosophical critique of Husserl’s phenomenology? Or does he suggest, perhaps inadvertently, that, because it is not, one has less reason to think that Heidegger is guilty, as charged, of ontological-historical anti-Semitism? There is a need for a very careful reading here. The passage in which Heidegger refers to Husserl in connection with his own ontological-historical anti-Semitism has already been cited, but it deserves closer scrutiny. Properly understood, the passage is a whole that consists of two parts that are in turn conjoined by one transitional but pivotal word. First, Heidegger sets the stage with a series of remarks of a general nature: [1a] For the same reason [a gross ignorance of the essence of Being and its being beyond power and impotence], however, every «pacifism» and every «liberalism» are also not in a position to penetrate into the area of essential decisions, because they only rise to the level of counter-play against genuine and artificial warriordom. The reason for the temporary increase in the power of Jewry, however, lies in the fact that the metaphysics of the West, especially in its modern development, provided the starting place for the spreading of an otherwise empty rationality and calculative capacity, which in this way lodged itself in the «spirit» without being able to grasp the hidden areas of decision on

66

Cf. Trawny, 2014, 81–92.

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its own. The more original and initial the future decisions and questions become, the more inaccessible they remain to this «race».67

Then, as if to illustrate what he has said about «Jewry», Heidegger applies it, in parentheses, to Husserl, whom he does not name as a Jew, but whom every informed reader will immediately recognize as a Jewish convert to Lutheran Christianity (1886):68 [1b] (Thus Husserl’s move to phenomenological observation, which involves distancing oneself against psychological explanation and historical accounting of opinions, is of lasting importance — and yet nowhere does it reach into the areas of essential decisions, but rather presupposes everywhere the historical tradition of philosophy; the necessary consequence shows itself at once in the change of course into Neo-Kantian transcendental philosophy, a change of course that in the end made unavoidable a progression into Hegelianism in the formal sense. My «attack» against Husserl is not directed against him alone and not at all essential — the attack goes against the omission of the question of Being, that is, against the essence of metaphysics as such, on the basis of which the machination of being is able to determine history. The attack grounds a historical moment of the highest decision between the priority of what is and the grounding of the truth of Being.)69

Thus Heidegger cites Husserl as an example of a thinker whose thinking does not reach into «the areas of essential decisions». At first sight, then, Heidegger might seem to be arguing, straight-forwardly and syllogistically, (1) that all Jews are «incapable of penetrating into the areas of essential decisions and thus omit the question of Being», (2) that Husserl was a Jew, and (3) that therefore he was «incapable of penetrating into the areas of essential decisions and thus omitted the question of Being». On the other hand, it is a legitimate question whether this is a case of an anti-Semitic thinker making a prejudice-based judgment about a Jewish thinker, or a case of one, non-Jewish, thinker critically pointing out the supposed substantive shortcomings of another, Jewish, thinker. It should go without saying that Husserl did not regard himself as a Jewish philosopher,70 67

Cf. again GA 96, 46. Cf. Schuhmann, 1977, 15–16. 69 Cf. again GA 96, 46–47. 70 Cf., e.g., Husserl, Letter to Dietrich Mahnke, October 17, 1921, in BW III, 431–435: «[…] Ich bin rein jüdischer Abstammung, habe aber nie eine konfessionelle oder “völkische” jüdische Erziehung genossen. Ich habe mich nie anders denn als Deutscher gefühlt und fühlen können, ich bin von meinen Kinderjahren her mit einer unendlichen Liebe in die Geistigkeit des deutschen Volks und in ihre endlosen herrlichen Horizonte hineingewachsen. […] Mein ganzes Leben, eigentlich schon von meinem 18. Lebensjahr, spielte sich so ganz außer Zusammenhang mit dem Judentum ab, daß ich eigentlich jahrzehntelang und bis vor kurzem daran vergessen habe, daß ich eigentlich rassenmäßig Jude sei. […] In meinem ganzen Lehren und Wirken, in meinem ganzen 68

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and that it does not exactly speak for Heidegger that he regards him as such here. Trawny leads off his case that Heidegger is guilty of ontological-historical antiSemitism with the passage in question (first 1 and then 1a and 1b above). It is both a cornerstone and the capstone of his chapter on Heidegger’s ontological-historical antiSemitism.71 He offers the following interpretation of the passage: Heidegger connects calculation completely generally with rationality. By doing so, he can classify [einordnen] his former teacher Edmund Husserl into a history in which a «temporary increase in the power of Jewry» condemns the «metaphysics of the West, especially in its modern development», to a lack of decisiveness [Entscheidungslosigkeit]. Heidegger speaks of an «attack» on Husserl that he, however, immediately relativizes [relativiert]. It is «not at all essential». Yet, against the background of the initial classification [Einordnung], the relativization [Relativierung] remains not credible [unglaubwürdig]. Husserl gets written [wird eingeschrieben] into a history of an «empty rationality and calculative capacity» on the basis of his belonging to a «race». One should, of course, not overlook the fact that Heidegger puts this concept in quotation marks; still, however one interprets this, it cannot moderate [abschwächen] anything about the general direction of Heidegger’s thoughts.72

What elevates the passage in question to the status of a linchpin in Trawny’s analysis, however, is the fact that it is the only one in the Black Notebooks of volumes 94–97 of the Complete Edition in which Heidegger mentions Husserl in close proximity to his anti-Semitic remarks generally or to his ontologically-historically anti-Semitic remarks specifically. According to Trawny, then, Heidegger is attacking Husserl’s philosophy by attacking his person (ad hominem), or, more precisely, his membership in a «“race”», making the fact of his Jewishness «responsible» («verantwortlich») for the failure of his phenomenology to reach into «the areas of essential decisions» and «explaining» Husserl’s phenomenology «indirectly in terms of the character of a “race”».73 This would be, and not only according to Trawny, profoundly unphilosophical. Bracketing Trawny’s specific interpretation, what speaks for the general anti-Semitic

Lebensstreben hatte ich das einzige Verantwortungsbewußtsein (in dieser Welt) “meinem” deutschen Volk gegenüber. […].» Ironically, it was the «philosophical anti-Semitism» of Hans Pichler (University of Greifswald), to whom Mahnke had asked him to write a letter of recommendation on his behalf, that reminded Husserl of his Jewish roots. Cf. also Husserl’s Letter to Mahnke of May 4/5, 1933, in BW III, 492–499.

Cf. Trawny, 2014, 31–32, 33–39. Cf. Trawny, 2014, 37. 73 Cf. Trawny, 2014, 37, 39. 71

72

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reading is the fact that, while in this context he does refer to «Neo-Kantian transcendental philosophy» and «Hegelianism in the formal sense» (both these criticisms would require separate analyses), Heidegger mentions by name no other thinker than Husserl. What speaks for the neutral reading is the fact that in other places in the Black Notebooks Heidegger often speaks of other thinkers, both Jewish and non-Jewish, whose thinking also did not reach into «the areas of essential decisions» because, according to him, all of them, like Husserl, got so wrapped up in inquires into being(s) that they lost sight of the question of Being.74 To use a metaphor that Heidegger, who spent approximately fifteen years of his life studying and writing in a Hütte in the Schwarzwald at Todtnauberg, would have understood, they missed the forest (Being) for the trees (beings). Yet there is a very fine line here. On the one hand, Heidegger appears to suggest that his critique of Husserl’s phenomenology is primarily philosophical. Indeed, the first thing that he does after mentioning his name is to say something positive about his phenomenological approach to philosophical topics. On the other hand, Heidegger does also seem to adduce Husserl’s philosophy as a specific example of Jewish thinking generally. One could also, but not easily, get the impression that Heidegger regards Husserl as an unwitting member of a «Jewish world conspiracy» that sought the deracination of all being(s) from the ground of Being and the de-racing of all peoples from the history of Being. Seldom have two letters spoken so many, or so few, volumes as they do in the word «So» that Heidegger uses to link, logically or not, the two parts of this one passage. But what exactly does this translated word «Thus» signify?75 What is its force? What is its valence? At least, it is evident that Trawny is wrong to impute to Heidegger the view that «the temporary increase in the power of Jewry» is the cause of which the effect is «the inability of modern Western metaphysics» to pose «the decisive question about Being», for Heidegger says the opposite.76 If Trawny is wrong about this basic fact of the case, then he may also be wrong about the connections that Heidegger is making between «the power of Jewry», Western metaphysics, and Husserl’s phenomenology.

74

Cf., e.g., GA 94, 345. Obviously the «So» in question can also be translated as «In this way». 76 Cf. GA 96, 46–47, and Trawny, 2014, 37, 39. 75

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In fact, there is another, completely different, more nuanced, and preeminently tenable, reading of the passage in question, and it is one that runs directly counter to Trawny’s interpretation. One may, namely, understand Heidegger to be saying expressis verbis that his «attack» on Husserl had nothing to do with his Jewishness but rather was primarily, if not purely, philosophical in nature. One may, that is, understand Heidegger to be saying that Husserl’s phenomenology represents a case study in «the essence of metaphysics as such», which favors being(s) and forgets Being and is therefore vulnerable to his «attack». On this reading, one should not follow Trawny and dismiss Heidegger’s qualification of his generalization without further ado as «not credible». Because this seems to be the most sensible prima facie reading of the passage in question, one should, on a judicious interpretation, understand Heidegger to be saying precisely this. Thus, due to his ontological-historical anti-Semitism, Heidegger does single out «the Jews», but, despite his ontological-historical anti-Semitism, he does not single out «the Jew Husserl». Indeed, the only reason why Heidegger «singles out» Husserl in this passage is to emphasize that he is not singling him out. Therefore there seems to be not only conceivable doubt but also reasonable doubt as to whether Heidegger is using Husserl as a Jewish thinker to advance the ontological-historical anti-Semitic reading of the development of modern Western metaphysics. Finally, it is crucial to register again the fact that there are two parts to Heidegger’s argument in the passage in question, namely, (1) that «the reason for the temporary increase in the power of Jewry» was «the failure of the metaphysics of the West to penetrate into the area of essential decisions», and (2) that Husserl’s phenomenology is part not of «the temporary increase in the power of Jewry» but of «the metaphysics of the West in its modern development». It is evident, then, that, however false and even perverse point (1) may be, Heidegger criticizes Husserl on point (2) not for personal but for philosophical reasons, that is, because he thinks that phenomenology is a philosophical approach that neglects or omits the question of Being in order to investigate beings. In a word, Heidegger’s criticism of Husserl is not that he is Jewish but that he is Western, and he goes out of his way to make this clear by adding a lengthy clarification in parentheses. To be clear: Heidegger is guilty, as charged by Trawny, of ontological-historical anti-Semitism. And, if he is saying that due to their «(“)race(”)» all Jewish thinkers fail to achieve access to «the area of essential decisions», then his saying that due to

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other «reasons» some non-Jewish thinkers also fail to do so cannot save him from the charge of ontological-historical anti-Semitism. But does Heidegger say anywhere in the Black Notebooks that have been published thus far that anyone other than he himself has succeeded in achieving access to «the area of essential decisions» with respect to Being? And does he use Husserl’s Jewishness against him in his criticism of his philosophy? Or can it be that in making an apparent exception for Husserl to his generalization about Jews Heidegger is playing the usual National Socialist game of «the exceptional Jew»?77 In light of the importance of the matter, one should in any case avoid the precipitous conclusion that Heidegger mentions Husserl here because of his own anti-Semitism, ontological-historical or other. 3. MISSING LINKS IN TRAWNY’S ANALYSIS OF THE HEIDEGGER-HUSSERL RELATIONSHIP As corroborative evidence for a more nuanced reading than Trawny’s, one need only take into account two other passages in the Black Notebooks in which Heidegger mentions Husserl, but in which he does not refer to his or anyone else’s being Jewish. These passages are not from volume 96 but from volume 94 of the Complete Edition, so it is possible to overlook their direct relevance to the issue at hand. In the first passage, Heidegger, expressing irritation at the cool reception of his recently published On the Essence of Ground (1929), says with respect to Husserl: Here it is over with the accounting for «influences» and dependences on Husserl, Dilthey, Kierkegaard, and whatever their names are. Here what should count — if at all — is to get serious about a confrontation with antiquity and with the repeated problem of Being. Instead of that, the prattle obviously mounts up from week to week.78

77

Cf. Arendt, 1951/2004, 82–93, 99, 105–116, and 1963, 117–119. Cf. also Heidegger, Letter to Hannah Arendt, Winter 1932/33 (in Arendt & Heidegger, 1998/2002, 68–69), in which he (1) rejects the charge of «“impassioned antiSemitism”», (2) admits to long-standing anti-Semitism «in Universitätsfragen», (3) claims that it has «nothing at all» to do with his «personal relationships to Jews (e.g. Husserl, Misch, Cassirer, and others)», and (4) adds that «above all» it «cannot affect the relationship» to Arendt — a Jew. 78 GA 94, 32: «Hier ist es aus mit dem Nachrechnen von “Einflüssen” und Abhängigkeiten von Husserl, Dilthey, Kierkegaard und wie sie alle heißen. Hier gälte es — wenn schon — Ernst zu machen mit einer Auseinandersetzung mit der Antike und mit dem wiederholten Seinsproblem. Statt dessen häuft sich von Woche zu Woche offenbar das Geschwätz.»

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Heidegger proceeds to criticize «the idle talk about “philosophy of existence”» («das Gerede über die “Existenzphilosophie”») and those who may be «influenced» by Kierkegaard, Kant, and Hegel, those who «talk like» Hartmann or Cassirer, and those who hold «some rootless and homeless “universal opinion”» («irgendwelche wurzel- und heimatlose “allgemeine Meinung”»).79 Of all the thinkers who are named in this entry, the only ones who are Jewish are Husserl and Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945). As is well known, significant philosophical differences between Heidegger and Cassirer, especially with respect to their varying interpretations of Kant, emerged at their Davos Dispute (1929).80 In the second passage, Heidegger, criticizing what he regards as a series of unsuccessful attempts by the thinkers of the Western metaphysical tradition to recapture the original sense of the question of Being, says with respect to Husserl and Scheler: […] It all stayed the same. The phenomenologists (Husserl and Scheler) achieved one thing: they awakened direct questioning — questioning turned toward the things themselves (intuition — essence), that is, something of the attitude of antiquity. But [it remained] rootless and submissive to the 19th century — in its schemata and «problems».81

Max Scheler (1874–1928), of course, was the son of a Lutheran father and an Orthodox Jewish mother who turned to Catholicism in his adolescence but in his maturity eschewed Catholicism as well as Jewish-Christianity and embraced humanistic philosophical anthropology. Despite his partial Jewish ancestry, however, Heidegger held him in the highest regard, and, after his death, recalled him as «the strongest philosophical force in modern Germany, nay, in contemporary Europe, and even in contemporary philosophy as such».82 In this long entry, Heidegger also mentions, in order of appearance, Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Hegel, Nietzsche, Jaspers, Weber, Kant, and Kierkegaard.83 Given that no one on this list is Jewish, there can be no issue here of an ontologically-historically anti-Semitic interpretation of the history of the question of

79

Cf. GA 94, 32. Cf. Gordon, 2010. 81 GA 94, 50: «[…] Alles blieb beim Alten. Die Phänomenologen (Husserl und Scheler) leisteten das eine: sie erweckten das unmittelbare — den Sachen selbst zugewandte Ver-nehmen (Anschauung — Wesen), d.h. etwas von der Haltung der Antike. Aber wurzellos und dem 19. Jahrhundert botmäßig — in dessen Schemata und “Problemen”.» 82 Cf. Heidegger, 1978, 50. 83 Cf. GA 94, 48–51. 80

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Being, Jaspers’s Jewish wife Gertrud (née Mayer) notwithstanding.84 In fact, Trawny neglects to weigh adequately these other two passages, in which Heidegger refers to Husserl in connection with specifically and exclusively philosophical concerns, and mentions his name as only one in a series of names of thinkers past and present, very few of whom are Jewish or have Jewish relations. If one argues that in passages 1a and 1b above Heidegger is denying what simply must be true, namely, that his «attack on Husserl» is motivated by ontological-historical anti-Semitism (an expression, again, that Heidegger does not use), then this approach can only rest on a presumption of guilt. No reasonable reader will fail, however, to apply the legal-hermeneutical principle of in dubio pro reo in reading any author, including Heidegger, whom he or she seeks genuinely to understand on their own terms. The accused is granted the benefit of the doubt, or in case of doubt one must find for the accused. Yet the most serious problem with Trawny’s attempt to establish a connection between Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism and his criticism of Husserl is its selectivity. Thus Trawny also neglects to account for Heidegger’s philosophical critique of Husserl in still other places in the Black Notebooks. In a long passage from volume 97 of the Complete Edition, for example, Heidegger writes this about Husserl: Has he who utters in thought the principle «to the things themselves» already proved himself as the one with a knowledge of the things themselves? No. He can still unsuspectingly commit an oversight in the matter of thinking and by such an oversight act most unsuspectingly against his own principle — still unable to sacrifice the principle too to the thing. The matter of thinking could demand that the principle in essence transform itself. «That something (what?) shows itself from out of itself» — is not only another formulation of the principle that the description be appropriate to the thing. Already in that turn of phrase is speaking the turning of thinking to ’Αλńθεια as an essential feature of Being itself in the sense of presence. Husserl not only knows nothing about all this; he resists it. One should really just look up the «Afterword» of the seventy-two year old to the Ideas and recognize that there the same is recorded as the Logos-article of 1910 says. Despite this, the Logical Investigations were a stimulus, not the execution, and not the ability to think the experience of ’Αλńθεια from out of the experience of the forgottenness of Being.85

84

In this connection, Gregory Fried once suggested to me that for Heidegger Plato was «the first Jew» (!). I agreed, but we both added that, if this is Heidegger’s way of thinking, then it is laden with questionable prejudices and tendentious presuppositions. 85 GA 97, 442: «Hat sich, wer im Denken das Prinzip “zu den Sachen selbst” ausspricht, der schon als der Sachkundige bewährt? Nein. Er kann sich in der Sache des Denkens noch arg versehen und bei solchem Versehen am ärgsten gegen sein eigenes Prinzip handeln — unvermögend, auch das Prinzip noch der Sache zu opfern. Die

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Heidegger draws a harsh conclusion: «By means of a mere principle of this kind (To the things themselves!) one does not yet become one who knows the things themselves.»86 Lest one think that here Heidegger is arguing against Husserl as a Jew, one should note that he continues with general observations about «the genuine teacher» and «learning»: The genuine teacher does not present propositions and rules. He lets learn. Learning prepares itself to experience, to repeat and to anticipate, what it at first means and has straightaway seen. Letting learn gives freedom [to learners] for the arrival of the thing; brings [them] into the journeyship among the things.87

Expressing not only a philosophical but also a pedagogical critique of Husserl, Heidegger applies these general observations to the particular case of his former teacher: In his time between 1890 and 1900, Husserl was, through his Logical Investigations, a teacher, even though the foundation of these investigations still moved completely within the traditional field of the doctrine of consciousness. The fact that here, vis-à-vis all empty and accidental argumentation and historical assertion, he simply risked the step into letting see, remains his historical position. Precisely this [is what] his mere adherents and propagandists do not want to see. The false admiration for his later philosophy makes him look ridiculous and makes of him, against his will, a bungler. Everyone who learns, however, is silent about the teacher.88

In these and such passages, one comes closer to a genuine understanding of Heidegger’s Sache des Denkens könnte verlangen, daß sich das Prinzip im Wesen wandelt. “Daß sich (was?) von ihm selbst her zeige” — ist nicht nur eine andere Formulierung des Prinzips der sachgemäßen Beschreibung. In jener Wendung spricht schon die Wendung des Denkens in die ’Αλńθεια als Wesenszug des Seins selbst im Sinne des Anwesens. Von allem diesen weiß Husserl nicht nur nichts; er sperrt sich dagegen. Das ‘Nachwort’ des 72 jährigen zu den “Ideen” möge man doch nachlesen und erkennen, daß hier das Gleiche festgehalten ist, was der Logosaufsatz von 1910 sagt. Trotzdem waren die “Logischen Untersuchungen” ein Anstoß, nicht der Vollzug und nicht das Vermögen, die Erfahrung der ’Αλńθεια aus der Erfahrung der Vergessenheit des Seins zu denken.» 86 GA 97, 442: «Durch ein bloßes Prinzip dieser Art (Zu den Sachen selbst!) wird man noch nicht ein Sachkundiger.» 87 GA 97, 442–443: «Der echte Lehrer trägt nicht Sätze und Regeln vor. Er läßt lernen. Das Lernen schickt sich an, zu erfahren, zurück- und vorzunehmen, was es zunächst meint und alsbald gesehen hat. Lernen-lassen gibt frei für die Ankunft der Sache; bringt in die Wanderschaft inmitten der Sachen. — » 88 GA 97, 443: «Zu seiner Zeit zwischen 1890 und 1900 war Husserl durch seine “Logischen Untersuchungen” ein Lehrer, mochte auch das Fundament dieser Untersuchungen noch ganz im traditionellen Feld der Bewußtseinslehre sich bewegen. Daß er hier, gegenüber allem leeren und zufälligen Argumentieren und historischen Behauptungen, einfach den Schritt wagte in das Sehen lassen, bleibt seine geschichtliche Stelle. Dies gerade wollen seine bloßen Anhänger und Propagandisten nicht sehen. Das falsche Bewundern seiner späteren Philosophie macht ihn lächerlich und erklärt ihn wider Willen zu einem Stümper. Jeder Lernende aber schweigt über den Lehrer.»

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philosophical criticism of Husserl in his Black Notebooks. They contain no evidence of anti-Semitism, ontological-historical or other, and they are consistent with what is otherwise known of Heidegger’s philosophical critique of Husserl’s phenomenology.89 Yet this is not the only evidence from volume 97 of the Complete Edition that casts doubt on Trawny’s attempt to arrange passages from Heidegger’s Black Notebooks in such a way as to show that his ontological-historical anti-Semitism plays a key role in his philosophical critique of Husserl or vice versa. In another passage, in which he again emphasizes that his critical relationship with Husserl had nothing to do with the latter’s Jewishness, Heidegger writes: Husserl. — Ever since Husserl, from 1930/31, in lectures that were really rather rallies (in Berlin and Frankfurt), publicly took position against me and repudiated my work as unphilosophy (cf. the Afterword to his «Ideas» (1930/31)), I have passed him by. I have never undertaken the slightest thing against Husserl. One lies, saying that I expelled him from the university and forbade [him] access to the library. Husserl had been emeritus, at his own wish, since 1928; since then he never again lectured or gave a seminar; he never used the university library, apart from a few exceptions in the years 1920 ff. What was there to expel? His works were never removed from the department library, as that was required for Jewish authors; just as little was ever a National-Socialist book, for example, [one by] Rosenberg and others, acquired, or, as required and also done in the other departments, was ever a «picture of the Führer» hung. I am saying this not by way of defense, but only as a statement, to which this too belongs, namely, that, between 1933 and 44, I, exactly as earlier, in the same objectivity, pointed out the significance of Husserl’s phenomenology and the necessity of the study of the «Logical Investigations». There was never uttered a word of criticism, which in fact would have been possible and justified and not a crime, neither in the lectures nor in the seminars.90

89

Cf. Thomä, 2013, 35–44. GA 97, 462–463: «Husserl. — Seitdem Husserl von 1930/31 öffentlich in Vorträgen, die schon eher Kundgebungen waren (Berlin und Frankfurt), gegen mich Stellung nahm und meine Arbeit als Unphilosophie zurückwies (vgl. das Nachwort zu seinen “Ideen” (1930/31)), bin ich an ihm vorbeigegangen. Ich habe nie das Geringste gegen Husserl unternommen. Man lügt, ich hätte ihn aus der Universität vertrieben und [ihm] die Bibliothek verboten. Husserl war seit 1928 emeritiert auf eigenen Wunsch; er hat seitdem nie mehr gelesen oder eine Übung gehalten; er hat nie die Universitätsbibliothek benutzt, von wenigen Ausnahmen in den Jahren 1920 ff. abgesehen. Was gab es da zu vertreiben? Seine Werke sind niemals aus der Seminarbibliothek entfernt worden, wie das für jüdische Autoren vorgeschrieben war; sowenig wie je ein nationalsozialistisches Buch, z. B. Rosenberg und dergleichen, angeschafft oder, wie vorgeschrieben und auch in den übrigen Seminaren befolgt war, ein “Führerbild” aufgehängt wurde. Ich nenne dies nicht zur Verteidigung, nur als Feststellung, wozu auch dieses gehört, daß ich zwischen 1933 und 44 genau wie früher in der gleichen Sachlichkeit auf die Bedeutung der Phänomenologie Husserls und die Notwendigkeit des Studiums der “Logischen Untersuchungen” hingewiesen habe. Es ist nie ein Wort der Kritik, was ja möglich und berechtigt und kein Verbrechen gewesen wäre, gefallen, weder in den Vorlesungen noch in den Übungen.»

90

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Besides taking a clear position against a widespread but unfounded rumor that would circulate for a long time to come,91 this passage also clearly does not fit into the picture that Trawny is painting of Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism and its alleged impact on his philosophical critique of Husserl’s phenomenology. One must, of course, concede, as the strange reference to Husserl’s «rallies» («Kundgebungen») in Berlin and other places suggests, that some of Heidegger’s language in these passages can be tasteless. He speaks, for example, of «propaganda» against his own way of thinking and of «a great falsification of history»: I passed Husserl by; that was a painful necessity. One would have interpreted any other attitude of mine too only as a polite gesture. Whoever speaks of «heinous betrayal», however, does not know that he is only talking revenge and knows nothing of that which happened early: that my own way of thinking was interpreted as defection, that one took refuge in propaganda when my way was not to be stopped otherwise. One is now staging a great falsification of history.92

One must also recognize, however, that Heidegger focuses on the fact that the break between him and Husserl had other, philosophical and professional, reasons, and that it had occurred «long before there was talk of National Socialism and persecution of Jews»: It seems to me, however, that my essays since «Being and Time» are the most worthy testimony for that which I owe Husserl — that I learned from him and testified for his way by the fact that I did not remain his follower, which I also never was. But precisely this violated the rules of the house, long before there was talk of National Socialism and persecution of Jews. Because the slurs and abuses are still in vogue even in the year 1948, [and] no one takes the pains to judge objectively on the basis of objective knowledge or even to go into my writings and to cite the otherwise much used lectures as testimonies for my thinking, let this be once again noted, not for the public, not as a defense, but rather as a statement. Cf. Teacher.93

91

Cf. again Arendt & Jaspers, 1985, 79, 84, 99, 732. Cf. also Heidegger, GA 16, 639. GA 97, 463: «Ich bin an Husserl vorbeigegangen; das war eine schmerzliche Notwendigkeit. Man hätte auch jede andere Haltung von mir nur als höfliche Geste ausgelegt. Wer aber von verabscheuungswürdigem Verrat redet, weiß nicht, daß er nur Rache redet und von dem, was früh geschah, nichts weiß: daß mein eigener Weg des Denkens als Abfall ausgelegt wurde, daß man zur Propaganda die Zuflucht nahm, als mein Weg anders nicht aufzuhalten war. Man inszeniert jetzt eine große Geschichtsfälscherei.» 93 GA 97, 463: «Mir scheint aber, daß meine Versuche seit “Sein und Zeit” das würdigste Zeugnis für das sind, was ich Husserl verdanke — daß ich von ihm lernte und für seinen Weg zeugte dadurch, daß ich nicht sein Anhänger blieb, der ich auch nie war. Aber genau dieses verstieß gegen die Hausordnung, lange vor dem, daß von Nationalsozialismus und Judenverfolgung die Rede war. Weil auch noch im Jahre 1948 die Verunglimpfungen und Schmähungen im Schwange sind, niemand sich die Mühe nimmt, sachlich aus Sachkenntnis zu urteilen oder gar auf meine Schriften einzugehen und die sonst viel benutzten Vorlesungen als Zeugnisse meines Denkens 92

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The fact that Husserl understandably weighted their personal and political differences differently from Heidegger does not necessarily support Trawny’s argument that there is a substantive connection between Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism and his philosophical critique of Husserl’s phenomenology. Thus, in arguing that Heidegger’s critique of Husserl in his Black Notebooks is motivated by ontological-historical anti-Semitism, Trawny overestimates the weight of one important passage from volume 96 of the Complete Edition, but underestimates the weights of several other equally important passages from volumes 94 and 97.94 Only by doing so can Trawny make a connection between Heidegger’s ontological-historical antiSemitism and his critique of Husserl, and even emphasize the alleged connection, in a way in which Heidegger does not. Indeed, Heidegger appears to want to do the opposite. Despite the order of Trawny’s presentation of quotations in his chapter on types of ontological-historical anti-Semitism, then, his chapter on Heidegger and Husserl does not strengthen his case that Heidegger is guilty of ontological-historical anti-Semitism. Although Trawny does appeal to the usual tropes in this connection, those pieces of evidence only suffice to establish Heidegger’s «folkish» (sit venia verbo: «völkisch») and academic anti-Semitism, which was already well known and generally acknowledged before the publication of any of the Black Notebooks. Thus Heidegger’s earlier statements indicating his «horror» at the «Jewification of our culture and universities», his becoming «a spiritual anti-Semite», his fear that «everything is flooded with Jews and pushers», his being «an anti-Semite in university matters», his belief in «a dangerous international network of [the] Jews», and his defamation of «the Jew Fraenkel» are indefensible and reprehensible, but they do not appear to be directed against Husserl in particular. Yet it is also clear that Trawny does not need to demonstrate that Heidegger is guilty of ontological-historical anti-Semitism in regard to Husserl in order to prove that he is guilty of ontological-historical anti-Semitism in a broader and deeper sense. In any case, there is strong circumstantial evidence that Heidegger’s world-view, which was not cosmopolitan but regional, not to say provincial, was colored by cultural anti-Semitism, which was

anzuführen, sei dies noch einmal vermerkt, nicht für die Öffentlichkeit, nicht zur Verteidigung, sondern als Feststellung. Vgl. Lehrer.» 94 Cf. Trawny, 2014, p. 85, fns. 15–16, p. 86, fns. 18–19, and p. 88, fn. 22.

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then transformed into academic anti-Semitism. In this respect, his philosophy did not overcome his Weltanschauung; rather, his Weltanschauung determined his philosophy. This finding fits into the intellectual landscape of the first decades of the twentieth century, a time during which Husserl attempted to distinguish between philosophy as rigorous science and philosophy as world-view, Jaspers tried to employ psychology and philosophy to understand world-views, and Heidegger was skeptical of the distinction between philosophies and world-views.95 In the end, Trawny’s position on the possibility that Heidegger’s philosophical critique of Husserl is «tainted» by ontological-historical anti-Semitism remains more than a little ambiguous. Hence he concludes the chapter with more questions than answers: The question remains — who spoke when of «persecution of Jews» [«Judenverfolgung»]? Heidegger, in any case, never speaks of it. Yet, as he recalls the break with Husserl, this word incidentally occurs [cf. GA 97, 54, and Trawny, Heidegger und der Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung, 86]. Why does Heidegger emphasize that the break occurred long before the «talk» of «National Socialism and persecution of the Jews»? Is Heidegger thinking of the time after the war, in which one could speak freely about the «persecution of the Jews» but this freedom was not used to do that? Or is Heidegger thinking of the 1930s? Is he thinking of the anti-Semitic propaganda? Was there «talk» in it of the «persecution of the Jews»? Is Heidegger thinking of secret conversations, of encounters, in which one expressed one’s revulsion at the rumors of the camps? Can these be at all connected with Husserl? When did Heidegger know about the «persecution of the Jews»?96

Therefore, however right Trawny is about Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism in general, it is clear that Heidegger’s sparse remarks on Husserl in the published Black Notebooks do not support the view that Heidegger applies his ontological-historical antiSemitism to the case of Husserl’s phenomenology in particular. Naturally, one cannot know with absolute, adequate, and apodictic certainty that there is no anti-Semitism or ontological-historical anti-Semitism whatsoever in Heidegger’s critique of Husserl in the Black Notebooks. For it is one thing to argue that Heidegger’s «attack» on Husserl is primarily philosophical in character, and another thing to claim that it is purely philosophical in nature. A remnant of doubt is ineradicable. Yet the fact that Trawny’s suggested reading is not inconceivable does not mean that

95

Cf. Husserl, 1911, Jaspers, 1919/1971, and Heidegger, 1919–1921. Cf. Trawny, 2014, 91–92.

96

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it is plausible. Moreover, although Trawny points out that one must get beyond the personal and political dimensions in determining whether «Heidegger’s philosophical rejection of Husserlian phenomenology was contaminated by an ontological-historical anti-Semitism»,97 it does not appear that in his cursory treatment of their relationship he gets into the decisive areas of the philosophical and professional objections that Heidegger raised against Husserl. Yet Trawny’s relevant chapter has one virtue. For due to the fact that it does not shed very much light on the relationship between Husserl and Heidegger with respect to philosophical topics, positions, and arguments, it practically exhorts the curious reader to reconsider the philosophical relationship between Husserl and Heidegger. So a new understanding of their relationship should replace the average-everyday-vague understanding with which one usually operates and which has been widely accepted. On this understanding, or, more precisely, misunderstanding, the philosophical relationship between Husserl and Heidegger flourished from Husserl’s arrival in Freiburg in the summer of 1916 to their failed attempt to compose together an article on phenomenology for the Encyclopaedia Britannica in the fall of 1927.98 CONCLUSION: FROM TRAWNY’S BOOK TO ANOTHER LOOK AT HEIDEGGER’S CRITIQUE OF HUSSERL In Heidegger and the Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy, Peter Trawny succeeds in making a compelling case that Heidegger is guilty of a kind of anti-Semitism that he, Trawny, accurately labels «ontological-historical anti-Semitism». Yet he fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism is the reason for, or is even substantively connected to, his philosophical critique of Husserl’s phenomenology. To the contrary, although Trawny leads off his elucidation of Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism with the only passage of the Black Notebooks of volumes 94–97 of the Complete Edition in which Heidegger mentions Husserl in the context of his own anti-Semitic remarks, in that very passage Heidegger goes out of his 97 98

Cf. Trawny, 2014, 86–87. Cf. again Husserl, 1997, 1–32, as well as Thomä, 2013, 35–44, and Vetter, Grundriss Heidegger, 68–72.

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way to make clear that his «attack» on Husserl is based on his conviction that his former mentor, like many other thinkers who are named elsewhere, both Jewish and non-Jewish, got lost in inquiries into being(s) and did not find his (or their) way to the question of Being. There is only one passage in these Black Notebooks that mentions Husserl and «Jewry» («Judentum») in close proximity to one another, it is not suited to play the role of «the smoking gun», and Trawny’s book does not contain a single example of an antiSemitic remark of any kind by Heidegger against Husserl himself or his philosophy from any other time before, during, or after their relationship. Yet the real problem with Heidegger’s mention of Husserl in the only passage in these Black Notebooks in which he names him in close proximity to remarks that can be construed as ontologically-historically anti-Semitic in Trawny’s stipulated sense, namely, the two-part passage on pages 46–47 of volume 96 of the Complete Edition, is actually one that Trawny does not address. It is the problem of indeterminacy due to over-determinacy. It is evident, namely, from the many and different contexts of these Black Notebooks that Heidegger posits a number of overlapping as well as underlapping factors that have allegedly led philosophers to neglect the question of Being in favor of their inquiries into being(s). Such factors include, but are not limited to, whether they have taken one or some or all of the following approaches to the question: (1) «Jewish», (2) «Platonic», (3) «Christian», (4) «Western», (5) «metaphysical», (6) «modern», and (7) «essentialist». Whatever these designations are supposed to mean (and this is not the place to reconstitute their precise meanings from the Black Notebooks), this is a long and tall list of supposed philosophical shortcomings to overcome. According to Heidegger, of course, Husserl shares all of them. Heidegger was willing, however, to listen to and learn from Husserl until sometime between the first edition of the Logical Investigations (1900/1901) and the Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy (1913). In the Black Notebooks, Heidegger once again makes clear that, on top of everything else, Husserl’s turn from philosophy as descriptive psychology to philosophy as transcendental phenomenology, accompanied by a rigorously scientific insistence on the method of reduction and eidetic intuition, meant that he could no longer follow him who had, in his own eyes, forsaken «the things themselves» in favor of thoughts of the things themselves as such (noemata). Yet this departure of the student from the way of the teacher has been known and understood for a long time, and it has never been connected with anti-

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Semitism, ontological-historical or other, on Heidegger’s part. In the end, one is left wondering: Given that Heidegger thinks that he has so much to criticize Husserl for, why does he even mention his name in the vicinity of any of his own anti-Semitic remarks? Heidegger says that it is because he is emphasizing that his critique is strictly philosophical and has nothing to do with the Jewish question, whereas Trawny seeks to exploit the sheer proximity of the mention in order to bolster his case for Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism. While Heidegger’s double denial is forceful,99 there remains a conceivable doubt that one can exploit by an uncharitable reading. The indeterminacy about whether Heidegger’s critique of Husserl in these Black Notebooks is purely, or rather only primarily, philosophical in nature, rests on the overdeterminacy of his criticisms. Yet one of the most effective ways to weaken a strong argument is to overstate it. Thus Trawny may have weakened his case for Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism by overstating it with respect to Husserl. He shows that Heidegger is guilty of anti-Semitism generally and of ontological-historical antiSemitism specifically, but just not with respect to Husserl individually. By emphasizing the one and only passage that suggests his reading, however, Trawny distracts the readers of the Black Notebooks from other, equally important, passages, which support a different interpretation. In his chapter on the relationship between Heidegger and Husserl, Trawny also says that one must get beyond the personal and political dimensions of their relationship,100 but he does not get into the decisive philosophical and professional areas of their differences. To sketch just three leitmotifs, one should begin with (1) Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s emphasis on the primacy of the theoretical,101 proceed through (2) his rejection of Husserl’s fixation on consciousness (Bewusstsein) as constituting Being and his adoption of his own focus on Dasein as disclosing Being (Sein or Seyn),102 and end with (3) his position that Husserl’s phenomenological reduction yields only the essences 99

Cf. again GA 96, 46–47, and GA 97, 462–463. Cf. again Trawny, 2014, 86–87. 101 Cf. Heidegger, 1927/1977, § 13 ff. Much of the argument of Chapter Three, especially that of §§ 19–21, though ostensibly directed at Descartes, can be read as a critique of Husserl. Heidegger’s critique of the dominance of the theoretical approach in philosophy is already evident in the earliest extant lecture courses that he gave in the War Emergency Semester of 1919 at the University of Freiburg. Cf. Heidegger, 1987/1999, especially 66–73. 102 Cf., e.g., Heidegger, 1927/1977, §§ 39–44, and Husserl, 1976, §§ 27–55 and 136–145. 100

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of thoughts (noemata) as «given» in eidetic intuitions but not «the things themselves» as they present themselves in their Being.103 In the end, Trawny’s analysis of the relationship between Heidegger and Husserl adds little to our philosophical understanding of it. Yet, in light of the shortcomings of Trawny’s account, one is left wondering whether Husserl and Heidegger were ever personally and philosophically really that close in the first place.104 In fact, already in early 1917, barely a year after Husserl’s arrival in Freiburg as Heinrich Rickert’s successor in 1916,105 Heidegger reports to his wife Elfride that he cannot accept Husserl’s phenomenology as a «finality» because in terms of its «approach» and its «goal» «it is […] too narrow and [too] bloodless», whereas «life is too rich and too great», so that someone who is «only a logician» in search of «the absolute» cannot find «the liberating way» to «a shaping of relativities».106 Also, in 1919 Heidegger writes to Elfride that, although «with many more horizons and problems» he is «above and beyond [Husserl]», he has chosen «cooperation» with him because «personal» considerations are less important than «scientific» — and «practical» — ones.107 At the beginning of 1920, moreover, Heidegger describes to Elfride how they are «on the way to a genuine, simple, and elementary grasping of life» together, but how he is «separated» by «worlds» from Husserl with a «great contrast» between them, and that therefore he must, «solely in order to preserve us materially», find a way to get along with him «without violent conflict».108 These statements, combined with his later account of his way into phenomenology, indicate that long before the years 1927–1931 Heidegger was critical of Husserl’s phenomenology, and that his critique was due to a considerable extent to his rejection of his mentor’s turn from phenomenology understood as descriptive

103

Cf. Husserl, 1976, §§ 63–127, and Heidegger, 1969/2007, 74–82. Heidegger’s account of his way into phenomenology makes it clear that he was intrigued by the questions that the Logical Investigations raised but he did not think that the Ideas I provided the answers. To the contrary, he suggests that the move from the earlier work to the later represents not progress toward but regress away from «the things themselves». Cf. Pöggeler, 1963/1983, 67–80. 104 See Heffernan, 2016. The following paragraph sketches some of the evidence from that study. 105 Husserl was named Ordinarius on February 9 and moved to Freiburg on April 1, 1916. Cf. Schuhmann, 1977, 199–200. The first correspondence between Husserl and Heidegger dates to May, 1916, and their first encounter to Sunday, July 23, 1916. Cf. Husserl, BW IV, 127. The Husserl-Heidegger correspondence is found in Husserl, BW IV, 127–161. 106 Cf. Heidegger, Letter to Elfride Heidegger, Pentecost Sunday (May 27), 1917, in Heidegger, 2005, 57. Martin Heidegger and Elfride Petri were married on March 21, 1917. 107 Cf. Heidegger, Letter to Elfride Heidegger, August 30, 1919, in Heidegger, 2005, 95–96. 108 Cf. Heidegger, Letter to Elfride Heidegger, January 4, 1920, in Heidegger, 2005, 103–104.

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psychology in the Logical Investigations (1900/1901) to phenomenology redefined as transcendental idealism in the Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy (1913).109 Already by 1923, Heidegger was writing to Jaspers that Husserl «has become completely unglued […] if he was ever “in one piece” […] he is speaking in such trivialities that one must pity him».110 Also in 1923, Heidegger tells Löwith that he has «burned and destroyed» Husserl’s Ideas in his seminar, as well as that, looking back to the Logical Investigations, he has come to «the conviction that Husserl was never a philosopher, not even for one second of his life [Huss(erl) war nie auch nur eine Sekunde seines Lebens Philosoph]».111 At work on Being and Time in the spring of 1926, Heidegger reports to Jaspers that Husserl «finds the whole thing disconcerting and “no longer accommodates” it in the usual phenomenology», from which Heidegger concludes that he is «de facto already further away» from Husserl than he himself thought.112 In the winter of 1926, Heidegger writes to Jaspers that, if Being and Time is «written “against someone”, then against Husserl», adding that Husserl «also saw that immediately» but «from the beginning stuck to the positive».113 Indeed, Husserl had sensed, however vaguely and obscurely, a great deal of the personal and philosophical alienation between himself and Heidegger long before he alluded to it in his public lectures.114 At the end of 1927, for example, Husserl reported to Roman Ingarden that «[he] had unfortunately not determined [Heidegger’s] philosophical education [philos(ophische) Ausbildung]» and that «[Heidegger] was apparently already peculiar [offenbar war er schon in Eigenart] as he studied [his own, i.e., Husserl’s] writings».115 In the summer of 1929,116 finally, after he

109

Cf. again Heidegger, 1969/2007, 74–82. This source, though composed in 1963 and 1969, is consistent with what is known of Heidegger’s development between his study of Husserl’s Logical Investigations and his reading of his Ideas I. 110 Cf. Heidegger, Letter to Karl Jaspers, July 14, 1923, in Heidegger & Jaspers, 1990, 42. 111 Cf. the source cited in Thomä, 2013, 40. 112 Cf. Heidegger, Letter to Karl Jaspers, May 24, 1926, in Heidegger & Jaspers, 1990, 64. 113 Cf. Heidegger, Letter to Karl Jaspers, December 26, 1926, in Heidegger & Jaspers, 1990, 71. 114 Cf. Husserl, 1927–1928, 1928, 1930, 1931. Translations of all these sources except for the «Nachwort» to Ideas are available in Husserl, 1997. 115 Cf. Husserl, Letter to Roman Ingarden, November 19, 1927, in BW III, 234. Husserl made this remark approximately one month after Heidegger’s very important letter to him (of October 22, 1927) regarding their ultimately unsuccessful collaboration on the article «Phenomenology» for the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Cf. Husserl, BW IV, 144–148. 116 Cf. Schuhmann, 1977, 349.

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had often been warned that Heidegger’s phenomenology was different from and hostile to his own,117 Husserl, in the face of Heidegger’s dismissive denials of such «nonsense», studied Being and Time as well as other works of his former assistant in order to arrive at «a sober and final position on the H[eidegger]ian philosophy»,118 only to come to «the distressing conclusion that [he] had nothing to do with this H[eidegger]ian profundity [Tiefsinn], this ingenious unscientificality [diese geniale Unwissenschaftlichkeit], that H[eidegger]’s open and hidden critique was based on gross misunderstanding, and that he was involved in the formation of a philosophical system of the kind which he [Husserl] had always considered it [his own] life’s work to make forever impossible».119 Therefore it is understandable how already in 1946 Heidegger could write, in an essay that would only be published in 2000, that he had «from the beginning and always stood outside the philosophical position of Husserl in the sense of a transcendental philosophy of consciousness».120 Finally, one should note that the Complete Edition is not yet complete, not even in terms of the Black Notebooks. The present paper restricts itself to the Black Notebooks of volumes 94–97 of the Complete Edition. For the present time, then, an adequate answer to the question about the full extent of Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism, as well as about the relevance of this special-specific anti-Semitism to the philosophical relationship between Husserl and Heidegger, must remain open.121 R EFER ENCES Altwegg, J. (Ed.). (1988). Die Heidegger Kontroverse. Frankfurt a. Main: Athenäum. Arendt, H. (1951/2004). The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York, NY: Schocken Books.

117

And after Heidegger’s Inaugural Lecture at Freiburg, «What Is Metaphysics?» (July 24, 1929). Husserl’s marginalia to Heidegger’s Being and Time and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics have been edited by R. Breeur (see References) and translated in Husserl, 1997, 258–472. 119 Cf. Husserl, Letter to Alexander Pfänder, January 6, 1931, in BW II, 180–184. Aside from Husserl’s Letter to Dietrich Mahnke of May 4/5, 1933 (in BW III, 491–502), this is the most important source for his view of the break with Heidegger. 120 Cf. Heidegger, 1946, in GA 16, 423. 121 I wish to thank Gregory Fried, Nicolas de Warren, Michael Gubser, Ingo Farin, Sophie Loidolt, Witold Plotka, Marci Shore, and Peter Andras Varga for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. 118

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Arendt, H. (1963). Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. New York, NY: Viking Press. Arendt, H., & Heidegger, M. (1998/2002). Briefe 1925 bis 1975 und andere Zeugnisse. Ed. U. Ludz. Frankfurt a. Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Arendt, H., & Jaspers, K. (1985). Briefwechsel 1926–1969. Ed. L. Köhler & H. Saner. Munich: R. Piper Verlag. Breeur, R. (Ed.). (1994). Randbemerkungen Husserls zu Heideggers Sein und Zeit und Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. Husserl Studies, 11, 3–63. Davidson, A. (Ed.). (1989). Symposium on Heidegger and Nazism. Critical Inquiry, 15. Farías, V. (1987). Heidegger et le nazisme. Tr. from Spanish and German by M. Benarroch & J.-B. Grasset. Paris: Éditions Verdier. Farías, V. (1989a). Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus. Tr. from Spanish and French by K. Laermann. Frankfurt a. Main: S. Fischer Verlag. Farías, V. (1989b). Heidegger and Nazism. Tr. from French and German by P. Burrell & G. Ricci. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Faye, E. (2005). Heidegger: L’introduction du nazisme dans la philosophie. Paris: Éditions Albin Michel S.A. Fédier, F. (Ed.). (2007). Heidegger, à plus forte raison. Paris: Fayard. Gordon, P. (2010). Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hachmeister, L. (2014). Heideggers Testament: Der Philosoph, der “Spiegel” und die SS. Berlin: Propyläen/Ullstein. Heffernan, G. (2016). A Tale of Two Schisms: Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl’s Move into Transcendental Idealism. The European Legacy: Toward New Paradigms, 21, 556–575. Heidegger, M. (1977 ff.). Martin Heidegger: Gesamtausgabe (GA 1–102). Ed. Fr.-W. von Herrmann et al. Frankfurt a. Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (1919–1921). Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (GA 9, 1–44). Frankfurt a. Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (1927/1977). Sein und Zeit. Halle-an-der-Saale – Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag. Heidegger, M. (1929). Was ist Metaphysik? (GA 9, 103–122). Frankfurt a. Main: Vittorio Klostermann.

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Heidegger, M. (1946). Was ist das Sein selbst? (GA 16, 423–425). Frankfurt a. Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (1949/2010). Über den Humanismus (orig. 1947; GA 9, 313–364). Frankfurt a. Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (1953/1987). Einführung in die Metaphysik (orig. 1935; GA 40). Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag. Heidegger, M. (1969/2007). Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie (orig. 1963/1969; GA 14, 91–102). Zur Sache des Denkens, 81–90. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag. Heidegger, M. (1976). Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten (September 23, 1966). Der Spiegel, 23, May 31, 1976, 193–219. Heidegger, M. (1978). Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz (orig. 1928) (GA 26). Frankfurt a. Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (1987/1999). Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie (orig. 1919) (GA 56/57). Frankfurt a. Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (1994). Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge: “Einblick in das was ist” (1949); “Grundsätze des Denkens” (1957) (GA 79). Frankfurt a. Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (2000). Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges (1910–1976) (GA 16). Ed. H. Heidegger. Frankfurt a. Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (2005). “Mein liebes Seelchen!” Briefe Martin Heideggers an seine Frau Elfride (1915–1970). Ed. G. Heidegger. Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. Heidegger, M. (2013). Nature, History, State (1933–1934) (Über Wesen und Begriff von Natur, Geschichte und Staat [1933/34]). Ed. & tr. G. Fried & R. Polt. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. Heidegger, M. (2014a). Überlegungen II–VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931–1938) (GA 94). Ed. P. Trawny. Frankfurt a. Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (2014b). Überlegungen VII–XI (Schwarze Hefte 1938/1939) (GA 95). Ed. P. Trawny. Frankfurt a. Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (2014c). Überlegungen XII–XV (Schwarze Hefte 1939–1941) (GA 96). Ed. P. Trawny. Frankfurt a. Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (2015). Anmerkungen I–V (Schwarze Hefte 1942–1948) (GA 97). Ed. P. Trawny. Frankfurt a. Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Heidegger, M., & Jaspers, K. (1990). Briefwechsel 1920–1963. Ed. W. Biemel & H. Saner.

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Frankfurt a. Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Husserl, E. (1950 ff.). Gesammelte Werke or Husserliana (Hua I–XLII). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950–1987 / Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988– 2004 / Dordrecht: Springer, 2004 ff. Husserl, E. (1911). Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft. Hua XXV, 3–62. Husserl, E. (1927–1928). Der Encyclopaedia Britannica Artikel. Hua IX, 237–301. Husserl, E. (1928). Amsterdamer Vorträge: Phänomenologische Psychologie. Hua IX, 302–349. Husserl, E. (1930). Nachwort zu meinen Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Hua V, 138–162. Husserl, E. (1931). Phänomenologie und Anthropologie. Hua XXVII, 164–181. Husserl, E. (1975). Logische Untersuchungen, Erster Band: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik (orig. 1900/1913) (Hua XVIII). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1976). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie (orig. 1913) (Hua III/1–2). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1984). Logische Untersuchungen: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis (orig. 1901/1913/1921) (Hua XIX/1–2). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1994). Briefwechsel (I–X). Ed. K. Schuhmann & E. Schuhmann. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Husserl, E. (1997). Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931). Ed. and tr. T. Sheehan & R. Palmer. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Jaspers, K. (1919/1971). Psychologie der Weltanschauungen. Berlin: Springer. Jaspers, K. (1977). Philosophische Autobiographie (Erweiterte Neuausgabe). Munich: R. Piper Verlag. Löwith, K. (1986/2007). Mein Leben in Deutschland vor und nach 1933: Ein Bericht (orig. 1940). Ed. F.-R. Hausmann. Stuttgart: Verlag J. B. Metzler. Ott, H. (1988). Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie. Frankfurt a. Main: Campus Verlag. Petzet, H. W. (1983). Auf einen Stern zugehen: Begegnungen und Gespräche mit Martin

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Heidegger 1929–1976. Frankfurt a. Main: Societäts Verlag. Pöggeler, O. (1963/1983). Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers. Pfullingen: Günther Neske. Schuhmann, K. (1977). Husserl-Chronik: Denk- und Lebensweg Edmund Husserls. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Sepp, H. R. (Ed.). (1988). Edmund Husserl und die phänomenologische Bewegung: Zeugnisse in Text und Bild. Freiburg – Munich: Verlag Karl Alber. Sluga, H. (1993). Heidegger’s Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Thomä, D. (Ed.). (2013: Revised and Expanded Edition). Heidegger-Handbuch: Leben– Werk–Wirkung. Stuttgart: Verlag J. B. Metzler. Trawny, P. (2014: Revised and Expanded Edition). Heidegger und der Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung. Frankfurt a. Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Trawny, P. (2015). Heidegger and the Myth of a Jewish World Conspiracy. Tr. Andrew Mitchell. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Vetter, H. (2014). Grundriss Heidegger: Ein Handbuch zu Leben und Werk. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.

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HORIZON 5 (1) 2016 : I. Research : M. Vajda : 54–69 ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ • STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY • STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE • ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES

doi: 10.18199/2226-5260-2016-5-1-54-69

WIE ICH AUS DER MINDERJÄHRIGKEIT DES MARXISMUS MIT DER HILFE DER PHÄNOMENOLOGIE HERAUSWUCHS? MIHÁLY VAJDA Professor emeritus at the University of Debrecen in Hungary, Regular Member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, University of Debrecen, Faculty of Arts, 4032 Debrecen, Hungary. E-mail: [email protected]

MY EMERGENCE FROM THE IMMATURITY OF MARXISM IN VIRTUE OF PHENOMENOLOGY In this paper the author reflects on the phenomenological motives in his departure from the Marxism of Georg Lukács in the Hungary of the late 1960s and early 1970s. He first encountered phenomenology at the university during the classes of Ágnes Heller, another future dissident of Marxism, which led him to study the Logical Investigations when he became a research assistant at the Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1961. Following in the footsteps of other readers of Husserl’s opus magnum, the author was confronted by Husserl’s manifest Platonism in the first and equally manifest psychologism in the second volume of the same work. This apparent contradiction between atemporal objectivities and their life-world origins led him to the phenomenology of Max Scheler, to whom the author dedicated the fourth chapter of his second monograph on Husserl published in 1969. The thinker who radically overcame Husserl was, for the author, Martin Heidegger. Modern scholarship has meanwhile convinced him of the fundamental differences between these two phenomenologists, but one lesson remains: Phenomenology is characterized by evidence that originates from seeing, rather than mere words and argumentations. Key words: Marxism, phenomenology, Husserl, Heidegger, Scheler, Hungarian reception of phenomenology, Lukács.

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КАК Я ВЫРОС ИЗ МАРКСИСТСКОГО МАЛОЛЕТСТВА ПРИ ПОМОЩИ ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИИ? МИХАЛИ ВАЙДА Заслуженный профессор Университета Дебрецена (Венгрия), действительный член Венгерской Академии Наук, Университет Дебрецена, Факультет искусств, 4032 Дебрецен, Венгрия. E-mail: [email protected] В данной статье автор размышляет о феноменологических мотивах своего отхода от марксизма в стиле Дъердя Лукача в конце шестидесятых — начале семидесятых годов. Впервые автор столкнулся с феноменологией в университете во время занятий Агнес Хеллер, впоследствии также отошедшей от марксизма. Это побудило его прочитать «Логические исследования», когда в 1961 году он стал научным сотрудником в Институте философии Венгерской академии наук. Вслед за другими читателями этого opus magnum Гуссерля, автор столкнулся с откровенным платонизмом первой части этого труда, и явным психологизмом второй его части. Видимое противоречие между атемпоральными объективностями и их истоками в жизненном мире привело автора к феноменологии Макса Шелера. Автор посвятил Шелеру четвертую главу своей второй монографии о Гуссерле, изданной в 1969 году. С точки зрения автора, мыслителем, который радикально превзошел Гуссерля, был Мартин Хайдеггер. Современные исследования убедили автора в фундаментальном различии между этими двумя феноменологами. Однако же налицо общий урок: феноменология зиждется на основаниях, почеренутых из видения, а не просто на словах и аргументах. Ключевые слова: Феноменология, марксизм, Гуссерль, Хайдеггер, Шелер, рецепция феноменологии в Венгрии, Лукач.

Es ist schon mehr als 50 Jahre her, dass ich Husserl zu lesen begann. Als ich noch Student war, und Ágnes Hellers Vorlesungen über die existentialistischen Ethik besuchte, hat sie erwähnt, dass der Ausgangspunkt der Existentialisten die Phänomenologie von Edmund Husserl war. Sie empfahl mir mit ihm zu beschäftigen. In Ungarn kennt ihn praktisch niemand. Ich wollte ihrer Empfehlung folgen, ich kam aber damals noch nicht dazu: als ich meine Universitätsstudien beendete, als «Revisionist» oder so etwas bekam ich mit Müh und Not nur eine Stellung als Lehrer in einer Elementarschule, obwohl ein Professor von mir mich als seinen Assistenten anstellen wollte. «Wisenschaftliche» Arbeit kam für mich nicht in Frage. Nach drei Jahren habe ich aber im Institut für Philosophie an der Akademie doch eine Stelle bekommen, dann begann ich Husserls Logische Untersuchungen fleißig zu studieren.1 Ob ich sie wirklich verstanden habe? Was 1

Erstausgaben: Husserl, 1900, 1901; Ausgaben im Rahmen der kritischen Edition: Husserl, 1975, 1984a, 1984b. Die

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eigentlich der Verfasser will, konnte ich, ehrlich gesagt, nicht verstehen. An Hand vom ersten Band, der Prolegomena, schien mir, dass Husserls Ziel nichts Anderes sei, als die Logik auf einer festen Basis aufzubauen, im Gegensatze zum Psychologismus, der sie als eine Wissenschaft der Gesetze des menschlichen Denkens auffasst. Das war für Husserl, wie man weiß ein gefährlicher Relativismus. Husserl meinte, dass jede Wahrheit, nicht nur so etwas, wie z. B. das Gesetz der Identität (A = A) unabhängig davon sei, wie ein Mensch denkt, sondern auch z. B. die Newtonsche Gesetze über die Bewegung der Himmelskörper vom jeglichen menschlichen Denken unabhängig seien. Mehr: Sie seien auch davon unabhängig, ob es überhaupt denkende Wesen gibt, sogar davon, ob es Himmelskörper, oder irgendeine materielle Welt überhaupt gibt. Dass A mit A immer identisch ist, konnte ich noch akzeptieren, damit aber, dass die Newtonschen Gesetzte auch in dem Falle ewige Wahrheiten seien, wenn es keine Welt gibt, konnte ich mich nicht versöhnen. Was heißt es eigentlich, dass diese Gesetze wahr seien (was bei Husserl übrigens damit identisch ist, dass sie für einen jeden wahr sind), wenn es gar nichts gibt, worauf sie sich beziehen könnten, und es kein Wesen gibt, für es sie wahr seien? Unabhängig davon, fand ich Husserls Text sehr spannend, ich fasste Husserl als einen modernen Platoniker auf, und so konnte ich für seine Behauptungen einen Sinn finden. Nehmen wir an, es gibt keine materielle Welt; im Reich der Ideen gibt es auch in diesem Fall Himmelskörper, deren Bewegungsgesetze nicht einfach anders sind, sie können sogar gar nicht anders sein, als die von niemandem, natürlich auch nicht von Newton registrierte Bewegungsgesetze. In der Welt der Schatten (der Phänomene?), wo wir leben, ist es möglich, dass man die Gesetze von Newton nicht kennt, es musste jemand kommen, der sie entdeckte; es gibt also eine Welt, die von eindeutigen, absolut gültigen Gesetzen beherrscht seien, und die Aufgabe des Philosophen wäre die Erkenntnisweise zu finden, die diese Welt mit absoluter Sicherheit «antrifft». Aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach fand ich wegen meiner Lukácsschen Schulung nichts Problematischen darin: natürlich ist das die Aufgabe des Philosophen, nur der arme Bourgeois-Idealist, dieser Husserl konnte nicht verstehen, dass diese eindeutige Welt, die von absolut gültigen Gesetzen beherrscht ist,

Bibliothek des oben genannten Instituts ist im Besitz von Exemplaren dieser Erstausgaben (Signaturen: B3060, B3062), die reichliche Lesespuren aufweisen. — Anmerkung des Herausgebers des Zeitschriftenheftes (Peter Andras Varga).

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nichts anderes sei, als unsere materielle Welt, in der vor dem durch und durch materiellen Menschen, der irgendwie auch mit geistigen Fähigkeiten begnadet ist, die Geheimnisse und Gesetzte dieser Welt sich immer tiefer und tiefer erschlossen werden. Natürlich nur in dem Falle, wenn er seine Klassenvorurteile in Klammern setzt. Ehrlich gesagt, könnte ich heute nicht mehr sagen, was für einen Eindruck der II. Band von den Logischen Untersuchungen auf mich übte; ob ich auch à la Heidegger geglaubt hätte: «Also doch eine Psychologie».2 Unwahrscheinlich. Ich wagte aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach nicht so frech kritisch sein. Eins ist aber sicher: Verstehen, was Phänomenologie eigentlich heißt, was ist das Neue, das Husserl in der Philosophie vertritt, konnte ich nicht. Als ich dann die darauffolgende Werke des Meisters gelesen habe, die Ideen I,3 Die Idee der Phänomenologie (Husserl, 1950), die fünf Vorlesungen, die er 1907 in Göttingen hielte usw., kam ich immer mehr in Verlegenheit. 4 Wie ist das nun eigentlich? Ich wollte den I. Band der Logischen Untersuchungen endlich mal verstehen: Woher weiß der Phänomenologe, dass die Gesetze von Newton ohne weiteres absolut gültig sind? Dass A = A, das ist in Ordnung. Wenn ich nicht beginne zu klügeln, ist dann das Gesetz der Identität auch mir sozusagen gegeben, mit absoluter Sicherheit sogar. Ist das zweite A mit dem ersten identisch, dann ist A natürlich mit A gleich; eine Tautologie. Ob das auch irgendwo anders gültig ist, als in der Welt der logischen und mathematischen Abstraktionen, das weiß ich nicht, genauer gesagt weiß ich ganz genau, dass es eben ungültig ist, mein Selbst von heute ist nicht identisch mit dem von Gestern; A = A ist ein logisches Gesetz d. h., das muss betont werden: eine Tautologie. Wieso sind aber Husserl die Gesetze von Newton mit einer absoluten und objektiven Sicherheit gegeben? In der intentionalen Korrelation des Bewusstseinsaktes von jemandem und 2

Heidegger schreibt in seinem Essay Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie das Folgende: «Der im Jahr 1900 erschienene erste Band des Werkes [es geht um die Logischen Untersuchungen] bringt die Widerlegung des Psychologismus in den Logik durch den Nachweis, dass sich die Lehre vom Denken und Erkennen nicht auf die Psychologie gründen lässt. Demgegenüber enthält aber der zweite im Jahre darauf erschienene, um ein dreifaches umfangreichere Band die Beschreibung der für den Aufbau der Erkenntnis wesentlichen Akte des Bewusstseins. Also doch eine Psychologie.» (Heidegger, 2007, 95) 3 Erstausgabe: Husserl, 1913; Ausgabe im Rahmen der kritischen Edition: Husserl, 1976. — Anmerkung des Herausgebers des Zeitschriftenheftes (Peter Andras Varga). 4 Ob sich diese Verlegenheit in den zwei Büchern klar war, die ich damals über Husserl und die Phänomenologie schrieb, das weiß ich nicht. Erstausgaben: (Vajda, 1968; Vajda, 1969); Ausgabe im Rahmen der Gesammelten Schriften von Vajda (2013, 149–297, 229–610). — Zusatz des Herausgebers des Zeitschriftenheftes (Peter Andras Varga).

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des intentionalen Gegenstandes, wenn alle Reduktionen durchgeführt werden, kann jemandem eben auch dies eine absolute Gegebenheit sein, ob das aber auch für andere eine absolute Gegebenheit, eine unwiderlegbare Wahrheit wäre? Ich habe inzwischen auch Scheler gelesen, ein Kapitel vom meinem zweiten Buch beschäftigt sogar mit ihm.5 Max Scheler sagt, was in der erwähnten Hinsicht helfen könnte. Er sagt nämlich, dass das Wesen des Gegenstandes und des Seins schließe gar nicht aus, dass nur ein Einziger sich in einem einzigen Akt etwas für sich selber zum Selbstgegebenheit bringt; es schließe sogar nicht einmal aus, dass ein bestimmter Gegenstand sich nur für einen einzigen in dieser Weise gegeben sein kann. Es schließe nicht aus, dass etwas nur für ein einziges Individuum wahr und gut ist: also schließt nicht einmal die nach ihrem Wesen nach individuell gültig und dennoch streng objektive und absolute Wahrheit und Einsicht aus.6 Alles ist in Ordnung. Scheler hat mich entschieden dabei geholfen auch im allgemeinen einzusehen: es gibt nicht so etwas, wie eine einzige Wahrheit, es ist oft so, dass eine Wahrheit einer anderen gegenübersteht, und in diesen Fällen gibt es kein Kriterium. Sowieso ist es überflüssig, sogar dumm, Kriterien zu suchen. Wir können tolerant sein, was die Wahrheit des Anderen betrifft, wir können uns damit auseinandersetzen um ihn über unsere Wahrheit zu überzeugen, oder wir können gegen seine Wahrheit auch kämpfen: mit edlen oder unedlen Mitteln. Mutatis mutandis ist das gültig auch für die sogenannten wissenschaftlichen Wahrheiten: Newton hätte ohne den um zweihundert Jahre älteren Kopernikus die Bewegungsgesetze der Himmelskörper nicht formulieren können, für ihn war das kopernikanische Weltbild eine absolute Wahrheit. Die «Weltbildern» von Ptolemäus und Kopernikus standen aber in einem scharfen Kampf miteinander. Wie das Thomas Kuhn «bewiesen hat», die Argumente von Kopernikus waren unleugbar überzeugend, deshalb waren die jüngeren, «moderneren» Wissenschaftler geneigt, das heliozentrische Weltbild zu akzeptieren. Die Entscheidung beruhte aber letztendlich nicht auf Vernunftgründen. Das Kopernikanische Weltbild war einfacher; und so starben langsam die Astronomen aus, die sich auf das geozentrische Bild beharrten. Wie wir wissen (ich weiß das von Kuhn, es ist aber wahrscheinlich so),

5

Vgl. Kap. III von Vajda (1969, 235–296); Ausgabe im Rahmen der Gesammelten Schriften von Vajda (2013, 299–610, 484–533). — Anmerkung des Herausgebers des Zeitschriftenheftes (Peter Andras Varga). 6 Siehe Schelers Essay Phänomenologie und Erkenntnistheorie (Scheler, 1957, 377–430).

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Tycho Brache bewies, dass man die seltsame Bewegung der Monde des Jupiters auch auf Grund des geozentrischen Weltbildes erklären kann. So etwas zu akzeptieren wäre aber für Husserl einfach absurd. Er wollte seine Überzeugung nicht aufgeben, dass die Gesetze von Newton auch ohne Himmelskörper ebenso gültig wären, wie das Gesetz der Identität. Nach den Logischen Untersuchungen suchte er in seinem ganzen Leben nach der Begründung der Erkenntnis, mit deren Hilfe wir zum fundamentum absolutum inconcossum gelangen könnten. Die Gesetzte von Newton seien absolut gültig, denn sie sind für die phänomenologische Betrachtung absolute Gegebenheiten (d. h. evident). Um wessen Betrachtung geht es aber? Der interessenlose Betrachter sitzt auch selbst in der Ideenwelt von Plato? Ja, eindeutig. In der vervollständigten Form der transzendentalen Phänomenologie betrachtet nämlich nicht das empirische Ich das Gegebene, es ist auch in Klammern gesetzt,7 sondern das transzendentale Ego. Die Ursache meiner immer größeren Verlegenheit, besser gesagt Verwirrung war, dass ich mit dem Husserlschen transzendentalen Ego gar nichts anfangen konnte.8 Ich wusste damals schon, dass Heidegger über den Husserl nach der transzendentalen Wendung gar nichts hören wollte. Und obwohl ich kein echter Kenner von Heidegger war, war diese Tatsache für mich genug, mich mit dem transzendentalen Ego nicht zu beschäftigen. Heute scheint mir, dass für Husserl das transzendentale Ego einfach die Garantie dafür war, dass er trotz seiner Beschäftigung mit der Lebenswelt die radikale Zurückweisung jedweden Relativismus nicht aufgeben musste. In den sechziger Jahren beschäftigte ich mich im Grunde genommen nur mit Husserl und Scheler. Dennoch würde ich nicht sagen, dass ich eine genaue Antwort auf die Frage hätte geben können: Was ist das eigentlich diese Phänomenologie? Die Methode der neusten Philosophie, ein neuartigen Standpunkt in der Philosophie? Ist sie eine Methode, worin besteht dann diese Methode? Die Frage konnte ich natürlich 7

Das Problem von Husserl mit Descartes im Grunde genommen war, dass er diesen Schritt verfehlte. Ich möchte nicht sagen, dass diese Verwirrung damit zusammenhing, dass ich damals, als ich mich Husserl systematisch beschäftigte, von Husserl nichts Anderes kannte, als die Schriften, die er schon in seiner Lebenszeit herausgab, bzw. noch einige, damals schon erschienene Bände von Husserliana. Nein. Hätte ich die Beschäftigung mit dem transzendentalen Ego damals nicht abgelehnt, hätte ich verstehen können, dass dies Ego nichts Anderes ist, als der unsterbliche Teil unseres Ich, der allein fähig ist, zur «verstandesmäßigen Liebe Gottes» zu gelangen, und der in uns allen gemeinsam ist. Siehe darüber das ausgezeichnete Buch von meinem Kollegen und Freund Tibor Schwendtner Husserl und Heidegger. Die Analyse einer philosophischen Auseinandersetzung (Schwendtner, 2008). Viele Gedanken dieses Textes stammen davon.

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auf Grund von Husserl ohne weiteres beantworten, dennoch habe ich klar gesehen, dass obwohl Scheler die Methode (die er aber nicht als Methode, sondern als ein geistiges Sehen betrachtete) von Husserl übernahm, bzw. zu übernehmen dachte, die Vorstellung von den beiden (auch) in dieser Hinsicht ganz unterschiedlich war. Dennoch: obwohl er die phänomenologische Betrachtung anders interpretiert, ist er letzten Endes ein Phänomenologe im Husserlschen Sinne. An Hand meiner damals noch sehr oberflächlichen Kenntnisse von Sein und Zeit, vor allem an Hand des §7 des Buches (1977) mein Eindruck war, dass Heidegger unter Phänomenologie etwas radikal Anderes versteht, als Husserl. * Bei Husserl ist die Phänomenologie, wie Schwendtner sagt, «kritisch handelnde Erfahrungsanalyse».9 Sie untersucht die Bewusstseinsakte — in Husserl vor allem die Erkenntnisakte — als gegebene, und die in den Bewusstseinsakten intentionierte, gegebene Sachlichkeit in ihrer Korrelation. Da nach Husserl ein jeder Bewusstseinsakt notwendigerweise auf ein Objekt gerichtet, d. h. intentional ist, hält die Phänomenologie die notwendige Korrelation des Aktes und des Objektes vor Augen: d.h., sie ist eine intentionale Erfahrungsanalyse, die von ihrem Interessenkreis jedwede reale Transzendenz ausschließt. So fasst sie das in dem wahrnehmenden Bewusstseinsakt als transzendent gesetztes Objekt, nur als Objekt dieses Aktes auf, während sie die Frage, ob das Objekt auch von dem Bewusstseinsakt, von Erkenntnisakt unabhängig existiert oder eben nicht, in Klammern setzt. Der Phantasieakt, der dasselbe Objekt intendiert, unterscheidet sich von dem Wahrnehmungsakt darin, dass der Wahrnehmungsakt das Objekt als transzendent setzt, der Phantasieakt aber nicht. Die Erkenntnis wird von jedweder Ablagerung, von jedweder Transzendenz-Setzung gereinigt, damit wir sie selbst untersuchen können; das erweist sich in der sogenannten natürlichen Einstellung als unmöglich, denn wir sind unfähig uns zu erklären, wie der Erkenntnisakt sein transzendentes Objekt trifft. Ich habe Husserls Grundstellung so verstanden, im Grunde genommen verstehe 9

Vgl. Schwendtner (2008, 81). — Anmerkung des Herausgebers des Zeitschriftenheftes (Peter Andras Varga).

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ich sie so auch heute noch, und wenn ich mich nicht irre — ich will aber mir keine frühe Verdienste vindizieren, — habe ich schon damals dies deshalb für wichtig gehalten, denn sie setzte der dualistischen Betrachtung der Welt ein Ende. Sie behauptete: das Objekt ist das intentionale Objekt der Bewusstseinsakte, den Baum, der vor mir steht gibt es nicht einmal außer mir, und als zweites in meinem Bewusstsein: es gibt nur einen einzigen Baum. Die phänomenologische Analyse soll den wahrnehmenden Akt, der sich auf den vor mir stehenden Baum richtet und dessen Objekt, den vor mir stehenden Baum, zusammen analysieren. Natürlich war ich im Klaren mit den schwierigen Problemen, die Husserls Vorstellung mit sich brachte, ich hielte aber für ihn den Daum, damit er sich von der Falle des Solipsismus befreien kann. Ich wusste aber, was er will, und wusste auch, dass er alles was er will, durch die Analyse des Gegebenen, des clare und distincte Gegebenen erreichen möchte. Es wird aber immer ein großes Problem bleiben — fährt er fort — bei der Durchführung der Evidenz klar festzustellen, was eigentlich in ihr wirklich gegeben ist, und was nicht, was von dem nicht-eigentlichen Denken nur hineinprojiziert wird. Die Existenz der natürlichen Einstellung, zu der Husserl auch die Einstellung der positiven Wissenschaften zurechnet, nimmt er natürlich zur Kenntnis, dafür interessiert er sich aber nicht. Für ihn ist nichts Anderes wichtig, wie man das wirklich Gegebene erreicht, d. h., wie der Philosoph in das Reich der reinen Phänomene gelangt, während man die Welt der natürlichen Einstellung hinter sich lässt. Wie das transzendentale Ego sich die Eventualitäten des empirischen Ich abschüttelt. Bei Heidegger ist das bestimmt nicht der Fall, ich beziehe mich auf nichts anderes, als auf die Struktur der Sorge. Der zentrale Gedanke des ganzen Lebenswerkes von Heidegger konnte sich in Sein und Zeit nicht entfalten, er konnte sich nämlich mit dem Gedanken der Geschichtlichkeit des Seins nicht fertig werden. Er hielt für absurd den Gedanken von Husserl, dass das Sein von dem ewig einen, mit sich ewig identischen transzendentalen Ego konstituiert wäre, er weiß aber noch nicht, wie die Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins als Sorge aussieht. Er weiß es noch nicht, seine Geschichtlichkeit selbst steht aber für ihn fest. Aus der Sorge-Struktur nicht austilgbare, dazu notwendigerweise dazugehörige durchschnittliche Alltäglichkeit — die Heidegger nicht übertreten will, er möchte nur die Art und Weise aufzeigen, wie kann das Dasein (auch) seine anderen, «eigentlichen» Seinsmöglichkeiten, auf die es sich entwerfen kann, verwirklichen — ist in Heideggers Auffassung nicht etwas

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Nebensächliches. Und erst recht nicht der Zustand der menschlichen Existenz, den das Dasein überwinden sollte. Der Unterschied der Auffassung des Meisters und des Jüngers war von vornherein in den Unterschied ihres Interesses reinkodiert. Als Heidegger als die Grundbestrebung in Husserls Logischen Untersuchungen den Gedanken «zu den Sachen selbst» annimmt, nimmt er noch aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach nicht wahr, dass «die Sache selbst» für ihn etwas ganz anderes darstellt, als für Husserl. Als er aber später mit der transzendentalen Wendung von Husserl konfrontiert wird — die natürlich eine notwendige Folge der Auffassung von der Logischen Untersuchungen war: Husserl war genötigt die Welt der reinen Phänomene mit der des empirischen Subjekts verbinden, er musste sich irgendwie doch in der «Höhle» wieder einrichten — , Heidegger weiß schon genau, wo der Unterschied zu finden ist. Die letzte Einsicht in den Unterschied seiner eigenen Phänomenologie und die von Husserl, dass Heidegger in dem Essay «Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie» (Heidegger, 2007, 91–102) formuliert, steckt schon im §7 von Sein und Zeit drin, wo er mit Husserl explizit nicht polemisiert. Aber nicht nur in seinem späten Essay, sondern schon in seinen Universitäts-Vorlesungen Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (Heidegger, 1997), die Heidegger im Jahre der Erscheinung von Sein und Zeit hielt, zeigt er aber ihren Unterschied klar. Bevor ich aber die erwähnten Texte zu interpretieren beginne, möchte ich einige Worte auch über die Phänomenologie von Max Scheler sagen. Scheler hielt die Phänomenologie — das habe ich schon erwähnt — nicht für eine Methode, erst recht nicht für einen Standpunkt, sondern eine Art Einstellung des geistigen Sehens. Dadurch erblickt oder erlebt man etwas, das ohne diese Einstellung versteckt geblieben wäre: man nimmt wahr, bzw. erlebt ein Reich von seltsamen «Tatsachen» (Scheler, 1957, 380).10 Wenn ich mich nicht irre, in der Zeit, als ich mein zweites Buch über Phänomenologie schrieb, habe ich keine große Aufmerksamkeit den Unterschied gewidmet, der in dieser Behauptung zu den Standpunkten von Husserl und Heidegger drin steckt. Für Husserl wäre absurd zu denken, dass seine Phänomenologie seltsame Tatsachen aufzeigt; Heidegger, der damit einverstanden gewesen wäre, dass die Phänomenologie, wenn sie zu den Sachen selbst zurückgeht, kommt bei etwas an, 10

Siehe Schelers Essay Phänomenologie und Erkenntnistheorie (Scheler, 1957, 377–430). — Zusatz des Herausgebers des Zeitschriftenheftes (Peter Andras Varga).

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das ohne diese geistige Einstellung versteckt geblieben wäre; dieses etwas wäre aber für ihn bestimmt kein «etwas»; wenn auch nicht das Nichts selbst, bestimmt kein etwas aber, das ist, sondern etwas, das es gibt.11 Als Scheler dann über die ständigen Desymbolisation der Welt spricht, schien ihm doch nicht das Erblicken von neuen Tatsachen vor dem Auge vorzuschweben, sondern das Erblicken der Tatsachen der Welt ohne Symbole, die man in der Tat nur erblicken kann, besprechen aber nicht, denn die sprachliche Symbole sind von ihnen abgetrennt. Wir können immer nur sagen, dass etwas nicht dies oder das ist, weil was dieses etwas als absolute Selbstgegebenheit ist, ist nicht zu sagen. Wir gehen es herum, und dann plötzlich sind wir genötigt zu sagen: «Jetzt sollst du hinschauen, jetzt kannst du es erblicken!» Scheler betont ausdrücklich, dass die natürliche Weltanschauung viel reicher sei, als die Weltsicht der Wissenschaft. Für ihn sei die Aufgabe der Philosophie nicht, die natürliche Weltanschauung zu übertreten. Die Philosophie, das phänomenologische Sehen soll daneben, wie auch neben der Wissenschaft das Gegebene selbst erreichen; dadurch bricht sie gleichzeitig die Macht der Sprache und deren Gewalt, die ausschließt und zergliedert. Dieser Gedanke des Ankommens bei dem Gegebenen selbst, wo die Philosophie die Welt nicht ordnen, sondern erkennen will, scheint mir die viel spätere Gegenüberstellung von Philosophie, Wissenschaft, die denkerische Arten von Seinsvergessenheit einerseits und Denken andererseits bei Heidegger vorzuzeichnen. * Aber zurück zu den zwei erwähnten Heidegger-Text. Zunächst der spätere: Was die phänomenologischen Untersuchungen als die tragende Haltung des Denkens neu gefunden haben, erweist sich als der Grundzug des griechischen Denkens, wenn nicht gar der Philosophie als solcher. Je entscheidender sich mir diese Einsicht klärte, um so bedrängender wurde die Frage: Woher und wie bestimmt sich, was nach dem Prinzip der Phänomenologie als «die Sache selbst» erfahren werden muss? Ist es das Bewusstsein und seine Gegenständlichkeit, oder ist es das Sein in seiner Unverborgenheit und Verbergung? (Heidegger, 2007, 99)

11

«…außer der Seienden gibt es nichts. Vielleicht ist es kein anderes Seiendes da, als die Aufgezählten [Natur, Geschichte, Gott, Raum, Zahl], es gibt aber vielleicht doch etwas, das wohl nicht ist, das es sich aber in einem bestimmten Sinne gibt», — sagt er in den Grundproblemen der Phänomenologie (Heidegger, 1997, 13).

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Das Prinzip der Phänomenologie ist also nichts anderes, als «zu den Sachen selbst!» und damit basta. Das hat er freilich im Jahre 1963 geschrieben, und er war selbst ganz bestimmt im Klaren darüber, dass er bestimmte Vorstellungen von den zwanziger Jahren in vielem korrigieren musste. Aber auch in dieser Hinsicht? In der Hinsicht, was eigentlich Phänomenologie ist? In dieser Zeit, 1963 schreibt er: Und heute? Die Zeit der phänomenologischen Philosophie scheint vorbei zu sein. Sie gilt schon als etwas Vergangenes, das nur noch historisch neben anderen Richtungen der Philosophie verzeichnet wird. Allein die Phänomenologie ist in ihrem Eigensten keine Richtung. Die ist die zu Zeiten sich wandelnde und nur dadurch bleibende Möglichkeit des Denkens, dem Anspruch des zu Denkenden zu entsprechen. Wird die Phänomenologie so erfahren und behalten, dann kann sie als Titel verschwinden zugunsten der Sache des Denkens, deren Offenbarkeit ein Geheimnis bleibt. (Heidegger, 2007, 101)

Der arme Husserl, er dreht sich jedes Mal in seinem Grab um, wenn dies jemand zitiert. Meine Frage war, ob Heidegger noch in der Lebenszeit von Husserl darüber etwas anderes dachte. In den Grundproblemen der Phänomenologie (1927) schreibt er das Folgende: Es gibt sowas wie die Phänomenologie nicht, und wenn es sie eben gebe, sie könnte nicht so etwas werden wie eine Art philosophische Technik. Im Wesen einer jeden wahren Methode, und d.h. in einem Weg, der zur Erschließung der Gegenstände führt, steckt nämlich drin, dass sie sich zu dem richtet, das sie selbst erschließt. (Heidegger, 1997, 467)

Es geht eben darum. In diesem Werk erklärt Heidegger, dass er anderswo ankommen möchte, als Husserl, und er sagt auch, worin der Unterschied besteht. Das grundsätzliche Moment der phänomenologischen Methode, die darin besteht, dass man den suchenden Blick vom naiv erfassten Seienden zum Sein zurückführt, nennt man phänomenologische Reduktion. Damit dass wir das Wort übernehmen, schließen wir zum zentralen Termin der Phänomenologie von Husserl an; obwohl es um etwas Anderes geht. Für Husserl ist die phänomenologische Methode, die er das erste Mal ausdrücklich in seinem Werk Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie (1913)12 ausgearbeitet hat, ist eine Methode für die Rückführung des phänomenologischen Blickes von der natürlichen Einstellung des Menschen, der sich in die Welt der Sachen und Personen hineinlebt zum transzendentalen Bewusstseinsleben und dessen noetischnoematischen Erlebnissen, in denen sich die Objekte als die Korrelaten des Bewusstseins konstituieren. Für uns ist die phänomenologische Reduktion die Zurückführung des

12

Also in einem Werk, das Heidegger als die Rückkehr zur philosophischen Tradition auffasste, und deshalb zurückwies.

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phänomenologischen Blickes von der Auffassung des Seienden, sei diese Auffassung wie auch immer, zum Verstehen des Seins des Seienden. (Heidegger, 1997, 29)

Wenn jemand an Hand des §7 von Sein und Zeit nicht wahrnahm, dass es nur das Wort identisch, es geht aber um etwas Anderes (Husserl selbst nahm das natürlich gleich war), der musste dies an der Vorlesungen, gleichzeitig mit der Herausgabe des Werkes gehalten, zur Kenntnis nehmen. Natürlich kannten diese Vorlesungen im Jahre 1927 nur die Studenten von Heidegger. Tibor Schwendtner zitiert einen Brief von ihm an Jaspers, wo er sagt, dass Husserl in der Mission der Begründer der Phänomenologie lebe. Es gebe aber keinen Menschen, sagt er, der wüsste, was sie eigentlich sei.13 In seinen Vorlesungen vom Jahre 1930 kommt er dann zur Einsicht, dass es richtig wäre, in der Zukunft ausschließlich das Phänomenologie zu nennen, was Husserl selbst zustande gebracht hat, und noch zustande bringen wird. Daneben wollen wir nach wie vor anerkennen — sagt er — , dass wir alle von ihm gelernt haben, und auch lernen werden. Dennoch würde ich nicht glauben, was Pöggeler sagt, nämlich das der Vortrag «Was ist Metaphysik?» als Abschied von der Phänomenologie aufgefasst werden sollte.14 Entweder war Heidegger nie ein Phänomenologe, oder er ist bis zu seinem Tode einer geblieben — meine ich. Gibt es so etwas nicht, wie die Phänomenologie, dann Heidegger, der Husserl folgend die Last der philosophischen Tradition abschütteln wollte, sich vor allem vom lebensfremden kategorialen Apparat, der sich auf die ursprünglichen griechischen Begriffe ansetzte trennen, und das Gegebene ohne Ansetzungen anzuschauen wollte, war bestimmt ein Phänomenologe, und er ist auch einer geblieben, auch wenn er bald wusste, dass Husserl zu der Tradition zurückgekehrt war, oder konnte er sich vielleicht davon nie richtig befreien. «Zu den Sachen selbst», das war und ist für Heidegger immer sehr wichtig geblieben. Schon ziemlich früh wusste er aber, dass er etwas anderes «erschauen» will: nicht die reinen, evidenten Gegebenheiten, sondern den Sinn des Seins. Damit hatte sich das grundlegende Ziel der Phänomenologie gleich verändert. Ihr Ziel bei Heidegger war nicht die Kritik der Erkenntnis, und dadurch deren absolute Begründung; durch seine Bestrebungen hatte sie Schritte gemacht, die Seinsvergessenheit 13

Vgl. Heidegger, & Jaspers (1990, 42), zitiert von (Schwendtner, 2008, 23, Anm. 43). — Anmerkung des Herausgebers des Zeitschriftenheftes (Peter Andras Varga). 14 Vgl. Pöggeler (1983, 79). — Anmerkung des Herausgebers des Zeitschriftenheftes (Peter Andras Varga).

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des Denkens zu überwinden. Die intentionale Erfahrungsanalyse hat bei den beiden ganz unterschiedliche Zielsetzungen. Scheler wollte vielleicht beide Ziele auf einmal erreichen, m. E. ist er aber damit nicht zu weit gekommen. Ich persönlich konnte das alles in den sechziger und siebziger Jahren nicht durchschauen. Ich habe eher nur geahnt, dass sich Wege der Begründer der Phänomenologie voneinander trennten. Das natürlich machte mir schwierig zu verstehen, was Phänomenologie eigentlich ist. * Warum bestand dann Heidegger überhaupt auf die Phänomenologie? Denn es war Husserl, der ihn zum Bewusstsein brachte, dass die Philosophie sich, wenn sie weitergehen möchte, auf die Erfahrung bauen muss. Er war dafür seinem Meister ein Leben lang dankbar, auch wenn ihn seine Feigheit, und vielleicht auch sein damals schon zur offiziellen Ideologie gewordene Antisemitismus zum bekannten Schritt veranlasste, in der zweiten Ausgabe von Sein und Zeit die Widmung an Husserl zu streichen. Er hat sich bestimmt damit beruhigt, dass Husserl dieses «AnthropologieBuch» sowieso hasste.15 Zurück also zur Erfahrung, das bei ihnen beiden, sogar bei ihnen drei wiederum bedeutete, dass sich die Philosophie keinesfalls auf die Ergebnisse der Wissenschaften bauen soll. Zu welchen Erfahrungen aber? Da waren sie aber gar nicht einig. Schwendtner analysiert ausgezeichnet, welche waren die Grunderfahrungen, die bestimmenden Erfahrungen im Auge von Husserl, und welche im Auge von Heidegger. Bei Husserl die sinnliche Wahrnehmung, bei Heidegger wiederum die Angst, das Sein zum Tode, das Gewissen, die bisher ebenso wenig zur Beute des philosophischen Denkens geworden sind, wie die geschichtliche Erfahrungen. Heidegger übertritt in der Tat das Gebiet der traditionellen Philosophie. Wenn wir Reiner Schürmann glauben können, dann müssen wir denken, dass Heidegger in seiner letzten Epoche gemeint hatte: die einzigen Phasen der Seinsgeschichte, bestimmt vom «ersten Anfang», waren immer auf eine bestimmte arché, auf ein bestimmtes Prinzip gegründet; die haben in einer gegebenen Epoche die 15

Vgl. Husserl (1994, 13, 270). — Anmerkung des Herausgebers des Zeitschriftenheftes (Peter Andras Varga).

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Seh- und Handlungsweise des Menschen16 geformt: denken wir nur daran, dass nach Heidegger in der heutigen Phase der Senisgeschichte dies arché nichts anderes sei, als das Wesen der Technik17; während nach dem zu erwartenden neuen, zweiten Anfang keine arché oder Prinzip mit gewaltsamer Kraft unser Sehen und Handeln in eine bestimmte Richtung zwingen werde. Unsere Welt wird an-aché-ist sein (Schürmann, 1987). Heidegger entfernte sich grundsätzlich von seinem Meister, der — wenn ich ihn richtig verstehe — bis zum Ende seines Lebens das absolute Sein erfassen wollte. Heidegger hat sich damit aber auch von der philosophischen Tradition entfernt. Mich hat bestimmt er, und nicht Husserl dazu geholfen, aus der Minderjährigkeit des Marxismus, und damit der Philosophie herauszuwachsen. * Was wäre dann die Phänomenologie? Ich kann das auch nach mehr als fünfzig Jahren nicht sagen. «Der nicht sieht, oder nicht sehen will, der spricht und selbst immerfort nur argumentiert, während dessen aber alle Widersprüche akzeptiert, und sie dennoch leugnet, mit dem können wir nichts anfangen», — hat Husserl gesagt.18 Der sieht und einsieht, der ist Phänomenologe. Der nur spricht und argumentiert, der ist keiner. Das reicht auch aber. R EFER ENCES Heidegger, M. (1977). Sein und Zeit. Unveränderter Text mit Randbemerkungen des Autors aus dem “Hüttenexemplar” (GA 2). Frankfurt a. Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (1997). Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (GA 24). Frankfurt a. Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (2005). Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge (GA 79). Frankfurt a. Main: Vittorio Klostermann.

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Ähnelt dies nicht an die Gedanken des späten Foucault über die dispositiven?  Siehe: Einblick in das was ist, Bremer Vorträge (Heidegger, 2005, 1–77). 18  Vgl. Husserl (1950, 61). — Anmerkung des Herausgebers des Zeitschriftenheftes (Peter Andras Varga). 17

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Heidegger, M. (2007). Zur Sache des Denkens (GA 14). Frankfurt a. Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Heidegger, M., & Jaspers, K. (1990). Briefwechsel 1920-1963. Frankfurt a. Main – Zürich: Klostermann – Piper. Husserl, E. (1900). Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Teil. Prolegomena zur reinen Logik. Halle: Max Niemeyer. Husserl, E. (1901). Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Teil. Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. Halle: Max Niemeyer. Husserl, E. (1913). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Halle: Max Niemeyer. Husserl, E. (1950). Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Fünf Vorlesungen (Hua II). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1975). Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Teil. Prolegomena zur reinen Logik. Text der 1. und der 2. Auflage. (Hua XVIII). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1976). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und hänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch. (Hua III/I). The Hague: Martinus Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1984a). Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band. Erster Teil. Untersuchungen zur Phämenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis (Hua XIX-1). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1984b). Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band. Zweiter Teil. Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis (Hua XIX-2). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1994). Randbemerkungen Husserls zu Heideggers Sein und Zeit und Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. Husserl Studies, 11 (1-2), 3–63. Pöggeler, O. (1983). Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers. Pfullingen: Neske. Scheler, M. (1957). Schriften aus dem Nachlass. Band I: Zur Ethik und Erkenntnislehre (GW 10). Bern: Francke. Schürmann, R. (1987). Heidegger on Being and Acting. From Principles to Anarchy. Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP. Schwendtner T. (2008).  Husserl és Heidegger. Egy filozófiai összecsapás analízise [Husserl and Heidegger. The Analysis of a Philosophical Controversy]. Budapest: L’Harmattan. (in Hungarian).

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Vajda M. (1968). Zárójelbe tett tudomány. A husserli fenomenológia tudományfelfogásának bírálatához [Bracketed Science. On the Critique of the Theory of Science in Husserl’s Phenomenology]. Budapest: Akadémiai. (in Hungarian). Vajda M. (1969). A mítosz és a ráció határán. Edmund Husserl fenomenológiája [On the Border between Myth and Ratio. Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology]. Budapest: Gondolat. (in Hungarian). Vajda M. (2013). Fiatalkori írások [Early Writings]. Pozsony: Kalligram. (in Hungarian).

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HORIZON 5 (1) 2016 : I. Research : F. Tava : 70–89 ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ • STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY • STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE • ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES

doi: 10.18199/2226-5260-2016-5-1-70-89

LIFEWORLD, CIVILISATION, SYSTEM: PATOČKA AND HABERMAS ON EUROPE AND ITS CRISIS FRANCESCO TAVA Postdoctoral Scholar KU Leuven, Institute of Philosophy, Husserl-Archives: Center for Phenomenology and Continental Philosophy, 3000 Leuven, Belgium. E-mail: [email protected] The aim of this article is to show how both Jan Patočka and Jürgen Habermas, starting from a reinterpretation of the idea of «lifeworld», engaged a critique of modern civilisation, aiming (with different outcomes) at a redefinition of the concept of political community. In order to achieve this goal, I firstly focus on Patočka’s understanding of modern rational civilisation and its attempt to fix the fracture between «life» and «world». At this stage, I take also advantage of Hans Blumenberg’s distinction between these two terms, in order to better clarify Patočka’s stance on this problem. Secondly, I analyse Habermas’ ideas of lifeworld and system, and their uncoupling in modern societies, as well as the reemergence of this issue in Habermas’ recent works on the European economic and political crisis. Finally, I focus on the very different ways in which Patočka and Habermas tackled the ideas of conflict and crisis in contemporary world, also in view of a possible path out of this crisis through a re-constitution of Europe. Key words: Lifeworld, civilisation, communicative action, system, crisis, Europe, solidarity, community.

ЖИЗНЕННЫЙ МИР, ЦИВИЛИЗАЦИЯ, СИСТЕМА: ПАТОЧКА И ХАБЕРМАС О ЕВРОПЕ И ЕЁ КРИЗИСЕ ФРАНЧЕСКО ТАВА Пост-докторант Университета Лёвена, Институт философии, Архив Гуссерля: Центр феноменологии и континентальной философии, 3000 Лёвен, Бельгия. E-mail: [email protected] Цель этой статьи — показать как в равной мере Ян Паточка и Юрген Хабермас, начав с обновления идеи «жизненного мира», обратились к критике современной цивилизации, со сходной целью — заново определить понятие политической общности (при всей различности результатов, к

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которым они пришли). Для того чтобы достичь этой цели, я для начала фокусирую внимание на современной рациональной цивилизации, как её понимал Паточка, и на его попытке залатать трещину между «жизнью» и «миром». На этом этапе я как раз буду опираться на то, как различает эти два понятия Ханс Блюменберг; это поможет лучше прояснись позицию Паточки в данном контексте. Затем я проанализирую представления Хабермаса о жизненном мире и системе, и проблему их раскола в современных обществах, равно как и возрождение интереса к этой теме в недавних работах Хабермаса о Европейском экономическом и политическом кризисе. В заключение я сосредоточусь на разборе тех разных способов, которыми Паточка и Хабермас решали проблемы конфликта и кризиса в современном мире, с оглядкой на поиск возможного выхода из этого кризиса путем пересборки Европы. Ключевые слова: Жизненный мир, цивилизация, система, кризис, Европа, сообщество.

1. LIFEWORLD In an essay he wrote in the early 1970s, commenting on Husserl’s Crisis of the European Sciences, Patočka gives a definition of the «lifeworld» which deviates both from Husserl’s definition and from his previous insights into this same topic.1 In particular he argues that: Our life-world is, after all, primordially a world of human practice, a world where people eat and work and devote themselves to tasks which they carry out by relying on that ever available yet ever overlooked resource of our physical, corporeal existence. Does not this world open itself more to my «I can» than to my «I perceive» or my «I observe»? (Patočka, 1989a, 234)2

Focusing his attention on the practical aspects of the lifeworld, Patočka goes as far as to say that the aforementioned «I can» which already at the level of Lebenswelt characterises human existence, is not a generic action, but rather an action already oriented — although still in an unthematic fashion — toward what in this world we might consider as good or evil: This life-world is a world of good and evil, and its subjectivity is that of the drama of

1

Patočka had already addressed the topic of the «lifeworld» or «natural world» in his habilitation thesis in 1936: (Patočka, 2008). About the genesis and the evolution of this concept in Patočka’s philosophy, especially in relation with the works of Husserl and Heidegger, see: (Srubar, 2002). For a analysis of Husserl’s concept of the lifeworld, with regard to the views of other authors, including Patočka, see: (Vetter, 2003). 2 About Patočka’s late critique of Husserl’s concept of lifeworld, see also: (Patočka,1989b; 1994).

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good and evil, the good and evil of an essentially finite being who cannot live except by projecting nonthematically, ever «knowing» that this projection is accompanied by the shadow of extreme possibility of not projecting at all. (Patočka, 1989a, 235-236)

The lifeworld according to Patočka is therefore not a «given» world, i.e. a world which can be easily taken for granted, as though its given or current orientation were the «real» one, notwithstanding the human deeds aimed at the modification or the enhancement of this world. Stating that the lifeworld is first and foremost the space of the human «I can» as it is originally oriented toward some notion of good or evil, Patočka bestows a precise ethical responsibility upon men and women, which consists in the possibility of actively changing their lifeworld through their actions; not simply surrendering to the «natural» (i.e. unalterable) character of this world, but courageously facing its crises and contradictions, and also striving to find a path out of them. Moreover, this conception also gives the lifeworld a process character: it is always a being-toward and the subject is likewise also always being towards some notion of the good. 2. CIVILISATION AND EUROPE Once the lifeworld has been recognised as the primary focus of ethical reflection, i.e. as the real world in which we orient ourselves through our free actions toward particular but only vaguely sketched notions of the good, it finally becomes possible to recognise the crisis that is affecting this world, and also respond to it. Hans Blumenberg cogently emphasised how modernity can be interpreted as a fracture of this concept of lifeworld, due to a substantial detachment of the two elements which compose this concept — «life» and «world» (Blumenberg, 1986, 7 ff.). While on the one hand «world» gets bigger and bigger, thanks to scientific and technical development, until it ends up being conceived no more as «earth» but rather as infinite «universe» on the other hand «life» is subjected to a gradual reduction, until it is confined to the private realm of the individual, that is the realm of feelings and passions, where no precise and rational knowledge is admitted. Focusing all its cognitive efforts on the «world» rather than on «life» humanity was able to achieve the remarkable scientific advancements that characterised modernity, culminating in the twentieth-century’s great discoveries. However, a comparable progress did not occur in human life and in the social and political institutions that regulate

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it, whose functioning seems to follow more intangible laws, compared to those which govern scientific reality. By introducing the idea of «supercivilisation», in the mid-1950s (Patočka, 1­ 996b)­,3 Patočka sought to define and explain humanity’s greatest attempt to fix the fracture of the life-world, the attempt at leading life back to its original dwelling, that is, that world with which it seems to have lost contact.4 Although in sketching the supercivilisation concept Patočka never directly engages the idea of lifeworld, I think this definition can be maintained. The technique of power which characterises supercivilisation is not, in fact, simply directed toward circumscribed human institutions (like polities, laws, and social conventions), but rather to human life as such, in all its aspects and functions.5 In this sense, we can talk of supercivilisation as a project which is aimed at reconfiguring and enhancing human life in such a way that it can eventually regain its centrality within the world from which the advancements of technical science seem to have left it out.6 Achieving this goal would mean re-establishing a regnum hominis (human rule) over the world, despite all the attempts of modern science to put all that is «human» at the outskirts of the universe, excluding it from its fundamental mechanisms. To do this, a new political project emerged, starting from early modernity, which aimed at a complete rationalisation of every aspect of human life, in order to adapt it to the scientific standards of today. The idea of homo oeconomicus, widespread in classical political economics7 — i.e. the conception for which the human condition has to be 3

For an extensive analysis of this concept, see: (Homolka, 2015). About the importance of Patočka’s idea of supercivilisation with regards to the civilisational theory, see: (Árnason, 2003, 132 ff.). 4 Although for Patočka the first examples of supercivilisation can be tracked down already in early modern history (Patočka, 1996b, 247), as I will show in what follows it is only during the twentieth century that this process of rationalisation fully climaxed. 5 «It is a well-known fact that this process, which originated in the area of mechanical sciences, as result of some discoveries in XIV century, spread to the whole modern lifestyle, and found its most potent manifestation in the capitalist enterprise, with its labour disciplination and world reification and banalisation. The result of this process were the phenomena of the division of labour and of the world market, the consequence of which was the rise of that huge web of objective relations, whose tentacles envelope this kind of life, ending up infringing on the whole world.» (Patočka, 1996b, 248). (All translations from Czech and German are made by the author) 6 I am thankful to the anonymous reviewer who demanded this clarification. 7 This concept was firstly introduced by John Stuart Mill, in order to explain the necessary theoretical abstraction performed by political economy: «[Political economy] does not treat the whole of man’s nature as modified by the social state, nor of the whole conduct of man in society. It is concerned with him solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end.» (Mill, 2004, 250).

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considered as an objective and scientifically analysable entity, and the individual as nothing but a rational and self-interested actor, so that it becomes possible to deduce human nature and behaviour from general principles and with scientific accuracy — might be seen as an attempt in this direction. While this conception may be valid as a simple theoretical abstraction,8 it proved to be de facto untenable, as soon as it starts to be considered as an exhaustive definition of the human being as such. In this circumstance, the mistake cannot be ascribed to science, whose method necessarily works through (explicitly recognised) abstractions and simplifications, but rather to whoever considers this abstraction a valid description of human being as such, overlooking their historically contingent peculiarities. As Patočka clarifies in his essay on supercivilisation, twentieth-century history shattered this political project based on a widespread rationalisation of human existence, as it vividly showed the existence of irrational forces in human nature which still impinge upon the present, in spite of any attempt to discipline them. In describing the supercivilisation and the crisis into which it fell, Patočka wanted to unearth these irrational forces, whose re-emergence reveals the lifeworld’s complexity. This complexity, which is already visible in light of the juxtaposition of the two elements which constitute this term, does not correspond to a fracture that could be fixed by merging these elements into a simple unity, as the rational supercivilising process aimed to do. On the contrary, human life is not and will never be a natural element of this world, but is rather something which always settles in it in a problematic way, not adapting itself to its natural structure, but rather shattering its fundaments. What Patočka suggests with his critique of the idea of supercivilisation, is the necessity to conceive life in light of all its conflicts and tragedies, appraising and not trying to overlook these problematic aspects. Questioning the «world of good and evil» means for Patočka precisely shedding light on the existential crisis and on the historical and political conflicts which characterised modern civilisation, from its genesis, until twentieth century’s most tragic events.

8

In this respect, Antonio Gramsci cogently pointed out that rejecting the concept of homo oeconomicus because of its abstractness would be as much meaningless as rejecting, for instance, the use of the symbol «H2O» for water. See: (Gramsci, 1975, 1948).

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The idea of a process of rationalisation, which essentially pertains to the concept of supercivilisation, refers back to Weber’s conception of rationalisation,9 which was later recovered by critical theory, and especially by Adorno, Horkheimer, and Habermas.10 In central and eastern Europe this topic acquired an important echo especially during the 1960s, in a period of intense political ferment and efforts of reformation in the socialist countries, which Patočka experienced at first hand.11 What Patočka actually adds to this debate is firstly the characterisation of two different and opposing variants into which the supercivilisation branches out. Secondly, he underlines how these variants, since they are both grounded on the same principle of a rational accumulation of power, also run, for different reasons, into the same internal dialectics, engendering an inner conflict which threatens their survival. The first variant of the supercivilisation is characterised by a substantial moderation. From this perspective, the rationalising process is not aimed at exhausting every aspect of existence, but rather at distancing oneself from all that which, in life, does not seem to be already oriented towards a possible objectification. In this way, however, moderatism ends up overlooking some fundamental components of social and political life, i.e. all its emotional and irrational aspects, with the consequence that people cease to find any concrete bond to this impersonal apparatus, which might be even considered as an enemy, an opposing structure which must be destroyed. The second, more radical version moves in the opposite direction, as — rather than excluding — it essentially aims at subordinating every force which resists its own domination, leading it back to its formalised system of power. «In this radical version,

9

About the very broad problematic of «rationalization» understood as the fundamental trait of modernity, see: (Weber, 2012). This work, written by Weber in the first years of twentieth century, has been repeatedly quoted by Patočka in his treatise on supercivilisation. 10 In the first pages of «Supercivilisation and its Inner conflict», Patočka mentions Weber and some unspecified «Marxist theorists» as those who have succeeded in recognising the «growing rationalization» as fundamental and determining factor of modernity. He could refer here both to Lukács, who analysed Weber’s discourse on rationalisation in terms of a process which essentially pertains to capitalism (Lukács, 1971, 88 ff.), as well as to the critical theory of Adorno and Horkheimer, who addressed this same issue, but understanding it in a broader sense, as the outcome of the history of civilisation (Adorno, & Horkheimer, 2002). 11 In this respect, an important role was played in Czechoslovakia by Karel Kosík who in the Dialectics of the Concrete, published in 1963 and destined to become one of the most representative intellectual sources of the Prague Spring, problematised the concepts of homo oeconomicus and rationalisation, with reference both to the phenomenological tradition, Marxism, and critical theory (Kosík, 1976, 50 ff.).

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rational civilization is the answer to all of life’s questions; there is not one existential problem for which it does not eventually provide the solution, either positive or negative.» (Patočka, 1996b, 251) The dichotomy between moderatism and radicalism can be easily contextualised within the world political situation of the 1950s: on the one hand the liberal democracy of western countries, represented by the former, and on the other the pervading bureaucraticism of the socialist states, represented by the latter.12 Despite all the differences, both these variants can be interpreted as different ways to establish a rationalisation of the means of power which corresponds to the ultimate end of the supecivilising process. Despite their apparent effectiveness, however, the two variants of the supercivilisation suffer severe setbacks; the outcomes of their processes are indeed — in the case of radicalism — an absent, denied freedom, and — in the case of moderatism — a freedom which is present, and yet emptied of any meaning. Under these circumstances, the aim of creating a perfectly rationalised political space, in which the difference between liberty and necessity could be finally dropped, in light of a higher and more comprehensive impersonal authority, inevitably collapses. Far from achieving a regnum hominis, the supercivilisation ends up establishing nothing but a regimen hominum, in which the fracture between life and world is fixed only at a price of a complete subjection of the former to the latter. Hence, the newborn homo oeconomicus, far from representing in a cogent way the perfect unity craved by the supercivilisation, and the rational, non-violent solution to any conflict, ends up as a slave, in the case of radicalism, since it is deprived of any power of acting freely, or as an outcast, in the case of moderatism, insofar as its values and beliefs are tolerated just as long as they are limited to its private life, without any chance to be actualised in a social and political context. Despite this critical situation, which frustrates its political project, in light of the historical events that occurred during the second half of the twentieth century, we can see how the supercivilisation seems indeed able to survive, not by addressing its

12

It must be acknowledged, though, that according to Patočka this analogy cannot be perfectly settled, inasmuch as both the opposing actors present historical traits which can be ascribed respectively to moderatism and radicalism.

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contradictions, but rather by perpetuating them, and thus acquiring a sclerotic shape. With regards to the radical system, it also has its own internal dialectics, whose peculiar trait consists in the fact that it does not lead to the dissolution of the system (which is prevented by the numerous devices of a state-organised technique), but rather to a life in contradictions, to the outliving of the contradictions, and hence to an internal slowdown, to the loss of every spontaneity, and then to the stagnation, from which [the system] keeps rousing through abrupt shakes of its whole structure. (Patočka, 1996b, 262)

What Patočka had probably in mind, in conceiving this long-lasting stagnation, was the condition of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in which the enthusiastic impulse towards the realisation of socialism was gradually converted into a political morass. In a more general sense, we can see how Patočka’s thought is anything but eschatological: the crisis of history does not lead to history’s end. Despite the same etymological meaning of the word «crisis» which inevitably suggests a temporary condition destined to lead to recovery or death,13 in this particular context «crisis» may actually become endless, notwithstanding all the various forces that aim at accelerating its progress, determining its conclusion. The same idea of an endless crisis emerges also in the Heretical Essays, written in the early 1970s, after the failure of the Prague Spring — that is after the last chance was lost to re-ignite the embers of rational civilisation. In particular, at the end of the fifth of these essays, Patočka tackled the problem of the technical age: of its decline and its possible end. One of the consequences of the modern technical age, as it emerged from the industrial revolutions and later culminated in the twentieth century, consists for Patočka in the loss of our capability to clearly distinguish between normality and exception, between everydayness and those events that because of their peculiar character are simply irreducible to it. Human institutions — religious, political, economic — have always tried to regulate this dichotomy between what in our lives

13

Notoriously the greek word krisis derives from the verb krinein, which means to separate, decide, and it originally belongs to the medical vocabulary. Both Hippocrates and Galen used it to indicate the turning point in a disease, which might lead either to healing or to death. Recently the idea of an «endless crisis» emerged in medical research (with reference to the medical consequences of the Nuclear fallouts in Chernobyl and Fukushima), as well as in political studies (with reference to the current economic and political crisis). See for example, Caldicott (2014): «The Fukushima disaster is not over and will not end for many millenia. […] [The radioactive fallout] cannot simply be “cleaned up” and it will continue to contaminate food, humans and animals» (Caldicott, 2014, 3); see also: (Gamble, 2014).

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is perceived as normal and those states of exception which threaten to shatter this normality. What distinguishes the technical age from the previous eras is its attempt not just to regulate these two fundamental components of human existence, but to completely eliminate any distinction between them. This leads to a sort of religion of everydayness, which recalls the final stage of the supercivilising project, and whose main characteristic is «boredom» which is not seen here as «something negligible, a “mere mood”, a private disposition, but rather the ontological condition of a humanity which has wholly subordinated its life to everydayness and its anonymity.» (Patočka, 1996a, 112)14 As in the case of supercivilisation, this perfectly homogeneous structure can be broken only by the most tragic events which characterised twentieth century, whose insurrection reveal its hidden fragility. In this sense, Patočka defines twentiethcentury «war» as «the full fruition of the revolt of the everyday» (Patočka, 1996a, 113). And yet, here too Patočka affirms that even though the technical age seems doomed to a speedy decline, because of its incapacity to prevent this re-emergence of life’s shattering and exceptional elements, this conclusion is all but certain: «As to the question whether the industrial civilization is decadent [...], the answer now seems easy. Still, we hesitate about it.» (Patočka, 1996a, 117) It is true, on one side, that this civilisation failed in its most important aim, that is allowing humanity to live an authentic life in this world, and ended up obtaining the opposite outcome, that is an «addiction to things, to their everyday procurement, to bondage to life.» (Patočka, 1996a, 113) Nonetheless, On the other hand, it is also true that this civilization makes possible more than any previous human constellation: a life without violence and with far-reaching equality of opportunity. Not in the sense that this goal would anywhere be actual, but humans have never before found the means of struggle with external misery, with lack and want, which this civilization offers. (Patočka, 1996a, 118)

Living in a civilisation in crisis, perpetuating its stagnation, seems after all preferable than taking a distance from it, at the risk of running again into that misery, lack, and violence, that the civilisation at least promises to forestall. In other words, an addiction to things appears a better solution than living a completely unsheltered life.

14

In his definition of boredom, Patočka is mainly influenced by Heidegger’s insight into this same topic. See in particular: (Heidegger, 1995).

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3. LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM We have seen how Patočka’s idea of supercivilisation can be interpreted as a systematic attempt to formalise and rationalise the lifeworld, an attempt to hide its inherent conflicts. Jürgen Habermas, in his analysis of the rationalisation problem, also used similar terms, referring to the idea of «lifeworld» as opposed but also tightly connected to the one of «system».15 Unlike phenomenology, which still conceives lifeworld within the frame of a philosophy of consciousness,16 Habermas aims to understand this concept as complementary to the one of «communicative action». According to him, the lifeword represents in fact the framework in which social actors are settled and in which communicative action occurs. The lifeworld can be thus represented by a «culturally transmitted and linguistically organized stock of interpretive patterns», which allow individuals to communicate in a natural and immediate way, by providing them «unproblematic, common, background convictions that are assumed to be guaranteed» (Habermas, 1987, 124). In this respect, Habermas can also add that: The lifeworld is, so to speak, the transcendental site where speaker and hearer meet, where they can reciprocally raise claims that their utterances fit the world (objective, social, or subjective), and where they can criticize and confirm those validity claims, settle their disagreements, and arrive at agreements. (Habermas, 1987, 126)

For this very reason it is not possible to relate to our own language as we would relate to any physical object, for it is not possible to simply take a step back from the communicative space of the lifeworld in the same way as we can take a distance from someone or something which physically stands in front of us. In this sense, the lifeworld 15

See in particular: (Habermas, 1975; 1987, 113 ff.). Whether this dichotomy between lifeworld and system is valid only in the context of Habermas’ early philosophical research, or if it is still tenable also in light of his later works on political theory (as I also maintain here) has been object of debate. See on this: (Baxter, 2011; Flynn, 2014; Wirts, 2014). 16 In order to distinguish his own method from the one of phenomenology, Habermas particularly refers to the social phenomenology developed by Alfred Schütz and Thomas Luckmann (Schütz, & Luckmann, 1973). According to Habermas’ interpretation, the mistake of phenomenology, both in its Husserlian form and in its following development, consists in the fact it sticks with the intuitive method proper of transcendental phenomenology, overlooking the possibility of a communicational­-theoretical approach: «This explains why Schütz and Luckmann do not get at the structures of the lifeworld by grasping the structures of linguistically generated intersubjectivity directly, but rather in the mirror of the isolated actor’s subjective experience. In the frame of the philosophy of consciousness, the “experiencing subject” remains the court of last appeal for analysis.» (Habermas, 1987, 130)

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lasts as a form of horizon; as something that continually changes, along with the change of society and of all its components. On the other hand, by «system» Habermas means those systems of action — like, for instance, economy or state — which by means of a series of media, like money and power, have generated over the years a series of rules and internal structures which separate them from the subjective position of the social actor, i.e. from their lifeworld, in order to regulate it from the outside. If on one side lifeworld follows the rules of «communicative action» aimed at a mutual understanding, the system undertakes a sort of «strategic action» aimed at objective and determined goals. Society consists thus in the intermingling of lifeworld, when it is conceived from the internal perspective of its actors, and of system, whether it is seen from an external and objective point of view. In modern societies this balance ends up changing, with the consequence of a detachment of lifeworld from system. On one hand, in light of the increasing complexity of modern societies, the lifeworld undergoes a process of rationalisation, in order to become capable of facing this complexity. An example of this is the shift from a pre-conventional stage of moral consciousness, based on particular expectations of behaviour, to a conventional and post-conventional stage, which determines the birth of formalised and institutionalised forms of law and ethics (Habermas, 1987, 175). On the other hand, the system too becomes more and more complex, by undertaking a process of specialisation and internal differentiation, which ends up creating a sort of separated world, totally disjointed from the norms and the conventions of the lifeworld, and therefore becoming unintelligible for the communicative praxis of everyday life. The result is a harsh separation between the two constitutive elements of society, which resolves itself into an attempt by the system to «colonise» the lifeworld, by transforming it into a mere subsystem: «[T]he more complex social systems become, the more provincial lifeworlds become. In a differentiated social system the lifeworld seems to shrink to a subsystem.» (Habermas, 1987, 173)17 As the actions in it are no longer realised by individuals by means of communicative processes, but are instead determined by systematic structures through external media, social actors loses their responsibility. The substitution of the communicative framework with a strategic set of actions, which 17

About this notion of «colonization» in Habermas, see, for example: (Jütten, 2011).

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corresponds to the juridification and economisation of everyday life, actually deprives human beings of their capability to act responsibly: «If by “responsibility” we mean that one orients one’s actions to criticizable validity claims, then a “deworlded” coordination of action that is unhinged from communicatively established consensus does not require that participants be responsible actors.» (Habermas, 1987, 184) What emerges from this brief reconstruction is first of all how a phenomenological concept, that is «lifeworld» constituted for Habermas a useful category to identify the process which, according to him, is at the origin of modern social pathologies. Secondly, it is also notable how this interpretation acquires for Habermas an even deeper meaning in light of the current economic and political crisis. In an interview with Die Zeit, conducted in 2008 just after the collapse of Lehman Brothers Bank, in which he tries to figure out a positive reaction to the rising crisis, Habermas states that his hope was «that the neoliberal agenda will no longer be accepted at face value but will be opened to challenge. The whole programme of an unscrupulous subordination of the lifeworld to the imperatives of the market must be subjected to scrutiny.» (Habermas, 2012, 104) Reading this passage in light of the uncoupling between lifeworld and system, pinpointed already in The Theory of Communicative Action, enables us to understand the crisis phenomenon as an opportunity to put an end to the colonisation of the lifeworld, by shattering the systemic control to which it is subjected.18 This would also entail, returning again to Habermas’ terminology, shaping a new kind of political and economic system, opened not only to strategic, but also to communicative action, and thus able to recover a space in itself for personal and political responsibility. What the current economic and political crisis in Europe has shown, according to Habermas, is the failure of the aforementioned colonisation of the lifeworld or, to put it in other words, the ineffectiveness of that «ordoliberal dream» according to which the EU member states would have automatically conformed to voluntary stability criteria, with no need of joint political decisions (Habermas, 2012, vii).19 The emergence of conflicting economic cultures among the various states, as well as of the constantly 18

About the influence of Habermas’ political philosophy on his late insight into the present condition of the European institutions and their ongoing crisis, see: (Verovšek, 2012). 19 On the ordoliberal tradition and its relevance to phenomenology, also in light of the current European political and economic crisis, see: (Miettinen, 2016).

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changing environments in which we live, reveals the presence of social and political bases which cannot be easily subdued by any external mechanism, which would be unable to recognise their complex nature. In light of this conflicting situation, we see a deep rift growing between European politics and European people; between existing European institutions, like the European Council or the European Commission, aiming at controlling the member states’ conduct from their external position, and the various elements which strive to contrast this «post-democratic exercise of political authority» (Habermas, 2012, viii), by advocating the sacredness of the nation state, or alternatively by endorsing the birth of a European federal state. In order to overcome this impasse, Habermas underlines the need of a constitutional project, aimed at the definition of a new form of European community; not simply an international community of states, but rather a cosmopolitan community of states and world citizens. The main question is how this passage, which necessarily oversteps the nation state’s dimension, could take place without causing the loss of the democratic legitimation which is necessary to the democratic political functioning. In other words, how can we think of Europe as a political conformation which, despite the lack of the internal unity that characterises a nation state, would still represent a community legitimised by its members, i.e. by both its states and its peoples? In this sense, insofar as the crisis which began in 2008 revealed the fragmentation of Europe, an insight into this crisis can perhaps reveal the possibility to create a new interaction between these fragments, beyond any illusion of mere unity. The fact that we cannot simply refer to one «European people» as a homogeneous body, does not prevent, but rather strongly urges us to conceive more complex forms of commonality, on which a future political union could be grounded.20 Concretely, this implies imagining new forms of «transnationalization of popular sovereignty […] in the shape of a democratic alliance of nation states» (Habermas, 2012, 11), without however lowering the level of democratic legitimation. To do this, Habermas aims to remove the «mental block», according to which there cannot be popular sovereignty without state sovereignty, by realising an analysis aimed at the

20

«[T]he enduring political fragmentation in the world and in Europe is at variance with the systemic integration of a multicultural world society and is blocking progress towards civilizing relations of violence within societies and between states through constitutional law.» (Habermas, 2012, 7)

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redefinition of the concept of political community, starting from its basic components, namely (1) the democratic association of free and equal legal persons, (2) the organisation of collective decision-making powers, and (3) the medium of integration of civic solidarity among strangers (Habermas, 2012, 13). Once these elements have been unearthed, it also becomes possible to see how, with the passage from nation state to European-level politics, they do not simply vanish, but rather enter a new constellation, still maintaining their full effectiveness.21 This reconfiguration enables the origin of a new political community, beyond state sovereignty but without losing the element of legitimation which essentially pertains to the democratic procedure. On the contrary, according to Habermas, in light of the growing complexity of world society, this passage is not only possible, but necessary and in line with the democratic principles. Habermas’ analysis explicitly tends to contrast the «reification» to which popular sovereignty has been subjected, i.e. the tendency to see this phenomenon as exclusively based on unchanging grounds, despite the modifications through which social reality went. In his explanation of the three building blocks of the political system, Habermas refers again to the phenomenological idea of «lifeworld» i.e. of that «shared horizon […] in which a collective will can take shape through communication.» (Habermas, 2012, 22, n.  31) Regaining this shared horizon would also mean for Habermas reestablishing within the context of this new European constitutional project that element of responsibility which was lost because of the colonisation of the lifeworld. Nonetheless, this same concept of responsibility should also take a more complex form, in order to cope with the change that the European social and political situation underwent. During the European Union’s history more and more importance has been in fact given to the «citizens» of Europe, and not only to the European collective actors, such as member states, which however maintain their role within the European regulation. Because of this coexistence, the European Union is characterised by a sort of duality: on one hand the citizens of the Union, and on the other the European states which keep functioning within the European communitarian system. This implies a sort of double responsibility on the part of individuals: «Every citizen participates in the European opinion — and will-formation processes both as an individual European who autonomously says “yes” 21

See on this also: (Habermas, 2001).

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and “no” and as a member of a particular nation.» (Habermas, 2012, 37) A new form of community, whose popular sovereignty corresponds to an «originally shared» sovereignty between European citizens and EU member states, must implement this multilevel character, by maintaining this balance between its constituent parts which should both be recognised as equal partners in all the community legislative functions. Only in this way, according to Habermas, would a loss of democratic legitimation be prevented. One question which remains open in Habermas’ argument is that of how the shift from the organisational cores of European member states to a new constitutional community of European citizens — whose outcome would be the birth of a «new constellation» between the three aforementioned components of the political system — can actually take place. Can this project be realised within the current European political frame, or is it rather necessary to establish new political institutions which could possibly help to accelerate this transition? In order to try to answer this question, it could be useful to compare the constitutional project envisaged by Habermas and Patočka’s insight into the European situation. 4. RETHINKING THE COMMUNITY We have seen so far how both Patočka and Habermas, in addressing the issue of the European civilisation and its crisis, followed two parallel paths. They both started from a reconsideration of the idea of the lifeword, understood in a strongly ethical and political fashion (the space of the human «I can», for Patočka, and the space of the communicative action for Habermas). They both proceeded by identifying the loss of the authentic level of the lifeworld — rationalised by the supercivilising project, according to Patočka, colonised by the system, according to Habermas — as the origin of the modern social pathologies. For Habermas, a possible solution of this situation would consist in fostering a constitutional project oriented toward a post-national constellation of our political space. A fundamental role is here played by the recovery of an element of individual responsibility within the political frame. This same element of responsibility is present also in Patočka who pointed out in the Heretical Essays how the fundamental question that «historical humans» have to face, once they are put in front of the historical crisis that the technical age runs up into, is «whether they are

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still willing to own up to history» (Patočka, 1996a, 118), 22 that is whether they are ready to behave in an active and responsible way in their present, despite its critical aspects. It is indeed from this position of responsibility, and not from the one of simple consciousness, that history — that is, «the most basic human achievement» (Patočka, 1996a, 153) — should be explained. Patočka suggested which shape this new insight into history should take in a series of essays he wrote in the same years during which the Heretical Essays were also elaborated (Patočka, 1988). The idea of «post-Europe», which emerges in these writings, can be actually interpreted as a way to handle the never-ending crisis of modernity. Since, as we have seen above, the crisis of the European political project does not determine its conclusion, but rather its stagnation, it follows that we cannot simply escape from crisis. What we can do is rather struggle to reach a new perspective towards Europe, from within its crisis, engendering a sharper insight into it. Post-Europe is not something which stems from Europe’s ashes, by means of a liberating rebirth. Concretely, engendering this post-European perspective means for Patočka looking back to Europe’s history, to its most meaningful events as well as to its catastrophes. This urgent need of creating a new «historical insight» (geschichtliche Einsicht) (Patočka, 1988, 230) does not consist though in a mere form of knowledge, but rather in a peculiar insight into the moral relations between success and decline, between what makes freedom possible and what prevents it. In this perspective, the historical catastrophes which Europe encountered are understood as events which are capable of shattering reality, breaking its crisis, rather than as ultimate defeats. The new position here described is all but peaceful: starting this historical enquiry entails indeed facing the conflicts which characterise reality, without simply trying to fix them, in order to regain control of the situation. The hope of a new form of political community, beyond the fall of twentieth-century political projects, depends for Patočka on the capacity to fully recognise the importance of this conflicting element, instead of concealing it. The only way to comprehend reality consists neither in dominating it nor in adapting passively to its tendencies. On the contrary, humankind will find a path out of the crisis which permeates its political condition, as soon as it will learn to move «…against the stream and the general attitude of reality» 22

I have partially changed the translation on the basis of the Czech original text (Patočka, 2002, 116).

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(Patočka, 1988, 282), that is in a purely conflicting way.23 Reading today Patočka’s texts on post-Europe gives the chance to reinterpret the «historical insight» that he envisioned as a useful theoretical tool, in view of a general rethinking of the idea and the grounds of today’s Europe. In this sense, the two paths followed by Patočka and Habermas, in order to address the European condition and its long-lasting crisis could be actually bridged, even though in a rather negative way. In order to do this, I would like to refer back to the question that has been previously left open, while dealing with Habermas, that is whether his idea of a new constitutional project for Europe should be grounded on the already existing institutions or whether it would rather require the creation of a new political entity. Taking into account Patočka’s late output, and especially the texts on the idea of post-Europe, we can think of a possible answer to this question, which seems to reject both these solutions.24 The solution which Patočka envisions here is not indeed a political one, or at least it is not political in the common sense of the word. According to his interpretation, envisaging a new «constitution» of Europe requires in fact first and foremost a phenomenological analysis of its fundaments: of its history, conflicts, internal and external relations. In this sense, Patočka’s «historical insight» can be interpreted as a new application of the Husserlian Rückfrage (or questioning-back) on Europe.25 Only by recovering the foundation meaning of Europe, as well as the authentic sense of lifeworld as the horizon of intersubjectivity, can a new constitutional project be actualised. In this sense, a philosophical and historical insight must forerun any concrete political venture. Every political programme, which aims at fostering the creation of new institutions within the European frame, will have indeed to take into account this backward reflection, which represents for Patočka the most meaningful heritage of phenomenology. 26 23

Se on this idea of «post-Europe» also: (Tava, 2016). With this I don’t want to contend that Patočka’s reflection on Europe, which originated in the peculiar historical context which followed the setback of the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia, can actually provide a solution to Europe’s ongoing political crisis. Yet some concepts that Patočka thematised in his work can contribute to generate new insights into this issue. 25 «[W]e must inquire back into what was originally and always sought in philosophy, what was continually sought by all the philosophers and philosophies that have communicated with one another historically; but this must include a critical consideration of what, in respect to the goals and methods [of philosophy], is ultimate, original, and genuine and which, once seen, apodictically conquers the will.» (Husserl, 1970, 17-18) 26 See on this point: (Meacham, 2016). 24

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Only doing this, the risk of relapsing again into a new variant of supercivilisation, in which the true concept of reason is substituted by a sclerotised rationalisation, will be eventually avoided. R EFER ENCES Adorno, T., & Horkheimer, M. (2002). Dialectics of Enlightenment. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Árnason, J. P. (2003). Civilizations in Dispute: Historical Questions and Theoretical Traditions. Leiden: BRILL. Baxter, H. (2011). Habermas: The Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Blumenberg, H. (1986). Lebenszeit und Weltzeit. Frankfurt a. Main: Suhrkamp. Caldicott, H. (Ed.). (2014). Crisis without End: The Medical and Ecological Consequences of the Fukushima Nuclear Catastrophe. New York, NY: The New Press. Flynn, J. (2014). System and Lifeworld in Habermas’ Theory of Democracy. Philosophy and Social Criticism, 40 (2), 205-214. Gamble, A. (2014). Crisis without End? The Unravelling of Western Prosperity. Basingstoke, NY: Pelgrave Macmillan. Gramsci, A. (1975). Quaderni dal carcere [Prison Notebooks]. Turin: Einaudi. (in Italian). Habermas, J. (1975). Legitimation Crisis. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Habermas, J. (1987). The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. II. Lifeworld and System. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Habermas, J. (2001). The Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy. In The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays (58-112). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Habermas, J. (2012). The Crisis of European Union: a Response. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press. Heidegger, M. (1995). The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Homolka, J. (2015). The Problem of Meaning in the Rational (Super)Civilisation: Patočka’s Interpretation of Modernity after World War II. In L. Učník, I. Chvatík, & A. Williams (Eds.), Asubjective Phenomenology: Jan Patočka’s Project in the Broader Context of His Work (167-186). Nordhausen: Traugott Bautz.

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Husserl, E. (1970). The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Jütten, T. (2011). The Colonization Thesis: Habermas on Reification. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 19 (5), 701-727. Kosík, K. (1976). Dialectics of the Concrete: A Study on Problems of Man and World. Dordrecht: Reidel. Lukács, G. (1971). History and Class Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Meacham, D. (2016). Supercivilisation and Biologism. In D. Meacham, & F. Tava (Eds.), Thinking after Europe: Jan Patočka and Politics. London: Rowman and Littlefield International. Miettinen, T. (2016). Governing with Ideas: On the Phenomenological Roots of the Ordoliberal Tradition. Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy. (Forthcoming). Mill, J. S. (2004). On the Definition of Political Economy, and on the Method of Investigation Proper to It. In Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy, 222-300. Retrieved from: http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/12004 Patočka, J. (1988). Europa und Nach-Europa. Die nacheuropäische Epoche und ihre geistigen Probleme. In K. Nellen, & J. Němec (Eds.), Ketzerische Essais zur Philosophie der Geschichte und ergänzende Schriften (207-287). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. Patočka, J. (1989a). Edmund Husserl’s Philosophy of the Crisis of the Sciences and His Conception of a Phenomenology of the “Life-World”. In E. Kohák (Ed.), Jan Patočka: Philosophy and Selected Writings (223-238). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Patočka, J. (1989b). The “Natural” World and Phenomenology. In E. Kohák (Ed.), Jan Patočka: Philosophy and Selected Writings (239-272). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Patočka, J. (1994). Die Selbstbesinnung Europas. Perspektiven der Philosophie, 20, 241-274. Patočka, J. (1996a). Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History. Chicago, IL: Open Court. Patočka, J. (1996b). Nadcivilizace a její vnitrní konflikt [The Supercivilization and Its Inner Conflict]. In Péče o duši I. Sebrané spisy: Vol. 1 (243-302) [Care for the Soul I. Selected Works]. Prague: Oikoymenh. (in Czech).

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Patočka, J. (2002). Kacířské eseje o filosofii dějin [Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History]. In Péče o duši III. Sebrané spisy: Vol. 3 (13-144) [Care for the Soul III. Selected Works]. Prague: Oikoymenh. (in Czech). Patočka, J. (2008). Přirozený svět jako filosofický problém [The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem]. In Fenomenologické spisy I. Sebrané spisy: Vol. 6 (127-261) [Phenomenological Writings I. Selected Works]. Prague: Oikoymenh. (in Czech). Schütz, A., & Luckmann T. (1973). The Structures of the Lifeworld. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Srubar, J. (2002). Jan Patočka: Phenomenology of Practice. In J. J. Drummond, & L. Embree (Eds.), Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy: A Handbook (311-325). Dondrecht: Kluwer. Tava, F. (2016). The Brave Struggle: Jan Patočka on Europe’s Past and Future. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 47 (3). Verovšek, P. J. (2012). Meeting Principles and Lifeworlds Halfway: Jürgen Habermas on the Future of Europe. Political Studies, 60 (2), 363-380. Vetter, H. (2003). Lebenswelten: Ludwig Landgrebe — Eugen Fink — Jan Patočka. Frankfurt a. Main: P. Lang. Weber, M. (2012). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. New York, NY: Routledge. Wirts, A. M. (2014). A Defense of the Lifeworld: The Source of Normativity in a Democracy. Philosophy and Social Criticism, 40 (2), 215-223.

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HORIZON 5 (1) 2016 : I. Research : Wing-Keung Chik : 90–114 ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ • STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY • STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE • ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES

doi: 10.18199/2226-5260-2016-5-1-90-114

TRUTH, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE POLITICAL. JAN PATOČKA’S VIEW ON LIVING IN TRUTH1 WING-KEUNG CHIK PhD candidate, Catholic University of Louvain, Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1348 Louvain-laNeuve, Belgium. E-mail: [email protected] Being one of the spokespersons of the civic manifestos Charta 77, Czech Philosopher Jan Patočka (1907– 1977) passed away after repeating interrogation. For human dignity, Patočka stands himself in truth in front of violence. What is the origin of responsibility which resists injustice?2 What is the significance of living in truth for being confronted with violence? In the text of Charta 77 «The Obligation to Resist Injustice» (1977), Patočka points out that morality of humanity is the ground of obligation.3 Then, what is the relationship between humanity and moral obligation? Regarding to the question above, this paper attempts to investigate the relationship of responsibility and living in truth, and demonstrates that there is an ontological responsibility of insistence implicated in living in truth, through illustrating the structure of manifestation of problematization. Socratic care of soul is the practice of familiarizing citizens with problematization through reflective dialogue as pluralization of otherness (doxai) of others. Otherness unveiled is the beginning of thinking and of the formation of polis. At last, with the analysis of worldliness of world as manifestation of plurality, the article will show that the responsibility of living in truth, as responding to plurality of world and realizes problematization which reforms community as polis with liberation and unity, is philosophical-political revolutionary. Key words: Care of the soul, problematization, responsibility, Arendt, otherness, dialogue, thinking, polis, pluralization.

1

This article is dedicated to Prof. Kwok-Ying LAU (The Chinese University of Hong Kong), and to the prodemocratic Umbrella Movement of Hong Kong (2014). 2  This is the title of one of the texts of Charta 77 of Patočka, «The Responsibility to Resist Injustice»(1977) (Kohák, 1989, 340-343). 3  «Yet the point of morality is to assure not the functioning of a society but the humanity of humans. Humans do not invent morality arbitrarily, to suit their needs, wishes, inclinations, and aspirations. Quite the contrary, it is morality that defines what being human means» (Kohák, 1989, 341).

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ИСТИНА, ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬ И ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЕ. ЖИЗНЬ В СОГЛАСИИ С ИСТИНОЙ СОГЛАСНО ЯНУ ПАТОЧКЕ 4 ВИНГ КОНГ ЧИК PhD, Католический Университет Лёвена, Институт философии, 1348 Лёвен, Бельгия. E-mail: [email protected] Будучи одним из представителей гражданского манифеста Хартия 77, чешский философ Ян Паточка (1907–1977) скончался после очередного допроса. Паточка, оставаясь верным самому себе и истине перед лицом насилия, тем самым даёт нам пример человеческого достоинства. Откуда же происходит ответственность, восставшая против несправедливости?5 Каково значение жизни в согласии с истиной и в конфронтации с насилием? В тексте Хартии 77 «Обязательство сопротивления несправедливости» (1977), Паточка показывает, что мораль человечности — основа такого обязательства.6 Как же взаимосвязаны человечность и моральное обязательство? Отталкиваясь от данного вопроса, эта работа ставит перед собой задачу изучить взаимосвязь между ответственностью и жизнью в согласии с истиной, а также показать на примере структуры проблематизации, что онтологическая ответственность настойчивости такого рода имплицитно присуща жизни в согласии с истиной. Сократическая забота о душе — это практика ознакомления граждан с проблематизацией через рефлексивный диалог как плюрализацию инаковости (doxai) других. Инаковость является началом размышления и формирования полиса. Наконец, благодаря анализу суетности мира как манифестации плюральности, статья должна показать, что ответственность жизни в согласии с истиной, являясь ответом на плюральность мира и пониманием пробематизации, реформирует сообщество и превращает его в полис, который имеет потенциал освобождения и объединения, а потому является философско-политически революционным. Ключевые слова: Забота о душе, проблематизация, ответственность, инаковость, диалог, мышление, Арендт, полис, плюрализация.

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Эта статья посвящена профессору Квок-Ину Китайского университета Гонконга, а также продемократическому «Движению зонтиков» Гонконга (2014). 5 Это название одного из текстов Хартии 77 Паточки «The Responsibility to Resist Injustice» (1977) (Kohák, 1989, 340-343). 6 «Все же моральность должна гарантировать не успешное функционирование общества, но человечность людей. Люди не изобретают мораль произвольно, с целью удовлетворения своих потребностей, желаний, склонностей и стремлений. Наоборот, мораль – это как раз то, что определяет человеческое в человеке» (Kohák, 1989, 341).

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Independent initiatives address the hidden sphere; they demonstrate that living within the truth is a human and social alternative and they struggle to expand the space available for that life; they help — even though it is, of course, indirect help — to raise the confidence of citizens; they shatter the world of «appearance» and unmask the real nature of power. The Power of the Powerless — To the memory of Jan Patočka, Václav Havel

INTRODUCTION The article is composed of two main parts: Firstly, it will be demonstrated that responsibility is ontologically implicated in living in truth as problematization, through elucidating the structure of manifestation. Secondly, it will be shown that Socratic care of the soul is the practice of problematization with others that familiarizing others to participate in or to share with living in problematicity in which otherness as doxai of others are being revealed. The revelation of otherness of others is the pluralization of otherness among citizens that letting the invisible otherness become visible. The cultivation of unveiling otherness of others as pluralization of doxai is the preparation of polis as ordinary way of practicing co-problematization. In the second part, it will be elucidated that otherness or difference unveiled in dialogue is the beginning or happen of thinking. Thinking as internal soundless dialogue implies the dependence of the appearance of otherness (in the form of doxai) of others. And then it will be illustrated that polis is not the community of apparent sameness but the mutual-dependence and mutual-encouragement of engaging in coproblematization as practicing manifestation of «not-yet» through revealing otherness in reflective dialogue. Living in truth as the form of polis — mutual encouragement of engaging in the practice of manifestation of being as co-problematization which responds to appearing plural doxai of world — is thus philosophical-political revoltary in its essence.

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I. LIVING IN TRUTH AND RESPONSIBILITY 1) Existence as Movements In The Natural World and the Movement of Human Existence (1936)7 and the lectures on Body, Community, Language, World (1968–1969),8 Patočka characterizes human existence as three kinds of movement. Movement shown by Patočka9 has the ontological character of creating or coming-into-being.10 The movement of human existence signifies the activity in which humankind brings itself into existence or comes to its life. The first movement of human existence is the elementary and instinctualaffective activity (Patočka, 1998, 143) which attaches to or depends on the bio-physical supply, like care and nourishment. Through the instinctual-affective activities, like the warmth and protection given by others (Patočka, 1998, 149), humankind comes into existence as living on earth. In the first movement, the earth manifests itself as power (Patočka, 1998, 149) which takes over humankind by supplying the need of living.11 The earth is the foundation of existence as providing condition of living in the way of domination. Thus there is no freedom in the first movement (Patočka, 1998, 150). The second movement of human existence is the activity of extending or securement of living, for the instance, working. Through working, humankind exerts to guarantee the necessities of living by production like farming. The activity of farming, as a kind of labour, transforms natural resources into product. Thus the second movement

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Mainly in the part of «Meditation sur “Le Monde naturel comme problème philosophique”» and «Qu’est-ce que l’existence?» (Patočka, 1988). 8 Mainly in the sixteenth lecture «Care and the Three Movements of Human Life» and the seventeenth lecture «The Three Movements of Human Life (continued)» (Patočka, 1998). 9 The notes of Jan Patočka are published as Papiers Phénoménologique [Phenomenological Papers] (Patočka, 1995). (in French). 10 «Signification ontologique — passage du non-être à l’être et inversement par ailleurs: devenir ceci ou cela, cela, c’est-à-dire passer du non-être-à-l’être-quelque-chose, n’est possible que par le mouvement. Le mouvement est donc ce qui rend l’étant ce qu’il est. C’est le mouvement qui unifie, entretient la cohésion, synthétise les déterminations de l’étant. La persistance, la succession des déterminations à même un substrat, etc., sont des mouvements.» (Patočka, 1995, 31) 11  For Patočka, the earth is not only understood as the power of domination, but also as manifestability of being of world. The relevant elucidation will be shown in the part II «Responsibility of Living in Truth as Response to Plurality of World.» (Patočka, 1988, 149)

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also attaches to the earth in the way of transformation, i.e., the activity of labour. The second movement is necessary and compulsory to the existence since it enforces the rooting of existence into earth and thus secures the conditions of living. As being alienated activity,12 the second movement is the existence without freedom. 2) Movement of Breakthrough: Truth and Freedom The third movement of human existence is the activity of breakthrough (Le mouvement de percée) (Patočka, 1988, 118). This movement is an action which attempts to break the domination of acceptance (Patočka, 1998, 159-160). The third movement does not signify an existence independent of earth, nor derived from previous movements, but hidden or suppressed by previous movements, for example, suppressed by the necessity of working which is understood as the activity of gaining the living for everyday life. The third movement does not detach from world but the meanings given as conventional acceptance. The third movement overcomes the domination of previous movements in the way of questioning or reflection. To reflect or question means distanciating with thematic object as transcendence. In this sense, the activity of reflection surpasses the domination of object through putting it into question. The transcendence of questioning as surpassing revolts the unexamined acceptance of conventional practice and gives rise to alternative. For example, the question «Why the citizens do not have the right of nomination in election?» shakens the conventional norms of not having the right of nomination as accepted necessity. As Paul Ricoeur (1913– 2005) shows in the preface of the French edition of Heretical Essay in the Philosophy of History (1975),13 the third movement of human existence as the movement of truth distinguishes itself from the acceptance of predominant normative convention and opens

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Alienation is understood as inauthenticity of human existence. «This movement, too, has its distinctive mode of inauthenticity, a failure to understand oneself, blinding others and oneself linked to the situation of conflict, suffering, guilt — a blindness, necessarily imposed on others and ourselves, that would not see such things.» (Patočka, 1998, 151) 13 1981 French edition, Essais hérétiques sur la philosophie de l’histoire, traduit par Erika Abrams, Lagrasse, Verdier, 1981; 1996 English edition, Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History, translated by Erazim Kohák, edited by James Dodd, with Paul Ricoeur’s Preface to the French Edition, Open Court, Carus Publishing Company, 1996.

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to manifestation of being.14 Questioning is an activity with power which de-solidifies or quakes the conventional practice accepted as norms. Quaking conventional practice does not signify being skeptical to world or falling into nihilism, since questioning does not detach from world but re-forms or renews the relationship with world15 by struggling against the domination of normative convention.16 Practiced in the form of philosophy, questioning steps forward to not-yet meaning or the being-of-unknown-yet which is on the way of manifesting,17 i.e., bringing not-yet being into existence as actualization (e.g., questioning as exploration). With the activity of questioning and reflection, alternative possibilities, which are against the domination of conventional practices, are to be alighted. 14

«The third fundamental movement of life is the movement of truth which, still within the world of pre­history, attests to the difference between the natural and that which is above nature, thus discerns within divinity the possibility of being open, of openness.» (Patočka, 1996, xii) 15 «As a result, meaning will never be simply given or won once and for all. It means that there emerges a new relation, a new mode of relating to what is meaningful; that meaning can arise only in an activity which stems from a searching lack of meaning, as the vanishing point of being problematic, as an indirect epiphany. If we are not mistaken, then this discovering of meaning in the seeking which flows from its absence, as a new project of life, is the meaning of Socrates’s existence. The constant shaking of the naive sense of meaningfulness is itself a new mode of meaning, a discovery of its continuity with the mysteriousness of being and what-is as a whole.» (Patočka, 1996, 60-61) 16 As shown by Etienne Tassin, living in problematicity does not refuse world as solid soil («sol ferme») but resists to accept given meaning taking as granted by shaking meaning of world («sens du monde»). «S’inscrire dans la problematicité, c’est adopter une “attitude qui ne ferme plus les yeux sur les expériences négatives, mais élit domicile à l’intérieur d’elles”, et envisager de “vivre dans le déracinement”. Penser et agir depuis le déracinement, depuis l’ébranlement du sens du monde et non sur le sol ferme, sera aussi, paradoxalement, ce qui permettra à la philosophie de s’élever contre le relativisme des valeurs et des normes — cela tout en reconnaissant l’historicité fondamentale de l’être humain et la relativité de son orientation au sein du monde ambiant, la relativité de sa science et de sa praxis, des images qu’il se fait de la vie et du monde.», ‘La question du sol; Monde naturel et communauté politique’, Etienne Tassin, Jan Patočka: Philosophie, Phénoménologique, Politique, textes réunis par Marc Richir et Etienne Tassin (Tassin, & Richir, 1992, 171). The distinction of staying on solid soil or solid ground (sol ferme) and uprooting (déracinement) of meaning given, and philosophy happens as praxis on the distinction of the two, will be further discussed in next paper. 17 «Thus the result of the primordial shaking of accepted meaning is not a fall into meaninglessness but, on the contrary, the discovery of the possibility of achieving a freer, more demanding meaningfulness. — This is then linked to that explicit awe before being as a whole, the awe-full realization that the totality of being is, which, according to ancient philosophers, is really the inmost pathos and origin of philosophy. Humans who do not remain in the humility of passively accepted meaning cannot be content with their fated lot and fundamentally linked with that is also that new possibility of relating to being and meaning which consists not in a predetermined, preaccepted answer but in questioning, and that precisely is philosophy. Questioning, however, presupposes the experience of mystery, of problematic being and this experience, which prehistoric humankind avoids, from which it takes refuge in the most profound, truth-laden myths, unfolds in the form of philosophy. Just as in acting politically humans expose themselves to the problematic nature of action whose consequences are unpredictable and whose initiative soon passes into other hands, so in philosophy humans expose themselves to the problematic being and meaning of what there is.» (Patočka, 1996, 63)

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Questioning and reflection is the problematization which discloses possibility of being18 in the way of suspending the given necessity of normative guidance. Problematization is living in truth. For truth, as primordially understood as disclosure (a-lètheia), it is not the knowledgeable judgment coherent with reality, but the activity of manifestation itself on which knowledge is formed. In the article «Life in Balance, Life in Amplitude» (1939) (Patočka, 2007a, 32-42), living in truth is characterized as the «life in amplitude». The «life in amplitude» is the existence which struggles to protest against the enclave of acceptance (Patočka, 2007a, 37-38). The protest discloses possible being of existence and the unknownness of world19 which manifests in «wonder».20 Problematization is prior to various possible modes of life since it is the existence which searches for different modes of living. Not similar to stone, humankind discovers and realizes possible existences21 as self-creation (Patočka, 2002, 209). Living in problematization, i.e., living in truth, as liberating from the veil accepted as selfevident (Patočka, 2007b, 56) and discloses possible existence, is characterized as the new life or rebirth of human existence.22 The new life of human existence is the foundation of all possible modes of life since conventional judgements23 and various modes of living are being examined and existential choices could be disclosed. Living in truth as problematization is the struggle which acts to overcome the domination of normative and alienated guidance24 and realizes the freedom of humankind (Patočka, 2007a, 40). 18

The possibility of being includes both the possible human existence and the being of world. For example, raising the question of «the goal or destination of life» shakens both the way of existence and the meaning accepted as convention. 19 The unknowness of world is the being of world as manifestation of worldliness of world. This will be elucidated in Part II «Responsibility of Living in Truth as Response to Plurality of World». 20 In the lecture «The Spiritual Person and the Intellectual» (1975), Patočka describes the experience of living in amplitude or problematicity as «wonder». «We wonder: to wonder means not to accept anything as self-evident, to stand still, to stop oneself, not to go further in one’s quest, to stop functioning.» (Patočka, 2007b, 55) 21 Patočka emphasizes, the possibility of existence is not same as the possibility of thing, like the possibility of a cup is for drinking, the activity of drinking actualizes the possibility of the cup as tool of drinking. Instead, the possibility of existence of human is the realization of its own existence. Human life self-realizes itself in its existential possibilities (Patočka, 1998, 146). 22 «Because in this, in the struggle for freedom, in the struggle with himself, man took possession of himself, of the deepest that he has in himself or that he is able reach. In this spark this new life appears to him.» (Patočka, 2007a, 40) 23 Thus truth as disclosure of being is prior to formation of judgment (Patočka, 1988, 261). 24 «La lutte est en ce sens ancrée dans le fond même de l’homme — non pas la lutte comme mode de l’auto-aliénation, mais une lutte qui se rapporte au contraire de cette aliénation et à son dépassement. Car la vie humaine n’est

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3) Truth and Responsibility As we know, problematization examines and revolts conventional guidance, and discloses possible ways of living. With the reflective examination of problematization, conventional practices could no longer be regarded as normative necessity. In other words, another possibility of not-being-as-such (which does not follow normative guidance) is manifested. The being manifested is not temporally belonged to present or past, but future. It is because questioning discloses the possibility which is not-yetto-be-completely-realized. The possibility disclosed is always on the way or the path (cheminement) (Patočka, 1988, 40) of realization. The being of possibilities is yet to be completely realized and is in the process of coming-into-being. The coming-into-being is «still-yet-to-be» or «not-yet-to-be». Questioning, as the activity of problematization which exposes the being of «not-yet-to-be», is always on the way of manifesting the being to be realized and thus it is temporally futural. The activity of problematization like reflective questioning, always manifests the being of possibility which is yet to be realized completely or yet to come into its being completely. The being of possibility is always on the way of realization. Thus the being of possibility has the ontological character of «not-yet-to-be». The «not-yet-to-be» is existentially belonged to the one who undergoes the activity of problematization. In other words, the being «not-yet-to-be» is owed to the existence of problematization. The being «not-yet-to-be» manifests itself as the task-to-be-finished which is to be realized as redeeming. The activity of problematization is the infinite process of manifesting the being «not-yet-to-be». Thus, the existence of problematization, i.e., activity of disclosure of being, is ontologically responsible for the process of realization of the being manifested25 which has the essential character of «not-yet-to-be». Therefore there is an ontological jamais donnée; dans sa figure véritablement humaine, elle doit toujours être conquise, et le mouvement de cette conquête consiste à surmonter, il est une lutte.» (Patočka, 1988, 11) 25 «I brought your attention to the most important idea, to the formation of the soul itself by itself. This means that this soul turned the experience that it does not know, the experience of knowing its not knowing, into experience about its own being. At the same time, it also experienced that it is brave because it exposed itself to problematization, that it is wise in knowing not knowing in the form of temperate and disciplined investigating, because it submits all other human affairs to this thinking struggle. It is just by making its own what is binding for it, nothing other that, as we would modernly say, its own responsibility; it does not claim anything apart from what is in this way its own.» (Patočka, 2002, 93)

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responsibility implicated in the activity of problematization as the being-insistence of the struggle of breaking through the domination of accepted convention. In face of difficulty or adversity, the courage of insistence of problematization, like raising challenging question in front of threat, is the responsibility of realization of the being «not-yet-to-be». The being «not-yet-to-be», as essentially belonged to the existence of problematization, is obligated to be realized as part of the existence. Courage as rooted in «looking-in», is the responsibility in resolution of realizing manifestation.26 II. RESPONSIBILITY OF LIVING IN TRUTH AS RESPONSE TO PLURALITY OF WORLD 1) Socratic Care of the Soul and Polis According to Patočka,27 Socrates is the one who insists in problematization through practicing the care of the soul. The soul is not the substance or reality of world. Also the soul is not the «mind» of duality of the distinction of mind and body, but the activity of manifestation or disclosure of being. Care of the soul is the cultivation or activation of manifestation of being. In other words, the care of the soul is the realization of the third movement of human existence.28 26

Courage is grounded on the manifestation in problematization which is the activity of «looking-in» as the disclosure of being. «When they risk life, they have to be courageous above all. But what does it mean to be courageous? You see that justice first wants something other than this excellence of the soul: it wants courage of these combatants, it wants a class of people who feel they are on the battlefield in every moment, and in every moment they really are upon it. But courage in Plato is naturally not blind courage, rather it is something regulated through looking-in. To be courageous means to know when I have to risk my life and when I have to threaten others.» (Patočka, 2002, 118) 27 Not only Patočka, Michel Foucault (1926-1984), in his lectures at the Collège de France (1983-84) on The Courage of the Truth, has shown that Socrates is the one who practices care of the self along his life in Athens. Moreover, the research of Foucault shows that Socratic care of the self is different from Platonic care of self (Foucault, 2011, 95-176). The Socratic care of the self as concerning the existence or life (bios) which is shown in Laches; The Platonic care of the self as establishing the soul being the reality of world as in Alcibiades. Meanwhile, Patočka distinguishes the difference between Socratic attitude and the Platonic attitude to philosophy. The Socratic attitude is the participation of the activity of problematization in public or among citizens. The Platonic one withdraws from the public and builds up the metaphysical kingdom (Patočka, 2007b, 59) 28 In his Caring for the Soul in a Postmodern Age: Politics and Phenomenology in the Thought of Jan Patočka, Edward F. Findlay suggests that care for the soul is the struggle against the domination of convention and reveals the possibility of freedom as resistance of staying in given meanings accepted once and for all. «What is it that characterizes Greek philosophy in such a distinctive way? Patočka describes it as a conscious decision no longer

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As we know, through verifying or examining the oracle of Delphi,29 Socrates is not the one who knows everything or possesses definite truth, but the one who knows that he does not know (Platon, 2002, Apology, 21d). Socrates is not satisfied with the living given or goodness accepted as convention, and he acts with examination to search for what he does not know yet. The quest of Socrates demonstrates an alternative of living which is contrary to the life unexamined, is the life in quest (Patočka, 2007b, 54-55). The Socratic examination, as reflective questioning and discourse, i.e., the activity of manifestation of being, is practiced with others. Socrates situates himself and the interlocutor in problematization, in which living in truth as unveiling of being is awakened and shared among with citizens. According to Hannah Arendt (1906 — 1975), Socrates is the figure who engages in public affairs with philosophical reflection. For Arendt, Socratic practice of problmatization is different from Plato.30 Socrates does not rule the citizens by absolute Truth (Arendt, 2005, 15) but familiarizes citizens with living in problematicity.31 In the words of Arendt, the practice of Socrates among citizens is to accept life and its inevitable decline as simply given. Greek philosophy, he contends, is characterized by a challenge, a refusal to accept the simple fate of a world and a life ever in decline. It resisted the inevitability of decline and, in doing so, discovered human freedom and its relation to the eternal. The battle against the degenerative tendency of the world, the resistance to it, is precisely human freedom; this is what the Greeks called care for the soul.» (Findlay, 2002, 59) Michael Gubser regards the epoch of ancient Greek is characterized as practicing problematization as inquiry for truths. «The Greeks recognized world problematicity — the notion that the world is not a fixed presence but an open question — and celebrated human inquiry, establishing insight and responsibility as moral standards. This recognition, said Patočka, launched the historical age, for history was nothing else but the openness to being and the consequent questing for truth.» (Gubser, 2013, 165) 29 As we have known, given by the oracle of Delphi, Socrates has been told that he is the wisest person of Athens. But Socrates did not listen to the oracle blindly and he acts to verify the message through dialoguing with citizens. 30 «When Plato claimed rulership for the philosopher because he alone could behold the idea of the good, the highest of the eternal essences, he opposed the polis on two grounds: first, he claimed that the philosopher’s concern with eternal things did not put him at risk of becoming a good-for-nothing, and second, he asserted that these eternal things were even more “valuable” than they were beautiful.» (Arendt, 2005, 10) 31 Socrates practices care of the soul with fellow citizens as familiarizing citizens with the existence of problematization which reveals truths from doxai. The Socratic practice of problematization among with citizens is the pluralization of visibility of citizens (plurality of citizens) through revealing hidden doxai as visible truths. Ivan Chvatík shows that Socrates familiarizes fellow citizens with shaking hidden followed conventional guidance and leads their «soul to tell for itself good from evil». «Socrates in turn mercilessly analyzes everything that had till then been taken for granted, viewed as certain, unchanging and clear, not in order to relativize it, but rather to show, through dialogue with his fellow citizens, where they are going wrong, misunderstanding or contradicting themselves in their views on the good conduct of life. He who contradicts himself is empty, hollow, i.e., actually inexistent, though he hides this from himself through empty discourse. Socrates shames those he confutes, but gives no advice; faithful to his “non-knowing”, he endeavors to lead their soul to tell for itself good from evil.» (Chvatik, 2011, 269) According to Martin Palouš, familiarizing citizens with problematization re-builds polis by correlating polis to the activity of philosophy that may overcome the decadent crisis of ancient Athens. «We all

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to «make friends» with citizens (Arendt, 2005, 16) by sharing citizens with a possible existence which is liberated from accepted domination of conventions. With regards to citizens, Socrates does not teach definite truth or does not teach what he possesses; instead, Socrates claims that he knows nothing but knowing that he does not know. According to the interpretation of Arendt, the claim of Socrates means that he does not know the opinions or doxai of others, 32 and thus Socrates unveils others’ doxai and turns doxai be seen as appearing in public.33 In the words of Arendt, Socrates reveals doxa «in its own truthfulness». Revealing doxa «in its own truthfulness» is to let doxa stand up on its own among other doxai in the face of others, by turning doxa into truth in the way of revealing doxa from hidden accepted guidance to become distinct from other doxai through questioning and dialogue. In this sense, revealing doxai of others is to unveil otherness or the difference of others. For example, raising the question «What does it mean by democracy?» reveals democracy as the political system of state which is distinct from other systems like aristocracy and monarchy by bringing it closer in illustration. In clarification, democracy is other than or different from aristocracy and monarchy. During questioning and dialogue, doxa is being examined by ridding of contradiction as truthfulization that brings doxa into light which is distinct from other doxai, i.e., to be appearing itself among other doxai. Socrates regards himself as practicing midwifery that generates knowledge, i.e., truths, from doxai of citizens.34 recall the exchange, in the Apology, between Socrates and his accusers concerning the problem of the education of youth. Who is a good educator and, on the contrary, who corrupts the young? In Ancient Athens, the polis itself was held to be the best educator, but what happens, then, in times of crisis? Is the best teacher still the mass of law-abiding citizens, the polis as a whole, with its dubious customs and decadent culture, or rather the philosopher? Socrates’ answer to this question, and the verdict of the Athenians, are well known. From that point on, polis and philosophy went their separate ways.» (Palouš, 2011, 172) 32 «For mortals the important thing is to make doxa truthful, to see in every doxa truth and to speak in such a way that the truth of one’s opinion reveals itself to oneself and to others. On this level, the Socratic “I know that I do not know” means no more than: I know that I do not have the truth for everybody; I cannot know the other fellow’s truth except by asking him and thereby learning his doxa, which reveals itself to him in distinction from all others.» (Arendt, 2005, 19) 33 «To assert one’s own opinion belonged to being able to show oneself, to be seen, and heard by others. To the Greeks this was the one great privilege attached to public life and lacking in the privacy of the household, where on is neither seen nor heard by others.» (Arendt, 2005, 14) 34 «Socrates, who refused public office and honor, never retired into this private life, but on the contrary moved in the marketplace, in the very midst of these doxai, these opinions. What Plato later called dialegesthai, Socrates himself called maieutic, the art of midwifery: he wanted to help others give birth to what they themselves thought

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Socrates wanted to bring out this truth which everyone potentially possesses. If we remain true to his own metaphor of maieutic, we may say: Socrates wanted to make the city more truthful by delivering each of the citizens of their truths. The method of doing this dialegesthai, taking something through, but this dialectic brings forth truth not by destroying doxa or opinion, but on the contrary by revealing doxa in its own truthfulness. The role of philosopher, then, is not to rule the city but to be its «gadfly», not to tell philosophical truths but to make citizens more truthful. The difference with Plato is decisive: Socrates did not want to educate the citizens so much as he wanted to improve their doxai, which constituted the political life in which he too took part. To Socrates, maieutic was a political activity, a give-and-take, fundamentally on a basis of strict equality, the fruits of which could not be measured by the result of arriving at this or that general truth. (Arendt, 2005, 15)

Emphasized by Arendt above, the Socratic practice of philosophy does not aim to rule the city or the citizens by seeking ultimate or eternal Truth as Plato does but makes citizens be visible through revealing doxai of citizens as visible truths in front of others through reflective dialogue. In revealing doxai of citizens as visible truths, it is the process of pluralization that unveils or articulates hidden doxai of citizens to be visible opinions among themselves. The pluralization of doxai of citizens35 as revelation of otherness or alternative is the refusal to the dominance of conventional norms since pluralization is processed as revealing doxai of citizens through examination as problematization which revolts against or transcends accepted guidances.36 Hence, Arendt considers Socratic dialogue is political in nature. «The purging element in thinking, Socrates’ midwifery, that brings out the implications of unexamined opinions and thereby destroys them — values, doctrines, theories, and even convictions — is political by implication.» (Arendt, 2003, 188)

anyhow, to find truth in their doxa.» (Arendt, 2005, 15) The process of pluralization of doxai of citizens may respond the question raised by Martin Palouš that problematization as pluralization of doxai may give account to the political phenomenon of plurality as fundamental aspect of human condition. «Nonetheless, in going through all his references to her analyses and observations, not only in the final text of the Heretical Essays, but also in the preparatory manuscripts and lectures from this period, I was puzzled by his total silence as concerns Arendt’s central point: human plurality as an essential aspect of our human condition, neglected by Western political philosophy. How can he have accepted some of her greatest insights, while at the same time closing his eyes to core elements of the revolution she wrought in contemporary political thinking?» (Palouš, 2011, 170) 36 «The quest for meaning, which relentlessly dissolves and examines anew all accepted doctrines and rules, can at every moment turn against itself, as it were, produce a reversal of the old values, and declare these as “new values”.» (Arendt, 2003, 177) 35

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2) Otherness and Thinking Through revealing doxai as truths through questioning and dialogue, doxai stand up themselves in face of others. Doxai are revealed as difference among citizens. Dialogue does not cancel difference but reveals differences among interlocutors,37 i.e., revealing doxai, which are different from the others, to be visible to interlocutors or adversaries. Through dialogue, interlocutors know the thoughts or opinions of others, and the opinions of others could thus be visible to each other. Revealing opinions of others in dialogue is the visualization of the difference or otherness between interlocutors, i.e., visualizing the invisible object which is out of their sight before dialogue.38 Doxai unveiled are the otherness of others. Otherness is the beginning or happen of thinking. For Aristotle, wonder is the glimpse of being of thought at the very first time. Thinking begins with wonder. Thinking happens with wonder that thinking is the activity of approaching the good or the being of thought by practicing the unique activity of human being as philosophizing, when knowing that being ignorant in front of being of thought (Aristotle, 2004, Metaphysics, 982b). In the activity of problematization, world is no longer disclosed as substantial object or the power of dominance, but as interior worldliness of world which is the manifestability39 of world. The manifestability of world40 discloses itself primordially 37

But the difference between interlocutors manifested in dialogue does not lead to separation; on the contrary, there is a unity of mutual promotion of each other to problematization. The relevant analysis will be demonstrated in later paragraphs. 38 Not only the hidden doxai as objects of thought are being unveiled, but also the invisible process of thinking as problematization is also visualized by bringing close in dialogue since the appearance of difference or otherness is the origin or the happen of thinking. The elucidation will be showed in the following paragraphs. 39 «L’idée du monde, le monde comme idée, ne sont pas compréhensibles si nous considérons le monde comme un ensemble de données effectivement réelles, mais seulement si nous le concevons comme l’ensemble des données dans leur rapport légal a des potentialités inépuisables qui, bien qu’irréalisables, nous sont a priori ouvertes et donnent sens à chaque expérience actuelle singulière; ces potentialités sont des horizons. (On pourrait dire aussi que chaque chose comporte la sphère de sa “manifestabilité”, la sphère de ce dans quoi elle se montre comme étant ce qu’elle est — la sphère de sa phénoménalité; le monde comme horizon de tous les horizons serait alors ce qui donne à chaque chose singulière la possibilité de se montrer).» (Patočka, 1988, 88-89) 40 In Heretical Essays it is named «phenomenality». Phenomenality does not signify manifestation of particular meaning of beings but the process of manifesting which is the movement of manifestation which alights particular meaning of beings as letting-be-seen. «However, there is also a derivative phenomenality. It does not consist in the self-givenness of something that is, but rather in a showing forth of something that manifests itself of itself; a phenomenality which manifests manifestation and therein secondarily something that manifests itself primarily.» (Patočka, 1996, 8-9)

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in the form of interest (inter-être) in natural world or non-problematic world as the community of «gods and mortals»41 that invites to come to the being of world42 as unveiling the manifestability of world as manifesting. Interest is not worldliness itself, but the path to worldliness as manifesting. Interest discloses itself as givenness of being of world, for an instance, the interest of music. The interest of music invites us to come closer to the manifestation of being by practicing relevant activities, like listening or playing music. Through participating in the activities of interest, the being of world as manifesting is furtherly unveiled. In Aristotelian sense, there is no growth or actualization of soul if being of world is absent. For Aristotle, actualization of soul is the practice of virtuous activities, e.g., thinking, which approach to manifestation through the activities. In Of the Soul, Aristotle analogizes the object of thinking with the object of sensation, thinking happens when it meets the object of thinking (i.e., being of thought), just like sensing activity happens when sensation reaches its object of sensation, like colors and sound. For Aristotle, human life actualizes itself through practicing unique virtuous activity43

41

«Thus this tradition attests to a prehistorical world of which we can speak as “natural” in the sense just described. It is natural in the sense of accepting the community of all it contains as something simply given, something that simply manifests itself. It is a community of gods and mortals, the shared life-space of those dependent on the nourishing earth and the heavenly lights and of those who are not so dependent and who thus constitute the most wondrous mystery of this world.» (Patočka, 1996, 25) 42 «The nonproblematic world is one in which concealment is not experienced as such. That does not mean that such a world would not have or know secret things, the sacred, or the mysterious; on the contrary, it can be full of such things, they might even play a decisive role — but it lacks the experience of the transition, of the emergence of what-is as phenomenon out of obscurity into the openness in the course of which even that which allows what-is to become manifest shows itself and thereby and only thereby sets questions about what-is on a firm foundation.» (Patočka, 1996, 12) 43 For Aristotle, friendship is favorable to virtuous person because of the difference between the being of virtuous activity and the person who practices virtuous activity. Owing to finitude of human beings, the being of virtuous activity could not be possessed as beings. Maintaining friendship with the ones who are virtuous par excellence promotes the cultivation of virtuous activities and thus human soul remains being active. With observing virtuous actions and discussion, staying close to virtuous persons is the way of awakening virtuous activities. Maintaining active in soul through practicing virtuous activity, e.g., reflective dialogue, encourages reciprocally to co-self-actualization of virtuous persons. That is the reason why Arendt considers that Aristotle regards friendship as the bondage of polis (Arendt, 2005, 17). This will be discussed in later paragraphs. «Further, it is thought that the happy person must live pleasantly. But the solidary person’s life is hard, since it is not easy for him to be continuously active all by himself; but in relation to others and in their company it is easier. […] Further, good people’s life together allows the cultivation of virtue, as Theognis says.» (Aristotle, 1999, 149,1170a) «For we said at the beginning that happiness is a kind of activity; and clearly activity comes into being, and does not belong to [someone all the time], as a possession does. Now if being happy consists in living and being active; the activity of the good person is excellent, and [hence] pleasant in itself, as we said at the beginning; what is

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which approaches — desires44 (philia) — the object, e.g., being of thought in thinking, that exceeds soul. For Arendt, thinking happens as loving (erôs)45 about the object which is not present yet, and thus thinking approaches the object of love as movement of wind46 or swiftness47 that stepping beyond and approaching the not-yet-being. Based on the nature of thinking as moving beyond and approaching the not-yet-being, thinking de-validates conventional norms and accepted values48 as shown in problematization. Following Socrates (Platon, 2015, Theaetetus, 189e6-190a7; Sophist, 263e3-5), Arendt regards thinking as internal soundless dialogue with self. Internal dialogue means it is our own is pleasant; and we are able to observe our neighbors more than ourselves, and to observe their actions more than our own; it follows that a good person finds pleasure in the actions of excellent people who are his friends, since these actions have both the naturally pleasant [features — they are good, and they are his own]. The blessed person, therefore, will need virtuous friends, given that he decides to observe virtuous actions that are his own, and the actions of a virtuous friend are of this sort. Further, it is thought that the happy person must live pleasantly. But the solitary person’s life is hard, since it is not easy for him to be continuously active all by himself; but in relation to others and in their company it is easier.» (Aristotle, 1999, 149, 1170a); «We agreed that someone’s own being is choiceworthy because he perceives that he is good, and this sort of perception is pleasant in itself. He must, then, perceive his friend’s being together [with his own], and he will do this when they live together and share conversation and thought.» (Aristotle, 1999, 150, 1170b) 44 «Every desire, too, is for the sake of something; for it is for the object of desire which is the starting-point of the practical intellect, and the last [step reached by the practical intellect] is the beginning of action. So it is with good reason that these two — desire and practical thought — appear to be the moving causes; for what causes motion is the appetitive [soul], and it is through this that thought causes motion, for the starting-point of [this] thought is the appetitive [soul].» (Aristotle, 1981, 57, 433b) 45 «Socrates calls this quest for meaning erôs, a kind of love which is primarily a need — it desires what it has not and which is the only matter he pretends to be an expert in. Men are in love with wisdom and do philosophy (philosophein) because they are not wise, just as they are in love with beauty and “do beauty”, as it were (Philokalein, as Pericles called it) because they are not beautiful. Love; by desiring what is not there, establishes a relationship with it. To bring this relationship into the open, make it appear, men speak about it in the same way the lover wants to speak about his beloved.» (Arendt, 2003, 179) 46 «Socrates himself, very much aware that thinking deals with invisibles and is itself invisible, lacking all the outside manifestation of other activities, seems to have used the metaphor of the wind for it: “The winds themselves are invisible, yet what they do is manifest to us and we somehow feel their approach”. (The same metaphor, incidentally, is used by Heidegger who also speaks of the “storm of thought”).» (Arendt, 2003, 175) 47 «As a word, house is shorthand for all these things, the kind of shorthand without which thinking and its characteristic swiftness — “swift as a thought” as Homer used to say — would not be possible at all. The word house is something like a frozen thought which thinking must unfreeze, defrost as it were, whenever it wants to find out its original meaning.» (Arendt, 2003, 172-173) 48 «The consequence of this peculiarity is that thinking inevitably has a destructive, undermining effect on all established criteria, values, measurements for good and evil, in short on those customs and rules of conduct we treat of in morals and ethics. These frozen thoughts, Socrates seems to say, come so handy you can use them in your sleep; but if the wind of thinking, which I shall now arouse in you, has roused you from your sleep and made you fully awake and alive, then you will see that you have nothing in your hand but perplexities, and the most we can do with them is share them with each other.» (Arendt, 2003, 175-176)

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one who raises question and the same one who answers the question. Although thinking as internal dialogue is solidary in nature, thinking is not isolated from others nor isolated from world. Thinking involves necessarily the appearing plural doxai of others.49 Thinking happens as endeavor of manifesting along with world that revealing itself as appearing doxai of others which are split from thought or out of thought. The world is not constitution of thinking, but the reality of appearing doxai of others.50 Thinking begins or happens as the movement of manifesting which approaches appearing plural doxai of world in the way of revealing doxai as truthfulization. Thus thinking may be solidary, but «not lonely». For nothing can be itself and at the same time for itself but the two-in-one that Socrates discovered as the essence of thought and Plato translated into conceptual language as the soundless dialogue eme emauto — between me and myself. But, again, it is not the thinking activity that constitutes the unity, unifies the two-in-one; on the contrary, the two-in-one become One again when the outside world intrudes upon the thinker and cuts short the thinking process. Then, when he is called by his name back into the world of appearances, where he is always One, it is as though the two into which the thinking process had split him clapped together again. Thinking, existentially speaking, is a solidary but not a lonely business; solitude is that human situation in which I keep myself company. (Arendt, 1978, 185)

As shown by Arendt above, reality «intrudes» and «cuts short» thinking. Reality shows something, i.e., the otherness of others, which is «more than» thinking or thought. The thinker intruded by reality could51 be called by reality to come forward to the 49

«Moreover, while engaged in the dialogue of solitude, in which I am strictly by myself, I am not altogether separated from that plurality which is the world of men and which we call, in its most general sense, humanity. This humanity, or rather this plurality, is indicated already in the fact that I am two-in-one. (“One is one and all alone and evermore shall be” is true only of God). Men not only exist in the plural as do all earthly beings, but have an indication of this plurality within themselves.» (Arendt, 2005, 22) 50 «To Socrates, as to his fellow citizens, doxa was the formulation in speech of what dokei moi, that is, “of what appears to me”. This doxa had as its topic not what Aristotle called the eikos, the probable, the many verisimilia (as distinguished from the unum verum, the one truth, on the one hand, and the limitless falsehoods, the falsa infinita, on the other), but comprehension of the world “as it opens itself to me”. It was not, therefore, subjective fantasy and arbitrariness, but was also not something absolute and valid for all. The assumption was that the world opens up differently to every man according to his position in it; and that the “sameness” of the world, its commonness (koinon, as the Greeks would say, “common to all”) or “objectivity” (as we would say from the subjective viewpoint of modern philosophy), resides in the fact that the same world opens up to everyone and that despite all differences between men and their positions in the world — and consequently their doxai (opinions) — “both you and I are human”.» (Arendt, 2005, 14) 51 Instead of facing or confronting otherness, the one intruded by otherness could flee away from otherness. But fleeing away from otherness is possible on the ground of otherness is being primordially unveiled as fundamental phenomenon of human existence. The problem of fleeing away from otherness and its relationship with evil is

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appearance of plurality of doxai. In the lectures on thinking (1951-1952),52 by tracing the etymological origin of the meaning of «thinking» and «calling», Heidegger regards thinking as the activity of thanking to the appearing of being of world in which our heart belongs.53 «Thanking» is the devotion to what is owed for as being beholden54 and gives thought to what it is belonged to.55 For Heidegger, interest is not leisure activity but the involvement of being of beings.56 «What is called thinking» does not only designate what thinking is but furtherly «what calls for thinking» or «what invites thinking that sets thinking in motion».57 Thinking is the activity of thanking that giving back to the appearing58 being of world. In the word of Arendt cited above, it is the «One» in which to be discussed in detail in another article. Martin Heidegger, lectures on What is Called Thinking?, a translation of Was Heist Denken?, translated and with an introduction by J. Glenn Gray, Perennial, 1976 (Heidegger, 1976). 53 Here «heart» does not mean the organ of body but the connection or communication with the being of world. «The thanc means man’s inmost mind, the heart, the heart’s core, that innermost essence of man which reaches outward most fully and to the outermost limits, and so decisively that, rightly considered, the idea of an inner and outer world does not arise.» (Heidegger, 1976, 144) 54 «In giving thanks, the heart gives thought to what it has and what it is. The heart, thus giving thought and thus being memory, gives itself in thought to that to which it is held. It thinks of itself as beholden, not in the sense of mere submission, but beholden because its devotion is held in listening. Original thanking is the thanks owed for being. That thanks alone give rise to thinking of the kind we know as retribution and reward in the good and bad sense.» (Heidegger, 1976, 141) 55 «This thinking which recalls, and which qua thinking alone is true thanks, does not need to repay, nor be deserved, in order to give thanks. Such thanks is not a recompense; but it remains an offering; and only by this offering do we allow that which properly gives food for thought to remain what it is in its essential nature. Thus we give thanks for our thinking in a sense that is almost lost to our language, and, so far as I can see, is retained only in our Alemannic usage. When the transaction of a matter is settled, or disposed of, we say in Alemannic dialect that it is “thanked”. Disposing does not mean here sending off, but the reverse: it means to bring the matter forth and leave it were it belongs. This sort of disposing is called thanking.» (Heidegger, 1976, 146) 56 «Interest, interesse, means to be among and in the midst of things, or to be at the center of a thing and to stay with it.» (Heidegger, 1976, 5) 57 «In the widest sense, “to call” means to set in motion, to get something underway — which may be done in a gentle and therefore unobtrusive manner, and in fact is most readily done that way. In the older Greek version of the New Testament, Matthew 8:18, we find: “(Sentence in ancient Greek) — seeing a large crowd around him, he called to them to go the other side”. The Greek word (word in ancient Greek) properly means to get something on the road, to get in underway. The Greek noun (another word in ancient Greek) means way. And that old word “to call” means not so much a command as a letting-reach, that therefore the “call” has an assonance of helpfulness and complaisance, is shown by the fact that the same word in Sanskrit still means something like “to invite”.» (Heidegger, 1976, 117) 58 «Presence does demand unconcealment, and is a rising from unconcealment — though not generally but in such a way that presence is the entry into a duration of unconcealment. The Greeks experience such duration as a luminous appearance in the sense of illuminated, radiant self-manifestation. Continuance is the comingto-the-fore that is at rest, has come to rest before the unconcealedness of what lies before us. Rest in duration is not, however, the absence of movement. Rest, in the presence of what is present, is a gathering. It gathers the rising to the coming-to-the-fore, with the hidden suddenness of an ever-possible absenting into concealness. The 52

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reality manifests as plural appearance of doxai and invites thinking happens. Thus philosophical thinking does not separate itself from world; rather, philosophical thinking arises from world, precisely, from the plurality of doxai of world. Existence of problematization, as the activity of self-realization of human beings, is the response to the provocation59 of the manifestability of world. The responsibility of living in problematicity, which grounds ontologically on the activity of manifesting, does not separate itself from worldliness of world as manifestability but implicates itself in the response60 to appearing plural doxai of world.61 (ancient Greek word) in the (another ancient Greek word), the coming into present being and being present, does not mean that what is present comes toward us men as object. The (first ancient Greek word) means nearness, in the sense of the radiance issuing from unconcealedness into unconcealedness. What has come near in such nearness may be very distant.» (Heidegger, 1976, 237) 59 «La lutte demeure indispensable en tant que lutte de l’éveil. Un tel combat n’est pas initialement une attaque, mais plutôt une provocation à la riposte, aux représailles à l’extermination. C’est seulement dans la défense opposée à cette répression primaire, à la puissance qui alors seulement devient ce qu’elle est, que se produit la révolte. La révolte ne se manifeste pas nécessairement à chaque fois comme violence physique, la violence n’est là que secondairement, en tant que conséquence, encore qu’elle soit étroitement liée au fait que l’éveil est toujours fini. L’éveil est un renouveau, une mise à découvert authentique de la vie, non dans sa profondeur passée et sa donation passive, mais dans l’appel irradie par sa dépendance, appel qui nous somme d’assumer, en y adhérant, ce à quoi, en tant que sort fini, nous ne pouvons échapper, ce qui nécessairement advient, mais qui pour cette raison même nous donne la possibilité de ne pas nous gaspiller, de ne pas nous fragmenter dans tout ce qui tend toujours à détourer notre regard de ce que nous sommes.» (Patočka, 1988, 43-44) 60 «Responsibility» is understood as the duty («have-to») of finishing the task «not-yet-finished». For example, «It is my responsibility to do the housework» means neither out of fondness nor being forced, but the task of «have-to» finish the housework undone; the responsibility of doing housework is grounded on relating the room to cleanness. The «relating» is an infinite process of realization of the demand of cleanness manifested (the room is to be cleaned once it is dirty). The responsibility is grounded on the process of «relating oneself to the manifested». In other word, responsibility is the realization of co-relation of being which relates to existence itself. (Corresponding to the main text we have discussed above, responsibility is implicated in the realization of manifestation of being. The realization of manifestation of being is the process of relating to the being manifested, i.e., the process of realization of corelation to being). «Response» (or «respond») is understood as «answering or action done to that which is relating to oneself», for example, «The teacher has responded my question» means that the teacher has done something, e.g., explanation, to answer the question which is relating to him (since the question is posed to the subject taught by teacher). Response is the action rooted in the discovery (manifestation) of that which is relating to existence, i.e., rooted in manifestation of co-relation. Thus, it is shown that responsibility, as grounding itself on the realization of co-relation of being, is structurally linked to response as manifestation of co-relation. Responsibility, as the activity of co-relation of being to existence, is the realization (the existential capability) of manifestation of co-relation. In short, responsibility is the realization of response. Referring to the main text, interest (intérêt: inter-être) is the activity which relates the existence to the being manifested (e.g., interest of music). Response, as the activity which acts to the being related to oneself, is co-relational. Responsibility has implicated itself in the activity of realization of response, i.e., the realization of co-relation of being. Questioning is not the activity of pure detachment or pure de-corelation but re-corelation in the way of de-corelating. Questioning does not direct itself to absolute nothingness but always on the way of unveiling being (as shown in the main text). Thus, responsibility (realization of co-relation) as insistence to response (co-relation of being) is implicated in questioning (as both de-corelation and re-corelation). 61 In Caring for the Soul in a Postmodern Age: Politics and Phenomenology in the Thought of Jan Patočka, Findlay

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3) Unity of Community as Polis and Co-Problematization In dialogue or discussion, the others’ opinion is to be visualized in sight as being considered during dialoguous discussion. Although dialogue reveals difference or otherness among interlocutors, this does not imply separation between interlocutors. From the perspective of transcendence of existence, reflective dialogue is the mutual encouragement of practicing problematization as spiritual activity of human being, through manifesting the difference or otherness (in the form of doxai) of others which is «outside of» the thoughts of individuals that awakens thinking. In the second essay of Heretical Esssay in the Philosophy of History, Patočka analyses polemos of Heraclitus and emphasizes that polemos as lightning of being unifies the conflicts among interlocutors. It is because polemos is the vision or letting–be–seen which lets interlocutors see or visualize the being of world manifested as otherness in problematization of dialogue.62 And thus states that responsibility is not moral standard beyond existence, but a mode of living (living in quest) which responds to oneself and to «world perceived as a whole». «Responsibility is not a moral value. It has no abstract content. Nor is it an Aristotelian virtue, responding to a sense of proportion or moderation. Instead, it describes the manner of living in which one acts in response to one’s own being, as well as to the world perceived as a whole.» (Findlay, 2002, 150) 62  The interpretation of polemos as revealing difference or otherness with respect to interlocutor in dialogue which promotes problematization is consistent with the interpretation of polemos of Nicolas De Warren as violent renewal of meaning from being, since the revelation of difference is the appearance of «violence» as otherness which is against or exceeds the given thought of interlocutor («being» used by De Warren) as happening of thinking or problematization. «Polemos is the violence of ontological questioning that fractures the apparently seamless bond between meaning and being. […] The bondage of the natural world is thus two-fold: it is the bondage to a total meaning, not simply as a totality of meaning that defines the world, but as a seamlessness, or lack of differentiation, between “meaning” and “being”; it is the bondage to an unquestionable relation towards being, or, in other words, a forgetting of being. Once grasped in its ontological dimension, polemos is not a violence against meaning per se (for, indeed, violence against meaning pervades the natural world), but against the seamlessness of meaning and being that characterizes the abiding sense in which the pre-given meanings of “what-is” within the natural world are taken for granted, as given without further question and concern.» (De Warren, 2014, 221-222) «In sum, polemos is not equivalent to violence against pre-given meaning without further ontological qualification; it is, moreover, not equivalent to the destruction of meaning and tumble into sheer meaningless. Polemos is a passage, a “flashing forth”, through a radical form of questioning and existence.» (De Warren, 2014, 222) James Dodd regards war understood by Patočka as the «archetype» of revolting against meanings given or assigned, and bringing forth new relationship to world. «That is, if profane everydayness, revolting against its own marginalization, has taken on the radicalized form of a selfproduction that feeds on anything that has force; if our understanding of the kind of beings that we are is that we are just given material available for a will to create; then war becomes the very archetype of that moment of a willful break from the given situatedness of life towards a new world, uniquely shaped by force, though for all that essentially bound to the profane.» (Dodd, 2006, 126, italics added) «Without war, individuals tend to slip through the grip of mere life, which without war can be nothing but an empty superficiality in the face of the transcendence of the sacred and the responsible. With war, the grip of mere life becomes total, for

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both interlocutors depend on each other to visualize the being of world as manifesting and thus unity is built among them.63 Unity in this sense does not mean holding same opinion among interlocutors, but the mutual encouragement of participating in problematization as manifesting «not-yet» in the visualization of otherness unveiled in dialoguous discussion. Hence, separation does not happen in the process of mutual manifestation of difference or otherness in dialogue; on the contrary, polis is born as new community 64 with unity which is the mutual-dependence of co-engaging in problematization which shakens accepted normative convention and renews relationship with world. For the formation of community as polis, Arendt regards it as the process of «equalization» of citizens that becoming equal to each other.

threatened life is a seemingly inescapable spiritual trap for those who are addicted to things.» (Dodd, 2006, 128) The interpretation of war of Patočka of James Dodd involves the distinction between sacred and profane, authentic and inauthentic existence of human being, the discussion of the relationship of being of world and generation of meaning as the relation of staying on earth and uprooting of given meanings will be unfolded in the coming article. 63 «Polemos is not the destructive passion of a wild brigand but is, rather, the creator of unity. The unity it founds is more profound than any ephemeral sympathy or coalition of interests; adversaries meet in the shaking of a given meaning, and so create a new way of being human - perhaps the only mode that offers hope amid the storm of the world: the unity of the shaken but undaunted.» (Patočka, 1996, 43) «Polemos, the flash of being out of the night of the world, lets everything particular be and manifest itself as what it is. Thus the greatest contradiction cleaves together in a unity which is above all, which manifests itself in all and governs all. Humans, however, encounter this One and become wise only when they themselves act, accomplishing their deeds in the atmosphere of freedom ensured by the law of the polis which, in turn, nurtures itself on the one law of the Divine whose name is polemos.» (Patočka, 1996, 43) Findlay shows that polemos as conflict is characterized as the struggle against the domination of given convention in which the unity of community is grounded. «Polemos is the spirit of the polis, by which is meant not the spirit of the Greek polis as a historical event, but the spirit of free politics itself. Conflict, for Patočka, binds the activity of political life to philosophy as the struggle against the fall into an acceptance of given meaning.» (Findlay, 2002, 174) «The unity of a free state is not founded on static ideology but on the struggle against its dominance. It is this commitment to struggle and acceptance of conflict that is the one force to which all parties may equally lay claim.» (Findlay, 2002, 174) 64 «On this basis there grows a new community and a new way of coming to cognitive terms with the totality of what-there-is. It is a new community, which, to be sure, is no longer simply the work of humans but in which humans do participate freely. It is not only a community of humans with each other, a mutual recognition in which they guarantee each other a spiritual perpetuation in the memory of glory. It is, rather, a community of humans with God who is their eternal memory and the perception of their essential spiritual being. It is a community in which, for all its hierarchy, all humans are equal before the face of the ultimate ‘true’ reality; in which they are thus true fellow participants in a meaningfulness which they did not create but which they are called to bring about.» (Patočka, 1996, 67) The «mutual recognition» is the encouragement and mutual dependence of each other to participate in realizing a common reality which is the eternal process of truthfulization as breaking through the accepted norms in problematization. «What, though, makes humans just and truthful is their care for their soul. Care for the soul is the bequest of ancient Greek philosophy. Care for the soul means that truth is something not given once and for all, nor merely a matter of observing and acknowledging the observed, but rather a lifelong inquiry, a self-controlling, self-unifying intellectual and vital practice.» (Patočka, 1996, 82)

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If we use Aristotle’s terminology in order to understand Socrates better — and great parts of Aristotle’s political philosophy, especially those in which he is in explicit opposition to Plato, go back to Socrates — we may cite that part of the Nicomachean Ethics where Aristotle explains that a community is not made out of equals, but on the contrary of people who are different and unequal. The community comes into being through equalizing, isasthenai. This equalization takes place in all exchanges, as between the physicial and the farmer, and it is based on money. The political, non economic equalization is friendship, philia. […] The equalization in friendship does not of course mean that the friends become the same or equal to each other, but rather that they become equal partners in a common world — that they together constitute a community. Community is what friendship achieves, and it is obvious that this equalization has as its polemical point the everincreasing differentiation of citizens that is inherent in an agonal life. Aristotle concludes that it is friendship and not justice (as Plato maintained in the Republic, the great dialogue about justice) that appears to be the bond of communities. (Arendt, 2005, 17)

«Equal partner» does not only mean ridding of privilege of power among friends or citizens, but the mutual dependence of each other in participating in problematization. In other words, we cannot make dialogue or cannot think as internal dialogue in the condition of absence of Other. As Arendt shows above, community is not made of equals but exactly of difference and unequals. The difference or otherness among citizens is the origin of unifying community as polis in the sense of mutual promoting each other to engage in co-problematization. «Equalization of citizens» is the process of mutualdependence of encouraging each other to participate in co-problematization. Perhaps we can be inspired from the etymological meaning of the word «dialogue» (διά-λογος). The word «dia-logue» literally means traversing logos. Through encountering otherness of others, i.e., dialogue as conversation or communication, logos is being traversed or reached in the sense of exercising the spiritual activity of human being. Thinking as internal dialogue, involves otherness (in the form of doxai of others) in itself that otherness awakens thinking. Being internal and soundless, thinking is a modality of dialogue. Polis is the unity of community which practices the ordinary way of thinking as mutual encouragement of engaging in co-problematization among citizens. Thus it could be known that the practice of problematization as Socratic care of the soul promotes the formation of polis by pluralizing doxai among citizens as truthfulization; in this sense, polis is the ordinary way of practicing problematization65 among citizens 65

As Findlay shows, polis is the way of practicing problematization as philosophy that promotes the possibility

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through dialogue. Hence Patočka regards Heraclitus observes the «common origin of philosophy and the polis».66 CONCLUSION Living in problematicity examines and revolts conventional norms in the way of transcending67 the domination of accepted guidance. Problematization trans-values68 the normative guidance from hiddenly accepted to the birth of alternative in disclosure.69 The responsibility of living in truth is not the moral code assigned to existence but structurally implicated in problematization as manifesting. In the form of dialogue or

of living in freedom which initiates «rather than simply accept». «The polis was where a philosophy of freedom could concretely manifest itself; it represented the opportunity for the self-aware citizen to reach forth, to no longer merely accept but to actively risk and strive. The polis was both the means to and the symbol of a new human possibility that announced a historical era: the possibility to initiate rather than simply accept.» (Findlay, 2002, 99) «Politics, then, as conceptualized and epitomized in Socratic philosophy, occupies a higher position in relation to philosophy than either religion or art, for original politics has as its purpose the transmission of philosophical insight to humanity, humanity as a whole and in its most fundamental mode — the mode of its social being. Politics presents us with the possibility to strive for and live a free life. It directly connects the spiritual life to praxis, while religion and art must be largely content with symbolizing that spirituality.» (Findlay, 2002, 109) 66 «Thus Heraclitus sees the unity and the common origin of philosophy and the polis.» (Patočka, 1996, 43) 67 «Transcendence» is understood as activity of liberating from the domination of normative tradition in the way of quest or reflection. «Socrates’ mastery is based on an absolute freedom: he is constantly freeing himself of all the bonds of nature, of tradition, of others’ schemata as well as of his own, of all physical and spiritual possessions.» (Kohák, 1989, 180) 68 «In reality, irony and ambivalence given by the life of Socrates, by the ambiguous meaning of everything he does and says, and this gave meaning and, in turn, from what we could call the transcendence of Socrates. Socrates, on the one hand, and this in the same moral world inhabited by others — also knows its measures and its concepts, know this life is full of it; on the other hand, however, his philosophical idea forced him to give all these concepts a way, to see behind them another dimension, than that in which they move others. With what, and already given the fundamental element of irony, that ambivalence; when Socrates and others think and talk about the good, they do not think and do not say the same thing; and this difference, in turn, on the other hand, is not a mere difference in terminology, because behind it is the trans-valuation of values, that wants to grasp what that man ultimately tends, even if unconsciously, and so you cannot remove the misunderstanding with no other intervention terminology, or other outward.» (translated from Italian) (Patočka, 2003, 399) 69 For Arendt, instead of following given guidance of convention, thinking practices the capability of telling «right from wrong» that may bring forth caution to «prevent catastrophes». «If thinking, the two-in-one of the soundless dialogue, actualizes the difference within our identity as given in consciousness and thereby results in conscience as its by-product, then judging, the by-product of the liberating effect of thinking, realizes thinking, makes it manifest in the world of appearances, where I am never alone and always much too busy to be able to think. The manifestation of the wind of thought is no knowledge; it is the ability to tell right from wrong, beautiful from ugly. And this indeed may prevent catastrophes, at least for myself, in the rare moments when the chips are down.» (Arendt, 2003, 189)

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internal dialogue as thinking, manifesting happens as responding to plural otherness as doxai of world. Thus the responsibility of living in truth as insistence of manifesting is the response to plurality of world. Socratic practice of care of the soul as self-creation of existence, reforms community70 as polis71 with freedom and unity by pluralizing doxai among citizens in the way of revealing otherness vigorously through reflective dialogue. Responding to appearing plural doxai of world, living in truth as unceasing struggle for the revival of community as polis which practices co-problematization and revolts against the domination of conventional guidance with responsibility, is thus philosophicalpolitically72 revolutionary. There are no dangerous thoughts; Thinking itself is dangerous. Hannah Arendt

R EFER ENCES Arendt, H. (1978). The Life of the Mind. New York, NY: Harcourt. Arendt, H. (2003). Responsibility and Judgment. New York, NY: Schocken. Arendt, H. (2005). The Promise of Politics. New York, NY: Schocken. Aristotle, (1981). On the Soul. Grinnell, IA: Peripatetic Press. Aristotle, (2004). Metaphysics. London: Penguin Classics.

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«To put it differently, the conflict between philosophy and politics, between the philosopher and the polis, broke out because Socrates had wanted — not to play a political role — but to make philosophy relevant for the polis. […] Whereas Socrates still obeyed the laws which, however wrongly, had condemned him, because he felt responsible for the city.» (Arendt, 2005, 26) 71 «The center there is [Greek word], or let us say bravery, the organ of courage, capable of listening to the highest and risking at the same time. In this we discerned what is our soul. Yet , from the cultivating of our soul arises the possibility of forming the state, the community that is necessary so that a person like Socrates does not need to die.» (Patočka, 2002, 121) «You see, then, that the question of the polis and its constitution, its constituting, is again the question of the soul, its character and its examination — care of the soul.» (Patočka, 2002, 121) 72  «The spiritual person is not of course a politician and is not political in the usual sense of this word. He is

not a party to the dispute that rules this world — but he is political in yet a different way, obviously, and he cannot be apolitical because this non-self-evident nature of reality is precisely what he throws into the face of this society and of everything that he finds around himself.» (Patočka, 2007b, 63)

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Aristotle, (1999). Nicomachean Ethics. Indianapolis, IN – Cambridge, MA: Hackett Publishing Company. Chvatik, I. (2011). The Responsibility of the “Shaken”: Jan Patočka and his “Care for the Soul” in the “Post-European” World. In Chvatík, I., & Abrams, E. (Eds.), Jan Patočka and the Heritage of Phenomenology: Centenary Papers. Contributions to Phenomenology: Vol. 61 (263-279). Netherlands: Springer. De Warren, N. (2014). Homecoming. Jan Patočka’s Reflections on the First World War. In Staudigl, M. (Ed.), Phenomenologies of Violence. Studies in Contemporary Phenomenology: Vol. 9 (207-243). Leiden – Boston, MA: BRILL. Dodd, J. (2006). Violence and Phenomenology. London: Routledge. Findlay, E. (2002). Caring for the Soul in a Postmodern Age: Politics and Phenomenology in the Thought of Jan Patočka. New York, NY: State University of New York Press. Foucault, M. (2011). The Courage of the Truth (The Government of Self and Others II). Lectures at the Collège De France 1983-1984. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Gubser, M. (2013). Jan Patočka’s Transcendence to the World. In Copoeru, I., Kono T., Nenon, T., de Haro, A. S., & Zirión, A. (Eds.), Razón y vida. La responsabilidad de la Filosofía. Investigaciones Fenomenológicas. Revista De La Sociedad Española De Fenomenología [Mind and Life. The Responsibility of Philosophy. Phenomenological Studies. The Spanish Journal of Phenomenological Society]. Monográfico 4/II (155-175). Madrid: Sociedad Española de Fenomenología. Heidegger, M. (1976). What is Called Thinking? New York, NY: Perennial. Kohák, E. (1989). Jan Patočka: Philosophy and Selected Writings. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Palouš, M. (2011). Jan Patočka’s Socratic Message for the 21st Century (Rereading Patočka’s “Charter 77 Texts” Thirty Years Later). In Chvatík, I., & Abrams, E. (Eds.), Jan Patočka and the Heritage of Phenomenology: Centenary Papers. Contributions to Phenomenology: Vol. 61 (163-174). Netherlands: Springer. Patočka, J. (1988). Le Monde Naturel et le Mouvement de l’Existence Humaine. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pulishers. Patočka, J. (1995). Papiers Phénoménologique. Grenoble: J. Millon. Patočka, J. (1996). Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History. Chicago, IL: Carus Publishing Company.

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Patočka, J. (1998). Body, Community, Language, World. Chicago, IL: Carus Publishing Company. Patočka, J. (2002). Plato and Europe. Stanford, CT: Stanford University Press. Patočka, J. (2003). Socrate: Lezioni di Filosofia Antica [Socrates: Lessons of the Ancient Philosophy]. Milan: Bompiani. (in Italian). Patočka, J. (2007a). Life in Balance, Life in Amplitude. In Manton, E. (Ed.). Jan Patočka: Living in Problematicity (32-42). Prague: Oikoymenh. Patočka, J. (2007b). The Spiritual Person and the Intellectual. In Manton, E. (Ed.). Jan Patočka: Living in Problematicity (51-69). Prague: Oikoymenh. Plato, (2002). Five Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo. Indianapolis, IN – Cambridge, MA: Hackett Publishing Company. Plato, (2015). Theaetetus and Sophist. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tassin, E., & Richir, M. (Eds.). (1992). Jan Patočka: philosophie, phénoménologie, politique. Grenoble: J. Millon.

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HORIZON 5 (1) 2016 : I. Research : I. Römer : 115–132 ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ • STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY • STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE • ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES

1.2 CONTRIBUTIONS ON LÁSZLÓ TENGELYI 1.2 ПАМЯТИ ЛАСЛО ТЕНГЕЛИ

doi: 10.18199/2226-5260-2016-5-1-115-132

FROM KANT TO THE PROBLEM OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL METAPHYSICS. IN MEMORY OF LÁSZLÓ TENGELYI INGA RÖMER PhD in Philosophy, Associate Professor, Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Faculty of Humanities and Cultural Studies, 42119 Wuppertal, Germany. E-mail: [email protected] The article outlines the central lines of László Tengelyi’s intellectual path and hints at some perspectives that could be continued on the basis of his last writings. The first part shows the development of his thought from the first Hungarian works on Kant up to his last book, so as to pose the question of a possible unity in his work. Such a unity can be seen in the diacritical tension, systematically enlarged in each period, between freedom, the story of a told life, expression and the finite projection of a world on the one hand, and guilt as an event of destiny, the region of a wild sense, a wild responsibility and an open infinite on the other hand. A second part presents the main ideas of «World and Infinit. On the Problem of Phenomenological Metaphysics», especially the programme of a phenomenological answer to the problem of metaphysics. The core of this programme is a metaphysics of facticity in the realm of which a methodological transcendentalism and a metontological transcendentalism become possible. A third part tries to situate László Tengelyi’s ideas within the context of contemporary «realism». Two of Meillassoux’ central arguments are discussed in order to show how László Tengelyi’s approach provides a phenomenological answer to their challenges. Key words: Phenomenology, metaphysics, transcendental philosophy, realism, Kant, Tengelyi, Meillassoux.

© INGA RÖMER, 2016

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ОТ КАНТА К ПРОБЛЕМЕ ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКОЙ МЕТАФИЗИКИ. ПАМЯТИ ЛАСЛО ТЕНГЕЛИ ИНГА РЁМЕР Доктор философии, доцент Бергского Университета Вупперталя, факультет гуманитарных наук и исследований культуры, 42119 Вупперталь, Германия. E-mail: [email protected] В статье выделяются центральные линии интеллектуального пути Ласло Тенгели, а также намечается их возможное дальнейшее развитие, основанное на поздних его работах. В первой части статьи показано развитие Тенгели от ранних работ его венгерского периода о Канте вплоть до последней его книги. Кроме того, здесь ставится вопрос о единстве его работ. Такое единство может быть усмотрено в диакритической напряженности, систематически возрастающей в каждый период, между свободой, историей рассказанной жизни, выражением и конечным проектированием мира, с одной стороны, и виной как событием судьбы, областью голого (wild) смысла, голой ответственности и открытой бесконечности, с другой стороны. Во второй части представлены основные идеи его книги «Мир и бесконечность. К проблеме феноменологической метафизики», в особенности программа феноменологического решения проблемы метафизики. Ядро этой программы — метафизика фактичности, в поле которой становятся возможными методологический трансцендентализм и мета-онтологический (metontological) трансцендентализм. В третьей части осуществлена попытка поместить мысль Тенгели в контекст современного «реализма». Обсуждаются два из центральных аргументов Мейясу с целью показать, каким образом подход Ласло Тенгели обеспечивает феноменологический ответ на их вызовы. Ключевые слова: Феноменология, метафизика, трансцендентальная философия, реализм, Кант, Тенгели, Мейясу.

The phenomenological movement inaugurated by Edmund Husserl over a hundred years ago is today a rather marginalized tradition in the philosophical landscape in Germany. It might not be an accident that one of its strongest voices came from outside the country and brought with it a thoroughly international attitude. László Tengelyi was of Hungarian origin and had lived in France before he became professor of philosophy in Wuppertal in 2001, where he stayed until his death in 2014. As a veritable «citizen of the world» and in his profound familiarity with the history of philosophy, he made it his task to continue the phenomenological movement as being able to provide answers to the most fundamental questions of the philosophical tradition, while at the same time engaging phenomenology into a dialogue with the protagonists of contemporary debates on the

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international scene. For László Tengelyi, an important feature of phenomenology was that its point of departure in what is today called the «first person perspective» contained an essential potential for critique. He saw in it a philosophical approach that was capable of counteracting ideological tendencies by returning to the concrete experience of the individual. Phenomenological philosophy has lost one of its most important thinkers, when László Tengelyi died much too soon in July 2014. The following reflections try to outline the central lines of his intellectual path and hint at some perspectives that could be continued on the basis of his last writings. The first part shows the development of his thought from the first Hungarian works on Kant up to his last book, so as to pose the question of a possible unity in his work. A second part presents the main ideas of World and Infinity. On the Problem of Phenomenological Metaphysics (Tengelyi, 2014b), especially the programme of a phenomenological answer to the problem of metaphysics. A third part tries to situate László Tengelyi’s ideas within the context of contemporary «realism». 1. FROM KANT TO THE PROBLEM OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL METAPHYSICS While his intellectual awakening was triggered by reading Thomas Mann, the beginning of László Tengelyi’s philosophical path was marked by an intense work on Immanuel Kant, resulting in two Hungarian books, entitled Autonomy and the order of the world. Kant on the Fundament of Ethics (Tengelyi, 1984) and Kant. The Order of the World and Freedom in the Development of the Critical System (Tengelyi, 1988). While his first writings focused on the relation between freedom and the order of the world in Kant’s critical philosophy, László Tengelyi soon saw himself compelled to exceed Kant’s theory of freedom. What was primarily at issue for him here was the problem of evil, for which he did not find an adequate solution in Kant. This led him to Schelling, where he found the notion of freedom towards good and evil. In his next book, again written in Hungarian, he reflects upon the problem of guilt and evil in Kant and Schelling, which leads him to the thesis expressed in the title: Guilt as an Event of Destiny (Tengelyi, 1992). Guilt cannot be entirely founded in man’s freedom, but there remains an uncontrollable moment to be understood as an event of destiny.

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In the second period of his thinking, László Tengelyi turned towards German and French phenomenology. His interest was first directed to the problems of the history of a life and narrative identity. His reflections led to the book The Wild Region in Life-History, first written in German (Tengelyi, 1998) and then translated into Hungarian (1998), English (2004) and French (2005). The heart of the book lies in the tension between the story of a lived life and the story of a told life, a tension rendered by the double sense of the German word «Lebensgeschichte» in the German title Der Zwitterbegriff Lebensgeschichte. On the one hand, the identity of a self can be understood narratively through the story of a life. On the other hand, there is a wild sense, spontaneously emerging in experience, a wild sense on which narrative identity is based, but which nevertheless resists a total integration into the story of a told life. This withdrawal of a wild region of sense is extensively analysed with respect to temporality and alterity. The book ends with the outline of an elemental ethic, centred on the notion of a wild responsibility. The English translation of the Hungarian title of this book would be The Story of a Life and the Event of Destiny; in this title, the relation between this book and his first works becomes particularly clear. The event-character of guilt, which was the result of the work on Kant and Schelling, already pointed towards this wild region of sense and responsibility. This takes on a broader meaning within the larger context of the phenomenological analyses dealing with the problem of the story of a life. A third period centres on the notion of experience. The first results of this period were the French book Experience Regained. Philosophical Essays I (Tengelyi, 2006) and the German book Experience and Expression. Phenomenology in Upheaval in Husserl and his Successors (Tengelyi, 2007). In these phenomenological analyses of experience and its relation to expression, once again László Tengelyi expands his perspective. The tension between the story of a life and the wild region of sense is now enlarged in direction of the tension between expression and experience as such. Thus, the topic of the story of a told life is widened towards a general phenomenology of language, and the analyses of wild sense lead through the notion of experience to an original form of phenomenological realism. In 2014, the second volume of the philosophical essays The Experience of Singularity. Philosophical Essays II (2014a) was published in French. These new essays can be situated within the continuity of the second period: their central idea is that of a singularity of the self, only to be experienced in answers to the calls of the

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Other and only to be expressed in a necessarily incomplete narration of this experience. The fourth and last period has its heart in the question and the problem of phenomenological metaphysics. First there is the voluminous book New Phenomenology in France, written together with Hans-Dieter Gondek (Tengelyi, 2011). This book is first of all an account of the second generation of French phenomenologists. However László Tengelyi does not content himself purely with giving an overview, but he tries to bring out what it is that holds this generation together. He states that one of the central axes of this generation is the question of the relation between phenomenology and metaphysics. Within this context, he emphasizes especially the approach of Jean-Luc Marion, who understands phenomenology as another First Philosophy, different from the onto-theological metaphysics that was criticized by Heidegger. László Tengelyi wants to continue these developments by aiming directly at another type of metaphysics, different from onto-theological metaphysics: a specifically phenomenological metaphysics. In his eyes, a phenomenological metaphysics would be a metaphysics of facticity, in the realm of which a methodological transcendentalism and a metontological transcendentalism become possible. One could say that the view of the tension between wild sense and expression is enlarged here one last time, this time in the metaphysical tension between a projection of the world (Weltentwurf) and the infinite: a projection of the world, which is always one projection of the world among others, finds itself in an irrevocable tension with an open infinite which does not cease to trouble every such concrete projection and to push it towards its reorganisation. The tension between wild sense and expression finds its most global and elaborated form in the tension between a phenomenological metaphysics of the projection of the world on the one hand and an open infinite on the other hand. Is there something that can be identified as a systematic unity in the works of László Tengelyi? And if this is the case, how can this unity be characterized? In my eyes, there is indeed a systematic unity of his life’s work: it consists in the tension, systematically enlarged in each period, between freedom, the story of a told life, expression and the finite projection of a world on the one hand, and guilt as an event of destiny, the region of a wild sense, a wild responsibility and an open infinite on the other hand. This tension is not at all to be understood in the sense of a dogmatic dualism, but rather in the sense of a diacritical philosophy as it was outlined by the late Merleau-Ponty.

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A diacritical tension on several levels seems to be the guiding thread or the architectonical centre of László Tengelyi’s thought. But can it not be said that the heart of his thinking, as its beginning, is essentially Kantian and situates itself in a Kantian lineage? A particular form of post-Hegelian phenomenological Kantianism perhaps, which holds on to a nonsynthetisable duality, to an insurmountable abyss between the finite and the infinite, but which also accounts for the historicity of thinking and a facticity that can never fully be mastered by thinking? If this interpretation were correct, the last project World and Infinity would be an autonomous and original development of those topics that were at the centre of László Tengelyi’s first Hungarian writings on Kant and Schelling. In now attempting to present the main ideas of World and Infinity, it goes without saying that I can only outline some of the most central lines of argument, contained in this very rich and complex book. 2. TOWARDS A PHENOMENOLOGICAL METAPHYSICS It is Heidegger to whom we owe a thesis and an argument about metaphysics that became very influential: for Heidegger, metaphysics as such is onto-theology; ontotheology is a form of a decay of thinking; therefore metaphysics as such is a philosophical dead end. To a large extent this argument depends on the thesis that metaphysics as such has an onto-theological structure. It is this Heideggerian thesis that was at the origin of a research programme which was initiated by Jean-Luc Marion, Jean-François Courtine and Rémi Brague. Their aim was to test this global thesis, its significance and its adequacy. Their detailed analyses of several authors from the history of metaphysics led them to the discovery that this Heideggerian thesis not only needs more precision and differentiation for each single author in this tradition, but that it is not even wholly accurate as regards all thinkers within the history of metaphysics. That meant: metaphysics is not as such onto-theology in the Heideggerian sense, but it is only so in certain of its forms, especially that of Duns Scotus. Duns Scotus himself was one of the first influences on Heidegger who had written his Habilitation thesis on the medieval philosopher who was the origin of that form of metaphysics referred to by Kant as the «metaphysics of the old». This idea of a plurality of types of metaphysics that are not all onto-theological and especially not all in the same sense was of major significance to László Tengelyi. This finding in French

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historiographical research was much more than «purely historical» (if there ever was such a thing): it rather meant an enlargement of the field of metaphysics towards a typology of different fundamental types of metaphysics. It further opened up the possibility of a non-onto-theological type of metaphysics. László Tengelyi’s own thesis, which is founded upon this idea, is that besides the Aristotelian, the Plotinian, the Scotist and the Cartesian structural forms of metaphysics, distinguished by the historical research programme, there is a fourth fundamental type of metaphysics: a particularly phenomenological type, and this type can be the form the problem of metaphysics might adopt in our times. László Tengelyi is not the only one who has argued for a systematic renaissance of metaphysics. Jean-François Courtine speaks of the «end of the “end of metaphysics”» (Courtine, 2005, 13). And maybe the idea of an «end of metaphysics» has always been itself a hidden form of metaphysics; this was at least Levinas’ suspicion when he wrote in 1972, that «the end of metaphysics is our unacknowledged metaphysics» (Lévinas, 1972, 76). In the so called «analytic» philosophy, a renaissance of metaphysics has occurred in two senses. On the one hand there is a line of speculative metaphysics that has been developing for decades around the works of Saul Kripke and David Lewis; on the other hand and as a reaction to the speculative line, there is the rather recent development of a scientific metaphysics in the form of a naturalized metaphysics that aims to unite the particular sciences into a single naturalistic worldview.1 But László Tengelyi takes neither one of these two lines of contemporary analytic metaphysics to be the most fruitful approach. It is rather a more Kantian line that serves as his guiding thread. For Kant, man as such is a metaphysician and naturally tends towards metaphysics; but for Kant, metaphysics is essentially a problem and needs to be understood in its problematic character if one wants to avoid dogmatic metaphysics. Certain conceptions in analytic metaphysics might not sufficiently pay attention to this point: reflections on possible worlds, inspired by Leibniz, show a certain tendency to fall back upon a precritical dogmatic form of metaphysics by not sufficiently respecting our epistemological restrictions, and the programme of a naturalized metaphysics seems to contain the counterpart to this programme in that it tends to presuppose a self-contained naturalism that is only to be explored in its structural forms (i.e. by analyzing notions of causality, 1

As regards this last, see for example: Kincaid (et al.), 2013 (Kincaid, Ladyman, & Ross, 2013).

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law etc.). For László Tengelyi, it is rather the Kantian line of critical metaphysics that should be continued and in his eyes this can be done from within the phenomenological tradition. Having emphasized the Kantian line, the question arises: why not stay with Kant himself? Why not stay a Kantian with respect to metaphysics? In the context of a discussion with Kant and two commentaries by Marc Richir and Jean-Luc Marion, László Tengelyi arrives at the following critique: Kant does in fact achieve a critique of the metaphysics of the pure possible as it was passed on to him by the Scotist tradition; but his own reconfiguration of the possible as «possibility of experience» is not successful in wholly overcoming the dogmatic primacy of the possible. The reason for this lies in a certain ambiguity in Kant: on the one hand, he criticizes a metaphysics of the possible that is detached from experience; on the other hand, he traces all existence and all concrete experience back to a faculty of cognition that always already contains the conditions for all experience as such. The consequence is that it is a priori impossible for experience to come up with something unexpected and profoundly new. Phenomena, experience, the appearing objects are all submitted to the strait jacket of the a priori conditions of the possibility of experience. There is finally a travestied ontotheo-logy in Kant, an anthropological turn of onto-theo-logy, in the sense that it is no longer God but now the pure I that inflicts the corset on experience. It is precisely with respect to this point that László Tengelyi sees progress in the radicalisation of this with the German Idealists, especially in Schelling whose positive philosophy thinks reality as a Wirklichkeit that exceeds all thought, and thus contains the accidental as well as radical contingency. It is this radicalisation developed by Schelling with respect to the Kantian approach that László Tengelyi sees continued in what he calls a metaphysics of facticity. He finds this metaphysics of facticity in Husserl, but also in Heidegger, and even in Sartre. However, he starts his reflections with Aristotle, whom he takes to be something like a proto-phenomenologist. While for Kant, necessity and apriority are inseparable, they are not inseparable for Aristotle, who develops the idea of a hypothetical necessity, detached from apriority. As long as a being exists, it is necessary, since its existence excludes the possibility of its non-existence. With this Aristotelian idea, László Tengelyi is able to discover the first traces of a metaphysics of facticity in the very beginning of the history of metaphysics. But it is only with Husserl that the real foundations of a metaphysics

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of facticity are actually developed; it is Husserl’s idea of a metaphysics of original facts (Urtatsachen) that, in László Tengelyi’s eyes, is crucial here. The central idea is that every eidetic phenomenology is necessarily founded in original facts that serve as the basis for any eidetic variation. There are four types of original facts: the I of mineness, the world of this I, intersubjectivity in the sense of an intentional interweavement, and finally history. These four original metaphysical facts are what takes the place of the traditional metaphysica specialis, and they replace the idea of first causes from traditional metaphysics. These four original facts, that are at the heart of a metaphysics of facticity, cannot be deduced from first causes that are supposed to be their origin. Those metaphysical facts are different from facts in the common sense while on the other hand Aristotelian hypothetical necessity still belongs to a description of facts in the common sense. But these metaphysical facts are not facts within our world but rather essentially depend on the performative phenomenologizing I. Going still further than Husserl himself, László Tengelyi proposes the thesis that phenomenality itself is also such an original metaphysical fact. This discovery of the event-character of phenomenality as an original fact prepares the path for a phenomenological reformulation of the metaphysica generalis. It opens up the possibility of developing phenomenology as another First Philosophy, understood as a phenomenology of the categories of the phenomenon in its phenomenality, and not any more of being as being. The categories are here understood as the fundamental traits of experience and László Tengelyi calls them «experientials» (Experientialien), thereby varying the Heideggerian expression «existentials». Since those experientials are founded in the original facts, it is in principle impossible to name them once and for all as the discovery of new experientials remains always possible and the procedure for such a discovery would belong to the realm of reflective judgment as described by Kant in his third Critique. For László Tengelyi, the experientials are characterized as tendencies towards a concordance of experience (Einstimmigkeitstendenzen der Erfahrung), the first of which would be the existence (Wirklichkeit) of a world as a global view of all the unifying tendencies, among which are space, time and the different types of causality. This realm of a metaphysica generalis or of First Philosophy as a phenomenological analysis of the categories of experience leads László Tengelyi to the idea of a phenomenological renewal of transcendental philosophy. However, with him

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transcendental philosophy takes on the form of a «methodological transcendentalism». This methodological transcendentalism is distinguished from a transcendental idealism in that it is founded on the original fact of consciousness. The decisive argument for a transcendentalism that is only methodological and not idealistic is to be found in Husserl’s idea of a retrospective constitution of a nature that precedes consciousness; it is thereby possible that there appears in consciousness a reality in the sense of a Wirklichkeit independent of consciousness. For László Tengelyi, this means that Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is not an idealism in the traditional sense in which reality would be entirely dependent on consciousness; however, this result also cannot be taken as an argument for a realism in the sense of a dogmatic naturalism or materialism. For the author of Welt und Unendlichkeit idealism and realism are names for standpoints within a battle between world-views (Weltanschauungskampf) and not really philosophical positions. The idea of a retrospective constitution together with the idea of original facts leads him to the modest position of a methodological transcendentalism as a phenomenological «working philosophy» (Arbeitsphilosophie). This metaphysics of facticity, completed by methodological transcendentalism, takes on the form of a philosophy of the world and its infinite. It is this idea that gives the book its title. Neither a philosophy of the subject, nor a philosophy of being, the phenomenology proposed by László Tengelyi is a phenomenology of the world. The heart of this phenomenology of the world is the difference between world and thing, the transcendence of the thing to the world. Because of this central difference, a difference that replaces the Heideggerian ontological difference, the methodological transcendentalism is at the same time a metontological transcendentalism in which a projection of the world configures ever anew what the basic structures of a thing are. László Tengelyi thereby continues the idea of a metontology proposed by Heidegger during his brief metaphysical period between 1928 and 1930. However, his argument is essentially based on a Kantian distinction: the world is not a closed totality of things, but, as Kant shows in the doctrine of the antinomies, it is the totality of phenomena (das All der Erscheinungen) that refers in itself to the infinite. In this sense, the world as world opens up to the infinite. It is this idea of an infinite of the world as world in opposition to an infinite beyond the world that László Tengelyi develops through arguments found in Cantor and Husserl. Those dense and complex chapters lead him to

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the central idea that the things and the world are characterized by an open infinite that leaves a fundamental place for the profoundly new: the singular things of the world have an open essence, which means their essence can acquire new properties; and the world, in which is included nature as one of its parts, is as such characterized by an open infinite. In this sense, the title for his phenomenology of the world as a phenomenology of the infinite could also have been «Die Welt und ihr Unendliches» — the world and its infinite. In spite of this emphasis on the infinite, our finitude is essential for László Tengelyi’s approach. It is at this point that we find a differentiating continuation of Heidegger on the one side and of Klaus Held on the other side, in which it is once again Kant who serves as the guideline for László Tengelyi: as finite beings, we develop worldprojections (Weltentwurf ), a term borrowed from Heidegger; however, according to László Tengelyi it is essential for this world projection that it is an idea of the infinite and in this we find a renewed version of the Kantian regulative idea. Such an idea of the infinite as contained in a world-projection is always only confirmed by a finite number of concordant experiences. Because of this insurmountable difference between the infinite of a world-projection and its finite confirmation, a world-projection can in principle never be completely justified by experience. Inversely, a finite number of experiences are compatible with several different world-projections. The result of the infinite of the world and the finitude of our experiences is that several different world-projections are possible while none of them can ever be completely justified. We can see that it is a Kantian idea of the infinite that allows László Tengelyi to criticize — in his infinitely elegant way — what he takes to be Heidegger’s and Held’s over-insistence on finitude. What he himself has labelled the «Wuppertal tradition of a phenomenology of the world» experiences a turn to the infinite with László Tengelyi. Next to the insistence on the infinite, we find another Kantian thought in this argument on the world-projections in the idea that there are antinomies constitutive for thinking, in this instance the antinomy between different world-projections. But how can we deal with this antinomic situation? Can it be resolved? Is there a new type of transcendental resolution that could renew the Kantian resolution of the antinomies through transcendental idealism? It is at this point of the book, that we are confronted with something that seems to be a meta-level of argument. However, it could be that it is ultimately not really a meta-level at all. László Tengelyi opposes two projections of the world that he takes

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to be dominant in our times: a metontological transcendentalism and a naturalistic autarcism. In the centre of metontological transcendentalism, the position he himself defends, there is the idea of a transcendence of things to the world; in the centre of naturalistic autarcism is the belief in a closed totality of nature. In László Tengelyi’s eyes the antinomy of those two world-projects cannot be resolved; however, an argument in favour of the transcendental option can be given and this is the argument of an open infinite, developed throughout the interpretation of Husserl. For László Tengelyi, we are inevitably within what he calls an agonal situation, where different world-projections are opposed; no solution of the antinomy is possible, only a lively and deepening thinking of the antinomy itself, continued in the attitude of an «agonal respect» towards the other projection. In the chapter on the agonal world-projections, László Tengelyi seems to move on a meta-level, where the controversy between metontological transcendentalism and naturalistic autarcism is not decided and cannot be decided. One might wonder however, whether this is really a meta-level? Is the agonal situation really unresolvable? Moreover, is this position not too modest? It might indeed seem as if László Tengelyi’s position is too modest in this respect. If metontological transcendentalism and naturalistic autarcism are two projections of the world, they are both already anchored in the transcendental perspective of metontological transcendentalism. Naturalistic autarcism as a projection of the world is already founded in the attitude of metontological transcendentalism. Thus, the description of the agonal and antinomic situation would not be a meta-level, but rather an antinomy coming up inside metontological transcendentalism, to which priority would therefore be accorded. László Tengelyi thought that such a primacy of metontological transcendentalism would be overly strong and, so to speak, did not testify to a sufficient amount of agonal respect. However, in his last conference (Tengelyi, 2015), held the day of his 60th birthday in 2014 one week before his death, he continues the perspective of a thinking of the world by referring to Rickert’s idea of a heterological principle, known from the Scotist tradition of disjunctive transcendentals. In Scotist philosophy, disjunctive transcendentals are pairs of concepts that grasp being in its totality. For László Tengelyi, the concepts of «nature» and «history» are to be understood as such disjunctive transcendentals, as soon as they are understood as alternatives of a world which together comprehend being in its totality in our epoch. In the second part of the text, entitled «Nature and history as

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alternatives of world», he adds to the heterological principle a Heideggerian principle, which he calls «transcendental principle of the opening of world» and according to which the thinking of the world presupposes a capacity for opening the world through freedom. He continues by a reflection in which Schelling is of central importance: the Schelling of the Ages of the World allows him a deeper and explicitly temporal conception of the alternatives of world, in which nature is the age of the world past, history the age of the present world, and in which the two together exhaust being in its totality, without however including the age of the future world, which is an opening that signals towards the infinite, thus transcending all totality of being. This conception thereby outlines a philosophy of the opening of the world, which is not meant to be directed against the position of agonal respect from the book, but which seems however to point towards an integrative transcendental position in which nature is understood as the past of the historical present and the open future. The debate between naturalism and the transcendental tradition since Kant became a central issue in recent years within the context of the so-called «New» and «Speculative Realism». These realisms are often — but not always — naturalisms or materialisms, aiming at overcoming the transcendental perspective as such. The following part of this text wants to situate the problem of phenomenological metaphysics, as it was formulated by László Tengelyi, with respect to this contemporary debate. 3. THE PROBLEM OF A PHENOMENOLOGICAL METAPHYSICS AND CONTEMPORARY «REALISM» There are different lines in the renaissance of metaphysics in our times, not only in analytic philosophy, but also and perhaps it could be said especially in the so called continental tradition. It seems that at least two lines can be distinguished within the continental tradition. On the one hand, there is a renaissance of metaphysics in the context of phenomenologically inspired French historiography of metaphysics, and it is this line that László Tengelyi seeks to continue; on the other hand, there is a renaissance of metaphysics largely inspired by the works of Gilles Deleuze and Alain Badiou, a line that has more recently developed into the growing field of a so called «Speculative»

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or «New» realism. While the first field has a certain unity, 2 the second is extremely heterogenic,3 so heterogenic not only in quality but also in intellectual content to such a degree that one wonders why the different authors even sail under the same flag. Since it is impossible to say something general about this field that would transcend an analysis of the socio-intellectual motives of this movement, I will focus only on the position of the central figure of Speculative Realism, Quentin Meillassoux, a French student of Alain Badiou, in order to develop the implicit answers László Tengelyi’s position contains with respect to the challenge raised by Meillassoux. In his book After finitude. An essay on the necessity of contingency, Meillassoux argues against what he calls «correlationism». By «correlationism», he means the whole tradition from Kant to phenomenology and analytic philosophy in which, he believes, speaking of reality has been renounced in limiting oneself to an analysis of the correlation of thinking and its correlate. There are two central arguments that can be taken as the core of Meillassoux’s position. The first argument is negative and circles around the problem of what Meillassoux calls the archi-fossile. According to Meillassoux, it is impossible for the correlationist tradition to explain an ancestral reality, that is, a reality that existed previous to the existence of consciousness; however, today’s sciences arrive at the thesis of such a pre-human reality by the analysis of archi-fossile material, and no one, not even the correlationist, doubts their results; therefore, the central thesis of correlationism includes a contradiction. We have already seen how László Tengelyi answers such an objection: it is through the Husserlian idea of a retrospective constitution that the correlationist phenomenologist can account from within consciousness for a reality that is independent of consciousness. The problem of the archi-fossile would therefore not be an unresolvable problem for phenomenology. The second argument is positive and concerns a necessary overcoming of the correlation from within itself: Meillassoux thinks that facticity is not to be understood 2

The «father» of «Speculative Realism» is Quentin Meillassoux, the three other founding figures of this movement are Ray Brassier, Iain Hamilton Grant and Graham Harman. Books that were essential to initiating this movement are: (Meillassoux, 2006; Brassier, 2007; Grant, 2006; Harman, 2005). Two central thinkers in the background of this movement are Deleuze and Badiou, see particularly: (Deleuze, 2011; Badiou, 1988). 3 We can limit ourselves here to mentioning the significant difference between the two «founding fathers» of «New Realism», Maurizio Ferraris and Markus Gabriel. Central to the beginning of this realism are: (Ferraris, 2012; Gabriel, 2013). See more recently in English: (Gabriel, 2015).

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as a limit of our thought, but rather as a principle of the Absolute and as such as a principle of reality in itself. The argument is in nuce the following: for the correlationist, facticity means that his own existence is not necessary, that he himself could also not exist; the possibility of his own non-existence, however, cannot be taken as a mere correlate of his thought, because it concerns the possibility of the non-existence of his own thinking being. Meillassoux deduces from this that the correlationist can only think his own non-existence if he understands his own facticity as a principle of the in-itself being independent of his own thinking; therefore universal contingency is the only absolute necessity: the result of that is Meillassoux’s speculative materialism of the hyper-chaos. If we return to László Tengelyi’s metaphysics of facticity, we can say the following: Meillassoux proposes a deduction from the mere necessity of the fact of the performative cogito to the principle of factuality and groundlessness of the Absolute in itself; he thereby converts a moment of the metaphysical original fact, its groundlessness, into a principle of the Absolute in itself. From the perspective of László Tengelyi’s approach, this is a speculative salto mortale that confounds two moments of facticity: from facticity characterized by an impossibility of giving a reason for the metaphysical existence of the cogito, Meillassoux concludes that the facticity as being-thrown (Geworfenheit) is a thrownness into a cosmos that is in itself positively characterized by chaos, groundlessness and total contingency. This conclusion however is a non sequitur, as an ego with a mere necessity of fact, I am thrown into the middle of something that I am not familiar with and in which I still need to find an orientation, something that I will never have to the full extent. From this, one cannot deduce that that into which I am thrown is positively characterized as a hyper-chaos in itself. Therefore, neither the negative argument nor the positive argument proposed by Meillassoux are strong enough to overcome phenomenology as a variation of the so called «correlationism»; the metaphysics of facticity developed by László Tengelyi contains the resources to answer his challenge. Like some of the new «realists» (for example Iain Hamilton Grant, Graham Harman), but certainly not all (for example Meillassoux, Benoist), László Tengelyi embraces the renaissance of metaphysics. It is not metaphysics, but rather «realism» that awakens his suspicions. We have already mentioned that in his eyes, «realism» and «idealism» tend to be standpoints without a sufficient philosophical foundation. The

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danger of dogmatism would therefore not be on the side of metaphysics, if metaphysics is continued as a problem and in the critical line of phenomenology, but the danger would rather be on the side of a «realism» as opposed to «idealism». For László Tengelyi, what is at issue is rather the finding a notion of reality within the realm of a metaphysics of facticity and metontological transcendentalism, while refraining from the problematic term of «realism». What then is «reality» in his conception? There are not only the forms of «Speculative Realism» in Meillassoux, Grant, Harman and Brassier and the forms of «New Realism» in Gabriel and Ferraris, but there are also realist tendencies in some of the authors who are close to the phenomenological tradition itself. In fact, that realism was never foreign to phenomenology is confirmed by one brief look at the group of Husserl’s earliest students of whom several pursued a realist phenomenology, later on even in contrast to Husserl’s own transcendental turn. In order to explicate László Tengelyi’s phenomenological notion of reality, I will contrast it briefly with the most elaborate contemporary «realism» developed from within the phenomenological tradition: the one proposed by Jocelyn Benoist. Benoist’s «realism» in his Éléments de philosophie réaliste (2011) is a «contextual realism»: that means reality, for Benoist, is «what one has» (ce que l’on a), the already acquired context, which is normative and necessarily presupposed in every particular intentional act. But for László Tengelyi (and he situates himself here in the thought of Marc Richir) such a context would always already be a holistic version of what Richir calls a «symbolic institution»; reality, on the contrary, is precisely that what disturbs such an institutionalized context, that what appears with a surplus of spontaneous sense, transcending the already inquired symbolic institutions. If one wants to speak of «realism» here, it is not a contextual realism, but rather a «subversive realism», in which reality is precisely that which forces open the already acquired context of our habits. However, a further question arises with respect to these opposed notions of reality: should not a phenomenological concept of reality be able to account for the two aspects that both seem to belong to reality, the reality of a context and the reality of that what disturbs the context? And how could this be done? Could it be Kant once again from whom we might take a distinction and transform it phenomenologically, this time the distinction between an «objective reality» in the sense of Sachhaltigkeit, that a concept only has if it can be represented in an intuition,

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and in the sense of existence, of Wirklichkeit, as the correlate of a concrete sensation? Whatever the answer to this question, for László Tengelyi it would be an answer that proposes a notion of reality within the broader conception of a metaphysics of facticity and its related metontological transcendentalism. Within the realm of a manifold renaissance of metaphysics in our times, it is László Tengelyi who neither falls back into a pre-critical metaphysics of possible worlds, nor naturalizes metaphysics, nor imprudently transcends the Kantian emphasis on our finite capacities forward into the direction of a new philosophy of the Absolute. It seems to me, that in spite of his criticisms of Kant, whom he seeks to transcend through Schelling and phenomenology, his own project can be understood as a project of a genuinely Kantian type, because it pays as much attention to the problematic character of metaphysics itself as to the fact that as philosophers we need to deal with the problems of metaphysics if we want to avoid being secretly swept away by a dogmatic form of metaphysics, even though it may appear under the name of an overcoming of metaphysics as such. In his last book World and Infinity, he thus holds on to an idea Kant formulates with the following words at the end of the Prolegomena: «That the human mind would someday entirely give up metaphysical investigations is just as little to be expected, as that we would someday gladly give up breathing so as never to take in impure air.» (Kant, 1968, Ak. 4: 367.21-24) It is not about holding one’s breath, but about trying to cleanse the metaphysical air we breathe — and it is László Tengelyi who has left us with an impressive proposal of how this might be done. R EFER ENCES Badiou, A. (1988). Être et événement. Paris: Seuil. Benoist, J. (2011). Éléments de philosophie réaliste. Réflexions sur ce que l’on a. Paris: Vrin. Brassier, R. (2007). Nihil Unbound. Enlightenment and Extinction. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Courtine, J.-F. (2005). Inventio analogiae. Métaphysique et ontothéologie. Paris: Vrin. Deleuze, G. (2011). Différence et repetition. Paris: Puf. Ferraris, M. (2012). Manifesto del nuovo realismo [Manifesto of New Realism]. Laterza: Roma-Bari. (in Italien). Gabriel, M. (2013). Warum es die Welt nicht gibt. Berlin: Ullstein.

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Gabriel, M. (2015). Fields of Sense. A New Realist Ontology. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Grant, I. H. (2006). Philosophies of Nature after Schelling. London – New York, NY: Continuum. Harman, G. (2005). Guerrilla Metaphysics. Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things. Chicago, IL: Open Court Publishing Company. Kant, I. (1968). Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können. Akademie Textausgabe: Vol. 4. Berlin – New York, NY: de Gruyter. Kincaid, H., Ladyman, J., & Ross, D. (Ed.). (2013). Scientific Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lévinas, E. (1972). Humanisme de l’autre homme. Paris: Fata Morgana. Meillassoux, Q. (2006). Après la finitude. Essai sur la nécessité de la contingence. Paris: Seuil. Tengelyi, L. (1984). Autonómia és világrend. Kant az etika fundamentumáról [Autonomy and the Order of the World. Kant on the Foundations of Ethics]. Budapest: Medvetánc. (in Hungarian). Tengelyi, L. (1988). Kant [Kant. The Order of the World and Freedom in the Development of the Critical System]. Budapest: Kossuth Kiadó. (in Hungarian). Tengelyi, L. (1992). A bűn mint sorsesemény [Guilt as an Event of Destiny]. Budapest: Atlantisz Kiadó. (in Hungarian). Tengelyi, L. (1998). Der Zwitterbegriff Lebensgeschichte. München: Fink. Tengelyi, L. (2006). Expérience retrouvée. Essais philosophiques I. Paris: L’Harmattan. Tengelyi, L. (2007). Erfahrung und Ausdruck. Phänomenologie im Umbruch bei Husserl und seinen Nachfolgern. Dordrecht: Springer. Tengelyi, L. (2011). Neue Phänomenologie in Frankreich. Berlin: Suhrkamp. Tengelyi, L. (2014a). L’Expérience de la singularité. Paris: Hermann. Tengelyi, L. (2014b). Welt und Unendlichkeit. Zum Problem phänomenologischer Metaphysik. Freiburg – München: Alber. Tengelyi, I. (2015). Philosophie als Weltoffenheit. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 63 (5), 958-976.

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HORIZON 5 (1) 2016 : I. Research : I. Breuer : 133–149 ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ • STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY • STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE • ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES

doi: 10.18199/2226-5260-2016-5-1-133-149

FAKTIZITÄT, NOTWENDIGKEIT UND ZUFÄLLIGKEIT BEI ARISTOTELES UND HUSSERL IRENE BREUER PhD in Philosophy, Architect, Lecturer, Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Faculty of Humanities and Cultural Studies, 42119 Wuppertal, Germany. E-mail: [email protected]

FACTICITY, NECESSITY AND CONTIGENCY AT ARISTOTLE AND HUSSERL In his book Welt und Unendlichkeit. Zum Problem phänomenologischer Metaphysik, László Tengelyi has enquired into the possibility of a phenomenological metaphysics. Among the many issues addressed in his book, he thematized a real necessity of a non-apriori kind at Aristotle and Husserl, a necessity which he called «a necessity of the fact». His research settled the basis for the present enquiry, which will examine the relationship between the absolute and the conditional necessity of a fact as well as the contingent or accidental features involved therein at Aristotle and Husserl, insofar as facticity is concerned. I intend to show that although both authors share the view that worldly beings are characterized by their contingency, they differ as to their necessity: Aristotle attributes a contingent necessity to the factual being i.e. to reality, a necessity characterized by its being temporarily conditioned by actuality and which can therefore be defined as the «conditional necessity of a fact». As to Husserl, transcendental phenomenology must, upon the basis of the eidetic method, determine the possibilities out of which the ego constitutes the factual world. He states the necessity of the fact as an eidetic necessity, which has to be grounded on eidetic laws. Later on, I’ll try to show how enquiries into a «metaphysics in new sense» lead to a revision of the meaning of «fact» and to an inversion of the order of foundation as well: The original givenness of the world, the primal I, intersubjectivity and historicity as primal and absolute facts carry the eidetic necessities. Accidental causes, on the other hand, account not only for the contingency of the real but, at Husserl, for the ego’s «essential openness» and its core of primal contingency. In this context, I’ll argue that facticity paired with the accidental allows for the irruption of something new that overwhelms us — an event as Ereignis. Key words: Aristotle, Husserl, facticity, accidental, necessity, contingency, absolute, event.

© IRENE BREUER, 2016

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ФАКТИЧНОСТЬ, НЕОБХОДИМОСТЬ И КОНТИНГЕНТНОСТЬ У АРИСТОТЕЛЯ И ГУССЕРЛЯ ИРЭНА БРОЙЕР PhD, архитектор, лектор факультета гуманитарных наук и исследований культуры, Бергский Университет Вупперталя, 42097 Вупперталь, Германия. E-mail: [email protected] В своей книге Мир и бесконечность. К проблеме феноменологической метафизики Ласло Тенгели исследовал возможность феноменологической метафизики. Среди многих проблем, затронутых в его книге, тематизируется вопрос о реальной необходимости non-apriori в философии Аристотеля и Гуссерля, проблема необходимости, которую он назвал «необходимостью факта». Его исследование установило основание для актуальности изучения отношений между абсолютом и условной необходимостью факта, а также контингентных или случайных особенностей, значимых для Аристотеля и Гуссерля в той мере, в какой ими затрагивается тема достоверности. Я намереваюсь показать, что, хотя оба автора согласны друг с другом в том, что для мирских существ характерно быть во власти непредвиденных обстоятельств, их точки зрения на природу необходимости различны. Аристотель приписывает случайную необходимость фактическому существу, т.е. действительности, а потому необходимость в его понимании характеризуется тем, что она временно обусловлена действительностью и может быть определена как «условная необходимость факта». В случае Гуссерля трансцендентальная феноменология должна, опираясь на эйдетический метод, определить возможности, благодаря которым ego конституирует фактический мир. Он определяет необходимость факта как эйдетическую необходимость, которая должна быть основана на эйдетических законах. Далее я пытаюсь показать, как вопрос о «метафизике в новом смысле» приводит к пересмотру значения «факта» и к инверсии порядка обоснования как такового: оригинальная данность мира, первичное Я, интерсубъективность и историчность как исходные и абсолютные факты образуют эйдетику необходимости. Случайные причины, с одной стороны, объясняют не только непредвиденные обстоятельства реального, но и, в случае Гуссерля, «сущностную открытость» ego и его ядро — первичные непредвиденные обстоятельства. В этом контексте я выдвигаю тезис, согласно которому фактичность, соединенная со случайным элементом, делает возможным наступление чего-то нового, сокрушительного для нас — события как свершения (Ereignis). Ключевые слова: Аристотель, Гуссерль, фактичность, случайное, необходимость, непредвиденное обстоятельство, абсолютное, событие.

EINLEITUNG In seinem Buch Welt und Unendlichkeit. Zum Problem phänomenologischer Metaphysik hat László Tengelyi die Möglichkeit einer phänomenologisch verfahrenden Kritik an der traditionellen Metaphysik herausgestellt. Wenn in meinem Artikel die Aufgabe gestellt wird, die Beziehungen zwischen absoluter bzw. bedingter Notwendigkeit

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der Tatsachen und ihrer Zufälligkeit — insofern sie die Faktizität betreffen — bei beiden Autoren zu untersuchen, so wird dies in Anknüpfung an Tengelyis wegweisende Untersuchung sowohl als Weiterführung einiger in ihr enthaltenen Problemstellungen als auch durch das Eingehen auf außerhalb ihrer liegende Aspekte unternommen. 1. ONTOLOGIE, KONTINGENZ UND ZUFÄLLIGKEIT BEI ARISTOTELES Die Ontologie des Aristoteles ist durch eine Struktur «katholou-prôtologique» (Brague, 1988, 110) gekennzeichnet: Das, was «Erstes» (prôton) ist, agiert wie eine Drehachse, um die sich ein «Allgemeines» (kathoulou) dreht (Brague, 1988, 114), d.h. ein Seiendes als Seiendes (to on he on) (Aristoteles, 1989, Met. IV 1, 1003a21f).1 Diese Struktur betrifft die Auffassung einer individuellen Instanz oder eines paradigmatischen Seiendes, in welchem sich die wesentlichen Bestimmungen, die in der Vielfalt der Phänomene verteilt sind, auf höchstem Grad aktualisieren (Courtine, 2003, 194). Die Antwort nach der Bedeutung des Seienden — «d[e]s Seiende[n] als Seiende[n]» (Aristoteles, 1989, Met. 2, IV, 1003a 21-22) und zugleich «d[e]s Eine[n] an sich […] insofern es Eines» ist (Aristoteles, 1989, Met. 2, IV, 1004b 6), weist nämlich eine verbindende Struktur auf – das «als» bzw. das «insofern» –, die zum einen als eine Durchgangsbewegung zwischen Potentialität und Aktualität (das Sein als Vorliegendes und Existierendes und das Eine als im höchsten Maße Vorliegendes) und zum anderen, im Bereich der Prädikation, als die Unterscheidung zwischen dem Subjekt (das Sein) und dem Prädikat (als möglichExistierendes) zu verstehen ist. Während die erste Deutung von der Realität zeugt, verweist die zweite auf die Möglichkeit (Brague, 1988, 500–504), 2 eine dynamis, die jedoch in den vom Akt bereits eröffneten Bahnen verläuft. Die Faktizität der Aktualität des Seins als ein Verwirklichtes — energeia téleia — bedeutet, dass die dynamis der

Vgl.: (Brague, 1988, 12). Vgl.: «C’est la considération de l’ “en tant que” qui distingue ici le mouvement de l’objet ou de l’état qui en

1

2

constitue le résultat (Physik I, 201a29-31) […] chaque fois que l’edifiable, en tant que nous disons qu’il est tel, est en acte (entéléchie), il s’edifie, et ceci est (le mouvement d’) edification (201a16s). […] “en tant que tel” […] se constitue dans et par une prédication par laquelle nous disons que l’edificale (sujet) est (copule) tel, c’est-à-dire bâtisable (prédicat). […] Il relève en effet du possible et non du réel.» (Brague, 1988, 500-504)

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energeia nicht vorausliegt, sondern ihr sozusagen innerlich ist (Brague, 1988, 497). Die Wissenschaft ist gleichzeitig universell und erste Wissenschaft vom höchsten Einen und der ganze Folge des Seienden, weil das erste Seiende deren Prinzip und Ursache ist: «Ist dies nun das Wesen [ousía], so muss der Philosoph die Prinzipien und die Ursachen der Wesen (erfasst) haben.» (Aristoteles, 1989, Met. 2, IV, 1003b 1718)3 Der Bereich der ersten Wissenschaft, die Ontologie, umfasst also die Erforschung des Seienden an sich, «insofern es Eines, und des Seienden, insofern es Seiendes» ist (Aristoteles, 1989, Met. 2, IV, 1004b 5-10). Es gibt für Aristoteles eine allgemeine Wissenschaft der einzelnen Substanzen, da sie ein Allgemeines enthalten: Erkenntnis ist möglich vom Einzelding aus insofern dieses als Allgemeines betrachtet wird. Diese «als»bzw. «insofern»-Struktur deutet darauf hin, dass es auf die Betrachtungsweise ankommt: Nicht das «Was» sondern das «Wie», das So-sein des Dings bzw. das Formprinzip kann ursächlich erfasst werden. Das Wirkliche ist dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass alle seine Möglichkeiten oder Potentialitäten sich verwirklicht haben. Da das höchste und Erste Seiende diese Bedingung erfüllt hat, ist es als eine unbewegte und ewige Substanz — ousía akínètos — verstanden (Aristoteles, 1989, Met. VI, 1, 1026a 29). Das erste Seiende ist schlechthin notwendig, d.h. es existiert in absoluter Wirklichkeit: «Ebensowenig ist von dem notwendig Seienden etwas nur dem Vermögen nach (der Möglichkeit nach), und dies ist doch das Erste; denn wenn dies nicht wäre, würde überhaupt nichts sein.» (Aristoteles, 1989, Met. IX, 1050b 18 ff.) Unbedingte Notwendigkeit kennzeichnet also dasjenige Seiende, das immer aktual ist. Aber welche Notwendigkeit kennzeichnet diejenige Seiende, die weder immer aktual noch immer nicht-existierend sind, d.h. diejenige Seiende, die der Entstehung und Verfall unterworfen sind? Aristoteles spricht in seinen verschiedenen Werken über einen bestimmten Modus der Notwendigkeit, die jedem Seienden zukommt — sogar dem zufälligen Seienden — weil es einfach existiert: «Dass nun das Seiende ist, wann es ist, und das Nichtseiende nicht ist, wann es nicht ist, ist notwendig. Gleichwohl ist nicht notwendig, weder dass alles Seiende ist, noch dass alles Nichtseiende nicht ist.» (Aristoteles, 1995, § 9, 19a23-24) Das Seiende im Allgemeinen, insofern es wirklich ist, ist auch notwendig, aber 3

Vgl.: (Aubenque, 1962, 246).

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dies ist keine schlechthinnige Notwendigkeit, sondern ist mit der Einschränkung versehen, dass das Seiende nur notwendig ist, insofern es existiert, d.h. seine Notwendigkeit ist eine durch seine Wirklichkeit bedingte. Folglich ergibt sich, dass, vorausgesetzt das Seiende ist oder existiert, es notwendig ist, d.h. sein Nichtsein ist ausgeschlossen. Aristoteles vereinheitlicht Aktualität und Notwendigkeit ausdrücklich in der Definition der hypothetischen Notwendigkeit. Ein kontingentes Sein weist für eine begrenzte Zeit dieselbe Notwendigkeit wie diejenige eines aktual ewigen Seins auf (Vuillemin, 1996, 24). Diese Notwendigkeit ist durch die Voraussetzung bedingt, dass die immanente Vollendung, die Aktualität des Potentiellen bzw. die Verwirklichung der Möglichkeiten stattgefunden hat. Daraus folgt, dass die reale Welt eine «durchgängige Notwendigkeit» aufweist, die auf ein «Spaltungsgesetz der Realmöglichkeit» zurückzuführen ist. Es impliziert folgende Paradoxien: «1. Was real möglich ist, das ist auch real wirklich […] Realgesetz der Möglichkeit […]; 2. Was real wirklich ist, das ist auch real notwendig […] Realgesetz der Notwendigkeit». Folglich, «was real möglich ist, das ist auch real notwendig». Somit trennen sich die positiven Realmodi von den negativen, die Unwirklichkeit implizieren, und ergeben somit ein Doppelgesetz, das den schwerwiegenden ontologischen Sinn des Realseins ausdrückt: Indem das mögliche Sein wirklich ist, ist sein Nichtsein ausgeschlossen, d.h. es existiert notwendig. Und umgekehrt, indem das mögliche Sein nicht wirklich ist, ist sein «Sein» unmöglich. Dies bedeutet, dass die reale Wirklichkeit eines Seins seine reale Möglichkeit voraussetzt. Folglich ist das Sein, insofern es wirklich ist, auch notwendig (Hartmann, 1966, 117–122). Nur solange eine Substanz aktual ist, ist sie auch notwendig, d.h. ihre Notwendigkeit ist zeitlich durch ihre Aktualität bedingt. Diese Notwendigkeit kann als eine «bedingte Notwendigkeit des Faktischen» bezeichnet werden. Damit ist keinen kausalen Determinismus verbunden: «Es müsste also hiernach alles mit Notwendigkeit stattfinden, und der Zufall (tyche) und die Möglichkeit des Werdens und Nichtwerdens müssten aus dem Gebiete des Werdens ganz hinweg genommen werden.» (Aristoteles, 1989, Met. XI, 8, 1065a 12-14) Das Akzidentelle (symbebekós) ist in gewisser Hinsicht unentbehrlich, «denn wäre [er] dies nicht, so müsste alles notwendig sein» (Aristoteles, 1989, Met. VI, 3, 1027a 31). Das Akzidentelle ist also nicht nur eine durch Privation gekennzeichnete Ausnahme, sondern etwas, was sich

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ins Geschehen einschleicht und gerade die Kontingenz unserer Welt ausmacht. So sagt Aristoteles: Da nämlich unter dem Seienden einiges sich immer auf gleiche Weise und notwendig (ex anagkés) verhält — ich meine nicht die Notwendigkeit, welche einen Zwang bedeutet, sondern welche bezeichnet, daß es sich nicht anders verhalten kann —, anderes zwar nicht notwendig und nicht immer, aber doch in den meisten Fällen ist: so ist dies das Prinzip und dies die Ursache davon, dass es ein Akzidenz gibt; denn was weder immer noch in der Regel stattfindet, das nennen wir Akzidenz. (Aristoteles, 1989, Met. VI, 1026b 26-33)

Das Akzidenz wird nicht vom Werde- oder Kausalprozess selber verursacht, sondern tritt unerwartet und plötzlich auf: es «fällt neben und außer» (Aristoteles, 1989, Met. VI, 2, 1027a 24f.) ihn. Dieses «außerhalb» wird in der Metaphysik, wo als Beispiel des Zufälligen die Art und Weise des Sterbens genannt wird, als ein anderes Geschehen gekennzeichnet (Aristoteles, 1989, Met. VI, 2, 1027b 10-13).4 Im bekannten Beispiel der Physik (Aristoteles, 1988, Phys. II, 6, 197b 29-32), wonach ein herunter fallender Stein oder Dachziegel jemanden tödlich trifft, gibt es für jedes einzelne Geschehen (dass «A» zum Markt geht und dass «B» herunterfällt) zwei unabhängige Gründe; denn keines von ihnen findet umwilllen des anderen statt. Aus der Fügung oder dem Zusammentreffen der beiden Geschehnisse, von denen jedes einer anderen Kette angehört, entsteht eine Wirkung, die das Ergebnis dieser Fügung ist. Das bedeutet, dass nur die Kreuzung von zwei heterogenen Kausalreihen eine Fügung ergeben kann und in diesem Sinne eine Nebenwirkung hervorruft. Dieses Entstehen von etwas Neuem kann als das Aufkommen eines Ereignisses verstanden werden. Der Zufall hat drei hochbedeutsame Funktionen: Erstens verhindert er den unendlichen Regress der Ursachen, sonst müsste es «nämlich für jedes Entstehende und Vergehende eine Ursache geben […] die dies nicht bloß im akzidentellem Sinne wäre» (Aristoteles, 1989, Met. VI, 3, 1027a 32-1027b), zweitens widerlegt er die Annahme einer absoluten Notwendigkeit in der Natur, die sich aus der notwendigen wechselseitigen Verknüpfung von Ursachen und Wirkungen ergeben könnte – in Worten Aristoteles: «Offenbar also geht es nur bis zu einem bestimmten Prinzip […]. Dies wird das Prinzip von etwas beliebig Zufälligem sein, und es wird nichts anderes als die Ursache seines Entstehens geben» (Aristoteles, 1989, Met. VI, 3, 1027b 13-14) –; und drittens verhindert 4

Vgl.: (Aristotle, 1984, 162). «But whether he dies by desease or by violence, is not yet determined, but depends on the happening of something else.» (Hervorgeh. von mir)

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er die Verbindung von Kausalketten und damit die Behauptung eines lückenlosen notwendigen Kausalgeschehens in der Welt, wenn die Ursachenketten homogen wären (Aristoteles, 1989, Met. VI, 2, 1027a 29; vgl.: Aristoteles, 1997, 362). Der Zufall verursacht eine unerwartete Nebenwirkung, die nicht nur ein Verfehlen des Zieles, eine ‚Entgleisung‘ des Prozesses bedeutet, sondern auch den Anfang einer neuen Kausalkette bilden kann. Diese Möglichkeit darf keineswegs abgewiesen werden. Die Tatsache, dass der Ursprung einer Ursachenkette ein Zufall ist, impliziert nicht, dass der ganze daraus entstehende Prozess zufällig wäre (Aristoteles, 1989, Met. XI, 8, 1065a 6-21).5 Der Zufall führt aber in einem Punkt der Kette zu einer Divergenz, einer Diskontinuität, die wegen ihrer Zufälligkeit nie aus etwas abgeleitet werden kann (Aristoteles, 1989, Met. VI, 3, 1027b 10-16). Wie wir gesehen haben, gibt es nach Aristoteles Zufall im Bereich des Werdens oder Nichtwerdens, also eine Kontingenz im Bereich der Wirklichkeit. Im Gegensatz zum Vergangenen, das notwendig und wahr ist, sind zukünftige Geschehnisse nicht vorbestimmt, auf sie trifft weder Wahrheit noch Unwahrheit zu. Aristoteles schränkt also die Gültigkeit des Prinzips der Zweiwertigkeit6 ein, um den unbestimmten Zufall zuzulassen. «[D]as andere Seiende aber, das akzidentelle, ist nicht notwendig, sondern unbestimmt; darum sind seine Ursachen ohne Ordnung und Grenze.» (Aristoteles, 1989, Met. XI, 8, 1065a 2126) Der Zufall aber ist akzidentelle Ursache in dem, was nach Vorsatz um eines Zwecks willen geschieht. Die Ursachen aber, durch welche das Zufällige geschehen kann, sind unbestimmt. Die Fragen beziehen sich auf die Art und Weise, wie sich der Tod ereignet: Der Tod ist vorbestimmt, das «wie» ist jedoch unbestimmt (Aristoteles, 1989, Met. VI, 1027b 10). Es gibt also eine Grenze in der Suche nach Ursachen; denn das Zufällige entbehrt jedes verursachenden Prozesses,7 sein Auftauchen ist ein unmittelbares Ereignis, es tritt nicht nur unerwartet und plötzlich, sondern von sich selbst auf.

5

Vgl.: (Aristoteles, 1989, 535). Kommentar von H. Seidl: «Die Ursachen des Akzidentellen sind selbst akzidentelle (d.h. nur indirekt wirkende und stoffliche), sowohl wenn sie vergangene sind für gegenwärtige Wirkungen, als auch wenn sie gegenwärtige und “werdende” (zukünftige) sind für zukünftige Wirkungen. Anderenfalls würde es nur Notwendiges geben.» (Hervorgeh. von mir) Vgl.: (Aristoteles 1989, Met. VI, 2, 1027a 5-10). 6 Vgl.: (Aubenque, 1962, 492). 7 Für Aristoteles gibt es eine Grenze in der Bestimmbarkeit der Ursachen, die auf die Tatsache zurückzuführen ist, dass irgendeine Bedingung für das Auftauchen des Zufälligen sich ergeben kann, jedoch nicht durch einen Prozess, sondern «unmittelbar» («instantaneously»). Vgl.: (Aristotle, 1997, 363).

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2. WESENSMÖGLICHKEITEN UND FAKTIZITÄT BEI HUSSERL In den Ideen I behauptet Husserl: «Die alte ontologische Lehre, dass die Erkenntnis der “Möglichkeiten” der der Wirklichkeiten vorhergehen müsse, ist m.E., wofern sie recht verstanden und in rechter Weise nutzbar gemacht wird, eine große Wahrheit» (Husserl, 1976, 178), eine Auffassung, die der traditionellen Metaphysik entnommen wird. Die Phänomenologie soll nämlich, den Cartesianischen Meditationen nach, die «regionalen Seinsmöglichkeiten» und ihre Korrelationen in sich schließen, um eine «konkrete Ontologie» als eine «konkrete Logik des Seins» zu gründen; denn die allgemeine faktische Struktur der gegebenen objektiven Welt, ihr Aufbau als bloße Natur […], [ist] in sehr weitem Maße […] eine Wesensnotwendigkeit […]. Denn ein derart ontologisches Apriori […] verleiht zwar dem ontischen Faktum, der faktischen Welt in ihren Zufälligkeiten eine relative Verständlichkeit, die einer einsichtigen Notwendigkeit des Soseins aus Wesensgesetzen. (Husserl, 1950, 164)

Die transzendentale Phänomenologie soll — so Husserl — anhand der eidetischen Methode die Möglichkeiten bestimmen, aus denen die faktische Welt in ihrer Wirklichkeit begriffen und vom Ego konstituiert werden soll. Denn «alle Rationalität des Faktums liegt ja im Apriori. Apriorische Wissenschaft ist Wissenschaft von dem Prinzipiellen, auf das Tatsachenwissenschaft rekurrieren muss um letztlich eben prinzipiell begründet zu werden.» (Husserl, 1950, 181) Im Einklang mit dieser These wird die Enthüllung des faktischen Egos allererst durch die apodiktischen Prinzipien ermöglicht, nämlich die Wesensallgemeinheiten und Notwendigkeiten (Husserl, 1950, 106). Die Wesensbegriffe sind also für jeden zufälligen Einzelfall allgemein und notwendig gültig.8 Nach dieser Begründungsordnung etabliert sich die Philosophie zunächst als reine universale Wesenswissenschaft, um nachträglich mit Rekurs auf die empirische Wirklichkeit ihre eigene Rationalität absolut zu begründen (Kern, 1975, 336). Übereinstimmend hiermit erklärt Husserl die «Notwendigkeit des Faktums» zu einer eidetischen Notwendigkeit, die durch die eidetischen Gesetze begründet wird: [E]s ist die Notwendigkeit eines Faktums, die so heißt, weil ein Wesensgesetz am 8

Vgl.: (Held, 1966, 147; Landgrebe, 1982, 120).

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Faktum, und zwar hier an seinem Dasein als solchem, beteiligt ist. Im Wesen eines reinen Ich überhaupt und eines Erlebnisses überhaupt gründet die ideale Möglichkeit einer Reflexion, die den Wesenscharakter einer evident unaufheblichen Daseinsthesis hat. (Husserl, 1976, 98)

In den Ideen I wird das «reine Ich» noch als «Besonderung von Wesensgesetzen», als von den apodiktischen Wesensallgemeinheiten begründet verstanden (Husserl, 1976, 19–20). Die Phänomenologie hat nicht mit Wirklichkeiten, sondern mit idealen Möglichkeiten zu tun, die durch Variation ein Allgemeines ergeben. Die faktische Wirklichkeit ist als «eine Möglichkeit unter anderen Möglichkeiten, und zwar als beliebige Phantasiemöglichkeit» und die «in Variation erzielten Einzelfälle als völlig irrelevant» (Husserl, 1968, 74) aufgefasst. Dies ist darauf zurückzuführen, dass in der Einstellung der rein eidetischen Wissenschaft die Tatsachen als individuelle Daseiende «zufällig» sind. Noch zur Zeit der Cartesianischen Mediationen wird die Phänomenologie als eine eidetische Wissenschaft aufgefasst, die auf a priori Einsichten gründet. Das Verhältnis zwischen dem faktischen Ich und seinem in der eidetischen Variation gewonnen Eidos «ich überhaupt» ist jedoch eine Ausnahme von dem Gesetz, wonach ein Wesen im Allgemeinen für jeglichen möglichen Einzelfall dieses Wesens mit Notwendigkeit zutrifft; denn «das letztfungierende Ich […] ist nicht bloß die zufällige Verwirklichung einer der unendlich vielen Möglichkeiten, die dieses Eidos Ego umfasst, sondern es liegt als Quellpunkt alles Konstituierens auch jeglicher Setzung eines Unterschiedes zwischen Faktum und Eidos voraus.» (Held, 1966, 147) Das Ego kann sich in seinem Sosein anders denken, aber seine Existenz sowie sein Existenzboden sind apoditkisch notwendig. Dabei verändert sich das Verhältnis von Faktum und Eidos9.10 Während das Sein eines Eidos, d.h. das Sein eidetischer Möglichkeiten, frei von jeder Verwirklichung und somit unabhängig von der Wirklichkeit ist, ist das «Eidos transzendentales Ich undenkbar ohne transzendentales Ich als faktisches.» (Husserl, 1973b, 385) Husserl betont dabei die Unmöglichkeit der Überschreitung des faktischen Ich: Ich bin das Urfaktum in diesem Gang, ich erkenne, dass zu meinem faktischen Vermögen der Wesensvariation etc. in meinen faktischen Rückfragen sich die und die mir eigenen 9

Vgl.: (Held, 1966, 147; Landgrebe, 1982, 176). Diese Wende wird von K. Held als «Ausnahme» von dem oben erwähnten Gesetz verstanden, während L. Landgrebe sie als eine «Preisgabe» der früheren Auffassung versteht.

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Urbestände ergeben, als Urstrukturen meiner Faktizität […] Mein faktisches Sein kann ich nicht überschreiten. (Husserl, 1973b, 386)

Die Setzung des faktischen Ich ist also notwendig, um die eidetische Variation zu ermöglichen: Wir können daraus folgen, dass die Setzung dieser Faktzität aus methodologischen Gründen erfolgt. In seiner Spätzeit scheint Husserl diese Einsichten jedoch zu revidieren, insofern die Reflexion sich nicht auf die Wirklichkeit einer «eidetisch-phänomenologischen Interpretation der Tatsachenwissenschaft» begrenzt. Schon in einem Beiblatt zur «Ersten Philosophie» von 1923/24 wird die Problematik auf dem Gebiet der «Irrationalität des transzendentalen Faktums» als Inhalt einer «Metaphysik im neuen Sinne» (Husserl, 1956, 188, Fn. 1) ausgeweitet. Das Problem der Irrationalität aller Rationalität hängt unmittelbar mit dem der «zufälligen Faktizität» zusammen; denn das Zufällige kennzeichnet die Probleme des Todes, des Schicksals, die des «“Sinnes” der Geschichte» und sogar der «ethisch-religiösen Probleme» (Husserl, 1950, 160). Die Phänomenologie wird auf die Probleme des Unbestimmten und Zufälligen erweitert, deren Ursachen, genau wie bei Aristoteles, unbestimmt sind. Es sind «Grenzfragen» des faktischen Lebens, «Urtatsachen, […] letzte Notwendigkeiten, die Urnotwendigkeiten» (Kern, 1975, 340). Die apodiktische Struktur der transzendentalen Wirklichkeit gehört zu diesen Urnotwendigkeiten. Diese Grenzfragen öffnen den Weg zur Enthüllung der apodiktischen Faktizität der Welt und des Ich. Schon in Ideen I hatte Husserl die Kontingenz der Welt oder ihre «presumptive Wirklichkeit» der «absoluten Wirklichkeit» (Husserl, 1976, 98) des Egos entgegengesetzt. Betrachten wir diese Aussagen im Kontext der späteren Schriften so bemerken wir, dass Husserl viel tiefer in den Evidenzmodus des Egos eingeht. Die Monade, das Ich, so Husserl, ist «ein absolutes, undurchstreichbares Faktum» (Husserl, 1973a, 155), d.h. mit «apodiktische[r] Evidenz als Urevidenz des Ich-bin» gegeben (Husserl, 1973a, 154). Das Ich kann sich im Sosein anders denken, aber es ist absolut als seiend notwendig, genauso wie sein «Existenzboden», die Welt, die sein Erfahrungsfeld bildet (Husserl, 1973a, 153). Denn «ich, der Umdenkende, der mich [durch Variation] der faktischen Wirklichkeit Enthebende, bin apodiktisch das Ich der faktischen Wirklichkeit und bin das Ich der Vermögen, die ich insbesondere als eidetisch denkendes und sehendes Ich mir faktisch erworben habe.» (Husserl, Ms.

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K III 12, 1935, 34f, zitiert in Held, 1966, 147) Das zufällige Sosein des Ich und der Welt setzt die absolute Faktizität des Ich und der Welt voraus; denn «ich denke sie [die Tatsachen], ich frage zurück und komme auf sie schließlich von der Welt her, die ich schon “habe” […] ich bin das Urfaktum in diesem Gang.» (Husserl, 1973b, 386) Husserl sieht ein, dass die Welthabe für ein einverleibtes Ego ein Urfaktum ist, denn die Erfahrung der Welt — im Unterschied zu irgendeiner Erfahrung überhaupt — kann nicht modalisiert werden. Folglich ist die Gewissheit der Welt apodiktisch gegeben.11 Diese Urtatsachen weisen auf die apodiktische Evidenz der Welt, der Intersubjektivität, der Leiblichkeit und Geschichtlichkeit — «die absolute Wirklichkeit» — hin (Husserl, 1973b, 386). Husserls Metaphysik unterscheidet sich von der traditionellen Metaphysik insofern sie diese Urtatsachen als originelle Gegebenheiten versteht.12 Es stellt sich heraus, dass allein das «ich bin, ich lebe», die letzte Urevidenz betrifft (Husserl, 1973a, 442). Die Egos haben ein «doppeltes Sein: ein absolutes Sein und ein Für-sich-und-für-einander-erscheinen» (Husserl, 1959, 506), sie sind «das Absolute, […] ohne deren kogitatives Leben, alle realen Substanzen nicht wären» (Husserl, 1959, 505), das heißt, sie sind apodiktisch notwendig.13 In der transzendentalen Betrachtung liegt das Absolute, das allen Möglichkeiten, allen Relativitäten zugrunde liegt und ihnen Sinn gibt (Husserl, 1973b, 669). So ist «das absolut Gegebene […] somit zunächst das absolut zweifellos Seiende» (Böhm, 1959, 221). Das «absolute Ich» ist das Ich in der «unmittelbar gegenwärtigen Lebensevidenz» (Taguchi, 2006, 115). Daraus ist einzusehen, dass die Urtatsachen in ihrer originalen Gegebenheit ontologisch notwendig sind, um die eidetischen Untersuchungen zu gründen. Hier ändert sich meines Erachtens die Bedeutung des Begriffes «Faktum». Die Notwendigkeit des Faktums bezeichnet keine empirische Notwendigkeit, die das Ich und die Dinge gleichsam als Tatsachen kennzeichnet, wie aus den Ideen 11

Vgl.: (Husserl, 2008, 246): «Nur auf dem Boden fortgehender Weltgewissheit ist für Einzelreales Zweifel und Nichtsein möglich. […] So ist Welt für mich ständig geltend in Seinsgewissheit […]. Wie immer ich mich umfingiere als personales menschliches Ich, ich bleibe also welthabendes und weltlich lebendes in dieser Struktur.» Vgl.: «Apodiktisch ist die Gewissheit vom Sein der Welt als Welt.» (Husserl, 2008, 256) 12 Vgl.: (Tengelyi, 2014, 180-194). 13 Vgl.: (Husserl, 1959, 396): «Mein Leben ist das an sich Erste, ist der Urgrund, auf den alle Begründungen zurückbezogen sein müssen».

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I hervorgeht, sondern eine ihnen vorausgehende Urtatsache, die apodiktisch alle Wirklichkeitssetzung ermöglicht. Diese Urtatsachen (Ich, Welt, Leiblichkeit, Intersubjektivität und Geschichtlichkeit) sind absolut von sich selbst gegeben und deshalb die Bedingung der Möglichkeit für die Setzung aller anderen Tatsachen. Diese Änderung des Begriffs «Faktum» läuft meiner Ansicht nach parallel zur Umkehrung des Fundierungsverhältnisses: Nach den Ideen I sind alle Tatsachen nur zufällig gegenüber der eidetischen Notwendigkeit des Allgemeinen, während das faktische Ich als Ausnahme faktisch notwendig ist um die Variation zu ermöglichen, d.h. aus methodologischen Gründen. In Husserls Spätschriften dagegen, setzt die eidetische Variation diese original gegebenen Urtatsachen voraus, die daher ontologisch notwendig sind. Die Phänomenologie erweist sich als durch diese Urstrukturen begründet. Diese Urtatsachen sind außerdem Urstrukturen meiner Faktizität, d.h. sie gründen auf das Leben des phänomenalisierenden Ego. Das Ich als Urfaktum, erklärt Husserl des Weiteren, hat einen «Kern von “Urzufälligem” in Wesensformen, in Formen vermöglichen Funktionierens, in denen die Wesensnotwendigkeiten fundiert sind.» (Husserl, 1973b, 386) Diese Aussagen begründen keine erneuerte Subjektmetaphysik, sondern weisen auf etwas Neues hin: Alle eidetischen Wesensformen, die durch Variation gewonnen werden, bergen einen «Kern von “Urzufälligem”» (Tengelyi, 2014, 184). Mit dem «Urzufälligem» sind nicht nur die Variationsmöglichkeiten, sondern die offene Möglichkeiten des «Irrationalen» oder der «unsinnigen Zufällen» gemeint, da «das Sein absoluter Menschen» eben bloß «ein Zufall ist, Zufall der Umgebung, Erziehung», usw. (Husserl, 2014, 398). Diese Überlegungen führen zur Einsicht, dass Faktizität hier keine kontingente oder zufällige Tatsache, dessen Nicht-Sein möglich wäre (wie in den Ideen I behauptet), sondern ein Faktum als das «Absolute» meint. Anfänglich scheint diese absolute Faktizität des Ich methodologisch notwendig zu sein im Hinblick auf die eidetische Variation. Ein Jahrzehnt später umfasst diese Faktizität sämtliche Urstrukturen, die ontologisch die Phänomenologie begründen. Diese Faktizität kann «auch nicht als “notwendig” bezeichnet werden», weil es allen Möglichkeiten vorausgeht (Landgrebe, 1982, 105). Hier ist die erwähnte Umkehrung vollständig durchgeführt: Nicht nur alle Wesensnotwendigkeiten, sondern jede faktische Wirklichkeit der Natur gründet in dem (absoluten) Urfaktum des Ich und der Welt.

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3. NOTWENDIGKEIT DER TATSACHEN UND UNMITTELBARKEIT DES SEINS BEI ARISTOTELES UND HUSSERL Aristoteles und Husserl teilen die Einsicht, dass die faktische Notwendigkeit einen Kern von Zufälligkeit in sich birgt. Beide drücken, obwohl sie sich jeweils auf eine Notwendigkeit beziehen, die durch eine Tatsache bedingt ist, doch etwas Verschiedenes aus: Bei Aristoteles ist es die faktische Existenz des Wirklichen und bei Husserl die Urtatsache des cogito (Tengelyi, 2014, 190). Außerdem gibt es bei beiden Autoren einen Unterschied im Begriff der «Faktizität»: Bei Husserl handelt es sich um das Absolute, das «grundlose Sein» des faktischen Ich — eine «absolute Tatsache», deren Notwendigkeit und Wirklichkeit ebenso absolut sind (Husserl, 1973b, 386). Trotzdem trägt das Absolute alle Wesensnotwendigkeiten als «Urstrukturen» seiner «Faktizität» in sich. Aus diesem Grunde kann seine Konzeption der absoluten Notwendigkeit nicht als Gegenpaar der Kontingenz verstanden werden, da sie jede kategoriale Unterscheidung vorausgeht, im Gegensatz zu Aristoteles, dessen Auffassung der absoluten und hypothetischen Notwendigkeit mit einer ontologischen Unterscheidung einhergeht. Im Unterschied zu Husserl geht Aristoteles von der faktischen und kontingenten Wirklichkeit aus, die als existierend gilt und einen teleologischen Charakter besitzt. In diesem Sinn drückt die hypothetische Notwendigkeit bei Aristoteles eine Voraussetzung für das Erreichen eines Zieles aus, das Zufälligkeiten zulässt. Die Wirklichkeit des Seienden schließt die Möglichkeit des Nichtseins dieses Seienden aus, aber nur solange es ist, d.h. es sich verwirklicht hat. Die Begründung und Notwendigkeit eines Seins liegt also a-tergo, d.h.: Nur vom verwirklichten Telos her sind die notwendigen Voraussetzungen anzugeben. Hier muss keine Urtatsache (im Husserlschen Sinne) apodiktisch vorausgesetzt werden: Der Ausgangspunkt Aristoteles ist die Wirklichkeit eines Seienden. Bei Husserl aber liegt die Begründung a-fronte: Erst durch die Urtatsache der Faktizität des Ich bzw. durch seine apodiktische Evidenz und seine absolute Notwendigkeit lassen sich die Welt, die Anderen und die Geschichte allererst konstituieren. Die Faktizität ist also bei Aristoteles keine Urtatsache, sondern es handelt sich um eine durch das potentielle Erreichen eines Telos bedingte Notwendigkeit. Der Zufall entsteht in der kontingenten Kreuzung zweier heterogener Kausalketten: Als ein plötzliches Unvorhersehbares kann diese Schicksalsfügung als Ereignis verstanden

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werden, das einen unbestimmten Charakter aufweist. Bei Husserl dagegen ist das Ich Träger der Welt, der Anderen und der Horizonte, deren singuläre Verwirklichung möglich, aber nicht notwendig ist. Daher hat das Offene im Spielraum der Wesensmöglichkeiten den Charakter von nicht-notwendiger Verwirklichung, wie schon erwähnt. Diese Offenheit kennzeichnet nicht nur die eidetische Variation, sondern sogar das Wesen des Egos: Indem Husserl seine Auffassung der Offenheit erweitert, stellt er das aristotelische Grundprinzip der Unveränderlichkeit des Eidos in Frage. Er fragt nämlich, ob «im voraus — a priori — [das Ding] durch sein eigenes Wesen vorgezeichnet [ist]» und ob «jedes Ding [...] überhaupt ein solches Eigenwesen» hat. Danach kommt die bahnbrechende Frage: Oder ist das Ding sozusagen immer auf dem Marsch, ist es gar nicht in dieser reinen Objektivität zu fassen, vielmehr […] nur ein relativ Identisches, etwas, das nicht im voraus sein Wesen hat, […] sondern ein offenes Wesen hat, das immer je nach den konstitutiven Umständen der Gegebenheit neue Eigenschaften annehmen kann? (Husserl, 1952, 299)

Dies bedeutet, dass sogar der Kern des Egos, sein Wesen, offen für Veränderungen ist, deren Verwirklichung möglich jedoch nicht notwendig ist. Das Ego kann sich nicht nur durch eidetische Variation als anders-Seiend denken, sondern sogar anders-werden durch diese «wesentliche Offenheit», wie wir sie bezeichnen können. Wir können daraus folgen, dass obwohl das Sein unseres Egos — sein Wesen — als solches absolut notwendig ist, die ihm kennzeichnenden Qualitäten kontingent sind, d.h. dem unvorhersehbaren Schicksal unterworfen. In diesem Sinne unterscheidet N. Hartmann zwischen Zufall und disjunktivem «bloß-Möglichsein»: Im Bereich der Nichtnotwendigkeit «entscheidet» der Zufall über wirklich und unwirklich während das «bloß-Mögliche» die Wirklichkeit und die Unwirklichkeit, «offen lässt» (Hartmann, 1966, 136). Husserls Auffassung des Kontingenten kann also als das «bloß-Mögliche» verstanden werden, da die wesentliche Offenheit des Lebens eine eidetische Notwendigkeit ist. Bei Aristoteles dagegen, hebt der Zufall die Notwendigkeit auf, indem sie ein Bruch der Naturkausalität verursacht. Trotz dieser Unterschiede teilen beide Autoren die Auffassung, dass am Anfang jeder Teleologie ein unmittelbares Ereignis liegt: Das faktische Ich kann nicht auf ein konstitutiv ursprünglicheres Ich zurückgeführt werden; denn es ist einfach schon «da»: «[D]as Ich stößt gleichsam auf dieses “Da”, das es selbst ist.» (Held, 1966, 149)

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In Husserls Worten, «das Ich ist ursprünglich nicht aus Erfahrung — im Sinne von assoziativer Apperzeption [...], sondern aus Leben (es ist, was es ist, nicht für das Ich, sondern selbst das Ich).» (Husserl, 1952, 252) Das Ich ist also unmittelbar gegeben, es ist nicht zu hintergehen. So auch bei Aristoteles; denn die Faktizität eines aktualen Seins «verlangt», dass sein Vorhandensein als Akt allererst erfasst ist, damit danach die ihr zugrundeliegende dynamis entdeckt werden kann (Brague, 1988, 497).14 Der Ansatzpunkt des teleologischen Prozesses bei Aristoteles liegt im existierenden Seienden, das sich fortschreitend aktualisiert, oder im Ereignis, das plötzlich auftaucht. Der Zufall tritt nicht nur unvorhersehbar ein, sondern erzeugt etwas Neues: Es kann deshalb als ein Ereignis im phänomenologischen Sinn des Wortes verstanden werden, als etwas, das sich nicht nur von sich selbst gibt, sondern das «ohne Vordeutung, gar ohne spezifische Erwartung» (Husserl, 2001, 11) oder sogar eine vorgehende Erwartung durchkreuzend auftreten kann. Indem es uns widerfährt und etwas Neues aufkommen lässt, zwingt es uns zu einer neuen Einsicht — ein Vorgang, der gerade das wesentliche der Erfahrung ausmacht (Tengelyi, 2007, 9). Ein Ereignis kann daher als die arché der Erfahrung verstanden werden. Zusammenfassend ist festzustellen: Obwohl die Faktizität sich bei beiden Philosophen auf etwas Verschiedenes bezieht — das absolute Urfaktum des Ich, der Welt, der Anderen und der Geschichtlichkeit bei Husserl, die hypothetische Notwendigkeit des Seienden bei Aristoteles —, teilen beide die Behauptung der «Notwendigkeit» des Faktischen. Die Phänomenologie unterscheidet sich von der traditionellen Metaphysik insofern diese Urtatsachen als ursprüngliche Gegebenheiten verstanden werden, welche die eidetischen Untersuchungen allererst ermöglichen. Die aristotelische Metaphysik gründet eben auf die höchste Wesenheit, die absolut notwendig ist. Dagegen, ist die Notwendigkeit des faktischen Seins zeitlich durch ihre Wirklichkeit bedingt. Beide Autoren teilen aber die Einsicht, dass am Ort wo jede Teleologie ansetzt, das Ereignis der Entstehung des Seienden oder des Ich steht. Das phänomenalisierende Ego Husserls gründet auf Urtatsachen, die ihm vorausgehen und seine Urstrukturen bestimmen. Als spontane Gegebenheiten, können sie als Ereignisse im ausgezeichneten Sinne verstanden werden. 14

 Vgl.: (Aristoteles, 1988, Phys. VIII, 5, 257b 7 ff.; Phys. VIII, 1, 251a 8 ff.).

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R EFER ENCES Aristotle, (1984). Metaphysics. In J. Barnes (Ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Aristoteles, (1988). Physik. Vorlesung über Natur. Zweiter Halbband: Bücher V-VIII. Hamburg: Meiner. Aristoteles, (1989). Metaphysik. Bücher I(A) — VI(E). Griechisch-Deutsch. Hamburg: Meiner. Aristoteles, (1995). De interpretatione. In Philosophische Schriften in sechs Bänden: Vol. 1. Hamburg: Meiner. Aristotle, (1997). Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon. Aubenque, P. (1962). Le problème de l‘être chez Aristote. Paris: PUF. Brague, R. (1988). Aristote et la question du monde. Paris: PUF. Böhm, R. (1959). Zum Begriff des “Absoluten” bei Husserl. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 13 (2), 214-242. Charlton, W. (1983). Aristotle’s Physics I, II. Oxford: Clarendon. Courtine, J.-F. (2003). Les catégories de l’être. Ètudes sur la philosophie ancienne et médievale. Paris: PUF. Hartmann, N. (1966). Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit. Berlin: de Gruyter. Held, K. (1966). Lebendige Gegenwart. Die Frage nach der Seinsweise des transzendentalen Ich bei Edmund Husserl, entwickelt am Leitfaden der Zeitproblematik. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1950). Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge (Hua I). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1976). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und hänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch (Hua III/I). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1952). Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution (Hua IV). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1956). Erste Philosophie (1923/1924). Erster Teil. Kritische Ideengeschichte. (Hua VII). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1959). Erste Philosophie (1923/1924). Zweiter Teil. Kritische Ideengeschichte

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(Hua VIII). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1968). Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925 (Hua IX). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1973a). Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, Texte aus dem Nachlaß. Zweiter Teil (1921-1928) (Hua XIV). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1973b). Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlaß. Dritter Teil (1929–1935) (Hua XV). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (2001). Die “Bernauer Manuskripte” über das Zeitbewußtsein (1917/18) (Hua XXXIII). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Husserl, E. (2008). Die Lebenswelt. Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1916-1937) (Hua XXXIX). New York, NY: Springer. Husserl, E. (2014). Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie. Analysen des Unbewusstseins und der Instinkte. Metaphysik. Späte Ethik (Texte aus dem Nachlass 1908-1937) (Hua XXXXII). New York, NY: Springer. Kern, I. (1975). Idee und Methode der Philosophie. Leitgedanken für eine Theorie der Vernunft. Berlin: de Gruyter. Landgrebe, L. (1982). Faktizität und Individuation. Hamburg: Meiner. Taguchi, S. (2006). Das Problem des “Ur-Ich” bei Edmund Husserl. Die Frage nach der selbstverständlichen “Nähe” des Selbst. Dordrecht: Springer. Tengelyi, L. (2007). Erfahrung und Ausdruck, Phänomenologie im Umbruch bei Husserl und seinen Nachfolgern. Dordrecht: Springer. Tengelyi, L. (2014). Welt und Unendlichkeit. Zum Problem phänomenologischer Metaphysik. Freiburg – Müchen: Alber. Vuillemin, J. (1996). Necessity and Contingency, the Master Argument. Stanford, CA: CSLI.

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HORIZON 5 (1) 2016 : I. Research : P. B. Marosán : 150–170 ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ • STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY • STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE • ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES

doi: 10.18199/2226-5260-2016-5-1-150-170

TRANSZENDENTALE ANTHROPOLOGIE. SINNBILDUNG, PERSÖNLICHES ICH UND SELBSTIDENTITÄT BEI EDMUND HUSSERL UND IHRE REZEPTION IN LÁSZLÓ TENGELYIS PHÄNOMENOLOGISCHER METAPHYSIK BENCE PÉTER MAROSÁN PhD, Budapest Business School, Faculty of International Management and Business; Pázmány Péter Catholic University, 2087 Piliscsaba, Hungary. E-mail: [email protected]

TRANSCENDENTAL ANTHROPOLOGY. FORMATION OF SENSE, PERSONAL I, AND ­SELFIDENTITY IN EDMUND HUSSERL AND THEIR RECEPTION IN THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METAPHYISICS OF LÁSZLÓ TENGELYI The main topics of the following article are Edmund Husserl’s conception of phenomenological anthropology and its reception in László Tengelyi’s philosophy. Thematically the paper is made up of two parts: the first treats the development of Husserl’s notion of the transcendental subject and the particular role the transcendental person played in his idea of a phenomenologically founded anthropology. The second examines the special influence of Husserl’s idea of the transcendental person on Tengelyi’s concept of the history of life (Lebensgeschichte) and on his thought of the metaphysics of contingency and experience. In the first part (which is made up of four sections) I analyze the development of Husserl’s notion of the subject, and I show how Husserl arrives at the concept of the concrete transcendental person in his genetic phenomenological researches of the 1920s. The idea of the transcendental person was the core of Husserl’s late conception of phenomenological anthropology. Husserl’s late concept of the transcendental subject could be characterized as a fragile and complex form of self-identity, and he even used the notions of «life path» («Lebensweg») and «history of life» («Lebensgeschichte») in this context. The crises of human life, crises of self-interpretation became analyzable problems within this sphere and with the means of transcendental phenomenology. The second part (which is made up of two sections) investigates the details of Husserl’s influence on Tengelyi’s work of life, with a special regard on his interpretation of the subject, the experience and metaphysics. Husserl played a fundamental role in the elaboration of Tengelyi’s own notion of self-identity, where self-identity was constituted through certain events of destiny (Schicksalsereignisse), which confronts us with radical alterity and strangeness

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(Fremdheit). Husserl was also an important source for Tengelyi, when he elaborated on his concept of the passive formation of sense (Sinnbildung) and his metaphysics of contingency. The ultimate foundation of the last formulation of Tengelyi’s phenomenological metaphysics (in his posthumous work, Welt und Unendlichkeit) was the idea of a concrete transcendental person, which we could find in the late Husserl. Key words: Phenomenology, philosophical anthropology, Edmund Husserl, László Tengelyi, phenomenological metaphysics, transcendental ego, formation of sense (Sinnbildung), self-identity, history of life (Lebensgeschichte).

ТРАНСЦЕНДЕНТАЛЬНАЯ АНТРОПОЛОГИЯ. СМЫСЛООБРАЗОВАНИЕ, ЛИЧНОЕ Я И САМОТОЖДЕСТВЕННОСТЬ У ЭДМУНДА ГУССЕРЛЯ И ИХ РЕЦЕПЦИЯ В ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКОЙ МЕТАФИЗИКЕ ЛАСЛО ТЕНГЕЛИ БЕНЦЕ ПЕТЕР МАРОШАН PhD, Бизнес школа Будапешта, факультет международного менеджмента и бизнеса; Католический университет им. Петера Пазманя, 2087 Пилишчаба, Венгрия. E-mail: [email protected] К ключевым темам данной статьи следует отнести концепцию феноменологической антропологии Эдмунда Гуссерля и её рецепцию в философии Ласло Тенгели.1 Статья состоит из двух тематических блоков: в первом рассматривается развитие понятия трансцендентального субъекта у Гуссерля и та особая роль, которую играл концепт «трансцендентальная личность» в его проекте феноменологического обоснования антропологии. Во втором тематическом блоке внимание уделяется тому особому влиянию, которое на философию Тенгели оказала гуссерлевская идея «трансцендентальной личности»: это влияние можно найти у Тенгели в концепции истории жизни (Lebensgeschichte), а также в его разработке метафизики контингентности и [категорий] опыта. В первой части (состоящей из четырёх разделов) я разбираю развитие понятия субъекта у Гуссерля и показываю, как Гуссерль в генетической феноменологии 1920-х годов приходит к концепции «конкретной трансцендентальной личности». Идея «трансцендентальной личности» составила ядро феноменологической антропологии позднего Гуссерля. Для трансцендентального субъекта в поздний философии Гуссерля характерна сложная и нестабильная форма самотождественности, он даже использует в этом контексте понятия «жизненный путь (Lebensweg)» и «история жизни (Lebensgeschichte)». Жизненный кризис человека, ситуации кризиса самоистолкования становятся проблемами, доступными анализу в рамках трансцендентальной феноменологии. Во второй части (состоящей из двух разделов) исследуются отдельные элементы влияния Гуссерля на философский проект Тенгели, особое внимание уделяется его интерпретации субъекта, опыта и метафизики. Гуссерль сыграл ключевую роль в разработке понятия самотождественности или тождества личности, которой занимался Тенгели, при этом самотождественность, тождество 1

Фонетически более точной была бы транскрипция «Тенгейи», но в русскоязычной литературе уже закрепилась транскрипция «Тенгели». – Прим. ред.

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личности рассматривалось как то, что складывается за счёт некоторых судьбоносных событий (Schicksalsereignisse), в которых мы сталкиваемся с радикально иным и с чуждостью (Fremdheit). Таким образом, Гуссерль был для Тенгели важным источником при разработке концепции пассивного смыслообразования (Sinnbildung) и его метафизики контингентности. Предельным основанием последнего варианта феноменологической метафизики Тенгели (в его посмертно опубликованной работе Welt und Unendlichkeit) стала идея «конкретной трансцендентальной личности», которую можно найти у позднего Гуссерля. Ключевые слова: Феноменология, философская антропология, Эдмунд Гуссерль, Ласло Тенгели, феноменологическая метафизика, трансцендентальное эго, смыслообразование, самотождественность, история жизни.

EINLEITUNG «Eine völlige Umkehrung der prinzipiellen Stellungnahme wird also vollzogen. Während die ursprüngliche Phänomenologie, als transzendentale ausgereift, jeder wie immer gearteten Wissenschaft vom Menschen die Beteiligung an der Fundamentierung der Philosophie versagt und alle darauf bezüglichen Versuche als Anthropologismus oder Psychologismus bekämpft, soll jetzt das strikte Gegenteil gelten: Die phänomenologische Philosophie soll völlig neu vom menschlichen Dasein her aufgebaut werden», sagte Husserl in seinem Vortrag «Phänomenologie und Anthropologie» (1931) über die Scheler’sche und Heidegger’sche Kritiken seiner transzendentalen Phänomenologie, die er als anthropologische Verkehrung seiner ursprünglichen gegenanthropologischen philosophischen Stellungnahme interpretierte (Husserl, 1988, 164). In diesem Aufsatz stellte er die Anthropologie als eine Wissenschaft, die die Objektivität und die wirkliche Welt voraussetzte, und die Phänomenologie, die von reiner leistenden, konstituierenden Subjektivität ausging, gegenüber. Man müsse zwischen einem unbefragten Objektivismus und einem radikalen, sich ausschließlich aufgrund subjektiver Leistungen aufbauenden phänomenologischen Transzendentalismus wählen; und Scheler und Heidegger wären letztlich der Versuchung der natürlichen, naiv-objektivistischen Einstellung zum Opfer gefallen. Trotz seiner Kritik an der objektivistischen, naturalistischen Anthropologie war Husserl nicht völlig gegen die Anthropologie als solche; er hatte die Idee einer phänomenologisch begründeten Anthropologie; er schrieb über «phänomenologische», «intentionale», «transzendentale Anthropologie» (Husserl, 1973d, Texten Nr. 29-30; Husserl, 2008, 747; Husserl, 2014, 531).

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Husserl meinte, dass der Sinn «Mensch» ein sehr komplexes Sinnesgebilde, eine höhere Stufe der Selbstobjektivation der transzendentalen Subjektivität sei. Die Selbstobjektivation sei ein transzendentaler Prozess, den man adäquat auch als Vermenschlichung, Verleiblichung und Verweltlichung interpretieren kann. Eine phänomenologisch begründete Anthropologie müsse sich nach diesen subjektiven Vorgängen und Leistungen orientieren. In Wahrheit war dieser Gedanke ein sehr wichtiger, gar zentraler Teil der Husserl’schen Phänomenologie. Husserls Überzeugung war, dass die phänomenologische Anthropologie nur an einer höheren Stufe der intentionalen Analysen erreichbar wäre. Der wichtigste Punkt, anhand dessen sein Ansatz der phänomenologischen Anthropologie erhellt werden kann, ist seine Auffassung des persönlichen Ich. Man kann den Begriff des persönlichen Ich genauso in Husserls statischer Phänomenologie (vor 1916/17), 2 wie in seiner genetischen Phänomenologie (nach 1917) finden. Die genetische Wendung der transzendentalen Phänomenologie half ihm, den Begriff des persönlichen Ich in die Richtung der transzendentalen Person fortzentwickeln (cf. Luft, 2011, 126-158). Die Einheit des persönlichen Ich konstituiert sich durch die Akten seiner Selbstinterpretation, wobei sich letzteres auch zwischen Sinngebung und Sinnbildung vermittelt. Diese Einheit ist bei Husserl teils Ergebnis von passiven Wirkungen der Sinnbildung. Mithilfe dieses Motivs kann man Husserls Auffassung des persönlichen Ich an die späteren Entwicklungen der phänomenologischen Philosophie knüpfen; vor allem an die Philosophie von Paul Ricœur, Marc Richir, Bernhard Waldenfels und László Tengelyi. Insbesondere wird uns Tengelyis Deutung von Husserls Lehre der konkreten transzendentalen Subjektivität mit Blick auf seine Auffassung der phänomenologischen Metaphysik als einer Metaphysik der Kontingenz wichtig sein, die er in seinem letzten Buch ausarbeitete (Tengelyi, 2014). Mein Aufsatz gliedert sich in folgende Abschnitte: I. Anthropologie aus subjektiven Quellen. Sinngebung, Sinnstiftung und Sinnbildung. II. Husserls Auffassung des reinen und persönlichen Ich. III. Selbstidentität und Selbstständigkeit der Person. IV. Die Krisen der Sinngebung. Die ursprüngliche Unbeherrschbarkeit der Sinnbildung. V. Verletzbare 2

Ms. B II 2 (1907/08) in (Husserl, 1973c, 5-9; Husserl, 2014, 137-168), Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie WS 1910/11 (Husserl, 1973c, Text Nr. 6), Ideen II.

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Selbstidentität. Tengelyis Auffassung von Lebensgeschichte ausgehend von Husserls Idee der transzendentalen Person. VI. Tengelyis Auslegung von Husserls Ansatz der transzendentalen Person als eine Grundlage für eine Metaphysik der zufälligen Faktizität. 1. ANTHROPOLOGIE AUS SUBJEKTIVEN QUELLEN. SINNGEBUNG, SINNSTIFTUNG UND SINNBILDUNG Husserl, wie man sieht, verwarf nicht alle Formen der Anthropologie. Er kritisierte nur die naturalistische, biologistische Art der Anthropologie als eigentümliches Ergebnis der allgemeinen objektivistischen, naturalistischen Tendenz der Neuzeit, die den Menschen als eine bloße natürliche Substanz, als ein natürliches Ding unter anderen Dingen auffasst. Er brach nur mit der Position des Naturalismus, der — so Husserl — den Menschen, das Subjekt naturalisierte und verdinglichte. Sein wahrer Gegner war dieser naturalistische Objektivismus, und nicht die Anthropologie als solche. Ihm schwebte eine allgemeine Reform der Anthropologie vor, die sich in den Rahmen seines lebenslangen Projekts der phänomenologischen Neubegründung und Erneuerung der Geisteswissenschaften einfügte.3 Eines seiner wichtigsten, höchsten Ziele war die radikale Denaturalisierung der Geisteswissenschaft als solche. Die phänomenologische Anthropologie, als eine Wissenschaft vom Menschen überhaupt, sollte diese durch die Phänomenologie neubegründete Geisteswissenschaft völlig umfassen.4 Nach Husserls Meinung solle man die Geisteswissenschaften der phänomenologischen Reduktion unterwerfen. Das heißt: man solle vor allem die phänomenologische Reduktion vollziehen, die Voraussetzung einer bewusstseinsunabhängig existierenden Welt außer Spiel setzen, und damit alle Sinnleistungen und Geltungen auf ihre konstituierenden subjektiven Quellen zurückführen. Husserl zufolge ist die letzte 3

Siehe z.B. Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft (1911) (Husserl, 1986, 3-62); Ideen II (Husserl, 1952); Natur und Geist SS 1919 (Husserl, 2002b); Erste Philosophie WS 1923/24, Zweiter Teil (Husserl, 1959, 275-301); Phänomenologische Psychologie SS 1925 (Husserl, 1968, 52-54, 376-379), vor allem Phänomenologie als absolute Geisteswissenschaft; Natur und Geist SS 1927 (Husserl, 2001a); Naturwissenschaftliche und geistes-wissenschaftliche Einstellung. Naturalismus, Dualismus und psychophysische Psychologie (vor 1930) (Husserl, 1976, 294-313); Die Krisis des europäischen Menschentums und die Philosophie (1935) (Husserl, 1976, 314-348; Husserl, 1973c, 90-98, 457 ff.; Husserl, 1973d, 480-508), (Husserl, 1973d, 480-508): Text Nr. 30, Universale Geisteswissenschaft als Anthropologie. Sinn einer Anthropologie, November-Dezember 1932. 4 Vgl.: (Husserl, 1973d, Text Nr. 30).

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Quelle die sinnkonstituierende transzendentale Subjektivität. Die Welt als Erscheinung ist ein Gebilde von Sinn. Dem reinen, transzendentalen Ego begegnet ein Strom von Empfindungsdaten (von «hyletischen» Daten), die es irgendwie interpretieren soll. Wir deuten die Dinge um uns herum als «Tische», «Stühle», «Gläser» usw. (vgl. Husserl, 1977, §27). «Tische», «Stühle», «Gläser» usw. sind «Einheiten des Sinnes», Ergebnisse eines sinnkonstituierenden Bewusstseins. «Alle realen Einheiten sind “Einheiten des Sinnes”», sagt Husserl (Husserl, 1977, 120). «Sinneseinheiten», so Husserl auch weiter, «setzten […] sinngebendes Bewusstsein voraus» (Husserl, 1977). Eine phänomenologisch reformierte Geisteswissenschaft muss auf der Voraussetzung des reinen, sinngebenden Bewusstseins aufbauen. Husserl nannte allgemeine Interpretationsweisen der Erfahrung Einstellungen. In Ideen II macht er einen Unterschied zwischen naturalistischer und personalistischer Einstellung (Husserl, 1952, §34,134 ff.). Das Korrelat der ersten ist die bloß physikalische, körperliche Natur, und dasjenige der zweiten ist die kulturelle, intersubjektive, geschichtliche Welt des Menschen. Außerhalb der phänomenologischen Einstellung sind wir vor allem in personalistischer Einstellung. Uns begegnen allererst alltägliche, altvertraute, praktische Dinge (Tische, Bücher, Klaviere usw.), und nicht bloß materielle, physikalische Objekte, die — als Sinneseinheiten — die Ergebnisse der naturwissenschaftlichen Einstellung und Methode sind. Husserl zufolge liegt die personalistische Einstellung der naturalistisch-naturwissenschaftlichen zugrunde. Die geisteswissenschaftliche Einstellung, deren Korrelat die geistige Welt ist, ist nur die theoretische Entfaltung und Ausarbeitung der personalistischen Einstellung. Husserl zufolge bestehe eine wesentliche Ursache des Misslingens der neueren Geisteswissenschaften darin, dass diese die Gefangenen des neuzeitlichen Naturalismus wären. Deswegen neigten die historischen Geisteswissenschaften dazu, den Menschen prinzipiell als ein biologisches Lebewesen unter naturwissenschaftlichen Gesetzen zu interpretieren, was, so Husserl, eine grundverkehrte, grundfalsche Auffassung sei. Das Grundgesetz der Natur ist die Kausalität, dasjenige der geistigen Welt ist die Motivation (Husserl, 1952, §56). Der Ausgang einer allgemeinen adäquaten Wissenschaft vom Menschen soll die Idee des freien persönlichen Ich sein, das nicht durch Naturgesetze, sondern nur durch Willensmotivation bestimmt ist. Deswegen ist Husserl der Auffassung,

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dass die Grundlage der Geisteswissenschaft als Anthropologie eine ausreichende Phänomenologie der Person sein soll. 2. HUSSERLS AUFFASSUNG DES REINEN UND PERSÖNLICHEN ICH Das transzendentale Ego ist eine relativ späte Entdeckung bei Husserl, der in seiner non-egologischen Periode das Ich als eine mundane-transzendente Entität aus dem Gebiet der philosophischen Analysen ausgeschalten hat (in den Logischen Untersuchungen (Husserl, 1984, 372-376)),5 und nach seiner transzendentalen Wendung, in seiner Vorlesung Idee der Phänomenologie (1907).6 In seiner Vorlesung im WS 1910/11 unter dem Titel Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie sprach Husserl über ein «phänomenologisches Ich», also offensichtlich war er dort schon der Meinung, dass man in der phänomenologischen Reduktion nicht der Idee eines reinen, phänomenologisch reduzierten Ich entbehren kann (vgl. Husserl, 1973c, 184 ff., 188-191). Husserls Auffassung eines unausschaltbaren reinen Ich hat sich bekanntlich um 1912, in seiner Ideen herauskristallisiert. Er widmete der Frage des reinen Ich erstmals in Ideen II detaillierte Analysen. In Ideen I schrieb er über die Transzendenz des reinen Ich hinsichtlich des jeweiligen immanenten Erlebnisses: «Bei der unmittelbar wesentlichen Rolle, die diese Transzendenz bei jeder cogitatio spielt, werden wir sie einer Ausschaltung nicht unterziehen dürfen, obschon für viele Untersuchungen die Fragen des reinen Ich in suspenso bleiben können» (Husserl, 1977, 124), obwohl er noch wiederholt von einem reinen Ich in der phänomenologischen Reduktion sprach (Husserl, 1977, 42 ff., 168, 178-184, 188, 202, 211 ff., 214, 244, 250, 304). In Ideen II hob er hervor, dass das reine Ich — als Pol von Erlebnissen, von Affektionen und Aktionen — ein notwendiges strukturelles Moment des reinen Bewusstseins, des Erlebnisstroms sei, und es nicht außer Spiel gesetzt werden könne (Husserl, 1952, §22-29). In Ideen II behandelte er das

5

Fünfte Logische Untersuchung, §8: «Nun muß ich freilich gestehen, daß ich dieses primitive Ich als notwendiges Beziehungszentrum schlechterdings nicht zu finden vermag.» In der zweiten Auflage des Buches (1913) hat Husserl zu diesem Satz in einer Fußnote hinzugefügt: «Inzwischen habe ich es zu finden gelernt, bzw. gelernt, mich durch Besorgnisse vor den Ausartungen der Ichmetaphysik in dem reinen Erfassen des Gegebenen nicht beirren zu lassen.» (Husserl, 1984, 361) 6 Siehe dazu die Frage der Ich-Ausschaltung (Husserl, 1985, 212; Husserl, 1973b, 44). Vgl.: (Taguchi, 2006, 55).

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persönliche Ich als einen transzendenten, weltlichen, konstituierten Gegenstand, den man mit der phänomenologischen Reduktion ausschließen müsse (Husserl, 1952, §28). Husserl wandte den Leibniz’schen Begriff «Monade» an das Phänomen des persönlichen Ich an, einen Ausdruck, den er seit 1907/08 zu gebrauchen begann (Ms. B II 2, und vermehrt in Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, §§39, 41). Das persönliche Ich sei der Träger von Habitualitäten, Ichvermögen, Erinnerungen, Stellungnahmen, Meinungen, intersubjektiven, geschichtlichen, geistigen Inhalten usw. Husserl zufolge sei das persönliche Ich durch das reine konstituiert. Das reine Ich ist in den Ideen ein purer logischer Pol der Aktionen und Erlebnisse. Nach seiner genetischen Wende (nach 1917) erkannte Husserl, dass diese rein logische, abstrakte Auffassung des transzendentalen Ich nicht ausreichend war, und entwickelte den Begriff der transzendentalen Person, des persönlichen, transzendentalen Ich. Meines Erachtens kann man auch schon in Ideen II einen persönlichen Aspekt des reinen, transzendentalen Ich ausweisen: «Aber das Ich ist nicht leerer Pol sondern Träger seiner Habitualität, und darin liegt, es hat seine individuelle Geschichte», sagte Husserl über das reine Ich (Husserl, 1952, 300; Marosan, 2013). Aber nur in seiner genetischen Phänomenologie vertiefte Husserl sein Verständnis des notwendig persönlichen Charakters des transzendentalen Ego. Der Begriff «Monade» gewann somit in dieser späteren Periode eine transzendentale Deutung. In den Cartesianischen Meditationen (1929) interpretierte Husserl das transzendentale Ego als identischen Pol der Erlebnisse und Substrat seiner Habitualitäten (Husserl, 1973a, §§31-32) und die Monade als «[d]ie volle Konkretion des [transzendentalen] Ich» (Husserl, 1973a, §33). Dieses Ich habe eine Geschichte, eine intersubjektive Umgebung anderer Mitsubjekte, eine Welt, einen Leib — all dies unter der phänomenologischen Reduktion; also als subjektive, konstitutive Leistungen, die aber notwendig zur Selbstkonstitution eines Ich gehören. «Eine Person kann konkret nicht sein, ohne einen Körper als Leib zu haben», schrieb Husserl (Husserl, 2012, 380). Es gehöre zum Wesen des transzendentalen Ego, eine Welt zu konstituieren (Husserl, 2008, Text Nr. 25).7 Die Grundlage der phänomenologisch umgebildeten Geisteswissenschaften soll dieses kulturelle, intersubjektive, leibliche, geschichtliche Ich sein. 7

«Die apodiktische Gewissheit meines menschlich-leiblichen Seins als Teil der apodiktischen Gewissheit des Seinsbodens “Welt”. Zurückweisung des cartesischen Zweifelsversuchs.»

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3. SELBSTIDENTITÄT UND SELBSTSTÄNDIGKEIT DER PERSON Das transzendentale Ego habe Husserl zufolge einen rein logischen, formalen und einen persönlichen Aspekt. In dieser letzteren Hinsicht bezeichnet Husserl das Ego auch als «transzendentale Person» (Husserl, 2002a, Text. Nr. 13),8 die der phänomenologischen Anthropologie zugrunde liegen soll.9 Das reine Ich habe eine formale, logische Identität, aber dieses letztere persönliche Ich verfüge über eine komplexe, flexible narrative Identität. Mit Husserls viel zitierten Worten aus den Cartesianischen Meditationen: «Das Ego konstituiert sich für sich selbst sozusagen in der Einheit einer Geschichte.» (Husserl, 1973a, 109) Die Identität des reinen Ich ist etwas Gegebenes, die Identität des persönlichen Ich ist sozusagen etwas Aufgegebenes. Es ist wichtig zu betonen, dass der Mensch nicht mehrere verschiedene, voneinander getrennte Ich hat, sondern es nur ein einziges transzendentales Ego gibt, das mehrere, voneinander nicht trennbare Aspekte hat: also eine rein formale, eine transzendentale, eine persönliche, eine empirische usw. Seite.10 Der transzendentale Aspekt ist der ursprünglichste; das transzendentale Ego konstituiert seine verschiedenen Seiten und Momente. Diese Seiten und Momente sind als konstitutive Leistungen im Verlauf der Selbstkonstitution des transzendentalen Ego zu verstehen. Verkörperlichung, Verweltlichung, Vergesellschaftlichung sind apriori notwendige Momente der Selbstkonstitution des Ego. Die Identität des völlig konkreten Ego ist eine inhaltliche, inhaltsreiche Identität einer Lebensgeschichte (Husserl, 1973d, 419).11 Die Erlebnisse, die Aktionen des Ego bauen eine — in seiner Selbstkonstitution — systematisch zusammenhängende Lebensgeschichte auf. 8

«Die Konkretion der transzendentalen Subjektivität als transzendentaler Person.» (Husserl, 2002a, 198) Die transzendental verstandene Person (und Personsgemeinschaft) als Grundlage einer «philosophisch echten Anthropologie» (Husserl, 2002a, 246). 10 Siehe dazu z.B. (Husserl, 1968, 294). «Mein transzendentales Ich ist also evident “verschieden” vom natürlichen Ich, aber keineswegs als ein zweites, als ein davon getrenntes im natürlichen Wortsinn, wie umgekehrt auch keineswegs ein in natürlichem Sinne damit verbundenes oder mit ihm verflochtenes. Es ist eben das (in voller Konkretion gefaßte) Feld der transzendentalen Selbsterfahrung, die jederzeit durch bloße Änderung der Einstellung in psychologische Selbsterfahrung zu wandeln ist.» 11 «Aber darf man sich damit begnügen, und ist es nicht ein Hauptstück der Konstitution der vorgegebenen Welt als vorgegebener menschlicher Welt (Welt des Menschen und Mitmenschen) und wohl ein Grundunterschied gegenüber dem Tier, dass in dieser Weise für mich und dann für jedermann (als Mitmenschen) ein “Lebensweg” konstituiert ist, meine Lebenszeit, meine “Lebensgeschichte”?» (Husserl, 1968) 9

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Die persönliche Identität des Ich konstituiert sich aufgrund seiner rein formalen Identität. Das persönliche Ich kann sich als identisches oder nichtidentisches konstituieren, im engen Zusammenhang mit seiner Selbstständigkeit oder Unselbstständigkeit. Vor Heideggers Sein und Zeit spricht Husserl in Ideen II über die Unselbstständigkeit der Person mithilfe des Ausdrucks «man»: «Neben den Tendenzen, die von anderen Personen ausgehen, stehen die in der intentionalen Gestalt unbestimmter Allgemeinheit auftretenden Zumutungen der Sitte, des Brauchs, der Tradition, des geistigen Milieus: “man” urteilt so, “man” hält so die Gabel u.dgl., die Forderungen der sozialen Gruppe, des Standes usw.» (Husserl, 1952, 269) Anders als bei Heidegger, der die Unselbstständigkeit des Daseins an eine eigentümliche Befindlichkeit knüpfte, namentlich an die in der existentiellen Einsamkeit erlebte, zum eigenen Tode vorlaufende Angst, vollzieht sich die Autonomie der Person bei Husserl in einer völlig selbstständigen, sich von den unbefragt überlieferten und übernommenen Normen und Traditionen distanzierenden, kritischen, vernünftigen Position. Selbstständigkeit ist bei Husserl eine selbständige, kritische, rationale Einstellung. Husserls Auffassung der Rationalität hat immer einen starken ethischen Charakter: denjenigen der Selbstverantwortung. Husserl zufolge sei der Mensch immer verantwortlich für die Rationalität oder Irrationalität seiner Taten; verantwortlich für sich selbst und für die ganze menschliche Gesellschaft. Das menschliche Leben, sagte Husserl, soll ein «Leben in der Apodiktizität», «in apodiktischer Freiheit» sein (Husserl, 1976, 275). Die menschliche Person ist als ein rationales Subjekt selbstständig, d.h. sie soll rational sein. Die Selbstständigkeit ist in diesem Sinn ein Sollen. Die rationale, transzendentale Person ist eine identische, wenn sie sich rational betätigt, und eine nichtidentische, wenn sie irrational ist. Die Selbstständigkeit und Selbstidentität sind etwas, was sie verwirklichen soll (siehe dazu: Husserl, 2014, 430-433).12 Die Selbstidentität des Subjekts konstituiert sich also durch die Akten des völlig konkreten Subjekts. Im theoretischen Leben soll eine theoretische Apodiktizität und in dem praktischen Leben eine praktische, ethische, axiologische Apodiktizität die Tätigkeit des menschlichen Subjekts leiten (vgl. Husserl, 2004, 244-254, 253 ff.). Die Idee des apodiktischen, rationalen 12

Beilage XXXI (aus 1920). «Sitte im engeren oder traditionellen Sinn. Recht, Sitte im eigentlichen Sinn. Gesichtspunkt der Sitte als Gesichtspunkt des “man”.»

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Lebens leiht der menschlichen Geschichte eine Teleologie, die sich auf eine völlig rationale menschliche Gesellschaft richtet, mit toleranten, aufgeklärten, vernünftigen Subjekten. 4. DIE KRISEN DER SINNGEBUNG. DIE URSPRÜNGLICHE UNBEHERRSCHBARKEIT DER SINNBILDUNG Wer bin ich? Es ist die Grundfrage des menschlichen Lebens. Wie im vorigen Abschnitt deutlich wurde, bin ich ein rationales, moralisch verantwortliches Wesen. Aber es ist eine sehr inhaltsarme Antwort. Die Antwort auf die Identitätsfrage des Subjekts konstituiert sich auf einem konkreteren Weg in der Reihe der si nngebenden Akte des transzendentalen Ego. Ich kann nur aus meiner Lebensgeschichte, aus meinen Erlebnissen und Wahlen, richtigen Erkenntnissen und Täuschungen erkennen, wer ich war, wer ich bin. Die konkrete Sinneseinheit der Lebensgeschichte konstituiert sich in Sinngebungen des transzendentalen Subjekts. Aus inhaltlicher Sicht besteht meine Selbstidentität in der Einheit meiner Lebensgeschichte, die ich als transzendentales Subjekt konstituiere. Husserl blieb meistens in dem Rahmen des cartesianischen Paradigmas insofern, als ihm zufolge aller Sinn (Interpretation, Auffassung) sinngebende Bewusstsein voraussetze (Husserl, 1977, 120). Nach dieser Auffassung sei der Mensch ausschließlicher Meister und Urheber seiner Lebensgeschichte. Es gibt keinen Sinn ohne sinngebendes Bewusstsein. Genau diese Voraussetzung wurde bei einigen Autoren der französischen Phänomenologie, wie Merleau-Ponty und Marc Richir, prinzipiell in Frage gestellt (Gondek, & Tengelyi, 2011, 20-29). Merleau-Ponty, und in der Folge auch Richir, sprach von spontan entstehenden Sinnbildungen, die für ihre Genese keine ichliche Sinngebung vorausgesetzt haben, und die aller solchen Sinngebung vorangegangen sind. Es gibt Sinnbildungen, die ohne jedwede ichliche Mithilfe entstanden sind, die als fait accompli, als vollendete Tatsachen vor uns stehen, bevor wir jedwede bewusste Interpretation des Erfahrenen vollziehen könnten. In diesem Sinn hat Tengelyi (Merleau-Ponty und Richir folgend) systematisch zwischen passiv vollzogener Sinnbildung (der passiven Entstehung des Sinnes) und aktiver, ichlichen Sinnstiftung unterschieden.13 Tengelyi zufolge sei der Mensch kein 13

Siehe auch: (Tengelyi, 1998, 164 ff.; Tengelyi, 2007a, xiv–xv, 17, 19–20, 43, 46, 129, 170, 181, 193 ff., 230, 242, 256, 330).

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ausschließlicher Urheber seiner Lebensgeschichte, sondern nur ihr Miturheber (Tengelyi, 2007b, 73). Man muss auch — zur Verteidigung Husserls — erwähnen, dass es bei ihm auch Prozesse passiver Sinnbildung gibt, die sich «nicht als noematische Korrelate von Noesen begreifen lassen».14 Bei Husserl kann man also auch Sinnbildung finden, die keine ichliche Leistungen voraussetzt, obwohl Husserl diesen Gedanken nicht systematisch ausgearbeitet hat. Schon in den Bernauer Manuskripten (1917/18) kann man die Vorstellung finden, dass man den ganzen Prozess der Sinnentstehung nicht völlig beherrschen kann. Ereignisse können ohne auf sie gerichtete Erwartungen vorkommen. «Ein unerwarteter Anfang kann nicht mit offenen Armen empfangen werden», sagt Husserl (Husserl, 2001b, 37). Unsere Erwartungen, Antizipationen können sich immer täuschen. Während eines Ereignisses kann es deutlich werden, dass es einen ganz anderen Sinn hat, als wir ihm am Anfang geliehen haben. Die Wege der Sinnbildung können völlig unvorhersehbare Richtungen nehmen, die alle Antizipationen eines aktiv konstituierenden Ich widerlegen. Sich täuschende Erwartungen können eine Krise der Sinngebung mit sich bringen. Es kann sein, dass ganze Reihen und Komplexe von Ereignissen einen völlig anderen Sinn haben, als wir sie früher interpretiert haben. Neue, unerwartet auftretende Sinne können früher herauskristallisierte Sinnstiftungen sprengen. Dies kann auch mit unserem Leben geschehen: Neue Erfahrungen können uns zwingen, wesentliche Momente unserer Lebensgeschichte in einem völlig neuen Licht zu sehen, durchaus neu zu interpretieren. Transzendentale, phänomenologische Anthropologie ist bei Husserl eine Disziplin, die ihm zufolge die sinngebenden, ichlichen, persönlichen Leistungen und ihre intersubjektiven Verflechtungen erforschen sollte. Aber ich denke, dass wir, den neueren Ergebnissen der Phänomenologie und auch impliziten Tendenzen bei Husserl selbst folgend, auch diese Disziplin auf das Gebiet von nicht-ichlichen, durchaus passiven Sinnbildungen und Krisen der Sinngebungen erweitern können.

14

Siehe auch: (Tengelyi, 2004, 795; Staudigl, 2011, 62; Tengelyi, 2014, 213-227).

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5. VERLETZBARE SELBSTIDENTITÄT. TENGELYIS AUFFASSUNG VON LEBENSGESCHICHTE AUSGEHEND VON HUSSERLS IDEE DER TRANSZENDENTALEN PERSON Seinen ganzen schöpferischen Lebensweg hindurch galten Tengelyi das Lebenswerk und die phänomenologische Grundstellung Husserls als ein fundamentaler Punkt der Orientierung. Tengelyi setzte sich zum Ziel, eine neubegründete Metaphysik der menschlichen Erfahrung auszuarbeiten. Diese metaphysische Grundfassung der Erfahrung lässt sich als ein Leitmotiv seiner philosophischen Bemühungen in allen drei Grundwerken seines Lebens finden: in seinem ersten Opus Magnum, in Dem Zwitterbegriff Lebensgeschichte (1998), in der Erfahrung und Ausdruck (2007), und auch in seinem letzten, postum erschienenen Werk, Welt und Unendlichkeit (2014). Diese Bücher beinhalten eine detaillierte und nuancierte Fassung von Tengelyis Metaphysik der Erfahrung, wobei die Husserl’sche Phänomenologie und insbesondere seine Auffassung des konkreten, persönlichen transzendentalen Ego immer als ein Ausgangspunkt und theoretische Grundlage herangezogen werden. Um die Natur und den genauen Maß des Einflusses der Husserl’schen Phänomenologie in Tengelyis Philosophie präzise zu beleuchten, sollten zuallererst diejenigen wesentlichen Punkte in Tengelyis Ansatz näher betrachtet werden, wo er sich einerseits an Husserl anknüpfte, und andererseits wo er von Husserl abwich. Im Mittelpunkt von Tengelyis Denken stehen die Probleme der Selbstidentität, der erfahrungsmäßigen Offenheit und der Welt als eines unbestimmten Horizonts. Das Verstehen des Zusammenhanges zwischen diesen Problemen und Begriffen bei Tengelyi ist grundsätzlich durch Husserls Phänomenologie und besonders durch seine phänomenologische Anthropologie bestimmt. Tengelyi strebte nach einer prinzipiell erfahrungsmäßigen und erfahrungsbegründeten Philosophie. Heidegger folgend hatte er gewisse, tiefgehende Bedenken gegen die fundamental als reine Wesenserkenntnis des transzendentalen Bewusstseins (und Ego) formulierte Konzeption der Phänomenologie in Husserls Ideen (1913).15 Husserl, zu15

Bei Tengelyi: «Die transzendental umgewendete Phänomenologie Husserls lief von vornherein Gefahr, als eine “Wesenslehre” vom “reinen Bewußtsein” sozusagen in eine “Noumenologie” auszuarten. Heidegger will dieser

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mindest für eine gewisse Zeit, bevorzugte die wesentlichen, eidetischen Möglichkeiten vor der faktischen Realität, was für Tengelyi als ein Rückfall hinsichtlich der früheren16 und auch späteren Ansätzen Husserls galt. Husserl gab diese Vorstellung später — besonders in den Forschungsmanuskripten der 1930er Jahre17 — auf, und Tengelyi behielt vor allem diese Manuskripte als Ausgangpunkt für seine erfahrungsorientierte Metaphysik im Auge. Erfahrung für Tengelyi ist allererst erfahrendes Leben; er interpretierte die Erfahrung grundsätzlich als ein Lebensphänomenon (cf. Tengelyi, 1998, 94 ff., 161 ff.). Tengelyi beschrieb ferner das erfahrende Leben als eine Verflechtung von Subjekt und Welt. Tengelyi zufolge schöpfe das Subjekt seinen eigenen Seinssinn und die wesentlichsten Elemente seiner Selbstinterpretation aus der Welt; andererseits bildet und formt das Subjekt den Sinn der Welt ebenso wie die weltlichen Situationen frei, in einem Zusammenwirken mit seinen Mitsubjekten. Es gibt eine Wechselwirkung, ein zirkuläres Verhältnis zwischen dem Subjekt, seinen Mitsubjekten und der Welt. Aber der Begriff der Welt spielt eine fundamentale und orientierende Rolle in Tengelyis Auffassung der Erfahrung, in einer gewissen Hinsicht kann man mit Recht sagen, dass Tengelyi eine Art «phänomenologische Kosmologie»,18 das ist: «Weltphänomenologie» praktiziert, diejenige Art der Phänomenologie, die Abbed Kanoor, ein Schüler von Tengelyi, als die «Wuppertal’sche Tradition der Phänomenologie» charakterisierte (Kanoor, 2015). Als wichtigste Vertreter dieser Tradition neben Tengelyi gelten Tengelyis Mentor Klaus Held und seine Assistentin Inga Römer. Für Tengelyi ist die Welt wesentlich das Reich der Offenheit: Sie stellt das Subjekt Gefahr entgegenwirken. Von daher sieht er sich vor die Aufgabe gestellt, in der “Seinsart des menschlichen Daseins”, in der “faktischen Existenz”, “die Möglichkeit der transzendentalen Konstitution” aufzuzeigen.» (Tengelyi, 1998, 60) «Die “erregende Frage” Heideggers nach dem faktischen Sein des Seienden, dessen “Wesen” in seiner Existenz liegt, läßt Husserls Wesenslehre vom reinen Bewußtsein und dem transzendentalen Ich in zweifelhaftem Licht erscheinen. / Wir sehen aber zugleich, daß Husserl mit dem Übergang zu dieser Wesenslehre auch hinter den von ihm selbst deutlich erkannten Möglichkeiten der Phänomenologie zurückgeblieben ist: Er ist dadurch von der Idee einer “erfahrenden Phänomenologie”, die “nicht eine Wesenslehre ist”, weit abgekommen — und zwar, allem Anschein nach, ohne sie je ausdrücklich verworfen zu haben.» (Tengelyi, 2007a, 150 ff.) 16 Z.B. hinsichtlich der Logischen Untersuchungen (1900/1901) (Husserl, 1975; Husserl, 1984). 17 Aber man kann die ersten Dokumente dieser Wendung schon in den frühen 20er Jahren finden. So schrieb Husserl z.B. in einem unveröffentlichten Manuskript aus dem Jahr 1921: «Die Fakta leiten alle Eidetik. Was ich exemplarisch nicht unterscheiden kann, [davon] kann ich auch keine eidetische Unterscheidung und Wesensbildung gewinnen. Das ist selbst wesensmassig einsehbar.» (Ms. B III 10, 19) 18 Meine Formulierung. — B.P.M.

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immer vor unerwarteten Neuheiten, und die Selbstauslegung des Subjekts wird immer wieder durch die Ereignisse der Welt erschüttert und zerstört; das Subjekt sieht sich genötigt, seine Interpretationen über sein Leben und die Welt zu korrigieren, aber es erleidet und betrachtet diese Ereignisse auch nicht ganz passiv und hilflos. Der Mensch, so Tengelyi, sei der Miturheber seines Schicksals — mit den objektiven Vorgängen der Welt und mit den Anderen. Die wichtigsten Punkte, wo sich Tengelyi an Husserl anknüpfte und wo Husserl zum vielleicht bedeutendsten Autor und Orientierungspunkt in der ganzen Geschichte der Philosophie wurde, waren die transzendentale Dimension der Erfahrung, die Begriffe von Sinnbildung und Sinnstiftung und der konkrete Charakter des transzendentalen Subjekts beim späten Husserl. Der Husserl’sche Gedanke der Transzendentalität blieb für Tengelyi sein ganzes Leben hindurch wegweisend.19 Demnach müsse die Erfahrung immer auf ein Subjekt bezogen interpretiert werden, indem sie immer in die Perspektive der ersten Person Singular gestellt wird: Die Erfahrung bestehe aus im Werden begriffenen und schon gestifteten Sinnen und Bedeutungen. Die Erfahrung sei in der Zweiheit von Sinnbildung und Sinnstiftung zu betrachten. Das transzendentale Subjekt, auf das diese Erfahrung bezogen ist, und für das es Sinn und Bedeutung gibt, ist nach dem späten Husserl wesentlich ein konkretes, gesellschaftliches, kulturelles, geschichtliches und leibliches Wesen. Tengelyi betonte diese Tatsache schon in Dem Zwitterbegriff Lebensgeschichte (Tengelyi, 1998, 92-103), vor allem aufgrund der Texte des 15. Bandes der Husserliana-Reihe. Sich auf Husserl stützend wollte Tengelyi unter allen Umständen diese transzendentale Dimension aufbewahren, um auf diese Weise die eigentümlichen Rechte des Subjekts gegenüber den naturalistischen, naturalisierenden, reduktionistischen Tendenzen zu sichern. Der Mensch sei nicht nur ein objektives, empirisches Wesen in der Welt, sondern er ist auch das Subjekt, dem die Welt als Phänomenon begegnet. Er ist das Subjekt, für den die Welt erscheint. Diese Husserl’sche Idee war für Tengelyi ausschlaggebend. Aufgrund der Idee des konkreten transzendentalen Subjekts in Husserls späten Ansätzen zur transzendentalen Anthropologie führte Tengelyi seine grundlegenden 19

Z.B. in seinem letzten Werk: (Tengelyi, 2014, 200-213).

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Erwägungen über das Subjekt und die Metaphysik der Erfahrung aus. Es geht um die ursprüngliche Unbeherrschbarkeit der Sinnbildung und den Selbstidentität konstituierenden Charakter der Schicksalsereignisse. Einerseits folgte Tengelyi gewissermaßen Ricœurs Auffassung der narrativen Identität: Er betonte, dass die Selbstidentität des Menschen teilweise durch die über die Zeit sich durchziehende Einheit seiner eigenen Lebensgeschichte konstituiert sei. Andererseits aber vollzog er in gewissen Punkten eine radikale Abwendung von Ricœurs Theorie der narrativen Identität. Für Tengelyi seien die letzten Quellen der Selbstidentität des Menschen diejenigen unwiederholbaren Schicksalsereignisse, die unseren Anspruch auf das Aus-sich-selbst-hinaustreten mit der Macht der unüberwindbaren Andersheit und Fremdheit konfrontieren. Es geht hier um die Krisen der Sinnstiftungen. Tengelyi zufolge gebe es entscheidende (schicksalsvolle) Ereignisse im Menschenleben, die all unsere Interpretationen hinsichtlich unseres ganzen Lebenswegs retroaktiv überschreiben und uns zwingen können, einen radikal neuen Standpunkt über uns und die Welt einzunehmen. Nach Tengelyi sind diese Erlebnisse genau die letzten Quellen unserer Selbstidentität. Tengelyi fand die Ansätze dieser Gedanken auch beim späten Husserl (Tengelyi, 1998, 100-103): Auch hier gibt es diejenigen passiven Tendenzen der Sinnbildungen und diejenigen Prozesse der Sinnformierungen, die das Subjekt nicht in vollem Maße beherrschen kann. Diese Prozesse überschreiben manchmal unsere Selbstund Weltinterpretationen. Beim alten Husserl, betont Tengelyi, wird die retroaktive Konstitution zu einem Teil der Selbstkonstitution des konkreten Subjekts. 20 Die Krisen der Sinnstiftungen können zur Erschütterung unserer ganzen Selbstidentität, zur Spaltung des Selbst führen, die sich gelegentlich nur sehr schwierig und schmerzvoll überwinden lassen. Nach Tengelyi werden diese Krisen der Sinnbildung beim Subjekt durch eine Begegnung mit der radikalen Alterität oder Andersheit hervorgerufen. Oder wie Tengelyi den Husserl’schen Begriff der Selbstspaltung

20

«Mit einem Worte: Husserl mußte dem Prinzip retroaktive Konstitution sehr nahe kommen, um die “Selbstkonstitution der Zeitlichkeit der Subjektivität” als “Lebensgeschichte” begreifen zu können.» (Tengelyi, 1998, 102)

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auslegt: «Er hat zwei Eigentümlichkeiten, die ihm eine besondere Bedeutung zukommen lassen: Einerseits läßt er sich aus Husserls sachnahen Betrachtungen ohne Gewaltsamkeit herleiten; andererseits bringt er die Phänomenologie in die Lage, sich auf eine fruchtbare Zwiesprache mit Denkern wie Freud, Lacan oder Levinas einzulassen — mit Denkern also, die auf ihre Weise eine Ichspaltung, ein gespaltenes Subjekt oder sogar ausdrücklich eine Spaltung des Selbst zur Sprache gebracht haben.» (Tengelyi, 2007a, 164 ff.) 6. TENGELYIS AUSLEGUNG VON HUSSERLS ANSATZ DER TRANSZENDENTALEN PERSON ALS EINE GRUNDLAGE FÜR EINE METAPHYSIK DER ZUFÄLLIGEN FAKTIZITÄT In seinem letzten Buch versuchte Tengelyi die letzte Form seiner phänomenologisch begründeten Metaphysik der Erfahrung auszuarbeiten, die auch an die zeitgenössischen Strömungen der analytischen Philosophie anknüpfen konnte (Tengelyi, 2014, 171 ff.). Vorerst, hinsichtlich der Geburt der phänomenologischen Metaphysik der Faktizität, verlieh er Husserls Auffassung des konkreten monadischen Ich eine zentrale Bedeutung. Husserl folgend machte Tengelyi einen scharfen Unterschied zwischen der eidetischen Notwendigkeit und der «Notwendigkeit eines Faktums» (Tengelyi, 2014, 180 ff.). Wie wir oben darauf schon hingewiesen haben, Husserl, vor seiner «genetischen Wende», in der Periode der Ideen, maß einen eigentümlichen Vorrang der Eidetik als Wissenschaft von puren idealen Möglichkeiten vor Tatsachen und Wissenschaften von Tatsachen bei. In Ideen I lesen wir zum Beispiel: «Die alte ontologische Lehre, daß die Erkenntnis der “Möglichkeiten” der der Wirklichkeiten vorhergehen müsse, ist m.E., wofern sie recht verstanden und in rechter Weise nutzbar gemacht wird, eine große Wahrheit.» (Husserl, 1977, 178) Auch in seinen späteren, systematischen Werken, wie in den Cartesianischen Meditationen, vertrat er die Meinung vom Vorrang des Eidetischen vor dem Faktischen (Husserl, 1973a, 160). Aber in seinen Forschungsmanuskripten und auch in seinen Vorlesungen, vom Anfang der 1920er Jahre an, begann er von notwendigen Fakten oder Tatsachen zu sprechen, «Urfakta», «Urtatsachen» oder «Urtatsächlichkeiten», wovon wir nicht abstrahieren können, wenn wir eine kohärente Interpretation der

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Erfahrung bieten möchten.21 Diese «Urtatsachen» sollen als Grundlage für alle Eidetik und eidetische Erkenntnis, aber auch für alle Tatsachenwissenschaften dienen. Anfang der 1930er Jahre sind bei Husserl die Umrisse einer vollständigen und systematischen Theorie der metaphysischen Urtatsachen auszumachen, als die letzte Grundlage aller möglichen Erkenntnis und Erfahrung. In seinen Überlegungen hinsichtlich der Metaphysik der Urtatsachen spielte das konkrete, persönliche Ego eine grundlegende Rolle. Tengelyi zufolge könne man prinzipiell die wesentlichsten Urtatsachen in vier Gruppen einordnen: 1) «Das jeweilige Ich als Urfaktum», 2) dieses Ich ist ein Weltträger, 3) der intersubjektive Aspekt des Ich, die intentionale Ineinander und Füreinander der konkreten Subjekte, 4) der geschichtliche Charakter des Ich (Tengelyi, 2014, 184187). Die drei letzten Typen der Urtatsachen sind offensichtlich auf den ersten, auf das Dasein des konkreten, transzendentalen Ich bezogen. Das transzendentale Ich, als ein leibliches, welthabendes, intersubjektives, geschichtliches Wesen (Tengelyi, 2014, 211), ist der Träger aller Fakten und Wesen. Tengelyi mahnt uns, dass die Begründung aller Erkenntnis und Erfahrung bei Husserl durch die Tatsache des konkreten, persönlichen Ich keineswegs eine einfache Neufassung der naiven, traditionellen Subjektmetaphysik bedeute. Sie weist lediglich auf die notwendige Perspektivität aller lebensweltlichen Erfahrung, wissenschaftlichen und philosophischen Erkenntnis hin (Tengelyi, 2014, 190).22 Diese Perspektivität ist durch Faktizitätsstrukturen charakterisiert. Das transzendentale Ich und seine Welt gewinnen einen grundsätzlichen Geschehenscharakter im Fluss der jeweiligen Erfahrung. Tengelyi zufolge fielen die Grundkategorien dieses Geschehens in den Aufgabenbereich einer phänomenologischen Kategorialanalyse (Tengelyi, 2014, 194-200). Tengelyi hob die ursprüngliche Verflochtenheit des transzendentalen Ich und der Welt beim späten Husserl hervor (Tengelyi, 2014, 324 ff.). Ichbewusstsein (Selbstbewusstsein) und Weltbewusstsein seien aufeinander bezogen, und die Strömung der Erfahrung vollziehe sich im Spannungsfeld zwischen den beiden. Beim späten Husserl findet sich auch der für Tengelyis Philosophie als wesentliches Leitmotiv geltende Gedanke, dass jedes Segment der Erfahrung (Erfahrungen von Ich, Anderen und die Welt) durch Tendenzen und Prozesse 21

Siehe z.B. die folgende Manuskriptstelle aus dem Jahr 1921: «Die Fakta leiten alle Eidetik. Was ich exemplarisch sieht unterscheiden kann, [davon] kann ich auch keine eidetische Unterscheidung und Wesensbildung gewinnen. Das ist selbst wesensmassig einsehbar.» (Ms. B III 10, 19) 22 Bei Tengelyi: die Performativität des phänomenologischen Ausgangpunkts.

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der spontanen, passiven, unbeherrschbaren Sinnbildung bestimmt ist (Tengelyi, 2014, 213227). Die Erfahrung ist ein unbestimmt offener Horizont für jeweils neue Sinne. Eine auf die ursprüngliche Faktizität des konkreten transzendentalen Ich begründete Metaphysik der Kontingenz hat die Aufgabe, sowohl die Prozesse der Sinnstiftung (der Domestikation der Neuheit) und den überraschenden, unvorhersehbaren Charakter des Hervortauchens eines neuen Sinnes in spontaner Sinnbildung verständlich zu machen. Die Metaphysik der Kontingenz soll für jegliche Neuigkeit offen bleiben und soll immer fähig sein, die neuen Kategorien der Erfahrung zu integrieren. Sie soll immer fähig sein, neue Kategorien zu bilden, um die radikalen Wendungen der Sinnbildung zu beschreiben. Sie soll elastisch sein. Diese Elastizität der Metaphysik der Kontingenz würde Tengelyi zufolge durch die faktische Notwendigkeit des transzendentalen, konkreten Ich und seine notwendigen Faktizitätsstrukturen garantiert. Auf diese Weise gewinnt Husserls späte Auffassung der transzendentalen Person eine methodologisch grundlegende Rolle in Tengelyis letzter Fassung der Idee der phänomenologischen Metaphysik: Sie ist eine radikale Kategorienanalyse der Erfahrung, die die Neuheit immer integrieren kann, ohne ihren überraschenden Charakter aus den Augen zu verlieren oder zu eliminieren. R EFER ENCES Gondek, H.-D., & Tengelyi, L. (2011). Neue Phänomenologie in Frankreich, Berlin: Suhrkamp. Husserl, E. (1952). Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution (Hua IV). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1959). Erste Philosophie (1923/4). Zweiter Teil (Hua VIII). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1968). Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925 (Hua IX). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1973a). Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge (Hua I). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1973b). Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Fünf Vorlesungen (Hua II). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

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Husserl, E. (1973c). Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Erster Teil. 1905-1920 (Hua XIII). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1973d). Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil. 1929–35. (Hua XV). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1975). Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Teil. Prolegomena zur reinen Logik. Text der 1. und der 2. Auflage. (Hua XVIII). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1976). Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie (Hua VI). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1977). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführungin die reine Phänomenologie 1. Halbband: Text der 1.-3. Auflage – Nachdruck (Hua III-1). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1984). Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Teil. Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. In zwei Bänden (Hua XIX). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1985). Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesungen 1906/07 (Hua XXIV). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1986). Aufsätze und Vorträge. 1911-1921. Mit ergänzenden Texten (Hua XXV). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1988). Aufsätze und Vorträge. 1922-1937 (Hua XXVII). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (2001a). Natur und Geist: Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1927 (Hua XXXII). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Husserl, E. (2001b). Die “Bernauer Manuskripte“ über das Zeitbewußtsein (1917/18) (Hua XXXIII). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Husserl, E. (2002a). Zur phänomenologischen Reduktion. Texte aus dem Nachlass (19261935) (Hua XXXIV). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Husserl, E. (2002b). Natur und Geist. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1919 (Hua Materialien IV). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Husserl, E. (2004). Einleitung in die Ethik. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920 und 1924 (Hua XXXVII). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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Husserl, E. (2008). Die Lebenswelt. Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1916-1937) (Hua XXXIX). New York, NY: Springer. Husserl, E. (2012). Zur Lehre vom Wesen und zur Methode der eidetischen Variation. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1891-1935) (Hua XXXXI). New York, NY: Springer. Husserl, E. (2014). Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie. Analysen des Unbewusstseins und der Instinkte. Metaphysik. Späte Ethik (Texte aus dem Nachlass 1908-1937) (Hua XXXXII). New York, NY: Springer. Luft, S. (2011). Husserl’s Concept of the “Transcendental Person”: Another Look at the Husserl-Heidegger Relationship. In Subjectivity and Life-world in Transcendental Phenomenology (126-158). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Kanoor, A. (2015). Zur Erinnerung an Prof Dr László Tengelyi. Retrieved from: http://www.philosophie.uni-wuppertal.de/fileadmin/philosophie/PDFs_allg/ Seminarmaterialien/Tengelyi/In_Memoriam/Kanoor_Tengelyi_zur_Erinnerung.pdf Marosán, B. P. (2013). The Concept of Transcendental Ego in Ideas I and II. Retrieved from: https://www.academia.edu/5283393/The_concept_of_transcen­dental_ego_ in_Husserls_Ideas_I_and_II Staudigl, M. (2011). Zur Phänomenologie zwischenmenschlicher Gewalt. Methode – Problematik – Perspektiven. In G.-J. van der Heiden, K. Novotný, I. Römer, & L. Tengelyi (Eds.), Investigating Subjectivity. Classical and New Perspectives (55-77). Leiden: BRILL. Taguchi, S. (2006). Das Problem des Ur-Ich bei Edmund Husserl. Dordrecht: Springer. Tengelyi, L. (1998). Der Zwitterbegriff Lebensgeschichte. München: Wilhelm Fink. Tengelyi, L. (2007a). Erfahrung und Ausdruck. Dordrecht: Springer. Tengelyi, L. (2007b). Narratives Handlungsverständnis. In J. Karen (Ed.), Narrative Ethik. Das Gute und das Böse erzählen (7-63). Berlin: Akademie Verlag. Tengelyi, L. (2004). Vom Erlebnis zur Erfahrung. Phänomenologie im Umbruch. In W. Hogrebe (Ed.), Grenzen und Grenzüberschreitungen (788-800). Berlin: Akademie Verlag. Tengelyi, L. (2014). Welt und Unendlichkeit. Zum Problem der phänomenologischen Metaphysik. Freiburg – München: Karl Alber.

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HORIZON 5 (1) 2016 : I. Research : P. Urban : 171–182 ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ • STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY • STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE • ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES

1.3 ETHICS, AXIOLOGY, AND LOGIC 1.3 ЭТИКА, АКСИОЛОГИЯ И ЛОГИКА

doi: 10.18199/2226-5260-2016-5-1-171-182

FOREGROUNDING THE RELATIONAL DOMAIN — PHENOMENOLOGY, ENACTIVISM AND CARE ETHICS PETR URBAN PhD, The Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy, 11000 Prague, Czech Republic.  E-mail: [email protected] Despite the emphasis on the relational and interpersonal domain found in the phenomenological tradition, a genuinely relational phenomenological ethics is still a desideratum. The aim of this paper is to call attention to care ethics as an already developed relational moral theory built on the idea of the centrality of the relational domain and to suggest a reason why phenomenologists and care ethicists should care more about each other. The argument proceeds in three steps. First, we focus on the phenomenological views of the lived body, intersubjectivity and mutual incorporation. Second, we discuss the current applications of the phenomenological insights in the so-called enactive approach to social cognition and pose the question of its ethical implications. The final section introduces the ethics of care as a current relational moral theory and highlights some points of commonality between care ethics and phenomenology. The paper concludes that the dynamics of care and mutual concern central to the ethics of care might be well analysed and further developed in terms of phenomenological and enactive views of intersubjectivity. Care ethics, on the other hand, might provide a well-elaborated framework for developing a phenomenological ethics ascribing a central place to the relational and interpersonal dimension of moral phenomena. Key words: Phenomenology, care ethics, phenomenological ethics, enactivism, the lived body, intersubjectivity, relationality.

© PETR URBAN, 2016

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АКТУАЛИЗИРУЯ РЕЛЯЦИОННЫЕ СФЕРЫ — ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЯ, ЭНАКТИВИЗМ И ЭТИКА ЗАБОТЫ ПЕТР УРБАН PhD, Чешская Академия наук, Институт философии, 11000 Прага, Чешская республика.  E-mail: [email protected] Несмотря на то, что реляционные и интерперсональные сферы заложены в феноменологической традиции, подлинно реляционная феноменологическая этика все еще испытывает дефицит внимания. Задача этой статьи — обратиться к этике заботы как уже оформившейся реляционной моральной теории, построенной на идее центральной реляционной сферы, и предположить основание необходимости большей взаимной заботы феноменологов и этиков. Аргумент развертывается в три шага. Во-первых, мы фокусируемся на феноменологических воззрениях о живом теле, интерсубъективности и взаимном включении (incorporation).1 Вовторых, мы обсуждаем современные приложения феноменологических идей в так называемом энактивистском подходе к социальным когнициям и ставим вопрос их этических последствий. Последняя часть вводит этику заботы как ныне существующую реляционную моральную теорию и высвечивает некоторые точки общности между этикой заботы и феноменологией. В статье делается вывод, что динамики заботы и взаимного участия (mutual concern), центральные для этики заботы, могут быть хорошо проанализированы и далее разработаны в отношении феноменологических и энактивистских позиций интерсубъективности. Этика заботы, с другой стороны, может подготовить создание хорошо разработанной конструкции для будущей феноменологической этики, центральное место в которой будет приписано реляционному и интерперсональному измерению морального феномена. Ключевые слова: Феноменология, этика заботы, феноменологичская этика, энактивизм, живое тело, интесубъективность, реляциональность.

INTRODUCTION My main motivation for writing this paper stems from the fact that, despite the emphasis on the relational and interpersonal domain found throughout the phenomenological tradition, a genuinely relational phenomenological ethics is still a desideratum. Under these circumstances, it seems useful to me to call attention to care ethics as an already developed relational moral theory built on the idea of the 1

«This process may be described (1) from a dynamical agentive systems point of view as an interaction and coordination of two embodied agents; (2) from a phenomenological approach as a mutual incorporation, i.e. a process in which the lived bodies of both participants extend and form a common intercorporality.» (Fuchs, & De Jaegher, 2009, 465-486) — Прим. ред.

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centrality of the relational domain. In this paper, my modest aim is to suggest a reason why phenomenologists and care ethicists should care more about each other. I also aim to show how that relates to the foregrounding of the relational domain in both philosophical traditions. My argument proceeds in three steps. First, I focus on the phenomenological views of the lived body, intersubjectivity and mutual incorporation. Second, I take a look at the current applications of the phenomenological insights in the so-called enactive approach to social cognition and open up the question of its ethical implications. Finally, I introduce the ethics of care as a relational moral theory and discuss the points of commonality between care ethics and phenomenology.2 EMBODIMENT AND MUTUAL INCORPORATION One of the most fruitful and influential gains of phenomenological philosophy lies, beyond doubt, in the exploration of the lived body and its constitutive role for the intentional life. Phenomenologists argue that the capacity for being intentionally related to the world is inseparable from being incarnated in the world. There is no inner theater of the mind into which images of the outside world are projected. Perceiver and perceived co-participate in perceptual fields as meaningful configurations in which the lived body exists as a momentum towards the world (Küpers, 2015). Our existence as embodied beings is not and can never be an immanently closed one. Instead of generating independent inner representations of the external world, we incorporate things in our environment. The lived body extends to the objects it interacts with and it does so by forming action-perception loops. The lived body coordinates to its environment, both forming a unified field of sensorimotor coherence (Fuchs, & De Jaegher, 2009). To move one’s body, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, is «to aim at things through it, or to allow one’s body to respond to their solicitation, which is exerted upon the body without any representation.» (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, 140)

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This paper doesn’t aim at a historical treatment of phenomenology. My main focus here is on current approaches and discussions following up the heritage the phenomenological tradition. For an instructive historical overview of phenomenology of sociality and intersubjectivity see e.g. (Szanto, & Moran, 2016) and (Salice, & Schmid, 2016).

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The lived body extends not only to the things that make up the world, but also to the bodies of other people. As is well known, phenomenologists do not aim to solve the so-called problem of other minds, but rather to dissolve it. As soon as one admits that the self is essentially embodied, as soon as it is no longer treated as the Cartesian res cogitans, the apparent problem of other minds disappears. Phenomenologists make the case that our contact with others is much deeper than any objectification or explicit knowledge. It is there, like our relationship to the world, by the mere fact of our bodily existing: I experience my own body as the power for certain behaviors and for a certain world, and I am only given to myself as a certain hold upon the world. Now, it is precisely my body that perceives the other’s body and finds there something of a miraculous extension of its own intentions, a familiar manner of handling the world. (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, 370)

My body-experiences and bodily embedment expand and incorporate the perceived body of the other and its embedding environment. The other’s body influences my own bodily movements and sensations, and vice versa. It reaches out, as it were, to my own body, and my own body reaches out to the other’s body. «Everything happens as if the other person’s intentions inhabited my body, or as if my intentions inhabited his body.» (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, 191) This joint embodiment creates a dynamic interplay forming a process of «mutual incorporation» (Leder, 1990, 94). Intentionality can never be a monological affair of the isolated mind or the individual, rather it is shared and developed collectively by a community of incarnated subjects (Küpers, 2015). Thomas Fuchs and Hanne De Jaegher recently offered an elucidating phenomenological analysis of mutual incorporation which they define as «the reciprocal interaction of two agents in which each lived body reaches out to embody the other» (Fuchs, & De Jaegher, 2009, 474). They illustrate the descriptive situation with an example of a tennis game. A skilled tennis player not only incorporates the ball and its trajectory, as it is the case in the process of unilateral incorporation (cf. Dreyfus, 2002), but also her opponent’s position, posture and movements. The player feels the thrust and direction of the opponent’s stroke. With this, her own body’s reaction is already being prepared. In a fluent phase of the game, even before one player strikes the ball, the other player’s reaction unfolds, and this already influences the first player’s initial action. In both players the lived body is, as it were, fluctuating between the incorporated body of the other and their own embodied position. They both experience the holistic development of the situation

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co-constituted by their bodily movements (Fuchs, & De Jaegher, 2009, 474). In the process of mutual incorporation, we experience that there is not just one center of gravity localized in one’s own lived body, but two or more of them continuously oscillating between activity and receptivity. We may say that the interactional «inbetween» becomes the source of the operative intentionality of interacting partners. Each behaves and experiences differently how they would do outside of the process. Another remarkable feature of mutual incorporation concerns its temporal structure. The interacting partners bring in their individual dispositions based on acquired intercorporeal practices. However, the development of interaction can change the dispositions of interactors. Hence, the meaning of the experienced situation is co-created and developed in a way not necessarily attributable to interacting partners considered in isolation. On the basis of this analysis Fuchs and De Jaegher highlight three key features of mutual incorporation: 1) The «in-between» becomes the source of the operative intentionality of interacting partners 2) Meaning is co-created in a way not necessarily attributable to either of the partners 3) Whoever is within the interaction is already affected by the other (Fuchs, & De Jaegher, 2009, 477). Here, the importance of the interpersonal relational domain, brought to the fore by classical phenomenological accounts of intersubjectivity, gains clear and concrete content.3 PARTICIPATORY SENSE-MAKING AND MORALITY Over the last decade, the phenomenological views of incorporation and mutual incorporation were fruitfully applied and further developed by the advocates of the enactive approach to social cognition. Enactivism is a transdisciplinary research program initially proposed as an alternative to mainstream cognitive science in the mid 1990s (Varela, Thompson, & Rosh, 1991). Whereas traditional cognitive science conceives of the mind as a computer-like input-output system and regards cognition as a set of

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Mutual incorporation is of course only one part of a wide spectrum of phenomena which phenomenology examines under the rubric of intersubjectivity. Nevertheless, here it is enough to refer to this particular example in order to show the phenomenological interest in the related area.

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internal mental representations of external objects, enactivists take up the heritage of phenomenological philosophy and reverse the picture by stressing that cognitive agents participate actively in the generation of meaning through their bodies and actions. Cognitive agents «make sense» of their environment by enacting the world. Hence, in the enactive view, the cognitive agent and the significant world in which the agent acts are to be seen as mutually co-constituting, since «sense-making» consists in the interaction between an adaptive autonomous system and its environment by which the environment takes on a significance or meaning for the system (Di Paolo, & Thompson, 2014). Enactivism also challenges another dominant trait of traditional cognitive science, namely its methodological individualism. Mainstream cognitive science takes the individual agent as a proper unit of analysis not only for understanding the mind, but also for understanding social phenomena. Enactivitsts, on the contrary, follow phenomenologists by calling attention to the interpersonal relational domain and stress that social interaction constitutes a proper level of analysis in itself. They argue that interactions are processes with a rich structure only apparent at the relational level of collective dynamics. The earliest proponents of the enactive approach to social understanding, Hanne De Jaegher and Ezequiel Di Paolo, have introduced the notion of «participatory sense-making» to characterize how social interaction opens up the possibility of sense-making processes being shared among interacting agents. They define participatory sense-making as «the coordination of intentional activity in interaction, whereby individual sense-making processes are affected and new domains of social sense-making can be generated that were not available to each individual on her own.» (De Jaegher, & Di Paolo, 2007, 497) From this view, it can be said that social beings act as interacting sense-makers, generating and transforming meaning together in and through interacting.4 Enactivists transpose the phenomenological insights concerning incorporation and mutual incorporation into the domain of empirical science and do not share the transcendental-philosophical claims of phenomenology. Nevertheless, their theories can be seen as enriching and complementing classical phenomenological analyses. Several contemporary theorists, such as Thomas Fuchs, Hanne De Jaegher or Shaun Gallagher, 4

I give a more detailed presentation of the enactive approach to social cognition elsewhere (Urban, 2015a).

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showed that the synthesis of phenomenological and enactive views of intersubjectivity provides an extremely fruitful basis for a criticism of the dominant ‘theory of mind’ approaches in the social cognition research. Most contemporary social psychologist and neuroscientists tend to reduce the meaningful engagement between subjects to cognitive inferences or simulations that a passive observer can make about mental states of other people based on their external behavior. Meanwhile, advocates of the enactivephenomenological approach conceive of mutual incorporation as the phenomenal basis of social cognition and highlight the interactional, perceptive, and embodied dimension of intersubjectivity. Instead of following this frequently discussed line of thought in contemporary phenomenology, however, I would like to focus on another possibility of developing the above-considered views of mutual incorporation and participatory sense-making. Giovanna Colombetti and Steve Torrance (2009) recently argued that the enactivephenomenological shift of attention from the individual to the interpersonal relational domain has profound repercussions for our understanding of emotions, values and ethics. Investigations of mutual incorporation and participatory sense-making teach us, among other things, that what each of us does in relation to another, if it is to be fully characterized, must be described in inter-individual relational terms. Colombetti and Torrance consequently argue that we must think of the ethical character of a given situation as, at least in part, emerging out of the inter-relations between the participants in the situation. Since different styles of interaction, with their varying affective overtones, make an ethical difference, the ethical qualities of interactions themselves have to be taken into account as an autonomous target of ethical appraisal (Colombetti, & Torrance, 2009). The important lesson to be taken from Torrance’s and Colombetti’s expansion of phenomenological and enactive views of intersubjectivity is that the inter-relational and inter-affective domain has to gain a more central place in our thinking about morality. In particular, their approach invites us to see the ethical content of a given situation as emerging as much from the relations and interactions of the participants as from the autonomous decision-making or original authorship of the subjects themselves. It suggests that we de-emphasize the traditional ethical notions of individual autonomy and deliberate activity of the individual rational subject. Moreover, such a relational approach

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to moral phenomena provides sound reasons for a criticism of dominant ethical theories, such as Kantian or Utilitarian ethics, for being too exclusively focused on the single agent. Viewed from the relational perspective developed on the basis of phenomenological and enactive insights, the major ethical theories seem to be lacking sufficient exploration of the moral salience of the participatory, collective dynamics of human relations and interactions as opposed to the ethical significance of individual actions and their aggregations (Colombetti, & Torrance, 2009; Urban, 2014; Urban, 2015b). CARE ETHICS AS A RELATIONAL MORAL THEORY As far as I know, a relational ethics of the type hinted aptly by Torrance and Colombetti has not been developed in the phenomenological tradition (cf. Sanders, & Wisnewski 2012). Nevertheless, such an ethics has been proposed and successfully elaborated in a rather different philosophical tradition, namely in feminist moral thought. Over the last three decades, a number of moral theorists, such as Sara Ruddick, Carol Gilligan, Nel Noddings, Virginia Held, Joan Tronto, and many others have argued that mainstream approaches in moral philosophy have focused too much on individuals while ignoring the moral significance of human relationships. They have also argued that the moral concepts developed by mainstream moral theories were ill suited for dealing with persons understood in relation to one another. Against the background of criticism, these ethicists have proposed a relational transformation of moral concepts and provided arguments explaining why persons are best understood in relational terms. The relational transformation of moral philosophy has inspired the development of care ethics, which has gradually evolved into an influential current of contemporary moral philosophy. Care ethics is rooted in a fundamentally relational view of human beings conceiving persons as mutually interconnected, vulnerable and interdependent beings. In contrast to the still dominant image of the autonomous rational individual, care ethicists typically visualize moral agents in terms of the relation between caregiver and cared for, in order to stress ethically significant aspects of human relationships, such as reciprocity, dependency or asymmetry. However, care ethics does not restrict itself to the realm of intimate relationships. On the contrary, it advocates abandoning the boundaries between traditionally separated domains of the private and the public and

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applies the relational ethical paradigm to agents, such as communities, nations or states. As a normative moral theory, care ethics conceives of care as a core value and paradigmatic practice. Care ethicists make the moral value of care explicit through reflection on the normative content of the universal human experience of caring for and being cared for. The characteristic stance of persons in genuine caring relations requires both mutual concern — attending to and meeting the needs of the particular other — and mutual respect to the otherness of the other. Hence, caring relationship cannot be conceived as neither altruistic nor egoistic in the traditional sense of the terms (Pettersen, 2011). Care ethicists emphasize that a genuine caring relation involves «the cooperative well-being of those in the relation and the well-being of the relation itself» (Held, 2006, 12). This means, among other things, that a genuine caring relationship can never be reduced to the individual projects, properties, and intentions of the agents involved in it. Instead it requires a mutuality that gives birth to the relational domain that could not have been achieved by individuals alone. At the same time, what produces and sustains the required mutuality are various practices of agents involved in the relationship, making the relative autonomy of individual agents a necessary part of the game: «To care well requires the recognition that care is relational: no judgment about whether care is good can be accomplished from a singular perspective, not that of caregivers or care receivers.» (Tronto, 2013, 140) A care-theoretical analysis of trust as a key aspect of caring relationships elucidates the fundamentally relational nature of care. Trust is a relation between persons, not a value achievable by persons in isolation. The value of trust cannot be divided into the value of the dispositions of the persons in the relation, or to the value of the relation to the individuals involved. […] For there to be trust between persons, such understanding must be mutual. (Held, 2006, 56 ff.)

Care ethicists also stress that trust often needs to be built and kept by ongoing practices of care. Trust is fragile and can be shattered in a single event. To rebuild it may take long stretches of time, or the rebuilding may be even impossible. It is striking how many similar points have been recently made on the basis of the enactivephenomenological analyses of attachment and trust. Fuchs and De Jaegher argue, with special regard to social interaction between infant and mother, that the emerging emotion of trust is typically undivided and distributed among the individual participants of the

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situation. Trust arises, as it were, from the «in-between» or from the over-arching process in which mother and her infant are immersed. Such distributed phenomena cannot be reduced to mere individual, private mental acts or properties. Of course the interaction process from which such distributed phenomena emerge may also involve breakdowns and mismatches. In this case reparation becomes a key process, since it conveys the experience that a miscommunication may end up in understanding again. Fuchs and De Jaegher emphasize that the repeated experience of successful repair will affect the infant’s trust in others and their bonding capacity (Fuchs, & De Jaegher, 2009). CONCLUSION This paper has shown that both advocates of phenomenological and enactive views of intersubjectivity and proponents of care ethics emphasize the importance of the relational and interactional domain. They rethink the concepts of the self and agency in ways enabling a novel reading of human relations in terms of the irreducibility of the relational domain. Both here and there, human beings are conceived as essentially embodied and embedded in multiple relational networks. Yet although the potential to a corroboration and mutual enlightenment between the two camps seems obvious, they have both developed separately thus far, with a general unawareness of one another.5 It seems plausible to conclude that the dynamics of care and mutual concern central to the ethics of care might be well analysed and further developed in terms of phenomenological and enactive views of intersubjectivity. Care ethics, on the other hand, might provide a well-elaborated framework for developing a phenomenological ethics ascribing a central place to the relational and interpersonal dimension of moral phenomena. Considering the possible directions of future research, it might be instructive to re-examine the relationship between phenomenology, ethics and feminism in the philosophy of Edith 5

There are exceptions worth mentioning here. For example, Maurice Hamington has rightly emphasized the importance of Merleau-Ponty’s thought for care theory (Hamington, 2004; Hamington, 2008). Hamington focuses particularly on Merleau-Ponty’s analyses of embodiment, habits and emphatic resonance. However, he says little about the relational and interpersonal domain at the heart of my present account. Sarah LaChance Adams recently offered another interesting view of the points of commonality between the two philosophical traditions in her remarkable book Mad Mothers, Bad Mothers and What a «Good» Mother Would Do (LaChance Adams, 2014).

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Stein (cf. Urban, 2015b, forthcoming). Another, more contemporary focus would be Anthony Steinbock’s recent phenomenological work on moral emotions (Steinbock, 2014). This work seems to provide a promising starting point for the desired dialogue between the phenomenological account of interpersonal phenomena, ethics and care theory. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work was supported by the Czech Science Foundation under the grant «Beyond Phenomenology of Sociality, GA16-23046S» realized at the Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences in Prague. R EFER ENCES Colombetti, G., & Torrance, S. (2009). Emotion and Ethics: An Inter-(en)active Approach. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 8 (4), 505-526. De Jaegher, H., & Di Paolo, E. A. (2007). Participatory Sense-Making: An Enactive Approach to Social Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6 (4), 485-507. Dreyfus, H. L. (2002). Intelligence without Representation – Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Mental Representation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1 (4), 367-383. Di Paolo, E., & Thompson, E. (2014). The Enactive Approach. In L. Shapiro (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition (68-78). London – New York, NY: Routledge. Fuchs, T. & De Jaegher, H. (2009). Enactive Intersubjectivity: Participatory Sensemaking and Mutual Incorporation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 8 (4), 465-486. Hamington, M. (2004). Embodied Care: Jane Addams, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Feminist Ethics. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press. Hamington, M. (2008). Resources for Feminist Care Ethics in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of the Body. In G. Weiss (Ed.), Intertwinings. Interdisciplinary Encounters with Merleau-Ponty (203-220). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

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Held, V. (2006). The Ethics of Care. Personal, Political, and Global. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Küpers, W. M. (2015). Phenomenology of the Embodied Organization. The Contribution of Merleau-Ponty for Organizational Studies and Practice. London: Palgrave Macmillan. LaChance Adams, S. (2014). Mad Mothers, Bad Mothers and What a “Good” Mother Would Do. Ethics of Ambivalence. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Leder, D. (1990). The Absent Body. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. Merleau-Ponty, M. (2012). Phenomenology of Perception. London – New York, NY: Routledge. Pettersen, T. (2011). The Ethics of Care: Normative Structures and Empirical Implications. Health Care Analysis, 19 (1), 51-64. Salice, A., & Schmid, H. B. (Eds.). (2016). The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality. History, Concepts, Problems. Cham: Springer. Sanders, M., & Wisnewski, J. J. (Eds.). (2012). Ethics and Phenomenology. Plymouth, MA: Lexington Books. Steinbock, A. J. (2014). Moral Emotions. Reclaiming the Evidence of the Heart. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Szanto, T., & Moran, D. (Eds.). (2016). Phenomenology of Sociality. Discovering the “We”. New York, NY: Routledge. Tronto, J. (2013). Caring Democracy. Markets, Equality, and Justice. New York, NY: New York University Press. Urban, P. (2014). Toward an Expansion of an Enactive Ethics with the Help of Care Ethics. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 71-73. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01354. Urban, P. (2015a). Enactivism and Care Ethics: Merging Perspectives. Filozofia, 70 (2), 119-129. Urban, P. (2015b). Enacting Care. Ethics and Social Welfare, 9 (2), 216-222. Urban, P. Edith Stein’s Phenomenology of Woman’s Personality and Value. (Herder Verlag, fall 2016). (Forthcoming). Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosh, E. (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

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HORIZON 5 (1) 2016 : I. Research : M. Khorkov : 183–193 ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ • STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY • STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE • ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES

doi: 10.18199/2226-5260-2016-5-1-183-193

PHÄNOMENOLOGIE AN DER GRENZE: ­Z UR GESCHICHTE DER REZEPTION UND VERMITTLUNG ­DER AXIOLOGIE MAX SCHELERS IN DEN WERKEN VON TADEUSZ H. CZEŻOWSKI (1889–1981) ­U ND LARISSA A. CHUHINA (1913–2002). EINE FORSCHUNGSNOTIZ MIKHAIL KHORKOV PhD, Associate Professor, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences, 109240 Moscow, Russia. E-mail: [email protected]

PHENOMENOLOGY AT THE BORDER: ON THE ­H ISTORY OF ­R ECEPTION AND MEDIATION OF MAX SCHELER’S AXIOLOGY IN THE WORKS OF TADEUSZ H. CZEŻOWSKI (1889–1981) AND LARISSA A. CHUHINA (1913–2002). A RESEARCH NOTE This article is written in the form of a brief research note and reports on the role and significance of the reception of Max Scheler’s phenomenological philosophy of values in the axiology of Polish philosopher Tadeusz H. Czeżowski (1889-1981) and in the works of his Russian student Larissa A. Chuhina (1913-2002), who played an important role in the studies in philosophical ideas of Max Scheler in Russia and Latvia during the Soviet period. Particular attention is paid to the fact that due to the influence of Czeżowski Chuhina interpreted Max Scheler not so much as one of the founders of philosophical anthropology, but primarily as proposer of the original phenomenological theory of values. The emphasis is also made on a significant modification which Max Scheler’s philosophy of values experienced in axiology of Czeżowski and Chuhina. Key words: Max Scheler, theory of values, phenomenology, axiology, Polish philosophy of the 20th century, Tadeusz H. Czeżowski, history of reception of phenomenological theories in Russia and Latvia, Larissa A. Chuhina.

© MIKHAIL KHORKOV, 2016

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ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЯ НА ГРАНИЦЕ: К ИСТОРИИ РЕЦЕПЦИИ И ОПОСРЕДОВАННОЙ РЕТРАНСЛЯЦИИ АКСИОЛОГИИ МАКСА ШЕЛЕРА В РАБОТАХ ТАДЕУША ИППОЛИТА ЧЕЖОВСКОГО (1889–1981) И ЛАРИСЫ А. ЧУХИНОЙ (1913–2002). ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКАЯ ЗАМЕТКА ХОРЬКОВ МИХАИЛ ЛЬВОВИЧ Кандидат философских наук, доцент, старший научный сотрудник, Институт философии РАН, 109240 Москва, Россия. E-mail: [email protected] Эта небольшая статья, написанная в форме краткой исследовательской заметки, сообщает о роли и значении рецепции феноменологической философии ценностей Макса Шелера в аксиологии польского философа Тадеуша Чежовского (1889–1981) и работах его русской ученицы Ларисы А. Чухиной (1913–2002), сыгравшей важную роль в изучении философских идей Макса Шелера в России и Латвии в советское время. Особое внимание уделяется тому, что благодаря влиянию Тадеуша Чежовского Л.А. Чухина стала интерпретировать Макса Шелера не столько как философского антрополога, но, прежде всего, как создателя оригинальной феноменологической теории ценностей. При этом акцент также делается на существенной модификации, которую испытала философия ценностей Макса Шелера в аксиологии как Тадеуша Чежовского, так и Л.А. Чухиной. Ключевые слова: Макс Шелер, теория ценностей, феноменология, аксиология, польская философия XX века, Тадеуш Чежовский, история рецепции феноменологических теорий в России и Латвии, Лариса Чухина.

Trotz wachsender Kenntnisse der gegenwärtigen Historiker der Philosophie über die große Bedeutung der Phänomenologie bei der Entwicklung der Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert in Mittel- und Osteuropa sowie für den Prozess ihrer Selbstidentifizierung auf nationaler und regionaler Ebene ist der Einfluss einzelner phänomenologischen Richtungen und Denker auf bestimmte Länder und Gruppen von Philosophen noch nicht allseitig geklärt. Wir wissen zwar, dass es neben der Husserlischen in vielfacher Verschränkung mit ihr auch andere phänomenologische Gedankenführungen rezipiert und präsent waren, aber es bedarf noch einer weiteren Prüfung, in wieweit sich bei den mittel- und osteuropäischen Philosophen Elemente verschiedener phänomenologischen Theorien und Ideen auswirkten. Diese Phänomene der Rezeption und Weiterentwicklung

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haben ihre eigenen Merkmale, die nicht nur durch die sehr häufigen Änderungen der Staatsgrenzen und Veränderungen von Ideologien und politischen Regime, sondern auch durch innere Logik der philosophischen Entwicklung sowohl auf lokaler und internationaler Ebene zum Leben gebracht wurden. Manchmal erschienen unter diesen Bedingungen seltsame Kreuzungen und Vermischungen der phänomenologischen und nicht-phänomenologischen Schulen und Ideen, die offensichtlich nicht in allen Fällen als oberflächliche Eklektizität charakterisiert werden müssen. Weiter in diesem Beitrag versuche ich näher zu zeigen, wie diese typischen Merkmale und lokale Besonderheiten sich im Fall einer wenig bekannten Rezeption der phänomenologischen Philosophie von Max Scheler gezeigt haben. Wenn wir — die berühmte Fragestellung Max Schelers in seinem Werk «Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos» (Scheler, 1976, 9) paraphrasierend («Fragt man einen gebildeten Europäer...») — einen philosophisch ausgebildeten Mittel- und Osteuropäer fragen, ob und — falls ja — was genau er über Max Scheler gehört hat, bekommen wir in den Fällen positiver Antworten eine vielfärbige Palette verschiedener Interpretationen, die einen guten Grund zu bezweifeln geben, dass man hier überhaupt über die gleiche Person und die gleiche Philosophie spricht. In einigen Ländern gilt er in erster Linie als Ethiker, in den anderen als ein philosophischer Anthropologe oder Wissenssoziologe. Einige halten ihn für einen Vertreter der katholischen Religionsphilosophie, für die anderen ist er ein Unterstützer des deutschen Kriegsnationalismus, oder des Pantheismus, oder Anhänger einer Philosophie der Geduld und des Pazifismus. Die gegenwärtige Rezeption Schelers, sehr oft an den Universitätsabteilungen der philosophischen Anthropologie oder Ethik von den anderen Philosophiegebieten isoliert, marginalisiert und didaktisch angepasst, stellt jedoch immer die Frage, ob und wie Philosophie im Allgemeinen und Phänomenologie im Besonderen ihr Interesse an diesen Philosoph zeigen müsste. In den 1920er Jahren war die Situation bemerkenswert anders, vor allem in Mittel- und Osteuropa. Beispielsweise zeigte das große Interesse an der Schelers phenomenologischen Werttheorie die sogenannte Lemberg-Warschauer Schule (die sie als «Axiologie» übersetzte und interpretierte). Zwar ist diese Schule in der allgemeinen Geschichte der Philosophie als solche mit Phänomenologie insgesamt gar nicht oder ganz wenig assoziiert (in der Regel, berücksichtigt werden nur einige Aspekte der

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Entstehung dieser beiden Schulen im Rahmen der österreichischen philosophischen Tradition), ist es jedoch wohl möglich, mit gutem Grund darüber zu sprechen, dass sie auch in den späteren Stadien ihrer Entwicklung von den einzelnen Strömungen der phänomenologischen Bewegung zu neuen Ansätzen inspiriert wurde. Vielleicht am klarsten kann man diese Tendenz beispielsweise in den Werken von Tadeusz H. Czeżowski (1889–1981) sehen. Dieser in Lemberg studierte und dann in Vilnius dozierte polnische Philosoph hat von Franz Brentano und Max Scheler die Idee übernommen, dass die ethischen Prinzipien und Werte in den Akten ihrer individuellen Realisierung apriorisch gegeben und darüber hinaus dem Bewusstsein evident sind, wenn auch nicht durch ein rationales logisches Denken als allgemeine Prinzipien aus den Gegebenheiten dieses Bewusstseins abgeleitet sein können: Fundamentem metodologii etyki naukowej jest koncepcja doświadczenia aksjologicznego. Terminy występujące w rozważaniach etycznych nie różnią się pod względem logicznym od terminów pozostałych nauk doświadczalnych, a struktura etyki ma być analogiczna do struktury teorii empirycznych. (Smolicka 2010, 77) Die Grundlage einer Methode der wissenschaftlichen Ethik ist Konzept der axiologischen Erfahrung. Die Begriffe erscheinen in ethischen Überlegungen nicht in Bezug auf die Logik der anderen experimentellen Wissenschaften, und die Struktur der Ethik ist keine Analogie zu der Struktur der Theorien der empirischen Wissenschaften.1

Während seiner Lehrtätigkeit an der Universität Vilnius (damals polnische Universität Wilna) in den 1920er und 1930er Jahren hat Czeżowski diese Idee mehrmals wiederholt zum Ausdruck gebracht, selbstverständlich auch im Bezug auf Scheler (Czeżowski, 1936; neu aufgelegt: Czeżowski, 1989, 115-116; Wachowiak, 1997; Torczyńska, 2013, 101). Leider kann die philosophische Tätigkeit Czeżowskis an der Universität Wilna während der Vorkriegszeit nur mit Hilfe seiner ganz wenigen in den regionalen und lokalen philosophischen Periodika veröffentlichten Artikeln beurteilt werden. Seine Handschriften und wissenschaftliche Archive gingen während des Zweiten Weltkriegs in einigen wesentlichen Teilen anscheinend verloren. Zumindest im Czeżowski-Nachlass, der heute an der Nikolaus-Kopernikus-Universität Toruń aufbewahrt ist, gibt es zwar zahlreiche Materialien (vor allem offizielle Dokumente und Briefe) aus der Vorkriegszeit, die Czeżowskis enorme Verwaltungstätigkeit an der Stefan-Batory-Universität in Vilnius  Aus dem Polnischen ins Deutsche übersetzt von Mikhail Khorkov.

1

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und seine Aktivität in den polnischen philosophischen Gesellschaften ausführlich dokumentieren, aber leider sehr wenig nennenswerte philosophische Manuskripte und Publikationen der 1920–1930er Jahre (Czeżowski, 1853-2012). Allerdings ist es immer noch möglich, auf der Grundlage von zeitgenössischen Berichten mit vollem Recht zu sagen, dass Czeżowski die grundlegenden Prinzipien seiner früheren Philosophie auch in den Nachkriegsjahren beibehalten hat, wenn er schon als Professor für Philosophie an der Nikolaus-Kopernikus-Universität in Toruń zu unterrichten begann. Dies wird klar und zweifellos durch die zahlreichen Veröffentlichungen seiner zweiten Lebenshälfte bestätigt (Czeżowski, 1946a, 1946b, 1946c, 1948, 1949, 1959, 1965, 1969, 1989). Die einzigartige Interferenz der phänomenologischen Axiologie Schelers und der logisch-gnoseologischen Prämissen und Methoden der Lemberg-Warschauer Schule in der Philosophie von Czeżowski, der allgemein zwar als kein Phänomenologe, sondern als Vertreter der Lember-Warschauer Schule gilt, aber gleichzeitig viel aus der Wertethik Schelers in seine eigene philosophische Axiologie übernommen haben sollte (Torczyńska, 2013, 101-102; Kovalchuk, 2014b, 12), hat Larissa A. Chuhina 2 (geb. Stowbunik, 19132002) tief beeinflusst, die in den 1930er Jahren als junge russisch-weißrussische Studentin an der Universität Wilna bei Czeżowski studierte (Kovalchuk, 2014a, 343; Kovalchuk, 2014b, 11). Unter ihren anderen philosophischen Lehrer waren auch Religions- und Kulturphilosoph Bogumił Jasinowski (1883–1969) und Henryk Elzenberg (1887–1967), der in Polen als einer der Gründer und Befürworter der Axiologie gilt (Kovalchuk, 2014a, 343-344; Kovalchuk, 2014b, 12). Trotz politischer und geschichtlicher Turbulenzen der Vorkriegs-, Kriegs- und Nachkriegszeit konnte L.A. Chuhina sein Interesse an Schelers Phänomenologie in ihren Promotions- und Habilitationsschriften (1967 Leningrad, 1984 Moskau) und in ihren sonstigen russischen (Chuhina, 1966, 1968, 1980, 1991, 1994, 1996a), englischen (Chuhina, 1993, 1996b) und lettischen (Chuhina, 1970, 1995) Publikationen sowie in ihrer Forschungs- und Lehrtätigkeit in Riga (Kovalchuk, 2014a, 346; Kovalchuk, 2014b, 15-16) weiterentwickeln. Dank der Aktivität von Schülern und Kollegen, vor allem von Frau Prof. Dr. Maija Kūle und Dr. Svetlana Kovalchuk,  Eine solche «formalisierte» Transkription ihres Namens verwendet man in der Regel in englischsprachigen

2

Publikationen und allgemeinen Bibliographien. Daher tritt er auch hierin auf, um die bibliographische Dissonanzen zu vermeiden. Aus Gründen der Phonetik scheint mir jedoch die Transkription Čuchina mehr korrekt zu sein.

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die zahlreiche Dokumente aus dem Nachlass der Philosophin publizierten und im Zusammenhang mit ihrem Jubiläum im Jahr 2013 eine Reihe von Veröffentlichungen gemacht haben (Kovalchuk, 2014a; Kovalchuk, 2014b), wird der Name von L.A. Chuhina und ihren Beitrag in die Entwicklung der Phänomenologie in Osteuropa nicht vergessen. Im Bezug auf die Scheler-Rezeption bei Chuhina muss man zunächst sagen, dass sie bei der Beschreibung der Schelers Axiologie immer ihre phänomenologischen Wurzeln ausdrücklich betonte (Chuhina, 1966; 1994, 380). In ihrem Nachwort zur russischen Übersetzung der ausgewählten Werke von Max Scheler (Chuhina, 1994) geht sie z.B. davon aus, dass die Werte und Wertphänomene bei Scheler immer mit Hilfe seiner phänomenologischen Methode untersucht wurden, die ihm erlaubte, diese Phänomene in ihrem konkreteren persönlichen Vollzug als der Welt eines Menschen zugehörige Aktwesenheiten zu verstehen (Chuhina, 1994, 380). Dieser Ansatz bietet einen Einblick in das Verständnis der phänomenologischen Grundlagen nicht nur Scheler’scher Wertlehre und Ethik, sondern auch seiner philosophischen Anthropologie, Wissenssoziologie, Religions- und Geschichtsphilosophie. Dabei nennt sie die Wertlehre Schelers — offensichtlich dem üblichen Begriff von Czeżowski (Czeżowski, 1936; Smolicka, 2010, 6, 8, 12, 14-16, 20, 23-24, 77, 88 ff.) nachfolgend — «Axiologie» (Chuhina, 1966; Chuhina, 1968; Kovalchuk, 2014a, 48). D.h. sie bezeichnet sie fast ausschließlich mit dem Wort, das in den Werken von Scheler kaum auftaucht. Der Interpretation von Czeżowski folgt Chuhina offensichtlich auch in dem Versuch, Schelers «Axiologie» als eine in erster Linie praktische, nicht theoretische philosophische Disziplin zu verstehen (Chuhina, 1994, 380381). Dieses Verständnis divergiert aber schon erheblich mit den theoretischen Zielen, die Scheler tatsächlich verfolgte, durch die Entwicklung seiner Werttheorie zu erreichen (Henckmann, 1998, 84, 115-125). Im Laufe der Zeit werden auch gewisse Unterschiede zwischen Chuhina und ihrem Lehrer Czeżowski sichtbar. Unter Beibehaltung der grundlegenden theoretischen Korrelationsstruktur zwischen der Welt der Werte und anderen Bereichen des Wissens und des Verhaltens, die in den Werken von Czeżowski vorgeschlagen und entwickelt wurde, beginnt sie in ihren Texten immer wichtigere Rolle der Kultur bei der Umsetzung von Werten zu unterstreichen (Chuhina, 1968; Kovalchuk, 2014a, 176). Besonders betont sie dabei die unersetzliche Rolle der humanistischen geistigen Kultur (Bildung, Religion, Philosophie, klassische Literatur und bildende Kunst). Das Einbeziehen des Menschen

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in die Sphäre der Werte erfolgt durch die Kultur und nur in der Kultur. Die Kultur ist hier also vielmehr als Umschlagstelle zwischen Werten und Einzelmenschen zu verstehen. In der weiteren Entwicklung dieses Themas kommt sie zum Schluss, dass die Personwelt (im Schelerschen Sinne) vom geistigen Leben als Kultur wertsetzend sei (Kovalchuk, 2014a, 49). Aber eine solche Interpretationsperspektive verletzt offensichtlich das Prinzip der Autonomie und Unmittelbarkeit der Werte, das Czeżowski konsequent verteidigte. Es ist schwierig, mit Sicherheit zu sagen, was genau eine solche Distanzierung L.A. Chuhinas von den ursprünglichen Prinzipien der Lemberg-Warschauer Schule beeinflusste (von einem philosophischen Standpunkt aus gesehen). Jedoch scheint mir höchstwahrscheinlich, dass es in diesem Fall über eine doppelte Wirkung auf die Philosophin sprechen muss: Erstens, es geht hier offensichtlich um Einfluss ihres anderen Lehrers Bogumił Jasinowski; zweitens, um Einfluss der Theorie der Wertträger von Max Scheler. Das heißt, dass es bei Chuhina auf jeden Fall schon um eine vermittelte Interpretation, man konnte sogar sagen, um eine schulbedingt vermittelte Interpretation geht, die immer von einem breiteren und den anderen Denkströmungen offenen Phänomenologie-Verständnis ausgeht. Das bedeutet aber nicht, dass die Grenzen der Phänomenologie bei konsequenter Durchführung dieser Interpretationsstrategie völlig verwischen. Im Gegenteil, diese Methode unterstreicht deren grundlegende Bedeutung für die Bewertung des philosophischen Gesamtprojektes von Scheler. Mit diesem methodischen Vertrauen ist in den Werken von L.A. Chuhina auch die konstanten Verweise auf die Tatsache verbunden, dass Scheler selbst in seiner typischen Art und Weise Phänomenologie regelmäßig grenzüberschreitend verwendete und damit neue philosophischen Richtungen eröffnete. Bemerkenswert dabei ist, dass sie in dieser kreativen Denkbeweglichkeit keinen Mangel, keine Schwäche und keinen Eklektizismus des deutschen Philosophen sieht. Damit nimmt Chuhina innerhalb der Rezeptionsgeschichte der Scheler’schen Phänomenologie in Russland und Lettland einen ganz besonderen Platz ein, soweit sie Scheler nicht nur als einen «philosophischen Anthropologen» (also, der gleichen Gruppe zusammen mit Helmuth Plessner, Arnold Gehlen und Michael Landmann zugehörigen Denker), sondern auch — und vor allem — als einen Phänomenologen, Erkenntnistheoretiker, Philosophen der Wertethik und der Religion interpretieren versuchte.

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Ich denke, dass dieses Beispiel der Max-Scheler-Rezeption, unabhängig davon, wie lokal es als eine philosophiehistorische Studie im Format einer case study scheinen mag, zeigt jedoch im Allgemeinen zwei ganz typische und wichtige Tendenzen der Gesamtentwicklung der Phänomenologie, die in Zentral- und Osteuropa klar nachvollziehbar sind. Erstens, es waren nicht immer die sogenannten «reinen» SchulPhänomenologen, und tatsächlich es mussten nicht immer sie sein, die Phänomenologie in den mittel- und osteuropäischen Ländern förderten und neue Generationen von Studierenden inspirierten, sich mit ihr zu beschäftigen. Ohne Berücksichtigung des philosophischen Engagements und der pädagogischen Anziehungskraft dieser Persönlichkeiten und ihrer Werke wäre die Geschichte der Phänomenologie in den einzelnen Ländern sowie in der gesamten Region nicht konsistent. Zweitens, Phänomenologie entwickelte sich in diesen Ländern nicht als eine national geprägte und national geschlossene Denkrichtung, sondern verstand sich immer als eine grenzüberschreitende und überregionale Bewegung. Man könnte sagen, sie war immer als ein internationales, politische und disziplinäre Grenze überwindendes Netzwerk philosophischer Kommunikation und aktueller Denkpraxis organisiert. Uns bleibt nur hoffen, dass sie sich auch weiterhin in dieser Gestalt entwickeln wird. R EFER ENCES Chuhina, L. A. (1966). Fenomenologicheskaya aksiologiya Maksa Schelera [Pheno­ menological Axiology of Max Scheler]. In A.G. Kharchev (Ed.), Problema tsennosti v filosofii [Value Problem in Philosophy] (181-193). Moscow – Leningrad: Nauka. (in Russian). Chuhina, L. A. (1968). Problema lichnosti v aksiologii Maksa Schelera [Problem of the Person in Max Scheler’s Axiology]. In Uchenyye Zapiski Tartusskogo Universiteta. Trudy po filosofii XI [Scientists Notes the University of Tartu. Works on Philosophy XI], (184-205). Tartu. (in Russian). Chuhina, L. A. (1970). Īstās un šķietamās vērtības [Real and Apparent Values]. Rīga: Liesma [Riga: Flame Publishing House]. (in Latvian). Chuhina, L. A. (1980). Chelovek i yego tsennostnyy mir v religioznoy filosofii. Kriticheskiy ocherk [Human Being and the World of Values in Religious Philosophy: A Critical

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Essay]. Rīga: Zinātne [Riga: Science Publishing House]. (in Russian). Chuhina, L. A. (1991). Chelovek i yego tsennostnyy mir v religioznoy filosofii. Kriticheskiy ocherk [Human Being and the World of Values in Religious Philosophy: A Critical Essay]. 2nd ed. Rīga: Zinātne [Riga: Science Publishing House]. (in Russian). Chuhina, L. A. (1993). Emotional a Priori and Moral-Metaphysical Meanings of Max Scheler’s Phenomenology. In A.-T. Tymieniecka (Ed.), Analecta Husserliana XXXIX. Reason, Life, Culture. Part 1: Phenomenology in the Baltics (87–105). Dordrecht – Boston, MA – London: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Chuhina, L. A. (1994). Chelovek i yego tsennostnyy mir v fenomenologicheskoy aksiologii Maksa Schelera [Human Being and the World of Values in Phenomenological Axiology of Max Scheler]. In Scheler, M. Izbrannyje proizvedeniya [Selected Works] (379–398). Moscow: Gnosis. (in Russian). Chuhina, L. A. (1995). Makss Šēlers par garīgo un tikumisko vērtību pagrimumu mūsdienu pasaulē [Max Scheler on Decline of Spiritual and Moral Values in the Contemporary World]. In Mūžīgais un laicīgais [The Eternal and the Secular] (110-121). Lielvārde: Lielvārds, LZA Filozofijas un socioloģijas institūts [Lielvarde: Lielvards, Latvian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology]. (in Latvian). Chuhina, L. A. (1996a). Chelovek v religioznoy filosofii [Human Being in Religious Philosophy]. Rīga: Zvaigzne ABC [Riga: Star ABC Publishing House]. (in Russian). Chuhina, L. A. (1996b). Critique of the Ethos of Modern Civilization in Max Scheler’s Phenomenological Axiology. Phenomenological Inquiry, 20, 55-67. Czeżowski, T.H. (1853-2012). Spis zespołu (zbioru) akt Spucizna Tadeusza Czeżowskiego, Nr zespołu 80 [Inventory of the Archive Fund of Tadeusz Czeżowski]. In Archiwum Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika [Archive of the University of Nicolaus Copernicus], 309, 1-60. (in Polish). Czeżowski, T. H. (1936). O przedmiocie aksjologii [On the Subject of Axiology]. Przegląd Filozoficzny [Philosophical Review], 39 (2), 465-466. (in Polish). Czeżowski, T. H. (1946a). Główne zasady nauk filozoficznych [Main Principles of Philosophical Sciences]. Toruń: Księgarnia Naukowa T. Szczęsny i S-ka [Toruń: Scientific Bookstore T. Szczęsny and Co.]. (in Polish). Czeżowski, T. H. (1946b). O naukach humanistycznych [On Humanities]. Toruń:

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Księgarnia Naukowa T. Szczęsny i S-ka [Toruń: Scientific Bookstore T. Szczęsny and Co.]. (in Polish). Czeżowski, T. H. (1946c). O uniwersytecie i studiach uniwersyteckich [On the University and the Studies at the University]. Toruń: Księgarnia Naukowa T. Szczęsny i S-ka [Toruń: Scientific Bookstore T. Szczęsny and Co.]. (in Polish). Czeżowski, T.H. (1948). O metafizyce, jej kierunkach i zagadnieniach [On Metaphysics, Its Trends and Issues]. Toruń: Księgarnia Naukowa T. Szczęsny i S-ka [Toruń: Scientific Bookstore T. Szczęsny and Co.]. (in Polish). Czeżowski, T. H. (1949). Logika: podrecznik dla studiujacych nauki filozoficzne [Logic: Manual for Students in Philosophical Sciences]. Warszawa: Państwowe Zakłady Wydawnictw Szkolnych [Warsaw: State Institutes of Educational Publishing Houses]. (in Polish). Czeżowski, T. H. (1959). Główne zasady nauk filozoficznych [Main Principles of Philosophical Sciences]. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy [Wroclaw: National Institute]. (in Polish). Czeżowski, T. H. (1965). Filozofia na rozdrozu: analizy metodologiczne [Philosophy at the Crossroads: A Methodological Analysis]. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe [Warsaw: State Scientific Publishing House]. (in Polish). Czeżowski, T. H. (1969). Odczyty filozoficzne. Wydanie drugie poprawione i rozszerzone [Philosophical Readings. Second Edition, Revised and Expanded]. Poznań: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe [Poznań: State Scientific Publishing House]. (in Polish). Czeżowski, T. H. (1989). Pisma z etyki i teorii wartosci [Writings of Ethics and Theory of Value]. Wrocław: Ossolineum. (in Polish). Henckmann, W. (1998). Max Scheler. München: Beck. Kovalchuk, S. (Ed.). (2014a). Intelektuālās identitātes un vērtības. Filosofei Larisai Čuhinai – 100 [Intellectual Identities and Values. Philosopher Larissa Chuhina – 100]. Rīga: LU Filozofijas un socioloģijas institūts [Riga: Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Latvian University]. (in Latvian). Kovalchuk, S. (2014b). Russkiye filosofy v Latvii: K stoletiyu so dnya rozhdeniya Larisy Chuhinoy [Russian Philosophers in Latvia: The Centenary of the Birth of Larissa Chuhina]. In S. Mazur (Ed.), Russkiy Mir i Latviya: Gorod. Kulturnaya stolitsa.

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Almanah obtschestva Seminarium Hortus Humanitatis [Russian World and Latvia: City. Capital of Culture. Almanac of the Society Seminarium Hortus Humanitatis]: Vol. 35, 9-18. Riga: Seminarium Hortus Humanitatis. (in Russian). Smolicka, A. (2010). Świat wartości w ujęciu Tadeusza Czeżowskiego i Henryka Elzenberga. Studium porównawcze [World of Values in the Understanding of Tadeusz Czeżowski and Henryk Elzenberg. A Comparative Study] (Unpublished doctoral thesis). Katowice: Uniwersytet Śląski, Wydział Nauk Społecznych [Katowice: University of Silesia, Faculty of Social Sciences]. (in Polish). Scheler, M. (1976). Späte Schriften (GW 9). Bern – München: Francke. Torczyńska, M. (2013). Wartość, dobro, szczęście w koncepcji Tadeusza Czeżowskiego. Konteksty współczesne [Value, Good, Happiness in the Conception of Tadeusz Czeżowski. Contemporary Contexts]. Kultura i Wartości [Culture and Values], 4 (8), 91-106. (in Polish). Wachowiak, A. (1997). Koncepcja oceny etycznej Tadeusza Czeżowskiego [The Concept of Ethical Evaluation of Tadeusz Czeżowski]. Toruński Przegląd Filozoficzny [Toruń Philosophical Review], 1, 133–152. (in Polish).

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HORIZON 5 (1) 2016 : I. Research : V. Grahovac : 194–213 ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ • STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY • STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE • ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES

doi: 10.18199/2226-5260-2016-5-1-194-213

THE PERSISTENCE OF SELF-ENCLOSURE IN THE WHOLEPART RELATIONSHIP: THE CASE OF HUSSERL AND KRACAUER VEDRAN GRAHOVAC PhD Candidate, University of Guelph, Philosophy Department, ON N1G 2W1 Guelph, Canada.  E-mail: [email protected] In this text I suggest the possibility of the strategic-philosophical closeness between Husserl and Kracauer, by closely reading Husserl’s Third Logical Investigation and Kracauer’s essay «The Mass Ornament». Although the both thinkers come from the traditionally different and often mutually opposing philosophical schools, neither of them simply dismisses or crosses out the position they criticize. To the contrary, I propose that both thinkers exaggerate the seeming self-evidentiality of the phenomenon they analyze. In the Third Logical Investigation Husserl rearticulates the whole-part relation as it is conceived within the formal ontology and psychologistic logic. The connection between parts is available to us only as the relational tension, which is «accumulated» in the mutuality between the irreparably self-enclosed parts. Fusion is therefore a modification in the unfolding of the relation between parts, where every «term in relation» conditions another one through its own positional completion, while being conditioned by another term. The phenomenological analysis, which is conducted through the intensification of the fixity of the above-mentioned poles, is «measured» by the inability of these poles to be self-evidentially isolated and subsequently reconciled. In the second part of my essay I pay attention to Kracauer’s suggestion that the vitality of the mass ornament is reflected in the contextual insignificance of its parts. Kracauer addresses the problem of mass depersonalization through the close and sarcastic inspection of the role of abstract rationality in the capitalist mode of production. This close inspection adopts the strategy of exaggeration, where the critical distance must not be considered beyond its ability to disclose the selfobscuring apparatus of the mass performances and spectacles. This disclosure, as Kracuaer suggests, must therapeutically lead through the center of the mass ornament, and not away from it. Key words: Husserl, Kracauer, wholes and parts, Logical Investigations, phenomenology, Critical Theory, phenomenological analysis.

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ПОСТОЯНСТВО САМО-ВЛОЖЕНИЯ В ОТНОШЕНИЯХ ЦЕЛОГО И ЧАСТИ: СЛУЧАЙ ГУССЕРЛЯ И КРАКАУЭРА ВЕДРАН ГРАХОВАЧ PhD, Департамент философии университета Гуэльфа, ON N1G 2W1 Гуэльф, Канада. E-mail: [email protected] В этом тексте я рассматриваю возможность стратегическо-философской близости между Гуссерлем и Кракауэром, основываясь на прочтении Третьего Логического исследования Гуссерля и эссе Кракауэра «Массовое украшение». Несмотря на то, что мыслители относятся к традиционно разным и как правило, оппонирующим друг другу философским школам, ни один из них не отклоняет и не отбрасывает критикуемые тезисы оппонентов просто так. Более того, я полагаю, что оба мыслителя преувеличили кажущуюся само-очевидность анализируемого явления. В Третьем Логическом исследовании Гуссерль вновь актуализирует проблему отношения целого и части в том виде как это понималось в пределах формальной онтологии и психологистической логики. Связь между частями доступна нам только как относительная напряженность, которая «накоплена» в силу взаимосвязи между безнадежно само-замкнутыми частями. Поэтому сплав — это модификация в разворачивании отношения между частями, где каждый «термин в отношении» условия наличия другого термина тем самым обусловлен другим термином посредством его собственной позиционной зависимости. Феноменологический анализ, который проводится посредством усиления неподвижности вышеупомянутых полюсов, «характеризуется» неспособностью этих полюсов быть самоочевидным образом изолированными и впоследствии согласованными. Во второй части моего эссе я обращаю внимание на предположение Кракауэра, согласно которому живучесть массового украшения отражена в контекстуальной незначительности его частей. Кракауэр предлагает решать проблему массовой деперсонализации путём строгого и саркастического контроля за ролью абстрактной рациональности в капиталистическом способе производства. Эта строгая инспекция принимает вид стратегии преувеличения, где критическая дистанция не должна рассматриваться вне ее способности раскрывать аппарат само-сокрытия массовых действий и спектаклей. Это раскрытие и разоблачение, как предполагает Кракауэр, должно терапевтически воздействовать на ядро массового украшения, и не удаляться от него. Ключевые слова: Гуссерль, Кракауэр, целое и части, Логические исследования, феноменология, критическая теория, феноменологический анализ.

INTRODUCTION The majority of the analyses done on the relationship between phenomenology and Critical Theory are mostly centered around the work of Heidegger and Adorno. Adorno in Negative Dialectics relentlessly challenges Heidegger’s philosophy of the call of Being and suggests that, despite Heidegger’s resistance to the propositional thinking, the notion

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of Being becomes the new totality, a non-essential essence, «an unknown quantity», which is «nothing but the pathos of its invocation» (Adorno, 1996, 98). Heidegger’s criticism of the European metaphysics becomes the new practice of the exclusionary thinking, according to Adorno, where Heidegger «seeks to hold on to that which points beyond itself, and to leave behind, as rubble, that beyond which it points.» (Adorno, 1996, 102) Heidegger, however, remained mostly without the significant philosophical response to the Critical Theory, and, according to Fred Dallmayr, apparently confessed of the complete ignorance of Adorno’s work (Dallmayr, 1991, 45). However, if we focus on the reflections upon propositional thinking, identity principle, language and the Enlightenment project, it is hard not to notice the important strategic overlapping between these thinkers. Heidegger, in reflecting upon the Parmenides’ insight into the sameness of thinking and being, suggests that the copula «is» in the proposition «A is A» should not be exclusively seen as a nexus or connexio, which merely connects the terms in relation. Heidegger observes that the connection between man and Being should be thematized as «the belonging together», where the representing of the belonging cannot be achieved «in terms of the unity of the together, but rather of experiencing this together in terms of belonging» (Heidegger, 2002, 29). For Heidegger, this mutual belongigness between thinking and being can ony be secured through the unity in the rift, where the proposition A=A expresses that the fixity of one term in relation is possible through the persistence of the other term in its own status of the correlated instance. Adorno, true, criticizes Heidegger for the ontological prioritizing of the above-mentioned belonging within the glorification of the concept of Being and concludes that Heidegger still ontologically separates the copula from the terms it connects. For Adorno, the copula is is «fulfilled only in the relation between subject and predicate» (Adorno, 1996, 101), whereas in Heidegger the ontological peculiarity of the belongigness overarches the specificity of the terms whose belongigness it is ought to reflect under the call of Being. However, if we follow Adorno’s thinking on the significance of the copula, we notice the unavoidable simmilarity between his and Heidegger’s re-articulation of the identity principle. For Adorno, the reconciliation avoids to become «philosophical imperialism of annexing the alien» only if that which is alien «in the proximity it is granted, remains what is distant and different, beyond the heterogeneus and beyond that which is one’s own» (Adorno, 1996, 191). The necessity of the conceptual transformation of the terms

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in the identity relation through their self-enclosure distinguishes the approaches of both authors. Dallmayr suggests, in quoting Mörchen, that the commonality between Heidegger and Adorno should not be misconstrued as a «unity of results», but it should be recognized «less in similar results or opinions than in underlying or motivating experiences» (Dallmayr, 1991, 46). In this essay, I intend to emphasize the commonality not only in the «the possible motivating experiences», but also in the execution of the philosophical strategies in Husserl and Kracuaer. My proposal is that, precisely because of the lack of the conceptual pathos which burdens both the call of Being and the negative dialectics, both Kracauer and Husserl are able to transform what they critically address by «clinging to it»,1 or by moving within the body of the concepts they criticize, so to speak. The seeming «methodological modesty» of Husserl and Kracauer is reflected in their strategy of exaggeration, which problematizes the fixed security of the critical distance. Husserl’s disinterestedness in the questions of «fundamental ontology» and Kracauer’s persistance in the feuilletonistic writing style makes possible for both of these authors not only to avoid to place the object on the orphaned throne of the subject,2 but also to demonstrate how the subject-object hierarchy, to borrow a phrase from Adorno, is, in fact, being abolished.3 In this text I provide a close reading of Husserl’s analysis of the whole-part relationship in the Third Investigation and relate it to Kracauer’s account of Ratio in

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This expression is used by Gerhard Funke in Phenomenology: Metaphysics or Method. This expression is part of the following observation by Funke: «Philosophy is , then, not dogmatic, but critical; it does not preach or proclaim, but clings to what is given in order to understand it in terms of its presuppositions: it thereby dissolves calm satisfaction with what is present on hand and becomes a permanent unrest in research into grounds.» (Funke, 1987, 8) 2 «But it is not the purpose of critical thought to place the object on the orphaned trhone once occupied by the subject. On that throne the object would be nothing but an idol. The purpose of critical thought is to abolish the hierarchy.» (Adorno, 1996, 181) 3 This demonstration essentially reflects nothing but the permanent labour of philosophy, which, as Funke suggests, consists in taking the naturalistic matter-of-courseness as its own «point of departure for reiterative reflections on the conditions of its own possibility» (Funke, 1987, 14). Funke observes the following: «The accepted stock of knowledge of “confidentially advancing” sciences is no less problematic than experiences from history. It is proclaimed, defended, absolutized in open or secret metaphysics. That is why new ideas as to what philosophy itself is and how, according to its essence, it should be defined arise again and again, and are taken for granted in each case — only to be stripped of their claim to absolute validity from a higher level of consciousness and reduced to the conditions for their formulation.» (Funke, 1987, 14)

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«The Mass Ornament». Both Husserl and Kracauer target a concept of union, where the parts are collected under the banner of the higher categorial entity. Both authors move within the inherent limitations, which underlie the self-evidentiality of the concepts employed in the formal ontology (Husserl) and in the principle of the abstraction in the capitalist mode of production (Kracauer). The intensification of the fixity of the parts of the whole (Husserl) and the parts of the bodies of the dancers in the mass ornament (Kracauer), is proportional to the inability of these poles to be self-evidentially isolated and subsequently reconciled through the process of their unification. Husserl is decisive that the whole cannot be a simple collection or a hierarchical combination of its parts. The unity of related terms is expressed through the changes in the way in which parts relate to each other through their mutual participation in the definition of their essences. The character of the unifying power is determined through the change of the role of a part in its relation to its complement. The connection between parts is available to us only as the relational tension, which is «accumulated» in the mutuality between the self-enclosed parts. Fusion is therefore a modification in the unfolding of the relation between parts, where every «term in relation» conditions another one through its own completion, while being conditioned by another term. Kracauer suggests that the participation of the masses in the mass ornament is proportional to their contextual irrelevance. The unity and its parts in the mass ornament are isolated moments, whose relation through the abstraction obscures their own specificity. As much as parts are merely collectible magnitudes for the unity, so too, their union is exclusively an ordering capacity, which secures its isolation from the context of the relation of its parts. The full capacity of the human being who participates in the mass ornament as its mere part never comes to the fore, because her corporeity is abstractly emphasized, so it can be utilized within the «liveliness» of the mass ornament. The humanness of the Tiller Girls dancers is important in its physical concreteness, in the uniqueness of the body of each particular dancer, as long as the dancers sustain the abstraction of the dancing formation. Paradoxically, the more it becomes apparent that, despite the general pattern of the movement of the figure, the dancers move within the «confines» and the capacities of their own body qualities, the stronger will be the submission of their uniqueness to the successful establishment of the mass ornament. Kracauer calls this self-perpetuating unity Ratio, where both the organic aspect of the

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human beings and its abstract ordering are equally deprived of their full capacity. The formal ontological self-evidentiality and the logical psychologistic selfassurance4 culminates in the mere compulsion of inner evidentiality (the mental confirmation of the logical laws) and it calls for the intervention of the pure science of logic. The ideal science of logic, however, deliberately shapes itself as an ironical inversion of the psychologistic justificatory cynicism. This means that the psychologistic thinkers openly take pride in the self-evidentiality of the inner or inward confirmation of the logical operations. Husserl, to the contrary, confronts this cynicism by making explicit that its justification rests on the constancy of its self-reiterating. Similarly, Kracauer’s method consists in the  overemphasis of the seeming completion of the unification within the figure of the mass ornament. Kracauer, however, does not assume the safe critical distance from the phenomenon he observes, before he critically addresses it. To the contrary, he illuminates the conceptual self-betrayal of the mass ornament by overemphasizing the inherent reiteration in the justification of its seeming compositional success. 1. HUSSERL’S INVESTIGATION OF FOUNDATIONALISM IN THE THIRD LOGICAL INVESTIGATION As pointed above, the psychologistic certainty in the mental grounding of logical laws secures its authority through the unacknowledged calling upon its own persistence. The circle of the self-confirmation of Husserl’s ideal laws of logic, to the contrary, results in the deliberate and openly acknowledged self-intensification of these laws. However, the 4

An excellent analysis of Husserl’s complex relationship with psychologism, which is beyond either mere indeptedness or rejection is provided by Peter Andras Varga in the article, «Psychology as Positive Herritage of Husserl’s Phenomenological Philosophy» in Studia Pheanomenologica X (Varga, 2010, 101-127). Varga pays special attention to Husserl’s thematizing of Lotze’s notion of self-assurance of reason (Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft). Lotze tackles the vicious circle in skepticism where «the justification of our knowledge presupposes the knowledge itself» (Varga, 2010, 111), by resorting to the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft. Varga suggests that Husserl in the early writings on epistemology challenges the psychologistic position about the inner evidentiality which is built into the seeming obviousness of the mental confirmation that accompanies the logical operations, by recalling the notion of the self-assurance of reason as well. Varga acknowledges the differences between these thinkers in their understanding of circularity, but he nevertheless states that Lotze’s similarity with Husserl occurs either in the reaction against skepticism (Lotze) or in the insistence on the peculiar epistemological status of the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft (Nelson).

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final aim of this «eccentricity» is not to secure the new theoretical purity, by excluding the psychologistic concept of inner evidentiality. To the contrary, the pure science of logic is possible as a «theory» of logic only through the constant inspection of the core arguments raised in the justification of the psychologistic notion of inner evidence.5 Husserl avoids the isolation of the «terms in relation» and their reconciliation through the unifying mediator, by insisting on the persistent self-enclosure of the founding-founded poles. The phenomenological-analytic force, which is released through the exaggeration of the parts in relation, challenges the self-evidentiality of the polarity: isolation-reconciliation. Husserl deliberately contrasts the notion of the unity as a «categorial predicate» with the unity as reality, in order to avoid the formalontological characterization of the whole-part relation in the Third Investigation. The «collective moment» exists only as the peculiar mutual positioning of the constitutive parts to which it refers. In the following sets of reflections, Husserl counters a concept of collection with a «mutual foundation», and a unifying decision with the stroke of peculiarly intimate fusion: This depends on the peculiarly intimate fusion of the different «moments» of the concretum, their mutual «penetration», which reveals itself in a mutual dependence as regard change and destruction. This fusion is not a fading into one another in the manner of the continuous, nor does it remove all separateness, but it is nonetheless a sort of peculiarly intimate mutual interconnection which must at a stroke set the whole complex of interpenetrating moments in relief, if only once a single discontinuous moment has provided the right conditions. […] The only true unifying factors, we may roundly say, are relations of «foundation». (Husserl, 2001b, 16, 36-37, italics added)

The engagement of the terms «stroke» and «the peculiar intimate interconnection» suggests that the notion of unity unfolds as the mirroring of the specific context within which the parts are mutually self-encircled. Husserl observes, in clarifying the peculiarity of the whole-part relationship, that the whole is not just «a peculiar part, a «moment of unity» that binds them [parts] together» (Husserl, 2001b, 37). He sarcastically remarks that if the whole is conceived as a binding power or capacity, then the parts of this whole,

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The ability of truth to «retain its ideal being», is preceded by its inability to be psycho-physically realized (Husserl, 2001, 86-87). The psychologistic need for the ultimate realization of truth, through its justificatory completion, opens up the space for the purity of the ideal law «to step in». This law, precisely because it is not psycho-physically or formally-ontologically realizable, remains, in its ideally lawful purity, what it is in itself.

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as absolutely isolated, simply exist in it as mutually indifferent and are «given in space» (Husserl, 2001b, 36). The moments of the whole, to the contrary, «require no chains and bonds to chain or knit them together, or to bring them to one another». Furthermore, «all these expressions have in fact no sense at all. Where it makes nonsense to speak of isolation, the problem of overcoming such isolation is likewise nonsensical.» (Husserl, 2001b, 36; italics added) The «fusion» is completed once it is clear that the «relief achieved by the whole concretum has priority over the relief of the mutually separated moments of its content» (Husserl, 2001b, 20). The peculiarity of the unity is always achieved and demonstrated through the notion of a whole «in respect of […] [its] founding members». Only the specific mode of the mutual self-achievement of the parts in relation necessitates the whole as a setting-in-relief: The notion of what is non-independent, with its indirectly, generally characterized definitory lawfulness, points to many factually determined variable laws of essence. It is not a peculiarity of certain sorts of parts that they should only be parts in general, while it remains quite indifferent what they are conglomerated with, and into what sorts of connection they are fitted. […] The concept of non-independence accordingly amounts to that of ideal lawfulness in unified combinations. If a part stands in an ideally law-bound and not merely factual combination, it must lack independence; since such a law-bound combination merely means that a part whose pure essence is of one sort, can exist lawfully only in association with certain other parts of these or those suitable sorts. (Husserl, 2001b, 18, some italics added)

The ideally-lawful peculiarity of the parts of the whole is not reflected in the simple fact that they are isolated magnitudes. The mutual foundation of the parts is exhibited within the context of the «sorts of the connection they are fitted». Husserl insists here that the specific mode in which one part is connected to its complement in unity re-articulates the essential characteristic of this part, in addition to defining the whole to which this part belong. The essentiality of the part, as it is determined by its Genus, achieves full clarity only within the context of the connection it participates in. Furthermore, the part of the whole participates in its Genus only through its complementarity with the part, with which it is mutually crystalized in its ideal essence. Husserl even explicitly states that we cannot observe the changes in the Genera of Quality and Extension, when we analyze them in their «mutual inseparability» (Husserl, 2001b, 9), as in the case of the non-independence of the color and extension in the moment of the colored shape. Hussserl insists that the relation between Quality and Extension is not used for the

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illustration of their formal-ontological definition, but he proposes that, to the contrary, «we shall rather make use of them to define inseparability or non-independence, or contrariwise, separability or independence.» (Husserl, 2001b, 9) Husserl entirely dismisses the concept of the mutual permeation of the parts within the pecularity of their relation in the whole. Furthermore, it is not only that the Extension and Quality do not impact or transform each other, but they achieve distinctive characteristics only within the context of their specific relation. The formal-categorial specifity of the independent part, its belongingness to certain Genera, becomes ideally-phenomenologically rearticulated in the context of its belongingness to the whole of which this part is independent. Husserl avoids insights such as Stumpf’s, according to which the changes in Quality cannot be isolated from the changes in Quantity, once they are analytically treated in their unity (Husserl, 2001b, 8). Although Stumpf implicitly opens up the possibility where the Genera Quality and Quantity cannot be treated outside of their mutuality in the unity, he still suggests that the relationship between Quality, Quantity and their unity is rooted in the «prior» admittance of their separate formal-ontological profile. True, Stumpf proposes that Quality and Quantity cannot be treated anymore in their independence, but he does not explore the possibility where their unification lies beyond their presumed isolation and the subsequent reconciliation. Although Husserl explicitly states that the essences of the Sense Quality and the Extension in a general fashion fix the «law governed inherence that a non-independent «moment» may have to a whole» (Husserl, 2001b, 18). he nevertheless insists that each of these categories is contained «in its own manner in the essential unity of visual sensation» (Husserl, 2001b, 18). He suggests that we cannot clarify what this manner is, but only emphasize that the ability of the «generic feature of being a sensory “moment”» to yield «the specific feature of being a sensory quality», cannot be further explained without the inclusion of the concept of quality. The part is ideally bound to another part not through the factual combination, but through the mereness of the manner in which «a part whose pure essence is of one sort, can exist lawfully only in association with certain other parts of these or those suitable sorts.» (Husserl, 2001b, 18) Proportionally to the fact that the mutual foundation between two non-independent parts «points backward» to the essential character of the Genera to which each of these parts belong, the fixed categorial position of these parts «points forward» to the peculiarity of the «essential

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unity» of the related parts. Husserl’s analysis extends beyond the reconciliatory dialectical solution to the relation of the prior isolated moments in the relationship. I call this strategy the sharpening of the moments of relation, where their unity is manifestation of the phenomenologically isolated tension between them. This tension is the reflection of the mutual self-encircling of the related parts, where their definition as parts of the whole illuminates the fixity of their initial categorial profile. Furthermore, the part’s participation in the essence of its Genus is fully articulated only though the persistence of the complementary part of the whole in its participation in the essence of its own Genus. We can, for example, observe the role of the white color in the petunia flower, which swings on the summer breeze, while it contributes, with the variety of its movements and shades, to the overall diversity of the colors and the shapes in the bouquet. If we focus on the relationship between the white color and the shape of the flower, we observe that the participation of the whiteness (of the petal) in the Genus of the white color is unbreakably bound to the way in which the petal bends. We immediately conclude that the petal is the whitest in the segment that bends most sharply, and that the edges of the petal which bend inward exemplify the white color in its purest form. The shape of the parts of the petal, which are remote from the center of the flower, tend to manifest a straight surface, which is accompanied with the decrease in its whiteness. The increase in the mutual proximity of the parts, e.g. the obviousness of the «fusion» between the bending and the coloration of the petal, evokes the purity of their Generic essences and demonstrates that their relation of unity is neither a combination, collection nor a mutual permeation between them. The «closer» the parts seem to each other, the greater is the distinction between them with regards to their essential profiles and vice versa; the further they are from each other by the generality of their definition, the stronger is their bond within the specificity of the manner in which they belong to the whole. The increase in the «height» of parts universal essentiality is proportional to the decrease in the «length» of the distance between them within the specificity of their union. The focus of the «horizontal» investigations of the agreements, disagreements or the blurring of the distinctions between the parts of the whole is replaced by an emphasis on the increase or the decrease in the intensity of the participation of the parts in their essence within the context of the union to which they belong. Husserl importantly observes that the mutual necessitation of the increase of the

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related parts in their belongingness to their essences is visible not only through their association but also through their exclusion. He remarks that two different colors are mutually founded through their exclusion if they cover «an identical piece of surface», which they «cannot do so completely» (Husserl, 2001b, 18). He further suggests that «to each essential, law-bound exclusion of a determinate characterization, there corresponds a positive law-bound requirement of a corresponding characterization and vice versa.» (Husserl, 2001b, 18) We witness here that the «movement» across the (vertical) ladder of the parts’ participation in their essences, is reflected in the persistent «fixity» or the inactivity of the parts in their (horizontal) encounter. The mutual inactivity, which illustrates the essential impermeableness of the parts of the whole, is reflected in the inability of the parts to enter into relation (whether of the mutual inclusion or of the exclusion) by affecting their mutual transformation. Their mutual inability to effect the changes in each other on the «horizontal level» is best illustrated by the concept of their mutual self-encircling, where the increase in their «vertical movement» is proportional to the rigidifying of the fixity of their positions or roles in the whole to which they belong. We can conclude that the white color in the petal, in fact, bends because it demonstrates the pure whiteness only if it is complemented with the bended shape of the petal. The purity of the shape of the bended petal is necessarily accompanied with the lack of any shade in the white color, and conversely, the remoteness of the purity of white is fully illuminated through the straightening (or bending inward) of the shape of the petal. However, Husserl emphasizes that as much as the changes in the «vertical ladder» of the essences of related parts describe their relation, so too the participation of the parts in their essences cannot be disentangled from the peculiarity of the context of their relation. This observation most directly avoids the prioritization of either the fusion without the consideration of its parts or of the analysis of the parts in their essences, outside of the context of their relation. Husserl performs the fundamental inversion of the concepts of movement and contact, at least in the way these concepts were framed by the traditional interpretation of the parts in relation and their whole. The «movements» or the activities of the parts in relation, their mutual intentionality and the categorial fixity of their whole is inverted in the phenomenological analysis. Husserl’s persistent sharpening of the terms in relation with regards to their profile in the unity and their formal-ontological definition, creates

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the effect of the topography of «inactivity». The analytical strengthening of this peculiar philosophical pointillism does not merely dismiss the self-evidentiality of the formalontological analysis, but it is measured by it. The above-mentioned topography is further strengthened through the distinction of the nature of the parts of the whole, namely whether they are non-independent or dependent. Thus the «pure Species» of non-independent objects «are governed by a law of essence to the effect that they only exist as parts of more inclusive wholes of a certain appropriate species.» (Husserl, 2001b, 12)6 The ideality of non-independent objects is established through the role these objects play in the whole of which they are parts. Furthermore, the whole of the non-independent parts gains its categorial predicate, achieves its attribute of the novel content, only with regards to its contents, which are mutually founded. The unity of the contents, which are founded on each other (whether one-sidedly or reciprocally), is a «much more intimate unity since less mediated unity» (Husserl, 2001b, 12). This intimacy is manifested in the predestination of the nonindependent object to be «non-independent of» something. Therefore, the ideal essence of the non-independent moment is «available» only because of the presence of other moments. The non-independent moment7 «is not merely an actual part, but its essence, its pure Species, predestines it to partial being.» (Husserl, 2001b, 12, italics added) This is why the color in the colored thing can exist «in general, and purely as such only as a “moment”» (Husserl, 2001b, 12). The colored thing does not impose itself as a separate entity which unifies isolated moments of color and quality, but its unifying character is exemplified in the fact «that the existence of certain sorts of contents conditions the mere co-existence of contents of certain coordinated sorts.» (Husserl, 2001b, 36) Although the independent parts or pieces are not mutually founded, because they «“found” new contents themselves», and they «“found” them together» (Husserl, 2001b, 36), the novelty of this unifying content can be estimated only «in respect of its founding members» (Husserl, 2001b, 37).8 As much as the whole is not a simple addition of its

6

Husserl’s caution about the word existence is clearly evident here. This also recalls the non-psychologist nature of the ideal lawfulness, as it is introduced in the Prolegomena of Logical Investigations. 7 Husserl makes a clear distinction between independent parts, calling them pieces, and non-independent one , calling them moments in the section § 17. 8 This unifying content in the case of the independent parts «engenders unity since it is “founded” on many

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isolated moments, where the significance of the part is exclusively transferred to the collecting role of the whole, so too the independent part is not explicated outside of the context of its independence — namely in the peculiarity of its relationship with the parts with which it is immediately or mediately associated.9 Husserl suggests «we can give no answer to the question of “what differentiates the generic feature of being a sensory ‘moment’” so as to yield the specific feature of being a sensory quality.» (Husserl, 2001b, 18) We cannot define this manner of the mutual foundation, it, simply, «cannot be further described» (Husserl, 2001b, 18). The essence of the part is accessible though the participation of its complement in its own essence, within the mode of their union. However, the mutual «essentialization» of the parts defines this union in the first place. We observe the process of the positioning of the parts of the whole in their essential distinctions, which results in the occurrence of the tension. Furthermore, this tension, the reflection of the formal-ontological impermeableness of the members separate in themselves» (Husserl, 2001b, 37).  For Jay Lampert, the progression towards supplementation is nothing but the referring or progression «back» towards «a priori categories that must have been prior» (Lampert, 1995, 74). He easily avoids privileging the moments-whole over the pieces-whole relationship (the mistake that Sokolowski makes) and openly suggests that when Husserl defines non-independence positively and independence negatively «this is not because independent objects do not need to have their relations to other objects accounted for, but is rather because the independence of an object is in a certain way dependent on relations of dependency, even though the nonindependent object negates such relation.» (Lampert, 1995, 75) Lampert directly points out that both independent and non-independent parts equally participate in their essence only within the peculiarity of their mutual (whether reciprocal or one-sided) foundationalism. It is clear that the mode of this foundationalism is different between independent and non-independent parts, precisely because of the difference of the «journey» they undertake on the path between their essential profile and the context of their relation. This is the reason why we cannot prioritize one type of foundationalism over another, as much as we cannot allow for the parts of the whole to be «externally» or «internally» combined or divided: «Husserl’s arguments for the objectivity of wholes and parts thus involve a certain rejection of wholes and parts. Wholes are objectively real just because a whole is nothing more than parts» demands for mutual supplementation. Parts are objectively real just because the ultimate indivisible parts, which compose objects are nothing more than the backward-referents of complexes which are already mediated. Hence if the term «whole» were to mean «closed unity» and part were to mean «indivisible unit», then whole and part would at best be hypothetical targets of combination and division; but if «whole» means «system of reciprocal supplementations» and «part» means «presupposed content lying in-between borders», then whole and part are always in the process of being objectified in the passing-over and settings-inrelief carried out in the self-propelling interpretation of individuals-in-context (Lampert, 1995, 85). However, I also want to emphasize that the dynamics of the backward reference fully illuminates the banality of the staticism, which is built into the formality of the separation between part and whole. Furthermore, the dynamics of the self-transformation of whole and parts re-emphasizes the rigidity of their positions and, in this way, raises the question about its own thematization outside its ability for the above-mentioned emphasizing. Therefore, we must be cautious about the «direction» or «result» implied in the dynamism of self-transformation of these categories. I suggest that Lampert’s dynamism must be seen within the context of its capacity to illuminate the staticism of the «hypothetical targets of combination and division» (Lampert, 1995, 86).

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parts in relation, is what makes the operation of their «unification», its activity, possible. The seeming formal-ontological contradiction of the unity, as seen in the separateness of the union which «endows» its parts with the context, becomes the source of the «agency» of the foundationalism. Foundationalism is therefore not (just) a process on behalf of the unity, but it is also a structure of the mutual necessitation of the essential profiling of the parts.10 10

Robert Sokolowski in «The Logic of Parts and Wholes in Husserl’s Investigations», depicts the strategy of foundationalism and suggests that the necessary rules which «govern» the blending between whole and parts «are possible because parts and wholes in general can be blended in certain way» (Sokolowski, 1968, 537). Sokolowski, in describing Husserl’s definition of moments as parts which are «inseparable from one another and from their wholes», writes that pieces are parts «that do not permeate one another and hence are separable from their wholes» (Sokolowski, 1968, 539). The concept of moment implies the following foundationalism: «Each part, by virtue of what it is, contains within itself a rule dictating the necessary progression of supplements that it must possess, the necessary series of horizons, within which it must rest.» (Sokolowski, 1968, 539) Sokolowski’s delineation of Husserl’s strategy of self-enclosure is also visible in his description of Husserl’s establishment of the mediateimmediate differentiation. He concludes that color is the «closer moment to a material thing than brightness is (brightness is farther) because color belongs to its whole through the mediation of fewer parts than brightness needs.» (Sokolowski, 1968, 540) Sokolowski, however, imposes the whole-parts dynamics as the analytical unit which underlies the composition and methodology of the whole of Logical Investigations. Sokolowski, for example, notices that Husserl never distinguishes intentionality (the Fifth Investigation) into acts and sensations, material and quality, partial and complete acts etc. so that he can eventually separate any of these pieces or stages from one another and from «consciousness». Although he importantly traces the similarity between the foundationalism of the Third Investigation and the phenomenological analysis employed in other investigations, he tends to interpret the latter through the lens of the former. Furthermore, he prioritizes the whole-moment over wholepieces dynamic, failing to realize that Husserl employs the same strategy in the analysis of the concepts of pieces and moments. Therefore, we can suggest that as much as non-independent parts through an ideally law-bound combination «must lack independence» (Husserl, 2001b, 18) so too, the independent parts are independent because they are not ideally bound to the above-mentioned combination. We might follow Sokolowski in his observation that the concepts of categorical intentionalities and the «thing in itself» cannot be instantiated as purely separate and isolated either from each other or from the overall context in which they appear (especially from the relations, as well as the processes into which they are immersed). However, we should be particularly hesitant to accept the claim that, when thinking about profiles and objects, we have to rely on moments and whole, instead of focusing on the schema pieces and whole. Overall, Sokolowski makes a misstep because, instead of recognizing the peculiarity of Husserl’s «pointilistic» strategy which is established at every analytical level of LI and in accordance with the operational specificity of these levels, he imposes the whole-moments dynamics as a thematic-analytic unit on the whole body of the LI. Therefore, he does not only fail to recognize the significance of circular strategy in each analytical step in LI, but he also blurs and weakens the peculiar shape of this strategy at the level of the whole-parts dynamics. We can, of course, agree with Sokolowski that the objectivity of a priori statements is «grounded in the meaning themselves, in the sense that make up the complex meaning», and that «we do not need to understand them first and then try to see if they are true or not; the very understanding of them is perception of their truth» (Sokolowski, 1968, 551). However, we can hardly agree with Sokolowski that the phenomenological analysis of self-evidentiality in the Sixth Investigation exemplifies the part-whole problematic («all such self-evident statements, whether positive or negative, are instances of part-whole logic») (Sokolowski, 1968, 551). I would rather suggest the reverse: the whole-parts dynamics is one of the six different stages of the problematizing of the concept of self-evidentiality. The major problem of Sokolowski’s insight above is reflected in the reduction of the peculiar phenomenological investigations down to the problems of the ontological foundationalism. Husserl remarkably addresses the specificity of the relation form-content, part-whole,

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2. THE DYNAMICS OF DEPRIVATION IN THE RECONCILLIATORY CAPACITY OF RATIO: EXAMINING THE VIVACITY OF MASS ORNAMENT The above-mentioned silence, the impossibility of the answer to the question of what characterizes sensory moment which yields sensory quality, is not only overlooked through the formal-ontological conceptualization of the unity, but it is deliberately ignored by it. The «epoch» of the mass ornament according to Siegfried Kracauer is marked through its own ignoring of the question of its grounding, precisely through the banality of its execution. In the essay «The Mass Ornament» Kracauer explores the loss of the individuality in Weimar Republic through the seemingly liberating effect of subject’s participation in the mass spectacles, such as military parades, stadium speeches and extravagant dance performances. Kracauer’s main target in this essay is the strategy of abstraction which shapes the capitalist mode of production. He expands upon the Marx’s position on the difference between surplus and use value, suggesting that the production and consumption of values became «the side effects in the service of the production process» (Kracauer, 1995, 78). The increase in profit perpetuates the division between the owners of the means of production and the labor power, by emptying out the agency of both poles of this division. Both community and personality vanish when «what is demanded is calculability», where the individual becomes important only as «a tiny piece of the mass» (Kracauer, 1995, 78). The root of the mass de-personalization is located in the increasing abstraction in the economic and scientific production. Being initially inspired by the process of demythologization, the «abstractness» (Kracauer, 1995, 81), becomes, through its instrumentalization, the purpose in itself, replicating and multiplying the «non-rational» aspect of the externality of «nature», which it is supposed to demystify. The rationality, by becoming the pure instrument for the categorical-sensous, precisely through a radical re-articulation as an overcoming of these polarities, within the context of their origination. For Husserl, the process of cooperation, unification and abstraction can only come into being through the persistent sharpening of the participation of the parts in relation in their essence. Had we thematically ascribed the process of self-encircling exclusively to only one of the available analytical themes in LI, we would then completely fail to grasp the full effects of every particular stage in LI, and miss the opportunity to understand the scope, origins and modes of Husserl’s phenomenological method.

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promotion of the self-preservation principle, subverts itself by destroying its ability for reflection over efficiency. The abstract rationality perpetuates the reason-nature difference, by openly turning itself into its opposite, or into the brute force of the nonreflective execution.11 It is, however, important to notice that the seeming proximity between nature and reason through their pure equation, in fact, perpetuates and strengthens their «difference». The reason and nature in their unity under the banner of «abstract rationality», are being treated as self-evidentially isolated concepts, which is further enforced through their reversibility in the unity of the abstract rationality. The instrumental reversibility between reason and nature strengthens the horizontal confrontation-reconciliation dualism between parts, because it formally obscures the fixity of their positions in the relation of their confrontation. The «instrumental reason» (to recall Max Horkheimer), by permuting the nature and reason, seemingly loosens up the pressure of their direct confrontation. However, although the fixity of the initial position of terms in relation is exchanged for their permutation, the relation of conflict is very carefully preserved. The abstract rationality (or Horkheimer’s instrumental reason), the formalconceptual isolation of the terms in relation necessitates their transformation, where the nature of their mutuality is seen through the inversion of their position within the unity which orders their participation. Even if we perform the permutation between reason and nature, we are still reinforcing the rigidity of their initial isolation and the need for their, also categorially isolated, unifying moment.12 This would correspond to

11

Kracauer points out that the more «abstractness consolidates itself, however, the more man is left behind, ungoverned by reason. If his thought midway likes a detour into the abstract, thereby preventing the true contents of knowledge from breaking through, man will once again be rendered subject to the forces of nature. Instead of suppressing these forces, the thinking that has lost its way provokes their rebellion itself by disregarding the very reason that alone could confront such forces and make them submit. It is a mere consequence of the unhampered expansion of capitalism’s power that the dark forces of nature continue to rebel ever more threateningly. thereby preventing the advent of the man of reason.» (Kracauer, 1995, 82-83) 12 The reconciliation-conflict dynamics in the reason-nature dualism reaches a new mode in the instrumental reason. Reason is more efficient in its combat with the externality of nature if it adapts to it and if it openly adopts the brute force, non-reflectiveness, perspectivalism, contingency, trickery and sophistry, which it ascribes to the alterity of nature. Horkheimer names the strategy of reason’s imitation of nature mimesis, and defines it as reason’s ability to utilize the rebellious impulses of nature, by re-enacting them: «The spiteful use of the mimetic urge explains certain traits of modern demagogues. […] Hitler’s bag of tricks seems almost to have been stolen from Charlie Chaplin. His abrupt and exaggerated gestures were reminiscent of Chaplin’s caricatures of strong men in the early slapstick comedies. Modern demagogues usually behave like unruly boys, who normally are

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the concept of the unity, which introduces itself as «the apparently plain truth», according to which «wherever two contents form a real unity, there must be a peculiar part, a “moment of unity”, that binds them together.» (Husserl, 2001b, 37) We would end up in this case, according to Husserl, in the indefinite complication of the relations between the parts, where the foundationalist concept of unity wouldn’t be separated from the formalontological. In this sense we would literally come up with the new unifying moment not only between parts, but also between each isolated part and the unity, etc. For example if U is the moment of unity between B and A, then U1 is the moment of unity between U and A (or U2 between U and B), U1.1 between U1 and U, U1.2 between U2 and U, «and so on in infinitum» (Husserl, 2001b, 37). To come back to Kracauer, the efficiency of the abstract rationality overpowers every particular distinction and quality of either individual personality or communities, where humans become mere attributes of the higher order of efficiency. Therefore, Kracauer suggests that the mass figures, which embody the abstract rationality, are «composed of elements that are mere building blocks and nothing more» (Kracauer, 1995, 76), and that people become «the fractions of figure» only «as parts of a mass, and not as individuals who believe themselves to be formed from within» (Kracauer, 1995, 76). He further observes the following: Rather the girl-units drill in order to produce an immense number of parallel lines. The goal being to train the broadest mass of people in order to create a pattern of undreamed-of dimensions. The end result is the ornament, whose closure is brought about by emptying all the substantial constructs of their contents. Although the masses give rise to the ornament, they are not involved in thinking it through. As linear as it may be, there is no line that extend from the small sections of the mass to the entire figure. The ornament resembles aerial photographs of landscapes and cities in that it does not emerge out of the interior of the given conditions, but rather appears above them. The more the coherence of the figure is relinquished in favor of mere linearity, the more distant it becomes from the immanent consciousness of those constituting it. (Kracauer, 1995, 77, some italics added)

reprimanded or repressed by their parents, teachers, or some other civilizing agency. Their effect on an audience seems due partly to the fact that by acting out repressed urges they seem to be flying in the face of civilization and sponsoring the revolt of nature. But their protest is by no means genuine or naive. They never forget the purpose of their clowning. Their constant aim is to tempt nature to join the forces of repression by which nature itself is to be crushed.» (Horkheimer, 2004, 81, italics added) The major source of the success of cynicism of instrumental reason is in the promotion of its limitation as the condition for its expansion. The authorirty of the reason in its abstraction is guarded through its mere execution.

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The full capacity of the human being who participates in the mass ornament as its mere part never comes to the fore, because her corporeity, her «organic naturality» is abstractly emphasized, so it can be utilized within the «liveliness» of the mass ornament. Kracauer uses the example of Tiller Girls dancing groups, whose female members’ distinction is important as long as it perpetuates the movement of the mass figure they create. The humanness of the dancers is important in its physical concreteness, in the uniqueness of their bodies, as long as they sustain the abstraction of the dancing formation. Paradoxically, the more it becomes apparent that, in spite of the regularity of the general pattern of the movement of the figure, the dancers move within the «confines» and the capacities of their own body qualities, the stronger will be the submission of their uniqueness to the successful establishment of the mass ornament. The dancers usually swing their legs either to the right or to the left, while «chaining» themselves to each other through the intertwining of their hands. The result is the creation of a geometric figure, whose pattern relies on the pace of the dancers’ movements. Dancers’ legs appear to be more free and emphasized, while their torsos are sequenced as building blocks for the center piece of the figure they create. The «naturality» of the parts of the figure is abstractly isolated and emphasized, which is proportional to the accentuation of the mere «corporeity» of the figure of the mass ornament, and therefore to the banality of its execution. In this sense, both the organic aspect of the human beings and its abstract ordering are equally deprived of their full capacity, and are therefore being equally abstracted from (Kracauer, 1995, 84). This is why both «rationality» of the pattern of the mass ornament and the «irrational» corporeity of its components reinforce the nature-reason rift through the fusion, which accomplishes itself through the linearity of the utilization of its components. Kracauer calls this self-perpetuating unity Ratio, and describes it in the following way: In spite of the rationality of the mass pattern, such patterns simultaneously give rise to the natural in its impenetrability. Certainly man as an organic being has disappeared from these ornaments, but that does not suffice to bring man’s basis to the fore; on the contrary, the remaining little mass particle cuts itself off from this basis just as any general formal concept does. Admittedly, it is the legs of the Tiller Girls that swing in perfect parallel, not the natural unity of their bodies, and it is also true that the thousands of people in the stadium form one single star. But this star does not shine, and the legs of the Tiller Girls are an abstract designation of their bodies. […] The Ratio that gives rise to the ornament is strong enough to invoke the mass and to expunge all life from the figures constituting it. It is too weak to find the human beings within the mass and to render the figures in the ornament transparent to knowledge. Because this Ratio flees from reason and takes refuge

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in the abstract, uncontrolled nature proliferates under the guise of rational expression and uses abstract signs to display itself. (Kracauer, 1995, 84, italics added)

We can also suggest that not in spite, but precisely because of the rationality of the mass patterns (as seen in its capacity for a merely abstractive utilization of its components), the nature of the components appears «in its impenetrability» (Kracauer, 1995, 84). Furthermore, it is important to pay attention to Kracauer’s emphasis on the lack of shining in the mass-constructed stars, and the fact the operational mereness of the legs of the dancers in the mass-figure is abstracted from their corporeity. Both cases illustrate the situation where both the whole and its parts are treated as purely isolated moments. The «voice» of this treatment, its articulate noise prevents us from comprehending the inescapability of Husserlian silence in an answer to the question what is being «added» to the sensory moment «so as to yield the specific feature of being a sensory quality» (Husserl, 2001b, 18) in the union of the extended quality. The combination of the parts is possible because the essentiality of the founding part necessitates the essentiality of the founded one. The mutual foundation of parts, which «equally» participate in their essence is what constitutes their union. The «silence» of the mutual self-encircling of the parts of the whole which produces the «voice» of their articulation should be seen as a tension which is released in the smoothness of the unification of the parts, conceived as the separate moments in the process of their, equally isolated, unification. What appears as the initial articulation of the whole-part relationship, which rests on the isolation of parts as moments in unity, disarticulates itself in the moment of its reiterative selfevidentiality. The only way we can point out the inherent self-betrayal of the formalontological articulation of the unification process, is to move within the formality of the categories, and trace their self-evidentiality back to the question of its justification. This is why Kracauer’s critical move beyond the mass ornament, as the identification of the «superficial shallowness» of Ratio, «leads directly through the center of the mass ornament, not away from it» (Kracauer, 1995, 86). R EFER ENCES Adorno, T. (1996). Negative Dialectics. New York, NY: Continuum. Dallmayr, F. (1991). Between Freiburg and Frankfurt: Toward a Critical Ontology.

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Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press. Funke, G. (1987). Phenomenology — Metaphysics or Method. Athens: Ohio University Press. Heidegger, M. (2002). Identity and Difference. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Horkheimer, M. (2004). Eclipse of Reason. New York, NY: Continuum. Husserl, E. (2001a). Logical Investigations. Vol. 1. London – New York, NY: Routledge. Husserl, E. (2001b). Logical Investigations. Vol. 2. London – New York, NY: Routledge. Kracauer, S. (1995). The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lampert, J. (1995). Synthesis and Backward Reference in Husserl’s Logical Investigations. Dordrecht – Boston, MA – London: Kluwer Academic Publishing. Sokolowski, R. (1968). The Logic of Parts and Wholes in Husserl’s Investigations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4(4), 537-553. Varga, P. (2010). Psychology as Positive Herritage of Husserl’s Phenomenological Philosophy. Studia Pheanomenologica X, 101-127.

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HORIZON 5 (1) 2016 : I. Research : J. Vydrová : 214–231 ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ • STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY • STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE • ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES

1.4 PHENOMENOLOGY AND AESTHETICS 1.4 ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЯ И ЭСТЕТИКА doi: 10.18199/2226-5260-2016-5-1-214-231

THE INTERTWINING OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND CUBISM — IN THE ANALYSES AND WORKS OF ART OF CZECH ARTISTS AND THEORETICIANS JAROSLAVA VYDROVÁ PhD, Scientific fellow of the Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences, 813 64 Bratislava 1, Slovak Republic. E-mail: [email protected] This study derives from the genealogy of phenomenological and cubistic aims and their thematic interests at the beginning of the 20th century in the Central-European milieu. In the first part, we observe common and close questions of Husserl’s philosophy on the one side and the new artistic initiative of cubists on the other. This level of observation and comparison is in the second part recognized and deepened thanks to the analyses of Czech philosophers (Bayerová, Patočka, Mathauser), theoreticians (Vlček, Kramář, Lamač and others) and works of cubists themselves (Kubišta, Filla, Hofman and others). The philosophical scope of the consideration also opens the principal question — which is the topic of the third part of the study — of the intertwining of phenomenological and cubistic methods (epoché, reduction and pictorial elaboration). Because it is not one unitary style, Cubism brings with it a complicated interpretative task: in relation to this, we present the polemic concerning the use of polyperspectivity and geometrisation; thanks to phenomenology, their deeper meaning can be revealed. We identify as phenomenological tendencies in cubistic works of art, their claim to liberate perception, to create pure forms and to refuse the symbolic, representative and imitative function of art. We analyse these questions with respect to the creative possibilities of the subject/artist as well as the pictorial/ perceptive character of the world. Key words: Husserl, Czech cubism, Central-European philosophy, phenomenological method, perception, object, work of art.

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ПЕРЕПЛЕТЕНИЕ ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИИ И КУБИЗМА В АНАЛИЗЕ И ТРУДАХ ЧЕШСКИХ ХУДОЖНИКОВ И ТЕОРЕТИКОВ ЯРОСЛАВА ВЫДРОВА PhD, научный сотрудник Института философии Словацкой Академии наук, 813 64 Братислава 1, Словацкая республика. E-mail: [email protected] Данное исследование основывается на генеалогии феноменологической философии и кубизма, а также их тематических интересов в начале ХХ века в Центральной Европе. В первой части статьи рассматриваются вопросы, общие и близкие как философии Гуссерля, так и художественным интуициям кубистов. Этот уровень рассмотрения и сравнения углубляется во второй части на основе работ чешских философов (Байерова, Паточка, Матхаузер), теоретиков (Влчек, Крамар, Ломач) и работ самих кубистов (Кубишта Филла, Хофман и др.). Философская цель этого рассмотрения состоит и в том, чтобы открыть принципиальный вопрос, который выступает темой третьей части исследования, а именно вопрос пересечения феноменологического метода и метода кубизма (эпохе, редукция и разработка изображения). Поскольку кубизм не является каким-либо единым стилем, он сопоставляется с завершенной интерпретативной задачей: в связи с ним автор статьи представляет полемику относительно использования полиперспективности и геометризации. Их более глубокое значение может быть обнаружено благодаря феноменологии. Автор статьи опознает те тенденции в произведениях искусства кубизма, которые претендуют на высвобождение восприятия, создание чистых форм, отбрасывание символических, репрезентативных и подражательных функций искусства, феноменологические тенденции. В статье эти вопросы анализируются в виду креативных возможностей субъекта/художника, а также изобразительного/перцептивного характера мира. Ключевые слова: Гуссерль, чешский кубизм, философия Центральной Европы, феноменологический метод, восприятие, объект, произведение искусства.

The effort to make phenomenology a scientific discipline and the effort to create a new language in art were analogous processes in Central Europe during which common problems and inspirations appeared. (Bayerová, Vlček, 1991, 47)

Husserl’s statement in Ideas I that fantasy is an element of phenomenology can lead us to develop various analyses dealing with forms of givenness and appearance of objects, as well as image consciousness and aesthetic experience. In the creative development of these themes, many mutually inspiring points of contact between phenomenology and

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art emerge; fruitful and «suggestive»1 meetings occur between certain phenomenological texts and specific artistic works. In Central European thinking at the start of the 20th century there is an interesting — at first sight unexpected yet internally justifiable — overlapping of phenomenology and Cubism. Both movements are in a way radical, each producing a revolution in both philosophical thinking and new artistic possibilities. Despite — and thanks to — their specificity, we come across «parallels, affinities and interconnections» (Bayerová, & Vlček, 1991), even their «rapprochement» (Pinnotti, 2010), all of which acquire a philosophically relevant form in the Czech context. In the following analysis, we will look at the work of the Czech phenomenologist Maria Bayerová and the art theorist Tomáš Vlček, both of whom addressed this question. By taking a detailed look at Czech phenomenology and art — in the texts of Jan Patočka and Zdeněk Mathauser — we will also consider other impulses in the development of this unusual theme which has a wider philosophical import. We focus on development in concrete phenomenological analysis (perception, thing and space) and in the next part, move on from the common thematic and programmatic elements of the two initiatives to analysis of the overlap of the phenomenological method with Cubist means of depiction. THE EXPONENTS OF THE AGE Mapping the historical and cultural points of overlap between the phenomenological movement and Cubism springs not so much from their explicit and deliberate mutual influence as from their identical temporal and spatial location as well as their similar programmatic orientation. «It is one of the paradoxes in the history of ideas that Cubism, which so greatly inspired philosophical approaches among the twentieth century avantgarde, was characterized by its representatives as an atheoretical or even antitheoretical movement.» (Pinotti, 2010, 63) In a similar way to Andrea Pinotti, we will try to resolve this paradox not in accordance with Picasso, Braque or Gris’ rejection of theoretical and philosophical approaches but by considering common features shared by this new artistic direction and by the philosophical discourse of the period. It is easier to resolve this paradox within the Czech context than that of French Cubism; though a solution emerges partly 1

As Mathauser (Mathauser, 2006, 134) succinctly describes it.

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through the influence of French artists, it is more manifest within the atmosphere of Austrian and Czech philosophy in the Central European cultural context. Czech artists did not reject theoretical approaches and in their own texts we can find theoretical and philosophical analyses.2 In the background to these intellectual and artistic movements, there is a creative dynamism linking the axis of the centre to its radials (i.e. French Cubism and its regional developments) which not only inspires but also creates a certain autonomy.3 Jan Patočka and Bohumil Kubišta, representatives of each of these movements, propose that we always see an artist as being an «exponent of their age», hence the necessity to look at the historical existence of artists who initiated this new artistic direction and at the same time were anchored in the same geographical and cultural space. Representatives of both phenomenology and Cubism perceived the critical and creative atmosphere at the start of the 20th century in much the same way. Modern art moved away from existing creation of forms, from reproduction, imitation and representation, from the poetic and decorative towards prosaic expression — its effect is more «non-literary and unpoetic, the distorting efforts of earlier periods» (Hofman, 2005, 70). Phenomenology also reacts to the prejudices and consequences of empiricism, positivism, psychologism and historicism, all of which led Husserl to call for a rigorous scientific approach. This ties in with his long-standing efforts at founding a new science as well as approach which would address both the subjective process of knowing and its objective and intersubjective conclusions. If we consider these two movements, artistic and philosophical, in a thematic context, we can see that they both want to understand the processes of perception and the appearance of objects in a new way, at the same time making the question of subjectivity and psychological processes a central theme. We can also observe this tendency in the context of that period which was related to discussions between psychology of associanism, Gestalt and phenomenological psychology. Although there probably do not exist many explicit statements from that period 2

This opinion is expressed by Lamač in his analysis «Czech Cubism and the World» (Švestka, & Vlček, 1991, 58). See the texts by Kubišta, Čapek, Hofman, Filla, Gutfreund, Beneš and Kramář collected in Frühling in Prag oder Wege des Kubismus (Fabritius, & Hagedorn, 2005; Lamač, 1968). 3 This is developed in Ars magazine dedicated to the relationship between the centre, which presents the dominant elements of Cubism, and the «artistic creativity of the periphery» (Lahoda, 2014, 112). In his study «Czech Cubism in the European Context» E. F. Frey refers to the efforts to achieve «the modernness of Western Europe» at the same time as «the gravitational strength of Czech and Central European traditions» (Švestka, & Vlček, 1991, 14).

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about the similarity between phenomenology and Cubism, their interrelationship was referred to in 1936 by Emil Utitz in his introduction to the German edition of the works of Emil Filla. He wrote that Filla «does not subscribe to the naturalistic positivism which was cultivated in the 19th century but instead to phenomenology, which focuses on the inalienable essence of the whole givenness, on legitimacy in its deepest form.» (Utitz, 2005, 111) Addressing the mutual relationship of the two movements, Tomáš Vlček writes: «Thus both phenomenology and Cubism tried to unify the culture of senses with that of reason, to uncover the value and meaning of the natural world and find a relationship to everyday events and objects.» (Švestka, & Vlček, 1991, 24) Many different themes and levels of understanding can be found in relation to this; for now we can state a dual purpose which has been noticed by Czech authors. On the one hand, phenomenology and Cubism rehabilitate perception and the perceptive world, capture the manifoldness of things and give free rein to experience. On the other hand, they require not an arbitrary but an observant spectator and viewer4 who is attentive to reality and able to be guided and stimulated by it. Two effects play a role: «satisfaction and requirement» (Mathauser, 1995, 6).5 THEMES: THE MANIFOLDNESS OF THINGS AND ART, WHICH DOES NOT IMITATE Together with new cultural, social and historical conditions, new programmatic intentions emerge revealing more concrete content. Themes that are key both for the 4

«Allusion and implication, which stimulate and cultivate our intelligence in fine art, presuppose that the observer is strongly familiar with the material world»; «confining oneself to certain features of things and then emphasizing them has contributed to a deeper knowledge of the world, especially the most banal and ordinary things [...] which we so often overlook» — as Kramář (1958, 30) puts it. We should recall that Kramář (1877–1960) was a promoter and collector of Cubists and in 1921 wrote an important analysis of Cubism. His collection is exhibited at the National Gallery in Prague. 5 We can continue to the wider relationship between phenomenology and the avant-garde. Phenomenology need not confine itself to figurative, narrative or traditional art but can also be applied to abstraction, experiments and questioning modernism — and not only in relation to hermeneutics but also to structuralism and semiotics. This theme again emerges in the Czech milieu with Mathauser. «J. Patočka’s texts are especially important in considering the relationship between phenomenology and structuralism. Elsewhere K. Chvatík writes about the link between the structuralistic Prague linguistic circle and phenomenology while Husserl’s phenomenological and Mukařovský’s structuralistic understanding of time are discussed by P. and W. Steiner and M. Červenka...» (Mathauser, 2006, 85) Mathauser also refers to Sepp’s, Trinks’s and G. Shpet’s texts.

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artistic and philosophical approach such as senses, body and space move into the foreground. The basic problem is perception: how we perceive, see and how objects appear to us. Both the above approaches want to capture the object in the origin of its appearance. Generally speaking, Husserl’s analysis of perception questions the mirrorreflective ability of external impulses in consciousness and at the same time rejects the symbolic and representative function of consciousness. He liberates perception from the layers of theoretical construction; perception is not a projection of ideas or notions. In freeing itself from this kind of interpretation of reality that would interfere with and influence an act of perception, phenomenology creates space for perception itself. As Cubism attacks impressionism,6 phenomenology «delimits itself» against psychologistic and empirical interpretations of perception. Cubism is not an imitative art, is neither naively photographic nor a mirror of reality, but instead depicts deformations, deflections, hyperbolae, curvatures, disorders and de-colorations — if the «rhythm of the picture» requires it, if subtler and more differentiated aspects of reality or if the object itself requires it. Phenomenological analysis shows that in perception, the dynamic of two complementary principles: pretension (Prätention) and deficit (Manko) applies. Perception requires us to apprehend more than we can actually see because an object presents itself to us only in its adumbrations and not from all sides at once. Thus, we anticipate and rely on the fact that the perception of thing will progress in such and such a way, which inevitably leads at times to disappointment and our expectations not being fulfilled. It is a field of «open possibilities a parte ante which a parte post can always more closely determine, limit and enrich although they still always face infinity.» (Husserl, 1973, 137) In the same spirit Vincenc Kramář (2005, 219) interprets Picasso’s endeavours when he points out that Picasso no longer wants to depict the object seen from one angle in space — as artists did from an earlier era, thanks to a play of colours, light and perspective etc., arousing in the viewer the desired impression and using illusion. In so doing they relied on considerably more than can seen in reality, arousing the desired effect through the playing of forms. At the same time, these earlier artists actually express less, because in an apparent imitation 6

«The system of colour depiction of the universe plays the role of another layer in the scheme of linear elements arising from the renaissance way of displaying space.» (Francastel, 2003, 86; Francastel, 1977, 159)

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of reality, they reduce an object to just one perspective, one that is clearly not exhaustive and is always arbitrary in its own way. Cubism thoroughly examines an object and in depicting it, wants to capture it in its naked reality. The cube, as often used by Husserl (e.g. Husserl, 1973, 91, 252), is in its symmetry an example of something which reveals its rear face to us by rotating, its rear face becoming its front face as it turns. Cubism leads to realizing and developing the relationship between the reality of object and the ideality of form, which then leads to the quest for new artistic expression or to the freeing of the pure form (Hofman, 2005, 202; Kramář, 2005, 214). In the following polemic which arose about Cubism, we can observe two sides to the creative process — the creative possibilities of the subject and the artistic facet of the world7 — together with their philosophical reflection. The radical new approach of Cubism can arouse the very opposite reaction to its intended points of departure. The main charge is one of formalism, deformation of reality by using geometrization and polyperspectivity. Deliberate intervention in the presentation of the observed object through its simplification, schematization and reduction to a geometric form (often the impression of the observer of Cubist work) negate an approach that wants to leave us to see things as they present themselves. Superficiality, transparency, utility and a simplified offering of the object run counter to the opacity of reality, which always leaves us missing certain aspects. According to this approach, geometrization would be in conflict with phenomenology. At the same time, we can ask if Cubism’s «violence» against the object does not lead to dehumanization of an art that wants to possess and manipulate («will to objectification»). Ortega y Gasset and Walter Biemel both tend to this opinion; Jan Patočka, however, disagrees and sees it as being an oversimplification. We can find his analysis in the relatively little known but interesting text «Notes on Picasso’s polypespectivity by W. Biemel» (Patočka, 2004) in which he reacts critically to analyses of Cubism which accuse it of object manipulation. Patočka wants to draw attention to a deeper tendency, which he finds in cubist works: «polyperspectivity is a term from experimental semantics [...] an attempt to get to the bottom of the painter’s efforts, to understand his capabilities, if possible, in a spontaneity which rejects preconceived 7

In choosing this framework, we were inspired by Kramář and by Sepp’s analyses of the exhibition of three artists (Kimura, Matoušková, and Van Look) in Prague.

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schemes of thoughts. It is not that he has mastered seeing but that by moving towards the absolutely elementary and original, the nature and being of things becomes manifest to him in another, more original and fuller way.» (Patočka, 2004, 33) The geometrical approach that Cubism works with is thus not the founding of schematization — it is not formalism but a type of realism –, it is more a quest for such an approach to the possibilities of depicting things that represent their «basic grammar». (Through the contrast of founding and quest, we want to express dynamism of creativity that does not offer stable solutions but can always run the risk of not fulfilling its intention.) In other words, polyperspectivity is not just a composite of perspectives, an aleatory adumbration of object or a working with the object for the needs of its neutral, total or technical operation. Geometrization is «the eliciting of privileged forms in the Husserlian sense. Privileged forms are those which contain the greatest potential of sense.» (Patočka, 2004, 412) Rejecting mere playing with forms and instead searching for pure forms or those which reactivate sense, goes deeper into the structure of perception and the phenomenal side of reality and enables us to follow further common coordinates of both, artistic and philosophical initiatives. If we remain with two facets that we have chosen as frameworks for analysis — the possibilities of artist/subjectivity and artistic/perceptual aspect of the world — we can observe deeper layers of this so-called «autogony» and «cosmogony» in one, as H. R. Sepp expresses it. Because «the world provides space for the movement of subjectivity» and «subjectivity in constant movement gives the constitution of the world ever new forms of sense» (Sepp, 2004, 68). Perception of things and their capturing on canvases, emphasising their figural aspects and shape connects with intentionality and arises from categories of relationship, part and whole. Intentionality — following laws of perception and the ways of givenness of the perceived thing — is at the same time anchored in passivity, where background and co-givenness dominate.8 This situatedness of subject and object of perception produces «subject-object dialogue, this drawing together, by the subject, of the meaning diffused through the object, and, by the object, of the subject’s intentions — a process which is physiognomic perception.» (MerleauPonty, 2005, 152-153) In other words, there emerges an overlap of «spontaneity and 8

Cf. Bayerová (1995, 90-94).

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receptivity» (Sepp, 2004, 18). Thanks to this, phenomenology and Cubism have at the same time discovered for us a whole new range of objects: from the significant, nontrivial discovery of everyday things through meetings with otherness, other worlds, periods and cultures to the search for symmetrical geometrical shapes. And so in the paintings, we meet with a bottle, a musical instrument, a skull or buildings; Filla’s works such as «Salome» and «Paraclete» or Kubišta’s «Harlequin» are very distinctive in this respect.9 This non-triviality is also connected with the fact that the functions of the senses are revealed in a new way, their connection (especially sight and touch) does not appear synthetic, eludes simple fusion or joining together. One sense does not succeed from another but instead they together create new synaesthetic units. Here too we find an interesting parallel between phenomenology and Cubism in terms of how tactile experience interests them. Husserl draws his lectures about object and space from analysis of moving and optical phenomena (in the oculomotor field); in later texts, however, this approach seems inadequate to him and he prefers to consider the issue from a haptic point of view. For the Cubist artist, body, tactile experience with the object in space is also important and forms part of the constitution of space.10 Kramář states in relation to this that «the touch and the muscular sense more objectively reflect sensory reality than visual perceptions» (Kramář, 1958, 48). The concept of perception and intentionality (an intentional arc, as described by Merleau-Ponty) is closely tied up with body that is no longer considered to be an object amongst objects but is characterized by its indeterminacy and situatedness. It is not a blind recipient of external impulses, but a field of localisation, an organ of movement and orientation. The body is an analogue to artistic work because «it is a nexus of living meanings, not the law», calculable in advanced or determined from the outside — in this sense «the body is to be compared, not to a physical object, but rather to a work of art» (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, 175, 174). Its significance is gained through experience and achievement of perception. This Merleau-Ponty’s analysis leads us on to addressing the relationships between subjectivity and space as well as between space and a work of art. In the case of Cubism, 9

Mathauser (Mathauser, 2006, 141) draws attention to the significance of dreams, jokes, mythology etc. See Breuer’s analysis (2015) of the haptic genesis; cf. Kramář (2005, 220-221).

10

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it seems that Husserlian texts about the constitution of space and geometry may serve us better than texts about image consciousness. Space ceases to be an objective or causal configuration but becomes a place we inhabit that acquires meaning through experience, in its living presence (lebendige Gegenwart). Similarly, the Cubist artist moves around observing the proportions and intersections of space and shape.11 In his essay «The Prosaic Beauty of Modern Art» (Hofman, 2005, 69) Hofman writes that we have grown used to expecting certain optical conclusions and that this art really does come from empirical content; at the same time, empirical reality can reactivate its potentiality, which «penetrates (also) through to what is unusual».12 Further: «instead of Cubist painting uniting everything into one impression, it offers a system of spatial shortcuts» (Hofman, 2005, 69); the focus of depiction changes and uses «the rhythmic synthesis of real spatial marking and shortening, which are elements of space and our knowledge of it (J. Junoy speaks about “orientation”)» (Hofman, 2005, 69). This, according to Hofman, is what is prosiac, simple but also revolutionary about Cubism. In Czech Cubism, with its distinctive architectural, painting and applied-arts elements, we can meet with the combination of space and movement together with the use of rhythm.13 In practical life, we also use tendencies, emphases and improvements of figural and shape qualities reflecting our preference for certain forms when moving and orientating ourselves within the natural world and when working with objects. We can find ourselves again in a similar polemic to the one about polyperspectivity. Does this lead to simplification? Where does the connection lie between choosing certain shapes and surfaces and the deeper meaning of this pictorial technique that does not aim to be arbitrarily deformative but instead realistic and observant? That we prefer flat surfaces, straight lines and plasticity14 comes from the practical pre-scientific world of commonly lived experience from which further processes, both theoretical and artistic, then follow. As Patočka states: «the straight line is a privileged 11

Cf. Lamač (1988, 171). Let us add descriptions of A. Dufourcq: «“the Mont Sainte-Victoire” is an oscillating topic of open plurality of accidental variations, a topic placed between these variations. That is why it is a topic with a rich future, one always on its way»; «we can add to variation the most unexpected and original elements; there is nothing which a priori forbids them to bear a topic (on condition that they can integrate harmoniously […]: just as some metaphors are able to revive meaning whereas others are not).» (Dufourcq, 2015, 753, 754) 13 Francastel (Francastel, 2003, 117; Francastel, 1977, 229-230) recalls one interpretation of Cubism which found «rhythm in the moment it left the geometrical spirit of the Renaissance and thus founded a new realism». 14 Cf. Husserl’s Crisis, appendix 3, which Bayerová and Vlček work with. 12

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shape not only perceptually but also actively: in it we have a structural element with which we can work, construct and experiment with some complexity.» (Patočka, 2004, 33) Bayerová and Vlček interpret this connection in the same way when they draw from those texts of Husserl in which he reveals the primary creative activities from which geometry originated, the relation to what is indubitable, to what «was available in the pre-scientific world and served as a material of idealization». And it is here that they find the connection with Cubism in which geometry «has become a means of reevaluating pictorial forms, though not from the object and sensory perception towards abstraction, but rather by giving sensoriness and objectivity new ways of functioning in an artistic work on the basis of geometry.» (Bayerová, & Vlček, 1991, 49) Rather than the reductiveness and superficiality which polyperspectivity and geometrization can lead to when used in a certain way, Czech theoreticians carry out a (phenomenological) analysis which respects laws of perception, polysensoriness and the situatedness of the observer, as well as the genuine15 effort of the (Cubist) artist in combining creative possibilities with shapes filled with sense (Patočka, 2004, 33). This leads to an important overlap in central questions about both approaches. We have therefore found a number of common thematic features which phenomenology and Cubism share. But can we go further? METHODS: EPOCHÉ AND REDUCTION IN PHENOMENOLOGY AND CUBISM16 When we seek to identify common characteristics of phenomenology and Cubism, the question of methods is implicitly present from the beginning and relates to phenomenological epoché and reduction and the artistic method of depiction. This area is addressed by the key interpretative approach developed by C. Einstein, G. Habasque, K. Piwocki, E. Escoubas, H. R. Sepp, and Z. Mathauser within the Czech milieu. This

15

Cf. Karul’s analysis of paradigms of modern art coexisting in contemporary art, of authenticity and inauthenticity in the approach of the artist, according to which we move within that modern art paradigm which preserves «the personal and subjective character of seeing [...]. Expressing interiority or subjectivity refers almost tautologically to the demand for authenticity.» (Karul, 2015, 737) 16 I have presented arguments for the comparison of methods also in this article: (Vydrová, 2015, 837-839).

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does not so much involve looking at the thematic convergences that occurred at around the beginning of the century when formulating the same questions nor the emergence of theoretical approaches but instead at the stronger «hypothesis that Cubism does the same as phenomenology, that it performs a parte imaginis the same operation that phenomenology performs a parte philosophiae [...] Cubist painting is thus [...] in itself phenomenological.» (Pinotti, 2010, 64)17 This connection of methods comes not merely from an effort which wants to approach reality without presuppositions (epoché) and dismantle theoretical schemes of interpretation, but also from an effort which crosses through the fleeting and accidental to that which is indubitable — in other words from the factual to the eidetic (eidetic reduction). We can observe use of this method in the synthetic phase, in what is called eidetic Cubism. «Experiencing, or intuition of something individual can become transmuted into eidetic sensing (ideation) — a possibility which is itself to be understood not as empirical, but as eidetic.» (Husserl, 1983, 8) According to Habasque, this enables independence and a priori knowledge, though not only for the needs of the scientific approach but also for «the inexact essences typical of the world of our concrete bodily experience, the same ones that Ideas I (§§71–75) had explicitly vindicated» (Pinotti, 2010, 64). We can add that this development is already present in the opening paragraphs in which Husserl determines the connection between (accidental) facts and (inevitable) essences,18 as well as where he hints at development of categories, regions and regional ontologies. This point of comparison can be developed further, as Sepp shows. According to him, phenomenology with its method functions like a caesura; its method is manifest in Cubism in a similar manner. Carl Einstein speaks in the same way about a Cubism which has again discovered experience and about an image as an interruption,19 dissociation,

17

Another line of argumentation present Kahnweiler and Gehlen, who point to the closeness to Kant and neoKantianism. This position has been challenged, however (by Gadamer and Sepp). 18 «When we said that any matter of fact, “in respect of its essence”, could be otherwise, we were already saying that it belongs to the sense of anything contingent to have an essence and therefore an Eidos which can be apprehended purely; and this Eidos comes under eidetic truths belonging to different levels of universality […] any material thing has its own essential species and, highest of all, the universal species “any material thing whatever”, with any temporal determinations whatever, any duration, figure, materiality whatever.» (Husserl, 1983, 7, 8) Habasque is criticized by Lamač, who in the case of phenomenology and Cubism sees only salient points not parallels (Lamač, 1988, 334-335; Blecha, 2007, 171). 19 Didi-Huberman quotes Einstein: «in his book about Braque, he offers this strange equation: “Image = interruption”.

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disintegration of a view (Didi-Huberman, 2006, 225-226; Didi-Huberman, 2010, 206), Mathauser uses the term «derailing» or observes the dynamic of putting a theme in a work of art and then cancelling it. This concerns epoché and reduction, which operate on the level of perception; subsequently, however, it also concerns the difference between various types and states of objects — the thing and the image (artefact) — which the special act of neutralization, the so-called modification of neutrality focuses on. Before reduction, «reelle Bestand of consciousness does not give of itself but of something else; it presents what is transcendent and what functions on a symbolic level. Epoché and reduction are attempts at invalidating this symbolization and at reductive uncovering reelle Bestand and its intentional referencing (Verweisungscharaktere) through original de-symbolization.» (Sepp, 1995, 299; cf. Sepp, 1988, 80) This means that the change of viewpoint is such, it enables understanding of the real «mechanism of the image», freeing of the «image order» and grasping of its autonomy.20 Thus for Husserl, the realms of fantasy, variation of imagination and quasi-reality are a fertile ground for phenomenology which is sufficiently free from transcendent obscurities and layers of meaning dealing with various states of reality and referring. Sepp thus reformulates the intention of Cubism with the phenomenological question: «Wie erscheinen Dinge-im-Wie-ihresWahrgenommenseins im Medium des Bildes?» (Sepp, 1995, 303)21 If phenomenology is a caesura which ultimately points to intentional achievements and a noetic-noematic correlation between perception and the perceived, imagination and the imagined, the caesura of Cubism focuses on appearance in the area of depiction, image. Phenomenological reflection exploring the conditions for intuition and meaning has its analogue in the Cubistic observance of the «syntax and semantics of pure depiction» (Sepp, 1995, 309), one which does not allude to other layers of transcendence, does not represent nor code. In other words, through reduction to pure forms, Cubism showed where the problem of depiction, imitation and duplication of reality in image really lies: it beguiles us because it does not leave things to merely appear but instead presents to us different realities. According to Sepp, pure experiences in phenomenology overlap with the pure, How should we interpret this? Primarily as a reference to the phenomenological analysis of distance...» (DidiHuberman, 2006, 225). 20 Cf. Mathauser (2006, 139), (Lamač, 1988, 175). 21 How do things (in their being-perceived) appear in the medium of image?

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autonomous image of Cubism and thus the realism of Cubism comes close to what reele Bestand means to Husserl, to real existence and the actual content of consciousness. Didi-Huberman (Didi-Huberman, 2006, 227; Didi-Huberman, 2010, 208) and Einstein also see Cubism in its epistemological context and attribute to it the function of «modifying» how we think about objects and appearances, modification of experience. The first-person approach, specific to phenomenology, disrupts the structure of causality and suspends those links between the subject and the world which are inserted from outside or which presuppose further types of reality (whether in the form of impressions, theoretical assumptions, causality or representation). In his text «Work of the Eye», Emil Filla draws attention to the important influence these tendencies have on art; with various forms of depiction our eye is literally forced to change: «Our eye has been spoiled. Because of its exposure to impressionistic works, it has learnt to only look for the surface impression, it has learnt to look strangely in the distance with narrowed eyes [...] from the distracting surface of the image, it wants to grasp the whole.» (Filla, 1968, 341) In other words, we can say that Cubism functions via two perspectives: on the one hand, it refuses an inner relationship between the image and observer, which should communicate some constructed psychological meaning — the modification of the position of viewer described by Einstein recalls the uninterested observer in Husserl. The observer in phenomenology and the viewer and artist in Cubism all have to undergo a change of viewpoint so that they can free up their perception and attention for the objects. This ties in with a second perspective in which Cubism questions and suspends objective and causal settings of space and time. Creation of new forms of depiction is then open to the dynamism which follows the qualitative aspects — of subject-object relation, as well as relation between the subject and the work of art — which is not the culmination of the artist’s endeavours but a continuation of the creative process (Didi-Huberman, 2006, 223; Didi-Huberman, 2010, 203-204). CONCLUSION: INTERTWINING OF ENDEAVOURS Cubist work places great demands on its audience, requiring them to free themselves from expectations, which are, however, often burdened by received but untested assumptions. It also places great demands on the artist; s/he may be able to create works of the highest order but may also be an artist of thwarted attempts and

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unfulfilled intentions (that Cubism may exhaust itself is confirmation of the dynamism of creativity and a rebuttal of accusations of schematism and manipulation of object and image). It is intended to be an active return to original perception, a sharpening of view that can sometimes be induced by just one raised line on a canvas, and by deepening knowledge of the world and things. It is in this that Cubism is phenomenological — with its demand for us to approach experience anew, it is both radical in its rejection of previous forms of depiction and also minimalist in its attempt to continuously purify, de-symbolize, dissolve the sense to its purest form. Interpreting Cubism is problematic and its theoretical analyses are varied. According to Francastel, we may study Cubism but should not look for its definition. In this respect our point of departure was the genealogy of phenomenological and cubistic aims at the beginning of the 20th century and their common practical endeavours and we found out, that the input of Czech specialists — on the one hand, in the work of Marie Bayerová and Tomáš Vlček, in the discussion of Jan Patočka with Walter Biemel and the mapping of points of overlap between phenomenology and the avant-garde done by Zdeněk Mathauser; on the other hand, in the artistic and theoretical texts of Czech Cubists — can be considered invaluable. Although points of overlap between phenomenology and Cubism may at first sight seem surprising, as we have tried to demonstrate, they exist both in thematic and programmatic areas as well as in methodological ones. In the wider sense, this overlap could also apply to their ambitions: if an image is «not meant to depict but to be, to work», as Didi-Huberman puts it (Didi-Huberman, 2006, 220; Didi-Huberman, 2010, 201), so phenomenology should not only create theory and syntheses but also look for a variety of themes, liberate seeing and capture the manifoldness of things themselves.22 R EFER ENCES Bayerová, M. (1995). Die Bedeutung der Intentionalität für die Bestimmung der Kategorie Beziehung. In J. Bloss, W. Stróżewski, & J. Zumr (Eds.), Intentionalität – Werte – 22

My thanks to Dr. J. Gresty for the English translation and Dr. R. Karul for help with the French texts. The text was written at the Institute of Philosophy SAS as part of the VEGA project 2/0050/14.

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Kunst. Husserl – Ingarden – Patočka (84-96). Prague: Filosofia. Bayerová, M., & Vlček, T. (1991). Kubismus, věda a filozofie – vztahy a inspirace [Cubism, Science and Philosophy – Relations and Inspirations]. In J. Švestka, & T. Vlček (Eds.), Český kubismus 1909 – 1925 [Czech Cubism 1909 – 1925] (44-53). Düsseldorf - Stuttgart. (in Czech). Blecha, I. (2007). Proměny fenomenologie [Transformations of Phenomenology]. Olomouc: Triton. (in Czech). Breuer, I. (2015). Die haptisch korrelative Genesis von Raum/Ort und eigener bzw. “intersubjektiver” Leiblichkeit an den Rändern der Phänomenologie Husserls: Die originäre Entstehung der Ur-präsenzen an den Grenzen der Gegebenheit. In J. Trajtelová (Ed.), The Yearbook on History and Interpretation of Phenomenology: New Generative Aspects in Contemporary Phenomenology: Vol. 3 (95-116). Frankfurt a. Main: Peter Lang Edition. Didi-Huberman, G. (2006). Pred časom. Dejiny umenia a  anachronizmus obrazov [Facing Time. History of Art and Anachronism of Images]. Bratislava: Kalligram. (in Slovak). Didi-Huberman, G. (2010). Devant le temps. Histoire de l’art et anachronisme des images. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit. Dufourcq, A. (2015). Merleau-Pontyho estetika [Merleau-Ponty’s Aesthetics]. Filozofia, 70 (9), 748-758. (in Slovak). Fabritius, H., & Hagedorn, L. (Eds.). (2005). Frühling in Prag oder Wege des Kubismus. München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. Filla, E. (1968). Práce oka [Work of the Eye]. In M. Lamač, Myšlenky moderních malířů [Ideas of Modern Painters] (341-342). Prague: Nakladatelství československých výtvarných umělců [Publishing House of Czechoslovak Artists]. (in Czech). Francastel, P. (1977). Peinture et société. Œuvres I. Paris: Denoël. Francastel, P. (2003). Malířství a společnosť [Painting and Society]. Brno: Barrister&Principal. (in Czech). Hofman, V. (2005). Die prosaische Schönheit der modernen Kunst. In H. Fabritius, & L. Hagedorn (Eds.), Frühling in Prag oder Wege des Kubismus (59-71). München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. Husserl, E. (1973). Ding und Raum. (Hua XVI). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

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Husserl, E. (1983). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy I. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Karul, R. (2015). Paradigmou súčasného umenia je neautenticita [Non-Authenticity: The Paradigm of Contemporary Art]. Filozofia, 70 (9), 736-747. (in Slovak). Kramář, V. (1958). Otázky moderního umění. K problémům umění první poloviny 20 století [Issues of Modern Art. On the Problems of Art in the first half of 20th Century]. Prague: Nakladatelství československých výtvarných umělců [Publishing House of Czechoslovak Artists]. (in Czech). Kramář, V. (2005). Der Kubismus. In H. Fabritius, & L. Hagedorn (Eds.), Frühling in Prag oder Wege des Kubismus (207-336). München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. Kubišta, B. (2005). Die zweite Ausstellung der Gruppe bildender Künstler im Obecní dům. In H. Fabritius, & L. Hagedorn (Eds.), Frühling in Prag oder Wege des Kubismus (39-44). München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. Lahoda, V. (2014). Cubist Territories. Ars, 47 (2), 109-112. Lamač, M. (1968). Myšlenky moderních malířů [Ideas of Modern Painters]. Prague: Nakladatelství československých výtvarných umělců [Publishing House of Czechoslovak Artists]. (in Czech). Lamač, M. (1988). Osma a Skupina výtvarných umělců 1907 – 1917 [The Eight Group and the Group of Fine Artists 1907 – 1917]. Prague: Odeon. (in Czech). Mathauser, Z. (1995). Mezi filozofií a poezií [Between Philosophy and Poetry]. Prague: Filosofia. (in Czech). Mathauser, Z. (2006). Básnivé nápovědi Husserlovy fenomenologie [Hints of Poetry in Husserl’s Phenomenology]. Prague: Filosofia. (in Czech). Merleau-Ponty, M. (2005). Phenomenology of Perception. London: Routledge. Patočka, J. (2004). Poznámky k polyperspektivě u Picassa [Notes on Picasso’s Polypespectivity by W. Biemel]. In J. Patočka, Umění a čas II [Art and Time] (3034, 412-413). Prague: OIKOYMENH. (in Czech). Pinotti, A. (2010). Cubism. In H. R. Sepp, & L. Embree (Eds.), Handbook of Phenomenological Esthetics. Dordrecht: Springer. Sepp, H. R. (1995). Der Kubismus als phänomenologisches Problem. In E. G. Valdés, & R. Zimmerling (Eds.), Facetten der Wahrheit (295-321). München: Karl Alber. Sepp, H. R. (1988). Annäherungen an die Wirklichkeit. Phänomenologie und Malerei

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nach 1900. In H. R. Sepp (Ed.), Edmund Husserl und die phänomenologische Bewegung: Zeugnisse in Text und Bild (77-93). München: Karl Alber. Sepp, H. R. (Ed.). (2004). Art & fenomen. Philosophie in Kunst. Prague: OIKOYMENH, DenkMal Verlag Bonn. Švestka, J., & Vlček, T. (Eds.). (1991). Český kubismus 1909–1925 [Czech Cubism 1909 – 1925]. Düsseldorf, Stuttgart. (in Czech). Vydrová, J. (2015). Fenomenológia a kubizmus – možnosti zblíženia [Phenomenology and Cubism: Possible Rapprochements]. Filozofia, 70 (10), 831-841. (in Slovak).

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HORIZON 5 (1) 2016 : I. Research : J. Josl : 232–246 ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ • STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY • STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE • ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES

doi: 10.18199/2226-5260-2016-5-1-232-246

THE END OF ART AND PATOČKA’S PHILOSOPHY OF ART JAN JOSL MА, postgradual student, Department of Aesthetics, Faculty of Arts, Charles University in Prague, 11642 Prague, Czech Republic. E-mail: [email protected] In this essay I consider the end-of-art thesis in its metaphysical and empirical versions. I show that both use the correspondence theory of truth as the basis for their conception of the history of art. As a counterpart to these theories I have chosen Patočka’s conception of the history of art. His theory is based also on the relationship between art and truth, but he conceives truth in the phenomenological sense of manifestation. In the rest of the essay I seek to show the consequences Patočka’s conception has for the history of art. In the first part, I set out to show Patocka’s critique of Hegel’s aesthetics as a system based on the correspondence theory of truth. In particular, I endeavour to explain his critique of some intrinsic problems of Hegel’s aesthetics, the general failure of Hegel’s system to achieve its goal, and, lastly, Hegel’s giving up on the meaning of the art in the present. I also seek to show that Danto’s version runs into the same problems and conclusions as Hegel’s. In the second part I discuss Patočka’s analysis of modern art and the aesthetic attitude, where he finds a hidden affinity between art and aletheia, which Hegel overlooked. The last part of the essay focuses on the consequences that the conception of the truth of art as aletheia have for the history of art. I conclude that art in such a conception represents an independent field of the manifestation of being in history beside philosophy. Moreover, modern and contemporary art do not mean the end of art; rather, they have their place in art history based on aletheia, since they are more focused on the manifestation itself than on what is manifested. Unlike Hegel and Danto, therefore, Patočka retains the historical meaning of modern and contemporary art. His conception of the history of art, summed up under the idea of aletheia, has greater explanatory potential than Hegel’s and Danto’s conceptions, and it retains the historical meaning of modern and contemporary art. Key words: Phenomenology, aesthetics, Jan Patočka, truth, Hegel, Danto, history of art.

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КОНЕЦ ИСКУССТВА И ФИЛОСОФИЯ ИСКУССТВА ПАТОЧКИ ЯН ЙОСЛЬ Магистр философии, постдокторант кафедры эстетики, факультета искусств Карлова Университета в Праге, 11642 Прага, Чешская республика. E-mail: [email protected] Автор рассматривает тезис о конце искусства в его метафизическом и эмпирическом вариантах. В основе концепции искусства, связанной с обоими вариантами, лежит корреспондентная теория истины. В противовес этим тезисам автор рассматривает концепцию истории искусства Паточки. Его теория также основывается на отношении между искусством и истиной, однако истину он понимает в феноменологическом смысле явленности. Затем автор пытается показать следствия концепции Паточки с точки зрения истории искусства. В первой части автор рассматривает критику Паточки гегелевской эстетики как системы, основанной на корреспондентной теории истины. В частности, автор проясняет критику некоторых внутренних апорий эстетики Гегеля, а также неудачу всей системы Гегеля, в особенности в отношении смысла искусства. Приводятся аргументы, согласно которым философия Артура Данто сталкивается с теми же проблемами, что и система Гегеля. Во второй части обсуждается анализ Паточки современного искусства и эстетической установки, а также обнаруженная им скрытая взаимосвязь между искусством и алетейей, не замеченная Гегелем. Последняя часть статьи выявляет следствия алетической концепции истины искусства для истории искусства. При такой концепции истины искусство представляет собой независимое поле явленности бытия в истории, наряду с философией. Более того, современное искусство не означает конца искусства; скорее, оно занимает присущее ему место в истории искусства, основываясь на алетейе — ведь это искусство сосредотачивается, скорее, на самой явленности, чем на том, что именно является. Таким образом, в отличие от Гегеля и Данто, Паточка сохраняет исторический смысл современного искусства. Его концепция истории искусства, основанная на алетейе, обладает большим объяснительным потенциалом, нежели концепции Гегеля и Данто. Ключевые слова: Феноменология, эстетика, Ян Паточка, истина, Гегель, Данто, история искусства.

The end-of-art thesis has two versions, one metaphysical, represented by Hegel, and one empirical, represented by Danto. Whereas for Hegel (1975) art has ended because of its inherent inability to represent the absolute, Danto (1984) simply states that the history of art is now a discontinuous «history of discontinuities» (Danto, 1984, 108) and that art died the moment technological development achieved the level of being a perfect copy of reality, which can easily be made by anyone who can use a digital camera. In this essay, I seek to demonstrate, with the help of Jan Patočka’s writings from

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the 1960s,1 that it is the history of art based on the conception of truth as adequatio which in both cases leads to such conclusions. Secondly, I seek to show that Patočka argues that this conception of truth is inadequate for art and that the history of art should be understood from the standpoint not of the correspondence theory of truth, but of the phenomenological conception of truth (aletheia) taken in the broad sense of manifestation. In the first part, I follow Patočka’s critique of Hegel’s aesthetics as a system based on the correspondence theory of truth, in particular, his critique of some intrinsic problems of Hegel’s aesthetics, the general failure of Hegel’s system to achieve its goal, and, lastly, Hegel’s giving up on the meaning of art in the present. In the second part, I undertake to demonstrate that Patočka finds an affinity not only between modern art and aletheia, but also between aletheia and the aesthetic attitude. In the last part of the essay I focus on some conclusions that follow from Patočka’s conception of the history of art and the role of art in the present. I During the second half of the 1960s, Hegel’s aesthetic theory appears in Patočka on two levels. The first level is Patočka’s work; he was translating Hegel’s Aesthetics into Czech at this time. The second is the philosophical level; Patočka was not only translating Hegel, but was also in a philosophical dialogue with him. Consequently, Patočka produced a number of essays on art from 1965 to 1966, dealing in one way or another with Hegel’s aesthetic theory. In particular, I have in mind «Hegel’s Aesthetic 1

Until recently, only a small number of works were concerned exclusively with Patočka’s philosophy of art. Naturally, one can reasonably take several different approaches to the topic. The first is mentioned by the editors of Umění a čas, vols I and II (Chavtík, & Vojtěch, 2004), who suggest that Patočkas’s remarks on art do not come from the heart of his philosophy: «The essays in these two volumes were written on different occasions, often as only a momentary response to a challenge arising from somewhere other than the core of Patočka’s own thinking.» (Chvatík, & Vojtěch, 2004, 369) On the other hand, many thinkers see Patočka’s philosophy of art as connected to one of his main philosophical ideas, like the natural world (Zuska, 2002), (Chvatík, 1990), or in connection to the theory of the three movements of life (Šrubař, 1987), or they see art as a reflection on of humankind’s place in a history (Biemel, 1987). Recently were finally published two monographies (Ševčík, 2014) and (Blahutková, & Ševčík, 2014) that are dealing only with Patočka’s philosophy of art. Authors of these two monographies, that should be read together, see Patočka’s philosophy of art as a place of manifestation of sense. This approach, by its accent on manifestation, is quite close to my own.

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Development», «Hegel’s Conception of Art as a Thing of the Past», «Hegel’s Philosophical and Aesthetic Development», and «Art and Time». In these works, Patočka presents Hegel’s late aesthetic theory as motivated by the question «to what extent is it in the power of truth, existing in the form of beauty, to make human beings fundamentally free» (Patočka 2004b, 217). The truth, which is supposed to free human beings, is, in Patočka’s view, conceived by Hegel as correspondence. «The main axis in this hierarchy consists in the idea of adequacy. Hegel starts from the traditional idea of adequatio intellectus ad rei, and states its possible variations.» (Patočka, 2004a, 275–276) Using the traditional conception of truth as adequatio intellectus et rei, Hegel formulates its three essential variations: speculative, that is, adequatio rei ad intellectum creantem; aesthetic, that is, adequatio intellectus finite ad infinitum; and logical in the sense of a proposition, adequatio intellectus finite ad rem creatam.2 Hegel’s idea of understanding art as an organ of beauty by its relation to the truth is in Patočka’s view a good point of departure. Since this attitude gives us a measure by which to define what art is and is not, what great art is and is not, and provide us with knowledge of how the artistic universe is organized, it also allows us to avoid a decline to arbitrariness of measures, programmes, and subjectivism (Patočka, 2004b, 223). Even though in Patočka’s view Hegel is right to consider the truth to be the essence of art, «he searches for the truth in the wrong place» (Patočka, 2004a, 302). One reason for Hegel’s misconception, according to Patočka, is that Hegel was seduced by the temptation to understand the very basis of our experience as the absolute subject, as God, and this is why, again according to Patočka, Hegel adopts the theologically motivated correspondence theory of truth (Patočka 2004a, 294). A consequence of Hegel’s approach, Patočka argues, is that the plurality of modern art «no longer expresses any general interest in which people could be united; instead, art has become a matter of subjective likes and interests […], its truth is secondary, and the liberation that art offers is incomplete.» (Patočka 2004b, 223) Patočka follows Hegel’s initial idea about the relationship of art to truth. He is

2

The very same division is mentioned in (Patočka, 2004b, 219-220). K vývoji Hegelových estetických názorů (On the development of Hegel’s aesthetic views), or repeated in (Patočka, 2004e, 323-324), «Učení o minulém rázu umění’» («Hegel’s Conception of Art as a Thing of the Past»).

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convinced, however, that a different conception of truth would be more appropriate for art. First of all, Patočka points out some shortcomings of the use of correspondence theory in Hegel’s aesthetics. In symbolic art, Hegel (Hegel, 1975a, 303–426), captivated by his own conception of truth as adequatio, overlooks, according to Patočka, a whole period of art that lay beyond Europe. Non-European art is not, despite what Hegel thinks, an imperfect art. On the contrary, the frame of the correspondence theory of truth, which is implicit in Hegel, is simply not, according to Patočka, capable of dealing with the variety of artistic styles: Symbolic art, however, contains the whole of the ancient Orient, Persia, India, Mesopotamia, and, primarily, Egypt, Jewish, and Islamic verse, and so forth; Hegel does not mention East Asian art at all, but it should be mentioned here. This means that the biggest part of artistic development, in fact all art outside Europe, has escaped Hegel’s conception. (Patočka, 2004a, 299)

I believe that this does not hold for Hegel. Though Danto’s theory rests not on any metaphysical principle like God or the Absolute, but on the idea of the perfect copy, it is clear that at heart it relies on the same principle as Hegel’s system, that is, that the truth of art rests in correspondence. Danto not only explicitly refers to Hegel as the source of his theory, but he also runs into the very same problems as Hegel. Using the idea of the perfect copy as the truth of art, Danto is forced to consider Chinese and Japanese art to have been «retarded by technological slowness» (Danto, 1984, 91), instead of accepting its difference. Not only is the correspondence theory unable to handle a variety of artistic styles, it is also unable to handle a variety of types of art. Patočka finds an example of this in Hegel’s conception of architecture (Hegel, 1975b, 630–700): It is most perfectly evident in architecture, which he [Hegel] has completely dissociated from the applied arts and by the term of the spiritual, put together with the depictive and expressive arts of sculpture, painting, and music. True, he succeeded in achieving some deep insights into the common origin of sculpture and architecture as well as into the late origin of purposefully artistic architecture; yet the notion that art should depict or express the Absolute fails most evidently here. (Patočka, 2004a, 301)

Amongst types of art, architecture thus represents for Hegel the imperfection of identity of form and meaning, which symbolic art represents for him in the area of artistic styles. Hegel is, Patočka’s argues, blind to the fact that works of architecture

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serve rather as something like orientation points in our world, representing the way we understand and live in space. Patočka gives an example of this in «An Essay on Read’s Book on Sculpture» (Patočka, 2004 ff., 441–453). Here, he describes how a prehistorical monolith introduces into reality the dimensions of close and far, home and foreign, and thus represents the origin of architecture and our understanding of space. And Danto again encounters the same problems as Hegel. If the history of art is taken as progress in the accuracy of duplication, then we are forced to deny the history, for example, of literature or music. Starting from Patočka’s critique of Hegel, we now see that a theory of the history of art based on the correspondence theory of truth will probably have significant difficulties in grasping the phenomena of art in the fullness of its historical styles and types. A pattern of searching, reaching, and overcoming an ideal inherent to the end-of-art thesis, either in its metaphysical form (Hegel) or in its empirical form (Danto), is in fact the very thing that flattens our view of art. II In his writings from the 1960s, Patočka strives to overcome these shortcomings of the history of art which are based on the correspondence theory of truth, and finds in art its relation to the phenomenological conception of truth conceived as aletheia.3 In «Art and Time», Patočka notes that, with respect to the modern art of Cézanne, Kandinsky, and Mondrian, metaphysical meaning ceases to have any importance. Modern art has given up on any positive meaning or idea. It has also given up on presenting anything specific (Patočka, 2015, 104). In this characterization of modern art, Patočka is in agreement with Hegel and also with Danto, for whom modern art «will bring into existence works which lack historical importance or meaning» (Danto, 1984, 111). But Patočka disagrees with the conclusions. The lack of meaning does not, he argues, suggest that the history of art has ended. Rather, it suggests, according to him, that modern art draws our attention away from what is manifested and turns it instead to the manifestation itself. Modern art is, in Patočka’s view, «art that wants to be as close 3

The fact that Patočka discovers in Hegel a notion of the truth of art that is close to Heidegger’s and is distinct from «correctness» is mentioned also in (Major, 1967; Legros, 1992; Ševčík, 2015).

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as possible to the source of meaning when it is born in our senses» (Patočka, 2004e, 344). In modern art, he writes, «it is no longer a work of art whose intention is somehow to say, to communicate, what controls its inner world — rather, the world then crystallizes into a world of meaning, which exists only in the work of art and by its grace.» (Patočka, 2015, 105) Another example of relationship between modern art and manifestation can be found in Patočka’s «Some Remarks on Polyperspectivity in Picasso by Walter Biemel» (Patočka, 2004c, 30–34). According to Patočka, polyperspectivity in Picasso’s work originates not, as Biemel suggests, in the technological spirit of the period, but in the artist’s efforts to go directly to the elements that make painting and its manifestation possible in the first place. To sum up, Patočka, contrary to Hegel, does not disapprove of modern and post-Romantic art, and he discovers its genuine relationship with manifestation, that is, aletheia. But Patočka does not see the relationship between art and aletheia as residing only in modern art. He also sees it at the very heart of the aesthetic experience. In his essay «Hegel’s Conception of Art as a Thing of the Past», Patočka discovers aletheia in Hegel’s own conception of the aesthetic attitude. When summarizing Hegel’s notion of the aesthetic attitude, he starts with the difference between the aesthetic attitude and the theoretical and practical attitudes. The difference between them, he notes, is reflected in our attitudes towards the world. Whereas theoretical and practical attitudes have their roots in the limited dimension of things in the world, with the aesthetic attitude we do not deal with singular things, with different purposes, with usefulness and effectiveness; instead, we and the thing are free from these worldly relations. With the aesthetic attitude we are therefore dealing with the global aspect of things. It is the world as a whole that appeals to us in aesthetic experience (Patočka, 2004a, 290). Just how close or distant to Husserl and the classic formulation of the aesthetic attitude is this phenomenological shift to the manifestation itself, liberation from worldly relations, as described by Patočka? Patočka briefly describes the effect that art has on the viewer as a «fantastic reflection» (Patočka, 2006, 288). This «fantastic reflection», however, must be understood differently from Husserl’s conception of reflection in fantasy. Patočka has several objections to Husserl’s conception of reflection. The first has to do with the reach of reflection. In both the postscript to the Czech edition of Cartesian

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Meditations and in «The Natural World Reconsidered Thirty-three Years Later», Patočka argues similarly against Husserl. According to Patočka, reflection does not go beyond the evidence of self-existence. Consequently, reflection includes nothing about the structure or content of our existence (Patočka, 1968, 183; and Patočka, 2009, 267). He sees the second problem in the nature of reflection, and questions the idea that reflection is theoretical in nature: In its true nature does reflection really mean reshaping the bond that binds me to my existence? Is it really, because of that, an approach to a completely different Self, to the absolute transcendental subject, to the stream of experience that constitutes the whole of objectivity? Is the stream of experience, where every experience has its type, its essence and even its essential relation to other experiences, really the essence of my being? Is such a conception not a profound misunderstanding of one’s own self, of one’s own being? (Patočka, 2009, 268)

Rather, argues Patočka, reflection has practical purpose. Reflection does not mean to step out of the world as is suggested, in Patočka’s view, by Husserl. The true purpose of reflection is to serve as an opposite movement to the movement of falling into the world in Heideggerian terms. The purpose of reflection thus represents Patočka’s third objection to Husserl’s conception of reflection (Patočka, 2009, 269). The last point of Patočka’s discussion with Husserl concerns the possibility of reflection: We either understand the concept of reflection as absolute self-evidence, but then reflection is truly going to be a leap into a kind of being radically different from the being of prereflexive life, or we have to rob reflection of its access to absolute immanence, to being that is not given in anticipations (in perspectives). (Patočka, 2009, 270–271)

Such reflection gives us being and world in their various perspectives, but provides no knowledge of absolute world structures. The history of art, for Patočka, thus expresses a different understanding of the world and of being in time: The world of our life (Lebenswelt) is the world of this special life; in different lives and worlds there are of course some common features, but they are woven together in special ways connected with this concrete life, its destiny, and its dénouement. (Patočka, 2006, 291)

This is why, according to Patočka, a work of literature, and in fact any work of art, is a «conjuring up of the world in its special essence» (Patočka, 2006, 290). Patočka’s

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«fantastic reflection» should therefore be understood in the light of these objections, which moves his position considerably closer to Heidegger’s. To sum up, we may say that Patočka’s aesthetic attitude is based on practical reflection that makes us disinterested in the worldly relation in terms of everydayness and inauthenticity in order to open up the world and being in their historical, yet total aspect: The viewer who considering how one’s approach to life and things is created is not completely disinterested; rather, he is fighting against the dilution of his interest in his own being into individual factual interests, interested in disinterestedness, in truth — and in this will to freedom from being thrall to his own factual self and its interests he is nevertheless a worldly spectator, even if not explicitly positing the world. (Patočka 2009, 270)

But what makes this kind of attitude possible? Patočka points out that it is not in fact anything. Rather, it is nothing, the power of negativity, death, and the past that are at the core of the aesthetic attitude. Heidegger argues that these are capable of freeing us from our worldly interests. Aesthetic experience is for Patočka, then, close to the anxiety that reveals the world as a whole in Heideggerian terms, but with a slight difference: Beauty is not the terrifying. It is, as Rilke said, only its beginning, the gaze of the eternal back on earth, as Klee said; it is the Indian Bacchus that veils himself in sensation and the image, under which, according to Hegel, lurks the terrifying. The negativity of nothingness manifests itself not in this its pure form, but in its positivity, in its overcoming the finitude of the present moment. (Patočka, 2004e, 344)

It is thanks to this negativity hidden in art that in the aesthetic attitude we and the work of art are liberated from worldly relations. The free nature of the aesthetic attitude is, in Patočka’s view, similar to the freedom that we can find in a game. But, compared to a game, the game of the aesthetic attitude is free from the world not merely in some aspects, but absolutely. Patočka therefore concludes: «Art is an absolute game, that is, a game that does not presuppose any previous a priori existence; rather, it is the game of this existence itself.» (Patočka, 2004e, 343) Whereas in the ludic character of modern art Hegel and Danto see evidence that it no longer has a historical meaning and that art has actually lost the freedom to entertain and other purposes, Patočka argues the opposite. Originating in the phenomenological position, the ludic character of the aesthetic attitude is, for him, a field in which the subject and the work of art can manifest themselves for themselves

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because they are free from any external ideas or measures. Consequently, at the heart of the aesthetic attitude lies hidden, for Patočka, the inherent relationship between art and manifestation itself. III These are the reasons why Patočka believes that the truth of art rests in aletheia rather than in the correspondence to either the metaphysical or the empirical ideal. But what are the consequences of this for the history of art? Ever since Plato, art has often been discredited by the correspondence idea of truth. In Book Ten of the Republic, Plato criticizes art conceived as mimesis mimeseos that represents the lowest level of truth and is even considered to be dangerous.4 For Hegel, art is also the lowest possible form of truth. The position of art in these theories is always dependent on the broader philosophical context, that is, what is considered to be true being. Art is then condemned on the basis of its correspondence to it. If aletheia is the truth of the art, then art creates an independent field of manifestation that has no need of any other external source to fill it with meaning. Art as aletheia contains its meaning in itself. It is fair to say that Patočka’s conception of art as aletheia thus offers a way to free the history of art from the sway of correspondence theory. If this is so, then modern art in no way represents the end of art, contrary to what Hegel and Danto suggest. The lack of reference to such meaning, either in its metaphysical version (true being) or in its empirical version (perfect copy), therefore does not imply that art is finished. In fact, modern art, having given up on presenting anything concrete, is, for Patočka, the most sincere art so far, because it draws our attention away from what is manifested and turns it to manifestation itself. Modern art thus returns to the source of aletheia, that is, in «[Wolfgang] Weischedel’s terms, problematicity; in Heidegger’s terms, the concealment of what-is as a whole as the foundation of all openness and all uncovering. Thus, it is this mystery that expresses itself in the shaking of naively accepted

4

See Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato’s doctrine of truth (Heidegger, 1998, 155–182). Heidegger demonstrates that Plato eventually subscribes to truth conceived as correctness of view. It is from this conception that Plato criticizes art in Book Ten of the Republic.

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meaning.» (Patočka, 1996, 77) Since, for Patočka, the historical character of art comes from aletheia as the process of manifestation, the course of the history of art reflects humankind’s relationship to the source of manifestation, its epiphany to us, and our effort to understand it and name it, rather than our searching and reaching for some ideal. It is true that in «Art and Time» Patočka suggests that the history of art may be divided into two great periods; one he calls «artistic», the other «aesthetic». A work of art is truly either a gate to metaphysical reality, in which case modern art represents a decline, or it is an autonomous sign and any metaphysical qualification of art is an illusion. But as Miloš Ševčík has clearly argued, in the context of Patočka’s later works‚ «the meaning of earlier art can reasonably be seen as a supposedly definitive meaning, religious in nature, which disguises the disclosed problematic nature of meaning. The meaning of modern art, on the other hand, can be seen as meaning that is problematic but stems from an explicit relation to being.» (Ševčík, 2015, 96) Without going into the details of the development of these divisions in Patočka’s philosophy, I wish to point out that such an outline of the history of art would have been impossible if Patočka had not approached the history of art from the phenomenological standpoint of manifestation. True, he himself had serious doubts about works of contemporary art. He describes post-1945 art as cybernetic, industrial, energetic, nanotechnical, and even non-European.5 Nevertheless, Patočka is more tolerant of our technical age than Husserl or Heidegger. In Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History, he argues that technological civilization is not completely decadent, and gives two reasons towards explaining why this is so. The first is that the decadent character of technological civilization is not entirely its own fault; rather, it is partly an inherited problem. The second, and most important, reason is that the technological age contains within itself

5

In 1969, Patočka visited an exhibition of post-1945 American painting, where he had an opportunity to see, for example, works by Andy Warhol, Roy Lichtenstein, and Lowell Nesbitt. Patočka summarizes his impressions as follows: «If we go to an exhibition of contemporary American painting, we will from the very beginning encounter an absolutely different atmosphere from the one that has hitherto been considered «modern’ post-Cubist art. The deformation and transformation of form, as well as the search for the laws of structure, the world of dreams and forms, have all almost entirely vanished. There is no more making the invisible visible in the spiritual sense; all we see is the forces of industrial production of our nanotechnical age that presents to our eyes the artefacts they produce.» (Patočka, 1999, 87–88)

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the possibility of a «turn from accidental rule to the rule of those who understand what history is about» (Patočka, 1996, 118), that is, history as the shaken certitude of pre-given meaning. And we may therefore suppose that in Patočka’s position there is no reason why the technical age cannot have its own artistic expression: «We do not see why the prosaic and hypertechnical age — in spite of all the suffering and excess that it causes to man beyond the usual biologically human measure — cannot find aesthetic liberation and manifestation of being commensurate to itself.» (Patočka, 2004e, 347) Thomas Mann’s Doctor Faustus (1947) is for Patočka an example of such an artwork. According to Patočka, the main topic of this novel is «to create a work of art at a miserable time, when all resources and possibilities seem to be exhausted» (Patočka, 2004d, 520). The main character, Adrian Leverkühn, is an artist who willingly makes a pact with the Devil, that is, with the evil of the world, in order to create an absolute masterpiece. For Patočka, this means that he does not consider evil to be a power independent of himself, but rather that he does indeed take responsibility for his actions. This responsibility, discovered by a guilty conscience, illustrates the dialectical relationship between art and technological reality. On the one hand, the art of today accepts technological development, and in many cases falls into the trap of the industrialization of culture, the machinery of supply and demand, and the influence of the mass media, and, as Danto and Hegel fear, loses its free character. On the other hand, art represents an area where technological progress is put into the service of human creativity and freedom, and thus gives rise to the feeling that in other areas we are guilty of having let technology control our actions. Ultimately, even contemporary art can, for Patočka, represent the creative power of «human beings, that is, an ability to allow being to manifest itself» (Patočka, 2015, 112) and therefore even in the technological age art can, for Patočka, be a place of human freedom and aletheia. It should be clear from the preceding discussion, I hope, that the pattern of searching, reaching, and overcoming an ideal that is inherent to the history of art based on correspondence theory leads to the end-of-art thesis. I have tried here to show too that Patočka considers aletheia to be the truth of art based on his interpretation of modern artworks as well as on his analysis of the aesthetic attitude. Eventually, I suggested that since Patočka considers art under the idea of aletheia, and not under

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correspondence, his approach not only has greater explanatory potential, but also offers a way to keep the historical meaning of art face to face with the end of art and cultural pessimism in the circumstances of today. R EFER ENCES Biemel, W. (1985). Bemerkungen zu Jan Patočkas Deutung der Kunst. Phanomenologishe Forschungen: Studien zur Philosophie von Jan Patočka, 17, 32–52. Blahutková, D., & Ševčík, M. (2014). Patočkovy interpretace literatury [Patočka’s Interpretations of Literature]. Červený Kostelec: Pavel Mervart. (in Czech). Chvatík, I., & Vojtěch, D. (2004). Ediční komentář [Editorial note]. In J. Patočka, Umění a čas [Art and Time]: Vol. I (367–428). Prague: Oikoymenh. (in Czech). Chvatík, K. (1990). Filosofie umění Jana Patočky [Jan Patočka’s Philosophy of Art]. Proměny, 27 (4), 28–33. (in Czech). Danto, A. C. (1984). The End of Art. The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (81– 116). New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Hegel, G. F. W. (1975a). Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art: Vol. I. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hegel, G. F. W. (1975b). Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art: Vol. II. Oxford: Oxford University Press Heidegger, M. (1998). Plato’s Doctrine of Truth. In W. McNeill (Ed.), Pathmarks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Legros, R. (1992). Patočka et Hegel. In M. Richir, & E. Tassin (Eds.), Jan Patočka: Philosophie, phénomenologie, politique (45–53). Grenoble: Millon. Major, L. (1967). Sebeuvědomění a čas: K Patočkově interpretaci Hegelovy estetiky [Selfawarness and Time: Notes on Patočka’s Interpretations of Hegel’s Aesthetics]. Filosofický časopis, 15, 625–635. (in Czech). Patočka, J. (1968). Husserlova fenomenologická filosofie a “Karteziánské meditace” [Husserl’s Phenomenological Philosophy and “Cartesian Meditations”]. In E. Husserl, Karteziánské meditace [Cartesian Meditations] (161-190). Prague: Svoboda. (in Czech). Patočka, J. (1996). Does History Have a Meaning? In J. Dodd (Ed.), Heretical Essays in

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the Philosophy of History. Chicago, IL: Open Court. Patočka, J. (1999). Evropa a doba poevropská [Europe and Post-Europe]. In Péče o duši II [Care for the Soul]. Sebrané spisy [Collected Works]: Vol. II. Prague: Oikoymenh. (in Czech). Patočka, J. (2004a). Hegelův filosofický a estetický vývoj [Hegel’s Philosophical and Aesthetic Development]. In J. Patočka, Umění a čas [Art and Time]: Vol. I (227– 302) Prague: Oikoymenh. (in Czech). Patočka, J. (2004b). K vývoji Hegelových estetických názorů [On the Development of Hegel’s Aesthetic Views]. In J. Patočka, Umění a čas [Art and Time]: Vol. I (216– 226). Prague: Oikoymenh. (in Czech). Patočka, J. (2004c). Poznámky k polyperspektivě u Picassa [Some Remarks on Polypercpectivity in Picasso]. In J. Patočka, Umění a čas [Art and Time]: Vol. II (30–34). Prague: Oikoymenh. (in Czech). Patočka, J. (2004d). Smysl mýtu o paktu s ďáblem [The Meaning of Myth about Pact with the Devil]. In J. Patočka, Umění a čas [Art and Time]: Vol. I (510–525). Prague: Oikoymenh. (in Czech). Patočka, J. (2004e). Učení o minulém rázu umění [Hegel’s Conception of Art as a Thing of the Past]. In J. Patočka, Umění a čas [Art and Time]: Vol. I (319–347). Prague: Oikoymenh. (in Czech). Patočka, J. (2004f). Úvahy nad Readovou knihou o sochařství [An Essay on Read’s Book on Sculpture]. In J. Patočka, Umění a čas [Art and Time]: Vol. I (441–453). Prague: Oikoymenh. (in Czech). Patočka, J. (2006). Spisovatel a jeho věc [Writer and his Thing]. In Češi [Czechs]: Vol I (280–292). Prague: Oikoymenh. (in Czech). Patočka, J. (2009). “Přirozený svět” v meditaci svého autora po třiatřiceti letech [“The Natural World” Reconsidered thirty-three Years Later]. In Fenomenologické spisy II (265-334). Prague: Oikoymenh. (in Czech). Patočka, J. (2015). Art and Time. Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics, 52(1), 99-113. Ševčík, M. (2014) Umění jako vyjádření smyslu: Filozofie umění Jana Patočky [Art as an Expression of Sense: Jan Patočka’s Philosophy of Art]. Červený Kostelec: Pavel Mervart. (in Czech).

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Ševčík, M. (2015). Patočka’s Interpretations of Hegel’s Thesis on the Past Character of Art. Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics, 52(1), 78–113. Šrubař, I. (1987). Zur Stellung der Kunst in Patočkas Philosophie. In J. Patočka, Kunst und Zeit (31-48). Stuttgart: Klett Cotta. Zuska, V. (2002). Mimésis — fikce — distance: k estetice XX. století [Mimésis — Fiction — Distance: to the Aesthetics of the XXth Century]. Prague: Triton.

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HORIZON 5 (1) 2016 : II. Translations & Commentaries : O. Bessmel’tseva : The Preface to the Translation : 247–257 ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ • STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY • STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE • ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES

II. ПЕРЕВОДЫ И КОММЕНТАРИИ doi: 10.18199/2226-5260-2016-5-1-247-257

ПРЕДИСЛОВИЕ К ПУБЛИКАЦИИ П ­ ЕРЕВОДА ­­7­ ­П АРАГРАФА ­ВТОРОЙ ЧАСТИ ­С ТАТЬИ МОРИЦА ГАЙГЕРА «К ­ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИИ ЭСТЕТИЧЕСКОГО НАСЛАЖДЕНИЯ» ОЛЕСЯ БЕССМЕЛЬЦЕВА Студент 2-го курса магистратуры кафедры истории зарубежных литератур Филологического факультета Санкт-Петербургского государственного университета, 199034 Санкт-Петербург, Россия. E-mail: [email protected]

АНДРЕЙ ПАТКУЛЬ (ред.) Кандидат философских наук, старший преподаватель кафедры онтологии и теории познания Института философии Санкт-Петербургского государственного университета, 199034 СанктПетербург, Россия. E-mail: [email protected] Приведённый ниже фрагмент статьи знакомит с эстетическими исследованиями немецкого философа первой половины XX в. М. Гайгера, положившими начало феноменологической эстетике. Являясь учеником многих ярких представителей психологической эстетики (Вундт, Липс), Гайгер, с одной стороны, симпатизирует психологическому подходу, открывшему философской эстетике путь из области спекуляций в сферу эмпирического опыта. С другой стороны, Гайгер тесно связан с феноменологией и Гуссерлем и с 1907 входит в круг мюнхенской феноменологической школы. Гайгер обнаруживает в феноменологическом подходе возможность сместить фокус от переживающего субъекта к эстетическому объекту и настаивает на допустимости и необходимости говорить об объективных эстетических характеристиках произведения искусства. Такого рода эстетическими ценностями должен обладать объект

© OLESYA BESSMEL’TSEVA, 2016 © ANDREI PATKUL, ED., 2016

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эстетического наслаждения, и в представляемом фрагменте Гайгер исследует прежде всего феноменологическую природу эстетического наслаждения. Здесь Гайгер отталкивается от кантовских рассуждений об особенностях эстетического чувства и рассматривает эстетическое наслаждение в его отношении к интересу и воле субъекта. Сопровождающее фрагмент предисловие даёт представление об общей структуре статьи, предполагающей пошаговое сужение поля исследования от определения феноменологических рамок наслаждения вообще к анализу непосредственно эстетического наслаждения и его связи с теорией ценности и психологической феноменологией. Таким образом, главными особенностями феноменологического метода Гайгера можно считать тщательность в анализе избранной феноменологической сферы, стремление обойтись без схематизаций и упрощений. Отсюда особый языковой стиль Гайгера и его тонкое чувство языка, благодаря которому становится возможным выделение мельчайших нюансов наслаждения. Ключевые слова: Феноменологическая эстетика, психологизм, эстетическое наслаждение, воля, интерес, Кант, Шопенгауэр.

THE PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION OF THE 7 TH PARAGRAPH OF SECOND PART OF THE ARTICLE «ON THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE AESTHETIC ENJOYMENT» BY MORITZ GEIGER OLESYA BESSMEL’TSEVA The second-year master´s student of the Department of History of Foreign Literatures at the Faculty of Philology at the St. Petersburg State University, 199034 St. Petersburg, Russia. E-mail: [email protected]

ANDREI PATKUL (ed.) PhD in Philosophy, senior lecturer of the Department of Ontology and Epistemology at Institute of Philosophy, St. Petersburg State University, 199034 St. Petersburg, Russia. E-mail: [email protected] The following fragment represents the aesthetical researches of the German philosopher Moritz Geiger acted in the first half of the 20th century, whose works are considered to have initiated the phenomenological approach in the aesthetic domain. Being a fellow by many bright personalities, the representatives of the psychological aesthetic (Wundt, Lipps), Geiger favours on the one hand the psychological approach for it leads out of the speculative philosophism into empirical experience. On the other hand Geiger gets close with phenomenology and Husserl and belongs since 1907 to the Munich school of phenomenology. Geiger sees in the phenomenological approach an opportunity to shift the focus from the feeling subject to the aesthetic object. He insists on the permissibility and rather necessity of speaking about the objective aesthetic characteristics of an artwork. They are the aesthetic values, which mark an object of aesthetic enjoyment. So in the fragment below Geiger focuses first on the

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phenomenological nature of the aesthetic enjoyment. In the attached fragment Geiger proceeds from the Kantian argumentation about the particularities of aesthetic enjoyment and analyses the aesthetic enjoyment in its relation to the interest and the will of an individual as an enjoying subject. The preface introduces the general structure of the article, its stepwise concretizing of the problem domain beginning with the outline of the phenomenological bounds of pleasure in general and moving toward the narrow analysis of the aesthetic enjoyment in particular and its relation to the axiology and the psychological phenomenology. Thus the main peculiarities of Geiger’s phenomenological method could be put to the scrutiny of his analysis of the chosen distinct domain as well as his tendency to avoid any schematism and any simplification within the domain. That makes Geiger’s language such an subtle and sensitive instrument for it should be able to articulate the slightest nuances of pleasure types. Key words: Phenomenological aesthetic, psychologism, aesthetic enjoyment, will, interests, Kant, Schopenhauer.

Приведённый ниже перевод знакомит читателей журнала с представителем феноменологической философии Морицем Гайгером (1880-1937), учеником Т. Липса и В. Вундта, участником мюнхенского кружка, одним из соиздателей «Ежегодника по философии и феноменологическому исследованию» (выходил с 1913 по 1930 г.г.). Данный текст — это отрывок из статьи Гайгера «К феноменологии эстетического наслаждения» (1913), вышедшей в первом выпуске ежегодника. Незадолго до получения учёной степени и доцентуры (в 1907 г.) Гайгер некоторое время сотрудничает с Э. Гуссерлем. В своей статье от 1913 г. Гайгер обращается к феноменологическому методу как к инструменту, с помощью которого он стремится внести ясность в философское исследование природы эстетического наслаждения на фоне актуальных философских дебатов «об эмпирико-психологическом или аксиологическом основании эстетики» (Allesch, 2006, 46). Размышления, представленные в этой статье и развиваемые Гайгером в его дальнейших исследованиях, составили его портрет в философской науке второй половины XX в. как основателя феноменологической эстетики (Allesch, 2006, 43). При этом Гайгер во многом остаётся сторонником взглядов Липса, принадлежащего к направлению психологической эстетики, и многократно цитирует его с одобрением. С другой стороны, Гайгер недвусмысленно показывает себя как критик теории вчувствования (Einfühlungstheorie) Липса, критик «благосклонный, но из тех, кого следует принимать всерьёз» (Allesch, 2006, 43). Как резюмирует в своей монографии профессор зальцбургского университета К. Алеш, Гайгер «приписывает психологической эстетике из исторической перспективы

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заслугу в преодолении интеллектуализма в эстетике, в рамках которого вопрос об эстетическом переживании практически оставался вынесенным за скобки. Но, с другой стороны, по мнению Гайгера, как раз эти психологически-эстетические направления зачастую впадают в противоположную крайность, а именно — в не менее односторонний “сентиментализм”» (Allesch, 2006, 48). Другой исследователь А. Микунас, профессор университета Огайо, высказывает мнение, что Гайгер разрабатывает свой подход к теории эстетики, «систематически анализируя четыре основных сферы и их отношения к эстетике: (1) критику метафизического подхода [...]; (2) кантианский поворот и результирующую из него субъективацию эстетических ценностей [...]; (3) современные усилия психологии предоставить базис для эстетических ценностей; (4) ценности в композиции произведения искусства и их позитивное содержание» (Mickunas, 1989, 44). При этом Микунас отмечает, что Гайгер не разрабатывает «всеохватную “систему”» (Mickunas, 1989, 55), что он «не стремится к интегрированию эстетического удовольствия в область эстетики аффекта, а эстетической апперцепции — в область эстетических ценностей» (Mickunas, 1989, 43), но «движется назад к феномену» (Mickunas, 1989, 55). «В этом смысле», заключает Микунас, «Гайгер был [...] феноменологом, выбравшим определённую сферу феноменологического исследования и неотступно следовавшим выбранному курсу, куда бы ни завела его сложность предмета его исследования». (Mickunas, 1989, 56). Вероятно, полагает Микунас, такая специфика эстетических исследований Гайгера стала поводом для Гуссерля назвать своего коллегу в одном из писем к Р. Ингардену «феноменологом лишь на четверть» («nur 1/4 Phänomenologe»; Husserl, 1968, 23). Кроме того, считает Микунас, в силу этой кажущейся узости, исследования Гайгера были несправедливо вытеснены из поля интересов философии, по крайней мере, в рамках американского научного пространства второй половины XX в. (Mickunas, 1989, 43). Представляемая читателям журнала «Horizon. Феноменологические исследования» статья Гайгера состоит из четырёх смысловых блоков. Во введении очерчивается проблемное поле и определяется метод исследования. Гайгер ставит своё исследование в контекст не только философской эстетики, но и психологии наслаждения. С одной стороны, он критикует умозрительность общей теории эстетики, с другой — узость психологического подхода, который рассматривает

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эстетическое наслаждение как одно из чувств, отличающееся от других лишь интенсивностью и степенью доставляемого субъекту удовольствия. Гайгер, напротив, ставит целью обнаружить «специфически эстетические качества чувств» (Geiger, 1913, 579) через описание эстетического наслаждения как самостоятельного феномена. Он исключает из исследования анализ видов и свойств эстетических предметов, но сосредотачивается на проблеме выделения собственно наслаждения из ряда родственных эмоций и обнаружения особых признаков, отличающих всякое эстетическое наслаждение от неэстетического. При этом Гайгер желает действовать не психологически-объяснительным методом, спрашивающем о чувственных мотивах наслаждения, но аналитически-описательным методом, в рамках которого «все объясняющие, все причинно-психологические моменты должны сознательно исключаться» (Geiger, 1913, 582). В первой части «Наслаждения» рассматривается общий феномен наслаждения, частным случаем которого будет наслаждение эстетическое. Прежде всего, Гайгер выделяет наслаждение из ряда других приятных эмоций. В отличие от радости, чувство наслаждения имеет дело исключительно с объектом и не требует для себя иных оснований. Гайгер считает необходимым отличать источник и воздействие наслаждения от его феноменологической сущности, дистанцируясь, в частности, от Аристотеля, у которого наслаждение определяется через его следствие — катарсис и духовное очищение (Geiger, 1913, 593). Общим признаком всякого наслаждения, по Гайгеру, является то, что оно не требует для себя оснований. Отсутствие оснований является причиной самодостаточности всякого наслаждения, вследствие которой субъект, испытывая наслаждение, оказывается отрешён от внешнего мира, выпадает из обычной жизни пока длится наслаждение (Geiger, 1913, 596-597). Гайгер спрашивает о способе данности объекта наслаждения и подчёркивает роль «наглядности», «чувственной явленности» (Geiger, 1913, 601). Объект должен быть дан определённым образом, в полноте «“осязаемых” моментов» («greifbar») неважно, мысленно представляемых или воспринимаемых непосредственно (Geiger, 1913, 602). Далее важна установка субъекта, испытывающего наслаждение, к чувству наслаждения. Главный вопрос здесь — о направлении «духовного движения» в момент переживания наслаждения: от Я к предмету (так радость всегда обращена к событию, её вызвавшему) или наоборот. Для наслаждения, заключает Гайгер,

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характерно второе, т.е. пассивное принятие субъектом того, что исходит от предмета (Geiger, 1913, 604-605), даже когда процесс «схватывания» предмета наслаждения требует от Я активности (например, принятие пищи, спорт и т.д.). Гайгер стремится освободить феномен наслаждения от любых волевых моментов, определяя его сущность как пассивное предоставление субъектом своего Я воздействию предмета наслаждения. Поэтому Я в момент наслаждения испытывает самоё себя особым способом. В отличие от гнева или поглощённости желанием, где субъект почти не осознаёт своего Я, в наслаждении, считает Гайгер, с самого начала важно участие субъекта как Я, которое чувствует на себе действие наслаждения, хотя степень этого участия, степень «растворения Я в наслаждении», «его идентификации с наслаждением» (Geiger, 1913, 614) может быть разной. Наслаждение, которое возникает в результате действия всех отмеченных моментов, Гайгер описывает как «определённый вид возбуждённости Я» (Geiger, 1913, 615) в результате воздействия на него объекта наслаждения. Этот факт даёт оправдание сторонникам этики наслаждения, которые хотят видеть «в многогранности наслаждения [...] богатство собственного Я» (Geiger, 1913, 618). Однако в силу того, что в наслаждении участвует только Я принимающее, но не Я критическое, Гайгер склонен охарактеризовать наслаждение как чувство «полностью неинтеллектуальное» и «примитивное», к которому способен любой человек, обладающий сознанием (Geiger, 1913, 628). С другой стороны, это центрированное в Я чувство способно раскрывать глубины Я, которые недоступны для других эмоций в силу их направленности от Я к объекту. Так эстетическое чувство, наиболее глубокая форма наслаждения, может развиться в сложное переживание. Во второй части «Эстетического наслаждения», из которой взят предлагаемый ниже отрывок, Гайгер на основании полученного описания феномена наслаждения анализирует особенности эстетического чувства. До сих пор последнее исследовалось в психологии без учёта феномена наслаждения вообще, что не давало ясной картины. По остроумному замечанию Гайгера такое неразличение приводит к противоречивой ситуации, когда в человеке всеми силами стремятся пробудить способность к эстетическому наслаждению и одновременно «жалуются на растущую жажду наслаждений среди граждан» (Geiger, 1913, 629). Гайгер различает эстетическое наслаждение в широком смысле и

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наслаждение предметами искусства и указывает на ошибку в стремлении эстетики, основанной на эстетическом чувстве, вывести особенности «прекрасного» из наслаждения. Гайгер берёт эстетическое наслаждение в широком смысле и выделяет в качестве его принципиальной особенности созерцательность, т.е. некоторую внутреннюю дистанцию наслаждающегося субъекта от предмета наслаждения (например, от вкуса вина при дегустации в отличие от случая, когда вино пьют, чтобы утолить жажду) (Geiger, 1913, 632). Это «сознание наслаждения» обуславливает более «живую и осознаваемую чеканку» эстетического чувства в отличие от других видов наслаждения (Geiger, 1913, 649). Ещё одним важным фактором является то, что в эстетическом наслаждении объект рассматривается «сквозь полноту его характеристик» (Geiger, 1913, 645), а не только как вещь, которая являет себя из этой полноты. Кроме того, для эстетического наслаждения необходима полная идентификация Я и наслаждения, его растворение в наслаждении объектом. Специфическая особенность эстетического чувства в том, что оно требует «самозабвенности» (Geiger, 1913, 652, 653), забвения «самости» (Selbst), которое следует отличать от общего для всякого наслаждения состояния отрешённости субъекта от обычного хода жизни. В приводимом отрывке Гайгер как раз отталкивается от тезиса о «самозабвенности» субъекта в эстетическом наслаждении и поясняет через этот тезис высказывание Шопенгауэра о «созерцании, лишённом воли» и Канта об «удовольствии, лишённом интереса» относительно эстетического чувства (Geiger, 1913, 653). Гайгер вносит ясность в понятия интереса, удовольствия и наслаждения. Он отмечает, что до известной степени всякому наслаждению свойственен интерес к предмету, поскольку нельзя испытать наслаждение к тому, что оставляет равнодушным. Однако следует отличать заинтересованность в предмете, когда субъект ищет от него некоторой выгоды, когда в наслаждении присутствует активность воли, от «незаинтересованного интереса» (Geiger, 1913, 660), в котором предмет привлекает сам по себе, и Я пассивно отдаётся созерцанию. Таким образом, Гайгер определяет эстетическое наслаждение как «наслаждение в незаинтересованном созерцании полноты предмета» (Geiger, 1913, 663). Для Гайгера важно прояснить этический характер эстетического чувства, которое имеет в этической теории предпочтение перед другими формами наслаждения. Такое предпочтение объясняется тем,

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что этика рассматривает эстетическое наслаждение более узко, как наслаждение эстетическими ценностями. Способность к такому наслаждению является сама по себе ценностью, однако, подчёркивает Гайгер, эта ценность стоит особо и не относится к моральным ценностям. С другой стороны, способность к глубокому наслаждению эстетическими ценностями свидетельствует о глубине личности наслаждающегося субъекта и его умению освобождаться от личных интересов («самозабвенность» эстетического чувства). Заключительная часть «Телесные ощущения» рассматривает степень участия телесных ощущений в чувстве наслаждения. Здесь Гайгер приводит две крайние точки зрения в философских дебатах: Джеймса-Ланге о том, что все чувства есть следствия некоторой телесной диспозиции, и Липса, который хочет видеть в телесных ощущениях лишь явления, сопутствующие наслаждению (Geiger, 1913, 675). Подчёркивая, что всякое наслаждение есть прежде всего наслаждение объектом, есть определённое воздействие конкретного объекта на Я субъекта, Гайгер резко дистанцируется от теории Джеймса-Ланге и примыкает к Липсу. Гайгер в стремлении к ясности охотно перемежает рассуждения яркими образными примерами и демонстрирует тонкое чувство языка. Он тщательно следит за точностью в именовании той или иной эмоции. В этой особенности лежит источник переводческих трудностей, поскольку для Гайгера существенным является различие между Wohlgefallen (букв. благорасположение, в переводе — удовольствие), Lust (удовольствие, охота, радость), Freude (радость) и Genuss (наслаждение), эмоциями, которые в русскоязычной картине мира могут перекрываться или не выделяться как таковые (Lust). Из тех же причин проистекают проблемы перевода грамматических структур, с которыми в других контекстах не возникло бы особых вопросов. Так в представленной ниже главе Гайгер ставит акцент на существовании в немецком языке двух форм «Interesse an etw. haben» (быть заинтересованным, интересоваться) и «sich für etw. interessieren» (интересоваться). Гайгер ставит в соответствие этим формам два принципиально разных типа феномена заинтересованности. Проблема для переводчика состоит в том, что немецкий язык, в отличие от русского, позволяет разграничивать эти две в целом синонимичные грамматические формы во всех контекстах употребления. Таким образом, переводчик, работая с текстами Гайгера, должен учитывать

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момент невольной языковой игры. Так у Гайгера мы имеем «заинтересованный» и «незаинтересованный» интерес. В свою очередь, «незаинтересованность» (uninteressiert), т.е. отсутствие влияния личных интересов на эстетическое чувство, следует отличать от «отсутствия интереса» (interesselos), которое в анализе Гайгера синонимично равнодушию. Эти, на первый взгляд, исключительно переводческие трудности открывают новое поле проблем. Возникает вопрос, имеем ли мы всё ещё дело с феноменами или уже с языком, и насколько Гайгер отдаёт себе отчёт в том, что на определённом этапе рефлексии эти две сферы начинают интерферировать. При чтении некоторых пассажей создаётся впечатление, что аргументация Гайгера базируется скорее на языковой интуиции, нежели на феноменологической рефлексии в сущность исследуемого явления. Яркие примеры такой интерференции можно обнаружить в четвёртой части. Так, в телесном ощущении «Weit-um-die-Brustsein» (букв. чувствовать простор в груди).1 Гайгер выделяет феномен «широты, простора» (Weite), который, по его мысли, связан с субъективным чувством внутренней «расширенности», «широты» (Ausgeweitetsein, innere Weite). Таким образом, приходит к выводу Гайгер, телесное и эмоциональное состояния могут инициировать друг друга через эту феноменальную связь (Geiger, 1913, 680-681). Несмотря на эти особенности аргументации, нельзя не заметить качественный скачок, который происходит у Гайгера. Здесь философское исследование эстетических феноменов приобретает ясность, точность и систематичность благодаря чёткому различению эстетического чувства и его объекта, а также этического и эстетического сознания. Мы полагаем, что этот ранний текст Гайгера представляет интерес для отечественной философской науки и, возможно, в дальнейшем может быть полностью переведён на русский язык. Для удобства читателя можно предложить следующий глоссарий, содержащий варианты перевода ключевых терминов Гайгера и краткий аналитический комментарий к каждому из этих вариантов.

1

Здесь и далее в цитатах выделение курсивом моё. — Прим. пер.

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Wohlgefallen (das)

удовольствие, используется в качестве самого общего понятия для приятного чувства; Гайгер отмечает, что Кант не делает различия между удовольствием (Wohlgefallen) и наслаждением (Genuss) (Geiger, 1913, 655);

Freude (die, -n)

радость, удовольствие, которое Гайгер связывает с существованием объекта радостного чувства, например, радость предвкушения (визита друга) связана с осуществлением этого события (Geiger, 1913, 656);

Genuss (der, -nüsse)

наслаждение, у Гайгера — удовольствие, для которого существование объекта приятного чувства безразлично (удовольствие от фантазий не связано с их исполнением (Geiger, 1913, 658)); к удовольствию такого рода относится также и эстетическое наслаждение (ästhetischer Genuss);

Interesse (das, -n)

интерес, совокупная позиция Я по отношению к предмету;

Interesselosigkeit (die)

отсутствие интереса, т.е. отсутствие какой бы то ни было позиции по отношению к предмету, равнодушие (Gleichgültigkeit, приводится Гайгером в качестве синонима (Geiger, 1913, 658));

Interesse an etw. haben, interessiert sein

быть заинтересованным в чём-то, т.е. быть увлечённым чем-то в силу ожидаемой личной выгоды (например, заинтересованность в победе конкретной лошади на скачках (Geiger, 1913, 659));

Interesse für etw. haben, sich für etw. interessieren

испытывать немотивированный интерес к чему-либо, быть захваченным чем-либо;

interessiertes Interesse

заинтересованный интерес, связан со знанием о пользе «интересного» предмета для переживающего субъекта, о возможности личной выгоды;

uninteressiertes Interesse

незаинтересованный интерес, спонтанная увлечённость, не мотивированная личной выгодой;

Olesya Bessemel'tseva

Selbst (das)

самость, Я жаждущее, Я вожделеющее, источник «моего» во мне, источник заинтересованного интереса (Geiger, 1913, 660);

Selbstvergessenheit (die)

самозабвенность, состояние, которое необходимо для испытания эстетического наслаждения, состояние незаинтересованного интереса (Geiger, 1913, 664);

Ichvergessenheit (die)

забвение о Я, утрата сознания, состояние, в котором невозможно эстетическое удовольствие как и любое другое переживание, требующее наличия переживающего субъекта (Geiger, 1913, 664).

Перевод выполнен по изданию: Geiger, M. (1913). Beiträge zur Phänomenologie des ästhetischen Genusses. Husserl. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, I, 567-684. Отрывок из (Geiger, 1913, 655-665). R EFER ENCES Allesch, Ch. G. (2006). Einführung in die psychologische Ästhetik. Wien: WUV. Geiger, M. (1913). Beiträge zur Phänomenologie des ästhetischen Genusses. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, 1, 567-684. Husserl, E. (1968). Briefe an Roman Ingarden. The Hague: Martinus Martinus Nijhoff. Mickunas, A. (1989). Moritz Geiger and Aesthetics. In E. F. Kaelin (Ed.), Ame­r ican Phenomenology. Origins and Developments (43-57). Dordrecht – Boston, MA –  London: Kluwer Academic Publ.

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HORIZON 5 (1) 2016 : II. Translations & Commentaries : M. Geiger : Trans. by O.Bessmel’tseva : 258–271 ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ • STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY • STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE • ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES

doi: 10.18199/2226-5260-2016-5-1-258-271

МОРИЦ ГАЙГЕР К ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИИ ЭСТЕТИЧЕСКОГО НАСЛАЖДЕНИЯ ОЛЕСЯ БЕССМЕЛЬЦЕВA (пер. с нем.) Студент 2-го курса магистратуры кафедры истории зарубежных литератур Филологического факультета Санкт-Петербургского государственного университета, 199034 Санкт-Петербург, Россия. E-mail: [email protected]

MORITZ GEIGER ON THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE AESTHETIC ENJOYMENT OLESYA BESSMEL‘TSEVA (trans.) The second-year master´s student of the Department of History of Foreign Literatures at the Faculty of Philology at the St. Petersburg State University, 199034 St. Petersburg, Russia. E-mail: [email protected]

Утверждение Канта о том, что эстетическое удовольствие (Wohlgefallen) «лишено всякого интереса», ни в коем случае не однозначно. Сначала [Кант]1 определяет (§2, Критика способности суждения): «Интересом называется удовольствие, которое мы связываем с представлением о существовании предмета»2 (Kant, 1913, 204). Для начала, будем придерживаться этого определения (и не 1

В квадратных скобках вставки переводчика. — Прим. пер. Перевод по: (Kant, 1966, 204). — Прим. пер.

2

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принимать во внимание в наших рассуждениях, что эта особенность призвана отделить удовольствие, вызванное прекрасным, от удовольствия, вызванного приятным и благим). Тогда мы можем для наших целей, не допуская ошибки в кантовском смысле, заменить удовольствие на наслаждение (Genuss), поскольку Кант не разделяет оба этих переживания. Итак, вначале утверждалось, что эстетическое наслаждение никогда не является наслаждением от представления о существовании некоего предмета, что существование предмета, вызывающего наслаждение, для наслаждения совершенно безразлично. С этим мнением мы можем полностью согласиться: мы и раньше видели, что наслаждение, вызванное фантазиями, может быть таким же сильным, как наслаждение, вызванное чувственным восприятием, что такого рода наслаждение фантазией ни в коем случае не предполагает, что воображаемые предметы принимаются за действительно существующие, и таким образом, представление о существовании предмета является безразличным для наслаждения. Впрочем, то же самое справедливо для всех видов наслаждения, в той степени, в какой они не являются наслаждением от наличия некоторого положения вещей, то есть — не только для эстетического наслаждения. Но Кант тут же добавляет к своему определению одно замечание, которое переводит проблему в иную область. А именно, он пишет: «Поэтому такое (удовольствие — пояснение Гайгера)3 всегда имеет отношение также и к способности желания — или как её определяющее основание, или по крайней мере как необходимо связанное с её определяющим основанием»4 (Kant, 1913, 204). Здесь в дискуссию включается новый момент: отношение эстетического наслаждения к воле; и только эта связь вообще делает понятным (хотя и не оправдывает) то, что Кант здесь говорит об «интересе»; поскольку в своём определении интереса как такового Кант радикально отклоняется от привычного языкового употребления; никто не стал бы настаивать на мысли, что радость (Freude), вызванная приходом друга (удовольствие, связанное с существованием

3

В русском переводе на этом месте стоит «интерес». В оригинале имеем только артикль с местоимением среднего рода «ein solches». Эта группа может относиться как к слову «удовольствие», так и к слову «интерес» (в нем. яз. оба они среднего рода). В остальном, цитаты приводятся по каноническим русским переводам без отступлений. — Прим. пер. 4 Перевод по: (Kant, 1966, 204). — Прим. пер.

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предмета) есть радость, исполненная интереса, в отличие от наслаждения некоторой комической ситуацией. Также и работы, написанные после Канта, рассматривают — по примеру Шопенгауэра — отношение эстетического наслаждения к воле прежде всего как «удовольствие, лишённое интереса»5. Согласно Канту, отношение представления о существовании предмета к воле выражено так: когда мы испытываем наслаждение или радость от представления, как будто мы действительно получили крупный выигрыш, тогда эта радость будет определяющим основанием, чтобы желать себе победы, чтоб жаждать победы; тогда как эстетическое наслаждение является чистым наслаждением от содержания представления и не пробуждает никакой жажды воплощения [этого представления]. В этом примерно заключается для Канта отличие наслаждения прекрасным от наслаждения приятным: «то, что моё суждение о предмете, в котором я признаю его приятным, выражает заинтересованность в нём, ясно уже из того, что через ощущение оно возбуждает желание обладать такими предметами»6 (Kant, 1913, 207). Здесь мы также можем согласиться с Кантом, коль скоро он говорит об эстетическом наслаждении, но следует верно понимать его высказывание. Кант, конечно, не отрицает, что эстетическое наслаждение действительно может порождать желания любого рода. Художник, который представляет себе прекрасную картину и наслаждается ею в своём представлении, понятным образом ощутит желание выразить свои фантазии на холсте; также и наслаждение того, кто увидит готовую картину, пробудит в нём желание обладать этой картиной. Но такие связи будут непрямыми, они являются лишь психологическими фактами и касаются психологического воздействия наслаждения. Напротив, существует некоторая внутренняя, не только фактическая связь между радостью от представления о существовании некоторого предмета и желанием, чтобы это представление перешло в сферу действительности. Из радости от представления, из мысли, как прекрасно было бы обладать этой вещью,

5

Я вынужден оставить здесь без внимания интерпретацию отсутствия интереса к предметной стороне, например, в связи с интенсивностью действия эстетической ценности (ср. например, Cohn, 1901, 30). 6 Перевод по: (Kant, 1966, 207). — Прим. пер.

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желание произрастает закономерно — не только в качестве психологического факта. Такого рода внутренняя чувственная связь существует также в тех случаях, когда [процесс] фактически останавливается на уровне представления об этом существовании и не вызывает никакого желания, когда по психологическим причинам внутренние чувственные связи не оказывают воздействия. Таким образом, нам было бы нечего возразить Канту до тех пор, пока мы остаёмся в пределах эстетического наслаждения и не спрашиваем, действительно ли отличие удовольствия, вызванного прекрасным, от удовольствия, вызванного приятным или благим, состоит в названных моментах, и не подходят ли приведённые определения также для описания других форм наслаждения, кроме эстетического. Но и сам Кант довольно часто отклоняется от собственных определений. Он употребляет понятие интереса в другом смысле, кроме приведённого выше (например, когда он говорит: «каждый должен согласиться, что суждение о красоте, к которому примешивается малейший интерес, очень пристрастно и не есть чистое суждение вкуса»7 (Kant, 1913, 205)). А кроме того, в некоторых случаях Кант рассматривает отношение воли к заинтересованному наслаждению совершенно иначе, чем это допускается начальным определением (например, когда он говорит: «всякий интерес предполагает потребность», или: «что касается интереса склонности при приятном, то каждый говорит: голод — лучший повар, и людям со здоровым аппетитом вкусным кажется всё, что только съедобно»8 (Kant, 1913, 210); то есть, случаи, в которых наслаждение следует воле, а не является ее [воли] определяющим основанием, как должно было бы быть, согласно Канту). Из сказанного делается ясно, почему в дискуссиях о кантовском удовольствии, лишённом интереса, возникали все возможные значения интереса, которые не были связаны с кантовским определением, и обсуждались все возможные отношения воли к наслаждению.9 И мы в дальнейшем оставим в стороне кантовское определение того, как соотносятся эстетическое наслаждение, интерес и желание, и рассмотрим 7

Перевод по: (Kant, 1966, 205). — Прим. пер. Перевод по: (Kant, 1966, 211). — Прим. пер. 9 Хороший обзор различных толкований кантовского «удовольствия, лишённого интереса» даёт Basch, V. (1896). Essai critique de l´esthétique de Kant. Paris: Alcan. 8

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это отношение объективно, без оглядки на Канта. При этом нам следует полностью освободиться от весьма примечательного определения интереса у Канта: феномен интереса не может рассматриваться как какой-то особенный вид удовольствия, как это делает Кант. То, что я с «интересом» наблюдаю за ходом войны между двумя государствами, вовсе не значит, что я наблюдаю его с удовольствием. Столь же мало связан интерес с представлением о существовании предмета. Меня может интересовать содержание моих фантазий, но при этом я не обращаю внимание на представление об их реальности, и интерес к математике не будет ни заинтересованностью в представлении о существовании математики, ни интересом в самом этом существовании. Конечно, я также могу быть заинтересован в существовании некоторого предмета, например, заинтересован в том, чтоб было хорошее железнодорожное сообщение между тем местом, где я родился, и местом, где я живу и т.д. Итак, интерес никак не связан ни с удовольствием, ни с существованием [предмета], но есть прежде всего некая особая форма установки Я по отношению к предметам. Я могу смотреть на человека «с интересом» и «без интереса». При этом ничто не меняется в содержании моего созерцания, но моя совокупная внутренняя позиция по отношению к предмету наблюдения меняется. Когда я узнаю в господине на улице хорошо известного мне писателя, я вдруг начинаю смотреть на него с «интересом» — я сморю на него «другими глазами», при этом изменяется способ того, как предмет мне даётся, как он мне раскрывается, и тогда изменяется также и моя внутренняя позиция по отношению к предмету. Противоположностью понятия «интерес» является отсутствие интереса, равнодушие к вещам — в то время, как противоположностью удовольствия будет не равнодушие, а неудовольствие. В некотором более широком смысле всякая продиктованная чувством установка сопровождается «интересом»: в наслаждении, в радостном переживании чего-либо, в чувстве печали из-за чего-то, а также в чувстве гнева содержится известный интерес к предмету [этих эмоций]. В этом заключается противопоставление того, что меня затрагивает, тому, что меня не затрагивает, оставляет меня безразличным. Когда один говорит, что кто-то ему нравится или не нравится, его раздражает или радует, другой на это может ответить, что его этот человек слиш-

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ком мало интересует, чтобы было возможно занять по отношению к нему ту или иную позицию: так, для всякой внутренней позиции по отношению к некоторому человеку необходим известный интерес к нему. Однако о действительном интересе к чему-то мы говорим всё же только тогда, когда это внутреннее участие преодолевает определённый минимальный порог, когда как раз «интересоваться чем-то» придаёт переживанию особенный оттенок заинтересованности.10 Мы говорим, что нас интересует некое занятие, лишь в том случае, когда внутреннее участие чётко выступает как переживание, в то время как всякое интенсивное занятие чем-то, конечно же, предполагает известную степень интереса; даже если, возможно, заинтересованность в некоторой вещи поначалу вызвана интересом к чему-то другому, связанному с этой вещью, [например,] интерес к определённой деятельности в некоторой профессиональной сфере [вызван] тем, что эта профессия обещает материальный успех и т.д. Причём, разным людям даётся в распоряжение разная мера интереса. Есть люди, которые практически всё делают с интересом, которые на ничтожное задание реагируют со всем интересом; но есть и другие, в которых интерес пробуждают лишь некоторые немногие вещи. Также и то, что пробуждает интерес, меняется в зависимости от склонности, воспитания и т.д. Мы не анализируем далее этот общий феномен интереса, который связан с целым рядом проблем. От этого самого общего феномена интереса отделяются теперь другие, которые мы тоже будем называть «интересом». Мы только что говорили об интересе как внутреннем участии, об интересе к чему-то, к искусству или политике, древностям или коллекционированию бабочек. Но об интересе говорят и как о заинтересованности в чём-то в весьма специальном смысле. Некто испытывает интерес к скачкам, но вовсе не заинтересован в том, чтоб победила именно эта конкретная лошадь (т.к. он, например, поставил не на эту лошадь). Мы будем в этом последнем смысле употреблять [понятия] «быть заинтересованным» и «незаинтересованность» — в отличии от [понятий] «испытывать интерес» и

10

Естественно, что и в эссе Ритук (Ritook, 1910, 367), где эстетический предмет рассматривался как [предмет], который нравится вопреки отсутствию интереса, интерес в широком смысле всё же наличествовал. Отсутствовал только интерес в специальном смысле.

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«отсутствие интереса». Люди, у которых отсутствует интерес, зачастую вовсе не являются «незаинтересованными» людьми. Так, в понятие интереса привносится новое значение. Отныне мы не считаем заинтересованностью просто захваченность предметом, [простое обращение к предмету] «с интересом», но [заинтересованностью будет] захваченность в силу некоторого более специального отношения предмета ко мне, например, в силу выгоды, которую я от этого предмета ожидаю, в силу некоторого преимущества, которое я от него имею. Интерес, который я испытываю к предмету, исходит в таких случаях не напрямую от предмета, не исключительно из внутренней занятости этим предметом — я не просто охватываю вниманием предмет, [не просто обращаюсь к нему] с интересом, но этот предмет приобретает интерес в силу некоторого отношения ко мне, например, как средство достижения цели, причём цель, в свою очередь, касается меня, а не является чисто объективной. Интерес к заботе о бедных является чистым [интересом] по существу, незаинтересованным, в отличие от заинтересованности в собственной славе. Так, выходит, что заинтересованный интерес противопоставляется незаинтересованному. Незаинтересованный интерес подразумевает, что предмет сам в силу своей природы удерживает моё внимание; заинтересованный интерес — что предмет становится интересным либо в силу своего отношения к самости (Selbst) наблюдателя, либо в силу отношения к чему-то другому (к пользе, например), к тому, что, однако, само в свою очередь становится интересным в силу своей значимости для Я — для того Я, которое мы назвали самостью (Selbst). Здесь мы возвращаемся к различиям, которые мы отметили при исследовании наслаждения своим настроением: Я, которое испытывает интерес к определённым вещам, есть попросту Я переживающее, Я регистрирующее. Я заинтересованное, напротив, — это Я, которое вожделеет, которое ставит акцент на «моём», это Я, значимость которого чувствует самодовольный человек (der Selbstgefällige11), — «Я-самость» (das «Selbst»); при этом, такой своекорыстный (selbstlich12) интерес вовсе не обязательно будет эгоистичным в узком смысле. 11

Курсив мой. — Прим. пер. Курсив мой. — Прим. пер.

12

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Какую роль играют оба этих типа интереса в эстетическом наслаждении? Само собой разумеется, что мы необходимо испытываем интерес к тому, чем мы эстетически наслаждаемся, и что эстетическое наслаждение возрастает с ростом внутреннего участия или интереса к предмету, который мы созерцаем. Чем больший «интерес» испытываем мы к материи и к способу её [художественного] оформления (Behandlung), тем легче наступает наслаждение, тем действеннее становятся моменты, мотивирующие наслаждение. Не случайно поэзия вновь и вновь обращается к теме любви во всё новых вариациях и, таким образом, использует тот сильный интерес, который большинство людей испытывают к этой материи; в то же время там, где этот интерес отсутствует, вместе с интересом к «скучным любовным историям», как правило, отсутствует и эстетическое наслаждение от чтения этих историй. Если материя сама по себе тяготеет к тому, чтоб пробуждать всеобщий интерес, если не нужно полагаться на то, что наблюдатель сам привнесёт свой специальный интерес [в материю], в этих случаях мы говорим об «интересных» материях. Так, по всеобщему мнению содержание трудов Ницше считается уже само по себе более интересным, чем сочинение о формальной логике. Итак, если принять, что эстетическое наслаждение (или скорее, эстетическое созерцание в наслаждении) в этом смысле никак не «лишено интереса», тогда проблема значительно усложняется, если мы зададимся вопросом, является ли эстетическое наслаждение заинтересованным или не является таковым. С одной стороны, всякое наслаждение является «заинтересованным», в противоположность к радости, как мы уже это отмечали выше. В этом случае мы характеризовали радость как [чувство] незаинтересованное, т.к. радость направлена на предмет, т.к. моменты удовольствия (Lust) связаны с самим обращением к предмету. С другой стороны, всякое наслаждение является «заинтересованным», оно оказывает возбуждающее воздействие на Я, удовольствие (Lust) связано с Я, содержится в Я — в этом смысле всякое наслаждение есть наслаждение собой [самостью] («Selbst»genuß). Тогда нам следовало бы сказать: наслаждение как таковое является во всех случаях «заинтересованным», т.е. и в случае эстетического наслаждения. Здесь говорилось о заинтересованности наслаждения как такового. Совершенно другой вопрос, содержится ли в созерцании, в обращении к предмету

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некое отношение к Я, некоторая заинтересованность. Тут следует ответить: эстетическое наслаждение исключает всякого рода заинтересованность в объекте наслаждения. Прежде всего, все случаи заинтересованности в некотором предмете изза пользы, которую я могу извлечь [из этого предмета], из-за преимущества, которое мне сулит этот предмет, т.е. по причине какой-либо мотивировки вообще исключаются из возможности наслаждения, в том числе эстетического. Если некто заинтересован в росте цен на мясо, потому что этот некто является скототорговцем, то он, конечно, обрадуется росту цен, поскольку ожидает [от этого роста] существенную прибыль. Он может наслаждаться ростом цен, но, как мы видели, обстоятельство ожидаемой весомой прибыли не обосновывает наслаждение, но является его причиной, быть может, источником наслаждения. Однако, такое наслаждение не есть чистое наслаждение предметом, не есть незаинтересованное наслаждение, напротив, здесь предмет связывает интерес, который он мне внушает, с пользой, которую [этот предмет] мне приносит. Итак, если даже само наслаждение — в этом случае менее, чем когда-либо — не является обоснованным, а наоборот — необоснованным, то интерес в предмете будет всё же обоснован прибылью, ожидаемой от роста цен на мясо. Напротив, эстетическое наслаждение требует, чтобы также и интерес [заинтересованность] в созерцаемом предмете был необоснованным, чтобы он, интерес в этом [конкретном] предмете, просто был. Так, в эстетическом наслаждении должен содержаться совершенно «необоснованный», и, таким образом, в отношении пользы полностью незаинтересованный интерес. Таков первый смысл положения о том, что эстетическое созерцание должно быть «незаинтересованным»: интерес в предмете должен быть необоснованным. Но даже когда интерес в предмете наслаждения является необоснованным, он всё-таки может быть заинтересованным; во всех тех случаях, когда уже в обращении к предмету каким-то образом содержится отношение к самости (Selbst). Во всех подобных случаях возбуждение Я происходит не исключительно через приятие (Aufnahme) предмета, но Я приходит в возбуждение из отношения к [своей] самости (Selbst). И совсем другим способом отношение к самости (Selbst) может содержаться уже в обращении к предмету. Объект наслаждения как таковой может иметь

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отношение ко мне. Мы можем наслаждаться своей ловкостью — можно наслаждаться тем, до чего ты хорош. Далее, мы обнаружили, что в наслаждении переживаниями может уже быть задето «само» («selbst») переживание, что наслаждение может быть наслаждением определённого способа чувствования себя (наслаждение настроением, поскольку оно является моим [настроением]). В обоих этих случаях самость (das Selbst) тем или иным образом принимала участие в создании предмета [наслаждения]; в других случаях, напротив, самость (das Selbst) влияет на схватывание предмета лишь через способ того, как предмет мне дан: знакомый мне пейзаж как таковой ничего не содержит в себе от [моей] самости (das Selbst). Однако мы, созерцая этот пейзаж, не будем [чувствовать себя] незаинтересованными — здесь источником заинтересованного наслаждения будет то, как этот пейзаж предстаёт и даётся мне в своей принадлежности ко мне. Иначе обстоит дело со сферами приятного и эротического. В таких случаях следует различать три возможности: во-первых, чтобы прояснить на примере, рассмотрим наслаждение пищей после долгого голодания. Здесь вкус пищи будет лишь отчасти источником наслаждения, больше — утоление голода. Соответственно, здесь имеет место не столько наслаждение от пищи, сколько наслаждение в утолении голода, и такого рода наслаждение является в высшей степени заинтересованным. На той же ступени заинтересованности стоит наслаждение такого рода, когда грубо-чувственное желание утоляют созерцанием красивого тела. Но в наслаждении пищей, кроме утоления голода, содержится ещё наслаждение двоякого рода: мы ощущаем вкус пищи, вкус вина, что есть чистое обращение к предмету, столь же незаинтересованное, как и созерцание пейзажной картины. Но пищу мы можем также смаковать, вино — потягивать, отдаваясь в обращении к [предмету] [его] приятному очарованию, и тогда уже в обращении к [предмету] содержится заинтересованность; мы отдаём себя приятному воздействию [пищи и вина] подобно тому, как позволяем ласкать наше тело тёплой воде при купании. В этом случае уже ничего не остаётся от незаинтересованной дегустации, которую мы можем причислить к эстетическому наслаждению в широком смысле — здесь лишь исключительно чувственное наслаждение. И к этому типу

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наслаждения мы должны будем причислить также созерцание прекрасного тела, исполненное эротическим наслаждением, в противоположность эстетическинезаинтересованному [созерцанию], которое по существу и предметно охватывает вниманием все качества тела, в том числе [его] эротическое [воздействие]. Этими примерами из наших более ранних рассуждений можно проиллюстрировать то, что мы подразумеваем, когда определяем эстетическое наслаждение как наслаждение, наступающее при незаинтересованном созерцании полноты предмета. А не при созерцании, лишённом интереса; напротив, глубокий интерес есть предпосылка интенсивного наслаждения. И в дальнейшем определение «незаинтересованный»13 нельзя относить напрямую к наслаждению как таковому: незаинтересованным должно быть созерцание, а не наслаждение. Ведь любое наслаждение, как мы видели, всегда будет заинтересованным в силу его возбуждающего воздействия на Я. Эти размышления позволяют нам занять некоторую позицию по отношению к вопросу, затронутому Кантом, об отношении наслаждения и воли. Что бы ни было действительно связано с наслаждением в моментах вожделения, всё это интересует нас столь же мало, сколь мало это интересовало Канта. То, что эстетическое наслаждение произведением искусства может вызвать желание обладать [этим произведением], что эстетическое наслаждение прекрасным телом может стать мотивом сексуального вожделения, — со всем этим можно без долгих слов охотно согласиться на радость противникам Канта (так же, как с этим согласился бы и сам Кант). Ницше, выступая с критикой Канта и Шопенгауэра, тоже не настаивает на действительной связи между наслаждением и желанием: «Но если допустить, что Шопенгауэр стократно прав в отношении своей собственной персоны, что дало бы это для уразумения сущности прекрасного? Шопенгауэр описал один из эффектов прекрасного, эффект волеутоляющий — единственно ли он регулярный? Стендаль, как сказано, — натура не менее чувственная, но более счастливо удавшаяся, чем Шопенгауэр, — подчеркивает другой эффект прекрасного: “прекрасное сулит счастье”; существенным предстает ему как раз

13

Кавычки переводчика. — Прим. пер.

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возбуждение воли («интереса») через прекрасное»14 (Nietzsche, 1921, 410). Но нас интересует не вопрос о том, как психологически соотносятся наслаждение и воля в том или ином человеке, но о том, как по сути своей устроена связь между наслаждением и желанием — прежде всего о том, нет ли желания в эстетическом наслаждении. Здесь снова можно обратиться к вышесказанному: всякое наслаждение есть приятие (Aufnahme), отдача (Hingabe), пассивность (Passivität) — именно в этом ключе противопоставили мы наслаждение всякой воле. Так, под наслаждением, в том числе эстетическим, уже согласно его сущностной закономерности понимается молчание активности и с тем — воли. Но ещё сильнее, чем в наслаждениях другого рода, даёт о себе знать отсутствие моментов воли в наслаждении эстетическом. В эстетическом наслаждении отсутствует внутреннее притяжение предмета наслаждения, отсутствует порывистая жажда бурного наслаждения. Также нет и той сущностно-закономерной связи воли с предметом наслаждения, которую мы находили в наслаждении, вызванном представлением о существовании некоторого предмета, где наслаждение, вызванное представлением о приходе друга, одновременно сопровождается желанием того, чтобы это представление стало реальностью. Итак, мы обнаруживаем следующее: в эстетическом наслаждении активность отсутствует как в качестве составляющей процесса обращения к предмету, так и в качестве сущностно-закономерного следствия наслаждения. Но также отсутствует отношение к активности в том качестве, в каком оно наглядно проявляется в ряде [примеров] заинтересованного наслаждения. Всюду, где наслаждение является наслаждением, вызванным удовлетворением некоторого влечения, некоторого воления, некоторого желания — во всех этих случаях влечение, воля, желание, разумеется, должны предшествовать [моменту] [их] удовлетворения. И наконец, в эротически-заинтересованном созерцании прекрасного тела, а тем самым и в эротически-заинтересованном наслаждении лежит сущностнозакономерная тенденция перейти от такого наслаждения к сексуальному вожделению. Напротив, в эстетическом наслаждении отсутствуют всякие волевые моменты: как те, для которых источником является активность наслаждений 14

Перевод по: (Nitsshe, 1990a, 479). — Прим. пер.

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другого рода, так и те, что берут начало в заинтересованности наслаждения. Такая незаинтересованность и отсутствие воли эстетического наслаждения есть то, что, совместно с растворением принимающего установку Я в Я наслаждающемся, складывается в «самозабвенность» («Selbstvergessenheit») эстетического наслаждения, которую нельзя путать с «забвением о Я» (Ichvergessenheit), т.е. отсутствием сознания собственного Я: лишь та активная самость (Selbst), которая изъявляет волю, которую что-то интересует, которая принимает некую установку, лишь она растворяется в чистом созерцании, уступая место предмету; при этом, момент сознания Я всё же присутствует в качестве воздействия на Я, которое оказывает предмет. Прав Шопенгауэр, когда он снова и снова подчёркивает, насколько редко приходит это состояние выключенной самости (Selbst) — как редко умолкают все наши интересы с тем, чтобы было возможно созерцание, лишённое воли. Конечно, Шопенгауэр преувеличивает, когда говорит, что большинство людей, так называемых «массовых продуктов природы», вообще не способны к эстетическому наслаждению, так как они не могут заставить умолкнуть свою волю; несомненно, верно по крайней мере то, что для осуществления такого рода безвольного созерцания сложного произведения искусства должен одновременно прийти в действие целый ряд благоприятствующих психологических обстоятельств в человеке. И вполне возможно, что существует куда больше людей, чем мы обычно предполагаем, которым почти никогда не удаётся подобное внутреннее освобождение от собственных интересов, подобное умолкание воли. Что эти люди никогда не испытывают состояния, с таким энтузиазмом представленного Шопенгауэром: «то безболезненное состояние, которое Эпикур славил как высшее благо и состояние богов, ибо в такие моменты мы сбрасываем с себя унизительное иго воли, празднуем субботу каторжной работы желания, и колесо Иксиона останавливается»15 (Schopenhauer, 1873, 231). Лишь в двух моментах можно заметить отдалённое отношение наслаждения к воле: во-первых, в том, что всякому наслаждению свойственна тенденция продолжаться, застыть в наслаждении, внутренне продлить его: «Ведь всякое

15

Перевод по: (Shopengauer, 1992, 207). — Прим. пер.

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удовольствие желает вечности»16. Однако, эта тенденция ощущается в действии лишь в момент прекращения [наслаждения]; но и тогда эта «тенденция» ещё далеко не стремление, не говоря уже о желании или волении. Немногим отличается и второй момент: он состоит в той внутренней склонности, той внутренней отдаче, которую мы можем испытывать к объекту нашего эстетического наслаждения — в том чувстве внутреннего притяжения к художественному полотну, которым мы эстетически наслаждаемся. Но и эта «склонность» лишь отдалённо состоит в родстве с отдельными моментами, которые порой обнаруживаются в проявлениях воли и желания — то есть она [эта «склонность»] ни в коем случае не есть сама воление или желание. R EFER ENCES Basch, V. (1896). Essai critique de l´esthétique de Kant. Paris: Alcan. Cohn, B. J. (1901). Allgemeine Ästhetik. Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann. Kant, I. (1913). Kritik der Urteilskraft (Akademieausgabe). Berlin: Reimer. Kant, I. (1966). Kritika sposobnosti suzhdeniya. [Critique of Judgement]. Moscow: Mysl´. (in Russian). Nietzsche, F. (1921). Zur Genealogie der Moral. Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner. Nitsshe, F. (1990). Genealogiya morali. [On the Genealogy of Morality]. Moscow: Mysl´. (in Russian). Nitsshe, F. (1990). Tak govoril Zaratustra. [Thus spoke Zarathustra]. Moscow: Mysl´. (in Russian). Ritook, E. (1910). Zur Analyse der ästhetischen Wirkung auf Grund der Methode der Zeitvariation. In Zeitschrift für Ästhetik 5 (356-407, 512-544). Stuttgart: F. Enke. Schopenhauer, A. (1873). Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. Leipzig: Brockhaus. Shopengauer, A. (1992). Mir kak volya i predstavlenie. [The World as Will and Representation]. Moscow: Moscow club. (in Russian).

16

«Denn alle Lust will Ewigkeit», известная цитата из Nietzsche, F. (1883) Also sprach Zarathustra. Перевод дословный, мой. В тексте по (Nitsshe, 1990b, 166) эта цитата переведена следующим образом (приводится с контекстом): « […] А радость рвется в отчий дом, […] В свой кровный, вековечный дом!» — Прим. пер.

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HORIZON 5 (1) 2016 : II. Translations & Commentaries : R. Sokolov : The Preface to the Translation : 272–280 ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ • STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY • STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE • ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES

doi: 10.18199/2226-5260-2016-5-1-272-280

ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЙ ­Т РАНСЦЕНДЕНТАЛИЗМ И ­ПОЭТИЧЕСКОЕ ВИДЕНИЕ: КОНЦЕПЦИЯ ­ПОЭТИЧЕСКОГО ­ЭЛЕМЕНТА МАРКА ­РИШИРА. ПРЕДИСЛОВИЕ К ­П ЕРЕВОДУ СТАТЬИ МАРКА РИШИРА «ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЯ ПОЭТИЧЕСКОГО ЭЛЕМЕНТА» РОМАН СОКОЛОВ Кандидат философских наук, доцент кафедры Общеобразовательных дисциплин, Чувашская государственная сельскохозяйственная академия, 428003Чебоксары, Россия. E-mail: [email protected] Данная публикация представляет собой перевод на русский язык статьи Марка Ришира Феноменология поэтического элемента, сопровождаемый предисловием переводчика. В своей статье Ришир выявляет «поэтический элемент» феноменального опыта как его фундаментальное условие, опираясь при этом как на традицию и методы трансцендентальной феноменологии, так и на эмпирические исследования психоанализа. Ришир наделяет конкретным эмпирическим наполнением заимствованный им у Гуссерля концепт перцептивной фантазии, обращаясь к теории «переходного объекта» Д.В. Винникотта, а затем экстраполирует полученные результаты на опыт создания и восприятия «поэтического» произведения (понимая последнее в широком, аристотелевском, смысле). Перцептивную фантазию в феноменологии Ришира следует отделять от «чистой фантазии»: последняя представляет собой «минимальный уровень схематического самовосприятия». Она существует уже в качестве «зачатков смысла», которые имеют место в пассивном синтезе, во «внеязыковом мирном схематизме». Чистая фантазия становится перцептивной фантазией именно тогда, когда происходит переворачивание (revirement) «зачатка смысла» в «смысл зачатка», благодаря некой фантазийной смене точки зрения. Этот процесс подразумевает формирование особого «поля игры» (Винникотт), или пространства трансцендентальной интерфактичности, в котором устанавливается некий первоначальный (доинтенциональный) тип отношений между двумя эго: младенцем и матерью, зрителем и актёром. В этом отношении перцептивная фантазия «воспринимает» в фантазии не какой-то объект, а другую перцептивную фантазию, принадлежащую другому. Благодаря этому, формируется локус первичной коммуникации: пространство трансцендентальной интерфактичности, которое, будучи «воспроизведено интенционально», становится затем пространством интерсубъективности. Относясь к некой фантазийноаффективной сфере, перцептивная фантазия (или «поэтический элемент») обладает некоторой «феноменологической избыточностью» по сравнению с логическим понятием. Поэтому здесь

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можно говорить об особом типе познания реальности, выходящем за рамки её объективистскологической экспликации. Ключевые слова: Трансцендентальная феноменология, перцептивная фантазия, поэтический элемент, трансцендентальная интерфактичность, переходное поле, трансцендентальное лоно, феномен языковой способности, бесформенное, фантазия-аффектация, опыт возвышенного.

ROMAN SOKOLOV PhD, associate professor, Department of General Education Disciplines, Chuvash State Agricultural Academy, 428003 Cheboksary Russia. E-mail: [email protected]

PHENOMENOLOGICAL TRANSCENDENTALISM AND POETIC VISION: MARC RICHIR’S CONCEPT OF THE POETIC ELEMENT. THE PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION OF MARC RICHIR’S ARTICLE «PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE POETIC ELEMENT» This publication is a translation into Russian of Marc Richir’s article Phenomenology of the poetic element, accompanied by a preface of translator. In his article Richir reveals «poetic element» of phenomenal experience as its fundamental condition, relying on it as a tradition and techniques of transcendental phenomenology and the empirical study of psychoanalysis. Richir gives concrete empirical content borrowed from Husserl’s concept of perceptual fantasies, referring to the theory of D.V. Winnicott’s «transitional object», and then extrapolates the results to the experience of creation and perception of the «poetic» work (knowing the latest in a broad, Aristotelian sense). Perceptual imagination of Richir’s phenomenology should be separated from «pure fantasy»: the latter is a «minimum level of conceptual self-image». It has been in existence as «the rudiments of sense», which take place in a passive synthesis of «extra-linguistic peace schematism». Pure fantasy becomes perceptive fantasy just when there is inversion (revirement) «germ of meaning» in the «sense bud», thanks to some fancy a change of perspective. This process involves the formation of a special «field of play» (Winnicott), or transcendental interfact space, which establishes a primary (preintentional) type of relationship between the two egos: the baby and mother, spectator and actor. In this respect, perceptual «sees» in fantasy not an object, and the other perceptive imagination in the fantasy that belongs to another. This formed the primary locus of communication: interfact transcendental space that is being «played intentionally», then it becomes a space of intersubjectivity. Dating back to some fancy-affective sphere, perceptive fantasy (or «poetic element») has a «phenomenological redundancy» in comparison with the logical concept. Therefore, one can speak about a special type of knowledge of reality beyond its objectivist and logical explication. Key words: Transcendental phenomenology, perceptive fantasy, poetic element interfact transcendental, transitional field transcendental bosom, the phenomenon of language, formless, fantasy-affectation, the experience of the sublime.

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В своём феноменологическом проекте Марк Ришир пытается отстоять гуссерлевский принцип трансцендентализма, одновременно учитывая трансформацию и развитие этого принципа в философских концепциях Хайдеггера, Деррида и, особенно, Мерло-Понти. Путь, который он при этом избирает, заменяя перцептивную модель опыта (которая была у Гуссерля) на «фантазийно-аффективную», предполагает, с одной стороны, погружение в «феноменологическое бессознательное», т. е. в более глубокие пласты опыта, нежели те, которые исследовал Гуссерль, а с другой — радикальную проблематизацию различия между языковыми и внеязыковыми феноменами (так называемыми «феноменами-мира»), предполагающую также постановку вопроса о генезисе смысла из его «зачатков» и «обрывков», осуществляемом благодаря темпорализации / спациализации посредством языковой способности (langage). Языковая способность, непосредственно соотносящаяся у Ришира со способностью к рефлективным (эстетическим) суждениям Канта — поскольку именно благодаря ей производится трансцендентальная рефлексия без понятия, — в то же время отличается от кантовой способности наличием у неё особой ритмизирующей функции, выступающей в качестве основного источника смысла, присущего феномену языковой способности (phénomène de langage), который можно рассматривать как основной объект изучения феноменологии Ришира. Согласно последнему, именно на уровне феноменов языковой способности (но не на уровне феноменов языка, la langue) происходит становление того человеческого измерения, которое должно стать предметом изучения современной феноменологической антропологии, которую он противопоставляет хайдеггеровскому подходу к человеку, имплицирующему редукцию последнего прежде всего к символическому измерению. По мнению Ришира, такая редукция несёт в себе серьёзную угрозу, поскольку элиминирует собственно индивидуальный и неповторимый характер человеческого бытия, связанного с производством столь же индивидуального и неповторимого смысла, подчиняя его различного рода «символическим учреждениям» и, по сути, лишая человеческого индивида его свободы. Ришир видит в поэзии ту область человеческого опыта, в которой происходит освобождение от репрессивного механизма символизации, поскольку в поэтическом произведении (которое Ришир рассматривает не как феномен языка, а как феномен мира) обнажается сам процесс феноме-

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нализации, а символы утрачивают закреплённое за ними культурное, религиозное, научное и т.п. значение. Отсюда возникает проблема создания некой «поэтической» квази-онтологии, которая в то же время была бы трансцендентальным основанием, собственно, феноменологии Ришира. Такая квази-онтология понимается Риширом как феноменологическая квази-онтология. Ришир не говорит о языке или языковой способности как таковых, для него они всего лишь феномены мира. Однако при их экспликации он прибегает к опыту различных «позитивных» дисциплин и, в частности, к опыту психоанализа, но, правда, лишь в той мере, в какой сам этот опыт можно, с определёнными оговорками, назвать феноменологическим. Иными словами, Ришир обнаруживает в психоаналитической традиции параллельную его собственной попытку ответить на поставленные им вопросы, связанные с предпринятым им поиском трансцендентального условия феноменологического. В роли такого трансцендентального условия, в данном случае, выступает то, что сам Ришир называет «перцептивной фантазией» (заимствуя этот термин у Гуссерля) и что параллельно обнаруживает себя в психоанализе Винникотта под именем «переходный объект». Именно эти два не вполне совпадающих (но близких) по своему содержанию понятия раскрывают два аспекта термина «поэтический элемент», который Ришир использует в названии своей статьи. Очевидно, слово «поэтический» следует понимать здесь не в узко лингвистическом, а в предельно широком, хайдеггеровом смысле, к которому необходимо прибавить и крайне важные психоаналитические (винникоттовские) коннотации, благодаря которым, оно может выступать синонимом таких понятий, как «творческий» (с одной стороны) и «иллюзорный» (с другой). В самом деле, трансцендентальным условием опыта у Ришира (и Винникотта, на которого он здесь ссылается) становится иллюзия. Именно благодаря ей, конституируется переходное пространство между «внутренним» и «внешним», которое затем становится пространством «интерфактичности». Это пребывание в иллюзии соответствует, помимо прочего, первичной идентификации с матерью у младенца, при которой младенец впервые обнаруживает своё существование. В противоположность «мужской» идентификации, в ходе которой конституируется «активный субъект» опыта, отделяющий и дистанцирующий себя от своего

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объекта, на этой, «женской» стадии субъект лишь переживает своё существование как таковое. Это, таким образом, некая первичная и пассивная идентификация, в которой главную роль выполняет переходный объект: материнская грудь. «Переходный объект демонстрирует способность матери так представить ребёнку мир, чтобы он с самого начала не догадался о том, что объект не является его собственным творением, порождением. В данном контексте для нас в полной мере значима адаптация, когда мать либо даёт ребёнку возможность почувствовать, что её грудь — это сам ребёнок, либо не делает этого. Здесь материнская грудь символизирует не действие, а существование» (Винникот, 2008, 126). Речь, стало быть, идёт о неком первичном, доинтенциональном отношении, благодаря которому, впервые происходит образование самости, т. е. осуществляется процесс самоидентификации, в ходе которого индивид встречается со своей собственной бытийностью. Процесс этот носит креативный характер и всегда предполагает выход за пределы чисто «внутреннего» существования индивида (в данном случае, младенца), поскольку необходимым условием конституирования самости является взаимодействие с другим. (В этом отношении можно говорить о принципиальном сходстве между младенцем и поэтом, ибо и тот, и другой пребывают в состоянии творчества, которое предполагает особое «потенциальное пространство» своего развёртывания, отличающееся как от «внутреннего» пространства субъекта, так и от «внешнего» пространства «сепарированных» объектов. Согласно Винникотту, в качестве такого потенциального пространства, в конечном счёте, обеспечивающего любые виды взаимодействия между индивидом и культурой, выступает пространство игры: творческое раскрытие самости может происходить лишь в процессе игры, ибо «только в игре возможно общение» (Винникот, 2008, 85)). На ранних стадиях человеческого развития в роли другого выступает мать, которая обеспечивает формирование Я ребёнка, вступая с ним в определённого рода коммуникацию. Конечный смысл этой коммуникации заключается в том, чтобы постепенно подготавливать индивида (ребёнка) к самостоятельному существованию в мире. Этот процесс предполагает постепенный переход от полного следования запросам ребёнка, когда мать как бы составляет с ним неразрывное целое, поддерживая в нём иллюзию некой «первичной магии», к постепенному дистанцированию от этих запросов и приучению его к определённой

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автономии. Поэтому на раннем этапе этого процесса мать должна «активно приспосабливаться к потребностям ребёнка», а затем постепенно ослаблять это приспособление «в соответствии с растущей способностью ребёнка отвечать на недостаток адаптации и его толерантностью к фрустрации» (Винникот, 2008, 23). Для того чтобы адаптация ребёнка совершалась успешно (и не происходило травматических для его психики событий), крайне важно поддерживать отношения доверия между ним и его матерью. Именно здесь в игру вступают «переходные объекты» (второго порядка), которые отдаляют момент фрустрации, наступающий в том случае, если мать по тем или иным причинам вынуждена на какое-то время оставить ребёнка. Таким образом, благодаря переходным объектам (таким, например, как «край одеяла», заменяющий ему материнскую грудь), младенцу удаётся замедлить процесс диссоциации, происходящий между ним и матерью в случае её длительного отсутствия. Однако, самое главное, состоит здесь в том, что появление таких переходных объектов свидетельствует об образовании первичной структуры воображаемого у младенца и формировании у него способности преодолевать травматические ситуации за счёт компенсаторной силы образа, которая разовьётся у него в полной мере уже во взрослом возрасте. Поддержание непрерывных и устойчивых отношений с матерью важно по той причине, что именно в них происходит формирование первичной «самости» ребёнка, которая станет основой будущей его личности. Очевидно, для Винникота (как и для самого Ришира) исходным является предположение, что самость формируется под взглядом другого. Развивая лакановский концепт стадии зеркала, Винникотт утверждает, что лицо матери выполняет ту же идентификационную функцию, что и зеркало, но на более раннем этапе развития ребёнка. В сущности, сам зеркальный образ — всего лишь компенсаторный феномен, призванный заменить лицо матери в её отсутствие. «Что видит ребёнок, когда он или она смотрит на лицо мамы? Я предполагаю, что в обычной ситуации ребёнок видит там самого себя или саму себя. Другими словами, когда мама смотрит на младенца, то, как она сама выглядит, имеет прямое отношение к тому, что она сама видит» (Винникот, 2008, 172). Таким образом, фантазийно-аффективный контакт с матерью выступает в качестве некого трансцендентального условия формирования первичной самости. Кроме того, опыт материнского взгляда, переживаемый младенцем, непосредственно

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отсылает нас к проблеме «феномена как не более, чем феномена», поскольку речь в данном случае идёт об опыте «невербализированного и невербализуемого». Ришир сближает этот первичный опыт с опытом восприятия произведения искусства, в частности, восприятия игры актёра, называя такое восприятие «неинтенциональным», поскольку, благодаря этой игре, в силу эмпатии, происходит идентификация с тем безóбразным (или бесформенным), которое представляет своей игрой актёр (например, с персонажем драмы). Актёр, посредством своего тела, которое выступает здесь в качестве «переходного объекта», делает близким «далёкое», несуществующего персонажа, организуя опыт, сходный с опытом лица у Левинаса. Поэтому можно сказать, что бесформенное — это не только элемент образа, представляемое им ничто, его квази-онтологическая глубина и размытость (фикция как чистая фантазия, образ-сюжет, а не соответствующая ей имагинативная материя, образ-объект), но и определённое состояние реципиента: состояние абсолютной пассивности, погружения в образ. И, очевидно, это также состояние младенца в момент его первичной идентификации с матерью. Таким образом, эстетический опыт1 можно рассматривать как регрессию к этому первичному («допредикативному») состоянию, которое противоположно состоянию активной, «мужской» идентификации (соответствующей символическому учреждению у Ришира). Однако это первичное состояние, в отличие от отчасти сходного с ним il y a Левинаса, является также состоянием свободы свободной игры без правил, в котором индивид не воспринимает какой-то объект, а грезит им, придавая ему при этом те или иные смыслы. В силу этого, «переходный объект» не имеет устойчивой онтологии, скорее, он появляется здесь в качестве некой мерцающей пустоты, которая всегда остаётся незаполненной. Иначе говоря, «объект» предстаёт перед нами не в своей объектности, а как некая «безóбразная вещественность», трансцендентальное лоно, «невидимое» Мерло-Понти, как всего лишь момент феноменализирующей саму себя феноменальности. Перцептивная фантазия как «поэтический элемент» «изображает» безóбразное, не изображая ничего. Более того, это безóбразное вообще не является чем-то представленным. Скорее, это оно 1

Субъектом этого опыта будет всегда пассивный субъект, т. е. субъект, лишённый своего интенционального центра и своего места (интериорности), а следовательно, не обладающий чётким разделением с другим.

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смотрит на нас, внимает нам, «поверхностно внимающим ему». Перед нами, таким образом, то, что Ришир называет онтическим симулякром: мерцание переходного объекта и безóбразного в транзитивном поле неинтенционального опыта. Поэтому поэтический элемент — это то, что никогда не актуализируется (объективируется), оставаясь всегда «виртуальным». Иначе говоря, поэтический элемент заключает в себе лишь «наживку смысла в его обрывке», но не сам смысл. Однако это не означает, что поэтический элемент феноменологически более беден, чем, например, логическое понятие. Напротив, согласно Риширу, он не может быть «просто-напросто» переведён в логическое измерение именно в силу своей феноменологической избыточности. Иными словами, относясь скорее к некой фантазийно-аффективной феноменальной сфере, нежели к сфере структурной лингвистики, он говорит нам настолько много, что мы просто не в состоянии редуцировать его к каким-то логическим структурам. Тем не менее, это не мешает ему стимулировать наши интерпретации, получая благодаря этому определённое, пусть и феноменологически несколько обедняющее его, завершение в «логическом». ГЛОССА РИЙ Bildobjekt — образный предмет Bildsujet — предмет образа Einfühlung — вчувствование fungieren — действовать fühlen — ощупывать, ощущать Leib — живая телесность, тело как интенциональный центр Leibhaftigkeit — воплощение Leibkörper — тело как часть объективной реальности Perzeption — восприятие perzeptive Phantasie — перцептивная фантазия Phantasieleib — фантазийное тело Phantasieleiblichkeit — фантазийная телесность Realität — реальность Sache — вещь

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Sachlichkeit — вещность Seinssetzung —бытийное полагание Schein-Perzeption — мнимое, кажущееся восприятие Stiftung — учреждение Umwelt — окружающий мир Wahrnehmung — различение, восприятие Wesen — сущность l’aire transitionnelle — переходное поле les amorces de sens — зачатки смысла l’élément poétique — поэтический элемент la figurabilité — образность le «giron» transcendantal — трансцендентальное «лоно» l’infigurable — безóбразное, бесформенное les lambeaux de sens — обрывки смысла la langue — язык (как система) le langage — речевая деятельность la phantasia (-affection) — фантазия (-аффектация) les phantasiai d’autrui — фантазии другого le rythme schématique — схематический ритм les «sièges» de la chôra — «обитель/пристанище» хоры Перевод статьи М. Ришира выполнен по следующему изданию: Richir M. (2008). Phénoménologie de l’élément poétique. Studia Phaenomenologica, VIII, 177-186. R EFER ENCES Forestier, F. (2014). La phénomenologie génétique de Marc Richir. New York, NY: Springer. Richir, M. (1987). Phénomènes, temps et êtres I - Ontologie et phénoménologie. Grenoble: Jérôme Millon. Richir, M. (1988). Phénoménologie et institution symbolique. Grenoble: Jérôme Millon. Vinnikott, D. (2008). Igra i real’nost’ [Game and Reality]. Moscow: Institute for Humanities Research Publ. (in Russian).

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HORIZON 5 (1) 2016 : II. Translations & Commentaries : M. Richir : Trans. by R. Sokolov, ed. by G. Chernavin : 281–298 ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ • STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY • STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE • ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES

doi: 10.18199/2226-5260-2016-5-1-281-298

МАРК РИШИР ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЯ ПОЭТИЧЕСКОГО ЭЛЕМЕНТА1 РОМАН СОКОЛОВ (пер. с фр.) Кандидат философских наук, доцент кафедры Общеобразовательных дисциплин, Чувашская государственная сельскохозяйственная академия, 428003, Чебоксары, Россия. E-mail: [email protected]

ГЕОРГИЙ ЧЕРНАВИН (ред.) PhD, доцент, Национальный Исследовательский Университет — Высшая Школа Экономики, 105066 Москва, Россия. E-mail: [email protected]

MARC RIСHIR PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE POETIC ELEMENT ROMAN SOKOLOV (trans.) PhD, associate professor, Department of General Education Disciplines, Chuvash State Agricultural Academy, 428003 Cheboksary Russia. E-mail: [email protected]

GEORGY CHERNAVIN (ed.) PhD, Assistant Professor, National Research University – Higher School of Economics, 105066 Moscow, Russia. E-mail: [email protected]

1

Этот очерк подводит итог текущей работе, предварительно названной нами «Феноменологические фрагменты о языке» (Richir, 2008).

© ROMAN SOKOLOV, TRANS., 2016 © GEORGY CHERNAVIN, ED., 2016

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Термин «перцептивная» φαντασία (perzeptive Phantasie), введённый Гуссерлем в тексте №18 XXIII тома Гуссерлианы, обозначает тот особый тип φαντασίαι, в которых присутствует «перцепция» (Perzeption) 2 чегото такого, что находится по ту сторону (или за пределами) как реального, так и фиктивного. «Перцепция» выходит за рамки как воспринимаемого в восприятии (Wahrnehmung), так и интенционального объекта воображения, возникающего в том случае, когда есть наглядное изображение воображаемого объекта, «перцептивная» видимость, некий образ-объект, Bildobjekt, который в действительности является симулякром. Типичный пример этого — театральный персонаж, которого «воплощает» актёр. В самом деле, хотя роль играет актёр, фантазийно «перципированным» на сцене, в неком ином театральном «пространстве» оказывается именно Ричард III. [Персонаж находится] по ту сторону восприятия (Wahrnehmung) тела актёра и произносимых им слов, и даже по ту сторону, пробуждающего наше воображение «перцептивного» облика героя, который, казалось бы, зависит от актёра. Весь талант актёра состоит в том, чтобы своей игрой (жестами, мимикой, речью — тем, что реально происходит с его живым телом, Leibkörper) перенести зрителей в иное театральное «пространство», в вымысел или театральную иллюзию. Реальная сцена (с её декорациями) и реальный актёр (с его реальным телом и реальными костюмами) не рассеиваются в воображаемом. Само это реальное, перейдя в φαντασία, превращается в вымысел реального, изобразительное содержание которого то же, что и в восприятии, но оно «воспринимается» и в φαντασία, которая ирреализует и нейтрализует его. Иначе говоря, так «перципированное» «реальное» находится в бесконечном переходном положении между реальностью, которая могла бы отменить театральное представление, и «фантастическим» (а не воображаемым).3 2

Далее мы будем переводить «Perzpetion» как «perception» с кавычками (которые также указывают на производное «perzeptiv») и Wahrnehmung как perception без кавычек. 3 Ришир исходит из гуссерлевского противопоставления фантазии и воображения, которое у самого Гуссерля не было вполне прояснённым. Французский философ рассматривает воображение как представление объекта посредством его образа. Иными словами, он видит в воображении «репрезентативный акт». Напротив, фантазия у него не имеет ничего общего с репрезентацией. Более того, в отличие от имагинативного акта, акт фантазии даже не является интенциональным. Он понимается

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«Реальное» схватывается в «фантастическом», т.е. оно в нем «воспринято», заставляет его участвовать в представлении. Изображение «реального» тем самым присутствует и в «перцептивной» φαντασία, как абстрактная часть конкретного целого, конституированного «перцептивной» φαντασία. Парадоксально, что другой абстрактной частью будет «перцепция» безóбразного (в театре — воплощаемый актёром герой). Поэтому, поскольку «реальное» находится в переходном положении между «реальностью» и «фантастикой», его можно назвать переходным (transitionnel) (в терминах Винникота). Таким образом, талант актёра заключается в том, чтобы самоустраниться перед лицом своего персонажа или в нем, т. е. в том, чтобы путем [актёрской] игры, самому стать переходным. Иначе говоря, он по-настоящему играет свою роль не тогда, когда «подражает» (mimétise) воображаемому представлению или зеркально отражает сложившееся у него представление о персонаже. Иначе это было бы чем-то вроде механического удвоения в рамках окружающего мира, Umwelt, выступающего лишь «обрамлением»; но в созерцании представленного «образа», как заметил ещё Дидро, герой отсутствует. Актёр по-настоящему играет только если «чувствует» своего героя, т. е. если «совершает», прежде всего для себя, это парадоксальное вчувствование (Einfühlung) в персонаж, не существующий вне театрального представления. Он по-настоящему играет, только если самоустраняется (устраняет то, каков он для себя как Leibkörper, тело, и как Leibhaftigkeit, аффективность — в этом и состоит работа над ролью) в пользу этого Einfühlung настолько, что «передаёт» зрителям это Einfühlung. Eсли зрители вовлечены в спектакль, то они осуществляют Einfühlung в отношении Einfühlung осуществленного актёром. Поэтому можно согласиться с тем, что Einfühlung в другого в действительности — это не восприятие (вещи) и не воображение (объекта). Оно совершается в φαντασία и благодаря ей (что заставляет нас говорить о фантазийном теле, Phantasieleib); более того, это «перцептивная» φαντασία близости (intimité) другого, которую нельзя образно представить в (перцептивном и/

здесь как «прото-онтологический» и «архитектонический» процесс. (Подробнее см.: Detisova, 2012). — Прим. пер.

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или имагинативном) созерцании. В случае театра, если актёр самоустраняется, то он становится посредником вчувствования (Einfühlung) в воплощённого им персонажа. Переход (le passage), который происходит путем такого самоустранения в опосредовании, — это в некотором роде переход целостной структуры «перцептивной» φαντασία в переходном поле (l’aire transitionnelle), в смысле Винникота.4 Таким образом, в этой перспективе, театральная ситуация имеет следующий смысл: актёр «перципирует» в φαντασία своего персонажа, не имеющего образа в каком бы то ни было созерцании. Актерской игрой — жестами, мимикой, интонациями речи — он вызывает эту «перцептивную» φαντασία, создаёт её зрителей. Актёр достигает этого благодаря своему живому телу (Leibkörper), которое становится «фантастическим» или, точнее, переходным телом, благодаря игре его живой телесности (Leiblichkeit) и его фантазийной телесности (Phantasieleiblichkeit). Зрители «воспринимают» Ричарда III в φαντασία на сцене, при этом сама сцена уже «перципирована» в φαντασία. К этому надо добавить, что такая безóбразность (в созерцании) близости персонажа, т.е., если хотите, невидимость этого последнего, не имеет ничего общего с классической безóбразностью умопостигаемого: персонаж не является идеальностью или идеей в платоновском смысле. Вот почему, чтобы избежать всякой двусмысленности, мы говорим здесь о безóбразности, уточняя, что она также «перципирована» в φαντασία. Случай театра можно легко распространить на всё поле эстетики, включив в него живопись, музыку, поэзию и роман. В каждом случае можно найти некий «объект», который воспринимается как переходный, и некое безóбразное, «перципированное» в той же самой «перцептивной» φαντασία. Что касается переходного «объекта», то в случае живописи это воображаемый образсюжет, Bildsujet (который, вероятно, сам по себе может быть нефигуративным), опирающийся на образ-объект, Bildobjekt, который, в свою очередь, опирается

4

Под «переходным полем» Винникотт понимает «иллюзорное» пространство первичной коммуникации, в котором осуществляется связь не просто между младенцем и его матерью, но, прежде всего, между «внутренней» и «внешней» реальностями, и формируется способность субъекта конституировать себя (свою телесность) в двойной перспективе: своего собственного внутреннего опыта и фантазийно «воспринятого» опыта другого, в зеркале которого он узнаёт самого себя. — Прим. пер.

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на физический носитель. В случае музыки это издаваемые инструментами звуки или группы звуков (которые eo ipso и исполняют); в романе это Bildsujets, весьма неполно изображенные в описаниях и ситуациях. Наконец, в случае поэзии это более-менее образные (figuratifs) элементы означаемого, которые приводятся в действие словами и игрой слов. Отсюда в каждом случае следует, что безóбразный компонент «перцептивной» φαντασία относительно безразличен к изображению (la figuration) взятого в φαντασία переходного «объекта». Этот «объект» укоренён не только в (зависящей от художника) фактуре произведения, но и в качестве его созерцания, слушания или чтения, а также — в качестве его исполнения (если, как в данном случае, оно имеет место). Эти два качества, по Винникотту, имеют отношение к свободе «свободной игры» (без заранее установленных правил); такая игра разыгрывается всякий раз, как мы оказываемся в переходном поле. И, как мы видели, переходное не обязательно совпадает с «перципированным» в φαντασία реальным, оно может соскальзывать и к воображаемым «представлениям». Вот почему переход не имеет конца, он не ограничен заданными пределами некого интервала. Основной парадокс «перцептивной» φαντασία состоит, таким образом, в том, что через относительно тонкую или грубую образность (la figurabilité) переходного «объекта», «перципированного» в φαντασία, через посредничество образности особо рода, также «воспринимается» нечто радикально безóбразное, лишенное всякого перцептивного или имагинативного созерцания и конституирующее своего рода переходную «глубину» и «размытость» «объекта». (При этом, в случае φαντασία ещё нельзя говорить собственно о воображаемом объекте, Bildsujet как таковом, т.  е. строго намеченном в определённой интенциональности, которая скрывала бы безóбразное и упраздняла переходное.) И, если вернуться к вчувствованию (Einfühlung), то со взглядом другого (пробуждающим мой взгляд) дело обстоит так же. Через образность лица другого и живую телесность (la Leibkörperlichkeit) другого я могу «почувствовать» (fühlen) внутренне. Но [это возможно] лишь потому, что посредником выступает зазор (в хоре, в смысле платоновского Тимея) как пространственное и временное ничто, трепещущая и живая «сердцевина» другого. Я могу «ощутить» себя другим по отношению к этому другому в преобразовании этого зазора в темпорализующий (в языке)

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и спациализирующий5 зазор (оба зазора абсолютны, будучи «обителью»6 хоры). В сущности, я «перципирую» в φαντασία в «сердцевине» живого взгляда другого также и φαντασίαι другого (les phantasiai d’autrui). Это происходит при посредничестве тех аффицирований, которые я испытываю как изменяющиеся в своих нескончаемых поворотах; среди них кружатся в танце виртуально образные «перцептивные» φαντασίαι (именно в качестве тех, что я «воспринимаю» в φαντασία). Их, пусть и в совершенно негативном смысле, упоминал в Йенской реальной философии (1805) Гегель.7 В терминах Винникотта, общая ситуация «перцептивной» φαντασία — это ситуация переходного «объекта» (в φαντασία в этой роли выступает образная сторона «перцептивной» φαντασία) в квази-онейрическом8 поле. Такое переходное поле — это поле игры без 5

Речь здесь идёт об особой модификации опыта телесности, который понимается у Ришира не просто в смысле гуссерлевского «kinaesthesis», связанного с проблемой темпоральности сознания и пассивного синтеза, но и исходя из примата фантазии и аффективности над восприятием и ощущением. Отсюда его отсылки к платоновской хоре (рассматриваемой им как некий «носитель пространственности», «вместилище без формы», которое, однако, в отличие от хоры Платона обладает собственным генезисом) и ко взгляду другого как условиям первичной телесной самоидентификации. И то, и другое выступает здесь в качестве различных модусов «бесформенного» (безóбразного), к которым, помимо «фантазийной телесности» и «другого, который смотрит на нас», относится также сам «фантазийный объект», предстающий перед нами в перцептивной фантазии в качестве «реального симулякра» (поскольку он, так сказать, располагается по ту сторону конкретного имагинативного содержания образа). На стадии первичной, внеязыковой феноменальности ришировский «индивид» как бы слит с этим «бесформенным», образуя, благодаря «сгущению аффективности, происходящей путём кинестетического напряжения и расслабления», «трансцендентальное лоно», но по мере феноменализации посредством языковой способности формируется зазор внутри этого первоначального единства, подготавливая его последующую поляризацию фигурами «меня самого» и «другого». — Прим. пер. 6 «В-третьих, есть еще один род, а именно пространство (χώρα): оно вечно, не приемлет разрушения, дарует обитель (ἕδρα) всему роду, но само воспринимается вне ощущения, посредством некоего незаконного умозаключения, и поверить в него почти невозможно. Мы видим его как бы в грезах…» (Platon, 1994, Timei 52a8-b2). Вслед за Платоном Ришир говорит о хоре как об обители (Тимей 52b1) или пристанище (Тимей 53a2), подразумевая при этом «абсолютное здесь» Гуссерля, но понимает его, очевидно, лишь как один из полюсов первичного (допредикативного) опыта сознания, который «перемигивается» с фантазийным и бесформенным «трансцендентальным лоном», образованным «совокупностью» (Флориан Форестье) младенца и его матери. При этом «трансцендентальное лоно» выступает как «повёрнутое» абсолютное здесь. — Прим. пер. 7 См.: Hegel, Jenenser Realphilosophie, Subjektiver Geist, a. Intelligenz, J. Hoffmeister (Hrsg.), Meiner, Philosophische Bibliothek, Bd. 67, pp. 180 – 181 (Hegel, 1967). 8 В психоанализе Винникотта «переходное поле» — это пространство, в котором происходит формирование символического, постепенно отделяющегося от реального. Однако в своём первоначальном смысле конституирующийся в этом поле «переходный объект» совмещает в себе (без их различения) черты фантастического и фактического, внутреннего и внешнего, творческого и воспринимаемого, субъективного и объективного. Очевидно, именно поэтому Ришир называет такое поле «квазионейрическим». — Прим. пер.

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правил, на котором разыгрывается трансцендентальная интерфактичность.9 Интерфактичность, в крайнем случае, может быть чисто виртуальной,10 что не мешает ей всегда функционировать, а значит — составлять один из компонентов радикально безóбразного. Итак, мы видим, что «перцептивная» φαντασία в её образности подразумевает «воспринятое» в ней радикально безóбразное совсем не интенциональным образом, ведь иначе это было бы воображение или восприятие образного объекта или же отсылка «в пустоту». Разумеется, в этой парадоксальной структуре нет ничего позиционального11 или квази-позиционального (пригодного для бытийного полагания без преобразования), а значит, здесь в принципе нет ничего пригодного для онтологии; впрочем, отсюда вовсе не следует, что это «ничего» ни на что не влияет. На деле следствия этой ситуации сложны и многообразны. Те следствия, которые нам хотелось бы извлечь отсюда в первую очередь, касаются речевой деятельности (langage). В нашем случае это следствие касается мышления, поскольку мы принимаем, что всякое мышление — это мышление в рамках речевой деятельности и что язык (langue), со всеми его правилами и способами выражения, есть лишь малая часть того, что подчинено символическому учреждению. Поэтому нам надо, оттачивая наше описание, вернуться к тому, с чего мы начали.

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Трансцендентальная интерфактичность — один из ключевых концептов феноменологии Ришира: некое первичное, доинтенциональное отношение, устанавливающееся между взглядом матери, идентифицируемым как одно из «абсолютных здесь», и «взглядом младенца» как другим «абсолютным здесь». Это отношение конституируется на уровне «архаических здесь» Leiblichkeit, а затем переносится «во внешние друг для друга места» (Форестье), благодаря чему происходит переход от доинтенциональной трансцендентальной интерфактичности к интенциональной трансцендентальной субъективности. — Прим. пер. 10 Под виртуальным мы, почти как в квантовой механике, понимаем то, что, не будучи ни актуальным, ни связанным с актуальным при посредстве потенциального, оказывает не меньшее влияние на реальную действительность в феноменологическом поле. Поэтому виртуальное существует в смысле «специфического» сверхвозможного, заставляя трепетать структуры актуальности, когда виртуальное «функционирует» (fungiert в словаре Гуссерля). 11 В словаре Гуссерля это «относящееся к Seinssetzung», в словаре Сартра — тетическое, т. е. относящееся к интенциональному акту сознания, полагающего свой предмет в качестве имеющего какое-то отношение к бытию (существующего, несуществующего, присутствующего, отсутствующего, сомнительного, приостановленного и т. д.). Противоположностью тетического акта будет формальный акт, т. е. полагающий свой предмет безотносительно к бытию. — Прим. пер.

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*** «Перцепция» переходного «объекта» фактически представляет собой Schein-Perzeption, видимость «перцепции»; прежде всего «перципированной» здесь оказывается та вещь (Sache), которую этот «объект» неинтенционально подразумевает — в этом часть парадокса «перцептивной» φαντασία. Действительно, в «перцептивной» φαντασία нет «перцепции» переходного «объекта» как такового, иначе такая «перцепция» стала бы восприятием (Wahrnehmung), а «объект» утратил бы свой переходный статус. Именно это имеет в виду Гуссерль, когда (опять же, в Hua XXIII, текст №18) объясняет, что «перципировать» [в фантазии — значит] «отклоняться». Речь идёт о том, чтобы сразу «перцепировать» весьма особую фикцию (fictum), в которой объект, будучи образным (figuré), не является изображением (figuration) в Bildobjekt некого Bildsujet. Переходный объект — это не «образ», а особая фикция, которая не противостоит реальности (Realität). Мы, в свою очередь, можем сказать, что эта фикция происходит не из модификации в воображении (с помощью квази-полагания), а из модификации в φαντασία. Именно эта последняя «перцептивна», а это значит: с одной стороны, в изображении переходного «объекта» нет ничего интенционального или, в более узком смысле, семиотического; с другой стороны, эта модификация с самого начала предполагает приостановку [бытийной значимости] в «фикции» φαντασία. Модификации в φαντασία, безусловно, подготавливают доступ к безóбразному, неинтенционально его подразумевая, но при этом фактически самоустраняются перед ним. Это собственно и «перципируется» (что парадоксально). Речь при этом вовсе не идёт об онтологическом тождестве переходного «объекта» и того, к чему он открывает доступ. Кусочек ткани, который сосёт грудной младенец, неинтенционально подразумевает мать, и она, в некотором смысле, в нём «есть», но он не является ни матерью, ни её символическим представлением. И именно потому, что мать как таковая гораздо больше всего того, что может происходить в наглядном изображении, что ей присуща некая, сама по себе безóбразная, вещественность (Sachlichkeit) (то, что мы называем трансцендентальным «лоном»), она и может быть в каком-то смысле «обретена» в посасывании кусочка ткани. Итак, выделить переходный «объект» — значит выстроить или произвести

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(безусловно, необходимую) аналитическую абстракцию, которой, однако, нет в феноменологической вещественности-содержательности, Sachlichkeit «перцептивной» φαντασία. Разумеется, этот «объект» в ней есть, но не как реальный объект, поскольку он модифицирован в φαντασία посредством φαντασία, и таким образом, его изображение оказывается фиктивным, так как не изображает ничего, кроме, так сказать, безóбразного. «Перципированное» в φαντασία не явлено как Bildsujet и тем не менее оно там, но уже как безóбразное в φαντασία. Если хотите, оно «явлено» в «перцептивной» φαντασία как безóбразное. Можно даже предположить, что это так именно потому, что φαντασία, так сказать, соотносится прежде всего с безóбразным и, чтобы «стабилизировать» это отношение, она «избирает» некий «объект», который всегда уже «фиктивен» (хотя и действителен). Этот «объект» всегда уже в φαντασία, а значит, всегда уже модифицирован в φαντασία, и, тем не менее, ещё не «перешел» в воображаемое, не претерпел учреждения, Stiftung, в воображении. Между тем это предполагает некую самость и, как кажется, некий выбор. Первое предположение подразумевает скрытую работу феноменологического возвышенного «в действии», т.  е. сверхсгущение аффективности в некую самость. Затем оно, как минимум, подразумевает схематическое прерывание феноменологически слепого схематизма внеязыковых феноменов,12 а значит всегда переход от феноменологического схематизма к схематизму языковому, который есть не что иное, как его продолжение. Второе предположение не подразумевает ни бессознательного «выбора объекта» во фрейдовском смысле, ни свободы произвольного выбора. Открытость к безóбразному матери, при этом строго совпадает с «обнаружением» переходного «объекта». Именно в этом вся его ценность: в слиянии выделений и запахов младенца (примордиального) с выделениями (молока) и запахами матери (в слиянии, благодаря которому, «объект» неинтенционально подразумевает «трансцендентальное лоно»). (Не говоря уже о том, что между кусочком ткани и грудью матери действительно есть некоторые внешние, наблюдаемые сходства и они могут направлять выбор). Всё это происходит 12

См., например, наши Méditations phénoménologiques, Jérôme Millon, Coll. «Krisis», Grenoble, 1992 (Richir, 1992).

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в φαντασία, без полагания чего-либо в качестве (реального или воображаемого) сущего, хотя и в некой вещественности (une Sachlichkeit), которую разделяет и мать (если она не настолько безжалостна, чтобы отнять кусочек ткани у ребёнка). Разумеется, трансцендентальный генезис не останавливается лишь на этой, скорее архаической, стадии. Переходное и «перцептивная» φαντασία обладают бесконечной способностью к расширениям и метаморфозам. Прежде всего это касается обмена взглядами, впрочем, к этой теме мы будем обращаться лишь по мере необходимости. В данном случае, это более чем оправдано. Взгляд, пробуждаемый взглядом (матери), на деле уже находится там, в некой «перцептивной» φαντασία. Это так, благодаря безóбразному, влекущему в глубину зрачков (т.  е. — уже переходного «объекта»); оно кроется в глазах [матери], наблюдающих за пробуждением взгляда [младенца]. А значит, точно так же, в φαντασία «перципируется» безóбразное, влекущее в глубину зрачков, которые отныне «обретают жизнь», наблюдают и не кажутся слепыми. Глаза и физические очертания лица здесь «фиктивны», хотя они все ещё относятся к действительности, т. е. они с самого начала претерпевают модификацию в φαντασία. Это, конечно, касается того, что собственно и происходит при обмене взглядами, поскольку «физикализация» или объективация лица придаёт ему неподвижность. Объективация взгляда делает его подобным взгляду статуй, он становится слепым или пустым и, следовательно, исчезает. Так, мы можем подавить взгляд другого, заглянув ему «прямо в глаза»: не следя за его взглядом, а фокусируясь на его глазах. Такая ситуация, при всей своей необычности (она скорее парадоксальна), тем не менее парадигматична, поскольку выступает как матрица или элементарная ячейка всякого языка. Это ситуация, когда одна «перцептивная» φαντασία «перцепирует» иную «перцептивную» φαντασία. Понятно, что инаковость здесь взаимна — это инаковость двух абсолютных здесь в качестве двух «обителей» (живых тел, Leiber) хоры, т.е. для нас речь идет о живой телесности, Leiblichkeit (и Phantasieleiblichkeit). Под хорой мы понимаем здесь «ещё не» пространство, а, так сказать, схематизирующее и схематичное разрастание13 элементарной 13

Конституирование пространства как «системы мест или как внешней локализации» происходит параллельно учреждению Leibkorper (телу как интенциональному центру и, с другой стороны, как части

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ячейки, которую мы только что выделили. Также понятно, что это «разрастание» открыто для того, что мы называем трансцендентальной интерфактичностью, для потенциального (способного стать актуальным) или виртуального (обречённого воздействовать, не актуализируясь) множества абсолютных здесь. Всё это, равно как и переход от внеязыкового феноменологического схематизма к феноменологическому схематизму языка, ещё нужно будет объяснить. Допустим для простоты, что внеязыковой феноменологический схематизм предстаёт, так сказать, в своей высшей точке, как слепой схематизм φαντασίαιаффектаций,14 ритмизованных сгущениями и рассеяниями. Пока возьмем «статическую» перспективу и не будем говорить о схематическом прерывании, а значит и о возвышенном. Тогда мы будем исходить из того, что языковой схематизм состоит в том, чтобы схематическая связь φαντασία (-аффектации) с φαντασία (-аффектацией) также была сразу же и «перцептивной» связью (связью «перцептивной» φαντασία (-аффектации) с «перцептивной» φαντασία [-аффектацией]).15 По крайней мере, из разбора ситуации обмена взглядами, мы уже знаем, что «перцептивная» φαντασία может «перципировать» иное. Таким образом, остаётся понять, как эту ситуацию можно обобщить в языке. Предположим, что трансцендентальная интерфактичность — это виртуальное множество абсолютных здесь (а это, по большей части, так). Тогда всякая φαντασία исходит из внеязыкового схематизма; она становится «перцептивной», только когда её, с одной стороны, «перцепируют» в φαντασία, а с другой — когда её виртуально осваивают взглядом (таким взглядом, который «перцепировал» ту «перцептивную» φαντασία, в которой «перцепируется» эта φαντασία). Именно в этом состоит то, что мы называем «рефлексивностью» речевой деятельности. Речевая деятельность, будь она «одна», была бы лишена ясности, а значит, неотличима от внеязыкового схематизма. Поэтому здесь нужна самость, такая «объективного мира»), на этой же стадии (стадии чистого Leib) пространство как некая форма ещё не возникает. — Прим. пер. 14 То, что, с нашей точки зрения, всякая фантазия освоена (habitée) аффектацией, мы постарались показать в очерке: «К феноменологии архаических корней аффективности» («Pour une phénoménologie des racines archaïques de l’affectivité») в Annales de phénoménologie, 2004, n°3, pp. 155-200 (Richir, 2004, 155-200). 15 Мы заключаем здесь «аффектацию» в скобки, чтобы указать, что впредь будем опускать это слово, каждый раз его подразумевая.

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самость, которая создаёт смысл и, так сказать, «сопровождает» свою схематизацию. То есть нужно схематическое прерывание и хотя бы скрытое действие функционирующего возвышенного.16 Или же самость должна высвободиться в функционирующем возвышенном, чтобы «захватить» ту или иную φαντασία и освоить (habiter) её. Это нужно для того, чтобы в этом жилище (habitation) упомянутая φαντασία стала «перцептивной» для φαντασίαι, пронизанных схематизмом. Это также нужно и для того, чтобы в трансцендентальной интерфактичности эти, теперь уже «перципированные», φαντασία, в свою очередь, превратились в «перцептивные» φαντασία, подразумевающие безóбразное и (по крайней мере виртуально) иные самости. Проблема, при этом, состоит в том, что φαντασίαι, поставленным так же и в «перцептивные» отношения в φαντασία, нельзя придать вид объектов или даже образов. Они строго предобразны, т. е. подпадают под рубрику а priori неопределённого множества виртуальных изображений (виртуальных, а не потенциальных). Это так, потому что предобразность, которую мы именуем образностью для простоты, не несёт уже в себе их изображений, как и их потенциально возможных актуализаций. Или же это так потому, что эти образности a priori индифферентны к изображениям, способным их зафиксировать. Итак, образность φαντασίαι, в этом смысле, виртуальна, но, именно благодаря своей виртуальности,17 действенна. И это вполне соответствует тем 16

Опыт возвышенного отсылает у Ришира к гиперболической редукции, поскольку в ходе этого опыта, связанного с «дикими смыслами», обнаруживается нечто «изначальное», первородное в человеке. Обнаруживается глубинная аффективная самость, которая составляет одну из главных структур «феноменологического бессознательного». Ришир требует, чтобы в ходе феноменологической редукции мы вышли за пределы «человеческого» — к «внечеловеческому». Поэзия, по его мнению, не вполне справляется с этой задачей, поскольку всё ещё ориентируется на игру «человеческих страстей». Очевидно, под «внечеловеческим» здесь понимается божественное, но рассмотренное не столько в трансцендентном, сколько в трансцендентальном смысле. Возвышение существует на границе, оно является пограничным, т. е. тем, что связывает протоязыковое с языковым. — Прим. пер. 17 См., например, то, что говорит о лебеде как поэтическом «символе» Гуго фон Гофмансталь, ведущий речь о поэме Геббеля: «[эти лебеди] означают, но не высказывают того, что они означают. Все, что бы ты ни сказал, будет неверно. Они означают здесь не что иное, как самих себя: лебедей. Лебедей, но увиденных глазами поэзии, которая каждый предмет каждый раз видит впервые, которая каждый предмет окружает всеми тайнами своего бытия. Здесь — это величие царственного полета, бесшумное одиночество сияющего белого тела, кружащего по черной воде, печально, высокомерно; чудесная легенда о своем смертном часе... Увиденные такими глазами, звери становятся […] живыми таинственными шифрами, которыми Бог вписывает в мир неизреченные вещи. Счастлив поэт, которому также дано эти божественные шифры вплетать в свои письмена» (Gofmanstal’, 1995, 535). (М. Ришир цитирует французский перевод эссе Гофмансталя по изданию: Hofmannsthal H. von, «L’entretien sur les poèmes

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характеристикам φαντασία, которые были отмечены Гуссерлем: изменчивому характеру, прерывистости, текучести, молниеносности (blitzhaft) и сущностной мимолетности, затенённости или неясности, как если бы образность не оставила ни места, ни времени изображению. Поэтому данная проблема сопоставима с другой, не менее сложной: не будучи зафиксированной с помощью языковой схематизации, φαντασία, взятая «в перцепции» в другой φαντασία, кажется слишком эфемерной и изменчивой, чтобы играть роль переходного объекта, быть частью совокупного феномена «перцептивной» φαντασία. Нельзя решить эту проблему, если не допустить, что сама эта переходность виртуальна, т. е. что она действует, но сама по себе, так сказать, не реализуется. Подобным же образом, «перцептивная» φαντασία, взятая в «перцептивной» φαντασία, с одной стороны, подразумевает радикально безóбразное, благодаря своей виртуальной переходности. С другой стороны, вместе с этим безóбразным, она подразумевает и совершенно виртуальный взгляд на «перцептивную» φαντασία, который её «перцепирует» (совершенно виртуального другого трансцендентальной интерфактичности). В равной степени φαντασία подразумевает переходность от одной «перцептивной» φαντασία к другой, благодаря чему безóбразное входит в отношение с самим собой — так складывается смысл. И всё это таким образом, что схематический ритм «перцептивных» φαντασίαι, переходящий от одних к другим, оказывается чем-то вроде следа в зазоре темпорализующего ритма. Это ритм смысла, созидающего самого себя в «перипетиях» «перцептивных» φαντασίαι: в их поворотах и взаимных метаморфозах в протенциях и ретенциях смысла, движущегося к самому себе (а не к какому-то присутствию, которого там нет). В свою очередь, этот зазор можно понять лишь в свете того факта, что возвышенное, если оно функционирует, не только сгущает аффективность в сверхплотное ядро аффектаций, образующих самость, но и опустошает, помещая в неё хорисмос (χωρισμός),18 радикально «внешнюю» «пустоту». Эту пустоту

(1903)», in: Hofmannsthal H. von, Lettre de Lord Chandos et autres essais, trad. A. Kohn et J. Cl. Schneider, Paris, Gallimard, 1980, p. 108 (Hofmannsthal, 1980, 180). — Прим. пер.) 18 Под χωρισμός у Платона понимается онтологический разрыв или разделение между умопостигаемым миром форм (κόσμος νοήτος) и чувственно воспринимаемым миром явлений (κόσμος αισθητος). — Прим. пер.

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традиционно относят к умопостигаемым элементам; она не принадлежит ни хоре, ни тому или иному «пристанищу» (абсолютному здесь) хоры, ни месту (Leib), ни даже протяжённости.19 Пустота не принадлежит и образности; впрочем, это не значит, что она представляет собой умопостигаемое «место» безóбразного вообще, которое можно без остатка растворить в умопостигаемом (иначе мы имели бы дело с противоречием). Однако с этим радикальным зазором абсолютной трансценденции ещё нужно разобраться; он раскрывает глубину, демонстрируя некое (доступное пониманию) родство между смыслом, созидающим себя в языке, и умопостигаемым. Это — родство, а не тождество (каковым оно было для классической философии). Для такого родства, впрочем, характерно, что и языковой референт в равной степени не растворяется в умопостигаемом; он отличается, сохраняет зазор, не совпадает с языковым смыслом (между ними пролегает бездна). В самом деле, языковой референт a priori конституируется «тем, что» может принимать на себя смысл путем сцепления виртуально образных и виртуально переходных «перцептивных» φαντασίαι. С одной стороны, мы подразумеваем, что феноменологические «знаки» или обрывки смысла не могут смешиваться с ними. С другой стороны, сам смысл темпорализуется (-спациализуется) в промежуточной среде (подобной «среде семантической») между этим абсолютно внешним элементом умопостигаемого и тем, что по отношению к нему, проявляется как интимнейшее внутреннее. Это касается не только самости, но и трансцендентальной интерфактичности как, по меньшей мере, виртуального обмена взглядами («перцептивными» φαντασίαι). Подводя некоторые итоги: обрывки смысла уже относятся к смыслу, их подразумевают «перцептивные» φαντασία; всякий раз они оказываются носителями того, что можно было бы назвать зачатками смысла. 20 Поэтому, 19

Объяснение этих трудных моментов см. в наших Феноменологических фрагментах о времени и пространстве (Fragments phénoménologiques sur le temps et l’espace, éd. Jérôme Millon, Coll. Krisis, Grenoble, 2006) (Richir, 2006). 20 По поводу этих понятий см. наши Феноменологические размышления (Méditations phénoménologiques, op.cit.) (В данном тексте Ришир говорит о том, что смысл никогда не бывает дан отдельно, но всегда включён в некое смысловое множество, каждый из элементов которого находится в резонансе с другими его элементами. Поэтому «зачатки смысла», ещё до того, как они образовали складки, приводя в действие темпорализацию / спациализацию, не были совершенно формальными или совершенно пустыми, но представляли собой некую феноменологическую конкретность, которая возникает из «обрывков» и «отрезков» двойного мерцательного движения мышления и мысли. Таким образом, смысл для Ришира

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со всей архитектонической строгостью, следует различать обрывок смысла и зачаток смысла: зачатки связаны с множественными и виртуальными смыслами (находящихся между собой в отношениях сверхвозможности (transpossibles) и сверхстрастности (transpassibles)21), тогда как обрывки всегда уже относятся к возможностям того или иного уже намеченного (amorcé) смысла, т.  е. принадлежат ему. *** Это крайне парадоксальная ситуация — ситуация самого поэтического элемента, — и её можно обнаружить, например, в центре рилькеанской поэтики. Приведем в качестве «иллюстрации» следующий стих, взятый из поэмы под названием «Гонг»: «Klang, der, wie ein tieferes Ohr, uns, scheinbar Hörende, hört…» Т.е. буквально: «Звук, который, подобно более глубинному слуху, слушает нас, мнимо слушающих...» Это значит, что наше слушание в действительности представляет собой «перцептивную» φαντασία звука, ставшего переходным. Такой звук подразумевает более глубинный слух, он делает нас мнимыми слушателями; скорее это он внимает нам, безóбразное в нем вслушивается в нас. Таково движение, благодаря которому, «перцептивная» φαντασία становится движением иной, «перципирующей» её «перцептивной» φαντασία. В нём «перципирующая» самость φαντασία, уже взятая в «перцептивной» φαντασία, перенимается в безóбразном и рефлексивном характере речевой деятельности. В некотором смысле, благодаря такому выпадению самости как субъекта, именно безóбразное (у Рильке — дух) как бы «перципирует» себя. Так можно понять то, что Рильке называет поэтическим

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инхоативен, т. е. проходит в своём становлении различные «фазы». — Прим. пер.) См. Мальдине А. О сверхстрастности // Шолохова С.А., Ямпольская А.В. (Пост)феноменология: новая феноменология во Франции и за ее пределами, М.: Академический проект, 2014, C. 145-203 (Mal’dine, 2014, 145-203). — Прим. пер.

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переворотом (или обращением),22 где звук «становится» совершенно виртуальным (безóбразным) другим. Это позволяет иначе подойти к нашим проблемам. Поэтический переворот, который разрабатывает и разыгрывает Рильке, свойственен не языку (langue), а речевой деятельности (langage). Это так, поскольку он требует поэтической разработки (а не простой риторической игры), которая позволила бы проявиться парадоксу речевой деятельности. Поэтическая разработка делает явным прохождение (transit) смысла через схематическое сцепление «перцептивных» φαντασίαι, «перципирющих» друг друга в своего рода переходной переходности. Ведь вообще «перцептивная» φαντασία подразумевает модификацию в φαντασία как реального, так и воображаемого. Придание образа этой модификации (в созерцании) делается переходным: образное в ней становится «фиктивным» (даже если есть некий Bildsujet, его квази-полагание само собой «нейтрализуется»), не будучи при этом Bildobjekt (или становясь, в свою очередь, Bildobjekt) некого Bildsujet. Иначе говоря, здесь нет ничего иного, кроме связи переходности и безóбразного: переходность подразумевает безóбразное и даёт к нему доступ. Эта связь всякий раз «управляется» свободной игрой, которая странным образом лишена правил, эйдетической обоснованности, и вполне может не проявляться. Во всяком случае, мы встречаемся с этой связью в художественном творчестве и «рецепции», где именно скрытое безóбразное составляет эстетическое качество. Когда, при схематизации в речевой деятельности, возникает «перцептивная» φαντασία другой φαντασία, модификация в φαντασία больше не происходит, так как она уже случилась. Это значит, что φαντασία, взятая в «перцепции» и не претворённая в образ, может играть переходную роль, только если она виртуальна, через образность, 22

Возможно, здесь присутствует скрытая отсылка к «Письмам к молодому поэту» Рильке. Приведем в русском переводе фрагмент из письма Рильке от 19.02.1903, а в скобках хрестоматийный французский перевод. На себя обращают внимание переклички с терминологией Ришира (creuser, retournement etc.): «Углубитесь (rentrez) в себя. […] Ищите (creusez) в себе глубокого ответа. […] И если из этого обращения к себе самому (retournement vers l’intérieur), из этого погружения в свой собственный мир родятся стихи, то Вам даже в голову не придет спрашивать кого-нибудь, хорошие ли это стихи». Рильке Р.М. Новые стихотворения, Вторая часть, серия «Литературные памятники», М.: Наука 1977, С. 327-328 (Ril’ke, 1977, 327-328); Rilke R.M. Lettres à un jeune poète, Collection Poésie, Paris: Gallimard, 1993, p. 11 (Rilke, 1993, 11). — Прим. пер.

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остающуюся виртуальной, поскольку никакое изображение в принципе не может занять её место. Эта роль играется совершенно незаметно, она действует как своего рода «бессознательная игра». Это подтверждается, с одной стороны, тем, что φαντασία взятая в «перцептивной» φαντασία, вводит в игру безóбразное (со смыслом в зачатке в его же обрывке), которое бы иначе не явилось; с другой стороны, тем, что безóбразное (такова «ретенция» речевой деятельности) делает обратный ход к воспринимающей его «перцептивной» φαντασία, выявляя её безóбразное как носитель иного обрывка смысла, в котором, в свою очередь, скрывается самость. Дело в том, что самость производит не только смысл, но и себя: только так ей доступна рефлексивность, которая никогда просто-напросто не отождествляется с рефлексивностью самости в «моменте» возвышенного. Именно поэтому встаёт новый вопрос, который мы не сможем обсудить здесь: вопрос о модификации в φαντασία самости, сгущённой в возвышенном и рефлексирующей себя в «чувстве» возвышенного, в самость, создающую себя при созидании речевой деятельности. R EFER ENCES Detistova, A. S. (2012). Fenomenologicheskii proekt M. Rishira: fantaziya kak izmerenie fenomenologicheskogo [The Phenomenological Project of M. Richir: Fantasy as a Dimension of the Phenomenological]. Voprosy filosofii [Questions of Philosophy], 6, 139-148. (in Russian). Platon, (1994). Timei. In Sobranie sochinenii v 4-kh tomakh. T. 3. [Collected Works in 4 Volumes: Vol. 3.]. Moscow: Mysl’. (in Russian). Hegel G. F. W. (1967). Jenaer Realphilosophie. Vorlesungsmanuskripte zur Philosophie der Natur und des Geistes von 1805-1806. In Hoffmeister, J. (Ed.), Philosophische Bibliothek: Vol 67. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag. Richir, M. (1992). Méditations phénoménologiques. Grenoble: J. Millon. Richir, M. (2004). Pour une phénoménologie des racines archaïques de l’affectivité. Annales de phénoménologie, 3, 155-200. Richir, M. (2006). Fragments phénoménologiques sur le temps et l’espace. Grenoble: J. Millon.

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Richir, M. (2008). Fragments phénoménologiques sur le langage. Grenoble: J. Millon. Gofmanstal’, G. (1995). Razgovor o stikhakh [Conversation about Poems]. In Gofmanstal’ G. Izbrannoe: Dramy. Proza. Stikhotvoreniya [Selected Works: Drama. Prose. Poems]. Moscow: Art. (in Russian). Hofmannsthal, H. (1980). L’entretien sur les poèmes (1903). In Hofmannsthal H. von Lettre de Lord Chandos et autres essays. Paris: Gallimard. Mal’dine, A. (2014). O sverkhstrastnosti [On Overpassion]. In Sholokhova, S. A., & Yampol’skaya, A.V (Eds.), (Post)fenomenologiya: novaya fenomenologiya vo Frantsii i za ee predelami [(Post)phenomenology: New Phenomenology in France and Beyond] (145-203). Moscow: Academic Project. (in Russian). Ril’ke, R. M. (1977). Novye stikhotvoreniya. Seriya Literaturnye pamyatniki [New Poems. Literature Landmarks Series]. Moscow: Nauka. (in Russian). Rilke, R. M. (1993). Lettres à un jeune poète. In Collection Poésie. Paris: Gallimard.

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HORIZON 5 (1) 2016 : III. Discussions : W. Płotka : 299–304 ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ • STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY • STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE • ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES

III. ДИСКУССИИ

REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE «HORIZONS ­BEYOND BORDERS. TRADITIONS AND PERSPECTIVES OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE» (JUNE 17–19, 2015, BUDAPEST, HUNGARY) WITOLD PŁOTKA PhD in Philosophy, Assistant Professor at the Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism, University of Gdańsk, 80-309 Gdańsk, Poland. E-mail: [email protected] The report presents an overview of the International Conference on «Horizons Beyond Borders. Traditions and Perspectives of the Phenomenological Movement in Central and Eastern Europe» that held on June 17–19, 2015 at the Institute of Philosophy of the Research Centre for the Humanities of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Budapest, Hungary. The report sketches the mina idea of the event, and points out organizational background of the meeting. Moreover, the report summarizes the main theses of key lectures given by the guests, and it shows the structure of the conference schedule. Key words: History of the phenomenological movement, phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe, politics, practical involvement, Michalski, Tengelyi.

© WITOLD PŁOTKA, 2016

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ОБЗОР МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ КОНФЕРЕНЦИИ «ГОРИЗОНТЫ БЕЗ ГРАНИЦ. ТРАДИЦИИ И ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКОГО ДВИЖЕНИЯ В ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЙ И ВОСТОЧНОЙ ЕВРОПЕ» (17-19 ИЮНЯ 2015 Г, БУДАПЕШТ, ВЕНГРИЯ) ВИТОЛЬД ПЛОТКА PhD, доцент Института философии, социологии и журналистики, Гданьский университет, 80309 Гданьск, Польша. E-mail: [email protected] Сообщение представляет собой обзор международной конференции «Горизонты без границ. Традиции и перспективы феноменологического движения в центральной и восточной Европе», которая состоялась 17–19 июня 2015 года в Институте философии Центра гуманитарных исследований Венгерской академии наук, в Венгрии. Сообщение содержит набросок центральной идеи данного события, и подчеркивает организационный фон встречи. Более того, сообщение подытоживает основные тезисы ключевых лекций, прочитанных гостями, что повторяет структуру расписания конференции. Ключевые слова: История феноменологического движения, феноменология в Центральной и Восточной Европе, политика, практическое участие, Михальски, Тенгели.

In June 17–19, 2015 the Institute of Philosophy of the Research Centre for the Humanities of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, MTA) in Budapest (Hungary) organized the International Conference on «Horizons Beyond Borders. Traditions and Perspectives of the Phenomenological Movement in Central and Eastern Europe». The conference was supported by the National Cultural Fund of Hungary (NKA). At the very beginning, it is worth noting that the Director of the Host Institution was Ferenc Hörcher, the Chair of the Organizing Committee was Peter Andras Varga (Hungarian Academy of Sciences), and the Secretary—Witold Płotka (University of Gdańsk). The main ideas of the conference «Horizons Beyond Borders» were not only to elaborate a rich, though complex history of the phenomenological movement in Central and Eastern Europe, but also to explore the role that phenomenology plays in contemporary philosophy in this part of the world. The organizers emphasized that it has long been understood that the circumstances of the phenomenological movement in

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Central and Eastern Europe were dramatically defined by the politics of the times. The generally hostile conditions for doing philosophy affected phenomenology specifically, in so far as it was officially regarded as an idealistic, bourgeois, and regressive philosophy. As a result, many philosophers in the phenomenological tradition, including some direct students of Edmund Husserl, were accused of «idealism» labeled as «enemies of materialism» and prohibited from teaching. Despite these adversarial circumstances, however, many phenomenologists presented interesting and important interpretations of philosophical issues. Some did phenomenology while bracketing political commitments, whereas others were strongly engaged in political activities. One need only recall such leading figures as, for example, Alexandru Dragomir, Eugen Enyvvári, Václav Havel, Roman Ingarden, Karel Kosík, Krzysztof Michalski, Constantin Noica, Jan Patočka, Wilhelm Szilasi, Józef Tischner, Karol Wojtyła, and many others. The full potential of their phenomenology, both its hopeful promise and its tragic history, constitutes a rich heritage that continues to define even contemporary philosophical horizons. With this regard, the main aim of the conference was to present scholars with a first-time opportunity to discuss the wide and rich range of phenomenological ideas that have been discovered in Central and Eastern Europe. The ideas and aims of the conference have met a good response of a strong group of researchers. The final program consisted of 64 lectures by scholars from 16 countries. It has to be stressed, however, that a good quality of presented talks was guaranteed by a process of blind peer-review completed by the Members of the Scientific Advisory Board including: Ivan Blecha (Palacký University, Olomouc), Cristian Ciocan (Institute for Philosophy «Alexandru Dragomir,» Bucharest), Ion Copoeru (Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca), Andrzej Gniazdowski (Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw), Balázs M. Mezei (Pazmany Peter Catholic University, Budapest), Karel Novotný (Institute of Philosophy, Academy of the Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague), Csaba Olay (ELTE University, Budapest), Wojciech Starzyński (Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw), Jaroslava Vydrová (Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava), and Michal Zvarík (Trnava University, Trnava). The conference was open by a lecture given by Ferenc Hörcher (Hungarian Academy of Sciences / Catholic University of Hungary) who lectured on Beyond Censure in Politics and Philosophy: The Memorable Years of the Eighties in Central Europe. The

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paper concerned the question of relationships between phenomenology and politics in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary in the 1980s’. Just after the lecture, Nicolas de Warren (KU Leuven, Belgium) presented a first plenary lecture: Unbearable Lightness of Eternity. The lecture was presented in the plenary «In Memoriam Krzysztof Michalski» and it concerned mainly the last book of Michalski—The Flame of Eternity: An Interpretation of Nietzsche’s Thought. The topic was the meaning of eternity, also in the context of Patočka’s philosophy. During the first day of the conference Marci Shore (Yale University, New Haven, USA) presented a second key lecture during the plenary «In Memoriam Krzysztof Michalski». Her paper was entitled Either/Or: An Antidote to Hegel. The paper explored the problem of the connection between Being and thought. As it was argued, Michalski, just as Patočka, saw in phenomenology possibility to bridge the gap between the two elements. The second day of the conference was open by the plenary lecture given by Michael Gubser (James Madison University, USA). In his talk Gubser discussed the relationship between phenomenology and politics in the work of Dietrich von Hildebrand and Aurel Kolnai. He argued that a study of both philosophers can show that by reference to phenomenology, they were able to use this philosophy in their political activity. Moreover, both regarded ideology as an element that determines human spirit. The third, last day of the conference was open by the plenary lecture of George Heffernan (Merrimack College, North Andover, USA). His talk concerned Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl in His «Black Notebooks». The lecture was a critical analysis of Peter Trawny’s book Heidegger and the Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy, where Trawny claims that in his Black Notebooks Heidegger is guilty of «historical-ontological antiSemitism». In Heffernen’s view, Trawny’s thesis must be enlarged, since Heidegger’s charge of ontologism is directed also against Plato and Aristotle. This, however, seems to suggest that his discussion with ontologism can be regarded also outside his cultural anti-Semitism. Further Invited Speakers were (in an alphabetical order): Jakub Čapek (Faculty of Arts, Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic), Istvan M. Feher (Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary), Maija Kūle (University of Latvia / Latvian Academy of Sciences, Riga, Latvia), Ivan Landa (Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic), Balazs M. Mezei (Pazmany Peter Catholic University,

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Budapest, Hungary), Victor Molchanov (Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow, Russia), Csaba Olay (Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary), Robin D. Rollinger (Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic), Inga Römer (Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Germany), Wojciech Starzyński (Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw), Adam Takacs (Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary), Petr Urban (Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic), and Mihaly Vajda (Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary). The conference schedule was divided into 14 (mostly parallel) thematic sessions: two «László Tengelyi Memorial Sessions» that presented contributions on Tengelyi’s oeuvre and his impact on contemporary phenomenology, «Beyond Borders» that displayed broader perspective on the phenomenological movement by noticing interrelationships between countries, two «Beyond Politics» sessions that tried to define a complex relationship between phenomenologists and political issues, «Figures» that aimed at description of main philosophers that determined the phenomenological movement in Central and Eastern Europe, «Figures: Roots» that concerned the main figures of early phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe, «Figures: Ingarden and his Heritage» dedicated exclusively to Ingarden’s philosophy, and to continuations of his thought, two «Figures: Longitudinal Analyses» sessions that explored topics specific to related countries from Central and Eastern Europe, two «Figures: Religion» sessions that investigated phenomenological theories with regard to the question of religion and theology, and, last but not least, two «New Phenomenology from CEE» sessions that gathered talks, which presented original contributions of contemporary thinkers from Central and Eastern Europe to contemporary phenomenology. Though the conference schedule concerned a large part of a rich heritage of the phenomenological movement in Central and Eastern Europe, it may not be an exaggeration to say that there are still many topics to be explored. In this context, one can comprehend the «Horizons Beyond Borders» conference as an important, though first step towards a deeper understanding of contribution of Central and Eastern European philosophers to phenomenology. In any case, the conference was, as it seems, an excellent occasion to consolidate many groups of phenomenologists, and it enabled presentations of many well-known, but also forgotten phenomenological theories. As it is well known,

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Husserl understood the crisis of philosophy also with regard to the conferences where — he claimed — philosophers met, but not philosophies. I think that the «Horizons Beyond Borders» has allowed to meet philosophies themselves. With this regard, one can expect a continuation of the ideas that were instantiated by the «Horizons Beyond Borders» conference.

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HORIZON ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ Журнал «HORIZON. Феноменологические исследования» издается при участии Института философии Санкт-Петербургского государственного университета и Центрального европейского института философии при Карловом Университете и Институте философии Чешской академии наук в формате научного рецензируемого периодического издания с 2012 года. Журнал выходит два раза в год, все материалы проходят процедуру двойного «слепого» рецензирования и экспертного отбора. Издание рассчитано как на специалистов в области феноменологии и фило­софской герменевтики, так и на широкий круг читателей, имеющих интерес к ак­т уальной философской ситуации. Целью журнала является формирование и поддержание общего коммуника­т ивного пространства для исследователей, работающих сегодня в области феноме­нологии и близких к ней философских направлений. Журнал рассылается в ведущие университетские центры России и Европы. Структура журнала «HORIZON. Феноменологические исследования»: Первый раздел — «Исследования» — содержит в себе оригинальные автор­ские статьи. Передавая рукопись в журнал, автор передает исключительные автор­ские права на ее публикацию журналу. Все материалы публикуются на основании согласия автора с вышеуказанным условием. Журнал публикует только оригиналь­ные исследования и статьи. В данном разделе материалы публикуются не только на русском, но также и на английском, немецком и французском языках без перево­да. Редколлегия просит авторов, предоставляющих свои материалы на английском, немецком или французском языках присылать их уже в прошедшем корректировку у носителя соответствующего языка виде. Второй раздел — «Переводы и комментарии» — представляет вниманию читателя переводы фрагментов текстов классиков или наиболее видных современных представителей феноменологического направления, а также философских направлений, близких к нему. Тексты переводов, как правило, сопровождаются экзе­гетическими комментариями. Цель данного раздела — обсудить главным образом малознакомые широкому читателю архивные документы, а также исследования, очерки, эссе авторов, вошедших в галерею мировой науки и философии. Публи­ кация всех переводов в журнале «HORIZON. Феноменологические исследования» согласована с правообладателями. Третий раздел — «Дискуссии» — составлен из отчетов об уже прошедших научных мероприятиях, связанных с феноменологией, как в России, так и за ру­бежом, отзывов, полемических реплик, интервью и бесед. Редакционная коллегия журнала стремится к тому, чтобы подобные отчеты были не только информацион­ными, но и аналитическими, и ставит перед собой цель тем самым интенсифици­ровать коммуникацию представителей феноменологического направления совре­менной философии, создавать поле для актуальных дискуссий. Четвертый раздел — «Рецензии» — составляется из отзывов на публикации по феноменологической тематике, увидевшие свет в течение последних пятнадцати лет. Раздел рецензий призван послужить представлению достойных научного чита­тельского интереса книг, следуя общей цели журнала: совместными усилиями соз­давать единое мыслительное поле, поле живого общения и обмена новыми идеями. Пятый раздел — «События» — включает в себя анонсы предстоящих собы­тий, к которым относятся не только проведение научных мероприятий, семинаров, конференций, презентаций, но и выход в свет монографий, научных переводов, за­щита диссертаций и т.п., ссылки на интересные

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интернет-источники, справочную литературу. Редколлегия журнала «HORIZON. Феноменологические исследования» при­глашает заинтересованных авторов присылать свои материалы для рассмотрения их на предмет возможной публикации в издании. К сотрудничеству приглашаются как российские, так и зарубежные исследователи. Все материалы следует присылать на имя главного редактора журнала Артёменко Натальи Андреевны по адресу: [email protected] Обращаем внимание авторов, что редколлегия вправе отклонить рассмотре­ние рукописи к публикации, если она не оформлена согласно требованиям журна­ла. Допускается также ориентироваться авторам при оформлении своих работ на последний номер журнала. Авторы присылают свои материалы на электронный адрес главного редактора как приложение к электронному письму, состоящее из двух файлов: 1. Информация об авторе, включающая: – аффилиацию (ученую степень и звание (если есть)) – институциональную принадлежность / место работы – адрес места работы с указанием почтового индекса, города, страны – научные интересы – последние публикации – адрес электронной почты 2. Рукопись: Материалы присылать в формате MS-Word. К рассмотрению принимаются оригинальные статьи (до 2 п. л.), рецензии (до 0,5 п. л.), переводы (при наличии авторских прав), рецензии на издания, уви­девшие свет в течение последних пятнадцати лет, отчеты о научных мероприяти­я х, анонсы. Статьи должны сопровождаться аннотацией на английском и русском языках (около 250 слов) с указанием имени автора, названия и 7–9 ключевых слов.

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HORIZON STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY The journal «Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology» is published under the auspices of the Institute of Philosophy of St Petersburg State University and Central European Institute of Philosophy, affiliated with the Charles University and the Institute of Phi­losophy of the Czech Republic Academy of Sciences. It has been published as a peer-re­viewed scholarly periodical since 2012. The journal is published biannually; all the sub­mitted articles are subject to peer-review and selection by experts. The journal is intended both for specialists in phenomenology and hermeneutics and for all those interested in the current situation in philosophy. The goal of the journal is to provide and support a common space of communication for researchers working in the field of phenomenology and in related branches of study. The journal is distributed to the libraries, leading university and research centers of Europe and Russia. The structure of the journal «Horizon. Studies inPhenomenology»: The first section — «Research» — contains original articles. When submitting a manuscript, the author conveys the exclusive copyright thereof to the journal. All the materials are published provided that the author agrees with this condition. The journal only publishes original studies and articles. This section includes papers written in Rus­sian, English, German and French (without translation). Authors submitting their texts in languages other than Russian (unless they are native speakers) are asked to have them corrected by a native-speaker. The second section — «Translations and Commentaries» — presents extracts from classical texts translated into Russian as well as translations of texts written by contemporary scholars in phenomenology and related fields. Publication of translations is conditional on having completed the necessary copyright formalities; consent of copy­right holders is required. Translations are published in «Horizon. Studies in Phenome­nology» only if copyright holders’ permission is obtained. Texts are usually followed by exegetic comments. The goal of this section is to discuss archival documents unfamiliar to most readers and present studies and essays by renowned philosophers and scientists. The third section — «Discussions» — is composed of reports on recent events re­lated to phenomenology which took place in Russia or abroad. It also includes polemics, interviews and reports on conferences. These reviews are meant to be not only purely informational, but analytical as well. The objective of this section is to intensify commu­nication between contemporary phenomenologists and provide a space for discussions on relevant topics. The fourth section — «Book reviews» — comprises comments or critical opin­ions on books and monographs on phenomenological themes published within the last 15 years. This section is intended to present noteworthy books, in accordance with the general goal of the journal, which is to cooperate on creating a unified field of thought, communication and exchange of new ideas. The fifth section — «Events» — contains announcements of forthcoming events such as conferences, seminars, monographs, thesis defenses etc. and reference to web sources and reference materials. The Editorial Board of the journal «Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology» invites all those interested to submit their texts in the afore-mentioned languages. Both Russian and foreign researchers are invited to collaborate. The authors are invited to send their texts addressed to the Editor-in-chief Natalia Artemenko to the e-mail address: [email protected]

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We wish to bring to the attention of the authors that the Editorial Board may decline a manuscript if it does not conform to the format requirements of the journal. When for­matting their papers, the authors may consult the last issue of the journal for guidelines. All the relevant materials should be attached to your e-mail. The attachment should contain two separate files: 1. Information on the author, including: – scientific affiliation (degree; academic title, if any) – institutional affiliation or place of work – scientific interests – recent publications – e-mail address 2. the manuscript proper All the materials should be sent in the MS-Word format. The following materials are accepted for submission: original articles (up to 80 000 printed characters), reviews (up to 20 000 characters), translations (with copyrights), book-reviews on publications which appeared within the last 15 years, re­ports on scientific events, announces. Articles should be provided with an abstract in Eng­lish (250 words), with the author’s name, the title and 7–9 key words.

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HORIZON ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY 5 (1) 2016

Главный редактор Н. Артёменко

Компьютерная верстка О. Филиппов, А. Спиридонов

Технический редактор С. Никонова

Автор обложки Э. Патракеев

Редактор сайта В. Меньшиков

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